MAJ GEN. G.W. CULLUM.

U. S. ENGINEERS

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THE

REBELLION RECORD:

A Diary of American Events.

WITH

DOCUMENTS, NARRATIVES, ILLUSTRATIVE INCIDENTS, POETRY, ETC.

EDITED BY

FRANK MOORE,

AUTHOR OF "DIARY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION."

TENTH VOLUME.

WITH FOURTEEN PORTRAITS ON STEEL, AND VARIOUS MAPS AND DIAGRAMS.

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1867.

REBELLION RECORD.

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

Engd by A. H. Ritchie

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DOCUMENTS AND NARRATIVES.

Doc. 1.

MILITARY MEASURES OF CONGRESS.

No. 1. EMPLOYMENT OF VOLUNTEERS.

In pursuance of the Proclamation of the President, of the fifteenth of April, 1861, the Thirty-seventh Congress assembled on the fourth of July. On the sixth, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, agreeably to notice given on the first day of the session, introduced into the Senate the following bills and joint resolution:

A bill to authorize the employment of volunteers to aid in enforcing the laws and protecting public property;

A bill to increase the present military establishment of the United States;

A bill providing for the better organization of the military establishment;

A bill for the organization of a volunteer militia force, to be called the National Guard of the United States; and

A joint resolution to ratify and confirm certain acts of the President for the suppression of insurrection and rebellion.

These bills and this joint resolution were referred to the Committee on Military Affairs, consisting of Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, Mr. King of New-York, Mr. Baker, of Oregon, Mr. Lane, of Indiana, Mr. Lane, of Kansas, Mr. Rice, of Minnesota, and Mr. Latham, of California. Mr. Wilson also introduced a bill to promote the efficiency of the army, which was referred, on motion of Mr. Grimes, of Iowa, to a special committee of nine, consisting of Mr. Wilson, Mr. Hale, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Powell, Mr. Cowan, Mr. King, Mr. Kennedy, and Mr. Howe.

On the eighth of July, Mr. Wilson, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported back the bill to authorize the employment of volunteers, with amendments. The original bill proposed that the President be authorized to accept the services of volunteers in such numbers as he might deem necessary, and that the sum of four hundred millions of dollars be appropriated to carry the act into effect; that each regiment of infantry should have one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, one major, one adjutant, one paymaster, one quartermaster, one surgeon, and one assistant surgeon, one sergeant-major, one regimental quartermaster sergeant, one regimental commissary sergeant, one hospital steward, two principal musicians, and twenty-four musicians for a band; and should be composed of ten companies, each company to consist of one captain, one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, one first sergeant, four sergeants, eight corporals, two musicians, one wagoner, and from sixty-four to eighty-two privates; that these forces should be organized into divisions of three or more brigades each; and each division should have a major-general, each brigade should be composed of four or more regiments, and should have one brigadier-general; that the President should be authorized to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for the command of the forces provided for, a number of major-generals, not exceeding six, and a number of brigadier-generals, not exceeding eighteen; that the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates should, in all respects, be placed on the footing, as to pay and allowances, of similar corps of the regular army, and their allowances for clothing be three dollars and fifty cents per month;

That volunteers who might be wounded or otherwise disabled in the service, should be entitled to the benefits which might have been or might be conferred on persons disabled in the regular service; and the legal heirs of such as died or might be killed in service, in addition to all arrears of pay and allowances, should receive the sum of one hundred dollars;

That there should be allowed to each regiment, one chaplain, who must be a regular ordained minister of a Christian denomination, and who should receive the pay and allowances of a captain of cavalry;

That the general commanding a separate department, or a detached army, be authorized to appoint a military board or commission of not less than three nor more than five officers, whose duty it should be to examine the capacity, qualifications, propriety of conduct, and efficiency of any commissioned officer of volunteers within his department or army;

That whenever a regiment of volunteers should be mustered into the service, the colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major, adjutant, and quartermaster thereof, should each have the privilege of franking any letter from any person belonging, in any capacity, to such regiment, not weighing over two ounces.

On the tenth, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of the bill and the proposed amendments. The first amendment, authorizing the President to call out five hundred thousand men, and appropriating five hundred millions of dollars, was agreed to; but, on motion of Mr. Sherman, of Ohio, the appropriation was stricken out. On motion of Mr. Rice, of Minnesota, the ninth section was so amended as to give chaplains the compensation of army chaplains instead of captains of cavalry. Mr. Rice then moved to strike out the eleventh section, allowing officers of volunteers to frank soldiers' letters. He avowed his willingness to vote an allowance of money to each regiment to defray postage expenses, but he believed the authority to frank soldiers' letters would lead to great abuses. Mr. Wilson opposed the amendment. He had franked thousands of soldiers' letters, and had done so freely. Mr. Collamer, of Vermont, did not think it would add to the expenses of the Post-Office Department, and he was opposed to the amendment. Mr. Rice withdrew his motion to amend.

Mr. Nesmith, of Oregon, said he knew men to-day sweating under the epaulets of brigadiers and major-generals who could not pass a board of any intelligent army officers in the world, if they were applicants for the position of first lieutenant, and he moved to amend the fourth section by adding:

That the President might select the major-generals and brigadier-generals provided for in the act, from the line or staff of the regular army; and the officers so selected, should be permitted to retain their rank therein.

Mr. Wilson said the proposition was in harmony with the policy he had advocated. "There are," he said, "several officers in the army, of great distinction, who would make excellent major and brigadier-generals. I think, and have thought, that those men ought to be selected in preference to civilians, however eminent they may be in talent or character. I shall, therefore, vote for this amendment; and I think that if it be sustained, it will enable the President of the United States to appoint some major and brigadier-generals from officers in the regular army, reserving to them the places they now hold in the army at the end of the contest, and that the country will be benefited by such a selection."

Mr. Nesmith's amendment was agreed to.

Mr. Powell, of Kentucky, moved to strike out the provision giving the franking privilege, and insert an amendment abolishing the franking privilege altogether; but the motion was lost. Mr. Saulsbury, of Delaware, moved to strike out of the first section "five hundred thousand men," and insert "two hundred thousand men." "He was," he declared, "fearful the Union would not be preserved by the mode contemplated in this bill, and suggested in the message of the President." He would vote men enough to protect the Capitol, and defend the States from invasion, and he believed the force he proposed sufficient for that purpose. Mr. Foster, of Connecticut, thought "two hundred thousand men too many to make peace, and too few to make war." The amendment was defeated — yeas, five; nays, thirty-two. The bill passed the Senate.

On the eleventh, a message was sent to the House, on motion of Mr. Wilson, requesting the return of the bill. The House having returned it, the Senate, on the twelfth, reconsidered the vote on its passage. Mr. Wilson then moved to strike out the first section, and insert: "That the President be authorized to accept the services of volunteers, in such numbers, not exceeding five hundred thousand, as he may deem necessary for the purpose of repelling invasion, suppressing insurrection, enforcing the laws, and preserving and protecting the public property. The volunteers mustered into the service under this act, shall serve for the term of three years, unless sooner discharged by the President; but nothing in this section shall affect enlistments for a shorter period of volunteers already mustered into the service. Before receiving into service any number of volunteers exceeding those now called for and accepted, the President shall, from time to time, issue his proclamation stating the number desired, either as cavalry, infantry, or artillery, and the States from which they are to be furnished, having reference in any such requisition to the number then in service from the several States, and equalizing, as far as practicable, the number furnished by the several States according to the Federal population." And this amendment was agreed to. Mr. Wilson then moved to amend the fourth section by adding that "the Governors of the States furnishing volunteers under this act shall commission the field, staff, and company officers requisite for the said volunteers; but in cases where the said authorities refuse or omit to furnish volunteers at the call or on the proclamation of the President, and volunteers from such States offer their services under such call or proclamation, the President shall have power to accept such services, and to commission the proper field, staff, and company officers;" and it was agreed to. Mr. Wilson then moved to reconsider the vote by which chaplains were to receive the same compensation as chaplains in the army, instead of the compensation of captains of cavalry. In support of the motion, Mr. Wilson maintained that the faith of the nation was plighted to chaplains who came out with the regiments mustered into service. Mr. Collamer, Mr. King, Mr. Ten Eyck, and Mr. Browning supported the motion, and Mr. Sherman, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Howe opposed it; but the amendment was reconsidered—ayes, twenty-five; noes, eleven, and then rejected. The bill was then passed—yeas, thirty-five; nays, four. Breckenridge and Powell, of Kentucky, and Johnson and Polk, of Missouri, voting against it.

In the House of Representatives, Mr. Blair, of Missouri, on the eleventh of July, reported from the Committee on Military Affairs, a bill to authorize the employment of volunteers, it be-

ing, with some slight modifications, the bill introduced into the Senate on the sixth by Mr. Wilson. On the thirteenth, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole for its consideration, Mr. Dawes, of Massachusetts, in the chair. Mr. Allen, of Ohio, moved to strike out "three years" and insert "one year," as the term of service of the volunteers. He thought that, "if, at the end of one year, the triumph of the Government over the rebellion was a doubtful question, some change of policy might be required of the Government." The amendment was opposed by Mr. Blair, and rejected. Mr. Blair moved to strike out five hundred million dollars, as specific appropriations for the support of the army had already passed the House. Mr. Cox, of Ohio, desired to know why it was proposed to increase the appropriation from four hundred million dollars, recommended by the President, to five hundred million dollars. Mr. Blair replied that it was the desire of the Committee "to strengthen the Government in putting down this unrighteous rebellion." Mr. Burnett, of Kentucky, desired to know if the sums appropriated were necessary to maintain the army proposed to be raised for a year. Mr. Blair believed it would not. Mr. McClernand, of Illinois moved to amend the bill by reducing the sum one hundred million dollars. Mr. McKnight, of Pennsylvania, desired to modify the amendment so as to reduce the number of men from "five hundred thousand" to "four hundred thousand." Mr. Pendleton, of Ohio, opposed the amendment proposed by Mr. McKnight to the amendment proposed by Mr. McClernand. Mr. Diven, of New-York, declared his readiness to vote a million of men if half a million were not sufficient. Mr. McClernand was willing to give the amount of men and money required by the Executive responsible for the use of men and money. Mr. Moorhead, of Pennsylvania, was opposed to the proposition; he was for five hundred thousand men, five hundred millions dollars. Mr. Harding, of Kentucky, declared that Kentucky would give men and money to defend the Constitution, but he would "not vote one dollar for subjugation." Mr. Hickman of Pennsylvania, said there could be "no loyalty without submission, and these men were to be taught by a strong hand that they are to pay the same regard to the Constitution and the laws as commoner people are forced to render to them. These men believe that they have a right to declare themselves out of the pale of legitimate government whenever it shall suit their interests to do so, or whenever it shall be in accordance with the lead of their passions to do so. We, the people of the North, of the loyal States, and all who act with the North, intend to educate these men in a different doctrine; and if we shall eventually be forced to bring them into subjection—abject subjection to the Constitution of the United States—it will be their fault and not ours." Mr. Campbell, of Pennsylvania, would give the Executive all the power—even a superabundant power—in this great crisis of the nation's fate. "He would darken the ocean with our fleets, and cover the land with our armies." Mr. Cox, of Ohio, would vote for Mr. McClernand's amendment; he would vote what was required "to enable the Executive to sustain the Government—not to subjugate the South." Mr. Burnett, of Kentucky, declared the object of the war to be the subjugation of the Southern States. Kentucky had refused to give men when called for, to protect the Capitol, and the Legislature had nearly unanimously indorsed the action of the Governor. Mr. McKnight's motion to amend Mr. McClernand's amendment was rejected; and Mr. McClernand's amendment was lost—only forty-seven voting for it. The clause appropriating five hundred millions, dollars was stricken out of the bill. Mr. Vallandigham, of Ohio, moved to add a proviso: "That before the President shall have the right to call out any more volunteers than are already in the service, he shall appoint seven commissioners, whose mission shall be to accompany the army on its march, to receive and consider such propositions, if any, as may at any time be submitted from the Executive of the so-called confederate States, or of any one of them, looking to a suspension of hostilities and the return of said States, or any one of them, to the Union, and to obedience to the Federal Constitution and authority." He declared that he offered the proposition in good faith; he would "suspend hostilities for present negotiation to try the temper of the South." Mr. Wright, of Pennsylvania, emphatically declared that the proposition held "out to rebellious men a reward for their treason." Mr. Hutchins, of Ohio, moved to amend the proposition so that those commissioners should "see that the war is vigorously prosecuted to the effectual putting down of this rebellion." Mr. Vallandigham declared he had moved his amendment "to be read hereafter, and to be read and pondered by the people." Mr. Hutchins's amendment was lost; forty-four members only voting for it, and Mr. Vallandigham's amendment was then rejected, only twenty-one members voting for it.

On motion of Mr. Curtis, of Iowa, the bill was so amended as to give the President authority to raise troops and appoint officers for them whenever the State authorities should neglect or refuse to do so. Mr. Diven, of New-York, moved to amend the fourth section so as to require the major-generals to be selected from persons educated at West-Point, or from persons who have served in the regular army not less than five years. Mr. Shillabarger, of Ohio, moved to add, "or who shall have, by actual service in war, shown efficiency and capacity for such command." The amendment to the amendment was agreed to, and then the amendment of Mr. Diven was rejected.

Mr. McClernand moved that the commander of a brigade shall have power to appoint a Roman Catholic chaplain for his brigade when no regiment in the brigade shall have such chaplain, but the amendment was rejected. Mr. Vallandigham proposed to strike out "Christian de

nomination," and insert "religious society," but the amendment was lost.

Mr. Colfax, of Indiana, moved to strike out the eleventh section giving colonels, lieutenant-colonels, majors, adjutants, and quartermasters of volunteer regiments authority to frank soldiers' letters, and insert: "That all letters written by the soldiers in the service of the United States may be transmitted through the mails without the prepayment of postage, under such regulations as the Post-Office Department may prescribe; the postage thereon to be paid by the recipient." Mr. Van Wyck, of New-York, moved as a substitute: "That the colonel of every regiment now or hereafter to be in the service of the United States, shall appoint the chaplain of his regiment, and in case there be no chaplain, then any person he may deem competent, to act as postmaster for the regiment, whose duty it shall be, without receiving, or being entitled to any compensation therefor, to frank with his name all letters and papers not weighing over one ounce for all officers, musicians, or privates in said service. All letters and papers so franked shall be carried free of postage: That any letter or paper directed to any officer, musician, or private in said service, addressed to the regiment to which such person belongs, shall be carried free of postage in all mails or boxes put up to receive letters and papers to be carried to the post-offices or mails of the United States: That all letters and papers directed to any officer, musician, marine, or sailor, in the service of the United States, directed to the station or ship where he may be serving, shall be carried free of postage in all the mails and boxes put up for the purpose of receiving letters and papers to be carried to the post-offices and mails of the United States: That the appointment referred to in the first section of this act shall, by said postmaster, be filed in the office of the Postmaster-General.

Mr. Van Wyck's amendment was rejected, and then Mr. Colfax's amendment was adopted.

Mr. Burnett offered as a proviso to be added to the end of the bill: "That the military force hereby provided for in this act, shall not be employed in subjugating and holding as a conquered province any sovereign State now or lately one of the United States."

The amendment was rejected. Mr. Burnett demanded the yeas and nays on the passage of the bill; but they were not ordered, and the bill passed without a division.

On the sixteenth, Mr. Blair, from the Committee on Military Affairs to whom the House had referred the Senate bill to authorize the employment of volunteers, reported with an amendment as a substitute—the amendment being substantially the House bill. The amendment was agreed to, and the bill passed.

In the Senate, on the seventeenth, on motion of Mr. Wilson, the Senate disagreed to the amendment of the House. The House insisted on its amendment—asked for a committee of conference, and Mr. Blair, of Missouri, Mr. Olin, of New York, and Mr. Wright, of Pennsylvania, were appointed managers. The Senate insisted on its disagreement, and appointed Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, Mr. Ten Eyck, of New Jersey, and Mr. Rice, of Minnesota, managers. On the eighteenth, Mr. Wilson, from the Committee of Conference, reported that the House of Representatives recede from its amendment to the bill, except the eleventh and twelfth sections, and agree to the bill of the Senate with the following amendments: "Strike out the preamble, and in lieu thereof insert as follows: 'Whereas certain of the arsenals, custom-houses, navy-yards, and other property of the United States have been seized, and other violations of law have been committed and are threatened by organized bodies of men in several of the States, and a conspiracy has been entered into to overthrow the government of the United States: Therefore;' and in line nine, of section one, after the word 'property,' strike out as follows, 'The volunteers mustered into service under this act shall serve for three years, unless sooner discharged by the President; but nothing in this section shall affect enlistments for a shorter period of volunteers already mustered into service;' and in lieu thereof insert: '*Provided*, That the services of the volunteers shall be for such time as the President may direct, not exceeding three years nor less than six months, and they shall be disbanded at the end of the war; and all provisions of law applicable to three years volunteers shall apply to two years volunteers, and to all volunteers who have been or may be accepted into the service of the United States, for a period not less than six months, in the same manner as if such volunteers were specially named.' "

"That the Senate recede from its disagreement to the eleventh and twelfth sections of the amendments of the House of Representatives, and agree thereto."

The report was concurred in.

The House concurred in the report of the Conference Committee made by Mr. Blair, and the bill introduced by Mr. Wilson on the sixth July passed on the eighteenth, and was approved by the President on the twenty-second of July, 1861.

No. II.—*The Bill to increase the Military Establishment of the United States.*

In the Senate, on the sixth of July, 1861, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, agreeably to notice given on the first day of the session, introduced a bill to increase the regular army. The bill provided, that there be added to the regular army nine regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and one regiment of artillery; each regiment of infantry to consist of not less than two, nor more than three battalions; each battalion to consist of eight companies, each company to consist of one captain, one first and one second lieutenant, one first sergeant, four sergeants, eight corporals, two musicians, and as

many privates, not exceeding eighty-two, as the President may direct. The regiment of cavalry to consist of not more than three battalions, of not more than two squadrons each, and each squadron of two companies, of seventy-two privates each. The regiment of artillery to consist of not more than twelve batteries; each battery to have as many privates as the President might direct, not exceeding one hundred and twenty-two.

That the field and staff commissioned officers should be to each regiment of infantry, one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, one regimental adjutant, one regimental quartermaster and commissary, and to each battalion of infantry, one major, one battalion adjutant, one battalion quartermaster and commissary; the regimental and battalion adjutants, and quartermasters and commissaries, to be taken from the lieutenants of the regiments and battalions respectively. To the regiment of cavalry, one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, one regimental adjutant, one regimental quartermaster and commissary, and to each battalion of cavalry, one major, one battalion adjutant, one battalion quartermaster and commissary. To the regiment of artillery, one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, one major to every four batteries, one adjutant, one regimental quartermaster and commissary, to be taken from the lieutenants of the regiment.

That there be four major-generals, with three aids-de-camp each, to be taken from captains or lieutenants of the army, and six brigadier-generals, with two aids-de-camp each, to be taken from the lieutenants of the army.

That the officers and enlisted men were to receive the same pay, emoluments, and allowances, and be on the same footing, in every respect, with those of corresponding grades and corps now in the regular service.

That the President be authorized to add to the regiments of dragoons, mounted riflemen, cavalry, artillery, and infantry of the regular army, as many officers and enlisted men as might make their respective organizations the same as those of the additional regiments, and that the commissions of the officers of the old regiments who might be promoted should bear equal date with those of officers promoted to the additional regiments.

That the term of enlistments made and to be made in the years eighteen hundred and sixty-one and eighteen hundred and sixty-two in the regular army, be for the period of three years, and those to be made after January one, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, to be for the term of five years.

On the ninth, Mr. Wilson, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported back the bill with an amendment, striking out the provision giving authority to the President to add to the old regiments as many officers and men as might make their organizations equal to the additional regiments authorized by the act.

On motion of Mr. Wilson, the Senate, on the thirteenth, proceeded to the consideration of the bill, and the amendment proposed by the Military Committee was adopted. Mr. King, of New-York, moved to amend the bill, by adding, that the increase of the force authorized by the act was declared to be for service during the insurrection, and six months after organized resistance should exist, the military establishment should be reduced to the number, grade, rank, and pay, authorized by law, on the first day of May, 1861, and the amendment was agreed to. Mr. King then proposed to amend, by adding, that the President should cause regiments, battalions, and companies to be disbanded, and officers to be discharged, so as to reduce the army as provided for in the amendment. Mr. Harris, of New-York, expressed his surprise that the Senate should strike what seemed to him so fatal a blow to this measure of the administration. He thought officers of the old regiments would not take commissions in the new regiments, with the understanding that they were to be discharged at the end of the war. The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. Nesmith, of Oregon, moved that the bill be amended by adding that no person should be commissioned as major or brigadier-general in the regular army who should not have previously served for the period of ten years in the regular or volunteer army of the Unitdd States; and no person should be commissioned as colonel, lieutenant-colonel or major in the regular army, who should not have previously served at least two years in the regular or volunteer army of the United States.

Mr. Wilson expressed the hope that the Senate would reject this amendment. Mr. Nesmith said, the object of the amendment was to exclude persons from civil life who have never had any military experience. "Ten years," he said, "was the shortest period in which any man can acquire the information necessary to qualify him to command in the army as brigadier or major-general." This amendment was rejected. Mr. Nesmith then moved, that, whenever the public service might require the appointment of any citizen to the regular army, a board of officers should be instituted, before which the applicant should appear for examination into his physical ability, moral character, attainments, and general fitness for the service. Mr. Nesmith thought that military knowledge was not attained by inspiration. Men must get it through study, experience, and service in the field. "The regulations," he said, "contained the principle of the amendment. Every thing has to be examined and present some qualifications for its position in the army, except the general officers who are to lead the army." Mr. Wilson said: "There were to be eight hundred and fifty officers in these regiments. It was arranged that one half of the officers should be taken from the old regiments. Nine of the eleven colonels had been taken from the army, one of the others had served in the field, and the other was adjutant-general of Ohio. One half of the captains and first lieutenants were to be taken from the old army, and

the second lieutenants were to be promoted from the ranks. Thousands of the young men of the country from law-schools and colleges were applying for commissions, and the Government could select young men of talent and character. There never was a time in the history of the country when men of talent, men of culture, men of experience, men of fortune, men who have mastered all that could be mastered in the colleges and institutions of learning of the country, are seeking, as they are now seeking, admission into the army. Mr. Nesmith desired to know why the regulation requiring a person from civil life to be examined by a board of officers had not been complied with. Mr. Wilson replied, that "the object was to get a military force into the field as speedily as possible, and the Government was, of course, compelled, by the exigencies of the service, by the condition of the country, to do in this case, what it was compelled to do in some other cases—disregard forms and regulations." Mr. Wilson said, that, in lieu of the regulations, the colonels who were mostly army officers, had been directed to examine the cases of line officers when they report for duty, and if they were disqualified, to report them to the department, and their commissions would be withheld. Mr. Latham, of California, thought a degree of partiality was shown in the appointments that was creating discontent in army. Mr. Wilson was aware that some dissatisfaction had been created by departing from the rule of seniority in the appointments. The desire had been to take officers who were fitted for responsible positions to make the army most effective. "This army of ours," he said, "is paralyzed toward the head. Your ablest officers are young captains and lieutenants; and if I wished to-day to organize a heavy military force, such as we are calling into the field, I would abolish the army as the first act, and I then would take officers from the army, and place them where their talents fit them to go, without reference to the rank they occupied in the old regiments. There are men who are field-officers, that ought to be second lieutenants; and there are second lieutenants who would make generals. That is the condition of our army to-day; and the nearer you come toward the head, until you reach perhaps the distinguished commander of the army, the less ability you have." Mr. Nesmith's amendment was rejected.

Mr. Nesmith moved to strike out "three years," and insert "five years," for enlistments in 1861 and 1862. He moved the amendment, he said, to secure uniformity in enlistments. He thought, if there had been a loyal army, these difficulties would never have occurred. "No man here," he declared, "will live to see a smaller standing army than the army we have to-day, with the increase for which this bill provides." Mr. Lane, of Kansas, "hoped the Senator from Oregon would not persist in his amendment. Men prefer a three years' to a five years' service. The argument in favor of the three years' enlistment is this, that by it you can fill up the regiments in time for service in the present wa without it, you cannot; if it is insisted up the army cannot be enlisted." The amendme was rejected.

Mr. Grimes, of Iowa, proposed to amend t bill by adding: "In selecting and appointi officers from the army into regiments here created, the relative rank by them held in t army shall be preserved." Mr. Fessenden, Maine, thought this amendment would not eff the object. Mr. Lane, of Kansas, said, "Con sion would ensue in the new regiments by t adoption of the amendment," and it was wi drawn. Mr. Doolittle thought some provisi ought to be inserted in the bill to secure offic going into the new regiments, their rights as ficers of the army. Mr. Wilson said, there co be no such provision, for, when officers leave t old regiments and go into the new, their pla are immediately supplied by new nominatio He agreed with Mr. Nesmith that we sho never live to see the army brought back wher then was. He was willing to trust the Congr that would be there at the end of the conte The bill with the amendments was then repor to the Senate. Mr. Fessenden moved to ame Mr. King's amendment providing for the red tion of the army six months after the rebell should cease, by inserting, "one year," inst of "six months." Mr. King expressed his w ingness to accept the amendment. Mr. McD gall, of California, was opposed to the ame ment proposed by Mr. King. He believed would be economy to increase permanently army. He believed it desirable for the *mor* of the force to be added. We should have bet officers; men who propose to devote themsel for their lives to the profession of arms. Foster, of Connecticut, was opposed to King's amendment. "It is assuming what have not the foresight to determine. Let morrow take care of itself. Let us be wise day, and not attempt to be wise for to-morro for to-morrow may bring exigencies, and m bring exigencies, about which we know noth to-day." Mr. Rice believed, "as a measure economy, the army should be increased."

On the fifteenth, the Senate resumed the c sideration of the bill, and Mr. Fessenden's ame ment to Mr. King's amendment was agreed The question recurring on Mr. King's ame ment as amended, Mr. Wilson said, he was posed to the amendment, but upon its be pressed by Mr. King, wishing to obtain a uni vote, he had said he would not resist it; upon further reflection he must change the surance then given, and oppose it. "Congre he declared, "would be as wise one year a we have put down the rebellion as they were day." Mr. Harris, of New-York, said the n sure of increasing the army had been ent upon as an administration measure. The a tion of the amendment would be "virtu practically, indirectly to defeat this measur the administration, for, I maintain, that, if amendment be adopted, we convert these

ments into volunteer forces." Mr. Hale, of New-Hampshire, had always been "opposed to an increase of the army and in favor of the diminution of it," but he thought, "it would be most unwise to engraft such an amendment as this on the bill at this time." Mr. Grimes did not believe we required a large standing army. "I believe," he said, "with my ancestors, that standing armies are hostile in their tendency and effect on republican governments; that they are provocative of wars; and I am not willing to say to the people of my section of the country that they are hereafter to support a larger standing army than that which is now authorized by law. It is not for us to dampen the ardor of the people at home whom we represent, by telling them that hereafter, if they support this war, and support the administration, they are to have fastened upon them a large standing army of forty-three thousand men." Mr. Wilson said: "The country understands its own interests, and when this contest is closed, the public burdens will be such, the taxation will be such, that the people will seek all proper ways to reduce their expenditures; and if there is a man in the army more than they want, they will strike that man's name from the rolls. Believing that the people then will know what they want, what their own interests require, and that they will be just as competent to decide this question as we are today, I choose to leave the question with them." Mr. Howe, of Wisconsin, moved to amend Mr. King's amendment, by striking out the words, "shall be reduced to the number, grade, rank, and pay authorized by law on the first of May, 1861," and insert, "may be reduced in such manner as Congress may direct." Mr. Howe believed the country required an addition to the standing army to protect the additional miles of frontier, the new routes of communication, and the relations with the Indian tribes within the borders. Mr. Howe's amendment to Mr. King's amendment was agreed to. The question recurring on Mr. King's amendment as amended, it was rejected. Mr. King remarked that his second amendment was only a part of the first, and with the failure of the first, it, of course, falls, and the amendment was rejected.

Mr. Johnson, of Tennessee, demanded the yeas and nays on the question of increasing the standing army. Mr. Grimes moved a reconsideration of the vote rejecting Mr. King's amendments, as he wanted to record his name against the permanent increase of the standing army. Mr. King hoped they would be unanimously reconsidered, and they were so reconsidered. The question recurring on the amendments as amended, Mr. Grimes demanded the yeas and nays, and they were ordered. The question, being taken by yeas and nays, resulted—yeas, twenty-three; nays, eighteen. Mr. King suggested that the second amendment ought not to be adopted, and it was rejected. The bill as amended was then passed without a division.

In the House of Representatives, on the fifteenth of July, Mr. Blair reported from the Military Committee a bill to increase the efficiency of the volunteer forces of the United States. On the sixteenth, the House, in Committee of the Whole, proceeded to its consideration. This bill was in substance the Senate bill to increase the military establishment, introduced on the sixth of July, by Mr. Wilson, and which passed the Senate on the fifteenth. It converted the eleven regiments into a volunteer force. It provided that the enlistments for these regiments should be under the charge of the officers appointed from civil life, and that the officers appointed from the army should be detailed for service in the volunteer regiments in the field. Mr. Blair stated that the Military Committee of the House unanimously dissented from the recommendation of the Secretary of War; they did not consider that there was any occasion to increase the military establishment; but as something had been done to organize the new regiments, the Committee had stripped the organization of that feature which alone made it repugnant to a free people—that of establishing a large standing army. Mr. Burnett, of Kentucky, declared that "the President has exercised powers that would have deprived any despot in Europe of his crown, if he had dared to do it." As one of the representatives of Kentucky, he protested against that State being called upon to furnish one man or one dollar of money to carry on the war. Mr. Holman, of Indiana, declared that Mr. Burnett, and especially Mr. Vallandigham, misapprehended the spirit of the country. "There never was a day or hour when the people intended to submit to the overthrow of the Union. Their moderation and forbearance became the great occasion; and in it I see the evidence of an unwavering purpose, the anchor of enduring hope. If in this emergency the administration had hesitated, the storm of indignation, irresistible as the sand-storm on the Lybian desert, would have swept it away. If questionable powers have been assumed, it was at the demand of public opinion. The overwhelming necessity, the safety of the capital, the safety of the public honor, the safety of the Union, and more than all, the safety of the public liberty, may be urged at least in extenuation. For it is an ancient maxim, older than the Constitution, that 'the safety of the people is the supreme law.'" Several slight amendments were agreed to in the Committee of the Whole, and concurred in by the House, and the bill was then passed without a decision. On the eighteenth, Mr. Blair, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported the Senate bill to increase the regular army, with an amendment as a substitute—the amendment being the House bill converting the regiments from regulars into volunteers. The substitute was adopted.

On the twenty-second, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of the House amendment. Mr. Wilson declared that the amendment effectually destroyed the measure, and if it was sustained by the Senate, the bill had better be at once abandoned. Mr. King supported the House

amendment. Mr. McDougall was not satisfied with the bill as it passed the Senate, deeming it inadequate to the wants of the country, but he was less satisfied with the amendment of the House. The Senate refused to concur in the House amendment.

The House, on the twenty-third, insisted on its amendment, asked a conference, and appointed Mr Blair, of Missouri, Mr. Olin, of New-York, and Mr. Mallory, of Kentucky, managers.

In the Senate, on the twenty-fourth, on motion of Mr. Wilson, the Senate insisted on its disagreement, agreed to the conference asked for by the House, and appointed Mr. Wilson, Mr. Rice, and Mr. Lane, of Kansas, managers. In the House, on the twenty-fifth, Mr. Blair made the following report: "The Committee of Conference on the bill to increase the present military establishment, have agreed to recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

"That the House of Representatives recede from its amendments to the bill of the Senate, except section eight, and agree thereto with the following amendments:

"Strike out as follows, 'in such manner and to such extent as Congress may direct;' and insert, 'to a number not exceeding twenty-five thousand men, unless otherwise ordered by Congress.'

"And also '*Provided*, That all the officers of the regular army who have been or may be attached or assigned to duty for service in any other regiment or corps, shall resume their positions in the regular army, and shall be entitled to the same rank, promotion, and emoluments, as if they had continued to serve in their own regiments or corps.'

"That the Senate recede from its disagreement to the eighth section of the amendment of the House, and agree thereto."

Mr. Blair said the Conference Committee on the part of the House felt constrained under present circumstances to recede from the amendments of the House, and to allow the Senate bill to pass, with an amendment, however, providing that the military establishment should be reduced at the end of the war to a number not exceeding twenty-five thousand men; that all the officers of the regular army who had been or might be attached or assigned to duty for service in any other regiment or corps, should resume their positions in the regular army, and should be entitled to the same rank, promotion, and emoluments, as if they had continued to serve in their own regiments or corps; and that the recruiting of these eleven new regiments should be placed in charge of officers appointed for the new regiments from civil life; and that, in the mean time, the officers of the regular army should not be employed in recruiting, but should be employed actively in the field. Mr. Vallandigham inquired if he was to understand that the report of the Conference Committee proposes to agree to the Senate bill increasing the standing army, as against the proposition to increase the volunteer force which was adopted by the House. Mr. Blair replied, that the managers on the part of the House were exceedingly reluctant to yield their amendment, and nothing but what they deemed a pressing emergency would have induced them to yield their objections to the Senate bill. The report of the Committee of Conference was agreed to—ayes, eighty-one, noes, twenty-two. In the Senate, on the twenty-sixth, Mr. Wilson made a report from the Committee of Conference which was concurred in without a division, and the bill was approved by the President on the twenty-ninth of July, 1861.

No. III.—*The Bill providing for the better Organization of the Military Establishment.*

In the Senate, on the sixth of July, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, agreeably to notice given on the first day of the session, introduced a bill for the better organization of the military establishment. The bill contained eighteen sections, and provided:

For the appointment of an assistant secretary of war;

For an increase of the adjutant-general's department, and the promotion of the Adjutant-General to the rank of a brigadier-general.

For an increase of the quartermaster-general's department;

For an increase of the ordnance department;

For an increase of the corps of engineers, and the promotion of the chief to the rank of a brigadier-general;

For an increase of the medical department of the army;

For the addition to the medical staff of a corps of medical cadets;

For the employment of female nurses in the permanent hospitals;

For the appointment of one chaplain to each regiment;

For increasing the number of cadets at the Military Academy, and authorizing the President to fill the vacancies created by the rebellion;

For the repeal of the act allowing three months' extra pay for reënlistments, and the premium for accepted recruits;

For the repeal of the act requiring the Secretary of War to discharge minors;

For the change of the army ration whenever circumstances might render it advisable by substituting fresh meats, potatoes, or fresh or dessicated vegetables;

For allowing in the hospitals, such quantities of fresh or preserved fruits, milk, butter, and eggs as might be necessary for the proper diet of the sick;

On the tenth, Mr. Wilson, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom the bill had been referred, reported it back with amendments. The Senate, on the twelfth, proceeded to its consideration, and on motion of Mr. Grimes, struck out the provision giving the Adjutant-General the rank of a brigadier-general. The Committee on Military Affairs reported an amendment

providing that the Superintendent of the United States Military Academy — whom the law required to be selected from the corps of engineers—should be an officer of the army, a graduate of the Academy, and distinguished for his scientific attainments. Mr. Hale of New-Hampshire moved to strike out the words, "a graduate of the United States Military Academy"—yeas, fourteen; nays, twenty-seven. Mr. Grimes moved to strike out the entire amendment, but withdrew the motion to allow Mr. Wilson to move an amendment providing that the Superintendent of the Academy should be an officer of the engineer, topographical engineer, ordnance or artillery corps. This amendment to the amendment was agreed to, and the amendment as amended adopted.

The Military Committee reported as an amendment, to strike out the seventeenth section, authorizing the Commissary-General to vary the subsistence of the army by substituting fresh meats for salt meat, and potatoes, fresh or desiccated vegetables for other portions of the ration and to insert in lieu of it: "That the army ration shall be increased as follows, namely: twenty-two ounces of bread or flour, or one pound of hard bread, instead of the present issue; fresh beef shall be issued as often as the commanding officer of any detachment or regiment shall require it, when practicable, in place of salt meat; beans and rice shall be issued in the same ration in the proportions now provided by the regulation; and one pound of potatoes per man shall be issued at least three times a week, if practicable; and when these articles cannot be issued in these proportions, an equivalent in value shall be issued in some other proper food, and a ration of tea may be substituted for a ration of coffee, upon the requisition of the proper officer." The amendment was agreed to. Mr. Wilson moved an amendment consisting of five sections, repealing the law allowing double rations to department commanders; providing that brevet rank should not increase pay; that officers entitled to forage should not commute it, but should draw in kind; that officers, when absent from duty six months, should not receive the allowances authorized by existing law; that sutlers might be appointed not exceeding one to each military post. This amendment was agreed to.

On motion of Mr. Grimes, the section authorizing the increase in the Ordnance Department was stricken out. Mr. Harris, of New-York, moved to amend the bill by adding: "That any cadet who shall hereafter be reported deficient, either in conduct or studies, shall be discharged from the Academy, and shall not be returned or reappointed except upon the recommendation of the academic board of the Academy." Mr. Hale moved to amend so that such cadet could not be appointed to a place in the army. Mr. Fessenden suggested a modification of the amendment so that it would read, "or appointed to any place in the army before his class shall have left the Academy and received their commissions," and Mr. Hale accepted the modification, and the amendment to the amendment of Mr. Harris was agreed to; Mr. Harris's amendment was then adopted. Mr. Wade, of Ohio, moved to strike out the entire section relating to the Academy. He declared he was "not in favor of increasing the number of cadets. I do not think the experience of the country has been such as should lead us to be in any great hurry to increase the number of cadets or to add to the patronage of the Military Academy. I cannot help thinking that there is something wrong about this whole institution. I do not believe that in the history of the world you can find as many men who have proved themselves utterly faithless to their oaths, ungrateful to the Government that has supported them, guilty of treason and a deliberate intention to overthrow that Government which has educated them and given them its support, as have emanated from this institution." On motion of Mr. Wilson, the eleventh section relating to the West-Point Academy, was stricken out with the view of perfecting the matter in a new bill.

On the seventeenth, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill. Mr. Wilson moved to amend by striking out all after the enacting clause, and inserting a new bill of twenty sections. In explanation of its provisions, Mr. Wilson said: "I have labored night and day, for many days and nights, to fit and prepare this bill to meet the actual wants of the country; and in doing so, I confess that in every step of it, I have had to meet the interests, the jealousies, or the prejudices of men connected with the army of the United States. But in framing this bill, I have endeavored to be governed wholly by the public interest, and not by the wants or wishes of any particular men in the army or in the departments:

The first section provides for an Assistant-Secretary of War, with a compensation of three thousand dollars per year;

The second section makes an addition to the quartermaster's department;

The third section provides that there shall be added to each of the corps of engineers and topographical engineers and the ordnance department, three first, and three second lieutenants;

The fifth section provides for raising three companies, to be composed of one hundred and fifty men each, to be sappers, miners, and pontoneers;

The sixth section authorizes an addition to the medical department of the army, of ten surgeons, and twenty assistant surgeons;

The seventh section proposes to add to the medical corps, fifty young men — medical students—to be called dressers;

The eighth section provides that, in permanent hospitals, female nurses may be substituted for soldiers, under the guide and direction of the surgeons of those hospitals;

The ninth section provides that one chaplain shall be allowed to each regiment, to be selected and appointed by the President; but he must

be an ordained minister of some Christian denomination; leaving the pay precisely as it is now;

The tenth section authorizes the President to fill the vacancies in the Military Academy on the recommendation of Senators;

The eleventh section abolishes three months' pay for reënlistments;

The twelfth section provides that two dollars a month shall be retained, instead of one dollar, from the soldier's pay; the object to make every soldier feel that he has got so much reserved interest;

The thirteenth section repeals the fifth section of the act approved September twenty-eighth, 1850, which requires the Secretary of War to discharge from the service all minors;

The next section provides that in all cases of enlistment or reënlistment, the oath of allegiance may be administered by a commissioned officer of the army;

The fifteenth section provides that the regiments of dragoons, mounted riflemen, and cavalry, shall all be consolidated and be one arm;

The sixteenth section provides for the alteration of the army ration, increasing it to a small extent—increasing the bread and not the meat;

The seventeenth section provides that there may be allowed in the hospitals fruits, milk, butter and eggs;

The eighteenth section provides that there shall be appointed, by the Secretary of War, on the recommendation of the council of administration, and approval of the commanding officer, as many sutlers as the exigency may require.

The remaining sections are taken from the bill to create a retired list.

This bill now presented as a substitute has been examined most carefully in the Adjutant-General's office, in the Secretary of War's office, and finally was examined and revised by General Scott. It received the unanimous sanction of the Committee on Military Affairs. Mr. Grimes moved to amend the amendment by adding five new sections providing for a retired list of the navy. Mr. Hale, Chairman of the Naval Committee, declared his opposition to both propositions. Mr. Grimes thought there were at least twenty naval officers that ought to be retired; "It would be for the interest of the Government to get rid of these men, who are effete, unable to perform the duties of their positions, and take young, active, and patriotic men and place them in their stead." Mr. Grimes's amendment to Mr. Wilson's amendment was agreed to.

Mr. Hale moved to amend the amendment by striking out all relating to retiring boards for the army and navy, and adding three sections relating to double rations, brevet commissions, and commutation of forage, adopted by the Senate on motion of Mr. Wilson, and not included in his pending amendment. Mr. Nesmith opposed the section relating to the commutation of forage, and Mr. Hale withdrew it. Mr. Wilson demanded the yeas and nays on Mr. Hale's motion to strike out of his amendment the sections relating to retired lists in the army and navy, a insert the new sections concerning brevet and double rations for department comman Mr. Hale's motion was supported by Mr. E of Oregon, and opposed by Mr. Foster of necticut, Mr. Ten Eyck of New-Jersey, and Fessenden of Maine. The question being t by yeas and nays, resulted—yeas, eleven; twenty-seven.

Mr. Rice, of Minnesota, moved to amend twentieth section at the end of the ninet line by adding—that should the Lieutenant-eral be retired under this act, it should be out reduction in his current pay, subsistenc allowances—yeas, twenty-nine; nays, eleve the amendment was agreed to. Mr. Hale mov amend the bill, so as to give to retired of "half-pay," instead of "pay." Mr. Collam Vermont, suggested that "the amendment sl be that they should retire upon half the p which they were entitled at the time of being retired, provided that the same sl never be less, by the year, than a certain n sum, say five hundred dollars a year, so give a man a support." Mr. Sherman n to amend the bill so as to give the retire ficer the pay proper of his rank, and no allowances. Mr. Hale withdrew his amend and Mr. Sherman's amendment was agree On motion of Mr. Sherman, sections two, and six of the bill increasing the adjutan eral's, the commissary, the quartermaster the medical departments were stricken ou the following added as a new section: " the President be authorized to appoint, b with the advice and consent of the Senate, assistant adjutant-generals, six commissari subsistence, four quartermasters, and twen sistant quartermasters, ten surgeons and t assistant surgeons, to have the pay, rank, a lowances, and perform the duties of simila cers in the present military establishment to hold their offices three years unless s discharged."

Mr. Hale moved as an additional se "That so much of the sixth section of t of August twenty-third, 1842, as allows tional or double rations to generals or ot ficers commanding geographical departme divisions, or to the commandant of each p nent or fixed post garrisoned with troop and the same is hereby, repeated." Mr. V suggested that the amendment be so m as to apply only to officers commanding in fortifications and garrisons. Mr. Hale ac the modification, and his amendment as m was agreed to. On motion of Mr. Hale, th ate, by a vote of twenty-one to eighteen, a ed the bill by adding: "That officers havir vet commissions shall not be entitled to a crease of pay or emoluments, because of t ercise of command according to their rank." Mr. Baker, of Oregon, wishing to sure that this provision did not apply t eral Scott, moved to amend the bill by a "That nothing in this act contained shall

event reduce the pay or emoluments of the Lieutenant-General of the army"—yeas, thirty; nays, six. Mr. Grimes moved to amend the substitute by adding, "That any commissioned officer of the army or navy, who, having tendered his resignation, shall, prior to due notice of the acceptance of the same by the proper authority, and without leave, quit his post or proper duties, with the intent to remain permanently absent therefrom, shall be regarded as a deserter and punished as such;" and the amendment was adopted. Mr. Foster moved to strike out of Mr. Wilson's substitute, "The superintendent of the Military Academy shall be an officer of the engineers, topographical engineers, ordnance, or artillery corps, a graduate of the United States Military Academy, and distinguished for his scientific attainments. He shall have the local rank, pay, and allowances of a colonel of engineers, and be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate;" and the amendment was agreed to. On motion of Mr. Wilson, the bill was recommitted to the Committee on Military Affairs.

On the eighteenth, Mr. Wilson from the Military Committee, to whom the bill had been recommitted, reported it back with amendments. Mr. Wilson said, in explanation of the action of the Committee, that "The tenth section of the bill, in regard to the vacancies in the Military Academy, the committee have changed so that they shall be filled by the President, 'upon the nomination, by members of the House of Representatives, of two from each State now represented in the House.' This will change the appointment from the Senate to the delegation of each State in the House of Representatives, and will give to each State two cadetships to be filled up in that way.

"An amendment was moved and adopted by the Senate yesterday, to the twentieth section of the bill in regard to the retired list of the army, to pay the retired officers their pay proper, and nothing more. The Senator from Iowa suggested that there would be an inequality in the pay of the officer retired, and that was the chief reason for recommitting the proposition. The committee have arranged it in this way: that if any commissioned officer shall become incapable of performing the duties of his office, he shall be placed on the retired list, and withdrawn from active service and command and from the line of promotion, with the following pay, namely, major-generals, two thousand six hundred and forty dollars; brigadier-generals, one thousand four hundred and eighty-eight dollars; colonels, one thousand one hundred and forty dollars; lieutenant-colonels, nine hundred and sixty dollars; majors, eight hundred and forty dollars; captains, seven hundred and twenty dollars; first lieutenants, five hundred and forty dollars; second lieutenants, five hundred and forty dollars; without any other pay or allowances. That is the pay proper now received by the officers of the infantry and artillery. It is the full pay proper of these officers, without any emoluments, and according to the proposition made by the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Sherman] yesterday, which was sustained by the Senate. This places officers of engineers, artillery, and infantry on the same footing, and does away with the objection, made by the Senator from Iowa, of inequality.

"The Committee propose to change the twenty-eighth section, in regard to the retired officers of the navy, by striking out the words 'leave-of-absence pay he was entitled to at the time of such retirement,' and inserting the words 'pay allowed by this act.'

"In the twenty-ninth section, the Committee propose to insert, after the word 'promotion,' in line six, these words:

"'With the following pay, namely, captains in the navy, one thousand three hundred dollars; commanders in the navy, one thousand one hundred dollars; lieutenants in the navy, one thousand dollars; surgeons, ranking with captains, one thousand three hundred dollars; with commanders, one thousand one hundred dollars; with lieutenants, one thousand dollars; paymasters, ranking with captains, one thousand three hundred dollars; with commanders, one thousand one hundred dollars; with lieutenants, one thousand dollars; chief engineers, one thousand dollars; first assistant engineers, seven hundred dollars; second assistant engineers, five hundred dollars; and third assistant engineers, four hundred dollars; masters, four hundred dollars; passed midshipmen, three hundred and fifty dollars; without any other pay or allowance. Captains, commanders, and lieutenants now on the retired list of the navy, shall receive the same compensation, and no greater, than is allowed to the officers of the same rank by the provisions of this act.'

"The officers that have been retired heretofore receive a larger pay than we propose to give officers retired by this act; this proposition places all the officers who are or may be retired, on the same footing. Other slight changes have been made in the bill, but they are merely verbal."

The Secretary of the Senate then read the amendments proposed by the Military Committee, as the first seven sections of the bill, and they were severally agreed to.

The next amendment was to insert as section eight, "That existing vacancies at the Military Academy, from congressional districts where there have been failures to make nominations according to the provisions of existing laws, shall be supplied by the President upon the nomination by members of the House of Representatives from such States as are represented in Congress: *Provided*, That but two cadets shall be appointed from any one State; and that such cadets shall be actual residents of the State from which they are nominated, and shall have the qualifications for admission to the Military Academy as are now required for appointments from congressional districts and at large. And no cadet, who shall hereafter be reported as deficient, either in conduct or studies, and recommended to be discharged from the Academy, shall be returned or reappointed, or appointed to

any place in the army before his class shall have left the Academy and received their commissions, unless upon the recommendation of the academic board of the Academy." Mr. Fessenden moved to strike out the words, "by members of the House of Representatives," and insert, "by the Governors of the respective States" —rejected, yeas, sixteen; nays, twenty-two. The question recurring on the amendment of the Committee, it was rejected. On motion of Mr. Wade, so much of the section as refers to the appointment of cadets to the Military Academy, was stricken out. Mr. Wilson moved to insert in lieu of the words stricken out by Mr. Wade, "That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to fill any existing vacancies at the United States Military Academy, from congressional districts for which no nominations are made by Representatives in Congress, by appointments from those districts or from the respective States at large"—yeas, seventeen; nays, twenty-three; so the amendment to the amendment was rejected. Mr. Carlisle, of Virginia, moved to insert in the blank made by Mr. Wade's amendment, "That existing vacancies at the Military Academy, from congressional districts where there have been failures to make nominations, according to the provisions of existing laws, shall be supplied by the President, upon the nomination of Senators from such States as are represented in the Senate;" the amendment was rejected.

The Secretary then read the amendments reported by the Military Committee, as sections nine to twenty-nine inclusive, and they were severally agreed to.

Mr. Wilson moved to amend the second section, by providing for the appointment of five assistant inspectors-general, with the rank and pay of a major of cavalry, and the amendment was agreed to. Mr. Powell, of Kentucky, moved as an additional section, "That no part of the army or navy of the United States shall be employed or used in subjecting or holding as a conquered province any sovereign State now or lately one of the United States, or in abolishing or interfering with African slavery in any of the States." Mr. Lane, of Kansas, moved to amend the amendment by adding to it, "Unless a military necessity shall exist for enforcing the laws or maintaining the Constitution of the Union." These amendments were discussed by Messrs. Powell, Browning, Carlisle, Fessenden, Howe, Sumner, Polk, and Saulsbury. Mr. Lane's amendment to Mr. Powell's amendment was rejected, eleven Senators voting for, and twenty-four against it. Mr. Sherman moved to strike out all of Mr. Powell's amendment, and insert, "That the purposes of the military establishment provided for in this act are to preserve the Union, to defend the property, and to maintain the constitutional authority of the Government." The amendment was agreed to—yeas, thirty-three; nays, four. Mr. Breckenridge moved to add to Mr. Sherman's amendment, the words, "but the army and navy shall not be employed for the purpose of subjugating any State, of reducing it to the condition of a territory or province, or to ish slavery therein." The amendment wa jected—yeas, nine; nays, thirty. The qu recurring on the original amendment as ame it was rejected. The bill was then pass amended.

In the House of Representatives, on th teenth, Mr. Blair, from the Military Comm reported a bill for the better organization o military establishment, and, on the ninete the bill was taken up, amended, and pa On the twenty-third, Mr. Blair from the Co tee on Military Affairs, to whom had bee ferred the Senate bill for the better organi of the military establishment, reported it with an amendment as a substitute. The stitute was adopted, and the bill as am passed.

In the Senate, on the twenty-fourth, th with the House amendment was taken up fo sideration. Mr. Hale moved that the bil amendment be referred to the Military Co tee, but the motion was not agreed to. Wilson hoped the Senate would disagree amendment, and send the bill back to the at once. Mr. Grimes said this bill as it from the Senate, "was more thoroughl cussed and better understood by the memb this body, than any bill that has been pas this session; and he should vote to non-c in the House amendment which struck out of the most material provisions of the bill." The amendment was non-concurr The House insisted on its amendment, a committee of conference, and appointed Blair, of Missouri, Mr. Crittenden, of Kent and Mr. Olin, of New-York, conferees. Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, insisted disagreements, agreed to a conference com and the chair appointed Mr. Wilson, of chusetts, Mr. Grimes, of Iowa, and Mr. R Minnesota, conferees.

In the House, on the twenty-seventh Blair, from the committee of conference, a report that the House recede from its a ment to the Senate bill, and agree to i several amendments; and the report was ed. In the Senate, on the twenty-ninth Wilson, from the committee of conference, a report, which was opposed by Mr. Hal Baker, and Mr. Sherman, and rejected motion of Mr. Wilson, the Senate insisted disagreement to the House amendment asked for another committee of conference. Wilson, Mr. Sherman, and Mr. McDougal appointed conferees. The House agreed further conference, and appointed Mr. Bl Missouri, Mr. Kelley, of Pennsylvania, ar Jackson, of Kentucky, conferees on its pa

In the Senate, on the first of Augu Wilson from the second committee of ence, reported that the committee of con on the disagreeing votes of the two Hou the bill providing for the better organization military establishment, had agreed to recor to their respective Houses, That the Ho

cede from its amendments to the Senate bill, and agree to it, with amendments; and the report was concurred in—yeas, twenty-seven; nays, nine. In the House, Mr. Blair made the report of the committee of conference, which was concurred in. This bill, containing twenty-five sections, was approved by the President on the third of August, 1861.

No. IV.—*The Act in addition to the Act to authorize the Employment of Volunteers to aid in enforcing the Laws and protecting Public Property.*

In the Senate, on the twenty-second of July, 1861, Mr. Wilson, on leave, introduced a bill in addition to the act for the employment of volunteers. The bill authorized the President to accept the services of volunteers, either as cavalry, infantry, or artillery, in such numbers as the exigencies of the public service might, in his opinion, demand, to be organized by the act of the twenty-second July, 1861. These volunteers were to be armed as the President might direct, to be subject to the rules and articles of war, and to be upon the footing in all respects with similar corps of the army, and to be mustered into the service for and during the war. Mr. Wilson desired to put the bill on its passage, but Mr. Pearce, of Maryland, objecting, it was passed over.

On the twenty-third, the Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, proceeded to the consideration of the bill. On motion of Mr. Wilson the bill was amended by adding to the first section a proviso, "That the number of troops hereby authorized, shall not exceed five hundred thouand." Mr. Wilson moved to amend the bill by adding as a new section, "That the President shall be authorized to appoint, by and with the consent of the Senate, for the command of the volunteer forces, such number of major-generals and of brigadier-generals as may in his judgment be required for their organization;" and the amendment was agreed to, and the bill as amended passed without a division.

In the House, on the twenty-fourth, Mr. Blair called up for consideration the Senate bill and passed it without a division, only fifteen members voting, on motion of Mr. Burnett, of Kentucky, for the yeas and nays. The President approved the bill on the twenty-fifth of July, 1861.

No. V.—*The Joint Resolution to approve and confirm certain Acts of the President of the United States, for suppressing Insurrection and Rebellion.*

In the Senate, on the sixth of July, 1861, agreeably to notice given on the fourth, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, introduced a joint resolution to approve and confirm certain acts of the President. The resolution was read twice and referred to the Military Committee. On the eighth, Mr. Wilson reported it back without amendment.

The resolution set forth that, "Whereas, since the adjournment of Congress, on the fourth day of March last, a formidable insurrection in certain States of this Union has arrayed itself in armed hostility to the Government of the United States, constitutionally administered; and whereas the President of the United States did, under the extraordinary exigencies thus presented, exercise certain powers and adopt certain measures for the preservation of this Government—that is to say: First. He did, on the fifteenth day of April last, issue his proclamation calling upon the several States for seventy-five thousand men to suppress such insurrectionary combinations, and to cause the laws to be faithfully executed. Secondly. He did, on the nineteenth day of April last, issue a proclamation setting on foot a blockade of the ports within the States of South-Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. Thirdly. He did, on the twenty-seventh day of April last, issue a proclamation establishing a blockade of the ports within the States of Virginia and North-Carolina. Fourthly. He did, by order of the twenty-seventh day of April last, addressed to the Commanding General of the army of the United States, authorize that officer to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus* at any point on or in the vicinity of any military line between the city of Philadelphia and the city of Washington. Fifthly. He did, on the third day of May last, issue a proclamation calling into the service of the United States, forty-two thousand and thirty-four volunteers, increasing the regular army by the addition of twenty-two thousand seven hundred and fourteen men, and the navy by an addition of eighteen thousand seamen. Sixthly. He did, on the tenth day of May last, issue a proclamation authorizing the commander of the forces of the United States on the coast of Florida, to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus*, if necessary. All of which proclamations and orders have been submitted to this Congress. Now, therefore,

"*Be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That all of the extraordinary acts, proclamations, and orders hereinbefore mentioned, be, and the same are hereby, approved and declared to be in all respects legal and valid, to the same intent, and with the same effect, as if they had been issued and done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress of the United States.

On the tenth, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of the resolution. Mr. Clark, of New-Hampshire, moved to strike out the words, "increasing the regular army by the addition of twenty-two thousand seven hundred and fourteen men, and the navy by an addition of eighteen thousand seamen." He said he did not know that any thing had been done toward increasing the army or navy, which must necessarily be made by law retroactive. Mr. Wilson said that "A plan has been arranged for the organization of eleven regiments for the army. Officers have been appointed, commissioned

with some qualifications, sent to certain points of the country, and money has been placed in their hands to fill up the ranks of the army. In regard to filling up the navy, I understand that of the eighteen thousand men ordered for the navy several thousand have been enlisted, and are now in the employment of the Government. I do not think it wise to strike out this provision; I think it had better remain there."

Mr. Polk, of Missouri, desired to have the resolution go over to a future day. Mr. McDougall, of California, thought it of vast importance to act promptly. "I am here," he said, "to indorse the preliminary actions of the Government." Mr. Fessenden of Maine would oppose postponement after that day, though he would defer the consideration of the subject till the next day, if Mr. Polk was not ready to speak then. Mr. Saulsbury, of Delaware, saw no reason for passing the resolution. Mr. Clark withdrew his amendment, as the Military Committee were unanimous for it. Mr. Polk moved to postpone the resolution until the next day. Mr. Dixon and Mr. McDougall opposed it, and the motion was lost. Mr. King, of New-York, moved to amend by a proviso that within six months after the rebellion should be put down, the army should be reduced to its organization on the first of July, 1861. Mr. Latham, of California, was opposed to an increase of the regular army and to the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*. Mr. King accepted a suggestion of Mr. Hale to include in his amendment the navy. Mr. Kennedy, of Maryland, was prepared to sustain the administration in all just and constitutional measures, but he could not vote for all the propositions in the resolution. Mr. Wilson expressed the hope that Mr. King would withdraw his amendment and move it upon the army bill, and allow the vote to be taken on the resolution. Mr. Lane, of Indiana, said, as a member of the Military Committee he "had voted to report the resolution. The red right hand of armed rebellion was raised to strike down the Government under which we live—the freest, happiest, grandest Government upon earth; and the President was suddenly called upon to put down this armed rebellion. Every effort which he has made to that purpose meets my most hearty and cordial coöperation and support." Mr. Kennedy expressed his "solemn conviction that you will never reconstruct the Union by the sword;" he would ask Mr. Wilson if he "is apprised of any necessity for or any reasons that require or justify the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus* in Maryland." Mr. Wilson replied: "I think the existence of a band of conspirators in the city of Baltimore, men who organized murder and shot down in the streets of that city brave men who were rallying at the call of the r country to defend the capital of the nation and uphold the cause of the republic, is a full, complete justification of the President in authorizing General Scott to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus* in and about that city. There is no spot on this continent, none whatever, where there have been blacker traitors t and about the city of Baltimore—men rea murder, for any crime—men who were o ing rebellion in that city, secreting arm have since been discovered and taken fr men who have been arrested. If there ev in any portion of the republic, any spot of or any time, where and when the writ *beas corpus* ought to be suspended, the Baltimore was the spot, and the last few the time, for its suspension."

Mr. Baker said: "As a member of the M Committee, I agree heartily in the report Chairman of the bills now upon your Whether that peace shall be conquered at mond, or Montgomery, or New-Orleans, or wilds of Texas, I do not presume to say; do know, if I may use so bold a word, th determined aggregated power of the who ple of this country—all its treasure, all its all its blood, all its enthusiasm, kindled, c trated, poured out in one mass of livin upon any foe—will conquer." Mr. Fes suggested to Mr. King to modify his amen so as to read: That nothing therein con should be construed as authorizing a nent increase of the army or navy beyon force at that time. Mr. King so modifi amendment. Mr. Wilson thought "the as proposed by the Senator from Maine, that we can all accept." Mr. Trumbull t Mr. Fessenden had succeeded admirably nexing a proviso which really had no m in it, but Mr. King expressed his satis with it, and it was agreed to.

Mr. Latham moved to strike out of the tion the words: "Fourthly. He did, by a of the twenty-seventh day of April last, add to the Commanding General of the army United States, authorize that officer to s the writ of *habeas corpus* at any point on the vicinity of any military line between t of Philadelphia and the city of Washi The amendment was rejected. Mr. Polk the yeas and nays on the passage of the tion, and they were ordered. He then ad the Senate against its passage, expressing to defer his speech until the next day. M son moved to postpone the resolution to t day, and take up the volunteer bill, and postponed. On the eleventh, Mr. Polk r and concluded his speech against the res Mr. Powell, of Kentucky, thought that ins being engaged in an effort to pass thro Senate a resolution approving these vio of the Constitution by the chief Executiv wanton and palpable violations of the C tion, the assuming the war power, the who committed these usurpations should raigned at the bar of the Senate, and be under impeachment. Mr. Breckenrid Mr. Bayard expressed a desire to speak resolution, and the Senate, on motion Wilson, postponed till the next day. sixteenth, Mr. Breckenridge addressed the in opposition to the passage of the res

He desired "the country to understand that the Constitution of the United States is no longer to be held as the measure of power on one side and of obedience on the other, but that it is to be put aside to carry out the purposes of the majority." Mr. Lane, of Indiana, declared: "I sanction and approve every thing that the President has done during the recess of Congress, and the people sanction and approve it, and there is no power this side of Heaven that can reverse that decision of the American people."

On the nineteenth, Mr. Bayard, of Delaware, addressed the Senate for two hours in opposition to the resolution; and on the twentieth, Mr. Latham, of California, spoke for nearly two hours against it, and Mr. Rice, of Minnesota, "indorsed to the fullest extent, all that had that day so ably and eloquently fallen from his lips." On the twenty-seventh, Mr. Johnson, of Tennessee, addressed the Senate at length. He declared the cause of the rebellion to be "disappointed, impatient, unhallowed ambition." "Certain men could not wait any longer, and they seized the occasion to do what they had been wanting to do for a long time — break up the Government. If they could not rule a large country, they thought they might rule a small one." He declared that "A distinguished Senator from Georgia once said, 'when traitors become numerous enough, treason becomes respectable.' Traitors are getting to be so numerous now that I suppose treason has almost got to be respectable; but God, being willing, whether traitors be many or few, as I have hitherto waged war against traitors and treason, and in behalf of the Government which was constructed by our fathers, I intend to continue it to the end." [Applause in the galleries.]

Mr. Pearce, of Maryland, spoke on the thirtieth, against the resolution and in condemnation of the action of the Government in his State, which he pronounced to be "positive, arbitrary, causeless, and wanton oppression." On the second of August, Mr. Wilson moved to take up the resolution for consideration. Mr. Trumbull, of Illinois, opposed the motion and demanded the yeas and nays, and they were ordered—yeas, twenty-eight; nays, eleven. Mr. Doolittle moved it to the Judiciary Committee. Mr. Polk demanded the yeas and nays, and they were ordered—yeas, seventeen; nays, twenty-three. Mr. Sherman, of Ohio, said: "I am going to vote for the resolution, and I am going to vote for it upon the assumption that the different acts of the administration recited in this preamble were illegal, and not upon the assumption that they were legal and valid. I 'approve' of the doing of them, and therefore I vote for that portion of the resolution. I am willing to make them as 'legal and valid' as if they had the previous express sanction of Congress; and therefore I vote for that clause of the resolution. I vote for these measures; and I approve them, as I said in the outset, all the more because the taking of them involved the President in some personal hazard. I will not approve them more, but I admire them the more because he did not hesitate to save the republic, although the act of saving it might be attended by some personal risk to himself."

The Senate, on the sixth, resumed the consideration of the resolution. Mr. King thought we had no time to amend it and there was no probability that it would pass the House so near the close of the session. Mr. Fessenden was ready to vote for the passage of the resolution, but thought the House at that late hour would not pass it. Mr. Trumbull declared he never would vote for it, and yielded the floor to Mr. King, who moved to go into executive session. The motion prevailed, and the resolution was not again considered.

No. VI.—*The Bill to authorize the Secretary of War to reïmburse Volunteers for Expenses incurred in employing Regimental Bands, and for other purposes.*

In the Senate, July fifteenth, Mr. Rice, of Minnesota, introduced a bill authorizing the Secretary of War to reïmburse the New-York Seventy-first regiment for expenses incurred in employing regimental bands. The bill was read twice and referred to the Military Committee. On the nineteenth, Mr. Rice reported back the bill with an amendment to strike out all after the enacting clause, and to insert in lieu of it, that the Secretary of War be authorized and directed to refund, to the volunteers called out by the President's proclamation of the fifteenth April, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, such sums of money as might have been expended by the said volunteers in the employment of regimental or company bands during the period of their service under said proclamation: *Provided*, the amount to be allowed should not exceed that to be paid to volunteer bands regularly mustered into the service under the President's proclamation of May third, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one. On the twentieth, the bill was considered, amended and passed, and on motion of Mr. Grimes its title was so amended as to read: "A bill authorizing the Secretary of War to reïmburse volunteers for expenses incurred in employing regimental and other bands." In the House, on the twenty-seventh, Mr. Blair reported it back from the military committee to whom it had been referred, the bill authorizing the Secretary of War to pay regimental and other bands, employed by volunteer regiments, with an amendment as an additional section, providing "that the President, in accepting and organizing volunteers under an act entitled 'An act authorizing the employment of volunteers to aid in enforcing the laws and protecting public property,' approved July twenty-second, 1861, might accept the service of such volunteers without previous proclamation, and in such numbers, from any State or States as, in his discretion, the public service might require." The amendment was agreed to, and the bill as amended passed without a division. In the Senate, on the twenty-ninth, the House amendment was concurred in; and the bill was ap-

proved on the thirty-first of July, 1861, by the President.

No. VII.—*The Bill authorizing the President to appoint additional Aids-de-camp.*

In the Senate, on the thirty-first of July, Mr. Wilson, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported a bill supplementary to an act entitled, "An act to increase the present military establishment approved July twenty-ninth, 1861." The bill provided that the President might, during the insurrection, upon the recommendation of the Lieutenant-General commanding the army of the United States, or of any major-general of the regular army commanding forces of the United States in the field, appoint such number of aids-de-camp, in addition to those authorized by law, as the exigencies of the service might, in the opinion of the President, require; such aids-de-camp to bear, respectively, the rank and authority of captains, majors, lieutenant-colonels, or colonels of the regular army, as the President might direct, and receive the same pay and allowances as were provided by existing laws for officers of cavalry of corresponding rank. The President was to cause the aids-de-camp appointed under the act to be discharged whenever they should cease to be employed in active service; and he might reduce the number so employed whenever he might deem it expedient so to do. Any officers of the regular army appointed aids-de-camp under the act, and attached or assigned to duty for service as such, were, on their discharge, to resume their positions in the regular army, and be entitled to the same rank and promotion as if they had continued to serve in their own regiments or corps.

Mr. Wilson stated that the number of staff-officers was inadequate to the needs of the service. Mr. Doolittle desired some limitation upon the number. Mr. Wilson thought the discretion of the President an ample guarantee that no more will be appointed than the service required. The bill was passed without a division. In the House, on the first of August, the bill was taken from the Speaker's table, passed without opposition, and approved by the President, August fifth, 1861.

No. VIII.—*The Act to promote the Efficiency of the Engineer and Topographical Engineer Corps, and for other purposes.*

In the House of Representatives, on the fifth of August, 1861, Mr. Blair, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported a bill to promote the efficiency of engineer corps. The bill provided that there should be added to each of the corps of engineers and topographical engineers, by regular promotion of its officers, two lieutenant-colonels and four majors, provided all vacancies created by such promotion should be filled by graduates of the Military Academy, recommended for such promotion by the academic board of that institution; and provided further, that said corps should be thereafter known as the first and second corps of engineers. It also directed that there should be added to the of topographical engineers one company diers, to be commanded by appropriate of such corps, to have the same pay and subject to the same rules and articles of wa to be governed in every particular in the manner, as the existing corps of topogra engineers. The bill was passed without a ment. In the Senate, on the fifth, the bil taken up for consideration, and Mr. Wilson to amend by striking out all after the en clause, and inserting: "That there shall be to each of the corps of engineers and topo ical engineers, by regular promotion of present officers, two lieutenant-colonels an majors.

"That there shall be added to the corps pographical engineers, one company of so to be commanded by appropriate officers o corps, to have the same pay and rations, ing, and other allowances, and to be entit the same benefits, in every respect, as the pany created by the act 'for the organizat a company of sappers, and miners, and niers,' approved May sixteenth, 1846.

"That vacancies hereafter occurring amo commissioned officers of the volunteer regi shall be filled by the Governors of the Sta spectively, in the same manner as origin pointments; and so much of the tenth sect the act of the twenty-second of July, 18 is inconsistent therewith, be, and the sa hereby, repealed.

"That the President of the United Sta hereby authorized to appoint two additio spectors-general for the United States the said inspectors-general to have the sam and receive the same pay and allowances a provided by law for inspectors-general."

The amendment was agreed to. Mr. then moved to amend by adding an add section: "That so much of the first sect the act approved August fifth, 1854, as a izes the appointment of civilians to super the national armories be and the same is repealed; and that the superintendents of armories shall be appointed hereafter fro cers of the ordnance department." Mr. said his sympathies and feelings were in fa a civil superintendent, but his judgment favor of the amendment, which would pla armory in the care of an officer experien the fabrication of arms. The amendme agreed to. Mr. Wilson moved to insert additional section: "That the pay of th commissioned officers, musicians, and p of the army of the United States be inc at the rate of four dollars per mont to continue for three years from the p of this act, and until otherwise fixed by Mr. Wilson "thought the public inter quired that we should increase the pay volunteers from eleven to fifteen dollars a which seemed to be a reasonable compens Mr. Sherman said it was an ungracious object to an increase of the pay of the volu

or of the regular army; the amendment should not be adopted without great consideration. Mr. Wade said "there was no just proportion between the pay of officers and privates; we were not paying enough to our soldiers," and he was for the proposition. Mr. Wilson said that by advice of Senators around him, and of Mr. King, his colleague on the committee, he would withdraw the amendment and introduce it as a separate bill. Mr. Johnson, of Missouri, moved to amend by adding as an additional section, "that this Congress recommend the Governors of the several States to convene their Legislatures for the purpose of calling an election to select two delegates from each congressional district, to meet in general convention at Louisville, in Kentucky, on the first Monday in September next; the purpose of the said convention to be to devise measures for the restoration of peace to our country." Mr. Powell, of Kentucky, demanded the yeas and nays. Mr. Carlisle, of Virginia, thought the proposition "inopportune." Mr. McDougall, of California, wished "merely to amend the remark made by the Senator from Virginia; he says this proposition would be inopportune; I say it would be cowardly." The amendment was rejected; nine Senators voted for it, and twenty-nine against it. The bill as amended, was then passed without a division. On the same day, the House, on motion of Mr. Blair, concurred in the amendments of the Senate; and the President approved it on the sixth of August, 1861.

No. IX.—*The Bill to authorize an Increase in the Corps of Engineers and Topographical Engineers.*

In the Senate, on the second of August, 1861, Mr. Wilson, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported a bill to increase the engineer corps. It provided, "That there should be added to each of the corps of engineers and topographical engineers, by regular promotion of their present officers, two lieutenant-colonels and four majors; and that there should be added to the corps of topographical engineers one company of soldiers, to have the same pay and rations, clothing, and other allowances, and to be entitled to the same benefits in every respect as the company created by the act for the organization of a company of sappers and miners and pontoniers, approved May sixteenth, 1846." On the third of August, the bill was considered and passed without amendment. In the House, on the fifth, Mr. Blair, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom the Senate bill had been referred, reported it back with an amendment as an additional section, "That the President of the United States be authorized to appoint two additional inspectors-general of the United States army, to have the same rank and receive the same pay and allowances as are now provided by law for inspectors-general." The amendment was agreed to, and passed as amended. The Senate, on motion, of Mr. Wilson, concurred in the amendment; and the President approved the act on the sixth of August, 1861.

No. X.—*The Bill making an Appropriation to deliver Arms to Loyal Citizens of Rebel States.*

In the Senate, on the twentieth of July, 1861, Mr. Johnson, of Tennessee, introduced a bill making an appropriation to pay the expenses of transporting and delivering arms and munitions of war to the loyal citizens of the States of which the inhabitants then or thereafter might be in rebellion against the Government of the United States, and to provide for the expense of organizing them into companies, battalions, regiments, or otherwise, for their own protection against domestic violence, insurrection, invasion, or rebellion. The bill provided that the sum of —— dollars be appropriated, to be expended under the direction of the President, in supplying and defraying the expenses of transporting and delivering such arms and munitions of war as in his judgment might be expedient to place in the hadns of any of the loyal citizens residing in any of the States of which the inhabitants were in rebellion against the Government of the United States, or in which rebellion was or might be threatened, and likewise for defraying such expenses as might be properly incurred in organizing and sustaining while so organized, any of said citizens into companies, battalions, regiments, or otherwise, for their own protection against domestic violence, insurrection, invasion, or rebellion. The bill was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. On the twenty-third, Mr. Wilson, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported the bill without amendment, and asked unanimous consent to consider it then, which was given. Mr. Wilson said the committee had not filled the blank, wishing to leave it to the Senate. Mr. Johnson, of Tennessee, moved that the blank be filled by inserting two millions, and the amendment was agreed to. On motion of Mr. Johnson, it was amended so as to read: "The loyal citizens residing in any of the States which are in rebellion against the Government of the United States, or in which rebellion is or may be threatened." Mr. Collamer, of Vermont, did not like the phraseology of the bill; he thought States could not be in rebellion, but the inhabitants might be. He moved to so amend it, as to make it read, "the States of which the inhabitants, now or hereafter may be in rebellion." This amendment was adopted, and the bill passed. In the House, the bill was referred to the Military Committee; and on the twenty-seventh, it was reported by Mr. Blair, and passed without a division. It was approved by the President on the thirty-first of July, 1861.

No. XI.—*The Act making Appropriations, and for other purposes.*

In the Senate, August first, 1861, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, reported from the Committee on Military Affairs, a bill appropriating one hundred thousand dollars for contingencies for fortifications, to be used and applied under the direction of the Secretary of War; providing that any

commissioned officer of the army, navy, or marine corps, who, having tendered his resignation, should, prior to due notice of its acceptance by proper authority, and without leave, quit his post or proper duties, with the intent to remain permanently absent, should be registered as a deserter, and punished as such; and abolishing flogging in the army, as a punishment for desertion. Mr. Hale, of New-Hampshire, moved to strike out of the bill the words, "for desertion," so that it would read, "that flogging as a punishment in the army is hereby abolished." Mr. Hale's amendment was agreed to, and the bill as amended passed. In the House, on the third of August, Mr. Stratton, of New-Jersey, from the Committee of Ways and Means, reported back the bill with several verbal amendments, which were agreed to, and the bill passed by the House. The Senate concurred in these amendments, passed it as amended; and the President approved it on the fifth of August, 1861.

No. XII.—*The Bill to provide for the Purchase of Arms, Ordnance, and Ordnance Stores.*

In the Senate, July twenty-ninth, 1861, Mr. Wilson introduced a bill to provide for the purchase of arms, ordnance and ordnance stores, which was read twice, and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. Mr. Wilson, from the Military Committee, reported back the bill without amendment, and it was passed without a division. In the House, on the first of August, Mr. Stevens, of Pennsylvania, from the Committee of Ways and Means, reported the Senate bill to provide for the purchase of arms; it was passed by unanimous consent, and approved by the President on the third of August, 1861.

No. XIII.—*The Act to increase the Pay of the Privates of the Army.*

In the Senate, on the fifth of August, 1861, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, from the Committee on Military Affairs, introduced a bill to increase the pay of the non-commissioned officers, musicians and privates of the regular army, volunteers, marines, and seamen in the service of the United States. The Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, proceeded to the consideration of the bill. Mr. Collamer, of Vermont, moved to amend by making the increase four dollars per month; and the amendment was agreed to—yeas, eighteen; nays, seventeen. Mr. Wilson then moved to amend by adding as a new section, "That all the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President of the United States, after the fourth of March, 1861, respecting the army and navy of the United States, and calling out or relating to the militia or volunteers from the States, are hereby approved, and in all respects legalized and made valid to the same intent and with the same effect as if they had been issued and done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress of the United States." Mr. Breckenridge said that the amendment sounded like the joint resolution to ratify and approve all acts of the President since the fourth of March, but one or two features were left out. Mr. Wilson replied that c two features of the joint resolution were le but he intended to call up the joint resc when this bill should pass. The amendme agreed to. Mr. Powell demanded the yea nays on the passage of the bill, and the ordered—yeas, thirty-three; nays, five; so t was passed. On motion, the title was am by adding the words, "and for other purp

In the House, Mr. Stevens, of Pennsy called up the bill, and moved to amend it ducing the increase of pay from four doll month to two dollars per month. He decla willingness to increase the pay, but did n where the money was to come from; he was ed at the expenses of the Government, whic one and a quarter millions per day. The ment was rejected—yeas, thirty-two; nays, six. Mr. Stevens then moved to amend by as a new section, "That the provisions of entitled 'An act for the relief of the Ohio an volunteers,' approved July twenty-sixth, be, and the same are hereby, extended volunteers mustered into the service United States, whether for two or three y for and during the war." Mr. Stevens ex that the amendment was intended to corr mistake made in using the words "milit stead of "volunteers." The amendme agreed to. Mr. Vallandigham moved to out the second section, "That all the act lamations, and orders of the President United States, after the fourth of March respecting the army and navy of the States, and the calling out, or relating militia or volunteers from the States, are approved, and in all respects legalized an valid to the same intent and with the s fect as if they had been issued and don the previous express authority of the C of the United States." The yeas and na taken and resulted—yeas, nineteen; na enty-four. Mr. Wickliffe, of Kentucky, the increase would be eighteen million and he moved that the bill be laid on th but the motion was lost. The bill was without a division. In the Senate, the amendment to the bill was agreed to. M son moved to reconsider the vote by wh Senate concurred in the House amendmen the provisions of the act entitled 'An act relief of the Ohio and other volunteers,' a July twenty-fourth, 1861, be, and the sa hereby, extended to all volunteers, muste the service of the United States, whether two, or three years, or for and during th The motion was agreed to, and then on m Mr. Wilson, the bill was laid on the table

Mr. Wilson then by unanimous con troduced "a bill to increase the pay of vates in the regular army, and of the vol in the service of the United States, other purposes." The bill proposed to the pay of the privates to thirteen d month; and also extended the provision

act "for the relief of the Ohio and other volunteers" to all volunteers, no matter for what term of service they might have been accepted. Mr. Wilson moved to amend the bill by adding as an additional section, "That all the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President of the United States after the fourth of March, 1861, respecting the army and navy of the United States, and calling out or relating to the militia or volunteers from the States, are hereby approved and in all respects legalized and made valid to the same intent and with the same effect as if they had been issued and done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress of the United States."

Mr. Breckenridge called for the yeas and nays, and they were ordered; and being taken, resulted—yeas, thirty-seven; nays, five; as follows:

Yeas—Messrs. Anthony, Bingham, Browning, Carlisle, Chandler, Clark, Collamer, Cowan, Dixon, Doolittle, Fessenden, Foot, Foster, Grimes, Hale, Harlan, Harris, Howe, Johnson of Tennessee, King, Lane of Indiana, Lane of Kansas, Latham, McDougall, Morrill, Pomeroy, Rice, Sherman, Simmons, Sumner, Ten Eyck, Trumbull, Wade, Wilkinson, Wiley, Wilmot, and Wilson—thirty-seven.

Nays—Messrs. Breckenridge, Bright, Kennedy, Pearce, and Powell—five. So the amendment was agreed to, and the bill passed. In the House, Mr. Stevens moved to take up the bill for consideration; but Mr. Crisfield, of Maryland, objected. Mr. Stevens appealed to him to withdraw his objection. He thought if Congress should adjourn without passing the bill, it would cause very great inconveniences and perhaps create the necessity for an extra session. Mr. Crisfield withdrew his objection; Mr. Johnson renewed it. Mr. Stevens then moved a suspension of the rules, and two thirds having voted for it, they were suspended, and the bill passed. It was approved by the President, on the sixth of August, 1861.

No. XIV.—*A Resolution expressing the Sympathy of Congress for the Bereaved Families and Friends of our Soldiers who have fallen in Defence of the Republic.*

In the House, on the second of August, 1861, Mr. Cox, of Ohio, by unanimous consent introduced a joint resolution expressing the sympathy of Congress, for the bereaved families and friends of our soldiers who have fallen in defence of the republic.

The resolution declared "that we acknowledge the faithful services and loyal devotion of our soldiers, who have fought and fallen in defending our flag and in vindicating the supremacy and majesty of the republic. Whether successful, or compelled, by the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, to resign a victory already won, their graves are honored, and history invests their names with unfading renown. And while the national Legislature expresses the sympathy of the nation for their bereaved families and friends, we commend to a generous people and the army, which is now eager to renew the contest, the imperishable honor of their example." It was unanimously passed. In the Senate, on motion of Mr. Latham, of California, it was considered and unanimously passed.

No. XV.—*The Bill to provide for Allotment Certificates among the Volunteer Forces.*

In the Senate, on the ninth of December, 1861, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, introduced a bill to provide for allotments of pay in the army. It was read twice, and referred to the Military Committee. On the seventeenth, Mr. Wilson reported it back from the committee, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. The amendment proposed to strike out all after the enacting clause, and insert:

"That the President shall appoint for each State having volunteers in the service not exceeding three persons, who shall be authorized by the President's commission to visit the several departments of the army in which volunteers from their respective States may be, and there procure from said volunteers, from time to time, their respective allotments of pay to their families or friends.

"That the persons appointed as commissioners to carry into effect the preceding section of this act shall receive no pay or emoluments whatever from the Treasury of the United States.

"That the fifth section of the act of twelfth June, 1858, giving sutlers a lien upon the soldiers' pay, be repealed; and all regulations giving sutlers rights and privileges beyond the rules and articles of war be abrogated."

Mr. Grimes moved to amend the amendment of the Military Committee, so as to pay to each of the commissioners two thousand dollars per annum without mileage. Mr. Wilson thought the amendment would endanger the passage of the bill, and Mr. Rice declared he should vote against it, if it were proposed to induce men to take a charitable office for money. Mr. Grimes's amendment was rejected, the amendment of the committee agreed to, and the bill as amended passed without a division. In the House, on the twentieth of December, Mr. Olin, of New-York, from the Military Committee, reported back the bill without amendment, and it was passed without a division; and approved by the President, on the twenty-fourth of December, 1861.

No. XVI.—*The Bill relating to Courts-Martial in the Army.*

In the Senate, on the ninth of December, 1861, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, introduced a bill relative to courts-martial, which was read twice, and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. On the twelfth, Mr. Wilson reported it back with an amendment. The bill provided that in time of war the commander of a division or separate brigade might appoint general courts-martial, and confirm, execute, pardon, and mitigate their sentences, as allowed and restrained in the sixty-fifth and eighty-ninth articles of war to commanders of armies and departments; but sen-

tences of such courts extending to loss of life or dismission of a commissioned officer, were to require the confirmation of the general commanding the army in the field to which the division or brigade belonged. It was further provided that when the division or brigade commander should be the accuser or prosecutor of an officer under his command, the court should be appointed by the next higher commander. The amendment of the Military Committee proposed to strike out the words, "of an officer under his command," so that it would read, "That when the division or brigade commander shall be the accuser or prosecutor, the court shall be appointed by the next higher commander;" and the amendment was agreed to. Mr. Doolittle suggested that the bill lie over, there was no occasion for its prompt passage. Mr. Wilson said the bill was in perfect harmony with the articles of war. It had been submitted to the Secretary of War, and he had replied that "the bill has been submitted to the Commanding General of the army, who reports that such an act is, in his opinion, absolutely necessary to facilitate the transaction of judicial business in a large army, and should be passed with as little delay as possible. The opinion of the Commanding General is concurred in and approved by this department." The bill was then passed without a division. In the House, on the twentieth of December, Mr. Blair, from the Military Committee, reported back the bill relative to courts-martial, without amendment, and it passed without a division. The President approved it on the twenty-fourth of December, 1861.

No. XVII.—*Joint Resolution, expressive of the Recognition by Congress, of the patriotic and gallant services of Brigadier-General Nathaniel Lyon, and of the Officers and Soldiers under his Command.*

In the House, on the eleventh of December, 1861, Mr. Blair introduced a joint resolution, expressive of the recognition by Congress, of the gallant and patriotic services of the late Brigadier-General Nathaniel Lyon, and the officers and soldiers under his command at the battle of Springfield, Missouri. It declared, "That Congress deems it just and proper to enter upon its records a recognition of the eminent and patriotic services of the late Brigadier-General Nathaniel Lyon. The country to whose service he devoted his life, will guard and preserve his fame as a part of its own glory.

That the thanks of Congress are hereby given to the brave officers and soldiers who, under the command of the late General Lyon, sustained the honor of the flag and achieved victory against overwhelming numbers at the battle of Springfield in Missouri. And that in order to commemorate an event so honorable to the country and to themselves, it is ordered that each regiment engaged shall be authorized to bear upon its colors the word "Springfield" embroidered in letters of gold; and the President of the United States is hereby requested to cause these resolutions to be read at the head of every regiment in the army of the United States.

Mr. Edwards, of New-Hampshire, thought it inexpedient to require the President to have the resolution read at the head of every regiment in the army, and he moved to strike out so much of the resolution as required it. Mr. Colfax opposed the motion, and it was rejected. The resolution was then unanimously passed. In the Senate, on the twelfth, the resolution was referred to the Military Committee, and on the twentieth, Mr. Wilson reported it back without amendment. The Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, proceeded to consider the joint resolution, and after remarks by Mr. Pomeroy, of Kansas, and Mr. Dixon, and Mr. Foster, of Connecticut, it was unanimously passed. It was approved by the President, on the twenty-fourth of December, 1861.

No. XVIII.—*Bill authorizing the Appointment of one or more Assistant Secretaries of War.*

In the Senate, on the twentieth of January, 1862, Mr. Wade, of Ohio, introduced a bill to authorize the Secretary of War to appoint one or more assistant secretaries, which was read twice, and referred to the Military Committee. On the twenty-first, the Senate, on motion of Mr. Wade, discharged the Committee on Military Affairs, from the further consideration of the bill, and proceeded to its consideration. Mr. Wilson moved to strike out all after the enacting clause, and insert in lieu of it, "That the President be, and he is hereby, authorized to appoint two additional assistant secretaries of war, whose salary shall each be three thousand dollars per annum, who shall perform all such duties in the office of the Secretary of War, belonging to that department, as shall be prescribed by the Secretary of War, or as may be required by law; the offices of these additional assistant secretaries to continue for one year." On motion of Mr. Hale, the amendment was so amended as to provide that they should be appointed "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." The amendment as amended was adopted as a substitute for the bill, and passed. In the House, on the same day, Mr. Gooch, of Massachusetts, moved that the bill be put on its passage, and demanded the previous question, which was ordered—yeas, seventy; nays, thirty-five. On motion of Mr. Holman, of Indiana, the yeas and nays were taken on its passage, and being taken, resulted—yeas, ninety-one; nays, thirty. So the bill passed, and was approved by the President, on the twenty-second of January, 1862.

No. XIX.—*The Resolution in relation to the Allotment Certificates of Pay to Persons held as Prisoners of War in the so-called confederate States.*

In the Senate, on the thirtieth of January, 1862, Mr. Rice, of Minnesota, introduced a joint resolution, relative to allotment tickets to prisoners of war. The Senate proceeded to consider the resolution, which required the Secretary of

War to procure from such officers and enlisted men of the United States army, as were or thereafter might be held as prisoners of war in the so-called confederate States, from time to time, their respective allotments of pay to their families or friends, certified by them in writing, and duly attested, in pursuance of such orders as might be made by the Secretary of War for that purpose, and upon which certified allotment he shall cause drafts to be made payable in New-York to the order of the persons to whom the allotments were or might be made, and to remit those drafts to the address of such person as might be designated in the allotment tickets. The resolution was then unanimously passed. The House concurred in passing the resolution, and it was approved by the President, on the sixth of February, 1862.

No. XX.—*The Bill to provide for the better Organization of the Signal Department of the Army.*

In the Senate, on the ninth of January, 1862, Mr. Wilson, from the Military Committee, reported a bill to provide for the better organization of the signal department of the army. On the tenth, the Senate proceeded to its consideration. It provided, that the President be authorized to appoint for service during the rebellion, as many signal officers, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of captains, or first lieutenants of cavalry, and as many enlisted men with the rank and pay of sergeants of cavalry as he might deem necessary. The bill also made the following appropriations: for the manufacture or purchase of signal equipments and signal stores, to equip and supply the forces now in the field, twenty thousand dollars. For contingent expenses of the signal department, one thousand dollars. For the manufacture or purchase of signal equipments and signal stores for countersign signals, to prevent the collision of friendly regiments, thirty-four thousand nine hundred dollars. Mr. Grimes moved to strike out "captains," and "first lieutenants," but after debate withdrew his motion; and on motion of Mr. Wilson, the first section, authorizing the President to appoint signal officers was stricken out. Mr. Sherman moved to amend by striking out the second section, providing that officers temporarily serving as signal officers, should receive for the time they were so serving, the pay and emoluments of cavalry officers of their respective grades, but the motion was lost, and the bill as amended, passed. In the House, on the seventeenth, Mr. Blair reported from the Military Committee, the bill without amendment; it was passed, and approved by the President, on the twenty-second of February, 1862.

No. XXI.—*The Bill making an Appropriation for completing the Defences of the City of Washington, and for other purposes.*

In the House of Representatives, December twentieth, 1861, Mr. Stevens, of Pennsylvania, from the Committee of Ways and Means reported a bill making an appropriation of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars for completing the defences of Washington. Mr. Stevens asked for immediate action on the bill, which was recommended by the Chief-Engineer General Barnard. He stated that the defensive system of Washington, consisted of forty-eight works, mounting over three hundred guns, some of which were of very large size; and the actual defensive perimeter occupied, was about thirty-five miles, exceeding the length of the famous (and hitherto the most extensively fortified extemporized field-works) lines of Torres Vedras by several miles. The bill was passed without a division. In the Senate, on the thirteenth of January, 1862, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, from the Military Committee, to whom the House bill had been referred, reported it without amendment. Mr. Clark, of New-Hampshire, moved to amend it by adding at the end, that the arrearages of all debts already incurred should first be paid out of this sum; and the amendment was agreed to. Mr. Pearce, of Maryland, and Mr. King, of New-York, opposed its passage. Mr. Wilkinson, of Minnesota, moved further to amend, "that no part of the sum hereby appropriated, shall be expended on any work hereafter to be performed." On the twenty-first, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill, and Mr. Wilkinson's amendment was agreed to. Mr. Wilson moved to amend it by adding two sections, "That the fifth section of the act of the twenty-eighth of September, 1850, providing for the discharge from the service of minors enlisted without the consent of their parents or guardians, be, and the same hereby is, repealed: *Provided*, That hereafter no person under the age of eighteen shall be mustered into the United States service, and the oath of enlistment taken by the recruit shall be conclusive as to his age.

"That no volunteers or militia from any State shall be mustered into the service of the United States on any terms or conditions confining their service to the limits of said State or vicinity; and if any such volunteers or militia are in service contrary to the provisions of this act, the same shall be discharged." Mr. Powell moved to amend by striking out the words which provided, that the oath of enlistment should be final and conclusive as to the age of the minor. Mr. Wilson stated that under the law of 1850, persons were often discharged as minors, who were twenty-four or twenty-five years of age. Mr. Powell, Mr. Clark, and Mr. Trumbull opposed making the oath of enlistment conclusive as to age. Mr. Nesmith, of the Military Committee, believed it would cut off very great abuses. Mr. Powell's amendment to the amendment was rejected, and Mr. Wilson's amendment agreed to. Mr. Wilson moved to add as a new section, that the tenth section of the act of the tenth of April, 1806, shall read: "That in time of war or rebellion against the supreme authority of the United States, all persons who shall be found lurking as spies, or acting as such, in or about the fortifications, encampments, posts, quarters, or headquarters of the armies of the United States, or

any of them, shall suffer death by sentence of a general court-martial." Mr. Collamer, of Vermont, moved "that the amendment be amended so as to confine it to those found lurking as spies around any fortification or post within any of that part of the United States which has been or may be declared to be in a state of insurrection;" and the amendment to the amendment was agreed to—yeas, twenty-four; nays, not counted. Mr. Wilson then moved to amend by adding as a new section: "That the fifty-fifth article of the first section of the act of April tenth, 1806, chapter twenty, be, and the same is hereby, so amended as to read as follows:

"Whoever, belonging to the armies of the United States in foreign parts, or at any place within the United States, or their territories, during rebellion against the supreme authority of the United States, shall force a safe-guard, shall suffer death."

On the twenty-third, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill, and the amendment to the fifty-fifth article of war was agreed to. Mr. Wilson then moved to modify Mr. Wilkinson's amendment, providing that no part of the money appropriated should be expended on work thereafter performed, so that it would apply to work thereafter commenced, and it was agreed to. The bill then passed without a division.

In the House, on the twenty-ninth, Mr. Blair reported from the Military Committee, in favor of concurring in the Senate amendment, excepting the third section, providing, that no volunteers should be mustered into the service, on any conditions confining their service to the limits of their State, and that the House non-concur in that amendment. The report of the committee was concurred in. The Senate, on the thirtieth, disagreed to the amendment of the House to the Senate amendments. The House insisted upon its amendment, asked a committee of conference, and the chair appointed Mr. Blair, of Missouri, Mr. Thomas, of Maryland, and Mr. Hickman, of Pennsylvania, managers on the part of the House. On the fifth of February, the Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, insisted on its disagreement, concurred in a committee of conference, and the chair appointed Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, Mr. Grimes, of Iowa, and Mr. Henderson, of Missouri, managers. In the House, on the ninth, Mr. Blair, from the committee of conference, reported that the House agree to the amendment of the Senate, with an amendment, so that it would read: "That no volunteers or militia from any State or territory shall be mustered into the service of the United States, on any terms or conditions confining their services to the limits of such State or territory, or their vicinity, beyond the number of ten thousand in Missouri, and four thousand five hundred in Maryland, heretofore authorized by the President of the United States, or Secretary of War, to be raised in said States." Mr. Lovejoy moved to lay the report on the table, but the motion was lost, and it was then adopted, without a division. In the Senate, on the tenth, Mr. Wilson, from the committee of conferenc report, which was concurred in; anc was approved by the President, on the of February, 1862.

No. XXII.—*The Bill providing for th gation of an additional Article of hibiting Officers of the Army from Fugitives from Service or Labor.*

In the House of Representatives, on of July, 1861, Mr. Lovejoy, of Illinois, i the following resolution, and demande vious question upon its passage: "Tl judgment of this House, it is no part o of the soldiers of the United States t and return fugitive slaves." Mr. M Kentucky, moved to lay it upon the ta sixty-six; nays, eighty-one. The quest ring on agreeing to the resolution, Mr. Illinois, demanded the yeas and nays, were ordered—yeas, ninety-three; n five.

In the Senate, on the fourth of 1861, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, g of his intention to introduce a bill to fficers and privates of the army for arr taining, or delivering persons claimed a slaves. Mr. Lovejoy, of Illinois, in t of Representatives, on the fourth of 1861, introduced a bill, making it a pe to capture or return, or aid in the capt turn of fugitive slaves. It was read its consideration postponed to the ten cember. In the Senate, on the seven December, Mr. Sumner, of Massachuse duced, and asked for the immediate con of a resolution, providing that the Com Military Affairs and the Militia be d consider the expediency of providing, tional legislation, that our national ar not be employed in the surrender o slaves. Mr. McDougall, of California, the resolution went over under the ru came up for consideration the next, Sumner stated that he had received co tions in regard to the outrages commit armies. He said he was glad to know and colleague, the Chairman of the on Military Affairs, promised us at onc meet this grievance. It ought to be i promptly, and to be passed at once. M of Pennsylvania, apprehended that the no possible difficulty whatever upon tion in any of its aspects. The reso agreed to.

Mr. Wilson, of Iowa, on the twent December, offered the following resol demanded the previous question upon the Committee on Military Affairs be to report a bill to this House, for the of an additional article of war, where ficers in the military service of th States, should be prohibited from usin tion of the forces under their respec mands for the purpose of returning fugi service or labor, and to provide for th

ment of such officers as might violate said article by dismissal from the service.

Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, on the twenty-third of December, introduced a bill in relation to the arrest of persons claimed to be held to service or labor by the officers of the military and naval service of the United States; which was read twice, and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. It declared that officers in the military service of the United States have, without the authority of law, and against the plainest dictates of justice and humanity, caused persons claimed as fugitives from service or labor to be seized, held and delivered up; and that such conduct has brought discredit upon our arms and reproach upon our Government; and it therefore proceeded to enact, that any officer in the military or naval service of the United States, who should cause any person, claimed to be held to service or labor by reason of African descent, to be seized, held, detained, or delivered up to or for any persons claiming such service or labor, should be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and should be dishonorably discharged, and for ever ineligible to any appointment in the military or naval service of the United States.

On the sixth of January, 1862, Mr. Wilson reported back his bill from the Committee on Military Affairs, with an amendment. On the seventh of January, Mr. Wilson called it up, and the Senate proceeded to its consideration. The Committee on Military Affairs reported an amendment to strike out all of the original bill, and insert as a substitute: That it should be unlawful for any officer in the military or naval service of the United States to cause any person claimed to be held to service or labor by reason of African descent to be seized, held, detained, or delivered up to or for any person claiming such service or labor; and any officer so offending should be discharged from service, and be for ever ineligible to any appointment in the military or naval service of the United States. Mr. Saulsbury, of Delaware, moved its indefinite postponement—yeas, thirteen; nays, twenty-three. On motion of Mr. Carlisle, of Virginia, it was temporarily laid on the table.

The Senate, on the sixteenth of January, on motion of Mr. Wilson, took from the table and resumed the consideration of the bill to punish persons in the military and naval service, for arresting and delivering fugitive slaves. The pending question being on the amendment reported from the Committee on Military Affairs, to strike out the original bill, and insert the amendment as a substitute, Mr. Collamer, of Vermont, said: "Without criticising at all the form of expression of the proposed amendment, I offer a substitute for it, which I send to the chair: 'No officer of the army or navy of the United States, or of the volunteers or militia in the service of the United States, shall assume or exercise any military command or authority to arrest, detain, hold or control any person, on account of such person being holden to service as of African descent; and any such officer so offending shall be dismissed from service.'" Mr. Wilson accepted the amendment proposed by the Senator from Vermont. Mr. Powell asked that the bill be postponed, and the amendment be printed, "in order that we may have some time to look into it." "The amendment," replied Mr. Wilson, "is very plain and simple; a child can comprehend its import. I hope that this important bill, which ought to have been passed on the second day of this session, for the honor of the country, will not be postponed any longer. "I have drawn up," said Mr. Saulsbury, "very hurriedly, an amendment, which I propose to insert as an additional section: 'Nor shall any soldier or officer, under like penalty, entice away or detain any person held to service or labor in the United States, from his or her master or owner.' If you adopt," said Mr. Saulsbury, "the amendment of the Senator from Vermont, you make it penal for a soldier or officer to return even to a loyal master or owner his slave: but you provide no penalty against any soldier or any officer for depriving even a loyal master of the services of his slave. My amendment proposes to prohibit, under the same penalty, an officer or a soldier of the army from decoying or enticing away from the service a slave, or from harboring a slave."

Mr. Rice, of Minnesota, proposed to amend Mr. Saulsbury's amendment by adding, "who may be a loyal citizen of the United States," and the amendment to the amendment was agreed to. Mr. Collamer thought that, under Mr. Saulsbury's amendment, if any soldier wanted to get dismissed from the service, he would have nothing to do but to entice a slave and he would get himself and the slave both dismissed. "I am opposed," said Mr. Wilson, "to this amendment in every shape and form, and to any legislation protecting, covering, or justifying slavery for loyal or disloyal masters. What I want to do is to put upon the statute-book of this country, a prohibition to the officers of the army from arresting, detaining, and delivering up persons claimed as fugitives, by the use of military power." Mr. Pearce, of Maryland, said: "The Senator from Massachusetts objects to a proposition which forbids officers and soldiers of the army from enticing, harboring, or preventing the recovery—that is the amount of it—of a fugitive slave, known to be such, upon the application of his master, known to be his lawful owner, according to the laws of the State in which he lives. What is the effect of that? It is an invitation to all the slaves of the State of Maryland, who can do so, to resort to this camp, sure of protection there, first, because no officer of the army can order their delivery up to their master, however loyal, or however indisputable his title may be to that slave."

The bill was then reported to the Senate; and, pending the question of concurring in Mr. Collamer's amendment, the Chair announced the special order of the day.

In the House, Mr. Blair, of Missouri, on the

twenty-fifth of February, reported from the Committee on Military Affairs a bill to make an additional article of war. The bill provided, that hereafter the following shall be promulgated as an additional article of war for the government of the army of the United States, and shall be obeyed and observed as such: "All officers are prohibited from employing any of the forces under their respective commands for the purpose of returning fugitives from service or labor who may have escaped from any persons to whom such service or labor is claimed to be due. Any officer who shall be found guilty by court-martial of violating this article shall be dismissed from the service." Mr. Bingham, of Ohio, moved to add, after the word "officers," the words "or persons in the military or naval service of the United States;" and the amendment was agreed to. "You," said Mr. Mallory, of Kentucky, "are deciding, by this article of war, that the President of the United States shall not be permitted to send a military force into a State to aid the authorities of that State in enforcing a national law which stands on your statute-book." Mr. Mallory wished to postpone the bill to the third Wednesday in March. Mr. Lovejoy objected to Mr. Blair yielding the floor. Mr. Blair would yield the floor to Mr. Mallory for the purpose indicated. Mr. Bingham hoped Mr. Blair would not yield the floor to allow this bill to be postponed to the end of March: "If that practice is to be pursued by the army and navy under the American flag, it ought to cover with midnight blackness every star that burns upon its field of azure, and with everlasting infamy the men who dare to desecrate it to such base uses." Mr. Vallandigham, of Ohio, moved to lay the bill on the table; upon which Mr. Bingham demanded the yeas and nays—yeas, forty-four; nays, eighty-seven. Mr. Blair demanded the previous question upon the bill and amendment; and it was ordered. He did not wish to press the bill to a vote to-night, and moved an adjournment; but the motion was lost—yeas, fifty-nine; nays, sixty-one. The question was then taken on the passage of the bill—yeas, eighty-three; nays, forty-two. So the bill passed the House.

In the Senate, on the fourth of March, Mr. Wilson reported back from the Military Committee, without amendment, the House bill providing for the promulgation of an additional article of war, forbidding officers or persons in the military and naval service, on pain of dismissal from the service, to arrest or return fugitive slaves. Mr. Davis would like to offer an amendment, and desired that the bill should go over until to-morrow. Mr. Wilson would, with the understanding that we take up the bill and act on it to-morrow, withdraw his motion to proceed to its consideration, and the proposition was assented to.

On the tenth of March, Mr. Wilson moved to take up the bill from the House of Representatives to make an additional article of war. "I move to amend the bill," said Mr. Davis, "by inserting after the word 'due,' in the eleventh line of the first section, the words, 'and also from detaining, harboring, or concealing any such fugitive.'" Mr. Saulsbury moved to amend by adding at the end of the first section, "That this article shall not apply in the States of Delaware, Maryland, Missouri, and Kentucky, nor elsewhere where the Federal authority is recognised or can be enforced"—yeas, seven; nays, thirty. Mr. Saulsbury moved to amend the bill by inserting after the word "due" in the eleventh line of the first section, the words, "or for the purpose of enticing or decoying such persons, held to service or labor, from the service of their loyal masters." The question, being taken by yeas and nays, resulted—yeas, ten; nays, twenty-nine. The bill was then passed—yeas, twenty-nine; nays, nine. It was approved by the President on the thirteenth of March, 1862.

No. XXIII.—*The Bill to provide for the Appointment of Sutlers in the Volunteer Service, and to define their Duties.*

In the Senate, on the second of January, 1862, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, agreeably to notice, introduced a bill for the appointment of sutlers in the volunteers, and to define their duties, which was read twice, and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. On the seventh, Mr. Wilson reported it back with amendments. The bill provided:

That the inspector-generals of the army should constitute a board of officers, whose duty it should be to prepare a list of such articles as might be sold by sutlers to the officers and soldiers of the volunteer service—the list to be subject to such revision as, in the judgment of the board, the good of the service might require; but the sale of intoxicating liquors should be in no way authorized by the board. A copy of the list, and of any subsequent change therein, and a copy of the act should be furnished by the board to the commanding officer of each brigade and of each regiment not attached to any brigade in the volunteer service.

That the acting brigadier-general, surgeon, quartermaster, and commissary of a brigade should constitute a board of officers, whose duty it shall be to affix to each article in the list a price for said brigade, which should be by them forthwith reported to the commanding officer of the division, if any, to which said brigade is attached, for his approval, with or without modification, and who should, after such approval, report the same to the inspector-general; and the same, if not disapproved by him, should be the price not exceeding which said articles might be sold. Whenever any brigade should not be attached to a division, said prices should then be reported directly to the inspector-general, and if approved by him, should be the price fixed for such brigade as aforesaid; and whenever any regiment should be unattached to any brigade, the acting colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major, and two senior captains thereof should constitute the board of officers by whom the price of the articles should be fixed for said regiment in the

same manner as was provided for an unattached brigade. The prices so fixed might be changed by the boards respectively from time to time not oftener than once in thirty days.

That it should be the duty of the commanding officer of each brigade, upon receipt of a copy of the list and copy of the act, to cause one sutler for each regiment in his brigade, to be selected by the commissioned officers of such regiment, which selection should be by him reported to the adjutant-general of the army; and if the same was not disapproved by the Secretary of War, the person so selected should be commissioned as sole sutler of the regiment. Any vacancy in the office of sutler, caused by the disapproval of the Secretary of War or from any other cause, should be filled in the same way as an original appointment.

That the sutlers chosen and commissioned should each be authorized to sell to the officers and soldiers of the regiment for which he had been chosen the articles designated in the list provided in the act, and none others, and at prices not exceeding those affixed to the articles. He should keep the list, together with a copy of the act, posted up in some conspicuous part of the place where he made his sales.

That it should be the duty of the inspector-general to cause the place of sale and articles kept for that purpose, by the sutlers, to be inspected from time to time, once in fifteen days at least, by some competent officer, and such changes in the place, or in the quality and character of the articles mentioned in the list so kept as should be required by said officer, should be conformed to by each sutler.

That there should be no sutler appointed for or permitted to sell to or trade with the officers or soldiers of any regiment in the volunteer service except such as should be selected and commissioned in conformity with the provisions of this act.

That any sutler who should violate any of the provisions of this act should, upon conviction thereof, be dismissed from the service and be ineligible to a reappointment, and should forfeit all goods, chattels, and effects found within the lines of the army at the time of such violation, one half to the use of the United States and the other half to the use of the person or persons who should furnish such evidence as should lead to a conviction for any such violation.

The Military Committee proposed to amend the first section, requiring reports to be made to the adjutant-general instead of the inspector-generals, and the amendment was agreed to. The Committee proposed to strike out the provision prohibiting the appointment of a sutler except such as should be selected according to the provisions of the act, and insert that "no person shall be permitted to act as sutler unless appointed according to the provisions of this act; nor shall any person be sutler for more than one regiment; nor shall any sutler farm out or underlet the business of sutling or the privileges granted to him by his appointment; nor shall any officer of the army receive from any sutler any money, or other presents; and any officer receiving such presents, directly or indirectly, shall be dismissed from the service. No sutler shall sell to an enlisted man on credit to a sum exceeding one fourth of his monthly pay within the same month; nor shall the regimental quartermasters allow the use of army wagons for sutlers' purposes, nor shall the quartermasters' conveyances be used for the transportation of sutlers' supplies: *Provided*, That nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to give sutlers a lien upon any part of the soldier's pay." The amendment was agreed to. Mr. Lane, of Kansas, moved to strike out all after the enacting clause and insert as a substitute: "That from and after the first day of February, 1862, the position of regimental and brigade sutlers shall be abolished in the army of the United States, regular and volunteer forces." Mr. Lane declared regimental sutlers unnecessary to the service; the sutler was an actual injury to the service. Mr. Wilson had intended, when he moved in the matter early in the session, to abolish the sutlers and adopt a system such as we had in the navy; but after consulting with the Quartermaster-General, the Commissary-General, the Inspector-Generals, the officers in the field, and with gentlemen of large experience, he had found it very difficult to apply to the land volunteer force the system so successfully working in the navy. He therefore proposed to regulate rather than abolish. Mr. Ten Eyck, of New-Jersey, thought the bill proposed would correct the abuses complained of. Mr. Wilkinson, of Minnesota, was opposed to the bill, and in favor of the motion of Mr. Lane. Mr. Fessenden was in favor of some bill that would correct the abuses, and the proposition of Mr. Wilson struck him favorably. Mr. Carlisle moved to recommit the bill with instructions to report a bill providing for a tobacco ration, and abolishing sutlers altogether. Mr. Grimes hoped the motion of Mr. Carlisle would not be adopted. Mr. Carlisle would "strike at the existence of these officers; cut them down if they are unnecessary; guard the soldier in the field from the sharks that are now following the army, that are absorbing what a generous Government is giving to its soldiers for their services, and that are throwing, as I know is the case in my own portion of the country, on the charities of those with whom the families of the soldiers reside to furnish to them the means of support." On the thirteenth, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill, the pending question being on Mr. Carlisle's motion to recommit with instructions. Mr. Hale was for the abolition of sutlerships altogether. Mr. Wilson said if Senators did not wish to pass the bill there was but one other plan to adopt, and that was to authorize the Government to furnish the needed articles, and to authorize quartermasters to draw for them and deliver them to soldiers at cost prices. Mr. Collamer suggested the modification of Mr. Carlisle's amendment so that tobacco may be furnished to soldiers who would pay for it; and the motion

was so modified. On the twenty-ninth, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill. Mr. Wilson stated that his original purpose was to rid the service of sutlers and adopt a system such as existed in the navy; and he had prepared with some care such a bill, and he was ready to present it. But "on reflection, on all the examination I can give the subject, on inquiry at the War Office, at the commissary department, at the quartermaster's department, on consultation with officers in the field, I am satisfied that the original bill as it was reported by the Committee on Military Affairs, which is a bill of regulation, will correct nearly all the abuses that now exist. I therefore prefer to make an amendment to the first section of the original bill, an amendment which I have prepared, on consultation with several officers in the field, and with persons who understand the subject.

"I propose to add to the first sentence of the first section of the bill the list of articles that we propose to allow sutlers to sell. This list may be modified and changed by the inspector-generals of the army, from time to time, as they see fit. I propose to amend the first section of the bill so it will read: That the Inspector-General of the army shall constitute a board of officers, whose duty it shall be to prepare, immediately after the passage of this act, a list or schedule of the following articles, which may be sold by sutlers to the officers and soldiers of the volunteer service, to wit: Apples, dried apples, oranges, figs, lemons, butter, cheese, milk, sirup-molasses, raisins, candles, crackers, wallets, brooms, comforters, boots, pocket looking-glasses, tin glasses, tin wash-basins, shirt-buttons, horn and brass buttons, newspapers, books, tobacco, segars, pipes, matches, blacking, blacking-brushes, clothes-brushes, tooth-brushes, hair-brushes, coarse and fine combs, emery, crocus, pocket-handkerchiefs, stationery, armor-oil, sweet-oil, sotten stone, razor-strops, razors, shaving-soap, soap, suspenders, scissors, shoe-strings, needles, thread, knives, pencils, and Bristol-brick." The amendment was agreed to. Mr. Lane's motion to amend, by striking out all after the enacting clause, and inserting a provision abolishing sutlerships altogether, was lost. The bill was then passed without a division. In the House, on the fifth of March, Mr. Blair, from the Military Committee, reported back the Senate bill to provide for the appointment of sutlers. On the tenth, the House resumed its consideration. The Military Committee reported an amendment, striking out the enumerated list of articles in the first section, and the amendment was agreed to. The next amendment proposed to strike out the third section, providing for the appointment of sutlers by the officers of regiments, and have them appointed as provided by law. The amendment was lost. The Committee reported an amendment to the fourth section, giving the sutler a lien on one sixth of the officers' and soldiers' pay. Mr. Thomas, of Massachusetts, proposed to amend the section so as to declare that the sutler should have no legal claim upon any officer, non-commissioned o private, to an amount exceeding one his pay, for articles sold during any mo amendment was agreed to. On motio White, of Indiana, the vote striking ou of articles in the first section was reco and the amendment rejected. Mr. W Pennsylvania, proposed to modify the tee's amendment to the fourth section sutlers might have a lien on the sold provided that they shall be allowed to the articles designated in the list or provided in the act, and none others prices not exceeding those affixed to sa as herein provided, and the section amended. The seventh section was so as to provide that any sutler who shoul any of the provisions of this act shoul colonel, with consent of the council of tration, be dismissed from the service. rich, of Minnesota, proposed a new sect viding that any regiment should have t to dispense with a sutler, whenever a of the regiment should so determine; amendment was lost. Mr. Blake, of Ohi to substitute for the bill an amendment ing that the office of sutler in the volun vice of the army of the United States s abolished: *Provided*, That the act tal and be in force from and after the firs the coming May. The amendment wa ed, and the bill as amended passed w division. In the Senate, on the eleve motion of Mr. Wilson, the Senate disa the House amendments to the sutle asked a committee of conference, and t appointed Mr. Wilson, Mr. Howard, Wright conferees. The House, on moti Blair, agreed to a conference, and the appointed Mr. Blair, of Missouri, Mr. Mc of Pennsylvania, and Mr. Richardson, of conferees on the part of the House. fourteenth of March, Mr. Wilson, from t mittee of conference, reported that the recede from its disagreement to the first fifth, sixth, and seventh amendments House; that the Senate recede from greement to the second amendment of th which gave a lien of one sixth on the pay of officers and privates, with a prov if any paymaster in the service of the States should allow, or pay any greater any sutler than that thereby authorized tained from the pay of the officers, non-sioned officers, musicians, or privates, fo sold by any sutler during any one mon the amount so allowed or paid by the ter should be charged against the said ter, and deducted from his pay, and ret the officer, non-commissioned officer, n or private, against whom the amount wa ally charged. And any captain or li commanding a company, who might co pay-roll, bearing a charge in favor of t against any officer, non-commissioned musician, or private, larger or greater t

sixth of the monthly pay of such officer, non-commissioned officer, musician, or private, should be punished at the discretion of a court-martial; that the Senate recede from its disagreement to the eighth amendment of the House with an amendment providing that the sutler dismissed for violation of the laws should, in addition, be ineligible to a reappointment as sutler in the service of the United States. The report was concurred in. The House, on the seventeenth, adopted the report of the conference committee made by Mr. Blair, and the President approved the bill on the nineteenth of March, 1862.

No. XXIV.—*Joint Resolution authorising the Secretary of War to accept Moneys appropriated by any State for the Payment of its Volunteers.*

In the Senate, on the eleventh of March, 1862, Mr. Wilson, from the Military Committee, reported a joint resolution to authorise the Secretary of War to accept moneys appropriated by any State for the payment of its volunteers, and to apply the same as directed by such State.

It authorised the Secretary of War, if any State during the present rebellion should make any appropriation to pay the volunteers of that State, to accept the same, and cause it to be applied by the Paymaster-General to the payments designed by the legislative act making the appropriation, in the same manner as if appropriated by act of Congress; and also to make any regulations that might be necessary for the disbursement and proper application of such funds to the specific purpose for which they might be appropriated by the several States. On the twelfth, it was considered and passed.

The House, on the thirteenth, on motion of Mr. Blair, referred it to the Military Committee, and on the nineteenth Mr. Olin, of New-York, reported it back without amendment. After debate, in which Mr. Olin, Mr. Stevens, and Mr. Edwards took part, the joint resolution was passed. It was approved by the President on the nineteenth of March, 1862.

No. XXV.—*The Joint Resolution authorising the President to assign the Command of Troops in the same Field or Department to Officers of the same Grade, without regard to Seniority.*

In the Senate, on the fourteenth of March, 1862, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported a joint resolution to authorize the President to assign the command of troops in the same field or department, to officers of the same grade, without regard to seniority. It provided that whenever military operations might require the presence of two or more officers of the same grade in the same field or department, the President might assign the command without regard to seniority of rank; and also that he might dismiss from the service, at his discretion, without the sentence of a court-martial, any officer of the army, when, in his judgment, the efficiency of the service would be promoted.

Mr. Sherman thought it a very great power to authorize the President, at his discretion, to dismiss an officer. Mr. McDougall desired that the resolution should lie over for consideration. On motion of Mr. Wilson, the Senate, on the seventeenth, resumed the consideration of the resolution. After remarks by Mr. Hale and Mr. Nesmith, it was recommitted to the Military Committee. On the eighteenth, Mr. Wilson, from the Committee, reported it back with an amendment to strike out the words authorising the President to dismiss from the service, at his discretion, without the sentence of a court-martial, any officer of the army, when in his judgment the efficiency of the service would be promoted thereby; the amendment was agreed to. The joint resolution providing that, whenever military operations might require the presence of two or more officers of the same grade in the same field or department, the President might assign the command of the forces in such field or department without regard to seniority of rank, was passed without opposition. In the House, on the second of April, on motion of Mr. Fenton, of New-York, the resolution was referred to the Military Committee. Mr. Olin moved to reconsider the vote of reference, and it was agreed to—yeas, sixty-seven; nays, twenty-five. Mr. Stevens moved that the resolution lie on the table—yeas, forty-four; nays, sixty-one. Mr. Vallandigham demanded the yeas and nays on its passage, and they were ordered—yeas, eighty-one; nays, forty. So the resolution was passed, and approved by the President on the fourth of April, 1862.

No. XXVI.—*Bill to increase the Efficiency of the Medical Department of the Army.*

In the Senate, on the seventh of February, 1862, Mr. Wilson introduced a bill to increase the efficiency of the medical department of the army, which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. On the twenty-second, Mr. Wilson reported it back with an amendment. The Senate, on the twenty-seventh, proceeded to consider it, the pending question being on the amendment reported by the Military Committee. The amendment proposed to strike out all after the enacting clause, and insert an amendment of seven sections, in the nature of a substitute. It provided that there should be added to the present medical corps of the army ten surgeons and ten assistant-surgeons, to be promoted and appointed under existing laws; twenty medical cadets, and as many hospital stewards as the Surgeon-General might consider necessary for the public service. That the Surgeon-General should have the rank, pay, and emoluments of a brigadier-general. There should be one assistant surgeon-general and one medical inspector-general of hospitals, each with the rank, pay, and emoluments of a colonel of cavalry; and the medical inspector-general should have, under the direction of the Surgeon-General, the supervision of all that relates to the sanitary condition of the army, whether in transports, quarters, or camps, and of the hygiene, police, discipline, and

efficiency of field and general hospitals, under such regulations as might thereafter be established. That there should be eight medical inspectors, with the rank, pay, and emoluments each of a lieutenant-colonel of cavalry, and who should be charged with the duty of inspecting the sanitary condition of transports, quarters, and camps, of field and general hospitals, and who should report to the medical inspector-general, under such regulations as might be thereafter established, all circumstances relating to the sanitary condition and wants of troops and of hospitals, and to the skill, efficiency, and good conduct of the officers and attendants connected with the medical department. That the Surgeon-General, the assistant surgeon-general, medical inspector-general, and medical inspectors, should be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, by selection from the surgeons of the army, without regard to their rank when so selected. That medical purveyors should be charged, under the direction of the Surgeon-General, with the selection and purchase of all medical supplies, including new standard preparations, and of all books, instruments, hospital stores, furniture, and other articles required for the sick and wounded of the army. In all cases of emergency they might provide such additional accommodations for the sick and wounded of the army, and might transport such medical supplies as circumstances might render necessary, under such regulations as might be thereafter established, and should make prompt and immediate issues upon all special requisitions made upon them under such circumstances by medical officers; and the special requisitions should consist simply of a list of the articles required, the quantities required, dated, and signed by the medical officer requiring them. That whenever the inspector-general, or any one of the medical inspectors, should report an officer of the medical corps as disqualified, by age or otherwise, for promotion to a higher grade, or unfitted for the performance of his professional duties, he should be reported by the Surgeon-General for examination to a medical board, as provided by the seventeenth section of the act approved August third, 1861.

Mr. Wilson moved to amend the fourth section by striking out the word "surgeons" and inserting the words "medical corps," so that it would provide that the Surgeon-General, the assistant surgeon-general, medical inspector-general, and medical inspectors should be appointed from the medical corps of the army, instead of the surgeons. After debate, in which Mr. Foster, Mr. Rice, Mr. Grimes, Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Sherman participated, the amendment to the amendment was agreed to. Mr. Grimes then moved to amend the same section by adding after the words inserted on motion of Mr. Wilson the words "or of the volunteer medical corps in the service of the United States," so that the officers might be selected from the medical corps of the army or of the volunteers. After debate, the amendment of Mr. Grimes to the amendment of the Military Committee was agreed to. moved to amend by striking out the selection from the medical corps of th from the volunteer medical corps in of the United States, without rega rank when so selected;" so that the could select in or out of the military se the amendment was rejected. Mr. California, moved that volunteer surge be examined for their appointments amendment was not agreed to.

On motion of Mr. Sherman, the ame the Military Committee was amended out the words, "that the Surgeon-Ge have the rank, pay, and emoluments dier-general." The amendment of th Committee that the assistant surge and the medical inspector-general o should have the rank, pay, and emol colonels of cavalry, and on motion of man, the words "colonels of caval stricken out, and "surgeons of ten y ice" inserted. On motion of Mr. She amendment was further amended, se medical inspectors should have the and emoluments of "assistant surge years' service," instead of "lieutena of cavalry." On motion of Mr. Grim amended so that the provisions of the continue only during the rebellion, amendment of the Military Committee, ed, was agreed to, and the bill as amen ed without a division.

The House, on the eleventh, referre to the Military Committee, and on the was reported back by Mr. Blair, with a ment, in the nature of a substitute; t tute being the original bill reported b ate Military Committee. On the eight House proceeded to consider the bill, ing question being on the substitute re the Military Committee. Mr. Blair, of Mr. McPherson, of Pennsylvania, Mr. of New-York, Mr. Blake, of Ohio, and logg, of Illinois, discussed its provisi Sherman, of New-York, moved to amen stitute by adding, at the end of the firs "that their pay, and that of all hosp ards in the volunteer as well as in th service, shall be forty-five dollars per m one ration, to be computed from the p this act." On the ninth of April, the sumed the consideration of the bill. bate, Mr. Sherman's amendment was Mr. McPherson, of Pennsylvania, then amend the proposed substitute by stri the words "the Surgeon-General to be under this act shall have the rank, emoluments of a brigadier-general;" but bate it was rejected. Mr. Wallace, of vania, moved to amend by striking out "regular," so that the appointments made from the volunteer or regular forc amendment was agreed to, the substitut ed by the Military Committee, as amen adopted, and the bill passed.

The Senate, on the tenth, proceeded to consider the amendment of the House, and, on motion of Mr. Wilson, the Senate disagreed to it, asked a committee of conference, and Mr. Wilson, Mr. Lane, of Indiana, and Mr. Nesmith, were appointed managers. The House insisted on its amendments, agreed to the committee of conference, and the Speaker appointed Mr. Blair, of Missouri, Mr. McPherson, of Pennsylvania, and Mr. Steele, of New-York, managers on the part of the House.

On the fourteenth, Mr. Wilson, from the committee of conference, reported that "the Senate concur in the amendment of the House to the bill, with the following amendments: in section one, line seven, after the word 'service,' strike out the words 'shall be forty-five dollars per month and one ration,' and insert in lieu thereof the words 'shall be thirty dollars per month;' and at the end of said section add as follows: 'and all medical cadets in the service shall, in addition to their pay, receive one ration per day, either in kind or commutation.' In section seven of said amendment of the House, strike out the whole section, and in lieu thereof insert the seventh section of the original bill of the Senate, with the following amendment thereto: at the end of the said seventh section of the Senate bill add as follows: '*Provided, however*, That when this act shall expire, all officers who shall have been promoted from the medical staff of the army under this act shall retain their respective rank in the army with such promotion as they would have been entitled to.'" The Senate concurred in the report. On the fifteenth, Mr. Blair reported to the House, and the report was agreed to. So the bill passed, and was approved by the President on the sixteenth of April, 1862.

No. XXVII.—*The Bill to facilitate the Discharge of Enlisted Men for Physical Disability.*

In the Senate, on the twenty-ninth of April, 1862, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, introduced a bill to facilitate the discharge of enlisted men for physical disability, which was read twice and referred to the Military Committee. On the second of May, Mr. Wilson, from the Committee, reported it back without amendment.

It empowered the medical inspector general, or any medical inspector, to discharge from the service of the United States any soldier or enlisted man laboring under any physical disability which made it disadvantageous to the service that he be retained therein; and the certificate in writing of the inspector general or medical inspector, setting forth the existence and nature of such physical disability, was to be sufficient evidence of the discharge; but it was provided that every such certificate should appear on its face to have been founded on personal inspection of the soldier discharged, and should specifically describe the nature and origin of his disability; and that the discharge should be without prejudice to the right of the soldier to the pay due him at its date.

On the ninth, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill; it was amended on motion of Mr. Wilson, so as to apply only to soldiers in permanent hospitals, and passed without a division. In the House, on the twelfth, the bill was taken up on motion of Mr. Fenton, of New-York. On motion of Mr. Richardson, of Illinois, it was so amended as to require the consent of the enlisted man to his discharge by the medical inspectors. It was then passed without a division. The Senate, on the same day, concurred in the House amendment, and it was approved by the President on the fourteenth of May, 1862.

No. XXVIII.—*Bill to authorize the Appointment of Medical Storekeepers.*

In the Senate, on the seventh of May, 1862, Mr. Wilson reported from the Military Committee a bill to authorize the appointment of medical storekeepers. It authorized the Secretary of War to add to the medical department of the army, medical storekeepers, not exceeding six in number, who were to have the pay and emoluments of military storekeepers in the quartermaster's department, who were to be skilled apothecaries or druggists, who were to give the bond and security required by existing laws for military storekeepers in the quartermaster's department, and to be stationed at such points as the necessities of the army might require. The provisions of the bill were to remain in force only during the continuance of the rebellion. On the eighth, the Senate proceeded to its consideration, and amended it on motion of Mr. Wilson, by adding a section, providing that the President was authorized to appoint, if he should deem it necessary, a chaplain for each permanent hospital, whose pay, with that of chaplains of hospitals heretofore appointed by him, should be the same as that of regimental chaplains in the volunteer force, and who should be subject to such rules in relation to leave of absence from duty as were prescribed for commissioned officers of the army. It was then passed. In the House, on the fifteenth, Mr. Blair reported back the bill from the Military Committee, demanded the previous question, and under its operation it was passed. It was approved by the President on the twentieth of May, 1862.

No. XXIX.—*A Bill providing that Company Officers of Volunteers should be paid on the Pay-Roll of their Regiment or Company, except when on Detached Service.*

In the House, on the twenty-second of June, 1862, Mr. Kellogg, of Michigan, introduced a bill providing that officers of volunteers should be paid on the pay-rolls of the regiments or companies to which they belonged, which was read twice, and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. On the thirteenth, Mr. Dunn, of Indiana, reported it back without amendment. It provided that company officers of volunteers should be paid on the muster and pay-rolls of their company, party, or detachment, and not otherwise, except when such officer should be on detailed service without troops, or on leave of ab-

sence. The bill was passed without a division. The Senate, on the fourteenth, on motion of Mr. Wilson, took it up, considered, and passed it, and it was approved by the President on the eighteenth of June, 1862.

No. XXX.—*Bill to limit the Number of Major-Generals and Brigadier-Generals to be appointed.*

In the Senate, on the second of May, 1862. Mr. Grimes introduced a bill to limit the appointment of major-generals and brigadier-generals in the army and volunteers, which was read twice, and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. On the fifth, Mr. Wilson reported it back with an amendment. It provided for the appointment of twenty major-generals, and two hundred brigadier-generals. The amendment proposed to make the number of major-generals "thirty" instead of "twenty." The amendment was agreed to, Mr. Hale moved to strike out "two hundred," and insert "one hundred and eighty." The Senate, on the seventh, on motion of Mr. Wilson, resumed the consideration of the bill, the pending question being on Mr. Hale's amendment, and it was further debated by Mr. Wilson, Mr. Hale, Mr. Harris, Mr. Lane, of Kansas, Mr. Ten Eyck, Mr. Chandler, and Mr. Grimes. The Senate resumed its consideration on the eighth, and the vote was taken on Mr. Hale's amendment, and it was lost—yeas, sixteen; nays, nineteen. The bill was then passed as amended. The House referred it to the Military Committee, and Mr. Olin, on the tenth of June, reported it back with a recommendation that it should not pass, and it was laid on the table.

No. XXXI.—*The Bill to provide Additional Medical Officers of the Volunteer Service.*

In the Senate, on the ninth of June, 1862, Ma Wilson, of Massachusetts, introduced a bill to provide for additional medical officers, which was read twice, and referred to the Military Committee. On the tenth, the bill was reported back by Mr. Wilson without amendment. It authorized the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint forty surgeons, and one hundred and twenty assistant-surgeons of volunteers, who were to have the rank, pay, and emoluments of officers of corresponding grades in the regular army, but no person was to be appointed to any of those positions unless he should have been previously examined by a board of medical officers to be appointed by the Secretary of War, and vacancies in the grade of surgeon were to be filled by selection from the grade of assistant-surgeon, on the ground of merit only. The act was to continue in force only during the existence of the rebellion. The Senate, on the eleventh, proceeded to the consideration of the bill, and after debate, in which Mr. Wilson, Mr. Grimes, Mr. Clark, Mr. Foster, Mr. Browning, and other Senators participated, it was passed without opposition. In the House, on the thirteenth, the bill was taken from the Speaker's table, and Mr. Blair moved to it, by adding two additional sections, pr that the office of brigade surgeon should b lished, and the officers of that corps be he designated surgeons of volunteers, and other respects be put upon the same footin rank, pay, and emoluments with the su provided for in the act. That there sho added to each volunteer regiment in the a an assistant-surgeon, to be appointed acc to the existing laws of the several States, ing for the appointment of regimental sur The amendment was agreed to. On mo Mr. Trimble, of Ohio, the bill was so amer to provide that the surgeons appointed und act, should be under forty years of age. T was then passed as amended, without a di On the seventeenth, the Senate concurred House amendments, with an amendment s out the proviso that the surgeon appointe the act should be under forty years of age House concurred in the Senate amendmen House amendment. On the second of Ju President returned the bill without his ap for the reason that he had signed an act w same title intended to supersede it, and question, shall the bill pass, the Senate mously voted in the negative. In the Se the twenty-fifth of June, Mr. Wilson intro bill to provide for additional medical office volunteer service. The object, Mr. Wils was to correct an error in the other bill the hands of the President. It was consid unanimous consent, and passed. On the sixth of June, the House took from the S table the bill on motion of Mr. Olin, and, planations, it passed unanimously, and proved by the President, on the second 1862.

No. XXXII.—*The Joint Resolution to age Enlistments in the Regular and V Forces.*

In the Senate, on the fourth of June, son introduced a joint resolution to e enlistments in the regular army and v forces. It proposed that so much of t section of "an act for the better organi the military establishment" as aboli premium paid for bringing accepted re the rendezvous, should be repealed, ar mium of two dollars be paid to any citi commissioned officer, or soldier, for an recruit for the regular army; and that dier who enlisted, either in the regular the volunteers, for three years, or du war, might receive his first month's p vance, upon the mustering of his com the service, or after he should have b tered into and joined a regiment alrea service. It was considered and passed.

In the House, on the seventeenth, resolution, on motion of Mr. Dunn, of was taken up, read twice, and referr Military Committee. On the eighteen reported back by Mr. Olin, of New-Y

after debate, passed, and was approved by the President, on the twenty-first of June, 1862.

No. XXXIII.—*Bill making Appropriations for the Support of the Army.*

The House, on the fourteenth of May, 1862, passed the bill making appropriations for the support of the army, for the year ending the thirtieth of June, 1863.

In the Senate, on the twenty-first of June, Mr. Fessenden, from the Finance Committee, to which it had been referred, reported it back with amendments. The Senate proceeded, on the first of July, to consider the bill and amendments. The House appropriated for the pay of volunteers, under the acts of the twenty-second and twenty-fifth of July, 1861, the sum of two hundred and twenty-six million two hundred and eighty-three thousand two hundred and eighty-two dollars. The Committee on Finance proposed to amend it by striking out that amount, and inserting in lieu of it, "one hundred and fifty million dollars: *Provided*, That the President shall not be authorized to increase the force of volunteers beyond the number of seven hundred and fifty thousand men, rank and file; nor to appoint more than —— major-generals, nor more than —— brigadier-generals. And all acts and parts of acts authorizing a larger force, or a greater number of major and brigadier-generals than are above provided for, are hereby repealed." Mr. King stated that he was authorized by the Military Committee to oppose the adoption of the amendment. Mr. Hale moved to amend the amendment so that it would read: "That the President shall not be authorized to appoint more than forty major-generals, nor more than two hundred brigadier-generals, and all acts and parts of acts authorizing a greater number of major and brigadier-generals than are above provided for, are hereby repealed." After debate, in which Mr. Hale, Mr. King, Mr. Fessenden, Mr. Grimes, Mr. Dixon, Mr. Trumbull, and Mr. Foster participated, the amendment was agreed to.

The bill was further amended, on motion of Mr. King, in obedience to the instructions of the Military Committee, by adopting new sections, providing "that there should be added to the clerical force of the Surgeon-General's office one clerk of class one, and one clerk of class two; and there should be added to the clerical force of the Paymaster-General's office three clerks of class four, six clerks of class three, eleven clerks of class two, and twenty clerks of class one; and that there should be added to the clerical and other force of the Adjutant-General's office two clerks of class four, two clerks of class three, six clerks of class one, and ten other clerks at a monthly compensation of sixty dollars each; and the Adjutant-General might detail ten more non-commissioned officers of the army as clerks in his office. That section five of the 'Act to authorize the employment of volunteers to aid in enforcing the laws and protecting public property,' approved July twenty-second, 1861; and section five of the 'Act to increase the present military establishment of the United States,' approved July twenty-ninth, 1861, should be so construed as to allow twenty-five dollars of the bounty of one hundred dollars therein provided, to be paid immediately after enlistment to every soldier of the regular army and volunteer forces thereafter enlisted during the continuance of the war; and the sum of seven million five hundred thousand dollars is hereby appropriated for such payments. That the President of the United Stated be authorized, by and with the consent and advice of the Senate, to appoint as many military storekeepers in the quartermaster's department of the army as the exigencies of the service might require: *Provided*, The whole number of military storekeepers in that department should not exceed twelve. That so much of the seventh section of the 'Act to found a military asylum for the relief and support of invalid and disabled soldiers of the army of the United States,' as required that 'all moneys, not exceeding two thirds of the balance on hand of the hospital fund, and of the post fund of each military station, after deducting the necessary expenses,' should be set apart to support the Military Asylum, be repealed." And that two million dollars be appropriated for providing for the comfort of discharged soldiers, who might arrive in the principal cities of the United States, disabled by disease or wounds, and unable to proceed to their homes, and for forwarding destitute soldiers to their homes. The House concurred in the amendments, and the bill passed, and was approved by the President, on the fifth of July, 1862.

No. XXXIV.—*The Joint Resolution providing for the Presentation of "Medals of Honor," to the Enlisted Men of the Army and Volunteer Forces, who have or who may distinguish themselves in Battle during the present Rebellion.*

In the Senate, on the thirteenth of May, 1862, Mr. Wilson reported from the Military Committee a joint resolution to provide for the presentation of "medals of honor" to enlisted men distinguished in battle. It provided that the President of the United States should be authorized to cause two thousand "medals of honor" to be prepared, with suitable emblematic devices, and to direct that the same be presented, in the name of Congress, to such non-commissioned officers and privates as should most distinguish themselves by their gallantry in action, and other soldier-like qualities during the present insurrection; and that the sum of ten thousand dollars be appropriated for the purpose of carrying the resolution into effect. On the nineteenth, the resolution, on motion of Mr. Wilson, was taken up, ordered to be engrossed, and passed without division. In the House, on the tenth of July, Mr. Olin, from the Military Committee, reported back the joint resolution for the presentation of "medals of honor," and it was passed without division, and approved by the President, on the twelfth of July, 1862.

No. XXXV.—*The Bill prohibiting the Confinement of Persons in the Military Service of the United States in the Penitentiary of the District of Columbia.*

In the House of Representatives, on the thirteenth of June, 1862, Mr. Bingham, of Ohio, from the Committee on the Judiciary, reported a bill to prohibit the confinement of persons in the military service in the Penitentiary of the District of Columbia, except as a punishment of certain crimes, and to discharge from the prison certain convicts by sentence of court-martial, which was recommitted to the Committee, with leave to report at any time. On the fifth of July, Mr. Bingham reported it back with amendments, and the House proceeded to its consideration. The bill provided that soldiers should not be confined in the Penitentiary of the District of Columbia, unless their offence, by common law, or a statute of the United States, subject them to such punishment; or except for mutiny, desertion, or an attempt to incite mutiny. Mr. Dawes moved to amend by adding that "no person thereafter, upon the decision of a court-martial, should be confined in any penitentiary in the United States, except under the conditions of the act." The amendment was agreed to, and the bill passed as amended.

In the Senate, on the eighth of July, Mr. Wilson, from the Military Committee, reported back the bill with amendments. The amendments proposed to strike out the words, "or such person be convicted of mutiny, or desertion, or an attempt to incite mutiny." Mr. Grimes opposed the amendment; Mr. Wilson, Mr. Harris, and Mr. Rice supported it; and it was agreed to, and the bill, as amended, passed on the twelfth. On the same day, the House, on motion of Mr. Wilson, of Iowa, took the bill from the Speaker's table, and, after debate, it was referred to the Judiciary Committee, with leave to report at any time. The House disagreed to the Senate amendments, and asked a committee of conference, and appointed Mr. Wilson, of Iowa, Mr. Dawes, of Massachusetts, and Mr. Phelps, of Missouri, managers. In the Senate, on the fourteenth, Mr. Wilson moved that the Senate insist on its amendments, and concur in the conference asked for by the House. The motion prevailed, and Mr. Wilson, Mr. Lane, of Indiana, and Mr. Wilkinson, were appointed managers. On the fifteenth Mr. Wilson, from the conference committee, reported, "that the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate to the bill, and agree to the same;" and the report was accepted. In the House, on the sixteenth, Mr. Wilson, of Iowa, made a report from the conference committee, and it was agreed to, and the bill was approved by the President, on the sixteenth day of July, 1862.

No. XXXVI.—*The Joint Resolution to authorize the Secretary of War to furnish extra Clothing to Sick and Wounded Soldiers.*

In the House, on the fifth of July, 1862, Mr. Hale, of Pennsylvania, by unanim introduced a bill authorizing the S War to furnish extra clothing for sick ed soldiers. It proposed to "authori tary of War to furnish extra clothing wounded, and other soldiers who mig the same by the casualties of war, rules and regulations as the departi prescribe, during the existence of tl tion." It was read three times and p Senate referred it to the Committee Affairs, and on the tenth, Mr. Wilson back without amendment. By una sent, it was read three times and pass approved by the President on the tw ly, 1862.

No. XXXVII.—*The Bill to amend t ing forth the Militia to execute the press Insurrection, and repel Inva*

In the Senate, on the eighth of Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, fron mittee on Military Affairs, reporte amend the act calling forth the militi the laws of the Union, suppress i and repel invasions, approved Febru eighth, 1795, which was read a first passed to a second reading. On the Senate resumed the consideration of amend the acts calling forth the mi cute the laws. It provided that wl President should call forth the militi ployed in the service of the United might specify in his call the period such service would be required, and so called should be mustered in, and serve, for the term specified, unless charged; and the organization of when so called into service, was to be to the organization prescribed by tl volunteers. Mr. Grimes, of Iowa, amend the bill by adding three secti ing that there should be no exemptic performance of military duty under law of the United States on account lineage; but whenever the militia sho ed into service, all loyal, able-bodied sons, between the ages now fixed b of the United States, should be called fence of the country. That when should be called into the service of States, under any law of the United President should have full power an to organize them into battalions, regi gades, and divisions, according to th color, as he should believe that the terest might require; and that the pr the two preceding sections should be so as to apply to and include volu might thereafter be called into the se United States, and all persons who h might thereafter be, enrolled in the volunteers, or as militia, should recei and rations of soldiers as allowed by ing to their respective grades. Mr. of Delaware, and Mr. Carlisle, of V

posed the amendment. Mr. King, of New-York, suggested a modification of the amendment so that the first two sections would read: "That the President be authorized to receive into the service of the United States, for the purpose of constructing intrenchments, or performing camp-service, or any other labor, or any war-service for which they may be found competent, persons of African descent; and such persons shall be enrolled and organized under such regulations, not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws, as the President may prescribe, and they shall be fed, and paid such compensation for their services as they may agree to receive when enrolled; and that when any man or boy of African descent shall render any such service as is provided for in the first section of this act, he, his mother, and his wife and children shall for ever thereafter be free, any law, usage, or custom whatsoever to the contrary notwithstanding." Mr. Grimes accepted the amendment in lieu of the first sections of his amendment. Mr. Saulsbury denounced the measure as "the most magnificent scheme of emancipation yet proposed." Mr. Sherman, of Ohio, had no doubt of the constitutional power of Congress to enroll black and white, free and slave for the defence of the country; but it would affect alike the loyal and disloyal; would therefore be unjust, and should be modified. Mr. Fessenden, of Maine, said: "I would do nothing that a civilized people ought not to do; I would employ no barbarians; I would not bring back the days of the tomahawk and scalping-knife; but any thing within the rules of civilized warfare that it is in my power to do, I would do, and it ought to be done." Mr. Rice, of Minnesota, thought the nation must speedily acknowledge the independence of the Confederacy, "or use all the means given us by the Almighty to prosecute the war to a successful termination." Mr. Wilson confessed that he looked "with something of admiration upon the mode in which the Southern traitorous leaders have carried on this war. They commenced the war by taking humanity by the throat, by putting under their feet every moral sentiment, every law of Almighty God. They planted themselves in defiance of God and of man upon the foundation of eternal slavery. Standing before the nations in that position, in defiance of all that is sacred, pure, and holy on earth, they have appealed to their people, to their passions, to their prejudices, to their hate; they have organized their people; they have issued their conscriptions, using every man who could do any thing, no matter how halt or maimed he might be, if he could strike a blow; they have carried on their military operations with great ability, and shown vast powers and great administrative ability, and great military ability. We are in one of the darkest periods of this contest, and we had better look our position in the face, meet the responsibilities of the hour, rise to the demands of the occasion, pour out our money, summon our men to the field, go ourselves, if we can do any good, and overthrow this confederate power that feels to-day, over its recent magnificent triumphs, that it has already achieved its independence. Bold and decisive action alone, in the cabinet and in the field, can retrieve our adverse fortunes, and carry our country triumphantly through the perils that threaten to dismember the republic." Mr. Davis, of Kentucky, opposed the calling out of negroes for military purposes. Mr. Wilkinson and Mr. Rice supported that policy.

On the tenth, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill. Mr. Collamer, of Vermont, had no doubt of the power to use colored men for the defence of the country: it was simply a question of expediency. Mr. Ten Eyck proposed so to amend the amendment as to strike out the words "any military or naval," before "service." He thought it would not affect the section, but would relieve it of its asperity. Mr. King opposed the amendment of Mr. Ten Eyck. The Chair ruled that Mr. Ten Eyck's amendment was not in order. Mr. Davis moved to amend by striking out the words, "or any military or naval service for which they may be found competent." After remarks by Mr. Doolittle, of Wisconsin, and Mr. Hale, of New-Hampshire, the vote was taken, and the amendment of Mr. Davis lost—yeas, eleven; nays, twenty-seven. Mr. Saulsbury moved to postpone indefinitely the consideration of the bill, but the motion was lost—yeas, nine; nays, twenty-seven. Mr. Henderson, of Missouri, moved so to amend the bill as to provide only for the freedom of persons of African descent as owe service to persons engaged in the rebellion—yeas, thirteen; nays, twenty-two. Mr. Henderson then moved to so amend the amendment as to provide that loyal persons should be compensated for the loss of the services of the slaves employed under the provisions of the act—yeas, twenty; nays, seventeen. The amendment of Mr. Grimes, as amended, was then agreed to. The question recurring on the second section of Mr. Grimes's amendment, providing that when any man or boy should render service, he, his mother, wife and children should be free, Mr. Sherman moved to amend it so as to apply only to persons owing service to any person who has borne arms against the United States, or adhered to their enemies by giving them aid and comfort—yeas, twenty-two; nays, sixteen. Mr. Browning, of Illinois, moved to amend the amendment by striking out of the persons to be made free, "his mother, wife, and children." Mr. Lane, of Kansas, and Mr. King opposed the amendment of Mr. Browning, and on the eleventh it was rejected—yeas, seventeen; nays, twenty-one. Mr. Browning then moved to amend by adding as a proviso: "That the mother, wife, and children of such man or boy of African descent shall not be made free by the operation of this act, except where such mother, wife, and children owe service or labor to some person who, during the present rebellion, had borne arms against the United States, or adhered to their enemies by giving them aid and comfort." Mr. Cowan, of Pennsylvania, and Mr. Davis supported the amendment, and Mr. Howe, of Wisconsin, Mr. Harlan,

of Iowa, and Mr. Wilkinson, of Minnesota, opposed it.

On the twelfth, Mr. Wilson, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported a bill to amend the "Act calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions," approved February twenty-eighth, 1795, and the acts amendatory thereof, and for other purposes; which was read twice, and ordered to be printed. The bill contained fifteen sections, and provided that whenever the President should call forth the militia, he might specify in his call the period for which such service would be required, not exceeding nine months; and if, by reason of defects in existing laws or in the execution of them in the several States, or any of them, it should be found necessary to provide for enrolling the militia, and otherwise putting the act into execution, the President was authorized to make all necessary rules and regulations; and the enrolment should include all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, and be apportioned among the States according to representative population. That the militia, when so called into service, should be organized in the mode prescribed by law for volunteers. That the President be authorized to accept the services of any number of volunteers, not exceeding one hundred thousand, as infantry, for a period of nine months, and every soldier who should enlist under the provisions of the section should receive his first month's pay, and also twenty-five dollars as bounty. That for the purpose of filling up the regiments of infantry then in the service, the President be authorized to accept the services of volunteers for twelve months, and such volunteers should be in all respects upon a footing with similar troops in the United States service, except as to service bounty, which should be fifty dollars, one half to be paid upon their joining their regiments, and the other half at the expiration of their enlistment. That the President should appoint a judge-advocate general, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of a colonel of cavalry, to whose office should be returned, for revision, the records and proceedings of all courts-martial and military commissions, and where a record should be kept of all proceedings had thereupon—and no sentence of death, or imprisonment in the penitentiary, should be carried into execution until the same should be approved by the President. That there might be appointed by the President for each army in the field a judge-advocate, with the rank, pay, and emoluments, each, of a major of cavalry. That thereafter all offenders in the army adjudged to be punished by a court-martial should be brought before a field-officer of his regiment, who should hear and determine the offence, and order the punishment to be inflicted. That all officers who had been mustered into the service of the United States as battalion adjutants and quartermasters of cavalry under the orders of the War Department, exceeding the number authorized by law, should be paid as such for the time they were actually employed in the service of the United States, and tha such officers then in service exceeding the ı ber, should be immediately mustered out o service. That the President be authorized t tablish and organize army corps. That each corps should have the following officers atta who should constitute the staff of the comm er—one assistant adjutant-general, one qua master, one commissary of subsistence, and assistant inspector-general, who should bea spectively, the rank of lieutenant-colonel, who should be assigned from the army or v teer force by the President; and also three a de-camp, one to bear the rank of major, and to bear the rank of captain; and the senior cer of artillery in each army should, in add to his other duties, act as chief of artillery and nance at the headquarters of the corps. Tha cavalry forces should be thus organized— regiment of cavalry should have one colonel lieutenant-colonel, three majors, one surgeon assistant surgeon, one regimental commis one sergeant-major, one quartermaster-serg one commissary-sergeant, two hospital stew one saddler-sergeant, one chief trumpeter, one chief farrier or blacksmith; and each ment should consist of twelve companies each company should have one captain, one lieutenant, one second lieutenant, and one s numerary second lieutenant, one first serg one quartermaster sergeant, one commissary geant, five sergeants, eight corporals, two sters, two farriers or blacksmiths, one sad one wagoner, and seventy-eight privates; regimental adjutants, the regimental qu masters, and regimental commissaries t taken from their respective regiments. Tha President be authorized to receive into the ice of the United States, for the purpose of structing intrenchments, or performing service, or any other labor, or any milita naval service for which they may be found petent, persons of African descent; and suc sons should be enrolled and organized such regulations as the President might scribe. That when any man or boy of A descent should render any such service as provided for in the act, he, his mother an wife and children should for ever thereaft free, any law, usage, or custom whatsoev the contrary notwithstanding. That ten milli dollars be appropriated to carry the proviso the act into effect. That all persons who had or should be enrolled in the service unde act, should receive the pay and rations all by law to soldiers according to their resp grades: *Provided*, that persons of African de should receive ten dollars per month and ration.

On the fourteenth, on motion of Mr. Sher the bill was amended, so that three dolla the ten dollars of compensation of colore sons should be in clothing. On motion o King, the bill was amended, by strikin ten million dollars, and inserting that th penses incurred in carrying the act into

should be paid out of the general appropriation for the army. Mr. Sherman moved to amend the bill, by providing that all enlistments thereafter made should be credited to the States respectively in which the same should be made, and be deducted from any future draft in pursuance of the act; but it was rejected. On motion of Mr. Hale, the bill was so amended as to limit the number of staff-officers of corps commanders to the number provided for in the tenth section.

On the fifteenth, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill. Mr. Sherman moved to amend the thirteenth section, so as to make it read: "That when any man or boy of African descent, who, by the laws of any State, shall owe service or labor to any person who, during the present rebellion, has levied war, or has borne arms against the United States, or adhered to their enemies, by giving them aid and comfort, shall render any such service as is provided for in this act, he, his mother, and his wife and child, shall for ever thereafter be free." Mr. Lane, Mr. Pomeroy, Mr. Howard, and Mr. Harlan opposed the amendment, but it was agreed to—yeas, eighteen; nays, seventeen. Mr. Wilson moved to amend the bill, by adding that medical purveyors and storekeepers should give bonds in such sum as the Secretary of War might require, with security to be approved by him, and the amendment was agreed to. Mr. Wilson then moved an additional section, providing that the sum of fifteen thousand dollars be appropriated for the purchase of artificial limbs for soldiers and seamen disabled in the service of the United States, to be expended under the direction of the Surgeon-General; but, on the suggestion of Mr. Grimes, he withdrew it, and it was, by unanimous consent, put as an amendment on to the supplemental civil appropriation bill.

Mr. Browning moved to strike out the words, "his mother, wife and children," so that the bill would simply provide for the freedom of the person of African descent rendering military service, but the amendment was lost—yeas, seventeen; nays, twenty. Mr. Browning then moved to amend, by adding a proviso, that the mother, wife and children of such man or boy of African descent should not be made free by the operation of the act, except where such mother, wife, or children owed service or labor to some person who, during the rebellion, had borne arms against the United States, or adhered to their enemies, by giving them aid and comfort. The amendment was supported by Mr. Henderson, and agreed to — yeas, twenty-one; nays, sixteen. After debate by Mr. Wright, of Indiana, Mr. Henderson, of Missouri, and Mr. Powell, of Kentucky, the vote was taken on the passage of the bill, and it passed—yeas, twenty-eight; nays, nine.

In the House, on the sixteenth, on motion of Mr. Stevens, the bill was taken from the Speaker's table, and read twice. Mr. Stevens moved the previous question. Mr. Holman, of Indiana, moved that the bill be laid upon the table, but the motion was lost—yeas, thirty; nays, seventy-seven. The previous question was then ordered, and the bill passed. It was approved by the President on the seventeenth of July, 1862.

No. XXXVIII.—*The Bill to define the Pay and Emoluments of certain Officers of the Army, and for other purposes.*

In the Senate, on the twenty-eighth of January, 1862, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, introduced a bill to define the pay and emoluments of certain officers in the army, which was read twice, and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. On the fourth of February, Mr. Wilson reported it back, with an amendment as a substitute. On the fifth, the Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, proceeded to the consideration of the bill, the pending question being upon the amendment as a substitute. The amendment provided that officers of the army having brevet commissions should not be entitled to any increase of pay or emoluments, because of the exercise of command according to their brevet rank. That officers entitled to forage for horses should not be allowed to commute it, but should draw the allowance in kind. That major-generals should be entitled to draw forage for four horses; brigadier-generals for three horses; colonels, lieutenant-colonels, and majors, two horses each; captains and lieutenants of cavalry and artillery for two horses each; and chaplains for one horse. That whenever an officer of the army should employ a soldier as his servant, he should, for each month deduct, from his own monthly pay, the full amount paid to or expended by the Government per month on account of the soldier. That the first section of the act approved August sixth, 1861, increasing the pay of privates, should not be so construed as to increase the emoluments of the commissioned officers. That so much of the act approved twenty-second July, 1861, as authorized each regiment of volunteers to have twenty-four musicians for a band, be repealed. That each brigade should have sixteen musicians as a band, to be selected from the regimental bands mustered out of service. That, in lieu of the present rate of mileage allowed to officers, not more than six cents per mile should thereafter be allowed, unless when an officer was ordered from a station east of the Rocky Mountains to one west of the same mountains, or *vice versa*, when ten cents per mile should be allowed. That, during the continuance of the present rebellion, there should be deducted from the compensation of all persons employed in the military, naval, and civil service of the United States, except warrant officers and sailors in the navy, and non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates in the army, ten per centum of the amount of their compensation. That in each of the permanent hospitals, where the President might deem it necessary, he might appoint a chaplain. That no person should be appointed a chaplain in the United States army who was not a regularly ordained minister of some reli-

gious denomination. That so much of the act approved July twenty-second, 1861, as allowed forty cents per day for the use and risk of the horses of company officers of cavalry, be repealed. That whenever an officer should be put under arrest, except at remote military posts or stations, it should be the duty of the officer by whose orders he was arrested, to see that a copy of the charges on which he had been arrested and was to be tried should be served upon him within eight days thereafter, and that he should be brought to trial within ten days thereafter, unless the necessities of the service prevent such trial, and then he should be brought to trial within thirty days after the expiration of the ten days. That whenever the name of any army officer should have been borne on the Army Register forty-five years, or he should be of the age of sixty-two years, he should be retired from active service; and that the President be authorized to assign any officer who might be retired to any duty.

Mr. Sherman moved to amend the ninth section of the bill making a deduction of ten per cent in salaries of officers in the military, naval, and civil service, by requiring the deduction to apply to all allowances for mileage, and for commutation for servants, forage, and rations, and to all fees or contingent allowances paid for personal services from the treasury of the United States. Mr. Doolittle moved to amend the amendment, and Mr. Sherman accepted it so as to read: "And this deduction shall apply to all allowances for mileage, for commutation for servants, forage, and rations, and for all fees and contingent allowances paid for personal services from the Treasury of the United States; and the rate of mileage of members of Congress shall be reduced fifty per cent, to be computed by the most direct travelled route from his residence to the seat of Congress. A statement of the mileage of each Senator shall be certified to the Secretary of the Senate, and of each Representative and Delegate to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives, by the Postmaster-General, within thirty days of the commencement of each session of Congress." Mr. Simmons, of Rhode Island, and Mr. Howe, of Wisconsin, opposed the amendment. Mr. Howe could not vote for the ninth section, making a deduction on Government salaries. Mr. Trumbull regretted that Mr. Sherman and Mr. Doolittle had pressed their amendments. Mr. Sherman's original amendment was agreed to, and Mr. Doolittle proposed to add a new section, reducing the rate of mileage fifty per cent. The amendment was opposed by Mr. McDougall, and was agreed to—yeas, twenty-nine; nays, ten. Mr. Howe moved to strike out the ninth section making a deduction in salaries of ten per cent during the war—yeas, two; nays, thirty-six.

Yeas—Messrs. Howe and McDougall—two.

Nays—Messrs. Anthony, Browning, Chandler, Clark, Collamer, Cowan, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Fessenden, Foot, Foster, Harlan, Harris, Henderson, Johnson, King, Lane of Indiana, Latham, Morrill, Nesmith, Pomeroy, Powell, Rice, Sa bury, Sherman, Sumner, Ten Eyck, Thoms Trumbull, Wade, Wilkinson, Willey, Wilm Wilson of Massachusetts, and Wilson of M souri—thirty-six.

On the fourteenth, the Senate resumed the c sideration of the bill. Mr. Wilson moved amend by adding as a new section: "That number of paymasters of the volunteer for of the United States shall be reduced so not to exceed one hundred and twenty-fiv and the amendment was agreed to. Mr. W son moved to amend by adding as a new sectic "That quarters and fuel shall be furnished officers only when on duty in the field, or wh assigned quarters in public buildings belong to the Government. The number of offices n allowed to certain officers of the army for transaction of business shall be furnished, a no more;" and the amendment was agreed On motion of Mr. Wilson, the bill was furt amended, by adding as additional sections:

"That the bounty now allowed by law to s diers in the service of the United States shall, the event that a soldier entitled thereto shall intestate, without having drawn the same, paid to the following persons, and in the or following, and to no other persons, to wit: fi to the widow of such deceased soldier, if th be one; second, if there be no widow, then the children of such deceased soldier, share a share alike; third, if such soldier left neit widow nor children (or children born in law wedlock,) then and in that case such bou shall be paid to the following persons, provid they be residents of the United States, to w first, to his father, or, if he be dead, or has ab doned his family, then to the mother of such s dier; and if there be neither father nor mot as aforesaid, then such bounty shall be paid such brothers and sisters resident as aforesa who may have been dependent upon such int tate for support. That all contracts made for, orders given for, the purchase of goods or s plies by any department of the Government sh be promptly reported to Congress by the pro head of such department, if Congress shall the time be in session, and if not in session, s reports shall be made at the commencement the next session. That no contract or or made as aforesaid, or any interest therein, sh be transferred by the party or parties to wh such contract or order may be given, to any ot party or parties, and that any such transfer sh cause the annulment of the contract or or tranferred, so far as the United States are c cerned: *Provided*, That all rights of action hereby reserved to the United States for a breach of such contract by the contracting pa or parties. That the President of the Uni States be, and hereby is, authorized and requ ed to dismiss and discharge from the milit service, either in the army, navy, or volunteer fo in the United States service, any officer for a cause which, in his judgment, renders such c cer unsuitable for service, and whose dismissi

in his judgment, would promote the public service."

Mr. Sherman moved to repeal the act authorizing the President to appoint additional aids-de-camp, and to discharge the staff-officers so appointed in thirty days; but after debate withdrew it. Mr. Grimes renewed the amendment, so modified as simply to repeal the act of August fifth, 1861.

On the fifth of March, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill, and Mr. Grimes's amendment was, on the suggestion of Mr. Clark, of New-Hampshire, modified so as to read, "That the act approved the fifth of August, 1861, entitled 'An act supplementary to an act entitled "An act to increase the present military establishment of the United States," approved the twenty-ninth of July, 1861,' be, and the same is hereby, repealed. But the repeal of the said act shall not be construed so as to deprive those persons already appointed under it from holding their offices in the same way and manner as if it had not been repealed;" and the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. Foster, of Connecticut, moved to strike out the tenth section in regard to chaplains, and insert: "That in each of the permanent hospitals, where the President may deem it necessary, he may appoint a chaplain, who shall receive the same compensation as is now allowed to chaplains in the volunteer service." Mr. Foster's amendment was rejected. Mr. Rice proposed to amend it so as to read, "That the appointments of chaplains to the army hospitals, as made by the President of the United States, are hereby approved, and the chaplains so appointed shall be compensated for their services in the same manner as regimental chaplains;" and the amendment of Mr. Rice was agreed to. Mr. Harlan moved to so modify the tenth section as to provide that chaplains in permanent hospitals should receive one thousand dollars per annum—yeas, fourteen, nays, twenty-three; so the amendment was rejected. Mr. Nesmith moved to add to the eleventh section the words, "and that hereafter there shall be but one chaplain in a brigade;" but it was rejected. Mr. Rice moved to add as a new section: "That hereafter all chaplains, whether in the regular or volunteer service or hospitals, shall receive one thousand two hundred dollars per annum." Mr. Harlan demanded the yeas and nays, and they were ordered. The amendment was adopted—yeas, thirty-one; nays, ten.

On the twelfth, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill, and Mr. Rice moved to strike out the ninth section, relating to the deduction on salaries, and the sixteenth section, relating to mileage. Mr. Grimes moved to amend the ninth section so that the salaries over eight hundred dollars per annum should pay ten per cent; but the motion was rejected. Mr. Rice's motion to strike out the ninth section was lost—yeas, twenty; nays, twenty; the Vice-President voted nay. The motion to strike out the sixteenth section, relating to the mileage, was lost—yeas, eight; nays, thirty-two.

On motion of Mr. Wilson, the bill was amended by adding as new sections: "That every person who shall furnish supplies of any kind to the army or navy, shall be required to mark and distinguish the same on the outside of each and every package, with the name or names of the contractors so furnishing such supplies to the army or navy; and no supplies of any kind shall be received unless so marked and distinguished. That the President of the United States shall have power, whenever in his opinion it shall be expedient, to purchase cemetery grounds, and cause them to be securely inclosed, to be used as a national cemetery for the soldiers who shall die in the service of the country." Mr. Grimes moved to amend the section relating to the compensation of chaplains, so as to allow them "one ration when on duty." Mr. McDougall moved to strike out the section authorizing brigade bands, and to strike out all of the section abolishing regimental bands, and to insert that "regimental bands be reduced to sixteen musicians;" but the motion was lost. Mr. McDougall demanded the yeas and nays on the passage of the bill, yeas—thirty-seven; nays, two; so the bill passed the Senate.

In the House, on the tenth of June, Mr. Blair, from the Military Committee, to whom the bill had been referred, reported it back with amendments. The first amendment proposed to strike out the first section, providing that brevet commissions should not entitle officers to increase of pay, and it was stricken out. The second amendment was agreed to, striking out the enacting clause of the second section, disallowing commutation of forage, making it the first section of the bill. The third amendment proposed to amend the section so as to provide that when forage in kind could not be furnished, officers should be entitled to commute. Mr. Blair moved to amend the amendment, so as to allow officers assigned to duty requiring them to be mounted, to receive the pay and emoluments of cavalry officers of the same rank. The amendment to the amendment was agreed to, and the amendment adopted. The fourth amendment to the bill proposed to strike out the sixth section, abolishing regimental bands. Mr. McPherson, of Pennsylvania, Mr. Fouke, of Illinois, and Mr. Edwards, of New-Hampshire, opposed the amendment, and it was rejected. The fifth amendment proposed to strike out in the seventh section the word "brigade," and insert "regimental," so that a regiment, instead of a brigade, should have sixteen musicians; but it was disagreed to.

The seventh amendment to strike out the ninth section, deducting ten per cent from the pay of Government officers during the rebellion, was agreed to. The eighth amendment, requiring chaplains employed at military posts to reside at the posts, and be subject to such rules in relation to leave of absence as commissioned officers, was adopted. The ninth amendment proposed to strike out the twelfth section, repealing the law

allowing forty cents per day for the use and risk of horses of company officers of cavalry; and it was agreed to—yeas, forty-eight; nays, forty-seven. The tenth amendment proposed to amend the thirteenth section, providing that an officer under arrest should be discharged unless a copy of the charges against him should be served on him within eight days, so as to read, "may be tried whenever the exigencies of the service will permit." On motion of Mr. Edwards, of New-Hampshire, the amendment was amended by adding the words, "within twelve months after such release from arrest;" and the amendment as amended was agreed to. The eleventh amendment proposed to strike out the fourteenth section, providing for retiring officers borne on the army or navy register forty-five years, or who should be sixty-two years of age; but the amendment was lost—yeas, twenty-eight; nays, sixty-eight. The twelfth amendment, striking out the fifteenth section, authorizing the President to assign to duty retired officers, was disagreed to. The thirteenth amendment proposed to strike out the sixteenth section, relating to the mileage of members of Congress. Mr. F. A. Conkling, of New-York, moved to amend the amendment so as to allow members of Congress their actual travelling expenses, and it was agreed to—yeas, ninety; nays, thirty-three. The amendment as amended was agreed to. Mr. Washburne moved to reconsider that vote, and lay the motion on the table. This motion was agreed to, so the sixteenth section was stricken out. The House, by a vote of seventy-three to twenty-one, agreed to the fourteenth amendment, striking out the eighteenth section, disallowing commutation of fuel and quarters to officers. The bill was amended by agreeing to the sixteenth amendment, placing volunteer engineers on the same footing, in regard to pay, emolument, and organization, as engineers of the regular army. The seventeenth amendment proposed to add a new section, providing that vacancies occurring among officers of volunteer regiments should be filled by the President, on the recommendation of officers of the regiments. Mr. Holman, of Indiana, and Mr. McPherson, of Pennsylvania, opposed the amendment, and Mr. Browne, of Rhode Island, advocated it. On the twelfth, the consideration of the bill was resumed, and the amendment rejected. The eighteenth amendment, providing that volunteer officers should have equal rank with officers of like grade having commissions from the United States, was agreed to. An amendment was adopted repealing the law retaining two dollars per month of the pay of privates in the regular army until the expiration of their term of service. The twentieth amendment was agreed to, authorizing the President to accept the services of foreign officers, and grant them commissions in the volunteer forces. A new section was added, requiring volunteers to be examined as to their physical condition, in the same manner as men enlisted into the regular army. The twenty-second amendment of the Committee authorized the President to assign army officers as field-officers, upon the application of Governors of States; and the amendment was agreed to. The twenty-third amendment, providing that any alien of the age of twenty-one years and upward, who had enlisted or should enlist in the armies of the United States, either the regular or volunteer forces, and had been or might be thereafter honorably discharged, might be admitted to become a citizen of the United States upon his petition, without any previous declaration of his intention to become a citizen, was agreed to. The twenty-fourth amendment was agreed to, providing that thereafter, every contractor for subsistence, clothing, arms, ammunition, munitions of war, and for every description of supplies for the army or navy of the United States, should be subjected to the rules and articles of war, so far as the same were applicable. On motion of Mr. Dunn, of Indiana, the bill was amended by adding a new section, providing that there should be added to the Adjutant-General's department, by regular promotion of its present officers, one colonel, two lieutenant-colonels, and nine majors; and that the grade of captain in said department be abolished, and all vacancies occurring in the grade of major should be filled by selection from among the captains of the army. Mr. Blair called for the previous question on the passage of the bill; it was ordered, and the bill passed without a division.

In the Senate, on the fourteenth, the House amendments were referred to the Military Committee, and on the eighteenth Mr. Wilson reported back the bill and House amendments, with an amendment. On the nineteenth, the Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, proceeded to the consideration of the amendments of the House; agreed to some of them, and disagreed to others, and agreed to others with amendments. On motion of Mr. Wilson, on the twentieth, the Senate asked a committee of conference, and Mr. Wilson, Mr. Nesmith, and Mr. Howard were appointed managers on the part of the Senate. The House insisted upon its amendments, agreed to a committee of conference, and Mr. Olin, of New-York, Mr. Dunn, of Indiana, and Mr. G. H. Browne, of Rhode Island, were appointed managers. On the seventh of July, Mr. Wilson, from the committee of conference, reported to the Senate that they recommend to their respective Houses: "That the Senate adhere to their disagreement to the amendments of the House to the said bill; and that the House adhere to its disagreement to the Senate's amendments to the House amendments to said bill." The Senate and House both concurred in the report of the conference committee.

Mr. Wilson, by unanimous consent, then introduced a bill to define the pay and emoluments of certain officers of the army, and for other purposes, which was read twice. The bill provided that officers entitled to forage should not be allowed to commute it, but might draw forage in kind. That when forage in kind could not be furnished, then officers might commute it. That

officers assigned to duty which required them to be mounted, should, on such duty, receive the pay, emoluments, and allowances of cavalry officers of the same grade. That major-generals should be entitled to draw forage in kind for five horses; brigadier-generals for four horses; colonels, lieutenant-colonels, and majors, for two horses each; captains and lieutenants of cavalry and artillery, or having the cavalry allowance, for two horses each; and chaplains, for one horse. That whenever an officer of the army should employ a soldier as his servant, he should deduct from his own monthly pay the full amount paid to or expended by the Government per month on account of the soldier. That the act to increase the pay of privates in the regular army and in the volunteers, should not be so construed as to increase the emoluments of the commissioned officers. That the act which authorized each regiment of volunteers to have twenty-four musicians for a band, be repealed. That each brigade might have sixteen musicians as a band, who should receive the pay and allowances provided by law for regimental bands. That in lieu of the rate of mileage allowed to officers where transportation in kind was not furnished to them, not more than six cents per mile should thereafter be allowed, unless where an officer was ordered from a station east of the Rocky Mountains to one west of the same mountains, or *vice versa*, when ten cents per mile should be allowed. That no person should be appointed a chaplain who was not a regularly ordained minister of some religious denomination, and who did not present testimonials of his good standing as such minister, with a recommendation for his appointment as an army chaplain from some authorized ecclesiastical body, or not less than five accredited ministers belonging to said religious denomination. That the compensation of chaplains should be one hundred dollars per month and two rations a day when on duty; and the chaplains of the permanent hospitals should be nominated to the Senate for its advice and consent; and chaplains employed at the military posts should be required to reside at the posts, and chaplains should be subject to such rules in relation to leave of absence as were prescribed for officers of the army. That so much of the law as allowed forty cents per day for the use and risk of the horses of company officers of cavalry, be repealed. That whenever an officer should be put under arrest, except at remote military posts, the officer by whose orders he was arrested should see that a copy of the charges were served upon him within eight days, and that he should be brought to trial within ten days thereafter, unless the necessities of the service prevent such trial; and then he should be brought to trial within thirty days after the expiration of the ten days or the arrest should cease: that if the copy of the charges were not served upon the arrested officer, the arrest should cease; but officers released from arrest might be tried whenever the exigencies of the service permit, within twelve months; and these provisions should apply to all persons under arrest. That whenever the name of any officer of the army or marine corps should have been borne on the army register or naval register forty-five years, or he should be of the age of sixty-two years, it should be in the discretion of the President to retire him from active service, and the President was authorized to assign him to any appropriate duty, and he should receive the full pay and emoluments of his grade while so assigned. That all contracts for the purchase of goods should be promptly reported to Congress. That no contract should be transferred by the party or parties to whom such contract might be given to any other party, and that any such transfer should cause the annulment of the contract. That every person who should furnish supplies to the army or navy should be required to mark the same, with the name or names of the contractors, and no supplies should be received unless so marked. That any person who should contract to furnish supplies for the army or navy should be deemed and taken as a part of the land or naval forces of the United States, and be subject to the rules and regulations for the government of the land and naval forces. That the President of the United States be authorized and requested to dismiss from the military service either in the army, navy, or marine corps, or volunteer force, any officer for any cause which, in his judgment, either rendered such officer unsuitable for, or whose dismission would promote the public service. That the President should have power to purchase cemetery grounds for the soldiers who should die in the service. That so much of the act of 1861 as authorized the appointment of additional aids-de-camp, be repealed. That the different regiments and independent companies mustered as volunteer engineers, pioneers, or sappers and miners, should be recognized as volunteer engineers, on the same footing, in all respects, in regard to their organization, pay, and emoluments, as the corps of engineers of the regular army. That any alien, of the age of twenty-one years and upward, who had been or might thereafter be honorably discharged from the service, might be admitted to become a citizen without any previous declaration of his intention to become a citizen, and he should not be required to prove more than one year's residence within the United States previous to his application to become such citizen. And that there should be added to the Adjutant-General's department, by regular promotion, one colonel, two lieutenant-colonels, and nine majors; and the grade of captain in the department should be abolished, and all vacancies occurring in the grade of major should be filled by selection from among the captains of the army. On the eighth, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of the bill, and Mr. Grimes moved to strike out so much as provided for the addition and promotion in the Adjutant-General's office—yeas, fifteen; nays, twenty; so the amendment was lost. The bill was then passed without a division. In the House, on the same day, Mr. Olin called up the bill from the Speaker's table, and it was passed

without a division, and was approved by the President on the seventeenth of July, 1862.

No. XXXIX.—*The Bill to facilitate the Discharge of Disabled Soldiers from the Army, and the Inspection of Convalescent Hospitals and Camps.*

In the Senate, on the seventeenth of December, 1862, Mr. Wilson, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported a bill to facilitate the discharge of disabled soldiers, and for the inspection of convalescent camps and hospitals, which was read, and passed to a second reading. It proposed to add to the medical corps of the army two medical inspectors-general, and eight medical inspectors, to be appointed by selection from the medical corps of the army, or from the surgeons in the volunteer service, without regard to rank, but with sole regard to qualifications. It provided that the officers of the medical inspector's department should be charged with the duty of making regular and frequent inspections of all military general hospitals and convalescent camps, and upon each inspection to designate to the surgeon in charge of such hospitals or camps, all soldiers who might be fit subjects for discharge from the service on surgeon's certificate of disability, or sufficiently recovered to be returned to their regiments for duty; and the medical inspecting officers were empowered to direct the return to duty, or the discharge from the service, of the soldiers designated.

On motion of Mr. Hale, the provision authorizing the President to select from the medical corps of the army or from the volunteer forces, was stricken out. Mr. Grimes moved to amend, by adding as, a new section, that all "three years or during the war" volunteers, raised or enlisted by the order or under the authority of the Secretary of War, be entitled to the bounty authorized to be paid to volunteers raised or recruited by the States under existing laws. He explained the object of the amendment to be, to place the "gray beard" regiment of his State, made up of enlisted men over forty-five years of age, upon the same footing as other three years volunteers. At the suggestion of Mr. Fessenden, Mr. Grimes withdrew his amendment, with the view of introducing it as a new bill. The bill was further discussed by Mr. Foster, Mr. Clark, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Grimes, Mr. Fessenden, Mr. Trumbull, Mr. Nesmith, and Mr. Hale. On motion of Mr. Fessenden, it was amended, by taking out the words "two medical inspectors-general." On motion of Mr. Clark, it was made the duty of the medical inspectors to see that soldiers, fit subjects for discharge, were discharged, or if sufficiently recovered, returned to their regiments. The bill, as amended, was then passed without a division.

In the House, on the nineteenth, on motion of Mr. Buffinton, of Massachusetts, the bill was taken from the Speaker's table. Mr. Blake, of Ohio, moved to amend it, so as not to require discharges on surgeon's certificates. Mr. Richardson, of Illinois, and Mr. McPherson, of Pennsylvania, opposed the amendment, and Mr. B withdrew it. The bill was then passed wit a division, and was approved by the Presi on the twenty-seventh day of December, 1

No. XL.—*The Bill to improve the Organiza of the Cavalry Forces.*

In the Senate, on the sixteenth of Decem 1862, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, introd a bill to improve the organization of the cav forces, which was read twice, and referred to Committee on Military Affairs. On the se teenth, Mr. Wilson reported it back wit amendment. It provided that thereafter regiment of cavalry might have two assist surgeons, and that each company of cav should have from sixty to seventy-eight vates. Mr. Wilson explained that the ob was to have a minimum number in the cav as in the infantry and artillery. The law construed to require seventy-eight private each company before organization. At the gestion of Mr. Grimes, Mr. Wilson moved amend, so that "each company hereafter ganized" should have from sixty to seve eight privates. The amendment was agreed and the bill passed. In the House, on twenty-third, on motion of Mr. Dunn, of diana, the bill was taken from the Speak table, and passed. It was approved by President on the sixth day of January, 1

No. XLI.—*The Bill to increase the Clerical other Force of the Quartermaster-Gener Office, and for other purposes.*

In the Senate, on the fourteenth of Janu 1863, Mr. Wilson, from the Committee on tary Affairs, reported a bill to authorize the pointment of three auditors and a solicitor the quartermaster's department, and to incr the clerical force of the Quartermaster-Gene office. The bill provided that there shoul appointed three auditors of the quartermast department, who should each receive a com sation of two thousand dollars per annum, who should perform such duties as might be signed to them, under the direction of the Q termaster-General, and in his office, in connec with the examination and settlement of accou of money and property; and one solicitor, compensation of two thousand dollars per num, who should be a person of legal knowle and ability, and who should, under the direc of the Quartermaster-General, take charge of, advise the Quartermaster-General upon all l questions arising in the service of the quar master's department. It also provided that t should be added to the clerical force of the Q termaster-General's office one hundred and tw ty clerks of class one, and thirty copyists, a annual compensation of six hundred dollars. the sixteenth, the bill, on motion of Mr. Wil was taken up, and briefly debated by Mr. son, Mr. Lane, Mr. Trumbull, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Pomeroy. On the twenty-third, the Se resumed its consideration. Mr. Harlan

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posed to amend the first section, by striking out the word "auditors," and inserting "assistant quartermasters-general;" but after debate, withdrew it. Mr. Hale would strike out the first section, authorizing the appointment of three auditors and one solicitor. On the twenty-fourth, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill; and on motion of Mr. Wilson, the first section was stricken out, and the second section so modified as to read: "That there should be added to the clerical and other force in the office of the Quartermaster-General four clerks of class four, ninety clerks of class one, and thirty copyists and six laborers, at an annual compensation of six hundred dollars each, to be appointed by the Secretary of War." Mr. Fessenden moved to amend, by adding as a new section: "That in settling the accounts of officers for clothing and other military supplies, the affidavit of any officer may be received, to show the loss of vouchers, or company books, or any matter or circumstance tending to prove that any apparent deficiency was occasioned by unavoidable accident or loss in actual service, without any fault on his part; or that the whole or any part of such clothing and supplies had been properly and legally used and appropriated; and such affidavits may be considered as evidence to establish the facts set forth, with or without other evidence, as may seem to the Secretary of War just and proper under the circumstances of the case." Mr. Trumbull moved to amend the amendment, by inserting after the word "officer" the words, "stating that he knows of no witness by whom he can prove the same facts." Mr. Fessenden objected to Mr. Trumbull's amendment, and after debate withdrew his own amendment. Mr. Rice renewed it, and Mr. Trumbull renewed his amendment to the amendment, and it was lost—yeas, seventeen; nays, eighteen. Mr. Sherman moved to amend, by striking out of the original amendment the word "officers," and inserting "commanding officer of a company," and it was agreed to. The amendment as amended was then agreed to—yeas, twenty-one; nays, sixteen. The bill as amended was then passed, and the title so amended as to read: "A bill to authorize the increase of the clerical and other force of the quartermaster's department, and for other purposes."

In the House, on the twenty-sixth, Mr. Olin, of New-York, moved the reference of the bill to the Military Committee, and it was so referred. Mr. McPherson, of Pennsylvania, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported it back without amendment. It was passed without a division, and approved by the President on the seventh day of February, 1863.

No. XLII.—*The Bill to authorize the Raising of a Volunteer Force for the Defence of Kentucky.*

In the House, on the twelfth of December, 1861, Mr. Blair, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported a bill to authorize the raising of a volunteer force for the better defence of Kentucky. On motion of Mr. Bingham, of Ohio, it was so amended as to subject the force so raised to "the rules and regulations of war." On motion of Mr. Wickliffe, its further consideration was postponed to the sixteenth, and on that day it was taken up, debated, amended, and passed.

The Senate, on the seventeenth, referred the bill to the Committee on Military Affairs. On the sixteenth of July, 1862, Mr. Wilson reported it back with an amendment. The Senate, on motion of Mr. Davis, proceeded to its consideration. It proposed to empower the Military Board of Kentucky to raise, and organize into regiments, a volunteer force not exceeding twenty thousand rank and file, to serve for one year within the limits of Kentucky in repelling invasion, suppressing insurrection, and guarding and protecting the public property; but at any time that it might be necessary, these troops might be employed out of the limits of Kentucky against the enemies of the State or of the United States. The officers and soldiers enrolled and mustered into the service of the United States were to be subject to the rules and articles of war, and to be placed on the same footing with other volunteers of the United States as to pay, subsistence, clothing, and other emoluments, for and during the time they might be in service. The Military Committee reported, as an amendment, a new section, providing that by and with the advice and consent of the commanding general of the department of which Kentucky might be a part, the volunteers authorized to be raised by this act, or any portion of them, might attach themselves to, and become part of the body of the three years Kentucky volunteers. The amendment was agreed to. On motion of Mr. Collamer, the bill was further amended, so that the officers and men should only be paid while in "actual service." After debate, in which Mr. Davis, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Lane, of Indiana, Mr. King, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Collamer, Mr. Clark, and Mr. Cowan participated, Mr. Trumbull moved the indefinite postponement of the bill. Mr. Howe took the floor, and the bill went over, and was not again called up during that session.

On the fifth of January, 1863, Mr. Davis moved to take up the bill for consideration, and the motion was agreed to. Mr. Trumbull, after debate, withdrew his motion for indefinite postponement, and the bill was amended, on motion of Mr. Davis, so as to authorize the troops to be raised by the "Governor" instead of the "Military Board;" further amended, on motion of Mr. Collamer, so as to allow the troops to be raised with "the consent of the President," and then on motion of Mr. Clark, recommitted to the Military Committee.

On the eighth, Mr. Wilson reported the bill back, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. The Senate, on the ninth, proceeded to the consideration of the bill and the amendment. The amendment reported by the Military Committee was to strike out all after the enact-

ing clause, and insert: That the Governor of Kentucky, by the consent and under the direction of the President, should have the power to raise and organize into regiments a volunteer force not exceeding twenty thousand, to serve for the term of twelve months, to be employed within the limits of Kentucky in repelling invasion, suppressing insurrection, and guarding and protecting the public property: *Provided*, that at any time it might be necessary, in the discretion of the President, these troops might be employed out of the limits of Kentucky against the enemies of the United States. That the regimental and company officers should be appointed and commissioned by the State of Kentucky, provided the officers should be entitled to pay only when the regiments or companies were filled as required by law and while in actual service. That the regiments, when raised and officered, should be mustered into the service of the President of the United States, and be subject to the command of the President. That the officers and soldiers thus enrolled and mustered into service should be subject to the rules and articles of war, and should be placed on the same footing as other volunteers in the service of the United States as to pay, subsistence, clothing, and other emoluments, except bounty, for and during the time they might be in actual service That a portion of this volunteer corps, not exceeding two regiments, might be mounted, and armed as mounted riflemen. That the President should have power to make such other regulations in regard to the organization of this force as he should deem expedient for the interest of the service. That by and with the consent of the President, the volunteers authorized to be raised by this act, or any portion of them, might be attached to and become part of the three years Kentucky volunteers. Mr. Harlan moved to amend, by striking out the words "Governor of Kentucky," and inserting the word "President," so that the President should be authorized to raise twenty thousand one year's volunteers in any State or States, instead of authorizing the Governor of Kentucky to raise that number of men in that State. After debate, the amendment was agreed to—yeas, nineteen; nays, sixteen.

The Senate, on the twelfth, resumed the consideration of the bill, and on motion of Mr. Lane, of Indiana, reconsidered the vote on Mr. Harlan's amendment — yeas, twenty-one; nays, fourteen. That amendment, and others agreed to on the ninth, were then rejected. On motion of Mr. Davis, it was so amended that the troops should be "raised within the State of Kentucky." Mr. Clark moved to postpone the consideration of the bill for one week; but the motion was lost—yeas, thirteen; nays, twenty-four. It was then passed—yeas, twenty-three; nays, thirteen. The bill was, on the sixteenth, referred by the House to the Committee on Military Affairs. On the fourth of February, Mr. Yeaman, of Kentucky, reported it back, with a recommendation that the amendment of the Senate be concurred in. Mr. Stevens, of Pennsylvania, move its reference to the Committee of the Whole lost — yeas, twenty-five; nays, ninety-thre Mr. Olin moved the previous question, and ur der its operation the substitute of the Senat was agreed to. So the bill was passed, and a proved by the President on the seventh of Fel ruary, 1863.

No. XLIII.—*The Bill to promote the efficiency the Commissary Department.*

In the House, on the eighth of Januar 1863, Mr. Washburne, of Illinois, introduced bill to promote the efficiency of the commissa department, which was read twice and referr to the Committee on Military Affairs. Mr. Mar ton, of New-Hampshire, on the fourth of Febr ary, reported it back with an amendment.

The bill provided that there should be adde to the subsistence department of the army, b regular promotions therein, one brigadier-gener who should be commissary-general of subsis ence; one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, and tv majors; the colonel and lieutenant-colonel to l assistant commissaries-general of subsistenc and that the vacancies in the above-mention grades should be filled by regular promotions the department.

The Committee on Military Affairs propos to amend by adding to the bill, that the vaca cies created by the promotions therein autho ized might be filled by selections from officers the regular or volunteer force; and the amen ment was agreed to, and the bill passed.

On the seventh, the Senate, on motion of M Lane, of Indiana, took it up for consideratio Mr. Wilson moved to amend the bill, so that t commissary-general, who was to have the ra a brigadier-general, should be appointed by lection, and the other officers by regular p motion. Mr. Lane, of Indiana, Mr. Ten Ey Mr. Lane, of Kansas, and Mr. Howe opposed t amendment, and Mr. Grimes and Mr. Wilson vocated it, not in opposition to the promotion Colonel Taylor, the Commissary-General, b upon the ground that general officers were pointed by selection. Mr. Wilkinson was c posed to the bill and the amendment. Mr. W son modified his amendment so that the comm sary-general should be selected from the co missary department; and it was then agreed and the bill passed. On the same day, the Hou on motion of Mr. Buffinton, of Massachuset concurred in the Senate amendment, and the b was passed, and it was approved on the nin of February, 1863.

No. XLIV.—*The Joint Resolution to facilit the Payment of sick and wounded Soldiers the Hospitals and Convalescent Camps.*

In the Senate, on the eighteenth of Februa 1863, Mr. Wilson introduced a joint resolutio facilitate the discharge of sick and wounded diers in the hospitals and convalescent cam which was read twice and referred to the Milit Committee. On the twentieth, Mr. Wilson

ported it back without amendment. It directed the Paymaster-General to take immediate measures for the payment of the sick and wounded soldiers in the convalescent camps, hospitals, and elsewhere, so that they might be fully paid within thirty days from the passage of the resolution.

Mr. Wilson asked for the immediate consideration of the resolution, and there being no objection, the Senate proceeded to its consideration. Mr. Fessenden stated the difficulty to be the want of the descriptive lists in the hospitals and convalescent camps. Mr. Wilson thought the difficulty grew out of the want of system. He wanted to force the pay department to put its strength upon the convalescent camps and hospitals, have every man's case examined, and have him paid in thirty days. Mr. Grimes did not think the object could be accomplished in thirty days, if it was applied to the whole country; and he moved to amend the resolution by striking out the word word "thirty" and inserting "sixty." Mr. Ten Eyck opposed the amendment. Mr. Wilson thought there was something in the suggestion of Mr. Grimes, and he would agree to the amendment. It was adopted, and the resolution passed. On the second of March, the joint resolution was taken up in the House and passed; and the President approved it on the third of March, 1863.

No. XLV.—*The Bill for Enrolling and Calling out the National Forces, and for other purposes.*

In the Senate, on the twenty-eighth of January, 1863, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, introduced a bill for the encouragement of reënlistments, and for the enrolling and drafting the militia, which was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. On the thirty-first, Mr. Wilson reported it back, with an amendment as a substitute. On the fourth and fifth of February, the bill was debated by Mr. Wilson, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Richardson, Mr. Trumbull, Mr. Carlisle, Mr. Bayard, Mr. Collamer, Mr. Howard, Mr. Davis, and Mr. Doolittle, and on motion of Mr. Lane, of Indiana, recommitted to the Committee on Military Affairs.

On the ninth of February, Mr. Wilson, from the Military Committee, reported a bill for enrolling and calling out the national forces, and for other purposes, in thirty-six sections. The Senate, on the sixteenth, proceeded to its consideration as in Committee of the Whole. Mr. Wilson, in explanation of the provisions of the bill, said:

"Sir, we have endeavored to frame this great measure for the defence of the periled nation against the blows of armed treason so as to bear as lightly as possible upon the toiling masses, and to put the burdens, as far as we could do so, equally upon the more favored of the sons of men. It is impossible, in this world of inequality, to frame a measure of this character to bear equally upon all conditions of men; but this bill has been framed in the earnest desire to make its burdens fall as gently as possible upon the poor and dependent sons of toil. But it is a high and sacred duty, resting alike upon all the citizens of the republic, upon the sons of toil and misfortune and the more favored few, to labor, to suffer, ay, to die, if need be, for their country. Never since the dawn of creation have the men of any age been summoned to the performance of a higher or nobler duty than are the men of this generation in America. The passage of this great measure will clothe the President with ample authority to summon forth the sons of the republic to the performance of the high and sacred duty of saving their country, now menaced, and the periled cause of civilization and freedom in America, and of winning the lasting gratitude of coming ages, and that enduring renown which follows ever duty nobly and bravely done. The enactment of this bill will give confidence to the Government, strength to the country, and joy to the worn and weary soldiers of the republic around their camp-fires in the land of the rebellion.

"A brief analysis of the sections of this measure will exhibit its comprehensive character, and will, I am sure, commend its beneficent provisions to the favor of Congress and of the country.

"Section one declares that all able-bodied male citizens of the United States, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, shall constitute the national forces, and be liable to military duty at call of the President, with certain exceptions.

"Section two exempts the Vice-President, judges of the various courts of the United States; heads of departments; the only son of aged and infirm parents dependent upon him; or where more than one son, in such cases the father may elect which shall be exempt, or the mother if the father is dead; only brother of children under twelve whose father and mother are dead; the father of motherless children under twelve, dependent upon him for support; where there are father and sons in the same family and household, and two of them are in the military service of the United States.

"Section three divides the forces not now in service into two classes. 1. All between eighteen and thirty years of age, and all the unmarried between thirty and forty-five. 2. All other persons liable to do military duty; and the second class not to be called into service until after the first shall have been called.

"Section four divides the United States into districts, of which the District of Columbia forms one, each Territory one or more as the President shall direct, and the remainder by the congressional districts, as fixed by State laws, or by the President in States not divided into districts.

"Section five provides that the President shall appoint a provost-marshal for each district, with the rank, pay, etc., of a captain of cavalry, the whole to be under a provost-marshal general, with rank, etc., of a colonel of cavalry, whose office shall constitute a bureau at the seat of Government.

"Section six provides that the Provost-Marshal General shall make rules for government of subordinates, furnish them the names of deserters, communicate all orders of the President for calling out the national forces; file copies of enrolment lists, obtain reports from his subordinates; audit all accounts connected with the service under his direction, and perform such other duties as the President prescribes.

"Section seven. The provost-marshal is to arrest and send to the nearest military post all deserters; to inquire into and report to his superior all treasonable practices; to seize and confine spies of the enemy; and obey generally all lawful regulations and orders of the Provost-Marshal General.

"Section eight provides for a board of enrolment in each district, of which the provost-marshal shall be president; the others to be appointed by the President of the United States, and one to be a practising physician and surgeon.

"Section nine provides that the board shall divide the districts into sub-districts of not exceeding two without the direction of the Secretary of War, before March tenth, and in each alternate year thereafter; to appoint an enrolling officer in each sub-district, and furnish blanks, etc. The officer to enroll all persons in his sub-district before April first, noting age, residence, and occupation, and report to the board; the board to consolidate the names into a list, and report to the Provost-Marshal General before first May.

"Section ten provides for separate enrolment of the classes, and that the ages shall be reckoned from the first July after enrolment.

"Section eleven. The enrolment is to be for two years, and the enrolled to be liable to serve three years, or for the war, on the same footing as the volunteers, as now provided by law.

"Section twelve. In case of call, the President is to assign to each district the number of men to be furnished; the board to draft the required number, and sixty per cent additional—the drafted men to be notified by the provost-marshal, and report for duty within ten days.

"Section thirteen. Men failing to report, to be treated as deserters, unless they show non-liability to do military duty.

"Section fourteen provides for the inspection of the drafted men by the surgeon of the board, and the hearing of claims for exemption by the board; their decision to be final in all cases.

"Section fifteen provides for the trial and punishment of surgeons for receiving presents or agreeing to receive any valuable thing for making a false report or for neglecting to make a report. Punishment to be fine not more than five hundred dollars nor less than two hundred dollars, imprisonment at discretion of court-martial, and dismissal from service.

"Section sixteen provides for the discharge of those not required, and payment of their travelling expenses. Also for the payment of the expenses of the draft; expenses of arresting and returning deserters; provides against commutation to the provost-marshals except for for and for pay of clerk hire, postage, stationery,

"Section seventeen provides for substitute

"Section eighteen provides for paying a bou of fifty dollars to all the present volunteers reënlist for one year, one half on reënlistm and the balance at the end of the term of r listment; those who reënlist for two years, tv ty-five dollars of the one hundred dollar bou provided by the fifth section of the act of J twenty-second, 1861, relating to volunteers.

"Section nineteen provides for the consol tion of companies in regiments of volunteers f the same State, when reduced to one half maximum, and for a reduction of the officer such cases in the same proportion.

"Section twenty provides that whenever giment is reduced below the minimum allo by law, no officers shall be appointed beyond number necessary to command the regiment

"Section twenty-one repeals so much of tion five of the act of July seventeenth, 186 requires the approval of the President to a tence of a court-martial in case of a spy or a serter, or of mutiny or murder, and substitute approval of the commanding general in the f

"Section twenty-two gives to courts-ma power to punish absenting officers by redu them to the ranks for three years.

"Section twenty-three provides that sol shall not sell or dispose of the clothes, arms, furnished by the United States, but all such ticles may be seized by any civil or military cer and delivered to any quartermaster.

"Section twenty-four provides for the pur ment by fine not exceeding five hundred dol and imprisonment not less than six months more than two years, for enticing a soldier t sert, for concealing or harboring or employi deserter, and for purchasing his arms, clot etc., and the same penalty for any superint ent or conductor of any public conveyance, tains of ships, etc., for carrying away or refu to deliver up any person knowing him to deserted.

"Section twenty-five provides the same ishment for resisting a draft, or for counselli aiding resistance to a draft, or counselling dr men not to appear at the place of rendezvou dissuading men from performing military d

"Section twenty-six provides that the P dent shall issue his proclamation declaring soldiers now absent without leave may r within a time to be specified by him wit punishment, except the forfeiture of their and rations during absence; and those wh not return, to be treated as deserters.

"Section twenty-seven provides for taking positions of witnesses not residing in the mil district where the court is held.

"Section twenty-eight provides that the j advocate shall have power to appoint a rep to record the proceedings and testimony o courts-martial.

"Section twenty-nine provides for a con ance for cause to either party, but not t

ceed sixty days, if the prisoner be in close confinement.

"Section thirty. In time of war, insurrection, and rebellion, cases of felony, by persons in military service, are to be tried only by courts-martial, subject to the articles of war—the penalty to be not less than is prescribed in the State where the offence is committed.

"Section thirty-one. Officers absent on leave are to receive half-pay and allowance, and if absent without leave, no pay and allowance during such absence.

"Section thirty-two. Commanders of regiments and batteries in the field to have power to grant furloughs, not exceeding thirty days, to five per cent of the non-commissioned officers and privates, for good conduct.

"Section thirty-three. The President is to assign drafted persons to any corps or service which exigencies may require.

"Section thirty-four. Details to special service are to be made only with consent of the commanding officer in the field, and no extra pay for special service to be allowed.

"Section thirty-five rescinds general orders of War Department Numbers 154 and 162, and forbids enlisting from the volunteers for regular army.

"Section thirty-six provides compensation for the grades in the cavalry service, not before provided for, namely, regimental commissary same as regimental quartermaster, chief trumpeter same as chief bugler, saddler-sergeant the same as regimental commissary-sergeant, company commissary-sergeant same as company quartermaster's sergeant. Also provides that the grade of supernumerary second lieutenant and two teamsters for each company, and one chief farrier and blacksmith for each regiment, shall be abolished; also, that each company may have two trumpeters, to be paid as buglers; one veterinary surgen to each regiment, at seventy-five dollars per month, and rank of regimental sergeant-major.

"Sir, these provisions embodied in this bill are intended to meet the needs of the country and the requirements of the military service. They have been incorporated into the bill after much examination and reflection, and with the approbation of several of our most experienced military men. I am confident the enactment of this bill, embodying so many provisions required by the exigencies of the public service, will weapon the hands of the nation, fire the drooping hearts of the people, thrill the wasting ranks of our legions in the field, carry dismay into the councils of treason, and give assurance to the nations that the American people have the sublime virtue of heroic constancy and endurance that will assure the unity and indivisibility of the republic of the United States."

Mr. Cowan, of Pennsylvania, moved to exempt Members of Congress from the enrolment and draft. On motion of Mr. Lane, of Kansas, the yeas and nays were ordered on the amendment. Mr. Richardson, of Illinois, and Mr. Doolittle, of Wisconsin, supported Mr. Cowan's amendment. Mr. Wilson thought its adoption would weaken the moral force of the law—he wanted every body to feel that this measure was a necessity, forced upon us by the needs of the country; that to be drafted to carry this country through the impending struggle was the most honorable thing that can fall upon an American citizen. The amendment was lost—yeas, thirteen; nays, twenty-four.

Mr. Cowan then moved to exempt Governors, Members of the State legislatures, and members of the judiciary of the several States. Mr. Clark, of New-Hampshire, moved to amend the amendment by striking out the words "members of the State legislatures"—yeas, twenty-two; nays, twenty; so the amendment to the amendment was agreed to. On motion of Mr. Fessenden, Mr. Cowan's amendment exempting the members of the judiciary of the several States was amended by adding the words, "justices of the peace not included;" and the amendment as amended was adopted. Mr. Collamer moved to amend the twelfth section by adding, "that in assigning to the districts the number of men to be furnished, the President should take into account the number of volunteers or militia furnished from the State, and allow the same, according to the period of their service, and allow the same to be apportioned equally among the districts in the State, and make apportionment of the districts of the several States accordingly." Mr. Sumner moved to amend the amendment so as to include all persons furnished the navy as far as can be ascertained. The amendment to the amendment was opposed by Mr. Grimes, Mr. Rice, Mr. Davis, and Mr. Howe, and rejected. Mr. Collamer's amendment was then agreed to.

Mr. Powell moved to exempt professors in colleges and teachers in schools; but the amendment was rejected without a division. Mr. Sumner moved to amend the amendment of Mr. Collamer, which had been agreed to, by adding "that in assigning to the districts in each State the number of men to be furnished therefrom, the President should take into account the number of persons that might thereafter be furnished to the navy, so far as could be ascertained;" and it was agreed to. Mr. Clark moved to strike out the thirteenth section, and insert: "that any person drafted and notified to appear as aforesaid, may, on or before the day fixed for his appearance, furnish an acceptable substitute to take his place in the draft, or he may pay to such person as the Secretary of War may authorize to receive it, such sum, not exceeding three hundred dollars, as the Secretary may determine for the procuration of such substitute, and thereupon such person so furnishing the substitute or paying the money shall be discharged from further liability under that draft; and any person failing to report after due service of notice as herein prescribed without furnishing a substitute or paying the required sum therefor, shall be deemed a deserter, and shall be arrested by the provost-marshal and sent to the nearest military post for trial by court-martial, unless, upon proper showing

he is not liable to do military duty, the board of enrolment shall relieve him from draft." The amendment was agreed to. Mr. Nesmith moved to strike out the third section, providing that the national forces should be divided into two classes, the first of which should comprise all persons subject to do military duty between the ages of eighteen and thirty years, and all unmarried persons subject to do military duty above the age of thirty and under the age of forty-five; the second class should comprise all other persons subject to do military duty; and they should not, in any district, be called into the service of the United States until those of the first class should have been called. Mr. Wilson moved to amend the section proposed to be stricken out, by striking out the word "eighteen" and inserting "twenty," and striking out the word "thirty" and inserting "thirty-five," so that the classes would be from twenty to thirty-five, and from thirty-five to forty-five; and the amendment was agreed to. Mr. Nesmith's motion to strike out the third section was lost.

Mr. Doolittle moved to amend the first section by adding that persons of foreign birth who should have declared on oath their intention to become citizens, and who should have exercised the privileges of citizens by voting in the United States, should be deemed to be citizens of the United States within the meaning of the act. The amendment was opposed by Mr. Howard, of Michigan, and Mr. Davis, of Kentucky, and rejected. Mr. Harris, of New-York, moved to amend the bill by adding, "persons who, being from scruples of conscience averse to bearing arms, are, by the constitution of any State, excused therefrom." Mr. McDougall, of California, declared that the obligation rested equally upon all, and the law should apply to all. Mr. Clark, of New-Hampshire, would exempt those whose religious feelings would be shocked if compelled to bear arms. Mr. Ten Eyck, of New-Jersey, thought the amendment did not go far enough. Mr. Lane, of Indiana, said the effect of the amendment would be unequal and unjust. Mr. Sumner moved to modify Mr. Harris's amendment so as to exempt the clergy. Mr. McDougall hoped the Senator from Massachusetts would not include the Methodist clergy, as they were a fighting clergy. Mr. Howard thought the loyal clergy were the most fighting portion of the people. Mr. Wilson would not exempt lawyers or clergymen. Mr. Davis would say to all of them: "Fight, pay, or emigrate." Mr. Henderson, of Missouri, would excuse nobody. Mr. Harris then withdrew his amendment. Mr. Sumner moved to exempt ministers of the Gospel. The amendment was supported by Mr. Sumner and Mr. Morrill, and opposed by Mr. McDougall, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Harris, and Mr. Henderson, and rejected.

The bill was then reported to the Senate as amended. The amendment exempting governors and judges was lost—yeas, seventeen; nays, nineteen; and the amendment giving States credit for persons furnished to the navy was non-concurred in—yeas, eleven; nays, twenty-five. Other amendments made as in Committee c Whole were concurred in. Mr. Wilkinson n to exempt members of Congress, governor judges of the several States; but the motio lost—yeas, sixteen; nays, twenty. Mr. of Kansas, moved to strike out of the c exempted, the Vice-President, the Judges c United States, and the heads of the vario ecutive departments — yeas, fourteen; twenty-two; so the amendment was rejecte

Mr. McDougall moved to amend by addi the first section that all able-bodied male ci of the United States, and persons of foreign who should have declared on oath their int to become citizens, under and in pursuan the laws thereof, between the ages of eig and forty-five years, except as hereinaft cepted, were hereby declared to constitu national forces—yeas, twenty-seven; nays, so the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. Wilson said the bill was a good on he proposed to put it in operation by addi a new section, that the President of the U States was authorized and empowered, duri present rebellion, to call forth the national by draft in the manner provided for in th The amendment was agreed to without a di Mr. Cowan moved to strike out in the el section the words, "three years or duri war," and insert "one year"—yeas, ten; twenty-six. Mr. Harris then moved to stri the words "three years," and insert "two y but the amendment was rejected. The bi then passed without a division.

In the House, on the twenty-third of Feb the Speaker stated the business to be the c eration of the Senate bill for enrolling and out the national forces. Mr. Olin, of New moved to refer the bill to the Committee c itary Affairs. Mr. Holman, of Indiana, sug that the bill be read by clauses for amen and that the discussion should be confi amendments. Mr. Vallandigham objected mode of proceeding. Mr. Wickliffe, of Ken moved to amend the motion of Mr. Olin t mit the bill to the Military Committee, structing the Committee to report it back proviso, that it should be the duty of th mander of troops at any post, in any St the days of election by the citizens of such held for the purpose of electing State offic officers of the United States, or Represen in Congress, or electors for the President o President, to remove and keep his troops a one mile from the place of voting durin election. Mr. Cox moved to amend by ad proviso, that no one should be enrolled und act except able-bodied white citizens of the States. Mr. Biddle, of Pennsylvania, d "know a district in Pennsylvania where t vost-Marshal, this little military despot, c ercise over free-born citizens the sway t claimed for him." Mr. Campbell, of Pen nia, declared his readiness "to vote the la and the last dollar for the accomplishment great object before us. I am ready to figh

by land and by sea, as long as may be necessary to crush out the rebels themselves, and all their sympathizers at home and abroad." Mr. Wright, of Pennsylvania, was not opposed to the spirit of the bill, but he thought some of its provisions in conflict with the Constitution, and he desired to amend it. Mr. Sargent, of California, was in favor of the bill, "because it distributes equally the burdens of the war, laying them as well upon the lukewarm friends or the open opponents of the Government as upon the true and faithful; because it prevents the possibility of demagogues, who seek the ruin of the republic, longer preventing the enlistment of soldiers to fight this great battle of freedom." Mr. Sheffield, of Rhode Island, thought the law would put to a severe test the loyalty of the people; in their submission to its provisions was involved the question of their devotion to their country. Mr. White, of Ohio, bitterly denounced the bill as an arbitrary measure. Mr. Vallandigham denounced the bi l as a measure "to abrogate the Constitution, to repeal all existing laws, to destroy all rights, to strike down the judiciary, and erect upon the ruins of civil and political liberty a stupendous superstructure of despotism." Mr. Bingham, of Ohio, replied to Mr. Vallandigham in a speech of great power. Mr. Voorhees, of Indiana, declared that the administration would deceive the country no more, nor coerce or intimidate it with its measures.

On the twenty-fourth, the debate was resumed by Mr. Mallory, of Kentucky, in opposition to the passage of the bill. Mr. Dunn, of Indiana, declared that the necessity was upon us to pass a bill of this character. Mr. Pendleton, of Ohio, and Mr. Wickliffe, of Kentucky, spoke in opposition to the passage of the bill. Mr. Stevens, of Pennsylvania, advocated the passage of the measure with some amendments. Mr. Steele, of New-York, objected to the bill "as one of a series of measures which centralize power in the Federal Government." Mr. S. C. Fessenden, of Maine, and Mr. Kelley, of Pennsylvania, advocated the measure, and Mr. Cox, of Ohio, and Mr. Norton, of Missouri, opposed it. On the twenty-fifth, Mr. Thomas, of Massachusetts, opened the debate in favor of the passage of the bill: "You die," he said, "without this measure; you can no more with it, except you die as cowards die, many times." Mr. Crittenden, of Kentucky, followed in opposition to the measure. "A negro army," he declared, "is a weakness in your country. It unnerves the white man's hand; it unnerves the white man's heart. White men will not fight by the side of negroes."

Mr. Olin moved to amend the bill by striking out of the seventh section the words, "to inquire into and report to the Provost-Marshal General all treasonable practices; to detect, seize, and confine spies of the enemy," and inserting in lieu thereof, "To detect, seize, and confine spies of the enemy, who shall, without unreasonable delay, be delivered to the custody of the general commanding the district in which they may be arrested, to be tried as soon as the exigencies of the service permit;" and the amendment was agreed to. On motion of Mr. Olin the bill was amended by adding as a new section, that all persons who, in time of war or of rebellion against the supreme authority of the United States, should be found lurking or acting as spies in or about any fortification, post, or encampment of any of the armies of the United States or elsewhere, should be triable by military commission, and, upon conviction, should suffer death. Mr. Cox moved to insert the word "white" before "able-bodied." Mr. Lovejoy demanded the yeas and nays, and they were ordered—yeas, fifty-two; nays, eighty-five.

Mr. Holman, of Indiana, moved to amend by inserting as a substitute a new bill of eleven sections—yeas, forty-five; nays, one hundred and seven; so Mr. Holman's amendment was rejected. The bill was then passed—yeas, one hundred and fifteen; nays, forty-eight.

On the twenty-eighth, the Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, proceeded to the consideration of the House amendments. Mr. Bayard, of Delaware, moved the indefinite postponement of the bill, and spoke at length against its provisions. Mr. McDougall, of California, followed in support of the bill. Mr. Turpie, of Indiana, declared that "the opposition to this measure was made because it was palpably in violation of the Constitution of the United States." Mr. Carlisle spoke in opposition to the measure. Mr. Hicks, of Maryland, spoke for the bill, and Mr. Kennedy, of the same State, against it. Mr. Davis and Mr. Powell, of Kentucky, Mr. Richardson, of Illinois, and Mr. Saulsbury, of Delaware, spoke in opposition to the bill. The question was then taken on Mr. Bayard's motion to indefinitely postpone it, and it was lost—yeas, eleven; nays, thirty-five. The several amendments of the House were then concurred in, and the bill was approved by the President on the third of March, 1863.

No. XLVI.—*The Act to amend an Act entitled "An Act to authorize the Employment of Volunteers to aid in Enforcing the Laws, and Protecting Public Property," approved July twenty-second*, 1861.

In the Senate on the twenty-fourth of February, 1863, Mr. Howe, of Wisconsin, from the Committee on Pensions, reported a bill to amend the act to authorize the employment of volunteers, approved the twenty-second of July, 1861. The bill provided that every non-commissioned officer, private, or other person who had been, or might thereafter be, discharged from the army within two years from the date of his enlistment, by reason of wounds received in battle, should be entitled to receive the same bounty as was granted, or might be granted, to the same class of persons who were discharged after a service of two years. It was read three times, engrossed, and passed without a division. In the House, on the second of March, it was taken up and passed. It was approved by the President on the third of March, 1863.

No. XLVII.—*The Joint Resolution giving the Thanks of Congress to Major-General William S. Rosecrans and the Officers and Men under his Command, for their Gallantry and Good Conduct in the Battle of Murfreesboro, Tennessee.*

In the Senate, on the eighth of January, 1863, Mr. Wilson introduced a joint resolution, giving the thanks of Congress to Major-General William S. Rosecrans, and the officers and men under his command, for their gallantry and good conduct at the battle of Murfreesboro, Tennessee, which was read twice and referred to the Military Committee.

On the twenty-first, Mr. Wilson reported it back without amendment. It presents the thanks of Congress to Major-General William S. Rosecrans, and, through him, to the officers and men under his command, for their distinguished gallantry and good conduct at the battle of Murfreesboro, Tennessee, where they achieved a signal victory for our arms; and the President of the United States was requested to cause the foregoing resolution to be communicated to Major-General Rosecrans, in such terms as he may deem best calculated to give effect to it.

On the twenty-seventh of February, Mr. Wilson called up the resolution, which had not been acted upon because the official report of the battle had not been received. The report had been received, and the resolution was taken up and passed.

The House of Representatives, on the second of March, took up and passed the joint resolution, and it was approved on the third of March, 1863.

No. XLVIII.—*The Bill providing for the Organization of the Signal Corps.*

In the Senate, on the ninth of February, Mr. Lane, of Indiana, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported a bill to provide for the organization of a Signal Corps to serve during the war, which was read twice, and ordered to be printed, with the report accompanying it. On the nineteenth, on motion of Mr. Lane, of Indiana, the bill was taken up, considered and passed.

In the House, on the second of March, the bill was taken up and read twice; and on motion of Mr. McPherson, it was amended by adding five new sections, providing, that paymasters be required, when informed by soldiers of the loss of allotment checks, to forward the information to the United States Sub-Treasurer in the city of New-York. That there may be appointed fifty surgeons and two hundred and fifty assistant-surgeons of volunteers. That section two of the act approved March third, 1849, entitled "An act to provide for the payment of horses and other property lost or destroyed in the military service of the United States," should be construed to include steamboats and other vessels, and railroad engines and cars. That no steamboat, nor the master or owner of any steamboat, should be liable to any of the penalties prescribed by ex ing laws, nor be liable to any person or pers for any injury or damage that may result, transporting gunpowder, or any materials wh ignite by friction, or oils or other explosive bu ing fluids, when such transportation should done in the service of the Government. That t part of the sixth section of the act to autho the employment of volunteers, approved J twenty-second, 1861, which secures to the wid of such volunteers as die or may be killed service, a bounty of one hundred dollars, sho not be construed to apply to any widow of soldier dying or killed in service who may h wilfully, maliciously, and without just prov tion, deserted her husband before he entered s service. On motion of Mr. Dunn, of Indi the bill was so amended as to provide, that laws heretofore passed relating to the pay of volunteers and militia called into the service si the first day of April, 1861, should be so c strued as to allow payment to such volunt and militia to commence as follows: to the listed men from the date of their individual rolment or enlistment, and to the non-comm sioned officers from the date at which they w mustered into service, the date of their ente upon actual service in the field, or the date of organization of their respective companies or r ments, in the manner prescribed by the gen orders of the War Department, whichever of t dates should in point of time first occur.

Mr. Holman, of Indiana, moved to amend bill by adding a new section, providing that pay of privates in the service of the United St should, after the first day of March, 1863, fifteen dollars per month; and it was agreed t yeas, eighty-four; nays, forty-six. On mo of Mr. Wright, of Pennsylvania, it was fur amended by adding three sections, provi that the President, the Secretary of War, the Surgeon-General be authorized to purc one or more site or sites for the purpose of er ing suitable hospital buildings for the accom dation of poor, disabled, discharged soldiers the army or of the volunteer service, and t paid for, as well as the cost of the improvem and buildings, out of the appropriation of million dollars made by an act entitled "An making appropriations for the support of army," approved fifth July, 1862. That the P dent, Secretary of War, and Surgeon-Gen were authorized to make rules and regulation to the management, control, and superintend of said hospitals. That the soldiers who ma entitled, under rules and regulations, to be pl in the hospitals, should be fed, clothed, and c fully provided for, at the cost of the Governm of the United States, so long as they were abled and incompetent to procure a living, or not the means of self-support: *Provided*, tha soldier during the time he might reside in said hospital or home should be entitled t ceive any pension. The bill, as amended, then passed. The amendments of the H were not acted upon by the Senate.

No. XLIX.—*The Bill authorising the Brevetting of Volunteer Officers.*

In the Senate, on the eighteenth of February, 1863, Mr. Lane, of Indiana, from the Military Committee, reported a bill to authorize the brevetting of volunteer and other officers, which was read and passed to a second reading. On the twenty-fifth, the Senate, on motion of Mr. Lane, proceeded to the consideration of the bill. It proposed to authorize the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to confer brevet rank upon such commissioned officers of the volunteer and other forces in the United States service as had been, or might thereafter be, distinguished by gallant actions or meritorious conduct; which rank should not entitle them to any increase of pay or emoluments. The bill was passed without amendment. In the House, on the second of March, it was taken up, read three times, and passed without amendment, and approved by the President on the third day of March, 1863.

No. L.—*The Bill to promote the Efficiency of the Corps of Engineers, and of the Ordnance Department, and for other purposes.*

In the House, on the thirteenth of June, 1862, Mr. Dunn, of Indiana, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported a bill to promote the efficiency of the corps of engineers, and of the commissary department, which was read twice, and its further consideration postponed. On the twenty-fourth, it was considered and recommitted, on motion of Mr. Dunn, to the Military Committee, with leave to report at any time. On the ninth of July, Mr. Dunn reported it back with amendments, which were concurred in, and the bill passed. The Senate, on the eleventh, referred it to the Military Committee, but no action was taken at that session.

In the Senate, on the thirteenth of February, Mr. Wilson introduced a bill to reörganize the corps of engineers, which was read twice, and referred to the Military Committee. On the seventeenth, Mr. Wilson reported back with an amendment. It was taken up for consideration on the twenty-sixth. It proposed to abolish the corps of topographical engineers, and to merge it into the corps of engineers, which were to have one chief engineer, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of a major-general; two inspectors-general of fortifications, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of brigadier-generals; five colonels, ten lieutenant-colonels, twenty majors, thirty captains, thirty first lieutenants, and ten second lieutenants. The general officers provided were to be selected from the corps of engineers, and officers of all lower grades were to take rank according to their respective dates of commission in the existing corps of engineers or corps of topographical engineers. No officer of the corps of engineers was thereafter to be promoted to a higher grade before having passed a satisfactory examination before a board of three engineers, senior to him in rank; and should the officer fail at the examination, he was to be suspended from promotion for one year, when he should be reëxamined, and, upon a second failure, should be dropped by the President from the army.

The Committee on Military Affairs reported as an amendment that there should be added to the ordnance department, one lieutenant-colonel, two majors, four captains, four first lieutenants, and eight second lieutenants. That there should be added to the officers in the quartermaster's department, by regular promotion, one colonel, four lieutenant-colonels, and eight majors; that the increase of rank and officers, and in the number of officers provided in sections four and five of the act should continue only during the existence of the present rebellion, and one year thereafter. The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. Kennedy, of Maryland, moved to amend, by adding, that the President be authorized to confer upon the senior officer of the marine corps, the rank, pay, and emoluments of brigadier-general in lieu of the office of colonel commandant, and that the office of colonel commandant be abolished; and the amendment was agreed to. Mr. Grimes moved to lay the bill on the table—yeas, seven, nays, twenty-eight. On motion of Mr. Wilson, the amendment of Mr. Kennedy was reconsidered; but was agreed to—yeas, twenty-two; nays, thirteen. Mr. Wilson then moved to lay the bill on the table, as he could not vote for it after the adoption of Mr. Kennedy's amendment; but the motion was lost—yeas, fourteen, nays, twenty. On motion of Mr. Wilson, the bill was then recommitted, and not again reported.

In the Senate, on the twenty-first of January, 1863, Mr. Wilson, from the Military Committee, reported the House bill referred to the Committee on the eleventh of June, 1862. On the thirteenth of February, on motion of Mr. Wilson, it was recommitted; and on the twenty-eighth, Mr. Wilson reported it back with an amendment as a substitute.

On the second of March, the Senate proceeded to consider the substitute. It proposed to strike out all of the House bill and insert: "That the corps of topographical engineers, as a distinct branch of the army, is abolished, and is merged into the corps of engineers, which shall have one chief-engineer, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of a brigadier-general; four colonels, ten lieutenant-colonels, twenty majors, thirty captains, thirty first lieutenants, and ten second lieutenants. That the general officer provided shall be selected from the corps of engineers as established, and that officers of all lower grades shall take rank according to their respective dates of commission in the existing corps of engineers or corps of topographical engineers. That no officer of the corps of engineers, below the rank of a field-officer, shall hereafter be promoted to a higher grade, before having passed a satisfactory examination before a board of three engineers, senior to him in rank; and should the officer fail at said examination, he shall be suspended from promotion for one year, when he shall be reëxamined, and, upon a second failure, shall be dropped by the President from the army. That

there shall be added to the ordnance department, one lieutenant-colonel, two majors, four captains, four first lieutenants, and eight second lieutenants; the additional officers herein authorized to be appointed by promotion, so far as the present officers of the ordnance corps will permit; and the residue to be appointed by transfers from other regiments or corps of the army. That there be added to the officers now in the quartermaster's department of the army, by regular promotion therein, one colonel, two lieutenant-colonels, and four majors, who shall have the same rank in said department as other officers of like grade therein. That the increase of rank of officers and in the number of officers provided for in this act shall continue only during the existence of the present rebellion and one year thereafter; excepting, however, the ordinary increase of grade by ordinary promotion, independent of the provisions of this act. That section two of the act approved March third, 1849, entitled 'An act to provide for the payment of horses and other property lost or destroyed in the military service of the United States,' shall be construed to include steamboats and other vessels, and 'railroad engines and cars,' in the property to be allowed and paid for when destroyed or lost under the circumstances provided for in said act. That the forces authorized to be received into the service by the twelfth section of the act approved the seventeenth of July, 1862, entitled 'An act to amend the act calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasion, approved February twenty-eighth, 1795, and the act amendatory thereof, and for other purposes,' shall be officered by persons appointed and commissioned by the President, and governed by the rules and articles of war. That all payments of advance bounty made to enlisted men who have been discharged before serving out the term required by law for its payment in full, shall be allowed in the settlement of the accounts of the paymasters at the treasury; but hereafter, in all such cases, the amount so advanced shall be charged against the enlisted men, unless the discharge be upon surgeon's certificate for wounds destroyed or sickness incurred since their last enlistment. That upon any requisition hereafter being made by the President for militia, any person who shall have volunteered or been drafted for the service for the term of nine months, or a shorter period, may enlist into a regiment from the same State to serve for the term of one year, and any person so enlisting shall be entitled to and receive a bounty of fifty dollars, to be paid in time and manner provided by the act of July twenty-second, 1861, for the payment of the bounty provided for by that act." Mr. Grimes moved to strike out the fifth and sixth sections, relating to the quartermaster's department, and the continuance of the ranks of officers one year after the close of the rebellion; and the amendment was agreed to—yeas, twenty-two, nays, fourteen. On motion of Mr. Harris, the substitute was amended, by adding, that no officer of the ordnance department below the rank of field-officer sh be promoted or commissioned to a higher gr nor should any officer of the army be com sioned as an ordnance officer, until he sh have passed a satisfactory examination befo board of not less than three ordance officers nior to himself in rank. Mr. Harris move amend the substitute, so as to increase the tains and first lieutenants of the ordnance de ment, "eight" each instead of "four" each; the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. Anthony moved to add an additional tion, relieving the members of the Friends draft; and he supported his amendment i earnest speech. It was opposed by Mr. Rich son, Mr. Lane, of Kansas, and Mr. Cowan, lost—yeas, fourteen; nays, twenty-two. On tion of Mr. Wilson, the substitute was amen by adding four new sections, providing that officers of the medical department should with the line officers of the army in superv the cooking within the same, as an impo sanitary measure, and that it should promul to its officers such regulations and instruc as might tend to insure the proper proporti the ration of the soldier. That cooks shou detailed in turn from the privates in each pany of troops in the service, at the rate o cook for each company numbering less than ty men, and two cooks for each company bering over thirty men, who should serv days each. That the President should be au ized to cause to be enlisted for each coo under-cooks of African descent, who shoul ceive for their full consideration ten dollar month, and one ration per day; three dolla said monthly pay might be in clothing. Th army rations should hereafter include pepp the proportion of four ounces for every one dred rations.

Mr. Sherman moved to amend, by pro that the increase of the rank and number ficers should continue only during the reb and one year after; and the amendmen adopted. Mr. Richardson, of Illinois, mov strike out the eighth section of the subst providing that the colored troops should b cered by men appointed and commission the President. The amendment was oppos Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Lane, of Kansas, a jected. The substitute as amended was agre Mr. Trumbull moved to amend, by adding tion repealing the three hundred dollar co tation clause of the enrolment act not the proved. After debate it was rejected—yeas nays, twenty-five. Mr. Davis moved to a by adding a section declaring that no negr or slave, should be enrolled in the military rine, or naval service of the United States it was rejected—yeas, twelve; nays, tw three. Mr. Powell then moved that no of African descent should be commission hold an office in the army—yeas, eighteen; seventeen. Mr. Lane, of Kansas, mov amend, by adding to Mr. Powell's amend the words "except company officers in c

nies composed exclusively of persons of African descent;" and the amendment was agreed to—yeas, nineteen; nays, seventeen. Mr. Wilson said he was satisfied that the bill would not go through Congress with the section in it, and he moved to strike it out, and the motion was agreed to. Mr. Richardson demanded the yeas and nays on the passage of the bill, and they were ordered, and resulted—yeas, twenty-six; nays, ten. On motion of Mr. Wilson, the title was amended so as to read: "An act to promote the efficiency of the corps of engineers and of the ordnance department, and for other purposes." The House concurred in the amendments of the Senate; so the bill was passed, and approved by the President on the third of March, 1863.

No. LI.—*The Bill to increase the Number of Major-Generals and Brigadier-Generals.*

In the Senate, on the tenth of February, 1863, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, reported from the Committee on Military Affairs a bill to authorize an increase in the number of major-generals and brigadier generals, which was read and passed to a second reading. On the eleventh, the Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, proceeded to the consideration of the bill. It authorized in addition to the four major-generals and nine brigadier-generals for the regular army, and the forty major-generals and two hundred brigadier-generals for the volunteer service, the appointment of thirty major-generals and seventy brigadier-generals of volunteers. On motion of Mr. Grimes, the yeas and nays were ordered on the passage of the bill. Mr. Grimes and Mr. Carlisle opposed its passage.

On the twelfth, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill. Mr. Fessenden moved to strike out the word "thirty" and insert "twenty," as the number of major-generals, and to strike out the word "seventy" and insert "fifty," as the number of brigadier-generals. The amendment was supported by Mr. Fessenden, Mr. Trumbull, Mr. Rice, and Mr. Carlisle, and opposed by Mr. King, Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Lane, of Kansas, and agreed to—yeas, twenty-four; nays, thirteen.

Mr. Trumbull moved to amend by adding at the end of the bill the words, "beyond which number as authorized by this act and the laws herein referred to, no general shall be appointed in any branch of the public service;" and the amendment was agreed to. Mr. Powell moved to recommit it to the Military Committee; but the motion was rejected. The bill was then passed—yeas, twenty-two; nays, fourteen.

In the House, on the twenty-first, the bill, on motion of Mr. Olin, was referred to the Military Committee. On the twenty-sixth, Mr. McPherson, from that Committee, reported it back with amendments. The first amendment reported by the Military Committee was to strike out the word "twenty" and insert "forty," so as to increase the number of major-generals forty instead of twenty; and it was agreed to—yeas, eighty-eight; nays, fifty-three. The second amendment was to increase the number of brigadier-generals one hundred instead of fifty, as proposed by the Senate; and it was agreed to—yeas, ninety-one; nays, forty-eight. The third amendment proposed to strike out the amendment moved by Mr. Trumbull, forbidding the appointment of any generals not provided for by law; and it was agreed to—yeas, seventy; nays, sixty-seven. Mr. Cox moved to amend it by adding that the President should appoint no one except for gallant and meritorious service in the field; and the amendment was agreed to—yeas, ninety-two; nays, forty-one. The bill was then passed—yeas, one hundred and two; nays, thirty-five.

In the Senate, on the twenty-seventh, Mr. Wilson moved that the Senate disagree to the House amendment, and ask a committee of conference. The motion was agreed to, and Mr. Wilson, Mr. Cowan, and Mr. Latham were appointed managers on the part of the Senate. On motion of Mr. McPherson, of Pennsylvania, the House insisted on its amendments, agreed to the committee of conference, and appointed Mr. McPherson, Mr. Dunn, of Indiana, and Mr. Mallory, of Kentucky, managers on its part.

In the Senate, Mr. Wilson from the committee of conference reported that the Senate concur in the first amendment of the House, to increase the number of major-generals "forty" instead of "twenty," with an amendment making the number "thirty;" that the Senate concur in the amendment of the House to increase the number of brigadier-generals "one hundred" instead of "fifty," with an amendment making the number "seventy-five;" that the Senate concur in the third amendment of the House, striking out the words, "forbidding the appointment of any generals not provided for by law;" and that the Senate concur in the fourth amendment of the House with an amendment so as to make it read: "That the officers to be appointed under this act shall be selected from those who have been conspicuous for gallant or meritorious conduct in the line of duty." The Senate concurred in the report.

In the House, on the twenty-eighth, Mr. McPherson, from the committee of conference, made a report. Mr. Cox moved that it be laid upon the table—yeas, thirty; nays, eighty-five; so the House refused to lay the report on the table. The report was then agreed to, and the bill was approved by the President on the second day of March, 1863.

No. LII.—*The Joint Resolution of Thanks to Major-General Ulysses S. Grant, and the Officers and Soldiers who have fought under his Command during the Rebellion; and providing that the President of the United States should cause a Medal to be struck, to be presented to Major-General Grant in the name of the People of the United States of America.*

In the House, on the eighth of December, 1863, Mr. Washburne, of Illinois, by unanimous consent introduced a joint resolution of thanks to

Major-General Ulysses S. Grant, and the officers and soldiers under his command, during the rebellion, and providing that the President of the United States should cause a medal to be struck, to be presented to Major-General Grant in the name of the people of the United States. The resolution was passed unanimously.

In the Senate, it was referred to the Military Committee, and on the sixteenth, Mr. Wilson reported it without amendment. The resolution directs "that the thanks of Congress be presented to Major-General Ulysses S. Grant, and through him to the officers and soldiers who have fought under his command during this rebellion, for their gallantry and good conduct in the battles in which they have been engaged; and requests the President of the United States to cause a gold medal to be struck, with suitable emblems, devices, and inscriptions, to be presented to Major-General Grant. When the medal shall have been struck, the President is to cause a copy of the joint resolution to be engrossed on parchment, and to transmit it, together with the medal, to Major-General Grant, to be presented to him in the name of the people of the United States of America. A sufficient sum of money to carry this resolution into effect is appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated." Mr. Wilson asked that the joint resolution should be put upon its passage. Mr. Fessenden asked if the Military Committee had made "any examination to ascertain what sum may be necessary to carry the resolution into effect." Mr. Wilson replied that "the Committee did not know what sum it would be necessary to appropriate, and it was thought best to leave the matter to the discretion of the authorities." The joint resolution was then unanimously passed, and approved by the President on the seventeenth of December, 1863.

No. LIII.—*The Joint Resolution to supply in part Deficiencies in Appropriations for the public Printing, and to supply Deficiencies in the Appropriations for Bounties to Volunteers.*

In the House, on the twenty-first of December, 1863, Mr. Stevens, from the Committee of Ways and Means, reported a joint resolution to supply in part deficiencies in the appropriations for the public printing, and to supply deficiencies in the appropriations for bounties and premiums to volunteers, which was read twice, committed to the Committee of the Whole, and made the special order for two o'clock of that day. The joint resolution appropriated fifty thousand dollars for deficiencies in the appropriations for public printing, and twenty million dollars for the payment of bounties, advance pay, and premiums, for soldiers who volunteered or enlisted in the service of the United States. At two o'clock the House, on motion of Mr. Stevens, resolved itself into Committee of the Whole, Mr. Fenton, of New-York, in the chair. After debate, in which Mr. Stevens, Mr. Brooks, Mr. Cox, Mr. Schenck, Mr. Garfield, Mr. Lovejoy, Mr. Spalding, Mr. Kelley, and Mr. Strouse participated, the committee, on motion, rose to terminate the debate.

Mr. Harding, of Kentucky, moved to amend by adding, as a provision, that no part of the money aforesaid should be applied to the raising, arming, equipping, or paying of negro soldiers. Mr. Schenck demanded the yeas and nays, and they were ordered, and being taken resulted—yeas, forty-one; nays, one hundred and five; so the amendment was lost. The joint resolution was then passed without a division.

On the twenty-second, the Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, proceeded to the consideration of the resolution. Mr. Wilson moved to amend it by striking out the words, "and premiums for soldiers volunteering or enlisting in the service of the United States," so that the clause would read: "That the sum of twenty million dollars, or so much thereof as may be required, be, and the same is hereby, appropriated for the payment of bounties and advance pay." The amendment was agreed to. Mr. Fessenden then moved to amend the resolution by adding a proviso, that no bounties, except such as were provided by law, should be paid to any person enlisted after the fifth day of January, 1865. After debate, in which Mr. Fessenden, Mr. Harris, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Cowan, Mr. Grimes, Mr. Collamer, Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Ten Eyck participated, the vote was taken on the amendment, and it was agreed to—yeas, thirty-five; nays, nine. Mr. Wilson moved to amend by adding as a new section, that the money paid by drafted persons should be paid into the treasury of the United States, and should be drawn out on requisitions, as in the case of other public moneys. The money so paid should be kept in the treasury as a special deposit, applicable only to the expenses of draft and for the procuration of substitutes, for which the same is hereby appropriated. The amendment was agreed to, and the joint resolution as amended was passed.

The House concurred in the amendments, and the joint resolution was approved by the President on the twenty-third of December, 1863.

No. LIV.—*The Joint Resolution to drop from the Rolls of the Army unemployed General Officers.*

In the House, on the eighth of March, 1864, Mr. Schenck, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported a joint resolution to drop from the rolls of the army unemployed general officers, which was read twice and made the special order for the fifteenth of March. On the sixteenth, the resolution was taken up, debated, and amendments proposed by Mr. Cox, of Ohio, and Mr. Kernan, of New-York. The House, on the seventeenth, on motion of Mr. Ashley, of Ohio, postponed the further consideration of the resolution to the sixth of April. On the eleventh of May, it was taken up, the pending question being on the amendments of Mr. Cox and Mr. Kernan. The amendment of Mr. Cox provided that whenever any officer should demand a court of in-

quiry, such court should be convened; and if the court find him competent to command in the rank to which he is entitled, he should be restored. The amendment was disagreed to—yeas, forty-six; nays, sixty-nine. Mr. Kernan's amendment provided for the appointment of a board of officers, to consist of three major-generals, three brigadier-generals, and three colonels, to examine into the competency, fitness, and efficiency for command of major-generals and brigadier-generals, who should not be in the performance of duty on the first of July, 1864. The amendment was lost—yeas, seventy-two; nays, forty-five. It was referred by the Senate to the Committee on Military Affairs, and not reported.

In the House, on the eighth of December, 1864, Mr. Schenck, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported a bill to drop from the rolls of the army unemployed major-generals and brigadier-generals, which was read twice and recommitted to the Committee. On the fourteenth, Mr. Schenck from the Military Committee, reported it back with a recommendation that it do pass. It provided that all major and brigadier-generals in the military service, who on the fifteenth day of February, 1865, should not be in the performance of duty or service corresponding to their respective grades or rank, and who should not have been engaged in such duty or service for three months continuously next prior to that date, should be dropped from the rolls of the army. That thereafter, continuously, until the termination of the war, on the last day of each month, after the fifteenth day of February, 1865, the provisions of the bill should be made applicable to any general officer in the military service, who should not, on the last day of any month, have been engaged in the performance of duty or service corresponding to his proper rank for three months consecutively, then next preceding. Mr. Eldridge, of Wisconsin, demanded the yeas and nays, and they were ordered, and the bill passed—yeas, ninety-nine; nays, thirty-eight.

In the Senate, the bill was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. On the twenty-second, Mr. Wilson reported, that "the Committee are unanimously of the opinion that economy, justice, and the efficiency and general interests of the military service alike demand that where general officers in the regular and volunteer forces of the United States are found to be unfit for commands, and who are consequently unemployed or employed on duty not corresponding to their rank, they should be mustered out of the service, and that the vacancies thus created should be filled by new promotions and appointments, in order that the officers of an inferior grade who are performing the duties proper to such general officers may be promoted to the rank and receive the pay, allowances, and emoluments of such general officers. But the Committee are of opinion that no fixed, inflexible rule of discrimination, such as is embodied in the joint resolution of the House of Representatives, could be adopted and executed consistently with equal and exact justice toward individual officers, and with the interests of the military service of the country. Justice and the public interests demand that the power to muster general officers out of the service of the United States should be exercised with much discrimination and care. The power of removal and the responsibility of action being now fully and completely vested in the President, the Committee unanimously report against the passage of the joint resolution of the House of Representatives." On the sixth of January, the Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, proceeded to consider the bill. Mr. Wilson moved its indefinite postponement. The indefinite postponement of the bill was advocated by Mr. Wilson, Mr. Lane, Mr. Grimes, Mr. Powell, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Hendricks, and Mr. Johnson, and opposed by Mr. Trumbull, Mr. Conness, Mr. Davis, Mr. Howe, and Mr. Farwell. The question was then taken, and the motion was agreed to—yeas, twenty-eight; nays, eight.

No. LV.—*The Joint Resolution expressive of the Thanks of Congress to Major-General Joseph Hooker, and Major-General George G. Meade, and Major-General Oliver O. Howard, and the Officers and Men of the Army of the Potomac.*

In the Senate, on the fourteenth of December, 1863, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, introduced a joint resolution expressive of the thanks of Congress to Major-General Joseph Hooker, and Major-General George G. Meade, and the officers and soldiers of the army of the Potomac, which was read twice and referred to the Military Committee. On the eighth of January, 1864, Mr. Wilson reported it back without amendment. The Senate, on the eighteenth, on motion of Mr. Wilson, proceeded to the consideration of the resolution, which declared that the gratitude of the American people, and the thanks of their representatives in Congress, be tendered to Major-General Joseph Hooker, and the officers and soldiers of the army of the Potomac, for the skill, energy, and endurance which first covered Washington and Baltimore from the meditated blow of the advancing and powerful army of rebels led by General Robert E. Lee; and to Major-General George G. Meade, and Major-General Oliver O. Howard, and the officers and soldiers of that army, for the skill and heroic valor which at Gettysburgh repulsed, defeated, and drove back, broken and dispirited, beyond the Rappahannock, the veteran army of the rebellion. Mr. Grimes said: "As I have read the history of that campaign, the man who selected the position where the battle of Gettysburgh was fought, and who, indeed, fought it the first day, was General Howard, and to him the country is indebted as much for the credit of securing that victory as to any other person. I wish, therefore, as a recognition of his merits, to couple his name with that of General Meade, in the vote of thanks." He moved to insert after the name of General Meade the name of Major-General Oliver O. Howard, and the amendment was agreed to. The joint resolution as amended then passed without a division.

The House of Representatives, on the twenty-sixth, passed it unanimously; and the President approved it on the twenty-eighth of January, 1864.

No. LVI.—*The Joint Resolution expressive of the Thanks of Congress to Major-General Nathaniel P. Banks, and the Officers and Men under his Command.*

In the Senate, on the fourteenth of December, 1863, Mr. Wilson introduced a joint resolution expressive of the thanks of Congress to Major-General Nathaniel P. Banks, and the officers and soldiers under his command at Port Hudson, which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. On the eighth of January, 1864, Mr. Wilson reported it back without amendment. The Senate, on the eighteenth, on motion of Mr. Wilson, took up the resolution, and it passed unanimously.

In the House, on the twenty-sixth, the resolution, on motion of Mr. Eliot, of Massachusetts, was taken up and passed. The joint resolution tendered the thanks of Congress to Major-General Nathaniel P. Banks and the officers and soldiers under his command, for the skill, courage, and endurance which compelled the surrender of Port Hudson, and thus removed the last obstruction to the free navigation of the Mississippi River; and was approved by the President on the twenty-eighth of January, 1864.

No. LVII.—*The Joint Resolution expressive of the Thanks of Congress to Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside, and the Officers and Men who had fought under him.*

In the Senate, on the fifteenth of December, 1863, Mr. Anthony, of Rhode Island, introduced a joint resolution expressive of the thanks of Congress to Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside, and the officers and soldiers who had fought under him, which was read twice and referred to the Military Committee. On the eighth of January, 1864, Mr. Sprague, of Rhode Island, from the Military Committee, reported it back without amendment. The resolution provided that the thanks of Congress be presented to Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside, and, through him, to the officers and men who had fought under his command, for their gallantry, good conduct, and soldier-like endurance; and that the President of the United States be requested to cause the resolution to be communicated to Major-General Burnside, in such terms as he might deem best calculated to give effect thereto.

On the eighteenth, the Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, proceeded to the consideration of the resolution, and it was unanimously adopted. The House of Representatives, on the twenty-sixth, passed it unanimously, and it was approved by the President on the twenty-eighth of January, 1864.

No. LVIII.—*Joint Resolution tendering the Thanks of Congress to Major-General W. T. Sherman.*

In the House, on the eighth of February, 1864, Mr. Cobb, of Wisconsin, introduced a joint re lution expressive of the thanks of Congress Major-General W. T. Sherman. The resoluti declared that the thanks of Congress and of t people of the United States were due, and tl the same be tendered, to Major-General W. Sherman, commander of the department a army of the Tennessee, and the officers and s diers who served under him, for their gallant a arduous services in marching to the relief of t army of the Cumberland, and for their gallant and heroism in the battle of Chattanooga, whi contributed, in a great degree, to the success our arms in that glorious victory. It was pass without a division.

In the Senate, on the thirteenth, Mr. Lane, Indiana, from the Committee on Military Affai to which the joint resolution had been referr reported it back without amendment, and it w passed, and approved by the President on t nineteenth of February, 1864.

No. LIX.—*The Bill Reviving the Grade Lieutenant-General in the United Sta Army.*

In the House of Representatives, on the fo teenth of December, 1863, Mr. E. B. Wa burne, of Illinois, introduced a bill, reviving t grade of lieutenant-general, which was refer to the Committee on Military Affairs. On t twenty-fifth of January, 1864, Mr. Farnswor of Illinois, reported it back, with an amendm in the nature of a substitute. The substitute vived the grade of lieutenant-general in the ar of the United States, and authorized the Pr dent, whenever he should deem it expedient, appoint, by and with the advice and consent the Senate, a commander of the army, to be lected, during war, from among the officers the military service of the United States, not low the grade of major-general, who were most tinguished for courage, skill, and ability, and w should be authorized, under the direction of t President, to command the armies of the Uni States. By the second section, the lieutena general so appointed was to be entitled to pay, allowances, and staff described in the of twenty-eighth May, 1798; also to the all ances described in the sixth section of the approved August twenty-third, 1842; provi that nothing in the bill should be construed affect in any way the rank, pay, and allowan of Winfield Scott, Lieutenant-General by brev then on the retired list of the army.

Mr. Fessenden demanded the previous qu tion; but the motion was lost—yeas, fifty-eig nays, sixty-six. Mr. Pendleton, of Ohio, mo to postpone the further consideration of the s ject for one week, and that the bill and ame ment be printed. Mr. Washburne demanded yeas and nays, and they were ordered—ye ninety-three; nays, fifty-six. So the motion postpone was agreed to.

On the first of February, the House procee to the consideration of the bill. The origi bill, introduced by Mr. Washburne, provided t

the grade of lieutenant-general be revived in the army of the United States, and the President be authorized, whenever he should deem it expedient, to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a commander of the army, to be selected, during war, from among the officers, not below the grade of major-general, of the regular army, or of volunteers most distinguished by courage, skill, and genius in their profession, and who, being commissioned as lieutenant-general, might be authorized to command the armies of the United States. That the lieutenant-general, appointed as before provided, should be entitled to the pay, allowances, and staff specified in the fifth section of the act approved May twenty-eighth, 1798; and also to the allowances described in the sixth section of the act approved August twenty-third, 1842, granting additional rations to certain officers.

The amendment provided, that the grade of lieutenant-general be revived in the army of the United States; and that the President be authorized, whenever he should deem it expedient, to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a commander of the army, to be selected, during war, from among the officers in the military service of the United States, not below the grade of major-general, most distinguished for courage, skill, and ability; and who, being commissioned as lieutenant-general, should be authorized, under the direction of the President, to command the armies of the United States. That the lieutenant-general appointed, as before provided, should be entitled to the pay, allowances, and staff specified in the fifth section of the act approved May twenty-eighth, 1798; and also the allowances described in the sixth section of the act approved August twenty-third, 1842, granting additional rations to certain officers: *Provided*, that nothing in the bill contained should be construed in any way to affect the rank, pay, or allowances of Winfield Scott, Lieutenant-General by brevet, then on the retired list of the army. Mr. Farnsworth, Mr. Schenck, Mr. Washburne, and Mr. Hubbard advocated the passage of the measure, and Mr. Garfield, Mr. Stevens, and Mr. Boutwell opposed it. Mr. Garfield moved that the bill and amendment be laid upon the table—yeas, nineteen; nays, one hundred and seventeen. Mr. Ross, of Illinois, moved to amend by adding, "And that we respectfully recommend the appointment of Major-General U. S. Grant for the position of lieutenant-general;" and it was agreed to—yeas, one hundred and eleven; nays, forty-one.

In the Senate, on the ninth, Mr. Wilson, from the Military Committee, to which it had been referred, reported it back with amendments. On the eleventh, on motion of Mr. Wilson, the Senate proceeded to its consideration.

The first amendment of the Committee was in line seven, section one, to strike out the words "commander of the army," and to insert "lieutenant-general;" and in line eight, after the word "selected," to strike out the words, "during the war;" so that the clause read: "And the President is hereby authorized, whenever he shall deem it expedient, to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a lieutenant-general, to be selected from among those officers in the military service of the United States, not below the grade of major-general, most distinguished for courage, skill, and ability." The amendment was opposed by Mr. Trumbull, and supported by Mr. Nesmith and Mr. Johnson, and adopted—yeas, twenty-five; nays, fifteen.

The next amendment of the Committee was in line eleven, after the word "ability," to strike out the following words: "And who, being commissioned as lieutenant-general, shall be authorized, under the direction of the President, to command the armies of the United States; and that we respectfully recommend the appointment of Major-General U. S. Grant, of Illinois, for the position of lieuenant-general." The amendment was opposed by Mr. Sherman, Mr. Howe, Mr. Richardson, Mr. Trumbull, Mr. Howard, Mr. Doolittle, and supported by Mr. Wilson, Mr. Nesmith, Mr. Grimes, Mr. Lane, and Mr. Johnson.

On the twenty-fourth, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill, and Mr. Grimes declared his unalterable opposition to its passage in any shape in which it would be presented to the Senate. Mr. Sherman, Mr. Howe, Mr. Wilkinson, and Mr. Hale made speeches in favor of the bill and against the amendment. Mr. Wilson, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Fessenden spoke for the amendment; and it was agreed to—yeas, twenty-eight; nays, twelve. Mr. Conness, of California, moved to amend the bill, by inserting after the words "lieutenant-general," the words, "who shall be commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States, under the direction of the President, and who shall remain in chief command during the pleasure of the President." Mr. Conness demanded the yeas and nays, and they were ordered—yeas, ten; nays, twenty-eight. So the amendment was rejected. Mr. Howard demanded the yeas and nays on the passage of the bill, and they were ordered. After a speech from Mr. Davis against the bill, it was passed—yeas, thirty-one; nays, six.

On the twenty-fifth, the House, on motion of Mr. Washburne, of Illinois, disagreed to the amendments of the Senate, asked a committee of conference, and appointed Mr. Washburne, Mr. McAllister, of Pennsylvania, and Mr. Fenton, of New-York, managers on its part. The Senate, on the same day, voted to insist on its amendments, agreed to a committee of conference, and appointed Mr. Wilson, Mr. Lane, of Indiana, and Mr. Johnson managers on its part.

On the twenty-sixth, Mr. Wilson, from the committee of conference, reported that the House of Representatives recede from its disagreement to the Senate amendments, and agree to the same with amendments. The report was accepted without a division. Mr. Washburne, from the conference committee,

reported in favor of agreeing to the Senate amendments with amendments. Mr. Cox moved that the report of the committee of conference be laid upon the table—yeas, thirty-six; nays, fifty-nine. The yeas and nays were then taken on accepting the report of the committee of conference; and it was agreed to—yeas, seventy-three; nays, forty-seven. The bill was approved by the President on the twenty-fourth of February, 1864, and General Grant was immediately nominated and confirmed Lieutenant-General.

No. LX.—*The Bill to amend "the Act for Enrolling and Calling out the National Forces."*

In the Senate, on the fifth of January, 1864, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, introduced a bill to amend an act for enrolling and calling out the national forces, and for other purposes, approved March third, 1863, which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. On the sixth, Mr. Wilson reported it back with amendments.

The bill provided that the President should be authorized to call for such number of men for the military service as the public exigencies should require. That the quota of each ward of a city, town, or township, or of a county, where the county was not divided into wards, towns, or townships, should be in proportion to the number of men liable to render military service, taking into account the number which had been furnished the military and naval service. That if any State should fail to furnish, within the time designated by the President, the number of men required, the provost-marshal of the district within which any ward of a city, town, or township, or county, where the same was not divided into wards, towns, or townships, which was deficient in its quota, was situated, should make a draft for the number deficient. That any person enrolled under the provisions of the act for enrolling and calling out the national forces, or who might be hereafter so enrolled, might furnish, at any time, an acceptable substitute who was not liable to draft. That any person enrolled and drafted might furnish an acceptable substitute, subject to such rules and regulations as might be prescribed by the Secretary of War. That if such substitute is not liable to draft, the person furnishing him should be exempt from draft during the time for which such substitute was not liable to draft; and if such substitute was liable to draft, the name of the person furnishing him should again be placed on the roll. That the commutation money paid by persons drafted in any congressional district should be applied by the War Department for the procuration of substitutes, which substitutes should be credited to that district in filling its quota. That the fourteenth section of the act amended should be amended so as to read: That all drafted persons should, on arriving at the rendezvous, be carefully inspected by the surgeon of the board. That boards of enrolment should have power to enroll any person whose name should have been omitted, and any person arriving at the age of twenty years, and any person who had not been in the military or naval service of the United States two years during the existing war and honorably discharged; and the boards of enrolment should release from draft any person who, between the enrolment and the draft, should have arrived at the age of forty-five. That whenever a mariner or able seaman should be drafted, he should have the right to enlist in the naval service. That all enlistments into the naval service or into the marine corps, that might be hereafter made of persons liable to service, should be credited to the ward, town, or township, or county, when the same was not divided into wards, towns, or townships, in which such enlisted men were or might be enrolled. That section two of the act for enrolling and calling out the national forces, should be amended by striking out all of the section, and inserting: "That the following persons be excepted and exempted from the provisions of this act, and shall not be liable to military duty under the same, to wit: Such as are rejected as physically or mentally unfit for the service; the Vice-President of the United States, the judges of the various courts of the United States, the heads of the various executive departments, the governors of the several States, and all persons actually in the military or naval service at the time of the draft, or who have been in such service for the term of two years during the present war, and been honorably discharged." That section third of the act for enrolling and calling out the national forces, and so much of section ten of the act as provided for the separate enrolment of each class, should be repealed. That any person who should forcibly resist or oppose any enrolment, or who should incite, counsel, or encourage to resist or oppose any such enrolment, should be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding five years, or by both of the punishments, in the discretion of the court. That the Secretary of War should be authorized to detail or appoint such number of additional surgeons for temporary duty in the examination of persons drafted into the military service, as might be necessary to secure the prompt examination of all drafted persons. That provost-marshals, boards of enrolment, or any member thereof, acting by authority of the board, should have power to summon witnesses, and enforce their attendance. That copies of any record of a provost-marshal or board of enrolment, or of any part thereof, certified by the provost-marshal, or a majority of the board of enrolment, should be deemed and taken as evidence in any civil or military court, in like manner as the original record. That members of religious denominations, who should, by oath or affirmation, declare that they are conscientiously opposed to the bearing of arms, should, when drafted, be considered non-combatants, and should be assigned by the Secretary of War to duty in the hospitals, or to the care of freedmen. That no person of foreign birth should, on account of alienage, be exempted from enrolment or draft, who had at

any time assumed the rights of a citizen by voting at any election held under authority of the laws of any State or Territory, or of the United States, or who had held any office under such laws, or any of them. That all claims to exemption should be verified by the oath or affirmation of the party claiming exemption. That if any person, drafted and liable to render military service, should procure a decision of the board of enrolment in his favor upon a claim to exemption by any fraud or false representation practised by himself or by his procurement, such decision or exemption should be of no effect. That any person who should procure, or attempt to procure, a false report from the surgeon of the board of enrolment concerning the physical condition of any person drafted and liable to render service, or a decision in favor of such person upon a claim to exemption, knowing the same to be false, should, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment. That the fees of agents and attorneys for making out and causing to be executed any papers in support of a claim for exemption from draft, or for any services that might be rendered to the claimant, should not, in any case, exceed five dollars. That no member of the board of enrolment, and no surgeon detailed or employed to assist the board of enrolment, and no clerk, assistant, or employee of any provost-marshal or board of enrolment should directly or indirectly be engaged in procuring or attempting to procure substitutes for persons drafted, or liable to be drafted into the military service. That any surgeon charged with the duty of inspection, who should receive from any person any money or other valuable thing, for making an imperfect inspection, or a false or incorrect report, and each member of the board of enrolment who should wilfully agree to the discharge from service of any drafted person who was not legally and properly entitled to such discharge, should be tried by a court-martial, and, on conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than three hundred dollars, and not more than ten thousand dollars, should be imprisoned at the discretion of the court, and be cashiered and dismissed the service. That nothing contained in the act should be so construed as to prevent or prohibit the enlistment of men in the States in rebellion under the orders of the War Department.

On the seventh, the Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, proceeded to the consideration of the bill, and several amendments reported by the Military Committee were agreed to. A new section, moved by Mr. Grimes, exempting from draft pilots, engineers, and masters-at-arms in the naval service, was adopted. On the eighth, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill, the pending question being the amendment reported by the Military Committee to repeal the commutation clause of three hundred dollars. Mr. Sumner moved to strike out all after the enacting clause of the amendment and insert: "That no drafted person shall be allowed to furnish a substitute, but he shall be discharged from the draft on paying to such officer as the Secretary of War may authorize to receive the same, the full sum of three hundred dollars. *And provided further*, That every such person thus discharged shall pay, in addition to the said sum of three hundred dollars, a certain proportion in the nature of a tithe of his annual gains, profits, or income, whether derived from any kind of property, dividends, salary, or from any profession, trade, or employment whatever, according to the following rates, to wit: on all income over six hundred dollars, and not over two thousand dollars, ten per cent; over two thousand dollars, and not over five thousand dollars, twenty per cent; and on all income over five thousand, thirty per cent." Mr. Clark, Mr. Collamer, Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Cowan opposed the repeal of the three hundred dollar commutation clause, and Mr. Lane, of Indiana, advocated its repeal.

On the twelfth, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill. Mr. Sumner proposed to modify his amendment so as to allow a drafted man to furnish a substitute, and to provide that the commutation money be used at the discretion of the Secretary of War to promote enlistments, or for the benefit of enlisted men. After debate, the vote was taken on Mr. Sumner's amendment to the amendment, and it was rejected—yeas, fifteen; nays, twenty-five. Mr. Wilson then moved to strike out all after the enacting clause of the amendment repealing the three hundred dollar commutation provision, and inserting: "That any person enrolled and drafted may pay to such person as the Secretary of War may designate to receive it, three hundred dollars for the procurement of a substitute, and such person so paying three hundred dollars for the procurement of a substitute, shall be exempt from draft until such time as he shall again become liable to draft by reason of the exhaustion of the enrolment from which the draft shall be made; but such exemption shall not exceed the time for which such person shall have been drafted." The debate was further continued by Mr. Howe, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Grimes, Mr. Fessenden, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Lane, of Kansas.

On the fourteenth, the debate was resumed, and the amendment to the amendment moved by Mr. Wilson having been withdrawn, the vote was taken on the amendment to repeal the commutation clause, and it was rejected—yeas, twelve; nays, twenty-eight. Mr. Sherman moved to amend by adding as a new section: "That any person enrolled and drafted into the military service of the United States, may furnish an acceptable substitute, subject to such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War. That if such substitute is not liable to draft, the person furnishing him shall be exempt from draft during the time for which such substitute is not liable to draft, not exceeding the term for which he was drafted; and if such substitute is liable to draft, the name of the person furnishing him shall again be placed on the roll, and shall be liable to draft on future calls. And any person now in the military or

naval service of the United States not physically disqualified, who has so served more than one year, and whose term of unexpired service shall not, at the time of substitution, exceed six months, may be employed as a substitute to serve in the troops of the State in which he enlisted; and if any drafted person shall hereafter pay money for the procuration of a substitute, under the provisions of the act to which this is an amendment, such payment of money shall operate only to relieve such person from draft on that call, and his name shall be retained on the roll, and he shall be subject to draft on future calls, and the maximum of commutation under said act shall hereafter be five hundred dollars instead of three hundred dollars." Mr. Anthony, of Rhode Island, moved to amend the amendment by adding as a proviso: "That no person who has been drafted and furnished a substitute or paid commutation as herein provided, shall again be liable to draft until the present enrolment shall be exhausted." The amendment to the amendment was rejected. On motion of Mr. Harris, Mr. Sherman's amendment was amended so as to make the maximum commutation four hundred dollars instead of five hundred dollars. Mr. Howard, of Michigan, moved to amend Mr. Sherman's amendment by striking out the last clause, "and the maximum of commutation shall be four hundred dollars instead of three hundred dollars;" and it was agreed to—yeas, twenty-three; nays, fourteen. Mr. Sherman's amendment as amended was agreed to.

Mr. Howe moved to amend by adding a new section providing that the money received as commutation should be a fund to be equally distributed among men drafted and mustered into the service; but the amendment was rejected. Mr. Dixon moved to amend by adding as a new section: "That all persons recognized as clergymen or ministers of religion by the ecclesiastical authority of the denomination or communion to which they belong, when called into the military service under this act, shall be regarded as non-combatants, and employed as chaplains or in hospitals." Mr. Wilson moved to amend by striking out the amendment and inserting: "That ministers of the Gospel, or members of religious denominations conscientiously opposed to the bearing of arms, and who are prohibited from doing so by the rules and articles of faith and practice of said religious denomination, shall, when drafted into the military service, be considered non-combatants, and shall be assigned by the Secretary of War to duty in the hospitals, or to the care of freedmen, or shall pay the sum of three hundred dollars to such person as the Secretary of War shall designate to receive it, to be applied to the benefit of the sick and wounded soldiers; and such drafted persons shall then be exempt from the draft during the time for which they shall have been drafted." Mr. Dixon accepted the amendment. Mr. Grimes moved to amend the amendment by striking out the words, "ministers of the Gospel or;" and the amendment was agreed to—yeas, twenty-eight; nays ten. Mr. Doolittle moved to amend by requiring members of religious denominations to make oath that they are conscientiously opposed to bearing arms; and the amendment was agreed to. The amendment as amended was agreed to—yeas, twenty-eight; nays, twelve.

On the fifteenth, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill. It was reported to the Senate, and the amendments made as in Committee of the Whole agreed to. Mr. Nesmith renewed the motion to repeal the three hundred dollar commutation clause of the enrolment act; but the motion was lost—yeas, fifteen; nays twenty-four. Mr. Sumner renewed his motion to require drafted persons to pay commutation in proportion to their incomes; but it was lost—yeas, sixteen; nays, twenty-eight. Mr. Doolittle desired to amend the bill so as to make persons who had resided one year in the country and voted, liable to enrolment and draft, and Mr. Trumbull moved to amend by adding: "That no person of foreign birth shall, on account of alienage, be exempted from enrolment or draft who has at any time assumed the rights of a citizen by voting at any election, or who has held any office; but the fact that any such person of foreign birth has voted or held, or shall vote or hold office, shall be taken as conclusive evidence that he is not entitled to exemption from military service on account of alienage." The amendment was agreed to.

The consideration of the bill was resumed on the sixteenth; debated and amended. On the eighteenth, the bill was further considered, debated, amended, and passed.

In the House, on the fifteenth of January Mr. Schenck, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom the bill had been referred, reported it back with an amendment. On the first of February, the House, on motion of Mr. Schenck referred it to the Committee of the Whole and made it the special order until disposed of. The Military Committee reported an amendment to strike out all of the Senate bill after the first section, and insert twenty-five new sections as a substitute. On motion of Mr. Stevens, of Pennsylvania, the original bill was amended so as to provide that persons paying three hundred dollars should be exempted during the time for which they were drafted, unless the enrolment should be exhausted. Mr. Holman, of Indiana, moved to amend so as to repeal the commutation provision. On the second, the debate was renewed by Mr. Schenck, Mr. Chandler, and Mr. Davis, of New-York, Mr. Anderson, of Kentucky, and Mr. W. J. Allen, of Illinois. The House, on the third, resumed the consideration of the bill, and Mr. Myers, and Mr. Williams, of Pennsylvania, addressed the House in its favor and Mr. Stiles of that State opposed it. Mr. Holman's amendment to strike out of the original bill the commutation clause was rejected—yeas, twenty-six; nays, seventy-three. Mr. Baldwin, of Michigan, moved to amend the bill by striking out the maximum of four hundred dol-

lars instead of three hundred dollars, and it was agreed to.

On the eighth, the bill was amended on motion of Mr. Rice, of Massachusetts, so as to allow soldiers to enlist in the navy. On the ninth, the bill was further discussed and amended. Mr. Stevens, on the tenth, moved to amend the Senate bill by striking out the twenty-seventh section, and inserting that "all able-bodied male persons of African descent, between the ages of twenty and forty-five years, whether citizens or not, resident in the United States, shall be enrolled and form part of the national forces. And when a slave shall have been drafted and mustered into the service of the United States his master shall have a certificate thereof, which shall entitle him to receive three hundred dollars from the United States, and the drafted man shall be free, provided that the slaves of loyal men only shall be paid for." On the eleventh, the House resumed the consideration of the bill, and Mr. Davis, of Maryland, moved to amend Mr. Stevens's amendment by adding: "The Secretary of War shall appoint a commission in each of the slaves States represented in Congress, charged to award a just compensation to each loyal owner of any slave who may volunteer into the service of the United States, payable out of the commutation money." The amendment to the amendment was agreed to. Mr. Baldwin, of Massachusetts, moved to strike out the words "owner of any slave," and insert, "the person to whom the colored persons may owe service;" and the amendment was agreed to. Mr. Webster, of Maryland, moved to insert after the word "certificate," in Mr. Stevens's amendment, the words: "The bounty of one hundred dollars, now payable by law to each drafted man, shall be paid to the person to whom said drafted person owes service at the time of his muster into the service of the United States," and it was agreed to. The amendment of Mr. Stevens was agreed to—yeas, sixty-seven; nays, forty-four.

On the twelfth, the House resumed the consideration of the bill. The previous question, on motion of Mr. Schenck, was ordered—yeas, seventy-eight; nays, fifty-six. Mr. Schenck briefly explained the amendment adopted in Committee of the Whole, and also the substitute of the Military Committee. The amendments adopted in Committee of the Whole were agreed to, with the exception of the twenty-second amendment, on which a separate vote was demanded. That amendment was to strike out the twenty-seventh section, and insert in lieu of it: "All able-bodied male persons of African descent, between the ages of twenty and forty-five years of age, whether citizens or not, resident in the United States, shall be enrolled according to the provisions of the act to which this is a supplement, and form part of the national forces; and when a slave of a loyal citizen shall be drafted and mustered into the service of the United States, his master shall have a certificate thereof. The bounty of one hundred dollars, now payable by law for each drafted man, shall be paid to the person to whom such drafted person owes service or labor at the time of his muster into the service of the United States, on freeing the person. The Secretary of War shall appoint a commission in each of the slaves States represented in Congress, charged to award a just compensation, not exceeding three hundred dollars, to each loyal person to whom the colored volunteer may owe service, who may volunteer into the service of the United States, payable out of the commutation money, upon the master freeing the slave." The amendment was agreed to. The vote was then taken on the substitute, which was in substance the Senate bill with the House amendments, and it was concurred in. Mr. Holman demanded the yeas and nays on the passage of the bill, and being taken, resulted—yeas, ninety-four; nays, sixty; so the bill was passed by the House.

On the fifteenth, the Senate, on motion of Mr Wilson, disagreed to the House amendments, and the House, on the sixteenth, insisted on its amendments, asked a committee of conference, and the speaker appointed Mr. Schenck, Mr. Kernan, of New-York, and Mr. Deming, of Connecticut, managers on the part of the House. The Senate insisted on its disagreement to the House amendments, agreed to a committee of conference, and Mr. Wilson, Mr. Nesmith, and Mr. Grimes were appointed managers. On the eighteenth, Mr. Wilson, from the committee of conference, made a report, which was ordered to be printed. The report, in substance, agreed to the Senate bill with some of the amendments of the House. The twenty-sixth section of the amendment of the House provided that masters, on freeing their slaves, should receive the commutation money. This provision permitted the master to claim the colored soldier as his slave after being mustered into the army. The committee of conference, on motion of Mr. Wilson, provided that every colored soldier, on being mustered into the service of the United States, should be free. On the nineteenth, the Senate agreed to the report of the conference committee—yeas, twenty-six; nays, sixteen. The House agreed to the report of the committee—yeas, seventy-one; nays, twenty-three. The bill was approved by the President on the twenty-fourth of February, 1864.

No. LXI.—*The Joint Resolution relative to the Transfer of Persons in the Military to the Naval Service.*

In the Senate, on the eighteenth of February, 1864, Mr. Conness, of California, introduced a joint resolution relative to the transfer of persons in the military to the naval service; it was read twice, and, by unanimous consent, considered as in committee of the whole. The resolution proposed to direct the Provost-Marshal General to enlist such persons as might desire to enter the naval service of the United States, under such directions as might be given by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy; and these enlistments were to be credited to the appropri-

ate district; but inasmuch as they received prize money, they were not to be entitled to any bounty. The President, whenever in his judgment the public service might require it, could transfer persons who had been employed in sea service, and were enlisted in the army, from their regiments to the naval service, upon such terms and according to such rules and regulations as might be prescribed; but the number of transfers from any company or regiment was not to be so great as to reduce it below the minimum strength required by the regulations of the military service, and the sums paid to such persons as bounty for entering the military service, were to be transferred from the naval recruiting fund to the credit of the proper appropriation for the land service. Mr. Conness stated that the joint resolution was prepared in accordance with the judgment of the Executive, of the Navy Department, and of the War Department. Mr. Grimes moved to amend the resolution by adding: "That there shall be paid to each enlisted able or ordinary seaman an advance, as a bounty, of three months' pay, to be refunded to the treasury from any prize money to which such enlisted man may hereafter be entitled." The amendment was agreed to, and the bill as amended passed.

On motion of Mr. Higby, of California, the House referred the resolution to the Committee on Military Affairs, with leave to report at any time. On the nineteenth, Mr. Deming, of Connecticut, from the Military Committee, reported the resolution without amendment, and it was passed without a division. It was approved by the President on the twenty-fourth of February, 1864.

No. LXII.—*The Bill to establish a Uniform System of Ambulances in the United States.*

In the Senate, on the twenty-third of December, 1863, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, introduced a bill to establish a uniform system of ambulances in the army, which was read twice, and referred to the Military Committee. On the twentieth of January, 1864, Mr. Wilson reported it back with amendments. The bill provided that the chief medical officer of each army corps, should, under the control of the medical director of the army to which such army corps belonged, have the supervision of all ambulances, and of all officers and men who might be detailed or employed to assist him, in the army corps in which he might be serving. That the commanding officer of each army corps should detail officers and enlisted men for service in the ambulance corps, namely, one captain, one first lieutenant for each division, one second lieutenant for each brigade, one sergeant for each regiment, three privates for each ambulance, and one private for each wagon; the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates detailed for each army corps to be examined by a board of medical officers of such army corps as to their fitness for such duty. That there should be furnished to each army corps two-horse ambulances, upon the basis of three to each regiment of infantry of five hundred men or more; two to each regime of infantry of more than two hundred and l than five hundred men or more: and one to ea regiment of infantry of less than two hundr men; two to each regiment of cavalry of five hu dred men or more; and one to each regiment cavalry of less than five hundred men; one each battery of artillery—to which battery of a tillery it should be permanently attached; to t headquarters of each army corps two such amb lances; and to each division train of ambulanc two army wagons; and ambulances should furnished to division brigades and commands n attached to any army corps upon the same basi each ambulance to be provided with such nu ber of stretchers and other appliances as shou be prescribed by the Surgeon-General. That t captain should be the commander of all the a bulances, medicine, and other wagons in the cor under the immediate direction of the medical rector, or chief medical officer of the army cor to which the ambulance corps belongs; and should pay special attention to the condition the ambulances, and see that they were at times in readiness for service; that the office and men of the ambulance corps were proper instructed in their duties, and that their duti were performed; and it should be his duty institute a drill in his corps, instructing his m in the most easy and expeditious manner of mo ing the sick and wounded, and to require that t sick and wounded should be treated with gent ness and care; and it should be his duty to s that the ambulances were not used for any oth purpose than that for which they were designe And it should be the duty of the chief medic officer of the army corps, previous to a marc and previous to and in time of action, or whe ever it might be necessary to use the ambulance to issue the proper orders to the captain for t distribution and management of the same; f collecting the sick and wounded, and conveyi them to their destination. And the officers the ambulance corps, including the medical rector, should make such reports, from time time, as might be required by the Secretary War, the Surgeon-General, the medical direct of the army, or the commanding officer of t army corps in which they might be servir That the first lieutenant for a division shou have complete control, under the captain of l corps and the medical director of the army cor of all the ambulances and men in that porti of the ambulance corps. He should be the a ing assistant quartermaster, and be responsil for all the property belonging to the ambulan corps, have authority to draw supplies from t dépôt quartermaster, upon requisitions approv by the captain of his corps, the medical directo and the commander of the army corps to whi he is attached. That the second lieutenant shou have command of the portion of the ambulan corps for a brigade, and should be under t immediate orders of the first lieutenant, a should exercise a careful supervision over t sergeants and privates. That the ambulances

the armies of the United States should be used only for the transportation of the sick and wounded, and, in urgent cases only, for medical supplies, and all persons should be prohibited from using them. That no person except the proper medical officers, or the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of the ambulance corps, or such persons as might be assigned to duty with the ambulance corps, should be permitted to take or accompany sick or wounded men to the rear, either on the march or upon the field of battle. That the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of the ambulance corps should be designated by such uniform or in such manner as the Secretary of War should deem proper. That it should be the duty of the commander of the army corps to transmit to the Adjutant-General the names and rank of all officers and enlisted men detailed for service in the ambulance corps of such army corps, and it should be the duty of the commander of the army corps to report to the Adjutant-General, from time to time, the conduct and behavior of the officers and enlisted men of the ambulance corps. That nothing in the act should be construed to diminish or impair the rightful authority of the commanders of armies, army corps, or separate detachments, over the medical and other officers, and the non-commissioned officers and privates of their commands.

On the third of February, the Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, proceeded to the consideration of the bill, and the amendments reported by the Military Committee were agreed to. Mr. Wilson then stated that the bill was based upon the orders of Colonel Letterman, Medical Director of the army of the Potomac. The bill, he said, had been sent to medical directors of armies, and to several generals, and the Committee on Military Affairs had received many letters approving the provisions of the bill. General Grant wrote that "the system, as now proposed, is a good one; that it may be subject to modifications which can be made by orders; that it is an admirable system to be adopted by all our armies." General Hooker said he regarded the bill as unexceptionable. General Sykes, commanding a corps in the army of the Potomac, said: "In its main provisions it is identical of Order Eighty-five, of this army, August twenty-fourth, 1863." "The system established in those orders has been tested, and found highly satisfactory." General Sedgwick, commanding the Sixth corps, of the army of the Potomac, said of the bill: "It is essentially the same as now organized in this army, and has been found to work admirably." General French, another corps commander of the army of the Potomac, says: "The system, as embodied in the bill, is almost practically perfect." General Pleasonton, who commanded the cavalry of the army of the Potomac, said of the bill: "I am very glad to find it so nearly accords with the system adopted for the service in this army. The experience of the past eighteen months has shown that the necessities of the service will be fully met by the provisions of your bill. While it provides in the most ample manner for the care of the sick and wounded, the checks against any abuse are well considered, and will prove effective." General Thomas wrote a letter indorsing the bill, and suggested an amendment, which was adopted by the Committee. "I have full confidence," he said, "that the bill as it now stands, will answer all the purposes needed. It is a general direction and guide, leaving sufficient scope for medical directors of armies to issue orders and make such modifications and changes of detail as may be necessary, from time to time, in their several armies. It extends to all our armies the system adopted eighteen months ago in the army of the Potomac, and which at Fredericksburgh, at Chancellorsville, and at Gettysburgh, according to the testimony of our officers, worked most admirably. It has been improving every day, and no doubt will continue to improve so long as the war lasts; for, in this department, as in every other, they are every day learning something." Mr. Wilson stated that it had been suggested that mule-litters might be introduced into the army. Mr. Grimes thought there ought to be a section in the bill giving authority to change the character of the ambulances, and detail officers and men to horse and mule-litters. Mr. Wilson moved to amend the bill by adding a new section, providing that horse and mule-litters might be authorized by the Secretary of War, under such rules and regulations as might be prescribed by the medical director of each army. The amendment was agreed to, and the bill then passed without a division.

In the House, on the eighth of March, Mr. Schenck, of Ohio, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported back the ambulance bill of the Senate with amendments, which were agreed to, and the bill was then passed without a division. On the ninth, the Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, concurred in the amendments of the House, and the bill was approved by the President on the eleventh of March, 1864.

No. LXIII.—*The Bill to amend Section Nine of the Act approved July seventeenth*, 1862, "*to Define the Pay and Emoluments of certain Officers of the Army.*"

In the House, on the eighth of March, Mr. Farnsworth, of Illinois, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported a bill to amend section nine of the act approved July seventeenth, 1862, "to define the pay and emoluments of certain officers of the army."

The first section of the bill provided that from and after the passage of the act, chaplains in the regular and volunteer service, and in hospitals, should not suffer any diminution of their pay and allowances when absent from duty on leave, on account of sickness or other disability, or when held by the enemy as prisoners.

The second section of the bill so amended the pension act of July, 1862, as to include chaplains in the regular and volunteer service; provided

that the pension to which a chaplain should be entitled for total disability should be twenty dollars a month; and it provided that the provisions of the act to which the section was an amendment should apply to the widows, children, mothers, and sisters of chaplains of the land forces who had died since the fourth day of March, 1861, or should die of wounds or disease contracted in the service of the United States, or while such chaplains were in the line of their duty.

The bill was passed without a division.

In the Senate, on the fourteenth, Mr. Wilson, from the Military Committee, reported back the bill without amendment, and it was passed without a division.

On motion of Mr. Foster, a message was sent to the House, requesting the return of the bill, and it was returned. The Senate, on motion of Mr. Foster, reconsidered the vote passing the bill. Mr. Foster moved to amend it by adding after the word "that," in the first section of the bill, "the rank of chaplain in the regular and volunteer service of the United States is hereby recognized. Chaplains shall be borne on the field and staff-rolls next after the surgeon, and shall be subject to the same rules and regulations as other officers of the army. They shall be entitled to draw forage for two horses, and to quarters and fuel, subject to the same conditions and limitations as are now by law provided in the case of surgeons. When absent from duty with leave, or on account of sickness or other disability, or when held by the enemy as prisoners, they shall be subject to no other diminution or loss of pay and allowances than other officers in the military service are under like circumstances." Mr. Wilson moved to amend the amendment by adding, "and chaplains who have been absent from duty by reason of wounds or sickness, or when held by the enemy as prisoners, shall be entitled to receive full pay, without rations, during such absence;" and it was agreed to. Mr. Foster moved to amend the bill by adding, as section two, "that it shall be the duty of chaplains in the military service of the United States to make monthly reports to the Adjutant-General of the moral condition of the regiments, hospitals, or posts to which they may be attached; and it shall be the duty of all commanders of regiments, hospitals, and posts to render such facilities as will aid in the discharge of the duties assigned to them by the Government;" and it was agreed to. Mr. Wilson moved further to amend it by adding, as a new section, "that all chaplains in the military service of the United States shall hold appropriate religious services at the burial of soldiers who may die in the command to which they are assigned to duty, and it shall be their duty to hold public religious services at least once each Sabbath;" and the amendment was adopted. The bill was passed without a division.

The House, on the twenty-ninth, on motion of Mr. Schenck, disagreed to the amendments of the Senate, asked a committee of conference, and the Speaker appointed Mr. Garfield, Mr. Odell, and Mr. Smithers managers on the part of House.

The Senate, on the thirty-first, insisted on amendments, agreed to a committee of con ence, and appointed Mr. Wilson, Mr. Foster, Mr. Riddle, of Delaware, conferees.

In the Senate, on the sixth of April, Mr. son, from the committee, reported "that House of Representatives recede from their agreement to the first amendment of the Sen and agree to the same, with the following ame ments, to wit, first, after the word 'chapl in the first line of said amendment, insert words 'without command;' second, after word 'surgeons,' in the fourth line of amendment, insert the words 'and shall such uniform as is or may be prescribed by army regulations,' and that the Senate agre the said amendments.

"That the House of Representatives recede f their disagreement to the third section of amendments of the Senate, and agree to the s with the following amendments, to wit, f after the words 'Adjutant-General,' in the fo line of said section, insert the words 'of the a through the usual military channels;' sec after the word 'condition,' in the fourth lin said section, insert the words 'and general tory,' and that the Senate agree to the amendments.

"That the House of Representatives recede f their disagreement to the fourth section of amendments of the Senate, and agree to the s with the following amendment, to wit, add the end of said section the words 'when pr cable,' and that the Senate agree to said am ment." The report was adopted. The H agreed to the report made on the same day by Garfield. So the bill passed, and was appr by the President on the ninth of April, 1864

No. LXIV.—*The Bill to increase the Rank, and Emoluments of the Provost-Marshal eral.*

In the House, on the eighth of March, 1 Mr. Schenck, from the Committee on Military fairs, reported a bill to amend "an act for en ing and calling out the national forces," so a increase the rank, pay, and emoluments of Provost-Marshal General. On motion of M W. Kellogg, of Michigan, the previous ques on the passage of the bill was ordered, and it passed—yeas, sixty-eight; nays, twenty-six.

In the Senate, on the twenty-third, Mr. L of Indiana, from the Committee on Military fairs, to which it was referred, reported it without amendment. On the eighteenth of A on motion of Mr. Lane, the Senate proceede its consideration. The Senate, on the ninete resumed the consideration of the bill, and debate, in which Mr. Lane, Mr. Fessenden, Grimes, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Harris, and Mr. Sa bury participated, it was passed—yeas, thi one; nays, seven. It was approved by the sident on the twenty-first of April, 1864.

No. LXV.—*The Joint Resolution to print the Official Reports of the Armies of the United States.*

In the Senate, on the twenty-sixth of January, 1864, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, introduced a resolution to provide for the printing of the official reports of the operations of the armies of the United States, which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. On the twenty-seventh, Mr. Wilson reported it back without amendment. The Senate, on the twenty-first of April, proceeded to its consideration. The resolution made it the duty of the Secretary of War to transmit, from time to time, to the Superintendent of Public Printing, copies of all official reports, and of all telegrams and despatches, not theretofore published by order of either House of Congress, relating to the movements, engagements, and operations generally, of the armies of the United States, which in his judgment the public interests might not require to be kept secret, commencing with the first of December, 1860; all such reports, telegrams, and despatches were to be arranged in chronological order, with a caption or title prefixed to each separate engagement, movement, or operation. It was to be the duty of the Superintendent of Public Printing to print the usual number (one thousand five hundred and fifty) of such reports, telegrams, and despatches for the Houses of Congress, and five hundred copies for the War Department. The resolution passed without a division.

In the House, on the twelfth, Mr. R. M. Clark, of New-York, moved to amend the joint resolution so that it would provide that the Secretary of War be directed to furnish the Superintendent of Public Printing with copies of all such correspondence, by telegraph or otherwise, reports of commanding officers, and documents of every description, in relation to the rebellion, to be found in the archives of his department since the first day of December, 1860, to that time and during the continuance of the rebellion, which might be, in his opinion, proper to be published; which said correspondence, reports, and documents should be arranged in their proper chronological order; that the Superintendent of Public Printing should cause to be printed and bound, in addition to the usual number, ten thousand copies of such correspondence, reports, and documents in volumes of not exceeding, as near as might be, eight hundred octavo pages each, which should be distributed by the Secretary of the Senate as follows: five hundred copies to the War Department, one complete copy to each State library of every State in the Union, and five complete copies to public libraries in each congressional district of the United States, to be designated by the representatives of that Congress from such districts; and of the remaining copies three thousand should be for the use of members of that Senate, and six thousand for the use of the members of the House of Representatives; that it should be the duty of the Secretary of War to cause a complete index to the matter contained in such volume to be prepared and inserted therein; and that all resolutions adopted by either House of Congress at that session directing the printing of any of the correspondence, reports, or documents, as contemplated, be rescinded.

The substitute was adopted, and the resolution as amended passed without a division. The Senate, on the sixteenth, concurred in the amendment of the House, and it was approved by the President on the nineteenth of May, 1864.

No. LXVI.—*The Army Appropriation Bill for 1864.*

The House of Representatives, on the twenty-first of March, 1864, on motion of Mr. Stevens, of Pennsylvania, proceeded to the consideration of the army appropriation bill, reported from the Committee of Ways and Means. Mr. Harding, of Kentucky, moved to amend it by adding a proviso, "that no part of the money hereby appropriated should be applied or used for the purpose of raising, arming, equipping, or paying negro soldiers;" but it was rejected — yeas, eighteen; nays, eighty-one. The bill was then passed without a division.

In the Senate, the bill was taken up on the twenty-second of April, and several amendments reported by Mr. Fessenden from the Committee on Finance agreed to. On motion of Mr. Wilson, the bill was amended, so as to provide that officers employing soldiers or servants should receive no pay or allowances for servants, but should be subject to deductions from their pay, of the pay and allowances of the soldiers employed as servants. Mr. Wilson then moved to amend the bill by adding five new sections, providing that enlistments thereafter made in the regular army during the continuance of the rebellion might be for three years. That all persons of color who had been or might be mustered into the military service of the United States should receive the same uniform, clothing, arms, equipments, camp equipage, rations, medical and hospital attendance, pay, and emoluments other than bounty, as other soldiers of the regular or volunteer forces of like arm of the service, from the first day of January, 1864; and that every person of color who should thereafter be mustered into the service should receive such sums in bounty as the President should order in the different States and parts of the United States, not exceeding one hundred dollars. That all persons enlisted and mustered into the service as volunteers under the call dated October seventeenth, 1863, for three hundred thousand volunteers, who were at the time of enlistment actually enrolled and subject to draft in the State in which they volunteered, should receive from the United States the same amount of bounty, without regard to color. That all persons of color who had been enlisted and mustered into the service of the United States should be entitled to receive the pay and clothing allowed by law to other volunteers in the service, from the date of their muster into the service: *Provided*,

that the same should have been pledged or promised to them by any officer or person who, in making such pledge or promise, acted by authority of the War Department. That the same premium should be allowed for each colored recruit then mustered or thereafter to be mustered into the service as should be allowed by law for white recruits. The amendment was agreed to—yeas, thirty-two; nays, five.

Mr. Davis, of Kentucky, moved to amend the bill, so that all negroes in the military service should be discharged when the rebellion should be suppressed—yeas, ten; nays, twenty-seven; so it was rejected. Other amendments were offered by Mr. Davis, but they were rejected. Mr. Hendricks, of Indiana, moved to amend as a new section, that the pay of the soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the army of the United States should thereafter be fifty per cent greater than was then allowed by law. Mr. Carlisle moved to amend the amendment, by adding as a proviso, that the pay of the non-commissioned officers should not exceed twenty-two dollars per month, and Mr. Hendricks accepted it. After debate, the amendment was rejected—yeas, six; nays, thirty. The bill as amended was then passed—yeas, thirty-six; nays, one.

In the House, on the thirtieth of April, Mr. Stevens reported back, from the Committee of Ways and Means, the Senate amendments. Mr. Holman, of Indiana, opposed the amendment equalizing the pay of soldiers, and moved to strike out of the section, putting colored soldiers on an equality with other soldiers, the word "pay;" but the motion failed—yeas, fifty-two; nays, eighty-four. Mr. Schenck, of Ohio, moved to amend the Senate amendment; but the motion was lost—yeas, fifty-eight; nays, sixty-five. He then moved to amend so much of the Senate amendment as gave to colored volunteers, under the call of October seventeenth, 1863, the same bounties as were given to white soldiers, so that the bounty should not exceed one hundred dollars—yeas, seventy-eight; nays, fifty-one. Mr. Stevens moved to amend, by striking out the section of the Senate amendment, authorizing the Secretary of War, on proof, to allow full pay to volunteers who were promised it when enlisted, and to insert a provision that all free persons of color should receive the same pay as other soldiers—yeas, seventy-three; nays, fifty-four.

The Senate, on the third of May, voted to disagree to the House amendments to the amendments of the Senate, and asked a committee of conference. Mr. Fessenden, Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Henderson were appointed managers on the part of the Senate. The House insisted on its amendments, agreed to the conference, and the Speaker appointed Mr. Stevens, Mr. Schenck, and Mr. Morrison, of Illinois, managers. The committee reported that they were unable to agree; and a new conference committee, consisting of Mr. Collamer, Mr. Nesmith, and Mr. Grimes, on the part of the Senate, and Mr. Morrill, of Vermont, Mr. Farnsworth, of Illinois, and Mr. Griswold, of New-York, were appointed. On the twenty-fifth, Mr. Morrill, from the conferen committee, made a report, which was disagre to—yeas, twenty-five; nays, one hundred a twenty-one.

On motion of Mr. Stevens, the House furth insisted, asked a further conference, and M Stevens, Mr. Pendleton, and Mr. Thomas ' Davis, of New-York, were appointed manager The Senate, on the twenty-seventh, agreed another committee, and Mr. Howe, of Wisconsi Mr. Morrill, of Maine, and Mr. Buckalew, of Pen sylvania, were appointed managers. On the ten of June, Mr. Howe reported: "That the House r cede from their disagreement to the eighth amen ment of the Senate, and agree to the same wi an amendment as follows, and the Senate agr to the same: strike out all after the enacti clause, (being section four,) and insert in li thereof the following: 'That all persons of col who were free on the nineteenth day of Apr 1861, and who have been enlisted and muster into the military service of the United State should, from the time of their enlistment, be e titled to receive the pay, bounty, and clothi allowed to such persons by the laws existing the time of their enlistment. And the Attorne General of the United States is hereby autho ized to determine any question of law arisi under this provision.'" After debate, in whi Mr. Howe, Mr. Sumner, Mr. Conness, Mr. Joh son, Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Fessenden participate the report was agreed to on the eleventh.

The House accepted the report on the thi teenth—yeas, seventy-one; nays, fifty-eigh By this legislation, colored troops were plac on the same footing as white troops. From t first of January, 1864, colored volunteers in t loyal States, under the call of the seventeent of October, 1863, were allowed the same bount as white volunteers; and all colored soldie free on the nineteenth of April, 1861, were to r ceive full pay; and the Attorney-General w authorized to decide whether colored men n free on the nineteenth of April were entitled the same pay as white soldiers. The bill w approved on the fifteenth of June, 1864.

No. LXVII.—*The Bill to increase the Pay o Soldiers in the United States Army, and fo other purposes.*

In the Senate, on the fourteenth of Decembe 1863, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, introduce a bill to increase the bounty to volunteers an the pay of the army, which was referred to t Committee on Military Affairs, and reporte back by Mr. Wilson on the sixteenth, wit amendments. The bill provided that the should be paid to such persons as had enlis ed under the proclamation of the seventeent of October, 1863, calling for three hundred tho sand volunteers, and to such persons as migl thereafter enlist for the term of three years, t following bounties, namely, to veterans, fo hundred dollars; to all other persons, thr hundred dollars. That the Secretary of W be authorized to pay a premium not exceedin

fifteen dollars for the enlistment of a veteran volunteer, and ten dollars for the enlistment of any other volunteer. That twenty millions of dollars be appropriated in payment of the bounties. That from the first day of January, 1864, the pay per month of non-commissioned officers and privates in the regular army and volunteer forces should be as follows, namely, sergeant-majors of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, twenty-three dollars; quartermaster-sergeants of cavalry and artillery, twenty-three dollars; of infantry, twenty dollars; first sergeants of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, twenty-three dollars; sergeants of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, nineteen dollars; sergeants of ordnance, sappers and miners and pontoniers, thirty-four dollars; corporals of ordnance, sappers and miners, and pontoniers, twenty dollars; privates, first class, eighteen dollars; second class, sixteen dollars; corporals of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, seventeen dollars; chief buglers of cavalry, twenty-three dollars; buglers, fifteen dollars; farriers, and blacksmiths of cavalry, and artificers of artillery, eighteen dollars; privates of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, sixteen dollars; principal musicians of artillery and infantry, twenty-two dollars; musicians of artillery and infantry, and musicians of sappers and miners and pontoniers, fourteen dollars. That all enlisted persons of African descent should have the same uniform, clothing, arms, equipments, camp equipage, rations, medical and hospital attendance, and pay, as soldiers of the regular or volunteer forces of the United States, of like arm of the service. That whenever the President should call upon the several States for men, the quota of each ward of a city, town, or township, or of a county, where the county was not divided into wards, towns, or townships, should be, as nearly as possible, in proportion to the number of men therein liable to render military service, taking into account the number which had been previously furnished, and the number of men that had entered or might enter the naval service. That chaplains, when absent from duty by reason of wounds or sickness, should be allowed full pay without rations, and half pay with rations during absence on leave occasioned by other causes; and chaplains who had been absent from duty by reason of wounds or sickness should be entitled to receive full pay without rations.

On the twenty-first of December, the bill was taken up, debated by Mr. Harris, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Grimes, Mr. Fessenden, Mr. Howe, Mr. Hendricks, Mr. Lane, of Indiana, Mr. Collamer, Mr. Cowan, Mr. Hicks, and Mr. Howard, and slightly amended. On the ninth of February, it was again taken up, and, on motion of Mr. Wilson, laid on the table, and not again called up.

In the Senate, on the eighth of January, 1864, Mr. Wilson introduced a bill to promote enlistments into the army, and for other purposes, which was read twice, and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. On the eighteenth, Mr Wilson reported it back with amendments. The Senate, on the twenty-first, proceeded to its consideration. It consisted of seven sections, and provided: That enlistments thereafter made in the regular army should be for the term of three years. That all persons of African descent who had been or might be mustered into the military service, should receive the same uniform, clothing, rations, medical and hospital attendance, pay and emoluments, as other soldiers of the regular or volunteer forces; and that every such person thereafter mustered into service should receive two months' pay in advance. That, when any man of African descent owing service or labor in any State under its laws, should be mustered into the military or naval service of the United States, he, and his mother, wife, and children, should be for ever free. Full pay, without rations, to chaplains theretofore or thereafter absent by reason of wounds or sickness; half pay, with rations, during absence on leave occasioned by other causes. The amendments, which were reported by the Committee, were concurred in.

On the twenty-seventh, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill, and on motion of Mr. Grimes, it was amended by striking out the words, "two months' pay in advance," to colored volunteers, and inserting the words, "such sums in bounty as the President shall order in different States and parts of the United States, not exceeding the sum of one hundred dollars."

On the third of February, Mr. Wilson, from the Military Committee, reported a joint resolution to equalize the pay of soldiers. It provided that all persons of color who had been or who might be mustered into the military service, should receive the same pay and emoluments, other than bounty, as other soldiers; and that every person of color who should thereafter be mustered into the service, should receive such sums in bounty as the President should order, not exceeding one hundred dollars. On the fourth, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of the joint resolution, and it was debated on that day, the tenth, the thirteenth, the sixteenth, the twenty-third, and the twenty-ninth, by Mr. Fessenden, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Ten Eyck, Mr. Lane, of Kansas, Mr. Conness, Mr. Pomeroy, Mr. Doolittle, Mr. Sumner, Mr. Foster, Mr. Lane, of Indiana, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Grimes, Mr. Cowan, Mr. Collamer, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Salisbury, Mr. Davis, Mr. Foot, Mr. Clark, Mr. Wilkinson, and Mr. Howard. Several amendments were moved, discussed, and acted upon, and the joint resolution, on motion of Mr. Grimes, recommitted to the Committee on Military Affairs.

In the Senate, on the second of March, Mr. Wilson reported a bill to equalize the pay of soldiers, in lieu of the joint resolution recommitted to the Committee. It provided: That all persons of color who had been or might be mustered into the military service, should receive the same uniform, clothing, rations, medical and hospital attendance, pay and emoluments, other than bounty, as other soldiers of the regular or volunteer forces, from the first day of January, 1864; and that every person of color who should thereafter be mustered into the service, should receive such

sums in bounty as the President should order in the different States and parts of the United States, not exceeding one hundred dollars. That all persons enlisted and mustered into service as volunteers, under the call dated October seventeenth, 1863, for three hundred thousand volunteers, who were at the time of enlistment actually enrolled and subject to draft in the State in which they volunteered, should receive from the United States the same bounty, without regard to color. That all persons of color who had been enlisted and mustered into the service, should be entitled to receive the pay and clothing allowed by law to other volunteers in the service, from the date of their muster into the service: *Provided*, That the same should have been pledged or promised to them by any officer or person, who, in making such pledge or promise, acted by authority of the War Department.

The Senate, on the seventh, on motion of Mr. Wilson, proceeded to the consideration of the bill. On the eighth, the Senate resumed its consideration, and Mr. Davis moved that the loyal owners of slaves taken into the service should be paid their fair value, which should be determined by a commissioner appointed by the district court. On the ninth, Mr. Davis spoke at great length in favor of his amendment, and against the policy of the measure; and on the tenth, the vote was taken on the amendment, and it was rejected—yeas, six; nays, thirty-one. The bill was then passed—yeas, thirty-one; nays, six.

On the twelfth of April, Mr. Wilson introduced a bill concerning the pay and subsistence of the army. It provided: That the army rations should thereafter be the same as provided by law and regulations on the first day of July, 1861, excepting the ration of pepper. That during the continuance of the war there should be added to the pay of all non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates of the army, a sum equivalent to the reduction of the ration, which sum was determined and declared to be two dollars per month. The bill was read twice, and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

On the twenty-second of April, on motion of Mr. Wilson, the army appropriation bill was amended by adding as an amendment the bill which passed the Senate on the tenth of March, to equalize the pay of soldiers.

In the House, on the twenty-ninth of April, Mr. Schenck, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to which the bill to equalize the pay of soldiers had been referred, reported it back with amendments. The bill and amendments were ordered to be printed, and recommitted with leave to report at any time. On the third of May, Mr. Schenck reported it back with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. The substitute provided: That after the first day of May, 1864, the pay of soldiers should be sixteen dollars per month. That the army rations should be the same as provided by law and regulation on the first day of July, 1861. That so much of the act to authorize the employment of volunteers as provided that each company officer should furnish his own horse, and should receive forty cents per day for use and risk, should be repealed. That the pay of clerks of paymasters in the army should be one thousand two hundred dollars per annum. That the act of the third of March, 1863, for enrolling and calling out the national forces should be so amended that an officer might have leave of absence, without deduction from his pay, for other causes than for sickness or for wounds. The substitute was agreed to, and the bill passed—yeas, one hundred and thirty-five; nays, none.

In the Senate, on the eleventh, Mr. Wilson, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to which had been referred the House amendments, reported them back with amendments; and the Senate, on the sixteenth, proceeded to their consideration. The first amendment of the Military Committee of the Senate proposed to strike out the first section of the House amendment, and insert: "That on and after the first day of May, 1864, and during the continuance of the present rebellion, the pay per month of non-commissioned officers and privates in the regular army, and volunteer and drafted forces in the service of the United States, shall be as follows, namely, sergeant-majors, twenty-six dollars; quartermaster-sergeants of cavalry and artillery, twenty-three dollars; of infantry, twenty dollars; first sergeants of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, twenty-four dollars; sergeants of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, twenty dollars; sergeants of ordnance sappers and miners and pontoniers, thirty-four dollars; corporals of ordnance, sappers and miners, and pontoniers, twenty dollars; privates, first class of the same corps, eighteen dollars; privates, second class of the same corps, sixteen dollars; corporals of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, eighteen dollars; chief buglers of cavalry, twenty-three dollars; buglers, sixteen dollars; farriers and blacksmiths of cavalry and artificers of artillery, eighteen dollars; privates of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, sixteen dollars; principal musicians of artillery and infantry, twenty-two dollars; musicians of artillery and infantry, and musicians of sappers and miners and pontoniers, sixteen dollars; hospital stewards of the first class, thirty-three dollars; hospital stewards of the second class, twenty-five dollars; hospital stewards of the third class, twenty-three dollars. The amendment was agreed to without a division.

The next amendment was to insert as new sections three, four, five, and six, after the second section of the House amendments: "That hereafter rations shall not be issued to soldiers sick in hospital, but commutation of rations shall be allowed and paid into the hospital fund, at the rate now established by law, for each soldier reported by the surgeon in charge as sick in hospital; and the receipt of the surgeon in charge shall be a sufficient voucher for the paymaster, or other disbursing officer, who may be charged with the payment of such commutation: *Provided*, That the hospital fund shall be devoted solely to

the diet and maintenance of the sick and wounded soldiers in such hospital. And *provided further*, that the Surgeon-General shall, with the approval of the Secretary of War, establish regulations for the accountability of medical officers having charge of the hospital fund. And any officer who shall appropriate to his own use, or shall misapply, any portion of a hospital fund, or who shall make any false report of the number of soldiers sick in hospital, shall, on conviction, be punished as a court-martial or military commission may direct. That all non-commissioned officers and privates in the regular army, serving under enlistments made prior to July twenty-second, 1861, shall have the privilege of reënlisting for the term of three years in their respective organizations, until the first day of August next; and all such non-commissioned officers and privates so reënlisting shall be entitled to the bounties mentioned in the joint resolution of Congress approved January thirteenth, 1864. That section thirty-five of the "Act for enrolling and calling out the national forces, and for other purposes," approved March third, 1863, shall not be construed to apply to enlisted men employed as clerks and messengers in the military offices in Washington, and at the several geographical, division, and department headquarters. That there be added to the battalion of engineers one sergeant-major and one quartermaster-sergeant, who shall also be commissary-sergeant, and each shall have the pay of a sergeant of engineers." This amendment was agreed to without a division.

The Committee reported as an amendment, to add as new sections seven, eight, and nine: That there should be attached to, and made a part of, the War Department, during the continuance of the present rebellion, a bureau to be known as the Bureau of Military Justice, to which should be returned for revision the records and proceedings of all the courts-martial, courts of inquiry, and military commissions of the armies of the United States, and in which a record should be kept of all proceedings had thereupon. That the President should appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, as the head of said bureau, a judge-advocate general, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of a brigadier-general, and one assistant judge-advocate general, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of a colonel of cavalry. And the judge-advocate and his assistant should receive, revise, and have recorded the proceedings of the courts-martial, courts of inquiry, and military commissions of the armies of the United States, and perform such other duties as had before been performed by the Judge-Advocate General of the armies of the United States. That the Secretary of War should have power to appoint for said bureau one fourth class, one third class, one second class, and two first class clerks. The amendment was agreed to—yeas, twenty-three; nays, eleven. The bill was further amended by adding: "That in all cases where the Government shall furnish transportation and subsistence to discharged officers and soldiers from the place of their discharge to the place of their enrolment or original muster into the service, they shall not be entitled to travel, pay, or commutation of subsistence."

On the seventeenth, on motion of Mr. Grimes, the section providing for the appointment of an assistant judge-advocate general, with the rank of colonel, was amended by striking out the word "colonel," and inserting "major," which was agreed to — yeas, twenty-two; nays, twelve. Mr. Powell moved that from and after the first day of May, 1864, the army should be paid in gold, or if paid in paper, it should be paid an amount equal to gold at the time of payment—yeas, six; nays, twenty-three. So the amendment was rejected. It was then moved by Mr. Powell to add to the first section of the amendment of the Military Committee, increasing the pay of non-commissioned officers and privates, a proviso that the provisions of the act should not apply to colored soldiers; but the motion was lost—yeas, five; nays, twenty-six.

The House disagreed to the Senate amendments, asked a committee of conference, and the Speaker appointed Mr. Schenck, of Ohio, Mr. F. W. Kellogg, of Michigan, and Mr. J. S. Rollins, of Missouri, managers on the part of the House. The Senate insisted on its amendments to the amendments of the House to the original bill, and Mr. Wilson, Mr. Grimes, and Mr. Nesmith were appointed managers on the part of the Senate.

Mr. Wilson, from the committee of conference, reported that the House agree to the first amendment of the Senate, increasing the pay of the army, with some slight amendments; that the Senate recede from its amendment concerning rations issued to soldiers sick in hospital; that the House agree to the third amendment of the Senate; that non-commissioned officers and privates of the regular army, serving under enlistments previous to the twenty-second of July, 1861, should have the privilege of reënlisting and receiving the veteran bounties; that the Senate recede from its fourth amendment, providing that the thirty-fifth section of the act for the enrolling and calling out the national forces, approved March third, 1863, should not apply to enlisted men employed as clerks and messengers in the military offices in Washington; that in the second line of the sixth section of the Senate amendment, strike out all of said section after the words "sergeant-major," and insert, in lieu thereof, "who shall be paid thirty-six dollars per month, and one quartermaster-sergeant, who shall also be commissary-sergeant, who shall be paid twenty-two dollars per month." And that the House of Representatives do agree to said amendment of the Senate as amended. That the House of Representatives do agree to the sixth Senate amendment, to wit, the insertion of section seven. Strike out the fourth, fifth, and all of the sixth line down to the word "and" in the seventh Senate amendment, and insert the following in lieu thereof, "The rank, pay, and allowances of a brigadier-general, and an assistant judge-advocate general, with the

rank, pay, and allowances of a colonel of cavalry." After the word "advocate," in the seventh line of said seventh Senate amendment, insert the word "general;" and that the House of Representatives do agree to said Senate amendment as amended. That the House of Representatives do agree to the eighth Senate amendment, to wit, the insertion of section nine. That the House of Representatives do agree to the ninth Senate amendment, to wit, the insertion of section ten. That the House of Representatives agree to the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth of the Senate amendments. The report of the conference committee was accepted in both Houses, and the bill was approved by the President June twentieth, 1864.

No. LXVIII.—*The Bill to provide for the Examination of certain Officers of the Army.*

In the Senate, on the first of February, 1864, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, introduced a bill to provide for the examination of certain officers of the army, which was read twice, and referred to the Military Committee.

On the third, Mr. Wilson reported it back with an amendment. The bill provided: That every quartermaster and assistant quartermaster, every commissary and assistant commissary of subsistence, every paymaster and additional paymaster should appear for examination before a board, composed of three officers of the corps to which he belonged. And all members of such boards of examination shall swear that they will conduct all examinations with impartiality, and with a sole view to the qualifications of the person or persons to be examined. That boards of examination should be constituted, under the direction of the Secretary of War, by the Quartermaster-General, the Commissary-General of Subsistence, and the Paymaster-General, at convenient places. That after the board should be constituted, and after the general orders should have been published for a period of ninety days, none of the officers mentioned in the first section of the act should receive any pay, allowances, or emoluments, until they should have appeared before the board of examination. That if the board of examination should report that any officer does not possess the requisite qualifications, they should forward the record of the examination to the head of the bureau to which he might belong; and if the head of such bureau should approve the finding, the officer so failing in his examination should, if commissioned, be dismissed from the service with one month's pay; and if not yet commissioned, his appointment should be revoked; and if the board should report that any officer failed to pass a satisfactory examination by reason of intemperance or vicious habits, and if the head of the bureau should approve the finding and report of the board as to his lack of the requisite business qualifications, then such officer should be dismissed without pay, and should not be permitted to reënter the service as an officer. That the boards of examination should forward all their records of examination to the heads of the bureaus to which they a pertain, and such records should be filed in tl proper bureaus.

On the ninth, on motion of Mr. Wilson, tl bill was taken up, the amendments agreed t and the bill passed without a division.

In the House, the bill was referred to tl Military Committee on the tenth. On the twe ty-first of June, Mr. Schenck reported it bac with amendments. The amendments we agreed to, and the bill passed without a d vision.

On motion of Mr. Wilson, the amendmen were referred to the Military Committee, an on the twenty-third, the Committee reported i favor of concurring in the amendments of tl House. The Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilso concurred in the amendments. So the bill wa passed, and approved by the President on th twenty-fifth of June, 1864.

No. LXIX.—*The Joint Resolution to provid for the Publication of a Full Army Registe*

In the House, on the twenty-first of Jun 1864, Mr. Schenck reported from the Committe on Military Affairs a joint resolution to provid for the publication of a full army register. authorized and required the Secretary of War, i connection with the army register for the yea 1864, to cause to be printed and published a fu roster or roll of all field, line, and staff-officers volunteers who had been in the army since th beginning of the rebellion, showing whether the were yet in the service or had been discharge and giving casualties and other explanations pr per for such register. And to defray, in whol or in part, the expenses of this publication, a edition of fifty thousand copies of such enlarge register should be published, and might be sol to officers, soldiers, or citizens, at a price whic should not more than cover the actual cost o paper, printing, and binding, and should not i any case exceed one dollar per volume. The re solution passed without a division. In the Sen ate, on the twenty-seventh, Mr. Anthony, o Rhode Island, from the Committee on Printing to which it had been referred, reported it bac without amendment. The joint resolution wa passed, and approved by the President on th thirtieth of June, 1864.

No. LXX.—*The Bill to provide for the mor speedy Punishment of Guerrilla Marauders and for other purposes.*

In the House, on the sixth of June, 1864, Mr Garfield, of Ohio, from the Committee on Militar Affairs, introduced a bill for the more speedy pun ishment of guerrillas, and for other purposes Mr. Eldridge, of Wisconsin, moved that the bil be laid upon the table. Lost—yeas, thirty-five nays, sixty-seven. It was then passed—yeas seventy-two; nays, thirty-seven.

In the Senate, on the thirteenth of June, Mr Wilson, from the Committee on Military Affairs to which the bill of the House had been referred reported it back with an amendment. The bil

provided: That the provisions of the twenty-first section of the act for enrolling and calling out the national forces, and for other purposes, approved March third, 1863, should apply as well to the sentences of the military commissions as to those of courts-martial; and thereafter, the commanding general in the field, or the commander of the department, as the case might be, should have power to carry into execution all sentences against guerrillas, and for robbery, arson, burglary, rape, assault with intent to commit rape, and for violation of the laws and customs of war, as well as sentences against spies, mutineers, deserters, and murderers. The second section provided that every officer authorized to order a general court-martial should have power to pardon or mitigate any punishment ordered by such court, including that of confinement in the penitentiary, except the sentence of death, or of cashiering or dismissing an officer, which sentences it should be competent, during the continuance of the rebellion, for the general commanding the army in the field or the department commander, as the case might be, to remit or mitigate; and the fifth section of the act approved July seventeenth, 1862, chapter two hundred and one, be repealed so far as it related to sentences of imprisonment in the penitentiary. The Military Committee reported in favor of striking out of the first section after the word "guerrillas," the words, "for robbery, arson, burglary, rape, assault with intent to commit rape, and the violation of the laws and customs of war." The amendment was opposed by Mr. Howard, of Michigan.

On the sixteenth, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill, and Mr. Wilson modified the amendment by striking out the word "and," so that it would read: "Shall have power to carry into execution all sentences against guerrillas for robbery, arson, burglary, rape, assault with intent to commit rape, and for violation of the laws and customs of war." Mr. Johnson opposed the passage of the bill, and Mr. Davis denounced it as "another of the series of strange and absurd bills that these extraordinary times have originated." But the amendment was agreed to. On the thirtieth, the Senate resumed the further consideration of the bill, and Mr. Hendricks moved to amend it by providing that the term "guerrillas" therein contained should not be held to include persons employed in the authorized service of the enemy. Mr. Conness moved to amend the amendment by adding the words, "whose operations shall be conducted according to the laws of war." But the amendment was rejected, and Mr. Hendricks's amendment was agreed to. On motion of Mr. Sumner, the bill was so amended as to provide that wherever the word "guerrilla" occurred, the word marauders should be inserted, so as to read "guerrilla marauders." Mr. Wilson moved to amend by adding a new section, providing that when a soldier in hospital should be discharged from the military service, but should be unable to leave or to avail himself of his discharge in consequence of sickness or wounds, and should subsequently die in such hospital, he should be deemed to have died in the military service. On motion of Mr. Lane, of Indiana, the amendment was so amended as to read, "when a soldier in any hospital shall have been discharged or shall be discharged;" and the amendment as amended was agreed to. Mr. Wilson then moved further to amend the bill by adding, "that payments which have been made by paymasters to non-commissioned officers of volunteer regiments from the date of their enrolment, and for a time previous to their muster into the service of the United States shall, if otherwise correct, be allowed in the settlement of such paymasters' accounts;" and the amendment was adopted. The bill as amended was then passed, and its title amended so as to read: "A bill to provide for the more speedy punishment of guerrilla marauders, and for other purposes."

In the House, on the first of July, the amendments of the Senate were disagreed to, a committee of conference asked for, and Mr. Farnsworth, of Illinois, Mr. Holman, of Indiana, and Mr. Morehead, of Pennsylvania, were appointed managers. The Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, insisted on its amendments, agreed to a committee of conference, and Mr. Trumbull, Mr. Lane, of Indiana, and Mr. Van Winkle, of West-Virginia, were appointed managers.

On the second, Mr. Trumbull, from the committee of conference, reported: "That the House recede from its disagreement to the first amendment of the Senate, and agree to the same. That the Senate recede from its second amendment, being the proviso to the first section. That the House recede from its disagreement to the Senate's third amendment, and agree to the same, with the following amendment: add to the end of said amendment the following words, "so far as relates to bounties." That the Senate recede from its further amendment. That the House recede from its disagreement to Senate's amendment to the title of said bill and agree to the same." The report was agreed to. The House of Representatives concurred in the report of the committee of conference, and the bill was approved by the President on the second of July, 1864.

No. LXXI.—*The Bill to provide for the better Organization of the Quartermaster's Department.*

In the Senate, on the eighth of March, 1864, Mr. Wilson introduced a bill to provide for the better organization of the quartermaster's department, which was read twice and referred to the Military Committee. On the fourth of April, Mr. Wilson reported it back with amendments. The bill provided: That there should be established in the office of the Quartermaster-General, to exist during the rebellion and one year thereafter, the following divisions, each of which should be placed in the charge of a competent officer of the quartermaster's department, who should, under such rules as might be prescribed by the Quartermaster-General, with the approval of the Secretary of War, transact the business of such division, to

wit: The first division should have charge of the purchase, procurement, and disposition of horses and mules. The second division should have charge of the purchase, procurement, issue, and disposition of cloth and clothing, camp and garrison equipage, and accoutrements. The third division should have charge of the purchase, charter, hire, and maintenance of all vessels to be used in the transportation of the army, and of prisoners of war, and of their supplies. The fourth division should have charge of the purchase, charter, hire, maintenance, and procurement of all transportation for the army, and its supplies by land and upon the western rivers. The fifth division should have charge of the purchase, procurement, issue, and disposition of forage and straw. The sixth division should have charge of the erection, procurement, maintenance, and disposition of all barracks, hospital buildings, storehouses, stables, bridges, wharves, and other structures composed in whole or in part of lumber, and of all lumber, nails, and hardware for building purposes. The seventh division should have charge of the purchase, procurement, issue, and disposition of all wagons, ambulances, travelling-forges and harness. The eighth division should have charge of all inspections of the quartermaster's department, and of all reports made by officers assigned to inspection duty, analyzing and preserving the reports as received, and communicating, through the Quartermaster-General, to the chiefs of the proper divisions such portions of the reports as might be necessary for their information and use. The ninth division should have charge of all the correspondence, returns, reports, and records received, filed, and preserved in the office of the Quartermaster-General. That the supplies and material for the quartermaster's department should be purchased, after due public notice, by the heads of the several divisions, except in cases of supplies procured within the field of active military operations. That the heads of the several divisions should, under the direction of the Quartermaster-General, from time to time advertise for proposals for the supplies necessary for the movements and operations of the several armies, and for other military purposes, in newspapers having general circulation in those parts of the country where such supplies could be most advantageously furnished; and all such supplies should be subject to careful inspection; and all clothing and camp and garrison equipage should be subject to a double inspection—first, as to the quality of the material, and second, as to the kind and character of the workmanship. That it should be the duty of the Quartermaster-General to establish depots, from time to time, at places convenient to the principal armies in the field, for receiving and distributing the supplies necessary for such armies. That when an emergency should exist requiring the immediate procurement of supplies for the necessary movements and operations of an army, and when such supplies could not be procured from any established depot of the quartermaster's department, or from the head of the division charged with the duty of furnishing such supplies, within the required time, then it shou be lawful for the commanding officer of such ar to order the chief quartermaster of such army procure such supplies during the continuance such emergency, but no longer. That it shou be the duty of the Quartermaster-General, i mediately after the passage of the act, and least once in every three months thereaft to require from the principal quartermaste of the several military departments and d pôts, approximate statements of the aggreg amounts of supplies on hand, and estimates the additional amounts required for the se ice for the ensuing three months, stating at wh places such supplies would be required, and wh amounts were legally contracted for but not d livered. That all inspectors of horses, mul clothing, fuel, forage, lumber, hired transpor and other supplies of the quartermaster's partment should be sworn to perform their d ties in a faithful and impartial manner, a should, for any corruption, wilful neglect, fraud in the performance of their duties, be liat to punishment by fine and imprisonment, by se tence of court-martial or military commissic That if any contractor or person furnishing su plies or transportation should give, or offer give, or cause to be given, to any officer or e ployee of the quartermaster's department havi charge of the receipt or disposition of the su plies or transportation furnished by him, or any way connected therewith, any money other valuable consideration, directly or in rectly, all contracts and charters with such p son should, at the option of the Secretary War, be null and void. That whenever it shou become necessary to purchase any steam or sa ing vessel for the use of the quartermaster's partment, the same should be first inspected one or more competent naval officers. That t officers placed in charge of the several divisio should, during the time that they remain in su charge, each have the rank, pay, and emolumen of a colonel in the quartermaster's departmer And that during the continuance of the rebellio the Secretary of War might assign to duty, as i spectors of the quartermaster's department, s officers, to be selected from the regular and v unteer officers who should have served for n less than one year in that department, who shou have, while so assigned and acting, the temp rary rank, pay, and emoluments of lieutenan colonels of the quartermaster's department.

On the eleventh of May, the Senate, on moti of Mr. Wilson, proceeded to the consideration the bill; the amendments were agreed to, a the bill, as amended, passed without a divisio

On the sixteenth, the House, on motion of M McIndoe, of Wisconsin, referred the bill to t Committee on Military Affairs. On the twent fourth of June, Mr. Schenck, of Ohio, report it back with amendments, and on the twent eighth, the amendments of the Committee, gether with an amendment of Mr. Dawes, of M sachusetts, were agreed to, and the bill as amen ed passed.

The Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, voted to disagree to the amendments of the House and ask a committee of conference on the disagreeing votes. Mr. Wilson, Mr. Trumbull, and Mr. Powell were appointed managers on the part of the Senate.

On the twenty-ninth, the House, on motion of Mr. Schenck, insisted on its amendments; agreed to a committee of conference, and the Speaker appointed Mr. Schenck, of Ohio, Mr. Deming, of Connecticut, and Mr. Ward, of New-York, managers on the part of the House.

On the thirtieth, Mr. Schenck, from the committee of conference, reported that the House recede from its first amendment, that the Senate agree to the other amendments, except the thirty-first amendment, and agree to it with an amendment. The report was agreed to. On the first of July, Mr. Wilson made a report from the conference committee, which was agreed to; and the bill was approved by the President on the fourth of July, 1864.

No. LXXII.—*The Bill to amend the Several Acts for Enrolling and Calling out the National Forces.*

In the Senate, on the twenty-third of May, 1864, Mr. Morgan, of New-York, introduced a bill to prohibit the discharge of persons from liability to military duty by reason of the payment of money, which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. On the twenty-fifth, Mr. Morgan reported it back with amendments.

The Senate, on the eighth of June, on motion of Mr. Wilson, proceeded to the consideration of the bill and amendments. It proposed to repeal so much of the enrolment act as authorized the discharge of persons drafted, on the payment of three hundred dollars for the procuration of a substitute. The Committee reported an amendment to add as a new section, That nothing in the act approved February twenty-fourth, 1864, amending the act approved March third, 1863, for enrolling and calling out the national forces, should be construed to repeal that part of the act approved March third, 1863, which required that the board of enrolment, in making drafts, should "make a draft of the required number and fifty per cent in addition;" and the amendment was agreed to. The Committee also reported an amendment to add as a new section, That section twelve of the "Act for enrolling and calling out the national forces, approved March third, 1863, be so amended that the notice to be served on drafted men might be served within ten days after such draft, or at any time within six months therefrom; and the amendment was agreed to. Mr. Wilson moved to amend by adding as a new section: That the President be authorized, on and after the passage of this act, to call out, for a period not exceeding one year, such number of men as the exigencies of the service might require by draft, according to the provisions of the act approved March third, 1863, entitled, "An act for enrolling and calling out the national forces," and the act approved February twenty-fourth, 1864, entitled, "An act to amend an act entitled, 'An act for enrolling and calling out the national forces.'" After debate, in which Mr. Conness, Mr. Brown, Mr. Collamer, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Grimes, and Mr. Lane, of Indiana, participated, the Senate adjourned.

On the ninth, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill, the question being on Mr. Wilson's amendment to draft for one year instead of three years. Mr. Wilson withdrew his amendment to enable Mr. Collamer to offer as an amendment, in four sections: That all calls for drafts thereafter made under the act entitled, "An act for enrolling and calling out the national forces, and for other purposes," approved March third, 1863, and of any act in addition to or amendment thereof, should be for a term not exceeding one year. That this act should not extend to or include drafts to be made in any district or subdivision thereof, to fill its quota on calls already made, but the same should be completed under the laws in force before the passage thereof. That no person drafted on future calls should be liable to be again drafted until the present enrolment should be exhausted. That the number of men furnished from any district for the service of the United States, beyond and above its quota on calls heretofore made, and the term of service of such men, should be considered and allowed to said district in calls thereafter made.

The amendment was discussed at great length by Mr. Collamer, Mr. Brown, Mr. Hendricks, Mr. Nesmith, Mr. Lane, of Indiana, Mr. Richardson, Mr. Doolittle, and Mr. McDougall. The vote was then taken on Mr. Collamer's first section, and it was agreed to—yeas, twenty-two; nays, seventeen. The other sections of Mr. Collamer's amendment were then adopted.

On the twentieth, the Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, resumed the consideration of the bill. Mr. Brown moved to amend by adding a new section requiring Indian tribes, having treaties and receiving annuities, to furnish their quotas, the force so furnished to be used in maintaining peace among the Indians, and relieving troops employed against hostile tribes. The amendment was opposed by Mr. Johnson, Mr. Hale, Mr. Saulsbury, Mr. Doolittle, Mr. Hendricks, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Richardson, Mr. Howard, Mr. McDougall, and Mr. Howe, and supported by Mr. Brown, and Mr. Lane, of Kansas. Mr. Doolittle moved to amend Mr. Brown's amendment by substituting for it a provision authorizing the Secretary of War to receive into the military service Indian tribes in treaty with the United States, to be employed as a part of the military force for the purpose of maintaining peace, and protecting from hostile incursion the Indian Territory, and other Territories where the hostile or invading force was in whole or in part composed of hostile Indians; and the amendment to the amendment was agreed to—yeas, twenty-four; nays, twelve. The amendment as amended was then rejected—yeas, ten; nays, twenty-nine. Mr. Wilson moved to amend by adding as a new sec-

tion: That every person who should be drafted under calls thereafter made, and who should serve honorably for a period of one year, should receive a bounty of one hundred dollars, to be paid upon his discharge from the service; and every person so drafted, and who should be honorably discharged after a term of service less than one year, should receive a bounty proportioned to his term of service. Mr. Conness moved to amend the amendment by striking out all after the word "that," and inserting: "From and after the passage of this act, every able-bodied volunteer who shall be accepted and who shall enter into the service of the United States shall be entitled to receive, after one year's service, one hundred dollars in addition to the sum now provided by law." After debate Mr. Conness withdrew his amendment, and the vote was taken on Mr. Wilson's amendment, and it was rejected.

Mr. Wilson moved to amend the bill by adding as a new section, That when a soldier, sick in hospital, should be discharged from the military service, but should be unable to leave, or avail himself of his discharge, in consequence of sickness or wounds, and should subsequently die in such hospital, he should be deemed to have died in the military service; and it was agreed to. Mr. Wilson moved further to amend the bill by adding as a new section, That payments which had been made by paymasters to non-commissioned officers of volunteer regiments from the date of their enlistment, and for a time previous to their muster into the service of the United States, should, if otherwise correct, be allowed, in the settlement of such paymasters' accounts; and it was agreed to. Mr. McDougall moved to amend the first section of the bill by adding: That ten days after the passage of the bill, substitutes should not be allowed in lieu of persons drafted. Mr. Wilson and Mr. Hale opposed it, and it was rejected—yeas, six; nays, thirty-five.

Mr. Ten Eyck, of New-Jersey, moved to amend the bill by adding, as a new section, That every non-commissioned officer, private, or other person, who had been, or should thereafter be, discharged from the army, within two years from the date of their enlistment, by reason of permanent injuries received, or permanent disability contracted, in the line of duty, should be entitled to receive the same bounty, in proportion to the time he might have served, as was granted, or might thereafter be granted, to the same class of persons who were discharged after a service of two years; and it was agreed to. On motion of Mr. Wilson, the bill was further amended by adding that hospital matrons should, after the first of July, 1864, receive twelve dollars per month and one ration.

Mr. Hendricks moved to strike out the first section, repealing the commutation clause of the enrolment act, and it was agreed to—yeas, twenty-one; nays, eighteen. Mr. Conness moved to lay the bill on the table, but the motion was lost—yeas, fifteen; nays, twenty-four. Mr. Sumner moved to amend the bill by requiring drafted persons to pay, in addition to the three hundred dollars commutation, on all incomes over one thousand dollars and not over two thousand dollars, five per cent; on all incomes over two thousand dollars and not over five thousand dollars, ten per cent; and on all incomes over five thousand dollars, twenty per cent; the money to be paid in bounties to men drafted and mustered into the service. On motion of Mr. Grimes, the bill was recommitted to the Military Committee. On the twenty-first, Mr. Morgan reported back the bill without amendment. The Senate, on motion of Mr. Morgan, proceeded, on the twenty-third, to its consideration. The amendments which had been adopted fell by the recommitment, and the original bill, providing simply for the repeal of the three hundred dollar commutation clause, was reported by the Military Committee. Mr. Morgan moved to amend it by adding, as a second section, the amendment moved by Mr. Collamer: That in calls for drafts thereafter made, under the act "for enrolling and calling out the national forces," and the acts in addition to or amendatory thereof, the same might be made for such term of time as the President should direct, not exceeding one year. Mr. Wilson moved to amend the amendment so as to make it read, "shall be made for one year;" lost—yeas, twelve; nays, eighteen. Mr. Chandler moved to amend Mr. Morgan's amendment by striking out "not exceeding one year," and inserting "not less than one nor more than three years;" lost—yeas, sixteen; nays, twenty-three. Mr. Morgan's amendment was then agreed to—yeas, twenty-five; nays, fourteen. Mr. Collamer then moved that the sum paid as commutation money should not exceed five hundred dollars, instead of three hundred dollars; but the amendment was rejected.

Mr. Grimes moved that the amendment proposed by Mr. Collamer, providing that the number of men furnished from any district to the service beyond and above calls theretofore made, and the term of service of such men, should be considered and allowed to said district in calls thereafter made, should be added as a new section; and it was agreed to. On motion of Mr. Grimes, the bill was further amended by adding as a new section an amendment proposed by Mr. Collamer, providing that no person drafted on future calls, or who should volunteer to fill the same, should be liable to be again drafted until the existing enrolment should be exhausted. The bill as amended was then passed—yeas, twenty-four; nays, seven.

In the House, on the twenty-first of June, Mr. Schenck, from the Military Committee, reported a bill to further regulate and provide for enrolling and calling out the national forces. Mr. Randall, of Pennsylvania, objected to its second reading. On the question, should the bill be rejected, the yeas were seventy-five, and the nays were seventy-five; the Speaker voted nay, and the bill was not rejected. Mr. Blaine, of Maine, moved to strike out the two first sections, providing that no payment of money should be ac-

cepted by the Government to release any drafted person from the performance of military duty, and that no substitute should be accepted for a drafted person, unless he be the father, brother, or son of the drafted man. The question, after debate, was taken on the motion striking out the first section; and it was agreed to—yeas, one hundred; nays, fifty. The second section was then stricken out without a division. Mr. Broomall, of Pennsylvania, moved a substitute for the bill. Mr. Fenton, of New-York, moved to amend it by adding that the President should accompany any order for a draft of men for military service with a notice that he would accept volunteers or substitutes in lieu of such drafted men prior to the day appointed for the draft, to fill up the quota or any part thereof, of any town, township, ward, precinct, or election district, or of any county not so sub-divided; and every person so volunteering, in lieu of a man to be drafted, should be credited to such town, township, ward, precinct, or election district, or county not so sub-divided; and if he volunteered, or was offered as a substitute for a drafted man, and was accepted and mustered into the service for a term of one year, unless sooner discharged, should receive and be paid by the United States a bounty of one hundred dollars; and if for a term of two years, unless sooner discharged, a bounty of two hundred dollars; and if for a term of three years, unless sooner discharged, a bounty of three hundred dollars; one half of which said bounty should be paid to the soldier at the time of his being mustered into the service, one fourth at the expiration of one half his term of service, and one fourth at the end of his term of service.

Mr. Ashley, of Ohio, moved to strike out of the amendment, "be credited to such town, township, precinct, or election district," and insert in lieu the words, "if subject to enrolment, be credited to the town, township, precinct, or election district in which he may be liable to enrolment; if not so subject, to the town, township, precinct, or election district in which he may have volunteered;" and it was agreed to—yeas, sixty-four; nays, forty-one. On motion of Mr. Boutwell, it was further amended by adding: That no volunteer or substitute who should be honorably discharged previous to the expiration of the term of his enlistment, should be entitled to his full bounty for the term of his enlistment. Mr. Ingersoll moved to amend, by adding after the word "service" the words, "But in case of his death when in said service, the residue of his bounty shall be paid to his legal representatives; and in case of his honorable discharge from wounds or sickness incurred in the service, he shall receive the full bounty;" and it was agreed to. Mr. Farnsworth then moved that the bill be laid upon the table, but the motion was lost. Mr. Fenton's amendment as amended was then agreed to.

On the twenty-fifth, the House resumed the consideration of the bill, and Mr. Schenck offered a substitute for the substitute moved by Mr. Broomall. The substitute, in eight sections, provided: For the repeal of the three hundred dollar commutation. For drafting for a period not less than one year. For a bounty of one hundred dollars for one year, two hundred dollars for two years, and three hundred dollars for three years. For allowing drafted men to select their organizations, when not filled. For discharging minors under eighteen years of age, and forbidding officers to muster into the service minors under sixteen years of age. For allowing provost-marshals to make a draft of fifty per cent in addition to the number required to fill the quota. For allowing to drafted persons transportation. For the enlistment of volunteers in the rebel States.

The bill was debated by Mr. Schenck, Mr. Odell, of New-York, Mr. Garfield, of Ohio, Mr. Mallory, of Kentucky, Mr. Blair, of Missouri, Mr. Dawes and Mr. Boutwell, of Massachusetts, and Mr. Kernan and Mr. Fernando Wood, of New-York. Mr. Cox moved to lay it on the table; but the motion was lost—yeas, fifty-seven; nays, seventy-eight. The main question was then ordered, and the House adjourned.

On the twenty-seventh the House resumed the consideration of the bill. Mr. Schenck demanded the yeas and nays on his amendment, and they were ordered. The amendment was lost—yeas, sixty-two; nays, ninety-one. The vote was then taken on Mr. Broomall's substitute, and it was rejected. Mr. Stevens moved an amendment as a substitute, in ten sections. Mr. Eliot, of Massachusetts, proposed ten additional sections, giving credit for naval enlistments, and allowing additional time for persons drafted who should be absent in pursuit of their business; and Mr. Stevens accepted them as part of his amendment. Mr. Blair moved to amend the original bill by adding, That thereafter no person should be received or accepted to serve in the army as a substitute for any other person liable to military duty, and who might have been enrolled or drafted for that purpose; but the amendment was rejected—twenty-five voting for it, and ninety-three against it.

Mr. Schenck moved to amend the bill by adopting a substitute for the substitute of Mr. Stevens. The substitute, he said, was the Senate bill on the table of the House. The substitute was lost—yeas, fifty-eight; nays, ninety-two. The vote was then taken on Mr. Stevens's substitute, and it was lost—yeas, twenty-three; nays, one hundred and twenty.

Mr. Smithers, of Delaware, offered a substitute for the original bill. It provided: That the President might call for any number of men as volunteers, for the respective terms of one, two, and three years, and any person mustered into the service for the term of one year, unless sooner discharged, should receive and be paid by the United States a bounty of two hundred dollars; and if for a term of two years, unless sooner discharged, a bounty of three hundred dollars; and if for a term of three years, unless sooner discharged, a bounty of four hundred dollars. That in case the quota or any part thereof of any town,

township, ward, precinct, or election district, or of any county not so subdivided, should not be filled within the space of sixty days after such call, then the President should order a draft for one year to fill such quota or any part thereof which might be unfilled; and in case of any such draft, no payment of money should be accepted or received by the Government as commutation to release any enrolled or drafted man from personal obligation to perform military service. That it should be lawful for the executive of any of the States to send recruiting agents into any of the States declared to be in rebellion, to recruit volunteers under any call under the provisions of this act, who should be credited to the State and to the respective subdivisions thereof which might procure the enlistment. That drafted men, substitutes, and volunteers, when mustered in, should be organized into or assigned to regiments, batteries, or other organizations of their own States, and, as far as practicable, should, when assigned, be permitted to select their own regiments, batteries, or other organizations from among those of their respective States, which, at the time of assignment, might not be filled to their maximum number. That the Secretary of War should discharge minors under the age of eighteen years, under the circumstances and on the conditions prescribed in said section; and thereafter, if any officer of the United States should knowingly enlist or muster into the military service any person under the age of sixteen years, with or without the consent of his parent or guardian, such person so enlisted or recruited should be immediately and unconditionally discharged; and such recruiting or mustering officer should be dismissed the service with forfeiture of all pay and allowances. That section three of an act entitled, "An act to amend an act entitled, 'An act for enrolling and calling out the national forces, and for other purposes,'" approved February twenty-fourth, 1864, be amended so as to authorize and direct district provost-marshals, under the direction of the Provost-Marshal General, to make a draft for fifty per cent in addition to the number required to fill the quota of any district, as provided by said section. That, instead of travelling pay, all drafted persons reporting at the place of rendezvous should be allowed transportation from their places of residence; persons discharged at the place of rendezvous should be allowed transportation to their places of residence. That all persons in the naval service of the United States, who had entered said service during the present rebellion, who had not been credited to the quota of any town, district, ward, or State, by reason of their having been in said service and not enrolled prior to February twenty-fourth, 1864, should be enrolled and credited to the quotas of the town, ward, district, or State in which they respectively resided. That if any person duly drafted should be absent from home in prosecution of his usual business, the provost-marshal of the district should cause him to be duly notified as soon as might be, and he should not be deemed a deserter, nor liable as such, until notice had be given to him and reasonable time allowed for hi to return and report to the provost-marshal his district; but such absence should not oth wise affect his liability under the act. The vo was then taken on the substitute; and it w lost—yeas, seventy-five; nays, seventy-seven.

On the twenty-eighth, Mr. Blair, of West-V ginia, moved to reconsider the vote on Mr. Smit ers's substitute. Mr. Holman moved to lay t motion on the table—yeas, seventy-three; nay eighty-five. Mr. Blair's motion to reconsider t vote was then agreed to—yeas, eighty-thre nays, seventy-one. Mr. Smithers's amendmer in the nature of a substitute, was then agreed —yeas, eighty-one; nays, seventy-five. M Stevens moved further to amend the bill by ad ing that nothing contained in the act should construed to alter, or in any way affect the la relative to those conscientiously opposed to bea ing arms. Mr. Pike, of Maine, moved to amei Mr. Stevens's amendment requiring the enr ment of persons between forty-five and fif years of age; but it was lost—yeas, forty-seve nays, one hundred and two. Mr. Stevens amendment was then agreed to—yeas, sevent seven; nays, sixty-four. The bill, as amende was then passed—yeas, eighty-two; nays, seve ty-seven.

In the Senate, on the twenty-ninth, Mr. W son, from the Committee on Military Affairs, which the bill had been referred, reported it ba with amendments. On motion of Mr. Wilso the Senate, in the evening session, proceeded to consideration. After being debated and amen ed in several particulars, Mr. Grimes mov to amend it by substituting for it the bill th passed the Senate; and the amendment was agre to. Mr. Ten Eyck moved to amend the subs tute by adding as a new section, That all enli ments that had been made into the naval servi or marine corps since the passage of the act amend an act entitled, "An act for enrolling a calling out the national forces," and which shou thereafter be made into the naval service or n rine corps, should be allowed and credited to t appropriate township, precinct, or district, on count of which such enlistments had been might be made, in the same manner as enli ments for the army were allowed and credited the several townships, precincts, or districts; a the amendment was agreed to. Mr. Sherm moved to amend by adding as a new sectio "That for the purpose of paying the bounti and of enforcing the draft, there be levied a collected, in addition to the duties imposed law, a special duty of five per cent on all incom exceeding six hundred dollars, accruing duri the year 1864;" and the amendment was agre to—yeas, twenty-five; nays, seven. Mr. Powe of Kentucky, moved to add a section forbiddi any State to recruit in other States; and it w agreed to. The bill as amended was then pass

On the thirtieth, Mr. Stevens moved that t amendment to assess on incomes a tax to p the bounties, and to carry into effect the enr

ment act, in the opinion of the House, contravened the first clause of the seventh section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States, and was an infringement on the privileges of the House, and that the bill, with the amendments, be respectfully returned to the Senate, with a message communicating the resolution; and the motion was agreed to. The Senate returned the bill to the House, with the section objected to left out. The House proceeded to consider the bill, and after debate, in which Mr. Dawes, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Schenck, and Mr. Harding participated, Mr. Le Blond, of Ohio, moved that no levy of troops should be made under the provisions of the act, except by volunteering, till such time as the President of the United States should have made a request for an armistice, and should have made such efforts as were consistent with honor to restore harmony among the States by the appointment of commissioners, empowered to negotiate for peace upon terms of the restoration of the Union under the Constitution, and until such efforts should have been rejected by the so-called confederate government. Mr. Cox moved to lay the whole subject on the table; lost—yeas, forty-three; nays, fifty-seven. The vote was then taken on Mr. Le Blond's amendment, and it was rejected—yeas, eleven; nays, eighty-nine.

On the first of July, the House, on motion of Mr. Schenck, resumed the consideration of the bill. Amendments were offered by Mr. Davis, of Maryland, Mr. Morrill, Mr. Orth, Mr. Thomas, and Mr. Garfield. The amendments of Mr. Thomas and Mr. Davis were rejected, and those of Mr. Morrell, Mr. Orth, and Mr. Garfield agreed to. The amendment of the Senate, as amended, was then disagreed to, and, on motion of Mr. Schenck, the House asked a committee of conference, and the Speaker appointed Mr. Garfield, Mr. Smithers, and Mr. Kernan managers on the part of the House.

The Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, insisted upon its amendments, agreed to the committee of conference, and appointed Mr. Wilson, Mr. Morgan, and Mr. Lane, of Indiana, managers. On the twenty-second, Mr. Wilson, from the conference committee, reported "that the Senate recede from its amendments to the House bill, and agree to it with several amendments." After debate, the vote was taken on concurring in the report, and it was non-concurred in—yeas, sixteen; nays, eighteen. On motion of Mr. Sherman, the Senate insisted on its amendments to the bill, and asked a further conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses—yeas, twenty-eight; nays, eight. Mr. Foster moved a reconsideration of the vote, and it was reconsidered—yeas, twenty; nays, seventeen. Mr. Sherman then withdrew his motion. On motion of Mr. Conness, the Senate reconsidered its vote non-concurring in the report of the committee of conference — yeas, eighteen; nays, seventeen. The vote was then taken on concurring in the conference committee's report; and it was agreed to—yeas, eighteen; nays, seventeen. In the House, Mr. Garfield made the report from the committee of conference, and it was agreed to—yeas, sixty-six; nays, fifty-five. The bill was approved by the President on the fourth of July, 1864.

No. LXXIII.—*The Joint Resolution expressive of the Thanks of Congress to the Veteran Soldiers who have reënlisted in the Army.*

In the House, on the seventeenth of February, 1864, Mr. Farnsworth, of Illinois, introduced a joint resolution expressive of the thanks of Congress to the veteran soldiers who have reënlisted in the army. It declared that the thanks of Congress are given to those noble and brave men who, having so gallantly endured the hardships and perils of war for more than two years, in support of their country's flag, present the sublime spectacle of again voluntarily enrolling themselves in the army of the Union for another three years' campaign, or so long as the war shall continue; and that the Secretary of War cause the resolution to be read to each of the veteran regiments who had reënlisted, or should reënlist. The joint resolution was passed without a division.

In the Senate, on the first of March, Mr. Wilson, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to which it had been referred, reported it back without amendment. The resolution was unanimously passed, and it was approved by the President on the twenty-second day of March, 1864.

No. LXXIV.—*The Bill to increase the Number of Cadets in, and to raise the Standard of Admission to, the Military Academy.*

In the Senate, on the twentieth of December, 1864, Mr. Wilson introduced a bill to increase the number of cadets in, and to raise the standard of admission to, the Military Academy, which was read twice and referred to the Military Committee. The bill provides: "That the President of the United States may appoint, in addition to the number of cadets heretofore authorized by law, two cadets for each State represented in Congress, who shall be actual residents of the State for which they may be appointed, and fifty cadets to be appointed from the military forces of the United States, regular and volunteer, who shall have served for a period of not less than one year. That no person shall hereafter be admitted as a cadet at the Military Academy who shall be less than seventeen or more than twenty years of age on the first day of July in the year of his admission. That on and after the first day of July, 1866, no person shall be admitted as a cadet at the Military Academy until he shall have passed a full and satisfactory examination in the following-named branches of education: First. Spelling, reading, writing, and the grammatical construction of the English language. Second. An outline of the physical and political geography and of the history of the United States. Third. Arithmetic, to include the decimal numeration, the four ground rules, the tables of the standard weights and measures, and the coins of

the United States, England, and France; reduction of weights, measures, and so forth; vulgar and decimal fractions, and ratios and proportions. Fourth. Algebra, to include the solution and discussion of equations of the second degree. Fifth, Geometry, to comprise the principal theorems and problems of plane geometry which treat of right lines, angles, triangles, polygons, and the circle. That the President may, from time to time, upon the recommendation of the Annual Board of Visitors and the Academic Board of the Military Academy, make such changes in the qualifications for admission provided for in the preceding section as may be deemed necessary. That on and after the first day of July, 1866, no person shall be admitted a cadet at the Military Academy, nor shall any cadet receive a commission in the army, who has not undergone a medical examination, and been pronounced physically qualified for the duties of a soldier." The bill was not reported back from the Military Committee.

No. LXXV. — *The Joint Resolution tendering the Thanks of the People and of Congress to Major-General William T. Sherman, and the Officers and Soldiers of his Command, for their gallant Conduct in their brilliant Movement through Georgia.*

In the House, on the fifth of January, 1865, Mr. Cole, of California, introduced a joint resolution tendering the thanks of Congress to Major-General William T. Sherman. The resolution declared: That the thanks of the people and of Congress be tendered to Major-General William T. Sherman, and through him to the officers and men under his command, for their gallantry and good conduct in their brilliant expedition through Georgia. On motion of Mr. Garfield, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

On the sixth, Mr. Schenck, from the Military Committee, reported back the resolution with a substitute, enlarging its scope so as to include the campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta. The substitute provided: "That the thanks of the people and of the Congress of the United States be tendered to Major-General William T. Sherman, and through him to the officers and men under his command, for their gallantry and good conduct in their campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta, and the triumphal march thence through Georgia to Savannah, terminating in the capture and occupation of that city; and that the President cause a copy of the resolution to be engrossed and forwarded to General Sherman." The substitute was agreed to, and the joint resolution as amended passed.

In the Senate, a message was received from the House announcing the passage of the joint resolution tendering the thanks of the people and of Congress to Major-General Sherman, his officers and men. On motion of Mr. Lane, of Indiana, the resolution was taken up for consideration. Mr. Trumbull moved its reference to the Committee on Military Affairs. In making the motion, he said: "The whole country appreciates—I certainly do—the distinguished services of Major-General Sherman; but I think we had better not take the resolution out of the ordinary course." Mr. Johnson declared that, "however proper it might have been, even if there were a uniform rule, to make the reference suggested by the Senator from Illinois, yet, as the motion of the Senator from Indiana was to take the resolution up that it might be acted upon at once, a delay now in acting upon it, (although I am sure such is not the motive that governs the Senator from Illinois, or would govern any other member of the Senate,) would be considered, perhaps, by the public as an intimation or an indication that there was, on the part of some one member of the Senate, an unwillingness to award this tribute to that gallant officer and his men." Mr. Foster said: "The thanks of Congress to an officer for gallant service I deem to be an honor and a great honor; but it is only when they are cordially and without hesitation offered. If we are to hesitate and higgle about thanking an officer or an army, I think we had better do nothing about it. I hope we shall act upon this resolution without a reference." "When General Sherman," said Mr. Clark, "cut loose from Atlanta, and marched upon the coast, it was said that he violated all the proprieties and rules of the military service. I would be glad, in this instance, to violate the practice of the Senate, and give him the thanks of Congress." Mr. Davis said the vote of thanks would have more moral value to the hero it was intended to honor if it were done deliberately and according to the practice of the Senate. The motion to refer was lost, and the joint resolution was unanimously passed, and approved by the President on the tenth of January, 1865.

No. LXXVI. — *The Resolution to present the Thanks of Congress to Major-General Alfred H. Terry, and the Officers and Men under his Command.*

In the Senate, on the eighteenth of January, 1865, Mr. Dixon, of Connecticut, introduced a joint resolution tendering the thanks of Congress to Major-General Alfred H. Terry for the brilliant victory of Fort Fisher, and it was read twice and referred to the Military Committee. On the nineteenth, Mr. Wilson, from the Military Committee, reported it back in a new draft. The amendment of the Committee was to strike out after the resolving clause, and insert: "That the thanks of Congress be presented to Major-General Alfred H. Terry, and to the officers and men under his command, for the unsurpassed gallantry and skill exhibited by them in the attack upon Fort Fisher, and the brilliant and decisive victory by which that important work had been captured from the rebel forces, and placed in the possession and under the authority of the United States, and for their long and faithful service and unwavering devotion to the cause of the country in the midst of the greatest difficulties and dangers.

"*And be it further resolved*, That the President of the United States be requested to communicate this resolution to Major-General Terry, and through him to the officers and soldiers under his command. The amendment was agreed to. The joint resolution passed, and the title was so amended as to read: "A joint resolution to present the thanks of Congress to Major-General Alfred H. Terry and the officers and men under his command."

In the House, on the twentieth, the joint resolution was reported back by Mr. Schenck from the Military Committee, to whom it had been referred, with an amendment inserting the word "brevet" before "major-general." The amendment was agreed to; the joint resolution as amended passed; the Senate concurred in the amendment, and it was approved by the President on the twenty-fourth of January, 1865.

No. LXXVII.—*The Joint Resolution to present the Thanks of Congress to Major-General Philip H. Sheridan, and the Officers and Men under his Command.*

In the House, on the twenty-third of January, 1865, Mr. Washburne, of Illinois, introduced a joint resolution tendering the thanks of Congress to Major-General Sheridan, his officers and men, which was read twice, and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. On the twenty-fifth, Mr. Deming, of Connecticut, reported it back with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. The substitute declared: That the thanks of Congress be tendered to Major-General Philip H. Sheridan and the officers and men under his command, for the gallantry, military skill, and courage displayed in the brilliant series of victories achieved by them in the valley of the Shenandoah, and especially for their services at Cedar Run, on the nineteenth of October, 1864, which retrieved the fortunes of the day and averted a great disaster; and it further requested the President of the United States to communicate the resolution to Major-General Sheridan, and through him to the officers and soldiers under his command. The substitute was agreed to, and the resolution as amended passed—yeas, one hundred and thirty-one; nays, two. In the Senate, on the first day of February, Mr. Wilson, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom it had been referred, reported back the joint resolution without amendment. By unanimous consent it was considered and passed, and was approved by the President on the ninth of February, 1865.

No. LXXVIII.—*The Bill to increase the Pay of the Officers of the Army, and for other purposes.*

In the House, on the eighteenth of February, 1865, Mr. Yeaman, of Kentucky, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported a bill to increase the pay of officers of the army. The first section provided that officers of the army should be exempt from the tax on their pay. The second section provided that during the rebellion, the pay proper of staff and line-officers of the army below the rank of brigadier-general, should be: Colonels of infantry and artillery, one hundred and forty dollars; lieutenant-colonels, one hundred and twenty dollars; majors, one hundred and five dollars; captains, ninety dollars; first lieutenants, seventy-seven dollars; second lieutenants, seventy dollars; colonels of all other arms of the service, one hundred and sixty-five dollars; lieutenant-colonels, one hundred and forty dollars; majors, one hundred and fifteen dollars; captains, one hundred and two dollars and fifty cents; lieutenants, eighty dollars and thirty-three cents. The third section provided: That hereafter, whenever any officer or soldier should be discharged from the service, except by way of punishment for an offence, he should be furnished transportation from the place of his discharge to his then actual place of residence; or, in case transportation could not be furnished by the Government, then he should be paid the actual cost of travelling in money. On motion of Mr. Rice, of Massachusetts, the bill was so amended as to include naval officers. Mr. Ross, of Illinois, moved to amend it so as to increase the pay of soldiers to twenty dollars per month, and it was agreed to—yeas, eighty-two; nays, thirty-three. On motion of Mr. Farnsworth, of Illinois, the pay of assistant surgeons was increased to one hundred and twenty-five dollars per month. On motion of Mr. Garfield, the bill was recommitted to the Committee on Military Affairs.

No. LXXIX.—*The Bill to increase the Efficiency of the Medical Corps of the Army.*

In the House, on the twenty-first of June, 1864, Mr. Schenck, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported a bill to increase the efficiency of the medical corps of the army, which was passed without opposition. On the second of July, Mr. Morgan, of New-York, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to which it had been referred, reported it back to the Senate.

In the Senate, on the twenty-third of February, 1865, Mr. Wilson, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom it had been recommitted, reported back the House bill to increase the efficiency of the medical corps of the army without amendment. It provided: That the medical director of an army in the field consisting of two or more army corps, and the medical director of a military department in which there were United States general hospitals containing four thousand beds or upward, should have the rank, pay, and emoluments of a colonel of cavalry; and that the medical director of an army corps in the field, or of a department in which there were United States general hospitals containing less than four thousand beds, should have the rank, pay and emoluments of a lieutenant-colonel of cavalry. This increased rank and pay should only continue to medical officers while discharging such special duties; and the assignments from time to time to such duty should be at least two thirds of them made from among the surgeons and assistant surgeons of volunteers. Mr. Hale desired to know what

would be "the increased pay of these officers, and how many of them would be increased." Mr. Wilson repliéd, that the medical director of an army in the field consisting of two or more corps, would be increased from a major to a colonel, and so with a medical director of a military department where there were United States general hospitals containing four thousand beds and upward. Wherever there was an army consisting of more than one corps, the medical director would be increased in rank. Some of the directors of large armies, after being in service for a long while—three years—were simply majors, with the same rank and pay with which they entered the service, and a great many of our best surgeons were leaving the service. They had no opportunity for promotion. No service, no fidelity, brought them an increase of pay or any reward whatever. Many of thém were leaving the service and returning home, and it was with the greatest difficulty that we were getting the necessary surgeons for the army; and unless some action was taken, a great many of our best surgeons would leave the service. It was in the power of a good surgeon to render immense service to the country, and to save thousands and tens of thousands of dollars in the army and in the large departments and hospitals. Mr. Hale opposed the passage of the bill, and demanded the yeas and nays, and they were ordered on its passage—yeas, twenty-five; nays, three. So the bill passed and was approved by the President on the twenty-fifth of February, 1865.

No. LXXX.—*Army Register.*

In the House, on the eighteenth of February, Mr. Schenck, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported a joint resolution authorizing and requiring the Secretary of War in connection with the army register of 1865, to cause to be printed and published a full roster of all general, field, line, and staff-officers of volunteers who had been in the army during the rebellion. It was passed without a division.

In the Senate, the joint resolution was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs; and on the twenty-second of February it was reported back by Mr. Wilson with amendments. The first amendment was to strike out all after the word "required," in the second line, to and including "sixty-five," in line three, so that it would read: "That the Secretary of War be authorized and required to cause to be printed and published a full roster of all general, field, line, and staff-officers of volunteers." The amendment was agreed to. The second amendment was after the word "States," in the sixth line, to insert "at any time;" so that the clause would read, "who have been in the army of the United States at any time." The amendment was agreed to. The third amendment was after the word "rebellion," in the sixth line, to insert the words, "including all informal organizations which have been recognized or accepted and paid by the United States." The amendment was agreed to. The fourth amendment was to strike out in t tenth line, the word "fifty," and insert in li of it, "twenty-five," so that the clause wou read, "an edition of twenty-five thousand copie: The amendment was agreed to. The fifth amer ment, was after the word "binding," in the teenth line, to strike out the words, "and sh not in any case exceed one dollar per volum The amendment was agreed to, and the reso tion as amended passed. The House concurr in these amendments, except the last one. T Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, receded fr its fifth amendment. So the joint resoluti was passed, and approved by the President the second of March, 1865.

No. LXXXI.—*The Bill for the better Orga sation of the Subsistence Department.*

In the House, on the fifteenth of Decemb 1864, Mr. Schenck, of Ohio, reported from t Committee on Military Affairs a bill for the b ter organization of the subsistence departme which was read twice and recommitted. the eighteenth of February, 1865, Mr. Schen reported back the bill with amendments, whi were agreed to. The bill provided: That duri the continuance of the rebellion, the Secreta of War might assign to each geographical mi tary division, to each separate army in the fi consisting of more than one army corps, to ea military department, and to each principal su sistence dépôt, not exceeding ten in number, officer of the subsistence department to act chief commissary, and also an officer of the su sistence department as assistant in the office the Commissary General of Subsistence, each whom, while so assigned and acting, should ha the rank, pay, and emoluments of a colonel the subsistence department; and, in like mann might assign, for purposes of inspection or oth special duty in the subsistence department, co missaries of subsistence, not exceeding six number, each of whom, while so assigned a acting, should have the temporary rank, pay, a emoluments of a lieutenant-colonel of the su sistence department; and to each army corps officer of the subsistence department, to be ch commissary of the corps, with the like rank lieutenant-colonel; and, in like manner, mig assign to each division of two or more brigades commissary, who, while so assigned and actir should have the rank, pay, and emoluments of major of the subsistence department: *Provid* That when any one of said officers was reliev from such duty, his increased rank, pay, a emoluments, allowed because of such assignme should cease, and he should return to his comm sioned rank in the subsistence department: *A provided further*, That the officers authorized to assigned by the act should be selected from t commissaries of subsistence who held comm sions or rank in the volunteer service only.

The second section provided that the Pr dent might appoint, by and with the advice a consent of the Senate, as many commissaries subsistence of volunteers, with the rank of c

tain, as the exigencies of the service might require. The bill, as amended, was passed without debate.

In the Senate, on the twenty-second, Mr. Wilson, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom it had been referred, reported back with amendments the House bill for the better organization of the subsistence department. On the twenty-third, the Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, proceeded to consider the bill and the amendments reported by the Military Committee. The House bill excluded all army officers from the promotions provided for by the bill; and the Committee reported an amendment, giving at least two thirds in each grade to commissaries in the volunteer service; and the amendment was agreed to. On motion of Mr. Trumbull, the second section authorizing the appointment of as many commissaries as the exigencies of the service might require was stricken out. The bill as amended was then passed without a division.

On the eighteenth of March, Mr. Schenck moved to take from the Speaker's table the bill for the better organization of the commissary department. The motion was agreed to, and the amendments of the Senate non-concurred in. The Senate on the third, on motion of Mr. Wilson, insisted on its amendments. The House insisted upon its disagreement, and asked a committee of conference. The Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, agreed to a committee of conference, and appointed Mr. Morgan, of New-York, Mr. Sprague, of Rhode Island, and Mr. Powell, of Kentucky, managers. Mr. Morgan, from the committee of conference, reported, that the proviso should read: That the officers authorized by the act should be selected for each grade from the commissaries of subsistence who held commissions or rank in the volunteer service, and in the regular subsistence department, in proportion to the number of each of said classes respectively in service at the date of its passage. The report was concurred in. The House adopted the report on motion of Mr. Schenck, and the bill was approved by the President on the third of March, 1865.

No. LXXXII.—*The Bill more effectually to provide for the National Defence by Establishing a Uniform Militia throughout the United States.*

In the Senate, on the ninth of February, 1865, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, introduced a bill to establish a uniform militia throughout the United States, which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

On the twenty-second of February, Mr. Wilson reported it back. It consisted of ten sections, and provided:

1st. That every male citizen, or person who had declared his intention to become such, between twenty-one and forty-five years of age, should be enrolled in the militia.

2d. That the following should be enrolled but exempted, namely: The Vice-President, judicial and executive officers, members of Congress and officers, custom-house officers and clerks, inspectors of exports, pilots, mariners in service, officers who had served three years in the army, navy, or militia, soldiers and sailors in the army or navy, artificers or workmen in the armories, postmasters and assistants, post-officers, post-riders and stage-drivers in the service of the United States, ferrymen on post-roads, telegraph operators on duty, Quakers and Shakers, and all persons then or thereafter exempted from militia duty by State law.

3d. Idiots, lunatics, common drunkards, vagabonds, paupers or criminals should not be allowed to serve.

4th. Arranged the militia into divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, companies, and batteries, and enumerates the rank and number of officers to be attached thereto, also the number of privates.

5th. Established a militia bureau in the War Department for the carrying out of all laws pertaining to the militia.

6th. Designated the title of the chief officer of such bureau, and defines his duty.

7th. Secretary of War authorized to appoint clerks, and classify and pay them.

8th. Assistant adjutant-generals were to be appointed in each State, and coöperate with chief of bureau, and defines their duties.

9th. When the militia was called out or accepted by the President, pay and pensions were to be the same as to the regular army.

10th. Repeals certain acts relative to militia then in operation.

No action was taken on this bill during the remainder of the session.

No. LXXXIII.—*The Joint Resolution to encourage the Employment of Disabled and Discharged Soldiers.*

In the Senate, on the fourteenth of February, 1865, Mr. Wilson, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the petition of citizens of Boston, praying the enactment of a law preferring the appointment to all inferior offices of persons honorably discharged from the military or naval service, submitted a report and joint resolution to encourage the employment of disabled and discharged soldiers. The report set forth: That it was the imperative duty of the national and State governments to give the preference for appointments in the various civil offices to persons who had been honorably discharged from the military or naval service of the United States, or who had suffered permanent disability while in the service, provided they possessed the qualifications necessary to properly discharge the duties of such offices. The number of civil offices, however, in the various departments of the government, though large at present, bore but a small proportion to the number of persons who had honorably served their country in the field, and who had been disabled by wounds or disease incurred in the line of duty. The great mass of the men who had served the country in the army and navy must,

of necessity, engage again in the varied avocations of civil life. While it was, therefore, the duty of the national government, in its civil appointments, to give the preference to men who had been maimed by wounds, or broken by disease, it was the sacred duty of bankers, merchants, manufacturers, mechanics, farmers, and business men in all the various avocations, to give the preference in all industrial pursuits to soldiers who had been honorably discharged from the service of their country. The joint resolution declared that persons honorably discharged from the military or naval service by reason of disability resulting from wounds or sickness incurred in the line of duty, should be preferred for appointments to civil offices, provided they should be found to possess the business capacity necessary for the proper discharge of the duties of such offices; that, in grateful recognition of the services, sacrifices, and sufferings of persons honorably discharged from the military and naval service by reason of wounds, disease, or the expiration of terms of enlistment, it was respectfully recommended to bankers, merchants, manufacturers, mechanics, farmers, and persons engaged in industrial pursuits, to give them the preference for appointments to remunerative situations and employments.

On the twenty-third of March, on motion of Mr. Wilson, the joint resolution was taken up, and it passed without division in both Houses, and was approved by the President on the third of March, 1865.

No. LXXXIV.—*The Bill to provide for a Chief of Staff to the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Armies of the United States.*

In the Senate, on the twenty-fifth of February, 1865, Mr. Wilson introduced a bill to provide for a chief of staff to the Lieutenant-General commanding the armies of the United States, which was read twice, and referred to the Military Committee. On the first day of March, Mr. Wilson reported it back without amendment. By unanimous consent, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which provided that the President of the United States might, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint a chief of staff to the Lieutenant-General commanding the armies of the United States, who should have the rank, pay, and emoluments of a brigadier-general in the United States army. It was passed without debate or opposition. On the second of March, the House, on motion of Mr. Schenck, took the bill from the Speaker's table, and passed it without opposition. It was approved by the President on the third of March, 1865.

No. LXXXV.—*The Joint Resolution tendering the Thanks of Congress to Major-General George H. Thomas, and the Army under his Command.*

In the House, on the nineteenth of January, 1865, Mr. Cox, of Ohio, introduced a joint resolution, tendering the thanks of Congress to Major-General George H. Thomas and the army ur his command, which was read twice, and refe to the Military Committee. On the twenti Mr. Garfield, of Ohio, reported it back, witl amendment in the nature of a substitute. amendment proposed by the Military Commi was, to strike out all after the word "resolv and insert: "That the thanks of Congres tendered to Major-General H. Thomas, and officers and soldiers under his command their skill and dauntless courage, by whicl rebel army under General Hood was sig defeated and driven from the State of Te see." The amendment was agreed to, and resolution as amended passed.

In the Senate, on the eleventh of Febr Mr. Wilson, from the Committee on Mi Affairs, to whom it had been referred, rep back the joint resolution, tendering the tl of Congress to Major-General Thomas, wi amendment. On the twentieth, Mr. Brow Missouri, called up the resolution, and pro an amendment, tendering the thanks of Co to Rear-Admiral S. P. Lee. The amen was received and ordered to be printed. (twenty-first, the Senate, on motion of Mr son, proceeded to consider the joint reso On motion of Mr. Brown, it was amend adding that the thanks of Congress be te to Captain S. Phillips Lee, and to the offic seamen under his command, for the skill, g ry, and good conduct exhibited by them operation with the land forces under co of Major-General Thomas in the great a cisive victories in Tennessee. The resolu amended was then passed.

On the third of March, Mr. Schenck, fr Committee on Military Affairs, reported b joint resolution, with a recommendation amendment tendering the thanks of Con Captain Lee be not concurred in; and the ment was not agreed to.

The Senate, on motion of Mr. Brown, from its amendment, and the joint resolu passed, and was approved by the Pres the third of March, 1865.

No. LXXXVI.—*The Bill for the Better ization of the Pay Department of the*

In the Senate, on the thirtieth of 1865, Mr. Wilson introduced a bill for t organization of the pay department of t which was read twice, and referred to tary Committee. On the ninth of Febr Wilson reported it back without amend provided that the Paymaster-General sh the rank, pay, and emoluments of brig eral. That there should be added t department two assistant paymaster who should be *ex-officio* inspector-ge the department, with the rank, pay, a ments of colonels of infantry. That tl ments to these offices should be mad tion from the officers of the pay d including the additional paymaster chief clerk, and who should have h

two years' service. That the assistant and deputy paymaster-generals should give bonds. That whenever a pay district should be established, for the charge of which no assistant or deputy paymaster-general should be available as chief, the Secretary of War might detail any paymaster or additional paymaster to do the duties of such chief; and during the continuance of such detail, the officer so detailed should have the rank, pay, and emoluments of a deputy paymaster-general. That the Secretary of War should have authority to detail officers of the pay department for duty as inspectors of such department, not exceeding four at any one time.

On the twenty-fourth, Mr. Sprague, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom the bill had been recommitted, reported it back without amendment, and on his motion, the Senate proceeded to consider it. Mr. Sprague moved to amend the third section, so that two thirds of the appointments should be from the volunteer paymasters, and the amendment was agreed to. On Mr. Sprague's motion, it was further amended, so that the provisions of the act should continue to the end of the war and one year thereafter. On the first of March, the Senate proceeded further to consider the bill, and after debate it was passed over and not again taken up. It was twice moved by Mr. Sprague as an amendment, but failed.

No. LXXXVII.—*The Bill to incorporate the National Military and Naval Asylum.*

In the Senate, on the twenty-eighth of February, 1865, Mr. Wilson, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported a bill to incorporate a national, military, and naval asylum for the relief of the totally disabled officers and men of the volunteer forces of the United States, which was read twice. The bill provided: That General Grant, Admiral Farragut, Vice-President Hamlin, Andrew Johnson, Vice-President elect, Chief-Justice Chase, Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War, and Mr. Welles, Secretary of the Navy, and ninety-three other eminent citizens of the country should be a body corporate for the purposes of the act. That the corporation should consist of one hundred members, and have power to fill all vacancies created by death, resignation, or otherwise, and to make by-laws, rules, and regulations. That the business of the corporation should be managed by a board of twelve directors, a president, two vice-presidents, and a secretary. That the board of directors should have authority to procure a site for a military asylum for officers and men of the volunteer forces of the United States, who had been or might thereafter be totally disabled by wounds received or sickness contracted while in the line of their duty during the rebellion. That for the establishment and support of this asylum, there should be appropriated all stoppages or fines adjudged against volunteer officers, soldiers, or seamen, by sentence of courts-martial or military commission, all forfeitures on account of desertion from the volunteer service, and all moneys due deceased volunteer officers, soldiers, or seamen, which then were or should be unclaimed for three years after the death of such officers, soldiers, or seamen, and all donations of money or property by any person, or persons for the benefit of the asylum. That the selection of the site for the asylum, and the plan of the buildings, and the rules for the general and internal direction of the asylum should be made by the directors; but no selection of a site for the asylum, or adoption of any plan of buildings, should be agreed upon until after the sum of half a million of dollars should have been first subscribed or donated, and paid into the treasury of said corporation. That the officers of the asylum should consist of a governor, a deputy governor, a secretary, and a treasurer; and such officers should be appointed from the pensioned officers of the volunteer force. That all volunteer officers, soldiers, and seamen, who had served during the rebellion, who had been totally disabled by wounds received or sickness contracted in the line of their duty, should be entitled to the benefits of the asylum. That the directors should make an annual report of the condition of the asylum to the War Department, which should be communicated to Congress. That all inmates of the asylum should be made subject to the rules and articles of war, and be governed thereby as if they were in the army or navy.

On the first of March, in the Senate, on motion of Mr. Wilson, the bill was taken up, and on motion of Mr. Hale amended, so that Congress might thereafter alter, amend, or repeal the act; and further amended, on motion of Mr. Hendricks, so as to make it a corporate body in the District of Columbia. It was then passed as amended. In the House, on the second of March, the bill was taken from the Speaker's table and passed. It was approved by the President on the third of March, 1865.

No. LXXXVIII.—*The Bill to amend the several Acts heretofore passed to provide for the Enrolling and Calling out the National Forces.*

In the Senate, on the twenty-fourth of January, 1865, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, introduced a bill in addition to the several acts for enrolling and calling out the national forces, and for other purposes, which was read twice, and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. On the thirtieth, Mr. Wilson reported it back with an amendment as a substitute. This substitute declared: That any person enrolled, and liable to be drafted, might be accepted as a substitute for a drafted person... That no person owing military service should be exempted from liability on account of furnishing a substitute for the navy, unless the substitute was presented in person to the board of enrolment, and was accepted by the board.

That any recruiting agent, substitute broker, or other person, who should enlist as a volunteer or substitute any insane person, or a person in a condition of intoxication, or a deserter from the military or naval service, knowing him to be

That the President is authorized to enlist or organize out of troops already in the service, six regiments of volunteer engineers.

That the President is authorized to enlist two additional companies, to be added to the regiment of volunteer engineers, raised under the provisions of an act approved May twentieth, 1864; and the regiment shall be considered one of the regiments authorized in the preceding section of this act.

That, whenever a regiment in the regular army is reduced below the minimum number, no officer shall be appointed in such regiment beyond those necessary for the command of such reduced number.

That "acting assistant surgeons" and "contract surgeons," while in the military service of the United States, shall be exempt from all liability to be drafted. And the amendment was agreed to. On motion of Mr. Trumbull, the resolution was amended by adding as a new section: That officers by brevet in the regular army shall receive the same pay and allowances as brevet officers of the same grade or rank in the volunteer service, and no more. Mr. Sprague moved to amend it by adding an amendment in seven sections, to reorganize the pay department of the army; but it was rejected—yeas, ten; nays, nineteen. On motion of Mr. Lane, of Kansas, the resolution was amended so that, whenever the head of any bureau in the War Department accepted any position of a higher rank than that provided for by law, then he should be deemed as having vacated his position, and should be subject to detail for field and other duty. It was further amended, on the motion of Mr. Buckalew, by adding: "That where any revised enrolment in any congressional or draft district has been obtained or made prior to any actual drawing of names from the enrolment districts, the quota of such district may be adjusted and apportioned to such revised enrolment, instead of being applied to, or based upon the enrolment, as it may have "stood before revision." On motion of Mr. Grimes, the resolution was amended by adding, as a new section: That no person owing military service should be exempted from liability to perform the same on account of furnishing a substitute for the navy, unless the substitute was presented in person to the board of enrolment by which the principal was enrolled. The joint resolution, as amended, was then passed.

In the House, on the third of March, Mr. Schenck, from the Military Committee, reported back the joint resolution, with an amendment to the Senate amendment; and the House proceeded to consider the resolution and the amendments. Mr. Schenck explained the proposed amendments. The Senate amendments provided that brevetted officers of the regular army should be placed on the same footing as brevetted officers of the volunteers that were not allowed increased pay on account of brevet rank. The Military Committee of the House proposed so to amend it as to allow increased pay for brevet rank for regular and volunteer officers. The Military Committee reported in favor of authorizing the War Depa ment to transfer officers from one branch of t service to another, and the Committee also repo ed in favor of repealing the seventeenth secti of the act of the seventeenth of July, 1862, a thorizing the President to dismiss officers wit out the sentence of court-martials. The Comm tee reported in favor of amending the Sena amendments by adding several sections of t bill passed by the House amendatory of the e rolment acts. On motion of Mr. Farnsworth, t twelfth section of the Senate amendment, intr duced by Mr. Lane, of Kansas, which would ha required the removal of General Meigs from t quartermaster's department, was stricken ou Mr. Holman moved an amendment to muster o soldiers with their regiments or batteries wl were enlisted in 1862 and 1863, with assuranc that they were only to fill the unexpired term their regiments or batteries; and the amendme was agreed to—yeas, ninety-one; nays, thirt one. Several amendments to the Senate amen ment were agreed to, and the Senate amendme as amended was adopted. The Senate non-co curred in the House amendments, asked a cor mittee of conference, and appointed Mr. Wilso Mr. Howard, and Mr. Buckalew managers. Tl House agreed to the conference, and appoint as managers on the part of the House Mr. Ga field, of Ohio, Mr. Odell, of New-York, and M Scofield, of Pennsylvania.

In the House, Mr. Garfield made a report fro the conference committee. He stated that "tl House passed, a few days ago, a joint resolutic defining the pay of officers' servants. That joi resolution went to the Senate, and in its place bill of thirteen sections was substituted. Tl House took that bill of thirteen sections, adopt the first eight, cut off the remaining five, an added twenty-three sections of its own. Ther were thirty points of difference between the tw Houses. The House receded from six; the Se ate receded from twenty-two; and in place of tl two others, substitutes were agreed on by tl committee. I will only mention the points c which the House receded, and the two modifie sections, as being of interest to us.

"First, in reference to bounties. The Hou section was modified so that bounties should b paid to the heirs of soldiers who were killed i battle, though they had not served two years and such bounties should only go to their widov or, if there be no widow, to their children, but sha not go to the legal heirs generally. The Sena refused to agree with the House amendment r pealing section seventeen of the act of July se enteenth, 1862, authorizing the President sun marily to dismiss officers from the army, nav or marine corps. But the managers of the cor ference on the part of the House proposed a sul stitute for the repealing section, by which tl power of dismissal is limited and regulated. Tl President may still dismiss an officer; but he required, on application, setting forth under oat that the dismissal was unjust, to order a trial c the officer by court-martial on the charges o

commissioner, constituting the enrolling board, should not be allowed mileage, but only transportation in kind.

That there should be appointed by the President an assistant provost-marshal general for each State, who should have the rank, pay, and emoluments of a lieutenant-colonel of cavalry.

That it should not be lawful for any person to engage in the business of procuring recruits or substitutes as an agent, substitute broker, or otherwise, for money or profit, without having first obtained from the Secretary of War authority in writing.

That any recruiting agent, substitute broker, or other person, who, for pay or profit, should enlist, or caused to be enlisted, as a volunteer or substitute, any insane person, or convict, or person under indictment for a felony, or person in a condition of intoxication, or a deserter, should, upon conviction by any court-martial, be dishonorably dismissed the service.

That, in addition to the other lawful penalties of the crime of desertion, all persons who had deserted, who should not return to service within sixty days after the passage of this act, should be deemed to have voluntarily relinquished and forfeited their rights of citizenship and their rights to become citizens.

The bill was further considered on the twenty-third, twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, and twenty-seventh, modified and amended in several particulars, and passed—yeas, eighty-three; nays, forty-six. On the twenty-eighth, it was read twice in the Senate, and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. On the first of March, Mr. Wilson reported it back with amendments.

In the House, on the eighteenth of February, Mr. Schenck, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported a joint resolution declaring and defining the law in relation to officers' servants.

The joint resolution declared the meaning of all provisions of law relating to soldiers employed by officers as servants to be: That, for every soldier thus employed by any officer, there should be deducted from the monthly pay of such officer the full monthly pay and allowances of the soldier so employed; that no officer should be allowed any greater number of servants than provided by law, nor be allowed for any servant not actually in his employment; that the measure of allowance for pay to officers' servants was the pay of a private soldier, and that no non-commissioned officer should be detailed or employed to act as a servant; nor should any private soldier be so detailed or employed, except with his own consent. The joint resolution was passed without a division.

In the Senate, on the twentieth, the joint resolution was referred to the Military Committee, and on the twenty-third, Mr. Wilson reported it back without amendment.

On the second of March, the Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolution. Mr. Wilson moved to strike out all of the original resolution, and insert:

That the measure of allowance for pay for an officer's servant is the pay of a private soldier, as fixed by law at the time; that no non-commissioned officer shall be detailed or employed to act as a servant, nor shall any private soldier be so detailed or employed except with his own consent; that for each soldier employed as a servant by any officer, there shall be deducted from the monthly pay of such officer the full monthly pay and allowances of the soldier so employed; and that, including any soldier or soldiers so employed, no officer shall be allowed for any greater number of servants than is now provided by law, nor be allowed for any servant not actually and in fact in his employ. That non-commissioned officers and privates in the volunteer service shall receive the same amount of clothing as non-commissioned officers and privates of the same arm of the regular army. That, if a soldier, discharged for wounds received in battle, die before receiving the bounty, provided by the act of March third, 1863, the bounty due shall be paid to the following persons, and in the order following, and to no other person, to wit: first, to the widow of such deceased soldier, if there be one; second, if there be no widow, then to the children of such deceased soldier, share and share alike; third, if such soldier left neither a widow, nor child nor children, then, and in that case, such bounty shall be paid to the following persons, provided they be residents of the United States, to wit: first, to his father; or, if he shall not be living, or has abandoned the support of his family, then to the mother of such soldier, and if there be neither father nor mother, then such bounty shall be paid to the brothers and sisters of the deceased soldier. That every non-commissioned officer, private, or other person, who has been, or shall hereafter be, discharged from the army by reason of wounds received in battle, on skirmish, on picket, or in action, or in the line of duty, shall be entitled to receive the same bounty as if he had served out his full term. That all persons of color, who were enlisted and mustered into the military service of the United States in South-Carolina, by and under the direction of Major-General Hunter and Brigadier-General Saxton, in pursuance of the authority from the Secretary of War, dated August twenty-fifth, 1862, "that the persons so received into service, and their officers, to be entitled to and receive the same pay and rations as are allowed by law to other volunteers in the service;" and in every case where it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the Secretary of War that any regiment of colored troops has been mustered into the service of the United States, under any assurance by the President or the Secretary of War, that the non-commissioned officers and privates of such regiment should be paid the same as other troops of the same arm of the service, shall, from the date of their enlistment, receive the same pay and allowances as are allowed by law to other volunteers in the military service; and the Secretary of War shall make all necessary regulations to cause payment to be made in accordance therewith.

That the President is authorized to enlist or organize out of troops already in the service, six regiments of volunteer engineers.

That the President is authorized to enlist two additional companies, to be added to the regiment of volunteer engineers, raised under the provisions of an act approved May twentieth, 1864; and the regiment shall be considered one of the regiments authorized in the preceding section of this act.

That, whenever a regiment in the regular army is reduced below the minimum number, no officer shall be appointed in such regiment beyond those necessary for the command of such reduced number.

That "acting assistant surgeons" and "contract surgeons," while in the military service of the United States, shall be exempt from all liability to be drafted. And the amendment was agreed to. On motion of Mr. Trumbull, the resolution was amended by adding as a new section: That officers by brevet in the regular army shall receive the same pay and allowances as brevet officers of the same grade or rank in the volunteer service, and no more. Mr. Sprague moved to amend it by adding an amendment in seven sections, to reorganize the pay department of the army; but it was rejected—yeas, ten; nays, nineteen. On motion of Mr. Lane, of Kansas, the resolution was amended so that, whenever the head of any bureau in the War Department accepted any position of a higher rank than that provided for by law, then he should be deemed as having vacated his position, and should be subject to detail for field and other duty. It was further amended, on the motion of Mr. Buckalew, by adding: "That where any revised enrolment in any congressional or draft district has been obtained or made prior to any actual drawing of names from the enrolment districts, the quota of such district may be adjusted and apportioned to such revised enrolment, instead of being applied to, or based upon the enrolment, as it may have "stood before revision." On motion of Mr. Grimes, the resolution was amended by adding, as a new section: That no person owing military service should be exempted from liability to perform the same on account of furnishing a substitute for the navy, unless the substitute was presented in person to the board of enrolment by which the principal was enrolled. The joint resolution, as amended, was then passed.

In the House, on the third of March, Mr. Schenck, from the Military Committee, reported back the joint resolution, with an amendment to the Senate amendment; and the House proceeded to consider the resolution and the amendments. Mr. Schenck explained the proposed amendments. The Senate amendments provided that brevetted officers of the regular army should be placed on the same footing as brevetted officers of the volunteers that were not allowed increased pay on account of brevet rank. The Military Committee of the House proposed so to amend it as to allow increased pay for brevet rank for regular and volunteer officers. The Military Committee reported in favor of authorizing the War De ment to transfer officers from one branch c service to another, and the Committee also r ed in favor of repealing the seventeenth se of the act of the seventeenth of July, 186: thorizing the President to dismiss officers out the sentence of court-martials. The Co tee reported in favor of amending the S amendments by adding several sections bill passed by the House amendatory of t rolment acts. On motion of Mr. Farnswort twelfth section of the Senate amendment, duced by Mr. Lane, of Kansas, which woul required the removal of General Meigs fr quartermaster's department, was stricke Mr. Holman moved an amendment to mus soldiers with their regiments or batteri were enlisted in 1862 and 1863, with ass that they were only to fill the unexpired their regiments or batteries; and the ame was agreed to—yeas, ninety-one; nays, one. Several amendments to the Senate ment were agreed to, and the Senate ame as amended was adopted. The Senate n curred in the House amendments, asked mittee of conference, and appointed Mr. Mr. Howard, and Mr. Buckalew manager House agreed to the conference, and a as managers on the part of the House field, of Ohio, Mr. Odell, of New-York, Scofield, of Pennsylvania.

In the House, Mr. Garfield made a rep the conference committee. He stated t House passed, a few days ago, a joint r defining the pay of officers' servants. T resolution went to the Senate, and in it bill of thirteen sections was substitut House took that bill of thirteen sections the first eight, cut off the remaining added twenty-three sections of its own were thirty points of difference between Houses. The House receded from six; ate receded from twenty-two; and in pl two others, substitutes were agreed c committee. I will only mention the which the House receded, and the tw sections, as being of interest to us.

"First, in reference to bounties. T section was modified so that bounties paid to the heirs of soldiers who wer battle, though they had not served t and such bounties should only go to th or, if there be no widow, to their childre not go to the legal heirs generally. refused to agree with the House ame pealing section seventeen of the act o enteenth, 1862, authorizing the Pres marily to dismiss officers from the a or marine corps. But the managers ference on the part of the House prop stitute for the repealing section, by power of dismissal is limited and reg President may still dismiss an officer required, on application, setting forth that the dismissal was unjust, to orc the officer by court-martial on the

which he was dismissed. If such trial is not had within six months after the application was made, the dismissal is made void. The section of the House amendment to provide for the transfer of officers from one corps to another, from one arm of the service to another, and from the volunteer service to the regular service, the House recede from.

"The section in regard to declaring foreigners liable to draft the House recede from, it being of doubtful constitutionality.

"The section in regard to increasing the pay of provost-marshals and enrolling officers the House recede from.

"The section in regard to substitute brokers being authorized by the Secretary of War, the House recede from, believing that in other sections of the bill the country is sufficiently protected from the evils of the substitute broker system.

"The last section of the bill, in regard to mustering out enlisted men who went into the service to fill up old regiments, we receded from, not, however, until we were satisfied that the Senate could not be induced to recede from their position, although adhering might involve the failure of the whole bill. The managers on the part of the Senate said that the Secretary of War had informed them that if this provision were adopted, it would take forty-five thousand men immediately from the field, and thus very much impair the efficiency of the army on the eve of a great campaign. In view of all the circumstances, the Committee recommend that the House recede from that amendment." Mr. Le Blond, of Ohio, demanded the yeas and nays on the acceptance of the report, and they were ordered, and being taken, resulted—yeas, seventy-one; nays, fifty-seven; so the report was agreed to.

In the Senate, Mr. Wilson, from the committee of conference, made a report, which, after debate, was agreed to without a division. The title of the joint resolution was changed so as to read, "An act to amend the several acts heretofore passed to provide for the enrolling and calling out of the national forces and for other purposes;" and it was approved by the President on the third of March, 1865.

No. LXXXIX.—*The Bill making Appropriations for the Support of the Army for the year ending June thirtieth, 1866, and for other purposes.*

In the House, on the seventeenth of January, 1865, Mr. Stevens, from the Committee of Ways and Means, reported a bill making appropriations for the support of the army for the year ending June thirtieth, 1866. On the seventh of February, the bill, on motion of Mr. Stevens, was taken up, and Mr. Wilson, of Iowa, moved to amend it by adding a proviso: That no money appropriated by the act should be paid for the purpose of paying any railway company for the transportation of property or troops of the United States where such company might have accepted a grant of lands from Congress upon condition of furnishing said transportation free of toll or other charge, except in such cases as had been modified by act of Congress. After debate, the amendment was agreed to, and the bill as amended passed the House.

In the Senate, the bill was referred to the Committee of Finance, and the Committee reported in favor of striking out the proviso forbidding the payment of any of the money appropriated by the bill for the transportation of troops over the land grant railroads. The Senate, on the eighteenth, proceeded to the consideration of the bill, and Mr. Cowan moved to amend the proviso so as to leave the subject to future adjustment between the Government and the railroads. After debate, in which Mr. Sherman, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Howard, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Trumbull, Mr. Cowan, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. Grimes participated, the proviso and amendment were informally passed over. Mr. Wilson moved to amend the bill by adding as a new section, That from and after the first day of March, 1865, and during the continuance of the rebellion, the commutation price of officers' subsistence should be fifty cents per ration; but the increase should not apply to the commutation price of the rations of any officer above the rank of brevet brigadier-general, or of any officer entitled to commutation for fuel or quarters; and the amendment was agreed to. Mr. Wilson then moved to amend by adding as a new section: That thereafter, during the continuance of the rebellion, there should be no deductions made from, or income tax levied upon, the salary of any officer in the military or naval service; and all acts or parts of acts inconsistent therewith were thereby repealed. Mr. Sherman opposed the amendment, stating that it would be pertinent to the income tax bill, and Mr. Wilson, at the suggestion of several senators, withdrew it. Mr. Wilson then moved to add a new section providing that all officers of volunteers below the rank of brigadier-general, who should continue in the military service to the close of the war, should be entitled to receive, upon being mustered out of said service, three months' pay proper. Mr. Howe moved to amend it by inserting "now in commission" after the word "volunteers;" and the motion was agreed to. The amendment as amended was adopted—yeas, twenty-four; nays, not counted. Mr. Wilson moved to add as a new section, That commissioned officers of the army, serving in the field, should thereafter be permitted to purchase rations for their own use, on credit, from any commissary of subsistence, at cost prices, and the amount due for rations so purchased should be reported monthly to the Paymaster-General, to be deducted from the payment next following such purchase; and it was agreed to. Mr. Wilson moved further to amend the bill by adding as a new section, "That the President may appoint, in addition to the number of cadets heretofore authorized by law, from among the orphan children of officers or soldiers who have been or may be killed in battle, or who have died or may die of disease incurred in the line of duty during the present rebellion, two cadets for each

State represented in Congress, who shall be actual residents of the State for which they may be appointed; and fifty cadets, to be appointed from the military forces of the United States, regular and volunteer, who shall have served for a period of not less than nine months." The amendment was opposed by Mr. Sherman and Mr. Howard, and rejected.

Mr. Wilson then moved to add a new section providing: That the Secretary of War be authorized and directed to cause tobacco to be furnished to the enlisted men of the army at cost prices, exclusive of the cost of transportation, in such quantities as they may require, not exceeding sixteen ounces per month, and the amount due therefor should be deducted from their pay in the same manner as provided for the settlement of clothing accounts; and it was agreed to. Mr. Sprague moved to amend the bill by adding six new sections organizing the pay department of the army; but it was rejected. The amendment to strike out the proviso forbidding the payment of any of the money appropriated to land grant railroads was again taken up, the pending question being on Mr. Cowan's amendment to it. After further debate, the vote was taken on Mr. Cowan's amendment, and it was lost—yeas, nine; nays, twenty-seven. The vote was then taken on striking out the proviso, and it was agreed to—yeas, thirty; nays, five. On motion of Mr. Trumbull, the bill was further amended—yeas, fifteen; nays, twelve—by adding as a new section: "That all laws and parts of laws, or regulations of the War Department, which give additional pay or rank to officers of the regular army over officers in the volunteer service of the same rank, are hereby repealed." The bill as amended was passed without a division.

In the House, on the twenty-seventh of February, on motion of Mr. Stevens, the bill was taken up, and the Senate amendments, excepting the amendment authorizing the Secretary of War to furnish tobacco to the soldiers, were non-concurred in.

The Senate, on motion of Mr. Sherman, insisted upon its amendments, asked a committee of conference, and appointed Mr. Cowan, Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Carlisle conferees. The House agreed to the committee of conference, and the Speaker appointed Mr. Wilson, of Iowa, Mr. Stevens, of Pennsylvania, and Mr. James C. Allen, of Illinois, managers. Mr. Wilson was excused from serving on the committee, and Mr. Washburne, of Illinois, was appointed.

On the first of March, Mr. Cowan, from the committee of conference, reported that the committee had recommended that the Senate recede from their fourth amendment. That the House of Representatives recede from their disagreement to the second and third amendments of the Senate. That the Senate recede from their disagreement to the amendment of the House to the sixth amendment of the Senate, and agree to the same. That the House recede from their disagreement to the first amendment of the Senate, and agree to the same with amendments, as follows: In line three of said amendment to s words "any railroad," and insert i the words, "the Illinois Central R to strike out all of said amendment "States" in line five; and that the to the same as so modified. Mr. posed the acceptance of the report, bate, the vote was taken, and it wa red in—yeas, thirteen; nays, twen motion of Mr. Trumbull, the Senat sisted on its amendments, asked a ference, and appointed Mr. Trumb well, and Mr. Powell conferees. agreed to a committee of conferer Speaker appointed Mr. Wilson, of Io man, of Indiana, and Mr. Davis, o managers.

On the third of March, Mr. Wils committee of conference, made a r House recommending the same acti mer committee of conference, exceptin ment in regard to land grant railroa the committee would not agree. O Mr. Wilson, the House, by a vote of to sixty-one, agreed to the Senate striking out the proviso relating to ra an amendment providing that no n priated by the act should be used for of paying the Illinois Central Railro for the transportation of the prope of the United States. The House vo to the report of the committee of c the disagreeing votes of the two Hou Senate, Mr. Trumbull made a report concurred in. Mr. Trumbull then the Senate disagree to the House an the Senate amendment striking out relative to the land grant railroad further conference. The motion wa and Mr. Harris, Mr. Howe, and Mr. appointed managers. The House further conference, and the Speake Mr. Thayer, of Pennsylvania, Mr. Mo and Mr. Kernan, of New-York, mana

Mr. Thayer reported to the Hou committee of conference could not a moved that the House agree to the of the Senate, striking out the provis land grant railroads, with an amendm the matter to the Supreme Court for a Mr. Morrill, of Vermont, moved that recede from its disagreement to the of the Senate, and it was agreed to— three; nays, forty-seven. So the bill was approved by the President on t March, 1865.

No. XC.—*The Joint Resolution t Enlistments by making Free the Children of Colored Soldiers.*

On the thirteenth of December, 18 son, of Massachusetts, introduced int a joint resolution to encourage enlis promote the efficiency of the militar forces, by making free the wives and persons who had been in, or might b

into, the service of the United States. The resolution was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs and was, on the fourteenth, reported back to the Senate, which, on motion of Mr. Wilson, proceeded to the consideration of the resolution. Mr. Davis, of Kentucky, moved its reference to the Judiciary Committee. Mr. Wilkinson, of Minnesota, hoped it would not be referred; "the resolution ought to be passed immediately." Mr. Wilson hoped the resolution would not be referred to any committee. "The needs of the country," he said, "more than justice or humanity, have weaponed the hand of the slave. Let us hasten the enactment of this beneficent measure, inspired by patriotism and hallowed by justice and humanity; so that, ere merry Christmas shall come, the intelligence shall be flashed over the land, to cheer the hearts of the nation's defenders, and arouse the manhood of the bondman, that on the forehead of the soldier's wife and the soldier's child no man can write slave." Mr. Hendricks, of Indiana, was "not able to see how, under the Constitution of the United States, Congress can free the servant who is held to service by the laws of a State." Mr. Powell, of Kentucky thought the resolution was "palpably unconstitutional."

On the twentieth, the Senate resumed the consideration of the resolution. Mr. Davis declared that "the great and principal effect of this resolution would be in Kentucky, and upon her people."

The Senate, on the fifth of January, 1865, resumed the consideration, the pending question being the motion of Mr. Davis to refer it to the Judiciary Committee. Mr. Wilson demanded the yeas and nays, and they were ordered. Mr. Doolittle "would vote to refer it to the Judiciary Committee." Mr. Saulsbury would "maintain the doctrine that not only have you not the power to decree the freedom of wives and children of negroes who volunteer in your army, if they are from States where slavery is recognized, but you cannot give permanent freedom to the negro volunteer if he be a slave." "All must confess," said Mr. Sumner, of Massachusetts, "the humanity of the proposition to enfranchise the families of colored persons who have borne arms for their country. There is no argument, whether of reason or of humanity, for the enfranchisement of the soldier which does not plead equally for that of his family. Nay, more: I know not how we can expect a blessing on our arms while we fail to perform this duty." The question was then taken on the motion to refer, and it was lost—yeas, fifteen; nays, nineteen.

On the ninth, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of the resolution, and Mr. Saulsbury made an elaborate speech against its passage. Mr. Davis moved to amend the resolution so as to make its operation prospective. Mr. Clark, of New-Hampshire, hoped Mr. Davis's amendment "would not be agreed to, and that we shall not only set free the wives and children of soldiers who may hereafter be enlisted, but the wives and children of those who have already gone into the service of the country." "This is the first time," said Mr. Davis, "I have ever ventured to utter a voice in the name of humanity in the Senate; but in the name of humanity—humanity to a degraded and helpless race of beings who are unable to support themselves — I protest that they shall not be deprived of the support which their masters and owners are bound by the laws to afford to them, and that they shall not be thrown helpless upon the world, without any means of supporting themselves." "I have noticed," said Mr. Pomeroy, of Kansas, "that men who are arguing in the interest of slavery always resist emancipation until the very last moment; and then, when the moment comes, they say it would be a great relief to the owners of this property to get rid of it; that it cannot take care of itself, and humanity comes in and pleads that some appropriation may be made to support this class of individuals, who are so helpless, and so inefficient, and so worthless. These people have a wonderful facility for taking care of themselves, and adapting themselves to any condition."

Mr. Wade, of Ohio, followed in an earnest and effective speech in favor of the immediate passage of the measure. Mr. Johnson, of Maryland, could not vote for the resolution, because he was fully under the impression that Congress had no authority to pass it. Mr. Wilson said that Mr. Davis, when he declared that we should turn poor wives and children out on the world without support, "forgets that we clothe and feed the husband and father, and pay him sixteen dollars a month, and with that pay he can support his wife and his children. Make them free, and not only will his wages go to their support, but the labor of their own hands will go to their support." The amendment moved by Mr. Davis was then rejected, without a count. Mr. Powell then moved: "That no slave shall be emancipated by virtue of this resolution, until the owner of the slave or slaves so emancipated shall be paid a just compensation." Mr. Powell then addressed the Senate in favor of this amendment, and in opposition to the passage of the resolution in any form. He closed his speech by demanding the yeas and nays on his amendment, and they were ordered, and, being taken, resulted—yeas, seven; nays, thirty. Mr. Saulsbury then moved to amend the resolution by adding that its provisions "shall not apply to or be operative in any State that has not assumed to secede from the Union;" but this amendment was rejected. The question on the passage of the resolution was then taken—yeas, twenty-seven; nays, ten; so the joint resolution to make free the wives and children of colored soldiers received the sanction of the Senate of the United States.

In the House of Representatives, the resolution was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. On the twenty-second of February, Mr. Wilson, of Iowa, reported it without amendment. "Does the gentleman believe," inquired Mr. Mallery, of Kentucky, "that Congress has the constitutional power to pass such a law?" "I have

always believed," replied Mr. Wilson, "that the Congress of the United States, in time of war, when it was necessary to make our population most effective for the purposes of war, has the power; and has the power to liberate slaves by congressional enactment." Mr. Harris, of Maryland, was fully convinced that this measure was presented and pressed, not to get soldiers; but "it is for the purpose, and that only, of interfering with and abolishing the institution called slavery." Mr. Wilson would tell the gentleman the purpose of this act. "To-day, in the forefront of your army, are thousands of colored men risking everything for the salvation of this republic. And, sir, this republic cannot afford to disgrace itself in the eyes of the civilized world by sending these men out to fight its battles, and chaining at home their wives and children in that bondage which is worse than death. It would be a disgrace never to be wiped from the face of this nation if we should permit this wrong to continue." Mr. Harris moved that the resolution be laid on the table — yeas, sixty-six; nays, seventy-seven. The question was taken, and it was decided in the affirmative — yeas, seventy-four; nays, sixty-three. So the joint resolution making free the wives and children of colored soldiers passed, and received, on the third of March, 1865, the approval of the President.

Some months afterward, General Palmer, commanding the department of Kentucky, said in a public report, that seventy thousand women and children had been made free by the passage of this resolution.

No. XCI.—*Military Confirmations in the Senate.*

During the rebellion, the Thirty-seventh and Thirty-eighth Congresses acted upon ten thousand eight hundred and ninety-one military nominations, ranging from second lieutenants up to Lieutenant-General Grant. These nominations imposed upon the Committee on Military Affairs vast labors, and required much time and attention of the Senate.

Doc. 2.

BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.

REPORT OF LIEUT.-GENERAL LONGSTREET.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS, A. N. V.,
NEAR FREDERICKSBURG, VA., Dec. 20, 1862.

Brigadier-General R. H. Chilton, Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General:

GENERAL: Upon my arrival at Fredericksburg, on the nineteenth of November, the troops of this command were assigned to positions as follows, viz.: McLaws's division upon the heights immediately behind the city and south of the Telegraph road; Anderson's division on McLaws's left, and occupying the heights as far as Taylor's hill on the Rappahannock; Pickett's division on McLaws's right, and extending to the rear along the margin of the wood which skirts Deep Run valley; Hood's division near Hamilton's Crossing of the railroad; Ransom's division in reserve, near my headquarters. Our batteries were assigned positions along the height: Pendleton, Colonel Cabell, Colonel A Captain Johnson, (Colonel Walton sick.) Pits were made for the prot batteries under the supervision of A portion of General Pendleton's lery was assigned to the heights General McLaws's division. Colo (Washington Artillery) occupied t Marye's Hill, and a portion of Col der's reserve occupied the other p derson's front, extending to the Ta our left. The brigade batteries t assigned to positions on the heights readiness to coöperate with their c for any other service that might be them. Our picket line was establis river bank extending from Bank's F battery, the most important portio the immediate orders of Major-Gen Upon the approach of General Jac Hood's division was closed in upon Pickett, and put in position upon th the opposite side of Deep Run va dition to the natural strength of ditches, stone fences, and road-cuts along different portions of the line, General McLaws's line were further by rifle trenches and abatis.

The enemy held quiet possession ford Heights until three o'clock on of the eleventh, when our signal guns of his approach. The troops, being ferent camp grounds, were formed and marched to their positions alo Ransom's division was ordered to tak position in easy supporting distance teries on the Marye Hill. Before th to their positions, McLaws's pickets brigade) engaged the enemy at the from time to time drove back differ parties engaged in laying the bri enemy was compelled, eventually, his plan of laying the bridges, and beg his troops across the river in boats, of the fire of his sharpshooters, and and fifty odd pieces of artillery.

At many points along the river ban could get no protection from the a This was particularly the case at th Deep Run, where the enemy succeed pleting his bridge early in the afterno in the afternoon he succeeded in thro bodies of troops across, at the city, b boats. Barksdale, however, engaged ly at every point, and with remarka Soon after dark, General McLaws ord dale's brigade to retire. The Gener confident of his position that a second sent him before he would yield the brigade was then relieved by that of General T. R. R. Cobb, which was General McLaws along the Telegrap front of Marye's house, (a stone fen along this road gave good protection fantry.) When Cobb's brigade got int

Ransom's division was withdrawn and placed in reserve. During the night the enemy finished his bridges and began to throw his troops across.

His movements, early on the twelfth, seemed to be directly against our right; but when the fog lifted, columns were seen opposite Fredericksburg, the head of them then crossing at the bridges opposite the city. Ransom's division was moved back to the Marye Hill. Featherston's brigade of Anderson's division (previously occupying this hill) was closed in upon the other brigades of Anderson. The entire day was occupied by the enemy in throwing his forces across the river and deploying his columns. Our batteries were opened upon the masses of infantry whenever they were in certain range. Our fire invariably drew that of the enemy's on the opposite heights, and they generally kept up the fire long after our batteries had ceased.

Early on the morning of the thirteenth, I rode to the right of my position, Hood's division. The dense fog in the early twilight concealed the enemy from view; but his commands, "Forward, guide centre, march!" were distinctly heard at different points near my right. From the direction of the sound, and the position of his troops the day before, I concluded that his attack would be upon General Jackson, at some point beyond my right. I therefore rode back to a point near the centre of my forces, giving notice to General Hood that the enemy would attack General Jackson beyond his right, that he should watch carefully the movements, and when an opportunity offered, he should move forward and attack the enemy's flank. Similar instructions were given to General Pickett, with orders to coöperate with General Hood. The attack was made, as had been anticipated. It did not appear to have all the force of a real attack, however, and General Hood did not feel authorized to make more than a partial advance. Where he did move out, he drove the enemy back in handsome style.

About eleven o'clock, A. M., I sent orders for the batteries to play upon the streets and bridges beyond the city, by way of diversion in favor of our right. The batteries had hardly opened, when the enemy's infantry began to move out toward my line. Our pickets in front of the Marye house were soon driven in, and the enemy began to deploy his forces in front of that point. Our artillery, being in position, opened fire as soon as the masses became dense enough to warrant it. This fire was very destructive and demoralizing in its effects, and frequently made gaps in the enemy's ranks that could be seen at the distance of a mile. The enemy continued his advance, and made his attack at the Marye Hill in handsome style. He did not meet the fire of our infantry with any heart, however, and was therefore readily repulsed. Another effort was speedily made, but with little more success. The attack was again renewed, and again repulsed. Other forces were seen preparing for another attack, when I suggested to General McLaws the propriety of reënforcing his advanced line with a brigade. He had previously reënforced with part of Kershaw's brigade, and ordered forward the balance. About this time, Brigadier-General T. R. R. Cobb fell, mortally wounded, and almost simultaneously Brigadier-General J. R. Cooke was severely wounded.

General Kershaw dashed to the front to take the command. General Ransom, on the Marye Hill, was charged with the immediate care of the point attacked, with orders to send forward additional reënforcements, if it should become necessary, and to use Featherston's brigade (Anderson's division) if he should require it.

The attack upon our right seemed to subside about two o'clock, when I directed Major-General Pickett to send me two of his brigades. One (Kemper's) was sent to General Ransom, to be placed in some secure position, to be ready in case it should be wanted. The other (Jenkins's) was ordered to General McLaws, to replace that of Kershaw in his line.

The enemy soon completed his arrangements for a renewed attack, and moved forward with much determination. He met with no better success than he had on the previous occasions. These efforts were repeated and continued from time to time till after night, when he left the field literally strewn with his dead and wounded.

Colonel Walton's ammunition was exhausted about sunset, and his batteries were relieved by Colonel Alexander's. Orders were given for fresh supplies of ammunition, and for everything to be prepared for a renewal of the battle at daylight.

On the fourteenth there was little firing between the sharpshooters. The enemy, screening his forces under a slight descent in the ground, held a position about four hundred yards in front of us. In the afternoon, I sent Captain Latrobe, of my staff, to the left to place artillery in position to play along the enemy's line, with instructions to Colonel Alexander to use such artillery there as he might think proper. The point was selected and the pits made by light the following morning. General Ransom was also ordered to strengthen his position on the Marye Hill by rifle trenches. Similar instructions were sent along the entire line. These preparations were made to meet the grand attack of the enemy, *confidently expected* on Monday morning. As the attack was not made, the artillery and General Ransom's sharpshooters opened upon the enemy and drove him back to cover in the city.

During the night the enemy recrossed the river. His retreat was not discovered till he had crossed the river and cut his bridges at this end. Our sharpshooters were moved forward, and our old positions resumed.

Four hundred prisoners, fifty-five hundred stands of small arms, and two hundred and fifty thousand rounds of small arm ammunition were captured.

Our loss, for the number engaged, was quite heavy. Brigadier-General T. R. R. Cobb fell, mortally wounded, in the heat of the battle of the thirteenth. He defended his position with great gallantry and ability. In him we have lost one of our most promising officers and statesmen. A tabular statement and lists of the killed, wounded, and missing accompany this report.

List of Casualties in the First Army Corps, Army Northern Virginia, in the Ba
Fredericksburg, December, 1862.

Division.	Brigade.	Regiment.	Kill'd.	Woun
Anderson's	Perry's	5th Florida	....	1
"	"	8th "	7	37
"	"	Donaldsonville Artillery	1	[illegible]
"	Featherston's	19th Mississippi	....	[illegible]
"	"	16th "	....	13
"	"	2d " Battalion	1	3
"	"	12th "	....	5
"	"	Three Batteries	....	6
"	Wright's	3d Georgia	1	....
"	"	2d " Battalion	1	....
"	Wilcox's	11th Alabama	3	5
"	Mahone's	6th Virginia	....	1
"	"	41st "	2	4
"	"	61st "	....	1
			16	87
Pickett's	Kemper's	1st Virginia	....	9
"	"	3d "	....	5
"	"	7th "	....	4
"	"	11th "	....	13
"	"	24th "	....	7
"	Jenkins's	P. S. S.	....	4
"	"	6th South Carolina	....	1
"	"	2d " "	....	3
				46
Ransom's	Cook's	15th North Carolina	....	163
"	"	27th " "	2	13
"	"	46th " "	....	58
"	"	48th " "	17	161
"	Ransom's	24th " "	4	24
"	"	25th " "	13	75
"	"	35th " "	9	20
"	"	49th " "	....	9
			45	463
Hood's	Law's	6th North Carolina	5	20
"	"	44th Alabama	....	1
"	"	4th "	3	16
"	"	54th North Carolina	6	40
"	"	57th " "	32	192
"	Toombs's	17th Georgia	....	3
"	"	15th "	1	6
"	"	20th "	....	2
"	Robertson's	4th Texas	1	....
"	"	5th "	....	5
"	Anderson's	7th Georgia	....	6
"	"	8th "	1	2
"	"	9th "	....	1
			49	294
McLaws's	Cobb's	Phillip's Legion	13	56
"	"	16th Georgia	4	61
"	"	18th "	....	30
"	"	Staff	....	3
"	Barksdale's	13th Mississippi	....	23
"	"	18th "	....	18
"	"	21st "	....	11
"	"	17th "	....	13
"	Kershaw's	8th South Carolina	....	7
"	"	2d " "	....	40
"	"	3d " "	....	119
"	"	7th " "	....	35
"	"	15th " "	....	47
"	"	James's Battery	....	1
			17	464
Stuart's	W. H. F. Lee's	Washington Artillery	3	22
"	"	15th Virginia Cavalry	....	6
"	"	9th " "	....	1
		Henry's Artillery	....	6
			3	35

Summary of Casualties in the First Army Corps during the Recent Actions before Fredericksburg.

Command.	December 11.							December 12.							December 13.							December 14.							Total.			Grand Aggregate.
	Killed.		Wound'd		Missi'g.			Killed.		Wound'd		Missi'g.			Killed.		Wound'd		Missi'g.			Killed.		Wound'd		Missi'g.						
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Aggregate.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Aggregate.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Aggregate.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Aggregate.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	
Anderson's Division	..	9	7	38	4	40	98	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	5	59	..	..	66	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	11	104	44	159
McLaws's Division *	2	27	10	141	..	64	244	..	..	..	2	..	..	2	9	60	40	498	1	3	611	..	1	..	..	..	..	1	32	699	68	858
Pickett's Division	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	6	..	..	7	..	2	2	42	..	1	47	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	50	1	54
Hood's Division	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	50	7	178	..	12	251	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	54	190	12	251
Ransom's Division	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	3	77	30	419	..	..	529	..	..	..	5	..	..	5	30	496	..	535
Walton's Battalion Artil'y	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	..	3	1	21	..	..	25	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	23	..	26
Alexander's " "	..	..	..	..	2	..	2	..	1	..	8	..	..	9	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	8	2	11
Grand Total	2	36	17	174	6	104	339	..	2	..	18	..	..	20	16	194	85	1217	1	16	1229	..	1	..	5	..	..	6	251	1516	127	1894

* One man killed on December 15th.

RECAPITULATION.

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Aggregate.
December 11	38	191	110	339
December 12	2	18	.....	20
December 13	210	1,302	17	1,529
December 14	.....	5	.....	5
December 15	1	.....	.....	1
	251	1,516	127	1,894

G. M. SORRELL,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Headquarters First Army Corps, December 20, 1862.

Much credit is due Major-General McLaws for his untiring zeal and ability in preparing his troops and his position, for a successful resistance, and the ability with which he handled his troops after the attack. I would also mention, as particularly distinguished in the engagement of the thirteenth, Brigadier-Generals Ransom, Kershaw, and Cooke, (severely wounded,) and Colonel McMillan, who succeeded to the command of Cobb's brigade, and Colonel Walton, (Washington Artillery,) and Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander, (reserve artillery.)

Brigadier-General Barksdale, with his brigade, held the enemy's entire army at the river bank for sixteen hours, giving us abundance of time to complete our arrangements for battle. A more gallant and worthy service is rarely accomplished by so small a force.

I refer you to the reports of these officers for more detailed accounts of the engagements. I desire to call the attention of the Government to the gallant officers and men mentioned in their reports.

Major-Generals Anderson, Pickett, and Hood, with their gallant divisions, were deprived of their opportunity by the unexpected and hasty retreat of the enemy. A portion of General Anderson's command was engaged in defending the passage of the river; a portion of General Hood's in driving back the attack against our right, and a portion of Pickett's did important service near the Marye Hill. I refer you to their reports for particular accounts.

Major Garnett held three batteries in reserve, in the valley between the positions of Generals Pickett and Hood, and was much disappointed not to have the opportunity to use them.

My staff officers, Major Sorrell, Lieutenant-Colonel Manning, Major Fairfax, Captain Latrobe, Captain Goree, and Lieutenant Blackwell, gave me their usual intelligent, willing aid. Major Haskell, Captain Young, and Captain Rodgers, volunteered their assistance, and rendered important services.

My thanks are also due to Surgeon Cullen, chief surgeon; Major Mitchell, chief quartermaster; Major Moses, chief of the subsistence department, and Captain Manning, signal officer, for valuable services in their respective departments.

I have the honor to be, General,

Most respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

JAMES LONGSTREET,

Lieutenant-General commanding.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JACKSON.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS,
ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA, January 31, 1863.

Brigadier-General R. H. Chilton, Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General, A. N. V.:

GENERAL: I have the honor herewith to submit to you a report of the operations of my corps in the battle of Fredericksburg, on Saturday, the thirteenth of December last.

In pursuance of orders, Major-General A. P. Hill moved his division at dawn on the morn of the twelfth, from his encampment near Yerb and relieved Major-General Hood, then pos near Hamilton's Crossing. At the same t Brigadier-General Taliaferro, then in comm of Jackson's division, moved from his enca ment above Guineas Depot, and took positio rear of Major-General A. P. Hill.

Early on the morning of the thirteenth, Ew division, under Brigadier-General J. A. E and Major-General D. H. Hill, with his divi arrived, after a severe night's march, from t respective encampments, in the vicinity of B ner's Neck and Port Royal—the troop Major-General D. H. Hill being from fifte eighteen miles distant from the point to w they were ordered. On the morning of tha the troops were arranged as follows: M General A. P. Hill occupied the front line, fo of two regiments of Field's brigade, comma by Colonel Brockenbrough, and the brigad Archer, Lane, and Pender, (posted from rig left in the order named,) his right resting c road leading from Hamilton's Crossing t Port Royal road, and his left extending to a short distance of Deep Run. These t were partially concealed by the wood, ne edge of which they were posted. The rem of Brockenbrough's command, consisting fortieth and fifty-fifth Virginia, was imme in rear of Walker's batteries, and acting support to them. Of the other two bri Gregg's and Thomas's, of the same divisic first was in rear of the interval between and Lane, and the second in rear of the i between Lane and Pender. The divisions Generals Early and Taliaferro formed the line—Early being on the right, the d of Major-General D. H. Hill, which w farther in rear, consituting the reserve. the eminence immediately to the right, L ant-Colonel Walker (Major-General A. P chief of artillery) had in position fourtee composed of the batteries of Pegram and tosh, with sections from the batteries of Cr Latham, and Johnson, commanded resp by Lieutenants Ellett, Potts, and Clutter. left of the line, and near the Bernard cabi posted twenty-one guns of the batteries tains Davidson, Raine, Caskie, and Bra under the immediate direction of Cap vidson. To the right, and some two yards in front of these, and beyond the were posted twelve guns, from the bat Captains Carpenter, Wooding, and under the direction of Captain Brocke General Taliaferro's chief of artillery; ter's battery, commanded by Lieutenant dree, and Braxton's, by Lieutenant Ma my left was Major-General Hood, of Lo corps, and on my right and front, the under command of Major-General Stua battery, near the Port Royal road, u direction of Major Pelham, of the Stu artillery, aided, in the course of the da tions from the batteries of Captain

(Lieutenant Graham commanding,) Captains Wilson, Smith, Garber, Dance, and the Louisiana Guards of my corps, thrown into position so as to cross their fire with the guns of Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, and designed to check the advance of the enemy in that direction. About ten o'clock, as the fog disappeared, the lines of the enemy, arranged in order of battle, were distinctly visible in the plain between us and the river, covering my front and extending far to the left toward Fredericksburg. The force in front of me I supposed to number about fifty-five thousand. Pelham, with part of the Stuart horse artillery, was soon engaged with the artillery of the enemy, and a brisk and an animated contest was kept up for about an hour. Soon after Pelham, in obedience to orders, had withdrawn from his position on the Port Royal road, the enemy directed his artillery on the heights held by Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, and upon the woods generally, occupied by our troops, evidently with a view of causing us to disclose whatever troops or artillery were there. Not eliciting any response, the enemy was seemingly satisfied that he would experience but little resistance to an effort to obtain possession of this hill. Accordingly, about eleven o'clock, he advanced by the flank, parallel to the Port Royal road, nearly to the road running from thence to Hamilton's Crossing, now unimpeded in his march, as Pelham was withdrawn. Facing to the front, he advanced in line of battle across the plain straight upon the position occupied by Walker. His batteries reserved their fire until the enemy's lines came within less than eight hundred yards, when the fourteen guns opened, pouring such a storm of shot and shell into his ranks as to cause him first to halt, then to waver, and, at last, seek shelter by flight. About one o'clock, the main attack was made by heavy and rapid discharges of artillery. Under the protection of this warm and well-directed fire, his infantry, in heavy force, advanced, seeking the partial protection of a piece of wood extending beyond the railroad. The batteries on the right played on their ranks with destructive effect. The advancing force was visibly staggered by our rapid and well-directed artillery; but, soon recovering from the shock, the Federal troops, consisting of the main body of Franklin's grand division, supported by a portion of Hooker's grand division, continued to press forward. Advancing within point blank range of our infantry, and thus exposed to the murderous fire of musketry and artillery, the struggle became fierce and sanguinary. They continued, however, still to press forward, and, before General A. P. Hill closed the interval which he had left between Archer and Lane, it was penetrated, and, the enemy pressing forward in overwhelming numbers through that interval, turned Lane's right and Archer's left. Thus attacked in front and rear, the Fourteenth Tennessee and Nineteenth Georgia, of Archer's brigade, and the entire brigade of Lane, fell back; but not until after a brave and obstinate resistance. Notwithstanding the perilous situation in which Archer's brigade was placed, his right, changing front, continued to struggle with undaunted firmness, materially checking the advance of the enemy until reënforcements came to its support. The brigade of General Thomas, posted as before stated, moved gallantly forward, and joined by the Seventh and part of the Eighteenth North Carolina, of Lane's brigade, gallantly drove back a Federal column which had broken through Lane's line. In the mean time, a large force of the enemy penetrated the wood in rear of the position occupied by the brigades of Lane and Archer, and came in contact with Gregg's brigade. Taken by surprise, Orr's rifles were thrown into confusion. It was in the act of rallying this regiment that Brigadier-General Maxey Gregg fell, in front of the rifles, mortally wounded. General Gregg was a brave and accomplished officer, full of heroic sentiment and chivalrous honor. He had rendered valuable service in this great struggle for our freedom, and the country has much reason to deplore the loss sustained by his premature death. Colonel Hamilton, upon whom the command of that brigade now devolved, hastened to meet the emergencies of his position, and, with the four remaining regiments and one company of the Orr rifles, (Lieutenant Charles,) gave the enemy a warm reception.

The enemy was not long permitted to hold the advantage which he had thus gained. The second line came promptly to the support of the first. Lawton's brigade, commanded by Colonel Atkinson, subsequently by Colonel Evans, Trimble's brigade, commanded by Colonel R. F. Hoke, and Early's brigade, commanded by Colonel Walker, (all under the command of Brigadier-General Early,) and the Forty-seventh and Twenty-second Virginia regiments of Colonel Brockenbrough's command, were already rushing with impetuous valor to the support of the first line. In Taliaferro's command, his right regiment, the Second, Virginia, of Paxton's brigade, became engaged with part of the enemy, which, after a slight resistance, retreated. The combat in the wood was brief and decisive. The farther advance of the enemy was checked. He was driven with great slaughter from the wood to the railroad; the two regiments of Breckenbrough's command, Archer, with the First Tennessee and Fifth Alabama battalion, and the three brigades commanded by Colonels Hoke, Walker, and Atkinson, pursuing the retreating Federals to the railroad, where they made a brief stand, when Hoke and Atkinson charged upon them with impetuosity, destroying many in the charge, and taking a large number of prisoners. Nor did they stop there; but, impelled by an ardor which reflects the highest credit on their courage and patriotism, this comparatively small force pressed the discomfited foe in hot pursuit, until they appeared so far within range of his artillery and the fire of a large force of his infantry, as to make farther pursuit an act of rashness. In this gallant charge, Colonel Atkinson was severely wounded, and fell into the hands of the enemy. Captain E. P. Lawton, assistant adjutant-general

of the brigade, though injured during the advance by the fall of his horse, continued to press forward on foot, heroically encouraging the brigade, until he fell mortally wounded.

During the day, some of the guns under Colonel Walker, becoming short of men and ammunition, and otherwise disabled from further service, were relieved by Captain Poague's battery with two twenty-pound Parrotts. These two pieces actively engaged the enemy's artillery, and afterward opened on the infantry. The exact range of the hill having been accurately obtained by much previous firing, the loss at this point was heavy. It is due to Captain Poague here to state, that when, late on the evening previous, he received orders to move his battery, he was distant some sixteen miles from the battle-field, and the promptitude with which he responded to the order, by a fatiguing night's march, is worthy of notice. Some guns of Major-General D. H. Hill's division were put in at this time on our right, under the direction of his chief of artillery, Major T. H. Carter, which were all well served. Later in the evening, Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman brought up two howitzers, from Captain Dance's battery, and placed them on the left of Captain Poague's guns. About this time Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman was severely wounded. On the extreme right, beyond the Massaponax, was a Whitworth gun, under the command of Captain Hardaway, of Major-General D. H. Hill's division, which was well served.

On the extreme left, the day did not pass without some incidents worthy of notice. Early in the day, the enemy opened upon the left with sixteen guns, afterward increased to twenty-four. The officers in command obeyed their orders, and, reserving their fire, the enemy advanced his skirmishers in heavy line upon the points occupied by the commands of Captains Davidson and Brockenbrough. They were soon driven off by canister; but the position of these batteries being thus disclosed to the enemy, a heavy artillery fire was directed upon them, which was replied to with animation and spirit. The ammunition of Captain Raine's battery proving defective, it was withdrawn, and Captain Latimer (acting chief of artillery of Ewell's division) was ordered to take a position still farther to the front and left. These last pieces were admirably served, and though suffering severely from skirmishers and sharpshooters, drove them back, and, by the accuracy and rapidity of their fire, inflicted a severe loss upon the enemy. As the Federal infantry pressed forward upon our front, it was deemed advisable to withdraw the batteries of Captain Brockenbrough, placed in advance of the railroad, before the enemy should seize the point of woods to their right and rear, which they a short time afterward penetrated — the withdrawal of the batteries being covered by Lieutenant-Colonel Hill, of the Seventh North Carolina. The brigade of General Pender was immediately in rear of the batteries of Captains Davidson and Latimer, and was without any protection from the enemy's artillery; and thus, notwithstanding the efficacy of the batteries acting in conjunction with Major Cole, of the Twenty-second North Carolina, in dispersing the cloud of skirmishers and sharpshooters that hung all day upon that part of the line, that brigade received much of the fire that was directed at these guns, and suffered severely. General Pender was himself wounded. The Sixteenth North Carolina, Colonel McElroy, which had been thrown out as a support to Latimer's battery, became warmly engaged with a brigade of the enemy, which had advanced up Deep Run, under cover, and, acting with two other North Carolina regiments, (the Fifty-fourth and Fifty-seventh,) of Law's brigade, Hood's division drove them back. Repulsed on the right, left, and centre, the enemy soon after reformed his lines, and gave some indications of a purpose to renew the attack. I waited some time to receive it, but he making no forward movement, I determined, if prudent, to do so myself. The artillery of the enemy was so judiciously posted as to make an advance of our troops across the plain very hazardous; yet it was so promising of good results, if successfully executed, as to induce me to make preparations for the attempt. In order to guard against disaster, the infantry was to be preceded by artillery, and the movement postponed until late in the evening, so that if compelled to retire, it would be under the cover of night. Owing to unexpected delay, the movement could not be gotten ready until late in the evening. The first gun had hardly moved forward from the wood a hundred yards, when the enemy's artillery re-opened, and so completely swept our front, as to satisfy me that the proposed movement should be abandoned.

The next day (fourteenth) the divisions under the command of Brigadier-Generals Early and Taliaferro formed the first line, that of Major-General D. H. Hill the second, and the division of Major-General A. P. Hill the reserve. The enemy continued in our front all day, apparently awaiting an attack from us. During the night, our lines were again changed so as to place the division of Major-General D. H. Hill in the front line, Major-General A. P. Hill in the second, and the divisions commanded by Brigadier-Generals Early and Taliaferro in the reserve.

On the fifteenth the enemy still remained in our front, and, in the evening of that day, sent in a flag of truce requesting a cessation of hostilities between his left and our right wing, for the purpose of removing his wounded from the field, which, under previous instructions from the commanding General, was granted. Our troops patiently remained in position on that, as they had done the previous day, eagerly awaiting another attack from the enemy; and such was the desire to occupy the front line, when such an attack should be made, that the division of Major-General D. H. Hill sent in a written request to be permitted to remain in the front line until next day. But our brave troops were disappointed in the expectation of another attack. For whilst they patiently waited during the night of the

enemy's artillery; [illegible]

MAJ. GEN. J. A. GARFIELD.

fifteenth, in the hope of another encounter on the following day, and of visiting upon the invaders of their sacred homes and firesides a just retribution for the outrages of this most unprovoked and unchristian war, the enemy hurriedly and silently, during that night, made good his retreat by recrossing the river.

For further details of the operations of my corps in the battle, I respectfully refer you to the reports of the division, brigade, and regimental commanders, who participated in the engagement; also to the reports of Colonel Crutchfield, my chief of artillery, Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, Colonel Brown, of the reserve artillery, and Captain Latimer, detailing the operations of the artillery. I refer you also to the same source of information for the names of many officers who distinguished themselves in this battle, and, by their good conduct, specially merit the approbation of the Government and of the country.

I herewith forward to you a list of the casualties of this corps on the thirteenth December, from which it will appear that twenty-six officers were killed, and one hundred and ninety-five wounded; three hundred and eighteen enlisted men killed, and two thousand three hundred and fifty wounded; eighteen officers and five hundred and eight enlisted men missing; making a total loss in this corps of three thousand four hundred and fifteen. Nearly all who are reported as missing were taken prisoners in the fight. By the official report of Major Bridgford, provost marshal of the corps, herewith submitted, it appears that we captured five hundred and twenty-one prisoners, of whom eleven were officers. The report of Major Bridgford exhibits a gratifying statement of the small number who straggled from the ranks during the last action, and affords further evidence of the improving discipline and spirit of the army.

The report of Major Bier, my chief of ordnance, shows that we captured four thousand four hundred and forty-six small arms.

My medical director, Dr. Hunter McGuire, gave special and skilful attention to the wounded.

Major J. A. Harman, chief quartermaster, Major W. J. Hawks, chief commissary, and Major G. H. Bier, chief of ordnance, discharged their duties well.

During the action, I received valuable assistance in transmitting orders, and discharging other duties, from the following members of my staff:

Colonel S. Crutchfield, chief of artillery.

Colonel A. Smeade, inspector-general.

Captain A. S. Pendleton, assistant adjutant-general.

Captain J. K. Boswell, chief of engineers.

First Lieutenant J. G. Morrison, aid-de-camp.

First Lieutenant J. P. Smith, aid-de-camp.

Second Lieutenant W. Williamson, engineer department.

I trust that the victory of Fredericksburg, with which God has blessed our cause, will continue to be gratefully remembered.

I am, General, your obedient servant,

T. J. JACKSON,
Lieutenant-General.

List of Casualties in Second Army Corps, Army Northern Virginia, in the Battles before Fredericksburg, December, 1862:—

DIVISION.	BRIGADE.	REGIMENT.	KILL'D.	WOUNDED.	TOTAL.
A. P. Hill's	Field's	27th Virginia	7	38	45
"	"	2d Virginia Battalion	2	25	27
"	"	35th Virginia	1	10	11
"	Gregg's	1st South Carolina	15	58	73
"	"	12th South Carolina	1	7	8
"	"	13th South Carolina	3	52	55
"	"	14th South Carolina	....	28	28
"	"	Orr's Rifles	21	149	170
"	Thomas's	14th Georgia	22	110	132
"	"	35th Georgia	7	82	89
"	"	45th Georgia	5	43	48
"	"	49th Georgia	8	53	61
"	Lane's	7th North Carolina	5	81	86
"	"	28th North Carolina	16	49	65
"	"	37th North Carolina	17	76	93
"	"	18th North Carolina	13	77	90
"	"	33d North Carolina	9	32	41
"	Archer's	7th Tennessee	5	33	38
"	"	1st Tennessee	5	52	57
"	"	14th Tennessee	4	55	59
"	"	19th Georgia	15	39	54
"	"	5th Alabama Battalion	3	18	21
"	Pender's	16th North Carolina	6	48	54
"	"	34th North Carolina	2	17	19
"	"	13th North Carolina	7	30	37
"	"	22d North Carolina	1	44	45
"	"	38th North Carolina	....	14	14
"	Artillery	Seven Batteries	11	88	99
			211	1,408	1,619

List of Casualties in Second Corps — Continued.

Division.	Brigade.	Regiment.	Kill'd.	Wounded.	Total
D. H. Hill's	Rodes's	5th Alabama	....	1	1
"	"	6th Alabama	1	7	8
"	"	26th Alabama	....	4	4
"	"	3d Alabama	1	2	3
"	Iverson's	20th North Carolina	....	3	3
"	"	23d North Carolina	....	1	1
"	"	12th North Carolina	....	5	5
"	"	5th North Carolina	1	3	4
"	Ripley's	4th Georgia	1	6	7
"	"	1st North Carolina	....	15	15
"	"	3d North Carolina	....	3	3
"	"	44th Georgia	1	1	2
"	Colquitt's	6th Georgia	....	3	3
"	"	23d Georgia	....	2	2
"	"	27th Georgia	....	2	2
"	"	28th Georgia	....	8	8
"	Anderson's	2d North Carolina	4	17	21
"	"	4th North Carolina	4	21	25
"	"	30th North Carolina	....	9	9
"	"	14th North Carolina	....	4	4
"	Artillery	Jeff Davis Artillery	1	3	4
"	"	Page's Battery	2	3	5
"	"	Fry's Battery	1	2	3
"	Colonel Brown's	Artillery Regiment	9	21	30
			26	146	172
Ewell's	Hays's	9th Louisiana	5	7	12
"	"	8th Louisiana	....	6	6
"	"	7th Louisiana	....	7	7
"	"	6th Louisiana	....	12	12
"	"	5th Louisiana	....	8	8
"	"	Louisiana Guard Artillery	1	1	2
"	"	Carrington's Battery	....	1	1
"	Trimble's	21st North Carolina	....	24	24
"	"	21st Georgia	3	24	27
"	"	15th Alabama	1	34	35
"	"	12th Georgia	4	16	20
"	Early's	13th Virginia	3	19	22
"	"	25th Virginia	1	13	14
"	"	31st Virginia	2	14	16
"	"	44th Virginia	2	13	15
"	"	49th Virginia	6	46	52
"	"	52d Virginia	....	13	13
"	"	58th Virginia	3	6	9
"	Lawton's	31st Georgia	15	63	78
"	"	61st Georgia	17	83	100
"	"	60th Georgia	6	72	78
"	"	13th Georgia	2	12	14
"	"	26th Georgia	5	48	53
"	"	38th Georgia	10	91	101
			86	633	719
Taliaferro's	Paxton's	2d Virginia	2	19	21
"	"	5th Virginia	....	11	11
"	"	4th Virginia	....	12	12
"	"	Carpenter's Battery	1	25	26
"	Jones'	21st Virginia	....	4	4
"	"	42d Virginia	1	25	26
"	"	48th Virginia	....	7	7
"	"	Raine's Battery	....	1	1
"	"	Caskie's Battery	....	3	3
"	3d, Col. Warren	48th Alabama	....	5	5
"	"	23d Virginia	....	1	1
"	"	37th Virginia	....	3	3
"	"	Wooding's Battery	....	13	13
"	4th, Col. Pendleton	1st Louisiana	....	8	8
"	"	2d Louisiana	....	7	7
"	"	10th Louisiana	....	7	7
"	"	14th Louisiana	....	5	5
"	"	15th Louisiana	1	4	5
"	"	Lusk's Battery	....	7	7
			5	167	172

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL R. H. ANDERSON.

HEADQUARTERS ANDERSON'S DIVISION,
NEAR FREDERICKSBURG, VA., January 3, 1863.

To Major G. Moxley Sorrel, A. A. General, Headquarters First Army Corps:

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my division, in the battle of Fredericksburg:

Upon the signal being given, on the morning of the eleventh of December, the troops were placed rapidly in position, in rear of the line of field works and batteries, extending from Hazel Run, on the right, to the Waterworks dam on the left, in the following order: Featherston's, Perry's, Mahone's, Wright's, and Wilcox's brigades.

In the afternoon of the eleventh, Ransom's division having been placed between Hazel Run and the plank road, Featherston's brigade was moved to the left of that road. About dark General Ransom recrossed Hazel Run and Featherston was replaced in his former position.

Detachments of one regiment from each brigade were thrown in front of the batteries, and strong pickets were pushed forward toward the town and along the canal.

Early on the twelfth, General Ransom resumed his former place behind Hazel Run and the plank road, and Featherston's brigade was again drawn to the left of the road. This position of the brigades, in the order above mentioned, was maintained until Thursday the seventeenth of December, when the division was withdrawn, and the troops returned to their camps. Previous to the commencement of the engagement there were two regiments, the Third Georgia and Eighth Florida, of Wright's and Perry's brigades, on duty in and near Fredericksburg. These regiments had been placed under the orders of Brigadier-General Barksdale, commanding in the town, and were engaged with the enemy when he was laying his bridges, and preparing to cross the river. The Third Georgia met with but very slight loss. The Eighth Florida suffered a loss of eighty-seven killed, wounded, and missing. The missing (43) were undoubtedly captured. The detachments and pickets which were advanced the first night in front of the batteries and along the canal, continued to occupy their posts, and they suffered some loss.

The whole loss of the division was one hundred and fifty-eight killed, wounded, and missing. The commanders of batteries, Captains Marion, Huger, and Lewis, and Lieutenant Peet, commanding Grandy's battery, merit especial notice for their skill, courage, and good management throughout the five days. Their batteries were subjected to a very heavy fire from those of the enemy. None of their shot, however, were spent in an artillery duel, but were reserved for those opportunities which the advancing and retiring columns of the enemy gave them.

It gives me pleasure to say that the most commendable spirit was exhibited by the officers and soldiers of the whole division. Their patient endurance of the exposure to which they were subjected, gave assurance of good conduct and gallant deeds, had an opportunity been presented. Featherston's and Perry's brigades lay four days and nights in an open field without shelter and without fire. It is due to Brigadier-General Mahone to say that he discovered and pointed out the important position for a battery, which enfiladed the slope upon which the enemy formed his battalions before and after his attacks upon Marye's Hill, and that he rendered very efficient service, assisting in the construction of the battery which drove them from that place of shelter. I beg leave to mention also Brigadier-General Cadmus M. Wilcox, and to ask attention to his long-continued and uniformly meritorious conduct in his present grade. I have witnessed his courage, zeal and ability, and have received most efficient coöperation from him, in the battles of Williamsburg, Seven Pines, Gaines's Mill, Frazier's Farm, Second Manassas and Fredericksburg. I earnestly recommend his promotion. Mr. Jett, an engineer attached to my division, rendered good service in the erection of field works, making and repairing roads, digging rifle-pits and trenches, and such like work. The reports of the commanders of brigades are herewith submitted.

I am, very respectfully,
Your most obedient servant,
R. H. ANDERSON,
Major-General, commanding Division.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL McLAWS.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION,
CAMP NEAR FREDERICKSBURG, December 30, 1862.

Major Sorrel, Adjutant-General:

MAJOR: My division occupied the front line of defence from Hazel River along the ridge of hills to the right and through the point of woods extending into Mr. Alfred Bernard's field, one brigade being in reserve. The brigades on the right had an extended rifle-pit at the foot of the main ridge from the left of the Telegraph road to a private road near Mr. Howison's barn. The next brigade had rifle-pits along the foot of the hills in front of its position, and others on the crests of the hills. The right brigade constructed rifle-pits and breastworks of logs, through the woods, with abatis in front of them. The crests of the hills were occupied by the batteries of Captain Read, one ten-pounder Parrott, one twelve-pounder howitzer, one three-inch rifle; Captain Manly's battery, one three-inch rifle, two twelve-pounder howitzers; Captain Ells, one thirty-pounder Parrott; Captain Macon, two ten-pounder Parrott's and two six-pounders; Cooper's, three ten-pounder Parrott's; Carlton's, two ten-pounder Parrott's; Eubank's, one three-inch rifle; McCarthy's, two three-inch rifles; Dearing, one ten-pounder Parrott; Ross, three ten-pounder Parrott's; and, in addition, there were a number of smooth-bore pieces placed along the hills, to be used should the enemy advance near enough for their effectual range. One brigade was constantly on duty in the city to guard the town and defend the river crossings

as far down as one fourth of a mile below Deep Run Creek. Two regiments from General Anderson's division picketed the river bank above the town, reporting to the Brigadier-General in charge of the brigade on duty in the city. The orders were, that two guns should be fired from one of my batteries in a central position, which would be the signal that the enemy was attempting to cross. These were the positions of my command and the orders governing them up to the tenth instant. On that day, the brigade of General Barksdale, composed of Mississippi troops, was on duty in the city. About two o'clock A. M., on the eleventh, General Barksdale sent me word that the movements of the enemy indicated they were preparing to lay down their pontoon bridges, and his men were getting into position to defend the crossing. About half past four he notified me that the bridges were being placed, and he would open fire so soon as the working parties came in good range of his rifles. I gave the order, and the signal guns were fired about five o'clock A. M. I had been notified from your headquarters the evening previous (the tenth instant) to have all the batteries harnessed up at daylight on the eleventh instant, and I had given orders that my whole command should be under arms at the same time. General Barksdale kept his men quiet and concealed until the bridges were so advanced that the working parties were in easy range, when he opened fire with such effect that the bridges were abandoned at once. Nine separate and desperate attempts were made to complete the bridges, under fire of their sharpshooters and guns on the opposite banks; but every attempt being attended with such severe loss, from our men posted in rifle-pits, in the cellars of houses along the banks, and from behind whatever offered concealment, that the enemy abandoned his attempts for the time, and opened a terrific fire from their numerous batteries constructed along the hills just above the river. The fire was so severe that the men could not use their rifles, and the different places occupied by them becoming untenable, the troops were withdrawn from the river bank back to Caroline Street, at half past four o'clock P. M. The enemy then crossed in boats, and, completing their bridges, passed over in force and advanced into the town. The Seventeenth Mississippi (Colonel Fizer) and ten sharpshooters from Colonel Carter's regiment, (the Thirteenth,) and three companies of the Eighteenth Mississippi regiment, (Lieutenant-Colonel Luse,) under Lieutenant Radliff, were all the troops that were actually engaged in defending the crossings in front of the city. More troops were offered; but the positions were such that but the number already there could be employed. As the enemy advanced into the town our troops fell back to Princess Ann Street, and, as the enemy came up, they were driven back with loss. This street fighting continued until seven P. M., when I ordered General Barksdale to fall back and take position along and behind the stone wall below Marye's Hill, where it was relieved by the brigade of Brigadier-General Thomas R. R. Cobb, and retired to their position on the right of my line of defence in the woods of Mr. Barnard. Lieutenant-Colonel Luse, with his regiment, (the Eighteenth Mississippi,) who occupied the river bank below the town, drove back the enemy in their first attempt to cross the river, and kept them in check until about half past three o'clock P. M., when two regiments, the Sixteenth Georgia (Colonel Bryan) and Fifteenth South Carolina, (Colonel DeSaussure,) were sent to his support; and it being then deemed advisable the whole force was withdrawn to the river road, where they remained until daylight the next day, when they rejoined their brigades, excepting the Sixteenth Georgia, which retook its position in the general line of defence. These regiments performed their duties under a severe and destructive fire from the enemy's guns, posted along the hills just above the river on the opposite side. Early on the morning of the eleventh, a battalion of the Eighth Florida regiment, numbering about one hundred and fifty men, was put in position to the left of Colonel Fizer, and in easy range of the enemy above the upper bridge, then being rapidly constructed by them. This battalion was commanded by Captain Long, and, while under his direction, it acted gallantly and did good service — Captain Long proving himself a gallant and efficient officer; but he was severely wounded about eleven o'clock A. M., and the battalion then rendered but little assistance. I call your attention to the special report of Lieutenant-Colonel Fizer on the subject, and to Captain Govan, in relation to the conduct of three companies of the same regiment, which were on duty with the right of Colonel Fizer's regiment, and also to the indorsement of Colonel Humphries, on the special report of Captain Govan. The brigade of General Barksdale, I consider, did their whole duty, and in a manner highly creditable to every officer and man engaged in the fight. An examination of the positions they held shows that no troops could have behaved more gallantly.

On the night of the eleventh instant, the Eighteenth and Twenty-fourth Georgia regiments, and Philips's Georgia Legion, of Cobb's brigade, relieved General Barksdale's command behind the stone wall at the foot of Marye's Hill, Philips's Legion on the left, the Twenty-fourth Georgia in the centre, and Eighteenth Georgia regiment on the right, occupying the entire front under the hill. During that night, the scouts took fifteen prisoners. On the twelfth inst., close and heavy skirmishing was kept up, but no real attack was made. On the thirteenth, skirmishing commenced at early dawn, the enemy shelling in that direction until about eleven o'clock, when the advance of the enemy drove in our pickets, and his column approached the left of the line by the Telegraph road, and deployed to our right, planting three stands of colors along our front; before their deployment was completed, our fire had so thinned their ranks that the survivors retreated, leaving their colors planted in the first position. Soon another column, heavier than the first, advanced to the colors, but were driven back with great slaughter. They were met, on retiring, by

reënforcements, and advanced again; but were again repulsed with increased loss.

About one o'clock P. M., General Kershaw was directed to send two regiments from his brigade to the support of General Cobb, who reported that he was getting short of ammunition. The Sixteenth Georgia regiment was sent forward at the same time. Not long after this, General Kershaw was directed to take his whole brigade. Just as his command was moving, he was ordered to hasten forward in person, and assume command of the position under Marye's Hill, as General Cobb had been wounded and disabled. The South Carolina regiments were posted, the Second and Eighth (Colonel Kennedy and Captain Stockburn commanding) in the road, doubling on Philips's Legion, (Colonel Cook,) and the Twenty-fourth Georgia, (Colonel McMillan,) the Third and Seventh South Carolina (Colonel Nance and Lieutenant-Colonel Bland) on the hill to the left of Marye's house; the Seventh was afterward moved (on a call from the Fifteenth North Carolina regiment for reënforcement) to the right and front of Marye's house, the three left companies being on the left of the house, the Fifteenth South Carolina (Colonel DeSaussure) in reserve at the cemetery; the Third battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Rice) was posted at Howison's mill to resist any attack that might have been made up Hazel Run. The Eighth and Seventh regiments arrived in time to assist in repelling a heavy assault made on the left at quarter to three P. M. The Third and Seventh regiments suffered severely while getting into position, especially the former. Colonel Nance, Lieutenant-Colonel Rutherford, Major Moffit, Captains Todd, Summers, and Nance, were shot down in succession, Captain Summers killed, the others more or less dangerously wounded, leaving the regiment under the command of Captain John K. G. Nance, assisted by Lieutenant Doby, aid-de-camp of General Kershaw. Colonel Nance, although badly wounded, declined being removed at the time, and continued to encourage and direct his men, and, after he was removed back to Marye's house, ordered that his regiment take a new position, where the men would be less exposed, and sent directions to have them re-supplied with ammunition. In the mean time, the enemy deployed in a ravine, which was between us and the city, and distant about three or four hundred yards from the stone wall, and advanced with fresh columns to the attack, at intervals of not more than fifteen minutes; but they were repulsed with ease, and driven back with much loss, on every occasion. This continued until about half past four P. M., when the enemy ceased in their assaults for a time, and posting some artillery in front of the town on the left of the telegraph road, opened on our position, doing but little damage. The batteries of Colonel Walton, on Marye's Hill, were at this time silent, having exhausted their ammunition, and they were being relieved by others from Colonel Alexander's battalion. Taking advantage of the hill, the Fifteenth South Carolina (Colonel De Saussure) was brought forward from the cemetery, and posted behind the stone wall, supporting the Second South Carolina regiment. The enemy, in the mean while, formed a strong column of attack, and advanced under cover of their own artillery, and, no longer impeded by ours, came forward along our whole front, in the most determined manner; but they were repulsed at all points. The firing ceased as night came on, and about seven o'clock our pickets and those of the enemy were posted within a short distance of each other.

About six P. M., the Third South Carolina regiment was brought from the hill, and posted on the left of Philips's Georgia legion, where it was relieved by General Kemper, with a portion of his brigade, about seven P. M., and was then ordered in reserve by General Kershaw, because of its previous heavy loss.

The body of one man, believed to be an officer, was found within about thirty yards of the stone wall, and other single bodies were scattered at increased distances, until the main mass of the dead lay thickly strewn over the ground at something over one hundred yards off, and extending to the ravine, commencing at the point where our men would allow the enemy's column to approach before opening fire, and beyond which no organized body of men was able to pass.

On the fourteenth, the enemy were in position behind the declivities in front, but the operations on both sides were confined to skirmishing of sharpshooters.

On the fifteenth it was discovered that the enemy had constructed rifle-pits on the edge of the ravine; but nothing of interest occurred during the day. Cobb's brigade was relieved by that of General Semmes on the night of that day, against the wishes, however, of Colonel McMillan, commanding Cobb's brigade, who objected to relinquishing such an honorable position. On the sixteenth, Tuesday morning, as the fog lifted, it was discovered that the enemy's pickets were withdrawn, and scouts, being sent out, reported that the enemy had retired across the river, removing their bridges. The town was re-occupied by two regiments from Kershaw's brigade, and a number of prisoners, arms, &c., were taken.

Captain Cuthbert, of the Second South Carolina regiment, with his company of sharpshooters, was thrown out on the edge of Hazel Run, and did good service in annoying the flank of the enemy as their columns advanced to the attack. His loss was considerable.

When General Kershaw's brigade was sent to the front, its place along the main line of defence was occupied by the brigade of Brigadier-General Jenkins, a regiment from which occupied the right flank of the troops at the foot of Marye's Hill, along Hazel Run, and was of essential service.

The Lieutenant-General was, however, overlooking the movements of all, and every order was issued under his supervision. The presence of himself and the General-in-Chief inspired the troops and rendered them invincible. The very great enthusiasm and ardent desire for the enemy

to advance which existed and was evident among all, officers and men, could not be surpassed. And, when it was discovered, on the sixteenth, that the enemy had retired, there was an universal expression of disappointment.

The artillery along the heights, under the supervision of Colonel H. C. Cabell, chief of artillery, and his subordinate, Major Hamilton, opened fire on the enemy's left flank whenever the column advanced, with such effect as to always force them to retire in disorder, or to incline to their right under shelter of ravines and rising ground, forced one of the enemy's batteries to retire, which had come forward on the right, and was of material assistance in checking the advance of their troops, which were threatening the centre. I refer you to the special report of Colonel Cabell in reference to the operations of the artillery.

The country and the army have to mourn the loss of Brigadier-General Thomas R. R. Cobb, who fell while in position with his brigade, and was borne from the field while his men were repulsing the first assaults of the enemy. He had but lately been promoted to a brigade, and his devotion to his duties, his aptitude for the profession of arms, and his control over his men, I have never seen surpassed. Our country has lost a pure and able defender of her rights, both in the council and the field.

My Aid-de-camp, Captain H. L. King, was killed on Marye's Hill, pierced with five balls, while conveying an order to Brigadier-General Cobb. He was a brave and accomplished officer and gentleman, and had already distinguished himself during the operations in front of Fredericksburg, as he had done in all the other engagements when on duty.

Lieutenant T. S. B. Tucker, my other Aid-de-camp, was badly wounded, while bearing one of my orders. He has always been noted for his daring and gallantry.

The services of my Adjutant-General, Major James M. Goggin, were important and distinguished, as they have been always.

My thanks are due to the other members of my staff, Major McLaws and Major Edwards, for their assistance; to Lieutenant Edwards, ordnance officer, who was active and efficient in supplying ammunition to the troops; and to Lieutenant Campbell, of the engineers, who had been engaged day and night, frequently all night, in strengthening the different positions, and on all occasions was very devoted and prompt in the discharge of his duties.

Colonel McMillan, of the Twenty-fourth Georgia, who succeeded to the command of the brigade when General Cobb was disabled, during the first assaults of the enemy on Marye's Hill, behaved with distinguished gallantry and coolness.

General Barksdale commanded his fine brigade as it should have been commanded, and added new laurels to those gained on every other previous battle-field.

I call attention to the conduct of General Kershaw, who, after the fall of General Cobb, commanded the troops about Marye's Hill, composed of his own brigade and that of General Cobb. He possesses military talents of a high order, and unites with them that self-possession and daring gallantry which endears him to his command, and inspires a confidence which but increases as the danger grows more imminent.

My Inspector-General, Major Costin, was particularly active and distinguished in leading troops into position and carrying orders, frequently under the hottest fire, and for his close attention to all his duties.

The brigade of General Semmes was not actually engaged; but, under his supervision, the position he commanded was strongly fortified, and his men were well prepared and eager for the fight under his leadership.

Surgeon Gilmon, chief surgeon of the division, had his field hospital in readiness, and his arrangements were so complete that there was no detention or unnecessary suffering of the wounded, and those who could not remain in camp were sent at once to the hospitals in Richmond.

The loss of killed, wounded and missing, in my command, was as follows: —

Command.	Killed.	Wound'd.	Missing.	Total.	Remarks.
Kershaw's Brigade	39	333	1	373	One missing, supposed to have been killed while the regiment was on picket.
Barksdale's Brigade	29	151	62	242	
Cobb's Brigade	32	198	4	234	
Semmes' Brigade	...	4	...	4	
Grand total	100	686	67	853	

I enclose reports of the several brigade commanders, with those of their respective regimental and battalion commanders, excepting General Barksdale, who, receiving a leave of absence, went away without rendering his report; those of his regimental commanders are, however, enclosed.

Very respectfully,

L. McLaws,
Major-General.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL RANSOM.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION,
CAMP NEAR FREDERICKSBURG, VA., Dec. 20, 1862.

Major G. M. Sorrel, Assistant Adjutant-General First Corps A. N. V.:

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of my division during the several days' operations before Fredericksburg, commencing on the eleventh instant:

On the morning of that day the division took position about six hundred yards in rear of our batteries, which were upon Marye's and Willis's Hills, and at the time occupied by the Washington artillery. About noon, it was withdrawn to the Telegraph road, a little in rear of where General Longstreet had his headquarters during the day. At nine o'clock P. M., it retook the position of the morning, Cooke's brigade being advanced to within two hundred yards of our batteries, and the Twenty-fourth North Carolina, of my brigade, was placed in a ditch on the left, and in the prolongation of Cobb's brigade, which occupied the Telegraph road in front of Marye's and Willis's hills. The left of the Twenty-fourth rested on the plank road. My batteries remained in rear of the division.

On the twelfth there was no change except the placing of three long-range guns from Cooper's battery near Howison's house on the right of the Telegraph road. During these two days occasional shells from the enemy's guns burst among and near the troops, but there were few, or no injuries.

About half past eleven o'clock A. M., on the thirteenth, large numbers of skirmishers were thrown out from the town by the enemy, and it soon became evident that an effort would be made to take our batteries, which I was supporting. Cooke's brigade was ordered to occupy the crest of Marye's and Willis's Hills, which was done in fine style. By this time the enemy backed his skirmishers with a compact line, and advanced towards the hills; but the Washington artillery and a well-directed fire from Cobb's and Cooke's brigades drove them quickly back to their shelter in the town. But a few minutes elapsed before another line was formed by the enemy, he all the while keeping up a brisk fire with sharpshooters. This line advanced with the utmost determination, and some few of them got within fifty yards of our line; but the whole were forced to retire in wild confusion before the telling fire of our small arms at such short range.

During this attack, two of Cooke's regiments, being badly exposed, (for there were then no rifle-pits on the hills,) were thrown into the road with Cobb's brigade. For some few minutes there was a cessation of fire; but we were not kept long in expectancy. The enemy now seemed determined to reach our position, and formed, apparently, a triple line. Observing this movement on his part, I brought up the three regiments of my brigade to within one hundred yards of the crest of the hills, and pushed forward the Twenty-fifth North Carolina volunteers to the crest. The enemy, almost massed, moved to the charge heroically, and met the withering fire of our artillery and small arms with wonderful stanchness. On they came to within less than one hundred and fifty paces of our line; but nothing could live before the sheet of lead that was hurled at them from this distance. They momentarily wavered, broke, and rushed headlong from the field. A few, however, more resolute than the rest, lingered under cover of some fences and houses, and annoyed us with a scattering but well-directed fire. The Twenty-fifth North Carolina volunteers reached the crest of the hill just in time to pour into the enemy a few volleys at most deadly range, and then took position, shoulder to shoulder, with Cobb's and Cooke's men in the road.

During this attack, the gallant Brigadier-General Cobb was mortally wounded, and almost at the same instant Brigadier-General Cooke was wounded and taken from the field. Colonel Hall, Forty-sixth North Carolina volunteers, succeeded to the command of his brigade. Nothing daunted by the fearful punishment he had received, the enemy brought out fresh and increased numbers of troops. Fearing lest he might, by mere force of numbers, pass over our line, I determined to meet him with every man at my disposal, and started in person to place the remaining two regiment of my brigade. Just at this instant, Brigadier-General Kershaw dashed, on horseback, at the head of one of his regiments, up the new road leading from the Telegraph road, and near the mill, and led it into the fight immediately at Marye's house. A second regiment from his brigade followed and took position in rear of and near the graveyard on Willis's Hill, and remained there. I now advanced my regiments, and placed one a few yards in rear of Marye's house, and the other on its right and a little more retired. With his increased numbers the enemy moved forward. Our men held their fire until it would be fatally effective; meantime, our artillery was spreading fearful havoc among the enemy's ranks. Still he advanced and received the destructive fire of our line; even more resolute than before, he seemed determined, madly, to press on; but his efforts could avail nothing. At length, broken and seemingly dismayed, the whole mass turned and fled to the very centre of the town. At this time, I sent my Adjutant-General to the road to ascertain the condition of the troops and the amount of ammunition on hand. His report was truly gratifying, representing the men in highest spirits, and abundance of ammunition. I had ordered Cobb's brigade to be supplied from my wagons.

The afternoon was now nearly spent, and it appeared that the enemy would not again renew his attempts to carry our position. Again, however, an effort, more feeble than those which had preceded, was made to push his troops over the bodies of the now numerous slain. The sun was down, and darkness was fast hiding the enemy from view, and it was reasonable to suppose there would be no further movement, at least toward

the point we held; but the frequent and determined assaults he had made would not permit me to despise either his courage or his hardihood, and thinking that, as a last alternative, he might resort to the bayonet under cover of darkness, I massed my little command so as to meet such an attack with all the power we were capable of exerting. Instead, however, of a charge with the bayonet, just after dark he opened a tremendous fire of small arms, and at short range, upon my whole line. This last desperate and maddened attack met the same fate which had befallen those which preceded, and his hosts were sent, actually howling, back to their beaten comrades in the town. A short time before the last attack, Brigadier-General Kemper had reported to me with his brigade. With two of his regiments I relieved the Twenty-fourth North Carolina volunteers, which had been in the ditch two days, and placed the others in close supporting distance at the crest of the hill.

During the whole time the enemy's artillery had not ceased to play upon us; but our batteries took no notice of it, reserving their fire and using it against the enemy's infantry, as it would form and advance, with extraordinary effect. Thus ended the fighting in front of Fredericksburg.

By ten o'clock P. M., General Kershaw had put the whole of his brigade in the road, and sent me word he could hold it. I was satisfied no further attempt would be made by the enemy before daylight, and withdrew my division two hundred yards, and permitted it to rest. At this time of night, I received orders to send a battery of long-range guns to Major Garnett. The three guns of Cooper's, at Howison's house, were sent, and they replaced by a like number from Branch's battery.

Until about four P. M., on the thirteenth, the Washington artillery had served in the batteries, when it was relieved by Colonel Alexander's battalion, and, during the night, I replaced five of his guns with twelve-pounder howitzers from my batteries. During the day, only three of my guns were in action, and those were at the Howison house. I am informed by the report of the captain that they did good service, both in the direction of Fredericksburg and more to the right.

On the fourteenth little of moment occurred. The enemy annoyed us by an unceasing fire from sharpshooters, but did little injury. Early on that night, I was directed to return Kemper's brigade to General Pickett. It was replaced by my own. Before daylight, orders came to relieve Jenkins's brigade, on the right of the Telegraph road, which I had now with my own, and the latter was replaced by Cooke's and one regiment from Featherston's, which was immediately on my left.

Late in the afternoon of the fifteenth, large numbers of infantry were seen collecting in the town, and the sharpshooters again began to be troublesome. Colonel Alexander and Lieutenant Branch, the latter having charge of a twelve-pounder howitzer and a Napoleon which Colonel A. had sent me, by a few well-directed shells dispersed the infantry in the town and dislodged the sharpshooters.

About daylight on the morning of the sixteenth, Brigadier-General Jenkins, with his brigade, reported to me, and relieved Cooke's.

Too high commendation cannot be bestowed upon the troops under my command, and those of other corps who came under my observation; and I trust it will not be out of place to mention some, at least, of the latter. The unwavering firmness evinced throughout, by all, raises them to the highest pitch of admiration.

The field, on the thirteenth, presented the unprecedented spectacle of a fierce battle raging, and not a straggler from the ranks.

Brigadier-General Cooke was wounded early in the action, but handled his troops well.

Brigadier-General Kemper came upon the field late, but in the handsomest style, under a galling fire, moved his command into position with the greatest alacrity and steadiness, and, during this time, lost a few killed and quite a number wounded.

While I do not disparage any, I cannot fail to mention the splendid and dashing action of the Twenty-fifth North Carolina volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Bryson commanding, in going into battle.

Though no part of my command, I will not pass over the already famous Washington artillery. Its gallantry and efficiency are above praise.

Colonel Alexander, of the artillery, brought in his battalion admirably, and relieved the Washington artillery under a hot fire.

I regret that I could not witness the part taken by the long-range guns of my batteries; but, from the commanders' reports, they did good service, both in the direction of Fredericksburg and more to the right of our lines. Lieutenant Branch, in charge of the two pieces above mentioned, handled them beautifully.

Lieutenant and Adjutant Cooke, Twenty-fourth North Carolina volunteers, was severely wounded. I have before witnessed his conduct, and no one more highly merits promotion.

The valuable assistance and daring gallantry of my Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Thomas Rowland, and volunteer Aid, Dr. H. L. Davis, deserve my warmest commendation. They, three times each during the day, traversed the entire front of my line, descending and returning from the road, thus six times running the gantlet of a most fearful fire.

I am much indebted to Lieutenant E. A. Thorn, ordnance officer for division, for his devotion and energy. Whatever might have been the duration of the battle, so long as ammunition could have been had, I felt sure that my troops would be supplied. After the battle, he collected about two thousand small arms.

Lieutenant and Aid-de-camp Brodnax rendered valuable aid.

I should fail in my duty if I did not notice the splendid dash of General Kershaw and his staff.

Lieutenant Landry, of Captain Maurin's bat-

tery, I believe, called the Donelson artillery, by direction of Captain Latrobe, Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General, took his piece from behind the epaulement in order to dislodge a body of the enemy upon whom the battery could not play. Most effectually he performed this service; but, in doing so, lost several of his men and had his piece disabled. His conduct was admirable, for, during the time, he was exposed to a direct fire of six and an enfilade fire of four guns.

With sadness, we mourn the loss of many gallant men; but I will pay a special tribute to the intrepid General Cobb, who fell, mortally wounded, in the midst of his men, while nobly defending our righteous cause. His brigade, throughout the day, remained at the post of honor, in the front line.

Among those who fell, and those of his comrades who lament his loss, there was not one more meritorious than the modest, but brave and manly, Major Kelly, of the Thirty-fifth North Carolina volunteers.

To two of my couriers, private Devam, Twenty-fourth, and private Hood, Thirty-sixth North Carolina volunteers, I am truly indebted for their devotion, gallantry, and intelligence, during the several days.

I herewith enclose a complete list of the casualties in my division; in the aggregate, five hundred and thirty. The wounded bear a large proportion to the killed. Before the town there were not engaged, all told, on our part, more than five thousand. It is impossible to estimate exactly the number of the enemy who were opposed to us. From prisoners taken, it is certain that all of Sumner's grand division and part of Hooker's were brought against the position. Among these can be named, specially, Hancock's and Whipple's division, the Irish brigade, and the whole of the regular infantry of the old United States army, the latter under Sykes.

The enemy's loss in killed must have been very large. Each of the nights of Saturday, Sunday, and Monday, the enemy bore off large numbers. On Tuesday I walked over the field, and the slain lay in many places piled up on each other. As I understand an accurate count of those buried has been made, I will not hazard an opinion as to the real number killed. The havoc was appalling. I am, sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

R. Ransom, Jr.,

Brigadier-General commanding Division.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL HOOD.

Division Headquarters, near Fredericksburg, Va.

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the participation of my command, composed of the Texas brigade, Brigadier-General J. B. Roberston commanding; Law's brigade, Brigadier-General E. M. Law commanding; Anderson's brigade, Brigadier-General G. T. Anderson commanding; Toombs's brigade, Colonel H. L. Benning commanding, and Reilly's, Bachman's, and Gardner's batteries, in the battle of Fredericksburg, December thirteenth, 1862, and operations in connection therewith:

In obedience to instructions from the Lieutenant-General commanding, on hearing the signal guns, about two o'clock on the morning of the eleventh December, I immediately formed my command and moved into position along the crest of the hills stretching from Dr. Reynolds's house to near the railroad crossing, and occupied the Bowling Green road with a heavy line of skirmishers. Soon afterwards, I pushed forward about one hundred riflemen to harass the enemy in his efforts to throw a bridge across the Rappahannock River, at the mouth of Deep Run. This party was unable, however, to effect the desired object, in consequence of the ground not affording shelter to the men within rifle range of the river. My scouts having reported, near dark, that the enemy had completed a bridge across the river immediately below the mouth of Deep Run, and in my front, I increased my force in the Bowling Green road, and threw a line of skirmishers to the front, with orders to the commanding officer to hold the road. The enemy commenced crossing infantry and artillery at dark, and continued doing so throughout the night, at the same time deploying to their left, to and below Mr. Arthur Bernard's house, thereby indicating his intention to attack our right.

During the night, I withdrew the force from the Bowling Green road, and the line of skirmishers back to the road. At about ten o'clock, on the morning of the twelfth, I was relieved by General A. P. Hill's division, and, in obedience to orders from the Lientenant-General commanding, relieved General Pickett on my left. Discovering a body of the enemy's cavalry deployed along the railroad, I detached two companies from Toombs's and one company from Law's brigade, and, without loss on our side, drove them off, killing two or three men and five horses. About dark, General Pickett reoccupied his original position; and, in compliance with instructions from the Lieutenant-General commanding, I moved my command back to my original position, with orders to cooperate with A. P. Hill's or any other troops of General T. J. Jackson's corps.

On the thirteenth, during the engagement on the right of our line, a considerable force of the enemy defiled from the right bank of Deep Run, and, forming line of battle, advanced, driving our skirmishers from and occupying the railroad. Two of Brigadier-General Law's regiments, the Fifty-seventh North Carolina, Colonel A. C. Godwin commanding, and Fifty-fourth North Carolina, Colonel J. C. McDowell commanding, were thrown forward, the Fifty-seventh leading, and in gallant style drove the enemy from the position he had gained, following him up to within three hundred yards of the Bowling Green road, and punishing him severely. These regiments, with the Fourth Alabama, Law's brigade, support, held the railroad until dark, when they were relieved by other troops from my command, who retained possession of it until the enemy recrossed the river, on the night of the fifteenth.

As usual, Brigadier-General Law was conspicuous upon the field, acting with great gallantry, and had his horse killed under him whilst personally directing the movements of his brigade.

It is with much pleasure that I call your attention to the gallant bearing of both the officers and men of the Fifty-seventh North Carolina regiment, Colonel A. C. Godwin commanding, in their charge on a superior force of the enemy, posted in the strong position he had gained. Equal praise is due the Fifty-fourth North Carolina regiment, Colonel J. C. McDowell commanding, for their able support of the Fifty-seventh, and especially for their display of discipline in changing front under fire, to cover the left flank of the Fifty-seventh from the fire of a force of the enemy occupying Deep Run, below the railroad, to which they became exposed in consequence of their pursuit of the force they had dislodged. Indeed, I cannot in justice omit to mention the bearing and morale of my entire command during the time the enemy was in our front, as evidenced by their earnest desire to be led to battle and their presence at all times, as, to the best of my knowledge, not a single officer or man left ranks without proper authority.

The members of my staff were, as usual, at their posts, and zealous in the discharge of every duty devolving upon them. Below will be found a summary of the casualties of my command.

For further particulars, attention is called to accompanying reports of brigade commanders.

I am, Major, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. B. HOOD,
Major-General, commanding

BRIGADES.	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		AGGREGATE.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
Texas Brigade	....	1	....	4	....	....	5
Law's Brigade	5	45	6	156	....	6	218
Anderson's Brigade	....	2	....	8	....	4	14
Toombs's Brigade	....	1	1	10	....	2	14
	5	49	7	178	....	12	251

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL D. H. HILL.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION, December 24, 1862.

Captain A. S. Pendleton, A. A. G.:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the operations of my command around Fredericksburg. On the third December my division was sent to Port Royal, to prevent the crossing of the Yankees at or near that point. Four Yankee gunboats were then lying opposite the town. Rifle-pits were constructed above the town on the night of the fourth, to prevent the pirates from ascending; and Hardaway's Whitworth gun was placed on Jack's Hill, some three miles below the town, and his remaining two guns, with Carter's Parrott's, were placed on the hill due west of the town. Hardaway opened upon the gunboats about three o'clock, on the fifth instant. Finding the fire too hot for them, they fled back to town, where they were sheltered from Carter's fire. Hardaway continued to pelt them; and, to stop his fire, (as is supposed,) the ruffians commenced shelling the town, full of women and children. The town was partially destroyed, but a merciful God kindly protected the inoffensive inhabitants. A dog was killed and a negro wounded; no other living being was injured. Finding that Hardaway's fire did not slacken, the pirates fled down the river. But now a worse fate awaited them than a distant cannonade. The gallant Major Pelham, of General Stuart's horse artillery, had a section of artillery immediately on the bank of the river, and gave them a parting salute. He was greeted with grape and canister, and had one man killed. There were no casualties at my batteries. From Yankee sources, we learned that the pirates lost six killed and twenty wounded. Whether they over-estimated or under-estimated their loss, I do not know. They sometimes lie on one side, and sometimes on another. In a few days, the pirates returned as high as Port Tobago, with five more of their thievish consorts. Eleven rifle guns of Colonel Browne's reserve artillery and all my division batteries were brought down to the river, under cover of a dense fog, and, when it lifted, were opened upon them. The firing was bad, except from the Whitworth, and it soon drove them under cover of a thick growth of woods, where they lay concealed. We have learned, from the same respectable Yankee source, that three of the pirates were struck, one three times, and that a captain was killed and four or five other thieves knocked on the head. We had no casualties. Just before sundown, on the twelfth instant, I received an order to march that night to Fredericksburg, as the Yankees were expected to attack General Lee the next day. A portion of my command was twenty-two miles from that city, and the most of them from eighteen to twenty. We began our march immediately, and proceeded until we were stopped by encountering General Early's column, some three miles from Hamilton's Crossing. We waited until daylight, and then followed General Early. His

division was placed in the second line, behind General A. P. Hill, and my division in the third line, behind General Early. We remained in that position until noon, when the division was ordered on the extreme right to meet a flank movement of the Yankees, under General Doubleday. We were, however, soon ordered back, as Doubleday did not advance, and our front line, under General A. P. Hill, had been broken. General Early pushed forward and recovered the lost ground, and my division took Early's position. My division artillery and the reserve artillery, under Colonel Brown, (temporarily under my command,) were sent forward in the afternoon to relieve the batteries which had been engaged in the morning. The relieving batteries have been highly commended for gallant and effective service. Captains Carter, Hardaway, Bondurant, Fry, and Page were conspicuous here, as everywhere, for gallantry and alacrity in the discharge of duty. Towards sundown, on the thirteenth, a general advance of our lines was ordered, preceded by artillery. Artillery officers were called for to volunteer for this hazardous duty. Captain Bondurant and Lieutenants Pendleton and Carter, of my division, volunteered and brought out their batteries. The answering reply of the Yankee artillery to ours was so rapid and constant that the advance was halted before our columns emerged from the woods to view.

On the fourteenth instant, Generals Early and Taliaferro occupied the front line, my division the second line, and General A. P. Hill the third. The Yankees, having been terribly thrashed the day before, were quiescent on the fourteenth. They had established themselves in a hedge-row, and had it lined with artillery. Hardaway got a position, with his Whitworth gun, from which he could enfilade the line. He drove out all their batteries, and made them leave at a gallop. I think that his gun killed the Yankee General Bayard, as no other of our guns could carry so far as to the point where he was struck. At Upperville, on November second, this gun put to flight two Yankee batteries, and cavalry and artillery, at the distance of three miles and a half. Grimes's brigade occupied the extreme right of our front line on the night of the thirteenth, and held the same position for the next two days. This brigade also furnished a hundred sharpshooters to support Stuart, and these were constantly skirmishing with the Yankees during the fourteenth and fifteenth. Colonel Estes, with his regiment, Forty-fourth Georgia, Doles's brigade, was also sent to support Stuart on the night of the thirteenth, and remained with him until the fifteenth. These advance troops, together with the skirmishers thrown out from each brigade when on the advance line, were the only portions of my division actively engaged with the Yankees. My division relieved Generals Early and Taliaferro before day on the fifteenth, and remained all day in the advance. Major Jones's battalion, of my division artillery, was placed on our left flank. The Yankees were unusually placid on the fifteenth. The only firing worthy of notice was from some dozen or twenty pieces on the other side of the river, attempting to dislodge Hardaway from his enfilading position. He, however, lay quietly on his straw-rick, looking at them with his glass, and only firing when he could make his shot tell. As the day of the fifteenth wore away without a fight, the division, with the exception of the advance detachments, not having drawn trigger, applied to Lieutenant-General Jackson to remain one day longer on the front line. This request was granted. At daylight, our pickets were thrown forward, and the enemy found to be gone. Burnside had changed his base. We captured two hundred and ninety-two of the Yankee pickets and stragglers, and gathered up between three and four thousand excellent rifles and muskets. I regret to add that, although none of my troops drew trigger, with the exceptions above made, we had one hundred and seventy-three casualties in the division, nearly all from the artillery fire of the Yankees.

My thanks are due to all my staff for faithful and efficient services. Major J. W. Ratchford and Major Archer Anderson, Adjutant-General's staff; Major Jones, commanding battalion of artillery; Captain Carter, Chief of Artillery; Captain M. L. Randolph, Signal Officer; Lieutenant R. H. Morrison, Aid-de-camp; Lieutenant E. F. Brevard, Volunteer Aid; Lieutenants Harris and Estelle, Ordnance Officers; Mr. Arthur Chichester, Engineer Officer; Sergeant Harmeling, commanding the couriers, — all rendered valuable and important service.

I cannot speak too highly of the steadiness of my men under fire, their confidence of victory and eagerness to lend their efforts to achieve it, their patient endurance of a fatiguing march the night before the battle, and their general subordination and good conduct. Under tried veterans as brigade commanders — Rodes, Colquitt, Pierson, Doles, and Grimes — I feel confident that they will do well whenever called upon to meet the infernal Yankees. In no battle of the war has the signal interposition of God in our favor been more wonderfully displayed than at Fredericksburg, and it is to be earnestly hoped that our gratitude will correspond in some degree with His favor.

Respectfully submitted,

D. H. HILL,
Major-General.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL A. P. HILL.

HEADQUARTERS A. P. HILL'S LIGHT DIVISION,
JACKSON'S CORPS, CAMP NEAR
FREDERICKSBURG, January 1, 1863.

Captain A. S. Pendleton, Assistant Adjutant-General Jackson's Corps:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the light division in the battle of Fredericksburg:

It having been definitely ascertained that the enemy had crossed the Rappahannock in large force, on the evening of the eleventh December, I was directed by General R. E. Lee, subse-

quently by the Lieutenant-General, also, to move my division at dawn, on the twelfth, and relieve Major-General Hood. In obedience to this order, I put my troops in position, my front line consisting of two regiments of Brockenbrough's brigade, the brigades of Generals Archer, Lane, and Pender, my extreme right resting upon the road leading from Hamilton's Crossing to the Port Royal road, and my left to within a short distance of Deep Creek. Upon the hill crowning the right of my line, Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay Walker, my Chief of Artillery, had in position, under his own immediate direction, fourteen rifle and Napoleon guns, composed of the batteries of Pegram and McIntosh, with sections from the batteries of Crenshaw, Latham, and Johnson, commanded respectively by Lieutenants Ellett, Potts, and Chitter. The batteries of Captains Davidson and Braxton (the latter commanded by Lieutenant Marye) were placed to cover my left, about two hundred yards in front of Pender's brigade.

My line of battle, as thus formed, was fully one mile and a half in extent, the division of Major-General Hood being on my left. Lane's brigade was some one hundred and fifty yards in advance of my general line, the timber, in the skirt of which was posted his brigade, jutting out into the low grounds some distance from the main body. Along the military road — a new road running in rear of my front line from right to left, cut by Major-General Hood — were posted my reserves, consisting of the remainder of Brockenbrough's brigade, Fortieth and Fifty-fifth Virginia, as a support to Walker's batteries, Gregg's brigade crossing the interval between Archer and Lane, and Thomas's brigade the interval between Lane and Pender. The division remained as thus posted during Friday and Friday night undisturbed, except by the shelling from the enemy's guns.

On Saturday morning, Lieutenant-General Jackson directed that Braxton's battery and two batteries from Brigadier-General Taliaferro's division be placed in advance of the railroad, and General Lane was directed to support them. Braxton's battery was relieved by Latimer, a young veteran. About ten o'clock, Saturday morning, the lifting of the fog discovered to us the lines of the enemy, drawn out in battle array on the low grounds between us and the river, covering the whole of my front, and extending far to the left, towards Fredericksburg. They were deployed in three lines, with heavy reserves behind the Port Royal road. Soon their lines, accompanied by ten batteries, six on their left and four on the right, moved forward to the attack. They had advanced but a short distance, when, Stuart's horse artillery opening on them from the Port Royal road and enfilading their lines, the advance was halted, and four of the batteries gave their attention for an hour or more to Major Pelham. As soon as Pelham ceased his fire, all their batteries, right and left, opened a terrific fire upon the positions occupied by my batteries, and shelled the woods promiscuously. There being no reply from any of our batteries, and being unable to elicit any discoveries from this sharp practice, continued for an hour or more, the advance was again sounded, and, preceded by clouds of skirmishers, the right gallantly essayed another attempt. To cover this advance, their batteries were now served with redoubled activity; and now, the masses of infantry being within point blank range, the roar was deepened and made deadly to the enemy as shell and canister from our long silent, but now madly aroused, batteries ploughed through their ranks. The enemy, however, continued to advance, and the three batteries already mentioned as having been posted in advance of the railroad, were compelled to retire, their withdrawal being covered by Lieutenant-Colonel Hill, with the Seventh North Carolina. Lane's brigade was the first to encounter the masses of the enemy, who, recoiling somewhat from his direct front, shifted their main attack to his right, endeavoring to penetrate through the interval between Archer and himself. The attack directly in front of Archer and of Walker's guns had been gallantly repulsed, the enemy finding what shelter they could along the railroad. Concentrating their columns of attack, the enemy now made a bold effort, and, pushing onward, turned Lane's right, although obstinately resisted by the Twenty-eighth and Thirty-seventh North Carolina regiments. Colonel Barber, of the Thirty-seventh, finding his right turned, changed front with his three right companies, and poured in a destructive fire. These two regiments continued to fight until their ammunition was exhausted, and were then quickly and steadily retired from the field, refilling their boxes and rejoining their brigade. The three remaining regiments of Lane's brigade (Seventh, Eighteenth, and Thirty-third North Carolina) steadily continued to battle against overwhelming numbers, and the attack was checked by well-directed volleys from the Thirty-third regiment, Colonel Avery. General Thomas, responding to the call of General Lane, rapidly threw forward his brigade of Georgians, by the flank, and deploying by successive formations, squarely met the enemy, charged them, and, joined by the Seventh and part of the Eighteenth North Carolina, drove them back, with tremendous loss, to their original position. In the mean time, the main column of attack had wedged in to the right and rear of Lane, encountered Archer's left, and, attacked in flank and rear, the Fourteenth Tennessee and Nineteenth Georgia were compelled to give back. General Archer, observing the threatening condition of affairs on his left, very promptly detached the Fifth Alabama battalion, holding his line with the brave First Tennessee, under the gallant Turney, and this movement, rapidly executed, and assisted by two regiments of Brockenbrough, (Forty-seventh Virginia and Twenty-second Virginia battalion,) was attended with signal success. The advancing columns of the enemy had also encountered an obstacle in the military road which they little expected — Gregg's brigade of South Carolinians

stood in the way. Taken somewhat by surprise, Orr's rifles were thrown into confusion, mistaking the advancing enemy for our own troops falling back. It was at this moment that Brigadier-General Maxcy Gregg — himself fearful of harming our friends — fell, in front of the rifles, mortally wounded. A more chivalrous gentleman and gallant soldier never adorned the service which he so loved. One company of the rifles, Lieutenant Charles, and the four remaining regiments, the First, Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth, stood firm as on parade. Colonel Hamilton, now in command of the brigade, threw back the right wing of his regiment and opened a destructive fire, the Twelfth faced about, and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth, under the direction of Colonel McGowan, faced by the rear rank, changed front forward, and stood prepared to resist any attempt to sweep down my rear. The combat was short, sharp, and decisive. The rattling musketry and charging yell of the Fifth Alabama battalion, the Forty-seventh Virginia regiment, and Twenty-second Virginia battalion, and the withering fire from Hamilton's regiment, right in their faces, was more than Yankee firmness could stand. In addition to this, that gallant old warrior, General Early, to whom I had sent, requesting that he would move down to my support, came crashing through the woods at the double-quick.

The enemy, completely broken, fled in confusion. The two regiments of Brockenbrough's brigade, Archer, with the First Tennessee and Fifth Alabama battalion, and Early's troops, chased them across the railroad and back to their reserves. In this backward movement of theirs, my artillery again inflicted heavy loss upon them. On the extreme left of my line, held by the North Carolina brigade of General Pender, (Thirteenth, Sixteenth, Twenty-second, Thirty-fourth, and Thirty-eighth,) the enemy made several threatening attempts to advance, but were invariably repulsed by the well-directed fire from Davidson's and Latimer's guns. From the nature of the ground occupied by Pender's brigade, and the entire absence of all protection against artillery, his brigade received the greater part of the terrible fire directed at Davidson and Latimer, and suffered severely. General Pender was himself wounded, and his Aid, Lieutenant Sheppard, killed, whilst gallantly rallying a portion of the Eighteenth regiment of Lane's brigade. During the temporary absence of General Pender, the command of the brigade devolved upon Colonel Scales, of the Thirteenth. The two batteries suffered much by the fire of a heavy line of skirmishers. Colonel Scales directed Major Cole, of the Twenty-second North Carolina, to dislodge them, which was handsomely done. The Sixteenth, Colonel McElroy, which had been thrown out as a support to Latimer's battery, became pretty hotly engaged with a brigade of the enemy which had advanced up Deep Run under cover, and, assisted by two North Carolina regiments of Law's brigade, Hood's division, drove them back. The enemy having thus been repulsed at all points, my brigades remained in their original positions, save General Thomas's, (Fourteenth, Thirty-fifth, Forty-fifth, and Forty-ninth Georgia,) which was not recalled from the position it had so gallantly won in the front line, and General Archer, who, being out of ammunition, was relieved by Colonel Hoke, of Early's division. About dusk I received an order from the Lieutenant-General to advance my whole line and drive the enemy. This order was, however, countermanded while preparations were being made to carry it out. During the night my division was relieved from the front by the divisions of Generals Early and Taliaferro. When the fight was hottest, General Taliaferro very promptly responded to my call, and moved down his division to within easy supporting distance of my left. I cannot close this report without calling the attention of the Lieutenant-General to the admirable manner in which the troops of this division behaved under that most trying of all things to the soldier, viz., inaction under a heavy fire of artillery. The absence of all straggling was remarkable, and is entitled to high commendation. The conscripts showed themselves desirous of being thought worthy comrades of our veteran soldiers. In this, as in all previous battles, my thanks are eminently due to the brigade commanders for their hearty coöperation, the coolness and skill with which they have handled their troops. General Pender, though wounded, resumed the command of his brigade as soon as his wound was dressed.

Amongst the field officers wounded are Colonels Turney, Barber, Purdie; Lieutenant-Colonel George, First Tennessee; Majors Vandegraff, Norton, Lee, Neill, and Buchanan. The three field officers and senior captain (Turney) of the First Tennessee were struck down. General Pender mentions especially First Lieutenant S. S. Kirkland and Mr. John Young, Volunteer Aid-de-camp. General Archer was efficiently served by Lieutenants Lemmon and Thomas. General Lane speaks of the good conduct of Captain Hawks and Lieutenant Lane, A. D. C. And General Thomas, that when all did so well he cannot say more. Captain Alexander Haskell, Assistant Adjutant-General to the lamented Gregg, was severely wounded, but refused to leave the field, until, fainting from exhaustion and loss of blood, he was carried off. Captain Alston, of the First South Carolina volunteers, also deserves special mention; he, having been severely wounded, after being dressed at the hospital, returned to the field in spite of the remonstrance of the surgeon. Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, assisted by Lieutenant Chamberlaine, directed the fire from his guns with admirable coolness and precision. Pegram, as usual, with McIntosh to help him, managed to find the hottest place, though perhaps Davidson might have been willing to exchange positions with them.

I had forgotten to mention that at half past three o'clock my batteries on the right, except one section of Pegram's, were relieved by the corps of Colonel Brown.

The chief surgeon of the division, Dr. Powell, by his system, and order, and untiring personal attention, secured more comfort to the wounded than has been usual. By ten o'clock the next day his hospital had been cleared of all those who could be moved, and, with their wounds dressed, were on their way to Richmond. He acknowledges valuable assistance from the Richmond committee.

The members of my staff, Major Morgan, assistant adjutant-general; Captain Wingall, assistant adjutant and inspector-general; Captain Hill, aid-de-camp; Major Palmer, First Virginia regiment, Captain Adams, signal officer, and Captain Gordon, volunteer aid-de-camp, (whose horse was killed,) were active and zealous in the discharge of their duties. Captain Howard, my engineer officer, was particularly efficient in strengthening my lines. Captain Stanard, ordnance officer, made efficient arrangements for the supply of ammunition, and fought with his guns. Captain Braxton, though sick, appeared on the field. Sergeant Tucker, chief of couriers, was, as usual, always by my side, active and fearless.

The loss in the light division is:

Officers — killed, sixteen; wounded, one hundred and nineteen. Enlisted men — killed, two hundred and fifteen; wounded, one thousand three hundred and fifty-five. Missing — officers, eleven; enlisted men, four hundred and six. Total, two thousand and eighty-five.

I respectfully refer you to the accompanying reports of commanding officers of brigades.

I am, sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
A. P. HILL,
Major-General, commanding Light Division.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL TALIAFERRO, COMMANDING JACKSON'S DIVISION.

HEADQUARTERS JACKSON'S DIVISION,
CAMP NEAR MOSS NECK, December 24, 1862.

Captain A. S. Pendleton, Assistant Adjutant-General:

CAPTAIN: In conformity with the order of the Lieutenant-General commanding, I have the honor to report the operations of this division, on the thirteenth and fourteenth instants, before Fredericksburg:

On the morning of the twelfth, I marched from Guineas Station to Hamilton's Crossing, at which place I found the division of Major-General A. P. Hill posted in order of battle from the crossing, on the right, to Bernard's quarters, on the left. I took position on the railroad, to his right, but was subsequently ordered to move my command to the rear of the left of his line. I posted Paxton's and Starke's brigades in rear of Gregg's and Thomas's, of Hill's division, and held Taliaferro's and Jones's brigades in reserve. In the evening I ordered Colonel Warren, commanding Taliaferro's brigade, to the rear of Hamilton's house, to support the artillery posted on the hill in front. Upon the arrival of Early's division next morning, this brigade was withdrawn, and reoccupied its old position. General Early's line connected with mine on the right. My artillery was held at the crossing on the Mine road, to the left of the division. I reported to General A. P. Hill my dispositions in his rear, and informed him that I had ordered the brigade and battery commanders to recognize any demands for support, if pressing, without the intervention of immediate superiors.

Early on the morning of the thirteenth, the batteries of Captains Wooding and Carpenter, the latter commanded by Lieutenant McKendree, were posted in the field, across the railroad, to the right of Bernard's quarters, and the Lee battery, Lieutenant Statham, and two pieces of Lusk's battery, on the hill to the left. The other pieces of these batteries operated on the extreme right.

The enemy advanced about nine o'clock, when our batteries opened a destructive fire upon them, causing them to waver and break; but they again advanced, concentrating so heavy a fire of artillery upon the position that it became necessary to retire the batteries behind the railroad, in rear of the quarters, after two hours' action. The infantry of the division, during this time, were subjected to the shells of the enemy, but advanced to the military road, to be in easy support of General Hill's line, with perfect steadiness and enthusiasm. General Paxton, finding that our troops were giving back to the right of Gregg's brigade, and the enemy advancing beyond the front line, through a gap, which fronted a boggy wood, supposed to be inaccessible to the enemy, moved his brigade to the right, and engaged, with two of his regiments, the enemy, who had penetrated to the military road, but who were retiring by the time he reached that point. He then pushed forward to the front, and occupied, for the rest of the day, the front line at that place. The other brigades were held in position in rear of the military road until the morning of the fourteenth, when I relieved General A. P. Hill's troops in the front; Starke's brigade relieving General Pender's on the left; Jones's, Taliaferro's, and Paxton's occupying the railroad, and connecting with General Early's troops on the right. At daybreak the enemy made a slight demonstration on my left, their skirmishers advancing nearly to the railroad cut, but they were instantly driven back. I thought it advisable to change the position of Starke's brigade, which had relieved Pender's, and extend my left on the railroad. This was ordered and accomplished; but I subsequently withdrew part of that brigade, and held it in position to command the rising ground near Bernard's quarters. The skirmishing, in the early part of the day, was quite brisk and animated along the whole line, but ceased about midday. I had given positive orders to waste no ammunition, and to fire only when the annoyance of the enemy's skirmishers rendered it necessary. I am satisfied the men fired with deliberation and considerable effect. I had a battery masked behind Bernard's house, and some of my pieces to the left coöperated with those of General Hood.

At five o'clock A. M. of the fifteenth, I was relieved by General D. H. Hill, and moved my command back to the Mine road.

I take pleasure in stating that officers and men behaved admirably, displaying coolness and courage under fire, and changing positions without any disorder or confusion.

I would particularly mention Brigadier-Generals Jones and Paxton, Colonel Warren, (Tenth Virginia,) commanding Taliaferro's brigade, and Colonel Pendleton, (Fifteenth Louisiana,) commanding Starke's brigade, whose reports are herewith forwarded, and who make especial mention of some of their officers: among them most particularly is Lieutenant-Colonel Gardner, Fourth Virginia infantry, who was severely wounded.

I cannot too highly mention the gallantry of Captain Brockenbrough, chief of artillery, and of Captain Wooding and Lieutenant Jones, Wooding's battery, and Lieutenant Lambie, Carpenter's battery, all of whom were severely wounded; and of Captain Caskie, Lieutenants McKendree, Hunton, Statham, Early, and Donald.

It is with great pain I have to add that the division has to deplore the loss of one of its most gallant officers of artillery, Lieutenant Barton, and two gallant officers of the Twenty-first Virginia regiment, Captain Ames and Lieutenant Swoop, who fell nobly discharging their duty.

I take occasion, in conclusion, to acknowledge my obligations to the officers of my staff, Captain W. T. Taliaferro, assistant adjutant-general, Captain Moore, inspector-general, and Major T. S. Taliaferro, volunteer aid-de-camp, and to call attention to the excellent arrangements made for the comfort of the wounded by Surgeon Coleman, medical director of division.

I enclose a list of killed and wounded, amounting to one hundred and ninety.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
W. B. TALIAFERRO,
Brigadier-General, commanding Jackson's Division.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL EARLY, COMMANDING DIVISION.

HEADQUARTERS EWELL'S DIVISION,
December 27, 1862.

Captain A. S. Pendleton, A. A. General Second Corps A. N. V.:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this division in the action of the thirteenth instant, near Fredericksburg:

In obedience to orders from the Lieutenant-General, commanding the Second corps, I marched the division, on the night of the twelfth instant, to the vicinity of Hamilton's Crossing, on the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad, and bivouacked for the night. Early next morning, in accordance with like orders, I moved to the crossing, and posted the division nearly at right angles with the railroad, along the direct road, which here crosses the railroad, with my right resting on the latter, so as to support the right of Major-General A. P. Hill's division, which occupied the front line. Hays's brigade was placed on the right, with Trimble's brigade, under command of Colonel R. F. Hoke, of the Twenty-first North Carolina regiment, immediately in rear of it. To the left of Hays's was Lawton's brigade, under command of Colonel E. N. Atkinson, of the Twenty-sixth Georgia regiment; and to the left of the latter was my own brigade, under command of Colonel J. A. Walker, of the Thirteenth Virginia regiment. The batteries of the division, under charge of Captain J. W. Latimer, who was detailed to act as chief of artillery for the occasion, in consequence of Captain William D. Brown (who was previously acting in that capacity) having been disabled by an accident, were directed to be parked, under cover, in the rear, until wanted. As the division moved into position, the artillery fire commenced from the enemy's batteries, though not at first directed towards the place occupied by the division. After a short interval, however, shells began to fall in the vicinity, and for two or three hours the division was exposed to quite a severe cannonade, and suffered, to some extent, from the shells and other missiles which passed through the woods in front.

About or a little after noon, the infantry fire having commenced in front, and becoming quite animated, a messenger from Brigadier-General Archer, of General A. P. Hill's division, came to the rear, stating that General Archer was pressed and wished reënforcements. Just at this moment I received an order from the Lieutenant-General commanding the corps, through one of his staff officers, to hold my division in readiness to move to the right of the railroad, as the enemy was making a demonstration in that direction. This caused me to hesitate a moment about sending a brigade forward; but I directed Colonel Atkinson to get ready to advance with his brigade, and the order had hardly been given before an officer of artillery came galloping to the rear with the information that an interval (an awful gulf, as he designated it) had been left in our front line on the left of General Archer's brigade, through which the enemy were penetrating with a heavy column, thus endangering Archer's brigade and all our batteries on the right. I immediately ordered Colonel Atkinson to move forward with his brigade, (Lawton's,) as I was informed the interval was in front of it. This order was promptly complied with, and the brigade, with the exception of one regiment, (the Thirteenth Georgia,) moved forward in fine style, and, in a few minutes, encountered the enemy in the woods on the hill immediately in rear of a point at which the railroad passes through a small neck of swampy woods, which position he had reached almost without opposition, thus greatly endangering our right, as, in a few minutes, Archer's and Field's brigades, with our batteries on the right, would have been surrounded, and the enemy have obtained a lodgment from which it would have been difficult to drive him. Lawton's brigade, without hesitating, at once dashed upon the enemy with the cheering peculiar to the Confederate soldier, and which is never mistaken for

the studied hurrahs of the Yankees, and drove the column opposed to it down the hill, across the railroad and out into the open plain, advancing so far and with such ardor as to cause one of the enemy's batteries to be abandoned. This brigade was, however, compelled to fall back from this point by the approach of a large column on its right flank, which proved to be Birney's division of Stoneman's corps and Hooker's grand division. In a very few moments after ordering the advance of Lawton's brigade, I also ordered Colonel Walker forward with my own brigade, as I was informed Lawton's brigade would not cover the interval in the line. This order was executed in double-quick time, and Walker encountered the enemy in the woods to the left of the place at which Lawton's brigade encountered one column, another having turned General Lane's right flank, and his brigade having given way in consequence. This column was quickly driven out of the woods by Walker, across the railroad, and into the plain beyond; but, perceiving still another column crossing the railroad to his left and entering the woods, he withdrew the brigade back to the railroad, and took position on it, detaching, at the same time, the Thirteenth Georgia regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Terrill, to attack the last-named column of the enemy on the flank. About the same time General Thomas, of General A. P. Hill's division, with his brigade, attacked this column in front, and, under the two fires, it was driven back, with considerable slaughter. As soon as Lawton's and my own brigades were ordered forward, I directed Colonel Hoke to move with his brigade (Trimble's) to the left of Hays's, on the same line; but he had hardly got into position before I received information that Archer's brigade was giving way, and I ordered Hoke to advance to his support, obliquing to the right. This was done in gallant style, and Hoke found the enemy in possession of the trench which had been occupied by General Archer's brigade, on the crest of the hill, and in the woods in rear of it. Hoke attacked the enemy vigorously, and drove him from the woods and trench to the railroad in front, in which there were reserves. He followed up his attack, and drove the enemy from the railroad, which was a strong position, some distance in front, capturing a considerable number of prisoners, and afterwards securing several hundred stands of arms. He advanced his brigade to a fence some distance in front of the railroad; but perceiving his danger of being flanked by the enemy, who had brought up large fresh columns, I sent an order to him to fall back to the original line, which order, however, he anticipated by retiring in good order, leaving two regiments and a battalion on the railroad, and occupying the trench on the crest of the hill with the two other regiments and the Thirteenth Georgia regiment, which latter, having failed to accompany its brigade on account of a misapprehension of its Colonel, had been ordered forward with Hoke's brigade, and got up in time to occupy the trench, but not to participate in the charge.

Just as I had ordered Colonel Hoke forward, I received a message from Lieutenant-General Jackson to advance to the front with the whole division; and I thereupon ordered General Hays to advance in rear of Colonel Hoke with his brigade, which movement was promptly executed; the enemy, who had discontinued his artillery fire while his infantry was advancing on the hill, having reopened his batteries, so that this brigade was exposed to a galling fire while advancing.

This brigade did not engage in the infantry fight, because, by the time it reached the front line, the enemy had been effectually repulsed. The movements of the three brigades which were engaged are necessarily described separately, because they engaged three separate bodies of the enemy. They were, however, moved forward in rapid succession in the order stated, and were, in fact, all engaged at the same time, though commencing their several engagements at different times in the same order in which they advanced. The railroad makes a circle in passing from the right of our position around to the left, so that Lawton's brigade, in passing to the front, with Walker's and Hoke's respectively on the left and right of it, was thrown into the apex of an angle, and having the start of them both, it was necessarily thrown farther forward than either of the others when it crossed the railroad and advanced into the plain. This exposed its flanks; and hence it was that this brigade was compelled to fall back, as before stated, which, however, it did not do until its commander, Colonel Atkinson, and Captain E. P. Lawton, the Assistant Adjutant-General, were both disabled by wounds, and its ammunition was almost entirely exhausted. Seeing this brigade falling back, I halted it on the hill in the woods immediately in rear of the place at which it had first met the enemy, and caused it to be reformed under the command of Colonel C. A. Evans, of the Thirty-first Georgia regiment, and, fearing that the enemy might follow through the same interval with a fresh column, I sent to General D. H. Hill for reënforcements, and he sent two brigades forward. Before, however, they arrived, Brigadier-General Paxton, of General Taliaferro's division, had filled the interval left open by the falling back of this brigade, by promptly moving his own brigade into it. I then sent Lawton's brigade to the rear to replenish its ammunition. Being posted at first in the second line, I did not have any immediate use for the batteries of the division, and therefore, after placing them under the charge of Captain Latimer, as stated, I requested Colonel Crutchfield, chief of artillery for the corps, to make such use of them as the emergencies of the day might require. In a short time he detached two batteries to a position on the left of General A. P. Hill's line; these were Captain Latimer's own battery and Captain Brown's battery, both being under charge of Captain Latimer, who accompanied them. These batteries did not operate in my view, but I am informed that they did excellent service, Captain Latimer having repulsed the enemy with canister after a regiment of infantry sent to sup-

port him had retired. Captain D'Aquin's and Captain Garber's batteries were also detached to the right of the railroad, and placed under charge of General Stuart's chief of artillery, Major Pelham, and likewise did excellent service, as I am informed. Late in the evening, Captain Carrington, with his battery, relieved the two which had been sent to the left, under Captain Latimer, and next morning did good service.

On the next day, Captain Dement, with his battery, was placed in position on the hill on the right occupied by the batteries the day before, but did not become engaged.

About sundown on the thirteenth, I saw General D. H. Hill's division moving to the front, and was informed by one of his Brigadier-Generals that the whole line was ordered to advance, and that his division was ordered to follow. This was the first intimation I had of it, as no such order had been given me. In a few moments, however, Lieutenant Morrison, aid-de-camp, rode up and informed me that General Jackson's orders were that I should hold myself in readiness to advance; and immediately afterwards one of my own staff officers rode up, and stated that General Jackson wished me to take command of the whole troops on the right and advance, regulating the distance by the effect produced on the enemy by our artillery. This was rather embarrassing to me, as my brigade had become separated in the positions assumed by them after repulsing the enemy, and a part of the troops on the right consisted of parts of two brigades of Major-General A. P. Hill's division. I rode immediately to where Colonel Hoke was posted, and met General Jackson himself, from whom I received the order in person to advance, supporting the artillery which he was about sending forward. I gave the order to Colonel Hoke and General Hays accordingly, and some pieces of artillery having been advanced a short distance to the front, Colonel Hoke advanced with a part of his command to the railroad, a portion being already there. The enemy immediately opened a terrible artillery fire, and, it becoming quite dark, our own artillery was withdrawn and the movement countermanded. In a short time afterwards, I received notice from General Jackson, through one of my staff officers, that as soon as General A. P. Hill's troops took position in front, I would move my own back and make them comfortable, getting provisions for them. No troops, however, of General Hill, came to relieve me, and Walker, Hoke, and Hays, with their brigades, remained during the night in the same positions in which they were at the close of the fight. During the night, I received an order, through Lieutenant Smith, aid-de-camp, directing that General Taliaferro would relieve General A. P. Hill's division on the front line, beginning on the left and relieving to the extent of his troops, and that I would supply the deficiency. I was already occupying the front line with three brigades.

Early next morning, Walker was relieved by General Paxton's brigade, and I then placed Hays's brigade in the position which Paxton had left, and placed one regiment in front on the railroad, so as to make a continuous line on that road. Hoke was left in the same position; Lawton's brigade was placed on the right of Hoke, and Walker was moved to the right and placed in the rear of Hoke's and Lawton's brigades, so as to support either of them in case of need, or be thrown upon the right flank, as occasion might require.

On the morning of the fifteenth, the division was relieved by the division of General D. H. Hill and moved to the rear, in reserve, there having been no renewal of the enemy's attack on the fourteenth. Having received orders to occupy the second line on the sixteenth, as I was proceeding to do so, I was ordered to move to the vicinity of Port Royal, and moved accordingly.

I cannot too warmly express my admiration of the conduct of the troops of this division on the thirteenth. The absence of straggling or skulking, to any considerable extent, was a gratifying fact. Officers and men generally behaved admirably. To Brigadier-General Hays and Colonels Walker, Atkinson, and Hoke credit is due for having promptly obeyed my orders and managed their respective commands with coolness, courage, and intelligence; and the same meed of praise is due Colonel Evans, who succeeded to the command of Lawton's brigade after Colonel Atkinson was wounded. Captain E. P. Lawton, assistant adjutant-general of Lawton's brigade, displayed great courage and energy, and I call especial attention to the remarks of Colonel Evans in regard to him. I regret very much that Captain Lawton was so seriously wounded in the advanced position to which his brigade went as not to be in a condition to be brought off when the brigade retired, and he consequently fell into the hands of the enemy, as did also Colonel Atkinson. It will be observed that Lawton's brigade was compelled to fall back; but in doing so it lost no credit, for it was impossible for this brigade to withstand the heavy column brought against it.

To Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Jones, inspector-general, Major S. Hale, acting assistant adjutant-general, Major J. P. Wilson, and Mr. H. Heaton, volunteer aids, and Captain L. Marye, of the artillery, and Captain William F. Randolph, of Ewell's body-guard, all of whom accompanied me on the field, credit is due for the coolness, courage, and intelligence with which they lent me their aid and bore my orders. To Captain Latimer is due the credit of having performed all the duties of his position efficiently and intelligently, and of having displayed great gallantry under fire. This young officer is one of great promise, and deserves promotion. The failure to mention other officers is not intended to exclude them from the commendation bestowed on those mentioned; but it is impracticable to mention all that are deserving of praise. I feel it incumbent on me to state that to Brigadier-General Archer, of General A. P. Hill's division, is due the credit of having held the enemy in check with a small portion of his men, after his flank and rear had been

gained, until reënforcements arrived, and that, with what of his brigade was left, he accompanied Colonel Hoke in his charge across the railroad. But for the gallant stand made by General Archer, the enemy would have gained an advantage which it would have required a greater sacrifice of life to wrest from him than was made. The reports of brigade commanders, and also of Captain Latimer, acting chief of artillery, are herewith submitted. A list of killed, wounded, and missing has been heretofore forwarded, from which it will be seen that the total killed was one hundred and two; total wounded, seven hundred and twenty-six; total missing, one hundred and five. Most of the wounded are but slightly injured, and about fifty of the missing, being entirely from Lawton's brigade, fell into the hands of the enemy, the greater part being, in all probability, wounded.

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. A. EARLY,

Brigadier-General, commanding Division.

REPORT OF BRIG.-GENERAL PENDLETON.

HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY CORPS A. N. V.,
CAMP NEAR CHESTERFIELD STATION,
R. & F. R. R., CAROLINE CO., VA., March 12, 1863.

General R. E. Lee, commanding:

GENERAL: Constant pressure of duty since the battle of Fredericksburg has prevented an earlier report of the part which then devolved upon the reserve artillery, and upon the undersigned as its commander and as supervisor of the artillery service in this army. Such report the undersigned has now the honor to submit, as proper in itself, and as part of the history of important transactions. While the army remained in the valley of the Shenandoah, after returning from Maryland, the undersigned was diligently engaged in reorganizing the artillery and in directing adequate forage arrangements. On November first, with the reserve artillery and ordnance trains, he took up the line of march for Culpeper Court-house, and on the evening of the fourth encamped near that place. On the fourteenth, at the request of the commanding General, he sent Lane's battery to coöperate with General Stuart in an attack upon a body of the enemy near Warrenton Springs. And on the seventeenth, the same battery of superior guns was despatched, as requested, towards Fredericksburg, to coöperate under direction of General McLaws. On the nineteenth, orders to that effect having been received, the undersigned marched, with the reserve artillery and ordnance train, towards Fredericksburg, taking a circuitous route, (south-easterly,) for the sake of forage. On Sunday, the twenty-third, he arrived with the trains, reported at general headquarters, and located camps as directed. The next morning, as requested by the commanding General, he proceeded to the front for the purpose of observing the dispositions of the enemy and examining the ground, with a view to the best positions for works and batteries. The enemy was conspicuously in force, and often within easy range from above Falmouth to a point a mile or more below Fredericksburg. They had batteries in position, and were, in a few places, beginning earthworks. On our own line a few hurried works were in progress. Lane's battery was already well posted on the heights overhanging the river-bend above Falmouth, and forming our extreme left. Epaulements had been thrown up, but they needed much additional work. Lewis's and Grandy's batteries, recently called from Richmond to aid in repelling the enemy, were also in position on the lower plateau, about half a mile to the right of Lane, and nearer the town. Those needed for their protection much additional labor. These observations, and a cursory survey of the general line between the river above Falmouth and the Telegraph road — in company with Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, then on duty with the undersigned; with Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander, whose encampment was visited, and with Captain Johnston, engineer, met with on the field — occupied the entire day, the distance being considerable, and the points of importance numerous. The next day, November twenty-fifth, after detailing Captain Ross to proceed with his battery to a point on the river three or four miles below, to be indicated by a member of the commanding General's staff, where gunboats might be effectually repelled, the undersigned again visited the front, to study the ground with reference alike to its own features and to the apparent designs of the enemy. In the evening, he also visited the admirable position on the river bank selected for Ross's battery. Major Nelson and the captains of the reserve batteries were next requested to accompany the undersigned along the line, that they also might become familiar with routes and positions. On the twenty-eighth, the commanding General having requested that another rifle battery should be placed eight or ten miles lower down the river, towards repelling gunboats, the undersigned took Captain Milledge's battery of light rifles to a commanding bluff just below Skinker's mill. Here the battery was left, with one of General Stuart's, under charge of Major Pelham, with whom, moving from point to point as gunboats threatened, it remained more than ten days. On the twenty-ninth, Lieutenant Anderson, of Ells's battery, near Richmond, reported the arrival of men and horses with two thirty-pounder Parrott guns, which, on recommendation of the undersigned, the commanding General had ordered up to the lines. Measures were promptly taken to have them tested, and to fit them in all respects for service. December first, the undersigned was diligently engaged in examining again the whole line with reference to the best positions for these two large guns, facility of ingress and egress being important for them, as well as extensive command of the field. The points selected were reported to the commanding General, with reasons for the choice, and, on his approval, the sites were next day pointed out, working parties engaged, clearings commenced, &c. The work on the right and back of Mr. Howison's house

was directed, with his accustomed intelligence and energy, by the since lamented General Thomas R. R. Cobb; that on the eminence farther to the left, and near the telegraph road, was staked off and directed by the undersigned. This point, densely wooded when first chosen, became the most important, perhaps, in the entire scene, as the position affording the best view of all the field, and therefore principally occupied by the commanding General and other chief officers during the battle. In such duties, and in designating with Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander, acting chief of artillery First corps, the various batteries to occupy assigned positions, the undersigned was engaged till the evening of December eleventh. This evening Major Nelson, who had closely reconnoitred during the day, reported to him indications of an approaching movement on the part of the enemy. He also received a reliable intimation of intelligence, said to have been sent to General Stuart by a friend across the river, that the enemy had orders to prepare rations and move at dawn next morning. On the twelfth, therefore, signal guns just before dawn were only what the undersigned anticipated. A few minutes after them he sent one aid to the front for information, and another to the commanding General to ask if the large Parrotts should not at once be taken into position — the possibility of their being needed elsewhere having caused this to be delayed. It being now approved, they were, as early in the day as practicable, taken to the works prepared for them. A dense fog more than half the day concealed the enemy, and rendered active operations nearly impossible. The morning was therefore employed by us in preparation, adjusting batteries in position, &c. Later in the day, as the atmosphere cleared up, it was known that the enemy had completed a bridge across the river near the mouth of Deep Run. Near that run, in the river road — suggested a judicious staff officer, who had some days before ridden over the ground — good positions might be chosen, which ought now to be occupied by several batteries. To test this the undersigned proceeded to the place, accompanied by Majors Nelson and Garnett. The locality was within easy range of the bridge, and was of course more or less under fire from the enemy's lines across the river. Examination soon satisfied the undersigned that the position was unsuitable, because effectually commanded by the enemy's heavy guns, and because much too far in advance of the supporting infantry line. In this view the two attending officers fully concurred; and when the case was submitted to the commanding General, his judgment sanctioned the conclusion reached. While on this tour the undersigned, satisfied that under existing circumstances it ought to be done, sent an Aid to recall Captain Ross with his battery from the post on the river, which he had so long and laboriously held, and had the satisfaction of finding that this only anticipated a direction to the precise effect from the commanding General. The four long-range guns of this battery were assigned position, under Major Garnett, on the heights near the right of McLaws's division. Saturday, thirteenth, heavy firing began early; and Patterson's six-pounder battery, with Ross's short-range section, having been assigned, under Major T. Jefferson Page, to General Hood's front, the undersigned hastened with Kirkpatrick's and Massie's batteries, under Major Nelson, to the heights near the Telegraph road, commanding Marye's Hill, with the view to sweeping that plateau in case it should be ultimately gained by the enemy. The two large guns were then visited by him, that on the right having been committed to the direction of Captain Barnwell, that on the left to the command of Captain G. W. Nelson. Directions being left for the management of these, he proceeded to the other batteries along the heights, and attended to the best adjustment of all the guns.

These duties having been discharged, and the furious fire of the enemy observed for some time, as well as the fog would permit, from the site of the left-hand large gun, the undersigned rode to the left of the line, for the purpose of determining whether Lane's heavy guns were likely to be of more service there or elsewhere. Under cover of the fog, he was enabled to pass near the works on Marye's Hill, occupied by the Louisiana Washington artillery, and those farther to the left, occupied by Maurin's and other batteries, so as to observe that all were ready. Captain Rhett's battery of heavy guns was visited, posted on the heights back of Marye's Hill, and near the plank road, for the purpose, also, of sweeping that plateau, if possibly gained by the enemy. Thence passing on towards the left, the undersigned observed the several batteries of Alexander's battalion and some of those with Anderson's division, a portion in position behind epaulements, others in reserve under cover of the hills. By the time we reached Lane's battery, on the left, distant objects could be distinguished. And from the concentration of fire there, as well as from the character of the ground and the apparent dispositions of the enemy, it seemed clear to Colonel Alexander, who rode thither with the undersigned, and to himself, that those guns ought not then to be removed from a point of such importance. Contingent provision was, however, made for supplying, by pieces of less power, the places of the Whitworth and larger rifles, in case greater need for these elsewhere should occur. The fog was now disappearing, and the firing becoming severe all along the line, so that shells were passing and exploding in considerable numbers about the undersigned and certain members of his staff on the route returning to the central point of observation. Here he remained until some time after dark, watching the struggle near and remote, occasionally directing the fire of the large gun, and from time to time receiving instructions from the commanding General concerning movements of batteries and other arrangements. This large Parrott having been used some hours with terrible effect upon the enemy, especially when, driven back by an intolerable fire from Marye's Hill, they crowded into the deep railroad cut,

which it enfiladed, burst about the thirty-ninth discharge. Although many persons were standing near, among them the commanding General and Lieutenant-General Longstreet, and, perhaps within ten feet, the undersigned, by a remarkable providence, the explosion was entirely harmless. Not a single individual received from it so much as a scratch. A small Parrott was immediately substituted, and orders were sent by an Aid for Lane's Whitworth to be removed to this point as speedily as possible. But before it arrived darkness had closed upon the scene; the enemy's last feeble attempt, made after dark, had failed, and the tumult of battle settled into the stillness of death.

Although the enemy had been thus far successfully repelled, alike on the right and left, it was confidently expected that a more serious attack would be made next morning; accordingly, measures were taken to meet it effectually. On request from General Jackson for additional guns to strengthen his extreme right, Milledge's battery of light rifles, which had that evening arrived from below, was ordered to report at dawn next morning to Major Pelham, who had charge of one or two batteries on the right. And at the request of General McLaws, who wished to detect and frustrate any effort of working parties of the enemy near our lines next the town, the undersigned caused to be prepared at the ordnance workshop, and conducted to the batteries on Marye's Hill, some incendiary shells, to be used, if found necessary, in firing certain buildings suitably situated so as to illuminate the scene and reveal any works in course of construction. This proved superfluous. Nothing being attempted by the enemy, the shells were not used. These duties necessarily occupied the undersigned till late, and required the active services of members of his staff during most of the night.

Sunday morning, the fourteenth, the decisive battle was expected. Accordingly, at an early hour the front was sought by the undersigned, as by others. The same dense fog prevailed as on previous mornings. The enemy, having been so destructively repelled from Marye's Hill on the day before, would not again essay that point, it was supposed, but concentrate upon the centre and right. And more effectually to frustrate anything like an attempt by surprise, under cover of the fog, to carry the heights occupied by the Whitworth and the remaining large Parrott, the short-range guns of Major Nelson's battalion were adjusted to sweep the approaches to those heights, and officers and men were kept on the alert at all the batteries. Nothing, however, occurred, except desultory firing. As the fog cleared up, the enemy appeared in full array along and near the river road, but comparatively inactive, as if, in some sort, respecting the Christian Sabbath. To watch their movements and counteract them by occasional shots, &c., was the course adopted on our part. As the day progressed, circumstances seemed to indicate a purpose by the enemy to throw a heavy force against and beyond our right flank, and the more adequately to meet the request of General Jackson the day before for stronger artillery there, the undersigned obtained the commanding General's sanction to the transfer of Lane's battery, save the Whitworth, from the extreme left to the extreme right. It was accordingly sent for, and marched several miles of the distance that night. On Monday, the fifteenth, the undersigned, supposing the still expected attack would be mainly directed against our right, proceeded thither for the purpose of posting Lane's battery and rendering other service. Having traversed the entire front between the left and right of General Jackson's corps, without meeting that commander, who had ridden, he was told, with the commanding General, the undersigned consulted other Generals there in command respecting positions to be occupied — especially General Stuart, whom he met at the defences on the hill near where the railroad emerges from the wood about Hamilton's Crossing. Having thus learned the localities in that quarter, he rode with Major Pelham and Captain Lane to select the best positions for Lane's guns.

Thus the morning passed, and the expected advance of the enemy remained unattempted. There was no serious movement, nor anything except distant and desultory firing. Nothing being likely to transpire, and all arrangements being made, the undersigned returned to the centre, and learned that the other large Parrott had burst at about the fifty-fourth discharge, providentially, again, doing no damage.

On Tuesday, the sixteenth, calling early at general headquarters, the undersigned learned that information had been brought of some mysterious movement of the enemy, and, hastening to the front, he saw, with astonishment, their immense trains and vast masses collected on the opposite side of the river. Under cover of night, the monstrous assailing host had stolen away to escape destruction. Nothing remained but to watch the discomfited multitude, and disturb their movements by an occasional shot from a long-range gun. A few of their most powerful pieces responded from time to time with shells well-directed towards our post of observation, but doing no harm whatever.

The contest was over, and the campaign virtually closed. In the eventful conflict thus terminated all the batteries of the general reserve, as well as those of the two army corps, were posted on the lines, and though not called, by the enemy's mode of attack, to bear the brunt of close and concentrated action, they were all more or less, and some quite severely, under fire. Lane's and Ross's, as of the best guns, were most in requisition, and rendered most service. Milledge's were useful on the river, and with Major Pelham in his successful dash upon the enemy when menacing our right flank. Patterson's, with a section of Ross's, under Major T. Jefferson Page, shared the defence of General Hood's front. And Kirkpatrick's and Massie's, under Major Nelson, rendered more secure the defences of Marye's Hill and the heights occupied by the large guns, and received a full share of the mis-

siles hurled at the latter. No serious casualty was experienced among them.

Officers and men all behaved well, and were ready, promptly and patiently, to discharge whatever duty might be presented. Captains Nelson and Barnwell, and, under them, the two lieutenants and the men of Ells's battery, at the large Parrotts, well performed their part. And the several members of my staff are entitled to honorable mention for the zeal, energy, and fortitude with which they passed through much danger, and performed, by night and by day, much labor.

In conclusion, the undersigned would record, as right and proper, an expression of gratitude for the divine guidance and guardianship under which these duties were discharged, and especially that so much was achieved by the army and its leaders, with so little to regret, and a loss so much less than usual to lament. He has the honor to be, with great respect,

Your obedient servant,

W. N. PENDLETON,

Brigadier-General and Chief of Artillery.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILCOX.

HEADQUARTERS WILCOX'S BRIGADE, December 24, 1862.

Major Thomas S. Mills, Assistant Adjutant-General:

SIR: I beg to submit herewith a brief report of the part borne by my brigade in the battle at Fredericksburg, on the thirteenth instant:

Since the arrival of the division in the vicinity of Fredericksburg, on the twenty-third ultimo, the brigade has been on the left of the division, and the extreme left of the army. And from that time till within a few days of the battle nothing of interest occurred, my command being occupied only in constructing, in part, one or two batteries on our front, and picketing on the canal in front of the house of Dr. Taylor, and thence on the Rappahannock above, some three fourths of a mile. The enemy's camps were visible on the far side of the Rappahannock, upon our arrival, and increased perceptibly for several days afterwards.

It was not long before the enemy were seen to be engaged in constructing batteries at various points on the heights beyond the river, and immediately on its banks; new batteries daily appeared, till at length extending from a point a mile above Falmouth, at convenient intervals, they reached Fredericksburg, and thence even down the river some three or four miles. On a great part of this line there were two tiers of batteries, one on the first bank of the river, and the other on heights commanding a level plateau in rear of this bank. Most of the guns of these various batteries could be made to bear both upon the city of Fredericksburg and on our batteries that crowned the heights on this side of the Rappahannock. The lines of the enemy's batteries, following the inflections of the river, enabled them to dispose of their pieces so as to enfilade most of the streets of the town; even those at right angles were alike exposed.

The two armies continued thus confronting each other on the opposite banks of the river, each constructing batteries, and the hostile pickets in full view and in close proximity; the batteries scarcely fired a gun, and the pickets, by mutual and tacit understanding, refrained entirely from the use of their rifles. This condition of affairs continued from day to day, till at length each party, perhaps, became impatient from delay and eager for the fray.

On the morning of the tenth, nothing unusual appeared upon my part of the line; the enemy's batteries and our own were as inactive as before; the pickets were neither stronger nor weaker; the day passed off quietly, and at dark there was nothing to indicate, to the closest observer on my front, that the enemy was preparing for or meditating an attack. Nothing occurred in the early part of the night to give warning of the intended attack; but, about half past four A. M. our signal guns were fired, upon hearing which, all were aroused and the command placed under arms. Little before the dawn of day musketry was heard in the direction of and in Fredericksburg, and, after that, the fire of the enemy's batteries began. Repairing to the front of my line of pickets before it was clear day, I learned that there was none of the enemy's infantry anywhere visible.

The enemy's batteries continued to fire with much spirit, and, as far as I could see, entirely concentrated upon the town of Fredericksburg. Many women and children, in great fright, with husbands and servants, were fleeing from their homes at this early hour to escape the enemy's terrible shells and cannon balls. Soon after it was clear daylight, I moved my brigade up to the front, and formed it in line of battle, under cover of the forest, and near the edge of an open field, fronting the river and the town, my left resting upon the river, one hundred and fifty yards to the left of Dr. Taylor's house, and then extending to the right across the road, on the right of Dr. Taylor's, leading into town, and thence along the base of the hill upon which Lane's battery, to the rear, was placed, crossed a deep ravine, and then bearing slightly to the rear of the Whitworth gun of Lane's battery, and then crossing another ravine, reached to Huger's battery, the right of my line. Four regiments occupied this line, and the fifth was held in rear of the centre of this line.

General Wright's brigade was on my right flank; the battery of Captain Lewis, attached to the brigade, was in position on a hill opposite to the ford between Falmouth and Fredericksburg.

The brigade remained all day quiet spectators of the enemy's fiendish and furious bombardment of Fredericksburg; many shots and shells were thrown into the woods occupied by my men, inflicting but a trifling loss, killing one and wounding two men of the Eleventh Alabama regiment.

In the afternoon it was known that the enemy had succeeded in his efforts to throw pontoon bridges over the river, and that, both in the town and below, several bridges were being used by

them for crossing over the troops. Late in the evening, Captain Lewis, seeing a column of the enemy's infantry advancing to cross the upper pontoon bridge, gave the order to his battery to fire upon them. This was instantly done, and with such effect as to drive over half of it back under cover of some houses. Later in the evening, the battery again fired upon artillery and cavalry that were in sight, and soon drove them off and out of view. This battery had orders to waste no ammunition, and to fire only when damage could be inflicted upon the enemy. The brigade slept under arms in line of battle, strong pickets being thrown to the front. The artillerymen remained with their guns.

During Friday, the twelfth, the brigade remained under arms and in position; shot and shell from the enemy's batteries fell at times near them, but without inflicting any loss. Lewis's battery, at various times during the day, fired at the enemy's batteries while crossing the river. About three P. M., a column of infantry (one brigade) came in sight; shot and shell were thrown upon the head of this column, causing much confusion in their ranks, and forcing them to change their course, and take shelter behind houses. Later in the day, the battery fired upon cavalry crossing the ford; in each case damage was done the enemy, as his ambulances were seen to leave the field with wounded.

Again all slept under arms, (the night of the twelfth,) with strong pickets in our front.

The early morn of the thirteenth was dark, and much obscured by a dense fog; at length, the rising sun dissipating the mist, about eight A. M. musketry was heard on our right; this fire quickened, and artillery was also heard in the same direction. The rapidity and quantity of the musketry fire indicated that a general action had begun. The firing, at length, began to approach nearer us, the right of our left wing had become engaged, and the firing still continued, extending towards our left, reaching as far as its centre, and here it remained for a long time, approaching no nearer our position. The firing had now become general; musketry, artillery, and the bursting of shells are heard, varying at times in quantity and rapidity, but without any entire cessation till dark; at times it would appear to be more intense far to our right, and then, again, the centre and the left centre would seem to be the point where the enemy were concentrating their heaviest forces and making the most vigorous efforts to force our line. More artillery appeared to be used on this day then I had ever known before; frequently, during the continuance of this battle, I counted as many as fifty shots per minute.

During this long and intensely exciting day my brigade remained in line of battle, ready to meet any advance of the enemy, or to hasten to any point of the line that might need support.

The battery of Captain Lewis lost no opportunity of firing upon the enemy's infantry and cavalry when in easy range; in all, it fired four hundred rounds.

The brigade lost, to-day, one killed and eight wounded — Lewis's battery one killed and two wounded.

Although the brigade lost but few men by the enemy's artillery and none by the musket, it would seem to be almost incredible that the loss should have been so inconsiderable; for, from a point near a mile above Falmouth, on a commanding height, there was a six gun battery of rifle pieces that enfiladed my line lower; down and nearer, on the slope of this hill, was a second battery, that had the same fire upon them; and yet nearer, and immediately on the banks of the river, and to the right of the two batteries above referred to, was another; and then again, on a very commanding hill, in rear of Falmouth, near the house of Miss Scott, was a battery of more than twenty pieces that bore upon us, and these of the heaviest rifle pieces; and down the river were one or two other batteries that could throw shot and shell far beyond our line; in these batteries there could not have been less than fifty pieces that bore upon us.

The night of the thirteenth we were under arms, like the two previous nights, strong pickets being in our front. During the night, our pickets were heard to fire frequently in the direction of Fredericksburg.

The morning of the fourteenth was foggy, and, when it had been scattered by the rising sun, nothing was seen of the enemy in our front, save his distant line of cavalry videttes, as usual. The fourteenth passed off quietly, some few artillery shots during the day, and at intervals a little firing between the pickets. The night of the fourteenth and the day of the fifteenth passed off with little or no firing. The night of the fifteenth was dark, windy, and rainy, and the morning of the sixteenth foggy; when the fog disappeared it revealed the fact that the enemy had recrossed the river, nothing remaining on this side but a few of the wounded, the unburied dead, and a few of the infantry pickets, whom they had failed to relieve; these delivered themselves up to my command as prisoners.

My command now returned to their camp, having been under arms since the morning of the eleventh. The lists of casualties having been previously forwarded, it will suffice in this report to state that the loss in my command was fifteen killed and wounded; of this number three were killed.

I am, sir,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
C. M. WILCOX,
Brigadier-General, commanding, &c.

REPORT OF BRIG.-GEN. FEATHERSTON.

HEADQUARTERS FEATHERSTON'S BRIGADE,
December 22, 1862.

Thomas S. Mills, Major and A. A. General:

MAJOR: In obedience to orders, I submit the following report of the part taken by my brigade in the battle before Fredericksburg:

About five o'clock A. M., on Thursday, the eleventh instant, at the firing of the signal guns,

my brigade was formed, and marched rapidly from its encampment to the line of battle previously designated for Major-General Anderson's division, in front and to the left of Fredericksburg. My brigade formed the right of Anderson's division, and was posted on Thursday morning between the plank road and Hazel Run, in front of the town, and some distance in rear of the Washington artillery. Here we remained during that day and night, protected from the artillery fire of the enemy by a continuous range of hills in our front.

On Friday morning, my brigade was moved to the left of the plank road, and our first position, between the plank road and Hazel Run, occupied by General Ransom's division.

During Friday and Friday night, we remained in position on the left of the plank road, about the same distance in rear of our batteries, where we were protected, by the same continuous range of hills, from the enemy's artillery fire. About ten o'clock A. M., on Saturday, we were ordered to advance in line of battle farther to the front, and halted about one hundred yards in rear of our batteries, on the left of the plank road, extending our line of battle up the river, in the direction of the Taylor house. Here we remained during the day, subjected to a very heavy converging fire from the enemy's artillery immediately in our front, and extending up the river to our left. My men were kept lying down during the day in an old road, protecting them as much as possible. The enemy's batteries immediately in front were numerous and skilfully served. Their batteries on our left completely enfiladed our position, which they did not fail to see, and of which they took every advantage to avail themselves. The fire of the enemy's artillery could not have been more rapid or galling on any part of the line than that which was brought to bear on our position on Saturday. The right of my brigade was also within range of the fire of the enemy's small arms. My orders were to hold this position in support of the batteries immediately in my front, and to advance to the batteries when the enemy advanced with small arms immediately in my front. There was no considerable advance of the enemy's small arms in our immediate front during the entire engagement. We remained in this position Saturday night, Sunday, and Sunday night, Monday, and Monday night. At a late hour on Sunday night, I was advised by General Ransom that one of his brigades would be withdrawn and sent across Hazel Run, down the river, by order of Lieutenant-General Longstreet. I then threw forward to the rock fence, on the right of the plank road, the Sixteenth Mississippi regiment, and five companies of the Forty-sixth Mississippi regiment, (formerly the second battalion,) to fill the place vacated by some of the troops withdrawn, and to form a continuous line of battle. These troops, to wit, the Sixteenth Mississippi and five companies of the Forty-sixth Mississippi, Sunday night, Monday, and Monday night, remained in that position, declining on Monday night to be relieved by other regiments of my brigade.

On Tuesday morning, after the fact was ascertained that the enemy had recrossed the river, the troops were withdrawn, except the Twelfth Mississippi regiment, which was left on picket in front. During the engagement of Saturday, the casualties in my brigade were forty-two killed and wounded, and one on Monday. Among the number I regret to enumerate the loss of two valuable officers, Major Lee, of the Forty-sixth, and Captain Fulkinson, of the Sixteenth regiments, both seriously, but, it is believed, not dangerously wounded. The small list of casualties, under so heavy a converging fire from the enemy's numerous batteries, can only be accounted for, under Providence, by the fact that the men were kept lying down closely on the ground, taking advantage of every hill and crest as a protection. A full return of the killed and wounded has already been transmitted to your headquarters. During the entire engagement of five days and nights, both officers and men manifested great patience and endurance, under the hardships and privations, and were eager to the last for a continuance of the fight.

The officers of the medical, commissary, and quartermaster's departments were prompt and efficient in discharging the duties of their several departments. In the absence of my regular staff officers, Captain W. R. Barksdale, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant A. N. Parker, aid-de-camp, (both absent on sick leave,) I feel greatly indebted to my volunteer aids, Captain C. H. Featherston and Mr. C. W. Graves, who attended me during the entire engagement, and who were ever ready, prompt and efficient in the execution of all orders, upon every part of the field.

I have the honor to be, Major,
Your obedient servant,
W. J. FEATHERSTON,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL KERSHAW.

HEADQUARTERS KERSHAW'S BRIGADE,
CAMP NEAR FREDERICKSBURG,
December 26, 1862.

To Major J. M. Goggin, Assistant Adjutant-General:

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit a report of the operations of my command during the recent engagement:

On the morning of the eleventh instant, by daylight, the brigade was formed in line of battle in the position assigned me, the right resting at the left of Howison's Hill, and the left near Howison's Hill, on Hazel Run. Ordered, during the day, to reënforce the picket of General Barksdale at Deep Run, the Fifteenth regiment South Carolina volunteers (Colonel De Saussure) was sent, but found the bridge at that point already completed and perfectly commanded by all the batteries on the other side. This regiment remained on picket until withdrawn to its former position, by order of the Major-General commanding, on Friday morning, after a night of such intense cold as to cause the death of one man, and disable,

temporarily, others. With this exception, the troops were kept in position, strengthening our defences nightly, without any incident requiring notice, until Saturday, the thirteenth. About one o'clock of that day, I was directed to send two regiments into the city to the support of General Cobb, then engaged with part of his brigade at the foot of Marye's Hill, and having called for reënforcements, I sent forward, at once, Colonel John D. Kennedy, with his own (Second regiment) and the Eighth regiment South Carolina volunteers, Colonel E. T. Stackhouse commanding. Within a few minutes after, I was directed to take my entire command to the same point, and assume command there. I had just moved when I was informed that General Cobb was wounded, and was directed by Major-General McLaws to hasten forward in person immediately and take command. Leaving my staff to conduct the troops, I proceeded, as rapidly as possible, to the scene of action, reaching the position at Stevens's house at the moment that Colonel Kennedy arrived with the Second and Eighth regiments, just in time to meet a fresh assault of the enemy. The position was excellent. Marye's Hill, covered with our batteries, then occupied by the Washington artillery, Colonel Walton commanding, falls off abruptly towards Fredericksburg to a stone wall, which forms a terrace on the side of the hill, and the outer margin of the Telegraph road, which winds along the foot of the hill. The road is about some twenty-five feet wide, and is faced by a stone wall, about four feet high, on the city side. The road having been cut out of the side of the hill, (in many places,) this last wall is not visible above the surface of the ground. The ground falls off rapidly to almost a level surface, which extends about a hundred and fifty yards; then, with another abrupt fall of a few feet, to another plain, which extends some two hundred yards, and then falls off abruptly into a wide ravine, which extends along the whole front of the city, and discharges into Hazel Run. I found, on my arrival, that Cobb's brigade, Colonel McMillan commanding, occupied our entire front, and my troops could only get into position by doubling on them. This was accordingly done, and the formation along most of the line, during the engagement, was consequently four deep. As an evidence of the coolness of the command, I may mention here, that, notwithstanding that their fire was the most rapid and continuous I have ever witnessed, not a man was injured by the fire of his comrades. The first attack being repelled at a quarter to three o'clock P. M., the Third regiment, Colonel J. D. Nance, and Seventh, Lieutenant-Colonel Bland, came into position on the hill at Marye's house, with Colonel De Saussure's Fifteenth regiment South Carolina volunteers in reserve and under cover of the cemetery. James's Third South Carolina battalion, (Lieutenant-Colonel Rice commanding,) I left in position at Howison's Mill, to protect our right from any advance of the enemy up Hazel Run. While the Third and Seventh regiments were getting into position, another fierce attack was sustained, and those regiments, especially the former, suffered severely. Colonel J. D. Nance, that gallant and efficient officer, fell at the head of his regiment, severely wounded in three places. Lieutenant-Colonel Rutherford, upon whom the command devolved, was almost immediately shot down, dangerously wounded, as also was Major Moffat, the next in command. Captain Todd, the senior captain, upon assuming command, was dangerously, if not mortally wounded, and his successor, Captain Summer, killed. Notwithstanding these unprecedented casualties, the regiment, without hesitation or confusion, gallantly held their position, under command of Captain John H. G. Nance, assisted by my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant A. E. Doby, and in every attack repulsed the enemy on that flank, assisted as gallantly by the Seventh regiment, immediately on their right. In the mean time, line after line of the enemy deployed in the ravine and advanced to the attack, at intervals of not more than fifteen minutes, until half past four o'clock, when there was a lull of about a half hour, during which a mass of artillery was placed in position in front of the town, and opened upon our position. At this time I brought up Colonel De Saussure's regiment. Our batteries on the hill were silent, having exhausted their ammunition, and the Washington artillery were relieved by a part of Colonel Alexander's battalion. Under cover of this artillery fire, the most formidable column of attack was formed, which, about five o'clock, emerged from the ravine, and, no longer impeded by our artillery, impetuously assailed our whole front. From this time until after six o'clock, the attack was continuous, and the fire on both sides terrific. Some few, chiefly officers, got within eighty yards of our lines; but, in every instance, their lines were shattered by the time they got within one hundred paces. The firing gradually ceased, and, by seven o'clock, our pickets were established within eighty yards of those of the enemy. Our chief loss, after getting into position in the road, was from the fire of sharpshooters, who occupied some buildings on my left flank in the early part of the engagement, and was only silenced by Captain Wallace, of the Second regiment, directing a continuous fire of one company upon the buildings. General Cobb, I learn, was killed by a shot from that quarter. The regiments on the hill suffered most, as they were less perfectly covered. During the engagement, Colonel McMillan was reënforced by the arrival of the Sixteenth Georgia regiment, and a brigade of General Ransom's command was also engaged; but as they did not report to me, I am unable to give any particulars in regard to them. That night we materially strengthened our position, and I more perfectly organized and arranged my command, fully expecting the attack to be renewed the next day. I sent the Third regiment in reserve, in consideration of their heavy loss. At daylight in the morning, the enemy was in position, lying behind the first declivity in front; but the operations on both sides were confined to skirmishing of sharp-

shooters. We lost but one man during that day, but it is reported that we inflicted a loss upon the enemy (Sykes's division) of one hundred and fifty. Monday morning discovered the pickets of the enemy behind rifle-pits, constructed, during the night, along the edge of the ravine. From this position they were nearly all driven by our batteries, and nothing of interest occurred during the day. General Semmes relieved General Cobb's brigade Monday night. Tuesday morning, as soon as the haze lifted, the enemy's pickets being no longer visible, I sent out scouts from my own brigade to the left, and from General Semmes's to the right. The former soon returned, reporting the evacuation of the town, which the latter soon confirmed, with the additional information that the bridge had been removed. I sent forward two companies, one from each brigade, and afterwards two regiments, in obedience to the order of the Major-General commanding, to occupy the town. A number of prisoners and a quantity of arms, ammunition, etc., were taken, the particulars of which have already been imparted. During these operations I was ably and gallantly assisted by Captain Holmes, A. A. G., and Lieutenant Doby, A. D. C., who were present on the field, in the active discharge of their duties. Lieutenant J. A. Myers, ordnance officer, was at his post promptly replenishing our exhausted ammunition. Lieutenant W. M. Dwight, A. I. G., was disabled, from the injuries received at Maryland Heights, but was on the field, and received a contusion on the head from a shell. Colonel McMillan, commanding Cobb's brigade, rendered valuable assistance, and when offered the alternative of being relieved Saturday night, gallantly claimed the honor of remaining. All the regimental field officers and company commanders are entitled to commendation for coolness and courage, and their successful efforts to produce a deliberate and effective fire, under the most trying circumstances. Besides the field officers already mentioned as wounded, Major F. Gaillard, Second regiment South Carolina volunteers, was struck in the face before he got into position, and was subsequently severely wounded while conveying directions, at my request, to the regiments in the rear. For particular mention of others who distinguished themselves in the engagement, I beg leave respectfully to refer to the reports of the commanders themselves, herewith submitted. Captain G. B. Cuthbert's company, Second regiment South Carolina volunteers, was thrown out by me on the edge of Hazel Run, on the thirteenth, in an exposed position, but one from which they could harass the enemy on their left flank. They held the position the whole day, exhausting their ammunition and effectively annoying the enemy. His loss was considerable, including two officers severely wounded. Captain Read's battery was posted on the hill, on the right of my first position, and did great damage to the advancing column of the enemy. They fired thirteen rounds of ammunition, affording excellent practice in the field. I will here remark that, during the engagement on Saturday, my command fired about fifty-five rounds per man. A large red and white battle flag, with the figure "1" in the centre, and an embroidered guide flag of the Sixty-ninth New York regiment, are the trophies taken in battle by my command, and have already been forwarded to division headquarters. I append herewith a recapitulation of the losses sustained by my brigade.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. KERSHAW,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

List of Casualties in Kershaw's Brigade.

Brigades.	Killed.		Wounded.		Total.		Aggregate.	Remarks.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.		
2d South Carolina Regiment, . .	. . . .	6	3	53	3	59	62	
3d " " "	5	20	14	124	19	144	163	One missing — supposed to have been killed while on picket.
7th " " "	. . . .	4	6	51	6	55	61	
8th " " "	. . . .	2	4	25	. . . .	27	31	
15th " " "	. . . .	1	2	50	. . . .	52	54	
James's Battalion, ...	. . . .	1	. . . .	1	. . . .	2	2	
	5	34	29	304	34	339	373	

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL WRIGHT.

HEADQUARTERS WRIGHT'S BRIGADE, ANDERSON'S DIVISION, CAMP NEAR FREDERICKSBURG, December 24, 1862.

Major Thomas S. Mills, A. A. G. Division:

MAJOR: In compliance with circular issued from division headquarters on December twentieth, I herewith transmit a report of the part taken by my brigade in the action at Fredericksburg. At early dawn on the morning of the eleventh instant, my brigade was put under arms and marched to a position in the rear of our redoubts on the left of the plank road, and there formed in line of battle, my right resting on Gen-

eral Mahone's left, and my left upon General Wilcox's right. In this position we remained until the morning of the sixteenth, when, the enemy having retired across the river, I fell back to my former and present camp.

On the morning of the eleventh, when the enemy opened his batteries upon the town, preparatory to crossing the river, the Third Georgia regiment was on picket duty on the river, at the upper edge of the town. This regiment retained its position during the whole day, subjected to a most galling fire from the enemy's batteries. At five o'clock, in the evening of that day, I received a communication from Colonel E. J. Walker, commanding the regiment, informing me that the enemy had effected the building of one or more bridges, and had crossed a considerable force into the town on his right, compelling the Eighth Florida regiment, which was on picket duty immediately on his right, to fall back, and that, from the sound of musketry, he was led to believe that General Barksdale's brigade, also on picket duty in the town, had retired to our line of battle, and inquiring what he (Colonel Walker) should do. I immediately sent him orders to hold his position at all hazards until morning, and if then he should become satisfied that General Barksdale's brigade had retired, and the enemy should show an imposing force on this side of the river, to fall back in order to my line, destroying the bridges over the canal. At eight o'clock next morning Colonel Walker fell back to my line, having accomplished the complete destruction of the canal bridges — General Barksdale having, as he supposed the night before, previously fallen back to our line of batteries. Colonel Walker's loss, during the day's bombardment, was one man killed and one slightly wounded. On Friday evening, the twelfth instant, the Second Georgia battalion, of my brigade, under the command of Captain C. J. Moffat, was ordered on picket duty in front of the Stansbury house, where it remained until Saturday evening, when it was relieved by the Forty-eighth Georgia regiment, Captain Hall commanding. During the fight of Saturday, Captain Moffat lost one man killed and one wounded. No other casualties occurred in my command during the action.

While the officers and men of my brigade had no opportunity to display the courage and gallantry which have heretofore marked their conduct in all the battles in which they have been engaged, their patient and protracted "*lying in wait*" during the six days they were under arms, exposed to the rigors of the severe cold weather and the fire of the enemy's batteries, has given me increased confidence in their character as veteran soldiers, who are alike equal to the trials of actual battle and of waiting under the enemy's guns for any emergency which might require their services.

I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
A. R. WRIGHT,
Brigadier-General, commanding Brigade.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL MAHONE.

HEADQUARTERS MAHONE'S BRIGADE, ANDERSON'S DIVISION, December 21, 1862.

To Major T. S. Mills, Assistant Adjutant-General, Anderson's Division:

MAJOR: In response to the call from division headquarters, I beg to present the following statement of the operations of this brigade in the late bombardment and battle of Fredericksburg:

Promptly after the signal of alarm, Thursday, the eleventh instant, the brigade was placed in the position assigned it by the division commander, immediately in rear of the line of battle selected in the event of any attack upon our own front.

For the most part, the brigade continued under arms in this position during the period of the fight, and, in fact, until Tuesday, the sixteenth instant, when the enemy evacuated Fredericksburg, and recrossed the Rappahannock. In the mean time, however, it always had a regiment, and sometimes two, in advance of the batteries on the front, which were exposed to the enemy's artillery fire, and which, though active, and especially on Saturday and Sunday, occasioned but eight casualties in the brigade. It may not be amiss to add, that much work, in the erection of batteries and rifle-pits, was performed by the troops of the brigade during the four days of the battle; among these works may be mentioned the one, as of special advantage, in dislodging the enemy from behind the hills on the right of the plank road.

I am, Major, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
WILLIAM MAHONE,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF COL. MILLER, OF COBB'S BRIGADE.

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS, FREDERICKSBURG, VA., December 20, 1862.

Major James M. Goggin, Assistant Adjutant-General:

I have the honor to report to you the part taken by this brigade in the battle of Fredericksburg:

On the morning of the eleventh instant, at five o'clock, the brigade was put under arms and in position, and so remained until seven o'clock P. M., when the Eighteenth and Twenty-fourth Georgia regiments and Phillips's legion were marched into Fredericksburg by General Cobb, to relieve General Barksdale, and took position in our line of battle in the road along the foot of Marye's Hill, crossing the Telegraph road, by which the enemy advanced; the legion on the left, Twenty-fourth Georgia in the centre, and Eighteenth on the right. The men lay on their arms during the night. Our pickets and scouts took fifteen prisoners. Close and heavy skirmishing was kept up during Friday, the twelfth, and on that night we again rested on our arms.

At daybreak on the thirteenth, skirmishing again commenced, accompanied by the enemy's

shells. This was kept up continually until about eleven o'clock A. M., when the advance of the enemy drove in our pickets, and his column approached the left of our line by the Telegraph road and deployed towards our right. He had succeeded in planting three stands of colors along our front, and when his column had been deployed about two thirds of the distance on his line, our well-directed fire had so thinned his ranks that the survivors retreated. General Cobb, whose fall we so much deplore, lived to see this first signal repulse and the bravery of the troops he so well commanded. About twelve or fifteen minutes thereafter General Cobb fell, mortally wounded, and I took command of the brigade. Soon another column, heavier than the first, advanced in our front, and moved steadily forward to their colors, near our centre. As the column approached, I directed the small arms to cease until the enemy should get nearer. So soon as he got within certain range, our fire mowed down his ranks, until they faltered and the survivors retreated. They were met by a strong reenforcement, and again advanced upon us in heavier force; and this time the slaughter in their ranks was terrific, and we again drove them back. Column after column was brought up during the afternoon, and the battle continued until after dark. In every attack the enemy was repulsed with immense slaughter. During the afternoon a courier informed me that you had sent the Sixteenth Georgia regiment to the mill, to await orders. I sent for that regiment, and placed it on our right, to strengthen and protect that point, which it held during the remainder of the engagement. We rested on our arms that night and throughout the next day. Sunday, the fourteenth, a close, heavy, and continuous skirmish fire was kept up. On Sunday night we were relieved by General Semmes.

I cannot speak in too high terms of the cool bravery of both officers and men, and the promptness and cheerfulness with which they obeyed and executed all orders. The heaps of slain in our front tell best how well they acted their part.

Annexed is a list of killed and wounded.

Very respectfully, &c., &c.,

ROBERT M. MILLER,
Colonel, commanding Brigade.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL PERRY.

HEADQUARTERS PERRY'S BRIGADE,
December 18, 1862.

Major Thomas S. Mills, Assistant Adjutant General:

MAJOR: I have the honor to enclose to you the reports of commanders of the Donaldsville artillery battery and the Eighth Florida regiment, the only portions of my brigade engaged in the recent battle on the Rappahannock River:

The Eighth Florida regiment having been detailed for picket duty and placed temporarily under command of Brigadier-General Barksdale, commanding the picket forces at Fredericksburg, I am unable to give additional information to that contained in Captain Lang's report, to which I call your attention. I addressed a note to Brigadier-General Barksdale, relative to three companies of this regiment, which were detailed from the regiment by General Barksdale, and assigned to a position apart from the regiment. General Barksdale replied that they were probably taken prisoners by the enemy. I have been able to obtain no further information upon the subject. I respectfully call to the attention of the General the gallant conduct of the Donaldsonville battery throughout the entire engagement. Both officers and men stood bravely and faithfully at their posts, and, while exposed to an unusually heavy fire, the guns were handled with masterly skill and with great effect.

The loss in the brigade is ninety-four killed, wounded, and missing. Of this number, eight were killed, forty-three wounded, and forty-three missing. Of these, the Eighth Florida regiment lost seven killed, thirty-seven wounded, and forty-three missing. The Fifth Florida regiment had one wounded. The battery had one killed and five wounded.

I have the honor, Major,
To be very respectfully, &c.,

E. A. PERRY,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

REPORT OF COLONEL HALL, COMMANDING COOKE'S BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS COOKE'S BRIGADE,
December 17, 1862.

CAPTAIN: Early on the morning of the eleventh instant, the brigade, under the command of General Cooke, was ordered to the front, opposite Fredericksburg, where we remained in position until about twelve o'clock, Saturday, the thirteenth, at which time the engagement was going on in our front.

The brigade was formed in line of battle as follows: The Twenty-seventh on the right, Forty-eighth next, Fifteenth on the left. We moved into action by regiments. After advancing about two hundred yards, under a heavy fire of shell and musketry, we arrived at the crest of Willis's Hill, which overlooks the battle-field, on which hill several batteries were placed.

With the exception of the Twenty-seventh, the brigade was halted on the crest of the hill, and delivered its fire on the advancing column of the enemy, who was then engaged in making a furious assault on our front line, which was covered by a long stone wall at the foot of the hill; which assault, on the arrival of the brigade, was repulsed, with great loss to the enemy. The enemy, that time, succeeded in getting up to within forty yards of the wall.

After the repulse of the enemy, the Forty-sixth was moved down the hill behind the fence, supporting Cobb's brigade. The Twenty-seventh and Forty-sixth remained behind the fence, and the Forty-eighth and Fifteenth on the top of the hill, all day.

Six different times during the day did the enemy advance his heavily-reënforced columns, and each time was driven back with immense

loss. The action ceased at night, when the brigade was withdrawn, and resumed the position they occupied previous to the action.

I regret to have to state that our brave commander was severely wounded early in the action.

It gives me great pleasure to state that, without exception, the conduct of the different regiments composing this brigade was deserving of the most unqualified approbation.

No engagement having taken place the next day, the commanders of the different regiments were ordered to intrench themselves that night, and before day each had opened ditches sufficient to cover their whole commands; and, the night after, two additional works were completed, sufficient for two more regiments.

On Sunday morning the brigade was relieved by General Jenkins, and ordered back to camp.

I regret to say the loss of the brigade was heavy. A correct list of casualties will be handed in.

I have the honor to be,

E. D. HALL,
Colonel, commanding Cooke's Brigade.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL LAW.

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,
December 17, 1862.

Major W. H. Sully, Assistant Adjutant-General:

I have the honor to report the part taken by my command in the engagement near Fredericksburg, on Saturday, December thirteen, 1862:

On the morning of the thirteenth, my brigade formed a portion of the second or reserve line, extending along the range of hills from the vicinity of Hamilton's Crossing to Dr. Reynolds's house. On the plateau, directly in front of the position occupied by my brigade, and about five hundred yards distant, the skirt of timber bordering on Deep Run, from its confluence with the Rappahannock, abruptly terminates. From this point to the river the channel of the run becomes gradually wider and deeper, its general direction being almost perpendicular to our own line and that of the enemy, on the Bowling Green road. I received orders, during the morning, from Major-General Hood, commanding the division, to render assistance to Major-General A. P. Hill's troops, in the event it should be required; and was ordered by General Hill to support Brigadier-General Pender, who held the left of the first line, to my front and right. At three o'clock in the afternoon a force of the enemy defiled from the wood on Deep Run, and, forming into line of battle, advanced upon Latimer's battery, which was posted on the plateau on General Pender's eft, and supported by one of his regiments. Perceiving this attack, I moved my brigade forward to the edge of the timber in rear of the battery. Detaching the Fifty-seventh and Fifty-fourth North Carolina regiments, I advanced with them to attack the enemy, who had now gained the line of the railroad, which crosses the plateau directly in front of the battery, and about two hundred yards from it. The enemy was promptly driven from the railroad by the Fifty-seventh North Carolina, which was in advance, and the regiment continued to move steadily forward to within three hundred yards of the Bowling Green road, driving his infantry before it. During the action a body of the enemy opened fire from the wood bordering the run, upon the left of the advancing line. This was promptly checked by a fire from the left of the Fifty-seventh and from the Fifty-fourth, which changed front obliquely to the left in order to face the wood. In the mean time, the Fourth Alabama had been brought forward in front of the battery as a support. Having accomplished my purpose of driving the enemy from the vicinity of the battery, I ordered the two regiments in advance to retire and take position on the railroad, which they held until after dark, when they were relieved by the Sixth North Carolina. The conduct of the Fifty-seventh and Fifty-fourth North Carolina regiments was admirable. I cannot speak too highly of their steady courage in advancing, and the coolness with which they retired to the line of railroad when ordered. Colonel Godwin, commanding the Fifty-seventh, and Colonel McDowell, commanding the Fifty-fourth, ably assisted by Lieutenant-Colonels Jones and Murchison, handled their commands with great skill and coolness. The officers of my staff, Captain Terrell, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Capons, aid-de-camp, were, as usual, conspicuous for gallantry and usefulness, contributing materially by their exertions to the good conduct of the troops. It is with deep sorrow that I report the death of private V. S. Smith, of the Fourth Alabama regiment, an acting officer on my staff. Alabama never bore a braver son, and our country's cause has never received the sacrifice of a manlier spirit. He fell, where the hour of danger always found him, at his post. The following is a recapitulation of the loss of the brigade:

REGIMENT.	KILLED.	WOUNDED.	MISSING.
57th N. Carolina, .	32	90	2
54th N. Carolina, .	9	35	3
6th N. Carolina, . .	5	19	. . . . .
4th Alabama, . . .	4	18	. . . . .
44th Alabama, . .	. . . . .	2	. . . . .
Total, ...	50	164	5

I am, Major, very respectfully,

E. M. LAW,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL SEMMES.

HEADQUARTERS SEMMES BRIGADE,
CAMP NEAR FREDERICKSBURG,
December 22, 1862.

Major J. M. Goggin, Assistant Adjutant-General:

MAJOR: I have the honor to report herewith a list of the casualties in my brigade in the battle

of Fredericksburg, from the eleventh to the fifteenth, inclusive. Except when posted in the road, at the foot of Marye's Hill, on the fourteenth and fifteenth, my brigade was not under fire from small arms. It was only exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery, from which it suffered but little.

I am, Major, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
PAUL J. SEMMES,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL PAXTON.

HEADQUARTERS PAXTON'S BRIGADE, JACKSON'S DIVISION, CAMP NEAR CORBIN'S FARM, December 24, 1862.

Captain W. T. Taliaferro, Assistant Adjutant-General:

CAPTAIN: In pursuance of the order from the division commander to report the participation of my brigade in the battle near Fredericksburg, I have the honor to state that my brigade, consisting of the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Twenty-seventh, and Thirty-third Virginia regiments, and Carpenter's battery, numbering in all about one hundred and twenty-three officers and eleven hundred men, marched from its encampment near Guineas Depot, on Friday morning, the twelfth instant, at daybreak. After reaching the battle-field, and frequent changes of positions, when the engagement commenced, my brigade occupied a position near the crest of the hill, some four hundred yards in the rear of General Gregg's brigade, of A. P. Hill's division, my right resting on the left of Ewell's division. My orders were to support General Gregg, and be governed in my action by his movements. Upon a report from my orderly, Mr. F. C. Cox, whom I had sent forward to give me information, that Gregg's brigade was moving, I ordered my brigade to the front in line of battle. About the time of reaching General Gregg's position, the Second Virginia regiment, occupying the right of my line, came in view of the enemy, and, under the order of Captain J. Q. A. Nadenbousch, commanding the regiment, filed obliquely to the right and rear, but scarcely effected its change of position when it was fired upon by the enemy. Expecting, from the indications, that my troops would be engaged in this position, I proceeded to bring forward the Fifth and Fourth regiments at double-quick, and post them upon the right of the second regiment, and to put the Twenty-seventh and Thirty-third regiments in position upon its left. These dispositions, however, were not accomplished until the firing ceased, the enemy having been gallantly repulsed by the Second regiment. Soon after I changed my position, and occupied the military road. Whilst there, I found that troops were falling back in disorder past the right of my line, when I deemed it prudent to move some three hundred yards to the right, upon the road, to guard against an advance of the enemy in that direction. Again I changed position, and occupied the line of the fence in front. That night my brigade slept on their arms on the military road, and the next morning before daylight, in pursuance of an order from the division commander, took a position on the railroad, my right resting opposite the position which my left had occupied on the military road. Here the day passed off quietly, with the exception of occasional firing between the pickets. Carpenter's battery was detached from my brigade on the twelfth, and was not under my orders during the engagement. A report of its participation in the engagement by Lieutenant McKendree, commanding, is transmitted herewith.

I am much indebted to my regimental officers, Captains Nadenbousch and Colston, acting field officers of the Second Virginia regiment; Lieutenant-Colonel Gardiner and Major Terry, Fourth Virginia regiment; Lieutenant-Colonel Williams and Captain Newton, Fifth Virginia regiment; Lieutenant-Colonel Edmondson and Major Shriver, Forty-seventh Virginia regiment, and Colonel Lee, Thirty-third Virginia regiment, for the exhibition of great gallantry, skill, and coolness in the discharge of their duties. Lieutenant-Colonel Gardiner, after having passed unhurt, and distinguished for his gallantry, through all the battles of the campaign, (Port Republic, Richmond, Cedar Mountain, Manassas, and Sharpsburg,) fell, at the head of his regiment, severely, if not fatally, wounded. To Adjutant C. S. Arnall, Fifth Virginia regiment, acting as my assistant adjutant-general, the highest praise is due for his gallant and energetic discharge of the duties incident to the position. To the rank and file of my command I am especially grateful, for the courage, fidelity, and promptness exhibited in obeying my orders. My brigade sustained a loss of four killed, sixty-nine wounded, one missing; total, seventy-four. The reports of regimental and battery commanders, with lists of casualties, are transmitted herewith.

Respectfully,
E. F. PAXTON,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF COLONEL HOKE, COMMANDING BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS TRIMBLE'S BRIGADE, December 19, 1862.

Major S. Hale, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Ewell's Division:

MAJOR: I respectfully report that on Saturday, thirteenth of this month, I received orders from General Early to form my brigade immediately behind General Hays's brigade, with my right resting upon the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, at Hamilton's Crossing, about four miles from Fredericksburg. I remained in this position for about two hours, under a very heavy cannonading, and lost a number of men in this place. The infantry firing at the front became quite heavy, and General Early ordered me to move my brigade by the left flank, and let my right rest upon the left of General Hays. I had scarcely gotten in this position before he ordered me to the front to the support of General Archer. I moved promptly and steadily to the front, and

found General Archer had been driven back, and the enemy had occupied the woods upon the top of the hill. I soon drove them from this position, and found, upon getting to the intrenchments at the edge of the woods, that they had retreated to the railroad, in which place they had held reserves. I saw that it would not do to allow them to remain in the railroad, as that point commanded a large portion of our intrenchments at the edge of the woods, and that I would lose from their sharpshooters; so I immediately ordered a charge, and drove them from their place, killing about two hundred, and wounding a large number, one hundred of whom fell into my hands. I must have wounded quite a number of the enemy at this point who were able to make their escape, as I was immediately upon them. I also captured about three hundred prisoners. I had brought from this point about four hundred stand of arms, and left a number across the railroad. After driving them from the railroad, I followed them to the fence beyond the road, and at this point halted to see if I could go farther. While I was in this position, the main line of the enemy gave back about fifty yards; and my opinion is, that if a brigade had been upon my right we could have driven the whole line. I remained in this position for some time, to see if any other forces were coming forward; and in the mean time the enemy threw a brigade down the river road, preparatory to making an attack upon my right flank, and seeing my position would soon become a critical one, I ordered the Twenty-first North Carolina and Twenty-first Georgia regiments and First North Carolina battalion back to the railroad, under Lieutenant-Colonel Harper, with orders to hold it to the last, and ordered the Fifteenth Alabama and Twelfth Georgia regiments back to the intrenchments at the edge of the woods, all of which was done effectually and promptly, and with a very slight loss. My loss in this charge and falling back was only two men killed and about thirty wounded, most of which were very slight. Lieutenant-Colonel Scott was killed while falling back to the woods. He acted most gallantly, and did his duty nobly. I held my position in the railroad, and at the edge of the woods, until Monday morning, fifteenth, at which time I was relieved by General D. H. Hill's troops. I cannot say too much in praise of the officers and men under my command; all did their duty nobly, and went into the fight with a spirit of determination, and it would be doing injustice to note any one particularly. Captain A. Hoffman, acting ordnance officer, was of great service to me upon the field. My tabular report of killed and wounded has been sent in. The report of the action of the battery attached to this brigade will be made by Captain Latimer, who was acting chief of artillery on that day.

Very respectfully,

R. F. HOKE,
Colonel, commanding Brigade.

Official copy:
S. HALE,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

REPORT OF COLONEL WALKER, COMMANDING BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS EARLY'S BRIGADE, Dec. 26th, 1862.

Major S. Hale, Acting A. A. G.

I have the honor to report the operations of Early's brigade in the battle near Fredericksburg, on the thirteenth instant:

We were placed in position by General Early, commanding division, in the second line of battle, supporting A. P. Hill's division. The action had not continued over half an hour, before I received an order from General Early (through Major Wilson, volunteer aid) to advance at double-quick, as the enemy had cut their way through the first line, and were advancing. I put the brigade in motion, and met the enemy about the middle of the woods; but they fell back as we came up, and we continued to press them closely, driving them across the railroad, and following them some distance beyond into the open field. When we reached the railroad there was no support on our left, and a large column of Federal infantry were moving across the railroad, about four hundred yards to our left, and entering the woods. Fearing to advance farther to our front, I drew my command back to the railroad, and held that position, after detailing Lieutenant-Colonel Terrill, with the Thirteenth Virginia, to deploy his regiment on our left flank, and directing him to advance under cover of the timber to engage the enemy's column on our left upon the flank. This was done promptly, and Thomas's brigade, of A. P. Hill's division, engaging them in front about the same time, they fell back in good order, but scarcely firing a gun in their retreat. The two fires told severely upon them, as the large number of dead and wounded left on that part of the field clearly showed. After this column of the enemy fell back, there was for some time no body of their troops in sight, but not deeming it prudent to give up the advantage of our position by advancing in pursuit over the open plain, I continued to hold the railroad for the remainder of the evening without any molestation from the enemy, further than by forming a fresh line of troops in sight, but out of our range, and throwing out skirmishers, who kept up a straggling fire until night. After dark, I left pickets on the railroad, and withdrew my command back into the woods about one hundred and fifty yards, and bivouacked for the night.

Early the next morning, we were relieved by Paxton's brigade, and joined the division.

Our loss was one hundred and fifty-seven in killed and wounded. I cannot close without expressing my admiration for the manner in which this brigade performed its duty, and the gallantry and bravery exhibited by both officers and men. I had no trouble in getting them to *fight*, but a good deal to get *them to stop*, when in my opinion it was imprudent to go farther.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

J. A. WALKER,
Colonel, commanding Brigade

Official copy: S. HALE,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL HAYS.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST LOUISIANA BRIGADE, December 19, 1862.

To Major Hale, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General:

MAJOR: On arriving at Hamilton's Crossing, on the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, Saturday, the thirteenth instant, about ten o'clock, I proceeded to place my brigade, according to orders, in line of battle, with my right resting on the railroad, and the line extended on the road leading to Spottsylvania Court House. Here I was directed to remain, and to take advantage of the shelter afforded by the hills on the north.

A short while before noon an order was conveyed to me to advance in line, through the woods, towards the front. I accordingly put my line in motion. While advancing, I was informed of the existence of a ditch on the crest of the hill overlooking the river bottom, and directed to occupy it as a rifle-pit. But, on reaching the place, I discovered other troops in possession of the ditch, and accordingly halted my line a few yards in their rear, in readiness to advance in support. In this position I continued the remainder of the day and the night following.

The next morning, the fourteenth instant, at dawn, my brigade was moved several hundred yards to the left, on a line with the ditch above referred to, in rear of and supporting General Paxton's brigade, then occupying the railroad. While in this position, I was directed to send a regiment to fill up a gap in the line along the railroad, between the brigades of General Paxton and General Trimble, then commanded by Colonel Hoke. The Seventh Louisiana regiment was sent to complete this line. The remainder of the brigade continued to occupy the line indicated during Sunday, the fourteenth instant, and the night succeeding.

In the morning following, the fifteenth instant, I resumed my original place, near Hamilton's Crossing, and there remained until the sixteenth instant, when I was ordered to occupy a line in rear of the batteries posted on the hill, with my right resting on the railroad. I had barely reached my position, when, the retreat of the enemy being discovered, I was ordered back to the crossing, and, in a short time thereafter, took up the line of march in the direction of Port Royal.

My loss, amounting to nine killed, forty-four wounded, and one missing, was inflicted by the enemy's batteries, while advancing in line, on the thirteenth instant, to the brow of the hill in front.

I have to commend the zealous promptness of officers and men in obeying my orders, and the earnest desire they evinced to meet the enemy. And, I am happy to add, there was less straggling during the several days of the recent engagements, than I have ever known. To Captain New and Lieutenant Macon, of my staff, I am indebted for the cheerful discharge of their respective duties.

HARRY T. HAYS,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

REPORT OF COLONEL KENNEDY, COMMANDING BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND SOUTH CAROLINA REGIMENT, December 20, 1862.

Captain C. H. Holmes, Assistant Adjutant-General, Kershaw's Brigade:

CAPTAIN: Between twelve and one o'clock on Saturday, the thirteenth ultimo, Lieutenant Dwight, of General Kershaw's staff, ordered me to take my regiment, the Second, and the Eighth, Captain Stackhouse, to the support of General Cobb, on the Telegraph road. I moved out, left in front, the Eighth following. In rear of the extreme right battery of Colonel Walton's artillery (on Fuller's Hill), I halted the Second regiment until Captain Stackhouse closed up. I then moved the two regiments into the field to the left of the wood, (in which I had halted,) fronted, and advanced in line of battle, making the Eighth the battalion of direction, and obliquing to the right, so as to throw the two commands between the two right batteries of the Washington artillery (Colonel Walton's) on the hill and the Marye house. The fire of shell and small arms was terrific, raking the whole field. The men moved forward in fine style, obeying promptly every command issued. When I arrived at the crest of the hill I gave the command, "Double-quick," and moved the two regiments to the stone fence on the Telegraph road, where General Cobb was posted. One volley was fired before reaching it, and that by the Eighth regiment. The Eighth regiment supported a portion of General Cobb's brigade, to the right, and the Second was disposed as follows: three companies on the left of the Eighth, one company and the half of another at the small house near the centre of General Cobb's line, (where General Kershaw made his headquarters,) three companies and a half to the left of this house, behind a stone wall, in rear of the Twenty-fourth Georgia regiment. Captain Pulliam, with his company, came up shortly after this disposition of my command, and was sent to a stone fence, where the Philips' legion (of General Cobb's brigade) was posted to the left of the Twenty-fourth Georgia, and, although later in the action than the rest of my regiment, (having failed to hear the order to move out of the trenches,) did fine execution. The action continuing until after dark, advance after advance of the foe was repelled. The whole regiment acted with cool daring and high courage; men never did their duty more thoroughly. My position being in the centre, I appointed Captain Wallace to superintend the operation of the left wing, and Captain Leitner the three companies on the right. I gave my attention to the operations of both, and of the centre. These officers deserve notice for their deliberative, prompt execution of every order. Major Gaillard was slightly wounded in advancing across the field, commanding the Second South Carolina regiment, (I, acting as commander of both battalions, the Second and Eighth). Shortly after reaching the stone wall, General Kershaw detailed him to con-

vey some order, and, in executing the commission, he was wounded in the foot, and compelled to leave the field. Thus I was deprived of his valuable assistance, and the regiment of that gallant bearing which he has exhibited on so many fields. Of the conduct of Captain Wallace, acting as field officer, I cannot speak too highly; he elicited the highest admiration, and is deserving of special mention. No braver man ever trod the field of battle. Captain Cuthbert's company had been deployed to the right of the creek early in the morning, and remained until after dark, doing execution in the ranks of the enemy. The exalted courage, enthusiasm, and chivalric daring of its commanding officer are always guarantees of its good success. Lieutenants Elliott and Fishburn, of this company, were wounded, gallantly discharging their duty. Captains Pulliam, Moore, Cunningham, Graham, and Lieutenants Maxwell, Brown, Perry, and Wallace, commanding companies, and their lieutenants, all acted with conspicuous bravery, and deserve my thanks for their hearty coöperation. It is useless to mention individual instances of courage; they are too numerous: suffice it to say, the regiment never acted with more coolness. Adjutant Sill was of every assistance to me, and exhibited great gallantry. Mr. B. Moses, of Company D, acting as orderly to me, bore himself well, but was disabled before reaching the wall, and compelled to retire. S. P. Boozer, of Company F, acting as same, coolly conveyed several orders to different parts of the regiment, and was wounded by my side. His demeanor was inspiriting. Captain Stackhouse, while under my command, (which was until General Kershaw reached the stone wall and assumed command,) acted deliberately, and commanded his men with success and bravery. Number of officers and men carried into action, three hundred and fifty. Officers killed, none; men killed, six. Officers wounded, seven; men wounded, fifty-five. Total killed and wounded, sixty-two.

All of which is respectfully submitted,

JOHN D. KENNEDY,
Colonel, commanding Second S. C. V.

REPORT OF COLONEL EVANS, COMMANDING BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS LAWTON'S BRIGADE,
NEAR PORT ROYAL, VA., Dec. 19, 1862.

Major S. Hale, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General:

MAJOR: On the thirteenth instant, about nine o'clock A. M., Lawton's brigade, Colonel E. N. Atkinson commanding, was formed in line of battle in a wood about three fourths of a mile west of the railroad, nearly opposite Hamilton's Crossing, below Fredericksburg, Virginia, the right resting on the left of another brigade of Ewell's division, the Thirteenth Georgia, Colonel J. M. Smith commanding, being the extreme right, and successively towards the left the Sixtieth Georgia, (Colonel W. H. Stiles,) Sixty-first Georgia, (Colonel J. H. Lamar,) Thirty-eighth Georgia, (Captain William McLeod,) Thirty-first Georgia, (Colonel C. A. Evans,) and the Twenty-sixth Georgia, (Captain Grace,) being six regiments, numbering about two thousand rank and file. While thus resting in line the shells of the enemy fell upon the regiments on the right, wounding several, but was borne without flinching by men who, in many engagements, have proven themselves not deficient in courage or patriotism. About half past one o'clock the brigade was ordered forward, and all the regiments advanced at once, in line, except the Thirteenth Georgia. The failure of this regiment to move at the proper time is subject to the following explanation: While in line this regiment rested upon the slope of a hill intervening between it and the other regiments, which prevented Colonel Smith from observing, at the time, the forward movement of the brigade, and receiving no order to advance, our line passed out of sight before he was aware that he had been left behind. Receiving orders, communicated by yourself soon afterwards, he advanced to rejoin the brigade, but was too late to participate in the action. Subsequently, being ordered to join Colonel Hoke, commanding Trimble's brigade, he placed his regiment in a trench near the edge of the field, on Colonel Hoke's left, where he remained until Monday morning. In the mean time, the brigade moving forward about two hundred and fifty yards, Captain Grace, commanding the Twenty-sixth Georgia, on the left, encountered the enemy, being apprised of their proximity to him by a volley poured into his ranks, which for a moment checked his advance. But quickly recovering, the regiment delivered its fire, reloaded, and, advancing, drove the enemy before them through the woods. Having encountered the enemy so soon, they became for the time separated from the brigade, and on reaching the ditch which skirted the edge of the woods, they observed the remaining regiments far out on the plain. Here Captain Grace was directed to halt his command, and not advance into the open field. The remaining four regiments, consisting of the Sixtieth Georgia, (Colonel Stiles,) Sixty-first Georgia, (Colonel Lamar,) Thirty-eighth Georgia, (Captain McLeod,) and Thirty-first Georgia, (Colonel Evans,) pushing ahead, came upon the enemy in a minute of time after they were first encountered by Captain Grace, receiving their fire without producing scarcely a perceptible check, fired in return, and, with loud cheers, dashed forward. From this time the contest consisted of but a series of temporary *halts* made by the enemy, only to be driven away from their positions. At the railroad the enemy made their most determined resistance, and for a few minutes poured a heavy fire into our line. Seeing that a charge was the most effectual plan to dislodge them, the order was given, and so rapidly accomplished that many of the enemy were captured, and a few, in their attempts to get away, received the application of the bayonet. As an incident of the battle, I desire to state that one of the enemy, after surrendering, levelled his gun to fire at our passing line; but a bayonet thrust from the hands of Captain

W. D. Wood, of the Thirty-first Georgia, prevented the intended barbarism. At this part of the railroad a short neck of woods juts out into the plain; so that on our right and left were the open field, while before the line lay this neck of thickly matted woods. Under its shelter the enemy fled, pursued by these four regiments with so much precipitation that both parties entered the ditches beyond almost together. At the railroad and in these ditches a large number of prisoners were captured and sent to the rear, among whom was one colonel and several officers of minor grade. A battery posted to the left, on a hill about two hundred yards distant from the last ditches referred to, tempted the troops still farther into the field, firing as they advanced towards it upon men and horses with such effect as to cause a portion of the battery to be withdrawn and the remainder to be abandoned. The prize was virtually in the hands of these gallant men, being abandoned and within seventy-five yards of the place where they stood; but at this moment a heavy line of the enemy advanced on our right flank, (learned since to have been General Birney's division,) and seeing that all had been accomplished which was in the power of these men to do, I communicated to them the order to retire to the protection of the woods. In the heat of the contest these four regiments may have "gone too far," but brave men in that important struggle feel that they scarcely went far enough. Colonel Atkinson, in command of the brigade, participating fully in the enthusiasm of the charge, was wounded in the arm, above the elbow, soon after entering the field, and fell into the hands of the enemy. Colonel Lamar, wounded by having a part of one of his fingers shot off, retired from the ground; and Major McCarthy succeeded to the command, leading the regiment into the open plain, assisted by Captain Peter Brennan. Colonel W. H. Stiles, commanding his regiment through the entire fight, I have the pleasure to state, did his duty, and did it well. I cannot forbear to mention, in terms of unqualified praise, the heroism of Captain E. P. Lawton, assistant adjutant-general of the brigade, from the beginning of the advance until near the close of the fight, when he received a dangerous wound, and was unavoidably left in the open plain, where he fell. Cheering on the men, leading this regiment, or restoring the line of another, encouraging officers, he was everywhere along the whole line, the bravest among the brave. Just as the four regiments emerged from the neck of woods referred to, his horse was shot from under him, and, in falling, so far disabled him that thousands less ardent or determined would have felt justified in leaving the field; but limping on, he rejoined the line again in their advance towards the battery, but soon received the wound with which he fell. It is gratifying to me to be able to record that officers and men generally behaved with the courage characteristic of the southern soldier, continuing for the brigade a well-deserved reputation. The report of casualties will testify how severe the fire was through which these brave men passed in driving the enemy before them. The Staunton artillery, commanded by Lieutenant A. W. Garber, (attached to this brigade,) at half past four o'clock, was ordered to the extreme right of our lines, and was actively engaged on the plain about two hours, when the batteries of the enemy ceased firing. The officers and men behaved with coolness and gallantry. Lieutenant Garber had his horse shot from under him during the engagement, but suffered no loss of his men. I am extremely gratified to mention that by the activity of Surgeon George F. Cooper, senior surgeon of the brigade, although with limited transportation, our numerous wounded received prompt attention.

I have the honor to be, Major,

Your obedient servant,

C. A. EVANS,
Colonel, commanding Brigade.

Official copy: S. HALE,
A. A. A. General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL PENDER.

HEADQUARTERS PENDER'S BRIGADE,
December 20, 1862.

Major-General A. P. Hill, commanding Light Division:

GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by my brigade in the fight of December thirteenth, before Fredericksburg:

I was placed in position Friday morning, early, on the extreme left of the division, in a skirt of wood, where we had no protection, nor could have, from the enemy's artillery. Two batteries were placed in my front; the right one commanded by Captain Davidson, who, I will here state, acted throughout with the greatest judgment, coolness, and bravery. Friday was taken up by slight skirmish firing, and now and then a slight artillery duel. Saturday morning we were engaged in the same manner. In the afternoon, however, when the enemy advanced on the right, they opened a most tremendous fire of artillery upon the batteries in my front, playing upon them from the front and right, from at least four batteries. This fire was most destructive to my men. At about this time a heavy line of skirmishers advanced within range of Captain Davidson's battery, and kept up a hot fire upon him. One of their balls, at this time, killed my aid, Lieutenant Sheppard, while he was very gallantly and coolly trying to rally some men who had broken on our right and were making to the rear. These skirmishers became so annoying that additional companies had to be thrown out, under the efficient Major Cole, to drive them back, which he did, and held them in check long after his ammunition had given out. Colonel McElroy, with his regiment, the Sixteenth North Carolina, had been placed, early in the morning, near the railroad cut, and in front of the left battery, which this day consisted of some rifle pieces, under Captain Latimer — as brave a soldier as I ever saw — to support it. He was here much exposed,

being far in advance of the general line, with his left totally unprotected, but with the ravine of Deep Run to cover the movement of the enemy on his left. After the heat of the action on the right, the enemy advanced a brigade up Deep Run, throwing one regiment somewhat in advance, which so sheltered itself behind the trees as to get near enough to take an officer and fifteen men of the Sixteenth prisoners, who were protecting the left flank of their regiment. This left the regiment to be raked by a fire down the railroad track. The Colonel drew his regiment back to the ditch and held his ground, until General Law sent forward two regiments to its assistance; these three then charged the enemy, driving them from the railroad cut and across the fields, to within a short distance of their batteries. Owing to a great many of Colonel McElroy's men not having cartridge-boxes, they got out of ammunition; but, getting into the ditch and dividing them, they maintained their ground. The officers and men of my brigade behaved throughout as well as I could have desired them.

In conclusion, I beg leave to commend the efficiency of First Lieutenant T. T. Kirkland, ordnance officer and acting assistant adjutant-general, and Mr. John Young, volunteer aid-de-camp. These gentlemen were greatly exposed during the two days we were in advance, but were always at their post. In the death of Lieutenant Sheppard I have to lament the loss of a brave and promising young officer.

I am, sir,

Very respectfully,

W. D. PENDER,
Brigadier-General.

List of Casualties in Pender's Brigade.

REGIMENT.	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		AGGREGATE.
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	
Staff	1*	....	....	....	1
Thirteenth North Carolina	....	7	4	26	37
Sixteenth North Carolina	2	4	8	40	54
Twenty-second North Carolina	....	1	2	42	45
Thirty-fourth North Carolina	....	2	2	15	19
Thirty-eighth North Carolina	....	....	1	13	14
Grand Total	3	14	17	136	170

* Lieutenant Sheppard, aid-de-camp, killed.

REPORT OF COLONEL HAMILTON, COMMANDING BRIGADE.

BIVOUAC ON RAPPAHANNOCK RIVER, HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, A. P. HILL'S LIGHT DIVISION, December 22, 1862.

Major R. C. Morgan, A. A. G.:

MAJOR: In obedience to orders from division headquarters, I have the honor to forward the enclosed reports of the regimental commanders of this brigade. After the unfortunate fall of Brigadier-General Maxcy Gregg, I assumed command of the Second brigade. I have but little to add to my report as regimental commander of the First regiment South Carolina volunteers, beyond mentioning that, so soon as I was informed that I was in command of General Gregg's brigade, I mounted a horse standing near and rode down the lines, informing the commanders of regiments that I was in command of the brigade, and cautioning the soldiers of the brigade to remain quiet and steady under the severe fire of shells, which were falling along the line which we occupied; and I am pleased to say that their courage and steadiness were of the highest character. The brigade, except my own regiment, First South Carolina volunteers, and Orr's rifle regiment, was not engaged with the enemy, as they retired under the fire from my own regiment, no doubt accelerated by their finding themselves at the mercy of the Second brigade, which had faced about, and, in an advance a few yards beyond, their entire flank would have been exposed to a severe and raking fire. Brigadier-General Paxton's brigade came up after I had driven the enemy off; but I am not aware that they were engaged at all with them at or near my position. I understand that General Early's brigade, under command of Colonel Walker, passed the left of the Second brigade, and marched to the front; but, as I was on the right of the brigade at this time, and in thick woods, I did not see it myself. Shortly after this, by order from General A. P. Hill, I moved the brigade forward as a support to Colonel Walker's brigade, and found him occupying the line of the railroad. The enemy were drawn out in line of battle some six hundred yards distant from the railroad, but, beyond advancing their skirmishers, made no forward movement. At dark an order came from Lieutenant-General Jackson, ordering an advance of the whole line. I accordingly advanced to the railroad, which I still found held

by Colonel Walker's brigade, who had received no such order, as Colonel Walker informed me. Shortly after my reaching the railroad, a message was sent to me, through Colonel McGowan, Fourteenth South Carolina regiment, from one of Lieutenant-General Jackson's staff, countermanding the order for a general advance of the line. I accordingly marched the brigade back to the position which it had held during the day, where we bivouacked for the night.

I desire to mention the good conduct of Sergeant Pratt, Company B, Orr's regiment rifles, who had rallied a squad of his company after his regiment had been broken and driven off by the enemy, and came to me and asked me to assign him a position, which I did, on the right of my own regiment. Nothing of moment occurred after this day's (thirteenth) engagement. The brigade suffered severely, considering that only two regiments were actually engaged with the enemy. Lists of killed and wounded, amounting to three hundred and sixty-three, have been already forwarded to you.

I am, Major,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
D. H. HAMILTON,
Colonel, commanding Second Brigade, Light Division.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL ARCHER.

HEADQUARTERS ARCHER'S BRIGADE,
A. P. HILL'S LIGHT DIVISION,
December 20, 1862.

To Major R. C. Morgan, Assistant Adjutant-General, Light Division:

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my brigade in the battle of Fredericksburg:

On arriving from sick leave Saturday morning, I found my brigade posted in the edge of a wood before Bernard's house, overlooking the plain through which the railroad and Bowling Green turnpike pass, the former at a distance from my front of about two hundred and fifty yards, the latter of about three quarters of a mile, my left resting where the wood extends forward to the front to a point beyond the railroad. General Lane's brigade was on my left, with an interval of about six hundred yards between us, while (as I was informed) General Gregg's brigade was immediately behind the interval, close enough to prevent my being flanked. On my right I found Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, with fifteen pieces of light artillery, supported by Colonel Brockenbrough's brigade. As the fog cleared away, the enemy was seen advancing from the Bowling Green road, and a little after nine o'clock A. M. several batteries were brought forward and placed in position about one thousand yards from us, which were fired on by some of our batteries, far off to the right, and with which they carried on a brisk exchange of shots for about an hour, occasionally throwing shell into the wood where I was posted. About half past ten o'clock A. M., they turned all their guns on our position, and, after thirty or forty minutes' severe shelling, their lines of infantry formed, and advanced rapidly to the attack. When they had arrived near enough, I perceived them massing in front of and entering the point of wood which I have before mentioned as projecting on my left, beyond the railroad, and immediately sent my ordnance officer, Lieutenant Lemmon, to warn General Gregg that it was time for him to move forward into the interval between Lane's and my brigade, to prevent my being flanked. Shortly after, fearing that General Gregg might be too late, I drew out the right battalion (Fifth Alabama) and ordered it to the left. When the enemy in my front arrived near the railroad, my brigade opened a rapid and destructive fire upon them, which soon checked their career, and forced them to retire and take shelter in the railroad track, from which they kept up a desultory fire upon our line. In the mean time, the column which had entered the point of wood on my left succeeded in passing round my left flank, and attacked the Nineteenth Georgia and Fourteenth Tennessee in rear and flank. These regiments were compelled to retire, leaving about one hundred and sixty prisoners in the enemy's hands. The greater part of the Seventh Tennessee also, seeing the regiments on their left give way, and hearing the cry that the enemy was in their rear, left the trenches in disorder. The First Tennessee, together with Lieutenants Timberlake, Foster, Wilmouth, and Baird, of the Seventh Tennessee, and a portion of the latter regiment, held its ground gallantly, and, after its ammunition was exhausted, charged, under Lieutenant-Colonel George, (Col. Turney having been severely wounded early in the action,) across the railroad track, with Colonel Hoke's brigade, of Early's division, and returned to its original position when the charge was over.

The Fifth Alabama battalion, which I had sent from the right to aid in opposing the enemy on the left, discharged their duty faithfully, first under Major Vandegraff, and, after he was wounded, under Captain Stewart.

After sending Lieutenant Lemmon, I also sent my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Thomas, to explain the urgency of the case to General Gregg, and to bring down another brigade in support of my front, which, although not then pressed in front, had nearly exhausted its ammunition.

General Gregg's and Lawton's brigades and the Fifth Alabama battalion drove back the enemy, who had passed my flank, and Colonel Hoke, in command of Trimble's brigade, came down to the edge of the wood, my original position, which I still maintained with the right of my brigade, but with empty rifles and cartridge-boxes. The whole line then charged over the field beyond the railroad. When it returned to the edge of the wood I drew back my troops about thirty yards, re-formed my brigade, and remained in support of the front line, (Hoke's brigade, which had relieved me in the trenches.)

I take pleasure in reporting that the attack along my whole front was gallantly and successfully repelled by my brigade. No enemy ever arrived within fifty yards of my front, and even

after my left was broken by the attack in rear and flank, the enemy in front had been so sharply repulsed that he did not venture to come again. Officers and men generally acted with gallantry.

Lieutenant Z. C. Gunn, Fourteenth Tennessee, fell in the most gallant discharge of his duty.

Lieutenant-Colonel Hutchins, of the Nineteenth Georgia, mentions particularly the good conduct of Captain Mabry, Lieutenants W. H. Johnson and M. Edwards, Sergeant Shell, and Corporal Rogan.

Lieutenants O. H. Thomas and George Lemmon, of my staff, rendered me gallant and efficient service throughout the action.

My loss in the action was forty killed, two hundred and eleven wounded, and one hundred and sixty-six missing, supposed to have been captured.

Among the wounded were Colonel Turney, Lieutenant-Colonel George, and Major Buchanan, of the First Tennessee; Captain Turney, the senior captain of the First Tennessee; Major Neil, of the Nineteenth Georgia; Major Vandegraff, of the Fifth Alabama battalion, and Mr. Frank Wotten, volunteer aid on my staff, the latter supposed to be mortally wounded.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. L. ARCHER,
Brigadier-General, commanding Brigade.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL LANE.

HEADQUARTERS LANE'S BRIGADE,
December 23, 1862.

Major R. C. Morgan, Assistant Adjutant-General:

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my brigade in the late engagement before Fredericksburg:

At half past six o'clock, on the morning of the twelfth, we left our bivouac and took the position assigned us on the railroad, my right being about two hundred and fifty yards to the left of the small piece of woods beyond the track, and my left resting on a dirt road, which crosses the railroad near the point where it makes a bend. Several batteries were to my left and rear, and General Pender some distance farther back, my left nearly covering his right. When I had made this disposition of my command, I rode to the right of General Archer's brigade, which was posted in the woods some four hundred yards from the railroad, and informed Colonel Turney, who was at that time commanding, that there was an open space between us of about six hundred yards. I also informed General Gregg of this opening; his command, which was to have been my support, being on the military road opposite this opening, and some five or six hundred yards from the railroad. I subsequently met General A. P. Hill, and spoke to him of our relative positions.

Nothing of interest occurred on Friday and Friday night. Saturday morning, I ordered the Seventh and Eighteenth regiments beyond the railroad to support three batteries, which had been placed on a hill immediately in their front. Lieutenant-Colonel Hill at once approached the captain of one of these batteries, told him he would insure its safety against any attempt on the part of the enemy to capture it, and that he must let him know when he wished him to move to the front. As soon as the fog lifted, heavy skirmishing commenced along my whole line, and the enemy were seen advancing. Our skirmishers, with the exception of Captain Turner's company, on the left, fell back. The batteries, just alluded to, then opened, with telling effect, and checked their advance. During this firing Captain Turner withdrew his company, as his men were suffering, and rejoined his regiment. Several pieces of the artillery, after firing a few rounds, hurried from the field, saying they were "choked." On intimation, from one of the captains of the batteries, Lieutenant-Colonel Hill promptly moved his regiment to the crest of the hill in front of the enemy, and delivered a volley at the sharpshooters, who were in range; the artillery all limbering up and driving to the rear. The Seventh and Eighteenth both suffered from the enemy's artillery fire, and, at times, from their sharpshooters. About two hours later the enemy advanced in strong force across the open field to the right of my front. Colonel Barber, his regiment being on the right, informed me, through Adjutant Oates, of the advance, and wished to know what he must do should he be flanked. On being ordered to hold his position as long as possible, he deflected his three right companies, and formed them to the rear at right angles to the track. I at once sent my courier, Mr. Shepperd, to inform General A. P. Hill that the enemy were advancing in force upon the opening, Captain Hawks having been previously sent to apprise him that their skirmishers were in front of the same. Eight regiments were seen to pass to my right, and another to move "by the right flank by file left" between the same body of woods and the fence beyond the track. This last regiment then faced by the rear rank, and opened fire upon my right. The three right companies of the Thirty-seventh became hotly engaged, and General Gregg's command was soon after encountered on the military road. Although our right was turned by such a large force, our position was deemed too important to be given up without a blow; and nobly did both officers and men await the approach of another large force along our entire front. As this force was concealed from the Thirty-third, Eighteenth, and Seventh regiments by the hill, about forty yards beyond the track, they were cautioned to reserve their fire. The Twenty-eighth and Thirty-seventh, however, had open, level ground in their front, and, when the enemy had gotten within one hundred and fifty yards of our line, they opened a terrific and deadly fire upon them, repulsing their first and second lines, and checking the third. These two regiments were subjected not only to a direct, but to right and left oblique fires, that portion of the enemy's force behind the hill, nearest the Twenty-eighth, firing upon them. As soon as the right of my command became en-

gaged with such an overwhelming force, I despatched Captain Hawks to General Gregg for reënforcements, with instructions, if he was unable to send them, to apply to General Thomas, or anybody else whom he might see in command of troops, for assistance. My whole command held their ground until the Twenty-eighth and Thirty-seventh had fired away not only their own ammunition, but that of their dead and wounded, which, in some cases, was handed to them by their officers. When these two regiments had ceased firing, the enemy, in column, doubled on the centre, bore down in mass from behind the hill upon the left of the Twenty-eighth and right of the Thirty-third, and the "power of numbers" forced them entirely across the railroad. The Twenty-eighth and Thirty-seventh, being flanked right and left, fell back in an orderly manner, and were resupplied with ammunition. A well-directed volley from the Thirty-third checked the enemy for a time, and Colonel Avery ordered a charge; but, being unsupported on his right, he countermanded the order, and withdrew his regiment into the woods, about seventy-five yards from the railroad. The Eighteenth regiment then fell back about one hundred yards, the right companies firing into the foe until he reached the woods in the pursuit. The Seventh, being on the left, fell back about fifty yards, in perfect order. During the greater part of the engagement the enemy's artillery played upon the woods in our rear. While awaiting reënforcements, I sent my aid, Lieutenant Lane, to the left, to tell Lieutenant-Colonel Hill, if he could possibly be spared, to come to the assistance of my right, as it was heavily pressed. The right, however, was forced to fall back before the order could be delivered. General Thomas came to my assistance, but too late to save my line. He encountered the enemy in the edge of the woods, drove them back, and, with the Eighteenth and Seventh regiments of my brigade on his left, chased them to their first position. The Thirty-third, in accordance with orders, held the position in the woods to which it had fallen back, until I could move up the Twenty-eighth and Thirty-seventh, when all again resumed their positions on the railroad. That night the whole brigade was aligned on the track, and skirmishers thrown forward, preparatory to a general advance. After this order was countermanded, my command rested on their arms until morning, when, having already been on duty upwards of forty-eight hours, there was heavy skirmishing along my whole front — a number of men being killed and wounded. We formed a portion of the second line on Monday, and, as we occupied an exposed position, the men soon constructed a very good temporary breastwork of logs, brush, and dirt, behind which they rested until Tuesday morning, when it was ascertained that the enemy had all recrossed the Rappahannock.

I cannot speak in too high terms of the gallantry of Colonels Avery, Barber, Lowe, and Purdie, and Lieutenant-Colonel Hill. They all commanded their regiments with bravery, and to my entire satisfaction. Colonel Purdie was slightly wounded. Colonel Barber received a painful wound in the neck, which, for a time, paralyzed his right arm, but he reported for duty again on Tuesday.

The other officers, both field and company, generally discharged their duties well.

Colonel Avery alludes in high terms to the efficiency of Lieutenant-Colonel Cowan. Colonel Purdie, in his report, makes an unenviable allusion to one of his officers, name not given.

The Yankee wretches dragged Lieutenant J. W. Peters, Company C, Thirty-seventh regiment, some distance by the legs, after he had been wounded in the head and leg.

The men of the Twenty-eighth and Thirty-seventh fought like brave men, long and well, while those of the other regiments calmly held their positions under a heavy artillery fire, one of the most trying positions in which soldiers can be placed.

I cannot refrain making special allusion to our conscripts, many of whom were under fire for the first time. They proved themselves worthy accessions to a brigade which has borne itself well in all the battles of the last eight months.

Captain F. T. Hawks, the assistant adjutant-general, Lieutenant Oscar Lane, my aid, and private James W. Shepperd, my courier, were of great assistance to me throughout the fight, often carrying orders and messages for me under the hottest fire.

Our ambulance corps was very efficient, and removed our wounded rapidly. Lieutenant James A. Bryan, ordnance officer, was untiring in his exertions to keep the command supplied with ammunition.

Our loss in officers was two killed, twenty-five wounded, and five prisoners; enlisted men, sixty killed, two hundred and thirty-two wounded, one hundred and eighty-three prisoners, and twenty-eight missing — an aggregate of six hundred and twenty-five.

Respectfully,

JAMES H. LANE,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF COLONEL BROCKENBROUGH, COMMANDING BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS FIELD'S BRIGADE,
December 21, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the action of this brigade in the late battle near Fredericksburg:

Stationed upon the extreme right of our division, we remained in this position until the concentrated forces of the enemy passed through a gap in, and reached the rear of, our lines. There being no enemy in our immediate front, and reënforcements being called for, I withdrew my command from its first position, and hurried as rapidly as possible to the point indicated. We moved up by the left flank, and so urgent and repeated were the calls for reënforcements that my two leading regiments, viz., Forty-seventh Virginia, Colonel Mayo, and the Twenty-second

battalion, Colonel Tayloe, the only regiments actively engaged, advanced in a run, separated themselves from the brigade, passed well to the left, and encountered the enemy in rear of our front lines, about midway between Generals Archer and Lane. Firing one volley into their left flank and charging them with a yell, they fled precipitately to the shelter of the railroad cut. Here they rallied and made a short stand, but being joined by a Georgia brigade, (Lawton's, I believe,) we made a second charge, which drove them from the railroad. Here the men were ordered to halt; but such was their impetuosity that much the larger portion of these two regiments advanced to the position which had been occupied by two of the enemy's batteries, which they found deserted. Being unsupported, they were, of course, compelled to retreat, which was done under the most galling fire of grape, canister, and minie balls.

The fact that only two regiments were actively engaged was accidental and unavoidable. The woods through which we passed being dense and filled with troops, the rapid run of the leading regiments soon separated them from the brigade, and, while they passed well around to the left, the remainder of the brigade only marched by direct line to General Archer's left, who was said to have been flanked. Driving the enemy from the woods was a task of short duration, and the troops engaged were completely successful in driving back the enemy before the remaining regiments, a few minutes behind them, could come to their assistance.

During the fight several of the enemy's mounted officers were shot down, and the colors of one regiment were seen to fall four times.

It affords me much pleasure to mention the good conduct of Colonels Mayo and Tayloe, and the officers and men under their command.

The valor and daring of the men were unprecedented. Many of them were fighting in sight of their homes, and seemed determined to drive back the enemy at all hazards.

Our loss was considerable, being about twenty per cent. of the troops actively engaged.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. M. BROCKENBROUGH,
Colonel, commanding Brigade.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL THOMAS.

HEADQUARTERS THOMAS'S BRIGADE,
GENERAL A. P. HILL'S DIVISION,
December 20, 1862.

Major R. C. Morgan, A. A. G.:

MAJOR: On Friday, December twelve, 1862, according to orders from Major-General Hill, this brigade left its camp near Mr. John Alsop's house, moved in the direction of Fredericksburg, and was directed to take position in line of battle on the military road, with orders to support General Pender, who occupied the front and left of the division. The remainder of the day and the succeeding night passed without any change in position.

About midday of December thirteenth, orders were received from Major-General Hill to render assistance and support to any part of the front line requiring it. Soon after which, an officer of General Lane's staff brought information that his brigade was hard pressed by overwhelming numbers. I immediately advanced my brigade down the road: being unable, on account of the density of the undergrowth, to advance in line, the brigade moved by the flank until near the scene of action, when the regiments were thrown into line of battle and advanced towards the enemy, who, at this time, had advanced into the woods. Their advance was checked there, and, after a stubborn resistance, this brigade charged them, driving them through the field and completely routing them. We pursued for some distance across the railroad, when, seeing no support either on the right or left, and my ammunition being reported to be well nigh exhausted, I concluded to fall back to the railroad. Forming, at this place, the front line, I determined to hold the position; at the same time, sending word to Colonel Pendleton, commanding brigade, that I was deficient in ammunition, and requesting him to be in supporting distance. The brigade bivouacked that night in the edge of the woods, throwing out pickets on the railroad, and were relieved early the next morning by Colonel Warren's brigade, and placed in reserve.

The officers and men of my command behaved with a gallantry highly commendable.

I have the honor to be, Major,

Your obedient servant,

EDWARD L. THOMAS,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. R. JONES.

HEADQUARTERS JONES'S BRIGADE,
December 20, 1862.

To Captain Taliaferro, Assistant Adjutant-General:

CAPTAIN: In the obedience to orders from division headquarters, I respectfully submit the following report of the part taken by my brigade in the recent battle at Fredericksburg:

I reached the ground on Friday evening, and was placed in position in the reserved line. On Saturday morning, thirteenth instant, I was directed to change my position to the left and farther to the front, but still occupying a portion in the reserve. My position subjected me to some annoyance from the shells of the enemy, one of which severely wounded the adjutant of the Forty-second Virginia regiment. About the middle of the day the musketry opened, when I was still farther advanced to within musketry range of the enemy. The front line not requiring support, I remained in this position the remainder of the day. In obedience to orders, I advanced at dawn next morning to the front, relieving Brigadier-General Lane. My command moved to this position under a heavy musketry fire from the enemy's sharpshooters, in which I had one man killed and several wounded. The completeness of the victory of Saturday not being

known, officers and men expected soon to be engaged with the enemy in force; and it affords me pleasure to report that all were anxious for the encounter, and manifested a feeling of disappointment as the day passed on and no signs of an advance were given by the enemy. A brisk skirmish was kept up during the day, in which I sustained a loss of thirty-seven officers and men killed and wounded. Among the former were Captain Ames, Company C, Twenty-first Virginia regiment, and Lieutenant Swoope, Company E, Twenty-first Virginia regiment, both in the faithful discharge of their duty. The fighting was necessary to keep the sharpshooters from occupying the crest which commanded our line.

Where all behaved coolly, gallantly, and equally well, I can speak of none in particular. I can only say that the gallant little brigade which has fought so gallantly and lost so heavily in the great battles of the past summer and fall, was ready to do its duty and bear its part in making the shortest and most direct route to Richmond a hard road to travel.

Very respectfully,

J. R. JONES,

Brigadier-General, commanding.

REPORT OF COLONEL PENDLETON, COMMANDING BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS STARKE'S BRIGADE,
CAMP NEAR FREDERICKSBURG, Dec. 19, 1862.

Captain W. T. Taliaferro, A. A. General Jackson's Division:

CAPTAIN: In obedience to the circular order of the Brigadier-General commanding, of this date, requiring reports from commanders of brigades of the participation of their respective commands in the late operations around Fredericksburg, I beg leave to submit the following report of the part taken therein by the brigade under my command:

Having previously cooked three days' rations, on the morning of the twelfth instant, at early dawn, we marched from our camp, near Guineas Depot, for the scene of the late engagement. The brigade under my command, soon after its arrival on the ground, about two P. M., took its position in line of battle on the extreme left of the right wing, in rear of and supporting Thomas's brigade in General A. P. Hill's division. In this position we remained until Saturday morning, the thirteenth, when we were ordered to take a different position, to our left and rear. Here we remained inactive, awaiting the progress of events, until half past one P. M., when a rapid and continued fire of musketry in our front indicated that the enemy had advanced to attack our front line, and we moved forward in close supporting distance of General Thomas, to whose relief I was ordered to go in case he desired my assistance. It was not until about four P. M. that I received a message from General Thomas informing me that he had driven the enemy back, but had only three rounds of ammunition, and wished me to move up close enough to charge the enemy in conjunction with him so soon as he should be again engaged. In accordance with this request, I again moved my command forward to within eighty paces of the line held by General Thomas, with unflinching determination, and, having ordered my men to lie down to avoid the desultory fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, awaited the signal for the onset. But the enemy having failed to renew the attack, as was anticipated, I was not called on. Just when it began to grow dark, I received the order of Lieutenant-General Jackson for a general advance between sunset and dark, and commenced the execution of it by moving forward; but finding that the troops in front of me were not in motion, I ordered a halt. Shortly afterwards the order was countermanded, and I bivouacked for the night.

At half past three o'clock, on the morning of the fourteenth, I was ordered to relieve General Pender on our advance line, and immediately did so.

The battery of Captain Carrington, stationed in front of my left, reported to me for orders, and was directed not to open unless the enemy threatened us with an attack, as he would thereby attract upon us the cross-fire of three of the enemy's batteries, from which the ground afforded us no protection whatever. Such, I was informed by General Pender, had been the case the day previous. From misapprehension or some other cause unknown to me, so soon as the forces of the enemy were seen to be in motion at the distance of apparently a mile, Captain Carrington opened upon his column with rifle pieces, and the consequence which I had foreseen immediately ensued, resulting in the loss of ten or twelve wounded, with little advantage to our side.

About ten A. M. I was ordered to throw my command forward in the field about three hundred yards, and occupy the line of the railroad, beyond which I had already posted my line of skirmishers before daylight. Moving in a circuitous route by the right flank, so as to screen the movement as much as possible from the observation and fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, I at once proceeded to occupy the new position assigned to me, though I found it impossible of accomplishment without the loss of several men wounded, one or more fatally. In moving four of the regiments of my brigade from the railroad, under an order subsequently received to throw them back in a line nearly at right angles with the railroad, I again sustained a slight loss from the same cause. The skirmishers thrown out along my front kept up a brisk and well-directed fire during the whole day, (twice exhausting their ammunition,) and, as was ascertained by actual observation during the presence of the flag of truce in the afternoon, with fatal effect on the enemy. The enemy, contrary to all expectation, having failed to advance or renew his attack during the day, we quietly bivouacked in our position for the night, and being relieved at four A. M., on the fifteenth, by the division of Major-General D. H. Hill, retired to the line of the reserve, which we occupied until it was ascer-

tained that the enemy had entirely abandoned the field and recrossed the Rappahannock.

Although my command was not at any time closely engaged, it was three times subjected to a sharp fire, and was, throughout the days of the thirteenth and fourteenth, in constant expectation of being brought into action. Under these circumstances every man remained firm at his post; not a straggler was to be seen leaving the ranks, and all evinced a commendable eagerness to engage the enemy, which needed only opportunity to ripen into the gallantry heretofore so conspicuous in the troops from Louisiana. Lieutenant-Colonel Nolan, commanding the First Louisiana regiment; Lieutenant-Colonel Goodwin, commanding the Fifteenth; Major Grogan, commanding the second; Major Leggett, commanding the Tenth, and Captain Verlander, commanding the Fourteenth, — are deserving of my especial commendation for the coolness and skill with which they commanded their respective regiments, and the promptness and energy with which they executed every order. I should entirely fail in my duty if I did not advert also to the valuable assistance rendered to me by First Lieutenant Thomas L. Mills, of the Tenth Louisiana, who tendered me his services as aid-de-camp for the occasion. His promptness and untiring activity in conveying my orders, although frequently exposed, are deserving of the highest praise, and I beg leave to mention him as eminently deserving of promotion. The casualties of my brigade have been heretofore reported at two killed and thirty-five wounded.

I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
EDMOND PENDLETON.
Col. Fifteenth Louisiana Regiment, commanding Brigade.

REPORT OF COLONEL WALTON.

HEADQUARTERS BATTALION WASHINGTON ARTILLERY, NEAR FREDERICKSBURG, Dec. 20, 1862.

To Major G. M. Borrel, A. A. General First Corps, A. N. V.:

MAJOR: In conformity to circular order of eighteenth instant, I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the battalion Washington artillery, of New Orleans, under my command, in the battles of the twelfth and thirteenth instants, near Fredericksburg, Virginia. The signal guns fired at four o'clock A. M., on the morning of the eleventh instant, aroused my camp, and gave notice that the enemy was in motion. Immediately the batteries of the First, Third, and Fourth companies (consisting of two three-inch rifles and one ten-pounder Parrot gun, under Captain Squiers, Lieutenants Galbraith and Brown, first company; two twelve-pounder light Napoleon guns, under Captain Miller and Lieutenant McElroy, third company; and two twelve-pounder howitzers and two twelve-pounder light Napoleon guns, under Captain Eshleman, Lieutenants Norcom, Battles, and Apps, fourth company) were placed in position in the redoubts on the hill back of the town, known as "Marye's Hill," extending from the Telegraph road to the plank road. Notwithstanding the dense fog, which enveloped the country around, and completely hid from view the town and river banks, the enemy, at about seven o'clock A. M., opened upon the town a tremendous fire from his numerous batteries, which lined the Stafford shore, to cover his crossing. This cannonading he continued during the day, with but little intermission, and without any response from my batteries. The command bivouacked for the night in the works, beside their guns. The next morning, twelfth instant, the fog was again exceedingly heavy. At two o'clock P. M. it had raised sufficiently for us to discern the hills opposite the city, densely covered with the enemy's infantry and artillery. At twenty minutes to four o'clock P. M. a heavy column was observed near the gas works, below the town, upon which my batteries immediately opened a well-directed and destructive fire, causing the enemy to break and run for cover. During this firing, the enemy's heavy batteries (across the river) opened upon us with shell and shot, disregarding which, my men steadily worked their guns without replying. After about ten minutes, having dispersed the column, my batteries ceased firing, and continued to receive in silence the continued fire of the enemy. Another night, passed by the officers and men beside their guns, brings us to the memorable thirteenth December. At half past twelve o'clock P. M. the enemy was observed, in force, moving down upon our position through the streets of the town. Everything being in readiness, fire was immediately opened from all my batteries, at once halting and breaking his first advance. Again they emerged in greater force, and, apparently, with much steadiness. Gaining the crest of an elevated piece of ground in our front, he opened upon our position a galling fire of musketry, and of artillery from the hills beyond. The brigade of General Cobb, in front of my batteries, then opened fire, and the battle became general all along our line. Again and again did their heavy masses come forth from the town, only to be mowed down and scattered in confusion, as each time they formed and advanced. Three times their colors were levelled by the unerring aim of the gunners. At two o'clock P. M. a portion of General Ransom's division (supporting column) moved steadily across the plateau in my rear: halting but an instant on the crest of the hill, they delivered a volley, then plunged with a cheer into the road below and in front of us, already occupied by Cobb's troops. The sharpshooters of the enemy, under cover of a crest in front and the slope of the hill, kept up a galling fire upon our works, causing many of my gallant men to fall, killed and wounded, at their posts; among whom was Lieutenant H. A. Battles, Fourth company, severely wounded in the arm by a minie ball. Five several times did heavy masses of the enemy's infantry, supported by light batteries which had been placed in position on the field, advance from the cover of the town and the scattered houses, only to meet the

fate of those who preceded them. They fell by thousands under the judicious, steady, and unerring fire of my guns, encouraged and aided by the gallant conduct of the brave troops in the road in front of us. At five o'clock P. M., after having been engaged four hours and a half, against overwhelming odds of the enemy, I was compelled to relinquish the post of honor to Woolfolk's and Moody's batteries, Alexander's battalion, having one gun disabled, and having exhausted all the canister, shell, and case-shot, and nearly every round of solid shot in the chests; more could not be supplied, in position, in time, the train being several miles distant. On the fourteenth my guns were held in reserve. On the fifteenth I took position in the works on the extreme left of our line, the position before occupied by Lane's battery, which I occupied until the eighteenth instant. On the eighteenth all my batteries were again concentrated in camp. The second company, Captain Richardson, was, during the engagements, attached to Pickett's division, in reserve, and was not engaged.

It is my duty, as it is my pleasure, to say, in behalf of my officers, cannoneers, and drivers, that upon no field during this war have men behaved more gallantly. To Captains Eshleman, Miller, and Squiers, and the brave officers and men under them, is the service indebted for the gallant defence of Marye's Hill against the stubborn and overwhelming assaults of an army of over fifty thousand men. To Lieutenant William M. Owen, my adjutant and only aid, I am, as usual, indebted for zealous and fearless conduct on the field, in the performance of all his duties. Before closing this report, I may be permitted, without being invidious, to direct the attention of the General commanding to the gallant conduct of Captain Eshleman, in directing, and Lieutenant Norcom, fourth company, in executing the order, in taking one of the Napoleon guns from the work, where it was out of range, and placing it between two of the redoubts, on the open field, there continuing it in action, entirely exposed to the enemy's infantry and sharpshooters, during the greater part of the engagement. My loss in this engagement is three killed and twenty-four wounded.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully,

J. B. WALTON,

Colonel of Artillery, commanding.

REPORT OF COLONEL CRUTCHFIELD.

HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY COMMAND, SECOND ARMY CORPS, January 3, 1863.

Lieutenant-General T. J. Jackson, commanding Second Army Corps, A. N. V.:

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the artillery of this corps in the engagement near Fredericksburg, December thirteen, 1862:

The heights on the right of our line were held by fourteen guns of the batteries of Major-General A. P. Hill's division, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. L. Walker, and consisting of the batteries of Captains Pegram and McIntosh, (four guns each,) and sections of the batteries of Captains Latham, Johnson, and Crenshaw, commanded respectively by Lieutenants Potts, Clutter, and James Ellett. This position was a commanding one, and afforded admirable advantage against a direct assault from infantry; but, what was more important, so controlled the ground in front as to force the enemy to open a heavy cannonade upon it, in the hope of silencing these batteries, before they could move any considerable mass of their infantry down the plain, as would be necessary should they endeavor to turn our right. On the other hand, it was liable to the disadvantages always attaching to a fixed position, that it must receive a concentrated fire from many points, added to which the formation of the ground at the top of the hill was such as not to afford much protection to men, and hardly any to the horses. It was, of course, a position of great importance; and it being specially necessary that its batteries should be able to open an effective fire upon the enemy's infantry in the plain below, should they endeavor to move down the river to threaten or turn our right, I directed Lieutenant-Colonel Walker to keep his guns concealed as well as he could, and not to allow himself to be drawn into an artillery duel, but, disregarding the fire of the enemy's batteries, to reserve his own for their infantry when it should come within effective range. On the left of our line were posted twenty-one guns, as follows: Just at Bernard's cabins and to their left, nine guns, consisting of six rifles, two Napoleons, and one six-pounder, of the batteries of Captains Davidson, Raine, Caskie, and Braxton, — all under the immediate direction of Captain Davidson. Some two hundred yards in front of these, to their right and beyond the railroad, were placed twelve guns, consisting of six rifles, three Napoleons, and three six-pounders, from the batteries of Captains Carpenter, Wooding, and Braxton, — all under the immediate command of Captain J. B. Brockenbrough. Captain Carpenter's battery was commanded by Lieutenant McKendree. From the first it was evident that the enemy's attack might be expected upon our centre, where the heights on our right descended to a level with the plain, and a point of woods running out into the field offered them early and good shelter, or that they would endeavor to turn our right. A considerable artillery force was held ready to meet this latter contingency by moving out and taking position in the fields to our right, so as to cross its fire with the batteries of Lieutenant-Colonel Walker. The centre of the line was our weakest point, since Lieutenant-Colonel Walker's guns could not oblique their fire to the left sufficiently to hope to prevent the enemy's seizing the point of woods referred to, at the distance at which it was. The batteries near Bernard's cabins more directly controlled this point, but only by a quite oblique fire to the right. So that there were some eight hundred or a thousand yards of our front, near the centre, undefended by a direct artillery fire to the front. I examined the ground carefully in

the woods behind this point, in hopes of being able to establish batteries of howitzers, which, by a canister fire, might soon check the enemy's infantry in their advance through the woods. But I found the ground unfavorable, being intersected by a deep ravine, and the undergrowth so thick as to require more time to clear it away than we had before the action began. The instructions given to Captains Brockenbrough and Davidson were to reserve their fire for the enemy's infantry at close range, and not to engage his batteries unless he advanced them to the support of his infantry; and then they were to concentrate their fire on the advancing battery, and not to fall back from their position so long as our infantry supported them. The enemy opened the attack by the fire of some twenty-five or thirty guns directed upon Lieutenant-Colonel Walker's position, and from about sixteen guns (afterwards increased to twenty-four) upon our batteries at and near Bernard's cabins. The officers in charge of these batteries obeyed their orders, and, the enemy's fire not being replied to, he advanced his skirmishers in very heavy line upon the points occupied by the commands of Captains Brockenbrough and Davidson. These were soon driven off by canister, and the exact positions of our batteries being thus disclosed to the enemy, he directed a heavy artillery fire upon them, and advanced one of his batteries near a chimney in the centre of the plain. This fire was replied to by our batteries, and soon two of the enemy's batteries were withdrawn, and their places supplied by others of longer range. About this time two of our rifle-guns, belonging to Captains Wooding's and Caskie's batteries, were disabled, by their axles breaking from the recoil of the gun, and had to be withdrawn. All this time the enemy's sharpshooters annoyed us greatly, working around to the right of Captain Brockenbrough's position whenever driven from his front, and pertinaciously readvancing whenever they could, under the shelter of their artillery fire. Though they were once or twice repelled by canister, when advancing imprudently, they were so well protected by the accidents of the ground, and so feebly opposed by our own sharpshooters, that they could not be entirely dislodged, and caused heavy loss in our batteries, both among men and horses. Captain Brockenbrough was wounded while gallantly discharging his duty, and Captain Wooding badly shot while acting as gunner to one of his pieces. Being badly supported by the infantry in their rear, after severe losses in officers, men, and horses, the batteries of Captain Brockenbrough's command were withdrawn, as they would have been lost so soon as the enemy seized the point of woods to their right and rear, as they did. The ammunition in Captain Raine's battery (commanded by Lieutenant Statham) was so defective (from the bad fuses, I think) that, none of its shell bursting, it was withdrawn, and its place supplied by the Chesapeake artillery, of three guns, Lieutenant Plater commanding, while a section of Captain Latimer's battery, under his own charge, was sent still farther to the front and left. These latter pieces were excellently managed, and, though losing heavily from the enemy's sharpshooters, drove back their lines with canister, and caused them great loss by an uncommonly accurate and rapid shell fire, as they were driven back by General Law's brigade, in their attempted advance. Lieutenant McKendree, of Carpenter's battery, exhibited noticeable resolution and composure in managing his battery. On the right the enemy, after furiously cannonading Lieutenant-Colonel Walker's position till they imagined his batteries crippled, advanced their infantry. One body moved towards the point of woods in our centre, and the other with its front parallel to the road from Hamilton's Crossing to the river road. When distant about eight hundred yards, Lieutenant-Colonel Walker's batteries opened upon them with great effect, and, at the same time, fifteen guns, composed of sections from the batteries of Captain Poague, (Lieutenant A. Graham commanding,) Captain Watson, Captain Smith, Captain Garber, one gun of Captain Dance's battery, and the Louisiana Guard battery, three guns, were thrown into position in the plain to our right, so as to cross their fire with that of the guns of Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, being specially designed to check the advance of the enemy towards the road from Hamilton's Crossing to the river road. These pieces were under the immediate command of Major Pelham, and were admirably managed and bravely fought, and perfectly accomplished their object. All these batteries did not go in at once, but were added as the weight of the enemy's fire seemed to require it. Towards the close of the day, as the enemy's infantry — driven from the woods by our own — fell back in confusion across the plain under the severe and accurate fire of the guns of Lieutenant-Colonel Walker and Major Pelham, some of the batteries of Lieutenant-Colonel Walker's command, being short of ammunition, and the men exhausted from working with diminished numbers, were relieved by a section of Lusk's battery, Lieutenant Dowell commanding, and a portion of the corps reserve, under Colonel J. Thompson Brown. I shall have to refer you to this officer's report as to what batteries they were, as I knew but one of them — Captain Poague's. They went in under a heavy fire, and, though suffering much, were bravely fought. Some guns of Major-General D. H. Hill's division artillery were put in at this time on our right, by his chief of artillery, Major Thomas H. Carter. As these batteries were unknown to me through their officers, I shall have to refer you to that officer's report as to which they were. They moved up with the rest, under heavy fire, and were well served.

It would perhaps be invidious to attempt to discriminate among officers and men, where there were so many fine examples of courage and devotion; and I fear I may have already done injustice in mentioning some to the exclusion of others, but I trust the reports of other officers will set it all right. I beg, however, to call your special

attention to the valuable and gallant services of Lieutenant-Colonel Walker and Major Pelham. The position in which Colonel Walker was placed was peculiarly trying, from his being required to endure, for a long time, a very heavy fire without replying to it. Colonel J. Thompson Brown, commanding the corps reserve, also displayed noticeable coolness and judgment in taking his guns in to relieve Lieutenant-Colonel Walker under a severe fire.

We lost no pieces; nor did we capture any. Lieutenant Plater had a gun disabled and a limber exploded. Lieutenant-Colonel Walker had a gun disabled and a caisson and limber exploded, and Colonel Brown a gun disabled, as also did the Louisiana Guard battery. No carriages or parts of carriages were lost by us. The disabled guns were of course brought off. The loss in horses, and the nature of the ground, together with the position of the enemy's batteries and their numbers, effectively prevented any advance of our batteries as their infantry fell back, and before fresh batteries could get in, their line was reformed near the river road, and it was nearly night.

I cannot close this report without calling your attention to the great defect in the ammunition we used, by which few of our shells burst. My own observation entirely confirmed the numerous complaints made to me from the batteries. Much, if not most, of this difficulty is, I am satisfied, justly attributable to the fuses.

I have the honor to remain,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
S. CRUTCHFIELD,
Colonel, and Chief of Artillery Second Corps.

REPORT OF LIEUT.-COLONEL ALEXANDER.

HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY RESERVE BATTALION, December 20, 1862.

To Major G. M. Sorrell, Adjutant-General First Corps:

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the artillery battalion under my command during the recent hostilities:

At dawn on the eleventh instant, on the firing of the signal guns, I moved from camp, and posted Captain Rhett's heavy battery in pits which he had prepared on the hill south of the plank road, overlooking the entire country in front and the opposite bank of the river, at a distance of one mile and a half. Captain Parker's two rifles were placed in pits which he had built near Stansbury's house, commanding the entire flats in front and the opposite bank of the river. His howitzers were concealed behind Stansbury's house, in most admirable positions for opposing any advance of the enemy on the north of the town. The batteries maintained these positions during the whole occupation of the city by the enemy. The batteries of Captains Jordan, Moody, and Woolfolk were held concealed in rear of the plateau, back of Stansbury's house, ready to move out upon it at the appearance of the enemy's infantry, or to any other point of our line needing reënforcements. The cannoneers of Captain Jordan's and Woolfolk's batteries were meanwhile employed, concealed by the mist, in making small pits on the most favorable points of the plateau, and eventually finished eight, in addition to those already there, which would have cost the enemy severely, had he attempted any advance north of the town. This disposition of my batteries remained unchanged during the eleventh and twelfth. On the twelfth, our infantry having evacuated the town, Captain Rhett's and Captain Parker's batteries opened their rifles occasionally at the position of the principal pontoon bridges of the enemy, Captain Rhett also enfilading two of the principal streets. These fires invariably elicited prompt and heavy responses from the enemy, from which, however, our pits saved us nearly all damage. On the morning of the thirteenth, this firing was continued, aided by three twelve-pounder guns of Captain Moody's battery, in a new position north of the plank road, opposite Captain Rhett, whence the street leading to the pontoon bridge could be enfiladed. This latter fire at once attracted a reply from every battery of the enemy's in reach, and caused us slight loss. Captain Moody, however, still held the position, sheltering his men when not firing. The enemy shelled this position not only all day, but every day of their occupation of the city afterwards, whence I infer that our fire must have caused them much annoyance. I afterwards made pits in this position for guns, with Captains Moody's and Rhett's cannoneers, but they were only completed on the morning of the enemy's evacuation. At twenty minutes to four P. M. of the thirteenth, I received an order to relieve the Washington artillery on Marye's Hill, their ammunition being nearly exhausted. I at once hastened there, with Captain Woolfolk's battery, Captain Moody's twelve-pounder guns, and two guns of Captain Jordan's battery, and occupied the pits under a heavy fire, which caused three fourths of my entire loss, while galloping up. The enemy were already within three hundred yards, and seeing the Washington artillery leave, after so protracted and gallant a defence, cheered and pressed on heavily, aided by three batteries, which opened from the edge of the town, and their line of heavy guns on the opposite bank. Disregarding the latter, we poured a rapid and murderous fire on the former and their advancing infantry, under which, and the accurate aim of our veteran infantry beneath us, they were soon driven to shelter behind the houses of the town. About dark the remaining section of Captain Jordan's battery was brought up, one gun replacing a damaged gun of Captain Maurin's in a pit left of the plank road, and the other remaining near, under the control of General Ransom, for any emergency. About seven P. M., the enemy, said to have been Sykes's division of regulars, again advanced, under cover of darkness, until opened on by our infantry below. My guns opened with canister and case-shot at the flashes of their muskets, and this, their last repulse, was said to have been

the bloodiest. At dawn on the fourteenth my only remaining guns in reserve, Moody's two twenty-four-pounder howitzers and one rifle of Captain Jordan's, relieved the remainder of Captain Maurin's battery in the pits left of the plank road; and two twelve-pounder guns of Moody's and two six-pounder guns of Captain Woolfolk's were relieved by brigade batteries, being out of ammunition. On the fourteenth we fired but few shot, and only at bodies of the enemy's infantry, being compelled to economise ammunition. On the night of the fourteenth Captain Parker discovered a position enfilading the canal valley, in front of the town, and two pits were constructed at it, which I occupied before day with Moody's twelve-pounder guns. When the fog lifted, the reserves of the enemy's pickets could be seen lying flat on their faces in the valley; in the language of General Burnside, "holding the first ridge." A few well-directed shots by Captain Moody soon, however, broke this hold, and all who could not find fresh shelter fled in confusion to the city, under the fire of our sharpshooters and several guns immediately in their rear. This, with a single shot in the brick tannery, broke up entirely the annoying fire of sharpshooters, under which we suffered considerably the day before; and for the rest of the day we worked openly in our pits, and fired at all bodies of infantry appearing in town, unannoyed. That night the town was evacuated. My especial thanks are due to Major J. R. C. Lewis, for his cool and efficient coöperation in the execution of all orders. The left of our line of batteries was under his special supervision for the last two days. I desire also to express here my high appreciation of the gallantry and efficiency of Captains Jordan, Rhett, Moody, Woolfolk, and Parker, before attested on many a hard-fought field, and fully corroborated on this. Captain Eubank, with the remaining battery of my battalion, is absent on detached service. Dr. Gray, surgeon, Captain Franklin, quartermaster, and Lieutenant Vaughan, commissary, managed their respective departments to my entire satisfaction. My adjutant, Lieutenant T. Henderson Smith, carried and executed my orders, under all circumstances, with coolness and judgment. My especial thanks are also due to C. S. Cadet Joseph C. Haskell, of South Carolina, who volunteered me his services, and rendered me indispensable assistance in the supervision of so extensive a command. I beg leave to recommend him to the War Department for promotion. Lieutenants Gillen, Wilson, Burroughs, Terrill, and Woolfolk, are mentioned in high terms by their captains, as are also Sergeant Cisse, of Moody's, and Private England, of Woolfolk's battery. The latter, unfortunately, was killed. I was personally impressed with the bearing of Lieutenant J. Donnell Smith, of Jordan's battery, commanding a section in the attack on the evening of the thirteenth. Corporal Lockwood, of his company, a most gallant soldier, whom I also noticed particularly, was wounded, I fear mortally, in the night attack. Our entire loss was one killed, ten wounded, and fifteen horses. One thousand and eighty rounds of ammunition were expended.

I am, Major, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
E. P. ALEXANDER,
Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding Battalion.

REPORT OF COLONEL HUMPHRIES.

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-FIRST MISSISSIPPI REGIMENT, December 17, 1862.

To William Barksdale, Brigadier-General, commanding Third Brigade:

GENERAL: As soon as the signal guns, on the morning of the eleventh instant, announced the advance of the enemy, I moved the Twenty-first regiment from camp, and arrived at the market-house in Fredericksburg at day-dawn, when, in obedience to your orders, I detached the right wing, under Major Moody, to go to the support of Captain Govan, of the Seventeenth regiment, who was guarding the wharf on the Rappahannock, and then engaged with the enemy. I saw no more of that portion of the regiment during the day, and respectfully refer you to Major Moody's report of his operations. The left wing I held in reserve at the market-house, with instructions to support Lieutenant-Colonel Fizer, of the Seventeenth regiment, at the upper pontoon, constructed by the enemy, or Captain Govan, if needed.

About one o'clock, I was ordered to go to the relief of Colonel Fizer, but, owing to a mistake of my guide as to the position of Colonel Fizer, I was conducted several hundred yards above, to a very exposed position, from which the enemy forced me to retire, by a heavy fire from their artillery. I returned to the market-house, and received orders to advance to the river and resist any advance of the enemy, who had then succeeded in forcing a passage of the river, and were engaged with Lieutenant-Colonel Fizer and Colonel Carter, of the Nineteenth regiment. I detached Captain Renfue, with his company, to the foot of William Street, and Captain Green, with his company, to the foot of the street leading from the Episcopal Church, and placed Captains Stamps, Sims, and Gibson, with their companies, on Main Street. By this time it was dark. Captain Green discovered the enemy advancing slowly down the river bank, and immediately opened fire upon him, and stubbornly resisted until, stricken down by a minie ball, his company fell back, bearing his body with them. The enemy, pursuing, charged up the street. Captains Stamps, Sims, and Gibson opened a galling fire upon him, and drove him off the streets, up towards the pontoon bridge, and held him in check until about seven o'clock, when I was ordered to withdraw my troops from the city, and form a line of battle at the foot of the hill, on the Telegraph road, where I remained until I was relieved by the gallant and lamented General Cobb, when I moved back to camp.

During the whole day we were exposed to a

heavy fire from the enemy's batteries, posted on the opposite heights, sheltering ourselves as we could behind houses, fences, etc.

The officers and men obeyed every order with promptness and alacrity, and maintained every position with a promptness and constancy worthy of all praise.

The Twenty-first regiment lost, during the day, eight killed, twenty-five wounded and thirteen missing.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BENJAMIN G. HUMPHRIES,
Colonel, commanding Twenty-first Regiment Mississippi Volunteers.

REPORT OF COLONEL CABELL.

CAMP NEAR FREDERICKSBURG, VIRGINIA, December 25, 1862.

Major James M. Goggin, A. A. G.:

MAJOR: In conformity with instructions, I have the honor to submit the following report of the conduct and services of the artillery, placed under my command, during the recent engagement:

The division of Major-General McLaws arriving here at the head of the column on Thursday, the twentieth, by a rapid movement, to intercept the threatened advance of the enemy at Fredericksburg, it devolved upon me, under the direction of Major-General McLaws, to place the artillery in position and prepare for their attack. It had been represented that the hills of the Stafford side of the Rappahannock completely commanded the heights on this side. This was apparently the case on the first view of the position, the upper range of hills being then covered with forest. Anticipating that the enemy, who were in large force on the opposite side of the river, would immediately attempt to force the passage of the river, preparations were at once made for resistance. However, the enemy not attempting a passage then, in a very short time the whole scheme of defence was arranged. About a mile above Fredericksburg, at Dr. John R. Taylor's residence, the land rises abruptly from the river to great elevation to the upper heights. These upper heights, however, rapidly recede from the river bank, and then take a course nearly parallel with, but at considerable distance from, the river. These hills, shortly below the right of the position of this division, rapidly diminish until near Hamilton's Crossing, where they have very inconsiderable elevation. The hills on the other side are much nearer the river. This gave the enemy great advantage in an attempt to cross the river, and in shelling his troops after they passed over. On our right, and shortly below Fredericksburg, their whole army could, and a large portion of it did, deploy on this side of the river in almost perfect security from our artillery. At the same time, being under the cover of their artillery on the Stafford side of the river, they were nearly as secure from an attack by our infantry. A knowledge of this fact probably induced General Burnside to cross the river; and his boast that, after the fight of Saturday, he remained two days in the plain, waiting and inviting an attack from us, is simply ridiculous. But near Dr. Taylor's house, where the upper heights commence to recede from the river, a lower range of hills commences, which, though also receding from, keeps much nearer, the river. This lower range of hills terminates abruptly with Marye's Hill, immediately in rear of the town of Fredericksburg — the hill then having almost the appearance of a promontory, the low grounds extending about eight hundred yards back to the base of the upper heights. This lower range of hills is much lower than the hills on the Stafford side of the river, and is commanded by the enemy's artillery. The position of our artillery and infantry, made by Major-General McLaws, was certainly most happy to countervail the disadvantages of our position. While the whole line was under my direction, I had recommended that short-range guns should be placed on the declivity on each side of Marye's house, between the house and the stone wall, where our infantry were drawn up during the battle. I had recommended this, in addition to the guns on the crest of the hill, in order to sweep the plain in front. The impossibility of giving guns on the crest of an abrupt hill sufficient depression gives great advantages to a column of infantry, who, by making a rapid charge, soon find themselves completely protected from the artillery on the hills. I had also recommended that guns should be placed on the northern side of the plank road, on the hills that sweep towards the upper part of Fredericksburg, as if for its protection. These positions would have given a complete enfilading fire upon the enemy advancing upon Marye's Hill, and also upon their forces massed in front of, but protected by the conformation of the ground from the fire or even sight of the gunners on the crest of the hill. These dispositions, for some reasons, were not made. Had they been made, the repulse would have been even more signal, and the victory even more complete, than we obtained. It is but an act of simple justice to Major-General McLaws to say that the disposition of the artillery, in other respects, was such as he had chosen. During the whole of Thursday, the eleventh of December, not a gun was fired by our batteries, and our cannoneers stood quiet spectators of the enemy's attempt to cross the river. The enemy's cannon was firing almost incessantly, and their shell frequently fell near our batteries. The next day, Friday, upon the uplifting of the fog, disclosed to our view the larger portion of the whole force of the enemy upon this side of the river. On the right of my position a battery of light artillery was discovered in position. A few well-directed shots from our batteries caused this battery quickly to retire to a position still farther to the right. The first position of this battery, if retained, would have been very annoying to our troops, who were drawn up under the cover of the woods and in convenient range of its guns. This battery then took position on the other side of Deep Creek, alongside of several other batteries, but its

the bloodiest. At dawn on the fourteenth my only remaining guns in reserve, Moody's two twenty-four-pounder howitzers and one rifle of Captain Jordan's, relieved the remainder of Captain Maurin's battery in the pits left of the plank road; and two twelve-pounder guns of Moody's and two six-pounder guns of Captain Woolfolk's were relieved by brigade batteries, being out of ammunition. On the fourteenth we fired but few shot, and only at bodies of the enemy's infantry, being compelled to economize ammunition. On the night of the fourteenth Captain Parker discovered a position enfilading the canal valley, in front of the town, and two pits were constructed at it, which I occupied before day with Moody's twelve-pounder guns. When the fog lifted, the reserves of the enemy's pickets could be seen lying flat on their faces in the valley; in the language of General Burnside, "holding the first ridge." A few well-directed shots by Captain Moody soon, however, broke this hold, and all who could not find fresh shelter fled in confusion to the city, under the fire of our sharpshooters and several guns immediately in their rear. This, with a single shot in the brick tannery, broke up entirely the annoying fire of sharpshooters, under which we suffered considerably the day before; and for the rest of the day we worked openly in our pits, and fired at all bodies of infantry appearing in town, unannoyed. That night the town was evacuated. My especial thanks are due to Major J. R. C. Lewis, for his cool and efficient coöperation in the execution of all orders. The left of our line of batteries was under his special supervision for the last two days. I desire also to express here my high appreciation of the gallantry and efficiency of Captains Jordan, Rhett, Moody, Woolfolk, and Parker, before attested on many a hard-fought field, and fully corroborated on this. Captain Eubank, with the remaining battery of my battalion, is absent on detached service. Dr. Gray, surgeon, Captain Franklin, quartermaster, and Lieutenant Vaughan, commissary, managed their respective departments to my entire satisfaction. My adjutant, Lieutenant T. Henderson Smith, carried and executed my orders, under all circumstances, with coolness and judgment. My especial thanks are also due to C. S. Cadet Joseph C. Haskell, of South Carolina, who volunteered me his services, and rendered me indispensable assistance in the supervision of so extensive a command. I beg leave to recommend him to the War Department for promotion. Lieutenants Gillen, Wilson, Burroughs, Terrill, and Woolfolk, are mentioned in high terms by their captains, as are also Sergeant Cisse, of Moody's, and Private England, of Woolfolk's battery. The latter, unfortunately, was killed. I was personally impressed with the bearing of Lieutenant J. Donnell Smith, of Jordan's battery, commanding a section in the attack on the evening of the thirteenth. Corporal Lockwood, of his company, a most gallant soldier, whom I also noticed particularly, was wounded, I fear mortally, in the night attack. Our entire loss was one killed, ten wounded, and fifteen horses. One thousand and eighty rounds of ammunition were expended.

I am, Major, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
E. P. ALEXANDER,
Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding Battalion.

REPORT OF COLONEL HUMPHRIES.

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-FIRST MISSISSIPPI REGIMENT, December 17, 1862.

To William Barksdale, Brigadier-General, commanding Third Brigade:

GENERAL: As soon as the signal guns, on the morning of the eleventh instant, announced the advance of the enemy, I moved the Twenty-first regiment from camp, and arrived at the market-house in Fredericksburg at day-dawn, when, in obedience to your orders, I detached the right wing, under Major Moody, to go to the support of Captain Govan, of the Seventeenth regiment, who was guarding the wharf on the Rappahannock, and then engaged with the enemy. I saw no more of that portion of the regiment during the day, and respectfully refer you to Major Moody's report of his operations. The left wing I held in reserve at the market-house, with instructions to support Lieutenant-Colonel Fizer, of the Seventeenth regiment, at the upper pontoon, constructed by the enemy, or Captain Govan, if needed.

About one o'clock, I was ordered to go to the relief of Colonel Fizer, but, owing to a mistake of my guide as to the position of Colonel Fizer, I was conducted several hundred yards above, to a very exposed position, from which the enemy forced me to retire, by a heavy fire from their artillery. I returned to the market-house, and received orders to advance to the river and resist any advance of the enemy, who had then succeeded in forcing a passage of the river, and were engaged with Lieutenant-Colonel Fizer and Colonel Carter, of the Nineteenth regiment. I detached Captain Renfue, with his company, to the foot of William Street, and Captain Green, with his company, to the foot of the street leading from the Episcopal Church, and placed Captains Stamps, Sims, and Gibson, with their companies, on Main Street. By this time it was dark. Captain Green discovered the enemy advancing slowly down the river bank, and immediately opened fire upon him, and stubbornly resisted until, stricken down by a minie ball, his company fell back, bearing his body with them. The enemy, pursuing, charged up the street. Captains Stamps, Sims, and Gibson opened a galling fire upon him, and drove him off the streets, up towards the pontoon bridge, and held him in check until about seven o'clock, when I was ordered to withdraw my troops from the city, and form a line of battle at the foot of the hill, on the Telegraph road, where I remained until I was relieved by the gallant and lamented General Cobb when I moved back to camp.

During the whole day we were exposed to

heavy fire from the enemy's batteries, posted on the opposite heights, sheltering ourselves as we could behind houses, fences, etc.

The officers and men obeyed every order with promptness and alacrity, and maintained every position with a promptness and constancy worthy of all praise.

The Twenty-first regiment lost, during the day, eight killed, twenty-five wounded and thirteen missing.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BENJAMIN G. HUMPHRIES,
Colonel, commanding Twenty-first Regiment Mississippi Volunteers.

REPORT OF COLONEL CABELL.

CAMP NEAR FREDERICKSBURG, VIRGINIA, December 25, 1862.

Major James M. Goggin, A. A. G.:

MAJOR: In conformity with instructions, I have the honor to submit the following report of the conduct and services of the artillery, placed under my command, during the recent engagement:

The division of Major-General McLaws arriving here at the head of the column on Thursday, the twentieth, by a rapid movement, to intercept the threatened advance of the enemy at Fredericksburg, it devolved upon me, under the direction of Major-General McLaws, to place the artillery in position and prepare for their attack. It had been represented that the hills of the Stafford side of the Rappahannock completely commanded the heights on this side. This was apparently the case on the first view of the position, the upper range of hills being then covered with forest. Anticipating that the enemy, who were in large force on the opposite side of the river, would immediately attempt to force the passage of the river, preparations were at once made for resistance. However, the enemy not attempting a passage then, in a very short time the whole scheme of defence was arranged. About a mile above Fredericksburg, at Dr. John R. Taylor's residence, the land rises abruptly from the river to great elevation to the upper heights. These upper heights, however, rapidly recede from the river bank, and then take a course nearly parallel with, but at considerable distance from, the river. These hills, shortly below the right of the position of this division, rapidly diminish until near Hamilton's Crossing, where they have very inconsiderable elevation. The hills on the other side are much nearer the river. This gave the enemy great advantage in an attempt to cross the river, and in shelling his troops after they passed over. On our right, and shortly below Fredericksburg, their whole army could, and a large portion of it did, deploy on this side of the river in almost perfect security from our artillery. At the same time, being under the cover of their artillery on the Stafford side of the river, they were nearly as secure from an attack by our infantry. A knowledge of this fact probably induced General Burnside to cross the river; and his boast that, after the fight of Saturday, he remained two days in the plain, waiting and inviting an attack from us, is simply ridiculous. But near Dr. Taylor's house, where the upper heights commence to recede from the river, a lower range of hills commences, which, though also receding from, keeps much nearer, the river. This lower range of hills terminates abruptly with Marye's Hill, immediately in rear of the town of Fredericksburg — the hill then having almost the appearance of a promontory, the low grounds extending about eight hundred yards back to the base of the upper heights. This lower range of hills is much lower than the hills on the Stafford side of the river, and is commanded by the enemy's artillery. The position of our artillery and infantry, made by Major-General McLaws, was certainly most happy to countervail the disadvantages of our position. While the whole line was under my direction, I had recommended that short-range guns should be placed on the declivity on each side of Marye's house, between the house and the stone wall, where our infantry were drawn up during the battle. I had recommended this, in addition to the guns on the crest of the hill, in order to sweep the plain in front. The impossibility of giving guns on the crest of an abrupt hill sufficient depression gives great advantages to a column of infantry, who, by making a rapid charge, soon find themselves completely protected from the artillery on the hills. I had also recommended that guns should be placed on the northern side of the plank road, on the hills that sweep towards the upper part of Fredericksburg, as if for its protection. These positions would have given a complete enfilading fire upon the enemy advancing upon Marye's Hill, and also upon their forces massed in front of, but protected by the conformation of the ground from the fire or even sight of the gunners on the crest of the hill. These dispositions, for some reasons, were not made. Had they been made, the repulse would have been even more signal, and the victory even more complete, than we obtained. It is but an act of simple justice to Major-General McLaws to say that the disposition of the artillery, in other respects, was such as he had chosen. During the whole of Thursday, the eleventh of December, not a gun was fired by our batteries, and our cannoneers stood quiet spectators of the enemy's attempt to cross the river. The enemy's cannon was firing almost incessantly, and their shell frequently fell near our batteries. The next day, Friday, upon the uplifting of the fog, disclosed to our view the larger portion of the whole force of the enemy upon this side of the river. On the right of my position a battery of light artillery was discovered in position. A few well-directed shots from our batteries caused this battery quickly to retire to a position still farther to the right. The first position of this battery, if retained, would have been very annoying to our troops, who were drawn up under the cover of the woods and in convenient range of its guns. This battery then took position on the other side of Deep Creek, alongside of several other batteries, but its

effectiveness was nearly destroyed by its compelled removal of position.

Every battery officer received the instruction that he was to fire with great deliberation, and to fire only upon large bodies of troops. Of course, some discretion was allowed to every officer, and I am happy to be able to state that that discretion was generally well exercised. And one of the best proofs of the effectiveness of our fire was afforded by their turning their guns upon us.

In front of my position the low grounds extended in an apparent plain from the base of the hill to the river bank. Through these low grounds the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad and the river road pass. Though apparently a plain, there are many inequalities of the ground, which, with these roads, enabled the enemy to mask his approach. All but five of our batteries were so placed as to command not only the approach of the enemy on our right, but also the Telegraph road and the abandoned railroad, called the Fredericksburg and Gordonsville Railroad. The guns back of Howison's house, besides this, commanded the left of the Telegraph road, and enabled us to give an oblique and almost enfilading fire upon the enemy advancing from the various streets in Fredericksburg, and who were drawn up under the protection of the inequalities of the ground in front of Marye's Hill. The main battle on the left was fought to obtain this hill. Between this hill and the town of Fredericksburg, it is said, the Rappahannock formerly flowed. The conformation of the ground, therefore, enabled the enemy to mask their troops so as to be out of view of our infantry, in position at the foot of Marye's Hill, and even from our artillery on the hill itself. My position enabled me to observe the enemy's left flank, upon which our guns opened a most destructive fire. It was easy to perceive, from previous knowledge of the ground and the location of their left flank, where their troops were massed, and our batteries, having an almost enfilading fire, opened upon them. Through the valley in front of Marye's Hill a sluice for the waste waters of the canal passes. There is no passage for the enemy's troops between the road immediately in front of Marye's house and the road leading directly from the Telegraph road to the depot of the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad. The approach by this latter road was completely commanded by our guns. Several times their advance was repulsed by the well-directed fire of our batteries.

Over a whole brigade was displaced and scattered in confusion to the rear. Once they made for the railroad cut, and several shells from our batteries exploded amongst them before they could escape from it. Once they charged by attempting to cross the cut, running down one side and up the other; and again they attempted to escape in the same manner. But on each occasion a murderous fire from our batteries caused them to retire precipitately.

I am confident that not only upon the approach and the successive repulses of the enemy was the fire of our batteries most efficacious, but that also it did great execution upon the masses of the enemy in front of Marye's Hill.

It may be proper, also, to state another fact in connection with the topography of the battle-field. The right of Marye's Hill terminates almost precipitously. The Telegraph road passes on the right of the hill, and then turns almost directly at right angles at the foot and in front of the hill. The railroad cut and embankment would have enabled the enemy to come in almost perfect security within a short distance of the right flank of our troops, drawn up behind the stone wall on the Telegraph road, and, by a rapid charge, to have our troops at the most serious disadvantage. Their advance could not have been effectively checked by the artillery on Marye's Hill, owing to the conformation of the ground.

It is due to the brave and skilful officers and cannoneers to say, that their cool, well-directed and most efficient fire not only aided materially in repulsing the direct attack on Marye's Hill, but in preventing the right flank of this position being turned by the enemy. While saying this, however, I wish to give all due praise to the gallant artillery corps who occupied so successfully the crest of Marye's Hill. I have been thus diffuse in describing the topography of the battle-field, as I think it due to our troops, both infantry and artillery, that the fact should be known, that not to the natural strength of our position, but to the skill and generalship of our leaders, and the gallantry, courage, and well-directed aim of our cannoneers and infantry, are we indebted for our most brilliant victory.

Forty-eight guns were placed under my charge during the engagement: Captain Reid's battery, three guns, occupied the position immediately to the right of the Telegraph road. Next to this battery, one of the thirty-pounder Parrott guns (Richmond manufactory) was placed. It was replaced by a Whitworth gun of Captain Love's battery. Next on the right, and on the hill back of Howison's house, and in the following order, were placed two six-pounder smooth-bore guns and two ten-pounder Parrotts, under the command of Captain Macon, of the Richmond Fayette artillery. The smooth-bore guns fired only round shot. Next, three pieces, Parrotts, of Captain R. L. Cooper's battery. This battery was withdrawn to another position, and replaced by three pieces, one Parrott and two three-inch rifles, of Captain Branch's battery. Next, two Parrotts of Captain Coalter's battery, and one thirty-pounder Parrott, (Richmond manufactory.) This gun was commanded by Lieutenant Anderson, of Captain Ells's battery. Both of the Richmond guns did good service, but exploded during the engagement. Next one three-inch rifle, commanded by Lieutenant Taylor, of Captain Eubank's battery. Next, one ten-pounder Parrott, commanded by Lieutenant Blunt, of Captain Dearing's battery. Next, five pieces, under the command of Major S. P. Hamilton, consisting of two ten-pounder Parrotts, of First company Richmond howitzers, Captain McCarthy, and three rifled guns of Captain Ross's battery. Captain Mosely's

battery, six pieces, had been placed in the rear of Marye's Hill, with a view to fire upon the enemy, in case they succeeded in taking that position. This battery occupied a position of danger and responsibility, and their courage and firmness, under fire, were well exhibited. Of this battery, two men were wounded, one horse killed, five public horses and Captain Moseley's horse wounded.

Besides these, there were twelve short-range pieces, under command of Major Nelson; two pieces of Captain McCarthy's battery, and three pieces of Captain Coalter's battery. These guns did not fire during the engagement.

In the Yankee accounts of the battle, it is stated that about one fifth of the killed and wounded were from the artillery. When it is recollected that this account takes in the losses on their left, where we used but little artillery, it would seem probable that their proportion of losses from the artillery in the battle in front of Marye's Hill was much greater.

I have the honor to be,

Major, very respectfully,

H. C. CABELL,

Colonel, and Chief of Artillery, Major-General McLaws's Division.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN D. LANG, OF EIGHTH FLORIDA REGIMENT.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH FLORIDA REGIMENT, December 16, 1862.

Major J. H. Whitner, Assistant Adjutant-General of Perry's Brigade:

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that, in conformity with orders, I moved my command on the night of the eighth instant, above Fredericksburg, near the canal, and relieved the Twelfth Mississippi regiment, then on duty as a reserve force for the support of our pickets.

On the morning of the eleventh instant, at about five o'clock, I received orders to report with my command at once, at the market-house, to Brigadier-General Barksdale. Before reaching the above place, I was intercepted by General Barksdale, and ordered to a point on the river forming the site of the old ferry, and instructed to confer with Lieutenant-Colonel Fizer, commanding Seventeenth Mississippi regiment, as to the best manner of disposing of my force to prevent the enemy from effecting a crossing. I was informed by General Barksdale that the enemy were attempting another crossing below the city, and, as the point at that ford was weak, I was to send three companies of my command to strengthen the same. I immediately placed companies A, F, and D, under command of Captain Boyd, with instructions in conformity with the above. I then formed the remaining companies in line of battle, in such manner as would best command the crossing and afford a cover for my men. The enemy were seen on the opposite bank, drawn up in two lines of battle, and his pontoniers were busily engaged in constructing a bridge. It was understood between Colonel Fizer and myself — my command being in position — that he would open fire and I would continue the same. At about half past five A. M. the pontoniers having advanced the bridge about two-thirds across the river, the Seventeenth Mississippi opened fire, and my command at once did the same, with good effect, the enemy being compelled to abandon his work and flee to points of security. The force of the enemy supporting the pontoniers immediately opened a heavy fire with artillery and musketry, which was kept up almost continuously the whole day. Each attempt of the pontoniers to continue their work was met by a well-directed fire from my command. Four officers of my command and about twenty enlisted men were wounded, and seven killed, when I was borne from the field, having received a severe wound in the head. The command then devolved upon Captain Love, who maintained the position, though exposed to a galling fire of shell, shot, canister, and musketry, until about four o'clock P. M., when, in accordance with orders, he withdrew his force. I regret that the absence of Captain Boyd, who together with the three companies composing his command are missing, renders it impossible to give a report of the service performed by him. It is proper to remark that Captain Boyd regarded the position intrusted to him as so exposed, and admitting of so little means of escape, that he objected to occupying the same until the order was repeated. I am pleased to say that my command behaved in a manner creditable to their State and the noble cause in which they were engaged. Below I furnish you with a list of the casualties of the Eighth Florida regiment:

Captain D. Lang, commanding regiment, seriously wounded in the head; Assistant Surgeon D. Hooper lost a leg.

Company B. — Privates T. M. Gray and J. N. Marshall, killed; First Lieutenant Hector Bruce, wounded in neck, slight; Corporal Charles McCall, head, severe; Corporal T. Harper, hand, slight; Privates J. P. Bracewell, abdomen, serious; George S. Lambert, J. F. Cox, J. R. Prevalt, slight; J. R. Green, missing.

Company A. — Sergeants J. N. Fielding, wounded, slightly; N. H. Allman, missing. Privates J. Boatright, F. Briant, G. W. Crawley, J. Driggers, D. Howle, B. J. Redding, G. B. Ross, and A. Williams, missing.

Company C. — Privates T. Saunders and E. Curl, wounded, severe; H. Daughtry, slight.

Respectfully,

D. LANG,

Captain, commanding Regiment.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN MAURIN.

CAMP NEAR DINMAN'S FARM, December 18, 1862.

To General Perry:

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my battery in the engagements before Fredericksburg:

The signal gun fired Thursday morning, the eleventh instant, found every man at his post. I had two sections of my battery on the field, the first commanded by Lieutenant Prosper Landry,

and the other by Lieutenant Camille Mollere. The four first bastions, immediately on the left of the plank road, were the positions assigned and occupied.

As soon as the fog, which covered us until about nine o'clock A. M., had disappeared, the enemy opened fire on me from his enormous field batteries and heavy guns on the opposite bank of the river, his shots falling around, some striking the works, but none doing any injury. This he repeated at intervals, each succeeding day, but with no better result for him, or none worse for me. According to orders, I withheld my fire until late in the evening, when the enemy came down to cross; but the increasing darkness preventing me from seeing the effects of my shots, I ceased firing.

Friday morning a company of sharpshooters advanced on my left; but a few well-directed shots from Mollere's section drove them back into the town. The enemy was now seen coming down in force from the opposite hills, in order to cross. The distance was rather too great for much accuracy; yet a shell from my ten-pound Parrott proved effective, bursting in the midst of an advancing column, causing it to stagger, making some run, and sending the mounted officers to arrest the flight of the fugitives. That this shot effected more than a mere panic was attested a short time after by the arrival on that spot of four ambulances, which returned with their load of killed and wounded.

Saturday morning, a column of the enemy being seen crossing the street of which the plank road is a prolongation, a few shots from the first piece forced it to take another line of march, behind the brow of the hills. But when his heavy columns debouched from the town, and were marching across the valley, in line of battle, to attack our lines, the second and third pieces were the only guns that could be brought to bear on them; and so effectually did they do this that the enemy brought forward immediately, in front of the edge of the town, eight pieces, which opened on me so furiously that they succeeded in diverting my fire, but not before I had fired more than two hundred rounds. Their shots were so well directed that I could only occasionally give a round to the infantry, whenever the opportunity occurred. What harm I did them, their smoke, as well as mine, prevented me from seeing; yet I saw one shell burst fairly among one of his detachments. A regiment now came forward to support them, which was driven back by Lieutenant Mollere's section. It was then that Captain Latrobe, of General Longstreet's staff, came and suggested the propriety of dislodging two or three regiments standing behind a steep hill, which not only protected, but also concealed them from our men, on whom they were evidently preparing to make a charge. But my ten-pound Parrott could not be brought to bear on them without taking it out of the bastion; and to do this were to meet almost certain death from the guns in front, which had by this time obtained a perfect range. However, the suggestion was no sooner made than Lieutenant Landry ordered it out, and, together with Captain Latrobe, helped the men to pull and put it in position. It was scarcely out, and not yet in position, when cannoneer Linopier fell dead, pierced to the heart by a piece of shell. The fate of their comrade seemed to inspire my men with renewed determination, and, undaunted by the shots of the guns and bullets of the sharpshooters, which were flying thick and fast around them, they behaved with the calm courage which deserves the highest praise. The piece was loaded and fired with such precision that not one shot was lost, but every one telling with frightful effect. It was loaded for the fourth time, and was ready to fire, when it was disabled by a shell, which broke a wheel, and at the same time wounded three men, (Corporal Thomas Morelli, whose skill as gunner cannot be too highly prized; and cannoneer Dernot Leblanc, whose foot has since been amputated, and P. Perez, severely wounded in three different places.) But the object was accomplished; some fled, some were killed, and the remainder dared not leave their cover. At night the broken wheel was replaced and the piece relieved. Of the first piece, cannoneers Adolphe Grilhe and F. Babin were wounded, the former severely and the latter slightly. Three horses were killed and two wounded.

Nothing worth mentioning was done on Sunday. At night I was relieved by Captain Jordan, after having been in position since Sunday night, the first instant. My third section, of six-pounder guns, was not engaged, but on Sunday night, the fourteenth instant, it was ordered in front, where it is at present, occupying works on the left.

Before closing this report, I can but render praise to Lieutenants Landry and Mollere, for their gallant conduct, and to my cannoneers and drivers. Casualties: one killed and five wounded; three horses killed and two wounded.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

V. MAURIN,

Captain, commanding Donaldsonville Artillery.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN E. TALIAFERRO.

HEADQUARTERS McLAWS'S DIVISION, December 20, 1862.

Major J. M. Goggin, A. A. G.:

MAJOR: I herewith transmit to you a report of the ordnance stores captured by this command in the recent battles around Fredericksburg:

One thousand five hundred small arms; two hundred thousand rounds of small arm ammunition; four hundred sets of accoutrements; three hundred knapsacks; one hundred and forty-five cartridge boxes, extra; six hundred and ninety-five rounds twelve-pounder shell and spherical case; one hundred and twenty twelve-pounder shot; two hundred and forty rounds of Parrott shells, different calibres; two hundred three-inch shell, of various kinds.

A considerable proportion of the shells, which were collected in the streets and houses, are somewhat damaged, but capable of being again rendered serviceable. The arms and accoutrements are,

for the most part, in good condition, and the small arm ammunition uninjured.

I am, sir, respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

E. TALIAFERRO,

Captain, and Ordnance Officer of Division.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN LEWIS.

HEADQUARTERS LEWIS'S BATTERY,
December 18, 1862.

Brigadier-General Wilcox, commanding Brigade:

GENERAL: I beg to submit the following report of the part taken by my battery in the battle fought before Fredericksburg:

I was placed in position on the hill immediately opposite the ford between Falmouth and Fredericksburg, on the night of the twenty-third of November, and commenced throwing up earthworks to protect the guns and cannoneers, which were completed before the enemy attempted to cross the river.

On Thursday morning, the eleventh of December, after the signal guns were fired, we were at our guns, ready for action, and there remained, without firing a gun, until late in the evening, when I saw a column of infantry (about two regiments) advancing to cross the upper pontoon bridge, when I gave the command to commence firing. We fired rapidly for a short time, driving the second regiment back behind Lacy's house.

A little later in the day, we fired at some cavalry and artillery, which soon withdrew from sight. I could have fired much more, but my orders were very strict about wasting ammunition, and only fired when certain of doing them damage. We slept at our guns that night.

On Friday, the twelfth instant, we engaged at various times in firing at batteries crossing the river. About three o'clock P. M., a column of infantry (about a brigade) came in sight. I opened on them immediately, throwing shell in the head of their column, scattering them and doing them much damage, causing them to change their course, and move back around Lacy's house. When we ceased firing, their ambulances came after the wounded. I could, with a glass, see many dead lying on the field after the ambulances had carried off the wounded. Later in the day I fired at some cavalry crossing the river at the ford. Again their ambulances were called into use.

On Saturday I fired on infantry, cavalry, and artillery, whenever they came within easy range, with what effect I could not tell.

On Sunday I only fired a few shots at cavalry. Up to Sunday night we fired about four hundred rounds, at which time I was relieved by a battery of smooth-bore guns, and moved back to the position formerly occupied by Captain Woolfolk's battery, since which time we have remained quiet.

I am happy to state that, although subjected to an enfilading fire of more than twenty guns, (and some of them their heaviest,) our works, though frequently struck, were so strong that none passed through, but several passed over the top and through the embrasure into the pits. I lost none killed, and only two wounded — Privates Hughes, in leg slightly, and Hailey, in head, from concussion. One horse was slightly wounded. I think we could have done them much more damage but for defectiveness of ammunition, causing us to lay aside our former experience of artillerists.

I have, General, the honor to be,

Your obedient servant,

J. W. LEWIS,

Captain, commanding Lewis's Light Artillery.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN GOVAN.

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY B,
SEVENTEENTH MISSISSIPPI REGIMENT,
December 31, 1862.

Colonel Fizer, Seventeenth Mississippi Regiment:

SIR: The Florida companies that reported to me on the eleventh instant were ordered into position on my right. The entire command, in my opinion, did not constitute forty men. They were ordered to conform to the movement of the command. The officer in command of said companies failed repeatedly to obey my commands, when ordered to fire on the bridge-builders; and so silent was his command that I hardly knew he was in position. His excuse for not firing was, that his position was too much exposed, and firing would draw the fire of artillery. I was informed that the officer was withdrawing his command by two o'clock. I passed the order down the line to fall back, which was promptly obeyed. I am confident that if any were captured it was from inefficiency, and from fear of being killed in the retreat. The position was held until sunset.

Very respectfully,

A. R. GOVAN,

Captain Company B.

REPORT OF COLONEL FIZER.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTEENTH MISSISSIPPI
REGIMENT, NEAR FREDERICKSBURG,
December 31, 1862.

Lieutenant John A. Barksdale, A. A. A. General Third Brigade:

LIEUTENANT: It becoming my duty to report to you the action of the Eighth Florida regiment, commanded by Captain Lang, during the engagement at Fredericksburg, December eleventh, 1862, I submit the following:

About five o'clock A. M. of the morning of the eleventh, General Barksdale came to me, at the ferry near Commerce Street, accompanied by a portion of the Eighth Florida regiment, numbering about one hundred and fifty men, I suppose. He said to me, "Assist Captain Lang, commanding, in putting his battalion in position," which I proceeded to do immediately, suggesting to Captain L. to place his battalion on my left, which could be in point-blank range of the enemy, above the bridge then being rapidly constructed by them — my regiment bearing on the front and from a point below. Such disposition being made, we easily swept the enemy from their bridge, from above, below, and in front. The battalion did good service and acted gallantly while commanded by Captain L. He obeyed my

suggestions with alacrity, and proved himself a worthy, gallant, and efficient officer, but fell, severely wounded, about eleven o'clock A. M., after which time I received but little aid from the regiment, as it seemed troubled and in want of a commander. I am compelled to state that a certain lieutenant (his name I do not recollect) so far forgot himself as to draw his pistol and threaten to kill some of my sharpshooters if they fired again, as it would draw the enemy's fire on the position. As to the conduct of the portion of the regiment sent to reënforce Captain Govan, I refer you to his enclosed report.

Very respectfully,

JOHN C. FIZER.

Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding Seventeenth Mississippi Regiment.

REPORT OF COLONEL FIZER.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTEENTH MISSISSIPPI REGIMENT, NEAR FREDERICKSBURG, VA., December 19, 1862.

To John R. Barksdale, A. A. G.:

SIR: I have the honor of submitting the following report of the action of the Seventeenth regiment Mississippi volunteers, while defending the passage of the Rappahannock, opposite the city of Fredericksburg, on the morning of the eleventh December, 1862:

Being ordered to the city on picket duty on the ninth instant, I was ordered to dispose of my regiment so as to guard the river from the ferry to a point about three quarters of a mile below. I promptly made such disposition as I thought would check the enemy, if he attempted to force a passage at or between either point indicated. The line of pickets consisted of two wings, the right commanded by Captain A. G. Govan, and the left by Captain A. J. Pulliam. The reserve I stationed at or near the market-house. About eleven o'clock P. M. of the tenth instant, you ordered me to double my pickets, which was promptly done, by sending to the right wing companies I and K, and to the left companies H and C; and, about four o'clock A. M. of the eleventh instant, you, in person, ordered me with my reserve, consisting of Companies D, E, G, and part of F, to repair at once to the upper ford, as the enemy were rapidly putting in their pontoons, preparatory to crossing. I reached the point as soon as possible, and, on getting there, found the enemy busily working on the bridge, having extended it about thirty feet on the water. On reaching this point, I relieved Captain Pulliam, and assumed command in person. You having left it discretionary with me when to begin the attack, I immediately made such disposition of the seven companies as I thought would be most effective. Knowing there were many families occupying the houses on the margin of the river, I deemed it proper to notify all the women and children of their danger, and give them time to get from under range of the enemy's guns. This being accomplished about five A. M., I ordered my men to fire on the bridge-builders, which they obeyed promptly and deliberately, and I think with stunning effect, the command being echoed by Captain Govan on the right, in the same manner and with equal effect, causing the enemy to throw down their implements and quit their work in great confusion. After which they immediately opened a heavy, galling, and concentrated fire of musketry and artillery upon both wings for an hour, and, supposing they had driven us from our position, they again began their work on the bridges. But as soon as we discovered them at work we renewed the attack, and drove them pell-mell from the bridges. They made nine desperate attempts to finish their bridges, but were severely punished and promptly repulsed at every attempt. They used their artillery incessantly, with a heavy detachment of sharpshooters, for twelve hours, we holding our position firmly the whole time, until about half past four P. M., when they increased their artillery and infantry, and their batteries becoming so numerous and concentrated, we could not use our rifles. Being deprived of all protection, we were compelled to fall back to Caroline Street, and, from there, were ordered from town. Having to abandon my position, (on the left,) believing Captain Govan still holding the lower bridge, and knowing the enemy to have crossed, I immediately despatched a courier to notify him to fall back, fearing he would be taken. He rendered me very valuable assistance, and held his position firmly and with great gallantry and unusual firmness, supported by a part of the gallant Eighteenth Mississippi regiment, composed of Companies A, I, and K. Lieutenant Radcliff deserves special notice for his able assistance to Captain Govan. I call your attention especially to the gallant conduct of Lieutenant Ourster, commanding Company F. Much credit is due to Lieutenant G. E. Thurmond, Company B, acting adjutant, for his promptness, coolness, and efficiency, in face of danger. Lieutenant Sweeney, of Company D, deserves much credit for promptness and efficiency. Captain G. R. Cherry, with his gallant company, stood the shot and shell like veterans, as did the commands of Captains Pulliam and Middleton and Lieutenants Patton and Lindly. I cannot close without according to Wm. C. Nelson, private of Company G, the highest praise for his services as courier, bearing despatches when shot and shell fell thickest and fastest. Much credit is also due to Private C. H. Johnson, Company F, for his valuable services as courier. First Lieutenant Jonas B. Clayton, Company G, quit his post, severely wounded, about three o'clock P. M., after having done valuable service with his gallant company. Colonel Carter, of the Thirteenth Mississippi regiment, furnished me with ten valuable sharpshooters, which rendered valuable service.

Very respectfully,

JOHN C. FIZER,

Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding Seventeenth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers.

P. S. The casualties in the regiment during the engagement were one hundred and sixteen killed, wounded, and missing.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL RICE.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION SOUTH CAROLINA INFANTRY, December 22, 1862.

CAPTAIN: On Saturday morning, thirteenth instant, the Third battalion, Kershaw's brigade, McLaws's division, South Carolina infantry, was ordered by Brigadier-General Kershaw to change position, from that first assigned to it, to the mill on the crest south of Fredericksburg, there to guard a gap in the railroad embankment, and prevent its passage by the enemy. The order was immediately executed; but the enemy failing to make his appearance at or near the gap, the battalion was not actively engaged in the battle of the thirteenth instant. This position was held by the battalion until the night of the sixteenth instant, when it was ordered on picket guard. On Saturday morning, while marching to the mill, Private A. W. Anderson, Company A, was severely wounded in the head by a shell from the enemy's guns. On Tuesday, the sixteenth instant, Private Wesley Bryant, Company E, was killed by a fragment of shell.

The above report of the whereabouts of the Third battalion South Carolina infantry, during the battle of the thirteenth instant, is respectfully submitted.

Your obedient servant,

W. G. RICE,
Lieutenant-Colonel Third Battalion South Carolina Infantry.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BLAND.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH SOUTH CAROLINA REGIMENT, CAMP NEAR FREDERICKSBURG, VA., December 19, 1862.

Captain R. C. Holmes, A. A. G.:

SIR: I have the honor to report that, upon hearing the signal guns, on the morning of the eleventh instant, I formed my regiment, about four o'clock, and marched to the position assigned me in line, on the hill to the right of the Telegraph road and left of Captain Read's battery. I deployed forward the flank companies, one hundred and fifty yards, to a ditch in rear of a field upon the edge of the open plain. This position we occupied during the bombardment of city and crossing the river by the enemy. At seven o'clock P. M. on the twelfth, I received orders to occupy, with the regiment, the ground held by our line of skirmishers and open rifle-pits during the night, advancing my skirmishers in the open field in front. The rifle-pits were finished and occupied by eight o'clock A. M. of the thirteenth, (Saturday.) About ten o'clock A. M. the enemy advanced and attacked the position held by General Cobb's brigade, of which engagement we were quiet spectators, until one o'clock P. M., when I received orders, with the other regiments of the brigade, to reënforce General Cobb. I moved by the left flank, in rear of the Third South Carolina regiment, down the Telegraph road for one hundred and fifty yards, then filed to the left, across Hazel Run, up the bluff in rear of Colonel Walton's battery, to the hill in rear of the Marye house, where I met Lieutenant Doby, of General Kershaw's staff, who ordered me to form the regiment in rear of Colonel Nance's Third South Carolina, which was on the left and upon a line with the Marye house. Immediately after I formed line, with the Fifteenth South Carolina filed in my rear. At this time I lost several of my officers and men wounded by fragments of shell; among them Captains Roper and Hudgens and Lieutenant Lovelace. In about three quarters of an hour, I was called upon by the commanding officer of the Fifteenth North Carolina regiment to reënforce him. I at once moved by the right flank into his position, which was to the right and front of the Marye house, my three left companies being in front of the house. The position was a good one, with the crest of the hill just in our front, at which point it descended rapidly towards the enemy. About seventy yards below, and in front of us, was the Telegraph road, with a stone wall or fence on the enemy's side, behind which rested three regiments of Cobb's brigade, and the Second and Eighth South Carolina regiments, the two latter having just reënforced them. The knoll in my front rendered it impossible for us to injure our friends, but placed us in fine range of our enemies. We would load and advance to fire, and then fall back to reload. My right flank was exposed, by a slight depression in the hill, to an oblique fire from the enemy, which was taken advantage of. Hence the greater loss in the right wing. We continued in the engagement until night, when the final charge was made and the enemy repulsed. My officers and men behaved as became South Carolinians and soldiers of Kershaw's brigade. I received valuable assistance from Major J. S. Hard and Adjutant Carwill, of this regiment, and Lieutenant Doby, of General Kershaw's staff, whose gallant conduct cannot be too highly spoken of. After night, I relieved, by order, Phillips's legion, of General Cobb's brigade, which was behind the stone fence before mentioned, in my late front. We held this position, with the wings doubled, occasionally exchanging shots with the enemy, until Tuesday morning, tenth instant, when I was ordered into the city on picket duty. We were relieved by one of General Barksdale's regiments, at seven o'clock P. M., and marched back to camp, having been absent six days and five nights. Drs. Shine and Carlisle displayed their usual skill and energy in caring for the wounded. My loss was four killed and fifty-seven wounded. Most of the wounds are slight.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

ELBERT BLAND,
Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding Seventh South Carolina Regiment.

REPORT OF MAJOR MOODY.

B. G. Humphreys, Colonel commanding Twenty-First Regiment Mississippi Vols.:

SIR: In compliance with your order, on the morning of the eleventh December, I took command of the right wing of the Fourth regiment,

composed of the following companies: Company A, Lieutenant Walcott; Company C, Lieutenant Longsfield; Company H, Lieutenant Brien; Company F, Captain Fitzgerald; Company G, Captain Dudley; and moved to the support of Captain Govan, of the Seventeenth Mississippi regiment, who was holding the enemy in check at the bridge, at the lower portion of the town. Immediately upon arriving I ordered company G to his support, but found that he had all the men he could use to advantage.

This wing remained in line in the road, about one hundred yards in the rear of Captain Govan's position, unprotected, from A. M. to P. M. The dense fog, which had before concealed us from the enemy, then cleared, and they concentrated their fire upon this wing. I immediately ordered the command to retire about three hundred yards, out of range of the enemy's fire. About four P. M. Captain Govan sent to me for assistance. I ordered forward Companies C and F, which order was obeyed with promptness. In the mean time, Captain Govan received orders from General Barksdale to retire. I then took position on the railroad, a short distance in the rear, leaving two companies at the deep cut on the road, and the other three I stationed near the Telegraph road, within supporting distance, and remained in this position until ordered by you, about ten P. M., to return to camp. You, sir, have every reason to be proud of this wing. From six A. M. to one P. M. they were exposed to the hottest fire I ever witnessed, and I saw no disposition on the part of officers or men to move from their position until ordered. Captain Govan and the brave men of his command are deserving of the highest praise. Up to the time he was ordered to leave his position, the enemy had not succeeded in laying a plank. Braver officers and men than Captain Govan and his command cannot be found. The following is a correct list of the killed and wounded of the right wing: Company A, one killed, two wounded; Company C, four wounded; Company H, six killed, three wounded; Company F, four wounded; Company G, two killed, five wounded. Total, nine killed, eighteen wounded, and three missing.

I remain your obedient servant,

D. W. MOODY,

Major Twenty-First Regiment Mississippi Volunteers.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN NANCE, COMMANDING REGIMENT.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD SOUTH CAROLINA REGIMENT, December 20, 1862.

Captain C. R. Holmes, A. A. G.:

SIR: As senior officer in command of the Third South Carolina regiment, the duty devolves upon me to detail the operations of the same in the recent engagement at Fredericksburg, Virginia. The regiment was aroused about five o'clock A. M. on Thursday, the eleventh instant, by the firing of the signal guns; and soon afterwards a courier from Brigadier-General Kershaw notified the Colonel commanding that the enemy were attempting to cross the Rappahannock River, opposite Fredericksburg, and ordered me to occupy its place in the line of battle, previously designated. Accordingly, the regiment was put in motion, and, about six o'clock A. M., was put in position on the hill on the right of the Telegraph road, and on the left of Captain Reid's battery, with the Seventh South Carolina volunteers, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Bland, on our right, and the Second South Carolina volunteer regiment, commanded by Lieutenant John D. Kennedy, on our left. Two companies of skirmishers, (Captain Hance's company, A, of rifles,) and Captain Nance's company, E, rifles, were deployed so as to cover the front of our regiment, and placed in the ditch at the foot of the hill, occupied by the regiments. The orders given these company commanders were to hold their positions as long as possible, and, when compelled, to fall back upon the regiments.

Thursday and Friday witnessed no advance by the enemy upon our immediate lines. On Friday night, the line of battle was changed from the top of the hill to its base, the regiments occupying the position previously held by the two companies of skirmishers. This position was strengthened, during the night, by digging pits and throwing up earthen breastworks.

On Saturday morning, the thirteenth instant, the enemy opened fire upon the right and left of our lines, at about nine o'clock. About ten minutes before one o'clock P. M. Colonel Nance received an order from Brigadier-General Kershaw to extend his lines so as to occupy the works of the Second South Carolina regiment on our left. This order was subsequently revoked, upon the information that Colonel Kennedy had left a company to do this. About fifteen minutes after two o'clock P. M. a verbal order was extended by Brigadier-General Kershaw, ordering Colonel Nance to move his command, by the way he would designate, to the support of Brigadier-General T. R. R. Cobb's command. The regiment was accordingly moved down the earthworks into the Telegraph road, then down the Telegraph road near the mill on —— Creek, and then up the newly-made road to the top of the hill just in rear of the cemetery, and from that point across the field in the rear of Marye's house, where Brigadier-General Kershaw ordered, through Major Gaillard, of the Second South Carolina regiment, that the regiment should form in line of battle and advance on a line with the Second South Carolina regiment. An order was received through Lieutenant A. E. Doby, aid-de-camp, to the effect that our right should rest upon Marye's house. Soon after, Lieutenant A. E. Doby, aid-de-camp, insisted that the enemy should not be allowed to gain possession of Marye's house, and, although only six companies on the line, Colonel Nance promptly brought the line forward. As the regiment reached the position, on a line with the front of Marye's house, it was exposed to a most murderous fire from the enemy, plainly visible from that point. The line was ordered to move across the chain fence. The remaining four companies had previously joined the advan-

cing line, and the ranks made complete. When the line reached the top of the hill, the order to fire was given, and the effects must have been terrible, as the shots were delivered coolly and with an evident intention to kill. About this time, Colonel James D. Nance fell, wounded in the thigh. Not long afterwards, Lieutenant-Colonel William D. Rutherford fell, shot through the right side, and not long afterwards, Major Robert C. Maffet was disabled by a ball through his arm. Here, too, Captain Rutherford P. Todd, who was acting as a field officer, was disabled by a ball in an artery of the right arm. Colonel James D. Nance, while lying down wounded, suggested to Captain William W. Hance, then commanding, that it would be better to move the regiment back a few paces into a road, parallel to the line of battle, leading from the Marye house to a street on our left, perpendicular to our line of battle. Whilst occupying this position, a vigorous and well-directed fire was kept up on the various lines, whenever they attempted to advance or exposed themselves. Sharpshooters, posted about the Marye house, dealt constant and well-directed fire upon the enemy. Captains William W. Hance and John C. Summer both fell, while in command of the regiment, the former having his leg badly shattered, the latter killed by a grape-shot through the head. The command then devolved upon myself, being the senior officer present. About six o'clock P. M., Lieutenant A. E. Doby, aid-de-camp, delivered an order to move the regiment about a hundred yards beyond our position at the Marye house, and behind a stone fence, connecting with the left of the position of Phillips's legion. Soon afterwards an order came, through Captain C. R. Holmes, assistant adjutant-general, to throw forward skirmishers, covering the line of the regiment. Accordingly, First Lieutenant R. H. Wright, commanding Company E, was sent forward, and, as his command drew near some dwelling-houses, just in front of the regiment, he was fired upon by the enemy's sharpshooters, posted in the houses. Under these circumstances, and the further fact that night was upon us, the line of skirmishers were drawn back some considerable distance. About seven o'clock, Brigadier-General Kemper, with two hundred and ninety men from his command, by the order of Major-General Ransom, relieved this command of its position in the immediate front, and by the order of Brigadier-General Kershaw, conveyed through Adjutant G. J. Pope, the regiment was moved back over the hill occupied by our batteries, near the mill on the —— Creek, where the Third South Carolina battalion, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Rice, was posted, and there remained until the night of the fifteenth instant, when, under orders received from Brigadier-General Kershaw, the regiment was marched back into its former camp.

I cannot refrain from complimenting the command at the dauntless spirit and bravery displayed throughout by the officers and men. All seemed to realize the call made upon them, and none failed to respond.

The fire the regiment was called upon to sustain was certainly not surpassed by that at Savage Station, Maryland Heights, and Sharpsburg. The command suffered severely in killed and wounded, as the accompanying list will show. There were twenty-five killed and one hundred and forty-two wounded; total loss, one hundred and sixty-seven.

Strength — Thirty-six commissioned officers, three hundred and sixty-four enlisted men; total, four hundred.

Respectfully,

J. K. NANCE,
Captain, commanding Third South Carolina Regiment.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL LUSE.

CAMP BARKSDALE'S BRIGADE, NEAR FREDERICKSBURG, VA., December 19, 1862.

General Barksdale:

SIR: It becomes my duty to report to you the action of the Eighteenth Mississippi regiment in the late battle of Fredericksburg:

The night of the tenth instant the regiment picketed the river for about half a mile above, and a quarter of a mile below, the mouth of Deep Run; that portion of the regiment not on post being encamped at Mrs. Ferneyhough's house, on the river road. About midnight I received orders from you to double my pickets, which was immediately done. Between this time and daylight I received information from my pickets that the enemy were preparing to throw a pontoon bridge across the river, opposite the lower post, above the mouth of Deep Run. You, being present at the time, ordered me to send three companies to support Captain Govan, of the Seventeenth Mississippi regiment, above, and to take the rest of my command to the river, to guard the point at which it was reported the enemy were constructing the bridge, opposite my line. This was done at once. I went myself to examine the movements of the enemy, and heard them throw in the first boat, about half an hour before day. Judging them to be within easy range of the mouth of Deep Run, I lined the banks with sharpshooters, in addition to the pickets. Their boats were thrown in with great rapidity from this time until daylight, when I discovered that the boats had been floated down the river several hundred yards, making the place of crossing below and out of range from Deep Run. I immediately ordered my two companies of sharpshooters down to the crossing, to open fire on the enemy simultaneously with the pickets in their front, and moved up with the rest of the regiment, getting in position and removing a paling fence just as the fire was opened in front. The enemy were driven from the bridge, and their supports on the opposite side of the river broke ranks, and were with difficulty rallied. Having accomplished this, pickets were posted near enough to watch the further movement of the enemy, with two companies concealed very near the crossing to resist any further work on the bridge or attempt to cross it, one company remaining on the upper side of Deep Run by your

order. The remaining four companies of the regiment I placed in the ravine in front of the crossing, posting one where the river road crosses Deep Run, to guard the point against any sudden move of the enemy. The companies, thus stationed, remained in the position above described until about noon, when two regiments came to reënforce me, one forming on my right, the other on my left. The ground which three of my companies occupied being embraced in the positions of the above-mentioned regiments, I brought them in, and remained in position to resist the crossing or advance of the enemy until half past three P. M., when Colonel De Saussure, commanding the reenforcements sent me, communicated to me an order from General Kershaw to fall back to the river road, about one hundred and fifty yards to our rear, leaving one company, (C,) Captain Cassell's, in the ravine, with instructions to fire on the enemy as he advanced. This order was executed. The enemy crossed in our front between sundown and dark, and, advancing his skirmishers, encountered Captain Cassell's company, who fired on them and retired, in obedience to their instructions.

It is but just to state that all the above movements, after daylight, were performed under a destructive fire of the numerous guns of the enemy posted on the opposite side of the river, and that all the dangerous duties assigned them were performed, by officers and men, with the steadiness of veterans.

I am, General, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

W. H. LUSE,

Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding Eighteenth Mississippi Regiment.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN STACKHOUSE, COMMANDING REGIMENT.

REGIMENTAL QUARTERS, EIGHTH SOUTH CAROLINA REGIMENT, December 19, 1862.

Brigadier-General Kershaw:

GENERAL: In obedience to orders contained in circular of this date, requiring the commanders of regiments, battalions, and batteries, to make reports of the engagements of their commands in the late action in front of Fredericksburg, I submit the following report:

On the morning of the eleventh December instant, on hearing the signal guns, I formed my regiment, and, in obedience to your orders, formed my command on your left, occupying a good position on the Telegraph road, at the point where the open sands connect with the woods.

I kept this position, with but little change, till one o'clock P. M. on the thirteenth, when, in obedience to your order, I moved my command, left in front, following Colonel Kennedy's (Second) regiment, by a tortuous and difficult way, to the open sand on Marye's Hill. As soon as we reached the open space on the hill, by order of Colonel Kennedy, I formed my command on his right. The two commands were then, by order of Colonel Kennedy, moved rapidly to the front. On reaching the crest of the hill in front, (my right resting on a line with the cemetery,) we came to troops lying on the ground and firing to the front. Believing this to be a portion of General Cobb's brigade who had been driven from their position, I halted my command, and went myself to the front, to get a view of the road in front of Marye's Hill. Finding General Cobb's brigade in position in the road, I caused my command to cease firing, (they had, without orders, opened fire on the advancing Yankee lines,) and moved it rapidly to the road. I formed it on the Twenty-fourth Georgia regiment, then in position behind the stone fence. Without much change, we kept this position till the evening of the sixteenth. By your order I was permitted to form my command in four ranks on Colonel De Saussure's (Fifteenth) regiment, my right resting on the Twenty-fourth Georgia regiment till the evening of the fourteenth, when that regiment was relieved by the Tenth Georgia regiment of General Semmes's brigade.

On the evening of the thirteenth, the enemy attempted several times to advance on our position, but succeeded only in reaching a defile, two hundred yards in front, which concealed them from view from our position. Notwithstanding the long range, I believe we did the enemy much injury on his march to the defile above alluded to.

On the fourteenth, we confined our fire to *select* parties of the enemy.

On the fifteenth and sixteenth, I have little of interest to record in connection with my command.

I was much pleased with the conduct of my command. For casualties, I beg leave to refer you to report made yesterday. Of the thirty-one killed and disabled, we lost twenty-eight in reaching our position.

I am, General, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

E. T. STACKHOUSE,

Captain, commanding Eighth South Carolina Regiment.

REPORT OF COLONEL DE SAUSSURE.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH REGIMENT SOUTH CAROLINA VOLUNTEERS, December 20, 1862.

Captain C. R. Holmes, Assistant-Adjutant General:

SIR: In compliance with instructions from headquarters, I have the honor to report that, on Saturday morning, the eleventh instant, the Fifteenth regiment South Carolina volunteers moved down the Bowling Green road to the support of the picket at the Ferneyhough farm, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Luse, Eighteenth Mississippi, and was formed on the right, upon the edge of Deep Run, in front of the road, with the Sixteenth Georgia, Colonel Bryan, on the left of Lieutenant-Colonel Luse. The command remained in that position, with three companies thrown forward towards the river as skirmishers, until ordered to retire to the Bowling Green road by General Kershaw, late in the day. The regiment remained on picket all night, until five o'clock A. M., Friday morning, when, by order of

Major-General McLaws, it resumed its proper position in line.

On Saturday the thirteenth instant, the regiment marched off by the left flank, with the rest of the brigade, to the support of General Cobb's brigade, under Marye's Hill. Passing to the rear of the batteries, the regiment halted, and lay down in line of battle, in rear of the Marye house, until, by an order extended through Assistant Adjutant-General Holmes, it was marched across the hill, under a heavy fire, to the rear of the cemetery, as a support to Colonel Walton's batteries. Later in the evening the regiment was marched down to the stone wall, on the road below Marye's Hill, to the support of the Second Carolina regiment, and there remained until the evacuation of the city of Fredericksburg by the enemy, the night of the fifteenth instant.

The conduct of the officers and privates of the regiment throughout the entire five days, from the eleventh to the sixteenth December, was such as to meet with my unqualified approbation.

I would respectfully bring to the notice of the Brigadier-General the services of the staff officers actually engaged: Adjutant James M. Davis, for the gallant and prompt execution of all orders extended by him; Surgeon James and Assistant-Surgeon Wallace; also the Rev. H. B. McCallum, chaplain of the regiment, for their skilful and assiduous attention to the wounded; and Ordnance Sergeant R. W. Boyd, for his prompt attention to the duties of his department.

The regiment went into action with twenty-seven commissioned officers and three hundred and seventy-seven enlisted men; and had two commissioned officers (Lieutenants Barron and Derrick) wounded, one sergeant and one private killed, and fifty-two enlisted men wounded, of which a tabular statement has been heretofore furnished.

Respectfully submitted.

W. D. DE SAUSSURE,
Colonel Fifteenth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers.

REPORT OF COLONEL NANCE.

RICHMOND, December 24, 1862.

Captain C. R. Holmes, A. A. G.:

SIR: Early in the morning of the thirteenth instant, I took my position in line of battle just to the right of the Telegraph road, as you approach Fredericksburg, and immediately at the foot of the first range of hills from the river. Except some slight shelling, which annoyed us and wounded one or more of my men, nothing of special interest occurred to us until about two P. M., when, by command of Brigadier-General Kershaw, I moved, by the left, out of some breastworks which I had thrown up the night before, down the Telegraph road five or six hundred yards, filed to the left, and, crossing the branch running by its side, took the road leading over the high hill on the left of the Telegraph road, and into the open field behind Marye's house. When within five or six hundred yards of this house, Lieutenant Doby, A. D. C., delivered to me an order to form my regiment and move forward and occupy the crest of the hill at Marye's house, with my right resting at the house. I immediately began to close up my regiment to execute the order, when Major Gaillard rode up, and, speaking for Brigadier-General Kershaw, extended substantially the same order, and, at my request, gave me the direction of the crest which I was to occupy, so that I could form parallel to it before advancing. The regiment was considerably strung out in the flank movement made in coming to this point, and while waiting for it to close up, Lieutenant Doby, A. D. C., came to me, telling me to hurry up, and represented to me that Marye's house was in danger of being possessed by the enemy. Seeing the importance of the point, and thus having my fears for its safety excited, I advanced at once with that portion of my regiment which was formed, and left my adjutant, Lieutenant G. J. Pope, to bring the other companies forward, as soon as they formed. When we reached the neighborhood of Marye's house a severe fire was opened upon us; but we steadily advanced to the crest of the hill, when my men lay down and opened fire on the enemy, who were in the flat in our front. By this time their fire was strongly directed against us. The other companies of my regiment came up immediately after we became engaged. I went to the right to see that they were put in proper position, and was shot down, a minie ball entering my left thigh just to the right and above my knee, while discharging this duty. At that time I declined to be moved, but continued to direct and encourage the men, who were already doing manfully. I soon saw, however, that we were too much exposed, and that we were contending at disadvantage, owing to the fact that we were engaged at a great distance, and the enemy's guns were of superior range. Having been moved back to Marye's house, I sent word to the officer in command to withdraw far enough to get shelter behind the crest of the hill, without retiring too far to deliver an effective fire. Accordingly Major Maffett, then commanding, withdrew to the road running beside the river fence, in Marye's yard, where, I believe, the regiment held its position, and continued its fire until the close of the battle. Afterwards I sent directions to the officer commanding to send a detail after ammunition. He did so, and this was my last official communication with the regiment for the day. An account of what subsequently occurred and a list of the casualties in the regiment will, I presume, be furnished by some other officer. It is my duty and pleasure to testify to the courage and fortitude with which these dangers were met and these fiery trials were endured by my brave comrades, so long as they were under my observation. Several valuable officers were wounded — one, Captain W. W. Hance, who has suffered amputation of his leg, is lost to the service, if he shall not unfortunately be lost to his friends. He was a superior and gallant officer, and his loss is a great one to the regiment. Captain John C. Summer, a most successful officer, Captain Per-

rin Foster, an efficient, zealous and conscientious officer, and Lieutenants Hollingsworth and Hill, both young lieutenants of promise, were killed. The three field officers, Captain Todd, senior captain, and Captain Hance, third senior captain present, were wounded, and Captain Summer, second senior captain present, was killed; thus putting the six ranking officers of the regiment *hors de combat.* Ours is a bloody record; but we trust it is a highly honorable one.

Very respectfully,

JAMES D. NANCE,
Colonel, commanding Third South Carolina Regiment.

REPORT OF COLONEL CARTER.

HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH MISSISSIPPI REG'T,
NEAR FREDERICKSBURG, VA., Dec. 28, 1862.

GENERAL: In accordance with your order, I marched my regiment, at about five o'clock on the morning of the eleventh instant, to the market-house in Fredericksburg, when I was ordered by you to take "position on Caroline Street, await Lieutenant-Colonel Fizer's orders, send him reenforcements whenever he called on me to do so, and should he be enabled to hold his position, then in that event to withdraw my regiment to the market-house." I accordingly took position on Caroline Street, immediately in rear of the position occupied by Lieutenant-Colonel Fizer, and opened communication with him, where I remained until about four o'clock P. M., under a very heavy and destructive fire from the batteries of the enemy on the opposite side of the river.

About two o'clock P. M., Lieutenant-Colonel Fizer asked me for ten men to act as sharpshooters, which I promptly sent him. About four o'clock P. M., Lieutenant-Colonel Fizer sent to me for two companies, which I was proceeding with, when I met him retiring with his command to the market-house, being unable to hold his position longer.

I immediately formed my regiment and withdrew it to the market-house, when I was ordered by you to form in the next street (towards the river) and engage the enemy; but, before I could do so, I ascertained that the enemy occupied the street on which I was ordered to form, and was advancing. I immediately disposed of my regiment on the street which I then occupied, (Princess Anne,) so as to command as many streets running at right angles with the river as I possibly could, and engaged the enemy at once, driving him towards the river, after a spirited engagement of two hours.

Having fired the last gun at the retreating enemy, I was then ordered to withdraw my regiment from the town, which order I promptly obeyed.

The enemy's loss, after crossing the river, in the engagement with my regiment, is estimated to be over two hundred killed and wounded. I refer you to the report already furnished you of the loss which we sustained.

Captain J. L. Clark was killed, by a solid shot, early in the morning. He was a promising young officer. Captain T. W. Thurman was dangerously wounded later in the day, fell in the hands of the enemy, and, in all probability, is dead. Lieutenant J. M. Stovall is missing, and is supposed to be killed.

I wish to call your attention to the gallant and meritorious conduct of Captain G. L. Donald, who had immediate command of several companies, which did fine execution, without sustaining any serious loss.

I wish, also, to make mention of the coolness, bravery, and soldierly-like conduct of both officers and enlisted men of my command.

J. W. CARTER,
Colonel, commanding Thirteenth Mississippi Regiment.

REPORT OF COLONEL J. THOMPSON BROWN.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST VIRGINIA ARTILLERY,
December 19, 1862.

Captain A. S. Pendleton, Assistant Adjutant-General:

CAPTAIN: In obedience to orders, I beg leave to submit the following report of the operations of my command in the late engagement before Fredericksburg:

About ten o'clock, Saturday morning, my batteries were ordered to a position in rear of Hamilton's house, ready to be called on as occasion might require. About twelve o'clock, by order of Colonel Crutchfield, I sent two Parrott rifles from Captain Poague's battery, under command of Lieutenant Graham, and two similar pieces from the Third Howitzers, under Lieutenant Utz, to report to Major Pelham, on the right of the railroad. Shortly afterwards, I was ordered to send to the same point four other rifle guns, viz.: two ten-pounder Parrotts and one brass rifle from Second Howitzers, and one three-inch rifle from Captain Dance's battery, all under the command of Captain Watson, (Second Howitzers.) These eight guns were actively engaged, and suffered severely from the enemy's artillery and sharpshooters. I have to lament the loss on this part of the field of a gallant and most excellent officer, Lieutenant Utz, commanding Third Howitzers. The ammunition of most of the pieces was exhausted before dark, and the pieces themselves withdrawn. Having obtained ammunition for the two rifles of the Third Howitzers, I sent them back to the field, where they remained, in company with the three pieces of Captain Watson's battery, until about nine o'clock. About two o'clock, by order of Colonel Crutchfield, I placed in position, on the hill to the extreme right of our infantry line, the two twenty-pounder Parrotts of Captain Poague's battery. These two pieces, unaided, engaged the enemy's artillery, and afterwards opened upon the infantry. The exact range of the hill having been obtained by much previous firing, our loss at this point was heavy. Among the killed was Lieutenant McCorkle, a brave soldier and estimable gentleman. Later in the evening, Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman brought up two howitzers from Captain Dance's battery, and placed them on the left of Captain Poague's pieces. Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman was severely wounded at this point, but

remained on the field until after dark. I fear I shall lose the assistance of this valuable officer for several months. Late in the evening, two pieces of Captain Hupp's battery, under Lieutenant Griffin, were ordered to the right of the railroad, and were successfully engaged with the enemy's sharpshooters. Captain Brooke's battery, although not actively engaged, was exposed to the enemy's fire on Saturday and Sunday. I cannot refrain from expressing my high admiration for the conduct of the officers and men of my command in the action before Fredericksburg. After marching all of the previous night, they came upon a field strewn with the wrecks of other batteries, and behaved in a manner which elicited the praise of all who saw them. I append a list of casualties:

Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman, wounded in leg. Poague's battery, six killed and ten wounded. Watson's Second Howitzers, one killed and seven wounded. Smith's Third Howitzers, three killed and three wounded. Dance's battery, none killed, two wounded. Hupp's battery, none killed, one wounded. Brooke's battery, none killed, two wounded. Total killed, ten. Total wounded, twenty-six.

I beg leave to call attention to the fact that but few of the shell for Parrott rifles exploded, owing to imperfect fuses.

Respectfully submitted.

J. THOMPSON BROWN,
Colonel First Virginia Artillery.

REPORT OF MAJOR D. B. BRIDGFORD.

HEADQUARTERS PROVOST MARSHAL
SECOND CORPS, January 9, 1863.

Major A. S. Pendleton, Assistant Adjutant-General:

MAJOR: In obedience to an order from the Lieutenant-General commanding, I herewith transmit the operations of the provost guard, consisting of the battalion and Captain Upshur's squadron of cavalry:

On the eleventh December I received an order to move towards Fredericksburg, with two days' rations cooked and placed in haversacks.

December twelfth, I moved at dawn on the Fredericksburg road to Hamilton's Crossing, where I placed a guard for the purpose of arresting all stragglers; also placed a guard, consisting of cavalry and infantry, along the whole line of the corps, in rear of the line of battle about half a mile, with instructions to arrest all men without proper passes, on authorized business for their commands, to be brought to the guard placed on the railroad. There my brigade surgeon was stationed to examine all men claiming to be sick, without proper passes from their brigade or regimental surgeons. Numbers, however, were really sick and totally unfit for duty. They were without passes. When a sufficient number were collected together, I sent them, under charge of cavalry, to be delivered to the first major-general whose command was going into the fight, to place them in front and most exposed position of his command. I am happy to state the number arrested and sent forward were comparatively few, in consideration of the size of the army.

During the thirteenth and fourteenth, the number sent in under guard were only five hundred and twenty-six. Numbers were turned back, owing to their not having proper passes to return to the rear to cook, &c.

I am most happy to state I had no occasion to carry into effect the order to shoot all stragglers who refused to go forward, or if caught a second time, upon the evidence of two witnesses, to shoot them. Had I occasion to carry it into effect, it certainly should have been executed to the very letter.

During the thirteenth and fourteenth I received and placed under guard three hundred and twenty-four prisoners of war, which I sent to Richmond by order of General Lee; eleven of them were commissioned officers and paroled by me; the balance I took names, regiments, brigades, and corps, as far as possible, in obedience to your order.

December sixteenth, I received one hundred and nine prisoners of war, which I paroled and sent to Guineas Depot, under command of Captain Upshur, with instructions to have them forwarded by railroad to Richmond, if possible, which orders were carried into effect. During the same day I went through Dr. Black's and Whitehead's hospital, where I paroled twenty-three Federal prisoners.

A considerable number of wounded prisoners were sent to Richmond. They do not appear in this statement, nor could I by any means ascertain the number.

On the seventeenth, I received an order to move with my entire guard in rear of General D. H. Hill's division on the Port Royal road. Captain Upshur, with his squadron, being absent, I ordered Captain Tucker to assist in bringing up the rear.

On the eighteenth, I camped on Mr. Brooke's farm, near where General D. H. Hill's division halted. I am happy to inform you that there was little or no straggling; the number did not exceed thirty, notwithstanding I used the cavalry in scouring the entire country around. It is my belief, so far as I was able to judge, that there was little disposition on the part of the men to shirk from duty; but, on the contrary, everything went to prove their willingness to do their utmost. The great mass seemed eager to confront the foe. The present system of provost guard, if carried into effect, will prevent all future straggling.

I have the honor to be, sir,
Your most obedient servant,

D. B. BRIDGFORD,
Major and Chief Provost Marshal Second Corps.

P. S. During the thirteenth there were three hundred and twenty sent back, and on the fourteenth two hundred and six, making the number, as above stated, five hundred and twenty-six.

List of Prisoners captured at Fredericksburg by Lieutenant-General Jackson's Corps.

Commissioned officers paroled,	11	Less 68 taken and sent by General Longstreet's corps,	68
Enlisted men,	445		
Enlisted men paroled,	133		
	589		521

This is the manner they were received here; five hundred and twenty-one is the amount taken.

Return of small Arms, Ammunition, &c., collected on the Battle-Field before Fredericksburg, in the Engagements of the 12th and 13th of December, 1862.

Small Arms.											Ammunition, &c.					
Springfield Rifles.	Improved Muskets.	Altered Muskets.	Austrian Rifles.	Belgian Muskets.	Springfield Muskets.	Mississippi Rifles.	Flint-Lock Muskets.	Enfield Rifles, Calibre 67.	Enfield Rifles, Calibre 57.	Damaged Guns.	Calibre 69.	Calibre 57 × 58.	Calibre 54.	Mixed and damaged Cartridges.	Infantry Accoutrements.	Belgian Rifles.
250	3148	1136	772	78	42	478	13	26	59	1406	80,000	94,000	31,000	50,000	1,800	312

RECAPITULATION.

Total on hand at the reserve trains,	7,720
" retained by the first army corps,	2,166
" " " second army corps,	513
" forwarded to Richmond,	692
	11,091

RECAPITULATION.

Grand total rounds of ammunition,	255,000

RECAPITULATION.

Total sets of accoutrements,	1,800

RECAPITULATION IN FULL.

Grand total of arms collected,	11,091	Grand total of rounds of ammunition,	255,000
Probable loss of our troops,	2,000	" " sets of accoutrements,	1,800
Grand total of arms captured,	9,091		

Respectfully submitted

BRISCOE G. BALDWIN,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Chief of Ordnance A. N. V.

HEADQUARTERS, A. N. V. *Ordnance Office*, Jan. 20, 1863.

REPORT OF MAJOR WHITE.

HEADQUARTERS WHITE'S CAVALRY, December 24, 1862.

Brigadier-General W. E. Jones, commanding Valley District:

GENERAL: I have the honor to send you a detailed account of my scout since I left camp on the morning of the tenth instant. I camped that night near Hillsborough.

On the thirteenth I captured twelve infantrymen in the neighborhood of Hillsborough, whom I sent back to Snickersville. I learned from them that the enemy had gone in the direction of Leesburg, and had about three hours' start. I immediately ordered an advanced guard to push them as rapidly as possible, and learn the force of their rear guard. My advance captured six infantrymen on the way, who were also sent to Snickersville. I reached Leesburg about three P. M. The enemy's cavalry left the town as we came in sight. My advance pushed on, and encountered them about three miles below Leesburg, on the Centreville road, and, after a brisk skirmish, drove them into the rear guard of their infantry and cavalry, capturing two and wounding three. Nobody hurt on our side. I did not deem it prudent to attack their infantry and cavalry combined with my force, and returned to the neighborhood of Waterford, and camped for the night.

On the morning of the fourteenth I started for Waterford, where I encountered Sam Means's force, some sixty men; we charged them and drove them through the town, killing one of their lieutenants and capturing their orderly sergeant and one private; both of whom, together with those already sent to Snickersville, making twenty-two in all, were sent to your headquarters for disposal. We pursued them about five miles in the direction of Point of Rocks. Learning that there was a force of about sixty cavalry in Poolesville, I determined to push forward to that place; sent my worst horses back; sent a squad of men to watch the enemy at Harper's Ferry; they charged the pickets, capturing twenty-six, which were paroled. I crossed the Potomac at

Conrad's Ferry with ninety-three men about one hour by sun; arrived at Poolesville about eight, P. M. Before entering the town I learned that about one half of their force had gone on a scout; and that the remainder were quartered in the town hall. Divided my force and charged it in two directions. Upon surrounding the hall and demanding its surrender, was answered with a volley from door and windows; we returned the fire with good effect, killing a lieutenant and the orderly sergeant, and wounding eight, including the lieutenant commanding. The hall was then surrendered; we captured twenty-one prisoners, all of whom we paroled. Our loss was one man killed.

Some of the enemy were scattered around the town, and when they heard the firing, made good their escape. We also captured forty-three horses, and destroyed all the stores, consisting of clothing of various kinds, blankets, Enfield rifles and muskets, also a large lot of commissary stores, together with wagons, &c. Remained in the town for several hours, and recrossed the Potomac at White's Ford. Whilst camped at the Trap, I sent a scout to Leesburg on the twentieth; they captured eight prisoners and paroled them.

I send you a list of names of all prisoners captured and paroled during my scout.

ELIJAH V. WHITE,
Major, commanding Battalion.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN LATIMER.

CAMP NEAR PORT ROYAL,
December 25, 1862.

Major S. Hale, A. A. A. General Ewell's Division:

MAJOR: In obedience to orders, I would most respectfully beg leave to submit the following report of the operations of the batteries of Ewell's division in the enagements with the enemy near Fredericksburg, on the thirteenth and fourteenth of the present month:

Early on the morning of the thirteenth, I was ordered by General Early to take command of the batteries of the division, as acting chief of artillery, and I immediatly reported to Colonel Crutchfield, chief of artillery second corps, for instructions. He ordered me to park the batteries in a sheltered spot, behind a range of hills, about half a mile behind our line of battle, and there await orders. He shortly after returned, and directed me to take my own battery, under command of Lieutenant Tanner, and Captain Brown's, under cammand of Lieutenant Plater, to the relief of some batteries occupying a position near the extreme left of the line formed by the second corps, and to report to Brigadier-General Pender, whose brigade then occupied this position. Only five guns were required, and, by direction of General Pender, I relieved five of the guns at that point by the two rifles belonging to my battery and the three rifles composing Captain Brown's. The position on which these guns were posted was not a very advantageous one, but the best that could be selected. It was a small rising in an open field, with a wood to the right, in which a portion of General A. P. Hill's division was posted, and on the left was a ditch and bank running parallel with the railroad, behind which a portion of General Hood's division was posted. In front, at the distance of about a mile, were four of the enemy's batteries, with lines of skirmishers considerably advanced in front of said batteries. We were exposed to quite a heavy fire from these batteries, but gained the position without loss. My orders were to fire only at infantry unless the batteries advanced, which orders I obeyed, firing only once at them, and then only to cover the advance of General McLaws's brigade, which was made late in the day. I was kept constantly engaged at this point from eleven A. M., when I gained it, until night, repelling repeated advances of the enemy by the use of canister. I relieved these batteries that night by Captain Carrington's battery, which engaged the enemy next morning, upon the advance of their skirmishers, successfully driving them back. Shortly after moving to the left with the batteries spoken of above, Captain D'Aquin's and the Staunton artillery, Lieutenant Garber, were ordered by Colonel Crutchfield to the right of our lines, to report to Major Pelham, where they were engaged most of the day. Not having personally superintended their movements during the day, I am unable to describe them minutely. Captain Dement's battery was ordered to the front on the fourteenth, where it remained in battery until we marched to this point, without, however, becoming engaged at any time. We have to lament the loss of Captain L. E. D'Aquin, of the Louisiana Guard artillery. A more gallant officer or more worthy man never fell upon the field of battle. Also, Lieutenant Grayson, Captain Brown's battery. He fell, nobly, at his post. The losses in the different batteries are as follows:

Louisiana Guard artillery, Captain D'Aquin—Captain D'Aquin, killed; one private wounded; two horses disabled; one gun disabled.

Captain Brown's battery, Lieutenant Plater—Lieutenant Grayson and one private killed; nine wounded; sixteen horses disabled; also, one gun and one caisson.

Staunton artillery, Lieutenant Garber—none killed or wounded; one horse disabled and one gun carriage, afterwards repaired.

Courtney artillery, Lieutenant Tanner—one private killed; Lieutenant Tanner and six privates wounded; eight horses disabled.

Captain Carrington's battery—four men wounded; seven horses disabled.

Captain Dement's battery—none killed or wounded; four horses disabled.

I am pleased to be able to say that all the officers and men under my command acted in a highly creditable manner, promptly and cheerfully obeying all orders, and standing to their posts.

I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully,
Your most obedient servant,
J. W. LATIMER,
Captain, and Acting Chief of Artillery of Ewell's Division.

REPORT OF COLONEL R. L. WALKER.

HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY CORPS,
December 21, 1862.

Major R. C. Morgan, Assistant Adjutant-General:

MAJOR: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the artillery corps of the light division in the engagement of Saturday, the thirteenth instant:

The batteries of Captains McIntosh and Pegram, with a section of the batteries of Captains Latham, Johnson, and Crenshaw, commanded respectively by Lieutenants Potts, Clutter, and James Ellett, numbering altogether fourteen guns, had position on the heights near the railroad, supported by the brigades of Brigadier-General Field (Colonel Brockenbrough commanding) and Brigadier-General Archer. Captains Braxton (Lieutenant Marye commanding Braxton's battery) and Davidson, with five and four guns respectively, took position on the left wing of the light division, in the plain just to the right of Deep Run Creek, and were supported by the brigades of Brigadier Generals Pender and Lane. About ten A. M., the enemy began a desultory fire from several batteries, as if feeling our position. Their fire, about eleven A. M., became hot and well directed, causing us some loss in men and horses. Captain McIntosh, commanding his own guns, and the sections of Captains Latham and Johnson, and Captain Pegram, commanding his own guns and the section of Crenshaw, were directed to withhold their fire till there should be an infantry demonstration. The enemy, weary of suspense, about twelve M., formed a front to attack the heights. Their advance, made by a division apparently, was speedily broken and driven back by Captains McIntosh and Pegram's murderous fire — the enemy opening upon them meanwhile very destructively, with at least twenty-five guns. This attempt having failed, the enemy, concentrated in mass and in enormous force, moved forward rapidly, protected by a fearful fire from all their guns, toward the point of woods in the plain, in defiance of our guns, which were served rapidly and with great havoc upon their dense ranks. In advancing to, and being routed by, the infantry from the woods, they suffered very heavy loss from the fire of our guns. While the attention of our guns was devoted to their infantry, their artillery caused us heavy loss; but as soon as engaged by our guns their shot flew wide, though in weight of metal they much exceeded us. At half-past three P. M., Captains McIntosh and Pegram becoming short of men and ammunition, and having one gun disabled and a caisson and limber exploded, they were relieved by the corps of Colonel Brown, except one section of Captain Pegram's battery, which remained till nightfall. Here we lost Lieutenants James Ellett and Z. C. McGruder, whose memory we should not willingly let die. Lieutenant Clutter was wounded also, and many brave men of the rank and file, gallantly doing their duty, were wounded and killed. On the left of the light division, Lieutenant Marye and Captain Davidson, with their commands, fully sustained their high reputation. Three charges were made upon their position, and gallantly repulsed with canister. Outnumbered in weight of metal, and often closely approached by the enemy's infantry, they as often sent them back with canister and shrapnel, and held their position until it was deemed expedient to abandon it. Captain Braxton was withdrawn about three P. M., and Captain Davidson at nightfall. Lieutenant Brander, of the latter battery, was slightly wounded.

The guns upon both flanks were served with the coolness of a parade, though exposed to a fire which seemed to fill the air with destruction.

Where all did their duty as well as, I am proud to say, the artillery of the light division did theirs in this engagement, comparison would be invidious. Men and officers vied with each other in their devotion to duty and regardlessness of self. I cannot, however, neglect this opportunity to call your especial attention to Lieutenant J. H. Chamberlayne as particularly deserving notice for his gallant conduct. His services are almost indispensable.

I have the honor to remain,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
R. L. WALKER,
Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding Artillery Light Division.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN NADENBOUSCH, COMMANDING REGIMENT.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND REGIMENT VIRGINIA INFANTRY,
CAMP NEAR MOSS NECK, December 23, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: In obedience to orders, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Second Virginia regiment in the battle of Fredericksburg, fought December thirteenth, 1862:

The regiment left camp near Guineas Depot at six o'clock A. M., on the twelfth instant, marched to Hamilton's Crossing, on the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, thence in a westwardly direction to a large wood covering the crest of hills overlooking the battle-field. After a number of changes of position, bivouacked for the night in the wood above referred to, in rear of General Gregg's brigade, of A. P. Hill's division, which held the military road.

About nine o'clock A. M., December thirteenth, the heavy cannonading on the right and left, and the sharp skirmishing in front, announced the great battle was near at hand. As the day advanced the musketry became more distinct and continuous, and soon the line in front of us became hotly engaged. At this time an order to advance was given, which was done with order and alacrity, marching in a north-easterly direction. The Second regiment was on the right of the brigade, and in consequence of this position, was the only one of the brigade, so far as I know, engaged in the musketry fight. Marching forward in line, with the other regiments of the brigade, I observed that there was no support on our right,

and kept a sharp look out for the safety of that flank. I apprehended that if the enemy was near at hand they would take advantage of this gap, and fall upon our flank at this unguarded point; and so it turned out. How, and in what way, the enemy gained this advanced position, and what disposition had been made of our front line, it is impossible for me to say. The gap was there, and they pushed forward with a large infantry force and a battery of artillery, as was ascertained from prisoners captured and wounded men upon the field. Observing them through the dense foliage at a distance, and the Brigadier being at a different point on the line, I took the responsibility of filing my regiment to the right, presenting my front to the enemy. No sooner had I gotten into position than they opened a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, to which the regiment replied rapidly and effectively, men and officers standing to their posts and doing their duty as only veterans know how. I rejoice to be able to say that there were but few men in the regiment who disgraced the name of soldier. It was during this brief but brisk fight that the regiment sustained a loss of three killed and seventeen wounded. Among the latter were Lieutenant William B. Colston, commanding Company E, and Lieutenant J. J. Haines, Company E. The enemy soon fled. We then advanced to within a short distance of the railroad, (the front line of the army,) and remained in this position until about seven o'clock P. M., sending forward Company C, (Captain Randolph,) as skirmishers to the railroad. About this time the brigade was withdrawn to the military road, where we slept upon our arms until half past three o'clock A. M., fourteenth instant, when we were ordered to take position in advance, along the line of railroad. There was quite lively skirmishing during the entire day — had one man wounded.

About five o'clock A. M., on the fifteenth instant, the brigade was relieved by Rodes' brigade, of D. H. Hill's division, and returned to the rear in third line — reserve.

During the entire four days of exposure, suspense, and danger, both officers and men evinced the true spirit of patriots and soldiers. I cannot but feel proud of the honor of having commanded such men. Captain R. T. Colston, second in command, and Adjutant R. W. Hunter, deserve honorable mention at my hands for gallantry and good conduct during the engagement, and their material aid in the command of the regiment.

Respectfully submitted,

J. Q. A. NADENBOUSCH,
Captain, commanding Second Regiment Virginia Infantry.

List of Casualties in the Second Virginia Infantry, December 13, 1862:

Company A. — Private Thomas Barr, severely wounded by gunshot, not serious.

Company E. — First Lieutenant W. B. Colston, severely wounded by shell, very serious; Second Lieutenant J. J. Haines, severely wounded by musket ball, not serious; private Samuel Stuckey, severely wounded by gunshot, not serious; private Harvey Kite, severely wounded by gunshot, not serious; private N. D. Rittenhour, severely wounded by gunshot, not serious; private Alexander Porterfield, slightly wounded by shell; private John Kiser, mortally wounded, and since died.

Company F. — Private J. M. Fleming, killed by shell; private Ford Friar, mortally wounded by gunshot.

Company G. — Sergeant Charles M. Asquith, slightly wounded by shell; private Fayette Rawlins, severely wounded by shell, serious; private William Kerl, slightly bruised by shell; private Daniel Moler, slightly bruised by shell; private Samuel Fay, slight; private Charles G. Tabb, slight.

Company H. — Private J. A. Luck, severely wounded by gunshot, not serious; private James Hicks, slightly; private William Reed, severely wounded by gunshot, not serious.

Company I. — Private J. T. Barr, severely wounded by gunshot, not serious.

Company K. — First Lieutenant B. W. Moore, slightly bruised by shell.

Total, twenty-one.

J. Q. A. NADENBOUSCH,
Colonel, commanding Second Virginia Infantry.

REPORT OF LIEUT.-COLONEL EDMONDSON.

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SEVENTH VIRGINIA VOLUNTEERS,
CAMP PAXTON'S BRIGADE, December 23, 1862.

Lieutenant Arnall, A. A. A. General First Brigade:

SIR: In obedience to order, I respectfully submit the following report of the participation of my regiment in the late battle of the thirteenth instant, before Fredericksburg, viz.:

General Paxton's brigade, of which my regiment forms a part, occupied, on the morning of the thirteenth, the rear position, or the third parallel line, in supporting distance of General Gregg's brigade, which occupied a position on the second parallel line. About nine o'clock A. M., a heavy cannonading commenced, and was kept up till about noon, to which my regiment, and the brigade generally, was severely subjected, but unflinchingly withstood. About noon the infantry became engaged, and the battle, for hours, raged furiously. Our line in front finally seeming to give way, my regiment, together with the remainder of the brigade, *eager for the fray*, moved up rapidly and in good order (passing over troops which, to all appearance, seemed to be doubting as to their duty) to the support of their comrades in front. The enemy, however, had been whipped back in the mean time, and our brigade became not engaged. The remainder of the day was engaged in changing position, but the enemy did not advance.

I sustained no loss in either killed, wounded, or missing. I would, however, here remark that I have never seen the officers and men of my

regiment behave with more gallantry and with cooler courage, seemingly having determined to conquer or die.

Respectfully,

JAMES R. EDMONDSON,
Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding Twenty-Seventh Regiment Virginia Volunteers.

REPORT OF MAJOR WILLIAM TERRY.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH REGIMENT VIRGINIA VOLUNTEERS, December 23, 1862.

Captain Charles S. Arnold, A. A. A. General Paxton's Brigade:

SIR: On the twelfth instant the Fourth regiment Virginia volunteers left camp, five miles north-west of Guineas Station, and moved in the direction of Fredericksburg, arriving at Hamilton's Crossing before noon, remaining near there some hours. Early in the afternoon the regiment, with the brigade, moved forward, and was put in position in rear of a portion of A. P. Hill's division, in the woods west of the railroad, and to the right of the road leading from Hamilton's Crossing in the direction of the Telegraph road. The regiment several times changed position during the afternoon, and rested for the night by their guns, a little in rear of the summit in these woods — the Fourth regiment during the day occupying the left of the brigade.

Early next morning, the thirteenth instant, the evidence of the approaching conflict was heard in brisk skirmishing and cannonading, the enemy's shot and shell passing and frequently bursting near the Fourth regiment, but doing no damage. Toward noon the regiment was retired a few hundred yards and formed in line of battle, from which position we soon moved forward by the front. Early in this movement Lieutenant-Colonel Gardner was severely wounded in the face by a fragment of shell, whilst gallantly leading his regiment, and carried from the field. As the next in rank, I assumed command. The regiment continued to move forward in direction of the heavy infantry firing in front, until we passed the crest of the hill, when we moved by the right flank along, and crossing the military road. Here the Fourth regiment was ordered to take position on the extreme right of the brigade, which was promptly done, and again formed in line of battle. During this time we were exposed to a galling fire of shot and shell, which wounded several of my men.

The engagement still progressing, we were again ordered forward along the military road, and took a position then unoccupied by any troops, some one hundred yards to the west of, and parallel to, the railroad. I threw out skirmishers in front of the regiment, who kept up a brisk fire with the enemy's skirmishers until dark, killing and wounding several of them. We remained here until after night, when I was ordered to follow the Twenty-seventh regiment. We moved a short distance to the rear along the military road, by which we had advanced, lying down for the night by the road side.

At three A. M., fourteenth instant, we were aroused, moved a few hundred yards through the woods, in the direction of Fredericksburg, and were placed in position behind the embankment of the railroad — the Second Virginia regiment resting upon a skirt of woods which crossed the railroad, and the Fourth regiment on the left of the Second. We remained in this position during Sunday, the fourteenth instant, hourly expecting a general advance of the enemy, but the day passed without any incident worthy of notice, beyond the skirmishing between the sharpshooters on both sides. I, however, restrained the Fourth regiment, and permitted no firing, and thus protected my men from any loss.

At dawn on Monday morning, the fifteenth instant, my regiment was relieved from duty on the advance post, and retired, with the brigade, about one mile to the rear, in the woods, where we remained till Tuesday morning, from which place we marched to our present encampment in Caroline county.

Of the conduct of officers and men, from Lieutenant-Colonel Gardner down, it affords me great pleasure to speak in the highest terms of commendation. For coolness and steadiness under a trying fire of artillery, I never saw their conduct surpassed. And while they were not called on to participate in an infantry fight, they showed they were ready to meet its danger and to do their duty. And I avail myself of this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to the officers and men for their cheerful, prompt, and ready obedience to orders under every circumstance; and, when all have behaved so well, I should do injustice did I attempt to bestow marked distinction upon any. I must also express my regret at the loss the service has sustained in the wounding of Lieutenant-Colonel Gardner, whose whole conduct during this war, on many hard-fought battle-fields, has marked him as a most trustworthy and efficient officer.

I give below a list of the casualties.

Very respectfully, &c.,

WILLIAM TERRY,
Major, commanding Fourth Regiment Virginia Volunteers.

List of Casualties in the Fourth Regiment Virginia Volunteers.

Field and Staff. — Lieutenant-Colonel Gardner, severely wounded in the face.

Company A. — Corporal Thomas Chatwell, shot in foot.

Company C. — Wounded: Private S. S. Coddall, in right foot; private William Boyd, in left leg; private George Pratt, in left leg; private C. L. Terry, in the back.

Company D. — Wounded: Private G. H. Hudge, in right leg; private A. J. Wolfe, in right hip.

Company F. — Wounded: Sergeant T. R. Stamper, in foot; private W. S. Shupe, in right hip; private S. O. Canico, in left side.

Company G. — Wounded: Sergeant J. H. Sublett, left hip; Corporal G. A. Willis, left arm; private P. Hall, in left hip and breast.

Company L. — Wounded: Private J. C. Snider, in left arm.

The wounds in most of the foregoing cases are slight — from fragments of shell. Many have already returned to duty.

WILLIAM TERRY,
Major, commanding Fourth Regiment Virginia Volunteers.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT MCKENDREE.

HEADQUARTERS CARPENTER'S BATTERY, CAMP PAXTON'S BRIGADE, December 23, 1862.

General E. F. Paxton, commanding First Brigade:

GENERAL: In obedience to orders, I submit the following report of the part taken by this company in the action of Saturday, the thirteenth instant:

On the morning of the day above mentioned, about six o'clock, we were conducted by Captain Brockenbrough, then acting chief of artillery, to a position in front of General Branch's brigade, being supported by the Seventh North Carolina regiment, which was posted alongside of the railroad, about one hundred yards to our rear. We were instructed to hold our position until our support had passed to the front, then if *necessary*, to move to another point some three hundred yards to the rear. As soon as we arrived on the ground the battery was prepared for action, but remained silent, according to orders, until about nine o'clock A. M., when we observed the enemy advancing on our right in considerable force, (infantry,) when we, in connection with Captains Braxton's and Wooding's batteries, immediately on our right, opened a brisk fire on the advancing column, which caused them to waver and break for a time, but soon reappeared, at the same time advanced several batteries on our left and front to within short range, and opened a destructive fire of artillery on our batteries. When I observed them advancing with artillery on our left, attempting to enfilade our position, (which they had partially succeeded in doing,) I at once despatched a messenger to the commanding officers of two batteries to our left and rear, requesting them to begin firing at once, and, if possible, dislodge the pieces thus advanced. Soon after one or both the batteries began a very slow fire, but without either driving the enemy from his position or attracting the firing in that direction. The fire was so destructive that we were soon compelled to continue the action with three pieces instead of four; and still later withdrew another piece, and placed all the available men I then had to the two remaining guns, and thus continued the action until our skirmishers were driven to the rear, and the infantry of the enemy rapidly advancing, which being observed by Captain Brockenbrough, he called on our support to come to our rescue, which they promptly did, passing some twenty yards to our front, and held the enemy in check until we could limber up our two remaining guns, which being done, we retired in good order some minutes after the other batteries had left the field — this being about eleven o'clock A. M. We left one caisson on the field for want of horses to haul it off. I then took a commanding position some three hundred yards to the rear of my first, and sent the orderly sergeant (having no commissioned officer to assist me) to halt the two pieces first sent from the field, and which were then moving off with Captain Wooding's battery. He soon returned, informing me that Captain Brockenbrough was riding at the head of the retiring column. Supposing that he intended me to follow, I then moved on. When I came up with him found that he had been severely wounded, in consequence of which he was retiring. He then ordered me to take command of Wooding's battery, in connection with my own, which I did, and reported to General A. P. Hill for orders, who directed me to go to the nearest open field in rear, get as many pieces ready for action as practicable, and await further orders. Late in the afternoon I received an order from General Taliaferro directing me to return to a point on the left, near the one occupied in the morning, and open fire on the enemy at once. Arriving near the point designated, met that officer, who informed me that we were too late, directing that we go back, and go into camp for the night.

Casualties:

Second Lieutenant D. R. Barton, killed; Second Lieutenant William T. Lambie, wounded severely; private Thomas Hastings, killed; Sergeant F. Karnes, wounded slight; Corporal P. O'Conner, slight; Corporal J. F. Fudge, severe; privates A. Staff, severe; A. J. Barrow, severe; George Myers, severe; William Baggage, severe; John Miller, slight; E. Piper, severe; John Sawyers, slight; James Gluver, slight; Isaac Swindle, slight; R. Martin, slight; William Newcomer, slight; M. Clemm, slight; H. Loch, severe; A. McCarty, slight; J. Hawkins, severe; John O'Niel, slight; W. Allemong, severe; John McCarty, slight; Joseph Grim, slight; John Cadwalader, slight; Joseph Anderson, missing. Ten horses killed and four disabled.

GEORGE MCKENDREE,
Lieutenant, commanding Battery.

REPORT OF COLONEL WARREN.

HEADQUARTERS TALIAFERRO'S BRIGADE, December 19, 1862.

Major Taliaferro, Assistant Adjutant-General Jackson's Division:

MAJOR: In obedience to orders, I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this brigade in the recent action near Fredericksburg:

The brigade left its encampment Friday morning about sunrise, and, on arriving at Hamilton's Crossing, was put in position in rear of the Hamilton house, in support of the batteries stationed on the hill. This position it occupied the remainder of the day and that night, but saw nothing of the enemy.

Early Saturday morning I was ordered to the left, and took position in rear and supporting distance of Brigadier-General Paxton's brigade, in the following order: Thirty-seventh Virginia regiment, commanded by Colonel T. V. Williams; Tenth Virginia regiment, commanded by Captain W. B. Yancey; Twenty-third Virginia regiment, commanded by Captain A. S. Richardson; Forty-seventh Alabama regiment, commanded by Captain I. M. Campbell; Forty-eighth Alabama regiment, commanded by Captain C. B. St. John. During the day I was advanced to the front, until I came up to the second line, at which point I received orders to fall back to the military road and occupy it.

Next morning, in accordance with orders, I occupied the front line on General Paxton's left. Early in the morning my skirmishers engaged those of the enemy for a short time, but during the day and night following this part of the line was remarkably quiet.

Monday morning, being relieved, we retired to the third line. Captain Wooding's battery was detached from the brigade Friday morning, and its action did not come under my observation. It was, however, early in the action, and sustained its reputation for gallantry and efficiency, but I regret to say, suffered severely — Captain Wooding and Lieutenant Jones both being severely wounded. The loss sustained by the brigade, not including loss in battery, was slight, being two officers and fourteen privates wounded. I refer to the report already furnished for names, &c.

Most respectfully,

E. T. H. WARREN,
Colonel Tenth Virginia Regiment, commanding Brigade.

REPORT OF COLONEL H. J. WILLIAMS.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH VIRGINIA VOLUNTEERS, December 24, 1862.

Lieutenant C. S. Arnall, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General:

LIEUTENANT: In pursuance of orders from brigade headquarters, I herewith transmit report of this regiment during the engagement near Fredericksburg, December thirteen, 1862.

On the morning of twelfth December, the regiment with the brigade left camp with two hundred and forty-six men, non-commissioned, &c., with seventeen commissioned officers, taking the road leading to Fredericksburg. Having marched a distance of about six miles, we were halted along the railroad and ordered to load; which being accomplished, we marched and countermarched along the railroad. Taking an oblique course across the field to the left of the road, we proceeded along and upon the top of the hills overlooking the valley about and around Fredericksburg, where we remained during the remainder of the day and night, without anything of importance occurring worthy of note. In the morning, at nine o'clock, cannonading became very heavy on our right, which continued until the fire was extended along our whole line. During this artillery duel several of the men upon the left of the regiment were wounded, one seriously, in Company F. About one o'clock we were again ordered back, and formed line of battle four hundred yards in rear of our former position. After remaining in this position a short time the roar of musketry plainly indicated that the battle had commenced. We then moved forward to what is called "the military road," under heavy fire of shell, &c. We were there halted a few moments, then ordered by the right flank, moving forward perhaps half a mile, when halted again for a few moments, throwing out skirmishers at the same time, moving forward in line of battle for a few hundred yards to a fence a short distance from the railroad, then we were halted and remained until the firing ceased, which was a little after dark, then we moved back to the military road and remained until near daylight, when we were moved forward and took a position in front along the railroad. In this position we remained during the day and night with no other casualties, save one man wounded in Company E. The firing continued during the along the whole line of skirmishers; remaining in this position during the day and night, we were relieved near daylight by General Rodes's brigade, when we took up the line of march, moving back perhaps one mile and a half, where we remained until next morning about nine o'clock, at this period we were ordered to move, taking the direction of Port Royal, we marched until a late hour, where we encamped upon the farm of in Caroline county, Virginia, where we now are. I must say, in conclusion, with the exceptions already mentioned in a former report, that men and officers never behaved so gallantly, and, in justice to all, I can give no one more praise than another. Sufficient to say that all were at their posts and did their duty. Annexed you will find list of casualties.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

H. J. WILLIAMS,
Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding Regiment.

List of Casualties in Fifth Virginia Volunteers:

Company D. — Wounded: Cyrus Lotts, accidentally in finger.

Company E. — Wounded: John Harris, seriously in abdomen.

Company F. — Wounded: Lieutenant John M. Brown, slightly in leg; Private Alfred Sheflet, leg amputated; Sergeant J. Dunlop, slightly in shoulder; Wm. H. Rodgers, seriously in leg; John Jorden, slightly in arm; Wm. T. Baily, slightly in shoulder; James Trimble, slightly in knee.

Company L. — Wounded: Corporal Gerard Kin, slightly in leg; F. M. Wood, accidental in finger.

Total number wounded, eleven.

Respectfully,

C. H. CALHOUN,
Acting Adjutant.

Doc. 3.

BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG, VA.

REPLY OF MAJ.-GEN. FRANKLIN.*

On the sixth day of April last a Report, purporting to be signed by the members of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, was published in many of the leading papers in the United States.

The Thirty-seventh Congress expired, by constitutional limitation, on the fourth of March previous. Some of the testimony embodied in the report has been taken since that time, and, consequently, this document has been spread before the country without having been submitted to either branch of Congress.

I do not refer to this irregular proceeding of a committee which had ceased to have a legal existence as a defence against the charges of which they have convicted me, but as one of the facts fairly to be considered in connection with the report itself, and the purposes it was intended to subserve.

The committee have not devoted much space to me, either in citations of testimony or in statements of their own; but in that limited space they have presented me before the country as responsible for the loss of the battle of Fredericksburg, in consequence of my disobedience of the orders of General Burnside.

If this be true, I have been guilty of the highest crime known to the military law, for the commission of which my life is forfeit and my name consigned to infamy.

Justice to the country, to the administration which has given me important commands in its armies, and to myself, demands that I meet these grave allegations as promptly as possible; while, from the peculiar circumstances of the case, the mode I adopt is the only one open to me.

Since the publication of the report, I have received an answer to an inquiry at the Adjutant-General's office, informing me that there are no charges on file against me at the department, to which, as a soldier, I am amenable. I am not at liberty to ignore a report which has already reached the hands of a majority of the loyal people of the United States, emanating from a committee of their representatives in Congress, because the legislative department of the government has taken upon itself duties that belong to the executive. I cannot shut my eyes to the magnitude of the question in its immediate public aspect. If it affected only myself, I might be well contented with the verdict which history will pass upon the transaction, under the sacred law which governs the ultimate triumph of the truth.

For two years we have been struggling to subdue a rebellion so enormous in its proportions and so persistent in its purposes that it has become a revolution.

This government has put into the field over seven hundred thousand men. To discipline these men, and to lead them in the field, the country must depend upon such as have been educated, to some extent at least, in military science. Hence it is a public question of the highest possible importance, whether an officer who has held important commands since the beginning of the war is entitled to the confidence of the people, or has justly forfeited his claim to it. It is a sad commentary upon the disjointed condition of the times, that at the very moment when the nation is offering its blood and treasure without stint in the effort to preserve inviolate the principles of civil liberty, a citizen of that nation, however humble, shall be accused, tried, and condemned of an infamous crime, before a tribunal sitting in secret session, without notice, or even an intimation of the charges made against him; without the opportunity to confront or examine the witnesses brought against him; to be himself called and interrogated, in utter ignorance that he is under trial; and, finally, to be denied permission to produce witnesses, when the fact became apparent to him that he was, for some unexplained reason, in danger of condemnation.

Since the time when the corner-stone of all civil liberty was laid under that government from which we derive our laws, which gives to the meanest subject, or the greatest criminal, the right to meet his accusers face to face and to confront his witnesses, no parallel can be found, in the history of constitutional governments, so startling in its violations of all that is sacred in personal rights, as are the proceedings of the secret tribunals created by the Congress which has just expired.

The report in question has been given to the press, but no part of the evidence is published, except such extracts as the committee have seen fit to embody in the report itself. Of my own testimony given before the committee, but a small part is printed. I shall therefore submit to the public some facts, stated by me to the committee, which they have not published, and some of the proofs which I requested the committee to take, but which they declined, upon the ground that they had not the time to take the testimony.

Among the facts submitted by me to the committee, which they have not noticed, are some which I must repeat in substance here.

On the twelfth day of December last, when I crossed the Rappahannock, I was in command of the Left Grand Division of the Army of the Potomac, which numbered about forty thousand men. It was entirely crossed and posted in line of battle by three o'clock of that day. My command consisted of two corps of three divisions each. At five o'clock General Burnside came to my headquarters, where he met — with me — Generals William F. Smith and John F. Reynolds, corps commanders. The subject of conversation was a proposed attack upon the enemy on the following morning, when I strongly advised General Burnside to make an attack from my division upon the enemy's right, with a column of at least

* A reply of Major General William B. Franklin, to the report of the Joint Committee of Congress on the conduct of the war, submitted to the public on the 6th of April, 1863.

thirty thousand men, to be sent in at daylight in the morning. At that time two divisions of General Hooker's command were on the north side of the river, near the bridges that I had crossed.

In order to make such an attack as I advised, I informed General Burnside that these two divisions must be crossed during the night. I reiterated my request that I should receive my orders as early as possible, that I might make the necessary dispositions of the troops before daylight. He stated at one time that I should have my orders in any event before midnight, and at another, that I should have them in two or three hours. He left my headquarters about six o'clock P. M., and I awaited his orders during the night. None reached me until half past seven o'clock in the morning. At midnight I sent an aid to ask for them, and received the reply that they were being prepared, and would be sent forthwith. The order which I received was brought by General Hardie, of General Burnside's staff, well known in the service as an able and zealous officer. It reached my hands at 7h. 30m. on the morning of the thirteenth. My command was then in the same position as when General Burnside left my headquarters the evening previous. The night had passed without orders, and General Hooker's two divisions were still on the other side of the river. With the light furnished by this state of facts, General Burnside's order, though incongruous and contradictory on its face, admitted of but one interpretation, viz., that he intended to make an armed observation from the left, to ascertain the strength of the enemy, — an interpretation also given to it by both of my corps commanders. The order is as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC,
December 13, 5.55 A.M.

"*Major-General Franklin, commanding Left Grand Division, Army of Potomac:*

"General Hardie will carry this despatch to you and remain with you during the day. The General commanding directs that you keep *your whole command in position* for a rapid movement down the Old Richmond road; and you will send out *at once a division at least*, to pass below Smithfield, to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's, on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported, *and its line of retreat open.* He has ordered another column, of a division or more, to be moved from General Sumner's command up the Plank road to its intersection with the Telegraph road, where they will divide, with a view to seizing the heights on both those roads. Holding these heights, with the heights near Captain Hamilton's, will, he hopes, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these points.

"He makes these moves by columns distant from each other, with the view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own forces, which might occur in a general movement during the fog. Two of General Hooker's divisions are in your rear, at the bridges, and will remain there as supports. Copies of instructions given to Generals Sumner and Hooker will be forwarded to you by an orderly very soon. *You will keep your whole command in readiness to move at once as soon as the fog lifts.* The watchword, which, if possible, should be given to every company, will be '*Scott.*'

"I have the honor to be, General,

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"JOHN G. PARKE,
"Chief of Staff."

Thus it will be seen that after ordering me to keep my *whole command* in readiness for a rapid movement down the Old Richmond road, I was directed to send out at once a *division at least* to seize the hill at Hamilton's. After referring to the order to General Sumner, he *reiterates the direction to keep my whole command in readiness for the Richmond road movement.*

For three hours before the order reached me I was satisfied that General Burnside had given up the idea (if he ever entertained it) of making an attack in force from the left, for the delay in sending the orders made such an attack impossible with any reasonable chance of success. And in this connection it is not improper in me to state that a map, made by the rebel General Jackson's topographical engineer, has fallen into the hands of our officers since General Hooker has been in command, from which it is apparent that the enemy's position could not have been carried by any force less than that recommended by me on the afternoon of the twelfth.

General Burnside knew the strength in numbers and position, as well as the desperate determination of the rebel army. Had he intended a movement in force, his orders both to myself and General Sumner would have been commensurate with such a purpose. Had he expected me to make such an attack upon an enemy whom I had met too often to be guilty of the folly of underrating, he would have given me the night in which to make a disposition of my troops for the conflict of the morrow, instead of leaving me to pass it in sleepless anxiety in my tent.

General Burnside ought to have known, and doubtless did know, that to make his "main attack," and thereby bring on a general engagement on my front, under an order of this description, sent after daylight in the morning, was to send his troops to a useless and unavailable slaughter; and, therefore, he could not have intended it. I acted upon the order at once, as nearly according to its literal directions as was in my power. The attack was ordered to be led by General Meade, one of the ablest officers in our service, supported by General Gibbon on his right, and General Doubleday in reserve. These three divisions formed one of the two corps (General Reynolds's) under my command on the south side of the river. Shortly after Meade advanced, the enemy's cavalry appeared on the left, accompanied by artillery, and Doubleday was ordered to drive them away. Soon after these troops were advanced, finding that the enemy was in force on all sides, I sent to General Stoneman to cross with one of his divisions, and before that had entirely crossed his second division was also ordered over.



REFERENCES.

GEN. SMITH'S SIXTH ARMY CORPS.

A 1. 1st Position of Gen. Newton's Division in reserve.
A 2. 2d Position do. do.
A 3. 3d do. do. do.
B 1. Position of Gen. Brooks' Division.
C 1. Position of Gen. Howe's Division.

GEN. REYNOLDS' FIRST ARMY CORPS.

D 1. 1st Position of Gen. Meade's Division.
D 2. 2d do. do. do.
D 3. 3d do. after the charge was made, finally retired from.
D 4. 4th Position of Gen. Meade's Division.
E 1. 1st Position of Gen. Gibbons' Division.
E 2. 2d do. do. do.
E 3. 3d do. do. retired from.
E 4. 4th do. do. Division.
F 1. 1st Position of Gen. Doubleday's Divis'n.
F 2. 2d do do. do

GENERAL STONEMAN.

G. Position of Gen. Birney's Division when he relieved Gen. Meade.
H. Position of Gen. Sickles, when he relieved Gen. Gibbons.
J. Tete du pont of 3[illegible] guns, under Capt. Ayres, to cover the retreat in re-crossing, with batteries on north side of river for same purpose.
K. Line of skirmishers and pickets.
L. Approximate position of Gen. Burns' division on the right of the Left Grand Division.
M Gen. Burns' position.
N. Position of Capt. De Russey's batteries.

The crossing of these divisions (which should have been made during the previous night, had an attack in force been contemplated) occupied at least three hours. While this was going on, one of General Smith's divisions was also ordered to report to General Reynolds. Of these several movements General Burnside was kept informed, by reports made by General Hardie to him at intervals during the day; and between 7.40 A. M. and 3.40 P. M. it was reported to him, by an officer of his own staff, that out of the eight divisions composing my entire command, including the two divisions that had been ordered across the river, six divisions had been employed in making the effort to seize Hamilton's hill, keeping the attacking force supported, and in checking the advance of the enemy, while but two divisions were left to protect the bridges, the right and the centre, and to keep the line of retreat open, and which two divisions were actually attacked during the day.

After my testimony had been taken by the committee, and they had declined to call General Hardie as a witness, I asked permission to hand them copies of the reports made by him to General Burnside during the day. This request was granted; and although it is impossible to overstate the value of the testimony contained in these despatches, fourteen in number, sent from the field of battle by an officer of the staff of General Burnside, who could have had no motive at the time to state anything but the exact truth, as the events were transpiring under his own eyes, yet no mention of, or reference to, these despatches is made by the committee in their report. As they present a statement of the transactions of the day upon the left, as seen by a competent and impartial witness, I present them in full, in the order in which they were sent. It will be noticed that the first despatch is dated at 7.40 A. M. This despatch is as follows, viz.:

"HEADQUARTERS FRANKLIN'S GRAND DIVISION,
December 13, 7.40 A. M.

"*General Burnside:*

"General Meade's division is to make the movement from our left; but it is reported that the enemy's skirmishers are advancing, indicating an attack upon our position on the left.

"JAMES A. HARDIE,
"Brigadier-General Vols., Assistant Inspector General."

The telegraph station connecting with General Burnside's headquarters was about one third of a mile from my headquarters, so that by eight o'clock of that morning General Burnside was informed by his Assistant Inspector-General of the fact that I had sent General Meade's division to make the movement directed by him. I submit, with entire confidence, that had General Burnside, upon the receipt of General Hardie's first despatch, discovered that I had either misapprehended his order, or was sending too small a force to its execution, he would at the moment have corrected my misapprehension.

So far from that, General Burnside did not communicate with me in any manner from that time until 2.25 P. M. of that day, when he sent me an order in writing, in which it was stated that my *instructions of this morning were so far modified as to require an advance upon the heights immediately in my front.* General Hardie's despatch upon the receipt of this order is as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS LEFT GRAND DIVISION,
"December 13, 2.25 P. M.

"*General Burnside:*

"Despatch received. Franklin will do his best. New troops gone in; will report soon again.

"JAMES A. HARDIE,
"Brigadier-General Volunteers."

Later in the day, and after three o'clock, when every regiment that I could spare was engaged in various parts of the field (as will appear by referring to Hardie's reports, and General Burnside's own testimony hereafter given) with an enemy that greatly outnumbered us, and when all my energies were directed to save the wing from being overpowered, and its line of retreat cut off, I received a verbal message from General Burnside, by one of his staff, that General Sumner's troops were being hard pressed, with a request to make a diversion in his favor if I could. To this I also responded that I would do my best.

For the details of what was done by me during the day, I leave General Hardie's despatches to speak for themselves. He was at my side from shortly after sunrise until sunset. He not only knew of every order and movement made by me, or under my direction, but was a perfectly competent judge of their wisdom and sufficiency.

In the performance of an act of common justice he has placed these despatches at my disposal.*

The following are copies of all those sent by him on the thirteenth of December, the day of the battle:

HEADQUARTERS FRANKLIN'S GRAND DIVISION,
December 13, 7.40 A. M.

General Burnside:

General Meade's division is to make the movement from our left; but it is just reported that the enemy's skirmishers are advancing, indicating an attack upon our position on the left.

9 o'clock A. M.

General Meade just moved out. Doubleday supports him. Meade's skirmishers engaged, however, at once with enemy's skirmishers. Battery opening, on Meade probably, from position on Old Richmond road.

11 o'clock A. M.

Meade advanced half a mile, and holds on. Infantry of enemy in woods in front of extreme left, also in front of Howe. No loss so far of great importance. General Vinton badly but not dangerously wounded.

Later—*Reynolds has been forced to develop his whole line.* An attack of some force of enemy's troops on our left seems probable, as far as can now be judged. *Stoneman has been directed to cross one division to support our left.* Report of cavalry pickets from the other side of the river, that enemy's troops were moving down the river

* In addition to the forces referred to in these despatches, a division from General Wilcox's corps reported to me late in the afternoon, and was put in the vicinity of the bridges; too late, however, to aid in any of the operations on the extreme left.

on this side during the latter part of the night. Howe's pickets reported movements in their front, same direction. Still they have a strong force well posted, with batteries there.

12 o'clock M.

Birney's division is now getting into position. That done, Reynolds will order Meade to advance. Batteries over the river are to shell the enemy's position in the woods in front of Reynolds's left. He thinks the effect will be to protect Meade's advance. A column of the enemy's infantry is passing along the crest of the hills from right to left, as we look at it.

12.5 P. M.

General Meade's line is advancing in the direction you prescribed this morning.

1 o'clock P. M.

Enemy opened a battery on Reynolds, enfilading Meade. Reynolds has opened all his batteries on it; no report yet. Reynolds hotly engaged at this moment; will report in a few moments again.

1.15 o'clock P. M.

Heavy engagements of infantry. Enemy in force where battery is. Meade is assaulting the hill; will report in a few minutes again.

1.25 o'clock P. M.

Meade is in the woods in his front; seems to be able to hold on. Reynolds will push Gibbon in if necessary. The battery and woods referred to must be near Hamilton's house. The infantry firing is prolonged and quite heavy. Things look well enough. Men in fine spirits.

1.40 o'clock P. M.

Meade having carried a portion of the enemy's position in the woods, we have three hundred prisoners. Enemy's batteries on extreme left retired. Tough work; men fight well. Gibbon has advanced to Meade's right; men fight well, driving the enemy. Meade has suffered severely. Doubleday to Meade's left not engaged.

2¼ o'clock P. M.

Gibbon and Meade driven back from the woods. Newton gone forward. Jackson's corps of the enemy attacks on the left. General Gibbon slightly wounded. General Bayard mortally wounded by a shell. Things do not look as well on Reynolds's front, still we'll have new troops in soon.

2.25 P. M.

Despatch received. Franklin will do his best. New troops gone in — will report soon again.

3 o'clock P. M.

Reynolds seems to be holding his own. Things look better somewhat.

3.40 o'clock P. M.

Gibbon's and Meade's divisions are badly used up, and I fear another advance on the enemy on our left cannot be made this afternoon. Doubleday's division will replace Meade's as soon as it can be collected, and if it be done in time, of course another attack will be made. The enemy are in force in the woods on our left towards Hamilton's, and are threatening the safety of that portion of our line. They seem to have detached a portion of their force to our front, where Howe and Brooks are now engaged. Brooks has some prisoners, and is down to the railroad. Just as soon as the left is safe, our forces here will be prepared for a front attack, but it may be too late this afternoon. Indeed, we are engaged in front anyhow. Notwithstanding the unpleasant items I relate, the *morale* generally of the troops is good.

4½ o'clock P. M.

The enemy is still in force on our left and front. An attack on our batteries in front has been repulsed. A new attack has just opened on our left, but the left is safe, though it is too late to advance either to the left or front.

I am willing to abide by this testimony, to determine whether I lost the battle of Fredericksburg in consequence of my disobedience of an order directing me "to attack with a division at least, and to keep it well supported."

On the night following I was with General Burnside at his headquarters, when he informed me that he intended to renew the attack from the right, and to lead the Ninth corps in person. At two interviews during that night, (which lasted at least two hours,) he did not intimate to me any disapprobation of my conduct, or of that of my officers and men, during that day.

Again I urged upon him that if the attack was to be renewed to renew it from the left, but with such force and preparations as would command success. An order, however, for an attack from the right was given by him. On the following day I had another interview with General Burnside, at his request, in which he informed me that strong protests were made against a renewal of the attack by Generals Sumner and Hooker, and he abandoned the plan of another attack with expressions of the greatest reluctance. I was with him for two or three hours on that occasion; and during that interview he did not express or intimate, in his language or deportment toward me, that he was not entirely satisfied with my conduct, and that of my officers and men. On the Wednesday or Thursday following I had another interview with him, in which, so far from expressing any dissatisfaction with me, he stated very distinctly, that I alone of his generals had "held up his hands," (as he expressed it;) that he had fully determined to resign his command, and to recommend me as his successor, as the commanding general of the Army of the Potomac. From that time until I was relieved from the command of the left grand division, although frequently called into consultation by General Burnside, he never had told me, or gave me to understand, that I either misconstrued or disobeyed his orders, or was in any way responsible for the disaster of the thirteenth, or had in the least lost his confidence. Indeed, had he believed that I had disobeyed his orders on the thirteenth, he could not have discharged his duty to the country without preferring charges against me to that effect.

It was during the period of time last referred to that the General Order No. 8, to which the

committee have made reference in their report, was directed to be issued by General Burnside. The committee state that this order dismissed some officers from the service, subject to the approval of the President, and relieved others from duty with the Army of the Potomac; that General Burnside asked the President to sanction the order, or accept his resignation as Major-General; *that the President acknowledged that General Burnside was right*, but declined to decide without consulting with some of his advisers. As I was relieved from duty with the Army of the Potomac almost immediately after this interview with the President, I shall assume that I was one of the officers thus relieved in the order; an assumption I could not make from any evidence derived from General Burnside's conduct to me when we were together, but which I am compelled to make, because I have been so informed by two gentlemen of high character, who have seen and read the order.

It further appears from the report, that the committee had that order before them; and as they have seen fit to visit upon me solely the responsibility for the loss of the battle of Fredericksburg, without referring in any manner to the repulse on the right, or stating its fearful loss in killed and wounded, I feel at liberty to state, on the authority of these same gentlemen who have seen Order No. 8, *that under that order General Hooker was one of the officers dismissed from service, subject to the approval of the President.* If, therefore, that order is invoked as a record of conviction, and, by it, General Hooker is dismissed while I am only relieved, I have the right to state the fact, and leave the public to judge of the motives of the committee — it stating that they have not considered it essential to report upon the operations of the right wing in this battle. Not only so, but I have a right to challenge the verity of the statement "that the President acknowledged General Burnside was right," when it was known to the committee that in the same order in which the President relieved General Burnside from the command of the Army of the Potomac, he made General Hooker his successor.

But I shall not accept it as conclusive against my conduct, that General Burnside did recommend that I should be relieved. It is a part of the history of the times that after the failure of his attempt upon the rebel army behind the heights of Fredericksburg, he addressed a letter to General Halleck, relieving the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief from all responsibility for that movement; and it is equally true, though not so publicly known, that shortly after that letter was published, General Burnside made quite as formal and earnest a request to the President to remove the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief from the positions severally occupied by them, as he did to dismiss certain of his officers in the Army of the Potomac. If it was true that the movement was his own, it was but an act of common justice to assume its responsibility.

Without intending to reflect upon that kind of magnanimity that takes the responsibility of a failure from the shoulders of those above us, and places it upon those below us, I will prove, by documentary evidence from General Burnside's hand, that his plan, as given to the committee, was not the plan on which he conducted the operations of the battle.

The committee have printed General Burnside's plan of attack as given by him. By the side of this, I print an extract from the letter of General Burnside to General Halleck, dated December nineteenth, six days after the battle, by which it appears that he intended to make his "vigorous attack," as he there calls it, over two miles from my front and upon the heights in the rear of the town of Fredericksburg, and that part of his order to me in which he informed me of the orders which he had given to General Sumner, showing that General Sumner's movement was to be simultaneous with mine. In this he states the measures taken to avoid a collision between General Sumner's forces and mine, while in the plan before the committee he is represented as testifying that he did not mean that General Sumner should move *until I had taken the position designated in the order.*

General Burnside's Plan of Attack, as given by the Committee.

"The enemy had cut a road along in the rear of the line of heights where we made our attack, by means of which they connected the two wings of their army, and avoided a long detour around through a bad country. I obtained from a colored man, from the other side of the town, information in regard to this new road, which proved to be correct. I wanted to obtain possession of that new road, and that was my reason for making an attack on the extreme left. I did not intend to make the attack on the right until that position had been taken, which I supposed would stagger the enemy, cutting their line in two; and then I proposed to make a direct attack on their front and drive them out of their works."

General Burnside's Plan of Attack, in his Letter to General Halleck.

"I discovered that he did not anticipate the crossing of our whole force at Fredericksburg, and I hoped, by rapidly throwing the whole command over at that place to separate, by a *vigorous attack*, the forces of the enemy on the river below from the forces *behind and on the crest in the rear of the town*, in which case we could fight him with great advantage in our favor. For this we had to gain a height on the *extreme right* of the crest which commanded a new road lately made by the enemy," &c.

Extract from General Burnside's Order to me, informing me of General Sumner's Orders.

"He has ordered another column of a division or more to be moved from General Sumner's command up the Plank road to its intersection of the Telegraph road, where they will divide, with a view to seizing the heights on both of those roads. Holding these heights, with the

MAJ. GEN. W. T. SHERMAN

heights near Captain Hamilton's, will, I hope, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these points. He makes those moves by columns, distant from each other, with a view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own forces, which might occur in a genera movement during the fog."

The statements in General Burnside's letter to General Halleck, his statement in the order of the thirteenth to me, and his statement of his plan before the committee, all agree upon one point at least — that he did not mean to make his "*main attack*" under either of those orders. Under the orders he issued he designed seizing, first, the heights in rear of the town; next, the heights near Captain Hamilton's, which he supposed would stagger the enemy; and then, he proposed to make a "*direct attack*" in the enemy's front, and drive him out of his works. The orders not only agree in this, but the fact, in all the significant proportions of its results, in killed and wounded, was before the committee, that General Sumner's command did actually move to seize "those heights on the crest in rear of the town," almost as soon as I did at that time. I had not only not taken the position at Captain Hamilton's, but was crossing troops from the other side of the river to save those who had been sent to make the attempt. General Burnside was informed of all this by General Hardie as the effort progressed. How then is it to be accounted for that General Burnside could have so far forgotten his intentions as to say, "*that he did not intend* MAKING *the attack* on the right until that position (my position) had been taken?" If he did not intend to do so, why did he make the attack before the contingency happened? He knew that the position on the left was *not* taken; why then did he order General Sumner forward if his intention was to keep him back until it was taken? If he did not intend that General Sumner should move until I had taken the heights at Captain Hamilton's, what does this language in his order to me mean, "He has ordered another column, of a *division or more*, to be moved from General Sumner's command up the Plank road to its intersection with the Telegraph road, where they will divide with a view of seizing the heights on both of those roads? *Holding these heights with the heights near Captain Hamilton's* will, he hopes, &c. He makes these moves by columns distant from each other with a view of *avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own forces*, which might occur in a general movement during the fog."

This is the language of a simultaneous movement; and that no doubt may be left about it, he gives as a reason why he keeps the moving columns distant from each other, that they might not encounter each other in a fog. If both columns were not to be moved at the same time, it is difficult to see how they could have collided in a fog.

It is, therefore, perfectly evident that under both orders issued that morning by General Burnside, he imagined that he could seize certain heights over two miles distant from each other, with the comparatively small force of a division sufficiently supported, for each column, and that when these were taken, he expected to follow up, by orders for a main attack with the "whole command," which I was to keep in "position for a rapid movement down the Old Richmond road." In the execution of these orders, the enemy discovered himself in force so much greater than General Burnside anticipated, that the plan proved totally inadequate to its expected results.

The disaster which followed is a matter of history, and considering the pressure to which the mind of the commanding General must have been subjected since that time, it is not difficult to find a reason why his present recollection of his plan differs so materially from the orders which he gave before the movement was made; but I submit that is an insufficient reason for visiting the consequences of the failure upon his subordinate in command.

After reciting the order, the committee state that when last before them, I considered the meaning of the order to be an armed observation to ascertain where the enemy was. They then proceed as follows: "In his (Franklin's) testimony given when your committee were at Falmouth, he says, 'I put in all the troops that I thought it prudent and proper to put in. I fought the whole strength of my command as far as I could, and at the same time keep my connection with the river open.'" These two statements seem to be presented under the idea that they convict me of an inconsistency, and in the report furnished by the committee to one of the newspapers, printed in pamphlet form, entitled "Tribune War Tract, No. 1," this statement of the committee is headed, in capital letters, "Franklin's inconsistent statements." What inconsistency is there between my interpretation of the second clause of the order, that it was for an armed observation to ascertain where the enemy was, and in the statement that in sending in this armed force of observation I *had* ascertained where the enemy was, and had been compelled to fight the whole strength of my command as far as I could, and at the same time keep my communication with the river open, in resisting a superior force, which had discovered itself on three sides of me? But the committee, in quoting my testimony, for some reason satisfactory to themselves, have omitted to state what was testified by me in the same connection.

By referring to the testimony given by me at Falmouth, (which has heretofore been made public,) I find that the words immediately following the quotation made by the committee in their present report are as follows: "The reason that we failed was, that we had not troops enough to carry the points where the attack was made, *under the orders that were given*." Why the committee have omitted that part of my evidence, while from the quotation marks the reader is led to suppose the whole sentence is given, I shall not stop to inquire.

The next statement in the report refers to the number of troops with which the attack was made by me, under the orders to send out "a division

at least," to seize the heights near Captain Hamilton's, and that is headed in the tract in the same conspicuous manner, "Franklin responsible for the defeat."

The committee's statement on this subject occupies but a few lines, and admits the sending out by me, under this order, of four divisions, numbering sixteen thousand five hundred men, as stated by them, without giving the number of Doubleday's division, which was nearly seven thousand more. The committee name only Meade's, Gibbon's, Doubleday's, and Birney's divisions, as those by which the attack was made and supported. They had it in proof, and in General Hardie's reports, that Newton's and Sickles's divisions also aided in that movement, while the divisions of Howe and Brooks also engaged the enemy during the day. However easy of explanation it may be that the employment of Newton's division was not referred to in the report, it is difficult to understand why Sickles's division should be omitted, when the only evidonce they have published on this subject discloses the fact that Sickles's division was also engaged.

The committee further say, "that the attack was in reality made by one of the smallest divisions in my command, the division of General Meade, numbering about four thousand five hundred men." They have omitted to state in that connection what was in evidence before them, that Meade's division was posted on the extreme left of my line, and the order being to attack at once, was consequently best posted for the attack. The Army of the Potomac had no braver soldier or better officer than General Meade, to lead his division to the attack.

The committee next say, that "General Burnside, upon hearing of the small force ordered to attack the enemy, sent an order to General Franklin to make a vigorous attack with his whole force." The committee do not state when General Burnside sent to me any order after that received at 7.30 A. M.; but if the ordinary construction is to be put upon their language, they intend to be understood that a second order was sent to me immediately after the receipt of General Hardie's first despatch to General Burnside, dated at 7.40 A. M., in which he was informed of what I proposed to do under the order. As before observed, this despatch must have been received by General Burnside by eight o'clock A. M. So that, according to the report, General Burnside sent me a second order to make a "vigorous attack with my whole force," shortly after eight o'clock A. M. By referring to General Hardie's reports, it will be seen that the first despatch from General Burnside, after that brought by him, is dated 2.25 P. M. in which he states, —

"December 13, 2.25 P. M.

"Despatch received. Franklin will do his best. New troops gone in. Will report soon again."

This order, so far from being an order to make a "vigorous attack with my whole force," directed me as follows:

"Your instructions of this morning are so far modified as to require *an advance upon the heights immediately in your front.*"

The response made to this modification of the order is shown by General Hardie's despatch to his chief just given.

The committee then proceed: "Several of the witnesses testified, that had the attack then been renewed with all the available force under General Franklin's command, it would have been successful." Who these witnesses are is not stated, nor is a word of their testimony given. If any one upon whose opinion the public would place any reliance has been found to express such an opinion, it has been given in ignorance of the orders under which I was acting during the day, or upon the assumption that such an order as the committee state I did receive, was issued to me in the early part of the day. I have shown that no such order was issued, and that the second order that was issued was received at 2.25 P. M. In connection with this modified order it is necessary to state, that immediately in front of one of my divisions was a narrow valley, held on both sides by the enemy, and protected by abatis, and troops entering it were necessarily subjected to a fire from both sides. It is patent. from an examination of this last order, that so far from being an order to renew the attack upon the hill at Captain Hamilton's, it was a virtual abandonment of that attempt. I was not allowed the opportunity to examine those witnesses, nor to produce those I named to the committee, who were with me during the day, and who alone were sufficiently acquainted with all the facts to form a respectable opinion on the subject.

But whatever opinions may have been expressed before the committee by witnesses, whose names they have not given, the same committee submitted a report to the Senate on the twenty-third day of December last, containing the evidence taken by them on the nineteenth of that month, in which the testimony of General Burnside, taken immediately after the battle, is given. This has been printed by order of the Senate. From this document I make the following extract, (referring to the battle of Fredericksburg:)

Q. By Committee.—"What causes do you assign for the failure of your attack here?"

A. "It was found impossible to get the men up to the works; the enemy's fire was too hot for them; the whole command fought most gallantly; the enemy themselves say they never saw our men fight so hard as on that day."

Q. "Were the enemy's works very strong?"

A. "Their works are not strong works, but they occupy very strong positions. It is possible that the points of attack were wrongly ordered; if such is the case I can only say I did to the best of my ability."

* * * * *

Q. "Do I understand you to say that you expected General Franklin to carry the point at the extreme left of the ridge in the rear of the town, and thereby enable our troops to storm and carry their fortifications?"


SKETCH
OF THE
BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG
SATURDAY, DEC. 13TH 1862.
RIGHT WING C.S.A. LT GL JACKSONS CORPS
BY JED HOTCHKISS T.E. 2ND CORPS A.N.V.
FREDERICKSBURG
STANSBURY
FORD
PEYTON
MARYE
HOWES
HAZEL
RUN
FERRYHOUSE
RAPPAHANNOCK
RIVER
ENEMY'S LINES
LONGSTREET'S CORPS
TELEGRAPH ROAD
DEEP
RUN
GOODWYN
LT GL LONGSTREET
HP QRS
OWENS
WHITE
BARNETT
LEE'S HP QRS
MARYE'S HILL
MARYE'S
RIVER
YERBY
JACKSON
YERBY
ALSOP
PRATT
STAUNTON ART.
HAMILTON'S CROSSING
PRATT'S BATT.
TO PORT ROYAL
BROOKE
PRATT
BULLOCK
BULLOCK
MILES

A. "I did expect him to carry that point; which being done, would have placed our forces in rear of their extreme left, and which I thought at the time would shake their forces to such an extent that the position in front could be easily stormed and carried."

Q. "*To what do you attribute his failure to accomplish that?*"

A. "*To the great strength of the position, and the accumulation of the enemy's forces there.*"

General Burnside then explained, that the delay in building the bridges gave the enemy time to accumulate his forces before he was able to order the attack.

* * * * * *

Q. "What was the conduct of the officers and men during the attack?"

A. "With the exception of a single regiment it was excellent."

Q. "Will you state, as nearly as you can, the whole number of our troops that were engaged?"

A. "We had about one hundred thousand men on the other side of the river."

Q. "What part of that number were actually engaged in battle?"

A. "Every single man of them was under artillery fire, and about half of them were at different times formed in columns of attack. *Every man was put in column that could be got in.*"

With this evidence of the General commanding the army before them, a committee of Congress, in a report submitted to the public without the testimony, deliberately states:

"*The testimony of all the witnesses* before your committee proves most conclusively that had the attack been made upon the left with all the force that General Franklin could have used for that purpose, the plan of General Burnside would have been completely successful, and our army would have achieved a most brilliant victory."

The committee continue, (still referring to the order, which, they say, was to make a "vigorous attack with my whole force," and was sent by General Burnside upon his hearing of the small force which I had ordered to the attack,) "General Franklin testifies that it was not an order but a request, and that when he received it, it was too late to renew the attack, and therefore he did not do it. General Franklin testifies as follows:" The committee then proceed to give an extract from a small portion of my testimony, *in which not a word of my testimony on the subject of this request is given.* My statement to them on that subject was substantially that after three o'clock of that day, according to my best recollection, an Aid from General Burnside came to me with the message that the enemy was pressing General Sumner on the right, and that I was requested to make a diversion in his favor if I could. I again replied that I would do the best I could. About the time that this message came, viz., at 3.40 P. M., as will be seen by referring to General Hardie's reports, that officer informed General Burnside as follows:

"Gibbon's and Meade's divisions are badly used up, and I fear another advance on the enemy on our left cannot be made this afternoon. Doubleday's division will replace Meade's as soon as it can be collected, and if it be done in time, of course another attack will be made. The enemy are in force in the woods on our left toward Hamilton's, and are threatening the safety of that portion of our line. They seem to have detached a portion of their force to our front, where Howe and Brooks are now engaged. Brooks has some prisoners, and is down to the railroad. Just as soon as the left is safe our forces here will be prepared for a front attack. But it may be too late this afternoon. Indeed we are engaged in front anyhow. Notwithstanding the unpleasant items I relate, the *morale* generally of the troops is good."

Keeping in mind the fact that the divisions of Howe and Brooks, which General Hardie reported to General Burnside were then actually engaged, were the two divisions upon which I had to rely to protect my right, centre, and bridges, and that every other division of my command was at that moment already in support of the left, and that this despatch of General Hardie's was a piece of the evidence before a committee, supposed to be in search of the truth in regard to a subject of such magnitude as the loss of the battle of Fredericksburg, it seems incredible that the next paragraph of their report following the extract from my testimony, which they have given, is the one already quoted, that, —

"The testimony of *all the witnesses* before your committee proves most conclusively that had the attack been made upon the left with all the force that General Franklin could have used for that purpose, the plan of General Burnside would have been completely successful, and our army would have achieved a most brilliant victory."

This sweeping statement is made without giving a word of testimony in support of the conclusion, or the name of a witness. I am necessarily in ignorance of what has been testified to by others before the committee, but I know that General Burnside and myself were at least two of "all the witnesses," and that he, when he was first examined, testified to the contrary of any such statement. I know that General Hardie's words, written from the battle-field to his chief, were in evidence, and that the facts shown by these witnesses prove the conclusions of this committee to be as unfounded as they are unmerited.

Standing, as I do, thus arraigned and condemned by the committee, I have no fear that my countrymen will adopt their verdict until I have been heard in my own behalf. They have thus far inhaled with the air they breathe that vital principle of fair play that hears before it condemns. As a people, they have no purpose to serve in striking down a public servant, unless he has proved to be unfaithful to his trust; and to their sense of justice I appeal, though the circumstances attending my accusation compel me to add to my statement a few words personal to myself.

My profession is that of arms. I was educated to it as a pupil of the nation. My duty and in-

clination leading in the same path with the feeling that stirred the nation's pulse when its flag was torn down by parricidal hands, I dedicated my life, and whatever was inwrapt within my life, to the defence of my country. I did not underrate the proportions of the rebellion, and I accepted my line of duty with the conviction that the nation would require of its loyal children determined purpose, and, perhaps, great sacrifices, before its unity would be restored. With these convictions I took command of a brigade in the Army of the Potomac in June, 1861. From that time until I was relieved from duty with the Army of the Potomac, on the twenty-fifth day of January, 1863, I have been trying to do my duty in camp and upon the field. That I have not altogether failed, the brave men who have grown up with me have proved on the battle-fields of Virginia and Maryland; and it is but common justice to those of them who yet live, and to the memory of those who are dead, to say that they never failed me in the time of trial. My time has been passed with my command. Including a period of illness, I have been absent from it but twenty-one days. This has left me but little time to look after matters personal to myself. Having no political associations of influence, I must content myself, as best I can, with the reflection that the committee believed that the failure at Fredericksburg demanded a victim, and that, being of no consequence except as a soldier, it was most available to order me to that duty.

I have had no friendships which have stood in the way of the performance of my duty.

When General Burnside took command of the Army of the Potomac, and up to the time he left it, I gave a hearty obedience to every order he gave me, as well as a full and frank expression of my opinion when he invited me to his councils. I supposed that we were attached friends, and that we were both looking only to those means which would achieve success. I agreed with him fully in the propriety of crossing the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg at the time proposed by his original plan. After that failed, whatever advice I gave to him in council sprang from the honest convictions of my judgment, and I should have been recreant to my duty to my country and my own conscience had I given him any other. When the crossing was determined upon, with what alacrity I obeyed the order, the time within which my troops were crossed and placed in line of battle is the best evidence. This done, and our troops posted on the enemy's side of the river, with nothing but frail pontoon bridges between them and their destruction as an army, I proposed that an assault should be made upon the enemy's position with a column strong enough to command success, (naming the number of at least six divisions,) with the request that I might be allowed to make immediate dispositions to carry it out. After waiting through the night, I was ordered to take a particular height with one division, and to keep my whole command in readiness for some contemplated movement. In obeying this order according to its letter and spirit, a force of the enemy upon my left, my right, and my centre discovered itself, sufficient to engage during the day every division in my command. Our failure was the natural consequence of the insufficient preparation and inadequate provision for an attack upon an army like that in front of us. This being the state of the facts, so far as I am concerned, without a hearing or the opportunity of defence, a report from the legislative branch of the government has been spread through the newspapers and in pamphlets before my countrymen, stating that had I obeyed the orders given me by General Burnside on that day, our army would have achieved a most brilliant victory. Instead of a brilliant victory, it was a sad and fearful disaster, in which many brave men fell — men to whom I was attached by two years' association; and for this disaster, and for the blood of these comrades, this committee say I am responsible.

I place these facts by the side of their report, perfectly willing to abide by the verdict which the public will pass upon me.

WILLIAM B. FRANKLIN.

NOTES.

The correspondence which follows shows the grounds upon which I based my assertion that General Burnside formally and earnestly requested the President to remove Mr. Stanton and General Halleck from the positions which they held in 1862-63.

Now, there is no excuse which can justify a statement of the kind made by General Burnside to his Generals on this subject, and the effect upon some of them was more damaging than would at first sight appear.

Having entire confidence in the truth of his statement, they looked upon him as a man whose boldness in bearding the lions in their den, entitled him to a certain admiration, but who had been destroyed by this very boldness. They considered him a doomed man, and that the end of his career as the Commander of the Army of the Potomac, was only a question of a few days.

It is, therefore, not to be wondered at, that certain Generals finding that he was still acting as if he felt firm in his seat, and as though his open condemnation of the Secretary of War and General-in-Chief had done him no harm, and knowing the extreme want of confidence of the troops in his capacity, should begin to feel nervous and anxious about the destiny of the Army of the Potomac under such a commander, and should believe that a representation of the feeling of the army toward him, made to influential persons in Washington, taken in connection with the fact (as they supposed it) that he had asked for the removal of the President's two chief military subordinates, might have weight in having some important change effected, without subjecting them to any very grave charges.

Nor is it to be wondered at that Generals who heard him make this statement, should afterwards have less confidence in his judgment, and should consider that no important operations would thereafter be carried on under his command.

In other words, it is quite likely that the misunderstandings caused by this "statement," might account in a great degree for the conduct of certain officers affected by the notorious Order No. 8.

When I gave my evidence before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War in December 1862, I did not quote the order which I received from General Burnside under which I made the attack at the battle of Fredericksburg. This is the reason for the omission.

I thought that General Burnside was the proper person to present this order in evidence. I asked him, after he had given his evidence, if he had delivered a copy of the order to the committee, or if he intended to deliver one, and he informed me that he had given it, or intended to give it.

Yet upon examination of the published evidence, upon which the committee based its report, I cannot find that this order was brought to its attention until General J. F. Reynolds gave his evidence in March, 1863, and I gave mine about April first, 1863.

So General Burnside's memory failed again in this instance.

This fact is mentioned because I stated to the committee in December, 1862, that I had fought the whole strength of my command as well as I could "under the orders that I had received," supposing the committee knew, as it ought to have known, what orders I had received. It ought to have known these orders, because it had already received the evidence of the commanding General.

There is one omission in the report of my evidence before this committee which is somewhat important to me. When I was before it, about April first, 1863, I stated that if my conduct at the battle of Fredericksburg was in course of investigation by it, I would be glad to have taken the evidence of Generals Smith and Hardie, who were with me during the whole day of the battle. The chairman refused to call these gentlemen, on the ground that there was no time. No mention of the request or the refusal was made in the report or the evidence. Yet there are published in the evidence two affidavits of staff officers of General Burnside, bearing on the subject, and both dated after the date of my evidence, and made in Cincinnati, the committee sitting in Washington. If there was time to have received them, there was time to have taken the evidence of Generals Smith and Hardie. Whether these affidavits were considered in making up the report of the committee I do not know. W. B. FRANKLIN.

On March nineteenth, 1866, General Franklin wrote to General Halleck, informing him that circumstances might render it necessary for him to publish certain correspondence between them in relation to a statement made by General Burnside, that he had requested of the President the removal of the Secretary of War and General-in-Chief shortly after the battle of Fredericksburg. The following are copies of General Halleck's answer and its enclosures, followed by copies of all the correspondence:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE PACIFIC,
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., April 17, 1866.

Major-General W. B. Franklin, Hartford, Conn.:

GENERAL: I have just received your note of March nineteenth, in which you state that it may be necessary for you to publish my letters to you (which you have hitherto regarded as confidential) in regard to General Burnside.

Having no intention to enter into any discussions in regard to differences or disputes which have arisen out of the events of the war, I shall very much regret the necessity of bringing my name into any question of difference between yourself and General Burnside. In order that you may have in your possession all the documentary evidence on the subject, I enclose herewith copies of my letter to him of May ninth, 1863, and his telegraphic answer of May fourteenth. Whether or not General Burnside ever made the promised answer to your pamphlet, I know not. I have never seen any, and the enlosure is the only correspondence we ever had on the subject.

Both Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Stanton assured me at the time that General Burnside had never made to them, or in their presence, the statement alluded to in your pamphlet; out that on the contrary, he had always expressed full confidence in, and warm regard for both the Secretary and myself. Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK.

GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL BURNSIDE.

[Personal.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, May 9, 1863.

Major-General Burnside, Cincinnati:

GENERAL: Major-General Franklin's pamphlet on the battle of Fredericksburg has been before the public for some weeks, and no doubt has attracted your attention.

General Franklin states positively that after that battle you urged the President to remove from office the Secretary of War and General-in-Chief. In the absence of any contradiction of this positive statement, it must be presumed that it is correct.

As you certainly could have had no motives personal to yourself for giving this advice to the President, and as you were well aware that I was placed in my present position contrary to my own wishes, and that I had endeavored to be relieved from it, I am bound to believe that, in my case, you were actuated in giving the alleged advice to the President, solely by a desire to confer a personal favor upon me. I look upon the matter in this light, and sincerely thank you for using your influence with the President, in the manner stated by General Franklin, to have me relieved from a thankless and disagreeable position, which you knew I did not wish to occupy.

Very truly yours, H. W. HALLECK.

FROM GEN. BURNSIDE TO GEN. HALLECK.

[Telegram.]

CINCINNATI, May 14, 1863.

Major-General Halleck:

Letter of the ninth, (9th,) just received. Never saw Franklin's pamphlet till day before yesterday. Shall answer it briefly, as soon as I have time. It cannot hurt any of us after it is answered.

(Signed), A. E. BURNSIDE.

GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL FRANKLIN.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, D. C., May 25, 1863.

[Personal and private.]

Major-General Franklin, York, Penn.:

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a copy of your pamphlet on the battle of Fredericksburg. I do not feel called upon to express any opinion in regard to the matters of dispute between yourself and General Burnside. Of course one or the other must be in error, but I presume the differences are such as often occur between honorable men, who both believe themselves to be in the right. There are, however, one or two statements in regard to myself to which I desire to call your attention.

You state positively that General Burnside made a "formal and earnest request to the President to remove the Secretary of War and General-in-Chief from the positions severally occupied by them." If consistent with your own sense of propriety, I respectfully ask that you will give me your authority for this positive assertion on your part. I am induced to ask this, from the fact that General Burnside was fully aware that I was placed in my present position against my own wishes; that I had taken every proper measure to avoid its responsibilities, and, at that very time I was desirous of being relieved from these responsibilities. I say that General Burnside was *personally* fully aware of these facts. How, under such circumstances, he could request my *removal*, is to me incomprehensible. Nevertheless, till your positive statement is explained or contradicted, it must be believed.

You seem to think that General Burnside's letter to me was drawn out of him for the purpose of removing responsibility from the shoulders of his superiors. In regard to this matter I have only to say, that the letter was published by permission of the President, after both the Secretary of War and myself had advised against its publication, and I had positively refused my assent. As I had advised against the Fredericksburg base from the beginning, and had abundant proofs of that fact, I required no statement of General Burnside in regard to my responsibility.

Again, in regard to General Burnside's order, or pretended order, No. 8, you are also under misapprehension. *I have never seen that order.* I learned from the President that *an* order had been presented to him by General Burnside, dismissing several officers of his command for endeavoring to create dissatisfaction and insubordination in his army. I said immediately, that if such was the case, the commander in the field ought to be sustained. I did not then know, nor do I know now, the names of the officers charged with so high a military offence. Moreover, I have been told by good authority that the pretended order, published in the newspapers, is very different from the order shown the President.

In these, as in many other matters connected with the Army of the Potomac, the press has grossly misrepresented me. But time will place all these things in their true light. Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK.

GENERAL FRANKLIN TO GENERAL HALLECK.

YORK, PENN., May 27, 1863.

To Major-General H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:

GENERAL: I have received your letter of the twenty-fifth inst. I am sure, from your statement, that General Burnside did not make the "formal and earnest request to remove the Secretary of War" and yourself, to which reference is made in my pamphlet reply to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and my assertion should have been that General Burnside *said* that he made the request.

The facts are these. General Burnside was in Washington on or about January first, last. He returned to camp, and soon after his return, informed me, I think in the presence of General Smith, and perhaps others, that he had seen the President, and had verbally recommended to

him the acceptance of his resignation, and the removal of the Secretary of War and yourself. The President, however, refused to entertain the suggestion, and the next interview which General Burnside had with him was in the presence of the Secretary of War and yourself. Between the first and second interviews he had reduced to writing the proposition which he had made in the first interview, and he read to the President a letter to him in which he tendered his own resignation, and proposed the vacation of the Secretary of War's and your positions, for the reason that all three of you had lost the confidence of the people. This is the substance of the story as I heard it from him just after his return to camp. On one occasion, just before his last attempt to cross the Rappahannock, I was in his tent with Generals Smith, Woodbury, Hunt, and Captain Comstock, corps of engineers, when I said to him, in substance, "you yourself recommended to the President the removal of the Secretary of War and General Halleck." He did not deny it; in fact he acknowledged that he had so recommended.

There is nothing in my pamphlet, nor have I said anything which will justify the assertion, that I "think that General Burnside's letter to me" (you) "was drawn out of him" for any purpose. On the contrary I know that before he wrote it, he expressed his intention of writing it to several persons, myself among the number, and the reason he gave for this intention was, that he might disabuse the minds of the people as to who was responsible for the battle of Fredericksburg. He intended the letter for publication, I know, and was excited to write it by the newspaper articles, which threw the blame upon the administration. I never had, nor ever expressed, an idea that the letter in question was drawn out of General Burnside by any person, or for any purpose, but have always known that the dictates of his own mind led him to write it.

I do not think that I have ever asserted, or ever thought that you had seen Order No. 8. I have looked over my pamphlet carefully, and find no sentence which will bear the construction that I thought you had seen it. I received all of the information in my possession concerning it from officers who saw it in General Hooker's hands, and the names in the pretended order, as published, agree in all respects with those reported to me as present in General Hooker's copy. The pamphlet was, however, written before the publication of the order in the Herald.

It was not my intention in my pamphlet to refer to any persons except the Committee on the Conduct of the War and General Burnside. I am sorry that my confidence in General Burnside's honesty led me to assert that he had requested the removal of the Secretary of War and yourself, and I can only account for his numerous mistakes by the hypothesis that he is crazy.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
W. B. FRANKLIN.

GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL FRANKLIN.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, May 29, 1863.

[Private and personal.]

Major-General Franklin, York, Penn.:

GENERAL: Your letter of the twenty-seventh is received, and I thank you for your frank reply to my inquiry.

Immediately on receiving your pamphlet, I addressed a note to General Burnside, calling his attention to what you had stated in regard to his having *formally* and *earnestly* requested my removal, and as he has not denied its correctness, I presume he admits it.

There is one singular statement in your letter, in regard to the embodying of General Burnside's recommendation for our removal in his letter of resignation, and reading it to the President in the presence of the Secretary and myself. There is not a word of truth in this, so far as I am concerned. The only letter of resignation of General Burnside which I ever saw or heard of, made no allusion whatever to either of us.

The reason of my alluding to Order No. 8 was, that you say the President "declined to decide, without consulting some of his advisers." The public would presume, perhaps, that I was one of these advisers, I merely wished to undeceive you on that point. The facts are these: General Burnside had had an interview with the President in the night, or very early in the morning. I was sent for while at breakfast. When I arrived at the President's room, he informed the Secretary and myself that General Burnside had proposed the dismissal and relieving of several high officers, and if his order were not approved he wished to resign. The President announced his decision to relieve General Burnside, and put General Hooker in command. He asked no opinion or advice, either from the Secretary or myself, and none whatever was offered by either of us. General Burnside afterwards came in, and the matter of accepting his resignation was discussed. I strongly urged him to withdraw it, which he finally consented to do.

The removal of General Burnside, and appointment of General Hooker, was the sole act of the President. My advice was not asked at all in the matter, and I gave no opinion whatever.

I have never doubted the honesty and integrity of purpose of General Burnside, but in his various statements he has certainly committed some most singular errors, and in none more so than in regard to the "Pontoons," upon which the public press got up such a furor against me. I had the means at the time of disproving most of his statements, but declined to use them, preferring, as in the case of the battle of Fredericksburg, to remain silent. By publicly denying one false charge, it would be inferred that those undenied were true. Moreover, when holding a command, I never enter into newspaper discussions.

Nevertheless, I think it due to history that officers should, among themselves, seek to reconcile and explain conflicting statements. It was simply with this object in view that I wrote to yourself and General Burnside, and I thank you for answering me so promptly and kindly. I only regret that General Burnside has not done the same.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK.

GEN. W. F. SMITH TO GEN. FRANKLIN.

NEW YORK, May 29, 1863.

DEAR FRANKLIN: Burnside referred to the matter of his letter to the President, asking that Stanton, Halleck, and himself should vacate their places, several times in my presence; but the first time in such detail that no new points were afterwards developed. He said he had had a long conversation with the President, which resulted in his going back to the hotel, and writing this letter, which he sent. In the letter he said he was sure Stanton and Halleck had not the confidence of the country, but of that the President could judge for himself; but he could assert positively that they had not the confidence of the army, and therefore suggested that the three should resign. The President said he could not think of accepting his resignation, and asked him if he had any objections to going to the others interested and making the statements in their presence. Burnside said no, certainly not, and they went to the War Department, saw the Secretary and General-in-Chief, and in their presence he reiterated his remarks about want of confidence; that neither of them said a word with reference to the matter, and the conversation after that was an attempt to get orders to cross the river, or orders not to cross the river. Burnside also made in Washington, and at the time, the same statement to Mr. John Tucker, then Assistant Secretary of War, and I certainly placed implicit confidence in his story. You are entirely at liberty to make any use of this letter.

Yours, as ever,
WM. F. SMITH.

Major-General Wm. B. Franklin, York, Penn.

This letter was transmitted by General Franklin to General Halleck, with a letter of transmittal merely.

GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL FRANKLIN.

[Personal and private.]

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1863.

Major-General Franklin, York, Penn.:

GENERAL: Yours of the third instant, enclosing a copy of General Smith's letter of May twenty-ninth is received. No such conversation as that mentioned by General Smith, nor any in the slightest degree resembling it, ever took place between General Burnside, the President, Mr. Stanton, and myself. What General Burnside may have said to the President or Secretary of War about me, in my absence, I, of course, do not know; but I have assurances that he never suggested my removal to either.

I have no desire to push this inquiry any farther, being satisfied that General Burnside's memory was, at least at that time, unreliable.

Very respectfully,
H. W. HALLECK.

GEN. W. T. H. BROOKS TO GEN. FRANKLIN.

INDIANAPOLIS, June 2, 1863.

DEAR FRANKLIN: I received your letter of the twenty ninth ult. yesterday. I was very sorry not to meet you.

I spoke to the Secretary about Burnside having stated that he had told the President he ought to remove himself

and Halleck. He said he had never heard of it until a few days before, when Halleck, having seen the statement made by you in your pamphlet, spoke to him about it. That so far as he knew, there is not a word of truth in it.

I heard Burnside make the statement in your presence. I have heard Sedgwick and Hancock say they heard Burnside make the statement. I have heard Hooker refer to it, as though he had heard it direct. I am almost certain I have heard Meade say he had heard Burnside make the same statement. I called the Secretary's attention to this in a letter written just before our last move, but he says he never received it.

Nearly every general officer in the Army of the Potomac has heard Burnside make the boast. I believe I wrote you that Hooker had mentioned the subject to the President, and he said he had never heard it.

* * * *

Yours truly,
W. T. H. BROOKS.

The above extract was sent to General Halleck with a letter of transmittal on June sixth, 1863.

DOC. 4.

SECESSIONISTS OF WEST VIRGINIA.

MAJOR-GENERAL HUNTER'S ORDER.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF WEST VIRGINIA,
IN THE FIELD, VALLEY OF SHENANDOAH,
May 24, 1864.

SIR: Your name has been reported to me, with evidence, that you are one of the leading secession sympathizers in this valley, and that you countenance and abet the bushwhackers and guerrillas who infest the woods and mountains of this region, swooping out on the roads to plunder and outrage loyal residents, falling upon and firing into defenceless wagon trains, and assassinating soldiers of this command who may chance to be placed in exposed positions. These practices are not recognized by the laws of war of any civilized nation, nor are the persons engaged therein entitled to any other treatment than that due, by the universal code of justice, to pirates, murderers, and other outlaws.

But from the difficulties of the country, the secret aid and information given to those bushwhackers by persons of your class, and the more important occupation of the troops under my command, it is impossible to chase, arrest, and punish these common marauders as they deserve. Without the countenance and help given to them by the rebel residents of the valley, they could not support themselves for a week. You are spies upon our movements, abusing the clemency which has protected your persons and property, while loyal citizens of the United States residing within the rebel lines are invariably plundered of all they may possess, imprisoned, and in some cases put to death. It is from you and your families and neighbors that these bandits receive food, clothing, ammunition, and information; and it is from their secret hiding-places in your houses, barns, and woods, that they issue on their missions of pillage and murder.

You are, therefore, hereby notified, that for every train fired upon, or soldier of the Union wounded or assassinated by bushwhackers in any neighborhood within the reach of my cavalry, the houses and other property of every secession sympathizer residing within a circuit of five miles from the place of the outrage, shall be destroyed by fire; and that for all public property jayhawked or destroyed by these marauders, an assessment of five times the value of such property will be made upon the secession sympathizers residing within a circuit of ten miles around the point at which the offence was committed. The payment of this assessment will be enforced by the troops of the department, who will seize and hold in close military custody the persons assessed, until such payments shall have been made. This provision will also be applied to make good, from the secessionists in every neighborhood, five times the amount of any loss suffered by loyal citizens of the United States from the action of the bushwhackers whom you encourage.

If you desire to avoid the consequences herein set forth, you will notify your guerrilla and bushwhacking friends to withdraw from that portion of the valley within my lines, and to join — if they desire to fight for the rebellion — the regular forces of the secession army in my front or elsewhere. You will have none but yourselves to blame for the consequences that will certainly ensue, if these evils are permitted to continue. This circular is not sent to you for the reason that you have been singled out as peculiarly obnoxious, but because you are believed to furnish the readiest means of communication with the prominent secession sympathizers of your neighborhood. It will be for their benefit that you communicate to them the tenor of this circular.

D. HUNTER,
Major-General, commanding.

Official copy: P. G. BIER,
A. A. G.

DOC. 5.

GENERAL TWIGGS' TREACHERY.

JACKSON BARRACKS, NEW ORLEANS,
March 17, 1863.

MY DEAR ———: I suppose you have long thought me dead; but I have not had an opportunity, until the present time, of letting you know why I have been so long silent, but I trust in God this will find you well.* I hardly know what to begin with first, for I have so long a list of adventures to tell you. When I received your letter, in Hatch's Ranche, New Mexico, I answered it by the next mail; since then I have not heard from you, or any one else. At that time, I think, I told you that I expected to leave there for Fort Butler, but shortly afterward the company to which I belong was ordered to Fort Bliss, Texas, on the Rio Grande, four hundred miles from Hatch's Ranche, which place we left on the twenty-fifth of January, 1861; the weather was intensely cold, and snow some six or eight inches deep for some three hundred miles of the way. We suffered very much during the greater part of the march, but as we neared the Texas border the days became more pleasant, but the

* This letter was written by a private soldier belonging to the Eighth United States regulars, which regiment was surrendered to the rebels by the treachery of General Twiggs in 1861.

nights were still cold and stormy. We arrived at Fort Bliss February twenty-fifth, and were all beginning to congratulate ourselves on having a good garrison for the summer, when the news of the secession reached us. At first we thought nothing of it; but the attack and surrender of Fort Sumter by the gallant Major Anderson convinced the most sceptical that things were taking a very serious turn. Shortly after the above events, we got orders from General Twiggs, the commander of the department of Texas, to evacuate the state, and turn over all the forts and stores to commissioners appointed by the state: we prepared to follow these instructions, but were delayed in consequence of wagons to carry our baggage through; but finally we got started on the thirty-first of March, 1861, with Colonel Reeves and two other companies of our regiment, I and B, and marched to Fort Quitman, where we were joined by Company F. We left there, and marched to Fort Davis, where we were joined by Companies E and H. We were now about three hundred and twenty men, all in good spirits, for at that time we were told by the commissioner of the state that we should not be molested on our march to the coast, but would be treated with all possible kindness, as the regiment had been so long in the state, guarding the frontier from the inroads of the Camanche Indians; so, with these promises in view, and the hopes of hearing from, and perhaps seeing, dear friends at home, we thought nothing of the long and wearisome march before us. But the sequel will show how bitterly we were betrayed by the traitor Twiggs and his worthless confederates.

Everything went on well until we got to Fort Clark, the nearest military post to the settlements, where we heard it announced that the Texans intended to make us all prisoners as soon as we got some forty or fifty miles farther down the country. This we did not believe, and even if we had it was then too late to turn back; so we pushed boldly on until we reached a little town called Castreville, where the people (principally Germans) assured us we would be met the next day by a large force, and have to surrender or fight. Well, I can assure you, my dear Ellen, that was rather hard, after having the assurance of a free pass out of the country; but it was too true. However, we were bound to show a bold front, and Colonel Reeves determined not to let the enemy steal a march on him; so we left Castreville that night at ten o'clock, (after marching that day twenty-five miles), and got to a place called Adam's Hill, close by the San Lucas Springs, before daylight. We were all tired out, and all hands got orders to lie down and rest; but it was of short duration, for just at sunrise the enemy came pouring down a hill some three miles in front of us. At the sound of the drum every man was in his place, and there we stood for a good hour, watching the rebels filing over the hill in front. Not a word was spoken in the ranks, but many a one thought of the dear ones at home, perhaps never to be seen again; but everything must have an end, and pretty soon an officer rode up to our ranks, and demanded an unconditional surrender. Colonel Reeves told him he would fight him first, and then see about the surrender. So the officer rode off to his side to report. At this time our officers came round, and told us we were about to go into an engagement, and they wanted every man to do his best; but that was unnecessary, for we were all determined to die before a rebel crowd should have it to say that the Eighth regulars would give in one inch. We were all of one mind, and that was, to fight to the last. In a short time the officer came back again, and told Colonel Reeves that it would be a useless waste of blood to fight; that he had only two hundred and ninety effective men, and opposed to him were twenty-three hundred, with six pieces of artillery, while we had none. The Colonel said he would fight them three to one, or if they drew off the artillery, he would fight them all; but, of course, they knew they had the advantage, and were determined to keep it; so the Colonel, after sending down one of our officers to count their number, surrendered. We were then ordered to stack arms; then the rebels gave a cheer — a cheer which made our cheeks burn and our hearts ache, one that we still remember, and will take a fearful vengeance for some of these days. It was unmannerly in them. There we stood, our little band small in numbers, but firm and determined; they, great in force, but cowards at heart; and I believed then, as I do now, that had we fought them, we would have been victorious. But let it pass; let the future tell the tale. We marched that day to within nine miles of San Antonio, and camped in full sight of the rebels at Leon Springs, and some of them came into our camp, but they met with a very cool reception. The next day we marched into San Antonio and gave up our arms. We were treated with a good deal of respect by the citizens, but we were in no mood to look kindly on them, as they had been instrumental in bringing on our misfortunes; all offers of kindness we treated with scorn, and wanted only to be released on parole as prisoners of war. We remained in San Antonio a month, and took a parole, by the advice of our officers, not to leave the county we were in. Afterwards we were sent out in a camp eight miles from San Antonio, where we remained during the months of July and August, thinking all the time that we would be released; but no, they wanted to have us all join the rebel cause, and promised to pay us all the United States government owed us; but we spurned all their offers. Some few men did join, but they were a riddance to us, and no acquisition to them, being the most dissatisfied men in our command. We were now ordered to be guarded, and were marched seventy-five miles, to Camp Verde. There our tents were taken away, and we had to make out as best we could. The cold weather was setting in, and we had not too plenty of clothing or blankets; but necessity is the mother of invention; so all hands went to work to build houses for the winter, some in twos and some in fours, just as they fancied, in partnership, as the labor was too much to do alone, and in an incredibly short time (without

tools of any kind) there was quite a town built up, of some one hundred and twenty houses, or shanties, which we called Lincolnville. Some of the houses were built of stone, some of logs, some of mud like those in New Mexico, and some of the wealthiest firms had quite respectable frame houses. I was in as a partner with three others, and I flatter myself our mansion was quite a gem, ten by fourteen feet, and seven feet high. We carried the boards that built it about three miles, and put it all up in six days; but the improvements we made occupied us much longer. We had a good chimney in it, also bedsteads, chairs, table, &c. You know I used to be pretty handy at such things, and all lent a hand to the work. After all was finished we put up a flag pole and made a flag, not the stars and stripes, (for that we dared not do,) but the red cross of St. George. The Texans thought we were great fellows to work; but we did the most of it to pass the time. Pretty soon we began to get out of and feel the want of some tobacco; so I proposed that we four should build a little ship, and by selling it get some little things we wanted; but my partners' talents not being in that line of business, I had to work alone for the benefit of the others, so I built a little war frigate with no other tools than a jackknife and an awl, rigged it, but could get no paint; so I had to use ink and some other articles: however, it was finished and put on exhibition; and it was a rarer sight to the natives than fifty live elephants or tigers. They have no idea what such a thing as a ship is. Hundreds came to see it, and it was with the greatest difficulty we could keep them from smashing it, handling it; so I had to sell it out or run the chance of getting it broke. All I got was ten dollars. I made another, but only got five dollars; so that branch of business had to be abandoned as unprofitable.

About this time an order came to have us move, just as we had got comfortably lodged for the winter; and on the fourth of December, 1861, Companies B, E, F, H, I, and K, left for Fort Mason, eighty-five miles from Verde. We left sixty men at Verde. We all got safely to Mason, and there the command was split up into five parties, one to Fort McKuvett, one to Camp Colorado, one to Camp Cooper, one to Fort Belknap, and Companies B and K, in all fifty-eight men, to Fort Chadbourne, clear up in the Camanche nation of Indians.

I forgot to tell you that we were three months and fifteen days in Camp Verde.

All these forts that I have mentioned are on the Indian frontier, and were formerly garrisoned by our soldiers, but none of us had ever been to any of them; but at the time I am writing about they were garrisoned by the rebels, and we were distributed amongst them, as I tell you, for safe keeping. I had the good luck to go with my company, K, to Chadbourne, two hundred and twenty miles from Fort Mason. We got there without any mishap, and remained there three months and fourteen days. We had all the liberty we wanted, but we could not get away, as there was not a house for over two hundred miles, and in an Indian country; so we had to make the best of it. Here we were well treated, and had nothing to do, but could not get a smoke for any money; we were all nearly crazy for tobacco; we smoked everything—leaves, coffee, tea, weeds, and paper, and, finally, to wind up our troubles, got out of flour, and went without bread for twenty-four days. Beef also run short, and the rebel Captain in charge of the fort told us he would go out with a party of men and kill some buffalo; so some of our men went along, myself amongst the number. We had only to go some thirty miles. When we came on the range of the animals he furnished us with good horses, guns, and six shooting pistols. We had a fine time, and the first day killed nineteen, and the next eleven. We only took the tongue and humps, put them in the wagons, and went home again; but that would not last long; so the Captain told us he would leave the fort if the flour did not come on such a day, and as we had been living on nothing but beans for some weeks, we were not in very good trim for marching one hundred and twenty miles, the nearest way we could get to Mason; but the boys went through all right. I took sick the night before the most of the men started, and came pretty near dying, but God willed it otherwise. I had to stop behind with four other men of my company for ten days, as there were not wagons enough to take the property; but we got to Mason a few days after the others. On this march down we made one hundred and twenty miles in five days; one day we marched thirty-eight miles, and had nothing to eat but beans and coffee. At Fort Mason we were found in a few days by our other companies that had been at the other forts. During the winter we were all put in a camp without any tents, but the weather by this time was beginning to be fine, (April.) We all commenced comparing notes; but I think we had a little the hardest times.

I must not enter into detail, but it is hard to finish now without a full account. We had a good camp at Mason, fine water and plenty of wood; so we commenced building brush houses to keep off the heat of the sun. That was quite a job, for the weather is extremely hot there in the summer months; but the sheds were built, and we were quite comfortable under the circumstances; but when it rained we used to catch it all; our things got wet, but we did not mind that much. We now began to be much in need of clothing, shoes, and in fact everything; but we went to work, got flour sacks, made shirts and trousers, and got some canvas and made slippers, with raw-hide soles; but we were always clean and neat even in our old clothes, and kept up our hearts, knowing that it could not last forever. I can now say I am a pretty good carpenter, builder, tailor, and shoemaker; you would be surprised.

It was at Mason we heard of the fall of New Orleans. I was out on a fishing tour fourteen miles from camp, and heard the good news; and you may be sure I did not stop long to fish after that, but hurried home to acquaint the others with the good news. Shortly after that event,

through some reports sent to General Bee at San Antonio, he ordered us to be closely guarded, and not to allow us to see any citizens. So a guard was put all around our camp, and we were regularly penned up; but soon after that we got an order to move to San Antonio — we were told, for the purpose of being paroled. We did not exactly believe it, but we were getting tired of Mason, and wanted to get to San Antonio, where we could better hear and see what was doing. So, after a stay in Mason of three months and sixteen days, we started on the road once more. I forgot to mention that while we were in Mason, Major Hill, a rebel officer, offered any of the men passes if they would go to work for some of the farmers round there; but he made nothing by it, for although we were offered five dollars a day, and had no clothes, and wanted the money, not one man would do a thing for them; at the same time the crops were ripe, but the farmers had no one to help them; and while at Mason our coffee was stopped, and we got rye and wheat instead. It is a great dish, I assure you; but we soon got used to that, and it went just as good as the pure old Java.

Nothing of any particular note occurred on the march to San Antonio. The weather was very hot, roasting, but by that time we were all pretty well acclimated, and could go as far in a day and farther than the Secesh horses. They were dying on the road every day, while we were improving. In due time we arrived in San Antonio for the second time, and of course were on tiptoe to know what was going to be done with us. Finally we were ordered to a camp on the head of the San Antonio River, five miles from the latter place — a good camp, with plenty of wood, and a good river to bathe in. That was what we wanted, for a soldier is out of his element if he has not plenty of water. After we had been in camp a few days, Captain Price, a Confederate officer, came and told us that we were going to be paroled but that if any of us wanted to join their army we could get a commission and all our pay; but the bait would not take, and we all remained true blue to the old flag. We were then visited by General Bee and the Inspecting General. He complimented us highly for our clean and healthy appearance, and asked us to join the South; but still the same answer. We then asked him about the parole and why we were guarded so closely. He told us it was our own faults that we were not free long before; that we could be soon then by joining; but he knew it would not work; so he threatened to punish us still more. We told him to do his worst; that our day would come some time. He then told us we had been on intimate terms with some of the disloyal citizens of the country, and would have to be kept under a close guard as long as we were prisoners in Texas.

Shortly after this we were joined in our camp by the sixty men that were left in Camp Verde. They were all in good health, but like the balance of us, were all disappointed in not getting paroled; but we soon went about building more summer houses, and after that was done, started and built a theatre out of green bushes, boards, and moss, which we found in abundance on all the large trees; we had quite a fine place, and as we all gave a hand to the work, it was soon completed. We had a good stage of boards, foot-lights, and a drop-curtain made out of a wagon cover. The building would seat about five hundred persons comfortably, the seats made out of boards and large trunks of trees; but the greatest trouble was to raise funds to start with. That, however, was accomplished by the rebel officers making a donation in the shape of some fifty dollars in Confederate money; with that we bought dresses, wigs, and candles to light up with. We had a big time the opening night, and the receipts of the house amounted to nearly one hundred dollars; of course none of our party paid any, but all the rangers had to come down or else stop out. We had very good music, having some tip-top musicians amongst us; we had to borrow the instruments in San Antonio. The orchestra consisted of three fiddles, one flute, one clarinet, and a guitar. We gave entertainments twice a week as long as there was any money around. At last so many of our men used to be away from camp that there was an order given to put on a close guard, and allow no one outside the lines on any business, and any of us found outside the guard were ordered to be shot; but that did not keep us in, for then we were determined to go out anyhow, to show them that they could not keep us in. We tried all kinds of plans to get out, and then came back and told them we had been in town. The officers came down heavy on the guard for letting us out, but they could not find out how we *run the blockade;* but we did. About this time some of the men determined to make their escape, and go over into Mexico, nearly three hundred miles. We tried to dissuade them from it, but they were getting tired of the whole arrangement, and would go; so some fifteen started one night in three different parties for the Rio Grande. They were not missed for three days. The rebels vowed vengenance against us and them, and thirty mounted men started after them; nine escaped, and the other five got out of provisions and had to apply for some at a house, where they were captured and brought back, after being nearly safe. They then put balls and chains on their legs, and confined them in the guard-house; but one night two of the five cut the chains and started off again. They were missed in about an hour, but they were not caught for two days. They travelled forty-five miles the night they left. Major Taylor, the officer in command, told them that he had orders to shoot them, but that if they promised him that they would not run away again, he would let them off; so they had to promise. The guard was now doubled, and it was mighty hard to get out; but we did do it, after all, and four more started, and got clear through to Mexico, and from there to New Orleans. We were a little too sharp for their sentinels. About this time the weather was beginning to look wintry,

day, was conspicuously gallant. Heroically urging them on to the attack, they fell very nearly at the same moment, (their wounds comparatively disabling them,) so far in the advance that some time elapsed before they were got off the field. Major Downie received two bullets through the arm before he turned over the command to Captain Messick. Color-Sergeant E. P. Perkins and two of the color-guard, successively bearing the flag, were wounded in Thursday's fight. On Friday Corporal Dehr, of Company A, the last of the color-guard, when close upon the enemy, was shot through the hand, and the flagstaff cut in two; Corporal Henry D. O'Brien, of Company D, instantly seized the flag by the remnant of the staff, and, waving it over his head, rushed right up to the muzzles of the enemy's muskets; nearly at the moment of victory, he too was wounded in the hand, but the flag was instantly grasped by Corporal W. N. Irvine, of Company D, who still carries its tattered remnants. Company L, Captain Berger, supported Kirby's battery throughout the battle, and did very effective service. Every man in the regiment did his whole duty. With great respect, I am,

Your obedient servant,

H. C. COATES,

Captain, commanding First Regiment Minnesota Volunteers.

His Excellency, ALEXANDER RAMSAY,
Governor of the State of Minnesota.

JOHN W. PLUMMER'S ACCOUNT.

ON the first of July, 1863, we started from Uniontown, Md., early in the morning, for Pennsylvania, via Tenalytown. We arrived after very slow marching at Tenalytown about noon, which is about seven miles from W——n, and thirteen from Gettysburg, and halted in a woods, cooked our dinners, and were given to understand that we were to remain during the rest of the day at least. So on the thought of that, one of my comrades and I went off and found a creek, and washed our shirts and socks, having had no opportunity of performing this needful operation of late; but we had scarcely got back when the order came to march, and we had the alternative of carrying our wet shirts or throwing them away, and trust to Providence to get some more; but we decided to carry them, heavy though they were. Hot was the day, and tired were we, with the prospect of a long and rapid march before we halted again. We spread them out on our knapsacks, so that in travelling along they were drying and continually lessening our load. When about three miles from Tenalytown, we began to hear the first rumors and reports we had heard of a battle then progressing at Gettysburg, and also plainly see the two lines of smoke of the two contending parties' fire. That accounted for our sudden orders to march. Rumors came thicker as we neared the field, from citizens, cavalrymen, and orderlies; but, as usual on such occasions, so contradictory we could make nothing definite or reliable out of them, though the weight of them seemed to satisfy us that at the close of the battle our forces were worsted, and had to fall back some distance, though we did nc get near enough to the field that night to see man wounded men or skedaddlers, if there were man of the latter class.

We halted about three miles from Gettysbur about nine o'clock that night, and had orders t build breastworks of the fence rails; but as w were pretty tired, and couldn't really see the ne cessity of work that far from the field, we boy did not build any, but lay down to sleep, whicl as it afterwards proved, was just as well, as n fighting was done there. The country, after w crossed the Pennsylvania line, seemed very muc like some of the poorer parts of Virginia, and th people like the Virginians, for they seemed pe fectly indifferent to our army passing througl and the great conflict which was raging and sti to rage so near their homes, and on the result o which depended the fate of the whole countr One group in particular, we saw, were, we be lieved, truly loyal, as one of them, a very intell gent looking woman, said to us while passing with *much feeling*, "*It gives us so much pleasur to see our good Union soldiers coming!*" Man a fervent "God bless you!" and "Good for you! were uttered by the tired and weary soldiers, an many, too, forgot their weariness and their load feeling that for such they could fight and endur any hardship without grumbling. One of ou boys, poor fellow! he is now dead, (Russ Allen, said, "Boys, who wouldn't fight for such as these? Just that little expression, and the way it was ex pressed, seemed to put new life into all of us, an we resolved, if possible, to give them yet mor pleasure by driving the invaders from their soil.

The next morning we were called up about day light, and before we had time to get coffee, had t march for the battle-field, where we arrived soon Troops were moving around in every direction getting in position for the coming battle. Ou corps was marched to the centre; but before bein placed in position on the line we were to occupy we were closed in column to hear an order and a appeal to the troops by General Gibbons, our di vision commander. It was good, and we all fel better after hearing it. It told of the great issu at stake in the coming contest — appealing to al to do their duty and win the gratitude and esteen of our friends and of the nation, and ordered tha every one found skulking away in time of actio should suffer death. I have always thought i would do good to make these addresses to troop before going into action, to rouse their enthusiasm and make them fight much better. Napoleo used to, and the Southerners do; but it is prac tised but little in our army. One thing ou armies lack is enthusiasm; and no efforts ar made to create it, when, in many cases, it woul accomplish more than real bravery or bull-dog courage; so I think, at least. Well, our corps an batteries got into position about nine o'clock, an occasionally a shot was fired from our guns, an some sharp skirmishing was carried on in fron of our lines. Our brigade was not in front; so w went to making coffee and cooking, and filling u the inner man, preparatory to the coming strug-

gle. About two o'clock the rebels opened on us from some of their batteries, and the way the ambulances, hospital men, stragglers, and darkies did skedaddle for the rear, was amusing to those old fellows who had got used, somewhat, to such things as shells. Several men of the brigade were wounded, and one shell killed a sergeant of Company I, named Woodworth, and wounded three others. After lying there about two hours, or till four o'clock, we were ordered to get our things on and be ready to move, as the Third corps on our left was going in, and we might be needed to help them. The artillery and musketry then commenced firing on the left, and continued with but little change for two hours, when our men began to give way slowly. We were at once ordered up to the left to support our batteries, and check the rebels' advance. We were marched up there about a quarter of a mile, and ordered to lie down in front of the batteries, as the shot and shell were coming over pretty plentifully. From there we could look all over the field, see our lines, the rebel lines, and their batteries very plainly. As I saw our men fall back, rally, and fall back again, skedaddlers rushing to the rear in squads, I never felt so bad in my life. I thought sure the day was gone for us, and felt that I would prefer to die there, rather than live and suffer the disgrace and humiliation a defeat of our army there would entail on us; and if ever I offered a sincere prayer in my life, it was then, that we might be saved from defeat. We all felt bad, but resolved, when our chance came, to do our best to retrieve the fortunes of the day, hardly expecting to come out of the conflict unharmed. Our turn soon came. We were ordered forward against the enemy, who were then within musket range of us; and if any ever were willing and anxious to go forward into what we all could see was a deadly place, our boys were. We had two open fields to advance over, while the rebels were coming down over another open field, and the Third corps falling back before. We went forward on a run, and with a yell, till about half way across the second field, when we were ordered, for some unaccountable reason to us, to halt, and the bullets were coming like hail-stones, and whittling our boys like grain before the sickle. "Why don't they let us charge?" cried all of us. "Why do they stop us here to be murdered?" Every one seemed anxious to go forward, and some run way out ahead and beckoned for us to come on. We have always believed that a determined charge would break any line, and that more would be accomplished and less life lost, than by lying down and firing two or three hours. We felt that we could check and force them to retreat, and we wanted to go against them with a vengeance and get over the deadly ground as soon as possible. We were halted again when across the second field; and though by this time few were left, we were just as anxious to go forward. We were almost together, and the rebels had nearly flanked the right of the regiment. But what surprised me most was to see some of the rebels, not fifty yards from us, standing out openly and loading and firing as deliberately as though they were in no danger whatever. Ah! there is no mistake but what some of those rebels are just as brave as it is possible for human beings to be. I expected they would turn and run when they saw us coming so determinedly, and I believe they would, had we gone right on. We had fired but a few shots before we were ordered to fall back. 'Twas some time before we could hear the order, and when we did the right of the regiment was half way back. We dreaded to go back for the danger of it, more than staying there; and we felt, though obeying orders, that we were being disgraced to fall back when we knew we could hold our own. We fell back, and it was then I had the first feeling of fear during the fight. I felt almost sure I would be hit, and I saw many wounded going back.

When we got back to the colors, where we rallied, scarce twenty-five men were to be found. Most who went in were killed, wounded, or helping off the wounded. The enemy advanced no farther, and soon some of our boys who did not fall back when ordered, came in bringing in prisoners, and they said when we fell back the rebels were making for the rear as fast as possible. It was now about dark. Another line came up of the First corps, and went in where we came out, found no enemy, advanced their pickets over the battle-field to enable us to get off our wounded, which they at once commenced to do. We were ordered to join the brigade again, on the right; and Lieutenant Heffelfinger took a couple of the boys and went and had all our wounded carried to the hospital that night. As we were going to the right to join the brigade, musketry was heard very plain, seemingly scarce half a mile off, and completely in our rear; in fact, some of the bullets whistled over our heads. Now we were sure that the battle was gone up for us, for the fighting continued fierce, and seemed growing nearer all the time. We made up our minds that we were whipped, and expected before morning to see the whole army routed, and flying for Baltimore. The prospect was gloomy and discouraging in the extreme to us, but, thank God, that time we were deceived, and our affairs and position were much better than the most sanguine of us could believe possible. The firing soon ceased on the right and what seemed our rear; the troops were got in their places, and put in position for the contest, whenever it should open again. Our brigade was placed almost in the same position we had previous to the charge in the afternoon, viz.: the left centre of the army, and the left of the Second division. We then lay down to get some sleep, with our equipment on and guns by our sides; and I here say I never slept better and had more pleasant dreams in my life than I had on the battle-field of Gettysburg, with dead men and horses lying all around me; but the excitement and exhaustion had been so great that a man could sleep in any condition, and under any circumstances. We got up about daylight, expected and awaited an attack from the enemy at any moment, but till afternoon all was quiet, except occasionally a shot

from their or our batteries. Most of us got some coffee during the forenoon, by going one or two at a time back to the rear, where they were allowed fires and cooking, which of course greatly refreshed us. A man's appetite generally, during a battle, is not very voracious. About half past twelve o'clock, as we had gathered around one of our Lieutenants to hear the yesterday's Baltimore Clipper read, bang! comes one of their shells over us, striking about twenty yards from us. That stopped the reading; each man took his place, lay down, and for the next two hours hugged the ground just about as close as human beings are generally in the habit of doing. The first gun was the signal for a hundred more to open, at less than half a mile distance, while till then their existence was perfectly unknown to us. Such an artillery fire has never been witnessed in this war. The air seemed to be filled with the hissing, screaming, bursting missiles, and all of them really seemed to be directed at us. They knew our exact position, for before we lay down they could with the naked eye plainly see us, and where our lines were, and tried to explode their shells directly over us; but fortunately most of them just went far enough to clear us, while many struck in front of us and bounded over us. We lay behind a slight rise of ground, just enough, by lying close, to hide us from the view of the rebels. A good many shell and pieces struck mighty close to us, and among us, but strange to say, none of us were injured, while the troops that lay behind us had many killed and wounded. Our batteries replied, but for the first time in our experience, they were powerless to silence the rebels, and in fact, many of our guns were silenced. So many of their horses and men were killed that they could not work their guns, and drew them off the field. Caisson after caisson blew up, and still the rebels' fire was fierce and rapid as ever. I kept thinking, surely they cannot fire much longer; their guns will get so hot they will have to stop, and they cannot afford, so far from their base, to waste so much ammunition. It was awful hot where we lay, with the sun shining down on us, and we so close to the ground that not a breath of air could reach us. We kept wishing and hoping they would dry up, as much to get out of the heat as the danger, for the latter we thought little of, after they had fired a while; but Lee had an object to attain by throwing away so much ammunition. He calculated by concentrating his fire on our centre that he could use up our batteries, drive away and demoralize our infantry lines, for owing to the shape of our lines, a shell coming from the rebels, if it failed to do any damage to the front lines, could scarcely fail to go into the reserves that lay back of us; and in fact many more were killed in the rear than in the front, though their fire was directed at the front line and batteries nearly altogether. Had he succeeded in doing what he expected, and got the position we occupied, we were defeated, and so badly that I much doubt our ability to stop their progress towards Baltimore, or anywhere they chose to go. But Mr [illegible] led for once, and threw away a mighty sight of good ammunition, and derived little benefit from it. Well, after firing about two hours and a half, they slackened up, and soon the order came, "Be ready, for they are running," (their infantry.) We had expected it, and it was not many seconds before every man had on his armor, and was anxiously awaiting the coming of the foe. They had to advance more than half a mile across open fields. They came out of the woods in three lines, and advanced in good order till they got more than half way to us, and in good range of our muskets, which of course we used, as did the battery pour grape and canister, when they closed in to their left, and massed together for a charge, on the part of the line held by the Second Philadelphia brigade of our division. As they closed together, we (our brigade) marched by flank to confound them, firing at them continually, pouring most of our shot into their flank, where every shot must tell. The Second brigade gave way before the rebels got to them, and commenced to fall back. Our brigade was hurried up, and the Third were brought up to the rescue, and with the Second, which soon rallied again, we charged the rebels just as they had planted one of their colors on one of our guns. A Vermont brigade was sent out to flank them, which they did handsomely. The rebels, now seeing the position they had got in, threw away their guns and gave themselves up by hundreds, and thus ended the great assault of Lee on the third. Not enough went back of Ricketts's division to make a good line of skirmishers. Another line came out on the left shortly afterwards, but they were repulsed as completely as the first, and with the exception of a little artillery firing, was the last of the fighting at Gettysburg.

During the assault the rebels poured into us lots of shell and grape from their batteries, but we scarce paid any attention to it, having all we could attend to in the infantry. Our boys felt bully during all the fight of the third, and no one thought of running or of the danger, except the Second brigade; and some of these regiments, Baxter Zouaves, for instance, never were known to stand fire. We took revenge for what they had done to our poor fellows the day before, and we never had had such a chance before. Most of us fired over twenty rounds, and at close range enough to do splendid execution; and if we didn't kill some Secesh in that battle we never did, and I fear never will during the war.

During the fight of the third, it might be said, almost, that every man fought on his own hook, for our division had been so used up the day before, that few officers were left. Generals Hancock and Gibbon were wounded early. Each man acted as though he felt what was at stake in the contest, and did all in their power to drive the enemy, without regard to officers, or whether there were any or not. Regiments all mixed up together, and in the last charge nearly all the flags of the division were together in a corner where the rebels got a hold. The flags of the rebel division were about the same, and when the assault was fully repulsed, they laid them on the ground in front of us, for

anybody to get who chose, and, as might be expected, the brave men of the Second brigade were on hand to pick them up when there was no danger, and claim all the honor. They are welcome, though, to all they can get, for among those who knew them and saw them in the fight, they will have to show something besides flags to establish their bravery on that field. The sights on the field were horrible, by far the worst of any field we have seen; but I have not the time or disposition to describe them. Never before were our batteries so used up. Some of them had not men and horses enough for two guns, and the four batteries of our corps had to be consolidated into two before leaving the field.

The morning of the fourth we drew rations, and plenty of them; and right there, where we had fought the day before, we cooked and ate a hearty breakfast, for by this time we were pretty hungry, and many of us out of grub. That day and the forenoon of the next, our men were busy burying the dead. About noon of the fifth we left the field to follow the rebels, who were now known to be making for the Potomac as fast as possible.

I have here tried to give you a slight sketch of the part we took in the great battle. It is very imperfect, and many things are left out I should like to have put in; but I think I have taken up space enough any way; so for the rest, if God spares my life, and my memory serves me, you must wait till about nine months from now, and I will try, if agreeable, to favor you. So, for the present, good by. JOHN W. PLUMMER.

MAJOR A. G. BRADY'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTEENTH REG'T CONN. VOLS.,
GETTYSBURG, PA., July 4, 1863.

GENERAL: In compliance with instructions from headquarters, I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the Seventeenth Regiment Connecticut volunteers, in the engagement of the first, second, and third instant.

The regiment reached Gettysburg between one and two o'clock P. M. of the first instant, and was marched with the other regiments of the brigade, through, and to the lower end of the town, and then halted for a moment. Four companies were immediately ordered out, (by Brigadier-General Ames,) under command of Major Brady, to the right of the bridge at the lower end of the town, with instruction to throw out two companies as skirmishers, the other two to be held as a reserve, and to take and hold the brick house to the left, and beyond the bridge. Two companies were thrown out and deployed as skirmishers as rapidly as possible to the right of the bridge, along the creek; the other two, held in reserve, were advanced in line, loading and firing as rapidly as possible, making at the same time a left wheel, so as to swing our right around the house — the reserve keeping near and conforming to the movements of the skirmishers. When near the house the enemy opened upon us with shot, shell, grape, and canister, which retarded our advance for a moment, until Major Brady dismounted, went in front of the line of skirmishers, and led them on until quite near the house. The enemy, anticipating our movements, shelled the house and set it on fire. We, however, held our ground, and held the enemy's skirmishers in check: their loss up to this time was at least five to one, most of the men in the four companies being excellent marksmen, and having volunteered for this occasion. They consisted of Companies A, B, F, and K, and commanded respectively by Captains McQuhae, Hobbie, Allen, and McCarty. We continued skirmishing briskly until Major Brady received orders from Brigadier-General Ames to draw in his skirmishers, and return to town as rapidly as possible, and take command of his regiment. The order was obeyed, and we fell back in good order, skirmishing with the enemy, who advanced as we retreated, and tried to cut us off and capture us before we got to the town; but we foiled them in this attempt by making a circuit, and entering the town near the upper end, and soon joined the remainder of the regiment, which we found near the lower end of the town.

The loss in the four companies under Major Brady was three men killed, one Captain and one Lieutenant wounded, one Sergeant and three men taken prisoners. I would here state that I had great difficulty in drawing in Captain McCarty's Company K, as they were so earnestly engaged, and making such sad havoc among the rebels. The remainder of the regiment, six companies under Lieutenant-Colonel Fowler, advanced with the other regiments of the brigade to the left and front of the town, and directly in rear of the One Hundred and Seventh Ohio volunteers, in close column by division, were ordered to the front, advanced and deployed at double-quick, and held their ground, (notwithstanding the rush to the rear of troops directly in advance,) until ordered by the brigade commander to fall back, which order was obeyed in good order, the men loading and firing as they fell back. Lieutenant-Colonel Fowler was killed when the regiment advanced and deployed. Captain Morn was killed about this time, and Captain French and Lieutenant Quinn were wounded, and many of the men were killed, wounded, and taken prisoners.

When the regiment reached the town, the four companies under Major Brady were still skirmishing with the enemy, and remained so until Brigadier-General Ames sent an Aid, with orders for Major Brady to return with his command and assume command of his regiment, he being the only field officer of the regiment present. Upon arriving in the town Major Brady assumed command of the regiment, and reported immediately to Brigadier-General Ames for instructions. The enemy were at this time advancing rapidly through the town. The regiment was immediately deployed in the streets, and fired several volleys into the ranks of the enemy, which thinned their ranks and retarded their advance. We kept the enemy from advancing through the town, until ordered to clear the street of our men for the purpose of planting a battery. The battery not being placed in position as intended, and the regiment being in line on the sidewalk, the enemy took advantage

of this, and with a superior force rushed through the main street, which compelled us to fall back, which we did reluctantly, but not without contesting the ground inch by inch. As we retreated we loaded, halted, and poured destructive volleys into their ranks, which cleared the main street of them several times; but we found the enemy too many for us. They poured in from every street in overwhelming numbers, which broke our ranks. Upon arriving near the battery on Cemetery Hill, the regiment was halted, and formed in line of battle, fronting the town. About this time Major-General Howard, who was in the thickest of the fight, regardless of danger, asked if he had troops brave enough to advance to a stone wall across a lot towards the town, and said he would lead them. We replied, "Yes; the Seventeenth Connecticut will," and advanced at once to the place indicated, remained a few moments, and again advanced across another lot still nearer the town, and behind a rail fence at the upper end of the town, which position we held till late in the evening, exposed to a galling fire from the enemy's sharpshooters, when the whole regiment was ordered out on picket, and performed that duty until two o'clock of the second instant, when we were relieved and took a position behind the rail fence, and one hundred and fifty paces farther to the right of the place we occupied before going out on picket. We remained in this position, exposed to the enemy's batteries and sharpshooters, until seven o'clock P. M., when we were ordered to the extreme right, behind a stone wall, on each side of a lane below the battery, opposite the cemetery entrance. Two companies were advanced to the grain field near the woods, through which the enemy were rapidly advancing. We covered the wall on each side of the lane by compelling about three hundred stragglers, who had no commander, to fall into our line. We had not more than time to form behind the wall before the enemy were discovered advancing rapidly upon us on our right, and a full brigade obliquely towards our left. When within one hundred and fifty paces of us we poured a destructive fire upon them, which thinned their ranks and checked their advance. We fired several volleys by battalion, after which they charged upon us. We had a hand-to-hand conflict with them, firmly held our ground, and drove them back. Soon after, some of the troops on our left giving way, the rebels succeeded in getting in our rear. We again drove them back, and held our position. It was during this conflict that Major Brady was wounded by a fragment of a shell, which hit him upon his right shoulder. After the enemy had been driven back, the firing ceased, excepting occasional shots from their sharpshooters. We were relieved by the Fourth Ohio volunteers, and were ordered to change front to the left, behind a wall running at right angles with the one we had just occupied, and fronting the town, and where the enemy entered on our left. We remained at this wall all night, and during the whole of the third instant, exposed to a cross-fire of the rebel bat- their sharpshooters. With the latter our best marksmen exchanged shots and succeeded in dislodging many of them. When the regiment entered the engagement on the first instant, it numbered seventeen officers and three hundred and sixty-nine enlisted men. We report at the present time nine officers and one hundred and twenty enlisted men.

Captain Wilson French and Lieutenant Barton are the only officers known to have been taken prisoners. The former was wounded in the first day's engagement. We are not aware that either of them was paroled. The regiment behaved gallantly. No troops in the world could behave better. Both officers and men are deserving of great credit for their coolness and bravery throughout the entire three days' battle. There are many deserving of especial mention for bravery on the field, but they are so numerous I will not undertake to give the names. The coolness and bravery displayed by the officers and men of Company B exceeded anything I ever saw. I am, General,

Your most obedient servant,

A. G. BRADY,

Major, commanding Seventeenth Regiment C. V.

To Brigadier-General A. AMES,

commanding Brigade.

DOC. 7.

GENERAL HOOKER ON THE RAPIDAN.

THE following is a copy of a letter from Major-General J. J. Peck to Andrew D. White, Vice-President of the Onondaga Historical Association. It was accompanied by a map of Suffolk, showing Longstreet's, Hill's, and Hood's operations in April and May, 1863, during the short campaign of General Hooker on the Rapidan.

NEW YORK, June 28, 1864.

Sen. A. D. White, Vice-President Onondaga Historical Association, Syracuse:

SIR: Permit me to present through you, to the Onondaga Historical Association, a map of Suffolk, Va., and the adjacent region. It is a section of a map which I had prepared while in command of the U. S. forces on the south side of the James River.

It is of especial interest as presenting the theatre of operations of one wing of Lee's army, under Lieutenant-General Longstreet, Hill, and Hood, from April tenth to May third, 1863. Although Hill was not present all the time, he was operating with Longstreet, and by his orders made certain demonstrations in North Carolina, about the first of April, with the object of causing troops to be detached from Suffolk and other points. Having accomplished his mission, he discontinued the siege of Little Washington on the fifteenth, and despatched his troops to Suffolk.

Longstreet himself may have joined Lee and Jackson at the crisis of Chancellorsville, or soon after, although his servants and horses fell into our hands near Suffolk, on the fourth of May. Doubtless one division, or a portion thereof, succeeded in reaching the Rapidan, in spite of the bold operations of Stoneman.

The relative strength of Hooker and Lee is given by the New York Tribune of March twenty-six, 1864, in an editorial on the "Richmond Campaigns," as follows: Hooker, one hundred and twenty-three thousand fighting men present for duty; Lee, forty-nine thousand seven hundred men.

At this time I do not purpose expressing an opinion respecting the accuracy of the estimates of the Tribune, but it is due the little army I had the honor to command, that I should state that the force opposed to us in front of Suffolk was very heavy, nearly twice my own, for many days, and in the hands of some of the ablest rebel West Pointers; viz., Longstreet, Hill, Hood, Pickett, Garnett, Anderson, French, &c.

The operations about Suffolk, ending May fourth, were suddenly eclipsed in the night of general gloom and painful anxiety which attended General Hooker's disaster at Chancellorsville. Attention was not again awakened upon that field, and the campaign will be imperfectly understood by the public while the official reports remain unpublished. Sincerely yours,

JOHN J. PECK,
Major-General.

DOC. 8.

THE IRON-CLADS AT CHARLESTON.

REPORT OF REAR-ADMIRAL DAHLGREN.

FLAG-STEAMER PHILADELPHIA, OFF MORRIS ISLAND, January 28, 1864.

SIR: Conformably to the wishes of the department, I submit the following review of the services of the monitors while under my command; and as some knowledge of the circumstances under which they have been tested may afford a better appreciation of their qualities, I shall briefly narrate some of the leading events in which they have participated during the operations at this place.

On the sixth July Rear-Admiral Dupont delivered to me the command of the naval forces occupying the coast of South Carolina, Georgia, and part of Florida. They embraced seventy (70) vessels of all classes, and were distributed at various points along an extent of more than three hundred miles. There was no concentration, the purpose being rather to distribute the vessels in order to enforce an efficient blockade.

Of the iron-clads, the Ironsides was off Charleston bar, two monitors were at Edisto, one at Stono, three at Port Royal, and one at Ossabaw.

The orders of the department (June twenty-four, 1863) only directed me to assume the command; they went no further, nor was there need that they should. There was an enemy in front, and it was my duty to compel him to obedience, so far as my means permitted. On the day that I arrived, an interview occurred with General Gillmore, in which the details for a descent on Morris Island were arranged to commence on the Wednesday following, but which were postponed first to Thursday, and then to Friday, in order to allow General Gillmore to perfect his arrangements.

In the absence of specific instructions, I was obliged to assume the responsibility of action, which the department was advised of.

The naval part of the operations consisted of, —

1. In assembling the iron-clads at the Charleston bar, so as to cross at early daylight on the day named, to cover the attack of the troops, to prevent the arrival of reënforcements during that attack, and to engage the rebel batteries, particularly Fort Wagner.

2. To furnish a convoy for the column that was to ascend to Stono, cover its landing, and shell James's Island.

3. To guard the depots of the army at Hilton Head and at Seabrook during the withdrawal of the troops concentrated on Folly Island. I should here state that Mr. Ericsson had decided to increase the thicknesses of the pilot-houses of all the monitors, and add heavy circles of metal to the bases of the turrets and pilot-houses.

The three at Port Royal were already in hand for this purpose, and some progress had been made. A part of my preparation consisted in putting a stop to the work, and having the vessels fitted temporarily for service.

This was effected in season, and before daylight of the ninth of July the monitors were off the bar, ready to pass in at the first sign of movement by the United States batteries on Folly Island.

The plan was to open from the masked batteries on the north end of Folly Island, cross the bar with the monitors, and enfilade the rebel position on the eminences of Morris Island, while the troops were to cross the narrow inlet which divides Morris Island from Folly Island when the proper moment arrived.

The obscurity of the night still rested on land and sea when I went on board the Catskill, (July tenth,). and not a symptom of preparation on shore was visible to us.

It was important that the monitors should not by their appearance give any intimation of what was meditated by being seen on the bar until the details ashore were completed; so I waited the first fire of the batteries. This was not long coming, and I led with my flag in the Catskill, followed by Captains Fairfax, Downes, and Colhoun, in the Montauk, Nahant, and Weehawken. Steering for the wreck of the Keokuk, and passing it, the monitors were laid in line about parallel to the land, opposite the southern eminences of Morris Island, and poured in a steady fire among the rebel garrison, who were there posted, making a feeble and ineffectual return to the storm of shot and shell that came upon their front and flank. I could see plainly the great confusion into which they were thrown by this sudden and overwhelming onslaught. It was a complete surprise, both as to time and to power developed.

The monitors were run in as close as the shoal waters permitted, so that the shells from our own batteries on Folly Island passed close ahead of and at times over some of them.

About eight o'clock a body of men were seen coming over the low sand beach of Morris Island, and while hesitating whether to treat them to some

volleys of grape, the sight of the Union flag* told who they were. They composed the brigade which had been brought from the Folly River by the boats of the squadron, under Lieutenant-Commander Bunce and Lieutenant Mackenzie.

I paused for a moment to observe the gradual accumulation of our men in masses, and their advancing movement; then pushed forward to accelerate with our enfilading fire the retreat of the rebels.

The sight was now of great interest. Our own troops could be seen taking possession of the sand hills where the enemy had rested the sole defence of this end of the island, while some battalions were moving along the beach. The defeated rebels were hurriedly making way along the low, flat land north of their position, and some two or three detached dwellings were in flames, while the monitors skirting the shore maintained a steady fire on the retreat. Presently they reached Fort Wagner; and here we were advised that our advance was checked, at least for the day, though it was but nine o'clock. The discomfited rebels were safe in the work, and our own men halted at a reasonable distance from it.

The monitor with my flag was now anchored as near the beach as the depth of water permitted, (twelve hundred yards,) and the other monitors in line to the southward. A steady fire was begun about half past nine, — the fort replying briskly, — and maintained through the day, except the dinner hour, until six in the evening; then I retired and anchored lower down.

Next morning before six o'clock the Flag-Lieutenant reported to me that an assault had been made at daybreak by our troops and failed, and about nine o'clock I had a note in pencil from the General, saying, "We attempted to carry Fort Wagner by assault this morning, and reached the parapet; but the men recoiled and fell back with slight loss."

It is known *now* that reënforcements had been hurried to the island by the rebels, and had entered the work about midnight.

I had no notice whatever of the General's intent, and could, therefore, render no aid in time.

Here ended the first part of the enterprise against Morris Island. It had been in all respects a surprise, and so complete that the rebels do not seem to have had any idea of it until the day before; and it is not certain they were then aware of the scale on which it was to be conducted.

Had a work like Wagner crowned the sand hills of the south end, we could not have established our position on the island — even a surprise would probably have been out of the question. But there were to be no more surprises — the undertaking was to be completed only by hard work patiently endured in the trenches, and by batteries ashore and afloat.

The General now decided to make a second assault in force, and to cover it by some light batteries established at distances varying from one thousand to seventeen hundred yards.

* The first planted on Morris Island by Lieutenant Rob-

While the preparations for this design were going on, the monitors were daily at work to occupy the attention of Wagner and keep down its fire — the gunboats assisting at long range.

On the eighteenth July, all being ready, about noon I led up in the Montauk, followed by four monitors and the Ironsides, anchored at twelve hundred yards, as near as the state of the tide would permit, and opened fire — the gunboats firing at a greater distance, and the shore batteries also in action.

As the tide rose the Montauk gradually closed in, until at seven o'clock she was about three hundred yards from Wagner, when I ordered grape to be used. Unable to endure the fire of the vessels, the guns of the fort were now silent, and not a man was to be seen.

About sunset a note in pencil from General Gillmore announced his intention to assault; but it was quite dark before the column reached the work. The fire of the vessels was continued so long as it was safe for our own men ashore, but ceased when the darkness made it impossible to distinguish friend from foe. The rattle of musketry soon made known the commencement of the assault, and continued with little intermission until half past nine, when it ceased; and then came the painful tidings of our defeat.

This was the end of the second part of the operation, and proved that the work was too strong and too pertinaciously defended to be taken by any off-hand blow. The slow and laborious operation by trench and cannon only was capable of reducing it.

And here I may remark, that in this necessity is to be found a principal cause for the delay in reaching Charleston that subsequently ensued. It was, no doubt, unavoidable, for it is to be presumed that no more troops could *then* be spared from the main armies. If there had been sufficient to make such an assault as would have overpowered all opposition, Wagner might have been carried at the first assault, Gregg would have yielded immediately, Sumter would soon have followed as a matter of course, and the iron-clads, untouched by severe and continued battering, would have been in condition to come quickly in contact with the then imperfect interior defences.

The rebel movements clearly indicate that they admitted the impracticability of defending Morris Island, and consequently Sumter, after our position on it was fully established and covered by the iron-clads. They only sought to hold the island long enough to replace Sumter by an interior position; hence, every day of defence by Wagner was vital to that of Charleston.

This policy was successful for two months, (tenth July to seventh September,) and gave time to convert Fort Johnson from a forlorn old fort into a powerful earthwork — improved by the experiences of Wagner. Moultrie received similar advantages, and most of the cannon of Sumter were divided between Johnson and Moultrie. Batteries were established along the south shore of the channel from Johnson towards the city;

and thus an interior defence was completed which, though it separated more widely the salient and principal works of the defence, by substituting Johnson for Sumter, yet rendered access to the upper harbor far more difficult, because a more powerful fire was concentrated from additional batteries upon vessels attempting to enter.

And thus it was that, even after Morris Island was evacuated and Sumter dismantled, the fleet must still pass the fire of Moultrie and Bee to find itself in presence of a formidable earthwork, supported by continuous batteries, and commanding obstructions more difficult than any between Sumter and Moultrie.

The real nature of these obstructions was not suspected until the winter freshets had broken away and floated into our hands a fair specimen of them, which were certainly far more formidable than had been anticipated.

So well do the rebels keep their counsel that the best informed refugees, who had been constantly engaged about the harbor, appeared to know as little about them as we did.

During the progress of the engineers towards Wagner the iron-clads played an important part, using their guns whenever an opportunity offered, as shown in the instances quoted. It may be readily conceived that, all things being equal, it was just as easy for the rebels to have worked towards our position as it was for our troops to work towards theirs. But there was a serious difference in the fact that the cannon of the iron-clads, and also of the gunboats, completely enfiladed the entire width of the narrow island, and absolutely interdicted any operation of the kind on the part of the rebels. In addition, whenever their fire was bearing severely on our own workmen, a request from the General always drew the fire of the vessels; and I do not know that it failed to be effective in any instance.

As a consequence the rebels were restricted to Wagner, and were powerless to hinder the progress of the trenches that were at last carried into the very ditch of the work, and decided its evacuation without assault.

The day before the contemplated assault, I led in the iron-clads in force, as agreed on, and battered the fort all day, tearing it into a sand heap.

The next morning it was to have been stormed, but the enemy had fled: they foresaw the inevitable result.

The vessels thus shared fully with the army in the operation that led to the abandonment of the works on Morris Island, and besides what is already mentioned, prevented the access of reenforcements, or their accumulation between Wagner and Gregg.

The boats of the squadron were also engaged on picket duty by night along the sea shore of Morris Island, and the little stream on its inner border.

A detachment of seamen and marines, under Captain Parker, participated in the practice of the batteries at Fort Sumter, by working four navy rifle cannons, landed for the purpose.

The duties of the iron-clads were not performed under idle batteries. The guns of Wagner never failed to open on them, and fired until their crews were driven, by those of our iron-clads, to take shelter in the bomb-proofs. One of these cannon, a ten-inch, left deep dents on every turret, that will not easily be effaced.

The operations of the iron-clads against Morris Island were appropriately closed by a severe contest with Fort Moultrie, Batteries Bee, Beauregard, &c., to relieve the Weehawken, which had grounded under their fire, and was finally got off with some severe injuries, owing to the falling tide having exposed the hull under the overhang.

There were other occasions when severe conflicts occurred with the rebel works on Sullivan's Island.

And besides the principal attacks in force, there were few days from the first attack on Morris Island (July ten) to its evacuation (September seven) that some iron-clads or gunboats were not engaged in firing at the enemy's works, so as to facilitate the labor of our troops ashore, as will be perceived by the following sample from the record:

Date.	Object.	Vessels Engaged.
1863.		
July 18	Assault on Wagner	Montauk, (flag,) Ironsides, Catskill, Nantucket, Weehawken, Patapsco; gunboats Paul Jones, Ottawa, Seneca, Chippewa, Wissahickon.
July 22	Wagner	Nantucket, Ottawa, (gunboat.)
July 23	Wagner, to cover advance	Weehawken, (flag,) Ironsides, Catskill, Montauk, Patapsco, Nantucket; gunboats Paul Jones, Seneca, Ottawa, Dai-Ching.
July 25	Wagner	Gunboats Ottawa, Dai-Ching, Paul Jones.
July 28	Wagner	Weehawken, Catskill, Ottawa, (gunboat.)
July 29	Wagner	Ironsides, Patapsco.
July 30	Wagner	Ironsides, Catskill, Patapsco, Ottawa, (gunboat.)
July 31	Rebel batteries on Morris Island	Ottawa, (gunboat.)
Aug. 1	Wagner	Montauk, Patapsco, Catskill, Weehawken, Passaic, Nahant, Marblehead, (gunboat.)
Aug. 2	Wagner	Ottawa, Marblehead, (gunboats.)
Aug. 4	Wagner	Montauk, Marblehead, (gunboats.)
Aug. 6	Wagner	Marblehead, (gunboat.)
Aug. 8	Wagner	Ottawa, Marblehead, Mahaska, (gunboats.)
Aug. 11	Wagner and vicinity	Patapsco, Catskill.
Aug. 13	Rebel batteries on Morris Island	Gunboats Dai-Ching, Ottawa, Mahaska, Wissahickon, Racer.
Aug. 14	Rebel batteries on Morris Island	Gunboats Wissahickon, Mahaska, Ottawa, Dai-Ching, Racer, Dan. Smith.

Date.	Object.	Vessels Engaged.
1863.		
Aug. 15	Wagner	Mortar-boats Racer, Dan. Smith.
Aug. 17	Rebel batteries on Morris Island, to direct fire from our batteries which opened on Sumter	Weehawken, Ironsides, Montauk, Nahant, Catskill, Passaic, Patapsco; gunboats Canandaigua, Mahaska, Ottawa, Cimarron, Wissahickon, Dai-Ching, Lodona.
Aug. 18	Wagner, to prevent assault	Ironsides, Passaic, Weehawken; gunboats Wissahickon, Mahaska, Dai-Ching, Ottawa, Lodona.
Aug. 19	Wagner	Ironsides.
Aug. 20	Rebel batteries on Morris Island	Ironsides; gunboats Mahaska, Ottawa, Dai-Ching, Lodona.
Aug. 21	Sumter and Wagner	Ironsides, Patapsco; gunboats Mahaska, Dai-Ching.
Aug. 22	Wagner	Weehawken, Ironsides; gunboat Montauk.
Aug. 23	Sumter	Weehawken, Montauk, Passaic, Patapsco, Nahant.
Sept. 1	Sumter and obstructions	Weehawken, Montauk, Passaic, Patapsco, Nahant, Lehigh.
Sept. 5	Between Sumter and Gregg	Lehigh, Nahant.
Sept. 6	Wagner and Gregg	Ironsides, Weehawken, Montauk, Passaic, Patapsco, Nahant, Lehigh.
Sept. 7	Batteries on Sullivan's Island	Ironsides, Patapsco, Lehigh, Nahant, Montauk Weehawken, (ashore.)
Sept. 8	Batteries on Sullivan's Island	Ironsides, Patapsco, Lehigh, Nahant, Montauk, Weehawken, (ashore.)

I shall now briefly comment on the various qualities of the monitors.

1st. Capacity for resistance.
2d. Power of ordnance.
3d. Draught of water.
4th. Speed.
5th. Number of crew.

1st. *Endurance.*—During the operations against Morris Island the nine iron-clads fired eight thousand projectiles, and received eight hundred and eighty-two (882) hits. Including the service at Sumter in April and the Ogeechee, the total number was eleven hundred and ninety-four, (1194), distributed as follows:

Service of Iron-clads. South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. Shots fired and Hits received by them during Operations against Morris Island.

Vessels.	No. of Shots Fired.		Hits.	Hits, April 7, 1863.	Hits at Ogeechee.	Total Hits.
	15-in.	11-in.				
Catskill	138	425	86	20	....	106
Montauk	301	478	154	14	46	214
Lehigh	41	28	36	....	....	36
Passaic	119	107	90	35	9	134
Nahant	170	276	69	36	....	105
Patapsco	178	230	96	47	1	144
Weehawken	264	633	134	53	....	187
Nantucket	44	155	53	51	....	104
Ironsides	....	4,439	164	....	....	164
Total,	1,255	6,771	882	256	56	1,194

	No. of shots fired.	Weight of proj. fired, in tons.
By Ironsides	4,439	288½
11-inch, by Monitors	2,332	151¼
15-inch, by Monitors	1,255	213¾
Total	8,026	653½

Of the eight monitors, one was always absent at Warsaw (Nahant or Nantucket) to blockade the rebel ram. The Lehigh did not arrive until August thirtieth, therefore was only able to participate in the operations of the remaining seven days, but did good work.

For some time only five monitors were available for general attack, and then six, which was the greatest number disposable at any one time.

The consequences of the protracted firing and hard usage to which the monitors were exposed ·se two months of incessant service, were unavoidably very considerable in the aggregate; and the greater, also, that all repair which could possibly be dispensed with was postponed to the conclusion. It was therefore necessarily extensive when entered upon. The battering received was without precedent. The Montauk had been struck two hundred and fourteen (214) times; the Weehawken one hundred and eighty-seven (187) times, and almost entirely by ten-inch shot. What vessels have ever been subjected to such a test?

It is not surprising that they should need con-

siderable repair after sustaining such severe pounding for so long a time, but only that they could be restored at all to serviceable condition. The force of the ten-inch shot must be experienced to be appreciated. Any one in contact with the part of the turret struck falls senseless, and I have been nearly shaken off my feet in the pilot-house when engaging Moultrie.

All the little defects of detail were marked by such a searching process. Decks were cut through; cannon were worn out; side armor shaken; tops of pilot-houses crushed, &c. But all these were reparable, and no vital principle was seriously touched.

With such workshops and means as a northern navy yard includes, the repair of all monitors would have been speedily executed; but when machinery, tools, labor, and material have all to be obtained, as they were here, from a great distance, there was of necessity considerable delay; and, moreover, it was not admissible to withdraw but a portion of the monitors at a time from the blockade.

The additions that were deemed advisable for strengthening the pilot-houses and turrets were also put on at this time, and the bottoms cleaned, for they had now become so foul with oysters and grass that the speed was reduced to three, or three and a half knots, and, with the strong tide of this harbor, added considerably to the difficulties of working the vessels properly under fire.

On one night I was caught by heavy weather from the south-east while close up to Sumter, when I had gone to attack it, and it was well that the darkness of the night prevented the slowness of our motion from being perceived while extricating the monitors from their position.

Power of Ordnance. — Each turret contains two guns, and from the peculiar facility which it has for giving direction to the heaviest ordnance, no doubt, arises the desire to make these of the heaviest description. How far other considerations should control the character of the ordnance, is necessarily an unsettled question.

To strike an armored ship it may be best to use a gun capable of the greatest power; but whether this shall be derived from a projectile of great weight, driven by low velocity, or of less weight, and high velocity; whether it shall be a fifteen-inch gun, fired with thirty-five or forty pounds, or a thirteen-inch, fired with fifty pounds of powder, is not here material; the weight of the gun for either purpose will not vary to any important degree. But in operations against earthworks, whose material cannot be damaged permanently, but only disturbed, and which are only to be dealt with by keeping down their fire, a much lighter projectile would be preferable, in order that the practice may be as rapid as possible. Hence a piece of sixteen thousand pounds for ten-inch or eleven-inch shot and shell.

When a number of monitors are brought together it would be better, also, to have guns of like kind in each turret, and bring into action whichever might be preferable. Each of the monitors of this squadron had a fifteen-inch and a smaller gun, (eleven-inch or eight-inch rifle,) and hence the rapidity of fire, which was most desirable, was not attained. That this was due to the calibre of the gun, and not to its being located in a turret, may be shown by one notable instance.

November ninth, 1863, the Montauk, Captain Davis, was engaged in battering Sumter. In so doing, the eleven-inch gun fired twenty-five shells successively in one hour, of which twenty-one hit the wall of the fort aimed at — distance sixteen hundred yards. This is at the rate of one shell in 2.4 minutes, which is not only rapid but also exceedingly accurate practice. There is no reason why another eleven-inch, if placed in the adjoining carriage, (instead of the fifteen-inch,) could not have been fired in the same time, at which rate that monitor would have delivered an eleven-inch shell every 1.2 minute.

The rates of fire reported for the Ironsides, by Captain Rowan, are,

	Time. H. M.	No. fired.	Time for each fire. M.
Most rapid,	0 50	25	1.74
Continuous,	2 55	490	2.86
Assumed,	1 00	360	1.33
Montauk,	1 00	25	2.40

It will be perceived that for a short space of time the frigate delivered a shell from each gun in 1.74 minute, for three hours in 2.86 minutes, and it is believed that a fire could be sustained at the rate of 1.33 minute. The last rate is therefore possible, but I am sure it would be difficult to sustain it long with much regard to good aim and considerable distances; and I believe, on the whole, that for every practical purpose there would be all desirable rapidity of fire from the eleven-inch in turret. Thus it is to be presumed that there will be equality of ordnance power in the same number of eleven-inch guns as to rapidity of fire, whether in a turret or broadside.

Draught of Water. — The monitors of the Passaic class draw about eleven and a half (11½) feet of water when properly trimmed. On this coast ten and eleven feet is the most convenient draught of water for penetrating all the principal sounds and rivers, and navigating them to any extent. A greater draught restricts a vessel in movement, and in many instances excludes her from several ports, except under very favorable circumstances.

Speed. — The speed of the monitors is not great, (seven knots,) but it is quite respectable with a clean bottom, and is fully equal to that of the Ironsides. Their steerage is peculiar, but when understood and rightfully managed, not difficult of control. They pivot with celerity and in less space than almost any other class of vessel.

Number of Men. — The number of men required to work them and the guns is only eighty, which is very moderate.

In common with all iron-clads, the scope of vision is much restricted, for the plain reason that in such vessels apertures of any size must be avoided. There are some other defects, but they are not inherent, and it is believed are susceptible of

being remedied wholly or in part. So much for the monitors.

The Ironsides is a fine, powerful ship. Her armor has stood heavy battering very well, and her broadside of seven eleven-inch guns and one eight-inch rifle has always told with signal effect when opened on the enemy. Draught of water about fifteen and one-half to sixteen feet. Speed six to seven knots, and crew about four hundred and forty men.

The defects of the vessel are the unplated ends, which are consequently easily damaged by a raking fire, and involve the rudder and screw more or less, while she can return no fire in either direction. This was particularly and frequently inconvenient in attacking the works on Morris Island, for at certain stages of the tide vessels tail nearly across the channel, and present bow and stern to the beach of Morris Island, so that sometimes it was necessary to delay placing the vessel in position, and at others she would swing around very awkwardly when engaged.

The monitors, on the other hand, were almost equally well defended on all sides, and could fire in any direction. The Ironsides was also open to descending shot, and her scope of fire too much restricted by badly placed ports.

The desire for comparison which rages just now can easily be satisfied by bringing the above data in juxtaposition.

Just as they are, the Ironsides is capable of a more rapid and concentrated fire, which, under the circumstances, made her guns more effective than the fifteen-inch of the monitors. On the other hand, she was restricted by draught to the mid-channel, was very vulnerable to a raking fire, and the direction of her own guns was very limited laterally.

The monitors could operate in most of the channels, — could direct their fire around the whole circle, — and were almost equally well defended on all sides.

The defects in both classes of vessels are susceptible of being remedied partially or entirely. The defence of the Ironsides could be made complete, and that of the monitors equally to. The armament of the monitors could be perfected so as to give all desirable rapidity of fire, but by no contrivance could the Ironsides be enabled to use much heavier guns than those mounted. Yet when such changes were made as experience has suggested, there still would remain to the monitors the lighter draught, choice of guns from the heaviest to the lightest, defensibility, and direction of fire around the whole circle; consequently the ability to carry a heavy battery into the least depth of water, with equal power of offence and defence in any direction, and that with half the number of guns carried in broadside by another vessel.

The comparison now made is to be understood as having relation to existing circumstances, and not at all intended as conclusive in regard to the general merits of iron-clads.

It is in this sense that the action of the navy department is to be considered with reference to the selection of one class of vessels over another.

It is evident that it was not designed to adopt any one style exclusively, for of the three vessels first ordered, two were of the ordinary broadside class — the Ironsides and the Galena. The latter was quickly proved to be absolutely inefficient, and so must any armored steamer of that size. It is universally admitted that plates of less than four and a half (4½) inches cannot stand the shock of heavy projectiles, and vessels so armored must be of considerable tonnage.

I presume the department only intended to build such vessels as were best adapted to the service at the scene of war.

Keeping in view the peculiar exigencies of the case, which required light draught and great ordnance power, it appears that the selection of the department could not have been more judicious in preferring a number of monitors to operate from a heavy frigate as a base; and if the intent of the department could have been carried out in regard to numbers, we should now have been in entire possession of the coast from the capes of Virginia to New Orleans, including Wilmington, Charleston, Mobile, &c.

Many defects of both classes are easily remediable, but some of those in the monitors could only be determined by the test of battle; before that, approximation only was possible.

What other style of vessel could the department have chosen? Certainly none that has been built by English or French naval authorities. The Warrior and her class are exceedingly powerful, but could not get within gunshot here.*

On the other hand, there is very little navigable water on this coast which is not accessible to the monitors. They command supremely all that is near the shore, and cannot themselves be reached by vessels of heavier draught. So that when there was some reason to apprehend the appearance of certain rams in this quarter, I assured the department that the iron-clads could maintain position so long as coal and provisions lasted.

It may appear that I speak too positively on the subject, but some experience with them certainly gives a right to do so. With a single exception I have been on board a monitor in all the principal actions, and the recurrence of casualties to the fleet captains † near me shows that I was in a situation to judge. I was once in the Ironsides in an attack on Moultrie and Sumter. I have also watched the behavior of the monitors at anchor through all the phases of winter weather in this exposed situation.

The completeness with which four little monitors, supported by an iron-clad frigate, have closed this port, is well worth noting.

Very soon after entering the roads I advanced one monitor well up towards the inner debouches

* According to Rear-Admiral Paris, the French Gloria draws 28 feet; the British Warrior, 26 feet; the Black Prince, 23½ feet; even those of inferior class, Defence and Resistance, draw 24 feet. Not one of these vessels could cross the Charleston bar, and would be perfectly impotent to render the least service in any of the operations now being carried on.

† Captain George W. Rodgers was next ahead when killed off Wagner, and his successor, Captain Badger, had his leg broken by an iron splinter in the attack on Sumter.

of the northern channels, supported by another. On the night of the nineteenth of July an English steamer attempted to run in, and having eluded the hot pursuit of the outside blockade, no doubt indulged in the belief that all danger was past. But the gallant Captain Rodgers was in advance that night with the Catskill, and a shell sent suddenly by him ahead of the culprit steamer signified no escape. In despair or alarm the latter grounded on a shoal, and her wreck has since served as a warning to like evil-doers. Two or three steamers that were in managed to get out immediately after, and one or two may have gotten in, for the crews of the monitors were often too fatigued then with a day's battle to keep watch at night; but there ended the business as such, and for several months not a vessel has passed in or out.

These four monitors, who thus keep watch and ward, muster eight (8) guns and three hundred and twenty (320) men, which is almost insignificant in contrast with the work done.

I have thus put on paper the general impressions now uppermost, but very hastily and under great pressure of business, which will, I hope, excuse such imperfections as may have inadvertently occurred.

With more leisure I could do full justice to this interesting subject.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, JNO. A. DAHLGREN,
Rear-Admiral, commanding S. A. B. Squadron.
Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Sec. of Navy, Washington, D. C.

ADDITIONAL REPORT.

FLAG-STEAMER PHILADELPHIA,
OFF MORRIS ISLAND, May 17, 1864.

SIR: I find that several omissions have occurred in my report to you on the iron-clads; they are handed to me just as the mail closes, and I have time only to request that they may be inserted in the report of January twenty-eighth, among the lists of actions then given, and also published in the Army and Navy Journal, which has published that report.

As my object was to show what the navy had done in this quarter, I am very glad to be able to extend the list. The loss of three fleet captains in succession — Captain Rodgers, killed in the Catskill, Captain Badger, wounded in an action with Moultrie, and Lieutenant Preston, taken prisoner in the assault on Sumter — necessarily deranged all the business of my command very much. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, JOHN A. DAHLGREN,
Rear-Admiral, commanding S. A. B. Squadron.
Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

Additional List of Actions in which the Iron-clads were engaged with the Rebel Batteries in Charleston Harbor while reducing Morris Island.

DATE.	NAME.	ROUNDS FIRED.	HITS BY ENEMY.	DISTANCE.	OBJECT.	REMARKS.
1863.				Yards.		
July 18 . .	New Ironsides.	805	4	1,400	Fort Wagner.	
July 20 . .	" "	168	13	1,300	" "	
August 23 .	" "	90	4	. . . .	" "	Ship was under way; distance varied from 1,100 to 1,300 yards.
Sept. 2 . .	" "	41	7	1,000	Fort Gregg. .	Hits from Gregg and Moultre; ship at anchor.
Sept. 2 . .	" "	9	. . . .	1,500	Fort Sumter.	
Sept. 5 . .	" "	488	. . . .	1,300	Fort Wagner.	
Sept. 5 . .	" "	32	1	1,800	Fort Gregg. .	Hit from Gregg.

On July twenty-ninth the Passaic engaged Wagner, and on August thirty-first Moultrie. On September eighth the Passaic, (in a disabled condition,) Patapsco, Weehawken, and Nahant engaged Moultrie.

I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JOHN A. DAHLGREN,
Rear-Admiral, commanding S. A. B. Squadron.

REPORT OF COMMODORE S. C. ROWAN.

UNITED STATES STEAMER NEW IRONSIDES,
OFF MORRIS ISLAND, May 13, 1864.

SIR: In obedience to your order of the twelfth instant, I enclose herewith a tabular statement of various actions of this ship with the rebel fortifications of Charleston harbor, and

Have the honor to be, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
S. C. ROWAN,
Commodore, commanding.
Rear-Admiral JOHN A. DAHLGREN,
Commanding S. A. B. Squadron, Flag-Steamer Philad.

Statement of Firing by the United States Steamer New Ironsides during her several Engagements with the Rebel Fortifications in Charleston Harbor.

Date.	Rounds Fired.	Hits by Enemy.	Distance.	Object.	Remarks.
1863.			Yards.		
July 18	805	4	1,400	Fort Wagner.	At anchor.
" 20	168	13	1,300	" "	" "
" 24	464	5	1,200	" "	" "
" 29	183	2	1,200	" "	" "
" 29	25	....	2,500	Fort Sumter.	50-pounder rifle on spar deck.
" 29	2	....	1,900	" Gregg..	
" 30	329	2	1,800	" "	At anchor.
" 30	1	....	2,250	" Sumter.	50-pounder rifle on spar deck.
Aug. 17	400	31	900	" Wagner.	Most of the hits were from 10-inch guns in Wagne and Gregg. At anchor.
" 17	30	....	1,700	Fort Gregg..	
" 17	2	....	2,700	" Sumter.	50-pounder rifle on spar deck.
" 18	118	....	...	" Wagner.	Under way; distance varied from 1,200 to 1,400 yd
" 19	50	....	1,100	" "	At anchor.
" 20	158	....	1,150	" "	" "
" 20	2	....	3,400	Rebel Steamer	50-pounder rifle on spar deck.
" 21	70	1	1,300	Fort Wagner.	At anchor; hit from Sumter; 11-inch shot, solid
" 22	115	....	...	" "	Under way; distance varied from 1,100 to 1,300 yd
" 23	90	4	...	" "	" " " " " " " "
Sept. 2*	41	7	1,000	" Gregg..	The hits were from Gregg and Moultrie; ship a anchor.
" 2	9	....	1,500	" Sumter.	
" 5	488	....	1,300	" Wagner.	At anchor.
" 5	32	1	1,600	" Gregg..	Hit from Gregg.
" 6	184	....	1,300	" Wagner.	Firing to meridian.
" 6	38	....	1,300	" "	At anchor; firing from meridian to sundown.
" 7†	152	24	1,200	Fort Moultrie	These hits were from Sullivan's Island batteries
" 8	483	70	1,200	" "	at anchor.

* Night attack. † Night attack on Moultrie.

Respectfully submitted,

S. C. Rowan,
Commodore, commanding

REPORT OF LIEUT.-COMMANDER E. SIMPSON.

United States Iron-clad Passaic,
Off Morris Island, S. C., April 21, 1864.

Sir: In the Army and Navy Journal, of the sixteenth instant, there is published a review of the service of the "monitors," by Rear-Admiral J. A. Dahlgren. As this review does not give this vessel credit for the service performed by her, I respectfully ask your attention to the subject, in order that the statement may be corrected at the Navy Department.

On the twenty-ninth of July, 1863, this vessel went into action with Fort Wagner, followed by the Patapsco; the New Ironsides joined in the action also. The presence of the Passaic in this action is not mentioned in the review.

On the thirty-first of August, 1863, the most serious engagement for iron-clads that had taken place to that date occurred between Fort Moultrie on one side, and the monitors Patapsco, Weehawken, Passaic, and Nahant, on the other, the detachment being under command of Commander T. H. Stevens, commanding the Passaic.

The conflicts with Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg, on Morris Island, each using two guns on the water face, were but trifling actions for iron-clads; but every collision with the batteries on Sullivan's Island that has taken place by daylight has been formidable. This action of the thirty-first of August, 1863, was of such a character.

During the action the Passaic grounded about half a mile from Fort Moultrie, and was severel hammered by the fort before she floated off. Thi engagement is not mentioned in the review.

On the eighth of September, 1863, the mos remarkable action between iron-clads and san batteries was fought under command of Com modore S. C. Rowan, between the batteries o Sullivan's Island, on one side, and the Iron sides, Patapsco, Lehigh, Passaic, Montauk, Na hant, and Weehawken, (aground,) on the othe This action, lasting for three hours, terminated i silencing the fire of the batteries on the island.

During this action the Passaic was at the hea of the line, having received an order from th Commodore, as she was going into action, to g well up and engage Battery Bee. In this actio the Passaic was hit in fifty-one new places, whic were easily counted after the action, and I hav no doubt that she was actually struck oftener tha I have reported. Strange as it may seem, th presence of the Passaic in this action is not men tioned in the review.

I feel especially concerned about the omissio in reference to this vessel, on the eighth of Sep tember, in consequence of the great efforts tha were made on board to keep her in an effectiv condition.

This was very difficult to do in consequence o her turret having been jammed on the night o sixth of September, which had caused the spindl and pilot-house to take up motion with the turre thus disabling the steering gear. Ingenious ex

pedients were adopted, (of all of which Rear-Admiral Dahlgren has reports,) and the vessel was carried successfully into action, notwithstanding her disabled condition.

After all these efforts to keep the vessel available, and after having endured the battering of those batteries on Sullivan's Island for three hours, it is most disheartening to find that the presence of the vessel in the action is not mentioned in the review; and I respectfully request, in justice to my own reputation, as well as that of every officer and man on board of this vessel, that you will have this report corrected.

I feel, sir, that the service of this vessel has been underrated. It is patent to all the commanders of iron-clads in the fleet that the Passaic is more battered than any of them, in many cases showing three shot-marks to one; and I ask that justice may be done her by correcting at the Navy Department the errors that I have pointed out in the review of Rear-Admiral Dahlgren.

For further information I enclose a copy of statements of firing made to Rear-Admiral Dahlgren during the past nine months.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. SIMPSON,
Lieutenant-Commander, commanding.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

Statement of Firings by United States Iron-clad Passaic, Lieutenant-Commander E. Simpson.

DATE.	ROUNDS FIRED.	HITS BY ENEMY.	DISTANCE.	OBJECT.	REMARKS.
1863.			Yards.		
July 29	15-inch, 12 shells; 15-inch, 1 shot; 150-pounder, 9 shells; 150-pounder, 1 shot	None . .	1,200	Fort Wagner	Carried away cap square bolt of rifle.
Aug. 9	Rifled 150-pounder, 1 shell . .	None . .	1,200	Battery Gregg	Returning fire of Battery Gregg while on picket duty.
Aug. 15	15-inch, 2 shells; 150-pounder, 2 shells	None . .	1,200	Black Steamer and Battery Gregg . . .	While on picket duty.
Aug. 17	15-inch, 30 shells; 150-pounder, 9 shells	Thirteen	1,200	Fort Wagner and Fort Sumter *	Engaged Wagner in forenoon, then engaged Sumter, and after dinner engaged Wagner again.
Aug. 18	15-inch, 18 shells	Five . .	1,000	Fort Wagner	Several bad hits, deck leading over bread room.
Aug. 23	15-inch, 9 shells; 150-pounder, 1 shell and 9 shot	Five . .	750	Fort Sumter	Shot from Sumter drove in a bolt of ring around wave of turret.
Aug. 31	15-inch, 1 shell; 150-pounder, 9 shells	Nine . .	875	Fort Moultre	Three shots through; one of them over coal-bunkers, 20 inches by 9; the other two causing bad leaks on berth deck. Another bolt driven in from ring around wave of turret.
Sept. 1	15-inch, 20 shells; 150-pounder, 20 shells and 6 chilled shot	Seven . .	1,200 to 600	Fort Sumter . .	No bad hits, but side armor sprung apart 6 inches at the stern, caused by fouling a monitor.
Sept. 6 (A. M.)	15-inch, 6 shells; 150-pounder, 9 shells	None . .	1,100	Covered way between Wagner and Gregg	No reply from the enemy.
Sept. 6 (P. M.)	15-inch, 1 shell; 150-pounder, 1 shell	None . .	. . . .	Obstructions	This firing was done on picket to prevent reënforcements coming to Wagner. In revolving turret the spindle and pilot-house torn up. Motion with the turret; turret, spindle, pilot-house, revolving together.
Sept. 8	15-inch, 19 shells; 150-pounder, 30 shells	Fifty-one	750	Battery Bee, on Sullivan's Island	Three new holes through the deck, and side armor badly injured in several places. Eleven hits on ring around base of turret; one of them at the base caused so much friction on deck plate as to require 34 pounds of steam to revolve the turret. Twenty-nine new hits on turret.
Nov. 16 (A. M.)	15-inch, 3 shells; 150-pounder, 31 shells	Three . .	1,500	Fort Moultrie	Covering the Nahant and Montauk, towing off the Lehigh that was aground.
Nov. 16 (P. M.)	150-pounder, 3 shells	None . .	1,750	Moultrie House . . .	Trying to ignite Moultrie House.
1864. Feb. 2	15-inch, 3 shells; 150-pounder, 68 shells	None . .	2,356	Blockade runner . . .	Blockade runner aground off Fort Moultrie.
Feb. 3	150-pounder, 35 shells	None . .	2,356	Blockade runner . . .	Trying to destroy Blockade runner off Fort Moultrie.

* Distance from Wagner 900 yards, from Sumter 2,000 yards.

Doc. 9.

THE WOMEN OF THE WAR.

B. F. TAYLOR'S LETTER.

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, October 22, 1863.

BEFORE this letter reaches you, the splendid project of the women of the North-west will be blossoming in full beauty. They will have thronged to the city of the Great Lakes "like doves to their windows," their hearts and offerings in their hands; and art, eloquence, and song, the grand pageant, the classic tableau, the exquisite device, the glowing thought, will have been hallowed to the sweet uses of mercy. The lips of the marble images at Mecca were worn away, they say, by the kisses of the pilgrims, but how must the delicate touch of true and loving women smooth and beautify the iron fate of our glorious boys in blue!

Close beside the scene that brightens your city like a carnival, garlanded with flowers and glad with sunshine, I see a shadow strange and sad. I am not sure that the laughing girls, who make a Sharon of the Soldiers' Fair, discern how heavy the borders of that night whence comes the dawn they smile in. I am not sure I can do better than to give an unstudied story of the unseen side of that golden shield of theirs — no silver side, alas! but dark, dull iron. The Ohio, at Louisville, behind you, southward across Kentucky and Tennessee, you look upon a region in the rear of the army of the Cumberland, a breadth of three hundred and eight miles to the spurs of the mountains. That area, once so lovely, is dappled with those shadows strange and sad — the hospitals of the Federal army. At Chattanooga, at Bridgeport, at Stevenson, at Cowan, at Decherd, at Murfreesboro', at Nashville, strown all along the way, are flocks of tents sacred to mercy and the soldiers' sake. I wish I could bring you near enough to see them, that I could lift aside a fold in ward A here, or ward B there; that you may see the pale rows, each man upon his little couch, the white sheet setting close to the poor, thin limbs like the drapery of the grave. It would wonderfully magnify, I think, the work you are doing, my sisters.

I would not take you to the surgeon's quarters when the battle is beginning; when he lays off the green sash and the tinselled coat, and rolls up his sleeves, and spreads wide his cases filled with glittering silver, and makes ready for work. They begin to come in, slowly at first — one man nursing a shattered arm, another borne by his comrades, three in an ambulance, one on a stretcher; then faster and faster, lying here, lying there, waiting each his terrible turn.

The silver steel grows cloudy and lurid; true, right arms are lopped like slips of golden willow; feet that never turned from the foe, forever more without an owner, strew the ground. The knives are busy, the saws play; it's bloody work. Ah, the surgeon, with heart and head, with hand and eye, fit for such a place, is a prince among them! Cool and calm, quick and tender, he feels among the arteries and fingers the tendons as if they were harp-strings. But the cloud thunders and the spiteful rain patters louder and fiercer, and the poor fellows come creeping in broken ranks like corn beaten down with the flails of the storm. "My God," cried a surgeon, as, looking up an instant from his work he saw the mutilated crowds borne in; "my God! are all my boys cut down!" And yet it thundered and rained. A poor fellow writhes, and a smothered moan escapes him. "Be patient, Jack," says the surgeon, cheerfully; "I'll make you all right in a minute." And what a meaning there was in that "all right!" It was a right arm to come off at the elbow, and "Jack" slipped off a ring that clasped one of the poor, useless fingers that were to blend with the earth of Alabama, and put it in his pocket! He was making ready for the "all right." Does "Alabama" mean "here we rest"? If so, how sad yet how glorious have our boys made it,

> "Who sink to rest,
> With all their country's wishes blest!"

Another sits up while the surgeon follows the bullet that had buried itself in his side; it is the work of an instant; no solemn council here; no lingering pause; the surgeon is bathed in patriot blood to the elbows, and the work goes on. An eye lies on a ghastly cheek, and silently the sufferer bides his time. "Well, Charley," says the doctor, (he is dressing a wound as he talks,) "what's the matter?" "O, not much doctor; only a hand off." Not unlike was the answer made to me by a poor fellow at Bridgeport, shattered as a tree is by lightning: "How are you now?" said I. "Bully!" was the reply. You should have heard that word as he spoke it; vulgar as it used to seem, it grew manly and noble, and I never shall hear it again without a thought of the boy on the dusty slope of the Tennessee; the boy — must I say it? — that sleeps the soldier's sleep within a hundred rods of the spot where I found him. And so it is everywhere; not a whimper, not a plaint. Only once did I hear either. An Illinois Lieutenant, as brave a fellow as ever drew a sword, had been shot through and through the thighs, fairly impaled by the bullet — the ugliest wound but one I ever saw. Eight days before he weighed one hundred and sixty pounds. Then, he could not have swung one hundred and twenty clear of the floor. He had just been brought over the mountain, and his wounds were angry with fever; they were lifting him as tender as they could; they let him slip and he fell, perhaps six inches. But it was like a dash from a precipice to him, and he wailed out like a child, tears wet his pale, thin face, and he only said, "My poor child, how will they tell her?" It was only for an instant; his spirit and his frame stiffened up together, and with a half smile he said, "Don't tell anybody, boys, that I made a fool of myself!" The Lieutenant, "sleeps well," and, alas! for the "poor child" — how did they tell her?

A soldier, fairly riddled with bullets, like one of those battle flags of Illinois, lay on a blanket gasping for breath. "Jemmy," said a comrade, and a friend before this cruel war began, with one arm swung in a sling, and who was going home on fur-

lough, "Jemmy, what shall I tell them at home for you?" "Tell them," said he, "that there isn't hardly enough left of me to say 'I,' but — hold down here a minute — tell Kate there is enough of me left to love her till I die." Jemmy got his furlough that night, and left the ranks forever. It seems to me that all true women must envy that girl's fate. Shot away all but his heart, that still beat true, who would not be the dead soldier's bride forever? O, there is nothing anywhere here to make you blush for human weakness: the rebel bullet is not moulded that can kill western manhood.

I want to say here, in a paragraph by itself, that the surgeons should be compelled to report to the women; if they do their duty, they have to perform, in large measure, woman's work. They have to need more than skill and scalpels; they want woman's fortitude, tenderness, and faith. There are the noblest of men among the surgeons in the Army of the Cumberland, who do not halt at the letter of duty, but go on cheerfully to the spirit, and there are — God save the mark! — men among them for whom faithless is the mildest euphemism. I must tell one instance: a "contract surgeon" — if you know what that is — went out on a pleasure ride within the hour — three o'clock — that two hundred sick and wounded men came into his ward. He returned at sunset, and on being reminded of his neglected duty, flippantly replied, "O, I'll do them in half an hour!" What, think you, would "do" him, and do him justice. For one I should be quite content to trust his fate to the verdict of a jury of the loyal women of the North-west, to whom be glory and honor everlasting!

Remember, I am writing only of the days after the battles of the Chickamauga — only of one scene in this tremendous tragedy. I have followed the wounded and the languishing to the surgeon's quarters at the edge of the field, and now comes that journey over the mountain roads to Bridgeport, — that beating every wound with hammers mile after mile. Watch me with the rocking, jolting, lurching train of three hundred ambulances, each with its sore, bruised burden, and tell me which is the more terrible, the whole strong regiment marching into the storm, or the broken mutilated column creeping away to shelter. You can hardly believe that one of all will survive the journey; that the folds of the waiting, empty tents, here and there and yonder, will ever swing back to receive them. Let me paint for you, if I can, one of those shadows, beside your sunshine there, with which I began this letter.

It is a white, dusty ridge in Alabama; tall, slim oaks sprinkle it, and beneath them, in streets with a far-eastern look, stand the tents of those blessed cities of mercy, a field hospital. The sun pours hotly down; a distant drum snarls now and then, as if in a dream; the tinkling concert of a cloud of locusts — the cicada of the south — comes like the dear old sleigh bells chime, from a distant tree. "The loud laugh that tells the vacant mind" is unheard; the familiar sounds of closing doors and children's carol never rises there; the tents swell white and sad and still. Within them lie almost three thousand soldiers, marred with all wounds conceivable, wasted with pain, parched with fever, wearily turning, wearily waiting, to take up the blessed march, Ho! for the North! That is the word, the ever-abiding charmer, that "lingers still behind." It is Stevenson, it is Nashville, it is Louisville, it is home, it is heaven! Alas, for it, how they falter and sleep by the way! And every one of these men was somebody's boy once; had a mother once, a wife, a sister, a sweetheart; "but better is a friend that is near than a brother that is afar off," and there are only two here in person, but how many in heart and work!

You have been thinking, my sisters, where is our work in all these scenes? That snowy roll of linen; that little pillow beneath the sufferer's head; that soft fold across the gashed breast; that cooling drink the rude, stalwart, kind nurse is putting to yonder boy's white lips; that delicacy this poor fellow is just partaking; that dressing-gown, whose broidered hem those long, thin fingers are toying with; the slippers, a world too wide for the thin, faltering feet; the dish of fruit a left hand is slowly working at, his right hand laid upon our Federal altar at Chickamauga, never to be lifted more. Your tree, my sister, bore that fruit; your fingers wrought, your heart conceived. "What do the women say about us boys at home?" asked a poor wreck of a lad as I sat by his side. That brow of his ached, I know, for the touch of a loving hand, and the "sound of a voice that is still." At the moment he asked the question he was turning over a little silken needle-book that one of you laughing girls made some day, and tucked in the corner of a bag, labelled "U. S. Sanitary Commission." On the cover of that book you had wrought the words, playfully perhaps, "My bold soldier boy." I silently pointed to the legend: the reply struck home to his heart and he burst into tears. I assure you they were not bitter tears he shed; and as he wiped them away with a white film of a handkerchief you girls hemmed for him, his question was twice answered, and he was content. His eyelids closed down, his breathings grew regular, he had fallen asleep, and I thought it was the picture of the "Soldier's Dream" over again.

You hear of the mal-appropriation of your gifts; but never fear; one grain may fail, but two will spring up and blossom into forget-me-nots. Your work is everywhere. Go with me to that tent standing apart. It is the dead-house tent. Four boys in their brown blankets, four white wood coffins, four labels, with four names on four still breasts. Two of the four garments the sleepers wear are of linen from your stores, stitched by your fingers. Verily, the Ladies' Soldiers' Aid Societies should be named "Mary," for are they not, like her of old, the "last at the cross, and the earliest at the grave"?

"When can I go home, doctor?" is the question forever shaped by the lips and asked by the eyes as he goes his daily rounds. There was a train of cars at last, — box cars — cattle cars — if you like it better, — drawn up opposite the hospital at nine o'clock, as the four hundred poor

boys, lame, bandaged, supported, carried outright, came over the hill to take the train. It was the wounded brigade, and three of every five wore some token of woman's remembrance — of your loving kindness. It was announced to them on the night before that they were to go at five, and there was no sleep for joy. Some of them had actually watched the night out in the open air, like the Chaldean shepherds, lest by some chance the train should go without them. But they were hopeful and heartful, for they would go by and by. That wounded brigade made my eyes dim as they came; no "pomp and circumstance" now, no martial step, no rustling banners and gleaming arms. I should have been less than human had I not swallowed my heart all day as I thought of that brigade, the grandest body of men I ever saw in my life. Well, the cars were floored with the sick and wounded, and we moved slowly away, and I must tell you that all the way along that weary ride of twenty hours to Nashville, it was the thoughtful gift of woman that kept their hearts up. Not on the field of Chickamauga, not in the woods of Alabama, not on the train in Tennessee could I get out of sight of the Sanitary Commission, the Florence Nightingales of the North-west. I want to describe that ride to-day, but cannot; how they waited hours till a Major-General's swift, commodious car should pass; how they crept along at the rear of everything alive. It is worth a chapter, and it shall have it. And so, my sisters, I have given you a hand's breadth of the shadow which that sunshine of yours has pierced and glorified like the coming of morning. When to the grand eternity of the historic page the scenes amid which we wait and labor have passed, the heart of the world will warm to the women of the North-west; soldierly daring and womanly deeds will be blended together forever; the kiss of the daughters will not stain the sword of the sons; the violet, lily, and laurel will bloom immortal together, and the lost Eden of old will smile once more on the map of the globe. B. F. T.

Doc. 10.

THE SOUTHERN PRISONS.

CHAPLAIN JAMES HARVEY'S ACCOUNT.*

WHOEVER may forget the interests and the glory of our common country, the soldier, whether in the field or in the prison, never forgets it or forgets us. And whoever may forget the loved ones at home, those upon the field and in the prison never forget them. I have heard many prayers in the Libby Prison, and whoever was offering prayer, whether a Chaplain, Captain, Lieutenant, Surgeon, Colonel, or Lieutenant-Colonel, Major or Brigadier-General, (for we had a Brigadier-General there that offered public prayer in the prison,) all the prisoners were willing to hear, and when they invoked the divine blessing for the loved ones at home, in spite of all self-control a tear would gather in their eyes, and there would be tremor in the voice as they remembered those that were far away. As we are here to-night, not in prison, but under the ægis of the stars and stripes, permitted to surround our own firesides and our own altars, should we not remember the brave soldiers? Who would begrudge the small pittance that we give to the Aid Society? We have had some good singing here to-night. I have heard a good deal of singing in Libby Prison; I have heard three hundred, I presume, join in the chorus of "John Brown's soul is marching on." The rebel officers did not like this, and sometimes, when we made them angry, they shut off the supply of water, and then we had none to cook with or to drink. Sometimes when we offended them by singing the Star-Spangled Banner, the Red, White, and Blue, or, "We are coming, Father Abraham, Six Hundred Thousand more," (for we made the prison ring,) they would refuse to bring us up any wood to cook with, and then we had many times to go without our breakfasts; but still we kept up the music.

When a man has been imprisoned it is not an uncommon thing to inquire how he got there, how he happened to be captured, and why he did not make his escape with the rest. I will say to you that I remained behind, when the retreat from Winchester took place, by the orders of Colonel Keffer, the colonel of my regiment, (the One Hundred and Tenth,) and when they had determined to cut their way out, it was the request of the Colonel that I should stay behind and see to gathering up and burying the dead and taking care of the wounded. I may remark here, that having remained behind, I saw a good deal more of the rebels and rebeldom than I otherwise should have done. I can assure you that the rebels came up through Winchester like the locusts of Egypt. They came exceedingly thick. Not less than thirty-five thousand invested the place, and it was told me that they had eighty pieces of cannon in position. How many they really had or used I do not know. These rebels passed through on their way up to Pennsylvania. Our entire loss in killed and wounded was about three hundred. The loss of the rebels in killed and wounded was about one thousand three hundred; so that their loss was over four to our one. After our forces left on Monday morning the rebels came in, and I saw a General ride up to the fort and pull down the stars and stripes and hoist the rebel flag in its place. This was a pretty hard sight to look upon. I was engaged in burying the dead around the town of Winchester, but in spite of all that I was able to do, I presume that some of our men never found a burial, and while the rebels gathered up and took back their wounded to what they called the Louisiana hospital, some three miles upon our right, I do not know of their paying any attention at all to our soldiers around Winchester. Upon our extreme right, where the Twelfth Virginia regiment, and One Hundred and Twenty-third and part of the One Hundred and

* Given in a Lecture at Piqua, Ohio.

Tenth regiment fought on Saturday, some of our men were killed, and I have been told, eaten by swine; and I believe it to be true. After spending three days in connection with our own hospital in gathering up the wounded, I found in the dead room of one of our hospitals five men, who were lying in a state of decomposition. The nurses told me they could not be handled or taken out, as the stench was such that the room could not be entered. I immediately went to an old German, who had furnished us with coffins when our forces had possession of Winchester, and engaged coffins from him, which I carried on my shoulders to the hospital. Those whose business it was to attend to this matter of burial refused to do it, and I had to use my authority, and say that the thing must be done, and that it should be done. I got a detail of our own men from the provost marshal, and we dug graves and buried these men. I worked at Winchester from Monday morning until Saturday afternoon — and this was the first I had seen of the provost marshal, when I had called upon him for a detail of men to dig those graves and bury these men. He ordered me to report to him to-morrow, and then the next day.

On Saturday, when I reported to him, he said there was a charge preferred against me. He then read the charge. The man who preferred the charge was in an adjoining room and I had an interview with him. He said that I had sent his negro girl to Ohio. I told him I had nothing to do with sending his negro girl away. After having some conversation with him, he told me that if I would engage to return that negro girl to him it would be all right. I told him it would be as much an impossibility for me to return the negro girl as to go to Ohio and gather up any other free girl and bring her down and give her to him. I had nothing to do with the matter, and did not know where the girl was, and could not make any such promise. He then informed me that if I did not return his girl he would hold me responsible. I told him that he might do so, but I had nothing to do with his girl, and it was out of my power to return her. The provost marshal then said that my parole was revoked, and he ordered me under arrest; and under a charge of bayonets I was taken before General Early, and was informed that by the laws of some of the Southern states the offence for which I was charged was punishable with death; that men were hung for such offences, and I ought to be. After leaving General Early, under charge of bayonets, I gathered up two blankets and rolled them up, for I had nothing else, my clothing having all been captured. I also took the only Bible that was there. I asked permission of the provost marshal to look among the baggage for my valise, but this permission was refused me. I gathered up my two blankets, and supposed that I was to go into some place of confinement in Winchester; but instead of that, I soon discovered that there was already in line of march out of the town some five or six hundred in number, and with them I was started on my march towards Richmond. The provost marshal told me that my destiny was to be delivered over to the civil authorities to be tried for the offense. I knew what the laws of Virginia were in regard to this matter, and I knew at the same time that there was no truth or honesty, no justice or humanity in the bosom of rebels. I knew that there was nothing for me to expect from them either in the way of justice or humanity. My only hope, then, was in the strong arm of our government. As I had seen thousands upon thousands of Confederates going up into Pennsylvania, I did not know what the result might be. I was considerably gloomy and downcast in my mind. Some of our soldiers and officers were marched out on the road, where they lay down upon the bare ground, and spent the night in a drenching rain, without hardly any blankets or protection. Many were left in the dust and heat for three days before they were taken out, and without blankets, or provisions, or anything to make them comfortable. When they lay down at night they lay down in the dust, and when they rose in the morning they were in the dust, and among this number were twelve or fifteen respectable women whose husbands were serving in the army. They were not camp-followers, but respectable women, and they were crowded into that fort with those three to four thousand men. Such objects of pity I never saw before. There they lay in the dust of a crowded fort, with nothing to protect them, nothing to eat, and nothing to drink, (for the water gave out in the cisterns,) and they were nearly famished for water. I was at the entrance of the fort, before my arrest, when the husbands of these women were marched out. They started out with them, but were driven back at the point of the bayonet into the fort; and though they wept and entreated to be permitted to accompany their husbands, they were kept there, and sent to Richmond in the same gang in which I was sent. I saw these women on the march for Richmond, lying on the bare ground and in the drenching rain. That is the way the Confederates treat our soldiers and our women.

The speaker here related an incident of the daughter of a wealthy merchant in Winchester, who had fallen in love with a Lieutenant in the Eighty-seventh Pennsylvania regiment, and had married him; and after the battle had asked permission to enter the fort to look for her husband, who fortunately had not been captured. Said the commander, "Is your husband in the Federal army? How came he to be there?" "Why," said she, "he was there when I married him." "You," said he, "a high-born Southern lady, marry a Federal soldier! Ain't you ashamed of yourself?" With a look of as much indignation in the countenance as I ever saw in the countenance of any lady in my life, she answered him, "No, sir! I am proud of him." In a short time an ambulance was sent to her father's house, and she was notified that immediately she must get into it and start for Richmond. She could not stay within the rebel lines. She must be sent north. The lady who was proud of her Federal soldier sat down flat in the ambulance, and rode

ninety-two miles to Staunton. I shall never forget, after we left Staunton, the remarks of this lady. At nearly every station that we came to, the rebels crowded upon the platforms to see these monstrous creatures called Yankees. After we commenced our march from Winchester, we reached Staunton, ninety-two miles, in four days. The first loaf of bread we bought we paid two dollars for, and we paid the same price for a little bucketful of milk. At night we had a stick of wood or a stone for a pillow. When we sent rebel prisoners to Martinsburg, twenty-three miles, we sent them in wagons; but here were Lieutenant-Colonels, Captains, Chaplains, and Surgeons marched the whole distance on foot, except when one of the guards got tired of riding, and would let some one ride his horse a short distance. We arrived in Richmond towards night, of a dark, drizzly, damp day, and there we were separated from the ladies who went down with us. The ladies were sent to Castle Thunder, and we were sent to Libby Prison. This Libby Prison stands on the north bank of the James River, on the east side of the city of Richmond, and gets its name from the former owners of the building, "Libby & Son." It was formerly used for a tobacco house. It is a building of about two hundred and fifty feet on the street, and one hundred feet back, and is three stories high. There are nine rooms, all about of a size. I should suppose that in the basement there are an equal number of rooms. There is not a sash nor a glass in a window in that building, with the exception of the one room that has been used for the hospital. I presume our officers who are there to-day, while we are here comfortable in this room, are without either sash or glass in the windows. In the room that I was in, which was one hundred feet long by fifty feet wide, there were fifteen openings for windows, but no sash or glass in any of them.

We were conducted into the office of that building, Captain Turner's room. (By the by, let me say to you, that if ever Captain Turner falls into the hands of any of the Union officers that have been confined in that prison it will be a sad day for him.) He is a man that is entirely devoid of humanity. There is not a good streak in him, from the ends of his toes clear up to the ends of his hair. He has another man under his control who acts as inspector, who is as mean a man as ever the Lord let live anywhere, and, as they say down in Castle Thunder, if the devil does not get him there is no use in having a devil. When we arrived at this office they took us into another room, where the process of searching commenced. They took our gum blankets and all our money, provided we did not hide it. Some of them hid their money, and, by keeping it out of sight, they succeeded in taking it into prison with them. From me they received ninety-one dollars in greenbacks. They gave me a receipt, and stated to us that all our money should be returned to us when we left the prison. But it so happened, as they said, that they got a despatch only an hour before we had to leave, and all our money was in the hands of the quartermaster, and he was at the other end of the town; and, with all the good wishes they had for me, and my fellow-chaplains, and much as they professed to desire the return of the money, it would be impossible to do it. So we came off without the money. [A voice—"I thought they did not like greenbacks."] They are as greedy for greenbacks as a pig is for green corn. I tell you that the guards of the prison would roll up Confederate money, and put little stones in it, so that they could throw it, and we would throw down greenbacks in exchange. They were punished severely if caught at it, but with all their care, and everything they could do to stop it, we could get all the money exchanged that we had; and if we had had ten times as much we could have got it exchanged. As a punishment, they reduced some officers to the ranks, and did all that it was possible to do to stop the circulation of greenbacks; for whenever a Confederate gets greenbacks enough to pay his way out, he is almost sure to desert; and that is one reason why they wish to keep greenbacks away from them.

When we were searched we were sent up stairs, and there I heard one cry I shall never forget, as it rung in my ears: "Fresh fish! fresh fish!" I thought we were to have fine living if we were to have fresh fish every day; but as soon as I got up I found that we were the fresh fish they were talking about. When we entered the prison we were called Milroy's thieves, for they had a terrible spite at Milroy. They said if they had only got him they would have torn him in pieces. Seeing that they had not got Milroy, they must have somebody upon whom to vent their spite. When Colonel Streight was first brought in they vented their spite on him. The Governor of Alabama issued a requisition that Colonel Streight and all his officers should be delivered over to the civil authorities, to be tried by the laws of Alabama, and executed. They endeavored to intimidate them. Well, when we came in they changed their spite from Colonel Streight to Milroy's men. They were all bad men. They must not buy a single thing. We must not buy any coffee, or tea, or sugar, or bread, or anything at all. They were going to put us on the scantiest rations and the strictest discipline. They were very angry towards us. The first scene that I witnessed in Libby Prison made a strong impression upon me. A surgeon, Dr. Pierce, a fine young man that had travelled with me on the march from Winchester down to Staunton, and from Staunton to Libby Prison, and after we had got there, on a hot day in June, sat down in the window and put his head out to breathe the fresh air. The guard on the street, passing by, ordered him to take his head in, but he did not hear him. It was said that the guard repeated the order, but he did not hear him. I heard the crack of a musket, and saw the bullet strike in the sleeper joist, just above Dr. Pierce. By the good providence of God, it barely missed him. I assure you we took care how we put our heads out of the windows after that. At Castle Lightning, opposite to Castle Thunder, a

guard fired upon a soldier at the window, the ball taking effect in the arm, and he was brought to the hospital.

The second scene that I witnessed in Libby Prison, was the selection of Captains Sawyer and Flynn, to be executed in the place of those two that were shot for recruiting within our lines by the order of General Burnside. An order came into our rooms that all the captains should report below, and there was a gay time among them. They said, Now we are going to be paroled, and go home. There was a smile upon every countenance, and we said to one another, don't you wish you was a Captain. I do. I would like to leave this place and go home. Seventy-five captains, with light hearts and happy countenances, passed down stairs into one of the lower rooms. When they got down there, one of the officers came in with an order from General Winder, that from this number, then confined in Libby Prison, two were to be selected by lot to be executed in retaliation for the two that were shot by General Burnside. They stood there around the room in a circle. A box was placed in the centre, and in that box was put the lots. Two of the chaplains in the prison with me came down to witness the drawing of these lots. Old Father Brown, a man whose head is almost as white as snow, Chaplain of the Sixth Maryland regiment, was the man who was to draw the lots. The lots fell upon Captain Flynn and Captain Sawyer: one was from New Jersey and the other from Indiana. I did think then that it was exceedingly singular that as New Jersey and Indiana had been more Butternut than any two other states, that the lot should fall upon them. I thought it something singular, and so it was. I hope these states have since redeemed themselves. The lots were drawn and the captains returned. There was a solemnity upon the countenances of the captains that I never saw upon the countenances of men before. To go into the battle-field, and stand before the cannon's mouth and before musketry, and even to shout in the charge and die upon the battle-field, seems to be something glorious, and men go into it with spirit and with nerve; but to be drawn by lot, and deliberately executed, was something for a brave man to face.

I saw men, who had braved every danger, quail under the idea of being thus selected for execution.

These men have never been executed yet, and they never will. For our government holds General Lee and Captain Winder in their stead, and we say to them, just as you deal with Flynn and Sawyer so we will deal with Lee and Winder.

The third scene that transpired in Libby Prison was in regard to Colonel Powell, who, in an engagement with the rebels, had been shot through the breast, and it was supposed that he would die. The Confederates came upon him where he was lying in his gore, and wanted to butcher him in cold blood. He was sent to Richmond and put into the hospital. He had been in the hospital about two weeks, when the man Turner took him down into the basement of the building, and opened the door of a dark damp cell, and said to him, "Get in there." Colonel Powell said, "Sir, for what am I to be put in there?" Turner said, "God d—n you, get in there! you will know before you get out what you are in there for." He went into the cell, and we got word of it in the upper part of the building, and one of our number got down below, and Colonel Powell got a chance to send a slip of paper to us, saying, "I am here in a cell; I have nothing to read; I have only a few leaves of Matthew, which I have got by heart. I can hear you pray and sing up there in the officers' room. Pray louder and sing louder: I want to hear you." Well, we began to inquire how he came to be in this cell. Finally, we asked General Winder why he was in the cell. The General replied that he did not know why it was, and General Jones knew nothing about it; and said he had given no such order. Our government, after a time, got word of it, and they informed the rebels that unless Colonel Powell was released from that cell, an officer of equal rank would be put in the same condition; and then Colonel Powell came out of the cell, having been put there simply upon Turner's authority, and because he had the power to do it. A truer, better, and nobler man never lived. A better soldier never drew a sword in battle. His regiment is the Second Virginia cavalry. It happened that the whole regiment was recruited in Ohio; but at that time our government had no need of cavalry, but was willing to accept them as a regiment of infantry. They crossed the Ohio and tendered their services to Governor Pierpont, of Virginia, who received them and commissioned the officers, calling them the Second Virginia cavalry, and in this way Ohio loses in the count one thousand two hundred men. I have seen men confined in the dungeon two days, on bread and water, for spitting on the floor of that old tobacco house. I have seen a member of the Eighty-seventh Pennsylvania regiment confined in one of these cells five weeks, until his clothes were mouldy.

In regard to the charge against me. They said there was abundance of evidence against me, but I was suffered to go with the other chaplains, and I never heard much more about the charge. They permitted me to fare as well as the rest of the officers, and to choose the soft side of a plank to sleep on. When a friend came in to see us we could not offer him a chair or a stool; we had to sit on the floor.

Among our number in prison we had one who amused himself in sketching. He would sketch the new-comer in his first observation of the prison; next, as he sat down to meditate on his condition; then, with a rebel paper in his hands reading rebel news; then, disgusted with rebeldom, as he laid himself down to seek some repose. There he lay, stretched on the floor, perhaps without a blanket, and a stick of wood for a pillow. There he lay down to repose. Next he made a discovery, and that was, that there was one of those great graybacks at work, about as big as a large grain of wheat. We understood the gray-

back process pretty well. The Castle Thunder poetry said that the lice were so big that they themselves became lousy.

On the fourth day of July we determined, in Libby Prison, to have a celebration, and by odds and ends and scraps among the officers then in Libby Prison, we gathered together material enough to make a Union flag — the stars and stripes. We had to make it very secretly. We then appointed our committees, and had correspondents, one from one of the Cincinnati papers, and one from the New York Tribune. We had men of talent, and we drew up a set of resolutions, and had everything in readiness in one of the upper rooms, with our flag spread out over us, when up came a rebel surgeon and pulled down our flag, and vetoed everything that we had in progress — and we had to submit to it.

Many ask us what we had to eat in prison. The officers drew a half-ration loaf of bread every day, and three ounces of meat. The officers had meat that was fit to eat, although none of the fattest and best, but it was not of that kind of beeves mentioned in the Castle Thunder poetry, that had to be killed to *save their lives*. We also got a small amount of rice, or some black-eyed beans. The peas were of a curious variety. They were *live peas*. Some of the men did not seem to care; they said it made the soup thicker. For drink we had the pure extract of James River, always warm and never cold, sometimes thick and sometimes thin. The soldiers confined on Belle Island are nearly starved, or fed on tainted meat. If a man has money he can send out and buy a barrel of potatoes for sixteen dollars, a barrel of flour for forty dollars, a pound of sugar for three dollars, a pound of coffee for ten dollars. On Belle Island there are thousands of our men without clothing to keep them warm; for when they go into a battle they sometimes lose their hats, or throw off their coats, and leave their blankets, and many of these men are destitute of sufficient clothing to keep them warm. At night they lie down upon the sand, without any blankets to keep them warm, and nothing but the great canopy of heaven for a covering, and the stars, as it were, for their candle. And there some of our soldiers have been, month after month, without anything under heaven to make them comfortable. You pity the soldiers in our own hospitals — then, my friend, let your pity go to our soldiers on Belle Island. They are there sickening and dying by tens, twenties, and by hundreds. Here before you to-night, and before God, at whose judgment bar I must stand, it is murder for those Confederates to put our men there on that island in that condition, and our government should take some step to relieve those men who are absolutely being murdered in this way.

I saw your townsman, William Hayes, who was on Belle Island, and had been brought from there to the hospital. He told me of his sufferings. Twice he was paroled to be sent north, but he was too weak to go to the depot. Men who are in the hospital are put in an ambulance and taken to the depot; but if they are on Belle Island they must walk. Now this man was twice paroled, but was too weak to walk to the cars and was left behind. Many of our men become so weak that a number of them join together to help one another. William Hayes was brought to the hospital, reduced to a living skeleton, and I obtained permission to visit him, and learned of his trials and sufferings, and received his message to his family. In view of eternity just before him he was cheerful and contented, with the hope and prospect of glory before him. But, my friends, this is only a single instance of the sacrifice that has been made, not only for our country, but as a sacrifice to rebel cruelty. Our boys on that island, instead of good provisions, get mule meat, or tainted meat, that before it was killed was as poor as the turkey that had to lean against the gate post to gobble. Many of those men are absolutely starved, and left without fuel, water, or blankets. There are about eight thousand brave men there, many of them from Ohio, whose sufferings must be terrible. Can you wonder that my sympathies go out for those suffering men, who have become so weak that they can hardly stand upon their feet?

Castle Thunder is north-west from Libby Prison, and is a place where they confine both men and women. Down in one room in Castle Thunder there were three hundred men. This room runs the entire length of the building, and was about one hundred feet long. There was one window in the end of the room, and that was closely cross-barred. There were three hundred men confined in this room, and two of them were in an entirely nude state, without one particle of clothing on their bodies. They had been there two years, and what little clothing they had when they first went in had worn out and gone, shred by shred, until they were in an entirely nude condition. They spent the winter by heating sawdust at the fire, and then, making a bed like pigs, they would get into it, and get those who were clothed to lie around them, to keep them from freezing during the winter.

The floors of the prison were covered with two or three inches of sawdust, and having but one window in the room, only a few could get to it to examine their clothes, and, as a consequence, they became so covered with vermin that the rebels had to take them out into the yard and set their negroes to scrubbing them off.

When the rebels heard that we had prayers in Libby Prison they scouted the idea, and came out in their papers against us, and said that they would just as soon expect that God would hear the cannibals pray as to hear the thieving Yankees; and they wondered at our temerity, and referred me specially to the second chapter of Romans, twenty-first verse, and advised me to read it before I prayed any more. This verse reads, "Thou, therefore, which teachest another, teachest thou not thyself? thou that preachest a man should not steal, dost thou steal?" They thought to be accused of stealing a negro was a great thing; and when they thought they had a special case they wanted to make a special example of it. They forgot how the rebel leaders perjured

themselves with an oath upon them, to supprot the Constitution of United States, and the laws of the United States; how they plotted treason against the government, and had stolen all our arms, robbed the treasury, stolen our ships, forts, and arsenals from the government of the United States, and yet they accused me of stealing, when they were the greatest thieves that ever trod on God's footstool. Men complain of Lincoln tyranny, and they talk of the Lincoln despotism. This has been their hue and cry.

I tell you to-night, my friends, that throughout the length and breadth of the Southern Confederacy the jails and penitentiaries are full to overflowing. There is not room to put the men. If they had tried me by the law of Virginia, and sentenced me to ten years' imprisonment in the penitentiary in Richmond, they would have had to build a room for me. What is true of Richmond is true of the rest of the South. The jails are full of men who love their country and the stars and stripes; men who would not swear by Jeff Davis; who would not take an oath to support the Southern Confederacy; men who prefer to lie in prison and rot, than support such a government as that; and yet with all this, thousands of good Union men are found in the South besides those who have been imprisoned for their loyalty, or murdered in cold blood. You talk about Lincoln despotism! No man ever lost his life under Lincoln tyranny. I wish you knew something about tyranny. I have seen them come into churches, where men were quietly worshipping, and take conscripts out of the church at the point of the bayonet, and force them into the rebel army; take them away from the house of God — take their sons, brothers, husbands, and march them off to camp. That is the way they do down South. They conscript everything there: old men, young men, and boys, into the army, and they all have to go, or go to prison.

Now a word about their pay. These rebel soldiers get eleven dollars per month in Confederate money, and a barrel of potatoes costs sixteen dollars, a barrel of flour forty dollars. How much can these rebel soldiers do towards supporting their families? Their wages amount to about two and a half or three cents per day for their services, and yet, by the tyranny of their government, they are forced from their homes and their families, into the rebel ranks.

Some of the men of this country complain about their heavy taxes, and how much they have got to pay to carry on this war. The rebel is taxed one tenth of all that he may raise to support the government, and if the government should need the balance they compel him to sell it to the government for the price that they see fit to put on it. Thus you see they take one tenth without giving anything, and fix their own price on the balance, and pay for it in Confederate money. Should you ever come under such a tyranny as that, you will then know what tyranny is; but God forbid that you should ever be in the condition of the rebels under the Jeff Davis tyranny; and under this tyranny the rebel soldier, if he goes forward he dies, and if he turns back he dies. Death stares him in the face turn and look which way he will, and the rebel soldier, for want of sufficient food, is pale and haggard, and they look gloomy and disconsolate.

The speaker then referred to the determination of the rebel leaders to push this war to the bitter, bitter end, and to use every means in their power to establish their independence; and he would say that the more we do to raise men and support this administration and sustain the government, the sooner will this rebellion be put down. There is no other way but to fight it through. There is no peace on this continent but in the restoration of the Union and in the suppression of this rebellion.

Let me say in conclusion, that when I again saw the stars and stripes floating in the breeze, it was a blessed sight; and when we were to be delivered to the United States authorities, my heart beat rapidly. I was nervous and excited. I thought that after all something might come up, and that we might have to be marched back to Libby Prison. I did not fully decide the question then whether I would die on the spot or go back.

The speaker then referred to the rebel soldiery, and believed that many of them were not true to the South, and only waited for deliverance from their tyranny; and that all over the South, as soon as our armies advanced in sufficient force, thousands of Union men would rise up and assert their allegiance to the old government.

Among the many incidents related by the speaker, we refer to a single instance of an infidel Surgeon, who said that he had never seen but one passage of Scripture fulfilled in Libby Prison, and that was, "*Seek and ye shall find.*" After we had been in prison for some time, and had been praying for the prison doors to be opened, the Surgeon ridiculed the idea, and said we had been praying a long time that the prison doors might be opened, and that we had got no answer to our prayer; while the prospect was that the surgeons, on account of the great need of their services in the army, would be delivered in preference to chaplains. Yet the prison doors were opened, and the chaplains stepped out, while the surgeons were left behind. I declare to you to-night, my friends, that I believe my deliverance was in answer to the prayers of God's people in my behalf. The speaker urged upon all the value of prayer for the soldiers and the captives, and the necessity of all loyal men doing all in their power to assist in alleviating the sufferings of the soldiers who are fighting the battles of our country.

Doc. 11.

ST. JOHN'S RIVER EXPEDITION.

REPORT OF LIEUT.-COMMANDER BREESE.

UNITED STATES GUNBOAT OTTAWA,
OFF BAY POINT, May 28, 1864.

SIR: In compliance with your instructions of the twenty-second instant, I got under way in

this vessel, with the Columbine in company, and proceeded to Picolata, where I had a consultation with General Gordon on the subject of the expedition. It was arranged that I should take two hundred and seventy troops on board this vessel and one hundred on board the Columbine, and proceed with them opposite to Pilatka, and there land them: the Columbine to retain thirty of hers on board as a guard. The steamer Houghton accompanied us with General Gordon and about three hundred men. At 4.15 P. M. we arrived at Pilatka, where the troops were disembarked, and the Columbine and this vessel proceeded up the river. I sent the Columbine ahead, as she was the faster, and the object was to reach Volusia as soon as possible. The Columbine was protected by fifty sand bags and some bales of hay. I enjoined caution on the Captain, and directed him to make the best of his way to Volusia, and take our troops on board if they were there, and return immediately; and if they had been captured to return at once. The understanding between the General and myself was, that I should go on up as far as the pilot could take the vessel, which I thought would be about Brown's Landing, two or three hundred yards above Dunn's Creek. At 7:20 P. M. of the twenty-second instant I came to anchor off Brown's Landing, about two hundred and fifty yards distant, and just astern of us the Houghton anchored. Not knowing why she came up, I took the dingey and went on board to ascertain, when I was informed that the General thought it best that she should be under the protection of this vessel during the absence of the troops. I had scarcely been told this when I was startled by the report of a field-piece fired at the Ottawa. I immediately jumped into my boat and returned to the ship before she had fired a shot in return; but she was all prepared, and in the act of firing. At 7.50 engaged the enemy, and fired by the flash of their guns; we could distinguish nothing else. The enemy had four field-pieces, of from six to twelve pounders I should judge, and fired shell, grape, and solid shot at us and the Houghton. The firing was quite rapid at first and very accurate, but after the third discharge of the one hundred and fifty-pounder rifle they ceased firing entirely, and retreated I presume.

This vessel was struck by grape thirty-seven times, and received a shell through the smokestack, carrying away also the mainstay; fortunately there were no casualties. The chain was shipped as soon as possible to get the vessel in motion, as we were too good a target for them. The firing was continued on our side until 9.20 P. M., some time after the enemy had ceased, because I was not certain but what he might be lurking somewhere on the banks, and I spread the fire along the river. At 9.45 P. M. anchored off the mouth of Dunn's Creek. At nine A. M., on the twenty-third, got under way and weighed anchor, which had been shipped. The vessel was not again fired upon. The landing would scarcely be noticed, the woods were very dense, and the undergrowth extends to the water's edge. I do not know whether we inflicted any damage upon the enemy or not, but presume we did, or he would not have ceased firing so soon. I did not feel justified in landing a boat, as it would be in the way if fired upon. It is with pleasure I can testify to the spirited and manly conduct of the officers and men.

On the afternoon of the twenty-fourth a messenger arrived from General Gordon, informing me that all had been accomplished by the expedition that could be, and that he wished this vessel to return to Pilatka and embark the troops she had landed there, and that he had sent a messenger to the Columbine to return. I immediately returned to Pilatka, and anchored at 5.20 P. M. I then saw an orderly from General Gordon, informing me that as the Houghton was not there he had concluded to go by land to Orange Mills, and there embark the troops. I remained at anchor all night, with the hope that the Columbine would return, but heard nothing of her. At 11.10 A. M., on the twenty-fourth, anchored at Orange Mills, but found no troops; the General had embarked part of his men on board of the Houghton, and the remainder he had marched across to Picolata. It left me in an awkward position, as the vessel could not float across the flats. I received on board seven stragglers left behind at Pilatka and from Orange Mills, belonging to the One Hundred and Fourty-fourth and One Hundred and Fifty-seventh New York volunteers. On the twenty-eighth instant crossed the flats unassisted, and anchored off Bay Point, agreeably to your order.

Accompanying this is a report of ammunition expended in the engagement with the battery.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. LIVINGSTON BREESE,
Lieutenant-Commander, U. S. N.

Commander GEO. H. BALCH,
Commanding St. John's River Flotilla, Jacksonville, Fla.

DOC. 12.

EXPEDITION TO CUT THE CHARLESTON AND SAVANNAH RAILROAD.

REPORT OF REAR-ADMIRAL DAHLGREN.

FLAG-STEAMER PHILADELPHIA,
PORT ROYAL HARBOR, May 28, 1864.

SIR: Since my last nothing of importance has occurred. The blockade is maintained as well as it can be with the present force.

In the St. John's our positions are undisturbed, attention being given to tracing out the torpedoes which the rebels are so industriously engaged in placing about the channel, and have already resulted in the loss of three transports by the army.

On the twentieth Captain Balch writes to me:

"From information received, by deserters, it is believed that the force immediately in front of Jacksonville has been much reduced; but whether our force here is strong enough to make an advance is somewhat doubtful."

When I returned here, on the twenty-second, from Ossabaw, I found an expedition preparing by General Birney, to ascend a certain stream and sever the railroad.

My coöperation being asked, I directed Lieu-

tenant-Commander Stone to take the McDonough, (Lieutenant-Commander Phythian,) and the Hale, Acting Master C. F. Mitchell, and render whatever aid might be needed. The Dai-Ching, Lieutenant-Commander Chaplin, was to assist as far as circumstances permitted. Two boat howitzers and a detachment of marines were added.

The expedition left this place on Wednesday, and early on Friday the army transports returned.

I was telegraphed that the affair was a failure, with the loss on the part of the army of a fine transport steamer, the Boston, which grounded under fire, and was destroyed to prevent falling into the hands of the rebels; some lives were lost, and about sixty horses were burned.

The Hale and McDonough did not return until the afternoon, not having been informed of the retreat of the troops.

The reports of the commanding naval officers show that the gunboats did the part assigned them satisfactorily, and without loss.

Lieutenant-Commander Stone was senior officer in command; Lieutenant-Commander Chaplin commanded the Dai-Ching; Lieutenant-Commander Phythian commanded the McDonough; and Acting Master Mitchell the E. B. Hale. I enclose the reports of these officers.

Captain Boutelle, of the United States Coast Survey, with his usual zeal, accompanied the gunboats in the Vixen, and skilfully piloted them along the windings of the narrow channel.

I take this opportunity of making my acknowledgments to the eminent head of the Coast Survey, Professor Bache, for the many advantages which I have derived, while in command here, from the accurate surveys executed by his orders. Their scientific and practical excellence have never been surpassed in any country, and have rendered them invaluable in conducting operations in this quarter. I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. A. DAHLGREN,
Rear-Admiral, commanding S. A. B. Squadron.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

INSTRUCTIONS FROM LIEUT.-COM. E. E. STONE.

UNITED STATES STEAMER VIXEN, OFF MOUTH OF SOUTH EDISTO RIVER, S. C., May 25, 1864.

SIR: On the receipt of this order you will immediately prepare to accompany General Birney up the Ashepoo River. Captain Boutelle, U. S. Coast Survey, informs me that you will have no trouble until you arrive at Bennett's Point, at the mouth of the Mosquito Creek, (marked A in the accompanying tracing,) at which point you may find some difficulty in turning, after which you will find the channel on the port hand. The object of your going is to act as a cover and feint.

General Birney will land to-night at the mouth of Mosquito Creek, and take up his line of march on the road towards the Savannah and Charleston Railroad, which it is his intention to cut if possible. You will please communicate with the General, and render every assistance in your power, having due regard to the safety of your ship. When the expedition returns you will resume your station.

I shall proceed up the South Edisto with the Vixen, McDonough, and Hale, and to-morrow morning open on Willstown if I can get near enough; therefore you will understand any heavy firing in that direction.

I send you a tracing of the proposed route and points:

A. Bennett's Point.

B. As far as I think it prudent for you to go.

C. The point at which I propose to land two howitzers and a few marines, in case I cannot get up to Willstown with the vessels.

Proposed route of General Birney.

You will find General Birney on board of the Plato, a small side-wheel steamer.

Hoping you will have a merry time,
I remain respectfully, your obedient servant,
EDWARD E. STONE,
Lieutenant-Commander U. S. Navy.

Lieut.-Com. J. C. CHAPLIN,
U. S. Steamer Dai-Ching.

REPORT OF LIEUT.-COM. E. E. STONE.

UNITED STATES STEAMER CHIPPEWA, PORT ROYAL HARBOR, S. C., May 27, 1864.

SIR: In obedience to your orders of the twenty-fourth instant, I proceeded with the McDonough, Hale, and Vixen, to and up the South Edisto River, as far as Governor Aiken's plantation, on Johossee Island, at which point I landed the marines and two howitzers on field carriages, who were ordered to cross the plantation to a point as near Willstown as they could get. I sent a boat to the point agreed upon with General Birney, with the expectation of communicating with him, but was disappointed, no vidette having been found.

On the morning of the twenty-sixth, at thirty-five minutes past seven, I opened with the howitzers on Willstown, and in the supposed direction of the battery, which we afterwards discovered from the window of one of the mills, but entirely out of range. As soon as the fog lifted, the vessels were ordered up as far as it was deemed prudent to go, and fire opened at half past eleven in the direction of the battery and houses at Willstown, by the rifle guns of the McDonough and Hale. After firing for a couple of hours orders were given for the vessels to return to the previous anchorage, and for the marines and howitzers to fall back to the place of debarkation. I despatched an armed boat through Mosquito Creek to communicate with the Dai-Ching, being anxious to learn the cause of a large fire observed to the westward, and the whereabouts of General Birney. On her return, at three o'clock in the morning of the twenty-seventh, I received the melancholy news of the disaster to the steamer Boston, and that the General had returned to Port Royal; whereupon the marines and howitzers were ordered on board, and at daylight we proceeded down the river, en route for this place, where we arrived this evening. For the details of the loss of the Boston, and the part taken by the Dai-Ching, in compliance with my orders, are fully

set forth in the accompanying report of Lieutenant-Commander Chaplin. Although we did not meet the enemy, I am confident, from the alacrity and cheerfulness with which my orders were obeyed, that the naval portion of the expedition would have brought back a far different account than that which must be told of the army.

Enclosed you will please find a copy of my orders to Lieutenant-Commander Chaplin, and a sketch showing the points occupied and covered by the forces under my command. Hoping I have carried out your instructions to your entire satisfaction, I remain respectfully,

Your obedient servant,
EDWARD E. STONE,
Lieutenant-Commander U. S. Navy.

Rear-Admiral J. A. DAHLGREN,
Commanding S. A. B. Squadron, Port Royal Harbor, S. C.

REPORT OF LIEUT.-COM. J. C. CHAPLIN.

UNITED STATES STEAMER DAI-CHING,
SAINT HELENA SOUND, May 21, 1864.

ADMIRAL: In obedience to orders from Lieutenant-Commander Stone to coöperate with General Birney, in his expedition to cut the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, I have to report as follows:

The transports, with the exception of the Boston, arrived here at half past six P. M., May twenty-fifth. I immediately called on General Birney for instructions, telling him I had no pilot, but thought I could find one on Ash Island. He replied, if I did not find one he would send the Captain of the transport Wyoming to pilot this vessel up in the morning; but in the mean time to send the Wild Cat outside to bring in the Boston. All the steamers proceeded up the Ashepoo, with the exception of the Boardman, which grounded near the mouth of the river. The Boston arrived about this time. I sent Acting Ensign Nelson on board the Boardman to render assistance, as he knew the channel; Mr. Nelson afterwards went on board of the Boston to pilot her to Bennett's Point. On his arrival at Mosquito Creek he informed Colonel Montgomery that that was the place where the landing was to be made. Colonel Montgomery, seeing a steamer standing up the river, said his orders were to follow. Mr. Nelson said he could pilot no farther. The Boston still kept on, and got in shore, under Chapman's battery, about midnight. At daylight, a pilot having been found, I started up the river to carry out my orders; while under way an Aid of General Birney's came on board and informed me of the grounding of the Boston, and the General thought it useless for me to attempt to get up, and to send our pilot and two boats to him. The pilot of this vessel was confident he could carry the ship up with safety; then the Aid said I had better try it, as we could render them valuable assistance in case of danger. I proceeded at once up the river to the point where the Boston was in shore, and on my arrival found the enemy firing briskly on her from the battery, and nearly all of the troops ashore in the marsh, having thrown away their arms and accoutrements, and, in many instances, their clothing. I immediately opened fire from all of our guns, and in a very few minutes silenced the battery. The army gunboat Plato then proceeded to the Boston, we firing occasionally for two hours without a response.

I called on the General again, and asked if I could be of service in getting her off, or saving public property. He replied, "No;" that he had already sent one of the Dai-Ching's boats, with one of his own officers up to set her on fire, and requested me to send another in tow of the Plato; however, before she arrived the vessel was in flames, having on board some sixty horses.

After the rebels got the range, every shot struck the steamer; fortunately none were killed by the fire of the enemy, but some seven or eight were drowned in their *hurried* attempt to get on shore. It was supposed she had been struck seventy or eighty times, one or two shots going through her boiler. The colored troops, being in a position where they could not return the fire, seemed to have been panic-stricken, and Mr. Nelson says it was as much as the officers could do to keep them from crowding into the boats and swamping them.

At eleven A. M. the General started down to Bennett's Point to embark his troops, as the object of the expedition failed. The Dai-Ching followed to cover embarkation. At two P. M., the troops being all on board the transports, they started down the river; we followed, covering the retreat, and anchored off Otter Island at 3.30.

It was the impression of Acting Ensigns Nelson and Sheppard that the Boston could have been gotten off; at all events, the horses might have been saved, as the Plato was alongside of her for some time before she was set on fire, and not a shot fired at them by the rebels.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. C. CHAPLIN,
Lieutenant-Commander.

Rear-Admiral J. A. DAHLGREN,
Commanding S. A. B. Squadron.

DOC. 13.

CAPTURE OF THE STEAMER COLUMBINE.

REPORT OF REAR-ADMIRAL DAHLGREN.

FLAG-SHIP PHILADELPHIA,
PORT ROYAL HARBOR, SOUTH CAROLINA,
May 30, 1864.

SIR: I have just received, by the courtesy of General Foster, the enclosed despatches to him from General Gordon, now commanding the troops at Jacksonville, from which it will be perceived that the Columbine has been captured. The loss will be much felt, because this is one of the few steamers that I have of such light draught. Captain Balch will, no doubt, report the details when he gets them. I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. A. DAHLGREN,
Rear-Admiral, commanding S. A. B. Squadron.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

DESPATCH OF BRIG.-GEN. G. H. GORDON.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF FLORIDA,
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA, May 27, 1864.

CAPTAIN: I have to report that on the night of the twentieth instant I received from Colonel Noble, commanding forces east of St. John's River, information that a force of about fifteen men and one officer had been captured by the enemy, who had crossed the river and surprised the post. On the morning of the twenty-first I advanced Colonel Noble a communication, in which I ordered him to withdraw his guards from the river opposite Volusia and Saunders. On the night of the twenty-first I received another communication from Colonel Noble stating that a force less in number than that at Welaka had been captured; that the enemy, reported to be four hundred (400) strong, were said to be pushing northward on the east side of the river. I received the last communication at about eleven at night. In an hour I started for the nearest point to that threatened. I carried with me in the steamer Charles Houghton two hundred (200) men from this garrison. At my request Captain Balch ordered two gunboats to accompany me, the Ottawa and little steam-tug Columbine. At Picolata I added to my force six (6) companies of Colonel Beecher's regiment, and all the available force of the One Hundred and Fifty-seventh New York regiment, numbering in all about six hundred and fifty (650) or seven hundred (700) men. I was obliged to use the naval boats, as well as the Houghton, to transport the troops. On Sunday, the twenty-second instant, I arrived at the landing opposite Pilatka. My movements had been slightly delayed by time expended at Picolata in filling sand bags (no cotton or hay bales, save one of the latter, being available) to render the little tug Columbine less vulnerable. I designed running the tug up the river to Volusia to protect that portion if threatened, which I could not doubt from the report of Colonel Noble. Although my march was lengthened by disembarking opposite Pilatka, I did not deem it prudent to convey troops farther up the St. John's. The Ottawa was to continue to the mouth of Dunn's Creek to afford all possible protection to the Columbine. The Columbine was ordered to proceed immediately to Volusia and afford all possible assistance to the force at Volusia. The Houghton was to await further orders, and was to keep near the Ottawa for her protection. I directed my march towards the road from St. Augustine to the crossing of the Haw Creek, thence to Volusia.

I had sent on the evening of the twenty-first a despatch to Colonel Noble, saying that I should move for this position, and directing him to keep forward to the same point, and beyond if practicable, all his available infantry and cavalry.

I have thus stated all the movements ordered and commenced from Saturday night at twelve o'clock until Sunday at four P. M.

Before the Columbine started I placed on board of her, at the request of Commander Breese, of the Ottawa, a guard of twenty-five men and two officers of Colonel Beecher's regiment. I informed her commander that I should press forward with my troops in the direction in which she was going; that I would afford him all assistance as soon as I could reach him; that I should not consider the discharge of his artillery as an indication that he was in danger. This was assented to by the commander of the Columbine, who said he would throw up a rocket if he was in danger.

My march was prolonged into night. I accomplished about nine miles, and encamped on the north side of Haw Creek. This creek is impassable but by boats. I heard a great deal of firing from artillery in the direction of the mouth of Dunn's Creek, but saw no rocket, and had no despatches. I presumed the firing to be the ordinary shelling of the woods by the gunboats. I pressed forward on Monday morning, making that day about thirty miles. I encamped at night at the crossing of Haw Creek. I found Colonel Noble had pushed his infantry four (4) miles farther, and that his cavalry was at Volusia.

The garrison at Volusia was safe, no rebels this side of the river. The two small posts at Welaka and Saunders captured, shamefully surrendered, I hear — not a gun fired. I have ordered full reports to be made, which I will transmit when received. I found the country people quite excited, and quite confident that the enemy, seven hundred (700) strong, were at the crossing of Haw Creek. Indeed, from reports, I had reason to believe some truth in this.

On Tuesday morning, the twenty-third, I directed Colonel Noble to send the cavalry down the country to drive in herds of beef cattle, which it is well known are going towards rebel armies. I also directed him to tell the Columbine to go down the river, that I had no further use of her. The infantry I ordered to concentrate at camp, nine miles south of St. Augustine, at that place, and at Picolata. The two hundred of the One Hundred and Forty-fourth were ordered to return to Jacksonville. My reasons for this disposition, and my views of the only mode of operating with infantry in this country of immense distances and illimitable pine deserts, I have given to the commanding General in a private letter. Having accomplished all I could, I did not deem it advisable to attempt to pursue the enemy across the river; and being totally unprepared to do it, if I had thought it advisable, as I had no boats, and having no rations, and no transportation for any with me, I made my way back to the landing at Picolata, to take the steamer Houghton to Jacksonville. I reached the river on Tuesday, the twenty-third, at about four o'clock P. M.

A despatch from the Ottawa, at the mouth of Dunn's Creek, to whom I sent my Aid, gave me the first information that the enemy had opened with artillery on Sunday night on the Houghton and on the gunboat. The Houghton had got under way and proceeded down stream; she was struck three times with twelve-pound solid shot, once amidships and near walking beam. No great harm done. I proceeded to Orange Mills, and there found the Houghton. This morning a re-

port from Colonel Noble informed me of the loss of the tug Columbine, and capture of most of those on board. Colonel Noble writes me that some (he does not say how many) of the Thirty-fifth colored had made their way to Haw Creek, and had given this information. They say that on Monday night, the twenty-third, opposite Horse Landing, the Columbine was opened upon as she was coming down the river; that she was disabled by the enemy's artillery, and was captured by two hundred of the enemy. It was on Tuesday, the twenty-fourth, at four o'clock P. M., that I communicated with the Ottawa, then lying at the mouth of Dunn's Creek, and within five miles of Horse Landing. The Ottawa had been here since Sunday, and yet she knew nothing of the report. This morning my cavalry captured a prisoner, who says that Dickerson (rebel) says he has captured a "little boat and two small guns;" that he has "burned the boat."

It seems, therefore, that this firing on Sunday night was by the enemy's artillery. This fact was not communicated to me until Tuesday afternoon, too late to do anything for the Columbine, if, indeed, anything could have been done for her. I deem it fortunate that I did not attempt to run farther up the river than Picolata with my troops. I will submit further facts in relation to the loss of the Columbine and the capture of the two posts at Welaka and Saunders as soon as received. While regretting the losses, and condemning whatever there may have been reprehensible in the conduct of the commanders at Welaka and Saunders, I feel keenly the disaster to the Columbine and her gallant crew, resulting, as it did, in the attempt to relieve my command.

My reconnoissance to the front, of the twenty-fifth, has developed the fact that there is no enemy at Camp Finnegan. I captured a prisoner this morning, who confirms the fact.

The force in Florida is as follows: At Camp Milton, of the Second Florida cavalry, Colonel McCormick, (effective men,) six hundred (600;) artillery, two (2) small pieces. Camp Milton and McCurth's Creek strongly fortified. At Baldwin, no troops, strong fortification, two pieces of artillery. At Trestle, across the St. Mary's, being fortified at this time by negroes. State troops raised for state defence — three companies expected daily at Milton, and two thousand (2,000) in all looked for. Captain Dickerson's cavalry has two hundred (200) effective men stationed at Pilatka. Dunham's artillery of light pieces on St. John's River, near Welaka, Saunders, and Horse Landing.

I am, Captain, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
GEORGE H. GORDON,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

Captain BURGER,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Department South.

REPORT OF REAR-ADMIRAL DAHLGREN.

FLAG-STEAMER PHILADELPHIA,
PORT ROYAL HARBOR, S. C., June 4, 1864.

SIR: I enclose herewith a report from Commander Balch, senior officer present in the St. John's River, Florida, from which there seems to be little doubt of the capture of the Columbine. As the officers and crew are probably prisoners, it will be impossible to have any investigation at this time. There is always more or less risk in passing these light steamers through narrow streams, where they are liable to be fired on without any warning from the densely wooded banks, and cannot turn readily or manœuvre, while their armament is too trifling to be of much account. Still, when the operations of the land forces require such aid, it is necessary to give it and do as well as we can.

I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. A. DAHLGREN,
Rear-Admiral, commanding S. A. B. Squadron.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

REPORT OF COMMANDER G. B. BALCH.

UNITED STATES STEAM-SLOOP PAWNEE,
OFF JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA, May 30, 1864.

ADMIRAL: I regret to have to report the capture of the Columbine by the rebels on Monday, the twenty-third instant, and under the following circumstances:

By the enclosed communications you will perceive that two of our posts on the east side of the St. John's, left by General Birney, were captured by the enemy; and another, consisting of fifty men at Volusia, was in imminent danger of being captured. Information was received by General Gordon, at 11.40 P. M. of the twenty-first instant, who immediately asked my assistance in trying to save the post at Volusia. Upon consultation with the General, it was deemed by us advisable to send the Ottawa and Columbine up the St. John's — the former to go as far up the river as the depth of water would admit, and the latter to proceed to Volusia with all despatch, to assist the troops at that point, and also to prevent the enemy from recrossing to the west bank of the St. John's.

General Gordon embarked his troops in the Charles Houghton, and without delay proceeded to Picolata, where he put aboard the Ottawa and Columbine an additional force, and, together, proceeded up the river to a point near Pilatka, where he disembarked his troops and marched at once for Volusia.

The Ottawa and Columbine left for the purpose of carrying out the plan as agreed upon — the Ottawa anchoring at Brown's Landing, distant twelve miles, by the river, from Pilatka; the Houghton in company, for greater protection, by order of General Gordon; the Columbine proceeding without delay to Volusia bar, which she reached at eleven P. M. of the twenty-second instant.

I herewith transmit the report of Lieutenant-Commander Breese, of the Ottawa, detailing an account of the attack made on his vessel and the Houghton by a rebel battery. You will be pleased to learn from the report of Lieutenant-Commander Breese that the battery was soon silenced, and much to the credit of the officers and crew of that

vessel. The engagement took place on Sunday night, the twenty-second instant, and the Ottawa remained at anchor off Brown's Landing till the afternoon of the twenty-fourth, when the messenger (referred to in Lieutenant-Commander Breese's report) arrived, bringing the information from General Gordon that all had been accomplished, and that the General had sent word to the Columbine to return.

From Lieutenant Commander Breese I learn that the pilot of the Ottawa (one of the best on the river) declined to take the Ottawa farther up the river than Brown's Landing; not on account of the depth of water, but on account of the narrowness of the channel, and the impossibility of making the turns in it with a vessel of the Ottawa's length. It would, therefore, seem that Lieutenant-Commander Breese literally obeyed my orders, which were to go as far up the river as possible.

By the report of Colonel W. H. Noble, commanding United States forces on the east side of the St. John's, you will learn that the Columbine was captured on Monday night by the enemy at Horse Landing. This landing is distant by the river some five miles above Brown's Landing, where the Ottawa was then at anchor. Lieutenant-Commander Breese, and his executive officer, Acting Master Gamble, state that they heard nothing which led them to believe that the Columbine was engaged with the enemy. This they account for by the dense woods intervening, and thus preventing the sound of the guns reaching them.

General Gordon informed me to-day that he expected the men who had escaped from the Columbine, and who had arrived at St. Augustine, to reach Jacksonville this evening, and I regret that they have not, as I was anxious to see them, and get their statements in relation to the capture of the Columbine, that I might transmit them to you for your information. Colonel Noble has sent General Gordon statements from two of those who escaped from the Columbine, and they are to the effect that she was on her way down the river, and that when near Horse Landing she commenced shelling the woods in that vicinity; soon after opening fire, the enemy opened fire from four pieces of artillery, her rudder chains being shot away at the first discharge, and that she ran aground; that she fired on the enemy, and, from the account referred to, surrendered after being under fire from one hour to three hours; these men report several killed and some eight wounded and five men drowned. It will be more satisfactory to you to have the statements of those who have escaped, and at the earliest moment possible I will examine them, and transmit to you their statements.

I regret exceedingly the loss of the Columbine, but I did not, under the pressure of the call made upon me, feel that I could do otherwise than to cooperate to the utmost to save our forces, threatened as they were, and which we had reason to believe would be captured if vigorous and prompt assistance were not rendered. I have proposed to General Gordon to send out a flag of truce for the purpose of learning everything we can in relation to the capture of the Columbine, and this will be done at the earliest moment deemed advisable; but as the General intends to move against the enemy on the morning of the first of June, he seems to think it better to delay taking a step of this kind till he has accomplished his movement. The rebel force in front is said to be weak, and I trust he will succeed in inflicting a serious blow on the enemy.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE B. BALCH,
Commander, and Senior Officer present.

Rear-Admiral J. A. DAHLGREN,
Commanding S. A. B. Squadron off Charleston, S. C.

REPORT OF REAR-ADMIRAL J. A. DAHLGREN.

FLAG-STEAMER PHILADELPHIA,
OFF MORRIS ISLAND, June 18, 1864.

SIR: I transmit herewith a report from Commander Balch, giving some particulars of the capture of the Columbine. There is always some satisfaction in knowing that when a vessel is lost every effort has been made to prevent it by a stout defence. Of course it is impossible to be certain of all the facts until they are developed by a court of inquiry, which can only be instituted when a sufficient amount of evidence is obtained.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

J. A. DAHLGREN,
Rear-Admiral, commanding S. A. B. Squadron.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

ADDITIONAL REPORT OF COM. G. B. BALCH.

UNITED STATES STEAM-SLOOP PAWNEE,
OFF MAYPORT MILLS, FLORIDA, June 12, 1864.

ADMIRAL: I have the honor herewith to transmit the statement of Drover Edwards, (landsman,) lately attached to the Columbine. He escaped from that vessel after she surrendered, but before the rebels took possession. He is intelligent, and gives the subjoined statement clearly and with every appearance of truth. From his statement I rejoice to believe that the honor of the navy was fully and gloriously maintained; and though we have to regret the loss of a very useful vessel, still it is gratifying to know that she was in the performance of most important service, viz., the assistance of our troops, which were in imminent danger of being cut off by the enemy.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE B. BALCH,
Commander, United States Navy.

Rear-Admiral J. A. DAHLGREN,
Commanding S. A. B. Squadron off Charleston, S. C.

STATEMENT OF DROVER EDWARDS, (LANDSMAN,) LATE ATTACHED TO THE COLUMBINE, WHO ESCAPED BY SWIMMING TO THE EAST SIDE OF THE ST. JOHN'S ON THE TWENTY-THIRD DAY OF MAY, 1864, THE DAY OF THE ENGAGEMENT OF THE COLUMBINE WITH THE REBEL BATTERY AT HORSE LANDING, ON THE ST. JOHN'S RIVER, FLORIDA.

THE Columbine arrived at Volusia bar at half past eleven P. M., on Sunday night, the twenty-second instant. Next morning a boat was sent to communicate with our troops at that post; found all safe. At noon Monday, twenty-third

instant, the Columbine started on her return; she stopped at Wilatka, a landing place above Horse Landing, about half an hour, and then proceeded down the river.

At four P. M., when near Horse Landing, called all hands to quarters, and commenced shelling the woods, and when opposite the landing fired two more rounds; the rebels opened fire from a battery distant not more than thirty yards, the forward gun being struck and knocked around, the carriage being injured, but not so as to render the gun useless; and the wheel-ropes being shot away, endeavors were made to repair the wheel-ropes, but before this could be done she was aground.

We continued firing; Captain Sanborn had given orders to hook her on, with the object of endeavoring to run by the battery, but she was aground; directions were given by Captain Sanborn to shift the forward gun over to the starboard side, to bring it to bear on the battery; this was done, and fire opened again on the battery. The Captain (Sanborn) fired every gun, and this continued till about six P. M., steady firing.

Many were killed by the rebel fire, as also many wounded; estimates the total killed and wounded at twenty, (20.)

Captain Daniels, commanding detachment of thirty-fifth United States colored troops, was wounded; saw many lying in the gangway killed and wounded; I saw five drowned, four being soldiers, and the other belonged to the Columbine, William Moran, (landsman,) colored. At about six P. M. Captain Sanborn showed a white flag, and surrendered. The rebels hailed and told him to send a boat ashore; boat was riddled with shot; did not send a boat. The rebels sent off three boats; when nearly alongside, I jumped overboard and swam to the east side of the river, and escaped to the woods. Here I met three soldiers of the Thirty-fifth United States colored troops, who had also jumped overboard; together we made our way to St. Augustine, which place we reached in five days.

I hereby certify that the above statement is true and correct.

his
DROVER + EDWARDS.
mark.

Certified to as the statement of Drover Edwards, (landsman,) late of the Columbine.
June 12, 1864.

GEORGE B. BALCH,
United States Navy.

LIST OF OFFICERS AND MEN CAPTURED.

FLAG-STEAMER PHILADELPHIA,
PORT ROYAL HARBOR, June 27, 1864.

SIR: I herewith enclose, for the information of the department, list of the officers and men of the United States steam-tug Columbine, captured by the enemy May twenty-third, 1864, and have the honor to be,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. A. DAHLGREN,
Rear-Admiral, commanding S. A. B. Squadron.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

PRISONERS CAPTURED MAY 23, 1864.

F. Sanborn, acting ensign; J. H. Johnston and George Whitney, third assistant engineers; W. D. Spencer, master's mate; G. F. Allison, quartermaster's cook; John Smith and George Walsh, quartermasters; Nicholas Fierny, Robert Haddon, and J. H. Ellis, firemen; John McDonald, Michael Noe, Patrick Kelly, and Mike Drilly, coal-heavers; Wiley Bloom, A. Mills, J. Hastings, A. Lewis, George Hall, W. Austin, T. Wiggins, W. Wyatt, W. Hampton, J. Jenkins, W. Hart, and J. Harrison, sailors; H. Pearson, cook,—total, twenty-seven.

I certify that the above is a correct abstract from the list furnished by Major-General Anderson, commanding Confederate forces in Florida.

EDELEMIRE MAYER,
Major Seventh Regiment U. S. S. F., A. A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF FLORIDA,
JACKSONVILLE, June 13, 1864.

REPORT OF ACTING ENSIGN SANBORN.

UNITED STATES STEAMER PHILADELPHIA,
PORT ROYAL HARBOR, S. C., September 3, 1864.

SIR: It becomes my painful and unpleasant duty to report to you the particulars of the loss of the United States steamer Columbine, under my command, in the St. John's River, on May twenty-third, 1864.

On the twenty-second of May, at four A. M., I received orders by the army transport Charles Houghton to report to Lieutenant-Commander L. L. Breese, commanding the United States steamer Ottawa. I reported to him at five A. M., and assisted her in reaching Pilatka. From this place I was by him ordered to proceed to Volusia, and convey such orders as I might receive from General Gordon, to whom he ordered me to report. Reporting to General Gordon at a landing opposite Pilatka, I received orders from General Gordon to receive on board a detachment of the Thirty-fifth United States infantry, (colored,) under command of Captain Daniels, as a guard, and verbal orders to be communicated to the commandant of the post of Volusia, fifty miles farther up the river.

Leaving Pilatka and the Ottawa, with orders to return immediately, at six P. M. I reached Volusia bar, five miles from Volusia, at half past eleven P. M., when I dropped anchor. In the morning, owing to the low state of the tide, I found it impossible to safely cross the bar with the Columbine. I therefore despatched Acting Master's Mate W. B. Spencer with an armed boat's crew to convey General Gordon's orders to the commandant of the post at Volusia, and return immediately. He was successful in so doing, and returned to the vessel at half past eleven A. M. of the twenty-third.

Immediately after his return, I weighed anchor and commenced my return. I stopped at Rembert's and Welaka on my return, at which latter place I obtained the particulars of the capture of a detachment of the Seventeenth Connecticut volunteer infantry, under command of one Captain Hovey. This was part of my orders.

Immediately after my departure from Welaka I beat to quarters, as I expected to be fired upon by infantry at Horse or Cannon's Landing. Upon rounding the point next above, I opened fire upon the landing and road above, leading to it, as soon as my guns could be brought to bear. Also giving the orders to slow down and lower the torpedo-catchers, which were immediately executed.

I could discover nothing suspicious until directly abreast the landing, distant about one hundred yards, when two pieces of artillery, concealed by the shrubbery and undergrowth, almost simultaneously opened fire upon me. I instantly gave orders to hook on, but unfortunately the second shot of the enemy cut my wheel-chains, and at the same time the pilot abandoned the wheel and jumped over the bow. The vessel almost immediately went ashore upon a mud bank. Before she struck, one of the enemy's shot struck the main steam-pipe, knocking a hole in it, causing a great loss of steam. Her being ashore, and the injury to the wheel-chains, were reported to me at nearly the same moment. I left the hurricane deck, and took charge of the forward gun, sending Mr. Spencer aft on the quarter deck to ship the tiller and hook the relieving tackles, at the same time stopping and backing the engine.

The engineer, Mr. Johnson, now reported the loss of steam, and at nearly the same moment Mr. Spencer reported the quarter deck swept by the enemy's sharpshooters and grape, and the after gun abandoned, and Mr. Davis killed.

I now placed the forward gun in charge of Quartermaster James Smith, and repaired to the quarter deck. I saw immediately the utter impossibility of saving the vessel unless the enemy could be dislodged. I now returned to the forward gun, of which I took charge, at the same time ordering Mr. Spencer to try and rally the infantry, which was now jumping overboard on all sides and swimming ashore. By our united exertions we finally stopped them. The engineer in charge, Mr. Johnson, at this time informed me the engine was useless, as one of the frame timbers had been shot away and locked the wheel. The officer in charge of the infantry having been wounded, the second in command and myself seeing all hopes of escape cut off, and the riflemen on the port bank of the river shooting the men down at the forward gun, I called a council of my remaining officers, in which it was decided to surrender. I was spared the mortification of hauling down the flag, it having been shot away in the early part of the action. It now became my humiliating duty to hoist a white flag to prevent the further useless expenditure of human life. A boat from the enemy immediately boarded me, demanding the surrender of the vessel. I refused to surrender to the officer in the boat, but having my own boat, went on shore and asked to see the commanding officer. I was immediately presented to Captain Dickerson, Confederate States army, from whom I demanded, in case of an unconditional surrender, personal safety to the officers and colored men on board, which was immediately guaranteed; whereupon I surrendered myself, officers, and crew as prisoners of war, and my vessel a prize to the (so-called) Confederate States of America.

The loss in killed, wounded, and missing is as follows, viz.:

Acting Master's Mate John Davis, while nobly performing his duty, killed; privates, five (5) wounded, sixteen killed and missing.

I take great pleasure in recommending to your favorable notice the conduct of Acting Third Assistant Engineer Henry J. Johnson, who coolly performed his duty until the engine became disabled, when he rendered me the most valuable assistance on deck; also that of Acting Master's Mate W. B. Spencer.

I have the pleasure to inform you that immediately after the removal of the wounded the enemy set her on fire, burning her to the water's edge, without removing an article of value.

She also formed the funeral pyre for those who fell while nobly defending her and the flag from dishonor. The remains of Mr. Davis were decently interred, covered by the flag he loved so well, and which he died bravely defending.

I have the honor to remain,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

FRANK W. SANBORN,

Acting Ensign, United States Navy.

Rear-Admiral J. A. DAHLGREN,

Commanding S. A. B. Squadron, Port Royal, S. C.

ADDITIONAL REPORT OF F. W. SANBORN.

UNITED STATES STEAMER PHILADELPHIA,
PORT ROYAL HARBOR, S. C., September 3, 1864.

SIR: In obedience to your expressed desire, I have the honor to present to you a report of my movements since the time of my capture, May twenty-third, 1864.

On the evening of my capture I was taken to Camp Call, the headquarters of my captor, Captain Dickerson, by whom I was very kindly treated, together with my officers and crew.

On the morning of the twenty-fourth, at eleven A. M., he gave to the officers a wagon, and to the wounded a wagon, to transport them to Gainsville. The privates were compelled to march, but the officer in command made frequent halts, in order that the men might not become too fatigued. We reached Gainsville on the morning of the twenty-sixth, and remained until that of the twenth-seventh, when we were placed in passenger cars and conveyed to Lake City, at which place we arrived at twelve P. M. We remained here until the following morning, when we took passage in a box-car for Madison, (all the negroes and Captain Daniels remaining behind,) which place we reached at about nine A. M. Transportation was procured for our baggage, and we commenced a wearisome march for Quitman, which place we reached on the evening of the ensuing day.

On the following morning we were placed in box-cars and taken to Savannah, which place we reached at five P. M., and were marched to Oglethorpe barracks, where we remained all night; this being the first time since our capture a roof

of any kind covered us, or we had been directly insulted by the officer in command.

The next morning we were again placed in box-cars, and on the same evening arrived in Macon. From the depot a guard of Georgians took us in charge, and marched us to Oglethrope barracks, about a mile distant from the depot. Here, I regret to say, myself and officers were separated from the white portion of the crew, who were taken to Andersonville.

I regret to say my officers and myself were here compelled to submit to a most humiliating search of our persons and baggage, the Confederate authorities taking any and all money from each officer, giving him therefor a receipt. In many cases the officers never saw their money again, or were compelled to draw it from the Confederate authorities at the rate of four and a half Confederate for one United States national currency, while, at the same time, the rates of exchange by private parties were from eight to ten (8 to 10) for one of the same. After having been subjected to the searching process, we were shown into a yard, containing about three and one-half (3½) acres or less, in which were already confined over eleven hundred (1100) prisoners, with no instructions as to the rules and regulations, nor what to do or how to act.

We finally, as it was now dark, bivouacked in the open air. The next morning showed us here we would have to remain for some time. Mustering together our blankets, we formed them into a sort of a tent, which, though open at both ends, protected us from the hot, scorching rays of a noonday sun. During the morning a ration was served out to us, which consisted of about a pint of corn meal and a table-spoonful of salt each.

I remained in Macon, together with my other officers, until the latter part of July, when I was among the first six hundred sent to Charleston. At the time of our leaving, it was stated one thousand remained, of which I have no doubt. Our rations in Macon were of the poorest kind — the bacon frequently decayed, and always full of maggots; the rice full of weevils; the beans full of worms and musty, and the meal sometimes musty; our supply of salt very insufficient, and no vegetables.

At the time of my leaving Macon many were prostrated by the scurvy, and some had died of it. Among my immediate acquaintances was and is a Mr. Ellis, of the navy, who was suffering severely from its effects in Macon; his body being covered with huge sores, which, since his removal to Charleston, have become somewhat better, but far from well.

During the first few days we were in Charleston we (the six hundred) were confined in the jail-yard, with no protection from the weather but what is known in the army as a shelter tent, into each of which six were obliged to crowd, and in one case eight. We were here nearly starved; compelled to mix with deserters, murderers, house-breakers, and felons of every description; add to this the brackish water, and the filth, dirt, refuse, which was allowed to collect in piles, and which created a stench sufficient to breed the most loathsome diseases, and the meagre food, our position was far from pleasant. For several days a table-spoonful of lard and a cup of meal was the only ration, but then again, on some days, our ration would consist of a loaf of wheat or rice bread and a pound of fresh meat.

From the jail-yard I was removed to the work-house, together with a number of others; here the rations were better a little, but we only remained a few days, when we were taken to Roper Hospital. Here we were required to give our parole not to attempt to escape or hold any communication with any person outside the prison limits. The building is large, airy, and commodious, has a fine yard and balcony in front, good yard and accommodations in the rear for cooking and washing, and is altogether far superior to any former accommodations. The rations are also of a better quality, and I am inclined to think have been increased in quantity, but still are very poor rrtions indeed.

There is a great scarcity of the proper medicines in the Confederacy, and many of our officers are now suffering in the hospitals for the want of proper medicine.

I am sorry to say, sir, that at the time of my capture my officers and myself were robbed of much clothing and valuables, and find it a common practice of the Confeds to rob men of boots, hats, pants, coats, or anything they may choose to fancy.

During the time I have been confined in Charleston I have been unwell, and have repeatedly gone to the Confederate surgeon, Doctor Rett, for medicine, which he has given me, but uniformly without success. My case now became quite bad, and on my reporting to him on Tuesday last for medicine, he frankly informed me he could do nothing for me, and said, furthermore, I would not live in the South, offering at the same time, if I would make application, to give his certificate and influence in my behalf. I accepted his kind offer, and made application, which was granted. I signed my parole September first, was placed inside of our lines, off Charleston, on the second; came here on the Wyoming last night at nine P. M., and now have the honor to report to you.

The person for whom I am to try and effect an exchange is Captain Henry Boneau, captured in the blockade runner Ella Annie.

I have the honor to remain,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRANK W. SANBORN,
Acting Ensign, United States Navy.

Rear-Admiral J. A. DAHLGREN,
Com'dg S. A. B. Squadron, Port Royal Harbor, S. C.

DOC. 14.

BEAUREGARD'S PLAN OF ATTACK AT THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 20, 1861.

Special Order No.

The following order is published for the information of division and brigade commanders:

FIRST DIVISION.

1st. Brigadier-General Ewell's brigade will march via Union Mills Ford, and place itself in position of attack upon the enemy. It will be held in readiness either to support the attack upon Centreville, or to move in the direction of Sauxter's Cross Roads, according to circumstances.

The order to advance will be given by the Commander-in-Chief.

SECOND DIVISION.

2d. Brigadier-General Jones's brigade, supported by Colonel Early's brigade, will march via McLane's Ford, to place itself in position of attack on the enemy on or about the Union Mills and Centreville road. It will be held in readiness either to support the attack on Centreville, or to move in the direction of Fairfax Station, according to circumstances, with its right flank towards the left of Ewell's command, more or less distant, according to the nature of the country and attack.

The order to advance will be given by the Commander-in-Chief.

THIRD DIVISION.

3d. Brigadier-General Longstreet's brigade, supported by Brigadier-General Jackson's brigade, will march via McLane's Ford, to place itself in position of attack upon the enemy on or about the Union Mills and Centreville road. It will be held in readiness either to support the attack on Centreville, or to move in the direction of Fairfax Court House, according to circumstances, with its right flank towards the left of Jones's command, more or less distant, according to the nature of the country.

The order to advance will be given by the Commander-in-Chief.

FOURTH DIVISION.

4th. Brigadier-General Bonham's brigade, supported by Colonel Bartow's brigade, will march via Mitchell's Ford to the attack on Centreville. The right wing to the left of the Third division, more or less distant, according to the nature of the country and of the attack.

The order to advance will be given by the Commander-in-Chief.

FIFTH DIVISION.

5th. Colonel Cocke's brigade, supported by Colonel Elzy's brigade, will march via Stone Bridge, and the fords on the right thereto, to the attack of Centreville: the right wing to the left of the Fourth division, more or less distant, according to the nature of the country and of the attack.

The order to advance will be given by the Commander-in-Chief.

SIXTH DIVISION.

6th. Brigadier-General Bee's brigade, supported by Colonel Wilcox's brigade, Colonel Stuart's regiment of cavalry, and the whole of Walton's battery, will form the reserve, and will march via Mitchell's Ford, to be used according to circumstances.

SEVENTH.

1. The light batteries will be distributed as follows:

To Brigadier-General Ewell's command, Captain Walker's six pieces.

2. To Brigadier-General Jones's command, Captains Alberti's and Stanard's batteries — eight pieces.

3. To Brigadier-General Longstreet's command, Colonel Pendleton's and Captain Inberton's batteries — eight pieces.

4. Brigadier-General Bonham's command, Captains Kemper's and Shields's batteries — eight pieces.

5. To Colonel Cocke's command, Colonel Hunton's, Captain Latham's, and Beckham's batteries — twelve pieces.

EIGHTH.

Colonel Redford, commanding cavalry, will detail to report immediately, as follows:

To Brigadier-General Ewell, two companies cavalry.

To Brigadier-General Jones, two companies cavalry.

To Brigadier-General Longstreet, two companies cavalry.

To Brigadier-General Bonham, three companies cavalry.

To Colonel Cocke the remaining companies of cavalry, except those on special service.

NINTH.

The Fourth and Fifth divisions, after the fall of Centreville, will advance to the attack of Fairfax Court House, via the Braddock and Turnpike roads, to the north of the latter. The First, Second, and Third divisions will, if necessary, support the Fourth and Fifth divisions.

TENTH.

In this movement the First, Second, and Third divisions will form the command of Brigadier-General Holmes; the Fourth and Fifth divisions, that of the second in command. The reserve will move upon the plains between Mitchell's Ford and the Stone Bridge, and together with the Fourth and Fifth divisions will be under the immediate direction of Brigadier-General Beauregard.

By command of General Beauregard.

THOMAS JORDAN,
A. A. Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
July 20, 1861.

Special Orders No.

The plan of attack given by Brigadier-General Beauregard, in the above order, is approved, and will be executed accordingly.

J. E. JOHNSTON,
General C. S. A.

Doc. 15.

ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF VIRGINIA.*

THE delegates now assembled in convention at Wheeling, deem it proper to address their fellow-citizens throughout the commonwealth, in explanation and vindication of the course they have unanimously felt it incumbent on them to pursue.

It is only necessary to allude briefly to the circumstances which called this convention into existence, to justify, in the fullest manner, any resumption of authority by the people in whose name they act. The General Assembly, which met in extra session at Richmond, in January last, without the excuse of impending danger or other grave necessity, and without constitutional authority, convened a convention, "to adopt such measures as they may deem expedient for the welfare of the commonwealth;" thus tamely relinquishing the very power reposed in themselves by the constitution, and, as the sequel proved, with a corrupt purpose. Elections were held for delegates to the proposed convention, and it being then clearly understood that an active and influential party favored the secession of the commonwealth from the United States, the issue presented everywhere was clearly "Secession" or "No Secession." We need not remind you that by a very large majority of the voters of the commonwealth secession was rejected and repudiated, by the election of delegates professedly opposed to that iniquity, nor that a still larger majority required, that any act of that convention, altering the fundamental law or affecting the relations of the state, should be submitted to the people, and without the approbation of a majority, expressed at the polls, should have no force or effect.

The proceedings of that convention, up to the seventeenth of April last, were evidently intended by those in the secret to persuade the members favorable to the perpetuity of the Union, and the people at large, that it was intended to propose terms on which it could be maintained. On the day named the mask was thrown aside, and the secession ordinance was passed. This was done in secret session, and no immediate promulgation of the fact was made to the people; nor, until since this convention assembled, was the injunction of secrecy so far removed that the vote on the passage of the ordinance was made public. It now appears that more than one third of the whole convention voted against it, and that nine members were absent. Up to this day the debates which preceded the vote are concealed from the people, who are thus denied a knowledge of the causes which, in the opinion of the majority, rendered secession necessary, and justified so gross a disregard of their lately expressed will.

Under the legislative act calling the convention, from which alone that body derived its authority, and under the vote of the people provided for by that act, the secession ordinance had no legal effect until ratified at the polls by a majority of the voters of the commonwealth. The leaders in the secession movement, whose conduct has proved them to be conspirators against the State of Virginia, and the peace and welfare of her people, did not wait until the time fixed for this ratification, to begin their overt acts of treason against the government and people of the United States, as well as the state and people for whom they professed to act. Indeed, two days before the adoption of the ordinance, with the connivance, or, as is alleged, in defiance of a feeble executive, they levied war against both by sending their emissaries to capture the Harper's Ferry armory, and to obstruct the entrance of the harbor on which is situated the Gosport navy yard. This bold assumption of authority was followed by numerous acts of hostility against the United States; by the levy of troops to aid in the capture of the national capital, and the subversion of the national authority, and, to crown the infamy of the conspirators, with whom the executive had now coalesced, by an attempt, without even the pretence of the authority or acquiescence of the people, to transfer their allegiance from the United States to a league of rebellious states, in arms against the former.

In this state of things, the day arrived when the people were to vote for or against the secession ordinance. Threats of personal injury and other intimidations, such as had been uttered upon the floor of the usurping convention against the remaining friends of the Union there, were used by the adherents of the conspirators in every county of the state. Judges charged the grand juries that opposition to disunion would be punished as treason against the commonwealth; and the armed partisans of the conspirators, in various places, arrested, plundered, and exiled peaceable citizens, for no other crime than their adherence to the Union their fathers had constructed, and under which they had been born and lived in prosperity and peace. We are not apprised by any official announcement of the result of the vote taken under such circumstances; but, whatever it may be, we denounce it as unfair and unjust, and as affording no evidence of the will of the people on the subject actually presented for their suffrages, and much less of their consent to be transferred to the self-constituted oligarchy of the south.

In the point of view in which this result, and the transactions which inevitably led to it, should be examined by the people of Virginia, it is unimportant whether secession was of itself desirable or not desirable; because the end cannot justify the means, if the latter are illegal and unholy. In the present case, the great principle which underlies all free government—the principle that the will of the people is the supreme law, or as expressed in the Declaration of Independence, that "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed," and in our own Bill of Rights, that "all power is vested in and consequently derived from the people," has not only been violated and set at nought, but has been trampled under foot. In the call of the

* Unanimously adopted by the convention in session at Wheeling, June twenty-fourth, 1861.

convention, in the acts of that body, in the circumstances preceding and accompanying the late election, a continued effort has been made, with what success you know, not merely to disregard the will of the people, but to set it at defiance, and to establish the counter principle, that the few should govern the many. The men justly termed conspirators and usurpers because they cannot show your warrant for their acts, were, when this convention met, practically in full possession of every branch of the state government, and still claim the right to exercise their usurped power; and if you submit to their acts of secession and affiliation with usurpers like themselves, you yield to them the right to govern you in perpetuity. Will your bill of rights and constitution afford you any protection against those who have already violated both? Will your connection with a pretended Confederacy, in every state of which the leaders have openly and directly refused to submit their similar acts to the approval or rejection of their people, aid you in the recovery of the fundamental right of which you have been so wantonly robbed?

But is secession right, or is it desirable if it is right? We will not amplify the argument on the first branch of this inquiry. The ratification of the constitution of the United States by our own commonwealth, in express terms, reserves the right to abrogate it to those by whom it was made, the people of the United States; thus repudiating in advance the modern doctrine of separate state secession. This is in strict accordance with the views of our elder statesmen, whose patriotism and ability are held in reverence, not only by us and by our fellow-citizens of the Union, but by good men throughout the world. It is the logic of every honest heart, that a contract, a compact, or call it what you will, can only be set aside by the joint act of those by whom it was made.

But why should secession be desirable? Why should Virginia desire to withdraw from that Union of which she has been for so long an honored member — that Union, the accomplishment of which illumines, with the brightest rays, her own history, and the lives of her most distinguished sons? Shall it be said that what she toiled to achieve in 1787, was destroyed by her own act in 1861? Is there on the page of history the story of a nation that has risen more rapidly to prosperity and power, or more steadily advanced in intellectual and moral culture? There is no such nation, nor is there among the thirty-four states one which has profited more by the association, or one which would suffer more from its dissolution, as is sufficiently indicated by our geographical position.

Impressed with these views, the north-western counties of the state, knowing that a large majority of their people remained, and would remain, faithful to the Union under all circumstances, met in convention at Wheeling on the thirteenth day of May last, to consult upon their condition and to take such steps as it might indicate. It was literally a mass convention, and from the irregular manner of the appointment of its delegates, was not calculated for the despatch of business. As the result of its deliberations, the convention which now addresses you was called, the representation in which is proportioned to that of the General Assembly. The number of counties actually represented is thirty-four, and we have reliable assurance that several which are now with us in spirit, will ere long be present by their regularly appointed delegates. Considering that in so many counties every expression of opinion unfavorable to the conspirators is suppressed, the number already represented is larger than could have been anticipated. Several of the delegates present escaped from their counties at the risk of their lives, while others are still detained at home by force or menaces against them or their families and property. Such is doubtless the case in other counties from which we have no information.

Two courses of action were presented to those who now address you upon their organization, both of which had been debated in the previous convention at this place. The first was the immediate separation of the western or north-western counties from the residue of the state. This was the result rather of a previous and growing belief, now amounting to conviction in the minds of all throughout this section of the state, that diversity, almost opposition, of interests, — different directions of the channels of trade, and the want of legislation adapted to their condition, and indispensable to their moral and material prosperity, rendered the separation desirable under any and all circumstances. But aside from the constitutional requirements which made its accomplishment almost impossible while hostilities continued, the consideration that to separate now, would be to separate from many who, under circumstances even more adverse than those by which they had been themselves surrounded, had maintained their loyalty to the Federal government, caused the abandonment of this course at this time. On the other hand, a sense of duty to those who, like themselves, were constrained to repudiate the action of the Richmond convention and the state authorities, demanded that such a course should be taken as would enable all the loyal citizens of the commonwealth to participate in its advantages, and to enjoy the security it might offer.

Besides submission to palpable usurpation, there was then but one alternative, namely, under the authority of numerous precedents in the history of nations, to assume the conduct of the government, on the ground that those previously intrusted with its administration, by their numerous illegal and unconstitutional acts, in plain derogation of the rights of the people, had, in the language of the Declaration of Independence, "abdicated government, by declaring us out of their protection, and waging war against us;" whereby, in the words of the same instrument, "the legislative powers, incapable of annihilation, have returned to the people for their exercise." This convention, therefore, in humble, but, as they firmly believe, proper imitation of the sages of '76, have, "in the name and on behalf of the

good people of Virginia," issued their declaration, "that the preservation of their dearest rights and liberties, and their security in person and property, imperatively demand the reorganization of the government of the commonwealth."

In pursuance of this declaration, we have passed such ordinances as are immediately necessary to reorganize the government, and put it in operation. We have appointed a governor, lieutenant-governor, attorney-general, and executive council, leaving to the General Assembly, which we have directed to be convened, at a very early day, to fill, or to provide for filling, all other offices as soon as in their judgment it can be properly done. The terms of the officers we have appointed are limited to six months, or until the election and qualification of their successors, for which the General Assembly is authorized to provide at the earliest possible period. In all this, our fellow-citizens will clearly perceive that there has been no disposition to assume any power or authority not demanded by the exigencies of their present unhappy condition, or to retain it longer than a regard for their highest interests may require.

In reply to remarks which have been made abroad, we deem it proper to say, that we have not seen occasion to take any steps in reference to the debt of the state. The idea of the repudiation of any part of it which was legally contracted, has not been expressed or entertained by any member of the convention. The only notice the subject has received, has been in connection with the proposed separation of the western counties, and whenever it has been thus named, those desirous of separation have invariably expressed their willingness to assume their equitable portion of the burden. Any promises of payment or projects of arrangement at this time, when the very existence of the commonwealth is threatened, would be worse than idle.

Under all these circumstances, with the firm conviction that the course adopted is the only one by which the state can be retained in the Union, and the liberties and rights of the people secured and perpetuated, we most earnestly call upon our loyal fellow-citizens, in every county of the commonwealth, who are not already represented in the General Assembly and in this convention, to elect members of the legislature, and appoint delegates to this body, at the earliest possible moment. Writs of election will be issued by the executive whenever it appears that they can be executed, and representatives from every county will be most cordially received. No suspension or essential change of any part of the constitution or laws of the commonwealth, unless positively demanded by the exigencies of the times, will be made, until the will of the whole people, or of their authorized representatives, can be freely expressed; and such changes as have been, or may hereafter be, so demanded, will be submitted for ratification at an early day.

We call upon the loyal citizens of the commonwealth to organize and arm for its defence against the conspirators and usurpers at Richmond, and their aiders and abettors. Plans will immediately be devised to give to such organizations the greatest efficiency. The general government will aid and protect us to the utmost of their power, and will most unquestionably recognize the reorganized government as the true and legitimate government of the state. They cannot and will not do otherwise.

The reorganized government appeals to the great body of the people for countenance and support in this hour of great anxiety and trial. They do so confidently, because, while there have been many defections from the great and holy cause of "Liberty and Union" among those to whom you have been accustomed to look for political information and direction, there have been comparatively few among yourselves. In this matter, which appeals to your dearest rights and interests, you have responded spontaneously to the promptings of your honest hearts. Your own experience has taught you the great benefits of the Union, and you recognize the great principle, that a government so beneficial in its operations, so mild in its requirements, so powerful to protect, and so constituted as to diffuse throughout an immense territory the blessings of prosperity and happiness, "should not be changed for light or transient causes." In every county where the free expression of your views has been permitted, your majorities in favor of the maintenance and perpetuity of the Union have far exceeded the calculations of the most sanguine among your friends. Persevere, then, in your most holy war against the corrupt and perjured oligarchy who have usurped your government, and would have sold you to the ambitious despots of an unholy affiliation. In such a cause, we may look for the blessings of that Holy One, who has made it a part of his divine providence that those who, in purity of heart and purpose, strive for the preservation of their dearest rights, their homes and their country, although the struggle may be protracted for long and weary years, shall never strive in vain.

By order of the Convention,

ARTHUR I. BOREMAN,
President.

G. L. CRANMER,
Secretary.

DOC. 16.

THE PASSAGE OF THE POTOMAC.

GENERAL PATTERSON'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT PENNSYLVANIA,
MARTINSBURG, July 6, 1861.

Colonel E. D. Townsend, A. A. General U. S. A., Washington City:

SIR: I telegraphed my intention to cross the Potomac on the first instant. I now have the honor to report my movements since that date.

I left Hagerstown on the afternoon of the thirtieth ultimo, the earliest day my command could take the field in a proper condition for active service, intending the following morning to enter Virginia with two columns, (at Dam No. Four and at Williamsport,) to be united the same

day at Hainesville, the location of the rebels. Owing to the danger and difficulty attending the fording at Dam No. Four, I placed all the force at Williamsport.

My order of march for the second instant, is given in the accompanying circular. The advance crossed the Potomac at four A. M., all taking the main road to Martinsburg with the exception of Negley's brigade, which, about one mile from the ford, diverged to the right to meet the enemy, should he come from Hedgesville, to guard our right and to rejoin at Hainesville.

About five miles from the ford the skirmishers in front and on the flank suddenly became engaged with the enemy posted in a clump of trees, at the same time their main force appeared in front sheltered by fences, timber, and houses.

Abercrombie immediately deployed his regiments, (First Wisconsin and Eleventh Pennsylvania,) on each side of the road, placed Hudson's section, supported by the First troop Philadelphia City cavalry, in the road, and advanced to the attack against a warm fire before him. The enemy, being supported by artillery, resisted for twenty-five minutes with much determination.

Lieutenant Hudson, after getting into position, soon silenced their guns.

In the mean time Thomas's brigade rapidly advanced, and deployed to the left flank of the enemy. The enemy seeing this movement, and being pressed by Abercrombie, retired, hotly pursued for four miles by artillery and infantry. The cavalry could not be employed on account of numerous fences and walls crossing the country. In the enemy's camp was found camp equipage, provisions, grain, &c.

This brush was highly creditable to our arms, winning as we did the day against a foe superior in number to those engaged on our side. They were well posted, sheltered by timber, and sustained by artillery and cavalry. Our men advanced over open ground against a warm fire of artillery and infantry. I present the reports of the Colonels Abercrombie and Thomas, and Lieutenants Perkins and Hudson, and take much pleasure in bearing testimony, as an eye-witness, to the admirable manner in which their commands were handled and their commendations earned.

I also bear testimony to the efficient service in posting portions of the troops, and conducting them to the front and into action, rendered by the members of my staff present and on the field of battle, Colonel Porter, Captain John Newton, and Lieutenant Babcock, and Majors Price and Biddle, who were employed conveying orders, also Surgeon Tripler, in attention to the wounded.

The loss of the enemy was over sixty in killed.

The number of the wounded cannot be ascertained, as a large number were carried off the field.

I am, Sir,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

R. PATTERSON,
Major-General, commanding.

CIRCULAR.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, WILLIAMSPORT, MD., July 1, 1861.

The commands will move to-morrow as follows, crossing the Potomac at this place at three A. M.:

Colonel Abercrombie's brigade, with one section of artillery and a squadron of cavalry.

Colonel Thomas's brigade, with one company of cavalry and two pieces of artillery.

General Negley's brigade, Colonel Longnecker's brigade, and one company cavalry, General Cadwallader, commanding.

The commanders will move in the above order. Baggage trains will cross after the commands, and be guarded by a portion of its regiment. A strong rear guard will be detailed by the commander of the first division.

The wagons must be kept closed up. Two regiments in all, from the third and fourth brigades, will be left as a guard to the public property in this town.

The commanders of cavalry companies and sections of artillery will report to their brigade commanders to-night, and join them in the morning.

By order of Major-General Patterson.

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

DOC. 17.

FIGHT WITH THE RAM ALBEMARLE.

OFFICIAL NAVAL REPORTS.

UNITED STATES STEAMER MATTABESETT, AT ANCHOR OFF ROANOKE RIVER, May 6, 1864.

GENERAL: I have to inform you that I engaged the ram Albermarle yesterday, from 4.40 to 7.30 P. M., with all my force, and regret that our efforts to capture him were not attended with success. Our shot had no perceptible effect upon her, close alongside. I drove her, however, into the mouth of Roanoke River, somewhat damaged, I think, but with machinery not disabled. I captured the Bombshell, with thirty-seven prisoners, officers and men. Have not as yet had any official return from the Sassacus, which has her in charge, and is anchored several miles below. Our loss in the large vessels is five killed and twenty-six wounded. I shall be able to hold possession of the sound against any force the rebels can organize at this point. I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

MELANCTON SMITH,
Captain, and Senior Naval Officer.

Brigadier-General J. N. PALMER,
Commanding Land Forces in North Carolina.

S. P. LEE,
Acting Rear-Admiral, commanding N. A. B. Squadron.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

LETTER OF ADMIRAL S. P. LEE.

FLAG-SHIP, NORTH ATLANTIC BLOCKADING SQUADRON, JAMES RIVER, May 14, 1864.

SIR: I transmit enclosed the report received last night from Captain Melancton Smith, senior

officer present, of the gallant fight on the afternoon of the fifth instant, in Albemarle Sound, between our wooden gunboats and the rebel iron-clad ram Albemarle, in which the latter was repulsed and her tender captured. I ask the special attention of the department to the signal bravery displayed by Captian Smith, and the officers and men engaged with him in this remarkable action, which adds a brilliant page to the exploits of the navy.

I have the honor to be, Sir,
Very respectfully, yours,
S. P. LEE,
Acting Rear-Admiral, commanding N. A. B. Squadron.
Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

ADMIRAL LEE'S INSTRUCTIONS.

FLAG-SHIP, NORTH ATLANTIC BLOCKADING SQUADRON, OFF NEWPORT NEWS, VA., April 23, 1864—1 P. M.

SIR: The Navy Department, by telegraphic despatch of this date, directs me to send you to assume command in the sounds of North Carolina, for the purpose of attacking, at all hazards, the rebel ram there, in the best manner to insure its destruction, by running it down with the double-enders, or in any other manner which my judgment or yours may suggest.

The Miami (Commander Renshaw) and the Tacony (Lieutenant-Commander Truxton) are now in the sounds. The Sassacus (Lieutenant-Commander Roe) was sent there last night. You will take the Mattabesett (Commander Febiger) and the Wyalusing (Lieutenant-Commander Queen) with you, and leave with all practicable despatch, availing yourself of the present high tides to enter the sounds. I send with you two (2) officers who have served in the sounds, and whose local knowledge will be useful to you.

Enclose a copy of my instructions of the twenty-first instant to Commander Davenport for your information and guidance, unless you find occasion to vary them for a more promising plan of attack.

Attacking the ram will, to some extent, intimidate it, and by getting alongside of it, in or near contact, and on each side, holding position, and by firing at the centre of its ports, whether open or shut, and on its roof, you will disable and capture it. Your guns should have double breeching, and be loaded with heavy charges (say from fifteen (15) to eighteen (18) pounds of powder for the nine-inch guns) and solid shot, and they should so be depressed as to fire as near a perpendicular line to the slope of the roof as practicable. If all hands lie down when the guns are fired, they will escape the rebound of broken parts from the shot.

At the time of this attack, if some shell were thrown down the ram's smoke-stack, she might thus be disabled.

The advantage of getting alongside, and of each side of her, is, that you prevent her from ramming, and have a controlling fire upon her roof and ports.

The ports and stern are her weak points. Even if her ports are kept closed, as in her attack on the Miami and Southfield's bows, you can, if alongside of her, fire through them and into her; and if her roof is, as described, of railroad iron, with a thin plating over it, the mechanical difficulty of securing this is such that it will loosen and fly off under the concussion of your heavy fire, whilst the inside nuts and bolts will act like canister on her deck, and the concussion, especially if her ports are shut, will shock and demoralize her crew, giving you a complete victory. Besides, you may force her ashore, where the falling freshet in the Roanoke River will leave her.

Be sure and not have the neutral point of your wheel-houses opposite her ports. Your wheel-houses should be abaft or forward of her roof,—better abaft.

The department seems to prefer ramming. This ram is reported to be of the usual Merrimac model; if so, heavy logging, and a knuckle ironed over, make her sides strong. But ramming under high speed may drive it in, or you may drive her ashore, or mount her ends, and (especially if in the sounds with some sea) sink her. Intrusted by the department with the performance of this signal service, I leave (with the expression of my views) to you the manner of executing it.

All assaults are exposed service; but this assault has, with much real risk, less than appears.

Wishing you success and promotion,
I have the honor to be
Respectfully yours,
S. P. LEE,
Acting Rear-Admiral, commanding N. A. B. Squadron.
Captain M. SMITH,
United States Iron-clad Onondaga.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN MELANCTON SMITH.

UNITED STATES STEAMER MATTABESETT, AT ANCHOR, ALBEMARLE SOUND, OFF ROANOKE RIVER, May 5, 1864.

SIR: I would respectfully report that the ram Albemarle, steamer Cotton Plant, with troops, and the armed steamer Bombshell, laden with provisions and coal, came out of Roanoke River to-day at two o'clock P. M., and after being tolled ten miles down the sound by the picket force left to guard the entrance of the river, the Mattabesett, Wyalusing, Sassacus, and Whitehead got under way, and stood up to engage them; the smaller boats falling into position in accordance with the enclosed programme.

The engagement commenced at 4.40 by the ram firing the first gun, which destroyed the Mattabesett's launch, and wounded several men. The second shot cut away some of the standing and running rigging. At 4.45 the Bombshell surrendered to the Mattabesett, and was ordered to fall in our wake; at 4.50 fired a broadside into the ram at a distance of one hundred and fifty yards; at 5.50 the Sassacus delivered her fire on passing, and then rammed his stern, pouring in a broadside at the same time. The Sassacus was seen soon afterwards enveloped with steam, when she hauled off, evidently disabled. The colors of the ram at this moment came down, and it was some time before it was ascertained whether he had surrendered, or they had been shot away. During the contact it was, of course, impossible for the other vessels to fire; but when the Sassacus be-

came disengaged and resumed her firing, the engagement became general; the smaller vessels firing so rapidly that it was dangerous for the larger ones to approach, and they appeared also to be ignorant of all signals, as they answered without obeying them. The engagement continued until about 7.30, when, it becoming dark, the Commodore Hull and Ceres were sent ahead to keep the ram in sight, and to remain on picket duty off the mouth of the Roanoke River, if he succeeded in entering it; the Mattabesett, Wyalusing, Miami, and Whitehead coming to anchor in the sound two miles and a half below. Eight torpedoes have been furnished by the army, and an attempt was made last night to place them in the mouth of the river: the entrance being watched, it was found impracticable. Another effort was made to-day, at two o'clock P. M., when the ram was discovered two miles above on his way out. During the engagement a seine was laid out across the ram's bow, in obedience to orders, to try and foul his propeller, but he passed over it without injury. A torpedo was rigged out from the bow of the Miami, and she was ordered to go ahead and attempt to explode it, but from some cause, yet unexplained, it was not done. She ran up, however, sheered off and delivered her broadside, and continued to fire at him rapidly. The injuries sustained by the ram are thought to be considerable, but his motive power is evidently uninjured. His boats were knocked off from the decks, and his stack riddled, and it is also believed that one of his guns was disabled. The ram is certainly very formidable. He is fast for that class of vessel, making from six to seven knots, turns quickly, and is armed with heavy guns, as is proved by the one hundred-pounder Brooks projectile that entered and lodged in the Mattabesett, and one hundred-pounder Whitworth shot received by the Wyalusing, while the shot fired at him were seen to strike fire upon the casemates and hull, flying upwards and falling in the water without having had any perceptible effect upon the vessel. I had tried the effect of ramming (as suggested by the department) in the case of the Sassacus, and was deterred from repeating the experiment by the injury she had sustained, and a signal from the Wyalusing that she was sinking, which, if the latter had been correct, (and I was not informed to the contrary until after the vessels came to anchor,) would have left too small a force of efficient vessels to keep the control of the sound, which I now hold, and shall be able to maintain against any rebel force that they will be able to organize at this point when present damages are repaired. I am convinced that side-wheel steamers cannot be laid alongside of the Albemarle without totally disabling their wheels, which is the reason for not adopting the suggestion contained in your order to me of the twenty-third instant. It is reported that the rebel barges with troops were at the mouth of the Croatan River, ready to come out, and *a steamer was seen* in that direction; but in regard to the first I have no positive information.

I herewith enclose a list of casualties on board the several vessels engaged, and will forward the detailed reports of the expenditure of ammunition and damages they sustained so soon as they are received from the commanding officer. I also forward you a hurried sketch of the appearance of the ram.

I am sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
MELANCTON SMITH,
Captain, and Senior Officer of the Sound.

Acting Rear-Admiral S. P. LEE,
Commanding N. A. B. Squadron.

ADDITIONAL REPORT OF CAPT. SMITH.

UNITED STATES STEAMER MATTABESETT,
OFF ROANOKE RIVER, May 5, 1864.

SIR: I should have embodied in my report the number of prisoners, arms, &c., captured in the Bombshell, but the Sassacus, who took her in charge after being herself disabled, is anchored some distance below, and has not communicated with me, and I have no available steamer to communicate with him. I am trying again to place torpedoes in the bend of the Roanoke River, two miles and a half from the mouth.

I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
MELANCTON SMITH,
Captain.

Acting Rear-Admiral S. P. LEE,
Commanding N. A. B. Squadron.

GENERAL ORDER AS TO PLAN OF ATTACK.

UNITED STATES STEAMER MATTABESETT,
ALBEMARLE SOUND, May 2, 1864.

THE steamers will advance in the third order of steaming, the Miami leading the second line of steamers.

Miami,	Mattabesett,
Ceres,	Sassacus,
Commodore Hull,	Wyalusing,
Seymour,	Whitehead.

The proposed plan of attack will be, for the large vessels to pass as close as possible to the ram, without endangering their wheels, delivering their fire, and rounding to immediately for a second discharge.

The steamer Miami will attack the ram, and endeavor to explode her torpedo at any moment she may have the advantage, or a favorable opportunity. Specific orders cannot be given for the attack, as the manœuvring of the ram cannot be anticipated, and the only order considered necessary is to sink, destroy, or capture by some or all methods here suggested. The stern of the ram is to be fired at by any of the vessels having a heavy gun, taking care not to fire when any of our own vessels are in range. The propeller is to be fouled, if possible, by lines from the stems of our vessels, or with the fish-net, as heretofore proposed.

The stack of the ram is supposed to be capped, rendering it impossible to throw powder or shell down, but all vessels having hose should be prepared to lead them up under the cap in the event of getting alongside. The stern and ports are probably the most vulnerable points, and should

be assailed by every vessel having an opportunity to fire into them. A blow from the ram must be received, if possible, on the bow, and as near the stem as our steering will permit; and if the prod should enter a vessel in that manner, open wide and go ahead, to prevent her withdrawing it, when the other vessels will attack the propeller.

Should the thirty armed launches accompany the ram, the small steamers will run them down, using their howitzers with shrapnel on approaching, and hand grenades when near. Small grapnels should be in readiness to throw at the stack, and secure our vessels alongside when other experiments have failed. Ramming may be resorted to, but the peculiar construction of the stems of the double-enders will render this a matter of serious consideration with their commanders, who will be at liberty to use their judgment as to the propriety of this course when a chance shall present itself.

M. SMITH,
Senior Officer.

CASUALTIES ON THE SASSACUS.

UNITED STATES STEAMER SASSACUS, May 6, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of casualties arising on board this ship from the engagement of the fifth instant:

James M. Hobby, first assistant engineer, scalded severely; G. H. Doyle, first class fireman, ditto; Thomas Welch, first class fireman, scalded, perhaps fatally; James Tillot, first class fireman, William Sutherland, first class fireman, Edward Kelly, second class fireman, and Joseph Murray, second class fireman, scalded and wounded, perhaps fatally; O. H. Merrell, second class fireman, scalded very severely; Charles White, second class fireman, scalded very severely; Thomas Johnson, second coal-heaver, killed; John English, coal-heaver, M. Sullivan, coal-heaver, and E. Sullivan, coal-heaver, scalded; E. H. Mayer, ensign, and E. Sawyer, ensign, contusion, not severe; E. Clayton, ordinary seaman, and John Lang, captain after guard, wounded severely; William McKay, carpenter's mate, and George Simms, captain's steward, wounded, not seriously; and T. W. Smith, seaman, scalded.

Respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
EDGAR HOLDEN,
Assistant-Surgeon, U. S. N.

Lieutenant-Commander F. A. ROE,
Commanding.

CASUALTIES ON THE MATTABESETT.

UNITED STATES STEAMER MATTABESETT, ALBEMARLE SOUND, N. C., May 5, 1864.

SIR: I would most respectfully report the following casualties on board this ship during the action with the rebel ram to-day:

Killed. — Ralph E. Lake, first class fireman, and William H. Dewitt, first class boy.

Wounded. — James L. Plunkett, acting master, contusion of right thigh; Daniel Lamon, captain forecastle, lacerated wound of scalp; James Mulvehill, ordinary seaman, contused wound of back and left elbow; Greenburg T. Smith, landsman, contused wound of left shoulder; Charles F. Moeller, first class boy, wound of right knee and ecchymosis of left eyebrow and lid; John B. Jewett, landsman, punctured wound of right fore-arm.

Very respectfully, &c.,
SAMUEL P. BOYER,
Acting Assistant-Surgeon, U. S. N.

Commander JOHN C. FEBIGER,
United States Navy.

CASUALTIES ON THE WYALUSING.

UNITED STATES STEAMER WYALUSING, OFF ROANOKE RIVER, May 5, 1864.

SIR: I regret to report the death of John A. Oliver, landsman, by being struck on the right side of the head, on the temporal bone, near the suture, by a fragment of iron shot away from off one of the starboard smoke-stack guys, forward, penetrating his skull into the brain. He was killed at the nine-inch gun forward.

Respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
CHARLES W. SARTORI,
Surgeon, United States Navy.

Lieutenant-Commander W. W. QUEEN,
Commanding U. S. Steamer Wyalusing,
off Roanoke River, N. C.

REPORT ON COMMANDER JOHN C. FEBIGER.

UNITED STATES STEAMER MATTABESETT, ALBEMARLE SOUND, N. C., May 6, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this vessel yesterday in the engagement with the rebel ram Albemarle. At three P. M., discovering the picket boats stationed off the mouth of the Roanoke River to be falling back, as ordered when the ram appeared, we made general signal to get under way. At ten minutes past three got under way and stood up the sound, with the Sassacus, Wyalusing, and Whitehead following in first order of steaming. At forty-five minutes past three made signal, "ram is out;" the Miami, Commodore Hull, and Ceres falling into position as we came up on port quarter, thus forming the third order, as directed. At twenty minutes past four Miami made signal, "the enemy is retreating," the ram and gunboat being observed to have their heads pointing towards the entrance of Roanoke River, distance about ten (10) miles. At forty minutes past four, when abaft the ram's beam, she fired two shots, one of which cut away both rails of launch and spar across davits, scattering splinters and wounding Acting Master Plunkett very slightly, two men severely and three slightly, all belonging to forward rifle gun. Noticing immediately after the firing an evident intention on the part of the ram to run into us, the helm was ordered to starboard, sheering to port, thus causing us to pass at a greater distance than was our intention. At forty-five minutes past four, when a little abaft the ram's beam, at between one hundred (100) and one hundred and fifty (150) yards distance, fired our starboard rifles and (9) nine-inch guns with solid shot, passing ahead, and when nearly

abeam of the Bombshell, firing the starboard howitzers and forward rifles at her. She immediately hauling down her colors and showing a white flag, orders were at once given to stop firing on her, and the howitzer's crew were sent to assist the crews of the two rifle guns. Passing ahead, the helm was put to port with the intention of running close along the starboard side of the enemy; but the smaller vessel, not keeping position or following our lead, we were soon compelled to stop the engine, being within their line of fire. Our vessels at this time were on both sides of the Albemarle, this vessel, the Wyalusing, and Sassacus being the only ones that had then rounded her bows, we being on her quarter, Sassacus abeam, and Wyalusing on starboard bow, all having stopped their engines. At five minutes past five the Sassacus ran down bows on, striking the Albemarle on starboard quarter. After remaining in contact some few minutes she disengaged herself, and soon afterwards was seen to be enveloped in steam; at this time the colors of the Albemarle were either shot away or hauled down, and were not hoisted again during the action. As her fire had ceased, we were under the impression that she had surrendered, until, soon after the Sassacus had got clear, she was observed to resume it; this vessel and others immediately doing the same. The squadron still remaining out of position, and endangering each other by their fire, our attention was turned to getting them into line. At twenty minutes past five we made signal to Miami "to pass within hail;" (she was soon after hailed, and ordered to go ahead and try her torpedo.) At half past five made general signal to keep in line, and forty-five minutes past five repeated the signal. At fifty-five minutes past five made signal to Wyalusing "to cease firing," she being still on ram's starboard bow; the remainder of the vessels (with the exception of the Sassacus, which had hauled off) were taking position on port quarter of the enemy. At five minutes past six made general signal to keep close order. At forty-five minutes past six made signal to Wyalusing to cease firing, she at the time coming round to take position. Soon after hailing her with an order to go ahead of the line and pass close to Albemarle, in reply she reported herself sinking, and at fifty-five minutes past six made signal "sinking;" but still going ahead, finally took her position. Finding that the line was gradually edging off, we steamed ahead inside, delivering our fire as rapidly as possible when on the quarter and abeam of the enemy, and after having passed ahead attempted to lay our seine in her course for the purpose of fouling her propellers, but, unfortunately, it was torn and lost before getting into the desired position. We then rounded the vessel to port, working the port battery; when nearly abeam of the enemy we received a six-inch rifle shot, which entered on the port side below wheel-house guards and abaft wheel, passing through water-ways, combings of engine-room hatch, wounding a first class fireman and boy so severely that they died soon afterwards, and bringing up in small arm locker. This shot is preserved on board, and is marked with the name of John M. Brooke. At half-past seven, growing quite dark, ceased firing, and at eight made private signal to anchor, coming into line abreast, heading to southward.

I am happy to state that the conduct of our crew, officers and men, was all, and more than could be reasonably expected from the imperfect state of organization, having had but few opportunities for exercise and drill since our hurried departure from New York. The firing was remarkably good under the circumstances, but the shot seemed to have but little effect upon the enemy.

Our pilot, Mr. Tooker, deserves mention for coolness and attention to his duties during our constant manœuvrings.

Enclosed are returns of gunner's expenditures, and report of injuries. The surgeon's report I have already had the honor to submit.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN C. FEBIGER,
Commander.

Captain MELANCTON SMITH,
Commanding Officer of Albemarle Sound, N. C.

AMMUNITION USED ON THE MATTABESETT.

In Gunner's Department.

Nineteen thirteen-pound charges, nine-inch.
Four ten-pound charges, nine-inch.
Twenty-seven ten-pound charges, a hundred-pounder Parrott.
Sixty primers.
Nineteen grommet wads.
Four junk wads.
Three breechings.
Two lock strings.
One two-pound charge, twenty-four-pound howitzer.
One one-pound charge, twelve-pounder rifle.
Twenty-seven solid shot, one hundred-pounder Parrott.
Twenty-three solid shot, nine-inch.
One shrapnel, twenty-four-pounder howitzer.
One Dahlgren shell, twelve-pounder howitzer.
One thumb-screw.
Eight muskets and eight sabre bayonets, with scabbards.

Respectfully submitted,

A. N. MITCHELL,
Lieutenant, and Executive Officer.

REPORT OF DAMAGES TO THE MATTABESETT.

Carpenter's Department.

Rail of launch stove in, and davit spar carried away; shot through waterways, just abaft port wheel, passed on through combing of engine-room hatch, carrying away the two after stanchions of hand-rail around crank-room, then through starboard combing, and carried away two sections of engine-room bulkheads, and one section of gallery bulkhead; also carried away deck bell-pulls, and second locker of armory on starboard side; forward stanchion of hurricane deck on port side carried away by No. 1 nine-inch broadside.

Boatswain's Department.

Square-sail buntlines.
Both vangs of main gaff.
Starboard main-boom topping-lift.
Peak halyards stranded.
Port main-topmast stay and main-topmast back stay.
One seine.
All shrouds starboard main lower rigging stranded, and forward shroud of starboard fore lower rigging ditto; also one ratline carried away by same shot.

Respectfully submitted.

A. N. MITCHELL,
Lieutenant, and Executive Officer.

Respectfully forwarded.

MELANCTON SMITH.

Respectfully referred to the consideration of the department. Commander Febiger seems to have handled his vessel well, and, with his officers and men, to deserve much credit for gallant conduct.

S. P. LEE,
Acting Rear-Admiral.

REPORT OF LIEUT.-COMMANDER F. A. ROE.

U. S. STEAMER SASSACUS, ALBEMARLE SOUND, NORTH CAROLINA, May 6, 1864.

SIR: I respectfully report on the action of this vessel with the rebel iron-clad Albemarle and gunboat Bombshell, at the head of Albemarle Sound, on the afternoon of the fifth instant, in company with the squadron under your command.

Steaming up the sound, about four P. M. yesterday, the Sassacus occupied the station next astern the Mattabesett, and the Wyalusing following, when we made out the ram, accompanied by the Bombshell and another steamer, coming down, driving the Miami and picket boats before them. Following your lead in the Mattabesett, I headed up the pass on the starboard side of the ram, and when nearly abreast of her starboard beam the Sassacus delivered her broadside. In this time the ram sheered with her port helm, for the purpose of ramming, but our superior speed foiled her in this attempt, and the Sassacus passed around her stern with a hard port helm. Off the port quarter of the ram lay the Bombshell, which had opened fire simultaneous with the ram, with rifle guns, which had annoyed me a good deal. I gave her the starboard battery, each shot hulling her, when she displayed white flags, and signals of surrender. Passing up to close hail of her, I demanded of her if she had surrendered. They said they had, and the rebel flag was hauled down, and I ordered her to drop down out of the way, and anchor: this was done.

As the Mattabesett had passed around the stern of the ram, and was heading down the sound again, the ram had turned partially round with a port helm, and now lay broadside to me. As the Sassacus had been drawn off some little distance by her operations and capture of the Bombshell, she had a good distance to get headway, and seeing a favorable moment before me, I ordered full steam and open throttle, and laid the ships fair for the broadside of the ram to run her down. The Sassacus struck her fairly, just abaft her starboard beam, in the position of the rear of the house or casemate, with a speed of nine to ten knots, making twenty-two revolutions, with thirty pounds steam. As I struck, she sent a hundred-pounder rifle shot through and through, from starboard bow to port side, on the berth deck.

The collision was pretty heavy, and the ram careened a good deal, so much so, that the water washed over her deck forward and aft the casemate. At one time I thought she was going down; I kept the engine going, pushing, as I hoped, deeper and deeper into her, and also hoping it might be possible for some one of the boats to get up on the opposite side of me, and perhaps enable us to sink her, or at least, to get well on to him on all sides. I retained this position full ten minutes, throwing grenades down her deck hatch, and trying in vain to get powder into her smoke-stack, and receiving volleys of musketry, when the stern of the ram began to go round, and her broadside port bearing on our starboard bow, when the ram fired, and sent a hundred-pounder Brooks rifle shot through the starboard side on the berth deck, passing through the empty bunkers into the starboard boiler, clean through it, fore and aft, and finally lodging in the ward-room. In a moment the steam filled every portion of the ship, from the hurricane deck to the fire-rooms, killing some, stifling some, and rendering all movement for a time impossible. When the steam cleared away so I could look around me, I saw my antagonist was away from me, and steaming off. In the mean time the engine was going, as no one could do anything below, some sixteen men being scalded. I then put the helm hard a port, headed up the sound, and around to the land, in order to clear the field for the other boats. Soon as the steam cleared up, and the effect of the explosion over, the officers and men immediately went to the guns, and kept them going upon the enemy until we drifted out of range. I tried to ricochet several nine-inch shot, so that she might be struck on her bottom by the upward bound of the shot; but I had the mortification to see every shot strike the water inside of her, and rise on the opposite side of her. While alongside of her, and almost simultaneous with the fatal shot of the enemy, Acting Ensign Mayer sent a hundred-pounder solid shot at her port, which broke into fragments, one of which rebounded and fell on our deck, as did also some fragments of grenades. While thus together, I fired three separate shots into one of her ports; we clearly observed the muzzles of two of his guns broken very badly. After the separation of the two vessels, the Sassacus was headed finally down the sound, and continued to move very slowly, working on a vacuum, and finally stopped, when I dropped anchor. In the mean time the Mattabesett and Wyalusing gallantly went in, and the fight was nobly maintained by those vessels.

While I regret the unfortunate accident which

drifted the Sassacus out of action, I cannot but hope and believe that her struggle with the iron-clad ram at such close quarters, and the act of running her down, were productive of great good. If we ever hear from the shots delivered when alongside of the ram, it will be consoling to us, as I am convinced they did some execution in the port. Yet I am forced to think that the Albemarle is more formidable than the Merrimac or Atlantic, for our solid one hundred-pounder rifle shot flew into splinters upon her iron plates. I have to report that the signal-books of this vessel were thrown overboard, and sunk, at the time the boiler was struck, and the ship enveloped in suffocating steam. It was appalling for a few moments, and the devotion with which the officers and men of the Sassacus stuck to and worked the guns fills me with professional pride. After anchoring, I sent the army steam-tug to bring the gunboat Bombshell, which had surrendered to us before we struck the ram under our guns. I then put a prize crew aboard, pumped her out, started her fires, and got up steam on her. She is now ready to move. I took her prisoners from the Ceres, where they had been temporarily placed. The injuries to the Sassacus will be found in the report of officers of different departments, which I herewith enclose, as also the surgeon's report of scalded and wounded. I would respectfully report the Sassacus as disabled for active operations until she can be repaired, and would request a survey upon her when it is convenient to grant it. In this unequal conflict of the wooden gunboats against an iron-clad, it gives me special pleasure to speak of the gallant and devoted bearing of officers and men. The maintenance of the fight with their guns, after the frightful disaster of the boiler, was worthy of the proudest day of our naval history. The divisional officers were cool, and I must note that Acting Ensign Mayer, at the forward rifle, one hundred-pounder, when loading and firing, almost muzzle to muzzle with the enemy's gun, was beautiful in his cool courage. I take great pleasure in testifying to the fine conduct of Acting Masters A. W. Muldaur and C. A. Boutelle. These officers were as cool and fearless as if at a general exercise. I respectfully recommend each for promotion to the grade of Lieutenant, deserved for good behavior and ability before the enemy in battle. I also respectfully recommend Acting Master's Mate O'Hara for examination for promotion to the grade of Ensign. Acting Assistant Paymaster G. De F. Barton acted as Aid and signal officer to me, and I take pleasure in acknowledging his coolness and attention to duty, while under a hot fire, where he voluntarily placed himself.

To the heroism and devotion of First Assistant Engineer J. M. Hobby, the government is probably indebted for the preservation of the Sassacus from a worse disaster. While every one who could, was forced to seek safety by flight from the scalding clouds of steam, Mr. Hobby stood at his post by the machinery, and though fearfully scalded himself, he cared for his machinery until the engine finally stopped. If it were possible to promote this officer, I earnestly and devoutly beg it may be done, for I consider that it has been amply and professionally won.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

F. A. Roe,
Lieutenant-Commander.

Captain M. Smith,
Com'dg Naval Forces in Sounds of NorthCarolina.

REPORT OF ENGINEER J. M. HOBBY.

United States Steamer Sassacus,
Albemarle Sound, North Carolina, May 5, 1864.

Sir: I respectfully report the following damage sustained by the machinery of this ship during the engagement with the rebel ram Roanoke on the fifth instant:

At six P. M. a six-inch rifled solid shot came through the starboard side of the ship about five feet above the berth deck; it passed through the forward bunker into the starboard boiler, seven feet from the front and fourteen inches from the top, cutting T-iron braces and dry pipe; thence through the after end of the boiler, cutting away Wordworth pump, steam and exhaust pipes, through engine-room; cutting a stanchion, thermometer, and exhaust unhooking gear between main cylinder and condenser; thence through bulkhead into the ward-room. The starboard wheel is badly knocked out of shape by coming in contact with the ram's stem as we passed her. The escape of steam was so great as to reduce the pressure in the boiler to nothing almost instantaneously. The steam so filled the engine and fire-rooms that it was with the greatest exertions on the part of the engineers that the fires were hauled. The division of firemen were all scalded and one instantly killed.

We will be able to finish the repairs by to-morrow sufficiently well as to steam under one boiler.

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. M. Hobby,
First Assistant Engineer, in charge.

Lieutenant-Commander F. A. Roe,
Commanding U. S. Steamer Sassacus.

[Indorsement.]

Agawam, May 16, 1864.

The attention of the Navy Department is respectfully called to the gallant conduct of Lieutenant-Commander Roe, and that of the officers whom he recommends for promotion.

S. P. Lee,
Acting Rear-Admiral.

REPORT OF LIEUT.-COMMANDER QUEEN.

United States Steamer Wyalusing,
Albemarle Sound, off Roanoke River,
May 6, 1864.

Sir: In obedience to your signal, at three o'clock P. M. of fifth, we immediately got under way, taking our station in line astern of the Sassacus, the Mattabesett leading, and stood up the sound in close order.

Signals were made by you soon afterwards that

the ram was out; we also discovered at the same time that our picket boats were falling back, pursued by the ram and two steamers in company. We immediately beat to quarters, (at twenty-seven minutes past four o'clock;) being in close range, about five hundred yards, we opened fire, simultaneously with the Mattabesett and Sassacus, passing the ram at the distance of one hundred and fifty yards, firing rapidly. In rounding the ram we came in contact with one of her consorts. It was my intention to run her down, but discovered in time she had surrendered; we immediately backed clear of her, and again attacked the ram, which had been in contact with the Sassacus, who had run into her. As she cleared from the Sassacus, in firing from our vessel we cut her signal halyards; she hauled down the flag, and I supposed she had surrendered, as she did not hoist it again during the action, but was soon convinced to the contrary.

At 5.30 flag-ship made general signal to keep close in line; at 5.45 repeated the signal; at 5.55 made signal to this ship to cease firing. At this time we were passing around the ram to form again into line, which had been interrupted by the Second division, who were firing at long range and over this ship. At 6.05 resumed our position in close order, by signal from the flag-ship. At 6.45, having again passed around the ram, signals were made to cease firing. At this time a report was made to me by the executive officer and third assistant engineer, J. J. Donahoe, who was stationed at the bell, that the ship was sinking. I immediately signalized it, and sent an order to chief engineer to start all the pumps. He informed me that it was not necessary, as the ship was not making more water than usual.

I was hailed from the flag-ship, but could not understand what was said. I made again for the ram, and followed her up closely, passing around her, and firing as often as possible at her, the distance varying from one hundred yards and upwards. Near the close of the action one of the pieces of the forward port-side plating of the ram was seen to fly off, from the effects of one of our shot. At 7.30 signal was made to cease firing, and by private signal we anchored at eight o'clock.

We received the following damages: One shell exploded in the starboard wheel-house, cutting away two of the outer rims of the starboard wheel, and blowing off a portion of the top part of the wheel-house; passing through the aft pilot-house, damaging the steering wheel, breaking the compass, tearing off a portion of the plating, and passing through and through the mainmast about thirty feet above deck; also through the hurricane deck into the starboard bath-room, and chipping a piece off of the top of the aft howitzer mounted on the hurricane deck. The second shot passed between the bottom of the gig and the rail, knocking off all her under planking, carrying away the starboard smoke-stack guy, killing one of the men at the nine-inch gun, tearing away the stanchion supporting the hurricane deck amidships, then through the engineer's store-room on the port guard forehead. The third shot came in on the starboard side of the berth deck, near the dispensary, tearing away ladder, bulkhead; through the port coal-bunkers, passing out in the port side a few feet forward of the boiler. The fourth shot came in on the starboard quarter about three feet above the water line, passing through the cabin, destroying mirror, chairs, furniture, &c., &c., bulkhead, companion-way, pantries; striking against a knee in the aft room, on the port side of ward-room, glancing upwards, tearing up the deck plankings, starting the water-ways, and breaking away two of the starts for the breechings, landing on deck; this proved to be a hundred-pound Whitworth solid rifle shot. The fifth passed over the quarter deck in a parallel line with the pivot gun, passing through one of the port shutters. Pieces of exploded shell cut away one of the shrouds of the main rigging; also the brails, passing through the mainsail.

The officers and crew fought bravely, and have merited my highest thanks for the manner in which they handled their several batteries. Too much praise cannot be bestowed upon them.

My executive officer, Acting Master William R. Hathway, who is one of the oldest appointments in this grade, I strongly recommend for promotion. The surgeon and paymaster rendered me very important aid in the supply of ammunition, and in making themselves generally useful. The chief engineer, H. H. Stewart, handled the machinery in a most able manner. I am also indebted to my clerk, George H. White, Jr., who acted as my Aid, for the efficient manner in which he carried out my orders.

Expended the following ammunition:

75 ten-pound charges, a hundred-pounder rifle.
47 solid shot, a hundred-pounder rifle.
20 5″ shell, a hundred-pounder rifle.
8 percussion shell, a hundred-pounder rifle.
40 thirteen-pound charges, nine-inch gun.
30 ten-pound charges, nine-inch gun.
37 solid shot, nine-inch gun.
33 5″ shell, nine-inch gun.
18 shell, twenty-four-pounder howitzer.
27 shrapnel, twenty-four-pounder howitzer.
210 primers.

I enclose you the surgeon and chief engineer's report.

I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
W. W. QUEEN,
Lieutenant-Commander, commanding.

Captain M. SMITH, U. S. N.,
Commanding Officer in the Sounds of North Carolina.

[Indorsement.]

AGAWAM, May 16, 1864.

Lieutenant-Commander Queen, his officers and men, appear to have done well their part in this gallant action.

S. P. LEE,
Acting Rear-Admiral.

REPORT OF ENGINEER H. H. STEWART.

UNITED STATES STEAMER WYALUSING, ALBEMARLE SOUND, May 6, 1864.

SIR: I have carefully examined the engines, boilers, and dependencies of this vessel, and, agreeably to your request, have the honor to report that the following is the amount of damage sustained during the late action:

Two of the outer rims in the starboard wheel were fractured, and a portion of the top of the wheel-house blown off; one of the smoke-pipe guys was cut off; one of the bell-wires also gave way during the engagement, but has been repaired. I am yours, respectfully,

H. H. STEWART,
Chief Engineer, United States Navy.

Lieut.-Com. W. W. QUEEN, U. S. N.,
Commanding.

REPORT OF ACTING MASTER JOSSELYN.

UNITED STATES STEAMER COMMODORE HULL, OFF ROANOKE RIVER, N. C., May 6, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to report the part taken by this vessel in the action of the fifth instant with the rebel ram.

I first sighted the ram at half past one o'clock, P. M., coming out of the river in company with two steamers, distant about two miles. In accordance with previous instructions, I retreated slowly down the sound, keeping out of range of her guns until the flag-ship came up, when I fell into line astern of the Miami. About five o'clock I fired several shots from my pivot guns at the ram, striking it once or twice.

At half past six I engaged the ram at close quarters, firing shell from my pivot and broadside guns, many of which struck the vessel, effectually preventing the opening of her ports. As I steamed ahead, in passing the ram's bow I paid out a large seine for the purpose of fouling his propeller, but, though encompassing the ram, it did not have the desired effect.

I ceased firing when it became too dark to distinguish the enemy. I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of my officers and crew, many of the latter being for the first time under fire. This vessel was not struck, and I have no casualties to report.

Enclosed is a list of ammunition expended.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRANCIS JOSSELYN,
Acting Master, commanding.

Captain MELANCTON SMITH, U. S. N.,
Senior Officer, Sounds of North Carolina.

ADDITIONAL REPORT OF ACTING MASTER JOSSELYN.

UNITED STATES STEAMER COMMODORE HULL, OFF ROANOKE RIVER, N. C., May 6, 1864.

Report of ammunition expended during engagement of May fifth:

Thirty-pounder Parrott shell, sixty, (60.)

Twenty-four-pounder howitzer shell, twenty-one, (21.) Respectfully submitted,

F. JOSSELYN,
Acting Master, commanding.

Captain MELANCTON SMITH, U. S. N.,
Senior Officer, Sounds of North Carolina.

REPORT OF LIEUT. CHARLES A. FRENCH.

UNITED STATES STEAMER MIAMI, OFF MOUTH OF ROANOKE RIVER, N. C., May 6, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the engagement with the rebel iron-clad ram Albemarle, and Bombshell. Yesterday, at one P. M., I got under way, in company with the Commodore Hull, Ceres, and army transport Trumpeter, and proceeded from our picket station, off Edenton Bay, across to the mouth of the Roanoke, for the purpose of putting down torpedoes. When within a short distance of the buoy at the mouth of the river, the rebel ram Albemarle was discovered coming down the river, accompanied by the Cotton Plant and Bombshell, the last two steamers laden with troops. I immediately despatched the Trumpeter to give you the earliest notice of their appearance. The vessels under my command were ordered to steam in line slowly down the sound, at such a distance that the enemy's movements could be watched. We dropped down to Bluff Point, the enemy following us determinedly. As soon as you came up, I steamed ahead, ready to follow your movements, and engage the enemy. At twenty minutes to five I opened fire with solid shot, and continued firing rapidly, with good range. The ram was struck by us at almost our first fire, and I have to report, throughout the action, excellent firing by both divisions of this ship. I saw the Sassacus running into the ram, and immediately headed for them both, with the intention of exploding under the ram the torpedo rigged on my bow; before I could get to her, however, the Sassacus became disabled, and dropped down from her. The ram had changed her course, and I could not work to advantage, on account of the fire of our own vessels. I still kept up a fire when it could be done without exposing the other vessels of our fleet. After we had been firing about an hour, you ordered me to run up to the ram and use the torpedo. I steamed ahead, still keeping up a rapid fire, until we got within the ship's length of her. I used every endeavor to get at her, bows on, but the Miami proving herself so unwieldy, and so very bad to steer, the enemy, (who was probably well aware of our purpose,) succeeded in keeping clear of us, by going ahead and backing and turning. We did not cease our fire, however, all this time. The enemy struck us three or four times while within this chase range; one shot, which passed through the after part of the cabin, came very near disabling our rudder. I dropped down from her, and reported to you the reason why I could not get my torpedo to work. You then ordered me to follow the Wyalusing in order. I did so, keeping up a fire which I believe was more effective than at any previous time, as I am confident one of our shot struck the upper part of her port while open, if it did not pass into her interior. Owing to the danger of getting aground, and the fact of the ship handling so badly, I deemed my fire more effectual at close range to be on one side of her than to attempt to pass clear around her. For more than ten minutes we poured solid shot upon

her as rapidly as we could fire; I then dropped astern, to give the vessels coming up an opportunity to pass and engage her. It was then growing dark; the ram steamed up to the Roanoke River, and the firing soon ceased on both sides.

The officers and men of this ship behaved with great coolness, and did their whole duty.

Enclosed you will please find carpenter's and gunner's reports. Casualties, none.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHARLES A. FRENCH,
Acting Volunteer-Lieutenant, commanding.

Captain M. SMITH, U. S. N.,
Senior Naval Officer, Sounds North Carolina.

REPORT OF ACTING MASTER WELLS.

UNITED STATES STEAMER GUNBOAT MIAMI, May 6, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of ammunition expended on the fifth instant, in the action with the iron-clad ram Albemarle, in the Albemarle Sound.

Seventy-six (76) thirteen-pound nine-inch cartridges.
Seventy-six (76) solid nine-inch shot.
Forty-one (41) ten-pound six-inch cartridges; one hundred-pounder rifle.
Forty-one (41) solid six-inch shot, (chilled ends,) four long, and thirty-seven short.
Seventy-six (76) selvage wads.
One hundred and fifty (150) percussion primers.

I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

WM. N. WELLES,
Acting Master and Executive Officer.

Acting Vol. Lieut. CHARLES A. FRENCH,
Commanding U. S. Steamer Miami.

REPORT OF H. S. BUCKLEY, CARPENTER'S MATE.

UNITED STATES STEAMER MIAMI, May 6, 1864.

SIR: I respectfully submit the following report of damages received by this vessel, in hull, &c., during the engagement with the rebel ram Roanoke, in Albemarle Sound, on the afternoon of the fifth instant:

One shot struck smoke-stack, and passed through, scattering fragments over quarter deck; one struck starboard wheel-house, and carried away hand-rail, passing through port quarter boat, tearing away her planking; one shell struck under the starboard counter, passed through, cutting away hang knee under after beam, and bursting in tiller-room, cutting through solid work of after pivot boss, and carrying away two thirds of second after beam and hang knee on port side, starting two outside planks, and started the decks up under pivot gun, and knocked down the cabin bulkhead, making a total wreck of the tiller-room. The ship is very much shaken from the effects of the rapid firing, making about five inches of water per hour. Several shot and shell passed over our top gear, but did little damage, save cutting away smoke-stack guys.

During the engagement off Plymouth with the same vessel, the ram ran under our port bow, and scarred the planking for several feet, within fourteen inches of the water. A shell from gun No. 3 struck the ram, rebounded and exploded, cutting away port forward boat davit, and fragments passing through deck forward of boiler and starboard waist, and cutting away port smoke-stack guys, and passing through smoke-stack.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant.

HENRY S. BUCKLEY,
Carpenter's Mate.

Acting Vol. Lieut. C. A. FRENCH,
Commanding U. S. Steamer Miami.

REPORT OF ACTING MASTER FOSTER.

UNITED STATES STEAMER CERES, ALBEMARLE SOUND, May 6, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to report that during the engagement yesterday with the rebel ram this vessel received no damage, neither were there any casualties.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. H. FOSTER,
Acting Master, commanding.

Captain MELANCTON SMITH, U. S. N.,
Senior Naval Officer, Sounds of North Carolina.

REPORT OF ACTING ENSIGN BARRETT.

UNITED STATES STEAMER WHITEHEAD, OFF ROANOKE RIVER, N. C., May 6, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to report to you the part taken by this vessel during the engagement of yesterday (fifth) with the rebel iron-clad ram Albemarle and gunboat Bombshell.

In obedience to a general signal made by the flag-ship Mattabesett, I weighed anchor at 3.30, and proceeded up the Albemarle Sound, following the United States steamer Wyalusing. The rebel ram, accompanied by two steamers, was soon discovered apparently steaming towards us. Went to quarters immediately, and prepared for action. At 4.30 the action became general between the leading vessels, Mattabesett, Sassacus, and Wyalusing, and the ram Albemarle.

Owing to the superior rate of speed of the above-named vessels, I was unable to bring my vessel into action until after the rebel steamer Bombshell had surrendered. The rebel steamer Cotton Plant, with a number of launches in tow, having succeeded in making her escape, my attention was then directed to the ram, upon which I opened fire with the hundred-pounder rifle, using solid shot first at a distance of one thousand yards, but it was soon lessened to four hundred yards.

The ram, meanwhile, commenced to retreat towards Roanoke River.

Being ordered by you to take my position astern of the United States steamer Miami, and follow up the attack closely, I immediately took the position assigned; but finding that I could not use the hundred-pounder rifle effectively, I steamed ahead of the Miami, and on a course parallel to that which the rebel steamer was making, until I approached within two hundred yards of her. At this distance we succeeded in making some excellent shots, the projectiles used being solid chilled-end shot, which must have made a serious impression on the iron armor of

the ram, as I judged from the appearance of the plating on her, when viewed through a glass.

Keeping the ram on my starboard beam, I ran ahead of and across her bows, making a circuit about her.

Notwithstanding the heavy fire which was concentrated on the rebel iron-clad by our vessels, she succeeded, under the cover of approaching darkness, to make good her escape up the Roanoke River. Having ceased firing at 7.30 P. M., we came to anchor off the mouth of the river, at eight, with the fleet. I have no casualties to report. Ammunition expended, seventeen solid shot, rifle one hundred-pounder, and one hundred and seventy pounds common powder.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. W. BARRETT,
Acting Ensign, commanding.

Captain MELANCTON SMITH,
Senior Naval Officer, Sounds of N. C.

ADDITIONAL REPORTS OF LIEUT.-COM. ROE.

UNITED STATES STEAMER SASSACUS,
JAMES RIVER, June 24, 1864.

SIR: I respectfully request that the enclosed communication may be appended to my report of May sixth, on the engagement with the iron-clad Albemarle.

This paper is a duplicate of one sent to Captain Smith, at the time of its date, and I furnish it under the apprehension that the original may not have reached you.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

F. A. ROE,
Lieutenant-Commander.

Admiral S. P. LEE,
Com'ding N. A. B. Squadron, James River, Va.

UNITED STATES STEAMER SASSACUS,
ALBEMARLE SOUND, N. C., May 7, 1864.

SIR: My attention being called by you to that portion of my report of the Sassacus, in the engagement of the fifth instant, in relation to the capture of the Bombshell, it will be observed that the Sassacus was second in line astern of the Mattabesett, and was totally ignorant of what the latter vessel had done.

The Sassacus, seeing the Bombshell approach her, as she was coming around to attack the ram, ordered her to surrender, and go below and anchor, which was done.

I merely narrated the facts which occurred in this vessel, and the Mattabesett may have done precisely what the Sassacus did, without the latter knowing it.

I trust this will explain any apparent contradictions that may seem to exist in the reports of the two vessels.

I was not aware that she had already surrendered to the Mattabesett, as you state she had. Upon questioning Captain Hudgins, who commanded the Bombshell, and who is now a prisoner of war on board this ship, he replied, He surrendered his vessel to the second vessel in line; that his flag had not been hauled down to the first, and that no surrender had been made of his vessel until ordered by the *second* vessel in the line to do so, when he struck.

He did not, nor does he know the name of the vessel to whom he surrendered, but that it was to the second vessel in line.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

F. A. ROE,
Lieutenant, commanding.

Captain M. SMITH,
Commanding Naval Forces, Sounds of North Carolina.

ADDITIONAL REPORT OF CAPTAIN SMITH.

UNITED STATES STEAMER MATTABESETT,
ALBEMARLE SOUND, N. C., June 4, 1864.

SIR: Your order of May seventeenth, through Rear-Admiral Lee, directing a full report to be furnished of the collision of the Sassacus with the rebel ram Albemarle, together with a diagram showing the position of the two vessels, is received, and I have the honor to make the following report:

One report from Lieutenant-Commander Roe has already been forwarded to Admiral Lee, and I retained two — one from himself, and the other from his executive officer — to avoid multiplying testimony that appeared to me to be much exaggerated; but both reports are now enclosed.

Lieutenant-Commander Roe states that he "struck the ram Albemarle fairly, just abaft his beam, at about nine or ten knots' speed. The blow jarred and careened her so much that the water flowed freely over her decks." His executive officer states that "we had a start of three or four hundred yards, and were making about eleven knots when we struck her with our prow at right angles on the starboard quarter, at the junction of her after casemate with the hull, forcing her side under water two or three feet."

It is my impression that the Sassacus, when within five hundred yards of the ram, had stopped her engines, and when fairly pointed, commenced steaming towards him, making it apparent that she intended to try the effects of ramming. I remarked to Captain Febiger at that time, "How slow she moves;" and in a few moments she struck, as represented, *fairly*, and nearly at right angles, causing the water to flow over the *deck* aft.

I subsequently called Lieutenant-Commander Roe's attention to the statement made by him in reference to the rate of speed, which he evidently estimated by the number of revolutions, without considering the short distance he had to run, from a dead stand, to reach the ram; but as he was not disposed to make the correction, although I had taken the report on board for that purpose, as well as to examine his injuries, I forwarded it as it was.

I should judge, from the slight injury the vessel sustained, and the short distance that the Sassacus was from the ram when heading for him, that her speed did not exceed five knots. The Albemarle, as I have since learned, did not sustain the slighest injury from the collision.

Lieutenant-Commander Roe also states, "I put three rifle shot into her port, and the muzzles

of two of her guns were badly broken." This is evidently a mistake, as the Albemarle has but two guns, each one working in three ports, and not a man on board was injured. The muzzle of one gun was broken, and the four deserters from the ram report that it was damaged in the early part of the action on the port side, but they continued to use it throughout the engagement. The stems of the double-enders, as well as the rudder-guards, are nearly perpendicular, are very frail, and are not calculated to run up on the deck. Had they been armed, I am of opinion that the Sassacus would have brought sufficient weight upon the deck to have sunk him.

I herewith enclose a diagram of the position of the Sassacus and Albemarle at the time of collision, and after they had been separated by the ram's steaming ahead. I have sent also to Rear-Admiral Lee a fragment of a solid shot fired from the one hundred-pounder rifle of the Sassacus when close alongside, proving that the various reports heretofore made of the invulnerability of the ram have not been much exaggerated.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant.

MELANCTON SMITH,
Captain and Senior Officer, in Sounds of N. C.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

U. S. STEAMER SASSACUS, OFF BLUFF POINT, ALBEMARLE SOUND, (Midnight,) May 5, 1864.

SIR: I have not had opportunity to send you a written despatch earlier. I sent you verbal reports by the Ceres, which it appears you have not received.

I struck the ram Albemarle fairly, just abaft her beam, at about nine or ten knots speed. The blow jarred and careened her so much that the water flowed freely over her decks, and gave her so great a tilt, that I at one time hoped I should sink her. I kept the engine going, and retained my position there, forcing her broadside to for some ten minutes, hoping some of our gunboats might get up alongside, opposite to me, as she was unable to harm them by ramming. Finding this could not be, and she starting ahead, the Sassacus slued obliquely towards her starboard side, when she fired, raking us, putting a one hundred-pound rifle shot clean through our starboard boiler, fore and aft. We then fired the pivot rifle, striking her port side, and a fragment of this shot flew back upon my deck. This shot was broken into fragments. I fired again with similar results. I put three rifle shot into her port, *and the muzzles of two of her guns were badly broken.* The shock of the collision was heavy, but did me no damage that I yet know, except breaking and sluing aside the projection outside the rudder. She does not leak. I received two severe shots from the ram while alongside of her, which were returned with interest.

After the boiler was burst, the escape of steam blinded everybody, from the hurricane deck down to the fire-room. The steam was terrible. One man died instantly, and I shall probably lose four or five more. The chief engineer, Mr. Hobby, is badly scalded, but most nobly and heroically remained at his post, and saved us from a worse disaster, of explosion to the other boiler, and of being helpless. Soon as I drifted round clear of the ram, and amidst the suffocating steam, my men and officers jumped to the guns, and continued pouring out solid shot into the enemy, until we drifted down out of range. The engine was still working slowly on a vacuum, and I succeeded in getting her out of the way of the other gunboats, and was forced to withdraw finally from action only because the engine at last stopped.

In the mean time, before I rammed the ram, the enemy's gunboat Bombshell, with three rifle howitzers and one twenty-pounder Parrott, which had been playing upon us, was hulled, and ordered to surrender, which she did, hauling down the rebel flag. I ordered her to drop down below the scene of action and anchor, which she did.

After I got the Sassacus out of the way, I sent the army steam-tug to bring her alongside of me and anchor. This was done. The Ceres came up, and I removed from her the officers and men captured from the Bombshell; they are now on board this vessel. I sent a prize crew to the Bombshell, started her fires, and I believe she is now ready to move under steam.

I was compelled to haul all fires on board of this vessel, but am now trying to get steam on the port boiler. Some pipes are knocked away, yet I hope to get able to move slowly to-morrow. The starboard boiler is, I fear, totally ruined. I have no wounded to speak of from the enemy's shot. We were hulled several times, and the injury to the boiler is, I believe, the most serious I have.

My people behaved most gallantly; the officers nobly. I believe the ram is damaged; but if solid shot split into fragments, and fly back upon my deck, it is a proof that she is more formidable than the Atlanta or Merrimac.

When alongside of her we threw grenades down her hawse hatch from aloft. I had charges of powder prepared ready to throw down her stack, but could not do it from aloft.

She played musketry upon me severely all the time. I was well prepared for my work, and so far as I can know, the effort to run her down was fairly made. She is too strong for us.

I regret most profoundly that I was obliged to drift out of the fight just as it was becoming interesting, and when my services were still needed, but I fear I am now totally *hors de combat.* I shall await your orders here, as I learn the enemy has been driven out of the sound into his retreat. If we did not gain a victory, we have not suffered a defeat, and the enemy was driven before our wooden boats.

Be pleased to send me instructions about the Bombshell and my own ship. I will endeavor to send you a more specific report soon, and I pray you will excuse this hasty and imperfect one.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

F. A. ROE,
Lieutenant-Commander.

Captain M. SMITH,
Commanding Naval Forces, Sounds of North Carolina.

REPORT OF ACTING MASTER BOUTELLE.

UNITED STATES STEAMER SASSACUS, ALBEMARLE SOUND, May 6, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of damages received in the master's department of this ship during her engagement with the rebel iron-clad ram Albemarle and her consort, the rebel steamer Bombshell, on the fifth instant. In ramming the Albemarle, we had a a start of three to four hundred yards, and were making about eleven knots, when we struck her with our prow at right angles on her starboard quarter at the junction of her after casemate with the hull, forcing her side under water two or three feet, and pushing her broadside to before us; our bow then resting on her quarter, her engine working ahead, bringing a heavy strain across our bow, our outer or false stem with its ram, which had been started by the shock of collision, were forced off, the stem splintering from two and a half feet below the rail to the lower part of the rudder, and hanging by the lower portion across our bow on the starboard side, starting and splintering the outer wood ends, and tearing away all of the false bow forward of the rudder, which is apparently not materially injured on its inner portion, as it moves quite freely by the use of the wheel. The position in which we lay when first striking the ram rendered it impossible for him to train any of his guns upon us, but the headway of the two vessels, exerted at right angles, forced her gradually round on our starboard bow, when he fired two six-inch rifle shots into us in rapid succession. The first of these, fired from his after gun so near as to cover our bow with smoke and burned powder, entered ten feet abaft the stem and three feet above the copper on the starboard side, passing through the yeoman's storeroom, thence diagonally across the berth-deck, and striking between the skin and the back of the fifth hanging knee from forward on the port side, cut through the ship's side at an angle of about twenty degrees, and fell in the water astern. This shot was immediately followed by a similar one from his forward gun, which shot entering abreast of the foremast four feet above the water on the starboard side, crushed obliquely through the side, cutting through the back of hanging knee, and leaving the inside of the ceiling about seven and one-half feet abaft where it first struck on the outside. From thence it passed through the throat of the next hanging knee, through the dispensary and bulkhead, starboard coal-bunker, passing on through the starboard boiler, and keeping on through the engine-room, cut in two a three-inch iron stanchion, thence through steerage and ward-room bulkheads, smashing doors and sideboard, cutting through magazine screen, when, striking an oak stanchion, which it splintered, it glanced at right angles and lodged in one of the starboard state-rooms. Many other shot passed over the ship, one of them cutting through the boarding netting two feet above the rail on port quarter, but most of them passing between the spars and rigging, which were not injured. In clearing the ram, our starboard wheel passed over her stern, crushing a launch which she was towing, and injuring the buckets and braces more or less on her hull. On examination I find that the shot holes are all well above the water-line, and as the ship makes no more water than usual, I think her actual injury to the hull much less than would seem a natural result from so tremendous a shock.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. A. BOUTELLE,
Acting Master, U. S. N.

Lieutenant-Commander FRANCIS A. ROE,
U. S. Steamer Sassacus, Albemarle Sound, N. C.

ADDITIONAL REPORT OF CAPT. SMITH.

UNITED STATES STEAMER MATTABESETT, ALBEMARLE SOUND, N. C., May 24, 1864.

SIR: I have to report the ram made his appearance to-day for the first time since the engagement of the fifth instant. He came down in sight of the picket boats stationed off the mouth of the Roanoke River, with head up stream, and was accompanied by a row-boat that pulled several times diagonally across the river, as if dragging for torpedoes. The Whitehead fired a shell, which exploded near his stern, when the Albemarle immediately steamed up the river.

I have heard from contrabands and refugees direct from Plymouth, that the plating of the ram was much injured; that four of our shots penetrated his outer armor, and that the concussion caused by our fire was so severe that it was found impossible to keep a light burning, and that one of the guns was rendered useless. What repairs have been made are not known.

I am of the opinion, from the intelligence received from Plymouth, that they are evacuating the place. Several guns have been sent up the river, and large loads of furniture are being towed up by every steamer. The guns of the Southfield have been raised; one has been sent away, and two are on the wharf ready for transportation. I have informed the commanding General at Newbern of the state of affairs at Plymouth, and signified my desire to coöperate with him in retaking the place if he could spare the necessary force, as I have heard from a reliable source that they have but two hundred men and the ram to guard it. * * * I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

MELANCTON SMITH,
Captain and Senior Officer, in Sounds of N. C.

Acting Rear-Admiral S. P. LEE,
Commanding N. A. B. Squadron.

DOC. 18.

DESTRUCTION OF THE HATTERAS.

CAPT. RAPHAEL SEMMES'S REPORT.

C. S. STEAMER ALABAMA, BAHIA, May 17, 1863.

I ARRIVED at Galveston (under sail) on the eleventh of January, and just before nightfall made the enemy's fleet lying off the bar, consisting of five ships of war. One of the steamers was soon after perceived to get under way, and steer in our direction. I ordered steam to be got up,

but set sail on the ship as a decoy, that I might entice the enemy's ship sufficiently far from the fleet to offer her battle. I wore ship and stood away from the bar, permitting the enemy to approach me by slow degrees. When the enemy had approached sufficiently near, I took in all sail, and wearing short around, ran up within hail. It was now dark, it being about seven o'clock.

The enemy hailed, "What ship is that?" We responded, "Her Majesty's steamer Petrel." The reply was, "I will send a boat on board." We now hailed in turn, to know who the enemy was, and when we had received the reply that he was the "United States steamer Hatteras," we again hailed him, and informed him that we were the Confederate steamer Alabama; and at the same time I directed the First Lieutenant to open fire upon him. Our fire was promptly returned, and a brisk action ensued, which lasted, however, only thirteen minutes, as at the end of that time the enemy fired an off gun and showed a light; and upon being hailed by us to know if he had surrendered, he replied that he had, and that he was in a sinking condition. I immediately despatched boats to his assistance, and had just time to remove the crew when the ship went down.

The casualties were slight on both sides, although the action was fought at a distance of from one hundred and fifty to four hundred yards. Our shot all told on his hull about the water line, and hence the small number of killed and wounded on the part of the enemy — two of the former and three of the latter. We had none killed and only one wounded. The Hatteras mounted eight guns, and had a crew of eighteen officers and one hundred and eight men. The Alabama also mounted eight guns, (with a small captured piece, a twenty-four pounder, too light to be of any service,) and had a crew of one hundred and ten men, exclusive of officers. Four of the Hatteras' guns were thirty-two pounders — the same calibre as our broadside guns, but our pivot guns were heavier than hers, this being the only disparity between the two ships.

We received a few shot holes from the enemy, doing no material damage. The enemy's steamer steamed out in pursuit of us soon after the action commenced, but missed us in the darkness of the night. Being embarrassed with a large number of prisoners, I steamed directly for Jamaica, where I arrived on the twentieth of January. Here I landed my prisoners, repaired damages, coaled ship, and on the twenty-fifth of January I proceeded to sea again. On the twenty-eighth of January I touched at the city of St. Domingo, in the island of the same name, and landed the crews of two of the enemy's ships which I had burned. I sailed again on the same day, and made my way to ——, thence to the island of ——, and thence to this place, where I arrived yesterday — burning, bonding, and destroying enemy's ships, as per list enclosed. I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. SEMMES,
Commander.

HON. S. R. MALLORY,
Secretary of the Navy.

Doc. 19.

ATTEMPT TO DESTROY THE ALBEMARLE.

CAPTAIN M. SMITH'S REPORT.

UNITED STATES STEAMER MATTABESETT,
ALBEMARLE SOUND, N. C., May 30, 1864.

SIR: I have to report that an effort was made on the twenty-fifth instant, at eleven o'clock P. M., by five volunteers from the steamer Wyalusing, to destroy the iron-clad Albemarle.

The party left at two o'clock P. M. on the twenty-fifth instant, (having made a reconnoissance two days before,) and ascended the Middle River in the Mattabesett's dingey, with two torpedoes, (each containing one hundred pounds of powder,) and their appendages, which they transported on a stretcher across the island swamps. Charles Baldwin, coal-heaver, and John W. Lloyd, coxswain, then swam the Roanoke River, with a line, and hauled the torpedoes over to the Plymouth shore, above the town. They were then connected by a bridle, floated down with the current, and guided by Charles Baldwin, who designed to place them across the bow of the ram — one on either side — and Allen Crawford, fireman, who was stationed on the opposite side of the river, in the swamp, was to explode them on a given signal.

Everything had worked favorably from the time of starting, until the torpedoes were within a few yards of the ram, when Baldwin was discovered, and hailed by a sentry on the wharf.

Two shots were then fired, and a volley of musketry, which induced John W. Lloyd, who heard the challenge and reports of small arms, to cut the guiding line, throw away the coil, and swim the river again to join John Laverty, fireman, who was left in charge of his clothes and arms. These two men, with the boat-keeper, Benjamin Lloyd, coal-heaver, returned to the ship the morning of the twenty-seventh, after an absence of thirty-eight hours in the swamps, encountering the additional discomfort of a rainy day and night.

Two days' unsuccessful search was made for Baldwin and Crawford, both of whom made their appearance on Sunday, the twenty-ninth instant, much fatigued by travel, and somewhat exhausted from the loss of food. No traces of their intended designs were left behind them. I cannot too highly commend this party for their courage, zeal, and unwearied exertion in carrying out a project that had for some time been under consideration. The plan of executing it was their own, except in some minor details, and although defeated in their purpose, (by accidentally fouling a schooner,) I deem it my imperative duty to recommend John W. Lloyd and Charles Baldwin to be promoted to a higher grade; and that all receive the "medal of honor" and pecuniary reward awarded by act of Congress for distinguished services.

Four deserters from the rebel ram Albemarle were brought on board by the picket boat yesterday, but I cannot, without delaying the army boat, communicate the intelligence they bring. They

state, however, that the ram Neuse is afloat, and ready in all respects for service.

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

MELANCTON SMITH,

Captain and Senior Officer, in Sounds of N. Carolina.

Acting Rear-Admiral S. P. LEE.

Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

Doc. 20.

SUSPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUS, WITH RULES OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT.

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, RICHMOND, VA., March 10, 1864.

General Orders, No. 31.

I. THE following Act of Congress "for the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in certain cases," with the instructions of the War Department, is published for the information of all concerned:

[No. 73.]

AN ACT to suspend the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in certain cases.

Whereas the Constitution of the Confederate States of America provides, in article first, section nine, paragraph three, that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it;" and whereas, the power of suspending the privilege of said writ, as recognized in said article first, is vested solely in the Congress, which is the exclusive judge of the necessity of such suspension; and whereas, in the opinion of the Congress, the public safety requires the suspension of said writ in the existing case of the invasion of these states by the armies of the United States; and whereas, the President has asked for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and informed Congress of conditions of public danger which render the suspension of the writ a measure proper for the public defence, against invasion and insurrection: now, therefore,

The Congress of the Confederate States of America do enact, that, during the present invasion of the Confederate States, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus be, and the same is hereby, suspended; but such suspension shall apply only to the cases of persons arrested or detained by order of the President, Secretary of War, or the general officer commanding the Trans-Mississippi Military Department, by the authority and under the control of the President. It is hereby declared that the purpose of Congress, in the passage of this act, is to provide more effectually for the public safety, by suspending the writ of habeas corpus in the following cases, and no others:

First. Of treason, or treasonable efforts or combinations to subvert the government of the Confederate States.

Second. Of conspiracies to overthrow the government, or conspiracies to resist the lawful authorities of the Confederate States.

Third. Of combining to assist the enemy, or of communicating intelligence to the enemy, or giving him aid and comfort.

Fourth. Of conspiracies, preparations, and attempts to incite servile insurrection.

Fifth. Of desertions, or encouraging desertions, of harboring deserters, and of attempts to avoid military service: Provided, that in cases of palpable wrong and oppression by any subordinate officer, upon any party who does not legally owe military service, his superior officer shall grant prompt relief to the oppressed party, and the subordinate shall be dismissed from office.

Sixth. Of spies and other emmissaries of the enemy.

Seventh. Of holding correspondence or intercourse with the enemy, without necessity, and without the permission of the Confederate States.

Eighth. Of unlawful trading with the enemy, and other offences against the laws of the Confederate States, enacted to promote their success in the war.

Ninth. Of conspiracies, or attempts to liberate prisoners of war held by the Confederate States.

Tenth. Of conspiracies, or attempts or preparations to aid the enemy.

Eleventh. Of persons advising or inciting others to abandon the Confederate cause, or to resist the Confederate States, or to adhere to the enemy.

Twelfth. Of unlawfully burning, destroying, or injuring, or attempting to burn, destroy, or injure, any bridge, or railroad, or telegraphic line of communication, or other property, with the intent of aiding the enemy.

Thirteenth. Of treasonable designs to impair the military power of the government, by destroying, or attempting to destroy, the vessels, or arms, or munitions of war, or arsenals, founderies, workshops, or other property of the Confederate States.

Sec. 2d. The President shall cause proper officers to investigate the cases of all persons so arrested or detained, in order that they may be discharged, if improperly detained, unless they can be speedily tried in the due course of law.

Sec. 3d. That, during the suspension aforesaid, no military or other officer shall be compelled, in answer to any writ of habeas corpus, to appear in person, or to return the body of any person or persons detained by him by the authority of the President, Secretary of War, or the general officer commanding the Trans-Mississippi Department: but upon the certificate under oath of the officer, having charge of any one so detained, that such person is detained by him as a prisoner, for any of the causes hereinbefore specified, under the authority aforesaid, further proceedings under the writ of habeas corpus shall immediately cease, and remain suspended so long as this act shall continue in force.

Sec. 4th. This act shall continue in force for ninety days after the next meeting of Congress, and no longer.

A true copy: JAMES M. MATTHEWS, Law Clerk

Approved February 15, 1864.

II. There will be appointed by this department, for each military division of the Confederacy east of the Mississippi River, one or more competent persons as commissioners to investigate the cases of persons who may be arrested or detained by any military authority, for any cause specified within the above recited act. Information of all such arrests will be given to him by the department commander as soon as practicable after they are made, and he will proceed to investigate the same. If, upon examination, a reasonable and probable cause for detention does not appear, he will certify the fact to the General or other officer in command, who will immediately discharge the prisoner from arrest. But if a reasonable and probable cause does appear, the commissioner will forthwith transmit to this department a copy of the evidence taken in the case, with his opinion thereon, for instructions, and meanwhile the prisoner shall remain in custody.

III. In all cases in which a person who has been enlisted in the army under any of the acts of Congress to provide for the public defence, or to raise troops to serve during the war, or to provide for local defence and special service, or who has been enlisted or enrolled for service under the acts of Congress further to provide for the public defence, or has been placed in the military service by the act of Congress to organize forces to serve during the war, approved seventeenth February, 1864, shall be held in custody for desertion or encouraging desertions, of harboring deserters, and of attempts to avoid military service, or of holding correspondence or intercourse with the enemy without necessity, and without the permission of the Confederate States, or of combining to assist the enemy, or of communicating intelligence to the enemy, or of giving him aid and comfort, or for any other cause specified in the act aforesaid; and in all cases in which any person not belonging to the military service shall be held in custody by any military authority for any of the causes mentioned in the act, shall apply to any court or officer in the Confederate States for a writ of habeas corpus, it will be the duty of the officer having the command or custody of such person forthwith to report the case, with all the relevant facts, to the War Department for instructions as to the proper answer to be made to such writ, and in the mean time to retain the custody and control of such person under this order, a copy of which will be communicated to the officer or court issuing the writ, as affording the reason why time should be given to make a more complete return.

IV. In all cases when the requisite delay cannot be obtained, it will be the duty of the officer having command and custody of persons embraced in the preceding section, or who may have in custody as prisoners any person charged under any of the sections of the above recited act of Congress, to make a special return in writing, and under oath, that the body of such persons so detained by him is detained by the authority of the Secretary of War, and that he declines, under and by virtue of his authority and the act of Congress aforesaid, to produce the body of such person, or to make further appearance or return to the said writ.

V. The commanding General of the Trans-Mississippi Department will perform the functions devolving upon the War Department, under these orders, in that portion of the Confederacy.

By order,

S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector-General.

DOC. 21.

OPERATIONS AGAINST THE INDIANS.

GENERAL SIBLEY'S REPORT.*

GENERAL SIBLEY left Camp Atchison, on the morning of July twenty, 1863, with a force consisting of one thousand four hundred infantry and five hundred cavalry. On the twenty-fourth, at one o'clock P. M., having crossed the Great Coteau of the Missouri, and while the General, with several officers, was some distance in advance of the main column, scouts came up reporting a large force of Indian warriors two or three miles distant. The train was immediately corralled upon the shore of a salt lake, and an intrenched camp rapidly formed under the direction of Colonel Crooks. Meanwhile the Indians were rapidly gathering on three sides and covering the hills around. One of the scouts succeeded in getting within speaking distance of Red Plume, a relative and Sisseton Chief, who told him to warn General Sibley that the plan of the Indians was to invite a council with the superior officers, shoot them down, and then make a rush upon the camp in great force. Other Indians approached near where the scouts were stationed, and commenced conversing with them, pretending to be desirous of making peace. Surgeon Weiser rode up and joined the scouts, when a young brave, probably mistaking him from his uniform for a commanding officer, manifested great delight at seeing him, and gradually approaching in this way, suddenly shot him through the heart. A general engagement followed, the Indians commencing the attack under shelter of the surrounding ridges. Colonel McPhail, with a detachment of rangers, was ordered to dislodge the enemy from the hill where Dr. Weiser was shot, supported by the Seventh regiment and Captain Edgerton's company of the Tenth. General Sibley, with a six-pounder under charge of Lieutenant Whipple, took possession of Big Mound, across a ravine, which the Indians had taken possession of, and poured into this ravine a raking fire with spherical case, soon driving them from their cover into the broken prairie. The rangers, supported by the Seventh, steadily advanced, driving the Indians from ridge to ridge, until finally they fled in confusion. This was upon the right of the camp. Upon the left Colonel Crooks and Colonel Averill deployed portions of the Sixth regiment as skirmishers, and drove the savages before them, routing them from point to point, until at length they also took to flight. General

* See Document, page 381, vol. 7, R. R.

Sibley, from an overlooking height, saw the whole body of the enemy in confused retreat, while their families were described crossing the distant hills towards the Missouri River. Colonel McPhail, with his regiment, was ordered to fall upon the rear of the retreating foe, supported by Lieutenant-Colonel Marshall with the Seventh, Captain Edgerton's company, and one six-pounder and a section of howitzers, under Captain Jones. The pursuit was continued until dark, the infantry following the mounted men at double-quick. An order from General Sibley to Colonel McPhail, to bivouac at nightfall, was by mistake given as an order to return, so that these wearied men, after marching from five in the morning till one in the afternoon, then fighting and pursuing the enemy for twelve miles, were obliged to spend the whole long night in picking their way through the darkness back to the main column, which they reached just as it was about to move. It consequently became imperatively necessary to rest a day in camp. On the twenty-sixth, the little army was again in motion. Arriving at the place where the Indians had been encamped, there, and for miles beyond, large stores of dried meat, tallow, cooking utensils, buffalo robes, &c., were found and burned. This loss will be severely felt by the Indians. A march of twelve miles brought the column to Dead Buffalo Lake, and there being neither wood nor water for a long distance ahead, it was deemed advisable to give the men and animals rest here. Indians soon began to menace the camp. Captain Chase, with his pioneers, (Company A, Ninth regiment,) and Captain Jones, with a section of his six-pound battery, were thrown forward about six hundred yards to an excellent elevation, and were joined by Colonel Crooks, with two companies of the Sixth, (A and B.) The enemy at that point far outnumbered this force, but maintained a safe distance, and were soon scattered by spherical case. They then crossed for an attack upon the left of the camp, when Captain Taylor, with Company A, of the rangers, was sent to oppose them. He held a largely superior force in check, until reënforced by Lieutenant-Colonel Averill, with two companies of the Sixth. The Indians still concentrating on the left and threatening a flank movement, Major McLaren moved six companies of the Sixth on an extended line, so as to cover that direction effectually, while Captains Wilson and Davy, with their companies of rangers, made a rapid dash, which repulsed the enemy with considerable loss. A precipitate flight followed, the Indians leaving their dead upon the field. Thus ended the second lesson.

The third battle was on the twenty-eighth, the march on the twenty-seventh being only eighteen miles, on account of the utter exhaustion of the animals. The ball was opened by the Tenth regiment, whose turn it was to be in advance. The column was moving out of camp, when the scout came shouting, "They are coming," closely followed by about two thousand Indians. As the enemy came over the brow of the hills in front, and got a view of "the situation" — the Tenth regiment rapidly deploying to meet them, and two sections of the battery in position for work — one Indian was heard to cry, "We are too late, they are ready for us!" and another to answer, "But remember our children and families; we must not let them get them."

They immediately spread out right and left, outflanking the Tenth on both extremes. The firing in front was very spirited and disastrous to the enemy, who were quite busily employed in carrying off their dead and wounded. The train was just at this moment filing out of the corral, and the other regiment not having taken their position, the advance had to be checked, to prevent the exposure and consequent destruction of the teams and supplies. An attempt was made by the Indians to get possession of some broken, rocky ground in the rear and close upon the train, but this movement was checked by Lieutenant-Colonel Marshall, with the Seventh regiment, Lieutenant Western, with a section of the battery, and one battalion of cavalry; and the foe were speedily repulsed and driven from their partially gained cover. The Sixth regiment, with a battalion of cavalry, held the centre of the column, and deploying to the right held the Indians in check in that direction, while the left wing of the same regiment stretched southward towards the lake. The first onset being successfully resisted, the order was given to move forward, and the whole column at once proceeded with a steadiness and valor which completely disconcerted the savages, who speedily retreated, anxious to join their families on the other side of the Missouri. General Sibley reached the woods skirting the shore shortly after noon on the twenty-ninth, the Sixth regiment being in advance. Colonel Crooks was ordered to clear the woods to the river, assisted by the battery, and in a short time our men were upon the bank. The opposite bluff was lined with Indians, who opened a spirited fire, but at too long range to be dangerous at all. Lieutenant-Colonel Averill's detachment replied with more effect. The evidence of crossing in a disastrous haste abounded everywhere. All their transportation had been abandoned, and many women and children were drowned.

Long and rapid marches, want of water and forage, days of fighting and nights of watchings, and the rapidly lessening stock of provisions, compelled General Sibley here to relinquish the further pursuit. The Indians were now upon a river which they could cross and recross with more facility than our soldiers, and which was bordered by almost impenetrable thickets — the prickly ash abounding. The animals, especially, were in a position which precluded any more rapid or sustained marches.

Two days were spent upon the branches of the Missouri, and for three successive evenings cannon were fired and signal rockets sent up, in the vain hope that General Sully might be within answering distance; and on the first instant, after thoroughly destroying the stuff abandoned by the Indians, the camp was broken up, and the expeditionary force again in motion, homeward bound. The point on the Missouri reached by General

Sibley, was in latitude 46° 42′, longitude 100° 35′, about forty miles by land below Fort Clark. The distance from Fort Snelling, by line of march, was made by Colonel Crooks to be five hundred and eight-five miles.

A DETAILED NARRATIVE.—THE BATTLE OF THE BIG MOUND.

On the twenty-fourth of July, about one o'clock, as the column was moving along the western base of a great hill or ridge of the Coteau Missouri, scouts who were in the advance returned with the report that we were in the immediate vicinity of a large camp of Indians. Other scouts came who had seen the Indians, and believed them to be preparing in great numbers to engage us—that they were then collecting in the rocky ravines and behind the ridges of the great hill. Soon the Indians were on the Big Mound, the highest peak of the hill. The train was turned off to the right a little way, and corralled on a salt lake.

Details of men were made to throw up intrenchments, so that a small number of men could defend the train and camp, while the main force should be engaged elsewhere. The camp was encircled by the several regiments, with the artillery placed at intervals between them. The Big Mound was directly east of camp, a mile and a quarter distant—a succession of hills, or the broken side of the big hill, rising from the camp to the Big Mound. There was a ravine directly east of camp, which extended nearly to the Big Mound.

The Sixth regiment was placed on the north side of the corral, its left resting on the lake; the Tenth regiment next to the Sixth, fronting north-east, and to the left of the ravine; the Seventh regiment on the right of the Tenth, fronting east and south-east on the ravine; the cavalry on the south side of the camp, with its right flank on the lake.

These dispositions had hardly been made before the report of firearms was heard on the hill directly in front of the Seventh regiment. Some of the scouts had gone part way up the hill, and were talking with the Indians. Doctor Weiser, surgeon of the Mounted Rangers, joined them, and shook hands with one or two Indians whom he had probably known at Shakopee. One Indian advanced and shot him through the heart. He fell, and died without speaking a word. The scouts fired, and the Indians fell back behind the ridge, returning the fire, one shot taking effect upon scout Solon Stevens, of Mankato. It proved to be but a slight wound in the hip. The ball had first passed through his rubber blanket, which was rolled up on his saddle. An ambulance was promptly sent out, which met the body of Doctor Weiser, being brought in on a horse.

The first battalion of cavalry—Captains Taylor, Wilson, and Anderson's companies—was promptly ordered to the scene of Doctor Weiser's death, where the scouts were skirmishing with the Indians. They found the ground so broken that they dismounted and sent their horses back to camp. Major Bradley, with Captains Stevens and Gilfillan's companies of the Seventh, were ordered to the support of the cavalry. The General, with a six-pounder, advanced to a hill on the left of the ravine, and began to shell the Indians at the head of the ravine and about the Big Mound. Captain Edgerton's company of the Tenth supported the the six-pounder.

The Sixth regiment was deployed on the foot hills in front of its line, to the north and north-east of camp. Captain Bank's company of the Seventh, on the right of the Sixth regiment. Lieutenant-Colonel Marshall, with the remaining five companies of the Seventh regiment, Captains Kennedy, Williston, Hall, Carter, and Arnold advanced up the ravine towards the Big Mound, and deployed on the left of the dismounted cavalry and Major Bradley's line.

The artillery, under the immediate direction of the General, drove the Indians out from the head of the ravine and from about the Big Mound. They fell back to the table land east of the mound, and into the broken ridges and ravines southward. They had come from that quarter, their camp being found around the hill, about five miles from our camp.

The shelling they got near the Big Mound prevented their getting around to the northward in any considerable numbers. They were massed in the broken ground to the south of the mound.

The line of the Seventh regiment and the three companies of cavalry named advanced steadily and rapidly, pouring a constant fire into the Indians, which reached them before their shorter range guns could have any effect on our troops. The left of the Seventh crossed the summit range just to the right of the mound, and flanking the right of the Indians, swept around to the southward and pursued the Indians into and through the ridges and ravines on the east of the range, while Major Bradley and Captains Taylor and Anderson pressed them hotly on the west side. Captain Wilson, of the cavalry, crossed to the right of the mound, and pursued some Indians that separated from the main body and retreated more directly eastward.

The Indians were thus pursued three or four miles, and until they were completely dislodged and driven from the hills to a broad plain southward. They would try to hold ridge after ridge, and to cover themselves in the ravines, but the better weapons of the whites were too much for them. They were sparing of ammunition, and probably not over half had firearms. Their number exceeded a thousand warriors.

As they were precipitately retreating down the ravines towards the plain, after the last stand, two companies of cavalry, Captain Austin's and Lieutenant Barton's, under the immediate command of Colonel McPhail, took the advance and charged the Indians, doing execution. Corporal Hazlep was shot in the shoulder by an Indian he was riding on to. Colonel McPhail thrust his sabre through the Indian. It was here that a stroke of lightning killed private John Murphy, of Company B, and his horse, and stunned another cav-

alryman. Colonel McPhail's grasp was loosened on his sword by the shock. He thought a shell had fallen among them. This momentarily checked the charge and rendered it less effective, the Indians getting out on the plain, where their immense numbers deterred any further charge until the cavalry could be reënforced.

Lieutenant-Colonel Marshall had left his line for a moment, and, taking care of Colonel McPhail's right flank, charged down the hill with the rangers. In an effort to cut off some Indians to the right, he got into rather close quarters with some of them. The thunder-stroke checked the the cavalrymen that he thought were following him in the dash. He wheeled his horse in time to avoid a single-handed encounter with a dozen warriors.

While the dismounted companies of cavalry were getting their horses from camp, and Captains Rubles's, Davy's, and Lieutenant Johnston's companies, that had been on the right of the hill with Major Bradley, were being formed for the pursuit, the Indians had got three or four miles away. Their families had been started ahead, and the warriors were covering the rear of the train. The cavalry pursued, and the Seventh regiment followed on. Lieutenant Whipple's section of the battery was sent forward, and Company B, of the Tenth, to support it. The cavalry reached the Indians before dark, and made five successive charges on their rear, killing a great number. The battery and the Seventh regiment were not up in time to take a hand.

The Indians fought desperately. One stalwart warrior, with an American flag wrapped around him theatrically, fired twice while the cavalry were within twenty rods charging upon him, his balls taking effect in the overcoats and saddle of private Green, and rubber blanket of Carlson, of Company F. The Indian got the powder down, but not the ball, for the third load, which he discharged at the breast of Archy McNee, of Company F, of course without effect. He then clubbed his musket and struck Carlson, nearly unhorsing him. A dozen carbine balls were put into, and then he had to be sabred to finish him.

Gustaf Stark, of Company B, was killed in one of these charges, and Andrew Moore dangerously, if not mortally, wounded.

The cavalry boys took twenty-one scalps in this charge.

Colonel McPhail had told them that it was very barbarous to take scalps, but that he wouldn't believe any man had killed an Indian unless he showed the hair, and enough of it so that two locks couldn't be taken from the same head.

The trail of the Indians was strewed with tons of dried buffalo meat, pemmican, robes and undressed buffalo skins, besides camp furniture. It was a wild flight, in which they abandoned everything that impeded them. Much of this stuff they left in camp.

The Seventh regiment, with Company B of the Tenth, had reached a point ten or twelve miles from camp, the artillery a point farther advanced, while Colonel McPhail was engaged fifteen miles from camp. Darkness came on, and Colonel Marshall ordered a bivouac of his men, and Captain Edgerton's company of the Tenth. Guards were posted, and the exhausted men had laid down to sleep, when Colonel McPhail returned on his way to camp, having received an order not to pursue after dark, and — mistakenly delivered — to return to camp. The General intended to leave it discretionary with Colonel McPhail to bivouac or return to camp accordingly, as he might have got many miles away, or be near to camp. The infantry joined the cavalry and artillery, and marched until daylight the next morning before reaching camp, having been twenty-four hours marching or fighting, and since ten o'clock in the morning without water.

The General was just ready to leave camp with the other forces, but the exhausted condition of the men and cavalry horses that had been out all night, precluded the march that day. This unfortunate mistake delayed the pursuit two days, for it required the next day's march, the twenty-sixth, to reach the point of the cavalry fight on the night of the twenty-fourth.

THE BATTLE OF DEAD BUFFALO LAKE.

Camp was moved on the twenty-fifth, three miles, on to the great hill, where a pond of fresh water and grass were found. Lieutenant Freeman's and Murphy's and Starr's bodies were buried at Camp Sidney, below the hill. Doctor Weiser's was buried at Camp Whitney, on the hill.

The march was resumed on the twenty-sixth, and Dead Buffalo Lake reached about noon. The Indians were seen in the distance advancing towards us. It was not known that there was any good camping-place within reach that day ahead, and it was decided to go into camp on the lake.

Lieutenant Whipple's six-pounders were advanced to a hill half a mile in advance, towards the Indians, and the Sixth regiment was deployed forward, to support the battery and engage the Indians.

The Indians circled around, got on the high knolls and ridges, and took observations, but seemed indisposed to pitch in. The artillery shelled them when they ventured near enough, and the skirmishers gave them shots when they approached anywhere near camp.

Thus some hours passed without the Indians developing their purpose. A large portion of them kept out of sight. Finally, about three o'clock, a mounted force of Indians suddenly dashed in on the north side of the camp, where mules had been turned out to graze, and where teamsters were getting grass.

The Indians had almost reached them, when Captains Wilson's and Davy's companies of cavalry — the latter under Lieutenant Kidder — putting their horses to the jump, dashed upon the Indians, and so dismayed them that they wheeled their ponies to escape, but not in time to escape the carbine shots, followed by the revolver and sabre, and left a goodly number of the red devils

on the field. Some of the scouts did good service in this charge.

One wounded Indian tried to escape by seizing his horse's tail, but, unfortunately for him, the pony got a shot in the shoulder. John Platt, of Company L, dashed up to finish the Indian with his revolver, but it didn't go off, and before he could check his horse he was upon the Indian, who had reserved a shot in his gun, which he fired into the thigh and bowels of poor Platt, giving him his death wound. Joe Campbell, one of the scouts, tried to save Platt, but it was too late. Campbell's shot, fired at the same instant that the Indian fired the fatal shot at Platt, went through the vitals of the savage and finished him. Platt's comrades, exasperated at his mortal wound, tore the Indian's scalp from his head before he was dead.

A part of the Sixth regiment, under Major McLaren, had returned to camp, and was on their color line, on the side where the Indians made the dash. They promptly advanced to the support of the cavalry, and took a hand in. Thus the Sixth, among the infantry regiments, on this day did the fighting. The cavalry and artillery in this, as in the previous and subsequent engagement, had always their full share of work. The Indians appeared on the south side of the camp, out of range, but made no further attack.

THE BATTLE OF STONY LAKE.

The march was resumed on the twenty-seventh, and the trail, still marked by robes and other articles, was followed towards the Missouri River.

We camped, after a march of nearly twenty miles, on a small lake half a mile long and twenty rods wide.

On the morning of the twenty-eighth, just as the rear of the train was filing around the south end of the lake, the advance being nearly to the top of a long hill that we were ascending, the Indians suddenly made their appearance in front and on the flanks, rapidly circling around to the rear. They were in immense numbers, seemingly all mounted.

Major Jo. Brown, guide, and some of the scouts, who were in advance, narrowly escaped being gobbled up. The Tenth regiment, Colonel Baker, which was in the advance, promptly and gallantly met the attack in front, which was the first demonstration of the Indians. The artillery was quickly brought into play, and the savages drew back to a safe distance. Colonel Crooks, with the Sixth regiment, on the right flank, held them at bay, and effectually guarded the train, while the cavalry on the left, and the Seventh regiment and cavalry in the rear, presented an unassailable line. The Indians got partly under cover of broken ground at the south end of the lake, but were soon dislodged by the fire of Lieutenant Western's section of the battery, and a line of skirmishers of the Seventh. One shot from an Indian, evidently aimed at Colonel Marshall, while he was locating a howitzer, struck the ground at his feet. The most determined effort, however, to make a breach, was in front, and was fairly resisted by the Tenth regiment, so that it had its day of fighting.

The Indians, as they came on at first, were heard to say, "It is too late, it is too late," evidently having expected to surprise us in camp. Another Indian answered, "We must fight for our children."

After reconnoitring all sides of the train, and finding it girt with a wall of fire, they seemed to think it was no use to make an assault. After seeing that the proper dispositions had been made for guarding the train, the General ordered the column to move forward, regardless of the Indians. The Indians seeing our purpose to press on towards their families, quickly withdrew, the whole demonstration not delaying the march over two hours.

General Sibley, Major Brown, and others, estimated the number of Indians engaged this day at over *two thousand*. In the battle of Big Mound were all the lower Indians, the Sissetoans, and part of the Yanktonais. In the last day's fight, that of Stony Lake, they had been reënforced by another camp of Yanktonais and some Tetons from the west side of Missouri River. We captured a Teton boy, who had no gun, and was subsequently released at the Missouri River. This Teton and an old squaw were the only prisoners taken in battle or near a battle. The supplications for the life of the wretches, when they had fired their last shot, were generally met by sabre thrust that finished them.

No more Indians were encountered until the banks of the Missouri were reached, the morning of the twenty-ninth. The Indians had made good use of the night, and got their families and ponies over. Their wagons, to the number of over one hundred, and a remnant of their plunder, that had not been strewn along the route of their flight, was left on the east bank of the river. Themselves covered the bluffs on the west side.

The Sixth regiment, then in the advance, deployed as skirmishers through the woods a mile and a half to the river. As they were starting to return, a heavy volley, that came from the high grass on the opposite bank, fell harmless about them or short of them. They stopped a moment to return it, but the distance was too great for effect.

While Colonel Crooks was at the river, the General sent an order by Lieutenant Beever, aid-de-camp. While returning with an answer, Lieutenant Beever mistook a trail that led down the river, where his body was found next day pierced by three arrows and a ball. He had also wounds from a tomahawk on his head. His horse lay near him. Two pools of blood, twenty paces from his body, indicated that two of his murderers had paid dearly for his life. On the same trail was found the body of private Nicholas Miller, of Company K, Sixth regiment, who had made the same mistake in taking the trail that Beever had.

Two days were passed in camp at the mouth of Apple Creek, on the Missouri, opposite Burnt Boot Island, and then the homeward march was

resumed. The expedition had but fifteen days' rations, nine or ten of which would be consumed in returning to Camp Atchison. It would take two or three days to cross the Missouri, so that all the surplus would have been consumed in crossing and recrossing the river.

The animals were completely worn down. Over twelve miles a day could not be made on the scanty feed they were getting. It would, therefore, have been useless to go farther. Much had been accomplished. Forty-four bodies of warriors had been found — many more carried off and concealed. The season's supplies of meat and clothing material, and their wagons, destroyed. The howlings of the squaws that came across the river told the tale of their misery and despair.

If General Sully shall arrive and take up the pursuit, their destruction can be rendered complete.

The body of Lieutenant Freeman, killed by the Indians, was promptly recovered, and buried at Camp Sibley, near the Big Mound. The scouts who were with Lieutenant Freeman and Mr. Brackett did not give themselves up to the hostile Indians, but made their way, minus horses, directly to camp. Lieutenant Freeman was killed on the east side of the hill, about the time the battle began on the west side. The scouts gave the same account of the affair that Mr. Brackett did. Search was made that evening for Mr. Brackett, but he could not be tracked on the dry prairie.

The following is the official list of the killed and wounded, as reported by Medical Director Wharton:

The Killed.

Surgeon J. S. Weiser, First Minnesota mounted rangers.

Private Gustaf Stark, Company B, First Minnesota mounted rangers.

Private Nicholas Miller, Company K, Sixth Minnesota volunteers.

The above were killed in the battles above described. To these must be added the name of

Lieutenant Freeman, Company D, First Minnesota mounted rangers, who was killed in the affair from which Mr. Brackett had such a narrow escape.

Private John Murphy, First Minnesota mounted rangers, killed by lightning.

Wounded.

Private John Platt, Company L, First Minnesota mounted rifles, wounded in right groin; since died.

Private Andrew Moore, Company B, mortally shot in right side.

Corporal William B. Hazlep, Company B, in right shoulder joint; recovering.

Sergeant James G. Grady, Company L, First Minnesota mounted rifles; flesh wound in thigh.

Making eight deaths by wounds or casualties, and two slightly wounded.

GENERAL SIBLEY'S ORDER.

The following order was read on dress parade on the evening of July thirty-first:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA,
DEPARTMENT OF THE NORTH-WEST,
CAMP SLAUGHTER, July 31, 1863.

To the Officers and Soldiers of the Expeditionary Forces in Camp:

GENERAL ORDER No. 51: IN THE FIELD.— It is proper for the Brigadier-General commanding to announce to you that the march to the west and south is completed, and that on tomorrow the column will proceed homeward, to discharge such other duties connected with the objects of the expedition, on the way, as may from time to time present themselves.

In making this announcement, General Sibley expresses also his high gratification that the campaign has been a complete success. The design of the government in chastening the savages, and thereby preventing for the future the raids upon the frontier, has been accomplished. You have routed the miscreants who murdered our people last year, banded as they were with the powerful Upper Sioux to the number of nearly two thousand warriors, in three successful engagements, with heavy loss, and driven them in confusion and dismay across the Missouri River, leaving behind them all their vehicles, provisions and skins designed for clothing, which have been destroyed. Forty-four bodies of warriors have been found, and many others concealed or taken away, according to the custom of these savages, so that it is certain they lost in killed and wounded not less than from one hundred and twenty to one hundred and fifty men. All this has been accomplished with the comparatively trifling loss on our part of three killed and as many wounded. You have marched nearly six hundred miles from St. Paul, and the powerful bands of the Dakotahs, who have hitherto held undisputed possession of the great prairies, have succumbed to your valor and discipline, and sought safety in flight. The intense heat and drought have caused much suffering, which you have endured without a murmur. The companies of Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth regiments of Minnesota volunteers, and of the First regiment Minnesota mounted rangers, and the scouts of the battery, have amply sustained the reputation of the state by their bravery and endurance amidst unknown dangers and great hardships. Each has had opportunity to distinguish itself against a foe at least equal in numbers to itself.

It would be a gratification if these remorseless savages could have been pursued and literally extirpated, for their crimes and barbarities merited such a full measure of punishment; but men and animals are alike exhausted after so long a march, and a farther pursuit would only be futile and hopeless. The military results of the campaign have been completely accomplished, for the savages have not only been destroyed in great numbers, and their main strength broken, but their prospects for the future are hopeless indeed, for

they can scarcely escape starvation during the approaching winter.

It is peculiarly gratifying to the Brigadier-General commanding to know that the tremendous fatigues and manifold dangers of the expedition thus far have entailed so small a loss in his command. A less careful policy than that adopted might have effected the destruction of more of the enemy, but that could only have been done by a proportional exposure on our part, and the consequent loss of many more lives, bringing sorrow and mourning to our own homes. Let us therefore return thanks to a merciful God for his manifest interposition in our favor, and for the success attendant upon our efforts to secure peace to the borders of our own state, and of our neighbors and friends in Dakotah Territory; and as we proceed on our march towards those most near and dear to us, let us be prepared to discharge other duties which may be imposed upon us during our journey, with cheerful and willing hearts.

To regimental and company officers of the command, the Brigadier-General commanding tenders his warmest thanks for their coöperation and aid on every occasion during the progress of the column through the heart of an unknown region, inhabited by a subtle and merciless foe.

For the friends and families of our fallen comrades we have our warmest sympathies to offer in their bereavement.

General Sibley takes this occasion to express his appreciation of the activity and zeal displayed by the members of his staff, one and all.

By command of
Brigadier-General SIBLEY.

Doc. 22.

EMPLOYMENT OF NEGROES IN THE SOUTHERN ARMY.

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE,
RICHMOND, VA., March 11, 1864.

General Orders, No. 32.

I. THE Act of Congress relative to the employment of Free Negroes and Slaves in certain capacities, and the Instructions of the War Department relative to its Execution, are published for the information of those concerned:

AN ACT to increase the efficiency of the Army by the Employment of Free Negroes and Slaves in certain capacities.

Whereas, the efficiency of the army is greatly diminished by the withdrawal from the ranks of able-bodied soldiers to act as teamsters, and in various other capacities in which free negroes and slaves might be advantageously employed; Therefore,

The Congress of the Confederate States of America do enact, that all male free negroes, and other free persons of color, not including those who are free under the treaty of Paris of 1803, or under the treaty of Spain of 1819, resident in the Confederate States, between the ages of eighteen and fifty years, shall be held liable to perform such duties with the army, or in connection with the military defences of the country, in the way of work upon fortifications, or in government works for the production or preparation of materials of war, or in military hospitals, as the Secretary of War or the commanding General of the Trans-Mississippi Department may, from time to time, prescribe; and while engaged in the performance of such duties shall receive rations and clothing, and compensation at the rate of eleven dollars a month, under such rules and regulations as the said Secretary may establish: Provided, that the Secretary of War or the commanding General of the Trans-Mississippi Department, with the approval of the President, may exempt from the operations of this act such free negroes as the interests of the country may require should be exempted, or such as he may think proper to exempt, on grounds of justice, equity, or necessity.

That the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to employ for duties similar to those indicated in the preceding section of this act, as many male negro slaves, not to exceed twenty thousand, as in his judgment the wants of the service may require, furnishing them, while so employed, with proper rations and clothing, under rules and regulations to be established by him, and paying to the owners of said slaves such wages as may be agreed upon with said owners for their use and service, and in the event of the loss of any slaves while so employed, by the act of the enemy, or by escape to the enemy, or by death inflicted by the enemy, or by disease contracted while in any service required of said slaves, then the owners of the same shall be entitled to receive the full value of such slaves, to be ascertained by agreement or by appraisement, under the law regulating impressments, to be paid under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of War may establish.

That when the Secretary of War shall be unable to procure the services of slaves in any military department in sufficient numbers for the necessities of the department, upon the terms and conditions set forth in the preceding section, then he is hereby authorized to impress the services of as many male slaves, not to exceed twenty thousand, as may be required, from time to time, to discharge the duties indicated in the first section of this act, according to the laws regulating the impressment of slaves in other cases: Provided, that slaves so impressed shall, while employed, receive the same rations and clothing, in kind and quantity, as slaves regularly hired from their owners; and in the event of their loss, shall be paid for in the same manner, and under the same rules, established by the said impressment laws: Provided, that if the owner have but one male slave between the ages of eighteen and fifty, he shall not be impressed against the will of said owner: Provided, further, that free negroes shall be first impressed, and if there should be a deficiency, it shall be supplied by the impressment of

slaves according to the foregoing provisions: Provided, further, that in making the impressment not more than one of every five male slaves between the ages of eighteen and forty-five shall be taken from any owner, care being taken to allow in each case a credit for all slaves who may have been already impressed under this act, and who are still in service, or have died, or been lost while in service. And all impressments under this act shall be taken in equal ratio from all owners in the same locality, city, county, or district.

(Signed,) THOMAS S. BOCOCK,
Speaker House of Representatives.
R. M. T. HUNTER,
President pro-tem. of the Senate.

Approved, February 17, 1864.
(Signed,) JEFFERSON DAVIS.

II. The Bureau of Conscription will direct the enrolment of all the persons described in the first section of the act aforesaid, east of the Mississippi River, who are not unfit for the service required from them by reason of physical or mental incapacity or imbecility, and shall assign them to the performance of the duties mentioned in the act, or similar duties in any of the military bureaus, or with troops in the field, as there may be any call for such service.

III. Applications for an exemption on the grounds that the interests of the country require it, or because it is demanded by justice, equity, or necessity, will be made to the enrolling office in writing, and will be disposed of by him according to the general directions contained in the regulations published in Orders No. 26, under the "act to organize forces to serve during the war."

IV. For the execution of the sections in the foregoing act, relative to the employment and impressment of slaves, the provisions of Orders No. 138, of the twenty-fourth October, 1863, will afford the requisite rules for the guidance of the military bureaus and the commanding Generals, with modifications hereafter mentioned. 1st. That slaves shall not be impressed when the services of free negroes can be obtained. 2d. Slaves under the age of eighteen and above the age of fifty are exempt. 3d. The hire for slaves impressed shall be according to the rates fixed by the appraisers under the act to regulate impressments. 4th. The limitation as to the term for which slaves shall be impressed for service shall be for twelve months instead of the term fixed by said orders, if the exigency shall require it.

V. All impressments for service in the various military bureaus under this act shall be by special order upon application to the War Department, disclosing the efforts that have been made to provide other labor specified in the act, the necessity for the impressment, the plan proposed to secure it.

5. The General commanding the Trans-Mississippi Department will superintend the execution of the law for that Department.

By order.

S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector-General.

Doc. 23.

SOUTHERN BARBARITY.

GENERAL GARFIELD'S ORDER.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, MURFREESBORO', April 25, 1863.

Circular.

THE following statement of an officer of high rank and well known integrity, captured at the late battle at Thompson's Station, and now a prisoner of war in the Libby Prison, at Richmond, is published for the information of the army and of the American people.

It is important that our fellow-citizens at home, and especially every soldier in the army, should know the shameless barbarity of the people against whom we are fighting. They have long arrogated to themselves those high qualities of chivalric honor on which they have based an assumed superiority over the people of the loyal states; but we in vain search the history of civilized warfare for a parallel to the deeds of wanton cruelty they are constantly committing against our soldiers whom the fortunes of war place in their hands.

The crime of treason seems to be the parent of all others, for those we once regarded as honorable men, and expected to meet as honorable enemies, do not hesitate to become pickpockets, robbers, and assassins. In many instances they have robbed captured officers and soldiers of their watches and pocket money, and even of a part of their wearing apparel.

They have brutally murdered several of our soldiers who had surrendered themselves prisoners of war. They have fired into passenger trains filled with unarmed men, women, and children. They have fired into a boat loaded with our sick and wounded, with its hospital flag flying, and, after having burned the boat and carried off all the medical stores, they left the sick and wounded to perish on the shore, in a drenching rain.

We cannot believe that the justice of God will allow such a people to prosper. Let every soldier know that death on the battle-field is preferable to a surrender followed by such outrages as their comrades have undergone.

J. A. GARFIELD,
Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.

From the statement we make the following extracts:

LIBBY PRISON, RICHMOND, VA., March 30, 1863.

ON the fourth of March, our brigade, being parts of the Thirty-third and Eighty-fifth Indiana, Twenty-second Wisconsin, and Nineteenth Michigan, numbering in all fifteen hundred and eighty-nine, together with the One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Ohio, and six hundred cavalry and one battery of six small guns, were ordered to proceed from Franklin to Spring Hill, ten miles south on the Columbia pike, and thirty miles from Nashville, Colonel John Coburn, of the Thirty-third, in command. When we were about four

miles out we met the enemy, and, after a sharp skirmish, drove them back, without loss on our side. Their loss was fifteen killed and wounded.

On the morning of the fifth we started early, the One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Ohio being left in the rear of our wagon train, which was large. After marching about two miles, our cavalry met the enemy's pickets and outposts, and severe skirmishing was kept up until we came in sight of Thompson's Station, the enemy falling back. When we reached the point where the railroad joins the pike, the enemy opened upon us with a heavy battery.

Colonel Coburn soon ordered one section of the battery to take position on the hill, on the left of the pike, and deployed the Nineteenth Michigan and Twenty-second Wisconsin to support it. The other three guns took position on the hill, on the right, supported by the Thirty-third and Eighty-fifth Indiana. Colonel Coburn ordered the Thirty-third and Eighty-fifth Indiana to make a demonstration on the left of the enemy, to draw him out, if in force, and if not, to charge his battery.

Our skirmishers soon started up the enemy, and we found, posted behind stone walls, fences, and brush, at the foot of the hill, two whole brigades of dismounted cavalry. Seeing it impossible to advance farther, the two regiments lay down and were covered by the buildings and fences.

We were not long here before Colonel Coburn ordered us back to the hill from which we started. We started back, and so soon as we were unmasked from the buildings, two regiments, from Arkansas and Texas, started after us with a yell, pursuing and firing on us all the way back, which, with their batteries playing on us also, made our situation pretty hot. Both of our regiments lost several killed and wounded, going and returning, and all this time not a shot had been fired by us. But as soon as we reached the hill, we turned and drove back the enemy faster than they came, killing Colonel Earl, of Arkansas. They again rallied and charged on us, but were driven back. It now became evident that we had encountered the whole of Van Dorn's and Forrest's forces.

Colonel Coburn now brought the Nineteenth and Twenty-second on the west side of the pike, and leaving the Thirty-third to protect the hill on its south face; the Tenth and Eighty-fifth were formed, facing the enemy east, at right angles, with the Twenty-second in the rear of the Eighty-fifth, except three companies.

Our lines were hardly formed, the men lying down behind the crest of the hill, till Armstrong's brigade charged from the east, and the Texans from the south, and the fighting was terrific. We reserved our fire until they were within thirty paces. Three times they gallantly charged up the hill from the east, and thrice we forced them back. But it was evident to us all, privates as well as officers, that the struggle was unavailing, and it was only a question of time as to our defeat. Our ammunition was nearly out, and Forrest, having got between us and Franklin, was closing in on us from the north. We formed a new line, with all four of our regiments facing north, to meet our new foe.

Here we met and checked Forrest, and held him till our last round was fired. We then fixed bayonets, to charge and break his lines, and try to escape. But just as we were about to charge, we discovered that Forrest had still another line in reserve, and a battery began to open and form a new position; that made it hopeless to think of escape, and so we surrendered. You will observe that none but our brigade took part in the fight. Of officers and men twelve hundred and six were taken. The rest were killed, wounded, or escaped. Of the number not taken there were probably four hundred, and one hundred and fifty or two hundred escaped; fifty or sixty killed and wounded.

The enemy were all cavalry and mounted infantry, but all fought on foot, every fourth man holding four horses, and his force consisted of six brigades, under Major-General Van Dorn, Brigadier-Generals French, Armstrong, Crosby, Martin, and Jackson. Infantry had no chance to escape after the fight once began.

Prisoners of war! I had supposed that soldiers taken in fair battle were treated as gentlemen, at least as human beings; but such is not the practice in this cursed land. I will state simply the facts. We were taken in the afternoon, after four hours' fighting, and marched fourteen miles to Columbia.

On the way the men had to wade the creek, over knee deep, and to ferry across Duck River, taking till after midnight to reach the town, when we were crowded into the court-house, so thick that we could scarcely lie down.

Next day it rained all day. We were marched out three miles from town, halted, and kept until four o'clock, having had nothing to eat since daylight before the fight — nearly thirty-six hours time! Then one and a half pounds of meat was issued, without bread, for three days' rations. We were then marched four miles farther, and encamped for the night, without tents, it raining all night.

Next day we were again marched eighteen miles on the road, had to cross a creek, waist deep, on a foot-log, which was springy; and as the men were slow, and some of the poor fellows got on their hands and knees to keep from falling, Confederate officers stood with stones in their hands to make them walk.

Next day we reached Shelbyville, at night. The men's rations had given out the second day, and although it was known we were coming, our men had to stay in the court-house yard, it raining all night. They got nothing to eat until two o'clock next afternoon. Here let me say, God bless the ladies of Shelbyville! They are as good Union people as ever lived. They have been tried by fire and blood.

They brought food, and words of good cheer and hope. How they do scorn those copperhead knaves of the North. The fourth day they marched us six miles, and again we slept in the open air, with a terrific rain storm raging all night. The

next day beggars description. It rained all day. We crossed one stream, waist deep, by wading. Some of the men swam it. The road was up the bed of a creek, and it was from ankle to knee deep more than half the time. We reached Tullahoma late in the evening.

The men had to stay all night on a piece of ground three inches deep in mud, with nothing but green oak wood to make fires, and nothing to eat but meat, without vessels to cook it in; and it rained until midnight. It then turned cold, and next morning Bragg stripped us of our overcoats and canteens, and shipped us on cars to Chattanooga, and we have frozen and starved our way here. The result is that we have lost more men by their treatment than by their bullets, and a Northern penitentiary is a palace in comparison with this place.

Doc. 24.

ATTACK ON THE LITTLE ADA.

LIEUT.-COMMANDER WEAVER'S REPORT.

UNITED STATES STEAMER WINONA,
OFF SUWANEE RIVER, S. C., March 25, 1864.

SIR: In obedience to your order of the twenty-first instant, directing us to proceed off the Santee River, and to prevent the steamer loading at McClellanville from going to sea, and to use such efforts to capture said steamer as might best meet that end consistent with safety, I have to report that I left Charleston harbor in this vessel, on the morning of the twenty-third instant, and arrived off the Santee at 5.30 P. M. of the same day. After making a careful reconnoissance of the north and south mouths of the Santee, I decided that there must be the deepest water in the latter, and anchored this vessel as near there as was prudent. At sunset I started a boat expedition in command of Acting Master E. H. Sheffield, executive officer of this vessel, consisting of the gig, second and third cutters, Acting Ensign William McKendry, in charge of one cutter, and Acting Master's Mate L. A. Cornthwaite in charge of the other. Acting Second Assistant Engineer W. J. Barrington, Acting Assistant Surgeon Charles Little, and twenty-one of the crew. I gave Mr. Sheffield orders to proceed up the Santee, and if he discovered the steamer Ada to either destroy her or bring her out. At four A. M., on the twenty-fourth, the expedition returned, Mr. Sheffield reporting that he went twelve miles up the river, passed a village eleven miles upon the right bank, two wharves and several warehouses, but saw no vessel. The party was not discovered. At eleven A. M. communicated with the United States steamer Paul Jones. I learned from her pilot (a colored man, and familiar with the country) that McClellanville is a small village on a salt water creek that makes into the sea just to the northward of Cape Roman, about eight miles distant. I started for the above-mentioned creek at four P. M., and anchored the Winona in sixteen feet of water near there at five o'clock. I again started the expedition with the same officers and men, having learned that the country on either side of the creek, up to the village, was nothing but a marsh. I ordered the officer in command to so time it as to arrive there on the commencement of the ebb tide, and to reconnoitre the first firm ground well before proceeding farther. At six o'clock P. M. the expedition returned. Acting Master Sheffield reports that in consequence of the darkness of the night and the many bayous making into the creek, it was with great difficulty that he kept in it — in fact, several times he lost his way. At six A. M. this morning he discovered the village and a steamer lying at anchor off the bank, it being by that time broad daylight, and being fearful that he had been discovered, he determined to attempt the capture of the steamer. The boats got within a few hundred yards before they were perceived by the enemy. At this time a large number of men were seen rushing about the steamer's deck, and a boat was lowered immediately after. The gig and second cutter boarded her on the port side, the third cutter running across her bow, intercepting a boat which had the captain in her, and forcing him to return on board. The surprise was complete, and in five minutes the captain and crew were disarmed and below decks, with a sentry at each hatch. There being no indications of a battery, Mr. Barrington at once started fires; the chain was hove short, but she was so fastened with stern moorings that the chain could not be slipped, and they proceeded at once to cut it with cold chisels. Soon after a masked battery of three rifle guns (supposed to be about twelve-pounders) opened on the steamer at short range, the shot striking about amidships, going in one side and out of the other, one shot penetrating the steam drum and another the boilers, destroying tubes, &c.; in fact, they had the range so perfectly that their shot completely riddled her; they were evidently prepared for an attack, as they had a target placed ahead and one astern of her, and were determined to disable her in case she was boarded. At this time it was broad daylight, and as by remaining longer there would have been great danger of having the boats sunk, Mr. Sheffield had all the arms passed into them, and reluctantly withdrew, feeling assured that the capture of our small force would have been the result had he not done so. The steamer proved to be iron, with scarcely any wood work about her; what little there was of an inflammable nature about the vessel was wet, as it was raining heavily at the time. In consideration of this, and the fact that there was no cargo on board, it was deemed best not to attempt to fire her; in fact, to have remained five minutes longer would have imperilled the lives of the whole party, the enemy's fire being so severe. The steamer is not the Ada, as supposed, but the Little Ada, of Glasgow, commanded by a Baltimorean named Martin. He remarked to our officers that they had done their work well, and asked only to be treated as a gentleman and as a prisoner of war. No sooner did the boats leave, however, than this same man opened a fire on them from a small Whitworth gun which the Little Ada had mounted on her

deck, and this fire was kept up some time after the batteries had ceased theirs, shrapnel bursting near the boats when they were a long distance off.

I cannot speak in too high praise of the conduct of the officers and men, with but one exception, Charles M. Muldoon, an ordinary seaman, an Englishman, and a man of no character, who deserted to the enemy. Although there was an abundance of liquor on board, and it was offered freely to the men, not one would take it, though they were cold and wet at the time. I was compelled by necessity to include five colored men in the party, and they behaved admirably under fire.

In conclusion, I wish to recommend to the favorable consideration of of the Navy Department Acting Master E. H. Sheffield, Acting Ensign William McKendry, and Acting Master's Mate L. A. Cornthwaite. Acting Ensign William McKendry applied some time since for an appointment, and I think he has well earned promotion. Acting Assistant Surgeon Charles Little, and Acting Second Assistant Engineer W. J. Barrington, also deserve much credit for their coolness and zeal. I am, Sir, respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. W. WEAVER,
Lieutenant-Commander.

Com. STEPHEN C. ROWAN,
Com'dg S. A. B. Squadron, Flag-ship New Ironsides, Charleston Harbor.

DOC. 25.

SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION.

GOVERNOR T. H. WATTS'S LETTER.

STATE OF GEORGIA,
QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE,
ATLANTA, GA., Sept. 19, 1863.

SIR: I herewith enclose you for publication a letter from Hon. T. H. Watts, governor elect of Alabama, which explains, in terms unmistakable and unequivocal, his views on that foul heresy called "reconstruction." Never were sentiments more pregnant with patriotism and devotion to our struggling cause penned. Every true son of the South will conclude the reading of this letter with spirits more buoyant and confidence more steadfast. Nor will our noble women fail to exclaim, "Governor Watts is right: rather than be subjugated we will march to the field of strife and bare our bosoms to the bullets of the cruel invader."

With such leaders, such soldiers, and such women, we *must*, we *shall* be free.

IRA R. FOSTER.*

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
RICHMOND, September 12, 1863.

Hon. Ira R. Foster, Q. M. Gen. of Ga., Atlanta, Ga.:

DEAR SIR: I have to-day received your letter of the first instant, forwarded to me from Montgomery, Alabama, and hasten to reply. You say that my name, since the Alabama election, has been freely used by many in connection with "*reconstruction*," meaning thereby that some people in Georgia suppose I am in favor of *re-union* with the Yankee government of the North. I am surprised and mortified that anybody in the South should so interpret the Alabama election. If those who claim my election as indicating any such feeling in Alabama, had read my letter of twenty-first March to General Lawler, and my short address to the people of Alabama, dated eighth June last, they would never have entertained such false notions.

It is due to the gallant people of my state to call attention to the resolutions of the recent called session of the legislature, passed unanimously, pledging all the men and resources of the state to prosecute the war until the independence of the Confederate States is fully established.

For myself, I will not forfeit my self-respect by arguing the question of "reconstruction."

He who is now, deliberately or otherwise, in favor of "reconstruction" with the states under Lincoln's dominion, is a *traitor* in his heart to the state of his residence and to the Confederate States, and deserves a *traitor's* doom. If I had the power, I would build up a *wall of fire* between Yankeedom and the Confederate States, there to burn, for ages, as a monument of the folly, wickedness, and vandalism of the puritanic race! No, sir! rather than re-unite with such a people, I would see the Confederate States desolated with fire and sword.

When the men of the South shall become such base cowards as to wish for such reunion, let us call on the women of the South to march to the battle-field, and in the name of the God of justice, bid them *fight* under the banner of the Southern liberty! The call would not be made in vain. Let the patriot sires, whose children have bared their breasts to Yankee bullets, and welcomed glorious deaths, in this struggle for self-government, rebuke the foul spirit which even whispers "reconstruction!" Let the noble mothers, whose sons have made sacred with their blood so many fields consecrated to freedom, rebuke the fell heresy! Let our blood-stained banners, now unfurled "to the battle and the breeze," rebuke the *cowardice* and *cupidity* which suggest "*reconstruction.*" The spirit of our heroic dead — the martyrs to our sacred cause — rebuke, a thousand times rebuke, "*reconstruction!*"

We have little cause — for despondency, none for despair! Let us nerve ourselves afresh for the contest; and let us not forget that

> "Freedom's battle, once begun,
> Bequeathed from bleeding sire to son,
> Though baffled oft, is ever won!"

If we are true to ourselves; true to the memories of the past; true to our homes and our firesides, and true to our God, we *cannot*, we *will not* be conquered! In any and in every event let us prefer death to a life of cowardly shame!

Your obedient servant,

T. H. WATTS.

* This letter was originally addressed to the Editor of the Atlanta Intelligencer.

Doc. 26.

ARMY AND NAVY EXPEDITION UP THE NANSEMOND AND JAMES RIVERS.

REPORT OF REAR-ADMIRAL LEE.

FLAG-SHIP NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON,
OFF NEWPORT NEWS, VA, April 16, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report in regard to the part taken by the navy in the recent combined army and navy expedition up the James and Nansemond Rivers: On the ninth instant I wrote to General Butler, suggesting that he send a sufficient force to clear the country in the vicinity of Smithfield and Chuckatuck of the guerilla parties known to be there, and to destroy the boats which it was supposed they had concealed. (Copy enclosed, No. 1.) In reply to this I received on the tenth a letter from General Butler, (copy No. 2,) which was brought by General Graham, who proposed going up the creeks with his light armed transports, and landing some troops in the Nansemond. I saw General Butler the same evening, and urged him to send at once a suitable force to come in from the rear and envelop the rebels so as to effectually capture them at Iron Station, and between the Blackwater, James, and Nansemond Rivers, and to advise me when he was ready to begin this movement, that I might send a naval force to watch Chuckatuck and Pagan Creeks, and prevent the escape of the rebels by water. This he promised to do. I suggested to him that the plan of attack brought by General Graham, of approach in front instead of in the rear, would drive back the rebels, whereas they ought to be captured. This recommendation I hoped would be adopted, but the plan sent by General Graham was substantially carried out, and the force sent to the rear was cavalry, and was kept too far off for effect. On the afternoon of the twelfth I received from General Smith and Colonel Shaffer (chief of staff to General Butler) a memorandum, of which a copy is enclosed. On the morning of the thirteenth I issued orders to the commanding officers of the gunboats I had assigned to take part in the expedition — the Commodore Morris, Commodore Perry, Commodore Barney, and Stepping Stones — of which copies are enclosed. Two (2) launches with howitzers from this ship, in charge of Acting Master Wilder and Acting Ensign J. Birtwistle, were ordered to accompany the Stepping Stones. The gunboats and launches accordingly started from this point as directed, and up to sunrise on the morning of the fourteenth all was carried out according to their orders given. At this time, however, the intended coöperations and the infantry force on Pagan Creek failed of being fully carried out, owing to the grounding of the transports and delay in landing the troops, and that part of the expedition designed to explore Pagan Creek did not begin to ascend it until 12.15 P. M. The launches, going ahead of the troops, were fired on from the shore by a concealed force, and Acting Master Wilder, of this ship, instantly killed, and H. Miller, landsman, severely wounded. Assistant Surgeon William Longshore's report of casualties is enclosed, and the report of Acting Master Campbell (12) gives full details of this part of the affair. The Commodore Morris, as will be seen by the report of her commanding officer, Lieutenant Fyffe, assisted the military force, and carried out my orders. The Commodore Perry and Commodore Barney also did their part in coöperating with the troops in the Nansemond and Western Branch. The boats from these vessels explored Western Branch to the extent that the troops afforded coöperation. The expedition returned yesterday afternoon. It failed in accomplishing the main objects, viz., the complete capture of the rebels in that region and the destruction of the torpedo-boat which attacked this ship on the morning of the ninth. This, it was ascertained, had gone from Pagan Creek to Richmond on the night of the tenth instant for repairs. This country is a very difficult one to operate in, and requires more time than was available for a complete overhauling. I give in a separate report information received in relation to this torpedo-boat. The results accomplished were four (4) prisoners, one (1) twelve-pound howitzer, belonging to the navy, and probably captured by the rebels from the army boat Smith Briggs, and a few wagons taken and brought off; a valuable officer killed, and one man wounded on our side — the rebel loss unknown. The following enclosures accompany this report:

No. 1. Admiral Lee to General Butler, April 9, 1864.

No. 2. To Admiral Lee from General Butler, April 10, 1864.

No. 3. Memorandum received from General Butler and Colonel Shaffer, April 12, 1864.

No. 4. Orders to Acting Master D. A. Campbell, United States steamer Stepping Stones, April 13, 1864.

No. 5. Orders to Acting Volunteer Lieutenant A. P. Foster, United States steamer Commodore Perry, April 13, 1854.

No. 6. Orders to Acting Master James M. Williams, United States steamer Commodore Barney, April 13, 1864.

No. 7. Orders to Lieutenant J. P. Fyffe, United States steamer Commodore Morris, April 13, 1864.

No. 8. Report of Lieutenant-Commander J. H. Upshur, commanding United States steamer Minnesota, (three enclosures,) April 16, 1864.

No. 9. Report of Acting Master J. M. Williams, United States steamer Commodore Barney, April 14, 1864.

No. 10. Report of Acting Volunteer Lieutenant A. P. Foster, United States steamer Commodore Perry, April 15, 1864.

No. 11. Report of Lieutenant Joseph P. Fyffe, United States steamer Commodore Morris, April 15, 1864.

No. 12. Report of Acting Master D. A. Campbell, United States steamer Stepping Stones April 15, 1864. I have the honor to be, Sir,

Very respectfully, yours, S. P. LEE,
A. R. Admiral, commanding N. A. B. Squadron

Hon GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

LETTER TO GENERAL BUTLER.

FLAG-SHIP N. A. B. SQUADRON,
OFF NEWPORT NEWS, VA., April 9, 1864.

GENERAL: The vicinity of Smithfield and Chuckatuck are known to be invested by guerillas, who are reported to have boats concealed up those creeks and their tributaries. You are aware that the rebels have an organized system of boat expeditions all along the coast, operating at one time from creeks in Morton and Gloucester counties against the Eastern Shore counties, Cape Charles light-house, &c.; at another time against the gunboat Underwriter at Newbern, and now against this ship here. In all these cases they harbor in the vicinity of their operations. This was explained by your prisoner, Acting Master Webb, of the rebel navy, captured while thus engaged in the Neck counties near Yorktown, where, as in the vicinity of Smithfield, &c., the small creeks are numerous and not accessible to our gunboats. It is believed that the little torpedo-boat which struck this vessel last night, happily without accomplishing its object, came out of Pagan and Chuckatuck Creeks or their tributaries. I respectfully suggest that you send at once a sufficient force to capture these rebels and destroy their boats on the upper creeks, and to coöperate with a naval force to prevent their escape by the river, which I will send as soon as you are ready.

I have the honor to be, General,
Very respectfully, yours.
S. P. LEE,
A. R. Admiral, commanding N. A. B. Squadron.

Major-General B. F. BUTLER,
Commanding Dep't Virginia and North Carolina.

LETTER TO ADMIRAL LEE.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
DEPARTMENT OF VA. AND N. C.,
FORTRESS MONROE, April 10, 1864.

ADMIRAL: I have your note in relation to the pirates of the creeks and inlets of the James River, and the means of destroying them, and am desirous of coöperating with you in that object. I have, therefore, sent General Graham, who is charged with the duty of making all such dispositions as you may judge necessary, after conference with him for the purpose indicated.

Very respectfully, yours,
BENJAMIN F. BUTLER,
Major-General, commanding.

Rear-Admiral S. P. LEE,
Commanding N. A. B. Squadron.

MEMORANDUM FROM GENERAL BUTLER.

FORT MONROE, April 12, 1864.

ADMIRAL LEE will please have a gunboat at Halloway's Point, on the Nansemond, to-morrow evening, for the purpose of covering the crossing of an infantry force. The boat is to remain until advised to withdraw. Place one or more gunboats some distance above Day's Point when the army gunboat Brewster proceeds to that place with her convoy to land the infantry — the naval vessels to remain there after the Brewster and transports leave, and to continue there until information is communicated that the object of the expedition has been effected. Likewise to station a gunboat near the mouth of Pagan Creek whilst the army gunboats of light draught convey troops in and out.

ORDERS TO D. A. CAMPBELL.

FLAG-SHIP NORTH ATLANTIC BLOCK'G SQUADRON,
OFF NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA, April 13, 1864.

SIR: Proceed with the Stepping Stones under your command, to the mouth of Pagan Creek, taking in tow the two (2) launches of the Minnesota. You will there be joined by an army transport with troops, which are directed to land at or near Smithfield at sunrise in the morning. Render all the assistance in your power in effecting and covering this intended landing, and after it is effected, remain at that station until you are advised that your services are no longer needed.

Guard closely the water before and after the landing is effected. The object of this expedition is to coöperate with a detachment of our troops, which will be landed some distance above Day's Point, for the purpose of scouring the waters about Pagan Creek, and capturing and destroying any rebel torpedo or other boats which may be there secreted.

In furtherance of this object, as well as covering the landing, the launches will be employed.

Respectfully, yours,
S. P. LEE,
Acting Rear-Admiral, commanding N. A. B. Squadron.

Acting Master D. A. CAMPBELL,
United States Steamer Stepping Stones.

ORDERS TO A. P. FOSTER.

FLAG-SHIP MINNESOTA,
NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA, April 13, 1864.

SIR: Proceed with the Commodore Perry, under your command, to the landing opposite Halloway's Point, on the Nansemond River, timing your departure so as to pass through the obstructions in safety, and so as to arrive at Halloway's Point at ten o'clock P. M., to-night. It is intended to cross in pontoon boats an infantry force to Halloway's Point at eleven o'clock P. M. Communicate with the officer in command of such troops as you may find upon the bank of the Nansemond, opposite Halloway's Point, and so dispose of the Commodore Perry as will best assist and cover the intended passage and landing of the troops on the other side of the river. You will remain in such position until you are advised that your presence there is no longer needed and you are directed to withdraw. The Commodore Perry is directed to proceed farther up the Nansemond to Western Branch, and you will send with her two armed boats from the Perry, under competent officers, who will be under the orders of Acting Master Williams, commanding the Barney.

Should the General Putman still be in the Nansemond, you will deliver the accompanying despatch to her commanding officer.

Respectfully, yours,
S. P. LEE,
Acting Rear-Admiral, commanding N. A. B. Squadron.

Acting Vol.-Lt. AMOS P. FOSTER,
Commanding United States Steamer Commodore Perry

ORDERS TO JAMES WILLIAMS.

FLAG-SHIP NORTH ATLANTIC BLOCK'G SQUADRON, OFF NEWPORT NEWS, April 13, 1864.

SIR: Proceed with the Commodore Barney, under your command, up the Nansemond River, communicating with the Commodore Perry, and receiving from her two armed boats, with which you will proceed with the Barney to the mouth of Western Branch. It is expected that a detachment from the army will be at Milnerstown or Red Ferry, situated on the West Branch, at about eleven o'clock to-morrow, (Thursday morning,) who are to coöperate with you in exploring and scouting the Western Branch for the purpose of capturing or destroying any rebel torpedo or other boats which may be there secreted. Upon your arrival at the mouth of the creek you will arm and equip two boats from the Barney, and, together with the two boats of the Perry assigned to you, you will carefully and cautiously ascend the Western Branch, having first endeavored to ascertain the strength of the enemy, if any there, and communicate, if practicable, with the army detachment expected at Milnerstown or Red Ferry at eleven o'clock. You will take command of this boat expedition in person, and be careful not unduly to expose your men. Upon the return of the boats to the Barney, join the Commodore Perry at Halloway's Point, and remain there until your services, in covering the army operations at that point, are no longer needed, when you will return and report to me here. Respectfully yours, S. P. LEE,

Acting Rear-Admiral, commanding N. A. B. Squadron.

Acting Master JAMES M. WILLIAMS,

Commanding U. S. Steamer Commodore Barney.

ORDERS TO LIEUTENANT FYFFE.

FLAG-SHIP NORTH ATLANTIC BLOCK'G SQUADRON, OFF NEWPORT NEWS, VA., April 13, 1864.

SIR: It is intended that a force of infantry will be landed at daylight, to-morrow morning, some distance above Day's Point, on the James River. For the purpose of assisting and covering this landing, you will hold yourself in readiness to proceed with the army transports, which will be collected at Newport News, at about midnight, this evening, under cover of the armed transport Brewster, and will accompany the expedition to the point of landing. You will direct that the United States steamer Shokokon, now on advance picket duty, be in readiness to join you as you proceed up the river, giving her commanding officer notice of the intended movement beforehand. Upon the arrival at the point of landing, you will so dispose of the Commodore Morris and Shokokon as to render every assistance in covering the landing, and after the landing has been effected, the naval vessels will remain in their positions until information is communicated that the objects of the expedition are effected. Guard closely the water during this movement. You are charged with the notification to the commanding officer of the vessels now lying in James River, between Newport News and the intended place of landing, of the intended movement, so that the vessels engaged in it may pass safely and quietly to their destination. It is intended that an infantry force shall land at or near Smithfield, passing into Pagan Creek to assist in that movement; the Stepping Stones, with two launches from the Minnesota, is detailed to assist and cover the landing, which will take place at sunrise to-morrow. Respectfully yours,

S. P. LEE,

Acting Rear-Admiral, commanding N. A. B. Squadron.

Lieutenant JOSEPH P. FYFFE,

Commanding U. S. Steamer Commodore Morris.

REPORT OF LIEUT.-COMMANDER UPSHUR.

UNITED STATES FLAG-SHIP MINNESOTA, OFF NEWPORT NEWS, VA., April 16, 1864.

SIR: I enclose herewith the reports of Acting Ensign Birtwistle and O'Connor, of this vessel, of the part taken by them and the men under their command, composing the crews of the launches in the late expedition to Smithfield; also Assistant Surgeon Longshaw's report of casualties. It is with feelings of deep regret and sorrow that I have to report the loss of Acting Volunteer-Lieutenant Wilder. He was a brave, zealous, and subordinate officer. True to the reputation he had won among his shipmates for promptness and gallantry, he fell while in the act of firing a shot at the enemy. I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. H. UPSHUR,

Lieut.-Commander, commanding U. S. Steamer Minnesota.

Acting Rear-Admiral S. P. LEE,

Commanding N. A. B. Squadron.

REPORT OF ENSIGN O'CONNOR.

UNITED STATES FLAG-SHIP MINNESOTA, OFF NEWPORT NEWS, VA., April 15, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the thirteenth of April, at about seven P. M., the first and second launches of this ship, with a crew of nineteen and twenty men respectively, the second launch being under the charge of Acting Ensign James Birtwistle, and both being under the command of Acting Master Charles B. Wilder, left this ship, and went alongside the United States steamer Stepping Stones, and were fastened astern, while the Stepping Stones proceeded a short distance up the James River and anchored.

At two A. M., on the fourteenth, the Stepping Stones proceeded up the James River to the mouth of Pagan Creek with the boats in tow, where she anchored, it being yet dark, and seeing no signs of the army transports. At about 5.30 A. M. two army boats came in view coming down the river, and soon others came from the same direction. We lay there, waiting for them to come in, which they seemed unable to do. At about ten A. M. the boats cast off from the Stepping Stones and anchored, while she proceeded out and communicated with the transports, and then piloted them into the creek, and was the pilot of the flotilla all of the way to Smithfield. When the Stepping Stones got back into the creek the launches proceeded up in tow of the army steamer Emma; she got aground after proceeding about three miles, when the boats cast

off from her and commenced to pull up. At about 12.15, noon, we arrived off Smithfield, having up to this time seen no enemies. The first launch proceeded a short distance beyond the wharf, to a jetty, where Mr. Wilder sent me with a guard of four men to bring down one of the inhabitants of the town — one of whom we saw sitting in front of a store. I brought him to Mr. Wilder, who examined him closely concerning the rebels and about the torpedo boat. He stated that there were no troops in the vicinity, nor had there been any since the Smith Briggs was destroyed; but occasionally some of the rebel picket came into the town. He also stated that the torpedo boat had been there twice, and had come from Richmond. He told us that the David had left the village on last Sunday night, at ten o'clock, and had returned to Richmond. We then went back to the wharf, and Mr. Wilder left the launch and communicated with Acting Master Campbell and the officer commanding the forces on shore. At two P. M. Mr. Wilder said to Mr. Birtwistle that he was going a short distance up the creek, and desired him to follow at a short distance, and cover us in the first launch, which he did accordingly. We then proceeded up the creek, and past the town, till we came to the ruins of a bridge, where we saw an old negro sitting; we went alongside the bank, and Mr. Wilder put various questions to him, and the answers he gave corroborated the statement of the man who was previously examined. Apprehending no danger, though we were prepared for it, we proceeded through the bridge and up the creek, and were followed at the proper distance by the second launch. When we were about three hundred yards from the bridge the enemy opened fire on us from the right bank of the stream, and from a thickly wooded bluff. Immediately we pointed the boat's head for the bluff and returned the fire from the howitzer and the rifles — Mr. Wilder going to the howitzer, and I attending to the boat and using small arms. We had fired two rounds at the rebels, and Mr. Wilder had the lock string in his hand ready to fire, when, I regret very much to say, he was struck by a rifle ball in the left temple and instantly killed. H. H. Miller, one of my men, was also struck by a rifle ball and badly wounded. I discharged the gun, and got the launch with her head down stream, thinking it was useless to endanger the lives of my men any longer. Mr. Birtwistle got a good position and ably supported me, and I will now add that through the whole expedition my men behaved well, and especially while under fire. This morning my boat, in company with the second launch, covered the army steamer Emma while she ascended the creek. We gave the woods a vigorous shelling, and had the satisfaction of starting some of the enemy from the woods. The town of Smithfield has a deserted appearance, and I saw no one in the town but old men, women, and children.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRED. A. O'CONNOR,
Acting Ensign United States Navy.

Lieut.-Commander J. H. UPSHUR,
U. S. Navy, commanding U. S. Steamer Minnesota.

REPORT OF ENSIGN BIRTWISTLE.

UNITED STATES STEAM FRIGATE MINNESOTA,
OFF NEWPORT NEWS, VA., April 25, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the thirteenth instant, pursuant to your orders, I left the ship, in charge of the second launch, with Master's Mate J. M. Simms, (20) twenty men, and heavy twelve-pounder howitzer, subject to the orders of Acting Master Charles B. Wilder, in command of the first launch, with Acting Ensign Fred A. O'Connor, (19) nineteen men, and heavy twelve-pounder howitzer, smooth bore. Both launches were taken in tow by the Stepping Stones. She anchored a short distance up the river until two o'clock next morning, the fourteenth, when she got under way and arrived off Smithfield Creek, which we entered at daylight and came to anchor just inside, awaiting the arrival of the army steamer which steamed in towards us at about nine A. M., but grounded outside. The Stepping Stones went out to pilot them in, while the launches lay at anchor until they came up, when we were taken in tow by the army steamer Emma to within about (3) three miles of Smithfield, when we cast off and took stations to cover the advance and landing of the troops, and arrived at Smithfield at about 12.30. Troops landed, launches advanced, and Mr. Wilder stationed me to guard the main street and back entrance to the town, while he commanded the main approaches to the right of the town; and while in this position Mr. Wilder interrogated an aged colored man who was living in a toll-house to a destroyed bridge near him in reference to the Torpedo, the nature of the creek, force and vicinity of the rebels, and other necessary and important questions, while I, on the left, questioned an aged white man in a similar manner. Shortly afterwards we compared accounts, and found them to agree. Though they said the Torpedo had left there last Sunday evening, Mr. Wilder was not satisfied, nor any of us; we thought possibly their statements were not true, or she might have returned. Mr. Wilder having called me to him, placed me in command of the right of the town, while he went to consult Acting Master Campbell, commanding the Stepping Stones. He returned, and said he was going a little way up the creek, and ordered me to follow him and cover his advance. He proceeded through the bridge a few hundred yards, when he was fired on from an ambushed bluff by concealed riflemen. Fortunately the second launch was lying on their oars — waiting for the first launch to get about (100) one hundred yards ahead — with the gun manned and trained directly on the bluff. I primed and fired a percussion shell right in their midst, and the second volley they fired was quite scattering; backed the second launch and fired rapidly, each shell bursting beautifully. The first launch, on being fired on, promptly rounded to and fired three effective shots from their gun, and discharged all their small arms, pulled from under the bluff under cover of the second launch, and I most sincerely regret to have to say that while in close action Mr. Wilder received a shot in the left temple which killed him instantly, and

in the very act of pulling the lock-string of the howitzer to fire the second shot. Mr. O'Connor then fought and managed the first launch gallantly, bringing her out manfully, and his men fought heroically. I ordered him to take position on the opposite side of the bridge, but he said he had wounded in his boat, so I allowed him to proceed to the Stepping Stones, and the shots then were very few. The Stepping Stones at this time chimed in beautifully, sending a number of well-directed shots in various places at the edge of the woods, which greatly cheered us, and we heard no more firing from the enemy.

I am very gratified to say that Mr. Simms, officer of the piece in the second launch, was remarkably cool, and directed the working of the gun in a most creditable and skilful manner. All the men, both at the gun and the oars, gave the strictest attention to every order, and I feel at a loss to commend any individual one. Therefore, sir, I commend to your notice both officers and men of both launches. Not a shot was dodged by any one, and when I headed the second launch towards the town, to get clear of some bushes on my starboard quarter, the crew murmured, and to hasten the move I had to tell them I was only getting clear of the bushes for a better position. I then lay a while in easy range, and the army having possession of the town and its rear, I reported to Captain Campbell, and lay astern of the Stepping Stones until the next morning. At about seven A. M. we covered the advance of the little army steamer Emma, with troops, up the creek, and had the satisfaction of driving a number of the enemy from the same place. She returned without the Torpedo.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JAS. BIRTWISTLE,
Acting Ensign.

Lieut.-Commander J. H. UPSHUR,
Commanding U. S. Steam Frigate Minnesota.

REPORT OF SURGEON LONGSHAW.

UNITED STATES STEAM FRIGATE MINNESOTA,
NEWPORT NEWS, VA., April 15, 1864.

SIR: I have to report the following casualties to the detachment sent from this ship on the thirteenth instant, under command of Acting Master D. M. Campbell, to coöperate with the army in landing at Smithfield, Va., on the fourteenth instant. Killed, Acting Volunteer-Lieutenant Charles B. Wilder; wounded, Harmon H. Miller, landsman, severely in left shoulder.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WILLIAM LONGSHAW JR.,
Assistant Surgeon U. S. N.

Lieut.-Commander J. H. UPSHUR,
Commanding U. S. Steam Frigate Minnesota.

REPORT OF JAMES M. WILLIAMS.

UNITED STATES STEAMER COMMODORE PERRY,
NANSEMOND RIVER, VA., April 14, 1864.

SIR: In obedience to your orders of the thirteenth instant, I proceeded up the Nansemond River, and at 7.45 P. M. of that day (thirteenth instant) reported to the commanding officer of the Commodore Perry, (lying at first obstructions in the river,) who furnished me with two boats (crews armed) from his vessel. We then proceeded up the river, and at 10.55 P. M. anchored at Sleepy Hole. I then fitted out two armed boats from this vessel, and with the two from the Commodore Perry communicated with Colonel Keys, of the One Hundred and Eighteenth New York volunteers, (at 11.30 P. M.,) who required our assistance in transporting his troops to the opposite side of the river. At 2.30 A. M. of this day (fourteenth April) they commenced crossing in army launches and boats on the expedition from this vessel, and at six A. M. the last of them had crossed. I then returned to this vessel immediately, got under way, and, with two of the Commodore Perry's boats in tow, steamed to Western Branch and anchored at the obstructions; then, with two boats' crews, armed, proceeded about three miles up the branch, where I communicated with the Colonel of the Thirteenth New Hampshire volunteers, who informed me that the pickets had seen rebel cavalry in the morning, (it was noon when I met the Colonel.) He also informed me that they (the rebel cavalry and infantry) were reported to be about ten thousand strong, and in the neighborhood of Barker's Cross Roads. A little farther up the branch I met a citizen (a farmer) whom I strictly questioned concerning torpedoes, boats, &c. He positively denied that any such things were in that neighborhood, but he acknowledged that they might be in Chuckatuck, as Lieutenant Roy had a force at his headquarters to replace the old one that we had captured on the twenty-ninth March. After receiving from him all the information that he appeared to know, I returned to my vessel, steamed to Sleepy Hole, where the Commodore Perry was anchored, returned her boats, and proceeded down river to flag-ship.

I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JAMES M. WILLIAMS,
Acting Master, commanding.

Acting Rear-Admiral S. P. LEE,
Commanding N. A. B. Squadron.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT FOSTER.

UNITED STATES STEAMER COMMODORE PERRY,
April 15, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in obedience to your orders of April thirteenth, I proceeded up the Nansemond River to the landing opposite Halloway's Point, at which place I arrived at 9.50 P. M. I there found Colonel Keys, of the One Hundred and Eighteenth New York volunteers, who told me that he intended to cross four hundred (400) troops as soon as his barges should arrive.

I offered to render him any assistance in my power with regard to crossing his troops. He told me that he would cross the troops himself, but desired me to take such a position as would cover the landing of his troops. This I immediately did.

At 11.45 P. M. the Delaware came up with four (4) launches, under the charge of a Lieutenant of the naval brigade. I immediately sent the Lieu-



MAJ. GEN. A. A. HUMPHREYS.

tenant with the barges on shore to report to Colonel Keys. I went on shore myself, and again offered to assist in crossing the troops. The Colonel, however, wished to cross them himself. It was five o'clock in the morning before all the troops were across the river. At three o'clock, on the afternoon of the fourth instant, seventy (70) men returned, under charge of the Lieutenant-Colonel of the regiment, and recrossed.

At two o'clock this P. M. Acting Ensign Arnold Harris arrived here in the army gunboat Brewster, and reported to me that the remainder of the troops under Colonel Keys had been taken to Norfolk, and would not return to recross at Nansemond. I immediately got under way, and proceeded to Newport News.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

AMOS P. FOSTER,

Acting Volunteer-Lieutenant, commanding.

Acting Rear-Admiral S. P. LEE,

Commanding N. A. B. Squadron, Newport News, Va.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT FYFFE.

UNITED STATES STEAMER MORRIS,
NEWPORT NEWS, April 15, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in obedience to your orders of the thirteenth instant, I proceeded with this vessel, the Commodore Jones, and Shokokon, accompanied by the army transports Brewster and John D. W. Pentz, up James River, to a point in Burrell's Bay, about three miles north of Point of Shoals light-house, where, arriving at 3.30 A. M., of the fourteenth, the troops were disembarked from the transports by the boats of this vessel, the Commodore Jones, and two launches, the Shokokon being sent on picket about four miles farther up the river. All the troops, nearly four hundred, of the Twenty-third Massachusetts regiment, were landed by five A. M., when the transports steamed down the river. About seven A. M. some musket firing was heard, which I supposed to be a small party of skirmishers. At eight A. M. an officer (quartermaster) came down to the beach at a point about one and a half mile below where the troops had landed and made signal to this vessel. He was accompanied by three soldiers. I went in a boat to communicate with him, but before I got to the beach he had sent two of his men off, who did not return, and are now supposed to be prisoners. On landing, he told me that he had two wounded men; that they were in the rear guard of the regiment, which was but a short distance off. I took five men with me to help bring the wounded down, the officer acting as guide. We proceeded about three quarters of a mile to where he said the rear guard ought to be, but saw nothing of them, nor could we find the wounded. We saw a cavalry picket or escort, composed of about eight men, riding in the direction of Day's Point. We fired upon them, at which they returned and galloped back, and we returned to our boats. I brought the officer and one man on board this vessel, and soon after I put them on board the Brewster. At 12.15 discovered some soldiers on shore, at a house just above Rock Wharf, who were signalizing to this vessel. I now discovered them to be the same ones we had landed in the morning. I manned two boats, and went on shore to see what assistance was required. On landing, the Colonel told me he had four wounded men and four prisoners, and said he had no way of caring for the wounded, and no way of keeping his prisoners, and wished me to receive them on board this vessel until they could be properly cared for, which I did. They were all put on board the Mt. Washington last evening, and sent down. He had also a twelve-pound Dahlgren howitzer, which he had found in the house, and which he said he should leave, as he had no way of taking it with him. I then took it and brought it on board, where I still have it. It is complete, with the exception of sights. At ten P. M. last night the John D. W. Pentz came up after the troops, and requested of me some boats to help reëmbark them, which I sent. They were all got off at 3.30 this morning, and immediately started down the river. I remained there until I received your orders to return to this station, which I reached at seven o'clock P. M.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH P. FYFFE,

Lieutenant, commanding.

Acting Rear-Admiral S. P. LEE,

Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

P. S.—I omitted to mention that at 2.30 this morning this vessel was hailed from Rock Wharf. I sent a boat, which brought off a soldier of the Twenty-third Massachusetts, who said he had been left behind. I shall send him to his regiment.

JOSEPH P. FYFFE,

Lieutenant, commanding.

REPORT OF ACTING MASTER CAMPBELL.

UNITED STATES STEAMER STEPPING STONES,
OFF NEWPORT NEWS, VA., April 15, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in obedience to your order of the thirteenth instant, I proceeded with this vessel and two launches from the Minnesota in tow, under command of Acting Master Charles B. Wilder, to the mouth of Pagan Creek, at sunrise on the fourteenth, to coöperate with a detachment from the army; but as the transports did not arrive until nine A. M., and then all got aground, it was late before we could proceed. As soon as the transports grounded I sent a boat to know if I could render them any assistance, to which the Captain replied they had no pilot. When the boat returned, and reported this to me, I steamed down to them, told the captains to follow me as soon as they could get afloat, and I would show them the way, which they did, and I steamed up the creek to Smithfield, arriving at 12.15 P. M., followed by the steamers C. W. Thomas, John Tracey, and Emma, and landed the troops without opposition. The Stepping Stones taking position about one hundred (100) yards below, and the launches about fifty (50) yards above, the transports to cover the landing. After the troops were landed, I immediately reported to the senior army officer present, and was



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requested to remain until further orders, which I did. At two P. M. Acting Master Wilder told me he would like to go to the upper end of the town with the launches, if I had no objection; I replied that I had none, and (as I suppose) thinking there was no danger, we not having seen any rebels on the way up, went about two hundred (200) yards farther up the creek, where about fifteen (15) of the rebel signal corps, which were concealed in the woods on the bank, opened on the launches with musketry. Sad to relate, Acting Master Wilder, of the Minnesota, was instantly killed, a musket ball passing through the head, and Harmon H. Miller, (seaman,) also from the Minnesota, was severely wounded. The boats returned the fire promptly, as did also this vessel, and we very soon heard no more from them. The boats, after giving the woods a pretty good shelling, returned to this vessel. I am satisfied, from the best information I could obtain, that the rebel torpedo boat, which has been hovering around these waters for a few days, left Smithfield on Sunday evening last, bound to Richmond. It is reported by the inhabitants, with several of whom, both white and black, I conversed, and their statements all agree, that the torpedo boat came to Smithfield on Saturday morning, the ninth instant, and left on Sunday evening for Richmond for repairs. As near as I could ascertain, she is a wooden boat, about thirty-five (35) feet long, and very narrow, has a propeller engine, low pressure, is covered with boiler iron, making her shot-proof against musketry, and is commanded by Lieutenant Davidson, of the rebel navy. This morning, at daylight, General Graham informed me that my services were no longer required at Smithfield, and requested me to cover the rear of his transports while going down the creek, which I did, and arrived at this place at 11.30 A. M. The officers and men of this vessel, as well as the officers and men of the Minnesota's launches, conducted themselves through this expedition in the most becoming manner, always ready and anxious to do their duty. Pilot Henry Stevens, of the Minnesota, deserves much credit in piloting this vessel, as well as the transports; were it not for him, we should not have been able to find the way to Smithfield without much difficulty.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
D. A. CAMPBELL,
Acting Master, commanding.

Acting Rear-Admiral S. P. LEE,
Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.

Doc. 27.

DESTRUCTION OF COTTON.

OFFICIAL ORDER AND DESPATCH.

RICHMOND, Friday, May 2, 1862.

To Major-General M. Lovell:

The following despatch was sent to you on the twenty-fifth of April.

A. T. BLEDSOE,
Assistant Secretary of War.

IT has been determined to burn all the cotton and tobacco, whether foreign or our own, to prevent it from falling into the hands of the enemy.

You will therefore destroy it all, if necessary, to prevent them from getting it. G. W. RANDOLPH,
Secretary of War.

C. S. OF AMERICA, HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT No. 1, CAMP MOORE, LOUISIANA, May 3, 1862.

General Order No. 17.—The enemy, by an overwhelming naval force, having succeeded in passing the defences and gaining possession of the city of New Orleans, are jubilant in the boast, that the struggle which a gallant people are making from a bondage to which death would be preferable, is rapidly closing in disgrace and humiliation to the South. They claim that the great Valley of the West being opened, the remotest commercial interest of the civilized world will have cause to side with them in the iron-handed controversy which they are waging upon us, for the reason that cotton will now flow from every tributary of the Mississippi to seek a market under their protection in the ports of Europe; for without that staple they know full well that a brief period will put an end to their attempt to conquer the South. It is with the people to decide this question for themselves.

If you are resolved to be free, if you are worthy of the heroic blood that has come down to you through hallowed generations, if you have fixed your undimmed eye upon the brightness that spreads out before you and your children, and are determined to shake away forever and ever all political association with the vandal horde that now gather like a pestilence about your fair country; now, my fellow-citizens, is the time to strike! *One sparkling, living touch of fire in manly action for one hour upon each cotton plantation, and the eternal seal of Southern independence is fired and fixed in the great heart of the world.*

It needs no argument to show that, with the destruction of negro property, the cotton and sugar lands of the South would be worthless, and that the mighty effort of this abolition war is for that purpose, is amply proved by a thousand evidences unnecessary to refer to in this order, and which are rapidly culminating in the various schemes of the Federal Congress in reference to the destruction of the slave-holding interest in all the border states.

Your Major-General calls, in this hour of danger, for one heroic effort, and he feels consciously proud that he will not call in vain. *Let not a solitary bale of cotton be left as spoil for the invader, and all will be well.* By order of Major-General LOVELL. J. G. PICKETT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Doc. 28.

HOW SMUGGLING WAS CARRIED ON.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN DUNHAM.

HEADQUARTERS DEFENCES OF WASHINGTON.

SIR: Agreeably to instructions received from Captain Richard B. Irwin, Acting Assistant Ad-

jutant-General to Major-General Banks, to visit the lower part of Maryland as far as Leonardtown, St. Mary's county, and arrest all parties suspected of smuggling articles into Virginia, or of selling goods to individuals who purposed conveying them across the Potomac, also to examine the post-offices at the many villages in that section of country, I have the honor to report that I started on November first, 1862, on the above expedition, accompanied by a squadron of the First Ohio cavalry, numbering seventy men, commanded by Captain N. D. Menken; reached the village of Piscataway at three P. M.; found nothing here to excite my suspicions, but I learned from the inhabitants that a large contraband trade was carried on in the neighborhood of Pamunkey Landing, some ten miles below Piscataway, and that drafted men and men belonging to the rebel army (the former to avoid serving, and the latter to visit their families in Maryland) were constantly crossing the Potomac at night, frequently in squads of ten to twenty.

Immediately upon receipt of this information I started for Pamunkey Landing, which is situated on the Potomac River, near the mouth of Pamunkey River. Upon arriving within a mile and a half of the river, I ordered fifty men to dismount, and marched them down to a place called Fishtown, situated upon the Potomac. Left Lieutenant Hartwell, Eleventh infantry, of General Banks's staff, at this point, with a portion of the force, and took the remainder down the river about two miles, stationing men at various intermediate points. Remained here several hours, but accomplished nothing. At two P. M. collected the men and started for camp.

About two miles from the river met a wagon containing six men. Two remained in the wagon and four attempted to escape into the woods, two of whom were recaptured. They acknowledged that they were bound for Richmond, and were returning from an unsuccessful attempt to cross the river. They were all armed but one, and two of the party belonged to the rebel army. Their names were as follows: Theodore Dent, J. R. Bateman, J. I. Turner, B. Montgomery. Next day sent them under guard to Washington, accompanied by a Dr. Hardie, whom I arrested upon suspicion of harboring these men previous to crossing. They are all now comfortably situated at the Capitol Prison. Arrived at Port Tobacco the evening of the second, where we encamped for the night. Discovered nothing at this place of a suspicious character.

The morning of the third visited Captain Kenyon, commanding squadron of Scott's Legion, at Chapel Point, about four miles below Port Tobacco. His whole force is stationed at this point, and he sends out parties into the surrounding country only upon receiving information that something of a treasonable nature is going on. He had lately made several captures of contraband goods, also some prisoners. Reached the village of Chaptico the same day about eleven P. M., and arrested a Mr. C. C. Spaulding, merchant, who for some time has been engaged in violating the blockade. Found in his money drawer letters implicating him. Also found in his storehouse several boxes mysteriously directed in large letters to "O. K.," of which he could give no account whatever.

At two A. M., of the fourth instant, started for Leonardtown, fourteen miles distant. On the way searched the house of a Mr. Maddox, situate on the banks of the Wicomico River. Discovered nothing. Reached Leonardtown about daylight, and arrested a Mr. E. Lee Spaulding, brother to C. C. Spaulding. Found in his safe nineteen hundred dollars in Southern money, taken in payment for bill of goods sold to a party of whom he knew nothing, not even so far as his name. He had made no entry of this, nor of many similar sales, upon the book, and gave the man no receipt. He had packed the goods in small bundles, at the request of the purchaser. The only account of the sale he could produce was a bill without name or date.

Left Leonardtown afternoon of same day, with Mr. E. L. Spaulding, and reached Chaptico at seven P. M., where we encamped for the night. Left Chaptico on the fifth with Mr. C. C. Spaulding and E. Lee Spaulding, in arrest; arrived at Pamunkey Landing at seven P. M., where we were rejoined by Lieutenant Hartwell, whom I had sent back from Newport on the afternoon of the third, in command of twenty men, with orders to make a more thorough search of the neighborhood of Pamunkey; also to arrest certain individuals suspected of entertaining parties who belonged to the opposite shore. I released them, however, because of insufficient proof against them. Left Pamunkey the sixth instant, at eight A. M., and arrived in Washington at three P. M.

The cases of Mr. C. C. Spaulding and Mr. E. Lee Spaulding were investigated by General Wadsworth. The former was pronounced guilty of having violated the blockade, fined three hundred dollars, and released; the latter was pronounced innocent. Mr. C. C. Spaulding paid the fine with great willingness, and, I have no doubt, considers it but a small percentage upon the thousands he has amassed in this illegal traffic. This contraband trade can be followed with impunity anywhere between about four miles below Fort Washington to the mouth of the Potomac. The blockade cannot be effectual, for thousands of dollars worth of goods are monthly smuggled into Virginia. I would respectfully suggest —

1. That the force stationed at Chapel Point, on the Potomac, numbering sixty men, be increased to several hundred, as the number now there is wholly inadequate to the amount of labor to be performed.

2. That this force be so disposed as to patrol the country and river shore daily, from Fort Washington to the river mouth.

3. That the commanding officer be required to forward weekly reports of captures, &c., to the Military Governor of the District of Columbia.

4. That all boats found upon the river, not in government service, be seized by the command-

ing officer, and used only for such purposes as he may deem proper.

5. That the post offices be inspected frequently; for, although I found nothing treasonable about them in my investigation, still I have no doubt that much illegal matter passes through them.

From the information I could glean from various sources I am convinced that almost every merchant in those lower counties has, to some extent, either been directly smuggling goods into Virginia, or has sold to irresponsible parties.

In conclusion, I desire to express my indebtedness to Lieutenant C. Hartwell, of General Banks's staff, for many valuable suggestions during this expedition, as also to Captain Menken, commanding squadron First Ohio cavalry, for his promptness in the execution of orders. Two days of the six we travelled fifty miles a day, because of my anxiety to surprise certain parties. Notwithstanding this, not a complaint was heard from a single man. The material of this squadron is excellent.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
Your most obedient servant,
ROBERT T. DUNHAM,
Captain and A. D. C.

To C. MCKEEVER,
Lieutenant Colonel and A. A. G.

DOC. 29.

OPERATIONS AGAINST THE INDIANS.

REPORT OF COLONEL SIBLEY.

HEADQUARTERS IN CAMP,
NEAR FORT RIDGLEY, September 8, 1862.

Adjutant-General Malmros:

SIR: I received despatches from officers at New Ulm, Winnebago Agency, and from Colonel Flandreau at South Bend, last evening, representing everything to be quiet in that quarter. On the sixth, I despatched Captain McLarty's company, of the Seventh regiment, to New Ulm, at the earnest request of the people there and in the vicinity, who represented that the settlers had been seized with a fresh panic, and would leave unless more troops were sent.

With a view to obtain some knowledge of the condition of the prisoners, by inducing Little Crow to send me some half-breed with whom I could communicate on the subject, I left a communication for him attached to a stake, near the spot where I interred our men killed in the attack upon Major Brown's camp, couched in these terms:

"If Little Crow has any propositions to make to me, let him send a half-breed to me, and he shall be protected in and out of my camp.

"H. H. SIBLEY,
"Colonel, commanding Military Expedition."

Last evening, a mule and buggy came into view from the camp. I immediately despatched the officer of the day to escort the occupant or occupants in safety to my tent, a white flag having been conspicuously displayed from the vehicle. He returned, accompanied by Thomas Robertson, son of the late Superintendent of Farming, and teacher among the Sioux, (one-eighth blood), and Thomas Robinson, a half-breed, son of a quondam trader of that name. They brought me a response to my note to Little Crow, of which the following is a verbatim copy:

"YELLOW MEDICINE, September 7, 1862.

"DEAR SIR: for what reason we have commenced this war, I will tell you, it is on account of Major Galbraith, we made a treaty with the Government, a beg for what little we do get, and then can't get it till our children was dieing with hunger it was with the traders that commence Mr. A. J. Myrick told the Indians they could eat grass or their own dung. Then Mr. Forbes told the lower Sioux that were not men then Robert he was making with his friends how to defraud us of our money, if the young braves have push the white man I have done this myself. So I want you to let the Goveinar Ramesy know this. I have great many prisneer women and childun it aint all our fault the Winnebagoes was in the engagement, two of them was killed. I want you to give me answer by barer all at present.

"Yours truly his
"LITTLE + CROW,
"mark"

Addressed to "Governor H. H. Sibley, Esq., Fort Ridgley."

I have questioned the two men very closely with reference to the prisoners, their number and condition, the location of the Indian camp, the intention of the leaders, and state concisely the substance of their replies. They say the white women and children number one hundred or more; that no violence has been offered the former; that they are as well taken care of by the farmer Indians as circumstances will permit; that they are allowed full liberty during the day, but are quartered at night; that only one half-breed, L. Labathe, was killed, and he would not have been had he not resisted. The other half-breeds are kept as prisoners, although unguarded. It is announced to them that, if they attempt to escape, they and their families will be killed. They have, in many instances, been forced to participate in the fights that have occurred, under penalty of being killed.

They say many of the Sioux, indeed all of the lower bands, were in favor of giving up the white prisoners, but the upper Indians object, which brought on a general wrangle between them.

To-day I send back the bearer of the truce flag, with a note in these words:

"LITTLE CROW: You have murdered many of our people without any sufficient cause. Return me the prisoners under a flag of truce, and I will talk to you like a man.

"H. H. SIBLEY,
"Colonel, commanding Military Expedition."

I am very anxious to secure the safety of the many prisoners before attacking the camp, as they will doubtless be placed in the most exposed

situations. The number of fighting men in the lower bands is five hundred and seventeen, according to actual enumeration; of Wahpetons, about two hundred and fifty, and that they have been reënforced by six hundred men from the Yankton and Sissiton bands, and that the Ehanktons, or Cut Heads, will be down as soon as they arrive from their hunt.

We have, therefore, to meet, according to Mr. Riggs, and other competent authority, twenty-seven hundred or twenty-eight hundred men, and I have, from the beginning, believed and acted from the conviction, that the lower bands would not attempt to escape, but would make a determined stand. Their main camp is at Yellow Medicine, and it is said by the Robinsons, that the upper Sioux have refused to allow them to go to their country, but tell them they must fight where they are.

From what I can gather, I am satisfied that they will make a desperate fight, and that we must expect night attacks, ambuscades, and every species of annoyance in our advance. In view of the great importance of the results of the movements of this column, and the fact that I am without any disposable force of mounted men, (there are not more than sixty or seventy left,) I must urge the absolute necessity of having cavalry, fully armed and equipped, to the number of at least one regiment, and the infantry force increased to two thousand men. This expedition, if properly supplied with men and materials, can crush this emeute at a blow, and wipe out the murderers, but should it meet with a repulse, or take the field against a vigilant and desperate enemy, without sufficient support, no one can foresee the horrible results.

The scouts, as well as the bearers of the flag of truce, assert that all outlying parties have been called in, in view of the menacing position of this corps, and the latter further state that the party that attacked Major Brown's camp consisted of three hundred and nineteen men, who left the Yellow Medicine with the intention of separating into two columns at this point, and simultaneously attacking St. Peter and Mankato, and they had no idea of the force which met and repulsed them in the neighborhood.

I hope the Third regiment will be ordered to join this column at once, and that men, and cartridges, and rations, and clothing will be passed forward with all expedition. Let us exterminate these vermin while we have them together. I will report to you in my next the amount and description of ammunition on hand, and what is still wanted. In accordance with your suggestion, I have sent to New Ulm eighty-three muskets, of different kinds, and twenty-eight hundred cartridges, which have been turned over to the sheriff of the county for arming the settlers.

I learn from Colonel Flandreau that he would leave for St. Paul to hurry up reënforcements and supplies for the south side of the river. While I concur in his report of the necessity of adding to his strength, I hope you will not forget that, in all probability, this corps must meet the main attack, and that the Third regiment, being disciplined, is indispensable as a nucleus and an example to the entirely raw officers and men comprising the large majority of the Sixth and Seventh regiments.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. H. SIBLEY,
Colonel, commanding.

Doc. 30.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD'S OFFICIAL REPORT

OF THE EVACUATION OF CORINTH, AND RETREAT TO TUPELO, MISSISSIPPI.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
TUPELO, MISS., June 13, 1862.

GENERAL: In relation to the recent military operations in this quarter, I have to submit the following for the information of the War Department:

The purposes and ends for which I had held and occupied Corinth having been mainly accomplished by the last of May, and by the twenty-fifth of that month having ascertained definitely that the enemy had received large accessions to his already superior force, whilst ours had been reduced day by day by disease, resulting from bad water and inferior food, I felt it clearly my duty to evacuate that position without delay. I was further induced to this step by the fact that the enemy had declined my offer of battle, twice made him, outside of my intrenched lines, and sedulously avoided the separation of his corps, which he advanced with uncommon caution, under cover of heavy guns, strong intrenchments, constructed with unusual labor, and with singular delay, considering his strength, and our relative inferiority in numbers.

The transparent object of the Federal commander had been to cut off my resources by destroying the Mobile and Ohio, and the Memphis and Charleston railroads. This was substantially foiled by the evacuation and withdrawal along the line of the former road; and, if followed by the enemy, remote from his base, I confidently anticipated opportunity for resumption of the offensive, with chances for signal success.

Under these plain conditions, on the twenty-sixth ult., I issued verbally several orders, copies of which are herewith, marked A, B, and C, partially modified subsequently, as will be seen by the papers, &c., herewith, marked D, E, F, and G. These orders were executed, I am happy to say, with singular precision, as will be found fully admitted in the correspondence, from the scene, of the Chicago "Tribune," herewith transmitted.

At the time finally prescribed, the movement commenced, and was accomplished without the knowledge of the enemy, who only began to suspect the evacuation after broad daylight on the morning of the thirtieth May, when, having opened on our lines from his formidable batteries of heavy and long range guns, erected the night previously, he received no answer from any direc-

tion. But as our cavalry pickets still maintained their positions of the previous day, he was not, apparently, fully satisfied of our movements, until some stores, of little value, in the town were burned, which could not be removed.

It was then, to his surprise, the enemy became satisfied that a large army, approached and invested with such extraordinary preparations, expense, labor, and timidity, had disappeared from his front, with all its munitions and heavy guns, leaving him without knowledge, as I am assured, whither it had gone; for his scouts were scattered in all directions, as I have since ascertained, to inquire what directions our forces had taken. Even now, indeed, I have reason to believe, the Federal commander has little knowledge of the position and disposition of my main forces.

But for the unfortunate and needless delay, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, of some five trains of box cars, (three miscellaneously freighted, and two empty,) in passing beyond the bridges over the Hatchie River and its branches, which in the plan of evacuation had been directed to be destroyed, at a certain hour, on the morning of the thirtieth ultimo, not an incident would have marred, in the least, the success of the evacuation, in the face of a force so largely superior. It was, however, through a too rigid execution of orders that these bridges were burned, and we were obliged to destroy the trains, as far as practicable, and burn the stores, including some valuable subsistence, to what extent will be more precisely reported as soon as practicable.

The troops moved off in good spirits and order, prepared to give battle, if pursued, but no serious pursuit was attempted. Remaining in rear of the Tuscumbia and its affluents, some six miles from Corinth, long enough to collect stragglers incident to new levies, my main forces resumed the march, and were concentrated on Baldwin, with rear guards left to hold the bridges across the Tuscumbia and tributaries, which were not drawn back until the evening of the second instant.

Whilst at Rienzi, half way to Baldwin, I was informed that on the morning of the thirtieth ult. a detachment of the enemy's cavalry had penetrated to Booneville, eight miles south of Rienzi, and had captured and burned a railroad train of ammunition, baggage, and subsistence, delayed there forty-eight hours by some mismanagement. I regret to add that the enemy also burned the railroad depot, in which were, at the moment, a number of dead bodies, and at least four sick soldiers of this army, who were consumed; an act of barbarism scarcely credible, and without a precedent, to my knowledge, in civilized warfare.

Upon the opportune appearance in a short time, however, of an inferior force of cavalry, the enemy left in great haste and confusion, after having received one volley. Only one of our men was carried away by him. Quite a considerable number of stragglers, and of our sick and convalescent, *en route* to Southern hospitals, who for a few moments had fallen into the enemy's hands, were rescued. These are the two thousand men, untruthfully reported by Generals Pope and Halleck to their War Department, as "captured and paroled" on that occasion.

I desire to record that one Colonel Elliott, of the Federal army, commanded in this raid, and is responsible for the cruel death of our sick.

As for the ten thousand stand of small arms, also reported by these officers as destroyed, the truth is, that not to exceed one thousand five hundred, mostly inferior muskets, were lost on that occasion.

I had intimations of this expedition the day before the evacuation, and had detached immediately suitable commands of infantry and cavalry to foil its purposes, and to protect the bridges on the line of my march. Unfortunately the infantry passed through and south of Booneville but a little while before the enemy made his descent; the cavalry, as before said, reached there in time only to rescue our men who had been captured.

Equally inaccurate, reckless, and unworthy are the statements of these Federal commanders, in their several official reports by telegraph, bearing dates of the thirtieth and thirty-first of May, and of first, second, and fourth of June, as published in Cincinnati and Chicago journals, touching the amount of property and stores destroyed by us at Corinth, and General Pope's alleged pressing pursuit.

Major-General Halleck's despatch of fourth June may particularly be characterized as disgracefully untrue; possibly, however, he was duped by his subordinate. Nothing, for example, can be wider from the truth than that ten thousand men and fifteen thousand small arms of this army were captured or lost. In addition to those destroyed at Booneville, some five hundred inferior small arms were accidentally left by convalescents in a camp four miles south of Corinth.

No artillery of any description was lost; no clothing. No tents worth removal were left standing. In fine, the letters of newspaper correspondents, enclosed, give a correct statement, both as to the conduct of the retreat, the scanty spoils of war left behind, the actual barrenness of substantial results to the enemy, and exhibit his doubt, perplexity, and ignorance concerning the movements of this army.

Baldwin was found to offer no advantages of a defensive character, and being badly provided with water, I determined to fall back upon this point, some twenty miles south, fifty-two miles from Corinth, and here to await the developments of the enemy's plans and movements.

Accordingly, leaving Baldwin on the seventh, (see papers appended, marked H,) the main body of my forces was assembled here on the ninth instant, leaving all the approaches from Corinth carefully guarded by a competent force of cavalry under an efficient officer, who occupied a line fifteen miles north of this place.

Supported by my general officers, I am doing all practicable to organize for defensive operations, whensoever any movement of the enemy may give the opportunity, which I anticipate as not remote.

I feel authorized to say, by the evacuation, the

plan of campaign of the enemy was utterly foiled, his delay of seven weeks, and vast expenditures, were of little value, and he has reached Corinth to find it a barren locality, which he must abandon as wholly worthless for his purposes.

I have the honor to be, respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General, commanding.

To General SAMUEL COOPER,
Adjutant-General and Inspector-General, C. S. A.,
Richmond, Va.

P. S.—My effective force on the morning of the evacuation, thirtieth May, 1862, did not exceed forty-seven thousand men of all arms; that of the enemy, obtained from the best source of information, could not have been less than ninety thousand men of all arms.

G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General, commanding.

(A.) Strictly Confidential.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY, W. D.,
CORINTH, MISS., May 26, 1862.

Special Orders, No. 30.

I. Captain Mauldin, commanding company cavalry at Bear Creek bridge, will hold his command in readiness to move at a moment's notice towards Baldwin or Guntown on the M. and O. R. R. He will, when orders to remove are received, thoroughly destroy all bridges, both of railroads and ordinary roads, on Bear Creek and its tributaries, and all bridges on his line of march. Should the enemy force him to fall back, before orders to do so have been received, he will burn all bridges as above instructed.

II. The commanding officer of the cavalry on and near the Tennessee River, will, if compelled by the enemy to fall back, move in the direction of Tuscaloosa, Alabama, or Columbus, Mississippi.

II. The commanding officer of cavalry, at or near Rienzi, will follow the movements of the army when they pass Rienzi, with his entire force.

IV. The commanding officer of the cavalry forces at or near Jacinto will report at once, in person to General Van Dorn, for orders, and will, until further orders, receive all of his orders from General Van Dorn.

V. The commanding officer of the troops at Chewalla and Cypress will hold their commands in readiness to move on short notice, by the most direct route, to Kossuth. When commencing this movement, they will thoroughly destroy the Cypress bridge, and all the railroad and mud road bridges in their rear, and all bridges that might be of service to the enemy; they will take their artillery with them, and on reaching Kossuth, will follow up the general movement of the army and protect its rear.

VI. The commanding officer of the cavalry at Pocahontas will hold his command in readiness to move on short notice to Ripley. On commencing the move, he will destroy all the railroad and mud road bridges in his rear, and all other bridges that may be of service to the enemy will be [illegible] will take all of his artillery with him, and move from Ripley to Pontotoc, and will protect the rear of the forces moving in that direction.

When at Ripley, he will communicate with general headquarters at Baldwin, for orders.

By order of Brigadier-General W. N. R. BEALL.

BEALL HAMPSTEAD,
Captain, and Assistant Adjutant General.

(B.) MEMORANDUM OF ORDERS.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
CORINTH, MISS., May 27, 1862.

THE following memorandum is furnished to General Bragg, for the intended movement of his army from this place to Baldwin, at the time hereinafter indicated:

1. Hardee's corps will move on the direct road from his position to Danville, by Cleburn's camp, which lies on the east of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, part of the way, thence to Rienzi and to Baldwin.

2. Bragg's corps, via the turnpike to Kossuth, until it reaches the south side of the Tuscumbia, thence by the Rienzi and Black Land road to Carrollsville and Baldwin.

3. Breckinridge's corps, (or reserve,) via the turnpike to Kossuth, thence to Black Land, Carrollsville, and Baldwin.

4. Polk's corps, via the turnpike to Kossuth, thence by the Western road to Black Land, Carrollsville, and Baldwin.

5. The baggage train of these corps must leave their position at twelve M., precisely, on the twenty-eighth instant, and stop for the night on the south side of the Tuscumbia, on the best available ground. The provision trains will follow the baggage trains.

6. The ammunition and ambulance trains must be parked at the most convenient point to their brigades, and moved in rear of the provision trains to the south side of the Tuscumbia, where they will await further orders. All of these trains are to be accompanied by one pioneer company and two infantry companies, properly distributed per brigade. The brigade and regimental quartermaster must accompany and be responsible for their trains.

7. The officers in charge of the baggage trains will receive sealed orders as to their point of destination, which they will open at the first-mentioned stopping-place.

8. As it may become necessary to take the offensive, the troops will take their position in the trenches, as soon as practicable, after disposing of their baggage in the wagon trains. One brigade per corps will be put in line of battle, in the best position for the offensive, in front of the trenches. The reserve will remain in position as already indicated to its General commanding. These troops will all bivouac in position, and at three o'clock A. M., on the twenty-ninth instant, if not attacked by the enemy, will take up their line of march to Baldwin by the routes indicated in Article I., leaving properly distributed cavalry pickets in front of their lines to guard and protect this retrograde movement. These pickets

will remain in position until recalled by the chief of cavalry, who will remain in Corinth for the purpose of directing the retrograde movement of cavalry, when each regiment must follow the route taken by the corps to which it shall have been temporarily assigned, for the protection of its rear and flanks.

9. Under no circumstances will these cavalry regiments abandon their position in front of the line, (unless compelled by overpowering numbers,) until the rear of the columns of the Army of the Mississippi shall have crossed the Tuscumbia; when the General commanding each corps will communicate that fact to the chief of cavalry, for his information and guidance.

10. The cavalry pickets will continue the usual skirmishing with the enemy in front of the lines, and, when retiring, they will destroy the roads and bridges in their rear, as far as practicable: and after having crossed the Tuscumbia, they will guard the crossings until recalled by the General commanding.

11. The chief of cavalry will order, if practicable, one regiment to report to Major-General Polk, one to Major-General Hardee, one to General Bragg, and one to Major-General Van Dorn, independently of the regiment now at Jacinto, already ordered to report to the latter officer.

12. After the departure of the troops from the intrenched line, a sufficient number of drums from each brigade must be left to beat at "reveille" at the usual hour; after which they can rejoin their commands.

13. The commanding officer of corps of the army of the Mississippi will leave, on the south side of the Tuscumbia, five hundred infantry and two pieces of artillery, to guard the four crossings of that stream, and to effectually destroy the bridges, and obstruct the roads, after the passage of the cavalry.

14. On arriving at Baldwin, the best defensive position will be taken by the army of the Mississippi, due regard being had to a proper and sufficient supply of wood and water for the troops and horses of the different commands.

G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General, commanding.

(C.) MEMORANDUM OF MOVEMENTS ON BALDWIN FOR GENERAL VAN DORN.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
CORINTH, MISS., May 27, 1862.

1. THE baggage trains of his army must leave their position at daybreak on the twenty-eighth instant, by the road on the east of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, to stop temporarily at about six miles from his headquarters, but with secret orders to the officers in charge of them to continue rapidly on the direct road to the vicinity of Baldwin. The provision trains will follow the baggage trains.

2. The ammunition and ambulance trains must be parked at the most convenient point to their brigades, or near the general headquarters, where they will remain until the troops shall have been moved to the front to take up their line of battle, when these trains will be ordered to follow the provision trains.

All of these trains must be accompanied by one pioneer company and two infantry companies (properly distributed) per brigade. The brigade and regimental quartermasters must accompany, and be responsible for their trains.

The officers in charge of the baggage trains will receive sealed orders as to their point of destination, which they will open at the already mentioned stopping-place.

3. As it may become necessary to take the offensive, the troops will take their position in line of battle as soon as practicable after disposing of their baggage in the wagon trains.

These troops will bivouac in position, and at three o'clock A. M., on the twenty-ninth instant, if not attacked by the enemy, will take up their line of march to Baldwin, by the route indicated, (Article I.,) leaving properly distributed cavalry pickets in front of their lines, to guard and protect this retrograde movement.

These pickets shall remain in position until recalled by the chief of cavalry, who will remain in Corinth for the purpose of directing the retrograde movement of the cavalry, when each regiment will follow the route taken by the corps to which it shall have been temporarily assigned, for the protection of its rear and flanks.

4. Under no circumstances will the cavalry regiments abandon their position in front of the lines, (unless compelled by overpowering numbers,) until the rear of the column of the Army of the West shall have crossed Clear Creek, when the Generals commanding shall communicate the fact to the chief of cavalry, for his information and guidance.

5. The cavalry pickets will continue the usual skirmishing with the enemy in front of the lines, and, when retiring, will destroy, as far as practicable, the roads and bridges in their rear, and, after having crossed Clear Creek, they will guard the crossing until recalled by the General commanding.

6. The chief of cavalry will order, if practicable, one regiment to report to Major-General Polk and one to Major-General Hardee, one to General Bragg and one to Major-General Van Dorn, independently of the regiment now at Jacinto, already ordered to report to the latter officer.

7. After the departure of the troops from the intrenched lines, a sufficient number of drums from each brigade must be left to beat "reveille" at the usual hour, after which they can join their commands.

8. The commanding officer of the Army of the West will leave, if necessary, on the south side of Clear Creek, about five hundred infantry and two pieces of artillery, to defend the crossing of said stream, and to effectually destroy the bridges and obstruct the road after the passage of the cavalry.

9. On arriving in the vicinity of Guntown, the best defensive position will be taken in rear of Twenty-mile Creek, due regard being had to a

proper and sufficient supply of wood and water for the troops. G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General, commanding.

(D.) Confidential.

CORINTH, May 28, 1862.

To General B. Bragg, commanding Army of the Mississippi, Corinth:

GENERAL: Considering that we have yet still so much to be removed from this place, I have decided that the retrograde movement shall not take place until the thirtieth instant, at the hours appointed, instead of the twenty-ninth.

You will please issue all necessary orders to that effect to the forces under your command.

It would be advisable to stop at once the ammunition and provision trains at convenient points to this place. Respectfully,

Your obedient servant,
G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General, commanding.
GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Acting Chief of Staff.

CORINTH, May 28, 1862.

(E.) *To Major-General E. Van Dorn, Danville Road:*

GENERAL: I approve of your request to leave at twelve h (not eleven) to-night, if it be clear. Send artillery at sundown two miles back, so as to be beyond reach of sound to the enemy. Be careful, however, not to send it too far.

As Bragg's rear guard will not leave until three h, A. M., yours ought not to leave before 2½ h, for Hardee's left would then be uncovered whilst moving in rear of your present position and before crossing the railroad.

Hardee will destroy the bridges (dirt and railroad) on Tuscumbia, provided he is guarding them. But have the matter clearly understood with him, so as to admit of no error. I referred in my note to the small bridge on Clear Creek, one which you must pass.

You must, of course, have out as few details as possible. You must be the sole judge of that.

The telegraph operator must remain at his post as long as possible, say until your main forces move to the rear, for at any moment we may be called upon to move forward.

I am glad to hear of the sham balloon. I hope it is so, for I fear that more than their artillery at this moment.

Your obedient servant,
G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General, commanding.

P. S. — You must not forget to obstruct thoroughly the road across Clear Creek, near General Jones's lines. You or Hardee must keep a strong guard of infantry and two pieces of artillery at the Clear Creek railroad bridge, until the last cars shall have left the depot here. Please arrange this matter distinctly with him.

Would it not be prudent to send one regiment, two pieces of artillery, and some cavalry to protect your train?

I think I would keep Price back in best position to move either to the rear to protect the train, if necessary, or to the front, in case of battle.

GEORGE W. BRENT,
Acting Chief of Staff.

CORINTH, May 25, 1862.

(F.) *General B. Bragg, Corinth:*

GENERAL: From information received, Guntown, four miles and a half below Baldwin, is considered a better position for the defensive; hence we will go there. Please give the necessary orders.

Small details must be kept in or about old camps, to keep up usual fires, on account of balloon, with orders to join their commands at ten hour, on the march to the rear, or in front, in case of battle.

Not too many fires must be kept on the lines to-night, so as not to reveal too clearly our position. A brigade (the best one) from each corps will be selected to guard and bring up the rear of each column, to move off about two hours after the rest of the column, and from which a small detail will be left at each bridge to destroy it after passage of cavalry. Detail to be in proportion to importance of bridge.

Would it not be advisable for the main forces to start at the one h, and the rear guards at three h A. M.?

No rockets must be fired to-night.

Your obedient servant,
G. T. BEAUREGARD.
GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Acting Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
CORINTH, May, 1862.

(G.) *To General B. Bragg and Major-Generals E. Van Dorn, L. Polk, W. J. Hardee, J. C. Breckinridge:*

GENERALS: The following modifications have been made in the order relative to the retrograde movement from this place:

1. At sundown the light batteries must be sent to about *one mile* from the intrenched lines, in order to avoid communicating to the enemy any information of the movement. These batteries must be so placed outside of the road as to follow their brigades at night without any difficulty.

2. At eight o'clock P. M., the heavy batteries of the lines must be removed, without noise, to the cars, and sent to the Central depot.

3. At ten o'clock P. M., the retrograde movement of the forces is to commence, as already instructed.

4. At twelve o'clock P. M., or as soon thereafter as possible, the rear guard is to follow the movement.

5. As soon as the Army of the Mississippi shall have got beyond the *Tuscumbia*, and the Army of the West beyond *Ridge Creek*, General Beall, at Corinth, (chief of cavalry,) shall be informed of the facts, and the position in the rear of said stream shall be held until the train shall be considered beyond the reach of the enemy.

6. Camp-fires must be kept up all night by the troops in position, and then by the cavalry.

7. Three signal rockets shall be sent up at three o'clock in the morning by the cavalry pickets of Generals Van Dorn, Bragg, and Polk.

8. All Artesian and other wells must be destroyed this evening, by a detachment from each brigade. All Artesian well machinery must be sent, forthwith, to the depot for transportation to Saltillo.

9. Whenever the railroad engine shall whistle through the night, near the intrenched line, the troops in the vicinity shall cheer repeatedly, as though reënforcements had been received.

G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General, commanding.
GEO. WM. BRENT,
Acting Chief of Staff.

(H.) MEMORANDUM OF ORDERS.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, BALDWIN, June 6, 1862, 5 h. P. M.

I. General Van Dorn's army will start at three h. A. M., on the seventh instant, on its way to Tupelo, via the road from Baldwin to Priceville. It will halt for the night at Sand Creek, a distance of about (17) seventeen miles from Baldwin. It will resume the line of march the next morning at three h. A. M., and will take position, for the present, at Priceville, leaving a brigade at the cross of the road, with the Ripley and the Cotton Gin road, near Smith or Brooks's house, and a cavalry force at or about the steam saw-mill. One brigade will be sent to Morrisville or vicinity, and a force of cavalry to guard the (20) mile creek ferry, on the road from Fulton, with a strong picket at the latter place. The cavalry regiment at Marietta will not leave that position until the eighth instant, at four A. M.

II. General Hardee's corps will start for Tupelo, at four h. P. M., on the seventh instant, via the same road as General Van Dorn's army, stopping for the night at a creek, about nine miles from its present position. He will send at four h. A. M., on that day, one regiment and two pieces of artillery, to the cross-road with the Natchez railroad, to guard the Twenty-mile creek crossing.

His corps will resume its line of march at four h. A. M., on the eighth instant, and will get to Tupelo that night if practicable. His rear guard of cavalry will remain in its present position until twelve P. M., on the seventh instant, and afterwards in the vicinity of Baldwin (guarding the rear of Hardee's corps) until about four h. A. M., on the eighth instant.

III. General Breckinridge's corps of reserve will leave for Tupelo, via Carrollsville and Birmingham, at three h. A. M., on the seventh instant, stopping for the night at Yanoby Creek, a few miles beyond the latter town, and will resume its line of march at three h. A. M., on the eighth instant.

IV. General Bragg's corps will leave by the same road as General Breckinridge's, (passing to the westward of Carrollsville,) at two h. P. M., on the seventh instant, stopping for the night at or near Birmingham; leaving there at three h. A. M., for Tupelo.

His cavalry will follow on the same road, the movement from where it is now posted, at two h. A. M., on the eighth instant. The regiment at Ripley will move on the road from that place to Tupelo, and all said cavalry will be posted as already indicated to General B. on the map.

V. General Polk's corps will conform its movements to that of General Bragg, starting at two h. P. M., on the eighth instant, on the direct road to Saltillo, west of the railroad, halting at that place until further orders. His cavalry will remain where at present posted, and will follow his movements along the same road, (guarding his rear,) at three h. A. M., on the eighth instant.

VI. All infantry outposts should be recalled in time to join their command.

VII. All finger boards and mile posts should be taken down by the cavalry of the rear guards.

G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General, commanding.
THOMAS JORDAN,
A. A. General.

DOC. 31.

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

REPORT OF GENERAL R. E. LEE.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA, September 21, 1863.

General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General, C. S. A., Richmond, Va.:

GENERAL: After the battle of Fredericksburg, the army remained encamped on the south side of the Rappahannock until the latter part of April. The Federal army occupied the north side of the river, opposite Fredericksburg, extending to the Potomac. Two brigades of Anderson's division, those of Generals Mahone and Posey, were stationed near the United States Mine or Bark Mill Ford; and a third, under command of General Wilcox, guarded Banks's Ford. The cavalry was distributed on both flanks — Fitzhugh Lee's brigade picketing the Rappahannock above the mouth of the Rapidan, and W. H. F. Lee's near Port Royal. Hampton's brigade had been sent into the interior to recruit. General Longstreet, with two divisions of his corps, was detached for service south of James River, in February, and did not rejoin the army until after the battle of Chancellorsville. With the exception of the engagement between Fitz Lee's brigade and the enemy's cavalry near Kelley's Ford, on the seventeenth of March, 1863, of which a brief report has been already forwarded to the Department, nothing of interest transpired during this period of inactivity.

On the fourteenth of April intelligence was received that the enemy's cavalry was concentrating on the upper Rappahannock. Their efforts to establish themselves on the south side of the river were successfully resisted by Fitz Lee's brigade and two regiments of W. H. F. Lee's, the whole under the immediate command of General Stuart. About the twenty-first, small bodies of infantry appeared at Kelley's Ford and the Rappahannock Bridge,

and almost at the same time a demonstration was made opposite Port Royal, where a party of infantry crossed the river about the twenty-third. These movements were evidently intended to conceal the designs of the enemy; but, taken in connection with the reports of scouts, indicated that the Federal army, now commanded by Major-General Hooker, was about to resume active operations. At half-past five o'clock A. M., the twenty-eighth of April, the enemy crossed the Rappahannock in boats, near Fredericksburg, and, driving off the pickets on the river, proceeded to lay down a pontoon bridge, a short distance below the mouth of Deep Run. Later in the forenoon another bridge was constructed about a mile below the first. A considerable force crossed on these bridges during the day, and was massed out of view under the high banks of the river. The bridges, as well as the troops, were effectually protected from our artillery by the depth of the river's bed and the narrowness of the stream, while the batteries on the opposite heights completely commanded the wide plain between our lines and the river.

As in the first battle of Fredericksburg, it was thought best to select positions with a view to resist the advance of the enemy, rather than incur the heavy loss that would attend any attempt to prevent his crossing. Our dispositions were accordingly made as on the former occasion. No demonstration was made opposite any other point of our lines at Fredericksburg; and the strength of the force that had crossed, and its apparent indisposition to attack, indicated that the principal effort of the enemy would be made in some other quarter. This impression was confirmed by intelligence received from General Stuart, that a large body of infantry and artillery was passing up the river. During the forenoon of the twenty-ninth that officer reported that the enemy had crossed in force near Kelley's Ford, on the preceding evening. Later in the day he announced that a heavy column was moving from Kelley's towards Germana Ford, on the Rapidan, and another towards Ely's Ford, on that river. The routes they were pursuing, after crossing the Rapidan, converge near Chancellorsville, whence several roads lead to the rear of our position at Fredericksburg.

On the night of the twenty-ninth, General Anderson was directed to proceed towards Chancellorsville, and dispose Wright's brigade and the troops from the Bark Mill Ford to cover these roads. Arriving at Chancellorsville about midnight, he found the commands of Generals Mahone and Posey already there, having been withdrawn from the Bark Mill Ford, with the exception of a small guard. Learning that the enemy had crossed the Rapidan, and were approaching in strong force, General Anderson retired early on the morning of the thirtieth to the intersection of the mine and plank roads, near Tabernacle Church, and began to intrench himself. The enemy's cavalry skirmished with his rear guard as he left Chancellorsville; but being vigorously repulsed by Mahone's brigade, offered no further opposition to his ma[illegible]e was placed on the old turnpike, Wright and Posey on the plank road. In the mean time General Stuart had been directed to endeavor to impede the progress of the column marching by way of Germana Ford. Detaching W. H. F. Lee, with his two regiments, the Ninth and Thirteenth Virginia, to oppose the main body of the enemy's cavalry, General Stuart crossed the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford, with Fitz Lee's brigade, on the night of the twenty-ninth. Halting to give his men a few hours' repose, he ordered Colonel Owens, with the Third Virginia cavalry, to throw himself in front of the enemy, while the rest of the brigade attacked his right flank, at the Wilderness tavern, between Germana Ford and Chancellorsville. By this means the march of this column was delayed until twelve M., when, learning that the one from Ely's Ford had already reached Chancellorsville, General Stuart marched by Todd's tavern towards Spottsylvania Court-House, to put himself in communication with the main body of the army, and Colonel Owens fell back upon General Anderson.

The enemy in our front, near Fredericksburg, continued inactive, and it was now apparent that the main attack would be made upon our flank and rear. It was therefore determined to leave sufficient troops to hold our lines, and with the main body of the army to give battle to the approaching column. Early's division of Jackson's corps, and Barksdale's brigade of McLaws's division, with part of the reserve artillery, under General Pendleton, were intrusted with the defence of our position at Fredericksburg, and at midnight, on the thirtieth, General McLaws marched with the rest of his command towards Chancellorsville. General Jackson followed at dawn next morning, with the remaining divisions of his corps. He reached the position occupied by General Anderson at eight A. M., and immediately began preparations to advance. At eleven A. M., the troops moved forward upon the plank and old turnpike roads, Anderson, with the brigades of Wright and Posey, leading on the former; McLaws, with his three brigades, preceded by Mahone's, on the latter. Generals Wilcox and Perry, of Anderson's division, coöperated with McLaws; Jackson's troops followed Anderson on the plank road. Colonel Alexander's battalion of artillery accompanied the advance. The enemy was soon encountered on both roads, and heavy skirmishing with infantry and artillery ensued, our troops pressing steadily forward. A strong attack upon General McLaws was repulsed with spirit by Semmes's brigade; and General Wright, by direction of General Anderson, diverging to the left of the plank road, marched by way of the unfinished railroad from Fredericksburg to Gordonsville, and turned the enemy's right. His whole line thereupon retreated rapidly, vigorously pursued by our troops, until they arrived within about one mile of Chancellorsville. Here the enemy had assumed a position of great natural strength, surrounded on all sides by a dense forest, filled with a tangled undergrowth, in the midst of which breastworks of logs had been constructed, with trees felled in front so as

to form an almost impenetrable abatis. His artillery swept the few narrow roads by which his position could be approached from the front, and commanded the adjacent woods. The left of his line extended from Chancellorsville towards the Rappahannock, covering the Bark Mill Ford, where he communicated with the north bank of the river by a pontoon bridge. His right stretched westward along the Germana Ford road more than two miles. Darkness was approaching before the strength and extent of his line could be ascertained; and as the nature of the country rendered it hazardous to attack by night, our troops were halted, and formed in line of battle in front of Chancellorsville, at right angles to the plank road, extending on the right to the mine road, and to the left in the direction of the Catharine furnace.

Colonel Wickham, with the Fourth Virginia cavalry and Colonel Owen's regiment, was stationed between the mine road and the Rappahannock. The rest of the cavalry was upon our left flank. It was evident that a direct attack upon the enemy would be attended with great difficulty and loss, in view of the strength of his position and his superiority of numbers. It was therefore resolved to endeavor to turn his right flank, and gain his rear, leaving a force in front to hold him in check and conceal the movement. The execution of this plan was intrusted to Lieutenant-General Jackson, with his three divisions. The commands of Generals McLaws and Anderson, with the exception of Wilcox's brigade, which during the night had been ordered back to Banks's Ford, remained in front of the enemy. Early on the morning of the second General Jackson marched by the Furnace and Brock roads, his movement being effectually covered by Fitz Lee's cavalry, under General Stuart in person. As the rear of the train was passing the furnace, a large force of the enemy advanced from Chancellorsville and attempted its capture. General Jackson had left the Twenty-third Georgia regiment, under Colonel Best, at this point, to guard his flank; and upon the approach of the enemy Lieutenant-Colonel J. T. Brown, whose artillery was passing at the time, placed a battery in position, to aid in checking his advance. A small number of men who were marching to join their commands, including Captain Moore, with his two companies of the Fourteenth Tennessee regiment, of Archer's brigade, reported to Colonel Brown, and supported his guns. The enemy was kept back by this small force until the train had passed, but his superior numbers enabled him subsequently to surround and capture the greater part of the Twenty-third Georgia regiment. General Anderson was directed to send a brigade to resist the further progress of this column, and detached General Posey for that purpose. General Posey became warmly engaged with a superior force, but being reënforced by General Wright, the enemy's advance was arrested. After a long and fatiguing march, General Jackson's leading division, under General Rodes, reached the old turnpike, about three miles in rear of Chancellorsville, at four P. M. As the different divisions arrived they were formed at right angles to the road — Rodes in front, Trimble's division, under Brigadier-General Colston, in the second, and A. P. Hill's in the third line. At six P. M. the advance was ordered. The enemy were taken by surprise, and fled, after a brief resistance. General Rodes's men pushed forward with great vigor and enthusiasm, followed closely by the second and third lines. Position after position was carried, the guns captured, and every effort of the enemy to rally defeated by the impetuous rush of our troops. In the ardor of pursuit, through the thick and tangled woods, the first and second lines at last became mingled, and moved on together as one. The enemy made a stand at a line of breastworks across the road at the house of Melzie Chancellor; but the troops of Rodes and Colston dashed over the intrenchments together, and the fight and pursuit were resumed and continued until our advance was arrested by the abatis in front of the line of works near the central position at Chancellorsville. It was now dark, and General Jackson ordered the third line, under General Hill, to advance to the front and relieve the troops of Rodes and Colston, who were completely blended, and in such disorder, from their advance through intricate woods and over broken ground, that it was necessary to reform them. As Hill's men moved forward, General Jackson, with his staff and escort, returning from the extreme front, met his skirmishers advancing, and in the obscurity of the night were mistaken for the enemy, and fired upon. Captain Boswell, chief engineer of the corps, and several others, were killed, and a number wounded. General Jackson himself received a severe injury, and was borne from the field. The command devolved upon Major-General Hill, whose division, under General Heth, was advanced to the line of intrenchments which had been reached by Rodes and Colston. A furious fire of artillery was opened upon them by the enemy, under cover of which his infantry advanced to the attack. They were handsomely repulsed by the Fifty-fifth Virginia regiment, under Colonel Mallory, who was killed while bravely leading his men. General Hill was soon afterwards disabled, and Major-General Stuart, who had been directed by General Jackson to seize the road to Ely's Ford, in rear of the enemy, was sent for to take command. At this time the right of Hill's division was attacked by the column of the enemy already mentioned as having penetrated to the furnace, which had been recalled to Chancellorsville to avoid being cut off by the advance of Jackson. This attack was gallantly met and repulsed by the Eighteenth and Twenty-eighth and a portion of the Thirty-third North Carolina regiments, Lane's brigade.

Upon General Stuart's arrival, soon afterwards, the command was turned over to him by General Hill. He immediately proceeded to reconnoitre the ground and make himself acquainted with the disposition of the troops. The darkness of the night, and the difficulty of moving through

the woods and undergrowth, rendered it advisable to defer further operations until morning; and the troops rested on their arms in line of battle. Colonel Crutchfield, chief of artillery of the corps, was severely wounded, and Colonel Alexander, senior artillery officer present, was engaged during the entire night in selecting positions for our batteries. As soon as the sound of cannon gave notice of Jackson's attack on the enemy's right, our troops in front of Chancellorsville were ordered to press him strongly on the left, to prevent reënforcements being sent to the point assailed. They were directed not to attack in force, unless a favorable opportunity should present itself; and while continuing to cover the roads leading from their respective positions towards Chancellorsville, to incline the left so as to connect with Jackson's right, as he closed in upon the centre. These orders were well executed, our troops advancing up to the enemy's intrenchments, while several batteries played with good effect upon his lines, until prevented by the increasing darkness.

Early on the morning of the third General Stuart renewed the attack upon the enemy, who had strengthened his right during the night with additional breastworks, while a large number of guns, protected by intrenchments, were posted so as to sweep the woods through which our troops had to advance. Hill's division was in front, with Colston in the second line, and Rodes in the third. The second and third lines soon advanced to the support of the first, and the whole became hotly engaged. The breastworks, at which the attack was suspended the preceding evening, were carried by assault, under a terrible fire of musketry and artillery. In rear of these breastworks was a barricade, from which the enemy was quickly driven. The troops on the left of the plank road, pressing through the woods, attacked and broke the next line, while those on the right bravely assailed the extensive earthworks behind which the enemy's artillery was posted. Three times were these works carried, and as often were the brave assailants compelled to abandon them — twice by the retirement of the troops on their left, who fell back after a gallant struggle with superior numbers, and once by a movement of the enemy on their right, caused by the advance of General Anderson. The left being reënforced, finally succeeded in driving back the enemy, and the artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonels Carter and Jones, being thrown forward to occupy favorable positions, secured by the advance of the infantry, began to play with great precision and effect. Anderson, in the mean time, pressed gallantly forward, directly upon Chancellorsville, his right resting upon the plank road, and his left extending around the furnace, while McLaws made a strong demonstration to the right of the road. As the troops advancing upon the enemy's front and right converged upon his central position, Anderson effected a junction with Jackson's corps, and the whole line pressed irresistibly on. The enemy was driven from all his fortified positions, with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and retreated towards the Rappahannock. By ten A. M. we were in full possession of the field. The troops having become somewhat scattered, by the difficulties of the ground and the ardor of the contest, were immediately re-formed, preparatory to renewing the attack. The enemy had withdrawn to a strong position nearer to the Rappahannock, which he had previously fortified. His superiority of numbers, the unfavorable nature of the ground, which was densely wooded, and the condition of our troops after the arduous and sanguinary conflict in which they had been engaged, rendered great caution necessary. Our preparations were just completed, when further operations were arrested by intelligence received from Fredericksburg.

General Early had been instructed, in the event of the enemy withdrawing from his front and moving up the river, to join the main body of the army, with so much of his command as could be spared from the defence of his lines. This order was repeated on the second; but by a misapprehension on the part of the officer conveying it, General Early was directed to move unconditionally. Leaving Hays's brigade and one regiment of Barksdale's at Fredericksburg, and directing a part of General Pendleton's artillery to be sent to the rear, in compliance with the order delivered to him, General Early moved with the rest of his command towards Chancellorsville. As soon as his withdrawal was perceived, the enemy began to give evidence of an intention to advance; but the mistake in the transmission of the order being corrected, General Early returned to his original position. The line to be defended by Barksdale's brigade extended from the Rappahannock, above Fredericksburg, to the rear of Howison's house, a distance of more than two miles. The artillery was posted along the heights in rear of the town. Before dawn, on the morning of the third, General Barksdale reported to General Early that the enemy had occupied Fredericksburg in large force, and laid down a bridge at the town. Hays's brigade was sent to his support, and placed on his extreme left, with the exception of one regiment, stationed on the right of his line, behind Howison's house. Seven companies of the Twenty-first Mississippi regiment were posted by General Barksdale between the Marye house and the plank road; the Eighteenth and the three other companies of the Twenty-first occupied the telegraph road at the foot of Marye's hill, the two remaining regiments of the brigade being farther to the right on the hills near to Howison's house. The enemy made a demonstration against the extreme right, which was easily repulsed by General Early. Soon afterwards a column moved from Fredericksburg along the river banks, as if to gain the heights on the extreme left, which commanded those immediately in rear of the town. This attempt was foiled by General Hays, and the arrival of General Wilcox from Banks's Ford, who deployed a few skirmishers on the hill, near Taylor's house, and opened upon the enemy with a section of

artillery. Very soon the enemy advanced in large force against Marye's and the hills to the right and left of it. Two assaults were gallantly repulsed by Barksdale's men and the artillery. After the second, a flag of truce was sent from the town, to obtain permission to provide for the wounded. Three heavy lines advanced immediately upon the return of the flag, and renewed the attack. They were bravely repulsed on the right and left, but the small force at the foot of Marye's hill, overpowered by more than ten times their numbers, was captured, after a heroic resistance, and the hill carried. Eight pieces of artillery were taken on Marye's and the adjacent heights. The remainder of Barksdale's brigade, together with that of General Hays, and the artillery on the right, retired down the telegraph road.

The success of the enemy enabled him to threaten our communications by moving down the telegraph road, or to come upon our rear at Chancellorsville by the plank road. He at first advanced on the former, but was checked by General Early, who had halted the commands of Barksdale and Hays, with the artillery, about two miles from Marye's hill, and reënforced them with three regiments of Gordon's brigade.

The enemy then began to advance up the plank road, his progress being gallantly disputed by the brigade of General Wilcox, who had moved from Banks's Ford as rapidly as possible to the assistance of General Barksdale; but arrived too late to take part in the action. General Wilcox fell back slowly until he reached Salem Church, on the plank road, about five miles from Fredericksburg.

Information of this state of affairs in our rear having reached Chancellorsville, as already stated, General McLaws, with his three brigades and one of General Anderson's, was ordered to reënforce General Wilcox. He arrived at Salem Church early in the afternoon, where he found General Wilcox in line of battle, with a large force of the enemy, consisting, as was reported, of one army corps and part of another, under Major-General Sedgwick, in his front. The brigades of Kershaw and Wofford were placed on the right of Wilcox, those of Semmes and Mahone on his left.

The enemy's artillery played vigorously upon our position for some time, when his infantry advanced in three strong lines, the attack being directed mainly against General Wilcox, but partially involving the brigades on his left. The assault was met with the utmost firmness, and, after a fierce struggle, the first line was repulsed with great slaughter. The second then came forward, but immediately broke under the close and deadly fire which it encountered, and the whole mass fled in confusion to the rear. They were pursued by the brigades of Wilcox and Semmes, which advanced nearly a mile, when they were halted to re-form in the presence of the enemy's reserve, which now appeared in large force. It being quite dark, General Wilcox deemed it imprudent to push the attack with his small numbers, and retired to his original position, the enemy making no attempt to follow.

The next morning, General Early advanced along the telegraph road, and recaptured Marye's and the adjacent hills without difficulty, thus gaining the rear of the enemy's left. He then proposed to General McLaws that a simultaneous attack should be made by their respective commands, but the latter officer, not deeming his force adequate to assail the enemy in front, the proposition was not carried into effect. In the mean time, the enemy had so strengthened his position near Chancellorsville, that it was deemed inexpedient to assail it with less than our whole force, which could not be concentrated until we were relieved from the danger that menaced our rear. It was accordingly resolved still further to reënforce the troops in front of General Sedgwick, in order, if possible, to drive him across the Rappahannock. Accordingly, on the fourth, General Anderson was directed to proceed, with his remaining three brigades, to join General McLaws — the three divisions of Jackson's corps holding our position at Chancellorsville. Anderson reached Salem Church about noon, and was directed to gain the left flank of the enemy and effect a junction with Early. McLaws's troops were disposed as on the previous day, with orders to hold the enemy in front, and to push forward his right brigades as soon as the advance of Anderson and Early should be perceived, so as to connect with them and complete the continuity of our line.

Some delay occurred in getting the troops into position, owing to the broken and irregular nature of the ground, and the difficulty of ascertaining the disposition of the enemy's forces. The attack did not begin until six P. M., when Anderson and Early moved forward and drove General Sedgwick's troops rapidly before them across the plank road in the direction of the Rappahannock. The speedy approach of darkness prevented General McLaws from perceiving the success of the attack until the enemy began to recross the river a short distance below Banks's Ford, where he had laid one of his pontoon bridges. His right brigades, under Kershaw and Wofford, advanced through the woods in the direction of the firing, but the retreat was so rapid that they could only join in the pursuit. A dense fog settled over the field, increasing the obscurity and rendering great caution necessary to avoid collision between our own troops. Their movements were consequently slow. General Wilcox, with Kershaw's brigade and two regiments of his own, accompanied by a battery, proceeded nearly to the river, capturing a number of prisoners and inflicting great damage upon the enemy. General McLaws also directed Colonel Alexander's artillery to fire upon the locality of the enemy's bridge, which was done with good effect. The next morning it was found that General Sedgwick had made good his escape, and removed his bridges. Fredericksburg was also evacuated, and our rear no longer threatened. But, as General Sedgwick had it in his power to recross, it was deemed best to leave General Early with his division and Barksdale's brigade to hold our lines as before — McLaws and Anderson being directed to return to Chan-

cellorsville. They reached their destination during the afternoon, in the midst of a violent storm, which continued throughout the night and most of the following day.

Preparations were made to assail the enemy's works at daylight on the sixth; but, on advancing our skirmishers, it was found that, under cover of the storm and darkness of the night, he had retreated over the river. A detachment was left to guard the battle-field while the wounded were being removed and the captured property collected. The rest of the army returned to its former position.

The particulars of these operations will be found in the reports of the several commanding officers, which are herewith transmitted. They will show more fully than my limits will suffer me to do, the dangers and difficulties which, under God's blessing, were surmounted by the fortitude and valor of our army. The conduct of the troops cannot be too highly praised. Attacking largely superior numbers, in strongly intrenched positions, their heroic courage overcame every obstacle of nature and art, and achieved a triumph most honorable to our arms. I commend to the particular notice of the department the brave officers and men mentioned by their superiors for extraordinary daring and merit, whose names I am unable to enumerate here. Among them will be found some who have passed, by a glorious death, beyond the reach of praise, but the memory of whose virtues and devoted patriotism will ever be cherished by their grateful countrymen. The returns of the medical director will show the extent of our loss, which, from the nature of the circumstances attending the engagement, could not be otherwise than severe. Many valuable officers and men were killed or wounded in the faithful discharge of duty. Among the former, Brigadier-General Paxton fell while leading his brigade, with conspicuous courage, in the assault on the enemy's works at Chancellorsville. The gallant Brigadier-General Nichols lost a leg; Brigadier-General McGowan was severely, and Brigadier-Generals Heth and Pender were slightly wounded in the same engagement. The latter officer led his brigade to the attack under a destructive fire, bearing the colors of a regiment in his own hands, up to and over the intrenchments, with the most distinguished gallantry. General Hoke received a painful wound in the action near Fredericksburg. The movement by which the enemy's position was turned, and the fortune of the day decided, was conducted by the lamented Lieutenant-General Jackson, who, as has already been stated, was severely wounded near the close of the engagement on Saturday evening. I do not propose here to speak of the character of this illustrious man since removed from the scene of his eminent usefulness by the hand of an inscrutable but all-wise Providence. I nevertheless desire to pay the tribute of my admiration to the matchless energy and skill that marked this last act of his life, forming as it did a worthy conclusion of that long series of splendid achievements which won for him the lasting love and gratitude of his country. Major-General A. P. Hill was disabled soon after assuming command, but did not leave the field until the arrival of Major-General Stuart. The latter officer ably discharged the difficult and responsible duties which he was thus unexpectedly called to perform. Assuming the command late in the night, at the close of a fierce engagement and in the immediate presence of the enemy, necessarily ignorant, in a great measure, of the disposition of the troops, and of the plans of those who had preceded him, General Stuart exhibited great energy, promptness, and intelligence. During the continuance of the engagement the next day he conducted the operation on the left with distinguished capacity and vigor, stimulating and cheering the troops by the example of his own coolness and daring. While it is impossible to mention all who were conspicuous in the several engagements, it will not be considered an invidious distinction to say that General Jackson, after he was wounded, in expressing the satisfaction he derived from the conduct of his whole command, commended to my particular attention the services of Brigadier-General (now Major-General) Rodes and his gallant division. Major-General Early performed the important and responsible duty intrusted to him in a manner which reflected credit upon himself and his command. Major-General R. H. Anderson was also distinguished for the promptness, courage, and skill with which he and his division executed every order; and Brigadier-General (now Major-General) Wilcox is entitled to especial praise for the judgment and bravery displayed in impeding the advance of General Sedgwick towards Chancellorsville, and for the gallant and successful stand at Salem Church. To the skilful and efficient management of the artillery the successful issue of the contest is in great measure due.

The ground was not favorable for its employment, but every suitable position was taken with alacrity, and the operations of the infantry supported and assisted with a spirit and courage not second to their own. It bore a prominent part in the final assault which ended in driving the enemy from the field at Chancellorsville, silencing his batteries, and, by a destructive enfilade fire upon his works, opened the way for the advance of our troops. Colonels Crutchfield, Alexander, and Walker, and Lieutenant-Colonels Brown, Carter, and Andrews, with the officers and men of their commands, are mentioned as deserving especial commendation. The batteries under General Pendleton also acted with great gallantry. The cavalry of the army at the time of these operations was much reduced. To its vigilance and energy we were indebted for timely information of the enemy's movements before the battle and for impeding his march to Chancellorsville. It guarded both flanks of the army during the battle at that place, and a portion of it, as has been already stated, rendered valuable service in covering the march of Jackson to the enemy's rear. The horse artillery accompanied the infantry, and participated, with credit to itself, in the engagement.

The nature of the country rendered it impossible for the cavalry to do more. When the enemy's infantry passed the Rappahannock at Kelley's Ford, his cavalry, under General Stoneman, also crossed in large force, and proceeded through Culpeper county towards Gordonsville, for the purpose of cutting the railroads to Richmond. General Stuart had nothing to oppose to this movement but two regiments of Brigadier-General W. H. F. Lee's brigade — the Ninth and Thirteenth Virginia cavalry. General Lee fell back before the overwhelming numbers of the enemy; and, after holding the railroad bridge over the Rapidan during the first of May, burned the bridge and retired to Gordonsville at night. The enemy avoided Gordonsville, and reached Louisa Court-House, on the Central railroad, which he proceeded to break up. Dividing his force, a part of it also cut the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, and a part proceeded to Columbia, on the James River and Kanawha Canal, with the design of destroying the aqueduct at that place. The small command of General Lee exerted itself vigorously to defeat this purpose. The damage done to the railroads was small and soon repaired, and the canal was saved from injury. The details of his operations will be found in the accompanying memorandum, and are creditable to officers and men. The loss of the enemy in the battle of Chancellorsville and the other engagements was severe. His dead and a large number of wounded were left on the field. About five thousand prisoners, exclusive of the wounded, were taken, and thirteen pieces of artillery. Nineteen thousand five hundred stand of arms, seventeen colors, and a large quantity of ammunition, fell into our hands.

To the members of my staff I am greatly indebted for assistance in observing the movements of the enemy, posting troops, and conveying orders. On so extended and varied a field all were called into requisition, and all evinced the greatest energy and zeal. The medical director of the army, Surgeon Guild, with the officers of his department, were untiring in their attention to the wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel Corley, chief quartermaster, took charge of the disposition and safety of the trains of the army. Lieutenant-Colonel Cole, chief commissary of its subsistence, and Lieutenant-Colonel Baldwin, chief of ordnance, was everywhere on the field, attending to the wants of his department. General Chilton, chief of staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, Major Peyton, and Captain Young, of the Adjutant and Inspector General's department, were active in seeing to the execution of orders. Lieutenant-Colonel Smith and Captain Johnston, of the engineers, in reconnoitring the enemy and constructing batteries; Colonel Long, in posting troops and artillery; Majors Taylor, Talcott, Marshall, and Venable were engaged night and day in watching the operations, carrying orders, &c.

Respectfully submitted,

R. E. LEE,
General.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL STUART.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, May 6, 1863.

Brigadier-General R. H. Chilton, A. A. and I. G., Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia:

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit, in advance of a detailed report, the following narrative of events connected with the battle of the Wilderness, May second, and of Chancellorsville, May third, and events following:

This corps, under its immortal leader, Lieutenant-General Jackson, attacked the enemy on his right, turning his right flank by the turnpike road at Melzie Chancellor's, two miles above Chancellorsville, making the attack late in the evening, after an arduous and necessarily circuitous march from the plank road, two miles below Chancellorsville. The enemy had a fine position, and if time had been given him to recover from his first surprise, and mass troops on that front, it would have been a difficult task to dislodge them; but Jackson's entire corps, both when marching and when in position, had been purposely screened from view by the cavalry of Fitz Lee's brigade — an important duty, which he performed with great skill and address. The attack was thus, in a measure, a surprise. The enemy's line of intrenchments was carried, and his legions driven in confusion from the field. It was already dark when I sought General Jackson, and proposed, as there appeared nothing else for me to do, to take some cavalry and infantry over and hold the Ely's Ford. He approved the proposition, and I had already gained the heights overlooking the ford, where was a large number of camp-fires, when Captain Adams, of General A. P. Hill's staff, reached me post haste, and informed me of the sad calamities which for the time deprived the troops of the leadership of both Jackson and Hill, and the urgent demand for me to come and take command as quickly as possible. I rode with rapidity back five miles, determined to press the pursuit already so gloriously begun. General Jackson had gone to the rear, but General A. P. Hill was still on the ground, and formally turned over the command to me. I sent also a staff officer to General Jackson, to inform him that I would cheerfully carry out any instructions he would give, and proceeded immediately to the front, which I reached at ten P. M. I found, upon reaching it, A. P. Hill's division in front, under Heth, with Lane's, McGowan's, Archer's, and Heth's brigades on the right of the road, within half a mile of Chancellorsville, near the apex of the ridge, and Pender's and Thomas's on the left. I found that the enemy had made an attack on our right flank, but were repulsed. The fact, however, that the attack was made, and at night, made me apprehensive of a repetition of it, and necessitated throwing back the right wing so as to meet it. I was also informed that there was much confusion on the right, owing to the fact that some troops mistook friends for the enemy, and fired upon them. Knowing that an advance under such circumstances would be extremely

hazardous, much against my inclination, I felt bound to wait for daylight. General Jackson had also sent me word to use my own discretion. The commanding General was with the right wing of the army, with which I had no communication, except by a very circuitous and uncertain route. I nevertheless sent a despatch to inform him of the state of affairs, and rode around the lines, restoring order, imposing silence, and making arrangements for the attack early next day. I sent Colonel E. P. Alexander, senior officer of artillery, to select and occupy with artillery positions along the line bearing upon the enemy's position, with which duty he was engaged all night. At early dawn Trimble's division composed the second line, and Rodes's division the third. The latter had his rations on the spot, and as his men were entirely without food, was extremely anxious to issue. I was disposed to wait a short time for this purpose; but when, as preliminary to an attack, I ordered the right of the first line to swing around, and come perpendicular to the road, the order was misunderstood for an order to attack, and that part of the line became engaged. I ordered the whole line to advance, and the second and third lines to follow. As the sun lifted the mist that shrouded the field, it was discovered that the ridge on the extreme right was a fine position for concentrating artillery. I immediately ordered thirty pieces to that point, and under the happy effects of the battalion system, it was done quickly. The effect of this fire upon the enemy's batteries was superb. In the mean time the enemy was pressing our left with infantry, and all the reënforcements I could obtain were sent there. Colquitt's brigade, of Trimble's division, ordered first to the right, was directed to the left to support Pender. Iverson's brigade, of the second line, was also engaged there, and the three lines were more or less merged into one line of battle, and reported hard pressed. Urgent requests were sent for reënforcements, and notices that the troops were out of ammunition, &c. I ordered that the ground must be held at all hazards; if necessary, with the bayonet. About this time, also, our right connected with Anderson's left, relieving all anxiety on that subject. I was now anxious to mass infantry on the left, to push the enemy there, and sent every available regiment to that point. About eight o'clock A. M. the works of the enemy directly in front of our right were stormed; but the enemy's forces retiring from the line facing Anderson, which our batteries enfiladed, caused our troops to abandon these works, the enemy coming in their rear. It was stormed a second time, when I discovered the enemy making a flank movement to the left of the road for the purpose of dislodging our forces, and hastened to change the front of a portion of our line to meet this attack; but the shortness of the time and the deafening roar of artillery prevented the execution of this movement, and our line again retired. The third time it was taken, I made disposition of a portion of Ramseur's brigade to protect the left flank. Artillery was pushed forward to th[illegible] [illegible]shooters were posted in a house in advance, and in a few moments Chancellorsville was ours, (ten o'clock A. M.) The enemy retired towards Ely's Ford, the road to United States Ford branching one half mile west of Chancellorsville. In this hotly-contested battle the enemy had strong works on each side of the road, those on the commanding ridge being heavily defended by artillery. The night, also, had given him time to mass his troops to meet this attack; but the desperate valor of Jackson's corps overcame every obstacle, and drove the enemy to his new line of defence, which his engineers had constructed in his rear, ready for occupation, at the intersection of the Ely's Ford and United States Ford roads. General Anderson's division of the right wing arrived upon the field, comparatively fresh. I set about re-forming my command, with a view to a renewal of the attack, when the commanding General received intelligence that the enemy had crossed at Fredericksburg, and taken Marye's hill. An Aid-de-camp of General Sedgwick, captured by Colonel Wickham's regiment on the right, near Banks's Ford, reported two corps, under command of Sedgwick. The commanding General decided to hold Hooker, beaten as he was, in his works, with Jackson's corps, and detach enough of other forces to turn on Sedgwick. The success of this strategy enabled him again to concentrate, to force Hooker's position; and arrangements were made for attack with this corps on the morning of the sixth, (Wednesday;) but before it was begun our skirmishers found the enemy's works abandoned, and, pressing forward to the river, captured many prisoners. The enemy had another work two miles in rear of the other, which was also abandoned. This region of country is known as "The Wilderness." Rapid pursuit in such a country is an impossibility, where the enemy takes care to leave his trains beyond the Rappahannock, and avails himself, as he does, of the appliances of art, labor, and natural obstacles to delay his pursuers. In this battle, in which the enemy's main force was attacked in chosen positions, he was driven entirely from the field, and finally fled across the river. Our troops behaved with the greatest heroism.

I desire to call the attention of the commanding General to the fact that I was called to the command at ten o'clock at night, on the battle-field, of the *corps d'armée* led so long by the immortal Jackson, in the midst of a night attack made by the enemy, without any knowledge of the ground, the position of our forces, or the plans thus far pursued, and without an officer left in the corps above the rank of Brigadier-General. Under these disadvantages the attack was renewed the next morning, and prosecuted to a successful issue. Major-General A. P. Hill, who had the misfortune to be wounded soon after the command devolved upon him, remained near the field next day notwithstanding his wound, for which I was very grateful, for circumstances might have arisen making his presence necessary.

To the generals of divisions and brigades I feel greatly indebted for the hearty coöperation, zeal, and support accorded to me by all to the fullest

extent of their ability. The field officers and others I hope to particularize hereafter in a detailed report, when the data is collected, as well as mention specially the various officers serving on my staff with marked distinction during the day.

I labored under great disadvantages in having none of General Jackson's staff with me until after the action began, and then only Major A. S. Pendleton, who, however, behaved with great heroism and efficiency when he did join me.

Our losses were heavy; the enemy's heavier. In Sunday's battle Brigadier-Generals Ramseur, Heth, and McGowan were wounded, and Paxton killed. Heth and Ramseur, though painfully wounded, persisted in retaining command to the close of the fight. Their heroic conduct will be specially mentioned in the report proper. The casualties of the corps I have not the means of knowing, as, before the returns were completed, I relinquished the command to Major-General A. P. Hill, in pursuance to the orders of the commanding General; but the division and brigade commanders were ordered to submit, through me, their reports of the battle of Chancellorsville.

The cavalry was well managed by Brigadier-General Fitz Lee, who seized Ely's Ford, and held the road to within two miles of Chancellorsville, driving the enemy's cavalry from the former place. His men, without rations or forage, displayed a heroism rarely met with under any circumstances; and, guarding the two flanks, accomplished an indispensable part of the great success which God vouchsafed to us.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. E. B. STUART,
Major-General, commanding.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL A. P. HILL.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS,
May 8, 1863.

Major W. H. Taylor, A. A. G.:

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following very imperfect sketch of our operations from the time we left Fredericksburg to the recrossing of the Rappahannock by the enemy. The corps of General Jackson, save Early's division, left our lines at Hamilton's Crossing at dawn on the morning of Friday, the first of May. Rodes's division, A. P. Hill's division, and Trimble's division, under Colston, arriving within four miles of Chancellorsville, line of battle was formed — Rodes in advance, Hill supporting, and Colston in reserve. The enemy were then rapidly pushed back into Chancellorsville. Saturday morning Rodes's, Colston's, and Hill's divisions were led by General Jackson on the enemy's flank and rear, crossing the two plank roads, and coming into the turnpike; the artillery of the corps, under Colonel Crutchfield, accompanying. The attack was made about six P. M. — Rodes's division and some artillery in advance; Colston and Hill supporting. The attack of Rodes was made with great energy. The enemy were driven for three miles, and into his works at Chancellorsville, with the loss of ten pieces of artillery and many prisoners. This was about nine P. M., and General Jackson directed General Hill to take charge of the pursuit. Whilst Lane's brigade was forming its lines for advancing and throwing out his skirmishers General Jackson was wounded. The enemy then made an attempt to retake their rifle-pits immediately fronting Chancellorsville, but were handsomely driven back by Colonel Mallory, Fifty-fifth Virginia, Heth's brigade. The enemy during this time had concentrated a most terrible fire of artillery on the head of Hill's division from thirty-two pieces of artillery. General Hill was disabled during this fire. General Stuart was sent for, and the command of the corps turned over to him.

It was thought best, under all the circumstances, not to push the pursuit any farther that night. Next morning all the artillery which could be put in position having been brought up, the infantry in three lines, — Colston, Hill, (now Heth's,) and Rodes, — General Stuart renewed the attack about dawn. The enemy were gallantly charged. The combat was furious. Colston's division having become somewhat broken and disordered, Heth took the advance — Archer on the extreme right, endeavoring to connect with Anderson, and Pender, with two brigades of this division, on the left of the road. The enemy were again charged, and twice were his works taken and twice relinquished. Rodes's division came up to the support; and after some tremendous fighting — all three divisions being engaged — the enemy were driven out, and his works occupied about ten o'clock. Archer's brigade captured four guns; and Brigadier-General William Hays was captured by Pender's brigade. Ramseur's brigade, under his gallant leadership, was conspicuous throughout the three days' fighting.

Our lines were again formed, covering the roads leading to the United States Ford. Pender, with four brigades on the left, Rodes in the centre, and Colston, with three brigades on the right; Heth, with three brigades, was sent to relieve Anderson. We held this position during Sunday and Monday, whilst Anderson and McLaws were detached to drive back General Sedgwick. Several advances of the enemy's skirmishers were repulsed; and he occasionally opened a heavy fire of artillery. Sedgwick having been demolished, the enemy recrossed on Tuesday night.

Major-General Stuart is deserving of great commendation for his admirable management of the troops. Called suddenly, late at night, to a new sphere of action, and entirely ignorant of the position of the brigades, with indomitable energy he surmounted all difficulties and achieved a glorious result. Brigadier-General Rodes distinguished himself much, and won a proud name for himself and his division. Generals Heth, Pender, and Ramseur contributed greatly to the success of our arms. Much is due the artillery. Colonels Crutchfield, Brown, Walker, and Alexander deserve special mention.

Respectfully,

A. P. HILL,
Major-General.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL ANDERSON.

HEADQUARTERS ANDERSON'S DIVISION,
NEAR FREDERICKSBURG, VA., June 6, 1863.

Brigadier-General R. H. Chilton, Assistant-Adjutant and Inspector-General, and Chief of Staff, A. N. V.:

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the division under my command during the late engagements along the Rappahannock:

Before the twenty-ninth of April the brigades were posted as follows: Mahone's and Posey's at United States Ford, Wilcox's at Banks's Ford, Perry's near the old mine road, about three miles west of Fredericksburg, and Wright's at Massaponax Church.

On the morning of the twenty-sixth of April, when the enemy crossed the river at the mouth of Deep Run, Wright's brigade was brought up from Massaponax Church, and placed to the left and rear of Major-General Early's position. Later in the day it was ordered to take post near Perry's brigade, and at dark the latter was moved to the river to relieve such of the troops of McLaws's division as were on duty above Fredericksburg and opposite Falmouth. About nine o'clock P. M., the same day, I received orders from the commanding General to repair to Chancellorsville, and to make such a disposition of the two brigades (Mahone's and Posey's) which had been posted at United States Ford, as to check the advance of the enemy who had crossed the Rappahannock at the fords above the Rapidan, and were approaching Ely's and Germana Fords on the latter river. I proceeded to obey these directions, and ordered Brigadier-General Wright to move his brigade to Chancellorsville. Upon arriving at Chancellorsville at midnight, I found that Brigadier-General Mahone had already occupied that place with the troops from the United States Ford, having left a regiment from his own and five companies of the Ninth Mississippi regiment from Posey's brigade, to hold the ford as long as possible. I learned also that the enemy had crossed the Rapidan at Ely's and Germana Fords, capturing, after a very obstinate resistance, the greater part of a working party and picket which had been stationed at the latter place. After consultation with Brigadier-Generals Mahone and Posey, and an examination of the position at Chancellorsville, I decided upon falling back from that place to the point on the plank road at which the old mine road crosses it; and this was done early on the morning of the thirtieth of April — Wright's brigade, which had arrived at daylight, and the force which had been left at United States Ford, being withdrawn at the same time. Wright's and Posey's brigades retired from Chancellorsville by the plank road and Mahone's by the old turnpike. Whilst they were moving off, and before the pickets had been called in, the cavalry of the enemy, under cover of fog and rain, dashed upon the picket on the Ely's Ford road, and captured a part of one company. They subsequently attacked the rear guard of Mahone's brigade, but were so effectually repulsed that we were no further annoyed by them during the movement. Upon arriving at the intersection of the old mine and plank roads, I met Colonel W. P. Smith, chief engineer, army Northern Virginia, and Captain Johnston, of the engineer corps, who had been sent by the commanding General to examine the position and establish the line of intrenchments. The work of intrenching was commenced immediately after the line had been selected, and was continued with great diligence and activity throughout that day, the night following, and the early part of the next morning. During the day there were occasional skirmishes with the enemy's cavalry who had followed from Chancellorsville. In the afternoon, Colonel Owens, commanding the Third regiment Virginia cavalry, joined me with his regiment, and threw out pickets to the front and upon each flank.

A little before sunrise on the first of May, Major-General McLaws having come up with his division, strengthened the force immediately in front, and secured our right flank by occupying the trenches along Motte Run. At eight o'clock A. M., Lieutenant-General Jackson arrived. By his orders the work on the trenches was discontinued, and the troops were put in readiness for an advance. Wilcox's and Perry's brigades, which had been left above Fredericksburg, being at the same time ordered to join their division. The advance commenced at eleven o'clock A. M. Mahone's brigade with Jordan's battery of Alexander's battalion leading the movement on the old turnpike, and Wright's and Posey's brigades, with the other batteries of Alexander's battalion, leading on the plank road. Colonel Owens's regiment of cavalry was employed in reconnoitring these roads and others diverging from them. When the troops on the plank road had advanced about two miles, the enemy was discovered in considerable force. They opened on us with artillery, and seemed determined to resist our further progress. Brigadier-General Wright was directed to follow, with his brigade, the line of the unfinished Fredericksburg and Gordonsville railroad, to threaten their right, and to compel them to fall back. This was executed with spirit and rapidity, and the enemy fell back with precipitation before our advance, which was resumed soon afterwards. General Wright continued to follow the line of the railroad without opposition until he arrived at the Catharine or Wellford's furnace, where he had a sharp encounter with a superior force of the enemy. Darkness put a stop to this conflict without any decided results having been attained, and at ten o'clock at night, in obedience to orders from Lieutenant-General Jackson, he returned to the plank road, along which Posey's brigade had, in the mean time, advanced to within a short distance of the enemy's intrenchments around Chancellorsville. Mahone's brigade, in like manner, fought its way along the old turnpike to a point about one mile from Chancellorsville. Wilcox's and Perry's brigades, in coming up from Fredericksburg, had been di-

rected to follow the old turnpike, and during the afternoon had coöperated with McLaws's division.

A little before daylight, on the second of May, Wilcox's brigade was ordered to resume the position at Bank's Ford from which it had been withdrawn.

The night of the first and morning of the second of May passed quickly. At seven o'clock A. M., Posey's brigade moved a little to the rear of the line of battle, having been relieved by that of Brigadier-General Thomas.

When Lieutenant-General Jackson's command moved against the enemy's right, the position immediately on the left of the plank road, which had been held by a part of his troops, was taken by Wright's brigade. At midday the enemy appeared in some force at the furnace. Posey's brigade was sent to dislodge him, and was soon engaged in a warm skirmish with him. The increasing numbers of the enemy made it necessary to move Wright's brigade to the support of Posey's, and Mahone's was at the same time moved over from the old turnpike to the position just left by Wright's. Posey's brigade gallantly maintained its position against great odds, and checked the further advance of the enemy. Perry's brigade joined me at dark. During the night, Posey's brigade constructed a line of breastworks.

At daylight, on the third, Perry's brigade was directed to gain the Catharpin road, and move towards the furnace. At sunrise, when it was supposed that General Perry had time to reach the vicinity of the furnace, General Posey's skirmishers were pushed forward towards it, and it was discovered that the enemy had retired.

Soon afterwards, in obedience to the directions of the commanding General, my whole force was advanced towards Chancellorsville. Mahone's brigade having its right on the plank road, and Wright's, Posey's, and Perry's successfully forming a line of battle on the left of, and nearly perpendicular to, that portion of the plank road between us and Chancellorsville. The troops pressed forward with spirited impetuosity, and with as much rapidity as was permitted by the dense thickets and tangled abatis through which they were obliged to force their way. After a short and sharp encounter they drove the enemy from his intrenchments. Wright's brigade was the first to reach Chancellorsville, at which place it captured a large number of prisoners. The other brigades coming up immediately afterwards, the division was placed in line along the old turnpike to the east of Chancellorsville. A little after midday Mahone's brigade was detached, by order of the commanding General, to operate with McLaws's division against the enemy, who were then reported to be moving from Fredericksburg up the plank road. At four o'clock in the afternoon I proceeded, in obedience to instructions, with Wright's, Perry's, and Posey's brigades, to the river road, below United States Ford, to watch that road, and to threaten the enemy's communications and his line of retreat from Chancellorsville. Major Hardaway, with fourteen pieces of rifle artillery, was attached to my command. Upon arriving at the river road I found the enemy strongly posted on Mine Run; and when I had completed a reconnoissance of his position it was too late to effect anything that evening. Captain Johnston, of the engineer corps, who accompanied me, having discovered large parks of the enemy's wagons, and the camps of some of his troops, on the opposite side of the river, Major Hardaway was directed to post his guns at daybreak on the fourth at a point indicated by Captain Johnston, and to open a hot fire upon the parks and camps. This was executed as directed, and I believe with good effect. Soon afterwards our skirmishers were pushed forward, with orders to drive back those of the enemy, and to discover his position and strength. This was accomplished without delay, the enemy being found in force, fortifying a high ridge between Mine Run and the road connecting United States Ford and Chancellorsville. Just at this time I received orders to march with my division towards Fredericksburg, and report to Major General McLaws, at Salem Church, on the plank road, being relieved from duty at this point by General Heth's command. I arrived at Salem Church with my command at eleven o'clock A. M., and reported, as directed, to Major-General McLaws. At twelve o'clock M., in obedience to the directions of the commanding General, my division was placed in line of battle on the left of Major-General Early's, which was occupying Marye's hill and the heights extending west from Fredericksburg. The general direction of the enemy's line was parallel with the plank road. At six o'clock P. M., the signal to advance being given, Early's division and my own marched rapidly upon the enemy's position, and drove him from it without much trouble, meeting with but slight resistance. Wright's brigade advanced with great intrepidity across a wheat field, under a hot fire of grape, and drove one of the enemy's batteries from its position. The enemy retreated towards Banks's Ford, and was followed closely as long as there was light enough to continue the pursuit. At daylight on the fifth, reconnoitring parties discovered that he had disappeared from our side of the river. At four o'clock P. M. I received orders to return with my command to the vicinity of Chancellorsville; and at dark I halted the head of the column one mile from that place; Wilcox's and Wright's brigades lying in bivouac on the Catharine road, Mahone's, Perry's, and Posey's on the plank road. At eight o'clock A. M., on the sixth, the division was moved forward to a position at the junction of the Ely's Ford and United States Ford roads. At eleven o'clock A. M., in obedience to the orders of the commanding General, I marched towards Fredericksburg, and in the afternoon returned to the position which had been occupied by the division previous to these operations. Wilcox's and Mahone's brigades, after being detached from my command, participated in the fight at Salem Church. I cannot too highly commend the gallant conduct of the division which I had the honor and good fortune to command. Where all performed their

duty with so much zeal and courage it is almost impossible to make a distinction, but Brigadier-General Posey, and his brave, untiring, persevering Mississippians, seem to me to deserve especial notice. Their steadiness at the furnace, on Saturday evening, when pressed by greatly superior numbers, saved our army from great peril, whilst their chivalrous charge upon the trenches on Sunday, contributed largely to the successes of that day. After three days and nights of incessant occupation, Saturday night was again passed by them in hard work upon intrenchments in front of the furnace, whilst the others had an opportunity to take some rest. But it would be doing injustice to Brigadier-General Wilcox to pass unnoticed his own gallant conduct, and that of his troops, at Salem Church, where they bore almost the whole brunt of the enemy's onset, and successfully repelled it. To Brigadier-General Mahone, to omit to mention his bold, skilled, and successful management, so well seconded by his brave Virginians; to Brigadier-General Wright and his high-spirited, fearless Georgians, whose attack at the furnace, on the evening of the first, and whose unflinching advance against the enemy's guns, under a heavy fire of grape, on the evening of the fourth, excited the admiration of all who saw them; and to Brigadier-General Perry and his heroic little band of Floridians, who showed a courage as intrepid as that of any others in their assault upon the enemy, in his intrenchments, on the third, and in their subsequent advance upon Chancellorsville. Lieutenant-Colonel Garnett and Majors Hardaway and Richardson, commanders of artillery, distinguished themselves by their activity, skill, and courage. I beg leave, also, to mention the meritorious services and general good conduct of the members of my staff, Majors T. S. Mills and R. P. Duncan, assistant adjutant and inspector-generals, Lieutenants Wm. McWillie and S. D. Shannon, aids-de-camp, and Messrs. R. D. Spaun, James G. Spaun, and E. J. Means, volunteer aids-de-camp. Captain E. N. Thurston, ordnance officer: Surgeons G. McF. Gaston and H. D. Feasee; Major J. A. Johnston, chief quartermaster, and Major Wm. C. Wingfield, chief commissary of the division, rendered valuable services by their careful and unremitting attention to their duties. The reports of the brigade and artillery battalion commanders are herewith respectfully submitted. The loss of the division in these operations was, killed, one hundred and eighty-six, wounded, one thousand and forty-nine, missing, two hundred and ten; total, one thousand four hundred and forty-five. I am, very respectfully,

Your most obedient servant,

R. H. ANDERSON,

Major-General, commanding Division.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL McLAWS.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION, May 10, 1863.

Major Taylor, A. A. G.:

MAJOR: On the first of May, instant, at twelve and a half o'clock at night, the brigades of Generals Kershaw, Semmes, and Wofford were put in march up the plank road, by order from your headquarters,—the brigade of General Barksdale remaining in Fredericksburg and vicinity.—and by six o'clock in the morning were in position behind the rifle-pits about Smith's hill, and extending to the right and left, joining General Anderson's command on the left, to defend the approaches from the United States Ford and from the direction of Chancellorsville. About eleven A. M. General Jackson, who had arrived with his forces and assumed command, directed me to advance along the turnpike road, having Mahone's brigade, of Anderson's division, in advance. I collected my own division as rapidly as possible from the rifle-pits, each brigade, as it was relieved, falling in rear of the others as they advanced in the march. After proceeding but a short distance the skirmishers became engaged. The main column advancing slowly, until the enemy, appearing in force, it was deployed, the line of battle formed across the turnpike road—Semmes's brigade on the left, and those of Mahone, Wofford, and Perry, of Anderson's division, in the order here named, to the right, extending so as to cover the mine road; Jordan's battery on the mine turnpike. Our skirmishers were driven in. Fire was opened on our lines from a battery four or five hundred yards in front; and, after skirmishing to the right and left, the main assault was made on the left against Semmes by Sykes's regulars; but they were repulsed at every attempt. Before the first assault I sent to General Jackson, by my Aid-de-camp, that the enemy were in force in my immediate front, and were advancing, and that a larger force could be seen along the heights, about one mile or more to the rear, and that the country was favorable for a flank attack from his side. After the first assault I received answer from General Jackson to hold my position, and that he would advance or was advancing his artillery, and if that did not answer he would endeavor to gain the rear of the enemy. General Kershaw coming up, his brigade was placed in support of General Semmes, extending beyond his left. The cavalry reporting that the enemy were advancing along the mine road, General Wilcox's brigade was ordered and took position, guided by Captain Johnson, of General Lee's staff, to protect my right, taking artillery with him. General Jackson's artillery and his advance, in conjunction with the failure of the attack on my front, forced the enemy to retire, when, by General Jackson's order, my whole line advanced in the same order as they had been displayed, as above stated. The order to advance was received at four P. M. My line halted at dark and bivouacked along the heights just beyond the point where the Mine Run crosses the turnpike. The next morning, the second, my line of battle was re-formed along the heights, in the same order as before, excepting that General Wilcox had been ordered, during the night previous, to return to Banks's Ford and hold that position, it having been reported that the enemy were moving down the river road, and, besides, were making demonstrations to cross the river at that ford. Two batteries were placed on the heights between General Semmes and Wofford.

A strong line of skirmishers was advanced, and were constantly engaged with those of the enemy. General Kershaw's brigade was held in reserve. I received orders from General Lee to hold my position, as General Jackson would operate to the left and rear. Not long after, I was directed to replace General Posey's brigade, on my left, by one from my command, and General Kershaw moved to that position, on the left of General Semmes. Following this order, I was directed to send the brigades of Generals Mahone and Perry to the left, and close in my command so as to connect with General Anderson's right — holding my right at the turnpike, but constantly pressing to the left, so as to be in communication with General Anderson, to do which, as the country was broken and densely wooded, and the directions constantly changing, I ordered the two brigades on the left, Kershaw's and Semmes's, to advance by battalion from the left, so as to form a broken line, but still covering the front and forming the connection. The batteries opened whenever the masses of the enemy on the hills in my front offered an opportunity, and with marked results. My orders were to hold my position, not to engage seriously, but to press strongly so soon as it was discovered that General Jackson had attacked. It was not until late in the evening that it was known General Jackson had commenced his assault, when I ordered an advance along the whole line to engage with the skirmishers, which were largely reënforced, and to threaten, but not attack seriously, in doing which General Wofford became so seriously engaged that I directed him to withdraw, which was done in good order, his men in good spirits, after driving the enemy to their intrenchments.

As General Jackson advanced, the enemy moved in front of two batteries on my line, which opened on them with excellent effect. This continued until darkness prevented any further efforts in my front.

Generals Kershaw and Semmes had been pressing to the left and front, and engaging the enemy with their skirmishers, which had left an open space, so far as the main body was concerned, between my right and centre, of considerable distance, but the skirmishers of General Semmes, composed of the entire Tenth Georgia regiment, were perfectly reliable, and kept the enemy to their intrenchments, so there was nothing to be apprehended from an advance in this direction.

May 3. — Nothing occurred during the night save the magnificent display caused by the night attack of General Jackson. My skirmishers, well to the front, and strong in number, engaged the enemy as day advanced. The batteries were run forward, and played upon the masses of the enemy, in good range, producing much confusion; finally, the repeated attacks of the forces on my left forced the enemy to give way from Chancellorsville, and our troops could be seen advancing across the plain. General Wofford threw a portion of his command across the valley between him and the Chancellorsville heights, and thus prevented the escape of a considerable body of the enemy which had been opposed to this brigade, and to his left and front, during the morning. I directed a flag of truce to be sent them, and they surrendered. I think General Wofford entitled to the most credit for their capture, although the Tenth Georgia, General Semmes, and General Wright, of Anderson's division, claimed their share equally. Kershaw and Semmes, bearing to the left to coöperate with General Anderson, to unite with the two wings of the army, had now swept around to the plains of Chancellorsville, and directed them to march down the plank road and unite with General Wofford's left. As this was in the act of accomplishment information was received that the enemy had carried the heights about Fredericksburg, and were advancing up the plank road. General Lee here rode up and ordered that the brigades of Generals Mahone and Kershaw should march at once towards Fredericksburg, with Moody's battery, to meet the enemy; and after these brigades were on the march, and had advanced some distance, he directed me to proceed in the same direction with the remainder of my division, which was done so soon as the brigades could be formed. On reaching the rifle-pits, just beyond the junction of the turnpike and mine roads, I found General Mahone's brigade along the rifle-pits, General Kershaw halted along the road, General Wilcox's brigade was marching to the front. I ordered them all forward; but as I was here informed that the enemy were in considerable force going down the telegraph road, and as I thought that it was perhaps their intention to march forward by the plank and mine roads, which came together just beyond the junction of the plank and turnpike roads, now in my rear, I halted General Wofford, with directions to watch the mine road on his right. I then rode on, and found General Wilcox with his brigade in line across the plank road at Salem Church, General Kershaw forming on his right and General Mahone on the left. I directed General Mahone still more to his left, as he was acquainted with the country, and placed General Semmes to the immediate left of General Wilcox. General Wofford was ordered forward, and placed on the right of General Kershaw. The batteries which I had brought with me had been engaged all the morning, and had but little ammunition left. They had been ordered back in such haste that there was no time for them to replenish their chests; but they engaged the enemy until their supplies were nearly exhausted, and then withdrew, and were posted in the rear to command the ground on the flanks and front. The batteries of the enemy were admirably served, and played over the whole ground. Before my command was well in position the enemy advanced, driving in our skirmishers, and coming forward with loud shouts, endeavored to force the centre, (Wilcox's,) and the left centre, (General Semmes's,) extending the attack somewhat to Mahone's brigade. One of Wilcox's regiments gave way, and, with the skirmishers running, had created a little confusion; but General Wilcox himself soon corrected this, and re-forming his men, charged the

enemy, in conjunction with two regiments of Semmes's brigade, led by General Semmes, and drove them back for a considerable distance. I now strengthened the left of Mahone's, which was strongly threatened, with two regiments from Wofford's brigade, (on the right,) and closed General Kershaw to the left, strengthening the centre, supposing that the attack would be renewed; but no other assault was attempted; and as night drew on the firing ceased on both sides, and my command bivouacked in line of battle.

In this engagement, three or four hundred were taken and about the same number of the enemy were killed and buried. Just previous to the assault I sent my inspecting officer, Major Costin, to try and communicate with General Early, and to bring back information as to his position and designs, and the whereabouts of the enemy in that direction. A courier late in the night brought me a note from General Early, informing me that he would concentrate his forces in the morning and drive the enemy from the heights, Marye's hill included. I sent his note to General Lee, who, approving it, I forwarded it to General Early, who, on the next morning carried the heights, with but little opposition. After this, General Early sent me word by his staff again, that if I would attack in front, he would advance two brigades and strike at the flank and rear of the enemy. I agreed to advance, provided he would first attack, and did advance my right, — Kershaw and Wofford — to operate with him, — but finding my force was insufficient for a front attack I withdrew to my line of the evening previous, General Early not attacking as I could hear. In the mean while I had informed General Lee of the plan proposed, and asking for an additional force. I was informed, in reply, that the remainder of General Anderson's division had been ordered forward. I then directed that no attack should be made until General Anderson arrived. General Lee came in person to superintend the movement, arriving about the same time with General Anderson's head of column. General Anderson was ordered to the right with his three brigades. My understanding was that the troops of my own division and the brigades of Wilcox and Mahone were to continue in line, facing the enemy, and those of General Early and three brigades of General Anderson were to attack their right and rear. Orders were given that my troops on the right — Kershaw and Wofford — should advance after it was known that the attack on the right had commenced, which would be indicated by the firing in that direction. I was on the right of my line, straightening it, and extending to the right, when notice was given that the attack would shortly be made by Generals Early and Anderson, and that Colonel Alexander, who had established a strong battery, on a prominent hill, which commanded one of nearly equal force on the other side, which would take my line in reverse, and, in a measure, enfilade it, should open fire. The orders were given at once. Alexander opened his batteries, and Generals Kershaw and Wofford advanc[illegible]nt through a dense woods. Distant firing in the direction of Fredericksburg was heard, indicating that the attack had commenced on the extreme right. Night now came rapidly on, and nothing could be observed of our operations. It being reported to me, from Mahone's position, that the noise of crossing on the pontoon bridge at Banks's Ford could be heard, I sent to Colonel Alexander, requesting him to throw shells so as to drop them as near as possible about the crossing, which was promptly done. Shortly afterwards, General Kershaw's arrival on the plank road was reported to me, and I requested General Wilcox to assume the direction of it, and with such a portion of his own brigade as he thought necessary, proceed down the Banks's Ford road, taking a battery with him, to press the enemy, seize the redoubts suitable for shelling the crossing, and open fire with the batteries, all of which was done in a most prompt manner, General Wilcox being acquainted with the localities, of which I knew nothing except by report.

I was as yet ignorant whether or not the attack upon the right had been a success, but the noise of their passage over the pontoon bridges convincing me that the enemy were in full retreat, I thought it best to press on in pursuit. After these orders had been given, and were in execution, I received a communication from General Lee, dated ten P. M., from Downman's house, informing me of the success of the attack on the right, and his desire that the enemy should be pushed over the river that night. Wofford's brigade advanced as far as the river road, engaging the enemy as he went, and driving them before him, and halted for the night beyond the river road, extending his pickets. Wilcox and Kershaw pushed on, driving the enemy before them, and occupied the redoubts commanding the ford and its approaches, and opened fire with artillery in that direction. As my troops advanced, I sent to Colonel Alexander, requesting him to fire on the approaches from the other side only, as I did not wish to risk his shells dropping among our troops; he did as requested, and the fire from all the batteries is reported by citizens about the ford as producing great confusion, and as being very destructive. The enemy throwing away their arms and breaking ranks, fled across the river in the greatest disorder. As evidence of which, the accompanying report of ordnance and ordnance stores picked up by my own division, on this side of Salem Church, shows how complete must have been the demoralization. The darkness of the night, ignorance of the country, and of the events transpiring on the other end of the line, prevented that coöperation which would have led to a more complete success, but I believe that all was gained that could have been expected under the circumstances. The enemy had several batteries — sixteen guns — in front of the left of my line, sweeping every approach from my left. I am not informed when they were withdrawn, but I suppose they were immediately after dark. By the next morning the enemy had retired from this side of the river, and my command was employed in burying the dead, attending to the wounded,

and collecting arms and accoutrements. I received orders during the morning to assemble my division, send General Anderson's brigades to rejoin him, and to send an intelligent officer to the position of General Heth, at or near the junction of the river and mine roads, to inform himself of the points to be occupied, and if General Heth had left, to replace him by the brigades of General Mahone and another of my own. But afterwards, in conversation with General Lee, he directed me to move one of my brigades (General Kershaw) to relieve General Heth. The brigade was already in motion, and I joined with it and went to General Heth's position. The march was not delayed for a moment, as the brigade did not halt even once, and it arrived at its destination before the storm. General Heth's main command was posted in rear of the rifle-pits, which had been constructed two or three hundred yards on the plank road side of the junction of the river and mine roads, with smaller bodies more to the front. His men and officers had their shelter and other tents pitched, and there were no indications of his moving on my arrival. I think he received orders after my arrival to move when I arrived. General Kershaw had relieved him, and was in position before the storm commenced. General Heth informed me that the strength of the three brigades under his command was about nineteen hundred aggregate, which was not so numerous as the single brigade of General Kershaw. Colonel Wickham offered his services to point out the different crossings on the river, and I rode down the river road with him. A terrible storm of wind and rain delayed my return to my headquarters until between eight and nine o'clock at night, when I learned that General Semmes had been ordered to join General Kershaw. The next morning early I rode to the position of Generals Kershaw and Semmes, and, advancing the skirmishers and scouts, discovered that the enemy had gone over the river. Shortly after, I received orders to retire to my former position in front of Fredericksburg, leaving a brigade (Wofford's) at Banks's Ford.

The number of killed, wounded, and missing in my division, are, —

Kershaw, . .	104, of which	2 are missing.
Barksdale, .	592, of which	327 are missing, besides 14 officers.
Semmes, . .	603, of which	26 are missing.
Wofford, . .	562, of which	9 are missing.
Artillery, . .	28, of which	2 are missing.
	1,889	

My Inspector-General reports over twelve hundred prisoners taken. Very respectfully,

L. McLaws,
Major-General.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL EARLY.

Headquarters Early's Division, May 7, 1863.

Major W. H. Taylor, A. A. G., Army Northern Virginia:

Major: About daylight, on the twenty-ninth ultimo, the enemy crossed at the mouth of Deep Run, and later near Pratt's house, below. On receiving information of the first movement, I immediately moved my division into line on the railroad, the right resting at Hamilton's Crossing, and the left at Deep Run, and occupied the river road in front with three regiments, and thus kept the enemy from advancing to that road. The residue of the troops having, in the mean time, been brought up on the afternoon of the thirtieth, I received instructions from Lieutenant-General Jackson to remain behind with my division and one of McLaws's brigades, (Barksdale's,) to observe the enemy, while the residue of the troops were removed to the left. General Pendleton, with a portion of his reserve artillery, and Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews, with his battalion of artillery, was also left behind. My division and Andrews's artillery occupied the lines on the right, and Barksdale's brigade and Pendleton's artillery occupied Fredericksburg in the rear.

About eleven o'clock, on the second instant, instructions were received from General Lee, through General Chilton, to leave a brigade behind as a guard, and move with the residue up to Chancellorsville; and, as soon as I could get ready, I commenced the movement, leaving behind Hays's brigade and one of Barksdale's regiments. A portion of General Pendleton's artillery, under like instructions, was sent to the rear. After I had commenced the movements, and had reached the plank road, and moved the head of the column up it about a mile, information was received from the rear of such character as to cause me to turn back and occupy the former line as before.

About light, on next morning, (Monday, the third,) I received information from General Barksdale that the enemy had thrown a bridge across at Fredericksburg; and I immediately sent Hays's brigade from the right to his support. In a short time the enemy commenced making demonstrations from the mouth of Deep Run and Fredericksburg. All his efforts to attack the left of my line were thwarted, and one attack on Marye's hill was repulsed. The enemy, however, sent a flag of truce to Colonel Griffin, of the Eighteenth Mississippi regiment, who occupied the works at the foot of Marye's hill with his own and the Twenty-first Mississippi regiment, which was received by him imperfectly, and it had barely returned before heavy columns were advanced against the position, and the trenches were carried and the hill taken. A large portion of the Eighteenth Mississippi regiment and a part of the Twenty-first being taken prisoners, and a company of the Washington artillery, with its guns, were captured. After this, the artillery on Lee's hill and the rest of Barksdale's infantry, with one of Hays's regiments, fell back on the telegraph road. Hays, with the remainder, being compelled to fall back up the plank road as he was on the left. Having received information, I hastened up, and succeeded in halting the artillery and infantry, and checked the advance of the enemy, and had the brigades on the right thrown back into the second line; and, upon the arrival of Hays's brigade, which came around from the

plank road, and three regiments of Gordon's, which had been sent for as soon as I heard of the disaster, a line was formed across the telegraph road at Cox's house, about two miles back of Lee's hill. Having received information, late in the day, that McLaws was moving down, and that the enemy, who had passed heavy columns up the plank road, through Fredericksburg, was to be attacked by his forces and mine in connection, I concentrated all my force at Cox's house, which was not accomplished until after night, having previously informed General McLaws of my intention to attack Marye's hill next morning, on the right and advance, extending my left so as to close in on him. Early next morning I threw Hoke's and Hays's brigade across Hazle Run, to move down towards the right, and advance Gordon's brigade towards Marye's and Lee's hills, followed by Smith's and Barksdale's brigades. Gordon succeeded in capturing Marye's hill with ease, aided by Colonel Andrews's artillery, and Barksdale's brigade was thrown into the trenches in front of the hill, and Smith's brigade moved across Hazle Run, and a line formed facing up the plank road, on the plain between Marye's hill and the heights on the plank road, and at Taylor's house. I then waited to hear from McLaws, but hearing no sound of an engagement in that direction, I felt the enemy with Smith's brigade, and finding that he had artillery on the heights in front of my right, I ordered the brigade to retire, and sent to General McLaws requesting him to turn. In return, I received information that Anderson's division was moving down, and that an attack was to be made at a signal. Subsequently I was sent for by General Lee, and having received his instructions, at the signal agreed on, Hays's, Hoke's, and Gordon's brigades, which had been placed in position, were advanced against the enemy. Hays advancing in the centre, from the foot of the hill opposite the mill and Hazle Run; Hoke on the left, advancing across the hill on which Downman's house is situated, and below it, and Gordon on the right up the hills on the north of the plank road, driving the enemy before them. This movement was commenced very late, and Hays's and Hoke's brigades were thrown into some confusion by coming in contact after they crossed the plank road, below Guest's house; and it becoming difficult to distinguish our troops from those of the enemy on account of the growing darkness, they had, therefore, to fall back to re-form, which was done on the plain below Guest's house. Gordon's brigade got in the rear of the enemy's right flank near Taylor's house, and took its position there. Barksdale's brigade had been left at Marye's hill, and Smith's in position on the left of it, to strengthen Barksdale, or reënforce the others as occasion might require, and two regiments were ordered up while Hays's and Hoke's were being re-formed. After seeing General Lee at night, Hoke's brigade was placed in line on the left of Gordon, and Hays was ordered to take position in the intrenchments on the right of Marye's hill, and Smith's regiments sent back to join the residue of the brigade on the left of that hill.

The loss in my division during all the time from the crossing was one hundred and thirty-six killed, eight hundred and thirty-eight wounded, and some five hundred are reported missing, the greater part of whom are, in all probability, stragglers. This does not include the loss in Barksdale's brigade and the artillery.

Very respectfully,

J. A. EARLY,
Major-General, commanding.

REPORT OF GENERAL STUART OF CAVALRY OPERATIONS.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
A. N. V., May 8, 1863.

Brigadier-General R. H. Chilton, A. A. and I. General Army N. Virginia:

GENERAL: In anticipation of the detailed reports, I have the honor to submit the following sketch of the operation of the cavalry immediately preceding and during the battles of the Wilderness and Chancellorsville. The enemy had more than a week previously concentrated a large body of cavalry (two or three divisions) along the line of the upper Rappahannock, whose attempt to hold a footing on the south bank of the river had been repulsed with loss by the two brigades with me, commanded respectively by Brigadier-Generals Fitzhugh and W. H. F. Lee. Finally, infantry appeared at Kelley's Ford and Rappahannock Bridge, but were so inactive that thus far there was nothing inconsistent with the supposition that their appearance was a feint. About dark, however, on Tuesday night, April twenty-eighth, the enemy crossed below the bend of the river at Kelley's, in boats, opposite our videttes, and, before the force posted to defend the ford could be sent to that point, had crossed in such numbers as to make any attempt at resistance futile. The party crossing at once threw over a pontoon bridge, and moved directly up the river, compelling our forces to abandon the ford at Kelley's, and severing our communication with the lower pickets. General W. H. F. Lee, near Brandy, on receiving this intelligence, sent a regiment (Thirteenth Virginia cavalry) at once to meet the advance of infantry, which was checked a mile above Kelley's. I received information of this move about nine o'clock P. M., at Culpeper, and made arrangements to have the entire cavalry and artillery force in Culpeper on the ground at daylight the next morning, directing, in the mean time, that the enemy be so enveloped with pickets as to see what route he took from Kelley's and keep him in check.* General W. H. F. Lee selected a fine position between Brandy and Kelley's, and awaited the advance, General Fitz Lee being held in reserve at Brandy, with a regiment at Stevensburg. The enemy did not make a serious advance towards our position, though Chambliss, with the Thirteenth Virginia, was skirmishing all the forenoon with the enemy's infantry.

About one o'clock P. M., I received a report from the pickets towards Madden's that the ene-

* In this report I have endeavored to describe the various operations of the cavalry, without detailing the result of the various contests.

my was moving a large infantry force in that direction. Leaving Chambliss in front of the enemy where I then was, I marched the remainder of the command, Fitz Lee in advance, directly to Madden's, where we pierced the enemy's column, while marching, and scattered it, taking possession of the road and capturing a number of prisoners, which enabled us to develop their strength and designs, as we captured prisoners from three army corps: the Eleventh, (Howard's,) Twelfth, (Slocum's,) and the Fifth, (Mead's,) and soon after learned that the column had marched direct for Germana Ford. These items were telegraphed to the commanding General. Colonel J. Lucius Davis, near Beaver Dam, had been telegraphed early that day to move his forces at once to occupy and hold the Rapidan Fords, but I had no assurance that the order would be obeyed with sufficient promptness to accomplish the object, and as there was no cavalry on the left flank of the main army, it was indispensably necessary to move round to get in front of the enemy moving down upon Fredericksburg, delay him as much as possible, and protect our left flank; besides, while in the execution of this design, I received instructions from the commanding General to give necessary orders about public property along the railroad, and swing around to join his left wing, delaying the enemy as much as possible in his march. The brigade of General Fitz Lee was put *en route*, in a jaded and hungry condition, to Raccoon Ford, to cross and move round to the enemy's front. General W. H. F. Lee, with the two regiments, the Seventh and Thirteenth, under his command, was directed to move by way of Culpeper, to take up the line of the upper Rapidan, and look out for Gordonsville and the railroad. Couriers had been, by direction, sent to Ely's and Germana to notify our parties there of the enemy's advance, but were captured, and consequently the parties at those points received no notice. By the good management of Captain Collins, however, (now Major Fifteenth Virginia cavalry,) the enemy was checked for some time at Germana, and his wagons and implements saved, though some of his men were captured. A strong party of sharpshooters was left to hold the road of the enemy's march as long as possible, and these follow on, which was done, the party maintaining their position until eleven o'clock at night, when the enemy advanced and compelled them to retire. Despatches captured showed that trains of wagons and droves of cattle accompanied the expedition, and the men were already supplied with five days rations in haversacks. These items placed it beyond doubt that the enemy was making a real movement to turn Fredericksburg. Crossing the Rapidan that night, the main body of cavalry was halted to rest a few hours, having marched more than half the night, and one regiment, Colonel Owen, was sent on to get between the enemy and Fredericksburg and impede his progress. Early the next day, (Thursday, April thirtieth,) Owen having reached the Germana road, on the Fredericksburg side, kept in the enemy's front, while the remainder kept on the enemy's right flank, opened on his column at Wilderness tavern, delaying his march until twelve M., and causing several regiments of infantry to deploy in line of battle to meet us. Hearing that the enemy had already reached Chancellorsville by the Ely's Ford road, I directed my march by Todd's tavern for Spottsylvania Court-House. Night overtook us at Todd's tavern, and anxious to know what the commanding General desired me to do further, I left the command to bivouac here, and proceeded with my staff towards his headquarters, near Fredericksburg, but had not proceeded a mile before we found ourselves confronted by a party of the enemy double our own, directly in our path. I sent back hastily for a regiment, which, coming up, (Fifth Virginia cavalry, Colonel Tyler,) attacked and routed the party. But, in the mean time, another body of the enemy's cavalry came in rear of the Fifth. Receiving notice of this, I gave orders to withdraw the Fifth from the road, and sent for the brigade to push on at once. This was done, and by the bright moonlight a series of charges routed and scattered this expedition, which had penetrated to within a mile or two of Spottsylvania Court-House. It has been since ascertained that this expedition was by no means an insignificant affair, and but for the timely arrival of this cavalry on the spot, and its prompt and vigorous action, might have resulted disastrously. Artillery, as well as trains, were passing Spottsylvania unprotected at the time. With very little rest, without waiting for rations or forage, this noble little brigade, under its incomparable leader, were in the saddle early the next morning, and moving on Jackson's left flank during the entire day, (May first), and swinging around to the left to threaten the enemy's rear. On the morning of May second, the cavalry of this brigade was disposed so as to clear Jackson's way in turning the enemy's right flank and to cover the movement of this corps, masking it on its right flank. This was done most successfully, driving off the enemy's cavalry whenever it appeared, and enabled Jackson to surprise the enemy. In the subsequent operations attending the battle and glorious victory, the cavalry did most essential service in watching our flanks, and holding the Ely's Ford road in the enemy's rear, Wickham and Owen being on the extreme right. The horse artillery kept pace with the infantry in the battle of the Wilderness, leading the attack of artillery. Too much praise cannot be awarded the brave men who thus bore fatigue, hunger, loss of sleep, and danger without a murmur. The operations of Brigadier-General W. H. F. Lee, with his handful of men, are embraced in the memoranda furnished by him. His report is not only satisfactory, but gives evidence of sagacity and good conduct throughout, and of great efficiency on the part of his command. The result shows that the disposition made of these two commands was absolutely necessary. Jones's brigade was entirely out of reach, and Hampton was south of James river recruiting. That Stoneman, with a large cavalry force, was allowed to penetrate into the heart of the State, though comparatively harm-

less in results, is due to the entire inadequacy in numbers of the cavalry of the army of Northern Virginia. The enemy has confronted us with at least three divisions of cavalry, more or less concentrated, which we oppose with one division, spread from the Chesapeake to the Alleghany; yet, had not the approach of a battle below made it neccessary to divide the force of the two Lees, I feel very confident that Stoneman's advance would have been prevented, though with great sacrifice of life, owing to disparity of numbers.* With the commanding General, who is aware of all the facts, we are content to rest our vindication, if the pursuit of the plain path of duty need vindication.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. E. B. STUART,
Major-General, commanding.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL JOHNSON.

HEADQUARTERS JOHNSON'S DIVISION, August 25, 1863.

Major Chas. Marshall:

MAJOR: I have the honor to forward Brigadier-General R. E. Colston's official report of the battle of Chancellorsville.

It will be observed that General Colston's report is very full, embracing the operations of the different brigades in detail.

None of the brigade commanders who commanded in the battle are present; three were killed, and the other, Brigadier-General H. C. Nichols, permanently disabled.

If General Colston's report is not sufficiently full for your purposes, please inform me, and I will forward reports from senior officers present, who participated in the battle.

I am, Major, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

ED. JOHNSON,
Major-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL COLSTON.

HEADQUARTERS COLSTON'S BRIGADE, May 28, 1862.

Major A. S. Pendleton, Assistant Adjutant General:

SIR: As commander of Trimble's division during the battle of Chancellorsville on the second and third instant, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of that division. This report would have been forwarded before but for the fact that, being separated from the rest of the division, and being no longer in command of it, I did not receive all the brigade returns until yesterday.

On the twenty-ninth of April, the divisions received orders to march from their camps at Moss and Shinker's Necks to Hamilton's Crossing. They reached this point in the evening, and remained there until May first. Orders were then received to march in a direction leading towards Chancellorsville. The march was continued until night, and resumed early the next morning upon the plank road leading to Orange Court-House. Arriving at the point where Generals Anderson's and McLaws's divisions were in position, we turned to the left by a road leading by Catherine furnace to the Brook road, and thence to the Orange and Fredericksburg plank road, which we followed to the Germana junction. Here the first brigade, under General Paxton, was detached from the division, and ordered to report to Brigadier-General Fitz Lee of the cavalry. This brigade was not engaged during the evening of the second, and did not rejoin the division until next morning. The rest of the division moved on together with the corps, until they had reached a point west of Wilderness Church, and in the rear of the enemy's right flank.

About five o'clock P. M., on May second, I received orders to form line of battle near the "Luckett house," perpendicular to a road which passes on by Wilderness Church, and merges into the plank road leading to Chancellorsville. After receiving several orders and counter orders, which caused some delay, my line was finally formed, my three brigades being nearly all on the left of the road, Colston's brigade being on the right under Colonel Warren, Jones's brigade next, and Nichols on the extreme left. My line was about two hundred yards in the rear of General Rodes, who was in the first line, and orders were received that when any portion of the first line needed reënforcements, the officer commanding this position would call for and receive aid from the portion of the line in his rear, without referring the order to division commanders.

Orders to advance were received at six o'clock precisely, and the troops moved on with enthusiasm against the enemy. In a few moments the action opened with a tremendous fire of musketry, two pieces of Stuart's horse artillery in the road supporting our infantry with their fire. Notwithstanding the tangled and very difficult character of the woods, and the resistance of the enemy, our troops advanced with great rapidity, driving the enemy like chaff before them, but not without loss to themselves. The division had advanced but a short time, not more than ten or fifteen minutes, and the battle had hardly more than commenced, when General Rodes called upon Colonel Warren to support him. The troops of my division had pressed on so ardently that they were already within a few steps of the first line, and, in some places, mixed up with them. The second and third brigades, commanded by General J. R. Jones and Colonel Warren, pushed on with and through the first line, and they were the *first* to charge upon and capture the first line of intrenchments of the enemy which were in an open field beyond the Wilderness Church. This they did under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry.

A large number of prisoners and two pieces of artillery were taken here by the Second brigade, Captain W. S. Hannah, of the Fiftieth Virginia

* A Belgian officer of General Carl Schurz's staff was captured, who represented that the Eleventh corps was certainly across; how much more was to follow he could not tell, but thought that the force altogether in this column was about twenty thousand. He seemed frank and honest, as well as communicative.

regiment, being the first to lay his hands upon these pieces, and Color-Sergeant Pickle, of the same regiment, planting his colors over them. At the same time, three pieces of artillery and a number of prisoners were taken by the Third brigade, whose gallant commander, Colonel Warren, had fallen, severely wounded, a few minutes before, and which was now under the command of Colonel T. V. Williams, Thirty-seventh Virginia. We continued to drive the enemy before us until darkness prevented our farther advance. The firing had now ceased, owing to the very difficult and tangled nature of the ground over which the troops had advanced, and the mingling of the first and second lines of battle, the formation of the troops had become very much confused, and different regiments, brigades, and divisions were mixed up together. In order to be ready to renew the conflict at daylight, it was necessary to re-form them in proper order, and a portion of General A. P. Hill's troops having moved to the front, I ordered the different brigades of my division to form near the log hospital, which was occupied by the enemy's wounded, and to draw a fresh supply of ammunition. The Fourth brigade was formed on the left of the plank road, the others on the right. The First, which had been detached in the evening, not having yet rejoined, was some distance in the rear. The troops were hardly reformed and placed in position, when the enemy opened, about ten o'clock, a furious fire of shot, shell, and canister, sweeping down the plank road and the woods on each side. A number of artillery horses, some of them without drivers, and a great many infantry soldiers, belonging to other commands, rushed down the road in wild disorder; but although many casualties occurred at this time in my division, the troops occupied their positions with the utmost steadiness. It was at this time that General Nichols, of the Louisiana brigade, (Fourth), a gallant and accomplished officer, had his left leg torn off by a shell, and was carried off the field. The command of his brigade devolved on Colonel J. M. Williams, who, during the following day, discharged with zeal and gallantry the duties of brigade commander. It was also about the same time that our great, and good, and ever to be lamented corps commander fell under the fire of some of the men of General Lane's brigade. A desultory firing continued at irregular intervals during the night, and the wearied troops had but small opportunity to obtain the repose which was so needful for the task of the next day. General J. R. Jones, owing to the ulcerated condition of one of his legs, was compelled to leave the field about eleven o'clock, and Colonel T. S. Garnett assumed command of his brigade.

Early on Sunday morning orders were given to the division to form at right angles to the plank road, near the log house occupied as a hospital by the enemy. Colston's and Jones's brigades on the right of the road, and Paxton's and Nichols's on the left, in second line. As soon as it was broad daylight the battle commenced with fury. Our troops advanced from the breastworks, running perpendicular to the plank road, and charged the enemy up the hills, but were driven back by the enemy, who were strongly reenforced. Colston's brigade, under Colonel T. V. Williams, immediately advanced to the support of the first line, and became hotly engaged. Colonel. T. V. Williams being wounded, and Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, who succeeded him in command of the brigade being killed, the command devolved first upon Lieutenant-Colonel Thurston, Third North Carolina regiment, and he being wounded, Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, First North Carolina, assumed command. Here Colonel McDowell, First North Carolina regiment, was wounded, and Major Stover, Tenth Virginia regiment, was killed. By this time the enemy were advancing in very strong force towards the right of our line and of the breastworks, and were about outflanking us on the right. Seeing this danger, I sent Mr. Grogan, of General Trimble's staff, to order Paxton's brigade to move by the right flank across the road, and Lieutenant Hinrichs, of the engineers, was sent with an order to Jones's brigade, under Colonel Garnett, to advance towards the right from their position, a little in the rear in reserve. This was a most critical moment. The troops in the breastworks, belonging mainly (I believe) to General Pender's and General McGowan's brigades, were almost without ammunition, and had become mixed with each other, and with fragments of other commands. They were huddled up close to the breastworks, six and eight deep. In the mean time the enemy's line was steadily advancing on our front and right, almost without opposition, until I ordered the troops in the breastworks to open fire upon them. At this moment, Paxton's brigade having moved by the right flank across the road, and then by the left flank in line of battle, advanced towards the breastworks. Before reaching them, the gallant and lamented General Paxton fell; the command devolved upon Colonel Funk, Fifth Virginia regiment. The brigade advanced steadily, and the Second brigade moved up at the same time. They opened fire upon the enemy and drove them back in confusion. It was at and beyond these breastworks that the division sustained the most severe loss, the nature of the ground being such that the enemy had a plunging fire upon us, and sent destruction upon all that occupied the slope of the hill on which we were. Here fell the gallant Colonel Garnett, commanding Jones's brigade, leaving Colonel Vandeventer, Fiftieth Virginia, in command. Here Major McKim, of division staff, was killed while most gallantly cheering on the men. Major Hoffman and Mr. Grogan, of the same staff, were wounded. All these officers having remained mounted with and near the division commander and the other members of the staff, and having their horses killed under them.

For a time the tide of battle fluctuated; the three brigades of this division making several distinct charges, and being driven back by superior numbers, until at last the enemy were compelled to abandon their works near the Chancellor house.

About twenty pieces of artillery coming into battery helped, finally, to drive back the enemy, and the conflict was virtually over at this point, and the firing ceased. In the mean while a very sharp fire on the left of the road announced that the Louisiana brigade was hotly engaged. I ordered part of the troops in the breastworks to march by the left flank to their support, and General Colquitt's brigade coming up at the same time, was ordered by General Stuart to proceed in the same direction. These forces arrived on the left just in time. The Louisiana troops, who had been fighting gallantly for a long time without support, and whose ammunition was almost entirely exhausted, were falling back, under a tremendous fire of artillery and musketry. The arrival of the reënforcements enabled them to stop their retrograde movement, and the whole line advanced together, and, delivering a few well-directed volleys, the enemy was forced to retreat. It was now about twelve o'clock. The enemy was driven beyond Chancellorsville. The troops of my division were almost entirely without ammunition, having expended all their own, besides a large quantity of Yankee ammunition. They were accordingly withdrawn to the rear, and supplied with fresh ammunition and with rations, of which they stood in great need, and their shattered ranks were reformed.

No further movements took place until about three o'clock. At this time I received an order to report in person to General Lee. Upon my doing so, the General ordered me to form my division perpendicular to the road leading from the Chancellorsville house towards the United States Ford, to throw forward skirmishers, and to advance for the purpose of feeling and ascertaining the enemy's position, not of taking his batteries. To this he added, that the road turned to the right at about a quarter of a mile distant, but that I would probably meet opposition before I got there. I accordingly formed my troops on both sides of the road, Nichols's and Colston's brigades being on the left and Jones's and Paxton's on the right. I ordered Lieutenant Hinrichs, of the engineers, to advance with the skirmishers and reconnoitre the enemy's position. The command was then given for the division to move forward. Hardly had they advanced a few paces, when a terrific fire of shell and canister was opened by the enemy, from a battery of twelve pieces of artillery. I ordered a section of Napoleon guns to advance up the road and reply to the enemy's fire. There was no other spot than the road in which they could be placed, and that was too narrow to allow a larger number of pieces to be put in battery. Finding that they would be speedily silenced, and probably with useless loss of life and material by the enemy's superior artillery, I ordered them back after a few rounds. In the mean time, perceiving some confusion on the left of the road, I proceeded there and found the Tenth Louisiana regiment exposed to a perfect storm of grape and shell, and rapidly giving away. Seco[illegible] Aid, Lieutenant Tosh, and by the [illegible] the officers of this regiment, whose conduct deserves the highest praise, I succeeded in arresting this retrograde movement, in spite of the enemy's continued fire; but the carnage in this small regiment was great — in less than two minutes, fifty officers and men fell, killed and wounded, by my side, including Lieutenant-Colonel Leggett, who was instantly killed by a shell. The remainder of the brigade suffered in a less degree, some portions having advanced inside of the point where the enemy's shot were falling. By this time it was ascertained that the enemy occupied a formidable position; twelve pieces of artillery were planted in barbette at the top of the first hill, and a line of intrenchments, occupied by infantry, stretched out on each side of the artillery, occupying a front much wider than that of my division. Another line of infantry, preceded by skirmishers, was drawn up outside of the works. To advance in the face of such a force, with a division so much reduced as mine was, would have been only to insure its destruction, and would have been contrary to the instructions I had received from the General commanding. I accordingly reported to General Stuart, who was, for the time, my immediate commander, that my division was not able to attack, with any prospect of success, the position of the enemy. I was then ordered by him to place my division in some intrenchments which had been abandoned by the enemy; the division was moved at night to a position in prolongation of General Rodes's line, and the position was fortified during the next day and night. On Monday and Tuesday occasional skirmishing took place with the enemy.

In reconnoitring his position and ascertaining his movements important service was rendered by Lieutenant-Colonel R. T. Colston, of the Second Virginia, and Captain William Randolph and Lieutenant Hinrichs, of the engineers.

The enemy having withdrawn their forces across the river, two brigades of this division, Colston's and Jones's, remained, the first at United States Ford, and the latter near Chancellorsville, and collected upon the battle-field vast quantities of arms, ordnance, &c., which were sent on to Guiney Station and Hamilton's Crossing. Communication was opened with the enemy by flag of truce; and, in accordance with instructions from General Lee, they were allowed to move all their wounded, and also the bodies of several of their officers who had fallen in the battle. These duties being completed, the two brigades above mentioned returned to the neighborhood of Hamilton's Crossing, and I returned to the command of my own brigade on the twentieth instant.

Where all did their duty so well and so completely, it becomes impossible to mention all those who exhibited great gallantry. That the troops of this division did perform their duty well and completely, is evidenced by the bloody roll of the killed and wounded. Two hundred and sixty-seven killed, and fifteen hundred and ninety-two wounded, making eighteen hundred and forty-nine casualties, not counting the very slightly wounded, in a division which went into action

with little more than six thousand men, is a larger percentage than that of any other division in the late battle. Although placed in second line at the commencement of the action, it is an indubitable fact that, before it had made progress many minutes, both on Saturday and on Sunday, the troops of this division had passed into and repeatedly through and beyond the first line. And, without any desire to detract from the just fame of other commands, I feel confident that much of the credit due to the prowess of Trimble's division has been attributed to others. The unusal proportion of officers who fell, — the fact that the four brigades lost eight brigade commanders, three of them killed and the rest disabled, and that out of the division staff one was killed and two were wounded, — all this shows that all, of every rank, bore their part well in this great battle.

I cannot, however, close this report without mentioning, more particularly, first the names of some of the most prominent of the gallant dead. Paxton, Garnett, and Walker died heroically at the head of their brigades. The chivalrous Duncan McKim, of General Trimble's staff, fell while conducting reënforcements to repel the enemy. Major Stover, of the Tenth Virginia, Lieutenant-Colonel Leggett, Tenth Louisiana, and many others, fell to rise no more. Colonel Warren, Tenth Virginia; Colonel T. V. Williams, Thirty-seventh Virginia; and Lieutenant-Colonel Thurston, Third North Carolina, wounded while commanding the Third brigade, deserve special mention for their gallantry. Also Colonel Funk, Fifth Virginia; Colonel Vandeventer, Fiftieth Virginia; Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, First North Carolina, and Colonel J. M. Williams Tenth Louisiana, on whom the command of the First, Second, Third, and Fourth brigades devolved respectively. Lieutenant-Colonel Withers, of Forty-second Virginia; Major White, Forty-eighth Virginia; Captain Buckner, Forty-fourth Virginia; Captain Mosely, Twenty-first Virginia; Major Perkins and Captain Kelly, commanding Fiftieth Virginia, and Captain Samuel J. C. Moore, acting adjutant-general to Jones's brigade, are mentioned for gallant conduct by their brigade commanders. Also, Lieutenant C. J. Arnell, acting assistant adjutant-general of Paxton's brigade, and Captain Henry Kyd Douglass, inspector of this brigade, to whose gallantry and good conduct I am also an eye-witness. Colonel H. K. Edmundson, of the Twenty-seventh Virginia, severely wounded at the head of his regiment, also deserves special mention. Of the conduct of the division staff I cannot speak too highly. Major Hoffman and Mr. Charles Grogan were both severely wounded while nobly discharging their duties. Captain W. Carvel Hall, assistant adjutant-general, was not only conspicuous for his gallantry, but discharged the arduous duties of his position, both during and after the battle, with a zeal and ability worthy of all praise; as did also Lieutenant Hinrichs, of the engineers, who acted, during the battle, as Aid-de-camp. Lieutenant James T. Tosh, my own Aid-de-camp, behaved with a daring and bravery which cannot be surpassed, and aided me materially more than once in rallying and pushing forward some portions of the line, momentarily wavering under the superior numbers and withering fire of the enemy.

I also wish to express my high appreciation of the skilful, zealous, and able manner in which Dr. R. F. Coleman, division surgeon, discharged the duties of his office. I am, sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

R. E. COLSTON,
Brigadier-General.

Official copy:

R. W. HUNTER, A. A. G.,
Johnson's Division.

REPORT OF BRIG.-GENERAL W. H. F. LEE.

Thursday, April 30th. — Marched from Culpeper to Rapidan station with Ninth and Thirteenth Virginia cavalry, and one piece of artillery; left one squadron in Culpeper, which fell back on the appearance of the enemy, and joined me at Rapidan. Enemy appeared that evening.

Friday, May 1st. — Engaged all day with one or two brigades of cavalry. One charge made by Colonel Beale with one squadron, to draw them out, took thirty prisoners, but could not bring them off; was pressed very hard. Received orders from General Lee to burn the bridge and fall back to Gordonsville; burnt the bridge, but held my position all day. Enemy commenced moving towards night in force on my left. Withdrew at night and marched towards Gordonsville.

Saturday, May 2d. — Reached Gordonsville at eleven o'clock A. M.; heard on my arrival that a large body of the enemy were at Trevillian's Depot and Louisa Court-House; sent the Ninth Virginia cavalry in that direction; their videttes were driven in by the enemy. The Ninth regiment charged and drove them three miles, killed and wounded a number, and took thirty-two prisoners. One Lieutenant and four prisoners taken represented three different regiments. My loss was three or four wounded. Went to the assistance of the Ninth with the Thirteenth regiment and two pieces of artillery; met Colonel Beale falling back; took a position and waited their approach. They did not advance. Learned that General Stoneman with his whole corps was at Louisa Court-House, moving towards James River; supposed that his object was to tear up the railroad; night coming on, my men and horses being wearied out by four days' fighting and marching, I left my pickets out and withdrew to Gordonsville.

Sunday, May 3d. — Received information from my scouts that the enemy were leaving Louisa, and moving in the direction of Columbia. Knowing their object was to destroy the aqueduct, I started after them. Arrived there at night; heard that they had left in a great hurry; pursued all night. At daybreak, having travelled sixty or seventy miles, the enemy being three hours ahead of me, halted. My videttes reported the enemy about one mile in advance; had exchanged words; they said they belonged to the Fifth regulars; knew the party I was pursuing was Wyndham's.

Monday, May 4th. — Started forward and came upon him drawn up in the road. One squadron of the Ninth was ahead a few hundred yards; charged; the enemy charged at the same time; fought hand to hand for four or five minutes; routed the party; killed six, wounded a number, and took thirty three prisoners, among them Captain Owens and Lieutenant Buford. Captain Owens reported that his regiment was not all present, but that he was on picket; that General Buford was only three miles distant. My horses and men being jaded, and having only about eight hundred men, I determined not to pursue. Continued back to Gordonsville, having travelled some seventy or eighty miles.

Tuesday, May 5th. — Rested, having sent out scouting parties. Heard by telegram from Richmond that the enemy were everywhere.

Wednesday, May 6th. — Having received information that the enemy were recrossing the railroad, moved down upon his left flank; came upon his rear at North Anna River; took some seventeen or eighteen prisoners. Their rear guard had crossed the river and torn up the bridge. It had been raining all day and the river was past fording. Hearing that this was only one party, and that another column was moving lower down, went in that direction; found they had all crossed the North Anna, and destroyed the bridges behind them. Moved that night in the direction of Louisa Court-House. Bivouacked in three miles of Court-House.

Thursday, May 7th. — Went to Trevillians and fed. Moved on at three P. M. for Orange Court-House; arrived at eight A. M. Scouts reported that the enemy had crossed the Rapidan.

W. H. F. Lee,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL PENDER.

CAMP GREGG, VA., May 14, 1863.

Brigadier-General H. Heth, commanding A. P. Hill's Division:

GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by my brigade in the battle of Chancellorsville. Having arrived upon the right of the enemy's position, May second, I was ordered to form line of battle upon the left of the road leading to Chancellorsville, in rear and in support of a line formed by part of Colston's division. In this order we advanced some distance, when orders were received to enter the road again, and push on by the flank, in which order I moved until reaching the advance position of our troops. Here, after my men were subjected to a most galling and destructive shelling from the batteries near Chancellorsville, I moved my regiments in to the left, and formed line of battle, my right resting upon the road. Before I had completed my formation I found that my troops occupied the most advanced position of our forces. Skirmishers were thrown out to the front, and in this position we remained until the general advance was ordered, early next morning, May third. My line had not advanced more than one hundred and fifty yards before the firing became very heavy; but my men continued to advance, and soon it became apparent that the enemy were posted behind a breastwork of logs and brush. This we carried without once hesitating. Beyond the breastworks the resistance again became very obstinate, as if we had come in contact with a fresh line; — but let me here say that the thickness of the undergrowth very much obstructed the view of operations the whole of this day; — and this, in its turn, was driven back after a short contest; but farther on the resistance became so great from their infantry force, and the tremendous fire from artillery on my right regiments, that they were forced to fall back, but rallied at the breastworks, about one hundred and fifty yards in our rear. My left regiment, (Thirteenth North Carolina,) not being subjected to the artillery fire, did not fall back, but continued to advance for a long distance, with the brigade on my left; and in this advance Lieutenant Ireland, Company E, Thirteenth North Carolina, rushed gallantly forward and captured Brigadier-General Hays and staff, who were endeavoring to escape. Corporal Monroe Robinson, Company A, Thirteenth North Carolina, also, about this time, chased a color-bearer so closely that he tore off the colors and threw down the staff, which was secured.

After the other four regiments fell back to the breastworks and were re-formed, I advanced again, the men going forward with alacrity; but, after penetrating the woods about the same distance as before, had to fall back again. This, to some extent, was unavoidable, as our line on the right of the road had been driven back about this time, and the men thus found that the enemy were at least one hundred yards in rear of them on the opposite side of the road. The Thirteenth North Carolina, (on the left,) after advancing a long way to the front, was finally compelled to fall back for want of support and ammunition, which it did in good order. When my line was forced back the second time, supports came up, and took the advance. My men were about out of ammunition, broken down and badly cut up, having lost about seven hundred officers and men in the short time we had been engaged. What field officers were left collected the men, after they had fallen behind the front line, and were engaged at different times during the fight. Knowing the ground pretty well by this time, I remained in the fight with whatever troops came up, until about the close of the action, when I very readily got my men into shape again, near the spot from where I commenced the advance.

I can truly say that my brigade fought (May third) with unsurpassed courage and determination. I never knew them act universally so well. I noticed no skulking; and they never showed any hesitation in following their colors. My list of killed and wounded will show how manfully they fought on that glorious day. After having witnessed the fighting of nearly all the troops that fought on the left of the road, I am satisfied with my own, but by no means claiming any superiority. All that I saw behaved as heroes.

Colonel Scales, Thirteenth North Carolina, was

wounded, and thus I was deprived of as gallant a man as is to be found in the service. Lieutenant-Colonel Hyman, Thirteenth North Carolina, showed himself a true and gallant officer. Captain Rogers, Thirteenth North Carolina, gallantly carried the colors of his regiment for some time after receiving a wound in the arm. Adjutant Walker, Thirteenth North Carolina, also received high commendation from his regimental commander for his gallantry. Lieutenant Smith, Company B, Thirteenth North Carolina, has been frequently recommended for promotion for gallant conduct, but thus far has not been confirmed. Being fired upon by one of the enemy, he rushed forward and killed him with his sword. Lieutenant Williamson, also recommended, as well as Lieutenant Smith, continued throughout the fight, after receiving a flesh wound through the thigh. Colonel McElroy and Lieutenant-Colonel Stowe, Sixteenth North Carolina, both behaved as finely as officers could, until they were both seriously wounded. And I cannot refrain from mentioning private Wiggins, of the same regiment, for his gallantry and endurance. After being on skirmish or picket duty for three days and nights, he volunteered to go out again, when he very coolly and deliberately loaded several guns, with which he killed several of the enemy. It is with great sorrow that I have to record the deaths of Lieutenant-Colonel Cole and Major Odell, Twenty-second North Carolina; two finer soldiers or more gallant men were not to be found in the army. They never failed me on any occasion. Lieutenant-Colonel Ashford, Lieutenants Brown and Robinson, Thirty-eighth North Carolina, the former part of the time, and the two latter all the time, in charge of my sharpshooters, distinguished themselves very much. Colonel Ashford was remarked for his gallantry by all; and Lieutenant Brown continued with, or in charge of, the sharpshooters for several days. He is a young man who deserves promotion. He kept his skirmishers so close to the enemy's breastworks on Monday and Tuesday as to pick off their artillery horses, men working on their trenches, and any one seen mounted. He drove in their skirmishers on all occasions. I should mention that Major McLauchlin, Thirty-eighth North Carolina, was badly wounded, while behaving most gallantly. Adjutant McIntire, same regiment, is also spoken of for distinguished conduct. In general terms, my officers, with but few exceptions, acted not only well, but remarkably so.

The following table will show my loss. Six out of ten field officers were killed or seriously wounded:

List of Casualties.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.	
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.
General Staff,								
Thirteenth North Carolina regiment,		31	11	167	1	6	12	198
Sixteenth North Carolina regiment,	3	14	7	66		15	10	93
Twenty-second North Carolina regiment,	2	28	7	122	1	14	10	164
Thirty-fourth North Carolina regiment,	1	17	3	107		20	4	144
Thirty-eighth North Carolina regiment,	2	18	7	70		11	9	99
Grand total,	8	108	36	532	2	66	45	710

I should have stated that Colonel McElroy, with his regiment, the Sixteenth North Carolina, after getting within three quarters of a mile of the point where the battle opened Sunday morning, was directed to report to General Stuart, who took him to some point in rear of the enemy, where he attacked a camp and routed them, when he rejoined me, at three o'clock A. M., only about two hours before the fight opened, having been marching all day and night.

I am, Sir, very respectfully, W. D. PENDER,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL THOMAS.

HEADQUARTERS THOMAS'S BRIGADE, May 19, 1863.

Captain R. H. Finney, A. A. G.:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that this brigade was ordered by Major-General Hill, on the morning of May second, to leave its position near Chancellorsville, on the right of the plank road from Fredericksburg to Gordonsville, and move with the division. In accordance with which order we moved with the division a few miles, when a message was received that the enemy had attacked and were threatening to capture the artillery and wagon train of the division, near the foundery. One regiment was at first sent, but the danger being reported to be most imminent, afterwards the whole brigade, with General Archer's brigade, returned and remained until the train had passed and the demonstrations of the enemy had ceased; when we moved on to overtake the division, which we did about eleven o'clock at night. The brigade was placed in position by General Heth, commanding division, on the extreme left and front, on the left of the plank road leading to

Fredericksburg, and near Chancellorsville, where we remained until daylight. At an early hour on Sunday morning the brigade was ordered to advance and attack the enemy. We advanced at once, driving a very heavy force of skirmishers before us. After proceeding about two hundred and fifty yards we found the enemy in strong force in our front, behind breastworks. The brigade charged with promptness and energy, and at the first charge drove the enemy, utterly routed, from their intrenched position. Advancing still farther we found a second line of the enemy, which we at once drove from its position. This brigade and one regiment from the brigade on our right, General Pender's, continuing to advance, driving the enemy before us, met another line of the enemy. After a sharp conflict this line was repulsed. At this point, finding that there were no troops on my left, and none in supporting distance on my right or rear, and the enemy were advancing in very heavy force on my left flank, and making demonstrations on my right, I ordered the brigade to move back, and took position near the line of the enemy's breastworks, where we remained until the whole line advanced.

When the enemy had been driven back at every point, the brigade, according to orders, rejoined the rest of the division.

I take pleasure in reporting that Colonel R. W. Folsom, Fourteenth Georgia; Lieutenant W. L. Grice, Forty-fifth Georgia; Major S. T. Player, Forty-ninth Georgia, and Captain John Duke, Thirty-fifth Georgia, commanded their respective regiments with marked success. All the officers and men of my command, who were present, acted with the utmost coolness and the most daring courage before the enemy.

I have to regret the loss of several valuable officers. Captain Harman, Fourteenth Georgia, and Captain Shaw, Forty-fifth Georgia, were killed, and Lieutenant-Colonel Fielder, Captain Hounger, and Lieutenant Solomons fell mortally wounded, in a few yards of the enemy's breastworks, gallantly leading their men to the charge.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDWARD L. THOMAS.
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL ARCHER.

HEADQUARTERS ARCHER'S BRIGADE,
June 2, 1863.

Captain R. H. Finney, A. A. G.:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that, about eleven o'clock A. M., May second, by order of Major General A. P. Hill, I withdrew my brigade from its advanced position on the "plank road," leaving my pickets out to wait until relieved, and proceeded to follow the other brigades of the division, which, with the exception of Thomas's, had gone to the left, by the Welford Furnace road. Thomas's brigade followed in my rear. When I had advanced two miles beyond the furnace, a Lieutenant-Colonel of cavalry rode up and reported that a large body of the enemy had attacked the train in my rear and driven off the troops which had been left to protect it. As the apparent exigency of the case allowed no time to communicate with the Major-General, I immediately ordered back my own and Thomas's brigade; but, when I arrived at the furnace, found that the enemy had already been repulsed by Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, of the artillery, and some infantry, among which I learned that Captain W. S. Moore, Fourteenth Tennessee regiment, with his company, bore a conspicuous part. I enclose, herewith, Captain Moore's report. Owing to the delay thus occasioned, I did not rejoin the division until late at night. During the night I formed on the extreme right of the division, with General McGowan's brigade on my left. The next morning, about sunrise, we moved forward to the attack, through dense pine timber, driving before us the enemy's skirmishers, and, at a distance of four hundred yards, emerging into the open field in front of a battery, which was placed on an abrupt hill near a spring-house. We advanced at double quick, and captured four pieces of artillery, and about one hundred prisoners, driving the infantry supports in confusion before us. From this position the enemy could be seen in heavy force in the woods, which commenced about six hundred yards diagonally to the right and front, and in the high open ground to the front. No other troops of our army were, at this time, in sight of us. After a few minutes' halt to reform our line, which had become somewhat broken by its rapid advance through the woods, I proceeded to attack the wood, which I have mentioned as lying diagonally to the front and right. My brigade, which was at the beginning only one thousand four hundred strong, and entirely unsupported, attacked with great intrepidity; but the position was strongly intrenched, and manned by vastly greater numbers, and we were forced to retire from within seventy yards of the intrenchments. We again formed and advanced to the attack, and were again forced to retire. I now moved my brigade to the point where we had captured the batteries, to await the arrival of reënforcements.

Soon after Major Pegram came up and occupied the position with artillery. Colonel Mercer came up on the left with three regiments of Doles's brigade, and General Anderson came up from the rear, on my right, with his division. He soon after moved to the right, leaving me in support of the artillery, which had opened a heavy and effective fire upon the enemy, which was hotly returned, although with little effect. In a few minutes General Lee rode up, and soon directed me to move forward with my own brigade and the three regiments of Doles's, which were under command of Colonel Mercer. After advancing four or five hundred yards Colonel Mercer requested a short halt until the ammunition, which had just arrived, could be distributed to his regiments. During this halt I received an order, through one of General Stuart's staff, not to advance farther until I received the order from him; but other troops coming up on Colonel Mercer's left and on my right, I moved slowly forward, and

soon came, on ascending the hill in front of Chancellorsville, in full view and range of the enemy's cannon, which opened a heavy fire upon us. About half of my brigade had by this time, in its advance, entered the woods, having swung around slightly to the right for this purpose; the left regiment of Doles's brigade, which was to the left of the centre of the enemy's artillery fire, and all that portion of the line on its left (I do not know what troops they were), moved over by flank to the left. As soon as I observed this movement I rode across the field to bring them back, but when I reached the plank road I found they had crossed it and entered the wood on its left. I then rode back across the field, under the fire of the artillery, to the point where my brigade had entered the wood. On account of the denseness of the tangled thicket, and the number of men of other brigades, I did not for some time find my own, and feared that it had fallen back, but was gratified to find that all its little regiments had moved promptly forward and driven the enemy from that part of their trenches farthest to the left and nearest to Chancellor's house. All firing ceased a short time after I entered the wood. I soon after found the brigade in the open field and joined the division on the plank road. The next day the division fortified its position on the left of the plank road fronting the United States Ford. General Pender, in command of the division, being wounded in the evening, the command of the division devolved on me, and that of the brigade on Colonel Fry for a short time, during which nothing important occurred except some skirmishing in front.

My loss in this action was forty-one killed and three hundred and seventeen wounded. Among the former was Major Smith, Thirteenth Alabama regiment, and Captain Stewart, commanding Fifth Alabama battalion, and among the latter Colonel McComb, Fourteenth Tennessee regiment, severely. My A. A. General, Captain Archer, and Aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Thomas, were present with the brigade throughout the action.

I take this occasion to acknowledge the gallant and efficient service of Mr. J. A. Williams, of Maryland, a volunteer Aid on my staff. The regiments were commanded as follows: First Tennessee, Lieutenant-Colonel George; Thirteenth Alabama, Colonel Fry; Fourteenth Tennessee, Colonel McComb, until wounded, and afterwards by Captain Wilson; Seventh Tennessee by Lieutenant-Colonel Fite, and Fifth Alabama battalion, by Captain Stewart.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant.
J. J. ARCHER,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL LANE.

HEADQUARTERS LANE'S BRIGADE,
"CAMP GREGG," May 10, 1863.

Captain R. H. Finney, A. A. G.:

On the morning of the 1st of May my brigade moved from its position in the second line, near Hamilton's Crossing, along the plank road, in the direction of Chancellorsville, and that night formed line of battle, with skirmishers thrown forward to the right of the road, about a mile and a half from the latter place. Next morning, after the artillery fight on our right, it was marched to the plank road above Chancellorsville, by the way of Welford's iron forge, and then ordered to move down the road by the flank, while the three lines of battle advanced. After it was ascertained that the enemy were rapidly falling back, it pushed forward with the artillery beyond the third and second lines to within a short distance of the first. Here General A. P. Hill ordered me (at dark) to deploy one regiment as skirmishers across the road, to form line of battle in rear with the rest of the brigade, and to push vigorously forward. In other words, we were ordered to make a night attack, and capture the enemy's batteries in front if possible. Just then they opened a terrific artillery fire, which was responded to by our batteries. As soon as this was over, I deployed the Thirty-third North Carolina troops forward as skirmishers, and formed line of battle to the rear,— the Seventh and Thirty-seventh to the right, the Eighteenth and Twenty-eighth to the left,— the left of the Thirty-seventh and right of the Eighteenth resting on the road. I had moved forward the Eighteenth and Twenty-eighth to within a short distance of our line of skirmishers, and was about to move the Seventh and Thirty-seventh to a corresponding position before ordering the whole line forward, when Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, of a Pennsylvania regiment, entered our lines with a white flag, and wished to know if we were *Confederate or Union troops*. Considering this an illegitimate use of the white flag, as he expressly stated *it was not his object to surrender*, and not wishing to let him return, I sent Lieutenant Lane to General A. P. Hill to know what I should do. Our skirmishers on the right soon after fired upon a few of the enemy who had approached tolerably near, and a few random shots were fired by the Seventh and Thirty-seventh regiments, without orders, which appear to have drawn the enemy's artillery and infantry fire. I understand from the official report of the commanding officer of the Eighteenth North Carolina troops, that General A. P. Hill, staff and couriers, were in the road in advance of them at the time, and to avoid the enemy's fire some of them dashed into the woods, over the Eighteenth regiment, which fired into them, mistaking them in the dark for the enemy's cavalry. After this unfortunate mistake I received information that a body of troops was moving on our right. I at once sent out Lieutenant Emack and four men to reconnoitre, and they soon returned with a Pennsylvania regiment, which had thrown down their arms, and surrendered themselves prisoners of war. This regiment was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, who had commenced to remonstrate with me for allowing it to be captured while he was in my lines with a white flag, when the enemy's artillery opened upon us again. I at once sent the regiment to the rear under Captain Young, his company having been detailed as a guard, and turned Lieutenant-Colonel Smith over to Captain Adams, signal officer, to be taken

to General A. P. Hill. General A. P. Hill being wounded, the night attack was not made as at first contemplated. I withdrew the left wing of the Thirty-third, which formed on the right of the Seventh, and extended our line still farther to the right, with the Eighteenth and Twenty-eighth regiments — the right of the Twenty-eighth resting on a road running obliquely to the plank road, with two of its companies broken back to guard against a flank movement. Between twelve and one o'clock that night the enemy could be heard marshalling their troops along our whole front, while their artillery was rumbling up the road on our right. Soon after, their artillery opened right and left, and Sickles's command rushed upon us with loud and prolonged cheering. They were driven back on the left by our skirmishers, but the fight was more stubborn on the right, *which was their main point of attack.* The Eighteenth and Twenty-eighth and left wing of the Thirty-third engaged them there, and gallantly drove them back, although they had outflanked us and encountered the two right companies of the Twenty-eighth, which had been deflected in anticipation of such a movement. A subsequent attack, made about half an hour later, was similarly repulsed. The Twenty-eighth captured a staff officer. The colors of the Third Maine volunteers were taken by Captain Clark's company of the same regiment. The Eighteenth also captured an Aid to General Williams. A number of field and company officers, and a large number of men, were captured along our whole line. After the enemy were repulsed, General McGowan was ordered forward with his brigade, and took position on our right.

On Sunday morning, about sunrise, the whole brigade was wheeled a little to the left, that the line might be perpendicular to the plank road, and then, in obedience to orders, moved gallantly forward with shouts driving in the enemy's skirmishers, and handsomely charging and carrying their breastworks. The left of the Thirty-seventh passed entirely over the works, capturing a number of prisoners; and the gallant old Seventh eclipsed all of its former glories. These works were on a hill, commanded by the Chancellorsville hill, which was fortified with a line of earthworks for twenty-eight (28) pieces of artillery, running nearly parallel to our position, and between four hundred and five hundred yards distant, with a stream of water intervening. As soon as we had dislodged their infantry, these guns, with others, opened a murderous fire of shell, grape, and canister upon us, a fresh column of their infantry was thrown against us, and with our right flank completely turned, we were forced to fall back, with the loss of *about one third of the command.* The Twenty-eighth rigiment, commanded by its gallant young Colonel (Lowe), fell back a few hundred yards, and was ordered to give assistance wherever needed, while I superintended the re-forming of the rest of the brigade, still farther to the rear. Colonel Lowe informs me that the Twenty-eighth behaved well throughout the remainder of the day; that it made two more charges under heavy artillery firing, and was [illegible] by Major-General Stuart. As soon as the rest of the brigade was re-formed, and replenished with ammunition, they were taken back into the woods, to the left of the plank road, to the support of General Colquitt's command, which was then nearly out of ammunition.

The woods which we entered were on fire; the heat was excessive; the smoke arising from burning blankets, oil cloths, &c., very offensive; the dead and dying of the enemy could be seen on all sides enveloped in flames, and the ground on which we formed was so hot as at first to be disagreeable to our feet. Nothing daunted, however, the men took their positions without a murmur, and notwithstanding their previous hard marching, desperate fighting, and sleepless nights, remained under arms again the whole of Sunday night, in the front line, while heavy skirmishing was going on. Never have I seen men fight more gallantly, and bear fatigue and hardship more cheerfully. I shall always feel proud of the noble bearing of my brigade in the battle of Chancellorsville, the bloodiest in which it has ever taken a part, where the Thirty-third discharged its duties so well as skirmishers, and with the Eighteenth and Twenty-eighth gallantly repulsed two night attacks, made by vastly superior numbers, and where the Seventh and Thirty-seventh vied with each other as to who should first drive the vandals from their works. Its gallantry has cost it many noble sacrifices, and we are called upon to mourn the loss of some of our bravest spirits. The fearless Perdie was killed while urging forward his men; the gentle, but gallant Hill, after the works had been taken, and Johnnie Young, a mere boy, not yet eighteen, but a brave and efficient Captain, fell at the head of his company. Captain Kerr, Lieutenants Campbell, Bolick, Emack, Weaver, Bouchelle, Babb, Callais, and Ragin all fell in the gallant discharge of their duties, as also did J. Roarker Lane, of Company E, Fifth Virginia cavalry, who at the time was acting as my volunteer Aid. I cannot speak in too high terms of the behavior of the officers of this brigade. Colonel Barbour, though wounded, was from time to time with his command, giving all the assistance he could. Major Morris, wounded in the foot, left the hospital on horseback and assisted in re-forming his regiment. Major Mayhew, after the left wing of the Thirty-third was withdrawn, and Lieutenant-Colonel Cowan, wounded, gallantly commanded the skirmishers in the night attack, was wounded in the charge the next day, and is now thought to be in the hands of the enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel Spear was wounded in one of the night attacks, and Colonels Avery and Haywood, Lieutenant-Colonels George and Ashcroft, and Major Davidson, in the charge of Sunday morning. After the loss of so many field officers, Major Barry and Captains Harris, Saunders, Brown, and Nicholson rendered me great assistance. Captain Saunders, in his official report, calls special attention to the efficiency of Lieutenants E. Price and J. L. Farrow of the Thirty-third regiment. Lieutenant Bryan, ordnance officer, and Lieutenant Nicholson, brigade inspector, discharged their duties well, though the

latter had but few "stragglers" and no "skulkers" to drive forward that I have yet heard of. I am specially indebted to my Aid-de-camp, Lieutenant O. Lane, and to one of my couriers, George E. Barringer, for the great assistance rendered me. They both bore themselves well under the hottest fires. My other courier was a poltroon, and has been sent back to his regiment. The brigade loss is twelve commissioned officers killed, fifty-nine wounded, and one missing; one hundred and forty-nine enlisted men killed, five hundred and sixty-seven wounded, and one hundred and twenty-one missing; making an aggregate of nine hundred and nine.

Respectfully,

JAMES H. LANE,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL DOLES.

HEADQUARTERS DOLES'S BRIGADE, RODES'S DIVISION, SECOND ARMY CORPS, May 9, 1863.

Captain Green Peyton, A. A. G.:

CAPTAIN: On the morning of the twenty-ninth of April this brigade was ordered to march in the direction of Hamilton's Crossing. The command was in motion by eight o'clock A. M.; arrived at the Crossing at ten A. M.; remained in position, on the crest of the hill at the Hamilton House, until two o'clock A. M., thirtieth; then moved in position, left of brigade resting on railroad, connecting with right of General Iverson's brigade, and connecting the right with left of General Colquitt's brigade; remained in this position during the day and night. At two o'clock, on the morning of May first, marched towards Orange Court-House plank road. About one o'clock P. M., formed line of battle on the plank road, about two miles from Todd's Tavern; threw out skirmishers, driving back those of the enemy, and took six prisoners. About six P. M., same day, moved up the dirt road, one mile beyond Todd's Tavern, and bivouacked for the night. About six o'clock A. M., May second, moved up the dirt road about half a mile, filed off to the left on the Furnace Road, arriving at Germana Road about three and a half o'clock P. M., and formed line of battle, left of brigade resting on said road. Brigade formed as follows: Fourth, Forty-fourth, Twenty-first, and Twelfth Georgia; the Fourth Georgia resting on road, skirmishers thrown forward about four hundred yards in advance. At five o'clock P. M., the order was given to advance against the enemy. The brigade moved as rapidly as possible through a very thick wood, and skirmishers were immediately engaged by those of the enemy. Our forces, marching rapidly forward, assisted in driving in the enemy's sharpshooters, when we were subjected to a very heavy musket fire, and grape, canister, and shell. The command was ordered to attack the enemy in his intrenched position, drive him from it, and take his batteries. The order was promptly obeyed; the Fourth and Forty-fourth Georgia assaulted his position in front; the Twenty-first Georgia was ordered to move towards the left and flank him, so as to enfilade his intrenchments; the Twelfth Georgia was ordered forward, and to the right, to attack a force of the enemy on the right. After a resistance of about ten minutes, we drove him from his positions on the left, and carried his battery of two guns, caissons, and horses. The movement of the Twelfth Georgia on the right was successful. The order to forward was given, when the command moved forward at the "double quick" to assault the enemy, who had taken up a strong position on the crest of a hill, in the open field. He was soon driven from this position, the command pursuing him. He made a stubborn resistance from behind a wattling fence, on a hill covered thickly with pine. The whole command moved gallantly against this position, the Fourth and Forty-fourth Georgia in front, and the Twenty-first and Twelfth on his left flank and rear. Here we captured one gun, (a rifled piece.) We pursued his retreating forces about three hundred yards over an open field, receiving a very severe fire from musketry and a battery of four pieces on the crest of the hill that commanded the field below; his infantry was in large force, and well protected by rifle pits and intrenchments. The command was ordered to "take" the intrenchments and the battery, which was done after a resistance of about twenty minutes. The enemy fled in utter confusion, leaving his battery of four pieces, his wounded, and many prisoners. The Twelfth Georgia, and the larger portion of the other regiments, were formed in good order, and pursued him through the pine forest, moving some five hundred yards to the front, and holding that position until after dark. While in this advanced position the enemy abandoned one gun. Fresh troops having been placed in that position, after dark I ordered the command to retire to the edge of the woods for the purpose of replenishing ammunition, the men being entirely out, and it being impossible to get ammunition to them. After replenishing with ammunition, we were ordered to bivouac on the field for the night. During this engagement, which lasted from about five and a half to nine o'clock P. M., the command captured eight pieces of artillery and many prisoners. The pieces of artillery were ordered to be carried to the rear, and turned over to the first artillery or ordnance officer found. In this engagement we lost many gallant men killed and wounded. Among the killed were Captain R. M. Bisel, company K, Fourth Georgia; Captain G. G. Green, company F; Captain H. M. Creidle and Lieutenant A. M. Burnside, acting adjutant of the Forty-fourth Georgia, and Captain U. C. Allen, Twenty-first Georgia, who fell while gallantly and nobly leading their commands. Colonel Phillip Cook, Fourth Georgia, severely, and Captain A. C. Watkins, company A, Twenty-first Georgia, mortally wounded while leading their commands in a charge against the enemy. Sunday morning, May third, at six o clock, the command was ordered forward, as follows: Forty-fourth, Twenty-first, Twelfth, Fourth, the left of the Forty-fourth connecting with the right of General Ramseur's brigade. The march to the front was through a very dense pine and swamp. During the march the left of

the brigade lost its connection with the right of General Ramseur, and moved off by the "right flank," passing in rear of the regiments to its right, whilst four companies of the Twenty-first Georgia and the Twelfth Georgia, with portions of the Forty-fourth and Fourth, moved to the front. The right portion of the brigade was ordered by General Stuart to support a battery to its right, while the left moved forward, assaulting the enemy, and assisting in driving him from his position from behind a strong work of logs. He was dislodged, after a very stubborn resistance, by a charge. This portion of the command kept up the pursuit, driving him through the woods, back on his batteries on the heights near Chancellorsville. While moving to assault him, in his position on the hill, I discovered the enemy in large force to my right. Colonel Willis, commanding Twelfth Georgia, was ordered to wheel his regiment to the right and engage him, the other companies coming up promptly to Colonel Willis's support. The enemy, after the first fire, fled. A large number threw down their arms and surrendered; they were ordered to the rear. Being protected by the crest of a hill to the left of the enemy's batteries, we moved by the flank, getting in his rear, when he abandoned seven pieces of artillery on the field and fled. We were attacked in our rear by his infantry force from the woods; we faced to the rear, charged the wood, and after a few minutes' resistance he withdrew. After he withdrew, his batteries at the Chancellorsville House opened a very destructive fire on us with grape, canister, and shrapnel. We were in about four hundred yards of his batteries. We did not have force enough to carry his position, and seeing no support on the field, and the enemy moving a large infantry force to our right, we withdrew to the woods where we first engaged him. That portion of the brigade ordered to support our battery was under command of Colonel J. T. Mercer, Twenty-first Georgia; they were afterwards ordered forward, and to conform to the movements of General Archer's brigade. After advancing to the woods, from which we were forced to retire, they were also forced to retire. The brigade was re-formed, and, by order from General Lee, ordered to the spring to our right, to act as provost guard over a large number of prisoners collected there. We remained there two or three hours, and sent prisoners to the rear under Lieutenant R. V. Jones, brigade-inspector. We then joined the division on the Germana Road at Chancellorsville, and remained in position in the road that night. On Monday, the fourth, we were ordered to move to the opposite side of the road, and connect my left with the right of General Pender. On Tuesday, the fifth, the skirmishers were ordered to press forward and feel the enemy, and ascertain his position and strength. They found him in strong numbers and well intrenched. On Wednesday, the sixth, at daylight, skirmishers were again ordered to feel the enemy. They moved to the front, and found he had evacuated his position and withdrawn his forces across the river. About two o'clock P. M., we were ordered to march back to our old encampment. In closing this report, I cannot speak in terms too high of Colonel Cook and Lieutenant Winn, of the Fourth Georgia; Colonel Willis and Major Hardeman, of the Twelfth Georgia; Lieutenant-Colonel Lumpkin, Forty-fourth Georgia; Colonel Mercer and Major Glover, Twenty-first Georgia. To their promptness and gallantry, and the able manner in which they were sustained by the officers and men of their commands, all of whom did their whole duty, I acknowledge my indebtedness. Attention is respectfully called to their reports, which you will find enclosed. To my staff, Captain Snead, assistant adjutant-general; Lieutenant Hawkins, aid-de-camp; Lieutenant Jones, brigade-inspector; Sergeant Furlow, and privates Cheeves and Ormsby, couriers, I am under many obligations for assistance given me. I respectfully commend them for "gallantry and meritorious conduct." This brigade went into action with one hundred and twenty-six officers and one thousand four hundred and sixty-eight enlisted men.

Casualties in Brigade.

Regiments.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Aggregate Casualties.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
Fourth Georgia,	1	28	12	103	...	11	155
Twelfth Georgia,	1	11	4	54	...	2	72
Twenty-first Georgia,	...	15	8	56	...	10	89
Forty-fourth Georgia,	2	8	7	99	...	5	121
Grand total,	4	62	31	312	...	28	437

I am, Captain, most respectfully yours,

GEO. DOLES,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL COLQUITT.

HEADQUARTERS COLQUITT'S BRIGADE, NEAR FREDERICKSBURG, May 15, 1863.

Captain Peyton:

Herewith I submit a report of the part taken by my brigade in the recent engagement at Chancellorsville, and the affairs connected with it.

On the morning of April twenty-ninth, intelligence being received that a portion of the Federal army had succeeded in crossing the river near Fredericksburg, my brigade was put under arms and marched to Hamilton's Crossing. Under cover of a hill, protected from the enemy's artillery, we lay during the day, and at three o'clock, next morning, took position upon a line of temporary intrenchments in front of the enemy. At intervals, during the day, a fire of artillery opened upon us, but without effect.

At dawn, on the morning of May first, we took up the line of march, and after proceeding six or seven miles above Fredericksburg, came upon a portion of our forces who had been engaging the enemy. Discharges of artillery and musketry were still heard. The division being formed in line of battle, my position was upon the right. In this order we advanced a few hundred yards, when my command was thrown into some confusion by coming in contact with the troops of General McLaws's command, formed perpendicular to my own line. The line being rectified, we began again to advance, when instructions were received that we should halt and await future orders. The skirmishers, moving in advance, picked up fifteen or twenty prisoners. At sundown we were withdrawn to the plank road, and continued the march for two or three miles, when we bivouacked for the night. Early the next morning we were again put in motion, my brigade in front, and, turning to the left from the plank road, leading from Fredericksburg to Orange Court-House, it was obvious that we were aiming for the flank and rear of the enemy.

On reaching the furnace, a mile distant from the point of divergence, I detached, by order of General Jackson, a regiment, (the Twenty-third Georgia, Colonel Best,) with instructions to guard the flank of the column in motion against a surprise, and to call, if necessary, upon any officer whose command was passing, for reënforcements. For the subsequent action and fate of this regiment I refer to the accompanying report of Colonel Best.

After a continuous march of six miles we again reached the plank road, which we had left. My brigade was placed in ambush along the line of the road, with the expectation that some demonstration would be made by the enemy's cavalry. In the mean time the division filed past, and I closed in upon the rear. At four o'clock we reached the road running through Chancellorsville to ———. Here we formed line of battle, my brigade upon the right, and uniting with Doles upon the left. In this order we advanced for a few hundred yards, when intelligence was communicated to me by the skirmishers that a body of the enemy was upon my right flank. I ordered a halt, and called back the Sixth Georgia, which had continued to advance. The regiment upon the right, the Nineteenth Georgia, was quickly thrown into position to meet any demonstration upon the flank, and ordered to advance about one hundred yards to the summit of a hill. The enemy's force proved to be a small body of cavalry, which galloped away as soon as the regiment advancing towards them was discovered, and a picket of infantry, which was captured by my skirmishers.

All apprehension in this quarter being allayed, we advanced again to the front, to renew connection with the line that had preceded us. As we emerged from the woods into an open field, I discovered Doles's brigade hotly engaged with the enemy at his first works. With a shout and at a double quick we moved to his support; but before we reached musket range, the enemy broke in confusion and fled. I halted in the open field and brought up two of my regiments, which had been delayed in crossing a creek and in climbing its steep banks. It was near dark and too late for further action. At ten o'clock I relieved the brigade of General McGowan, watching a road leading to one of the enemy's main positions, and detailed the Sixth Georgia regiment to support a battery in front. During the night, the alarm being given, my whole command was moved to the support of the battery, and was subjected, at intervals, to a fierce artillery fire from the enemy.

Early the ensuing morning I took my position in line of battle on the extreme right, and, in pursuance of orders, was advancing upon the enemy's position, when I received orders to move to the support of General Archer, a guide being furnished to direct me to him. I had proceeded but a short distance, when I was ordered to repair, in haste, to the extreme left of our line, where the enemy threatened to turn our flank. I had scarcely reached the new position, when I was again ordered to the right, and thence again to the left. While our forces were occupied in the assault on Chancellorsville, the enemy sought to assail them in flank, and made desperate efforts to regain possession of the turnpike. It was to defeat this object that my brigade was thrown to the left. Forming line of battle parallel to the road, I advanced, in face of a severe fire, to a line of breastworks from which the enemy had been driven. Here I found the Third Alabama, of Rodes's brigade, and some Louisiana and South Carolina regiments stubbornly resisting his advance. They had well nigh exhausted their ammunition. Upon my arrival they withdrew, producing some confusion in rushing through my ranks. It was momentary, however. Advancing beyond the breastworks, we opened a furious and well-directed fire upon the enemy. The contest was sharp and fierce for a few moments. I ordered a charge, which was responded to with a shout at a double quick. The enemy broke and fled in confusion, throwing away arms, accoutrements, and every encumbrance. We continued the pursuit for half a mile, killing and capturing many, and driving the fugitives into their fortifi-

cations in rear of Chancellorsville. Coming to a halt, we lay under cover of woods within four hundred yards of their works, for four or five hours. Some demonstrations being made upon my left, the brigade of General Lane was sent to my support. Previously, the Fiftieth Virginia, Captain Matthews, and a detachment of a South Carolina regiment, under Major Gordon, had joined me as reënforcements. The enemy did not show himself again outside of his works. At four o'clock I was relieved, by the direction of Major-General A. P. Hill, under the command of General Pender. We took position soon after in the trenches about Chancellorsville, where we lay until ordered back to our camp, near Grace Church.

Colonels Zachery, Graybill, and Hutchins led their regiments with spirit and energy. Captain Gratten, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Randle, aid-de-camp, were indefatigable in their efforts, and conspicuously bold in the discharge of their duties. Mr. H. H. Colquitt, acting upon my staff, bore himself with spirit and coolness.

Especial credit is due Captain William M. Arnold, Sixth Georgia regiment, who commanded the battalion of skirmishers. His energy, zeal, and gallantry won my admiration.

A. H. COLQUITT,
Brigadier-General.

The names of the following officers and men are mentioned by their regimental commanders as deserving special notice for meritorious conduct:

Company A, Sixth Georgia regiment. — Corporals R. W. Clarke, Wm. Chappell; private W. G. Howell.

Company D, Twenty-seventh Georgia regiment. — Lieutenant G. W. Latham, commanding.

Company F, Twenty-seventh Georgia regiment. — Lieutenant W. P. Edwards, commanding; Sergeant James Shirah.

Company C, Twenty-seventh Georgia regiment. — Sergeant W. A. Webb; corporals S. C. Tentrell, C. M. Newbury; privates H. Newberry, M. Merritt, J. Murchison, J. Haskins, J. Worsham, W. G. Clary, and Simon Johnson.

Company E, Twenty-seventh Georgia regiment. — Privates A. L. Dodd, John J. Buffington, G. M. Dodd, James Larter, Thomas J. Horton, and A. J. Whitaker.

Company G, Twenty-seventh Georgia regiment. — Privates T. J. Reavis and J. C. Curtis.

Company H, Twenty-seventh Georgia regiment. — Sergeants J. B. Bryant and T. J. Duke; corporal B. P. Pryor; privates B. F. Norris, G. W. Rape, J. M. Lindsay, and John H. Lewis.

Company K, Twenty-seventh Georgia regiment. — Private William Connell.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL IVERSON.

HEADQUARTERS IVERSON'S BRIGADE,
May 13, 1863.

Captain G. Peyton, A. A. G.:

Having rested on our arms on the extreme left of the third line of battle, composed of the troops of Rodes's division, during the night of May second, about six o'clock A. M., of May third, we advanced with the whole line, one brigade of which (Rodes's) intervened between mine and the plank road.

My command was formed in the following order, from right to left: Twenty-third North Carolina, Twentieth North Carolina, Twelfth North Carolina, and Fifth North Carolina.

The direction was Chancellorsville, moving to the left of and parallel to Germana road. Advancing through the almost impenetrable undergrowth, subjected to the incessant artillery fire of the enemy, it was impossible to see any portion of the brigade over fifty yards. In consequence of the difficulty of proceeding, I soon received information from Lieutenant-Colonel Lee, commanding the Fifth North Carolina, that his regiment was disconnected from the brigade. Fearing that he might get lost, and fall into the hands of the enemy, I sent him word to move by the right flank, and then close up. This manœuvre threw him in rear of the line, leaving the Twelfth North Carolina on the left flank. Upon reaching the first barricades of the enemy, which had been carried by the first line of our troops, a heavy fire of artillery opened on my left, raking the whole line, and the skirmishers of the enemy fired on my left flank. I ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston, commanding Twelfth North Carolina, to deploy skirmishers to protect his flank, and to press on. At the barricades, I met General Rodes, and informed him that the enemy were threatening my flank. My brigade pressed on, and found the troops of the first lines retiring before the heavy force of the enemy, and we became the first line, engaging the enemy in front, who gradually retired before us; but at this time they were advancing in heavy force on my left flank. I despatched a messenger to General Stuart with this information, and asked him for reënforcements. Before any could have arrived they closed with us, forcing the Twelfth and Twentieth North Carolina to retire to the barricades. Colonel D. H. Christie, with five companies of his regiment, had charged that part of the enemy's battery resting on the plank road, captured it by an enfilading fire, and caused the abandonment of their guns, when, finding that he was outflanked from the left, was forced to retire after a desperate fight, losing many men killed, wounded, and prisoners. It is supposed that Major Blackwell, of the Twenty-third North Carolina, was captured here. Lieutenant Colonel Lee, with the Fifth North Carolina, had come up in the mean time, but had not been engaged; he reported his regiment to me in the centre of my brigade, and was ordered to sustain two regiments of Rodes's brigade, in an advanced position, but finding the whole falling back, he also retired to the breastworks. Finding the danger from the forcing of our left flank imminent, and the enemy still pressing on, I was forced to give my whole attention to that point, and, in conjunction with General Thomas, formed a portion of a Louisiana brigade, with two regiments of Rodes's brigade, I think the Sixth and Twelfth Alabama, to meet the at-

tack of the enemy from the left. At the same time having learned that the troops with General Lee had driven the enemy, and effected a junction with the right of our corps, I announced the fact to my brigade, and again advanced them to the front. They had gone but a short distance when the troops I had formed on the left became engaged with the advancing line of the enemy. I then communicated with Colonel S. B. Pickens, commanding Twelfth Alabama, whose gallantry on this occasion I cannot too highly commend, so completely and courageously did he lend himself to aid me in preparing the line to resist an attack, and ordered him to hold the enemy in check till I could procure reënforcements. The incessant stream of balls showed that the enemy were in force, and I found that the advance of my brigade was continually checked by the enemy on the left enfilading the line. Leaving the troops I had placed in position, I went out to the plank road for assistance, and observing troops in line on the right of the road, I sent Captain J. P. Halsey to them for aid. He communicated with General Colston, who promptly moved a portion of his command in the required direction. I saw General Stuart, and informed him of the situation, and he immediately forwarded the brigade of General Colquitt to support the left. Returning to watch the effect of the reënforcements, I received a contusion in the groin from a spent ball, which made walking very painful, and as the battle ceased shortly after, I requested Colonel Christie to take the command of the brigade till I could procure my horse. Upon joining the brigade in front, I received orders from General Rodes to move up the plank road, and take position, with my right resting on the brick house at Chancellorsville, where we fortified our position, by the use of bayonets and fingers, and remained subjected on several occasions to the shells and canister of the enemy, until Wednesday evening, May sixth, when ordered to return to camp.

On Wednesday morning, the enemy having retired, skirmishers were pressed forward to the river, capturing many prisoners. When a whole command behaved so well as mine did, I shall be obliged to confine myself, with one exception, to the commendation of officers commanding regiments, leaving it to them to name individuals distinguished for conduct. The exception is, Lieutenant Malone, of the Fifth North Carolina, upon whom I depended for correct information from the line of skirmishers. He was nearly always in front, and, on Wednesday morning, when informed of my wish to find out the position of the enemy, crept forward, alone, into their intrenchments, and brought me in news of the evacuation.

Colonel D. H. Christie, for the gallant manner in which he fought his regiment at the breastworks of the enemy, deserves promotion, and I here take occasion to recommend him for the same.

Colonel T. F. Toon, Twentieth North Carolina, was wounded while fighting his regiment gallantly in the front line.

Lieutenant-Colonel R. D. Johnston, of the Twenty-third North Carolina, to whom I had given command of the Twelfth North Carolina, cannot be too highly praised for the distinguished courage with which he commanded, under trying circumstances.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lee, up to the time of his wound, bore himself, and commanded his regiment with determined bravery.

My thanks are due Captain D. P. Halsey, A. A. G., for his promptness and readiness in carrying my orders to any part of the field, and the thanks of the country are due the whole command, officers and men, for their unexceptionable conduct.

Lists of casualties are enclosed with regimental reports.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant.
ALFRED IVERSON,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL RAMSEUR.

HEADQUARTERS RAMSEUR'S BRIGADE,
CAMP NEAR HAMILTON'S CROSSING, May 23, 1863.

Major G. Peyton, A. A. General:

In obedience to general orders, No. ——, dated May seventh, 1863, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my brigade in the series of skirmishes and battles, opening at Massaponax Creek and ending in the splendid victory at Chancellorsville:

Wednesday, A. M., April 29th.—The brigade was placed below Massaponax Creek to dispute the enemy's crossing, and remained in that position, occasionally annoyed by their artillery, (by which I lost a few men,) and kept on the alert by picket firing till Thursday evening, when we were withdrawn to a point near Hamilton's Crossing.

Friday, May 1st.—At three o'clock A. M. we were aroused for the march, and led the advance of Major-General Rodes's division in the direction of Chancellorsville. At a distance of seven miles from Fredericksburg we were detached from our own division and ordered to report to Major-General Anderson, when we advanced upon the enemy, who fell back in confusion before our sharpshooters, for several miles strewing the way with their arms and baggage. This brigade, with General Posey on our right and General Wright on our left, for upwards, perhaps, of two miles, being in advance. About six o'clock P. M. we found the foe in force upon our front, and supported by batteries that poured grape unsparingly into the woods through which we were still advancing. Night approaching, a halt was ordered, and we slept on our arms, with a strong picket line on the outposts.

Saturday, May 2d.—We were relieved about sunrise, and shortly thereafter marched, by a series of circuitous routes and with surpassing strategy, to a position in the rear of the enemy, whom, at about five o'clock P. M. we were ordered to attack. This brigade was directed to support Brigadier-General Colquitt, with orders to overlap his right by one regiment, and was placed accordingly.

At the command, we advanced with the division, preserving a distance of about one hundred yards in rear of General Colquitt. Brisk firing was soon heard upon our front and left, indicating that General Doles had encountered the foe. At this point General Colquitt moved by the right flank, sending me word by an officer of his staff that the enemy was attempting to turn his right. I immediately moved by the right flank, but heard no firing in that quarter. Again he sent his staff officer to inform me that the enemy was pushing his right flank, when I directed him to say to General Colquitt, in effect, that the firing indicated a sharp fight with General Doles, and that my impression was that his support was needed there, and that I would take care of his right flank. General C. moved to the front with the exception of one regiment, which continued to the right. I then pressed on by the right flank to meet the enemy that General Colquitt's staff officer *twice* reported to me to be in that direction, and prosecuted the search for half a mile perhaps, *but not a solitary Yankee was to be seen!* I then came up to the division line, and moved by the left flank to the support of General Colquitt, *whose men were resting in line of battle on the field General Doles had won!* On Saturday night our division occupied the last line of battle, within the intrenchments, from which the routed corps of Siegel had fled in terror. My brigade was placed perpendicular to the plank road, the left resting on the road, General Doles on my right, and Colonel O'Neal, commanding Rodes's brigade, on my left. I placed Colonel Parker's Thirtieth North Carolina on the right of my brigade; Colonel Bennett, Fourteenth North Carolina, on right centre; Colonel Cox, Second North Carolina, left centre, and Colonel Grimes, Fourth North Carolina, on left.

Sunday, May 3d.—The division being, as stated, in the third line of battle, advanced about nine o'clock to the support of the second line. After proceeding about a quarter of a mile I was applied to by Major Pegram for a support to his battery, when I detached Colonel Parker, Thirtieth North Carolina, for this purpose, with orders to advance obliquely to his front and left, and rejoin me after his support should be no longer needed, or to fight his regiment as circumstances might require. I continued to advance to the first line of breastworks, from which the enemy had been driven, and behind which I found a small portion of Paxton's brigade, and Jones's brigade, of Trimble's division. Knowing that a general advance had been ordered, I told these troops to move forward. *Not a man moved.* I then reported this state of things to Major-General Stuart, who directed me to assume command of these troops, and compel them to advance. This I essayed to do; and after fruitless efforts, ascertaining that General Jones was not on the field, and that Colonel Garnett had been killed, I reported again to General Stuart, who was near, and requested permission to run over these troops in my front—which was cheerfully granted. At the command "Forward," my brigade, with a shout, cleared the breastworks, and charged the enemy. The Fourth North Carolina, (Colonel Grimes,) and seven companies of the Second North Carolina, (Colonel Cox,) drove the enemy before them until they had taken the last line of his works, which they held under a severe direct and enfilading fire, repulsing several assaults on this portion of our front. The Fourteenth North Carolina (Colonel Bennett,) and three companies of the Second were compelled to halt some hundred and fifty or two hundred yards in rear of the troops just mentioned, for the reason that the troops on my right had failed to come up, and the enemy was in heavy force on my right flank. Had Colonel Bennett advanced, the enemy could easily have turned my right. As it was, my line was subject to a horrible enfilade fire, by which I lost severely. I saw the danger threatening my right, and sent several times to Jones's brigade to come to my assistance, and I also went back twice myself, and exhorted and ordered it—officers and men—to fill up the gap (some five hundred or six hundred yards) on my right—but all in vain. I then reported to General Rodes that unless support was sent to drive the enemy from my right I would have to fall back. In the mean-time Colonel Parker, of the Thirtieth, approaching my position from the battery on the right, suddenly fell upon the flank, and handsomely repulsed a heavy column of the enemy, who were moving to get in my rear by my right flank—some three or four hundred of them surrendering to him as prisoners of war. The enemy still held his strong position in the ravine on my right, so that the Fourteenth and the three companies of the Second could not advance. The enemy discovered this situation of affairs, and pushed a brigade to the right and rear of Colonel Grimes, and seven companies of Colonel Cox's second, with the intention of capturing their commands. This advance was made under a terrible direct fire of musketry and artillery. The move necessitated a retrograde movement on the part of Colonels Grimes and Cox, which was executed in order, but with the loss of some prisoners, who did not hear the command to retire. Colonel Bennett held his position until ordered to fall back, and in common with all the others, to replenish his empty cartridge-boxes. The enemy did not halt at this position, but retired to his battery, from which he was quickly driven, Colonel Parker, of the Thirtieth, sweeping over it with my troops on my right. After replenishing cartridge-boxes, I received an order from Major-General Rodes to throw my brigade on the left of the road to meet an apprehended attack of the enemy in that quarter. This was done, and afterwards I was moved to a position on the plank road, which was intrenched, and which we occupied until the division was ordered back to camp near Hamilton's Crossing. The charge of the brigade, made at a critical moment, when the enemy had broken, and was hotly pressing the centre of the line in our front, with apparently overwhelming numbers, not only checked his advance, but threw him back in disorder, and pushed him, with heavy loss, from his last line of works.

Too high praise cannot be accredited to the officers and men for their gallantry, fortitude, and manly courage during this brief but arduous campaign. Exposed as they had been for five days immediately preceding the fights, on the picket line, they were, of course, somewhat wearied, but the order to move forward and confront the enemy brightened every eye and quickened every step. Under fire all through Wednesday, Wednesday night, and Thursday, without being able effectually to return this fire, they bore all bravely, and led the march towards Chancellorsville on Friday morning in splendid order. The advance of the brigade on Friday afternoon was made under the very eyes of our departed hero, Jackson, and of Major-General A. P. Hill, whose words of praise and commendation, bestowed upon the field, we fondly cherish, and on Sunday the magnificent charge of the brigade upon the enemy's last and most terrible stronghold was made in view of Major-General Stuart, and our division commander Major-General R. E. Rodes, whose testimony, that it was the most glorious charge of that most glorious day, we are proud to remember, and to report to our kindred and friends.

To enumerate all the officers and men who deserve special mention for their gallantry, would be to return a list of all who were on the field. All met the enemy with unflinching courage: and for the privations, hardships, and splendid marches, all of which were cheerfully borne, they richly deserve the thanks of our beautiful and glorious Confederacy.

I cannot close without mentioning the conspicuous gallantry and great efficiency of my regimental commanders. Colonel Parker, of the Thirtieth, who was detached during the fight of Sunday to support a battery, and having accomplished that object, moved forward on his own responsibility, and greatly contributed to wrest the enemy's stronghold at Chancellorsville from their grasp, as well as prevent their threatened demonstrations upon the right of my brigade. The gallant Grimes of the Fourth, whose conduct on other fields gave promise of what was fully realized on this. Colonel Bennett, of the Fourteenth, conspicuous for his coolness under the hottest fire; and last, though not least, the manly and chivalrous Cox, of the Second, the accomplished gentleman, splendid soldier, and warm friend, who, though wounded five times, remained with his regiment until exhausted. In common with the entire command I regret his temporary absence from the field, where he loved to be. Major Hart, Second North Carolina troops, commanded the skirmishers faithfully and well. To the field and company officers, one and all, my thanks are due for the zeal and bravery displayed under the most trying circumstances. To the gentlemen of my staff I owe especial thanks for services rendered on the march and upon the field. Captain Seaton Gales, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Richmond, aid-de-camp, were with me all the time, promptly carrying orders under the very hottest fire. I take pleasure, too, in speaking of the bearing of private James Stinson, courier, a youth of twenty, who displayed qualities a veteran might boast of, and of the conduct of private J. F. Beggarly, also a courier to headquarters. To Dr. Briggs, senior surgeon of the brigade, my thanks are due for his skill, zeal, and care of the wounded.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

S. D. RAMSEUR,

Brigadier-General, commanding.

REPORT OF BRIG.-GENERAL BARKSDALE.

FREDERICKSBURG, May 15, 1863.

Major W. H. Taylor, A. A. G., Army Northern Virginia:

MAJOR: When General McLaws moved up the river on the night of the thirtieth of April, I was temporarily detached from my command, and ordered to report to General Early. My brigade was then at Marye's hill, with the exception of twelve companies, which were protecting the river from Taylor's hill to the Ferneyhough house. By General Early's order, I, with the Thirteenth and Seventeeth regiments, relieved the pickets of Generals Kershaw and Wofford above the railroad. The brigade was then extended over a picket line of not less than five miles. On Saturday appearances indicated that the enemy were leaving their encampments on this side of the river, and were marching to reënforce Hooker. By General Early's order, the Twenty-first regiment of my brigade was left to picket the river, while the other three regiments, with three of his brigades, proceeded to rejoin the main army at Chancellorsville. He had marched but a short distance, when it was reported that the enemy were advancing upon General Hays, who had been left with his brigade on the line from Hamilton's Crossing to Fredericksburg. General Early ordered the entire command to return to its former position. About two o'clock, on Sunday morning, having thrown a pontoon bridge over the river, the enemy commenced crossing into Fredericksburg in large numbers. I at once informed General Early of the fact, and asked for reënforcements. With several batteries, under the command of General Pendleton, and a single brigade of infantry, I had a front of not less than three miles to defend, extending from Taylor's hill on the left, to the foot of the hills in rear of the Howison house. The Twenty-first regiment was posted between the Marye house and the plank road, three companies of which were afterwards sent to the support of the Eighteenth regiment, which were stationed behind the stone wall at the Marye house. The Seventeenth regiment was placed in front of Lee's hill, and the Thirteenth still farther to the right. One regiment from General Hays's command was subsequently placed to the right of the Thirteenth. Four pieces of artillery were placed on the right of Marye's house, two on the left, and the balance on Lee's and the hills in the vicinity of the Howison house, thus making the only disposition of the small force at my command which, in my judgment, would prevent the enemy from passing the line.

The battle commenced at daylight. A furious cannonading was opened from the enemy's batteries in town, and along both banks of the river. Two assaults were made upon Marye's heights, but both were signally repulsed. About eight o'clock a heavy column of the enemy were seen moving up the river, evidently for the purpose of getting possession of Taylor's hill, which, if successful, would have given him command of the position which I held. But this was prevented by the timely arrival of General Hays, with four regiments of his brigade. The enemy having thus been foiled in his purpose, turned the head of his column down the river again; but it was impossible to tell whether he had abandoned the attempt, or intended to advance again on the same position with a still heavier force. General Wilcox had now reached Taylor's hill with three regiments of his brigade, one of which he promised to send to the right in case it should be needed. This regiment was sent for, but there was not sufficient time for it to come up before the action was over. With a line as extended as this, and in consideration of the small number of forces at my disposal, and the uncertainty as to the point against which the enemy would hurl the immediate force he had massed in town, I deemed it proper that the regiments should remain as they then were, and await the happening of events. Very soon, however, the enemy came out from his hiding-place, and moved in three columns and three lines of battle, twenty thousand strong, against the position held by my brigade. At the same instant Colonel Humphreys was assailed on the left, Colonels Holder and Carter, and the Louisiana regiment on the right, and Colonel Griffin in the centre. After a determined and bloody resistance by Colonel Griffin and the Washington artillery, the enemy, fully twenty to one, succeeded in gaining possession of Marye's hill. At all other points he was triumphantly repulsed; but seeing the line broken at this point, I ordered the Thirteenth, Seventeenth, and Louisiana regiment to fall back to the crest of Lee's hill, to prevent the enemy from getting in our rear. This they did, resisting his approach at every step; and with the aid of Frazer's and Carlton's batteries, both of which were handled with the most consummate skill and courage, finally succeeded in checking his advance. The Twenty-first regiment, with the remainder of the Eighteenth, after Marye's hill had been taken, fell back, and rejoined the brigade on the hills. The distance from town to the points assailed was so short, the attack so suddenly made, and the difficulty of removing troops from one part of the line to another was so great, that it was utterly impossible for either General Wilcox or General Hays to reach the scene of action in time to afford any assistance whatever. It will then be seen that Marye's hill was defended by but one small regiment, three companies, and four pieces of artillery. A more heroic struggle was never made by a mere handful of men against overwhelming odds. According to the enemy's own accounts, many of this noble little band resisted to the death, with clubbed guns, even after his vast hordes had swept over and around the walls. His loss, from reports published in his own papers, was a thousand killed and wounded; but, according to statements from intelligent citizens, it reached two thousand. Upon the pretext of taking care of their wounded the enemy asked a flag of truce, after the second assault at Marye's hill, which was granted by Colonel Griffin, and thus the weakness of our force at that point was discovered. It is proper to say that Colonel Griffin, who is a brave and gallant officer, granted this flag of truce without consulting me. The next morning the line of battle was formed on the river road, General Gordon in front, General Hays on the left, and my brigade on the right of the road. It was soon discovered that Lee's and Marye's hills had been abandoned by the enemy. General Gordon took possession of Marye's hill without opposition. My brigade was ordered to the stone wall in front of the hill; and I was ordered to send out skirmishers, and if the town was not strongly defended, to storm and take it. I at once sent out both scouts and skirmishers, both of whom reported that, in their judgment, the town was in a state of strong defence; that rifle-pits had been dug across the streets, and that cannon had been planted on both sides of the river, which completely commanded the entire town. This fact I reported to General Early, who ordered me to remain where I then was, and prevent any advance from town on the part of the enemy. During the night the enemy recrossed the river; and on the following morning I moved in and occupied the town, capturing about forty prisoners. In concluding this brief report, I desire specially to mention the names of Captain J. A. Barksdale, adjutant of this brigade; Lieutenant J. A. Gibson, acting inspector-general; Harris Barksdale, aid-de-camp, as having acted with the greatest possible coolness and gallantry. Dr. Hill, senior surgeon of the brigade, and all the regimental surgeons, did their whole duty. All the couriers who were with us, J. T. Broach, W. M. Palmer, and W. L. McKee, carried my messages to the different commands promptly, regardless of danger.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. BARKSDALE,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL POSEY.

HEADQUARTERS POSEY'S BRIGADE, NEAR FREDERICKSBURG, VA., May 12, 1863.

To Major Thomas S. Mills, A. A. General, Anderson's Division:

MAJOR: I have the honor of submitting a report of the part my brigade took in the recent engagement about Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg. On the evening of the twenty-ninth ultimo, being then in camp with Brigadier-General Mahone, near the United States Ford, we were advised by our scouts and the cavalry pickets, who were posted at Ely's Ford and Germana bridge, that the enemy had crossed in heavy force at those points, and were advancing on the Ely and plank roads towards Chancellorsville. Upon

consultation, we concluded to leave five companies of my brigade, (Nineteenth Mississippi regiment,) and one regiment of General Mahone's brigade, to watch and defend the United States Ford, while we moved our brigades to Chancellorsville. On reaching that place, we posted my brigade on the right and left of the plank road at Chancellorsville, and General Mahone's brigade in Ballard's and Nixley's fields, half mile from Chancellorsville, on the Ely road. We remained in this position until about seven o'clock the next morning, the thirtieth, when we were directed by the Major-General commanding, who reached Chancellorsville about twelve o'clock A. M., to move our commands back to a position where the mine road crosses the old pike and plank road. We remained in this position until the next morning about nine o'clock, May first, when I was ordered to advance my brigade up the plank road. After moving about two miles, I formed a line of battle in Albridge's field, between the plank road and old pike, and sent out the Twelfth regiment as skirmishers, moving the other three regiments forward as fast as the skirmishers advanced; the advanced line of skirmishers soon encountered the enemy, when I advanced another line, and we drove the enemy's skirmishers back in gallant style, until we encountered the enemy in heavy force drawn up in line of battle on the furnace road; this line was soon broken by the vigorous onset of my skirmishers, (at this time Lieutenant-Colonel Harris, commanding the Twelfth, was severely wounded while gallantly leading on his command, and was taken off the field.) I continued my advance across the furnace road, through a dense wood, thickly set with undergrowth, driving back the enemy's skirmishers through the woods, until I reached a marsh, and became much exposed to a rapid shelling from the enemy's artillery, when I halted my command, and remained here until about eleven o'clock P. M., when I received an order from the Major-General commanding to advance as far as I could. I then pushed my skirmishers forward, and with much difficulty crossed the marsh in front, and advanced within a short distance of the enemy's lines of works; the enemy on my right being on my flank and somewhat in the rear of my right. I remained in this position until about seven o'clock the next morning, when I was relieved by Brigadier-General Thomas; and then moved with my brigade to the field in rear of the furnace road, where my command was allowed to rest for a short time. Saturday, second May, about ten o'clock A. M., my command moved down the furnace road, and formed a line of battle with three regiments, (the Forty-eighth being left behind as skirmishers, and not being relieved until late at night,) on each side of the road, about five hundred yards from the furnace. Here my skirmishers were hotly engaged with the enemy during the whole day and part of the night, the enemy being in heavy force in my front, and making frequent efforts to advance, without success: on every occasion my line of skirmishers drove them back in confusion. On the morning of the third, the enemy having disappeared from my front, I advanced my command, by the furnace, capturing many prisoners and arms, until I reached a point in a field in rear of our batteries on the extreme right of the enemy's lines; here I formed my command in column of regiments, and, after a short time, was ordered to advance by flank to the right, and attack the enemy, who were in strong force on a hill in front. I deployed first the Nineteenth, then the Twelfth, Forty-eighth, and Sixteenth, directing the commanders to move by the left flank (which would bring them in line of battle, fronting the enemy) as soon as they attained sufficient room in the woods, and push forward their skirmishers vigorously against the enemy's. The movement was made in fine order under heavy fire of shell and grape; as each regiment attained its position, the commanders pushed forward gallantly and irresistibly through a dense wood and over a wide abatis, and into the trenches of the enemy, driving him off with much slaughter, and capturing many prisoners. Too much credit cannot be given to the officers and men for this gallant and daring and irresistible charge, sweeping the enemy for more than a half mile of their strong works, overcoming, without hesitation, both natural and artificial obstacles. It would not be proper in this limited report to mention the many instances of individual daring which came under my observation, and which have been reported to me; and where all the officers and men behaved so nobly it would be invidious to individualize. Commanders of regiments acted with consummate skill and valor. Colonel Baker, of the Sixteenth, attacked the enemy's works on their extreme right; Colonel Jayne, of the Forty-eighth, (who was wounded in the charge,) next; Major Thomas, of the Twelfth, and Colonel Harris on the right of the brigade. These commanders simultaneously charged the enemy's works, and I am much indebted to them for the success of my command. My command, after storming the works, being somewhat scattered on account of the dense woods and vigorous pursuit, I moved it back a short distance and re-formed in an open field on the right, and in a very short time was ready to move forward. On the afternoon of this day my command was moved on the old pike, the left resting near Chancellorsville house, and my right extended on the pike. I here sent out ten companies of skirmishers, who penetrated to Ballard's and Nixley's field, where the enemy were in force and throwing up works of defence. In the afternoon, my brigade, with Generals Wright's and Perry's, were moved near the United States Ford, where I sent out the Nineteenth and Twelfth regiments and drove in the enemy's skirmishers. The next day, Monday, the fourth, my command was moved, with Generals Wright and Perry, towards Fredericksburg, and in the afternoon formed a line of battle near Hazel Run, fronting Dolmer's house. At the signal to advance, led by the Major-General commanding, my command moved across to the plank road, opposite Guests's house, under heavy fire, and at dark formed a line of battle, and remained until about twelve o'clock, when I was ordered to move to a

point up the plank road near Banks's Ford. During this time my skirmishers were actively engaged and brought in many prisoners. I remained near Banks's Ford during the balance of the night, and the next evening, the fifth, in a severe storm of wind and rain, advanced to within two miles of Chancellorsville and bivouacked for the night. Early the next day, sixth, I was moved to Ballard's field, and that evening returned to my old camp near Fredericksburg. My command was on foot from the twenty-ninth of April to the seventh May, inclusive, and bore the privations, fatigue, labor, and fighting without a murmur. My staff officers, Stanhope Posey, A. A. General, and J. B. Posey, A. D. C., rendered good services. My Aid-de-camp being very sick, had to leave the field Saturday morning, and my assistant adjutant-general being wounded on Saturday, was disabled from doing active duty, but remained in the field while the fighting lasted. In the mean time one of my couriers, Mr. Asberry Hancock, acted both a courier and aid-de-camp, and did most valuable service, displaying acts of daring and heroism worthy of mention, and for his conduct in the field in front of the enemy deserves the highest consideration, and should be promoted. My courier, Weil, also deserves mention. I must here mention that Lieutenant-Colonel Manlove, of the Forty-eighth, volunteered, and gallantly led a line of skirmishers on Friday morning with good effect. It affords me pleasure to notice the gallant conduct of T. L. Duke, chaplain of the Nineteenth regiment, who remained in front of his regiment with his musket during the series of engagements, and mainly directed the movements of the skirmishers of that regiment. I herewith send a list of casualties, and also the reports of commanders of regiments, giving more particular details which are interesting.

Very respectfully,

CARNOT POSEY,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

REPORT OF BRIG.-GENERAL A. R. WRIGHT.

HEADQUARTERS WRIGHT'S BRIGADE,
CAMP NEAR GUINEAS'S STATION, May 13, 1863.

To Major Thomas S. Mills, A. A. G., Anderson's Division:

MAJOR: I herewith enclose a report of the part taken by my brigade in the recent engagements near Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, together with a correct list of casualties sustained by this command. At fifteen minutes after ten o'clock A. M., on the twenty-ninth ultimo, I received orders to move with my command to or near Hamilton's Crossing, and in supporting distance of General Early's left, I immediately put my brigade in motion, and at twelve M., reached the position indicated, with my right near to Early's left. Here I remained until late in the afternoon, when, in obedience to orders from Major-General Anderson, I moved my command near to his headquarters, on the military road. Here we bivouacked, as we hoped, for the night, but at twelve o'clock I was ordered to move rapidly with my command to Chancellorsville, distant some twelve or fifteen miles, where I would report to Major-General Anderson. During a drenching rain and impenetrable darkness we commenced the march, and moving by the Fredericksburg and Orange plank road, at daylight, on Thursday, May the thirtieth, I reported in person the arrival of my brigade at Chancellorsville. Here I received orders to retrace my steps, and fall back towards Fredericksburg, as far as the crossing of the old mine road on the plank road, and there await the approach of the enemy, then reported as advancing in heavy force by the Ely's Ford and Germana roads. At eight o'clock A. M. I reached the desired position, and formed line of battle on a range of hills in rear of Hopewell nursery, with my right resting upon the plank road. My men had marched twenty-seven miles in less than twenty-one hours, and most of the time in a heavy rain and through deep mud, and when I halted, were almost completely exhausted. After a hasty reconnoissance of the position I concluded to change my line to the crest of a range of hills, upon which the small-pox hospital and an old church were situated, and about three quarters of a mile in rear of my first position. Here I formed as before with my right resting upon the plank road, and my left upon the Fredericksburg and Gordonsville railroad. During the afternoon, having received a few intrenching tools, I commenced digging a line of rifle-pits in front of my position, and by working during the whole night I had, by seven o'clock on Friday morning, my entire line well protected, having also, during the night, kept a detail at work throwing up an epaulement for two pieces of artillery on the right of the plank road. No enemy having appeared in sight in front of my position, at about noon, on Friday, the first of May, I was ordered to move my brigade up the plank road, and, feeling for the enemy, to drive him before me should he be found. Having proceeded about one mile my skirmishers became engaged with the enemy's advance, who began very soon to give way, while I pressed forward with the main body of my command, until having reached within one and a half or two miles of Chancellorsville I discovered the enemy in considerable force, occupying a position on both sides of the plank road, along the skirt of a heavy forest, with a large clearing in his front. At this point, by command of Lieutenant-General Jackson, Alexander's battalion of artillery was placed in position, and supported by my brigade, opened a heavy fire upon the enemy's line. Meanwhile I threw forward a strong body of skirmishers from the Third Georgia regiment on both sides of the road, and pushing them well to the front, those on the right soon became actively engaged with a considerable body of the enemy's infantry: the firing continuing very heavy on my right, I ordered Captain Jones's company, Second Georgia battalion, to the support of company "H," Third Georgia regiment, then on the right. In a very few minutes the enemy began to give way, and Captain Jones continued to press them for some distance through the dense wood. About the middle of the afternoon I received

orders from General Anderson to move my brigade across and to the left of the plank road, and, bearing well off from the road, endeavor to get upon the enemy's right flank and rear. I immediately commenced the movement, and reaching the Gordonsville and Fredericksburg railroad, I moved rapidly up that road, keeping Captain Wilson's company, Forty-eighth Georgia regiment, and Captain Scragg's company, Twenty-second Georgia regiment, well in advance, as skirmishers.

About six o'clock P. M. I reached Wellford's iron furnace, one and a half miles south-west of Chancellorsville, where I found Major-General Stuart, who informed me that the enemy, in considerable force, was occupying the thick woods north of, and near the furnace, in the direction of Chancellorsville. I immediately prepared to give him battle, and ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Carswell, commanding Forty-eighth Virginia regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel Warden, commanding Twenty-second Georgia regiment, to move cautiously forward through the almost impenetrable forest, with one company for each regiment thrown forward as skirmishers, and, finding the enemy, to press him vigorously. The Third Georgia regiment and Second Georgia battalion I held in reserve, to be used as occasion might require. Lieutenant-Colonels Carswell and Warden, moving rapidly forward, were soon engaged with a heavy force of the enemy's infantry, and the firing for a few minutes was very severe. Through this heavy fire Carswell and Warden continued to press, and their gallant commands soon cleared the woods, and reaching the edge of an open field, charged upon and drove the enemy up a high hill, in rear of a farm house, where he took shelter under cover of a dense pine thicket. Fearing lest my small command should fall into a Yankee trap, I ordered my line to halt, and despatched a messenger to General Stuart, asking that he send me a portion of his artillery, under cover of whose fire I intended again to charge the enemy, unless our artillery should show them to be in very greatly superior force. Some time elapsed before our guns could be got into position, owing to the character of the ground and the very bad roads over which they had to pass, and it was nearly sunset before we opened our fire. Immediately the enemy responded with two heavy batteries, one immediately in front and one upon our right, and very soon a third opened upon us from a high hill on our left. Our guns replied with spirit, but owing to the superior number of guns opposed to them and their advantageous position, the result was not as favorable to us as I had hoped and anticipated. Ascertaining the locality of the enemy's guns, I directed Lieutenant-Colonel Carswell to move off by his left flank through a deep ravine near the edge of the field, in which the enemy's guns were posted, and gaining the right and rear of the enemy's battery upon our left, to charge upon and take it. But owing to the near approach of night and the dense undergrowth through which we had to pass, it was found impossible to accomplish my object, and, at dark, the firing ceased on both sides, and I withdrew my men; and, in obedience to orders from Lieutenant-General Jackson, received through Major-General Stuart, I marched by the furnace road, and, at eleven o'clock P. M. rejoined my division, then on the plank road about one mile from Chancellorsville. My loss, during the day, amounted to two killed and twenty-two wounded. The enemy's loss I had no means of discovering, as I left the scene of conflict so soon, but it must have been very considerable, including quite a number of prisoners.

Early on Saturday morning, the second instant, I was ordered to form my brigade on the left of, and perpendicular to the plank road, with my right resting upon it, keeping one regiment deployed as skirmishers well to the front in the dense woods. In this position I continued until two o'clock P. M., when I received orders to move quickly in the direction of the iron furnace to the support of General Posey, who was then threatened by a heavy force of the Yankees. Just at this time the enemy advanced two full brigades upon the Third Georgia regiment, deployed as skirmishers in my front, and commenced a fire upon that regiment. I was compelled to leave it unsupported, but reporting the fact promptly to the Major-General commanding the division, I proceeded rapidly to the support of General Posey, whose brigade I found in line extending on both sides of the road to the furnace, and distant from the latter about one thousand yards. The enemy appeared in considerable force upon the hills around the furnace, and had a strong line of sharpshooters advanced as far as the small run which flows at the foot of the furnace hill. After a brief consultation with General Posey, I formed my brigade on his right, with my line extending well to the right in the direction of the left of the Third Georgia regiment, left, as before stated, hotly engaged by a large force of the enemy. The firing continuing so incessant and terrific in the direction of the latter regiment, I despatched a messenger to Major Jones, commanding, to ascertain the condition of things in his immediate front, and to inform him of my readiness to reënforce him if he should require it, but ordering him to hold his position at all hazards, as he held the key to our whole line in this quarter. Having received an answer from Major Jones that he was not only able to hold his own against the terrible odds to which he was opposed, but that he was actually advancing upon and driving the enemy before him, I drew in my line upon the left and concentrated the balance of my brigade there, in order to coöperate more favorably with Posey, who was, about this time, threatened with a heavy force which was seen advancing down the hill from the furnace, and approaching his position with loud cheers. This was about dark on Saturday, and as the enemy's threatened movement against General Posey was not made, I again directed my attention in the direction of Major Jones's position on my right.

Shortly after dark the firing ceased along my whole front, and at half past eight o'clock, Major Jones's Third Georgia regiment having been re-

lieved from its position in the woods, as skirmishers, returned to the brigade and was formed upon its right. My loss during the day was very slight, though I regret to add that some of my men, who were wounded the day before and left at the furnace in hospital, were to-day captured, together with two ambulances, which had been sent up to bring them off. When the depot for my wounded was established at the furnace it was at least a mile within our lines, but by some means unknown to me the enemy retook the position on this day, (Saturday, the second,) and thus got possession of some of my wounded men.

Early on Sunday morning I received orders to advance my brigade through the woods in the direction of Chancellorsville, connecting my right with General Mahone's left and my left with General Posey's right. This gave me a line of over a mile to cover with less than sixteen hundred men. I soon found that this was entirely impracticable, and I pushed forward through the woods endeavoring to keep equidistant from Mahone and Posey, keeping my flanks protected by a strong line of skirmishers and flankers. In this order I moved steadily on my right, about three quarters of a mile to the left of the plank road, until I fell upon a strong body of Yankee infantry posted in the woods, about one half a mile in the front (as I afterwards discovered) of a strong line of rifle-pits, protected by abatis formed by the felling of the thick forest timber for some distance in front of their intrenchments. Quickly engaging the enemy with vigor he gave way, and I pursued him up and into his strong works. Here my small command encountered the most terrible fire of artillery and musketry I have ever witnessed, and our farther advance was temporarily checked. About this time firing on my left was heard, and I felt assured Posey was up to his work. Not having heard from or of General Mahone, I despached an officer of my staff to seek him and inform him of my position, and beg him to move forward to my support. Immediately after this messenger left me, Major Taylor, an officer in command of General Mahone's line of skirmishers, approached me and informed me that he knew nothing of the locality of General Mahone's brigade, except when last heard from it was very far in the rear, and that he (Taylor) should wait or fall back with his skirmishers until he could be brought near to his brigade. I urged him not to do so, as I had just sent word to General Mahone, informing him of the condition of things in front, and urging him to come to my support, and which I thought he would speedily do. Directly after this Major Taylor left me, and I saw no more of him or General Mahone's forces during the day. Being thus without support on my right, I determined to move a little towards the left, where I continued to hear Posey's fire, and ordered Major Jones, with his Third Georgia regiment, to deploy his line, and pushing up to the enemy's works examine his position and report. About this time the firing far on the left of Posey's position became heavy, and I felt assured that Jackson was advancing there. Major Jones moved his regiment rapidly up to within a few rods of the enemy's works, where, pressed by Posey and Perry on my immediate left, and Jackson farther on, the Yankees gave way and fled from their intrenchments. We pressed forward and immediately occupied them, although on my right the enemy still retained possession of their works and opened a pretty sharp fire of shell and musketry upon us as we took possession of their abandoned rifle-pits. I was then ordered by Major-General Anderson to move up the Third Georgia regiment and dislodge the enemy's sharpshooters on our right, and then push forward for the enemy's battery, which was playing so incessantly upon us. The order was given, and the Third Georgia commenced its movement along the line of rifle-pits towards the plank road, led by Major Jones. In a few minutes he received a severe wound in the right arm, (since amputated,) and the command devolved upon Captain Andrews, who continued to advance, until having reached the plank road about two hundred yards from Chancellorsville, I ordered him to charge the enemy, then in some confusion around and in the rear of the brick house. This charge was made with spirit, and the enemy fled, leaving us in entire possession of his strong position. At this point we captured three pieces of artillery and eight caissons, and about three hundred prisoners. I immediately re-formed my brigade (now somewhat scattered in running through the woods and timber) along the road in front of the brick house, and ordered four companies of the Third Georgia forward on both sides of Ely's Ford road as skirmishers to feel for the flying foe. Soon as I had my line formed and ready to press on, I reported the fact to Major General Anderson, who, with General Lee, had ridden upon the field, and then received orders to move down the plank road for a few rods and await further orders. Meanwhile my skirmishers had overtaken the running Yankees, and had succeeded in capturing an entire Yankee regiment, (the Twenty-seventh Connecticut,) with all its field officers and about six or seven hundred men. I continued to scour the woods for an hour or two, and captured quite a number of straggling Yankees.

Late in the afternoon I was ordered down a byroad in the direction of the United States Ford, following Posey's brigade. Nothing of importance occurred during this march, and at night bivouacked near Childs's house. My loss during this day was pretty severe, amounting to seventeen killed, and one hundred and sixty-three wounded, including in the list of killed some of my best officers.

On Monday morning I received orders to move back up the road, towards Chancellorsville, until I reached the turnpike road; and from thence was ordered down the turnpike to Salem Church, five miles above Fredericksburg, which point we reached about noon, when I halted to receive further orders. Major-General Anderson then directed me to move off to the right of the road, and passing well to the left of the enemy's line, to take position on the slope of the hills in rear of Downman's farm. Here I formed line of battle, my right upon the left of Hoke's brigade, of Early's division, Posey's right upon my left.

The enemy were in position along the north slope of the ridge upon which Downman's house stands, with a strong line of sharpshooters occupying the crest of the ridge and the house, and fencing around Downman's yard with heavy batteries on the hills in their rear. At the appointed signal, just before sunset, I moved forward by the right flank around to the right of the hill on which I had formed, and passing up a ravine, came upon the border of the open field in rear of Downman's house, about four hundred yards from it, and here rapidly forming in line I charged across the fields, swept by the house, and reached the woods opposite, driving the enemy before me like chaff. Arriving at the skirt of the woods, I halted my command, (fearing if I proceeded farther in that direction I should encounter Wofford's brigade, who, I had been informed, would advance in that direction,) and sent a messenger to General Anderson informing him of my position, from whom I received instructions to wait in my then position for further orders. During this time the enemy kept up a murderous fire along my whole line, and with considerable effect. I remained in this position until dark, subjected to this murderous fire, without being able to respond to the enemy's guns. Between eight and nine o'clock I was ordered to move up to the plank road, and form on Posey's left, which I did, and soon after we moved down the road in the direction of Banks's Ford, Posey in advance. After proceeding two and a half or three miles, we were ordered to halt; and were then ordered by Major-General Anderson to bivouac for the night. My loss this day was considerable, amounting to six killed, and eighty-three wounded.

On Thursday, the fifth instant, about two o'clock P. M., I received orders to move my command immediately up the plank road to Chancellorsville. I commenced the march at once in one of the hardest rains I have ever seen, and which continued with less violence during the whole afternoon. At dark, we encamped about one and a half miles from Chancellorsville; and, early next morning, (Wednesday,) we marched to Chancellorsville, and from thence down the Ely's Ford road to a point just behind Brooks's house. Here we were halted until about noon, when I was ordered to retrace my steps, (the Yankees having retired beyond the river,) and take my men into their camp, in the rear of Fredericksburg. Thus ended the eight days of marching and fighting.

I cannot, in justice to the brave men composing this command, close my brief report without expressing my highest admiration for their splendid conduct during this eventful week. No man ever had better or braver soldiers. The Twenty-second Georgia, Lieutenant-Colonel Warden, and the Forty-eighth Georgia, Lieutenant-Colonel Carswell, on Friday, near the iron furnace, acted with distinguished coolness and courage, driving a vastly superior force of the Yankees for nearly a mile, and only relinquished further pursuit by receiving orders from me to halt. On the same day Company "H," Captain Luckee, of the Third Georgia, and Company "B," Captain Jones, of the Second Georgia battalion, performed efficient and valuable service as skirmishers, during the advance and firing on the plank road.

On Saturday the Third Georgia sustained its former reputation in engaging and actually repulsing two brigades of the enemy, on the left of the plank road, near Chancellorsville.

On Sunday, at Chancellorsville, and again on Monday afternoon, near Fredericksburg, the entire command evinced the most heroic fortitude and chivalric daring; charging, in both instances, and routing the Yankee infantry, under a deadly fire from the enemy's batteries. To Lieutenant-Colonel Warden, Lieutenant-Colonel Carswell, Major Ross, and Major Jones, and the skilful officers and brave men of their commands, is the country in no small degree indebted for the splendid results of the week.

This command and the country have to deplore the untimely loss of Captain Heath, of the Twenty-second Georgia, Captain Kendrick and First Lieutenant Spier, of the Forty-eighth Georgia, who were killed on Sunday near Chancellorsville.

To Captain Girardey, A. A. general, Lieutenant Hazlehurst and Captain Bell, aids-de-camp, I am greatly indebted for their valuable and efficient services during all the week's operations.

I am, Major, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
A. R. WRIGHT.
Brigadier-General, commanding Brigade.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL PERRY.

HEADQUARTERS PERRY'S BRIGADE,
May 9, 1863.

To Major Thomas S. Mills, A. A. General:

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my command, consisting of the Second and Eighth Florida regiments, in the recent engagements in Spottsylvania county:

On the evening of the twenty-ninth of April, in compliance with orders from division headquarters, I moved my command to the heights in front of Falmouth, and throwing my pickets out to the river bank, remained in line of battle until about eleven o'clock on the morning of the first of May, when, in obedience to orders from Major-General Anderson, I moved with my command up the plank road, and into the old turnpike road. I advanced up this road until I came to our line of battle, held by Major-General McLaws on the right. I then received an order from Major-General McLaws to form my brigade on the right of Brigadier-General Wofford's brigade. This threw me some distance to the right of the old mine road. I at once formed my line of battle, and receiving information from Major-General McLaws that the enemy were advancing on the old mine road, I threw out skirmishers and so disposed my line as to enable me to command both the old mine road and the Dewson Mill road. Brigadier-General Wilcox soon coming up and forming his brigade on my right, I was relieved from giving further attention to the Dewson Mill road, and resumed my original line, my right regiment resting in the

rifle-pits on the left of the Dewson Mill road. About five o'clock P. M. I received orders from Major-General McLaws to double my line of skirmishers and advance. I did so for about one and one half miles, encountering no enemy. I halted with Brigadier-General Wofford's brigade on my left. Brigadier-General Wilcox not receiving orders to advance at the time, did not join my right. General Wofford having become disconnected from the line on his left, determined to bivouac for the night. Accordingly I threw out a strong line of pickets and disposed my men for rest. They were very much exhausted, owing to the nature of the country through which they had advanced. About ten o'clock I received an order to retrace my steps and march up the turnpike road to Major-General McLaws's position. I did so, and having arrived with my brigade near General McLaws's headquarters, received an order revoking the former order, and directing me to move my command back to the position I had just left. Having retaken that position, I remained until morning, everything in my front continuing quiet. Brigadier-General Wofford having reëstablished his connection with the line on his left, the line of battle was advanced, I moving in conformity with the line on my left, keeping out a strong line of skirmishers, and sending out scouting parties to my front and right, we encountered no resistance to our advance. The enemy falling back without firing a gun, we took a few prisoners and found some abandoned commissary stores, arms, &c. About four o'clock in the evening the line was closed up to the left by order from Major-General McLaws, until my left rested a few paces to the right of the pike road. My skirmishers here became engaged with the enemy, driving back the enemy's skirmishers and holding the ground gained against a brisk fire from both infantry and artillery. At dark I received an order from Major-General McLaws to report with my command to Major-General Anderson, on the left of Major-General McLaws's line, and in obedience to Major-General Anderson's orders, bivouacked my men in the woods for rest. Some time before daylight of the morning of the third of May, I moved my command, by direction of Major-General Anderson, down the Catharpin road, for the purpose of scouring the country to the left of and rear of the left of Major-General Anderson's line. I found the country clear, and moved up by the furnace, on the left of the line, and came up with the other brigades of the division, near to the enemy's works. I at once formed my line of battle and pushed forward upon the right flank of the enemy's works on the left of the line of Major-General Anderson's division. The fire was quite brisk here from a line of the enemy, thrown back at right angles to this front, to protect his flank and rear. This line soon gave way, and pushing forward, I found myself inside of his breastworks. Having no knowledge of the ground, and the woods being so thick as to entirely obstruct the view, I was at a loss for some time as to the direction of the enemy's next line. Their musket balls soon gave me the proper direction, and I changed front, and sending out skirmishers, soon found their line on the thickly wooded hill in the rear of their breastworks, and to their right of the field in front of Chancellor's. I ordered a charge, and the enemy, after one or two rounds, broke in the utmost confusion, throwing down arms, knapsacks, &c., great numbers of them running into our lines.

No sooner had the enemy's lines vanished, than their batteries poured a most terrific fire of grape and canister into my lines. The men lying down, and being partially protected by a slight ridge, the fire was not as fatal as I had reason to fear. Upon going to the front I found no infantry in my front, between me and the turnpike road, and that I could not lead my men against the enemy's battery without encountering the range of our own battery on the left of the rear of my line, which was then clearing out the enemy in double-quick time. While making this charge, portions of two other brigades, who were lying down in the woods, and whom a portion of my line had charged over, rushed back from the sudden and terrific fire poured into us before the enemy gave way, and the Eighth Florida regiment, which had not then passed over them, mistaking them for the left of their own brigade, allowed themselves to be swept back a short distance by them. They were not, however, at all panic stricken, but were rallied at once, their morale and spirit in no manner impaired. I cannot think any blame should be attached to either the officers or the men of the regiment. I remained in that position until the rest of the division was marched up by General Anderson, and moved by the right flank with them to the turnpike road, where the division halted. Soon after, I was directed by order from General Anderson, to occupy the works on the right of the pike road, to prevent the enemy from throwing a force into them. I remained in those works until ordered to follow the division towards United States Ford.

That night I halted with the division, — being on its left, — put out strong pickets, and rested until about two hours before daylight of May fourth, when I received orders to throw one regiment forward upon each of two roads running towards the ridge occupied by the enemy, in the rear of Chancellorsville. I sent forward the Fifth Florida, on the road leading by Grady's house, and the Second Florida, about half a mile farther to the left, throwing forward a connected line of skirmishers in front of the two regiments. These skirmishers encountered the enemy's pickets in considerable force, but they offered feeble resistance, and were pressed back a mile or a mile and a half, to the enemy's intrenchments. I was then ordered by General Anderson to draw in the two regiments and line of skirmishers, and follow the division towards Fredericksburg, which I did, and was next posted on the left of the line of the division. My line being to the rear of Downman's house, Brigadier-General Posey being on my right. There being an interval of three quarters of a mile between my left and the right of General McLaws's line, I was ordered to hold the position I then oc-

cupied, until further orders, unless when the right of our line had advanced up the plank road to a point opposite me, I should see an opportunity to strike. I had thoroughly scouted the woods to my left, and from the information I had obtained, felt confident of capturing both the battery at Gregg's house, and much of the infantry thrown up between that and Downman's house. That hope, however, as well as all opportunity for me, in the position in which I was to strike a single blow to advantage, was destroyed by Brigadier-General Wright's brigade swinging across the line of battle and charging across the field in my front before our right could so engage the enemy on the plank road as to prevent the artillery and infantry from escaping by that road. Upon reporting my position to General Anderson, I was directed to remain there until morning.

On the morning of May fifth, by direction of General Anderson, I moved to the vicinity of the Morgan house, on the plank road; there I remained until about four o'clock P. M., when, with the other brigades of the division, I moved up the plank road and bivouacked for the night. Early in the morning of the sixth, by order of General Anderson, I detached two regiments, posted one on the Catharpin road and one at fork of plank road and the road leading to Spottsylvania Court-House, halting the other regiment where the furnace road crossed the plank road. About one o'clock I called in my regiments and returned to my old camp.

The conduct of both officers and men of my command, through the tiresome marches and continued watching, as well as while engaging the enemy, was such as to merit high praise. The firm and steadfast courage exhibited, especially by the Fifth and Second Florida regiments, in the charge at Chancellorsville, attracted my particular attention.

I am indebted to Captain McCaslan, A. A. A. general, Lieutenant Taylor, aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Scott, volunteer aid-de-camp, and Lieutenant Riley, acting inspector, for the great assistance they rendered me by their attention to their duties and gallant conduct.

My command was kept supplied with rations by the persevering energy of Major Elder, brigade commissary. Major Hinkle, brigade quartermaster, for his untiring efforts to alleviate the sufferings of the wounded, who were collected at the station awaiting transportation to Richmond, has merited my particular thanks. I enclose the list of casualties. I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully, &c.,

E. A. PERRY,

Brigadier-General, P. A. C. S.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL MAHONE.

HEADQUARTERS MAHONE'S BRIGADE,
ANDERSON'S DIVISION, May 27, 1863.

To Major T. S. Mills, A. A. G., Anderson's Division, First Corps, A. N. Va.:

MAJOR: I beg leave to report the operations of this brigade in the late battles of the Rappahannock.

It is proper to premise, that this brigade with that of General Posey, had been stationed near the United States Ford for the purpose of defending that crossing of the Rappahannock. On Wednesday, the twenty-ninth April, it was reported to me that the enemy had made his appearance in force at the Germana and Ely's Crossings of the Rapidan. This appearance of the enemy upon our flank and rear rendered our position at the United States Ford no longer tenable, and with a view to checking his advance upon the flank of our army, as was now clearly discerned to be his aim, the two brigades, General Posey's and mine, were immediately placed in position near Chancellorsville, so as to cover the roads from the Germana and Ely's Crossings of the Rapidan and that of the United States Ford, uniting at Chancellorsville. In the mean time our camps, stores, equipage, transportation, and sick were sent to the rear, and without any material loss of any of them. The brigades occupied their position at Chancellorsville, as indicated, until next morning, Thursday, the thirtieth instant, when, under the direction of the Major-General commanding the division, who had happily joined us during the night, they fell back on the United States mine road, this brigade at and covering the crossing by that road of the old turnpike. Before leaving our position at Chancellorsville, however, the enemy's cavalry advanced on the Ely's Ford road, made its appearance, and after a precipitate advance upon our picket, capturing several, he subsequently came upon our rear guard, the Twelfth Virginia infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Field commanding, and was repulsed so effectually as to leave us free from any further annoyance during the change of position, to which I have already referred, and then in process of execution. Shortly after we had taken up our new line, at the intersection of the mine and turnpike roads, the enemy came down the turnpike in considerable force of cavalry and infantry, but nothing occurred at this point beyond a little skirmishing with his sharpshooters and reconnoitring parties. The next day, Friday, first May, this brigade led on the turnpike in the general advance of our forces, and very shortly engaged the enemy under General Sikes, when we had quite a brisk little engagement, artillery and infantry, Major-General McLaws commanding. The enemy, (United States regulars,) many of whom we captured, was promptly repulsed, and our line of battle, now formed, was moved rapidly forward to a point on the turnpike south of Chancellorsville, about one and a quarter miles, known as McGees. This brigade continued here with Major-General McLaws's forces confronting the enemy's line of battle in that quarter, until the next day, when it was transferred and occupied our front line immediately on the left of the plank road. In this position we continued, up to the fall of Chancellorsville, engaging the enemy more or less warmly as the progress of General Jackson's operations on his flank and rear seemed to call for, and as the range of his, General Jackson's, enfilading fire would allow. It was during this service of the brigade that the advance line of skirmishers of the

Sixth Virginia infantry, Colonel George T. Rogers, under the immediate command of Captain W. Carter Williams, charged over the enemy's abatis near the plank road, fired upon him in his rifle-pits, captured prisoners from four different regiments, and the colors and color-bearer of the One Hundred and Seventh Ohio, returning to his position with his handful of men, with the loss of an officer as prisoner. This gallant and successful sortie was made a little after dark, Saturday, the second May, when General Jackson's fire was heavy, and it was in fighting over the same ground the next morning that the valiant Williams fell, mortally wounded. The standard, a most elegantly finished work, was duly delivered. Immediately following the fall of Chancellorsville, this brigade was sent, with a brigade of Major-General McLaws's division, to look after the enemy, then reported to be advancing up the plank road from Fredericksburg, under General Sedgwick. Meeting General Wilcox, with his brigade, about the divergence of the plank and turnpike roads; and finding that the enemy was really and rapidly advancing, it was at once determined to meet him at the Salem Church. At this point, possessing the advantages of ground, our line was formed. In the mean time Major-General McLaws had joined us with the balance of his division. My brigade, in the spirited fight at this place, occupied the extreme left of the line, lying wholly in the woods, and participated in the successful resistance made to the enemy's very determined effort to break our lines at that point. Upon the conclusion of this battle, Tuesday, the fifth May, the brigade rejoined its division. The conduct of the officers and men, as well in bearing the hardships and privations attending eight consecutive days of exposure and excitement, as well as in battle, deserve high commendation, and at least this acknowledgment at my hands. The Twelfth Virginia, Lieutenant-Colonel Field commanding, for its rapid and efficient resistance of the superior forces of the enemy, while covering the formation of our lines of battle on the turnpike, Friday, the first May. The Sixth Virginia, Colonel Rogers commanding, for its vigorous pressure and bold sorties upon the enemy and his works around Chancellorsville, Saturday and Sunday, the second and third of May, for its veteran-like behavior at Salem Church, receiving without disorder the enemy's sudden fire while moving by the flanks. And the Sixty-first Virginia, Colonel Grover, for its gallant and successful skirmish with the enemy during the formation of our lines at the Salem Church, deserves special mention; while the part borne by the Sixteenth Virginia, Lieutenant-Colonel Whitehead commanding, and the Forty-first Virginia, Colonel Parham commanding, was everywhere, though less arduous, well and bravely performed. In this connection it is but due that I should record here my high appreciation of the efficient and gallant conduct of the staff officers with me, Captain R. Taylor, A. A. general, and First Lieutenant Richard Walke, ordnance officer. Among the gallant spirits who were seriously wounded, Captain Banks, company E, Twelfth Virginia infantry, must be mentioned. He fell among the foremost in the skirmish fight of his regiment on the turnpike, May first, and was at the time commanding our advance guard. His conduct on this occasion was beautifully heroic. The number of prisoners taken by the brigade was large, but cannot be accurately stated, owing to the hurried and detached manner in which they had to be sent to the rear. The casualties of the brigade in all these battles were as follows: —

Regiment.	Officers.			Men.			Total.
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	
12th Va. infantry, . . .	.	2	2	5	29	48	86
6th " " . . .	1	1	1	7	32	5	47
41st " " . . .	2	3	.	4	20	.	29
16th " " . . .	.	1	.	1	16	.	18
61st " " . . .	.	5	.	4	25	3	37
Detail building bridge at Germana, ...	.	.	3	.	.	35	38
Total, ...	3	12	6	21	122	91	255

I am, Major, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
WILLIAM MAHONE,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILCOX.

HEADQUARTERS WILCOX'S BRIGADE, NEAR SALEM CHURCH, May 10, 1863.

Major Thomas S. Mills, A. A. G. of Division:

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part borne by my brigade in the recent engagements with the enemy in this vicinity, commencing on the first and ending on the fifth instant: On the twenty-ninth ultimo orders were received to be ready to move at a moment's notice, it being known that the enemy were advancing in heavy force from the direction of Chancellorsville. The following day artillery was heard at intervals in that vicinity, and on the next, the first instant, the brigade moved (under orders) up the plank road, and came soon within hearing of musketry. Arriving at the intersection of the plank road and the old turnpike, the command followed the latter; and it was not long before they came under a distant artillery fire, our troops being at the time engaged skirmishing with the enemy about one mile off. Having reported to General McLaws, commanding on this road, the brigade was ordered to the right, on the mine road; and a battery was directed to be posted, with the view of engaging one of the enemy's, then sweeping, with its fire, the old turnpike. Lewis's battery, attached to my command, was soon in position. The enemy, however, ceasing to fire, the brigade was formed in line on the right of General Perry's brigade, and this on the right of General Wofford. This brought my command to occupy, in part, a line of

rifle-pits running from Banks's Ford to within a few hundred yards of the mine road. Half past six, P. M., orders were received to advance to the front. This forward movement was continued, though with much difficulty, owing to the densely thick forest, till the darkness of the night rendered it impracticable to go farther. The command was halted near Dewson's mills, on Mott Run, three quarters of a mile from the Rappahannock; and having established pickets in front and on our flanks, the command bivouacked for the night. Two companies were ordered out on patrol, with the view of ascertaining whether or not the enemy occupied the river road near Dicker's house, and if not, to communicate with our pickets left near Banks's Ford. The enemy were found not to occupy the river road: the companies returning captured three Federal soldiers making their way, so they stated, to the United States Ford. Ten P. M. orders were received to return to the old turnpike, and halt for the remainder of the night, in rear and near the advance troops on that road. This point was reached near half past two A. M., and soon after orders came to return to Banks's Ford, and to hold it at all hazards — it being reported that the enemy were in force there, and threatened to cross; the ford was reached at daylight. The command had thus been on the march the entire night. The second instant, the brigade remained near Banks's Ford. Large bodies of the enemy's infantry and artillery were seen moving up on the opposite side of the river. Artillery was also heard in the direction of Chancellorsville. Strong pickets were kept up during the night near the ford. Having visited my line of pickets on the morning of the third instant, I found that the enemy had reduced very much, apparently, his force. The sentinels on post had their haversacks on — a thing unusual. This induced me to believe that much of the force from Banks's Ford had been sent to Chancellorsville; and having been ordered the day before, by the commanding General, to leave a small force to watch the ford, if, in my judgment, I was satisfied that the enemy did not intend to cross, and then move up the plank road. Reporting the fact to him, I relieved my pickets, being convinced, as stated, that the enemy had removed most of his forces from Banks's Ford, and did not intend crossing there. Leaving only about fifty men and two pieces of artillery to guard Banks's Ford, my command was being formed to march to Chancellorsville, when one of my pickets (infantry) came running from the canal in front of Dr. Taylor's, to report to me that the enemy were advancing up the road between the canal and the river. Hurrying rapidly to the canal, I saw the enemy advancing on the direct road from Fredericksburg, three regiments being seen, the leading one not more than one thousand yards distant. Gathering in my pickets along the canal and at the dam above Taylor's — in all less than twenty men — they were deployed as skirmishers on the crest of the hill in front of Dr. Taylor's, and near the canal. Two rifle pieces of Huger's battery, already prepared to move to Chancellorsville, were ordered into position in the battery across the road form Taylor's. While these dispositions were being made, our infantry were seen taking position in the rifle-pits near Stansbury's house. Huger's two rifle pieces being now in position, opened with a fire of shells upon the enemy, who had halted in the road upon the display of our skirmishers. The advance one of these regiments moved down the river in front of Falmouth, and sought shelter from our artillery fire in the rifle-pits along the river. The other regiments remained in the road, lying down, the stone knolls on either side of which gave good protection. The enemy being so easily checked by the display of such a small force on our side, I was induced to believe that it was only a demonstration to keep us near Fredericksburg, and prevent reënforcements from going to Chancellorsville. Seeing a group of officers near Stansbury's house, I rode to them, and met Generals Barksdale and Hays. The former informed me that the enemy were in considerable force in and below Fredericksburg. This was the first intimation I had of the fact, and expressed some anxiety as to his right flank, and said that he should have reënforcements. I now determined not to move my command up the road until I knew definitely the intention of the enemy, and ordered them in the ravine opposite Dr. Taylor's, where they would be near, and yet out of sight.

I now rode to the vicinity of the Marye house to see and confer with General Barksdale. While near this house I saw great numbers of the enemy in Fredericksburg, and a battery in the street, running near the cemetery, was firing occasional shots at a battery of ours, to the left of the plank road. I returned to my command without seeing General Barksdale, and, on my return, saw several regiments of the enemy's infantry moving out of the upper edge of the town.

I had been with my command but a few minutes when one of General Barksdale's staff reported to me that the General was hard pressed, and wanted me to send him a regiment. I instantly ordered the Tenth Alabama to move in the direction of the Marye house, and rode rapidly in that direction myself, and when in the open field and high ground between Stansbury's and the plank road saw Hays's brigade moving over in the direction of the plank road. This I supposed to be for the support of General Barksdale; but, upon inquiry from one of Hays's regiments, learned that the enemy had taken Marye's hill and a portion of two of Barksdale's regiments, and that Hays's brigade was falling back to the telegraph road. Soon a courier from General Barksdale confirmed this report, and with a suggestion from General Barksdale that I also had better fall back to the telegraph road.

On the left of the plank road the ground in rear of Marye's hill is higher, and overlooks and commands well that hill. Believing that my own and Hays's brigade could form in line extending from rear Stansbury's house along the crests of hills towards the plank road, and contest the field, at least for a time, successfully with the enemy, I

asked General Hays not to cross the plank road, but to remain with me; this he declined doing, having been ordered to fall back to the telegraph road, and was soon out of sight.

Thus far I have given a simple narrative of incidents as they occurred. Finding myself alone on the left of the plank road, with the enemy in full view on the crests of the first range of hills in rear of Fredericksburg, and with three times my own force clearly seen and in line, I felt it a duty to delay the enemy as much as possible in his advance, and to endeavor to check him all that I could, should he move forward on the plank road. I with this view formed my brigade promptly in line along the crests of the hill running near Stansbury's house, at right angles to the plank road. Two rifle pieces of Lewis's battery were placed in position to the rear of the left of my line, and two slightly in front of my right, which rested some five or six hundred yards in front of Guest's house; skirmishers were thrown forward, covering my entire front. As soon as the four pieces of artillery were in position they opened fire upon the enemy's lines, some eight or nine hundred yards to the front. This held the enemy in check for some time. At length they deployed skirmishers to the front, and began to advance. This was slow, and delayed by frequent halts — they seemed reluctant to advance. The enemy now brought a six-gun battery to the front, on the left of the plank road, not far from Marye's house, and opened with a fire of shells upon my line. The enemy's skirmishers now advanced and engaged ours, not nearer, however, than three hundred and fifty or four hundred yards, their solid lines remaining some distance behind the skirmishers. The enemy's battery having fired for some time, both the skirmishers and lines in rear advanced. They had also moved by a flank across the plank road, and it was reported to me that they were moving up on the far side of the road, and were in a line with my right flank. The artillery was now directed to withdraw. Then the skirmishers rejoined their regiments, and all moved to the rear on the river road, half a mile in rear of Dr. Taylor's, where they were halted for a few minutes.

In this affair with the enemy Lieutenant Barksdale, of Lewis's battery, received a severe wound in the shoulder from a piece of shell; three infantry killed, and eighteen or twenty wounded by skirmishers. From this slight affair with the enemy I felt confident, if forced to retire along the plank road, that I could do so without precipitancy, and that ample time could be given for reënforcements to reach us from Chancellorsville; and moreover, I believe that should the enemy pursue, he could be attacked in rear by General Early, reënforced by Generals Hays and Barksdale. I now directed Major Collins, Virginia cavalry, who was with me, with some forty or fifty men, to move over to the plank road, slightly in rear of Downman's, and dismounting a part of his men in rear of a thicket of pine, to deploy them to the right and left of the road as skirmishers. The command then moved on to the red church (Salem Church) on the plank road. The enemy followed up the plank road, and halted when the skirmishers of Major Collins were seen by them. Having examined the ground near the toll-gate, I determined to make a short stand there. My brigade was then moved back in line from Salem Church, and halted in rear of the gate; two rifle pieces were placed in the road, and we waited the approach of the enemy. They were soon heard to fire on Major Collins's skirmishers, who retired after a short skirmish, and at length appeared in lines, preceded by skirmishers. Major Collins's men now retired to the rear, and skirmishers were deployed from two regiments to their front. Our artillery opened fire upon the enemy's advancing lines; this caused a halt, and a slight fire ensued between the skirmishers. The enemy now brought up artillery, and began a brisk shelling of our lines. At this time Major Goggin, A. A. general to General McLaws, reported to me that General McLaws had sent three brigades to my support, and that they would soon arrive. These brigades were directed to be halted in rear of the church, and out of view of the enemy. In this affair with the enemy, Lieutenant Cobb, of Lewis's battery, received a severe wound in the arm, rendering it impossible to command his pieces longer: they were then ordered to the rear: three of the infantry were killed and fifteen wounded. My command was now ordered back to the church. The conduct of my men during all this time was such as I knew it would be, leaving nothing to be desired, and I felt the utmost confidence in my ability to make a successful stand at the church with the three supporting brigades. At Salem Church line of battle was formed, crossing the road at right angles; two regiments of my brigade, the Eleventh and Fourteenth Alabama, were on the left of the road, the latter on the left of the two; the Tenth Alabama on the right next to the road, and the Eighth Alabama on the right of the Tenth. There was an interval of seventy-five or eighty yards between the left of the Tenth and the right of the Eleventh. In this interval on the road four pieces of artillery were in battery; the Ninth Alabama was in rear of the Tenth, one company of the Ninth being stationed in the school-house to the right of the church, and in front some sixty yards. A second company of this regiment was placed in the church, with orders to fire from the windows of the lower floor, and from the windows of the gallery. (This church being occupied with furniture of refugees from Fredericksburg.) Such was the formation of my brigade for battle. I am thus particular in giving details for the reason that the principal attack was made at the church and its immediate vicinity. Kershaw's brigade was on the right of my brigade, Semmes and Mahone on the left — Mahone to the left of Semmes. The brigades had not been in position long before the enemy were seen advancing up the plank road in line of battle; their lines crossed the road at right angles; a field battery accompanied their advance. This was halted at the gate, about one thousand yards

distant, and soon opened with a brisk fire of shells upon our battery near the church; the two batteries fired some fifteen or twenty minutes, when ours was withdrawn, for the want of ammunition. The enemy then threw shells to the right and left of the church, through the woods, endeavoring to reach our infantry. These latter were well protected while lying down, and no casualties occurred from explosions of shells. The enemy's artillery ceased to fire near five o'clock P. M. Their skirmishers then advanced, and a spirited fire ensued between the skirmishers for some fifteen or twenty minutes. Ours then retired, firing as they fell back; the enemy's skirmishers pursued, followed by their solid lines of infantry, and still a third line in rear, on either side of the road. As they advanced from the toll-gate, were open fields, and the ground slightly ascending; these fields continued to within about two hundred and fifty yards of the church, and then woods, thick, but of small growth. When the front line of the enemy reached this wood they made a slight halt, then giving three cheers, they came with a rush, driving our skirmishers rapidly before them. Our men held their fire till their men came within less than eighty yards, and then delivered a close and terrible fire upon them, killing and wounding many, and causing many of them to waver and give way. The enemy still press on, surround the school-house, and capture the entire company of the Ninth Alabama stationed in it, and pressing hard upon the regiment in rear of the school-house, throws it into confusion and disorder, and forces it to yield ground. The Ninth Alabama regiment in rear of this regiment spring forward as one man, and, with the rapidity of lightning, restores the continuity of our line, breaking the lines of the enemy by its deadly fire, and forcing him to give way, and following him so that he could not rally, retake the school-house, free the captured company, and in turn take their captors; the entire line of the enemy on the right of the road is repulsed, and our men follow in rapid pursuit. The regiment that had given way to the first onset of the enemy now returned to the attack and joined in the pursuit. The enemy did not assail with the same spirit on the left of the road, and were more easily repulsed, and now are followed on either side of the road, which is crowded with a confused mass of the discomfited enemy. With a good battery to play upon this retreating mass the carnage would have been terrific. There was no rallying or re-forming of this line. Another line came up the plank road at a double quick, and filing to the right and left, formed line in front of my brigade. This line was scarcely formed before they were broken by the fire of my men, and fled to the rear. The pursuit continued as far as the toll-gate. Semmes's brigade and my own were the only troops that followed the retreating enemy. In rear of the gate were heavy reserves of the enemy. Our men were now halted and reformed, it being quite dark, and retired, not pursued by the enemy, leaving pickets far to the front in the open field.

The vigor of the enemy's attack at the church was doubtless due to the fact that they believed there was only one brigade to resist them, and that they anticipated an easy affair of it; while the number of dead and wounded left on the field attests the obstinacy of the resistance of our men — two hundred of the former and more than one hundred and fifty of the latter; and largely over two hundred prisoners not wounded, and one Federal flag captured. Thus ended this spirited conflict at Salem Church — a bloody repulse to the enemy, rendering entirely useless to him his little success of the morning at Fredericksburg. The rear of our army at Chancellorsville was now secure and free from danger, and the Sixth army corps of the enemy and a part of the Second were now content to remain on the defensive.

I beg to assure the Major-General commanding that the conduct of both officers and men of the brigade was in the highest degree creditable. They were furiously attacked by superior forces, and not only stood their ground but repulsed the enemy with great loss, pursued him, and, encountering a second line in their pursuit, they scattered and dispersed this body also; night and want of ammunition prevented a further pursuit. This success, so brilliant for our men, was dearly earned by the sacrifice of the lives of seventy-five of the noble sons of Alabama, and the wounding of three hundred and seventy-two, and forty-eight missing, an aggregate of four hundred and ninety-five; of the missing, the most fell into the hands of the enemy, wounded in the early part of the day near Stansbury's, and afterwards at the toll-gate. Six officers were killed and twenty-three wounded. The killed were Captain R. A. McCrary, Eighth Alabama, a valuable officer, much lamented by his regiment; Captain W. C. Murphy, Ninth Alabama, highly distinguished at the battle of Williamsburg, where he received two severe wounds. He fell at Salem Church in the thickest of the fight, and in advance of his men. Lieutenant Harper, Tenth Alabama; Lieutenant Strudwick, Eleventh Alabama; Lieutenants Bankston and Cox, Fourteenth Alabama, all fell fighting with the heroism of veteran soldiers, against greatly superior forces of the enemy. Among the severely wounded are Colonel Royston, Eighth Alabama; Colonel Pinkard, Fourteenth Alabama; Major McCord, Fourteenth Alabama; Captain Cook, Tenth Alabama; Lieutenants Barksdale and Cobb, Lewis's battery; all alike distinguished for their intelligence and valor.

I cannot call to your notice all officers that are deserving of especial praise, for the conduct of all was excellent; I will, however, report that the five regimental commanders, Colonel Royston, Eighth Alabama, and after his severe wound, Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert, who commanded the Eighth Alabama; Colonel Pinkard, Fourteeth Alabama; Colonel Forney, Tenth Alabama; Colonel Sanders, Eleventh Alabama; Major Williams, Ninth Alabama, were intelligent, energetic, and gallant in commanding, directing, and leading their men. The brigade slept on the field at Salem Church on the night of the third instant.

On the morning of the fourth the enemy were seen in our front, and fired occasional shots during the day from a battery some one thousand two hundred yards distant. Three additional brigades arrived on the fourth, and, late in the afternoon, a general advance was made against the enemy — Early on the right, Anderson in the centre, and McLaws holding his position on the left. The enemy gave way rapidly, and was soon driven across the river, having been on this side little over twenty-four hours. I followed the enemy in the direction of Banks's Ford, with two regiments, Eighth and Ninth Alabama, of my brigade, supported by Kershaw's brigade; this advance being made about half past nine P. M. Above and near Banks's Ford thirteen officers and one hundred and fifty men were taken prisoners. Among the officers, one Lieutenant-Colonel, one Major, and two Captains. No loss on our side in this affair. Captains King and May, Ninth Alabama, were distinguished for their activity and gallantry, having captured these prisoners with their two companies. Manly's battery rendered valuable services in shelling the retreating enemy near Banks's Ford; twenty of the enemy were wounded by this shelling and fell into our hands the next day, and many were killed.

The morning of the fifth instant the brigade moved in the direction of Chancellorsville, in common with the other brigades of the division, and bivouacked during the night to the left and near Chancellorsville. Next morning moved out to take our position in line of battle, but soon ascertained that the enemy had retired and recrossed the Rappahannock; the brigade then returned to its former camp near Banks's Ford. Whilst my entire command acquitted themselves handsomely in their engagement of the third instant with the enemy, I cannot close this report without calling to your especial notice the conduct of one entire regiment of the brigade, the Ninth Alabama. This regiment, the weakest in numbers, occupied a position in rear of the strongest regiment of the brigade; this strong regiment, hotly pressed by the enemy in heavy force, was thrown into confusion and gave way, the Ninth Alabama sprang forward instantly into the vacant space left in our line, and boldly confronting the enemy, and by a close and deadly fire of musketry, broke his line and drove him back.

To my staff, Captain W. E. Winn, A. A. general, and Lieutenant M. M. Lindsay, aid-de-camp, I am under obligations for services cheerfully rendered during our recent operations. Captain Winn was conspicuous for his gallantry at Salem Church in assisting to rally and re-form promptly one of my regiments that had been thrown into disorder and confusion, and while thus engaged his horse was shot. To Major Goggin, A. A. general to General McLaws, I am also indebted for his gallant and valuable services rendered at the same time and on the same occasion. [illegible] to commend to your favorable no[illegible]riers, private Ridgeway, of the [illegible], and private Brundidge, of the Ninth Alabama: the former had his horse killed at Salem Church.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
C. W. WILCOX,
Brigadier-General, commanding, &c.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL HETH.

HEADQUARTERS A. P. HILL'S LIGHT DIVISION, May 25, 1863.

To Major-General J. E. B. Stuart:

GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of operations of the several commands under my orders, at different times, in the interval between leaving the vicinity of Hamilton's Crossing on the morning of the first of May, until the termination of the operations at Chancellorsville on the third of May, 1863:

My brigade moved from Hamilton's Crossing on the morning of the first of May, on the plank road leading to Chancellorsville. When within three miles of Chancellorsville I received an order from Major-General Hill to report in person to him. On doing so I was ordered to take the brigades of McGowan, Lane, and my own, and advance by a cross-road leading from the plank road to the old pike, a distance of one and a half miles; on reaching the old pike, to feel my way and advance in the direction of Chancellorsville. When I reached the old pike I found General McLaws, with a portion of his command, some half a mile to the rear of where I struck the pike. On advancing, my skirmishers became hotly engaged; and as it had become quite dark, a farther advance was not made that night. Early in the morning I was ordered to open with a battery, under the immediate charge of Major Pegram, upon the enemy's position, and continue the firing for about half an hour. Our fire was returned by the enemy. Being informed by Major Pegram that his shot were doing the enemy no damage, I directed him to cease firing. Soon after I received orders to move with my command, crossing the plank road, and following the rest of the division. General Hill, soon after passing the old furnace, directed me to resume command of my brigade. On reaching a position in rear of Chancellorsville, I was ordered to form line of battle on General Colston's left. General Colston advanced his line before the formation was completed, and rendered a compliance with the order impossible. I then received orders to form on General Pender's left. This was done. I also received orders to go to the support of any general officer requesting aid. After advancing in line of battle about one and a half miles on the left of and parallel to the plank road, I received a message from Brigadier-General J. H. Jones requesting support. I put my brigade in motion and advanced, passing Melzie Chancellor's house, and entered the thick oak woods on the left of the plank road. On entering these woods the enemy opened upon my command a heavy fire of artillery, doing us some damage. It was now becoming quite dark. The undergrowth was so thick and entangled that it was impossible to advance in any order. I ordered

the brigade to re-form on the plank road, which had scarcely been done when orders were received from General Hill to move down the road by the flank. On reaching the position in the road occupied by General Hill, he directed me to deploy two regiments, one on the right, the other on the left of the road, to check the enemy, who were then advancing. These movements had not been completed before the enemy opened heavily upon the Fifty-fifth Virginia regiment. It was here that gallant and promising officer, Colonel F. Mallory, was killed. Soon after, General Hill informed me that he was wounded, and directed me to take command of the division. General Lane's brigade, at this time, was in line of battle on the right of the road, occupying the breastworks from which the enemy had been driven. I directed General Pender to form his brigade in line of battle on the left of the road, occupying the deserted breastworks of the enemy. Before the remaining brigades could be placed in line of battle, the enemy, under Sickles, advanced and attacked General Lane's right. He was handsomely repulsed by the Eighteenth, Twenty-eighth, and a portion of the Thirty-third North Carolina regiments. This attack was made by the enemy under cover of heavy shelling. These regiments behaved with commendable courage and zeal in repelling at least five times their numbers. McGowan's brigade was now ordered on Lane's right, and soon after, Archer's brigade on McGowan's right. Thomas's brigade, posted on the left of the road, and on Pender's left. Heth's brigade was held as a reserve. In this position the division remained until just after daybreak, when Heth's brigade was ordered up. Two regiments — the Fortieth and Forty-seventh Virginia — were placed on the right of the road, supporting Lane's left; the Fifty-fifth and Twenty-second Virginia battalion on the left, to support Pender's right. Major-General Stuart now ordered me to prepare to advance. I ordered Generals McGowan and Archer to move forward, as the line formed by their brigades was not perpendicular to the plank road, but inclined to the right and rear. Archer's brigade only advanced a short distance, before it became hotly engaged, the enemy being strongly posted behind breastworks, making an angle with the plank road. I now gave the order for a general advance. The light division (A. P. Hill's) forming the front line, opened the battle of Chancellorsville. Generals Pender and Thomas, on the left, found the enemy posted behind a breastwork of logs and brush, immediately in their front, at a distance of about one hundred and fifty yards. The breastworks were charged and carried, the men never hesitating for a moment, driving the enemy before them, and pursuing him until a second line was reached, which was in like manner broken. A third line of the enemy was now encountered. After a desperate and prolonged fight without supports, or a piece of artillery to aid them, but on their part subjected to heavy artillery fire of from ten to twelve pieces, these gallant brigades fell back, in order, to the breastworks, from which the enemy had been driven, and which they held until reënforcements were brought up, when again the attack was renewed, and the enemy driven from this part of the field of battle. Lane's brigade, supported by the Fortieth and Forty-seventh Virginia regiments, (Heth's brigade,) and McGowan's brigade advanced and charged the enemy behind his breastworks, who was supported by twenty-nine pieces of artillery. I cannot conceive of any body of men ever being subjected to a more galling fire than this force. The brigades of Lane, McGowan, and a portion of Heth's, (Colonel Brockenbrough commanding,) notwithstanding, drove the enemy from his works and held them for some time, but were finally compelled to fall back, which was unavoidable, from the course that affairs had assumed on the right of the line. As soon as Archer's brigade commenced to move, it became hotly engaged. General Archer was compelled to conform his line of battle to that of the enemy, which, as I before remarked, in his front, was not perpendicular, but formed a considerable angle with the plank road. McGowan's right thus became separated from Archer's left, and the interval increased as the enemy were driven before them, until McGowan and Lane found that their right flanks were seriously threatened. It was not until this occurred that these two brigades fell back to the line of works from which they first commenced to advance. Many valuable officers and men were lost in the charge, and especially when falling back. It was here that General McGowan was wounded, the command of his brigade devolving on Colonel Edwards, who was, immediately after assuming command, seriously wounded. The command of McGowan's brigade next devolved on Colonel Hamilton, First South Carolina regiment, who commanded the brigade during the remainder of the action. General Archer advanced with his brigade, conforming his line of battle to that of the enemy. He charged the works in his front, and without the least halt or hesitation, carried them, driving the enemy before him, who outnumbered him five to one. General Archer succeeded in capturing a battery of four guns. By his gallant attack he secured the key to the enemy's position, clearing a hill and open space in his front, and thus gaining for our artillery a position, from which they were enabled to silence the twenty-nine gun battery of the enemy, which had inflicted so much loss upon our lines. From this position our artillery had also a raking fire on the enemy's works on our right. General Archer, after carrying the hill referred to, advanced beyond the open space and attacked the enemy on his right. He was joined by Major-General Anderson. About this time the enemy threatened to turn Thomas's and Pender's left. Reënforcements were ordered to them, among which, McGowan's brigade (Colonel Hamilton commanding) formed a part. As soon as reënforcements reached Pender and Thomas a general advance took place, and, aided by our artillery, which had not been able to assist us in any previous attack, the works of the enemy were cleared, and retreating rapidly, he fell back in the direction of United States Ford. Thus ended the battle of Chancellorsville.

Where all behaved so well, it would appear like

unjust discrimination in mentioning individuals. Generals Pender, Archer, and Thomas deserve, for their successful attacks, to be specially mentioned, and under the murderous fire of artillery to which they were particularly exposed, no officers or men could have done better than Generals Lane and McGowan and Colonel Brockenbrough. The light division, (A. P. Hill's,) although unfortunately deprived of the presence of their gallant commander, showed on this day that the spirit with which he had inspired them by success, on so many battle-fields, was still present; and each and all did their duty. A list of killed and wounded has been furnished.

I cannot close this report without adding, that my personal staff, Captains Finney and Harrison, Lieutenants Selden and Heth, and acting engineer officer, W. O. Slade, deserve my thanks for their gallantry and coolness on all occasions during the battle.

For acts of individual gallantry, I respectfully refer you to the reports of brigade and regimental commanders.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
H. HETH,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL RODES.

HEADQUARTERS D. H. HILL'S DIVISION,
May 25, 1863.

Major A. S. Pendleton:

MAJOR: I have the honor to make the subjoined report of the part taken in the engagement at Chancellorsville, and the movements that preceded it, by the division of Major-General D. H. Hill, then under my command, composed of the brigades of Doles, Colquitt, Iverson, Ramseur, and Rodes.

Early on the morning of Wednesday, April twenty-ninth, it being announced that the Federal army had crossed the Rappahannock River, I marched from Grace Church to Hamilton's Crossing, and was placed in position on the extreme right of the army, extending — perpendicular to the railroad — to Massaponax Creek. A portion of Ramseur's brigade being at the time on picket on the river, he was ordered, with the whole of his brigade, to occupy the south side of the creek, guarding the ford near its mouth. My line was strongly and rapidly fortified by the troops, and held, until the morning of the first May, without molestation, except from the artillery fire of the enemy.

Much credit is due to Colonel J. Thompson Brown and Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas H. Carter, of the artillery, for their energy and judgment in assisting to render this line impregnable to assault. Ramseur's line was partially exposed to an enfilading fire from the heights across the river, but such was the accuracy of the fire of the Whitworth battery, Lieutenant Hurt commanding, stationed with General Ramseur, that their batteries were scattered, and their attempts in this direction rendered unavailing.

At dawn, on May first, my troops were again in motion, advancing from Hamilton's Crossing, by the military road, to its junction with the Fredericksburg and Orange Court-House plank road, and thence up the plank road, for about two miles. At this point I became aware of a serious engagement on my right, between a portion of the troops of Major-General Anderson, then advancing by the old turnpike, and Sikes's division of regulars, Federal army. Being in advance of the corps, I continued to move forward for about half a mile, keeping out skirmishers towards the enemy to prevent annoyance. The firing becoming very heavy and close, the column was halted by General Jackson, and General Ramseur's brigade detached, by his order, to support that portion of Anderson's division, which was in front of my division. This brigade became sharply engaged under Anderson, behaving with great coolness and gallantry, as I have been informed by Generals Hill and Anderson. Brigadier-General Ramseur handled his own skirmishers, and with great skill and gallantry. The rest of the division moved by the right flank to the top of the ridge near the road, and after being established in line of battle, was directed by Lieutenant-General Jackson to shelter itself and await orders. Subsequently it was moved forward into the woods, but, though the skirmishers became engaged, capturing several prisoners, the main body of the enemy had retired before I was permitted to advance. Remaining in line of battle until about sunset, the division then resumed its march up the plank road, and bivouacked that night near Aldrich's tavern, about one mile and a quarter from Chancellorsville.

At an early hour on the morning of the second, Iverson's brigade was ordered to relieve Ramseur's, still on duty with Anderson, in front. Iverson subsequently overtook the division on the march. About eight o'clock the route was resumed, this division still in advance. Turning short to the left, about one half mile beyond Aldrich's, we followed the mine road, for the purpose of getting on the right and in rear of Hooker's army. On arriving at the old furnace on this road, the Twenty-third Georgia regiment, Colonel Best, was detached by General Jackson's order, to guard a road from the direction of Chancellorsville, by which the enemy might threaten the main column. This regiment, with the exception of the Colonel and a few men, was subsequently captured by the enemy, who made a vigorous assault upon the ordnance train and artillery then passing, but were gallantly repulsed by Colonel J. Thompson Brown, commanding battalion artillery. Colonel Best's report of the manner in which his regiment discharged its important duty, and its fate, is enclosed. A court of inquiry on the subject was prevented by the removal of Colquitt's brigade, to which it was attached, from this department to that of North Carolina.

On reaching the plank road again, about two miles north-west of Chancellorsville, our cavalry was found skirmishing with that of the enemy, and a delay was caused by an endeavor on our part to entrap them. At this point, it having been determined to make a still further detour towards

the enemy's rear, the column was moved across to the old turnpike road, and was formed in line of battle about four o'clock P. M., two and a half miles from Chancellorsville. The line was formed perpendicular to the road, by which it was equally divided. Iverson's brigade on the left, Colquitt's on the right, Rodes on the left centre, Doles on the right centre; the right of Rodes and left of Doles resting on the road. Ramseur's brigade was placed in the rear of Colquitt as a support, and to guard the flank. By five o'clock, Trimble's division, under command of Brigadier-General Colston, had formed about one hundred yards in rear of my command, and in continuation of Ramseur's line. A. P. Hill's division formed the third line in rear of Colston. Each brigade commander received positive instructions, which were well understood. The whole line was to push ahead from the beginning, keeping the road for its guide. The position at Talley's house was to be carried at all hazards, as, from the best information that could be obtained, it commanded the second position of the enemy at Melzie Chancellor's house. After taking the heights at Talley's, if the enemy showed a determined front on the next ridge, my men were to be sheltered until our artillery could come up and dislodge them — under no other circumstances was there to be any pause in the advance. As there was possibility of pressure on my right flank, Ramseur was directed to watch that flank carefully, thus leaving Colquitt free to push ahead, without fear from that quarter. For similar reasons, the left regiment of Iverson was placed perpendicular to line of battle, with orders to follow the advance by the flank. At five and a quarter P. M., the word was given to move forward, the line of sharpshooters being about four hundred yards in advance. In consequence of the dense mass of undergrowth, and orders not having been promptly given to the skirmishers of Rodes's brigade, some little delay was caused when the main line reached the skirmishers' line. This latter was put in motion again by my order, and, soon after, the Alabama brigade encountered the fire of the enemy. At once the line of battle rushed forward with a yell, and Doles at this moment debouched from the woods and encountered a force of the enemy and a battery of two guns intrenched. Detaching two regiments to flank the position, he charged without halting, sweeping everything before him, and pressing on to Talley's, gallantly carried the works there, and captured five guns, by a similar flank movement of a portion of his command. So complete was the success of the whole manœuvre, and such was the surprise of the enemy, that scarcely any organized resistance was met with after the first volley was fired. They fled in the wildest confusion, leaving the field strewn with arms, accoutrements, clothing, caissons, and field pieces in every direction. The larger portion of his force, as well as intrenchments, were drawn up at right angles to our line, and being thus taken in the flank and rear, they did not wait for the attack. On reaching the ridge at Melzie Chancellor's, which had an extended line of works facing in our direction, an effort was made to check the flying columns. For a few moments they held this position, but once more my gallant troops dashed at them with a wild shout, and firing a hasty volley, they continued their headlong flight to Chancellorsville. It was at this point that Trimble's division, which had followed closely in my rear, headed by the brave and accomplished Colston, went over the works with my men, and from this time until the close of the engagement the two divisions were mingled together in inextricable confusion. Pushing forward as rapidly as possible, the troops soon entered a second piece of woods thickly filled with undergrowth. The right becoming entangled in an abatis near the enemy's first line of fortifications, caused the line to halt, and such was the confusion and darkness, that it was not deemed advisable to make a further advance. I at once sent word to Lieutenant-General Jackson, urging him to push forward the fresh troops of the reserve line, in order that mine might be re-formed. Riding forward on the plank road, I satisfied myself that the enemy had no line of battle between our troops and the heights of Chancellorsville, and on my return, informed Colonel Crutchfield, chief of artillery of the corps, of the fact, and he opened his batteries on that point. The enemy instantly responded by a most terrific fire, which silenced our guns, but did little execution on the infantry, as it was mainly directed down the plank road, which was uncovered, except by our artillery. When the fire ceased, General Hill's troops were brought up, and as soon as a portion were deployed in my front as skirmishers, I commenced withdrawing my men, under orders from the Lieutenant-General. During this glorious victory, and pursuit of more than two miles, I had only three brigades really engaged. General Colquitt, soon after starting, was misled by the appearance of a small body of the enemy's cavalry, and notwithstanding the instructions to himself and General Ramseur, halted his brigade to resist what he supposed to be an attack on his flank. This error was discovered too late to enable him to do more than follow the victorious troops of Doles over the field they had won. Ramseur being ordered to follow Colquitt and watch his flank, was necessarily deprived of an active participation. On withdrawing my troops, I was directed to see that Jones's brigade, of Colston's division, was so placed as to guard a road coming in from the direction of the furnace on the right, and to relieve, with one of my brigades, McGowan's brigade, of Hill's division, then guarding a second road from the same direction, which entered the plank road farther up. Whilst preparing to make these dispositions, a sudden and rapid musketry fire was opened in front, which created a little confusion among the troops; order was speedily restored, however. Apparently, this firing proceeded entirely from our own men, as not a ball from the enemy came within sound. There being no other place but the open ground at Melzie Chancellor's suitable for such a purpose, I withdrew all my troops, except Colquitt's brigade, then on guard, to re-form them at that point. Finding the intrenchments partially occupied by Paxton's brigade, I formed line of battle in connection with

him. At this time the enemy opened a similar terrific fire of artillery to that which had taken place just before my withdrawal, which caused much confusion and disorder, rendering it necessary for me to place guards across the road to stop stragglers. Shortly after this occurrence I was informed that Lieutenant-General Jackson was wounded, and also received a message from Major-General Hill that he likewise was disabled, and that the command of the corps devolved on me. Without loss of time I communicated with Brigadier-Generals Heth and Colston, commanding respectively the divisions of A. P. Hill and Trimble, and made the necessary arrangements for a renewal of the attack in the morning, it being agreed that the troops were not in condition to resume operations that night. Just at this time, (about two o'clock,) the enemy made an attack on our right, but being feeble in its character, and promptly met, it lasted but a short time. Very soon after, Major-General J. E. B. Stuart, who had been sent for by Major Pendleton, A. A. general of Lieutenant-General Jackson, arrived on the ground and assumed command. I deem it proper to state that I yielded the command to General Stuart, not because I thought him entitled to it, belonging, as he does, to a different arm of the service, — nor because I was unwilling to assume the responsibility of carrying on the attack, as I had already made the necessary arrangements and they remained unchanged, but because, from the manner in which I had been informed that he had been sent for, I inferred that General Jackson or General Hill had instructed Major Pendleton to place him in command, and for the still stronger reason that I feared that the information that the command had devolved on me, unknown, except to my own immediate troops, would, in their shaken condition, be likely to increase the demoralization of the corps. General Stuart's name was well and very favorably known to the army, and would tend, I hoped, to reëstablish confidence. I yielded because I was satisfied the good of the service demanded it.

On the morning of May third, being the rear division, I established my line with Rodes's and Iverson's brigades on the left of the plank road, as before, Ramseur's brigade on the right, then Doles's, and finally Colquitt, on the extreme right. The attack was renewed about six o'clock A. M.; and soon after I received orders to move forward, which I promptly obeyed, first giving directions to each brigade commander to push forward until the enemy was encountered, and engage him vigorously, moving over friend and foe alike if in the way. At the moment of starting, our cavalry reported a strong demonstration of the enemy on our extreme left, and Colquitt was detached to oppose it. He was subsequently moved to the extreme right, to support a portion of General A. P. Hill's troops, and ultimately got heavily and handsomely engaged on the left of my division, as will be seen hereafter. On account of the dense forest, the undulating character of the ground, and the want of an adequate staff, it was not in my power, during the subsequent m[illegible]ve a great deal of personal attention to the actions of any of my commands, except Rodes's and Ramseur's brigades, which were next to the road; but my orders were faithfully executed by each brigade commander. Moving forward steadily, with no material stoppage except that occasioned by the tangled undergrowth, they soon encountered a heavy fire of artillery. Pressing on, they soon overtook the second line of battle, then at a halt, except the Stonewall brigade, which was moving (under orders) from the left to the right of the plank road. I ordered Colonel O'Neil not to wait on this movement, but to advance his brigade over the second line. At this moment Colonel O'Neil was disabled by a fragment of a shell, and in person I made his right regiment (the third Alabama) press forward through the troops, and sent a staff officer with directions to Colonel Hall, who succeeded to the command, to continue his advance. The first line was in turn overtaken and passed; but the confusion arising from passing the two lines caused the two regiments on the left of this brigade to become separated from the others. These two moved obliquely to the right, under the immediate command of Colonel Hall, and encountered the fire of the enemy's infantry, posted behind a barricade on the right of the road, and not more than two hundred yards from the epaulements on the heights. At this juncture, a portion of Iverson's brigade and a portion of Pender's troops, under the immediate command of Brigadier-General Pender, coming up, he ordered them all forward. The enemy was compelled to abandon the barricade and fall back; and pressing on, Colonel Hall's two regiments, — the Fifth and Twenty-sixth Alabama, — together with the Twenty-third North Carolina regiment, Colonel Christie, carried the heights in magnificent style, planting their flags inside the works. In this charge the gallant Lieutenant-Colonel Garvin, of the Twenty-sixth Alabama, fell, desperately wounded, inside the works. In the mean time the residue of Rodes's, Iverson's, and Pender's troops, moving forward, to the left of Hall and Christie, were met and repulsed by the enemy, thus leaving the flank of the party on the heights exposed to an overwhelming force. They were compelled to fall back behind the plank road, with loss of over one hundred men, and both Alabama flags. A second line of battle having been assembled along the log breastworks on the left of the road, composed of parts of the Third, Sixth, and Twenty-sixth Alabama, the Fifth North Carolina, under Lieutenant-Colonel Lee, who had just joined it, and other scattering troops, I ordered it, through Major Whiting, to attack — moving parallel to the plank road. Hall immediately attacked the epaulements again with his two regiments, and gallantly carried them; but the troops just mentioned, who had attacked farther to the left, being again repulsed, he again fell back to the breastworks. Whilst this was transpiring in front, the enemy made an attack in force on my left and rear. This attack was met by the Twelfth Alabama, Colonel Pickens, Colonel Lightfoot, of the Sixth Alabama, with a small portion of his regiment, and some troops of

Nichols's brigade, skilfully placed by General Iverson, and sustained against fearful odds, until I ordered up Colquitt's brigade, which quickly and handsomely repulsed it. The enemy being repulsed decidedly here, barely holding his own in the left centre, and compelled, about the same time, by the artillery fire from the right, to abandon the epaulements, withdrew all his forces to the hill back of the Chancellorsville house. The fighting on the centre and left was of a most desperate character, and resulted in the loss of many valuable officers, among them, and most to be regretted, was Major A. M. Gordon, of the Sixth Alabama, a young officer of great promise, and great purity of character.

General Pender, speaking of the first advance of my troops, stated to me that Colonel Christie and his regiment, which he handled in magnificent style, especially attracted his attention, and that the Colonel deserved promotion. Whilst these movements were taking place on the left, Ramseur and Doles pushed forward on the right, passed the first line of intrenchments, which had already been carried, passed the first and second lines of our troops, and became fiercely engaged. Doles deflecting to the right, passed up a ravine behind the graveyard on Chancellor's hill, and finally came out in the field nearly opposite the house, driving the enemy before him as he advanced, and actually getting several hundred yards to the rear, as well of those troops opposing the rest of my division as of those opposing General Anderson's division. Subsequently he was compelled to fall back; and was directed by General Lee to take charge of a large body of prisoners. Ramseur, after vainly urging the troops in possession of the first line of intrenchments to move forward, obtained permission to pass them, and, dashing over the works, charged the second intrenched line in the most brilliant style. The struggle at this point was long and obstinate; but the charge on the left of the plank road at this time caused the enemy to give way on his left; and this, combined with the unflinching determination of his men, carried the day, and gave him possession of the works. Not being supported, he was exposed still to a galling fire from the right, with great danger of being flanked. Notwithstanding repeated efforts made by him, and by myself in person, none of the troops in his rear would move up until the old Stonewall brigade arrived on the ground, and gallantly advanced, in conjunction with the Thirtieth North Carolina regiment, Colonel Parker, of Ramseur's brigade, which had been detached to support a battery, and was now on its return. Occupying the works on the right of Ramseur, and thus relieving him, when his ammunition was nearly exhausted, the Stonewall brigade pushed on, and carried the Chancellorsville heights, making the third time they were captured. They, in turn, were forced to fall back, but recaptured several of the prisoners, and one of the flags taken from Colonel Hall.

At this juncture, Lieutenant-Colonel Carter, who had behaved with signal courage and judgment during the whole action, succeeded, in conjunction with Major Pegram, in getting several batteries in position in a field to the right, which opened with such precision and rapidity on such of the enemy's batteries and troops as remained on the plain of Chancellorsville as finally to drive them back in utter confusion. Lieutenant-Colonel Hillary Jones, of the artillery, a most accomplished officer, had, however, before this, placed ten guns near the plank road and on the nearest ridge to the enemy's epaulements, which had fired with marked success on the artillery stationed at the Chancellor house and on the retreating troops. As soon as our artillery fire would permit, the heights were occupied by the infantry, and, by order of General Stuart, I took charge of arranging all the troops found on the field in line of battle, parallel to the plank road. The earliest troops on the ground were Colonel Brockenbrough's and another Virginia regiment, belonging, I think, to the same brigade. These were subsequently withdrawn, and my troops located as follows: Iverson's brigade on right, extending from the Chancellorsville house up the plank road; next, Rodes's brigade, then Ramseur's brigade, and finally, Doles's brigade, all parallel and close to the road. Doles was subsequently thrown across the road, and at an angle of forty-five degrees with it, connecting with General Pender, by whom this line was continued on to the left. Colston's division, now attached to my command, was located on the turnpike road, to the right, and in continuation of my line. Colquitt's brigade was placed *en echelon* with reference both to Iverson and Colston, and one hundred yards in rear, to enable our artillery to operate in the interval. This position was strongly fortified, and was held without molestation until Tuesday morning, when I pushed forward my whole line of skirmishers to feel the enemy. He was discovered to be in very great force, both of infantry and artillery, with formidable intrenchments.

Early on Wednesday morning my outposts reported that the enemy had retired. I again threw forward my skirmishers and found that the entire force had retreated during the night. Following them in person, with a few troops, it was ascertained that they had successfully crossed the river, availing themselves of the very severe storm and darkness of the previous night. The line of their retreat was marked by every evidence of a careful and well-conducted march, but little public or private property, except such as was necessary for hospital purposes, being left behind.

On the evening of Wednesday, May sixth, my column was again in motion, and camped that night in their old quarters near Grace Church, having been absent eight days, participating in the achievement of a signal victory, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery, ten flags, seventy-five thousand rounds of small-arm ammunition, and four bushels of musket-caps from the enemy. The small arms, ammunition, and the caps afterwards fell into the hands of Major Allen, corps ordnance officer, and Captain Marye, ordnance officer of

Colston's division. It is worthy of remark that the enemy abandoned such a large number of knapsacks in retreating to his works, that when this division began its homeward march in the rain it was thoroughly equipped with oil-cloths and shelter-tents of the best quality.

The division sustained a heavy loss in killed and wounded, especially on the second day. The conduct of its men and officers was such as to win the highest encomiums from General Jackson, and such as had been rarely equalled. Its laurels were dearly bought, however, as will be seen by the tabular statement of killed and wounded herewith filed, marked "A." I do not think the enemy's loss was as great as ours, as he fought us generally from behind his barricades and earthworks; still it was heavy.

As an act of justice to them, and for future reference, the names of all the officers who participated in the engagement are presented in the appendices to the reports of brigade commanders. The general, field, and staff officers who were present are herewith presented in appendix "B."

It is impossible for me, within reasonable limits, to mention all the officers and men who were distinguished for gallant and meritorious conduct at this battle. It is, however, my duty to call attention to the great gallantry and efficiency in this action of Brigadier-Generals Doles and Ramseur, Colonel Edward Willis, Twelfth Georgia; Colonel Cooke, Fourth Georgia, severely wounded; Colonel Hall, Fifth Alabama; Colonel Christie, Twenty-third North Carolina; Colonel Pickens, Twelfth Alabama; Lieutenant-Colonel J. N. Lea, Fifth North Carolina; Lieutenant-Colonel Hobson, Fifth Alabama, severely wounded; Colonel Garrett, of the Fifth North Carolina, (who had behaved most gallantly on the first day, and was unfortunately wounded by one of our own men after the close of that day's fight; Colonel Parker, Thirtieth North Carolina; Colonel R. T. Bennett, Fourteenth North Carolina; Captain H. A. Whiting, A. A. G., of Rodes's brigade; Captain Green Peyton, of my staff, and Captain M. L. Randolph, signal corps. The last named officer was remarkable among all these brave and accomplished officers for his daring coolness and efficiency.

Colonel O'Neal, commanding Rodes's brigade, deserves special notice for his gallantry.

It is proper to mention that Colonel W. R. Cox, of the Second North Carolina, was wounded repeatedly before he left the field. All of the other officers did their duty nobly, but those I have mentioned came under my own notice, or were so spoken of by competent persons, as to make it my duty to mention them in this manner.

My staff officers, Captain Green Peyton, and Captain M. L. Randolph, have been mentioned for their meritorious conduct. Their duties were more than usually arduous during the action, and were nobly discharged.

Mr. Ed. O'Neal, volunteer aid, a youth under eighteen, behaved most gallantly, and I am under great obligations to him.

Four of my couriers, C. S. Ellis, company "B," Fourth Georgia; Gilliam James, company "D," Fifth Alabama; ——— ———, and ——— ——— of Stuart's cavalry, (Fitz Lee's brigade,) were of great service to me during the battle, and exhibited great courage and intelligence. Both of the former deserve promotion for their conduct.

Enclosed will be found reports of brigade and regimental commanders. Respectfully,

R. E. RODES,
Brigadier-General, commanding Division.

APPENDIX A.

Strength and Casualties of the Brigades of D. H. Hill's Division, commanded by Brigadier-General Rodes, in Battle of Chancellorsville.

Brigade.	Strength.		Casualties.						Aggregate.
			Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	
Doles's,	133	1489	4	62	31	312	. .	28	437
Iverson's,	135	1660	9	69	26	305	5	72	486
Ramseur's,	129	1380	12	142	41	485	5	103	788
Rodes's,	151	1744	5	85	42	496	21	167	816
Colquitt's,*	130	1600	. .	9	8	120	28	284	449
	678	7873	30	367	148	1718	59	654	2976

* This estimate of the strength of this brigade is not accurate, as the brigade was transferred to North Carolina soon after the battle, and left no data from which we can get the exact estimate.

R. E. RODES,
Brigadier-General, commanding Division.

REPORT OF COLONEL O'NEAL.

HEADQUARTERS RODES'S BRIGADE,
SANTEE, CAROLINE COUNTY, VA., May 12, 1863.

Captain G. Peyton, A. A. G.:

CAPTAIN: In obedience to orders, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of Rodes's brigade during the eight days' campaign, commencing on the twenty-ninth April and ending on the sixth May, 1863. Early in the morning of the twenty-ninth April I received orders to hold the brigade in readiness to move at a moment's warning, and about eight o'clock the brigade was formed on the road, the right resting on Round Oak Church. Thence, after a short delay, we moved to Hamilton's Crossing. Here I was ordered to put the brigade in line of battle in a skirt of pine woods, about one mile to the right of the railroad and just in rear of our works. The brigade rested here during the balance of the day and until three o'clock next morning, when I was ordered to move the brigade to the right, about half a mile, and place it in the intrenchments — the right resting on Massaponax Creek and the left on the Bowling Green road. During the day the enemy's batteries across the river shelled a portion of the line, — the Third and Sixth Alabama regiments, — but, being protected by the earthworks and the hill, no damage was done. At three o'clock on the morning of the first May, I moved the brigade to Hamilton's Crossing, left in front, and thence to the plank road, some seven or eight miles, where I was ordered to prepare for immediate action, to support the forces of General Anderson, who were engaging the enemy. Being in rear of General Colquitt's brigade, I was directed to connect with him and move as he moved. At this point the men were ordered to take off and pile their knapsacks, and, forming by the rear rank, I moved the brigade across an open field to a public road, and then down it about one mile, where we rested in a wood till late in the evening, when I received orders to march back to the plank road, and after reaching it, to halt the brigade and send back for the knapsacks. Having obtained the baggage, I moved down the plank road about two miles and bivouacked for the night. Early on the morning of the second of May the brigade was moved forward on the plank road about one mile, and thence taking a road to the left, passed the furnace and formed in line of battle, after a march of some ten or twelve miles, beyond the turnpike road, just above its junction with the plank road, and in rear of the enemy. The brigade was formed perpendicular to the road and on the left of it, with the right regiment, the Third Alabama, resting on the road and connecting with General Doles's, which was on the right of the road. About half after five o'clock the order to advance was given, and very soon the corps of sharpshooters, under Major Blackford, of the Fifth Alabama, were engaged with the enemy's pickets. The brigade moved rapidly and steadily forward, and in a few minutes was engaged, delivering a regular and telling fire. We drove the enemy from his first line of breastworks, and, pursuing him with spirit and rapidity, soon came upon his second line of works, which were carried after only a moment's delay. At this time the enemy's batteries poured upon us, especially the right wing, the Third and Sixth Alabama regiments, a shower of grape and canister. Still advancing, we continued to drive the enemy before us and passed to his third line, consisting of log works, which were immediately carried — the enemy giving only one volley before he fled. Darkness coming on, the pursuit was discontinued. In this short space of time we drove the enemy before us about two miles, and from three breastworks and two abatis. We captured a considerable number of prisoners. Captain W. T. Renfro, commanding the right wing of the Fifth Alabama, after Colonel Hobson had been wounded, brought in two hundred and twenty-five, and Colonel Lightfoot, of the Sixth Alabama, one hundred and five. Among the prisoners was Colonel Packer, Fifth Connecticut, and several other officers. We captured three pieces of artillery, and part of a fourth piece, which was claimed by another brigade. We also captured a lot of ammunition and a quantity of small arms. The Third Alabama captured and have now in possession two stands of Federal artillery colors, and the Sixth Alabama captured one battery flag. Being with the brigade throughout this brilliant charge, I can personally bear witness to the gallant bearing of the officers, and the daring, dashing courage of the men. In this connection, permit me also to state the order, regularity, and precision with which the several regimental commanders moved and handled their commands throughout this charge. The Third Alabama, under the command of Captains Bonham, Chester, and Phelan, was ordered to move along the road and perpendicular to it, and was the battalion of direction; and the other regiments — the Sixth, under Lieutenant-Colonel Lightfoot and Major Gordon; the Twelfth, under Colonel Pickens and Captain Proskauer; the Twenty-sixth, under Lieutenant-Colonel Garvin and Major Bryan, and the Fifth, under Colonel Hall and Lieutenant-Colonel Hobson — moved in line of battle with this regiment, and, although passing through a dense and "tangled forest" for a mile, all the regiments were connected and moved in a regular unbroken line, the officers exhibiting the greatest coolness and daring, cheering on their men by both voice and example. In this charge, Lieutenant Colonel E. L. Hobson was wounded, while gallantly rushing in front of his men, near the enemy's second line of works. Major Bryan, Twenty-sixth Alabama, was also wounded, near the same place and about the same time, while bravely performing his duties. Captain Watkins Phelan, who commanded the left wing of the Third Alabama, was also wounded in this charge. He, with Captain Bonham, who commanded the regiment, and Captain Chester, who commanded the right wing of the Third Alabama, acted most gallantly, and led their regiment with great success, and it is but simple justice to say that each regiment did its whole duty. As soon as the night

put an end to the pursuit I formed the brigade, and having had ammunition issued to the men, I reported to the Brigadier-General commanding division for orders. He ordered me to move to the earthworks to the left of the road, the second line we had carried, and to relieve General Paxton, which was done, and there we rested for the night.

About six o'clock Sunday morning, the third of May, I received orders to advance, the brigade being in the third or reserve line of battle. We moved forward, under heavy shelling, in an open field, and then through a dense wood for about one mile, when we came up with our second line of battle and passed through it. I inquired, as we passed, whose brigade, and was informed it was General Paxton's. We continued to move forward until we came to some other troops, where I ordered a halt, and found that the Third Alabama had lapped over and got in front of the Sixth Alabama, the regiment immediately on its left. While rectifying the line, the Brigadier-General commanding rode up and ordered me to the road with him, and, explaining to me the position of the forces on my right, and the direction I was to pursue, ordered me to push forward over our first line of battle, and dislodge the enemy from Chancellor's hill. In company with Major Whiting, assistant adjutant-general, I immediately started on a run for the centre of the brigade to execute this order, and when near the centre, was stricken down by the fuse of a shell, which disabled me for the balance of the day. I directed Major Whiting to move the brigade forward, and to inform Colonel Hall, of the Fifth Alabama, that the command devolved on him. Colonel Hall was, at the time, on the extreme left of the line with his regiment. The brigade moved forward under a most terrific storm of shell, grape, canister, and musketry, and, for what took place afterwards I respectfully refer you to the report of Colonel Hall, who so bravely led it, and that of Colonel Pickens, who so gallantly resisted the advance on our left, and ask that their reports may be taken and considered a part of this. In obedience to orders from the corps commander to report what standards were captured and which lost, I have the honor to report that the colors of the Fifth Alabama regiment were captured by the enemy in the attack upon the intrenchments at Chancellor's house, on the morning of the third instant. This regiment, supported by only a portion of the Twenty-sixth Alabama and four companies of Iverson's brigade, were the first to charge and carry the enemy's works near the Chancellor house. Having taken possession of the epaulements which commanded the plank road, this regiment moved forward in the charge considerably in advance of the right, and, being unsupported by the brigade on its left, had its left flank turned by a superior force, and was forced to retire from the works. In doing so the color-bearer was wounded, and with the colors and over a hundred of its men were surrounded and captured. Retiring only to the plank road, this regiment again charged and took these works without support, and a second time had to retire before superior numbers. Captured in the midst of the enemy's guns and intrenchments, and some time before any other troops reached that point, the loss of their flag is one of the highest evidences of the gallant and daring services rendered by the Fifth Alabama regiment in the action of that day. I cannot close this report without calling special notice to that assiduous attention to every duty, and that calm courage, coolness, and self-possession exhibited under all circumstances during these trying days, by Major H. A. Whiting, assistant adjutant-general, and most respectfully recommend him to the commanding General for promotion. He was invaluable to me throughout the two engagements of Saturday and Sunday. I am also greatly indebted to Adjutants Pickett and Moore, of the Third and Twenty-sixth Alabama regiments, who acted as Aids, for valuable services in fearlessly carrying and delivering orders. The Brigade Inspector, Lieutenant Partridge, was energetic and untiring in the performance of his duties, and rendered efficient aid. I desire also to mention Mr. Webb Woodruff and Mr. Rittenhouse Moore, who were with me and did good service. Enclosed you will find the reports of regimental commanders, to which I call special attention. Also, lists of casualties.

I am, Captain, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

EDWARD A. O'NEAL,

Colonel, commanding Brigade.

REPORT OF COLONEL HALL.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ALABAMA REGIMENT,
SANTEE, CAROLINE COUNTY, VIRGINIA, May 8, 1863.

Captain H. A. Whiting, A. A. G., Rodes's Brigade:

CAPTAIN: In obedience to an order from headquarters, I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by Rodes's brigade while under my command, in the battle of Chancellorsville, of the third instant:

About six o'clock A. M., the brigade was formed in the third or rear line of battle, and moved forward under the command of Colonel O'Neal. Proceeding about a mile, under a heavy fire of shell, we passed the second line of battle. Here Colonel O'Neal, who had so gallantly led us, was wounded, and this unfortunate circumstance placed me in command of the brigade. Soon we had overtaken the first line of battle, which was moving by the right and left flanks. At this point the brigade was separated, part of the Third and Sixth, and all of the Twelfth Alabama regiments following the troops moving by the left flank, and part of the Sixth, all of the Fifth and Twenty-sixth Alabama following those moving by the right flank; this, owing to the dense forest, was not discovered at the time. I had just assumed command, and had not time to pass to the centre of the brigade before troops were seen in my front. Believing them to be our men, I ordered my command to cease firing and move on, and soon saw from his killed and wounded that it was the enemy. The command was pressed rapidly forward, under a most terrific fire of shell,

grape, and musketry, to the branch on the left of the road, and about one hundred and fifty yards from the earthworks on Chancellor's hill. Seeing strong batteries on the hill, supported by heavy columns of infantry, I halted, and, sheltering the men as much as possible, ordered them to fire on the men in the works on the hill, particularly at the cannoneers. So heavy was our fire that it was with difficulty that their gunners could be kept at their pieces, and his fire soon sensibly slackened; this fire was kept up fifteen or twenty minutes. During this time, Captain Whiting, A. A. general, went back to bring forward the balance of the brigade, from which, it was here discovered, we were separated. Very soon after halting a battery opened on my left, completely enfilading my entire line, but owing to our position most of the shot passed harmlessly over head. I again sent back the order to bring up the remainder of the brigade, which was not found. The battery on my left continuing its enfilading fire, and heavy volleys of musketry showing the enemy to be there in strong force, I sent notice to the division commander, that unless they were pressed on my left my flank would be turned, and I could not hold my position. Just after sending this message I discovered that the enemy in the works on the hill were in some confusion, when I ordered a charge, which was promptly obeyed by part of my command. The works were soon in my possession, together with a battery of five pieces, the enemy having fled with the rest of his guns. The colors of the Fifth and Twenty-sixth Alabama were planted in a short distance of each other on the works. The works were carried about nine o'clock A. M. by these two regiments, and a small part of the Sixth, which had become separated from their regiment. Noticing at this time that all the men had not moved forward at the order to charge, I returned to the branch, and again ordered them forward, which command was promptly obeyed. While hurrying them forward, I noticed a body of men on my left running. I called to an officer then passing, asking him what that meant, and who those men were. He stated that they belonged to a brigade which I knew to be on my left, and that "the d—d scoundrels would not fight." I pointed to the works, telling him that my men held them, and called on him to assist me in rallying his men for the purpose of resisting the enemy, then advancing on my left and rear. The men could not be rallied. The enemy continued to advance, unopposed, and, gaining my rear, compelled me to evacuate the works which I had just captured. This was done, with a heavy loss of killed, wounded, and prisoners. Most of the command who escaped rallied and returned with other troops, who afterwards captured the same works, and *these troops were driven* from the works by a column flanking them on the left and rear, as I had been driven some time before. After this I was ordered to rally my command, and move to the left of the road to support troops then engaging the enemy. Afterwards the brigade was formed in line of battle at Chancellorsville, where it remained until the enemy recrossed the river, when we returned to our old encampment, on the night of the sixth instant; having been absent marching and fighting for eight days.

In this report, I have only mentioned the Fifth, Twenty-sixth, and part of the Sixth Alabama regiments, because these were the only troops of the brigade under my immediate command during the battle. For the part taken by the other regiments of the brigade in this ever memorable engagement, you are respectfully referred to the report of Colonel Pickens, of the Twelfth Alabama, under whose gallant leadership they so heroically fought.

Justice demands that I should mention Lieutenant-Colonel Garvin, commanding the Twenty-sixth, and Captain Renfro, commanding the Fifth Alabama, who were both severely, if not mortally wounded, while gallantly leading their regiments, and giving the highest evidence of their coolness and skill, which should ever characterize the true soldier.

To the cool and undaunted courage of Major H. A. Whiting, A. A. G., I feel greatly indebted for the success attending my attack on the works on Chancellor's hill. If skill as an officer and gallantry in action entitle any-man to promotion, Major Whiting truly deserves it.

For individual acts of courage, and the casualties of the battle, you are respectfully referred to the reports of regimental commanders.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. M. HALL,

Colonel, commanding Brigade.

REPORT OF COLONEL HAMILTON.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, LIGHT DIVISION, CAMP GREGG, May 20, 1863.

Captain R. H. Finney, A. A. General:

CAPTAIN: In consequence of the wounding of Brigadier-General McGowan and Colonel O. E. Edwards, Thirteenth regiment South Carolina volunteers, early in the day, on the third instant, I found myself in command of this brigade. It will be unnecessary for me to recapitulate the movements of the brigade on the march, as I have already, in giving a report as regimental commander, detailed those of First regiment South Carolina volunteers, which will cover those of the brigade previous to our reaching the enemy, in rear of their line of works beyond Chancellorsville. At sunset, second instant, we reached that part of the field which had been cleared by Brigadier-General Rodes, scattering the enemy in every direction; passing beyond, we were drawn up in line, by order of Brigadier-General McGowan, on the plank road, the Fourteenth regiment South Carolina volunteers being deployed and covering our front as skirmishers. Here we were subjected to a heavy fire of shells, which was annoying, but did not do us a great deal of damage. After remaining here until about eleven o'clock, orders were given for an advance of the brigade, Thirteenth South Carolina volunteers on the right, First South Carolina volunteers next to the rifle

regiment (Orr's) on the left, directing battalion. The attempt was made, but either in consequence of the impossibility of advancing through a thick and almost impenetrable pine thicket, or from a change of orders, the order was countermanded. At twelve o'clock (midnight) the brigade marched to a position in front of the enemy's breastworks, with Brigadier-General Lane on our left, and Brigadier-General Archer on our right. At sunrise the advance was commenced, the brigade, however, obliqued too much to the left, separating our line from that of Brigadier-General Archer, and somewhat overlapping the right of Brigadier-General Lane. So soon, however, as the ground was cleared before us, the four regiments engaged, (First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Orr's rifles,) dashed at the enemy's first line of breastworks, and clearing them with rapidity, the brigade passed about one hundred yards to the front and engaged the enemy, who appeared to be collected in strength on our right. Up to this time Brigadier-General McGowan was active and courageous in urging on the brigade, exposing himself without any sort of regard for his own safety; the last that I saw of him, his huge form was towering from the top of the breastworks, which we had just passed: he was soon after, unfortunately, wounded, but I am happy to say not dangerously. The brigade soon became very hotly engaged, particularly the two right regiments, (First and Orr's rifle regiments.) The enemy finding our right open and unsupported, (Brigadier-General Archer having lost his connection with our line, from our having obliqued to the left in advancing from the cover of the woods,) pressed on to pass round our right flank, and get possession of the breastworks in our rear. This being apparent to the two right regiments, (First and Orr's rifles,) they fell back to the line of breastworks, and continued to fight the enemy, who, if they had pushed vigorously forward, could at once have driven us out, as that portion of the works was unoccupied for some time, but such a deadly fire was poured into them whenever they showed themselves that their immediate advance was checked. While fighting at the breastworks, I learned that Colonel Edwards, Thirteenth regiment South Carolina volunteers, had assumed command of the brigade. From him I did not receive many orders, as he was, I regret to say, soon very severely wounded; as likewise my gallant young subaltern, Lieutenant James T. Proctor, (company C, First regiment,) whom I had just before detailed to act as his A. A. General, who, after a very few moments of duty lost his leg. We had not fought for any great length of time, when a portion of Major-General Trimble's division, commanded by Brigadier-General Colston, came to reënforce us on the right, but from their hesitancy in taking the position, and encumbering us in the rear, they were but of little use, and the enemy soon commenced pouring over the breastworks on our right. My regiment (First South Carolina volunteers) and Orr's rifle regiment being out of ammunition, without the means of replenishing it, and our flank exposed by the enemy occupying the line (the prolongation of ours) to the right, it was deemed best to retire for the time, which was done. Falling back a short distance to a road in rear, as commander of my own regiment, I found Brigadier-General Colston rallying some of his own troops; to him I reported, asking that my regiment might be supplied with ammunition, which was furnished me. The rifle regiment (Orr's) soon joined me. Here I learned for the first time that Colonel Edwards was wounded. I assumed command of that portion of the brigade which was with me, and soon resumed the advance. Finding the breastworks occupied by our own troops, I was ordered, by Brigadier-General Colston, to march the portion of the brigade which had joined me across the plank road, and occupied the position commanding the flank of the line of breastworks held by our troops; here I took position, and remained under an irregular but severe fire of shells for two hours, expecting every moment to be engaged with the infantry of the enemy, as scattering bullets were occasionally reaching us, and sometimes heavy firing was heard immediately in our front; gradually the fire slackened. I was left without further orders, and finding the brigade of Brigadier-General Pender in my rear, moving out into the plank road, I reported to him for orders, and learned that he was in command of the light division, both Major-General A. P. Hill and Brigadier-General Heth having been slightly wounded. After a short time we received our rations, replenished our ammunition, and being rejoined by the rest of the brigade, which had been with Colonel A. Perrin, Fourteenth regiment South Carolina volunteers, I marched the brigade, under orders of Brigadier-General Pender, to a position on the left of the plank road, and was established on the front line of his division, facing eastward, (on Sunday afternoon, third instant,) holding, as he informed me, the key of his position, and which I was ordered by him to hold at all hazards and to the last extremity.

Throwing out skirmishers to the front, and covering my entire line, we prepared to bivouac, and obtain such rest as we might in a swamp, with dead, dying, and roasted Yankees, (the woods having taken fire just after the battle of that day, third instant,) but our rest was constantly interrupted by our skirmishers becoming engaged with those of the enemy.

On Monday, the fourth, I was ordered to remove the brigade to a position in rear of the one held by me during the afternoon and night before. Here I had breastworks rapidly thrown up, six companies covering my front as skirmishers, and scouts sent out to reconnoitre the position of the enemy. From these scouts I learned, early in the evening, that the enemy were making no demonstration on their right and in my front. During this night I could hear the moving of the artillery and wagon trains down towards Banks's Ford, and so reported it to Brigadier-General Pender, with my impression that they were moving off, which subsequent events proved to be correct. Nothing of further moment occurred, beyond our pushing my skirmishers, by a wheel of their line

to the left, upon and against the right flank of those of the enemy.

I beg to speak of the efficiency of Major Croft, Fourteenth South Carolina volunteers, Major Hunt, Thirteenth South Carolina volunteers, and Captains Butler and Haskell, of First regiment South Carolina volunteers, and Captain Duncan, Thirteenth regiment South Carolina volunteers, while respectively in command of skirmishers. To Captain T. P. Ashton, First regiment South Carolina volunteers, who acted as my Assistant Adjutant-General, I feel myself under great obligations for his untiring zeal and efficiency. He was ready at all hours to go to any position, either to the skirmishers in front or along the line; his calm, courageous bearing won my admiration and esteem, and to his intelligence and ready perception of his duties my labors, which would have been arduous in being placed suddenly in command of the brigade, were lightened by his aid.

After remaining at our intrenched position, we marched off on Wednesday, the sixth instant, and returned to this camp on Thursday, seventh instant.

It remains now but to speak of our losses. They were heavy, (lists of which have already been forwarded to division headquarters, Brigadier-General Pender,) and among them I regret to announce the death of Colonel James M. Perrin, Orr's rifle regiment, who was mortally wounded while gallantly fighting his regiment at the breastworks, on Sunday, third May. Colonel Perrin was one of the captains of my old regiment, (First South Carolina volunteers,) and on duty with me in South Carolina previous to my coming to Virginia, in 1861. Since then he has, at various times, been under my command. A more zealous or efficient officer could not have been found in this command. Noble, brave, and pious, he lived to win the admiration and esteem of his friends, and we will trust died to receive the reward of a life spent in the strict discharge of every duty.

I beg to enclose the reports of the Thirteenth, First, Fourteenth, and Orr's rifles, South Carolina volunteers. The Twelfth regiment, South Carolina volunteers, was not engaged in the battle, but was detailed as a guard to prisoners, and, on Monday, the fourth May, was sent off to Richmond, with upwards of two thousand prisoners, and did not return to the brigade until two days after our return to this camp.

I am, Captain, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
D. H. HAMILTON,
Colonel, commanding Second Brigade, Light Division.

REPORT OF COLONEL BROCKENBROUGH.

HEADQUARTERS HETH'S BRIGADE,
May 18, 1863.

R. H. Finney, A. A. G. Light Division:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this brigade during the late battles of the second and third of May, in the vicinity of Chancellorsville. Leaving Hamilton's Crossing at early dawn on the first, the brigade halted at seven o'clock P. M., on the plank road, about one mile east of Chancellorsville. The advanced troops of our corps had encountered the enemy near Salem Church, and with slight resistance they fled to their works.* At ten o'clock on the following morning, leaving the turnpike to our right and moving upon the old furnace road, we turned the right flank of the enemy, and at five and a half o'clock P. M. reached the plank road again, about four miles west of Chancellorsville, and in their rear. Here we formed line of battle and commenced a rapid advance, this brigade occupying the second line. Our approach in that direction seemed to take by surprise and create a considerable panic among the enemy, who, notwithstanding they occupied superior natural positions, strengthened by works of magnitude, fled at our approach, night alone giving them quarter. We pursued them within three fourths of a mile of Chancellorsville. The rapid flight of the enemy, the eagerness of our pursuit, the tangled wilderness through which we had marched, and the darkness of the night, created much confusion in our ranks, which at this point was increased by a deadly fire poured into our ranks by friends and foes from our right, left, and front. Artillery, with their caissons, occupied the road abreast of us, and, without drivers, dashed headlong through our ranks. Under these circumstances our troops halted, and the chase ended for the night. During the night the enemy was not idle, but worked like beavers in erecting the most formidable barricades and breastworks, thus partially relieving themselves of the panic of the previous evening, and determining them to give battle. Early on the morning of the third, the brigade, by General Heth's order, was again deployed in line of battle, extending on either side of the road, the Fortieth and Forty-seventh Virginia regiments on the right, following General Lane's brigade; the Fifty-fifth and Twenty-second Virginia on the left, supporting General Pender. The advance of our leading line became irregular, and the turnpike, which separated the brigade, being much more elevated than the ground upon either side, the interval between the two portions became so considerable as not to be seen the one by the other. Being in close proximity to the enemy, our advance line in a few minutes became hotly engaged, and we were exposed to the most deadly fire I have ever experienced. Very soon the troops in advance were forced back through our lines, leaving us without support on either flank. The two regiments on the left of the road had by this time moved within one hundred yards of the enemy's intrenchments, and while fiercely engaging them, had their left turned and were compelled to retire. The two regiments on the right remained in their position, awaiting support to charge the enemy's works. Finding no one disposed to move, though many thousands had taken shelter behind the barricade, our line was formed, and being joined by about twelve hundred troops of different brigades, we led the second charge. Upon reaching the edge of the field, these troops, with a yell, increased their speed to a double quick,

and, such was the impetuosity of the charge, that the enemy's resistance, though fierce and bloody, was of short duration. We soon triumphantly mounted their intrenchments, completely routing them from a position from which it is almost impossible to conceive how an army could be driven. On gaining the works, we discovered the field literally crowded with men flying in every direction, and poured into them a deadly fire. Occupying this position about two minutes, we discovered troops advancing through the woods upon our left, and supposed they were friends till a volley fired into our left and rear removed the delusion. Their numbers and position being vastly superior to ours, and unsupported on our left, we were again forced to retire. As soon as our artillery shelled this piece of woods, we advanced a third line and held the position. Artillery now coming to our support, soon silenced the enemy's batteries, (which had harassed us during the entire day,) and forced them to abandon, in great confusion, their strong and well-selected position, to take shelter in the wilderness and retreat towards the river.

The loss sustained by the brigade in killed and wounded amounted to thirty-three officers and two hundred and seventy enlisted men. Could aught repay us for the noble spirits who have fallen, we would find consolation in the glorious victory achieved; but our little brigade, and the entire corps, will long miss and mourn the loss of the experienced and gallant dead. With few exceptions, the bearing and conduct of officers and men were unexceptionable.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. M. BROCKENBROUGH,
Colonel, commanding Brigade.

REPORT OF COLONEL BALDWIN.

ORDNANCE OFFICE, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, May 20, 1863.

Brigadier-General R. H. Chilton, Adjutant and Inspector-General, A. N. V.:

SIR: I have the honor to report the following as the principal captures in the recent engagements near Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville:

Artillery. — Five twelve-pounder Napoleons; seven three-inch rifles; one ten-pounder Parrott; nine caissons; four rear parts of caissons; three battery wagons; two forges; fifteen hundred rounds artillery ammunition; a large lot of artillery harness, a large lot of wheels, axles, ammunition, chests, &c.

Infantry. — Twenty-nine thousand five hundred collected, ten thousand admitted dropped by our men, nineteen thousand five hundred captured; nineteen thousand five hundred muskets and rifles; eight thousand cartridge boxes; four thousand cap pouches; eleven thousand five hundred knapsacks; three hundred thousand rounds infantry ammunition.

I have carefully confined myself to what has been reported as collected and *counted*. This, of course, is considerably less than the amount actually captured, as a number of unarmed men supplied themselves with arms, accoutrements, &c., and the army, generally, helped themselves from the cartridge-boxes of the enemy. Also every day small lots of muskets and rifles are brought in; and, without doubt, quite a number of arms, &c., are retained in regimental ordnance wagons, for further contingencies, and not reported. A large quantity of lead has been and is now being collected from the battle-fields. Respectfully submitted,

BRISCOE G. BALDWIN,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Chief of Ordnance, A. N. V.

List of Casualties in the Battle of Chancellorsville, May 2d and 3d, 1863.

COMMAND.	BRIGADE.	DIVISION.	KILLED.	WOUNDED.	TOTAL.
Lieut.-Gen. Thos. J. Jackson,				1	1
Captain J. K. Boswell, engineer department,			1		1
Signal corps,			1		1
General's escort,				2	2
Fifth Louisiana,	Hays's,	Early's,	9	44	53
Sixth Louisiana,	"	"	16	65	81
Seventh Louisiana,	"	"	5	75	80
Eighth Louisiana,	"	"	12	71	83
Ninth Louisiana,	"	"	21	51	72
Captain J. Mitchell, A. A. G., Gordon's brigade,				1	1
Thirteenth Georgia,	Gordon's,	Early's,	3	27	30
Twenty-sixth Georgia,	"	"	3	21	24
Thirty-first Georgia,	"	"	3	20	23
Thirty-eighth Georgia,	"	"	2	18	20
Sixtieth Georgia,	"	"	5	30	35
Sixty-first Georgia,	"	"		28	28
Brigadier-Gen. R. F. Hoke,				1	1
Sixth North Carolina,	Hoke's,	Early's,	8	21	29
Twenty-first North Carolina,	"	"	15	63	78
Twenty-fourth North Carolina,	"	"	3	38	41
Fifty-seventh North Carolina,	"	"	9	61	70
First North Carolina battalion,	"	"		11	11
Thirteenth Virginia,	Smith's,	"	5	31	36
Forty-ninth Virginia,	"	"		10	10
Fifty-second Virginia,	"	"	4	8	12
Fifty-eighth Virginia,	"	"	2	26	28
Major-General A. P. Hill,				1	1
Captain Forbes,		A. P. Hill's,	1		1
General's escort,		"	1	1	2

List of Casualties — continued.

Command.	Brigade.	Division.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
Brigadier-General H. Heth,	. . . . .	A. P. Hill's,	. . . . .	1	1
Forty-seventh Virginia,	H. Heth,	"	4	48	52
Fifty-fifth Virginia,	"	"	20	90	110
Twenty-second Va. battalion,	"	"	6	23	29
Fortieth Virginia,	"	"	14	73	87
Brigadier-General McGowan,	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	1	1
Captain Haskell, A. A. G.,	McGowan,	A. P. Hill's,	. . . . .	1	1
First South Carolina,	"	"	12	80	92
Orr's Rifles,	"	"	19	92	111
Twelfth South Carolina,	"	"	. . . . .	2	2
Thirteenth South Carolina,	"	"	6	60	66
Fourteenth South Carolina,	"	"	9	87	96
Fourteenth Georgia,	Thomas,	"	8	67	75
Thirty-fifth Georgia,	"	"	6	27	33
Forty-fifth Georgia,	"	"	4	29	33
Forty-ninth Georgia,	"	"	3	33	36
Seventeenth North Carolina,	Lane's,	"	37	127	164
Eighteenth North Carolina,	"	"	30	96	126
Twenty-eighth North Carolina,	"	"	12	77	89
Thirty-third North Carolina,	"	"	28	105	133
Thirty-seventh North Carolina,	"	"	34	193	227
First Tennessee,	Archer's,	"	8	50	58
Seventh Tennessee,	"	"	11	45	56
Fourteenth Tennessee,	"	"	7	28	35
Fifth Alabama battalion,	"	"	3	30	33
Thirteenth Alabama,	"	"	13	127	140
General Trimble's staff,	. . . . .	. . . . .	1	2	3
Pioneer Corps,	. . . . .	Trimble's,	. . . . .	3	3
Tenth Virginia,	Colston's,	"	23	101	124
Twenty-third Virginia,	"	"	9	53	62
Thirty-seventh Virginia,	"	"	19	89	108
First North Carolina,	"	"	34	83	117
Third North Carolina,	"	"	38	141	179
Brigadier-Gen. E. F. Paxton,	. . . . .	. . . . .	1	. . . . .	1
Second Virginia,	E. F. Paxton's,	Trimble's,	8	58	66
Fourth Virginia,	"	"	14	149	163
Fifth Virginia,	"	"	7	113	120
Twenty-seventh Virginia,	"	"	9	62	71
Thirty-third Virginia,	"	"	10	56	66
Brigadier-Gen. F. T. Nicholls,	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	1	1
First Louisiana,	F. T. Nicholls's	Trimble's,	8	27	35
Second Louisiana,	"	"	15	90	105
Tenth Louisiana,	"	"	15	51	66
Fourteenth Louisiana,	"	"	4	60	64
Fifteenth Louisiana,	"	"	5	37	42
General Jones's staff,	. . . . .	"	. . . . .	1	1
Twenty-first Virginia,	Jones's	"	4	40	44
Forty-second Virginia,	"	"	15	120	135
Forty-fourth Virginia	"	"	18	58	71
Forty-eighth Virginia,	"	"	12	91	103
Fiftieth Virginia,	"	"	8	110	118
Artillery corps, 2d army corps,	. . . . .	. . . . .	26	124	150
Twelfth Alabama,	Rodes's,	D. H. Hill's,	14	77	91
Twenty-sixth Alabama,	"	"	13	85	98
Fifth Alabama,	"	"	24	130	154
Sixth Alabama,	"	"	24	125	149
Third Alabama,	"	"	17	121	138
Sixth Georgia,	Colquitt's,	"	2	39	41
Twenty-third Georgia,	"	"	. . . . .	4	4
Twenty-seventh Georgia,	"	"	2	39	41
Twenty-eighth Georgia,	"	"	2	31	33
Nineteenth Georgia,	"	"	2	31	33
Fourth Georgia,	Doles's,	"	29	121	150
Twelfth Georgia,	"	"	11	46	57
Twenty-first Georgia,	"	"	13	72	85
Forty-fourth Georgia,	"	"	11	100	111
Thirtieth North Carolina,	Ramseur's,	"	25	98	123
Fourth North Carolina,	"	"	45	110	155
Fourteenth North Carolina,	"	"	15	116	131
Second North Carolina,	"	"	47	167	214
Fifth North Carolina,	Iverson's,	"	4	37	41
Twelfth North Carolina,	"	"	12	95	107
Twentieth North Carolina,	"	"	13	64	77
Twenty-third North Carolina,	"	"	32	113	145
Twelfth Virginia,	Mahone's,	Anderson's,	5	27	32
Sixteenth Virginia,	"	"	1	17	18
Forty-first Virginia,	"	"	5	23	28
Sixty-first Virginia,	"	"	4	28	32
Sixth Virginia,	"	"	5	34	39
Grandy's Battery,	"	"	1	3	4
Eighth Florida,	Perry's,	"	11	36	47
Second Florida,	"	"	3	29	32
Fifth Florida,	"	"	6	22	28
Eighth Alabama,	Wilcox's,	"	5	45	50

List of Casualties — continued.

Command.	Brigade.	Division.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
Ninth Alabama,	Wilcox's,	Anderson's,	21	90	111
Tenth Alabama,	"	"	12	61	73
Eleventh Alabama,	"	"	10	72	82
Fourteenth Alabama,	"	"	7	116	123
Lewis's Battery,	"	"	.....	5	5
Sixteenth Mississippi,	Posey's,	"	17	59	76
Twelfth Mississippi,	"	"	3	33	36
Nineteenth Mississippi,	"	"	6	40	46
Forty-eighth Mississippi,	"	"	10	44	54
Second Georgia Battalion,	Wright's,	"	2	26	28
Twenty-second Georgia,	"	"	5	70	75
Third Georgia,	"	"	11	111	122
Forty-eighth Georgia,	"	"	7	41	48
Thirteenth North Carolina,	Pender's,	A. P. Hill's,	31	178	209
Sixteenth North Carolina,	"	"	17	73	90
Twenty-second North Carolina,	"	"	30	139	169
Thirty-fourth North Carolina,	"	"	18	110	128
Thirty-eighth North Carolina,	"	"	20	77	97
Eighteenth Georgia,	Wofford's,	McLaws's,	14	72	86
Twenty-fourth Georgia,	"	"	14	73	87
Sixteenth Georgia,	"	"	18	115	133
Cobb's Legion,	"	"	22	135	157
Phillips' Legion,	"	"	3	19	22
Field and Staff,	"	"	1	.....	1
Fifteenth South Carolina,	Kershaw's,	"	9	45	54
Seventh South Carolina,	"	"	.....	14	14
Second South Carolina,	"	"	.....	11	11
James's Battalion,	"	"	1	8	9
Third South Carolina,	"	"	1	11	12
Thirteenth Mississippi,	Barksdale's,	"	7	43	50
Seventeenth Mississippi,	"	"	10	70	80
Eighteenth Mississippi,	"	"	25	43	68
Twenty-first Mississippi,	"	"	3	25	28
Fifty-first Georgia,	Semmes's,	"	30	119	149
Tenth Georgia,	"	"	23	105	128
Fifty-third Georgia,	"	"	15	105	120
Fiftieth Georgia,	"	"	17	153	170
Cable Artillery,	.....	"	4	12	16
Washington Artillery,	.....	.....	4	8	12
Alexander's Artillery,	.....	.....	5	35	40
Lee's Cavalry Brigade,	.....	Stuart's,	4	7	11
Total,	.....	.....	1,581	8,700	10,281

Doc. 32.

BATTLE OF KELLEYSVILLE.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL STUART.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
ARMY OF NORTHERN VA., March 25, 1863.

Brigadier-General R. H. Chilton, A. A. and I. G., Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia:

GENERAL: I have the honor to enclose herewith the very graphic report of Brigadier-General Fitzhugh Lee, of the battle of Kelleysville, March seventeenth, between his brigade and a division of the enemy's cavalry. There is little to be said in addition. The dispositions made for meeting this anticipated raid were sufficient to have prevented or very much retarded the crossing of the Rappahannock at Kelleysville. The report shows wherein these dispositions failed of their object. The brigade, however, under its noble chief, so redeemed the day by an exhibition of the most extraordinary heroism, that we are half disposed to lose sight of the picket failure in the outset.

Being charged by the commanding General specially with the preparations to meet Stoneman, I was present on the occasion, because of the responsibility which would necessarily attach to me for what was done; but, having approved of General Fitzhugh Lee's plans, I determined not to interfere with his command of the brigade as long as it was commanded entirely to my satisfaction, and I took special pride in witnessing its gallant conduct under its accomplished leader. The defeat was decided, and the enemy, broken and demoralized, retired, under cover of darkness, to his place of refuge — the main army — having abandoned in defeat an expedition commenced with boasting and vainglorious demonstration. I have the honor to enclose a copy of congratulatory orders from division and brigade headquarters, and an order announcing to the division the death of the lamented and noble Pelham. I was especially indebted to him for his usual gallant services, and to Captain Harry Gilmer, Twelfth Virginia cavalry, who accompanied me as volunteer staff. Major Louis F. Terrill, the court-martial to which he belonged having taken recess, buckled on his sword with very commendable zeal, and came to the field, where he acquitted himself with credit, both as an artillerist and as staff officer. I cordially concur with the Briga-

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Eleventh Alabama,
Fourteenth Alaban
Lewis's Battery, .
Sixteenth Mississi
Twelfth Mississipp
Nineteenth Mississi
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Second Georgia Bat
Twenty-second Geo
Third Georgia, . .
Forty-eighth Georg
Thirteenth North C
Sixteenth North Ca
Twenty-second Nor
Thirty-fourth Nort
Thirty-eighth Nort
Eighteenth Georgia
Twenty-fourth Geo
Sixteenth Georgia,
Cobb's Legion, . .
Phillips' Legion, .
Field and Staff, . .
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James's Battalion,
Third South Carolin
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Eighteenth Mississi
Twenty-first Missis.
Fifty-first Georgia,
Tenth Georgia, . .
Fifty-third Georgia,
Fiftieth Georgia, .
Cable Artillery, .
Washington Artille
Alexander's Artille
Lee's Cavalry Briga
Total, ...

BATTLE

REPORT OF

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

Eng'd by A H Ritchie

GEN. WILLIAM MAHONE.

dier-General commanding in the high praise bestowed by him on Colonel T. L. Rosser, Fifth Virginia cavalry, who, though severely wounded at two P. M., remained in command at the head of his regiment till the day was won, and night put an end to further operations; on Colonel James H. Drake, First Virginia cavalry, who led his regiment in a brilliant charge upon the enemy's flank, routing and pursuing him to his stronghold; on the lamented Puller and his comrades fallen; on Lieutenant Hill Carter, Third Virginia cavalry, and Peter Fontaine, Fourth Virginia cavalry, whose individual prowess attracted my personal attention and remark, the latter receiving a severe wound; on the very efficient staff of General Lee, enumerated in his report, and the many others to whom the seventeenth of March will ever be the proudest of days.

Brigadier-General Fitz Lee exhibited in the operations antecedent to and consequent upon the enemy's crossing the sagacity of a successful General, and, under the blessing of Divine Providence, we are indebted to his prompt and vigorous action, and the determined bravery of his men, for this signal victory, which, when the odds are considered, was one of the most brilliant achievements of the war, General Lee's command in action being less than eight hundred.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. E. B. STUART.
Major-General, commanding.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
ARMY OF NORTHERN VA., March 20, 1863.

General Orders, No. 9.

The Major-General commanding approaches with reluctance the painful duty of announcing to the division its irreparable loss in the death of Major John Pelham, commanding the horse artillery. He fell, mortally wounded, in the battle of Kelleysville, March seventeenth, with the battle-cry on his lips, and the light of victory beaming from his eye.

To you, his comrades, it is needless to dwell upon what you have so often witnessed — his prowess in action, already proverbial. You well know, though young in years, a mere stripling in appearance, remarkable for his genuine modesty of deportment, he yet disclosed on the battle-field the conduct of a veteran, and displayed in his handsome person the most imperturbable coolness in danger. His eye had glanced on every battle-field of this army, from the first Manassas to the moment of his death, and he was, with a single exception, a brilliant actor in all. The memory of *the gallant Pelham*, his many manly virtues, his noble nature and purity of character, is enshrined as a sacred legacy in the hearts of all who knew him. His record has been bright and spotless, his career brilliant and successful. He fell the noblest of sacrifices on the altar of his country, to whose glorious service he had devoted his life from the beginning of the war. In token of respect for his cherished memory the horse artillery and division staff will wear the military badge of mourning for thirty days, and the senior officer of the staff, Major Von Borck, will place his remains in the possession of his bereaved family, to whom is tendered, in behalf of the division, the assurance of the heartfelt sympathy in this deep tribulation. In mourning his departure from his accustomed post of honor on the field, let us strive to imitate his virtues, and trust that what is loss to us may be more than gain to him.

By command of Maj.-Gen. J. E. B. STUART.

R. CHANNING PRICE,
Major, and Assistant Adjutant-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL FITZ LEE.

HEADQUARTERS LEE'S CAVALRY BRIGADE,
March 23, 1863.

General R. H. Chilton, A. A. G. and A. I. G., A. N. V.:

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of an encounter on the seventeenth instant, between my brigade and a division of the enemy's cavalry, certainly not less than three thousand mounted men, with a battery of artillery:

My first intimation of their approach was in a telegram received at eleven A. M., on the sixteenth, from headquarters Army Northern Virginia. At six P. M. scouts reported them at Morrisville, a little place six miles from Kelley's Ford. At one A. M., another report informed me that the enemy had encamped at that place, coming from three different directions. I that night reënforced my picket of twenty sharpshooters by forty more. I regret to say that only about eleven or twelve of them got into the rifle-pits in time for the attack of the enemy, (owing to an unnecessary delay in carrying their horses to the rear,) which commenced about five A. M.

The force in the pits under Captain James Breckinridge, of the Second, behaved very gallantly, holding in check a large force of the enemy, mounted and dismounted, for an hour and a half, killing and wounding thirty or forty of them. I also ordered the remaining sharpshooters of the brigade under that very efficient officer, Major Morgan, First Virginia, to move from their camps by daybreak, to a point on the railroad, where the road turns to Kelley's, half a mile from the railroad bridge, and three and a half from Kelley's; and the rest of the command was ordered to be in readiness to move at the shortest notice. At that time a force was reported to be at Bealeton, supposed to be their advance guard, and it was uncertain whether they would attempt to cross at Kelley's, the railroad bridge, or move on towards Warrenton.

The report that the enemy's attack was made at Kelley's never reached me; and the first intimation I received from that point was at half past seven A. M., to the effect that they had succeeded in crossing, capturing twenty-five of my sharpshooters, who were unable to reach their horses. I moved my command at once down the railroad taking up a position to await their approach, ordering my baggage wagons and disabled horses to the rear, towards Rapidan station. Some time elapsing, and they not advancing, I determined to move upon them, and marched immediately for Kelley's. First met the enemy half a mile

this side of the ford, and at once charged them. Their position was a very strong one, sheltered by woods, and a long, high stone fence, running at right angles to my advance. My men, unable to cross the fence and ditch in their front wheeled about, delivering their fire almost in the faces of the enemy, and re-formed again, facing about, under a heavy fire from their artillery and small arms. The Third, in this charge, was in front, and First Lieutenant Hill Carter was very conspicuous in his behavior.

From that time it was a succession of gallant charges by the various regiments, and once by the whole brigade in line, whenever the enemy would show his mounted men, (they invariably falling back upon his artillery,) and sheltered, dismounted skirmishers. Their total advance was two miles from the ford. At that time my artillery arrived, and they were driven back, recrossing the river about half past seven, with us in close pursuit.

My whole command acted nobly. Sabres were frequently crossed, and fences charged up to; the leading men dismounting and pulling them down, under a heavy fire of canister, grape, and carbine balls. Had I my command in the order it arrived in this enervating section of country, and not weakened by the absence of four squadrons on picket, guarding a line stretching from Griffinsburg on the Sperryville turnpike to Richard's Ford, and by the large number of horses unfit for duty by exposure to the severe winter, with a very limited supply of forage, I feel confident the defeat of the enemy would have been changed into a disorderly rout, and the whole brigade resupplied with horses, saddles, and bridles.

Commanding officers of the detachments from the various regiments engaged mention, in their reports, as deserving special attention: In the Fifth, private Wm. J. Haynes, company F, badly wounded; private A. R. Harwood, company E; private Henry Wooding, company C, especially commended, seized the colors when the horse of the color-bearer was shot, and carried them bravely through the fight; Sergeants Morecock and Ratcliffe, and private George James, company H. In the Fourth, Captains Newton and Old, Lieutenant Hobson and Adjutant Fontaine, seriously wounded. Sergeant Kimborough, of company G, deserves particular notice: wounded early in the day, he refused to leave the field. In the last charge, he was the first to spring to the ground to open the fence; then dashing on at the head of the column, he was twice sabred over the head, his arm shattered by a bullet, captured and carried over the river, when he escaped and walked back, twelve miles, to his camp. Lieutenant-Colonel Payne, commanding, also mentions privates Joseph Gilman, J. R. Gilman, Poindexter, Redd, Sydnor, Terry, and N. Priddy. In the Third, Captain Collins, company H; Lieutenants Hill Carter and John Lamb, of company D; Lieutenant Stamper, of company F; Lieutenant R. F. Hubbard, company G; and first Lieutenant Hall, of company C, was twice wounded, before he desisted from the charge, and when retiring, received a third and still more severe wound, and was unable to leave the field. Adjutant H. B. McClellan is also particularly commended for his gallantry. Acting Sergeant-Major, E. W. Price, company K, private Keech, company I, and bugler-drilling Sergeant Betts, of company C; privates Young, company B, Fowler, company G, and Wilkins, company C, died as became brave men, in the front of the charge, at the head of the column.

In the Second, the commanding officer reports, where so many behaved themselves with so much gallantry he does not like to discriminate.

In the First, Captain Jordan, company C, and Lieutenant Cecil, company K, specially commended for reckless daring, without a parallel. As coming under my own observation, I particularly noticed Colonel T. L. Rosser, of the Fifth, and his habitual coolness and daring, charging at the head of his regiment. Colonel James Drake, of the First, always ready at the right time and place. Colonel T. H. Owen, of the Third, begging to be allowed to charge again and again. Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Payne, of the Fourth, unmindful of his former dreadful wound, using his sabre with effect in hand-to-hand conflict, and the imperturbable, self-possessed Major Breckinridge, of the Second, whose boldness led him so far that he was captured, his horse being shot. Colonel T. L. Manford, of the Second, I regret to say, was president of a court martial in Culpeper Court-House, and did not know of the action in time to join his command until the fight was nearly over. I also recommend for their behavior, Captain Tebbs, of the Second, and Captain Litchfield and Lieutenant Dorsey, of the First; also Major W. D. Morgan, of the First.

My personal staff, Major Mason, Captains Fergusson and Bowling, Dr. J. B. Fontaine, and Lieutenants Lee, Ryals, and Minnegerode, rendered great service by their accurate and a quick transmission of orders, and by their conduct under fire. Surgeon Fontaine's horse was killed under him, and my own horse was also shot; but, through the generosity of private John H. Owings, company K, First Virginia cavalry, attached to my headquarters, was quickly replaced by his.

The conduct of couriers Owings, Lee, Nightingale, and Henry Shackelferd, deserves the highest praise. The enemy's loss was heavy. Besides leaving a number of his dead and wounded on the field, he carried off a large number on horses and in ambulances. We captured twenty-nine prisoners — a captain, two lieutenants, and twenty-six privates. My own loss was eleven killed, eighty-eight wounded, and thirty-four taken prisoners, making an aggregate of one hundred and thirty-three. In horses, seventy-one killed, eighty-seven wounded, twelve captured, making an aggregate loss of horses one hundred and seventy.

Among the killed, I deeply regret to report Major Puller, of the Fifth, and Lieutenant Harris, of the Fourth. Both gallant and highly efficient officers — a heavy loss to their regiments and country.

In conclusion, I desire *especially* to state that

Major-General J. E. B. Stuart joined me before the fight commenced, was on the field the whole day, assisted immensely by his *sagacious counsels*, large experience, and by his *usual daring* and *conspicuous example*, in turning the fortunes of the day in our favor. We share with him the anguish and deep grief felt at the loss of the noble Pelham of his staff—an officer of the brightest promises for the future. Major Terrill, of General Stuart's staff, besides being active on the field, assisted the gallant Breathed in the management of the artillery.

Captain Gilmer, Twelfth Virginia cavalry, a volunteer for the occasion on the Major-General's staff, I also commend for his marked bravery and cool courage. I append a recapitulation of my loss. Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

FITZ LEE,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

Recapitulation of the Loss of Brigadier-General Fitz Lee's Cavalry Brigade in the Engagement near Kelleysville, March 17th, 1864.

	Killed.		Wounded.		Taken Prisoners.		Aggregate Loss.	Horses.			Aggregate Loss of Horses.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.		Killed.	Wounded.	Taken by Enemy.	
Field and staff,	1	..	..	..	..	..	1	1	1	..	2
First Regiment Virginia Cavalry,	..	1	..	7	..	..	8	7	13	1	21
Second Regiment Virginia Cavalry,	..	1	2	16	1	14	34	6	20	..	26
Third Regiment Virginia Cavalry,	..	4	6	31	..	3	44	26	24	1	51
Fourth Regiment Virginia Cavalry,	1	1	1	16	..	16	35	15	16	10	41
Fifth Regiment Virginia Cavalry,	1	1	2	7	..	..	11	16	13	..	29
Battery,											
Total,	3	8	11	77	1	33	133	71	87	12	170

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. H. F. LEE.

HEADQUARTERS LEE'S CAVALRY BRIGADE, NEAR CULPEPER COURT-HOUSE, April 17, 1863.

Major R. Channing Price, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Division Headquarters:

MAJOR: I have the honor, agreeably to instructions from division headquarters, to forward a report of the operations of my brigade on the fourteenth and fifteenth instants. During the night of the thirteenth, I received information from Lieutenant Payne, commanding Black Horse scout, that the enemy's cavalry and artillery in heavy force were moving up from Fredericksburg in the direction of Kelley's Ford. I immediately sent Captain Bolling, company G, Ninth Virginia cavalry, with his company of sharpshooters, to reënforce the picket at that place. He arrived before day, and placed his men in the rifle-pits. About day he reports that, with a regiment dismounted as sharpshooters lining the banks, the enemy's cavalry made a dash at the ford. They dashed back at the first volley from our sharpshooters. Captain Bolling's command consisted of about one hundred and fifty men. During the morning of the fourteenth they forced their way across the river at Rappahannock Station, the sharpshooters posted to protect the bridge giving way and leaving the rifle-pits exposed to a flank fire. On the appearance of reënforcements, they immediately recrossed, and the horse artillery, superintended by Major Beckham, engaged the enemy's batteries. Firing was kept up by the artillery and sharpshooters most of the day. On the fifteenth their cavalry forced a crossing at Wellford's Ford, driving the few pickets off, and made a dash at Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis at Beverly's Ford, driving him away. As soon as the brigade could be brought forward, I proceeded at once to Beverly's Ford, and, with Colonel Chambliss's Thirteenth regiment Virginia cavalry, drove their rear guard, consisting of about two squadrons, into the river, drowning a number of them, capturing fourteen prisoners, horses, &c. I cannot speak too highly of Colonel Chambliss and his command. He had with him only about one good squadron. Lieutenant Nash, adjutant of Thirteenth regiment, and Pat Freeman, the Colonel's orderly, were conspicuous for their gallantry. The regiment charged through a creek, the water up to their saddle skirts. Colonel Beale had crossed with the head of his regiment, but was recalled. He captured one Lieutenant and ten privates and horses. Major Beckham, with his artillery, rendered valuable aid, and he and his officers deserve much praise for the remarkable manner in which their guns were served. In closing this, I take pleasure in making special mention of Captain Bolling. His conduct on this, as on all former occasions in battle, was marked for coolness and gallantry. I have the honor herewith to transmit reports from the commandants of the respective regiments and batteries. Also to append a summary of the casualties and captures of the two days:

Staff Ninth Virginia.	Killed.		Woun'd		Missi'g.		Pris'rs.		Horses.			Remarks.
	Officers.	Privates.	Officers.	Privates.	Officers.	Privates.	Officers.	Privates.	Killed.	Wounded.	Captured.	
Staff,	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	A. A. General's horse's leg broken.
Ninth Virginia,	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	1	12	Private missing, supposed to be a prisoner.
Thirteenth Virginia,	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	..	3	1	..	
Second North Carolina,	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	..	..	..	Lieut. Gary, of Thirteenth, slightly wounded.

CAPTURES.

One Lieutenant and ten privates by Ninth Virginia cavalry.
Four privates by Thirteenth Virginia cavalry.
Sixteen horses and equipments.

Referring to the horses captured from my command, I have to say that, owing to the smallness of my force, (two regiments being detached,) my picket at Wellford's Ford was small and when the enemy dashed upon Colonel Lewis they were separated some distance from their horses, and being partially surprised, they had to make their escape without their horses, as they were in great danger of themselves being captured. It is needless to state that the Major-General of cavalry was on the field most of the time, and that his presence gave confidence and stability to the command.

I have the honor to remain,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
W. H. F. LEE,
Brigadier-General, commanding Cavalry Brigade.

REPORT OF COLONEL CHAMBLISS.

HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH VIRGINIA CAVALRY, April 17, 1863.

CAPTAIN: In obedience to instructions, I have the honor to report the operations of my regiment with the enemy, on the fourteenth and fifteenth instants. On the fourteenth, under the direction of the General commanding brigade, my regiment was posted at Kelley's Ford, supporting sharpshooters in the rifle-pits — Lieutenant Gary, company "D," having been previously sent to the Rappahannock bridge with twenty sharpshooters, to take position in the rifle-pits. During the day, he had been driven out of his position, and I called upon him for an explanation. He stated that the block-house was occupied by a few men of another regiment, posted to prevent the crossing of the bridge, allowed the enemy to come over without firing a shot, and thereby exposed his flank; that he was fired into from that direction, while a body of the enemy's mounted men were attempting to cross the ford; these he gave a volley and retired on account of what has just been stated. He left the pits with his men, but soon, however, took position in the block-house, under sharp fire of the enemy. Lieutenant Gary was wounded; no other casualties occurred during the day. On the fifteenth I received orders, and moved with my command towards Wellford's Ford, as the enemy were reported to have crossed in large force. Owing to heavy details, I had only forty men in camp, and came upon the rear guard of the enemy near Beverly's Ford, where we charged them and drove them pell-mell into the river, capturing fourteen prisoners and drowning several. The only casualties were one man wounded and one missing. All the men and officers behaved well, and charged under heavy fire through a rocky and swollen stream. It is useless to say more, as this occurred under the immediate eyes of the General; but I cannot close this report without mentioning the energy and cool bravery displayed by my Adjutant, Lieutenant Nash, on the occasion above alluded to.

I am, Captain, your obedient servant,
JOHN R. CHAMBLISS.

REPORT OF COLONEL BEALE.

HEADQUARTERS NINTH VIRGINIA CAVALRY, April 11, 1863.

Brigadier-General W. H. F. Lee:

I submit report of the part taken by this command in the skirmishing on the Rappahannock on the fourteenth and fifteenth instants, together with casualties and captures. On the fourteenth one company, under command of Captain Stith Bolling, held the ford at Kelley's Mills, and repulsed, with some loss to the enemy, an attempt to cross with a force of two or more regiments. Another company, under immediate command of Captain John W. Hungerford, under Lieutenant Colonel Lewis, held the ford at Beverly's Mills. The balance were engaged in watching the enemy at Rappahannock bridge, and reëstablishing the pickets driven out in the morning. On the fifteenth, the enemy having crossed in large force at a ford above, flanked that portion of the command under Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis, and came down upon them by surprise. The coolness and admirable manœuvring of Lieutenant-Colonel

Lewis and Lieutenant G. W. Beale, in command of sharpshooters dismounted, alone saved this little band. By boldly charging the advance, the dismounted men were successfully extricated from a position of great danger. The whole command in the evening supported Colonel Chambliss in a charge upon the retreating foe. We captured one First Lieutenant of Third Indiana cavalry, and ten privates, ten horses, ten carbines, and seven pistols. Our casualties were, one private, company A, killed, one private, company H, missing, supposed to be captured, two horses killed and one wounded, twelve horses captured. The conduct of officers and men merits the highest commendation.

R. L. T. BEALE,
Colonel, commanding.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN J. W. STRANGE.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND NORTH CAROLINA CAVALRY, NEAR BRANDY STATION, April 16, 1863.

General W. H. F. Lee, commanding Cavalry Brigade:

GENERAL: In obedience to orders, I have the honor to report that during the operations of the brigade on the fourteenth instant, my command, consisting of one hundred and sixteen mounted men, was held as a protection to the Whitworth gun, stationed on the road about a mile beyond Brandy Station, where we remained without any active duty until relieved by your order, about nine P. M., and returned to camp. On the morning of the fifteenth instant, twenty men, under command of Lieutenant James Baker, company D, were detached, and sent to the block-house at Rappahannock bridge, to protect it, and I, with the rest of my command, were held as a protection to two guns of Captain Moorman's battery, stationed near the bridge. These dispositions remained unchanged until about two P. M., when I received orders to proceed, in company with Captain Moorman's guns, to Beverly Ford, and there protect them in their operations against the enemy. We saw no active duty during the skirmish, and after the enemy were repulsed returned with the brigade to our present camp. During these two days the dismounted men, (143) rank and file, that had been distributed at the different fords as sharpshooters, had several encounters with the enemy; those stationed at Wellford's Ford, under command of Lieutenant Lucky, company B, were driven off, and privates Robert H. Sumrou, company B, A. D. Clark, company D, J. H. Ray, company A, John Kelley, company A, were captured. These were the only casualties that occurred in my regiment.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. W. STRANGE,
Captain Co. D, commanding Regiment.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN MOORMAN.

HEADQUARTERS MOORMAN'S BATTERY, April 16, 1863.

Brigadier General W. H. F. Lee:

Pursuant to order, I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by my battery during the engagement of the fourteenth and fifteenth:

Upon the fourteenth, my battery moved from camp, near brigade headquarters, following the Ninth cavalry. Upon reaching a high hill, some mile and a half below Brandy Station, I was ordered, by Major Beckham, to send one piece (rifled) forward to Kelley's Ford, where, under command of Lieutenant Shoemaker, it fired repeatedly upon the enemy, (across the river,) with what effect not ascertained. The remainder of my battery (two guns) I moved, by order of General Stuart, to Rappahannock bridge, and there opened upon, dispersing different squads of the enemy. During the afternoon a section of the enemy's guns were put in position behind earthworks, and engaged my guns for probably forty minutes, and then retired. I am happy to report no casualties during the day.

On the fifteenth, my battery was again called out and held in position near the old church, upon the road (I believe) to Beverly Ford. From there it returned to camp, not being called upon.

Respectfully submitted, M. N. MOORMAN,
Captain, commanding Battery Light Horse Artillery.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT FORD.

CAMP NEAR CULPEPER COURT-HOUSE, April 16, 1863.

Captain W. S. Robins, A. A. G.:

CAPTAIN: I was ordered, on the morning of the fourteenth, to move a section of my battery near Rappahannock bridge, — Lieutenant Brown's section, — consisting of a Napoleon and a Blakely rifled gun. We took position with the Blakely about three quarters of a mile from the river, and shelled the enemy's sharpshooters who had occupied the hills opposite. After dispersing them, I moved the section on the hill immediately overlooking the river, and there exchanged shots, for about half an an hour, with a section of the enemy's artillery, which was well protected by a redoubt. We sustained no injury. I am not certain whether we punished our opponent or not. The redoubt was struck repeatedly.

About twelve o'clock the next day, (fifteenth,) I was ordered hurriedly to Wellford's Ford, in the midst of a drenching rain; arrived there; sharpshooters were again dispersed.

We returned to camp this morning, having expended about one hundred rounds of ammunition, and having no casualty to report. Lieutenant Burrows was with us also.

Officers and men behaved well; and, notwithstanding the rain was calculated to produce discontent, nothing of the kind was manifested.

I remain, your obedient servant,

C. S. FORD.

Doc. 33.

GENERAL GARFIELD'S LETTER TO GENERAL ROSECRANS.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT CUMBERLAND, MURFREESBORO', June 12, 1863.

GENERAL: In your confidential letter of the eighth instant to the Corps and Division Commanders and Generals of cavalry of this army,

there were substantially five questions propounded for their consideration and answer, viz.: —

1. Has the enemy in our front been materially weakened by detachments to Johnson or elsewhere?

2. Can this army advance on him at this time with reasonable chances of fighting a great and successful battle?

3. Do you think an advance of our army at present likely to prevent additional reënforcements being sent against General Grant by the enemy in our front?

4. Do you think an immediate advance of this army advisable?

5. Do you think an early advance advisable?

Many of these answers are not categorical, and cannot be clearly set down either as affirmative or negative; especially in answer to the first question there is much indefiniteness, resulting from the difference of judgment as to how great a detachment could be considered a "material reduction" of Bragg's strength. For example, one officer thinks it has been reduced ten thousand, but not "materially weakened."

The answers to the second question are modified in some instances by the opinion that the rebels will fall back behind the Tennessee River, and thus no battle can be fought, either successful or unsuccessful.

So far as these opinions can be stated in tabular form, they will stand thus: —

Answer to first question,	6 "Yes."	11 "No."
" second "	2 "Yes."	11 "No."
" third "	4 "Yes."	10 "No."
" fourth "	0 "Yes."	15 "No."
" fifth "	0 "Yes."	2 "No."

On the fifth question, three gave it as their opinion that this army ought to advance as soon as Vicksburg falls, should that event happen.

The following is a summary of the reasons assigned why we should not, at this time, advance upon the enemy: —

1. With Hooker's army defeated, and Grant's bending all its energies in a yet undecided struggle, it is bad policy to risk our only reserve army to the chances of a general engagement. A failure here would have most disastrous effects on our lines of communication, and on politics in the loyal states.

2. We should be compelled to fight the enemy on his own ground, or follow him in a fruitless stern chase, or, if we attempted to outflank him and turn his position, we should expose our line of communication, and run the risk of being pushed back into a rough country, well known to the enemy and little known to ourselves.

3. In case the enemy should fall back without accepting battle, he could make our advance very slow, and, with a comparatively small force posted in the gaps of the mountains, could hold us back while he crossed the Tennessee River, where he would be measurably secure and free to send reënforcements to Johnson. His forces in East Tennessee could seriously harass our left flank and constantly disturb our communications.

4. The withdrawal of Burnside's Ninth army corps deprives us of an important reserve and flank protection, thus increasing the difficulty of an advance.

5. General Hurlburt has sent the most of his forces away to General Grant, thus leaving West Tennessee uncovered, and laying our right flank and rear open to raids of the enemy.

The following incidental opinions are expressed: —

1. One officer thinks it probable that the enemy has been strengthened rather than weakened, and that he would have a reasonable prospect of victory in a general battle.

2. One officer believes the result of a general battle would be doubtful, a victory barren, and a defeat most disastrous.

3. Three officers believe that an advance would bring on a general engagement. Three believe it would not.

4. Two officers express the opinion that the chances of success in a general battle are nearly equal.

5. One officer expresses the belief that our army has reached its maximum strength and efficiency, and that inactivity will seriously impair its effectiveness.

6. Two officers say that an increase of our cavalry, by about six thousand men, would materially change the aspect of our affairs and give us a decided advantage.

In addition to the above summary, I have the honor to submit an estimate of the strength of Bragg's army, gathered from all the data I have been able to obtain, including the estimate of the General commanding in his official report of the battle of Stone River; facts gathered from prisoners, deserters, scouts, and refugees, and from rebel newspapers.

After the battle he consolidated many of his decimated regiments and irregular organizations, and at the time of his sending reënforcements to Johnson his army had reached its greatest effective strength. It consisted of five divisions of infantry, composed of ninety-four regiments, and two independent battalions of sharpshooters — say ninety-five regiments.

By a law of the Confederate Congress, regiments are consolidated when their effective strength falls below two hundred and fifty. Even the regiments formed by such consolidation (which may reasonably be regarded as the fullest) must fall below five hundred men; I am satisfied that four hundred is a large estimate of the average strength. The force would then be, —

Infantry, 95 regiments,		400 each,	38,000
Cavalry, 35 "	say	500 "	17,500
Artillery, 26 batteries,	"	100 "	2,600
		Total,	58,100

This force has been reduced by detachments to Johnson. It is as well known as we can ever expect to ascertain such facts, that three brigades have gone from McCown's division and two or three from Breckinridge's; say two. It is clear

that there are now but four infantry divisions in Bragg's army — the fourth being composed of fragments of McCown's and Breckinridge's divisions, and must be much smaller than the average. Deducting the five brigades, and supposing them composed of only four regiments each, which is below the general average, it gives an infantry reduction of twenty regiments, four hundred each, —eight thousand; leaving a remainder of thirty thousand.

It is clearly ascertained that at least two brigades of cavalry have been sent from Van Dorn's command to Mississippi, and it is asserted in the "Chattanooga Rebel," of June eleventh, that General Morgan's command has been permanently detached and sent to Eastern Kentucky. It is not certainly known how large his division is, but it is known to contain at least two brigades. Taking this minimum as the fact, and we have a reduction of four brigades. Taking the lowest estimate, four regiments to the brigade, and we have a reduction by detachment of sixteen regiments, five hundred each, leaving his present effective cavalry force nine thousand five hundred. With the nine brigades of the two arms thus detached, it will be safe to say there have gone six batteries, eighty men each: four hundred and eighty; leaving him twenty batteries, two thousand one hundred and twenty, making a total reduction of sixteen thousand four hundred and eighty, leaving, of the three arms, a total of forty-one thousand six hundred and eighty. In this estimate I have placed all doubts in Bragg's favor, and I have no doubt it is considerably beyond the truth. General Sheridan, who has taken great pains to collect evidence on this point, places it considerably below these figures; but assuming these to be correct, and granting what is still more improbable, that Bragg would abandon all his rear posts, and entirely neglect his communications, and could bring his last man into battle, I next ask, What have we to oppose to him?

The last official report of effective strength of this army, now on file in the office of the Assistant Adjutant-General, is dated June eleventh, instant, and shows that we have in this department, omitting all officers and enlisted men attached to department, corps, division, and brigade headquarters, —

First, infantry, one hundred and seventy-three regiments, ten battalions sharpshooters, four pioneers, one regiment engineers and mechanics, with a total effective strength of seventy thousand nine hundred and eighteen.

Second, cavalry, twenty-seven regiments, one unattached company: eleven thousand eight hundred and thirteen.

Third, forty-seven and a half batteries field artillery, consisting of two hundred and ninety-two guns, and five thousand and sixty-nine men; making a grand total of eighty-seven thousand eight hundred: or, leaving out all commissioned officers, this army represents eighty-two thousand seven hundred and sixty-seven bayonets and sabres.

This report does not include the Fifth Iowa cavalry, six hundred strong, lately armed, nor the First Wisconsin cavalry, nor Coburn's brigade of infantry, now arriving, nor the two thousand three hundred and ninety-four convalescents now on light duty in Fortress Rosecrans.

There are detached from this force as follows: —

At Gallatin,	969
" Carthage,	1,149
" Fort Donelson,	1,495
" Clarkesville,	1,138
" Nashville,	7,292
" Franklin,	900
" Loverane,	2,117
Total,	5,130

With these posts as they are, and leaving two thousand five hundred efficient men, in addition to the two thousand three hundred and ninety-four convalescents, to hold the works at this place, there will be left sixty-five thousand one hundred and thirty-seven bayonets and sabres to throw against Bragg's forty-one thousand six hundred and eighty.

I beg leave also to submit the following considerations: —

1. Bragg's army is now weaker than it has been since the battle, or is likely to be again for the present, while our army has reached its maximum strength, and we have no right to expect further reënforcements for several months, if at all.

2. Whatever be the result at Vicksburg, the determination of its fate will give large reënforcements to Bragg. If Grant is successful, his army will require many weeks to recover from the shock and strain of his late campaign, while Johnson will send back to Bragg a force sufficient to insure the safety of Tennessee. If Grant fails, the same result will inevitably follow, so far as Bragg's army is concerned. No man can affirm with certainty the result of any battle, however great the disparity in numbers, — such results are in the hand of God. But viewing the question in the light of human calculation, I refuse to entertain a doubt that this army, which in January last defeated Bragg's superior numbers, can overwhelm his greatly inferior force. The most unfavorable course for us that Bragg could take would be to fall back without giving us battle. But this would be very disastrous to him, besides the loss of material of war and the abandonment of the rich and abundant harvest now nearly ripe in Central Tennessee. He would lose heavily by desertion. It is well known that a wide-spread dissatisfaction exists among his Kentucky and Tennessee troops. They are already deserting in large numbers. A retreat would greatly increase both the desire and the opportunity for desertion, and would very materially reduce his physical and moral strength. While it would lengthen our line of communications it would give us possession of McMinnsville, and enable us to threaten Chattanooga and East Tennessee; and

it would not be unreasonable to expect an early occupation of the former place.

5. But the chances are more than even that a sudden and rapid movement would compel a general engagement, and the defeat of Bragg would be in the highest degree disastrous to the rebellion.

6. The turbulent aspect of politics in the loyal states renders a decisive blow against the enemy at this time of the highest importance to the success of the government at the polls, and in the enforcement of the Conscription Act.

7. The government and the war department believe that this army ought to move upon the enemy — the army desires it, and the country is anxiously hoping for it.

8. Our true objective point is the rebel army, whose last reserves are substantially in the field, and an effective blow will crush the shell, and soon be followed by the collapse of the rebel government.

9. You have, in my judgment, wisely delayed a general movement hitherto till your army could be massed and your cavalry could be mounted. Your Mobile force can now be concentrated in twenty-four hours, and your cavalry, if not equal in numerical strength to that of the enemy, is greatly superior in efficiency and morale.

For these reasons, I believe an immediate advance of all our available forces is advisable, and, under the providence of God will be successful.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. GARFIELD,
Brigadier-General, Chief of Staff.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROSECRANS,
Commanding Department Cumberland.

Official: E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Doc. 34.

HARPER'S FERRY ARMORY AND HISTORY.

THE recent appearance of the first instalment of several works devoted to the war, suggests to those who are familiar with the events the duty of correcting at once the errors necessarily incident to the haste with which these volumes have been prepared before such errors are permanently incorporated into the recognized authorities on the subject of the rebellion. And an article in a late number of a popular magazine is so palpably deficient in fact, and so erroneous in deduction, as to call for a response. In truth, histories of the great rebellion are so rapidly multiplying that the power of the press seems to be severely taxed to supply the demand, the varieties being suited to every taste, from the baffled malignity and dismal lamentations which form a pleasing climax to that gem in the literature of treason known as the "Lost Cause," to the ponderous compilations which make up the pages of the "Rebellion Record." Very little time has been lost "in the improvement of the subject," and writers and publishers have been alike anxious to

"Catch, ere she change, the Cynthia of the minute."

Whether there has not possibly been an undue haste in the preparation of these works, whether the facts have been sought and eliminated with sufficient industry and care, whether reference has been had in all cases to the best authorities, and whether the passions and prejudices pertaining to the conflict have sufficiently subsided to secure a thoroughly faithful and impartial narrative of events so complicated and momentous, are questions which I do not propose to discuss. All will admit, however, that every fact which is not below the dignity of history is worthy of being told correctly; and it cannot be altogether uninteresting or unprofitable to glance at some of the statements touching one incident which marked the commencement of the rebellion, and to show how widely these statements vary from the whole truth. As every work on the subject of the war to which the writer has had access pretends to describe this incident with more or less minuteness, the facts connected therewith may be considered of sufficient consequence to justify an appeal to the testimony as found in the official records. The substance of what is herein related may be found in the evidence given before the committee of the senate which investigated the matter, and of which Mr. Senator Grimes was the acting chairman.

This historic perversion has finally assumed so considerable a magnitude as to be found in the newspaper and the magazine; in the incidental summaries of the biographer, in the more elaborate disquisitions of the historian, and in the quasi authoritative reports of the war department. In his history of the "American Conflict," Mr. Greeley introduces the fiction with commendable brevity; Mr. Lossing, according to the character and purpose of his work, goes more into detail, and supports himself by a formidable array of marginal references; the authors of Harper's "Pictorial History" repeat the story with additions, and General Strother, who was on the ground, and who ought to have known, and evidently intended to narrate the facts in his spirited sketch in Harper's Magazine for June, 1866, indorses the general error. In Holland's admirable life of Mr. Lincoln, the story is thus told: —

"The government works at Harper's Ferry were blown up and burned by Lieutenant Jones, in command of a company of regulars, moved by the intelligence of an advance of a large confederate force." Mr. Secretary Cameron, whose forgetfulness, as will be shown, is very extraordinary, in his official report at the extra session of Congress in 1861 uses the following language: —

"In this connection it is a pleasurable duty to refer to the very gallant action of Lieutenant Roger Jones, at Harper's Ferry, and the handsome and successful manner in which he executed the orders of the government at that important post." Other quotations are not necessary, as the essence of the fiction is contained in these two brief passages, though in the "histories" referred to the story is considerably amplified and embellished. Lieutenant Jones was never in command at Harper's Ferry. For several

months preceding the assault on Fort Sumter he had been stationed at the armory in command of a guard of about fifty men. The superintendent of the armory was a delegate to the Richmond convention, but though elected as a Union man, voted with the majority for secession, and immediately hastened home to surrender his command to the traitors. On the day that Virginia "seceded," Captain Kingsbury, of the ordnance department, then on duty in Washington, was ordered, at the suggestion of General Scott, to proceed immediately to Harper's Ferry and assume command.

That order was couched in the following terms: —

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, April 17, 1861.

SIR: By direction of the Secretary of War you will immediately proceed to Harper's Ferry, Virginia, and perform the duties of superintendent of the armory at that place until further orders.

I am, Sir,
Very respectfully, &c.,
(Signed,) L. THOMAS,
Adjutant-General.

To Captain CHARLES P. KINGSBURY,
Ordnance Department.

Should it occur to the reader that there is a slight discrepancy between the language of Mr. Cameron's report as already quoted, and the terms of this order, I must refer him to that ex-official for an explanation. And it would also be satisfactory if a copy of "the orders of the government," which were "executed in such a handsome and successful manner," could be furnished at the same time by the Secretary. Before leaving Washington, Captain Kingsbury received verbal instructions from General Scott. On the morning of the eighteenth of April he assumed control of the armory. The ordinary operations of the post were continued until after the arrival of the first passenger train from the east. On that train came the late Superintendent, of the armory with a few friends, and their advent was signalized by a disloyal demonstration on the part of a crowd in attendance upon the depot. The cry, "Virginia will take care of Harper's Ferry!" was loudly and defiantly repeated. An intense excitement soon prevailed in the village, and extended to the shops. It was evident, from the confidence of the traitors, that in their opinion the place would soon be in their possession, and if it was to be defended no time must be lost in organizing the Union forces. The shops were accordingly closed, by order of Captain Kingsbury; the men were assembled, and in a brief address the commanding officer described the situation, and called for volunteers. The workmen had been formed into military companies since the John Brown raid. All who were faithful to their allegiance, and willing to protect and defend the property of the United States, were directed to assemble with their company organizations at one o'clock P. M. The order was received with applause; the men dispersed, as was supposed, for their arms and equipments; but the appointed hour arrived, and brought with it no such force as had been expected. Only a small number of the men employed responded to the appeal, and it was uncertain, in view of the active and evil influences then at work around them, how many of these could be relied on at the decisive moment. To attempt to defend the post with the small detachment of regulars, would have been preposterous; for before one o'clock it was believed, on the authority of a telegram from Washington, that an armed force was *en route* from Richmond to capture the place, and secure the fifteen thousand arms which were still in store, and which Floyd and his coadjutors had been unable to dispose of. There was then but one alternative by which to defeat the purpose of the traitors, and the destruction of the arms became a military necessity. About three o'clock P. M. a report was received that several Virginia companies were marching from Charlestown to the Ferry, and it was also ascertained that the agents of the railroad to Winchester had been specially instructed to keep the track clear that night, which was an unusual order, as only day trains were habitually run upon that road. As the necessity for active measures arose much sooner than had been anticipated the preparations were necessarily hastily made; and as the civil employees of the government could not be relied upon, the details of the affair were of course confided to Lieutenant Jones and his men. The powder belonging to the armory was in the magazine on the heights, and orders were given by Captain Kingsbury to have it transferred where it would be at once available. Government powder is packed in barrels, holding one hundred pounds each, and these, from their size, could not be conveyed to the storehouses containing the arms without revealing the fact, and possibly exciting suspicion as to the object of the transfer. Fortunately several small kegs were found, which proved to have been carried thither by John Brown, and which were admirably adapted to the holy and patriotic purpose for which it was now wanted. The boxes containing the arms were so arranged as to be most favorable to ignition, the fagots were piled and the powder distributed, ready for the application of the fire at the given signal. Care was taken in the arrangement of the powder to prevent, as far as practicable, any injury to private dwellings or their occupants by the explosion; and as the prime object of the Virginia expedition was plainly the seizure of the arms, their destruction was considered of such importance as not to be hazarded by a diversion of the means to other parts of the establishment. It therefore became necessary to rely upon the natural combustibility of the materials for the destruction of the workshops and machinery. Between nine and ten o'clock P. M. a gentleman arrived from the direction of Charlestown, and reported that about two thousand men were within a short distance of the place. As this information appeared reliable, the match was soon applied to the trains already laid in the arsenals, and to the combustible materials in the carpenter's

shop, and the room containing the gunstocks. The rifle works, in which there were but a small number of finished arms, on account of their remoteness, could not be conveniently fired. As soon as the buildings were fairly lighted, Lieutenant Jones with his guard left for Hagerstown, while Captain Kingsbury was hardly authorized to leave then, and was also unwilling to depart before learning the result of his efforts to baffle the Richmond conspirators. For some time after the beginning of the conflagration the streets of the village were deserted. At length one man, who appeared more enterprising than his neighbors, entered one of the burning arsenals and hauled therefrom into the street a box of arms. On opening it, and not finding the rifle muskets he evidently expected, he rushed again towards the building for the probable purpose of trying his luck upon another, when the first discharge of old John Brown's powder caused him to recoil, and it is believed that no other attempt was made to enter the storehouses before the contents were destroyed. Captain Kingsbury, therefore, had the gratification of ascertaining, that although the shops and machinery were not seriously damaged, of the fifteen thousand or sixteen thousand rifles and muskets in store, which were intended to arm the battalions of treason, only a few hundred — and not thousands, as has been stated — that were scattered among the buildings escaped destruction.

The entire responsibility of the affair thus devolved upon Captain Kingsbury. He sought to defend the place by arming the operatives, and when this was found impracticable, it was by his orders and through his instrumentality that the only means at hand were made available to destroy the arms, and thus defeat the object of the assault.

Of all those engaged in the affair he was the only one exposed to personal peril. At one time, surrounded by an infuriate mob, with a bayonet at his breast, he might probably have been the first victim of the rebellion but for the generous interposition of a gentleman present, to whom he was almost a stranger. A citizen of Harper's Ferry thus wrote to him, on the twenty-fifth of April: "The feeling against you rose very high, and I was glad to learn that you had left the place. If you had not, I have no doubt but your person would have sustained injury." After escaping from the hands of his captors, Captain Kingsbury was enabled, by a night tramp of twenty-two miles over the cross-ties of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, to reach Washington on the evening of the nineteenth, where he found, on his arrival, that the pressure of official duty was such that he had no time to make a written report of his conduct. That, however, was not then necessary, as the facts were not only well known in military circles, but also among the rebel sympathizers of the capital. Yet, notwithstanding all this, the name of the officer who originated the movement, and carried it to a successful conclusion, was suppressed at the time by the northern papers, and carefully excluded from an official report of the affair by the very Secretary by whose order he was thus suddenly placed in a position of such responsibility; and the same version or perversion of the facts is still reproduced by all the historians of the rebellion. But while Captain Kingsbury's name was thus systematically ignored at the north, and by the war department of the government, his efforts for the cause of the Union were promptly recognized and appreciated elsewhere. In the "Staunton (Va.) Spectator," and other southern newspapers, he was denounced for his action at Harper's Ferry as a "diabolical monster," and his name held up for reproach and execration among his friends and relatives at the south.

A brief glance at the circumstances connected with the attack on Harper's Ferry will show that the events of that night probably had a far more important bearing upon the final result of the rebellion than has ever been publicly ascribed to them. The object of Wise — who it was understood originated the raid — and his fellow-conspirators was, evidently, to capture the arms, proceed at once to Baltimore, arm the ruffians then having control of that city, and complete the then easy conquest of the national capital. An extra locomotive of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, with steam on, was in waiting at the Harper's Ferry bridge; a mysterious party from Baltimore was on the ground, one of whom positively refused the use of the engine to carry Captain Kingsbury beyond the power of the mob from which he had just made his escape; and the next day — the day of the slaughter of the Massachusetts troops — these arms would doubtless have been in the hands of the myrmidons of treason on a triumphal march to Washington.

This view of the matter is forcibly presented in Abbott's history of the rebellion, and is sustained by the following extracts from letters written by officers holding at that time high position in the military service. General Craig, who was then Chief of Ordnance, thus writes: "There can be no doubt the destruction of the arms there (Harper's Ferry) was cause of great disappointment to the conspirators, who evidently calculated on being able by their means to equip a force sufficient to capture the capital, half filled as it was with traitors and lukewarm officials." General Cullum, who was then on the staff of Lieutenant-General Scott, writes as follows: "It was doubtless the design of the rebels to procure arms there (Harper's Ferry) and move on Baltimore. Washington was doubtless the ultimate point of attack; but the whole rebel project failed by the destruction of the arms at Harper's Ferry." If these views are correct, is it not probable that not only the capital, but the nation, was thus saved? For if the traitors had then obtained possession of Washington, the concession of belligerent rights by France and England would have been promptly followed by unconditional recognition, and the bastard progeny of rebellion — to quote the language of Edmund Burke, similarly applied — begotten "in a drunken delirium, produced by hot spirits drawn from the alembic of hell," would have become legitimatized by a successful revolution.

Doc. 35.

CAPTURE OF THE CHESAPEAKE.

LIEUT.-COMMANDER NICKELS'S REPORT.

UNITED STATES STEAMER "ELLA AND ANNA,"
BOSTON, December 23, 1863.

SIR: In accordance with Commodore Montgomery's order of the ninth instant, to proceed to sea and cruise in search of the pirate "Chesapeake," we got under way at twenty minutes to one P. M., on the tenth instant, and proceeded to sea. Arrived at Eastport, Maine, on the twelfth instant, at nine A. M., having encountered head winds and thick weather, and left on the same day at ten A. M., with news that the "Chesapeake" was in Margaret's Bay, N. S. Arrived off Cross Island, the entrance to Margaret's Bay, at six P. M., on the thirteenth. The weather being so thick we could not enter, and we attempted to lay in sight of the light; but, thicker weather coming on, and a heavy blow from the southward, we could not make the land until two P. M. on the fifteenth instant, to the eastward of our port. Finding it impossible to get into Margaret's Bay, and the ship being so light that we could do but little in the gale which was blowing, and our coal being nearly exhausted, we ran into Halifax. Arrived at the coal wharf at half past five P. M., and left at eleven P.M. (having taken in one hundred and thirty-six tons coal) for La Have, N. S., where the "Chesapeake" was then reported to be. All this night a heavy gale was blowing from the westward, rendering it difficult to get to the windward. Arrived at La Have on the sixteenth instant, at three P. M., and found the pirate had left that place the night before, and the mouth of the river that morning. We then got news that she was at Lunenberg, (twenty-five miles distant,) and we immediately started for that port, where we arrived at half past six P. M. Telegraphed at once to Halifax for news of her whereabouts, which we received, stating that the "Chesapeake" entered Mud Cove, Sambro Harbor, that evening. We immediately got under way, and ran down to the mouth of the harbor, where we remained, being unable to find a pilot to take us in before daylight. We then steamed in under full steam, hoping to catch the pirates asleep. At twenty minutes past seven A. M. made her out, with a schooner alongside coaling her. We immediately cleared for action, putting all the guns on the starboard side, the side we wished to board her from, as we had news that she had mounted two guns. At ten minutes before eight laid our ship alongside, striking her, but not heavily, on the port bow. Upon boarding her, found that all the pirates had escaped, except two who had been shipped in the Provinces. We immediately commenced coaling her from this ship, also putting stores, and a prize crew on board. We then sent an armed boat's crew on board the schooner which had been coaling the "Chesapeake," preparatory to leaving, and found several trunks and packages, which the Captain of the schooner acknowledged to have been taken from the "Chesapeake," and also one of the original seventeen who captured the steamer off Cape Cod, and whom we found secreted in the cabin, under buffalo skins. We took the packages and trunks on board the "Chesapeake," transferring the pirate, together with the other two found on board the "Chesapeake," to the "Ella and Anna," and placed them in double irons.

I neglected to say that, when near the prize the American ensign was hoisted, "Union down," by the engineer, one of the original crew held as prisoners by the pirates soon after the pirates had left her in boats.

At one P. M. finished coaling, and put Acting-Master William McGlown in charge of the prize, with written orders to proceed to Boston, and report to the Commandant of the navy yard. I immediately got under way with prize alongside, and steamed out of the Cove. At the mouth of Sambro Harbor fell in with the United States sloop of war "Dacotah," Captain Cleary, who hailed us, and asked if that was the "Chesapeake." I replied in the affirmative. He then asked, "Where do you proceed with your prize?" I replied, "To Boston." He then asked, "Did you catch the pirates?" I replied, I had but three. He then told me to repair on board. I went on board, when he ordered me to proceed to Halifax with the prize for adjudication; at which port we arrived and dropped anchor at quarter before four P. M. I immediately telegraphed to Commandant Montgomery of my arrival, and of my capture. The matter now remains in Captain Cleary's hands, who, on the morning of the nineteenth, ordered me to transfer the prisoners to the custody of the British officers, and to turn the prize over to the British authorities. Accordingly at one P. M. I sent Ensign Coghlan with the three prisoners to the British authorities appointed to receive them. At two P. M. I transferred the prize to the British authorities, Captain O'Brien, of the revenue service, taking charge of her.

At four P. M. the "Dacotah" made signals for us to sail. I immediately visited the General commanding that post, and made apology for not calling, on my entrance the first time, and sailed at half past six P. M. for Boston, where we arrived this day.

Before closing I would call your attention to the noble conduct of all my officers, all of whom volunteered for this service. Some of them had just returned from a two years' cruise, and had at this time received no leave of absence to see their families, being attached to the "Santiago de Cuba." The others were attached to vessels now refitting in Boston, and enjoying a few days in port. All were ready for any duty or emergency, and seconded me in any matter I proposed, and underwent the hardships of a cold and stormy cruise cheerfully.

Enclosed please find a list of the officers, showing the duty they were upon when attached to this ship.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. F. NICKELS, U. S. N.,
Acting Vol. Lieut.-Com. U. S. Steamer "Ella and Anna."

To Admiral SILAS STRINGHAM,
Commandant Navy Yard, Boston.

I certify the above to be a true copy.

J. F. NICKELS.

Doc. 36.

THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

GENERAL T. J. WOOD'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS, CHATTANOOGA, TENN., September 29, 1863.

SIR: At early dawn of the morning of Sunday, the sixteenth August, I received an order to move with my division from Hillsboro', Middle Tennessee, by the most practicable and expeditious route across the Cumberland Mountain to Sherman in the Sequatchy Valley.

Wednesday evening, the nineteenth, was the time fixed for the division to arrive at the destination assigned to it.

The Second brigade (Wagner's) had for a month previously occupied Pelham, near the foot of the mountains, and General Wagner had been ordered to repair the road up the mountains known as the Park road. As the order of movement left to my discretion the route by which my division should cross the mountains, I determined to make the ascent by the Park road, thence to Tracy City, thence by Johnson's to Purdon's, where I would fall into the road leading from McMinnville, by Altam Cut, to Thurman.

Immediately on receiving the order I despatched instructions to General Wagner to commence the ascent of the mountains, and to insure his being out of the way of the other two brigades, I directed he should continue the work of getting up his train during the night of the sixteenth. This was done, and early on the morning of the seventeenth, the road being free, the First and Third brigades, with their baggage trains and the ammunition and supply trains of the division, began to ascend the mountains.

The work was continued unintermittedly through the day and entire night of the seventeenth, and by ten o'clock of the eighteenth the whole was up. Wagner's brigade had advanced to Tracy City Monday morning, the seventeenth, with orders to move forward as far as the Thurman, or Anderson road, on Tuesday, the eighteenth. I allowed the First and Third brigades, Buell's and Harker's, to rest until one P. M., on the eighteenth, and then moved to Tracy City. Wagner was ordered to advance on the Thurman road to Thurman, Wednesday morning, select a good encampment, and await my arrival there with the other Second brigades and the heavy trains. The distance from Tracy City to Thurman is twenty-eight miles, which had to be accomplished in one day, with the First and Third brigades, their batteries, and the trains to be at the rendezvous assigned me at the designated time. At four o'clock A. M., on the nineteenth, the march was commenced, and a little after nightfall the brigades encamped at Thurman.

The order for the general movement directed me to take with me two days' subsistence for the men, and ten days' grain for the animals. I descended into the Sequatchy Valley with twenty-five days' subsistence for the men, and sixteen days' grain for the animals.

I do not mention this fact in a spirit of egotism, but simply to show what can be accomplished by intelligence, good judgment, energy, and a willingness to make some sacrifice of personal comfort by commanders.

Every experienced and educated soldier knows that one of the greatest drawbacks on the mobility and activity, and consequently on the offensive power of an army, is to be found in the immense baggage and supply trains that usually accompany its movements: hence, whatever lessens the number of vehicles required for the transport of baggage, by so much increases the efficiency of the army. I transported all the supplies I took into Sequatchy Valley in the wagons originally assigned to my division for the transportation of regimental and staff baggage.

I was then prepared with my division for a campaign of twenty-five days on full rations, or fifty days on half rations. The additional forage required beyond what I brought with me could have been found in the country.

In conformity with the order for the general movement I despatched Wagner's brigade early on Thursday morning, the twentieth, to the easttern slope of Naldron's ridge, to make something of a show of force, and at the same time closely observe, and, if opportunity permitted, to threaten the enemy. With the other two brigades, First and Third, I remained encamped at Thurman till the early morning of the first of September; I then moved, in conformity to orders, to Jasper, lower down in the valley.

Late in the afternoon of the second I received an order to send one of my brigades to Shellmound, to cross the Tennessee River. The First brigade was immediately put in motion under this order, and, under the skilful management of Colonel Buell, was thrown across the river rapidly and without accident during the night. Early on the morning of the third, I moved with the Third brigade and the ammunition and ambulance trains to the crossing, and with the energetic and judicious assistance of Colonel Harker, had everything passed rapidly across without accident. I remained encamped at Shellmound until Saturday afternoon, the fifth, awaiting orders, the delay being occasioned by the necessity of waiting for the supply trains, which had been sent across the river at Bridgeport.

During the afternoon of the fifth I received an order to move with the two brigades of my division with me, via Whiteside and the river road, to the junction of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad with the Trenton Railroad, for the purpose of observing and threatening the enemy posted on the spur of Lookout Mountain. I advanced as far as Whiteside Saturday afternoon and evening. Early Sunday morning I continued to advance, Harker's brigade leading. Soon very light parties of the enemy were encountered, but they rapidly fell back before my steady onward movement, though the country through which my line of march led me is most favorable to a prolonged and obstinate resistance by a small force.

Crossing Raccoon Mountain, I descended into

Lookout Mountain Valley, and then followed down the valley northward to the junction of the two railways. As I moved down the valley the enemy's signal stations on the crest of Lookout Mountain were in full and perfect view, evidently watching my advance, and rapidly communicating the result of their observations to the rear. At the junction of the railway my command was about two to two and a half miles from the enemy's advanced works; but the outposts and pickets were much nearer each other, in fact, in hearing distance. As I was well aware that the enemy had been able to learn from his signal stations with very close approximate correctness the strength of my command, and hence would be most likely disposed to take advantage of my inferiority of force and attempt to crush me by a sudden blow, I immediately made the best possible disposition to foil him in such an attempt. In making these dispositions I soon became convinced of the utter untenableness of the position at the junction of the railway for an inferior force to receive an attack from a superior one. The position is entirely open, capable of being assailed simultaneously in front, on both flanks, and in rear. I was well satisfied I was in the immediate proximity of a very large force of the enemy, (which could be still further swelled in a very short time.) This information I had gained satisfactorily during my advance; and it was strengthened and corroborated during the afternoon and evening of the sixth. At two o'clock P. M. I communicated to the Corps commander my position seven miles from Chattanooga, (being at the junction of the railway,) informed him of my immediate proximity to the enemy, and attempted to describe briefly the objects which debarred my farther progress to Chattanooga. At four P. M. I communicated to him the result of further observations, and some facts omitted in my note of two P. M. In my note of two P. M. I suggested that he should move part of the force immediately with him, to cover my rear from a reverse attack. This he declined to do, on the ground of a want of authority, and indicated that in case I should be attacked by a superior force I would have to fall back on him, also indicating that if I should have to retreat, I had better do so by the Trenton road. I had already opened communication with him by that road. Not intending to retreat except as a matter of direct necessity and last extremity, and as the evidence continued to increase during the evening that I would be attacked in heavy force early next morning, I determined to shift my command a mile and a half to the rear, to a very strong and highly defensible position, in which I was satisfied I could maintain myself against almost any odds for a long time, and if finally overpowered, could draw off my command to the rear. From this position I could maintain my communication by the Trenton road with the force immediately with the Corps commander. The movement was commenced at ten o'clock P. M., the sixth, and made with perfect success, though my pickets were at the time in hearing of the enemy's pickets. My command was thus safely extricated from immediate imminent danger. I learned satisfactorily, during the afternoon of the sixth, that the spur of Lookout Mountain was held by Chatham's division, supported immediately in rear of Hindman's (late Withers's) division, being the whole of Lieutenant-General Polk's Corps. My two small brigades confronted this force. About eight A. M. in the morning of the seventh, I received a copy of a communication addressed by the commanding General to the Corps commander, saying that he thought it would be safe (judging from some indications he had obtained of the movements of the enemy) to threaten the enemy on the spur of Lookout Mountain with a part of my force. This communication the corps commander appears to have construed into an order to make a reconnoissance in force, and accordingly ordered that I should make such a reconnoissance without loss of time. I accordingly commenced at once to make my preparations for making the reconnoissance, and actually made it at the earliest possible moment compatible with the safety of the command and the assurance of the success of the reconnoissance itself. As the results of the reconnoissance have hitherto been reported, I will not now recapitulate them. After taking the necessary precautions for insuring the safety, as far as possible, of the command to be engaged in the reconnoissance, and the assurance of the success of the reconnoissance, I committed the conduct of it to that gallant and accomplished officer, Colonel Harker, commanding the Third brigade of my division. I instructed him to proceed with the utmost circumspection, but to force his command as near to the enemy's position as he might deem prudent. This point I was of course compelled to submit to his judgment. It affords me the greatest satisfaction to record, in a permanent, official manner, that Colonel Harker conducted the reconnoissance in exact conformity with my wishes and instructions.

Securing well his flanks and rear from being assailed without timely notice, he drove his solid line to within some thousand yards of the enemy's batteries, (and his line of skirmishers to within some six hundred yards,) when twelve guns opened on him, and then drew off his command, with the loss of but one man. I know no parallel in military history to this reconnoissance. My command being much jaded and worn by the labors of the several preceding days, I allowed it to rest during the eighth. But I was on the alert to gain information of the movements and designs of the enemy. Near nightfall I obtained some information which led me to suspect the enemy was evacuating Chattanooga, but the individuals who gave it were by no means positive. With a view to verifying this information, I addressed a note to the Corps commander, informing him that I had observed some mysterious indications on the part of the enemy, of which I proposed to compel a development by a reconnoissance in force early next morning. During the night I received a reply to my note, saying the Corps commander could not approve the making the reconnoissance on account of some indications of a general movement of the army, but that he would refer my note to the com-

manding General. Confidently believing the commanding General would approve my proposition to make the reconnoissance, I held my command in readiness for the movement. In the mean time General Wagner, having with him the Second brigade of my division, had received information on the northern side of the river that the enemy was evacuating Chattanooga.

The information having been communicated to the commanding General of the army, an order was despatched to me to move my command to Chattanooga, prepared for a vigorous pursuit of the enemy.

This agreeable order was joyfully obeyed, and in a very few minutes my command was in rapid motion. Between my late camp in Lookout Mountain Valley and the spur of the mountain my command was overtaken by the Ninety-second Illinois mounted infantry, commanded by Colonel Adkins, who informed me he had been ordered to press forward to Chattanooga with all haste, to secure any property the enemy might have left behind, and to discover something of his lines of retreat. I allowed his regiment to pass my command; but on the spur of the mountain I overtook the regiment, halted, when the Colonel informed me that the enemy's skirmishers outflanked his, and his further progress was debarred. I immediately threw forward the Twenty-sixth Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Young commanding, to the right and higher up the mountain side than the skirmishers of Colonel Adkins extended, and rapidly drove the enemy's skirmishers from the mountain side. No further opposition was encountered in occupying Chattanooga, and the Ninety-second Illinois pushed rapidly into the town, followed by my First and Third brigades. The Second brigade crossed from the north side of the river during the afternoon and evening of the ninth. The colors of the Ninety-seventh Ohio, of the Second brigade of my division, were the first planted on the works of Chattanooga, having been brought across the river by a few men in a small boat early in the morning. Thus was this great strategic position, the long-sought goal, gained to us, and occupied by our troops!

Placing myself as soon as possible after the occupation in communication with most intelligent and reliable citizens, I learned that a portion of the enemy's troops had retreated by the Cove road, and that the remainder, with the baggage and the material of war, had retreated by the Rossville and Lafayette road. I was informed further that Buckner's command, which had been posted at Tyner's Station, on the railway, had retreated by Johnson, to Ringgold; but I subsequently learned that he did not go so far eastward as Ringgold, but passed through Greysville, and thence to Lafayette. The bulk of these facts I reported to the commander of the Corps immediately on his arrival, and by him I am informed they were communicated to the commanding General. My division remained in Chattanooga until the morning of the tenth. I then received an order to detail one brigade to occupy the town, and move with the other two in pursuit of the enemy by the Rossville and Ringgold Road. The Second brigade was detailed to remain in Chattanooga. At ten A. M. of the tenth, I led the First and Third brigades out of Chattanooga, to commence the pursuit of the enemy. At two P. M. of that day I advised the Corps commander of the reported presence of a considerable force on my right flank, and at half past seven P. M. I further advised him that I had taken a "contraband" during the late afternoon, who reported the bulk of the rebel army, with General Bragg in person, at Gordon's Mill, on the Chickamauga, where it is crossed by the Rossville and Lafayette road. I was incredulous of the story, and so expressed myself; but if true, it was so important it should be known, that I deemed it my duty to report his narrative. It is due to the humble person who furnished me this invaluable information to record that subsequent developments proved his report to be singularly accurate and correct. Based on my note of half past seven P. M. of the tenth, a communication was sent me by the commanding General to send a brigade by the way of Rossville, to make a reconnoissance in the direction of Gordon's Mill, with a view to verifying the truth of the "contraband's" report. The order was received at early daylight of the morning of the eleventh. Colonel Harker's brigade was immediately sent to execute this service. About the time Harker's brigade was moving, the Corps commander arrived at my camp. I was directed by him to move forward with my remaining brigade two miles on the Ringgold road, and there to await further orders. The order was obeyed. At half past three P. M., while awaiting further instructions, I received an order from the commanding General to move across the country, by the shortest and most expeditious route, to the Rossville and Lafayette road, to support Colonel Harker. Near the same hour I received a note from Colonel Harker, informing me that he had been driving the enemy all day, and had arrived within three miles of Gordon's Mill. I immediately sent him an order to press forward to the mill, and informing him that I would make a junction there with him during the evening. The junction was made, and fortunately, for Harker had been driving his little brigade all day against a vastly superior force, the rear guard of the enemy's great army. A full report of this brilliant and dangerous reconnoissance has been already made, and it is not now necessary that I should say more than that it was superbly made.

When I arrived at Gordon's Mill, at half past eight P. M., of the eleventh, the enemy's camp fires could be distinctly seen on the other side of the creek. Their light reflected over a wide section of the horizon, and extending upward on the heavens, told that the foe was present in considerable force. It was my intention to continue the pursuit early next morning, the twelfth, but till eiget o'clock A. M. the atmosphere was so loaded with haze, fog, and smoke, that it was difficult to see a hundred yards in advance. While I was waiting for the atmosphere to become sufficiently clear to continue the pursuit I received an order to remain at Gordon's Mill until the Corps commander arrived there with

the other two divisions of the corps. This was done during the afternoon of the twelfth. My two brigades remained quiet during the thirteenth, enjoying much needed rest. During the evening of the thirteenth a copy of a letter of instructions from the commanding General to the Corps commander was furnished me by the latter, in which he was directed to leave my command at Gordon's Mill, and proceed with the other two divisions to a position on Missionary Ridge, with a view to facilitating the concentration with the other corps of the army. My orders directed me to try stoutly to maintain the position at Gordon's Mill, but if attacked by a superior force, to fall back slowly, resisting stoutly, to Rossville, where it was supposed I would be supported by Major-General Granger's force, in case of extremity; and in case I should not be supported at Rossville by Granger, I was directed to select a position guarding the roads leading to Chattanooga and around the point of Lookout Mountain, and hold them at all hazards. Resolved to make the most stubborn resistance at Gordon's Mill, I took advantage of the creek, a very strong and defensible position, and barricaded my entire front and flanks strongly. So strengthened, I could have successfully resisted a front attack of a vastly superior force.

With the exception of an occasional firing on my pickets, the enemy left me undisturbed at Gordon's Mill till between eleven A. M. and twelve M., of Friday, the eighteenth instant. A rapid advance of his light troops, supported by troops in a solid line on my right front, drove in my pickets as far as the creek, but no effort was made to pass the stream. Such an attempt would have been foiled, and cost the enemy dearly. At about one o'clock P. M. a force, apparently about a brigade of four regiments, emerged from the woods on the southern side of the creek, nearly opposite the centre of my position, apparently with the intention of forcing a passage at the ford near the mill. A few well-directed shots from Bradley's battery soon forced him to relinquish this design, and seek the shelter of the woods. The enemy continued to hover in my front during the whole afternoon, making, however, no serious attempts, and I accordingly became reasonably satisfied that his demonstrations were only a mask to his real design, that of passing a heavy force across the creek lower down, with a view to turning our left, and cutting our communications with Chattanooga. I communicated my opinion on this point to the commanding General at his headquarters during the evening of the eighteenth. It was verified by the opening of a terrific engagement on our left as early as half past eight A. M. on the nineteenth; troops had been moved to our left during the night of the eighteenth to meet the exigency. The battle continued throughout the forenoon and into the afternoon, but my command was left at Gordon's Mill until three o'clock P. M. At this hour I received a verbal order from the Corps commander, through one of his staff, to move with my command, and to take position, as well as I now remember, on the right of some part of General Van Cleve's division. Throughout the entire preceding part of the day I had distinctly observed a considerable force in front of my position at Gordon's Mill, and just before I had received the order to move into action a "contraband" came into my lines, from whom I learned that this force was the division of General Bushrod Johnson.

Knowing that it would pass the creek immediately on my evacuating my position, if it should not be occupied by some other troops, I despatched one of my Aids-de-camp to the commanding General, to inform him of the presence of this force in my then front, and to suggest that at least a brigade should be sent to occupy the position so soon as I should vacate it. On his way to the headquarters of the commanding General my Aid-de-camp encountered Major-General McCook, to whom he communicated the object of his mission to headquarters. General McCook immediately ordered a brigade from his corps to move into position at Gordon's Mill. My Aid-de-camp rode on to headquarters and reported what had been done to the commanding General, who approved the disposition. No delay, however, had occurred on this account in the movement of my command from Gordon's Mill. Immediately on the receipt of the order my command was put in rapid motion for the scene of the great conflict. As already remarked, the order directed me to take position on the right of General Van Cleve's command, but as I was totally ignorant of his position in the battle, and met no one on my arrival on the field to enlighten me, I found myself much embarrassed for the want of information, whereas I could bring my command judiciously and effectively into action. It should be borne in mind that many of the troops were engaged in the woods, and that it was next to impossible to gain information by sight of the arrangement of the troops already engaged.

This information could only be given by general and staff officers, posted in advance to aid in bringing the troops arriving freshly on the ground into action properly. Fortunately, shortly after my arrival on the field I met General Davis, from whom I received some useful information in regard to the status of the conflict. From him I learned that his left brigade, Haynes's, was sorely pressed and needed assistance. While I was in conference with him, a staff officer informed him that Colonel Haynes reported he could not maintain his position, and at the same instant I saw a stream of fugitives pouring out of the woods across the Rossville and Lafayette road, and over the field to the west of it. These, I learned, belonged to Haynes's brigade of Davis's division. It was evident a crisis was at hand; the advance of the enemy, before which these men were retiring, must be checked at once, or the army would be cut in twain. Desiring Major Mendenhall, of the Corps commander's staff, who chanced to be near me at the moment, to go and rally the fugitives rushing across the field on the west side of the road, I at once commenced my dispositions to check the advancing foe. When I first met General Davis on the field I had inquired of him where the fight was.

He pointed into the woods, whence the roar and rattle of a very sharp musketry fire resounded, and told me that Haynes's brigade was heavily engaged in there. I immediately directed Colonel Harker to form his brigade in battle array nearly parallel to the Rossville and Lafayette road, advance into the woods, and engage the enemy. But the evidence immediately brought to my notice, that Haynes's brigade was retiring, made a change in this position necessary. I consequently directed Colonel Harker to throw forward his right, holding his left as a pivot on the road, thus giving his line an oblique direction to the road, and then advance his whole line. By this disposition I hoped to be able to take the enemy's advancing force in flank. These dispositions, though expeditiously made, were scarcely completed, when a staff officer rode up, and reported that the enemy had gained the road and was advancing up it in the direction of Gordon's Mill. This information rendered necessary a further change in the arrangement of Harker's brigade. I ordered him to refuse his left, which brought the left half of his line at right angles to the road, and gave to his whole front the form of a broken line, with the apex towards the enemy. In this shape he advanced rapidly, engaged the enemy, and drove him between a half and three fourths of a mile. I followed his advance nearly half a mile, and finding he was doing well, as well as having perfect confidence in his ability to handle his brigade, I remarked to him that I would then leave him and go to look after my other brigade, Colonel Buell commanding, which had followed Harker's to the field of battle. For the details of the severe conflict through which Harker's brigade passed at this stage of the battle, for an account of the valuable service it rendered in checking the force which threatened to cut the right of the army from the left, for a report of the heavy loss of gallant officers and men which occurred here, and for a description of the skilful manner in which the brigade was extricated from the perils by which it became environed from encountering in its advance a vastly superior force, I must refer to the more detailed report of Colonel Harker. The list of casualties attests the severity of the fighting. The gallant commander himself had two horses shot under him. Bradley's battery, attached to Harker's brigade, owing to the density of the woods into which the brigade advanced, did not accompany it. The signal service which this battery rendered at a later period of the action will be chronicled at the proper time. Leaving Harker's brigade, I returned to where I had ordered Colonel Buell to halt and form his brigade. When I first met General Davis on the field of battle, I was informed by him that Carlin's brigade of his division was hotly engaged in the woods in advance, or eastward, of the cornfield in which our meeting occurred. The sharp and quick rattle of musketry fully assured the correctness of the statement. Seeing no other reserve at hand, and assured that both Harker and Carlin were seriously engaged, I determined to hold Buell's brigade in hand to meet emergencies. And it was fortunate I did so, for ere long Carlin's brigade was swept back out of the woods, across the cornfield, and into the woods beyond the field on the western side of the road, carrying everything away with it. When I observed the rush across the cornfield, I was near to the One Hundredth Illinois. With a view to checking the advancing and exultant enemy, I ordered Colonel Bartleson, commanding One Hundredth Illinois, to fix bayonets and charge on the foe. The bayonets were properly fixed, and the regiment had just commenced to advance, when it was struck by a crowd of fugitives, and swept away in the general melange. The whole of Buell's brigade was thus carried off its feet. It was necessary that it should fall back across the narrow field on the western side of the road to the edge of the wood, under whose cover it rallied. As soon as possible it was formed along the fence separating the field from the woods, and, with the aid of a part of Carlin's brigade, and a regiment of Wilder's brigade, dismounted, repulsed the enemy. This result was greatly contributed to by the heavy and most effective fire, at short range, of Bradley's and Estep's batteries. At this critical moment these two batteries were most splendidly served. The narrow field separating the woods on the west from the Rossville and Lafayette road is scarcely two hundred yards wide. Buell's brigade was formed just east of the road, when it was struck by Carlin's brigade; it hence had to retire, but the distance of less than two hundred yards to get the shelter of the woods for re-forming. But in crossing this narrow space it suffered terribly. The killed and wounded were thickly strewn on the ground. Captain George, Fifteenth Indiana, of my staff, was struck by a ball and knocked from his horse by my side.

So soon as the enemy was repulsed, I addressed myself to forming Colonel Buell's brigade, for the purpose of advancing it to recover the lost ground. Order being restored, and a sufficiently solid formation acquired to warrant an advance, I led the brigade back in person, and reoccupied the ground from which it had been forced, the side on which it was orignally formed.

In this advance my horse was twice shot, the second one proving fatal. I dismounted one of my orderlies near me and took his horse. In this advance a portion of Carlin's brigade participated, led by General Carlin. Estep's battery, attached to Buell's brigade, accompanied the advance. Scarcely had the lost ground been repossessed, when the enemy emerged from the woods on the eastern side of the cornfield, and commenced to cross it. He was formed in two lines, and "advanced firing." The appearance of his force was large. Fortunately reënforcements were at hand. A compact brigade, of Sheridan's division, not hitherto engaged, was at the moment crossing the field in the rear of the position then occupied by Buell's brigade and the portion of Carlin's. This fresh brigade advanced handsomely into action, and joining its fire to that of the other troops, most materially aided in repelling a most dangerous attack. But this was not done until con-

siderable loss had been inflicted on us. The enemy advanced near enough to cut down so many horses in Estep's battery that he could not bring off his guns; but as our infantry held its ground, they did not fall into the hands of the enemy.

After the attack had been repelled some of the men of the brigade of Sheridan's division kindly drew the pieces to the ravine, or rather dip in the ground in rear of the ridge on which the battery was posted, where Captain Estep retook possession of them. For this act of soldierly fraternity and kindness I desire publicly and officially to return my thanks, and those of my division, to the troops who rendered it, and I only regret that I do not know the number of the brigade and the name of its commander, that I might more distinctly signalize them in my report. The day was now far spent, in truth, it was now near sunset. No further serious demonstrations were made by the enemy on our immediate front. The troops were posted in a strong position to resist a night attack, the brigade of Sheridan's division and Buell's brigade being in juxtaposition, the former on the right and the latter on the left.

Harker's brigade was held as a reserve in the edge of the woods on the western side of the road, and Bradley's battery was posted near to it, to cover the troops in the front line. Just after nightfall a sharp fire ran along the line, caused by some movement of the enemy, which at first was taken for an advance, but in the end proved it to be nothing more than a picket demonstration. Jaded, worn, and thirsty, the men laid down to pass a cheerless, comfortless night on the battlefield. It affords me much pleasure here to record a Samaritan deed rendered to my division during the night by Colonel Harrison, of the Thirty-ninth Indiana, and a part of his mounted regiment. The men were very thirsty, but the distance to water was so great that but a few could hope to get permission to go for it. During the night Colonel Harrison brought us some four hundred canteens of good water. They were distributed among my men as equitably as possible, and proved the cooling drop to the thirsty soldiers. Estep's battery was refitted during the night, and was ready for service the next morning. Between midnight and daylight of the morning of the twentieth I received an order to move my command to a position on the slope of Missionary Ridge, to be held there as a part of the reserve of the army in the coming conflict of the morning.

The movement was quietly and successfully made. In the early morning I was directed to move my division to the eastward from the slope of Missionary Ridge, and take the position hitherto occupied by Negley's division, keeping my left in constant communication with General Brannan's right. Colonel Barnes's brigade of Van Cleve's division was ordered to report to me for service during the day.

Placing his brigade on the left, Harker's in the centre, and Buell's on the right, (the whole formed in two lines, the first one deployed, the second one in double column closed in mass, with their batteries following and supporting,) I advanced my command, and occupied the position assigned. In doing so I met with no opposition from the enemy. I was instructed not to invite an attack, but to be prepared to repel any effort of the enemy. In throwing out skirmishers to cover my front I aroused the enemy, and had quite a sharp affair with him. By a very imprudent advance of his regiment at this moment, done without an order, Colonel Bartleson (moving himself in advance of his troops) was shot from his horse, and either killed or very severely wounded; it was impossible to decide which, on account of the proximity of the place where he fell to the enemy's lines. He was an accomplished and gallant officer, and a high-toned, pure-minded gentleman. His loss is a serious disadvantage to his regiment and to the service. The position my command then occupied closed the gap in our lines between Sheridan's left and Brannan's right. Although I had not been at all seriously engaged at any time during the morning, I was well satisfied that the enemy was in considerable force in my immediate front, consequently I was extremely vigilant. Such was the status of the battle in my immediate vicinity when I received the following order:

HEADQUARTERS, D. C.,
September 20, 10.45 A. M.

Brigadier-General Wood, commanding Division:

The General commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds as fast as possible, and support him. Respectfully, &c.,

FRANK J. BOND,
Major, and A. D. C.

I received the order about eleven o'clock. At the moment of its receipt I was a short distance in rear of the centre of my command. General McCook was with me when I received it. I informed him that I would immediately carry it into execution, and suggested that he should close up his command rapidly on my right to prevent the occurrence of a gap in our lines. He said he would do so, and immediately rode away. I immediately despatched my staff officers to the brigade commanders with the necessary orders, and the movement was at once begun. Reynolds's division was posted on the left of Brannan's division, which, in turn, was posted on the left of the position I was just quitting. I had consequently to pass my command in rear of Brannan's division to close upon and go to the support of Reynolds. So soon as I had got the command well in motion I rode forward to find General Reynolds, and learn where and how it was desired to bring my command into action. I did not find General Reynolds, but in my search for him I met Major-General Thomas, to whom I communicated the order I had received from the commanding General, and desired to know where I should move my command to support General Reynolds. General Thomas replied that General Reynolds did not need support, but that I had better move to the support of General Baird, posted on our extreme left, and who needed assistance. I exhibited my order to him, and asked whether he would take the responsibility of changing it. He

replied he would, and I then informed him I would move my command to the support of General Baird. I requested General Thomas to furnish me a staff officer to conduct it to, and report it to General Baird. I then rode to the other two brigades, for the purpose of following with them in the rear of Barnes's brigade to the assistance of General Baird. When I rejoined them I found the valley south of them swarming with the enemy. It appears that when I moved my command to go to the support of General Reynolds that the gap thus made in our lines was not closed by the troops on my right, and that the enemy poured through it very soon in great force. The head of his column struck the right of Buell's brigade, and cutting off a portion of it, forced it over the adjacent ridge, whence it retired, as I have subsequently learned, with the vast mass of fugitives from the troops on the extreme right towards Rossville. In moving to the support of General Reynolds, naturally following the shortest route, I moved through the woods. My two batteries, Estep's and Bradley's, could not follow their brigades through the woods, and consequently were compelled to make a short detour to the left to get into the open fields on the slope of the ridge, intending to move thence parallel to their brigades. But they were caught in the movement by the rapidly advancing columns of the enemy. Estep's guns were captured, (in the neighborhood of infantry on the right, which, as I understand, might have supported him if it had stood,) while Bradley's battery, more fortunate, succeeded in getting over the ridge, and drew off towards Rossville, with the tide of fugitives setting strongly in that direction.

For further details in regard to the movement of the batteries at this stage of the action, I must refer to the reports of Captains Bradley and Estep. I will only remark, that while their movements did not occur under my immediate observation, but took place beyond the reach of my infantry support, I am fully satisfied from all I have learned that neither Captain Bradley nor Estep can be censured for what occurred. When I discovered the enemy in force in the valley south of my command I at once divided his intention, and appreciated the terrible hazard to our army, and the necessity for prompt action. His object was clear. Having turned our right, and separated a portion of our forces from the main body, he was seeking the rear of our solid line of battle to attack it in reverse, hoping thus to cut our communication with Chattanooga, and capture and destroy the bulk of the army. I had with me at the time but one brigade — Harker's, and a portion of Buell's. I immediately formed a line across the valley, facing southward, determined if possible to check the advance of the enemy. He was in full and in plain view in the open fields, and it was evident his force far outnumbered mine. But I felt this was no time to be comparing numbers. The enemy, at all hazards, must be checked! I was without the support of artillery, and knew I had to depend alone on the musket. I formed my line in a skirt of woods reaching across the valley. In front of me was the open field, across which the the enemy was advancing. It was a matter of great importance to get possession of the fence which bounded this field on the northern side. My line, as formed, was some one hundred and fifty or two hundred yards from the fence north of it, while the enemy's lines were perhaps as much as three hundred and fifty yards south of it. In person I ordered the One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Ohio, Colonel Opdyke commanding, to advance and seize the fence. There was a momentary hesitation in the regiment to go forward. Its gallant Colonel immediately rode in front of the centre of his regiment, and taking off his hat, called on his men to advance. His regiment gallantly responded by a prompt advance, as men ever will under the inspiration of such leadership. The enemy quickly lined the fence, when a sharp fire was opened on the enemy. Soon the Sixty-fourth Ohio, Colonel McIlvain commanding, followed, and formed along the fence on the left of the One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Ohio.

This bold and rapid offensive movement seemed to take the enemy by surprise, and disconcert his movements, for his hitherto advancing lines halted. The other regiments, Sixty-fifth Ohio and Third regiment, Major Brown commanding the former, and Colonel Dunlap the latter, of Harker's brigade, with the Fifty-eighth Indiana, of Colonel Buell's brigade, Emler commanding, were formed on the right of the One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Ohio, higher up the fence, and on a hill dominating the field in which the enemy had halted. The One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Ohio and Sixty-fourth Ohio again advanced, and took position behind a copse of wood near the centre of the field, the now debated ground of the contending bodies. The movements of the enemy at this moment were so singular, and his blurred, and greasy, and dusty uniform so resembled our own when travel-stained, coupled with the fact that it was expected a part of McCook's command would come from that direction, (the terrible disaster to his force on the right not then being known by us,) that for a few minutes the impression prevailed, and the cry ran along my line, that the troops in front of us were our own. I ordered the firing to cease; the thought of firing on our comrades in arms being too horrible to contemplate. In a few minutes, however, the delusion was dispelled, the enemy commencing to advance in a way that left no doubt of his identity, for he advanced firing on us. I do not mention this mistake on account of its possessing any particular importance *per se*, but rather record it as an instance of the strange delusions which sometimes occur on the battle-field without any sufficient cause, and without the possibility of a reasonable explanation. This mistake was the more remarkable, as the enemy was probably not more than three hundred, certainly not over three hundred and fifty yards distant, and was halted in a broad open field. But for the mistake we could have punished him most severely at the time he was halted. The hour was now about high noon, possibly it may have been as late as half past twelve P. M.

When the One Hundred and Twenty-fifth and Sixty-fourth Ohio advanced to the copse in the open field, I ordered Colonel Opdyke to line the southern side of the copse with skirmishers, with a view to annoying and delaying the progress of the enemy. As he advanced he inclined to his left, evidently with the intention of outflanking my line and turning my right. This movement of the enemy made it necessary I should gain a position in which I could form a shorter and more compact line, in which my right would be more protected by natural obstacles. I accordingly retired my little command to a narrow and short ridge which shoots out nearly at right angles as a spur from the general ridge, which is parallel to the Rossville and Lafayette road. The short and narrow ridge extends athwart the valley in nearly an east and west course.

The abprutness of the declivity on either side of it almost gives to this ridge the quality of a natural parapet. Troops holding it could load and fire behind, out of reach of the enemy's fire, and then advance to the crest of it to deliver a plunging fire on the fore.

In addition, there was a moral effect in its command over the ground south of it, which inspired the courage of the troops holding it. Here I determined to make an obstinate and determined stand. When General Brannan's right was turned, (by the opening of the gap in our lines, by the movement of my division to support General Reynolds,) he had been compelled to fall back to the general ridge in closing on the west, the valley in which the great battle was fought, which ridge, as already remarked, runs nearly parallel with the Rossville and Lafayette road. When I took position in the narrow ridge, extending partially across the valley, with Harker's brigade, General Brannan formed his command on my right, and higher up on the main ridge, thus giving to our united lines something of the shape of an irregular crescent, with the concavity towards the enemy. This disposition gave us a converging fire on the attacking columns. When my arrangements in this position were concluded, it was probably one P. M., or a little after. The enemy did not leave us long in the quiet possession of our new position. Soon a most obstinate and determined attack was made, which was handsomely repulsed. Similar attacks were continued at intervals throughout the entire afternoon.

To describe each one in detail would be unnecessary, and only add useless prolixity to my report. But I deem it proper to signalize one of these attacks specially. It occurred about four o'clock, and lasted about thirty minutes. It was unquestionably the most terrific musketry duel I have ever witnessed. Harker's brigade was formed in two lines. The regiments were advanced to the crest of the ridge alternately, and delivered their fire by volley at the command, retiring a few paces behind it, after firing, to reload.

The continued roar of the very fiercest musketry fire inspired a sentiment of grandeur, in which the awful and the sublime were intermingled. But the enemy were repulsed in this fierce attack, and the crest of the ridge was still in our possession.

Finally the evening shades descended and spread the drapery of moonlight over the hardly contested field. The battle ceased, and my command still held the position it had taken about one o'clock, maintaining with glorious courage a most unequal contest in point of numbers.

But our inferiority did not seem to appall my men. Their courage and steadfast resolution rose with the occasion. I do not believe that history affords an instance of a more splendid resistance than that made by Harker's brigade, and a portion of Buell's brigade, from one o'clock P. M. on the twentieth to nightfall. A part of the contest was witnessed by that able and distinguished commander, Major-General Thomas.

I think it must have been two o'clock P. M. when he came to where my command was so hotly engaged. His presence was most welcome. The men saw him, felt they were battling under the eye of a great chieftain, and their courage and resolotion received fresh inspiration from this consciousness. At a most opportune hour in the afternoon, probably between two and three o'clock, Major-General Granger arrived on the field with two brigades of fresh troops, of the division of General Steadman. They were brought into action on the right of General Brannan, (who was on my right,) and rapidly drove the enemy before them. This movement very considerably relieved the pressure on my front. The gallant bearing of General Granger during the whole of this most critical part of the contest was a strong reënforcement. It affords me much pleasure to signalize the presence with my command for a length of time during the afternoon (present during the period of the hottest fighting) of another distinguished officer, Brigadier-General Garfield, chief of staff. After the disastrous rout on the right, General Garfield made his way back to the battlefield, (showing thereby that the road was open to all who might chose to follow it to where duty called,) and came to where my command was engaged. The brigade which made so determined a resistance on the crest of the narrow ridge during all that long September afternoon had been commanded by General Garfield, when he belonged to my division. The men remarked his presence with much satisfaction, and were delighted that he was a witness of the splendid fighting they were doing. Early in the afternoon my command was joined by portions of two regiments belonging to Van Cleve's division, the Seventeenth Kentucky, Colonel Stout commanding, and the Forty-fourth Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Aldrick commanding. The fact that these parts of regiments, preserving the form of a regimental organization, did not leave the field after the disaster on the right, when so many other troops fled from the contest, is certainly most creditable to them. This fact also affords very just ground for the inference, that if a more determined effort had been made by the officers, many other regiments that left the field might have been kept on it. The remains of the two

regiments most nobly and gallantly aided my command in repulsing the separated attacks of the enemy. The Forty-fourth Indiana bore itself with special gallantry. I should do injustice to my feelings were I to omit to record the splendid resistance made on my right by General Brannan and his command. It was the *ne plus ultra* of defensive fighting.

About seven P. M. I received an order from General Thomas to withdraw my command from the field, and retire to Rossville. The order was obeyed without noise, without confusion, and without disaster.

My command left the field, not because it was beaten, but in obedience to an order.

With a fresh supply of ammunition it could have renewed the contest next morning. And here I can appropriately return my thanks to Major-General Granger for a timely supply of ammunition given me during the afternoon, when that in the cartridge-boxes and men's pockets was reduced to two or three rounds per man, and when the prospect of being reduced to the bayonet alone, as a means of defence, seemed inevitable. My own ammunition train had been carried off by the rout from the right.

My command reached Rossville about ten P. M., where it bivouacked for the night. Early next morning, the twenty-first, in obedience to orders, I took a strong position on Missionary Ridge. Strong barricades against an infantry assault were at once made. During the day there was some light firing on my picket front, but nothing serious; the enemy was, however, evidently in considerable force in my front. At ten P. M., on the twenty-first, my command, in obedience to orders, left its position on Missionary Ridge, and withdrew to this place. Early Tuesday morning, the twenty-second, it occupied its present position in the line of defences, and has since been most constantly and actively engaged in strengthening them.

To the officers and men of my command I return my thanks for their gallant bearing, soldierly conduct, and steadfast courage, exhibited both in the contests of Saturday, the nineteenth, and Sunday, the twentieth. Their conduct on both days deserves all praise, and I commend it to the consideration of the commanding General. There were undoubtedly instances of individual misconduct which deserve reprehension, but as a whole the behavior of the command was most satisfactory. Of the numerious killed and wounded I would gladly speak by name, but the list is too numerous. To do so would extend my report beyond all reasonable length. I can only here express my sincere condolence with the relatives and friends of the gallant dead and wounded. The regiments and batteries in my command represented the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Kentucky. The citizens of these great and loyal states have much cause to be proud of their representatives in the late great conflict. They may safely trust their honor and the public weal to such representatives.

For the special commendation by name of the more subordinate officers and men who distinguished themselves, I must refer the commanding General to the reports of my brigade commanders, Colonels Harker and Buell, with their accompanying documents, the sub-reports of regimental commanders. Where so great a portion of my command behaved well, it is difficult to distinguish officers by name, and perhaps may be regarded as making an invidious distinction. Nevertheless I consider it my duty, on account of their distinguished services, to commend to the notice of the commanding General, Colonel Dunlap, commanding Third Kentucky, Colonel McIlvain, commanding Sixty-fourth Ohio, Colonel Opdyke, commanding One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Ohio, and Captain Bradley, commanding Sixth Ohio battery. I desire to commend Colonel Opdyke especially to the favorable consideration of the commanding General. The record of his regiment, a comparatively new one, and never before in a general engagement, in the late battle, will, I am sure, compare most favorably with that of the most veteran regiment engaged. The credit is mainly due to the Colonel commanding. His untiring zeal and devoted attention to his regiment have brought forth fruit worthy of its efforts. I commend him to the commanding General as an officer capable and worthy of commanding a brigade. Colonel Buell, commanding the First brigade of my division, has exercised this command about three months. He bore himself with great gallantry on the field, both on Saturday, the nineteenth, and Sunday, the twentieth. With a little more experience he will make an excellent Brigadier-General, and should receive the promotion. In my report of the battle of Stone River, I especially signalized the services of Colonel Harker, commanding the Third brigade of my division, and earnestly recommended him for promotion, both as a reward for his merits and as an act of simple justice. In the late campaign he peculiarly distinguished himself. He made two of the most daring and brilliant reconnoissances of the campaign, reconnoissances almost without a parallel in the annals of warfare; and his personal gallantry on the battle-field, the skilful manner in which he handled his brigade, holding it well together when so many other troops broke, and his general good conduct, are beyond all praise. To speak of his services in the language of what I conceive would be just encomium, might be considered fulsome praise. I earnestly recommend him for immediate promotion to the rank of Brigadier-General.

Returns herewith submitted show that I went into action on Saturday with an effective force of men and officers of twenty-nine hundred and sixty-five. The return of casualties shows that my command lost in killed and wounded, absolutely known to be such, eight hundred and forty-four; and in killed, wounded, and missing, one thousand and thirty-five. Taking the number of killed and wounded actually known, it will be found to be twenty-eight and eighty one hundredths per cent. (28.80) of the effective force with which I went into action. But it is fair to presume, as we retired from the field Sunday evening, that many of the one hundred and ninety-one reported missing,

were either killed or wounded, and that their bodies fell into the hands of the enemy. Taking the number of the killed, and wounded, and missing, it will be found to be thirty-four and ninety one-hundredths (34.90) per cent. of my whole command. These figures show an almost unparalleled loss. They attest the severity of the conflicts through which my command passed on the nineteenth and twentieth. The record of its participation in the great battle of the Chickamauga is written in blood. Before closing my report, I deem it my duty to bring to the notice of the commanding General certain facts which fell under my observation during the progress of the conflict on the twentieth. As I was moving along the valley with my command, to the support of General Reynolds, in conformity with the order of the commanding General, I observed on my left (to the west of me) a force posted high up the ridge. I inquired what force it was, and was informed it was a part of a brigade of General Negley's division. I was informed that General Negley was with this force in person. I remember seeing distinctly a battery on the hill-side with the troops. At the time, it was certainly out of the reach of any fire from the enemy. This was between eleven and twelve o'clock in the day. A little later in the day, perhaps a half or three fourths of an hour, when I became seriously engaged, as already described, with the large hostile force that pierced our lines and turned Brannan's right, compelling him to fall back, I looked for the force I had seen posted on the ridge, and which, as already remarked, I had been informed was a part of General Negley's division, hoping, if I became severely pressed, it might reënforce me, for I was resolved to check the enemy if possible. But it had entirely disappeared. Whither it had gone I did not then know, but was informed later in the day it had retired towards Rossville; and this information I believe was correct. By whose orders this force retired from the battle-field I do not know; but of one fact I am perfectly convinced, that there was no necessity for its retiring. It is impossible it could have been at all seriously pressed by the enemy at the time; in fact, I think it extremely doubtful whether it was engaged at all.

Near sundown of the twentieth I met General John Beatly not far from where I had fought the enemy all the afternoon. He was entirely alone when I met him, and did not seem to have any special command. I at once came to the conclusion that he had not retired from the battle-field when the bulk of the division he is attached to did. At the moment I met him I was engaged in halting some troops that were crossing the valley north and east of my position, and who appeared to have straggled away from the front on which General Thomas's command had been engaged all the day. General Beatly desired to know where I desired these troops re-formed. I pointed out a position to him, and desired him to re-form them, which he said he would do. I then rode back to my command.

It is proper that I should remark that I did not see the Corps commander from about nine and a half o'clock A. M. on Sunday, the twentieth, to some time after sunrise of the twenty-first, when I met him at Rossville.

The officers of my staff performed their duties well in the late arduous campaign, as well on the march and in camp as on the battle-field. I deem it due to them to record their names in my official report, and to thank them individually for their valuable assistance and coöperation: Captain M. P. Besto, assistant adjutant-general, Lieutenant J. L. Zargaw, Fifty-eighth Indiana, aid-de-camp, Lieutenant George Shafer, Ninety-third Ohio, aid-de-camp, Lieutenant-Colonel T. R. Palmer, Thirteenth Michigan, inspector-general, Surgeon W. W. Blair, Fifty-eighth Indiana volunteers, medical director, Captain L. D. Myers, assistant-quartermaster, Captain James McDonald, commissary subsistence, Captain William McLaughlin, Thirteenth Michigan, topographical engineer, Captain J. E. George, Fifteenth Indiana, commissary of muster, Lieutenant P. Halderman, Third Kentucky, ordnance officer, Captain M. Reiser, Sixty-fourth Ohio, provost-marshal, up to the occupation of Chattanooga, when his leg was accidentally broken, since which time his duties have been well performed by Lieutenant Ehlers of the same regiment. Captain Cullen Bradley, Sixth Ohio battery, who, in addition to commanding his own battery, ably performs the duties of chief of artillery. It affords me much pleasure to mention in my official report the true courage and faithful devotion exhibited throughout the entire conflict by two members of my personal escort. Early in the conflict of Sunday my color-bearer was wounded. The colors were then taken by Sergeant Samuel Goodrich, company A, One Hundredth Illinois, who bore aloft my standard through the remainder of the day, remaining with me all the time. Private Robert Lemmon, company I, Fifty-eighth Indiana, a member of my escort, rode immediately in rear of me through the whole conflict of Sunday, the twentieth. Whenever I called, this brave and devoted boy, a youth of not more than sixteen or seventeen years of age, responded.

I have the honor to forward herewith, as accompaniments to my report, first, official report of Colonel Harker, commanding Third brigade, (with sub-reports of regimental commanders,) marked "A;" second, official report of Colonel Buell, commanding First brigade, (with sub-reports of regimental commanders,) marked "B;" third, return of effective force taken into action nineteenth September, marked "C;" fourth, return of casualties in the battles of the nineteenth and twentieth, marked "D;" fifth, map showing the various positions of command in the battles of the nineteenth and twentieth, marked "E."

I cannot conclude my report of the participation of my command in the great battle of the Chickamauga, a battle in which the fate of the proud army of the Cumberland hung trembling in the balance, — in truth, a battle in whose result the great nation's life seemed involved, — without returning thanks to Almighty Providence for his merciful deliverance vouchsafed to us from the hosts of our enemies. For his protection of my-

self through all the dangers of the bloody conflict I am humbly thankful.

I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
TH. J. WOOD,
Brigadier-General U. S. Volunteers, commanding.

Doc. 37.

THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS.

[Correction of Official Reports.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT N. E. V., ARLINGTON, August 13, 1861.

Colonel Richardson, commanding Fourth Brigade:

SIR: I herewith enclose you an extract from a supplemental report of Brigadier-General McDowell, of the battle of Bull Run, on the twenty-first ultimo. I am, Sir, very respectfully,

Your most obedient servant,
CHAUNCY MCKEEVER,
Asst. Adj.-General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT N. E. V., ARLINGTON, August 12, 1861.

Lieutenant-Colonel E. D. Townsend, A. A. G., Headquarters of the Army:

COLONEL: My attention has been called by those interested, to two omissions in my report of the battle of the twenty-first ultimo, near Manassas, and I ask leave to make the following corrections, wishing that they be made part of my original report. In speaking of the retreat, I mentioned that it was covered by Colonel Blenker's brigade. I should have said Colonel Richardson's and Colonel Blenker's brigades. The former was on the left of the Centreville ridge, and the latter in front of it on the Warrenton road. Each covered the retreat of those on the respective roads to the common point, Centreville, from there to the rear. Colonel Richardson was behind, and covered the main body.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
Your most obedient servant,
IRVIN MCDOWELL,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

CHAUNCY MCKEEVER,
Asst. Adj.-General.

SPECIAL DESPATCH TO THE DETROIT DAILY TRIBUNE.

WASHINGTON, July 23.

My brigade has just arrived, after covering the retreat of the entire army.

All are up in tolerable good order.

The Michigan Second and Third regiments were in the rear of the whole.

J. B. RICHARDSON,
Commanding Fourth Brigade.

GENERAL WILLCOX'S REPORT.

DETROIT, MICHIGAN, September 3, 1861.

Brig.-General L. Thomas, Adj.-Gen. U. S. A.:

GENERAL: My brigade, the Second of Heintzelman's division, marching in rear of Franklin's origade, arrived at the Sudley Ford at about half past twelve P. M., July twenty-first, 1861.

The brigade now consisted of the First Michigan, Eleventh New York, (Fire Zouaves), Thirty-eighth New York, and Arnold's battery. The Fourth Michigan had been left at Fairfax Station and Fairfax Court-House by order of General McDowell. Halting for rest and water, I obeyed the General's orders to post Arnold's battery on a hill commanding the ford, with the First Michigan for support, and at one o'clock pushed forward with my two remaining regiments up the Sudley and Brentville road. We marched about two miles, and came up on the left of what I supposed to have been Franklin's line, near the junction of the Warrenton and Sudley roads. The troops on our left were engaged in a desultory fire with the enemy posted in the thicket and ravine across the Warrenton road, not far from the Henry house. The Thirty-eighth New York was quickly formed in order of battle, and the Zouaves were hastening into line, when I received an order to detach a regiment for the support of Ricketts's battery, (of Franklin's brigade,) posted on a hill quarter of a mile to our right and front, near Dogan's house. I led up the Zouaves for this important service, leaving the Thirty-eighth under its gallant and experienced Colonel Hobart Ward.

Ricketts was soon ordered to take a new position near the Henry house. The Zouaves followed in support, and finally formed line on the right flank of the battery with two companies in reserve.

Up to this time the enemy had fallen back, but now he formed the remains of his brigades engaged with Hunter in the morning, viz., Bee's, Barton's and Evans's, in a new line upon Jackson's brigade of fresh troops, making all together six thousand five hundred infantry, thirteen pieces of artillery, and Stuart's cavalry, according to General Beauregard's report. This force was posted in the belt of woods which skirted the plateau southwardly, and lying in the angle formed in that direction, between the Warrenton and Sudley roads, about a mile from the Warrenton road, and with its left resting on the Brentsville and Sudley road. Ricketts's battery had crossed the Sudley road, from its post near Dogan's house, and was within musket range of the woods, which stretched from that road around from his right towards his front, and forming a pocket, which almost enveloped the battery with its support.

The enemy were first discovered by Colonel Heintzelman, lining the woods in our front. He ordered up the Zouaves, commanded by Colonel Farnham. The ground was slightly rising before us, and the enemy opened a heavy but not destructive fire, as we reached the crest. The Zouaves returned the fire, but immediately fell back bewildered and broken.

Stuart's cavalry charged upon them from the woods on the right, but were scattered by a fire from the two reserve companies, with a loss ascertained (from the Southern papers) of twenty-nine killed and wounded.

Meantime Ricketts's cannoneers were being picked off. With Colonel Heintzelman's approval, and a promise of reënforcements, I collected some one hundred Zouaves, and with Captain Downey, and others of their officers, made a dash into the

woods on our right, and killed, wounded, and captured about thirty of the enemy.

Returning in a few minutes, I found the field cleared of both friend and foe, except the killed and wounded. The horses, men, and two officers of Ricketts's battery lay stretched upon the ground, but the enemy had not yet seized it.

Recrossing the Sudley road, I met the First Michigan, Major Bidwell commanding, and marching back with this regiment, we found the enemy now drawn up in a thin line across the field and in possession of the battery. Advancing to the fence on the roadside, the First Michigan opened fire; the right wing fell back to reload, owing to a blundering order, but the left stood firm, expelled the enemy, and retook the battery. The troops here opposed to us I believe to have been the Seventh Georgia.

Colonel Heintzelman now came up and ordered us promptly forward, and with the promise of another regiment, it was my design to turn the enemy's left. The left wing of the First Michigan recrossed the field, struck into the woods beyond the Zouaves, succeeded in destroying and capturing a small number of the enemy, and pushing back his extreme left out of that part or point of the woods adjacent to the Sudley road.

Meantime the right wing of the First Michigan re-formed and advanced in good order. I met it, and we pushed on towards the next point of woods. From this point I found the enemy's left discovered us by our fire, and we became engaged with their rear rank, their front being then occupied by the advancing troops of Franklin's or Sherman's brigade. The officers and men of the First Michigan stood up bravely at this critical moment, holding on anxiously for reënforcements. But from all I can learn, the Thirty-eighth, which was ordered up to me, were directed to the left of the Henry house, (instead of to the right and along the Sudley road,) came in contact with the enemy's centre, and never reached me. It was now nearly four o'clock. General Beauregard had been gathering new reënforcements. General Kirby Smith had joined him with a portion of Johnston's army. Our scattered troops were contending in fractions against the enemy's army in position, and massed on the plateau, with his artillery sweeping every approach. General Johnston was bringing fresh troops to turn our own right. The Twenty-eighth Virginia attacked my own handful from the rear in the woods, and I had the ill fortune to be wounded, and a few moments afterwards captured. But I was spared witnessing the disaster which further pursued our arms.

In this report I have only endeavored to supply partly the information that was not known, or found in any other report, in consequence of my capture. Permit me to add further that the Thirty-eighth New York was distinguished for its steadiness in ranks, and for gallantly repelling a charge made upon it by the New Orleans Tigers. The Zouaves, though broken as a regiment, did good service under my own eyes in the woods, and detachments of them joined various other regiments in the fight. The First Michigan deserves the credit of advancing farther into the enemy's lines than any other of our troops, as their dead bodies proved after the battle.

I only regret that from the fact of my separation from Arnold's battery I cannot add any testimony of my own to the well-known gallantry with which he and his command conducted themselves. I have the honor to be, General,

Very respectfully yours,

J. B. WILLCOX,

Brig.-Gen, late Colonel First Michigan Infantry.

Doc. 38.

THE BATTLE OF MISSION RIDGE.

GENERAL T. J. WOOD'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION FOURTH ARMY CORPS, IN THE FIELD IN EAST TENNESSEE, December 29, 1863.

SIR: As early as the fifteenth of November, ultimo, it was generally known among the higher commanders of the troops assembled in Chattanooga, that a movement was in contemplation to cause the investment, which had then continued nearly sixty days, to be raised.

The investing force, commanded by General Braxton Bragg, of the rebel army, comprised eight divisions of infantry arranged in four corps, under the lead of some of the ablest officers in the enemy's service. Reliable information, obtained at the time the movements for raising the investment were in contemplation, showed that the rebel divisions averaged not less than six thousand infantry each. This estimate would give forty-eight thousand infantry as about the investing force. Including the artillery and cavalry, it would be a moderate estimate to place the whole investing force at over fifty thousand men. The rebel divisions usually comprise four brigades, with a field battery attached to each brigade. This rate would give one hundred and eighty-two field guns as the artillery equipment of the beleaguering army.

But a very imperfect understanding of the defensive power of the rebel army would be obtained by considering its numbers and equipments only. It occupied a position so strong naturally, and so intrenched by art, as to duplicate the defensive power of its numbers. Lookout Mountain and Mission Ridge are so related to each other and Chattanooga that the army which holds them commands the outlets from the town on east, south, and south-west. The natural strength and command of the position occupied by the insurgents had been much improved by intrenchments.

During the week commencing on the fifteenth and ending on the twenty-second of November, the subordinate commanders of the Army of the Cumberland were summoned twice to department headquarters to have the plan of operations explained to them and to receive their instructions. The original plan of operations was briefly this: the force of Major-General Sherman was to cross the Tennessee River at the mouth of the North Chickamauga Creek, ascend the north-eastern flank of Mission Ridge, (which here juts against

the river,) sweep the ridge, and take the enemy's intrenchments, both at its base and on its crest, in flank and rear. Two divisions of the Fourth army corps, General Sheridan's and my own, were to cross Citico Creek near its mouth, just above Chattanooga, move up the peninsula enclosed between the creek and the Tennessee River, form a junction with the right flank of General Sherman's force, swing to the right, and sweep along the lower slope and the base of Mission Ridge. The remaining force in Chattanooga was to make a demonstration against the enemy's works directly in front of Chattanooga, while at the same time looking out for the safety of the town against a counter attack. The force in Lookout Valley (General Hooker) was to threaten Lookout Mountain.

It was conceeded that a direct front attack of the enemy's works on Mission Ridge could not be made with a reasonable prospect of success; or if such an attack should be successful, it could only be made at a great and unnecessary cost of life.

In pursuance of this plan, orders were issued on Friday the twentieth to be prepared to move at daylight the following morning. It was directed that the men should have one hundred rounds of ammunition on their persons, and two days' cooked rations in their haversacks.

A heavy fall of rain Friday afternoon and night, with other causes of delay, prevented General Sherman's command from reaching in time the point at which he was to pass the river; consequently the movement intended to be made at daylight Saturday morning was postponed.

On Sunday, the twenty-second, the orders of the preceding Friday were renewed.

The failure of General Sherman's command to be Sunday night at the rendezvous assigned it caused a further postponement of the movement of the troops destined to coöperate immediately with it.

To a just understanding of the subsequent movements of my division, it should be remarked that during the whole of Sunday, the twenty-second, much movement, some of it singular and mysterious, was observed in the rebel army. Officers in command of the grand guards and outposts were instructed to observe the greatest vigilance Sunday night, to send out patrols frequently as near as possible to the enemy's picket lines, and to report promptly all information of interest.

At twelve M., on Monday, the twenty-third, I received the following orders:

HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF THE CUMBERLAND,
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE, November 23, 1863.

Major-Gen. Granger, commanding Fourth A. C.:

The General commanding department directs that you throw one division of the Fourth corps forward, in the direction of Orchard Knob, (and hold a second division in supporting distance,) to discern the position of the enemy, if he still remain in the vicinity of his old camps.

Howard's and Baird's commands will be ready to coöperate if needed. J. J. REYNOLDS,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.

J. S. FULLERTON,
A. A. General.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS,
November 23, 1863.

Brigadier General Wood, with his division, will as soon as possible carry out the foregoing instructions, and will be supported by General Sheridan's division, to be posted along near the line of railroad, its right resting about midway between Moore's road and the brush knob in front of Lunette Palmer. Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. GRANGER,
Major-General, commanding.

Twelve o'clock M.

Brigadier-General TH. J. WOOD,
Commanding Third Division Fourth Army Corps.

Immediately on the receipt of this order I summoned my brigade commanders to my headquarters, to give them full and minute explanations as to the manner in which I intended to execute the instructions I had received. I desired also to express in person the part the command of each was to perform in the operations. The disposition of the division, as then explained to the brigade commanders, and as was subsequently most successfully carried out, was as follows:

Hazen's brigade on the right, Willich's on the left, were to be formed in two lines, the first deployed, the second in double column, closed in mass.

Beatty's brigade formed in double column, closed in mass, so as to be ready to deploy to the front, or deploy faced to the left, was held in reserve in rear of Willich's left. This arrangement would fully protect Willich's left from any flank movement of the enemy during the advance. As General Sheridan had been ordered to occupy a position which would place his division in rear of my right flank during the advance, I had no occasion to look to the safety of my right. In addition to the double line formation just described, the entire grand guard on duty for the day was to be deployed on the advance sentinel line of pickets, so that the whole would be covered with a cloud of skirmishers. I ordered the formation to take place on the broad slope on the southern side of Fort Wood. This work crowns a conical eminence about two hundred feet elevation above the level of the river, situated about a half a mile out of Chattanooga in a south-easterly direction. From its parapet the rebel works and troops were clearly discernible.

The descent of this hill on the northern, eastern, and western sides is abrupt, but gradually on the southern, extending down into the valley through which runs the Western and Atlantic railway. At one and a half o'clock P. M. the arrangements were all completed, the troops were in position, and the reserve ammunition and ambulance trains in rear of Fort Wood.

Then, at the bugle signal, the magnificent array and serried columns moved forward.

It scarcely ever falls to the lot of man to witness so grand a military display.

Every circumstance that could heighten the interests of, or impart dramatic effect to the scene, was present. On the ramparts of Fort Wood were gathered officers of high rank, crowned with honors gathered on other fields. There, also,

were officers distinguished for scientific attainments and rare administrative ability.

Troops in line and column checkered the broad plain of Chattanooga.

In front, plainly to be seen, was the enemy, so soon to be encountered in deadly conflict. My division seemed to drink in the inspiration of the scene, and, when the advance was sounded, moved forward in the perfect order of a holiday parade.

It has been my good fortune to witness, on the Champs-de-Mars and on Long Champ, reviews of all arms of the French service, under the eye of the most remarkable man of the present generation. I once saw a review, followed by a mock battle, of the finest troops of El Re Galantuomo. The pageant was held on the plains near Milan, the queen city of Lombardy, and the troops in the sham conflict were commanded by two of the most distinguished officers of the Piedmontese service—Cialdini, and another whose name I cannot now recall. In none of these displays did I ever see anything to exceed the soldierly bearing and the steadiness of my division, exhibited in the advance on Monday afternoon, the second. There was certainly one striking difference in the circumstances of these grand displays. The French and Italian parades were peaceful pageants: ours involved the exigencies of stern war—certainly an immense difference.

I should do injustice to the brave men who thus moved forward to the conflict in such perfect order, were I to omit to record that not one straggler lagged behind to sully the magnificence and perfectness of the grand battle array.

From Fort Wood to the railroad the country is open. South of the railroad, the country passed over is partly open and partly wooded. Hazen's brigade had to pass over the open field, several hundred yards in breadth, and Willich's through the woods. On the southern side of the field the enemy's front line of pickets was posted. The skirmishers were instructed to press forward, as soon as the advance was sounded, as rapidly as possible, and drive in the enemy's out line of pickets on their reserves. This service was excellently performed.

To the proper understanding of the subsequent movements of the division, some explanatory remarks are necessary.

Orchard Knob, given in the order directing the reconnoissance as the guiding point, is a steep, craggy knoll, rising some hundred feet above the general level of the valley of Chattanooga. It is twenty-one hundred yards from Fort Wood. The rebels had held the knob as an outpost since the investment was first established.

A position naturally so strong, they had done little to strengthen it by intrenchments on its summit. To the right of Orchard Knob, looking to the south, a rocky, abrupt, wooded ridge extends several hundred yards toward the southwest. It is not so elevated as the knob. The enemy had formed rude, but strong barricades on the northern slope, just below the crest of this ridge. To the left of the knob, still looking to the south, a long line of rifle-pits extended away off to the northeast, and, trending round, reached almost to Citico Creek. Orchard Knob was the citadel of this line of intrenchments.

General Willich was ordered to direct his brigade on the knob, and General Hazen his brigade on the intrenchments on the right of it. So soon as the skirmishers moved forward, the enemy opened fire. Across the open field and through the woods the skirmishers kept up a sharp, rattling fire, steadily and rapidly driving in the enemy. As the knob and intrenchments were neared the fire became hotter, the resistance of the rebels more determined, but the majestic advance of our lines was not for a moment stayed. Finally, Willich's brigade, which had met with less opposition than Hazen's, having arrived quite near the knob, "by a bold brush," ascended its steep acclivity, crowned its summit, and it was ours. Reference is made to the report of Brigadier-General Willich for a more full description of this brilliant feat of arms.

In the meantime, Hazen's brigade was encountering a determined resistance from the enemy, sheltered by his breastworks on the rocky ridge to the right. For a few moments the fire was sharp and destructive. More than a hundred casualties in the leading regiments attest the severity of the fire. But nothing could restrain the impetuosity of the troops. In a few moments after Willich's brigade had carried Orchard Knob, Hazen's skirmishers poured over the enemy's barricades. The Twenty-eighth Alabama was captured, with its flag, almost entire. I respectfully refer to the report of Brigadier-General Hazen for a more detailed narrative of this gallant and successful assault. Among the killed we have to mourn the loss of Major Birch, Ninety-third Ohio, who was killed while gallantly leading his regiment to the charge. So soon as the Knob and the barricades were taken, the enemy fled, to take shelter in his intrenchments at the base of Mission Ridge.

Beatty's brigade, though not playing so distinguished a part as the other two brigades, was doing good service in the part assigned him. Following the left of Willich's brigade, so soon as the knob was carried, some of Beatty's regiments were brought forward to occupy a portion of the rifle pits to the left of Willich's position. The remainder was held in reserve. Shortly after the successful dash, General Granger, commanding the Fourth army corps, joined me at Orchard Knob. Personal observation assured him of the extensiveness and completeness of our success. The result having been reported to General Thomas, commanding the Department, he ordered the position to be held and intrenched. Soon the men were engaged in this work. While so employed, the enemy opened a most terrific fire of shot and shell on us from

several batteries established on Mission Ridge. It was continued nearly an hour—in fact, until toward nightfall. It seems almost a miracle, but it is nevertheless true, that no damage was inflicted by the enemy's artillery. One man only was very slightly wounded by the fragment of a shell.

While my division was engaged in intrenching its position, the Eleventh army corps was ordered to take post on my left. The resistance it met in its front from the enemy in his rifle-pits rendered its progress slow. Two regiments of Beatty's brigade were deployed to the left to take the rifle-pits in flank, drive out the enemy's skirmishers therefrom, and relieve the pressure on the front of the Eleventh corps. This service was quickly and handsomely done, but the Eleventh corps neglecting to occupy the rifle-pits, the enemy returned to them. It was hence necessary for the two regiments of Beatty's brigade to render the service over again on Tuesday morning, the twenty-fourth. The whole of the night of the twenty-third was spent in intrenching our position. In this laborious work the troops evinced as much fortitude as they had shown gallantry in gaining the position. Not only was a line of rifle-pits and barricades constructed along the entire front of the division during the night, but a strong epaulement for a six-gun field battery was thrown up on the summit of Orchard Knob; Bridges' battery, of forty-three inch Rodman guns and two Napoleons. The early light of Tuesday morning disclosed to the anxious gaze of the rebels such works as must have convinced them we intended to hold the position won the day before. Perchance they saw in this evident intention the prognostic of further and more extensive operations, to be attended by more distinguished and important results.

I almost refer to the report of General Beatty, commanding Third brigade of my division, for a full report of his command in the operations of the twenty-third.

During the twenty-fourth the division was quiet, remaining in undisturbed possession of the important acquisitions of the previous afternoon. The enemy in full view, and sheltered behind his rifle-pits, at the base of Mission Ridge, made no effort to retrieve his losses. An occasional shot from the skirmishers, and a booming of a gun from Orchard Knob, varied the monotony of the day. We had ample opportunity to watch with eager interest the brilliant operations, though miles away from us, of General Hooker's command for the possession of Lookout Mountain. And when the morning sun of Wednesday had dispelled the mist from the mountain top and displayed to our view the banner of the brave and the free flying from the topmost peak of Lookout Mountain, loud and long were the joyous shouts with which my division made the welkin ring.

Shortly after night-fall, Tuesday, the twenty-fourth, I received the following order:

HEADQUARTERS, FOURTH ARMY CORPS,
CHATTANOOGA, November 24, 1863, 6.40 P. M.

GENERAL: The following instructions have just been received:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
CHATTANOOGA, TENN.

GENERAL GRANGER: The General commanding Department directs that you have everything ready for an offensive movement early tomorrow morning.

J. J. REYNOLDS,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.

You will make every preparation for such movement.

By command of Major-General Granger.

J. S. FULLERTON,
Lieutenant-Colonel and A. A. General.

Brigadier-General WOOD,
Third Division, Fourth Corps.

In conformity with these instructions I had, during Tuesday night, one hundred rounds of ammunition per man distributed to the troops, and the rations in the haversacks replenished. At dawn Wednesday morning my division was ready for action, and only awaited the order from the senior officers to commence the onslaught. Early in the forenoon of Wednesday, Orchard Knob became the station of officers of high rank and signal renown. The Commanding General of the Grand Division of the Mississippi was there, as was also the Commander of the Department and Army of the Cumberland. During the forenoon I was ordered to advance my line of skirmishers to the southern edge of the wood intervening between my position and the enemy's rifle-pits at the base of Mission Ridge. This service was gallantly performed; the enemy's skirmishers being rapidly driven back and compelled to take shelter behind their rifle-pits. As the day progressed, the interest which attracted every eye and absorbed every feeling was that involved in the attempt of General Sherman's command to effect a lodgment on Mission Ridge, near the tunnel. Severer opposition than had been expected was evidently being met with. To lessen the opposition General Sherman was encountering, it was determined that a movement should be made against the rebel centre. I was ordered to advance and carry the enemy's intrenchments at the base of Mission Ridge, and hold them. The signal for the advance was to be six guns fired in rapid succession from the batteries on Orchard Knob. The necessary instructions were given to the brigade commanders. This was near three o'clock P. M. Soon the booming of the guns awakened the reverberations of the fastnesses of Mission Ridge and Lookout Mountain; and before the echoes had died away in the distant recesses of their ragged heights the advance was commenced.

Mission Ridge is an elevated range (with an average altitude of several hundred feet above the general level of the country), running from north-east to south-west.

The part of it assaulted by my division the afternoon of the twenty-fifth, is about four miles from Chattanooga, and about a mile from Orchard Knob. Between the latter and the base of Mission Ridge there is a broad, wooded valley. Of course, this had to be traversed before the intrenchments at the base of the ridge could be assaulted.

As soon as our troops began to move forward the enemy opened a terrific fire from his batteries on the crest of the ridge.

The batteries were so posted as to give a direct and cross fire on the assaulting troops. It would not, perhaps, be an exaggeration to say that the enemy had fifty pieces of artillery disposed on the crest of Mission Ridge. But the rapid firing of all this mass of artillery could not stay the onward movement of our troops. They pressed forward with dauntless ardor, and carried the line of intrenchments at the base of the ridge. The enemy in these intrenchments, doubtlessly impressed with the uselessness of resistance, made no serious opposition, but sought safety by flight behind his intrenchments on the crest of the ridge.

When the first line of intrenchments was carried, the goal for which we had started was won. Our orders carried us no further.

We had been instructed to carry the line of intrenchments at the base of the ridge, and then halt. But the enthusiasm and impetuosity of the troops were such that those who first reached the intrenchments at the base of the ridge bounded over them, and pressed on up the ascent after the flying enemy. Moreover, the intrenchments were no protection against the enemy's artillery on the ridge. To remain would be destruction; to retire would be both expensive in life, and disgraceful.

Officers and men all seemed impressed with this truth. In addition, the example of those who commenced to ascend the ridge so soon as the intrenchments were carried, was contagious.

Without waiting for an order, the vast mass pressed forward in the race of glory, each man eager to be the first on the summit.

The enemy's artillery and musketry could not check the impetuous assault. The troops did not halt to fire; to have done so would have been ruinous. Little was left to the immediate commanders of the troops than to cheer on the foremost, to encourage the weaker of limb, and to sustain the very few who seemed to be faint-hearted.

To the eternal honor of the troops, it should be recorded that the laggards were, indeed, few in number. The interval which elapsed between the carrying of the intrenchments at the base of the ridge and the crowning of the summit, must have been one of intense and painful anxiety to all who were not participants in the assault. The ascent of Mission Ridge was, indeed, an effort to try the strongest limbs and the stoutest hearts.

But suspense and anxiety were not of long duration. Upward steadily went the standard of the Union (borne onward by strong arms, upheld by brave hearts), and soon it was seen flying on the crest of Mission Ridge! Loud, indeed, were the shouts with which this spectacle was received.

Some of the first troops on the crest pressed forward in pursuit of the flying enemy immediately in front of them, while others (with great good sense on the part of their brigade commanders) were deployed to the right and left to clear the ridge, and to relieve the pressure on our troops that had not gained the summit.

The good effect of the flank attacks was almost instantaneously apparent, and soon the entire crest was occupied by our troops. Mission Ridge was ours! The enemy, whom we had seen during the two lonely months of the investment occupying this dominating position, was in full retreat.

As the day was nearly spent, and the troops much worn and somewhat disordered by the ascent, the pursuit could not, of course, be long continued. Darkness was coming on apace, and the brigades were re-formed on the crest of the ridge, where they bivouacked for the night.

The assault of Mission Ridge is certainly one of the most remarkable achievements that have ever occurred. Military history would probably be ransacked in vain for a parallel. With so much armed resistance encountered, probably no assault was ever so eminently successful.

In fifty minutes from the time the advance commenced, the first flags were seen flying on the crest of the ridge. But the great achievement was not won without serious loss. Many gallant and accomplished officers and brave men were killed and wounded in the assault. To these especially is the lasting homage and gratitude of the country due.

As is not at all singular, there is a difference of opinion as to what troops first crowned the summit of Mission Ridge. All the different divisions engaged in the assault set up claims to this honor; the brigades of the same division (I know it is so in my division) have conflicting claims; and in like manner the regiments of the same brigade lay claim to the honor. Each commander, observing his own troops more closely than others, is disposed to think, with all honesty, that his command was first on the crest. While admitting I am liable to be mistaken, I sincerely think a considerable portion of my division were the first troops that reached the summit. But I am not able to discriminate with certainty which one of the three brigades was first up. The truth is, parts of each brigade reached the crest almost simultaneously; and where injustice might be done, I do not think it advisable to make a decision on the conflicting claims. In fact, I do not consider myself competent to do so. I own that I was much more interested in getting to the top of the ridge than in seeing who reached there first. Happily, it is a question which does not require to be definitely settled. The strong position of the enemy was carried, and it matters little what particular

regiment, brigade, or division was first on the summit. Where all strove so ardently to do well, he who was first up can only be considered as more fortunate, not more deserving, than his comrades.

I must refer to the report of brigade commanders, with their accompaniments, the reports of regimental commanders, for a more minute and detailed narrative of the operations of their several commands than I can present in this report. To these reports I must also refer for many instances of special commendation for gallantry and good conduct displayed by regimental and company officers and soldiers. To record all the instances of heroism displayed by men and officers, would extend this report beyond all reasonable compass.

After the rout of the enemy by the successful assault on Mission Ridge on the afternoon of the twenty-fifth, as shown by the reports of the brigade commanders, were as follows; General Willich, commanding First brigade, reports the capture of *five* pieces of artillery; General Hazen, commanding Second brigade, reports the capture of *eighteen* pieces of artillery; and General Beatty, commanding Third brigade, reports the capture of *eight* pieces of artillery. There is, I believe, some conflict of claims between Generals Willich and Hazen as to the priority of capture of two pieces of artillery, and I think they have both included them in their reports of captures. Without pretending to decide which of the two has the better claim, which I am really not able to do (nor is it at all important the question should be settled), I make the correction, to avoid counting two pieces twice. The reports of the brigade commanders show an aggregate capture of *twenty-nine pieces of artillery* by the division—all field pieces. In regard to the conflict between Generals Willich and Hazen, it may be remarked that it is not at all strange such differences of opinion should exist in regard to occurrences on the battle-field, as, by reason of the turmoil of the conflict, it is often impossible to mark distinctly the exact order of precedence of events; and where also two regiments may arrive simultaneously at the same place, and yet each honestly think itself the first there. General Willich, commanding First brigade, reports the capture of two regimental colors; General Hazen, commanding Second brigade, three; and General Beatty, two; making a total of seven. General Willich reports the capture of twelve hundred stands of small arms; General Hazen, six hundred and fifty; and General Beatty, two hundred; making an aggregate of two thousand and fifty stands of small arms.

Grand summary of captures by the division:

Field guns—twenty-nine.

Field caissons—twenty-five.

Regimental colors—seven.

Stands of small arms—two thousand and fifty.

Prisoners—over one thousand, for whom receipts were received by the Provost-Marshal of the division from the Provost-Marshal General. I have not the report of my Provost Marshal before me, and hence cannot give the exact number. Among the prisoners were officers of various grades.

The causualties in the division amounted to sixteen officers killed and fifty-nine wounded; non-commissioned officers and privates killed, *one hundred and fifty-four;* wounded, *eight hundred and thirteen;* making the total casualties of the division *one thousand and thirty-two.* Among these the country has to mourn the loss of many gallant and accomplished officers, and brave and devoted men. I have already noted the death of Major Birch, of the Ninety-third Ohio, who was killed while gallantly leading his regiment in the assault on the enemy's intrenchments on Monday afternoon of the twenty-third. Major Irvin, Sixth Ohio, and Major Glass, Thirty-second Indiana, while displaying like heroism, were killed in the assault on Mission Ridge. In the death of these gallant and excellent officers the country has sustained a severe loss.

To my brigade commanders, General Willich, commanding First brigade; General Hazen, commanding Second brigade; and General Beatty, commanding Third brigade, my warmest thanks are due (and are hereby tendered) for the prompt, skilful, and intelligent manner in which they performed their duties in these brilliant operations. They each displayed high personal gallantry, as well as professional intelligence. I commend them to the consideration and care of my seniors in rank. They speak in terms of high praise of their staff officers, and, I doubt not, justly.

In writing a report of operations affording opportunities for the display of personal gallantry and heroism, and for rendering high and distinguished service, it is impossible to chronicle the name of every officer or soldier specially distinguishing himself. And where all have done well, to attempt to discriminate individuals would, perhaps, lead to invidious distinctions. But, as in extensive operations, some are fortunate enough to specially distinguish themselves, it is doing no more than justice to them to commemorate their names in an official report. Colonel Berry, commanding Fifth Kentucky, displayed conspicuous gallantry on the twenty-third and on the twenty-fifth. He was slightly wounded on both days. Colonel Wiley, commanding Forty-first Ohio, rendered signal service on both days, and displayed high courage. In the assault on Mission Ridge he received a ghastly wound in his right knee, rendering amputation necessary. Lieutenant-Colonel Chandler, commanding Thirty-fifth Illinois, after being among the very first on the summit of Mission Ridge, rendered the most important service by a prompt flank movement to the left, whereby a portion of the resisting rebels were swept off. Lieutenant-Colonel Chandler then, according to his brigade commander's report, followed up the enemy a mile and a half in his retreat. Colonel Stout, commanding Seventeenth Kentucky, and Colonel Knefler, commanding

Seventy-ninth Indiana, distinguished themselves by the vigor of their assault on Mission Ridge, and the ardor with which they attacked the rebels after the crest had been gained.

To the members of my personal staff, Captain Bestow, Assistant Adjutant-General, First Lieutenant Yargan, Fifty-eighth Indiana, and Second Lieutenant Shaffer, Ninety-third Ohio, Aides-de-Camp, Captain Bartlett, Forty-ninth Ohio, Inspector-General of the Division, and Captain Wells, Eighty-ninth Illinois, Assistant Commissary of Musters, who accompanied me on the field throughout the entire operations, my thanks are especially due for much valuable assistance, promptly and intelligently rendered. They all bore themselves with signal gallantry. Captain Bestow was slightly wounded by the fragment of a shell in the assault on Mission Ridge. To the members of my staff who were not immediately on the field, Captain Bradley, Sixth Ohio battery, Chief of Artillery; Captain Myers, Assistant Quarter-Master; Captain Mullen, Commissary of Subsistence; Lieutenant Haldeman, Ordinance Officer; and Captain Taft, Provost-Marshal, I must tender my thanks for the excellent manner in which they performed their appropriate duties. Captain Bridges, commanding the battery which was posted on Orchard Knob during the night of the twenty-third, did good service. Special praise and commendation are due to that accomplished officer and Christian gentleman, Surgeon W. W. Blair, Medical Director of the division, for the excellent arrangements, provided in advance, for taking care of the wounded, and for the prompt manner in which, so far as human power could do it, their sufferings were alleviated.

Though it may be unusual, I trust it will not be considered in bad taste, more especially when it is remembered that we commenced the career of arms together in our boyhood, if I return my sincere acknowledgments to the Commander of the corps of which my division is a part, for the prompt and hearty support he gave me throughout the brilliant operations which terminated in raising the protracted investment of Chattanooga and the rout of the rebel army.

Immediately after the termination of the operations around Chattanooga, my division, with another of the corps, was ordered to march to the relief of the garrison of Knoxville, beleaguered by the rebels under General Longstreet. Thinly clad, some of the men being absolutely barefooted, and all deficient in clothing, and after having been more than two months on short rations, the march was cheerfully commenced and rapidly made at a most inclement season of the year. The line of march having been changed after leaving Chattanooga, it was impossible to draw subsistence from the Commissariat Department, and during the remainder of the march it was necessary for the troops to subsist on the country. This their indomitable energy enabled them to do. And, I may add, they have been compelled to live in the same way, more or less, ever since. When we marched from Chattanooga it was understood that the object of the movement was simply to cause the siege of Knoxville to be raised, and that as soon as this was accomplished we were to return. On our arrival at Knoxville it was determined to hold us there, while the garrison pursued the retreating rebels.

After remaining at Knoxville a week, a report was received that Longstreet had turned on his pursuers and was driving them back. To support them we were ordered to advance to this point, and here we have remained ever since, suffering all the privations and hardships that insufficient clothing, insufficient shelter, and insufficient food, at the most inclement season of the year, can produce. When we marched from Chattanooga the troops were allowed but one wagon per regiment for the transportation of baggage, shelter, and cooking utensils.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
THOMAS J. WOOD,
Brigadier-General U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.

Tabular Statement of Casualties in the Third Division, Fourth Army Corps, in the operations before Chattanooga, on 23d, 24th, and 25th days of November, 1863.

COMMANDS. THIRD DIVISION, FOURTH ARMY CORPS.	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL.
	Commissioned Officers.	Enlisted Men	Commissioned Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Commissioned Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Commissioned Officers and Enlisted Men.
First Brigade.....	7	46	17	267	....	....	337
Second Brigade....	7	86	30	399	....	....	522
Third Brigade.....	2	12	12	148	....	....	174
Total.....	16	144	59	814	....	....	1,033

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PROVISIONAL COURT FOR LOUISIANA.

By the capture of New Orleans and some of the adjacent ports of the State of Louisiana, a territory of great importance was placed under the control of the Federal arms, and the government of that district was a duty at once cast upon the power holding it. The agricultural and manufacturing interests of this section of

country, connected with the two great staples, cotton and sugar, would have been sufficient to call for more than the ordinary extemporaneous provisions in such cases; but, in addition to those, it embraced one of the largest commercial cities in the country—one, too, of much wealth and great business activity, and known for many years before as one of the most turbulent and difficult to govern. The only power of the Federal Government there was the military. This in its nature being executive, and purely so, neither the legislative nor the judicial wants were supplied by it. The army could very well execute decrees and orders, but it could not well hear and decide cases; and to provide for the government of this territory while it should be held and occupied by the Federal forces, one of the first things was to establish a judiciary by which controversies could be decided and justice administered.

Some of the earlier experiments in temporary expedients for this purpose were not as successful as could be desired. A large part of the population of Louisiana were foreigners—persons born in Europe who had never been naturalized in the United States, and who still owed allegiance to, and were entitled to the protection of the governments under which they had been born. This class in particular, by the aid of the consuls and agents of their respective governments, had given a great deal of trouble, not only at New Orleans and in Louisiana, to General Butler and the authorities there, but numbers of claims which had been passed upon in one way and another in Louisiana went on appeal to Washington, and were there, through the ministers and agents of the respective governments, pressed upon the attention of the authorities. These cases, as they had not been passed upon by courts of general jurisdiction and permanent powers, had to be re-examined there. In this manner a great amount of labor was thrown upon the President and members of the Cabinet, and sometimes very serious anxieties were occasioned as to the relations of the government with the governments of these complainants. To supply the wants of the State and avoid these complications with foreign powers, this court was created with powers plenary in all cases. The order of the President creating it was in the following words:

"EXECUTIVE ORDER, ESTABLISHING A PROVISIONAL COURT IN LOUISIANA.

"EXECUTIVE MANSION,
"WASHINGTON, October 20, 1862.

"The insurrection which has for some time prevailed in several of the States of this Union, including Louisiana, having temporarily subverted and swept away the civil institutions of that State, including the judiciary and the judicial authorities of the Union, so that it has become necessary to hold the State in military occupation; and it being indispensably necessary that there shall be some judicial tribunal existing there capable of administering justice, I have, therefore, thought it proper to appoint, and I do hereby constitute a Provisional Court, which shall be a Court of Record for the State of Louisiana, and I do hereby appoint Charles A. Peabody, of New York, to be a Provisional Judge to hold said court, with authority to hear, try, and determine all causes, civil and criminal, including causes in law, equity, revenue, and admiralty, and particularly all such powers and jurisdiction as belong to the District and Circuit courts of the United States, conforming his proceedings, so far as possible, to the course of proceedings and practice which has been customary in the courts of the United States and Louisiana—his judgment to be final and conclusive. And I do hereby authorize and empower the said Judge to make and establish such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the exercise of his jurisdiction, and to appoint a Prosecuting Attorney, Marshal and Clerk of the said court, who shall perform the functions of attorney, marshal, and clerk, according to such proceedings and practice as before-mentioned, and such rules and regulations as may be made and established by said Judge. These appointments are to continue during the pleasure of the President, not extending beyond the military occupation of the city of New Orleans, or the restoration of the civil authority in that city and in the State of Louisiana. These officers shall be paid out of the contingent fund of the War Department, compensation as follows: * * * * * Such compensations to be certified by the Secretary of War. A copy of this order, certified by the Secretary of War, and delivered to such Judge, shall be deemed and held to be a sufficient commission. Let the seal of the United States be hereunto affixed.

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

"By the President:

"WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State."

"WAR DEPARTMENT,
"WASHINGTON, 23d October, 1862.

"I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy, duly examined and compared with the original of the executive order of the President of the United States, constituting a Provisional Court for the State of Louisiana.

"Witness my hand and the seal of the War Department.

"EDWIN M. STANTON,
"Secretary of War."

"Attest: JOHN BOTTS,
"Chief Clerk."

This order provides a tribunal, with powers as comprehensive as can be desired for any and all purposes. Without limit as to amounts or the nature of the controversies, it confers on Judge Peabody the power to hear and determine all causes of every name and kind, and ordains that his decision shall be final and conclusive.

The language of the order is very clear: "I do hereby appoint Charles A. Peabody, of New York, to be a Provisional Judge to hold said court, with authority to hear, try, and determine all causes, civil and criminal, including causes

in law, equity, revenue, and admiralty, and particularly all such powers and jurisdiction as belong to the District and Circuit courts of the United States, * * * * his judgments to be final and conclusive," leaving no doubt as to either the comprehensiveness of its jurisdiction in respect to the subject-matters embraced, or the extent of its powers as to the conclusiveness of its judgments.

This court went into operation in January, 1863. Its inauguration was announced by a proclamation of General Shepley, then Military Governor of Louisiana, in the following terms:

"A PROCLAMATION.

"STATE OF LOUISIANA, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, "NEW ORLEANS, December 29, 1862.

"By an executive order, dated on the twentieth day of October, A. D. 1862, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, has constituted an '*United States Provisional Court for the State of Louisiana*,' and appointed the Hon. Charles A. Peabody to be a Provisional Judge to hold said court.

"By the terms of this order he is invested 'with authority to hear, try, and determine all causes, civil and criminal, including causes in law, equity, revenue, and admiralty, and particularly to exercise all such powers and jurisdiction as belong to the District and Circuit courts, conforming his proceedings, as far as possible, to the course of proceedings and practice which has been customary in the courts of the United States and Louisiana; his judgments to be final and conclusive.'

"The said Judge is further authorized and empowered to make and establish such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the exercise of his jurisdiction, and to appoint a Prosecuting Attorney, Marshal, and Clerk of the said court.

"In the exercise of the authority conferred by this order, the said Judge has appointed George D. Lamont, Prosecuting Attorney, Augustus De B. Hughes, Clerk of said court, and Isaac Edwards Clark, Marshal.

"Official notice is hereby given of the organization of said court, and of the appointment of the said Charles A. Peabody as Judge, and of the officers of the court by him appointed.

"All judgments, decisions, and decrees of said court, and all acts of said officers by them done under the authority of said order, are to be respected and obeyed accordingly.

"GEORGE F. SHEPLEY,
"Military Governor of Louisiana."

Under this order it will be seen that the powers conferred were the administration of justice, and that not according to any law designated or suggested. The civil institutions of the country having been swept away, the law theretofore in force there had yielded like the rest, and was no longer in force as the rule of conduct of men, or the guide in the administration of justice. The court therefore was to administer justice, not by any particular law, but in its own way, and to adopt its own rules or laws by which it would be guided in the administration of it; and this very early called for the adoption and promulgation by the court of a system of rules of action.

The court considered it the purpose and duty of the government to govern the country held by its armies in a manner consistent with its own dignity and best interests, and the condition of things brought about by the war in which it was engaged; that in doing this it would have great respect for the interests of those to be governed; that in selecting the system of laws by which transactions between individuals should be governed and controversies decided, the interests of the people of the locality would be chiefly consulted; the government itself having but little interest, except to deal justly, preserve quiet, cultivate contentment, and give the people the system most beneficent for them under all the circumstances of the case. The government naturally looked to the system it found in operation there at the time of the conquest of the country. That system had been introduced there by the wisdom of the country, as best suited to the wants of the community, its habits and pursuits; and it was reasonable to suppose that the selection had been wise, and this circumstance would commend it to the favorable consideration of the government. That system had, moreover, been in force previously, and the transactions and contracts which would be the subjects of consideration in the court, had most of them been entered into while it had been so in force, and, as might fairly be presumed, with reference to it as the system by which they would be construed and carried into effect; and consequently that system (other things being equal) would be most just and beneficial in its operation in those cases; and not less so than any new system in respect to other cases more recently arisen, or those thereafter to arise. The court therefore declared that, as far as the altered condition of things would permit, the system of laws heretofore in Louisiana would be adopted as the one which would be the guide of the court in the administration of justice.

The general orders of the General in command of the Department of course were binding as laws, and were to be respected as of paramount authority by the court.

Those orders made numerous modifications of the law adopted as the basis of the system, and indicated the policy of the government in the many matters to which they related. They were the express or written law of the land for the time, and corresponded in most respects with the statutes enacted by the legislative power in a country under civil administration of government.

All the power of the government being in the military arm, it followed that that arm had the power to dictate laws according to which justice should be administered, as well as to erect courts to administer it. For reasons similar to those which led the court to adopt the laws of

Louisiana in matters pecuniary and civil in their nature, the criminal laws of Louisiana were adopted as the rule of the administration of criminal justice. "These laws," said the court, in a charge to a grand jury, "framed by the wisdom of the State, with an enlightened appreciation of the wants and interests of the community here, will be found best adapted to the government of this country, and will be your guide and rule in your deliberations generally in the performance of your duties as grand jurors."

The laws of the State, however, in criminal as well as civil matters, he said would not be adhered to inflexibly in the new condition of things.

There were changes in circumstances which must be taken into account in administering criminal justice. These changes and the modifications they would require in the administration of justice, were subjects to be considered by the court in cases as they should arise, and not generally matters that could be provided for by rules of general application. It was natural that certain crimes should become frequent in a state of society broken and chaotic, where the general feeling of obligation and restraint among men was relaxed, and the temptations to crime, growing out of increased wants and temptations, greatly increased, and the punishments must be graduated accordingly.

In most cases where a departure from former laws would become expedient, it would be in the direction of greater mildness in punishment. In some cases, however, a deviation in the opposite direction might be called for by the necessities of the case. A similar rule was adopted as to cases which, under the former system of things, would have been cognizable by the Federal courts. In those cases the same law was applied as would have been administered in the Federal courts in the respective departments of civil and criminal, legal and equitable, admiralty and maritime, jurisprudence.

As soon as the court was ready for business, a large amount was commenced in it of the various kinds to which the habits and pursuits of the country give rise in times of peace, and many questions were presented which arose out of the peculiar circumstances of the times, the previous occupation by the Confederate authorities, acts governmental and personal during that time, and the change of rule by the occupation by the Federal forces. Most of the questions presented were such as arise naturally out of the transactions between men in a community—such as this was, and had been; but many of them were eccentric in their character, arising out of the peculiar state of things existing at the time, and that which had previously existed there in the course of the revolution, the Confederate rule, and the transition from Federal to Confederate, and from Confederate back to Federal government, and the substitution of martial for civil law and government. Many of these were exceedingly novel and peculiar.

The court was always governed by the rules and principles of law, adhering to all the forms of civil tribunals, and avoiding everything like a military administration of justice. In criminal matters it summoned a Grand Jury, and submitted to it all charges for examination. After indictment found, the cases were tried before a jury with all the usual forms of law, and all the rules theretofore in use which were not inconsistent with the existing condition of things. Several capital cases were tried, and convictions were obtained. Three cases were tried in one week, in two of which convictions of murder were had, and in the other a conviction of manslaughter—such a coincidence as in that licentious country had probably never occurred before, and was not likely soon to occur again.

Crimes against the person there had seldom before been punished at all, and hence this administration of justice in that place was remarkable.

The first court established there was the Provost Court of the army; at first performing only the duties of a military court, then those of a general criminal court.

In addition to these duties, and in the absence of other courts, the Provost Court, from time to time, sometimes by order of the Commanding General, entertained and tried civil suits, and those not only of the usual character arising out of transactions of a pecuniary nature, but those once esteemed of ecclesiastical cognizance, such as successions, the administration of the estates of deceased persons, the custody of infants and their estates, and cases of divorce, not only "a mensa et thoro," but also "a vinculo matrimonii."

In that court the pleadings had always been oral; no notes of evidence were taken, and the decision usually followed immediately on the closing of the evidence or arguments of counsel, in cases where arguments were heard.

That court had been doing business some months when the Provisional Court went into operation, and the questions growing out of the actions of that court were among the most novel and eccentric that came before the Provisional Court. The operations of that court had been most beneficent, and it was safe to assume that justice and the best interests of the public would be advanced by sustaining its acts so far as circumstances would permit, and the Provisional Court, therefore, always inclined to sustain its jurisdiction. When, for instance, a divorce "a mensa et thoro" had been adjudged by that court, on the application of the wife, and more than a year had elapsed without a reconciliation of the parties, the law of Louisiana in such a case giving the plaintiff after the expiration of a year, a right to a complete divorce "a vinculo matrimonii," and half of the property acquired during coverture, the Provisional Court was applied to, to make the final decree and distribute the property between the parties.

The Provisional Court sustained the jurisdic-

tion of the Provost Court, affirmed its decision, and ordered judgment of divorce, dissolving the bonds of matrimony, and dividing the property of the marriage, and awarding the custody and support of the children.

De Barr vs. *De Barr.*

A Mr. Emerson during the rule of the Confederate authorities, held a mortgage on the property of one Guilloutet. He proceeded to foreclose it, and had obtained an order for the sale of the property. He directed the Sheriff to receive in payment of his mortgage only gold and silver. Guilloutet wished to pay it in Confederate notes. These Emerson refused to receive. Shortly afterwards Emerson was arrested by order of a Confederate Provost-Marshal and carried before him and questioned as to his refusal to receive Confederate notes in payment. He said that he had refused, and further said that as to debts like the mortgage arising out of contracts made prior to the Confederate rule, when the currency was specie or its equivalent, and on which he had paid or loaned specie, he should insist on payment in specie, and should decline to receive Confederate notes. The Provost-Marshal ordered him committed to the parish prison, telling him that he would discharge him whenever he would consent to receive Confederate notes in payment of all sums due him. Being an old man and infirm, he could not remain there without great danger to his life, and he soon yielded to the entreaties of his wife and friends, and gave a written promise to the Provost-Marshal that he would receive those notes in payment of all sums due him, and was discharged. Shortly afterwards the mortgage was paid off by Guilloutet in Confederate notes, and was cancelled off record.

Soon after the Provisional Court was opened, Emerson brought a suit to have the cancellation of the mortgage rescinded and the mortgage restored to its condition as a lien on the premises, and offered to return the Confederate notes to Guilloutet. Since the cancellation of the mortgage, Gilloutet had procured from another person, named Samony, having no knowledge of the manner in which the cancellation of Emerson's mortgage had been effected, another loan, and had given another mortgage on the same property. The holder of this mortgage was also made defendant in Emerson's suit, and the lien of his mortgage was also sought to be cut off or postponed to that of Emerson.

The Court ordered the cancellation to be vacated, and Emerson's mortgage to be restored as a lien on the property, but declined to vacate or postpone the lien of the subsequent mortgage, and excepted that from the operation of Emerson's lien, and established it as prior to that of Emerson's mortgage.

It is not a little remarkable that while things of this kind were of frequent occurrence during the rule of the Confederacy, there is no law of the Confederate States, or of any State of the Confederacy, making these Confederate notes legal tender, or obliging any one to accept them in payment, and the whole matter of urging this currency, so universal throughout the Confederacy, and of which instances were so frequent, and the modes often so fatally violent, was without the warrant or pretence of any warrant of law whatever.

The Court held that its powers to hear and determine finally all cases, embraced not only cases originating therein, but also those commenced and pending in other courts in the State, whose functions were suspended by the Rebellion, and not only those pending in courts of original jurisdiction, when they had been commenced in the State courts and the Federal courts, but also those pending in appellate courts of the State and of the United States within the boundaries of that State, and accordingly cases pending in the Supreme Court of the State, the appellate court of last resort, on appeal from the courts of the several parishes, and those pending in the Circuit courts of the United States on appeal from the District courts of the Eastern and Western districts of Louisiana, were considered as coming within the powers of this court to hear and decide, and some of them were transferred to it by order of this court, and were then heard and determined. Causes pending in other courts were transferred to this court only where the functions of the court in which they were pending were in suspense and they could not be prosecuted to a conclusion there. Where the courts in which they were pending were then in operation and justice could be had there, this court always declined to interfere. Among the cases in which the action of the court was early invoked, were many of a public character on behalf of the government by its officers. Of these some of the most attractive were those of maritime prize, and those arising under the Confiscation acts of 1862. Numbers of these were presented for consideration at an early day. The Court immediately decided that it had not jurisdiction in cases of prize, holding that, although such questions were embraced in the general terms of the order constituting the court, still that in the very nature of the court, deriving its powers, not from the Constitution or laws of the United States, but from the Chief Executive officer and military head of that government, exercising powers conferred on him as such officer by the law of nations, and constituted for and holding its sessions in territory held in military occupation by the forces of the United States, and over which his powers of government were derived from the conquest and military occupation of it, and from the necessities arising from that condition of things, it had not jurisdiction for such purposes, and it declined to entertain them.

Suits in considerable number were also brought on behalf of the United States to enforce the laws of 1862 for the confiscation of the property of those who had taken active part in the rebel-

lion. In answer to these proceedings, it was insisted that the court had not jurisdiction in cases of this class, and very able and elaborate arguments were heard, Mr. George S. Lacey, and Mr. William H. Hunt, and Mr. Roselins, all eminent members of the bar of New Orleans, appearing for the claimants, and Mr. Lamont, the Prosecuting Attorney of the court, appearing for the government. This argument occupied several days, and at the close of it the court took time for consideration. While the question remained undecided, the constitutional courts of the United States for that district were organized and opened, and all business of the kind was transferred, with the approbation of both courts, to the District Court, that being the court in which, by the law itself, questions arising under it were directed to be tried.

The question of jurisdiction was never decided, and was in effect, by subsequent events, withdrawn from consideration. It was understood, however, that Judge Peabody had great doubts of his jurisdiction, and that his doubts arose from an inclination to think that the question was governed by the same rule as that of jurisdiction in cases of prize, in which he had already decided that he had not jurisdiction. If, however, the court had originally had jurisdiction in these cases, in the absence of the Federal court, on which the jurisdiction had been expressly by the act itself conferred, he was quite of the opinion that it did not retain it after the organization and re-establishment of that court, but was thereby divested of it.

In cases of prize the court declined jurisdiction, and in cases of confiscation it doubted its jurisdiction and never exercised it.

In no other class of cases was the jurisdiction of the court ever questioned or doubted. So convincing is the argument of necessity to persons present and witnessing with their own senses its illustrations, that no one was found to doubt that the military power of the United States holding that country in military occupation, had, *ex necessitate rei*, the right to govern it.

All other powers being suspended by the conquest, it followed that whatever of government it should have must come from that source. That it should have government from some source, no sane man could doubt. That it could in the existing condition of things have it from any other was plainly impossible. It must, therefore, have it from that; and to have refused it would have been not merely a breach of duty, but a violation of one of the first principles and plainest dictates of humanity.

The judgments and mandates of this court were, of course, to be executed. They would be executed by the same power by which the court was constituted. To this the military and naval force at the command of the President was pledged. With this understood, nothing like resistance or a hesitation to obey was ever for a moment experienced.

When the commission of this court was first presented to the bar, the all-embracing comprehensiveness of its jurisdiction, as to the cases and questions which it was authorized to entertain, and the omnipotence of its judgments, terminating without appeal the rights of the parties in all cases, attracted attention and remark. No serious objection was made to it, however, and soon after it went into operation, the readiness with which it was filled with business of the first magnitude, a great part of which was equally cognizable by other courts then in operation in the parish of Orleans, showed that litigants and the bar were on the whole not at all disposed to shun, but rather were disposed to seek this court, anomalous as it was in its jurisdiction and powers.

Doc. 40.

THE BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS, VA.

MAJOR-GENERAL WARREN'S ACCOUNT.*

Introduction.

The confidence shown by the Commander-in-Chief in selecting me for the command of the Department of Mississippi, then the theatre of actual warfare, immediately after the battle of Five Forks, I deemed a thorough vindication of my conduct on that memorable occasion.

I felt, though denied the official investigation which I had applied for, that I could leave my justification before the public to the ultimate publication of the official reports. I trusted, too, that General Sheridan's report would do me justice, and that he could not fail in it to acknowledge that his treatment of me was hasty and based on erroneous impressions. The publication of this report, dated May 16, in the Official Gazette, disappointed this hope, for therein, as far as mention is made of me, it is in terms of disparagement, and in efforts to justify his inconsiderate action.

After this publication I thought the investigation I sought could not long be denied, and I have remained silent till now, fully believing an impartial investigation would relieve me of the imputations of General Sheridan, and place just censure on those by whom I have been wronged.

To bring my professional grievances before the public is a thing from which I have shrunk, and I do not do so now from any love of controversy. If circumstances were different I should be glad to avoid it; but the facts being little known and understood, and there being many misrepresentations, I am under this necessity. I have, therefore, prepared the following narrative of facts in much detail, so that each one can examine and judge for himself, as, I presume, all fair-minded men, whose time will permit, will gladly do.

* An account of the operations of the Fifth Army Corps, commanded by Major-General G. K. Warren, at the battle of Five Forks, April 1, 1865, and the battles and movements preliminary to it, by G. K. Warren, late Major-General Volunteers.

In the report† of General Sheridan there are three imputations against me—the *first* of which is vaguely made, in the following:

"Had General Warren moved according to the expectations of the Lieutenant-General, there would appear to have been but little chance for the escape of the enemy's infantry in front of Dinwiddie C. H."

If such expectations were formed, they were not reasonable, according to the facts. I acted during the night under orders from General Meade, which, with my dispatches to him, and other facts, will be given. It will appear that the enemy held all the roads necessary for his escape; that he withdrew from General Sheridan's front to Five Forks early in the night, and that the swollen state of Gravelly Run and a broken bridge prevented my troops from reaching General Sheridan till daybreak. It also will appear that the tenor of my orders from General Meade were, not that I was to prevent the escape of the enemy, but to use every exertion to succor General Sheridan, who could "*not maintain himself at Dinwiddie C. H. without reinforcements.*" My dispatches show that it was my own suggestion to attempt to intercept the enemy if he remained in General Sheridan's front, and not fall back, as I was at first ordered.

The *second* imputation is contained in the following:

"General Warren did not exert himself to get up his corps as rapidly as he might have done, and his manner gave me the impression that he wished the sun to go down before dispositions for the attack could be completed."

The facts of the movements of the troops in coming up to this point are all given in the statements of Brevet Brigadier-General Bankhead, who carried my order to the troops to move up while I rode forward to examine the ground on which they were to form; and in the letters of Generals Crawford, Griffin, and Ayres, who commanded my three divisions. I present them here in their proper place in the narrative, and they are conclusive that I and my troops exerted ourselves to form for the attack as rapidly as possible.

While the troops were forming I told General Sheridan it would occupy till four P. M., at which time they *were* formed, and at which time the sun was *two and a half hours high.* Certainly I could not have expected the sun to go down before the "dispositions for the attack could be completed," nor have given him reason to think I wished it. I had at the time confidence in the success of our proposed attack, and the kindest feelings toward General Sheridan, under whom I was glad to serve. I am utterly at a loss to account for the misapprehension he labored under in imputing such baseness to me, and I trust my conduct throughout the war has shown to those by whom I am best known that I am incapable of it.

† Extracts from this report, giving all that relates to me, are placed in the appendix to this narrative.

The *third* imputation is contained in the following:

"During this engagement portions of his line gave way when not exposed to a heavy fire, and simply from want of confidence on the part of the troops, which General Warren did not exert himself to inspire."

I had, at the time of the engagement, to control the movements of an entire *corps d'armée*, fighting and changing front as it advanced through the forests. It is clearly a case for the exercise of a corps commander's judgment, how far he shall at any time give his personal efforts to the general control of his corps, or assist his subordinate commanders in their commands, and whether he shall use his staff and himself to rally troops who break under a not very severe fire, from want of confidence, or to so direct other portions of his command as to thereby remedy the evil which this giving way produced. Whatever is vital to the success of the whole is the thing deserving the corps commander's attention, and to that, throughout, I gave mine. On account of the forest, General Sheridan saw but one flank of the operations of my command, and was no further cognizant of my exertions. He saw nothing of the fighting of General Crawford's division, which suffered more from the enemy's fire than any other. There was no part of my command that did not witness my exertions at one time or another, and my horse was fatally shot close to the enemy's breastworks. To those who served under me I refer for proof of my exertions, and, as they represent every section of our country, any one who wishes can verify my assertion by those around him.

If General Sheridan had stated which of my troops misbehaved for want of my presence, I could bring the evidence of their commander to bear in my defence. But how this exertion could have been specially required of me I am at loss to understand; for he says himself, "I cannot speak too highly of the troops in this battle and the gallantry of their commanders."

The duty of every soldier to obey has its correlative which entitles him to the protection of those under whom he serves, and this I have been denied.

General Sheridan says:

"I therefore relieved him from the command of the Fifth corps, authority for this action having been sent to me before the battle, unsolicited."

From the time that authority reached him he, apparently, sought occasion to use it. I say this with regret; but the tone of the report toward me, and his hasty action, indicate that it was so. If a victory won by my command, under my direction, could not gain me credit, where the plans made were, as he says, "*successfully executed,*" and where my efforts and directions were known to almost every one, then nothing could.

General Grant, while giving the above authority to General Sheridan, had never signified to me, in the remotest manner, any dissatisfac-

tion with me. I had had no direct official relations with him. My instructions all came through General Meade, and to him all my reports were made. If General Grant had ever expressed himself displeased with me to General Meade, the latter had kept it from me; and he ever showed, by intrusting to me the advance of the army on many vital occasions, and often by sending me on detached expeditions, the highest confidence in me, and this is well known.

I shall further reply to the imputations of General Sheridan while giving the narration of the events to which they relate, which narration, I hope, will possess an interest of its own, independent of its defence of me.

Narrative.

In order to introduce the battle of Five Forks intelligently, I will first describe the previous operations of March twenty-ninth, thirtieth, and thirty-first, and shall do so but briefly, in order to confine attention particularly to the first of April and the orders of the night before.

My command, on March twenty-ninth, consisted of General Crawford's division, five thousand two hundred and fifty strong; General Griffin's division, six thousand one hundred and eighty strong; and General Ayres' division, three thousand nine hundred and eighty strong. I took with me, as directed, only five four-gun batteries, under General Wainwright. I had no cavalry, except an escort of forty men, under Captain Horrell.

All the cavalry of the army, except headquarter escorts, was with General Sheridan, whose operations were to be so distinct from mine that I was ordered to act entirely independent of any protection he could give my flanks. My position throughout was on the left flank of the infantry and artillery, army of General Meade.

To facilitate the understanding of the subject, I have added to my narrative a reliable map, on a scale of one mile to an inch. The region represented is of the character common in Virginia, level, much covered with thick and tangled woods, and well watered by numerous small, swampy streams. The soil was clayey or sandy, which, when commingled in wet places, partakes of the nature of "quick-sand," and where, upheaved by the winter frosts that now had left it, presented little less support to wheels or hoofs than would a bank of snow.

I enumerate here the officers of my staff, not merely because it is due to them whenever the operations of the Fifth army corps are considered, but also to point out those to whom any one can specially refer for the correctness of what I write. This staff has probably had as much experience in the actual warfare as any other that could be named. It consisted of Colonel H. C. Bankhead, Inspector-General, and Major Wm. T. Gentry, Commissary of Musters, both graduates of the United States Military Academy; of Colonel F. T. Locke, Adjutant-General, which position he had held from the organization of the corps, in May, 1862; of Colonel A. L. Thomas, Chief Quartermaster; of Colonel D. L. Smith, Chief Commissary of Subsistence; of Colonel T. R. Spencer, Medical Director; of Dr. Chas. K. Winne, Medical Inspector; of Captain Malvern, Chief Ambulance Officer; and of Captain G. B. Halstead, Assistant Adjutant-General. To these, for the time, was added Captain Wm. H. H. Benyaurd, of the Regular Engineers, detached from General Meade's staff to accompany me, and who gave me most important assistance, as also did Major Van Bokkelen, of the Volunteer Engineer Brigade, who joined us with a light canvas pontoon train. My personal aides-de-camp were Major E. B. Cope, a most valuable topographical officer; Captain James S. Wadsworth, son of the lamented General James S. Wadsworth; and Captain Gordon Winslow, son of the like lamented Rev. Gordon Winslow.

BATTLE OF QUAKER ROAD.

We left our camp, in rear of the lines at Petersburg, at three A. M., on March twenty-ninth. We moved south, across Rowanty Creek, below the junction of Gravelly and Hatcher's Runs, took the road thence to Dinwiddie Court House, as far as the Quaker Road, then turned up this latter, and crossed Gravelly Run.

A sharp engagement took place between a division of the enemy and my advance, consisting of General Griffin's division, at the Old Saw-Mill site, in which General Griffin drove the enemy back to the junction of the Quaker Road and Boydton Plank-road, inflicting upon them a severe loss, and losing himself three hundred and sixty-seven killed and wounded.

It commenced raining in the night, and continued to rain heavily all day on the thirtieth. During this day, General Griffin's line was advanced, with heavy skirmishing up the Boydton Plank-road, so as to confine the enemy, near Burgess' Mill, to his breastworks along the White Oak Road. A reconnoissance by General Ayres' division was also made, as far west as where the enemy's line along the White Oak Road turned northward to Hatcher's Run, and our picket line was established near the White Oak Road. Finding, on personal examination, that, though we could see the road, our pickets did not occupy it, I directed this occupation to be made that evening.

BATTLE OF WHITE OAK RIDGE.

Toward daylight on March 31, General Griffin's division was relieved by a portion of the Second army corps. At 7.35 A. M., in answer to a dispatch of General Webb, requesting to be informed of the location of my troops, I sent the following:

"General Griffin's troops will be massed near Mrs. Butler's; General Ayres' near S. Dabney's; General Crawford's about half-way between. They are along a wood-road running from near Mrs. Butler's to W. Dabney's, on the White Oak Road. It is not practicable now for wheels, and there is a very difficult branch of Gravelly Run


MAP OF THE
BATTLE-FIELD OF FIVE FORKS, VA.,
April 1st, 1865, and of
Field of Operation preliminary to it,
Showing the operations of
THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
Commanded by Maj.-Gen. G. K. Warren.
Indicates the Enemy.
1st Div., 5th Corps, Bvt. Maj.-Gen. Chas. Griffin.
2d " " " R. B. Ayres.
3d " " " S. W. Crawford.
Scale—1 inch per mile.
Note.—While the Fifth Corps attacked the enemy, as indicated, at Five Forks, our cavalry occupied and engaged his front.
WELDON R.R.
SOUTHERLAND STA.
SOUTH SIDE R.R.
FORD ROAD
HATCHERS RUN
FIVE FORKS
BURGESS
WHITE OAK ROAD
GRAVEL RUN CHURCH
CHAMBERLAIN CREEK
DINWIDDIE C.H.
DARNEYS MILL
OLD SAWMILL
J. STROUT
PLANK ROAD
BOYDTON
VIRGINIA ROAD
GRAVELLY RUN
HATCHERS RUN
ROWANTY CR.
STAGE ROAD
W. PERKINS
CUT TAIL CREEK
STONY CREEK
ADAMS
GRIFFIN
CRAWFORD
AYRES
CORPS HEAD QRT.
CORPS HEAD QRTS.
ENEMY AT DARK MAR. 31

that runs south from the White Oak Ridge, joining the stream at the crossing of the Plank-road, which will take a long time to make practicable for wagons. I have all the pioneers I can spare at work on it. I will send you a sketch."

It must be noticed here that, at this time, we were quite ignorant of the country I was operating in, and the following corrections are now necessary in the above dispatch. The place "S. Dabney's" did not exist, though on our printed maps. The place taken for S. Dabney's is marked on the map "unknown." The road, instead of joining the White Oak Road at W. Dabney's, does so near "Butler's." General Griffin's division was just north of Mrs. Butler's, but this name was given to indicate the approximate location on the map.

The space occupied by the troops extended but little beyond a mile. General Crawford's division was in juxtaposition with General Ayres', and massed ready to fight in any direction. General Ayres was cautioned to be prepared to meet the enemy's attack both from the north and west, and reconnoissances were being made to gain a full knowledge of the country.

At 8.40 A. M., I received the following dispatch from General Webb:

"There is firing along General Humphreys' front. The Major-General commanding desires you to be ready to send your reserve, if it should be called for, to support General Humphreys. *There will be no movement of troops to-day.*"

To this I at once sent the following reply:

"Your dispatch of 8.25 A. M. is just received. There is a good deal of musketry firing going on in our lines, by the men firing off their guns to put in fresh loads. Unless I break loose entirely from General Humphreys, I think the force he sent to relieve General Griffin is much more than, under any circumstances, would be needed there. My troops are, however, at all times as ready to move as it is possible to keep them for a long time. If the enemy break General Humphrey's line at any time, or threaten to do so, I shall not wait for orders to assist him, if I can."

At 8.50 A. M., I received the following from General Humphreys:

"Please let me know where your right will rest, that I may connect with you? General Miles has relieved General Griffin, and I find a vacant space on his left."

To this I at once replied as follows:

"I send you a sketch of the country west of the Plank-road, and a copy of my communication to General Webb, as to my position. I cannot take up any regular line of battle on account of the woods and swamps, but have assembled each division at a point, so they can fight in any direction. I had a brigade of General Griffin's and a battery stationed at Stroud's, for support. I don't think your left could be turned (even if I moved away), without having full information. But as my troops now are, I could move Griffin right up on your flank along with my artillery. I shall work hard all day to get the road through the woods in order."

At 8.55 A. M., I received the following from General Webb:

"Owing to the weather, no change will to-day be made in the present position of the troops. Three days' rations of subsistence and forage will be brought up and issued to the troops, and the artillery and wagons authorized to accompany them. The empty supply wagons will be sent to the rear, to be refilled at the railroad terminus. The Chief Engineer and Corps Commanders will use every exertion to make practicable the roads to the rear and communications with their several commands."

At 9.40 A. M., I sent the following dispatch to General Webb:

"I have just received a report from General Ayres that the enemy have their pickets still this side of the White Oak Road, so that their communication is continuous along it. I have sent out word to him to try and drive them off, or develop with what force the road is held by them." This operation I deem essentially necessary to the security of our own position, and I directed General Ayres to use a brigade, if necessary, the distance being but a few hundred yards. In answer to it I received the following dispatch from General Webb, written 10.30 A. M.:

"Your dispatch, giving General Ayres' position, is received: "General Meade directs that should you determine, by your reconnoissance, that you can get possession of the White Oak Road, you are to do so, notwithstanding the orders to suspend operations."*

General Winthrop, with his brigade of General Ayres' division, advanced accordingly about 10½ A. M., and was repulsed, and simultaneously an attack, which had been preparing against General Ayres, was made by the enemy in heavy force, both from the north and west, and General Ayres' division was forced back. General Ayres did all that was in his power to stay the enemy. I hastened toward the point of attack; but on arriving near General Crawford's division, it was also falling back, and all our efforts to hold the men in the woods were unavailing. General Griffin's line was then formed along the east bank of the branch of Gravelly Run, with Mink's battery on his right, and after some

* Comparison of the preceding dispatches with the following extract relating to the same subject, taken from Lieutenant-General Grant's report to the Secretary of War, dated July 22, 1865, published with the annual documents, shows that Lieutenant-General Grant must have been misinformed in relation to the reports made by me, and the orders I received.

[EXTRACT.]

"On the morning of the 31st, General Warren reported favorably to getting possession of the White Oak Road, and was directed to do so. To accomplish this, he moved with one division instead of his whole corps."

It is seen that the operations proposed by me and ordered, were as General Meade describes, of the nature of a "reconnoissance" only, the result of which was to determine what should be done. Special arrangement would have to be made with General Humphreys, if Griffin's division had to be moved up to the point where Generals Ayres and Crawford were. The action of the enemy, however, interfered with the plans, as they often did, and produced the resulting operations.

severe fighting the enemy was stopped. Generals Crawford and Ayres re-formed their troops behind this line. Information of these events was sent to General Humphreys early in their occurrence, and he sent General Miles' division to close the space between his left and General Griffin's right. One brigade of this, also, advanced to the attack of the enemy, but was at first driven back.

At 1 P. M., I made the following report to General Webb:

"General Ayres made an advance with a small force at 10 A. M., which the enemy drove back and followed up in heavy force, compelling both Ayres and Crawford to fall back on Griffin, and, of course, in much confusion. Griffin's troops held the enemy at the Run west of the Plank-road. General Miles' division" (a brigade of it) "afterward attacked the enemy and were forced back on my right. My skirmish line in front of Griffin (most of it) has advanced on my left.

"I am going to send forward a brigade, supported by all I can get of Crawford's and Ayres' divisions, and attack, swinging on our right. Arrangements are being made for this, and it will take place about 1.45 P. M., if the enemy does not attack sooner."

Owing to some difficulties in crossing the Run, this advance which was thus made with the whole available corps, took place a little after the time specified above. General Humphrey's division, under General Miles, also advanced against the enemy about the same period on our right, but the movement was not made in close connection with mine. It is my intention to enter more into details when I receive the official reports of my division commanders.

At 3.40 P. M., I wrote, from the White Oak Road, the following dispatch to General Webb:

"We have driven the enemy, I think, into his breastworks. The prisoners report General Lee here to-day, and also that their breastworks are filled with troops. We have prisoners from a portion of Pickett's and Johnson's divisions.

"General Chamberlain's brigade acted with much gallantry in their advance, capturing nearly the entire Fifty-sixth Virginia regiment, with its flags."

We met with but little opposition in this advance, so that only this one brigade was earnestly engaged.

The loss to the corps, in killed and wounded, from the morning of March 29th to the close of the battle of White Oak Ridge, was eighteen hundred, and included several distinguished soldiers.

OPERATIONS TO SUCCOR GENERAL SHERIDAN.

Thus far my operations were independent of those of General Sheridan, but at this point they came into direct relation to him, and the narrative will be given in more detail. *It must be borne in mind, however, that I acted under General Meade's orders till daybreak of the morning of April* 1.

About 5 P. M., March 31, while on the White Oak Road, I received the following from General Webb, chief of staff:

"Secure your position, and protect, as well as possible, your left flank. Word has been sent to Sheridan, and it is believed that Sheridan is pushing up. General Humphreys will be ordered to push up and to connect with your right. You might, if you think it worth while, push a small force down the White Oak Road, and try to communicate with Sheridan, but they must take care not to fire into his advance."

The rattle of musketry could now be heard south-west from us, which seemed to us to be receding, and which led us to think the enemy was driving our cavalry. I then ordered General Griffin to send General Bartlett, with his brigade, directly across the country, so as to attack the enemy on the flank, and I sent Major Cope, of my staff, with him. At 5.15 P. M. I received the following from General Webb, which directed what before had only been suggested:

"The Major-General commanding directs that you push a brigade down the White Oak Road to open it for General Sheridan, and support the same if necessary. The firing is so near that the General presumes that the command will not have far to go. The distance you will push out must depend on the circumstances of the movement and the support you can give them."

Thus, at the time when to General Meade it seemed "the firing is so near," it plainly sounded to us more and more distant, indicating that our cavalry was falling back, of which I soon had confirmation.

At 5.50 P. M., I sent the following to General Webb:

"I have just seen an officer and a sergeant from General Sheridan's command, who were cut off in an attack by the enemy and escaped. From what they say, our cavalry was attacked about noon by cavalry and infantry, and rapidly driven back, two divisions—Crook's and Deven's—being engaged. The firing seemed to recede from me toward Dinwiddie C. H. I have sent General Bartlett and my escort in that direction, but I think they cannot be in time. I hear cannonading that I think is from near Dinwiddie C. H.

About 6.30 P. M., I received the following from General Webb:

"A staff officer of General Merritt's has made a report that the enemy has penetrated between Sheridan's main command and your position—this is a portion of Pickett's division. Let the force ordered to move out the White Oak Road move down the Boydton Plank-road as promptly as possible."

The force I sent under General Bartlett had now been gone an hour, and to recall it would have required two hours at least for it to reach the Boydton Plank-road, and make it too late for use before dark. My artillery had all been left on the Boydton Plank-road on account of the mud, which had compelled me to do so, and General Griffin had left General Pearson there, with three regiments of infantry

of General Bartlett's brigade to support it. I, therefore, sent the following dispatch to General Webb, at 6.30 P. M., which explained what I did:

"I have ordered General Pearson, with three regiments that are now on the Plank-road, right down toward Dinwiddie C. H. I will let Bartlett work and report result, as it is too late to stop him."

It was then nearly dark.

Having previously reconnoitred the enemy's breastworks on the White Oak Road, I added the following, concerning them, to my dispatch of 6.30 P. M.:

"We can see the enemy's breastworks for two miles east along the White Oak Road. If they are well manned they cannot be carried. I am within two hundred yards of where they turn off northward from the White Oak Road."

I then gave directions to secure the position we had gained by intrenching, and proceeded, with my staff, back about two miles to the Boydton Plank-road, at which place I could communicate by telegraph with General Meade during the night. General Meade's headquarters were distant four and a half miles, being near where the Vaughan Road crosses Hatcher's Run. General Grant's were near Dabney's Mill, about four miles from me. General Sheridan's at Dinwiddie C. H., distant five and a half miles, and separated from me by a stream not fordable for infantry where it crossed the Boydton Plank-road, and the bridge was broken down. General Grant and General Meade were about ten miles from General Sheridan.

At eight P. M., I received the following dispatch from General Meade, written 7.30 P. M.:

"Dispatch from General Sheridan says he was forced back to Dinwiddie C. H. by a strong force of cavalry supported by infantry. This leaves your rear and that of the Second corps on Boydton Plank-road open, and will require great vigilance on your part. If you have sent the brigade down the Boydton Plank-road, it should not go farther than Gravelly Run, as I don't think it will render any service but to protect your rear."

General Pearson had been compelled to stop at Gravelly Run on account of the swollen stream and broken bridge.

At 8.20 P. M., I wrote to General Webb:

"I sent General Bartlett out on the road running from the White Oak Road and left him there. He is nearly down to the crossing of Gravelly Run. This will prevent the enemy communicating by that road to night. I have about two regiments and the artillery to hold the Plank-road toward Dinwiddie C. H. It seems to me the enemy cannot remain between me and Dinwiddie C. H. if Sheridan keeps fighting them, and I believe they will have to fall back to the Five Forks. If I have to move tonight I shall leave a good many men who have lost their way. Does General Sheridan still hold Dinwiddie C. H.?"

At 8.40 P. M., I received, by telegraph, the following, marked confidential, from General Webb:

"The probability is that we will have to contract our lines to-night. You will be required to hold, if possible, the Boydton Plank-road and to Gravelly Run—Humphreys and Ord along the Run. Be prepared to do this at short notice."

I regretted exceedingly to see this step foreshadowed, for I feared it would have the "morale" of giving a failure to our whole movement, as similar orders had done on previous occasions. It would, besides, relieve the enemy in front of General Sheridan from the threatening attitude which my position gave me, and I therefore sent the following, by telegraph, at 8.40 P. M., to General Webb:

"The line along the Plank-road is very strong. One division, with my artillery, I think, can hold it, if we are not threatened south of Gravelly Run, east of the Plank-road. General Humphreys and my batteries, I think, could hold this securely, *and let me move down and attack the enemy at Dinwiddie C. H. on one side, and Sheridan on the other*. On account of Bartlett's position they (the enemy) will have to make a considerable detour to reinforce their troops at that point from the north. Unless General Sheridan has been too badly handled, I think we have a chance for an open field fight that should be made use of."

My object was not effected at once, for at 9.17 P. M. I received the following, by telegraph, written by General Webb at 9 P. M.:

"You will, by the direction of the Major-General commanding, draw back at once to your position within the Boydton Plank-road. Send a division down to Dinwiddie C. H., to report to General Sheridan. This division will go down the Boydton Plank-road. Send Griffin's division. General Humphreys will hold to Mrs. Butler's."

Whereupon I issued the following order to my command, which was sent out 9.35 P. M.:

"I. General Ayres will immediately withdraw his division back to where it was massed yesterday, near the Boydton Plank-road.

"II. General Crawford will follow General Ayres, and mass his troops behind the intrenchments near Mrs. Butler's.

"III. General Griffin will immediately withdraw General Bartlett to his present position, then move back to the Plank-road and down it to Dinwiddie C. H., and report to General Sheridan.

"IV. Captain Horrell, with his escort, will remain where General Griffin's headquarters now are till daybreak, and then come back to the Plank-road, bringing in all stragglers.

"V. Division commanders, in executing this movement, which is ordered by General Meade, will take care to see that none of their pickets, or any portion of the troops, are left behind.

"General Ayres and General Crawford will have their troops under arms at daybreak, and the Chief of Artillery will have all the batteries in readiness to move."

At 9.50 P. M., I received, by telegraph, the following from General Webb, written 9.20 P. M.:

"The division to be sent to Sheridan will start at once. You are to be held free to act within the Boydton Plank-road. General Humphreys will hold to the road and the return."

To this I immediately replied:

"Your dispatch of 9.20 is just received. I had already sent out my orders, of which I send you a copy. You directed General Griffin to be sent to General Sheridan at once. It will take so much time to get his command together that I withdrew the other divisions first, they being unengaged; but this will not retard General Griffin. The bridge is broken on the Plank-road, and will take I hardly know how long to make practicable for infantry. I sent an officer (Captain Benyaurd, Engineer) to examine it as soon as your first order was received. He now reports it not passable for infantry. It requires a span of forty feet to complete the bridge, and the stream is too deep to ford. Nevertheless, I will use everything I can get to make it passable by the time General Griffin's division reaches it."

General Griffin's division, in addition to the delay of assembling General Bartlett's brigade, had to withdraw a picket line in front of the enemy, and, if it moved first, the others, pending it, had to relieve this picket line.

The bridge over Gravelly Run we had found broken by the enemy on our occupation of the Plank-road on the 29th. As I was required to operate independently of the cavalry, and protect my own flanks, it was desirable to me (the bridge being in my rear, as I faced the enemy on the White Oak Road), that it should remain broken. Even the dispatch of this evening from General Meade, which I received at 8 P. M. (previously given), would have justified me in destroying the bridge, had it yet been standing intact. I had no pontoons with me now; the supply with which I started on the 29th had been used in bridging Rowanty Creek and the Quaker Road crossing of Gravelly Run, and the boats and engineers were kept there for the service of the trains.

At 10.15 P. M., I received, by telegraph, the following dispatch from General Webb, written 9.40 P. M.

"Since your dispatch of 8.20 P. M., the General commanding finds that it is impossible for Bartlett to join Griffin in time to move with any promptitude down the Boydton Plank-road. He therefore directs that you send another good brigade to join Griffin, in the place of Bartlett's, in this movement. Sheridan was attacked by five brigades from Gordon's corps—three from Pickett's; possibly by two from Gordon's, one of them being Hoke's old brigade."

This dispatch showed that my previous one, giving the condition of the bridge at Gravelly Run, had not yet been received. I deemed it would show, when it was, that General Bartlett could join General Griffin before the bridge would be passable, and that Griffin could thus reach Sheridan as soon as any one, and require no change in my previous order; and, while waiting the result of the reception of the knowledge of the state of the crossing by General Meade, I, at 11.50 P. M., received the following dispatch from him, written 10.15 P. M.:

"Send Griffin promptly as ordered, by the Boydton Plank-road, and move the balance of your command by the road Bartlett is on, and strike the enemy's rear, who is between him and Dinwiddie C. H. General Sheridan reports his position as north of Dinwiddie C. H., near Dr. Smith's, the enemy holding the cross-roads at that point. Should the enemy turn on you, your line of retreat will be by J. M. Brooks' and R. Boiseau's, on the Boydton Plank-road. (See one-inch map.) You must be very prompt in this movement, and get the forks of the road at J. M. Brooks' before the enemy, so as to open to R. Boiseau's. The enemy will probably retire toward Five Forks, that being the direction of their main attack this day. Don't encumber yourself with anything that will impede your progress or prevent your moving in any direction. Let me know when Griffin starts and when you start."

This dispatch also showed that mine, concerning the difficulty of crossing Gravelly Run, was still not received. That I did not over-estimate the effect of this dispatch, when it should reach General Meade, is proved by his dispatch written at 11.45 P. M. (See over.) It also showed complete ignorance of the position of the enemy along "the road Bartlett is (was) on," for the enemy already held this road on the south side of Gravelly Run, and, if not themselves at J. M. Brooks', occupied our approach to it. The condition of affairs here is given by Major Cope, in his report, as follows:

"About five P. M. you directed me to lead Bartlett's brigade, by a direct road, if possible, toward the sound of firing in the direction of Dinwiddie C. H., and attack the enemy in the rear. I immediately reported to General Bartlett, who had his column put in motion. The left of the corps rested in open ground. We came out from the left and crossed this ground for half a mile; then we came to a small branch of Gravelly Run on the edge of the timber. Here we found a wood-road that ran in the right direction. We followed it one mile through the wood over rolling ground, crossing the branches of Gravelly Run. At the south edge of this timber, and in open ground on a hill, stands Dr. ——'s house (and here our skirmishers became engaged with the enemy's pickets). The ground slopes from here to Gravelly Run, and is open all the way down. The enemy, after considerable skirmishing, were driven down the slope and across the Run three-quarters of a mile from the house. The house is near a main road leading north from Dinwiddie C. H. to the main road. General Bartlett established a line of pickets along Gravelly Run crossing this road. He also kept videttes out on his right watching this road and other approaches in the rear. It was much after dark when he had made the proper disposition of his troops, and then we

began to turn our attention to the number and extent of the enemy's camp fires. They seemed to stretch for miles on the south side of the Run, and we could distinctly hear them chopping, moving wagons, and talking."

In addition to this, the enemy held the point on the road Bartlett was on, where it joins the White Oak Road, as had been ascertained by Major Gentry of my staff, while endeavoring to communicate with General Bartlett. The Major lost his orderly by capture, while he narrowly escaped himself.

It was now one hour and a-half since my order had been sent withdrawing the divisions to the Plank-road, so that I supposed they were all moving back toward the Plank-road, along the forest road, with its single bridge across the branch of Gravelly Run, and in the order of Ayres, Crawford, Griffin, with General Bartlett's brigade nearly rejoined to the latter. To prevent the confusion and delay that would occur by bringing General Griffin to the Plank-road and sending back General Ayres, one of which would have to leave the road for the other to pass, and to save the time that would be lost by each division in changing their relative places, I determined to send General Ayres' division to Dinwiddie C. H., instead of General Griffin's, as it greatly simplified and expedited the operation, and saved the men's strength so sorely tried. It had, besides, the effect to prevent the separation of brigades from their proper divisions, and keep each intact—a matter of importance. As quickly as I could write it, I at eleven P. M. issued the following order:

"1*st*. General Ayres, instead of halting his command, as directed in his last order (see mine on p. 352), will proceed down the Plank-road to Dinwiddie C. H., and report to General Sheridan. He will send a staff officer to report here when the head of the column arrives.

"2*d*. General Crawford and General Griffin will mass their divisions at the point where the order reaches them, and report their position by the officer that brings it. A change of plan makes this change of order necessary."

I note here, a little out of the order of time, that I did not learn the position of General Crawford and General Griffin till one A.M., and so difficult had it been to get the troops in motion on this intensely dark and stormy night, that, although this order from me was sent one hour and a-half after the one for them to fall back to the Plank-road, yet it found them still in the same position. It must be remembered that our troops, so near the enemy, could not be roused by drums and bugles or loud commands, but each order had to be communicated from each commander to his subordinate, from the General till it reached the non-commissioned officers, which latter only could arouse each man by a shaking.

The obstacles to overcome in carrying out so many orders in the darkness of a stormy, starless night, when the moon had set, deserves a statement of them in detail.

The roads and paths the staff officers and messengers would have to take, were often filled with troops, and were as bad as clayey soil at the breaking up of winter could make them. These routes were mostly shut in by the evergreen forests through which they passed, rendering the night's darkness as profound as that of the deepest caverns. The horse, exhausted for want of food and wearied with life and-death exertions, carried his rider slowly through the mud, and staggered and stumbled over the obstructions. The messenger disappeared on his mission the instant he moved, and once out of call of the voice could not be stopped, or found till he had made the tour his instructions required, and returned to the place of departure. On arriving at his destination, the messenger, though, perhaps, familiar with it in the daylight just closed, could scarce recognize it in the light of the camp-fires, which burned around him on every side, showing everything in disproportioned and unreal forms. By these fires, the exhausted soldiers slept heavily, almost deaf to the questions addressed to ascertain the locality, or answered half in their sleep. The commanding officers, to escape the noise of drivers urging their struggling teams along the muddy roads, and the straggling of men over them as they slept, were compelled, in seeking repose, to establish their headquarters a little way from the main routes; and this alone many times caused vexatious delays in getting orders to them. Added to these were the vicissitudes of battle, which always left the commands and detachments scattered, more or less, as the day closed, and much increased the difficulties of getting the orders for a general movement in the night, sometimes causing such detachments to be left entirely without orders, when all the rest of their commands had moved away.

Knowing all these things, every precaution was used to provide for them, but yet they always existed.

In order to comply with General Meade's first order, I had first to send an officer to each division. Then Major Cope was the only person capable of taking an order to General Bartlett's brigade, and he was sent. I had sent Major Gentry to ascertain General Bartlett's location; but he taking the White Oak Road, found the enemy holding the junction of it with the one General Bartlett was on, and failed, as before stated, to find a way to him. I had to send another officer for the pioneers, and go with them at once to the crossing of Gravelly Run, to make the bridge. I had to send another to the bridge itself, to report the condition of the crossing. I had, with my full complement of staff officers, but the following available, all the others being engaged in their appropriate departments: Colonel Bankhead, Major Gentry, Major Cope, Captain Benyaurd, Captain Wadsworth, and Captain Winslow.

Having, under these circumstances, made my dispositions to execute one order for a general movement promptly, it is easy to see what strait

I was placed in to countermand those orders before the officers sent out with the first one returned.

But to resume the narration. After I had sent the order last quoted, I informed General Meade what I had done, as follows:

"I issued my orders on General Webb's first dispatch, to fall back, which made the divisions retire in the order they could most readily move, viz.: Ayres, Crawford, and Griffin. I cannot change them to-night without producing confusion that will render all my operations nugatory. I will now send General Ayres to General Sheridan, and take General Griffin and General Crawford to move against the enemy, as this last dispatch directs I should. Otherwise I cannot accomplish the apparent objects of the orders I have received."

I proceeded to make the necessary orders and arrangements to move with the two divisions as soon as I could. The movement had to be made without artillery, or ambulances, or ammunition wagons, and instructions had to be given, in the two latter cases, for special provisions. The Chief of Artillery had to be informed, and relations established between him and General Humphreys, commanding the Second corps, whose troops were required to take my place along the Plank-road.

At twenty minutes past twelve, I received the following from General Humphreys:

"I am directed to resume my position of this morning, &c., &c. At what time do you propose to move? I propose to move simultaneously with you."

To this I sent the following reply:

"I have just received your dispatch, by Captain Wistar. Under the order to withdraw at once (viz., that received at 9.17 P. M.), I thought we each could do so individually under cover of darkness, and so ordered. I have since received orders to attack the enemy with two divisions, sending one down the Plank-road to report to General Sheridan. My artillery, five four-gun batteries, under General Wainwright, will remain on the line of the Plank-road. I think the enemy that drove General Sheridan must withdraw to-night. I had a brigade on the north road from J. Boiseau's. I have now orders to move against the force that attacked Sheridan, and shall send all I have to move *there* or *wherever* the firing of battle near us may indicate."

At one A. M., I received reports from my officers who had returned from carrying my order of eleven P. M., and learned the position of Generals Crawford and Griffin. At this time I received the following dispatch from General Meade, written by him at 11.45 P. M.:

"A dispatch, partially transmitted, is received, indicating the bridge over Gravelly Run is destroyed, and time will be required to rebuild it. If this is the case, would not time be gained by sending the troops by the Quaker Road? Time is of the utmost importance. Sheridan cannot maintain himself at Dinwiddie without reinforcements, and yours are the only ones that can be sent. Use every exertion to get troops to him as soon as possible. If necessary, send troops by both roads, and give up the rear attack. If Sheridan is not reinforced, and compelled to fall back, he will retire by the Vaughan Road."

On receiving this dispatch, showing so much solicitude for General Sheridan's position, and the necessity of reinforcing him directly, even if I had to countermand the previous order, and forego entirely the rear attack, and which, also, left the question for me to determine, I felt much anxiety about what to do. The night was far advanced. The distance to Dinwiddie C. H. by the Quaker Road, from the location of my troops, was over ten miles. It was impossible for them to reach there by that road before eight A. M. By that time they could be of no use in holding Dinwiddie C. H. In this case, the most direct route for the rear attack would be down the Plank-road, where General Ayres was marching. This attack, too, would be then the most effective, as the whole corps would be together in making it, and all in communication with headquarters of General Grant, and through him with General Sheridan, which might be of great importance. If General Sheridan retired by the Vaughan Road, too, the rear and right flank of General Humphreys would be left exposed, as stated in General Meade's dispatch, received by me at eight P. M. (already given here). Finally, to send a division around by the Quaker Road was to break my command up in three pieces, and, if it had been done, it is doubtful if the success of the first of April would have been gained, as the men thus sent would have been too exhausted to reach the Five Forks that day.

I therefore determined that it was best to abide the movements already begun, and keep the two divisions, Griffin's and Crawford's, where they were, till I could hear that General Ayres certainly had reinforced General Sheridan. The men of the two divisions were gaining, while waiting this result, a little of that rest they stood so much in need of, on this their fourth night of almost continual deprivation of it, and we had but a short distance to move before reaching the enemy, near J. Boiseau's.

Having determined this, at one P. M. I wrote the following dispatch to General Meade:

"I think we will have an infantry bridge over Gravelly Run sooner than I could send troops around by the Quaker Road. But if I find any failure, I will send that way. I have sent Captain Benyaurd (two hours ago) with what he thought was necessary to make it practicable in one hour, and trust to that. I am sending to General Sheridan my most available force."

At 2.5 A. M., I learned the following, which I sent General Webb:

"The bridge over Gravelly Run Captain Benyaurd reports now practicable for infantry, and General Ayres advancing across it toward Dinwiddie C. H. I have given General Ayres orders to report to General Sheridan."

At 4.30 A. M. I received information that General Ayres had communicated with General Sheridan, and, while I was just mounting to join Generals Griffin and Crawford, to move across the country against the enemy at J. Boiseau's, I received the following from General Sheridan, at 4.50 A. M., which is published with his report, and there stated to be written at three A. M.

"I am holding in front of Dinwiddie C. H., on the road leading to Five Forks, for three-quarters of a mile, with General Custer's division. The enemy are in his immediate front, lying so as to cover the road just this side of the Adams' House, which leads out across Chamberlain's *bed* or *run*. I understand you have a division at J. Boiseau's; if so, you are in *rear* of the enemy's line and almost on his flank. I will hold on here. Possibly they may attack Custer at day-light; if so, have this division attack instantly and in full force. Attack at daylight any way, and I will make an effort to get the road this side of Adams' House, and if I do, you can capture the whole of them. Any force moving down the road I am holding, or on the White Oak Road, will be in the enemy's rear, and in all probability get any force that may escape you by a flank attack. Do not fear my leaving here. If the enemy remain I shall fight at daylight."

This suppositious state of affairs given above promised most brilliant results, if true; but it was not. The enemy occupied the position at J. Boiseau's on the preceding night, and instead of my having a division there, the nearest to it I had was Bartlett's brigade, about three-quarters of a mile north of Gravelly Run, the crossing of which the enemy guarded. Even this brigade of mine I had to withdraw, by General Meade's order, at 9.35 P. M. I fully expected, if the enemy had not retreated, to have to fight a battle in order to get across Gravelly Run, near to J. Boiseau's; and, if the enemy had designed to stay, we undoubtedly must have done so. I so anticipated in my instructions to General Griffin.

About five A. M. General Griffin left his position near the enemy on the White Oak Road, and moved directly and rapidly across the country to Crumps. He found the enemy had left the crossing of the Run open, and he moved on to J. Boiseau's, meeting at the forks of the road our cavalry, under General Devin. At this point General Griffin reported to General Sheridan, as I had directed, should such a state of affairs as was found be developed.

I remained with General Crawford's division, which we formed to retire in line of battle to meet the enemy, should he pursue us from his breastworks, as I confidently expected he would as soon as he discovered our movements.* I also deployed my escort to retire toward the Plank-road, to take back any men or supplies which might be coming to that point through ignorance of the changes that had been made in the night. General Griffin's march having been unobstructed, I did not reach him till he had met our cavalry. I then ascertained, too, that General Ayres' division was massed about half a mile south of us, near J. M. Brooks's.

It will be recollected that General Ayres began to move back from the White Oak Road by an order from me, sent at 9.35 P. M, March 31, which was written on the first intimation I received to send troops to General Sheridan. No orders stopped him, nor did anything delay him but physical obstacles—such as the darkness, bad roads, and broken bridge. I will now quote from his report the result:

"The division was ordered to move down the Boydton Pike during the night of March 31, and report to General Sheridan at Dinwiddie C. H. Before arriving there it was met by a staff officer of General Sheridan, with instructions to turn off on a road leading west into a road leading from Dinwiddie C. H. to the White Oak Road" (*i. e.*, from R. Boiseau's to J. M. Brooks'), "and come upon the left and rear of the enemy, who was facing General Sheridan's command near Dinwiddie. As we approached, *just* after *daylight*, the enemy hastily decamped."

This actual trial disposes of the question of the ability of my troops to reach General Sheridan by midnight. It took General Ayres till daybreak.

It may be said, in support of the expectations, that the state of the bridge and stream were not known when the expectations were formed; but they should have been. The route was used for communications between General Grant and General Sheridan the two preceding days. But even if not known then, they certainly were when General Sheridan wrote his report and General Grant authorized its publication; and it was but manly and just to have then corrected any unfavorable impression his lack of knowledge at the time may have caused him to take up concerning me.

But, let us suppose the two divisions that General Grant directed to be moved by J. Boiseau's, were expected to reach General Sheridan by midnight. The order which I received was written by General Meade 10.15 P. M., five minutes after General Grant's to General Sheridan. It reached me 10.50 P. M., thirty-five minutes after being written. Supposing all possible dispatch used, twenty minutes at least would be required for me to make the necessary arrangements; *twenty* more minutes would be required to carry my order to the divisions; *twenty* more minutes for them to transmit them to the brigades; and *forty* minutes, at least, for the troops to get ready to move; for it must be remembered that no bugles or drum could be used to sound calls or arouse the men. No General could make plans based on greater rapidity of execution than here allowed, and our experience

* The neglect of the enemy to follow up General Crawford's division as he withdrew is still inexplicable to me; for had they done so, General Lee would have been early informed of the movement of our infantry against his detached force at Five Forks, and either have reinforced them or warned them to withdraw, and the disaster to them which resulted might have not occurred. It seems to me an oversight not to have been expected from our previous experience.

rarely realized it on the most favorable occasions, while this was one of the least so. Summing up these intervals of time, we have two hours to add to the time of General Grant's writing to General Sheridan. I venture to say it took nearly this time for the note itself to reach General Sheridan. Adding these two hours, would make it at least twelve o'clock before my two divisions could move. They then had four miles to traverse, taking the White Oak Road, before reaching the crossing of Gravelly Run, which would occupy till two A. M. They had then to cross the stream and strike the rear of the enemy opposed to General Sheridan, enumerated by him as follows:

"The opposing forces was Pickett's division, Wise's independent brigade of infantry, and Fitz Hugh Lee's, Rossers', and W. H. Lee's cavalry commands. This force is too strong for us."

To join General Sheridan by midnight, on this route, I finally had to capture or destroy whatever of this force was between me and General Sheridan. Any expectations more unreasonable could not have been formed, nor would I attribute them to any one not wholly ignorant of the true state of the case.

In regard to intercepting the enemy, the facts show it was impossible under the circumstances. I learned from deserters that they had begun to move toward Five Forks as early as ten P. M. the night before, believing their position would be untenable the next morning. They had consequently withdrawn in the night, carrying off their wounded and leaving only a cavalry picket in General Sheridan's front, which, as General Ayres says, "hastily decamped" as he approached at daylight. It will be seen by a dispatch of General Meade to General Grant, dated six A. M. (given hereafter), that General Sheridan must have been aware of this withdrawal of the enemy early in the night.

While awaiting with General Griffin for instructions from General Sheridan, who had advanced with the cavalry toward Five Forks, I received, about 9.30 A. M., the following order, written by General Webb at six A. M.:

"General Meade directs that, in the movements following your junction with General Sheridan, you will be under his orders, and will report to him. Please send a report of progress."

I sent the report of progress requested, which was in accordance with the facts hereinbefore given.

To show how General Meade was led to send me this order, I will give a copy of a dispatch from him to General Grant, written at six A. M., April 1, an official copy of which was furnished me:

"The officer sent to General Sheridan, returned between two and three A. M., without any written communication, but giving General Sheridan's opinion that the enemy were retiring from his front. The absence of firing this morning would seem to confirm this. I was asleep at the time this officer returned, and did not get the information till just now. Should this prove true, Warren will be at or near Dinwiddie soon, with his whole corps, and will require further orders."

This dispatch also shows an important circumstance that affects the question of my ability to intercept the enemy. The officer that brought General Meade this information from General Sheridan, "between two and three A. M.," could not have left General Sheridan less than two hours previous, the distance being about ten miles over the worst possible roads; so that General Sheridan thought the enemy was retiring as early, at least, as between twelve and one, and the information could scarce have reached General Sheridan, from his picket line, in less than one hour's time, so that the enemy's movements in retiring must have become apparent as early, at least, as between eleven and twelve. This confirms the reports deserters, in the morning, gave me, and which the completeness of the withdrawal sustains. Thus, at the very time of the night that General Sheridan thought the enemy retreating, I was impressed, by repeated dispatches from General Meade, that General Sheridan could not hold on without reinforcements, and I acted under that authority and belief.

The order from General Meade placing me under General Sheridan's orders, however, was not necessary for that purpose, as I should have obeyed any orders General Sheridan might give me, recognizing him as my superior army commander.

BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS.

When I met General S., at about eleven A. M., his manner was cordial and friendly. I had never served with him before.

After talking with General Sheridan a short time, at the place I found him, while he was occasionally receiving reports from his cavalry, he mounted and rode off to the front. At one P. M. an officer brought to me an order to bring up the infantry. I at once dispatched Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Bankhead to give the orders to the division commanders to bring up their commands, specifying the order which I thought they could most rapidly move in. I then went up the Five Forks Road in advance of the infantry, to see General Sheridan, and to inform myself of the use to be made of my troops, so that no time would be lost on their arrival. General S. explained to me the state of affairs, and what his plan was for me to do. This I entered upon most cordially. General S. had placed an officer back on the road to mark the point where my command was to turn off. I then rode back to the point indicated, turned up the road which led by Gravelly Run Church, and examined the ground, and employed my escort, which had by this time rejoined me, to picket the front I was to take up, so as to prevent the enemy discovering the presence of my infantry.

General Sheridan's order was to form the whole corps before advancing, so that all of it should move simultaneously. He especially stated that the formation was to be oblique to the road, with the right advanced, with two divisions in front, and the third in reserve behind the right division. The number of lines and consequent extent of front, he left me to decide. Upon examination, I determined on an equivalent of three lines of battle for each of the front divisions, arranged as follows: Each division was to place two brigades in front, each brigade in two lines of battle, and the third brigade in two lines of battle behind the centre of the two front lines. The third division to be posted in column of battalions in mass behind the right. To General Ayres I assigned my left, General Crawford my right, and General Griffin my reserve behind the right. In moving, they were instructed to keep close to the left, and to preserve their direction in the woods, by keeping the sun, then shining brightly, in the same position over their left shoulders.

General Ayres placed the Maryland brigade on his left, in two lines, and General Gwin's brigade on his right; this last brigade was formed in three lines instead of two, as the regiments could not be so well disposed in two lines. General Winthrop's brigade, General Ayres formed as his reserve. General Crawford formed his lines so as to place Colonel Kellogg's brigade on his left, General Baxter's brigade on his right, and General Coulter's brigade as his reserve.

The length of the front we occupied was about a thousand yards. The casualties of the three preceding days, together with the loss of those who had given out from weariness, or were absent on detached duty, had probably reduced our effective force at least a thousand men in each division below that with which we set out on the twenty-eighth, so that we had then present about twelve thousand men.

While the troops were forming, I prepared the accompanying sketch, with explanations, for each division commander, and directed them, as far as time would permit, to explain it to the brigade commanders:

"April 1, 3 P. M.

"The following is the movement now about to be executed:



"The line will move forward as formed till it reaches the White Oak Road, when it will swing round to the left, perpendicular to the White Oak Road. General Merritt's and General Custer's cavalry will charge the enemy's line as soon as the infantry get engaged. The cavalry is on the left of the infantry, except McKenzie's, which is moving up the White Oak Road from the right."

General Griffin, in his report, says the formation prior to the attack was as follows:

"The First division on the right flank formed in three lines, with one brigade on the right *en echelon*."

I supplied General Griffin with the same sketch and plan of operations as I had General Ayres and General Crawford, in which I thought I indicated General Griffin's position in rear of the right. But the necessity for him to protect his own flank, and the wedge-like shape of the formation, as a whole, led General Griffin to regard his division as on the right.

General Sheridan says, in his report, that he directed "one division to be formed in reserve opposite the centre." This is a mistake; his order was to form it in rear of the right. The line was to be formed "obliquely to and at a point a short distance from the White Oak Road;"* this threw the right in the advance, and, it was supposed by him, would strike the enemy first and need the support.

During the formation of my troops, I used all the exertions possible to hasten their arrival, and everything was so prepared for them, that they marched at once to their assigned position without a halt.

General Sheridan expressed to me his apprehension that our cavalry, which continued to fire on the enemy, would use up all their ammunition before my troops would be ready. I informed him that they would not all be in position before four P. M., but that I was ready to

* See Sheridan's Report.

move at once with whatever was at hand, if he directed, and let the rest follow; but he did not. His impatience was no greater, apparently, than I felt myself, and which I strove to repress and prevent any exhibition of, as it would but tend to impair confidence in the proposed operations. When everything possible is being done, it is important to have the men think it is all that success requires, if their confidence is to be retained.

Against General Sheridan's most ungenerous statement, that I gave him the impression that I wanted the sun to go down, I simply place my denial, and trust that my whole conduct in life, and especially in this war, sustains me in it. The sun did not set until two hours and a half after the formation was completed.

In proof of the efforts I made to get the troops in position, and the rapidity with which they did move, I present the following communications from Brevet Brigadier-General Bankhead, of my staff; Brevet Major-General Crawford, commanding Third division; Brevet Major-General Griffin, commanding First division; Brevet Major-General Ayres, Second division.

General Bankhead writes me, under date of June twenty-seventh:

"SIR: In reply to your letter of the seventeenth inst., received the twenty-fifth, I have the honor to state that I was with you April first, at the time you received some instructions from General Sheridan, through one of his staff officers. As to the nature of the orders I am not aware, further than that you immediately turned to me, and directed me 'to bring up the corps at once along the road we were at the time, and that you would meet the column yourself; that the divisions would march in the following order, viz., Third, First, Second.' I immediately galloped back, and gave the orders, in person, to Generals Griffin and Crawford. As I was directed to see the head of the column was started on the right road, I sent the order to General Ayres, commanding Second division (who was further off to the right), by one of your Aids, either Major Cope or Captain Wadsworth.

"The orders were obeyed promptly, and the troops moved out as expeditiously as the nature of the road and the crowded state it was in (being blocked up with led cavalry horses) would admit. Every exertion appeared to be made by General Crawford, who had the advance, to keep the road clear for the infantry to pass. I remained with the head of the column until within a short distance of the place it was halted and placed in position to make the attack.

"(Signed) H. C. BANKHEAD,
"Brevet Colonel Assistant Inspector-General."

The following is from General Crawford, dated July seventeenth:

"GENERAL: In reply to your communication of June seventeenth, asking if my division did not move, with all practicable dispatch, in forming prior to our attack on the enemy at the battle of Five Forks, I have the honor to state, that the troops under my command moved at once, upon the receipt of the order, and that, in my opinion, no unnecessary time was lost from that time till they were formed as you directed.

"(Signed) S. W. CRAWFORD,
"Brevet Major-General."

The following is from General Griffin, dated June twenty-sixth:

"GENERAL: In reply to your communication of the seventeenth instant, in reference to the movement of the First division just prior to the battle of Five Forks, April first, 1865, I have to state I was in command of that division on that day, and about two o'clock P. M., received, through Colonel Bankhead, Corps Inspector, an order to move down the road leading northward with all possible dispatch, as the cavalry and infantry were to attack the enemy at once. I moved my troops as promptly as I could, and on arriving near the place where the corps was formed for the attack, was met by yourself. You immediately pointed out the ground that my troops were to form on, remarking, in substance, that you wished me to be as expeditious as possible. The order was executed at once, and I then reported in person to you. In my opinion, the division was formed without any halting or unnecessary delay.

"(Signed) CHARLES GRIFFIN,
"Brevet Major-General."

The following is from General Ayres, dated June twenty-fourth:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of yours of the seventeenth inst., last evening, asking an official statement concerning the movement of the Fifth corps on the first of April, from the position where it was massed to that where the lines of battle were formed previous to that attack. I do not know at what time the order was given to commence the movement. I was ordered to follow the First division. This was done, and my division was kept well closed up on the troops in front. On arriving near the position where the lines were forming, you requested me to form my troops as expeditiously as possible, as General Sheridan desired to attack the enemy immediately. Once again, during the formation, you desired me to be expeditious. My division, being a very small one, was soon formed, whereupon I reported to you that I was ready. The order was then given, and the troops moved at once to the attack.

"(Signed) R. B. AYRES,
"Brevet Major-General."

My record on this point could not be better or more complete.

In view of this testimony, it is further apparent that General Sheridan had left out of his calculations the necessary time to make the formation he directed, and that, in his own opinion, his plan was endangered thereby.

The propriety of an army all moving at once pre-supposes, in order that the General who so

employs it should be entitled to the credit of the results obtained, that he should have his information so exact that the mass falls directly upon a vulnerable and vital point of the enemy's position. If there thould be a mistake in this, the chief merit belongs to those exertions and arrangements by which the mistake is corrected, or in the new dispositions which the occasion demands as requisite and which may be practicable. But General Sheridan's calculation, as to the position of the left flank of the enemy's line, was faulty, and to a very serious extent, considering that he had placed all the troops in position for the move. The changes we had to make afterward required the greatest exertion of myself and staff, when everything was in motion, and in woods of the difficult nature usually found in Virginia, no one of the command being at all acquainted with the ground over which we were moving.

After the forward movement began, a few minutes brought us to the White Oak Road, distant about a thousand yards. There we found the advance of General McKenzie's cavalry, which, coming up the White Oak Road, had arrived there just before us. This showed us, for the first time, that we were too far to our right of the enemy's left flank. General Ayres' right crossed the road in the open field, and his division commenced changing front at once, so as to bring his line on the right flank of the enemy's position. Fortunately for us, the enemy's left flank so rested in the woods that he could not fire at us as we crossed this open field, and the part of it that faced us formed a very short line. This General Ayres attacked at once, the firing being heavy, but less than usually destructive, on account of the thick woods. The rapid change of front by General Ayres caused his right flank, at first, to get in advance of General Crawford, owing to the greater distance the latter had to move, and exposed it to be taken in flank by the enemy. Orders were sent by me to General Crawford to oblique his division to the left and close up this interval.

As soon as I had found the enemy's left flank, orders were sent to General Griffin, by several staff officers, to move also obliquely to the left, and come in to the support of General Ayres. But as Griffin's division was moving out of sight in the woods, the order only reached him in the neighborhood of the place marked "Chimneys" on the map. While giving orders thus, I did not think it proper to leave my place in the open field, because it was one where my staff officers, sent to different parts of the command, could immediately find me on their return, and thus I could get information from all points at once, and utilize the many eyes of my staff and those of my subordinate commanders, instead of going to some special point myself, and neglect all others.

The time had not arrived, in my judgment, for me to do that. It may be that at this time it was that General Sheridan thought I did not exert myself to inspire confidence in the troops that broke under a not very severe fire. There was no necessity for my personal presence for such purpose reported from any part of the field.

The time which elapsed before hearing from General Crawford or General Griffin convinced me they must have passed on beyond the right of General Ayres. Leaving sufficient means to send any important information after me, I then rode rapidly to the right, near the Chimneys, and was received with a considerable fire from the enemy across the open field. As I afterward learned, the fire from this position of the enemy occasioned some unsteadiness in General Ayres' right, and also caused the left of General Crawford to oblique to the right, so as to keep the protection of the ridge and trees. I remained here till General Griffin arrived with his division, when I directed him to attack the enemy on the right of General Ayres, and this he proceeded to do. I then rode back to General Ayres' position, and found that he had captured the enemy's extreme left, and some thousand prisoners. This information I sent to General Griffin, and then rode as rapidly as possible to direct General Crawford, as circumstances might require.

Before proceeding further, I will give quotations from Major Cope's report relating to the preceding:

"You sent me to General Griffin with an order to bring his division toward the White Oak Road, by the flank, in order to be in better supporting distance of the second division. Also to inform General Crawford that he was going somewhat too far to the right. I found Generals Griffin and Crawford to the right of the Chimneys, and gave them your orders. At this time the enemy had a line of skirmishers running from the left of their line of works, by the Sidney House, toward Hatcher's Run. You came to where General Griffin was, and then returned to the White Oak Road, where I joined you a few minutes after. The part of the enemy's line where you were had been carried by General Ayres, and you sent me again to General Griffin, with this information, and with an order to push forward as fast as possible. He had already reached the Sidney House, and was pushing forward across the field. I delivered your order, and gave him the direction to advance, which was west."

I also annex an extract from General Ayres' report, describing his operations after the forward movement began:

"After moving through a wood into an opening, the skirmishers engaged those of the enemy, pushing them back. Soon after crossing the White Oak Road, finding the enemy's fire to come from the left, I changed front to the left by *facing* the Second brigade to the left, and filing it to the left. Not to lose time, I also threw the First brigade" (his reserve) "into the front line on the left of the Second. The Third brigade, soon after engaging the enemy, finding its right flank in the air (I must confess that I experienced anxiety also on this account) portions

of it were very unsteady, but subsequently moved up and bore their part of the action in a handsome manner. After this change of front, the troops were pushed forward and soon came upon the left flank of the enemy, which was thrown back at right angles with his main line, and covered by a strong breastwork, screened behind a dense undergrowth of pines, and about one hundred yards in length. This breastwork my troops charged, and took it at the bayonet's point, capturing, in carrying it, over one thousand prisoners and several battle-flags. *Halting there a short time by General Sheridan's order, till it was apparent the enemy were giving away generally*, I pushed forward rapidly, holding my men in hand, and r arching steadily in line of battle."

I have italicised the "halting there," &c., because it shows that General Sheridan modified his own order not to halt. No order to halt was given by me. What caused the general giving way of the enemy while General Ayres was halted by General Sheridan's order, was due to the operations elsewhere directed.

It will be seen that the rapid change of front by General Ayres, necessitated by the unexpected condition of things, unavoidably threw his flank temporarily "in air." Had the line gradually swung round, by wheeling, General Crawford would have been on his right, but as it was, the change had the momentary effect to leave General Crawford "en echelon," in rear of Ayres' right. It happened, also, that the right of General Ayres became exposed, too, to a fire from the enemy across the open field, around Sidney's. General Crawford's left encountered this same fire, as it came up on General Ayres' right, and the effect was to cause Crawford's line to oblique somewhat to the right to gain the cover of the woods and ridges, but it kept steadily moving on in the enemy's rear—a threatening movement which made the position of the enemy no longer tenable, assailed as he was both in front and flank besides.

I will now extract from General Crawford's report. After giving a copy of the order to attack that I had furnished him with (see p. 358), he says:

"In obedience to this order we crossed Gravelly Run; crossed the White Oak Road, and changed direction to the left and advanced directly west. We encountered the enemy's skirmishers shortly after moving, driving them steadily back. Our way led through bogs, tangled woods, and thickets of pine, interspersed with open spaces here and there. The connection between the Second division and my line, could not be maintained. I received an order from both General Sheridan and General Warren, to press rapidly forward. I urged on the entire command. General Coulter's brigade, from being in support of my rear, was brought to fill the gap between me and the Second division. I pressed immediately on and found myself in the enemy's rear on the Ford Road, which I crossed." * * "Just at this point the enemy opened on my centre and left flank a very heavy fire. Major-General Warren arriving on the field at that moment, directed me to advance immediately down the Ford Road, and General Coulter's brigade was selected for that purpose. Two regiments, commanded by Major Funk, placed on what was then the left of the road, and the rest of the brigade were on the right, supported by the other two brigades, 'en echelon,' I advanced at once, and captured a battery of four guns and the battle-flag of the Thirty-second Virginian infantry. We then changed direction and advanced again in a south-west direction, the enemy flying before us, though keeping up a desultory firing."

General Griffin's report says:

"Immediately after, the order to advance against the enemy was given, with instructions to the division that after it had crossed the road it was to change direction to the left, so as to strike the enemy in flank and rear. After advancing about a mile, and finding nothing in front, save a few cavalry videttes, and there being heavy volleys of musketry to the left and rear, the division was halted."

This halting under the circumstances, was a commendable exercise of discretion. He says that, a personal examination showing him the enemy on his left, he marched in that direction. To effect this same thing I had sent Major Cope to him, as already stated. A small portion of General Griffin's division became separated in the woods from the rest, and continued on with General Crawford's division, and was used by me on the Ford Road. General Griffin, having made proper dispositions, "moved against the enemy at double-quick," taking his breastworks and one thousand five hundred prisoners.

As stated by General Crawford, I came up with his division near B. Boiseau's after he had crossed the Ford Road. He had been driving back the enemy's skirmish line all the way, and continually turning the left of any force opposing Generals Ayres and Griffin. I at once directed his line to swing round to face southward, as we had now closed up the outlet for the enemy's escape northward, and to move down upon the position of the enemy at the forks of the road, a point well indicated to us by the firing of some pieces of artillery there by the enemy. General Crawford's troops soon encountered a stiff line of the enemy formed to meet him, and from the fire of which General Coulter's brigade suffered severely. The contest, however, was short, for the enemy, now pressed front, flank and rear, mostly threw down

NOTE.—General Sheridan's report states that he directed General McKenzie to swing round on the right of the infantry and gain the Ford Road, so as to cut off the enemy's escape that way. As General McKenzie did not succeed in getting there till after the infantry had gained the road, I asked of him the nature of his operations. He informed me that in attempting to execute his order he found himself north of Hatcher's Run, and moving directly away from the battle, which seemed heavy. He therefore (as General Griffin had done) moved back toward the White Oak Road, so as to take part in the action.

their arms. Three guns of the captured battery were found on the road, where they had been stopped in their attempt to escape northward.

Immediately after the forks were gained I directed General Crawford to change front again to the right, and march toward the sound of the firing, so as again to take the enemy in flank and rear, and this he at once did. I also directed a cavalry brigade, which had been kept mounted, and which now came rapidly along the Ford Road toward me, not to move along it further, but to file to their left and proceed in the direction General Crawford had taken.

I then passed down the Ford Road, and on reaching the forks, turned to the right along the White Oak Road. The troops were joyous and filled with enthusiasm at their success, but somewhat disorganized thereby and by their marching and fighting so long in the woods. On my arriving at the point E (see map), I found that our advance there was stayed by the enemy, who had formed a new line for their left flank near the position F, while they yet maintained their front against our cavalry on the south. Though the orders had been not to halt, and many officers were then urging their men forward, the disordered men, not feeling the influence of their commanders, continued to fire without advancing.

Accompanied by Captain Benyaurd and the portion of my staff then present, I rode out to the front and called those near me to follow. This was immediately responded to. Everywhere along the front the color-bearers and officers sprang out, and, without more firing, our men advanced, capturing all the enemy remaining.

During this last charge my horse was fatally shot within a few paces of the line where the enemy made his last stand, an orderly by my side was killed, and Colonel Richardson, of the Seventh Wisconsin, who sprang between me and the enemy, was severely wounded.

I sent General Bankhead, after the last of the enemy had been captured, to General Sheridan to report the result and receive his instructions. He returned with the reply that my instructions had been sent me. At seven P. M. they reached me, and were as follows:

"Major-General Warren, commanding the Fifth army corps, is relieved from duty, and will report at once for orders to Lieutenant-General Grant, commanding armies United States."

I at once asked of General Sheridan an explanation of this order, but could obtain none.

The Fifth corps, in this battle, captured 3,244 men, with their arms, eleven regimental colors, and one four-gun battery with its caissons.

It lost, in killed and wounded, 634 men, of which 300 were in General Crawford's division, 205 in General Ayres' division, and 125 in General Griffin's division. Among these were several distinguished officers of high promise. Their names will be duly recorded in the official reports.

CONCLUSION.

I believe there never was a previous period of my military life when the operations I have described would not have gained me the praise of my superior. I have seen nearly all the principal officers of my command, and all unite in telling me that they regard my treatment as unjust. General Griffin assured me he would so express himself at suitable opportunity to General Sheridan. Of the many expressions of sympathy I have received from members of my corps, the following letter, sent me unsolicited, but published here by permission, written by one of its most worthy officers—Colonel T. F. McCoy, of the One Hundred and Seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers—is given as a type:

"I had expected to have the pleasure of meeting you before retiring from the service, personally paying my respects, and bidding you a kind farewell; but it was ordered otherwise. A mere glimpse of you, as we passed through Petersburg on our march North, was the last sight the Fifth corps had of their beloved commander. I can most truthfully assure you of your great popularity with the corps, both officers and men; and I can assure you further, that it was a prevailing sentiment that it was a well-merited popularity. I speak freely and frankly. I can realize how gratifying it is to a commanding officer to know that he has the love and respect of his men.

"On the second of April, when it was known that you had been taken from us, there was mingled surprise, regret, and gloom. I have read and re-read, again and again, General Sheridan's report of the battle of the Five Forks, and in my humble judgment, he utterly fails in justifying his conduct in your removal. Even if what is asserted were true, (which I do not believe,) in view of your past valuable services to the country, and more especially to your corps, and you in command, having, in a great measure, gained by its splendid conduct that afternoon, the most important victory of the campaign; and while thanks and shouts were going up to Heaven for the great achievement, to relieve from his honored command one of the principal heroes was an act most strange and no less astounding. This is merely the substance of what has been in my mind, and which I would have been pleased to have expressed to you personally, could I have met you at any proper period since. I look back upon this battle of the Five Forks with great interest, it being the turning point of the great movements from which flowed so many favorable and glorious results. Then, I have a more personal interest in it from the fact of my regiment conducting itself so well, that I had the honor of receiving the thanks of General Baxter on the field."

It is a source of much regret to me that the suddenness of my removal has prevented my taking an appropriate leave of my command,

and thereby to express to them my warm wishes for their future, and my sympathy with them, whatever that future may be.

I feel, too, that many to whom it would have been gratifying to carry with them to their homes my testimony of their services have been deprived of it. So far as this can be remedied, I shall be glad to do so yet. I also hope that those who may have been overlooked in the distribution of honors will write to me, and I will endeavor to promote their just claims as far as my endorsement can.

No. 119 East Seventeenth Street,
New York City, December 10, 1865.

Appendix.

I give herein an appendix of all the authoritative communications yet published on the battle of Five Forks

LETTER FROM GENERAL WARREN IN REGARD TO HIS BEING RELIEVED BY GENERAL SHERIDAN.

"Mississippi River, Thursday, May 11, 1865.

"*To the Editors of the New York Times:*

"I respectfully request the publication in your paper of this communication and accompanying letters relating to the battle of Five Forks.

"The only reason I have heard assigned for relieving me at that time were the surmises of newspaper correspondents, which there is no authority for. But an unfriendly spirit toward me apparently dictated their suppositions, and they have done me much injustice. I was relieved only after the battle was over, and while at the head of my troops, and when not even a fugitive of the enemy was in sight.

"I personally sought of General Sheridan a reason for his order; but he would not, or could not, give one, and declined to do so. I obeyed the order to report to General Grant that night, and was by him assigned to the command of the defences at City Point and Bermuda Hundred. After the evacuation of Richmond and Petersburg, I was given the command of the troops at the latter place and along the Southside Railroad, belonging to the Army of the Potomac. When these troops were relieved by troops from the Army of the James, I was left in Petersburg awaiting orders. I then addressed a letter (copy sent herewith), dated April ninth, to General Rawlins, Chief of Staff, soliciting an investigation. On the twenty-second April, I sent another, requesting permission to publish the first one, for the reasons set forth therein (copy sent herewith). On the second May, I telegraphed Colonel Bowers, Adjutant-General, to ascertain if these had been received, and he answered, they 'were received, the latter during General Grant's absence. Orders have been sent you (me) to report here, when you can see the General.'

"On May third, I received by telegraph an extract from General Orders No. 78, of May first, assigning me to the command of the Department of the Mississippi. I at once proceeded to Washington, and, after a personal interview with General Grant, received, on the sixth of May, an answer to my communications of the ninth and twenty-second April, authorizing my publishing them, and stating the reasons for not granting me the investigation sought. A copy of this letter is herewith sent.

"Having thus exhausted my means of getting at the cause of my being relieved by General Sheridan, I present the following brief account of the operations on the first of April:

"The operations of the enemy on the thirty-first of March made it necessary for me to send a portion of my corps during the night to support General Sheridan's cavalry, which had been forced back to near Dinwiddie Court House. One of my divisions was thus compelled to march all night, after having fought all day, and the rest of the corps moved toward the enemy that confronted the cavalry at daybreak.

"Our presence on the flank and rear of the enemy compelled him to fall back rapidly to the vicinity of the Five Forks, and General Sheridan, on advancing with the cavalry, found him slightly intrenched there. This force proved to be a complete division of the enemy's infantry, and all the cavalry of Lee's army.

"I received an order from General Meade, after joining General Sheridan, to report to him for duty, which I did, and the corps was halted by his direction at the point where we joined him, about eight A. M. At one P. M. I was directed to bring up the corps to Gravelly Run Church, a distance of about two and three-fourths miles from where they had been halted, and there form with two divisions in front and one in reserve, so as to move with the whole corps, and attack and turn the enemy's left flank on the White Oak Road.

"My line was formed accordingly. Ayres on the left, in three lines of battle; Crawford on the right, in three lines of battle; and Griffin's division in reserve in masses. This occupied till four P. M. The forward movement then began. General Ayres' division became first engaged, wheeling to the left, from facing north to facing west, as it advanced. General Crawford's division also wheeled to the left on General Ayres' as on a pivot, but owing to the nature of the ground and forests, and the greater distance to gain, he lost his connection with General Ayres.

"Into the interval thus left General Griffin's division was placed. These two divisions steadily drove in the enemy's left flank. General Crawford's division moved on westward till it gained the road leading north from the centre of the enemy's position, when it was wheeled to the south, and attacked the troops that were endeavoring to hold this road as an outlet for escape.

"All the divisions now closed in upon the enemy, capturing the artillery that was attempting to move north, and nearly all the infantry, which their movements had thrown in the greatest confusion. I successfully followed the opera-

tions of my divisions from left to right, being with General Crawford when the position was taken.

"While these movements above described were going on, the cavalry engaged the enemy along his whole front, which was facing south. The enemy still maintained the right of his line, confronting the cavalry, after we had swept away his left and centre; but the Fifth corps crowding along the line without waiting to re-form, captured all who remained, as it swept along.

"I was with the extreme advance in the last movement, and was relieved while there at seven P. M., the battle being then over, and not even a fugitive enemy in sight.

"The following are copies of the letters herein referred to.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. K. WARREN,
"Major-General Volunteers."

GENERAL WARREN TO COL. BOWERS.

"PETERSBURG, April 22, 1865.

"*To Colonel T. S. Bowers, A. G., Headquarters Armies of United States:*

"COLONEL: I beg leave to forward a copy of communication addressed to Headquarters Armies United States, on the ninth instant, with the request to be allowed to publish the same. This will relieve me and my friends from an unpleasant relation to the public, will answer many letters daily received, and will prevent my silence being an injury to me. I can then patiently await the investigation that I do not doubt will in due time be accorded to me.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. K. WARREN,
"Major-General Volunteers."

REQUEST FOR AN INVESTIGATION.

"PETERSBURG, April 9, 1865.

"*To Brigadier-General J. A. Rawlins, Chief of Staff, Headquarters Armies of United States:*

"GENERAL: The order of General Sheridan taking from me the command of my corps on the evening of the first of April, after the victory was won, assigns no cause, and leaves me open to the inferences now finding expression in the public prints, and which are in every way to my prejudice.

"I am unconscious of having done anything improper or unbecoming to my position, or the character of a soldier, or neglected any order or duty.

"I therefore respectfully request a full investigation of the matter as soon as the exigencies of the service will admit.

"I make this application now while awaiting orders, which I deem the most appropriate time; but I do not intend nor desire to press the matter upon the consideration of the Lieutenant-General until he can give it his attention without interfering with more important duties. The regard already shown me, in immediately assigning to me another command on the second instant, gives me the assurance that he will not deem it an intrusion to solicit an opportunity to vindicate the honor and reputation of a faithful soldier of the Union, who waits in silence under an unmerited injury, till such time as his superior shall be ready to give him a hearing.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. K. WARREN,
"Major-General Volunteers."

GENERAL GRANT'S REPLY.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
"WASHINGTON, May 6, 1865.

"*To Major-General G. K. Warren:*

"GENERAL: Your note, requesting authority to publish your application for an investigation of the grounds upon which you were relieved from the command of the Fifth army corps, or to have the investigation, is received.

"It is impossible at this time to give the court and witnesses necessary for the investigation, but I see nothing in your application objectionable to have published.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"U. S. GRANT,
"Lieutenant-General."

The following report, it will be perceived, contradicts no statement of my letter of May 11. It is copied from the Army and Navy Journal:

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN.

"CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS, May 16, 1865.

"GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following narrative of the operations of my command during the recent campaign in front of Petersburg and Richmond, terminating with the surrender of the rebel army of Northern Virginia, at Appomattox Court House, Virginia, on April 9, 1865:

* * * * *

"During the night of the thirty-first of March, my headquarters were at Dinwiddie Court House, and the Lieutenant-General notified me that the Fifth corps would report to me, and should reach me about midnight. This corps had been offered me on the thirtieth instant; but very much desiring the Sixth corps, which had been with me in the Shenandoah Valley, I asked for it, but on account of the delay which would occur in moving that corps from its position in the lines in front of Petersburg, it could not be sent to me. I respectfully submit herewith my brief accounts of the operations of the day, the response to which was the ordering of the Fifth corps to my support and my command, as also the dispatch from the Lieutenant-General notifying me of his action. I understood that the Fifth corps, when ordered to report to me, was in position near S. Dabney's house, in the angle between the Boydton Road and the Five Forks Road.

"Had General Warren moved according to the expectations of the Lieutenant-General, there would appear to have been but little chance for the escape of the enemy's infantry in front of Dinwiddie Court House. Ayres' division moved

down the Boydton Plank-road during the night, and in the morning moved west *via* R. Boiseau's house, striking the Five Forks Road about two and a half miles north of Dinwiddie Court House. General Warren, with Griffin's and Crawford's divisions, moved down the road by Crump's house, coming into the Five Forks Road, near J. Boiseau's house, between seven and eight o'clock on the morning of the first of April. Meantime I moved my cavalry force at daylight against the enemy's lines in front, which gave way rapidly, moving off by the right flank and crossing Chamberlain's Creek. This hasty movement was accelerated by the discovery that two divisions of the Fifth army corps were in their rear and that one division was moving toward their left and rear.

"The following were the instructions sent to General Warren:

"CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS, DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE, April 1, 1865, 3 A. M.

"*To Major-General Warren, commanding Fifth Army Corps*:

"I am holding in front of Dinwiddie Court House, on the road leading to Five Forks, for three quarters of a mile, with General Custer's division. The enemy are in his immediate front, lying so as to cover the road just this side of A. Adams' house, which leads out across Chamberlain's Bed or Run. I understand you have a division at J. Boiseau's; if so, you are in rear of the enemy's line, and almost on his flanks. I will hold on here. Possibly they may attack Custer at daylight; if so, attack instantly and in full force. Attack at daylight any how, and I will make an effort to get the road this side of Adams' house; and if I do, you can capture the whole of them. Any force moving down the road I am holding, or on the White Oak Road, will be in the enemy's rear, and in all probability, get any force that may escape you by a flank attack. Do not fear my leaving here. If the enemy remains, I shall fight at daylight.

"P. H. SHERIDAN,
"Major-General."

"As they fell back, the enemy were rapidly followed by General Merritt's two divisions, General Devin on the right and General Custer on the left, General Crook in the rear. During the remainder of the day, General Crook's division held the extreme left and rear, and was not seriously engaged.

"I then determined that I would drive the enemy, with the cavalry, to the Five Forks, press them inside of their works, and make a feint to turn their right flank; and, meanwhile, quietly move up the Fifth corps, with a view to attacking their left flank, crush the whole force, if possible, and drive westward those who might escape, thus isolating them from their army at Petersburg. Happily, this conception was successfully executed. About this time General McKenzie's division of cavalry, from the Army of the James, reported to me, and consisted of about one thousand effective men. I directed General Warren to hold fast at J. Boiseau's house, refresh his men, and be ready to move to the front when required; and General McKenzie was ordered to rest in front of Dinwiddie Court House until further orders.

"Meantime, General Merritt's command continued to press the enemy, and, by impetuous charges, drove them from two lines of temporary works; General Custer guiding his advance on the widow Gilliam's house, and General Devin on the main Five Forks Road. The courage displayed by the cavalry officers and men was superb, and about two o'clock the enemy was behind his works on the White Oak Road, and his skirmish line drawn in. I then ordered up the Fifth corps on the main road, and sent Brevet Major Gillespie, of the Engineers, to turn the head of the column off on the Gravelly Church Road, and put the corps in position on this road, obliquely to and at a point but a short distance from the White Oak Road, and about one mile from the Five Forks. Two divisions of the corps were to form the front line, and one division was to be held in reserve, in columns of regiments, opposite the centre.

"I then directed General Merritt to demonstrate as though he was attempting to turn the enemy's right flank, and notified that the Fifth corps would strike the enemy's left flank, and ordered that the cavalry should assault the enemy's works as soon as the Fifth corps became engaged, and that would be determined by the volleys of musketry. I then rode over to where the Fifth corps was going into position, and found them coming up very slowly. I was exceedingly anxious to attack at once, for the sun was getting low, and we had to fight or go back. It was no place to intrench, and it would have been shameful to have gone back with no results to compensate for the loss of the brave men who had fallen during the day. In this connection, I will say that General Warren did not exert himself to get up his corps as rapidly as he might have done; and his manner gave me the impression that he wished the sun to go down before dispositions for the attack could be completed. As soon as the corps was in position, I ordered an advance in the following formation: Ayres' division on the left, in double lines; Crawford's division on right, in double lines; and Griffin's division in reserve, behind Crawford's; and the White Oak Road was reached without opposition.

"While General Warren was getting into position, I learned that the left of the Second corps of the Army of the Potomac, on my right, had been swung around from the direction of its line of battle until it fronted on the Boydton Road, and parallel to it, which offered an opportunity to the enemy to march down the White Oak Road and attack me in right and rear. General McKenzie was therefore sent up the Camp Road, with directions to gain the White Oak Road, if possible; but to attack at all hazards any enemy

found, and, if successful, then march down the road and join me. General McKenzie executed this with courage and skill, attacking a force of the enemy on the White Oak Road, and driving it toward Petersburg. He then countermarched, and joined me on the White Oak Road just as the Fifth corps advanced to the attack, and I directed him to swing round with the right of the infantry and gain possession of the Ford Road at the crossing of Hatcher's Run. The Fifth corps, on reaching the White Oak Road, made a left wheel, and burst on the enemy's left flank and rear like a tornado, and pushed rapidly on, orders having been given that, if the enemy was routed, there should be no halt to re-form broken lines. As stated before, the firing of the Fifth corps was the signal of General Merritt to assault, which was promptly responded to, and the works of the enemy were soon carried at several points by our brave cavalrymen. The enemy were driven from their strong line of works and completely routed, the Fifth corps doubling up their left flank in confusion, and the cavalry of General Merritt dashing on to the White Oak Road, capturing their artillery and turning it upon them; and riding into their broken ranks so demoralized them that they made no serious stand after their line was carried, but took to flight in disorder. Between five thousand and six thousand prisoners fell into our hands, and the fugitives were driven westward, and were pursued until long after dark by Merritt's and McKenzie's cavalry for a distance of six miles.

"During this attack I again became dissatisfied with General Warren. During the engagement portions of his line gave way, when not exposed to a heavy fire, and simply for want of confidence on the part of the troops, which General Warren did not exert himself to inspire. I therefore relieved him from the command of the Fifth corps, authority for this action having been sent to me before the battle, unsolicited. When the pursuit was given up, I directed General Griffin, who had been ordered to assume command of the Fifth corps, to collect his troops at once, march two divisions back to Gravelly Church, and put them into position at right angles to the White Oak Road, facing toward Petersburg, while Bartlett's division, Griffin's old, covered the Ford Road to Hatcher's Run. General Merritt's cavalry went into camp on the widow Gilliam's plantation, and General McKenzie took position on the Ford Road at the crossing of Hatcher's Run. I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of the troops in this battle, and of the gallantry of their commanding officers, who appeared to realize that the success of the campaign and fate of Lee's army depended upon it. They merit the thanks of the country and reward of the government. To Generals Griffin, Ayres, Bartlett, and Crawford, of the Fifth corps, and to Generals Merritt, Custer, Devin, and McKenzie, of the cavalry, great credit is due; and to their subordinate commanders they will undoubtedly award the praise which is due to them for the hearty co-operation, bravery, and ability which were everywhere displayed.

* * * * * * *

"I am, Sir, very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,
"P. H. SHERIDAN,
"Major-General.

"Brevet Maj.-Gen. JOHN A. RAWLINS,
"Chief of Staff."

"CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS,
"DINWIDDIE C. H., March 31, 1865.

"*Lieutenant-General Grant, commanding Armies United States:*

"The enemy's cavalry attacked me about ten o'clock to-day, on the road coming in from the west, and a little north of Dinwiddie C. H. This attack was very handsomely repulsed by General Smith's brigade of Crook's division, and the enemy was driven across Chamberlain's Creek. Shortly afterward, the enemy's infantry attacked on the same creek in heavy force, and drove in General Davies' brigade, and, advancing rapidly, gained the forks of the road at J. Boiseau's. This forced Devin, who was in advance, and Davies, to cross to the Boydton Road. General Gregg's brigade and General Gibbs', who had been toward Dinwiddie, then attacked the enemy in the rear very handsomely. This stopped the march toward the left of our infantry, and finally caused them to turn toward Dinwiddie and attack us in heavy force. The enemy then again attacked at Chamberlain's Creek, and forced Smith's position. At this time Capehart's and Pennington's brigades of Custer's division came up, and a very handsome fight occurred.

"The enemy have gained some ground, but we still hold in front of Dinwiddie C. H., and Davies and Devin are coming down the Boydton Road to join us.

"The opposing force was Pickett's division, Wise's Independent Brigade of Infantry, and Fitzhugh Lee's, Rosser's, and W. H. Lee's cavalry commands.

"The men behaved splendidly. Our loss in killed and wounded will probably number four hundred and fifty men; very few were lost as prisoners.

"We have of the enemy a number of prisoners. This force is too strong for us. I will hold out to Dinwiddie C. H. until I am compelled to leave.

"Our fighting to-day was all dismounted.
"P. H. SHERIDAN,
"Major-General."

"DARNEY MILLS, March 31, 1865—10.05 P. M.

"*Major-General Sheridan:*

"The Fifth corps has been ordered to your support. Two divisions will go by J. Boiseau's, and one down the Boydton Road. In addition to this, I have sent McKenzie's cavalry, which will reach you by the Vaughan Road.

"All these forces, except the cavalry, should reach you by twelve to-night.

"You will assume command of the whole force sent to operate with you, and use it, to the

best of your ability, to destroy the force which your command has fought so gallantly to-day.

"U. S. GRANT,
"Lieutenant-General."

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THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT.

RICHMOND, VA., May 19, 1864.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I herewith transmit, for your information, a communication from the Secretary of War, covering a copy of the reports of General Bragg and his subordinate commanders, of the battle of Chickamauga.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, WAR DEPARTMENT, RICHMOND, VA., May 19, 1864.

To His Excellency the President:

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith, for the information of Congress, copies of the reports of General Bragg and his subordinate commanders, of the battle of Chickamauga.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War.

REPORT OF GENERAL BRAGG

WARM SPRINGS, GEORGIA, December 28, 1863.

General S. Cooper, Adjutant General C. S. A., Richmond, Va:

SIR: Most of the subordinate reports of the operations of our troops at the battle of Chickamauga, having been received, are herewith forwarded; and for the better understanding of the movements preceding and following that important event, the following narrative is submitted:

On the twentieth of August it was ascertained certainly that the Federal army from Middle Tennessee, under General Rosecrans, had crossed the mountains to Stevenson and Bridgeport. His force of effective infantry and artillery amounted to fully seventy thousand, divided into four corps. About the same time, General Burnside advanced from Kentucky towards Knoxville, East Tennessee, with a force estimated by the General commanding that Department at over twenty-five thousand. In view of the great superiority of numbers brought against him, General Buckner concluded to evacuate Knoxville, and, with a force of about five thousand infantry and artillery, and his cavalry, took position in the vicinity of Loudon. Two brigades of his command, Frazier's, at Cumberland Gap, and Jackson's, in Northeast Tennessee, were thus severed from us. The enemy having already obtained a lodgment in East Tennessee by another route, the continued occupation of Cumberland Gap became very hazardous to the garrison, and comparatively unimportant to us. Its evacuation was accordingly ordered, but on the appeal of its commander, stating his resources and ability for defence, favorably endorsed by Major-General Buckner, the orders were suspended on the thirty-first of August. The main body of our army was encamped near Chattanooga, whilst the cavalry force, much reduced and enfeebled by long service on short rations, was recruiting in the vicinity of Rome, Georgia. Immediately after crossing the mountains to the Tennessee, the enemy threw a corps by way of Sequatchie Valley to strike the rear of General Buckner's command, whilst Burnside occupied him in front. One division already ordered to his assistance proving insufficient to meet the force concentrating on him, Buckner was directed to withdraw to the Hiawassee with his infantry, artillery and supplies, and to hold his cavalry in front to check the enemy's advance. As soon as this change was made, the corps threatening his rear was withdrawn, and the enemy commenced a movement in force against our left and rear. On the last of August it became known that he had crossed his main force over the Tennessee River, at and near Carpenter's Ferry, the most accessible point from Stevenson. By a direct route he was now as near our main depot of supplies as we were, and our whole line of communication was exposed, whilst his was partially secured by mountains and the river. By the timely arrival of two small divisions from Mississippi our effective force, exclusive of cavalry, was now a little over thirty-five thousand, with which it was determined to strike on the first favorable opportunity. Closely watched by our cavalry, which had been brought forward, it was soon ascertained that the enemy's general movement was towards our left and rear, in the direction of Dalton and Rome, keeping Lookout Mountain between us. The nature of the country and the want of supplies in it, with the presence of Burnside's force on our right, rendered a movement on the enemy's rear with our inferior force extremely hazardous, if not impracticable. It was, therefore, determined to meet him in front whenever he should emerge from the mountain gorges. To do this and hold Chattanooga was impossible, without such a division of our small force as to endanger both parts. Accordingly our troops were put in position on the seventh and eighth of September, and took position from Lee and Gordon's Mill to Lafayette, on the road leading south from Chattanooga and fronting the east slope of Lookout Mountain. The forces on the Hiawassee and at Chickamauga Station took the route by Ringgold. A small cavalry force was left in observation at Chattanooga, and a brigade of infantry, strongly supported by cavalry, was left at Ringgold to hold the railroad and protect it from raids.

As soon as our movement was known to the enemy, his corps nearest Chattanooga, and which had been threatening Buckner's rear, was thrown into that place, and shortly thereafter commenced to move on our rear by the two roads to Lafayette and Ringgold. Two other corps were now in Will's Valley, one nearly opposite the head of McLemore's Cove, a valley formed

by Lookout Mountain and a spur of the main ridge called Pigeon Mountain, and the other at or near Colonel Winston's, opposite Alpine.

During the ninth, it was ascertained that a column, estimated at from four thousand to eight thousand, had crossed Lookout Mountain into the cove, by way of Stevens' and Cooper's Gaps. Thrown off his guard by our rapid movement—apparently in retreat, when, in reality, we had concentrated opposite his centre—and deceived by the information from deserters and others sent into his lines, the enemy pressed on his columns to intercept us, and thus exposed himself in detail.

Major-General Hindman received verbal instructions on the ninth to prepare his division to move against this force, and was informed that another division from Lieutenant-General Hill's command, at Lafayette, would join him. That evening the following written orders were issued to Generals Hindman and Hill:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY TENNESSEE,
Lee and Gordon's Mill, 11¾ P. M., Sept. 9, 1863.

Major-General Hindman, commanding Division:

GENERAL: You will move with your division immediately to Davis' Cross-roads, on the road from Lafayette to Stevens' Gap. At this point you will put yourself in communication with the column of General Hill, ordered to move to the same point, and take command of the forces, or report to the officer commanding Hill's column, according to rank. If in command, you will move upon the enemy, reported to be four thousand or five thousand strong, encamped at the foot of Lookout Mountain, at Stevens' Gap. Another column of the enemy is reported to be at Cooper's Gap—number not known.

I am, General, &c.,

KINLOCH FALCONER,
Assistant-Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY TENNESSEE,
Lee and Gordon's Mill, 11¾ P. M., Sept. 9, 1863.

Lieutenant-General Hill, commanding Corps:

GENERAL: I enclose orders given to General Hindman. General Bragg directs that you send or take, as your judgment dictates, Cleburne's division to unite with General Hindman, at Davis' Cross-roads to-morrow morning. Hindman starts at twelve o'clock to-night, and he has thirteen miles to make. The commander of the column, thus united, will move upon the enemy encamped at the foot of Stevens' Gap, said to be four thousand or five thousand. If unforeseen circumstances should prevent your movement, notify Hindman. A cavalry force should accompany your column. Hindman has none. Open communication with Hindman with your cavalry in advance of the junction. He marches on the road from Dr. Anderson's to Davis' Cross-roads.

I am General, &c.,

KINLOCH FALCONER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

On the receipt of his order, during the night, General Hill replied that the movement required by him was impracticable, as General Cleburne was sick, and both the gaps, Dug and Catlett's, had been blocked by felling timber, which would require twenty-four hours for its removal.

Not to lose this favorable opportunity—Hindman, by a prompt movement, being already in position—the following orders were issued at eight A. M., on the 10th, for Major-General Buckner to move with his two divisions and report to Hindman:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY TENNESSEE,
Lee and Gordon's Mill, 8 A. M., Sept. 10, 1863.

Major-General Buckner, Anderson's:

GENERAL: I enclose orders issued last night to Generals Hill and Hindman. General Hill has found it impossible to carry out the part assigned to Cleburne's division. The General commanding desires that you will execute, without delay, the order issued to General Hill. You can move to Davis' Cross-roads by the direct road, from your present position at Anderson's, along which General Hindman has passed.

I am, General, &c.,

GEORGE W. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

And both Hindman and Hill were notified. Hindman had halted his division at Morgan's, some three or four miles from Davis' Cross-roads, in the cove, and at this point Buckner joined him, during the afternoon of the tenth. Reports fully confirming previous information in regard to the position of the enemy's forces, were received during the tenth, and it became certain that he was moving his three columns to form a junction upon us, at or near Lafayette. The corps near Colonel Winston's, moved on the mountain towards Alpine, a point twenty miles south of us. The one opposite the cove continued its movement, and threw forward its advance to Davis' Cross-roads, and Crittenden moved from Chattanooga, on the roads to Ringgold and Lee and Gordon's Mills. To strike these isolated commands in succession was our obvious policy. To secure more prompt and decided action in the movement ordered against the enemy's centre, my head-quarters were removed to Lafayette, where I arrived about half-past eleven, P.M., on the tenth, and Lieutenant-General Polk was ordered forward with his remaining division to Anderson's, so as to cover Hindman's rear during the operations in the cove. At Lafayette, I met Major Nocquet, engineer officer on General Buckner's staff, sent by General Hindman, after a junction of their commands, to confer with me, and suggest a change in the plan of operations. After hearing the reports of this officer, and obtaining from the active and energetic cavalry commander in front of our position, Brigadier-General Martin, the latest information of the enemy's movements and position, I verbally directed the Major to return to General Hindman and say that my plans could not be changed, and that he would carry out his orders. At the same time the following written orders were sent to the General by courier:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY TENNESSEE,
LAFAYETTE, GA., 12 P. M., September 10, 1863.

Major-General Hindman, commanding, etc.:

GENERAL: Headquarters are here, and the following is the information:

Crittenden's corps is advancing on us from Chattanooga. A large force from the south has advanced to within seven miles of this point. Polk is left at Anderson's to cover your rear. General Bragg orders you to attack and force your way through the enemy to this point at the earliest hour you can see him in the morning. Cleburne will attack in front the moment your guns are heard.

I am, General, etc.,
GEORGE W. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Orders were also given for Walker's reserve corps to move promptly and join Cleburne's division at Dug Gap, to unite in the attack. At the same time Cleburne was directed to remove all obstructions in the road in his front, which was promptly done, and by daylight he was ready to move. The obstructions in Catlett's Gap were also ordered to be removed, to clear the road in Hindman's rear. Breckinridge's division, Hill's corps, was kept in position south of Lafayette to check any movement the enemy might make from that direction.

At daylight, I proceeded to join Cleburne at Dug Gap, and found him waiting the opening of Hindman's guns to move on the enemy's flank and rear. Most of the day was spent in this position, waiting in great anxiety for the attack by Hindman's column. Several couriers and two staff officers were dispatched at different times, urging him to move with promptness and vigor. About the middle of the afternoon, the first gun was heard, when the advance of Cleburne's division discovered the enemy had taken advantage of our delay and retreated to the mountain passes. The enemy now discovered his error, and commenced to repair it by withdrawing his corps from the direction of Alpine, to unite with the one near McLemore's Cove, whilst that was gradually extended towards Lee and Gordon's Mills. Our movement having thus failed in its justly anticipated results, it was determined to turn upon the Third corps of the enemy, approaching us from the direction of Chattanooga. The forces were accordingly withdrawn to Lafayette, and Polk's and Walker's corps were moved immediately in the direction of Lee and Gordon's Mills. The one corps of the enemy in this direction was known to be divided — one division having been sent to Ringgold. Upon learning the dispositions of the enemy from our cavalry commander in that direction, on the afternoon of the twelfth, Lieutenant-General Polk, commanding the advance forces, was directed in the following note:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY TENNESSEE,
LAFAYETTE, GA., 6 P. M., September 12.

Lieutenant-General Polk:

GENERAL: I enclose you a dispatch from General Pegram. This presents you a fine opportunity of striking Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail yourself of it at daylight to-morrow. This division crushed, and the others are yours. We can then turn on the force in the cove. Wheeler's cavalry will move on Wilder so as to cover your right. I shall be delighted to hear of your success.

Very truly yours,
BRAXTON BRAGG.

To attack at daylight on the thirteenth. Upon further information the order was renewed in two notes, at later hours of the same day, as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY TENNESSEE,
LAFAYETTE, GA., 6 P. M., September 12, 1863.

Lieutenant-General Polk, commanding Corps:

GENERAL: I enclose you a dispatch marked "A," and I now give you the orders of the commanding General, viz.: to attack at day-dawn to-morrow the infantry column reported in said dispatch at three-quarters of a mile beyond Peavine Church on the road to Graysville from Lafayette.

I am, General, etc.,
GEORGE W. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY TENNESSEE,
LAFAYETTE, GA., September 12, 1863.

Lieutenant-General Polk, commanding Corps:

GENERAL: The enemy is approaching from the south, and it is highly important that your attack in the morning should be quick and decided. Let no time be lost.

I am, General, etc.,
GEORGE W. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

At eleven P. M., a dispatch was received from the General, stating that he had taken a strong position for defence, and requesting that he should be heavily reinforced. He was promptly ordered not to defer his attack, his force being already numerically superior to the enemy, and was reminded that his success depended upon the promptness and rapidity of his movements. He was further informed that Buckner's corps would be moved within supporting distance the next morning.

Early on the thirteenth I proceeded to the front, ahead of Buckner's command, to find that no advance had been made on the enemy, and that his forces had formed a junction and recrossed the Chickamauga. Again disappointed, immediate measures were taken to place our trains and limited supplies in safe positions, when all our forces were concentrated along the Chickamauga, threatening the enemy in front. Major-General Wheeler, with two divisions of cavalry, occupied the positions on the extreme left, vacated by Hill's corps, and was directed to press the enemy in McLemore's Cove, to divert his attention from our real movement. Brigadier-General Forrest, with his own and Pegram's division of cavalry, covered the movement on our front and right. Brigadier-General B. R.

Johnson, whose brigade had been at Ringgold holding the railroad, was moved towards Reed's Bridge, which brought him on the extreme right of the line. Walker's corps formed on his left, opposite Alexander's Bridge. Buckner's next, near Ledford's Ford. Polk's opposite Lee and Gordon's Mills, and Hill's on the extreme left. With Johnson moved two brigades, just arrived from Mississippi, and three of Longstreet's corps, all without artillery and transportation.

The following orders were issued on the night of the seventeenth for the forces to cross the Chickamauga, commencing the movement at six o'clock A. M. on the eighteenth, by the extreme right, at Reed's Bridge.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY TENNESSEE,
IN THE FIELD, LEET'S TAN-YARD,
September 18, 1863.

CIRCULAR.

I. Johnson's column (Hood's), on crossing at or near Reed's Bridge, will turn to the left by the most practicable route, and sweep up the Chickamauga towards Lee and Gordon's Mills.

II. Walker, crossing at Alexander's Bridge, will unite in this move, and push vigorously on the enemy's flank and rear in the same direction.

III. Buckner, crossing at Ledford's Ford, will join in the movement to the left and press the enemy up the stream from Polk's front at Lee and Gordon's Mills.

IV. Polk will press his forces to the front of Lee and Gordon's Mills, and if met by too much resistance to cross will bear to the right and cross at Dalton's Ford, or at Ledford's, as may be necessary, and join the attack wherever the enemy may be.

V. Hill will cover our left flank from an advance of the enemy from the cove, and, by pressing the cavalry in his front, ascertain if the enemy is reinforcing at Lee and Gordon's Mills, in which event he will attack them in flank.

VI. Wheeler's cavalry will hold the gap in Pigeon Mountain, and cover our rear and left and bring up the stragglers.

VII. All teams, etc., not with troops, should go towards Ringgold and Dalton, Georgia, beyond Taylor's Ridge. All cooking should be done at the trains; rations, when cooked, will be forwarded to the troops.

VIII. The above movements will be executed with the utmost promptness and persistence.

By command of General BRAGG.

GEORGE W. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

The resistance offered by the enemy's cavalry and the difficulties arising from the bad and narrow country roads, caused unexpected delays in the execution of these movements. Though the commander of the right column was several times urged to press forward, his crossing was not effected until late in the afternoon. At this time, Major-General Hood, of Longstreet's corps, arrived and assumed command of the column, Brigadier-General Johnston resuming his improvised division of three brigades. Alexander's Bridge was hotly contested and finally broken up by the enemy, just as General Walker secured possession. He moved down stream, however, a short distance, and crossed, as directed, at Byron's Ford, and thus secured a junction with Hood after night.

The movement was resumed at daylight on the nineteenth, and Buckner's corps, with Cheatham's division, of Polk's, had crossed and formed, when a brisk engagement commenced with our cavalry under Forrest on the extreme right. About nine o'clock, a brigade from Walker was ordered to Forrest's support, and soon after Walker was ordered to attack with his whole force. Our line was now formed with Buckner's left resting on the Chickamauga, about one mile below Lee and Gordon's Mills. On his right came Hood with his own and Johnston's divisions, with Walker on the extreme right, Cheatham's division being in reserve, the general direction being a little east of north. The attack ordered by our right was made by General Walker in his usual gallant style, and soon developed a largely superior force opposed. He drove them handsomely, however, and captured several batteries of artillery in most gallant charges. Before Cheatham's division, ordered to his support, could reach him he had been pressed back to his first position by the extended lines of the enemy assailing him on both flanks. The two commands united were soon enabled to force the enemy back again, and recover our advantage, though we were yet greatly outnumbered. These movements on our right were in a direction to leave an opening in our line between Cheatham and Hood. Stewart's division, forming Buckner's second line, was thrown to the right to fill this, and it soon became hotly engaged, as did Hood's whole front. The enemy, whose left was at Lee and Gordon's Mills when our movement commenced, had rapidly transferred forces from his extreme right, changing his entire line, and seemed disposed to dispute, with all his ability, our effort to gain the main road to Chattanooga in his rear. Lieutenant-General Polk was ordered to move his remaining division across at the nearest ford, and to assume the command in person on our right. Hill's corps was also ordered to cross below Lee and Gordon's Mills and join the line on the right.

Whilst these movements were being made our right and centre were heavily and almost constantly engaged. Stewart, by a vigorous assault, broke the enemy's centre, and penetrated far into his lines, but was obliged to retire for want of sufficient force to meet the heavy enfilade fire which he encountered from the right. Hood, later engaged, advanced from the first fire, and continued to drive the force in his front until night. Cleburne's division, of Hill's corps, which first reached the right, was ordered to attack immediately, in conjunction with the force already engaged. This veteran command, under

its gallant chief, moved to its work after sunset, taking the enemy completely by surprise, driving him in great disorder for nearly a mile, and inflicting a very heavy loss. Night found us masters of the ground, after a series of very obstinate contests with largely superior numbers.

From captured prisoners and others we learned with certainty that we had encountered the enemy's whole force, which had been moving day and night since they first ascertained the direction of our march. Orders had been given for the rapid march to the field of all reinforcements arriving by railroad, and three additional brigades from this source joined us early next morning. The remaining forces on our extreme left, east of the Chickamauga, had been ordered up early in the afternoon, but reached the field too late to participate in the engagement of that day. They were ordered into line on their arrival, and disposed for a renewal of the action early the next morning. Information was received from Lieutenant-General Longstreet of his arrival at Ringgold and departure for the field. Five small brigades of his corps, about five thousand effective infantry (no artillery), reached us in time to participate in the action, three of them on the nineteenth, and two more on the twentieth.

Upon the close of the engagement on the evening of the nineteenth, the proper commanders were summoned to my camp fire, and there received specific information and instructions touching the disposition of the troops, and for the operations of the next morning. The whole force was divided for the next morning into two commands and assigned to the two senior Lieutenant-Generals, Longstreet and Polk. The former to the left where all his own troops were stationed, the latter continuing his command of the right. Lieutenant-General Longstreet reached my headquarters about eleven P. M., and immediately received his instructions. After a few hours' rest at my camp fire, he moved at daylight to his line just in front of my position. Lieutenant-General Polk was ordered to assail the enemy on our extreme right at day-dawn on the twentieth, and to take up the attack in succession rapidly to the left. The left wing was to await the attack by the right, take it promptly when made, and the whole line was then to be pushed vigorously and persistently against the enemy throughout its extent. Before the dawn of day myself and staff were ready for the saddle, occupying a position immediately in rear of and accessible to all parts of the line. With increasing anxiety and disappointment I waited until after sunrise without hearing a gun, and at length dispatched a staff officer to Lieutenant-General Polk to ascertain the cause of the delay, and urge him to a prompt and speedy movement. This officer, not finding the General with his troops, and learning where he had spent the night, proceeded across Alexander's Bridge to the east side of the Chickamauga and there delivered my message. Proceeding in person to the right wing, I found the troops not even prepared for the movement. Messengers were immediately dispatched for Lieutenant-General Polk, and he shortly after joined me. My orders were renewed, and the General was urged to their prompt execution, the more important as the ear was saluted throughout the night with the sounds of the axe and falling timber, as the enemy industriously labored to strengthen his position by hastily constructed barricades and breastworks. A reconnoissance made in the front of our extreme right, during this delay, crossed the main road to Chattanooga, and proved the important fact that this greatly desired position was open to our possession.

The reasons assigned for this unfortunate delay by the wing commander appear in part in the reports of his subordinates. It is sufficient to say, they are entirely unsatisfactory. It also appears from these reports that when the action was opened on the right, about ten o'clock A. M., the troops were moved to the assault in detail and by detachments, unsupported until nearly all parts of the right wing were in turn repulsed with heavy loss. Our troops were led with the greatest gallantry, and exhibited great coolness, bravery, and heroic devotion. In no instance did they fail, when called on, to rally and return to the charge. But though invariably driving the enemy, with great slaughter, at the points assailed, they were compelled in turn to yield to the greatly superior numbers constantly brought against them. The attack on the left, promptly made as ordered, met with less resistance, much of the enemy's strength having been transferred to our right, and was successfully and vigorously followed up. About two P. M., passing along the line to our left, I found we had been checked in our progress by encountering a strong position, strengthened by works and obstinately defended. Unable to afford assistance from any other part of the field, written orders were immediately dispatched to Lieutenant-General Polk to again assault the enemy in his front with his whole force, and to persist until he should dislodge him from his position. Directing the operations on our left to be continued, I moved again to the right and soon dispatched a staff officer to General Polk, urging a prompt and vigorous execution of my written orders. About four P. M., this general assault was made and the attack was continued from right to left until the enemy gave way at different points, and, finally, about dark, yielded us his line. The contest was severe, but the impetuous charge of our troops could not be resisted when they were brought to bear in full force, even where the enemy possessed all the advantage of position and breastworks. The troops were halted by their respective commanders, when the darkness of the night and the density of the forest rendered further movements uncertain and dangerous, and the army bivouacked on the ground it had so gallantly won. Both flanks having advanced more

rapidly than the centre, they were found confronting each other in lines nearly parallel and within artillery range. Any advance by them, especially at night, over ground so thickly wooded, might have resulted in the most serious consequences.

The enemy, though driven from his lines, still confronted us, and desultory firing was heard until eight P. M. Other noises, indicating movements and dispositions for the morrow, continued until a late hour at night.

During the operations by the main forces, on the nineteenth and twentieth, the cavalry, on the flanks, was actively and usefully employed, holding the enemy in observation and threatening or assailing him as occasion offered. From the report of Major-General Wheeler, commanding on the left, it will be seen what important service was rendered, both on the twentieth and twenty-first, by his command, especially in the capture of prisoners and property, and in the dispersion of the enemy's cavalry. Brigadier General Forrest's report will show equally gallant and valuable services by his command on our right.

Exhausted by two days' battle, with very limited supply of provisions, and almost destitute of water, some time in daylight was absolutely essential for our troops to supply these necessaries and replenish their ammunition before renewing the contest. Availing myself of this necessary delay to inspect and readjust my lines, I moved, as soon as daylight served, on the twenty-first. On my arrival, about sunrise, near Lieutenant-General Polk's bivouac, I met the ever-vigilant General Liddell, commanding a division in our front line, who was awaiting the General, to report that his pickets this morning discovered the enemy had retreated during the night from his immediate front. Instructions were promptly given to push forward our whole line of skirmishers to the front, and I moved to the left and extended these orders. All the cavalry at hand, including my personal guard, were ordered to the front. Members of my staff, in passing through the lines of our left wing with their escort, were warned of danger, and told that they were entering on the neutral ground between us and the enemy. But this proved to be an error, and our cavalry soon came upon the enemy's rear guard, where the main road passes through Missionary Ridge. He had availed himself of the night to withdraw from our front, and his main body was already in position within his lines at Chattanooga. Any immediate pursuit by our infantry and artillery would have been fruitless, as it was not deemed practicable, with our weak and exhausted forces, to assail the enemy, now more than double our numbers, behind his intrenchments. Though we had defeated him and driven him from the field with heavy loss in men, arms, and artillery, it had only been done by heavy sacrifices, in repeated, persistent, and most gallant assaults upon superior numbers strongly posted and protected.

The conduct of our troops was excellent throughout the prolonged contest. O where success seemed impossible, failed to rally and return to the cha last combined and determined effo the spirit of every man seemed to success, was crowned with the rev such gallantry in a just cause.

Our loss was in proportion to the and obstinate struggle. Two-fifths lant troops had fallen, and the numb and staff officers stricken down wil how these troops were led. M Hood, the model soldier and inspirin after contributing largely to our suc suffered the irreparable loss of a le valuable life should be spared to us a source of thankfulness and gratit General Hindman, highly distingui lantry and good conduct, receiv contusion, but persisted in keepin until he witnessed the success i command largely participated. B erals B. H. Helm, Preston Smit Deshla died upon the field in the her of duty. They were true patriots soldiers, and worthy of the high re enjoyed. Brigadier-Generals Adan McNair fell severely wounded, wh leading their commands in the th fight. It is gratifying to know th lescing, and will be again found a duty and danger.

Judging from appearances on enemy's losses must have excee largely, but we have no means of mating them. We captured over e prisoners, fifty-one pieces of art thousand stand of small arms, and ammunition, with wagons, aml teams, medicines, and hospital st quantities. The accompanying ma three and four—based on accurate afford the necessary information i understanding of the movements o The positions of the troops on the mostly from the sketches of the commanders. The times selected were the morning of the nineteen action commenced; the morning tieth, and the evening of the two close of the operations. There h delay in rendering some of the s ports, and none have been receiv tenant-Generals Polk and Hill, and brigades in Longstreet's corps. T these has caused a delay in makin and induced me to defer forward hoping that all might be submitte

For the many deeds of daring a roic devotion exhibited on this f is made to the subordinate report remarked that the private soldie distinguished, as he always will where the rank and file is made u citizens of the country.

The medical officers, both in th

the hospitals, earned the lasting gratitude of the soldier, and deserve the highest commendation. The great number of wounded thrown suddenly upon their hands taxed every energy and every faculty. With means greatly inadequate, especially in transportation, they soon reduced confusion into order, and, by assiduity and skill, afforded to the gallant sufferers that temporal relief for which they might look in vain to any other source. In this connection, it is a pleasing duty to acknowledge in grateful terms the deep indebtedness of the army to the Hospital Relief Associations, which so promptly and so generously pressed forward their much-needed assistance. Under the admirable management of their officers in Atlanta, we were soon furnished with every necessary and comfort, and stores continued to arrive until notice was given that our wants were all supplied. The officers of my staff, personal and general, served me on this field and on the arduous marches, proceeding with their usual zeal, intelligence and gallantry.

The whole cavalry force having been dispatched to press the enemy and cut off detachments, orders were given for the army to move to a point near the railroad and convenient to water, still interposing between the enemy and our large number of wounded, our trophies, and our wounded prisoners, whose removal from the field occupied many days.

Our supplies of all kinds were greatly reduced, the railroad having been constantly occupied in transporting troops, prisoners, and our wounded, and the bridges having been destroyed to a point two miles south of Ringgold. These supplies were ordered to be replenished, and as soon as it was seen that we could be subsisted, the army was moved forward to seize and hold the only communication the enemy had with his supplies in the rear. His important road, and the shortest by half to his depot at Bridgeport, lay along the south bank of the Tennessee. The holding of this all-important route was confided to Lieutenant-General Longstreet's command, and its possession forced the enemy to a road double the length, over two ranges of mountains, by wagon transportation. At the same time, our cavalry, in large force, was thrown across the river to operate on this long and difficult route. These dispositions, faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage. Possessed of the shortest road to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a question of time. The disastrous loss of these advantages must be the subject of a future communication. The suggestion of a movement by our right, immediately after the battle, to the north of the Tennessee, and thence upon Nashville, requires notice only because it will find a place on the files of the department. Such a movement was utterly impossible for want of transportation. Nearly half our army consisted of reinforcements just before the battle, without a wagon of an artillery horse, and nearly, if not quite, a third of the artillery horses on the field had been lost. The railroad bridges, too, had been destroyed to a point south of Ringgold, and, in all, the road from Cleveland to Knoxville. To these insurmountable difficulties were added the entire absence of means to cross the river, except by fording at a few precarious points too deep for artillery, and the well-known danger of sudden rises, by which all communication would be cut, a contingency which did actually happen a few days after the visionary scheme was proposed. But the most serious objection to the proposition was its entire want of military propriety. It abandoned to the enemy our entire line of communication, and laid open to him our depots of supplies, whilst it placed us with a greatly inferior force beyond a difficult and, at times, impassable river, in a country affording no subsistence to men or animals. It also left open to the enemy, at a distance of only ten miles, our battle-field, with thousands of our wounded and his own, and all the trophies and supplies we had won. All this was to be risked and given up for what? To gain the enemy's rear and cut him off from his depot of supplies by the route over the mountains, when the very movement abandoned to his unmolested use the better and more practicable route of half the length on the south side of the river. It is hardly necessary to say the proposition was not even entertained, whatever may have been the inferences drawn from subsequent movements.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
BRAXTON BRAGG,
General.

WARM SPRINGS, GA., January 2, 1864.

General S. Cooper, Adjutant-General, C. S. A.:

SIR: I forward the reports of the battles of Chickamauga by my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Ellis. The maps of the battle-field have been so long and so unexpectedly delayed that I conclude not to wait for them any longer. They are daily expected from Dalton, where I left them nearly completed, and will be forwarded as soon as received.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
BRAXTON BRAGG,
General

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL LONGSTREET.

HEADQUARTERS NEAR CHATTANOOGA,
October, 1863.

Colonel George William Brent, Assistant Adjutant-General:

COLONEL: Our train reached Catoosa platform, near Ringgold, about two o'clock in the afternoon of the nineteenth of September. As soon as our horses came up, about four o'clock, I started with Colonel Sorrel and Colonel Manning, of my staff, to find the headquarters of the commanding General. We missed our way, and did

not report until near eleven o'clock at night. Upon my arrival, I was informed that the troops had been engaged during the day in severe skirmishing, while endeavoring to get in line for battle. The commanding General gave me a map showing the roads and streams between Lookout Mountain and the Chickamauga River, and a general description of our position, and informed me that the battle was ordered at daylight the next morning; the action to be brought on upon our right, and to be taken up successively to the left; the general movement to be a wheel upon my extreme left as a pivot. I was assigned to the command of the left wing, composed of Hood's and Hindman's divisions, an improvised division under Brigadier-General B. R. Johnson, and Buckner's corps, consisting of Stewart's and Preston's divisions. The artillery consisted of the battalions of Majors Williams, Robertson, and Leyden, together with some other batteries attached to brigades.

As soon as day of the twentieth had dawned, I rode to the front to find my troops. The line was arranged from the right to the left as follows: Stewart's, Johnson's, Hindman's and Preston's divisions. Hood's division (of which only three brigades were up) was somewhat in the rear of Johnson's. Kershaw's and Humphreys' brigades, McLaws' division, were ordered forward from Ringgold the night before, but were not yet up. General McLaws had not arrived from Richmond. I set to work to have the line adjusted by closing to the right, in order to occupy some vacant ground between the two wings, and to make room for Hood in the front line. The divisions were ordered to form with two brigades in the front line, and one supporting where there were but three brigades, and two supporting where there were more than three. General Hood was ordered to take the brigades of Kershaw and Humphreys and use them as supports for his division, thus making his division the main column of attack. Before these arrangements were completed, the attack was made by our right wing about ten o'clock. The battle seemed to rage with considerable fury, but did not progress as had been anticipated. As soon as I was prepared, I sent to the commanding General to suggest that I had probably better make my attack. Before the messenger returned, I heard that the commanding General had sent orders for the division commanders to move forward and attack. I had no time to find the officer who brought the order, as some of the troops were in motion when I heard of it. Upon this information, I at once issued orders to attack to the troops not already in motion, holding one of Buckner's divisions (Preston's) in reserve. As the battle upon our right was not so successful as had been expected in the plan of attack, I was obliged to reverse the order of battle, by retaining my right somewhere near the left of the right wing. To do this, Stewart's division was obliged to halt upon reaching the Lafayette and Chattanooga road. Hood's column broke the enemy's line near the Brotherton house, and made its wheel to the right. In making this movement, Major-General Hood fell severely, and it was feared mortally, wounded, by a Minie ball breaking his thigh. He had broken the enemy's line, however, and his own troops and those to his right and left continued to press the enemy with such spirit and force that he could not resist us.

Brigadier-General Law succeeded to the command of Hood's division, and Brigadier-General Kershaw to the command of the two brigades of McLaws' division. General Kershaw having received no definite orders himself (being under the command of General Hood,) and not being advised of the wheel to the right, had gained more ground to the front than was intended in the movement of his two brigades. Johnson's division followed the movement made by Hood, and gained the Crawfish Spring and Chattanooga road, having a full share in the conflict.

Major-General Hindman, in command of my left division, first met the enemy near the Vineyard house, and drove him back upon his strong position near the widow Glenn's, or burnt house. By a well-directed front and flank attack, he gained the position after a severe struggle. The enemy's dead at this point mark well his line of battle. Hindman was then ordered to move by his right flank and reinforce Johnson, near the Villets house, who was pressing forward against great odds.

About three o'clock in the afternoon, I asked the commanding General for some of the troops of the right wing, but was informed by him that they had been beaten back so badly that they could be of no service to me. I had but one division that had not been engaged, and hesitated to venture to put it in, as our distress upon our right seemed to be almost as great as that of the enemy upon his right. I therefore concluded to hold Preston for the time, and urge on to renewed efforts our brave men who had already been engaged many hours. The heights extending from the Villets house across to the Snodgrass house, gave the enemy strong ground upon which to rally. Here he gathered most of his broken forces and reinforced them. After a long and bloody struggle, Johnson and Hindman gained the heights near the Crawfish Spring road. Kershaw made a most handsome attack upon the heights at the Snodgrass house, simultaneously with Johnson and Hindman, but was not strong enough for the work. It was evident that with this position gained, I should be complete master of the field. I therefore ordered General Buckner to move Preston forward. Before this, however, General Buckner had established a battery of twelve guns, raking down the enemy's line which opposed our right wing, and at the same time having fine play upon any force that might attempt to reinforce the hill that he was about to attack. General Stewart, of his corps, was also ordered to move against any such force in flank. The combination was well timed and arrranged. Preston dashed gallantly at the hill. Stewart flanked a reinforcing column, and captured a

large portion of it. At the same time, the fire of the battery struck such terror into a heavy force close under it, that we took there also a large number of prisoners. Preston's assault, though not a complete success at the onset, taken in connection with the other operations, crippled the enemy so badly that his ranks were badly broken, and by a flank movement and another advance the heights were gained. These reinforcements were the enemy's last or reserve corps, and a part also of the line that had been opposing our right wing during the morning. The enemy broke up in great confusion along my front, and, about the same time, the right wing made a gallant dash and gained the line that had been held so long and obstinately against it. A simultaneous and continuous shout from the two wings announced our success complete. The enemy had fought every man that he had, and every one had been in turn beaten. As it was almost dark, I ordered my line to remain as it was; ammunition boxes to be refilled, stragglers to be collected, and everything in readiness for the pursuit in the morning.

Early on the twenty-first, the commanding General stopped at my bivouac and asked my views as to our future movements. I suggested crossing the river above Chattanooga, so as to make ourselves sufficiently felt on the enemy's rear, as to force his evacuation of Chattanooga —indeed, force him back upon Nashville, and, if we should find our transportation inadequate for a continuance of this movement, to follow up the railroad to Knoxville, destroy Burnside, and from there threaten the enemy's railroad communication in rear of Nashville.

This I supposed to be the only practicable flank movement, owing to the scarcity of our transportation; and it seemed to keep us very nearly as close to the railroad as we were at the time. At parting, I understood the commanding General to agree that such was probably our best move, and that he was about to give the necessary orders for its execution. Orders came in the afternoon for the march. The rear of the right wing did not move until quite dark. I did not, therefore, put my wing in motion till daylight the following morning. Before moving on the morning of the twenty-second, McLaws' division was ordered to follow the enemy on to Chattanooga. The remainder of the command marched for the Red House Ford, and halted about noon. During that night I received orders to march the entire command back to Chattanooga, and moved in pursuance thereof early on the twenty-third. We reached the Watkins House about eleven o'clock A. M., and proceeded to take up a line around the enemy's position at Chattanooga. I desire to mention the following named officers as distinguished for conduct and ability, viz.: Major-Generals Hood, Buckner, Hindman, and Stewart; Brigadier-Generals B. R. Johnson, Preston, Law (respectively in command of division), Kershaw, Patton, Anderson, Gracie, McNair (severely wounded), and Colonels Trigg and Kelly, both in command of brigades. Honorable mention should also be made of Brigadier-Generals Humphreys, Benning, Deas, Clayton, Bate, Brown, Robertson, and Manigault. For more detailed accounts of the noble deeds performed by our gallant officers and brave soldiers, I refer you to the reports of my junior officers. The steady, good conduct throughout the long conflict of the subordinate officers and men which the limits of this report will not permit me to particularize, is worthy of the highest praise and admiration. I am greatly indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel Sorrel, Assistant Adjutant-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Manning, Chief of Ordnance, Major Latrobe, Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General, and Captain Manning, Signal Corps, for their able, untiring, and gallant assistance. Colonel Manning received a painful wound. The movement of Stewart's division against the enemy's reinforcements was made upon the suggestion of Colonel Sorrel and Captain Manning. The result was the beginning of the general break throughout the enemy's line. My other staff officers had not arrived from Virginia. Major Walton, acting Chief of Subsistence Department, and Major Keilly, acting Chief of Quartermaster's Department, were at the railroad depot in the active discharge of the duties of their departments. Among the captures made by the left wing during the day, were not less than forty pieces of artillery, over three thousand prisoners, and ten regimental standards; besides, a few wagons, seventeen boxes small arms, eleven hundred and thirty sets accoutrements, and three hundred and ninety-three thousand rounds small arm ammunition, were collected on the field. The accompanying list of casualties shows a loss by the command (without McNair's brigade, from which no report has been received) of one thousand and eighty-nine killed, six thousand five hundred and six wounded, and two hundred and seventy-two missing. Its strength on going into action on the twentieth was two thousand and three officers and twenty thousand eight hundred and forty-nine men.

I have the honor to be, Colonel,
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant-General.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL S. B. BUCKNER.

HEADQUARTERS NEAR CHATTANOOGA,
November 11, 1863.

Colonel Sorrel, Assistant Adjutant-General Longstreet's Corps:

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit, in connection with the reports of my subordinate commanders, the following synopsis of the military movements of Buckner's corps on the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth September, 1863:

The corps consisted of the division of Major-General A. P. Stewart, which was composed of Johnson's, Brown's, Bate's, and Clayton's brigades, and of the division of Brigadier-General William Preston, composed of the brigades of

Brigadier-General Gracie and of Colonels Trigg and Kelly, of a battalion of artillery to each division, and a battalion of reserve artillery, under Major S. C. Williams. Brigadier-General Johnson's brigade having been detached several days before, by orders from army headquarters, was engaged under its gallant commander under the orders of another corps commander, and did not report to me until two days after the battle.

On the morning of the eighteenth, I moved from a point on Peavine Creek, midway between Peavine Church and Rock Spring Church, under orders to cross the West Chickamauga River at Thedford's Ford, after Major-General Walker's division had succeeded in crossing below me. Part of my route being common with that of Walker's column, my march was somewhat retarded by the encounter of the two columns, but, notwithstanding this, I occupied, about two P. M., with Stewart's division, after a brisk skirmish, the crossing at Thedford's Ford, and with Preston's division, without opposition, the crossing at Hunt's or Dalton's Ford. In this position, holding both banks of the stream, I awaited the movements of Walker, on my right.

At daylight on the nineteenth, under instructions from the commanding General, I crossed my entire corps to the west bank and formed it in line of battle—Stewart on the right (on the left of Hood's division), facing south-west, in the direction of Lee and Gordon's Mill; General Cheatham's division, as I was informed, being directed to sustain me in the proposed advance. About noon, when the enemy's attack on Walker had been met, and Cheatham's division, which had been sent to sustain him, had become hotly engaged, Stewart's division was detached, by the orders of the commanding General, to support Cheatham. For the operations of his division until he again came under my orders, on the following afternoon, I refer to the report of its able commander.

In obedience to the orders of the commanding General, I remained with my remaining division to hold the extreme left of the line. With this view, I deployed Preston's division on a line extending from an abrupt elevation on the bank of the river along a ridge in a north-west direction—the flanks well sustained by artillery. Considerable skirmishing took place towards the right of this line—the enemy falling back in a south-west direction—and the troops were considerably exposed to artillery fire during the day. Being informed by a staff officer of the commanding General that General Hood, who had advanced to my right, was hard pressed, and being requested to reinforce him as far as I could, I immediately, about three o'clock P. M., sent to his assistance the brigade of Colonel Trigg. The gallant and successful charge of this brigade drove back the advancing enemy and relieved the left of Hood, which was outflanked and retiring before the enemy's heavy attack. During the day both Stewart's division and Trigg's brigade had penetrated the enemy's line and passed beyond the Chattanooga road; but at night both were drawn back into positions which would conform to the general line, which had pushed forward during the day's action. During the night of the nineteenth I materially strengthened the position on the left by intrenchments.

On the morning of the twentieth, Lieutenant-General Longstreet assumed command of the left wing. About two o'clock in the afternoon he, in person, ordered me conduct Preston's division, leaving one regiment and a battery to hold the left, to the Chattanooga road. Between three and four o'clock it was formed as follows: Gracie's and Kelly's brigades in two lines, at right angles to the road north of Brotherton's, and just in rear of Poe's, commonly called the "burnt house;" Trigg's brigade just south of Brotherton's house, and supporting Williams' artillery. At this time Stewart was in line, his left advanced in front of Preston's right, his right receding, forming an obtuse angle with Preston's line. In his front was a heavy breastwork of logs, on the summit of a slight ridge heavily wooded and strongly held by the enemy's infantry and artillery. His right flank was opposite the angle of this work; his centre, facing towards the north-west, was opposed to the flank of the work, which was perpendicular to the road. On Stewart's right, in front of the face of the work, and parallel to the Chattanooga road, was Cleburne's division, of Hill's corps. Brigadier-General Law's brigade, of Hood's division, was in line perpendicular to the road to the left, and slightly in advance of Preston, and close by the burnt house (Poe's), near which was a battery of Hood's artillery. A personal reconnoissance, in company with the Lieutenant-General commanding, showed an advantageous position for artillery in front of Poe's burning house, from which point the enemy's main line, which fronted eastward and was situated a little to the east of Kelly's field, was exposed to an enfilade fire, or rather to a fire slightly in reverse. His right flank, as before stated, was thrown back at right angles to the road, and was located behind log breastworks, in the heavy wood between Poe's and Kelly's fields. As the enemy's right had been beaten back, it had, by a conversion on this angle of their work as a pivot, been gradually driven to assume a position also at right angles to the road, his right resting on a chain of heights beginning near Snodgrass's house, about a fourth of a mile west of Kelly's house, on the road, and extending westward about one mile to the Crawfish road. These heights constitute the southern spurs which terminate Missionary Ridge, are covered with open woods, have a gentle but irregular slope on the south, the north and the east, and their summits are fully a hundred feet above the level of the surrounding country. A little after four o'clock P. M., under instructions from the Lieutenant-General commanding, I ordered Preston, with Gracie's and Kelly's brigades, to support Kershaw's brigade in the attack on the heights near Snod-

grass's house, sustaining him afterwards by Trigg's brigade. Under the able direction of Brigdier-General Preston, the first two brigades passed Kershaw's and Anderson's brigades, which had suffered severely in the action, and, with great impetuosity, assailed the enemy in his almost impregnable position. Trigg on coming up was directed to the left of Kelly, and, joining in a simultaneous movement of Brigadier-General B. R. Johnson's division still further to the left, pierced and turned the enemy's line, and, in conjunction with Kelly, Gracie and Robertson, drove him from his strong position into the ravines beyond, where a large number of prisoners were captured. For the details of this brilliant action I refer you to the graphic report of Brigadier-General Preston. While this action was progressing, the Lieutenant-General commanding directed Stewart's division to advance and to aid the combined attack. I ordered, by his authority, Williams' battalion of reserve artillery to be placed in position in front of Poe's house. This was done under the immediate direction of Major Porter, my chief of artillery. About this time the enemy were moving reinforcements to sustain his right, which was staggering under the terrific assault of Preston. Williams, with eleven pieces of artillery, opened upon this reinforcing column with destructive effect, dispersing it in every direction and silencing his artillery. At the same time, Stewart assaulted the enemy's works and captured a number of prisoners, who dared not cross the stream of fire which Williams poured across their path. Stewart, in advancing, also threw forward one of his batteries, which joined in the fire. As he advanced, I conducted Darden's battery, of Williams' artillery, to Kelly's field, but this battery, as well as Stewart's division, it now being nightfall, was withdrawn into the edge of the wood, as we encountered in our advance the right wing of our army, which joined in the assault of the enemy's works, and was moving in a direction perpendicular to our line of march. The continued cheers of the army announced, at dark, that every point of the field had been gained. Stewart bivouacked within the intrenchments he had assaulted; Preston, upon the heights he had so gallantly won.

For the details of the action of which this report is only a brief synopsis, and a notice of individual conduct, I respectfully refer you to the reports of the division, brigade, and regimental commanders, and of the chief and battalion commanders of the artillery, which are herewith transmitted.

To the gentlemen of my staff I am indebted for their prompt and gallant discharge of duty on every occasion. No commendation from me can add to the well-earned reputation of Major-General Stewart and his able Brigadiers—Johnson, who was detached and in command of an improvised division—Brown, Bate, and Clayton. They were worthy leaders of the brave troops, nearly all of them veterans, whom they so gallantly led. Upon Brigadier-General Preston and his brigade commanders, Brigadier-General Gracie and Colonels Twigg and Kelly, I cannot bestow higher praise than to say, that their conduct and example were such as to convert a body of troops, but few of whom had before been under fire, into a division of veterans in their first battle. Stewart's veterans maintained the reputation they had won on many fields. Preston's troops emulated their example and equalled them in merit.

The recapitulation of the heavy losses sustained in both divisions is a sad testimony of the soldierly qualities of the survivors. Few troops, who have suffered so heavily, have been victorious on the field of their losses. But the result is only another evidence of the invincible spirit of our people, which, under the guidance of Providence, must finally win us our independence as a nation.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
S. B. BUCKNER,
Major-General, lately commanding Buckner's Corps.

REPORT OF MAJOR FRANK PORTER.

HEADQUARTERS BUCKNER'S DIVISION,
NEAR CHATTANOOGA, Nov. 10, 1863.

To Major William F. Martin, Assistant Adjutant-General:

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the artillery of General Buckner's corps, at the battle of Chickamauga. It consisted of Williams' battalion of four batteries; Leyden's battalion of three batteries, and three batteries of Major-General Stewart's division, acting with their brigades. Leyden's battalion was attached to Brigadier-General Preston's division, and by his order one battery was attached to each of his brigades.

As most of the ground over which the battle was fought was very thickly wooded, we could not see more than three hundred yards to the front, consequently could very seldom use artillery. For this reason the batteries of Major-General Stewart's division fired but a few shots, though they were left in exposed positions and lost between twenty and thirty horses. Two of the batteries of Leyden's battalion were engaged Saturday and Sunday, but, owing to the thickness of the timber and undergrowth, continued but a short time. They were unable to ascertain the damage they inflicted. They suffered but a slight loss themselves. One of his batteries (Jeffries') was held on the extreme left of the original line until the battle ceased. Williams' battalion was kept as reserve, and on Saturday morning was placed in position on the ridge which Preston's division occupied. When Stewart's division was carried to the right of the line, Brigadier-General Mackall, General Bragg's chief of staff, ordered that all the artillery that could be spared from the corps should be placed in the position just vacated by General Stewart. In obedience to this order, Major Williams was directed to post two of his batteries there, and

remain to repel any assault that the enemy's infantry might make. He remained there several hours, part of the time under a heavy artillery fire which he could not return, as our fuses are so uncertain that he would have run the risk of killing our own men by firing over their heads. He remained there till about sundown, when he was moved back to his former position, where he remained till the left made its move to the front and right on Sunday. He was then ordered to leave Baxter's battery to assist Jeffries in holding the bluff on the extreme left of the line, and move with his three other batteries in rear of Preston's division. After getting to the Chattanooga road, he was placed in several positions to check the expected moves of the enemy, but did not get into action till about five P. M. This was when Preston's division was in the hottest of the fight, and the enemy was crossing the Chattanooga road in large numbers to reinforce that part of their army holding the hill to the left. Major Williams was then ordered to take position about a thousand yards from where they were crossing and open fire with his three batteries. This he did, with great execution, silencing the enemy's artillery, cutting off the reinforcements, and enabling the infantry to capture between five and six hundred prisoners. All the officers and men acted, whenever they had an opportunity of doing so, with courage and coolness. Enclosed are reports of the battalion commanders.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRANK PORTER,
Major and Chief of Artillery.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL A. P. STEWART.

HEADQUARTERS STEWART'S DIVISION,
NEAR CHATTANOOGA, TENN., October 15, 1863.

Captain J. N. Gallaher, Assistant Adjutant-General:

SIR: This division, constituting at the time a part of Buckner's corps, with the exception of Johnson's brigade detached, marched, on Thursday morning, September seventeenth, 1863, from Lafayette, Georgia, in the direction of Chattanooga. We bivouacked for the night on Peavine Creek, and resumed the march next morning with Bate's brigade in front, Clayton's following, and Brown's in rear, the column taking the direction to Thedford's Ford on the West Chickamauga. Arriving during the afternoon of Friday, the eighteenth, within a mile or less of the ford, Major-General Buckner directed me to occupy the high ground in its vicinity, commanding the approaches to it, but not to bring on an engagement with the enemy, who were near at hand, unless necessary. With the aid of Major Nocquet, of the engineers, Bate's and Clayton's brigades, with their batteries, were placed in position on the wooded heights, respectively, below and above the ford, Brown's being drawn up in reserve in rear of Clayton's. The Eufala battery, Captain Oliver commanding, and Caswell's battalion of sharpshooters, both of Bate's brigade, opened fire upon the enemy, in the direction of Alexander's Bridge, who soon retired. Three companies from Clayton's brigade were then sent across the stream to occupy, as skirmishers, a wooded hill beyond, and after nightfall his entire brigade crossed.

Early Saturday morning, the nineteenth, the other two brigades passed on, and formed in rear of Clayton's. The commanding General coming up soon after, and receiving information that the troops which had crossed the stream lower down had advanced and established their line in front of and nearly at right angles to Preston's, whose division had passed the stream above, and was then on my left, General Buckner directed me to move forward and form on the left of this line. This was done, Clayton forming on the left of McNair, whose brigade constituted part of an impromptu division, commanded by Brigadier-General B. R. Johnson, Brown, and Bate in rear. Preston's division was then formed on my left, also in three lines, all fronting nearly or quite to the west. While in this position the Eufala battery (three-inch rifled guns) was sent forward by General Buckner's order, as I was informed, and opened fire on the enemy's position in front. The enemy replied with shell and round shot, wounding a few of our men. A subsequent change, made also by order of General Buckner, moved us a space equal to brigade front directly to the right. Soon after making this change of position, and, as I supposed, near noon, Major Pollock B. Lee brought me an order from the commanding General to move to the point where firing had commenced, which seemed to be a considerable distance to the right, and somewhat to the rear of us. Before moving I went to General Bragg, himself, who was near by, in order to get more specific directions. He informed me that Walker was engaged on the right, was much cut up, and the enemy threatening to turn his flank; that General Polk was in command on that wing, and that I must be governed by circumstances. Moving by the right flank in the direction indicated, from half a mile to a mile, we arrived near a corn-field, beyond which the heaviest firing was heard. Messengers were sent in search of General Polk, but without success, and fearing to lose too much time, I determined to move upon the enemy aross the corn-field. Lieutenant W. B. Richmond, Aid to General Polk, confirmed me in this design. He came up in search of the General himself, and told me that, from what he knew of the nature of the ground and situation of the enemy, a better point at which to attack them could not be found. Accordingly, Brigadier-General Clayton was directed to advance, and it is but just to this excellent officer and his fine brigade to say that they moved forward to this, their first engagement, with great spirit and alacrity, and in admirable order. Major Hatcher, of my staff, was sent with them to bring me intelligence, and I followed myself until overtaken by an Aid of Brigadier-General Wright, of Cheatham's division, who informed me that Wright's brigade had been turned by

the enemy on its left, its battery captured, and the General needed aid. Passing a short distance towards the left, and meeting General Wright, he informed me that his brigade had fallen back, leaving his battery in the hands of the enemy. This, at least, was the substance of what he said, according to my recollection. Brigadier-General Brown was immediately ordered to advance, and, soon after, it was discovered that Clayton's brigade had obliqued to the left and was moving forward in our front. After a severe engagement of near an hour, during which he sustained a loss of nearly four hundred officers and men, General Clayton withdrew to replenish his exhausted ammunition, and his place was supplied by General Brown. This gallant officer with his veteran command advanced rapidly, driving the enemy before them several hundred yards through a dense undergrowth, and routing his first line, driving it back upon his second, which was posted on a slight ridge, and supported by artillery. Advancing upon this line, under a terrific fire from all arms, the enemy were forced from the ridge, which was occupied, but from which the brigade soon withdrew, in consequence of a force of the enemy threatening its right.

After passing the dense undergrowth mentioned, the horses were killed and gunners driven from several field-pieces opposite the centre and right of the brigade. Three of them, six-pounder rifled brass pieces, were brought off by Lieutenant Anderson, commanding Dawson's battery, and two others by other troops of the division. The left regiment (Twenty-sixth Tennessee) also drove the enemy from another battery, three pieces of which were left between the opposing lines, but were not brought off. The brigade sustained, during this engagement, a heavy loss in officers and men. It being necessary to relieve Brown, Bate's brigade was brought up, and received by the enemy with as hot a fire as had successively greeted Clayton and Brown. Attacking, however, with their usual impetuosity, they drove the enemy back, forcing him to withdraw his batteries and to abandon one position after another, losing and re-capturing a piece of artillery, and wresting from him the flag of the Fifty-first Tennessee regiment, Wright's brigade. Clayton's brigade being again brought forward as a support to Bate, the two pressed on, driving the enemy beyond the road leading to Chattanooga. Clayton's brigade, with a portion of Bate's, continued the pursuit for half a mile beyond this road, when, in consequence of threatening movements on the right and left, they fell back leisurely about sunset, re-forming on the east side of the road.

In these charges the Fifteenth and Thirty-seventh Tennessee regiments, Colonel Tyler commanding, captured four pieces of artillery, and Clayton's brigade, aided by the Fifty-eighth Alabama, of Bate's brigade (Colonel Bush Jones commanding), captured three pieces. During the whole of these several engagements the enemy's fire was very heavy and destructive, and each brigade suffered severely, both in officers and men. Their conduct was most gratifying, and needs no praise from me.

As the result of the afternoon's work, to which each brigade contributed its full share, I claim that we rescued the battery of Wright's brigade and the flag of one of his regiments; that twelve pieces of artillery were wrested from the enemy, from two to three hundred prisoners were captured and several hundred stands of small arms secured and sent to the rear, and the enemy's line pierced near its centre and driven back beyond the Chattanooga road. Among the prisoners was Lieutenant-Colonel Von Schraden, Assistant Inspector-General on the staff of the Federal General Thomas. Of the artillery actually captured, I am unable to ascertain how many pieces were ultimately secured. After night, Major Eldridge, Chief of Artillery, sent four pieces and one caisson beyond the Chickamauga.

The men being exhausted, and night approaching, after distributing ammunition, Brown's brigade was formed in front, facing the Chattanooga road; Clayton on the right and facing in that direction, as there were no troops of ours within half a mile of us towards the right. Bate's brigade on the left, and in rear of Brown's. During the night a number of stragglers from the ranks of the enemy were picked up and sent to the rear by my skirmishers or pickets. I should have stated that owing to the difficulties of the ground, its advantages being altogether with the enemy, it was found impracticable to use artillery. During the night the enemy were heard constructing defences, and moving artillery towards his left.

After leaving General Bragg, as mentioned, I saw no officer whose rank was superior to my own for the rest of the day. Having been separated from the corps to which the division was attached, a staff officer was sent after night —the earliest moment practicable—to report to Major-General Buckner, who directed that we should remain in position until further orders.

Early the next morning, twentieth, Lieutenant-General Longstreet, who had arrived during the night, came to see me, and informed me that I would receive my orders on that day directly from him, that the attack was to commence on our extreme right at daylight, was to be followed on the left, and gradually, or rather successively, to extend to the centre, and that I should move after the division on my right or the one on my left had moved, according to circumstances. Apprising him of the fact that there were no troops to the right, at least within a half mile, he directed me to move something more than a quarter of a mile in that direction. This was done, Brown's brigade forming on the front line on the crest of a slight ridge, and constructing a breastwork of logs; Clayton's a few hundred yards in rear, on a parallel ridge, and Bate with his left resting on Brown's right, his line extend-

ing obliquely to the right and rear, to prevent the enemy from turning our position, it having been ascertained that the right wing was a very considerable distance to our rear. My division was the right of the left wing commanded by Lieutenant-General Longstreet, and McNair's brigade was on the left of Brown's. Subsequently Wood's brigade, of Cleburne's division, was formed on the right, and in prolongation of Brown's, and about nine A. M., Deshler's was formed on the right of Bate's.

In the meantime, a heavy fire was opened upon us from the enemy's batteries in our immediate front, and but a few hundred yards distant, by which some losses were occasioned. At length, about eleven A.M., Major Lee, of General Bragg's staff, came to me with an order to advance at once and attack the enemy. I informed him what orders had previously been received, and that no attack had been made on my right. He replied that General Bragg had directed him to pass along the lines and give the order to every division commander to move upon the enemy immediately. Accordingly, I arranged with General Wood that he should advance with Brown, which was done without delay. Clayton was moved up immediately to Brown's position, and Bate's right thrown forward to bring him on line with Clayton, when they also advanced to be within supporting distance of Brown and Wood. For several hundred yards both lines pressed on under the most terrible fire it has ever been my fortune to witness. The enemy retired, and our men, though mowed down at every step, rushed on at double-quick, until at length the brigade on the right of Brown broke in confusion, exposing him to an enfilade fire. He continued on, however, some fifty to seventy-five yards further, when his two right regiments gave way in disorder, and retired to their original position. His centre and left, however, followed by the gallant Clayton and indomitable Bate, pressed on, passing the corn-field in front of the burnt house, and to a distance of two to three hundred yards beyond the Chattanooga road, driving the enemy within his line of intrenchments, and passing a battery of four guns, which were afterwards taken possession of by a regiment from another division. Here, new batteries being opened by the enemy on our front and flank, heavily supported by infantry, it became necessary to retire, the command re-forming on the ground occupied before the advance.

During this charge, which was truly heroic, our loss was severe. Several valuable officers were killed and wounded. Generals Brown and Clayton were each struck by spent grape, temporarily disabling the former, and General Bate and several of his staff had their horses killed, the second lost by General Bate that morning. After remaining long enough to re-form the lines, to replenish ammunition and rest the men, the command again advanced to the corn-field mentioned above, then moved by the right flank until it formed across a ridge which extended obliquely to the front and right. The enemy were still in position behind a breastwork of logs, a few hundred yards in front of us, and, General Buckner coming up, I understood it to be his wish that I should not then attempt to go forward, but to await orders.

In the meantime a severe struggle was going on to the right and left of the field, in one corner of which, near the Chattanooga road, stood Kelly's house.

About five P. M. an order reached me, by an officer of General Longstreet's staff, to move forward upon the enemy. Brown's brigade, now commanded by Colonel Cook, of the Thirty-second Tennessee, was directed to support the artillery placed in position on a hill in the corn-field to our left, and Clayton's and Bate's brigades, in the order named, advanced with a cheer and at a double-quick upon the enemy's defences. The enemy gave way, utterly routed; our men dashed over their breastworks, pursuing to the edge of the open ground or field around the "Kelly house," where we halted, capturing three or four hundred prisoners, among whom was Major Beattie, of the regular army. A prisoner, brought up before the charge was made, stated that the position was held by the division of the Federal General Reynolds. The Eufala battery was brought up and fired the last shots at the retreating foe, who, being taken in flank by our attack, fled from their position in front of the division on our right.

During the night and next morning several thousand stands of small arms, accoutrements, &c., and a large quantity of ammunition, were collected by my division, a large portion of which was removed by our ordnance wagons.

Our total loss in the three brigades during Friday afternoon, Saturday and Sunday, was as follows, viz.:

Brigades.	Officers.	Men.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	Per cent.
Brown's,	120	1,320	50	426	4	480	33.3
Bate's,	132	1,065	66	516	11	593	48 7
Clayton's,	94	1,352	86	535	13	634	42.4
Dawson's Battery,	3	62	1	6	8	7	.....
Eufala Battery,	3	103	1	13	.....	14	.....
Humphreys' Battery,	3	86	1	2	.....	3	.....
Escort Company,	3	32	.....	1	1	2	.....
	358	4,040	205	1,499	37	1,733	.....

Among these were several officers of eminent worth and services, whose names are mentioned in the reports of brigade commanders. I desire to express my high appreciation of Brigadier-Generals Brown, Bate, and Clayton, and of their respective commands. Representing the three States of Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee, they vied with each other in deeds of high and noble daring. The Confederacy has nowhere braver defenders led by more skilful commanders. It is due to the several members of my staff that I should acknowledge my obligations for their invaluable services, and record my estimate of their personal bearing and conduct in the field.

Major R. A. Hatcher, A. A. General, than whom there is not a more active or faithful officer in the service, displayed throughout his usual intelligence, promptness, and cool courage. Major John C. Thompson, A. I. General, and Lieutenant S. H. Cahal, A. A. and I. General, were conspicuous for their zeal and disregard of danger. Major J. W. Eldridge, Chief of Artillery, discharged his duties with energy and skill, bringing the artillery into play, on the few occasions where it was practicable, with judgment and success. My two Aids, Lieutenants Bromfield Ridley, Jr., and R. Caruthers Stewart, though very young men, and the latter under fire for the first time, behaved with commendable gallantry.

On Saturday, I was also well served by Mr. John E. Hatcher, a volunteer Aid, and private John M. House, a clerk in the Adjutant-General's office. To Chief Surgeon G. B. Thornton, and the Medical Inspector, Dr. G. W. Burton, I am indebted for the good care of the wounded, and the excellent hospital arrangements provided under their supervision, and for their unremitting attention to their duties. Under the management of Captain J. W. Stewart, Ordnance Officer, supplies of ammunition were always promptly at hand when needed, and affairs were managed to my entire satisfaction in their respective departments, by Majors John A. Lauderdale, Acting Quartermaster, and J. D. Cross, Acting Commissary of Subsistence, who are among the most faithful and energetic officers of their branches of service.

My thanks are due to Captain H. L. Foule, commanding my escort, and who acted as my Aid, and to the officers and men of his admirable company, for their intelligence, activity, and zeal. I have never required a service from the company, nor from any member of it, that was not performed to my entire satisfaction. In conclusion, I desire to express my humble but most grateful acknowledgments to Almighty God for the signal success that crowned our arms. Greatly outnumbered as we were by a skilful and determined foe, our own strong arms and stout hearts could never have secured to us the victory without the Divine favor. Let all the praise be ascribed to His holy name.

Enclosing with this the reports of brigade and regimental commanders, to which I beg to refer for details and for the names of those in their respective commands who entitled themselves to special mention,

I am, Captain, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
ALEXANDER P. STEWART,
Major-General.

The credit of rescuing Carnes' battery, of Wright's brigade, is due to Brown's Brigade. The flag of the Fifty-first Tennessee regiment was recaptured by Bate's brigade.

ALEX. P. STEWART,
Major-General.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. CHEATHAM.

HEADQUARTERS, CHEATHAM'S DIVISION, POLK'S CORPS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE, CAMP PRESTON SMITH, BEFORE CHATTANOOGA, October 20th, 1863.

Lieutenant-Colonel George Wm. Brent, Assistant-Adjutant-General Army of Tennessee:

COLONEL: I have the honor to report the action of my command at the battle of Chickamauga, and in the subsequent affair resulting in the occupation of Missionary Ridge:

The division was composed of Jackson's brigade, Brigadier-General John K. Jackson; Maney's brigade, Brigadier-General George Maney; Smith's brigade, Brigadier-General Preston Smith; Wright's brigade, Brigadier-General M. J. Wright; Strahl's brigade, Brigadier-General O. F. Strahl; Stanford's battery of four guns, Captain T. J. Stanford: Carnes' battery of four guns, Captain W. W. Carnes; Scoggins' battery of four guns, Captain J. Scoggins; Scott's battery of four guns, First-Lieutenant John Marsh commanding; and Smith's battery of four guns, First-Lieutenant William B. Turner commanding.

In obedience to orders from Lieutenant-General Polk, I crossed Chickamauga Creek at Hunt's Ford, on the nineteenth September, at seven o'clock A. M., and moved my command by the flank in a northern direction, formed my line of battle, and awaited orders.

At eleven o'clock A. M., I received orders direct from the General commanding the army, through Lieutenant Parker, of his staff, to move to the extreme right of our line, to the support of Major-General Walker, whose division had been for some time warmly engaged, and who reported himself as being heavily pressed by the superior numbers of the enemy, who, subsequent events disclosed, had, or was at this time concentrating the bulk of his forces on our right and in front of Major-General Walker's command. Moving rapidly by the right flank, I reached the road leading from Alexander's Bridge, and at once formed my command immediately in rear of Major-General Walker's line of battle—Jackson's brigade on the right, Smith's in the centre, and Wright's brigade on the left, the whole line supported by Maney's and Strahl's brigades, which were held as reserves. About twelve o'clock, M., I gave the order to advance, at the same time notifying the several brigade commanders that there was no

support on the right or left flank, and, after proceeding about one hundred and fifty yards, the line encountered the enemy advancing rapidly in heavy force in pursuit of the retiring columns of Major-General Walker. The left and centre of Jackson at once, and in a few moments thereafter the entire line, became engaged, and succeeded in checking the advance of the enemy, and handsomely drove him back, with heavy loss, to the distance of about three-fourths of a mile, where he took shelter behind his breastworks, and, assisted by the arrival of heavy reinforcements, checked the further advance of my line. Without support either on my right or left and after a severe engagement of two hours, I directed the three brigades to retire for re-formation, and ordered Generals Maney and Strahl to occupy and hold the positions vacated by Jackson and Smith and make no attempt to advance. Reaching the positions assigned them, Maney's and Strahl's brigades were attacked in front and on both flanks, by the superior numbers of the enemy, and forced to retire and take position in rear of Jackson's and Smith's brigades, which were moved forward in the position held before the advance, and on the right and left of Turner's battery. The enemy, flushed with a supposed victory, boldly advanced upon my line, and, coming within short range, was checked and forced back in disorder by the well directed discharges of shell and canister from the guns of Turner's battery. I made no effort to advance my line after this success, for the reason that the enemy's dispositions on my right and left flank, and from information derived from prisoners captured, satisfied me that the entire corps of the Federal General Thomas, reinforced by the divisions of Vancleve and Palmer, were in my front. I deemed it prudent, therefore, to simply hold my position, and await the arrival of reinforcements. The result of this engagement of about three hours' duration, against such heavy odds, with both flanks exposed, was, that my command successfully checked the advance of the enemy, whose purpose seemed to be to seize the crossing of the Chickamauga at Alexander's Bridge and Hunt's Ford. This result was attended with a heavy loss of officers and men, as is attested by the long list of casualties heretofore furnished to the commanding General, and by numerous exhibitions of good conduct on the part of officers and men, particular mention of which is made in the reports of the several brigade commanders, which are herewith forwarded. I cannot, however, forbear to refer to the important service rendered by Lieutenant William B. Turner, commanding battery. Posted on an elevation commanding the approach of the enemy, he used his advantage with great effect, and displayed a degree of efficiency in the service of his guns highly commendable to himself, his officers, and men, and accomplished a result the importance of which it is difficult to estimate. Three pieces of Scoggins' battery were at the same time engaged, and rendered excellent service.

Jackson's brigade, during this engagement, took from the enemy three pieces of his artillery and sent them to the rear. Scoggins' battery, of this brigade, in retiring, under orders, had the horses of one piece and one caisson disabled and left them in the hands of the enemy. The piece and caisson were, however, subsequently recaptured.

Wright's brigade, occupying the extreme left of my line, after a sharp conflict of two hours' duration, was found to be exposed to a severe fire on the left flank and forced to retire. Carnes' battery, doing duty with this brigade, after losing one half of its men and horses, was abandoned on the field, but the enemy was unable to remove the guns, and they were recaptured, uninjured, in the advance of the next day.

At six o'clock P. M., the division of Major-General Cleburne arrived on the field, and, with my command, was ordered by Lieutenant-General Polk to attack the enemy at once. My entire command advanced, under a heavy fire of musketry for about six hundred yards, the enemy yielding and giving way at our approach. At this point, orders were given to make no further advance and the firing abruptly ceased, when my lines were re-formed and the division bivouacked in line of battle.

In this night attack, Jackson's and Smith's brigades only, of my command, encountered the enemy. Three hundred of the enemy were captured by Smith's brigade and sent to the rear, and the colors of the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania regiment were captured by Colonel, now Brigadier-General A. J. Vaughn, Jr. It was in this night attack that Brigadier-General Preston Smith, of Tennessee, received his mortal wound, from which he died in fifty minutes. At the head of his noble brigade, of which he had been the commander, as Colonel and Brigadier-General for two years and a half, he fell in the performance of what he himself, with his expiring breath, simply said was his duty. Active, energetic, and brave, with a rare fitness to command, full of honorable ambition, in perfect harmony with the most elevated patriotism, the whole country will mourn his fall and do honor to his memory. Two of his staff, Captain John Donelson, acting Assistant Adjutant-General, and Captain Thomas H. King, acting Aid-de-Camp, both officers of excellent merit, were killed within a few minutes of General Smith.

During the night of the nineteenth September, I was notified by Lieutenant-General Polk that the attack would be renewed at daylight. My command was already formed and in expectation of orders to advance at the appointed hour, but, for reasons thus unknown to me, no advance was made until nine o'clock, A. M. When in the act of advancing my line, I discovered that my front was partially covered by Major-General Stewart's division, and, communicating the fact in person to the General commanding the army, was by him directed not to advance, but to hold my command as a reserve.

No part of my command, except Jackson's brigade, was engaged in the active operations of the twentieth September, until the hour of six P. M.

About eleven o'clock, A. M., of the twentieth September, Brigadier-General Jackson received orders from the General commanding the army to go to the support of Lieutenant-General Hill. For an account of the action of this brigade, whilst detached from my command, your attention is directed to the report of Brigadier-General Jackson.

At two o'clock, P. M., I received orders to proceed with my command to the extreme right of our line, where I remained until six. P. M., when a general advance of the whole line was ordered. Jackson's brigade, on the left of General Walker, was now actively engaged, and his ammunition being nearly exhausted, General Maney, with his brigade, was ordered to relieve him. Wright's brigade was ordered to form on Maney's right, and to advance with the entire line, now in motion. These brigades encountered but slight resistance. The enemy, now fiercely assailed at all points, yielded the field to us and fled in disorder.

At two o'clock, P. M., on the twenty-first, I moved my command in the direction of Chickamauga Station, and bivouacked for the night near the old Mission House, on Chickamauga Creek.

Early on the morning of the following day, I was directed by Lieutenant-General Polk to move in the direction of Chattanooga, and arrived at the foot of Missionary Ridge at ten o'clock A. M. I soon ascertained that the enemy occupied the crest of the ridge in force. After making the necessary reconnoissances, Maney's brigade on the right, and Smith's on the left—the latter was now commanded by Colonel A. J. Vaughan—were deployed and ordered to carry the position held by the enemy, which was done, after a spirited engagement of a few minutes. The position was found to be one of much natural strength, increased by breastworks made of stone and fallen timber; but the enemy, now demoralized by a succession of disasters, made but a feeble resistance, and fled in great haste.

In concluding this report, I beg to mention an act of daring and heroism on the part of Colonel S. S. Stanton, of the Twenty-eighth Tennessee Volunteers. During the engagement of the nineteenth, his regiment, exposed to a close and heavy fire, wavered for a moment, and seemed to be in the act of falling back, when the intrepid Colonel seized the colors of his regiment, and, rushing to the front, called his men to follow him. Inspired by his heroic example, the regiment re-formed on the colors, and at once recovered the ground they had lost. Whilst the colors were in the hands of Colonel Stanton, they were pierced thirty times by the enemy's balls.

The officers of my staff—Major James D. Porter, Jr., Assistant Adjutant-General; Major John Ingram, Assistant Adjutant-General; Major Melancthon Smith, Chief of Artillery; Major Joseph Vaux, Jr., Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain Thomas F. Henry, Assistant Inspector-General; Dr. F. Rice, Chief Surgeon; Lieutenant F. H. McNairy, Aid-de-Camp; Lieutenant J. Webb Smith, Aid-de-Camp; Major S. H. Brooks and A. L. Robertson, volunteer Aids-de-Camp; Major John A. Cheatham, Chief of Ordnance; Major G. V. Young, Chief Quartermaster; Major B. J. Butler, Chief Commissary—all deserve honorable mention for the proper performance of the duties assigned them.

My escort—Company G, Second Georgia cavalry, Captain T. M. Merritt—were, under my orders, employed in collecting the small arms abandoned by the enemy, and deserve honorable mention for the industrious performance of their duty.

Respectfully, Colonel,
Your obedient servant,
B. F. CHEATHAM,
Major-General, commanding.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE.

HEADQUARTERS BRECKINRIDGE'S DIVISION, HILL'S CORPS,
October, 1863.

Lieutenant-Colonel Archer Anderson, Assistant Adjutant-General:

COLONEL: I have the honor to report the operations of my division in the battle of Chickamauga, on the nineteenth and twentieth of September last:

It was composed of the Second, Fourth, Sixth and Ninth Kentucky, and Forty-first Alabama regiments, with Cobb's battery, under the command of Brigadier-General B. H. Helm; the Thirteenth, Twentieth, Sixteenth, Twenty-fifth and Nineteenth Louisiana; Thirty-second Alabama, and Austin's battalion of sharpshooters, with Slocomb's battery (Fifth Washington artillery), under the command of Brigadier-General Daniel Adams; the First, Third and Fourth Florida; Forty-seventh Georgia and Sixtieth North Carolina regiments, with Mabane's battery, under the command of Brigadier-General M. A. Stovall. My effective strength was, of enlisted men, three thousand three hundred and ninety-five. Total, three thousand seven hundred and sixty-nine.

At daylight of the eighteenth, my command moved from Catlett's Gap and that neighborhood, in the Pigeon Mountain, and the same afternoon took position on the east bank of the Chickamauga, near Glass's Mills, and composed the extreme left of the infantry of the army. I immediately threw the Second Kentucky across the ford to skirmish with the enemy and reveal his position, the Sixth Kentucky being placed in close supporting distance at the mill. Adams' brigade was sent, by order of Lieutenant-General Hill, to a ford a mile and a-half above, where the enemy, as the cavalry reported, threatened to cross. It was so late when these dispositions were made that nothing satisfactory was developed that night.

On the morning of the nineteenth, Slocomb,

with four guns, Cobb, with two, and the remainder of Helm's brigade, were moved across Glass's Ford to ascertain the position of the enemy, while the two rifled pieces of Slocomb's battery, under Lieutenant Vaught, took position on a bluff upon the east side of the stream. An artillery engagement ensued, much to our advantage, until the enemy, who occupied the better position, brought forward a number of heavy guns and showed the greater weight of metal. While the engagement was progressing, I received an order from Lieutenant-General Hill to withdraw my command, if it could be done without too great peril, and take position about three miles south of Lee and Gordon's Mill, on the road leading from Chattanooga to Lafayette, and so as to cover the approach to that road from Glass's Mill and the ford above, leaving a regiment and section of artillery to observe those crossings.

The movement was made in good order, Colonel Dilworth, with the First and Third (consolidated) Florida and a section of Cobb's battery, being left in observation. Our casualties, which fell upon Slocomb, Cobb, and Helm, were twenty-two killed and wounded. The loss of the enemy in killed alone, as shown by an examination of the ground after the twentieth, was nearly equal to the sum of our casualties. Although the enemy was in considerable strength at the fords above referred to, the result showed that it was a covering force to columns passing down the valley to unite with the centre and left of his army. Soon after taking up the new position, I was ordered to relieve Brigadier-General Patton Anderson's division, which was facing the enemy opposite Lee and Gordon's Mill. The troops marched rapidly, yet it was late in the afternoon before this movement was completed. The division was hardly in position when I received an order from the General commanding the army to move to the right, cross the Chickamauga at a point further down, and occupy a position to be indicated. The division crossed at Alexander's Bridge, and arriving, between ten and eleven o'clock at night, at a field about a mile and a half in the rear of the right of our line of battle, bivouacked there by order of Lieutenant-General Polk. Remaining some time at Lieutenant-General Polk's camp-fire, I left there two hours before daylight (the twentieth) to place my command in position. During the night General Polk informed me that I was to prolong the line of battle upon the right of Major-General Cleburne. Conducted by Major ———, of his staff, and Lieutenant Reid, Aid-de-Camp to General Hill, my division reached Cleburne's right a little after daybreak. Upon the re-adjustment of his line, I formed on his right, and became the extreme right of the general line of battle. Helm was on the left of my line, Stovall in the centre, and Adams on the right, the last extending across a country road leading from Reed's Bridge and striking the Chattanooga road at a place called Glenn's Farm. The country was wooded, with small openings, and the ground unknown to me. Our skirmishers, a few hundred yards in advance, confronted those of the enemy. Our line was supposed to be parallel to the Chattanooga road.

Soon after sunrise, I received a note from Lieutenant-General Polk directing me to advance, and about the same time Major-General Cleburne, who happened to be with me, received one of the same tenor. Lieutenant-General Hill having arrived, the notes were placed in his hands. By his order, the movement was delayed for the troops to get their rations, and on other accounts.

Dilworth, who had been relieved by a cavalry force late the preceding evening and who had marched all night, now arrived and took his place in line.

At half past nine A. M., by order of Lieutenant-General Hill, I moved my division forward in search of the enemy. At the distance of seven hundred yards we came upon him in force, and the battle was opened by Helm's brigade with great fury. The Second and Ninth Kentucky, with three companies of the Forty-first Alabama, encountered the left of a line of breastworks before reaching the Chattanooga road, and, though assailing them with great courage, were compelled to pause. From some cause, the line on my left had not advanced simultaneously with my division, and in consequence, from the form of the enemy's works, these brave troops were, in addition to the fire in front, subjected to a severe enfilading fire from the left. Twice they renewed the assault with the utmost resolution, but were too weak to storm the position. The rest of Helm's brigade, in whose front there were no woods, after a short, but sharp engagement, routed a line of the enemy, pursued it across the Chattanooga road, and captured a section of artillery posted in the centre of the road. This portion of the brigade was now brought under a heavy front and enfilading fire, and, being separated from its left and without support, I ordered Colonel Joseph H. Lewis, of the Sixth Kentucky, who succeeded to the command upon the fall of General Helm, to withdraw the troops some two hundred yards to the rear, to reunite the brigade and change his front slightly, to meet the new order of things by throwing forward his right and retiring his left. The movement was made without panic or confusion.

This was one of the bloodiest encounters of the day. Here General Helm, ever ready for action, and endeared to his command by his many virtues, received a mortal wound, while in the heroic discharge of his duty. Colonel Hewitt, of the Second Kentucky, was killed, acting gallantly, at the head of his regiment. Captain Maderia, Captain Rogers, and Captain Leedman, of the Second; Captain Daniel, of the Ninth Kentucky, and many other officers and men, met their deaths before the enemy's work's; while Colonel Nuckols, of the Fourth Kentucky, Colonel Caldwell, of the Ninth, and many more officers and men, were wounded.

In the meantime, Adams and Stovall advanced steadily, driving back two lines of skirmishers. Stovall halted at the Chattanooga road. Adams, after dispersing a regiment and capturing a battery, crossed the road to Glenn's Farm, and halted a short distance beyond, in an open field. When Helm's brigade was checked, and I had given Colonel Lewis orders in reference to his new position, I rode to the commands of Adams and Stovall on the right. It was now evident from the comparatively slight resistance they had encountered, and the fact that they were not threatened in front, that our line had extended beyond the enemy's left. I at once ordered these brigades to change front perpendicular to the original line of battle, and with the left of Adams, and the right of Stovall resting on the Chattanooga road, to advance upon the flank of the enemy. Slocomb's battery, which had previously done good service, was posted on favorable ground on the west of the road to support the movement. The brigades advanced in fine order over a field, and entered the woods beyond. Stovall soon encountered the extreme left of the enemy's works, which, retiring from the general north and south direction of his intrenchments, extended westwardly nearly to the Chattanooga road. After a severe and well-contested conflict, he was checked and forced to retire. Adams, on the west of the road, met two lines of the enemy, who had improved the short time to bring up reinforcements and reform nearly at a right angle to the troops in his main line of works.

The first line was routed, but it was found impossible to break the second, aided as it was by artillery, and after a sanguinary contest, which reflected high honor on the brigade, it was forced back in some confusion. Here General Adams, who is as remarkable for his judgment on the field as for his courage, was severely wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. Among the casualties, Lieutenant-Colonel Turner, of the Nineteenth Louisiana, was wounded, and the gallant Major Butler, of the same regiment, was killed.

Stovall had gained a point beyond the angle of the enemy's main line of works. Adams had advanced still farther, being actually in rear of his intrenchments. A good supporting line to my division at this moment would probably have produced decisive results. As it was, the engagement on our right had inflicted on the enemy heavy losses, and compelled him to weaken other parts of his line to hold his vital point. Adams's brigade re-formed behind Slocomb's battery, which repulsed the enemy by a rapid and well-directed fire, rendering on this occasion important and distinguished services.

By order of Lieutenant-General Hill, my division was withdrawn a short distance to recruit, while the troops of Major-General Walker engaged the enemy. My new line was about six hundred yards in advance of the position on which I first formed in the morning, with a slight change of direction, which brought my right relatively nearer to the Chattanooga road.

Soon after taking this position, an attack was reported on our right flank. It proved to be Granger's corps coming up from Rossville, and threatening our right with a part of his force. At the request of Brigadier-General Forrest, I sent him a section of Cobb's battery, under the command of Lieutenant Gracey, who assisted handsomely in repelling the enemy.

At the request of the brigade commanders, the artillery of the division had been ordered to report to the brigades with which they were accustomed to serve. Cobb's battery, from the nature of the ground, could not participate to its accustomed extent, yet, as opportunity afforded, it displayed its accustomed gallantry. The excellent battery of Captain Mabane, for the same reason, was able to take little part in the action.

The afternoon was waning and the enemy still obstinately confronted us in his intrenchments. I received permission from Lieutenant-General Hill to make another charge. A line of troops on my right, and covering a part of my front, advanced at the same time. A portion of these troops obliqued to the right, and my line passed through the rest, who seemed to be out of ammunition, so that after moving a few hundred yards the enemy alone was in my front. The division was advanced with intrepidity, under a severe fire, and dashed over the left of the intrenchments. In passing them, I saw on my left the right of Major-General Cleburne, whose brave division stormed the centre. Several hundred of the enemy ran through our lines to the rear; the rest were pursued several hundred yards, and beyond the Chattanooga road. Of these some were killed and a good many taken prisoners, but most of them escaped in the darkness. It was now night; pursuit was stopped by order of General Hill, and, throwing out pickets, I bivouacked in line, near the road.

The prisoners taken by my command during the day, of whom there was a considerable number, were allowed to go to the rear, since details could not be spared for them, and it was known they would be gathered up there.

The division captured nine pieces of artillery. I am aware that it is usually the whole army, not a part of it, that takes guns from the enemy, and that often the troops who obtain possession of them owe their good fortune quite as much to fire from the right and left as to their own efforts; yet I think it due to my command to say that, in regard to at least six of these guns, such considerations do not apply, and that they were taken without assistance from any other troops.

My total casualties, as shown by official reports, amounted to twelve hundred and forty, of which number one hundred and sixty-six were killed, nine hundred and nine wounded, and one hundred and sixty-five missing.

To Brigadier-General Stovall, to Colonel Lewis, who succeeded to the command of Helm's bri-

gade, and to Colonel R. L. Gibson, who succeeded to the command of Adams's brigade, the country is indebted for the courage and skill with which they discharged their arduous duties.

The officers and men of the division, with exceptions so rare as to place in striking contrast to them the general good conduct, sustained their former reputation, and were alike worthy of each other.

To the gentlemen of my staff, I feel sincere gratitude for the prompt, fearless, and cheerful manner in which they discharged their duties. Major Wilson, Assistant Adjutant-General; Colonel Van Zinken, A. A. G., who had two horses shot under him; Captain Martin, A. I. G., who received a contusion from a grape shot; Lieutenant Breckinridge, Aid-de-Camp, whose horse was shot; Captain Semple, Ordnance Officer; Lieutenant Bertus (Twentieth Louisiana), A. A. I. G.; Dr. Heustis, Chief Surgeon; Dr. Kratz, on duty in the field; and Messrs. McGehee, Coleman, Mitchell, and Clay, volunteers on my staff, performed their duties in a manner to command my confidence and regard.

One member of my staff I cannot thank. Major R. E. Graves, Chief of Artillery, received a mortal wound in the action of Sunday, the twentieth. Although a very young man, he had won eminence in arms, and he gave promise of the highest distinction. A truer friend, a purer patriot, a better soldier never lived.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE,
Major-General A. C. S.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL P. R. CLEBURNE.

HEADQUARTERS CLEBURNE'S DIVISION, HILL'S CORPS,
MISSIONARY RIDGE, NEAR CHATTANOOGA,
October 18, 1863.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Archer Anderson, Assistant Adjutant-General Hill's Corps:

COLONEL: I have the honor to report the operations of my division in the battle of Chickamauga, fought on Saturday and Sunday, the nineteenth and twentieth of September, 1863:

During the afternoon of Saturday, the nineteenth ultimo, I moved my division in a westerly direction across the Chickamauga river, at Ledford's Ford, and having received orders to report to Lieutenant-General Polk, commanding the right wing of the army, I did so, and was directed by him to form a second line in rear of the right of the line already in position. Accordingly, soon after sunset, my division was formed, partially *en echelon*, about three hundred yards in rear of the right line. My right rested in front of a steam saw-mill, known as Jay's Mill, situated on a small stream running between the Chickamauga and the road leading from Chattanooga to Lafayette. My line extended from the saw-mill almost due south for nearly a mile, fronting to the west. Polk's brigade, with Calvert's battery, commanded by Lieutenant Thomas J. Key, composed my right wing; Wood's brigade, with Semple's battery, my centre, and Deshler's brigade, with Douglas' battery, my left wing. I now received orders from Lieutenant-General Hill to advance, passing over the line which had been repulsed, and drive back the enemy's left wing. In my front were open woods, with the exception of a clearing (fenced in), in front of my centre, the ground sloping upwards as we advanced. Ordering the brigades to direct themselves by Wood's (the centre) brigade, and preserve brigade distance, I moved forward, passing over the first line, and was in a few moments heavily engaged along my right and centre. The enemy, posted behind hastily constructed breastworks, opened a heavy fire of both small arms and artillery. For half an hour the firing was the heaviest I had ever heard; it was dark, however, and accurate shooting was impossible. Each party was aiming at the flashes of the other's guns, and few of the shots from either side took effect. Major Hotchkiss, my Chief of Artillery, placed Polk's and Wood's artillery in position in the cleared field in front of my centre. Availing themselves of the noise and the darkness, Captain Semple and Lieutenant Key ran their batteries forward within sixty yards of the enemy's line and opened a rapid fire. Polk pressed forward at the same moment, on the right, when the enemy ceased firing, and quickly disappeared from my front. There was some confusion at the time, necessarily inseparable, however, from a night attack. This, and the difficulty of moving my artillery through the woods in the dark, rendered a further advance inexpedient for the night. I consequently halted, and, after readjusting my lines, threw out skirmishers a quarter of a mile in advance, and bivouacked. In this conflict, the enemy was driven back about a mile and a half. He left in my hands two or three pieces of artillery, several caissons, two or three hundred prisoners, and the colors of the Seventy-seventh Indiana and those of the Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania.

About ten o'clock next morning, I received orders from Lieutenant-General Hill to advance and dress on the line of General Breckinridge, who had been placed on my right. Accordingly, directing each brigade to dress upon the right, and preserve its distance, I moved forward. Breckinridge was already in motion. The effort to overtake and dress upon him caused hurry and some confusion in my line, which was necessarily a long one. Before the effects of this could be rectified, Polk's brigade, and the right of Wood's encountered the heaviest artillery fire I have ever experienced. I was now within short canister range of a line of log breastworks, and a hurricane of shot and shell swept the woods from the unseen enemy in my front. This deadly fire was direct, and came from that part of the enemy's breastworks opposite to my right and right centre. The rest of my line, stretching off to the left, received an oblique fire from the line of breastworks which, at a point opposite my centre, formed a retiring angle, running off towards the Chattanooga and Lafayette road be-

Andrew Johnson

hind. The accompanying map, showing the shape of the enemy's line of works opposite my line, will explain our relative positions. Upon reference to it, it will be seen that opposite to my right and right centre the enemy's works ran about half a mile north and south, and nearly parallel to the Chattanooga and Lafayette road, which was about three hundred yards behind; that at a point opposite my centre his works formed, as before stated, a retiring angle, running in a westerly and somewhat oblique direction to the Chattanooga and Lafayette road; and that at a point nearly opposite my right, his works formed another retiring angle, running back also to the road. My right and right centre, consisting of Polk's brigade and Lowry's regiment of Wood's brigade, were checked within one hundred and seventy-five yards of the advance part of this portion of the enemy's works, and the rest of the line were halted in compliance with the order previously given, to dress upon the right. Passing towards the left at this time, I found that the line of advance of my division, which was the left of the right wing of the army, converged with the line of advance of the left wing of the army; the flanks of the two wings had already come in collision; part of Wood's brigade had passed over Bate's brigade of Stewart's division, which was the right of the left wing, and Deshler's brigade, which formed my left, had been thrown out entirely, and was in rear of the left wing of the army. I ordered Wood to move forward the remainder of his brigade, opening at the same time in the direction of the enemy's fire with Semple's battery. That part of Wood's brigade to the left of Lowry's regiment, and to the left of the southern angle of the breastworks in its advance at this time, entered an old field, bordering the Chattanooga and Lafayette road, and attempted to cross it in the face of a heavy fire from works in its front. It had almost reached the road, its left being at Poe's house (known as the burning house), when it was driven back by a heavy oblique fire of small arms and artillery, which was opened upon both its flanks; the fire from the right coming from the south face of the breastworks, which was hid from view by the thick growth of scrub oaks bordering the field. Five hundred men were killed and wounded by this fire in a few minutes. Upon this repulse, Lowry's regiment having also in the meantime been forced to retire, I ordered the brigade still further back to re-form. Semple's battery, which had no position, I also ordered back. I now moved Deshler's brigade by the right flank, with the intention of connecting it with Polk's left, so filling the gap left in my centre by the withdrawal of Wood. This connection, however, I could not establish, as Polk's left had, in its turn, been also driven back. Finding it a useless sacrifice of life for Polk to retain his position, I ordered him to fall back with the rest of his line, and with his and Wood's brigades I took up a strong defensive position, some three or four hundred yards in rear of the point from which they had been repulsed. Deshler's brigade had moved forward towards the right of the enemy's advanced works, but could not go beyond the crest of a low ridge from which Lowry had been repulsed. I therefore ordered him to cover himself behind the ridge, and hold his position as long as possible. His brigade was now *en echelon* about four hundred yards in front of the left of the rest of the division, which here rested for some hours. In effecting this last disposition of his command, General Deshler fell, a shell passing fair through his chest. It was the first battle in which this gentleman had the honor of commanding as a general officer. He was a brave and efficient one. He brought always to the discharge of his duty a warm zeal and a high conscientiousness. The army and the country will long remember him.

At about 3.30 P. M., I received orders from Lieutenant-General Polk to move forward on a line with my left, Deshler connecting my right with Jackson's brigade, and, when I had formed my line, to remain and hold the position. I accordingly advanced with my centre and right wing, drove in the enemy's skirmishers, and forced his line behind the works from which he had repulsed us in the morning. The left wing of the army had been driving the enemy; the right wing now attacked. Lieutenant-General Polk ordering me to advance my heavy batteries and open on the enemy, Captain Semple, my acting Chief of Artillery (Major Hotchkiss, my Chief of Artillery, being disabled by a wound received the day before), selected positions in front of the line, and placed his own and Douglass's batteries within two hundred yards of the enemy's breastworks, and opened a rapid and most effective fire, silencing immediately a battery which had been playing upon my lines. About the same time Brigadier-General Polk charged and soon carried the north-western angle of the enemy's works, taking, in succession, three lines of breastworks. In these brilliant operations he was materially aided by Key's battery, and towards its close by Douglass's battery, which had again been moved by my orders to my extreme right, where it was run into position by hand. A large number of prisoners (regulars) were here captured. The enemy abandoned his works and retired precipitately. Brigadier-General Polk pursued to the Chattanooga and Lafayette road, where he captured another piece of artillery. I here received directions from Lieutenant-General Hill to halt my command until further orders. I cannot close this report without an acknowledgment of distinguished services rendered by various officers and men, which would otherwise pass unnoticed. I have already incidentally called attention to the gallant conduct of Brigadier-General Polk, but it is due to him and to the country, which wishes to appreciate its faithful servants, to say that to the intrepidity and stern determination of purpose of himself and men I was principally indebted for the success of the

charge on Sunday evening, which drove the enemy from his breastworks and gave us the battle. Colonel Mills, also, is entitled to be remembered. Leading his regiment through the battle until the fall of his Brigadier (the lamented Deshler), he was then called by seniority to command the brigade, which he did with gallantry and intelligence.

To my staff—Major Calhoun Benham, Assistant Adjutant-General (who received a contusion in the right shoulder from a grapeshot or fragment of shell); Captain Irving A. Buck, Assistant Adjutant-General (whose horse was shot under him); Major Joseph K. Dixon, Assistant Inspector-General; Captain B. F. Phillips, Assistant Inspector-General; Lieutenant J. W. Jetton, Aid-de-Camp and Acting Assistant Inspector-General; Major T. R. Hotchkiss, Chief of Artillery (who received a wound from a Minie ball in the foot on Saturday, which deprived me of his valuable services afterwards); Captain Henry C. Semple (who replaced Major Hotchkiss as Chief of Artillery, when disabled); Captain C. F. Vandeford, Chief of Ordnance; Lieutenant L. H. Mangum, Aid-de-Camp, and Lieutenant S. P. Hanly, Aid-de-Camp (who received a contusion from a grapeshot)—I am indebted for the faithful and indefatigable manner in which they performed their vital (though, perhaps, not showy) duties throughout these operations. Major T. R. Hotchkiss, Chief of Artillery; Captain Semple, with his battery, and Lieutenant Thomas J. Key, commanding Calvert's battery, rendered invaluable service, and exhibited the highest gallantry on Saturday night in running their pieces up, as they did, within sixty yards of the enemy. In this they were ably sustained by Lieutenant Richard Goldthwaite, of Semple's battery. Here Major Hotchkiss received his wound. Captain Semple also displayed skill and judgment as Acting Chief of Artillery, particularly in the selection of a position for his own and Douglass's batteries on Sunday evening, which gave an oblique fire upon the enemy in his works, contributing to the success of the final charge by Polk's brigade. Captain O. S. Palmer, Assistant Adjutant-General of Wood's brigade, was conspicuous for his coolness and attention to duty on the field, and has my thanks. I am much indebted also to Dr. A. Linthicum, Chief Surgeon of my division. The completeness of his arrangements, his careful supervision of subordinates, both on the field, under fire, and elsewhere, and in the hospital, secured our gallant wounded prompt attention, and all the alleviation of pain attainable in the exigencies of battle. Surgeon A. R. Erskine (then acting, now actual Medical Inspector of my division) rendered most efficient service. Assistant-Surgeon Alfred B. DeLoach particularly distinguished himself by his unselfish devotion going repeatedly far forward under fire, and among the skirmishers, to attend the wounded. James P. Brady and Melvin Overstreet, privates in the Buckner Guards (my escort), specially detailed to attend me through the battle, went with me wherever my duty called me. Brady was wounded in the hand. Overstreet had his horse shot. To Captain C. F. Vandeford, my Chief of Ordnance, my thanks are especially due. His trains were always in the best order, and in the most accessible position, and to his care in this respect I am indebted for a prompt supply of ammunition in every critical emergency which arose. I carried into action on Saturday, the nineteenth, five thousand one hundred and fifteen officers and men, four thousand eight hundred and seventy-five bayonets. On Sunday, the twentieth, I carried in four thousand six hundred and seventy-one officers and men, four thousand four hundred and thirty-seven bayonets. In the two days my casualties were two hundred and four killed, fifteen hundred and thirty-nine wounded, six missing—making in all one thousand seven hundred and forty-nine.

Respectfully,

P. R. CLEBURNE,
Major-General.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL T. C. HINDMAN.

ATLANTA, GEORGIA, October 25, 1863.

Lieutenant-Colonel G. M. Sorrel, A. A. General Longstreet's Corps:

COLONEL: Sickness prevented me from exercising command on Saturday, September nineteenth, until about three P. M. My division had then crossed the Chickamauga at Hunt's Ford, and was soon after ordered to the support of Major-General Hood. The order was executed under a heavy artillery fire from the enemy, causing some loss. My position was on Hood's left and Buckner's right, near the centre of the left wing of the army, facing west, parallel with the Lafayette and Chattanooga road, six or eight hundred yards distant. The brigades of Deas and Manigault constituted my first line, and Anderson's my reserve. Nothing important happened during the remainder of the day. After dark, in the readjustment of my line, a sharp skirmish occurred on Manigault's left, the enemy retiring.

About eleven A. M., on Sunday, September twentieth, under orders from Lieutenant-General Longstreet, commanding the left wing, my command moved forward simultaneously with the troops on my right. At the distance of three hundred yards, skirmishing commenced and immediately my whole line was engaged. Rushing on at a double-quick, through a storm of bullets, shot and shell, Deas' brave Alabamians and Manigault's Alabamians and South Carolinians, equally brave, drove the enemy from his breastworks, then pushed his beyond the Lafayette road, and charged his second line of breastworks three hundred yards further on. The troops on Manigault's left not advancing with him, he was enfiladed on that flank by infantry and artillery, checked, and at length forced to retire. One gun of his battery, temporarily disabled, was left exposed to capture, when Colonel J. C. Reid's Twenty-eighth Alabama gallantly faced about and brought it off in safety.

Deas swept like a whirlwind over the breastworks. Anderson's fearless Mississippians carrying the breastworks in their front, moved up rapidly on his left, to Manigault's place. Without halting, these two brigades then drove the enemy across the Crawfish Spring road and up the broken spurs of Missionary Ridge, to its first elevation, one hundred yards west. Hiding behind this, the enemy opened a tremendous fire of musketry and cannon upon our line as it advanced, and at the same time enfiladed it from an eminence in a field on the right. But, without faultering, he was charged, driven from his strong position, and pursued upwards of three-quarters of a mile, when he ceased resisting and disappeared, going north, completely routed. A body of Federal cavalry, covering the retreat of the infantry, made a demonstration against my right, but retired hastily when about to be attacked.

Meantime Manigault sent back for and received the support of Trigg's brigade, of Buckner's corps, and, with it, compelled the rapid retreat of the force in his front.

The Fifteenth Alabama regiment, of General Law's command, which had lost its direction, fired on Deas' right, but upon discovering the mistake, moved up and fought gallantly with him.

I now sent staff officers to the right and left, and ascertained that my advance was nearly a mile further west than any other troops of the left wing, none of which had yet reached the Crawfish Spring road. To my right and rear there was hot firing. I determined to move there, and gave the necessary orders directing the command to march north-east to the Lafayette road, till the position of our troops then engaged should be ascertained. This was to avoid the possibility of collision with friendly forces, and to gain time for re-forming portions of my command disordered by their rapid pursuit of the enemy.

In the splendid advance which I have attempted to describe, through woods and fields, and over a part of Missionary Ridge, against the troops of Sheridan's and J. C. Davis's divisions, seventeen pieces of Federal artillery were captured by my division, fourteen of which were taken into possession and conveyed to the rear by Captain Waters, Acting Chief of Artillery, and three pieces by Major Riby, Chief of Ordnance. Since the battle, I have been informed that a staff officer from army headquarters found ten pieces abandoned in a gorge in front of my position, west of the Crawfish Spring road. The number of prisoners exceeded eleven hundred, including three Colonels. The ground was strewn with small arms, of which fourteen hundred were collected. Five or six standards, five caissons and one battery wagon, one ambulance, about forty horses and mules, and nine ordnance wagons, with one hundred and six-five thousand rounds of ammunition, were also secured. The numerous wounded and dead of the enemy fell into our hands. Among the latter was Brigadier-General Lytle, of the Federal army, killed by Deas' brigade.

While moving to the right and rear, I was met by a staff officer of Brigadier-General Bushrod Johnson, and afterwards by that officer himself, stating that he was hard pressed and must have support forthwith or he would be compelled to fall back. I immediately placed Anderson's brigade under his orders.

Deas, who was out of ammunition, obtained a partial supply from Johnson's wagons, and then marched west across the Crawfish Spring road and formed line of battle, facing west, at the top of the first ridge beyond. His skirmishers became engaged immediately with those of a force of the enemy occupying the next ridge. Manigault, now coming up, was directed to form on Deas' right. I believed the force in my front to be the same that I had previously routed, making its way towards Chattanooga, and designed cutting it off and capturing it. But at this juncture, before Manigault's line had been established, brisk firing had commenced to my right and rear, east of the Crawfish Spring road, and I received from General Johnson urgent requests for further support. Deas and Manigault at once moved in that direction and formed on his left. Previous to their arrival the firing had ceased.

General Johnson's line faced nearly north, about perpendicular to the Lafayette road and to our original line of battle. It was the side of an extremely rough and steep projection of Missionary Ridge, near Dyer's farm, and was extended easterwardly by the lines of Anderson and Kershaw. The height teminated in an open field, near Kershaw's right. It was elsewhere densely wooded. The enemy held the summit in strong force, his artillery planted on sundry sudden elevations rising up like redoubts; his infantry between these, behind the crest, and further sheltered by breastworks of trees and rocks.

At three P. M., a force of the enemy, probably that which I had recently confronted west of the Crawfish Spring road, appeared on my left, capturing several men of my infirmary corps and others who had fallen out from fatigue or wounds. I was apprehensive of an attack in rear, and sent to General Longstreet and General Buckner for reinforcements. At the same time, being the officer of highest rank present, and deeming concert of action necessary, I assumed command of General Johnson's troops, and ordered an immediate and vigorous attack upon the enemy in our front—Deas and Manigault, with Johnson's command, all under direction of that officer, to wheel to the right until faced east, and then to advance, taking the enemy in flank; Anderson to move forward when the firing should begin. General Kershaw agreed to conform to the movements of the latter. I hoped to insure the capture or destruction of the enemy by driving him in confusion upon the right wing of our army.

The movement began at half-past three. Skir-

mishing extended along the whole line as Deas, at the extreme left, commencing swinging. In a few minutes a terrific contest ensued, which continued at close quarters, without any intermission, over four hours. Our troops attacked again and again, with a courage worthy of their past achievements. The enemy fought with determined obstinacy, and repeatedly repulsed us, but only to be again assailed. As showing the fierceness of the fight, the fact is mentioned that, on our extreme left, the bayonet was used, and the men also killed and wounded with clubbed muskets. A little after four the enemy was reinforced and advanced, with loud shouts, upon our right, but was repulsed by Anderson and Kershaw. At this time it became necessary to retire Garrity's battery, of Anderson's brigade, which had been doing effective service. It was subsequently held in reserve. Dent's battery, of Deas' brigade, was engaged throughout the struggle. Notwithstanding the repulses of our infantry, the officers and men of this battery stood to their guns undaunted, and continued firing, inflicting severe loss on the enemy, and contributing largely to the success of my operations.

At twenty minutes after four Brigadier-General Preston, of Buckner's corps, in answer to my application for help, brought me the timely and valuable reinforcements of Kelly's brigade, and, within an hour afterwards, the remaining brigades of his division, Gracie's and Trigg's. These brave troops, as they arrived, were conducted by officers of my staff, to the right of my line, and promptly advanced, in conjunction with the rest, upon the enemy. From this time we gained ground, but, though commanding nine brigades, with Kershaw's co-operating, and all in action, I found the gain both slow and costly. I have never known Federal troops to fight so well. It is just to say, also, that I never saw Confederate soldiers fight better.

Between half-past seven and eight P.M., the enemy was driven from his position, surrendering to the gallant Preston six or seven hundred prisoners, with five standards and many valuable arms. One piece of artillery, two or three wagons, and about fifty prisoners, fell into the hands of Deas' brigade. This was the victorious ending of the battle of Chickamauga.

At eleven P.M., suffering much pain from an injury received about mid-day, I relinquished to Brigadier-General Anderson the command of my division.

The usual commendatory expressions would almost seem to cheapen the services of the officers and men of my immediate command during the day, and those who fought with us in the afternoon. The relation of what they performed ought to immortalize them. For signal gallantry and efficiency the army and country are indebted to Brigadier-Generals Preston and Johnson, and their several brigade commanders; also to Brigadier-General Kershaw, and the three brigade commanders of my division, Anderson, Deas and Manigault. Without the decided success which they won on Dyer's Hill, Chickamauga would not have been a victory, unless after another day of fighting and slaughter.

On the same roll of honor should be inscribed the names of the chivalrous staff officers, the devoted officers of the regiments and companies, and the heroic rank and file. The reports of my subordinates mention many of each grade who distinguished themselves. Not a few of them fell gloriously, and now rest on the field; others bear honorable wounds, and others fortunately remain unhurt. I respectfully ask attention to the records of their conspicuous bravery, and that the appropriate rewards of valor be conferred on them.

The following staff officers were with me on the field:

Colonel C. W. Adams, Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General and Chief of Staff.

Major J. P. Wilson, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Captain Walker Anderson, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

Lieutenant B. F. Williams, Aid-de-Camp.

Captain D. D. Waters, Acting Chief of Artillery.

Captain J. F. Walton, Provost Marshal.

Captain Lenoir, and Lieutenants Gordon and Lee, of my cavalry escort, also acted on my staff during the engagement.

The conduct of all these officers was in the highest degree soldierly, and their services most valuable. They have my thanks, and deserve the confidence of their superiors. Colonel Adams especially, by his greater experience, his cool courage, and his admirable promptness and precision, has placed me under lasting obligations, and amply shown his fitness for higher rank, which I earnestly hope will be given him.

Major E. B. D. Riley, Chief of Ordnance, was very efficient in his department, having his trains almost constantly at hand, and supplying every call for ammunition with the least possible delay.

Major J. C. Palmer, C. S., performed his duties in the most satisfactory manner, providing the command with cooked rations during the battle, and the movements preliminary to it, with almost as much regularity as if prepared by the men themselves in camp. In this he was efficiently aided by Captain S. M. Lanirr, Assistant-Quartermaster, an officer always ready and willing, and whose qualifications and services fairly entitle him to promotion.

Chief Surgeon C. Terry was prompt and efficient to the utmost extent of the means at his disposal.

Lieutenant L. P. Dodge, Aid-de-Camp, was disabled by being thrown from his horse before the battle commenced, and was not afterwards with me.

The strength of my division, on going into action, was five hundred and one officers, and five thousand six hundred and twenty-one enlisted men.

My loss in officers was sixteen killed, eighty-

one wounded, and one missing; in enlisted men, two hundred and fifty-six killed, one thousand three hundred and ninety-nine wounded, and ninety-seven missing. Whole loss, two hundred and seventy-two killed, one thousand four hundred and eighty wounded, and ninety-eight missing.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
T. C. HINDMAN,
Major-General.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL WALKER, COMMANDING RESERVE CORPS.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION,
NEAR CHATTANOOGA, TENN., October 18, 1863.

Lieutenant-Colonel George Wm. Brent, Assistant Adjutant-General:

COLONEL: The reports of the commanding officers of the brigades and divisions having been received, I hasten to forward them to headquarters, together with my report as commander of the reserve corps:

On the 18th of October, I was ordered by the commanding General to cross the Chickamauga at Alexander's Bridge, if practicable—if not, to cross at Byron's Ford, about one and a half miles below. Before reaching the bridge, I was informed that I would have to fight for it, as it was held by the enemy. General Liddell, commanding division, was ordered to advance with Walthall's and Govan's brigades (Colonel Govan commanded General Liddell's brigade). General Walthall advanced upon the bridge, and became engaged with the enemy, and, after a short and sharp encounter, took the bridge, which was torn up by the enemy, making it necessary for the command to cross at Byron's Ford. Colonel Govan's skirmishers were also engaged. Ector's and Wilson's brigades were held in reserve, and not engaged. Byron's Ford was crossed at night by the troops, but the ordnance wagons, in consequence of the rocky and uneven nature of the ford, were not crossed until morning. Colonel Wilson's brigade was left to guard the wagons, and the rest of the command bivouacked about a mile from the ford. I received an order that night to report to General Hood's command.

Early in the morning, General Forrest asked for a brigade of infantry, and the commanding General (General Bragg) directed me to order a brigade to report to him. Shortly afterwards, hearing firing, I remarked to the commanding General (General Bragg) that I thought Wilson's brigade was engaged, and that I would hasten to it. He directed me to attack with all the force I had. [General Liddell labors under a misapprehension in the first part of his report, when he speaks of my sending for orders and making a recomoissance. I had been on the field before I saw General Liddell, and had received orders from the commanding General (as I state in my report) before I went on the field, and was satisfied of the large force of the enemy, and sent for reinforcements before I met him. When I did meet him we had some conversation about the forces, etc., which I do not remember. He is mistaken in regard to time.] On reaching the ground I found that Wilson's and Ector's brigade (having also been taken by Forrest, without any authority from me) were heavily pressed, and, from the greatly superior numbers of the enemy, were compelled to fall back. I refer you to Colonel Wilson's report for the part his brigade took in the action. General Ector is absent, his brigade having been ordered to Mississippi; and I have no report from him, but his brigade acted with the greatest gallantry. I ordered Liddell's division up as soon as I reached the ground, and they came up as quickly as possible, formed in line of battle, and moved up in gallant style and attacked the enemy. I refer you to General Liddell's report, and to General Walthall's and Colonel Govan's for particulars. This division, too, after a desperate and gallant struggle had to fall back. Discovering, on my arrival on the ground, that my command had encountered a heavy force, I sent immediately back to the commanding General for reinforcements. About one o'clock General Cheatham came up, and was informed by me where his division was needed. I refer you to his own report for his part in the action. About five P. M. (I had no watch, but this was about the time), General Polk came up and took command, and my command acted under his orders. I am satisfied that there were more than Thomas' corps engaged; and all northern accounts state that parts of Crittenden's and McCook's were engaged. The unequal contest of four brigades against such overwhelming odds is unparalleled in this revolution, and the troops deserve immortal honor for the part borne in the action. Only soldiers fighting for all that is dear to freemen could attack, be driven, rally and attack again such superior forces. Two lines of battle of the enemy were broken in the first attack by Wilson; and when he was compelled to retire from the front of the breastworks which the enemy had fallen behind, the fight was taken up by Liddell's division, and the enemy's line broken again, when he again took refuge behind his breastworks, and Liddell was compelled to fall back. The troops were rapidly formed again, and the unequal contest was carried on from between nine and ten A. M., by my command until about half-past one P. M., when, as I have said, Cheatham's division came up. In the afternoon at about five o'clock, my command was ordered by General Polk to support Cleburne. General P. will doubtless report what then happened.

I was directed, Saturday night, by General Polk (to whom I was then ordered to report) to hold my reserve corps in readiness to support an attack upon the enemy, which would take place at daylight, and to support Cheatham's division. I was on the ground at daylight ready for the attack. The attack was not made at that time, and between about nine and ten I was ordered, instead of supporting Cheatham, to support Hill's corps, a part of the right wing

(commanded by Polk), to form my reserve so as to *echelon* Breckinridge, who was on the right of Hill's corps. Before I got into my position, and whilst marching by the flank to gain the ground to the right, I was sent for by General Hill to his support. General Polk was with my command when I received the order. I marched rapidly forward in line of battle, part of the time at double-quick, and reported to General Hill. General Polk was with me. General Hill informed me, on my arrival, that he wanted a brigade. I told him there was one immediately behind him. He remarked he wanted Gist's brigade. I informed him that it was to the left and had just come up (General Gist had a few moments before, been put in command, by me, of General Ector's and Colonel Wilson's brigades, and Colonel Colquitt had command of Gist's brigade). He ordered General Gist's brigade immediately into the fight in the rear of Breckinridge, a part of whose division had fallen back, and the whole of which was hard pressed. I refer you to General Gist's report for the performance of his command.

General Walthall was detached to the left to the support of Brigadier-General Polk, by Hill or Polk. My command being thus disposed of, *brigades* being sent in to take the places of divisions, my only occupation was to help from the detached portions of my command as they came out from a position. I felt certain they would have to leave when they were sent in. My division commanders received their orders direct from General Hill, and I refer you to their reports.

Breckinridge's division having fallen back, and General Hill having reported Cleburne's division, on Breckinridge's left, routed, my reserve corps having fallen back in detachments, in which they were sent in, and a column having been observed marching down the Chattanooga road, on our right, I was compelled to insist on having something to do with my own command. With our right flank exposed to their advancing column, the reported gap that the withdrawal of Cleburne had made on the left, I was in favor of forming the command in a strong position about one hundred and fifty or two hundred yards in rear of us, until we ascertained positively the condition of our flanks, and then make the best disposition of the combined force and strike the enemy to the best advantage. General Hill, differing with me, ordered his line of battle, one at right angles to the other. General Breckinridge being at right angles to mine, he facing southward to oppose the force then coming from Chattanooga, and I facing westward toward the enemy we had been fighting. We were in this position when one of General Polk's Aids rode up and told General Hill that General Polk had directed him to order General Hill peremptorily to advance immediately on the enemy. General Gist was then ordered by me to move his division in the direction of the enemy, and General Liddell's division was ordered on his right. Generals Breckinridge and Cheatham were in rear and on General Gist's left. The command marched forward. I refer you to General Gist's and General Liddell's reports for the result.

My command bivouacked on the battle-field, and the enemy retreated in the direction of Chattanooga.

I owe to myself and to the gallant command under me, to state that when I reported to General Hill, had he permitted me to fight my reserve corps according to my own judgment, and had not disintegrated it, as he did, by sending it in detachments, I would have formed my five batteries on the left flank of the enemy toward the Chattanooga road, and opened fire upon the enemy's flank, and would have either pushed them forward, supported by infantry, or have marched past them with my combined force, and I feel satisfied that the enemy's left would have been carried much easier than it was, and many a gallant man have been saved, and the enemy's retreat intercepted.

I refer the commanding General to the reports of the division and brigade commanders for the conduct of their officers on the field.

In the three days' fighting I had the honor to command the gallant reserve corps, I witnessed nothing but a heroism that was worthy of men battling for their freedom. To the division and brigade commanders, General Gist, commanding division composed of General Gist's, General Ector's, and Colonel Wilson's brigades, and General Liddell, commanding division composed of General Walthall's and Colonel Govan's brigades, I have only to say that the Brigadier-Generals fought with a gallantry that entitle them to division commands, and the Colonels commanding brigades, with an obstinacy and courage that entitle them to the rank of Brigadier-Generals. The conduct of Colonels, commanders of batteries, line officers, and privates, is recorded by their respective commanders.

I may be permitted in my own division, which was commanded on Sunday by General Gist, to state that Colonel Wilson, who commanded a brigade on both Saturday and Sunday, and acted with great distinction, and who is the oldest Colonel from Georgia, is entitled, from long service with the brigade and from gallant conduct, to the command of the Georgia brigade he now commands in the capacity of Brigadier-General; and that the gallant Stevens, of Gist's brigade, (who was severely wounded), from what I know of his capacity as an officer, from his gallantry on the field, and from his devotion to the cause, would grace any position that might be conferred.

To my staff, Captain J. B. Cumming, Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain S. H. Crump, Assistant Inspector-General; Lieutenants Lamar and Kenan, Aids-de-Camp; Lieutenant Magruder, Ordnance Officer, who was on the field with me, and Captain M. H. Talbot, volunteer Aid, I am indebted for distinguished and gallant service on the field, and to Captain Troup, Assistant Adjutant-General, who was dangerously wound-

ed whilst carrying an order in the thickest of the fight. From the character of the fighting, on both Saturday and Sunday, they were greatly exposed, and bore themselves as became gentlemen and soldiers fighting for all that is dear.

For the gallant dead we can but mourn. The noble, brave, and chivalrous Colquitt, who fell in command of Gist's brigade, was a soldier and a gentleman, a Christian and a friend. I hope I will be excused for paying, in my report, a tribute to his worth.

A map of the field and a list of casualties will accompany this report.

Gregg's brigade, which now forms a part of Walker's division, reported during the battle to Major-General Hood, whose official report will, doubtless, give an account of its operations. I am proud to hear it behaved with great gallantry.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
W. H. T. WALKER,
Major-General, commanding Division.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH WHEELER.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS,
October 30, 1863.

Colonel George W. Brent, Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of Tennessee:

COLONEL: Having been called upon to report the operations of my command during and incident upon the battle of Chickamauga, I have the honor to make the following statement of facts, in order simply to designate the position of the command. I cannot, in justice to the officers and men, make a full official report, until the reports of subordinate commanders have been received. I trust, however, this statement will answer until a full report can be prepared:

On the twenty-seventh of August, my command, consisting of Wharton's and Martin's divisions, and Roddy's brigade, were stationed as follows: Estis's regiment, of Wharton's division, picketing Tennessee River from Bridgeport to Guntersville; Wade's regiment, Martin's division, from Guntersville to Decatur, and detachments from Roddy's brigade from Decatur to the mouth of Bear Creek. The main body of Wharton's division was stationed near Rome, Ga.; of Martin's division, near Alexandria, Alabama, and of Roddy's brigade, near Tuscumbia, Alabama. Two regiments of the corps were on detached duty with General Pillow.

On the twenty-seventh, General Martin's command, numbering about twelve hundred men, was ordered to Trenton, and General Wharton's to the vicinity of Chattanooga.

On the twenty-ninth, the enemy crossed the Tennessee River in force, driving back the pickets of Colonel Estis's regiment. About five hundred men of General Martin's division, under Lieutenant-Colonel Malden, moved up Wills' Valley, and were placed on picket duty below Chattanooga.

It now became evident that the enemy were moving two divisions of cavalry and McCook's corps of infantry over Sand Mountain and into Wills' Valley by the Caperton road. I was ordered to take post in Broomtown Valley, for the purpose of picketing the passes of Lookout Mountain. General Martin, with about twelve hundred men, guarded the passes from the Tennessee River to Niel's Gap, and General Wharton from Neil's Gap to Gadsden. These commands kept the enemy continually observed, and full reports concerning him were several times each day sent to army headquarters. Several columns of the enemy's cavalry were pushed over the mountain, all of which were successfully driven back.

On the twelfth of September, McCook's corps of infantry and Stanley's corps of cavalry moved over the mountain at Alpine, and, after a severe fight, our cavalry (under Colonel Avery, a most gallant and discreet officer) was compelled to fall back.

Skirmishing continued nearly every day until the seventeenth, when I was ordered to move into McLemore's Cove, by Dug and Catlett's Gaps, and attack the enemy, in order to make a demonstration in that direction. We fought for some hours, driving the enemy for some distance, but finally developed a force too large to be dislodged.

On the following day we moved to Owen's Ford, on Chickamauga River, leaving heavy pickets at all the gaps of the mountain as far as Gadsden.

About two P. M., I learned the enemy's cavalry were moving up McLemore's Cove. I moved across the river and warmly assailed their flank, dividing the column and driving the enemy in confusion in both directions.

During the night I received orders to guard well all the passes of the mountain and all the fords of the river down to General Longstreet's left flank, and to attack the enemy at every opportunity which presented itself. This order was complied with, and the remainder of my force was concentrated at Glass's Mill. A considerable force of the enemy, with artillery, were deployed on the opposite bank, and warm skirmishing commenced. As soon as arrangements could be made, I dismounted all my available force, crossed, and warmly assailed the enemy, hoping that we might draw troops from the centre, and thus create a diversion. After a short fight the enemy wavered. We charged him, and drove a largely superior force fully two miles to Crawfish Spring, killing and wounding large numbers, and taking thirty-five officers and men prisoners, besides the wounded. We were successful in creating the diversion, as the enemy thought our advance a heavy flank movement, and reinforced this point heavily. The enemy, in his accounts of the battle, state that General Longstreet flanked him at this point at the hour we made the attack. At this time I received orders to move my available force to Lee and Gordon's Mills, and attack the enemy. We arrived at that place about three o'clock P. M., crossed the river, and vigorously assailed

him. After a short time, he commenced retreating in confusion. We followed as rapidly as possible, capturing about one thousand prisoners, twenty wagons, and a large amount of arms and ordnance stores. About dark, we also captured five large hospitals, with a considerable supply of medicines, camp equipage, and a great number of wounded prisoners, besides over one hundred surgeons. The pursuit was continued till two hours after nightfall, when we retired to feed our horses.

Early on the morning of the twenty-first, I detached two regiments, pursuant to orders, to pick up stragglers and arms. About nine A. M., I received orders from General Longstreet to send a force of cavalry to find the enemy's position. At the same time I received orders from General Bragg, through Colonel McKinstry, to save the captured property. To accomplish both these objects, I detailed five hundred of my best mounted men, under Colonel Anderson, to comply with General Longstreet's order, with full instructions to report every hour to that officer. As previously stated, two regiments were already at work collecting stragglers and arms; leaving with me but about seventeen hundred men. Just at this time I received information from my pickets at Owen's Ford, that the enemy, in large force, was driving back our cavalry from that point. It was also reported that the enemy had a large train of wagons with him. At the same time I observed a heavy dust in Chattanooga Valley, which appeared to indicate a movement from Chattanooga, along the foot of Lookout Mountain, towards McLemore's Cove, for the purpose of succoring the command reported at Owen's Ford. I immediately moved over to Chattanooga Valley and drove back towards Chattanooga the force which was marching from that place. I then left the Eighth Texas rangers and my escort to hold the enemy in check, while, with the balance of the command, I moved up towards McLemore's Cove.

After marching about five miles we met a large force of cavalry, which, seeing the dust of our approach, had deployed a considerable force in a strong position. I immediately deployed two regiments and commenced skirmishing. Finding their position strong, I detached a squadron to turn their right flank. This caused the enemy to waver, when we charged in line and also in column on the road, driving him in confusion. The enemy attempted to form a new line with his reserves several times, but we met him with such force as to disperse him each time, driving him before us. We continued the charge several miles, capturing, killing, or dispersing nearly the entire command, said to number about two thousand men. We secured immediately upon the road only about four hundred. We also captured eighteen stand of colors, and secured their entire train, numbering about ninety wagons, loaded with valuable baggage. Many of the men who escaped to the adjoining woods were picked up on the following morning, and only about seventy-five men, half of whom were dismounted, succeeded in joining the Federal army. We also captured a number of arms. The wagons and mules were turned over to the Chief Quartermaster of Army of Tennessee.

On the following morning, pursuant to orders, we pressed on to within one mile and a quarter of Chattanooga, driving the enemy's cavalry behind his infantry. We remained in this position until night, when, pursuant to orders, I proceeded towards Trenton, preparatory to crossing the Tennessee River. After one day's march, I received orders to return and sweep up Lookout Mountain to Point Lookout. The order was received at two P. M., and I immediately started with an advance guard of two hundred men, ordering the command to follow.

On arriving at Summertown at dark, I found one regiment of the enemy behind strong barricades. I dismounted my men to feel their position and charged their flanks, driving them for some distance. In this hasty retreat they left several guns, knapsacks, overcoats, and cooking utensils, also their supper already cooked. By that time I learned that my command had been stopped and ordered to Chickamauga Station. I, however, with my small command, which numbered one hundred and five dismounted men, pressed the enemy off the mountain.

After surveying the enemy's works, and reporting fully his position to the commanding General, I proceeded to Chickamauga Station, where I received orders to cross the Tennessee River above Chattanooga. During the night, however, I received orders to move towards Charleston to support General Forrest, who was moving upon the enemy in that direction.

On the twenty-ninth I received orders to cross the Tennessee River with that portion of my command then with me (one brigade having been left with the army) and three brigades which General Forrest had been ordered to send me.

On the morning of the thirtieth, I learned that these commands had just arrived at a point about twenty miles from the point of crossing. I ordered them to the latter place, and proceeded there with the commands of Generals Wharton and Martin. The enemy had occupied the opposite bank, and immediately concentrated a force nearly, if not quite, equal to our own, to resist our crossing. This force had followed me up the river, and I found that at any point at which I should attempt to cross could be reached as easily by them as by my command. Under these circumstances, I determined to cross at the point I then was. The three brigades from General Forrest were mere skeletons, scarcely averaging five hundred effective men each. These were badly armed, had but a small supply of ammunition, and their horses were in horrible condition, having been marched continuously for three days and three nights without removing saddles. The men were worn out and without rations. The brigade commanders made most urgent protests against their commands being called upon to move in this condition.

With this state of things I allowed the worst horses to be returned to the rear, and with the remainder crossed in the face of an enemy nearly as large as our own force. We assailed and drove the enemy about three miles.

On the morning of November second I reached Sequatchie Valley, and at three o'clock on the following morning proceeded down towards Jasper, with about fifteen hundred men. After travelling about ten miles we overtook and captured thirty-two six-mule wagons, which were destroyed. The mules were carried on with the command.

On approaching Anderson's Cross-roads we were met by a considerable force of cavalry, which we charged and drove before us. We here found a large train of wagons, which proved to extend from the top of Waldron's Ridge for a distance of ten miles towards Jasper. This train was heavily loaded with ordnance, quartermaster, and commissary stores. The number of wagons was variously estimated at from eight to fifteen hundred. No one saw, perhaps, more than half the train. The Quartermaster in charge of the train, as well as other employees, stated that there were eight hundred six-mule wagons, besides a great number of sutler wagons. The train was guarded by a brigade of cavalry in front and a brigade of cavalry in rear, and on the flank, where we attacked, were stationed two regiments of infantry. After a warm fight the guards were defeated and driven off, leaving the entire train in our possession. After selecting such mules and wagons as we needed, we then destroyed the train by burning the wagons and sabering or shooting the mules. During this work my pickets were driven in on both flanks and my rear. Fortunately the enemy was repulsed, and we remained undisturbed for eight hours, and until our work was thoroughly accomplished. Just before dark, as we were retiring, a large force of cavalry and infantry moved upon us from Stephenson, skirmishing with our rear until dark. During this General Martin, Colonel Avery and Lieutenant-Colonel Griffith were distinguished for gallantry. During the night I moved over Cumberland Mountain, and early next morning joined General Wharton near the foot of the mountain, and went forward to attack McMinnville. The enemy was pressing close behind, but we succeeded in capturing the place, with an enormous supply of quartermaster and commissary stores, with the fortifications and garrison, which numbered five hundred and eighty-seven men, with arms, accoutrements, &c. Two hundred horses were also captured. The day and night were occupied in destroying the stores, a locomotive, a train of cars, and a bridge over Hickory Creek—such of the stores as could be transported having been distributed to the command.

On the following day we marched to Murfreesboro'. After making a demonstration upon the place, we moved over, and, after a short fight, captured a strong stockade guarding the railroad bridge over Stone River, with its garrison of fifty-two men. The day was occupied in cutting down the bridge and thoroughly burning the timber. We also burned the railroad ties and track for three miles below the bridge.

The following day we destroyed a train and a quantity of stores at Christiana and Fosterville, and destroyed all the railroad bridges and tressels between Murfreesboro' and Wartrace, including all the large bridges at and near the latter place, capturing the guards, &c. We also captured and destroyed a large amount of stores of all kinds at Shelbyville—the enemy running from his strong fortifications upon our approach.

That night I ordered Davidson's division to encamp on Duck River, near Warner's Bridge; Martin's division two miles further down, and Wharton's two miles below Martin's. During the evening I learned that the enemy, who had been closely pursuing, had encamped near Frazier's farm. I immediately informed General Davidson of the position of the enemy, and directed him to keep the enemy observed, and to join me should the enemy move towards him. This order was shortly after repeated with this modification, that he should move immediately to my position (Crowell's Mill). Unfortunately he failed to comply with this order, and on the following morning was attacked by a superior force of the enemy. I received two consecutive dispatches from General Davidson which indicated he was moving down Duck River, but on questioning his couriers, I ascertained that he was moving towards Farmington. I immediately started at a trot towards Farmington, with Martin's division, ordering General Wharton and the wagons to follow me. I reached Farmington just in time to place five regiments of Martin's command in position when the enemy appeared. I had ordered General Davidson to form in column by fours on the Pike, and to charge the enemy when they were repulsed by Martin's division, General Davidson having officially reported to me that only three regiments of the enemy had been seen during the day.

The engagement commenced warmly, but the enemy was soon repulsed. General Davidson had failed to form, as stated, and, instead, had moved for some distance. The enemy soon after came up in strong force, with a division of infantry and a division of cavalry. We fought them with great warmth for twenty minutes, when we charged the line and drove it back for some distance. General Wharton's column and our train having now passed, and the object for which we fought being accomplished, we withdrew, without being followed by the enemy.

The enemy, in his own account of the fight, acknowledged a loss of twenty-nine killed, including one Colonel, and one hundred and fifty-nine wounded. My entire loss was less than one-fourth of the above figures.

A reconnoissance was made towards Columbia, which caused the enemy to evacuate that place and destroy all their stores, including thirty days' rations for the garrison.

We then proceeded to the Tennessee River at

Muscle Shoals, the only fordable place on the river, where we crossed without difficulty, the enemy reaching the river just after I had crossed.

Two pieces of artillery of Wiggin's battery having broken down several times, were finally abandoned on account of our utter inability to bring them further. The officers deserve great credit for carrying them so far in their disabled condition. One of the limbers of White's battery blew up, which caused it also to be abandoned. Two of the pieces were howitzers, and the other was an iron gun which had been condemned at every inspection for the last year.

During the trip we captured in action sixteen hundred prisoners, and killed and wounded as many of their cavalry as would cover our entire loss.

A full report of the casualties in my command during the battle, and during the trip through Middle Tennessee, will be found in the annexed tabular statement.

A considerable amount of the property captured on the trip was brought across the river.

The result of the operations of the cavalry under my command during the battle of Chickamauga were, first, guarding the left flank of the army for a distance of ninety miles, during and for twenty days preceding the battle of Chickamauga, during which time it continually observed and skirmished with the enemy, repelling and developing all his diversions. During the battle, with the available force (which near exceeded two thousand men) not on other duty, such as guarding the flanks, we fought the enemy vigorously and successfully, killing and wounding large numbers, and capturing two thousand prisoners, one hundred wagons and teams, a large amount of other property, and eighteen stand of colors, all of which were turned over to the proper authorities.

To Generals Wharton and Martin, commanding divisions, and Colonels Wheeler, Morgan, Crews and Harrison, commanding brigades, I tender my thanks for their zeal, energy, and gallantry during the engagement. To General Davidson and Colonel Hodge, who commanded the troops which joined me on the expedition across the Tennessee River, I tender my thanks for their good conduct, and that of their troops during their advance upon McMinnville, and to General Martin and Colonel Avery for their gallant assistance in the capture and destruction of the wagon train, and to General Martin and his command particularly for their good conduct at Farmington, and their laborious work in destroying the bridges on the railroad. General Wharton and his command behaved throughout with their accustomed gallantry.

I tender my thanks to the following members of my staff for their gallantry and good conduct, viz.. :

Colonel King, Majors Burford, Jenkins, Hume, and Hill; Captains Turner, Powell, Wade, Flush, and Kennedy, and Lieutenants Pointer, Wailes, Nichol and Hatch.

To Major Hume, particularly, am I indebted for his gallantry during the fight at Farmington, where he was wounded, and to Lieutenant Pointer, my Aid, for his gallantry during a cavalry charge, when he dashed upon the enemy's color-bearer, shot him, and then turned and brought the colors back to his command.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH WHEELER,
Major-General.

APPENDIX A.

HEADQUARTERS DAVIDSON'S CAVALRY DIVISION,
October 7, 1863.

Major-General Wheeler, commanding Cavalry:

GENERAL: The enemy are following me. I am now six miles below town, on the south side of the river.

I have not yet made a decided stand.

Respectfully,
H. B. DAVIDSON,
Brigadier-General commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DAVIDSON'S CAVALRY DIVISION,
ALLEN'S HOUSE, October 8, 1863.

Major-General Wheeler, commanding Cavalry:

GENERAL: I am moving down the side of the river. The enemy are following me up. As soon as I can get a position, I will make a stand. I think they are in strong force.

Respectfully,
H. B. DAVIDSON,
Brigadier-General commanding.

True copies:
M. G. HUDSON, *A. D. C.*

REPORT OF BRIG.-GEN. LIDDELL, COMMANDING DIVISION.

HEADQUARTERS LIDDELL'S AND LOWRY'S BRIGADES,
CLEBURNE'S DIVISION, A. T., BEFORE CHATTANOOGA, Tenn.,
October 10, 1863.

Captain Joseph B. Cumming, A. A. G., late of the Reserve, A. T.:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the action of my division, consisting of Walthall's and Govan's brigades, and constituting a portion of the reserve at the battle of Chickamauga:

About two o'clock P. M., on Friday, the eighteenth of September, I was ordered by Major-General Walker to take Alexander's Bridge, across the Chickamauga. The reconnoissance I made was a very hasty and imperfect one, and, relying chiefly upon the information obtained from General Pegram, I instructed Brigadier-General Walthall, of my division, to make an attack upon the enemy in possession of the bridge. This was promptly executed, and in three-quarters of an hour we had it in possession. The force in our front consisted of Wilder's mounted infantry, from whom were captured a half dozen or more breech-loading rifles. Our loss was one hundred and five in killed and wounded, and I can only account for this disproportion from the efficiency of this new weapon, our attack having been made through thick woods and cedar under-brush, rendering the artillery of the enemy that was used on the

occasion, comparatively harmless. The bridge having been torn up, prevented our crossing, at that point, and, making a detour of about a mile and a half northward, we effected a crossing at Byron's Ford, continuing thence our movement to a position nearly one half mile in front of Alexander's Bridge, where we bivouacked for the night on the same ground occupied by a portion of the enemy in our attack on the bridge.

The next morning, the nineteenth, about daylight, we continued our movement, in the same direction, towards Lee and Gordon's Mill, for about one and a half miles further, where we halted for further instructions.

About eight o'clock, the firing of General Forrest's cavalry and Ector's and Wilson's brigades, became very heavy in the rear of the direction we were taking, and on the right of our intended line of battle. The country around was mostly oak woodland, and in places thick under-brush.

About eleven o'clock, Major-General Walker asked me to go with him on a reconnoissance, to know what the demonstration meant then being made on our right. After proceeding northward one and a half miles, we found the enemy pressing back General Ector's and Colonel Wilson's brigades, the latter more or less in confusion, and other evidences of attack, making it apparent that a heavy force was bearing down upon us. I replied to General Walker's inquiry as to what I thought of it, "that I was satisfied a corps of the enemy was about being thrown forward to turn our right wing, which it was absolutely necessary for us to meet promptly with heavy reinforcements." He agreed with me in this opinion, and immediately wrote the same to General Bragg. At the same time orders were received by him from General Bragg to attack the enemy immediately with all his force, upon which he instructed me to bring up my force to the relief of the two brigades already mentioned, and to retard, if possible, the further progress of the enemy. As soon as my command could reach the place, I formed the line facing northward, General Walthall on the right, Colonel Govan on the left, and at once moved forward to the attack at fifteen minutes past twelve P. M., cautioning Colonel Govan to look well to his left, as I apprehended that his left wing would strike the enemy first, although he was not then visible on account of the thick undergrowth. In a few minutes we became hotly engaged with the enemy's infantry and artillery, and, pressing forward with a shout, we captured all the artillery in our immediate front, with many prisoners of the Fifth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-first United States Regulars, and Fourth Kentucky. I ordered the artillery to be taken to the rear as rapidly as possible, but so many horses had been killed that it was very difficult to secure the pieces. We had now broken through two lines of the enemy immediately in our front, and were just engaging the third when it was discovered that their extended lines were overlapping and flanking us, right and left, upon which it became necessary to retire rapidly, by a flank movement to the right, to avoid destruction or capture. After reaching the next hill in rear of us, we found General Cheatham's division taking position, having just come up a little too late to our support in action. It was now perfectly clear that we had been opposed to an entire corps of the enemy (General Thomas's), to drive back which General Cheatham's division soon after proved to be insufficient. My command now having been re-formed and rested for a short time, I was ordered to the extreme right of General Cheatham's line, forming an obtuse angle with it, upon reaching which position I moved forward to the attack a second time, in line nearly at right angles to that assumed by me in the first attack; Colonel Govan now on the right, and General Walthall on the left. The latter finding the enemy well posted, and in very strong force, after a contest of half an hour, was compelled to withdraw about two hundred yards, the left regiment of Colonel Govan's brigade falling back with him. The right of Colonel Govan's brigade had captured several pieces of artillery from the enemy, which seemed lightly supported, and, whilst endeavoring to secure them, was fired upon by a Confederate battery, from the rear, the position of the line in the under-brush having concealed it from view, thus causing the mistake. This unlucky accident caused him to retire to the same line with General Walthall, without accomplishing his object. In this last attack, we fought over a portion of the ground on the left that we had contended for in the first engagement, the enemy having pushed up and occupied two-thirds of it. It was now within an hour of sunset, when General Cleburne's division came up in my rear, as General Cheatham's had done in the first fight, and forming his line of three brigades parallel with mine, moved forward over us upon the enemy, engaging him about two hundred yards from my front. This attack being sudden and unexpected, the enemy gave way for the distance of half a mile or more, when both parties ceased firing for the night. It now being dark, we bivouacked where we were, and next morning, about six o'clock, in obedience to orders received from General Walker, I moved my command with General Ector's brigade, about a mile and a half to the right, on the prolongation, and in support of General Breckinridge's right. After arriving there, I was ordered to move forward to the attack in place of General Breckinridge's division, which had been repulsed in its attack on the enemy's left flank and rear. Here, at the order of Lieutenant-General Polk, General Walthall's brigade was detached from me and moved to the left of General Gist's brigade, which was then making a direct attack on the left of the enemy's line near his breastworks. At the same time an order was given me by General Hill to take Colonel

Govan's brigade and move on the Chattanooga road and engage the enemy in his rear. This was about eleven o'clock. After moving forward a short distance I ordered Colonel Govan to change direction to the left, which he did, finding the enemy in some woods after passing a small field, and pushing him back to the open ground in rear of the left of his fortifications. This was about half a mile in advance of Gist's brigade and on the Chattanooga road, cut off from all connection with any of our forces. After a severe engagement, in which the enemy gave way opposite the right and pressed forward in large force on the left of the brigade, thus apparently designing to cut him off, Colonel Gowan was forced to retire rapidly to avoid destruction.

For the part taken by General Walthall after he was detached from me I refer to his report. On reaching the cover of the timber by a circuitous detour to the right, the brigade was halted and re-formed, and soon afterwards was joined by General Walthall's command from the left of Gist's. We were ordered now to remain in line, awaiting further orders. About six P. M. Lieutenant-General Hill ordered me to move straight forward and occupy the Chattanooga road. I requested General Hill to support me on the left, as I was satisfied from personal observation during Colonel Govan's attack that I would be enfiladed. This he said he would give me, and I moved off at once. The line had passed some little distance beyond the Chattanooga road, meeting with little or no resistance to that point, when, as expected, it was enfiladed by batteries on both flanks, whilst a battery in front played upon it across a waste field. I immediately placed seven pieces of artillery on a high point on the right of General Walthall's brigade, which held the right wing, to engage the enemy's batteries and draw the fire, if possible, from the infantry. My line was parallel with the enemy's works and in his rear, upon his left flank, nearly half a mile. Here I had halted and ordered the men to lie down, no enemy just then appearing in front. There was a wide open field in front and on my left. The enemy soon after this apparently left his works and pressed upon the rear of my left flank, whilst his batteries enfiladed me. Soon afterwards a cloud of skirmishers suddenly emerged from the woods, encirling my front and right wing. From the combination of attacks, my command was forced to withdraw to avoid being captured. A part of my skirmishers were nevertheless captured, together with Colonel Scales, Thirteenth Mississippi regiment, Walthall's brigade. The Federals had left their works, at this time, in retreat from the field, and our whole line was moving upon them. After reforming my command I moved to the position of the Chattanooga road, near McDonald's house, where it bivouacked on the ground it was ordered to hold. At ten o'clock, Sunday night, my scouts reported that the enemy had entirely withdrawn from the field and disappeared toward Lookout Mountain.

In these five different engagements, in the space of three days, I lost a great many officers and men; my loss being one hundred and sixty-two killed, nine hundred and sixty-three wounded, and two hundred and seventy-seven missing; total, one thousand four hundred and four; out of an effective total in both brigades of three thousand one hundred and seventy-five before action.

The attack of the enemy being aimed at our right wing, his force was necessarily large to accomplish his object, and, in every instance, overpowered me with numbers. In no instance, in the last two days' fight, did we make an attack without being flanked by the overlapping lines of the enemy; and, although forced to give way four different times, serious and heavy loss was inflicted upon the Federals in each attack, and the command always promptly rallied to renew the engagement.

In connection with Sunday evening's affair, it is proper for me to state that the force which was reported by General Forrest, about four P. M., to Lieutenant-General Hill to be moving from the direction of Chattanooga, in support of the enemy's left flank, took its position in the edge of the woods on the opposite side of the waste field in my front, supported its batteries on my right flank and front, and, during the last engagement, threw forward its skirmishers, which, co-operating with the attack on my left and rear and the enfilading fires of their artillery, kept every movement of their own side in view as well as our own. This force retired with the balance of the enemy at dusk, having apparently accomplished its object of preventing our getting in his rear. We took about eight hundred prisoners, nearly all of whom were regulars in the United States army. Major Coolidge, of the Sixteenth United States infantry, was killed. Captain Van Pelt, of Loomis' battery, was captured by the Eighth Arkansas and First Louisiana infantry. Of the pieces captured, four were secured by Govan's brigade and one by Walthall's. I refer to the reports of brigade commanders for particulars. Colonel Featherston, of the Fifth Arkansas, was killed early in the first action. Colonel Gillespie and Lieutenant-Colonel Baulcum were both wounded. In Brigadier-General Walthall's brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel McKelvane, Twenty-fourth Mississippi, Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan, Twenty-ninth Mississippi, Major Pegram, Thirty-fourth Mississippi, Major Staples, Twenty-fourth Mississippi, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, Twenty-seventh Mississippi, Major Johnson, Thirtieth Mississippi, and Lieutenant-Colonel Reynolds, Thirtieth Mississippi, were wounded, the last mortally. Officers and men of both brigades behaved with unusual gallantry, and I have the satisfaction of knowing that they did their duty to their country, side by side, against greater odds than they have hitherto met. Although no brilliant results were directly accomplished, the record for hard fighting cannot be well surpassed. In my humble opinion it is the best evidence of good

soldiers, when overpowered by immense numbers on all sides, to be able to rally promptly and return again and again to the contest undaunted. The enemy was held in check by the resolute bravery of my two brigades, united with the rest of General Walker's command, until sufficient support could come up to prevent our right flank from being turned by General Thomas' corps. To my two brigade commanders, Brigadier-General Walthall and Colonel Govan, I am greatly indebted for their prompt co-operation in every movement and quick apprehension of the constantly recurring necessities that arise on a battle-field. I know of no more gallant soldiers, and feel honored by the command of such officers. My staff, Captain G. A. Williams, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Lieutenant J. L. Bostick, Aid-de-Camp, behaved with their usual gallantry and need no commendation at my hands. Lieutenant Dulin, Brigade Inspector, was slightly wounded in the forehead. To my Chief Surgeon, Dr. McFadden, my thanks are due for his prompt attention to the wounded and their rapid removal from the field, however distant they were from the hospital he had been enabled to establish. I would respectfully bring to notice the gallantry of Captain Fletcher, of the Thirteenth Arkansas regiment, in repelling the sudden attempt of the enemy to capture two pieces of artillery, which were unavoidably delayed in being removed from their position late in the evening of the twentieth. I thank God for permitting us to be the survivors of a great victory for our country.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN R. LIDDELL,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. PRESTON, COMMANDING DIVISION.

GREENVILLE, SOUTH CAROLINA, October 31, 1863.

Captain Gallaher, Assistant Adjutant-General:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to transmit, in obedience to orders, a report of the part taken by the division under my command in the battle of Chickamauga:

On the eighteenth of September, our forces advanced in several columns to cross the Chickamauga, and give battle to the Federal army under General Rosecrans. Major-General Buckner's corps, consisting of Stewart's division and mine, moved on the road to Thedford's Ford, and on the evening of that day (Friday) my command bivouacked at Hunt's or Dalton's Ford, on the south bank of the river and east of the road. The skirmishers of Colonel Kelly's brigade soon discovered the enemy posted along the opposite bank of the stream, extending above in the direction of Lee and Gordon's Mill. Soon after nightfall General Gracie's brigade was moved across the ford and established in line of battle, running almost east and west, near Hunt's house, and a few hundred yards north of the river, where it remained during the night.

On the next morning my two remaining brigades crossed the river at dawn, and were formed in line of battle in Hunt's field. Stewart's division soon occupied a position on my right, and extended eastward in the direction of Thedford's Ford. Riding forward, I found troops of Brigadier-General Johnson's and Major-General Hood's commands forming in line of battle nearly at right angles to my own line, facing westward, toward the Chattanooga road, and afterwards met General Bragg, Major-General Hood, and Major-General Buckner, who were conferring together. Having reported to Major-General Buckner the position of my troops, I returned, and about eight o'clock received an order from him to advance through Hunt's field, in the direction of the enemy. Gracie's brigade was immediately conformed to the general line of battle, and moved westwardly toward the main road, that runs north from Lafayette to Chattanooga. After advancing about six hundred yards it arrived near a sharp curve of the Chickamauga, which impeded further progress. I halted the command on the brow of the hill overlooking the stream and plain below. The enemy's lines and batteries were discovered about fifteen hundred yards distant, in the direction of Lee and Gordon's Mill, across the bend of the river, which it would have been necessary to cross twice, with an open field intervening, swept by their artillery, had the advance continued straightforward. Having halted Gracie, I drew up Kelly's brigade three hundred yards in the rear, upon a declivity in the field, and Trigg's brigade about three hundred yards in rear of Kelly's, on the prolongation of Bate's brigade, of Stewart's division, which was on the right—thus forming my division in a column of three brigades. A rocky hill near Gracie's right, overlooking the field below, afforded an excellent position for artillery. Upon it I posted Jeffries' battery. The enemy commenced shelling my lines rapidly, and I lost a commissioned officer killed, and a few men of the Sixth Florida, with Lieutenant Lane and others of the Sixty-third Tennessee wounded. A shot or two was fired by Jeffries, but I ordered the battery to cease firing, as the distance was too great to assure proper accuracy. My troops remained in ranks without further reply, patiently enduring the fire. About twelve o'clock, in compliance with an order received from Major-General Buckner, I moved my command by the right flank from about six or eight hundred yards to a position somewhat west of north from Hunt's field. Trigg's brigade occupied the front, in a woodland, near a small cabin. Gracie was formed near Trigg, and Kelly was posted in the rear, supporting Leyden's battalion of artillery. No further event of importance occurred during the day to Gracie's or Kelly's brigades. Soon after Trigg occupied his position, some three hundred yards in advance of Gracie and Kelly, his skirmishers, under Colonel Maxwell, engaged those of the enemy with spirit, and some two hours afterwards were driven in by the enemy's artillery. There was a small corn field three or four hundred yards in front of Trigg, in which

the enemy were posted. About two or three o'clock a continuous and heavy fire of infantry and artillery (and their shells exploding beyond our rear lines) announced a conflict near the field in front. I was informed that Hood's division was attacking the enemy in the field, whilst my division was held in reserve. Soon after I received an order from Major-General Buckner to detach a brigade and reinforce General Hood. For this purpose Colonel Trigg was ordered to advance in the direction of the firing, and to give the required support. The action soon became hot in front. Trigg joined Brigadier-General Robertson, of Hood's division, and attacked the enemy. They were broken in confusion. The Sixth Florida, under Colonel Findlay, sustained heavy loss; but owing to some misapprehension of orders, the brigade failed to capture the enemy's battery, or to reap the fruits of their repulse. As I was not personally superintending the attack, I refer to the report of Colonel Trigg for details.

Riding forward, however, I found the evidences of a stubborn and sanguinary conflict in the margin of the wood and the corn field beyond, from which the enemy were retiring their lines. Night coming on, Trigg bivouacked in the woodland near the edge of the corn field, while Gracie and Kelly occupied a position in front of a little hut, near which Major-General Buckner had established his headquarters.

I have no means of ascertaining, with accuracy, the loss sustained by my division on Saturday, but estimate it at about one hundred and fifty or one hundred and seventy-five killed and wounded, nearly all of whom were from Trigg's brigade. During the night Gracie's and Kelly's brigades were vigorously engaged in constructing defenses to strengthen the left, and, in the morning, Williams' and Leyden's battalions of artillery were supported by my infantry, under cover of good field intrenchments.

On Sunday, about midday, the battle became fierce along the right towards Chattanooga, and there was a general advance of the left wing, under Lieutenant-General Longstreet. Stewart's division and Trigg's brigade were moved forward northwestwardly, in the direction of Brotherton's house, on the Chattanooga road. Under an order from Major-General Buckner, I advanced with Gracie's and Kelly's brigades, with the exception of the Sixty-fifth Georgia, Colonel Moore, which was left to protect Jeffries' battery, near Hunt's field, on the left. Gracie's and Kelly's brigades were formed in line of battle across the Chattanooga road, in front of Brotherton's house, and Trigg a short distance in the rear. The enemy, in some fields on the north, maintained an active fire of shot and shell on my troops until about half-past three o'clock, when I received an order to move towards Dyer's house and field, to support Brigadier-General Kershaw. Guided by Captain Terrill, I advanced with Gracie's and Kelly's brigades, Trigg's having been retained near Brotherton's by Major-General Buckner, to resist an apprehended attack of cavalry on our left and rear. After moving through the woodland between the Chattanooga road and Dyer's farm-house, I reached a large field extending northward to some wooded ravines and heights. These heights stretch nearly east and west from the Lafayette and Chattanooga road, to another nearly parallel road running from Crawfish Spring to Rossville, and about two miles west of the former. From the edge of Dyer's field the ground descends to a wooded ravine, and after two or three intervening depressions, each succeeding height being more elevated, you reach the summit of the ridge, which is some two hundred feet above the level of the plain. Along this ridge the enemy were drawn up under General Thomas, as it is believed from the statement of prisoners. A strong battery was posted on the loftiest and most eastern of these heights, toward Snodgrass' house and Chattanooga. On the north-east the undulations were gentle, and cleared fields and farms stretched away to the eastward to open and wooded plains.

Upon these plains the battle had raged during the day, and the heights were the key of the enemy's position, and his last stronghold. As soon as the advance brigade of Gracie reached Dyer's field, I ordered him to form in line of battle, with his left wing resting near a tall pine on the summit of the hill, near the edge of the field, and in front of the enemy's strongest position. This was done with great animation and in admirable order. I then directed Colonel Kelly to form his brigade on the left of Gracie, and to change direction to the right as he advanced. The owner of the farm, John Dyer, one of my couriers, gave me a most accurate and valuable description of the local topography, and I directed Kelly to cover and protect Gracie's left. Whilst engaged in bringing Kelly into position, Gracie's brigade disappeared in the wood, advancing against the battery hill. I ordered Captain Blackburn, my volunteer Aid-de-Camp, to follow and ascertain from General Gracie by what authority he had moved. General Gracie replied that he had been ordered to advance by Brigadier-General Kershaw, who was in the ravine just beyond the field. The movement was slightly premature, as Kelly was not formed, but I at once ordered his brigade forward, and sent Captain Blackburn to direct him to oblique to the right again, so as to press toward the slope of the hill in the rear, while Gracie was attacking in front. The enemy had kept up a rapid artillery fire from the hill and across the field, but Gracie, passing through Kershaw's ranks, which were halted in the first ravine beyond the field, dashed over the ridge beyond and into the hollows between it and the battery hill. The brigade advanced with splendid courage, but was met by a destructive fire of the enemy from the cover of their field works on the hill. The Second Alabama battalion stormed the hill and entered the intrenchments. Here an obstinate and bloody combat ensued. Brigadier-General Gracie, whilst bravely leading his men, had his horse shot under him. Lieutenant-Colonel Ful-

kerson, commanding the Sixty-third Tennessee, Lieutenant-Colonel Jolly, of the Forty-third Alabama, Lieutenant-Colonel Holt, of the First Alabama battalion, and Lieutenant-Colonel Hall, of the Second Alabama battalion, were severely wounded whilst gallantly leading their respective commands in the assault on the hill. Many brave officers and men here fell. The brigade carried into action about two thousand and three officers and men, and, in the space of an hour, lost six hundred and ninety-eight killed and wounded. The Second Alabama battalion, out of two hundred and thirty-nine, lost one hundred and sixty-nine killed and wounded. In the action its color was pierced in eighty-three places, and was afterwards, by request, presented to His Excellency the President, who promoted the brave standard-bearer, Robert W. Heith, for conspicuous courage. George W. Norris, of Captain Wise's company, of Hall's battalion, fell at the foot of the enemy's flag-staff, and was buried at the spot where he had so nobly died.

Gracie's brigade advanced between four and five o'clock, and Kelly moved about ten minutes afterwards, to assail the second hill on the ridge, three or four hundred yards west of the battery hill. I ordered him to change direction obliquely to the right, which was promptly done, and in a few minutes the brigade had passed beyond the troops halted on the left of Kershaw's brigade in the ravine and engaged the enemy on the ridge, three or four hundred yards beyond. Then a desperate combat ensued, the hostile forces being not more than thirty or forty yards apart. Kelly gained the hill after a bloody struggle, and the enemy vainly sought to dislodge him from it.

Just as I first formed, and moved Kelly into action, I met Major-General Hindman and staff, on the summit of the hill near Dyer's field. The General, though suffering from a contusion on the neck, from a fragment of shell, remained in the saddle. He informed me of the state of affairs, and assured me of my opportune arrival, and authorized me to post a battery of his on a point of the field so as to guard against and cover any repulse of my troops, or any adverse event. This was done by me, though I did not learn the name of the officer commanding the battery. When the fire on Gracie and Kelly was fully developed, its great volume and extent assured me that support was indispensable. At once I dispatched Captain Blackburn, Captain Preston and Lieutenant Johnson, of my staff, with orders to bring Trigg's brigade forward rapidly, and to inform Major-General Buckner, at Brotherton's, of my situation and the urgent necessity of the order. Shortly after Captain Harvey Jones, A. A. General of Gracie's brigade, rode up and informed me that Gracie had gained the hill, but could not hold it without reinforcements. I instructed him to inform Gracie that the hill must be held at all hazards, and that I would send Colonel Trigg to his support in a few minutes. Soon after Colonel Kelly sent me word by Lieutenant McDaniel that he could not hold the hill without succor, and I gave him a similar response. This was about the period of the heaviest fire, and I rode forward to where Colonel Kelly was engaged on the hill, and Lieutenant McDaniel brought him to me. I reiterated the order and the assurance of Trigg's speedy arrival, and passed on to the right, where I met General Gracie. He reported his ammunition almost exhausted, and was withdrawing his men to replenish his cartridge boxes.

In the meantime, General Buckner had sent me Colonel Trigg's brigade, which, advancing in double-quick time, arrived at a critical moment, while the battle was raging fiercely. One of Trigg's regiments went to the support of General Gracie, while the remainder of his brigade was ordered to form on the left of Kelly and to attack the enemy on the ridge. This fresh brigade, moving over the troops halted in the valley below, assaulted with great ardor the the enemy on the left of Kelly, and quickly carried the first ridge. The fresh and lengthening line of fire from this fine command reanimated our men, and disheartened the enemy, who relinquished their first position, and fell back to a second ridge, occupied by a strong force and posted behind field works. A momentary lull ensued. Brigadier-General Robertson reported to me, and I directed him to occupy and hold the position from which Gracie had withdrawn to replenish his ammunition. I sent, at this time, for Colonel Kelly, who reported in person, and informed me that the enemy in his front seemed in confusion. I directed him to use his discretion and press the advantage by advancing as far as practicable, with Trigg wheeling to the right toward the declivity of the battery hill, stretching towards Chattanooga. It was now moonlight, and Kelly returning to his command after a few minutes absence from it, the fire reopened, and, continuing for a short time, ceased. It was the last fire of the day, and closed the battle.

In the last attack made by Trigg and Kelly, Colonel Hawkins, of the Fifth Kentucky, a brave and skilful officer of Kelly's brigade, captured two Colonels, one Lieutenant-Colonel, a number of company officers, and two hundred and forty-nine prisoners. The Twenty-second Michigan, the Eighty-ninth Ohio, and part of the Twenty-first Ohio regiments were captured by Trigg's and Kelly's brigades, and five stands of colors were taken by Sergeant Timmons, of the Seventh Florida regiment, and by Privates Heneker, Harris, Hylton, and Carter, of the Fifty-fourth Virginia. Colonels Carleton, Lefebvre, and Lieutenant-Colonel Glenn were among the prisoners.

The next morning about four thousand five hundred stands of arms, which had been thrown away by the flying enemy, were secured by my command. I learned that Steadman's division and troops from General Granger's reserve corps held the heights attacked by my division, and from captured artillerists, at Snodgrass' house, that the hill had been occupied by a battery of the regular army and another from Ohio.

Among the wounded at Snodgrass' house, where a hospital had been established by the enemy, were many prisoners, some of whom were from Crittenden's corps, portions of which seem also to have occupied the hill. In the attack on the hill no artillery could be used by us effectively. The struggle was alone for the infantry. Few fell who were not struck down by the rifle or the musket. Whilst at the height of the engagement, the reserve artillery of Major Williams opened fire, by order of Major-General Buckner, on the rear lines of the enemy, but with what effect I could not judge. The fire served, however, to draw that of the enemy to another part of the field on my right. As my line advanced, I sent word to General Buckner, requesting him to cause Williams to cease firing or he would enfilade my men who had now the ridge, and the batteries were promptly stopped. The battalion of Georgia artillery, under Major Leyden, was engaged with Colonel Trigg on Saturday, and that of Captain Jeffries, protected by the Sixty-fifth Georgia, occupied an important position on the left. Captain Peeble's battery, of Major Leyden's command, sustained a small loss in the engagement. No opportunity for the advantageous use of his guns was offered in that quarter of the field. I refer to Major Leyden's report for detail.

The next morning, I ordered the burial of the dead. Many of our brave men had fallen in charging the slopes leading to the summit of the ridge. The musketry from the low breastworks of the enemy on the hill attacked by General Gracie, had set fire to the dry foliage, and scorched and blackened corpses gave fearful proof of the heroism and suffering of the brave men who had stormed the hill. The ground occupied by the enemy's battery was strewn with slain. More to the north, in a wooded dell in front of Kelly and Trigg, many dead and wounded of the enemy were found, who had fled the combat and sought concealment in its shadows. All the dead along my line, whether friend or enemy, were buried, and the wounded removed to hospital.

I have already mentioned the services of Brigadier-General Gracie and his command, and desire to express my approval of the courage and skill he manifested in the battle. It also affords me pleasure to notice the valuable services of Colonel J. M. Moody, Lieutenant-Colonel Sandford, Major McLennan, Captain Walden, and Surgeon Luckie, of Gracie's brigade. Colonel Trigg maintained and increased his justly merited reputation as a brave and skilful officer. Every order was executed with energy and intelligence. To the rapidity with which he moved his command to the support of Kelly's and Gracie's brigades, and availed himself of the advantages of the field, I attribute, in a great measure, the success of my command in carrying the position. Colonel Findlay, of the Sixth Florida, moved at once to my support, with Lieutenant-Colonel Wade, of the Fifty-fourth Virginia, while the Seventh Florida, under Colonel Bullock, was brought forward by Colonel Trigg, in person. During the struggle for the heights, Colonel Kelly had his horse shot under him, and displayed great courage and skill. He animated his men by his example, and with unshaken firmness retained the ground he had won. During the action, he was reinforced by a regiment from the brigade of Brigadier-General Patton Anderson, who was in his vicinity, for which timely aid I desire to express my obligations.

Colonel Kelly took into action eight hundred and seventy-six officers and men, one of his regiments (the Sixty-fifth Georgia) being detached, and lost three hundred killed and wounded. Colonel Palmer, of the Fifty-eighth North Carolina, though wounded, remained on the field, and bravely commanded his regiment. Lieutenant-Colonel Edmund Kirby, a young, brave, and lamented officer of the same regiment, fell early in the action. Captain Lynch, of the Sixty-third Virginia, and Lieutenant-Colonel Conner, Major Myneher, and Adjutant Thomas B. Cook, of the Fifth Kentucky, merit honorable mention. Captain Joseph Desha, of the Fifth Kentucky, who, though painfully wounded, remained on the field until the enemy was defeated, deserves especial commendation. Captain Desha has been often in action, and always honorably mentioned, and I respectfully recommend him for promotion.

The actual strength of the command taken by me into action on Sunday was three thousand seven hundred and fifty-two men, and three hundred and twenty-six officers, being an aggregate of four thousand and seventy-eight infantry, and my total loss in the battle was twelve hundred and seventy-five killed and wounded—and sixty-one missing, nearly all of the lost having been subsequently accounted for.

I desire to express my thanks to my staff for the efficient aid they rendered me. Major W. M. Owen, Chief of Artillery; Captain Sandford, Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain Edward C. Preston, Division Inspector; Lieutenant Edward Whitfield, Ordnance Officer; Lieutenant Adams, Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General; Lieutenant Harris H. Johnston, Aid-de-Camp, and Captain J. C. Blackburn, volunteer Aid-de-Camp, were actively employed during the battle, and I tender to them the assurance of my sense of their valuable services on the field. Lieutenant Bowles, of Morgan's cavalry, was temporarily attached to my staff, and assisted me greatly during the engagement. Major Edward Crutchfield, Quartermaster, and Major Bradford, were under orders a short distance in the rear, but availed themselves of each interval to join me at the front, and fulfilled their respective duties to my entire satisfaction. Surgeon Benjamin Gillespie, by the establishment of field hospitals and his care of the wounded, merits my thanks and official notice.

Inclosed I transmit the reports of General Gracie, Colonels Kelly and Trigg, with others of subordinate officers. I refer to them for many details which cannot be embraced in this report,

and invite attention to the instances of skill and gallantry shown by officers and men which they record. The troops of my division had never been engaged in any important battle, having been stationed during the war chiefly in Southwestern Virginia and East Tennessee, to defend their mountain passes from invasion. Held in reserve while the conflict raged around them for a day and a half, they manifested a noble ardor to share its dangers and its glories. Though long in service, and not aspiring to the title of veterans, I felt strong confidence in their patriotism, courage, and discipline. The hour for the trial of all these great qualities arrived; every hope was justified, and I feel assured that both officers and men won honorable and enduring renown upon the memorable field of Chickamauga.

I have the honor to remain

Your obedient servant,

W. PRESTON,
Brigadier-General, P. A. C. S.

Tabular Statement of the Strength of Preston's Division in the Battle of Chickamauga, and the Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing.

Command.	Effective Strength.				Killed, Wounded, and Missing.						
	Sept. 19, 1863.		Sept. 20, 1863.		Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
Gracie's Brigade,	185	1,992	134	1,869	6	84	30	578	.....	27	725
Trigg's Brigade,	119	1,417	108	1,091	3	43	18	213	.....	5	282
Kelly's Brigade,*	109	1,037	84	792	5	57	15	223	....	29	329
Total,	363	4,446	326	3,752	14	184	63	1,014	.....	61	1,336

* The Sixty-fifth Georgia detached on September twentieth.

W. PRESTON,
Brigadier-General commanding Division.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL N. B. FORREST, COMMANDING CAVALRY.

HEADQUARTERS FORREST'S CAVALRY COMMAND,
DALTON, GEORGIA, October 22, 1863.

Lieutenant-Colonel George W. Brent, A. A. General Army of Tennessee:

COLONEL: I have the honor to forward the following report of the operations of my command during the action at Chickamauga Creek on the nineteenth and twentieth ultimo; also a brief statement of its movements and engagements prior and subsequent to the battle of Chickamauga, accompanying it with the reports of Brigadier-General Pegram, commanding division, and Colonel J. L. Scott, commanding brigade. No report from Brigadier-General Armstrong, commanding First division of the corps, has been received. A report is also due from Brigadier-General Davidson, who commanded a brigade of General Pegram's division during the battle of Chickamauga. The reports of both officers would no doubt have been furnished but for the movements in the East Tennessee, and afterwards under General Wheeler in Middle Tennessee, which gave no time or opportunity to make them out.

On the nineteenth ultimo I was ordered to establish my headquarters at Dalton, and my command was located and disposed of as follows: Colonel Hodges' brigade was sent on the Cleveland and Dalton road to meet the enemy—then reported at Athens, Tennessee, and advancing; Colonel Scott's brigade was ordered to Ringgold, Georgia, to watch the enemy on the road from Chattanooga to that point; General Pegram was left at or near Peavine church, and Brigadier-General Armstrong's division was located in front of General Cheatham's infantry division, on the Chattanooga and Lafayette road. I retained with me at Dalton about two hundred and forty men of General Morgan's command.

The reports of General Pegram and Colonel Scott sufficiently detail their operations prior to the battle of Chickamauga, and require no further comments here.

On Thursday, seventeenth ultimo, I moved from Dalton, and on Friday morning from Ringgold to Peavine Creek, having with me Morgan's men (under Lieutenant-Colonel Martin) and my escort, and met the enemy's cavalry (Mintry's brigade) at Peavine Creek. Dismounting Lieutenant-Colonel Martin's command, and, assisted by Brigadier-General B. R. Johnson's command, the enemy were driven across the Chickamauga at Reed's Bridge, at which point I was joined by General Pegram's division. Crossing the

creek at a ford above the bridge, the country was scoured for a mile west of the bridge. General Hood's command of infantry also crossed the Chickamauga and formed in line of battle, my command bivouacking on the field in the rear of his line, near Alexander's Bridge.

On the morning of the nineteenth, I was ordered to move with my command down the road towards Reed's Bridge and develop the enemy, which was promptly done, and their advance was soon engaged at the steam saw-mill near that point. Finding the enemy too strong for General Pegram's force, I dispatched a staff officer to Lieutenant-General Polk's quarters for General Armstrong's division. He could only spare Dibrell's brigade, which arrived shortly after we engaged the enemy, was speedily dismounted and formed, and, with General Pegram's division, were able to hold position until infantry reinforcements arrived, the first brigade of which, under Colonel Wilson, formed on my left, advanced in gallant style, driving the enemy back and capturing a battery of artillery. My dismounted cavalry advanced with them. The superior force of the enemy compelled us to give back until reinforced by General Ector's brigade, when the enemy were again driven back. From statements of prisoners captured, the enemy's force engaged was four brigades of infantry and one of cavalry. But when driven back the second time, with the loss of another battery, their full force was developed, and, being met and overpowered by vastly superior numbers, we were compelled to fall back to our first position. A cavalry charge was made to protect the infantry as they retired, which they did in good order, though with loss. We captured many prisoners, but were unable, for want of horses, to bring off the guns captured from the enemy. Until the arrival of Major-General Walker (being the senior officer present), I assumed temporary command of the infantry, and I must say that the fighting and the gallant charges of the two brigades just referred to excited my astonishment. They broke the enemy's line, and could not be halted or withdrawn until nearly surrounded. We fell back, fighting and contesting the ground, to our original position, near the mill on the Reed's Bridge road. General Cheatham's division coming up and engaging the enemy, drove them for some distance, but was, in turn, compelled to fall back. Seeing General Maney's brigade hard pressed and retiring before the enemy, I hastened to his relief with Freeman's battery of six pieces, dismounting Colonel Dibrell's brigade to support it. The conduct of Major John R. ———, Chief of Artillery, and the officers and men of this battery, on this occasion, deserve special mention. They kept up a constant and destructive fire upon the enemy until they were within fifty yards of the guns, getting off the field with all their guns, notwithstanding the loss of horses. They were gallantly protected by Colonel Dibrell in retiring, who fell back with the line of infantry. General Armstrong, having been released by General Polk, arrived with his brigade and took command of his divison, forming it, and, with Pegram's division, holding the road to Reed's Bridge, which had been repaired during the day.

On Sunday morning, the twentieth, I received orders to move up and keep in line with General Breckinridge's division, which I did, dismounting all of General Armstrong's division, except the First Tennessee regiment, of McDonald's brigade, holding General Pegram's division in reserve on my right. The two commands of General Armstrong's division, which were mounted, took possesion of the Lafayette road, capturing the enemy's hospitals and quite a number of prisoners. They were compelled to fall back, as the enemy's reserves, under General Granger, advanced upon that road. Colonel Dibrell fought in front, with the infantry, during that day. As General Granger approached, by shelling his command and manœuvring his troops, he was detained nearly two hours and prevented from joining the main force until late in the evening, and then at a double-quick and under a heavy fire from Freeman's battery, and a section of Napoleon guns, borrowed from General Breckinridge. After Granger's column had vacated the road in front of me, I moved my dismounted men rapidly forward and took possession from the Federal Hospital to the woods on the left, through which the infantry was fighting and advancing. My artillery was ordered forward, but, before it could reach the woods and be placed in position, a charge was made by the enemy, the infantry line, retreating in confusion, and leaving me without a support, but held the ground long enough to get my artillery back to the position from which we shelled Granger's column, and opened fire upon the advancing column with fourteen pieces of artillery, driving them back and terminating on the right flank the battle of Chickamauga. This fire was at short range, in open ground, and was to the enemy very destructive, killing two colonels and many other officers and privates.

It is with pride and pleasure that I mention the gallant conduct of the officers and men of my command. General Armstrong's division fought almost entirely on foot, always up and frequently in advance of the infantry. My command was kept on the field during the night of the twentieth, and men and horses suffered greatly for want of water. The men were without rations and the horses had only received a partial feed once during the two days' engagement.

On Monday morning I moved forward on the Lafayette road towards Chattanooga, capturing many prisoners and arms. The latter were collected as far as practicable and sent to the rear, using for that purpose several wagons and ambulances captured from the retreating enemy or abandoned or left by them. On taking possession of Mission Ridge, one mile or thereabouts

from Rossville, we found the enemy fortifying the gap; dismounted Colonel Dibrell's regiment, under command of Captain McGunns, and attacked them, but found the force too large to dislodge them. On the arrival of my artillery, it opened on and fought them for several hours, but could not move them.

We held possession of the ridge during the night, and on Tuesday moved down from Mission Ridge into the Chattanooga Valley, driving the enemy into the woods, and advancing on the Lafayette road beyond Watkins' farm, and holding position there until the arrival of Kershaw's brigade. My command was kept in line of battle during the night at Silrey's Ford, on the Tennessee River.

On Wednesday twenty-third, with McDonald's battalion, I gained the point of Lookout Mountain. My troops, being gradually relieved by infantry, were ordered to the rear, and went into camp at and near Bird's Mills, with orders issued to cook up rations and shoe the horses as rapidly as possible.

On Friday morning, the twenty-fifth, I received orders to move with my entire command to meet the forces of Burnside at or near Harrison, which order was immediately obeyed. Having proceeded as far as Chattanooga Station, a second courier came up with an order to proceed *via* Cleveland to Charleston and disperse the enemy at that place, and, if necessary, to cross the ——— River. I reached Cleveland that night, and went to Charleston next morning; found the enemy on the opposite side of the river. I moved up my artillery, and after a sharp cannonading, drove them off and threw my cavalry across the river. From prisoners captured, found the force opposite Charleston, and retreating, was a mounted brigade commanded by Colonel Byrd. Learning also that Wolford's Federal cavalry was encamped at Cedar Springs, three miles from Athens, it was deemed necessary to follow, which was done rapidly, fighting them repeatedly and driving them before us. Their last stand was made at Philadelphia, when Wolford's brigade was put to flight by the advance of Armstrong's division, under Colonel Dibrell. Receiving orders to return at once, I withdrew my command back to Charleston, ordering General Davidson, with his division, and General Armstrong, with his brigade, to report to General Wheeler at Cotton Port Ferry. Our loss in the expedition to East Tennessee was four men wounded and two captured. We killed and wounded about twenty of the enemy, and sent one hundred and twenty prisoners to Dalton.

In closing this report, I desire to pay a just tribute to my officers and men for their gallantry and uncomplaining endurance of all the fatigues and dangers incident to the movements and engagements set forth in this report. The charges made by Armstrong's division (while fighting on foot) in the battle of Chickamauga would be creditable to the best drilled infantry. The officers of my staff have, as on many previous occasions, discharged all duties with promptness and fidelity.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully,
your obedient servant,
N. B. FORREST,
Brigadier General commanding.

P. S.—As soon as official reports can be obtained from General Armstrong's and General Davidson's divisions they will be forwarded. Our losses cannot at present be estimated.

Respectfully, etc.,
N. B. FORREST.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN PEGRAM, COMMANDING CAVALRY DIVISION.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
NEAR CHICKAMAUGA STATION, September 24, 1863.

To Major J. P. Strange, Assistant Adjutant-General Forrest's Cavalry Corps:

MAJOR: In obedience to orders, I have the honor to make the following report of the recent combats of my command with the enemy:

The first of these occurred near Graysville, on the tenth instant, when, being out on a reconnoissance with the Sixth Georgia cavalry (Colonel Hart), it was reported the enemy had thrown himself between Colonel Scott and myself. Deeming the opening of communication with Scott most important, I ordered Colonel Hart to charge the enemy with two companies of his command. This he most gallantly did, and brought out fifty-nine prisoners—being the skirmishers of Palmer's division—from within sight of the masses of the enemy. The second engagement with the enemy was on the twelfth instant, near Leet's tan-yard, where we fought for two hours Wilder's lightning brigade of mounted infantry. My force engaged in this fight was the Sixth Georgia and Rucker's legion. It would be impossible to pay too high a tribute to the daring gallantry of my small force in this unequal conflict with the picked brigade of General Crittenden's corps. For a time the fight was almost literally hand to hand. I was forced back only about four hundred yards, which point I held during the night. My loss in this fight was fifty killed and wounded, numbering some of my most valuable young officers. A correct list of killed and wounded will be forwarded. Our next meeting with the foe was on Saturday, the nineteenth instant, on the memorable field of "the Chickamauga." Brigadier-General Davidson, having reported for duty, was assigned to the command of my old brigade. He was ordered to take position near Reed's saw mill. Before reaching it, he met and drove before him the enemy's pickets, capturing a few of them. Some time after this skirmish, whilst General Forrest and I were in front examining the roads, General Davidson was attacked suddenly upon his left. Hurrying back, I found it somewhat difficult, aided by General Davidson and all my officers, to get the command in a proper position to repel the fierce attacks of the enemy's infantry. All the available force was soon, however, well posted, under the general direction of

General Forrest. It became at once apparent to all that we were fighting overpowering numbers. General Forrest, having sent several messages for the infantry to come up, finally went for them himself, ordering me to hold the position until their arrival. In obeying this order, our loss was about one-fourth of the command, including several officers. Nearly every colonel of the brigade had a horse shot under him. Although the highest praise is due to all the gallant men engaged in this (for cavalry) remarkable fight, I must not omit mentioning particularly Colonel Goode, of the Tenth Confederate cavalry, whose horse was shot, and Captain Arnold, Sixteenth battalion Tennessee cavalry, who was badly wounded. Our next engagement with the enemy was with Colonel Minty's brigade mounted infantry, being a part of the rear-guard of General Rosecrans' army. After driving his skirmishers for more than a mile, we found him strongly posted on Missionary Ridge. We drove him from one fine position, but were unable to dislodge him from the summit; from which, however, he retired during the night. In holding the ground gained, my command was subjected to a heavy fire of canister at three hundred yards range. Both General Davidson and Colonel Scott lost several men, among whom, I regret to say, was the gallant Lieutenant-Colonel Fain, of the Sixth Georgia, badly wounded. The steadfastness with which both brigades bore this artillery fire was admirable in the extreme, especially as evincing the discipline of the men. General Davidson again met the enemy on the twenty-second, on the Chattanooga and Harrison road. With a part of his brigade he attacked and routed the Fifty-ninth Ohio infantry, took a number of prisoners, arms, &c., and was prevented from capturing the brigade entire only by a mistake of one of his own regiments, which fired upon the portion headed by himself.

It will be observed that my report is confined to the operations of the brigade lately commanded by myself. This is because the other brigades of the division have, in the exigencies of the service, been separated from me. For Colonel Scott's operations, I refer you to his report, herewith enclosed.

I am, Major, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

JOHN PEGRAM,

Brigadier-General, commanding Division Cavalry.

N. B.—General Davidson will furnish you, at the earliest opportunity, with a complete list of the casualties and captured property.

Respectfully, &c.,

JOHN PEGRAM,

Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF COLONEL J. L. SCOTT, COMMANDING CAVALRY BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS SCOTT'S CAVALRY BRIGADE,
CHICKAMAUGA, September 24, 1863.

Major A. R. H. Ransom, A. A. A. G. Pegram's Division of Cavalry:

MAJOR: In accordance with orders from Brigadier-General Pegram, I herewith forward my report of the operations of this brigade during the recent active operations of this army. After covering the evacuation of East Tennessee, and removing all stores on the lines of railroad as far as Ringgold, Georgia, I reported to General Pegram, on the Chattanooga and Lafayette road. On the eleventh instant, under orders from General Forrest, I proceeded to Ringgold, where I encountered the advance of the enemy, General Crittenden's corps, and, after a sharp skirmish, fell back towards Dalton, to a strong position, which I held for two hours. Forced from it, I retreated slowly on to Tunnel Hill, fighting the enemy at every available point until night, when reinforcements from the command of General Forrest, who had been present during the day directing the movements, arrived. The next morning the enemy retired, and, following them, I skirmished heavily with their rear, on the twelfth and thirteenth instant, as far as the Lafayette road, near Leet's Tanyard.

On the fourteenth, under orders from General Forrest, I returned to Ringgold, and remained near that place until the evening of the seventeenth instant, when the enemy again advanced upon Ringgold from the direction of Graysville. I marched out to meet them and drove them back. That night the enemy encamped about five miles from Ringgold, on the Chattanooga road, with four regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and a battery. About midnight, with four companies of the Second Tennessee cavalry and one piece of artillery, I surprised their camp, throwing the whole force into confusion. After a sharp fight, I retired to my camp at Ringgold, the enemy not following.

On the eighteenth, by command of General Pegram, I proceeded to Red House, nine miles from Chattanooga, and drove in the advance of the enemy's reserve corps under General Granger. On the nineteenth I marched and engaged the enemy, seven regiments of infantry and a battery, with two hundred men from my command, composed of the Second and Fifth Tennessee, First Louisiana, the detachment of Morgan's command, and the Louisiana battery of two rifle pieces and two mountain howitzers. After a fierce engagement of several hours, during which I drove the enemy more than two miles and disabled one of their guns, my ammunition failing, I withdrew to my camp at the creek, the enemy too much exhausted to pursue. On the twenty-first, I held the left of the road in General Pegram's attack upon Missionary Hill, and on the twenty-second, under orders from Major-General Cheatham, I proceeded on his right, and, crossing Missionary Ridge, descended in the valley to the Western and Atlantic Railroad, about three miles from Chattanooga. Here I encountered the Fifty-ninth Ohio infantry, and drove them, in confusion, into Chattanooga. Following up, I attacked the enemy in his intrenchments, and drove them from their first line of rifle-pits. Night coming on, General Pegram

ordered me to withdraw my command to the top of the ridge, and on the next morning to this place.

It is impossible to state the loss of the enemy, but, from all information obtained, their loss in killed and wounded on the nineteenth amounted to over one hundred, besides one of General Whittaker's staff officers and seven privates prisoners. My entire prisoners amount to four commissioned officers and thirty privates. On the twenty-second I captured about seventy-five fine rifles for my unarmed men.

My own loss foots up as follows: In the Second Tennessee—Killed: officers, two; privates, three. Wounded: officers, one; men, thirteen. In the Fifth Tennessee cavalry—Killed: men, two. Wounded: officers, two; privates, twelve. In the detachment of General Morgan's command—Killed: three men. Wounded: officers, one; men, six. In the First Louisiana, one man wounded; and in the Louisiana battery, three men wounded and fifteen horses killed. Total killed, two officers and eight men. Wounded: officers, four; men, thirty-five. Total loss, forty-nine.

Of the conduct of both officers and men I cannot speak too highly. All displayed the utmost bravery and gallantry. When every one did so well, it is impossible to particularize individual instances of gallantry, but in the death of Captain Ford and Lieutenant Crozier, Second Tennessee cavalry, I have lost two brave and gallant officers, whose places it will be most difficult to fill.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. L. Scott,
Colonel, commanding Brigade of Cavalry.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL B. R. JOHNSON, COMMANDING DIVISION.

Headquarters Chattanooga, October 24, 1863.

Major-General Sellers, Assistant Adjutant-General:

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the division under my command in the action of the Chickamauga:

At five o'clock A. M., September eighteenth, 1863, four brigades and three batteries of artillery from Catoosa Station, and vicinity of Ringgold, Georgia, moved, under my command, with orders from headquarters Army of Tennessee, to proceed *via* Pleasant Grove Church to Leet's Tan-yard. Law's brigade, under Colonel Sheffield, not having cooked its rations, was ordered to do so, and follow as promptly as possible. Benning's brigade was left, in compliance with orders, to guard the depot at Ringgold. My command then consisted of the following brigades, which moved in the order in which they are named, viz.: Johnson's, McNair's, Gregg's, and Robertson's, with batteries, Everett's, Culpeper's, and Bledsoe's, in the centre, and trains in rear of their respective brigades. The head of the column had not proceeded more than three miles on the road when a dispatch was received from Colonel Brent, headquarters Army of Tennessee, directing me, with the forces under my command, to retrace my steps to the vicinity of Ringgold, and there to take the direct road to Reed's Bridge and to make a lodgment on the west bank of the Chickamauga, Forrest's cavalry covering the front and right flanks of my column on the march from Ringgold. The command was promptly put on the new line of march, and soon after I received orders and the plan of operations, by which I was directed, as commander of the right column of the Army of Tennessee, to attack the enemy in my front, in whatever force I might find them, and, after crossing Reed's Bridge, to turn to the left by the most practicable route and sweep up the Chickamauga, toward Lee and Gordon's Mill, while Major-Generals Walker and Buckner, crossing at Alexander's Bridge and Ledford's Ford, were directed to join in my movement. The orders and plans of operations indicated that the attack on the enemy's left wing was expected to be initiated by the column under my command.

About eleven o'clock A. M., in compliance with orders previously received, I halted the column near Kuler's Mill, on the Graysville and Lafayette road, four and a half miles from the former place. Captain Thompson, Assistant Chief of Artillery of General Bragg's staff, reported to me at this point, with orders to move forward immediately, and through him my arrival and the hour thereof was reported to headquarters Army of Tennessee.

Being informed by citizens that the enemy were about one mile in advance, I formed a line of battle along the road—McNair's, Johnson's, and Gregg's brigades in front, batteries in position, and Robertson's brigade in reserve. While forming the line, Brigadier-General Forrest joined me with his escort, and proceeded to the front to develop the position of the enemy, and was soon skirmishing with them. Just as my line was formed, Major Robertson came up from the direction of Lafayette and reported to me, with eight pieces of artillery. My line of skirmishers in front was now promptly advanced to Peavine Creek, which offered some obstructions to regular movements, and caused some delay in crossing the troops. Captain McDonald, of the Seventeenth Tennessee regiment, opened fire with his company upon the enemy's pickets, about one hundred and eighty yards west of the creek, and repulsed a charge of their reserve, which was made down the road to the creek. Major Robertson placed some four pieces of artillery from his own command and a section of Everett's battery in position, and opened upon the enemy, part of whom were dismounted, driving them back, with a section of artillery, which they had posted in good position. As soon as the command could cross the creek, the line, preserving its formation, with Robertson's brigade supporting, McNair's on the right, was pressed forward to the top of the hill, dis-

lodging the enemy from a second position. The cavalry, on the right, kept up the skirmishing during the ascent. We found in front of the Seventeenth Tennessee regiment three Yankees killed and one mortally wounded. It was now ascertained that the enemy's force consisted of three or four regiments of mounted men. Pressing down the western declivity of this hill, the enemy were again found in position at Reed's Bridge, over which they had passed.

The skirmishers of the Twenty-third Tennessee regiment becoming engaged, the whole regiment, supported by the brigade, charged, with a shout and run, and drove off the Yankees before they could destroy the bridge. The twenty-third Tennessee regiment here had five men wounded. After our skirmishers and some of the regiments had passed, the enemy opened a battery on the bridge, which was silenced by a section of Bledsoe's artillery.

Lieutenant Hastings, of the Seventeenth Tennessee regiment, was wounded at the bridge by the enemy's artillery.

My command commenced crossing the Chickamauga about three o'clock P. M. Major-General Hood having appeared in the column, I reported to him, and submitted to him my orders just before passing the bridge, in person. Having crossed the Chickamauga, partly by the bridge and partly by the ford above the bridge, by four o'clock P. M., the command advanced to Jay's steam saw-mill, about one mile west of Reed's Bridge, where there are two roads leading to Alexander's Bridge. I ordered the formation to be preserved, and the line of battle, extending across the right hand or western road, to move forward.

General Hood, however, here took command, and directed one regiment of Gregg's brigade to be marched in line of battle, extending across the left hand or eastern road, the other regiments of the command to be moved in the rear along that road in column of companies. Marching in this order, we proceeded rapidly past a burning house near Alexander's Ford, penetrating between the enemy and the Chickamauga to a point nearly opposite their centre, about two miles and a half from the steam saw-mill, and about one mile west of Dalton's Ford, when, in the darkness of the evening, the skirmishers at the head of the column became engaged, and Gregg's brigade was immediately deployed under a sharp fire, which wounded three men, one (First Sergeant Company D, Seventh Texas regiment) mortally. McNair's and Johnson's brigades were immediately deployed, facing southwest, and supporting Gregg's brigade. Robertson's brigade formed a line near the wagon train in rear, facing north-west, while the Forty-fourth Tennessee regiment, of Johnson's brigade, remained as rear-guard of the train. Our front line was now about eight hundred yards from Vinyard's house, on the road from Chattanooga to Lee and Gordon's Mill. The whole Yankee army was in our front —mainly at Lee and Gordon's Mill—on our right flank and rear; while our army was still on the east side of the Chickamauga. My command was the first to cross this stream, and none of our troops crossed at any point until our column had swept the west bank in front of their respective places of crossing. One-third of our forces was required to remain awake during the night, and the rest slept upon their arms.

Obstructions to cavalry were hastily placed in our front, skirmishers were thrown out to the field east of Vinyard's house, one hundred and fifty yards in front of our left flank, and scouts were sent out nearly to the road to Lee and Gordon's Mill.

September nineteenth, 1863. On making an examination of our position, early in the morning, I discovered that our skirmishers were within one hundred and fifty yards of General Preston's division, which had crossed the Chickamauga at Dalton's Ford during the night, that our line was in front and nearly perpendicular to his, and that most of our army had crossed at points lower down, placing our column near the left of our army. Major Robertson, with his eight pieces of artillery, was now detached from my command, and Robertson's brigade was united with the other brigades of Hood's division, under Brigadier-General Law, which had come up during the night, leaving three brigades under my command; these two divisions were placed under the command of Major-General Hood.

Our line of battle was formed about seven o'clock A. M., in a curve around the crest of an elevation in the woods, about one thousand yards east of the Chattanooga and Lee and Gordon's Mill road. My right brigade faced nearly west, and my left brigade about south-west. In my division, Johnson's brigade, commanded by Colonel John S. Fulton, of the Forty-fourth Tennessee regiment, was placed on the right, Gregg's brigade on the left, and McNair's brigade in reserve, in rear of Gregg's brigade. Everett's battery was posted in position on the right of Johnson's brigade, and Bledsoe's First Missouri battery on the right of Gregg's brigade. Captain Culpeper's three guns were held in reserve in rear of McNair's brigade. Law's division was posted on my right and Preston's on my left, a little retired, so that the left of the Fiftieth Tennessee regiment, on the left of Gregg's brigade, was thrown back with a view to form a connection which was never regularly made. The fighting commenced on the right of our army, about a half a mile north-west of the burnt house, near Alexander's Bridge. The first gun was fired at half-past seven A. M.

About two o'clock P. M., the enemy in my front advanced and drove in my skirmishers. I ordered Bledsoe's and Everett's batteries to open fire, and Culpeper's battery was brought into action on the left of Gregg's brigade. These guns all fired in a direction bearing towards Vinyard's house, from which direction the attack seemed to come. The right of Gregg's and the left of Johnson's brigades repulsed the

attack in that vicinity, but the engagement still continued on the left of Gregg's brigade, where the left regiments were suffering severely. The Fiftieth Tennessee regiment lost twelve killed and forty-five wounded before it moved from its position. About half-past two o'clock P. M., by direction of Major-General Hood, having instructed my artillery to move with the infantry, and to come into action whenever opportunity permitted, particularly cautioned my command to preserve its connections, to wheel slowly and to touch to the right, I ordered the division to advance and engage the enemy. This movement did not extend to the division on my left. In front of Gregg's brigade the woods presented a thick undergrowth, in which that brigade at once becoming hotly engaged, its progress was impeded, while Johnson's brigade advanced some six hundred yards before the enemy opened fire upon it. The artillery advanced and fired by section, keeping well up with the infantry. Gregg's brigade advanced some three hundred yards, obliquing in endeavoring, under fire, to keep the connection to the right. The connection, however, was broken in the thick woods, between the Second and Third battalions, the two right regiments preserving their connection with the line on their right, and wheeling with it to the right; the Third and Fourth regiments, advancing less obliquely, faced more to the south, while the left regiment of that brigade, the Fiftieth Tennessee regiment, under Colonel Suggs, moved more directly to its front, which was in a southern direction, owing to the left having been thrown back to connect with Preston's division, and at the same time it stretched out to the right, just north of Vinyard's fields, to cover the increasing interval, until nearly the whole regiment was deployed in open order as skirmishers. This movement of the Fiftieth Tennessee regiment was induced by the heavy attack of the enemy on that flank; but it did not succeed in preserving the connection, and it became separated from the brigade. In this condition, the brigade fought gallantly and kept up a heavy fire all along its broken line and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy.

Two regiments of McNair's brigade, the Thirty-ninth North Carolina regiment, under Colonel Coleman, and the Twenty-fifth Arkansas regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hupstalder, were sent forward between the Fiftieth Tennessee regiment and the brigade to which it belongs. These two regiments came up to the left of the Seventh Texas regiment, of Gregg's brigade, about four hundred yards in front of the position from which my line had moved, and advanced gallantly to the road from Chattanooga to Lee and Gordon's Mill, north of Vinyard's farm, and left still a wide interval on the right of the Fiftieth Tennessee regiment, which regiment continued to present an extended line and to fight gallantly and persistently the heavy forces in front, while its ranks were being continually thinned. It will be seen by the report of Colonel Coleman, of the Thirty-ninth North Carolina regiment, forwarded herewith, that the two regiments from Gregg's brigade drove the enemy in rapid flight across the Chattanooga road, and passed a small house in a corn field west of the road, and north of Vinyard's house; and that here, though the enemy in their front were in flight and broken, those regiments fell back for want of support, and on account of reinforcement received by the enemy, and a flank fire on the left.

In the meantime, the brigade of Brigadier-General Robertson, of Hood's division, was brought up and advanced on the right of the Fiftieth Tennessee regiment, which now contracted its line and concentrated its fire upon the enemy on the left in the vicinity of Vinyard's. Under the spirited charge and heavy fire of Robertson's brigade, the enemy were driven back some distance. The operations of the brigade will be more properly reported by its division commander. It will, however, be proper for me to state that, during a halt, before Robertson's brigade reached the Chattanooga road, Brigadier-General Gregg rode out in front to reconnoitre the enemy's position. He very soon found himself near the enemy's line, and was suddenly halted by the Yankee skirmishers. Turning his horse to ride back to the rear, he was shot through the neck. Having fallen from his horse, the Yankees proceeded to take from his person his spurs and sword, when Robertson's brigade charged forward and recovered possession of him and his horse.

Brigadier-General Gregg deserves special commendation for his gallantry and activity on the field. The brigade which he commanded is an excellent one, and is commanded by a worthy and able officer.

Colonel Suggs, of the Fiftieth Tennessee regiment, also merits particular notice for the manner in which he from time to time disposed his regiment and protected our flank, which was necessarily exposed in our advance, as the movement did not extend to the division on our left. While these operations were going on in my left brigade, the right one, Johnson's, with which the Forty-first Tennessee regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel James D. Tillman, and the Third Tennessee regiment, under Colonel C. H. Walker, of Gregg's brigade, preserved their connection, having advanced some six hundred yards, received the fire of the enemy's artillery and infantry and became hotly engaged. The enemy were posted upon rising ground. A battery swept our ranks with grape-shot, while their infantry delivered heavy volleys from small arms. The contest continued here nearly an hour, when the enemy, after a stubborn resistance, gradually retired to an open woods, beyond the road from Chattanooga to Lee and Gordon's Mill; approaching the road, a part of the brigade halted and poured its fire into the enemy's ranks, now in full view, two hundred yards in front; again advanced, crossed the road, gained the cover of the woods on the left

of the field in which the enemy's battery was posted, a clearing, with inclosure intervening. The Twenty-fifth Tennessee regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Snowden, and part of the Twenty-third Tennessee regiment, now wheeled to the right, moved on the flank of the battery, gained the cover of a fence north of the clearing, poured into it a few volleys, charged and captured the battery. This was well and gallantly done, and Lieutenant-Colonel Snowden, with the officers and men under his command, deserve especial consideration for the manner in which the movement was accomplished. The remainder of the brigade, save about one-third of the right regiment, now crossed the road. The Seventeenth Tennessee, the left regiment, had moved about two hundred yards beyond it, and the Third and Forty-first Tennessee regiments of Gregg's brigade, which had continued to move with Johnson's brigade, had advanced somewhat farther, when the enemy, marching by the flank, suddenly appeared on the left and rear of the last two regiments. Colonel Walker, of the Third Tennessee regiment, on discovering this movement, faced his regiment by the rear rank and moved back across the road, while Colonel Tillman hastened to communicate the knowledge of the movement to Colonel Fulton, commanding Johnson's brigade. The movement of the enemy down the Chattanooga road was so prompt, that they penetrated our line on the left of Johnson's brigade, filed off to the left and fired a volley into its rear. This brigade now moved by one impulse to the right and fell back to the east of the road from Chattanooga to Lee and Gordon's Mill, leaving eleven officers (including Major Davis, of the Seventeenth Tennessee regiment), sixty men, and the captured battery, in the hands of the enemy. In the meantime the Third and Forty-first regiments Tennessee volunteers, which were falling to the rear, were placed in position by Captain W. T. Blakemore, my Aid-de-Camp, who was on duty in that part of the field and discovered this movement of the enemy, and, by his instruction, charged the column which had so suddenly appeared in our rear and drove it back. Colonel Walker now placed these regiments diagonally across the road, the right advanced, facing the enemy, in which position I ordered him to remain for a time. I have no doubt that we have encountered a portion of McCook's corps of the Federal army, moving to support their left. Our scouts thrown out in front of our skirmishers, and my Brigade Inspector, Lieutenant Black, after a personal reconnoissance, had previously reported the enemy moving artillery and infantry in that direction. With the heavy force of the enemy still in vicinity of Lee and Gordon's Mill, this advance of my division, unsupported by any movement on my left, was pushed quite as far as was judicious.

Finding my line now, about sunset, quite irregular in its formation, I proceeded immediately to re-form it, in the woods, about six hundred yards east of the road from Chattanooga to Lee and Gordon's Mill, when, by order of Major-General Hood, temporary breastworks of timber were put up along the line, behind which my command rested during the night, with skirmishers thrown out to the road. During this brief engagement, the loss of the division was quite heavy. The Third Tennessee regiment reports twelve men killed and forty-five wounded before it was ordered to advance. The Seventh Texas regiment had several killed and wounded at the same time. Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas W. Beaumont, well and honorably known in civil as well as military life, Captain Williams and two other company officers of the Fiftieth Tennessee regiment were killed, seven officers wounded and one missing, while it lost heavily in men. The Forty-fourth Tennessee regiment had Lieutenant-Colonel John L. McEwing, Jr., commanding (a gallant and able officer, who has rendered faithful and efficient service in our army) and five company officers wounded, one (Captain Samuel Jackson) mortally. It lost about fifty men wounded and six killed, one of whom (Sergeant T. A. Johnson) was particularly distinguished for gallantry. The command of this regiment now devolved upon Major G. M. Crawford. The Seventeenth Tennessee regiment had one officer killed and two officers and twenty men wounded. Colonel N. B. Granbury, of the Seventh Texas, Major S. H. Colmes, of the First Tennessee battalion, and Major Lowe, of the Twenty-third Tennessee regiment, were severely wounded. The Twenty-third Tennessee lost, in all, one officer and five men killed, five officers wounded, and fifty-eight men wounded and captured. The losses of the other regiments are not reported in this connection. Captain Jackson, of the Forty-fourth Tennessee regiment, has since died of his wounds. Known to me long and familiarly in youth and manhood as Captain Samuel Jackson has been, I feel unable to do justice to his many virtues, his pure and admirable character, or his merits as as an officer and soldier.

On Sunday, September twentieth, 1863, my line was formed by seven o'clock A. M., with McNair's brigade on the right, Johnson's brigade in the centre, and two regiments—the Fiftieth Tennessee regiment and the First Tennessee battalion (consolidated), under Major C. W. Robertson, and the Seventh Texas, under Major Van Zant—on the left. The rest of Gregg's brigade, commanded by Colonel Suggs, formed a second line. Culpeper's battery was placed in position on the right of McNair's brigade, Everett's on the right of Johnson's brigade, and Bledsoe's on the right of the two regiments in the front line from Gregg's brigade. Hindman's division formed on my left, and Stewart's on my right. Hood's division, commanded by Brigadier-General Law, formed in rear of my division, giving us a depth of three lines. About ten o'clock A. M., our skirmishers fell back under the advance of the enemy. My line promptly opened a steady fire with artillery and small arms, which soon repulsed the attack. Ten minutes

after eleven o'clock A. M., a general advance was ordered, which, commencing somewhere on the right, included Hindman's division on the left. The enemy occupied the ground in our front, along the road leading from Chattanooga to Lee and Gordon's Mill. Their line was formed along the fence at Brotherton's house, and they had a battery in the open field south of the house, where Johnson's brigade had captured a battery on Saturday. The enemy also occupied two lines of breastworks, made of rails and timber, extending along my front and to the left of it, in the woods west of Brotherton's farm. By order of Major-General Hood, I moved my division forward and at once engaged the enemy. We advanced about six hundred yards through the woods, under a heavy fire of artillery and infantry, which swept our ranks with terrific effect, and crossed the road to Lee and Gordon's Mill, the left brigades of my division passing on either side of Brotherton's house. Our charge was irresistible, and the Yankees who did not flee were killed and captured at the fences and out-houses. Among the latter is especially mentioned Colonel F. A. Bartleson, of the One-Hundredth Illinois regiment, who was captured, with many others, by Johnson's brigade.

Everett's battery now took a position in a field south of Brotherton's house, and opened to the front and left, firing about six rounds to the piece, and my line again moved forward under a heavy fire from the enemy's breastworks. The fire was so heavy that my right brigade faltered for a moment, and some of the men commenced falling back, but it was soon rallied and moving forward again. My whole line, Gregg's brigade in rear, supported by Hood's division, under Law, in a third line, swept forward with great force and rapidity and carried the breastworks, from which the foe precipitately retreated, under a heavy fire, particularly directed to the left, from my left brigade. Having advanced some distance in the woods west of Brotherton's farm, to the foot of a small ascent covered with a thick growth of young pines, my right brigade halted under the effect of a heavy fire, which was also severely damaging my second line. Colonel Suggs now pushed to the front the three regiments of Gregg's brigade which had formed my second line, Johnson's brigade moving to the left at the same time, and again my line advanced rapidly on the enemy, driving them from the woods east of Dyer's house, McNair's brigade bearing to the right.

Our lines now emerged from the forest into open ground on the border of long open fields, over which the enemy were retreating, under cover of several batteries, which were ranged along the crest of a ridge on our right and front, running up to the corner of a stubble-field, and of one battery on our left and front, posted on an elevation in the edge of the woods, just at the corner of a field near a peach orchard, and southwest of Dyer's house. The scene now presented was unspeakably grand. The resolute and impetuous charge, the rush of our heavy columns, sweeping out from the shadow and gloom of the forest into the open fields, flooded with sunlight, the glitter of arms, the onward dash of artillery and mounted men, the retreat of the foe, the shouts of the hosts of our army, the dust, the smoke, the noise of fire-arms, of whistling balls and grapeshot, and of bursting shell, made up a battle scene of unsurpassed grandeur. Here General Hood gave me the last order I received from him on the field: "Go ahead and keep ahead of everything." How this order was obeyed will be best determined by those who investigate all the details of this battle.

The unusual depth of our columns of attack, in this part of the field, and the force and power with which it was thrown upon the enemy's line, had now completely broken and routed their centre and cast the shattered fragments to the right and left. Everett's battery was here ordered into action on the right of Johnson's brigade and opened upon the retreating foe, while my line continued to advance.

There was now an interval of eight hundred yards between Hindman's division on my left and my command. Johnson's brigade on the left bore but slightly to the right, its left regiment stretching across the road from Dyer's house to Crawfish road, and passing on both sides of the house. Gregg's brigade, in the centre, moved a little to the right, so as to flank and capture nine pieces of artillery on its right, posted on the ascent to the eminence, in the corner of the field north of Dyer's house. McNair's brigade, now somewhat in the rear of the two left brigades, moved obliquely to the right and directly upon the eminence. My line was here uncovered by Hood's division, which must have changed its direction to the right.

The nine pieces captured by Gregg's brigade are reported by Colonel Suggs, commanding, as having been taken from the field by a detail under Adjutant Fletcher Beaumont, of the Fiftieth Tennessee regiment, who caused the Yankee drivers to drive some of the teams to the rear. Four of these pieces, three-inch rifles, belong to the First Missouri Federal battery, and are now in possession of the First Missouri Confederate battery (Bledsoe's), attached to Gregg's brigade. A statement made by Adjutant Beaumont in regard to the capture is herewith enclosed.

In this advance, Brigadier-General E. McNair, commanding the right brigade, and Colonel Harper, of the First Arkansas regiment, of that brigade, were wounded—the latter mortally, and the command of McNair's brigade devolved upon Colonel Coleman, of the Thirty-ninth North Carolina regiment. Colonel Coleman reports that McNair's brigade charged and carried the eminence in the corner of the field to our right, capturing the ten guns, eight of which were immediately carried off, and two were subsequently removed, and that the brigade fell back for want of ammunition and support, and formed on the left of Robertson's brigade, of Hood's division. Whether Colonel Coleman's report

has any reference, in this connection, to the nine guns reported as captured by Gregg's brigade, or whether there is any point of dispute between these two brigades as to captured artillery, I cannot now determine. McNair's brigade has been detached from this army, and I am unable to communicate with it in time to make my report explicit on this point.

In the meantime, I discovered what I conceived to be an important position, directly in our front—an elevated ridge of open ground, running nearly north and south, beyond the narrow strips of woods on the western borders of the open fields in our front and about six hundred yards west of the elevation on which the nine pieces of artillery had been captured, and I hastened to press forward Gregg's brigade, which had halted for a moment on the flank of the guns that were being removed, while Johnson's brigade approached the same position from the left. From the crest of this ridge the ground descends abruptly into a corn field and cove, lying south of Villetoe's house. West of the cove is a range of the Missionary Ridge, while north of it a spur of that ridge spreads out to the east. Through a gap at the angle between this spur on the north and the ridge on the west of the cove, and about one thousand yards from the ridge on the east, where my division was now taking position, passes the Crawfish road, which continues south along the base of the ridge on the western side of the cove. Along this road a line of telegraph wires extended from Chattanooga to General Rosecrans's headquarters, and at the gorge of the gap a train of wagons filled the road, while a number of caissons and a battery of artillery, for defence of the train, occupied the grounds near Villetoe's house.

The ridge on the east of the cove was taken without resistance, though the enemy had there constructed a breastwork of rails, and had filled up a large number of their knapsacks, secure, as they doubtless thought, from the danger of the battle-field. As soon as this ridge was occupied, which was a few minutes before twelve M., our advance position, commanded by adjacent hills and separated on the right and left as far as I could see from our troops, induced me immediately to send my Aid-de-Camp, Captain Blakemore, to report our position to Lieutenant-General Longstreet, commanding our wing, and to bring up artillery and infantry to our support, while I disposed of my command for defence. Gregg's brigade was at once posted partly facing to the north, at the edge of the woods at the north end of the field, and partly facing to the west, along a portion of the adjacent ridge. Johnson's brigade was posted, facing to the west, on the crest of the ridge, about one hundred yards to the left of Gregg's brigade. Both brigades immediately advanced their skirmishers to the front.

When I discovered the train of wagons at the gorge of the Crawfish road, the enemy were making every effort to get them away. I promptly posted Everett's battery on the ridge between Johnson's and Gregg's brigades, when it opened fire on the train. The fire of the artillery and some shots from our advancing skirmishers created the utmost consternation among the drivers and teams, causing some of the wagons to be upset, and others to be run against trees and up the precipitous acclivities adjacent. Lieutenant Everett also sent forward one piece of artillery to a knoll in the corn field south of Villetoe's house, which fired up the gorge along the Crawfish road. A few shots were fired upon us from a battery of the enemy posted on the high ground north of our position, to which Everett's artillery replied, firing about six rounds, when the enemy ceased firing on us. A ball from Lieutenant Everett's battery dismounted one of the guns (a rifle piece), near Villetoe's house, by breaking the axle-tree. Our skirmishers now advanced and took possession of the wagons, caissons and guns. Lieutenant Everett sent forward two teams and hauled off one Napoleon gun and caisson, attaching, for that purpose, the limber of a six-pound gun found near by the Napoleon, for which no limber was found. This gun has since been ascertained to be one of the guns of Lumsden's battery, captured by the enemy on the nineteenth, and has been returned to that battery. Besides the two pieces above-named, a six-pounder, smooth-bore, and another piece, description not now known, and seven caissons, were captured. The wagons contained some quartermaster's property, but were mainly loaded with ammunition for artillery and infantry. Two of General Rosecrans's escort and Captain Hescock, of the First Missouri Federal light artillery, Battery G, were captured on the side of the ridge west of Villetoe's house, where many other prisoners were picked up by our skirmishers. My engagements were such at this period as to prevent me from looking after or estimating the number or value of articles captured. Many of the wagons were subsequently removed by other commands in rear of mine. I now estimate the wagons captured at about thirty, a few of which had teams attached.

Before making any disposition for a further advance, I found it necessary to replenish our supply of ammunition, and, consequently, I ordered up a supply from the rear and distributed it to the most of the regiments of my command. Subsequently we drew our ammunition from the captured train. Lieutenant Black, of my staff, now brought up Dent's battery of Napoleon guns, of Hindman's division, which he found somewhere on our left, and placed three pieces on the ridge in the north-west corner of the field we occupied. No General officer or reinforcements having come up, and seeing no troops in my vicinity, my Aids having been long absent in search of support, I became impatient at the delay. Giving orders that our position should be held at all hazards, I galloped off, in person, in search of support. Having swung slightly to the right from our first position, the connection was

broken on our left, and I could see no troops in that direction. It subsequently appears that General Hindman's division gallantly drove back to the west and south the enemy's line in his front and on my left, inflicting a heavy loss on them and thus relieving us from danger in that direction.

Riding towards our right and rear some half a mile, I came upon Brigadier-General Kershaw advancing with his brigade through the open field upon the eminence near to which we had captured the battery of nine guns in our advance, and where I saw the United States flag now floating, the position having been reoccupied by the enemy. Here I learned that Major-General Hood had been wounded. Colonel Cunningham, of his staff, informed me that Brigadier-General Kershaw's brigade was much needed to attack the position in its front, and I consequently had to seek further for support. I sent Captain Blakemore, who joined me here, to find and bring up General McNair's brigade, and, after riding sometime, I found on the road, approaching my command, Major-General Hindman and Brigadier-General Anderson, to whom my Aid had communicated my necessities and wishes. Being informed that Brigadier-General Deas' brigade would move to support my left, and that General Anderson was then advancing to fill up the vacancy on my right, I returned to my command with a view to driving the enemy from my flank, directed Dent's battery to open fire to the rear of the eminence, about six hundred yards to our right, on which I had seen the United States flag floating, and on which I left Kershaw's brigade advancing.

More than an hour had now been spent in this position, and I resolved to press forward my line, even before support reached me. I therefore proceeded to form my line, facing to the north, along and in continuation of the north end of the field; Gregg's brigade on the right and Johnson's brigade on the left, extending through the corn field south of Villetoes' house and to the Crawfish road. My line being formed, I was advised that the enemy occupied the ridge beyond Villetoe's corn field and west of the Crawfish road, and it therefore became necessary to protect our left flank by skirmishers thrown out in that direction from Johnson's brigade. The advance commenced about the time Deas' brigade formed, facing to the west on the ridge we had just left. I directed Brigadier-General Deas to move his brigade directly to its front until his right flank should reach the position of my left, then to wheel to the right, sweeping the ridge west of the Crawfish road, and come up and form on the left of my line of battle.

The crest of the spur of Missionary Ridge north of Villetoe's house extends east and west in its general direction, but crosses to the south about the middle. At the east and west ends of the crest are the most elevated points of the spurs. On the slope north of the west end is Snodgrass' house, at which were the headquarters of Generals Rosecrans and Thomas during the latter part of the battle. Towards the south the slope from the crest is gradual for some distance in several places; and especially so at the west end, and terminates towards the cove in an abrupt, serrated declivity, presenting to our approach from the south several secondary spurs or knobs, with intervening short ravines. Along the crest of this spur the last desperate struggle of the northern army was made at the battle of Chickamauga.

Gregg's and Johnson's brigades, followed by Dent's and Everett's batteries, advanced in line towards the north, the left passing over the wagons, caissons, and pieces of artillery near Villetoe's house and reaching to the Crawfish road. There were a number of wounded Federals at Villetoe's house. The ladies of the family, who had taken shelter from danger on Saturday and Sunday beneath the floor, now burst forth and greeted our soldiers with clapping of hands and shouts of joy, presenting an impressive scene. The brow of the secondary spurs north of Villetoe's house were gained without resistance by Gregg's and Johnson's brigades, and by Anderson's, which had come up on our right, during our advance. The line was then halted, the alignment connected, and the two regiments of Gregg's brigade which were formed on the left of my line in the morning, now returned to their brigade. Four of Dent's Napoleon guns and Everett's battery of three guns were placed in position on the spur occupied by Johnson's brigade, and two pieces of Dent's battery were placed upon the hill with Gregg's brigade. There was now no support on the left of Johnson's brigade, though Deas' brigade was every moment expected there.

A few minutes before two o'clock P. M., after the artillery had opened fire, the order was given to advance from this position with a view of gaining the main crest of the ridge in our front, which was some thousand yards distant on our left, but much nearer on our right on account of its curvature to the south in the middle. The enemy opened fire upon our left before it advanced one hundred yards. Our movement was, however, continued for a time, until my left formed a position in which it was enabled to hold the enemy in check. But the Federals moved up on our flank along a secondary spur, which united at the elevation at the west end of the main ridge with that upon which Johnson's brigade was fighting, and this movement was held in check some time by our troops firing obliquely to the left. The advance of Brigadier-General Anderson on our extreme right was a gallant and impetuous charge. It encountered a heavy force of the enemy posted in a strong position, from which they poured a volume of fire that speedily repulsed the charge. Gregg's brigade gained the crest of the ridge, after a sharp contest, driving the foe down the northern slope of the ridge and delivering a damaging fire in the retreating masses; but the enemy returned to the attack, and there being now no support on our right, the line commenced

falling back on the flank, just after Lieutenant-Colonel Tillman, commanding the Forty-first Tennessee regiment, was disabled by a wound. The Third Tennessee regiment, with about forty men of the Fiftieth Tennessee and Seventh Texas regiments, on the left of this brigade, claims to have held its advanced position until Johnson's brigade fell back under the flank movement of the enemy on its left. In retiring, this regiment had six men captured. As my line fell back, our artillery opened with canister, and was gallantly served under fire of the enemy's infantry until the troops, rallying in line at the batteries, repulsed the charge of the foe.

I now gave orders to hold the hill, and await the reinforcements from Hindman's division momentarily expected. Soon Manigault's brigade was seen advancing in line of battle through Villetoe's corn-field, in the cove in our rear. As it came up on the left of my line, Brigadier-General Deas reported in person, having with his brigade swept the ridge west of the Crawfish road. Having sent a staff officer to place these two brigades in line on my left, I rode toward the right, and met General Hindman, who directed me to take command of the left wing and wheel to the right, making the right of my division the pivot. McNair's brigade, under Colonel Coleman, now came up and formed a line in rear of the left of my division. I also detailed ten men from Johnson's brigade to assist in working the guns of Dent's battery.

Our line, from left to right, was formed of brigades in the following order, viz.: Deas', Manigault's, Johnson's, Gregg's, and Anderson's, with McNair's brigade in rear of Johnson's. Deas' brigade occupied the brow of the steep spur which forms the north side of the gorge, through which the Crawfish road passes Missionary Ridge. Manigault's stretched across the ravine and extended up the side of the adjacent spur to the right, on which Johnson's and McNair's brigades, with seven pieces of artillery, were posted. Gregg's brigade was formed on a spur of some greater length, extending more towards the east, and separated in part from the main ridge by a hollow, with a piece of table land at its head to the west. Anderson's brigade was formed in two lines on the right, the front line extending up to the slope of the spur on which Gregg's brigade was formed, on the left and across the hollow on the right. The section of Dent's artillery with Gregg's brigade in the last attack was now moved to the hollow on the right, ready to be run up by hand on the main ridge as soon as it should be carried. Kershaw's brigade was somewhere on the right of, but not connected with, Anderson's brigade.

I proceeded in person to put the line in motion. Commencing with Deas' brigade, and giving careful instructions to preserve the dress and connection to the right, I passed along the line until I saw it all gallantly moving forward. A most obstinate struggle now commenced for the possession of this spur of Missionary Ridge—the last stronghold of the enemy on the battle-field of Chickamauga. Our artillery opened on the brow of the ridge and the infantry became immediately engaged. The firing was very heavy on both sides, and showed that the enemy were in strong force in our front, supported by artillery posted near the junction of the two spurs on which Deas' and Johnson's brigades respectively moved. Our line pressed determinedly forward for some time, keeping up an incessant fire with small arms. But the enemy now evidently received reinforcements of fresh troops, which advanced with a shout that was heard all along our lines, and we were driven back to our guns. It was subsequently ascertained from prisoners captured that the reinforcements were a part of General Granger's corps, which we fought the rest of the day. Deas' brigade, and the part of Manigault's next to it, fell back to the foot of the hill; Anderson's fell back to its first position, and these three brigades, save two regiments of Manigault's next to Johnson's brigade, did not again enter the fight.

In falling back on the spur on which Johnson's brigade and the two batteries fought, McNair's brigade, which formed a second line, mingled with the troops of the first line on the left of Johnson's and the right of the two regiments of Manigault's brigade, and continued to fight in that position during the rest of the day. The retreat on this hill was precipitate, and called for all the exertions I could command to prevent many of the troops from abandoning it. The officers, however, joined with every energy and zeal in the effort to stay the retreat, and by appeals, commands, and physical efforts, all save a few who persisted in skulking behind trees or lying idly on the ground, were brought up to our lines in support of the artillery. In the meantime our batteries were promptly opened and gallantly served amid a shower of the enemy's bullets, and, together with the best and bravest of our infantry, who promptly rallied on our artillery, poured such a volume of fire upon the advancing foe that his onward progress was effectually stayed.

I cannot here speak too highly of the gallantry of the men and officers of Dent's and Everett's batteries on this occasion. It elicited my highest admiration, and I at once endeavored involuntarily to express personally to the commanders my high appreciation of the work they had so nobly done. It is claimed by Johnson's brigade that they rallied to a man at the battery. I may be permitted to say for these noble men, with whom I have so long been associated, that I then felt that every man in the brigade was a hero. Of Gregg's brigade I can speak in no less exalted terms. All, indeed, who now participated in this final, protracted, and trying struggle, merit the highest praise.

All our troops had now suffered severely here and in other parts of the field. Hindman's division, it is understood, had been especially weakened in the conflict before it came to our support. Neither McNair's, Gregg's nor Johnson's brigades mustered over five hundred guns.

The part of Manigault's brigade adjacent to my division, about two regiments, under Colonel Reed, of the Thirty-fourth Alabama regiment, participated in the invincible spirit which fired our men, and continued to fight with us. I ordered that the hill should be held at all hazards, and determined that all should be lost before I would abandon it. I felt that this position (on the extreme left) was one of the utmost importance, and might determine the fate of the day. Indeed, defeat here would have let the enemy's right swing back around our left flank, over the strong positions we had won; and here, as at Murfreesboro', where all our movements on the left had been very similar, a chance for victory might be lost.

About this time my Aid, Captain W. T. Blakemore, reported to me some two hundred men of Benning's brigade, in our rear, under command of a Major, whose name is not recollected. Upon going to it, the officer in command reported it utterly unserviceable on account of its having been cut up and demoralized. I consequently did not put it in the fight.

The enemy where not whipped, and the conflict still raged with varying fortune. Repeatedly our men advanced, and were in turn forced to yield a portion of the ground they had gained. I directed our men to advance as far as possible, then hold their position and never retreat. We thus gradually approached the crest of the ridge.

At about five P. M., I sent my acting Aid-de-Camp, Lieutenant George Marchbanks, Confederate States army, back to the foot of the ridge, to request Brigadier-Generals Deas and Manigault to bring up their brigades to my support. Lieutenant Marchbanks reports that Brigadier-General Deas replied that, on consultation with Brigadier-General Manigault, they had decided that it would not be safe to put their commands in the same position without the support of fresh troops.

Over three hours passed in this conflict, in which officers and men toiled on and manifested more perseverance, determination and endurance than I have ever before witnessed on any field. We had now slowly driven the enemy on the left, up the gradual ascent, about half a mile, to the coveted crest of the ridge, where they made the last desperate resistance; and our lines gradually grew stronger and stronger under the animating hope of victory so nearly within our grasp. It was finally nearly sunset, when a simultaneous advance swept along our whole lines, and, with a shout, we drove the enemy from the ridge, and pursued them far down the northern slope to the bottom of the deep hollow beyond. We had now completely flanked and passed to the rear of the position of the enemy on the ridge to our right, and I am convinced we thus aided in finally carrying the heights south of Snodgrass's house.

About the time the ridge was carried, Colonel Trigg, of Preston's division, reported to me with a part of his brigade. I sent Captain Terry, of the Seventeenth Tennessee regiment, who was wounded and mounted on horseback, to place Trigg's command on our right, and it relieved Gregg's brigade, which was out of ammunition.

I now proceeded to reform my line, which, in the pursuit, I regret to say, was entirely broken, owing in part to the peculiar conformation of the ground over which we passed. I still hoped to follow up the retreating foe.

After I ordered McNair's and Johnson's brigades to form on Trigg's, this brigade suddenly disappeared, called away, no doubt, to co-operate with Kelly's brigade in capturing the two regiments of General Granger's corps, which surrendered to them about dark. I felt now that it would be unsafe to advance, disconnected as my command was, and it being now dark, nearly eight o'clock P. M., I withdrew it some two hundred and fifty yards to a good position near the top of the ridge, threw out pickets to the front, and sent scouts to find the enemy.

My line was arranged for the night in the following order:

The two regiments of Manigault's brigade, under Colonel Reed, of the Thirty-fourth Alabama regiment, and the left thrown back to protect our flank, and in succession to the right, were aligned to Johnson's, McNair's and Gregg's brigades. On my right, Trigg's and Kelly's subsequently formed. About eight o'clock at night, abandoning all hopes of advancing further, I rode away and searched until about eleven o'clock, for the headquarters of the army or the wing, with a view to making a report of my position. Failing in this attempt, I returned to my command worn out with the toils of the day. The following morning revealed to us the fact that the enemy had left us in possession of the field. Details were now made to collect the spoils and bury the dead.

I ought here to mention the heroic efforts on the part of officers and men which came under my observation; but, for want of personal acquaintance with the parties, I cannot do justice to all. I especially noticed the faithful toil and heroic conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Reynolds, of the first battalion of dismounted rifles, McNair's brigade, who was conspicuous in his efforts to preserve our lines and encourage and press on our men. For hours he, with many other officers, faithfully and incessantly labored in this duty. In this connection I must, in justice, mention Colonel J. S. Fulton, of the Forty-fourth Tennessee regiment, commanding Johnson's brigade; Colonel R. H. Keble, of the Twenty-third Tennessee regiment; Lieutenant-Colonel Floyd and Captain Terry, of the Seventeenth Tennessee regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel Snowden, and Acting Adjutant Gregg, of the Twenty-fifth Tennessee regiment. To Colonel Suggs, I feel especially indebted for his gallant, able and efficient services in commanding Gregg's brigade. He is a good and meritorious officer. Colonel Walker and Lieutenant-Colonel Clack, of the Third Tennessee; Colonel Grace, of the Tenth Tennessee;

Captain Curtis, of the Fiftieth Tennessee, and Captain Osburn, of the Forty-first Tennessee regiments, all of Gregg's brigade, merit special commendation for their services in this protracted struggle. To the courage and fortitude of the men of this brigade, as well as to every other brigade which struggled with them in our last persistent efforts to drive the enemy from their final position, I trust the proper sense of gratitude will be awarded. Colonel Coleman, commanding McNair's brigade, did gallant service and carried his command faithfully through all the varying fortunes of the field, on the left, to the very close of the fight. I regret that I am unable to specify more particularly the services of meritorious officers of this brigade.

I beg leave to call attention to the efficient use made of artillery in my command. My purpose in accordance with preconceived notions, was to keep my artillery employed to the utmost practicable extent in conjunction with my infantry; and my little experience on this battlefield, only determines me on all like occasions to improve on my practice of this day.

I need add nothing more in acknowledgment of the services of Captain Dent and Lieutenant Everett, commanding batteries in my lines, or of the gallantry of the men under their commands.

I have to regret that no report has been furnished me by Captain Culpeper, commanding the battery attached to McNair's brigade; and I also regret that neither this battery nor Bledsoe's First Missouri battery, commanded by First Lieutenant R. Wood, and attached to Gregg's brigade, for reasons not known to me, followed their brigades or participated in our fight for Missionary Ridge, where they would have won unfading laurels for every officer and man attached to them.

The gallant conduct of my Brigade Inspector, Second Lieutenant M. W. Black, of the Seventeenth Tennessee regiment, distinguished him throughout my command, and I feel that I can scarcely do justice to his services. He was always in the moments of severest conflict among the foremost ranks, reckless and indifferent to danger. Ardent, active, and zealous, he has proven himself a most valuable officer on the field of battle. While personally directing a piece of artillery in the fight on Missionary Ridge, on the twentieth of September, he was severely wounded by a ball that crushed his lower jaw and carried away part of his tongue. His speedy recovery is, however, now hopefully anticipated.

To my Aid-de-Camp, Captain W. T. Blakemore, who has served with me in every conflict of this army as well as at Donelson, and always with honor and ability, I am indebted for much valuable service on the field, and he merits more than I can say for him here.

My Brigade Inspector, Lieutenant E. R. Smith, of the Twenty-fifth Tennessee regiment, and my acting Aid-de-Camp, Second Lieutenant George Marchbanks, of the Confederate States army, gallantly and faithfully labored with me on the nineteenth and twentieth of September, and I desire to acknowledge my obligations to them for the zeal and intelligence with which they performed their respective duties.

To the medical staff of each brigade of this division I desire to tender my grateful acknowledgments for their faithful and efficient services in taking care of the wounded.

To my efficient ordnance officer, Lieutenant James B. Lake, I feel that a special acknowledgment is due as well for all his faithful services past, as for the prompt supplies which he furnished my whole division from a brigade ordnance train, and yet, at the close of the battle, exhibiting greater abundance of stores on hand than at its commencement.

In conclusion, it will be observed that the severests conflicts in which my command was engaged on the field of Chickamauga, occurred on the evening of the nineteenth, and in the morning and evening of the twentieth September.

On the evening of the nineteenth, my command suffered as much in three hours as during the whole day of the twentieth September.

On Sunday, my command suffered severely until the enemy's breastworks were carried in the morning, and again during the contest for the spur of Missionary Ridge, in the evening.

My division commenced to fight in the front line on the nineteenth of September, and fought in the front line through the conflict of both days, and at the close was far in advance of all support, as it was also at different times during the latter day.

The strength of my command and the number of casualties are hereunto appended. The lists of killed, wounded, and missing in Gregg's and Johnson's brigades were forwarded on the twenty-ninth of September, but no list has yet been furnished by McNair's brigade, and the aggregates are only given by Colonel Coleman, who commanded this brigade after General McNair was wounded.

I have received no report from Brigadier-General E. McNair or Gregg.

Everett's battery fired four hundred and twenty-eight rounds.

Bledsoe's battery fired one hundred and twenty-five rounds.

Culpeper's battery not reported.

Dent's battery not reported, as it belongs to Hindman's division, though it fought with mine from about one P. M., until sunset twentieth September, 1863.

I forward herewith the reports of Lieutenants Everett and Wood, commanding batteries attached respectively to Johnson's and Gregg's brigades, and the reports of Colonels Suggs, Coleman, and Fulton, commanding brigades.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

B. R. JOHNSON,

Brigadier-General.

List of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing, in Johnson's Division.

Brigades.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Aggregate.	Remarks.
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.		
Johnson's,	3	25	28	243	13	85	357	* Aggregates only furnished in this brigade.
Gregg's,	9	100	39	435	1	17	607	
McNair's,*	.....	51	.....	336	.....	64	451	

Report of Officers and Men taken into action on the nineteenth and twentieth September, 1863.

Brigades.	19th September.			20th September.			Remarks.
	Officers.	Men.	Aggregate.	Officers.	Men.	Aggregate.	
Johnson's,	108	761	869	61	495	556	* Not furnished for 20th.
Gregg's,	134	1,218	1,352	95	753	848	
McNair's,*	100	1,107	1,207	.....	.....	.....	

Aggregate infantry, 3,428.

Artillery.	19th September.			20th September.			Remarks.
	Officers.	Men.	Aggregate.	Officers.	Men.	Aggregate.	
Everett's,	3	84	87	3	82	85	* Not furnished for 20th.
Culpeper's,*	4	80	84	.....	.....	.....	
Bledsoe's,	3	81	84	4	67	71	

Aggregate artillery, 255.

REPORT OF BRIG.-GEN. GIST, COMMANDING DIVISION.

Headquarters Gist's Brigade,
Near Chattanooga, Tenn., October 14, 1863.

Captain J. B. Cumming, Assistant Adjutant-General:

Captain: I have the honor to submit the following report of the participation of the troops under my command in the battle of Chickamauga on Sunday, the twentieth of September last:

Being ordered with my brigade—consisting of the Fourth Georgia volunteers, Colonel P. H. Colquitt commanding; the Twenty-fourth South Carolina volunteers, Colonel C. H. Stevens commanding; the Sixth South Carolina volunteers, Colonel James McCullough commanding; the Eighth Georgia battalion of volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel L. Napier commanding, and Ferguson's light battery, Lieutenant Beauregard commanding—to Rome, Georgia, upon detached service, I did not engage in the affairs of the eighteenth and nineteenth of September, with the other troops of the reserve corps of Major-General W. H. T. Walker. On the afternoon of Thursday, the seventeenth of September, I received orders from the Colonel commanding to report, with my brigade, at Ringgold, Georgia, and was further informed that transportation by rail would be afforded me. I left Rome the next morning, upon the arrival of the trains, with the Twenty-fourth South Carolina volunteers, Eighth Georgia battalion, three companies of the Fourth Georgia volunteers, and Ferguson's battery, there not being cars sufficient for the remainder of the command. Upon reaching Kingston, I urged the transportation agent to send forward additional cars for that portion of the brigade still at Rome, and he assured me that he would do so promptly. I subsequently telegraphed him from Ringgold to hasten on the rest of the command. The result was that the Sixteenth South Carolina volunteers and my battery did not join me until the morning of the twenty-

third of September, three days after the battle. Upon arriving at the terminus of the railroad, Catoosa (wood station), on the morning of the nineteenth, I rode forward to Ringgold for orders and to obtain wagons for my reserve ammunition, my own train being left with the division upon my departure for Rome. In a few hours I received orders from the General commanding to guard and convoy to the army a large ordnance train that would be formed and reported to me. This train was not reported until near ten o'clock P. M. With the train in charge, having procured a reliable guide in the person of Dr. Evans, of Ringgold, I reached Alexander's Bridge, at which point I was directed to cross Chickamauga Creek, if possible, about sunrise upon the morning of the twentieth, after a most fatiguing march during the entire night. I reported my arrival with the train to army headquarters, and, being relieved of further charge of it, was directed to march forward to a point about a mile distant from the bridge and there await further orders. After remaining at this position some twenty minutes, I was ordered, by a staff officer of the General commanding, to move forward, reporting to Lieutenant-General Polk, and join Major-General Walker's corps, being at the same time placed under the guidance of a staff officer of General Polk; he turned over the direction of my command to a second officer of the same staff, and he to a third officer. With considerable difficulty, and after marching for some time, I reached the division to which I was attached. Upon reporting my command, at this time numbering only nine hundred and eighty, aggregate, I was ordered by Major-General Walker to at once assume command of the division, consisting of Brigadier-General Ector's, Colonel Wilson's and my own brigade—the brigades of Ector and Wilson numbering about five hundred each, having suffered heavy losses in the engagement on the previous day. Lieutenant-General D. H. Hill was present when I reported to Generals Polk and Walker, and, as I was turning off to assume command of the division, requested Major-General Walker to send a brigade to the support of Major-General Breckinridge's division that was hotly engaged in our front and upon our left. Major-General Walker indicated one of General Liddell's brigades near by. General Hill asked for Gist's brigade, saying he had heard of that brigade. General Walker remarked that Gist's brigade is just coming up, and directed me to report to General Hill. I did so; the brigade being now under command of Colonel P. H. Colquitt, of the Fourth Georgia volunteers, he at once reported and received his instructions from General Hill. General Walker then directed me to report the other two brigades also to General Hill, which was promptly done. Colonel Colquitt having his instructions from General Hill, advanced his command in the direction indicated, being cautioned that he was to support General Breckinridge, two of whose brigades was reported in his immediate front. I was afterwards directed by General Hill to follow up and support the advance of the first brigade with the brigades of Ector and Wilson. Colonel Colquitt, upon advancing a few hundred yards in the woods before him, found himself in the presence of the enemy, strongly posted and massed behind a breastwork of logs, the troops reported in his front having retired before the galling fire of the enemy. The direction taken by Colquitt was also too far to the right, and the left regiment (Twenty-fourth South Carolina volunteers) only came directly upon the enemy's lines, which were so disposed by a salient as to rake the entire front of the brigade as it came forward, with a severe and destructive enfilading fire. The brigade could not have changed direction, as the position of the enemy was not discovered by Colonel Colquitt until the left was within a short distance of the breastworks; the right, however, changed front sufficiently to become directly engaged. Colonel Colquitt did not reconnoitre the position, as he was instructed that our troops were in his front. The enemy now poured forth a most destructive and well-aimed fire upon the entire line, and though it wavered and recoiled under the shock, yet by the exertions of the gallant Colquitt, nobly seconded by Colonels Stevens, Capers, and other brave and true officers, order was promptly restored, and for some twenty-five minutes the terrific fire was withstood and returned with marked effect by the gallant little band.

It was here that the lamented Colquitt was mortally wounded whilst cheering on his command; and, in quick succession, the iron-nerved Stevens and the intrepid Capers were seriously wounded and, among others who deserve to live in their country's memory, yielded up their life-blood. One third of the gallant command was either killed or wounded. Reeling under the storm of bullets, having lost all but two of their field officers, the brigade fell back, fighting, to the position from which they advanced. The brigade of Ector and Wilson kept up their fire from the ————. The enemy did not venture beyond their works, so severely had they suffered, until I was directed by General Hill to withdraw my men to the position they occupied before advancing, and reform my whole line in rear of the batteries, some few hundred yards distant from the enemy's position. This order was gallantly extended under a heavy fire, by Captain M. P. King, my Assistant Adjutant-General. Our lines being re-established, we remained in position until about four o'clock P. M., when a general advance was ordered.

Major A. M. Speer, with seven companies of the Fourth Georgia volunteers, having come up, my own brigade, now under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Napier, was increased to some one thousand four hundred men and officers. I was directed by Major-General Walker to support the advance of General Liddell's division. Upon reaching the Chattanooga road, General Liddell found his command exposed to a heavy fire on both flanks and fell back to my rear. The gal-

lant Fourth Georgia, occupying the right of the brigade, eager to avenge their beloved Colonel, the brave Captain Cooper and other true officers of the regiment, with a loud cheer, led by their brave Major, charged through the woods before them, driving the enemy and capturing some forty prisoners. The remainder of the brigade followed up handsomely the advance upon the left. Upon reaching the Chattanooga road, the force of the enemy that engaged and fired upon the flanks of General Liddell's division had retired from view; and, not being aware of any support upon my right, I at once halted the command, threw out skirmishers to my front and upon my right flank, and sent information of my position to Major-General Walker. The brigades of General Ector and Colonel Wilson advancing, took up position to the left of the first brigade without encountering any serious opposition. Not receiving any further orders, and night being nearly upon us, we bivouacked upon the field of victory. General Liddell, whose command was promptly re-formed, came up and took position on my right. The firing ceased; loud cheers went up to heaven, and the grandest, most important battle of the war was fought and won.

I would respectfully refer the Major-General commanding to the reports of Brigadier-General Ector and Colonel Wilson for particulars in relation to their respective commands, and acknowledge my indebtedness to them for judicious and efficient support. To Major B. B. Smith, Inspector, Captain M. P. King, Assistant Adjutant-General, Lieutenant L. M. Butler, and J. C. Habersham, Aid-de-Camp, of my staff, I am under great obligations for valuable assistance in reforming commands, extending orders under heavy fires and other efficient service. Major J. S. Green, Brigade Quartermaster, Captain J. A. Bowil, acting Brigade Commissary, and Lieutenant J. M. Hunt, acting Brigade Ordnance Officer, were at their post and in efficient discharge of their respective duties. I would recommend to the favorable notice of the General commanding, the distinguished gallantry of Colonel C. H. Stevens, Twenty-fourth South Carolina volunteers, who, besides being severely wounded, had two horses killed under him.

I have the honor to enclose a report of the officers and men from my own brigade, represented by their commanding officers, as having conducted themselves meritoriously upon the field of battle.

I cannot close my report without expressing my satisfaction at the conduct and efficiency of the officers, and my admiration for the brave and soldierly bearing of the men of the division which I had the honor to command in the battle of Chickamauga. Their rolls of killed and wounded testify to the place which they occupied in the picture.

I am, Captain, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
S. R. Gist,
Brigadier-General commanding.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL E. C. WALTHALL.

Headquarters Walthall's Brigade,
Near Chattanooga, October 6, 1863.

Captain G. A. Williams, Assistant Adjutant-General:

Captain: I have the honor to submit the following report of the battle of Chickamauga, in what concerns my own command:

On Friday, the eighteenth September, about ten o'clock P. M., when the head of Major-General Walker's column reached a point about a half mile from Alexander's Bridge, I was ordered by Brigadier-General Liddell, commanding division, to form line of battle, with the left of my brigade resting on the road leading to the bridge, and to move forward, guiding left, and keeping the road to my left. The line was formed almost at right angles to the road, the right slightly retired, and skirmishers, covering my entire front, were thrown forward about two hundred yards.

These dispositions made, I moved forward through a dense thicket, and, after advancing about a quarter of a mile, the enemy's skirmishers were encountered in front of my left and centre, the two regiments on the right, Twenty-fourth Mississippi regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel McKelvane) and Twenty-seventh Mississippi regiment (Colonel Campbell), meeting no opposition, except in front of the two companies on the left of the Twenty-seventh regiment. The road on which my left rested in the beginning of the movement turns to the right at a point two or three hundred yards from the bridge, forming a right angle. At this point the Thirty-fourth Mississippi regiment, Major Pegram commanding, and Thirtieth Mississippi regiment, Colonel Scales commanding, in advancing passed across the road into an open field, and the Twenty-ninth Mississippi regiment, Colonel Brantley, the centre regiment of my command, being immediately opposite the bridge, was stubbornly resisted for about fifteen minutes; and, in the meantime, the regiments to the left of this, driving the skirmishers of the enemy before them, swung round under the enemy's artillery fire, through an open field, until the line they formed was nearly at right angles to that formed by the other three regiments, conforming in the main to the general direction of the creek. When the bridge was gained by the Twenty-ninth Mississippi regiment, it was done under a heavy fire from the enemy posted on the opposite bank of the creek, which along my line was narrow, but deep, with steep banks and impassable. The bridge had been torn up by the enemy; but this fact, owing to the density of the undergrowth, could not be ascertained until the bank of the creek was occupied. The Thirty-fourth and Thirtieth Mississippi regiments, after swinging to the right as above mentioned in the field, had been halted by their commanders and the men ordered to lie down, the enemy having disappeared in their front. I then directed the skirmishers of these regiments, which I had pre-

viously ordered to be pressed forward, to be recalled, and the regiments to move by the right flank until they closed up an interval between the Thirtieth and Twenty-ninth, near the angle in the line. Fowler's battery of my brigade, during the engagement, was put in position by the Brigadier-General commanding, on an eminence to the left of my line, to operate on a battery of the enemy which had been shelling my line, but the enemy withdrew his pieces while Captain Fowler was getting in position, and, in the meantime, the bridge was taken. In this action the Twenty-ninth Mississippi lost heavily, and in the Thirty-fourth an officer and twenty-four enlisted men were wounded. The Twenty-fourth sustained no loss, and Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth but slight. When the condition of the bridge was reported to Major-General Walker, he directed me to move my command by the right flank, under the direction of a guide furnished me, towards Byron's Ford, about one mile below Alexander's Bridge, where my command, followed by the rest of Major-General Walker's corps, crossed, without opposition, and moved about a mile towards Lee and Gordon's Mill, on the Vinyard road. Night, in the meantime, coming on, I halted, under orders from the Brigadier-General commanding, and the next morning, soon after daylight, I moved out, left in front, following Colonel Govan's brigade. The column had not moved more than three-quarters of a mile when it was halted, and rested on the road side until about eleven o'clock, when I received orders from the Brigadier-General commanding to advance in line of battle. After moving forward two or three hundred yards, he directed me to move by the right flank, and, when my right was nearly opposite an old shop near the road, to halt, and front, and advance in line of battle. Just here a staff officer from Major-General Walker came to me with orders to move rapidly forward, as Ector's and Wilson s brigades were badly cut up and largely outnumbered by the enemy. Soon the General came in person, and, meeting me with my command, gave me instructions as to directions, localities, &c. With Colonel Govan's brigade on my left, I moved rapidly forward and encountered the enemy (before I had advanced five hundred yards) in strong force. The firing indicated that the two brigades had met the enemy along the whole line of both at the same time. After moving forward a hundred yards, or so, my line was checked for a moment by a heavy artillery and musketry fire, but, when ordered to advance, the whole line moved promptly forward with a shout, breaking the first and then the second line of the enemy, passing over two full batteries and capturing four hundred and eleven prisoners, of whom twenty-three were commissioned officers. The prisoners, in the main, claimed to be from the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixteenth United States infantry, and from Company H, Fifth artillery, and one First Lieutenant from Fourth Indiana battery. A large proportion of the artillery horses attached to the batteries over which we passed, having been either killed or wounded, it was impossible, at the time, to retire the pieces as they were gained. Lieutenant-Colonel Reynolds, field officer of the day, with a detail from the Thirty-fourth Mississippi regiment, removed one Parrott gun to the rear, which was delivered to Major Palmer, Chief of Artillery on Major-General Walker's staff.

After passing beyond the second line of the enemy I ascertained that he was turning my right flank, and, while making a disposition of my right regiment in the effort to prevent it, Lieutenant-Colonel Reynolds, who had been sent to the left of the line to observe the operations there, reported to me that the enemy were already upon the flank of my left regiment. Moving towards the left I discovered a piece of artillery being put in position, opposite, and within three hundred yards of the left of my line, which was already turned. I withdrew my command at once, the engagement having lasted about one hour. The enemy did not pursue, and I took my position, under orders from the Brigadier-General commanding, to the right of the position from which Major-General Cheatham's command just then advanced.

In this engagement my command suffered heavily. Lieutenan-Colonel McKelvane, commanding Twenty-fourth Mississippi regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan, of the Twenty-ninth Mississippi regiment, were severely wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel McKelvane remained in command of his regiment (after he was wounded) till the engagement was over. In the course of two hours from this time, several immaterial changes having, in the meantime, been made in my position, Lieutenant-General Polk directed me to move by the right flank, in extension of Major-General Cheatham's line, taking my position on the right of Brigadier-General Jackson. This was done under the enemy's fire, whose purpose seemed to be to turn General Cheatham's right flank. Colonel Govan's brigade took position on my right, whereupon the Brigadier-General commanding ordered his line to advance. My command moved forward some three or four hundred yards, the enemy contesting the ground, but falling back until the crest of a ridge in front of me had been gained. Here the enemy, strongly posted, delivered a very heavy fire of artillery and small arms; the advance was checked, and in the course of ten or fifteen minutes my line was forced to retire to its original position on Brigadier-General Jackson's right, and I was directed by the Brigadier-General commanding to remain there until further orders. Four guns of Fowler's battery were posted, during this last movement, in rear of Liddell's division, and opened fire on a battery of the enemy which was shelling the troops on the left, and silenced it in a few minutes. One section under Lieutenant Phelan, in an attempt to follow my brigade when it moved to General Cheatham's right, passed, by reason

of another command being mistaken for mine, beyond the right of my line, and was put in position at a point where the infantry supporting it was forced to fall back before a superior force of the enemy, after a short engagement. All the horses of one piece were killed, and all but one of the other either killed or wounded. One piece was lost, but afterwards recaptured; the other was brought off. The loss in killed and wounded in this section was heavy, and the pieces used with great effect.

In the engagement on Saturday afternoon Major Pegram, commanding the Thirty-fourth Mississippi regiment, and Major Staples, commanding the Twenty-fourth Mississippi regiment, were severely wounded, and Captain Smith, the senior Captain of the latter, having been slightly wounded, the command of that regiment devolved on Captain Toomer till the next morning, when Captain Smith reported for duty and assumed command. The command of the Thirty-fourth regiment devolved on Captain Bowen after Major Pegram was wounded. When Captain Fowler reported that one of the pieces under Lieutenant Phelan had been lost on my right, the line in the meantime having fallen back, and the firing having ceased, the Twenty-fourth Mississippi regiment, under command of Captain Toomer, was sent to the right, under the supervision of Lieutenant-Colonel Reynolds, field officer of the day, to a point opposite where the gun was said by Lieutenant Phelan to have been taken by the enemy, and moved forward, driving back the enemy's skirmishers, till it was ascertained that the enemy, who had retired from the position he occupied when the gun was taken, had removed the gun before falling back. The regiment was then ordered back to its proper position in line.

At an early hour on Sunday morning my command was moved by the left flank, by order of the Brigadier-General commanding, to the rear of Major-General Cheatham's line and then back, past the position where it had spent the night, to the right, a distance of about a mile and a-half in rear of where Major-General Breckinridge's forces were engaged, and halted about three-quarters of a mile from the Chattanooga road. About twelve o'clock, and after one or two unimportant changes of position, Lieutenant-General Polk directed me to move to the left, to a point to be indicated by Major Ratchford, of Lieutenant-General Hill's staff, to the support of Brigadier-General Polk. I moved by the left flank to the point indicated by Major Ratchford, who accompanied me, and advanced my line under a heavy fire from the enemy, which commenced before I got into position. I pressed forward two or three hundred yards under this fire through dense under-growth, until the enemy opened fire on my left flank from the angle of his fortifications just opposite. About the same time an impression—afterwards shown to be unfounded—was produced by stragglers, and among them one officer, falling back from some line to the right of my immediate front, that the right of my line had fired into our own friends; so dense was the thicket that it was impossible to ascertain, at the moment, the exact position of any line, nor was I able to find Brigadier-General Polk's command. My left having been driven back, I ordered the right to cease firing and retired it, and re-formed my line under cover of the hill, and reported the fact to Lieutenant-General Hill, who directed me to hold the position which I occupied, guarding well my left; my right and centre being then covered by another command, which had fallen back, and was re-forming very near me. Lieutenant-Colonel Reynolds, of the Thirtieth Mississippi regiment, whom but a short time before I had assigned to the command of the Thirty-fourth Mississippi regiment, fell, mortally wounded, at his post of duty, just before the left of my line gave way under a flank fire, as above stated, and died soon afterwards. No braver man or better soldier fell upon the field of Chickamauga than this faithful and accomplished officer, whose loss is deeply deplored throughout this command. In his death the service sustains a heavy loss. Major Johnson, of the Thirtieth Mississippi regiment, was wounded about the same time, but, his wound being slight, he did not quit the field.

In a short time after my line was re-formed, I was ordered by the Brigadier-General commanding to move my command by the right flank some four hundred yards, and forward about half that distance, and await orders. The right of my brigade rested in a field, near a fence, and the centre and left in the woods, just in rear of a little prairie. In this position, with my battery posted near the centre of my line, and Govan's brigade on my left, I remained until about five o'clock, when I received orders from the Brigadier-General commanding that the line would advance, and to move my command forward, guiding left. I put it in motion, my brigade being then on the extreme right of the line, and met no opposition even from the enemy's skirmishers until I was in sight of the Chattanooga road, near McDonald's house. Here the skirmishers, firing from behind the house and the out-houses of the settlement, resisted my advance for a moment, but soon most of them fled, a few surrendering. I moved across the road and into the open field beyond, and was ordered by the Brigadier-General commanding to halt about two hundred yards from the road, and let the men lie down till he could put the batteries of his division on my right; and to this he gave his personal attention. While my line was advancing unopposed, a continuous fire was heard to my left, and most of it seemed to be on the left of Govan's brigade, and as the division advanced this firing was continued to its left and rear. In the field in which my line was halted, Govan's brigade also halted, in extension of my line. Skirmishers were kept two or three hundred yards in front. The order to lie down had scarcely been given and executed, when the whole line was enfiladed from three batteries—

one on the hill in the neighborhood of Cloud's house; another within three hundred yards of the right of my line, concealed in a clump of bushes (both these on the right): and one to the left of Govan, near the Chattanooga road. Some of our pieces were turned upon the batteries to the right, and used to the best advantage under the circumstances, but neither was silenced. After enduring a very heavy fire for ten or fifteen minutes from these three batteries, with no enemy to be seen in front, the brigade to my left gave way, and my own soon followed, falling back in confusion under a furious cannonade. The enemy, from the woods to the right, soon appeared and occupied the road in time to cut off and capture most of the skirmishers, with several of their officers, who covered my front in the field. Colonel J. J. Scales, commanding Thirtieth Mississippi regiment, was captured here, and Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, Twenty-seventh Mississippi regiment, then acting as field officer of the day, was wounded. He, however, returned to duty next morning. With the three remaining field officers (and one of them slightly wounded, but still on duty) out of the ten with whom I had gone into action on Saturday morning, my broken line was promptly re-formed and moved forward. The enemy had withdrawn before I again reached the Chattanooga road, and I was ordered by the Brigadier-General commanding, soon after, to take position in a field to the right of Govan's brigade, which was posted near McDonald's house and east of the Chattanooga read, and to construct such temporary protections for the men as could be made of rails, etc., in front of my lines. Just after I got into the field with my command, I was directed by the Brigadier-General commanding to move it back into the woods, in rear of Colonel Govan; two shells, to which the enemy replied from a battery in front, having been thrown directly over my line from some battery in my rear, the first one exploding just over the Twenty-fourth Mississippi regiment and severely wounding a man of that command.

The next day the whole corps moved toward Chattanooga by the main road, it having been ascertained that the enemy had retired during the night. In this battle, out of ten field officers, one hundred and thirty-four company officers, and sixteen hundred and eighty-three enlisted men, which I carried in, I lost seven hundred and five, of whom sixty-nine were killed and twelve have since died from their wounds. A full report of casualties is herewith submitted.

To all of my regimental commanders, and to Captain Fowler, of Fowler's battery, I am indebted for their cordial support, and a gallant, faithful, and skilful discharge of duty at all times during the battle, as I am to the officers and men of their commands, for the coolness, daring and persistence (except in a very few instances) which marked their action throughout all the engagements. For individual instances of gallantry, etc., for a more perfect understanding of details, I respectfully refer to the reports of regimental and battery commanders, herewith submitted. To the several members of my staff my thanks are due for the valuable aid I received at their hands, by means of their prompt attention to all their duties, and their gallant bearing under all circumstances.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. C. WALTHALL,
Brigadier-General commanding.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. M. MANIGAULT.

HEADQUARTERS MANIGAULT'S BRIGADE, HINDMAN'S DIVISION, POLK'S CORPS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE, MISSIONARY RIDGE, TENN., October 8, 1863.

Major J. P. Wilson, Assistant Adjutant-General:

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit this, my report of the part taken by this brigade in the late battle of Chickamauga and on the two days preceding it:

On the morning of the eighteenth September (having left our encapment near Lafayette the previous evening), when about a mile and a half from Lee and Gordon's Mill, on Chickamauga Creek—the enemy opening upon our column whilst on the march, from a battery on the opposite side—we were ordered to form a line of battle fronting the enemy's position, which threw my command, the right resting on the road, obliquely across an open field, our front being covered by skirmishers deployed from each regiment under the command of Major Butler, of the Twenty-eighth Alabama regiment. Here the men were ordered to lie down, in order to avoid the fire of the enemy's artillery, which had begun to open upon our lines, causing a loss of six men in the Tenth and Nineteenth South Carolina regiments. This position was afterwards changed, in order to bring our right nearer to General Deas' left, whose brigade extended beyond me to the right. Bivouacking near the road that night, we again occupied a position near the same place, but with the lines advanced and the left thrown forward some three or four hundred yards on the following morning, the enemy's artillery occasionally throwing a few shots in our neighborhood, but without effect. Our skirmishers kept up a steady fire with those of the enemy opposing them, suffering a small loss on their own part.

In the afternoon of this day (September nineteenth) we received orders, through the division commander, to move with the division to join the main body of the army, a portion of which had become engaged, the battle having commenced. Moving by the right flank, and following the brigade of General Deas, we crossed the Chickamauga at Hunt's Ford, wading to the west bank. Continuing to move on for a distance of about two miles, we arrived upon the ground in the neighborhood of which Hood's division had been engaged during the afternoon. It was understood that we were to support this division. The brigade was then formed in line, with that of General Deas upon the

right, and Anderson's as a support, a few hundred yards in rear—our line facing directly west. It was now after sunset, when the order to move forward was received, and we advanced, dressing to the right, some four or five hundred yards, moving forward slowly and with difficulty, owing to the dense growth through which we had to pass. Skirmishers were thrown to the front, the line having been halted.

The skirmishers and the left companies of the Thirty-fourth Alabama regiment, on the extreme left of the brigade, a short time after night-fall (twice) became engaged with a force of the enemy, believed to be a reconnoitring party, in which that regiment lost some twelve or thirteen men killed and wounded, but in each instance inflicting a severe loss upon the enemy and driving them back. Falling back from the above position, by order of the division commander, about nine o'clock that night we rejoined the line of battle, a portion of the brigade filling the space between the left of Hood's division and the right of Major-General Buckner's corps.

On the morning of the twentieth of September (Sunday), at an early hour, our final line of battle was complete—the brigade being in the front line, General Deas, with his brigade, being on my right, and my left resting on Colonel Trigg's brigade, of Preston's division, Buckner's corps. My instructions were to move forward when the brigade to my right moved—the attack commencing on the right of the army—the movement being taken up successively by each division and brigade towards the left, and I was also informed that the troops on my left would move forward in like manner. At about half-past eleven A. M. (the action having commenced on the right at about ten o'clock), General Deas' brigade began its forward movement, and my own was given the order to advance. The guide being to the right, in order to preserve a continuous line (as much as possible) with that portion of the division on the right, the men were obliged to move forward at a very rapid pace. Skirmishers, covering the entire front, preceded our advance at a distance of from one hundred to one hundred and fifty yards. The brigade moved steadily on for a distance of some six or seven hundred yards before meeting with any opposition, when we found the enemy in our front, posted near the crest of a hill, a gradual ascent leading to it; and behind breastworks of logs and timber their infantry lay, opening upon the command a heavy fire at short range from their positions of fancied security. At this point the Tenth and Nineteenth South Carolina regiments were partially in a wood; the Twenty-fourth Alabama regiment was exposed in an open field in front of them, and in the centre of which was planted a Federal battery; several pieces of artillery also being in the wood on our right. Waters' battery, which had followed in rear of the brigade, occupied our centre, the Twenty-eighth Alabama regiment on the left of it, its right being on the west edge of the same field and extending into a wood beyond, and the Thirty-fourth Alabama regiment to the left of this wood, also in an open field, with thick woods in their front. The entire line now became hotly engaged, the Tenth and Nineteenth South Carolina and the Twenty-fourth Alabama regiments advancing to within eighty yards of the enemy's breastworks, receiving and giving a heavy fire. Here they were checked and, from the severity of the fire, thrown into some confusion, not so much from the fire in their front as from a heavy enfilade fire from the enemy on their left, which caused a heavy loss, but they almost immediately advanced again and drove the enemy from his works, capturing many prisoners and three pieces of artillery. The Twenty-eighth and Thirty-fourth Alabama regiments moved steadily forward, also receiving a heavy fire, and drove the enemy from the works in their front. Finding myself at this time on the extreme left of the army, the forces on my left, which, when in line of battle, I had been told would advance simultaneously with me, had not done so (the information which I had received being, I suppose, incorrect), and that my left flank was overlapped, as far as could be seen, by several regiments of the enemy's infantry, and not knowing how heavy the enemy's force was in this direction—my three right regiments being thrown in much confusion, and a large force of the enemy advancing through the field on my centre to recover their lost ground and three pieces of artillery which had been captured by the Nineteenth South Carolina, which, however, the enemy did not succeed in doing—I ordered the brigade to fall back about three hundred yards, across the Chattanooga and Lafayette road. In this movement the two left regiments, the Twenty-eighth and Thirty-fourth Alabama, fell back with an unbroken front. In retiring the battery, the pole of the limber of a piece having been broken, the piece was for a time abandoned. However, Colonel Reid, commanding Twenty-eighth Alabama regiment, moved his regiment forward, deploying two companies as skirmishers, and succeeded in recovering it.

Just after having given the order for the retirement of the brigade, General Anderson's command of Mississippians, the reserve of the division, came gallantly forward and swept by me, his left regiment covering some four or five companies of my right regiment. The Tenth South Carolina, Colonel Pressley commanding, the Sixteenth and Nineteenth South Carolina, with several companies, there joined him, and continued to move forward. Previous to the advance of General Anderson, I had sent to General Buckner to request that the brigade which had been on my left whilst in line (Trigg's brigade) should be sent forward to my support. They soon made their appearance, but the enemy had fallen back, owing to the advance of Generals Deas and Anderson, and others on my right; they apprehending, in all probability, that they themselves would be cut off, seeing

also that reinforcements were coming to my assistance.

The line having been re-formed, the brigade was then moved forward and was placed, by order of General Hindman, on the right of General Deas' brigade, then occupying a portion of a ridge west of the road known as the Rossville road. Here we remained but a short time, when orders were received from the same source to report to General Bushrod Johnson, whose command was then heavily pressed, on a succession of ridges which lay east of our present position, about half a mile to our right, and to the east of the Rossville road. The command was immediately moved and formed on the summit of one of the ridges before alluded to, the line being at right angles with that occupied in the morning and running east and west. My right covered the battery of Captain Dent, which we found, to move to the support of General Johnson, already in position; the centre rested in a gorge between the ridge on which the battery stood and the left, which crowned a second ridge; having the brigade of General Deas on the left, the right of his brigade, however, covering six companies of the Thirty-fourth Alabama regiment. Skirmishers having been thrown forward, immediately developed the enemy not more than one hundred and fifty or two hundred yards in our front, with a battery in position.

About half past three o'clock, having received orders from General Bushrod Johnson, under whose supervision the movement was to be made, to swing my line round, making a right-half wheel, which wheel was to be continued if practicable, in order to envelop the enemy in our front and drive him back upon the centre of our lines, General Deas on my left to commence the movement, and each successive brigade to conform to the wheel, keeping the touch of the right and dressing to the left, the troops were set in motion, and here commenced one of the most desperate contests of the day. The movement was scarce begun ere the entire line became engaged, and a deadly fire of musketry and canister was opened upon it at short range. The line for a short time was thrown in much confusion, but was quickly rallied and again advanced; again and again were they driven back, but as promptly rallied and moved forward again, at each advance driving the enemy still further from their original position. Nothing but the determined valor of our soldiers could have withstood the withering volleys poured into them by the enemy, who at this point certainly fought with great obstinacy.

The field and company officers were, as a general rule, conspicuous for their good conduct, urging and cheering on the men, and themselves setting an example to which their men nobly responded. After a contest of nearly three hours, victory crowned their efforts, and the foe were baffled and beaten and many taken prisoners. Owing to the exposed position of the Thirty-fourth Alabama regiment, and to the fact that a large number of the enemy still remained on our left, this regiment could never get ahead, and was, together with a large number of men from the other regiments of the brigade, held in hand to prevent any demonstration of the enemy on our flank.

It was after sunset when the firing ceased, and night ended the contest. The men, completely exhausted by their long continued efforts, had the proud satisfaction of knowing that they had been victorious in every part of the field, and that their efforts had contributed no small share to the earning of this great victory.

I would respectfully refer you to the list of killed and wounded already handed in. We have to deplore the loss of many brave officers and men who fell on that bloody field. The loss of no one will be felt more keenly than that of Captain D. E. Huger, Assistant Inspector-General of my staff, who fell about a half hour before sunset, pierced through the heart by a rifle ball, and expired immediately. Earnest and zealous in the discharge of his duty, he had made himself respected and beloved in this command by his gentle, manly manners, his impartial and consistent discharge of the duties of his department, and by his great courage, coolness, and judgment in action. The Twenty-fourth Alabama also lost one of its most efficient officers, Captain O'Brien, a gentleman of accomplished mind, a brave and gallant officer. Captain Chamberlain and Lieutenant Cooper, of the same regiment, were severely wounded, and their valuable services will be for a long period lost to their country.

The following named officers were distinguished for their conduct on the field, and I take pleasure in bringing them to your attention in this report: Lieutenant-Colonel Julius S. Porcher, Tenth South Carolina volunteers; Major J. L. White, Nineteenth South Carolina volunteers, and Adjutant Fenell, of same regiment.

Of the Twenty-fourth Alabama regiment, Captains Hazard, Oliver, McCraken, Fowler, and Hall, Lieutenants Higley, Chapman, Pacham, Dunlap, Young, Euholm, Hood, Hanley, Northrup, Short, Adjutant Jennison, Sergeant-Major Minck, and Color-Sergeant Moody, behaved with great gallantry.

Lieutenant Jordan, of the Twenty-eighth Alabama, conducted himself in a most conspicuous manner, and I regret to say was killed during the action. Of the same regiment, Captains Hopkins and Ford, Lieutenant Graham and Acting Adjutant Wood, throughout the action, were distinguished for their gallant conduct. Captain Reise, A. Q. M., and Commissary Sergeant Craig, were efficient in the discharge of their duties in their respective departments. Thirty-fourth Alabama regiment, Lieutenants Mitchel, Lambert, Oliver, Crochett, and Bickerstaff, behaved in a manner to attract attention.

I cannot close my report without referring specially to the conduct and bearing of Colonel J. C. Reid, commanding, and Major W. L. Butler, Twenty-eighth Alabama regiment; Colonel J. F. Pressley, commanding Tenth South Caro-

lina; Colonel N. N. Davis, commanding, and Lieutenant Colonel B. Sawyer, Twenty-fourth Alabama regiment, and Major Slaughter, commanding Thirty-fourth Alabama regiment, and to their individual exertions is to be attributed much of the success which attended our arms on that day. Untiring in their efforts, they set an example to their commands by their personal daring, the effect of which was visible in many instances.

To my staff I am indebted for the most valuable assistance. Captain C. J. Walker, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Lieutenant W. E. Huger, Aid-de-Camp, who fearlessly exposed their persons, carrying and executing orders under the most trying circumstances. Lieutenant Malone, Brigade Provost-Marshal, was active in the discharge of his duty, and rendered efficient service in the prevention of straggling, forcing many, who were unwilling to face the heavy fire to which they had been exposed, back into their proper positions.

I beg leave to call your attention to the report of the regimental commanders, who have more particularly specified the names, rank, &c., of parties conspicuous for their conduct in their respective regiments, on the occasion of the battle of Chickamauga.

I have the honor, Major, to be,

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. M. MANIGAULT,

Brigadier-General, commanding Brigade.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL Z. C. DEAS.

HEADQUARTERS DEAS' BRIGADE, HINDMAN'S DIVISION, POLK'S CORPS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE, MISSIONARY RIDGE, BEFORE CHATTANOOGA, Oct. 9, 1863.

Major J. P. Wilson, Assistant Adjutant-General Hindman's Division:

MAJOR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by my brigade in the action of the nineteenth and twentieth September, 1863, on Chickamauga Creek:

Late in the afternoon of the seventeenth September, my brigade, with the division, left Lafayette and bivouacked for the night near Worthon's Gap. The next morning we moved forward and formed line of battle on the east side of Chickamauga Creek, opposite to Lee and Gordon's Mill, where we had skirmishing and artillery firing, off and on, during that and the next day, until the division was relieved by that of General Breckinridge, and ordered to cross the creek at Hunt's Ford, about one and a half miles below. Soon after crossing, we came under fire of the enemy's artillery, when I received orders to form on the right of Manigault's brigade, with General Anderson supporting, and move forward, which I did promptly, but before I reached the line of the enemy it was dark. All fighting having ceased, I fell back, under orders, a short distance, and bivouacked for the night.

At early daylight, I again moved forward to take my position in line, which was at the time occupied by a portion of a division under Brigadier-General Law, which was moving by the right flank to make room for me; but it was seven, or perhaps even as late as eight o'clock, before my entire brigade got into position, with Brigadier-General Manigault's on my left, and Brigadier-General Anderson's in support. Here I received instructions that the fighting would commence on the right and gradually extend towards the left, each brigade attacking as the one on its right became engaged.

A few minutes after ten o'clock A. M., heavy firing of infantry and artillery on the right announced that the fight had commenced in earnest. About twenty minutes after eleven the brigade on my right (Gregg's) moved forward and engaged the enemy. I immediately followed, and by the time I had advanced three hundred yards, saw the line of the enemy behind a breastwork of logs, at sight of which my men rushed forward with a yell, and, charging the defences, took them without faltering. As they climbed over, some six or seven hundred of the enemy threw down their arms and hurried through our lines to the rear. These works were at the foot of a gradually sloping hill of considerable height, just beyond the crest of which were posted about twelve pieces of artillery, and in front of them, a little lower down, was another work of the enemy, which was carried by my brave and gallant men without a moment's faltering. About twelve pieces of artillery were taken here.

By the time I gained the crest of the hill my brigade (which had for some distance been moving at a double-quick, passing in this manner over two works of the enemy) became somewhat scattered, and were, in consequence, checked for the moment in their onward movement. It was at this period that Brigadier-General Anderson's gallant Mississippi brigade came to my assistance, and as my men saw them coming they moved forward again and, in conjunction with this brigade, captured several other pieces of artillery and scattered the enemy in our front so effectually that they never rallied or re-formed again during the day on this part of the field. During this charge, my brigade occupied the extreme left of the army, with the exception of Brigadier-General Anderson's, which, from being in support, had got on my left. I now halted and re-formed my brigade, to be used as emergencies might require; and, learning that Major-General Hindman was near by, reported, in person, and received orders to move to the rear and right, and assist the troops then engaged, which proved to be Brigadier-General Bushrod Johnson's division. I should here state that my men killed, early in the fight, and bore off the body of Brigadier-General Lytle, United States army.

In moving back to take a new position, Brigadier-General Anderson's brigade and mine came together, but soon separated again, he going to the right, and I to the left, to form on the left of Brigadier-General Bushrod Johnson; but on taking my position, under instructions

from him, I found there was a gap of about six or seven hundred yards. General Manigault, coming up some time after this with his brigade, was ordered by Major-General Hindman to fill up this gap. To get into line with these brigades, it was necessary for me to make a right wheel and to form a line at right angles with my last. It was now about four o'clock. My line having been formed, I was ordered by General Johnson to make a right wheel again, or swing to the right, which brought me in collision with the enemy. My brigade at this time being the extreme left of the army, and on the east side of the Rossville road, formed a line facing almost to the left flank of the one I occupied in the morning. Here commenced an attack on the right and rear of Thomas's or Granger's corps, posted on a steep hill, on which was planted artillery. My brigade was at this time without any support whatever. The ascent of this hill was exceedingly difficult, besides being very steep. Here I met with the most obstinate resistance I had encountered during the day, and, after contending with the enemy in this unequal position during an hour and a half, my men in this time having been partially driven back several times, my whole line was finally driven down the hill. After re-forming in an adjoining hollow, I again moved forward and found that the attack on the enemy had been so severe that they were not disposed to risk another engagement, and had retired, leaving me in possession of the field.

It was now dark, and I posted my command so as to hold the Rossville road, on which I then was, and then sent forward scouts one mile to the front, who reported no enemy, but captured about fifty prisoners. Here I bivouacked for the night.

The nature of the ground over which the battle was fought did not admit of the free use of artillery, but Dent's battery, which was attached to my brigade, followed it closely during the morning attack, firing, however, only a few shots; but in the afternoon it rendered signal service, fighting at the time with other commands on my right. The officers deserve special mention for their conduct.

I cannot close this report without testifying my high appreciation of the courage and daring displayed by the officers and men of the brigade which I had the honor to command on this ever memorable field. They here added fresh laurels to those already won on other fields in the sacred cause of their country.

To regimental and battery commanders and their brave men, my thanks are due and most willingly tendered for their very valuable assistance and co-operation in aiding to bring this battle to a successful and decisive issue.

To my staff, I am specially indebted for their willingness and gallantry in carrying out my orders on the field: Captain E. F. Travis, Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain Douglas Wirt, Assistant Inspector-General; Lieutenant Aid-de-Camp; Captain R. H. Williams, volunteer Aid-de-Camp; Lieutenant C. J. Michailoffsky, Provost-Marshal, and to Senior Surgeon V. B. Gilbert; Major R. J. Hill, Assistant Quartermaster; Major H. A. Deas, Assistant Commissary of Subsistence, and Lieutenant T. B. Dallas, Ordnance Officer, for the zeal and efficiency with which they discharged the duties of their several respective departments.

In going into the fight on the twentieth, the brigade numbered one hundred and fifty-seven officers, and seventeen hundred and eighty-five enlisted men, of whom one hundred and twenty-five were killed, five hundred and ninety-two wounded, and twenty-eight missing; total, seven hundred and forty-five. Among the killed I much regret to record the name of Lieutenant-Colonel John Weeden, commanding Twenty-second Alabama regiment, who fell, early on Sunday morning, while most gallantly leading and cheering on his brave regiment. A few minutes before him, fell the ranking captain of this regiment, L. D. Nott, than whom no braver or better officer ever poured out his life's blood in his country's cause. He died where the brave and good should die, in the front rank, leading his men on to victory. Two heroes! whose lives were sacrificed to fanaticism. Major B. R. Hart, of the same regiment, was severely wounded in the same charge.

I have omitted to state that, on Sunday afternoon I passed over some ten or a dozen ordnance wagons, filled with ordnance stores; three or four pieces of artillery and caissons; many ambulances, and one or two supply wagons, and a dozen or more mules and horses. There had evidently been a stampede here, and these were the fruits left for us.

Before closing, I wish to mention the fact, that the Fifteenth Alabama regiment, Colonel Oates, was with my brigade a portion of the time during the first attack on Sunday morning, and afterwards left me to go to the assistance of General Johnson, in the fight of the afternoon. It is simple justice to say that, what I saw of this regiment, it was behaving with great gallantry.

I am, Major, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
Z. C. Deas,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

The following statement probably appertains more to the division than to the brigade report of this battle, and is therefore reserved for the postscript:

According to the strong testamentary evidence of the occasion, and that also of very many prisoners, this brigade, very materially and opportunely assisted by Anderson's, attacked, on Sunday morning, Sheridan's division, of McCook's corps; and, by the impetuosity of their attack, so thoroughly cut off Davis' division, of the same corps, that they never again assisted in the fight on that day; and, from the best information I can gather, fell back to Chattanooga by the western road to Rossville. The names of

divisions above cited are taken from the statements of prisoners.

This postscript is meant more for information than as a portion of my report.

I am, Major, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
Z. C. DEAS,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL PATTON ANDERSON.

HEADQUARTERS ANDERSON'S BRIGADE, HINDMAN'S DIVISION,
POLK'S CORPS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
MISSIONARY RIDGE, NEAR CHATTANOOGA, TENN., Oct. 6, 1863.

Major J. P. Wilson, Assistant Adjutant-General, Hindman's Division:

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this command in the late battle of Chickamauga:

On the evening of the nineteenth of September, at about five o'clock P. M., Major-General Hindman assumed command of the division on the west bank of the Chickamauga, not long after we had crossed to that side, and while the division was being put in position for the impending battle. I resumed the command of my brigade, which had been relinquished on the seventeenth, at Lafayette, Georgia, for the purpose of relieving Major-General Hindman, who was too unwell to exercise the command of his division. On taking command of my brigade, I took position in line from two to three hundred yards in rear of Deas' left, and Manigault's right, as the reserve brigade of Hindman's division. We bivouacked on the field for the night, and received orders to take up and continue the attack ordered to be made on the right at daylight on the morning of the twentieth of September. The attack on our right was not made, however, until between ten and eleven o'clock on the morning of the twentieth, when it was promptly taken up by Deas and Manigault in my front, and the whole division moved confidently on the enemy's first line. Deas swept everything before him, without halting, or even checking up, in his advance to and over the enemy's first line of breastworks. Manigault was checked, and diverged to the left, unmasking my two left regiments. The whole brigade was moved steadily forward, gradually closing the space between it and Deas' line, until the ascent of a range of wooded hills was reached, where the enemy, by reason of his advantageous position for both infantry and artillery, had brought Deas momentarily to a stand. Three pieces of his artillery, strongly posted about two-thirds of the way up the hill and supported by infantry, were causing Deas' left regiment to waver, when I ordered an advance. The command was most gallantly responded to, the artillery captured, the heights carried, and the enemy so badly routed as to be unable to make any real stand again upon that part of the field. I continued in pursuit, however, for half a mile or more, when, finding my lines imperfect by reason of some being able to follow faster than others, I rode to those in advance and soon succeeded in halting them until the line could be perfected. Here Colonel Coltart, of Deas' brigade, with a portion of his (Fiftieth Alabama) regiment, and another colonel, of some other command, whose name I have forgotten, with a few men, reported to me, having lost their proper commands. Before the new alignment had been completed, a staff officer from General Hindman recalled me from further pursuit, on account of a flank fire which had been opened by the enemy, with artillery and small arms, on my rear and left regiments—the Forty-first and Ninth Mississippi, Colonel Tucker and Major Lyman commanding, respectively.

After re-forming, the command was marched back, by General Hindman's order, in the direction from which they had advanced, a distance of about a half or three-quarters of a mile, then changed direction to the right over an open field, towards a position where Kershaw was reported to be heavily pressed.

My brigade reached this position about three in the afternoon and was ordered to form line on Kershaw's left, to support him in an attack upon a wooded hill in his front, where the enemy was strongly posted. In taking position it was found that the command of Brigadier-General Bushrod Johnson was in line on the extreme left, with not sufficient interval between his right and Kershaw's left for my whole command. The interval, however, was filled, and the over-plus held in reserve. The attack was soon made by the whole line. It was stubbornly resisted from a very strong position just behind the crest of the hill. A portion of two of my regiments gained the crest of the hill and planted colors there; but the position was a hot one, and some breaking to the rear on the left caused the whole to give way for a time. The troops were rallied on the slope of the hill, lines re-formed, and all in readiness to resume the attack, when the enemy advanced his line immediately in my front, down the hill, with some impetuosity. The line was instantly ordered forward to meet this charge, and the command quickly responded to. The enemy was met by a volley and a charge which did much execution, his line broken, and his troops fled in some confusion; but as there was no corresponding forward movement by the brigades on my right and left, and as the hill near the crest was very difficult to ascend, he had time either to re-form or to bring up a second line before we reached the top of the hill, and another repulse was the consequence. Troops never rallied more promptly, and without confusion or clamor. On taking position near the foot of the hill it was found necessary to distribute ammunition, and, while this was being done, Colonel Kelly came up with his brigade, and moved forward to the assault. The Seventh Mississippi, Colonel Bishop commanding, of my brigade, having some ammunition in the cartridge-boxes, was ordered in with Colonel Kelly, to strengthen his command as much as possible. Soon after, two Florida regiments,

under Colonel Finley, also moved forward to Colonel Kelly's support. It was now nearly night, and the importance of completing the day's work, thus far so handsomely accomplished by the left wing, was apparent to all. Kelly made a most vigorous attack, supported as above, and succeeded in occupying a portion of the heights from which he had driven the enemy. Night, at this time, put an end to further pursuit. Every preparation was now made for a renewal of the conflict early the next morning.

At eleven o'clock P. M., of the twentieth, Major-General Hindman sent for me and turned over to me the command of the division, which he had assumed the evening previous, having received a contusion which disabled him from further service at that time, and here my connection with the brigade ceased, the command thereof devolving upon Colonel J. H. Sharp, of the Forty-fourth Mississippi regiment. The light of the morning of the twenty-first disclosed the fact that the enemy had, under cover of darkness, hastily withdrawn towards Chattanooga, from a field in which he had been so severely but justly punished.

In the first charge, after moving up to General Deas' line, which had been checked near the base of a range of wooded hills west of the Chattanooga road, the brigade captured three pieces of artillery, killing many of the cannoneers at their guns, and taking others prisoners. A little further on, and to the left, the Forty-first Mississippi, my left regiment, captured a battery of five guns, among which were several fine rifled pieces. Several stands of colors were also taken during the day. No note was taken of the number of prisoners captured by the brigade. They were immediately ordered to the rear without guard or escort. Nine ordnance wagons, loaded with fixed ammunition, several mules and horses, etc., etc., were also taken and turned over to the proper officers.

I cannot close this brief recital of facts, connected with the operations of the brigade I had the honor to command on the twentieth, without testifying to the officers and troops my high appreciation of the valor, courage, and skill displayed by them on this memorable field. Without a single exception, so far as my knowledge at this time extends, they have borne themselves gallantly and added fresh laurels to those so nobly won upon the former fields of Shiloh, Munfordsville, Perryville, and Murfreesboro. To the regimental, battalion, and battery commanders, individually, my thanks are due, for their zealous, vigorous, and unremitting efforts throughout the whole day to make the battle a decisive one. For instances of individual gallantry, conspicuous above others, I refer to the reports of subordinate commanders, herewith transmitted.

The brigade numbered one hundred and fifty-six officers and one thousand seven hundred and nine enlisted men on the morning of the the loss was five hundred and fifty-eight, of whom eighty were killed, four hundred and fifty-four wounded, and twenty-four missing. Among the killed I regret to record the name of Major John C. Thompson, of the Forty-fourth Mississippi regiment. A man of education and position at home, of an age far beyond that prescribed by the laws of the land for involuntary service, at the first tocsin of war he enlisted in the ranks, and fought as a private in the ranks at Belmont and Shiloh, having been severely wounded at the latter. His gallantry and services marked him before the men of his State for promotion, which he soon after received, and commanded his regiment, with his usual gallantry, at the battle of Murfreesboro. On the memorable field of the Chickamauga his devotion to the cause of his country has been sealed with the blood of a patriot.

I am, Major, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
PATTON ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL L. E. POLK.

HEADQUARTERS POLK'S BRIGADE,
BEFORE CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE, October 10, 1863.

To Captain Irving A. Buck, Assistant Adjutant-General Cleburne's Division:

CAPTAIN: In obedience to orders from division headquarters, I respectfully submit the following report of the part taken by my brigade, composed of the following regiments, from left to right: Third and Fifth Confederate, commanded by Colonel J. A. Smith; First Arkansas, Colonel J. W. Colquitt; Second Tennessee, commanded by Colonel W. D. Robinson; Forty-eighth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel G. H. Nixon; and Thirty-fifth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel B. J. Hill, and Calvert's battery, commanded by Lieutenant S. J. Key, in the battle of the nineteenth and twentieth of September, on Chickamauga Creek:

On Saturday morning, the nineteenth September, my brigade rested in line of battle on the right of Cleburne's division, which formed the extreme left of the army of Tennessee. About one o'clock P. M., I received orders to move in the direction of the right of the army. The necessary orders were immediately given, and my brigade commenced moving down Chickamauga Creek, wading the creek at Tete's Ford, and, moving on, was placed in position some three hundred yards in rear of Liddell's division, on the extreme right of the army. The other brigades of Cleburne's division following, were placed in position on the prolongation of my left. In this move, some eight miles, from the left to the right of the army, although expeditiously performed, some hours were taken. About five and a half o'clock P. M., I received orders from General Cleburne to move my brigade forward, to pass over Liddell's division in our front, and engage and drive the enemy before us. My brigade was immediately moved forward, and having passed Liddell's division some

two hundred yards, encountered the enemy strongly posted on the side of a hill, with temporary breastworks, who immediately opened a destructive fire of grape, canister, and small arms, upon the left of my line, which, for a moment, caused a delay in my advance. The right of the brigade overlapping their line, and finding little resistance in their front, wheeled to the left and took the enemy on the flank. At the same time, two batteries of artillery, Semple's and Key's, having been ordered up by General Cleburne between Wood's and my brigade, opened at short range upon the enemy. Their lines gave way, and they fell back in great confusion. We continued to press them till nearly nine o'clock, when, there being some danger of firing into our own men, we were ordered to halt and rectify or lines. This ended the contest for the night, most of the fighting having been done since dark. In this engagement we drove the enemy seven miles and a quarter, captured over fifty prisoners and three pieces of artillery, and same number of caissons. The loss of the brigade, considering the heavy musketry, was light, not being over sixty men killed and wounded. We rested in line of battle the remainder of the night, with a strong line of skirmishers thrown some four hundred yards in front.

On Sunday morning, the twentieth, our provision wagons were brought up and the men permitted to eat their breakfast, having been without anything to eat for twenty-four hours. My brigade was again ordered forward, commencing the move about nine o'clock; General Breckinridge having placed his line upon the prolongation of my right, with two batteries of artillery between the right of my brigade and left of his division; owing to some mistakes I did not receive the order to advance until a few moments after General Breckinridge's division had been put in motion. Immediately upon the order being received I moved my brigade, obliquing slightly to the right, so as to keep my right connected with General Breckinridge's left; the enemy's fortifications running off at right angles to the rear of their line, opposite the right of my brigade, I was not able to recover my immediate connection with his left before I encountered the enemy, strongly posted in a strong line of fortifications, on the crest of a hill; my line from right to left soon became furiously engaged—the enemy pouring a most destructive fire of canister and musketry into my advancing line, so terrible, indeed, that my line could not advance in the face of it, but lying down partially protected by the crest of a hill, we continued the fight some hour and a half. Wood's brigade not promptly supporting me upon the left, it was impossible to charge their breastworks. My ammunition becoming exhausted, by orders, I fell back some four hundred yards, leaving a line of skirmishers in my front to oppose the advance of the enemy, until my ammunition could be replenished. The enemy were too much hurt to advance, and were well satisfied to hold their works. I remained in this position some hours. In this engagement my loss was very great, amounting to some three hundred and fifty killed and wounded. Among the number was Captain W. J. Morris, of Third and Fifth Confederate regiment, a brave and worthy officer. Captain McKnight, of Second Tennessee regiment, also fell in these engagements in the faithful discharge of his duties. Major Driven, of the Second Tennessee, received a most painful and serious wound in the head. Adjutant Greenwood, of First Arkansas, one of the best and most gallant officers in the army, fell mortally wounded. Here also my Inspector-General, Captain Hugh S. Otey, a brave and faithful officer, was mortally wounded by a cannon ball, from the effect of which he died a few days after. My brigade remained here until about four o'clock P. M., when I was ordered by General Cleburne to advance and take up my position upon the left of Brigadier-General Jackson. Arriving in this position, I found General Jackson's line advancing; partially wheeling my brigade to the left, I immediately advanced with Jackson's brigade, and again encountered the enemy behind their breastworks, some five hundred yards to the right of where I engaged them in the morning. Again I was met by a terrible volley of grape, canister, and small arms, which caused a temporary halt. Ordering Lieutenant Key to bring up his battery beneath the crest of the ridge, where my line of battle was fighting, he replied that his horses could not live a moment under such a fire. I then ordered him to bring the pieces by hand, and, assisted by some volunteers from the brigade, succeeded in doing so, and opened upon their breastworks with double charges of canister, at a distance of less than two hundred yards. Observing at this time, that the enemy's line wavered, I immediately ordered a charge, and, at four and a half o'clock, succeeded in getting possession of their first line of works, taking more than two hundred prisoners, all of them regulars. The enemy fell back in some confusion to his second line and again made a stand. About this time some batteries of artillery, which General Cleburne had massed on a hill upon my left, poured so destructive a fire upon the columns coming up to support the troops in the breastworks, that finding that their supports had been driven back, they gave way and retired in great confusion from their second line of breastworks, and did not stop a moment in their third line. I moved my brigade rapidly forward and pursued them across the Chattanooga road, reaching the road a little before dark. At this time the firing had stopped everywhere, and the army of Rosecrans was in rapid and disorderly retreat towards Chattanooga. In this engagement my loss, though not as heavy as in the morning, was heavy—losing nearly two hundred men. It was here that Captain Beard, of the Third and Fifth Confederate regiment, and Captain George Moore, of same regiment, both gallant officers, met their death. Here

also Captain N. C. Hockersmith and Lieutenant A. J. Petner, of the First Arkansas regiment, were seriously wounded. Many other true and brave men also fell here.

During the entire fight the men and officers of my brigade acted well.

Among the officers who were most distinguished at the battle of Chickamauga, I must mention the name of Colonel B. J. Hill, Thirty-fifth Tennessee regiment. Upon every field in the West, from Shiloh to Chickamauga, this officer has acted with conspicuous courage and coolness. I earnestly recommend his name for promotion.

Colonel Smith, of Third and Fifth Confederate regiment, acted with his usual courage and skill. He has since been promoted. Promotion could not have fallen on one more worthy.

Colonel Robinson, Colonel Colquitt, Colonel Nixon, Lieutenant-Colonel Holes, and Major Pearson all deserve well of their country.

I respectfully refer you to reports of regimental commanders for other names distinguished for gallantry.

I here return my thanks to Captain W. H. King, my Assistant Adjutant-General, and Lieutenant Schell, for efficient services rendered upon the field.

A full list of the casualties in my brigade has already been sent forward.

Respectfully,

L. E. POLK.
Brigadier General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL S. A. M. WOOD.

HEADQUARTERS WOOD'S BRIGADE,
MISSIONARY RIDGE, TENNESSEE, October 9, 1863.

Captain Buck, A. A. G.:

SIR: The undersigned submits the following report of the part taken by his brigade in the battle of the nineteenth and twentieth of September, 1863, near Chickamauga river:

The brigade consisted of the Thirty-second and Forty-fifth Mississippi regiments, commanded by Colonel M. P. Lowry; the Thirty-third Alabama, Colonel Samuel Adams; the Forty-fifth Alabama, Colonel Breedlove, and the Sixteenth Alabama, Major McGaughey; also, Major A. T. Hankins' battalion of sharpshooters. Semple's battery is attached to this brigade, but had been, about the time we arrived in the field, directed by orders from the Division Chief of Artillery.

At twelve o'clock, on the nineteenth, the brigade was in line of battle on the Lafayette and Chattanooga road, near where the left of our army was engaged with the enemy. Orders were received to march in rear of Brigadier-General Polk's brigade. After moving in a northeastwardly direction for four or five miles, we approached the field near the right of our army and formed in line of battle, after crossing the West Chickamauga Creek at a ford, the men wading. This delayed our march in order to [illegible]ich was farther delayed by two [illegible]g the road. The brigade was formed in line as follows: Right—Hankins, Lowry, Breedlove, McGaughey; Adams, left. Brigadier-General Polk was on my right; Brigadier-General Deshler on my left. At this time Major-General Cleburne ordered me to move forward (the guide being upon my brigade), and, if I met with any batteries, not to delay, but charge and take them. I communicated this order to each of my Colonels. Skirmishers were thrown out three hundred yards in advance. Firing of pickets was all this time going on in our front, and I heard it remarked that a line of our troops were in that direction. The order was now given to advance. We soon came to a line of our men lying down, which we passed over. In a few minutes our skirmishers were engaged and the line pressed rapidly to the front, passing through a wooded and slightly undulating country, until we reached the field. The line touched the fence in a slight ravine or hollow, the ground gradually ascending in the field in front. The opening covered nearly the length of my brigade, and was about two or three hundred yards across. The enemy were strongly posted in rear of this field, having constructed breastworks of rails and logs. They opened fire, as we crossed the fence, with great rapidity. The command moved up vigorously against a foe almost wholly protected from our fire, and who delivered volley after volley into our ranks. When we had reached the farther side of the field, many of the enemy still remained behind their defences, and shots were delivered in twenty paces of each other. In crossing this field Colonel Lowry, of the Thirty-second Mississippi regiment, greatly distinguished himself by his continued exertions in urging forward his command. The enemy were routed from their defences and driven into the woods. In advancing, the brigade to my right had changed direction to the left, which threw its left in front of my right, and prevented Colonel Lowry's command and Major Hankins' sharpshooters from firing. I sent my Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Palmer, to order them to cease firing; but, before he arrived, Colonel Lowry had anticipated the order by giving it himself. The Forty-fifth Alabama regiment, next to the right, was now in advance of Colonel Lowry and halted, ceasing to fire at this time, as did also the Sixteenth Alabama, the enemy having fallen back. The Thirty-third Alabama, being my left in advancing, was pressed upon by the right of Deshler's brigade, which I strove to prevent. The direction of their line being slightly oblique to mine, and it being dark, some little confusion occurred as to the positions of the different commands, which were soon rectified. Skirmishers were ordered out in front of the brigade, and then doubled. We captured over a hundred prisoners, besides the wounded left on the field. Most of them were taken at the log defences, which they said they had been instructed to hold to the last. In no action has this command ever displayed more eagerness to engage the enemy, or been more

successful in their attack. The brunt of the action was on the left of Polk's brigade and across mine. He alone advanced through an open field and against the defences of logs and rails. Other troops had failed to carry this position during the day, as we heard. The confusion which happened to one of the regiments was the result of some unauthorized person giving a command "to retreat" (see report of Sixteenth Alabama regiment), and that was soon rectified by Major McGaughey. The whole command lay upon their arms during the night, in line of battle. Semple's battery, attached to my brigade, was not under my control during this action. I, however, saw it placed in position by the Division Chief of Artillery, and its fire was of the greatest service in routing the enemy and silencing his batteries. On the morning of the twentieth, the troops were aroused at early dawn, the line rectified, the skirmishers in front relieved, and everything made ready to engage the enemy. Ammunition had been replenished during the night. Shortly after daylight, a day's ration of cooked provisions was brought up and distributed. The morning was cold, and the men were allowed to have small fires and eat their breakfast. At ten o'clock I was notified the line was about to near the enemy, and that the movement would commence on my right. I had already heard that it was probable that my brigade overlapped troops to my left not of this division, and that some irregularity existed in the lines as formed. At a few minutes past ten the brigade on my right moved forward, and I moved with it. Its left soon crowded on my right, when I obliqued to the left to give room. In a few moments it made a rapid movement obliquely to the right, leaving a gap. The brigade was at once ordered to follow this movement and every exertion was made to do so, but we were now under fire of artillery, and had advanced but a short distance when my right was within short range of the enemy's rifles. They were hidden behind logs and timber, covered with bushes. The whole line to the right, was now at a halt, and firing; this was followed by the right of my brigade, Hankins' sharpshooters and Colonel Lowry's regiment. The Major-General passed me at this moment, and I informed him that my left had passed over some of our troops lying down, and were in front of them. The whole front of the brigade to my left was covered by other troops. He directed me to see to the left of my command, and said that Deshler's brigade would be taken to the right. The Sixteenth and Thirty-third Alabama regiments were ordered to lie down on a line with the troops in the front line to my left, who were also lying down. I found Brigadier-General Bowen at the right of his line, and told him that the batteries now firing on us would enfilade me if I advanced without a corresponding advance to my left. He said he had no orders to advance, but would send to Major-General Stewart for orders. Major-General Stewart came to that position, and having ordered his division forward, I immediately ordered the Forty-fifth Alabama regiment, supporting my battery, up into line with the Sixteenth and Thirty-third Alabama regiments, and ordered them all forward. About this time the line to the right had fallen back, and the position occupied by Colonel Lowry and Major Hankins was taken by Deshler's brigade. The peculiar character of the enemy's works, represented by a diagram annexed, will show that, whilst the right of my command was very near them, an angle was formed in its front, and the enemy's line was thrown back so as to give them the cover of woods, and compel us to advance through a wide field. My brigade advanced into this field. The Thirty-third Alabama, under the lead of its gallant Colonel, crossed the field and the Chattanooga road. The fire of the enemy at this point was most destructive, and though this movement was supported by Brown's, Clayton's, and Bate's brigades, it was not long before all had to return, and were again assembled and formed at the position from which they last advanced. My command, being the right of the line advancing against this returned line of the enemy, was subjected to a cross and enfilading fire, which was very severe on all, but especially on the Forty-fifth Alabama regiment, which was forced back earlier than the Sixteenth and Thirty-third Alabama, and re-formed on Colonel Lowry's regiment. As soon as the position of these regiments could be ascertained, the Sixteenth and Thirty-third were ordered to take their places in the line, they being six or eight hundred yards in advance on the left. During this movement Semple's battery, under the command of Lieutenant Goldthwaite, followed the brigade and opened effectively on the enemy. In the second advance it was not deemed desirable that the battery should advance with the brigade, the batteries of other brigades on our left being ordered to remain in position. After reforming our line, a division was moved to our right (Cheatham's), and I received an order to move up to the support of Polk's brigade. I formed in line with it, threw out skirmishers, and moved to the right a half mile. Our skirmishers were engaged with the enemy until nearly sundown, when, General Polk having advanced and desiring the support of a regiment, I directed Colonel Lowry to go to his support. But the enemy had been routed.

In conclusion, it may be stated that no command conducted itself with more spirit or determination. By subsequent examination of the field, it was observed that at no point were the enemy's works so strong as in our front; and the peculiar formation of his lines, which, owing to the heavy timber and under-growth, could not be ascertained by any effort but an assault, subjected the command to a very destructive cross and enfilading fire on Sunday. The reports of the Colonels and commanders of batteries and battalions will show a list of casualties. The loss, at the time, in the brigade, was ninety-six killed on the field, and six hundred and eighty

wounded. Many have died since, among them four field officers: Major McGaughey, of the Sixteenth Alabama regiment; Major Carr, Thirty-second Mississippi; Major Hankins, Hankins' sharpshooters; Major Gibson, Gibson's battalion, attached to Thirty-third Alabama regiment. These officers, of the same rank, were all distinguished by former services on the field of battle. They were all of great merit, and their loss will be long deeply regretted by their commands. For further particulars, reference is made to reports of commanders of regiments and companies.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
S. A. M. WOOD,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL M. A. STOVALL.

HEADQUARTERS STOVALL'S BRIGADE,
BRECKINRIDGE'S DIVISION, HILL'S CORPS,
MISSIONARY RIDGE, October 3, 1863.

To Major James Wilson, Assistant Adjutant-General:

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my brigade in the action of Sunday, the twentieth of September, 1863:

In obedience to orders from headquarters Breckinridge's division, of date September sixteen, 1863, I moved from my position on the Alpine road, near Lafayette, Georgia, on the Catlin's Gap road, at or near the latter place on the morning of the seventeenth. Here I remained in position until the morning of the eighteenth, when I was ordered to proceed on the Crawfish to Chattanooga road. I halted at the intersection of the two latter for about thirty minutes, when I marched to Pigeon Ridge, near Glass's Mill (stopping and forming line of battle for a short while, in the meantime), and again went into position. I remained at this place until Saturday, the nineteenth, when I was again moved down the Chattanooga road to Snow Hill. Skirmishers had scarcely been deployed, and the proper dispositions made, when I was ordered still further forward in a north-easterly direction to the battle-field as reinforcements to the right of our line, reported then to be hard pressed by the enemy. This move did not commence until five o'clock P. M.; hence I did not get into position until Sunday, the twentieth instant. Saturday night, the nineteenth instant, we slept on the edge of the battle-field, and moved out into position at four o'clock A. M., the next (Sunday) morning. We formed a line of battle at sunrise, this division being on the extreme right of the army—my brigade being in the centre of the division, and between the brigades of Brigadier-Generals Adams and Helm respectively. Skirmishers — twenty-five men from each regiment—were immediately deployed, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Badger, of the Fourth Florida regiment. Subsequently, orders were received to advance the line thus deployed, and for a regiment to be thrown forward to support them. In obedience thereto, I ordered Colonel Borden, commanding the Fourth Florida regiment, to take out his command as the support required. For the manner in which he manœuvred it, while in advance, I respectfully refer to the accompanying report from him.

Between nine and ten o'clock, my brigade was ordered to advance. I moved out in good order, parallel to the Chattanooga road, about a half mile, not without first encountering two distinct lines of the enemy's skirmishers and driving them in. Here the brigade was halted and, by a flank movement, formed nearly perpendicular to its former position. Thus re-formed, I moved forward, and had not gone far before I encountered the enemy in heavy force and strongly intrenched. Here the battle raged fiercely. A concentrated fire of grape and canister, shot and shell, of every conceivable character, was poured into us from the front, while my left suffered no less from an enfilading fire equally galling and severe. Brigadier-General Helm's brigade, having encountered the enemy's breastworks, was unable to keep up the alignment, which, taken with the fact that the reserve ordered to our support failed to come up, and the further fact that my left, as well as my front, was thus exposed, the brigade—in fact, the whole line—was forced to retire. The troops of my command fell back simultaneously, forming in perfect order, not exceeding two hundred yards in rear of the position for which they had gallantly contested. From this position I was still further retired and placed in position on the extreme right of the division, acting as a support to the command of Major-General William H. T. Walker. Here I remained at rest for a few hours. During the interval, I had my cartridge-boxes all replenished, my command remaining quiet until four o'clock P. M. About that hour I was ordered to move my brigade to the extreme right of the line. Again formed nearly parallel to the Chattanooga road. This latter movement was ordered, that we might form part of a support to the brigades of Brigadier-Generals Liddell and Walthall. They were soon driven in, but were afterwards re-formed and thrown forward a second time. Just at this juncture, I was ordered to advance. Changing my direction by a left half wheel, I was brought to the enemy's line. Thus in position, I commenced the charge. My brigade pressed through two lines of our own troops, passed over the enemy's breastworks, and, with deafening shouts of patriotic enthusiasm, pursued the foe to the Chattanooga road, where, in obedience to orders, I halted, night putting an end to the conflict.

I respectfully refer to the accompanying statement, marked ——, showing the regiment, name, and rank of every officer and soldier killed, wounded, and missing; also the character of the wounds.

I am much indebted to Colonel Dilworth, First and Third Florida; Colonel Borden, Fourth Florida; Lieutenant-Colonel Ray, Sixtieth North Carolina, and Captain Cone, Forty-seventh Geor-

gia, who led their respective commands with skill and judgment. Also, to Captain Weaver, who succeeded to the command of the Sixtieth North Carolina after its Colonel was disabled. Captain J. P. C. Whitehead, my Assistant Adjutant-General; Lieutenant A. J. Hanson, and Captain J. H. Hall (who was severely wounded in the shoulder), displayed great coolness and daring during the conflict, and to them I am much indebted for valuable services rendered; also, to Lieutenant A. Dunham, Ordnance Officer, for the promptness manifested in the discharge of the duties of his responsible office.

I have the honor to be, respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

M. A. STOVALL,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL GEORGE MANEY.

HEADQUARTERS MANEY'S BRIGADE,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE, Oct. 6, 1863.

Major James D. Porter, Assistant Adjutant-General:

I respectfully submit the following report of the part taken by my command in the battle of the nineteenth and twentieth instant, near Chickamauga Creek:

My brigade was composed of the Fourth Tennessee regiment, Colonel James A. McMurray commanding; the Sixth and Ninth Tennessee regiments (consolidated), Colonel George C. Porter commanding; the First and Twenty-seventh Tennessee regiments (consolidated), Colonel H. R. Field commanding; Maney's battalion sharpshooters, Major Frank Maney commanding, and a field battery of four twelve-pounder Napoleon guns, under the command of First Lieutenant William B. Turner.

My command crossed Chickamauga Creek at Hunt's Ford, on the morning of the nineteenth September, and, after proceeding in a northern direction about two miles by the flank, was formed in line of battle. I here met General Liddell's command, which was being re-formed, after having been, as I understood, severely engaged with superior numbers. Passing forward of this command towards the engagement then pending, and which seemed to have been taken up by brigades in advance of me, I was, after some inconsiderable halts, ordered to enter the action by relieving Jackson's brigade—my information, at the time, being that Strahl's brigage would be in line on my left. The position pointed out to me as the one at which I was to relieve Jackson's command, was a ridge well wooded, where the right half of my command rested; but from the centre to my left, the timber on the side of approach had been newly felled and presented some difficulty to easy passage in line. In extension to my left, there was an open corn field—a narrow strip of woodland intervening. My line commenced engaging instantly on reaching the top of the ridge described, and in a few moments afterwards I was informed by a messenger from General Forrest that there was nothing on the right but his cavalry, and that he was unable to sustain himself against the strong force of the enemy which was pressing him. Strahl's brigade was not at this moment in line with me on the left, it having, as I afterwards learned, become earlier engaged and fallen back to re-form. My own line numbered less than one thousand guns. My battery was just in rear of my centre, but the ground was not favorable to its advantageous engagement. About three hundred yards in my rear there was a hill-top in open woods—a most favorable position in many particulars for a battery. Lieutenant Turner was ordered to leave one piece in position, to be used in any emergency which might arise, and retire the remaining three to this hill-top, and there take position and await further orders. Some moments after this I heard a battery open in rear of the right of my line, and hastening to it I found that Forrest had been forced in on my right. General Forrest, in person, was with the battery, which was firing obliquely to the front and right, and, as I thought, too much in range with two companies of my right regiment, which had been thrown out as flankers to this part of my line. General Forrest was apprised of this fact and requested to oblique his guns more to the right, which he did and continued firing, as he informed me the enemy was certainly approaching in force from that direction. The firing was now constant along my entire front, and the enemy's indicated that his line extended far beyond my left. Forrest's battery was some protection to my right flank, and my single Napoleon, while it could not fire with any effect over the ridge in front, was in position to rake the open field to the left and rear of my line, and to this extent prevented the enemy's coming behind us, unless it should first be driven off by sharpshooters, lodged on the ridge-top, under cover of the woods between my line and the field. The action increased in fury, especially on the left, and I was soon convinced that my command was greatly overmatched in numbers. A staff officer was sent with this information to the division General, and another to my left and rear in search of General Strahl, with the request for him to move up in line with me on the left. Passing myself to the ridge-top to the left of my line, I discovered the enemy but a short distance from my left, advancing by the flank boldly, and evidently with the purpose of passing through this skirt of woods at right angles with my line, and thus gain my rear and centre of my left flank. The emergency was critical, and, being without a staff officer I hastened in person to General Strahl, who I found had received my message and was aligning for an advance. To avoid delay, I asked him to move forward a single regiment to hold the interval between my left and the open field, and he ordered his right regiment, Colonel Walker's, and perhaps another, to advance immediately. This force made a gallant drive forward, and the enemy gave way before them. I had, about this time, received the order to fall back and form be-

hind Smith's brigade, which was in line with my guns on the hill-top in the rear. My line was retired in as good order as its shattered condition would admit of. Before reaching Smith's line, I was instructed to continue my infantry back to the ordnance wagons for a supply of ammunition. The ammunition replenished, my command again moved forward and bivouacked for the night in line with and on the left of the division, without further engagement of my infantry for the day.

My advanced gun, under the immediate command and efficient management of First Lieutenant Smith, after covering the retiring line with several well-directed shots at short range, was withdrawn to the hill-top and took position with the other three—the battery, by order of the division General, being retained there with the line formed to check the enemy's advance. The service it here rendered in checking and driving back the enemy's advancing line did not occur under my immediate eye, but is reported as brilliant and decisive. The enemy, pressing forward on what he deemed our yielding lines, was met by shot and shell, and then double charges of canister belched in quick succession from four as good guns and, in my judgment, as gallantly and efficiently manned and served as any our service can boast. Three times his lines were broken and shattered before their deadly discharges, and finally he abandoned, in disordered rout, all efforts to capture them. The excellent conduct of Lieutenant Turner and his gallant officers and men on this occasion was but a repetition of their services on the fields of Perryville and Murfreesboro.

The active engagement of my command on Saturday was about three-quarters of an hour in duration and extremely severe. Besides being opposed on all parts by largely superior numbers, two of the enemy's batteries were actively served against it obliquely from the right and left, and ranging principally from the centre to the left of my lines. The loss in this engagement was heavy, including some of the most valuable officers of my command. Colonel McMurray, a gentleman of the noblest qualities and an officer of fine abilities and great gallantry, received a wound in the thickest of the fight, from which he has since died, and Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis and Major Bradshaw, of the same regiment, both officers of great merit, were, in quick succession, severely wounded in the gallant discharge of their duties.

In Turner's battery the loss of officers was two of the four—First-Lieutenant Smith severely wounded, and Second Lieutenant Ingraham killed. Both these officers displayed great gallantry. While the behavior of my entire line was of a character so entirely satisfactory and commendable as to forbid the claim of superiority in conduct of any one part over another, the extreme left, held by the Sixth and Ninth regiments (consolidated), was most exposed, and the chances of the day demanded of this veteran command a bloody sacrifice. It is but a just tribute to say the demand was met by them as became heroes in many battles. Their loss in killed and wounded was over half their number engaged, including among the latter Major Wilder and many other officers of excellent merit.

On Sunday, the twentieth, my command remained in line of battle, with the other brigades of the division, where it had bivouacked the night before, some half a mile to the left of the position of my previous day's engagement, until about two o'clock P. M., when I was ordered to move by the right flank about the distance of a mile, when I was halted for a considerable time, receiving, in this position, some shelling, but sustaining but small loss. Late in the afternoon I was ordered into line with other brigades of the division for a general movement, as I understood, against the enemy's main position near the Chattanooga road. There was at this time sharp firing obliquely to my front and left, and about the time I was in line Brigadier-General Polk, of Cleburne's division, came up, asking for assistance, and stating that his command had gained a portion of the enemy's breastworks, but was engaged in front without support on either flank, adding that if I would advance it would relieve him. I did not feel at liberty to detach myself without instructions from my division commander, but at this moment discovering General Cheatham a short distance to my right, I proceeded to him immediately and gave him the information just received from General Polk, when I was ordered to go to his assistance. On my return General Polk was not present to advise me of the precise position of his command, he having, I suppose, in the meantime rejoined it; but remembering his remark, that I would relieve him by advancing, I moved directly forward. This movement brought me into action, I think, some two or three hundred yards to his right. The order to advance was received by my entire line with an enthusiasm plainly telling that their valor was more stimulated than abated by their severe suffering of the previous day. My line was soon engaged, but the force in front yielded and were driven rapidly back. A fire was, however, opened on my left flank, but the giving way of the enemy in front, and the continued rapid advance of my line caused this to cease, and the enemy delivering it quickly abandoned his position on my left, under the impression, as prisoners stated to me, that our movement would gain his rear. As soon as the firing ceased I commenced re-forming my line, which had become considerably disordered by its rapid movement through thick woods and under-growth. Before this was done I was joined by Wright's brigade, which came forward after me. It was now some time after sunset, and almost entirely dark in the thick woods. Skirmishers and small parties thrown forward for observation reported no enemy in front between me and the Chattanooga road. General Breckinridge's entire command came from towards

my right, passing in rear of and almost at right angles with my line. Under these circumstances, and to avoid the danger of collision with our own troops in the darkness, I sent a staff officer to advise the division General of the result of my movement, with the information that I had halted for further orders. My staff officer returned, reporting that he did not find General Cheatham, but had delivered my report to Lieutenant-General Polk, who directed that I should remain where I was. I then bivouacked for the night in the enemy's breastworks, where, I understood, had been the main position of Thomas' corps. My loss in this engagement was light compared with that of the previous day.

On Monday, at two o'clock P. M., the enemy having abandoned the field and, during the preceding night, withdrawn to Chattanooga, our march commenced toward that point. We bivouacked for the night on Chickamauga Creek, about —— miles from the battle-field.

Early Tuesday morning we resumed the march, gaining the road leading from Chickamauga Station to Chattanooga, about one mile and a half east of Missionary Ridge. Advancing by this road, it was ascertained the enemy occupied the ridge, and, after a short halt, for the purpose of reconnoitring, my brigade, being in front, was ordered by Major-General Cheatham to drive them from and take possession of the ridge. My line was formed on the right of the road and properly sustained with skirmishers. With these dispositions my command was advanced to the attack, and after a spirited engagement of a few moments the enemy was driven, and the ridge top was in our possession. My loss in this affair was eighteen killed and wounded.

Through all the trials and dangers incident to their part in this memorable battle, the conduct of my command was such as might have been expected of intelligent and patriotic veterans. Their ranks had been thinned on many other fields, yet all were eager here to strike for the right as though there was no death, no suffering before them, but only their cause to serve.

I feel it proper, in addition to those whose good conduct has been mentioned in connection with their wounds, to express my thanks to Colonels Porter and Field, commanding regiments, and their associate field officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Buford, Lieutenant-Colonel House and Major Allen, for their zealous and efficient aid throughout the engagement. Also to Major Maney, commanding battalion of sharpshooters, and Captain Bostwick, of the Seventh Tennessee regiment, who commanded the regiment with gallantry and ability after the fall of all its field officers. Lieutenant Turner, commanding battery, deserves especial notice for the effective and decisive manner in which his battery was commanded and served. I also mention Lieutenant Henry, of the battery, for his gallant and efficient conduct. My staff—Captain Porter, Assistant Adjutant-General; Lieutenant House, Aid-de-Camp, and Lieutenant Ruble, Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General—have my thanks for their courage and great assistance throughout the engagement. Private William Whitthorne, for the time disabled, by a wound received in a former action, from carrying his musket, tendered his services, and I must commend his intelligence and gallantry in conveying my orders to different parts of the field.

Lists of casualties in my command have been furnished. Reports of battalion commanders herewith filed, are referred to for particulars and for instances of gallantry in their commands.

Very respectfully,

GEORGE MANEY,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL O. F. STRAHL.

HEADQUARTERS STRAHL'S BRIGADE,
MISSIONARY RIDGE, September 30, 1863.

Major James D. Porter, Jr., Assistant Adjutant-General Cheatham's Division:

SIR: On the morning of the nineteenth instant, my brigade, composed of the Fourth and Fifth, Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth, Thirty-first and Thirty-third Tennessee regiments, and Captain Stanford's rifle battery, moved by the right flank, in compliance with orders from division headquarters, and crossed Chickamauga Creek about three miles below Lee and Gordon's Mill. From this point, and about the middle of the day, we moved rapidly to the right about two miles, where we halted and formed in line of battle immediately on the left of General Maney's brigade. About one o'clock P. M., I received an order from General Cheatham to move forward, which I did, and took a position immediately in rear of General Smith's brigade, which was at that time hotly engaged with the enemy, and some two hundred yards in front of the position I had taken.

Shortly after taking this position, General Smith sent me word that he was about to be driven back, and wished me to come to his support, which I did at once, moving forward over his line to a small elevation some two hundred and fifty yards in his front, entirely relieving him, and engaging the enemy. In a short time after thus engaging the enemy, General Smith rode up to me, and told me that my left flank was still in rear of General Wright, and that my right flank was not supported by any one, and that I was in a position to be flanked by the enemy on my right, unless I immediately moved in that direction. Discovering, however, that General Wright had retired, and that none of our troops were in my front, and knowing the great danger of attempting a flank movement in the presence and under the fire of an enemy, and expecting General Maney to come up on my right, I did not move in that direction until General Smith rode up to me a second time, and told me that General Cheatham directed that I should close the gap between myself and General Jackson, by moving to the right. I then concluded that General Maney had been ordered elsewhere,

and I, therefore, immediately gave orders to move to the right, but had hardly commenced the movement before the enemy met the front of my column with a murderous and destructive fire, enfilading nearly the whole of my line, and moving in such a direction as soon to be in the rear of my right, if I attempted to hold the position I then had.

The position of the two lines were about as is shown by the following diagram:



Therefore, not knowing whether I was to receive support on my right, and having no time for delay, I immediately gave orders for my line to retire, and at once moved back to a position where I hoped to be able to prevent the enemy from flanking me. I gained this position with my left in good order, my right being thrown into confusion by the heavy fire they were receiving, both from the front and on their flank. The officers, however, all acted with great gallantry and coolness, and immediately rallied their men as soon as they arrived at positions where they could do so and not be in immediate danger of being flanked. In this movement we were compelled to leave most of our men killed and wounded on the field, some of which fell into the hands of the enemy. Our loss whilst placed in this unfortunate position was near two hundred, and among that number some very valuable and gallant officers.

Most of the field officers on my right were dismounted by having their horses shot from under them, and Major Heiskell, of the Nineteenth Tennessee regiment, a very gallant officer, was severely wounded in the foot.

During this short encounter with the enemy the Nineteenth Tennessee regiment was on my right, and was therefore much more exposed, and consequently met with a much heavier loss than any other in the brigade. But its field officers, Colonel F. M. Walker and Lieutenant-Colonel B. F. Moore, acted with such coolness and gallantry that they inspired their men with courage and confidence, and prevented that demoralization which might have been expected under such trying circumstances.

It was now, while engaged in re-forming my line, that General Maney came up and pressed the enemy back for some distance on my right, and soon became hotly engaged. As soon as my line was re-formed I moved forward to his support, and arrived on a line with his left just in time to meet the enemy, who were advancing rapidly and pressing his line back. My three regiments, the Nineteenth, Thirty-first, and Thirty-third, were thrown forward in advance of the left of my brigade and took possession of a sm[illegible] woods, which they held until the [illegible]ht had fallen back so far that [illegible] exposed to a severe enfilading fire, when I again ordered them to retire to the position where they had first rallied, in order to prevent the enemy from swinging around my right and thus getting in my rear. Then I re-formed my whole line, but learning that General Smith's brigade was in line just on my right and but a short distance in my rear, and being without support on either flank, I deemed it advisable to move back and form on him; which I did, and remained in this position until dark.

While in this position, my battery, commanded by Captain T. P. Stanford, for the first time opened upon the enemy and shelled them for a short time, but with what effect I could not tell. The ground over which we had been fighting during the afternoon was of such a nature that it would not admit of the use of artillery, and especially of a rifle battery; therefore I was compelled to meet every advance of the enemy with my infantry alone, although their batteries were playing on me the whole time, and from positions that made their fire very effective. My battery, however, was at all times immediately in my rear, and ready, at a moment's notice, to go into position had an opportunity offered where it could have been used with effect.

About dark General Deshler's brigade, which was then in my rear, was ordered to the front, and moved forward in such a manner as to cover my right. In a short time after he had passed me, going to the front, I was ordered to follow, and did so, continuing to advance until I came up with his line, which was an old field, and near where we had been engaged during the afternoon. Here we bivouacked for the night in line of battle.

During the night our infirmary corps brought off many of our killed and wounded that we had left on the field.

The next morning we were held in this position until noon or later, when we moved by the right flank to the extreme right of the army, and was then moved forward and placed in position immediately in rear of General Liddell's command, and there remained until the morning of the twenty-first, when I formed on the right of General Liddell and sent forward skirmishers some two miles and a half, but without discovering an enemy, save some few stragglers, who surrendered without making any resistance.

During the whole engagement my command was almost continually within range of the enemy's cannon, and, at times, suffered severely from it.

My Ordnance Officer, Lieutenant Winston, during and after the engagement, collected and hauled from the field one thousand stand of small arms.

Several small squads of prisoners were taken by my men and sent to the rear, but without any account of their number.

The company and field officers, as a general thing, conducted themselves with great gallantry and coolness, and discharged their duties in such a manner as to reflect much credit upon themselves and their commands. The privates in the ranks, as usual, displayed that noble courage for which Southern soldiers have ever been distinguished.

My staff officers, Captain J. W. Johnson, A. A. G., and Lieutenant John S. Chapman, A. A. I. G., rendered me very efficient service on the field, and during the whole engagement manifested a zeal and energy in the discharge of their duties that was truly commendable.

I have already forwarded to you a list of the casualties of this brigade, showing the name, rank and command of the officers and men killed, wounded and missing during the engagement. That report shows our loss in killed to be nineteen; wounded, two hundred and three, and missing, twenty-eight—making the whole loss sustained by the brigade two hundred and fifty, officers and men.

Some of the missing have since been heard of as wounded and in the hands of the enemy. Many of the wounded men are but slightly injured, and will soon be able to join their comrades. But there are many noble spirits who will never return; and while we have to mourn the loss of our gallant dead, and sympathize with those who are suffering from their wounds, yet we cannot but rejoice that the tide of invasion has, for once, been hurled back, and that the faces of our gallant and victorious soldiers are now turned towards their homes, and that a new and unconquerable spirit has been aroused throughout our whole army.

Respectfully submitted,

O. F. STRAHL,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL M. J. WRIGHT.

HEADQUARTERS WRIGHT'S BRIGADE, CHEATHAM'S DIVISION,
POLK'S CORPS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
IN THE FIELD, October 9, 1863.

Major James D. Porter, Assistant Adjutant-General, Cheatham's Division:

MAJOR: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of my brigade in the battle of Chickamauga, on the nineteenth and twentieth ultimo:

On Saturday, nineteenth ultimo, at half-past eight o'clock A. M., I was ordered by Major-General Cheatham to advance and cross the Chickamauga, at a ford known as ——— Ford, following immediately after Brigadier-General Preston Smith's brigade, and followed by Brigadier-General George Maney's brigade. Immediately after we crossed the ford heavy firing commenced in our front, which was ascertained to be an engagement between the reserve division of Major-General Walker and the enemy, who was in heavy force and was pressing Walker hotly with his largely superior numbers. My brigade, after crossing, was formed in line of battle in a field, in the rear of Brigadier-General Smith. I was ordered to follow immediately in the rear of Smith when he moved. In an hour Smith moved in the direction of the battle-field, and we followed closely in his rear. After moving into a wood in a direction inclining down the Chickamauga, another halt was made of half an hour, when I received an order from General Cheatham to form in line of battle, and moved forward in a direction nearly at right angles to the road along which we were posted, with that brave and accomplished officer, General Preston Smith, still on my right. Maney being in my rear in the line of march, I supposed that he would be ordered up to the left. Indeed, in the act of executing the forward movement in line of battle, I was informed by General Smith that we were a supporting force to Major-General Walker, who was supposed to be in our front.

My brigade is composed of the following regiments, which moved in line, from right to left, in the order named: Sixteenth Tennessee regiment, Colonel D. M. Donnell commanding; Eighth Tennessee regiment, Colonel John H. Anderson commanding; Fifty-first and Fifty-second Tennessee regiments, Lieutenant-Colonel John G. Hall commanding; Twenty-eight Tennessee regiment, Colonel S. S. Stanton commanding; Thirty-eighth Tennessee regiment and Murray's Tennessee battalion, Colonel John C. Carter commanding, with the battery of light artillery commanded by Captain Wm. W. Carnes. The men moved up in splendid style, obeying all orders with the alacrity and precision which is their habit on parade. With the information I had received, believing Major-General Walker in our front, I had directed each regiment to throw out skirmishers, and thus guard against the too frequent and often criminal folly of pouring a fire in the rear of our own comrades in arms when engaged against a foe in front. This order I immediately countermanded when it became quite evident that a most galling fire had been opened by the enemy's batteries and infantry upon my right flank and a portion of the centre. This fire continued for some minutes before the left flank was engaged, and was the result of my line of battle being advanced obliquely towards the right, instead of being parallel to the enemy's line. It was certainly due, also, somewhat to the fact that the Sixteenth and Eighth Tennessee regiments, extending their line into a corn field in open view of the enemy, whose position was concealed by timber and under-growth, were compelled to advance into

the wood in front, thus finding a better and more secure position, and some cover for their men from the murderous fire which they were gallantly sustaining.

The centre and left, however, soon became earnestly engaged. Having no eligible position for artillery near the centre, I was compelled to post Carnes' battery (Steuben artillery) on the left of the Thirty-eighth Tennessee regiment, being the extreme left of my position; supposing, too, at that time, that I would be supported on the left by the brigades both of Brigadier-General Maney and Brigadier-general Strahl. My position was near the foot of a declivity, gently rising towards the left and presenting on that flank the highest ground on our line, and therefore the best position for artillery; while that of the enemy was on an eminence rising from the drain or low ground just in our front, many feet above ours, and protected by works probably thrown up the previous night.

Immediately after the enemy's fire was opened, I dispatched the order to commence firing to each of the commanding officers of regiments, which was executed promptly, and with coolness and precision. I have reason to believe that the effect of our firing upon the enemy was terrific, from the report of a wounded officer, who fell into the hands of the enemy and subsequently escaped, and from a careful survey of the battle-ground by some of the men after the action.

The enemy opened upon us a cross fire of two batteries, and a concentrated shower of musket shot from a greatly superior force, their line extending the full length of a brigade beyond my unsupported left. Our men met the terrible fire which was hurled upon them, with constancy, coolness, and undaunted courage, bearing the shock like veterans, and not perceptibly wavering beneath its severity, and returning shot for shot, as far as their inferiority of numbers would allow.

After sustaining this fire for three hours and a half, from twelve M. to three and a half P. M., seeing that Brigadier General Smith, immediately on my right, had withdrawn from the field, and learning from some of my officers that their ammunition was nearly exhausted, I determined to order the brigade to retire. Before, however, I could give orders to execute this movement, a courier informed me that the enemy was flanking my position, which upon moving in that direction, I distinctly discovered, seeing his line moving through the ravine and under-growth upon the left flank. I then dispatched orders to the Colonels and commander of the battery to withdraw to a hill about a quarter of a mile in the rear. Discovering at this opportune moment a supporting brigade approaching in line of battle, and not being able to move rapidly enough to communicate with the General commanding (Brigadier General Clayton), in consequence of my being dismounted, I requested the Colonel commanding the leading regiment to move to my left and protect the men in retiring, which he did promptly and efficiently. At the same time I informed him that the enemy was flanking our position.

Each of the regiments was withdrawn slowly and in good order. Although all the horses of the battery, except three, were killed, and about one half of the company shot down, either killed or wounded, thus rendering the battery useless to check the advance of the enemy's flanking force, Captain Carnes, First Lieutenant Marshall and Second Lieutenant Cockrell, of the artillery, remained with the battery until they received orders to retire, narrowly escaping capture, and gallantly standing at their posts until the last moment. Second Lieutenant Van Vleck gallantly died at his post.

After retiring from the field I at once dispatched a staff officer to Major-General Cheatham, advising him of the position of the brigade, and informing him of the fact that our ammunition was nearly exhausted, which was promptly supplied.

After five o'clock P. M., the brigade was again ordered to take position about four hundred yards to the right of the ground on which we had fought the enemy. Major-General Cleburne's division and Smith's brigade, of Major General Cheatham's division, at about six o'clock P. M., on our immediate right, made a most gallant and successful movement upon the enemy's position: but my brigade was not ordered to participate in the glorious charge which cost the lives of many brave patriots, and among them the heroic General Preston Smith.

Having bivouacked at this position on Saturday night, on Sunday morning, a line of battle was again formed and held steadily for three hours under a most harassing fire from the enemy's batteries. One man of the Sixteenth Tennessee regiment was severely wounded by a round shot. About one o'clock P. M., I was ordered to move the brigade around to the right of our position, following Maney in moving by the right flank. About six o'clock P. M., Maney being on our left, I was ordered to follow his movements in line of battle. Major-General Walker's division and Brigadier-General Jackson's brigade, of Cheatham's division, were already engaged fiercely in assaulting a fortified position of the enemy, at which a very large force of his artillery had been concentrated. A furious contest was raging, with wild and terrible carnage. Though the gallant troops of Walker and Jackson held their position with unsurpassed stubbornness and heroism, yet the enemy, encouraged by the strength, natural and artificial, of his position, and his concentrated forces, was making a most stubborn fight. At this critical moment the two brigades (General Maney's and my own) were precipitated, with a deafening hurrah, and a rapid shock, to support our gallant comrades, who were contending against unequal odds. The men were in the highest spirits and moved forward with an animation that I have never seen surpassed. At this time the scene was one of the most animated and exciting that can be imagined. The whole issue of the

combat seemed suspended upon a moment's work. The shouts of our gallant patriots presaged success, and every eye was lighted with victory. It came at that propitious moment. The enemy, already daunted by the fierce ordeal through which they had passed from the guns of Walker and Jackson, could no longer bear the trial when the cheers of our reinforcing battalions were wafted to them on the evening breeze. They broke in hopeless confusion and rout, precipitately fled before our pursuing columns, leaving their dead and wounded behind them and several pieces of their artillery. Although my brigade did not reach the position in time to fire but a very few guns from the Thirty-eighth Tennessee regiment, yet it is a source of heartfelt satisfaction that the cheers of the men and their impetuous charge assisted in striking terror into the heart of the foe and in hastening his inglorious flight.

In this engagement and that of Saturday, the brigade captured seventy-one prisoners, including a Captain and two Lieutenants. The loss in the brigade was forty-four killed on the field, forty-three missing (most of whom are known to be, and the others are supposed to be, in the hands of the enemy), and four hundred wounded.

Among the killed I regret to mention Captain Parks, Sixteenth Tennessee regiment; Lieutenant Hainey, Murray's battalion, attached to the Thirty-eighth Tennessee regiment; Lieutenant Wade and Color-bearer Bland, of the Fifty-first and Fifty-second Tennessee regiments; Captain Whaley and Lieutenant Craig, of the Twenty-eighth Tennessee regiment, and Lieutenant Van Vleck, Carnes' battery. Among the wounded were Colonels John H. Anderson and D. M. Donnell; Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. Hall, and Major T. G. Randle; Captains Puryear, Callum, and Bonds, and Lieutenants Cunningham, Leonard, Flynn, and Shaw, Eighth Tennessee regiment; Lieutenants Potter, Owen, and Worthington, Sixteenth Tennessee regiment; Captain McDonald, and Lieutenants Apple, Dauley, and Taylor, Twenty-eighth Tennessee regiment; Adjutant Caruthers, Lieutenants Banks and Ridout, Thirty-eighth Tennessee regiment, and Captain Burton, Lieutenants Billings, Chester, White, Hainey, Tillman, and Wade, Fifty-first and Fifty-second Tennessee regiments. All the field officers of the brigade, and the officers of the battery, acted with such distinguished gallantry that I feel it would be invidious to make a distinction. Company officers and men, with very inconsiderable exceptions that have come to my knowledge, bore themselves with a gallantry and steadiness becoming patriots contending for freedom and all that honorable men hold dear.

I am indebted for valuable assistance during the engagement to my staff officers, Captain Leon Trousdale, Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain E. F. Lee, Assistant Inspector-General; my Aids-de-Camp, Lieutenant E. T. Harris, and Lieutenant Sidney Womack, and Mr. Charles T. Smith. They each discharged their duties with fidelity and zeal. One of my couriers, Mr. William S. Hill, won the commendation of all and my warm thanks, for his gallantry and alacrity in the discharge of his perilous duties. Brigadier-General W. C. Whitthorne, Adjutant-General of Tennessee, volunteered to act as Aid-de-Camp on the first day's march from Chattanooga, and discharged the various duties that I assigned to him with a promptness, courage, and ability which merit and receive my warmest thanks. On the field General Whitthorne conducted himself with conspicuous gallantry. The infirmary corps discharged their duties with such fearlessness and fidelity as to attract my special observation. The provost guard also, under their worthy and gallant Provost-Marshal, Lieutenant Richardson, fully fulfilled the standard of their duties. They lost one killed and two wounded in the engagement of Saturday.

I unite with all true patriots of our country in returning thanks to Almighty God, without whose assistance our strength is weakness, for the substantial victory with which he has crowned our efforts.

I herewith transmit the reports of the regimental commanders of the brigade, to which your especial attention is respectfully invoked.

I regret I cannot accompany them with the report of Captain Carnes, commanding battery, whose absence on business connected with his battery necessarily delays its preparation.

I have the honor to be, Major,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

MARCUS J. WRIGHT,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. K. JACKSON.

HEADQUARTERS JACKSON'S BRIGADE, CHEATHAM'S DIVISION, POLK'S CORPS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE, BEFORE CHATTANOOGA, October 3, 1863.

Major John Ingram, A. A. G. Cheatham's Division, Polk's Corps, A. T.:

MAJOR: On the nineteenth September, 1863, at about seven o'clock in the morning, the brigade which I have the honor to command, being the advance of Major-General Cheatham's division, crossed Chickamauga Creek at Hunt's or Dalton's Ford, about a mile below Lee and Gordon's Mill. The brigade was immediately deployed in line of battle on the west side of the creek, and awaited the crossing by the remainder of the division.

At about nine o'clock A. M., moved by the flank in a north-western direction and formed line in the rear of Major-General Buckner's right, as his reserve. Remained in this position about an hour, when an order was received to move still further to the right to the support of Major-General Walker. Passing rapidly about half a mile northward by the right flank, the brigade reached the road leading from Alexander's Bridge, and proceeded thence westward about half a mile. Here the line of Major-General Walker's troops was reached. My brigade was immediately placed in line of battle and ordered to advance. The order was promptly and cheer-

fully obeyed, and the advance continued about one hundred and fifty yards, when the enemy opened fire upon my left centre. The brigade returned the fire, which soon became general. A charge being ordered, the troops responded with great intrepidity, driving the enemy before them from a half to three quarters of a mile, captured three pieces of artillery, which were immediately sent to the rear; also, a large number of knapsacks, from which the enemy had been driven.

At this point the enemy, being heavily reinforced and having the advantage of breastworks, checked the advance of the brigade and stubbornly held their ground.

Seeing troops on the left retiring, I sent to inquire the meaning of it, and was informed that it was part of Brigadier-General Preston Smith's brigade, which had been pressed back by superior numbers, thus leaving my flank entirely exposed. Soon after, my left fell back, under the false impression that a retreat had been ordered, but were immediately rallied and reformed, and promptly retook their original position. Learning that the enemy were endeavoring to turn my right, which was not protected by any infantry force, and the left being exposed and nearly out of ammunition, I sent a staff officer to request Brigadier-General Maney, whose brigade was in reserve, to come to my relief. The contest had now lasted for about two hours, and had been unusually severe. My battery, commanded by Captain John Scoggin, had moved up with the line and done good service. Brigadier-General Maney's brigade moved forward gallantly, and, upon being relieved by him, I ordered my brigade to retire; which was done slowly and in good order. While moving to the rear the horses of one piece and one caisson were disabled, and consequently that piece and caisson fell into the hands of the enemy, but were subsequently recovered. Line of battle was formed, again, in the position occupied before the advance and on the right of Turner's battery. My battery was so posted as to have a cross fire in front of Turner's battery. The enemy's advance upon us was checked at this point.

A little before dark Major-General Cleburne, having formed a line on my right, making an obtuse angle with mine, commenced a forward movement, and about the same time an order was received from Major-General Cheatham to move up my brigade also, which was promptly done.

The fire of small arms immediately became severe. The left of my brigade, thinking, in the darkening twilight, that Major-General Cleburne's line was in their front, became a little confused by the suddenness and severity of the fire, but were soon brought up, and the whole line advanced about six hundred yards. Here the firing abruptly ceased, and, it being now quite dark and the impression still prevailing that our friends were in front, Major W. D. C. Lloyd, my volunteer Aid-de-Camp, and Lieutenant S. S. Harris, acting Inspector-General of my brigade, rode forward to ascertain the facts, when Major Lloyd rode into the enemy's lines and was captured.

My brigade had moved in Major-General Cleburne's line, with Brigadier-General Deshler's brigade on its left. About nine o'clock at night, in order to allow Brigadier-General Deshler to close upon his own division, I ordered my brigade to retire to its original position, where it remained until morning.

On Sunday morning, the twentieth instant, in pursuance of orders from Major-General Cheatham, I moved by the left flank about half a mile and took position as a reserve in the rear of Brigadier-General Maney's brigade. Remaining there until about eleven o'clock A. M., I moved, by order, back to my original position. Here an order was received from General Bragg, through Major Falconer, Assistant Adjutant-General, to move at once with my brigade to the right and front and report to Lieutenant-General Hill. I moved promptly by the right flank and sent Captain Merino, my Assistant Adjutant-General, and Lieutenant Harris, to find Lieutenant-General Hill. They returned reporting their search unsuccessful. At this point Lieutenant-General Polk ordered me to take position on the right of Brigadier-General Polk and to move forward at once. Deeming it proper, in pursuance of the order of the commanding General, to report to Lieutenant-General Hill for orders, I moved still further by the right flank and to the right of Brigadier-General Polk's brigade, and sent again to Lieutenant-General Hill, who directed that my brigade should take position on Brigadier-General Liddell's left and fill up a gap between that brigade and Major-General Cleburne's right. A staff officer of Lieutenant-General Hill having indicated the position my brigade was to take, it was moved forward some one hundred and fifty yards, when the commanding officer of my sharpshooters reported skirmishers of the enemy in heavy force on my left and opposite the gap on Major-General Cleburne's right, which my brigade was insufficient to fill. I directed two additional companies to be deployed as skirmishers, with orders to the five companies, consisting of my battalion of sharpshooters and these two companies, to dislodge the enemy. After considerable skirmishing, Major Whitely, of my battalion of sharpshooters, reported that he could not dislodge the enemy; that they were in strong force, and supported by a line of battle and a battery.

I immediately reported these facts to Lieutenant-General Hill, and that if I advanced, the gap not being filled up, my left flank would be exposed to an enfilading fire. He sent me an order, nevertheless, to form on Brigadier-General Liddell's left and move forward with his line. This order was promptly executed. The brigade, with the battery in the centre, moved forward in splendid style about one hundred yards, when the enemy opened a galling fire from the front

and left flank, enfilading the entire line, with canister and small arms. The engagement now became terrific, and the position of my brigade extremely critical. The troops, however, stood nobly to the work before them and, steadily advancing, surmounted the hill on which the enemy's breastworks were, the battery moving with the line and rendering effective service. The enemy were driven from their breastworks, and Brigadier-General Maney's brigade, coming up at this opportune moment, charged them, and the the contest was over. At daylight on Monday morning the enemy was found to have sought safety in flight, under the cover of darkness.

The report of my Provost-Marshal shows the capture of seventy-four prisoners (not including wounded men), representing twenty-two regiments, and from five States.

I annex a list of the killed, wounded, and missing of my command, which was composed, from right to left, as follows: Second Georgia battalion sharpshooters, Eighth Mississippi regiment, Fifth Mississippi regiment, Scoggin's battery, second battalion of First Confederate regiment, and the Fifth Georgia regiment.

The total effective was one thousand two hundred and eighty-six; the aggregate effective, one thousand four hundred and five; loss, four hundred and ninety; from which it will be perceived that the percentage of casualties was 34.87, and that the greatest loss was in the Fifth Georgia regiment, amounting to nearly fifty-five per cent.

I am, Major, respectfully, &c.,

JOHN K. JACKSON,
Brigadier-General, commanding Brigade.

Tabular Statement of the Casualties of Jackson's Brigade, Cheatham's Division, Polk's Corps, Army of Tennessee, on the nineteenth and twentieth of September, 1863, *in the Battle of Chickamauga.*

COMMAND.	TOTAL EFFECTIVE.	AGGREGATE EFFECTIVE.	KILLED.	WOUNDED.	MISSING.	TOTAL CASUALTIES.	PERCENTAGE.
Brigadier-General and Staff,	.....	5	.....	.....	1	1	20.00
Battalion of Sharpshooters,	101	108	3	27	.....	30	27.77
Eighth Mississippi regiment,	375	404	10	84	.....	94	23.26
Fifth Mississippi regiment,	225	252	4	70	1	75	29.76
Scoggin's battery,	86	89	1	11	1	13	14.60
Second battalion First Confederate regiment,	181	194	10	73	.....	83	42.78
Fifth Georgia regiment,	317	358	27	165	2	194	54.94
Total,	1,286	1,406	55	430	5	490	34.87 average.

JOHN K. JACKSON,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. GRACIE.

HEADQUARTERS GRACIE'S BRIGADE,
IN FRONT OF CHATTANOOGA, October 2, 1863.

J. L. Sandford, Assistant Adjutant-General:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor of herewith forwarding the report of the operations of my brigade, composed of the Sixty-third regiment Tennessee volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Fulkerson commanding; Forty-third regiment Alabama volunteers, Colonel Y. M. Moody commanding; First battalion Alabama legion, Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Holt commanding; Second battalion Alabama legion, Lieutenant-Colonel B. Hall, Jr., commanding; Third battalion Alabama legion, Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. A. Sandford commanding, on the days of the nineteenth and twentieth September, 1863:

Taking position on the evening of the eighteenth instant at Dalton's Ford, on Chickamauga River, early on the morning of the nineteenth, the brigade formed its first line of battle, facing the enemy's works near Lee and Gordon's Mill. It was exposed to the fire of the enemy's shell, wounding Lane and others of the Sixty-third Tennessee regiment. Further than this the brigade in this day's fight.

On the morning of the twentieth, the brigade was ordered to near Dyer's house on the Chattanooga road, where, again forming line of battle, it again received the fire of the enemy's shell. Between four and five o'clock P. M., orders were received to suppport Kershaw's brigade, posted to the left of the Chattanooga road. Word was sent to General Kershaw that the brigade was ready, and he ordered it to advance. Passing through Kershaw's command, the brigade found itself suddenly in the presence of the enemy, strongly posted behind breastworks of logs and rails, on the crest of an opposite hill. The fire of musketry, grape and canister immediately commenced; but, undaunted, the brigade scaled the precipitous heights, driving the enemy before it, and took possession of the hill. Holding these heights for nearly an hour, and ammunition becoming scarce, I informed Brigadier-General Preston, commanding division, that, unless supported, the brigade could not much longer hold out. Trigg's and Kelly's brigades were ordered to my relief. Though with

ammunition nearly exhausted, the brigade held its own till the scattering fire of its musketry betrayed its condition to the enemy. Trigg's and Kelly's brigade arriving, the command withdrew to replenish its empty cartridge-boxes.

Early the next morning the brigade resumed the position it had so nobly won. The number of killed and wounded, shows the desperate nature of the contest; of about eighteen hundred and seventy carried into action, ninety were killed and six hundred and fifteen wounded.

Where so many distinguished themselves it would be difficult to particularize; all nobly did their duty. I would, however, call attention to the following-named officers: Lieutenant-Colonel A. Fulkerson, Sixty-third regiment Tennessee volunteers, who, in the absence of the Colonel, commanded the regiment and led it into action; to him it owes its discipline and efficiency. Colonel Fulkerson was severely wounded in the arm, making, with the one received at Shiloh, the second during the war. He is deserving of a much higher position.

Colonel Y. M. Moody, of the Forty-fifth Alabama regiment, always at the head of his regiment on the march, maintained the same position on the field, rallying and encouraging his men.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. J Jolly, of the same regiment, though seriously wounded in the thigh, remained on the field until no longer able to walk, and then had to be carried off.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Holt, of the First battalion Alabama legion. This battalion sustained the heaviest loss; of two hundred and thirty-nine carried into action, one hundred and sixty-nine were killed and wounded; among the latter was Lieutenant-Colonel Holt, seriously, in the knee.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bolling Hall, commanding second battalion Alabama legion. It was this battalion that first gained the hill and placed its colors on the enemy's works. Its colors bear marks of over eighty bullets. Its bearer, Robert Y. Hiett, though thrice wounded and flagstaff thrice shot away, carried his charge throughout the entire fight. He deserves not only mention, but promotion.

Lieutenant-Colonel Hall behaved most gallantly, receiving a severe wound in the thigh.

Lieutenant-Colonel John W. A. Sanford, commanding the Third battalion Alabama legion, and Major McLennan, commanding the Fourth battalion Alabama legion, nobly did their duty, sustaining heavy loss, both in officers and men. Captain W. B. Walton, Company B, Second battalion Alabama legion, was wounded in the breast, arm and shoulder, inside the enemy's works. His case deserves special mention. Assistant-Surgeon James B. Luckie, of the Third battalion Alabama legion, both in the field and at the hospital, was most attentive to the wounded, as indeed were all the medical officers of the command. Captain H. E. Jones, my Assistant Adjutant-General, was most conspicuous for coolness and gallantry, carrying orders into the the fight; he was more exposed than any one in the field. Also my Aid-de-Camp, Lieutenant E. B. Cherry. I am happy to state that, though both these officers had their horses shot under them, both escaped unhurt. To Lieutenant J. N. Gilmer, Adjutant of the Alabama legion, who, during the absence of its commander, has acted as my A. I. General, and to Messrs. George C. Jones and J. T. Harwell (both wounded), my thanks are due for services rendered. Major E. L. Hord, my quartermaster, who so completely equipped my brigade, was constantly at his post, performing his onerous duties. Major C. D. Brown, my commissary, who, by untiring energy, kept the brigade constantly supplied with cooked rations. My thanks are also due to Lieutenant A. M. MacMurphy, my efficient ordnance officer.

Among the noble dead I have to record the names of Captain James T. Gillespie and Lieutenant S. M. Deadrick, Company I, Sixty-third Tennessee regiment; Captains O. H. Prince, Company A, and J. A. P. Gordon, Company C, Lieutenant Wm. H. Watkins, Company B, Forty-third Alabama regiment, and Lieutenant R. H. Bibb, of the First battalion Alabama legion.

I am, Captain, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. GRACIE, Jr.,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. D. CLAYTON.

HEADQUARTERS CLAYTON'S BRIGADE,
NEAR CHATTANOOGA, Oct. 3, 1863.

Major R. A. Hatcher, Assistant Adjutant-General, Stewart's Division:

MAJOR: The following report of the part taken by this brigade in the battle of Chickamauga on the nineteenth and twentieth of September, 1863, is respectfully submitted:

On Thursday, the seventeenth day of September, this brigade, consisting of the Eighteenth, Thirty-sixth, and Thirty-eighth Alabama regiments, commanded respectively by Colonel J. T. Holtzclaw, Colonel L. T. Woodruff, and Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. Lankford, and Humphries' battery, took up the line of march from Lafayette, Walker county, Georgia, where it had been bivouacked a few days, towards the battle-field. Resting the night of the seventeenth, near Rock Spring, it proceeded the next day to Thedford's Ford on the Chickamauga Creek. Brigadier-General Bate's brigade proceeding down the creek a short distance, his artillery engaged the enemy, who were then near Alexander's Bridge, my brigade being exposed to the fire, by which I lost one man killed. I advanced three companies from the Eighteenth Alabama regiment across the creek as skirmishers, under command of Major Hundley of that regiment, and rode over myself for the purpose of making observations. Placing the three companies as pickets in a piece of woodland, I crossed my whole brigade over the creek (the men wading) soon after nightfall, at a point a short distance above Thedford's Ford, being the first troops to cross the creek in that vicinity. I put the battery in

position on the left, supported by the Thirty-eighth Alabama regiment, and directed the other regiments to bivouac immediately upon the bank of the creek. On the morning of the nineteenth, the other brigades (Brown's and Bate's) of the division (Stewart's) having crossed the creek and formed in my rear, my brigade moved forward in line of battle at an early hour, a distance of between one and two miles, until it reached a position from which the enemy could be seen upon the distant hills. The brigade, and so far as I could learn, the whole army, except upon the extreme right, where the engagement had already begun, halted until half-past one o'clock P. M., when it was ordered to the right about one mile. Having received instructions as to the point upon which I should direct my brigade, with the further admonition that, after having more definitely located the enemy, I would have to act for myself and be governed by circumstances, I moved forward in line of battle with skirmishers in front. Having proceeded a few hundred yards through a dense under-growth and being about to enter a cultivated field, I halted for the purpose of correcting the alignment, when Colonel John C. Carter, of the Thirty-eighth Tennessee regiment, Wright's brigade, Cheatham's division, came on foot from my left in great haste and informed me that my brigade was marching in the wrong direction, and that unless I changed my direction nearly perpendicularly to the left, my brigade would soon be in range of the enemy's small arms and artillery, which would enfilade my line; and that, as I then stood, the right of the enemy was in rear of my left. I immediately changed my direction, and, marching by the left flank and filing obliquely to the left and rear (the nature of the ground not admitting of any other movement), had scarcely changed for the purpose of moving in the new direction, when the enemy opened fire upon us, which was promptly returned. The firing seeming to be too much at random, I passed down and up the line calling the attention of officers to the fact. I then directed my staff to inform regimental commanders that I was about to order a charge. Passing again down the line, I was informed by several officers that their ammunition was expended, and I therefore reconsidered my first intention to charge the enemy, being unable on account of the thick under-growth to form a satisfactory idea of his strength, and withdrew for the purpose of replenishing the ammunition. This was done in good order and with little loss, the enemy having almost simultaneously ceased firing. In this engagement the brigade lost near four hundred officers and men killed and wounded. It began about half-past two o'clock and lasted one hour. The enemy was formed in a semi-circle around and over a slight elevation or hill, which gave him great advantage in position, and the manner in which both ends of my line were cross-fired upon induce the opinion that we were greatly out-numbered. I again moved forward about four o'clock, the brigades of Generals Brown and Bate having successively advanced and engaged the enemy. Passing Bate's brigade, then in front, my line continued steadily forward with promptness and spirit, accompanied nearly to the Chattanooga road by the Fifty-eighth Alabama regiment, Colonel Bush. Jones (which attracted my attention by the excellent order in which it moved), and a small portion of another regiment, which I did not recognize, both of Bate's brigade. The enemy continued to retreat to and beyond the Chattanooga road, near which my brigade captured two pieces of artillery, which were brought off in the manner stated by my regimental commanders, whose reports accompany this. My brigade continued the pursuit of the enemy one-half mile beyond the road, when a staff officer reporting the enemy advancing in strong force from the right, and it also having been reported to me through my Assistant Adjutant-General, by a staff officer, whom he did not recognize, that the enemy's cavalry had been seen in force upon the left as if preparing to advance, my brigade fell back across the road at leisure, where I halted and re-formed it in connection with the portion of General Bate's brigade already referred to. I take pleasure in mentioning that Captains Crenshaw and Lee, with their companies, from the Fifty-eighth Alabama regiment, of Bate's brigade, accompanied mine beyond the road. They are gallant officers. In this charge my brigade captured fifty or sixty prisoners, besides the two pieces of artillery; and I have reason to believe that the loss in killed and wounded inflicted upon the enemy, to some extent, compensated for our own in the earlier engagement. Changing the direction of my line by a front forward upon the right, and the other two sides of a triangle being formed by Generals Brown and Bates, night coming on, the troops slept upon their arms within a few hundred yards of the enemy, who could be distinctly heard erecting breastworks. During the night my pickets brought in about forty prisoners, among whom were several officers of the lower grades. Early on the morning of the twentieth, the brigade was moved to the right, and in a position about three hundred yards from and parallel to the Chattanooga road. Here it remained until eleven o'clock, subjected the most of the time to a severe fire from the enemy's artillery, by which several men were wounded. About eleven o'clock, General Brown being in front, and General Bate on my right, the whole division advanced under a most terrible fire of grape and canister from the enemy's artillery, before which several most gallant officers fell bravely leading their men, among whom I cannot forbear to mention the name of the chivalrous and accomplished Lieutenant-Colonel R. F. Juge, of the Eighteenth Alabama regiment. Notwithstanding this, the brigade pressed forward through a narrow corn field to the first pieces of artillery by the road-side, when two other batteries, one in front and one upon the right, assisted by small arms, began a most murderous fire, before which all were com-

pelled to retire. I was myself struck by a grape-shot, and compelled to dismount for a short time. The Thirty-eighth Alabama regiment, scarcely breaking its line, fell back only a short distance. The other regiments promptly re-formed near the position originally occupied by them, and moved forward to rejoin it. General Brown's brigade was re-formed by Colonel Cook (General B. having been wounded) on my left, and General Bate's brigade upon my right. My own and General Brown's brigade soon moved forward again to the road, and then to the right, towards the enemy, who were ascertained to be there in strong position. General Bate was formed in my rear, and in this position the command remained until about five o'clock P. M., when I again moved my brigade forward. Soon coming upon the enemy behind breastworks, they were gallantly charged by my whole line with great spirit, the enemy fleeing in wild disorder across a large open field, upon the edge of which I ordered a halt, and the brigade continued to fire as long as the enemy could be seen. Many taking refuge in and around a hospital (Kelly's house), I sent forward, first, the Thirty-eighth, and afterwards the Eighteenth Alabama regiments, which, together, captured three hundred prisoners, besides near the same number of wounded.

Thus terminated the part taken by this brigade in the battle of Chickamauga. I have omitted to say anything about the battery, because it was under the Chief of Artillery for the division, except a short time, during which I had no opportunity of using it. I suppose the report in regard to it will more properly be made through the Chief of Artillery.

The brigade went into action on the nineteenth with thirteen hundred and fifty-two, total effective, and ninety-four officers. It lost in the two days, twelve officers killed dead upon the field, and eighty-nine men. Thirty have since died. Thirty-four officers and four hundred and forty-nine men were wounded and fifteen missing, making the aggregate, killed, wounded, and missing, six hundred and twenty-nine. This does not include many who were slightly wounded and did not leave the field. The brigade captured two pieces of artillery, three hundred and ninety-six prisoners, besides about two hundred and fifty wounded and in hospital. It collected twelve hundred and forty-nine muskets and rifles, six hundred and forty sets of accoutrements and twenty thousand cartridges. (The greater portion of the guns and ammunition were carried off the field by my own ordnance wagons. I claim for my brigade that it was the first and the last in the division to encounter the enemy; the first in the army to pierce the enemy's centre and cross the Chattanooga road, which was done on Saturday evening near Brotherton's house. I conclude this report by tendering my cordial thanks to, and testifying in behalf of, the gallant men composing this brigade, in all whose [illegible] appeared not a single coward, and to the officers, worthy of such men, leading them in every charge. My thanks are particularly due to Captain J. M. Macon, A. A. G., Lieutenant J. Vidence, Assistant Inspector-General, and Lieutenant W. N. Knight, Aid-de-Camp, who rendered me prompt and valuable services throughout the whole engagement, never once shrinking from their duty. To the commanders of regiments, I also make my acknowledgments for the efficient manner in which they directed and kept their commands together, the most difficult of all duties upon the field. I also tender my thanks to Major-General Stewart, who was everywhere and under all circumstances present with his command. To the gallant dead, a contemplation of whom saddens our hearts, we give our tears and a hearty "well done!" May the God of battles give us courage to emulate their heroic examples, and, when the time shall come, bravely to share their fate.

I am, Major, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
H. D. CLAYTON,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. B. BATE.

HEADQUARTERS BATE'S BRIGADE, STEWART'S DIVISION,
IN FRONT OF CHATTANOOGA, October 9, 1863.

Major R. A. Hatcher, Assistant Adjutant-General:

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the participation had by my brigade in the late three days' battle of the Chickamauga, comprising the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth ultimo:

Having been ordered to advance, take possession of and hold Thedford's Ford, but not to bring on a general engagement unless indispensable to the accomplishment of these objects, I moved my command at once, at a double-quick, and occupied a wooded eminence commanding it, and placed my battery, the Eufala light artillery, on a cleared hill to the front and left, which overlooked the enemy, and within a few hundred yards of his position. The attack, in which the Fourth Georgia battalion of sharpshooters, Major Caswell, and my artillery alone were engaged, was brisk and spirited. In the meantime, however, the entire brigade was subjected to a severe shelling from the enemy just above Alexander's Bridge, and across the Chickamauga, by which one man was killed and five or six wounded. After a few well-directed shots from my battery, which Captain Oliver placed promptly in position, the enemy gave way. This was the opening fight of the battle of the Chickamauga. We bivouacked near the camp of the enemy, commanding the two fords—Thedford's and the Bend Ford—where I crossed my command next morning at an early hour, and formed line of battle in rear of Brigadier-Generals Brown's and Clayton's brigades, the whole under command of Major-General Stewart. We moved in this order, bearing to the right, through a corn field

and woodland nearly two miles, at which point we were halted for some hours. Here my artillery was put forward to develop the enemy's position; which it did, drawing shell and round shot upon our lines, wounding three or four of my men. We were moved hence by the right flank near a point where heavy volleys of musketry were heard, and thence by the left flank in line of battle, some three or four hundred yards, and halted in the same relative position we had occupied during the earlier part of the day, mine being the rear line of battle. At three o'clock P. M., Brigadier-Generals Clayton's and Brown's brigades successively engaged the enemy. In about thirty minutes I was ordered by Major-General Stewart to advance—General Clayton having withdrawn and Brown also passed to the rear. My line of battle was organized by placing Caswell's battalion of sharpshooters (Fourth Georgia) on the right, and in succession from that wing was the Twentieth Tennessee, Colonel T. B. Smith; Thirty-seventh Georgia, Colonel A. T. Rudler; Fifty-eighth Alabama, Colonel Bush. Jones, and Fifteenth and Thirty-seventh Tennessee, Colonel R. C. Tyler, constituting the supporting line. I had thrown out no skirmishers. The whole command moved forward with spirit and zeal, engaging the enemy hotly before it had proceeded two hundred yards—his line extending in front and to the right and left of us. A battery in front of my extreme right played constantly and with terrible effect upon that wing, until my right pressed within less than fifty paces of it, when it was rapidly removed to prevent capture. Another revealed its hydra-head immediately in the rear of this, supported by a second line, hurling its death-dealing missiles more destructively, if possible, upon our still advancing but already thinned ranks. Having driven the first line back upon its support, a fresh battery and infantry were brought to play upon my right, which, by its advanced position had become subject to an enfiladed fire, gave way, but not until Major Caswell, Colonel Smith and Colonel Rudler, the three officers commanding respectively the three right battalions, were wounded, and at least twenty-five per cent. of their numbers killed and wounded. When the right gave way the enemy sought to follow it up, and pressed his sharpshooters beyond the right flank, who, finding it well aligned and in the attitude of resistance, precipitated themselves back and out of reach. The men were easily rallied, and promptly re-formed a short distance in the rear of the point to which they had advanced. In this dash the enemy captured one of my pieces and one of my couriers. It needed, however, but a moment to retake the piece, which was handsomely done. In this contest my right retook the battle-flag of the Fifty-first Tennessee regiment, General Wright's brigade, which but a moment before had been wrested from them by superior numbers and the flank movements of the enemy. I was rejoiced to deprive him of this trophy, so recently won, and return it to its gallant owners, hallowed as it is by its baptism in the blood of Shiloh, Perryville and Murfreesboro. My left, in the meantime, composed of the Fifty-eighth Alabama, Colonel Jones, and Fifteenth and Thirty-seventh Tennessee regiments (consolidated), Colonel Tyler, not being so much harassed by the enfilade fire from the right, pressed steadily forward in fine order, driving the enemy, who contested every inch of ground with dogged and persistent obstinacy until forced beyond the Chattanooga road and several hundred yards back into the wood, thus deranging his compact lines and breaking his centre. In this charge Colonel Tyler captured three guns; and Colonel Jones participated with the Thirty-eighth Alabama, Colonel Woodruff, in the capture of three; for the particulars of which I refer to their reports. It being nearly night, and having advanced so far beyond the enemy's lines as to make them liable to a flank movement, they returned from further pursuit to the point on the battle-field to which I had ordered the Eufala light artillery, and where General Clayton and I were re-forming our shattered commands—Colonel Tyler bringing with him his captured guns, and Colonel Jones in such fine order as to elicit my public commendation. Owing to a movement of the enemy to our right, the front of General Clayton's command was changed by Major-General Stewart to meet an expected attack from that source, and my line was left fronting the Chattanooga road. General Brown's command subsequently intervened. Thus we bivouacked for the night upon the field of carnage, enveloped by the smoke of battle and surrounded by the dead of friend and foe.

Sunday morning found us in the line assumed the night previous, and, under the order of Major-General Stewart, I moved my command by the right flank five or six hundred yards. and took position forward and on the right of General Brown's brigade, but in forming the line was compelled to retire the right to an angle of about forty-five degrees on account of the proximity of the enemy, located to my right oblique. Caswell's battalion of sharpshooters, under command of Lieutenant Joel Towers, Captain Benjamin Turner having been dangerously wounded the evening before, was thrown forward and deployed at right angles with my right, to guard against a repetition of the movement of the previous evening, to turn that flank, to which we were liable, there being at that time no force sufficiently near to intervene. Having assumed this line of battle, I had a temporary barricade of logs hastily constructed, which gave partial protection against the shower of grape, canister and shell which continuously and most angrily saluted us. During the time that we were subjected to this ordeal several men and officers were killed and wounded, yet no restiveness or other evidence of demorilization was manifested.

At about nine A. M., the brigade of General Deshler was placed upon my right, prolonging

the line, and observing the same inclination to the rear. Soon thereafter, I received notice that General Wood's brigade was in my front, and that the general movement would be a successive one, by brigades, commencing on the right, and was ordered by Major-General Stewart to follow up the movement of General Deshler. After waiting, under a severe and incessant fire of artillery, until about eleven o'clock A. M., I communicated to General Stewart that no movement on my right had taken place; that General Deshler had been killed, and I desired to know if I should longer remain inactive. About this this time there was firing in my front, and soon thereafter General Wood's command came back, passing over my line. I was then ordered by Major-General Stewart to advance and attack. My command received the order with a shout, and moved upon the foe at a rapid gait. The battalion of sharpshooters was ordered to maintain its position at right angles to the line, and check, if possible, if not to delay, any movement in that direction, giving the earliest notice of the same. My right, as upon the evening previous, became hotly engaged almost the instant it assumed the offensive. It was subject to a most galling fire of grape and musketry from my right oblique and front, cutting down with great fatality the Twentieth Tennessee and Thirty-seventh Georgia at every step, until they drove the enemy behind his defences, from which, without support, either of artillery or infantry, they were unable to dislodge him. General Deshler's brigade not having advanced, I called on Major General Cleburne, who was near my right and rear, for assistance; but he having none at his disposal which could be spared, I was compelled to retire that wing of my brigade, or sacrifice it in uselessly fighting thrice its numbers, with the advantage of the hill and breastworks against it. I did so in good order, and without indecent haste, and aligned it first in front and then placed it in rear of our flimsy defenses. My left, the Fifty-eighth Alabama, and Fifteenth and Thirty-seventh Tennessee, the latter under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Frazier, Colonel Tyler having been wounded, being further from the enemy's line than my right, did not so soon become engaged, neither at this time subject to so severe a cross-fire, proceeded steadily on and drove the enemy behind his works, which had been constructed the night previous, on the very spot we had driven them from, and maintained their position with a dogged tenacity until the Twentieth Tennessee and Thirty-seventh Georgia were put in position behind the barricade, and the battalion of sharpshooters drawn in. The artillery of the enemy had ceased to play upon us, except at slow intervals, and a part of their (Tyler and Jones) commands having already returned, I dispatched Lieutenant Blanchard, of my staff, to ascertain their situation, who reported that he met them returning with the balance of their commands in good order. I placed them in position and awaited orders. I am unable to give as accurate an account of my left as of my right, for the reason that the right became first engaged, and the commanders of the three right battalions having been wounded the evening previous, devolving the command on junior officers, I felt that my personal services were most needed there, which prevented my witnessing, so as to give in detail, the incidents connected with that portion of the field. I found, however, their dead in the breastworks of the enemy, which is the highest evidence that can be afforded of what they did. In this fight, my command lost thirty per cent. killed and wounded, in addition to the heavy loss of the evening before. After a short respite, Major-General Stewart ordered my command (which still held its position in the front line) to the left, where it would be more secure from the artillery missiles of the enemy on my right. Here we remained until about five P. M., when I was orderd to form in the rear of General Clayton, and join him in taking the batteries and breastworks on our right, from which we had suffered so heavily during the day. I changed front forward on my right battalion, and, together with General Clayton's brigade, soon were over the fortifications, driving the enemy in confusion and capturing a number of prisoners. In this charge, Captain Tankersly commanded the Fifteenth and Thirty-seventh Tennessee, Lieutenant-Colonel Frazier having been wounded. The Eufala light artillery, Captain Oliver had kept close to my infantry, nothwithstanding the obstruction of a dense wood; took position inside the fortifications, and opened a rapid and destructive fire upon the retreating foe until the curtain of night closed upon the the scene. I claim for this battery the honor of opening on Friday evening, and closing on Sunday evening, the battle of Chickamauga.

My brigade went into the fight with muskets in the hands of one third of the men, but after the first charge on Saturday evening, every man was supplied with a good Enfield rifle and ammunition to suit, which was used with effect on their orginal owners the next day. The dead and wounded of the enemy, over which we passed in driving them back on Saturday and Sunday, gave an earnest of the telling effect produced upon them in both days' fight. Besides arming itself with Enfield rifles, a detail from my command, under supervision of my ordnance officer, James E. Rice, gathered upon the field and conveyed to the ordnance train about two thousand efficient guns. The pieces captured by Colonel Tyler, and those in which Colonel Jones participated in the capture, were taken to the rear and turned over to proper officers.

My command entered the fight, Friday evening, with one thousand and fifty-five guns, thirty provost guard, and a fair complement of officers, out of which number it lost seven officers and fifty-nine men killed, and five hundred and forty-one wounded, sixty-one of whom were officers, making a total of six hundred and seven.

It is seen that every field officer in the brigade, excepting three, were wounded. For further particulars, allow me to respectfully refer to the reports of the commanders of battalions and the battery, which are herewith transmitted.

I cannot close this report without noticing the distinguished services rendered, unworthy as the tribute may be, by my field officers, Colonels Tyler, Smith, Rudler, and Jones, Lieutenant-Colonels Smith, Myer, and Frazier, and Majors Wall, Kendrick, Shye, and Thornton; to each of whom is due the highest meed of praise. It would be invidious to make distinctions when each has played his part so well. Colonels Rudler and Smith and Major Caswell were painfully (the last two seriously) wounded, at the head of their respective commands, early in the engagement of Saturday, and compelled to retire from the field, thus devolving the command of the Twentieth Tennessee on Major Shye; the Thirty-seventh Georgia on Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, and battalion of sharpshooters on Lieutenant Towers, each of whom did his duty gallantly and nobly throughout the conflict. Colonel Tyler, Lieutenant Colonels Myer and Frazier, Majors Wall, Kendrick, and Thornton, were wounded, from which they suffered considerably (the last named officer prostrated by the explosion of a shell), but still remained at the post of duty, bearing themselves with distinguished gallantry.

To each of my staff, Major Winchester (who, notwithstanding his leg was badly hurt from the fall of his horse when shot Friday evening, continued in the field until the close of the fight), Lieutenants Blanchard and Bate, I am indebted for their hearty co-operation and prompt execution of my orders, notwithstanding each was unhorsed by shots from the enemy. Also, to James E. Rice, Brigade Ordnance Officer, I am indebted for the prompt discharge of his duties; but to none are my thanks more signally due, or more cordially awarded, than to my gallant young Adjutant, Captain W. C. Yancey, who while cheering and encouraging my right wing, in its desperate charge on Sunday, received a fearful wound, shattering his foot, and compelling him to retire from the field. I take pleasure, also, in adding my testimony, humble as it may be, to the hearty co-operation of the two gallant brigades of Stewart's division, General Clayton's and Brown's, in every discharge in which it was the fortune of my command to engage.

Major-General Stewart will accept my thanks, as a soldier's tribute, for his polite and genial bearing, and personal assistance in the thickest of the fight, the time when I felt I much needed it. While I recount the services of the living, I cannot pass unremembered the heroic head; the cypress must be interwoven with the laurel. The bloody field attested the sacrifice of many a noble spirit in the fierce struggle—the private soldier vieing with the officer in deeds of high daring and distinguished courage. While the "River of Death" shall float its sluggish current to the beautiful Tennessee, and the night wind chant its solemn dirges over their soldier-graves, their names, enshrined in the hearts of their countrymen, will be held in grateful remembrance as the champions and defenders of their country, who had sealed their devotion with their blood, on one of the most glorious battlefields of our revolution.

I am, Major, most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
WILLIAM B. BATE,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL J. C. BROWN.

HEADQUARTERS BROWN'S BRIGADE,
BEFORE CHATTANOOGA, October 13, 1863.

Major R. A. Hatcher, Assistant Adjutant-General, Stewart's Division:

MAJOR: I respectfully beg leave to submit the following as a report of the part performed by my command in the battle of Chickamauga, on the nineteenth and twentieth of September, 1863:

My brigade consisted of the Eighteenth Tennessee, Colonel J. B. Palmer; Forty-fifth Tennessee, Colonel A. Searcy; Thirty-second Tennessee, Colonel Edward C. Cook; Newman's battalion, Major Tazewell W. Newman, and the Twenty-sixth Tennessee, Colonel John M. Lillard, forming line from right to left in the order stated, numbering twelve hundred effective men. On the morning of the nineteenth, Dawson's battery of Georgia light artillery, four pieces, commanded by Lieutenant R. W. Anderson, also reported to me.

At early dawn of the nineteenth, I crossed the Chickamauga at Ledford's Ford, and formed in rear of Brigadier-General Clayton, six hundred yards from that stream, Bate forming soon after in my rear. A little after sunrise we moved to the front in that order, swinging the right a little forward, until we came up with the division commanded by Brigadier-General Johnson, and formed on its left. About eleven o'clock, we moved by the right flank four or five hundred yards in rear of Johnson's division, and soon afterwards eight hundred yards further, halting immediately in rear of the left of Cheatham's division, which was then hotly engaged. His left brigade, being numerically overpowered and repulsed, was relieved by Brigadier-General Clayton, immediately in my front. I followed this movement closely, being so near to Clayton's line that many of my command were wounded and a few killed before I could return the fire. The front line advanced but little under the combined fire of the enemy's artillery and small arms, until General Clayton reported his ammunition exhausted.

At about two P. M., in obedience to orders received in person from the Major-General commanding, I relieved him, and encountered the enemy in an unbroken forest, rendered the more difficult of passage by the dense under-growth which for more than two hundred yards extended along my entire line. And difficulties

were still further enhanced by the smoke of battle, and the burning of the woods rendered it impossible to distinguish objects twenty paces in advance. My skirmishers encountering the enemy at an hundred yards or less, I pushed rapidly upon his lines, under a most terrific fire from all arms. There was no position from which my artillery could be served with advantage against the enemy, while two of his batteries immediately in my front, and one almost on my right flank, filled the air with grape, canister, shells and solid shot; while volley after volley of musketry, in quick succession, swept my men by scores at every discharge. For four hundred yards, however, my line steadily advanced without faltering at any point until the enemy had been driven beyond the tangled under-growth and his first line completely routed. A stubborn resistance from the second line, supported by artillery, posted upon a slight acclivity in our front, and pouring showers of canister upon us for a few minutes, checked our progress, but again we advanced, driving back his second line up to and beyond the summit of the ridge, until my right rested upon and my centre and left had passed the crest. Unfortunately, however, at this moment, when the rout of the second line was about being made as complete as the disaster to the first a few minutes previous, a force of the enemy appeared upon my right flank, and had well nigh turned it, compelling the Eighteenth and Forty-fifth Tennessee regiment to retire rapidly and in some confusion under a heavy enfilading fire. This necessitated the withdrawal of the centre and left, there being no support upon my right for a mile and none in my rear nearer than six hundred yards, and which was then not in motion.

Before reaching the summit of the ridge, many of the best and bravest officers of my command had been stricken down. Among these may be named Colonel J. B. Palmer, severely wounded; Colonel John M. Lillard, mortally wounded; Lieutenant-Colonel Butler, slightly wounded; Major Joyner and Major Tazewell W. Newman, severely wounded, besides many line officers, whose services were almost indispensable to their commands.

Soon after passing the dense under-growth mentioned above, we killed the horses and drove the gunners from five field pieces, three upon the right and two in the centre. The command passed them, but the men were not permitted to fall out of ranks to remove them. Lieutenant Anderson, of Dawson's battery, removed three of them (six-pounder rifle brass pieces) to the rear, and the other two were removed by persons unknown. In addition to this, the Thirty-second Tennessee, in the centre, just before being withdrawn, and while a little beyond the crest of the ridge, drove the enemy from two other field pieces and silenced their fire, but did not reach them; while the left (Twenty-sixth Tennessee) drove him from a battery of the second line, but was reti[illegible] reaching it. In this action Carnes' b[illegible] artillery, of Wright's brigade, which had an hour or two previous been captured by the enemy, was re-taken by my command.

Brigadier-General Bate relieved me about —— P. M., and I rapidly re-formed and replenished my ammunition in his rear, and, when ready again to move forward, a staff officer announced that the enemy had penetrated between Bate's left and Johnson's right, and that his skirmishers were moving upon my flank. I immediately changed the direction of my line at a double-quick, first sending forward a strong line of skirmishers. But finding that the enemy had either retreated or that the alarm was a false one, I reported the fact to the Major-General commanding, and, in obedience to his orders, moved again to the front and, passing the commands of Bate and Clayton, formed in line beyond their left flank, almost upon the precise ground to which I had previously pursued the enemy. Having placed my artillery in position under the personal supervision of Major-General Stewart, and protected my front with skirmishers, I was directed to remain and hold the position during the night. The enemy was about two hundred and fifty or three hundred yards distant in my front, but did not advance, and, save an occasional shot on the picket line and a few shells about nightfall, there was no firing during that night.

Soon after daylight on Sunday morning (the twentieth), in obedience to orders from the Major-General commanding, I moved by the right flank five hundred paces, inclining a little to the rear, so as to keep the crest of the ridge. In a few moments the skirmishers encountered a sharp fire from the enemy and were rapidly driven in on the right, six or eight of them being shot down. They were immediately reinforced, pushed cautiously forward, under such shelter as the ground and timber afforded, to a distance of one hundred and fifty yards; but so near was the enemy that they could not be advanced further without provoking an engagement, which I had been cautioned to avoid until our line could be established. Brigadier-General Bate formed on my right, but at an angle with my line, his right retired. In a short time afterward Brigadier-General Wood, of Cleburne's division, formed on my right, a little in front of Bate. We erected temporary defences of logs, rocks, brush, and such other materials as could be hastily collected.

At about half-past ten A. M., the enemy commenced shelling us from two positions, one immediately in my front, about four hundred yards distant, and the other more to my right, doing but little damage.

At about eleven o'clock, when ordered to advance, I moved in line to the front, preceded by my skirmishers, who, soon driving in the enemy's skirmishers, rallied upon the command. We moved at double-quick nearly three hundred yards through an open wood, the enemy retiring before us, when the brigade on my right broke in confusion. My line still advanced fifty or

seventy-five yards further, and to within fifty yards of the enemy's battery and line of defences, when the right, wholly unsupported and receiving a terrible cross fire of musketry and artillery upon its flanks, broke and retired in disorder to our temporary defences. I found all efforts to rally the Eighteenth and Forty-fifth Tennessee, short of the defences, in vain and, indeed, impracticable, under the storm of grape and canister which prevailed upon every part of the field over which these two regiments passed. The centre and left continued steadily to advance until they crossed the Chattanooga road two or three hundred yards, and passed the battery in our front, but on the right flank of the Thirty-second Tennessee regiment. But being unsupported on the right, in consequence of the retreat of the Eighteenth and Forty-fifth Tennessee regiments, it became necessary to retire the remainder of the line, because to have advanced further would have exposed it to the hazard of being cut off, while to have remained stationary, without shelter and under fire from a protected foe, would have sacrificed the men without obtaining any compensating advantage. I therefore ordered it to retire, which it accomplished in comparatively good order, to the original line. While re-forming my line, I received a slight wound, which disabled me from duty for the remainder of the day, and I refer to the report of Colonel Cook, upon whom the command devolved, for the conduct of the brigade in the evening.

It would give me pleasure to mention the distinguished valor exhibited by many officers and men throughout the action; but the limits of this report will not permit it, and, by implication, injustice might be done to others not named. With but few individual exceptions, the whole command did credit to the noble State which sent it into the field, and added new lustre to the cause for which it fought.

To the regimental commanders, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Hall, of the Forty-fifth, and Major McGuire, of the Thirty-second, who respectively commanded the skirmishers, I cheerfully accord the highest meed of praise for bravery and skill. In the death of Colonel Lillard, the country lost one of her best men and bravest soldiers, and his command an officer whose place cannot be supplied. I feel deeply the loss of Colonel Palmer's services in the field, for with him on the right, the gallant Cook in the centre, and the brave Lillard on the left, I felt the utmost confidence in the unvarying steadiness of my line.

I beg leave to refer you to the accompanying reports of my regimental commanders (marked A, B, C, D and E) for detailed accounts of the part borne by those several commands.

I cannot close without expressing my obligations to the members of my staff, Captain H. J. Cherry, A. A. G., Captain Gid. H. Low, A. A., Inspector-General, and Lieutenant James T. Brown, A. D. C., for the services rendered by them during the entire engagement. More gallant men could not be found. They discharged their several duties with a degree of fidelity and intrepidity which mere language cannot reward. Major B. P. Roy, A. Q. M. General, Major B. F. Carter, A. C. S., Dr. James F. Grant, brigade surgeon, and Lieutenant Mark S. Cockrille, ordnance officer, performed their several duties with an efficiency and zeal deserving the highest praise. I am also indebted to George B. McCallum and M. A. Carter, acting staff officers, for valuable and efficient assistance on the field throughout the battle.

I have the honor to be, Major,

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. C. BROWN,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL B. G. HUMPHREYS.

HEADQUARTERS BRIGADE,
NEAR CHATTANOOGA, TENN., Oct. 8, 1863.

Major J. M. Goggin, Assistant Adjutant-General:

MAJOR: In obedience to orders, I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by this brigade in the action of the twentieth of September:

The brigade arrived on the battle-field, at Alexander's Bridge, at two o'clock A. M., on the twentieth, from Western Virginia. About ten o'clock General Kershaw ordered me into line of battle on his left. Heavy firing was heard in our front, when we advanced in line parallel to the Lafayette road. Crossing the road, we found the enemy on a hill at the edge of an old field. General Kershaw at once engaged him and drove him from his position. At this time General Bushrod Johnson rode up to me and requested me to move my brigade to General Kershaw's right, as the enemy were massing in that direction and threatening a flank movement. I immediately moved to General Kershaw's right, met the enemy in force, drove in his skirmishers and found him intrenched on a hill with artillery. After engaging him and reconoitring his position, I found it impossible to drive him from it.

I immediately informed General Longstreet of the enemy's position and strength, and received orders from him to hold my position without advancing, while he sent a division to attack him on the right and left. The attack on my left was first made with doubtful success; the attack on my right was successful, driving the enemy from his position in great confusion. It was now dark, and no further pursuit was made.

I refer you to the accompanying lists of casualties. The brigade captured during the day over four hundred prisoners, five stands of colors, and twelve hundred small arms.

On the twenty-second, learning that a party of the enemy was on the mountain, near the gap at Rossville, I detached thirty men from the Eighteenth regiment, and the command of Captain Ratcliff, Company A, and Lieutenant Ottenburg, of Company K, to skirmish for them. They succeeded in capturing nine officers and one hundred and twenty men, making a total of prisoners captured by the brigade, thirty-

seven officers and five hundred and thirty-five men.

The individual cases of gallantry and daring among the officers and men were numerous, and where all behaved so well it is unneccessary to particularize. I cannot conclude this report without paying a tribute of admiration to the bearing and dauntless courage of Brigadier-General Kershaw and his brave Palmetto boys, who have so long and so often fought side by side with the Mississippi troops. The gallant and heroic daring with which they met the shock of battle, and irresistibly drove back the Federal hosts, merits the highest encomiums and lasting gratitude of the army and the country. Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

BENJAMIN G. HUMPHREYS.
Brigadier-General, commanding.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. B. KERSHAW.

HEADQUARTERS KERSHAW'S BRIGADE,
NEAR CHATTANOOGA, October 15, 1863.

Major J. M. Goggin, Assistant Adjutant-General:

MAJOR: I respectfully submit the following report of the operations of my own and Humphreys' brigade in the late battle of Chickamauga. The mention of the latter brigade is necessarily general, from the fact that General Humphreys' report did not pass through me, and, being on foot during the engagement, I could only assume a very general command. I respectfully refer to the report of General Humphreys for more particular information of his movements.

At midnight, on the eighteenth of September, the last of my brigade arrived at the terminus of the railroad near Catoosa Station, and next morning marched, under orders from the General commanding, to Ringgold, at which place the command united with that of Brigadier-General Humphreys. About nightfall orders were received from the Lieutenant-General commanding to join General Hood with the command. Conducted by Colonel Dillard, we moved at once across Alexander's Bridge over Chickamauga Creek, and bivouacked at one o'clock A. M., on the twentieth. At nine o'clock we were ordered by the Lieutenant-General commanding to a position in reserve to Hood's division, near the headquarters of the commanding General. About eleven o'clock I was ordered forward with the command to report to Major-General Hood. Arriving, I found his troops engaged in front, and a line of battle just going in. General Hood directed me to form line in his rear, with my centre resting on the spot where I found him, which I suppose was his centre. Forming line, Humphreys on my left, as rapidly as possible, under fire of the enemy, and in a thick wood, I moved as directed, to the front. I had been directed to occupy a line of breastworks; but, before reaching that point, a staff-officer of the Lieutenant-General commanding was sent to direct me to a point further in advance. I crossed the Lafayette road near a house, and, crossing the open ground, entered the woods beyond, and proceeded nearly to what I understood to be the Cove road. While passing through the last wood, Lieutenant-General Longstreet directed me to to look out for my right flank, and I had disposed of Colonel Hennagan's Eighth South Carolina, my right regiment, in such a manner as to cover me in that direction, as I supposed. Having reached the point last mentioned, the firing on my right became very heavy, and a portion of General Hood's division fell back along my line. I changed front almost perpendicularly to the right on Colonel Nance's Third South Carolina regiment, my left centre, which I had indicated as the directing battlion. This movement had just been accomplished, when an officer of Brigadier-General Law's staff informed me of the unfortunate loss of Major-General Hood, and suggested that, as senior Brigadier, I should assume the direction of the two brigades of that division on my right. General Bushrod Johnson was present and called for a comparison of rank, which seemed to satisfy him. Major Cunningham, Assistant Inspector-General, General Hood's staff, who had been sent by the General to conduct me, made the opportune suggestion that the Lieutenant-General commanding be informed. Relieved by this, I requested him to direct General Humphreys to move up and support me on my right, he having been thrown in my rear by my change of front. General Johnson had undertaken to advance a brigade on my left. The enemy occupied a skirt of wood on the far side of the field around Dyer's house; his right extending into the wood beyond the field, his left crossing the Cove road. His colors were ostentatiously displayed along the lines. The last of Hood's division engaged in my front had just retired, when I ordered the advance, directing Colonel Hennagan to extend to the right and engage the enemy in that direction until Humphreys' arrival, who was then in motion. The distance across the field was about eight hundred yards, with a fence intervening about one-quarter of the distance. As soon as we crossed the fence I ordered bayonets fixed, and moved at a double-quick, sending Lieutenant-Colonel Gaillard's Second South Carolina regiment, my extreme left, to gain the enemy's right flank. When within one hundred yards of the enemy they broke, and I opened fire upon them along the whole line, but pursued them rapidly over the first line of hills to the foot of the second, when I halted under a heavy fire of artillery on the heights, sheltering the men as much as possible, and there awaited the coming of Humphreys on my right. The Seventh South Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel Bland, my right centre regiment, and the Fifteenth South Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph F. Gist, had obliqued to the right. Colonel Hennagan had pursued the enemy so far to the right that, when Humphreys got up, he occupied the interval between the Fifteenth and Eighth regiments. Colonel

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BRIG. GEN. EDW. A. WILD.

Oates, Fifteenth Alabama, Law's brigade, came up on the right of the Seventh and occupied the line between that and the Fifteenth, and with those regiments advanced without orders. I had sent to the right to direct that I should be informed when Humphreys arrived.

Hearing the firing renewed on my right, I advanced the left wing, Third South Carolina, James' battalion, and Second South Carolina, and gained, in some points, the crest of the hill within a few yards of the enemy's lines. After one of the most gallant struggles I have ever witnessed, especially on the part of the Third South Carolina and James' battalion, which occupied a position in front of the enemy's battery, I was compelled to fall back to a point about two hundred and fifty yards, where I determined to hold the enemy until reinforcements arrived. The enemy soon advanced, but, by a cool, deliberate fire, was quickly repulsed. General Humphreys reported that he could make no further advance on account of the heavy force of the enemy to his right. I directed him to make such disposition of his troops as would cover my right flank. About three o'clock Brigadier-General Anderson's Mississippi brigade came to my support. I described to him the situation, and suggested an attack on the right flank of the position of the enemy. He acquiesced in my view and advanced his left preparatory to the movement, covering his front with skirmishers, who immediately became engaged, and drove in those of the enemy, but, raising a shout along their lines, they advanced their line of battle at a charge, driving back Anderson's brigade in some confusion. With hearty cheers the Second and Third South Carolina and James' battalion engaged them with the utmost enthusiasm; Anderson's brigade promptly re-formed and opened fire. His reserve regiment came up, and, in ten minutes time, the enemy was driven pell-mell. The Second South Carolina and Anderson's brigade dashed after him and drove him to the top of the hill, the Second South Carolina reaching the crest. The troops to his left having fallen back to their former position, Lieutenant-Colonel Gaillard says, in his report, that "he was obliged, reluctantly, to fall back." This was an attack on the right flank of the enemy, and the line was at an oblique angle to my line. All of my regiments, except the Second, though not participating in the direct attack, served to hold the enemy in position along that portion of the line, and were mostly engaged during the attack. About four o'clock Gracie's and Kelly's brigades came up and reported to me. I directed them, the former to form on my rear, and the latter to form on Gracie's left. General Hindman informed me that he was about to attack on Anderson's left, well on the right flank of the enemy, with two brigades of infantry, with artillery. Soon after, he opened heavily in that direction, but sent me word the attack was likely to fail unless a demonstration was made along the front. I determined on an attack, combining all our forces. McNair's brigade, which had come up on my right, Gracie's, Kelly's, Anderson's, my Eighth, Fifteenth, and Second regiments participating. The rest of my brigade being, in whole or in part, out of ammunition, remained in reserve at their position. This was one of the heaviest attacks of the war on a single point. The brigades went in in magnificent order; General Gracie, under my own eye, led his brigade, now for the first time under fire, most gallantly and efficiently, and, for more than an hour and a half, the struggle continued with unabated fury. It terminated at sunset—the Second South Carolina being among the last to retire. At dark General Robinson, of Hood's division, came up with his brigade and picketed to my front. About ten o'clock, I think, he informed me that the enemy had left. I immediately communicated the fact to the Lieutenant-General commanding. In the morning General Robinson withdrew, and I sent forward Lieutenant-Colonel Gaillard to take possession of the enemy's hospital and to picket to the front. The day was spent in caring for the wounded, burying the dead, and collecting arms. In the afternoon Major-General McLaws resumed command of the division. My brigade was marched a few miles that night towards Chattanooga, and next day drove in the enemy to their present lines, in conjunction with Wofford's brigade, my Eighth South Carolina being chiefly engaged. But few men were lost in this affair. During the first charge of the twentieth my brigade captured nine pieces of artillery, three of which were taken by the Eighth South Carolina, and some half dozen caissons, with ammunition. Most of these were taken before they could open fire. My losses were heavy, as will be seen by reference to the accompanying detailed report. Among them are some of the most gallant and efficient officers and men of my command, and choice spirits of Carolina chivalry. Lieutenant-Colonel Elbert Bland, Seventh South Carolina, fell at the head of his regiment in the first moment of our triumph. A few moments later, Major John S. Hard, his successor, was instantly killed. The command then devolved on Captain E. J. Goggin. Captain J. M. Townsend, commanding James' battalion, was killed, leading the charge upon the enemy's stronghold. Lieutenant-Colonel Hoole, Eighth South Carolina regiment, was killed in the early part of the action. Lieutenant-Colonel Bland was recognized generally as an officer of rare ability. His power of command, his cool, dauntless courage and self-control in battle, his excellent judgment, disciplinary skill and ability in camp, marked him as a man of a high order of military talent. His personal and social characteristics were equally noble and elevated. In him we have lost a champion worthy of our glorious cause. Major John S. Hard was a gallant and accomplished officer, and has highly distinguished himself on every battle-field in which his regiment has been engaged. Captain Townsend commanded his battalion, on this occasion, in such a manner as to elicit my commendation

on the field, before he fell, and would, if he were living, have been here mentioned with high distinction. Lieutenant-Colonel Hoole was an officer of much merit, but has been prevented by protracted illness from attaining that distinction he might have achieved with his gallant regiment. He was much beloved for his personal qualities, and his loss will be deeply deplored by his comrades. For particular mention of other brave spirits who have fallen, I respectfully refer to the accompanying reports of regimental commanders. My pride and satisfaction with the conduct of my entire brigade, in the engagement, could not be more complete. Officers and men, each acted as if impressed with the feeling that the destinies of the country depended upon his own faithful, earnest, and intelligent discharge of duty. I shall not attempt to particularize.

The only member of my staff with me during the whole day was Captain C. R. Holmes, A. A. G. To him, as on all previous occasions of this character, I am greatly indebted for the most valuable and gallant services. He represented me on the right wing of my brigade. I detailed Second Lieutenant H. L. Tarley to act as Aid-de-Camp, and cannot too highly commend his gallantry, activity, and efficiency, under the most trying circumstances. As an evidence of my appreciation, I detailed him to accompany the captured flags to Richmond. Lieutenant W. M. Dwight, A. A. and I. G., joined me in the afternoon and aided me with his usual efficiency.

In the absence of horses for myself and staff, I detailed one man from each regiment as orderlies to communicate with the command. All of them rendered efficient service, and two, M. F. Milan, Company A, Third South Carolina regiment, and Rawlins Rivers, Company I, Second South Carolina regiment, were killed in the discharge of that duty. Rivers had attracted my notice by gallant and intelligent services in the same position at the battle of Fredericksburg.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. B. KERSHAW,

Brigadier-General, commanding.

REPORT OF COL. C. C. WILSON, COMMANDING BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS WILSON'S BRIGADE,
MISSIONARY RIDGE, October 1, 1863.

Captain Joseph B. Cumming, Assistant Adjutant-General:

CAPTAIN: It was not until one o'clock on Friday night, the eighteenth instant, that my brigade succeeded in crossing Shaelan Ford, on the Chickamauga River, the road having been blocked up by the wagons and artillery trains of the brigades and divisions which preceded us on the march. We bivouacked on the west side of the river that night, prepared to follow our division on the next day's march. The ordnance train of the division not having succeeded in crossing Friday night, I was directed by special order from division headquarters to remain with the train, holding my brigade as a guard until it had crossed, and then to rejoin the division. I immediately detached the Thirtieth Georgia regiment, and sent it to the ford as a guard to that portion of the train that had not crossed, and to furnish fatigue parties to help forward disabled or stalled wagons, having first reconnoitred the position and thrown out two companies on each road leading to the ford to guard against surprise by the enemy. About nine o'clock A. M., the whole train had crossed and was put in motion, with the Twenty-fifth Georgia and a section of the battery ahead as an advance guard and the rest of the brigade in rear. In this order we had marched about two miles from the ford, to the intersection of the road from Alexander's Bridge with the road to Lee and Gordon's Mill, when I received, from one of General Forrest's staff, an order from division headquarters, directing me to go with General Forrest and obey his orders. The train was thereupon sent forward alone, and the brigade filed to the right on the Alexander's Bridge road, conducted by the staff officer who had brought me the order. One company, however, of the Thirtieth Georgia regiment, which had been thrown out as skirmishers from the ford, had not yet overtaken the regiment, and did not until the fight was over, but fell in on the left of General Ector's brigade, and behaved gallantly, as I am informed, during the engagement of that day. This was Company B, Captain Hitch. Riding forward with General Forrest, he informed me that the enemy, in considerable force, were engaging his cavalry to the right and front of my position, and he directed me to select a position and form line of battle on the left of the road. I formed my line on the ridge of the long hill which, from the north-east, overlooks and commands the plain where our first encounter with the enemy took place, posting the artillery by sections on the most elevated positions and opposite to the intervals between regiments. We had not remained in this position long when an order from General Forrest informed me that the enemy were pressing him sorely in front, and directed me to move upon his left. This order was promptly executed, the brigade moving off by the right flank, and filing up the Alexander's Bridge road about three-eighths of a mile, was formed forward into line. The line was scarcely formed when firing commenced on the left. The order was given to move forward at once, and the line stepped off with the enthusiasm of high hope and patriotic determination, and the precision and accuracy which only disciplined and instructed troops can attain. The enemy's skirmishers were encountered at once and driven in on their first line, which opened upon us a terrific fire. Steadily the line moved forward and poured into the enemy's rank a well-directed fire, which very soon caused his line to break and fly from the field in confusion, leaving dead and wounded covering the field over which we marched. The command still pressed forward on the retreating foe, and soon encountered a second line

of battle, which seemed to have been drawn up three or four hundred yards in rear of the first; then again the contest was renewed with great energy, and the position disputed with stubborn resolve. The firing at this point was terrific, and many brave officers and men fell while gallantly discharging their duties. For a time our line wavered, and the overwhelming force of the enemy seemed determined to drive us from the field. Rallying from the shock of this new encounter, our line again moved forward with determination and energy, and finally succeeded in driving back the enemy's second line in confusion to his breastworks, which had been erected of fallen trees about four hundred yards in rear of his second line. At this time an order from General Forrest directed me not to press the enemy further, but, in the meantime, our line had come within range of the breastworks, from which a constant and galling fire was poured into our ranks, and a heavy force was moving around our left flank. I at once dispatched one of my staff to General Ector, who I knew was a short distance in our rear, with a request that he would move up on my left. But before my messenger reached him, General Forrest had ordered his brigade to the right—a position held up to that time by the cavalry. In the meantime, the enemy, having turned my left, poured an enfilading fire into our thinned ranks, and compelled the whole left of the line to fall back, including the Thirtieth Georgia regiment, which occupied the centre. Observing this movement, and pressed by a galling fire in front, the right of the line, made up of the Twenty-fifth and Twenty-ninth Georgia regiments, began slowly to fall back. This movement having been promptly arrested, I passed towards the left with a view of rallying the rest of the brigade, and succeeded in restoring order to the thinned ranks of the Thirtieth Georgia, when I discovered the enemy still pressing around the left towards an open field, through which our line had advanced. I thereupon directed Lieutenant-Colonel Boynton, then commanding the Thirtieth Georgia to fall back a little further to a wood on the left of the road, intending to re-form on it. While this was being done, General Ector's brigade went in on the right of my line, and the Twenty-fifth and Twenty-ninth Georgia regiments went with this brigade again into the action, and remained with it during the fight of that brigade, and the sharpshooters and Louisiana battalion, were rallied and re-formed in the rear of other troops of our division, which at this time had come up to our relief. Having been re-formed, and our cartridge-boxes replenished, the brigade took up its position again, remained on the battle-field that night, and moved with the division next day.

During the action of this day (Sunday, the twentieth instant), it was not our fortune to be much engaged. Our ranks had been much reduced, and we mustered not over four hundred and fifty aggregate. About twelve M., the right of our line having advanced some distance, we engaged the enemy in a thick wood, about half a mile from the Chattanooga road, in connection with general Gist's brigade, which was in front of us, and General Ector's, which was in our rear. At this time the three brigades were occupying the same line nearly, and this arrangement necessarily resulted in some confusion. After a very unsatisfactory fight, lasting probably forty minutes, and in which we lost some valuable officers and a few men, we were ordered to fall back and re-form. This was accomplished, the line falling back a few hundred yards, where we remained until about five P. M., when the line was re-formed, with General Gist's brigade on the right, General Ector's on the left and mine in the centre—the division being under command of General Gist—and advanced to the last charge, meeting, however, no enemy, and having the satisfaction of taking up our bivouac upon the field from which our enemy had been driven in confusion. This brigade entered the fight with an effective force of twelve hundred men, and lost, during the two days' fighting, ninety-nine killed, four hundred and twenty-six wounded, and eighty missing. Of the number missing, many were wounded and fell into the enemy's hands, but were recaptured with the field hospital he had established near the battle-field. Of the number wounded several have since died, among them Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. Williams, commanding Twenty-fifth Georgia regiment, a brave and gallant officer, to whom much praise is due for his conduct on the field. He fell at his post and in the efficient discharge of his duties.

A list of killed and wounded officers having been furnished, I deem it unnecessary to embody it in this report. I may be permitted to say, however, that among them were numbered the bravest, the truest, and the best. Where all behaved so well, it would be invidious to draw distinctions. I know of no instance in which any officer shrank from the discharge of his duty, and in mentioning a few who fell under my own observation I do not mean to disparage those who did not. I notice, as worthy of commendation, the cases of Captains A. W. and A. H. Smith, of the Twenty-fifth Georgia regiment, and Captain Spencer, of the Twenty-ninth Georgia regiment, Lieutenants Alfred Bryant and A. B. Sadler, of the First battalion Georgia sharpshooters, who, notwithstanding they were wounded, remained with their commands through the fight and discharged their duties to the end. I respectfully ask the favorable consideration of the Major-General commanding to the cases of my Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General, First Lieutenant Robert Wayne, and of my acting Assistant Adjutant-General, First Lieutenant R. E. Lester. The first was seriously wounded in the leg whilst in the discharge of his duties, and Lieutenant Lester was wounded in the head and abdomen, under the same circumstances, and had two horses killed under him. They were both conspicuous in the fight, riding fearlessly along the line in

the thickest of it, distributing orders, rallying the men when broken, and setting an example to all of courage and devotion, and of a cool and intelligent discharge of duty under the most trying circumstances, worthy of all commendation. I acknowledge myself greatly indebted to them. I respectfully ask their promotion to the rank of Captains in the department in which they are serving. I also take great pleasure in noticing the cases of First Lieutenant G. R. McRae, Adjutant of the Twenty-ninth Georgia regiment, who was conspicuous in the fight, encouraging his men and rallying them when broken, and who, being left senior officer after the first engagement, assumed command of the broken remnants, and gallantly led them in again on the left of General Ector's brigade.

During the first day's fighting many prisoners were taken, but they were turned over at once and no account kept of them, and many were sent to the rear without a guard, not having men to spare for that purpose. One section of my battery alone was able to get into position, and did some service. The enemy had no artillery in our front, and we took no pieces. The field was not such as to render artillery useful.

In addition to the officers above-named who, being wounded, remained on the field, I will add the name of First Lieutenant A. H. Harrell, Company H, Twenty-ninth Georgia regiment. About one o'clock Sunday afternoon, private Thomas Henderson, Company A, Fourth Louisiana battalion, was captured by the enemy—he being in advance of his battalion—but, when the route of the enemy commenced, made his escape from his guard, and, seizing a rifle, on his return to our lines captured and brought in six of the enemy as prisoners, delivering them to the guard of Brigadier-General Bate.

I am, Captain, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
C. C. WILSON,
Colonel, commanding Brigade.

REPORT OF COL. A. J. VAUGHAN, COMMANDING BRIGADE.

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS IN FIELD,
IN FRONT OF CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE, October 4, 1863.

Major J. G. Porter, Assistant Adjutant-General:

MAJOR: I beg leave to submit the following report of the action of General Preston Smith's brigade (composed of the One Hundred and Fifty-fourth and Thirteenth Tennessee regiments, under command of Colonel A. J. Vaughan, Jr.; Twelfth and Forty-seventh Tennessee regiments, under command of Colonel W. M. Watkins; Eleventh Tennessee regiment, under command of Colonel G. W. Gordon; Twenty-ninth Tennessee regiment, under command of Colonel Horace Rice; Scott's battery, under command of First Lieutenant John H. Marsh; and a battalion of sharpshooters, composed of two companies from the Twelfth and Forty-seventh Tennessee regiments, one from the One Hundred and Fifty-fourth Tennessee regiment, one from the Eleventh and one from the Twenty-ninth Tennessee regiments, under command of Major J. W. Dawson; One Hundred and Fifty-fourth senior Tennessee regiment, and Major William Green, Eleventh Tennessee regiment), Cheatham's division, Polk's corps, Army of Tennessee, in the battle of Chickamauga and the occupation of Missionary Ridge, on the nineteenth, twentieth, twenty-first and twenty-second days of September, 1863:

On the evening of the seventeenth September orders were received to move General Preston Smith's brigade out on the Ringgold road to the intersection of Lee and Gordon's Mill road, thence to Rock Spring church, where we bivouacked for the night in line of battle.

Early on the morning of the eighteenth of September, we were ordered to move forward in the direction of the ford below Lee and Gordon's Mill, on West Chickamauga. Our advance during the day was very slow, having to wait for Buckner's corps to pass to the front and effect a crossing of the creek, which they succeeded in doing about dark, after heavy skirmishing. We bivouacked at night, in line of battle, half a mile south of West Chickamauga.

Early on the morning of the nineteenth September, the brigade moved forward, crossed the creek, and formed in line of battle on the left of Jackson's brigade. As soon as the division effected a crossing, we moved forward near a mile, and formed line in similar order in rear of Buckner's corps. We remained in this position a short time, when we received orders to move by the right flank, in double-quick, to the support of General Walker, who for some time had been actively engaging the enemy. On arriving at the scene of action, we found General Walker stoutly resisted, and his command much exhausted from long and continued action. We were ordered to form line immediately. Formed, as before, on left of General Jackson's brigade. As soon as formed, we were ordered to advance and engage the enemy. We advanced but a short distance before we met the enemy, advancing. We engaged him at once, and furiously drove him before us six or eight hundred yards, forcing him to take shelter behind the breastworks from which he had advanced in the morning. We moved steadily forward until within musket-range of their works; and, notwithstanding we were subjected to a severe and concentrated fire both of musketry and artillery, the brigade kept up a steady and determined fire until the supply of ammunition was nearly exhausted. General Smith, being apprised of this, immediately informed General Cheatham of the fact, at the same time assuring him he was able to hold the position until he could forward a brigade to his relief. General Strahl was ordered forward. As soon as he occupied General Smith's position, General Smith withdrew his brigade, moved some four hundred yards to the rear, and re-formed his line.

During this engagement, beginning at about twelve o'clock M., and closing about two o'clock P. M., the officers and men of the different regiments of the brigade acted with conspicuous

gallantry, discharging every duty and responding to every order, with commendable promptness.

Since all acted so well, I cannot particularize. Scott's battery, under First Lieutenant John H. Marsh, advanced with the brigade, and took position, as ordered, under a heavy and destructive fire of the enemy, so much so, that a number of men and horses were disabled before the battery was placed for action. Immediately a rapid and well-directed fire was opened upon the enemy, with telling effect upon his ranks. This fire was vigorously maintained until the brigade was relieved and ordered to the rear. It was in this engagement that First Lieutenant John H. Marsh was severely, if not dangerously, wounded, while gallantly encouraging his men and inspiring them by his own distinguished coolness and heroism. The command then devolved upon Second Lieutenant A. T. Watson, who, throughout the engagement, acted with commendable bravery.

In bringing on the engagement and in driving the enemy, the battalion of sharpshooters did efficient service, both officers and men acting well their parts.

After supplying the command with ammunition and taking position as ordered, it was found that Scott's battery was so disabled, by the loss of men and horses, as to be unfit for action during the evening. Turner's battery, of Maney's brigade, was ordered to report to General Smith. It was placed on the right of the brigade, and did effective service in checking the second advance of the enemy. Throughout the evening Lieutenant Turner poured a murderous fire into the enemy's ranks, his coolness and disregard of danger eliciting the highest praise from the officers and men of the entire brigade. It was while supporting this battery that Major Dawson, One Hundred and Fifty-fourth senior Tennessee regiment, in command of the battalion of sharpshooters, was severely wounded in the groin.

The enemy, finding it impossible to drive us from our position, sullenly retired out of range, and comparative quiet prevailed along our line until six o'clock P. M., when General Smith, being informed that a night attack was determined upon, was ordered, so soon as General Deshler's brigade of Major-General Cleburne's division should advance to his front, to move his brigade forward as General Deshler's support. After having advanced in this order some two hundred yards, the engagement was commenced on the right and extended to Deshler's brigade in our front. Advancing a short distance further, it being quite dark, a portion of this brigade became somewhat confused and fell back on our line. General Smith ordered them to move forward, which order was obeyed. We continued to advance but a short distance, when they a second time fell back on our line and were again urged forward by General Smith. Instead of moving direct to the front, they obliqued to the left and uncovered the two right regiments of General Smith's brigade. In the darkness, General Smith did not know this, and a third time coming upon troops at a halt in his immediate front, presuming them to belong to General Deshler's command, he and Captain Thomas H. King, volunteer Aid, rode to the front to ascertain the delay. On riding up to the line (which proved to be the enemy) and asking who was in command of these troops, he was discovered to be a Confederate officer, and he and Captain King were both killed. I, at the same time, was in front of my regiments, accompanied by Captain Donelson, acting Assistant Adjutant-General to General Smith, to know the cause of the delay of what I supposed to be a portion of General Deshler's command. Riding up to a soldier, I asked him to what command he belonged. Discovering that I was a Confederate officer, he fired at me, missing me, but killing Captain Donelson, who was by my side. I immediately ordered some files from the Twelfth Tennessee regiment to shoot him, which they did, killing him instantly. The line in front, seeing their situation, cried out, "Don't shoot; we surrender." I then rode forward, and found them in the act of grounding their arms. Discovering a stand of colors in my front, I asked, "Who has those colors?" The reply was, "The color-bearer." I then said, "Sir, to what command do you belong?" He replied, "To the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania regiment." I then took from him the stand of colors and handed them to Captain Carthell, Forty-seventh Tennessee regiment, and ordered him to turn them, with the prisoners captured, about three hundred in number, over to General Cheatham.

The reason that I have been thus explicit in detailing the facts connected with the capture of the stand of colors is, they were claimed to have been captured by General Deshler's command.

Being informed that General Smith had been killed, I assumed the command of the brigade, the command of my regiment devolving upon Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. Pittman.

After this there was no more firing of consequence. Orders were received from Major-General Cheatham to bivouac in line of battle for the remainder of the night.

On the twentieth my brigade was not actively engaged, being held as a reserve. We were, however, subjected to a heavy artillery fire, killing and wounding several men. Late in the evening we were ordered to the extreme right, where we remained until the morning of the twenty-first September. I then ordered the battalion of sharpshooters, under command of Majors Green and Pearl, to deploy (so as to cover the front of my brigade) and move as far as the top of Missionary Ridge, or discover the whereabouts of the enemy. In a short time, they reported the enemy in the valley around Chattanooga.

At three o'clock P. M., we were ordered to the extreme right of the line, and bivouacked for the night near Byrd's Mill.

On the morning of the twenty-second of Sep-

tember we moved, on the Shallon Ford road, in the direction of Chattanooga. When we arrived at the foot of Missionary Ridge, we formed line of battle on the left of General Maney's brigade and advanced to the top of the ridge, meeting with but little resistance, though the enemy were strongly posted.

Accompanying this will be found the reports of the several regimental commanders, Major William Green, commanding battalion of sharpshooters, and Lieutenant A. T. Watson, commanding Scott's battery, of the action taken by their respective commands, to which I invite your attention. A list of the casualties of the brigade has already been forwarded to headquarters.

I cannot close this report without alluding to the very efficient service rendered me by Captain J. W. Harris, Inspector-General on General Smith's staff, in carrying and executing all orders in the most prompt manner possible. Also, Captain Emmett Cockrill, volunteer Aid to General Smith, deserves especial notice for the manner in which he discharged every duty assigned him. Thanks are due to Major King, Brigade Commissary, for keeping the troops so well provided with rations during the campaign from Lafayette, Georgia, to this place. Also, to Major Beecher, Brigade Quartermaster, for the efficient manner in which our wounded were carried from the field. Thanks are also due to Captain Henry K. Beatty, Brigade Ordnance Officer, for the prompt and efficient manner in which the command was kept constantly supplied with ammunition. Also, special credit is due Lieutenant J. W. Cochran, Brigade Provost-Marshal, for the promptness and efficiency displayed in discharging the duties of his office.

Especial attention is called to Colonel Rice's report in reference to the gallant conduct of E. H. Clayton, courier to General Smith.

I am, Major, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
A. J. VAUGHAN, Jr.,
Colonel, commanding.

REPORT OF COLONEL C. A. SUGG, COMMANDING BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS GREGG'S BRIGADE,
TOP OF MISSION RIDGE, September 26, 1863.

I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by Gregg's brigade in the actions of Friday, Saturday, and Sunday (eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth instant), while under my command:

Shortly after five o'clock, in the afternoon of Saturday (nineteenth), the brigade having then been hotly engaged for several hours, I was notified that General Gregg had been disabled by a severe wound in the neck, and had been borne from the field, and that the command in consequence devolved upon me. I accordingly reported to General Johnson for orders. The brigade having fallen back, defensive positions were made for the night by posting pickets in advance and constructing breastworks of logs.

At seven o'clock, the following morning (Sunday, twentieth), I was ordered to take position in rear of McNair's and Johnson's brigades, in reserve. About eleven A. M., the division being ordered forward, we advanced some eight hundred yards, under heavy fire, when the front line first wavered, then halted, in considerable confusion. It soon rallied, but, after advancing about two hundred yards farther, halted a second time, in the face of a heavy force of the enemy, strongly posted behind breastworks of rails and fallen timber. My command suffering greatly in its position in rear, I now proposed to General McNair to permit me to pass to the front. He consented, and my command was ordered forward and succeeded in dislodging the enemy from his position, though not without heavy loss. Major C. W. Robertson, commanding Fiftieth Tennessee (Lieutenant-Colonel Beaumont having been killed the day before) was here severely wounded in the groin, while gallantly leading his regiment. Up to this point all the fighting had taken place in thick cover. Steadily advancing, the brigade now emerged from the timber into a cleared field of considerable extent, gradually sloping down from the further edge, where the enemy had posted a battery of eight guns. This battery I was ordered to flank, leaving it on my right. Across the open field the brigade charged and, supported on the right flank, captured the guns. Four of these pieces, rifled guns of the Ward pattern and three-inch calibre, belonging to the First Missouri (Federal) battery, are now appropriately in possession of the First Missouri (Bledsoe's) battery, belonging to this brigade. A thickly wooded ridge in rear of the captured battery, and commanding the position, was the next point of attack. Ordered by General Johnson, in person, to take this position, the brigade advanced to the assault, again without support on the right. The ridge was carried, and my battery, from the nature of the ground, being unable to keep up, the brigade was halted upon its crest and disposed in such form as to sweep with its fire the slopes and hollows on both sides of the ridge and hold the position until the artillery could come to our support. So soon as the guns arrived, they were placed in position to open fire upon the enemy's battery of five pieces, covering the retreat of an ammunition train. In a few minutes the enemy's cannoneers abandoned their guns; the teamsters were seen cutting loose the horses from their traces, and the whole took to flight, leaving both battery and train in our possession. Later in the day, the contents of the captured wagons served to replenish the exhausted boxes of the brigade. Finding the position commanded by still another ridge in front, but bearing to the right, the brigade was ordered forward, the position in front taken, and my battery of four guns posted so as to secure its possession, while skirmishers were thrown out to ascertain the position and force of the enemy. He was found to be in heavy force on the same ridge on my right. Adjusting my line accordingly, the brigade again

moved forward, charging the enemy in gallant style, under a heavy fire. Here Lieutenant-Colonel J. B. Tillman, commanding Fourth Tennessee, was wounded in the shoulder, while nobly leading his men. The enemy was driven back, but rallied and returned to the attack in greater force, contesting the ground with unusual obstinacy. For the want of artillery support, the right wing of the brigade fell back beyond the battery, left in the position already described, but was enabled to re-form under cover of the steady fire and unbroken front maintained by the Third and Fiftieth Tennessee (Colonel C. H. Walker), and Seventh Texas (Major R. M. Vanzandt), by whom the guns were saved from capture, and to whom the right wing was indebted for an opportunity to recover from the temporary confusion into which it had been thrown. This being quickly effected, and, perceiving the impossibility of holding the position, if captured, without the aid of artillery, I ordered two guns to be moved to my right, and, believing that the teams would be destroyed if the horses were attacked, I ordered them to be moved up the hill by hand. The brigade was again ordered to charge, the enemy was driven from the ridge and into the hollow beyond; but the guns pushed forward and opened upon him with such telling effect that he made no further effort to recover his lost ground. It was now five o'clock in the afternoon, the brigade having advanced, since eleven o'clock in the morning, fully three miles, describing, in its onward and upward course, through timber and clearing, over hill-tops and ridges, a line approaching in shape very nearly the fourth of a circle. Finding my ammunition exhausted, a supply was ordered, and obtained from the train previously captured from the enemy. Trigg's brigade arriving on the ground at this juncture, I thankfully accepted the proposition of the commanding officer to form line in my front, and ordered the brigade to fall back beyond the crest of the hill and rest for the night; and, no interruption being apprehended from the beaten enemy, the brigade slept on the ground which it had so bravely won.

On the following day, more than one hundred of the enemy's dead were counted on the hillside and in the hollow immediately in front of the brigade. Nor was the series of brilliant successes, thus briefly described, won without heavy loss on our own part, though one greatly inferior to that of the enemy, and inferior, too, to the loss of the brigade on the previous day (Saturday). Where all, both officers and men, did so well, it is difficult, as it would be unfair, to discriminate further than has been already done in this report. At the same time, I should be doing less than justice if I were to omit to make special mention of the very efficient and important service rendered, throughout the day and in every stage of the conflict, by Bledsoe's battery, Lieutenant R. L. Wood commanding.

A statement of the number of men engaged, of the casualties sustained, and of the captures made by the brigade, so far as an estimate of them can now be obtained, will be found subjoined.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
C. A. Sugg,
Colonel, commanding Brigade.

Aggregate present in Gregg's Brigade, according to Field Return of September nineteenth, 1863.

Command.	Aggregate present.
Forty-first Tennessee regiment	325
Fiftieth " "	104
Seventh Texas "	177
Third Tennessee "	274
Tenth " "	190
Thirtieth " "	185
First Tennessee battalion	82
Total infantry	1,337
Battery	84
Brigade staff	4
	1,425

The foregoing represents the number of officers and men taken into action on the morning of Saturday, nineteenth. No field return was called for or made on the morning of Sunday, twentieth.

Aggregate loss in Officers and Men Killed, Wounded, and Missing, in Gregg's Brigade, in the actions of September eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth.

Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Privates Killed	107
Wounded	475
Missing	70
Total	652

List of Captures made by Gregg's Brigade in the actions of September eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth.

Captures.	Amount.
Prisoners	No estimate.
Small arms	No estimate.
Colors	None.
Artillery	Thirteen pieces.
Wagons	Five.
Ambulances	One.

A number of prisoners were taken by the brigade on each day and sent to the rear, but it is impossible to furnish an estimate which would be even an approximation to the real number, therefore none is attempted. Large quantities of arms were gathered on the ground over which the brigade passed, and piled for removal; but, before they could be counted, the brigade was ordered to change position, being transferred from General Johnson's to General Walker's division. The pieces of artillery (thirteen

in number) in regard to the capture of which it is understood that rival claims have been advanced, were not only captured by this brigade, but duly taken possession of at the time by a detail made for the purpose, under charge of Lieutenant Fletcher Beaumont, Adjutant of the Fiftieth Tennessee regiment.

STATEMENT OF ADJUTANT BEAUMONT IN REGARD TO THE CAPTURE OF NINE PIECES OF ARTILLERY FROM THE ENEMY ON THE BATTLE-FIELD OF CHICKAMAUGA.

IN THE FIELD, October 9, 1863.

Colonel Sugg:

SIR: Having been requested to furnish a written statement of the facts regarding the capture from the enemy on the battle-field of Chickamauga, September twentieth, 1863, by General Gregg's brigade, of nine pieces of artillery, which I am enabled to do by reason of having been your Aid-de-Camp on that day, and, as such, having sent the pieces to the rear for safety in the event of an attempt to retake them, I beg leave to submit the following, which will be indorsed by members of the Forty-first Tennessee regiment of this brigade, who were witnesses to the statement herein set forth:

Preparatory to advancing upon the enemy, our division, consisting of Generals Johnson's, McNair's, and Gregg's brigades, the whole commanded by Brigadier-General Johnson, was formed by placing Johnson's brigade on the left, McNair's on the right, with two regiments and a battalion from our brigade on the extreme left—the remainder of the latter following as a support about one hundred yards in rear of the front line. In this order the division moved off. Having gone some distance, McNair's brigade, immediately in our front, halted, the enemy maintaining a brisk fire on the whole line, when, by consent of its commander, our brigade passed over it and gained the front line. Soon after we emerged into an open field, on the opposite side of which, to our right and on an eminence commanding the field, was posted the enemy's artillery. Seeing a rich prize within its grasp, our brigade marched forward until it had gained the flank; then wheeling to the right, went up and possessed it, several of the pieces having been silenced and abandoned before the brigade had commenced to wheel. On reaching the guns we had so nobly won, as your Aid, I proceeded to take possession and have them removed to the rear for safety against re-capture. For this purpose I made a detail of the men nearest to me, and, when I could find them, such wounded as were able to ride horseback, and Federal prisoners, with a guard. Every gun and its accompaniments which fell into our hands were saved. I would also mention that instead of eight (8) guns, as you estimate in your official report, there were nine (9) to my knowledge, having seen that number myself after the fighting had subsided in the evening of that day. Too eager to get them safely to the rear, I did not stop to ascertain the exact number, supposing that I would have an opportunity to settle that point afterwards, as I directed them to be taken to the hill our brigade was posted on before the advance began.

I am, sir, respectfully yours,

FLETCHER BEAUMONT,
Adjutant Fiftieth Tennessee regiment.

We fully concur in the above statement.

W. G. Vanclave, Company H, Forty-first Tennessee regiment.

C. S. Haughton, Company H, Forty-first Tennessee regiment.

B. W. Smith, Fourth Sergeant, Forty-first Tennessee regiment.

A. P. N. Bells, Company H, Forty-first Tennessee regiment.

A. J. Park, Company H, Forty-first Tennessee regiment.

Levi Osburn, Company H, Forty-first Tennessee regiment.

Willy Osburn, Company H, Forty-first Tennessee regiment.

H. M. Fowler, Company H, Forty-first Tennessee regiment.

The above names are members of Company H, Forty-first Tennessee regiment, and authorized me to sign their names.

W. M. COOPER,
First Lieutenant Company H, Forty-first Tennessee regiment.

REPORT OF COL. D. COLEMAN, COMMANDING BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS MCNAIR'S BRIGADE,
CAMP NEAR RINGGOLD, GEORGIA, September 24, 1863.

Captain Blakemore, A. A. A. General:

CAPTAIN: In obedience to Brigadier-General Johnson's order of yesterday, I have the honor to report the part taken by this brigade in the late battles:

Shortly before daylight on the eighteenth instant, this brigade (Brigadier-General E. McNair's), in company with that of Brigadier-General B. R. Johnson, who commanded the whole force, left Catoosa Station, on the Chickamauga River, and marched, by way of Ringgold, by the Lafayette road to the intersection of the Graysville and Reed's Bridge roads. Here, cannonading and sharp skirmishing being heard on the left, line of battle was formed, with Johnson's brigade on the right, and the force swept steadily in this order, with skirmishers in front, across the country to the left, the enemy giving away with scarcely any resistance, to the Reed's Bridge road, near the bridge. Thence marched, hearing heavy musketry firing in front, to within one and a half miles of Lee's Mill, on the Chattanooga and Lee's Mill road, where it encamped in line for the night some time after dark.

On the nineteenth, just about eight A. M., the battle having begun on the right, the brigade was placed in position in the rear of Gregg's brigade, with the artillery, Captain Culpeper's three pieces, and the Thirty-ninth North Carolina regiment, Colonel Coleman, and Twenty-fifth Arkansas, Lieutenant-Colonel Hupstelder. Colonel Coleman, commanding both regiments, being

ordered to support General Gregg, moved rapidly forward and, getting near Gregg's brigade (then under a terrific fire), charged impetuously, passing over the left of Gregg's brigade, with loud cheers, and drove the enemy in rapid flight through the thick woods, across the Chattanooga road, past the small house, a hundred yards on and in to the corn fields beyond, making a distance altogether of about three-quarters of a mile. In this last advance Lieutenant-Colonel Hupstelder fell, wounded with five balls. Though the enemy, to whom we had been opposed in front, were in flight, broken and in confusion, having sustained a heavy loss in killed, the two regiments find their tired and weakened line exposed to a fatal flank fire, especially on the left; unsupported on account of the rapidity of their advance, with an enemy's battery near on the left and a strong enemy's reinforcement approaching, and our ammunition nearly exhausted, the impracticability of longer holding this advanced and exposed position was immediately manifest and the force was ordered back to the woods. Here they were re-formed and, a fresh line having passed to relieve them, were marched back to nearly their original position to await ammunition, where they were joined by the rest of the brigade, which finally moved forward to the position in line where it was encamped for the night, between Johnson's brigade, on the right, and Hindman's division on the left.

The First, Second, and Fourth Arkansas battalions (consolidated), Major Ross, all under the immediate command of General McNair, were ordered forward soon after the advance of the Thirty-ninth North Carolina and Twenty-fifth Arkansas, and charged on the right of the course taken by the latter regiments and drove the enemy, in successive charges, beyond the Chattanooga road. Here, on the withdrawal of the Thirty-ninth and Twenty-fifth, being exposed to a heavy flank fire on the left, besides that in front, and the ammunition beginning to fail, they rejoined the other two regiments.

The artillery, Captain Culpeper commanding, supported the advance of the brigade so long as it was safe to fire, and then, the under-growth being too thick to advance, remained in their position the remainder of the day.

On the morning of the twentieth, the brigade was placed in line between Stewart's division on the right, and Hindmand's on the left, with a slight barricade of branches and small dead wood in front. Here, about half past nine A. M., the line repulsed an advance of the enemy. In a few minutes after, the brigade, advancing with the rest of the line, drove the enemy steadily and rapidly back, passing over two successive lines of temporary breastworks, a distance of about three quarters of a mile, reaching the corner of the field, at the opposite end of which were two batteries of the enemy's on a hill commanding the whole advance. General McNair and Colonel Harper, First Arkansas rifles, had just been disabled by wounds, that of the latter officer mortal. The brigade, already in advance of the line, charged furiously upon the batteries diagonally on the right and captured them, taking ten pieces, eight of which were immediately sent, with their remaining horses, to our rear, and the remaining two, then in the woods, were carried to the rear afterwards, the ground never having been re-occupied by the enemy.

The brigade was now considerably in advance of the line, though this was rapidly approaching; our left was still more exposed by the break made by our diagonal charge; the enemy were firing from the woods in front, while within two hundred yards farther in the woods a large body of the enemy were seen drawn up in good order. Our forces were reduced by our rapid advance and the ammunition nearly exhausted. It was necessary at once to abandon our position. The brigade retired back to the woods, procured ammunition, and took position in line on the left of Robinson's brigade. Here, receiving an order from Brigadier-General Johnson, the brigade, under Colonel Coleman, upon whom the command had devolved, advanced forward and to the left, about half a mile, to the support of Johnson's brigade, which was supporting Robinson's battery, which was stationed on the brow of a hill to the right of the Lookout Valley road, at which point the force there were resisting with difficulty the determined advance of the enemy in heavy force. In a few minutes General Johnson ordered our advance, when, passing the line immediately supporting the battery, which line also advanced, we charged over the hill upon the enemy, and, after a protracted and obstinate resistance, a brigade on our right and Manigault's brigade, on the ridge to our left, advancing on parallel lines to us, the enemy were completely driven from the position. In this conflict we suffered much from a flanking fire, arising from tardy support on our left.

The artillery, Captain Culpeper, having assisted in repulsing the enemy at half-past nine A. M., was placed in position by General Law, with his battery, and remained there during the day. I take great pleasure and pride in saying that the whole brigade behaved most nobly during all the fighting of both days, being uniformly in advance of all others in every onset. Its losses and its trophies bear ample testimony to its good conduct. In another report I propose to particularize individual instances.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

D. COLEMAN,

Colonel, commanding Brigade.

A.

Tabular Statement of Total Aggregates of McNair's Brigade engaged at Chickamauga, September eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth, 1863.

Command.	Total.	Aggregate.	No. of Rounds Fired.
Field and Staff	.....	2	.....
First Arkansas	254	273	70
Fourth Arkansas	385	415	70
Second Arkansas	125	139	70
Thirty-ninth North Carolina	232	247	80
Twenty-Fifth Arkansas	111	133	80
Total infantry	1,107	1,209	About 75
Culpeper's battery, S. C. artillery	80	84	301 shots.

One caisson exploded, two horses killed and six wounded; one set wheel harness damaged.

D. Coleman,
Colonel, commanding McNair's Brigade.

Henry Waldrop,
A. A. A. General.

B.

Tabular Statement of Casualties in McNair's Brigade at Chickamauga, on eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth of September, 1863.

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.			Missing.	Total.
		Mortally.	Severely.	Slightly.		
Field and Staff	.....	.....	1	1	.....	2
First Arkansas	14	3	89	54	16	106
Fourth Arkansas	14	4	25	31	29	103
Second Arkansas	6	1	15	27	3	52
Thirty-ninth North Carolina	10	4	46	40	3	103
Twenty-fifth Arkansas	7	4	26	21	3	61
Culpeper's S. C. battery	.....	.....	5	9	.....	14
	51	16	157	163	54	441

D. Coleman,
Colonel, commanding McNair's Brigade.

Henry Waldrop,
A. A. A. General.

C.

A Statement of Captures made by McNair's Brigade at Chickamauga, on the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth of September, 1863.

Ten pieces of artillery.

Several caissons, left on the field and brought off aftewards.

Six first-class ordnance wagons.

Six wagon loads of small ammunition.

Brought off the field eight hundred fine rifles.

Piled up, for ordnance wagons, two thousand rifles.

Brought off the field twenty-six artillery horses.

Two stand of colors—one Eighth Kansas, the other not remembered.

One taken from private Harry Barger, Company I, Twenty-fifth Arkansas, by force, after capturing it himself, by an officer ranking First Lieutenant, of Maney's brigade.

D. Coleman,
Colonel, commanding McNair's Brigade.

Henry Waldrop,
A. A. A. General.

REPORT OF COLONEL JOHN S. FULTON, COMMANDING BRIGADE.

Headquarters Johnson's Brigade,
September 30, 1863.

Captain W. T. Blakemore, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General:

I have to report the action taken with the enemy by the Forty-fourth, Twenty-fifth, Twen-

ty-third, and Seventeenth Tennessee regiments, composing this brigade, and Company E, of the Ninth Georgia battalion of artillery, a battery of two howitzers and two small rifle pieces, commanded by First Lieutenant W. S. Everett, in an affair at and from Ringgold to Chickamauga Creek, on the seventeenth and eighteenth instant, and at the battle of Chickamauga, on the nineteenth and twentieth instant.

By order from Brigadier-General Johnson, this brigade moved at three P. M. on the seventeenth instant, from its encampment, three miles south of Ringgold, on the Ringgold and Dalton road, in the following order: Twenty-fifth, Forty-fourth, Twenty-third, and Seventeenth Tennessee regiments. On our approaching Ringgold, a supply train on its way to Ringgold had been reversed and was rapidly returning. At this juncture I received an order from General B. R. Johnson to form the brigade in line of battle at the foot of Taylor's Ridge, and throw forward skirmishers to hold Ringgold. The Twenty-fifth Tennessee regiment, being in front, took position on its right flank, to protect the wagons, rapidly moving to the rear. The brigade was formed in line of battle at the foot of Taylor's Ridge, the Forty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Tennessee regiments on the right of the road, and the Twenty-third and Seventeenth Tennessee regiments on the left. A company from each regiment was sent, in charge of Major Davis, to hold Ringgold, with a detachment of Scott's cavalry on my flanks. A section of the battery was placed on my extreme right on elevated ground, where I ordered it to open upon the enemy's battery, posted on the hill above and to the northwest of Ringgold, which had fired two shots into the town. After firing eight rounds I dislodged the enemy, who was pursued by Colonel Scott's cavalry, with a section of Everett's battery, six miles. He (Colonel Scott) having reached their encampment, a few rounds of grape and canister were fired among the enemy's camp-fires, when Colonel Scott, with the section of artillery, retired. The brigade rested on their arms, in line of battle, during the night. Rations were cooked and in haversacks by daylight on the morning of the eighteenth instant, when we took up the line of march to Leek's tan-yard. After marching a short distance, the line of march was changed. The brigade countermarched and followed the enemy in the direction of Chattanooga, and, having reached Keeler's (over-shot) mill, we found that the enemy were near us. The brigade was formed in line of battle and skirmishers thrown forward, together with the left wing of the Forty-fourth Tennessee regiment, under General Forrest, followed by the right of that regiment, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel McEwen, Jr. Lieutenant Everett fired a few rounds on the enemy, under direction of General Forrest. The skirmishers of the seventeenth Tennesee regiment engaged the cavalry pickets of the enemy, killing three men and mortally wounding one. The enemy's skirmishers having been driven back, the Twenty-fifth, Twenty-third, and seventeenth regiments were moved forward, crossing Peavine Creek, some six hundred yards from our first position into and over a corn field where these regiments were drawn up in line of battle. The enemy had taken his position in the corn field opposite, running to a high ridge near the junction of the Graysville and Lafayette, Ringgold and Chattanooga roads. A section of the First Missouri battery, Bledsoe's, having been placed in position on my left by Generals Johnson and Forrest, in rear of the Seventeenth Tennessee (the Forty-fourth was now brought to the right of the Twenty-fifth Tennessee regiment), the firing from this battery drove the enemy from his position, and, after shelling the woods in our front, I again received an order to advance in line of battle. My skirmishers were kept deployed at a distance of two hundred yards, which distance they kept, passing over the ridge (a strong position) and forward to Reed's Bridge, across which the enemy had moved and taken position in the woods beyond. Before reaching the bridge, Reed's, the Seventeenth Tennessee was detached and sent by General Forrest to the left to attack a force of the Federals at their principal encampment. Before gaining this position, however, the enemy fled. The skirmishers of the Twenty-third Tennessee, whilst approaching Reed's Bridge, became engaged, and the Twenty-third Tennessee regiment voluntarily pushed forward with a yell and drove the enemy from the bridge before it could be destroyed. Here the Twenty-third Tennessee had five men wounded, one of whom, Private A. Melton, color-bearer, when obliged to give up his colors, called upon his successor to carry them forward "ahead of every thing else." Skirmishers were immediately sent over the bridge and deployed, followed by the Forty-fourth, Twenty-fifth, and Twenty-third Tennessee regiments, which filed to the right some three or four hundred yards, through a corn field. The enemy now opened a battery upon the bridge, one of its shells wounding Lieutenant Hastings, of the Seventeenth Tennessee, which regiment was returning to rejoin the brigade and crossed the bridge under the enemy's fire of artillery. A section of First Missouri (Bledsoe's) battery, of the reserve artillery, opened fire and drove the enemy's battery from its position.

The brigade moved forward in line of battle, changing direction to the right, and moved in line to Alexander's Bridge, where we were halted and remained for the brigade on our left (Gregg's) to come up.

Gregg's brigade moved forward, followed by Johnson's, which after marching some six hundred yards, the Forty-fourth Tennessee was detached to guard our wagon train. Having marched some two and a half miles by the flank, Gregg's brigade became engaged with the enemy. We changed front forward on left company, left battalion, and moved up on line with other troops on our left, and rested on our arms

during the night, one-third of the men being required to be awake, and skirmishers deployed in our front.

Saturday, September nineteenth. Early this morning a detail of intelligent men was made, five from each regiment, to reconnoitre the enemy's line. They reported to me, about ten A. M., the enemy one and a quarter miles distant and in our front. The Forty-fourth Tennessee took its position on the right of the brigade, and the line of the brigade conformed to that of Gregg's, on our left, and Robinson's, on our right, which encompassed the top of a low ridge. The firing commenced on our right about eight A. M., and continued along the line until Cheatham became engaged.

About one P. M., the skirmishers of the Seventeenth Tennessee, as well as those of Gregg's brigade, were driven in. A general engagement was now commenced on our left, the left companies of the Seventeenth Tennessee participating by firing obliquely to the left. At this time Everett's battery was placed behind the extreme left of the Seventeenth Tennessee, the fire of which drove the enemy back at this point.

Shortly after, the command to move forward was given, the left regiment to touch to the right until we reached the road, when the right would move slowly, that the left may come up to the road, thus to change direction slightly to the right. But this order was not fully carried out. We did not advance exceeding seven hundred yards, when the enemy opened fire upon us, and we became hotly engaged. The enemy had planted a battery, which struck about the centre of the Forty-fourth Tennessee regiment, and which opened upon our advancing lines, throwing, in rapid succession, grape and canister, and supported by infantry, whose fire of small arms was heavy, well directed and disastrous. The entire brigade now became hotly engaged (during this engagement Major Lowe, of the Twenty-fifth Tennessee, was wounded), which lasted nearly an hour, the enemy making a stubborn resistance, gradually retiring, he having advantage of both under-growth and ground, but finally was driven across the Chattanooga and Lafayette road. The Seventeenth Tennessee regiment, on approaching the road, was halted and opened fire on the enemy in its front, distant about two hundred yards, in a woodland; the under-growth having been cut out, the enemy were in full view. The Forty-fourth Tennessee was still engaging the enemy. The Twenty-fifth and a portion of the Twenty-third Tennessee regiments crossed the road, the other portion of the Twenty-third being with the Seventeenth Tennessee, and gained the cover of the woods, and moved to the flank of the enemy's battery, still firing upon the right of our line, at right angles with my present line, gaining a fence, under which they opened fire, delivering several volleys, ceased firing, re-loaded, and charged the battery, driving the enemy's gunners from their guns and killing several horses. The caissons were moved off by the enemy, leaving their pieces on the field. The Seventeenth Tennessee and the other portion of the Twenty-third Tennessee had crossed the road, having driven the enemy. The Seventeenth Tennessee here lost an officer killed, two officers and about twenty men wounded. In this engagement the Forty-fourth Tennessee suffered heavily, sustaining a loss in killed and wounded. A portion of Robinson's extreme left (Texans) and part of the Forty-fourth Tennessee had been driven back, but about two-thirds of the Forty-fourth Tennessee crossed the road. Here Lieutenant-Colonel McEwen, Jr., five company officers (Captain Jackson one of the number), and fifty men were wounded and six men killed; among the latter, Sergeant T. A. Johnson, color-bearer, one of the bravest of the brave. Lieutenanant-Colonel McEwen, Jr., however, remained with his command, after he was wounded, until obliged to retire from exhaustion. Lieutenant-Colonel Tillman, of the Forty-first Tennessee, Gregg's brigade, rode up to me at this time, stating that the enemy was moving down the road to my left, and would soon be in my rear; doubting the report, I suggested that our lines were connected on our left, and that a flank or rear movement could not, therefore, be made by the enemy. I, however, found that but two regiments of Gregg's brigade had moved up with my line, and they had retired. Lieutenant-Colonel Tillman had thus lost sight of his regiment, and, in company with him and Lieutenant-Colonel Floyd, I started to the road to satisfy myself as to the correctness of this report; I had gone but a short distance when I discovered a column of the enemy moving by the flank in direction of the Seventeenth Tennessee regiment, which rapidly gained its rear. I heard distinctly the commander's halt, front, and immediately their fire was pouring upon our flank and rear. Here a general stampede ensued, so sudden and unexpected was the movement. We fell back two hundred yards in rear of the Chattanooga and Lafayettte road and re-formed. In this flank movement of the enemy, the Seventeenth Tennesse regiment lost eleven officers, including their gallant Major Davis, who was wounded, and about sixty men taken prisoners. The brigade built temporary breastworks, behind which it remained during the night, in line of battle. Our skirmishers, under Major McCarver, were directed to occupy the Chattanooga and Lafayette road, but this could not be done, the lines on my right and left not conforming thereto; I, however, instructed them to be posted within fifty yards of the road.

Sunday, twentieth September. This morning my line connected on the right with McNair's (Gregg being in the next line in our rear), and General Hindman on the left. Everett's battery took position between my left and the right of Law's. Shortly after nine A. M., the skirmishers, under direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Ready, fell back to the breastworks, bringing those of the enemy after them. A well-directed fire from

the Forty-fourth Tennessee drove the enemy's skirmishers back, leaving many of his dead in our front. My skirmishers were sent forward and very soon they became again engaged, the enemy using his artillery. About ten A. M., a general advance was ordered. The left of the brigade had advanced but a short distance before it became engaged with the enemy, the battle having commenced some three hours earlier on the right. The Seventeenth Tennessee recrossed the Chattanooga and Lafayette road, when it engaged the enemy. The whole line crossing the fence, the engagement became general. Here we passed a house and garden, and through an open field (it was here that Lieutenant-Colonel Ready, of the Twenty-third Tennessee, was wounded, while rushing forward). On entering the house, cribs, &c., many prisoners, both officers and men, were captured, and here some fine swords were taken from the enemy. Among the prisoners was the Colonel of the One Hundredth Illinois regiment. The enemy's breastworks, which had been built at intervals along his line, offered but a poor assistance to the enemy to resist our advance, which was not only vigorous and spirited, but irresistible; we found he had a second line of breastworks about eighty yards in rear of the first, made of logs and rocks, behind which they scarcely halted.

Having driven the enemy from his first position, we halted and re-formed our line in front of a dense, low, pine thicket. Pressing forward, we carried this position, the dead of the enemy showing how good a protection he had calculated on. We passed through a stubble wheat field to a ravine, until we reached the edge of a long, open field, the upper side of which being a bald hill, or high ridge, upon which the enemy had a heavy battery of nine guns, firing upon the advancing line on our right. Without delay the field was entered and charged across, and the ridge, or bald hill, was gained, the troops on our right having flanked and silenced the enemy's battery, which was captured. Everett's battery was immediately brought up, together with Dent's, which were opened upon the enemy's retreating wagon train, moving on the Chattanooga and Crawfish Spring road. I sent forward skirmishers to reconnoitre the hollow beneath, where was found the enemy's telegraph running up the Chattanooga and Crawfish Spring road, several hundred yards to our right. This telegraph was cut down, and several prisoners captured; among the prisoners a staff officer of Major-General Vancleve, and one of General Rosecrans' escort, with their horses and equipments. The effect of our batteries was fine, the enemy rapidly retreating. A mounted officer was dispatched to the troops on our left, who had not kept pace with us, with a flag, to show and direct them to our position; they had already opened one of their batteries upon our position, *having taken us for the enemy;* their battery was playing on us from the second hill on our left. Having received orders to move to the hollow beneath, we here changed direction to the right, which threw the line almost perpendicular to the former; this done, I marched forward, entering a corn field. Here we began to see the fruits of our rapid and continuous movements. Three twelve-pounder brass field pieces and three caissons were here captured, and nine four-horse wagons, one of which, with four mules attached, was immediately sent to the rear; three of these wagons were laden with ordnance, the others with commissary and quartermasters' stores. Some of the wagons were capsized, so utter was their confusion. I immediately found that my left flank was exposed, and sent forward a heavy line of skirmishers to cover both my left flank and front, and advanced the brigade to the hill-side, and there halted. I also sent forward a party to reconnoitre the front in advance of the line of skirmishers, who, after an absence of an hour, reported the enemy about one and a half miles distant and advancing. In the meantime, I had learned of the enemy having skirmishers, or that occasional shots were fired from the hill on my left, running almost at right angles with the one on which I was then resting. I sent immediately a company of skirmishers to reconnoitre the hill —a few prisoners were brought in. In the corner of the field, below my present position, was Villette's house, where the enemy had practised many outrages; the ladies were found lying under the floor of the house, and, when they saw the enemy retreating and our line advancing, they broke from their concealment, shouting and clapping their hands for joy. A delay of an hour occurred whilst waiting the movement of some troops to our left, under orders from General B. R. Johnson. During this time, however, a portion of Dent's and Everett's batteries were placed in position in front of the brigade, and we replenished our cartridge-boxes from the enemy's three wagons, laden with ordnance, which had been captured here.

Between one and two o'clock P. M., I advanced to the top of the hill, when we were again upon the enemy, who opened a heavy fire upon us. Our batteries and small arms here were engaging the enemy some fifteen minutes, when our line fell back some fifteen paces under cover of the hill, Gregg's command, on my right, giving back at the same time—this, no doubt, having started the backward movement. Just at this time the two brigades (Day's and one other) were marching in line of battle by the Villette house, to connect with our lines on the left, they changing direction to the right for this purpose. A general advance was ordered, and our batteries opened simultaneously. The firing was heavy, and the enemy's massive columns were hurled against our wearied heroes. Again our line fell back. Two brigades now came up in our rear; one of these brigades moved in advance of us, and, receiving the enemy's fire, fell back behind us again. My line was again ordered forward, the enemy being within fifty yards of the batteries and but one piece firing. Here commenced

a most desperate struggle for the possession of this ground—Missionary Ridge. The battle raged furiously, and the tide of success wavered in the balances; charge after charge was repulsed, only to rally and charge again. Again our line fell back, and the untiring, indomitable and determined officers rallied again their fast thinning ranks, and again moved forward. Here officers and men behaved most gallantly; appeals to love of home and wounded comrades, and the peril of the moment, were made, and never did men rush forward more eager, daring, desperate and defiantly. The enemy's treble lines now began to show that our fire was terribly effective upon them. Our cartridge-boxes had been replenished as required, and still we were nearly out. Again more ammunition was supplied, and the conflict continued hot and heavy. The enemy was now slowly giving back, hard pressed by our now shattered remnants. Another charge, with the yells of the men and cheers of the officers, and forward we pressed, only to discover the victory was ours, and the enemy in full retreat. This series of engagements lasted four long hours, during which Johnson's brigade won many laurels and an imperishable name. At this moment, another brigade came up, and was loudly cheered forward, but the enemy made no resistance. Our ammunition being (with but few exceptions) exhausted, the brigade halted and re-formed, moved forward, about-faced, marched back some distance and formed on Manigault's line. Here we sent forward pickets to cover our front, and several prisoners were brought in. The men rested on their arms during the night, having on this day won a victory—one of the most glorious of the war. In this engagement Everett's battery fired very effectively, being in the thickest of the fight. This evening he had one sergeant and two men wounded, and five horses shot down by the enemy during the engagement. This morning, whilst firing on the enemy's wagon train, he dismounted one piece of the enemy's artillery. He fired four hundred and twenty-eight rounds during the four days' fight. I commend the officers of this battery to favorable consideration for their fidelity and good conduct whilst under fire.

I have also to notice the services of Lieutenant Dent, commanding Robinson's battery, whose fire upon the enemy was incessant and effective. Both officers and men behaved most coolly and gallantly during the day.

I have great pleasure in attesting to the gallant and efficient conduct of the following officers:

Lieutenant-Colonel McEwen, Jr., commanding the Forty-fourth Tennessee regiment, wounded.

Lieutenant-Colonel Snowden, commanding the Twenty-fifth Tennessee regiment.

Colonel Keeble, commanding Twenty-third Tennessee regiment.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ready, of Twenty-third Tennessee regiment, wounded.

Major Lowe, ——— Tennessee regiment, wounded.

Lieutenant-Colonel Floyd, commanding Seventeenth Tennessee regiment.

Major Davis, of Seventeenth Tennessee regiment, wounded and captured.

Adjutants Cross, Gwynn, and Fitzpatrick, and Lieutenant Gregg, who came into action on Sunday morning. Also, Captain Terry, who after he was wounded on Saturday evening, rendered me valuable service on Sunday. Mention may also be made of the following: Private (Ex-Captain) Ridley, of the Twenty-Third Tennessee, who went into the action and fought manfully with a gun, setting a good example to all. Lieutenant Vernon, of Company B, Twenty-third Tennessee, for the manner in which he bore himself.

On entering the action this command numbered as follows, viz.:

Commands.	Officers.	Men.	Aggregate.
Forty fourth Tennessee..	29	266	294
Twenty-fifth Tennessee...	25	120	145
Twenty-third Tennessee..	28	153	181
Seventeenth Tennessee...	27	222	249
Battery.....	—	—	85—954

The number of the different regiments of this command was thus small, the barefooted men having been sent to the rear by order from the division commander, as follows:

Forty-fourth Tennessee, fifty-six men; Twenty-fifth Tennessee, twenty-three men; Twenty-third Tennessee, twenty-six men; Seventeenth Tennessee, one hundred and twenty men and two officers. Aggregate, two hundred and twenty-seven.

My loss was as follows:

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.	Captured and Missing.
Forty-fourth Tennnessee..	10	88	15
Seventeenth Tennessee ...	..	61	60
Twenty-third Tennessee..	8	77	13
Twenty-fifth Tennessee...	10	45	1
Battery.....	..	3	..
Total	28	274	98
Aggregate....400.			

I have much pleasure in stating that there was no straggling, either by officers or men. I have also great satisfaction in noticing the medical appointments of this brigade, for promptness and efficiency. The care and treatment of the wounded by Dr. Jackson, of the Forty-fourth Tennessee, acting Brigade Surgeon; Dr. Plummer, of the Twenty-third Tennessee; Dr. Harris and Dr. Jones, of the Seventeenth Tennessee; and Drs. Fryar and Jackson, of the Twenty-fifth Tennessee. Also, I return my thanks to Dr. John Gannaway, who volunteered his services and rendered himself useful in a

high degree. I think I may say that the wounded of this brigade received attention second to no other brigade in the army commanded by General Bragg.

I have to report the following capture of ordnance and ordnance stores: Three hundred Enfield rifles (in train); two thousand two hundred Enfield rifles, different calibres, stacked on field; total, two thousand five hundred. Sixty-nine thousand Enfield cartridges, calibre five hundred and seventy-seven (in train); thirty-five thousand Enfield cartridges issued from enemy's wagons; fifty thousand piled with small arms; total, one hundred and fifty-four thousand.

Of the wagons captured this day, nine (four-horse) were secured by this brigade; one, with team, for ordnance train. Also, three wagon loads of accoutrements.

Lieutenant Lake, in charge of the division ordnance train, has made the foregoing report to me. The *pro rata* of this capture is due to Johnson's brigade, viz.: One hundred Enfield rifles, seven hundred and thirty-three guns, different calibre, stacked on the field; total, eight hundred and thirty-three. Twenty-three thousand Enfield cartridges; eleven thousand six hundred and sixty-six issued from the enemy's wagons; sixteen thousand six hundred and sixty-seven piled with small arms; total, fifty-one thousand three hundred and thirty-three. One wagon load of accoutrements I have also to enumerate. Three brass twelve-pounder cannon; three caissons for cannon, captured on the field on Sunday evening by this brigade as mentioned in this report, one of which was hauled to the rear by Lieutenant Everett, commanding my battery, "attached." I would also state that one of the above guns was manned by men (artillerists) from the Seventeenth and Twenty-third Tennessee regiments, and used, under direction of Lieutenant Dent, with good effect on the enemy during the four hours' contest on Sunday evening. I have also to mention Ordnance-Sergeant J. F. Baxter, wounded on the field. This man is an untiring officer and faithful to his trust.

The provost guard, under Lieutenants Ewing and Orr, rendered invaluable service. I am pleased to notice the conduct of Private Turner Goodall, of the provost guard, who, in the thickest of the fight on Sunday evening, seeing the men all so gallantly at work and hard pressed, came up with his gun and fought manfully through the hottest of the fight, and by words of encouragement to his fellow-soldiers and example, did his whole duty as a soldier and provost guard.

The capture of prisoners by this brigade in the two days' fight exceeds six hundred men and officers sent to the rear. I would also mention Lieutenant Ewing, of the provost guard, from the Seventeenth Tennessee regiment, who, finding that the officers of his company had all been placed *hors de combat*, asked permission and returned to take command of his company on Sunday morning. He is a worthy and promising officer.

I have to report the following articles captured from the enemy, and secured by Dr. John W. Templeton for the use of the brigade: one two-horse spring ambulance, seventy dozen bandages, two pounds opium, and other medicines, one dozen sets splints. Dr. Templeton is the Hospital-Steward of the Forty-fourth Tennessee regiment.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN S. FULTON,

Colonel, commanding Johnson's Brigade.

REPORT OF COL. D. C. GOVAN, COMMANDING BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS LIDDELL'S BRIGADE,
MISSIONARY RIDGE, October 6, 1863.

Captain G. A. Williams, Assistant Adjutant-General:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this brigade in the recent battle of Chickamauga, on the nineteenth and twentieth of September, 1863:

On the eighteenth of September, about two o'clock P. M., I, with General Walthall's brigade, forming a reserve division, commanded by General Liddell, in Walker's corps, arrived in front of Alexander's Bridge, on West Chickamauga Creek. I was ordered to move forward, supporting General Walthall's brigade in an attack to gain possession of the bridge, then held by the enemy. Walthall's brigade, moving forward, soon engaged the enemy, who occupied a dense thicket on the south side of the creek, near the bridge. After firing several volleys he hastily retreated, leaving us in possession of the bridge, which was, however, rendered useless, the planks having been removed. The brigade was not actively engaged, excepting the skirmishers, who were thrown forward on General Walthall's left to the creek, sustaining a loss of one killed and five wounded. Moving down the creek one and a half miles, I crossed at Byron's Ford, and bivouacked about one mile from the ford.

Early on the morning of the nineteenth, I moved in a south-westerly direction, and halted in a position nearly opposite Alexander's Bridge. While here, awaiting orders, it was ascertained that a heavy column of the enemy was moving around to turn our right flank. Wilson's and Ector's brigades were already engaged, and were being heavily pressed. About twelve o'clock M., I was ordered to move forward to their support. Walthall's brigade, being on my right, formed line of battle facing northward. Moving forward about one-quarter of a mile, I engaged the enemy, and succeeded by a charge in driving him from his position, capturing his artillery and three or four hundred prisoners. Pursuing this advantage, I encountered his second line, which was also routed after a hotly contested fight, again leaving his artillery in our possession. I had previously been cautioned by General Liddell to look well to my left flank,

as a force of the enemy were reported advancing in that direction. I accordingly instructed Colonel Gillespie, commanding the left regiment of the brigade, to protect his left by throwing skirmishers well on his flank, and, in case of being attacked from that direction, to change his front so as to meet the attack. About the time, or just previous to engaging the third line, a heavy column of the enemy moved on my left flank. The left regiment, according to my instructions, changed front so as to meet it, while the other regiments of the brigade engaged him in front. This overwhelming force, which attacked my left flank and had gained my rear, forced me to retire; which movement I executed by the flank, in order to prevent the capture of a portion of the brigade, and reformed my line in rear of General Cheatham's division, then moving into position. It was afterwards ascertained that we had engaged the whole of General Thomas' (Federal) corps. The two lines which I had driven back in confusion were composed in part of the Fifth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Twenty-first regiments regular United States army. Four hundred men and some officers belonging to these regiments were captured and safely sent to the rear, together with three Parrott guns, composing a part of Loomis' battery, designated as Company H, Fifth artillery, United States army; which were sent to the rear under charge of three men belonging to the First Louisiana regiment, and delivered to Major Palmer, Chief of Artillery, Walker's corps. One piece, a James rifle gun, captured by the Second and Fifteenth Arkansas regiments, was carried to the rear by hand by men belonging to that regiment, and delivered to Lieutenant Shannon, commanding Swett's battery. The other pieces from which the enemy had been driven (the horses attached to them being either killed or disabled), we were compelled to leave behind when we retired. This engagement lasted nearly two hours.

In the fight many gallant officers and privates were killed and wounded. Among the first was Colonel L. Featherston, commanding Fifth and Thirteenth Arkansas regiments, who fell, mortally wounded, while gallantly leading his regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel Baucum, commanding Eighth Arkansas and First Louisiana regiments, severely wounded, while carrying the colors at the head of his regiment. Late in the evening I was ordered to the extreme right, on the prolongation of the line occupied by General Cheatham, facing westward, with Walthall's brigade on my left. Moving forward I ascertained that there was no considerable force of the enemy in my front, the firing indicating him to be in the immediate front of General Walthall in force. My left regiment, the Sixth and Seventh Arkansas, gave way, and moved about two hundred yards to the rear, being, as they informed me, enfiladed and fired into. While in this position, one of our own batteries in rear fired over my lines and slightly wounded several of my men. The fire from the battery continuing, I moved a short distance to the rear, and by the left flank, and formed on Walthall's right, in which position we remained during the night. I was informed by several officers that there was a battery immediately in front of the last position occupied, which the enemy had abandoned, and which I might have had conveyed to the rear if I had ascertained the fact sooner.

On the morning of the twentieth, about nine o'clock, I was ordered to take a position on the extreme right, supporting Major-General Breckinridge's division. About noon I was ordered to advance, making a slight change of direction to the left. While executing this movement, I was ordered by one of Lieutenant-General Polk's staff officers to the assistance of Gist's brigade, which was heavily pressed by the enemy. The officer could only give me general direction as to where General Gist's brigade was engaged. Encountering no enemy in my front, I commenced changing direction to the left, so as to meet the enemy, who had opened fire upon me from the edge of the woods immediately on my left flank. This movement, difficult at all times, was executed across an open field, in an exposed position and under a heavy fire of musketry. The brigade pressed gallantly forward, and succeeded in driving the enemy from his position in the woods. Continuing this circular movement to the left, the left regiment pressed up to an angle of the enemy's fortifications, while the right continued to press the enemy across an open field, until I had reached a position forming an acute angle with our original direction, and almost immediately in rear of a line of the enemy's strongest breastworks.

Gist's brigade, which I had not succeeded in finding, had fallen back about the time I had engaged the enemy. I was thus completely isolated from our line. I would here state that Walthall's brigade had previously been sent to another part of the field.

The enemy, being massed in heavy force behind his breastworks, and perceiving the interval between my left and the right of our lines, made a vigorous attack upon my left, and succeeded, by enfilading and overlapping it, in breaking it, and thus, while the right was driving the enemy, it was in danger of being captured. This was only obviated by the greatest efforts on the part of the regimental commanders, who, after they had succeeded in halting their commands, moved by the right flank, and, by a circuitous route, succeeded in rejoining the command. I immediately re-formed the line and was placed in position in the front line, on the left of General Walthall's brigade.

About five o'clock P. M., orders were received to advance. There was a considerable interval between me and Jackson's brigade, next on my left, which fact was represented to General Liddell, and by him communicated to General Walker. The movement commenced, I, in obedience to orders, conforming my movements to those of General Walthall's brigade, next on my

right, I passed on, moving square to the front, two regiments passing through an open field, through which I had executed the change of direction to the left in the engagement last mentioned. The skirmishers in my front developed no enemy.

But before reaching the Chattanooga and Lafayette road, Captain Stringfellow, First Louisiana, in command of the skirmishers, reported to me that he saw two of the enemy's batteries in position, about two hundred and fifty yards from my left flank, on either side of the above mentioned road, supported by a long line of infantry. Jackson's brigade, which was some distance to my left and rear, having engaged the enemy in his front, had halted, thus leaving my left entirely unprotected. Upon examination I found the report of Captain Stringfellow to be correct, discovering the enemy to be in position as he represented. It was impossible, from the disposition of the enemy's force, for me to extricate myself by changing my front. Reaching a position just across the road, and on a line with General Walthall's left, I ordered the men to lie down. The enemy immediately opened fire from the two batteries on my left, and also with small arms; while two batteries, afterwards ascertained to be on General Walthall's right, opened almost at the same time. Under this heavy and galling fire, no other alternative was left but to withdraw the brigade as speedily as possible, to save it from annihilation or capture. The brigade retreated in considerable confusion, but was promptly rallied, and re-formed some three or four hundred yards in rear.

Shortly afterwards, I again advanced to a position near the house of McDonald, on the Chattanooga and Lafayette road, and some distance to the right of the position from which I had just been driven. Just about this time the enemy's line gave way in every quarter, and the battle was ended.

The loss in officers and privates was very heavy, being over fifty per cent. of the number carried into the fight, a report of which is herewith forwarded.

For instances of individual bravery and skill among company officers and privates, I refer you to reports of regimental commanders. Among the field officers, Lieutenant-Colonels John L. Murray and R. F. Harvey, the former commanding the Fifth and Thirteenth Arkansas regiments, the latter the Second and Fifteenth Arkansas regiments, were particularly distinguished for their gallantry during the engagements; and by their coolness and skill, on two occasions, saved their regiments from capture. I strongly recommend the first (Lieutenant-Colonel Murray) to the favorable consideration of the President as one particularly distinguished for his skill and gallantry in the battle of Chickamauga. To Lieutenant-Colonel Harvey, then commanding the Second and Fifteenth regiments, an equal meed of praise is due, but, unfortunately for the service, this gallant officer died on the 30th instant of disease contracted by over-exertions on the field, lamented by all who knew him.

To Captain Fletcher, Company A, Thirteenth Arkansas regiment, I am indebted for saving one piece of Swett's battery, which had several horses disabled, and, but for his timely efforts, would have fallen into the enemy's hands. He seized the colors of the Second and Fifteenth Arkansas regiments and rallied enough men to drive back the enemy, whose skirmishers were within a short distance of the gun.

Lieutenant Shannon, commanding Swett's battery, handled it with distinguished skill and gallantry, and most effectively, whenever an opportunity offered.

The members of my staff, Lieutenant J. G. Warfield, Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General; Lieutenant W. L. Laurie, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Lieutenant G. T. Snowden, Aid-de-Camp, rendered me efficient aid, and were always at my command.

In conclusion, as an act of justice to the brigade which I had the honor to command, and with which I had been associated in all the hard-contested battles in the West, from Shiloh to this last memorable one, I beg leave to state that they never failed to drive the enemy in their front, and advanced each time with a single line, unsupported, and with one or the other of my flanks unprotected, and that on no former occasion was their courage and endurance more severely tested, nor in any previous battle did they ever exhibit more determined bravery and gallantry.

I am, Captain, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

D. C. GOVAN,

Colonel, commanding Brigade.

REPORT OF COL. R. Q. MILLS, COMMANDING BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS DESHLER'S BRIGADE,
MISSIONARY RIDGE, October 6, 1863.

Captain J. A. Buck, A. A. General, Cleburne's Division:

CAPTAIN: In compliance with orders from general headquarters, I herewith submit my report of the action of this brigade in the battle of the nineteenth and twentieth ultimo:

This brigade, composed of Colonel Wilkes' Texas regiment, Colonel Mills' Texas regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Hutchinson's Arkansas regiment, and Captain Douglas' Texas battery, under command of Brigadier-General James Deshler, moved about three o'clock P. M., on Saturday, the nineteenth ultimo, from a point near the junction of the Lafayette and McLemore's Valley roads, towards our extreme right, and in rear and parallel with our line of battle. About half-past four o'clock P. M., we crossed a branch of the Chickamauga and moved directly and hastily forward to the extreme right, where the battle seemed raging with great fierceness. After passing, for some time, through swarms of stragglers, prisoners, and wounded, we arrived on the line, and were formed, facing our

right flank, and moved forward to the attack, and proceeded some two hundred yards, when the brigade was halted and ordered to lie down. In a few minutes we rose up and advanced to the front, and occupied some time in getting our position.

It was now getting dark, but the firing was still heavy and constant between the enemy and some brigade opposite our extreme right and perpendicular to our line. We were not more than a hundred yards from his right flank, where he had a battery of artillery firing at the troops on our right. We remained here some minutes. Brigadier-General Deshler did not know but that the battery was our own, and declined to advance on it in the dark; it being then impossible to distinguish friend from foe. The contest in front of our right was soon decided in favor of the Confederates. The enemy was beaten back, and there was a temporary lull on the field. The skirmishers from Colonel Wilkes' regiment, in moving forward in the dark, came suddenly and unexpectedly on the enemy's line and were captured. He, in attempting to retreat from the brigade in his front, as unexpectedly came upon Colonel Wilkes' regiment on his flank, where he was greeted with a volley that killed and wounded several and caused them to propose a surrender, when about one hundred prisoners, including several officers, were taken, together with two stand of colors from the Seventy-seventh Illinois and the Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania, by Colonel Wilkes' regiment, against which the main force came. Some dozen or more were taken, each, by Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson and Lieutenant-Colonel Hutchinson. In this affair Colonel Wilkes also recaptured his skirmishers. This, with the exception of occasional firing by our skirmishers, terminated the fighting for the night. We moved back several hundred yards and formed line of battle, and lay down to rest till morning. In the night our line was again re-formed, throwing forward our left wing.

About half-past nine o'clock, on the morning of the twentieth, we moved off a short distance by the left flank, and then advanced to the front, passing through a portion of Major-General Cheatham's division. Having gained an open ground several hundred yards in our front, the enemy began, from one or two long-range guns, to shell our line, and, as we approached nearer, gave us several shots of canister, killing and wounding some fifteen or twenty men. We finally arrived, about ten o'clock A. M., on the ground we were ordered to occupy. We found it being hastily abandoned by the troops who were occupying it before we came. We advanced to the crest of the hill, some two hundred yards in front of the enemy's barricades and breastworks, when he opened a destructive fire upon us. We were ordered to lie down and commence firing. We now began the engagement in earnest, but at great disadvantage. The enemy was behind his defences, and we without cover; he had two batteries of artillery, we had none, our own battery not being able to get a position to give us aid. Captain Semple's splendid battery was on the hill with us, and on the extreme left of the brigade, when we moved up and occupied the hill. It fired a few shots, and was moved to some other portion of the field. The enemy poured on our heads, from ten o'clock A. M., to half-past one o'clock P. M., a constant and terrible fire of artillery and musketry, which we returned with our rifles, with the same constancy and stubborness.

About twelve o'clock M., our supply of ammunition began to give out, and I sent a courier to Brigadier-General Deshler to inform him of the fact and to ask where we could get more. A few minutes after, I saw him coming towards my right, some forty paces from me, when he was struck by a shell in the chest and his heart literally torn from his bosom. I may pause here to pay a passing tribute to the memory of our fallen chief. He was brave, generous, and kind, even to a fault. Ever watchful and careful for the safety of any member of his command, he was ever ready to peril his own. Refusing to permit a staff officer to endanger his life in going to examine the cartridge-boxes to see what amount of ammunition his men had, he cheerfully started himself to brave the tempest of death that raged on the crest of the hill. He had gone but little way when he fell—fell as he would wish to fall—in the very centre of his brigade, in the midst of the line, between the ranks, and surrounded by the bodies of his fallen comrades. He poured out his blood upon the spot watered by the best blood of his brigade. Among the host of brave hearts that were offered on the altar of sacrifice for their country on that beautiful Sabbath, there perished not one nobler, braver, or better than his. He lived beloved, and fell lamented and mourned by every officer and man of his command. He sleeps on the spot where he fell; on the field of his country's victory and glory, surrounded by the bodies of those who stood around him in life, and lie around him in death. A messenger from Colonel Wilkes' regiment informed me of the fact soon after General Deshler fell, also that Colonel Wilkes was wounded and not with the regiment.

Just at this critical juncture our ammunition was exhausted, and no one knew where to get more. I assumed command, and, supposing that the enemy would advance as soon as the firing ceased, I ordered bayonets fixed and the cartridge-boxes of the wounded and dead to be gathered, and one round from them to be given to each man to load his gun with, and hold his fire in reserve to repel an assault. While this order was being executed, Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, who was on the left of my regiment, sent Lieutenant Graham to inform me that the four left companies had not been firing. Being at too great a distance from the enemy, he had the good sense to prevent them from wasting their ammunition unnecessarily. I immediately ordered those four companies to the front on the

hill, where the fire was hottest, and ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson to take command of them and hold the hill at every hazard, till I could get ammunition and have it distributed. I soon procured the ammunition, and refilled my cartridge-boxes. At this time, one of the Major-General's staff came to me and informed me that I was ordered to hold the hill on which the brigade was formed; that I was not permitted to advance, and must not retire if it were possible to hold my position. I therefore moved my command at once some twenty or thirty paces to the rear of the crest, and on the side of the hill, for cover, leaving a body of sharpshooters behind trees on the top of the hill to keep up a fire with the enemy. The enemy's fire soon slackened down to a contest between the skirmishers. At the same time, he advanced a line of skirmishers toward the open space between my command and Brigadier-General Polk, on my right. I soon received information from Lieutenant-Colonel Coit, then commanding Wilkes' regiment, that the enemy was moving around my right flank in force. I ordered him to throw out a company of flankers and engage them. In less than twenty minutes I was informed that our skirmishers were retiring before the enemy. I immediately ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Hutchinson to reinforce the skirmishers with one company from his regiment, which was promptly done. Still hearing of this flank movement, I ordered Captain Kenard, of Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson's regiment, to reinforce the other two companies with his, take command himself of these companies, put his men under good cover, and hold the enemy in check at all hazards. He very promptly moved with his company to the ground, assumed command of the three companies, repulsed the enemy's skirmishers, and held his position without a serious struggle. A straggling fire was kept up between the enemy and my sharpshooters till late in the evening, when the advance of our left wing caused him to abandon his works and take to his heels. The troops of my command, both officers and men, behaved with the greatest bravery, coolness, and self-possession during the whole engagement. They advanced with a steady step, under a heavy fire of shell, canister, and musketry, to their position, and held it with firmness and unwavering fortitude throughout the fight. Texans vied with each other to prove themselves worthy of the fame won by their brothers on other fields, and the little handful of Arkansas troops showed themselves worthy to have their names enrolled among the noblest, bravest, and best of their State. It is scarcely possible for them to exhibit higher evidences of courage, patriotism, and pride on any other field. They were not permitted to advance, and would not retire, but, as brave men and good soldiers, they obeyed the orders of their General and held the hill. Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, Lieutenant-Colonel Hutchinson, and Major Taylor, remained constantly on the line, handled their commands with ability, and conducted themselves gallantly through the entire action.

I most respectfully refer you to the reports of subordinate commanders for particular acts of gallantry, lists of casualties, etc. I feel it my duty, however, to record here the names of Lieutenant Matt. Graham, of Company C, Tenth Texas regiment, and private William McCann, of Company A, Fifteenth Texas regiment, as worthy of honorable mention for their conduct, more than ordinarily gallant, on the field. Lieutenant Graham several times volunteered, and insisted on being permitted, to carry orders and messages up and down the line, where he was constantly exposed to the thickest fire. His services were highly beneficial to Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, who speaks of him in terms of highest praise. Private McCann was under my own eye. He stood upright, cheerful, and self-possessed in the very hail of deadly missiles, and cheered up his comrades around him. After he had expended all his ammunition, he gathered up the cartridge-boxes of the dead and wounded, and distributed them to his comrades. He bore himself like a hero through the entire contest, and fell mortally wounded by the last volleys of the enemy. I promised him during the engagement that I would mention his good conduct, and, as he was borne dying from the field, he turned his boyish face upon me, and, with a light and pleasant smile, reminded me of my promise.

The First Texas battery, commanded by Captain James P. Douglas, belonging to Deshler's brigade, was not engaged on the nineteenth. On the twentieth it followed the brigade as far as the open field, covered thickly with felled timber, when, finding it impossible to follow us further, Captain Douglas moved towards our left flank and came into another field, where he was exposed to the enemy's fire. He immediately opened fire on Douglas from two of his batteries, killing one of his horses and knocking down one of his wheels. He extricated himself from this position, and, by order of Major-General Cleburne, took position on the hill with the brigades of Brigadier-Generals Wood and Polk, in rear of my line. He afterwards moved down on the right to where Brigadier-General Polk was warmly engaging the enemy, disengaged his horses and carried his pieces by hand in the very face of the foe. He fired a few rounds at sixty or eighty yards distant from the enemy, advancing his pieces by hand with the line of Brigadier-General Polk's brigade. The enemy were soon routed and fled the field. Too much praise cannot be bestowed on Captain Douglas and the officers and men of his battery, for their gallant conduct. They were not engaged for any considerable length of time, but the very short quarters at which Captain Douglas threw down the gauntlet soon decided the enemy to yield the field to a battery that could charge a brigade of infantry behind their rifle-pits. Captains J. L. Hearne and B. F. Blackburne, and

Lieutenant G. B. Jewell, of the brigade staff, are entitled to my thanks for promptly reporting to me when Brigadier-General Deshler fell, and for their valuable services rendered to me during the engagement.

The aggregate strength of the brigade, including the battery, on the morning of the nineteenth, was seventeen hundred and eighty-three. I lost in the fight fifty-two killed and three hundred and sixty-six wounded.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

R. Q. MILLS,
Colonel, commanding Brigade.

REPORT OF COL. J. H. LEWIS, COMMANDING BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS HELM'S BRIGADE,
BEFORE CHATTANOOGA, September 30, 1863.

Major James Wilson, Assistant Adjutant-General:

SIR: The death of Brigadier-General B. H. Helm makes it my duty, as senior Colonel commanding, to report the part taken by this brigade in the actions of the nineteenth and twentieth instant:

On the afternoon of the eighteenth the brigade took position on the right bank of West Chickamauga, near Glass's Mill, except the Second Kentucky regiment deployed on the opposite side as skirmishers.

On the morning the nineteenth the command, with Cobb's battery, crossed the stream. About nine A. M., a shot from the battery into a house about five hundred yards off, where the enemy's skirmishers were concealed, excited an immediate response from the enemy farther to the right, followed soon after by a spirited artillery duel, in which Slocum's battery, which had, in the meantime, crossed over, participated; resulting in silencing the enemy. Soon, however, another battery of the enemy opened fire still farther to the right. In a short time, orders having been issued from Major-General Breckinridge to that effect, the whole command re-crossed the stream and moved to the Chattanooga road. Fourteen men of this brigade were killed and wounded on this occasion. From thence we moved towards Chattanooga, to the position held by and relieving Deas' brigade. About two hours after nightfall we reached a point one half mile beyond Alexander's Bridge, where we bivouacked until three A. M., twentieth instant, when we were ordered to our position in line of battle one mile or more beyond and on the left of the division. We got into position and were ready to advance by about half past five A. M. Soon after getting into position, one company from each regiment was, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Wickliffe, of the Ninth Kentucky, deployed two hundred and fifty yards in advance as skirmishers. Becoming hotly engaged with the enemy, the Fourth Kentucky regiment, Colonel Nuckolls commanding, was ordered to their support. The skirmishers of the enemy, having the advantage in position, showed determination and kept up a rapid fire, wounding several officers and men before the advance of the brigade. Amongst others severely wounded was Colonel Nuckolls, by which his command was thereafter deprived of the services of this gallant and meritorious officer.

Between nine and ten A. M., the brigade advanced in the following order, viz.: the Sixth Kentucky, Colonel Lewis, and the Second Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel Hewitt commanding, on the extreme right and left respectively. The Fourth Kentucky, Major Thompson, and Ninth Kentucky, Colonel Caldwell commanding, on the right and left centre respectively, and the Forty-first Alabama, Colonel Stansell commanding, in the centre.

The enemy's fortifications did not extend the entire length of the brigade front, but the Sixth and Fourth, and seven companies of the Forty-first, in advancing, passed to the right and clear of them, consequently fighting the foe on something like equal terms. This portion of the command, with but a momentary halt and no hesitation, steadily drove the enemy back to within one hundred yards of the Chattanooga road, when I discovered a battery of two Napoleon guns fifty yards beyond the road. Here I also discovered, for the first time, what the thicker growth of timber had prevented me from observing before, that the left of the brigade was considerably in rear. Neither a halt nor retreat at this time was, in my judgment, proper or allowable. So the command was given to take the battery, and it was done. Soon after crossing the road, Captain McCawley, of General Helm's staff, informed me that the General had been mortally wounded, near the position occupied by the left of the brigade.

The right not being then under fire, I left it in command of Lieutenant-Colonel Cofer, and started, on Captain McCawley's horse, to where the other portion of the brigade was. I encountered considerable difficulty in re-uniting the brigade, on account of the distance apart and the want of staff aid—having no one with me but Captain Hewitt, and not him immediately, on account of the loss of his horse. Although not personally cognizant of the behavior of the left of the brigade previous to assuming command, yet I am warranted by information of an entirely satisfactory kind in speaking of it. Justice to the living, and affectionate memory of the dead, make it a duty and a pleasure to allude to their conduct in terms of praise.

After advancing about four hundred yards, they encountered a heavy musketry and artillery fire in front, and also an enfilading fire from the left, which the failure of the command to their left to advance simultaneously with Breckinridge's division enabled the enemy to pour into their ranks. Besides, I am satisfied they were subjected to a fire on their right from the two pieces subsequently captured by the right of the brigade. Yet three several times this devoted little band charged the enemy, securely fortified and in a favorable position. Though necessarily repulsed, their frightful loss shows their constancy and bravery. Here the kind, pure, brave

Brigadier-General B. H. Helm was mortally wounded, heroically doing his duty. Lieutenant-Colonel James W. Hewitt, in advance of his regiment, and showing a devotion and daring entitled to the highest commendation, was killed. Colonel Caldwell was severely wounded, as usual, in his place, doing his duty. Robert C. Anderson, Color-Sergeant Second Kentucky, was killed upon the enemy's works, after having planted his colors thereon. Here fell many another officer and soldier, life images of Kentucky's old, renowned, and valiant soldiers—true men. The blood of her sons also attests Alabama's chivalry and manhood.

As soon as I ascertained the exact position of the left, I caused it to be moved by the right flank to the right, and in advance of where it was then, till the right of the brigade, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Cofer, was met—he having re-crossed the road—when I formed the brigade in line of battle nearly perpendicular to the road and to the enemy's works. About this time I received orders from Lieutenant-General Hill, through one of his staff, not to advance, but to await the arrival of fresh troops. In a short time Gist's brigade attacked the enemy, passing through my lines for that purpose, but was drawn back. Ector's brigade then advanced, but being unable to drive the enemy from his works, finally fell back, leaving this brigade again to confront the enemy. My men, though at this time nearly exhausted by several hours' hard fighting, and suffering greatly for want of water, remained firm, no one leaving his place. After the repulse of the other two brigades, I was ordered to retire several hundred yards to the rear to rest the men, which was done in good order and without confusion.

Late in the afternoon Walker's division advanced against the enemy, a portion of it attacking the same point the left of this brigade did in the morning. Being with my command about four hundred yards in rear at that time, and out of sight of the combatants, I could not see with what result the attack was made, though a short time thereafter Cheatham's division moved to the attack over the same ground—Bright's brigade, of that division, passing through the lines of this brigade. After some time had elapsed, and it appearing from the firing that no appreciable advantage had been gained, this brigade was moved forward, being on the left of the division. In advancing, it was discovered that the centre brigade of the division lapped on mine, making it necessary for me to oblique to the left about two hundred yards. It was also necessary to advance the left more rapidly than the right wing, in order to get on a line more parallel with the enemy. Both these difficult movements were executed while marching through the woods, without any material derangement of the line, the command moving steadily and unfalteringly forward.

Upon arriving in sight of the enemy's fortifications, the brigade rapidly charged upon them, driving them from their stronghold in confusion towards the Chattanooga road. The pursuit was continued across an open field till the road was reached, when, it being dark, I judged it prudent to halt, which met the approval of Lieutenant-General Hill, who, close after us, immediately came up. In passing through the fortifications a number of prisoners were captured and sent to the rear. We also captured two pieces of artillery in the road, which our rapid pursuit of the enemy prevented their carrying off—one Napoleon and one James rifle. The nature of the ground—wood-land—prevented Cobb's battery performing the important part in this action he and his gallant company have so often done, and knew so well how to do—though, in the afternoon, one section, under the gallant and faithful Gracey, was placed in position under General Forrest. I refer you to Captain Cobb's report for an account of their behavior on that occasion.

I am not enabled to state the exact number engaged in the actions of the nineteenth and twentieth. But one thousand three hundred is the approximate number of officers and men, including Cobb's battery. The whole number of casualties was sixty-three killed and four hundred and eight wounded.

It would afford me pleasure to designate, by name, the officers and men who so gallantly fought on these two occasions, for, with very few exceptions, all did their duty. But to do so would swell this report to an inordinate size. However, I feel it to be my duty, and take pleasure in the performance of it, to call attention to the conduct of the field officers of the different regiments. Lieutenant-Colonel Cofer, in command of the Sixth, after I took command of the brigade; Major Clark, of the same regiment; Major Thompson, in command of the Fourth, after Colonel Nuckolls was wounded; Captain Millett, senior Captain, acting field officer, of the same regiment, and Major Nash, in command of the seven companies of the Forty-first Alabama, all came under my observation. In each I remarked constancy, gallantry, and coolness. In the afternoon, Colonel Stansell, of the Forty-first; Lieutenant-Colonel Wickliffe, in command of the Ninth, after Colonel Caldwell was wounded, and Captain Gillam, acting field officer, of the same regiment, attracted my notice, and but confirmed the good account I had of them in the morning. Captain Lee, of the Second Kentucky, though too unwell to endure the fatigue throughout the day, acted as field officer with his accustomed bravery in the charges made by the left in the morning.

It is the highest praise I can possibly bestow on the officers of the brigade, to say they proved themselves, in nearly every case, worthy of their commands.

Of the staff of Brigadier-General Helm, I take pleasure in bearing testimony in behalf of, and making special mention of, Captain Fayette Hewitt, Assistant Adjutant-General. As soon as he was enabled to do so, he reported to me, and throughout the entire action, after the death

of General Helm, as well as previous thereto, as I learn, he displayed coolness, gallantry, and judgment.

Captain G. W. McCawley, Assistant Inspector-General, promptly reported to me the wounding of General Helm, as before stated, at which time I got from him his horse, not having my own with me, when he returned to where General Helm was wounded, and remained with him. I am reliably informed that previous thereto he was in his place on the left, and acted bravely and efficiently.

Captain Helm, acting Commissary Subsistence, though not compelled to do so, went on the field and did his duty.

Leonard W. Herr, Aid-de-Camp, and Lieutenant John Pirtle, acting Aid-de-Camp, reported to me as soon as the necessary attention to their wounded General allowed, and thereafter acted gallantly and faithfully.

I inclose the several reports of regimental and the battery commanders, together with a list of killed and wounded.

I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JOSEPH H. LEWIS,
Colonel, commanding Helm's Brigade.

REPORT OF COL. R. L. GIBSON, COMMANDING BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS ADAMS' BRIGADE,
September 26, 1863.

Major James Wilson, Assistant Adjutant-General, Breckinridge's Division:

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this brigade, composed of the Thirteenth and Twentieth Louisiana volunteers, Colonel Leon Von Zeniken; Sixteenth and Twenty-fifth Louisiana volunteers, Colonel D. Gober; Nineteenth Louisiana volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. Turner; Thirty-second Alabama volunteers, Major T. C. Kimball, and Austin's battalion Louisiana sharpshooters, with Slocomb's battery Washington artillery, in the battle of Chickamauga, from the moment that I assumed command:

I was engaged in re-forming my regiment when, informed that Brigadier-General D. W. Adams having been disabled by a wound, the command of the brigade devolved upon me. I at once ascertained that there was no support on the left of the brigade, and ordered the command to form on the rear slope of the hill upon which Captain C. H Slocomb's battery of Washington artillery was posted. This having been accomplished, I left the line in charge of Colonel Daniel Gober, Sixteenth and Twenty-fifth Louisiana volunteers, and hastened to the left, where I observed several regiments falling back. One of these I at once moved to the support of the line on the left, and directed Captain Labouisse, A. I. G., to bring up another, retreating through the woods, to the same position. With Captain Slocomb's assistance, he succeeded in placing two regiments in position. They were believed to belong to the brigade on our left. The Thirty-second Alabama volunteers and Austin's battalion, which had not participated in the charge, but had been ordered to oppose the advance of a column of the enemy's infantry, reported on our right and rear, were called in and directed to join the brigade on the right of the battery. It was deemed best to occupy ourselves with the enemy in sight, leaving the cavalry reports for after-consideration. These dispositions had just been made, when Major-General Breckinridge reached us, and approved them.

Captain Slocomb, whose battery had made a noble stand, here informed me that he was considerably cut up, and that he thought it best to retire for a short time. He was ordered to retire. In less than two hours he again reported ready for action, having equipped himself, in nearly everything needed, from the battery taken by the brigade in approaching, for the first time, the main Chattanooga road.

I do not think it worth while to speak of the different lines of battle taken before again engaging the enemy. About four o'clock, by order of Major-General Breckinridge, the brigade was posted about three hundred yards in rear of Major-General Walker's command (General Liddell's division). The line was here subjected to some shelling, and it became apparent that our forces in front were unsuccessful in their attacks. About sundown General Breckinridge turned to me and directed that I should advance, and at the same time execute a change of direction to the left. I had advanced but a short distance, when I saw, from what was occurring in front of us, that our lines in advance were giving away under an enfilading fire from the left, and I therefore gained as much ground to the left as time and circumstances would permit. The movement forward was made slowly, carefully, and with all possible precision. We passed over several lines of troops as we advanced, who cheered us heartily. The extreme right regiment was detained a few moments by one of these lines, as will be seen by referring to Colonel Gober's report. I determined, if possible, not to fire a gun, and it is due to the officers and men of the brigade that I should state that we passed through a new line engaging the enemy without halting and without firing, and continued to advance, moving in perfect order, until within a few paces of the enemy, when a charge was ordered and the whole command, with a terrific yell, sprang upon him. A volley was received without effect; a second, from the barricades of trees and stones, checked us for an instant; but the officers rushed forward again, the men followed, and the enemy, panic-stricken, fled in the wildest disorder. Not a moment was to be lost; the brigade was urged forward, its centre resting near the fence which separated the corn field from the woods, the left extending into the field. We thus continued to drive the enemy from every position for three-quarters of a mile, until we had entered the woods about seventy yards from the Chattanooga road, where it was halted. Darkness was now rapidly approaching.

I had sent Lieutenant Ware, of the staff, to the left, and he reported to me that there were no troops on that flank; confirming the statement of Colonel Von Zeniken, commanding the left regiment. I had gone myself to the right. I deemed it proper therefore to halt and to rectify the alignment, which had become broken in the pursuit, before advancing further. This had just been finished when Lieutenant-General Hill rode up and, observing that we had done well, directed that I should throw forward skirmishers for the distance of a mile. A few moments afterwards I was ordered by Major-General Breckinridge to bivouac near the main Chattanooga road, and I accordingly moved back to this position. Many prisoners remained within our lines during the charge, but no attention was paid to them: they numbered probably three or four hundred.

The position stormed was held by a brigade of United States regulars, under Brigadier-General King. The enemy's dead and wounded marked the track of the brigade. Many hundreds of small arms were found upon the field next morning. A battery was taken by the Thirteenth and Twentieth Louisiana, but the gallant manner in which the remainder of the brigade behaved entitles them to share in the credit of the capture.

In the night our skirmishers, under Captain E. M. Dubroca, Company B, Thirteenth and Twentieth Louisiana, sent in thirty prisoners, among them several officers; and Major T. E. Austin's battalion brought in fifty more next day. The brigade halted victorious at night on the very ground whence it had recoiled at midday.

I would respectfully refer the Major-General commanding to the reports of subordinate commanders for the parts their commands bore in the battle.

Among the officers, Colonel Daniel Gober, Sixteenth and Twenty-fifth Louisiana, and Colonel Leon Von Zeniken, Thirteenth and Twentieth Louisiana, were conspicuous for courage and skill. All the officers and men behaved with commendable gallantry. Major C. H. Moore, Sixteenth and Twenty-fifth Louisiana; Major T. C. Kimball, Thirty-second Alabama; Captain H. A. Kennedy, Nineteenth Louisiana, who commanded in the evening charge, and Captain E. M. Dubroca, Thirteenth and Twentieth Louisiana, showed themselves officers well fitted to handle troops on the field. The report of Captain C. H. Slocomb, Washington artillery, shows how large a share his command bore in the engagement. I cannot speak in terms too high of the bearing of the officers and men of this battery. The skill of the former is only equalled by the bearing of the latter.

Our valor-inspiring Chief of Artillery, Major Graves, of Major-General Breckinridge's staff, fell, mortally wounded, in the arms of Captain C. H. Slocomb. He fell, where his heroic soul desired, on the battle-field, among those who loved him, and in the arms of a brave comrade.

But our success was not without heavy loss. Our chivalrous commander, Brigadier-General D. W. Adams, was wounded in the charge of the morning, and fell into the hands of the enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. Turner, Nineteenth Louisiana, was wounded, and the brave Major Loudon Butler, of the same regiment, breathed his last at the head of his regiment. Of General Adams' staff, I am indebted for valuable services to John W. Labouisse, A. I. G., who was ever prompt and efficient, and to Lieutenants E. M. Scott and G. S. Yerger, likewise, for zeal and bravery. Nor should I omit to pay a special tribute to the soldierly bearing of Lieutenant S. L. Ware. He is entitled to much credit for his conspicuous gallantry. The gallant Adjutant-General, Captain E. P. Guillet, was already wounded. Major M. Hanly, A. Q. M., and Major W. V. Crouch, A. C. S., have, throughout the campaign, discharged their duties with fidelity and promptness.

The brigade entered the action with one hundred and twenty officers, and lost in killed and wounded thirty-three; with twelve hundred enlisted men, and lost in killed, wounded, and missing, three hundred and ninety-six. It drove the enemy from two batteries which fell within our lines, only six guns of which, however, upon investigation, were positively taken by officers of the command. About six hundred prisoners were likewise captured during the battle. It only ceased the pursuit of the enemy at night and under orders. One hour more of daylight had added largely to our captures.

I have the honor to remain,

Yours, very respectfully,

R. L. Gibson,

Colonel, commanding.

Report of the Effective Strength of the several Regiments composing Adams' Brigade, carried into the Battle of Chickamauga, on each day of the battle.

Command.	Name of Commander.	19th September.			20th September.		
		Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Total.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Total.
13th and 20th Louisiana regiment,	Colonel Leon Von Zinken,	.....	.....	.....	34	255	289
16th and 25th Louisiana regiment,	Colonel D. Gober,	.....	.....	.....	26	293	319
19th Louisiana regiment,	Lieut.-Col. R. W. Turner,	.....	.....	.....	33	317	350
Austin's battalion,	Major T. E. Austin,	.....	.....	.....	9	90	99
32d Alabama regiment,	Major T. C. Kimball,	.....	.....	.....	18	127	145
Slocomb's battery,	Captain C. H. Slocomb,	6	120	126	5	107	112
Total,	.....	6	120	126	125	1,189	1,314

The infantry of this brigade was not engaged in the battle of September 19th.

Respectfully submitted,

R. L. Gibson,
Colonel, commanding.

REPORT OF COLONEL J. H. KELLY, COMMANDING BRIGADE.

Headquarters Third Brigade, Preston's Division,
In the Field fronting Chattanooga,
September 25, 1863.

Captain: I have the honor to submit the following as a report of the operations of the brigade under my command in the battle of the nineteenth and twentieth instant:

The night of the eighteenth instant I bivouacked, with three regiments of the brigade (the Sixty-third Virginia, Major French commanding, having been detached the day before as a guard to the division ordnance train), on the right bank of the Chickamauga. At daylight, on the morning of the nineteenth, I was ordered to cross the Chickamauga at Dalton's Ford, and at about eight o'clock I formed line of battle in a corn field, on the left of Brown's brigade, Stewart's division, and three hundred yards in rear of Gracie's brigade, the Fifty-eighth North Carolina, Colonel J. B. Palmer commanding, forming the right; the Fifth Kentucky, Colonel H. Hawkins commanding, the left, and the Sixty-fifth Georgia, Colonel Moore commanding, the centre of my line. Here the brigade was subjected to a brisk cannonade from the enemy's batteries. At about eleven o'clock I was ordered to move by the right flank about four hundred yards, when I again formed line of battle, and remained in position during the remainder of the night and day, being occasionally shelled. At this point the Sixty-Third Virginia, less two companies detached as guard for division ordnance train, reported to the command at about three o'clock P. M.

At about seven o'clock, on the morning of the twentieth instant, the brigade was moved by the left flank about three hundred yards and posted on an eminence, as a support to three batteries of Major Leyden's battalion of artillery. From this position I threw out four companies of skirmishers, in charge of Lieutenant-Colonel Edmund Kirby, Fifty-eighth North Carolina. He moved to the front and left, and reported the enemy moving to the right. At one o'clock I was ordered to leave the Sixty-fifth Georgia as a support to the above-named batteries, and move by the right flank and form line of battle five hundred yards in rear of Gracie's brigade and conform to its movements. While the line of battle was in process of formation, I discovered that Gracie's brigade was moving by the right flank on the Chattanooga road. I therefore moved by the right flank five hundred yards to the right of that road and parallel with it. After marching in this direction about one and a half miles, I was halted and ordered to form line of battle to resist an attack from the front or the left flank. This disposition was made, and I remained in position until about half-past three o'clock P. M.—the enemy meanwhile actively shelling me. At this time I was ordered to move by the left flank, and, having marched three-fourths of a mile, I was ordered to form on the left of Gracie's brigade. While this was being executed I was ordered to make an oblique change of direction to the right and to advance. I had advanced but a short distance when I was subjected to the enemy's fire. The enemy was posted on a heavily wooded ridge, from which he had several times repulsed other troops of our army. The approach to him was over a succession of hills, with intervening depressions, each hill to the front being somewhat more elevated. The brigade, under fire of the enemy, moved steadily to the front three or four hundred yards, holding its fire until within very short range of the enemy, the right being no more than fifteen or twenty, the centre about forty, and the left about sixty yards distant, when our first fire was de-

livered. After a desperately contested fight of half an hour, I succeeded in gaining the hill, from which the enemy made three unsuccessful attempts to dislodge me by assault. However, owing to the conformation of the ground, the Fifty-eighth North Carolina was exposed to a galling fire from the front and both flanks, and, after losing about half its numbers, was compelled to fall back to a position of greater security. Just before this falling back, Lieutenant-Colonel Edmund Kirby, gallantly cheering his men, fell, pierced by four bullets—Major Dula having been wounded early in the engagement. At this juncture I was indebted to Brigadier-General Anderson for a reinforcement of one regiment from his command. Colonel Palmer, the only field officer with the regiment, was here wounded, but still continued in command. After exchanging fires with the enemy for about an hour and a half, I determined to attempt to dislodge him by assault, and for this purpose transferred the Fifty-eighth North Carolina from the right to the left of my line and moved forward, swinging somewhat to the right. When I arrived at the base of the hill, the enemy was heard to cry, "We surrender, we surrender." I immediately stepped to the front, my horse having been previously killed, and called upon the officer who seemed to be in command, and demanded that if he proposed to surrender he should lay down his arms. He came to the front and said, "Wait a minute." I replied, "No, sir; lay down your arms instantly, or I will fire upon you," and turned to my command; but before I could give the command "ready," he poured upon it a terrific fire, which, on account of its suddenness, threw the brigade for the instant into confusion, but it rallied and was re-formed within thirty yards of this position. I am confident that the enemy intended to surrender, and that his fire was drawn by an unauthorized shot from his ranks. Finding that my ammunition was almost exhausted, I sent to the rear for reinforcements or a supply of ammunition. At this juncture I met Colonel Trigg, commanding brigade, and informed him of the position of the enemy, asking him, at the same time, to co-operate with me in his capture. He agreed, and formed his line on my left, with the intention of swinging the whole force to the right. Just as the movement was begun, I was notified by one of his staff that the Brigadier-General commanding division wished to see me, and I repaired at once to where he was stationed in the field. During this temporary absence the enemy surrendered to Colonel Trigg. Immediately after the surrender, a force, supposed to be of the enemy, opened a heavy fire, which created considerable confusion, in which a large number of the enemy were making off. Colonel H. Hawkins, of the Fifth Kentucky, here captured two hundred and forty-nine prisoners, including two Colonels, one Lieutenant-Colonel, and a number of company officers. About this time I rejoined the command, and turned over to Lieutenant-Colonel Wade, of the Fifty-fourth Virginia, to be taken to the rear, my prisoners, except the three field officers, who were sent to division headquarters in charge of one of my staff. The night being far advanced, I made arrangements to replenish my supply of ammunition, and went into bivouac on the hill which the brigade had so gallantly won.

It would not be proper for me to close this report without tendering my thanks to the members of my staff and the officers commanding the regiments for valuable assistance rendered in handling the troops, and bearing testimony to the gallant conduct of the officers and men composing the command. It was the first time that most of them had ever been under fire, yet they acted with the coolness and courage of veterans. Fighting against a superior force, posted in an apparently impregnable position, they moved steadily forward, beat and captured the enemy, and slept in his strong place. When all did their duty so well, it seems almost invidious to make particular mention of any one; yet I must be allowed to speak of the gallant conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel E. Kirby, Fifty-eighth North Carolina; Captain C. H. Lynch, Sixty-third Virginia; Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. Connor, Major William Mynhier and Adjutant Thomas H. B. Cork, Fifth Kentucky, and especially Captain J. Desha, Fifth Kentucky, who, although painfully and severely wounded early in the action, remained at the head of his company until the enemy was defeated.

I took into the fight an aggregate of eight hundred and fifty-two, and lost, in killed and wounded, three hundred and three, and twenty-six missing.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. H. KELLY,

Colonel, commanding Brigade.

REPORT OF COLONEL R. C. TRIGG, COMMANDING BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS TRIGG'S BRIGADE,
September 26, 1863.

Captain J. L. Sandford, Assistant Adjutant-General:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part borne by my brigade in the battles of the Chickamauga, on the nineteenth and twentieth instant:

By order of Brigadier-General Preston, commanding division, I crossed the Chickamauga, at early dawn, the morning of the nineteenth, and formed line of battle near Hunt's house, on the prolongation of Brigadier-General Bate's line. Whilst occupying this position the enemy threw shot and shell into my lines from a battery on the right. The Sixth regiment Florida volunteers (Colonel Findley) lost one lieutenant, one sergeant, and one private killed, and two privates wounded. I promptly moved the brigade forward so as to get the cover afforded by the opposite hills.

About twelve o'clock M., by direction of Bri-

gadier-General Preston, I moved my brigade by the right flank and re-formed on the crest of a ridge about half a mile north of Hunt's house. As soon as the line was formed, I deployed the First regiment Florida cavalry (dismounted), Colonel Maxwell, as skirmishers, three hundred yards in advance, and covering the entire front of the brigade. This regiment soon became engaged with the enemy's infantry in a corn field and the woods to the right of the field. It kept up quite a brisk fire for more than two hours, when the right was driven in by a destructive fire of grape and canister from a battery in the field. At this time I was ordered to reinforce General Hood and move in the direction of the firing. The firing was on my right. I moved by the right flank until met by a staff officer, who came to conduct me to the point where General Hood needed support—the position held by General Benning's brigade. At his instance I moved by the front. Soon after I was met by another staff officer, who claimed my support for General Robertson's brigade. I continued my movement by the front until I came near a corn field, in which the enemy had a battery, protected by earthworks, near the Chattanooga road, and supported by a long line of infantry drawn up in the field, and in rifle-pits and woods on the right and left of the battery. The enemy was advancing when I first discovered him, and had passed about one-third the length of the field. The troops that had won the wooded ridge outside of the field, and on my right, were falling back in some confusion. The advance of the enemy and the falling back of our troops seemed to effect some change in the mind of the officer conducting me. He requested me to halt until he could learn precisely what position I was to take. While thus halted and under the enemy's fire, General Robertson appeared and hurriedly informing me that his line was very much weakened and would be beaten back unless quickly reinforced, indicated the direction in which I should move. I obliqued to the right until I supposed that my right was opposite to his left. This brought the front of my brigade to the corn field fence. All this while I had been under a most destructive fire of the enemy's artillery, and, at this time, he concentrated upon me the fire of his whole force in the corn field and in the timber around it. I had not, as yet, fired a single gun. I reserved my fire until I reached the fence. At the first volley the enemy broke in confusion to the left and rear. Seeing his confusion, I ordered my brigade to charge before he could rally. The Sixth Florida regiment gallantly responded, leaping the fence and dashing forward to the crest of the ridge, forcing the enemy's broken line to seek the nearest cover on the right, left, and rear. This regiment regained the ridge, which I am informed was won and lost more than once during the day, cleared the corn field of all the infantry, drove nearly all the gunners from the battery, and would have certainly captured it but for a lamentable interference with my command.

When the order to charge was given, I was on the right with this regiment. The order was not promptly conveyed to the other regiments of the brigade, and they failing to conform to the movements of the Sixth Florida, it got from one hundred and fifty to two hundred yards in advance. Having gained the crest of the ridge, I discovered, for the first time, that the other regiments of the brigade were not up with the Sixth Florida. I immediately started to bring them up, but had gone but a short distance, when I perceived them crossing the fence and moving forward in good order. I returned to direct the movements of the Sixth Florida. When these regiments had reached the second fence, I discovered that they were being moved by Brigadier-General Robertson across the field by the right flank and in rear of the Sixth. Finding that this regiment would not receive support from the rest of my brigade, and it being exposed to a terrible fire from the front and left (the enemy having in part recovered from his panic), I withdrew it below the crest of the ridge, and unwillingly relinquished the capture of the battery, which a few minutes before I had regarded as almost accomplished. For such was the disposition of my brigade that when the charge was ordered, two regiments and half of another on my left overlapped the enemy's battery and supports, and, when withdrawn from the field, they were moving rapidly to turn his right flank. Night put an end to the conflict.

On the morning of the twentieth, I formed my brigade four hundred yards in the rear of Manigault's brigade, Hindman's division, and was ordered to support him and conform to his movements. About twelve o'clock M., General Manigault moved forward in the direction of the Chattanooga road. I followed. When within four hundred yards of the road, I came up with his artillery, which had halted, and met a good many stragglers from his brigade. I rode forward to the road and found some confusion in the brigade. I informed an officer of General Manigault's staff that I was there to support him and ready to render the support at any moment.

About this time I learned from an officer of General Hindman's staff, that the left of Hindmand's division was threatened and would be turned unless quickly supported (the left of that division having been supported up to that time by Manigault's brigade). I moved my brigade to the Chattanooga road in double-quick time, passing General Manigault's brigade and taking the front. The position of the enemy being indicated to me, I disposed of the troops of my command with a view to offensive movements and ordered the battery assigned me (Captain Peeples, Ninth Georgia battalion) to take position and open fire upon the enemy. The enemy failing to respond, after several rounds, and it being evident that he had withdrawn from that part of the field, I ordered the firing to cease and proposed to advance, when I received orders from General Buckner to move down the Chat-

tanooga road and support Williams' battalion of artillery.

Having remained in support of this artillery until half-past two o'clock P. M., I was ordered by General Buckner to move back on the Chattanooga road, with two of my regiments and one piece of artillery, and select a favorable position to resist the enemy's cavalry, which, it was understood, had passed to our rear, and was moving on that road. Whilst engaged in the discharge of this duty, with the First Florida (dismounted) cavalry and Seventh regiment Florida volunteers (Colonel Bullock) and one piece of artillery, an order from General Buckner directed me to withdraw one regiment and rejoin the division. I withdrew the Seventh Florida, but had hardly put it in motion when I received from General Preston a pressing order to move rapidly to the support of the other brigades of his division (Gracie's and Kelly's).

The cavalry whose movements I had been sent to opppose having proved to be our own, I took the responsibility of ordering the other regiment and the piece of artillery to follow, and communicated the facts to General Buckner as I passed along. The Sixth Florida and Fifty-fourth Virginia regiments had been already put in motion by Colonel Findley, senior Colonel. The battle was raging furiously when I arrived with the Seventh Florida regiment, which I formed on the left of the Fifty-fourth Virginia, which, with the Sixth Florida regiment, was already formed on the left of Kelly's brigade. [The First Florida (dismounted) regiment, on the way to join the brigade, was detached by order of General Preston and sent to the support of General Gracie's brigade]. Without wavering or faltering, these two brigades—marching over some of our own troops, who were lying down—drove the enemy steadily before them, until his right was forced from its strong position, on rough, broken ground, heavily timbered. Driven from this position, he fell back upon a second line of ridges, running perpendicular to the Chattanooga road, which was already held by a strong force and protected by breastworks. When near the base of this ridge, I learned from Colonel Kelly the precise locality of the enemy, and immediately determined, with him, to attempt the capture of that part of his force in my front, my position being particularly favorable for the attainment of this end. I immediately wheeled my brigade to the right, which brought me in rear of the enemy, and moved rapidly up the hill to within twenty paces of his lines. This movement surprised him and resulted in the capture of the Twenty-second Michigan, the Eighty-ninth Ohio, and part of the Twenty-first Ohio regiments, five stands of colors, and over one thousand five hundred small arms, of the latest and most approved pattern.

Darkness having fallen, and the enemy having withdrawn from his position on my left, no further movement was attempted.

Before beginning the movement last alluded to, I requested two brigades, which were in my rear, to form on my left and co-operate with me. They declined, for the want of ammunition. It is greatly to be regretted that they were not in a condition to give me assistance. Had they formed on my left, our line would have extended nearly, if not quite, to the Chattanooga road, and being in rear of the enemy, all his forces occupying the ridge would have been completely cut off.

Where every officer and man did his whole duty, special mention cannot be made.

The fortune of war threw the Sixth Florida regiment into the post of danger, and upon them fell the heaviest loss, and proved them "veterans in their first fight." Their commanding officer is proud to render to them this just tribute of praise, and he is also proud to express his conviction that each other regiment of his brigade is worthy of, and, had circumstances allowed, would have won equal commendation. It is simple justice to my command to say that it beat the enemy everywhere it found him, and carried every position which it assaulted.

I take pleasure in mentioning the following named soldiers, who have distinguished themselves by the capture, each, of a stand of the enemy's colors:

Sergeant L. E. Timmons, Company I, Seventh regiment Florida volunteers, captured the regimental flag of the Twenty-first Ohio regiment.

Private Oscar F. Honaker, Company F, Fifty-fourth Virginia regiment, captured the regimental flag of the Twenty-second Michigan regiment.

Private W. F. Harris, Company F, Fifty-fourth Virginia regiment, captured the State flag of the Twenty-second Michigan regiment.

Private Henderson Hylton, Company A, Fifty-fourth Virginia regiment, captured the regimental flag of the Eighty-ninth Ohio regiment.

Private Franklin Carter, Company K, Fifty-fourth Virginia regiment, captured the State flag of the Twenty-first Ohio regiment.

In this connection, I deem it proper to state that private J. H. M. Moseley, Captain Hays' company, Sixth regiment Florida volunteers, captured a stand of colors, and, while guarding prisoners to the rear, he passed a small party of men, who claimed them. Being unable to distinguish these men in the dark, and supposing them to be a squad detailed by me to receive the captured colors, he gave them up. These colors have not been heard of since. I have no doubt of the truth of private Moseley's statement. It is corroborated by other evidence. These colors were doubtless turned over to men of another command, and sent in to headquarters as captured by them.

Appended is a statement of the killed, wounded and missing of my brigade.

I am, Captain, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

ROBERT C. TRIGG,

Colonel, commanding Brigade, Preston's Division, Buckner's Corps.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN CHARLES SWETT, ACTING CHIEF OF ARTILLERY.

ARTILLERY ENCAMPMENT, LIDDELL'S BRIGADE, October 7, 1863.

Captain S. A. Williams, Assistant Adjutant-General:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of the action of the artillery of Liddell's division, in the battle of Chickamauga, on the nineteenth and twentieth of September, and also in the affair of the eighteenth ultimo:

On the morning of the seventeenth of September, orders were received to be in readiness for an early movement, and, at three P. M., Liddell's division left Lafayette and moved toward the enemy in the direction of Chattanooga.

At nine o'clock, on the morning of the eighteenth, the command reached a point on Chickamauga Creek, near Alexander's Bridge; but finding it in possession of the enemy, line of battle was formed, and an advance made, in order to dislodge them. The enemy had but one battery, which was posted near a house on the opposite bank of the creek, and which fired upon our skirmishers, a few shots passing over the line. Fowler's battery was moved to the front, and placed in position near the road, and on the edge of a cultivated field, from which place a section of his guns were ordered some three hundred yards further to the front by General Liddell, but do not think he fired from the place designated. The battery under command of Lieutenant Shannon was ordered to the right of Walthall's brigade, to a position commanding the one occupied by the Federal battery. After firing a few rounds the enemy disappeared, as our fire was not returned, nor were they again seen at this place. The fire of our battery was ordered to cease, and the command moved forward, crossing the Chickamauga at Byron's Ford, and camping for the night one mile from that stream.

On the morning of the nineteenth, the command moved at an early hour and formed line of battle a mile distant from our camp of the previous night, and advanced to the support of Ector's brigade, which was then engaging the enemy. The Washington light artillery followed Liddell's brigade, and a portion of Fowler's battery following Walthall's, though neither battery could be brought into action, in consequence of the rapid advance of the command, and of the character of the ground over which we were moving. At this place a flank movement of the enemy caused the division to fall back, though Lieutenant Shannon succeeded in firing a few rounds on retiring, in order to check the enemy; but Fowler's battery could not be brought into action (though it was twice halted by myself for that purpose), as the enemy would have surrounded and captured the guns had they been unlimbered. From this position the division moved to the right near a mile distant, and formed line perpendicular to the formation of the morning. From this point the command advanced with the Washington light artillery, on the right of Liddell's brigade, it being the intention to have Fowler's battery follow on the left of Walthall. As the division moved, a Parrott battery opened upon our line, but a few well-directed shots from Fowler's battery either caused it to change position or to retire, as it did not again open. The division advanced but a few hundred yards, when it retired to the base of an inclination that it had nearly gained the summit of, which movement was, in a measure, owing to a battery firing over our line from the rear, and which was connected with Forrest's command. Before the division retired, I moved to the front and left, to secure a position for Fowler's battery, and, while gone, Captain F. permitted one of his Lieutenants to move with the brigade to which he is attached, with the section under his command, which resulted in the loss of one Napoleon gun and fourteen horses, though the gun was subsequently retaken. The Washington light artillery was taken at dusk to a position in the rear and to the right of Cleburne's division, where for about half an hour we shelled the enemy's rear. A caisson and three limbers were taken from the field on the return of the battery to our line, and a James rifle gun and limber was hauled to the company by hand and turned over to Lieutenant Shannon, by members of the brigade. The division remained in this position till the following morning, when it was moved by the left flank about one mile, and afterwards two miles to the right, to a position in the rear and to the right of General Breckinridge, who was then engaging the enemy. The division remained here till ten A. M., when it was ordered forward to the support of General Breckinride. On reaching the rear of General Breckinridge's command, it was found to be falling back, though repeatedly rallied and renewed the contest. The artillery was ordered into position in rear of the line, on the left of the road, and fronting the west, which position we were ordered to defend; but did not find it necessary to fire. Fowler's battery was here moved forward and an effort made to gain a position on the right of our line, which could not be done in consequence of the infantry continually giving way. We remained here till half past four P. M., when we moved against the enemy, the artillery following by the road, and ascending a hill and taking position in an orchard near McDonald's house, and on the right of the division, we succeeded in getting seven guns in position and engaged a Parrott battery of the enemy, distant about eight hundred yards, but had no sooner opened than we were fired upon by a masked battery, two hundred yards from our right flank, and by one one thousand yards from and south-west of us, and by another on the left flank of Liddell's brigade. The effect of our fire was very destructive to the enemy, but we were forced to leave the ground, as the advance of a line of the enemy at a double-quick on the left flank of Liddell's brigade, together with the artillery fire made the position untenable. The

order was given to the artillery not to retire till the last moment, nor until the infantry had fallen back. The artillery reached the base of the hill, when, being flanked by the Federals and a horse shot down in a gun of both Fowler's battery and the Washington light artillery company, Lieutenant Shannon called upon Captain Fletcher, of the Thirteenth Arkansas, who rallied a few men and secured both pieces, which were soon afterwards taken to the rear.

On the morning of the twenty-first, a gun was ordered by General Liddell to the position occupied by us on the previous evening, and soon afterwards both Fowler's battery and the Washington light artillery were ordered to the same place. It soon being discovered we had no enemy in our front, the command moved on the Lafayette and Chattanooga road in the direction of the latter place. A report of the casualties in the artillery of the division has been forwarded.

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES SWETT,

Captain and Acting Chief of Artillery, Liddell's Division.

Doc. 42.

THE BATTLE OF STONE RIVER.*

MAJOR-GENERAL McCOOK'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS, IN CAMP TWO AND A HALF MILES SOUTH OF MURFREESBORO, TENNESSEE, January 8, 1863.

Major C. Goddard, Chief of Staff:

MAJOR: In compliance with telegraphic orders from the General commanding, received at my camp on Mill Creek, five miles south of Nashville, at half-past four o'clock A. M., on the morning of the twenty-sixth of December, 1862, I put the right wing of the Fourteenth army corps in motion toward Nolensville, Tennessee.

The First division, Brigadier-General Jeff. C. Davis commanding, marched at six A. M., upon the Edmonson pike, with orders to move upon that road to Prim's blacksmith's shop, whence it was to march direct, by a country road, to Nolensville.

The Third division, Brigadier-General Philip H. Sheridan commanding, also marched at six A. M., and upon the direct road to Nolensville.

The Second division, Brigadier-General R. W. Johnson commanding (the reserve of the right wing), followed the Third division upon the direct road.

The advance guard of Generals Davis' and Sheridan's columns, encountered the enemy's cavalry about two miles beyond our picket line. There was continuous skirmishing with the enemy until the heads of these columns reached Nolensville.

About a mile beyond the town, the enemy made a determined stand in a defile and upon a range of hills that cross the turnpike at this point, lining the slopes with skirmishers and placing a six-gun battery on a commanding position, endeavoring to repel our advance.

They were attacked in front and their position handsomely turned, by General (Colonel) Carlin's brigade of Davis' division, capturing one piece of their artillery and several prisoners. After taking possession of the defile and hills, the command was encamped.

On the night of this day, I was visited by the General commanding, who gave me verbal orders to move forward in the morning to Triune, seven miles distant, and attack Hardee's corps, supposed to be quartered at that place. At this place I was joined by Brigadier-General D. S. Stanley, Chief of Cavalry, with the First and Second Tennessee regiments and Fifteenth Pennsylvania cavalry.

Preparations were made to move forward at daylight, the cavalry under General Stanley in advance, followed by the Second division under General Johnson.

It having rained all the day previous and the entire night, there was a deep fog, which prevented our seeing one hundred and fifty yards in any direction.

The columns having moved about two miles to the front, they again encountered the enemy, consisting of cavalry, infantry, and artillery. The fog at this time being so thick that friend could not be distinguished from foe, and our cavalry being fired upon by our infantry skirmishers on the flanks—the enemy being conversant with the ground, my troops strangers to it, and, from prisoners captured, having learned that Hardee's corps had been in line of battle since night before. I did not deem it prudent to advance until the fog lifted. I ordered the command to halt until the work could be done understandingly. The fog having lifted at one o'clock P. M., an advance was immediately ordered, driving the enemy's cavalry before us.

On nearing Triune, we found that the main portion of the forces had retired, leaving a battery of six pieces, supported by cavalry, to contest the crossing of Wilson's Creek, which has steep and bluff banks.

The enemy having destroyed the bridge, it was with difficulty that it could be crossed. On the approach of our skirmishers, the battery, with the cavalry, took flight down the Eaglesville road. It now being nearly dark, and a severe and driving rain-storm blowing, they were pursued no further.

Johnson's division crossed, and camped beyond Wilson's Creek, repairing the destroyed bridge.

On the morning of the twenty-eighth, I ordered out a strong reconnoissance, under command of Brigadier-General Willich, to learn whether the enemy had retired to Shelbyville or Murfreesboro. Pursuing seven miles down the Shelbyville road, it was found that the enemy had turned to the left, having taken a dirt road which led to the Salem pike, thence to Murfreesboro.

Leaving the Second brigade of Johnson's

* See page 112 Documents Rebellion Record, Volume 6.

division at Triune, I marched on the twenty-ninth, with my command, on the Balle Jack road, toward Murfreesboro, the road being very bad, and the command did not reach Wilkinson's Cross-roads (five miles from Murfreesboro) until late in the evening.

My command was encamped in line of battle, Sheridan's on the left of Wilkinson's pike, Davis' division on the right of the same road, Woodruff's brigade guarding the bridge over Overall's Creek, and the two brigades of Johnson's division watching the right.

On that evening, believing that the enemy intended giving our army battle at or near Murfreesboro, I ordered the brigade left at Triune to join the command without delay, which it did on the thirtieth.

At one o'clock A. M., on the thirtieth, I received an order from General Rosecrans to report in person at his headquarters, on the Murfreesboro pike, and arrived there at three and a half o'clock A. M., received my instructions, which were that the left of my line should rest on the right of General Negley's division, and my right was to be thrown forward until it became parallel, or nearly so, with Stone River, the extreme right to rest on or near the Franklin road.

My entire command advanced at nine and a half o'clock, and Sheridan's division moving down the Wilkinson turnpike, until its advance encountered the enemy's pickets.

The line of battle was then formed, the left of Sheridan's division resting upon the Wilkinson pike, immediately upon General Negley's right. The remainder of Sheridan's division was deployed to the right, the line running in a southeasterly direction. Davis' division, which had already been deployed, moved up, his left resting upon Sheridan's right, Johnson's division being held in reserve. Our front was covered with a strong line of skirmishers, who soon became sharply engaged with the enemy's sharpshooters and skirmishers.

The line moved forward, but slowly, as the enemy contested stubbornly every inch of ground gained by us. The ground was very favorable to them. They were under cover of heavy woods and cedar thickets. At twelve o'clock M. on the thirtieth, the house of a Mr. Harding came within our lines. From that point I ascertained where the enemy's line of battle was—our skirmishers being then about five hundred yards distant from it.

The right, under General Davis, moved handsomely, but slowly, into position, as the ground over which he had to march was hotly contested by the enemy's skirmishers.

At one o'clock P. M., word was sent to General D. S. Stanley, Chief of Cavalry, that Colonel Zahn, commanding three regiments of cavalry on my right flank, was hard pressed by a superior force. I ordered one brigade of my reserve division to report to General Stanley, who conducted it to the Franklin road. On his approach, the enemy pressing, Colonel Zahn retired, and the brigade was ordered back to its former position.

At two o'clock P. M., a citizen, residing on the Franklin road, and about half a mile in front of the enemy's line of battle, was put under guard by General Stanley. He reported as follows:

"I was up to the enemy's line of battle twice yesterday, and once this morning, to get some stock taken from me. The enemy's troops are posted in the following manner: The right of Cheatham's division rests on the Wilkinson pike. Withers is on Cheatham's left, with his left resting on the Franklin road. Hardee's corps is entirely beyond that road, his right resting on that road, and his left extending toward the Salem pike."

This man was immediately sent to the General commanding, and subsequently returned to me with the report that his information had been received.

I also sent a report to the General commanding, by my Aid-de-Camp, Horace N. Fisher, that the right of my line rested directly in front of the enemy's centre. This made me anxious for my right. All my division commanders were immediately informed of this fact, and two brigades of the reserve division, commanded respectively by Generals Willich and Kirk, two of the best and most experienced Brigadiers in the army, were ordered to the right of the line, to protect the right flank, and guard against surprise there.

At six o'clock P. M., I received an order from the General commanding to have large and extended camp-fires built on my right, to deceive the enemy, making them believe we were massing troops there. This order was communicated to General Stanley, commanding cavalry, and carried into execution by Major R. H. Nodine, Twenty-fifth Illinois, Engineer Officer on my staff.

On the morning of the thirtieth, the order of battle was nearly parallel with that of the enemy, my right slightly refused, and line of battle in two lines.

Two brigades of the reserve reinforced the right of the line, and the Third brigade of the reserve was posted in column about eight hundred yards in rear of the right. On the evening of the thirtieth, Sheridan's left rested on the Wilkinson road, and on the right of Negley's division, and the line then ran in a south-easterly direction, through a cedar thicket, until General Davis' right rested near the Franklin road. Kirk's brigade was on Davis' right. Willich's brigade flanked on a line nearly perpendicular to the main line, forming a crochet to the rear, to avoid the possibilities of my right being turned by anything like an equal force. My line was a strong one, open ground in front for a short distance. My instructions for the following day were received at about six and a half o'clock P. M. on the thirtieth, which were as follows:

"Take strong position; if the enemy attack you, fall back slowly, refusing your right, contesting the ground inch by inch. If the enemy do not attack you, you will attack them, not vigorously, but warmly. The time of attack by

you to be designated by the General commanding."

I was also informed that Crittenden's corps would move, simultaneously with my attack, into Murfreesboro'.

Written instructions were sent by me to each division commander, on the night of the thirtieth, explaining to each what would be required of them on the thirty-first.

At about six and half o'clock on the thirty-first, a determined, heavy attack was made on Kirk's and Willich's brigades, on the extreme right. They were attacked by such an overwhelming force, that they were compelled to fall back.

General Kirk being seriously wounded at the first fire upon his main line, General Willich having his horse killed early in the action, and he falling into the hands of the enemy, the two brigades were deprived of their immediate commanders, and gave way in confusion. Colonel Post's brigade, on the right of Davis' division, and, in fact, my entire line to Sheridan's left, was, almost simultaneously, attacked by a heavy force of the enemy. The attack in front of Davis and Sheridan was repulsed several times; and had not the heavy attacking columns of the enemy on my right succeeded so well, my line could have been maintained, and the enemy driven back to his barricades, which extended from the Wilkinson pike, with but a short interval, three-fourths of a mile beyond the Franklin road. General Sheridan's division was ably manœuvred by him, under my own eye.

As soon as it became evident that my lines would be compelled to give way, orders were given to re-form my line in the first skirt of timber, in the rear of my first position. The enemy advancing so rapidly on my right, I found this impossible, and changed the point of re-forming my line to the high ground in rear of the Wilkinson pike.

Moving to the left of my line, and in rear of Sheridan's division, I here met General Rousseau, in a cedar-wood, posting his division to repel the attack. I then ordered my line to fall still further back, and form on the right of Rousseau. I gave General Johnson orders, in person, to form his division in rear of Rousseau; Rousseau's division having been withdrawn to the open ground in rear of the cedar-woods, the last position became untenable, and my troops were retired to the Nashville pike, where my wing, except Shaeffer's brigade of Sheridan's division, was reassembled and replenished with ammunition. On arriving at the pike, I found Colonel Harker's brigade, of Wood's division, retiring before a heavy force of the enemy. I immediately ordered Roberts' brigade, of Sheridan's division, to advance into a cedar-wood, and charge the enemy and drive him back. Although this brigade was reduced in numbers, and having but two rounds of cartridges, it advanced to the charge, under the gallant Colonel Bradley, driving the enemy back with the bayonet, capturing two guns and forty prisoners, and securing our communication on the Murfreesboro pike at this point. This brigade is composed of the Twenty-second, Forty-second, Twenty-seventh, and Fifty-first Illinois. The Twenty-seventh particularly distinguished itself.

About eleven o'clock A. M., Colonel Moses B. Walker's brigade arrived upon the field, and reported to me for duty. They were assigned to General Sheridan's command, to whose report I refer for the good conduct of this brigade.

On the afternoon of the thirty-first, the right wing assumed a strong position; its left, composed of Walker's brigade, resting near a commanding knoll, the line running nearly north-west along the slope of a ridge, covered with cedar growth, the right resting on the Murfreesboro pike. On the slope strong barricades were erected, which could have been well defended by single lines. The second line, Gibson's brigade (late Willich's), was used as a reserve. The right wing, excepting Davis' division and Gibson's brigade, did not participate in any general engagements after the thirty-first. There was constant skirmishing in my front till the night of the third.

On the fourth, the enemy left his position in front of the right, and evacuated Murfreesboro the night of the same day. On the sixth, the right wing marched to its present camp, two miles and a half south of Murfreesboro, on the Shelbyville pike.

The reports of Generals Johnson, Davis, and Sheridan, division commanders, are herewith inclosed. Accompanying General Johnson's report, you will find the reports of the brigade, regimental, and battery commanders, carefully prepared.

I have been thus particular on account of the commanding General's dispatch to the General-in-Chief, and also from erroneous reports sent to the public by newspaper correspondents. The attention of the General commanding is particularly called to the reports of Colonels Gibson and Dodge; also, to Lieutenant-Colonel Jones' report, who commanded the pickets in front of Willich's brigade.

Captain Edgarton, commanding battery of Kirk's brigade, certainly was guilty of a great error in taking even a part of his horses to water at such an hour. He is in the hands of the enemy, and therefore no report can be had from him at present.

In a strict compliance with my orders, and the knowledge I possessed of the position of the enemy, which was communicated to my superior and the Generals under my command, I could not have made a better disposition of my troops.

On subsequent examination of the field, I found the statements of the citizens referred to in my report correct, as the barricades extended fully three-fourths of a mile beyond the Franklin road. I am well satisfied that Hardee's corps, supported by McCown's division (late of Kirby Smith's corps), attacked Kirk's and Willich's

brigade about the same time Withers' division attacked Davis, and Cheatham's division attacked Sheridan. Cheatham's and Withers' divisions compose Polk's corps.

I was in the rear of the centre of my line when this attack commenced; therefore I did not see all of the columns that attacked and turned my right; but it may be safely estimated that the rebel force outnumbered ours three to one.

After leaving my line of battle, the ground in the rear was, first, open fields; second, woods—then a dense cedar-thicket; and over such ground it was almost impossible for troops to retire in good order, particularly when assailed by superior numbers.

My ammunition train, under charge of my efficient ordnance officer, Captain Gates P. Thurston, First Ohio, was at an early hour ordered to take a position in the rear of the centre of my line. It was then attacked by the cavalry, which was handsomely repulsed by a detachment of cavalry under the direction of Captain H. Pease, of General Davis' staff, and Captain G. P. Thurston, ordnance officer.

The train was conducted safely to the Nashville pike by Captain Thurston, cutting a road through the cedar-wood for the passage of the train.

To Brigadiers R. W. Johnson, Philip H. Sheridan, and Jeff. C. Davis, I return my thanks, for their gallant conduct upon the day of the battle, and for their prompt support and conscientious attention to duty during their service in the right wing. I commend them to my superiors and my country.

To Brigadier-General D. S. Stanley my thanks are particularly due. He commanded my advance from Nolensville, and directed the cavalry on my right flank. A report of the valuable services of our cavalry will be furnished by General Stanley. I commend him to my superiors and my country.

For the particular instances of good conduct of individuals, I refer you to the reports of division commanders.

I cannot refrain from again calling the attention of my superiors to the conspicuous gallantry and untiring zeal of Colonel W. H. Gibson, of the Forty-ninth Ohio volunteers. He succeeded to the command of Willich's brigade, and was ever prompt to dash upon the enemy with his gallant brigade when opportunity permitted. I have repeatedly recommended him for promotion. He has again won additional claims to his reward.

Colonel Harker, commanding a brigade of Wood's division, performed gallant service under my supervision, as also did Colonel Fyffe, of the Fifty-ninth Ohio. They are commended to my superiors.

To my staff—Lieutenant-Colonel E. Bassett Langdon, Inspector-General; Major R. H. Nodine, Engineer Officer; Major J. A. Campbell, Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain Gates P. Thurston, Ordnance Officer; Captain B. D. Williams, Aid-de-Camp; Captain J. F. Boyd, Assistant Quartermaster; Captain O. F. Blake, Provost Marshal; Major Caleb Bates, Volunteer Aid-de-Camp; Captain Horace N. Fisher, Volunteer Aid-de-Camp and Topographical Engineer—my thanks are due for their conspicuous gallantry and intelligence on the field.

My escort, under command of Lieutenant Huckston, Second Kentucky Cavalry, and my orderlies behaved gallantly. When my horse was shot, Orderly Cook, of the Second Indiana cavalry, replaced him with his own.

The officers of the Signal corps were ever ready to perform any service in their line, or as Aids.

The report of Surgeon C. McDermot, the Medical Director of the right wing, is also submitted. Surgeon McDermot's gallantry on the field, and his great care of the wounded, is worthy of great praise. My entire medical corps behaved nobly, except Assistant Surgeon W. S. Fish, of the Third Indiana cavalry, who fled to Nashville. He is recommended for dismissal.

The casualties of my wing are five hundred and forty killed, and two thousand two hundred and thirty-four wounded.

The nation is again called upon to mourn the loss of gallant spirits who fell upon the sanguinary field.

First of these, Brigadier-General J. W. Sill, commanding First brigade, Third division. He was noble, conscientious in the discharge of every duty, brave to a fault. He had no ambition save to serve his country. He died a Christian soldier, and in the act of repulsing the enemy.

Such names as Roberts, Shaeffer, Harrison, Stem, Williams, Reed, Houssam, Drake, Wooster, and McKee, all field officers, and many other commissioned officers, of the right wing, who fell vindicating their flag, will never be forgotten by a grateful country.

All of which is respectfully submitted,

A. McD. McCook,
Major-General United States Volunteers.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS' REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS CENTRE FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
MURFREESBORO, January 15, 1863.

Major C. Goddard, Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff:

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit to the Major-General commanding the Department of the Cumberland, the following report of the operations of that part of my command which was engaged in the battle of Stone River, in front of Murfreesboro. It is proper to state here, that two brigades of Fry's division, and Reynolds' entire division, were detained near Gallatin and along the Louisville and Nashville railroad, to watch the movements of the rebel leader, Morgan, who had been, for a long time, on the watch for an opportunity to destroy the railroad.

Rousseau's, Negley's, and Mitchell's divisions,

and Walker's brigade, of Fry's division, were concentrated at Nashville; but Mitchell's division being required to garrison Nashville, my only available force was Rousseau's and Negley's divisions, and Walker's brigade, of Fry's division, about thirteen thousand three hundred and ninety-five (13,395) effective men.

December 26.

Negley's division, followed by Rousseau's division and Walker's brigade, marched by the Franklin pike to Brentwood, at that point taking the Wilson pike. Negley and Rousseau were to have encamped for the night at Owen's store. On reaching the latter place, Negley, hearing heavy firing in the direction of Nolensville, left his train with a guard to follow, and pushed forward with his troops to the support of Brigadier-General J. C. Davis' command, the advance division of McCook's corps, Davis having become hotly engaged with the enemy posted in Nolensville and in the pass through the hills south of that village. Rousseau encamped, with his division, at Owen's store, and Walker, with his brigade, at Brentwood. During the night a heavy rain fell, making the cross-road almost impassable, and it was not until the night of the twenty-seventh that Rousseau reached Nolensville with his troops and train. Negley remained at Nolensville until ten A. M. on the twenty-seventh, when, having brought his train across from Wilson's pike, he moved to the east, over an exceedingly rough by-road, to the right of Crittenden, at Stewartsboro, on the Murfreesboro pike. Walker, by my orders, retraced his steps from Brentwood and crossed over to the Nolensville pike.

December 28.

Negley remained in camp at Stewartsboro, bringing his train from the rear. Rousseau reached Stewartsboro on the night of the twenty-eighth. His train arrived early next day.

December 29.

Negley's division crossed Stewart's Creek, two miles south-west and above the Turnpike Bridge, and marched in support of the head and right flank of Crittenden's corps, which moved, by the Murfreesboro pike, to a point within two miles of Murfreesboro. The enemy fell back before our advance, contesting the ground obstinately with their cavalry rear-guard.

Rousseau remained in camp at Stewartsboro, detaching Starkweather's brigade, with a section of artillery, to the Jefferson pike crossing of Stone River, to observe the movements of the enemy in that direction. Walker reached Stewartsboro, from the Nolensville pike about dark.

December 30.

A cavalry force of the enemy, something over four hundred strong, with two pieces of artillery, attacked Starkweather about nine A. M., but were soon driven off. The enemy opened a brisk fire on Crittenden's advance, doing but little execution, however, about seven A. M. During the morning, Negley's division was obliqued to the right, and took up a position on the right of Palmer's division of Crittenden's corps, and was then advanced through a dense cedar thicket, several hundred yards in width, to the Wilkinson Cross-road, driving the enemy's skirmishers steadily, and with considerable loss. Our loss comparatively small. About noon, Sheridan's division of McCook's corps, approached by the Wilkinson Cross-road, joined Negley's right, McCook's two other divisions coming up on Sheridan's right, thus forming a continuous line, the left resting on Stone River, the right stretching in a westerly direction, and resting on high wooded ground, a short distance to the south of the Wilkinson Cross-road, and has since been ascertained, nearly parallel with the enemy's intrenchments, thrown up on the sloping land bordering on the north-west bank of Stone River. Rousseau's division (with the exception of Starkweather's brigade) being ordered up from Stewartsboro, reached the position occupied by the army about four P. M., and bivouacked on the Murfreesboro pike, in the rear of the centre. During the night of the thirtieth, I sent orders to Walker to take up a strong position near the turnpike bridge over Stewart's Creek, and defend the position against any attempts of the enemy's cavalry to destroy it. Rousseau was ordered to move by six A. M., on the thirty-first, to a position in rear of Negley. This position placed his division with its left on the Murfreesboro pike, and its right extending into the cedar thicket, through which Negley had marched on the thirtieth.

In front of Negley's position, bordering a large open field, reaching to the Murfreesboro pike, a heavy growth of timber extended in a southerly direction toward the river. Across the field, running in an easterly direction, the enemy had thrown up rifle-pits at intervals from the timber to the river bank to the east side of the turnpike. Along this line of intrenchments, on an eminence about eight hundred yards from Negley's position, and nearly in front of his left, some cannon had been placed, affording the enemy great advantage in covering an attack on our centre. However, Palmer, Negley, and Sheridan held the position their troops had so manfully won the morning of the thirtieth, against every attempt to drive them back, and remained in line of battle during the night.

December 31.

Between six and seven A. M., the enemy having massed a heavy force on McCook's right during the night of the thirtieth, attacked and drove it back, pushing his divisions in pursuit in echelon, and in supporting distance, until he had gained sufficient ground in our rear to wheel his masses to the right, and throw them upon the right flank of the centre, at the same moment attacking Negley and Palmer in front with a greatly superior force. To counteract this movement, I had ordered Rousseau to place two brigades, with a battery, to the right and rear of Sheridan's division, facing toward the west, so as to support Sheridan, should he be able to hold his

ground, or to cover him, should he be compelled to fall back. About eleven o'clock, General Sheridan reported to me that his ammunition was entirely out, and he would be compelled to fall back to get more. As it became necessary for General Sheridan to fall back, the enemy pressed on still further to our rear, and soon took up a position which gave them a concentrated cross-fire of musketry and cannon on Negley's and Rousseau's troops, at short range. This compelled me to fall back out of the cedar-woods, and take up a line along a depression in the open ground, within good musket range of the edge of the woods, while the artillery was retired to the high ground to the right of the turnpike. From this last position, we were enabled to drive back the enemy, and cover the formation of our troops and secure the centre on the high ground. In the execution of this last movement, the regular brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Shepard, Eighteenth United States infantry, came under a most murderous fire, losing twenty-two officers and five hundred and eight men in killed and wounded; but, with the co-operation of Scribner's and Beatty's (John) brigades, and Guenther's and Loomis' batteries, gallantly held its ground against overwhelming odds. The centre having succeeded in driving back the enemy from its front, our artillery, concentrating its fire on the cedar-thicket on our right, drove him back far under cover, from which, though attempting it, he could not make any advance.

January 1, 1863.

Repeated attempts were made by the enemy to advance on our position, during the morning, but they were driven back before emerging from the woods. Colonel Starkweather's brigade, of Rousseau's division, and Walker's brigade, of Fry's division, having reinforced us during the night, took post on the right of Rousseau, and left of Sheridan, and bore their share in repelling the attempts of the enemy on the morning of the first instant.

Negley's divison was ordered, early in the day, to the support of McCook's right, in which position it remained during the night.

January 2.

About seven A. M., the enemy opened a direct and cross-fire from his batteries in our front, and from a position on the east bank of Stone River, to our left and front, at the same time making a strong demonstration with infantry, resulting, however, in no serious attack. Our artillery—Loomis', Guenther's, Stokes', and another battery—the commander's name I can not now recall—soon drove back their infantry. Negley was withdrawn from the extreme right, and placed in reserve behind Crittenden's right. About four P. M., a division of Crittenden's command, which had crossed Stone River to reconnoitre, was attacked by an overwhelming force of the enemy, and, after a gallant resistance, compelled to fall back. The movements of the enemy having been observed, and reported by some of my troops in the centre, I sent orders to Negley to advance to the support of Crittenden's troops, should they want help. This order was obeyed in a most gallant style, and resulted in the complete annihilation of the Twenty-sixth Tennessee (rebel) regiment, and the capture of their flag. Also, in the capture of a battery, which the enemy had been forced to abandon at the point of the bayonet. (See Negley's report.)

January 3.

Soon after daylight, the Forty-second Indiana, on picket in a clump of woods about eight hundred yards in front of our lines, was attacked by a brigade of the enemy, evidently by superior numbers, and driven in, with considerable loss. Lieutenant-Colonel Shanklin, commanding the regiment, was surrounded and taken prisoner, while gallantly endeavoring to draw off his men, under the fire of such superior numbers. From these woods, the enemy's sharpshooters continued to fire occasionally during the day, on our pickets.

About six P. M., two regiments from Colonel John Beatty's brigade, Rousseau's division, co-operating with two regiments of Spears' (Tennessee) brigade, of Negley's division, covered by the skilful and well-directed fire of Guenther's Fifth United States artillery, and Loomis' First Michigan battery, advanced on the woods and drove the enemy, not only from its cover, but from the intrenchments, a short distance beyond.

The enemy having retreated during the night of the third, our troops were occupied during the night of the fourth in burying the dead left on the field. In the afternoon, one brigade of Negley's division was advanced to the crossing of Stone River, with a brigade of Rousseau's division in supporting distance, in reserve.

January 5.

My entire command, preceded by Stanley's cavalry, marched into Murfreesboro and took up the position which we now hold. The enemy's rear guard of cavalry was overtaken on the Shelbyville and Manchester roads, about five miles from Murfreesboro, and after sharp skirmishing for two or three hours, was driven from our immediate front.

The conduct of my command, from the time the army left Nashville to its entry into Murfreesboro, is deserving of the highest praise, both for their patient endurance of the fatigues and discomforts of a five days' battle, and for the manly spirit exhibited by them in the various phases in this memorable contest. I refer you to the detailed reports of division commanders, for special mention of those officers and men of their commands whose conduct they thought worthy of particular notice.

All the members of my staff, Major G. E. Flynt, Assistant Adjutant-General; Lieutenant-Colonel A. Von Schrader, Seventy-fourth Ohio, Acting Inspector-General; Captain O. A. Mack, Thirteenth United States infantry, acting Chief

Commissary; and Captain A. J. Mackay, Chief Quartermaster, were actively employed in carrying orders to various parts of my command, and in the execution of the appropriate duties of their office. Captain O. A. Mack was dangerously wounded in the right hip and abdomen, while conveying orders from me to Major-General Rousseau. The officers of the Signal corps, attached to my headquarters, did excellent service in their appropriate sphere, when possible; and as Aids-de-Camp, carrying orders. My escort, composed of a select detail from the First Ohio cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant Barker, of the same regiment, having been on duty with me for nearly a year, deserve commendation for the faithful performance of their appropriate duties. Private Gusteam was killed by a cannon shot, on the morning of January second. Surgeon C. D. Beebe deserves special mention for his efficient arrangements for moving the wounded from the field, and giving them immediate attention.

The details will be seen in the accompanying reports of division commanders.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Major-General, United States Volunteers.

MAJOR-GENERAL CRITTENDEN'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS LEFT WING,
MURFREESBORO, January 20, 1863.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. Goddard, Chief of Staff:

COLONEL: In obedience to orders, I left camp near Nashville on the twenty-sixth of December, and reached the point where the battle of Stone River was fought, before dusk on the morning of the twenty-ninth. The march from Nashville was accompanied by the skirmishing usual when an army moves toward an enemy, posted near by and in force. The gallant and handsome things done by several different portions of my command during this march, have been mentioned in detail by the immediate commanders conducting the advance and leading the skirmishers. The seizure of two bridges, one by General Hascall, and the other by Colonel Hazen; the gallant charge of the troops of Hascall's brigade at Lavergne; and the counter-charge and capture of twenty-five of the enemy by a company of the new regiment, One Hundredth Illinois, when charged by the enemy's cavalry, are worthy of special notice.

It was about dusk, and just at the moment when Generals Wood and Palmer had halted to gather up their troops, that I reached the head of my command. These two Generals had their divisions in line of battle—General Wood on the left, and General Palmer on the right; the enemy in sight, and evidently in heavier force than we had yet encountered them, it was evident they intended to dispute the passage of the river and to fight a battle at or near Murfreesboro.

At this moment I received an order to occupy Murfreesboro with one division, camping the other two outside.

I immediately gave the order to advance, and the movement was commenced. General Wood was ordered to occupy the place, General Palmer being ordered, at General Wood's suggestion, to keep in line with Wood's division, and advance with him, until he had forced the passage of the river. At this time it was dark. General Wood had declared, when he received the order, that it was hazarding a great deal for very little, to move over unknown ground in the night, instead of awaiting for daylight, and that I ought to take the responsibility of disobeying the order. I thought the movement hazardous, but as the success of the whole army might depend on the prompt execution of orders by every officer, it was my duty to advance. After General Wood had issued the order to advance, and General Palmer had received his also, they both came to see me, and insisted that the order should not be carried out. I refused to rescind the order, but consented to suspend it for one hour, as General Rosecrans could be heard from in that time. During the interval the General himself came to the front, and approved of what I had done.

In the meantime, Colonel Harker, after a sharp skirmish, gallantly crossed the river with his brigade and Bradley's battery, and Hascall was already in the river advancing, when the order to suspend the movement was received. As soon as possible I recalled Harker, and, to my great satisfaction, this able officer, with consummate address, withdrew from the actual presence of a vastly superior force his artillery and troops, and recrossed the river without any serious loss. During the night General McCook came over to see the commanding General, and reported that he was on the Wilkinson pike, about three miles in the rear of our line, and that he should advance in the morning.

The next morning (the thirtieth) early, my line of battle was formed. Palmer's division occupied the ground to the right of the turnpike, his right resting on Negley's left, Negley having advanced into the woods and taken a position in the centre, to take a position with General McCook when he should come into line. General Wood was to occupy that part of our front to the left of the turnpike, extending down the river. General Van Cleve was held in reserve to the rear and left. This position of our forces was, without material change, maintained all day, though the skirmishing during part of the day was very heavy, particularly on our extreme right, where McCook was coming up. Then, when it apparently assumed the proportion of a battle, I proposed to cross the river with my corps, and attack Murfreesboro from the left, by way of the Lebanon pike; but the General, though approving the plan of attack, would not consent that I should move until McCook was more seriously engaged.

On the morning of the thirty-first, when the

battle began, I occupied the front near the turnpike, General Palmer's division on the right, General Wood on the left, General Van Cleve in reserve to the rear and left. About eight o'clock, when my troops under Van Cleve were crossing the river, as ordered, and when all was ready for an advance movement, it became evident that our right was being driven back; orders were received and immediately issued recalling Van Cleve and stopping the advance; Van Cleve was ordered to leave a brigade to guard the ford—Matthews' brigade, Colonel Price commanding in Colonel Matthews' absence, was left—and to hurry with all possible dispatch to try and check the enemy to the right and rear. One brigade of his division, Colonel Fyffe's, had already been ordered to protect the train then threatened near the hospital, and General Van Cleve moved at once and quickly to the right with Beatty's brigade. He arrived most opportunely, as his own and Colonel Beatty's reports show, and checked the enemy. The confusion of our own troops, who were being driven from the woods at this point, hindered him, for some time, from forming his men in line of battle. This difficulty, however, was soon overcome, his line rapidly formed, and one small brigade, commanded by the gallant Colonel Beatty, of the Nineteenth Ohio, under the direction of General Van Cleve, boldly attacked vastly superior forces of the enemy then advancing in full career, checked their advance, and drove them back. Being soon remforced by Fyffe's brigade and Harker's brigade, of Wood's division, the enemy were pressed vigorously, and too far. They came upon the enemy massed to receive them, who, outnumbering them and outflanking them, compelled them to fall back in turn. This they did in good order, and fighting with such effect that the enemy drew off and left them, and they were able to hold their position during the remainder of the day. From this time the great object of the enemy seemed to be to break our left and front, where, under great disadvantages, my two divisions, under Generals Wood and Palmer, maintained their ground.

When the troops composing the centre and right wing of our army had been driven by the enemy from our original line of battle to a line almost perpendicular to it, the First and Second divisions of the left wing still nobly maintained their position. Though several times assaulted by the enemy in great force, it was evident that it was vital to us that this position should be held, at least until our troops, who had been driven back, could establish themselves on their new line. The country is deeply indebted to Generals Wood and Palmer for the sound judgment, skill, and courage with which they managed their commands at this important crisis in the battle. The reports of my division commanders show how nobly and how ably they were supported by their officers; and the most melancholy and convincing proof of the bravery of all who fought in this part of the field is their terrible list of killed and wounded, for with them was no rout, no confusion; the men who fell, fell fighting in the ranks.

Generals Wood and Van Cleve being wounded on the thirty-first, their commands devolved, of course, on other officers—General Hascall taking command of Wood's division, and Colonel Beatty of Van Cleve's, on the first day of January. It was a fortunate thing that competent and gallant officers took command of these two noble divisions.

On the night of the thirty-first, with the consent of the General commanding, I reunited my command, bringing them all together on the left of the turnpike, and before daylight, by orders from the General commanding, we took up a new line of battle, about five hundred yards to the rear of our former line; Hascall's division was ordered to rest their right on the position occupied by Stokes' battery, and his left on General Palmer's right; General Palmer was to rest his left on the ford, his right extending toward the railroad, and perpendicular to it, thus bringing the line at right angles to the railroad and turnpike, and extending from Stokes' battery to the ford. On the morning of the first of January, Van Cleve's division again crossed the river, and took position on ground the General considered it important we should hold, extending from the ford about half a mile from the river, the right resting on high ground near the river, and the left thrown forward, so that the direction of the line should be nearly perpendicular to it. These changes in position having been accomplished, the day passed quietly, except continued skirmishing and occasional artillery firing. The next day (January second) large forces of the enemy's infantry and artillery were seen to pass to the right, apparently contemplating an attack. Lieutenant Livingston, with Drury's battery, was ordered over the river, and Colonel Grose's brigade, of Palmer's division, was also crossed over, taking post on the hill near the hospital, so as to protect the left and rear of Beatty's position.

About four o'clock on the evening of the second, a sudden and concentrated attack was made on the Third division, now commanded by Colonel Beatty; several batteries opened at the same time on their division.

The overwhelming numbers of the enemy directed upon two brigades, forced them, after a bloody but short conflict, back to the river. The object of the enemy (it is since ascertained) was to take the battery which we had on that side of the river. In this attempt it is most likely they would have succeeded, but for the sound judgment and wise precaution of Colonel Beatty, in changing the position of his battery. It was so late when the attack was made that the enemy, failing in their enterprise to capture our battery, were sure of not suffering any great disaster in case of a repulse, because night would protect them. They not only failed to capture our battery, but lost four of their guns in their repulse and flight. As soon as it became evident that the enemy were driving Col-

onel Beatty, I turned to my Chief of Artillery, Captain John Mendenhall, and said, "Now, Mendenhall, you must cover my men with your cannon." Without any show of excitement or haste, almost as soon as the order was given, the batteries began to open, so perfectly had he placed them. In twenty minutes from the time the order was received, fifty-two guns were firing upon the enemy. They cannot be said to have been checked in their advance; from a rapid advance they broke at once into a rapid retreat. Reinforcements soon began to arrive; our troops crossed the river and pursued the flying enemy until dark.

It is a pleasant thing to report that the officers and men from the centre and right wing hurried to the support of the left wing, when it was known to be hard pressed. General J. C. Davis sent a brigade at once without orders, then applied for and obtained orders to follow immediately with his division. General Negley, from the centre, crossed with a part of his division. General McCook, to whom I applied for a brigade, not knowing of Davis' movement, ordered immediately Colonel Gibson to go with his brigade, and the Colonel and the brigade passed at double-quick in less than five minutes after the request was made. Honor is due to such men. On the night of the second, General Hascall, with his division, and General Davis with his, camped a little in advance of the position which Beatty had occupied. General Palmer, commanding the Second division, camped with two brigades in reserve to Hascall's and Davis' divisions, and the remaining brigade, on this side of the river. In this position these troops remained until Saturday night, when the river beginning to rise, and the rain continuing to fall, it was feared we might be separated from the rest of the army, and all re-crossed the river except Palmer's two brigades, which remained, and did not come back until it was ascertained the next day (Sunday) that the enemy had evacuated Murfreesboro.

I feel that this report of the part taken by my command in the battle of Stone River is very imperfect. I have only endeavored to give a general outline of the most important features of the battle. The reports, however, of the division commanders, and the report of the Chief of Artillery, give a detailed and good account of the memorable incidents which occurred in this particular fight.

Reports of the division commanders show how nobly they were sustained by their subordinate officers, and all reports show how nobly the troops behaved. Generals Wood and Van Cleve, though wounded early in the battle of the thirty-first, remained in the saddle and on the field throughout the day, and at night were ordered to the rear; General Palmer, exposing himself everywhere and freely, escaped unhurt, and commanded the Second division throughout the battle. To these division commanders, I return my most earnest and heartfelt thanks, for the brave, prompt, and able manner in which they executed every order, and I most urgently present their names to the commanding General and to the Government, as having fairly earned promotion.

After the thirty-first, General Hascall commanded Wood's division, the First, and Colonel Beatty the Second, Van Cleve's. To these officers I am indebted for the same cheerful and prompt obedience to orders, the same brave support which I received from their predecessors in command; and I also respectfully present their names to the commanding General and the Government, as having earned promotion on the field of battle.

There are numerous cases of distinguished conduct in the brigade as well as regimental commanders, mentioned by my division commanders as meriting promotion. I respectfully refer the General commanding to division, brigade, and regimental reports, and solicit for the gallant officers and men who have distinguished themselves for conduct and bravery in battle, the honors they have won. We have officers who have commanded brigades for almost a year, though they have but the rank of Colonel; in such cases, and in all like cases, as where a Lieutenant commands a company, it seems, if the officers have capacity for their commands on the field, that they should have the rank the command is entitled to. The report of Captain Mendenhall, Chief of Artillery to the left wing, shows the efficiency, skill, and daring with which our artillery officers handled their batteries. Division and brigade commanders vie with each other in commendation upon different batteries. Some of the batteries, fighting as they did in parts of the field, won praises from all. To these officers, also, attention is called, with a sincere hope that they may be rewarded as their valor and bearing deserves.

Major Lyne Starling, Assistant Adjutant-General to the left wing, has been, for nearly eighteen months, the most indefatigable officer I ever knew in his department. His services to me are invaluable. On the field here, as at Shiloh, he was distinguished, even among so many brave men, for his daring and efficiency. Captain R. Loder, Inspector-General for the left wing, has entitled himself to my lasting gratitude, by his constant and able management of his department. It is sufficient to say that the gallant and lamented Colonel Garesché told him, in my presence, but a short time before the battle, that he had proved himself to be the best Inspector-General in the army. On the field of battle bravery was added to the same efficiency and activity which marked his conduct in the camp.

Captain John Mendenhall, who has been mentioned already as Chief of Artillery to my command, but of whom too much cannot be said, is also Topographical Engineer on my staff. In this capacity, as in all where he works, the work is well and faithfully done. His services at Shiloh, of which I was an eye-witness; his splendid conduct as Chief of Artillery to the left wing;

his uniform soldierly bearing, point him out as eminently qualified for promotion.

To the Medical Director of the left wing, Dr. A. J. Phelps, the thanks of the army and the country are due, not only for his prompt attention to the wounded, but for his arrangements for their immediate accommodation. He took good care not only of the wounded of my command, but of more than two thousand wounded from other corps, and from the enemy. Since the battle, I have visited his hospitals, and can bear testimony to the efficiency of the Medical Department of the left wing.

Captain Louis M. Buford and Lieutenant George Knox, my Aids-de-Camp, were brave, active, and efficient helps to me all through the battle. Captain Buford was struck just over the heart, fortunately, by a ball too far spent to penetrate, and which only bruised. The Captain and Lieutenant Knox were frequently exposed to the heaviest firing, as they fearlessly carried my orders to all parts of the field.

Captain Case, of the Signal corps, tendered his services as a volunteer Aid, and proved himself a bold soldier and an efficient Aid. Two other officers of the same corps, Lieutenants ——— and ———, tendered their services as Aids, and were placed on my staff during the battle, and I thank them sincerely for their services.

Lieutenant Brown, of the Third Kentucky cavalry, who commanded my escort, was as quietly brave on the battle-field as he is mild and gentlemanly in the camp.

Before concluding this report, it will be proper to add, that when I speak of a quiet day, I mean to speak comparatively. We had no quiet days; no rest from the time we reached the battle-field until the enemy fled, skirmishing constantly, and sometimes terrible cannonading. On the second, which we call a quiet day, until about four o'clock P. M., the First division, under Hascall, lay for half an hour, in the early part of the day, under the heaviest cannonading we endured. Many men were killed, but he and his brave soldiers would not flinch.

The number of killed and wounded demonstrates with what fearful energy and earnestness the battle was contested in my command.

Most respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

T. L. CRITTENDEN,

Major-General, commanding.

GENERAL D. S. STANLEY'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY, FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
NEAR MURFREESBORO, January 9, 1863.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit for the information of the General commanding the army, the following statement of the part taken by the cavalry under my command in the advance upon and battle of Murfreesboro:

Upon the twenty-sixth day of December, I divided the cavalry into three columns, putting the First brigade, commanded by Colonel Minty, Fourth Michigan cavalry, upon the Murfreesboro pike, in advance of General Crittenden's corps. The Second brigade, commanded by Colonel Zahn, Third Ohio cavalry, was ordered on Franklin, to dislodge the enemy's cavalry, and move parallel to General McCook's corps, protecting his right flank. The reserve cavalry, consisting of the new regiments, viz.: Anderson troop, First Middle Tennessee, Second East Tennessee cavalry, and four companies of the Third Indiana, I commanded in person, and preceded General McCook's corps on the Nolensville pike.

Colonel John Kennett, commanding cavalry division, commanded the cavalry on the Murfreesboro pike. For the operations of this column, and also the movements of Colonel Zahn up to the thirty-first of December, I would refer you to the inclosed reports of Colonel Kennett, and Colonels Zahn and Minty.

On the morning of the twenty-sixth, our cavalry first encountered the enemy on the Nolensville pike, one mile in advance of Balle Jack Pass; their cavalry was in large force, and accompanied by a battery of artillery. The fighting continued from ten o'clock until evening, during which time we had driven the enemy two miles beyond Lavergne. The Third Indiana and Anderson troop behaved gallantly, charging the enemy twice, and bringing them to hand-and-hand encounters. The conduct of Majors Rosengarten and Ward, the former now deceased, was most heroic. On the twenty-eighth we made a reconnoissance to College Grove, and found that Hardee's rebel corps had marched to Murfreesboro.

On the twenty-ninth, Colonel Zahn's brigade having formed, was directed to march upon Murfreesboro by the Franklin road; the reserve cavalry moving on the Balle Jack road, the column communicating at the crossing of Stewart's Creek. We encountered the enemy's cavalry, and found them in strong force at Wilkinson's Cross-roads. Our cavalry drove them rapidly across Overall's Creek, and within one-half mile of the enemy's line of battle. The Anderson cavalry behaved most gallantly this day, pushing at full charge upon the enemy for six miles; unfortunately their advance fronted too recklessly; having dispersed their cavalry, the troop fell upon two regiments of rebel infantry in ambush, and after a gallant struggle were compelled to retire, with the loss of Major Rosengarten and six men killed, and the brave Major Ward and five men desperately wounded. With the loss of these two most gallant officers, the spirit of the "Anderson Troop," which gave such full promise, seems to have died out, and I have not been able to get any duty out of them since.

On the thirtieth the entire cavalry force was engaged in guarding the flanks of the army in position. Some small cavalry skirmishing occurred, but nothing of importance. At eleven o'clock P. M., the thirtieth, I marched for Lavergne, with the First Tennessee and the Anderson cavalry. Near that place I was joined by detachments of the Fourth Michigan and Seventh Pennsylvania cavalry. At half-past nine o'clock

on the thirty-first, I received an order from the General commanding, directing me to hasten to the right. I made all possible speed, leaving a strong detachment to protect the trains crossing the road at Stewartsboro, and to pick up stragglers. Upon arriving upon the right flank of the army, I found order restored, and took position on General McCook's right, my right extending toward Wilkinson's Cross-roads, occupying the woods about the meeting-house and Overall's Creek. In this position we were attacked, about four o'clock P. M., by a long line of foot skirmishers. My first impression was that these were covered infantry, but I soon learned that they were dismounted cavalry. We successfully held them at bay for half an hour with the Fourth Michigan and Seventh Pennsylvania dismounted, when, being outflanked, I ordered our line to mount and fall back to the open field. The enemy followed here, and, being reinforced by detachments of the Anderson and Third Kentucky cavalry, and by the First Tennessee, we charged the enemy and put him to rout. The cavalry held the same position this night they had taken upon my arrival upon the field. About nine o'clock New Year's morning, the enemy showed a line of skirmishers in the woods to our front, and soon after brought a six-gun battery to bear upon my cavalry. As we could not reach the enemy's skirmishers nor reply to his artillery, I ordered my cavalry to fall back. A part of Zahn's brigade marched this day to Nashville, to protect our trains. Colonel Zahn's report is inclosed.

The second and third of January the cavalry was engaged in watching the flanks of our position. On the fourth it became evident that the enemy had fled; the cavalry was collected and moved to the fords of Stone River. Upon the fifth we entered Murfreesboro. Zahn's brigade marched in pursuit of the enemy on the Shelbyville pike six miles, finding no opposition. With the remainder of the cavalry, I marched on the Manchester pike, and encountered the enemy in heavy force at Lytle's Creek, three and a half miles from town. We fought with this force till near sundown, pushing them from one cedar-brake to another, when, being reinforced by General Spears' brigade of East Tennesseeans, we drove the enemy out of his last stand in disorder. We returned after dusk and encamped on Lytle's Creek. Our troops all behaved well. The skirmishing was of a very severe character.

The Fourth United States cavalry, which was this day first under my control, behaved very handsomely. Captain Otis' command acted independently until the fifth instant, when they came under my command.

The duty of the cavalry was very arduous. From the twenty-sixth of December till the fourth of January, the saddles were only taken off to groom, and were immediately replaced.

Respectfully submitted,

D. S. STANLEY,
Brigadier-General and Chief of Cavalry.

REPORT OF COLONEL JOHN KENNETT.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION,
CAMP STANLEY, January 8, 1863.

Captain W. H. Sinclair:

SIR: I have the honor to submit to you the reports of the part taken in the fighting of the two brigades composing the First cavalry division from December twenty-sixth, 1862, up to the night of January fifth, 1863, from Nashville to Murfreesboro, and six miles beyond Murfreesboro, on the Manchester and Shelbyville pikes.

On leaving Nashville the Second brigade, under Colonel Zahn, took the road to Franklin; Brigadier-General D. S. Stanley, with the First and Second Tennessee cavalry and Anderson troop, taking the Nolensville pike. The First brigade, Colonel Minty commanding, under my charge, took the Murfreesboro pike. I reported my command to General Palmer, who placed us in advance. Our skirmishers drove the enemy some five miles. The afternoon was well spent when General Palmer relieved us with infantry skirmishers. The cavalry forming the reserve on the right and left flanks, the First brigade marched directly as a reserve to the advance skirmishers of the army composing the left wing, on their flanks, up to December thirtieth, 1862.

On December thirty-first, 1862, we were posted as reserves on the flanks, throwing out our skirmishers and vedettes, watching the movements of the enemy. We performed a variety of duty as scouts on the different avenues leading to our camp and connecting with the roads centring upon Nashville, Tennessee—flankers, vedettes, couriers—engaging the enemy daily on the right flank.

Some few incidents which could not have fallen under the eye of the brigade commanders, having occurred under my immediate notice, I beg leave to append.

When the enemy charged upon our wing, scattering a few regiments, who stampeded to the rear, I received orders from General Rosecrans, in person, to collect all the cavalry at my command, and proceed to rally the right wing and drive the enemy away. I found Colonel Murray, of the Third Kentucky, in command of about a squadron of men. With that we made our way to the right. We found a complete stampede—infantry, cavalry, and artillery, rushing to the rear, and the rebel cavalry charging upon our retiring forces on the Murfreesboro pike. Colonel Murray, with great intrepidity, engaged the enemy toward the skirts of the wood, and drove them in three charges. His men behaved like old veterans. Between his command and the field, was filled with rushing rebel cavalry charging upon our retreating cavalry and infantry, holding many of our soldiers as prisoners.

I rallied the Third Ohio, some two companies, who were falling back, and formed them in the rear of a fence, where volley after volley had the effect of driving back the rebels on the run, the Third Ohio charging upon them effectually, thereby relieving the pike of their presence,

saving the train, one piece of artillery, and rescuing from their grasp many of our men taken as prisoners. One of my staff, Lieutenant Rielly, being a prisoner in their hands, was released. Lieutenant Murray, of the Third Ohio, displayed energy, courage, and coolness upon this occasion, in executing my orders. I also take great pride in mentioning the prompt manner with which my staff conveyed my orders in all these engagements.

Two of my orderlies displayed high order of chivalry. Jaggers charged upon two rebel cavalry, rescuing two men of the Fourth Ohio volunteer cavalry, who were being taken off as prisoners. The other, Farrish, shot two of the rebels, and came to my rescue in a personal encounter with a rebel, who was in the act of levelling his pistol at my head, but he found a carbine levelled into his own face, and at my order to surrender, he delivered his pistols, carbine, and horse to me. They both deserve promotion, and would make good officers.

The able and undaunted spirit and ability which Colonel Minty has displayed whenever coming under my eye, I take great satisfaction in noticing. The officers and men all displayed great self-sacrifice. Major Wynkoop, of the Seventh Pennsylvania, commanding, and Lieutenant Wooley, Adjutant-General of the First brigade, carried out every order with unhesitating energy and will, displaying the highest order of gallantry.

Captain E. Otis, of the Fourth regular cavalry, although he does not belong to my division, but being posted on the left wing of our skirmishers on the march on the Manchester road, I feel it my duty as well as take great pleasure in stating he is an able and efficient officer.

Brigadier-General D. S. Stanley being in command of the forces pursuing the retiring rebels on the march, it fell to my lot to convey and see his orders executed. Before closing this report it is my duty to make honorable mention of the meritorious conduct of Lieutenant Newell, commanding a section of artillery attached to my division. During the first day's engagement near Lavergne, he placed his two pieces on well-selected ground, and did great execution, killing three horses, dismounting seven, and scattering the rebel cavalry by his well and timely aimed shots. He has on several occasions displayed talents of the first order as an artillerist.

It would not be amiss at this time to state that my entire command were short of rations, performing duty, night and day, in the wet field without shelter, exposed to the wet, cold, and hunger, without a murmur. Major Paransom, of the Third Ohio, displayed great presence of mind and determination in maintaining his position on the right flank with his battalion, to cover an ammunition train, long after the cavalry on his right had been driven away by the enemy's shells.

Your obedient servant,

JOHN KENNETT,
Commanding Division.

REPORT OF GENERAL R. W. JOHNSON.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION,
RIGHT WING, January 6, 1863.

Major J. A. Campbell, Assistant Adjutant-General:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Second division, under my command, beginning December twenty-sixth, 1862, the day upon which it left Nashville, and terminating on January sixth, 1863:

Agreeably to orders, the divisions of the right wing of the Fourteenth army corps marched from their camps near Nashville, taking the Nolensville pike, and arrived in that village the same day, at four o'clock P. M. On the following day the same divisions, with mine in advance, marched to Triune. The rebel rearguard contested the ground inch by inch, and the day was passed constantly skirmishing with them, with no loss on our side, but several casualties on their part. Triune was occupied by my division about four P. M. The following day (December twenty-eighth), the command remained in Triune. A reconnoissance, to ascertain the direction the enemy had retreated, was made by a brigade of my command, commanded by Brigadier-General A. Willich. It having ascertained that the enemy had retreated toward Murfreesboro, I was ordered to leave a brigade at Triune, and on the twenty-ninth to march on Murfreesboro on what is known as the Balle Jack road. Colonel P. P. Baldwin, Third brigade, was left at Triune. The command arrived at Wilkinson's Cross-roads about eight P. M., on the twenty-ninth, and an order sent at once to Colonel Baldwin to move forward his brigade, which arrived early on the afternoon of the thirtieth. My division was in reserve on the twenty-ninth. On the following morning, December thirtieth, General Sheridan's division was ordered to advance in line of battle, covering the Wilkinson pike, while General Davis' division marched in the same order, on the right of General Sheridan. My division, being held in reserve, was marched in column on the pike. There being no troops on General Davis' right, and General Sheridan's left being guarded by General Crittenden's left wing (N. B.—Negley's division of centre), I was ordered to oblique to the right, covering the right of General Davis' division. About two o'clock P. M., I received an order from Major-General McCook to look well to my right, as General Hardee (rebel), with his corps, was on the right flank of our column. I ordered the Second brigade, Brigadier-General E. N. Kirk commanding, to take position with his brigade, his left resting against the right of General Davis, his right refused so as to cover our right flank. About dark I placed General Willich's on the right of Kirk's, refusing his right, and directed a heavy line of skirmishers to be thrown forward, connecting on the left with those of General Davis, and extending to the right and rear, near the Wilkinson pike. This line of skirmishers was thrown forward about six hundred yards, and

near those of the enemy. My Third brigade, Colonel Baldwin commanding, was held in reserve. In consultation with General McCook, late in the afternoon of the thirtieth, he informed me that he had reliable information to the effect that the centre of the rebel line of battle was opposite to our extreme right, and that we would probably be attacked by the entire rebel army early on the following morning. His prediction proved true. He also informed me that he had communicated this information to the commanding General. I expected a change in the programme for the following day, but none was made. My brigade commanders were called together, and the operations of the following day fully explained to them. Every arrangement was made for an attack. Two gallant and experienced officers commanded my two advance brigades, and every precaution was taken against surprise.

At twenty-two minutes past six o'clock on the morning of the thirty-first, the outposts in front of my division were driven in by an overwhelming force of infantry, outnumbering my forces greatly, and known to contain about thirty-five thousand men. At the same time my extreme right was attacked by the enemy's cavalry. The gallant Kirk and Willich soon opened up a heavy fire of musketry and artillery on the advancing columns, causing wavering in the ranks; but fresh columns would soon replace them, and it was apparent that to fall back was a "military necessity." Edgarton's battery, after firing three rounds, had so many of his horses killed as to render it unmanageable. He, however, remained with it, and continued to fire, until he fell by a severe wound, and he and his battery fell into the hands of the enemy. Before falling back, the horse of General Willich was killed, and he was wounded and taken prisoner. About the same time, General Kirk received a severe wound, which disabled him. Seeing the pressure upon my lines, I ordered up my reserve brigade, under the gallant Baldwin. The troops of his brigade advanced promptly, and delivered their fire, holding their ground for some time; but they, too, were compelled to fall back. The troops of this division, for the first time, were compelled to yield the field temporarily, but the heroes of Shiloh and Perryville did not abandon their ground until forced to do so by the immense masses of the enemy hurled against them, and then inch by inch.

The ground over which the division passed, covered with the enemy's dead and those of our own men, shows that the field was warmly contested. Several times the lines were re-formed and resistance offered; but the columns of the enemy were too heavy for a single line, and ours would have to yield. Finally the left flank of my division reached the line of General Rousseau's, when it was re-formed and fought until out of ammunition, but my efficient Ordnance Officer, Lieutenant Murdoch, had a supply in readiness, which was soon issued, and the division assisted in driving the enemy from the field in their last desperate struggle of the day. Soon the curtain of darkness fell upon the scene of blood, and all was quiet, awaiting the coming of morn to renew hostilities.

Morning came, but the enemy had withdrawn. January first was a day of comparative quiet in camp, few shots being fired, but many preparations made for a heavy battle on the following day. General Crittenden's wing was attacked in force on the second, and one of my brigades, Colonel Gibson's, was sent to reinforce them. For the gallant part taken by it reference is made to the report of Major-General Crittenden. The enemy evacuated Murfreesboro on the night of the third. On the sixth I was ordered to move my camp to a point on the Shelbyville road, four miles south of Murfreesboro.

The conduct of the officers and men under my command was good. The Louisville Legion, under the command of the gallant Lieutenant-Colonel Berry, brought off by hand one cannon, after the horses were killed. They yielded the ground only when overpowered, offering an obstinate resistance at every point. Some few in each regiment, becoming panic-stricken, fled to Nashville for safety. Captain Simonson managed his battery with skill and courage, and with it did good execution. He lost two guns, but not until the horses had been killed and the guns disabled. Goodspeed's battery lost three guns and quite a number of horses. This battery was handled well and did good execution, under Lieutenant Belden.

After the capture of General Willich, his brigade was commanded temporarily by Colonel Wallace, of the Fifteenth Ohio, but was afterward commanded by Colonel W. H. Gibson, Forty-ninth Ohio. General Kirk becoming disabled was replaced by Colonel Dodge, Thirtieth Indiana, while the Third brigade was commanded by Colonel Baldwin. These four Colonels have demonstrated their fitness for command on several bloody fields, and are recommended to my superiors for promotion. Their coolness and courage rendered them conspicuous throughout the bloody engagement. Major Klein and his battalion of the Third Indiana cavalry, deserve special mention; under their gallant leader, the battalion was always in front, and rendered efficient service.

To Captains Barker, Hooker, Thurston, and McLeland; Lieutenants Taft, Hills, and Sheets, of my staff, many thanks are due for their efficiency and promptness in carrying orders to all parts of the field. My Medical Director, Surgeon Marks, and the medical officers of the division, were untiring in their exertions to alleviate the sufferings of the wounded, and to them my thanks are due. My escort, composed of the following named men of the Third Kentucky cavalry, who accompanied me throughout the engagement, deserve special mention for their good conduct: Sergeant Wm. C. Miles; privates Geo. Long, Thomas Salyers, John Christian, John Whitten, James Bowen, B. Hammerslein, R. A. Novah.

Private Bowen's horse was killed by a cannon ball.

The loss of the division was as follows: Killed, 260; wounded, 1,005; missing, 1,280; total, 2,545.

The missing are supposed to have been captured.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
R. W. JOHNSON,
Brigadier General, commanding.

BRIGADIER GENERAL JEFF. C. DAVIS' REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, RIGHT WING, January 8, 1863.

Major J. A. Campbell, Acting Adjutant-General:

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the division under my command, in the recent operations against the enemy's forces in the vicinity of Triune and Murfreesboro:

On the morning of the twenty-sixth ult., in compliance with instructions received from the General commanding the right wing, I broke up camp at St. James' Chapel, on Mill Creek, and advanced upon Nolensville via the Edmonson pike, as far as Prim's blacksmith shop; from thence my advance was over a rugged country road, rendered almost impassable by the incessant rain which had been falling in torrents during the entire morning.

The enemy's pickets were discovered by my cavalry escort (composed of Company B, Thirty-sixth Illinois volunteers, under command of Captain Shirer), within a few miles of our camp. This small force of cavalry being the only mounted force under our command, I ordered them to the front, with instructions to drive in the enemy's pickets, and to attack him on his flanks at every opportunity. So effectually was this done that the infantry and artillery were enabled to move with little interruption to within a mile of Nolensville. By this time I had learned from reliable information, through citizens as well as cavalry scouts, that the enemy occupied the town in some force both of cavalry and artillery.

The First brigade, consisting of the Twenty-second Indiana, Seventy-fourth, Seventy-fifth, and Fifty-ninth Illinois regiments, and the Fifth Wisconsin battery, commanded by Colonel P. Sidney Post, was immediately deployed for an advance upon the town. Pinney's Fifth Wisconsin battery was posted so as to command the town and all approaches from the south-west. The enemy's cavalry was seen by this time taking position on a range of hills south-west of town, and was evidently attempting to flank our position. A few shells from Pinney's battery soon caused them to fall back. A battery which by this time they had succeeded in getting into position, opened fire, but was after a few rounds silenced by Pinney's guns.

The Second brigade, consisting of the Twenty-first and Thirty-eighth Illinois, Fifteenth Wisconsin, and One Hundred and First Ohio regiments, and the Second Minnesota battery, commanded by Colonel Carlin, had by this time formed a line of battle on Post's right, and moving rapidly forward soon engaged the enemy's dismounted cavalry in a sharp skirmish.

The Third brigade, consisting of the Twenty-fifth and Thirty-fifth Illinois, Eighty-first Indiana, and the Eighth Wisconsin battery, commanded by Colonel Woodruff, was deployed on the right, so as to check any effort which might be made to attack my flank from this direction. Carlin advanced in excellent order, driving everything before him until ordered to halt, having dislodged the enemy from his position entirely.

By this time I ascertained that the enemy would probably make another effort to resist our advance about two miles further on, and notwithstanding it was late in the afternoon, and the men were much fatigued from a hard day's march through rain and mud, I could not forego the opportunity thus offered in giving them another chance to signalize their courage and endurance. Ascertaining the enemy's position as well as I could, I ordered the advance. Their lines were soon discovered, occupying a range of high rocky hills, through which the Nolensville and Triune pike passes, known as "Knob's Gap." This was a favorable position to the enemy, and well guarded by artillery, which opened fire at long range upon Carlin's lines.

Hotchkiss' and Pinney's batteries were rapidly brought into action and opened fire, while Carlin's brigade charged the battery, carried the heights in his front and captured two guns. Post's brigade carried the heights on the left of the road with but little resistance, while Woodruff's brigade drove in the enemy's skirmishers on the extreme right.

The day had now closed, and I ordered the troops to bivouac in accordance with instructions from the General commanding, who arrived at this time upon the ground, followed by Generals Sheridan's and Johnson's divisions.

The steady courage and soldierly zeal displayed on this occasion by both officers and men, gave ample assurance of what could be expected of them in the coming struggle at Murfreesboro.

On the twenty-seventh, in accordance with the General's instructions, the division took position at the junction of the Balle Jack road with the Nolensville pike, one mile from Triune, where it remained in bivouac until the morning of the twenty-ninth, at which time the advance was resumed. In compliance with instructions, I moved forward on the Balle Jack as far as Stewart's Creek, a few miles beyond which it was reported by our cavalry the enemy had shown himself in considerable force. The General commanding, arriving at this time in person at the head of the column, ordered a halt until the division in the rear could be brought up.

Brigadier-General Stanley, commanding the

cavalry in advance, soon reported the road clear, and the march was resumed without obstruction, until the entire command reached the Wilkinson pike, six miles from Murfreesboro.

The division bivouacked during the night at Overall's Creek, three and a half miles from Murfreesboro, the left brigade resting on the Wilkinson pike. On the morning of the thirtieth, the division moved forward and took position on General Sheridan's right, about three hundred yards south of and parallel to the Wilkinson pike, in which position it remained until two o'clock P. M. A few companies of skirmishers thrown to the front, in a skirt of timber land, soon found those of the enemy, and for several hours a brisk skirmish was kept up with varying results.

About two o'clock P. M., the General commanding ordered a general advance of the whole line. This the enemy seemed at first disposed to resist only with his skirmishers; gradually, however, as both parties strengthened their lines of skirmishers, the contest became more animated. Our main lines steadily advanced, occupying and holding the ground gained by the skirmishers, until about half an hour before sunset, when the enemy's position was plainly discovered running diagonally across the old Murfreesboro and Franklin road. The enemy's batteries now announced our close proximity to their lines. Carpenter's and Hotchkiss's batteries were soon brought into opposition and opened fire. Woodruff's and Carlin's brigades by this time felt the fire of the enemy's main lines and responded in the most gallant manner.

Post's brigade, moving steadily forward on the right, after a most obstinate resistance on the part of the enemy, succeeded in driving his skirmishers from a strong position in our front, forcing them to retire upon their main lines. Night soon brought a close to the conflict. Receiving directions at this time, from General McCook, to desist from any further offensive demonstration than what might be necessary to hold my position, I ordered the troops to rest for the night on their arms. Two brigades of General Johnson's division, heretofore held in reserve, arrived and took position on my right about sunset, thus extending our line of battle beyond the old Franklin and Murfreesboro road. These brigades were commanded by Generals Willich and Kirk.

The night passed off quietly until about daylight, when the enemy's forces were observed by our pickets to be in motion. Their object could not, however, with certainty be determined until near sunrise, when a vigorous attack was made upon Willich's and Kirk's brigades. These troops seemed not to have been fully prepared for the assault, and, with little or no resistance, retreated from their position, leaving their artillery in the hands of the enemy. This left my right brigade exposed to a flank movement, which the enemy was now rapidly executing, and compelled me to order Post's brigade to fall back and partially change its front. Simultaneous with this movement the enemy commenced a heavy and very determined attack on both Carlin's and Woodruff's brigades.

These brigades were fully prepared for the attack, and received it with veteran courage. The conflict was fierce in the extreme on both sides. Our loss was heavy, and that of the enemy no less. It was, according to my observations, the best contested point of the day, and would have been held but for the overwhelming force moving so persistently against my right. Carlin finding his right flank being severely pushed and threatened with being turned, ordered his troops to retire. Woodruff's brigade succeeded in repulsing the enemy, and holding its position until the withdrawal of the troops on both its flanks compelled it to retire.

Pinney's battery, which was posted in an open field upon my extreme right, and ordered to be supported by a part of Post's brigade, now opened a destructive fire upon the enemy's advancing lines. This gallant and distinguished battery, supported by the Twenty-second Indiana and Fifty-ninth Illinois regiments, together with a brigade of General Johnson's division, commanded by Colonel Baldwin (Sixth Indiana volunteers), for a short time brought the enemy to a check on our right. Hotchkiss's battery had also, by this time, taken an excellent position near the Wilkinson pike, so as to command the enemy's approach across a large cotton-field in his front, over which he was now advancing. The infantry, however, contrary to expectations, failed to support this battery, and after firing a few rounds was forced to retire. In accordance with instructions received during the night, announcing the plan of operations for the day, I desisted from any further attempts to engage the enemy except by skirmishers thrown to the rear for that purpose, until my lines had reached within a few hundred yards of the Nashville and Murfreesboro pikes, when I again determined to re-form my lines to resist his further advance. To this order but few of the regiments responded, their ranks being much thinned by killed and wounded, and not a few availed themselves of the favorable opportunity offered by the dense woods through which we were compelled to pass, to skulk like cowards from the ranks.

The reserve force here moved to the front, and relieved my command from any further participation in the engagement until late in the afternoon, when, in compliance with instructions, I took position on the right. My skirmishers were immediately thrown out, and soon engaged the enemy's, until night brought a close to hostilities for the day.

During the first and second of January, the division occupied this position in skirmishing with the enemy's pickets until late in the afternoon of the second, when I received orders from General Rosecrans to hasten to the support of a part of General Crittenden's command, who had been some time hotly engaged with the enemy across the river, on our extreme left.

Moving as rapidly as possible across the river to the field of battle, I found our gallant troops forcing the enemy back on his reserves. The brigade of Colonel Woodruff, being in the advance, only arrived in time to participate in the general engagement.

After relieving the troops of General Palmer and Colonel Beatty, and particularly the brigade of Colonel Hazen, which had so nobly vindicated their courage in the then closing conflict, I ordered a heavy line of skirmishers to be thrown out. The enemy's lines were soon encountered, and a renewal of the engagement seemed imminent. A few rounds of grape and canister from one of our batteries, however, caused them to withdraw, and night again brought a cessation of hostilities.

During the night I disposed of my troops in such manner as would best enable me to repel an attack, and, in compliance with instructions, I directed rifle-pits and breastworks to be thrown up. This was done, and morning found us well prepared for any emergency, either offensive or defensive.

The following day (third of January), considerable skirmishing was kept up without abatement, from early in the morning until dark. During the night, I received orders from General Crittenden to withdraw my command from the east bank of the river, and to report with it to General McCook.

This movement was executed between one and four o'clock in the morning, during which time the rain fell incessantly. The pickets about this time reported the enemy as having been very active in their movements during the latter part of the night, and their convictions that he was evacuating his position. Further observations made after daylight proved this to be the case.

The following list of casualties shows a loss in the division during the several engagements above described, as follows:

OFFICERS.		
Killed	16	
Wounded	34	
Missing	2	52
ENLISTED MEN.		
Killed	176	
Wounded	784	
Missing	399	1,359
Total		1,411

This division lost three pieces of artillery, and captured two. In the list of officers killed, are the names of Colonel Stem, One Hundred and First Ohio; Colonel Williams, Twenty-fifth Illinois; Lieutenant-Colonel Wooster, One Hundred and First Ohio; Lieutenant-Colonel McKee, Fifteenth Wisconsin; Captain Carpenter, Eighth Wisconsin battery, and Captain McCulloch, Second Kentucky cavaly, of my staff, whose noble deeds of valor on the field, had already placed their names on the list of brave men. The history of the war will record no brighter names, and the country will mourn the loss of no more devoted patriots than these.

Among the wounded are Colonel Alexander, Twenty-first Illinois; Lieutenant-Colonel Tanner, Twenty-second Indiana; Captain Pinney, Fifth Wisconsin battery, and Captain Austin, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, on the staff of Colonel Woodruff, whose names it affords me special gratification to mention.

From the twenty-sixth of December, until the close of the engagement on the fourth of January, at Murfreesboro, no entire day elapsed that the division or some portion of it did not engage the enemy. During a great part of the time the weather was excessively inclement and the troops suffered much from exposure. A heavy list of casualties and much suffering was unavoidable under the circumstances.

It affords me much pleasure to be able to report the cheerful and soldier-like manner in which these hardships and privations were endured by the troops throughout. History will record, and the country reward, their deeds.

My staff, consisting of T. W. Morrison, acting Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain H. Pease, Inspector-General; Captain McCullough, Lieutenants Frank E. Reynolds, and Thomas H. Dailey, Aids-de-Camp; Surgeon J. L. Judd, Medical Director; Captain Shriver, Ordnance Officer; Lieutenant R. Plunket, Provost Marshal; private Frank Clark, Clerk to the Assistant Adjutant-General, and acting Aid-de-Camp; deported themselves throughout the entire campaign, as well as on the battle-field, with distinguished zeal and conspicuous gallantry.

While expressing my high regard and approbation of the General commanding, I desire to tender my thanks to yourself, Major, and to Colonel Langdon, Major Bates, Captains Thurston, Williams, and Fisher, of his staff, for the prompt and efficient manner in which the field duties were performed by them.

During the several engagements in which the division participated, my subaltern officers attracted my admiration by their conspicuous gallantry, and whose names, I regret, cannot be mentioned in this report. They will be remembered in future recommendation for promotion.

I am, Major, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JEFF. C. DAVIS,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

GENERAL SHERIDAN'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, RIGHT WING,
CAMP ON STONE RIVER, TENNESSEE,
January 9, 1863.

Major J. A. Campbell, Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff:

MAJOR: In obedience to instructions from the headquarters of the right wing, I have the honor to report the following as the operations of my division, from the twenty-sixth day of December, 1862, to the sixth day of January, 1863:

On the twenty-sixth of December I moved

from camp, near Nashville, on the Nolensville pike, in the direction of Nolensville. At the crossing of Mill Creek the enemy's cavalry made some resistance, but were soon routed, one private and one Lieutenant of the enemy being captured.

On approaching Nolensville, I received a message from General Davis, who had arrived at Nolensville, via the Edmonson pike, that the enemy were in considerable force on his front, and requesting me to support him.

On the arrival of the head of my division at Nolensville, General Davis advanced upon the enemy's position about two miles south of that place, supported by my division. The enemy had here made a stand in a gap of the mountains, but after a sharp conflict with General Davis's command, were routed and one piece of artillery captured.

On the next day (twenty-seventh) I supported General Johnson's division in its advance on Triune, where the enemy were supposed to be in considerable force.

The town was taken possession of after a slight resistance, the main portion of their forces having evacuated the place.

On the twenty-eighth I encamped at Triune. On the twenty-ninth I supported General Davis's division, which had the advance from Triune on Murfreesboro, encamping that night at Wilkinson's Cross-roads, from which point there is a good turnpike to Murfreesboro.

On the next day (thirtieth) I took the advance of the right wing on this turnpike, toward Murfreesboro, General Stanley with a regiment of cavalry having been thrown in advance.

After arriving at a point about three miles from Murfreesboro, the enemy's infantry pickets were encountered and driven back, their numbers constantly increasing until I had arrived within about two miles and a quarter of Murfreesboro. At this point the resistance was so strong as to require two regiments to drive them. I was here directed by Major-General McCook to form my line of battle and place my artillery in position. My line was formed on the right of the pike and obliquely to it, four regiments to the front with a second line of four regiments, within short supporting distance, in the rear, with a reserve of one brigade, in column of regiments, to the rear and opposite the centre. General Davis was then ordered to close in and form on my right, the enemy all this time keeping up a heavy artillery and musketry fire upon my skirmishers.

The enemy continued to occupy, with their skirmishers, a heavy belt of timber to the right and front of my line, and across some open fields, and near where the left of General Davis's division was intended to rest. General Davis was then directed by Major-General McCook to swing his division, and I was directed to swing my right brigade with it until our continuous line would front nearly due east. This would give us possession of the timber above alluded to, and which was occupied by the enemy's skirmishers in considerable force. This movement was successfully executed, after a stubborn resistance on the part of the enemy, in which they used one battery of artillery. This battery was silenced in a very short time by Bush's and Hescock's batteries, of my division, and two of the enemy's pieces disabled.

At sundown I had taken up my position, my right resting in the timber, my left on the Wilkinson pike, my reserve brigade of four regiments to the rear and opposite the centre.

The killed and wounded during the day was seventy-five men. General Davis's left was closed in on my right, and his line thrown to the rear, so that it formed nearly a right angle with mine. General Negley's division, of Thomas's corps, was immediately on my left, his right resting on the left hand side of the Wilkinson pike.

The enemy appeared to be in strong force in a heavy cedar-wood, across an open valley in my front and parallel to it, the cedar extending the whole length of the valley, the distance across the valley varying from three hundred to four hundred yards.

At two o'clock on the morning of the thirty-first, General Sill, who had command of my right brigade, reported great activity on the part of the enemy immediately in his front. This being the narrowest point in the valley, I was fearful that an attack might occur at that point. I therefore directed two regiments from the reserve to report to General Sill, who placed them in position in very short supporting distance of his lines.

At four o'clock in the morning the division was assembled under arms, and the cannoniers at their pieces. About fifteen minutes after seven o'clock in the morning, the enemy advanced to the attack across an open cotton field on Sill's front. This column was opened on by Bush's battery, of Sill's brigade, which had a direct fire on its front; also by Hescock's and Houghtaling's batteries, which had an oblique fire on their front, from a commanding position near the centre of my line. The effect of this fire upon the enemy's columns was terrible. The enemy, however, continued to advance until they had reached nearly the edge of the timber, when they were opened upon by Sill's infantry at a range of not over fifty yards. The destruction to the enemy's column, which was closed in mass, being several regiments in depth, was terrible. For a short time they withstood the fire, wavered, then broke and ran; still directing his troops to charge, which was gallantly responded to, and the enemy driven back across the valley and behind their intrenchments. In this charge I had the misfortune to lose General Sill, who was killed.

The brigade then fell back in good order and renewed its original lines. The enemy soon rallied and advanced to the attack on my extreme right, and in front of Colonel Woodruff, of Davis's division. Here, unfortunately, the brigade of Colonel Woodruff gave way, also one

regiment of Sill's brigade, which was in the second line. This regiment fell back some distance into the open field and then rallied, its place being occupied by a third regiment of my reserve. At this time the enemy, who had attacked on the extreme right of our wing, against Johnson, and also on Davis's front, had been successful, and the two divisions on my right were retiring in great confusion, closely followed by the enemy, completely turning my position, and exposing my line to a fire from the rear. I hastily withdrew the whole of Sill's brigade, and the three regiments sent to support it, at the same time directing Colonel Roberts, of the left brigade, who had changed front and formed in column of regiments, to charge the enemy in the timber from which I had withdrawn three regiments. This was very gallantly done by Colonel Roberts, who captured one piece of the enemy's artillery, which had to be abandoned.

In the meantime I had formed Sill's and Shaeffer's brigades on a line at right angles to my first line, and behind the three batteries of artillery, which were placed in a fine position, directing Colonel Roberts to return and form on the new line. I then made an unavailing attempt to form the troops on my right in this line, in front of which there were open fields through which the enemy was approaching under a heavy fire from Hescock's, Houghtaling's, and Bush's batteries.

After the attempt had proved to be entirely unsuccessful, and my right was again turned, General McCook directed me to advance to the front and form on the right of Negley. This movement was successfully accomplished, under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, every regiment of mine remaining unbroken.

I took position on Negley's right, Roberts' brigade having been placed in position at right angles to Negley's line, facing to the south, the other two brigades being placed to the rear and at right angles with Roberts', and facing the west, covering the rear of Negley's lines. I then directed Houghtaling's battery to take position at the angle of these two lines, Captain Hescock sending one section of his battery, under Lieutenant Taliaferro, and one section of Bush's battery, to the same point; the remaining pieces of Hescock's and Bush's batteries were placed on the right of Negley's line, facing toward Murfreesboro. In this position I was immediately attacked, when one of the bitterest and most sanguinary contests of the whole day occurred.

General Cheatham's division advanced on Roberts' brigade, and heavy masses of the enemy with three batteries of artillery advanced over the open ground which I had occupied in the previous part of the engagement, at the same time the enemy opening from their intrenchments in the direction of Murfreesboro.

The contest then became terrible. The enemy made three attacks and were three times repulsed, the artillery range of the respective batteries being not over two hundred yards. In these attacks Roberts' brigade lost its gallant commander, who was killed.

There was no sign of faltering with the men, the only cry being for more ammunition, which, unfortunately, could not be supplied on account of the discomfiture of the troops on the right of our wing, which allowed the enemy to come in and capture our ammunition train.

Shaeffer's brigade being entirely out of ammunition, I directed them to fix bayonets and await the enemy. Roberts' brigade, which was nearly out of ammunition, I directed to fall back resisting the enemy. Captain Houghtaling, having exhausted all his ammunition, and nearly all the horses of his battery having been killed, attempted, with the assistance of the men, to withdraw his pieces by hand.

Lieutenant Taliaferro, commanding the section of Hescock's battery, having been killed, and several of his horses shot, his two pieces were brought off by his sergeant with the assistance of the men. The difficulty of withdrawing the artillery here became very great, the ground being rocky and covered with a dense growth of cedar. Houghtaling's battery had to be abandoned, and also two pieces of Bush's battery. The remaining pieces of artillery in the division were brought through the cedars with great difficulty, under a terrible fire from the enemy, on to the open space on the Murfreesboro pike, near the right of General Palmer's division. In coming through the cedars two regiments of Shaeffer's brigade succeeded in obtaining ammunition, and were immediately put in front to resist the enemy, who appeared to be driving in our entire lines.

On arriving at the open space I was directed by Major-General Rosecrans to take these two regiments and put them into action on the right of Palmer's division, where the enemy were pressing heavily. The two regiments went in very gallantly, driving the enemy from the cedar timber and some distance to the front. At the same time I put four pieces of Hescock's battery into action near by and on the same front. The other two regiments of Shaeffer's brigade, and the Thirty-sixth Illinois, of Sill's brigade, were directed to cross the railroad, where they could obtain ammunition. I then, by direction of Major-General McCook, withdrew the two regiments that had been placed on the right of Palmer's division, also Captain Hescock's pieces, that point having been given up to the enemy in the re-arrangement of our lines.

These regiments of Shaeffer's brigade having supplied themselves with ammunition, I put it into action, by direction of Major-General Rosecrans, directly to the front and right of General Wood's division, on the left hand side of the railroad.

The brigade advanced through a clump of timber, and took position on the edge of a cotton field, close upon the enemy's lines, relieving the division of General Wood, which was falling back under a heavy pressure from the enemy.

At this point I lost my third and last brigade

commander, Colonel Shaeffer, who was killed. The brigade, remaining in this position until after it had expended its ammunition, was withdrawn to the rear of this timber, when it was again supplied, and joined by the Thirty-sixth Illinois. I was here directed by General Rosecrans to form a close column of attack and charge the enemy should they again come down on the open ground.

The remaining portion of the evening this gallant brigade remained in close column of regiments, and under fire of the enemy's batteries, which killed about twenty of the men by round shot. In the meantime, Colonel Roberts' brigade, which had come out of the cedars unbroken, was put into action by General McCook at a point a short distance to the rear, where the enemy threatened our communications on the Murfreesboro pike.

The brigade, having but three or four rounds of ammunition, cheerfully went into action, gallantly charged the enemy, routing them, recapturing two pieces of artillery, and taking forty prisoners. The rout of the enemy at this point deserves special consideration, as they had nearly reached the Murfreesboro pike.

On the night of the thirty-first I was placed in position on the Murfreesboro pike, facing south, and on the ground where Roberts' brigade had charged the enemy, General Davis being on my right.

On the first of January heavy skirmish fighting, with occasional artillery shots on both sides, was kept up till about three o'clock P. M., when a charge was made by a brigade of the enemy on my position. This was handsomely repulsed, and one officer and eighty-five men of the enemy captured. Colonel Walker's brigade, of Thomas' corps, was also placed under my command temporarily, having a position on my left, where the same character of fighting was kept up.

On the second of January Colonel Walker sustained two heavy attacks, which he gallantly repulsed. On the third skirmishing took place throughout the day. On the fourth all was quiet in front, the enemy having disappeared. On the fifth nothing of importance occurred, and on the sixth I moved my division to its present camp on Stone River, three miles south of Murfreesboro on the Shelbyville pike.

I trust that the General commanding is satisfied with my division. It fought bravely and well. The loss of Houghtaling's battery and one section of Bush's was unavoidable. All the horses were shot down or disabled, Captain Houghtaling wounded, and Lieutenant Taliaferro killed.

My division, alone and unbroken, made a gallant stand to protect the right flank of our army, being all that remained of the right wing. Had my ammunition held out I would not have fallen back, although such were my orders if hard pressed. As it was, this determined stand of my troops gave time for a re-arrangement of our lines.

The division mourns the loss of Sill, Shaeffer, and Roberts. They were all instantly killed, and at the moment when their gallant brigades were charging the enemy. They were true soldiers—prompt and brave.

On the death of these officers, respectively, Colonel Grensel, Thirty-sixth Illinois, took command of Sill's brigade; Lieutenant-Colonel Laibold, Second Missouri, of Shaeffer's, and Colonel Bradley, of Roberts' brigade. These officers behaved gallantly throughout the day.

It is also my sad duty to record the death of Colonel F. A. Harrington, of the Twenty-seventh Illinois, who fell heroically leading his regiment to the charge.

I refer with pride to the splendid conduct, bravery, and efficiency of the following regimental commanders, and the officers and men of their respective commands:

Colonel F. T. Sherman, Eighty-eighth Illinois.

Major F. Ehrler, Second Missouri.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Weber, Fifteenth Missouri.

Captain W. W. Barrett, Forty-fourth Illinois, (wounded).

Major W. A. Preston, Seventy-third Illinois (wounded).

Major Silas Miller, of the Thirty-sixth Illinois (wounded and a prisoner).

Captain P. C. Oleson, Thirty-sixth Illinois.

Major E.C. Hubbard, Twenty-fourth Wisconsin.

Lieutenant-Colonel McCreary, Twenty-first Michigan.

Lieutenant-Colonel N. H. Walworth, Forty-second Illinois.

Lieutenant-Colonel F. Swanwick, Twenty-second Illinois (wounded and a prisoner).

Captain Samuel Johnson, Twenty-second Illinois.

Major W. A. Schmitt, Twenty-seventh Illinois.

Captain Wescott, Fifty-first Illinois.

I respectfully bring to the notice of the General commanding, the good conduct of Captain Hescock, Chief of Artillery, whose services were almost invaluable. Also, Captains Houghtailing and Bush, and the officers and men of their batteries.

Surgeon D. J. Griffiths, Medical Director of my division, and Doctor McArthur, of the Board of Medical Examiners of Illinois, were most assiduous in their care of the wounded.

Major H. F. Dietz, Provost Marshal; Captain Morhardt, Topographical Engineer; Lieutenant George Lee, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General; Lieutenants A. M. Denning, Frank H. Allen, B. W. DeBruin, J. L. Forman, and Soward, Aids-de-Camp, officers of my staff, were of the greatest service to me, delivering my orders faithfully, and promptly discharging the duties of their respective positions.

The ammunition train above alluded to as captured, was retaken from the enemy by the good conduct of Captain Thurston, Ordnance Officer of the corps, and Lieutenant Douglas, Ordnance Officer of my division, who, with Sergeant Cooper of my escort, rallied the stragglers and drove off the enemy's cavalry.

The following is the total of casualties in the division:

OFFICERS.

Killed	15	
Wounded	38	
Missing	11—	64

ENLISTED MEN.

Killed	223	
Wounded	943	
Missing	400—	1,566
Total		1,630

Of the eleven officers and four hundred enlisted men missing, many are known to be wounded and in the hands of the enemy.

Prisoners were captured from the enemy by my division, as follows:

Majors	1
Captains	1
Lieutenants	3
Enlisted men	216
Total	221

I am, sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
P. H. SHERIDAN,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

GENERAL JAMES S. NEGLEY'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH DIVISION,
MURFREESBORO, January 8, 1863.

Major George E. Flynt, Chief of Staff:

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the troops under my command, in the engagement with the enemy on Stone River:

On Tuesday morning, December thirtieth, 1862, the Eighth division, composed of the Seventh and Twenty-ninth brigades, Schultz's, Marshall's and Wells' batteries, was posted on a rolling slope of the west bank of Stone River, in advance, but joining the extreme right of General Crittenden's line, and the left of General McCook's.

In the rear and on the right, was a dense cedar-wood with a broken, rocky surface. From one position, several roads were cut through the woods in our rear, by which to bring up the artillery and ammunition trains.

In front, a heavy growth of oak timber extended toward the river, which was about a mile distant. A narrow thicket diagonally crossed our left, and skirted the base of a cultivated slope, expanding to the width of a mile, as it approached the Nashville pike.

This slope afforded the enemy his commanding position (in the centre), on the crest of which his rifle-pits extended (with intervals) from the oak timber immediately in my front, to the Nashville pike, with a battery of four Napoleon and two iron guns, placed in position, near the woods, and about eight hundred yards from my position.

Behind this timber, on the river bank, the enemy massed his columns, for the movements of the next day.

His skirmishers were driven from our immediate front after a sharp contest; in which the Nineteenth Illinois and Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania volunteers displayed admirable efficiency. The position of my command was held, under a heavy fire, until darkness terminated the skirmishing in our front, by which time we had inflicted considerable loss upon the enemy.

In the meantime, General Sheridan's division came up and formed "line of battle" (his left resting on my right), and began to advance, driving the enemy, until he had passed the centre of my brigade.

While General Sheridan was in this position, I changed my front slightly, bearing it more to the left, to avoid masking a portion of Sheridan's command.

The troops remained in this position and in "order of battle" all night, cheerfully enduring the cold and rain, awaiting the morrow's sun, to renew the contest.

Early the next morning, and before the heavy fog had drifted from our front, the enemy, in strong force, attacked General McCook's right, commencing a general engagement, which increased in intensity toward his left.

Sheridan's division stood its ground manfully, supported by the Eighth division, repulsing and driving the enemy at every advance.

The enemy still gained ground on General McCook's right, and succeeded in placing several batteries in position, which covered my right; from these, and the battery on my left, which now opened, the troops were exposed to a converging fire, which was most destructive.

Houghtaling's, Schultz's, Marshall's, Bush's, and Wells' batteries were all ordered into action in my front, pouring destructive volleys of grape and shell into the advancing columns of the enemy, mowing him down like swaths of grain.

For four hours the Eighth division, with a portion of Sheridan's and Palmer's divisions, maintained their position, amid a murderous storm of lead and iron, strewing the ground with their heroic dead.

The enemy, maddened to desperation by the determined resistance, still pressed forward fresh troops, concentrating and forming them in a concentric line, on either flank.

By eleven o'clock, Sheridan's men, with their ammunition exhausted, were falling back. General Rousseau's reserve and General Palmer's division had retired in the rear of the cedars, to form a new line. The artillery ammunition was expended, that of the infantry reduced to a few rounds. The artillery horses were nearly all killed or wounded; my ammunition train had been sent back, to avoid capture; a heavy column of the enemy was marching directly to our rear, through the cedars. Communication with Generals Rosecrans and Thomas was entirely cut off, and it was manifestly impossible for my command to hold the position, without

eventually making a hopeless, fruitless sacrifice of the whole division.

To retire, was but to cut our way through the ranks of the enemy. The order was given, and manfully executed; driving back the enemy in front, and checking his approaching columns in our rear.

All the regiments in my command distinguished themselves for their coolness and daring, frequently halting and charging the enemy, under a withering fire of musketry.

On approaching General Rousseau's line, the battalion of regulars, under command of Major King, at my request, gallantly charged forward to our assistance, sustaining a severe loss in officers and men, in the effort.

Colonels Stanley and Miller now promptly re-formed their brigades, with the remaining portions of the batteries, and took position on the new line, as designated by Major-General Thomas.

Shortly afterward, the Twenty-ninth brigade was ordered to the left, to repel an attack from the enemy's cavalry upon the trains.

The troops remained in line all night and the next day in "order of battle" until noon, when the division was ordered to the right of General McCook's line, in expectation of an attack upon his front.

The next day (January two) at one o'clock P. M., my command was ordered to the support of General Crittenden, on the left, and took position in the rear of the batteries, on the west bank of Stone River.

About three P. M. a strong force of the enemy, with artillery, advanced rapidly upon General Van Cleve's division; which, after sustaining a severe fire for twenty or thirty minutes, fell back in considerable disorder; the enemy pressing vigorously forward to the river bank.

At this important moment, the Eighth division was ordered to advance, which it did promptly; the men crossing the river and charging up the steep bank with unflinching bravery. The Twenty-first, Eighteenth, Sixty-ninth, and Seventy-fourth Ohio, Nineteenth Illinois, Eleventh Michigan, Thirty-seventh Indiana, and Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania volunteers, displaying their usual promptness and gallantry. Four pieces of artillery and a stand of colors belonging to the Twenty-sixth (rebel) Tennessee, were captured at the point of the bayonet, also a large number of prisoners; the enemy retreating in disorder.

It is proper to mention here, that the artillery practice of Schultz's, Mendenhall's, Standart's, Wells', Marshall's, and Stokes' batteries, which were acting temporarily under my orders, in this engagement, was highly satisfactory, giving the enemy great tribulation.

The promptness displayed by Captain Stokes, in bringing his battery into action by my orders, and the efficient manner with which it was served, affords additional evidence of his marked ability and bravery as an officer and patriot. In the same connection, I feel permitted to speak in complimentary terms of the gallant Morton, and his pioneer brigade, which marched forward under a scathing fire, to the support of my division.

The enemy having fallen back to his intrenchments, my division re-crossed the river and resumed its former position.

On the evening of the fourth, the Twenty-ninth brigade was moved forward to the north bank of Stone River, near the railroad, as an advanced force. On the same day, General Spears' First Tennessee brigade was assigned to the Eighth division. This brigade distinguished itself on the evening of the second, in a desperate charge on the enemy. On the morning of the fifth, I was ordered to take command of the advance, and pursue the enemy toward Murfreesboro.

By nine A. M., the Eighth division, Walker's brigade (pioneer brigade), and General Stanley's cavalry force had crossed the river and taken possession of Murfreesboro, without meeting any resistance; the rear guard of the enemy retreating on the Manchester and Shelbyville roads, our cavalry pursuing, supported by the Twenty-ninth brigade, on the Shelbyville pike, and by Colonel Byrd's First East Tennessee regiment, on the Manchester pike.

The rear guard of the enemy (three regiments cavalry and one battery) was overtaken on the Manchester, five miles from Murfreesboro. Colonel Byrd fearlessly charged this unequal force of the enemy, driving him from his position, with a loss of four killed and twelve wounded; enemy's loss not ascertained.

Our army marched quietly into Murfreesboro, the chosen position of the enemy, which he was forced to abandon after a series of desperate engagements. The joyful hopes of traitors have been crushed—treason receiving another fatal blow.

My command enthusiastically join me in expression of admiration of the official conduct of Generals Rosecrans and Thomas. During the most eventful periods of the engagements their presence was at the point of danger, aiding with their counsels and animating the troops by their personal bravery and cool determination.

I refer to my command with feelings of national pride for the living, and personal sorrow for the dead. Without a murmur, they made forced marches over almost impassable roads, through drenching winter rains, without blankets or a change of clothing; deprived of sleep or repose, constantly on duty for eleven days; living three days on a pint of flour and parched corn. Ever vigilant, always ready, sacrificing their lives with a contempt of peril, displaying the coolness, determination, and high discipline of veterans, they are entitled to our country's gratitude. Pennsylvania, Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Tennessee, may proudly inscribe upon their scrolls of fame the names of the Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania volunteers, Eighteenth, Twenty-first, Sixty-ninth, and Seventy-fourth Ohio, Schultz's and Marshall's (Ohio) batteries, the Eleventh Michigan, Nine-

teenth Illinois, Thirty-seventh Indiana, Wells' section (Kentucky) battery, and Spears' Tennessee brigade.

I wish to make honorable mention of the bravery and efficient services rendered by the following named officers and men, for whom I earnestly request promotion:

Brigadier-General Spears, commanding First Tennessee brigade.

Colonel T. R. Stanley, Eighteenth Ohio volunteer infantry, commanding Twenty-ninth brigade.

Colonel John T. Miller, Twenty-ninth Indiana volunteers, commanding Seventh brigade.

Captain Jas. St. Clair Morton, commanding pioneer brigade.

Captain James H. Stokes, commanding Chicago battery.

Major John H. King, commanding Fifteenth United States infantry.

Captain Bush, commanding Fourth Indiana battery.

Captain James A. Lowrie, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Lieutenant Fred. H. Kennedy, Aid-de-Camp.

Captain Charles T. Wing, Assistant Quartermaster.

Major Fred. H. Gross, Medical Director.

Captain James R. Hayden, Ordnance Officer.

Lieutenant Wm. W. Barker, Aid-de-Camp.

Lieutenant Robert H. Cochran, Provost Marshal.

Lieutenant Francis Riddell, acting Assistant Commissary of Subsistence.

Lieutenant Charles C. Cook, acting Aid-de-Camp.

Lieutenant W. D. Ingraham, Topographical Engineers.

Captain Frederick Shultz and Lieutenant Joseph Hein, Battery M, First Ohio artillery.

Lieutenants Alex. Marshall, John Crable, and Robert D. Whittlesey, Battery G, First Ohio artillery.

Captain W. E. Standart, Battery B, First Ohio artillery.

Lieutenant A. A. Ellsworth, commanding Wells' section Kentucky artillery.

Lieutenant W. H. Spence, Wells' section Kentucky artillery.

Lieutenant H. Terry, Third Ohio cavalry.

Secretaries—Sergeant H. B. Fletcher, Company K, Nineteenth Illinois volunteers; Corporal Rufus Rice, Company K, First Wisconsin volunteers; Private James A. Sangston, Company C, Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania volunteers, and Sergeant Charles Rambour, Company K, Seventy-fourth Ohio volunteers; Wm. Longwell, Orderly, Seventh Pennsylvania cavalry.

Escort—Sergeant George C. Lee, Corporal E. H. Daugherty, Privates Henry Schwenk, Henry B. Zimmerman, John Higgins, Leon Starr, Daniel Walker, John McCorkle, Abraham Kepply, George Gillem, John Cunningham.

The following is an approximate report of the casualties in my command, during the battles before Murfreesboro, December thirtieth and thirty-first, 1862, and January second and third 1863:

Casualties.

Command.	Went into Action.				Lost in Action.										
					Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Horses.			Guns.	
Second Division—Centre—Fourteenth Army Corps.	Officers.	Men.	Horses.	Cannon.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Lost.	Disabled.
First Tennessee Brigade,	66	784	8	..	....	3	1	22	..	..	..	1	..	..	..
Twenty-ninth Brigade,	93	1719	37	..	8	78	25	259	..	94	5	3	5	..	..
Seventh Brigade,	71	1948	..	..	3	79	20	415	1	193	..	..	..	..	..
Infantry,	230	4401	45	..	11	160	46	696	1	287	5	4	5	..	..
Schultz Battery	2	75	56	4	..	1	1	..	..	1	5	4	..	1	..
Marshall's Battery,	3	110	116	6	..	5	..	5	..	14	34	12	..	4	..
Wells' Battery	2	47	40	3	..	1	..	3	.	6	18	6	4	1.	1
Artillery,	7	232	212	13	..	7	1	8	..	21	57	22	4	6	1
Total,	237	4633	257	13	11	167	47	704	1	308	62	26	9	6	1

Remarks.—My command captured upwards of four hundred prisoners, four brass field pieces, and one stand of regimental colors.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

James S. Negley,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

GENERAL ROUSSEAU'S REPORT.

NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, January 11, 1863.

Major George E. Flynt, Chief of Staff:

SIR: I have the honor to report the part taken by my command, the Third division of the army, in the battle of Murfreesboro, begun on the thirty-first ultimo, and ended on the third instant:

Early on the morning of the thirtieth ult., in obedience to the order of Major-General Thomas, my division moved forward toward Murfreesboro from Stewartsboro, on the Nashville and Murfreesboro turnpike, about nine miles from the latter place. On the march forward several dispatches from General Rosecrans reached me, asking exactly where my command was, and the hour and minute of the day. In consequence we moved rapidly forward, halted but once, and that for only five minutes. About half past ten o'clock A. M., we reached a point three miles from Murfreesboro, where Generals Rosecrans and Thomas were, on the Nashville and Murfreesboro turnpike, and remained during the day, and bivouacked at night.

At about nine o'clock A. M., on the thirty-first, the report of artillery and the heavy firing of small arms on our right announced that the battle had begun by an attack on the right wing, commanded by Major-General McCook. It was not long before the direction from which the firing came, indicated that General McCook's command had given way and was yielding ground to the enemy. His forces seemed to swing round toward our right and rear. At this time General Thomas ordered me to advance my division quickly to the front to the assistance of General McCook.

On reaching the right of General Negley's line of battle, General Thomas there directed me to let my left rest on his right, and to deploy my division off toward the right as far as I could, so as to resist the pressure on General McCook.

We consulted and agreed as to where the line should be formed. This was in a dense cedar-brake, through which my troops marched in quick time to get into position before the enemy reached us. He was then but a few hundred yards to the front, sweeping up in immense numbers, driving everything before him. This ground was new and unknown to us all. The woods were almost impassable to infantry, and artillery was perfectly useless, but the line was promptly formed. The Seventeenth brigade, Colonel John Beatty commanding, on the left; the regular brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel O. L. Shepard commanding, on the right; the Ninth brigade, Colonel B. F. Scribner commanding, was placed perhaps a hundred yards in the rear and opposite the centre of the front line, so as to support either or both the brigades in front, as occasion might require. My recollection is that perhaps the Second and Thirty-third Ohio regiments filled a gap between General Negley's right and the Seventeenth brigade, occasioned by the effort to extend our lines far enough to the right to afford the desired aid to General McCook.

The Twenty-eighth brigade, Colonel John C. Starkweather commanding, and Stone's battery of the First Kentucky artillery, were at Jefferson crossing on Stone River, about eight miles below.

Our lines were hardly formed before a dropping fire from the enemy announced his approach. General McCook's troops, in a good deal of confusion, retired through our lines, and around our right, under a most terrific fire. The enemy in pursuit furiously assailed our front, and, greatly outflanking us, passed around to our right and rear.

By General Thomas's direction I had already ordered the artillery, Loomis' and Guenther's batteries, to the open field in the rear. Seeing that my command was outflanked on the right, I sent orders to the brigade commanders to retire at once also to this field, and riding back myself, I posted the batteries on a ridge in the open ground parallel with our line of battle, and as my men emerged from the woods they were ordered to take position on the right and left, and in support of these batteries, which was promptly done. We had perhaps four or five hundred yards of open ground in our front. While the batteries were unlimbering, seeing General Van Cleve close by, I rode up and asked him if he would move his command to the right, and aid in checking up the enemy by forming on my left, and thus giving us a more extended line in that direction in the new position taken. In the promptest manner possible his line was put in motion, and in double-quick time reached the desired point in good season.

As the enemy emerged from the woods in great force shouting and cheering, the batteries of Loomis and Guenther, double-shotted with canister, opened upon them. They moved straight ahead for awhile, but were finally driven back with immense loss. In a little while they rallied again, and, as it seemed, with fresh troops, again assailed our position, and were again, after a fierce struggle, driven back. Four deliberate and fiercely sustained assaults were made upon our position, and repulsed. During the last assault, I was informed that our troops were advancing on our right, and saw troops, out of my division, led by General Rosecrans, moving in that direction. I informed General Thomas of the fact, and asked leave to advance my lines. He directed me to do so. We made a charge upon the enemy and drove him into the woods, my staff and orderlies capturing some seventeen prisoners, including a Captain and Lieutenant, who were within one hundred and thirty yards of the batteries. This ended the fighting of that day, the enemy in immense force hovering in the woods during the night, while we slept upon our arms on the field of battle. We occupied this position during the three following days and nights of the fight. Under General Thomas's direction I had it intrenched by rifle-pits, and believe the enemy could not have taken it at all.

During the day, the Twenty-eighth brigade, Colonel Starkweather, was attacked by Wheeler's cavalry in force, and some of the wagons of his train were burned before they reached him, having started that morning from Stewartsboro

to join him. The enemy were finally repulsed and driven off with loss. Starkweather's loss was small. In this affair the whole brigade behaved handsomely.

The burden of the fight fell upon the Second Wisconsin, Lieutenant-Colonel Hobart commanding. This regiment, led by its efficient commander, behaved like veterans. From the evening of the thirty-first until Saturday night, no general battle occurred in front of my division, though firing of artillery and small arms was kept up during the day, and much of the small arms during the night. The rain on the night of the thirty-first, which continued at intervals until the Saturday night following, rendered the ground occupied by my command exceedingly sloppy and muddy, and during much of the time my men had neither shelter, food, nor fire. I procured corn, which they parched and ate, and some of them ate horse-steaks cut and broiled from horses on the battle-field. Day and night in the cold, wet and mud, my men suffered severely, but during the whole time I did not hear one single murmur at their hardships, but all were cheerful and ever ready to stand by their arms and fight. Such endurance I never saw. In these severe trials of their patience and their strength, they were much encouraged by the constant presence and solicitous anxiety of General Thomas for their welfare.

On the evening of Saturday, third inst., I asked permission of General Thomas to drive the enemy from a wood on our left front, to which he gave his consent. Just before, I directed the batteries of Guenther and Loomis to shell the woods with six rounds per gun, fired as rapidly as possible. This was very handsomely done, and ended just at dark, when the Third Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel O. H. Lawson, and Eighty-eighth Indiana, Colonel George Humphreys, both under command of the brigade commander, Colonel John Beatty, moved promptly up to the woods. When near the woods they received a heavy fire from the enemy, but returned it vigorously and gallantly and pressed forward. On reaching the woods a fresh body of the enemy, attracted by the fire, moved up on their left to support them. On that body of the enemy Loomis's battery opened with shell. The fusilade was very rapid, and continued for perhaps three-quarters of an hour, when Beatty's command drove the enemy at the point of the bayonet, and held the woods. It turned out that the enemy were posted behind a stone breastwork in the woods, and when ousted about thirty men were taken prisoners behind the woods. This ended the battle of Murfreesboro.

On the morning of the thirty-first, six companies of the Second Kentucky cavalry, Major Thomas P. Nicholas commanding, were ordered down to watch and defend the fords of Stone River to our left and rear. The cavalry of the enemy several times, in force, attempted to cross these fords, but Nicholas very gallantly repulsed them with loss, and they did not cross the river.

I should have mentioned that Friday evening late I was directed by General Thomas to place a regiment in the woods on our left front as an outpost, and with the view to hold the woods, as they were near our lines, and the enemy could greatly annoy us if allowed to hold them. Our skirmishers were then just leaving the woods. I ordered the Forty-second Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Shanklin commanding, to take that position; which he did. But early the next morning the enemy, in large force, attacked Colonel Shanklin, first furiously shelling the woods, and drove the regiment back to our lines, taking Shanklin prisoner. It was this wood that was retaken on Saturday night as before described.

The troops of the division behaved admirably. I could not wish them to behave more gallantly. The Ninth and Seventeenth brigades, under the lead of their gallant commanders, Scribner and Beatty, were, as well as the Twenty-eighth brigade, Colonel Starkweather, veterans; they were with me at Chaplin Hills, and could not act badly.

The Twenty-eighth brigade held a position in our front after the first day's fighting, and did it bravely, doing all that was required of them like true soldiers.

The brigade of United States infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel O. L. Shepard commanding, was on the extreme right. On that body of brave men the shock of battle fell heaviest, and its loss was most severe. Over one-third of the command fell killed or wounded; but it stood up to the work and bravely breasted the storm, and though Major King, commanding the Fifteenth, and Major Slemmer ("Old Pickens"), the Sixteenth, fell severely wounded, and Major Carpenter, commanding the Nineteenth, fell dead in the last charge, together with many other brave officers and men, the brigade did not falter for a moment. These three battalions were a part of my old Fourth brigade at the battle of Shiloh.

The Eighteenth infantry, Majors Townsend and Caldwell commanding, were new troops to me, but I am proud now to say we know each other. If I could I would promote every officer and non-commissioned officer and private of this brigade of regulars for gallantry and good service in this terrific battle. I make no distinction between these troops and my brave volunteer regiments, for in my judgment there were never better troops than these regiments in the world. But the troops of the line are soldiers by profession, and with a view to the future I feel it my duty to say what I have of them. The brigade was admirably and gallantly handled by Lieutenant Colonel Shepard.

I lost some of the bravest and best officers I had. Lieutenant Colonel Kell, commanding Second Ohio, was killed. After he fell his regiment was efficiently handled by Major Anson McCook, who ought to be made Colonel of that regiment for gallantry on the field. Colonel Forman, my brave *boy* Colonel of the Fifteenth Kentucky, also fell. Major Carpenter,

of the Nineteenth infantry, fell in the last charge. His loss is irreparable. Many other gallant officers were lost.

Of the batteries of Guenther and Loomis I cannot say too much. Loomis was Chief of Artillery for the Third division, and I am much indebted to him. His battery was commanded by Lieutenant Van Pelt. Guenther is but a Lieutenant. Both of these men deserve to be promoted, and ought to be *at once*. Without them we could not have held our position.

I fell in with many gallant regiments and officers on the field, not of my command. I wish I could name all of them here. While falling back to the line in the open field, I saw Colonel Charles Anderson gallantly and coolly rallying his men. Colonel Grider, of Kentucky, and his regiment, efficiently aided in repulsing the enemy. The Eighteenth Ohio, I think it was, though I do not know any of its officers, faced about, and charged the enemy in my presence, and I went along with it. The Eleventh Michigan, and its gallant little Colonel (Stoughton), behaved well, and the Sixth Ohio infantry, Colonel Nick Anderson, joined my command on the right of the regular brigade, and stood manfully up to the work.

I fell in with the Louisville legion in retreat, Lieutenant-Colonel Berry commanding. This regiment, though retreating before an overwhelming force, was dragging by hand a section of artillery which it had been ordered to support. A part of General McCook's wing of the army had fallen back with the rest, but through the woods and fields, with great difficulty, bravely brought off the cannon it could no longer defend on the field. When I met it, it faced about and formed line of battle with cheers and shouts.

To Lieutenant McDowell, my acting Assistant Adjutant-General; Lieutenant Armstrong, Second Kentucky cavalry; Lieutenant Millard, Nineteenth United States infantry, Inspector-General; Captain Taylor, Fifteenth Kentucky, and Lieutenant Alf. Pirtle, Ordnance Officer, my regular Aids, and to Captain John D. Wickliffe and Lieutenant W. G. Jenkins, both of Second Kentucky cavalry, Aids for that battle, I am much indebted for services on that field.

The wounded were kindly and tenderly cared for by the Third Division Medical Director, Surgeon Muscroft, and the other surgeons of the command.

Lieutenant McDowell was wounded. My Orderlies, James Emery and the rest, went through the whole fight behaving well. Emery was wounded. Lieutenant Carpenter, First Ohio volunteer infantry, one of my Aids, was so badly injured by the fall of his horse that I would not permit him to go on the field. Lieutenant Hartman, Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania volunteer infantry, a member of my staff, was ill with fever, and unable to leave his bed.

It should be mentioned that the Eighty-eighth Indiana, Colonel Humphreys, being placed at one of the fords on Stone River where our forces were temporarily driven back, very opportunely rallied the stragglers, and promptly crossed the river and drove the enemy back. In this he was aided by the stragglers, who rallied and fought well. The Colonel was wounded by a bayonet thrust in the hand in the attack of Saturday night on the enemy in the woods in our front.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

LOVELL H. ROUSSEAU,
Major-General.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL PALMER'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, LEFT WING,
CAMP NEAR MURFREESBORO, January 9, 1863.

Major L. Starling, Chief of Staff:

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit, for the information of the General commanding, the following report of the operations of this division, from and including the twenty-seventh of December up to and including the fourth of January:

At 11.20 A. M., on the twenty-seventh of December, while in camp near Lavergne, I received orders to move forward, following the division of General Wood, and to detach a brigade to proceed by the Jefferson pike and seize the bridge across Stewart's Creek. The duty of conducting this operation was assigned to Colonel Hazen—which was well and skilfully done.

The brigades of Cruft and Grose reached the west bank of Stewart's Creek late in the afternoon of the twenty-seventh, and bivouacked there until the morning of the twenty-ninth.

During all the day, Sunday, the twenty-eighth, the enemy's pickets were in sight across the creek, firing upon us occasionally at long range, but did us no harm. On Monday morning, twenty-ninth of December, at nine o'clock, I was ordered to deploy one regiment as skirmishers; to dispose of my other troops so as to support it, and move forward at ten o'clock precisely and continue to advance until the enemy were found in position.

This disposition was made.

A few minutes before ten o'clock, Parsons was ordered to shell the woods to our front, and at ten o'clock Grose's brigade moved forward, skirmishing with the enemy, supported by the First brigade, Hazen not having yet joined me.

The command advanced steadily, driving the light force of rebel skirmishers before it to the top of the hill, some mile and a half this side of Stewart's Creek, and being under the impression that the divisions of Wood and Negley were to advance with me.

In a few moments Wood's advance came up on the left of the pike and the two divisions moved forward, constantly skirmishing (though much heavier on Wood's front than my own) to the ground occupied that night, afterward the theatre of battle of the thirty-first.

During the day the casualties were ten wounded in Grose's brigade, none severely.

On the morning of the thirtieth, my division was formed as follows: Third brigade (Grose's) in two lines, the left resting on the pike; First

brigade (Cruft's) to the right, extending across the point of woods, his extreme right retired to connect with Negley's left; and Hazen's brigade in reserve.

There was considerable skirmishing during the day, the greater portion of which fell upon Cruft's brigade, which was in rather unpleasant proximity to a point of woods to his front and right, held by the enemy in strong force.

About four o'clock I was ordered to advance and open upon the enemy with all my artillery. This was not done, probably, as soon as the order contemplated. The ground occupied by the batteries at the time the order was received was low and confined; upon pushing forward the skirmishers of the First brigade to clear the way to a good artillery position, in the open field to the front, the rebels were found numerous and stubborn. Learning very soon that a mere demonstration was intended, all my batteries opened, and, I am satisfied, damaged the enemy considerably. The skirmish attending this movement was quite brisk; the troops engaged doing themselves great credit. This closed the operations of the day.

On the morning of the thirty-first, Cruft's brigade retained its position of the day before. Hazen's brigade had relieved Grose, who had fallen back to a point some two hundred yards to the rear, and was formed in two lines nearly opposite the interval between the First and Second brigades; Standart's battery on the extreme right, Parsons' near the centre.

Early in the morning I rode to the right of my own command, and the battle had commenced on the extreme right of the line; soon afterward, near eight o'clock, General Negley, through one of his staff, informed me he was about to advance and requested me to advance to cover his left. I gave notice of this to the General commanding, and a few moments later received orders to move forward. I at once ordered General Cruft to advance, keeping close up well toward Negley; Colonel Hazen to go forward, observing the movements of Wood's right; and Grose to steadily advance, supporting the advance brigades, and all to use their artillery freely.

My line had advanced hardly a hundred yards when, upon reaching my own right, I found that General Negley had, instead of advancing, thrown back his right, so that his line was almost perpendicular to that of Cruft and to his rear; and it was also apparent that the enemy were driving General McCook back, and were rapidly approaching our rear.

Cruft's line was halted by my order. I rode to the left to make some disposition to meet the coming storm, and by the time I reached the open ground to the south of the pike, the heads of the enemy's columns had forced their way to the open ground to my rear. To order Grose to change front to the rear was the work of a moment, and he obeyed the order almost as soon as given; retiring his new left so as to bring the enemy under the direct fire of his line, he opened upon them in fine style and with great effect, and held his ground until the enemy were driven back.

In the meantime General Negley's command had, to some extent, become compromised by the confusion on the right, and my first brigade was exposed in front and flank to a severe attack, which also now extended along my whole front. Orders were sent to Colonel Hazen to fall back from the open cotton field into which he had moved. He fell back a short distance, and a regiment from Wood's division which had occupied the crest of a low-wooded hill, between the pike and the railroad, having been removed, he took possession of that, and there resisted the enemy. Hazen on the railroad, one or two regiments to the right, some troops in the point of woods south of the cotton field and a short distance in advance of the general line, among whom I was only able to distinguish the gallant Colonel Whittaker and his Sixth Kentucky; still further to the right Cruft was fighting, aided by Standart's guns, and to the rear Grose was fighting with apparently great odds against him. All were acquitting themselves nobly, and all were hard pressed. I could see that Grose was losing a great many men, but the importance of Hazen's position determined me, if necessary, to expend the last man in holding it. I gave my attention from that time chiefly to that point.

The One Hundredth Illinois came up on the left of the railroad and fought steadily. As soon as Colonel Grose was relieved of the enemy in his rear, he again changed front, moved to the left and co-operated with Colonel Hazen. One regiment was sent to my support from General Wood's command, and which behaved splendidly. I regret my inability either to name the regiment or its officers. Again and again the attack was renewed by the enemy, and each time repulsed, and the gallant men who had so bravely struggled to hold the position occupied it during the night.

Brigadier-General Cruft deserves great praise for so long holding the important position occupied on our right, and for skilfully extricating his command from the mass of confusion around it. Standart fought his guns until the enemy were upon him, and then brought them off safely; while the Second Kentucky brought off by hand three guns abandoned by General Negley's division.

Colonel Hazen proved himself a brave and able soldier by the skill and courage exhibited in forming and sheltering his troops, and in organizing and fighting all the materials around him for the maintenance of his important position.

Colonel Grose exhibited great coolness and bravery, and fought against great odds. He was under my eye during the whole day, and I could see nothing to improve in the management of his command.

I shrink from the task of specially mentioning regiments or regimental officers. All did their duty, and, from my imperfect acquaintance with regiments, I am apprehensive of injurious mistakes.

I recognized during the battle the Forty-first Ohio, which fought until it expended its last cartridge, and was then relieved by the noble Ninth Indiana, which came into line with a heavy shout, inspiring all with confidence. The Eighty-fourth, One Hundred and Tenth, and One Hundredth Illinois I knew; all new regiments, and all so fought that even the veterans of "Shiloh" and other bloody fields had no occasion to boast over them. The Eighty-fourth stood its ground until more than one-third of its number were killed or wounded. The Sixth Ohio, the Twenty-fourth Ohio, the Twenty-third Kentucky, and the Thirty-sixth Indiana were pointed out to me; and I recognized the brave Colonel Whittaker and his fighting men doing soldiers' duty. I only saw the regiments of Cruft's brigade fighting early in the day; I had no fears for them where valor could win. Indeed, the whole division fought like soldiers trained under the rigid discipline of the lamented Nelson, and by their courage proved that they had caught a large portion of his heroic and unconquerable spirit.

During the whole day I regarded the battery under the command of Lieutenant Parsons, assisted by Lieutenants Cushing and Huntington, as my right arm, and well did the conduct of these courageous and skilful young officers justify my confidence. My orders to Parsons were simple: "Fight where you can do the most good." Never were orders better obeyed.

The reported conduct of the other batteries attached to the division is equally favorable. They were in other parts of the field.

My personal staff, Captain Norton, acting Assistant Adjutant-General; Lieutenants Simmons and Child; Lieutenant Croxton, Ordnance Officer; Lieutenant Hays, Division Topographical Engineer; Lieutenant Shaw, Seventh Illinois cavalry, were with me all day on the field, and carried my orders everywhere with the greatest courage. Lieutenant Simmons was severely injured by a fragment of a shell.

I cannot commend the conduct of Doctor Sherman, Ninth Indiana volunteers, Medical Director, too highly. At all times from the commencement of the march from Nashville, and during the battles and skirmishes in which the division was engaged, up to the occupation of Murfreesboro, he was always at his post, and by his industry, humanity, and skill, earned not only my gratitude and that of this command, but that of the wounded of the enemy, many of whom were thrown upon his care.

On the first of January, this division was relieved and placed in reserve. On Friday, the second, Grose's brigade was ordered over the river to the left to support the division of Colonel Beatty, and during the action the brigade of Colonel Hazen was also ordered over to cooperate with Grose, while the First brigade (Cruft's) was posted to support a battery on the hill near the ford.

During the heavy cannonade the First brigade maintained its position with perfect coolness.

While the engagement was going on across the river a rebel force of what seemed to be three small regiments, entered the clump of woods in front of the position of our batteries on the hill near the ford. These troops were in musket range of our right across the creek, and I determined at once to dislodge them. Seeing two regiments, one of which was commanded by Colonel Garrit, and the other by Colonel Attmire, I ordered them to advance to the edge of the wood and deploy some companies as skirmishers. They obeyed me cheerfully and pushed in. Not being willing to leave the repulse of the enemy a matter of doubt, or to expose these brave fellows to the danger of heavy loss, I ordered up two of Cruft's regiments, and upon approaching the edge of the woods halted them, and told them it was my purpose to clear the woods at the point of the bayonet. To inspire them with coolness and confidence, the preparation for the charge was made with great deliberation. To get the proper direction for the line, guides were thrown out and the proper changes were made. Bayonets fixed, and these two regiments, Thirty-first Indiana and Ninetieth Ohio, ordered to clear the woods. They went in splendidly. It was done so quickly that the rebels had hardly time to discharge their pieces. They fled with the utmost speed. All these regiments behaved handsomely.

Commands.	Killed.			Wounded.			Missing.			Aggregate.
	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Total.	
First Brigade,	.....	44	44	9	218	227	6	120	126	397
Second Brigade,	5	41	46	17	318	335	.....	52	52	433
Third Brigade,	10	97	107	22	456	478	.....	74	74	659
Standart's Battery,	.....	5	5	.....	12	12	.....	3	3	20
Parson's Battery,	.....	2	2	.....	14	14	.....	6	6	22
Cockerell's Battery,	.....	2	2	1	13	14	.....	2	2	18
Total,	15	191	206	49	1,031	1,080	6	257	263	1,549

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, yours,

J. M. Palmer,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

GENERAL T. J. WOOD'S REPORT.

NASHVILLE, TENN., January 6, 1863.

Major Lyne Starling, Chief of Staff:

On the morning of the twenty-sixth ult., the left wing of the Fourteenth army corps broke up its encampment in the vicinity of Nashville, and moved toward the enemy. Reliable information assured us that they were encamped in force at and in the vicinity of Murfreesboro; but as their cavalry, supported occasionally by infantry, had extended its operations up to our outposts, and as we had been compelled, some days previous to the movement on the twenty-sixth ult., to fight for the greater part of the forage consumed by our animals, it was supposed we would meet with resistance as soon as our troops passed beyond the lines of our own outposts. Nor was this expectation disappointed. The order of march, on the first day of the movement, placed the Second division (General Palmer's) in advance, followed by my own. Several miles northward of Lavergne, a small hamlet nearly equidistant between Nashville and Murfreesboro, portions of the enemy were encountered by our advance guard, a cavalry force, and a running fight at once commenced. The country occupied by these bodies of hostile troops, affords ground peculiarly favorable for a small force to retard the advance of a larger force. Large cultivated tracts occur at intervals, on either side of the turnpike road, but the country between the cultivated tracts is densely wooded, and much of the woodland is interspersed with cedar. The face of the country is undulating, presenting a succession of swells and depressions.

This brief description is applicable to the whole country between Nashville and Murfreesboro, and it will show to the most casual observer how favorable it was for covering the movements and designs of the enemy in resisting our progress. The resistance of the enemy prevented our troops from gaining possession of the commanding heights immediately south of Lavergne, during the first day's operation, and delayed the arrival of my division at the site selected for its encampment until some time after nightfall. The darkness of the evening and the lateness of the hour prevented such a reconnoissance of the ground as is so necessary in close proximity to the enemy. But to guard effectually against surprise, a regiment from each brigade was thrown well forward as a grand guard, and the front and flanks of the division covered with a continuous line of skirmishers.

The troops were ordered to be roused at an hour and a half before dawn of the following morning, to get their breakfast as speedily as possible, and to be formed under arms and in order of battle before daylight. An occasional shell from the opposite heights, with which the enemy commenced to greet us shortly after the morning broke, showed these precautions were not lost. As it was understood from the commanding General of the corps, that the right wing was not so far advanced as the left, the latter did not move forward until eleven o'clock A. M. on the twenty-seventh. At this hour the advance was ordered, and my division was directed to take the lead. The entire cavalry on duty with the left wing was ordered to report to me; being satisfied, however, from the nature of the country, that its position in the advance would be injudicious, and retard, rather than aid, the progress of the infantry, I directed it to take position in rear of the flanks of the leading brigade. I ordered Hascall's brigade to take the advance, and moved forward in two lines, with the front and flanks well covered with skirmishers. The other two brigades, Wagner's and Harker's, were ordered to advance on either side of the turnpike road, prepared to sustain the leading brigade, and especially to protect its flanks. These two brigades were also ordered to protect their outer flanks by flankers. In this order the movement commenced. Possession of the hamlet of Lavergne was the first object to be attained. The enemy were strongly posted in the houses, and on the wooded heights in the rear, where they were enabled to oppose our advance by a direct and cross-fire of musketry. Hascall's brigade advanced nobly across an open field to the attack, and quickly routed the enemy from their stronghold. This was the work of only a few minutes, but more than twenty casualties in the two leading regiments proved how sharp was the fire of the enemy. The forward movement of Hascall's brigade was continued, supported by Estep's Eighth Indiana battery. The enemy availed themselves of the numberless positions which occur along the entire road, to dispute our progress, but could not materially retard the advance of our troops, so determined and enthusiastic. They continued to press forward through the densely-wooded country, in a drenching rain-storm, till the advance reached Stewart's Creek, distant some five miles from Lavergne. Stewart's Creek is a narrow, deep stream, flowing between high and precipitous banks. It is spanned by a wooden bridge, with a single arch. It was a matter of cardinal importance to secure possession of this bridge, as its destruction would entail difficulty and delay in crossing the river, and, perhaps, involve the necessity of constructing a new bridge. The advance troops found, on their arrival, that the enemy had lighted a fire upon it, but had been pressed so warmly that there had been no time for the flames to be communicated to the bridge. The line of skirmishers and the Third Kentucky volunteers, Colonel McKee, dashed bravely forward, though opposed to a fire from the opposite direction, threw the combustible materials into the stream, and saved the bridge. While this gallant feat was being performed, the left flank of the leading brigade was attacked by cavalry. The menaced regiments immediately changed front to left, repulsed the attack, and a company of the One Hundredth Illinois, Colonel Bartleson, succeeded in cutting off and capturing twenty-five prisoners, with

their arms, and twelve horses, with their accoutrements. The result of the day's operations was twenty casualties (wounded), in Hascall's brigade, and some twenty-five prisoners taken from the enemy. The enemy fell back in great disorder from Stewart's Creek. He left tents standing on the southern bank of the creek, and in this encampment the ground was strewn with arms.

Sunday, the twenty-eighth ult., we remained in camp, waiting for the troops of the right wing and centre to get into position.

Monday, the twenty-ninth, the advance was resumed. Wagner's brigade, of my division, was deployed, in order of battle, on the left or eastern, and a brigade of General Palmer's division, on the right or western side of the road. Cox's Tenth Indiana battery supported Wagner's brigade. Moving *pari passu*, the two brigades advanced, clearing all opposition, till we arrived within two miles and a half of Murfreesboro. Harker's brigade was disposed on the left of Wagner's brigade, in the advance, and Hascall's held in reserve. On arriving within two miles and a half of Murfreesboro, the evidences were perfectly unmistakable that the enemy were in force immediately in our front, prepared to resist, seriously and determinedly, our further advance. The rebels, displayed in battle array, were plainly seen in our front.

Negley's division, which was to take position in the centre, to complete the communication between the right and left wings, was not up, but several miles in the rear. Van Cleve's division, which was to support the left, was in the rear of Negley's. Consequently, I halted the troops in advance, reported the fact to General Crittenden, commanding the left wing, and desired further orders. Up to this moment, the information received had indicated, with considerable probability, that the enemy would evacuate Murfreesboro, offering no serious opposition. But observations assured me, very soon after arriving so near the town, that we should meet with determined resistance, and I did not deem it proper to precipitate the force in advance—two divisions, my own and Palmer's—on the entire force of the enemy, with the remainder of our troops so far in the rear as to make it entirely possible—perhaps probable—that a serious reverse would occur before they could support us. Furthermore, the afternoon was well nigh spent, and an attempt to advance would have involved us in the obscurity of the night, on unexamined ground, in the presence of an unseen foe, to whom our movements would have rendered us seriously vulnerable.

The halt being approved, my division was disposed in order of battle, and the front securely guarded by a continuous line of skirmishers, thrown out well in advance of their reserves. The right of the division (Wagner's brigade) rested on the turnpike, and occupied a piece of wooded ground, with an open field in front of it; the centre (Harker's brigade) occupied, in part, the woods in which Wagner's brigade was posted, and extended leftward into an open field, covered in front by a low swell which it was to occupy in case of an attack, and General Hascall's brigade was posted on the left of the division, with the left flank resting nearly on Stone River. The entire division was drawn up in two lines. Stone River runs obliquely in front of the position occupied by the division, leaving a triangular piece of ground of some hundreds of yards in breadth in front of the right, and narrowing to almost a point in front of the left.

Such was the position occupied by my division on Monday night. It remained in this position throughout Tuesday, the thirtieth—the skirmishers keeping up an active fire with the enemy. In this encounter, Lieutenant Elliott, Adjutant of the Fifty-seventh Indiana, was badly wounded. In the afternoon, I had three days' subsistence issued to the men; and, near nightfall, by order, twenty additional rounds of cartridges were distributed to them. Commanders were directed to instruct the troops to be exceedingly vigilant, and to report promptly any indication in their fronts of a movement by the enemy. The artillery horses were kept attached to their pieces. Between midnight and daylight on Wednesday morning I received a message from Colonel Wagner, to the effect that the enemy seemed to be moving large bodies of troops from the right to the left. I immediately dispatched the information to the headquarters of the left wing, and I doubt not it was sent thence to the commanding General, and by him distributed to the rest of the corps. The division was roused at five o'clock on Wednesday morning; the men took their breakfasts, and, before daylight, were ready for action. Shortly after dawn, I repaired to the headquarters of the left wing for orders. I met the commanding General there, and received orders from him to commence passing Stone River, immediately in front of the division, by brigades. I rode at once to my division, and directed Colonel Harker to commence the movement with his brigade, dispatching an order to General Hascall to follow Colonel Harker, and an order to Colonel Wagner to follow General Hascall. While Colonel Harker was preparing to move, I rode to the front to examine the ground. A long, wooded ridge, withdrawn a few hundred yards from the stream, extends along the southern and eastern side of Stone River. On the crest of this ridge the enemy appeared to be posted in force. During the morning some firing had been heard on the right, but not to a sufficient extent to indicate that the troops were seriously engaged. But the sudden and fierce roar and rattle of musketry, which burst upon us at this moment, indicated that the enemy had attacked the right wing in heavy force, and soon the arrival of messengers, riding in hot haste, confirmed the indications. I was ordered to stop the movement to cross the river, and to withdraw the brigades to the rear, for the purpose of reinforcing the centre and right. General

Hascall's and Colonel Harker's brigades were withdrawn, and the latter, under orders from the commanding General, moved to the right and rear. I ordered Colonel Wagner to hold his position in the woods at all hazards, as this was an important point, and so long as it was held, not only were our left front and flanks secured, but the command of the road leading to the rear preserved. The vigorous attack on our right and centre, extended to our left, and our whole line became seriously engaged. Not only was the extreme left exposed to the attack in the front, but was much harassed by the enemy's artillery, posted on the heights on the southern side of Stone River. But the troops nobly maintained their position, and gallantly repulsed the enemy. A slackening of the enemy's fire at this moment, in his attack on our centre and left, and other indications that his forces were weakening in the centre, rendered the juncture apparently favorable for bringing additional and fresh troops into the engagement. Hascall's brigade was now brought forward, and put into position on the right of Wagner's brigade. But the abatement of the enemy's fire was but the lulling of the storm, to burst soon with greater fury. The attack was renewed on our centre and left with redoubled violence. Hascall's brigade had got into position in good season, and aided in gallant style in driving back the enemy. Estep's battery, generally associated with Hascall's brigade, had been detached early in the morning, and sent to the right and rearward, to aid in driving back the enemy from our centre and right. The falling back of the right wing had brought our lines into a crochet. This rendered the position of the troops on the extreme left particularly hazardous, for had the enemy succeeded in gaining the turnpike, in his attack on the right, the left would have been exposed to an attack in the reverse. This danger imposed on me the necessity of keeping a rigid watch to the right, to be prepared to change front in that direction, should it become necessary. Again the enemy were seen concentrating large masses of troops in the fields to the front and right, and soon these masses moved to the attack. Estep's battery was now moved to the front to join Hascall's brigade. The artillery in the front lines, as well as those placed in the rear of the centre and left, poured a destructive fire on the advancing foe, but on he came until within small-arm range, when he was repulsed and driven back. But our thinned ranks and dead and wounded officers told, in sad and unmistakable language, how seriously we were sufferers from these repeated assaults. Colonel McKee, of the Third Kentucky, had been killed; and Colonel Hines and Lieutenant-Colonel Dennard, of the Fifty-seventh Indiana, and Colonel Blake and Lieutenant-Colonel Neff, of the Fortieth Indiana, with others, were wounded. During this attack, the Fifteenth Indiana, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, counter-charged on one of the enemy's regiments, and captured one hundred and seventy-five prisoners. The capture was from the Twentieth Louisiana. While this attack was in progress, I received a message from General Palmer, commanding the Second division of the left wing, that he was sorely pressed, and desired I would send him a regiment, if I could possibly spare one. I sent an order to General Hascall to send a regiment to General Palmer's assistance, if his own situation would warrant it. He dispatched the Fifty-eighth Indiana, Colonel G. P. Buell's regiment, to report to General Palmer. The regiment got into position, reserved its fire until the enemy were in close range, and then poured in a withering discharge, from which the foe recoiled in disorder. Our extreme left next became the object of the enemy's attention. Skirmishers were seen descending the slope on the opposite side of the river, as also working their way down the stream for the purpose, apparently, of gaining our left flank and rear. A few well-directed charges of grape and canister from Cox's battery drove them back. This battery did most excellent service in counter-battering the enemy's artillery, posted on the heights on the southern side of the river. The afternoon was now well advanced, but the enemy did not seem disposed to relinquish the design of forcing us from our position. Heavy masses were again assembled in front of the centre, with a view, evidently, of renewing the onset. But the well-directed fire of the artillery held them in check, and only a small force came within range of our small arms, which was readily repulsed. The enemy concluded his operations against the left, as night approached, by opening on it with his artillery. Cox's and Estep's batteries gallantly and effectually replied. But darkness soon put a conclusion to this artillery duel, and when the night descended brought a period to the long and bloody contest of this ever-memorable day, which found the First and Second brigades, Hascall's and Wagner's, occupying, with some slight interchange in the position of particular regiments, the ground on which they had gone into the fight in the morning. Every effort of the enemy to dislodge them had failed; every attack was gallantly repulsed. I cannot speak in too high terms of praise of the soldierly bearing and steadfast courage with which the officers and men of these two brigades maintained the battles throughout the day. Their good conduct deserves and will receive the highest commendations of their commanders and countrymen. The commanding General of the enemy has borne testimony in his dispatch to the gallantry and success of their resistance. Cox's and Estep's batteries were splendidly served throughout the day, and did the most effective service. They lost heavily in men and horses, and it was necessary for Estep to call on the One Hundredth Illinois, for a detail to aid in working his guns. I have previously remarked that the Third brigade, Colonel Harker's, was detached early

in the morning and sent to reinforce the right. It remained on that part of the field during the entire day, I am not able, consequently, to speak of its service from personal observation. But its extremely heavy list of casualties shews how hotly it was engaged, and what valuable service it rendered. I am sure it met the expectation I had ever confidently entertained of what would be its bearing in presence of the foe. Bradley's Sixth Ohio battery was associated with this brigade during the day, was skilfully handled and did most effective service. It lost two of its guns, but they were spiked before they were abandoned. They were subsequently recaptured by the Thirteenth Michigan, attached to this brigade. From all I have learned of the service of the Third brigade and Bradley's battery, I am sure they deserve equal commendation with the other two brigades and batteries, which so stoutly held the left. An official report of events so thrilling as those of the battle of the thirty-first ult., made from personal observations amid the din and roar of the conflict, and unaided by the reports of the subordinate commanders, must necessarily present but a brief and meagre outline of the part enacted by the troops whose services it professes to portray. A report so prepared may, entirely unintentionally on the part of the writer, do injustice to particular troops and officers. From the inability of reference to the reports of subordinate commanders, I cannot give any detail of the heavy casualties of the battle of the thirty-first. I must leave them to be reported, with the subsequent casualties, by my successor in command. The absence of such reports prevents me from signalizing by name such regimental and company officers as particularly distinguished themselves. But where all did so well it would be difficult, perhaps invidious, to discriminate among them. To my brigade commanders, Brigadier-General Hascall, commanding First brigade, Colonel Wagner, Fifteenth Indiana, commanding Second brigade, and Colonel Harker, Sixty-fifth Ohio, commanding Third brigade, my warmest thanks are due for their valuable assistance, their hearty co-operation, and intelligent performance of duty throughout the whole of that trying day. For these services and their gallant and manly bearing under the heaviest fire, they richly deserve the highest commendation and the gratitude of their countrymen. Colonels Wagner and Harker have long and ably commanded brigades, and I respectfully submit it would be simply an act of justice to confer on them the actual and legal rank of the command they have so long exercised. To Major S. Race, Chief of Artillery; Surgeon W. W. Blair, Fifty-eighth Indiana; Captain M. P. Bestow, Assistant Adjutant-General; First Lieutenant J. L. Yargan, Fifty-eighth Indiana, Aide-de-Camp; Captain Y. R. Palmer, Thirteenth Michigan, Inspector-General, and Major Walker, Second Indiana cavalry, volunteer Aid-de-Camp, my thanks are due and cordially given. Captain L. D. Myers, Division Quartermaster; Captain Henderson, Commissary of Subsistence to the division, and First Lieutenant Martin, Twenty-first Ohio, Signal Officer, but for some time engaged in performing the duties of Acting Assistant Quartermaster, great credit is due for the intelligent and efficient performance of duty in their respective departments. Captain Bruce, Fifty-eighth Indiana, Ordnance Officer of the First Virginia, deserves credit for valuable services rendered in the Ordnance Department for the entire division, during the absence of the Division Ordnance Officer.

My division is composed of regiments from the States of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, and Kentucky. To the relatives and personal friends of those who have fallen in defence of their country, I would respectfully offer my sympathy and condolence.

About ten o'clock Wednesday morning, during one of the heaviest attacks, I was struck by a Minnie ball on the inner side of the left heel. Fortunately the ball struck obliquely, or the injury would have been much severer. My boot was torn open, the foot lacerated, and a severe contusion inflicted. I did not dismount from my horse till seven o'clock in the evening. The coldness of the night, combined with the injury, made my foot so painful and stiff as to render it evident I would not be effective for immediate service. I was ordered by the commanding General of the corps to repair that night, by ambulance, with an escort, to the city. It was with extreme regret I found myself in a condition to make it necessary, on account of my injury, to leave the division I had formed and so long commanded; but the regret was alleviated by the reflection that I had left the division under the command of an able and experienced officer, one who had long served with it, who knew it well, and in whom it had confidence—Brigadier-General Hascall.

I am still confined to my room, but trust ere long to be able to resume my duties.

I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
TH. J. WOOD,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

GENERAL VAN CLEVE'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION,
ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND.

Major Lyne Starling, Assistant Adjutant-General:

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division on the thirty-first of December, 1862:

At seven o'clock on the morning of that day, I received an order to cross Stone River, on which my left rested, and march toward Murfreesboro. The First brigade, Colonel Beatty, Third brigade, Colonel Price, and the batteries, Captain Swallow commanding, were promptly moved over and formed into line; the Second brigade, Colonel Fyffe, being retained on the south side by a subsequent order.

My lines being formed and about to advance,

by your order I recrossed the river, leaving the Third brigade to guard the ford. With the First brigade I marched rapidly to the support of General Rousseau, whose division was hard pressed by the enemy. We formed in a wood on the south side of the Murfreesboro and Nashville turnpike. Our lines were no sooner formed than the enemy were seen advancing, driving before them our scattered troops. Our ranks were opened to suffer them to pass, when they closed and opened on the enemy with a withering fire, who were soon brought to a halt. A murderous fire was kept up on both sides about twenty minutes, when the enemy began to recoil. Our second line now relieving the first with a hearty cheer, the rebels broke and retreated. The Second brigade coming up at this moment, formed on the right and joined in the pursuit. We pressed the enemy through this wood, and across an open field, to another wood, where they appear to have met with reinforcements and re-formed. The Seventh Indiana battery, Captain Swallow, joined us on this open field, and rendered efficient aid. Here I received information from General Rosecrans that General Rousseau was driving the enemy, accompanied with an order for me to press them hard.

At the same moment I was notified by a messenger from Colonel Hasker, whose brigade was to my right and rear, that the enemy were in force on my right in a wood, and were planting a battery there. I immediately sent a message to Colonel Hasker to press the enemy hard, as I had no reserve to protect my right; to Captain Swallow, who was doing good service with his battery, not to suffer it to be captured; to Colonel Beatty to send two regiments, if they could possibly be spared, to the support of Colonel Fyffe, and a fourth to General Crittenden to inform him of my critical situation. The enemy now poured a galling fire of musketry, accompanied with grape and shell, on our right. Colonel Fyffe's brigade, supported by Captain Swallow's battery, gallantly returned the fire, but being overpowered by numbers on front and flank, were soon compelled to retire, followed but a short distance by the enemy. Captain Swallow, to whom too much praise cannot be awarded, brought off his battery safely.

Colonel Beatty, who had been pressing the enemy on the left, as soon as he learned the condition of affairs, retired in good order; with two of his regiments, was ordered by General Rosecrans to protect a battery on the Murfreesboro road; the remaining two regiments of his brigade and Colonel Fyffe's brigade were re-formed, and took a position on the left of General McCook's corps, and to the right of the Pioneer, which position we occupied without further adventure till after dark.

I cannot close this report without inviting your attention to the gallantry displayed by those under my command during this engagement. To both officers and men too much praise cannot be awarded. I would particularly notice the coolness, intrepidity, and skill of my brigade commanders, Colonels Beatty and Fyffe, and of Captain Swallow, Chief of Artillery. To the members of my staff, Captain E. A. Otis, Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain C. H. Wood, Inspector-General; Captain William Starling, Topographical Engineer; Lieutenants T. F. Murdoch and H. M. Williams, Aids-de-Camp, I owe much for the promptness, faithfulness, and gallantry with which they executed my orders, and conveyed intelligence on the field. Sergeant R. B. Rhodes, of the First Ohio cavalry, in command of my escort, conducted himself like a true soldier, and deserves honorable mention.

A slight wound received early this day, becoming exceedingly painful, on the following morning I was compelled to turn over the command of the division to Colonel Beatty, and retire from the field.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. P. VAN CLEVE,
Brigadier-General.

COLONEL BEATTY'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION,
CAMP NEAR MURFREESBORO, January, 1863.

Major Lyne Starling, Assistant Adjutant-General:

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this division for the time embraced between the first and third days of January, 1863, inclusive:

I was called to the command of the division on the morning of January first, by General Van Cleve's disability, from the wound received in the battle of the preceding day.

At three P. M. on that day, I received orders to cross Stone River with my command at the "upper ford," and hold the hill overlooking the river near the ford. Accordingly, at daybreak the Third brigade, Colonel Price commanding, crossed the river at the place indicated, throwing out skirmishers and flankers. Colonel Price was quickly followed by Colonel Fyffe's brigade; the force being formed in two lines, the right retiring on the high ground near the river and east of the ford, and the left thrown forward so that the direction of the line should be nearly perpendicular to the river.

In the meantime, the First brigade, Colonel Grider commanding, had been disposed as follows: Two regiments were formed in the hollow near the hospital, as a reserve, the other two remaining on the other side of the river to support a battery.

The enemy's skirmishers were now discovered in a wood, distant half a mile or so from our first line, and occasional firing took place on both sides.

Information of all these movements was sent to General Crittenden, who sent me word if I needed artillery to order up a battery. The Third Wisconsin battery, Lieutenant Livingston commanding, was accordingly, at about ten o'clock A. M., ordered to cross the river and remain in the hollow near the ford.

Small parties of the enemy's cavalry and infantry were occasionally seen, and at length a strong line was distinctly visible through the openings of the wood. Lieutenant Livingston was ordered to bring up his battery. It was accordingly placed in position on the rising ground in front of Colonel Fyffe's brigade. Several shells were thrown at the enemy's line, which caused its disappearance; it was supposed that they had lain down. One section, Lieutenant Hubbard commanding, was now moved to the hill on the right, whence, also, one or two shells were thrown at detached parties. Colonel Fyffe's brigade was moved to the left of the battery, where it was covered by a skirt of woods. Our whole force had been constantly concealed by making the men lie down.

About one o'clock the remaining two regiments of Colonel Grider's brigade, the Nineteenth Ohio and Ninth Kentucky, were ordered to cross the river, which they did, forming near the hospital on the left of the other two regiments of the same brigade, to protect our left flank. The enemy's force was occasionally seen moving to our left, and Generals Crittenden and Palmer were advised of the fact; Colonel Grose was consequently ordered to support me. His brigade formed so as to protect our left, relieving the Nineteenth Ohio and Ninth Kentucky. These two regiments were formed in rear of the right of the second line, as a reserve, being posted in the hollow near the ford.

No other disturbance occurred during the day, except the occasional firing of the skirmishers; so Colonel Grose's brigade and Livingston's battery recrossed the river. About midnight we were alarmed by sharp firing from the skirmishers; they reported that it was caused by the enemy's skirmishers advancing and firing upon us. One of our men was killed and one wounded. Nothing else occurred during the night. On the morning of Friday, January second, Livingston's battery came across the river again, and was posted as before. There was light skirmishing during the earlier part of the day.

The Seventy-ninth Indiana, Colonel Knifler, was ordered to take place in the first line, to close the gap between Colonel Fyffe's brigade and the others. Nothing of note occurred until about eleven o'clock, when the firing of the enemy's skirmishers became very constant and heavy, as they slowly crept up toward us. The skirmishers now reported a battery being planted in our front, and shortly afterward, that fifteen regiments of infantry and three pieces of artillery were moving to our left.

Notice of all these movements was given to Generals Crittenden and Palmer, and Colonel Grose's brigade again came over to our support. About noon the enemy's battery opened with occasional shells, directed at Lieutenant Hubbard's section of artillery on the hill. The enemy's artillery were now seen moving to our left, and soon another battery opened fire upon Lieutenant Hubbard's section.

As the enemy's skirmishers were so near that their firing was annoying and dangerous to the artillery, I ordered Lieutenant Livingston to retire and take a position on the hill near the hospital. A few shells were still thrown by the enemy's battery on our left, and occasional ones from an apparently heavy battery across the river. As the enemy's skirmishers pressed ours very closely, our lines were strengthened by throwing out two more companies. The firing was very sharp, and many of our men as well as theirs, were wounded. At about half-past two o'clock it was reported that four more of the enemy's guns were moving toward our left. Word was sent of this, as in case of all other movements, to General Crittenden. At about three o'clock our skirmishers reported that the enemy's skirmishers were throwing down the fence in front of our line. Orders were sent to Colonel Price to let his first line fall back behind the crest of the hill, but before he could receive them the enemy were advancing across the field to the charge. They were formed in column, with a front of apparently two regiments.

The first column was three regiments, or six ranks deep; this was succeeded by a second of the same depth, and a third apparently greater.

At the same moment their artillery opened from three or four different points, throwing shot, shell and canister directly into us.

As the enemy's columns approached to within a hundred yards or so, the first line rose up and delivered a heavy fire upon their column, which checked it for a moment; they soon pressed on, however. The regiments of the first line, the Fifty-first Ohio, Eighth Kentucky, and Thirty-fifth and Seventy-ninth Indiana, fought gallantly until the enemy were within a few yards of them, when, overpowered by numbers, they were compelled to retire.

This movement confused and disorganized the second line, which also was ordered to fall back. The reserve, consisting of the Nineteenth Ohio, Ninth Kentucky, and Eleventh Kentucky, was now ordered up. They advanced most gallantly toward the crest of the hill, and poured a destructive fire upon the enemy, whose first column was by this time almost annihilated. Their supporting columns soon came up, however, and at the same time a force advanced along the river bank upon our right flank. Our men fought with most desperate courage, as will appear from their severe loss, until forced back by the actual pressure of the enemy. Even then they broke back from the right, file by file, stubbornly contesting their ground. At last, however, the right being forced back, the left was ordered to retire, which it slowly did until the bank of the river was reached.

Attempts were made to rally the men at several points, but it was impossible from the heavy fire and the close proximity of the enemy; most of them were, therefore, forced across the river, where many of them rallied and returned with the first supporting troops; and I am proud to say that the colors of the Nine-

teenth Ohio, Ninth Kentucky, and Fifty-first Ohio were the first to recross the stream after the enemy's check. The tremendous fire of our artillery on the south side of the river, with Livingston's battery on the other, with the determined resistance they had met, had stopped the enemy at the river; and now, as our troops pressed forward, they fled in confusion, leaving four of their guns.

Several brave officers had rallied a great number of our men, and were the foremost in the advance.

Night now came on and closed the pursuit. The regiments were rapidly reorganized, and in a few hours were in a state of efficiency, and turned out promptly and cheerfully at an alarm.

The Second brigade, Colonel Fyffe, was not attacked, the front of the enemy's column not extending to them. Seeing the right driven back, they also retired in good order. Lieutenant Livingston's battery fired constantly and well from the first appearance of the enemy, until the very last moment he could remain safely. He then crossed the river without losing a piece.

I cannot too much commend the gallant manner in which my men fought, and the promptness with which, when forced to give way, they rallied and reorganized.

The following is a report of the number of killed, wounded and missing in the engagement before Murfreesboro, Tennessee:

Commands.	Killed.			Wounded.			Missing.			Aggregate.
	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Total.	
Brigadier-General Van Cleve,	.....	.....	.....	1	.....	1	.....	.....	.....	1
First Brigade,	7	59	66	16	303	319	.....	81	81	466
Second Brigade,	4	76	80	14	215	229	2	160	162	481
Third Brigade,	6	75	81	21	397	418	2	146	148	647
Artillery,	.....	6	6	.....	19	19	.....	.....	.....	25
Total,	17	216	233	52	934	986	4	387	391	1,620

To the commanders of the different brigades, Colonels Grider, Price and Fyffe, my thanks are due for the gallantry and coolness of their behavior under very trying circumstances. Lieutenant Livingston, of the Third Wisconsin battery, did efficient service, and performed his duty ably and handsomely. Lieutenant Smoch, Third Kentucky cavalry, who commanded a detachment of couriers, remained constantly on hand near me, and was of great use.

To the following officers, members of my staff, I tender my thanks for their assistance, and the manner in which it was rendered: Captain E. A. Otis, Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain C. H. Wood, Acting Assistant Inspector-General; Captain William Starling, Topographical Engineer, and Lieutenants T. F. Murdoch and H. M. Williams, Aids-de-Camp.

Respectfully submitted,

SAMUEL BEATTY,
Colonel, commanding.

CAPTAIN J. ST CLAIR MORTON'S REPORT.

The following is a full abstract of the official report of Captain James St. Clair Morton, corps of engineers, commanding brigade of pioneers:

The pioneer brigade of the Army of the Cumberland consists of three battalions of infantry, selected from forty different regiments, and the Chicago Board of Trade battery, Captain Stokes. Captain Bridges, of the Nineteenth Illinois, commanded the First battalion; Captain Hood, of the Eleventh Michigan, the Second, and Captain Clements, of the Sixty-ninth Ohio, the Third battalion.

On the march from Nashville, the brigade constructed two bridges over Stewart's Creek, between the hours of four P. M. and four o'clock A. M., twenty-ninth and thirtieth of December, arriving at the battle-field on the thirtieth.

On the morning of the thirty-first of December, the brigade was engaged in improving the fords of Stone River, in which the right battalion sustained the fire of some rebel cavalry. Captain (now Brigadier-General) Morton was ordered, soon afterward, to take position in line of battle. The brigade was formed by order of General Rosecrans, in person, fronting toward the right. The enemy appeared on a rise of ground, in front, from which they had driven one of our batteries. Stokes' battery immediately opened fire, with canister, and drove them back. Captain Morton, at the personal order of General Rosecrans, who, with his staff accompanying him, advanced to the eminence and held it, under a heavy fire from the rebel batteries and sharpshooters. Stokes' battery was supported by the First battalion, on the left, posted in a thicket; the Third battalion on the right, its flank protected by the Second battalion, posted in a wood, still further to the right.

Shortly after the line was formed the enemy appeared across the field, preparing to charge upon one of our retiring detachments, which had been rallied by the commanding General. Stokes' battery opened upon the foe, and the advance

of the enemy was speedily arrested. The right battalion was attacked soon after, the enemy obviously intending to penetrate the line under cover of the forest. The battalion changed front to obtain a flanking fire, and by a single volley repulsed the enemy, composed of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Texas regiment. The Seventy-ninth Indiana had rallied on the right of the battalion in the meantime, and assisted in the success. This was one of the most brilliant episodes of the battle. It followed quickly upon the charge made by the General in person, and was really the second act of the drama, which changed the tide of battle.

Toward sunset the enemy appeared on Morton's left. Two sections of Stokes' battery were brought to the left of the First battalion, and a brigade of the enemy which had attacked the battalion in the thicket, was bitterly repulsed. Their dead were left within fifty paces of Morton's lines. The troops behaved admirably.

The pioneers slept on their arms that night. Early New Year's morning, the enemy again appeared on the left, apparently to advance through a gap between it and the Murfreesboro turnpike. Morton immediately changed front and occupied the gap. A hot engagement ensued, infantry and artillery being used so effectively that the enemy could not push beyond the edge of the wood, and they were finally driven back with severe loss. The position was held by the pioneers until after nightfall, when they were relieved and formed in reserve.

On the morning of Friday, the second part of the pioneers were engaged making road-crossings over the railroad, when the enemy opened a severe cannonade. Stokes' battery returned the fire, and the battalions advanced, supporting it under a fire of solid shot and shell, until the rebel battery was silenced, when the pioneers fell back to their position.

In the afternoon, when Breckinridge made his attack upon Van Cleve's small division, which had been thrown across the river on our left, General Rosecrans, in person, ordered the pioneers to the left as reinforcements. Morton marched his command at double-quick, and arrived on the line occupying a gap in it, under the firing of a rebel battery, which was soon silenced by Stokes' battery, which was worked with great skill and vigor.

General Negley's (Eighth) division was already tremendously engaged. The enemy had advanced in columns of brigades six deep without intervals, presenting a most formidable mass, and threatening to carry everything before them. Our batteries opened in magnificent concert, and the most obstinate combat of the whole series of engagements was culminating. General Negley now requested Morton to reinforce him, and the pioneers were at once moved up at a double-quick and formed, the Third battalion in second line behind the division under command of General Jeff. C. Davis, the First extending beyond it, and throwing out its own advance, occupying the space between it and the river; Stokes' battery was posted on a knoll between the First and Second battalions, the Second being in second line on the extreme right. The fighting, meantime, of the most violent description, was growing slack, and the enemy, finally defeated, were flying back to Murfreesboro, darkness preventing pursuit.

After nightfall, the pioneers recrossed the river, and again assumed position in the reserve, the Second battalion being detailed to dig rifle-pits in the front, near the pike, and on the extreme right. They labored all night in the rain. On January third, the Third battalion relieved the First, then on duty in the trenches; on the fourth, the Second and Third battalions began the construction of two lunettes on the north bank of the river, and the First battalion began a trestle bridge across it; on the fifth the work continued, and the Third battalion, with the advance of the army, went in pursuit of the enemy.

The loss of the brigade was as follows:

BATTALIONS.	OFFICERS.	MEN.		Total.
	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded	
First	3	4	5	12
Second	..	4	5	9
Third	..	4	10	14
Stokes' Battery	1	3	9	13
Total	4	15	29	48

The force of the brigade actually engaged was sixteen hundred men—ninety-five in Stokes' battery.

Throughout the engagement the pioneers behaved nobly, and upon requisition worked zealously night and day, although insufficiently subsisted, and under vicissitudes of inclement weather and rebel fire.

Captain Morton eulogized the conduct of the artillerymen in the highest manner. They fought under the eye of the General, and won high encomiums from him. Captain Morton, in his report, says: "As the commanding General was everywhere present on the field with his staff, he cannot but have remarked the good service done by Captain Stokes, who manifested the greatest zeal, and managed his battery with the utmost decision and success."

Captain Morton most honorably mentions his Adjutant, Lieutenant Lambessen, of the Nineteenth Illinois; his Inspectors, Lieutenants Clark, of the Sixteenth United States infantry, and Murphy, of the Twenty-first Wisconsin; his Aids, Lieutenant Reeve, of the Thirty-seventh Indiana, and Assistant Engineer Pearsall; "all of

whom exhibited the utmost ardor and alacrity in the performance of their duty."

Captain Hood, Captain Clements and Captain Bridges, commanding the battalions, are highly extolled. The latter, though wounded on the thirty-first, remained in command of his battalion.

CAPTAIN MENDENHALL'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS LEFT WING, January 10, 1863.

Major L. Starling, Chief of Staff:

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the artillery in the left wing, from December twenty-six, 1862, to January two, 1863. This army marched from camp, near Nashville, December twenty-sixth; the left wing marching on the Murfreesboro pike.

December 26.

About three P. M., our advance was brought to a stand-still, near Lavergne, by a rebel battery. It was opposed by a section of artillery serving with the cavalry, which being unable to dislodge the enemy, our advance battery (Captain Standart, Battery B, First Ohio) was, after a little delay, put in position and opened fire, soon silencing the enemy.

December 27.

General Hascall took the advance with his brigade, and Lieutenant Estep's Eighth Indiana battery. They marched steadily forward till the enemy were driven across Stewart's Creek; the battery halting only when it was necessary to fire; two pieces were posted near, covering the bridge.

December 28.

Some artillery was so disposed as to check the enemy, should they attempt to destroy or retake the bridge.

December 29.

Lieutenant Parsons, commanding Batteries H and M, Fourth artillery, being in a commanding position, threw a few shells about nine A. M., driving the enemy's picket from the opposite woods. Our column advanced across the bridge at ten A. M., meeting with little resistance till within about three miles of Murfreesboro. Our troops were placed in line of battle as they came up, the artillery remaining with their divisions.

December 30.

About nine A. M., the enemy opened fire upon Captain Cox's Tenth Indiana battery (which was between the pike and the railroad, and in front partially covered by woods). Captain Bradley's Sixth Ohio battery at once took a position to the left of the woods, and in a corn field. The two batteries soon silenced that of the enemy. One shot killed a man near where a number of general and staff officers were standing, and another passing through Battery H, Fourth artillery, killing one man, wounding another, besides disabling a horse.

December 31.

The left wing started to cross Stone River, about eight A. M., but before a division had crossed, intelligence was received that the right was falling back. Colonel Fyffe's brigade, which was about crossing, was ordered to countermarch and move at double-quick to the right. Captain Swallow's Seventh Indiana battery operated for a time with this brigade, shelling the rebel cavalry from the brick hospital. Colonel Beatty's brigade, having recrossed the river, advanced to the support of the right wing; but the Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania battery, Lieutenant Stevens commanding, being unable to follow the brigade through the woods, took a position near the pike, and received the enemy with shot and shell as they advanced after our retreating columns, and I think did his part in checking them. He advanced as they retreated, and took a position in a corn field on the right of the pike near the three-mile post, and again opened upon the enemy. The position of this battery underwent several changes during the rest of the day, but remained in the same immediate vicinity. The Third Wisconsin battery, having recrossed the river with the brigade, took a position commanding the ford, and about twelve M. opened upon the enemy's cavalry, while attempting to drive off some of our wagons which had crossed the river, and were near a hospital we had established on the other side, driving them away with very little booty. The batteries of General Wood's division (Cox's Tenth Indiana, Estep's Eighth Indiana, and Bradley's Sixth Ohio, all under command of Major Race, of the First Ohio artillery) fought with the brigades with which they were serving. I had no occasion to give special orders to them during the day. The batteries of General Palmer's division served with it during the morning, rendering good service. Captain Standart's battery fell back with General Cruft's brigade, and was not again engaged during the day. Captain Cockerell, during the afternoon, was ordered to the front, taking a position in the corn field on the left of the woods where the enemy were making such desperate attempts to force back the left. At this place, Captain Cockerell was severely wounded in the foot, and the command of his battery devolved upon Lieutenant Osburn. Two guns of this battery were disabled from their own firing, the axles being too weak. One of the limbers of this battery was blown up during the day. Lieutenant Parsons, commanding Batteries H and M, Fourth artillery, was ordered up to support the left, about four P. M., and took a position near the railroad. After he had expended all his ammunition, I sent Captain Swallow's Seventh Indiana battery to replace him. These batteries did much to repel the enemy as they advanced with the evident determination to drive us back at all hazards if possible. During the night the batteries were re-supplied with ammunition, and I directed them to take positions, as follows, before daylight, viz.: Lieutenant Livingston, com-

Engd by A. H. Ritchie

GEN. ROBERT B. POTTER.

manding ford on the extreme left; Captain Swallow, on his right, near the railroad; Lieutenant Stevens also near the railroad, but on the

forward with his brigade, and send his battery to the crest of the hill near the batteries engaged; the Eighth Indiana battery took posi-
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manding ford on the extreme left; Captain Swallow, on his right, near the railroad; Lieutenant Stevens also near the railroad, but on the left of Captain Swallow. The batteries of the First division between the railroad and the pike. Captain Bradley on the left, Captain Cox on the right, and Lieutenant Estep in the centre. The Second division batteries near the pike in reserve.

During the morning, Lieutenant Livingston was directed to cross the river (he was assigned a position by Colonel Beatty), and Captain Swallow took his place commanding the ford; Lieutenant Parsons was ordered to a position on General Rousseau's front by General Rosecrans, and Captain Cox was moved across the pike near Stokes' battery, to support the right of his division, which had moved its right to that point. After dark, Captain Standart was ordered to relieve Stokes' battery. No firing, except now and then a shell at the enemy's pickets, during the day.

January 2.

Early in the forenoon, the enemy opened fire first upon our left, which was not responded to, their shot and shell doing no harm. They were opened more furiously upon the troops and batteries near the railroad and pike, several of our batteries replying and soon silencing them. When the enemy had nearly ceased firing, Stokes' battery opened with canister upon Captain Bradley's battery and Colonel Harker's brigade, wounding several men and horses.

Captain Standart, with three pieces, Captain Bradley's and Lieutenant Estep's batteries, retired a short distance to fit up, they having received more or less injury from the enemy. Captain Bradley fell back on account of being fired into by Captain Stokes. He returned to his former position, after a little while, but Captain Standart and Lieutenant Estep remained in reserve. I then ordered Lieutenant Parsons, with Batteries H and M, Fourth artillery, to a position on the ridge to the right of Captain Swallow (who was on the highest point ridge, covering the ford) and Lieutenant Osburn, Battery F, First Ohio, to a position perhaps a hundred yards to the right of Lieutenant Parsons. During the afternoon Colonel Beatty changed the position of Lieutenant Livingston's battery to near the hospital (across the river).

About four P. M., while riding along the pike with General Crittenden, we heard heavy firing of artillery and musketry on the left. We at once rode briskly over, and arriving upon the hill near the fords saw our infantry retiring before the enemy. The General asked me if I could not do something to relieve Colonel Beatty with my guns—Captain Swallow had already opened with his battery. I ordered Lieutenant Parsons to move a little forward with his guns; then rode back to bring up Lieutenant Estep with his Eighth Indiana battery; meeting Captain Morton with his brigade of pioneers, he asked for advice, and I told him to move briskly forward with his brigade, and send his battery to the crest of the hill near the batteries engaged; the Eighth Indiana battery took position to the right of Lieutenant Parsons. Seeing that Lieutenant Osburn was in position (between Lieutenants Parsons and Estep) I rode to Lieutenant Stevens' Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania battery, and directed him to change front to fire to the left, and open fire; and then to Captain Standart's, and directed him to move to the left with his pieces, and take position covering the ford. I found that Captain Bradley had anticipated my wishes, and had changed front to fire to the left, and opened upon the enemy. This battery was near the railroad. Lieutenant Livingston's battery (which was across the river) opened upon the advancing enemy and continued to fire until he thought he could no longer maintain his position, when he crossed over, one section at a time, and opened fire again. The firing ceased about dark. During this terrible encounter of little more than an hour in duration, forty-three pieces of artillery belonging to the left wing, Captain Stokes' battery of six guns, and the batteries of General Negley's division, about nine guns, making a total of about fifty-eight pieces, opened fire upon the enemy. The enemy soon retired; our troops following. Three batteries of the left wing, besides those of General Davis, crossed the river in pursuit. During this engagement, Lieutenant Parsons had one of his howitzers dismounted by a shot from the enemy, but it was almost immediately replaced by one captured from the enemy and brought over by the Nineteenth Illinois.

Captain Cockerell and Lieutenant Buckmar were both wounded on the thirty-first. The former commanded Battery F, First Ohio, and the latter belonged to the Seventh Indiana battery. Major Race, First Ohio artillery, Chief of Artillery in the First division, and the several battery commanders, with their officers and men, all, with *one exception*, deserve most grateful mention for their coolness and bravery throughout the battle. Lieutenant Parsons, commanding Batteries H and M, Fourth artillery, and his officers, Lieutenants Cushing and Huntington, deserve great credit for their courage under the hottest of the enemy's fire. They were probably under closer fire and more of it than any other battery in the left wing, and perhaps in the army. I am more than pleased with the way they behaved, as well as the brave men under them. Captain Bradley, Sixth Ohio battery, deserves particular notice for the manner in which he handled his battery. The *one exception* above referred to, is Lieutenant Richard Jervis, of the Eighth Indiana, who is represented to have acted in a very cowardly manner, by retiring a section of the battery at a critical moment without orders, or notifying his battery commander.

The following are the casualties, etc., in the several batteries:

Batteries and Commanders.	Officers Wounded.	Men.		
		Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
H and M, Fourth Artillery, Lieutenant Parsons,	.....	2	14	6
B, First Ohio, Captain Standart,	.....	3	13	3
F, First Ohio, Captain Cockerell,	1	2	12	.....
Seventh Indiana, Captain Swallow,	1	4	7	.....
Third Wisconsin, Lieutenant Livingston,	.....	.....	4	.....
Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania, Lieutenant Stevens,	.....	2	7	.....
Eighth Indiana, Lieutenant Estep,	.....	.....	6	6
Tenth Indiana, Captain Cox,	.....	1	4	.....
Sixth Ohio, Captain Bradley,	.....	2	2	1
Total,	2	16	69	16

I am, Major, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

JOHN MENDENHALL,
Chief of Artillery.

Doc. 43.

OPERATIONS IN TENNESSEE VALLEY.

MAJOR-GENERAL HAZEN'S REPORT.*

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS, CHATTANOOGA, Oct. 8, 1863.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. Goddard, A. A. General, Headquarters Dept. Cumb.:

In obedience to orders received at Poe's Tavern, September third, 1863, from Headquarters of the Department, I assumed command of all the troops in the Tennessee Valley, embracing Wagner's and my own brigade of infantry, Minty's brigade of cavalry, and Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry—in all between six and seven thousand men—with orders to keep these forces well in hand, to closely watch the movements of the enemy at all the crossings of the Tennessee River, make such dispositions of the force as should lead the enemy to believe that the valley was occupied by a large force, and to cross ourselves and occupy Chattanooga at the earliest opportunity.

The forces were scattered from Kingston to William's Island, a distance of seventy miles, watching the entire line of the river for this distance, and guarding at least at twenty ferries and fords.

I at once visited, in person, the entire length of the line, making such dispositions as I thought best for carrying out the design of the command, withdrawing as much as possible the left of the line, and giving orders for the construction of boats in the North Chickamauga, to be floated down and used for crossing, when needed, at the mouth of that stream.

Troops were made to appear simultaneously at three or four different crossings, and, by ingeniously arranging their camp-fires and beating their calls, and the dexterous use of artillery, were made to represent a division of troops at each place.

The object desired was fully obtained.

I also placed all heavy stores on Waldon's Ridge, and, as the enemy threatened to cross his cavalry in heavy force, made preparations to receive him, and, failing to destroy him, to drive him up the valley beyond Pikeville, where he could be met by General Burnside.

A battery and two regiments of infantry were placed opposite Chattanooga, and the enemy at that point annoyed and two of his boats disabled. I also established communication, by signal, between all the crossings near me and my headquarters.

On the second, the enemy burned the Loudon Bridge, and Buckner's corps commenced moving slowly down the river, making strong demonstration upon its banks, as if to cross, at several places. They moved on Tyner's Station, reaching that point on the sixth and seventh, followed by a heavy cavalry force, that took the place of the infantry on the river as they were relieved, and, from their numbers, Colonel Minty reported that indication made it pretty certain that a crossing was about to be attempted.

At the same time, the pontoon bridge of the enemy was moored at Chattanooga, as if to cross over troops at that point.

All the crossings were closely watched, and the troops held in readiness for any movement. On the eighth, the river was cleared of all rebel troops above Chickamauga, and I directed Minty to cross over at the mouth of Sale Creek, reconnoitring the country well in his front, and move cautiously down to Harrison, always controlling one of the fords near him, so as to cross back if it should be found necessary.

Before the order could be obeyed, a heavy cavalry force confronted him on the opposite side of the river, and the crossing was not attempted. On that night, however, they all retired from above Frior's Island, and at eleven A. M., on the ninth, from their works opposite that island.

The city of Chattanooga was also evacuated the same morning, and the troops of General

* See Brown's Ferry, Georgia.

Wagner crossed over and occupied the city, a portion of Wilder's force crossing at Frior's Island, reconnoitring thoroughly the country opposite and towards Chattanooga.

Colonel Minty was at once ordered down to cross and report to Colonel Wilder, while all the troops not already over were, on the night of the ninth, concentrated at Frior's Island, and on the morning of the tenth crossed by fording, which was accomplished within the space of six hours, without loss of life or material.

The boats, although completed, were not required. I found in the Tennessee Valley an abundance of subsistence for my troops, and brought out of it seventy beeves for the army.

The casualties in all these operations were, two killed, one drowned, and five or six wounded. Several hundred prisoners and deserters were sent to the rear.

I have earnestly to commend to the attention of the Government the services of Colonels Wilder and Minty, commanding cavalry brigades.

I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
W. B. HAZEN,
Brigadier-General.

Doc. 44.

LETTER FROM MAJOR-GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

THE ATTACK ON MUNSON'S HILL.

The following letter, addressed to Colonel H. L. Scott, explains itself.

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND, Jan. 11, 1866 [7].

COLONEL: I received last evening yours of the twenty fourth December, informing me that a friend had written to you as follows:

"When we meet, I will tell you of the generally prevailing prejudice against you in New York and elsewhere, growing out of the story that General McClellan had in some way intimated that you had had correspondence with the rebels and had given them important information, before McClellan's attack on Munson's Hill (I think it was), not far from Washington."

You are entirely correct in believing that no intimation from me led to the foregoing accusation. I am ignorant of the origin of the story, but I know that no word or thought of mine could possibly have given rise to it. It affords me great pleasure to have the opportunity of repeating to you what I have always said when questioned in regard to this story, viz.: that I never had the slightest reason to suppose for an instant that you did, on the occasion referred to, or any other, give any information to any one concerning the movements of the Government troops, and that I did not believe you knew any thing about what was going on after I reached Washington, in July, 1861, for I did not think you were in Washington at all from the period of my arrival there up to the retirement of General Scott from active service.

I always regarded this story as simply one of the many slanders which were so abundant during the excitement of the war.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

Col. H. L. SCOTT,
Elizabeth, N. J.

Doc. 45.

THE DEFENCE OF CHARLESTON, S. C.*

MESSAGE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS.

RICHMOND, VA., Feb. 12, 1864.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I herewith transmit for your information a communication from the Secretary of War, covering copies of several additional "reports of General Beauregard, connected with the defence of Charleston." JEFFERSON DAVIS.

LETTER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, WAR DEPARTMENT, RICHMOND, VA., February 10, 1864.

To the President of the Confederate States:

SIR: In response to a resolution of the House of Representatives, calling for "the reports of General Beauregard, connected with the defence of Charleston, which have not hitherto been published," I have the honor to forward the following, which cover all the periods reported, except those embraced in such reports as have already been transmitted to Congress:

1. Report of the examination of Charleston harbor, by the Spanish consul, after attack by Confederate iron-clads:
2. Report of the action of the seventh of April, 1863, between the abolition iron-clads and the forts and batteries in Charleston harbor.
3. Reports of Brigadier-Generals Ripley and Taliaferro of operations from the eighth to the twentieth of July, 1863, inclusive.
4. Report of operations from the first to the twentieth August, inclusive.
5. Report of operations from the twenty-first to the thirty-first August, inclusive.
6. Reports of the evacuation of Morris Island.
7. Major Elliott's report of night assault on Fort Sumter.

I am, Sir, respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JAMES A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War.

REPORT OF THE EXAMINATION OF CHARLESTON HARBOR BY THE SPANISH CONSUL, AFTER ATTACK BY CONFEDERATE IRON-CLADS.

SPANISH CONSULATE, CHARLESTON, February 1st, 1863.

Mr. Thomas Jordan, Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff of the Department South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida:

MY DEAR SIR: I take pleasure in replying to

* See Documents, page 515, Volume 6, R. R.

your communication of the thirty-first of January last, respecting the notification of the raising of the blockade at Charleston by the naval force of the Confederate States.

I should inform you, that I remitted a copy of the same communication to His Excellency the Minister Plenipotentiary at Washington. I thank you for your kind offer in placing a steamer at my disposal, so that I may go and satisfy myself as to the condition of the port. Having gone out in company with the French consul, and arrived at the point where the Confederate naval forces were, we discovered three steamers and a pilot boat returning. I must also mention that the British consul at this port manifested to me verbally, that some time subsequent to this naval combat, not a single blockading vessel was in sight.

I avail myself of this opportunity to offer you my sincere respects.

MUNOZ DE MONCADA,
Spanish Consul.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD'S REPORT OF THE ACTION OF 7TH OF APRIL, 1863.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA, AND FLORIDA, CHARLESTON, S. C., May 24, 1863.

General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General, Richmond, Va.:

GENERAL: I have the honor to transmit with this, the report of Brigadier-General Ripley, commanding the First military district, South Carolina, of the battle of the seventh ultimo, together with the reports of his subordinate officers, and of Majors D. B. Harris and W. H. Echols, Provisional Engineer corps.

The accumulation of the enemy's troops, transports, and iron-clad vessels at Port Royal, during the months of February and March, and subsequently, in the North Edisto and Stono Rivers, having convinced me that the long threatened attack on Charleston was immediately impending, every possible precaution was at once made for the exigency, including the concentration, at strategic points in this vicinity, of all available troops, for the defence of the several land approaches to the position, and provisions for the further and rapid concentration, upon this point, of forces from other of the military subdivisions of the Department.

On the fifth of the month, the enemy's ironclads, of the *monitor* class, appeared, and anchored off the bar, which they crossed on the following day, accompanied by the iron-mailed frigate New Ironsides, bearing the Admiral's pennant. On the seventh of April, in the afternoon, the enemy moved forward to the attack, in single file—seven single-turreted *monitors*, to wit: *Weehawken, Catskill, Montauk, Nantucket, Passaic, Nahant, and Patapsco*, the *Keokuk* with two fixed turrets, and the New Ironsides—the *Weehawken* leading, the New Ironsides fifth in the order of battle. By three o'clock P. M., the head of the line had come within easy range of Forts Sumter and Moultrie, and Batteries Beauregard, Bee, and Cummins' Point, and Wagner; a few minutes later the first gun was fired from Fort Moultrie, and soon the engagement became general.

On our side, seventy-six guns of various calibre, including nine mortars and fifteen smooth bore thirty-two-pounders, were brought to bear on the fleet, which carried thirty-two guns of the heaviest calibres ever used in war, to wit: Fifteen and eleven-inch Dahlgren guns, and eight-inch rifle pieces. The Weehawken in advance, provided with a contrivance for catching and exploding torpedoes, was soon compelled to retire before the iron storm it encountered. The New Ironsides, at the distance of seventeen hundred yards from Fort Sumter, was frequently struck, and was next forced to fall back out of range, evidently injured. The Keokuk having, meantime, approached to about nine hundred yards of Fort Sumter, was quickly riddled, her guns silenced, and she was withdrawn from the fight vitally crippled. The remaining monitors, six in number, with twelve guns, maintained their fire until twenty-five minutes after five P. M., when they, too, retired out of range of our batteries, and came to anchor. four of them *hors de combat*, and one of them, the Passaic, so disabled as to make it necessary to send her under tow at once to Port Royal.

On the following morning, the full extent of the injury done to the Keokuk was shown. as she sunk at her anchors in the shallow water off Morris Island. Her armament, two eleven-inch Dahlgren guns, two United States flags, two pennants and three signal flags, have since been taken from her, and the former are now in position for effective service—substantial trophies of the affair. The New Ironsides and six monitors remained at anchor within the bar, but out of effective range of any of our works, until the afternoon of the twelfth of April—their crews and a corps of mechanics visibly and actively employed repairing damages, and apparently preparing to renew the attack; then weighing anchor they all recrossed the bar, the New Ironsides to resume her position as one of the blockading fleet, and the monitors (four of them in tow) to return to Port Royal.

For the detail of this conflict, I beg to refer you to the several reports herewith submitted. but it may not be amiss to recapitulate some of the salient results.

The action lasted two hours and twenty-five minutes, but the chief damage is reported by the enemy to have been done in thirty minutes; the Keokuk did not come nearer than nine hundred yards of Fort Sumter. She was destroyed. The New Ironsides could not stand the fire at the range of a mile. Four of her consorts, monitors, were disabled at the distance of not less that thirteen hundred yards. They had only reached the gorge of the harbor, never within it, and were baffled and driven back before reaching our lines of torpedoes and obstructions, which had been constructed as an ultimate defensive resort, as far as they could be provided. The heaviest batteries had not been employed;

therefore it may be accepted as shown, that these vaunted monitor batteries, though formidable engines of war, after all, are not invulnerable or invincible, and may be destroyed or defeated by heavy ordnance, properly placed and skilfully handled; in reality they have not materially altered the military relations of forts and ships.

On this occasion the monitors operated under the most favorable circumstances. The day was calm; and the water, consequently, was as stable as of a river. Their guns were fired with deliberation, doubtless by trained artillerists. According to the enemy's statements, the fleet fired one hundred and fifty-one shots, eight of which were ascribed to the New Ironsides, three to the Keokuk, and but nine to the Passaic, which was so badly damaged. Not more than thirty-four shots took effect on the walls of Fort Sumter—a broad mark—which, with the number of discharges, suggests that the monitor arrangement, as yet, is not convenient for accuracy or celerity of fire.

Fort Moultrie and other batteries were not touched, in a way to be considered, while in return they threw one thousand three hundred and ninety-nine shots. At the same time, Fort Sumter discharged eight hundred and ten shots; making the total number of shots fired two thousand two hundred and nine, of which the enemy reports that five hundred and twenty struck the different vessels—a most satisfactory accuracy, when the smallness of the target is considered. This precision was due not only to the discipline and practice of the garrison engaged, but in no slight degree to an invention of Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph A. Yates, First regiment South Carolina artillery, which had been applied to many of our best guns, and which shall, as fast as possible, be arranged for all the heavy ordnance in the department. By this felicitous device, our guns were easily held trained upon the monitors, although the latter were constantly in movement, and this with but five men at the heaviest pieces. The reports of the engineers (herewith) will show the precise extent of the damage inflicted on Fort Sumter. It is sufficient for me to say, that at the time the enemy quit these waters, the work was capable of resisting as formidable an attack as the one it had just foiled.

For the casualties of the day (so slight), I must refer you to the reports herewith. Too much praise cannot be given to the officers and men, in all the works engaged, for their spirit, gallantry, and discipline, which, indeed, I had a right to expect, from the high soldierly condition into which these garrisons had been brought by their officers. My expectations were fully realized; and the country, as well as the State of South Carolina, may well be proud of the men who first met and vanquished the iron-mailed, terribly armed armada, so confidently prepared, and sent forth by the enemy to certain and easy victory.

To the professional resources, skill as an artillery officer, intelligent and indefatigable zeal and assiduity of Brigadier-General Ripley, commanding the First military district, and specially charged with the defence of the harbor, much is due for the completeness of the defence, and the proud results of the seventh of April. He was ably seconded by his subordinate commanders, whose services he has fitly noticed in his own report. To Colonel A. J. Gonzales, Chief of Ordnance and Artillery, and Major D. B. Harris, Chief Engineer, and Major W. H. Echols, Provisional Engineer corps, and their several assistants, I return my thanks, for valuable services in their respective departments.

I have also to record my obligations to the Honorable William Porcher Miles, representative in Congress, for constantly exerted services, in securing for the defence of Charleston so many of the heaviest guns wielded so effectually.

The Confederate States iron-clad ships, Palmetto State and Chicora, under the command of Captain J. R. Tucker, C. S. N., as soon as the enemy advanced to the attack, took their positions (previously arranged), ready to perform their part in the conflict, at the opportune moment.

On the day after the combat, Flag Officer Lynch, C. S. N., arrived here from North Carolina, with an effective detachment of sailor artillerists, to tender service in any battery. He was assigned to a most responsible position—Cummins' Point battery—but was in three days thereafter recalled by the Navy Department.

The flags and trophies sent herewith were taken from the wreck of the Keokuk, by Lieutenant W. T. Glassell, C. S. N. The more material trophies, two eleven-inch Dahlgren pieces, now in battery, were recovered, under the supervision of General Ripley, by the mechanical resources and energy of Mr. Adolphus Lacoste, employee of the district ordnance department, assisted by parties from the garrison of Fort Sumter, under command of Lieutenant S. C. Boyleston, and Lieutenants J. M. Rhett and K. Kemper, First South Carolina artillery.

The enemy's land forces, collected in considerable strength on Seabrook Island, and in the transports in North Edisto River, and on Folly, Coles, and other islands about the mouth of the Stono River inlet, made no attempt to co-operate actively with the naval attack.

In conclusion, I shall avail myself of the occasion to give, as my opinion, that the best, the easiest way to render Fort Sumter impregnable would be to arm, conformably to its original plan, both tiers of casemates and the barbette, with the heaviest guns, rifled or smooth-bore, that can be made.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. Beauregard,
General, commanding.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. S. RIPLEY'S REPORT OF ACTION OF SEVENTH OF APRIL, 1863, BETWEEN THE ABOLITION IRON-CLADS AND THE FORTS AND BATTERIES IN CHARLESTON HARBOR.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST MILITARY DISTRICT,
DEPARTMENT OF S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, April 13, 1863.

Brigadier-General Thomas Jordan, Chief of Staff, Dep't of S. C., Ga., and Fla.:

GENERAL: Upon the first instant the increase of the enemy's force in the Stono, and information from North Edisto, gave warning that the long threatened combined movement upon Charleston was about to take place. Brigadier-General S. R. Gist, commanding First subdivision of this district, James Island and St. Andrews, took prompt measures for the observation and repulse of any attack in that direction. Colonel R. T. Graham, commanding Third subdivision, occupied the shore of Morris Island on Light House inlet, to control the passage from Folly Island, and a strict watch has been kept up to the present time on the land movements of the enemy.

On the fifth, the iron-clad fleet of the abolitionists, consisting of seven monitors and one double-turreted vessel, hove in sight from Fort Sumter, and came to anchor outside, in the vicinity of the Ironsides frigate, then a part of the blockading squadron. The sixth was apparently spent by the enemy in preparation, and by our artillerists in verifying the condition of their material. On the morning of the seventh, the enemy was inside the bar with all his iron-clads, including the frigate, but from his proximity to the shoals and the haze of the atmosphere, his position could not be determined.

The various works of preparation were progressed with, both on the exterior and interior line of defence, until about two o'clock P. M., when the enemy steamed directly up the channel, the Weehawken, with a false prow for removing torpedoes attached, leading, followed by three monitors, the Ironsides, flagship; three other monitors; the Keokuk, double-turret, bringing up the rear.

At each fort and battery, officers and men made preparation for immediate action, while the enemy came slowly and steadily on. At three o'clock Fort Moultrie opened fire. At five minutes past three, the leading vessel, having arrived at fourteen hundred yards off Fort Sumter, opened upon it with two guns. The eastern battery of Fort Sumter replied. Batteries Bee, Beauregard, Wagner, and at Cummins' Point, opened about this time, and the action became general, the four leading monitors closing up on the Weehawken, and taking position at an average distance from the forts and batteries of about fifteen hundred yards. In accordance with instructions, the fire from the different points was concentrated upon the leading vessels, and the effect was soon apparent from the withdrawal of the leading monitor from action, her false prow having been detached and she otherwise apparently injured.

The remaining monitors, in advance of the flag-ship, held their position, directing their fire principally at Fort Sumter, but giving occasional shots at Fort Moultrie (of which the flag-staff was shot away), Batteries Beauregard and Bee. The Ironsides, meantime, opened fire and drew the attention of Forts Moultrie and Sumter, and the Cummins' Point battery. A few heavy and concentrated discharges caused her to withdraw out of range, where she was soon followed by two other monitors.

At five minutes past four, the Keokuk left her consorts and came to the front, approaching to within nine hundred yards of Fort Sumter, twelve hundred from Battery Bee, and one thousand of Fort Moultrie. Her advance was characterized by more boldness than had hitherto been shown by any of the enemy's fleet; but, receiving full attention from the powerful batteries opposed to her, the effect was soon apparent. The ten-inch shot and seven-inch rifle bolts crashed through her armor, her hull and turrets were riddled and stove in, her boats were shot away, and in less than forty minutes she retired with such speed as her disabled condition would permit. The remaining monitors kept their position for a time; but soon, one by one, dropped down the channel and came to anchor out of range, after an action of two hours and twenty-five minutes, at ranges varying from nine hundred to fifteen hundred yards.

The full effect of our batteries upon the enemy could not be precisely ascertained, and as our strength had not been entirely put forth, it was believed that the action would soon be renewed. The monitor which had led into the action, however, proceeded south, outside of the bar, on the same evening.

Before the commencement of the affair, I was proceeding in a boat to Battery Bee, and watched the progress of the cannonade from that point. The guns were worked with as much precision as the range would admit. There were no damages or casualties. Visiting Fort Moultrie, the damaged flag-staff was being replaced, and everything prepared for the renewal of the fire, should the enemy approach again. One man had been mortally wounded by the falling of the staff. Crossing the channel to Fort Sumter, the effect of impact of the heavy shot sent by the enemy against the fort which they are so anxious to repossess, greater in calibre and supposed destructive force than any other hitherto used in war, was found to have been much less than had been anticipated.

Five men had been injured by splinters from the traverse, one eight-inch columbiad had exploded, one ten-inch carriage had its rear transom shot away, and one rifled forty-two-pounder had been temporarily disabled from the effect of recoil upon defective carriages. The garrison was immediately set to work to repair damages, and, the strength of the enemy's projectiles having been ascertained, to guard such points as might be exposed to their effect, should the attack be renewed. Cummins' Point battery and Battery

Wagner were uninjured except from the accidental explosion of an ammunition chest in Battery Wagner.

During the night of the seventh, stores were replenished, threatened points upon land reinforced, working parties from the Forty-sixth Georgia regiment brought to Fort Sumter, and the renewal of the struggle in the morning awaited with confidence.

When day dawned, on the morning of the eighth, the enemy's fleet was discovered in the same position as noticed on the previous evening. About nine o'clock, the Keokuk, which had been evidently the most damaged in the action, went down about three and one-half miles from Fort Sumter and three-fourths of a mile from Morris Island. The remainder of the fleet were repairing damages. Preparations for repulsing a renewed attack were progressed with in accordance with the instructions of the commanding General, who visited Fort Sumter on that day. A detachment of seamen, under Flag-Officer W. F. Lynch, arrived from Wilmington, and, on the ninth, temporarily relieved the artillerists in charge of the Cummins' Point battery. The operations of the enemy's fleet consisted only in supply and repair. Toward evening of the ninth, a raft, apparently for removing torpedoes or obstructions, was towed inside of the bar. Nothing of importance occurred during the tenth.

During the night of the tenth, Lieutenant-Colonel Dargan, of Colonel Graham's command, crossed Light-House Inlet, drove back the enemy's pickets with loss, and returned with one prisoner.

On the eleventh there were indications that the attacking fleet was about to withdraw; and on the twelfth, at high water, the Ironsides crossed the bar and took up her position with the blockading fleet; and the monitors steamed and were towed to the southward, leaving only the sunken Keokuk as a monument of their attack and discomfiture.

In this, the first trial of the abolition iron fleet against brick fortifications, and their first attempt to enter the harbor of Charleston, in which they were beaten before their adversaries thought the action had well commenced, they were opposed by seventy-six pieces in all, including mortars. Thirty-seven of these, exclusive of mortars, were above the calibre of thirty-two-pounders. The expenditure of shot against the fleet was twenty-two hundred and twenty-nine projectiles, of which over sixteen hundred were over the calibre of thirty-two-pounders. The guns which the enemy brought to bear, were, if their own account is to believed, thirty in number, including eight-inch rifled, eleven and fifteen-inch guns, which would make their weight of metal, at one discharge, nearly, if not quite, equal to that thrown by the batteries.

During the action, Brigadier-General Trapier, commanding Second subdivision of this district, was present at Fort Moultrie; Brigadier-General Gist, commanding First subdivision, at Fort Johnson; Colonel R. F. Graham, commanding Third subdivision, on Morris Island, and Colonel L. M. Keitt, commanding Sullivan's Island, at Battery Bee, attending to their duties and awaiting the development of the attack. The action, however, was purely of artillery—forts and batteries against the iron-clad vessels of the enemy; other means of defence, obstructions and torpedoes, not having come into play. Fort Sumter was the principal object of the enemy's attack, and to that garrison, under its gallant commander, Colonel Alfred Rhett, ably seconded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. Yates and Major Ormsby Blanding, and all the officers and men, special credit is due for sustaining the shock, and, with their powerful armament, contributing principally to the repulse. The garrison of Fort Moultrie, under Colonel William Butler, seconded by Major Baker and the other officers and soldiers, upheld the historic reputation of that fort, and contributed their full share to the result. The powerful batteries of Battery Bee were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Simkins, and were served with great effect. Battery Wagner, under Major C. K. Huger; Cummins' Point battery, under Lieutenant Lesesne, and Battery Beauregard, under Captain Sitgreaves, all did their part according to their armament. Indeed, from the reports of the commanders, it is hard to make any distinction where all did their duty with devotion and zeal. Those cases which have been ascertained will be found in the reports of the subordinate commanders. The steady preparation for receiving a renewed attack by the officers, and the good conduct and discipline of the troops, especially in the garrison of Fort Sumter, where the labor was necessarily great, have been quite as creditable as their conduct under fire. While service in immediate action is that which is most conspicuous after such a result has been accomplished, the greatest credit is due to that long, patient, and laborious preparation, by which our works, never originally intended to withstand such an attack as has been encountered, have been so re-secured as to enable our gallant and well-instructed officers and men to obtain their end with comparatively small loss. In that preparation, the late Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas M. Wagner contributed much on both sides of the channel, and Colonel Rhett, Lieutenant-Colonel Yates, Major Blanding, and other officers of Fort Sumter, have been more or less engaged since the fort fell into our hands, two years since. Colonel Butler, Lieutenant-Colonel Simkins, and other officers of the First South Carolina infantry, have been, for more than a year, engaged at the works on Sullivan's Island. Besides these, various officers of engineers and other branches of the department staff, known to the commanding General, have been, at different times, principal contributors in the work; and although, in the limits of this report, it is impossible to mention all to whom credit is due, it is well that works like these, without which, in such emergencies, personal gallantry avails

naught, should be appreciated. During the seven days, while the presence of the fleet threatened action, Captain Wm. F. Nance, principal Assistant Adjutant-General on the district staff, performed his difficult duties in the administration of a command of ——— thousand men in a prompt, judicious, and efficient manner. He was assisted by Lieutenants H. H. Rogers and W. H. Wagner, A. D. C. Captain F. B. Dubarry, District Ordnance Officer, was especially active and energetic in the supply of ammunition and material for the batteries. He was assisted by Lieutenant C. C. Pinckney. Captain B. H. Read, A. A. G.; Colonel Edward Manigault, and Lieutenant-Colonel St. Clair Dearing, volunteers upon the staff, were present during the action at Fort Sumter. Captain E. M. Seabrook, volunteer Aid-de-Camp, and Lieutenant Schmerle, Enrolling Officer and acting Aid-de-Camp, were generally with me during the active period, and all were energetic and prompt in the discharge of the duties required of them. Captain John S. Ryan acted on my immediate staff. To Majors Motte A. Pringle and Norman W. Smith, Post and District Quartermasters, and Captain McClenahan, A. C. S., many thanks should be rendered. The duties of the Quartermaster's Department were excessively laborious on account of the limited means of transportation, and it is a matter of congratulation that, with such means, they were so well performed.

The reports of engineer officers will inform the commanding General of the condition of the various works, as well as of the acts of officers in that branch of the service.

I have the honor to transmit herewith a sketch of the position of the enemy's fleet at a quarter past four o'clock P. M. on the seventh, a return of the guns engaged, a return of ammunition expended, a numerical return of casualties, and the reports of different commanders. To the last I beg respectfully to refer for such information as is not included in this report.

I have also to transmit herewith two abolition ensigns obtained from the Keokuk, as she lies off Morris Island beach, by Lieutenant Glassell, C. S. N., one of which is evidently the ensign under which she fought and was worsted. None of the iron-clads flew large flags, the object having doubtless been to avoid presenting a mark to our artillery.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
R. S. RIPLEY,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

Return of Guns and Mortars at Forts and Batteries in Charleston Harbor, engaged with the Abolition Iron-clads, April seventh, 1863:

FORT OR BATTERY.	10-inch Columbiad.	9-inch Dahlgrens.	7-inch Brooke.	8-inch Columbiad.	42-pounder, rifled.	32-pounder, rifled.	32-pounder, smooth.	10-inch Mortars.	Grand Total.
Fort Sumter	4	2	2	8	7	1	13	7	.....
Fort Moultrie	.....	.....	.....	9	.....	5	5	2	.....
Battery Bee	5	.....	.....	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Battery Beauregard	.....	.....	.....	1	.....	1	.....	.....	.....
Battery at Cummins' Point	1	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Battery Wagner	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	1	.....	.....	.....
Total	10	3	2	19	7	8	18	9	76

Return of Casualties in action:

FORT OR BATTERY.	Killed.	WOUNDED.				Grand Total.	REMARKS.
		Mortally.	Dangerously.	Severely.	Slightly.		
Fort Sumter	.....	.....	.....	1	4	.....	Splinters from traverse.
Fort Moultrie	.....	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	Fall of flagstaff.
Battery Wagner	3	.....	.....	2	3	.....	Explosion of ammunition chest
	3	1	.....	3	7	14	

Return of Ammunition expended in action April seventh, 1863:

Battery or Fort.	Shot, Round.				Shell, Round.		Shot, Rifle.				Bolts, Rifle.	Tubes.	Powder.
	10-inch Columbiad.	8-inch Columbiad.	9-inch Dahlgren.	32-pounder.	10-inch Mortar.	8-inch Columbiad, Incendiary.	7-inch Brooke.	42-pounder.	32-pounder.	32-pounder, shell.	32-pounder.	Friction Tubes.	Pounds of Cannon Powder used.
Fort Sumter	120	270	54	100	40	.....	86	140	21	.....	.....	1,047	7,620
Fort Moultrie	.....	339	.....	243	51	5	.....	.....	.....	38	192	1,200	7,375
Battery Bee	225	58	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	350	3,940
Battery Wagner	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	22	.....	.....	27	132
Battery Beauregard	.....	64	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	45	7	41	157	1,155
Battery at Cummins' Point	40	.....	26	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	73	860
Fort Johnson	.....	.....	.....	.....	2	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	2	11
Total	385	731	80	343	93	5	86	140	88	45	233	2,856	21,093

Exhibit of number of Rounds fired by the Enemy on seventh of April, and number of Shot received by each Iron-clad, copied from United States Journals:

	Rounds.
New Ironsides fired	8
Catskill fired	25
Keokuk fired	3
Montauk fired	26
Nantucket fired	15
Passaic fired	9
Nahant fired	24
Weehawken fired	26
Patapsco fired	18
Total	154
New Ironsides received of shots	65
Keokuk " "	90
Weehawken " "	60
Montauk " "	20
Passaic " "	58
Nantucket " "	51
Catskill " "	51
Patapsco " "	45
Nahant " "	80
Total	520

THOMAS JORDAN,
Chief of Staff.

REPORT OF COLONEL ALFRED RHETT OF ENGAGEMENT OF SEVENTH OF APRIL, BETWEEN YANKEE IRON-CLADS AND FORT SUMTER, &c.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST SOUTH CAROLINA ARTILLERY,
FORT SUMTER, April 13, 1863.

Captain William F. Nance, A. A. G., First Military District, South Carolina:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report:

The abolition iron-clad fleet, consisting of the frigate New Ironsides and eight monitors, appeared in sight on Sunday morning, April fifth, instant; crossed the bar the same evening, and anchored in the main ship channel.

At two o'clock P. M., April seventh, instant, the whole iron-clad fleet advanced to the attack in the following order, viz.: four monitors were in the advance, led by the Passaic; the Ironsides came next, followed by three other single turreted monitors, and the Keokuk, a double-turreted monitor, bringing up the rear.

At thirty minutes past two P. M., the long roll was beaten, and every disposition made for action.

At fifty-five minutes past two P. M., the garrison, regimental and Palmetto flags were hoisted, and saluted by thirteen guns, the band playing the national airs.

At three o'clock P. M., the action was opened by a shot from Fort Moultrie. At three minutes past three P. M., the leading vessel having approached to within about fourteen hundred yards of the fort, she fired two shots simultaneously, one, a fifteen-inch shrapnel, which burst; both passed over the fort. The batteries were opened upon her two minutes later, the firing being by battery. The action now became general, and the four leading monitors taking position from thirteen hundred to fourteen hundred yards distant, the fire was changed from fire by battery to fire by piece, as being more accurate. The fire by battery was again resumed as occasion offered. The Ironsides did not approach nearer than seventeen hundred yards. The whole fire of the batteries engaged was concentrated on the Passaic for thirty minutes, when she withdrew from the engagement, apparently injured. The other ships, each in turn, received our attention. The fire of both Fort Moultrie and this fort being now directed against the Ironsides, she immediately withdrew out of effective range. The other turretted monitors came under our fire in like manner as the preceding, slowly passing in front of the fort in an ellipse; one only,

the last, approaching to about one thousand yards.

At five minutes past four P. M., the Keokuk left her consorts and advanced, bow on, gallantly to within nine hundred yards of our batteries. She received our undivided attention, and the effect of our fire was soon apparent. The wrought-iron bolts from a seven-inch Brooke gun were plainly seen to penetrate her turret and hull, and she retired in forty minutes, riddled, and apparently almost disabled.

At twenty-five minutes past five P. M., the whole fleet withdrew. The iron-clads had been under our fire for two hours and twenty-five minutes. The Keokuk has sunk, one monitor was towed south on the morning of the eighth April, instant; several were apparently injured; and the fact has been demonstrated, that iron-clads of the monitor class are not invulnerable.

The enemy's fire was mostly ricochet and not very accurate; most of their shot passed over the fort, and several to the right and left. The greater portion of their shots were from thirteen to fourteen hundred yards distant, which appeared to be the extent of their effective range; some shots were from a greater distance, and did not reach the fort at all.

For the effect of the fire of the enemy upon the fort, I would respectfully refer to the report of Engineer.

One eight-inch columbiad, old pattern, chambered gun, exploded. This gun was being fired at about one degree elevation, and it is my opinion that its bursting was caused by the shot rolling forward, when the gun was run into battery. In firing at low degrees of elevation and at depression, sabot shot should be used.

One forty-two-pounder rifled gun was dismounted by recoil, and temporarily disabled.

One ten-inch columbiad was disabled, by having the rear transom of its carriage shot away. Both guns were again ready for action in a few hours.

The garrison flag received a shot through the Union. The regimental flag was much torn by fragments of shell.

The garrison, consisting of seven companies, First South Carolina artillery, was disposed of as follows, viz:

First—Captain D. G. Fleming, with Company B, seventy-eight men, in command of east parapet battery, assisted by Lieutenants F. D. Bake and Iredell Jones; Lieutenant J. M. Rhett, Company A, although on sick report, was assigned temporarily to Company B.

Second—Captain F. H. Harleston, with Company D, seventy-four men, in command of north-east parapet battery, assisted by Lieutenants McMillan, King and W. S. Simkins.

Third—Captain J. C. King, with Company F, in command of north-west parapet battery, assisted by Lieutenants A. S. Gilliard, John Middleton, and W. H. Johnson.

Fourth—Captain J. C. Mitchell, with Company I, seventy-eight men, in command of west parapet battery, assisted by Lieutenant J. S. Bee.

Fifth—Captain J. R. Macbeth, with Company E, seventy-seven men, in command of mortar battery and east casemate battery, assisted by Lieutenant J. J. Alston.

Sixth—Captain W. H. Peronneau, with Company G, seventy-seven men, in command of north-east casemate battery, assisted by Lieutenant E. S. Ficklin.

Seventh—Captain C. W. Parker, with detachment Company C, fifty-five men, and detachment Company E, in command of north-west casemate battery, assisted by Lieutenants G. E. Haymworth and K. Kemper.

Eighth—Lieutenant H. Grimball, with regimental band, fifteen men, in command of second tier casemate battery.

Ninth—Lieutenant Clarkson, with detachment of twenty-five men of Company B, Charleston battalion, posted in second tier of casemate as sharpshooters.

Lieutenant-Colonel Yates, having reported for duty on the morning of the seventh of April, was assigned to the immediate command of the parapet batteries.

The casemate batteries were under the immediate command of Major Ormsby Blanding.

The following is the number of guns brought into action: Two seven-inch Brooke guns; four ten-inch columbiads; two nine-inch Dahlgrens; four eight-inch columbiads; four eight-inch navy guns; seven banded and rifled forty-two pounders; one banded and rifled thirty-two pounder; thirteen smooth-bore thirty-two-pounders; seven ten-inch sea-coast mortars.

The following were the officers of the staff:

Lieutenant S. C. Boyleston, Adjutant; Captain T. M. Barker, Assistant Quartermaster; Captain S. P. Ravenel, A. C. S.; Reverend N. Aldrich, Chaplain; Sergeant-Major, C. P. Grunshig, and Quartermaster-Sergeant, William Nicoll. Lieutenant Charles Inglesby was Officer of the Day. Lieutenant J. G. Heyward was Officer of the Guard. Lieutenant E. P. Ravenel was acting Ordnance Officer, assisted by Lieutenant James B. Heyward, Lieutenant of Ordnance.

The medical department was under charge of Surgeon M. S. Moore, assisted by Assistant-Surgeon Samuel Muller.

Mr. Edward White was present as acting Engineer Officer.

The members of the Signal corps were T. P. Lowndes, Arthur Grimball, and Joseph W. Seabrook.

Several officers of General Ripley's staff were present during the engagement, and in the absence of General Ripley, tendered their services to me.

Captain Benjamin Read, A. A. General; Colonel Edward Manigault and Colonel St. Clair Dearing were present, having tendered their services also.

Mr. Lacoste also was present, and rendered efficient service.

With regard to the conduct of the garrison, it is impossible for me to draw any distinction. Officers and men were alike animated with the

same spirit, and I cannot speak in too high terms of their coolness and gallantry throughout the action. All acted as though they were engaged in practice, and the minutest particulars of drill and military etiquette were preserved.

For expenditure of ammunition, I would respectfully refer to enclosed report of Ordnance Officer.

For a list of casualties, I would also refer to enclosed Surgeon's report.

At nine o'clock A. M., April eighth, the Keokuk was seen to sink near Morris Island beach, where she now lies.

Respectfully submitted,

ALFRED RHETT,
Colonel, commanding.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL TRAPIER'S REPORT OF ACTION IN CHARLESTON HARBOR, APRIL SEVENTH, 1863.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND SUBDIVISION,
FIRST MILITARY DISTRICT, SULLIVAN'S ISLAND, April 13, 1863.

Captain W. F. Nance, A. A. G.:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the action of the seventh instant, between the enemy's fleet of iron-clad war vessels and the fort and batteries on this island:

At about two o'clock P. M., on that day, it was reported to me that the movements of the fleet, which had been for some time anchored within the bar, were suspicious, and that some of the vessels appeared to be advancing. So stealthily did they approach, however, that not until half past two o'clock did I become convinced that the intentions of the enemy were serious and that the long threatened attack was about to begin. I immediately repaired to Fort Moultrie, where I had previously determined to make my headquarters during the action. Slowly but steadily the iron-clads approached, coming by the middle or "swash" channel in single file, the Passaic (it is believed) in the van, followed by the rest (eight in number) at equal distances, the flag ship, New Ironsides, occupying the centre.

At three o'clock, Colonel William Butler, commanding in the fort, reported to me that the leading ship was in range. I ordered him immediately to open his batteries upon her, which was done promptly, and the action began. Fearing that the range was rather long for effective work, the firing, after a few rounds, was suspended for a short time; but finding the enemy refused close quarters, there was no alternative but to engage him at long range or not at all. We decided upon the former, and Fort Moultrie again opened her batteries. Batteries Bee and Beauregard had also, by this time, opened fire, and the action had become general. It soon became obvious that the enemy's intentions were to fight and not to run by, and orders were given to "train" on vessels nearest in, and to fire by battery. Volley after volley was delivered in this way; but although it was plain that our shot repeatedly took effect, their impact against the iron casing of the enemy being distinctly heard and seen, yet we could not discover but that the foe was indeed invulnerable.

About half past five or six o'clock P. M., or after the action had lasted about two hours and a half, the enemy, as slowly as he had advanced, withdrew from the contest, apparently unharmed, so far at least as his power of locomotion went. Subsequent events have happily revealed the fact, that one at least of our enemy's "invulnerables" has given proof that brick walls and earthen parapets still hold the mastery.

The nearest the enemy ventured at any time to Fort Moultrie was estimated at one thousand yards, to Battery Bee sixteen hundred yards, to Battery Beauregard fourteen hundred yards.

Fort Moultrie was garrisoned by a detachment from the First South Carolina regular infantry, Colonel William Butler commanding, assisted by Major T. M. Baker, and consisting of the following companies:

Company A, Captain T. A. Huguenin; Company E, Captain R. Press Smith; Company F, Captain B. S. Burnett; Company G, First Lieutenant E. A. Erwin commanding; Company K, Captain C. H. Rivers.

Battery Bee was garrisoned by another detachment from the same regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel J. C. Jenkins, and consisted of the following companies:

Company C, Captain Robert DeTreville; Company H, Captain Warner Adams; Company I, Captain W. Tabourn.

Colonel L. M. Keitt, Twentieth regiment South Carolina volunteers, by my consent, took post at Battery Bee, and remained there during the action.

Battery Beauregard was under the command of Captain J. A. Sitgreaves, First South Carolina regular artillery, and was garrisoned by the following companies:

Company K, First South Carolina regular artillery, First-Lieutenant W. E. Erwin commanding.

Company B, First South Carolina regular infantry, Captain J. H. Warley commanding.

It gives me pleasure to have it in my power to report that not a single casualty occurred among any of these troops, with the exception only of one in Fort Moultrie. Early in the action our flaff-staff was shot away, and in falling struck private J. S. Lusby, Company F, inflicting a severe wound, from which he died in a short time. Neither the fort itself, nor the material was in the least injured. It is due to the garrison of Fort Moultrie and their soldierly and accomplished commander, Colonel Butler, that I should not close this report without bearing testimony to the admirable skill, coolness, and deliberation with which they served their guns. They went, all—men as well as officers—to their work cheerfully and with alacrity, showing that their hearts were in it. There was enthusiasm, but no excitement. They lost no time in loading their guns, but never fired hastily or without aim.

The reports of Colonel Keitt, Lieutenant-Colonel Simpkins, and Captain Sitgreaves, give me every reason to believe the garrisons of Batteries Bee and Beauregard acquitted themselves equally well, and are equally entitled to the thanks and gratitude of their commander and their country.

Colonel Butler makes honorable mention of the following officers: Captain M. H. Wigg, A. C. S., when the flag staff was shot away, promptly mounted a transom and placed the regimental flag in a conspicuous place upon it. Captain G. A. Wardlaw, A. Q. M., and Lieutenant and Adjutant Mitchell King, and First-Lieutenant D. G. Calhoun, were likewise prompt in placing the battle and garrison flags in conspicuous positions. Lieutenant Williams, Ordnance Officer, is also favorably mentioned.

To Captains William Greene and B. G. Pinckney, of my staff, and First-Lieutenant A. H. Lucas, my Aid-de-Camp, I am indebted for valuable assistance, and my thanks are also due to Lieutenant-Colonel O. M. Dantzler and Doctor G. W. Wescott, volunteer Aids for the occasion.

I have the honor to transmit herewith a statement in tabular form, showing the expenditure of ammunition by Fort Moultrie and the batteries during the action.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

J. H. TRAPIER,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

REPORT OF THE PART TAKEN BY FORT MOULTRIE IN THE ACTION OF THE SEVENTH OF APRIL.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT MOULTRIE, S. C., April 13, 1863.

First Lieutenant W. E. Hane, Adjutant of Forces on Sullivan's Island:

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following statement of the part taken by this fort in the action with the iron-clad fleet of the abolitionists on the seventh of this month:

On the fifth, the attacking fleet, consisting of eight turreted gunboats and the steam-frigate Ironsides, crossed the bar and took a position about three miles and a half or four miles from this fort. On the seventh it advanced in the direction of the harbor, one of the turreted boats some distance in advance. As soon as the leading boat came within range, I reported the fact to the Brigadier-General commanding, and received orders from him to commence the action. Thinking it was the object of the enemy to run by Fort Sumter, I permitted the firing to be rapid at the commencement, using every precaution, however, to encourage deliberation in aiming. The boats engaged were at all times, during the action, within range of the guns of this fort. About three-quarters of an hour after the first gun was fired, the frigate Ironsides steamed up to within sixteen hundred yards and took a position apparently with a view of taking a prominent part in the action. All the guns that could be brought to bear were trailed upon her and fired, and she in a few minutes afterwards moved out of range. The fire was generally directed upon the boat in advance, and I think with some effect. Shots were seen to strike frequently, many of them breaking to pieces. The guns engaged were manned by Companies A, E, F, and G, First South Carolina infantry, commanded respectively by Captains T. A. Huguenin and R. Press Smith, First Lieutenant Erwin, and Captain B. S. Burnett; the mortars by Companies F and K, Captain C. H. Rivers, were fired with creditable accuracy. Officers and men performed their duties with spirit and celerity. During the action the flag-staff was cut down by a shot from the enemy, which, in falling, struck private Lusby, Company F, First South Carolina infantry, causing his death in a few minutes. This was the only casualty of any importance. One gunner, private Harrison, Company G, lost a finger by some inadvertence in running a gun into battery, but returned to his post after getting his wound dressed. When the flag was struck down, Captain W. H. Wigg, A. C. S., promptly placed the regimental flag in a conspicuous place upon a traverse. Captain W. H. Wardlaw, A. Q. M., and Lieutenant and Adjutant Mitchell King and First Lieutenant D. G. Calhoun were likewise prompt in placing the battle and garrison flags in conspicuous positions. Major T. M. Baker, First South Carolina infantry, was wherever his services would be most useful. The Ordnance Officer, Second Lieutenant Thomas Williams, was at his post at the magazine. Much credit is due to him for the good condition of the gun carriages and the ordnance stores. I have already submitted a report of the amount of ammunition expended. The guns engaged consisted of nine eight-inch columbiads, five thirty-two-pounder rifled and banded guns, five smooth-bore thirty-two pounders, and two ten-inch mortars.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

WILLIAM BUTLER,
Colonel First South Carolina Infantry, commanding.

REPORT OF COLONEL KEITT OF THE PART TAKEN BY THE BATTERIES OF SULLIVAN'S ISLAND IN THE ACTION OF THE SEVENTH OF APRIL.

HEADQUARTERS, SULLIVAN'S ISLAND, April 13, 1863.

Captain Green, A. A. G.:

CAPTAIN: I had the honor this morning to send to you the reports of the commandants of the various batteries on Sullivan's Island engaged in the action of the seventh instant with the enemy's iron-clad fleet. The action was commenced at three o'clock by Fort Moultrie, and in a short time thereafter was general throughout all the batteries. Immediately after the opening of the engagement, I left Fort Moultrie (where Brigadier-General Trapier had stationed his headquarters and was overlooking the conflict) and repaired to Battery Bee.

At this battery I found the garrison alert and ready to direct their fire against the invading fleet. Their guns were promptly trained, and

fired with rapidity and great precision. I saw, very distinctly, a large number of ten-inch shot from this battery strike the Keokuk, and also two of the monitor vessels, which alternately advanced to the front. They struck turrets, decks, and hull. The injury inflicted could not be accurately estimated, but I believe that it was severe. The officers of the garrison were cool, vigilant, and energetic, and the men were prompt, active, and thoroughly familiar with their duties. Lieutenant-Colonel Simkins overlooked the management of the battery, and I testify to his vigilance, skill and the energetic discharge of his duties. The firing I thought a little too rapid, but I have no doubt that in the end it subserved a good purpose. The storm of shot and bolts which fell around the enemy confused, if it did not appal him.

The Beauregard battery directed its fire with great precision against the Ironsides and the two monitors which were nearest to it. The shot of this battery struck those vessels repeatedly. The officers and men behaved with the highest coolness and gallantry.

Fort Moultrie was under General Trapier's own eye, and he can best tell how worthily she vindicated her historical reputation.

The companies of the Twentieth regiment South Carolina volunteers, which were upon the island, were drawn up to protect the upper batteries and to repel a land attack, if such were attempted. They were eager to join their brethren in arms in the conflict, but the prudent abstinence of the foe from an attempt to land prevented them. They were under command of Captain P. A. McMichael, Lieutenant-Colonel Dantzler having been invited by General Trapier to act as his special aid on the occasion; and, had a land attack been made, Lieutenant-Colonel Dantzler could easily have reached the portion of his regiment drawn up on the island, and have taken command of it, which he intended to do.

I have the honor to be, Captain,

Your obedient servant,

LAWRENCE M. KEITT,
Colonel, commanding Post.

Official:

WILLIAM F. NANCE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

CIRCULAR.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST MILITARY DISTRICT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, December 26th, 1862.

In case the proposed attack upon this harbor is known beforehand, special directions will be given for the service of the different batteries. As, however, it may happen that a surprise may be attempted, or that the intervening time between the knowledge of the intention and the event may be too short, the instructions hereinafter contained will be carefully attended to.

Each commanding officer of a fort or battery, will give his attention immediately to the strengthening of his carriages, and the complete preparation of his material. Besides making the proper requisitions on the staff departments, let him endeavor to do as much as possible from his own resources. While staff departments are, to a great extent, crippled, for want of material and workmen, much can be accomplished by ready expedients without their aid. Every carriage must be kept carefully screwed up, and if any are defective, made at least temporarily efficient. All the elevating screws, eccentric wheels, and traversing gear must be put in order, and kept so, and especial care must be taken to see that a full supply of small implements is constantly on hand.

Ammunition should be examined, and immediately apportioned to the several guns, reference being had to the orders heretofore given on that subject; but where the quantity is not sufficient, the greater portion should be given to the heavier guns, as on them principally the success of the defence must depend.

Officers and men of each command must be kept on the alert, and instructed to go to battery, at once, upon an alarm; and especial care must be taken that each battery is in readiness for instant action as the men arrive at their guns.

It is hoped and believed that most of these things are habitually attended to, but as constant vigilance is our only security, they cannot be too forcibly insisted upon.

Upon observing a disposition to attack on the part of the enemy, the nearest fort or battery will give the alarm. By day a shotted gun, and dipping the flag, will communicate the danger to the other fortifications and headquarters. All commands will go at once to battery, and the circumstances of the alarm communicated to headquarters by telegraph or signal. By night, a shotted gun and a rocket will give the intelligence.

In whatever way the attack is made by the enemy, he is to be engaged as soon as possible to do so effectually, with a few long range guns from every fort that will bear. The number of these guns must be left to the discretion of the commanding officers, who must see that the fire is as accurate as possible. They must not engage too great a number, and be careful not unduly to excite their men, or strain their guns and carriages. While the long range fire is valuable, if accurate, to annoy the enemy, and force him to develop his attack, it is not to be depended on for more. Other things being equal, it will be well that the guns to leeward are first engaged. The remaining guns of the batteries will be trained by battery on different points where the enemy must pass, care being taken to have the fire of each battery concentrated. As the enemy approaches, let the distance he will be in passing be accurately estimated by the distance buoys, and the elevation made to correspond, making it too little rather than too great for direct fire. If the vessels are passing rapidly, the guns should be discharged by battery, just as the prows of the vessels come across the line of sight.

In the case of wooden vessels, the object will be to hit them near the water-line, just abaft the smoke-stack. In the case of iron-clad vessels, to hit the deck or the turrets at the intersection with the deck, and especially to let all the shots strike at once.

The first fire will be concentrated upon the leading vessels, and will be continued upon them as long as the guns by battery will bear well, and especially if they become entangled in obstructions, even if certain vessels engage to draw off the attention of the outermost batteries and remain behind.

Should some of the vessels succeed in passing, the action must then pass into the hands of commanding officers of batteries. They will pour in their fire as far as practicable, by battery, and as fast as it can be done with accuracy on whatever vessels of the enemy may be nearest them.

The guns of Beauregard battery, Fort Moultrie, Battery Bee, and the eastern, north-eastern, and north-western faces of Fort Sumter will be used to form the first circle of fire to which the enemy must be subjected; the centre being a little to the eastward of a line between the forts and midway. Every effort must be made to crush his vessels and repel his attack within this circle, and especially while he is entangled in the obstructions.

All the mortars of Fort Sumter and Fort Moultrie will be trained on the centre above indicated. The fuzes will be of the full length, and the shells have large bursting charges; it being better to have the fuzes fail than the shells to burst in the air, and the full effect of the explosions being desirable if successful. The mortar batteries will be fired by battery when the enemy's vessels are about two ship's lengths from the point on which they are trained.

If the fleet is large, the mortars will be kept trained on the same point, and fired by battery as rapidly as possible while the fleet is passing. If small, and a portion has passed the first circle of fire, the mortars of Fort Sumter will be trained to operate on the second circle, the centre of which will be at a point about midway between Forts Sumter and Ripley, and to the southward of the middle ground shoal. It will be formed by the heavy guns of Fort Johnson, Fort Ripley, Castle Pinckney, Battery Bee, and the north-western and western faces of Fort Sumter.

The guns of Forts Johnson and Ripley and Castle Pinckney will open on the leading vessels as they come within easy range, care being taken that every shot finds its mark. Those of Fort Sumter and Battery Bee will continue upon the leading vessels as long as they are close, but if they elongate their distance, the fire will be concentrated on the vessels nearest them.

Should any vessel succeed in passing the sec- fire, the third will be formed and n by the guns of White Point battery and Battery Glover, with such guns of Forts Johnson and Ripley and Castle Pinckney as will bear. Concentration on the leading vessels will be the object as before.

During the action, care will be taken, as far as possible, to prevent the chances of shot from the batteries taking the direction of our own works. The best way of doing this will be to let none miss the enemy, and when he is between the works most especial accuracy will be striven for.

The vessels of the Confederate navy will engage during the action, and they may often pass our batteries. In this case, officers and gunners cannot be too careful to avoid hitting them. The fire by battery, as a general thing, will be discontinued at those vessels of the enemy which our ships engage closely; but if occasion offers, endeavors will be made to hit the ports of the revolving turrets on the enemy's vessels when turned from our ships, to disarrange and throw out of gear the machinery for closing the ports.

Accurate fire by single guns will be concentrated on the enemy's vessels, if two or more attack one of ours; and should the distance admit, then it will be advisable to pour upon one of them a heavy fire by battery.

The plunging fire from Fort Sumter is expected to be particularly effective, and when single rifled guns are fired from the barbettes of that fort, it will be well to hit the grated roofs of the turrets with square-headed bolts, followed by shells filled with molten iron.

The square-headed bolts for the ten-inch columbiads and the heavier guns will be fired by battery when the enemy is within close range. Solid shot and bolts will be used generally against iron-clads during the action.

The furnaces for melting iron and heating shot will be kept in heat, and heated projectiles will be used whenever occasion offers advantage.

Should it happen that any of the enemy's vessels become disabled and endeavor to get out of fire, the outermost batteries must pay particular attention to prevent them, and in case other of the enemy's ships come to the assistance of the disabled, let every gun and mortar which will bear be turned upon them by battery.

The great object of the enemy will probably be to run by, and every effort must be made to crush him in each successive circle of fire which he encounters.

Hog Island channel will be obstructed, and the obstructions must be guarded by the long range guns of Fort Sumter and the columbiad of Battery Bee nearest it.

It is doubtful whether the enemy will attempt to pass by Folly channel. If he does, a circle of fire will be formed by the guns of Fort Ripley, Castle Pinckney, and White Point battery.

The position of torpedoes will be communicated to commanding officers, and the effort

made to drive the enemy's vessels upon them if he is taking other courses.

The obstructions will also be designated, and under no circumstances will the enemy be permitted to reconnoitre them.

The headquarters of the undersigned will be at Fort Sumter, and directions be sent by telegraph and signal to the different posts, should anything require special directions.

Batteries Marshall and Wagner will be worked to the extent of their capacity for injuring the enemy, by their commanding officers, without unduly exposing their commands.

The directions given above, relate generally to the defeat of an attack by the enemy's fleet alone. Should a combined attack be made by land and water, other orders can be issued, as nothing of that kind can be done by surprise.

The present circular will be studied and reflected upon by all officers who will be engaged in this honorable duty of the coming defence. With careful attention, coolness, and skilful gunnery, success is far more than probable.

R. S. RIPLEY,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

Official:
WM. F. NANCE,
A. A. General.

REPORTS OF THE MILITARY ENGINEERS OF THE ENGAGEMENT OF THE ENEMY'S IRON-CLAD FLEET WITH THE FORTS AND BATTERIES COMMANDING THE OUTER HARBOR OF CHARLESTON ON THE SEVENTH OF APRIL, 1863.

OFFICE OF CHIEF ENGINEER,
CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA,
April 23, 1863.

Brigadier-General Thomas Jordan, Chief of Staff:

GENERAL: In compliance with instructions, Major Echols has made a report in detail of the engagement on the seventh instant, of the enemy's iron-clad fleet with the forts and batteries commanding the outer harbor of this city, which I have the honor to hand you herewith.

This report is based upon information derived from the commanding officers of the forts and batteries engaged in the fight, and upon an examination in company with myself of those works on the eighth and ninth instant.

The fire of the enemy was directed chiefly against Fort Sumter, at a distance of from nine to fifteen hundred yards. The injuries to the fort, of which the tables and drawings accompanying Major Echols' report give an accurate description, were not of a character to impair its efficiency. The crushing effect of the enemy's heavy missiles was less than I had anticipated. The chief damage was probably caused by the explosion of shells against and in the walls of the fort.

The manner in which the fort withstood the bombardment is a matter of congratulation, and encourages us to believe that the repairs that have been made, and the measures now in progress to strengthen and protect its walls, will enable the fort to withstand a much more formidable bombardment with like good results.

Of the other works engaged, none of which attracted much of the enemy's attention, only one—Fort Moultrie—received any damage, and that was very trivial.

Fort Moultrie, Battery Wagner, and Cummins' Point battery fired upon the fleet at a distance of from twelve to fifteen hundred yards; Batteries Bee and Beauregard at a distance of from sixteen hundred to two thousand yards—too far, in the case of the latter-named batteries, for useful effect against iron-clads.

Our batteries were admirably served by our skilled artillerists. Much of the rapidity and accuracy with which our heavy guns were fired was due to the use of Colonel Yates' traverser, with the merits of which the General commanding has been fully impressed.

Our batteries discharged about twenty-two hundred shot of all sorts; the enemy's fleet about one hundred and ten, chiefly fifteen-inch shell and eleven-inch solid shot—not less than eighty of which were directed at Fort Sumter.

The sinking of the Keokuk, and the discomfiture of other iron-clads, has established their vulnerability to our heavy projectiles at a range, say, of from nine to twelve hundred yards.

It appeared on an examination of the wreck of the Keokuk, on the sixteenth instant, by Lieutenant Boyleston, confirmed in the main by my own observations on the nineteenth instant, that her turrets within four and a half feet of their tops, had been pierced by four ten-inch shot and one seven-inch rifle shot, and a wrought iron Brooke bolt had pentrated seven-eighths of its length and stuck in the plating. Several severe indentations were also observed, near which the plates were warped and the bolts broken or started. The top of the smoke-stack (of sheet iron) was very much torn, and the bottom of it (of similar structure to the turrets) pierced by a ten-inch shot. The vessel having sunk in thirteen feet of water, prevented an examination of the lower portions of her turrets, or of her hull, which, no doubt, were served in like manner. From this it would appear that the ten-inch shot are just as effective at the distance, say. of nine hundred yards as the seven-inch Brooke bolts against such structures as the turrets of the Keokuk.

The result of this engagement is highly gratifying, and increases our confidence in our ability, with good batteries of suitable guns, to contend successfully with vessels of the monitor class. The enemy's evident and just dread of torpedoes, as evinced in his preparation for their explosion, by the "Devil," or torpedo-searcher, should induce us to multiply our defences of that character in whatsoever manner they can be made available.

I have the honor to be,
Yours, very respectfully,
D. B. HARRIS,
Major and Chief of Engineers.

Official:
G. THOMAS COX.
Lieutenant Engineers.

CONFEDERATE STATES ENGINEER'S OFFICE,
CHARLESTON, S. C., April 9, 1863.

Major D. B. Harris, Chief Engineer Department:

MAJOR: I have the honor to make the following report of the engagement between Fort Sumter and the enemy's iron-clad fleet on the seventh of April, 1863, at three o'clock P. M., lasting two hours and twenty-five minutes:

The incidents which transpired during the engagement are based upon information received from the officers in charge of the works, but more particularly from the observations of Colonel Rhett, commanding Fort Sumter, and Lieutenant S. C. Boyleston, Adjutant First regiment South Carolina artillery, who made special observations during the whole action; the remainder from personal inspection afterward.

Forts Sumter, Moultrie, Batteries Bee, Beauregard, Cummins' Point, and Wagner, were engaged. The fleet consisted of the Ironsides, supposed armament sixteen guns; the Keokuk, two stationary turrets, carrying one gun each, and seven single revolving turreted vessels, carrying (supposed) two guns in each, presumed to be the Montauk, Passaic, Weehawken, Patapsco, Nahant, Catskill, and Nantucket, which took position from nine hundred to fifteen hundred yards from Fort Sumter.

They steamed up main ship channel toward Fort Moultrie, in line of battle, as follows: Four single turrets, Ironsides, three single turrets, and Keokuk, following one after the other at intervals of about three hundred yards—the foremost one moving slowly, and carrying on her prow the "Devil," or torpedo-searcher, a description of which will be sent you. When within twenty-two hundred yards, Fort Moultrie fired the first gun upon her, near buoy number three, then distant about fifteen hundred yards from Sumter, which had previously trained her battery of barbette guns upon the buoy, and opened fire by battery when she reached that position, at three minutes past three o'clock.

The first turret opened fire at five minutes past three, and moved backward, thus developing their manœuvre of attack. At this moment the engagement became general. The second turret passed the first, fired, moved backward; the first moved forward, passed the second, fired, and backed, then retired from action; the other turrets monœuvring in the same relative manner, each time nearing or receding a little from the fort in order not to present a permanent target.

The Ironsides, when at seventeen hundred yards from Moultrie, and two thousand from Sumter, stopped, discharged a battery at the former, when Sumter concentrated a heavy fire upon her; numbers of shot were seen to strike her, and several to penetrate; three, at least, in her wooden stern. Deeming two thousand yards too close quarters, she retired out of range, supposed injured, in favor of less prominent and more formidable imps, after an engagement of forty-five minutes. The Keokuk, at five minutes past four, defiantly turning her prow directly toward Sumter, firing from her forward turret gun, the batteries of Sumter, Moultrie, Bee, and Cummins' Point, were concentrated upon her, her turrets receiving numbers of well-directed shots, several apparently penetrating, showed evidence of considerable damage. When within nine hundred yards she was struck, supposed by a wrought iron bolt (one hundred and seventeen pounds) from a seven-inch Brooke rifle *en barbette*, near her bow, penetrating, and ripping up a plating about six feet long, and two and a half wide, which ended her career; she stopped, seemed disabled for a few minutes, then turned to the channel and proceeded toward the bar at forty-five minutes past four. She sank off the south end of Morris Island, at half past eight o'clock, the following morning; her smoke-stack and turrets are now visible at low water. From her wreck floated ashore a book, a spy-glass, and pieces of furniture bespattered with blood, and small fragments of iron sticking in them.

The firing of the turrets was timed—they discharged generally at intervals of ten minutes; the engagement lasted two hours and twenty-five minutes. Allowing six of them constantly engaged, they delivered eighty-seven shots; one fired twice, and retired; the Keokuk fired three or four times, and the Ironsides about seventeen—making the total number fired by the enemy about one hundred and ten, which were principally directed at Sumter. Her walls show the effect of fifty-five missiles—shot, shell, and fragments; the carriage of a ten-inch columbiad on the western face was completely demolished by a shot coming over the parapet; a forty-two-pounder rifle on the north-east face, dismounted by breaking a travese wheel—both soon remounted in position; four small holes knocked in the roof of the eastern quarters by grazing shots; an eight-inch columbiad burst on the eastern face, throwing the chase and half the reinforce over the parapet, the other half over the quarters in the parade, demolished the carriage, but did no other damage; nearly all the window panes and some of the sashes in the fort were broken by concussion.

The accompanying table of effects of shot, and sketches of the elevations of the faces, show the points of impact, the kind of projectile used, so far as could be ascertained by inspection, and found; they were principally fifteen-inch shell and eleven-inch shot. The nature of the material against which they were projected, crumbling generally without retaining an impression, precludes any positive information as to their exact kind or calibre—only a few were evident; to the best of my judgment, according to the effect, eight fifteen-inch shells struck the faces—two of these penetrated the wall of the eastern face, just below the embrasures in the second tier, next to the east pancoupe, not seriously damaging the masonry; one exploding in the casemate set fire to some bed-

ding, the other passed through a window and burst in the centre of the fort. Several exploded in contact with the wall, by which the principal craters appear to have been formed; one passed over the parapet into the quarters on the western side, exploded, damaging several walls; five eleven-inch shot struck the faces, one penetrating near one of the same embrasures pierced by the fifteen-inch shell, broke through and entered the interior wall of the quarters; only one impression represented any appearance of a rifle projectile. One fifteen-inch solid shot, one fifteen inch hollow shot, several fifteen-inch shells and eleven-inch shot were found in and around the fort; fragments of fifteen-inch shells were picked up on the outside; the berme being very narrow and sloping prevented any means of ascertaining by the bodies themselves, their kind—all being precipitated into the water, after striking. It is reported, also, that several shrapnel were fired over the barbette guns of Sumter. Some of the shells which exploded in contact with the wall may probably have been percussion rifle shells, as some of the turrets are known to carry eight-inch rifles, but no fragments were found, nor do any of the officers report indications of rifle projectiles by sound or otherwise, with but one exception; the commanding officer of Battery Wagner reports one by sound to have passed over, fired by the Ironsides. Nine shots were fired at Moultrie at distances: of turrets, thirteen hundred yards; of Ironsides, seventeen hundred yards; an eleven-inch shot struck down the flag-staff at thirty-seven minutes past three—passed through the roof of the quarters, penetrated the wall of the ordnance storehouse, about two feet thick, and dropped in the room; another struck the glacis and ricochetted over the fort; a third, a fifteen-inch shell, burst at the water's edge, a fragment of which was found; the others passed over. Five shots were fired at Battery B without effect, at a distance of about two thousand yards—one fell behind the breakwater, another passed along the front of the battery and burst; the others passed over. Six or seven were fired at Battery Beauregard, at a distance of two thousand yards, without effect; two eleven-inch shot were found. Two were fired at Cummins' Point without effect—one at twelve hundred or thirteen hundred yards, from the Ironsides; the other at fourteen hundred to fifteen hundred yards, from a turret. Four were fired at Battery Wagner; one from the Ironsides sounded like a rifle shot passing through the air; one grazed the top of the traverse, and another exploded over the battery, sending a fragment into a traverse.

A single turret which fired her two guns simultaneously, ceased to fire one of them at about four o'clock—half of the port being closed the remainder of the action; cause not visible. They were frequently struck upon their decks, and several shot were seen sticking in the hull of one of them. And from another, steam issued when struck upon it. A cast iron bolt (rifle forty-two) struck a bevelled plate or guard around the base of a turret, which curved and turned one end up.

The projectiles generally broke in pieces, as could be seen by fragments falling in the water, or bounded from the vessel. One, after striking, was observed to drop and rest at the foot of the turret. Several of the smoke-stacks were penetrated.

A lookout appeared on the top of one of the turrets, apparently observing the effect of the shot; at the flash of a battery from Moultrie he instantly disappeared.

The casualties are slight. At Sumter five men were wounded by fragments of masonry and wood. One of the negroes engaged at work at the fort, who was sitting on the berme of the western face, was wounded by a brick knocked from the parapet and falling upon his head.

At Moultrie one man was killed by the falling of the flag-staff when shot away.

At Battery Wagner an ammunition chest in the angle of the parapet and traverse, in the chamber of the thirty-two pounder, exploded from the blast of the gun, killing three men, mortally wounding one, slightly wounding Lieutenant Steadman, in charge of the gun, and three men; blew them about twenty feet, cracked the traverses, threw the shot from the pile of balls in every direction, and slightly damaged the chassis.

I arrived at Fort Sumter about two o'clock at night after the engagement, and found Mr. E. J. White, of the engineer department, busily engaged building in the casemates, first and second tiers, behind the damaged walls, with sand bags; several of them were completed and considerably strengthened. This work was continued all night and the next day by the garrison and the fifty negroes who had been employed at the fort, and remained during the engagement. On the following morning the fleet lay inside the bar, in the same line of battle in which they approached—the first one about two and a half miles from Sumter, and one and a half miles from Morris Island. Men were visible all day on the turret of one, hammering, evidently repairing her plating. Wind sails were set, indicating that their quarters, even at this season of the year, were uncomfortable and badly ventilated. About noon one of the turrets went south, probably to Port Royal, for repairs or for the security of that place against our iron-clads from Savannah.

The Ironsides has kept up a full head of steam since the engagement, as can be seen by her constantly blowing off. Three holes are distinctly seen in her stern, two just above the water-line.

The "Devil" floated ashore on Morris Island—the cables by which it was attached to the turret's bow were cut away. It is probable that the "Devil," becoming unmanageable, was the cause of the turret retiring early from the action—it being a massive structure, consisting of two layers of white pine timbers, eighteen

inches square, strongly bolted together; a re-entering angle twenty feet deep to receive the bow of the vessel, fifty feet long, twenty-seven feet wide; a layer of bevelled timbers on the front forming a bow, seven heavy iron plates, through which passed chains directly down and over the sides, through hawser-pipes; to these were attached grappling-irons with double prongs, suspended underneath, at the sides and bow; in the countersinks of the plates were loose iron rollers, apparently to facilitate the drawing of the chains through the holes over them, when the grapplings took hold, to drag up to the "Devil" whatever he may catch with his hooks.

The colors of the six turrets remaining on the eighth are as follows:-

First turret, lead color; stack, lead color; top of stack, red, with black ring.

Second turret and stack, black.

Third turret, black; stack, white; top green.

Fourth turret, black; stack, black; top stack (1-3) lead color.

Fifth turret and stack, lead color.

Sixth turret and stack, black.

The hull of the turret in running trim stands about two feet above water level, carrying a whistle, stove-pipe, and stanchions for swinging a small boat on deck, with a light railing around it. When cleared for action, she is submerged almost to the water level; the other articles all removed flush with the deck. The issue of steam from the deck several times observed, if not from injury, is probably from the blow-off pipe, taken down flush, as she cannot carry it, as other vessels, on her sides.

I accompany the report with a sketch of the battle-ground, showing the relative positions of the forts and fleet; one of the faces of the fort, showing parts damaged; one of the Keokuk; one of a turret submerged for action; and one of the "Devil."

Very respectfully,

Your most obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. ECHOLS,
Major Engineers.

Official:

G. THOMAS COX,
Lieutenant Engineers.

Table of effects of projectiles on walls of Fort Sumter.—The numbers correspond with those on drawing of elevations, showing the locations of points of impact.

No.	Projectile.	Penetration		Crater.				Remarks.
				Height.		Width.		
		Ft.	In.	Ft.	In.	Ft.	In.	
1	.....	.....	2	.....	.....	.....	.....	Scaled.
2	Frag. Shell....	.....	6	.....	.....	.....	.....	Scaled.
3	.....	2	3	4	0	4	0	Embrasure "A," exterior concrete keystone and interior embrasure arch knocked out; masonry cracked.
4	15-inch.....	.....	9	3	0	4	0	Assisted No. 3. Spent.
5	11-inch.....	1	0	1	0	1	0	Penetrated concrete and new masonry facing.
6	15-inch.....	.....	3	.....	.....	.....	.....	Ricochet and spent.
7	Frag. Shell....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	Scaled.
8	.....	1	0	2	0	2	0	Apparently rifle-shot; no serious injury.
9	3 Shots	2	6	10	0	8	0	One 15-inch, other two not known; parapet wall cracked twenty-five feet in length, serious damage, perhaps by exploding shell.
10	15-inch.....	2	3	6	0	4	0	Interior arch of embrasure "B" dislocated; masonry between piers and embrasure badly shaken and projecting.
11	Frag. Shell...	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	Scaled.
12	15-inch.....	1	6	3	0	3	0	Shook masonry.
13 & 14	Frag. Shell....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	Scaled.
15	.....	1	6	3	0	3	0	Interior embrasure ("C") arch broken; masonry cracked.
16	.....	2	2	3	0	3	0	Perhaps exploding shell.
17	15-inch.....	.....	15	.....	.....	.....	.....	Scaled—spent ball.
18	.....	1	6	3	0	3	0	Masonry shaken.
19	.....	3	0	5	0	5	0	Exploding shell on pier; not much internal injury.
20	.....	1	6	3	0	3	0	No serious injury.
21	.....	1	6	4	0	3	0	Masonry around embrasure "D" badly cracked, and projecting inside.
22	15-inch.....	5	0	4	0	3	0	Penetrated, striking head of arch, and thrown upward, tearing away a quantity of masonry, not seriously damaging body of masonry, exploded in casemate.
23	11-inch.....	5	0	2	0	2	0	Same effect as 22. Destroyed embrasure "E."
24	.....	2	6	3	6	3	6	Not seriously damaging body of masonry.
25	15-inch.....	5	0	4	0	4	0	Same effect as 22; destroyed embrasure "F;" exploded in parade.
26	11-inch.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	Scaled—ricochet and spent.
27	.....	1	4	2	3	2	0	No serious damage.
28	.....	1	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	No serious damage.
29	.....	2	4	5	0	5	0	Serious damage; wall not much cracked
30	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	Scaled.
31	15-inch.....	1	0	3	0	4	0	Knocked off one foot of angle.
32	11-inch.....	.....	6	2	6	2	0	Knocked off six inches of angle.
33	.....	.....	5	3	0	2	0	Oblique fire. Scaled.
34	Frag. Shell...	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	Scaled.
35	.....	1	6	2	6	2	6	Shook masonry.
	.....	1	3	3	.....	4	.....	Broke and projected in sole of embrasure "G."

No.	Projectile.	Penetration.		Crater.				Remarks.
				Height.		Width.		
		Ft.	In.	Ft.	In.	Ft.	In.	
37	.....	.....	10	2	0	3	0	Very oblique fire. No damage.
38	Frag. Shell...	.....	4	2	0	2	0	" " "
39	.....	.....	2	4	0	4	0	" " "
40	.....	1	0	2	0	4	0	" " "
41	.....	2	1	3	0	3	0	Exploding shell.
42	.....	.....	10	1	6	1	6	Oblique. Scaled.
43	.....	1	2	2	0	2	0	No serious injury.
44 } 45 } 46 }	Frag. Shell...	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	Scaled.
47	11-inch.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	Scaled—very oblique.
48	....	2	4	5	0	5	0	Exploding shell. Cracked parapet wall.
49	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	Knocked out iron embrasure slab, 1 foot wide, six inches thick, three feet long; indented it 1½ inches, and broke it in three pieces. Shook masonry.
50	.....	1	5	3	0	3	6	No serious injury.
51	11-inch.....	2	6	5	0	7	0	Brick traverse, east pan coupe.
52	15-inch.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	Entered western quarters and exploded, damaging walls.
53	11-inch.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	Entered western quarters and remained in quarters.
54	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	Demolished 10-inch columbiad carriage and chassis in southwest angle.
55	....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	Struck end stone masonry berme south-east angle. Four small holes knocked in brick arch roof of eastern quarters by grazing shots or fragments from traverse.

William H. Echols,
Major Engineers.

Official:
G. Thos. Cox,
Lieutenant Engineers.

Table showing the number, kind, and position of Guns in action, and number and kind of projectiles used against the iron-clad fleet before Charleston, seventh April, 1863.

Location.	No.	Kind of Gun.	Projectile.	Shots.
Fort Sumter, 810 shots. East and north-east faces, barbette.	2	7-in. Brooke's Rifles.....	Wrought iron bolts...	86
	4	10-in. Columbiads	Solid Shot...	120
	4	8-in. "	"	160
	5	42-pounder Rifles.....	Shot and bolts.....	138
	2	9-in Dahlgrens	Shot.....	54
	3	10-in. S. C. Mortars.....	Shells filled with melted iron.....	40
1st tier casemate,	2	8-in. Shell Guns, navy.....	Shot.....	60
	2	8-in " "	"	50
	8	32-pounders.....	"	100
2d tier "	1	42-pounder Rifle.....	"	2
Fort Moultrie, 868 shots.	9	8-inch Columbiads.....	Shot and 5 incendiary shells.....	344
	5	32-pounder Rifles.....	192 bolts, 38 shells	230
	5	32-pounders	Shot....	243
	2	10-inch S. C. Mortars	Shells.....	51
Battery Bee, 283 shots.	5	10-inch Columbiads.....	Shot.....	225
	1	8-inch "	"	58
Battery Beauregard, 157 shots.		8-in "	"	64
	1	32-pounder Rifles.....	41 bolts (75 lb.), 45 shot.....	
	2		7 shells.....	93
Cummins' Point, 65 shots.	1	10-in. Columbiad.....	Shot.....	37
	1	9-in. Dahlgren.....	Shells.....	28
Battery Wagner, 26 shots.	1	32-pounder Rifle.....	"	9
	1	24- " "	"	1
	2	32-pounders.....	Shot.....	16
No. of Guns..... ...	69		Total number of Shots fired....	2209

Wm. H. Echols,
Major Engineers.

Official:
G. Thos. Cox,
Lieutenant Engineers.

cover of their fire, succeeded in effecting a landing at Oyster Point, and the main shore of Morris Island. The enemy advanced immediately, driving back our inferior force of infantry, and succeeded in expelling our troops from the south end of Morris Island, and capturing the artillery above named, with its munitions. This was not effected without a severe struggle, in which we lost two hundred and ninety-four killed, wounded, and missing, among whom I mention, with especial regret, the following officers: Captain Cheves and Haskell, and Lieutenant Bee, who had rendered important service previous to, and behaved with distinguished gallantry in, the engagement.

The first reinforcements, Nelson's Seventh battalion South Carolina volunteers, arrived at the close of the action, and could only assist in covering the retreat, which was made under the flank fire of the monitors to Battery Wagner, where our troops were formed to resist further advances, and the guns of which opened on the pursuing enemy. Fort Sumter and Battery Gregg also opened fire, and put a stop to their proceedings for the day.

In the evening Battery Wagner was reinforced by Colonel Olmstead's command of Georgia troops, and the garrison kept on the alert for defending it against an attack. This occurred at dawn on the eleventh, when the enemy advanced upon the work in two columns and made a desperate assault, which was gallantly and decidedly repulsed, with a loss to the enemy which may safely be estimated at over eight hundred men. Our burying parties interred over one hundred inside of our lines, and one hundred and thirty were taken prisoners.

Our loss was one officer and five privates killed, and one officer and five privates wounded. The enemy on land remained comparatively quiet during the day, being engaged burying his dead and strengthening his position. Three monitors and three wooden gunboats engaged and bombarded the fort.

On the twelfth, Brigadier-General Hagood took command of the positions on James Island. Brigadier-General Taliaferro was assigned to the command of the works on Morris Island. The armament of the fort was increased by four twelve-pounder howitzers, under Colonel Du Pass and Lieutenant Waties, and two thirty-two-pounder carronades, on siege carriages. The enemy's shot took effect on the steam-scow Manigault, lying at a partially constructed battery at Vincent's Creek, disabling the scow and scattering the workmen. Battery Wagner was shelled by the enemy's fleet continuously during the day. One monitor took a position to the northward, apparently to enfilade the rear of the work. Lieutenant-Colonel Yates ordered Battery Gregg to open rapidly, which it did, driving the monitor off, apparently severely injured, as she transferred her crew at once to one of the gunboats.

On the thirteenth, under the able supervision of Brigadier-General Taliaferro, continued preparations were made against a renewed attack. The Twenty-first South Carolina volunteers and two companies of the First South Carolina artillery were relieved by the Fifty-first North Carolina and a detachment of Georgia artillery under Captain Buckner. The land operations of the enemy consisted in erecting batteries and protections, in which they were interrupted by the fire from Fort Sumter and Battery Gregg. The gunboats and monitors kept up a continued shelling throughout the day, with but slight intermissions when they had suffered from the sea fronts of Wagner and Gregg. In the evening the enemy succeeded in setting fire to the wreck of the steam-scow Manigault, in Vincent Creek.

On the fourteenth, two regiments, under Brigadier-General A. H. Colquitt, arrived, which were sent to James Island to reinforce Brigadier-General Hagood's command. Brigadier-General Clingman's command, consisting of the Eighth, Thirty-first, Fifty-first and Sixty-first North Carolina regiments, had arrived the previous day, and, with the exception of the Fifty-first, were stationed on James Island.

The enemy's wooden gunboats shelled Battery Wagner during the day at long range. During the night, Brigadier-General Taliaferro threw out a party, one hundred and fifty strong, under Major Ryan, of the Seventh South Carolina battalion, which drove in the enemy's pickets from his rifle-pits, extending across the island about three-quarters of a mile from Battery Wagner, back upon his main supports, inflicting a considerable loss, with but small upon our part.

On the fifteenth the enemy landed troops in force on Morris Island, and there were indications of a renewal of the assault on the fort. The frigate Ironsides had crossed the bar on the night of the fourteenth. During the day the enemy was strengthening his position, our troops being engaged in repairing damages and replying to the enemy's monitors, gunboats and sharpshooters. The Charleston battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel P. C. Gaillard, relieved the Seventh battalion and three companies of the Twentieth regiment South Carolina volunteers; Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Simkins, First South Carolina infantry, relieved Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. Yates, in command of the artillery on Morris Island; Captain Adams' company, of First South Carolina infantry, relieving Captain Chichester's company of artillery.

Brigadier-General Hagood made a reconnoissance of the enemy, in his front, on James Island.

On the morning of the sixteenth, in accordance with instructions, Brigadier-General Hagood advanced against the enemy, from his headquarters near Secessionville, James Island, driving in the enemy's pickets on his left, and making an advance against that portion of their force. Two columns made the attack, one led by Brigadier-General A. H. Colquitt, and the other by Brigadier-General Hagood in person. The enemy was protected by the fire of his gunboats in Stono

and Little Folly Rivers. Brigadier-General Hagood succeeded in driving the enemy, about two thousand in number, from James Island, and inflicting upon him a serious loss in killed and wounded, capturing fourteen negroes belonging to the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts regiment. Not the least important of these operations was the engagement with the sloop of war Pawnee, by two sections of Napoleon guns, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Del. Kemper, in which the steamer was injured and forced to retire. General Hagood's loss was three killed, twelve wounded, and three missing. The enemy withdrew entirely from James Island, to Battery Island, when General Hagood advanced his pickets, and the ground has been held to the present date, twenty-second July.

At Battery Wagner and on Morris Island, our troops continued their work of repair, subject to a continued shelling from gunboats and monitors at long range.

On the seventeenth, the enemy's vessels all disappeared from the Stono, and his troops were concentrated on Little Folly and Morris Islands. Firing from the enemy's fleet and land batteries was kept up during the day on Battery Wagner, which interfered seriously with the transportation to Cummins' Point. This has had, ever since, to be carried on at night.

On the night of the seventeenth, the Thirty-first North Carolina regiment relieved Colonel Oldstead's command of Georgia troops, and Captain Craven's company of the Twentieth South Carolina volunteers.

The work of repair and preparation was proceeded with during the night, and at daylight on the eighteenth, the enemy's land and sea batteries opened a *feu d'enfer* upon the devoted work. The practice was rapid in the extreme, from the Ironsides, from the monitors, and from all the wooden gunboats which, without exposing themselves, could get the range. According to Brigadier-General Taliaferro's estimate, over nine thousand shot and shell were thrown; but, as if by the special interposition of Providence, our loss was slight. Indications of an assault at dusk were apparent, and the guns of Sumter and Battery Gregg were in preparation to open fire over Battery Wagner on the columns of the enemy. Brigadier-General Hagood was relieved from the command of James Island, to be in readiness to support or relieve Brigadier-General Taliaferro, and Colonel Harrison's Thirty-second regiment of Georgians proceeded to the reinforcement and relief of the garrison. While in passage, the assault commenced, which was bravely met and repulsed with terrific slaughter on the part of the enemy by the heroic garrison and its commander, Brigadier-General Taliaferro, who directed all the operations until the final repulse.

In his report the details of the assault and its repulse are set forth, and I cannot do more or better than to second his commendations of those brave officers and men who stood the tempest of shot and shell and sent back the column of the enemy from their work, with a loss which may safely be computed at about three thousand in killed, wounded and prisoners. Brigadier-General Hagood, with Colonel Harrison's regiment, assisted in the final repulse of a party who had made a lodgment in the south-eastern salient of the battery.

The carnage of the enemy in the confined space in front of Battery Wagner, was extreme. The ditch and glacis were encumbered with the slain of all ranks and colors, for the enemy had put the poor negroes, whom they had forced into an unnatural service, in front, to be, as they were, slaughtered indiscriminately. The white Colonel who commanded them fell with many officers of the regiment, the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts, and the colors under which they were sent to butchery by hypocrisy and inhumanity, fell draggled in blood and sand in the ditch, a mournful memorial of the waste of industry.

This result was not accomplished without a loss on our part of brave officers and men, though of those who in the struggle battled for the right, the proportion who fell was far less than that of their enemy.

In this engagement, our loss in killed, wounded, and missing, was one hundred and seventy-four. Among the officers, whose loss we have to lament, and whose position and services entitle them to special mention, were Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Simkins, of the First South Carolina infantry, Captain William H. Ryan, Charleston battalion, Captain W. T. Tatum, First South Carolina infantry, who were killed; and Major David Ramsay of the Charleston battalion, who was severely wounded. Other gallant officers and soldiers fell, whose names are mentioned in the reports of their several commanders, and whose memories should be cherished by a grateful country. While the assault on Battery Wagner was progressing, Battery Gregg, under Captain Lesesne, and the batteries of Fort Sumter, under Colonel Alfred Rhett, kept up a continuous fire upon the ground over which the enemy advanced, until Brigadier-General Taliaferro advanced his pickets to the front, when they ceased, and the narrow field of battle was quiet for the night.

Brigadier-General Taliaferro, who had been in command and on trench duty for five days, was relieved in the morning, by Brigadier-General Hagood.

This report, ending with the second repulse of the enemy from Battery Wagner, will be continued from that time. The operations of the enemy from that date, within the limits of my command, have changed their character. In closing it, I have the honor to express my high appreciation of the distinguished services of Brigadier-General Taliaferro, who commanded the troops in Battery Wagner with great ability and gallantry, and repulsed the memorable assault of the eighteenth, and of the excellent conduct of Brigadier-Generals Hagood and Colquitt, as evidenced in the attack on the enemy's position, on the sixteenth. Besides these, Colonel

REPORT FROM BATTERIES AT FORT JOHNSON, OF ENGAGEMENT OF SEVENTH APRIL, 1863.

HEADQUARTERS AT EAST LINES, April 12, 1863.

Colonel C. H. Stevens, commanding East Division, James Island, S. C.:

COLONEL: I have the honor to report that one of my companies, Company I, Captain Humbert, stationed at Fort Johnson, had a small share in the glorious little fight of the seventh instant, with the turreted iron-clads in Charleston harbor.

About half-past two o'clock of that afternoon, eight (8) iron-clads were seen approaching for the purpose of engaging Fort Sumter, and when within easy range, they opened fire upon her. My guns of heavy calibre at that post, being so placed as to bear only upon the inner harbor, could not be brought to bear upon the iron-clads; but in our anxiety to "have a place in the picture," and in order somewhat to test the range of a ten-inch mortar in that direction, I authorized Lieutenant Bolivar, in charge, to open fire from it, which, after being fired twice with shell, filled and plugged, and the object sought attained, was ordered to be discontinued.

The officers and men were all eagerly anxious to play a part in the engagement, and we only regret that our position was such as to prevent our having a more prominent place in an engagement which does so much credit to all concerned.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully,

A. D. FREDERICK,
Colonel Second Regiment S. C. Artillery, commanding.

Upon this was the following indorsement:

HEADQUARTERS JAMES ISLAND AND ST. ANDREWS, McLEOD'S, April 14, 1863.

Respectfully forwarded. I reached Fort Johnson some twenty minutes after the engagement between the monitors and the forts and batteries had commenced, on the seventh instant, and, finding that the mortar at Fort Johnson was not effective, the range being too great, ordered the firing discontinued after two shells had been thrown. Battery Glover was not engaged at any time.

Respectfully,

S. R. GIST,
Brigadier-General.

ACTION OF APRIL SEVENTH, CHARLESTON HARBOR.

BATTERY BEAUREGARD, SULLIVAN'S ISLAND, April 15, 1863.

Captain Wm. Green, A. A. G.:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that about two o'clock P. M., on Tuesday, the seventh instant, it was reported to me that the enemy's iron-clads, which had previously taken a position inside the bar, were steaming up main ship channel. I ordered the long roll sounded, and all the guns of this battery to be manned forthwith, placing those men who were not engaged at the pieces in a position so as to be protected f the enemy. As soon as the leading boat came within range, and after Moultrie and Sumter had opened, I directed the fire of two rifled guns and an eight-inch columbiad on that boat, and continued to fire on her, until I was satisfied that it was not her intention to pass the forts. I fired rapidly at first, because I saw that she would soon reach a point on which my rifled guns could not be brought to bear. About this time the Ironsides came up and exposed her broadside, when I immediately directed the fire of the same guns on her, and paid more attention to her than any other boat during the fight. I occasionally fired a shot at the Keokuk, or any one of them that offered a fair mark to the guns used. About half-past four, I found that my supply of rifled projectiles and eight-inch solid shot was getting short. I ordered the firing to cease, and sent a messenger to the fort to know if I could be supplied, but received a message from Brigadier-General J. H. Trapier, in the meantime, to cease firing altogether.

The guns that were engaged were manned alternately by detachments from Company K, First South Carolina artillery, Lieutenant W. E. Erwin commanding, and from Company B, First infantry, Captain J. H. Warley commanding. I am satisfied that the Ironsides was struck several times by shot from this battery, and I think one or two others were also struck, with what effect it is impossible to say, except from reports since the engagement, which lead us to believe that the enemy were considerably damaged. I have reason to be satisfied with the firing, and the cool, deliberate, and determined aspect which characterized both men and officers during the engagement. I inclose a tabular statement of the amount and kinds of ammunition expended. The enemy fired several rounds at us, none of which took effect. There were no casualties from any cause whatever.

I have the honor to be,
Your obedient servant,

J. A. SITGREAVES,
Captain, commanding.

REPORT OF ENGAGEMENT OF SEVENTH OF APRIL, 1863.

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT FIRST INFANTRY, BATTERY BEE, April 13th, 1863.

Captain Wm. Green, A. A. G.:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that, at about half-past two P. M., on Tuesday, the seventh instant, the officer of the day reported to me that the monitor fleet of the enemy, accompanied by the Ironsides, was approaching. I immediately ordered the long roll beat; the guns were manned, and everything got in readiness for action. On reaching the battery, nine (9) iron-clads, including the Ironsides, were observed slowly making their way up Ship channel. At this time, four (4) of the monitors proper were in line of battle in advance, the Ironsides and others in rear. While waiting the nearer approach of the enemy, instructions were given that the left section of the battery commanded by Captain Warren Adams, should

commence firing, on an order from me, to be followed, first by Captain Wm. T. Tatum, commanding centre section, and finally by Captain Robert D. Treville, commanding section on extreme right, and that the fire should be concentrated on the leading vessel, until otherwise directed. The advance vessels still numbering four, took their positions, alternately ranging from eighteen hundred to two thousand yards from this battery. At three o'clock P. M., Fort Moultrie opened on the enemy, followed by Fort Sumter. Ten minutes later (ten minutes past three P. M.) this battery opened fire. At this time the fire became general from all the outer forts and batteries in the harbor, and the advanced iron-clads of the enemy, which fired slowly, directing their fire principally at Fort Sumter. An occasional shot was fired at this battery, none of them doing any injury. As it was believed that the object of the enemy was to pass the batteries and enter the harbor, the firing at first was rapid, but at all times deliberate and well directed. When it became evident that such was not his intention, the firing from the battery became slower, and continued so until the Keokuk advanced in close range to Fort Sumter and this battery, at which time the order was given to fire more rapidly and to concentrate it on her. Two hundred and eighty-three (283) solid shot were fired from this battery—Captain Adams firing one hundred and twenty six, Captain Tatum, eighty-four, Captain De Treville, seventy-three. Of this number many were distinctly seen to strike the vessels aimed at, and it is believed doing serious damage in many instances.

At half-past five P. M., the enemy's fleet withdrew, and all firing ceased. The officers and men of this command did their duty.

I am happy to state that no casualties occurred at this battery, and believe the command to be as effective as it was prior to the engagement.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. C. SIMKINS,
Lieut.-Col., commanding.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT W. S. GLASSELL OF VISIT TO THE KEOKUK.

C. S. GUNBOAT CHICORA,
CHARLESTON HARBOR, April 13th, 1863.

Brigadier-General Ripley:

GENERAL: Having made a visit to the Keokuk this morning, with a view to observing the effect of your batteries upon her iron turrets, I succeeded in procuring the trophies, which it affords me much pleasure to forward to you, viz.: two United States flags, two pennants, and three signal flags. Several other articles were also obtained—a rammer, sponges, lanterns, &c., which are on board the Chicora.

I am, General, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

W. S. GLASSELL,
First Lieutenant, C. S. N.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. S. RIPLEY'S REPORT OF THE OPERATIONS OF TROOPS UNDER HIS COMMAND FROM THE EIGHTH TO THE TWENTIETH DAY OF JULY, 1863, INCLUSIVE.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST MILITARY DISTRICT,
CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA, July 22, 1863.

Brigadier-General Thomas Jordan, Chief of Staff:

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the daily occurrences of my command, commencing on the eighth instant, on which day the enemy's iron-clad fleet appeared off the bar, and his force of transports at sea and in the Stono River was largely increased, indicating the renewal of the attack on the approaches of the city of Charleston. With the limited force at my command, such measures as could be taken to guard the salient points of attack, the south end of Morris Island and James Island, were ordered, and directions given for the disposition of troops ordered by the commanding General for reinforcements.

On the ninth, the enemy landed a strong force on Battery Island and unmasked works on Little Folly bearing upon our positions at the south end of Morris. The works at that point were, from various causes, incomplete, and, from want of transportation, the arrival of reinforcements was tardy.

Endeavors were made to strengthen our position on Morris Island, but from lack of force, no great improvement was accomplished.

On the morning of the tenth, the enemy opened a heavy fire upon our position from Little Folly with from twenty to thirty long-range guns, which he had placed in battery during the night. Soon after four monitors took position to the north-east of the position, enfilading it and taking some of the batteries in reverse. Our troops defending were composed of the Twenty-first South Carolina volunteers, under Colonel R. T. Graham; two companies of the First South Carolina artillery, under Captains J. C. Mitchell and J. R. Macbeth, and a detachment of the First South Carolina infantry, under Captain Charles T. Haskell, in all about seven hundred, with the following artillery placed in position; in detached batteries along the shore, to command the beach and the crossing from Little Folly, viz.: three eight-inch navy shell guns, two eight-inch sea-coast howitzers, one rifled twenty-four-pounder, one thirty-pounder Parrott, one twelve-pounder Whitworth, and three ten-inch sea-coast mortars, in all eleven pieces.

There were on Morris Island, besides two companies of artillery under Captains Chichester and Matthews, the garrison of Battery Wagner, and one at Battery Gregg, under Captain Lesesne, all the artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel James A. Yates, First South Carolina artillery. After about three hours' furious shelling from the enemy, to which our guns steadily replied, a large number of barges, filled with troops, came up Little Folly River, and, under

cover of their fire, succeeded in effecting a landing at Oyster Point, and the main shore of Morris Island. The enemy advanced immediately, driving back our inferior force of infantry, and succeeded in expelling our troops from the south end of Morris Island, and capturing the artillery above named, with its munitions. This was not effected without a severe struggle, in which we lost two hundred and ninety-four killed, wounded, and missing, among whom I mention, with especial regret, the following officers: Captain Cheves and Haskell, and Lieutenant Bee, who had rendered important service previous to, and behaved with distinguished gallantry in, the engagement.

The first reinforcements, Nelson's Seventh battalion South Carolina volunteers, arrived at the close of the action, and could only assist in covering the retreat, which was made under the flank fire of the monitors to Battery Wagner, where our troops were formed to resist further advances, and the guns of which opened on the pursuing enemy. Fort Sumter and Battery Gregg also opened fire, and put a stop to their proceedings for the day.

In the evening Battery Wagner was reinforced by Colonel Olmstead's command of Georgia troops, and the garrison kept on the alert for defending it against an attack. This occurred at dawn on the eleventh, when the enemy advanced upon the work in two columns and made a desperate assault, which was gallantly and decidedly repulsed, with a loss to the enemy which may safely be estimated at over eight hundred men. Our burying parties interred over one hundred inside of our lines, and one hundred and thirty were taken prisoners.

Our loss was one officer and five privates killed, and one officer and five privates wounded. The enemy on land remained comparatively quiet during the day, being engaged burying his dead and strengthening his position. Three monitors and three wooden gunboats engaged and bombarded the fort.

On the twelfth, Brigadier-General Hagood took command of the positions on James Island. Brigadier-General Taliaferro was assigned to the command of the works on Morris Island. The armament of the fort was increased by four twelve-pounder howitzers, under Colonel Du Pass and Lieutenant Waties, and two thirty-two-pounder carronades, on siege carriages. The enemy's shot took effect on the steam-scow Manigault, lying at a partially constructed battery at Vincent's Creek, disabling the scow and scattering the workmen. Battery Wagner was shelled by the enemy's fleet continuously during the day. One monitor took a position to the northward, apparently to enfilade the rear of the work. Lieutenant-Colonel Yates ordered Battery Gregg to open rapidly, which it did, driving the monitor off, apparently severely injured, as she transferred her crew at once to one of the gunboats.

On the thirteenth, under the able supervision of Brigadier-General Taliaferro, continued preparations were made against a renewed attack. The Twenty-first South Carolina volunteers and two companies of the First South Carolina artillery were relieved by the Fifty-first North Carolina and a detachment of Georgia artillery under Captain Buckner. The land operations of the enemy consisted in erecting batteries and protections, in which they were interrupted by the fire from Fort Sumter and Battery Gregg. The gunboats and monitors kept up a continued shelling throughout the day, with but slight intermissions when they had suffered from the sea fronts of Wagner and Gregg. In the evening the enemy succeeded in setting fire to the wreck of the steam-scow Manigault, in Vincent Creek.

On the fourteenth, two regiments, under Brigadier-General A. H. Colquitt, arrived, which were sent to James Island to reinforce Brigadier-General Hagood's command. Brigadier-General Clingman's command, consisting of the Eighth, Thirty-first, Fifty-first and Sixty-first North Carolina regiments, had arrived the previous day, and, with the exception of the Fifty-first, were stationed on James Island.

The enemy's wooden gunboats shelled Battery Wagner during the day at long range. During the night, Brigadier-General Taliaferro threw out a party, one hundred and fifty strong, under Major Ryan, of the Seventh South Carolina battalion, which drove in the enemy's pickets from his rifle-pits, extending across the island about three-quarters of a mile from Battery Wagner, back upon his main supports, inflicting a considerable loss, with but small upon our part.

On the fifteenth the enemy landed troops in force on Morris Island, and there were indications of a renewal of the assault on the fort. The frigate Ironsides had crossed the bar on the night of the fourteenth. During the day the enemy was strengthening his position, our troops being engaged in repairing damages and replying to the enemy's monitors, gunboats and sharpshooters. The Charleston battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel P. C. Gaillard, relieved the Seventh battalion and three companies of the Twentieth regiment South Carolina volunteers; Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Simkins, First South Carolina infantry, relieved Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. Yates, in command of the artillery on Morris Island; Captain Adams' company, of First South Carolina infantry, relieving Captain Chichester's company of artillery.

Brigadier-General Hagood made a reconnoissance of the enemy, in his front, on James Island.

On the morning of the sixteenth, in accordance with instructions, Brigadier-General Hagood advanced against the enemy, from his headquarters near Secessionville, James Island, driving in the enemy's pickets on his left, and making an advance against that portion of their force. Two columns made the attack, one led by Brigadier-General A. H. Colquitt, and the other by Brigadier-General Hagood in person. The enemy was protected by the fire of his gunboats in Stono

and Little Folly Rivers. Brigadier-General Hagood succeeded in driving the enemy, about two thousand in number, from James Island, and inflicting upon him a serious loss in killed and wounded, capturing fourteen negroes belonging to the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts regiment. Not the least important of these operations was the engagement with the sloop of war Pawnee, by two sections of Napoleon guns, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Del. Kemper, in which the steamer was injured and forced to retire. General Hagood's loss was three killed, twelve wounded, and three missing. The enemy withdrew entirely from James Island, to Battery Island, when General Hagood advanced his pickets, and the ground has been held to the present date, twenty-second July.

At Battery Wagner and on Morris Island, our troops continued their work of repair, subject to a continued shelling from gunboats and monitors at long range.

On the seventeenth, the enemy's vessels all disappeared from the Stono, and his troops were concentrated on Little Folly and Morris Islands. Firing from the enemy's fleet and land batteries was kept up during the day on Battery Wagner, which interfered seriously with the transportation to Cummins' Point. This has had, ever since, to be carried on at night.

On the night of the seventeenth, the Thirty-first North Carolina regiment relieved Colonel Oldstead's command of Georgia troops, and Captain Craven's company of the Twentieth South Carolina volunteers.

The work of repair and preparation was proceeded with during the night, and at daylight on the eighteenth, the enemy's land and sea batteries opened a *feu d'enfer* upon the devoted work. The practice was rapid in the extreme, from the Ironsides, from the monitors, and from all the wooden gunboats which, without exposing themselves, could get the range. According to Brigadier-General Taliaferro's estimate, over nine thousand shot and shell were thrown; but, as if by the special interposition of Providence, our loss was slight. Indications of an assault at dusk were apparent, and the guns of Sumter and Battery Gregg were in preparation to open fire over Battery Wagner on the columns of the enemy. Brigadier-General Hagood was relieved from the command of James Island, to be in readiness to support or relieve Brigadier-General Taliaferro, and Colonel Harrison's Thirty-second regiment of Georgians proceeded to the reinforcement and relief of the garrison. While in passage, the assault commenced, which was bravely met and repulsed with terrific slaughter on the part of the enemy by the heroic garrison and its commander, Brigadier-General Taliaferro, who directed all the operations until the final repulse.

In his report the details of the assault and its repulse are set forth, and I cannot do more or better than to second his commendations of those brave officers and men who stood the tempest of shot and shell and sent back the column of the enemy from their work, with a loss which may safely be computed at about three thousand in killed, wounded and prisoners. Brigadier-General Hagood, with Colonel Harrison's regiment, assisted in the final repulse of a party who had made a lodgment in the south-eastern salient of the battery.

The carnage of the enemy in the confined space in front of Battery Wagner, was extreme. The ditch and glacis were encumbered with the slain of all ranks and colors, for the enemy had put the poor negroes, whom they had forced into an unnatural service, in front, to be, as they were, slaughtered indiscriminately. The white Colonel who commanded them fell with many officers of the regiment, the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts, and the colors under which they were sent to butchery by hypocrisy and inhumanity, fell draggled in blood and sand in the ditch, a mournful memorial of the waste of industry.

This result was not accomplished without a loss on our part of brave officers and men, though of those who in the struggle battled for the right, the proportion who fell was far less than that of their enemy.

In this engagement, our loss in killed, wounded, and missing, was one hundred and seventy-four. Among the officers, whose loss we have to lament, and whose position and services entitle them to special mention, were Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Simkins, of the First South Carolina infantry, Captain William H. Ryan, Charleston battalion, Captain W. T. Tatum, First South Carolina infantry, who were killed; and Major David Ramsay of the Charleston battalion, who was severely wounded. Other gallant officers and soldiers fell, whose names are mentioned in the reports of their several commanders, and whose memories should be cherished by a grateful country. While the assault on Battery Wagner was progressing, Battery Gregg, under Captain Lesesne, and the batteries of Fort Sumter, under Colonel Alfred Rhett, kept up a continuous fire upon the ground over which the enemy advanced, until Brigadier-General Taliaferro advanced his pickets to the front, when they ceased, and the narrow field of battle was quiet for the night.

Brigadier-General Taliaferro, who had been in command and on trench duty for five days, was relieved in the morning, by Brigadier-General Hagood.

This report, ending with the second repulse of the enemy from Battery Wagner, will be continued from that time. The operations of the enemy from that date, within the limits of my command, have changed their character. In closing it, I have the honor to express my high appreciation of the distinguished services of Brigadier-General Taliaferro, who commanded the troops in Battery Wagner with great ability and gallantry, and repulsed the memorable assault of the eighteenth, and of the excellent conduct of Brigadier-Generals Hagood and Colquitt, as evidenced in the attack on the enemy's position, on the sixteenth. Besides these, Colonel

Graham, Twenty-first South Carolina volunteers; Colonels Olmstead and Harrison, of the Georgia volunteers; Lieutenant-Colonel P. C. Gaillard, Charleston battalion; Lieutenant-Colonel Yates, Captains J. C. Mitchell, Lesesne, First South Carolina artillery; Captains Chichester, Mathews, Buckner, Dixon, Du Pass, and Lieutenant-Colonel Harris and Captains Ramsay and Barnwell, engineers, deserve especial consideration for their gallant and valuable services.

The Signal corps, under Lieutenant Markoe, have been actively employed, and that officer has reported Sergeant J. E. Edgerton, privates W. S. Lance, E. W. Martin, W. D. Du Barry, A. Grimball, and F. K. Huger, for zeal and gallantry in performing their duties under the heavy and continuous fire of the enemy.

During this period of anxiety and activity, the officers serving upon the district staff have performed their duty in such manner as to enable me to rely with confidence upon their further exertions during the continuance of the contest. I feel it proper to refer, with special commendation, to Captain William F. Nance, Assistant Adjutant-General, whom I have more than once recommended for promotion, and whose services become steadily more valuable as they become more arduous. I have also to express my satisfaction with the manner in which their respective and laborious duties have been discharged by Majors Motte A. Pringle and C. H. Juber, Quartermasters, and Captain C. C. Pinckney, Ordnance Officer, Captain B. H. Read, A. A. G. and Lieutenant Schnierle, A. A. D. C., were present and actively engaged in the operations of the sixteenth. Lieutenants Rogers and Wagner, A. D. C. have been continuously employed.

I have to acknowledge the services of Major J. Motte Middleton, and Captain Thomas D. Eason, upon my personal staff.

The limits of this report are such, that it may be that many things are omitted which should be mentioned to the credit of many meritorious officers, and these I will endeavor to mention in a supplement.

Accompanying, are the reports of Colonel R. T. Graham, of the action of the tenth instant, and of the assault on the morning of the eleventh; of Brigadier-General Taliaferro, of the operations of the troops on Morris Island, from the thirteenth to the nineteenth instant, inclusive; of Brigadier-General Hagood, of the engagement with the enemy's pickets on James Island, and with the Pawnee, in the Stono; of Lieutenant Markoe, Signal Officer, and of all subordinate commanders.

I also enclose tabular lists of the killed, wounded and missing, and list of prisoners captured during the period of this report.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
R. S. RIPLEY,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

h appears the following indorse-

HEADQUARTERS SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA AND FLORIDA,
CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA, August 1, 1863.

Respectfully forwarded for the information of the War Department. I see but little to add to this clear and full report of recent operations in this quarter, submitted by the commanding General of this district, whose disposition of troops and general conduct of the responsible duties intrusted to him, I beg to commend to the special notice of his Excellency the President.

In connection, however, with this relation of events, between the ninth and nineteenth ultimo, I beg to call attention to my letters to the Secretary of War, of the tenth May and twentieth July, and one to General Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General, dated June fifteenth, as containing information essential for a proper knowledge of the situation.

I beg leave also to express my high appreciation of the gallant conduct of the officers and men engaged, especially those mentioned by Brigadier-Generals Ripley and Taliaferro, and by subordinate commanders.

The conduct of Brigadier-General Taliaferro during the operations of the eighteenth of July, and the assault on Battery Wagner that night, cannot be too highly commended. Lieutenant-Colonel D. B. Harris, Chief Engineer, present on that occasion, behaved in the emergency with characteristic and conspicuous coolness, energy and professional skill. He aided materially to repulse the enemy. Accompanying are the following papers, viz.:

Report of Brigadier-General Taliaferro and subordinate commanders, marked "A;" report of Colonel R. T. Graham and subordinate commanders, marked "B;" report of Lieutenant F. Markoe, commanding Signal corps, marked "C;" list of officers and men captured by our forces on Morris Island, marked "D;" papers relative to exchange of wounded prisoners, marked "E;" and list of negro prisoners, marked "F."

G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General, commanding.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILLIAM B. TALIAFERRO OF THE BOMBARDMENT AND ASSAULT OF FORT WAGNER, JULY EIGHTEENTH, 1863.

CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA,
July 21, 1863.

Captain Nance, A. A. G.:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report, for the information of the Brigadier-General commanding the District of South Carolina, the operations of the troops of my command, on Morris Island, during the week commencing Monday, the thirteenth instant, and particularly the occurrences of Saturday, the eighteenth instant, which terminated in a most decisive and overwhelming repulse of the enemy:

On Monday, the thirteenth instant, I made such an inspection of parts of the island as the limited means at my disposal offered, and on Tuesday morning relieved Colonel Graham of the command of the troops, including the garrisons of Forts Wagner and Gregg.

I found that the abolitionists occupied the island, in force, from the southern part to Gregg's Hill, upon which they were already erecting batteries, and had constructed a signal station; that they had thrown forward their skirmishers to a point indicated by a single palmetto tree, one mile and a quarter to their front, and about three quarters of a mile from Fort Wagner, at which last post, the undulating and successive ranges of sand hills shielded them and their operations from our view.

In the course of the morning, their riflemen gave us some annoyance, and during the day, the wooden vessels of their fleet, aided by one turreted iron-clad, attacked our works, throwing some three hundred heavy shell and shot. I determined to make a slight reconnoissance at night (to feel the enemy and to add to the confidence of the garrison), and ordered a party consisting of one hundred and fifty men, from various commands, under Major Ryan, of Nelson's South Carolina battalion, to push forward, drive in the enemy's pickets, and feel its way until it encountered a heavy supporting force. This duty was gallantly and well performed. Major Ryan pushed the pickets and first reserve back upon a reserve brigade, in such disorder that the latter fired upon their retreating companies, inflicting a heavy loss, in addition to the punishment already inflicted by Major Ryan.

I established rifle-pits some two hundred yards outside the works (the nearest practicable point), and made such dispositions for holding the post against assaults (by assigning each command its particular position, &c.) as were necessary.

On Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, the bombardment was kept up from the fleet from ten until five each day; the average number of projectiles thrown at the works being three hundred daily; the casualties being few, and the damage to the fort inappreciable, our work having been directed up to this time, not to repairs, but to improvements at Forts Wagner and Gregg. During these three days, the enemy, under cover of the sand-hills, erected batteries on land, the nearest being about three-quarters of a mile off, and others extending from Gregg's Hill to the left, and distant about one mile and three-quarters from Fort Wagner. These batteries were gradually unmasked, and were, with the exception of the first, entirely without range of our guns.

On Saturday morning, the eighteenth instant, at 8.15 A. M., the enemy having disclosed his land batteries, brought up to their support his entire fleet, consisting of the Ironsides, flag ship; five monitors, and a large number of wooden steam gun-ships. With this immense circle of fire by land and sea, he poured, for eleven hours, without cessation or intermission, a storm of shot and shell upon Fort Wagner, which is, perhaps, unequalled in history.

My estimation is that not less than nine thousand solid shot and shell of all sizes, from fifteen-inch downwards, were hurled during this period, at the work; the estimate of others is very much greater. The garrison of the fort on this day consisted of the Charleston battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Gaillard (whose position extended from the sally-port, in Light-House Inlet Creek on the right, to the left until it rested on Colonel McKeatchin's regiment, Fifty-first North Carolina), which extended to the gun-chamber, opposite the bomb-proof door, at which point, and extending along the face of the work to the left, to the sally-port next to Fort Gregg, the Thirty-first North Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel Knight, occupied the work. These positions for the infantry were verified by frequent inspections, and the several commands were required to sleep in position, and each man was instructed as to the exact point which he should occupy, and which in any moment of confusion he would be required to gain and hold. In addition to this, a small portion of the Thirty-first North Carolina were held as a reserve in the parade, and a part occupied the parapet just to the right of the sally-port. On the outside of the fort two companies of the Charleston battalion held the sand-hills along the beach, and their face extending from the sally-port to the sea beach.

The artillerists occupied the several gun-chambers, and two light field pieces were placed in battery, outside of the fort on the traverse, near the sally-port. The artillery command consisted of Captains Tatum and Adams' First South Carolina infantry, Buckner and Dixon's Sixty-third Georgia heavy artillery, and Captain Du Pass, commanding light artillery, all under the general command of Lieutenant-Colonel Simkins, Chief of Artillery. The infantry, except the Charleston battalion, and the artillery, except the gun detachments, were placed, shortly after the shelling commenced, under cover of the bomb-proofs. The first-named battalion, with a heroic intrepidity never surpassed, animated by the splendid example of their field officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Gaillard and Major Ramsay, had no protection, except such as the parapet afforded them, yet maintained their position without flinching, during the entire day. The ten-inch gun was fired at intervals of ten to fifteen minutes, against the iron-clads, and the heavy guns on the land face, whenever the working parties or cannoniers of the enemy on the land showed themselves within range. The mortar in charge of Captain Tatum was fired every half hour.

The casualties during the day, from the bombardment, did not exceed eight killed and twenty wounded.

About ten o'clock, the flag halyards were cut, and the Confederate flag blew over into the fort. Instantly Major Ramsay, of the Charleston battalion, Lieutenant Rudick, Sixty-third Georgia (artillery), Sergeant Shelton, and private Flynn, Charleston battalion, sprang forward and replaced it on the ramparts, while, at the same time, Captain Barnwell, of the engineers, dashed out, seized a battle-flag, and erected it by the side of the garrison flag. This flag was subse-

quently shot away, and replaced by private G. Gilleland, Charleston battalion.

As night approached, the increased severity of the bombardment plainly indicated that an assault would be made, and orders were issued to the command to prepare to man the ramparts.

At a quarter to eight, the lines of the enemy were seen advancing, and the bombardment slackened to an occasional shell from the ships and land batteries. As the enemy advanced they were met by a shower of grape and canister from our guns, and a terrible fire of musketry from the Charleston battalion and Fifty-first North Carolina. These two commands gallantly maintained their position, and drove the enemy back quickly from their front. with immense slaughter.

In the meantime, on the left of the work, the Thirty-first North Carolina could not be induced to occupy their position, and ingloriously deserted the ramparts, when, no resistance being offered at this point, the advance of the enemy, pushing forward, entered the ditch, and ascended the work, at the extreme left salient of the land face, and occupied it.

I at once directed Lieutenant-Colonel Gaillard to keep up a severe enfilading fire to his left, and directed the field pieces on the left of the fort, outside of the sally-port, to direct their fire to the right, so as to sweep the ditch and exterior slope of that part of the work thus occupied, and thus at the same time prevented the enemy from being supported at that point, and cut off all hope of his escape.

The main body of the enemy, after a brief attempt to pass over the field of fire, retreated under the fire of our artillery and the shells of Fort Sumter, and must have suffered heavily as long as they were within the range of our guns.

Colonel Harris, of the engineers, to whose skill I am much indebted, and whose coolness and gallantry were most conspicuous during the previous day, placed a howitzer on the right of the fort outside the beach, and co-operated with the guns on the left.

Thinking it advisable to dislodge the enemy at once, before they had time to communicate their temporary success, I called for volunteers to dislodge them. This call was promptly met by Major McDonald, of the Fifty-first North Carolina infantry, and by Captain Ryan, Charleston battalion. I selected Captain Ryan's company, and directed them to charge the enemy in the salient.

This work they advanced to with great spirit, but unfortunately Captain Ryan was killed at the moment of the advance, and his men hesitated, and the opportunity was lost.

Wherever the enemy showed themselves a sharp fire was kept up upon them by the Fifty-first North Carolina, and after considerable injury thus inflicted, a party of the Thirty-second Georgia regiment having been sent along the parapet to the left and on the top of the magazine to approach their rear, they surrendered.

In front of the fort, the scene of carnage is indescribable. The repulse was overwhelming, and the loss of the enemy could not have been less than two thousand (2,000) in killed, wounded, and prisoners, perhaps much more.

Our loss I estimate at fifty killed, and one hundred and fifty wounded, but will forward an exact return.

The assailants consisted of troops from Connecticut, Pennsylvania, New Hamphire, Ohio, and New York, and the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts negro regiment (under Colonel Shaw, who was killed), under the command of Brigadier-General Strong. The supports were commanded by Brigadier-General ———.

I will hereafter make a supplementary report, and give such details as may be required.

As to the damage done to the work and guns, I have the honor to refer you to the reports of the Engineer Officer and Chief of Artillery, which will be forwarded.

I will remark this, whilst the injury done to the work is considerable, it is much less than could have been expected, and the damage to the guns, it is hoped, may be repaired in a short time.

In conclusion, whilst I feel it my duty to mention the disgraceful conduct of the Thirty-first North Carolina infantry, I am proud to bear testimony to the efficiency and gallantry of the other troops.

Colonel McKeatchin's regiment, Fifty-first North Carolina infantry, redeemed the reputation of the Thirty-first regiment. They gallantly sought their positions under a heavy shelling, and maintained it during the action. Colonel McKeatchin, Lieutenant-Colonel Hobson, and Major McDonald, are the field-officers of this regiment, and deserve special mention.

The Charleston battalion distinguished themselves, not only by their gallantry, but by their discipline, and cool performance of their duty. and obedience to orders under the excitement and confusion always incident to a night attack.

Lieutenant-Colonel Gaillard, and the brave Major Ramsay, who, I regret to say, was severely wounded, deserve the highest expression of commendation for their conduct during the bombardment and assault.

The artillery behaved throughout the day with remarkable courage. Lieutenant-Colonel Simkins had a most severe duty to perform during the day, in directing the operations of the artillery. This, unflinchingly and admirably, he performed, and after the enemy's heavy guns had ceased, he mounted the parapet and encouraged the infantry. There, on the ramparts, in the front, this admirable soldier and accomplished gentleman sealed his devotion to our cause by an early but most heroic death.

Captains Buckner and Dixon, Sixty-third Georgia, and Captain Adams, First South Carolina infantry, deserve especial mention; but I desire to bring most conspicuously to the notice of the Brigadier-General commanding, the name of Lieutenant Poore, whose coolness, skill and gal-

lantry were unsurpassed. I regret to say he was severely wounded.

I would also especially mention Lieutenant Waters, commanding the field pieces on the left of the works, who was conspicuous for his gallantry, and was severely wounded; and the skill, coolness, and gallantry of Captain Du Pass, who assumed command of his pieces after his fall. These pieces rendered most important service.

I have doubtless omitted the names of many officers whose gallantry should be recorded, and shall, in a subsequent report, endeavor to do justice to all.

I must, in conclusion, mention the good conduct of Sergeant Williams, of Lieutenant Poore's company, and Corporal Conneway, of the Twenty-second Georgia battalion, who greatly distinguished themselves.

To the officers of my personal staff I am under obligations.

I lament to record the death of the gallant Captain Waring, A. A. D. C., and the wounding of Captain Twiggs, Inspector-General, and Captain Stony, A. D. C., who were stricken down, nobly discharging their duty.

To Captain Taliaferro, A. A. G., Lieutenants Mazyck and Cunningham, Ordnance Officers, and Meade, A. D. C., and to Surgeon Habersham, Major Holcombe, and Captain Boote, I tender my thanks for their aid, &c., during the course of the week. I would especially mention Captain Barnwell, of the engineers.

In the early part of the week, the commands of Colonel Olmstead, Lieutenant-Colonel Capers, Major Harney, and Major Bosinger, of Lieutenant-Colonel Nelson and Lieutenant-Colonel Dantzler, and the artillery under the admirable management of Lieutenant-Colonel Yates, with such officers as Captains Mathews and Chichester, deserve great credit for their bravery and zeal.

I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
WILLIAM B. TALIAFERRO,
Brigadier-General.

BRIGADIER GENERAL R. S. RIPLEY'S REPORT OF THE DEFENCE OF CHARLESTON, FROM THE FIRST TO THE TWENTIETH OF AUGUST, 1863, INCLUSIVE.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST MILITARY DISTRICT,
CHARLESTON, August 21, 1863.

Brigadier-General Thomas Jordan, Chief of Staff:

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the various operations for the defence of Charleston against the present attack, from the first of August, on which day Colonel L. M. Keitt, of the Twentieth South Carolina volunteers, relieved Brigadier-General Clingman, in command of Battery Wagner.

The work of repair and strengthening Battery Wagner had been progressed with until the battery had become quite as strong as it originally was. The commanding General having determined to keep up an increased armament, spare carriages and chassis and one ten-inch gun were transported, on the night of the thirtieth of July, to Battery Wagner, and arrangements made for getting them in position. This delicate and important work was accomplished under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Yates, by Captain Frank Harleston, First South Carolina artillery, and Mr. A. D. Lacoste, with Captain Harleston's company, First South Carolina artillery, assisted by heavy details from the garrison of Battery Wagner. The enemy during the day was principally employed on his works of attack, but kept up an occasional fire upon the battery, doing no damage.

In the evening he opened on the light draft steamer Chesterfield, at Cummins' Point, driving her off, and, for the first time, attempting to interrupt our communication with Morris Island.

The Fifty-fourth Georgia regiment was relieved from Morris Island by the Charleston battalion. The guns of Battery Wagner were generally silent during the day. Fort Sumter and Battery Gregg opened upon the enemy whenever they were observed at work within range. Battery Simpkins, at Shell Point, kept up a steady fire.

Our works in process of erection on James' Island, progressed steadily, and the troops in that locality were held in readiness for such movements as might become necessary, under Brigadier-General Taliaferro.

During the morning of the second, Battery Simkins kept up its fire on the enemy's works, which did not reply until about two o'clock in the afternoon, when they opened sharply from the land works and one gunboat, keeping up a fire during most of the afternoon, which was replied to by Batteries Wagner, Gregg, Sinkins, and Fort Sumter. At night the enemy again opened, with mortars and Parrott guns, towards Cummins' Point, to cut off the communication. No material damage occurred, and in other portions of this command all was quiet.

The fire from the enemy's batteries was kept up on Battery Wagner quite steadily during the morning of the third, having the effect of killing one man and wounding two officers and twelve privates, most of them slightly. Battery Wagner replied but little to the enemy's fire, the garrison being at work. The carriages for the two ten-inch guns proved to be so badly fitted as to cause delay in getting them ready for service. Fort Sumter and the exterior batteries kept up a fire on the enemy's advanced works. At night the Twentieth South Carolina volunteers and detachments of the Fifty-first North Carolina regiment, were relieved by the Twenty-first South Carolina volunteers. As the communication by means of steamers was quite dangerous, the exchange was effected by means of small boats, manned by crews from the navy.

These performed their duty well, and my thanks are due to Flag Officer J. R. Tucker, C. S. N., and the officers and men of his command, for the valuable assistance rendered.

The fourth passed very quietly on Morris

Island, there being very little firing on either side. Only the usual duties occurred in other parts of the command.

On the fifth, the two ten-inch guns and other armament of Battery Wagner were in readiness for action. The enemy showing but little disposition to engage with his iron-clads, the ten-inch guns were kept masked until such time as he should come to close action. On land he was busy putting down mortar platforms. His fire was principally from Cohorn mortars at our sharpshooters from the Twentieth South Carolina volunteers and the Charleston battalion, who, armed with Whitworth rifles, caused him serious annoyance.

During the night the Eighth North Carolina relieved the Nineteenth Georgia, and a detachment of the Twentieth South Carolina volunteers, Captains Chichester's and Mathews' companies of artillery, relieved Captains Miles' and Hunter's. The different detachments of artillery from light batteries and siege trains were also changed. This work was accomplished, as before, under the direction of Major Motte A. Pringle, Quartermaster, with the assistance of the navy.

The enemy having established an annoying picket guard at an unfinished battery at the mouth of Vincent's Creek, he was attacked, at about nine o'clock, by a party from the navy and from the Twenty-fifth South Carolina volunteers, under Lieutenant Commanding Warley of the Confederate States steamer Chicora, Captain Sellers commanding the land forces. The party proceeded in four boats, guided by Mr. J. Fraser Mathews, to the northern entrance of Lighthouse Creek, where Captain Sellers landed and proceeded against the enemy's picket. Lieutenant Warley, with two boats, went round to the mouth of Vincent's Creek to cut of the enemy's barges. A brisk skirmish ensued, which resulted in the capture of one boat, with one Captain and ten non-commissioned officers and privates of the enemy, of which the Captain and four non-commissioned officers and privates were wounded, one mortally. The remainder of the enemy's party were driven off in another boat under a heavy fire, which undoubtedly caused them some damage. On our side, one private of the Twenty-fifth South Carolina volunteers was killed.

Brigadier-General Hagood relieved Colonel Keitt in the command of our forces on Morris Island on the sixth, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Welshman Brown relieving Major Warley in command of the artillery. The Sixty-first North Carolina regiment relieved the Charleston battalion during the night. The operations of the enemy were very quietly conducted. Throughout the command the work of preparation went on, Fort Sumter and Battery Simkins firing occasionally, during the day, whenever the enemy's parties were working within range.

A thirty-two-pounder, rifled, was transported to and mounted on Battery Wagner during the night of the sixth, and the works on both sides progressed without interruption throughout the seventh, except from sharpshooters, of whom ours from Battery Wagner annoyed the enemy to a considerable extent. At night, being attracted by the communication of a steamer with Cummins' Point, the enemy sent up a rocket from the fleet opposite Battery Wagner, when his land batteries opened heavily on the supposed locality of the steamer, and kept up the fire until near daylight. It was replied to by Fort Sumter and Battery Simkins. No damage was done to the steamer.

On the eighth a working party of the enemy was discovered to the east of Black Island, either building a bridge or battery. It was opened upon from Battery Haskell, and the work ceased for the time. During the day the firing at intervals from Sumter, Gregg, and Simkins was kept up; but the enemy remained comparatively quiet until evening, when he opened with mortars and Parrott guns, principally on Battery Wagner, keeping up the cannonade until near five o'clock on the morning of the ninth.

On the ninth operations were continued, the enemy being greatly annoyed by our sharpshooters, and occasionally opening fire with great spirit and rapidity, to endeavor to dislodge them. At about five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy's land batteries opened, shelling briskly from their mortars towards Battery Wagner and the landing at Cummins' Point.

During the night of the ninth the Eighth North Carolina regiment was relieved by Colonel Olmstead's command of Georgia troops, and the detachment of couriers from the Fifth South Carolina cavalry by others of the same regiment.

On the tenth the enemy were very busily at work, and although Fort Sumter and Battery Simkins kept up a steady fire, they caused him but little interruption, and he succeeded in approaching about one hundred yards in advance of his former position of attack.

During the day he kept quiet, except firing from his sharpshooters, which was replied to with spirit and effect by ours, until, at about five o'clock in the afternoon, his land batteries, of both mortar and Parrott guns, opened briskly. No great damage was effected beyond knocking off the wheel of a carronade, which was soon replaced.

Colonel Harrison, of the Fifty-fourth Georgia regiment, relieved Brigadier-General Hagood in command of our troops on Morris Island, but the fire of the enemy interfered seriously with the relief of the troops on Morris Island, he having erected a large Drummond light in a position to brightly illuminate the landing. The steamers engaged in the transfer were withdrawn, and the relief discontinued for the night.

Colonel Olmstead relieved Colonel Graham in the command of Fort Johnson, which was made a depot for the troops relieving the garrison of Morris Island. Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. Yates was assigned to the command of the artillery at Batteries Simkins and Cheves, and at Fort Johnson.

At about seven o'clock on the morning of the eleventh, the enemy's land batteries and monitors opened heavily on Battery Wagner, but the monitors soon withdrew. The fire from the land batteries was, however, kept up with more or less spirit during the day, and replied to by Fort Sumter, Batteries Simkins and Gregg. The damage to our works was slight.

During the night of the eleventh the relief of the garrison by fresh troops was accomplished, with the assistance of the boats of the navy. So soon as it had been finished, Colonel Harrison opened fire upon the enemy's working parties nearest Battery Wagner, interfering with and putting a stop for the time to their progress.

Fort Sumter and Battery Simkins also kept up a steady fire on the approaches. The enemy replied from his land batteries, Parrotts, and mortars, doing some damage to the bomb-proofs, but without inflicting any casualty on our side.

On the morning of the twelfth, the enemy opened with two-hundred-pound Parrott shot and shell upon Fort Sumter from his batteries near the foot of Craig's Hill, on Morris Island, a distance of about five thousand yards. Wherever the shot struck light masonry it did serious damage. The heavy masonry of concrete and the revetments of sand were not materially damaged. The fort was struck seventeen times. The transport steamer Hibben, lying at the wharf of Fort Sumter, was shot through her boiler, scalding and injuring nine negro hands on board.

The enemy was observed from Battery Wagner building a work at their extreme left. Colonel Rhett, commanding Fort Sumter; Captain Mitchell, commanding Battery Simkins, and Captain Lesesne, commanding Battery Gregg, directed their fire upon his parties, which were dispersed and the work stopped.

At dark Battery Wagner opened on the enemy's works immediately in its front with eight guns, and kept a steady fire, at intervals, throughout the night. Sumter and Simkins also kept up a steady fire, and no progress in advance was made by the enemy. His rearmost batteries, however, were in progress, and a continued reply was kept to the fire of Battery Wagner, with shots at Battery Gregg to interrupt communication.

The effect was to kill one and wound four of the garrison at Battery Wagner, and I regret to add that of the latter Captain J. C. Gray, of Lucas's battalion of artillery, a gallant and accomplished young officer of high promise, was mortally injured. He has since died.

On the thirteenth the enemy several times undertook to repair the damage to their advance, but were repulsed by a fire skilfully directed against them from Battery Wagner. Finding that it was difficult to proceed with his approaches, he fell back to his rear batteries, and with his naval force opened fire on Battery Wagner and Battery Gregg. Fort Sumter and Battery Simkins replied, and the sharpshooters at Battery Wagner kept those of the enemy quiet during the day.

One man was mortally wounded at Battery Gregg. During the afternoon, the heavy Parrott guns of the enemy opened on Fort Sumter, of which several struck the gorge wall and the reinforce to the western magazine, injuring the brick work to a considerable extent, but not sufficiently to cause any serious apprehension of a speedy penetration of the defences on that side. One falling in the interior of the work injured temporarily a mortar platform.

The Twelfth Georgia battalion was relieved from Morris Island during the night, bringing the garrison to about the strength of eleven hundred, as ordered by the commanding General.

During the fourteenth the enemy remained remarkably quiet, firing only occasionally, replied to by our batteries. At night Fort Sumter was struck five times by land batteries, and once from a gunboat, with slight damage. Battery Wagner, opened fire, first at intervals, to which the enemy replied with all the guns he could bring to bear. Our guns were allowed to remain quiet for a time, to permit him to bring up his working parties, when they were reopened with vigor, putting a stop to his operations, and, from the report of our advanced pickets, it is believed that serious loss was inflicted upon him. His operations against other points consisted only in occasional shots, which were replied to from our batteries.

On the fifteeth the enemy fired occasionally at Battery Wagner, and was at work principally on his long range batteries at the southern part of Morris Island. A few shots were directed at Fort Sumter during the evening. Colonel L. M. Keitt, of the Twentieth South Carolina regiment, relieved Colonel Harrison in command of the troops on Morris Island. The Twentieth South Carolina volunteers relieved the Fifty-first North Carolina at Battery Wagner. A brisk artillery action was kept up between our batties on Morris Island and those of the enemy, and one of the monitors threw several shells at the transport steamer Sumter. Battery Simkins and Fort Sumter kept up a fire upon the enemy's approaches.

During the night of the fifteenth the enemy kept up a vigorous fire, both vertical and direct, on Battery Wagner and Battery Gregg, until about half-past four o'clock on the sixteenth, when it ceased. It was replied to by Sumter, Gregg, and Simkins at intervals. From Battery Wagner the fire was continuous and slow until about two o'clock in the morning, when a general discharge took place along the whole front, causing interruption to the advancing works of the enemy. The enemy's batteries were universally quiet during the sixteenth, so far as Wagner and Gregg were concerned; but during the afternoon he opened on Fort Sumter, apparently to get the range, firing forty-eight shots, of which four passed over, four or five fell short, ten struck inside, and the remainder outside the

fort. Whenever the shot struck the lighter brickwork it did considerable damage, and disabled a twenty-four pounder in the gorge, by loosening the pintle through the masonry. During the night the Twenty-first South Carolina volunteers relieved Colonel Olmstead's command on Morris Island. The artillery commands and couriers were also relieved by detachments from their respective regiments and battalions, and about twelve o'clock Battery Wagner opened on the enemy, keeping up a continuous fire during the night. Fort Sumter and Battery Simkins also kept up their practice.

On the morning of the seventeenth the enemy opened with three two-hundred-pound Parrott guns and one one-hundred-pounder on Fort Sumter, at distances varying from two and a quarter to three miles. This fire was kept up, with but little intermission, throughout the morning. At twenty-five minutes past nine the Ironsides and six monitors came into action against Fort Sumter, Batteries Wagner and Gregg, directing their shots principally at Sumter. At a quarter before eleven they came within about three thousand yards of Fort Sumter, when Colonel Rhett opened his batteries. Colonel Butler, from Fort Moultrie, had opened a few guns, but a large force of negroes being at work on his front, he was directed to discontinue his fire. The Ironsides and the monitors were struck repeatedly; and at ten minutes before one o'clock the rapid firing ceased, the fleet withdrawing from the contest. One of the monitors, during the action, left the squadron and steamed rapidly down the channel to the wooden fleet of the enemy, and soon after all their flags were observed to be flying at half-mast. Six hundred and twelve shots and shell had been fired at Fort Sumter, of which most struck. The casualties in the fort were one man killed; Lieutenant John Middleton, Lieutenant Julius Rhett, Lieutenant Johnson, engineer, and ten privates slightly wounded. The fort was seriously injured on the north-west face; one nine-inch Dahlgren gun, three forty-two-pounders and one eight-inch columbiad disabled. During the afternoon the land batteries re-opened their fire heavily upon the fort, cutting deeply into the gorge wall and adding much to the damage of the north-western face, and disabling a ten-inch columbiad. By night the enemy had thrown nine hundred and forty-eight shot, of which four hundred and forty-five struck outside; two hundred and seventy passed over. Battery Wagner, which received its full share of the enemy's fire, was but little damaged; but sustained a serious loss in the death of Captain Wampler, of the engineers, a gallant and accomplished officer, who was killed by a shell from the enemy's fleet while faithfully performing his arduous duties. Battery Cheves was opened on the morning of the seventeenth, at nine o'clock, with four eight-inch columbiads and four eight-inch navy guns on ship carriages. The fire was kept up throughout the day with the columbiads at the enemy's works on Morris Island, and working parties in the marsh, having the effect of annoying the former and dispersing the latter. The four eight-inch navy carriages were found to be inadequate to stand the elevation and range, and dismounted their guns after about an hour. They were directed to be re-mounted on columbiad carriages and repaired for service as speedily as possible. Battery Haskell also opened on the enemy's working parties between Morris and Black Islands.

During the night of the seventeenth, the enemy remained comparatively quiet. The troops on Morris Island were resupplied, and a large quantity of ammunition and stores were removed from Fort Sumter to Sullivan's Island.

Early on the morning of the eighteenth, the Ironsides, two monitors, and the enemy's land batteries opened upon Fort Sumter and Battery Wagner. The battery and forts replied slowly. Batteries Simkins and Cheves also opened upon the enemy, annoying them to a considerable extent; but on account of the miserable quality of our fuses, only by the striking of the shells, but few burst.

Before two o'clock, the Ironsides and monitors retired, the land batteries alone keeping up the cannonade, with the effect of causing the wall on the north-west face of Sumter to project and cutting well away into the gorge. During the afternoon the Ironsides and five monitors took up position in line, and with the land batteries kept up heavy fire, taking the north-west face in reverse, disabling the remaining guns, and two ten-inch columbiads on the north-east face; two guns on the west face remaining were also disabled, besides the seven-inch Brooke gun in the south-west angle.

The enemy ceased his fire about seven o'clock P. M., having thrown eight hundred and seventy-six shot and shell, of which four hundred and fifty-two struck outside, two hundred and forty-four inside, and one hundred and eighty went over. One man was seriously, and two slightly wounded.

At Battery Wagner a rifled gun and ten-inch columbiad were disabled, but the damage to the works otherwise was not serious. One monitor of the enemy was observed undergoing repairs during the night.

The enemy's land batteries commenced firing at half-past four o'clock in the morning, principally on Fort Sumter, but firing from mortars and small guns on Battery Wagner.

By ten o'clock the cannonade on Sumter had become more serious than hitherto, damaging the walls seriously, killing one and wounding four. All the gorge guns had been rendered useless, and the first shot passed through the gorge walls, just under the crown of an arch west of the main gateway. The fire continued steadily during the afternoon, with its usual effect. The western quarters of Fort Sumter having been demolished, the walls were torn down by the garrison. One ten-inch mortar

mounted in the parade of Fort Sumter was dismounted in the afternoon.

The width of twenty feet of the gorge wall fell during the night, leaving the protection on that side through the upper arches only the sand and cotton with which the casemates were filled. The damage to other parts of the fort was in proportion. One man had been killed and four wounded at Fort Sumter. The fort received seven hundred and eighty shots, four hundred and eight outside, two hundred and forty-one inside, and one hundred and thirty-one over.

The enemy's fleet made a demonstration of attacking during the afternoon, but having received a few shots, retired.

At Battery Wagner, his approaches were kept up, but being checked by the riflemen and artillery, his progress was slow. During the night, the Charleston battalion relieved the First Georgia battalion, and a company of the Second South Carolina artillery relieved Captain Miles' company (acting artillery) at Battery Wagner. The garrison was otherwise supplied and provisioned. An additional supply of ammunition was transported from Sumter to Sullivan's Island.

Batteries Cheves and Simkins had kept up their fire during the day and night of the nineteenth, receiving an occasional shot from the enemy.

On the twentieth the enemy re-opened his fire heavily, principally against Fort Sumter, doing, as might be expected, more damage than before. It was steadily kept up throughout the day, and at night Colonel Rhett reported it as the heaviest which had taken place. Eight hundred and seventy-nine shots were fired, of which four hundred and eight struck outside, two hundred and ninety-six inside, one hundred and seventy-five passed over. The greater portion of the gorge wall had fallen in, but the sand and cotton in the rooms had been revetted by the debris, and protection to a certain extent was still afforded. The north-west face was clearly breached by the severe fire, and a casemate knocked through. One rifled forty-two pounder on the east, and one on the north-east face, were disabled. Captains Gaillard and Fleming, and one private, were slightly wounded.

The enemy being observed advancing by sap on Battery Wagner, Colonel Keitt opened his batteries upon them, and with his sharpshooters succeeded in checking their progress. The Ironsides and monitors moved up to close proximity of the fort, and opened a heavy enfilading and direct fire, which caused him to close his embrasures. The damage to Battery Wagner was no greater than usual upon that battery.

Batteries Simkins, Cheves and Haskell, were in operation upon the enemy's flank during the twentieth. Lieutenant-Colonel Yates reports the practice as having been much improved, and that he had reason to believe that two ammunition chests had been blown up in the enemy's trenches, and one gun dismounted. Also, that in the afternoon the fire of the enemy had become somewhat wild from the effect of rapid firing on his pieces at long range.

The report given above contains the principal active operations of the defence and attack, up to the evening of the twentieth. During the time included in it, our works of preparation on the interior lines have steadily progressed. The batteries and shelters on Sullivan's Island have advanced to completion, and the heavy guns and mortars, which have been received and secured from Fort Sumter, have been placed in position, manned, and provided with ammunition as far as possible. A strong front has been made to command the channel, should the enemy succeed in overpowering the brave defenders of Batteries Wagner, Gregg and Fort Sumter. Preparations have been made for placing heavy batteries along the shores of Ashley River, from Fort Johnson, west, to command the inner harbor and channels. All batteries which would bear upon the enemy have been served with as much vigor as circumstances would permit, and his attack confined to as narrow limits as possible.

During this twenty days' progress of the siege, the conduct of the troops and their commanders has been admirable.

Brigadier-General Hagood and Colonels Keitt and Harrison, who have commanded the advanced posts on Morris Island, during the period of this report, have shown the qualities of constancy, bravery, and skill, in the performance of their trying and arduous duties. The various officers attached to the staff of these commanders have performed their duties well, and I beg heartily to concur in the reports of their chiefs, heretofore transmitted to Department headquarters.

Amongst those who deserve especial mention for their conduct in the defence of the posts on Morris Island, are Lieutenant-Colonels Gaillard, Charleston battalion; Dantzler, Twentieth South Carolina volunteers; and Dargan, Twenty-first South Carolina volunteers; Lieutenant-Colonel J. Welshman Brown and Major Warley, Second South Carolina volunteer artillery, and Captain Chichester, artillery. The latter has served several times with distinction.

Captain Hill, Ordnance Officer attached to these headquarters, having been sent to Battery Wagner, remained during a very prolonged tour of duty, which was performed in such manner as to elicit the warmest approval of the different commanders.

Major Henry Bryan and Captain Maloney, of the Adjutant-General's department, are deservedly commended by Colonel Keitt and Brigadier-General Hagood.

Majors Holcombe and Sage, Commissaries, and Captains Guerard and Woodward, Quartermasters, have performed their duties with their inefficient means, in such manner as to insure the supply of the positions of which they had charge.

The garrison of Fort Sumter, under Colonel Alfred Rhett and Major Ormsby Blanding, have stood to the defence of their castle with untiring fortitude and bravery. From the nature of the structure, and the enemy's projectiles, the exposure during the periods when subjected to fire, has been great, and extremely annoying, and yet every duty of repair and details has been carried on without interruption or undue delay. I refer generally to Colonel Rhett's reports for the mention of those subordinate officers who have distinguished themselves by good conduct. But, in this connection, I would mention the services of Lieutenant John Johnson, of the engineer corps, at Fort Sumter, before and during the siege, as evincing high talent and character in his profession, as well as bravery and constancy.

Captains Parleson and Fleming deserve an especial mention for their continued and zealous services

The staff officers attached to district headquarters have been constantly employed. Captain W. F. Nance, principal A. A. G., who has earned honorable mention on every occasion, under my command, and several times been recommended for promotion, has performed every duty to my satisfaction.

Major J. M. Middleton and Captain Ephraim Seabrook, volunteer A. D. C.; Captain C. C. Pinckney, District Ordnance Officer, and Major Suber, District Quartermaster, have been actively and usefully employed.

Major Motte A. Pringle, Post Quartermaster, and especially in charge of transportation, has been indefatigable night and day, with the small means at his disposal, and which he could obtain, in forwarding stores and supplies, and relieving troops during the whole period.

In this duty he has been assisted greatly by the boats and crews of the Confederate navy, under charge of Lieutenants Ward, Haskell, and Payne.

I shall continue this report from this date. I have the honor to inclose a report of casualties during the period treated of. I also send the reports of Lieutenant John Johnson, Engineer, in charge of Fort Sumter, and a list of prisoners captured.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
R. S. RIPLEY,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. S. RIPLEY OF OPERATIONS FROM THE TWENTY-FIRST TO THE THIRTY-FIRST OF JULY, INCLUSIVE.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST MILITARY DISTRICT,
CHARLESTON, August 1st, 1863.

Brigadier-General Thomas Jordan, Chief of Staff:

GENERAL: Since my report of the twenty-second, detailing the operations of this command up to the twentieth, inclusive, the plan of the enemy, as I then stated, seems to have been changed. There has been no attempt at a further assault upon our works on Morris Island. From the twenty-first to the twenty-fourth there has been occasional firing, both from the enemy's fleet and land batteries; but his time has been chiefly occupied in the erection and completion of three new batteries on that portion of the island in his possession, thus advancing his lines as far as could be done with safety.

On the twenty-first the enemy sent in, by a flag of truce, a communication from General Gilmore, with a request that the officer commanding Battery Wagner would give to General Vogdes, who accompanied it, a personal interview. While Captain Tracy, the staff officer of General Hagood, then in command, was bearing the message brought by the flag, both the fleet and land batteries re-opened their fire, and General Hagood very promptly refused to receive any communication until an apology had been made for this violation of the flag. A satisfactory explanation having been offered and accepted, an interview was had between General Hagood and General Vogdes, which terminated in arrangement to exchange the wounded prisoners on both sides, and ten o'clock on the following Friday was appointed as the hour, when the transports from each party should effect the exchange at the point from which the fleet have usually conducted the attack upon Battery Wagner.

On the morning of the twenty-fifth, the day upon which the exchange was to be effected, the enemy opened fire about day-light both from the fleet and land batteries. This fire was vigorously sustained until the arrival, about ten o'clock, of the flag of truce boat, conveying the prisoners, and for a portion of that time was equal in intensity to the bombardment of the eighteenth. Upon the arrival of the boat in the neighborhood of the place appointed, the firing ceased, and the exchange was regularly effected, we delivering one hundred and five and receiving thirty-nine wounded prisoners. No reference having been made in the agreement to the negro prisoners of the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts regiment, none of them were included in the exchange, a report of which by Colonel Anderson and Major Middleton, the officers appointed to conduct it, has already been furnished. The fire of the enemy on this morning, especially from one of the more advanced land batteries, armed with Parrott guns, did serious damage to Battery Wagner. The remaining ten-inch columbiad was dismounted from the sea-face of the battery, and the magazines so much exposed that it became necessary to remove the ammunition; and General Taliaferro, who had previously relieved General Hagood in the command, anticipating a renewal of the bombardment upon the completion of the exchange of prisoners, requested, as a matter of prudent precaution, that all necessary arrangements should be made for the transfer of the troops from the island in case of necessity.

The exchange of prisoners was completed about two o'clock, when the flag of truce boat

returned. The enemy, however, did not renew his attack, and the time thus allowed was improved to the utmost in repairing the damage which had been done. The condition of the battery, as reported by General Taliaferro, was submitted to the General commanding, and after full deliberation it was determined to hold it, and instructions sent to General Taliaferro not to abandon the works without express orders to that effect. From that date to the present the bombardment has never been renewed, although there has been occasional and brief firing upon the battery from the iron-clads. In the meantime the battery has been thoroughly repaired and placed in a condition even superior to what it was in the beginning. The enemy, meanwhile, are busily at work in improving their present works and erecting new ones, of which our means of observation do not enable me to give a detailed account. On our side new batteries have been erected, and the work of completing them and mounting the necessary armament actively pressed, and every effort made to annoy the enemy by such batteries as bear upon their working parties and lines—an attempt in which, I have reason to think, we have been to a considerable extent successful. The condition of the new batteries is known to the commanding General, and will be mentioned in the succeeding report.

The garrisons of Batteries Wagner and Gregg have been relieved as regularly as possible with our means of transportation. On the twenty-second Brigadier-General Taliaferro relieved Brigadier-General Hagood. On the twenty-sixth Brigadier-General Colquitt relieved Brigadier-General Taliaferro. Brigadier-General Colquitt was relieved on the twenty-eighth by Brigadier-General Clingman, and the latter officer was relieved on the first of August by Colonel L. M. Keitt. The fire from the land batteries of the enemy upon Batteries Wagner and Gregg has been annoying, especially upon our communication by steamer between Fort Sumter and Cummins' Point.

The casualties which have occurred from the twentieth to the thirty-first of July, inclusive, have been thirteen killed and forty-nine wounded. I have the honor to enclose the returns and lists.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
R. S. RIPLEY,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA AND FLORIDA,
CHARLESTON, S. C., August 7, 1863.

Respectfully forwarded for the information of the War Department. In view of the possibility that Batteries Wagner and Gregg, which are only outworks, mounting respectively twelve and three guns, might fall under the concentrated fire of the enemy's numerous and powerful land and naval batteries, I determined, immediately after the fall of the south end of Morris Island into the possession of the enemy to establish a circle of batteries from Legare's Point, on Schooner Creek, James Island, to Battery Beauregard, on Sullivan's Island, so as to concentrate their fire (including Forts Sumter and Moultrie) on Morris Island, from about half its length to Cummins' Point, and render that portion of the island untenable to the enemy, should he succeed in driving us away from it. That defensive system is now being carried out to the extent of our available means in labor and heavy ordnance. Many of the long range guns in Sumter, not absolutely required for its defence, have been removed to arm the new batteries under construction. The remaining guns are being protected with traverses, merlons and embrasures. The officers' quarters on the gorge of the fort (south face) have been filled up with wet cotton bags and sand, and a "chemise" of sand bags is being added to the scarp wall of the same face, to extend, if practicable, from bottom to top. The defective lines on James Island are also to be shortened by the construction of a new line of redans and redoubts from Secessionville to the Stone River, long since contemplated, but not executed for want of labor.

Herewith are papers, marked A, B, C, D, E, F, connected with the defence of Morris Island during the present attack.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA AND FLORIDA,
CHARLESTON, July 15, 1863.

It is reported Gilmore will open fire in the morning, and attempt an assault afterwards. Will be assisted by fleet. Be on watch and prepared.

THOMAS JORDAN,
Chief of Staff.

Official:
H. H. ROGERS,
A. D. C.

Send the above dispatch to Colonel Rhett, Fort Sumter, and Brigadier-General Taliaferro, Morris Island.

H. H. ROGERS,
A. D. C.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST MILITARY DISTRICT, DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA AND FLORIDA,
CHARLESTON, S. C., July 19, 1863.

Do the best that you can to get fresh troops on the island. Enemy possibly so punished that he may give no annoyance early to-morrow. Make the best, at least.

THOMAS JORDAN,
Chief of Staff.

GENERAL RIPLEY,
Commanding Fort Sumter.

CHARLESTON, S. C., July 19, 1863—1 A. M.

Brigadier-General R. S. Ripley, Fort Sumter:

Morris Island must be held at all cost, for present. The commanding General directs Keitt's regiment to be thrown there, to push any advan-

tage before daylight; also, nearest other regiment or battalion—Graham's or Nelson's, as most expeditiously moved. Cannot navy help with transportation?

THOMAS JORDAN,
Chief of Staff.

CHARLESTON, S. C., July 19, 1863—1.30 A. M.

Brigadier-General R. S. Ripley, Fort Sumter:

I advise you (without seeing General Beauregard) to embark Keitt's regiment at once, and throw it on Morris Island. I will see him.

THOMAS JORDAN,
Chief of Staff.

CHARLESTON, S. C., July 19, 1863—2 P. M.

Brigadier-General W. B. Taliaferro, Morris Island:

Detailed telegram of events at Battery Wagner wanted from General Taliaferro. Reinforcements on way to push advantage, if possible.

THOMAS JORDAN,
Chief of Staff.

CHARLESTON, S. C., July 19, 1863.

Brigadier-General R. S. Ripley, Fort Sumter:

What has Harrison's regiment effected? Troops thrown on Morris Island at once might strike an effective blow. Detailed report from Battery Wagner wanted up to latest moment.

THOMAS JORDAN,
Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA, AND FLORIDA, CHARLESTON, S. C., July 24, 1863.

Lieutenant-Colonel D. B. Harris, Chief Engineer, Morris Island:

COLONEL: Examine condition for resistance of Battery Wagner and report in person, as soon as possible. Explain to General Taliaferro that he must fight the fleet with sand; that the battery originally was only meant to defend against land approach. The battery must be held as long as possible—even twenty-four hours are important.

Respectfully, &c.,
G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General, commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA, AND FLORIDA, CHARLESTON, S. C., July 24, 1863.

Brigadier-General W. B. Taliaferro, Morris Island:

GENERAL: The batteries designed to render Batteries Wagner and Gregg untenable by the enemy, if reduced, not being completed, it has become exigent that those last batteries should be held to the last extremity. Wagner, being under the guns of Sumter and Gregg, should be held by infantry and siege guns *alone*, until its parapets and bomb-proofs are destroyed and *no longer afford shelter against artillery*. The General regards it almost improbable that another assault will be attempted. Furthermore, the evacuation of Wagner does not necessarily involve immediate abandonment of Gregg, which, ...uced garrison and sharpshooters filling the sand-hills between it and Wagner, may be held for several days longer. When obliged to quit either work, the guns must be thoroughly disabled by spiking, knocking off trunnions, cutting and burning carriages, and bomb-proofs, and by blowing up the magazines and parapets. In view of the great improbability of an assault, may it not be well to reduce the garrison minimum to-morrow morning, just about two o'clock?

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS JORDAN,
Chief of Staff.

REPORT OF THE EVACUATION OF MORRIS ISLAND, WITH ENDORSED REMARKS OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL.

CHARLESTON, September 7, 1863.

Captain William F. Nance, A. A. G., First Military District, Dept. S. C., Ga., and Fla.:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of the evacuation of Morris Island, including Batteries Wagner and Gregg, by the troops under my command, on the night of the sixth instant. This step was authorized by a dispatch sent by signals from district headquarters, and received by me between four and five P. M., and directed in detail, by a special order from department headquarters, which was received from Captain McCabe, of General Ripley's staff, at dark, and was necessitated from the untenable condition of Battery Wagner, the greatly exhausted condition of the garrison, and constant artillery and sharpshooting fire of the enemy, which prevented repairs.

The gradual approaches of the enemy had passed the front of the battery, and the termination of their sap was not over fifty yards from the parapets of the sea-face, enabling them to throw a mass of troops upon this flank, when our men were mostly in the bomb-proofs, where I was forced to keep them by the unceasing fire of mortar and rifle guns on land, with an enfilading fire from the fleet, during most of the day. The salient on the left of the battery, had been swept by such a terrible cross-fire as to breach the parapet and throw it into irregular shapes, rendering the ascent from the moat easy, and, moreover, men could not be kept there during the cross-fire, without the certainty of most of them being wounded or stunned. This salient is the part of the work gained by the enemy, in the assault of the eighteenth of July.

As soon as the evacuation was authorized, I gave detailed instructions to the regimental commanders, viz.: Lieutenant-Colonel John G. Pressly, commanding Twenty-fifth South Carolina volunteers; Major James Gardner, commanding Twenty-seventh Georgia volunteers; Captain W. P. Crawford, commanding Twenty-eighth Georgia volunteers, for the gradual movement of their men to Cummins' Point, so as to keep up an effective front to the enemy, and insure silence and promptness. They expressed their hearty approval, believing an evacuation necessary, to prevent a useless sacrifice of men.

The men went down as if for special duty, and though the most intelligent knew the fact, nearly all went off as if going to be relieved.

Captain Huguenin, Chief of Artillery, was promptly notified of the steps to be taken, and made his arrangements with my sanction, for the removal of the artillery, and the written orders, when received, were submitted to him for his guidance. He was intrusted with the delicate duty of bringing up the extreme rear, and firing the only magazine which contained powder—Lieutenant Mazyck, Ordnance Officer, being ordered to assist him. His report, with Lieutenant Mazyck's, is inclosed, marked A, and is referred to as an important portion of this report.

At dark I sent to Captain H. R. Lesesne, who was commanding Battery Gregg, an order to prepare to blow up his magazine, and render his guns unserviceable, directing him to confer with Captain F. D. Lee, of the engineers, who had read the orders. I had no copy of the detailed order, which came late, to give him, which was thus not communicated to him. I refer you to his report marked B, for particulars.

To anticipate the possibility of a pursuit by the enemy while retreating from Wagner, I ordered Lieutenant Robert M. Stiles, Chief Engineer at Battery Gregg, to construct a rifle-pit across the island, at a narrow point, about a quarter of a mile in advance of Battery Gregg; this was accomplished by him after dark, while under mortar fire, with a force of seventy-seven negroes in charge. He also cut away most of the earth-covering of the magazine on the side towards our James Island batteries, then sent his negroes off to Fort Johnson, using a large flat left at Cummins' Point for that purpose.

Owing to the necessity of protecting the already reduced garrison, I had, early on the morning of the sixth instant, made the following disposition of my troops: The Seventy-seventh Georgia regiment, effective total one hundred and seventy-five men, commanded by Major Gardner, a gallant and intelligent officer, were in the sand hills, well protected in pits dug there, the hillocks being natural traverses. Fifty men of the Twenty-eighth Georgia, under Captain Adams, who had picketed the beach during the night, were also there; the remainder of the regiment, numbering one hundred and thirty effectives, were assigned to the extreme right of Battery Wagner; about forty-five kept out on the lines, and the remainder in the bomb-proof. The Twenty-fifth South Carolina (Eutaw) regiment, which had been terribly reduced by casualties and sickness, during the day and night preceding, to an effective total of about three hundred and sixty-five men, manned the left and centre of the battery, keeping only a guard of each company on its respective position of the lines, the remainder in the bomb-proof. Two companies of this regiment were sent to the sand hills for protection, and to make room in the bomb-proof, where several men had fainted on the fifth, from excessive heat and foul air. Major Gardner was ordered to cover the retreat with the Twenty-seventh Georgia, in case of pursuit by the enemy; in the meantime to picket the beach at dark, and hold his reserve in readiness to support Battery Wagner.

At early dark I ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Pressly, commanding Twenty-fifth South Carolina, a very intelligent and reliable officer, to detail four companies (about one hundred men) to take a field-piece from the left curtain to Cummins' Point, and embark on the first boat. Half an hour after, Captain Crawford, commanding Twenty-seventh Georgia volunteers, was ordered to move a howitzer from the right of Wagner, to the rifle-pit near Gregg, place the piece in position there, collect his regiment from line of battle in rifle-pits, and when notified that transportation was ready to send a company at a time to embark. Major Gardner was ordered to man the rifle-pits when Captain Crawford had left. Lieutenant-Colonel Pressly was ordered to extend his lines and cover the line manned by the Twenty-eighth Georgia, as soon as that regiment started, which was promptly done by him.

I will here remark, that all this night, as on the previous night, the enemy threw a strong calcium light on the front of Battery Wagner. About nine o'clock P. M., being informed that transportation was ready, the embarkation commenced, and went on briskly and quietly until all had been embarked except the rear guard, which was commanded by Captain T. A. Huguenin, numbering thirty-five men—twenty-five men of the First South Carolina infantry, Company A, ten men of the Twenty-fifth South Carolina volunteers, under command of Lieutenants Brown and Taft.

At about eleven o'clock P. M., I turned over the command of Battery Wagner to Captain Huguenin, and ordering my Adjutant-General, Major H. Bryan (a member of General Beauregard's staff), who had volunteered for special duty on Morris Island, to accompany me, I proceeded towards Cummins' Point. At the rifle-pits I received information that more transportation was ready, and I immediately ordered Major Gardner to embark his regiment, and to take with him the twelve-pounder howitzer; which he did, but could not bring it off the island.

The transportation, under the direction of Major M. A. Pringle, Post Quartermaster in Charleston, was admirably managed. Lieutenant-Colonel Dantzler, Twentieth South Carolina volunteers, having been specially detailed by General Ripley to superintend the transportation, under his spirited and excellent management, it succeeded perfectly. When the infantry were all embarked, I directed Captain Kanapaux, commanding light artillery, to spike his three howitzers, and embark his command. Captain Lesesne was then ordered to spike the guns of Battery Gregg, and embark his men. The rear guard from Wagner coming up at this time, were embarked. I had ordered Captain Huguenin down, sending word by private John A.

Stewart, "Gist Guards," the cavalry couriers having left without permission.

There was no light kept at Gregg, so I could not well note the hour. With two or three boats, I now anxiously waited for Captain Huguenin's party. Finally, perceiving that the enemy's barges, from Vincent Creek, were attacking our boats with musketry, I ordered the safety-fuse to the magazine of Battery Gregg to be lighted. It was lit; the firing then ceased. As I desired the explosions at both batteries to be simultaneous, as ordered, I ordered Captain Lesesne to extinguish the fuse, intending to relight it or apply another fuse, when Captains Huguenin and Pinckney, and Lieutenant Mazyck, who were the only persons who had not yet come to the point, arrived. Major Holcombe, who had lighted the fuse, immediately attempted to extinguish it. He informed me from the parapet of the battery that it would be difficult to cut it in twain, and that it was burning brightly. At that moment, the absent party arrived, and I directed him not to interfere with the fuse, which was then burning brightly. About half-past one A. M., with the rear guard of my command I embarked, thus successfully withdrawing from Morris Island, and my responsibility ended. As we started off, the Yankee barges directed their musketry fire upon us, causing the bullets to whiz around us, but doing no harm. Bearing towards Fort Sumter, I proceeded to flag-steamer Charleston, and notified Captain Tucker that the evacuation af Morris Island was accomplished, and requesting him to give the rocket signal to our batteries. I then proceeded to district headquarters, and repeated the information, arriving at three A. M. on the seventh.

During the day and evening of the sixth, Captain Adger, the efficient Quartermaster, kept his only wagon moving the wounded from Wagner to Gregg, under the direction of Chief Surgeon William C. Ravenel. Strange to say, none were hurt by the enemy's fire, which, from time to time, swept across the way. Of course, the wounded were embarked first. Dr. Ravenel performed his arduous duties with alacrity and zeal, showing every kindness to the wounded and stunned, which poured in from sunrise on the fifth, till the evening of the sixth. He left about half-past ten, leading his ambulance corps. I am happy to state that the majority of the wounds were slight, though disabling the men for the time. The guns in the batteries were spiked, and the implements generally destroyed, equipments mostly carried off. The magazines were not blown up, owing to the faulty character of the safety-fuses used for the purpose, which were ignited—that at Battery Wagner by Captain Huguenin, assisted by Captain Pinckney, District Ordnance Officer, and that at Battery Gregg by Major Holcombe, under Captain Lesesne's instructions, and the supervision of Captain F. D. Lee, and Lieutenant Stiles, of the engineers. The enemy were within thirty steps of the front of Battery Wagner, the voices of their sappers could be distinctly heard; any attempt to break off the trunnion, or shatter the carriage of a gun, could have been distinctly heard, and our movements discovered; besides the gun-chambers had been filled with loose sand, displaced by the enemy's shot. The guns could not be managed. I attempted to move the sand, but my working parties were broken up as soon as put to work. The enemy had planted heavy mortars, within one hundred yards of the battery, and they could and did throw their shells into any designated spot. They could hear the movement of a party at work along the line, and would kill, wound, or disperse the men.

Property had to be destroyed within thirty steps of the enemy; and while they could hear the voices of our men in this close proximity to them, the whole garrison had to be removed. Their sand batteries and fleet swept every inch of ground between Batteries Wagner and Gregg, and any suspicion of our movements compromised, if it did not destroy, the safety of the garrison. All the guns were effectually spiked. At Battery Gregg, everything was destroyed but the two ten-inch guns; they were prepared for bursting when the last party embarked. Before this party arrived, the enemy's barges fired upon ours, transporting our troops, and also turned their fire upon us. An attempt had been made by the enemy the preceding night, in barges, to assail and capture Battery Gregg; the number of their barges there, in easy range, could not be ascertained. I was informed by the engineer, Captain Lee, that the explosion of the magazine would destroy the guns; the fuse was lighted, burning well, and no doubt was entertained of its igniting the magazine. The rear guard from Battery Wagner had embarked under fire from the enemy's barges. These barges, I am convinced, gave the enemy the information of the withdrawal of our garrison. The guns of Battery Gregg were spiked. My chief exertion was to save my men, whose future services will, I trust, be worth much more to the Confederacy than what I failed to destroy to the enemy. Had instructions been sent to me earlier, more might have been done.

Lieutenant Stiles, Assistant Engineer, stationed at Battery Gregg, at my request had come up to Battery Wagner in the morning. Upon examination, he expressed to me a doubt whether there was powder enough in the magazine to blow it up. I should state at this point, that I had sent, on Friday, for an additional supply of powder, sending the requisition and my report as to the state of the garrison, and of the day preceding, by Major Warley, Chief of Artillery, who was wounded, and, returning to the city in a small boat, sent for the purpose. This boat was captured by the enemy's barges, and my report either taken or destroyed by Major Warley. Of this capture I had no knowledge until Saturday night. The blowing up of the magazines was intrusted by me to brave and intelligent officers, who, I think, did their best to effect it. The Chief Ordnance Officer of the dis-

trict came to Morris Island, apparently to look after this, and was given every facility he asked for. I did not attempt to destroy the bomb-proof at Wagner, because, after consulting with Captain Lee, of the engineers, I deemed it impracticable, from the small quantity of combustible material at my disposal, and that any smoke would at once inform the enemy, and stimulate him to pursue us by land and water. It must be remembered that the sand above the bomb-proof was considerably saturated with water, which dripped through in several places.

To Captain Huguenin, Chief of Artillery, Major Bryan, A. A. G., Lieutenant-Colonel Pressly, commanding Twenty-fifth South Carolina volunteers, and Lieutenant-Colonel Dantzler, superintending embarkation, I am chiefly indebted for the success of the evacuation.

My thanks are due to Mr. J. F. Mathews, engineer corps, for the use of his boat and crew, for moving troops, and bringing me off at the last.

Captain Hayne, and Lieutenants Montgomery and Blum, of the Twenty-fifth South Carolina volunteers (three valuable officers), were killed at their posts of duty, during the last of the siege. Let their names be honored.

I desire to record the faithful services of privates Leith, and Stewart, and Bond, of the Gist Guard, South Carolina volunteers, who have remained voluntarily on duty at Battery Wagner almost the entire siege, always attentive and cool under fire. Stewart would make an excellent commissary, and Leith, a practical and hard-working ordnance officer.

Lieutenant R. M. Stiles, engineer corps, creditably performed the duties assigned to him.

Lieutenant Miller, Company A, Second South Carolina artillery, was distinguished for his courage, and for his cheerfulness, which was not diminished by a slight wound on the knee, and by being stunned for half an hour.

To Major Bryan, of General Beauregard's staff, who volunteered as my Adjutant-General, I am under the greatest obligations. Although, at the time I was ordered to Morris Island to assume command of the forces there, he had a furlough to visit his father in Georgia, who was very ill, he promptly waved it, and volunteered to go with me. His tact, coolness, experience, courage and untiring industry, were of the greatest service to me. During the night and the day, his vigilance extended to every department, and perpetually sought out means of increasing our resources and defences.

In spite of severe indisposition, for several days, I have made every exertion to meet the very unusual responsibities imposed upon me.

Taking all circumstances into consideration, I trust that this will not compare unfavorably on the part of the garrison with any other retreat made during this war.

I am, sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
L. M. KEITT,
Colonel, commanding.

Official:
W. GORDON MCCABE.

[ENDORSED.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA, AND FLORIDA, CHARLESTON, S. C., Sept. 19, 1863.

Had the evacuation been conducted in strict compliance with detailed orders, it would be one of the most memorable in history, and hereafter it may be regarded as a signal success, and highly creditable to the commanding officer and all officers and men who participated in it. Subjected to a terrible fire, and beleaguered almost to the very ditch of the work, by an enterprising, watchful adversary, yet the entire garrison was withdrawn in safety. The coolness and discipline which characterized this operation, and through which an efficient command has been saved to the country for future use, are deemed worthy of note and commendation by the War Department, especially when taken in connection with their stout defence of Morris Island, for four days preceding the evacuation, together with the limited and imperfect means of water transportation at command. One of the reasons assigned for not bursting the guns, blowing up the magazines and bomb-proofs in Batteries Wagner and Gregg, is an alleged want of time, after the order to evacuate had reached Morris Island. This calls for remarks from these headquarters. It had been a standing order for several weeks previous to the evacuation, that in such an event, all guns, magazines, bomb-proofs, &c., should be thoroughly destroyed, and, with that view, time fuses had been tested, and with "rat-tail" files were provided for both works. Further, the written special instructions of Brigadier-General Ripley, prescribing measures and means for the complete destruction of these works, and of their armaments, at the proper time, and the detailed orders directing and regulating the evacuation of Morris Island, were received by the commanding officer *at dark*, on the sixth instant (about six P. M.). The last detachment of his command did not quit the island until after one A. M., on the seventh instant; hence there were seven hours for the completion of all necessary arrangements. I am, therefore, unable to admit that there was any lack of time for the thorough execution of the work of destruction ordered. It is not explained why the time-fuses failed to explode the powder left in the magazines; they were seen burning brightly when last observed, and it is therefore probable that either before, or whilst the fire was being applied, the ends in contact with the powder were accidentally detached.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.
General, commanding.

PAPERS RELATING TO THE EVACUATION OF MORRIS ISLAND—LIEUTENANT COLONEL D. B. HARRIS RECOMMENDS EVACUATION OF MORRIS ISLAND BATTERIES.

OFFICE OF CHIEF ENGINEER, CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA, August 6, 1863.

Brigadier-General Thomas Jordan, Chief of Staff:

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that I

visited our works on Morris Island to-day, and in consideration of their condition, of our inability to repair damages at Battery Wagner as heretofore, of the dispirited state of its garrison, and of the progress of the enemy's sap, I am reluctantly constrained to recommend an immediate evacuation of both Batteries Wagner and Gregg.

The thirty-six hours severe bombardment to which these batteries have been subjected—confining the troops to the shelter of the bomb-proof—has resulted in so dispiriting the garrison of Wagner, as to render it unsafe, in the opinion of its chief officers, to rely upon it to repel an assault, should the enemy attempt one. The head of the enemy's sap is within forty yards of the salient of the battery, and he is making rapid progress in pushing it forward, unmolested by the fire of a single gun, and with scarcely any annoyance from our sharpshooters.

In consequence of the accuracy of fire of his land batteries, which are now in close proximity to Battery Wagner—say from five to eight hundred yards—aided by reverse fire from his fleet, it is impossible, in the opinion of the officers of the fort, to keep up a fire either of artillery or small arms; and the enemy is thus left free to work on his trenches, which he is pushing rapidly forward, the head of his sap being, as above stated, within forty yards of the salient of the work, which is so seriously damaged by a battery of Parrott guns, kept constantly playing upon it, as to render it untenable. This difficulty could, however, be overcome by the erection of a parapet across the gorge of the salient, and the conversion of the bomb-proof covering into another parapet overlooking the salient, if it were practicable to work, as heretofore, at night. The covering to the bomb-proof and magazine also need repair. We have been thus far able not only to repair damage at night, but to add from day to day to the strength of the battery; but now that the enemy's sap is in such close proximity to the battery, and he has contrived to throw light upon the parapets at night, it is impossible to do so without a heavy loss of men. In the effort last night to repair damages, the commanding officer of the fort reports a loss, in killed and wounded, of sixty to eighty men of the working party alone. Without our ability to repair damage at night, the battery will become, under the incessant fire of the enemy's land batteries and fleet, untenable—say in two days.

It is in view of these facts that I have thought it my duty to make the recommendation at the commencement of this report.

I have the honor to be, General,

Yours very respectfully,

D. B. HARRIS,

Lieutenant-Colonel and Chief Engineer

Official:

E. KEARNY,

A. A. A. General.

MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE OF GENERAL OFFICERS IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONDITION OF BATTERIES WAGNER AND GREGG.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA, AND FLORIDA, CHARLESTON, S. C., September 26, 1863.

At eleven o'clock A. M., fourth instant, a meeting of officers was convened by the commanding General, at his office, for the purpose of enabling him to determine how much longer he should attempt to hold the north end of Morris Island. Present—General G. T. Beauregard, commanding; Major-General J. F. Gilmer, second in command; Brigadier-General R. S. Ripley, commanding First military district; Brigadier-General Thomas Jordan, Chief of Staff and acting Recorder; Brigadier-General Johnson Hagood; Brigadier-General A. H. Colquitt; Lieutenant-Colonel D. B. Harris, Chief Engineer of the Department.

Brigadier-Generals Hagood and Colquitt have both recently commanded on Morris Island, and Lieutenant-Colonel Harris, who had frequently visited Morris Island during the operations, and was present during the assault made by the enemy on the night of the eighteenth of July, in company with Major-General Gilmer, inspected the works on the night of the third instant, by order of the commanding General.

The first question addressed to these officers was as follows:

First—How long do you think Fort Wagner can be held without regard to safety of garrison?

Generals Hagood and Colquitt replied—That in their belief the enemy could now storm and carry the parapet of Battery Wagner before our men could be got out of the bomb-proofs, and we would then be held at a fatal disadvantage. That if the enemy should continue his approaches as now, by zig-zags up to the ditch, some eight or ten days would probably elapse before he could be expected to take the work by regular approaches, but that an assault could be made successfully some days sooner, should the enemy advance somewhat nearer by constructing another parallel and thence dash forward and storm the works.

Colonel Harris—Thought the enemy would seek to take the work by regular approaches, for which ten days would be necessary. The chances of success of an attempt to carry the work after a partial approach somewhat nearer than at present would, he believed, be unfavorable for the enemy. An attempt to carry the work by storm or assault at present would scarcely be successful.

Second—How long can the fort be held with a fair prospect of saving its garrison with the means of transportation at our command, and circumstances relative thereto as heretofore indicated by actual experience?

General Hagood—Did not think the garrison of Battery Wagner can be saved without we steal a march on the enemy, and that when the

enemy approaches nearer, he will be certain to get knowledge of any movement toward evacuation.

General Colquitt—Thought the enemy may take the position at his pleasure; may light up the work now with calcium lights; that the chances are diminishing daily for saving the garrison. But both thought with proper precautions the garrison might be successfully withdrawn.

Colonel Harris—Did not believe the enemy would attempt assault, but would seek to take it by regular approaches on the salient, hence the garrison might be saved within two days of the time the enemy would be able to reach the ditch, or the completion of his approaches.

Third—How long after the loss or evacuation of Wagner could Fort Gregg be held?

General Hagood—If vigorously attacked, Battery Gregg would fall immediately after Wagner was carried.

General Colquitt—Would evacuate both the same night.

Colonel Harris—Believed if vigorously followed up, Battery Gregg must fall immediately after the enemy shall get possession of Wagner. In case the reduction of Wagner is delayed a week, we can, however, throw up intermediate works for infantry to check the advance of the enemy, and delay the fall of Battery Gregg, say, three days.

Fourth—Can the heavy guns (two in Wagner and three in Gregg) in those two works be removed before their evacuation, without endangering the safety of the works and their garrison?

Generals Hagood and Colquitt—Thought the columbiads could be removed without endangering the safety of the garrison, especially if precautions were taken to assure the men that these guns were removed because now useless, and to be replaced by others more effective in this stage of defence. The columbiads do not materially enhance the strength of the works at this time.

Colonel Harris—Thought, if obstinate resistance is to be made, the guns should not be removed.

Fifth—Can we take the offensive suddenly with a fair prospect of success, by throwing, during the night, three thousand men on the north end of Morris Island, making, in all, four thousand men available, bearing in mind that no reinforcements could be sent there until night, and perhaps none for several nights, according to the movements of the enemy's ironclads and the fire of his land batteries?

Generals Hagood and Colquitt—Did not think the offensive can now be undertaken with our present means of transportation, and thought it would certainly fail if attempted.

At half past two P. M., Brigadier-Generals Hagood and Colquitt were dismissed to their posts, and at three P. M. the conference was adjourned, to meet again at eight P. M.

At eight P. M. the conference was resumed. Present—General G. T. Beauregard, Major-General J. F. Gilmer, Brigadier-General R. S. Ripley, Brigadier-General Thomas Jordan, and Lieutenant-Colonel D. B. Harris.

A discussion then took place relative to the condition of the works—the probable plan of attack of the enemy, our means of defence, of transportation, and reasons for prolonging our foothold on Morris Island until ten o'clock P. M., the result of which was the determination by the commanding General, to hold Morris Island so long as communication with it could be maintained at night by means of row-boats, but for which purpose sailors, or men able to handle boats and oars with efficiency, were essential. It was agreed that the holding of Morris Island as long as possible was most important to the safety and free use of the harbor of Charleston, and our ability to keep up easy communication with the works on Sullivan's and James Islands, in view of which it was thought proper to renew applications by telegraph to the Secretaries of War and Naval Departments for some two hundred sailors or oarsmen, which was done at once. It was further decided that the five heavy guns on Morris Island, being necessary, morally and physically, for the defence of the position to the last extremity, and such being the difficulties, if not, indeed, the insurmountable obstacles in the way of their removal at this time, that no effort should be made to save them, and consequently that they should be ultimately destroyed, with as much of the works as practicable, when further defence was abandoned. The conference was then adjourned until an answer should be received to application for oarsmen.

CHARLESTON, S. C., September 7, 1863.

On the morning of the sixth instant, the despatches herewith, marked "A," and subsequently a letter, marked "B," from Colonel L. M. Keitt, commanding Confederate States forces on Morris Island, having been received, reporting that Battery Wagner was no longer tenable, and that the garrison must be sacrificed if the position was not evacuated that night, detailed orders were issued for the withdrawal of the garrison and destruction of the works and armament, contingent on the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Harris, Chief Engineer, who was directed to repair at once to Battery Wagner and inspect and report its condition for further defence. His report is appended, marked "C." Meantime, Flag Officer Tucker was conferred with and called on for such means of assistance in the withdrawal of the garrison as were at his disposition, and every possible arrangement was made. The orders and an accompanying memorandum, marked "E" and "F," were finally issued and reached Morris Island about six P. M. Orders several days previously, under instructions from these headquarters, had been issued by the district commander, regulating the manner of destroying the work and arma-

ment, in case of such an exigency. See paper marked "F."

Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS JORDAN,
Chief of Staff.

INSTRUCTIONS IN REFERENCE TO EVACUATION OF BATTERIES WAGNER AND GREGG.

[CONFIDENTIAL.]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST MILITARY DISTRICT,
DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA, AND FLORIDA, CHARLESTON, S. C., September 5, 1863.

Commanding Officer Battery Wagner:

SIR: As it is within the contingencies that Batteries Wagner and Gregg may be evacuated, I wish the engineer and artillery officers to be fully prepared. A quantity of safety-fuse has been sent down, at different times, to both Batteries Wagner and Gregg. This will at once be examined and kept in place for service. All magazines will be prepared for explosion, before the final evacuation takes place, by causing safety-fuses, at least three in number, to be inserted in a file of cartridges or a barrel of powder in each magazine, to be carefully trained so that ignition be not premature, and of the length to insure time for leaving with the rear guard. The fuse burns fifteen seconds to the foot, so that if ten minutes is required, the length of the fuse should be forty feet, or more in proportion.

The Engineer Officer, or some careful person, should be provided with matches and linstock, and, at a signal from the commanding officer, should light carefully, and without undue haste, each safety-fuse, and report.

The Artillery Officer should destroy the implements of each gun which is not firing, and should spike securely all the guns of smaller calibre, destroy the elevating screws, and render the carriages unserviceable. It will be well to ram a shot or shell down without cartridge, first inserting a small wedge of wood, to cause the ball to stick in its position.

The ten-inch columbiads, if not removed, must be destroyed. They must be burst, if possible. It is intended to send down a few two-hundred-and-ten-pound bolts, with Tennessee caps. If these come, put in two cartridges, with two bolts, prime with powder, and lash a small cartridge over the vent, with a slow match inserted. Let the matches be fired at the same time with the magazines. It will be well to cut through the braces of the carriage, and put all the eccentric wheels in gear. If the bolts do not come, put in two cartridges, two solid shot, another cartridge, and then fill the gun up to the muzzle, priming and arranging the safety-fuses as before.

Other instructions will be given with regard to the evacuation, as far as the troops are concerned; but should it take place, as these arrangements will depend on circumstances—and the circumstances and the destruction of armament, &c., will require consideration and especially coolness on the part of the artillery and engineer officers—it has been thought proper to send these instructions now. You will please communicate them to the artillery and engineer officers of the command, and furnish them with the copies inclosed, in strict confidence. They must be turned over to their successors, as will be the case with this paper to the officer who relieves you. Should Battery Gregg be evacuated, the same arrangements will be made for the demolition of magazines and armament; but, of course, at that point it will not take place until the last moment, according to instructions from these or Department headquarters.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

R. S. RIPLEY,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

Official: WM. F. NANCE,
A. A. G.

Official: E. KEARNY,
A. A. A. G.

TELEGRAMS GIVING EFFECTIVE FORCE AT WAGNER—STATE OF AFFAIRS AT THAT WORK, ETC.

I. *By signal, received at 12:45 A. M., September sixth, 1863.*

MORRIS ISLAND, September 5, 1863.

Captain Nance, A. A. G.:

I had nine hundred, and not fourteen hundred men. About one hundred of these to-day were killed and wounded. The parapet of salient is badly breached. The whole fort is much weakened. A repetition to-morrow of to-day's fire will make the fort almost a ruin. The mortar fire is still very heavy and fatal, and no important work can be done. Is it desirable to sacrifice the garrison? To continue to hold it is to do so. Captain Lee, the engineer, has read this and agrees. Act promptly and answer at once.

L. M. KEITT,
Colonel, commanding.

The above was received by me at 1.30 A. M., September sixth. G. T. B.

For answer of General commanding see No. 4.

II. *By signal from Morris Island.*

3.45 A. M., September 6th.

Captain Nance, A. A. G.:

Incessant fire from Yankee mortar and Parrott battery. Can't work negroes—better look after them promptly. Had thirty or forty soldiers wounded in an attempt to work. Will do all I can, but fear the garrison will be destroyed without injuring the enemy. The fleet is opening, but I hope that we may stand till to-night.

COLONEL KEITT.

III. *By signal from Morris Island.*

10.30 A. M., September 6th.

Captain Nance, A. A. G.:

Boats must be at Cummins' Point early to-night, without fail. COLONEL KEITT.

Official:

E. KEARNY,
A. A. A. G

IV. *By signal to Colonel L. M. Keitt, commanding Morris Island.*

CHARLESTON, September 6, 1863—2.15 A. M.

Repair work with soldiers and negroes on island. I will determine to-day what measures to adopt. No action should be taken in haste. 'Tis too late to act this night.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Official:

E. KEARNY,
A. A. A. G.

MORRIS ISLAND, September 6, 1863—3.15 P. M.

Captain Nance:

Will boats be here to-night for the garrison? If so, at what time? And if our sacrifice be of benefit, I am ready; let it be said so, and I will storm the enemy's works at once, or lose every man here. The enemy are within fifty yards of us, and before day dawns we should assault him, if we remain here. Answer positively, and at once.

Assistant Engineer Stiles has just inspected the fort. He says it is untenable.

L. M. KEITT,
Colonel, commanding.

Official:

W. F. NANCE,
A. A. G.

E. KEARNY,
A. A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY WAGNER, September 6, 1863.

Captain Nance, A. A. G., Charleston, S. C.:

CAPTAIN: The enemy will, by night, advance their parallel to the most of this battery. The garrison must be taken away immediately after dark, or will be destroyed or captured. It is idle to deny that the heavy Parrott shell have breached the walls and are knocking away the bomb-proofs. Pray have boats immediately after dark at Cummins' Point, to take away the men. I say deliberately that this must be done, or the garrison will be sacrificed. I am sending the wounded and sick now to Cummins' Point, and will continue to do so, if possible, until all are gone. I have a number of them now there.

I have not in the garrison four hundred effective men, excluding artillery. The engineers agree in opinion with me, or rather shape my opinion. I shall say no more.

L. M. KEITT.

E. KEARNY,
A. A. A. G.

SPECIAL ORDERS DIRECTING THE EVACUATION OF BATTERIES WAGNER AND GREGG.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA, AND FLORIDA,
CHARLESTON, S. C., September 6, 1863.

Special Orders, No. 176.

Battery Wagner, Morris Island, being no longer tenable, without undue loss of life, and the risk of final capture of its entire garrison, the position and Battery Gregg will be evacuated as soon as practicable, to which end the following arrangements will be made by the district commander:

1. Two of the Confederate States iron-clads should take up positions near Fort Sumter, with their guns bearing on Cummins' Point, and to the eastward of it.

At the same time all our land batteries will be held prepared to sweep all the water faces of Battery Gregg. Transport steamers will take positions within the harbor, but as near as practicable to Cummins' Point, to receive the men from the row-boats, by which the embarkation will be effected from Morris Island.

As many row-boats as necessary, or which can be manned by efficient oarsmen, will be provided and kept in readiness at once, to proceed to and reach Cummins' Point, or that vicinity, as soon after dark as may be prudent. Having reached the beach of Morris Island, a courier, or a relay of footmen, will be dispatched by the naval officer in charge, with notice of the fact to the officer in command of Battery Wagner, and of the exact transport capacity of the boats. A naval officer, with proper assistants, will have exclusive charge of the boats and of their movements.

2. The commanding officer of Battery Wagner having made, during the day, all arrangements for the evacuation and destruction of the work and armament, and when informed of the arrival of the boats, will direct—first, the removal and embarkation of all wounded men; and, thereafter, according to the capacity of the boats at hand, will withdraw his command, by companies, with soldierly silence and deliberation. Two companies will remain in any event to preserve a show of occupation and repair, and to defend from assault during embarkation; and it is strictly enjoined that no more men shall be permitted to quit the work and go to the landing, than can be safely embarked. The embarkation will be superintended by the field officers, or regimental and battalion commanders, who will halt and keep their respective commands about one hundred (100) yards from the boats, divide them into suitable squads, for assignment to the boats, in exact conformity with the directions of the naval officers in charge of embarkation, and then superintend the disposition of the men accordingly, impressing on all the vital necessity for silence, obedience to orders, and the utmost coolness.

3. The companies left to occupy Battery Wagner to the last, will be under the charge of a firm and intelligent field officer, who will not withdraw his command until assured there is sufficient transportation for all the remaining garrison of the island, including that of Battery Gregg.

4. The final evacuation will depend for success, on the utmost coolness and quiet on the part of every man. At least two officers, previously selected, will be left to light the fuses, already arranged and timed to about fifteen minutes, to blow up the magazine and bomb-proof, and to destroy the armament in the

manner already indicated in special instructions from district headquarters. But the fuses must not be set on fire until it is certain that there is transportation for the removal of all the garrison, or except the enemy become aware of the evacuation and are evidently about to storm and enter the work. The men must be embarked with arms loaded, ready to repel an attack by both parties of the enemy.

5. The garrison of Battery Gregg will stand stanchly at their post until the last company from Battery Wagner shall be embarked. It will then take to the boats with silence and deliberation, provision having been duly made at Battery Wagner for the destruction of the work and its ordnance. Both explosions shall be as nearly simultaneous as possible, and the complete success of the evacuation will probably be in the hands of those whose high duty will be to apply the fire to the fuses at Battery Wagner.

The garrison of Battery Gregg will be embarked with the same precautions and regulations as prescribed for Battery Wagner.

In case the enemy should carry Battery Wagner immediately after the garrison shall have evacuated, or in any way the explosion of the magazine shall be prevented, a signal of three (3) rockets, discharged in rapid succession, shall be made from Battery Gregg, when the naval vessels in position and our land batteries bearing on Battery Wagner will be opened with a steady fire on the sight of that work, as will be likewise done immediately after an explosion shall take place, and this fire will be maintained slowly during the night.

Brigadier-General Ripley will give such additional orders as will be calculated to secure the successful evacuation of Morris Island, or to meet emergencies. He will confer with Flag Officer Ingraham, and procure all necessary assistance.

The operation is one of the most delicate ever attempted in war. Coolness, resolute courage, judgment and inflexibility on the part of officers; obedience to orders and a constant sense of the necessity for silence on the part of the men, are essential for complete success and the credit which must attach to those who achieve it.

By command of General Beauregard.

THOMAS JORDAN,
Chief of Staff.

Official:

JOHN M. OTEY,
A. A. G.

MEMORANDUM IN REFERENCE TO THE REMOVAL OF TROOPS FROM MORRIS ISLAND.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT,
SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA, AND FLORIDA,
CHARLESTON, September 6, 1863, 3.30 P. M.

Brigadier-General R. S. Ripley, commanding First Military District, Charleston, S. C:

The steamboats to take position near the south edge of the channel, and about midway between Forts Johnson and Sumter. Small ply between steamers and Cummins' Point; should steamboats be driven from their position, must go to Fort Johnson.

First trip of small boats to take off the sick and wounded to steamboats.

First (and possibly the second) trip with troops, to be landed at Sumter, the rest at steamers. If the steamboats are driven away by shot and shell, then at Johnson.

The trips to be continued until all are off of Morris Island, notwithstanding the shelling of the enemy.

The troops landed at Sumter to be removed to steamers or Fort Johnson, as soon as the transportation of the whole from Morris Island shall have been finished.

A fast boat to be left behind for the dozen (about) officers who are to blow up magazines, burst guns, etc.

Officers in Sumter must be notified of the intention to land troops at that work, from Morris Island.

All the batteries must be notified of this movement of small boats and steamers in the harbor to-night.

When the officers left at Wagner and Gregg to explode magazines, &c., shall have got sufficiently far from Cummins' Point for our batteries to open on the site of those two works, those officers will set off from their boat three rockets, or make some other agreed signal to notify the batteries that they can commence firing.

A blue light at Gregg will indicate when the ten-minute fuses in Wagner are to be lighted; those in Gregg are not to be lighted until the officers from Wagner have reported.

Troops in Wagner and Gregg will march at proper times to Cummins' Point beach, by companies, each company being halted about one hundred yards from the position of the boats; their officers will then send them by squads equivalent to the capacity of each boat destined to receive them. All the men must have their arms loaded on entering the boats to defend themselves in case of necessity.

The most complete silence and order must be maintained throughout the entire operation.

G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General, commanding.

Official:

A. R. CHISHOLM,
A. D. C.

Official:

JOHN M. OTEY,
A. A. G.

REPORT OF MAJOR ELLIOTT.

HEADQUARTERS FORT SUMTER,
September 9, 1863.

Captain W. F. Nance, A. A. G.:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor of making the following report:

About eight o'clock, yesterday, the Ironsides, and five monitors, took positions close to Sullivan's Island, and engaged Fort Moultrie, and the batteries on that island. They kept up a very severe fire for several hours, our batteries replying promptly.

Yesterday morning, a monitor was evidently aground near Morris Island; on reporting the fact, Fort Moultrie opened on her, hitting her effectively at least twice. Her deck was six feet above the water-line, leaving her sides exposed. Shell Point battery also fired on her. It is to be regretted that our fire was not more general and continuous. At high water, in the afternoon, she got off.

In the engagement of the fleet with Fort Moultrie, the monitors were frequently struck, and the Ironsides had her deck hit twice, one of the shots tearing away a large portion of her upper bulwarks. She lay alongside of a transport all the afternoon, evidently undergoing repairs.

Having for several nights expected a boat attack, I had one-third of the garrison under arms on the parapet, and the remainder so posted as to reinforce with promptness.

At one A. M., this morning, I saw a fleet of barges approaching from the eastward. I ordered the fire to be reserved until they should arrive within a few yards of the fort. The enemy attempted to land on the south-eastern and southern faces. He was received by a well directed fire of musketry, and by hand-grenades, which were very effective in demoralizing him. Fragments of the epaulement were also thrown down upon him. The crews near the shore sought refuge in the recesses of the foot of the scarp; those farther of, in flight. The repulse was decided, and the assault was not renewed. His force is reported to have been four hundred men, but it is believed to have been much larger. His loss is four men killed; two officers and seventeen men wounded, and ten officers and ninety-two men captured. We secured five stands of colors and five barges; others were disabled, and drifted off. One gunboat, and Fort Johnson, and the Sullivan's Island batteries enfiladed our faces, and contributed to prevent a renewal of the assault. Many of the shots struck the fort. The garrison, consisting of the Charleston battalion, behaved admirably. All praise is due to Major Blake, his officers and men, for the promptness and gallantry displayed in the defence.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
STEPHEN ELLIOTT, Jr.,
Major Artillery, P. A. C. S., commanding.

Doc. 46.

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG, MISSISSIPPI.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL PEMBERTON'S REPORT

HEADQUARTERS GAINESVILLE, ALABAMA, August 2d, 1863.

General S. Cooper, A. and I. G., Richmond, Va.:

GENERAL: At the earliest moment compatible with the performance of other and very pressing duties, I have the honor to present the following report of the operations of the troops of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, preceding and during the siege resulting in the capitulation of Vicksburg. The enemy, after long continued and strenuous efforts to reach the right flank of Vicksburg by forcing a passage through the upper Yazoo River, finally relinquished his design, and on the night of the fourth and fifth of April, re-embarked his troops, and before daylight was in rapid retreat. About the same time a heavy force of the enemy which had been collected at Baton Rouge, was mostly withdrawn, and transferred to Western Louisiana, leaving but one division to occupy that place. After consultation by telegraph with Major-General Gardner, commanding Port Hudson and the Third military district, deeming the garrison at Port Hudson more than sufficient under existing circumstances, and to save supplies at a point so difficult to provide —the navigation of the Mississippi River being then obstructed to us, and the mouth of the Red River, from whence large quantities of subsistence stores were drawn, being blockaded by one of the enemy's gunboats—I ordered Rust's brigade and two regiments, under Brigadier-General Buford, to proceed immediately to Jackson, Mississippi, with the then view of employing them against raids of the enemy in Northern Mississippi, my great deficiency in cavalry leaving that portion of the department almost without protection.

About the eleventh March, fearing that the enemy might succeed in opening a canal, practicable for the passage of transports across the peninsula opposite Vicksburg, I deemed it necessary to occupy Grand Gulf, near the mouth of the Big Black, and assigned Brigadier-General Jno. S. Bowen, with his Missouri brigade, to that point, with instructions to construct batteries for the protection of the mouth of the Big Black, and as a secondary obstacle to the navigation of the Mississipp iRiver. General Bowen was also directed to look well to the approaches by the Bayou Pierre. He subsequently informed me that he had prepared for the defence on both sides of the Bayou. On the twenty-second, five heavy guns were mounted and ready for service; two of these were removed from the batteries at Vicksburg, and three intended for gunboats being built in the Trans-Mississippi Department, were detained by my order, it being impracticable to obtain them elsewhere. At the same time the enemy commenced his movement to reach Vicksburg by the Hushpuccana and Deer Creek; another expedition was also attempted through Steel's Bayou, via Rolling Fork and the Sunflower, the object of both being to enter the Yazoo River, above Haynes' Bluff; in these designs he was completely baffled. Many of our smaller boats, which were also fitted for the navigation of these streams, and which were employed in the tranportation of supplies for Vicksburg, were necessarily diverted from this purpose to transport troops to meet and repel these expeditions. The same interruption in the transportation of supplies

was also of constant occurrence during the protracted expedition via the Yazoo Pass.

On the seventh of April I received a telegram from the President, inquiring as to the practicability of sending reinforcements to General Bragg, in Middle Tennessee, and directing me to send them if existing circumstances in the department would admit of it.

On the same day I informed the President by telegram, that in my judgment it was not safe to diminish the forces in this department at that time. On the ninth of April I telegraphed General S. Cooper, A. and I. G., as follows: "I am confident that few reinforcements, if any, have been sent to Rosecrans from Grant; no troops whatever are reported to have gone above the mouth of the Yazoo Pass. I endeavor to keep General Johnston advised of any movement which may affect his army. The enemy is constantly in motion in all directions; he appears now to be particularly engaged with Deer Creek, by land from Greenville. I have forces there to meet him. It is reported, but not yet confirmed, that a movement under McClernand, in large force by land, is in progress west of the river and southward; I doubt it. My operations west of the Mississippi must greatly depend on the movement of the enemy's gunboats. I have several regiments now near New Carthage. I will inform you promptly of anything important, and if I ascertain that part of Grant's army is reinforcing Rosecrans, will dispatch troops to General Johnston as rapidly as possible."

On the eleventh of April, I again telegraphed General Cooper, A. and I. G., and General J. E. Johnston, at Tullahoma, as follows: "A scout from Austin reports that forty transports, loaded down, but without troops, passed up the Mississippi River, on the third and fourth instant." Brigadier-General Chalmers reports that Ellett's marine brigade passed up the Mississippi on the seventh. The same evening, three gunboats and nineteen transports, loaded with troops, passed up—the last ten boats from Tallahatchie, twenty miles up Cold Water, on Wednesday, going up. I think that most of Grant's forces are being withdrawn to Memphis."

On the same day I again telegraphed General Johnston as follows: "The following report just received: Scout Kemp reports: 'Near Byhalia on the tenth; the enemy is strengthening his guard on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Twelve thousand troops passed Memphis going up the river, on the seventh. The same day, fifty pieces of artillery were landed at Memphis, and taken to the Memphis and Charleston depot. Part of Grant's army reported to be going to Corinth, and down the Mobile and Ohio Railroad—the balance to reinforce Rosecrans.' Lawson reports, near Memphis, tenth: 'Marine brigade gone up Cumberland River; also, fourteen transports and two gunboats passed up the river on the night of the seventh. A corps of engineers reached Memphis from below.'" Acting on these and other corroborating reports, I said to General Johnston, in closing my dispatch: "I am collecting troops here, and can send you four thousand (4,000) at once, if absolutely necessary;" and, accordingly, the brigades of Generals Tilghman, Rust, and Buford, were, on the thirteenth of April, placed under orders to move with dispatch to Tullahoma, while General Vaughn's brigade, of East Tennesseans, was ordered to be held in readiness to move at short notice. Major L. Mims, Chief Quartermaster, was instructed to furnish the necessary transportation as speedily as possible; and the following dispatch, dated April twelfth, was transmitted to General Johnston: "I will forward troops to you as fast as transportation can be furnished, about eight thousand men. Am satisfied Rosecrans will be reinforced from Grant's army. Shall I order troops to Tullahoma?" On the fifteenth April, statements made by persons just out of Memphis, of which I was notified by telegraph, indicated that the retrograde movement from Vicksburg was probably a ruse, and that an early attack might be expected on that place; and on the sixteenth, I telegraphed General Johnston thus: "I can send you only two brigades; the latest information induces the belief that no large part of Grant's army will be removed." On the same day General Stevenson was directed to delay the movement of Vaughn's brigade; and on the seventeenth Major Mims, Chief Quartermaster, was instructed that no more troops would be forwarded in the direction of Tullahoma until further orders.

General Tilghman's was held in position between Jackson and the Big Black Bridge, and on the same day the following telegram was dispatched to General Cooper, A. and I. G.: "General Stevenson reports that eight boats attempted to pass Vicksburg last night; five succeeded in passing, one was burned and sunk, and two disabled. General Chalmers reports sixty-four steamers left Memphis on the fifteenth instant, loaded with troops and negroes, apparently with intention of making an assault on Vicksburg. The enemy has nine (9) boats between Vicksburg and Port Hudson. I cannot send any more troops, and think that those on the way to General Johnston should come back."

General Bowen, at Grand Gulf was immediately advised of the passage of the boats referred to in the above dispatch, and instructed to withdraw his troops from the Louisiana shore, at the first favorable opportunity; he was also immediately reinforced by the Sixth Mississippi regiment and First Confederate battalion, and a field battery. On the same day the following telegram was dispatched to General Johnston. "The troops sent you were taken from Port Hudson; a brigade under Brigadier-General Buford, aggregate present four thousand and sixty-five. The enemy has nine boats between Vicksburg and Port Hudson. He has land forces at New Carthage, from Grant's army, and can reinforce them to any extent; he can use his nine boats to cross his troops to this

side. The arrival of General Lorenzo Thomas has changed the enemy's plans, or his movement up the river was a ruse. I ought to have back Buford's brigade; certainly no more troops should leave this department. A dispatch from Brigadier-General Chalmers, yesterday, says, sixty-four boats left Memphis since Thursday, loaded with soldiers and negroes, ostensibly to assault Vicksburg. The raft on the Yazoo, at Snyder's Mills, has given way, and is entirely destroyed; I am, therefore, compelled to strengthen the batteries there at the expense of Vicksburg. General Stevenson reports that eight boats passed the bend last night; one was burned and two disabled; apparently, the other five escaped uninjured. Indications of an attack on Vicksburg are so strong, that I am not warranted in sending any more troops from this department." From information received after this dispatch was sent, I learned that eight of the enemy's most formidable gunboats, besides his transports and barges, succeeded in passing safely on the sixteenth.

I found it a very difficult matter to obtain the necessary hawsers and chains for the raft in the Yazoo, but it was speedily replaced under the active and energetic supervision of Mr. Thomas Weldon. My request for the return of the troops forwarded to Middle Tennessee to reinforce General Bragg, was immediately complied with. A portion of them, however, had reached Chattanooga; the remainder were halted by telegraph at various points on the route, and the whole were restored to this department as soon as was practicable.

The enemy's vessels of war occupying the river between Vicksburg and Grand Gulf, it was impossible for me to operate effectually in the Trans-Mississippi Department, to prevent the advance of the enemy to the west bank of the river.

On the seventeenth April, therefore, I addressed the following telegraphic communication to Captain E. Powell, A. Q. M., at Natchez: "Forward the following to Lieutenant-General Smith, or Major-General Taylor, viz.: 'For the want of the necessary transportation, I cannot operate effectually on the west bank of the river; the enemy is now in force at New Carthage and Richmond. I beg your attention to this.'" Captain Powell notified me at once that this dispatch had been forwarded by courier.

On the eighteenth, I addressed a second communication, through the same medium, as follows: "Lieutenant-General Smith, or Major-General Taylor: The enemy are cutting a passage from near Young's Point to Bayou Vidal, to reach the Mississippi River, near New Carthage; without co-operation it is impossible to oppose him. Inform me what action you intend to take." To these communications, and to a subsequent one of twenty-second April, I received no reply, until after the capitulation of Vicksburg, when an acknowledgment of the receipt of that of the twenty-second, dated May thirtieth, reached me.

On the nineteenth, reports of raids in Northern Mississippi, from several points in Tennessee, reached me. All the available cavalry north of the Southern Railroad was at once placed at the disposal of Brigadier-Generals Ruggles and Chalmers, commanding respectively the First and Fifth military districts, which embraced all the northern portion of the State of Mississippi; and both were notified of the expected raids. Two companies of cavalry of Waul's Legion alone were ordered to report to Brigadier-General Barton, at Warrenton. One of the marauding expeditions, under Colonel Grierson, which crossed the Tallahatchie River at New Albany, succeeded in passing directly through the State, and eventually joined General Banks' forces at Baton Rouge, Louisiana. So great was the consternation created by this raid, that it was impossible to obtain any reliable information of the enemy's movements, rumor placing him in various places at the same time.

On the twentieth, I addressed the following telegram to General Johnston: "Can you not make a heavy demonstration with cavalry on the Tallahatchie, towards Abbeville, if only for fifty miles? The enemy are endeavoring to compel a diversion of my troops to Northern Mississippi." The same day the following communication was addressed to General Johnston in response to one from him, asking if I could not send reinforcements to the assistance of Colonel Roddy: "I have not sufficient force to give any efficient assistance to Colonel Roddy. The enemy are advancing from Memphis, via Hernando; from Grand Junction and LaGrange, via Holly Springs and Salem, and from Corinth, via New Albany. You are aware that I have but a feeble cavalry force; but I shall certainly give you all the aid I can. I have literally no cavalry from Grand Gulf to Yazoo City, while the enemy is threatening to pass the river between Vicksburg and Grand Gulf, having now twelve (12) vessels below the former place. A gunboat and one transport passed Austin on the eighteenth, having in tow fifteen flat-boats or pontoons, with twenty-five skiffs on them. Another transport passed Austin on the nineteenth, towing sixteen flats or pontoons."

Brigadier-General Ruggles was directed to send all his available cavalry, both Confederate and State, at once towards Corinth, as a diversion in favor of Colonel Roddy, General Johnston having informed me that a superior force of the enemy from Corinth was in front of Roddy at Tuscumbia, and desiring me, if possible, to send aid to the latter. Having no available cavalry to meet the raid of Grierson, which was ravaging the northern portion of the State, I endeavored to employ a portion of Buford's brigade (infantry), then returning to the department, and directed the commanding officer of the First regiment, on his arrival at Meridian, to remain until further orders, to protect the most important points on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and thereby succeeded in saving the valuable property, machinery, &c., at Enterprise, upon

which town the enemy advanced and demanded its surrender; but Major-General Loring having reached there with a sufficient force of infantry in time, their object was frustrated. The enemy had previously succeeded in destroying several miles of the track of the Southern Railroad west of Chunky River, which for more than a week greatly delayed the transportation of troops, and entirely prevented that of supplies (except by wagons) from our depots on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad.

To meet these raids, as far as possible, Major-General Loring was placed in command of all the troops then on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad; he was directed not to leave the line of the road for any great distance; to keep in telegraphic communication with me, and constantly to advise me of his position; and that, operations on that line being minor in importance to those upon the Mississippi River, his troops must be so disposed as to enable him to move them in that direction at a moment's notice. The same day the following communication was addressed to General Johnston at Tullahoma: "Heavy raids are making from Tennessee deep into this State; one is reported now at Starkville, thirty (30) miles west of Columbus. Cavalry is indispensable to meet these expeditions; the little I have is in the field there, but totally inadequate. Could you not make a demonstration with a cavalry force on their rear?"

Another expedition having been reported moving across the country in a south-westerly direction from Pontotoc, Brigadier-General Featherston, then commanding Fort Pemberton, on the Yazoo, was ordered to move without delay toward Duck Hill, or Winona, and General Tilghman, then at Canton, was directed to hold trains in readiness to move to Winona at a moment's notice. This became more necessary as a heavy column of infantry, as well as cavalry, was reported moving from Memphis, with the supposed view of taking possession of Grenada. The same day the following communication was telegraphed to General Cooper, A. and I. G.: "I have so little cavalry that I am compelled to direct a portion of my infantry to meet raids in Northern Mississippi. If any troops can possibly be spared from other departments I think they should be sent here." Every effort was made by me to provide cavalry to arrest Grierson's raid, also to accumulate a force for operations in the direction of Warrenton, and Grand Gulf.

Thinking it quite as probable that Grierson would return by the route on which he was advancing as that he would continue his progress southward, on the twenty-fourth Brigadier-General Chalmers, at Panola, was directed to move with all his cavalry and light artillery, via Oxford, to Okolona, to intercept the force of the enemy then at Newton Station, on the Southern Railroad. Captain Henderson, commanding special scouts at Grenada, was also instructed to send couriers to Generals Loring, Buford, and Ruggles, notifying those officers by telegrams from the nearest telegraph office, and advising each station on the road that the enemy had reached Newton, on the Southern road.

A force was also ordered to proceed from Jackson to Forrest or Lake Station, or to such other points as circumstances might render necessary. Major-General Gardner, at Port Hudson, was notified that the enemy had reached the Southern Railroad; that it was probable he would endeavor to form a junction with Banks at Baton Rouge, and was instructed to send all his disposable cavalry to intercept him. Brigadier-General Featherstone, with his brigade, then at, or *en route* for, Winona, was ordered to move to Grenada, if there was any approach of the enemy (as was reported) from the north on that place, unless he was also threatened by an advance from the east. As it was possible that Grierson's forces might return by Jackson, such arrangements as my means allowed were made to defend the capital of the State. Brigadier-General Tilghman, then at Canton, was authorized to mount one of his regiments at that place, by the impressment of horses, or otherwise, and immediate steps were taken to mount the Twentieth Mississippi and a detachment of the Fourteenth Mississippi, both of these regiments being at the time on duty in Jackson. Similar authority was given to General Loring, then on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, to mount what force he could on that line. In the impressment of horses and their necessary equipments, Major L. Mims, Chief Quartermaster, was materially aided by his Excellency the Governor of Mississippi, who was also earnestly advised to mount, by the same process, a portion of the the State troops in Northern Mississippi.

All the cavalry I could thus collect south of the Southern Railroad was placed under the orders of Colonel R. V. Richardson, until he should fall in with Colonel Wirt Adams, who was then directed to assume command and direct the movements of the whole. On the twenty-eighth, it was ascertained that Grierson was continuing his movement south of Hazlehurst, and not towards Grand Gulf, or the Big Black Bridge. Colonel Adams was directed to follow him up and ambuscade him if possible. These instructions were carried out as far as practicable, and resulted in a smart skirmish near Union Church; Colonel Adams' force, however, was too weak to effect anything important. Grierson, after suffering considerable loss, by an ambuscade further south, which was well planned and executed by a cavalry force from Major-General Gardner's command, eventually succeeded in joining General Banks' army at Baton Rouge.

I have been thus circumstantial in reciting the incidents connected with this celebrated raid, that I might clearly demonstrate the great deficiency, I may almost say the absence of cavalry in my department, and the absolute impossibility of protecting my communications, depots, and even my most vital positions with-

out it; and further to show that consequent upon this want of cavalry, I was compelled to employ infantry, and thus weaken my force in that arm at other important points. I wrote to General Johnston on March twenty-fifth, urgently requesting that the division of cavalry under Major-General Van Dorn, which had been sent to the Army of Tennessee for special and temporary purposes, might be returned to me. Under date of Tullahoma, April third, Colonel B. S. Ewell, A. A. G., replied to my request and from that reply I make the following extract: "In the present aspect of affairs, General Van Dorn's cavalry is much more needed in this department than in that of Mississippi and East Louisiana, and cannot be sent back as long as this state of things exists. You have now in your department five brigades of the troops you most require, viz., infantry, belonging to the Army of Tennessee. This is more than a compensation for the absence of General Van Dorn's cavalry command."

I will terminate this subject with the following telegram addressed to General Johnston, at Tullahoma, on the twenty-seventh of April:

"However necessary cavalry may be to the Army of Tennessee, it is indispensable for me to maintain my communications. The enemy are to day at Hazlehurst, on the New Orleans and Jackson Railroad. I cannot defend every station on the roads with infantry. I am compelled to bring cavalry here from Northern Mississippi, and thus the whole of that section of the State is left open; further, these raids endanger my vital positions."

When it seemed probable that the enemy would succeed in opening a navigable canal across the peninsula opposite Vicksburg, and thus to a great extent avoid the batteries established there, I directed that Grand Gulf should be occupied, and as many heavy guns placed in position as could be without too much weakening the defences of Vicksburg.

Believing that the urgency of the case demanded it, I assumed the responsibility of detaining three heavy guns *en route* for the Trans-Mississippi Department, and withdrew two others from the batteries at Vicksburg. Insufficient as I knew this battery to be, it was the heaviest I could place there. Fort Pemberton, on the Tallahatchie, then occupied our attention; the enemy in large force by land and water, was exerting all his energies against the position with the view of turning the right flank of Vicksburg, and every available gun was required for its defence. This necessity continued to exist until the fall of the rivers rendered an approach by water impracticable. Grand Gulf was not selected as a position for land defence, but for the protection of the mouth of the Big Black, and also as a precautionary measure against the passage of transports, should the canal before referred to prove a success, which then seemed highly probable.

The necessary works were, however, constructed, under the direction of Brigadier-General Bowen, to defend the batteries against an assault from the river front, and against a direct attack from or across Big Black. When, however, the enemy succeeded in passing sufficient transports to cross his troops from the west bank of the river, below Grand Gulf—there being a practicable route by which to move his land forces from above Vicksburg to a point nearly opposite Bruinsburg—the position of Grand Gulf itself lost most of its value; but so great were his facilities of transportation, and so rapid his movements, that it was impracticable to withdraw the heavy guns. The only means of subsisting an army south of Big Black, are from Vicksburg or Jackson; the former requiring a transportation by dirt road of forty, and the latter of fifty-five miles, in addition to that by rail. Without cavalry I could not have protected my own communications, much less have cut those of the enemy.

To have marched an army across Big Black of sufficient strength to warrant a reasonable hope of successfully encountering his very superior forces, would have stripped Vicksburg and its essential flank defences of their garrisons, and the city itself might have fallen an easy prey into the eager hands of the enemy.

The enemy having succeeded, on the night of April sixteenth (as heretofore related), in passing the batteries at Vicksburg with a number of his gunboats and transports, and the report of a heavy movement southward on the Louisiana shore being fully confirmed, I immediately made the necessary dispositions for more perfectly guarding all points between Vicksburg and Grand Gulf, and reinforced Brigadier-General Bowen with Green's brigade, the Sixth Mississippi regiment, the First Confederate battalion, and a battery of field artillery. Other troops were collected on the line of the railroad between Jackson and the Big Black Bridge, and measures were taken to get the troops that were being returned from Middle Tennessee into such positions that they could be readily moved at a moment's notice.

Major-General Stevenson was directed to place five thousand men in easy supporting distance of Warrenton, in addition to the brigade already there. Major Lockett, my Chief Engineer, was sent to Grand Gulf. On the twenty-second I addressed a communication to Lieutenant-General E. K. Smith, acknowledging the receipt of one from him of the fifteenth, asking my co-operation on the west side of the Mississippi, and stating my inability to do so because of the enemy's gunboats in the river, and from want of transportation, and again asking his co-operation in front of Grand Gulf and New Carthage. The following telegram was addressed to Major-General Stevenson on the twenty-third: "I consider it essential that communications, at least for infantry, should be made by the shortest practicable route to Grand Gulf. The indications now are that the attack will not be made on your front or right, and all troops not absolutely necessary to hold the works at Vicksburg

should be held as a movable force for either Warrenton or Grand Gulf."

On the twenty-eighth, Brigadier-General Bowen telegraphed that "transports and barges loaded down with troops are landing at Hard Times, on the west bank." I immediately replied as follows: "Have you force enough to hold your position? If not, give me the smallest additional number with which you can. My small cavalry force necessitates the use of infantry to protect important points." Major-General Loring, then at Meridian, was ordered to send two of his regiments across the break on the Southern Railroad, near Chunky River, and Colonels Farrell and Reynolds, who were west of the break, were ordered to proceed immediately to Jackson. Major-General Buckner, commanding at Mobile, was notified that I should look to him to assist me in protecting the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, as I required all the troops I could spare to strengthen General Bowen. Major-General Gardner, at Port Hudson, was also ordered to move Gregg's brigade rapidly to Jackson. Brigadier-General Tilghman, then on the Mississippi Central Railroad, was directed to move promptly with all his troops (save bridge guards) to Jackson. Major Clark, commanding at Brookhaven, was instructed to send couriers to all cavalry commanders near him, ordering them to move towards Grand Gulf, with directions not to encounter the main body of the enemy, but to harass him in the rear and flank. Similar instructions were forwarded to Osyka and Hazlehurst. To General Johnson, at Tullahoma, the following telegram was sent: "The enemy is at Hard Times, La., in large force, with barges and transports, indicating an attack on Grand Gulf with a view to Vicksburg. I must look to the Army of Tennessee to protect the approaches through Northern Mississippi." The following, also, to Major-General Stevenson, at Vicksburg: "Hold five thousand men in readiness to move to Grand Gulf, and on the requisition of Brigadier-General Bowen move them. With your batteries and rifle-pits manned, the city front is impregnable." To General Bowen, at the same time, the following was sent: "I have directed General Stevenson to have five thousand men ready to move on your requisition, but do not make requisition unless absolutely necessary for the safety of your position. I am also making arrangements for sending you two or three thousand men from this direction in case of necessity. You cannot communicate with me too frequently." I believe I fully estimated the importance of preventing an advance upon Jackson, if it could be done without sacrificing Vicksburg; but if the latter was lost the former was comparatively of little value. Vicksburg might still be held with Jackson in possession of the enemy, but it was the hope of being able to hold the position on Bayou Pierre, upon which the safety of Jackson depends, that made [illegible]xious to reinforce General Bowen, [illegible]hat, at least to have a sufficient [illegible] to secure his retreat across the Big Black. On the thirtieth of April I received the first information of the landing of the enemy on the east bank of the Mississippi River. General Bowen reported by telegraph that three thousand (3,000) Federal troops were at Bethel Church, ten miles from Port Gibson, at three o'clock, on the evening of the twenty-ninth, and that they were still landing at Bruinsburg. Brigadier-General Tracy, of Stevenson's division, had reached Grand Gulf with his brigade on the thirtieth. Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, of the Twentieth Mississippi, with fifty mounted men of his regiment, left Jackson for the same place on the twenty-ninth, and Major J. D. Bradford, a good artillery officer, was sent to replace the lamented Colonel Wade as Chief of Artillery. Between twelve and two o'clock P. M., on the thirtieth, Brigadier-General Baldwin, with his brigade of Smith's division, had crossed the Big Black at Hankinson's Ferry. At nine o'clock A. M., May first, General Bowen informed me, by telegraph—his army being then in position three miles south of Port Gibson—that General Baldwin was entering the latter place. On the same day General Bowen telegraphed me that prisoners taken reported McClernand in command; that three divisions had landed, one of which took the right hand road from Rodney, and that the enemy's force was estimated at twenty thousand men. He adds, however, "I disbelieve the report." At three P. M., the same day, General Bowen advised me that he still held his position, but that he was hard pressed, and concluded by asking when Major-General Loring would arrive. In reply, he was notified, by telegram, that another brigade from Vicksburg was *en route* to reinforce him, and would probably reach him before Major-General Loring could arrive from Jackson. At 5.30 P. M., he informed me that he was falling back across the Bayou Pierre, and that he would endeavor to hold that position until the arrival of reinforcements. On reaching Rock Springs, about eighteen miles from Grand Gulf, Major-General Loring, learning that Brigadier-General Bowen had fallen back before a large force from Port Gibson, in the direction of Grand Gulf, directed two regiments and a field battery of Tilghman's brigade, which had been withdrawn from the Big Black Bridge, to move as rapidly as possible to Grand Stone Ford, and hold it at all hazards, to prevent the enemy from flanking Bowen in that direction, and then proceeded himself to the headquarters of General Bowen, near Grand Gulf. Major-General Loring, concurring with General Bowen as to the impracticability of holding his position with so small a force, directed its withdrawal across the Big Black at Hankinson's Ferry.

In his official report, Major-General Loring says: "This had hardly been determined upon when your communication was received, stating that the army had fallen back towards Grand Gulf, and ordering it to move at once out of its position, and to cross the Big Black at Hankinson's Ferry." The movement was promptly

carried out; previous to crossing the river, however, Colonel A. W. Reynolds' brigade, of Stevenson's division, had arrived. Not having heard from General Bowen after 5.30 P. M., on the first instant, I dispatched him, via Rocky Springs, on the morning of the second, as follows: "If you are holding your position on the Bayou Pierre, and your communication is open by the Big Black to this place, continue to hold it. I am informed that you have fallen back to Grand Gulf; if this is so, carry out my instructions just sent in cipher." These instructions were, in case he had fallen back to Grand Gulf, which is a *cul-de-sac*, to destroy his heavy guns, and such stores as could not be transported, and endeavor to retire across the Big Black. The last brigade of Major-General Stevenson's division, which had been hurried forward to reinforce Bowen, with the hope of enabling him to hold his position on the Bayou Pierre; or, in case he should be compelled to fall back, to protect his retreat, had not all arrived when the retiring column, under Major-General Loring, commenced crossing the Big Black, at Hankinson's Ferry.

For the details of the battle of Port Gibson, the list of casualties, &c., I beg to refer to the official report of Brigadier-General Bowen, and the reports of his subordinate commanders, which I have the honor to transmit herewith; as also the report of Major-General Loring, who commanded the retreat, after the column had been put in motion by Brigadier-General Bowen. Amongst the slain whom the country deplores, I regret to mention Brigadier-General E. D. Tracy, a brave and skilful officer, who fell where it is the soldier's pride to fall, at the post of duty and of danger. Though disastrous in its results, the bloody encounter in front of Port Gibson, nobly illustrated the valor and constancy of our troops, and shed additional lustre upon the Confederate arms. Confronted by overwhelming numbers, the heroic Bowen and his gallant officers and men maintained the unequal contest for many hours, with a courage and obstinacy rarely equalled; and though they failed to secure a victory, the world will do them the justice to say they deserved it. With a moderate cavalry force at my disposal, I am firmly convinced that the Federal army, under General Grant, would have been unable to maintain its communications with the Mississippi River; and that the attempt to reach Jackson and Vicksburg from that base would have been as signally defeated in May, 1863, as a like attempt from another base had, by the employment of cavalry, been defeated in December, 1862. The repulse of General Bowen at Port Gibson, and our consequent withdrawal to the north bank of the Big Black, rendered it necessary that I should, as rapidly as possible, concentrate my whole force for the defence of Vicksburg from an attack in the rear by Grant's army, which was hourly swelling its numbers. Orders, therefore, were immediately transmitted to the officers in command at Grenada, Columbus and Jackson, to move all available forces to Vicksburg as rapidly as possible.

On the morning of the third, two of the enemy's barges, loaded with hospital and commissary stores, were destroyed in attempting to pass the batteries at Vicksburg. On the fifth, I telegraphed General Johnston that: "Six thousand cavalry should be used to keep my communications open, and that the enemy advancing on me was double what I could bring into the field." To the Honorable Secretary of War I sent the following telegram, under date of May sixth: "General Beauregard sends but two brigades, perhaps not five thousand men. This is a very insufficient number. The stake is a great one. I can see nothing so important."

On the seventh the President notified me that all the assistance in his power to send should be forwarded, and that it was deemed necessary to hold Port Hudson as a means of keeping up our communications with the Trans-Mississippi Department.

Major-General Gardner, who, with Brigadier-General Maxcey and five thousand (5,000) men, had previously been ordered to Jackson to reinforce this army, was immediately directed to send Maxcey's brigade rapidly forward, and to return himself, with two thousand (2,000) men, to Port Hudson, and hold the place at all hazards. On the seventh, indications rendered it probable that the enemy would make a raid on Jackson; the staff departments, therefore, and all valuable stores, were ordered to be removed east. In the meantime my troops were so disposed as to occupy the Warrenton and Hall's Ferry road, which afforded great facilities for concentration, and various positions on the Baldwin's Ferry road, and from thence between Bovina and Edwards Depot—each division being in good supporting distance of the other. Colonel Waul, commanding Fort Pemberton, was directed to leave a garrison of three hundred men at that place, and proceed with the remainder of his force to Snyder's Mills. On the tenth, information was received from a scouting party that visited Cayuga and Utica, where the enemy had recently been, that his cavalry force was about two thousand, and that he was supposed to be moving on Vicksburg. My dispositions were made accordingly, and every effort was used to collect all the cavalry possible. Such as could be obtained was placed under the command of Colonel Wirt Adams, who was directed to harass the enemy on his line of march, cut his communications wherever practicable, patrol the country thoroughly, and to keep Brigadier-General Gregg (who has just arrived with his brigade from Port Hudson, and was then at Raymond) fully advised of the enemy's movements. On the eleventh, Brigadier-General John Adams, commanding at Jackson, was directed to hurry forward, as fast as they could arrive, the troops from South Carolina, to reinforce Brigadier-General Gregg at Raymond. At this time, information was received from Brigadier-General Tilghman that the enemy was in force opposite

Baldwin's Ferry, and Gregg was notified accordingly, and informed that the enemy's movements were apparently towards the Big Black Bridge, and not, as had been supposed, against Jackson. On the twelfth, the following was addressed to Major-General Stevenson: "From information received, it is evident the enemy is advancing in force on Edwards Depot and Big Black Bridge; hot skirmishing has been going on all the morning, and the enemy are at Fourteen-mile Creek; you must move up with your whole division to the support of Loring and Bowen, at the bridge, leaving Baldwin's and Moore's brigades to protect your right." In consequence of this information, Brigadier-General Gregg was ordered not to attack the enemy until he was engaged at Edwards or the bridge, but to be ready to fall on his rear or flank at any moment, and to be particularly cautious not to allow himself to be flanked or taken in the rear. Thus, it will be seen that every measure had been taken to protect Edwards' Depot and Big Black Bridge, and by offering or accepting battle to endeavor to preserve my communications with the east.

At this juncture, however, the battle of Raymond was fought by a large body of the enemy's forces, and one brigade of our troops, under the command of Brigadier-General Gregg.

I have received no official report of that affair, and hence cannot say how it was fought, or by whom the engagement was brought on. Unofficial information represents Brigadier-General Gregg and his small command to have behaved with great gallantry and steadiness; but after an obstinate conflict of several hours, they were finally overwhelmed by superior numbers and compelled to retire. The command was withdrawn in good order, and retired to Jackson.

On the fourteenth, a large body of the enemy made their appearance in front of Jackson, the capital of the State. After some fighting, our troops were withdrawn, and the enemy took possession of the place; but as General Johnston was commanding there in person, his official report, which has doubtless gone forward, will furnish all the information required.

On the twelfth, the following telegram was sent to General Johnston: "The enemy is apparently moving his heavy force towards Edwards' Depot, on the Southern Railroad; with my limited force, I will do all I can to meet him; that will be the battle-field if I can forward sufficient force, leaving troops enough to secure the safety of this place (Vicksburg). Reinforcements are arriving very slowly, only one thousand five hundred having arrived as yet. I urgently ask that more be sent; also, that three thousand cavalry be at once sent to operate on this line. I urge this as a positive necessity. The enemy largely outnumber me, and I am obliged to hold back a large force at the ferries on Big Black, lest he cross and take this place. I am also compelled to keep considerable force
nk of Vicksburg, out of supporting
he same dispatch was also sent to His Excellency President Davis, on the same date.

The divisions of Major-Generals Loring and Stevenson moved from the line they had occupied between Warrenton and Big Black Bridge to Edwards' Depot, General Stevenson being directed to keep well closed up on the rear of General Loring's column. On the evening of the twelfth, I moved my headquarters to Bovina to be nearer the scene of active operations. The command arrived at Edwards' Depot on the thirteenth, and was placed in position covering all approaches from the south and east, in the following order, viz.: Bowen on the right, Loring in the centre, and Stevenson on the left. This position was occupied from the night of the thirteenth until the morning of the fifteenth. On the thirteenth, the following dispatch was sent to General Johnston: "General Forney reports from Vicksburg, this morning, four transports loaded with troops arrived at Young's Point this morning. Five regiments and a battery passed down by Brown and Johnston's. Wagon trains continue to pass back and forth. My reinforcements will be very small and arrive very slowly. If possible, Port Hudson should also be reinforced. I have been forced to draw largely from there. I have no Major-General to command brigades arriving in Jackson. I am in position with eight brigades near Edwards' Depot."

On the morning of the fourteenth, while on my way from Bovina to Edwards' Depot, I received the following dispatch, dated May thirteenth, from General Johnston, then at Jackson: "I have lately arrived, and learn that General Sherman is between us with four divisions at Clinton. It is important to re-establish communications that you may be reinforced. If practicable, come up in his rear at once; to beat such a detachment would be of immense value; the troops here could co-operate; all the strength you could quickly assemble should be brought; time is all important." I immediately replied as follows: "Bovina, May 14, '63—I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communication. I move at once with whole available force, about sixteen thousand, from Edwards' Depot, leaving Vaughn's brigade, about fifteen hundred, at Big Black Bridge; Tilghman's brigade, fifteen hundred, now at Baldwin's Ferry, I have ordered to bring up the rear of my column; he will be, however, from fifteen to twenty miles behind it. Baldwin's Ferry will be left necessarily unprotected. To hold Vicksburg are Smith's and Forney's divisions, extending from Snyder's Mills to Warrenton, numbering effective, seven thousand five hundred men. The men have been marching several days, are much fatigued, and I fear will straggle very much. In directing this move, I do not think you fully comprehend the position that Vicksburg will be left in, but I comply at once with your order."

The "detachment" General Johnston speaks of in his communication, consisted of four

divisions of the enemy, constituting an entire army corps, numerically greater than my whole available force in the field; besides the enemy had, at least, an equal force to the south, on my right flank, which would be nearer to Vicksburg than myself in case I should make the movement proposed. I had, moreover, positive information that he was daily increasing his strength. I also learned, on reaching Edwards' Depot, that one division of the enemy (A. J. Smith's) was at, or near, Dillons. This confirmed me in the opinion, previously expressed, that the movement indicated by General Johnston was extremely hazardous. I accordingly called a council of war of all the General officers present, and placing the subject before them (including General Johnston's dispatch) in every view in which it appeared to me, asked their opinions respectively. A majority of the officers present expressed themselves favorable to the movement indicated by General Johnston. The others, including Major-Generals Loring and Stevenson, preferred a movement by which the army might attempt to cut off the enemy's supplies from the Mississippi River. My own views were strongly expressed as unfavorable to any advance which might separate me farther from Vicksburg, which was my base; I did not, however, see fit to put my own judgment and opinions so far in opposition as to prevent a movement altogether, but believing the only possibility of success to be in the plan of cutting the enemy's communications, it was adopted, and the following dispatch was addressed to General Johnston: "Edwards' Depot, May 14, 1863—I shall move as early to-morrow morning as practicable with a column of seventeen (17) thousand men to Dillon's, situated on the main road leading from Raymond to Port Gibson, seven and a half miles below Raymond, and nine and a half miles from Edwards' Depot. The object is to cut the enemy's communications and to force him to attack me, as I do not consider my force sufficient to justify an attack on the enemy in position or to attempt to cut my way to Jackson. At this point your nearest communication would be through Raymond. I wish very much I could join my reinforcements. Whether it will be most practicable for the reinforcements to come by Raymond (leaving it to the right, if the march cannot be made through Raymond), or to move them west along the line of railroad (leaving it to the left and south of the line of march) to Bolton's Depot, or some other point west of it, you must determine; in either movement I should be advised as to the time and road, so that co-operation may be had to enable the reinforcements to come through. I send you a map of the country which will furnish you with a correct view of the roads and localities." Pursuant to the plan laid down in this dispatch, the army was put in motion on the fifteenth, about one in the afternoon, in accordance with the following order, viz.:—

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT MISSISSIPPI AND E. LOUISIANA, EDWARDS' DEPOT, "May 14, 1863.

"*Special Orders.*

"This army will move to-morrow morning, fifteenth inst., in the direction of Raymond, on the military road, in the following order:

"1st. Colonel Wirt Adams' cavalry will form the advance guard, keeping at least one mile in advance of the head of the column, throwing out one company in front of his column and a small detachment in its advance, besides the flankers upon his column when practicable.

"2d. Loring's division will constitute the right and the advance in the line of march. He will throw a regiment of infantry with a section of artillery at least two hundred yards in his front, with a company of infantry at least seventy-five yards in its advance, all with the necessary detachments and flankers.

"3d. Bowen's division will constitute the centre, and will follow the leading division.

"4th. Stevenson's division will constitute the left, bringing up the rear of the column.

"5th The artillery of each brigade will march in the rear of the brigade.

"6th. The ambulances of each brigade will follow in the rear of their brigade.

"7th. The ordnance wagons of each division will follow in the rear of their division.

"8th. The wagon train will follow in the rear of the entire column.

"9th. Should Tilghman's brigade arrive after the departure of the column, it will constitute, with a field battery, the rear guard, following immediately in the rear of the wagon train.

"10th. A company of Wirt Adams' cavalry will close the order of march.

"11th. The wagon train will follow in the order of division, that is to say, the wagon train of Loring's division in the right of the train; that of Bowen's division in the centre, &c. Quartermasters, Commissaries and Ordnance Officers, will remain with their trains, unless otherwise ordered.

"Straggling, always disgraceful in an army, is particularly forbidden. Stringent orders will be issued by the division commanders to prevent this evil; the rear guard is especially instructed to permit no one to fall to the rear under any circumstances."

A continuous and heavy rain had made Baker's Creek impassable by the ordinary ford on the main Raymond road, where the country bridge had been washed away by previous freshets; in consequence of this the march was delayed for several hours, but the water not falling sufficiently to make the creek fordable, the column was directed by the Clinton road, on which was a good bridge, and after passing the creek upwards of one and a half miles, was filed to the right along a neighborhood road, so as to strike the Raymond road about three and a half miles from Edwards' Depot. The march was continued until the head of the column had

passed Mrs. Elliston's house, where it was halted and the troops bivouacked in order of march.

I made my headquarters at Mrs. Elliston's, where I found Major-General Loring had also established his. The divisions of Generals Stevenson and Bowen having been on the march until past midnight, and the men considerably fatigued; desiring also to receive reports of reconnoissances made in my front before proceeding further, I did not issue orders to continue the movement at an early hour the following morning.

Immediately on my arrival at Mrs. Elliston's, on the night of the fifteenth, I sent for Colonel Wirt Adams, commanding the cavalry, and gave him the necessary instructions for picketing all approaches in my front, and directed him to send out scouting parties to discover the enemy's whereabouts. I also made strenuous efforts to effect the same object through citizens, but without success. Nothing unusual occurred during the night. On the morning of the sixteenth, at about half past six o'clock, Colonel Wirt Adams reported to me that his pickets were skirmishing with the enemy on the Raymond road, some distance in our front. While in conversation with him a courier arrived and handed me the following dispatch from General Johnston:

"CANTON ROAD, TEN MILES FROM JACKSON,
"May 15, 1863, 8.30 A. M.

"Our being compelled to leave Jackson makes your plan impracticable. The only mode by which we can unite is by your moving directly to Clinton, informing me that we may move to that point with about six thousand men. I have no means of estimating the enemy's force at Jackson. The principal officers here differ very widely, and I fear he will fortify if time is left him. Let me hear from you immediately.

"General Maxcey was ordered back to Brookhaven, you probably have time to make him join you—do so before he has time to move away."

I immediately directed a counter-march, or rather a retrograde movement by reversing the column as it then stood, for the purpose of returning towards Edwards' Depot to take the Brownsville road, and thence to proceed towards Clinton by a route north of the railroad. A written reply to General Johnston's instructions, in which I notified him that the countermarch had been ordered, and that the route I should take, was dispatched in haste, and without allowing myself sufficient time to take a copy.

Just as this reverse movement commenced, the enemy drove in Colonel Wirt Adams' cavalry pickets, and opened with artillery at long range, on the head of my column on the Raymond road; not knowing whether this was an attack in force, or simply an armed reconnoissance, and being anxious to obey the instructions of General Johnston, I directed the continuance of the movement, giving the necessary instructions ing the safety of the wagon train. The demonstrations of the enemy soon becoming more serious, orders were sent to division commanders to form in line of battle on the cross road, from the Clinton to the Raymond roads—Loring on the right, Bowen in the centre, and Stevenson on the left. Major General Stevenson was instructed to make the necessary dispositions for the protection of the trains then on the Clinton road and crossing Baker's creek. The line of battle was quickly formed without any interference on the part of the enemy; the position selected was naturally a strong one, and all approaches from the front well covered. A short time after the formation of the line, Loring's division was thrown back so as to cover the military road, it being reported that the enemy had appeared in that direction. The enemy made his first demonstration on our right, but after a lively artillery duel for an hour or more, this attack was relinquished and a large force was thrown against our left, where skirmishing became heavy about ten o'clock, and the battle began in earnest along Stevenson's entire front, about noon. Just at this time a column of the enemy was seen moving in front of our centre toward the right. Landis's battery of Bowen's division opened upon and soon broke this column and compelled it to retire. I then directed Major-General Loring to move forward and crush the enemy in his front, and directed General Bowen to co-operate with him in the movement. Immediately on the receipt of my message, General Bowen rode up and announced his readiness to execute his part of the movement as soon as Major-General Loring should advance. No movement was made by Major-General Loring; he informed me that the enemy was too strongly posted to be attacked, but that he would seize the first opportunity to assault if one should offer. The enemy still making strenuous efforts to turn Major-General Stevenson's left flank, compelled him to make a similar movement towards the left, thus extending his own line and making a gap between his and Bowen's division. General Bowen was ordered to keep this interval closed, and the same instructions were sent to General Loring, in reference to the interval between his and General Bowen's division.

General Stevenson having informed me that unless reinforced he would be unable to resist the heavy and repeated attacks along his whole line, Bowen was ordered to send one brigade to his assistance, which was promptly brought forward under Colonel F. M. Cockrell, and in a very short time his remaining brigade, under the command of Brigadier-General Martin E. Green, was put in, and the two together under their gallant leaders charged the enemy, and for a time turned the tide of battle in our favor, again displaying the heroic courage which this veteran division has made conspicuous on so many stricken fields. The enemy still continued to move troops from his left to his right, thus increasing his vastly superior forces against Stevenson's and Brown's divisions. Feeling

assured that there was no important force in his front, I dispatched several staff officers in rapid succcession to Major-General Loring, ordering him to move all but one brigade (Tilghman's, which was directed to hold the Raymond road and cover the bridge and ford at Baker's Creek) to the left as rapidly as possible. To the first of these messages sent about two P. M., answer was returned by Major-general Loring that the enemy was in strong force in his front and endeavoring to flank him.

Hearing no firing on the right, I repeated my orders to Major-General Loring, explained to him the condition of affairs on the left, and directed him to put his two left brigades into the fight as soon as possible. In the transmission of these various messages to and fro, over a distance of more than a mile, much valuable time was necessarily consumed, which the enemy did not fail to take advantage of. About four o'clock P. M., a part of Stevenson's division broke badly and fell back in great disorder, but was partially rallied by the strenuous exertions of myself and staff, and put back under their own officers into the fight; but observing that large numbers of men were abandoning the field on Stevenson's left—deserting their comrades who, in this moment of greatest trial, stood manfully at their posts—I rode up to General Stevenson, and informing him that I had repeatedly ordered two brigades of General Loring's division to his assistance, and that I was momentarily expecting them, asked him whether he could hold his position. He replied that he could not; that he was fighting from sixty thousand to eighty thousand men. I then told him I would endeavor myself to find General Loring, and hasten him up, and started immediately with that object. I presently met Brigadier-General Buford's brigade, of Loring's division, on the march, and in rear of the right of Bowen's division.

Colonel Cockrell, commanding the First Missouri brigade, having in person, some time previously, urgently asked for reinforcements, which (none of Loring's troops having come up) I was then unable to give him, one regiment of Buford's brigade was detached at once, and directed to his support; the remainder of Buford's brigade was moved as rapidly as possible to the assistance of General Stevenson. Finding that the enemy's vastly superior numbers were pressing all my forces engaged steadily back into old fields, where all advantages of position would be in his favor, I felt it to be too late to save the day, even should Brigadier-General Featherstone's brigade, of General Loring's division, come up immediately. I could, however, learn nothing of General Loring's whereabouts; several of my staff were in search of him, but it was not until after General Bowen had personally informed me that he could not hold his position longer, and not until after I had ordered the retreat, that General Loring with Featherstone's brigade, moving, as I subsequently learned, by a country road, which was considerably longer than the direct route, reached the position on the left, known as Champion's Hill, where he was forming line of battle, when he received my orders to cover the retreat. Had the movement in support of the left been promptly made when first ordered, it is not improbable that I might have maintained my position, and it is possible the enemy might have been driven back, though his vastly superior and constantly increasing numbers would have rendered it necessary to withdraw during the night, to save my communications with Vicksburg. Early in the day, Major Lockett, Chief Engineer, had been instructed to throw a bridge across Baker's Creek, on the Raymond road. The stream had also fallen sufficiently to render the ford practicable. The retreat was ordered to be conducted by that route, and a staff officer immediately dispatched to Brigadier-General Tilghman, who was directed to hold the Raymond road at all hazards. It was in the execution of this important trust, which could not have been confided to a fitter man, that the lamented General bravely lost his life. He was struck by a fragment of shell, and died almost instantly. Although, as before stated, a large number of men had shamefully abandoned their commands, and were making their way to the rear, the main body of the troops retired in good order. On reaching the ford and bridge at Baker's Creek, I directed Brigadier-General Bowen to take position with his division on the west bank, and to hold the crossing until Loring's division, which was directed to bring up the rear, had effected their passage.

I then proceeded at once to the intrenched line covering the wagon and railroad bridges over the Big Black, to make the necessary arrangements for holding that point during the passage of the river.

In his official report, Major-General Stevenson says: "On my arrival, about sunset, at the ford on Baker's Creek, I found that the enemy had crossed the bridge above, and were advancing artillery in the direction of the road on which we were moving; one battery had already taken position, and was playing on the road, but at right angles and with too long a range to prevent the passage of troops. Here I found on the west side the brigades of General Green and Colonel Cockrell, of Bowen's division, who had there halted and taken up position to hold the point until Loring's division could cross. I found Colonel Scott, of the Twelfth Louisiana regiment of Loring's division, halted about one-half mile from the ford, on the east side, and directed him to cross. I there addressed a note to General Loring, informing him of what I had done, telling him of the change I had caused Colonel Scott to make in his position, stating that, with the troops then there and others that I could collect, I would hold the ford and road until his division could cross, and urging him to hasten the movement. To this note I received no answer, but in a short time Colonel Scott moved off his regiment quickly in the direction

of his original position, in obedience, I was informed, to orders from General Loring. Inferring from this that General Loring did not intend to cross at that ford, he having had ample time to commence the movement, I suggested to General Green and Colonel Cockrell to move forward to the Railroad Bridge. My command reached that point at about one o'clock that night, and bivouacked near Bovina."

The entire train of the army, under the judicious management of Colonel A. W. Reynolds, commanding Tennessee brigade of Stevenson's division, was crossed without loss, though the movement of the enemy compelled Colonel Reynolds' brigade to cross the Big Black above the Railroad Bridge. On reaching the line of intrenchments occupied by Brigadier-General Vaughn's brigade of East Tennesseans (Smith's division), he was instructed by myself in person to man the trenches from the railroad to the left; his artillery to remain as then posted, and all wagons to cross the river at once. Special instructions were left with Lieutenant J. H. Morrison, A. D. C., to be delivered to Generals Loring, Stevenson, and Bowen, as they should arrive, and were delivered to all except General Loring, as follows:

General Stevenson's division to cross the river and proceed to Mount Alban.

General Loring's to cross and occupy the west bank.

Brigadier-General Bowen's division, as it should arrive, was directed to occupy the trenches to the right and left of Vaughn's, and his artillery to be parked, that it might be available for any point of the lines most threatened.

General Stevenson's division arriving very late in the night, did not move beyond Bovina, and I awaited in vain intelligence of the approach of General Loring. It was necessary to hold the position to enable him to cross the river, should the enemy—which was probable—follow him closely up. For this purpose alone I continued the troops in position, until it was too late to withdraw them under cover of night. I then determined not to abandon so strong a front whilst there was yet a hope of his arrival. I have not, up to this time, received General Loring's report of the share taken by his division in the battle of Baker's Creek, nor have I yet been informed of the reason why he failed to rejoin the army under my command.

The Big Black River, where it is crossed by the Railroad Bridge, makes a bend somewhat in the shape of a horse-shoe; across this horse-shoe, at its narrowest part, a line of rifle-pits had been constructed, making an excellent cover for infantry, and at proper intervals dispositions were made for field artillery. The line of pits ran nearly north and south, and was about one mile in length. North of, and for a considerable distance south of the railroad and of the dirt road to Edwards' Depot, nearly parallel with it, extended a bayou, which, in itself, opposed a serious obstacle to an assault upon the pits. This line abutted north on the river and south upon a cypress brake, which spread itself nearly to the bank of the river. In addition to the Railroad Bridge, which I had caused to be floored for the passage even of artillery and wagons, the steamer "Dot," from which the machinery had been taken, was converted into a bridge, by placing her fore and aft across the river. Between the works and the bridge, about three-quarters of a mile, the country was open, being either old or cultivated fields, affording no cover should the troops be driven from the trenches.

East and south of the railroad, the topographical features of the country, over which the enemy must necessarily pass, were similar to those above described; but north of the railroad, and about three hundred yards in front of the rifle-pits, a copse of woods extended from the road to the river. Our line was manned on the right by the gallant Cockrell's Missouri brigade; the extreme left by Brigadier-General Green's Missouri and Arkansas men, both of Bowen's division, and the centre by Brigadier-General Vaughn's brigade of East Tennesseans, in all about four thousand (4,000) men, as many as could be advantageously employed in defending the line, with about twenty (20) pieces of field artillery.

So strong was the position that my greatest, almost only, apprehension was a flank movement by Bridgeport or Baldwin's Ferry, which would have endangered my communications with Vicksburg; yet this position was abandoned by our troops almost without a struggle, and with the loss of nearly all our artillery. I speak not now of the propriety or of the necessity of holding this position; I had, as heretofore, noticed my object in doing so; I considered that object sufficient, and I also deemed the force employed for the purpose ample.

Brigadier-General Vaughn's brigade had not been engaged at Baker's Creek; his men were fresh, and I believed were not demoralized. I knew that the Missouri troops, under their gallant leaders, could be depended upon. By whose order the battery horses were so far removed from their guns, as not to be available, I do not know; it certainly was not by mine.

General Bowen, with whom I had had a personal interview in his tent on the night of the sixteenth, and who received my instructions from my own lips (Lieutenant-Colonel Montgomery, of Lieutenant-General E. K. Smith's staff, being then present, and acting as my A. D. C.), I do not believe to be responsible for it; he was too old and too good a soldier; enough, however, will, I think, be developed in a few words to cover the whole case. Early in the morning of the seventeenth, the enemy opened his artillery at long range, and very soon pressed forward with infantry into the copse of wood north of the railroad; about the same time he opened on Colonel Cockrell's position with two batteries and advanced a line of skirmishers, throwing forward a column of infantry, which was quickly driven back by our batteries. Pretty heavy skirmishing was for a time kept up along our

whole line; but presently the enemy, who had massed a large force in the woods immediately north of the railroad, advanced at a run, with loud cheers. Our troops in their front did not remain to receive them, but broke and fled precipitately. One portion of the line being broken, it very soon became a matter of *sauve qui peut*.

I shall only add, with reference to the affair of Big Black, that a strong position with an ample force of infantry and artillery to hold it, was shamefully abandoned almost without resistance.

The troops occupying the centre did not do their duty; with an almost impassable bayou between themselves and the enemy, they fled before the enemy had reached that obstacle.

I have received no report from Brigadier-General Vaughn of the operations of his brigade on this occasion. Colonel Cockrell says, in his official report: "After a lively skirmish-fire had been kept up for some time along our whole front, I saw the line between the railroad and first skirt of timber, north of the railroad, beginning to give way, and then running in disorder. I watched this disorderly falling back a few minutes, when I saw that the enemy had possession of the trenches north of the railroad, and were rapidly advancing towards the bridge, our only crossing and way of escape; the enemy now being nearer this crossing than my line, I therefore ordered the brigade to fall back, and, moving rapidly, gained the bridge, crossed over, and re-formed on the west bank of the river, north of the railroad."

Colonel Gates, commanding Second brigade, Bowen's division, says, in his official report: "They (the enemy) formed their men on the river, in the timber, where we could not see them. They brought their men out by the right flank, in column of four, about one hundred and forty yards in front of my regiment at a double-quick. I then opened a most terrific fire upon them and kept it up until the brigade had passed out of my sight behind a grove of timber, immediately upon my right; they moved so as to strike the trenches occupied by Brigadier-General Vaughn's brigade—so I am informed. I do not know whose troops were there, but it was immediately on the right of Green's brigade. After they had passed me I listened for our men to open a heavy volley on my right and drive the enemy back; upon not hearing any firing on the right, I directed Lieutenant-Colonel Law to mount his horse and go to General Green and know whether the centre was holding their position or not. Colonel Law returned in a few minutes and said that General Green ordered me to fall back. I did so at once. After I had got back below the bend of the river I discovered that they had crossed the ditches and were between me and the bridge." In this precipitate retreat but little order was observed, the object of all being to reach the bridge as rapidly as possible; many were unable to do so, but effected their escape by swimming the river; some were drowned in the attempt; a considerable number unable to swim, and others too timid to expose themselves to the fire of the enemy by an effort to escape, remained in the trenches and were made prisoners. In this connection, I deem it my duty to make the following extract from the report of Colonel Cockrell: "Captain T. B. Wilson, of the Second infantry, Company G, claiming to have been exhausted, did not go with his company into the battle of Baker's Creek, and having made his way to Big Black, joined his company in the rifle-pits early on the morning of the seventeenth instant, and when his company was ordered to fall back, abandoned his company and remained lying in the rifle-pits and was captured by the enemy, and whilst a prisoner stated to Colonel Elijah Gates, of the First Missouri cavalry, who was also a prisoner, that he, Captain Wilson, intended to take the oath and then go to fighting the enemy as a guerilla. Such conduct merits a dismissal in disgrace, and such an officer should not remain in the way of gallant and efficient officers, now commanding his company." In this opinion I fully concur.

Neither Brigadier-General Bowen nor Green had furnished reports of the action on Big Black previous to their death. To the former had been intrusted the defence of the *tete de pont*, and he had received my instructions in person. The latter had been second in command. Brigadier-General Vaughn having failed to render his report, I am dependent for the particulars of the action upon those of Colonels Gates and Cockrell, which are respectfully forwarded herewith.

Major Lockett, Chief Engineer, was instructed to fire both bridges after seeing that all the troops had crossed. This was effectually accomplished under his personal supervision. The guns in position were ample for the defence, but the infantry failing to support them, they were abandoned; such as were not in position were safely brought from the field, placed in battery on the bluff on the west bank, and with others already established, and a sufficient force of infantry, held the advancing columns of the enemy effectually in check.

It had become painfully apparent to me that the morale of my army was not such as to justify an attempt to hold the line of the Big Black River. Not only was it greatly weakened by the absence of General Loring's division, but also by the large number of stragglers, who, having abandoned their commands, were already making their way into Vicksburg. The enemy, by flank movements on my left, by Bridgeport, and on my right by Baldwin's or other ferries, might reach Vicksburg almost simultaneously with myself, or perhaps interpose a heavy force between me and that city. Under these circumstances nothing remained but to retire the army within the defences of Vicksburg, and to endeavor as speedily as possible to re-organize the depressed and discomfited troops. Orders were accordingly

issued at ten A. M., and Major-General Stevenson directed to conduct the retreat, which was executed without haste and in good order. I myself proceeded at once to Vicksburg to prepare for its defence. I think it due to myself, in bringing this portion of my report to a conclusion, to state emphatically that the advance movement of the army from Edwards' Depot, on the afternoon of the fifteenth of May, was made against my judgment, in opposition to my previously expressed intentions, and to the subversion of my matured plans. In one contingency alone I had determined to move towards Jackson; the safety of Vicksburg was of paramount importance — under no circumstances could I abandon my communication with it; a sufficient force must also be left to defend the river front of the city—the approaches by Chickasaw Bayou, by Snyder's Mills, and Warrenton, against a *coup de main*. My effective aggregate did not exceed twenty-eight thousand; at least eight thousand would be required for these purposes; it would also be necessary to hold the bridges across the Big Black, on the line of the Southern Railroad. With these deductions my movable army might reach eighteen thousand. I give this number as the maximum. In the event, therefore, of the enemy advancing with his whole force east of the Mississippi River against Jackson, my communications by the shortest line being open, would have enabled me to move upon his rear. General Johnston's forces and my own might have formed a junction, or have attacked simultaneously in front and rear; but I did not think it would be wise to attempt to execute this plan until the arrival of expected reinforcements at or near Jackson; hence I received General Johnson's instructions on the morning of the fourteenth to move to Clinton with all the force I could quickly collect, with great regret, and I well remember that, in the presence of one or more of my staff officers, I remarked in substance, "such a movement will be suicidal." Nevertheless, notifying General Johnston of the fact, I took measures for an advance movement at once—not, it is true, directly towards Clinton, but in the only direction which, from my knowledge of the circumstances surrounding me, I thought offered a possibility of success. Had I moved directly to Clinton the enemy would not have given me battle in front, but would have interposed a force greater than my own between me and Vicksburg. It is only necessary to refer to the maps accompanying this report to see how feasible was such a movement. I have already given, in the body of this report, the two letters of instructions from General Johnston, dated respectively the thirteenth and fifteenth of May, 1863. In obedience to the injunctions contained in the former, which was received on the morning of the fourteenth, I lost no time in putting my army in motion in the direction already stated, and for the reasons given. About seven A. M., on the sixteenth, I received the latter, which reiterated the previous instructions. I had in no measure changed my views as to the propriety of the movement therein indicated, but I no longer felt at liberty to deviate from General Johnston's positive orders; he had been made aware of my views and did not sustain them. The order of march was at once reversed, but the army was hardly in motion before it became necessary to form line of battle to meet the greatly superior forces of the enemy. About six P. M., on the sixteenth, whilst on the retreat, the following communication was handed to me:

"CAMP SEVEN MILES FROM JACKSON, May 14, 1863.

"GENERAL: The body of troops mentioned in my note of last night compelled Brigadier-General Gregg and his command to evacuate Jackson about noon to-day, the necessity of taking the Canton road at right angles to that upon which the enemy approaches prevented an obstinate defence.

"A body of troops reported this morning to have reached Raymond last night, advanced at the same time from that direction. Prisoners say it was McPherson's corps (four divisions) which marched from Clinton; I have no certain information of the other; both skirmished very cautiously. Telegrams were dispatched when the enemy was near, directing General Gist to assemble the approaching troops at a point forty or fifty miles from Jackson, and General Maxcey to return to his wagons and provide for the security of his brigade, for instance, by joining General Gist. That body of troops will be able, I hope, to prevent the enemy in Jackson, from drawing provisions from the east, and this one may be able to keep him from the country towards Panola. Can he supply himself from the Mississippi? Can you not cut him off from it? And above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him? As soon as the reinforcements are all up they must be united to the rest of the army. I am anxious to see a force assemble that may be able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy.

"Would it not be better to place the forces to support Vicksburg between General Loring and that place, and merely observe the ferries, so that you might unite if opportunity to fight presented itself?

"General Gregg will move towards Canton tomorrow. If prisoners tell the truth, the force at Jackson must be half of Grant's army. It would decide the campaign to beat it; which can only be done by concentrating, especially when the remainder of the Eastern troops arrive; they are to be twelve thousand to thirteen thousand.

"Most respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,
"(Signed) J. E. JOHNSTON."

It will be observed that General Johnston's letter of the fifteenth, which caused me to reverse my column with the view of marching to Clinton, was received before the retreat commenced, and about eleven hours earlier than the

one of the fourteenth, just presented. I know nothing of the causes which produced this result, but I respectfully invite attention to the fact that in this letter of the fourteenth, General Johnston suggests that very movement which I had made, and for the purpose I had indicated.

After expressing the hope that certain dispositions made by himself might prevent the enemy from drawing provisions from the east, or from the country towards Panola, he says, "Can he supply himself from the Mississippi? Can you not cut him off from it, and above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him?" I have introduced General Johnston's letter entire, that the context as well as that portion to which I have particularly called attention may be considered. I had resisted the popular clamor for an advance, which began from the moment the enemy set his polluting foot upon the eastern bank of the Mississippi River. I had resisted the universal sentiment, I believe, of the army, I know of my general officers, in its favor, and yielded only to the orders of my superiors. I was not invited by General Johnston to submit my plans to him for his consideration; it is, therefore, unnecessary now to speak of them.

One of the immediate results of the retreat from the Big Black was the necessity of abandoning our defences on the Yazoo, at Snyder's Mills; that position, and the line of Chickasaw Bayou were no longer tenable.

All stores that could be transported were ordered to be sent into Vicksburg as rapidly as possible—the rest, including heavy guns, to be destroyed. There was at this time a large quantity of corn, probably twenty-five thousand or thirty thousand bushels, on boats, much of which might have been brought in, had it been possible to furnish the necessary wagons. The boats were sent up the river. Two companies were directed to remain at Snyder's Mills, making a show of force until the approach of the enemy by land should compel them to retire; to them was intrusted the duty of forwarding all stores possible, and of destroying the remainder. This detachment rejoined its command in Vicksburg on the morning of the eighteenth. Every precaution was taken to guard the important approaches to the city by Forney's and Smith's divisions, while the troops which had been engaged in the battles of the sixteenth and seventeenth were bivouacked in rear of the intrenchments. During these battles the troops of Major-General Forney's division were disposed as follows:

Brigadier-General Hèbert's brigade occupied the line along the Yazoo River, from Haines' Bluff to the Mississippi, including the approaches by Chickasaw Bayou. Brigadier-General Moore's brigade, with the Mississippi State troops, under General Harris, attached (about six hundred), guarded the river-front at Warrenton, and the approaches from the lower ferries on Big Black River. Brigadier-General Shoupe's brigade, of Major-General Smith's division, guarded the river-front of the city. Brigadier-General Baldwin's brigade, with Waul's Legion attached, guarded the approaches to the city from the Hall's Ferry road around to the Railroad Bridge on the Big Black; the heavy artillery at the batteries on the river-front, under Colonel Higgins.

Brigadier-General Moore's brigade was drawn in at once from Warrenton, and placed in the intrenchments on either side of the Baldwin's Ferry road.

Brigadier-General Hèbert's brigade arrived before daylight on the eighteenth, bringing with it all the light pieces, and, in addition, two twenty-pounder Parrotts and a Whitworth gun. This brigade immediately occupied the intrenchments on both sides of the Jackson road. On the morning of the eighteenth the troops were disposed from right to left, as follows:

Major-General Stevenson's division of four brigades, occupied the line from the Warrenton road, including a portion of the river-front to the railroad—a distance of about five miles; Major-General Forney, with two brigades, the line between the railroad and the Graveyard road—about two miles; and Major-General Smith, with three brigades, the Mississippi State troops, and a small detachment from Loring's division, the line from the Graveyard road to the river-front on the north—about one and a quarter miles. Brigadier-General Bowen's division was held in reserve to strengthen any portion of the line most threatened, and Waul's Texas Legion (about five hundred) was in reserve, especially to support the right of Moore's or the left of Lee's brigades. On the entire line about one hundred and two pieces of artillery, of different calibre, principally field, were placed in position at such points as were deemed most suitable to the character of the gun; changes of location being made when occasion called for it. An engineer officer under the supervision of Major Lockett, Chief Engineer of the Department, was assigned to each division, with an assistant to each brigade commander. Daily reports were made through the proper channel to Major Lockett of the operations of the Engineer Department, and of the progress of the enemy's works. Major Lockett thus kept me constantly informed of all important changes, making, himself, a daily report.

Instructions had been given from Bovina that all cattle, sheep, and hogs belonging to private parties and likely to fall into the hands of the enemy, should be driven within our lines. A large amount of fresh meat was secured in this way. The same instructions were given in regard to corn, and all disposable wagons applied to this end.

On the eighteenth, Colonel Wirt Adams, who had been previously directed to cross to the west bank of the Big Black with all his cavalry, was notified that Snyder's Mills would be abandoned, and that he was expected to operate on

the flank and rear of the enemy, with the view of cutting off his supplies in that direction. Colonel Adams's force was, however, very inadequate to this purpose.

During the night of the seventeenth, nothing of importance occurred. Most of the artillery was speedily placed in position on the lines, and immediate measures were taken to arm all men, who had either unavoidably lost, or who had thrown away, their arms on the retreat. General Johnston was notified, on the seventeenth, of the results of the battle of Baker's Creek and Big Black, and informed that I had in consequence been compelled to evacuate Snyder's Mills. About noon of the eighteenth May, whilst engaged in an inspection of the intrenchments, with Major Lockett, my Chief Engineer, and several of my General officers, the enemy was reported to be advancing by the Jackson road. Just at this moment the following communication was received by courier:

"CAMP BETWEEN LIVINGSTON AND BROWNSVILLE,
"May 17, 1863.

"*Lieutenant-General Pemberton:*

"Your dispatch of to-day, by Captain Henderson, was received. If Haines' Bluff is untenable, Vicksburg is of no value, and cannot be held. If, therefore, you are invested in Vicksburg, you must ultimately surrender. Under such circumstances, instead of losing both troops and place, we must, if possible, save the troops. If it is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies, and march to the northeast.

"Most respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,
"(Signed) J. E. JOHNSTON,
"General."

The evacuation of Vicksburg! It meant the loss of the valuable stores and munitions of war collected for its defence; the fall of Port Hudson; the surrender of the Mississippi River, and the severance of the Confederacy.

These were mighty interests, which, had I deemed the evacuation practicable, in the sense in which I interpreted General Johnston's instructions, might well have made me hesitate to execute them. I believed it to be in my power to hold Vicksburg. I knew and appreciated the earnest desire of the government and of the people that it should be held. I knew, perhaps better than any other individual, under all the circumstances, its capacity for defence.

As long ago as the seventeenth of February last, in a letter addressed to his Excellency the President, I had suggested the possibility of the investment of Vicksburg by land and water, and for that reason the necessity of ample supplies of ammunition, as well as of subsistence, to stand a siege. My application met his favorable consideration, and additional ammunition was ordered. With proper economy of subsistence and ordnance stores, I knew that I could stand a siege. I had a firm reliance on the desire of the President and of General Johnston to do all that could be done to raise a siege. I felt that every effort would be made, and I believed it would be successful. With these convictions in my own mind, I immediately summoned a council of war, composed of all my General officers. I laid before them General Johnston's communication, but desired them to confine the expression of their opinions to the question of practicability. Having obtained their views, the following communication was addressed to General Johnston:

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF MISSISSIPPI AND
"EAST LOUISIANA,
"VICKSBURG, May 18, 1863.

"*General J. E. Johnston:*

"GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communication in reply to mine, by the hands of Captain Henderson. In a subsequent letter of same date as this letter, I informed you that the men had failed to hold the trenches at Big Black Bridge, and that, as a consequence, Snyder's Mills was directed to be abandoned.

"On the receipt of your communication, I immediately assembled a council of war of the General officers of this command, and having laid your instructions before them, asked the free expression of their opinions as to the practicability of carrying them out. The opinion was unanimously expressed that it was impossible to withdraw the army from this position with such *morale* and material as to be of further service to the Confederacy. While the council of war was assembled, the guns of the enemy opened on the works, and it was at the same time reported that they were crossing the Yazoo River at Brandon's Ferry, above Snyder's Mills. I have decided to hold Vicksburg as long as is possible, with the firm hope that the government may yet be able to assist me in keeping this obstruction to the enemy's free navigation of the Mississippi River. I still conceive it to be the most important point in the Confederacy.

"Very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,
"J. C. PEMBERTON,
"Lieutenant-General."

The development of the intrenched line from the extreme right of Major-General Stevenson's position to the left of Major-General Smith's was about eight miles, the shortest defensible line of which the topography of the country admitted. The plan was submitted to me immediately after I assumed command of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, in the latter part of October, 1862—was approved and ordered to be carried out with the utmost dispatch. Similar instructions were about the same time given for fortifying the strong position at Snyder's Mills; and the line of defence of Port Hudson was also ordered to be commenced at once. The line of defence around the city of Vicksburg consisted, as is shown on the map accompanying the report of Major Lockett, Chief Engineer, of a system of detached works (redans, lunettes and redoubts), on the promi-

nent and commanding points, with the usual profile of raised field-works, connected in most cases by rifle-pits. To man the entire line I was able to bring into the trenches about eighteen thousand five hundred muskets; but it was absolutely necessary to keep a reserve already to reinforce any point heavily threatened. It became indispensable, therefore, to reduce the number in the trenches to the minimum, capable of holding them until a reserve could come to their aid. It was also necessary that the reserve should be composed among the best and most reliable; accordingly, Bowen's division (about two thousand four hundred men), and Waul's Texas Legion (about five hundred), were designated for that purpose, thus reducing the force in the trenches to little less than fifteen thousand five hundred men. The legion was on the eighteenth assigned as a reserve to Forney's division, and was held in rear of Brigadier-General Moore's right; but in the evening of the nineteenth was transferred to Stevenson's division; and during the remainder of the siege was held in rear of Brigadier-General Lee's brigade, occupying one of the most exposed and important positions on the whole line. On the night of the seventeenth, and during the eighteenth, Major-General Smith, misapprehending my instructions, given him immediately after my return from the Big Black, had occupied an outer line of defense on the range of hills north of the Fort Hill road. This line had undoubtedly some advantages; it was within six hundred yards of the inner line, and partially commanded one of our most important river batteries. I considered, however, that the increased length which would be necessarily given to the whole line of defence, the intervening valley, and other objections to its occupation, more than counterbalanced the advantage; the troops and artillery were, therefore, on the night of the eighteenth, silently and safely withdrawn, and General Smith's division occupied the inner line during the remainder of the siege. The enemy had, however, made during the day a demonstration with artillery and infantry on his position; and early on the morning of the nineteenth he occupied the abandoned heights. During the day there was constant and heavy skirmishing along the left of our centre on the Graveyard road, accompanied with brisk artillery fire; in the afternoon the enemy made a charge on Smith's right and Forney's left, but was severely repulsed, losing two stands of colors. Later, their sharpshooters and artillery opened heavily on the Jackson and Baldwin's Ferry roads. A courier was dispatched with the following telegram to the President:

"We are occupying the trenches around Vicksburg; the enemy is investing it, and will probably attempt an assault. Our men have considerably recovered their *morale*, but unless a large force is sent at once to relieve it, Vicksburg before long must fall. I have used every effort to prevent all this, but in vain."

May 20.

The enemy continued to move from our right, with heavy cannonading towards the centre and left, three guns temporarily disabled. At noon, the mortar-fleet of Admiral Porter took position on the west side of the peninsula and commenced the bombardment of the city. The following dispatch was forwarded by courier to General Johnston: "The enemy assaulted our intrenched lines yesterday at two points, centre and left, and was repulsed with heavy loss. Our loss small. I cannot estimate the enemy's force now engaged around Vicksburg at less than sixty thousand, it is probably more. At this hour, 8:30 A. M., he is briskly cannonading with long-range guns; that we may save ammunition, his fire is rarely returned. At present our main necessity is musket-caps; can you send them to me by hands of couriers or citizens? An army will be necessary to relieve Vicksburg, and that quickly; will it not be sent? Please let me hear from you if possible."

May 21.

The fire from the mortar-fleet continued without intermission, accompanied by heavy artillery and musketry fire from the rear, to which but slight response was given. Several guns were dismounted and a number of officers and men killed and wounded. In the afternoon the enemy's gunboats steamed up and threw a number of shells into the city, but without material damage. Anticipating an attack on the right, General Bowen was ordered to hold his command in readiness to assist the threatened point, and that the safety of the magazines might be secured from the possible danger of disloyal persons within the lines, General Stevenson was ordered to organize a guard for their protection from among the most reputable of the citizens, and to place the guard under the command of a commissioned officer. The prospect of a protracted siege, and the uncertainty as to how many assaults we might have to repel, and in view of the possibility of having to march out from our intrenchments to meet and co-operate with an assisting army expected under General Johnston, rendered it a matter of vital importance that every charge of ammunition on hand should be hoarded with the most zealous care. The amount of ammunition in Vicksburg, though large, would not have sufficed for an unlimited daily expenditure for a protracted period. The importance of the most rigid economy, therefore, in its use was apparent, and strict orders were consequently issued against all picket skirmishing and artillery duels where neither served any useful purpose. These orders were repeated as occasion required. It being impracticable to continue feeding the large number of mules and horses then in Vicksburg, General Stevenson was directed to have them driven beyond the lines for pasturage, or, if practicable, to send them, in charge of a detail, to General Johnston. By this means we were relieved of a serious encumbrance which

would else have drawn heavily upon our limited supplies of forage. Another courier was to-day sent to General Johnston with the following dispatches: "During the past two days the enemy has passed up the river in transports in large force for a point not yet discovered."

"The enemy has continued a spirited fire all day, also his shelling from mortar boats. Our men have replied rarely. Two large transports came down loaded with troops; they are evidently reinforcing their present large force. Am I to expect reinforcements? from what direction, and how soon? Have you heard nothing from General Loring? Can you send me musket-caps by courier?"

"The enemy kept up incessant sharpshooting all yesterday on the left and centre, and picked off our officers and men whenever they showed themselves. Their artillery fire was very heavy, ploughed up our works considerably and dismounted two guns on the centre; the works were repaired and the guns replaced last night. The great question is ammunition. The men credit, and are encouraged by, a report that you are near with a large force. They are fighting in good spirits, and the reorganization is complete."

"P. S.—Brisk musketry and artillery fire to-day on the centre. Three guns there dismounted—will be replaced as far as possible. Officers suffer most from their sharpshooters. Incessant mortar firing from the river, and last night three of their gunboats engaged the lower batteries."

May 22.

The fire from the enemy's artillery and sharpshooters from the rear was heavy and incessant until noon, when his gunboats opened upon the city, while a determined assault was made along Moore's, Hebèrts, and Lee's lines. I cannot bet ter describe this assault than by the following extracts from the official reports of my several division commanders. General Stevenson says, in his report:

"On the morning of the twenty-second of May, many indications showed that they (the enemy) contemplated an assault upon the line of General Lee. A tremendous artillery fire was opened and kept up for about two hours, while the fire of their large force of sharpshooters was heavy and incessant. At about one o'clock P. M., a heavy force moved out to the assault, making a gallant charge. They were allowed to approach unmolested until within good musket range, when every available gun was opened upon them with grape and canister, and the men rising in the trenches poured into their ranks volley after volley with so deadly an effect that, leaving the ground literally covered in some places with their dead and wounded, they precipitately retreated."

The angle of one of our redoubts having been breached by their artillery previous to the assault, when the repulse occurred, a party of about sixty of the enemy, under the command of a Lieutenant-Colonel, made a rush and succeeded in effecting lodgments in the ditch at the foot of the redoubt, and planted two colors on the parapet. It was of vital importance to drive them out, and upon a call for volunteers for that purpose, two companies of Waul's Texas Legion, commanded respectively by Captain Bradley and Lieutenant Hoague, accompanied by the gallant and chivalrous Colonel E. W. Pettus, of the Twentieth Alabama regiment, musket in hand, promptly presented themselves for the hazardous service. Of their success and the manner in which it was achieved, General Stevenson says:

"A more gallant feat than this has not illustrated our annals during the war. The preparations were quietly and quickly made, but the enemy seemed at once to divine our purpose, and opened upon the angle a terrible fire of shot, shell, and musketry; undaunted, this little band—its chivalrous commander at its head—rushed upon the works and in less time than it requires to describe it, it and the flags were in our possession. Preparations were then quickly made for the use of hand-grenades, when the enemy in the ditch, being informed of our purpose, immediately surrendered."

General Forney, in his report, speaking of the assault upon our intrenchments, says:

"On the twenty-second of May he assaulted three points on my line, as follows: Three times on my extreme left and extending to General Smith's front; twice on the Jackson road, and twice on the Baldwin's Ferry road, at eleven A. M., and five P. M. These assaults were made by larger bodies, and apparently with more determination than those of the nineteenth of May. Colonel Waul's Legion had previously been sent to General Stevenson, but Green's brigade of Bowen's division, was in reserve behind my right, and assisted in repelling the attack at that point. There were also, on this day, two Louisiana regiments, of Smith's division, in reserve behind my division. The enemy was repulsed in each of his attempts, though he succeeded in getting a few men into our exterior ditches at each point of attack, from which they were, however, driven before night. Hand-grenades were used at each point with good effect. A color banner and two stands of colors were captured by the Second Texas regiment of Moore's brigade. On this day the casualties in my division were forty-two killed and ninety-five wounded. The loss of the enemy must have reached two thousand."

General Smith, in his report of this assault, says:

"The twenty-second passed in the same manner until about two P. M., when a column was discovered advancing against the right of Shoupe's brigade. It was immediately driven back; another then approached on the right of the centre. This was dispersed without great effort, and with considerable loss. Again the enemy appeared in increased force on my right and Forney's left. He was promptly repulsed with heavy loss. This terminated the day's op-

erations, with the exception of the same heavy fire of musketry and artillery, kept up until dark along my entire front."

After these several decided repulses the enemy seemed to have abandoned the idea of taking by assault, and went vigorously at work to thoroughly invest and attack by regular approaches, and the history of one day is pretty much the history of all.

May 23.

This day was unusually quiet, with but little artillery firing until late in the afternoon. The sharpshooters of the enemy were more cautious, and he was evidently staggered by the severe repulse of the day previous. Many of his dead were still lying unburied in sight of our trenches. The fire from the mortar fleet continued heavy and incessant. At night the engineers were busily engaged repairing in the work in front of Lee, Moore, and Hebert, which were badly shattered.

May 24.

At an early hour the mortar fleet opened and kept a continuous and heavy bombardment throughout the day. Just before dark the artillery from the rear opened a rapid and heavy fire, but not of long duration. In the afternoon the enemy attempted to mine our works on the Jackson road, but were soon driven off by the use of hand-grenades. During the night the engineers were engaged in increasing and strengthening our works. Before daylight our river pickets captured a barge laden with coal, which was sunk, it being found impracticable to unload it. General Stevenson was ordered to have collected all the ammunition scattered in front of our trenches, and to have the cartridge-boxes of the enemy's dead emptied of their contents, it being important to all, in any way, to our limited supply of ammunition and musket-caps especially, of which latter we stood greatly in need, having a million more of cartridges than of caps, without which latter the former could be of no possible value.

May 25.

The enemy appeared in force to-day on the Warrenton and Hall's Ferry roads. The firing was about as usual until about six o'clock, when a cessation of hostilities was agreed to, to permit the enemy to bury his dead, killed in the assault of Friday. The following is the correspondence on the subject:

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF MISSISSIPPI AND EAST LOUISIANA,
"VICKSBURG, May 25, 1863.

"*Commanding General United States Forces in front of Vicksburg:*

"SIR: Two days having elapsed since your dead and wounded have been lying in our front, and, as yet, no disposition on your part of a desire to move them being exhibited; in the name of humanity, I have the honor to propose a cessation of hostilities for two and a half hours, that you may be enabled to remove your dead and dying men. If you cannot do this, on notification from you that hostilities will be suspended on your part for the time specified, I will endeavor to have the dead buried and the wounded cared for.

"Very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,
"J. C. PEMBERTON,
"Lieutenant-General."

To which communication the following reply was received:

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
"NEAR VICKSBURG, May 25, 1863—3.30 P. M.

"*Lieutenant-General J. C. Pemberton, commanding Vicksburg, Miss.:*

"SIR: Your note of this date, proposing a cessation of hostilities for two and a half hours for the purpose of giving me an opportunity of collecting the dead and wounded, is just received. As it will take some time to send word to all my forces to avail themselves of the opportunity afforded, and to return this to you so that notice may be given to your troops of the cessation of hostilities, I will name six o'clock P. M., to-day, as the hour when we will commence collecting any wounded or dead we may have still upon the field. From that hour for two and a half hours all hostilities shall cease on our side.

"Very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,
"(Signed) U. S. GRANT,
"Major-General."

During the day about one hundred prisoners were captured, and a working party was sent to throw up obstructions on the flat below the city. No circumstance worthy of special note occurred between this date and that of the twenty-seventh. The enemy evidently was discouraged by his previous fruitless and costly assaults upon our works in the rear, and he therefore determined, if possible, to attempt to silence our upper battery, and then, by the aid of his gunboats, to effect a lodgment in the trenches immediately above and beyond it. With this design, on the morning of the twenty-seventh, at about nine o'clock, four of his boats engaged our lower batteries; at the same time, the Cincinnati, a turreted iron-clad of the largest class, and carrying fourteen guns, pushed boldly down the river, rounded the peninsula, and was soon hotly engaged with our upper battery at short range. After a spirited engagement of about forty-five minutes, the Cincinnati was rendered a complete wreck, and only escaped total destruction by being run aground on the Mississippi shore, where she is probably still lying. The lower fleet, witnessing her discomfiture, soon drew off, with what damage to themselves it is impossible to say. The firing from our batteries was most excellent, and too much praise cannot be awarded to Colonel Higgins, his officers and men, for their gallantry, coolness, and skill. The enemy still continued to work steadily in completing and strengthening his line of

circumvallation. His fire of musketry and artillery was continuous during each day. Major Mathews, Ordnance Officer, was instructed to have the large number of unexploded Parrott shells scattered around the city sent to Paxton's foundry and re-capped. On the morning of the twenty-ninth, the enemy opened a terrific fire from the rear, and for four hours a storm of shot and shell was rained upon the city, seriously damaging many buildings, killing and wounding a large number of soldiers and citizens. During the day Ellett's marine brigade arrived and anchored at the bend above. Two couriers had arrived from General Johnston on the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth, respectively. The former brought eighteen thousand caps, the latter twenty thousand, and the following dispatch, the first received since the eighteenth:

"May 28, 1863.

"*Lieutenant-General Pemberton:*

"My last note was returned by the bearer. Two hundred thousand caps have been sent. It will be continued as they arrive. Bragg is sending a division; when it comes I will move to you. Which do you think the best route? How and where is the enemy encamped? What is your force?

"(Signed) J. E. JOHNSTON."

The two hundred thousand caps mentioned in the above dispatch were captured by the enemy. I dispatched the following in reply: "Your dispatch of twenty-fifth received this morning, with twenty thousand caps; Fontaine yesterday with eighteen thousand. No messenger from you since the eighteenth. I have eighteen thousand men to man the lines and river-front; no reserves. I do not think you should move with less than thirty or thirty-five thousand men, and then, if possible, towards Snyder's Mills, giving me notice of the time of your approach. The enemy encompasses my lines from right to left flank, occupying all roads. He has three corps: Sherman on my left; McPherson, centre; McClernand on my right; Hurlburt's division from Memphis, and Ellett's marine brigade (the last afloat). Enemy has made several assaults. My men are in good spirits, awaiting your arrival. Since investment we have lost about one thousand men, many officers. You may depend on my holding the place as long as possible. On the twenty-seventh we sunk one of their best iron-clad gunboats."

On the thirtieth, I again dispatched as follows: "Scouts report the enemy to have withdrawn most of his forces from our right yesterday, leaving Hall's Ferry road open, I apprehend, for a movement against you. I expect this courier to return to me."

The meat ration having been reduced one-half, that of sugar, rice, and beans, was largely increased. It was important, above all things, that every encouragement should be given to the troops. With this object in view, I ordered the impressment of chewing-tobacco, and its issue to the troops. This had a very beneficial influence. The enemy kept steadily at work, day and night, and, taking advantage of the cover of the hills, had run his parallels up to within seventy-five yards of our works. He was also mining at different points, and it required the active and constant attention of our engineers to repair at night the damage inflicted upon our works during the day, and to meet his different mines by countermining. Orders were issued to prepare thunder-barrels and petards for the defence of near points, and every precaution taken to check the enemy in his operations, and to delay them as far as possible. On the seventh of June, the following dispatch was sent to General Johnston: "I am still without information from you later than your dispatch of twenty-fifth. The enemy continues to intrench his position around Vicksburg. I have sent out couriers to you almost daily. The same men are constantly in the trenches, but are still in good spirits, expecting your approach. The enemy is so vigilant that it is impossible to obtain reliable information. When may I expect you to move, and in what direction? My subsistence may be put down for about twenty days." On the tenth, I again dispatched as follows: "The enemy bombards day and night from seven mortars on opposite side of peninsula. He also keeps up constant fire on our lines with artillery and sharpshooters. We are losing many officers and men. I am waiting most anxiously to know your intentions. Have heard nothing of you or from you since twenty-fifth of May. I shall endeavor to hold out as long as we have anything to eat. Can you not send me a verbal message by a courier crossing the river above or below Vicksburg, and swimming across again opposite Vicksburg?" Again, on the twelfth, I dispatched as follows: "Courier Walker arrived this morning, with caps. No message from you. Very heavy firing yesterday from mortars and on lines." About this time our provisions, particularly of meat, having become exhausted, General Stevenson was instructed to impress all the cattle in the city, and the Chief Commissary directed to sell only one ration per diem to any officer. He was also instructed to issue for bread equal portions of rice and flour—four ounces each. About the thirteenth, Captain Saunders arrived from Jackson, via Steele's Bayou, with two hundred thousand percussion-caps, and a day or two subsequently I received the following dispatch from General Johnston:

"May 29, 1863.

"I am too weak to save Vicksburg; can do no more than attempt to save you and your garrison. It will be impossible to extricate you unless you co-operate, and we make mutually supporting movements. Communicate your plans and suggestions, if possible."

On the fourteenth and fifteenth, I addressed General Johnston as follows: "Last night Cap-

tain Saunders arrived with two hundred thousand caps, but brought no information as to your position or movements. The enemy is landing troops in large numbers on Louisiana shore, above Vicksburg. They are probably from Memphis, but it may be from Yazoo; I cannot ascertain positively. On the Graveyard road the enemy has run his saps to within twenty-five yards of our works. He will probably attempt to sink a mine; I shall try to thwart him. I am anxiously expecting to hear from you, to arrange for co-operation."

"VICKSBURG, June 15, 1863.

"The enemy has placed several very heavy guns in position against our works, and is approaching then very near by sap. His fire is almost continuous. Our men have no relief—are becoming much fatigued, but are still in pretty good spirits. I think your movement should be made as soon as possible. The enemy is receiving reinforcements. We are living on greatly reduced rations, but I think sufficient for twenty days yet." The enemy had now placed in position on the peninsula several very heavy guns, the fire of which was very destructive, and though repeated attempts were made we could not succeed in silencing them. On the nineteenth, the following telegram was sent to General Johnston: "The enemy opened all his batteries on our lines about half-past three o'clock this morning, and continued the heaviest fire we have yet sustained, until eight o'clock, but he did not assault our works. Artillery is reported to have been distinctly heard about two o'clock A. M., towards and east of Snyder's Mills, supposed to have been an engagement with your troops. On the Graveyard road the enemy's works are within twenty-five feet of our redan, also very close on Jackson and Baldwin's Ferry roads. I hope you will advance with the least possible delay. My men have been thirty-four days and nights in trenches without relief, and the enemy within conversation distance. We are living on very reduced rations, and, as you know, are entirely isolated. What aid am I to expect from you? The bearer, Captain Wise, can be confided in." On the night of the twenty-second a party from Cumming's Georgia brigade, Stevenson's division, made a gallant sortie on the Hall's Ferry road, and captured a Lieutenant-Colonel and twelve men, with their intrenching tools, &c. On the night of the twenty-third a heavy skirmish occurred in front of Cummings's line for the possession of a picket-station, which resulted in the repulse of the enemy. Under date of the twenty-first, the following dispatch was sent out to General Johnston:

"Your dispatches of fourteenth and sixteenth received. If it is absolutely impossible in your opinion to raise the siege with our combined forces, and that nothing more can be done than to extricate this garrison, I suggest that, giving me full information in time to act, you move by the north of the railroad, drive in the enemy's pickets at night, and at daylight next morning, engage him heavily with skirmishers, occupying him during the entire day, and that on that night, I move by the Warrenton road, by Hankinson's Ferry, to which point you should previously send a brigade of cavalry, with two field batteries to build a bridge there, and hold that ferry; also Hall's and Baldwin's to cover my crossing at Hankinson's. I shall not be able to move with my artillery, and wagons. I suggest this as the best plan, because all the other roads are too strongly intrenched, and the enemy in too heavy force for a reasonable prospect of success, unless you move in sufficient force to compel him to abandon his communications with Snyder's, which I still hope we may be able to do. I await your orders. Captain Cooper understands all my views, and will explain further."

I insert here two dispatches from General Johnston, one of which is acknowledged in my letter above:

"June 14, 1863.

"All that we can attempt is to save you and your garrison. To do this exact co-operation is indispensable. By fighting the enemy simultaneously, at the same point of the line, you may be extricated. Our joint forces cannot raise the siege of Vicksburg. My communications with the rear can best be preserved by operating north of the railroad. Inform me, as soon as possible, what point will suit you best. Your dispatch of the twelfth received. General Taylor with eight thousand men will endeavor to open communication with you from Richmond."

"June 22, 1863.

"Your dispatch of the fifteenth received. General Taylor is sent by General E. K. Smith to co-operate with you from the west bank of the river, to throw in supplies, and to cross with his force if expedient and practicable. I will have the means of moving towards the enemy in a day or two, and will try to make a diversion in your favor, and, if possible, communicate with you, though I fear my force is too small to effect the latter. I have only two-thirds of the force you told messenger Saunders to state to me the least with which I ought to make an attempt. Scouts report the enemy fortifying towards us, and the roads blocked. If I can do nothing to relieve you, rather than surrender the garrison endeavor to cross the river at the last moment, if you and General Taylor communicate."

Late in the afternoon of the twenty-fifth the enemy exploded his first mine, under the parapet of General Forney's works. In his official report that officer says: "The explosion effected a breach through which the enemy immediately attempted to charge, but was promptly and gallantly repulsed. The Sixth Missouri regiment, which had been held in reserve, was on the spot immediately after the explosion, and its commander, Colonel Eugene Irwin, was instantly killed while attempting to lead a charge over the

works. Six men of the Forty-third Mississippi regiment, who were in the shaft countermining at the time of the explosion, were buried and lost. At dark the enemy had possessed himself of the ditch and slope of the parapet, and our troops retired to an interior line a few feet back. This point was now reinforced by Colonel Cockrell's brigade of Bowen's division, and work was resumed by the enemy, and by us, they mining, and we countermining." From this time until the first, nothing of moment occurred. On that morning, however, the enemy sprung another mine, on the right of the Jackson road, which is thus spoken of by General Forney, in his report: "The result was the entire demolition of the redan, leaving only an immense chasm where it stood. The greater portion of the earth was thrown towards the enemy, the line of least resistance being in that direction. Our interior line was much injured. Nine men who were countermining were necessarily lost, and a large number of those manning the works were killed and wounded. The enemy, however, made no attempt to charge, seeming satisfied with having materially weakened the position. I understand that the amount of powder used by the enemy in this explosion was one ton. While all this was taking place on the Jackson road the enemy was by no means idle at other points. At the work on the Baldwin's Ferry road his sappers had nearly reached the ditch. At this place we sprung a countermine, which was, unfortunately a little premature." From this time forward, our engineers were kept constantly and busily employed in countermining against the enemy, who was at work day and night countermining on the different portions of the line. About this time, our stock of bacon having become almost exhausted, the experiment of using mule meat as a substitute was tried, it being issued only to those who desired to use it; and I am gratified to say it was found, by both officers and men, not only nutritious but very palatable, and every way preferable to poor beef. I have already given *in extenso*, the several letters received from General Johnston up to this time, and my replies thereto. In this connection I take occasion to introduce General Johnston's letter of the twenty-seventh June, which was never received by me, but a copy of which General Johnston was kind enough to furnish:

"June 27, 1863.

"Your dispatch of the twenty-second received. General E. K. Smith's troops have been mismanaged, and have fallen back to Delhi. I have sent a special messenger urging him to assume direct command. The determined spirit you manifest, and his expected co-operation, encourage me to hope that something may yet be done to save Vicksburg, and to postpone both the modes suggested of merely extricating the garrison. Negotiations with Grant for the relief of the garrison, should they become necessary, must be made by you. It would be a confession of weakness on my part, which I ought not to make, to propose them. When it becomes necessary to make terms, they may be considered as made under my authority." To preserve the continuity of the narrative, and that events may be mentioned in the order of their dates, I also give General Johnston's letter of July third, which was received by me on the tenth:

"CAMP NEAR BRIDGING'S FERRY,
"July 3, 1863.

"Your dispatches of the twenty-eighth were destroyed by messenger. He states that General Smith's troops were driven back to Monroe. This statement, and his account of your condition, make me think it necessary to create a diversion, and thus enable you to cut your way out, if the time has arrived for you to do this; of that time I cannot judge; you must, as it depends upon your condition. I hope to attack the enemy in your front on the seventh, and your co-operation will be necessary. The manner and the proper point for you to bring the garrison out, must be determined by you, from your superior knowledge of the ground and distribution of the enemy's forces. Our firing will show you where we are engaged. If Vicksburg cannot be saved, the garrison must." On the first of July I felt satisfied that the time had arrived when it was necessary either to evacuate the city and cut my way out, or to capitulate upon the best attainable terms. My own inclination led me to favor the former; with this view, therefore, I addressed to my division commanders, Generals Stevenson, Forney, Smith, and Bowen, the following communication:

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF MISSISSIPPI AND EAST LOUISIANA,
VICKSBURG, July 1, 1863.

"GENERAL: Unless the siege of Vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, it will become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place. I see no prospect of the former, and there are many great, if not insuperable obstacles in the way of the latter. You are, therefore, requested to inform me with as little delay as possible as to the condition of your troops, and their ability to make the marches, and undergo the fatigue necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation. You will, of course, use the utmost discretion whilst informing yourself through your subordinates, upon all points tending to a clear elucidation of the subjects of my inquiry.

"Very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,
J. C. PEMBERTON,
Lieut.-General, commanding."

The next day I received a reply from each of these officers, which is herewith submitted:

"HEADQUARTERS STEVENSON'S DIVISION,
VICKSBURG, July 2, 1863.

"GENERAL: Your note—confidential—of yesterday, requesting me to inform you as to the



GEN. JOHN G. PARKE.

condition of my troops, and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigue necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation of this city, was duly received, and I have the honor to reply thereto, as follows: My men are very cheerful, but from long confinement, more than forty-five days, in the trenches, on short rations, are necessarily much enfeebled, and a considerable number would be unable to make the marches and undergo the fatigue which would probably be necessary to a successful evacuation of this city. If pressed by the enemy, and it should be necessary to place the Big Black in our rear in one march, the chances are that a large number of them now in the trenches could not succeed. I believe, however, that most of them, rather than be captured, would exert themselves to the utmost to accomplish it. I respectfully transmit herewith the opinions of my brigade commanders on these points.

"I am, sir, respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,
C. S. STEVENSON,
Major-General."

"DIVISION HEADQUARTERS,
NEAR VICKSBURG, July 2, 1863.

"GENERAL: In reply to your confidential note of yesterday, requesting to be informed as to the condition of my troops, and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation, as heart-rending as the reply may be, I have to state, that I concur in the unanimous opinion of the brigade and regimental commanders, that the physical condition and health of our men are not sufficiently good to enable them to accomplish successfully the evacuation. The spirit of the men is still, however, unshaken, and I am satisfied they will cheerfully continue to bear the fatigues and privations of the siege. I inclose herewith, for your further information, the brigade reports.

"I have the honor to be,
"Very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,
"JNO. H. FORNEY,
"Major-General."

"DIVISION HEADQUARTERS,
"July 2, 1863.

"GENERAL: Your note of yesterday desires from me a reply on two points, viz.: the condition of my troops, and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigue necessary to a successful evacuation of this place. The length of the marches and amount of fatigue necessary to a successful evacuation, not being indicated, I confine myself to giving the following information and opinion: There are about (3,000) three thousand men in my division, including State troops, in a condition to undertake a march of eight or ten miles a day in this weather, if there is an opportunity of resting at intervals. Out of these three thousand, only about two thousand are considered reliable, in case we are strongly opposed and much harassed. A secret evacuation I consider almost impossible, on account of the temper of many in my command, who would of necessity be left behind, not to mention their natural timidity when left alone, which would induce them to at once get into communication with the enemy for their own fancied safety. I would really expect the enemy to become aware of the movement before my command had cleared the right of our line. It is proper to mention that the two thousand alluded to have suffered severely in the loss of field officers during the siege, and while their individual bravery remains the same, they will be more readily thrown into confusion from want of officers to handle them, if forced to halt and go through any formation to oppose an enemy. In other words, while under the impression that the troops will to-day resist an assault as obstinately, or perhaps more so, as when they first manned the trenches, I do not think they would do as well out of them and in the field. I believe that General Johnston either has or will fight Grant, and my hope has been that he will be successful, and in time to relieve us; at present, however, I see no chance of timely relief from him, and his dispatches have never indicated a hope of being able to raise the siege. Under these circumstances, I deem it best to propose terms of capitulation before forced to do so from want of provisions. The following, although not called for by your note, is respectfully stated on account of a personal conversation had some days since. In regard to evacuating with or without entering into terms of agreement with the enemy, I should much prefer the former; there is to my mind, no practical difference between giving up a place openly or secretly.

"I am, very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,
"M. S. SMITH,
Major-General."

"HEADQUARTERS BOWEN'S DIVISION,
"VICKSBURG, MISS., July 2, 1863.

"GENERAL: In reply to your inquiry of this morning, in regard to the condition of my command to force their way through the enemy's lines, in case that the necessity should arise to evacuate this position, I have the honor to state that my men are in as good, if not better spirits than any others in the line, and able to stand as much fatigue; yet, I do not consider them capable (physically) of enduring the hardships incident to such an undertaking. Forty-five days incessant duty, day and night, with short rations —the wear of both mind and body, incident to our situation, has had a marked effect upon them, and I am satisfied that they cannot give battle and march over ten or twelve miles in the same day. In view of the fact that General Johnston has never held out to us the slightest hope that the siege could be raised—that his demonstration in our favor to relieve this exhausted garrison would, of necessity, be sufficient to raise it, I see no alternative but to rescue the command,

by making terms with the enemy. Under the most favorable circumstances, were we to cut our way out, we could not, in my opinion, save two-thirds of our present effective strength; no provision could be made for our wounded who fell in the attempt, or those we leave behind in the hospitals, and our army would reach General Johnston (if we should get through) a mere handful of broken-down stragglers. I would, therefore, recommend that an immediate proposition be made to capitulate. If accepted, we get everything we have a right to hope for; if rejected, we can still hold out stubbornly for some days, and our enemy may make the proposal to us. When our rations are exhausted, or nearly so, we may accept a surrender with the condition of a general parole, instead of imprisonment, for the command. If the offer is made at once, we have a better chance of making terms than when we have only one day's resistance in store, in case of a refusal. The proposition coming from us, if rejected, will make our men determined to fight to the last; theirs, on the contrary, will feel that after Vicksburg has been offered, their blood is shed to gratify a mere vindictive feeling against its garrison, whose only fault has been the noble defence they have made; and I believe that numbers of the enemy have still enough manhood to admire our courage and determination, and urge liberal terms of capitulation.

"I am, General, very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,
"JNO. S. BOWEN,
"Major-General."

The opinions of General Stevenson's brigade commanders will be found in that officer's report, while those of General Forney's are presented in the appendix to this. So far as I know, not a solitary brigade or regimental commander favored the scheme of cutting out; and only two, whose views were presented to me, intimated the possibility of making more than one-half of their commands available for that purpose. With this unanimous opinion of my officers against the practicability of a successful evacuation, and no relief from General Johnston, a surrender, with or without terms, was the only alternative left me. I therefore addressed the following note to Major-General Grant:

"VICKSBURG, July 3, 1863.

"*Major-General U. S. Grant, commanding U. S. Forces, near Vicksburg, Miss:*

"GENERAL: I have the honor to propose to you an armistice for —— hours, with a view to arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end, if agreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners to meet a like number to be named by yourself, at such place and hour to-day as you may find convenient. I make this proposition to save the further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period. This communication will be handed you under flag of truce, by Major-General J. S. Bowen.

"I am, General, very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,
"J. C. PEMBERTON,
"Lieutenant-General, commanding."

In the course of two hours the annexed reply was received:

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
"NEAR VICKSBURG, July 3, 1863.

"*Lieutenant-General J. C. Pemberton, commanding Confederate Forces, &c.:*

"GENERAL: Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice for several hours for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation through commissioners to be appointed, &c. The useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course, can be ended at any time you may choose by an unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in Vicksburg, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and I can assure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war. I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange the terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than those indicated above.

"I am, General, very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,
"U. S. GRANT,
"Major-General."

Upon the return of General Bowen with this letter, I understood that it was the desire of Major-General Grant to have a personal conference with me, and this being agreed to, at three o'clock P. M., accompanied by General Bowen and Captain Montgomery (then supposed to be a Lieutenant-Colonel), I proceeded to the lines, where I met General Grant, surrounded by a number of his officers. I soon learned that there was a mutual misunderstanding in regard to the desire for this interview, and therefore informed General Grant that if he had no terms to propose other than were contained in his letter, the conference could terminate, and hostilities be resumed immediately. After some further conversation, he proposed that General Bowen and Captain Montgomery, and two of his officers, Major-Generals McPherson and Smith, should retire for consultation, and suggest such terms as they might think proper for our consideration. After some conversation between these officers, we parted, with the understanding that General Grant would communicate with me by ten o'clock P. M., and about that hour the following letter was received:

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
"NEAR VICKSBURG, July 3, 1863.

"*Lieutenant-General J. C. Pemberton, commanding Confederate Forces, Vicksburg, Miss.:*

"GENERAL: In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, I will submit the following propo-

sition for the surrender of the city of Vicksburg, public stores, &c. On your accepting the terms proposed, I will march one division, as a guard, and take possession at eight A. M., to-morrow. As soon as rolls can be made out and paroles signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff, and cavalry officers, one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property. If these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing them; thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse wagons or mule teams as one, will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and soldiers, as fast as they become able to travel. The paroles of these latter must be signed, however, whilst officers are present authorized to sign the roll of prisoners.

"I am, General, very respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"U. S. GRANT,

"Major-General."

This letter was immediately submitted to a council of General officers. My own inclination was to reject these terms, but, after some discussion, I addressed General Grant as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS, VICKSBURG, July 3, 1863.

"*Major-General U. S. Grant, commanding, &c.:*

"GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post. In the main, your terms are accepted; but, in justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops, I have to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement between us: At ten A. M. to-morrow, I propose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colors and arms, stacking them in front of my present lines, after which you will take possession; officers to retain their side-arms and personal property, and the right and property of citizens to be respected.

"I am, General, very respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"J. C. PEMBERTON,

"Lieutenant General, commanding."

Early on the morning of the fourth, the following reply was received:

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
"BEFORE VICKSBURG, July 4, 1863.

"GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communication of third instant. The amendments proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full. It will be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole, signed by himself, which, with the completion of the roll of prisoners, will necessarily take some time. Again, I can make no stipulations with regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property; while I do not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannot consent to have myself under any restraint by stipulations. The property which officers will be allowed to take with them, will be as stated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers will be allowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one horse each. If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march to the front of the line now occupied by it, and stack arms at ten o'clock A. M., and return to the inside and remain as prisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it. Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms by nine o'clock A. M., I shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall act accordingly. Should these terms be accepted, white flags should be displayed along your lines, to prevent such of my troops as may not have been notified, from firing upon your men.

"I am, General, very respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"U. S. GRANT,

"Major-General."

In response to this note, I immediately dispatched the following, accepting the terms of surrender as modified by General Grant:

"HEADQUARTERS, VICKSBURG, July 4, 1863.

"*Major-General U. S. Grant, commanding United States Forces, &c.:*

"GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, and in reply to say that the terms proposed by you are accepted.

"Very respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"J. C. PEMBERTON,

"Lieutenant-General."

These terms, it may be proper to say, were approved by every division and brigade commander, with one exception (Brigadier-General Baldwin), who, without offering any objection to them, insisted upon holding out, but assigned no reason for it. In accordance with this agreement, the garrison was surrendered at ten o'clock A. M., and the Federal forces immediately took possession of our works and placed guards in the city. If it should be asked why the Fourth of July was selected for the day of the surrender, the answer is obvious. I believed that on that day I should obtain better terms. Well aware of the vanity of our foes, I knew they would attach vast importance to the entrance on the Fourth of July into the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify their national vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted from them at any other time. This question of time was also

discussed by my General officers in council and my views concurred in. The assertion that the surrender of Vicksburg was compelled by the want of subsistence, or that the garrison was starved out, is one entirely destitute of truth. There was at no time any absolute suffering for want of food among the garrison. That the men were put upon greatly reduced rations is undeniably true, but in the opinion of many medical officers it is at least questionable whether, under all the circumstances, this was at all injurious to their health. It must be remembered that for forty-seven days and nights these heroic men had been exposed to burning suns, and that during all this period they never had—by day or night—the slightest relief. The extent of our works required every available man in the trenches, and even then they were in many places insufficiently manned. It was not in my power to relieve any portion of the line for a single hour. Confined to the narrow limits of a trench, with their limbs cramped and swollen, without exercise, constantly exposed to a murderous fire of shot and shell, while the enemy's unerring sharpshooters stood ready to pick off every one visible above the parapets, is it strange that the men grew weak and attenuated? They had made a most heroic defence; many had met death with a smile upon their lips; all had cheerfully encountered danger, and almost without a murmur had borne privation and hardships well calculated to test their manhood. They had held the place against an enemy five times their number, admirably clothed and fed, and abundantly supplied with all the appliances of war. Whenever the foe had attempted an assault, they drove him back discomfited, covering the ground with his killed and wounded, and already had they torn from his grasp five stands of colors as trophies of their prowess (none of which were allowed to fall again into their hands). Knowing the anxious desire of the government to relieve Vicksburg, I felt assured that, if within the compass of its power, the siege would be raised; but when forty-seven weary days and nights had passed, with the knowledge I then possessed that no adequate relief was to be expected, I felt that I ought not longer to place in jeopardy the brave men whose lives had been intrusted to my care. Hence, after the suggestion of the alternative of cutting my way out, I determined to make terms, not because my men were starved out, not because I could not hold out yet a little longer, but because they were overpowered by numbers, worn down with fatigue, and each day saw our defences crumbling beneath their feet. The question of subsistence, therefore, had nothing to do with the surrender of Vicksburg. With an unlimited supply of provisions, the garrison could not, for the reasons already given, have held out much longer. My previous dispatches from General Johnston had not made me very sanguine, and his dispatch of June twenty-second was not calculated to render me more hopeful. He said:

"General Taylor is sent by General E. K. Smith, to co-operate with you from the west bank of the river, to throw in supplies, and to cross over if expedient and practicable. I will have the means of moving towards the enemy in a day or two, and will try to make a diversion in your favor, and if possible communicate with you, though I fear my force is too small to effect the latter." * * * * *

"If I can do nothing to relieve you, rather than surrender the garrison endeavor to cross the river at the last moment, if you and General Taylor can communicate."

I never received any communication from Major-General Taylor on the subject of co-operation, nor had I any knowledge of his whereabouts, or of his forces, and I heard no more from General Johnston until the tenth of July, when I received his dispatch of the third, in Vicksburg, from the bearer who had been several days confined and a prisoner to the Federal authorities. Had I received General Johnston's dispatch of the twenty-seventh of June, in which he encouraged the hope that both Vicksburg and the garrison might be saved, I would have lived upon an ounce a day and would have continued to meet the assaults of all Grant's army rather than have surrendered the city until General Johnston had realized or relinquished that hope; but I did not receive his dispatch until the twentieth of August, in Gainesville, Alabama, nor had I the most remote idea that such an opinion was entertained by General Johnston; he had for weeks ignored its possibility. I had notified him on the fifteenth of June that I had enough to subsist my army for yet twenty days, but he held out no hope of raising the siege. On the twenty-fifth of May, thirty-four days previous, he had informed me that on the arrival of an expected division from Bragg's army, he would "move to me." I supposed then, with my co-operation, to raise the siege. No subsequent dispatch from him sustained my understanding of his communication; all, without exception, of later date, spoke only of the possibility of extricating the garrison. His dispatch of July third, received by me six days after the capitulation, held out no such hope, and I am fully and entirely satisfied that no efficient aid would have been given me even to effect an evacuation. I do not mean nor desire to be understood as implying that it might have been given me; I only express my conviction that had I been able to hold the enemy at bay for yet a month, I do not believe, as anxious as I was to co-operate, that I would have been relieved by any force from the outside.

In a dispatch of the sixteenth, I think, for I have not the copy, I suggested that, as General Johnston deemed it impracticable to do more than by possibility to relieve the garrison, a proposition from him for an evacuation of Vicksburg might be favorably entertained by General Grant. In his dispatch of the twenty-seventh, already alluded to, and previously copied, will

be found his views on that point. The dispatch of June twenty-second from General Johnston, rendered it painfully apparent that the siege could not be raised (to cross the Mississippi River, as suggested, in the face of the enemy's gunboats and land batteries, was an impossibility), and unless this was effected, the defence which had been so long and gallantly maintained, ceased to be of any practical utility.

Proud as I was of my brave troops, honoring them as I did and do for the courage, fortitude and constancy they had so nobly displayed, I felt that it would be an act of cruel inhumanity to subject them longer to the terrible ordeal to which, for so many days and nights, they had already been exposed. Brain and sinew will alike wear out, the bravest may be overpowered by numbers, and I saw no advantage to be gained by protracting a hopeless defence, which I knew must be attended with a useless waste of life and blood. I had then to choose between such favorable terms as I might be able to obtain and an unconditional surrender, or subject the garrison and the citizens, including hundreds of women and children, to the horrors of an assault which I could no longer hope to repel.

Much (and, I think, unmerited) obloquy has been cast upon me, by a large portion of the public press, for an imputed failure to provide adequately for the subsistence of the garrison of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. The government and my immediate military superior, perhaps better informed of facts, have, so far as I am aware, refrained from censure, reserving a decision until a full investigation shall have determined to what extent, if any, it is deserved. Immediately on assuming command of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, on the fourteenth of October, 1862, I gave my earnest and unremitting attention to the reorganization of the several staff departments, and to the great question of supplies. It is unnecessary to speak of the great confusion and general want of system which prevailed. I found most of the district commanders exercising the authority which pertained only to the department commander, or to a General commanding an army in the field; each appeared in a great measure to be acting independently of the other. To some considerable extent this seemed necessary, under the existing circumstances. Major-General Van Dorn was in immediate command of the army at Holly Springs, and it naturally engaged most of his attention. General Bragg, to whose department the geographical districts, just organized into a separate department, had been attached, was too far removed to permit him to give his personal supervision. It resulted almost necessarily from this state of things, that but little attention had been given to the accumulation of supplies. No depots of importance existed within the limits of the department, nor had any measures been taken to establish them. Much of the season best suited to the collection of stores from the Trans-Mississippi had gone by; they were undoubtedly abundant there, but my command did not embrace that district of country; I had no control over the steamboats in Red River. It was one thing to purchase supplies, but another to transport them. Most of the boats were engaged in carrying sugar, molasses and salt, either for private parties, or for the government. There was great opposition on the part of owners at every attempt to divert them from these purposes. The government was appealed to against what was styled, the violation of the rights of citizens, by the military authorities. It required time to ascertain what was needed to be done, and time to acquire the means of its accomplishment. On the twenty-fifth of October, the necessary orders were issued to procure and transport supplies from the parishes of Point Coupeé, Concordia, and Tensas. Major Caney, then chief commander, was directed to confer with Lieutenant-Colonel Broadwell, agent of the commanding General, then in the Trans-Mississippi Department; but to make arrangements for supplying the department without relying upon him. Major Dillon, Commissary for the army, with Major-General Van Dorn, was directed to use every effort to subsist it from the northern and north-western counties. For several months after I entered upon duty in the department, there was not water enough to admit of the passage into the Mississippi of the larger boats which had been run up the Yazoo or Red River for safety. As early as the latter part of October, I authorized the opening of the raft in the Yazoo, that the smaller boats might pass out. Notwithstanding the violent opposition of private parties, very many of these were immediately taken either into the permanent employ of the government, or chartered as supplies could be obtained. The transportation of sugar and molasses owned by the government and by speculators interfered materially with the rapid accumulation of other supplies. When, however, about the eighteenth of January, the larger boats were able to enter the Mississippi, a sufficient number was at once put into requisition for government transportation, and a large amount of corn and bacon was thrown into Vicksburg and Port Hudson from the Trans-Mississippi Department. I regret, however, to say that, from want of proper care and energy upon the part of those responsible for its safe keeping, a large quantity of corn which had been landed on the shore was removed so slowly, and so little precaution taken to secure it from the effects of the heavy rains of the season, that much was destroyed by that cause, and much was carried off by the rapid rise of the river. It happened that just at this time, about the tenth of January, I made an official visit to Port Hudson, and was myself a witness of the consequence of this neglect at that point. On the fourteenth of January, I addressed the following letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Broadwell, agent of the Commissary-General, and also for my department, under my immediate instructions:

"Purchase bacon for this department; if possible, buy several million pounds; also send, if you can, a few thousand live hogs to Port Hudson and Vicksburg. If the present navigation should be interrupted, try to get the hogs across the river, so that they can be driven to the interior of the State, and rendered available for the use of the troops. If nothing better can be done, you will contract with energetic men to get from Texas two or three hundred wagons loaded with bacon, the meat to be paid for by the Chief of Subsistence of this department, the transportation to be settled by the Quartermaster, and the wagons and teams to be taken by the government at a fair valuation. You had better attend to salt first, bacon next, and to sugar afterwards. You are properly accredited to commanding Generals elsewhere, who are requested to assist you in accomplishing my wishes, as herein indicated. I was extremely desirous at this time to procure a sufficient supply of salt, to enable me to cure bacon, and with that purpose, an order was issued prohibiting the exportation of hogs from the department. The difficulty in obtaining salt in sufficient quantity at the proper season, prevented the success of this plan to any great extent. Though extremely anxious at this time to purchase all the meat possible, I did not think it advisable to make large purchases of corn from the Trans-Mississippi, for Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and Lieutenant-Colonel Broadwell was so notified. It has already been shown that the large amount at Port Hudson had not been properly secured, and more was still being delivered. The enemy's attempt on Vicksburg, via Chickasaw Bayou, had just signally failed, and his troops been withdrawn and re-embarked. Before the first of January supplies from Deer Creek and Sunflower, could not be brought down owing to the low stage of the water, and when the rise of the river admitted their being landed at "Snyder's Mills," the character of the soil, and the roads over which wagons must pass, was such as to render transportation almost utterly impracticable. I had, however, appropriated one hundred wagons for that special purpose. In a communication dated February twenty-sixth, General Stevenson says: "During wet weather we cannot use the dirt road from Haines' Bluff to this point (Vicksburg). The passage of our train of over one hundred wagons would render it impassable in one day; besides, not being able to haul more than a quarter load, it would prevent its being kept in good order. To relieve it at such times, grain should be obtained by railroad, but it, as now managed, cannot be relied on." There was an abundance of corn in the department, but in very many instances planters refused to sell, except for cash payments, and the great delay in forwarding funds embarrassed me accordingly. On the twentieth of January I telegraphed as follows to the Honorable Secretary of War: "Unless funds are sent immediately to Major Thomas Johnston, Chief C. S. of Department, the army cannot be supported; estimates have been forwarded. Please have money sent at once." During this time stores were being rapidly collected at various depots, but the difficulty of transportation, owing to the wretched condition of the S. R. R., the obstacles that were being continually thrown in the way by the railroad authorities, and the clamor made at any attempt of mine to make private interests subservient to government necessities, had the effect of preventing effectually the rapid accumulation of supplies. Positive prohibition had been issued by the War Department against the interference of commanding Generals, or other officers, with railroad transportation. Immediately on the reception of this prohibition I telegraphed the A. and I. General, Richmond: "If I cannot control the railroads in this department, the business of the department, and the subsistence of the troops, will fail. I beg that Colonel Wadley may be sent here at once." Arrangements had been made, as already stated, as fully as the means at my disposal would admit, to transfer supplies from Snyder's Mills to Vicksburg, and the Chief of Subsistence was positively ordered to keep constantly on hand a supply of not less than sixty days. Similar instructions were given to the Chief Quartermaster of the department. Every possible effort was made to carry out my orders. If I failed in the full accomplishment of my wishes, it was from circumstances utterly beyond my control. It must be remembered that almost continuous movements of troops and ordnance were necessary in consequence of the persistent efforts of the enemy from about the middle of December to the date of the investment of Vicksburg. About the fifteenth of February, the enemy began his movement through the Yazoo Pass. None but our smallest boats could be employed in the upper waters. From this date until the enemy abandoned his designs not only by the Pass and Tallahatchie, but also by the Sunflower and Deer Creek, the boats which were employed in bringing down supplies from those small streams were frequently and necessarily diverted to the transportation of troops and munitions of war. Early in February the enemy also succeeded in passing two of his gunboats by our batteries at Vicksburg; this at once rendered the navigation of the Mississippi and Red Rivers dangerous, and from that time forth it was only by watching opportunities, and at great risk of capture, that supplies could be thrown into Port Hudson and Vicksburg; nevertheless, large amounts were successfully introduced into both places, into the latter via Black River; Port Hudson, however, received much the larger portion, being easier of access. In addition to efforts made by agents under my own instructions to supply Port Hudson, the Chief of Subsistence of the department was ordered on the eighteenth of February, to furnish Major-General Gardner's command with ample funds to meet the demands of the service. About the middle of the same month, believing it highly probable that not only the subsistence of my own army,

but also that of General Ruggles might be dependent upon the supplies of the country intersected by the Mississippi and Ohio Railroad, I issued positive orders that neither grain nor meat should be allowed to leave the department by that road. The condition of the Southern Railroad daily growing worse in consequence of the heavy rains and its light structure, every effort was made on my part to aid the managers in its speedy and effectual repair. A communication urging its importance in a military point of view, was addressed to his Excellency the Governor of the State on the twentieth of February, asking his assistance by the impressment of negroes to labor on it, the Vice-President having informed me that planters would not hire their hands. On the twenty-eighth of February and second of March instructions were again sent to Lieutenant-Colonel Broadwell to purchase all the meat possible at the price suggested by him, and notified also that beef could be crossed safely, and to send forward all he could control. March first, Brigadier-General Ruggles was directed by telegraph as follows: "You must give every possible assistance in procuring within your district all the corn, beeves, and bacon, and salted pork, that can be had, and forward as rapidly as possible for army at Vicksburg. Purchase from planters at the lowest prices you can, and impress all in hands of speculators at same rates." About the same time Major-General Taylor, commanding West Louisiana was respectfully urged to have all the beeves, bacon, and salted pork, forwarded, and it gives me great pleasure to add that I am greatly indebted to his active exertions, as well as to Lieutenant-Colonel Broadwell, for large supplies of corn and meat. On the twenty-third of March the following letter was received from Lieutenant-Colonel Broadwell:

"ALEXANDRIA, LA., 17th March, 1863.

"GENERAL: Four steamboats arrived here today from Shreveport and Jefferson, loaded chiefly with corn. One of them had three hundred thousand pounds of bacon; three others—the Charm, Texas, and Frolic—are reported coming down with loads; five others—the Falls City, Louisville, Starlight, General Hodges, and Ninahnis—are below here, with full cargoes, designed for Port Hudson; but the Federal gunboats are reported blocking the mouth of this river. Great God! how unfortunate. We must try to get cattle to Bowman's Landing, fifteen miles back of Waterproof, and, if possible, swim them at the latter point; but the cattle here are thin, and may be unfit for beef, when they arrive on the other side; in fact, it is doubtful whether many of them will ever get through the swamps and bayous through which they are required to pass on this side. As the water declines, I think that cattle, in large quantity, can be crossed over by swimming; but, at present, the prospect of your getting supplies from this side is gloomy enough. With the hope, General, that the supervision of steamboat navigation may embarrass you less than at present,

"Very respectfully, &c.,

"(Signed) W. A. BROADWELL."

On the day of its receipt, the above letter was referred to Major Thomas Johnston, Chief of Subsistence, for his information, and was returned with the following indorsement:

"Respectfully returned. The following boats have arrived out of Red River, and have discharged their cargoes at Port Hudson:

"Frolic, corn, to A. Q. M;
"Louis d'Or, corn, to A. Q. M.;
"Trent, corn, to A. C. S.;
"Drover, corn, to A. C. S.;
"Red Chief, corn, to A. C. S.;
"Starlight, corn, to A. C. S.;
"Indian, corn, to A. C. S.;
"T. D. Hine, bacon, hogs, and beef, to A. C. S.

"The steamer General Hodges spoken of, discharged her cargo at Alexandria. The Louisville had twenty thousand bushels of corn. The Falls City turned over all her cargo except three hundred and fifty barrels of molasses to steamer T. D. Hine. Lieutenant Cammack left Alexandria on the eighteenth inst., one day later than the communication for Colonel Broadwell.

"(Signed) THOS. JOHNSTON,
"Major and Chief of Subsistence."

Evidence of a similar character, all showing the constant and earnest efforts made by myself and officers to secure an ample store of subsistence for Vicksburg and Port Hudson, could be adduced to an indefinite extent; but to give the whole, would swell this report to a huge volume. I content myself, therefore, with throwing a number of letters, orders, telegrams, &c., on this subject, into an appendix. In the month of March I was in receipt of a number of letters from respectable citizens, containing suggestions that were frequently valuable; but, unfortunately, they were such that should have been made months before, and some of them at a time when I was not in the department. But these suggestions, whether timely and valuable in themselves or not, were rendered worthless to me by reason of the then active military operations on the Yazoo River and its tributaries, which were constantly diverting all my boats from the important duty of transporting supplies to the indispensable service of transporting troops and munitions of war. This was also the case in many instances where provisions were offered me by citizens. I was offered supplies of corn and meat, but at a time when, from the proximity of the enemy and other causes, it was utterly impracticable for me to make them available. In this connection, I cannot forbear saying that, in nine cases out of ten where subsistence was offered me, the offer carried with it a demand for transportation which it was en-

tirely out of my power to furnish. To have made purchases under such circumstances would have been simply ridiculous. A cargo of bacon which had been run up Choctaw Bayou on the eighteenth of April, to avoid the enemy's gunboats on Red River, was, by the energetic exertions of Mr. Howell Hinds, of Jefferson county, Miss., successfully transported across the river to Port Gibson. I was extremely anxious to get this meat to Port Hudson, but the difficulties of transportation prevented, and before it could be removed by General Bowen to a point of safety, it became necessary to destroy much of it, to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy. In this connection, I again refer to the fact that when I was compelled to abandon Snyder's Mills, there was at least thirty thousand bushels of corn at that place. I mention this to show that there was no deficiency of corn in the department, but that the great, and, indeed, insuperable obstacle, was the want of transportation by dirt road, and the almost constant and daily interruption of railroad communication on the Southern road, which was the only means of transportation of subsistence to Vicksburg. I think I have now shown conclusively that I spared no exertion to have Vicksburg and Port Hudson abundantly provisioned, and that whenever the supply fell short of the demand or of my expectations, it was caused by circumstances wholly beyond my control. In this connection I may add, that I had, at the time of the surrender of Vicksburg, about forty thousand pounds of pork and bacon, which had been reserved for the subsistence of my troops in the event of attempting to cut my way out of the city; also, fifty-one thousand two hundred and forty-one pounds of rice; five thousand bushels of peas; ninety-two thousand two hundred and thirty-four pounds of sugar; three thousand two hundred and forty pounds of soap; five hundred and twenty-seven pounds of tallow candles; twenty-seven pounds of star candles, and four hundred and twenty-eight thousand pounds of salt.

Much unnecessary clamor has been raised about the want of ammunition in Vicksburg. I have already shown that my supply of ammunition was large, and the principal, indeed the only, deficiency was in musket-caps. The appendix devoted to the subject of ordnance will demonstrate that I am not responsible for that deficiency, whatever its extent may have been. I therefore beg special attention to my telegrams to Colonel Gorgas, of the Ordnance Department, for ordnance and ammunition, commenced as early as November, within three weeks after I assumed command of the department, and they were continued persistently up to almost the last hour of uninterrupted communication with Richmond. I believe that the Chief of Ordnance furnished me with everything in his power. I only desire that I may not be held responsible for what the government could not furnish.

I am unable, as yet, to give full reports of the casualties at Baker's Creek, Big Black, and during the siege of Vicksburg. They will be forwarded as soon as division commanders shall have rendered them complete. The same with reference to ordnance and ordnance stores. Very many officers and soldiers have distinguished themselves by particular acts of gallantry, or have rendered themselves conspicuous by untiring exertions and devotion to duty. So many, indeed, as to preclude the possibility of my referring to each in the body of this report; attention is therefore respectfully invited to the appendix, and to the reports of division, brigade, and other commandess.

I cannot close, however, without expressing my especial thanks to Major-Generals C. S. Stevenson, J. H. Forney, and M. L. Smith, and to Brigadier-Generals Barton, Cummings, Lee, and Colonel A. W. Reynolds, of General Stevenson's division. To Major-General Forney's brigade commanders, Brigadier-Generals Hebert and Moore; to Major-General M. L. Smith's brigade commanders, Brigadier-Generals Shoupe, Baldwin, and Vaughn; to Colonels Gates, Dockery, and Cockrell, of Bowen's division, and to Colonel Higgins, commanding the river batteries, and to Colonel Waul, commanding Texas Legion. If the most unremitting attention to the arduous duties of their position, entitle officers to commendation and respect, they have each and all won it during the protracted and trying siege. To Major-General C. S. Stevenson I am particularly indebted for much and valuable aid in many ways during the siege; to his immediate supervision was principally intrusted the subsistence of the troops.

To the officers of my staff I return my sincere thanks for the cheerful and zealous manner in which they have discharged all their duties. Colonel Thomas H. Taylor, who accompanied me on the field at Baker's Creek, and who, during the siege, was assigned to duty as Inspector-General and Commandant of the Post, in both capacities rendered most valuable service. Major Jacob Thomson, Inspector-General of the department, also accompanied me on the field on that occasion, as on all others, whether in the office or in the active performance of the duties of his department, has ever shown himself zealous and competent. Major Thompson, immediately after the retreat into Vicksburg, was, in company with Major Sprague, dispatched to communicate in person with General Johnston. Major R. W. Memminger, A. A. G., and Chief of Staff, and Major W. H. McArdle, A. A. G., have for many months been in the constant performance of their arduous and responsible duties pertaining to the Adjutant-General's department. It is little to say, that on these officers, assisted by Second Lieutenant F. M. Stafford, C. S. A., and A. A. A. G., has devolved a labor and an amount of business scarcely equalled in any other military department of the Confederacy; day and night they have devoted themselves to the public service, and I specially commend them and Major J. Thompson to the favorable consid-

eration of the government. No officer in the department has been more constantly and actively engaged than Major Samuel Lockett, Chief Engineer, for his professional skill and excellent judgment, wherever occasion required it, from Grenada to Port Hudson; during the siege of Vicksburg, none exposed themselves more fearlessly to danger than he and his gallant assistants, Captains Powhattan Robinson, James Cooper, J. J. Conway, D. Winter, and James Hagan, and Lieutenants E. W. McMahon, W. O. Flynn, Geo. Donnelan, W. A. Gloster, Southard, Blessing, and Mr. Ginder. It gives me pleasure to name them, and to ask a recognition of their merits. I consider myself to have been particularly fortunate in the selection of Chief Quartermaster of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana. Major L. Mims entered upon the duties of that office immediately on my assuming command, and has proved himself eminently qualified for the position; his energy and capacity I have rarely seen equalled. I believe that no man could have done more with the means at his disposal. Major Mims was greatly aided by that most excellent and efficient officer, Major Geo. Whitfield, Quartermaster, in charge of the transportation department. Major Johnston, Chief of Subsistence, has been untiring in his efforts to provide for so large a command; he had great difficulties to contend with, and generally has met them successfully. I am also greatly indebted to my Chief Paymaster, Major A. B. Cooke, for the ability and energy he has displayed in the execution of the business of his office. To Major G. L. Gillespie, Chief Commissary of General Stevenson's division, and acting Chief Commissary of the army during the siege, I owe my thanks; much is due to his energy and good judgment. Also to Major Orme, General Stevenson's Chief Quartermaster. Surgeon Bryan, Medical Director of the Army of Vicksburg, accompanied me on the field, and performed all his duties there and during the siege to my entire satisfaction. Captain Bryce, Ordnance Storekeeper, displayed great ability and devotion to duty during the siege. He was everywhere he should have been, and was emphatically the right man in the right place. Colonel C. A. Fuller, Inspector of Heavy Artillery, and Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Saunders, P. A., Chief of Artillery of the department, performed their respective duties satisfactorily, and Colonel Saunders accompanied me on the field, where he rendered me valuable service. Colonel W. T. Withers, Chief of Field Artillery with the army, was active and attentive to his duties, and prompt in the execution of orders. In addition to his duties as Chief of Artillery, Colonel Withers continued in command of his regiment; he also accompanied me on the field. Captain C. McRae Selph, A. A. G., on duty with Colonel T. H. Taylor, was of great assistance to that excellent officer, more particularly during the siege; he also accompanied me on the field, and was constantly engaged in the transmission of orders. To my personal staff, Lieutenant J. H. Morrison, A. D. C.; Lieutenant J. C. Taylor, A. D. C., and Lieutenant H. C. Tupper, Twenty-fourth regiment Mississippi volunteers, A. D. C., I am greatly indebted, not only for service in the field, but for much laborious duty in the office, and I commend them to the favorable consideration of the government. Captain L. M. Montgomery, being unable to reach the Trans-Mississippi Department, to which he had been assigned, tendered his services as volunteer A. D. C. I found him an energetic and gallant officer, and a most valuable assistant. To him, and Major Sturges Sprague, volunteer A. D. C., who also accompanied me on the field, and was constantly engaged in the transmission of orders, I tender my sincere thanks. Also to Captain James Cooper, Fourteenth Mississippi, who served me as volunteer A. D. C. on the occasion of the battle of Baker's Creek. Captain Barclay and Lieutenant Wilkinson, of Bowen's division, with fifty brave fellows of that command, are entitled to special mention for their gallant conduct on the night of the thirtieth of May, in burning the sunken gunboat Cincinnati, which they accomplished as far as practicable.

I have the honor to be, General,

Your obedient servant,

J. C. PEMBERTON,
Lieutenant-General.

GENERAL JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON'S REPORT.

MERIDIAN, MISSISSIPPI,
November 1, 1863.

General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General:

SIR: The following report of my operations in the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, is respectfully offered as a substitute for the imperfect one forwarded by me from Jackson on May twenty-seventh, 1863:

While on my way to Mississippi, where I thought my presence had become necessary, I received, in Mobile, on March twelfth, the following telegram from the Secretary of War, dated March ninth: "Order General Bragg to report to the War Department for conference. Assume yourself direct charge of the Army of Middle Tennessee." In obedience to this order I at once proceeded to Tullahoma. On my arrival I informed the Secretary of War, by a telegram, of March nineteenth, that General Bragg could not then be sent to Richmond, as he had ordered, on account of the critical condition of his family.

On the tenth of April I repeated this to the President, and added, "being unwell then, I afterwards became sick, and am not now able to serve in the field. General Bragg is, therefore, necessary here." On the twenty-eighth my unfitness for service in the field was reported to the Secretary of War.

On the ninth of May I received, at Tullahoma, the following dispatch, of the same date, from the Secretary of War: "Proceed at once to Mississippi and take chief command of the

forces there—giving to those in the field, as far as practicable, the encouragement and benefit of your personal direction."

It is thus seen that neither my orders nor my health permitted me to visit the Mississippi after the twelfth of March until the time when I took direct charge of that department.

From the time of my arrival at Tullahoma until the fourteenth of April, General Pemberton's reports, all by telegraph, indicated that the efforts of the enemy would be against General Bragg rather than himself, and looked to the advancement of his attempt on Vicksburg. In that of April thirteenth, he says: "I am satisfied Rosecrans will be reinforced from Grant's army. Shall I order troops to Tullahoma?"

On the seventeenth of April General Pemberton telegraphed the return of Grant and the resumption of the operations against Vicksburg.

On the twenty-ninth of April he telegraphed: "The enemy is at Hard Times, in large force, with barges and transports, indicating a purpose to attack Grand Gulf with a view to Vicksburg." He also reported "heavy firing at Grand Gulf. The enemy is shelling our batteries, both above and below."

On the first of May he telegraphed: "A furious battle has been going on since daylight, just below Port Hudson. * * * The enemy can cross all his army from Hard Times to Bruinsburg. I should have large reinforcements. The enemy's movements threaten Jackson, and, if successful, will cut off Vicksburg and Port Hudson." I at once urged him to concentrate, and to attack Grant immediately on his landing; on the next day I sent the following dispatch to him: "If Grant crosses unite all your troops to beat him; success will give back what was abandoned to win it."

I telegraphed to you on the first: "General Pemberton calls for large reinforcements. They cannot be sent from here without giving up Tennessee. Can one or two brigades be sent from the east?"

On the seventh I again asked for reinforcements for Mississippi.

I received no further report of the battle of Port Gibson, and on the fifth I asked General Pemberton: "What is the result, and where is Grant's army?" I received no answer and gained no additional information in relation to either subject until I reached the Department of the Mississippi, in obedience to my orders of May ninth.

There, on May thirteenth, I received a dispatch from General Pemberton, dated Vicksburg, May twelfth, asking for reinforcements, as the enemy, in large force, was moving from the Mississippi, south of the Big Black, apparently toward Edwards' Depot, "which will be the battle field if I can forward sufficient force, leaving troops enough to secure the safety of this place."

Before my arrival at Jackson, Grant had beaten General Bowen at Port Gibson; made good the landing of his army—occupied Grand Gulf, and was marching upon the Jackson and Vicksburg Railroad.

On reaching Jackson, on the night of the thirteenth of May, I found there the brigades of Gregg and Walker, reported at six hundred. I learned from General Gregg that Maxcey's brigade was expected to arrive from Port Hudson the next day; that General Pemberton's forces, except the garrison of Port Hudson, (five thousand) and of Vicksburg, was at Edwards' Depot—the general headquarters at Bovina; that four divisions of the enemy, under Sherman, occupied Clinton, ten miles west of Jackson, between Edwards' Depot and ourselves. I was aware that reinforcements were on their way from the east, and that the advance of these, under General Gist, would probably arrive the next day, and with Maxcey's brigade, swell my force to about eleven thousand.

Upon this information I sent to General Pemberton, on the same night, the thirteenth, a dispatch informing him of my arrival, and of the occupation of Clinton by a portion of Grant's army; urging the importance of re-establishing communications, and ordering him to come up, if practicable, on Sherman's rear at once; and adding, "to beat such a detachment would be of immense value—the troops here could co-operate. All the strength you can quickly assemble should be brought—time is all important."

On Thursday, May fourteenth, the enemy advanced, by the Raymond and Clinton roads, upon Jackson. The resistance made by the brigades of Gregg and Walker gave sufficient time for the removal of the public stores, and at two P. M., we retreated by the Canton road, from which alone we could form a junction with General Pemberton. After marching six miles the troops encamped.

From this point I sent to General Pemberton the dispatch of May fourteenth, of which the following is a copy:

"GENERAL: The body of troops mentioned in my note of last night, compelled Brigadier-General Gregg and his command to evacuate Jackson about noon to-day. The necessity of taking the Canton road, at right angles to that upon which the enemy approached, prevented an obstinate defence. A body of troops, reported this morning to have reached Raymond last night, advanced at the same time from that direction. Prisoners say that it was McPherson's corps (four divisions), which marched from Clinton. I have no certain information of the other. Both skirmished very cautiously. Telegrams were dispatched when the enemy was near, directing General Gist to assemble the approaching troops at a point forty or fifty miles from Jackson, and General Maxcey to return to his wagons, and provide for the security of his brigade—for instance, by joining General Gist. That body of troops will be able, I hope, to prevent the enemy in Jackson from drawing provisions from the east, and this one may be able

to keep him from the country towards Panola. Can he supply himself from the Mississippi? Can you not cut him off from it; and, above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him? As soon as the reinforcements are all up, they must be united to the rest of the army. I am anxious to see a force assembled that may be able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy.

"Would it not be better to place the forces to support Vicksburg between General Loring and that place, and merely observe the ferries, so that you might unite if opportunity to fight presented itself?

"General Gregg will move towards Canton to-morrow.

"If prisoners tell the truth, the forces at Jackson must be half of Grant's army. It would decide the campaign to beat it, which can be done only by concentrating, especially when the remainer of the Eastern troops arrive; they are to be twelve or thirteen thousand."

This dispatch was not answered. General Pemberton states in his official report that it was received at six P. M., on the sixteenth, whilst on the retreat (from the battle field of Baker's Creek).

On the next day, May fifteenth (Friday), the troops under me marched ten and a half miles further, to Calhoun Station. On the morning of that day I received a letter from General Pemberton, dated Edwards' Depot, May fourteenth (Thursday)—5.40 P. M.: "I shall move, as early to-morrow morning as practicable, a column of seventeen thousand to Dillon's. The object is to cut off enemy's communications and force him to attack me, as I do not consider my force sufficient to justify an attack on the enemy in position, or to attempt to cut my way to Jackson."

This was the first communication received from General Pemberton after my arrival at Jackson, and from it I learned that he had not moved towards Clinton, ten hours after the receipt of my orders to do so, and that the junction of the forces, which could have been effected by the fifteenth, was defeated, and that, in disobedience of my orders, and in opposition to the views of the majority of the council of war, composed of all his Generals present—before whom he placed the subject—he had decided to make a movement by which the union would be impossible. General Pemberton was immediately instructed that there was but one mode by which we could unite, viz., by his moving directly to Clinton.

The Brigadier-Generals representing that their troops required rest after the fatigue they had undergone in the skirmishes and march preceding the retreat from Jackson, and having yet no certain intelligence of General Pemberton's route or of General Gist's position, I did not move on Saturday. In the evening I received a reply to my last dispatch, dated four miles south of Edwards' Depot, May sixteenth, stating it had reached him at 6.30 that morning; that "it found the army on the middle road to Raymond. The order of countermarch has been issued. Owing to the destruction of a bridge on Baker's Creek, which runs for some distance parallel with the railroad and south of it, our march will be on the road leading from Edwards' Depot in the direction of Brownsville. This road runs nearly parallel with railroad. In going to Clinton, we shall leave Bolton's Depot four miles to the right. I am thus particular, so that you may be able to make a junction with this army." In a postscript he reported, "heavy skirmishing is going on in my front."

On the afternoon of the same day I received General Pemberton's first reply to the order sent him from Jackson to attack Sherman, dated Bovina, May fourteenth, 9.10 A. M., as follows: "I move at once, with my whole available force, from Edwards' Depot. In directing this move, I do not think you fully comprehend the condition Vicksburg will be left in, but I comply at once with your order."

On May seventeenth (Sunday), I marched fifteen miles in the direction indicated in General Pemberton's note, received the previous evening. In the afternoon a letter was brought from him, dated Bovina, May seventeenth, a copy of which has been forwarded to the War Department. In this, referring to my dispatch of May thirteenth, from Jackson, General Pemberton wrote: "I notified you on the morning of the fourteenth of the receipt of your instructions to move and attack the enemy towards Clinton. I deemed the movement very hazardous, preferring to remain in position behind the Big Black, and near to Vicksburg. I called a council of war, composed of all the General officers. * * * * A majority of the officers expressed themselves favorable to the movement indicated by you. The others, including Major-Generals Loring and Stevenson, preferred a movement by which this army might endeavor to cut off the enemy's supplies from the Mississippi. My own views were expressed as unfavorable to any movement which would remove me from my base, which was, and is, Vicksburg. I did not, however, see fit to place my own judgment and opinion so far in opposition as to prevent the movement altogether; but, believing the only possibility of success to be in the plan proposed, of cutting off the enemy's supplies, I directed all my disposable force—say seventeen thousand five hundred—towards Raymond or Dillon's." It also contained intelligence of his engagement with the enemy on the sixteenth, near Baker's Creek, three or four miles from Edwards' Depot, and of his having been compelled to withdraw, with heavy loss, to Big Black Bridge. He further expressed apprehension that he would be compelled to fall back from this point, and represented that, if so, his position at Snyder's Mills would be untenable, and said: "I have about sixty (60) days' provisions at Vicksburg and Snyder's. I respectfully await your instructions." I immediately replied, May seventeenth: "If Haynes' Bluff be

untenable, Vicksburg is of no value, and cannot be held. If, therefore, you are invested in Vicksburg, you must ultimately surrender. Under such circumstances, instead of losing both troops and place, you must, if possible, save the troops. If it is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies, and march to the north-east." That night I was informed that General Pemberton had fallen back to Vicksburg.

On Monday, May eighteenth, General Pemberton informed me by letter, dated Vicksburg, May seventeenth, that he had retired within the line of intrenchments around Vicksburg, having been attacked and forced back from Big Black Bridge, and that he had ordered Haynes' Bluff to be abandoned. His letter concluded with the following remark: "I greatly regret that I felt compelled to make the advance beyond Big Black, which has proved so disastrous in its results." It will be remembered that General Pemberton expected that Edwards' Depot would be the battle field before I reached Jackson. See his dispatch of the twelfth, already quoted, and that his army, before he received any orders from me, was seven or eight miles east of the Big Black, near Edwards' Depot.

On Tuesday, May nineteenth, General Pemberton's reply, dated Vicksburg, May eighteenth, to my communication of the seventeenth, was brought me near Vernon, where I had gone with the troops under my command for the purpose of effecting a junction with him, in the event of his evacuating Vicksburg, as I had ordered, in which he advised me that he had "assembled a council of war of the General officers of this command, and having laid your instructions before them, asked the free expression of their opinion as to the practicability of carrying them out; the opinion was unanimously expressed, that it was impossible to withdraw the army from this position with such *morale* and material, as to be of further use to the Confederacy. On receiving this information, I replied: "I am trying to gather a force which may attempt to relieve you. Hold out." The same day I sent orders to General Gardner to evacuate Port Hudson.

I then determined, by easy marches, to re-establish my line between Jackson and Canton, as the junction of the two commands had become impossible.

On the twentieth and twenty-first May, I was joined by the brigades of Generals Gist, Ector, and McNair; the division of General Loring, cut off from General Pemberton in the battle of Baker's Creek, reached Jackson on the twentieth, and General Maxcey with his brigade, on the twenty-third, By the fourth of June the army had in addition to these been reinforced by the brigade of General Evans, the division of General Breckinridge, and the division of cavalry, numbering two thousand eight hundred men, commanded by Brigadier-General W. H. Jackson.

Small as was this force—about twenty-four thousand infantry and artillery, not one-third of that of the enemy—it was deficient in artillery, in ammunition for all arms, and in field transportation, and could not be moved upon that of the enemy, already intrenching his large force, with any hope of success.

The draft upon the country had so far reduced the number of horses and mules that it was not until late in June that draught animals could be procured from distant points, for the artillery and teams.

There was no want of commissary supplies in the department, but limited transportation caused a deficiency for a moving army.

On the twenty-third of May, I received a dispatch from Major General Gardner, dated Port Hudson, May twenty-first, informing me that the enemy was about to cross at Bayou Sara, that the whole force from Baton Rouge was in his front, and asking to be reinforced. On this my orders for the evacuation of Port Hudson were repeated, and he was informed "you cannot be reinforced; do not allow yourself to be invested; at every risk save the troops, and if practicable move in this direction." This dispatch did not reach General Gardner, Port Hudson being then invested.

About the twenty-fourth of May, the enemy made such demonstrations above the Big Black and towards Yazoo City, that I sent Walker's division to Yazoo City with orders to fortify it, and the demonstrations being renewed, placed Loring's division within supporting distance of Walker's, and in person took post at Clinton.

Dispatches arrived from General Pemberton, dated Vicksburg, May twentieth and twenty-first. In that of the twentieth he stated that the enemy had assaulted his intrenched lines the day before, and was repulsed with heavy loss. He estimated their force at not less than sixty thousand, and asked that musket-caps be sent, they being his main necessity. He concluded: "an army will be necessary to save Vicksburg, and that quickly; will it be sent?" On the twenty-first he wrote: "The men credit, and are encouraged by, a report that you are near with a large force. They are fighting in good spirits and their organization is complete."

Caps were sent as fast as they arrived. On May twenty-ninth I sent a dispatch to General Pemberton, to the following effect: "I am too weak to save Vicksburg, can do no more than attempt to save you and your garrison. It will be impossible to extricate you unless you co-operate and we make mutually supporting movements. Communicate your plans and suggestions if possible." The receipt of this was acknowledged in a communication dated Vicksburg, June third, in which General Pemberton says: "We can get no information from outside as to your position or strength, and very little in regard to the enemy."

In a dispatch, dated June tenth, from General Gardner—the first received since his investment—he reported having repulsed the enemy in several severe attacks, but that he was getting short of provisions and ammunition. To

which I replied, June fifteenth, informing him that I had not the means of relieving him, adding: "General Taylor will do what he can on the opposite side of the river. Hold the place as long as you can, and, if possible, withdraw in any direction, or cut your way out. It is very important to keep Banks and his forces occupied." In a dispatch, dated June twentieth, I sent him word that General Taylor had intended to attack the enemy opposite Port Hudson on the night of the fifteenth, and attempt to send cattle across the river.

The want of field transportation rendered any movement for the relief of Port Hudson impossible, had a march in that direction been admissible; but such a march would have enabled Grant (who had now completed his strong lines around Vicksburg) to have cut my line of communication and destroyed my army; and from the moment that I put my troops in march in that direction, the whole of Middle and North Mississippi would have been open to the enemy.

On June seventh, I repeated the substance of my dispatch of May twenty-ninth to General Pemberton.

On the fourth of June, I had told the Secretary of War, in answer to his call for my plans, that my only plan was to relieve Vicksburg, and my force was far too small for the purpose.

On June the tenth, I told him I had not at my disposal half the troops necessary.

On the twelfth, I said to him, "to take from Bragg a force which would make this army fit to oppose Grant would involve yielding Tennessee. It is for the government to decide between this State and Tennessee."

On the fourteenth, I sent General Pemberton the following: "All that we can attempt to do is to save you and your garrison. To do this, exact co-operation is indispensable. By fighting the enemy simultaneously at the same point of his line you may be extricated. Our joint forces cannot raise the siege of Vicksburg. My communication with the rear can best be preserved by operating north of railroad. Inform me, as soon as possible, what point will suit you best. Your dispatches of the twelfth received. General Taylor, with eight thousand men, will endeavor to open communications with you from Richmond." To this communication, General Pemberton replied, June twenty-first, recommending me to move north of the railroad towards Vicksburg, to keep the enemy attracted to that side, and stating that he would himself move at the proper time by the Warrenton road, crossing the Big Black at Hankinson's Ferry; that "the other roads are too strongly intrenched and the enemy in too heavy force for a reasonable prospect of success," unless I could compel him to abandon his communications by Snyder's.

On the fifteenth, I expressed to the department the opinion, that without some great blunder of the enemy, we could not hold both (Missisipi and Tennessee), and that I considered saving Vicksburg hopeless.

On the eighteenth, I said: "Grant's position, naturally very strong, is intrenched and protected by powerful artillery, and the roads obstructed. His reinforcements have been, at least, equal to my whole force. The Big Black covers him from attack, and would cut off our retreat if defeated."

On June twenty-second, in reply to a dispatch from General Pemberton, of the fifteenth, in which he said, that though living on greatly reduced rations, he had sufficient for twenty days, I informed him that General Taylor had been sent by General E. K. Smith to co-operate with him from the west bank of the Mississippi, and that in a day or two I would try and make a diversion in his favor, and, if possible, open communications; adding, "though I fear my force is too small to effect the latter, I have only two-thirds of the force you told messenger Saunders to state to me as the least with which I ought to make an attempt. Scouts report the enemy fortifying towards us, and the roads blocked."

A day or two after this a dispatch was brought me from General Pemberton, dated June twenty-second, suggesting that I should make to General Grant "propositions to pass this army out with all its arms and equipages," renewing his hope of my being able, by force of arms, to act with him, and expressing the opinion that he could hold out for fifteen days longer. To this dispatch I replied, June twenty-seventh, informing him that General E. K. Smith's troops had fallen back to Delhi, and that I had urged him to assume the direct command; and continued, "the determined spirit you manifest, and his expected co-operation, encourage me to hope that something may yet be done to save Vicksburg, and to postpone both of the modes suggested of merely extricating the garrison. Negotiations with Grant for the relief of the garrison, should they become necessary, must be made by you. It would be a confession of weakness on my part, which I ought not to make, to propose them; when it becomes necessary to make terms, they may be considered as made under my authority."

On the twenty-ninth of June, field transportation and other supplies having been obtained, the army marched towards the Big Black, and on the evening of July first encamped between Brownsville and the river.

Reconnoissances, which occupied the second and third, convinced me that attack north of the railroad was impracticable. I determined, therefore, to make the examinations necessary for the attempt south of the railroad, thinking, from what was already known, that the chance of success was much better there, although the consequences of defeat might be more disastrous.

On the night of the third, a messenger was sent to General Pemberton with information that an attempt to create a diversion would be made, to enable him to cut his way out, and that I hoped to attack the enemy about the seventh.

On the fifth, however, we learned the fall of Vicksburg, and, therefore, fell back to Jackson.

The army reached Jackson the evening of the seventh, and on the morning of the ninth, the enemy appeared in heavy force in front of the works thrown up for the defence of the place. These, consisting of a line of rifle-pits, prepared at intervals for artillery, extended from a point north of the town, a little east of the Canton road, to a point south of the town, within a short distance of Pearl River, and covered most of the approaches west of the river; but were badly located and constructed, presenting but a slight obstacle to a vigorous assault.

The troops promptly took their assigned positions in the intrenchments on the appearance of the enemy, in expectation of an immediate assault. Major-General Loring occupying the right; Major-General Walker, the right of the centre; Major-General French, the left of the centre, and Major-General Breckinridge the left. The cavalry, under Brigadier-General Jackson, was ordered to observe and guard the fords of Pearl River above and below the town.

The reports that had at various times been made to me by the commanding officers of troops encamped near Jackson, of the scarcity of water, led me to believe that Sherman, who advanced in heavy order of battle from Clinton, could not besiege, but would be compelled to make an assault. His force was represented to consist of his own and Ord's army corps and three divisions in addition. The spirit and confidence manifested by the whole army under my command were such that, notwithstanding this vast superiority of numbers, I felt assured, with the advantages given by the intrenchments, weak as they were, an assault by him would result in his discomfiture.

Instead of attacking, the enemy, as soon as they arrived, commenced intrenching, and constructing batteries. On the tenth, there was spirited skirmishing, with slight cannonading, continuing throughout the day. This was kept up with varying intensity and but little interruption until the period of our evacuation. Hills commanding and encircling the town, within easy cannon range, offered favorable sites for batteries. A cross-fire of shot and shell reached all parts of the town, showing the position to be entirely untenable against a powerful artillery.

On the eleventh, I telegraphed the President: "If the position and works were not bad, want of stores, which could not be collected, would make it impossible to stand a siege. If the enemy will not attack, we must, or, at the last moment, withdraw. We cannot attack seriously without risking the army."

On the twelfth, besides the shirmishing, there was a heavy cannonade from the batteries near the Canton and South Clinton roads. The missiles reached all parts of the town. An assault, though not a vigorous one, was also made upon Major-General Breckinridge's line. It was quickly repelled, however—principally by the direct fire of Cobb's and Slocomb's batteries, and flank attack of the skirmishers of the First, Third, and Fourth Florida, and Forty-seventh Georgia regiments. The enemy's loss was two hundred prisoners, nearly the same number killed, many wounded, and the colors of the Twenty-eighth, Forty-first, and Fifty-third Illinois regiments.

By the thirteenth the enemy had extended his lines until both his flanks rested on Pearl River.

I telegraphed the President, on the fourteenth, that a large force lately left Vicksburg "to turn us on the north. This will compel us to abandon Jackson. The troops before us have been intrenching and constructing batteries since their arrival."

On the fifteenth I telegraphed the President: "The enemy is evidently making a siege, which we cannot resist. It would be madness to attack him. The remainder of the army under Grant at Vicksburg, is, beyond doubt, on its way to this place."

On the sixteenth of July information was received that a large train from Vicksburg, loaded with ammunition, was near the enemy's camp. This, and the condition of their batteries, made it probable that Sherman would, on the next day, concentrate upon us the fire of near two hundred guns. It was also reported that the enemy had crossed Pearl River in the rear of their left flank. The evacuation of Jackson that night was, therefore, determined on.

Our withdrawal was effected on the night of the sixteenth. All public property and the sick and wounded, except a few not in a condition to be moved, had been previously carried to the rear. The right wing retired towards Brandon by the new Brandon road, and the left wing by the old Brandon road. The cavalry remained to destroy the bridges over Pearl River and observe the enemy. The evacuation was not discovered by the enemy until the next day.

Our loss during the siege was estimated at seventy-one killed, five hundred and four wounded, and about twenty-five missing. The army retired, by easy marches, to Morton, distant about thirty-five miles from Jackson. Desertions during the siege and on the march were, I regret to say, frequent.

Two divisions of the enemy, with cavalry, drove our cavalry through Brandon on the nineteenth, returning to Jackson the next day. Their object seemed to be to destroy the railroad bridges and depots.

Colonel J. L. Logan, commanding a mounted force around Port Hudson, reported three successful engagements with detachments of the enemy.

On the twelfth of July I received information, from Colonel Logan, of the surrender of Port Hudson on the ninth; subsequently the report of Major Jackson, A. A. G., was received, informing me of the surrender. That officer stated that provision was exhausted, and that the position of the enemy rendered it impossible

for the garrison to cut its way out; but two thousand five hundred of the garrison were fit for duty at the time of the surrender.

The enemy advanced against Yazoo City both by land and water on the thirteenth. The attack by the gunboats was handsomely repulsed by our heavy battery, under the command of Commander Isaac N. Brown, of the navy. The "De Kalb," the flag-ship of the hostile squadron, an iron-clad, mounting thirteen guns, was sunk by a torpedo. To the force advancing by land no resistance was made by the garrison, commanded by Colonel Creasman, of the Twenty-ninth North Carolina regiment.

I have introduced my dispatch of May fourteenth into this report, because General Pemberton, after stating that it was not received until after the battle of Baker's Creek, claimed that although he had not acted on those instructions, the letter suggested the very movement he had made, and for the same purpose. When the enemy was at Jackson the letter suggested a movement for the sole purpose of dislodging him, and so stated. General Pemberton's march, with whatever purpose made, was begun after the enemy had abandoned Jackson, and was almost in his presence. My order of the fifteenth—at which time I should have joined General Pemberton, to take immediate command of the main army, but that I was still too weak to attempt such a ride—which was received by him very early on the morning of the sixteenth, required him to abandon that movement; had he obeyed it the battle of Baker's Creek would have been escaped.

About the middle of January, finding the cavalry in Mississippi inactive, and being satisfied, by the representations of well informed persons, acquainted with the country, that it could not be usefully employed in Mississippi until late in the spring, and persuaded that a larger cavalry force was needed to cover that portion of Tennessee from which General Bragg was drawing his supplies, I transferred about two-thirds of the cavalry of Mississippi to Tennessee.

By this transfer from Mississippi at a time when General Grant had fallen back on Memphis, and Sherman and McClernand had been repulsed at Vicksburg, I gave strength to the Army of Tennessee, which had been greatly reduced by the engagements near Murfreesboro, and enabled General Bragg to cover the country and secure supplies for his army.

About March twentieth, General Pemberton applied for cavalry for the protection of the northern part of the State during the planting season. But his reports heretofore referred to, indicated that the enemy's forces were to be employed in Tennessee rather than Mississippi, and Van Dorn's cavalry being then absolutely necessary to hold the country from which General Bragg was drawing his supplies, I could not send it, and so informed General Pemberton. When he reported that Grant's army was returning to the Mississippi, a strong brigade of cavalry was ordered from Tennessee into that State.

The time to strike the enemy with the best hope of saving Vicksburg, was when he was landing near Bruinsburg. To do this with any prospect of success, a rapid concentration of all the forces should have been made, and an attack. Under this conviction, I telegraphed to General Pemberton on May first, from Tullahoma: "If Grant's army lands on this side of the river, the safety of Mississippi depends on beating it. For that object you should unite your whole force." And, again, on May second: "If Grant crosses, unite your whole force to beat him. Success will give back what was abandoned to win it."

These instructions were neglected, and time was given to Grant to gain a foothold in the State, and at Port Gibson and Raymond detachments of our troops were defeated and driven back by overwhelming numbers of the enemy.

On the thirteenth, when I learned that there were four divisions of the enemy at Clinton, distant twenty miles from the main body of General Pemberton's forces, I gave him orders to attack them, and notified him that we could co-operate. This order General Pemberton disobeyed; and so reported to me in his letter of the seventeenth. I directed him to move twenty miles to the *east* to co-operate with me in attacking Sherman. He moved to the *south*, and made our co-operation and junction impossible. He claims that this order compelled him to make the advance beyond the Big Black, which proved so "disastrous." Before I had reached Jackson, and before the order was given, General Pemberton made his first advance beyond (east of) the Big Black, to Edwards' Depot; after the receipt of the order, in violation of it, he made his second and his last advance from that point to the field of Baker's Creek. He further claims that this order caused the subversion of his "matured plans." I do not know what those plans were, but am startled to find matured plans given up for a movement in violation of my orders, rejected by a majority of his council of war, and disapproved (as he states) by himself. On the twelfth, he wrote me that if he could collect force enough, Edwards' Depot would be the battle-field. The battle of Baker's Creek was fought three or four miles from Edwards' Depot. The presence of the enemy was reported to him the night before. There was no apparent obstacle to prevent him from resuming his original position, and carrying out his "matured plans."

It is a new military principle, that when an officer disobeys a positive order of his superior, that superior becomes responsible for any measure his subordinate may choose to substitute for that ordered.

But, had the battle of Baker's Creek not been fought, General Pemberton's belief that Vicksburg was his base, rendered his ruin inevitable. He would still have been besieged, and, therefore, captured. The larger force he would have carried into the lines, would have added to, and hastened the catastrophe. His disasters were due not merely to his entangling himself with

the advancing columns of a superior and unobserved enemy, but to his evident determination to be besieged in Vicksburg, instead of manœuvring to prevent a siege.

Convinced of the impossibility of collecting a sufficient force to break the investment of Vicksburg should it be completed, appreciating the difficulty of extricating the garrison, and convinced that Vicksburg and Port Hudson had lost most of their value by the repeated passage of armed vessels and transports, I ordered the evacuation of both places. General Gardner did not receive this order before the investment of Port Hudson, if at all. General Pemberton set aside this order, under the advice of a council of war, and, though he had in Vicksburg eight thousand fresh troops not demoralized by defeat, decided that it "was impossible to withdraw the army from this position with such *morale* and material as to be of further service to the Confederacy;" but, "to hold Vicksburg as long as possible, with the firm hope that the government may yet be able to assist me in keeping this obstruction to the enemy's free navigation of the Mississippi River." Vicksburg was greatly imperilled when my instructions from Tullahoma to concentrate were neglected; it was lost when my orders of the thirteenth and fifteenth of May were disobeyed. To this loss were added the labor, privations, and certain destruction of a gallant army, when my orders for its evacuation were set aside.

In this report I have been compelled to enter into many details, and to make some animadversions upon the conduct of General Pemberton.

The one was no pleasant task; the other was a most painful duty. Both have been forced upon me by the official report of General Pemberton, made to the War Department instead of to me, to whom it was due.

General Pemberton, by direct assertion and by implication, puts upon me the responsibility of the movements which led his army to defeat at Baker's Creek and the Big Black Bridge—defeats which produced the loss of Vicksburg and its army.

This statement has been circulated by the press, in more or less detail, and with more or less marks of an official character, until my silence would be almost an acknowledgment of the justice of the charge.

A proper regard for the good opinion of my government has compelled me, therefore, to throw aside that delicacy which I would gladly have observed towards a brother officer, suffering much undeserved obloquy, and to show that in his short campaign General Pemberton made not a single movement in obedience to my orders, and regarded none of my instructions; and, finally, did not embrace the only opportunity to save his army—that given by my order to abandon Vicksburg.

Most respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. E. JOHNSTON,
General.

LETTER FROM PROFESSOR EWELL.

WILLIAMSBURG, June 25, 1866.

To the Editor of the Rebellion Record:

The following is an extract from Dr. Craven's diary:

"Pemberton made a splendid defence of Vicksburg, and might have been relieved if the officer commanding the army sent to relieve him (General Johnston) had not failed to obey the positive orders to attack General Grant, which Mr. Seddon, then Secretary of War, had sent. If the same officer, who was upheld in command by the anti-administration party, had vigorously attacked Sherman at Atlanta when directed, the fortunes of war would have been changed, and Sherman hurled back to Nashville over a sterile and wasted country—his retreat little less disastrous than Napoleon's from Moscow. He did not do so, and was relieved; General Hood, a true and spirited soldier, taking his place. But the opportunity then was gone; and to this delay, more than to any other cause, the Southern people will attribute their overthrow whenever history comes to be truly written."

In the statement this extract contains, that General J. E. Johnston failed to obey "positive orders" or directions to attack General Grant at Vicksburg, in 1863, or General Sherman at Atlanta, in 1864, there is a mistake, caused, no doubt, by Dr. Craven having misapprehended his distinguished patient, with whom, in his misfortunes, I know no one sympathizes more truly than General Johnston. I venture to make this correction, in justice to a war-worn veteran who freely shed his blood in defence of the Southern cause, and who is too good a soldier to wilfully disregard an order of his military superior. The only approach to an order to attack General Grant in 1863, was given in a telegram from the Secretary of War, and this was modified, and virtually revoked, by a second telegraphic communication, received the same day. The gentleman who was at the time Secretary of War of the Confederate States, had too much wisdom and practical sense to give a "positive order" to General Johnston to attack with his army of about twenty-three thousand men General Grant's army, numbering some eighty thousand, covered, in a position of great natural strength, by the unfordable Big Black River, and by formidable lines of intrenchments, defended at all points by powerful artillery.

In like manner, no such orders were given during the Atlanta campaign, and the disasters that befell the Army of Tennessee after General Johnston was relieved, clearly demonstrated that they ought not to have been given. My position on General Johnston's staff, and my relations to him, caused all his correspondence with the authorities in Richmond, by mail, by telegraph, or by messengers, from January, 1863, to July, 1864, at which time he was relieved, to pass through my hands. Any asser-

tion I have herein made I am fully prepared to prove.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
BENJ. S. EWELL.

Doc. 47.

THE BATTLE OF HELENA.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL HOLMES.

LITTLE ROCK, August 14, 1863.

Brigadier-General W. R. Boggs, Chief of Staff, Department Trans-Mississippi, Shreveport, Louisiana:

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit to the Lieutenant-General commanding the following report of the attack made by me upon Helena, on the fourth of July, 1863:

In the month of June, 1862, the Federal forces under General Curtis, from the attempted invasion of Arkansas betook themselves to the city of Helena, and there fortified. Since that time it has been constantly and heavily garrisoned by Federal troops. The possession of this place has been of immense advantage to the enemy. From it, they have threatened at all times an invasion of Arkansas, thereby rendering it necessary that troops should be held in position to repel such invasion. From it they have controlled the trade and sentiments of a large and important scope of country. It has been to them a most important depot for troops in their operations against Vicksburg.

In view of these great advantages to them, of the great embarrassment to my movements elsewhere, arising from the proximity of a large and threatening army, and of the deleterious effect on that portion of the State caused by their presence, it was deemed of very great importance that they should be driven from their only stronghold in Arkansas. As a means of raising the siege of Vicksburg, and of keeping the Mississippi river closed, in the event of a surrender of that city, the policy of the move was perfectly apparent. Moreover, from information, considered reliable, in my possession, the capture of Helena by the forces at my disposal seemed perfectly practicable.

On the fourteenth June, 1863, I telegraphed to Lieutenant-General Smith, that I believed I could take the place, and asked his permission to attack it. Two days after I started to Jacksonport, there to consult with Generals Price and Marmaduke, and to make the necessary preliminary arrangements. The result of this interview was the following orders:

Price's command, consisting of General McRae's Arkansas and General Parsons' Missouri brigades of infantry, constituting Price's division, and Colonels Green's and Shelby's brigades of Missouri cavalry, Marmaduke's division to rendezvous at Cotton Plant, and Brigadier-General Fagan's Arkansas brigade of infantry, at Clarendon, on the twenty-sixth June (Friday), whence, by converging roads, the two columns would move in the direction of Helena. I also informed General Walker, commanding brigade of cavalry in the vicinity of Helena, of my intention, and directed him to allow no ingress to the place.

Upon my return to Little Rock, I found that General Smith had fully sanctioned my proposed attack, and that the Secretary of War had written a strong letter, suggesting, advising, and urging it. Thus encouraged, on the twenty-sixth of June, I proceeded to Clarendon, and assumed command of the expedition. From unavoidable necessity, consequent upon rain, high water, and wretched roads, General Price's command did not reach its rendezvous for four days after the day fixed, thus giving the enemy abundant notice of my approach. General Fagan arrived at his place of rendezvous (Clarendon), on the twenty-sixth. As soon as the troops were in position, I proceeded towards Helena by converging roads, and reached Allan Polk's house, five miles from Helena, on the morning of July third.

Having received full, accurate, and reliable information of the forces and fortifications of the enemy in Helena, and the topography of the surrounding country, I here made the final disposition for the attack. That information disclosed that the place was very much more difficult of access, and the fortifications very much stronger than I had supposed, before undertaking the expedition; the features of the country being peculiarly adapted to defence, and all that the art of engineering could do having been brought to bear to strengthen it. The fortifications consisted of one regular work, heavily armed with siege guns, and four strong redoubts, mounted with field pieces and protected by rifle-pits on suburban hills.

The disposition for the attack was as per following order:

"The attack on Helena will be made to-morrow morning at daylight, and as follows:

"First—Major-General Price, in command of McRae's and Parsons' brigades, will proceed by the best route, assume position, assault and take Graveyard Hill, at daylight.

"Second—Brigadier-General Walker, with his cavalry brigade, will, in like manner, proceed to the Stirling road, where he will hold himself in position, to resist any troops that may approach Righton Hill; and when that position is captured, he will enter the town and act against the enemy as circumstances may justify.

"Third—Brigadier-General Fagan will proceed by the best route, assume position, and take the batteries on Hindman Hill, at daylight.

"Fourth—Brigadier-General Marmaduke will proceed with his command, by the best route, assume position, and take Righton Hill, at daylight."

* * * * * *

This plan of attack was fully concurred in by all my General officers, and the part assigned to each accepted with alacrity.

Between eleven and twelve o'clock at night, the troops began to move to their respective positions, whence to assault in the morning.

General Fagan detached a regiment from his brigade, and sent it forward to the right, on the lower Little Rock road, to occupy the attention of the enemy in the rifle-pits below the city, and to protect his flank, in case of an attack from that quarter.

Three detached companies of cavalry, under Captain Denson, were ordered to act as vedettes in the plain south of the city, and to transmit to General Fagan rapid information of any attempt to flank him. His artillery was also sent forward on this, the only practicable road, with the hope that it might assist in creating a diversion, and thereby aid the general movement.

I took a position a little after daylight on the Graveyard Ridge, half a mile from the fortifications, a central point, there to await the development of the attack.

Soon after daylight, Brigadier-General Marmaduke drove in the pickets of the enemy in his front and assaulted Righton Fort. It is believed that a strong, vigorous, and sudden attack on this fort would have been successful; but some delay occurring, a heavy force of the enemy appeared on his left flank and rear, and held him perfectly in check during the whole day. It was the peculiar duty of Brigadier-General Walker to have prevented this movement on the part of the enemy, and, as represented by General Marmaduke, the same could have been easily accomplished. No satisfactory reason has been given by General Walker why this service was not rendered. This attack, being most remote, was not under my personal supervision, and was too distant for me to give specific orders.

The assault on the first line of rifle-pits, in front of Hindman Hill, was made at a few minutes after daylight. General Fagan, at the head of his brigade, charged gallantly over four lines, under a deadly fire from the rifle-pits and guns on his front, and most disastrous enfilading fire from Graveyard Hill on the left, previous to the attack by General Price. Having driven the enemy from, and carried the fifth and last line of rifle-pits, the brave men, who had followed him thus far, overcome by sheer exhaustion, resulting from the inordinate exertion of their difficult charge, and the intense heat of the day, were unable to proceed further. A charge upon the fort was nevertheless attempted, and failed. The brigade thereupon took shelter behind the inner line of breastworks, anxiously awaiting assistance. This assistance never arrived. Major-General Price did not make his attack till after sunrise, and more than an hour after the time named in the order. As an explanation of this delay, his report states that, finding when he had gotten within one and a half miles of the position he had been ordered to take, that his division would arrive upon the ground prematurely, he ordered a halt, and resumed his march at dawn of day. His troops, when brought into position and ordered forward, behaved magnificently, charging rifle-pits and breastworks without a falter, and taking the hill without a halt.

As soon as the works were carried, I rode rapidly into them. Finding the guns in the fort had been rendered useless, by the enemy, before being abandoned, I at once dispatched one of my staff to the rear, to bring up some artillery. Owing to the impracticability of the roads, this could not be effected in time.

Perceiving the position of the gallant Fagan and his command, I ordered Brigadier-General Parsons, the only General officer present, to proceed at once to attack the Hindman Fort in the rear. Everything was in confusion. Regiments and brigades mixed up indiscriminately, and the order was not attended to. Immediately afterwards I sent an order to General Price to the same effect, and then returned to my headquarters.

Two or three hundred yards in the rear, I passed Brigadier-General McRae, who had not joined his brigade since the assault. I ordered him at once to the fort.

It seems that General McRae was the officer designated by General Price to go to General Fagan's assistance. After much delay, he proceeded on this duty, but utterly failed to render the slightest aid, making no attempt to assault the hill.

Not having been advised of this order for General McRae, and being impatient of the delay, I proceeded again to the fort on Graveyard Hill, where I found General Parsons, with only three hundred or four hundred men of his brigade. He informed me that General McRae had been ordered to the relief of General Fagan. That officer was nowhere to be seen, while General Fagan, with greatly reduced force, was being assaulted and driven back by the enemy largely reinforced. Under these circumstances, at ten and a half A.M., I ordered the troops to be withdrawn.

My retreat from Helena was effected in the most perfect order, and without the slightest demoralization of any kind.

My whole force engaged in this expedition amounted to seven thousand six hundred and forty-six (7,646). My loss, as near as is ascertained, is one hundred and seventy-three (173) killed; six hundred and eighty-seven (687) wounded; seven hundred and seventy-six (776) missing. Total, sixteen hundred and thirty-six (1,636). See reports of division and brigade commanders forwarded herewith.

I write this report with a deep pain. I commanded brave, gallant, and willing troops, and should have succeeded in the capture of Helena: for, though the difficulties were very great, they were not insurmountable, and the misfortune of a failure was, in a very great measure, consequent on the men not being well in hand after success. Most of my loss in prisoners resulted in not restraining the men, after the capture of Graveyard Hill, from advancing into the town, where they were taken mainly without resist-

ance. If, instead of this, the regiments and brigades had been re-formed instantly, the capture of Hindman Hill, and consequently of the town, would have been of easy occurrence.

I cannot close this report without expressing my obligations to his Excellency, Harris Flanigan, Governor of Arkansas, who accompanied me, and had my confidence, during the whole campaign. I owe to his cool, discriminating judgment, many valuable suggestions. His presence, confidence, and zeal had no little influence on the spirit and energy of the Arkansas troops. He and Colonel Gordon Rear, Adjutant-General of the State, acted as volunteer Aids-de-Camp on my staff during the battle. As the expedition failed, which should have succeeded, I refrain from all expressions of commendation, believing that the brave officers and men who distinguished themselves will willingly forego the applause due to them, in consideration that our beloved country reaped no benefit from their exploits.

I have the honor to be, General,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
THOMAS H. HOLMES,
Lieutenant-General.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL PRICE.

HEADQUARTERS PRICE'S DIVISION,
CAMP ON JONES' LAKE, July 13, 1863.

Captain John W. Hinsdale, A. A. G.:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit to the Lieutenant-General commanding, the following report of the part taken by this division in the attack made upon Helena on the fourth instant:

I left Jacksonport, in obedience to his orders, on the twenty-second day of June, with this division and Marmaduke's division of cavalry. My march was greatly impeded by the extraordinary rains, which, beginning on the evening of the twenty-fourth June, and falling almost without intermission for four days, made the rivers, bayous, and creeks, over which my route lay, and the bottoms and swamps through which it ran, almost impassable to troops, unprovided, as mine were, with the means of repairing roads and constructing bridges or rafts. I was, however, enabled by the skill and energy of my officers, and by the willing endurance and laborious industry of my men, to surmount these unlooked-for obstacles, and to reach, on the morning of the third instant, a point within five miles of Helena.

At this point, Lieutenant-General Holmes, having assumed the immediate command of all the troops before Helena, detached Marmaduke's division from my command, leaving me two brigades; the one of Arkansians, under Brigadier-General Dandridge McRae, consisting of three regiments of infantry and a field battery, with twelve hundred and twenty-seven men present for duty; the other of Missourians, under Brigadier-General M. Monroe Parsons, consisting of four regiments of infantry, a battalion of sharpshooters, and a field battery, having in all, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight (1,868) men present for duty. These two brigades constituted this division.

The order of attack directed that I, "in command of McRae's and Parson's brigades, should proceed by the best route, assume position, assault and take the Graveyard Hill at daylight." I made my dispositions accordingly, and moved at midnight, with Parsons' brigade in front.

As my route lay for the greater part of the way across abrupt hills and deep ravines, over which it was utterly impracticable to move my artillery during the darkness, I ordered the pieces to be left behind until daybreak, and armed details from each battery to accompany the infantry, in order to man the guns which I expected to capture.

Finding, when I had gotten within a mile and a half of the position which I had been ordered to take, that my division would arrive upon the ground prematurely, I ordered a halt, during which the Lieutenant-General commanding came to and remained with the division until the dawn of day, when the line of march was resumed. Then pushing forward rapidly, until my skirmishers had become engaged with those of the enemy, and within half a mile of his works, the troops were formed into two columns of divisions, Parsons' brigade occupying the right and moving in front.

The enemy's fire becoming somewhat sharp about this time, the guides who were conducting the columns took occasion to leave unperceived. Some confusion and consequent delay ensued, but another guide having been obtained, the head of the column soon occupied the position from which the assault was to be made. A brief halt was here ordered, to give the troops time to recover somewhat from the exhausting fatigues consequent upon their rapid march over a succession of almost precipitous and heavily wooded hills.

The order for the assault (as explained to the General officers and regimental commanders of the division the evening before) directed that General Parsons, moving in front, should halt the head of his column at the point from which he was to make the assault, until the head of General McRae's column should reach its position on the left, when both columns should advance simultaneously to the assault.

During the brief halt just alluded to, and just as I had ordered General McRae forward, the Lieutenant-General commanding rode up and asked why the assault had not been made. I explained the facts to him, and thinking that time enough had elapsed for General McRae to get into position, I dispatched one of my staff to General Parsons to ascertain why he was not advancing. He replied that he was waiting for General McRae to get into position. Meanwhile General McRae had moved his brigade into position, but (owing to the difficulties and necessities of the ground) further to the left than had been originally ordered and explained to General Parsons, and with a high ridge inter-

posing between it and Parsons' brigade, so that the latter officer could not see that it had gotten into position. I immediately directed one of my staff officers to communicate these facts to General Parsons and to order him to make the assault without any further delay, as General McRae, to whom I had sent orders to that effect, would be advancing before he (General Parsons) could receive my order.

Both brigades moved forward on the instant, rapidly, steadily, unflinchingly, and in perfect order, under a storm of Minnie balls, grape and canister, which were poured upon them not only from the Graveyard Hill in their front, but from the fortified hills upon the right and the left, both of which were in easy range.

The enemy gave way before the impetuous assault of the attacking columns, which, entering the works almost simultaneously, planted the Confederate flag upon the summit of the Graveyard Hill.

Each brigade had done its allotted duty with equal zeal, devotion, and gallantry, and each is entitled to an equal share of the honor which justly attaches to those who discharge their duty as these men did, fearlessly, well, and successfully.

Being in possession of the hill, and finding that the captured guns had been shot-wedged, I directed my Chief of Artillery to bring forward the pieces which I had left behind. This he did as promptly as the difficulties of the ground would permit, but not until it was too late for them to be used in the action. Meanwhile a heavy fire was concentrated upon the hill from the four fortified positions, which the enemy still continued to hold, and from the hill-sides and ravines, under cover of which their sharpshooters delivered a well-directed and very effective fire, whilst the gunboat, which lay in front of the town, kept up an unintermitting discharge of its heavy guns.

Perceiving at once that the surest way to relieve my men from the disastrous effects of this galling fire, was to aid General Fagan to take the enemy's works upon my right, and receiving information at the same time, that that gallant officer had been repulsed in every attempt to assault those works, I sent to General Parsons an order directing him to move his brigade forthwith to the reinforcement of General Fagan. He replied to the officer by whom I sent the order, that General McRae (who was by his side at the time) would, with my permission, go to the assistance of General Fagan, whilst his (Parsons') brigade, being the stronger of the two, would hold the Graveyard Hill. Before this reply was brought back to me I sent another of my staff, by direction of the Lieutenant-General commanding, to deliver to General Parsons an order similar to the one already sent. General Parsons' reply having been meanwhile received, another order was sent directing him to hold the hill, and General McRae to reinforce General Fagan, as speedily as possible, with his brigade.

It soon became obvious, however, that both brigades had been so much weakened by their heavy losses in killed and wounded, and particularly in prisoners (the most of the latter having been captured in the immediate vicinity of the town, whither they had gone without orders from me), and by the straggling of those whom thirst and the intense heat of the day overcame, or who had become disheartened by the failure of the other assaulting columns, that I could not send any effective aid to General Fagan, without too greatly endangering my own position. It was equally obvious that, unless such aid could be promptly sent to General Fagan, the general attack upon Helena must fail. It was under these circumstances that I received an order from the Lieutenant-General commanding to withdraw my division. In compliance with this order my troops were withdrawn to a point about four miles from Helena, where they rested for the night, and resumed the march hither on the morning of the fifth.

The Lieutenant-General commanding was himself a witness of the conduct of my division. He saw the alacrity with which they advanced to the positions to which they had been assigned. He knows the steadiness and unfaltering courage with which they moved, in the midst of a deadly fire, over deep ravines and precipitous hills, obstructed with felled timber, to, into, and over the works which they had been ordered to take, driving everything before them. He himself was a witness of the undaunted bravery and enduring constancy with which, animated by his own inspiring example and gallant bearing, they stood unshaken in the very centre of that unceasing fire which was hurled against them from gunboat, from flats, and from rifle-pits. I am sure that he will pay them that tribute of praise to which their courage and endurance entitle them. The accompanying reports of Brigadier-Generals McRae and Parsons will explain in detail the part taken by their respective brigades, and point out to the Lieutenant-General commanding, such of their officers and men as are particularly deserving of mention. I have not been able to obtain perfectly accurate reports of the casualties of this division, but these may be stated approximately as follows:

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
McRae's Brigade.....	46	168	133	347
Parsons' Brigade.....	59	336	369	764
	105	504	502	1,111

I will forward detailed reports of these casualties as soon as the lists can be carefully revised. The separation of the command will

necessarily entail some delay in the revision of them.

The admirable conduct of Brigadier-General Parsons, not only upon the field, but upon the march, merits my earnest commendation, whilst his skill and gallantry, as well as his long and uninterrupted active service as Brigadier-General, first in the Missouri State Guard, and more recently in the Provisional Army of the Confederate States, are, in my opinion, worthy of recognition on the part of the government.

I must also commend the excellent discipline which General McRae maintains at all times in his brigade; the marked good sense and energy with which he conducted its march to Helena; the promptitude with which he has always obeyed my commands, and the earnest efforts which he made to reinforce General Fagan towards the close of the attack.

I have not in my former reports mentioned the officers of my staff, though most of them have beem eminently deserving of praise for gallant and meritorious conduct upon more than one hard-fought field. Justice requires that I should not permit the present occasion to pass without placing upon record my sense and appreciation of the worth and merits of those of them, at least, who participated in the present movement.

Major Thomas L. Snead, Senior Assistant Adjutant-General of my command, to whom I have been often indebted for vigorous support in hours of perilous trial (apart from the intelligent and faithful performance of the responsible and onerous duties of his office), surpassed himself this day in the intrepid manner with which he bore himself throughout the conflict, rallying the troops again and again, and urging them forward to the scene of action.

In this work, under the hottest fire of the enemy, and until we had swept their intrenchments and carried the hill, he was faithfully, fearlessly, and gallantly assisted by Major L. A. Maclean, A. A. G.

My thanks are due to my Aids-de-Camp, Lieutenant Richard T. Morrison and Lieutenant Celsus Price, for their willing assistance promptly rendered upon this, as upon other hotly contested fields.

I commend all these officers to the Lieutenant-General commanding, and through him to the President, for promotion, on account of gallant and meritorious conduct in the field.

Acting Engineers, John Mhoon, of Alabama, and D. C. Cage, of Mississippi, not only deserve honorable mention for their gallantry upon the field, but for the skill and energy with which they overcame the difficulties that obstructed my road from Cache River to Helena. I have repeatedly recommended Mr. Mhoon for appointment in the Engineer corps, and again respectfully urge the President to recognize the worth of so excellent an officer. Mr. Cage's services demand a similar recognition.

Nor should the less conspicuous, but equally useful, services of Major Isaac Brinker and Major John Reid be passed over in silence. To the practical good sense and untiring and well directed energy of the former, as Chief Quartermaster of my division, I am greatly indebted for the accomplishment of the march to Helena and back to this point; while the latter, as Chief Commissary of Subsistence, has, in spite of many difficulties, continued to subsist the troops both regularly and well.

Lieutenant-Colonel Clay Taylor, Chief of Artillery and acting Chief of Ordnance, discharged the onerous duties of both those offices with laborious fidelity and to my entire satisfaction.

To my Chief Surgeon, Thomas D. Wooten, to Surgeon William M. McPheeters, and to Assistant Field Purveyor R. M. Slaughter, my constant thanks and commendation are due for the sedulous manner in which they have at all times devoted themselves to the sick and wounded, but never more humanely or more conspicuously than upon this occasion.

These gentlemen tell me that they owe their grateful acknowledgments to the Reverend Mr. Marvin for the very important services which he rendered at their hospitals, not only offering the consolation of his holy office to the dying, but ministering assiduously to the wants of the wounded.

Major John Tyler, C. S. A., acting, for want of an appropriate command, as volunteer Aid-de-Camp, remained by my side in view of special contingencies, which might fittingly task his valuable accomplishments.

Mr. Charles T. Perrie, volunteer Aid-de-Camp, is also entitled to my thanks for the activity which he displayed at the opening of the attack.

I would refer particularly to the gallant conduct and bearing of Mr. Gustavus A. Dyer, Clerk in the office of the Assistant Adjutant-General, and of Orderly Daniel M. Kavanaugh, both of whom have, by their conduct in the field, merited commissions in the army, and both of whom have borne themselves equally well in more important battle fields.

Major Henry M. Clark, Assistant Inpector-General, was detained from the field by serious illness; Major E. C. Cabell, Paymaster, by duties elsewhere.

I am, Captain, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
STERLING PRICE,
Major-General.

REPORT OF GENERAL PARSONS.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH BRIGADE, PRICE'S DIVISION,
July 10, 1863.

Major T. L. Snead, A. A. G.:

MAJOR: I have the honor to report the following as the part taken by my brigade in the battle of Helena, on the fourth instant:

On the evening of the third of July the army bivouacked on the Little Rock and Helena road, and six miles from the latter place. It having been determined to attack the enemy at dawn next morning, the disposition of the troops for

the various points of attack was immediately made by the Lieutenant-General commanding the army, and the Major-General commanding this division. The assault and capture of the enemy's works on Graveyard Hill was assigned by the Major-General commanding to Brigadier-General McRae's brigade (Arkansas), and my brigade (Missouri volunteers). This position was, by the Lieutenant-General commanding, believed to be the strongest of all the enemy's works, and the key to all his defences. He was particularly solicitous that it should be carried and held at all hazards. It was represented to contain six heavy pieces, protected by earthworks and a line of rifle-pits on its front, and extremely inaccessible on account of the numerous sharp ridges, steep ravines, and felled timber, in its front and flank. These works were situated between Fort Hindman on the right, and another fort on the left, both being within rifle range of the position to be assailed by my command, and supported in its rear by another fort between it and the town of Helena, and Fort Curtis obliquely to the right and rear of the work to be assaulted. All these fortifications were situated upon high, steep hills, with deep ravines and felled timber between, rendering the rapid and orderly movement of the troops very difficult.

At twelve o'clock on the night of the third, the division was put in motion, my brigade in advance, which moved in the following order, viz.: first, battalion of sharpshooters, Major Pindall commanding, in front; second, the Ninth regiment, Colonel White; third, the Eighth regiment, Colonel Burns commanding; fourth, the Seventh regiment, Colonel Lewis commanding; fifth, the Tenth regiment, Colonel Pickett commanding. After moving on the main road about two miles, the column diverged to the left, along an obscure path for two miles further, and then left this path to the left, and followed up a rivulet, until arriving within about one and a half miles of Graveyard Hill. Day having not yet dawned, a halt was ordered, to await sufficient light, during which time my command was ordered to "load." I had previously thrown out well to the front, as skirmishers, Major Pindall's battalion of sharpshooters, to which command was attached Captain Biscoe's company of sharpshooters, from McRae's brigade. Taking advantage of this halt, I particularly instructed in person the commandants of regiments as to the plan of attack, and charged them that, in the event if any of their division should become disordered in carrying the works, they should be promptly re-formed, and, as the orders of my superiors extended only to the capture of Graveyard Hill, that no further movement should be made without orders. I deemed this precaution absolutely necessary, as it was impossible for either myself or staff to ride over the rough ground on which we moved, and consequently orders could not be transmitted with the usual rapidity.

At daylight the march was resumed, and in a short time we encountered the steep ridges and deep ravines, which rendered the movement very slow and fatiguing. At five o'clock A. M., Major Pindall encountered the enemy's pickets, about half a mile from the fortifications. Sharp skirmishing ensued, and finally they were driven in. I ordered the column to form divisions at half distance, and moved steadily forward in that order. The enemy now commenced throwing shells and grape upon the column, killing and wounding about twenty men; but no signs of disorder or fear were apparent—they moved steadily and firmly forward. By this time Pindall's sharpshooters had arrived within musket range of the enemy's works, and from behind stumps and logs, and the branches of felled trees, were delivering an effective fire upon the gunners of the enemy's artillery.

Upon arriving within three hundred yards of the line of rifle-pits, I again halted the columns, to allow rest, and to enable Brigadier-General McRae to move upon my left and take position, as previously agreed upon between that officer and myself, for the purpose of making a combined assault upon the works. So soon as it was announced to me that he was in position, I ordered the "forward" at double-quick, to which officers and men responded with alacrity. Just at this moment a heavy fire was opened on my right flank from a rifle-pit, distant about one hundred and fifty yards; also the shell and grape from Fort Hindman were showered down upon the column. This was the critical moment. I watched with an anxious eye to see whether my battalions would falter or break under this flank attack, but they moved gallantly on, unheeding the murderous missiles now being hurled on them both from front and flank. Turning my attention to the front, the head of the two columns (McRae's and mine) were beyond the rifle-pits, and in an instant White's battle-flag, waving over the works, announced that Graveyard Hill was won.

Thirty men of Tilden's battery having been armed and sent forward with Colonel White's regiment, under command of Lieutenant Lesneur, for the purpose of working the enemy's guns, upon their capture, this officer immediately took them in charge, but finding shot wedged in the bore, and the enemy having taken away the worms, he could not work them. He and his men resumed their muskets, and fought as infantry throughout the battle.

As previously ordered, the commandants of regiments proceeded to restore order in their commands, wherever confusion had occurred. Just at this time the Lieutenant-General commanding arrived upon the hill, and gave orders directly to one of my Colonels to attack and carry the fort in the direction of the town, and he proceeding to execute the order, the other commandants, understanding it to be a general movement towards the town, advanced in that direction, some portions of regiments rushing into town, and even to the river's bank. All the way from Graveyard Hill to the town, and

through it, those devoted troops were exposed to a fatal cross-fire from the enemy's artillery and musketry. It was here that my loss was the heaviest; not more than half of those that went in that direction returned—the remainder were killed, wounded, and taken prisoners.

From time to time the enemy made repeated assaults on Graveyard Hill, but was always successfully repulsed. Whilst General McRae and myself were thus holding it under the terrific storm of bullets hurled upon us, both from the right and from the left, he suggested that if I, with my command, would hold the position, he would assault Fort Hindman in the rear, which General Fagan was then engaging in front. This arrangement having been agreed upon, he moved with what troops he had at his disposal to the assault; but, being assailed by the guns from the fort, by the musketry from the rifle-pits, and in flank by the heavy artillery from the gunboat, he was compelled to withdraw his gallant command into the timber for shelter.

During these operations against Fort Hindman, the enemy was continually shelling my position from the fort upon my left, and repeatedly advanced against me, but was each time repulsed. General Fagan having retired from the assault upon Fort Hindman, no troops were now upon the field except my own. The enemy moved upon me in front and upon both flanks, and opened a furious cross-fire of artillery from right and left. I still maintained my position, driving back the enemy's infantry wherever assaulted. At a quarter past ten o'clock A. M., I received an order from the Major-General commanding to "retire." I immediately sent orders to commandants of regiments and Pindall's battalion to withdraw their commands in good order, and fight the enemy as they retired. At half-past ten A. M., I withdrew my command from the field.

It gives me great pain to report the heavy losses in brave officers and men that my brigade sustained on that bloody field. The following commissioned officers of the Ninth regiment fell killed on the field: Major Sandford, Captain Launius, Lieutenant Spencer. The following were wounded: Colonel White, Adjutant Thomas, Lieutenants Kelly, Essleman, and Kerr.

In Pindall's battalion were wounded: Captains Cake and Phillips, and Lieutenant Armstrong.

In the Eighth regiment were killed: Lieutenants Foster and Farley. Wounded: Lieutenant-Colonel Murray; Captains M'Rill, Bradley and Johnson; Lieutenants Pierce, McBride, Gibson, Dudley, Good, Stevens, and Weatherford.

In the Seventh regiment were killed: Captains Cocke and Perry. Wounded: Lieutenant-Colonel Cummings; Adjutant Waisburg, Captain Gillett, Stemmons, and McGee; Lieutenants Austin, Anderson, Weims, Wight, Strong, Wall, Finley, West, Gonce, and Bronaugh. Colonel Lewis captured.

In the Tenth regiment were wounded: Lieutenants Wright, Baker, and Hanley.

The following is a summary of my losses in each regiment, battalion, and the artillery detachment:

Seventh regiment..	Killed	17	
	Wounded	126	
	Missing	54	—197
Eighth regiment....	Killed	14	
	Wounded	82	
	Missing	67	—163
Ninth regiment....	Killed	7	
	Wounded	53	— 60
Tenth regiment....	Killed	11	
	Wounded	41	
	Missing	237	—289
Pindall's sharps'trs..	Killed	9	
	Wounded	26	
	Missing	8	— 43
Artillery detach't...	Killed	1	
	Wounded	8	
	Missing	3	— 12
Total loss			764

RECAPITULATION.

Killed	59	
Wounded	336	
Missing	469	—764

It will thus be seen that every regiment, battalion and squad of my brigade was actively engaged with the enemy, and that each sustained its proportionate of the heavy losses above reported—Captain Tilden's battery not having been taken into action, it being impracticable to do so on account of obstructions in the line of march.

While the country will long mourn the loss of the gallant officers and men who fell as martyrs to our cause, the historians of this revolution will record them as "the bravest of the brave." For their gallant comrades who lie now disabled from their wounds, the officers and soldiers of this brigade feel the deepest solicitude, and cherish the hope that they will soon recover and return to their commands, to give the country more examples of unprecedented coolness and daring.

To mention the name of any particular officer or soldier as having distinguished himself for gallantry above his fellows, would be to do injustice; for the brigade, as a whole, has fully sustained its well-earned reputation, and given additional evidence of the disinterested devotion of Missourians to the cause of their country—showing, as heretofore, that they are always among the first in the breach, and the last to leave it. I am indebted to my Aids, Captain Edwards and Lieutenant Chesnut for the prompt and untiring energy with which they assisted me in the engagement. Major Monroe, my brigade Quartermaster, and Major Ruthven, my brigade Commissary, deserve great praise for the activity with which they discharged the duties of their respective departments. Chief Surgeon Bear, with the regi-

mental surgeons and their assistants, were on the field, and, by their prompt professional attention to the wounded, saved many valuable lives. A report in detail of the killed, wounded and missing, will be forwarded at an early day to the proper department.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully,

M. M. PARSONS,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

Official:

THOMAS L. SNEAD,
Major and A. A. G.

REPORT OF GENERAL MCRAE.

HEADQUARTERS MCRAE'S BRIGADE, July 14, 1863.

Major Thomas L. Snead, Assistant Adjutant-General, Price's Division:

MAJOR: I submit the following report of the action of my brigade in the assault upon the town of Helena, on the fourth instant:

On the third orders were issued from district headquarters for General Parsons' and my brigade to assault and take the fort upon Graveyard Hill at daylight upon the morning of the fourth. By agreement, General Parsons' brigade was to move in front until he got into position, so as to enable him to rush past the fortification, by way of the ravine south of the Graveyard Hill, and then charge the fort in reverse. As soon as General Parsons was in position, my brigade was to move to the left and charge the works in front, simultaneously with the assault to be made by General Parsons. The evening before the assault General Parsons and myself had been furnished with five guides. We took up the line of march at twelve o'clock at night. Three of these guides went with General Parsons. I also sent to his front one company of sharpshooters, under command of Captain Biscoe, of Hart's regiment—Captain Biscoe being familiar with the country. Before daylight our column was halted, to wait until the other attacking columns were in position. After forming into columns of divisions, we again moved on. As soon as the enemy's fire opened, General Parsons sent back for another guide, those sent with him having deserted him. I sent one, and the one who remained with me shortly after left. At this time we were upon the ridges, three in number, each having a fort upon it and firing, and in appearance were exactly alike. Here I halted for a short time, in doubt as to the route. Finding the correct route, we pushed on upon the crest of the hill to where the timber was cleared away in front of the rifle-pits, and then crossed to the north side of the ridge, and moved up to a position that I thought near enough to make a charge; but between my position and the work that was to be carried, there was a deep ravine, just in front of the fort. As soon as the command was massed into position, a general rush was made into the fort, and the works were carried. This assault was made from the north. The enemy were driven from the works and pursued into the verge of the town. About this time General Parsons' brigade entered into the fort, he having charged about the same time as my brigade, thus rendering the capture of the position certain; for, had our assault failed, he would have been so close that we could not have failed. Here I would state that, while moving along the north side of Graveyard Hill, my command was exposed not only to the fire of the fort and rifle-pits in front, but also to the fort north of Graveyard Hill, which fort was not attacked, and to whose fire my command was exposed. While moving along, I discovered a battery of field-pieces were being moved to the rear, so as to completely enfilade my command, and being in point blank range for canister. Before marching I had armed Captain Marshall's company of artillery with muskets, and moved it along in rear of my column, so that in the event we captured the fort, I would be prepared to work the guns. I now was compelled to use this company as sharpshooters, and deployed them, ordering them to approach as close as possible to the battery and prevent it getting into position, which they accomplished in a very gallant manner. As soon as the works were carried, I at once returned to where I had deployed Marshall's company, and ordered Captain Marshall to call his men and take charge of the guns and work them. While giving these orders Lieutenant-General Holmes rode up and ordered me at once to the assistance of General Fagan, who was attacking the fort upon the south of Graveyard Hill. I at once went to the fort and ordered my officers to assemble their men; but, before they were able to do so, General Holmes again, in a peremptory manner, ordered me to the assistance of General Fagan. I had not more than two hundred men with me. With them I charged down the hill, aiming to assault the north front of the fort, but when I arrived at the foot of the hill, the fire of the enemy was so withering that, with the force I had, it was madness to attempt to scale the hill, the hollow being raked by artillery situated opposite its mouth, and completely enfiladed with rifle-pits, in point blank range. I therefore deployed my men, and commenced firing upon the rifle-pits and works, which were being attacked by General Fagan, aiming to make as great a diversion as possible.

I remained here until I was informed that the enemy had retaken the works on Graveyard Hill, when I sent Captain Cobbs, of Hart's regiment, with his company, to General Fagan, and to inform him that I was unable to attack the works in front, being now exposed to fire in rear, as well as flank. I crossed over the narrow ridge in front of the fort attacked by General Fagan, and the fire was so great and severe that the men were compelled to cross this ridge singly. When I reached the crest of the hill I discovered General Fagan's men in a rifle-pit in front of the main works, and they seemed too few, even reinforced with what men I had, to accomplish anything, and within a short time I

saw them rush out of the rifle-pits into a deep gorge immediately in their rear. Discovering the enemy moving around the crest of the hill, and, fearing that I would be surrounded, I retreated into the ravine between the two forts attacked, and re-organized what command I had with me, and then moved to the rear, forcing every straggler that I found to fall into the ranks. The first field officer that I met was Colonel Hawthorne, at some huts where some of General Fagan's wounded were, and in a short time General Fagan came up. After moving a short distance from here I met General Holmes.

I must here call your attention to the fact that the information concerning the localities, strength of the enemy, &c., was very erroneous. The ground over which we moved was almost entirely impassable; the crest of the hill so narrow that it would have been murder to have attempted to have assaulted along it; the sides of the hill full of gullies, with almost perpendicular sides, and that covered with fallen timber, so placed as most to impede an approach; the day one of the hottest; our column not only exposed to a storm of shell, but for a long way (say six hundred yards) to a fire of canister and grape, front and flank, as well as from sharp-shooters from rifle-pits, which were placed by the enemy to protect every possible approach.

Under all this, I am proud to say that my little brigade of less than three regiments, and these small, moved steadily, without faltering, upon the foe, protected by fortifications and artillery; and the hill up which the final rush was made, was so steep and slippery that it was almost impracticable. For all that, with a wild shout they rushed up it, drove the concealed enemy from his position, and seized his works.

I am happy and proud to state that the officers and men in my brigade did their whole duty, and when all did so well a distinction is difficult. As for my field officers—that they did their duty, it needs but to state that, of nine who went into the battle, six were wounded, two mortally.

Attention is called to the gallant conduct of Colonel Hart, who led his men to the assault, and, when in the fort, seized one of the enemy's guns and fired it against them.

Here also fell mortally wounded Lieutenant W. F. Rector, Adjutant of Hart's regiment, whose gallantry and undaunted bravery signally distinguished him in the assault.

Major Davie, gallantly leading his men, fell shot through the thigh in front of the fort.

Captain Robinson, acting Major, fell mortally wounded in front of his men.

There also fell mortally wounded the brave, the zealous Major Martin, of Hart's regiment, as also Major Stephenson, of Gause's regiment. There also fell Captain Garland, of Glenn's regiment; Lieutenant Eppes, of Gause's regiment, than whom a better man or braver soldier has not offered up his life during the war.

Colonels Glenn and Gause and Lieutenant-Colonels Rogan and Hicks deserve special mention for the cool and daring manner in which they led their men.

Lieutenant Crabtree, of Green's regiment, displayed the greatest intrepidity.

Sergeant Champ, Company A, of Hart's regiment, deserves the greatest credit for gallantry, rushing in advance of his regiment in the charge.

Color-Sergeant Garland, of Glenn's regiment, also deserves special mention. He advanced his regimental colors to the front, and maintained his position through the assault, his colors being torn into ribbons.

My thanks are due my staff for efficient aid rendered me during the action, especially to Lieutenant John McKoy, my A. A. I. G.

In conclusion, I will state that I left the field without orders. Having been ordered by General Holmes to the part of the field upon which General Fagan's brigade fought, I was unable to communicate with Major-General Price, but when he left all effort upon our part had ceased. My loss is as follows: Killed, forty-six; wounded, one hundred and sixty-eight; missing, one hundred and thirty-three; total, three hundred and forty-seven. For further particulars reference is made to list, which is respectfully submitted.

Respectfully,

D. McRae,
Brigadier-General.

Official:

Thomas L. Snead,
Major and A. A. G.

REPORT OF GENERAL FAGAN.

Headquarters Second Brigade, &c.,
Camp at Searcy, Arkansas,
July 21, 1863.

Major W. B. Blair, A. A. A. General, Headquarters District of Arkansas, &c.:

Major: I have the honor to report as follows in regard to the part taken by my brigade in the attack on Helena, upon the fourth instant:

On the evening of the third instant, at dark, I ordered Colonel Brooks, with his regiment, one section of Etter's battery of light artillery, commanded by Lieutenant John C. Arnett, and three companies of cavalry, commanded by Captain Densen, to move to the front in support of the cavalry, then within three miles of the town of Helena. About eleven o'clock at night, with the three remaining regiments, commanded respectively by Colonels King, Hawthorne and Bell, and Blocker's battery of light artillery, commanded by Captain W. D. Blocker, I moved forward on the road towards Helena. On joining Colonel Brooks, where the old hill road leaves the Little Rock road, I ordered him to advance *at once* with his command, on the latter road, to attract and engage the attention of the enemy, south of the town, and hold his forces in the rifle-pits on the river. At the same time, I ordered Colonel Hawthorne, whose regiment

was in advance, to lead the brigade forward on the hill road. This was promptly complied with, and the brigade moved on without interruption, until within one mile of the outer works of the enemy. At this point, the road was completely filled with felled timber, the largest forest growth intermingling and overlapping its whole length, whilst on either side precipitous and impassable ravines were found running up even to the very intrenchments of the enemy. It was utterly impossible to move my artillery or ammunition train along this road; the obstacles were so great, indeed, that I was under the necessity of directing every officer of my command to dismount, and proceed on foot—a dire necessity, which subsequent events gave occasion seriously to deplore. After crawling through the interstices of the closely jutting limbs and boughs, and climbing over the thickly matted timber, for one mile, my line of skirmishers, who had been ordered by me not to fire, came within sight of the enemy. I went to the front, and could plainly see that the enemy was on the alert, and evidently expecting and awaiting an attack. The order of the Lieutenant-General commanding was to assault the fortifications with the several attacking columns, *precisely* at daylight on the morning of the fourth. Not having been apprised of the obstructions in the road, I made no arrangements to remove them. The limited time to daylight would not allow of an *attempt* even to take my artillery along. It was ordered to remain in the road, where the obstructions were first met with. To conform to orders, it was necessary for me to move with the utmost celerity. Freeing myself of everything except my column of infantry, I pushed forward with all the haste in my power.

At daylight I reached and attacked the enemy in his works. Colonel Hawthorne being in advance, was hurried rapidly into line on the right of the road, which led directly up to the fort on Hindman's Hill. He at once engaged the enemy, who occupied their extreme or outer line of rifle-pits. Bell's regiment emerged next from the confused mass of felled timber, and coming up was also double-quicked into line on the left of the road, engaging as they came into position the intrenched forces of the enemy, over against them. King's regiment brought up the rear. He rapidly threw his men into position, and was ordered by me immediately to the support of Colonel Hawthorne. My entire force was now engaged. The assault upon the rifle-pits was made from both the right and left of the road. Never did men behave with greater steadiness and gallantry than did the troops of those three regiments. Over the heavy timber, the deep gorges, and the precipitous banks, they moved. Over opposite to them ran the long line of fortifications, towards which they moved with eager, anxious steps. Cowering behind their strong works, the enemy beheld their advance with consternation. Still on they moved, unhesitatingly, amid the "leaden rain and iron hail." The gorge is passed, the ascent of the steep acclivity is nearly gained, the red line of rifle-pits looms up clearly amid the uncertain light and haze of dawn. With a shout of triumph they rush towards it, and the enemy are driven pell-mell from one row of the rifle-pits to another. Up to this time there had been no attack at any other point. Daybreak had come and gone, and still the guns of my brigade and those of the enemy were the only ones that interrupted the stillness of the morning. Owing to this my brigade was exposed to a constant and galling enfilading fire from the works on Graveyard Hill. This exposure, combined with the close and constant fire in our front, was most trying to the men. Their numbers were being rapidly decimated, not only by the fire of the enemy, but by extreme exhaustion, occasioned by their scaling the steepest of hills, made almost impassable by quantities of timber cut down, which was of itself an almost insurmountable barrier to our advance. We reached and took possession of the fourth tier of rifle-pits. Now it was that the column commanded by Major-General Price (Parsons' and McRae's brigades), charged the works on Graveyard Hill, gallantly driving the enemy before them, and taking possession of their fortifications and artillery. There remained yet one row of intrenchments between my brigade and the fort on Hindman's Hill. I ordered a charge. My men, though thoroughly exhausted and worn, answered with a shout, and sprang forward most gallantly. This being the inner and last line of works between us and the enemy, of course was defended with great stubbornness. It was of no avail. My men sprang forward bravely and defiantly, and, after a severe contest, succeeded in driving out the enemy, who fled, crowding back into the frowning fort, and under cover of its heavy guns. The fort yet remains to be taken. Of all the many obstacles and threatening fortifications that opposed our advance that morn, there only remained the fort. All other obstacles, natural and artificial, had been overcome—rugged and almost impassable ravines—the steepest and most broken hillsides, *abatis*, and line after line of breastworks, had been passed and left behind. Before us there only remained the fort, and the plain on which it was built. Notwithstanding the reduced condition of my command and the exhaustion of those yet remaining, I ordered a charge upon the fort. My Colonels, King, Hawthorne, and Bell, did all in their power to encourage the men to the attack. The effort was made, but the prostrate condition of my command prevented success, and after losing in the attempt several gallant officers and many brave men, I formed again in rear of the inner line of rifle-pits, whilst the guns of the fort continued to pour forth a furious fire.

It was now verging on eleven o'clock in the day. More than three hours before, the guns on Graveyard Hill had been taken by our friends, and there seemed no obstacle in the way of their victorious march. Eagerly did we look to see their column coming to our aid, and at first with

the most undoubting hope and confidence, but less confidently as hour after hour wore on, and still they made not their appearance. Time wore on, the pleasant morning deepened into the sultriest and hottest of days. The thinned ranks of my regiments became thinner and thinner each moment. The guns of the enemy (not more than one hundred or one hundred and fifty yards distant) were telling sadly against us, whilst the heat, the want of water, and the toil, were no mean auxiliaries. Still, the brave men left stood manfully up to the discharge of their duty. At this time, written orders were received from Lieutenant-General Holmes, directing that I withdraw my troops from the field, and fall back to Allan Polk's (six miles in the rear). We retired from the field, and fell back slowly to that point. It was in the last assault upon the fort that Major Cocke, of Hawthorne's regiment, received a severe wound in the shoulder. I would make especial mention of this brave and accomplished officer—his daring was conspicuous throughout the engagement.

Here, also, the much beloved Captain Walton Watkins, whilst most gallantly leading his company over the enemy's works, fell. It has never been my lot to witness more gallantry and more determined courage than displayed by this young officer on that day. We mourn the loss of other brave and true officers who fell during the engagement.

Of the conduct of my Colonels, too much praise cannot be said. Brooks, King, Hawthorne, and Bell, each and every one, did his whole duty. Brooks' command being on the lower road, was not immediately under my eye, but of the part taken by him I respectfully refer you to his report. He succeeded entirely in carrying out the orders he received to the letter. His report will show the number of prisoners captured by him, as well as the amount of property taken and brought from the field, or destroyed.

The position assigned to Colonel King threw him perhaps on that ground most difficult of all to get over. Had it not been for the determined character of this brave young Colonel, his regiment, perhaps, would not have been advanced over all the difficulties he met with.

Major Dillard and Adjutant Bourne, of same regiment (King's), deserve much praise for the assistance they rendered Colonel King.

Colonel Hawthorne was constantly at the front, cheering his men on from one success to another. When orders came from Lieutenant-General Holmes to abandon the field, Colonel Hawthorne remained with a small number of his men, engaging the enemy, until the last of the army had left the field, and retired beyond the high hills which lay between them and danger.

Colonel Bell and Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson, same regiment, with a large number of his officers and over one hundred of his men, were captured by the enemy, in an attempt to enter the fort from the south side. The loss of Colonel Bell is a serious one to us. It affords me pleasure to bear testimony to his distinguished gallantry and daring.

Major Blackwell (Bell's regiment) was intrusted by me with an important part on the field, and is entitled to my thanks for the successful manner in which he performed it.

Major B. T. Duval, Quartermaster on my staff, is entitled to my thanks for his constant attention to every duty on the march from Little Rock. He was with me on the field, and, by his coolness and good judgment, was enabled to render me important assistance up to the time of the withdrawal of my troops from the field.

Captain Wyatt C. Thomas, Assistant Adjutant-General of the brigade, was, as usual, at his post. The conduct of this young officer has often before won for him "honorable mention." On this field, he was constantly with, and cheering the troops forward. His bravery and gallantry justify especial mention.

My Aid-de-Camp, Captain Albert Belding, always eager to discharge every duty, was sent by me at daylight, with important orders to Colonel Brooks, some distance from me on my right. I was consequently deprived of the valuable assistance his quickness and daring so well qualify him to render on the field.

Captain John B. Howell, my Ordnance Officer, was ordered to remain constantly with his ammunition train, which, as above stated, had to be left in the rear. This deprived me of the immediate services of this gallant officer.

The officers of my staff, Major B. F. Fall, brigade Commissary; Mr. James H. Tucker volunteer Aid-de-Camp, and Mr. J. W. Paul, acting Inspector-General, are all entitled to my thanks for the assistance rendered me during the engagement.

The aggregate force engaged against Fort Hindman and the defences in front of it, was thirteen hundred and thirty-nine.

I have, Major, the honor to be,
With much respect,
Your obedient servant,
J. F. FAGAN,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF COLONEL KING.

HEADQUARTERS KING'S REGIMENT ARKANSAS INFANTRY,
CAMP AT SEARCY, July 22, 1863.

Captain Wyatt C. Thomas:

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by my regiment in the late battle fought at Helena, on the fourth instant:

On the night of the third instant I took up the line of march at eleven o'clock, taking the road leading to Helena; and when within about ten miles of that place, I, with Colonels Hawthorne and Bell, led by General Fagan, took the road leading into town by the way of Hindman Hill. When arriving within about three quarters of a mile of the hill, we found the road so

blockaded by fallen timber that it was impossible for anything but infantry to pass, and it was with great difficulty that the men could get through it at all. By the time I got my regiment to the open road, skirmishing commenced by Colonel Hawthorne, who was moving in front. I immediately moved my regiment up at a double-quick, arriving at the scene of action about daylight. I was immediately ordered by General Fagan to take position on the right of Colonel Hawthorne, who had formed line of battle, and was skirmishing with the enemy in the rifle-pits, which were immediately in front of us. I moved my regiment as ordered, taking position on the crest of a hill overlooking the town, where I was exposed to a galling fire from the enemy's rifle-pits or breastworks, which were about one hundred and fifty yards in front of us. By the time I got my men well up and in line, I received an order from General Fagan to charge the works in front of me, which I did; but, as you yourself know, the ground was so very rough that it was impossible to move rapidly. After scrambling over and under the fallen timber, across a ravine, that I would at any other time, or under any other circumstances, have considered impossible to make my way through, and at last up the side of a hill that was so steep that the men had to pull themselves up by the bushes, we reached the first line of breastworks, and drove the enemy back. Here we were met with a terrific fire, not only from the inner line of works and an enfilading fire from our left, but from the fort on the hill in front of us, near Hindman's house, which was about two hundred yards distant from us, and also from the battery on what is known as Graveyard Hill.

In this position we kept up a heavy fire, moving forward from one line of works to another, until we reached the inner line of the enemy, taking refuge in their forts. I then received an order from General Fagan to send a small force round to the right of my position, to see that the enemy did not flank us; also, to move my regiment to the left, where I found Colonel Hawthorne, with his regiment and a portion of Colonel Bell's, behind the last line of works, which was about one hundred yards from the first line. Here it was we found that it was impossible for our men to go further. Many of them had been left so exhausted that they could not go on.

While in this situation, General Fagan ordered me to take the fort, but the men were so exhausted that most of them were unfit for further service.

We remained behind the breastworks, keeping up a steady fire at the fort, until about eleven o'clock A. M., at which time we were ordered off the field.

I cannot speak too highly of the most of my officers and men throughout the fight, particularly of the gallant Major Dillard and Adjutant Bourne, who were in every charge, and cheering the men on at all times.

My loss was as follows: twelve killed, forty-six wounded, and twenty missing.

I have the honor to be,
Your obedient servant,
J. P. KING,
Colonel, commanding Regiment.

REPORT OF COLONEL BROOKS.

HEADQUARTERS BROOKS' REGIMENT,
CAMP NEAR COTTON PLANT, July 10, 1863.

Captain Wyatt C. Thomas, Assistant Adjutant-General Second Brigade:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the following as the part taken by my command in the engagement of the fourth instant at Helena:

At dusk on the third, in compliance with instructions from Brigadier-General Fagan, I moved forward with my regiment and one section of Etter's light artillery, Lieutenant J. C. Arnett commanding, to the support of the cavalry, then within three miles of the enemy.

At half-past one o'clock A. M., on the morning of the fourth, I received orders from Brigadier-General Fagan, to advance on the Little Rock road with my regiment, Captains Denson's, Miller's and ——— companies of cavalry, and the section of artillery; make a feint on the south of Helena; attract the attention of the enemy in that direction, hold the force in the rifle-pits south of the town, and operate otherwise as I could.

Before reaching Beech Grove, I withdrew the cavalry advance, and deploying skirmishers, met the enemy's infantry and cavalry pickets at daybreak. A sharp skirmish ensued, in which three of the enemy were killed and six captured. The company of cavalry in position on the right of the line of skirmishers received a fire which killed three horses. Moving forward to the negro quarters, I found them abandoned, the occupants having fled to the town at the first alarm. Eight negroes were taken and sent to the rear. Shortly afterwards I reached the hill at the Clements House, and placed my command in position, advanced skirmishers well to the front and right, extending nearly to the river. The enemy soon opened with a rifled battery from the left of the rifle-pits next to the levee, but without doing any injury. Immediately the gunboat commenced firing, one shell exploded in Captain Denson's company, wounding three men, and killing three horses. Captain Blocker reported to me with his battery, but a position for it could not be obtained. I moved Etter's section to the hill, and upon gaining the summit it was found impracticable to use but one piece. This opened briskly, drawing a terrific fire from the battery and gunboat, and after expending thirteen rounds Lieutenant Arnett was compelled to withdraw. About eleven o'clock, I ordered Lieutenant E. T. Delony upon the hill with the gun. The range of the enemy's guns was so accurate, and the fire so furious, that he retired after firing eight rounds. The force in front and on the right was fully three times as

large as mine. An advance to attack the enemy in the rifle-pits would have subjected my small command to the heavy guns of Fort Curtis, a light battery in the rear of the works, an enfilading fire from the rifled battery, and an attack in flank and rear from the levee. Under these circumstances, I deemed it best to hold that force of the enemy in check, and prevent him from reinforcing his most important points of defence, and by the use of a six-pounder (not being able to bring more than one piece into position) divert as much as possible, the fire of the battery and gunboat from the attacking columns. In this I was entirely successful.

At twelve o'clock M., I received orders from Brigadier-General Fagan to retire, and, subsequently, instructions from Lieutenant-General Holmes to halt at a designated position, as the rear guard of the army. By my direction, Captain Denson's company applied the torch to the negro quarters, which were consumed, together with five thousand pounds of bacon, fifteen hundred bushels of corn, and a quantity of commissary stores and clothing.

During the entire morning the demonstrations of the enemy behind the levee were of a threatening character. Captain Denson, commanding cavalry detachment, rendered efficient service in counteracting his movements and protecting my right flank. —— ——, of his company, distinguished himself in the capture of three prisoners.

I brought off nine prisoners, eight negroes, five mules, one horse and equipments, one ambulance and team, and a small lot of clothing and canteens.

Companies B and K (skirmishers), commanded respectively by Captains F. R. Earle and Arkansas Wilson, deserve especial mention for the steadiness with which they advanced, drove the enemy before them, and maintained their positions under a heavy artillery fire.

Lieutenant-Colonel Gunter and Major Pettigrew were constantly at their posts in the discharge of their duties.

The only casualty in my regiment was private A. C. Peck, Company B, severely wounded in the chest.

I am, Captain, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

W. H. Brooks,

Colonel, commanding.

REPORT OF COLONEL BELL'S REGIMENT.

Camp Bayou DeView, July 10, 1863.

Captain Thomas:

Captain: I have the honor to make my report of the part taken by Bell's regiment in the engagement of the fourth instant at Helena. We moved for half a mile at double-quick, passing through brush and logs, with which the road was blockaded, and approached in view of Helena at half-past four o'clock A. M., taking our position on Colonel Hawthorne's left in line of battle, and commenced firing on the enemy in front. The enemy threatened to flank us on the left, when Captains Hurley's and Donaldson's companies were detached and thrown out to engage him, under my command, to protect our left flank. The regiment then advanced over the first hill. Here Captains Pleasants and Smith were wounded, and many men killed and wounded. The ground at this point was almost impassable, and the whole road and deep ravine full of timber, over which I scattered my men, and it was impossible to keep in line; but we succeeded in getting through, after remaining in the timber and hollows nearly two hours under a heavy fire, and made a charge, when, the enemy giving way, we entered the rifle-pits. Here many of our men fell, perfectly exhausted, from over-heat.

At this point the firing ceased on our left, indicating that our forces had been called off. The enemy, seeing our condition, rushed upon and surrounded us, and compelled many of our officers and men to surrender.

The detachment under my command advanced over two ravines and up the hill fronting and nearest to the intrenchments and fort, about three hundred paces distant, which position we held about two hours, keeping up a constant fire until the ammunition was exhausted.

About that time Colonel Hawthorne, on our right, ordered a charge on the intrenchments. I called on my men to join in the charge, which, with the exception of Captain Donaldson and part of his company, followed, and in about twenty minutes we reached the intrenchments, where I remained, awaiting ammunition, which I had sent for, until I was ordered to fall back.

My men, with few exceptions, acted well. I will mention the names of Lieutenant Porter, of Company B, Lieutenant Thompson, Sergeant Lowry, and private Dance, of Company A, as acting with marked bravery. The loss of the detachment was two killed, six wounded, and thirty missing. The regiment entered the fight with an aggregate of four hundred and thirty-two; the entire loss was two hundred and seventeen.

I respectfully submit the above as my report of the part taken by Bell's regiment in the engagement of the fourth instant at Helena.

T. H. Blacknall,

Major, commanding Bell's Regiment.

REPORT OF COLONEL HAWTHORNE.

Headquarters Hawthorne's Regiment,
Camp near Bayou DeView,
July 9, 1863.

Captain W. C. Thomas, A. A. General:

Sir: In obedience to orders from brigade headquarters, I have the honor to submit the following report of the part my regiment took in the action at Helena, on the fourth instant:

At eleven o'clock P. M., on the night of the third, we left our encampment, six miles from Helena, and marched to take up our positions in front of the intrenchments, my regiment being in the advance. The road over which we

passed (known as the Hill road, from Little Rock to Helena) was extremely rugged, and it was not without considerable difficulty, and great fatigue to the men, that we succeeded in getting within one mile of the enemy's intrenchments. At this point I found the road blockaded with fallen timber to such an extent, that I halted the brigade, of which I was temporarily in command, sent Captain Millar's company, which had been in advance, to the rear, and sent forward Captain P. G. Roper's company (A), deployed as skirmishers. General Fagan now arrived at the head of the column, and ordering all the field and staff officers to dismount, we moved forward as rapidly as possible towards the intrenchments—the skirmishers deployed on either side of the road, keeping well in advance of the main body. At five minutes past four o'clock A. M., my skirmishers reported the enemy in sight. By order of General Fagan I moved my regiment in double-quick by the right flank, along the crest of a hill running at right angles with the road, and parallel with the enemy's first line of intrenchments; and, without halting, so soon as my left had passed the road I moved by the left flank in line of battle towards the enemy. Without waiting for the other regiments of the brigade to form, I gave the order to charge, which was responded to by loud shouts along my entire line. The men dashed down the steep declivity amid a perfect storm of bullets, climbed step by step over vast piles of fallen timber, up the rugged sides of almost perpendicular hills, and finally, after unheard-of toil and fatigue, scaled the opposing height and drove the enemy in consternation from their first line of defences. Here I waited to recruit my men, whose strength was very much exhausted, and to give Colonel Bell time to form his regiment and move up on my left. As soon as Colonel Bell informed me that he was ready, our two regiments moved forward together, and after encountering and overcoming obstacles similar to and even greater than those in front of the first line of rifle-pits, drove the enemy out and took possession of their second line. Colonel King had, by order of General Fagan, under a heavy and constant fire, and after almost superhuman exertions, placed his regiment two or three hundred yards beyond my extreme right, partly in rear of the enemy's third line of intrenchments, and nearly at right angles with the position occupied by Colonel Bell's regiment and mine. I sent a courier to communicate with him, who returned with the gratifying intelligence that his regiment was in position, and was ready and anxious to charge the enemy. The three regiments now moved forward with a shout, and, notwithstanding the steep hillsides, covered with immense masses of fallen timber, up and over which we had to climb, and notwithstanding the perfect hail-storm of bullets which assailed us at every step, we soon drove the enemy out of his third line of defence. We soon rallied our exhausted troops, re-formed our broken lines, and again charged the enemy, driving him from his fourth line of intrenchments. It was now about seven o'clock A. M. My regiment had been hotly engaged for nearly three hours. The men were completely exhausted. Numbers had fainted from excessive heat and fatigue. Many had been killed and wounded, and a large majority in each of our three regiments were utterly unable to fight any longer. We began to be discouraged. From the very commencement of the action we had been listening for the guns of Generals Price, Marmaduke, and Walker, but thus far we had listened in vain. Every brigade except ours had failed to attack at daylight, as ordered. Even the very guns on Graveyard Hill were wheeled around and directed against our lines, which they swept again and again from one end to the other with grape and canister.

Just at this moment the scene changed. Heavy and rapid volleys of musketry were heard on our left. General Fagan announced to us that our friends were storming Graveyard Hill, and ordered us to move forward at once. Our men responded with a shout, dashed down into the deep ravine, climbed the steep sides of the opposite hill, and just as the noble brigades of Parsons and McRae swept in triumph across the face of Graveyard Hill, drove the enemy from his fifth and last line of rifle-pits back to his forts, and under cover of his siege guns. An attempt was now made by General Fagan to capture the fort on Hindman's Hill, which was immediately in our front. But our men were too much exhausted and our numbers too few. The attack was unsuccessful, and resulted in the death and capture of many valuable officers and men. It was here that Captain Walton Watkins, commanding Company D, of my regiment, was killed, while gallantly leading this last and most desperate charge. His conduct throughout the engagement had been chivalrous and manly, so much so as to attract universal attention and admiration. Here, also, I lost the services of Major John B. Cocke, who was severely wounded and compelled to retire from the field. It affords me much pleasure to bear testimony to the coolness, courage, and efficiency of this gallant officer. His services throughout that desperate fight were invaluable, and his absence was most keenly and sensibly felt. Lieutenants Richard Shaddock, Hinson, Hainard, and Thompson, were killed while bravely fighting at their posts.

But to return to the fight: Graveyard Hill was evacuated soon after it was taken. The other positions to the left of that hill, that were to have been taken at daylight, had not even been attacked. The firing had ceased at all points except the firing of our brigade, and that of our enemies directed against us. This latter was now most terrific, and the whole force of the enemy seemed to be directed against our little band. Yet, notwithstanding their vast superiority in numbers and position, notwithstanding the terrible withering fire that continued to pour upon us from their own ranks;

notwithstanding the attempts of the enemy to flank our position, both on the right and on the left, we held our position firmly for three long hours.

At thirty minutes past ten o'clock A. M., I received an order from General Fagan to withdraw my regiment from the field. I had marched some forty or fifty paces, in compliance with this order, when I received another requiring me to leave a small guard to cover my retreat. I called for volunteers, but no one responding, I returned myself, and with nine men who volunteered to accompany me, kept up a fire upon the enemy for twenty minutes longer. The ammunition was now expended and I thought it prudent to retire. The enemy were close upon us and advancing from all points. Not a moment was to be lost. We retreated as rapidly as possible, but as we descended the first hill, the enemy assailed us with a terrible volley of musketry. Three of our little party fell to rise no more. The remaining six, myself and a Yankee prisoner, whom we had kept with us all the time, succeeded in making our escape.

My officers and men, with but few exceptions, deported themselves with great gallantry.

My loss, so far as I have been able to ascertain, is as follows: Killed, twenty; wounded, seventy; missing, forty-three.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. T. HAWTHORNE,

Colonel, commanding Regiment.

REPORT OF GENERAL MARMADUKE.

HEADQUARTERS MARMADUKE'S DIVISION, JACKSONPORT, ARKANSAS, July 25, 1863.

To Major W. B. Blair, A. A. A. General, District of Arkansas:

MAJOR: I have the honor to report herewith the part taken by my command in the battle at Helena.

I was ordered on the evening of the third of July to be in position, attack and take the fort on Reiter's Hill, at daylight on the morning of the fourth of July.

My command, mounted, consisted of Shelby's brigade, about one thousand one hundred men, and Greene's brigade, six hundred and fifty men, total one thousand seven hundred and fifty men.

At ten o'clock P. M., July third, I marched to get into position; when three miles from the fort I dismounted my whole force except one company, under Major Elliott. I then moved forward. When within two miles of the fort, I found the road and country thoroughly obstructed, the enemy having chopped down the trees and rendered almost impassable that approach to the fort and town. The country was exceedingly rough.

I was delayed some half hour or more by my guides, who lost their way, and reported that they were completely lost, and unable to guide me further; in consequence of which I did not get into position until a little after daylight, but before sunrise.

The enemy's pickets and skirmishers were encountered some three quarters of a mile from the fort, and driven to within one hundred and fifty yards of the fort. In this the enemy lost several killed, wounded, and five prisoners.

Shelby's brigade was in the advance, and so narrow was the road, and so rough and rugged were the hills, that the troops could only march by the flank, and the artillery with great difficulty was brought up, piece by piece and by hand.

By the time the advance had reached within two hundred yards of the fort, and those in rear brought up and deployed along the ridges, the enemy had brought to my left and rear a body of infantry and several pieces of artillery, which during the whole day's fight poured upon me a deadly fire.

I now had a heavy force in my front (infantry in rifle-pits and artillery in position), which it would have been difficult with my whole force to have carried. In addition, I had the force on my left (of infantry and artillery) thoroughly protected by the levee, which engaged a large part of my force, and on every attempt to advance enfiladed my line. It was from the sharpshooters and artillery on my left and rear that I suffered my greatest loss, and not until they were dislodged could I have advanced. I twice dispatched to Brigadier-General Walker to advance and assist me in dislodging them. It was not done.

From half past four A. M., till eleven A. M., I held my position, unable to advance; the enemy with their infantry and artillery on my front and left flank constantly engaging my forces. At eleven A. M., I received orders from General Holmes to retire.

My loss was fourteen killed, fifty-two wounded, one missing. Among the killed were Major R. H. Smith, my division Quartermaster, and Captain J. C. Clark, of Company D, Shelby's regiment. Major Smith was a gallant and valuable officer; he was shot dead beside a piece of artillery, encouraging and assisting the cannoniers in their duties. Captain Clark was a most exemplary man and excellent officer; he was killed leading his men forward.

Amongst the wounded, I regret to announce that Colonel Shelby, commanding brigade, who was ever in the thickest of the fight, received a painful and serious wound in the wrist.

For a more special report of the conduct of the several regiments and their officers, I respectfully refer you to the brigade commander.

As yet I have not received the report for Shelby's brigade—will forward it as soon as received—have delayed this report awaiting same. The conduct of every officer and soldier of my command, as far as I know, was excellent.

The attack upon Fort Reiter, by my command, was a failure. I have every reason to believe

that my troops would have carried it, had it not been for the force on my left and rear, which occupied that position after daylight, and which could and should have been prevented from taking that position, and after they had gained the position, could have been driven from it by General Walker's brigade, which did not come to the support of my left till after seven o'clock A. M., and during the whole engagement his force was more than half a mile to my left and rear. I could see the force which engaged Walker's brigade, and at no time did it exceed five hundred; I think three hundred a big estimate. Walker's brigade not only did not prevent reinforcements from going to Fort Reiter, but the enemy, after sunrise, actually passed to my left, and half a mile to my rear, and held that position during the day.

Very respectfully,

J. MARMADUKE,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

REPORT OF GENERAL WALKER.

HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,
CAMP NEAR LICK CREEK, July 7, 1863.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the conduct of my cavalry brigade, in the battle before Helena, on the fourth instant:

In obedience to General Orders No. 2, I moved my command towards Helena, on Sterling's road. Arriving at the blockade before daylight I dismounted and sent forward three companies, attempting to capture the enemy's pickets in that direction. At daylight, I sent forward three more companies dismounted, and commenced the work for removing obstacles in the blockade, for the passage of artillery. My advance soon became engaged with the enemy. Reinforcing my advance, and forwarding and bringing into action my artillery, I was continually engaged until nearly three o'clock P. M. I effectually complied with the part assigned me in the order of attack, by preventing the enemy from throwing troops to Reiter's Hill, which they were constantly trying to do, and made two strong efforts and were repulsed. I protected General Marmaduke's left flank. My command was engaged in front of his left. At about two o'clock, I was informed by General Marmaduke that he had already withdrawn his command. I had hard fighting to protect my left flank, and when my right became exposed I commenced getting loose from the enemy, and retired.

I must speak in the highest terms of the officers and men of my command upon the occasion—no straggling in reaching the place assigned them, although accompanied by apparent insurmountable difficulties, resisted successfully the enemy, and twice drove him away handsomely. I send herewith reports of Colonels Dobbins and Newton.

I am, Major, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

L. M. WALKER,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF COLONEL DOBBINS.

IN THE FIELD, July 5, 1863.

Brigadier-General Walker:

GENERAL: I respectfully submit the following report of the movements of my regiment on the fourth instant:

According to your order, I moved my regiment and battery of four pieces, on the evening of the third, from the Bowie Farm, on the Little Rock road, four miles west of Helena, to the old Porter Farm, east of Crawley's Bridge, on the road leading from Helena to Sterling, a distance of about fifteen miles, and remained at that place until two o'clock on the morning of the fourth, then moved down the road to a point where the mill road intersects the Sterling road, one and a half miles north of Helena, where I dismounted one hundred and fifty men, and sent them forward as skirmishers, beyond the blockade, to within three-quarters of a mile of Helena, and a short distance above the levee leading out from the hills. I then dismounted one hundred and fifty more men, and sent them forward to the same point, and extended the line of skirmishers from the hills to the Mississippi river. I then drew up the remainder of the regiment in line of battle north of the blockade, about four hundred yards in the rear of the line of skirmishers, and there waited to learn the result of the attack made by General Marmaduke upon the battery and fortifications of Reiter's Hill, and, not learning anything definite, and discovering the enemy moving up between the levee and Mississippi river, I moved my battery forward according to your order, and commenced firing on the enemy advancing, and also the enemy's batteries playing upon General Marmaduke's command and my front. I then advanced, causing the enemy to fall back, moving their batteries some six hundred yards further down the levee. About two hours after the enemy again advanced with artillery, and in much larger force than at first. I again opened fire on them with my battery and small arms, and, with the assistance of a portion of Colonel Newton's regiment, again caused them to fall back and move their battery still further down the levee; after which skirmishing was kept up until some three hours after the firing had ceased along our entire line, at which time I received your order to fall back slowly on the Grant Mill road, which I succeeded in doing without losing any men after I left the battle-field.

The loss in my regiment in the engagement was four killed and eight wounded—one mortally, two seriously, and five slightly. For particulars I refer you to Dr. Dunn, surgeon of my regiment.

The officers and men of my regiment and battery deserve great credit for gallantry and courage displayed on that day.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

ARCH. S. DOBBINS,
Colonel, commanding Regiment Cavalry.

REPORT OF COLONEL NEWTON.

HEADQUARTERS NEWTON'S REGIMENT ARKANSAS CAVALRY,
CAMP AT GIST'S, PHILLIPS COUNTY, ARKANSAS, July 8, 1863.

Captain J. G. Alexander, A. A. G. Walker's Division, &c., in the Field:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor, in obedience to your instructions of to-day, to submit the following report of the part taken by my regiment in the attack on Helena on the fourth instant:

I reached Mrs. Moonley's and halted there about twelve o'clock P. M., on the third instant. About an hour before day on the morning of the fourth, in obedience to an order from the Brigadier-General commanding, I resumed the march, taking the Sterling road towards Helena, moving in rear of Colonel Dobbins' regiment. Arriving at the spring, about a mile from town, the brigade was halted by General Walker. We remained there until the firing commenced on our right, when I was ordered up to a point near the blockade of felled timber, there to await orders.

About seven o'clock I received an order to send thirty sharpshooters to the support of Colonel Dobbins' regiment, who were deployed to our front, beyond the blockade and to the left of the skirmishers, from General Marmaduke's command. I detailed the required number from the different companies, selecting men with long-range guns, as far as practicable; placed them under command of Lieutenant Barnes, of Company A, and carried them forward to the left of Dobbins' skirmishers and beyond the lagoon (which, starting from near the base of the levee, on the north side of Helena, runs eastward to Porter's Lake), where they were soon engaged with the enemy, and did good service.

At half-past seven, by order of General Walker, I detached Companies B and G under command of Captain Portis, of the former, and deployed them as skirmishers to support Barnes' sharpshooters, and resist a small force of Federal cavalry which was reported to be threatening our extreme left. About eight o'clock Portis reported to me that the enemy had reenforced in his front, that he was being pressed, and needed two more companies. I immediately communicated the information to General Walker, and, by his direction, instructed Portis to observe the enemy closely, skirmish with him, and, if too heavily pressed, fall back slowly, advising me from time to time of what was transpiring.

About this time I received an order to send forward another company to support Dobbins' skirmishers, which I obeyed by sending Captain Rolland's Company E, under command of Lieutenant Garner.

Learning that the enemy had made several attempts to force Portis back, and gain possession of the west bank of Porter's lake, which would enable him, by means of his sharpshooters, to annoy the rear of our battery posted on the hill in front of the blockade, and, perhaps, finally force us from the hill altogether, I went in person to where Portis was to learn the true condition of affairs, and ascertain what, if anything, could be done. I found that Portis, with his small force, had made a gallant resistance, and had thus far foiled the enemy in his several attempts to occupy the western or inner bank of Porter's lake; but that he, nevertheless, had lost some ground, and had but little more to lose. I deemed it important, therefore, not only to regain what had been lost, but to drive the enemy beyond the levee and into town, if possible, with my small force. There not being time left me to previously communicate with General Walker, I ordered up Companies C and F, without first notifying him. The latter I deployed as skirmishers, and advanced to the front. They were soon engaged. I moved Company C forward across the lagoon before mentioned, and, pursuing the skirmishers to the front vigorously, ordered a charge. The enemy fled precipitately. We pursued him about three hundred yards. Finding that he was rallying his men in his rifle-pits, which were situated to the left of the levee and near the river bank, I deployed my whole force then with me as skirmishers, posted them as best I could, and left them under command of Captain Portis, with instructions to hold the ground we had thus gained, until he should receive other orders from me. I started to the headquarters of the Brigadier-General commanding, to get permission to use my whole regiment for the purpose of dislodging the enemy, or, failing in that, confining him to his rifle-pits, and thus prevent him from annoying our left. Arriving there, I learned that our troops were withdrawing, and, by General Walker's direction, retired my command to the point where the mountain road, leading from the spring on the Sterling road to the Grant's Mill road, diverges from the Sterling road, and there disposed my forces so as to cover the withdrawal of our troops. When the rear of Dobbins' regiment had passed, I moved back on the Mountain road, as directed, and thence upon Grant's Mill road.

I enclose herewith a list of casualties. The officers and men engaged behaved in admirable style. Captains Portis and Bryant, commanding skirmishers, did their duty well. Lieutenant Barnes, who, with his thirty sharpshooters, was almost constantly engaged, here, as everywhere else that I have ever placed him, was prompt and faithful, and displayed great courage. Lieutenant Smith, adjutant of the regiment, brave to a fault, and seeking rather than avoiding danger, rendered much valuable service. And as were the officers, so were the private soldiers whom they led, fearless of danger, each seeming intent solely on doing his duty well.

I am, Captain, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
R. C. NEWTON,
Colonel, commanding.

Doc. 48.

THE BATTLE OF BRISTOE STATION.

REPORT OF GENERAL A. P. HILL.*

HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY CORPS, October 26, 1863.

Colonel R. H. Chilton, A. A. and I. General, Army of Northern Virginia:

COLONEL: I have the honor to state that on the morning of the fourteenth instant, I left my camp, one mile distant from Warrenton, on the Amissville turnpike, at five o'clock A. M., and in obedience to orders from the General commanding, "took the Warrenton and Alexandria turnpike, until reaching Broad Run Church, then to take the road by Greenwich and on to Bristoe Station." Upon arriving at Broad Run Church information reached me, from various sources, that the enemy were moving by a road leading from Greenwich to the Warrenton and Alexandria pike, and coming into it a mile below Buckland. The rumbling of wagons, which could be distinctly heard, led me to place reliance in these reports.

General Anderson was directed to take his division down the turnpike towards Buckland, and, if possible, to strike the column at the point where it came into the pike. If nothing could be accomplished there to turn off and rejoin me at Greenwich. In the meantime, I moved on the road to Greenwich with Heth's and Wilcox's divisions, leaving one battery and Scales' brigade at Buckland to guard the train which had been directed to halt there. General Anderson, in the execution of my orders, found the force referred to to be of cavalry, having already disappeared, and that Major-General Fitzhugh Lee had come up with his cavalry on my left flank; Colonel Rosser, of his advance, having skirmished with the enemy, and driven them back, rejoined me at Greenwich, following Heth's division. From this point to Bristoe, we followed close upon the rear of the Third corps, picking up about one hundred and fifty stragglers. Upon reaching the hills this side of Broad Run, and overlooking the plain on the north side, the Third corps was discovered resting, a portion of it just commencing the march towards Manassas. I determined that no time should be lost, and hurried up Heth's division, forming in line of battle along the crest of the hills, and parallel to Broad Run. Poague's battalion was brought to the front and directed to open on the enemy. They were evidently taken completely by surprise, and retired in the utmost confusion. Seeing this, General Heth was directed to advance his line until reaching the rear, and then to move by the left flank, cross at the ford, and press the enemy. This order was being promptly obeyed when I perceived the enemy's skirmishers making their appearance on this side of Broad Run, and on the right and rear of Heth's division. Word was sent to General Cooke (commanding the right brigade of Heth's division) to look out for his right flank, and he very promptly changed the front of one of his regiments, and drove the enemy back. In the meantime, I sent back to General Anderson to send McIntosh's battalion to the front, and to take two brigades to the position threatened, and protect the right flank of Heth. The head of Anderson's column appearing, Heth was now ordered to advance again and carry out the original order. Davis' brigade, of Heth's division, had been detached as a support to Poague's battalion. The three brigades—Cooke's, Kirkland's, and Walker's—advanced in beautiful order, and quite steadily. Cooke's brigade, upon reaching the crest of the hill in their front, came within full view of the enemy's line of battle behind the railroad embankment, the Second corps, and of whose presence I was unaware. The position was an exceedingly strong one, and covered by the direct and enfilading fire of batteries on the rising ground in rear. A portion of Cooke's brigade became hotly engaged, and of course it became impossible to execute his original order to move by the left flank. Kirkland, finding Cooke engaged, also swung around his left, and gallantly charged to Cooke's assistance. McIntosh's battalion had, before this, been ordered by me to take a position overlooking the railroad and station, and in rear of Cooke's left. Poague's battalion was ordered to take another position, and open fire on the battery which was enfilading Kirkland's line. This was not done as quickly as I expected, and Kirkland's line was exposed to a very deliberate and destructive fire. Nevertheless it continued to advance, and gained the railroad, clearing it for a time of the enemy. About this time Generals Cooke and Kirkland were both wounded, and their fall at this critical moment had a serious influence upon the fortunes of the combat. Their men were unable to stand the heavy fire which was poured upon them, and commenced giving back, the three right regiments of Cooke's brigade in good order. Walker had crossed Broad Run in pursuance of the original order. Anderson had been sent to the right to look out for the threatened right flank, and no support was immediately available—Wilcox's division not having yet come up. The infantry falling back (the left of Cooke's brigade) passed through McIntosh's guns, and the enemy passing on, the guns, five in number, were immediately seized and ran down the hill, under the protection of the enemy's artillery and line of battle. General Walker, upon being informed of the perilous condition of the guns, immediately sent forward a regiment, and drove off the enemy; but the guns had disappeared. Dark came upon us before new dispositions could be made to attack, and during the night the enemy retreated.

Brigadier-General Posey was seriously wounded by a shell in the early part of the action. In conclusion, I am convinced that I made the attack too hastily, and at the same time that, a

* See page 540, Documents, Vol. 7, Rebellion Record.

delay of half an hour and there would have been no enemy to attack. In that event, I should equally have blamed myself for not attacking at once.

I enclose my official report of killed, wounded, and missing.

I am, sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
A. P. HILL,
Lieutenant-General, commanding Third Corps.

REPORT OF GENERAL HILL.

HEADQUARTERS HILL'S DIVISION,
October 24, 1863.

Captain W. N. Starke, A. A. G., Third Army Corps:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division on the fourteenth instant:

The division moved from camp near Warrenton at half-past five o'clock A. M., on the fourteenth instant, following General Anderson's division. When within a mile of New Baltimore, orders were received to pass General Anderson's artillery, by keeping to the right, as it was designed that my division should follow a different road. After passing through New Baltimore, and about a mile and a half or less from the village, I was directed to take a right hand road, which proved to be a cross-road leading to Bristoe Station, via Greenwich. Just before reaching Greenwich, some twenty stragglers of the Third corps, Federal army, were captured. A desultory fire of artillery was heard from just after daybreak, apparently on our right, and continued during the entire day.

It was ascertained at Greenwich that a corps of the enemy had encamped there the evening previous, the last of this corps leaving about eight o'clock A. M., on the fourteenth. From Greenwich we passed on by the most direct road to Bristoe Station, picking up a number of stragglers on the road.

When within a mile and a half of Bristoe Station, I was directed by General A. P. Hill to form three brigades of my division in line of battle, perpendicular to the road on which we were advancing, holding the Fourth brigade as a reserve, which was to continue its march by the flank. Cooke's brigade (leading) was formed on the right of the road, its left resting on the road; Kirkland was put in position on the left of the road, his right resting on the road; and forming a continuous line with Cooke; Walker was directed to form on Kirkland's left; Davis's brigade was held in reserve in the road.

Kirkland had not quite completed the formation of his line when orders were received from General Hill to push on with the two brigades then in line (Cooke's and Kirkland's), informing me, at the same time, that the enemy were retreating rapidly, and that expedition was necessary.

Walker's brigade was at this time in rear of Kirkland, his right resting in rear of Kirkland's right. General Walker was informed of the change, and directed to form on Kirkland's left, if possible, as Kirkland moved forward.

The order was now given to advance. On reaching a cleared space, some two or three hundred yards in our front, the enemy was discovered about three-quarters of a mile in front of Kirkland's left. A few shots from one of Poague's batteries threw them into much confusion, and all that were in sight retreated in disorder across Broad Run. On seeing this, General Hill directed me to move by the left flank, cross Broad Run, and attack the fugitives. This order was given, and my line halted for the left to commence the flank movement. Before this movement was commenced, information was received that a heavy column of the enemy had appeared on our right. I asked General Hill whether the flank movement should continue. He directed that it should be deferred for the present. Some ten minutes afterwards I received orders to move forward. About this time General Cooke in person reported to me that the enemy would take him in flank as he moved forward. This was reported to General Hill, who informed me that General Anderson's division had been, or would be, ordered to the right. General Cooke was informed of this, and the forward movement commenced. Walker had not been able to form line of battle on Kirkland's left. The two brigades (Cooke's and Kirkland's) moved off in handsome style. The skirmishers soon became engaged. The enemy's strength in my front was only known from the reports made by Captain Johnston, engineer corps. As subsequently shown, it proved to be Warren's Second army corps. Marching parallel to the railroad, the enemy was concealed from our view by hills and woods. On seeing our advance, the enemy formed his line in rear of the railroad embankment, his right resting on Broad Run, and hidden by a railroad cut. In his rear a line of hills ascended to some thirty or forty feet in height, giving him an admirable position for his artillery. The railroad cut and embankment, at the foot of the hill, gave him perfect protection for his infantry. In rear of the enemy's right, on the hills just noticed, a circular line of rifle-pits had been thrown up for the protection of the bridge over Broad Run. These rifle-pits were filled with infantry, and a battery was established in rear and higher up the hills.

As Kirkland moved forward, his left struck the enemy in the railroad cut, near Broad Run. He drove everything in his front along the line of the railroad before him, but was unable to carry the second line of works (rifle-pits) that were in his front. When in the railroad cut, his men were exposed to an enfilading fire from his right, in addition to a severe fire from a battery on the north side of Broad Run. The position was untenable. He was compelled to fall back. A number of his men, unwilling to expose themselves, remained in the railroad cut, and were captured. General Cooke was wounded

early in the action. When within some five hundred yards of the railroad his brigade halted, and commenced firing. It subsequently charged up to within forty yards of the railroad embankment, but was driven back, being exposed not only to the heavy fire behind the railroad embankment, but also to a fire on its right flank.

The enemy's batteries, during the advance of Cooke and Kirkland, completely swept the field over which the advance was made.

As soon as Cooke's brigade gave way, I ordered General Davis to form his brigade on Cooke's right, thus protecting Cooke from a flank movement.

During the advance of Cooke and Kirkland, a battery belonging to Moseley's battalion, Anderson's division, was ordered to take position on a hill about five or six hundred yards from the railroad, and about opposite Kirkland's right flank and Cooke's left. This battery was captured by the enemy. I was ignorant of the fact that a battery had been ordered to occupy this position, until it had been taken. A knowledge of its position on my part, however, would not have saved it, as it would not have been deemed necessary to have furnished a special support for it so long as the two brigades (Cooke's and Kirkland's) were in its front. On receiving information that the enemy's skirmishers were approaching the battery, and that it was in danger, a regiment was ordered to its support, but arrived on the ground after five guns had been taken off.

During the advance of Kirkland, Walker gained ground to the left, crossing Broad Run. Finding that Kirkland's left was gaining ground to the right, General Walker recrossed the run. Before he could form on Kirkland's left, Kirkland had been driven back.

General Walker, during the rest of the engagement, supported a battery from Pague's battalion, placed on a hill about seven or eight hundred yards from the railroad. This engagement was over before either Walker or Davis could be brought into action.

After the repulse of Cooke and Kirkland, I reformed my line, and advanced again to within about five hundred yards of the railroad, where I remained during the night. No second attack was ordered, as I was convinced that the position of the enemy was too strong to be attacked in front. The position now occupied enabled me to avail myself of an opportunity to resume the attack, in the event of an attack being made on the enemy's left flank by General Ewell's troops, or others.

I deem it but just to the troops commanded by Generals Cooke and Kirkland to say, that, with the exception of one regiment, all behaved well under the circumstances.

It must be borne in mind that when the attack was made by Cooke and Kirkland, the enemy's force in front was unknown. It turned out that a much larger force was in our front than was supposed—one, if not the greater portion of two, entire corps. The position accidentally occupied by the enemy was as strong, or stronger, naturally and artificially, than military art could have made it by many hours' work. The enemy's left flank extended a mile, or three-quarters, to my right; he was not compelled to manœuvre to get into position, marching by the flank; he was already in line of battle, protected by a railroad embankment, at a convenient height to shelter his men; with hills in his rear admirably adapted to render effective his numerous batteries. No military man, who has examined the ground, or who understands the position and the disproportionate numbers of the contending forces, would attach blame to these two brigades for meeting with a repulse. My confidence in these troops is not shaken by the result, and I feel satisfied on fields to come they will vindicate the high reputation they have gained on many a hard-fought battle-field. Had they succeeded in driving the enemy in their front before them, and carried the hills beyond the railroad, it is probable the two brigades would have been captured by the enemy unengaged on their right.

I beg leave to bring to the notice of the Lieutenant-General commanding the gallantry displayed by Generals Cooke and Kirkland, both of whom were severely wounded. I regret that, in the absence of the reports of brigade and regimental commanders, I am unable to name the officers who deserve special mention for good conduct. A report of casualties is enclosed. My thanks are due to my personal staff.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

H. Heth,
Major-General.

REPORT OF GENERAL R. H. ANDERSON.

HEADQUARTERS ANDERSON'S DIVISION,
NEAR RAPPAHANNOCK STATION, VA.,
October 21, 1863.

Captain W. N. Steele, A. A. General Third Army Corps:

CAPTAIN: At half-past two o'clock in the afternoon of the fourteenth instant, when near Bristoe Station, I received orders from the Lieutenant-General commanding the Third corps, to send Moseley's battalion of artillery to the front, and to move two brigades of my division to the right of the road by which we had been approaching the station, to intercept a column of the enemy's troops which was moving along the railroad towards the station.

Posey's and Perry's brigades were immediately put in motion through a piece of woods, to execute the order, but before they arrived within striking distance, the enemy moved off at double-quick, and disappeared in a piece of pine forest near the railroad.

The brigades continued to advance towards the railroad, in the direction which had been indicated by Lieutenant-General Hill, until they found the enemy strongly posted behind the

railroad embankments and cuts, with a battery of artillery so planted as to enfilade the road, and sweep the open place of ground between them and ourselves.

The column which I had been directed to intercept had got into position along the railroad, and I halted the troops until I could examine the ground between them and the enemy. Whilst so engaged, I met Brigadier-General Long, who proposed to place some of his artillery upon a slight eminence which afforded a good position for artillery. To this I gladly assented, as I deemed it necessary to the further advance of the troops of my command.

At this time I received notice that the troops of the Second corps were coming up on my right, and I was directed to form a line of battle, so as to connect my right with the left of that corps. The other brigades of my division were then ordered up, and the line was formed as quickly as the nature of the ground would permit. During these movements of my command, Heth's division became hotly engaged, and a brigade of his troops, near the left of my division, was driven back. The enemy's skirmishers advanced through the gap, and General Long found it impracticable to post his artillery. Perry's brigade checked the further advance of the enemy, and Mahone's was put in motion to regain the ground from which our men had been driven, but before it reached the place, it was reoccupied by another brigade of Heth's division. Perry's and Posey's brigade then drove back the enemy's line of skirmishers, and General Long's artillery got into position; but it was now nearly dark, and, after a few minutes' cannonading, to which the enemy replied warmly, the firing was discontinued.

The troops of my division remained in line of battle during the night. In the morning the enemy were gone.

I regret to report that in this affair Captain Thomas L. Barrand, of the Sixteenth Virginia regiment, an excellent officer, was killed. Brigadier-General Posey and Lieutenant-Colonel Bays, commanding Eighth Florida regiment, received severe wounds, the former in the left thigh, and the latter in the right hip; and Captain A. R. Jones, Twelfth Mississippi regiment, was wounded in the right leg. The total casualties were eleven (11) killed and forty-three (43) wounded. Very respectfully,

Your most obedient servant,

R. H. ANDERSON,
Major-General, commanding.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. H. WALKER.

HEADQUARTERS WALKER'S BRIGADE,
October 25, 1863.

Major R. H. Finney, A. A. General, Heth's Division:

MAJOR: In accordance with circular from division headquarters, I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by my brigade in the engagement at Bristoe Station, on the fourteenth of October, 1863:

My brigade was formed in line of battle in a woods, about one hundred yards in rear of General Kirkland's, my right covering his right, his brigade being nearly double the length of mine. While in this position General Heth informed me the enemy was running; that he would not have time for me to get upon Kirkland's left, but that I must do so on the march. This I found impossible to do. Kirkland's brigade soon got into the open field, and commenced gaining ground to the right, by a wheel, while mine, already behind and on the circumference, had a dense woods to march through for half a mile. This distance brought my brigade on Broad Run. While crossing this in line of battle, Kirkland became hotly engaged. Seeing his left gaining ground so fast to the front and right, I marched my brigade by the right flank, again crossed Broad Run, and double-quicked my brigade to try and catch up with Kirkland's left. When I got into the open field I saw his left had been repulsed and was falling back in utter confusion. I succeeded in getting the three right regiments of my brigade interposed between the enemy's advance and the battery on the hill at the cemetery. A portion of Kirkland's brigade (two regiments) were then rallied on the right of these regiments. The four regiments on the left of my brigade were halted on the crest of the hill at the cemetery, abreast with the battery at that place. The line remained thus until the regiments of Kirkland's brigade were moved, under direction of General Kirkland's Adjutant-General, to the right and rear of the battery at the cemetery. Captain Hill, of General Hill's staff, then brought an order for this battery to move to the right. I told him I was supporting the battery, and asked him if I should move with it. He replied: "Yes." I had scarcely gotten half way down the hill with my brigade when Major McIntosh reported to me that his supports having retired he had to withdraw his men from the battery on the right of the road, and that if I could get a regiment there in time, I might retake it. This I endeavored to do immediately, and ordered a regiment to double-quick to the position, but before it arrived the guns were out of sight. Simultaneously with Major McIntosh, Major Finney, Adjutant-General, reported that the enemy were again advancing in the direction of the cemetery. I immediately deployed a regiment as skirmishers; again formed my brigade in its original position, and remained so until new dispositions were made for the night.

I omitted to state at the commencement, before my brigade was put into line, General Hill detached the Fourteenth Tennessee regiment, and directed it to take a position as skirmishers on the right of his line. This regiment rejoined the brigade the next morning. Enclosed is a list of casualties during the engagement.

Respectfully submitted,

H. H. WALKER,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF COLONEL HALL.

HEADQUARTERS COOKE'S BRIGADE,
NEAR RAPPAHANNOCK STATION, VIRGINIA, October 22, 1863.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that, on the fourteenth instant, on arriving within one or two miles of Bristoe Station, the brigade formed a line of battle on the right of the road in the following order: first, Forty-sixth North Carolina; second, Fifteenth North Carolina; third, Twenty-seventh North Carolina, and the Forty-eighth North Carolina on the left. After forming we advanced through a very thick undergrowth. On clearing the woods and arriving in the first opening, the brigade was halted a few moments to correct the alignment. The enemy was discovered massed upon our left beyond the railroad, and to the left of the road leading to the station. Being then in command of the extreme right regiment, I immediately discovered that the enemy was in heavy force on my right, and busily engaged in getting in position. In a few moments we were ordered to advance, and soon after the enemy's skirmishers commenced firing on my right flank. I discovered the line of battle behind the railroad, extending as far on my right as I could see. Also, a mass of troops lying perpendicular to the road, and on the side next to us, from which body an advance was made on my right in considerable numbers. I then sent word to General Cooke that I was much annoyed by the fire and seriously threatened. I sent my right company to engage the skirmishers on my right, but they were soon driven in. I then changed the front of my regiment on the first company and checked their advance. The brigade had again halted, just before getting under fire, and I moved back just in time to join the line in the final advance. Soon after getting under fire, I found that the left of the brigade had commenced firing as they advanced, which was taken up along the whole line. Shortly afterwards information was brought me that General Cooke was wounded, and that I was in command. I ordered my regiment to cease firing, and passed up to the centre of the brigade, stopping the firing as I went. The brigade was then within two hundred yards of the railroad. On getting on the top of the hill, I found the brigade suffering from a heavy flank fire of artillery, from the right—the number of guns I cannot say, evidently more than one battery. Also, the guns on the left and rear of the railroad had an enfilading fire on us. The musketry fire from the line of railroad was very heavy. I soon saw that a rapid advance must be made, or to withdraw. I chose the former. I passed the word to the right regiments to charge, which was done in what I conceive to be in good style. The Fourth regiment was somewhat confused. But I sent the Lieutenant-Colonel commanding word to follow the line, which he did with about two-thirds of his regiment, the balance giving way. The brigade charged up to within forty yards of the railroad, and from the severity of the fire, and from then seeing the extreme left of the line falling back, they fell back; the two right regiments in good order; the third (Twenty-seventh North Carolina) in an honorable confusion, from the fact that between one-half and two-thirds of the regiment had been killed and wounded, they being in a far more exposed position than the other two regiments, and had gone further. The Forty-eighth, in advancing, encountered the whole line falling back. I halted the brigade in the first field we came to, about four hundred yards from the enemy's line, from which position we fell back beyond the second field, on seeing the enemy come out on our right and left. After a short time the brigade of General Davis joined us on the right, when we again advanced to within four hundred yards of the enemy, and, on seeing the right brigade halt, I halted, where we remained during the night. As there was a battery of artillery lost during the engagement, and from its proximity to the brigade the loss may be laid to it, I will state that I knew nothing of the guns being there until we had fallen back to the second field. The guns *may have* been in our rear, but they must certainly have been placed there after we advanced; and, in retreating, from our losses, both by casualties and straggling, shortened our line so much that, with the addition of one of General Kirkland's regiments (Forty-fourth North Carolina), which joined our left, the left of the brigade was some distance to the right of the guns. On learning the guns were there, and in danger, I detached a portion of one regiment to the relief, but the guns had been taken off before the relief arrived. I would respectfully state that I have been with the brigade during some of the heaviest engagements of the war, and have never seen the men more cool and determined, and that their falling back resulted from no fault of theirs, but from the great superiority of numbers and position of the enemy, and entire want of support, both in rear and prolongation of our lines.

I have the honor to be,
Respectfully,
E. D. HALL,
Colonel, commanding.

REPORT OF MAJOR McINTOSH.

HEADQUARTERS McINTOSH'S BATTALION ARTILLERY,
IN CAMP, NEAR BRANDY FORD,
Oct. 23, 1863.

Captain W. N. Starke, A. A. G. Third Army Corps:

CAPTAIN: In accordance with your request, I have the honor to submit the following report, being duplicate of one already furnished Colonel Walker, of the part taken by this battalion in the engagement at Bristoe Station on the afternoon of the fourteenth instant:

When within about a mile of the station, I received an order from Major-General Anderson, through Major Duncan, his staff officer, to move my battalion to the front. Passing the division, I halted a moment upon the open ground

where the descent to the railroad begins; and Major Duncan saying, as he joined me again, that he had directions from Lieutenant-General Hill where to place me, I moved immediately on, attracting some fire from the enemy's batteries. Observing that I was approaching near the enemy, I ordered Captain Hunt to take his two Whitworth guns out of the column and place them in the best position he could find on the hills in rear. Captain Johnson's battery had previously been detached by order of General Anderson, and left at Broad Run. With the remaining nine guns, I proceeded to follow Major Duncan, who pointed out an open space between two pine thickets as the position which I was to occupy. Our line of infantry was then in the act of advancing over the hill at this point, and drew a heavy musketry fire on them in rear. I therefore halted my column at the base of the rising ground in front, sending word by Lieutenant Houston, my Ordnance Officer, who accompanied me on the field, to Lieutenant-General Hill, why I had done so, and ordering the pieces to draw up under cover, I proceeded to look at the ground with Major Duncan. On casting my eye over the field, I saw and represented to Major Duncan the exposure of the situation, because of its proximity to the railroad bank, being only four or five hundred yards distant, where the enemy's line of battle was posted, and in full view of a number of opposing batteries, stretching from the left to the extreme right. He (Major Duncan) left, saying he would represent the situation to General Hill. In the meantime our line had advanced a short distance over the crest of the hill, and exhibiting symptoms of wavering, I ordered up five light rifle-guns, consisting of the Second Rockbridge battery, three guns, Lieutenant Wallace commanding; and a section of Hunt's battery, under Lieutenant Crenshaw, and directed them to open with shell, firing over the heads of our men.

Lieutenant Houston returned just at this time, with a message from General Hill, that he wished me to take a position as quickly as possible, and I therefore ordered up a section of Rice's Napoleon battery, placing it to the left of the rifle-guns. Before this order was executed, however, our line of infantry in front had broken, and falling back to the guns, passed on to the rear; my officers joined me in endeavoring to rally and stop them upon the slope in rear of the guns, but without avail. Lieutenant Wilson while thus engaged was struck down and seriously injured by a shell.

The ground being clear of our infantry in front, I directed a round or two of canister to be thrown at the enemy along the railroad, but pointed the fire chiefly against the opposing battery, which concentrated upon me a converging fire from three directions. I despatched a messenger hastily to General Hill, to say that I was badly enfiladed from the right, and regarded the position untenable, which message the General has since informed me he did not receive.

Believing I could obtain a position to the right, where I could divert the enemy's fire, I proceeded in that direction with the two guns undisposed of, a section of Napoleon, under Lieutenant Price, and met Major Duncan on the way, who told me guns were needed in that quarter, and who showed me a position from which the enemy's battery, then annoying me so much, could be taken almost in rear. He informed me at the same time that General Long would have up a number of guns in a few minutes, and as one of Lieutenant Price's was detained by an accident on the way, I deemed it imprudent to open with one gun, and ordered the Lieutenant to report to General Long as soon as he came up, and desired him to open immediately.

Returning to the first position, where I had left seven guns engaged, I observed that the fire had ceased. On inquiring the reason of Lieutenant Wallace, then in command, he replied that he had not men enough left to work the guns; that the enemy was advancing, and he had just been to look for infantry support. I at once ordered the guns to be dragged down the hill by hand, and the remaining men, who were lying in the bush, started forward; but at that instant, a body of the enemy, apparently skirmishers, appeared stealing over the crest of the hill, and in a moment more were among the guns. I saw it was too late to remove them, and directed the limbers and caissons to be drawn off on the edge of the wood, and the men to retire without noise.

Believing the number of the enemy at the guns to be small, and that they could still be recovered with prompt action, I rode rapidly in search of a body of infantry, but the plain in my rear was bare of all troops. After some minutes, I found a brigade—General Walker's, I think—and reported to him the condition of affairs, and desired him to throw forward a body as quickly as possible.

A few minutes after I observed General Heth approaching, when I informed him also of my situation. Lieutenant Wallace informs me that he saw the enemy roll off the guns by hand, in a few minutes after they were taken possession of. The two Napoleon guns of Captain Rice were both disabled, having their axles broken, and the cheeks of one shivered; one was dragged off before the approach of the enemy. The other was recovered the next morning. All the ammunition in the limbers of the pieces was expended by Captain Rice, his caissons being kept in rear. He estimates the time during which he was engaged, at one hour; his casualties were eight men wounded, and ten horses disabled.

The five rifle pieces, which preceded Captain Rice in the action, were engaged probably an hour and a quarter. Lieutenant Wallace's three guns fired two hundred and four rounds. His casualties were two Lieutenants wounded, and two men killed and thirteen wounded; Lieutenant Crenshaw's section fired only twenty-five

rounds; his casualties were one man killed and sixteen wounded.

The total of casualties was three men killed and thirty-nine wounded; forty-four horses were disabled. The section of Napoleon guns, under Lieutenant Price, reported to Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, of General Long's command, and was engaged late in the afternoon, without suffering any loss in men or horses. The section of Whitworths fired eight shots at the enemy, also without loss.

I am, Captain, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
D. G. McIntosh,
Major Artillery.

Doc. 49.

EXPEDITION INTO EAST TENNESSEE.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL STEVENSON.

Headquarters Stevenson's Division,
near Tyner's Station,
November 12, 1863.

To Colonel G. W. Brent, A. A. G. Army of Tennessee:

Colonel: Agreeably to orders received from army headquarters on the seventeenth ultimo, I proceeded to Charleston, Tennessee, arriving there with a portion of my command about two o'clock P. M., on the nineteenth ultimo.

The failure of the railroad officials to carry out the arrangements and obey the orders relative to the transportation of the troops, and the delay caused thereby, have been made the subject of a special communication to the commanding General.

Immediately upon my arrival at Charleston I gave the following directions to Colonels Morrison and Dibrell, commanding brigades of cavalry:

"Colonel Morrison, with his whole effective force, reinforced by Colonel McKenzie's and Major Jessie's commands, will move so as to reach the rear of Philadelphia by daylight to-morrow morning, and be prepared to co-operate with Colonel Dibrell, who, with his effective command, will advance so as to attack the enemy, supposed to be at that point, at daylight. Should the enemy not be found at Philadelphia, the commands will seek and capture or drive him across the Tennessee. Having routed the cavalry, they will move on London, and, should the force of the enemy's infantry there be small, will attack and carry that place. In that event London will be held by a sufficient force, and suitable scouts sent up the river for information with regard to the enemy in that direction. Colonel Morrison will send a select force of one hundred and fifty men, in command of a suitable officer, to destroy the ferry at Kingston. He will also detail from his command two companies to picket the river on our left flank."

The movement directed was at once commenced, but owing to the difficulty in crossing the Hiwassee at the ford by which Colonel Morrison moved, the attack was not made until as late as one o'clock P. M., on the twentieth ultimo. For a time the resistance was stubborn, the enemy making a gallant fight, but finally they broke and fled, in the greatest confusion, to their defences at London. The fact that they had there a fortified position, with an infantry support, the approach of darkness, and the exhaustion of our cavalry after their long march and severe fight, decided Colonels Morrison and Dibrell not to make an immediate attack upon London. Our loss amounted to fifteen killed, eighty-two wounded, and three missing. That of the enemy was greater in killed and wounded, and by capture about seven hundred prisoners, six pieces of artillery, and all their wagons, ambulances, and camp equipage. On the next morning the enemy advanced in force, infantry and cavalry, from London, and Colonels Morrison and Dibrell withdrew their commands to Sweetwater, there to await the arrival of the infantry. The enemy fell back to London that night. I reached the front on the morning of the twenty-second, moved the infantry to Mouse Creek that day, and soon afterwards to Sweetwater. On the evening of the twenty-third of October the enemy advanced in considerable force and engaged the cavalry for a short time, retiring at dusk. Their loss is not known. Ours is five wounded.

The same movement was again made by them on the evening of the twenty-sixth of October. In this affair our loss was three wounded and five missing. The enemy are known to have had three commissioned officers and several privates killed, and a number wounded.

On the twenty-seventh of October I was informed that the notorious bushwhacker and robber, Bryson, had been sent, with his command, by Burnside, to get in my rear and obtain information as to our movements and intentions. I immediately gave Brigadier-General Vaughn a detachment of about one hundred men, and directed him to intercept and, if possible, to destroy the party. He succeeded in dispersing them, killing several, and taking among the prisoners a Captain. During the pursuit Bryson himself was killed.

On the twenty-seventh of October Cheatham's division, commanded during the expedition by Brigadier-General Jackson, reached Athens, and by this accession my force, before so weak as to be entirely inadequate for a decided movement against the enemy at London, was strengthened to such an extent as would have enabled me to actively assume the offensive; but the enemy, informed doubtless by disloyal citizens of the arrival of these reinforcements, evacuated London on the night of the same day.

On the twenty-eighth of October I sent Brigadier-General Vaughn, with a force of cavalry, across the Little Tennessee River at Morgan-

town, with orders to make a demonstration upon Knoxville and gain all the information he could of the enemy's force, movements, and intentions. He found a force at Leaper's Ferry; attacked and drove them across the river after quite a sharp engagement, inflicting considerable loss upon them. He also went to Lenoir's Ferry. The sudden and heavy rain that fell at this time raised the Little Tennessee so rapidly that it became exceedingly hazardous for him to remain on that side, and he accordingly returned to Morgantown.

On the third of November, Colonel Dibrell crossed the Little Tennessee, with about seven hundred men, but found the enemy in too great force in his front to permit him to make any decided move. The results of these scouts in eliciting information were promptly communicated to you by telegraph.

On the fourth of November I received orders by telegraph to send two of the brigades of Cheatham's division to Tyner's by railroad on the fifth, and the remaining two on the sixth, and immediately thereafter to send the two brigades of my own division. On the eighth instant I received orders from the commanding General to leave Brigadier-General Cumming to bring on my division, and report in person at army headquarters as soon as possible after the arrival of Lieutenant-General Longstreet at Sweetwater. He reached that point on the night of the ninth, and, as directed, I left Sweetwater on the morning of the tenth, arriving at Tyner's upon the same day.

I am, Colonel, respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
C. S. Stevenson,
Major-General, commanding.

REPORT OF COLONEL MORRISON.

Headquarters Cavalry Forces,
Owen's, near Sweetwater, Tennessee, October 27, 1863.

Major J. J. Reeves, A. A. G.:

Major: I have the honor to report that, agreeably to instructions from General Stevenson, I succeeded in getting my entire command, numbering about eighteen hundred men, across Hiwassee River, at and above Rencasnon's Ferry, by ten o'clock on the night of the nineteenth instant. I immediately took up the line of march for the rear of Philadelphia, the distance to the point where I expected to strike the Philadelphia and London road being fifty miles. The weather was very disagreeable, and the roads were in very bad condition, rendered worse every hour by the incessant showers that had been falling since I left Harrison. Men and officers bore up astonishingly under the circumstances, having, in crossing the river and making the march, lost two nights' sleep in succession. On arriving near Philadelphia, I communicated with Colonel Dibrell, suggesting that he had better move up and make a demonstration in the front, so that I could without interruption and undiscovered, make the enemy's rear; and reaching Pond Creek, a point to the left of and opposite Philadelphia, I intercepted and captured a foraging train and forty prisoners. From this point I sent a party on each of the roads leading into town, with instructions to drive in the enemy's pickets and hold their positions if possible, and thus prevent his learning the direction taken by the main part of my command. I finally reached the rear of Philadelphia, after a hard march of fifty miles in fifteen hours, unobserved. I caused the telegraph wire to be cut, and sent as rapidly as possible one regiment to London, a distance of four miles, there to make a feint and prevent General White from reinforcing Woolford at Philadelphia, with his infantry from that point. The surprise was complete, and the feint at London a success. I now hastened on to Philadelphia, a distance of two miles, and soon had a view of the enemy's line of battle, whereupon I dismounted my men and commenced the attack, Colonel Dibrell having opened an artillery duel in the front some time before. The enemy, on discovering me in their rear, at once turned their whole force, with six pieces of artillery, against my command, which was now reduced to about one thousand men. Afterwards ensued one of the hardest cavalry fights of the war, both sides struggling vigorously for the mastery. I was made to fall back twice, but with little effort each time rallied my men, and soon had the enemy completely routed and flying in confusion towards London, capturing their artillery (six pieces), wagon train, ambulances, stores, and between five hundred and seven hundred prisoners. A portion of the latter was captured by Colonel Dibrell's command.

The officers and men of my command conducted themselves handsomely from the commencement of the march to the rout of the enemy at Philadelphia, but credit is especially due to Colonel Hart, of the Sixth Georgia, Colonel Rice, of the Third Confederate, and Colonel Harper, of the First Georgia cavalry, who lost a leg while leading his men in a gallant charge. Colonels Rice and Hart occupied the left, and nobly did each do his duty. From an intrepid charge on the enemy's rear, his artillery, wagons, and stores, with most of the prisoners, fell into their hands. Lieutenant George Yoe, Captain Davidson Lamar, and Adjutant John W. Tench, acting on my staff, have my thanks for their assistance, efficiency, and gallantry on the field.

Although the victory was complete, the fruits of it fell short, far, of what they would have reached if I had had the prompt co-operation of the forces in front.

The casualties in my command are fourteen killed, eighty-two wounded. Those of the enemy much larger.

J. J. Morrison,
Colonel, commanding Second Cavalry Brigade.

Jno. J. Reeves,
A. A. G.

REPORT OF COLONEL DIBRELL.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CAVALRY BRIGADE,
ARMSTRONG'S DIVISION, Sunday, October 27, 1862.

Major J. J. Reeves, A. A. G.:

SIR: According to previous orders received, I moved with my brigade and a detachment of General Morgan's command, from Charleston, on the nineteenth, at twelve o'clock M.; crossed the Hiwassee River and travelled all night. By an agreement with Colonel Morrison, commanding brigade, I was to be in front of Philadelphia by twelve M., of the twentieth. He was to cross the Hiwassee below me and move to the rear of the enemy. Subsequently Colonel Morrison notified me that he could not be at the appointed place before two o'clock P. M. Meantime I advanced my forces, drove in the enemy's pickets, kept up a skirmish at a respectable distance, keeping all my command out of sight of the enemy, except two regiments and one section of artillery, until Colonel Morrison could get in position. As soon as this was known, I moved rapidly forward and opened upon the enemy with my artillery, and charged them with cavalry, held in readiness for that purpose, completely routing the enemy and scattering them through the woods in every direction, capturing in all six pieces of artillery, all their wagons, ambulances, stores, &c., and a large number of horses, equipments, &c., five hundred and six prisoners.

In this engagement I only claim for my brigade that they did their part most admirably, and are entitled to the reputation they had previously so richly merited; and I fully accord to Colonel Morrison's brigade an equal share of all the glories won, for the gallant part acted by them in the engagements. Without their co-operation, so brilliant a success would have proven a failure, as the enemy were but a few miles from a large infantry force to support them.

My loss was one man killed and three captured. A few horses were wounded.

Brigadier-General Vaughn had kindly volunteered his services, which were invaluable to me, and his gallantry and daring charge upon the enemy has endeared him to my brigade, and caused them all to regard him as one of the bravest of the brave.

In the engagement of the twenty-third my loss was five wounded; the loss of the enemy not known. In the engagement of yesterday, my loss was three wounded and five missing. Two horses were wounded. The enemy left some twelve or fifteen dead and wounded upon the field, and are known to have had three commissioned officers and several privates killed and a number wounded.

The conduct of the men and officers, both cavalry and artillery, was very fine during all the engagements.

I am, Major, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
G. G. DIBRELL,
Colonel, commanding Brigade.

Doc. 50.

THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD'S ORDER BEFORE THE BATTLE.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
July 20, 1861.

Special Order, No. —.

The following order is published for the information of division and brigade commanders:

First.—Brigadier-General Ewell's brigade will march via Union Mills Ford, and place itself in position of attack upon the enemy. It will be held in readiness either to support the attack upon Centreville, or to move in the direction of Sangster's Cross-roads, according to circumstances.

The order to advance will be given by the Commander-in-Chief.

Second.—Brigadier-General Jones' brigade, supported by Colonel Early's brigade, will march via McLean's Ford, to place itself in position of attack on the enemy, on or about the Union Mills and Centreville roads. It will be held in readiness either to support the attack on Centreville or to move in the direction of Fairfax Station, according to circumstances, with its right flank towards the left of Ewell's command, more or less distant, according to the nature of the country and attack.

The order to advance will be given by the Commander-in-Chief.

Third.—Brigadier-General Longstreet's brigade, supported by Brigadier-General Jackson's brigade, will march via McLean's Ford, to place itself in position of attack upon the enemy, on or about the Union Mill and Centreville road. It will be held in readiness either to support the attack on Centreville or to move in the direction of Fairfax Court House, according to circumstances, with its right flank towards the left of Jones' command, more or less distant, according to the nature of the country.

The order to advance will be given by the Commander-in-Chief.

Fourth.—Brigadier-General Bonham's brigade, supported by Colonel Barton's brigade, will march via Mitchell's Ford, to the attack of Centreville, the right wing to the left of the Third division, more or less distant, according to the nature of the country and of the attack.

The order to advance will be given by the Commander-in-Chief.

Fifth.—Colonel Cocke's brigade, supported by Colonel Elzey's brigade, will march via Stone Bridge and the fords on the right thereto, to the attack of Centreville; the right wing to the left of the Fourth division, more or less distant, according to the nature of the country and of the attack.

The order to advance will be given by the Commander-in-Chief.

Sixth.—Brigadier-General Bee's brigade, supported by Colonel Wilcox's brigade, Colonel Stuart's regiment of cavalry, and the whole of Walton's battery, will form the reserve, and will

march via Mitchell's Ford, to be used according to circumstances.

Seventh.—The light batteries will be distributed as follows:

1. To General Ewell's command, Captain Walker's six pieces.

2. To Brigadier-General Jones, Captains Alberti' and Standard's batteries, eight pieces.

3. To Brigadier-General Longstreet, Colonel Pendleton's and Captain Imboden's batteries, eight pieces.

4. To Brigadier-General Bonham, Captains Kemper's and Shields' batteries, eight pieces.

5. To Colonel Cocke, Colonel Hunton's, Captains Latham's and Beckham's batteries, twelve pieces.

Eighth.—Colonel Radford, commanding cavalry, will detail, to report immediately, as follows:

To Brigadier-General Ewell, two companies cavalry.

To Brigadier-General Jones, two companies cavalry.

To Brigadier-General Longstreet, two companies cavalry.

To General Bonham, three companies cavalry.

To Colonel Cocke, the remaining companies of cavalry, except those on special service.

Ninth.—The Fourth and Fifth divisions, after the fall of Centreville, will advance to the attack of Fairfax Court House, via the Braddock and Turnpike roads, to the north of the latter.

The First, Second, and Third divisions will, if necessary, support the Fourth and Fifth divisions.

Tenth.—In this movement the First, Second, and Third divisions will form the command of General Holmes; the Fourth and Fifth divisions that of the second in command. The reserve will move upon the plains between Mitchell's Ford and Stone Bridge, and, together with the Fourth and Fifth divisions, will be under the immediate direction of General Beauregard.

By command of General Beauregard.

THOMAS JORDAN,
A. A. General.

Doc. 51.

BATTLES OF POCOTALIGO AND YEMASSEE.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. B. WALKER.*

HEADQUARTERS THIRD MILITARY DISTRICT, S. C.,
POCOTALIGO, November 4, 1862.

Brigadier-General Thomas Jordan, Chief of Staff and A. A. G.:

SIR: I have the honor to report, that about nine o'clock, on the morning of the twenty-second of October, I was informed by my pickets that the enemy were landing in force at Mackey's Point, from twelve gunboats and transports. I was notified, at the same time, that they were ascending the Coosawhatchie River with four transports.

The command was immediately ordered under arms, to march to Old Pocotaligo. I moved in advance to the telegraph office; and made the following disposition of my forces: The Lafayette artillery, four pieces, under Lieutenant LeBleur, and a section of the Beaufort volunteer artillery, under Lieutenant N. M. Stuart, were ordered to Coosawhatchie, a town two miles distant from my headquarters in McPhersonville, and five from Old Pocotaligo. Captain Wyman's company, stationed near Coosawhatchie, and five other companies of the Eleventh regiment of infantry, from Hardeeville, were ordered to support this artillery. Colonel Colcocke's command of five companies of cavalry, and two companies of sharpshooters, had been recently notified to expect an attack at Coosawhatchie, and in that event were instructed to move to its support. Major Jefford's command, of three companies of cavalry, were ordered from Green Pond to the Saltkehatchie Bridge. With the blessings of a good Providence, these combinations of my forces, scattered over an extent of sixty miles, were effected in time to foil the enemy.

I also telegraphed to General Beauregard's headquarters to Brigadier-General Hagood, commanding Second Military District, and to Brigadier-General Mercer, at Savannah, for reinforcements, requesting those from Charleston to disembark at Pocotaligo, and those from Savannah at Coosawhatchie. Captain W. L. Trenholm, who was in command of the outposts, consisting of two companies—his Rutledge mounted riflemen and Captain Kirk's partisan rangers—was ordered to withdraw the main body of the pickets, only leaving a few important posts guarded.

The force with which I first engaged the enemy consisted of two sections of the Beaufort volunteer artillery and the Nelson light artillery, eight pieces, under the command of Captain Stephen Elliott; the Charleston light dragoons, Captain B. W. Rutledge; First battalion cavalry, Major Morgan; Captain D. B. Heyward's company of cavalry; Captain Kirk's partisan rangers; Captain Allston's company of sharpshooters; Captain Izard's Company I, of the Eleventh regiment of infantry, Lieutenant W. L. Campbell commanding; number in all four hundred and seventy-five (475).

As one-fourth of the cavalry were horse-holders, the force actually engaged was reduced to four hundred and five (405) men.

The force of the enemy was represented by prisoners, and confirmed by the statement of negroes who had crossed Port Royal Ferry to the main land on that day and been captured, to be seven regiments, one of which I judge went to Coosawhatchie.

I sent in advance a section of the Beaufort volunteer artillery, supported by Captain Allston's sharpshooters and two companies of cavalry under Major Morgan to skirmish with the

* See Rebellion Record, vol. 6, page 40, Documents.

enemy, while I took position on the Mackey's Point road, near Dr. Hutson's residence, at a salt marsh skirted by woods on both sides and crossed by a causeway. After a short encounter with the enemy, in which Major Morgan, while at the head of his command, was severely wounded in the ankle, my advance force retired in good order to the main position. The Beaufort artillery was posted in and near the road commanding the causeway, and the Nelson artillery in an open field in the rear of the line of skirmishers and screened from the enemy by the trees in front. A dropping fire of infantry first commenced, which was soon swelled by their artillery. Owing to the close proximity of the trees fringing the other side of the swamp, I found that my artillery were suffering severely in men and horses, and, accordingly, after holding my ground for three-quarters of an hour, I determined to withdraw to a second position two miles and a half in rear. This was done in good order, Captain Allston's sharpshooters and part of Company I, Eleventh infantry, covering our retreat and behaving for the most part with great spirit. At the head of the road I was joined by Captain Trenholm with the larger portion of his company and Captain Kirk's. I assigned the command of the cavalry to him, and ordered my whole force to move back across Pocotaligo Bridge and take up a position among the houses and scattered trees of the hamlet.

The artillery was placed in position to command the bridge and causeway—the Charleston light dragoons being held in reserve. The bridge was ordered to be torn up; and this was scarcely done when the enemy appeared in sight and commenced a continuous and rapid fire of musketry and rifled guns. Lieutenant Massie, of the Nelson artillery, could bring only one piece of his battery into action, owing to the original smallness of his company, now greatly reduced by deaths and wounds.

Two pieces of the Beaufort artillery were silenced by the disabling of the gunners; the remaining two kept up a fire to the close of the fight. The enemy's artillery was entirely silenced and withdrawn early in the action. One piece of the Beaufort Artillery was most judiciously withdrawn during the battle and posted three hundred yards on my right, under Sergeant-Major Fuller. It was retired by a cross-road unseen by the enemy, and had all the effect of a reinforcement from its new and unexpected position. It fired spherical case, and the practice was excellent.

At the crisis of the fight I ordered up the Charleston Light Dragoons. That gallant corps came forward with an inspiriting shout and took position on my left, which wanted strengthening.

I had been notified by telegraph that reinforcements were on the way from Charleston and Savannah and Adams' Run. The Nelson battalion of two hundred men, Captain Slight commanding, was the only reinforcement that arrived in time for the fight, about an hour and a half before its close.

As soon as this corps made its appearance near the field, I ordered one-half to a position commanding a causeway some six hundred yards on my right, to protect my flank; and the remainder was deployed to the front to relieve my exhausted men. The arrival of this battalion gave me assurance of victory; I felt perfectly certain of success.

The two companies sent to my right under Captain Brooks were well handled; one was deployed as skirmishers and subjected to a scattering fire. Their appearance threatened the enemy's flank, and no doubt hastened his retreat.

The enemy continued their fire until six o'clock P. M., when it slackened and ceased. I then sent a squad of six men of the Rutledge Mounted Riflemen over the bridge to ascertain the position of the enemy. The bridge was in so damaged a condition that it was some time before the infantry could cross.

The cavalry were obliged to make a circuit of five miles to reach the head of the road by which the enemy had retreated. This enabled them to retire unmolested. As soon as the cavalry arrived, I sent two companies, Rutledge Mounted Riflemen, Lieutenant L. I. Walker commanding, and Captain Kirk's Partisan Rangers, to follow up the retreat. I was reluctant to send a larger force, as I did not know the result of the contest at Coosawhatchie, and from the telegraph wire being cut, was fearful it was disastrous to our arms. A locomotive was despatched from Pocotaligo Station by my Aid, Mr. R. M. Fuller, and two couriers by myself to that point to reconnoitre, while I held my force at the junction of the Mackey's Point and Coosawhatchie roads, ready to operate either way. The cavalry had proceeded but two and a half miles in pursuit when they were stopped by a bridge completely torn up and destroyed by the enemy in their flight. This could not be repaired until morning. There were abundant evidences that the retreat of the enemy was precipitate and disordered. One hundred small arms were picked up and a considerable amount of stores and ammunition. The road was strewn with the debris of the beaten foe. Forty-six of the enemy's dead were found on the battle-field and roadside. Seven fresh graves were discovered at Mackey's Point. I estimated their total killed and wounded at three hundred.

The fight, from the first fire of our advance to the final retreat of the enemy, lasted from half past eleven o'clock A. M. to six o'clock P. M. We have ample reason to believe that our small force not only fought against great odds, but against fresh troops brought up to replace those first engaged. The entire command had been earnestly warned in orders not to waste their fire. This caution was urged upon them during the action by the commanding officer, his aids, and the company officers. I am satisfied, from my own observation, they fired with care and

judgment; and yet some of our men expended eighty rounds of cartridges in the battle. The close vicinity of the ordnance train under its energetic chief, Captain W. W. Elliott, enabled me to keep up the supply.

I beg to express my admiration of the remarkable courage and tenacity with which the troops held their ground. The announcement of my determination to maintain my position until reinforcements arrived seemed to fix them to the spot with unconquerable resolution.

The rapid and continuous volleys of the enemy's musketry were only intermitted while fresh troops were brought up and while those engaged retired.

The Beaufort volunteer artillery fought with great courage, and their pieces were admirably served. Captain Stephen Elliott, whose name is identified with the history of the defence of this coast by many a daring exploit, behaved with his accustomed coolness, skill, and determination.

Captain Trenholm, in command of the cavalry, again exhibited high qualities as a soldier on the same ground where he had won his first laurels.

Captain Edwards, Company "B," First battalion cavalry, showed good conduct in the command of his company.

Lieutenant Walker, commanding the Rutledge Mounted Riflemen, displayed judgment and daring. His company were as steady as veterans, using their rifles with great precision and effect.

When the battle was hottest I ordered Lieutenant Walker to take a squad of his men and assist the Beaufort artillery to remove one of their pieces further to the rear. This was most gallantly done under a severe fire.

Lieutenant Massie, of the Nelson Light Artillery, was active and energetic in the service of his guns.

Captain Rutledge, of the Charleston Light dragoons, was cool and collected in both fights. His gallant corps was held in reserve, and when they took up their position, came with a most inspiriting cheer, which the men engaged returned, thus giving the impression to the enemy of decided reinforcements.

The government is greatly indebted to Captain Sligh and his brave battalion for their timely aid. Captain Sligh behaved with marked coolness and courage. Captain* ——— and Lieutenant† ——— who came immediately under my notice, showed zeal and bravery. I have again to commend the conduct of Lieutenant R. M. Skinner, acting adjutant of the First battalion cavalry. He was among the foremost on the field until disabled by a severe wound in the arm.

Enclosed is Colonel Colcocke's report of the engagement at Coosawhatchie; it will be seen that his command behaved with spirit and success.

* The names of these officers, though repeatedly requested, have not yet been learned.

† The commanding officer of the battalion has received instructions to forward them to department headquarters.

The most important point to defend was the railroad bridge over the Coosawhatchie river. From this the enemy were very quickly driven by our artillery fire, but they succeeded in penetrating to a point on the railroad west of the bridge, before the cavalry arrived; one or two rails only being torn up and the telegraph wire cut, the damage was repaired in a few minutes. After the enemy had retired to their gunboats, the cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson, fired with effect upon their crowded decks.

To the following gentlemen, acting as my personal staff, I desire to express my thanks for their zeal, gallantry, and intelligent discharge of duty: Captain Hartstene, C. S. N., Naval Aid, Captain W. W. Elliott, Ordnance Officer, Captain George P. Elliott, Captain John H. Screven, Corporal D. Walker, and privates Tripp and Martin, of the Rutledge Mounted Riflemen, and private E. B. Bell, of the Seventeenth Battalion, S. C. V. Privates F. F. Davant and Ion Simmons, of the Charleston Light Dragoons, had their horses shot, and afterwards fought with their company on foot.

My Aid, Mr. R. M. Fuller, rendered valuable service by the intelligent discharge of his duty at the telegraph office. The Messrs. Cuthbert, father and son, gave me useful assistance. Privates Tripp and Bell were seriously, and private Martin slightly wounded. Captain Hartstene's horse was wounded, and Captain Walker's killed.

The judgment, coolness, and gallantry displayed by Captain Hartstene, were as conspicuous on land as he has hitherto shown on sea. I must express my indebtedness to Mr. Buckhalter of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, for valuable services, and for the resolution and courage with which he urged a train filled with troops, after the engineer had been killed, through an ambuscade of the enemy to Coosawhatchie.

When the engagement was over, ample reinforcements arrived from Savannah and Charleston. The enemy's gunboats remained in a commanding position off Mackay's Point on the twenty-third, covering their embarkation. My force could not be moved nearer than two miles without being exposed to a destructive fire. A detachment of cavalry under Captain Trenholm closely watched their operations, occasionally saluted by their shells.

On the night of the twenty-third, Sergeant Robinsons of the Rutledge Mounted Riflemen, made a reconnoissance up to the extreme point, and discovered that the enemy had abandoned the main land. Early on the morning of the twenty-fourth, their gunboats disappeared. I enclose a list of the casualties, and a sketch of the positions at which the different conflicts took place.

I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
W. S. WALKER,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

List of Casualties in the Battle of Pocotaligo, October 23, 1862.

	Killed	Wounded	Missing
Company I, Eleventh Infantry	2	3	2
Captain Allston's Sharpshooters	1	7	2
Nelson's Battalion	4	17	..
Beaufort Volunteer Artillery	1	13	..
Nelson Light Artillery	4	14	..
Company A, First Battalion Cavalry	..	1	..
" B, " " "	1	9	..
" C, " " "	..	1	1
" D, " " "	1	2	..
Rutledge Mounted Riflemen	..	2	..
Charleston Light Dragoons	..	8	..
Partisan Rangers	1	2	..
Marion Men of Combahee	..	6	1
Aggregate	15	80	6

One lieutenant and two men were captured while on picket, belonging to Company C, First Battalion of Cavalry.

RECAPITULATION.

Company I, Eleventh Infantry—killed, wounded and missing; all enlisted men.

Captain Allston's sharpshooters.—Wounded, Captain Allston, Second Lieutenant M. Stuart, Third Lieutenant E. P. Carter, slightly; killed, one enlisted man; three wounded; two missing.

Nelson's Battalion.—All enlisted men.

Beaufort Volunteer Artillery. All enlisted men.

Nelson Light Artillery.—Wounded, Lieutenant Massie, severely; enlisted men, four killed, thirteen wounded.

First Battalion cavalry.—Wounded, Major Morgan, severely; Lieutenant R. M. Skinner, acting Adjutant, severely. Company A, one enlisted man wounded. Company B, one enlisted man killed; wounded, Lieutenant P. D. Rush, slightly; and eight enlisted men. Company C, enlisted men; one wounded and one missing. Company D, enlisted men; one killed and two wounded.

Charleston Light Dragoons.—Enlisted men; eight wounded.

Rutledge Mounted Riflemen.—Enlisted men; two wounded.

Partisan Rangers.—Second Lieutenant W. T. Specs killed; wounded, Third Lieutenant P. E. Terry, severely; one enlisted man.

Marion men of Combahee.—Wounded, six enlisted men, and one missing.

REPORT OF COLONEL C. J. COLCOCK.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD REGIMENT CAVALRY, S. C. V.,
GRAHAMVILLE, November 4, 1862.

Lieutenant Ed. H. Barnwell, A. A. A. General:

SIR: A little after nine o'clock on the morning of the twenty-second of October, it was reported to me unofficially that about daylight that morning the Abolition fleet, consisting of fourteen steamers, with numerous barges attached, had proceeded up Broad River.

Prostrated by a protracted spell of fever, from which I had just began to convalesce, I was too weak to take the field, but resumed the command of my post. I ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson to take command of the small force at my disposal, which consisted, as you are aware, of five companies of cavalry and two companies of sharpshooters, of Major Abney's battalion, who was in command, and to proceed with the least possible delay towards Coosawhatchie, to which point I was informed that a portion of the enemy's fleet were advancing. On arriving at Bee's Creek, still four miles from Coosawhatchie, Colonel Johnson was informed that a portion of the Abolition forces were landing at Seabrook's Island, in his rear, a point indicating an attack upon this place. To meet this he had to divide his command, and put three companies in the vicinity of Bee's Creek Hill. This information was subsequently ascertained to be incorrect, but too late to make use of these forces in the defence of Coosawhatchie.

Proceeding with three companies of cavalry towards that point, upon arriving within two miles of it he ascertained that the enemy had already landed from a gunboat and barge lying a little below the Ocean Landing, and was advancing his column towards the direction of Bee's Creek Hill. He immediately dismounted his men, and formed them as skirmishers to meet the expected attack. This movement, however, was only a feint, as they soon "about faced" and advanced towards Coosawhatchie. The ground being unfavorable for a charge, the effect of which would have necessarily been attended with severe loss to the cavalry, with a prospect of little injury to the enemy, Colonel Johnson very judiciously made a detour to the left, hoping to cut them off before they reached Coosawhatchie.

About this time the train, with a portion of Colonel Ellis' regiment and Captain Chisholm's company, of Major Abney's battalion, which had been taken up within a short distance of Coosawhatchie, as they were marching along the railroad track towards that point, passed by. The enemy hearing their approach for some distance (the two roads here running parallel and very close to each other), availed themselves of the opportunity to ambuscade and fire into the train.

The particulars of this disastrous affair I will not refer to, as I suppose a full report of all the circumstances will be made up by the officer in command of that detachment, who succeeded the late unfortunate Major Harrison. It seems, that on arriving near Coosawhatchie, the enemy divided into two detachments, one of which ambuscaded thet rain as above referred to, and the other advanced to the river, for the purpose of destroying the railroad and turnpike bridges. With timely forethought, you had fortunately

despatched at an early hour that morning, for their protection, the Lafayette artillery, Lieutenant Le Bleux commanding, and a section of Captain Elliott's battery, Lieutenant Stuart commanding. These, supported by Captain Wyman's company of infantry, most gallantly repulsed the enemy in their attack on the bridges, and drove them in confusion towards their other detachments, which, beyond the range of our artillery, had succeeded in cutting the telegraph wire and displacing a couple of rails on the track. About this time the cavalry, which had to make a considerable detour over very unfavorable ground, made its appearance, and the enemy beat a hasty retreat, the cavalry pursuing. Unfortunately, the enemy had taken the precaution, in advancing, of destroying all the bridges, which so retarded the progress of the cavalry as to prevent their cutting off their retreat to their gunboat and barges. Disappointed in this object, Colonel Johnson dismounted his men, and, deploying them as skirmishers, advanced to within about one hundred and thirty yards of the gunboats, where, under the protection of a few trees, they poured three volleys from their rifles into the crowded decks and barges of the enemy, which must have done considerable execution. The companies composing this detachment consisted of Captains J. H. Howard's, A. B. Estes', under the immediate command of Lieutenant Peebles, and Captain George C. Heyward's. Recovering from their surprise, the enemy opened a terrific fire of grape, shell, and musketry, in which they were assisted by two of their gunboats stationed a half mile lower down the river, under whose enfilading fire our small force had to fall back. In this affair I regret to inform you we lost private Thomas B. Fripp, of Captain Heyward's company, who fell mortally wounded, shot in three places—as gallant a soldier and true-hearted gentleman as ever fell a martyr in defending the cause of liberty. First-Lieutenant T. G. Buckner, of Captain Heyward's company, was also severely, but I hope not mortally, wounded in the abdomen, and Corporal Thomas Farr, of the same company, received a flesh wound in the thigh, from which, I am happy to say, he is rapidly recovering. That the casualties were not greater, I can only attribute to the interposition of a merciful Providence, who protects those fighting in a righteous cause. For casualties occurring in Major Abney's command, I refer you to that officer's report, which you will find herewith enclosed.

Two hours after this train passed Grahamville another train arrived from Savannah with the Thirty-second and ——— Georgia regiments, under the command of the gallant Colonel Harrison. Unfortunately, they arrived at Coosawhatchie after the enemy had retired, and thus were denied the pleasure which they seemed earnestly to desire, of having a brush with the Abolitionists.

The enemy's boats retired immediately after the skirmish, leaving in their hasty retreat one of their splendid barges, capable of transporting seventy or eighty men.

The next morning not a sign of the Abolition fleet was to be seen in the upper waters of Broad River.

I have the honor to remain,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
C. J. Colcocke,
Colonel, commanding.

Headquarters Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida,
Charleston, S. C., December 12, 1863.

Report of the Casualties in the command of Brigadier-General W. S. Walker in the affair with the Abolitionists at Pocotaligo and Yemassee, October twenty-second, 1862.

Name.	Rank.	Company.	Killed, Wounded, and Missing.
C. Peters	Private	Nelson Va. Battery	Killed.
John F. Fulcher	"	" " "	"
Wm. A. Thacker	"	" " "	"
Thomas J. Allen	"	" " "	"
E. E. Jefferson	1st Lieutenant	" " "	Wounded slightly
F. T. Massie	2d Lieutenant	" " "	" "
George C. Eggleston	Sergeant	" " "	" severely
J. W. Eggleston	"	" " "	" "
C. W. Coffey	Private	" " "	" "
W. W. Wright	"	" " "	" "
B. W. Wright	"	" " "	" slightly.
B. W. Golsby	"	" " "	" severely.
E. W. Thacker	"	" " "	" "
G. W. Pugh	"	" " "	" "
John Allen	"	" " "	" "
C. T. Bowling	"	" " "	" slightly.
Sam Wood	"	" " "	" "
Salath Wood	Corporal	" " "	" "
R. W Campbell	Private	" " "	" "
S. Fenbril	Corporal	Co. C, 7th Bat. S. C. V.	Killed.
F. Turnipseed	Private	" " " " "	Wounded, since died.
S. F. Tolson	"	" F, " " "	Killed.
G. Hale	"	" " " " "	"
G. Bruce	"	" " " " "	Wounded, since died.
G. McGougan	"	" F, " " "	" "

Report of Casualties—(Continued).

Name.	Rank.	Company.	Killed, Wounded, and Missing.
S. Sinclair	Private	Co. A, 7th Bat. S. C. V.	Wounded in thigh.
W. D. Hill	Sergeant	" C, " " "	" in arm.
F. Davis	"	" " " " "	" in leg.
R. Y. Neil	Corporal	" " " " "	" in chest.
John Hawkins	Private	" " " " "	" in leg.
J. A. Davis	"	" " " " "	" in mouth.
G. Evans	"	" " " " "	" in shoulder.
C. Faust	Corporal	" E, " " "	" "
A. Ammond	Private	" " " " "	" in eye.
H. Dees	"	" " " " "	" "
R. Turner	"	" F, " " "	" in shoulder.
B. Turner	"	" " " " "	" in side.
G. W. Horton	"	" " " " "	" in neck.
J. Hopkins	"	" " " " "	" in head.
G. Smith	"	" G, " " "	" in arm.
M. Gibrom	"	" " " " "	" in thigh.
A. F. Hughes	"	" " " " "	" "
Wm. Gustice	"	" " " " "	" in chest.
W. R. Tiller	"	" " " " "	" in thigh.
J. A. Miles	Corporal	Charleston Light Dragoons	" slightly.
E. C. Holland	Private	" " "	" "
G. E. Manigault	"	" " "	" "
M. B. Pringle	"	" " "	" "
James Hopkins	"	" " "	" severely.
J. J. H. O'Neill	"	" " "	" "
J. M. Prioleau	"	" " "	" "
J. D. Porcher	"	" " "	" slightly.
Skinner	Lieutenant	Co. A, 1st Bat. S. C. V.	" painfully.
A. S. Dukes	Private	" B, " " "	Killed.
P. D. Rush	Lieutenant	" " " " "	Wounded slightly.
J. P. Dautzler	Private	" " " " "	" "
J. S. Funches	"	" " " " "	" "
D. A. Trick	"	" " " " "	" "
S. B. Nias	"	" " " " "	" "
J. D. Rickenbacker	"	" " " " "	" "
J. W. Thomas	"	" A, " " "	" "
R. H. Wannamaker	"	" " " " "	" "
H. E. Crisee	"	" C, " " "	" mortally.
A. O. Banks	Lieutenant	" " " " "	Missing.
J. G. Reuphart	Corporal	" " " " "	"
H. P. Hyser	Private	" " " " "	"
Thomas Fleckley	"	" " " " "	"
J. J. Richardson	"	" D, " " "	Killed.
W. W. Willis	"	" " " " "	Wounded painfully.
R. N. W Harkag	"	" " " " "	" slightly.
W. T. Speaks	Lieutenant	Kirk's Co. Par. Rangers.	" "
P. E. Terry	"	" " " "	" painfully.
B. W. Davis	Sergeant	" " " "	" in thigh.
Jasper Johns	Private	Co. F, 3d S. C. Cavalry	" "
John Adams	"	" " "	" severely.
L. Ritter	"	" " "	" in thigh.
W. T. Remley	"	" " "	" in arm.
W. D. Jordan	"	" " "	Missing.
J. J. Tripp	"	Rutledge Mounted Rifles	Wounded severely.
Sanders Glover	"	" " "	" slightly.
T. G. Buckner	Lieutenant	Co. K, 3d S. C. V. Cavalry	" severely.
J. J. Harrison	Major	" 11th S. C. V.	Killed.
G. W. Monroe	Private	" C, "	Wounded slightly.
C. Rush	"	" B, "	Crushed by railroad train, dead.
C. Cook	Sergeant	" D, "	Wounded slightly.
G. E. Stanley	Private	" " "	" "
F. E. Grant	Sergeant	" L, "	Wounded.
J. P. Campbell	Private	" " "	Killed.
A. J. Smoke	Sergeant	" " "	"
S. Crosley	Private	" " "	Wounded.
Wm. O. Began	"	" " "	"
H. Valentine	"	" " "	"
G. W. Way	"	" " "	"
James Warren	"	" " "	"
G. P. Warren	"	" " "	"
James Yarley	"	" " "	" slightly.
E. B. Loyless	Lieutenant	" " "	Missing.
R. Riller	Private	" " "	"
J. Hiers	Corporal	" H, "	Wounded in shoulder.
J. M. Hickman	Private	" " "	" "
J. Polk	"	" " "	" severely.
W. J. Carter	"	" " "	" slightly.
P. B. McDaniel	"	" B, 1st Bat. S. C. S. S.	Killed.
J. B. Allston	Captain	" " " " "	Wounded slightly.
M. Stuart	Lieutenant	" " " " "	" "
Capers	"	" " " " "	" "
J. B. Attaway	Private	" " " " "	" "
W. Brown	"	" " " " "	" "
E. Bootwright	"	" " " " "	" severely.

Report of Casualties—(Continued).

NAME.	RANK.	COMPANY.	KILLED, WOUNDED, AND MISSING.
S. M. Smith	Private	Co. B, 1st Bat. S. C. S. S.	Wounded.
W. W. Lang	"	" " " " "	Missing.
J. Walden	"	" " " " " "	"
J. F. Chapin	Sergeant	Beaufort Light Artillery	Wounded slightly.
Wm. Thompson	"	" " "	" severely.
N. B. Fuller	Corporal	" " "	" "
E. E. Burban	"	" " "	" "
J. J. Brown	"	" " "	" "
J. E. Tripp	Private	" " "	" since died.
R. F. Sams	"	" " "	" severely.
John Jenkins	"	" " "	" slightly.
Daniel Jenkins	"	" " "	" "
A. Budden	"	" " "	" "
E. B. Trescott	"	" " "	" "
T. E. Cuthbert	"	" " "	" severely.
S. A. Sams	"	" " "	" slightly.
J. D. Richardson	"	" " "	" "

Total casualties: Killed, 14; wounded, 102; missing, 9.

Doc. 52.

EXPEDITION TO HARTSVILLE, TENN.

REPORT OF GENERAL BRAXTON BRAGG.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
MURFREESBORO, TENNESSEE, December 22, 1862.

General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General, Richmond, Virginia:

SIR: Having been informed by acting Brigadier-General John H. Morgan, whose cavalry brigade covered my front in the direction of Hartsville, Tennessee, that the enemy's force at that point was somewhat isolated, I yielded to his request and organized an expedition under him for their attack. On the fifth instant Hanson's brigade, of Breckinridge's division, was moved forward on the road towards Hartsville, and halted at Baird's Mills, a point nearly due east from Nashville, and half way to Hartsville, when it was joined by Morgan's cavalry force. Two regiments, the Second and Ninth Kentucky infantry, with Cobb's Kentucky artillery, moved from this point, with the cavalry, at 10 P. M. on the sixth, to attack the enemy at Hartsville. Early on the morning of the same day, Hanson, with the remainder of his brigade, moved as directed, on the road towards Nashville, for the purpose of a reconnoissance and to cause a diversion.

At the same time that the troops above named left their camps near here, Major-General Cheatham, with two brigades, moved out on the Nashville road, halted at night at Lavergne, fifteen miles, and on the next day, in conjunction with General Wheeler's cavalry, made a strong demonstration on the enemy's front.

These movements had the desired effect, and completely distracted the enemy's attention from the real point of attack. Learning that a foraging train of the enemy was on his right flank, Cheatham detached Wheeler with a cavalry force to attack it, which he did in his usual dashing and successful manner, capturing eleven wagons and fifty-seven prisoners. Under cover of these feints, Morgan, by an extraordinary night march, reached the point of his destination about sunrise, and in a short, but warmly contested engagement, killed, wounded, and captured the entire command of more than two thousand officers and men.

I enclose herewith the reports of General Morgan and the subordinate commanders, and take great pleasure in commending the fortitude, endurance, and gallantry of all engaged in this remarkable expedition. It is a source of personal and official gratification to perceive that the department has recognized the services of the gallant and meritorious soldier who led the expedition, by confirming my previous nomination of him as a Brigadier-General.

Two sets of infantry colors and one artillery guidon, taken at Hartsville, are also forwarded with this report. A third set of infantry colors was presented by its captors to the President, on his recent visit to this place.

I am, sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
BRAXTON BRAGG,
General, commanding.

REPORT OF GENERAL JOHN H. MORGAN.

MORGAN'S HEADQUARTERS, CROSS-ROADS NEAR MURFREESBORO,
December 9, 1862.

Colonel Brent, Chief of Staff:

SIR: I have the honor to lay before you, for the information of the General commanding, a report of the expedition against the Federal forces at Hartsville.

I left these headquarters at 10 A. M., on the sixth instant, with one thousand four hundred of my command under the orders of Colonel Duke; the Second and Ninth Kentucky infantry, commanded by Colonel Hunt; Captain Cobb's battery of artillery; two small howitzers; and two rifled Ellsworth guns, belonging to my own command.

At Lebanon I received information that no

* See Rebellion Record, Volume 6, page 245, Documents.

change had been made in the number of the Federals at Hartsville, their number being still about nine hundred infantry and four hundred cavalry, with two pieces of artillery. I found afterwards that their force had been considerably underrated.

I proceeded with the infantry and artillery to Purcell Ferry on the Cumberland River, sending the cavalry, under the orders of Colonel Duke, to pass at a ford some seven miles below the point where we were to "rendezvous." I passed my troops with great difficulty, there being but one boat; and about half-past five on the morning of the seventh I arrived at Hague Shops, two miles from the Federal camp. I found that Colonel Duke, with his cavalry, had only just marched up, having crossed the ford with difficulty, and that one regiment of his command, five hundred strong (Colonel Gano's), had not yet reported. Major Stoner's battalion had been left on the other side of the Cumberland, with two mountain howitzers, to prevent the escape of the enemy by the Lebanon road, and Colonel Kenneth's regiment had been ordered to proceed to Hartsville to picket the road leading to Gallatin, and to attack any of the Federals they might find in that town, to take possession of the Castilian Springs, Lafayette and Carthage roads, so as to prevent the escape of the enemy. This reduced my force considerably, but I determined to attack, and that at once; there was no time to be lost; day was breaking, and the enemy might expect strong reinforcements from Castilian Springs, should my arrival be known. Advancing, therefore, with the cavalry, closely followed by the artillery and infantry, I approached the enemy's position. The pickets were found and shot down. The Yankee bivouac first appeared to cover a long line of ground, and gave me to suppose that their number was much greater than I anticipated. On nearing the camp the alarm was sounded, and I could distinctly see and hear the officers ordering their men to fall in, preparing for resistance. Colonel Duke then dismounted Colonel Clarke's and Colonel Chenault's regiments, in all about seven hundred and fifty men, drawing them up in line in a large field in the front, and a little to the right of the enemy's line which was then forming, and seeing that the artillery and infantry were in position, he ordered his men to advance at the double-quick, and directed Colonel Chenault, who was on the left, to oblique so as to march on the enemy's flank.

His men then pressed forward, driving the Federals for nearly half a mile, without a check, before them, until their right wing was forced back upon their own left wing and centre.

Colonel Duke then ordered a halt until the infantry had commenced their attack on the Federal left wing, which caused a retreat of the whole line. At this juncture Lieutenant-Colonel Hoffman and Major Steele, of Gano's regiment, came up with about one hundred men of that regiment, who had succeeded in crossing the ford, and threw their small force into the fight. My dismounted cavalry, under Colonel Duke, had only been skirmishing, previously to this, for about twenty minutes; but seeing that Colonel Hunt, with the infantry, was pressing hard upon the Federal's left, he ordered an advance upon the right wing and flank of their new line; it gave way and ceased firing, and soon after surrendered.

Colonel Duke reports that his men fought with a courage and coolness which could not be surpassed.

Colonels Clarke and Chenault led on their men with the most determined bravery, encouraging them by voice and example.

The timely arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel Hoffman and Major Steele, and the gallant manner in which they showed themselves into the fight, had a very decided effect upon the battle at the point at which they entered. The artillery, under Captain Cobb, did most excellent service, and suffered severely from the enemy's battery, which fired with great precision, blowing up one of his caissons and inflicting a severe loss on that arm.

The infantry conducted themselves most gallantly; the Second Kentucky suffering most severely.

Colonel Bennett's regiment, as I said before, was not in the fight, having been sent on special service, which was most efficiently performed, four hundred and fifty prisoners having been taken by them, and twelve Federals killed.

Thus, sir, in one hour and a half, the troops under my command, consisting of five hundred cavalry (Colonel Gano's, Colonel Bennett's regiments and Major Stoner's command not participating in the fight), seven hundred infantry, with a battery of artillery, in all about one thousand three hundred strong, defeated and captured three well-disciplined and well formed regiments of infantry with a regiment of cavalry, and took two rifled cannon, the whole encamped on their own ground and in a very strong position, taking about eighteen hundred prisoners, eighteen hundred stand of arms, a quantity of ammunition, clothing, quartermasters' stores, and sixteen wagons. The battle was now over. The result exceeded my own expectations, but still I felt that my position was a most perilous one, being within four miles in a direct line and only eight by the main Gallatin road of an enemy's forces of at least eight thousand men, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, who would naturally march to the aid of their comrades on hearing the report of our guns. I, therefore, with the assistance of my staff, got together all the empty wagons left by the enemy, loaded them with arms, ammunition, and stores, and directed them immediately to Hart's Ferry

There was no time to be lost. The pickets placed by my assistant Adjutant-General on the Castilian Springs road sent to report the advance of a strong body of Federals, estimated at five thousand men.

I sent to Colonel Clarke's regiment to make a show of resistance, ordering Colonel Gano's regiment, which had arrived, in support. In

the meantime I pressed the passage of the ford to the utmost.

This show of force caused a delay in the advance of the enemy, who had no idea of the number of my men, and probably greatly overrated my strength, and gave me time to pass the ford with infantry, artillery, and baggage wagons. The horses of my cavalry being sent back from the other side of the Cumberland River, to carry over the infantry regiments, it was time to retreat. The enemy attacked our rear, but was kept at bay by the two regiments before specified, aided by four guns I had previously ordered to be placed in position on the south side of the Cumberland, looking forward to what was now taking place. The banks of the river, on both sides, are precipitous, and the stream breast deep, but our retreat was effected in excellent order. We lost not a man, except three badly wounded, that I was reluctantly forced to leave behind. Cavalry, infantry, guns, and baggage train safely crossed, with the exception of four wagons which had been sent by another route, and which are still safely hidden in the woods, according to accounts received to-day.

In justice to my brave command, I would respectfully bring to the notice of the General commanding, the names of those officers who contributed, by their undaunted bravery and soldier-like conduct, to the brilliant success which crowned the efforts of the Confederate arms.

To Colonel Hunt, of the Ninth Kentucky, commanding the infantry, I am deeply indebted for his valuable assistance. His conduct, and that of his brave regiment, was perfect, and their steadiness under fire remarkable.

The Second Kentucky also behaved most gallantly and suffered severely—sixty-two men killed and wounded, three regimental officers left dead on the field, sufficiently testified to their share in the fight, and the resistance they had to encounter.

Colonel Clarke's regiment paid also a high price for its devotion. It went into the field two hundred and thirty strong, had six officers, with twenty-one non-commissioned officers and privates killed and wounded, besides six missing.

Colonel Duke, commanding the cavalry, was, as he always has been, "the right man in the right place." Wise in council, gallant in the field, his services have ever been invaluable to me.

I was informed by my Adjutant-General that Colonel Bennett, in the execution of the special service confided to him, and in which he so entirely succeeded, gave proofs of great gallantry and contempt of danger.

I owe much to my personal staff. Major Llewellyn, Captains Charlton Morgan and Williams, and Lieutenant Tyler, acting as my Aides-de-Camp, gave proof of great devotion, being everywhere in the hottest fire, and Major Llewellyn received the sword of Colonel Stewart, and the surrender of his regiment. Captain Morgan and Captain Williams' horses were killed under them, and Lieutenant Tyler was severely wounded. My Orderly Sergeant, Craven Peyton, received a shot in his hip, and had his horse killed by my side.

I must have forgiveness if I add, with a soldier's pride, that the conduct of my whole command deserved my highest gratitude and commendation.

Three Federal regimental standards and five cavalry guidons fluttered over my brave column on their return from the expedition. With such troops victory is enchained to our banners, and the issue of a contest with our Northern opponents, even when they are double our force, no longer doubtful.

I have the honor to be, sir,
With the highest respect,
Your most obedient servant,
JOHN H. MORGAN,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL BRECKINRIDGE.

HEADQUARTERS BRECKINRIDGE'S DIVISION,
December 11, 1862.

Major Thos. M. Jack, A. A. General:

SIR: I have the honor to forward a report from Colonel R. W. Hanson, commanding First brigade of my division, covering the report of Colonel Thos. H. Hunt, who commanded the Second and Ninth Kentucky regiments and Cobb's battery, in the recent expedition (under command of Brigadier-General Morgan) against Hartsville; and also, the reports of Major Hewitt and Captain Morehead, commanding, respectively, the Second and Ninth Kentucky, and of Captain Cobb, commanding the battery.

I beg to call attention to the officers and men specially named for gallantry, and to suggest, respectfully, that the troops engaged in this expedition deserve mention in orders for conduct, which, in fortitude and daring, has not been surpassed during the war.

Very respectfully,
JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE,
Major-General, commanding.

REPORT OF COLONEL R. W. HANSON.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,
CAMP NEAR MURFREESBORO, December 11, 1862.

Colonel Buckner, Assistant Adjutant-General:

In pursuance of the order of General Bragg, I proceeded, with my command, on the fifth instant, to Baird's Mill, and remained two days, making, as directed, reconnoissance towards Nashville. General Morgan designated the Second and Ninth Kentucky and Cobb's battery as the troops he desired to accompany him upon the Hartsville expedition. They were detached under command of Colonel Hunt. I enclose, herewith, his report of the battle of Hartsville, and the reports of his subordinate officers. I wish to call attention to the honorable mention that is made in Major Hewitt's and Colonel Hunt's reports of the gallant conduct of Sergeant Oldham, of the Second Kentucky regiment, with the hope that the proper steps may be taken to procure for him the proper reward of his con-

duct. Sergeant Oldham was the color-bearer of the Second Kentucky regiment at the battle of Donelson, and acted with great gallantry upon that occasion. He is a suitable man for a lieutenancy, being well qualified as well as truly brave.

R. W. HANSON,
Colonel, commanding Brigade.

REPORT OF COLONEL THOMAS H. HUNT.

HEADQUARTERS NINTH KENTUCKY REGIMENT,
CAMP NEAR MURFREESBORO, December 9, 1862.

To Captain John S. Hope, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that the detachment from the First brigade, Breckinridge's division, consisting of the Second Kentucky regiment, Major James W. Hewitt, commanding, three hundred and seventy-five strong; Ninth Kentucky regiment, Captain James T. Morehead, commanding, three hundred and twenty strong, and Cobb's battery, placed under my command, as senior officer, with orders to report to General Morgan, left Baird's Mill where the brigade was in bivouac, on Saturday the sixth instant, about one and a half o'clock P. M. Marching in the rear of the cavalry force until we arrived in the vicinity of Lebanon an exchange was made, when the infantry mounted the horses and rode five or six miles. The command reached Cumberland River about ten o'clock. The infantry, artillery, and a small portion of cavalry, crossed at ——— Ferry, the balance of the cavalry crossing at a ford a few miles lower down the river. The two boats used for crossing were of small capacity and in miserable condition, but by constant bailing they were kept afloat, and by five o'clock in the morning the command was safely over.

The march of five miles to Hartsville (where the battle was fought), yet to make, over bad roads for artillery, was not accomplished until after sunrise, and the purpose of General Morgan to surprise the enemy was defeated. When we approached in sight of their camp we found their infantry already formed, occupying a very strong position on the crest of a hill with a deep ravine in front, and their artillery in battery. The troops under my command were placed in position west of the enemy's camp, while under a heavy fire from their battery, and sharpshooters thrown out from their right, but these latter were quickly driven in by the dismounted cavalry.

The Second regiment having been formed on the left of the Ninth, was now ordered forward to support and follow up the success gained by the cavalry skirmishers. That they had hot work to accomplish is shown by their heavy loss in killed and wounded.

In the meantine Captain Cobb, with his battery, was not idle. He was doing good execution and the enemy responded with effect, one of their shells striking and blowing up a caisson. As the ground was cleared of the enemy opposite our left, he (Captain Cobb) was ordered to take a new position with his battery in that direction, and at the same time the Ninth Kentucky regiment was ordered forward to engage the enemy's left.

My whole command was now engaged. The crest of the hill was reached, and here commenced a desperate struggle, as the contestants were only from thirty to fifty paces apart, where they fought for the space of ten minutes, when the order to charge was given and most nobly was the command responded to. The enemy broke and were driven to the river cliff, where they were completely surrounded by my force in front, and the dismounted cavalry on their flanks and rear, and where they surrendered at discretion.

It was a continued success from the commencement. In about one hour and a half from the time the first gun was fired they surrendered, and more prisoners were brought off than we had men in the action. Large quantities of commissary and quartermasters' stores were also secured, a section of artillery, and a large number of small arms with the usual supply of ammunition.

General Morgan had made most skilful disposition, which, with the good fighting qualities of the troops engaged, secured success. I cannot speak in too high terms of praise of the troops, and I scarcely know which most to admire, their patient endurance on the march or courage in the battle. They marched fifty miles in cold winter weather, the ground covered with snow, crossed and recrossed the Cumberland River, fought a largely superior force, strongly posted within six miles of their supports, and brought off the prisoners, all within the space of thirty hours. Captain Cobb, with his officers and men, had a most laborious time in getting their pieces and horses across the river, and it was only by the best directed exertions they succeeded at all. Where officers and men all behaved so well it is impossible for me to single out individual cases as peculiarly worthy of commendation. I cannot, however, refrain from mentioning Lieutenant Joseph Benedict, who acted as my Aid on the occasion. He was the right man in the right place.

I enclose herewith copies of the reports of Major Hewett, Captain Morehead, and Captain Cobb, and would bring to your attention the fact that the former commends Color-Sergeant John Oldham for his gallant bravery.

The following is a summary of the loss sustained by my command:

COMMAND.	KILLED.	WOUNDED.	MISSING.
Second Kentucky regiment.....	8	54	3
Ninth Kentucky regiment.....	7	10	1
Cobb's Battery.....	3	7	0
Total..... ..	18	71	4

Included in the above are of the Second Kentucky regiment, Chas. H. Thomas, First Lieutenant, and John W. Rogers, Second Lieutenant, Company C, killed; T. M. Horne, First Lieutenant, Company A, mortally wounded; Second Lieutenant A. J. Pryor, Company D, Lieutenant Harding, Company K, wounded. Of Ninth Kentucky, Second Lieutenant Dandridge Crockett, killed, First Lieutenant J. W. Cleveland, wounded.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

THOMAS H. HUNT,
Colonel, commanding Detachment.

REPORT OF MAJOR HEWITT.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND KENTUCKY REGIMENT,
CAMP MURFREESBORO, Dec. 9, 1862.

Colonel Thomas H. Hunt:

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in pursuance of your orders, I formed my regiment on the left of the Ninth Kentucky, opposite the enemy's camp near Hartsville, a portion of General Morgan's cavalry being at the same time on my left. When the orders came for me to advance, I ordered my regiment forward, and after passing the fence the nature of the ground was such that I deemed it advisable to deploy my regiment, and therefore gave the order to deploy. In this way we drove the enemy from their first camp and continued to drive them until they surrendered. The officers, without an exception, behaved in the most gallant style. They were continually in advance of their men, urging them forward; and where all behaved so well, it would be impossible to particularize. Each seemed to vie with the other in deeds of gallantry. The whole command, I am pleased to say, behaved in a most unexceptionable manner. I cannot conclude my report without reference to Color-Sergeant John Oldham, whose conduct and courage during the whole engagement elicited the encomiums of both officers and men. Appended is a list of the killed, wounded, and missing, all of which I respectfully submit.

Your obedient servant,

JAMES W. HEWITT,
Major, commanding Twenty-second Kentucky regiment.

Killed	8
Wounded	54
Missing	3
Total	65

REPORT OF CAPTAIN JAMES T. MOREHEAD.

NINTH KENTUCKY REGIMENT,
CAMP NEAR MURFREESBORO,
December 10, 1862.

To Colonel Thomas H. Hunt, Commanding Infantry:

SIR: At twelve o'clock, on Saturday the sixth instant, I, as senior captain, was placed, by your orders, in command of the Ninth Kentucky regiment, which had, the day before, moved to Baird's Mills, eighteen miles from Murfreesboro, and was at that time about to march against the enemy, reported to be at Hartsville, Tennessee.

The weather was excessively cold, the snow having fallen the day before to some depth, and the road was very rough; notwithstanding, the men marched steadily during the day and all night, and reached the immediate neighborhood of the enemy, near Hartsville, at sunrise. The enemy occupied a strong position in front of his encampment, his line of battle stretching along the crest of a hill, which was separated from our forces by an intervening hollow or ravine. Our line of battle was formed with Cobb's battery on the right, supported by the Ninth Kentucky regiment directly in its rear. On our immediate left was the Second Kentucky regiment, and still further to the left a portion of two regiments of dismounted cavalry, under Colonel Duke. The enemy occupied with his sharpshooters the woods and ravines in front of the left wing of our line, and opened a brisk fire on us. Against them the dismounted cavalry deployed as skirmishers, and soon succeeded in dislodging and driving them back upon the main body of the enemy. The Second Kentucky regiment was ordered forward, and the Ninth left in support of the battery. In a few minutes after I was ordered to advance, and moved the regiment, in double-quick, in the direction of the main body of the enemy, going over, in our route, very rough ground, and through a deep ravine. Ascending the hill the regiment advanced to the right of the Second Kentucky, halted, and immediately became engaged, at less than fifty paces, with the enemy. After fighting for a short time, I ordered a charge, which was made with such gallantry by the regiment, that the left wing of the enemy's line gave way and commenced retreating in confusion. Pressed closely by the Ninth Kentucky, they passed through their camps and took refuge under the brow of a hill on the bank of the river, and in rear of their artillery. The regiment continued to move rapidly on and captured the two pieces of artillery and a stand of colors, charged the line of the enemy and drove them to the brink of the river, compelling their immediate surrender. Here we captured Colonel Moore, commanding Brigade, who, in reply to a question from Captain Crouch, answered that he surrendered himself and all the men around him, meaning the whole force. The battle was now fairly won, the firing had ceased, save a few scattering shots here and there. I immediately formed the regiment again in line of battle, had order restored, stragglers collected, and the men kept in their places. I sent details from all the companies to look after the dead and wounded, and detailed Company "H," Captain Bosche, to guard the One hundred and sixth Ohio regiment captured by us. The prisoners being collected, I was ordered to detail Companies "A and C," to guard them, and afterwards Company "G." The regiment recrossed the river and began its march towards Lebanon, Tennessee. Too much praise

cannot be given to the officers and men for their spirit and patient endurance under a march of almost unexampled hardship and rapidity, and for their gallantry and good conduct in action.

The regiment had in battle an aggregate of three hundred and twenty men. The casualties were as follows, viz.:

Company A—Lieutenant Thomas McCaing, commanding; one private wounded.

Company B—Captain Crouch, commanding; one private wounded.

Company D—Lieutenant Beale, commanding; one private wounded.

Company G—Lieutenant Daniel, commanding; one private missing; one private wounded.

Company H—Captain E. Bosche, commanding; one private missing and one corporal killed.

Company I—Captain John Desha, commanding; three privates killed, and two lieutenants (J. W. Cleveland and W. T. Casey) and three privates wounded.

Company K—Lieutenant Gaines, commanding; killed Lieutenant D. S. Crockett, and one private.

Total: Killed, seven; wounded, ten; missing, nine.

All of which is respectfully submitted,

JAMES T. MOREHEAD,
Captain, commanding Ninth Kentucky Regiment.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN COBB.

Report of Killed and Wounded in Captain R. Cobb's Company of Light Artillery, in the Action near Hartsville, Tennessee, on Sunday, the seventh December, 1862.

Killed: Sergeant W. E. Etheridge; Privates David Watts and Sanderfer. Total 3.

Wounded and left on the field on account of severity of wounds:—Corporal James Donoh; Privates T. C. Carnhill, B. F. Perdue, Henry Williams. Total 4.

Wounded and not left:—Private John Leonard (slightly), John Thomas, R. F. Lear. Total 3.

Total killed and wounded, 10.

Respectfully submitted,

R. COBB,
Captain, commanding Battery.

Killed, Wounded, and Missing.

COMMAND.	KILLED.	WOUNDED.	MISSING.	TOTAL.
Ninth Kentucky Regiment	6	10	1	17
Second " "	8	64	6	78
Colonel Gano's Regiment of Cavalry	.....	.....	1	1
Colonel Clarke's " "	2	24	6	32
Colonel Chenault's " "	1	4	.....	5
Colonel Bennett's " "	1	3	.....	4
Cobb's Battery	3	7	.....	10
General Morgan's Staff	.....	2	.....	2
Total	21	114	14	149
Officers	4	11	1	16
Non-commissioned Officers	5	13	4	22
Privates	12	90	9	111
Total	21	114	14	149

A true copy from files in this office.

GEO. WM. BRENT,
A. A. General.

Doc. 53.

BEAUREGARD'S LETTER TO PIERRE SOULE.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA, AND FLORIDA, CHARLESTON, S. C., December 8, 1863.

Hon. Pierre Soule, Richmond, Va.:

MY DEAR SIR: In compliance with your request made on the eve of your departure for Richmond, I have prepared for you a sketch of certain operations by which we may yet retrieve our late losses, and possibly baffle the immense resources of men and available material of our enemy:

1. The system hitherto followed of keeping in the field separate armies, acting without concert on distant and diverging lines of operations, and thus enabling our adversary to concentrate at convenience his masses against our fractions, must be discontinued as radically contrary to the principles of the art of war, and attended with inevitable results such as our disasters in Mississippi, Tennessee, and Northern Georgia.

2. We must arrange for a sudden and rapid concentration, upon some selected, decisive strategic point of the theatre of war, of enough troops to crush the forces of the enemy embodied in that quarter. This must necessarily

be done at the expense or hazard, for the time, of other points less important, or offering less advantages; for striking the enemy a blow thus struck will necessarily disorganize his combinations and give us the choice of the field of operations.

I am sensibly aware of our limited means, our want of men, the material appliances of war and of transportation, and hence the difficulties which will embarrass us in the execution of this plan of concentration; but I see no way to success except through and by it. A different course may indeed protract the contest, which will become day by day more unequal; we may fight stoutly, as hitherto, many more bloody and indecisive battles, but will never win a signal, conclusive victory, until we can manage to throw a heavy and overwhelming mass of our forces upon the fractions of the enemy, and at the same time successfully strike at his communications, without exposing our own.

I believe this may yet be done. Not knowing, however, our present available forces, and their locations, I am unable to make a definite or detailed plan of operations. But I believe I am warranted in assuming that we have under arms two hundred and ten thousand effective men, distributed nearly as follows:

In the Trans-Mississippi Department, say	40,000
Department of Alabama and Mississippi, say	15,000
Under Hardee (including Longstreet), say	60,000
Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, say	28,000
Department of North Carolina, say	7,000
Department of Virginia, say	60,000
Total	210,000

Looking at a map of the Confederate States, it will be seen that the most injurious blow which the enemy could strike at present would be to take possession of Atlanta—thus isolating still more completely the Trans-Mississippi States, and detaching, in a great measure, the States of Mississippi and Alabama from the Eastern portion of the Confederacy. It would also be a deplorable injury to the energetic, populous State of Georgia, and cripple the resources of that people. We should, therefore, regard Atlanta as the actual *objective* point of the large force which the enemy has concentrated about Chattanooga, and the one which we must, at all cost, prevent him from obtaining. In this state of affairs, throwing aside all other considerations, subordinating all other operations to this one vital campaign, at a concerted moment we must withdraw from other points a portion of their forces—all, indeed, not absolutely essential for keeping up a show of defence or safety against a *coup-de-main*—and concentrate in this way every available soldier possible, for operations against General Grant.

Such strategic points as Richmond, Weldon, Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and Meridian, or Jackson, Miss., at the same time, should be fortified, garrisoned, and provisioned, according to their present relative value to the Confederate States, sufficiently to prolong their defence, if attacked or besieged, until troops for their relief could be detached as required from the army in North-western Georgia. I will now state, approximately, what troops may, in my belief, be drawn from the following quarters, and added to the army at or about Dalton, namely:

From Alabama and Mississippi	10,000
From South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida	8,000
From North Carolina	2,000
From Virginia	20,000
Total	40,000

These forty thousand men, added with celerity to the force now under Hardee, and including that under Longstreet, and other detachments, would make an army of one hundred thousand men. Let this army take the offensive at once, and, properly handled, it should crush any force that Grant could assemble in time and oppose, scattered, as he evidently is, and unprepared, as he would be, for such an event. To insure the success of a plan of operations, the press must be led to preserve complete silence touching all military movements. Depots of subsistence, munitions of war, ambulances, wagons, horses, etc., should be established at certain points, not too far from Atlanta, for rapid concentration at the proper time. Meantime, whatsoever troops that could safely be withdrawn from the departments already indicated, should be quickly, quietly concentrated at suitable central points, thence to be thrown forward with all possible despatch to Dalton, with all the means of transportation available, of all sorts. At the same time, the officer appointed to command this large army should make all his preparations for such a *trust*, and the sudden accumulation of troops of all arms, so that he may be able to mould it into a homogeneous mass as early as practicable, and to inaugurate offensive operations without loss of one moment of time that may be obviated; and further, he must be invested with an *unrestricted*, unembarrassed selection of staff officers, and thoroughly emancipated from the least subordination to the views and control of the heads of bureaus at Richmond—a reproduction, in this war, of that fatal Austrian system with which no eminently successful commander ever had to contend—a pernicious plan of administration which will clog and hamper the highest military genius, whether of a Napoleon or Cæsar.

I believe the success of the plan of campaign thus sketched, and the utter defeat of the enemy, would be almost certain.

The question would next be, whether to pursue the routed enemy with vigor to the banks of the Ohio and Mississippi, or to return to the several sources, whence the army was gathered, their respective detachments or quotas for the campaign. This should be left, however, to be

determined by the nature of the enemy's operations at the time.

I must finally remark that, were it possible to concentrate, with sufficient expedition, at or about Knoxville, such an army as I have indicated, that would be the better point whence to take the offensive into Middle Tennessee than Dalton—that is, according the principles of the art, would promise more decisive results; for it is evident we should thus threaten the enemy's communications without exposing our own. (Principle II., Art of War), "*Le secret de la guerre est dans le secret des communications.*"—Napoleon. By a movement from Knoxville, we should be doing what is taught in connection with the Third Maxim (Art of War), to wit: "*That part of the base of operations is the most advantageous to break out from into the theatre of war which conducts the most directly on the enemy's flank or rear.*" There may be, however, such practical difficulties in the way of the execution of such a movement on that line as may not make it advisable to adopt it. "The whole science of war," it has been well said, "may be briefly defined as the art of placing, in the right position, at the right time, a mass of troops greater than your enemy can there oppose to you." These conditions, I sincerely believe, may be filled by very much such a plan as the one which I have hurriedly placed before you. Of course my views must be subject to such modification as my want of precise information relative to the number and location of our troops may render necessary.

The hour is critical and grave—

> "The enemy increaseth every day,
> We, at the height, are ready to decline."

I am filled with intense anxiety lest golden opportunities shall be lost—lost forever. In no theatre of human actions is it so true as in war—

> "There is a tide in the affairs of men,
> Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune
> Omitted, all the voyage of their life
> Is bound in shallows and in miseries.
> * * * * * *
> And we must take the current when it serves,
> Or lose our ventures."

It is concentration and immediate mobility that are indispensable to save us.

Yours, sincerely,

G. T. BEAUREGAUD.

Official: A. TERRY,
A. A. General.

Doc. 54.

BATTLES OF CORINTH AND HATCHIE BRIDGE.*

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL VAN DORN.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF WEST TENNESSEE,
HOLLY SPRINGS, MISS., Oct. 20, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the battle of Corinth:

Having established batteries at Port Hudson, secured the mouth of Red River and the navigation of the Mississippi River to Vicksburg, I turned my especial attention to affairs in the northern portion of my district.

On the thirtieth day of August I received a despatch from General Bragg, informing me that he was about to march into Kentucky, and would leave to General Price and myself the enemy in West Tennessee. On the fourth day of September I received a communication from General Price, in which was enclosed a copy of the despatch from General Bragg above named, making an offer to co-operate with me. At this time General Breckinridge was operating on the Mississippi River, between Baton Rouge and Port Hudson, with all the available force I had for the field; therefore I could not accept General Price's proposition. Upon the return, however, of General Breckinridge, I immediately addressed General Price, giving my views in full in regard to the campaign in West Tennessee, and stating that I was then ready to join him with all my troops. In the meantime orders were received by him, from General Bragg, to follow Rosecrans across the Tennessee River into Middle Tennessee, whither it was then supposed he had gone. Upon the receipt of this intelligence I felt at once that all my hopes of accomplishing anything in West Tennessee, with my small force, were marred. I nevertheless moved up to Davis' Mill, a few miles from Grand Junction, Tennessee, with the intention of defending my district to the best of my ability, and to make a demonstation in favor of General Price; to which latter end, also, I marched my whole command, on the twentieth day of September, to within seven miles of Bolivar, driving three brigades of the enemy back to that place, and forcing the return from Corinth of one division (Ross's) which had been sent there to strengthen Grant's army.

General Price, in obedience to his orders, marched in the direction of Iuka, to cross the Tennessee, but was not long in discovering that Rosecrans had not crossed that stream. This officer, in connection with Grant, attacked him on the nineteenth day of September, and compelled him to fall back towards Baldwin, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. On the twenty-fifth day of the same month I received a despatch, by courier, from General Price, stating that he was at Baldwin, and was then ready to join me with his forces in an attack on Corinth, as had been previously suggested by me. We met at Ripley, on the twenty-eighth of September, according to agreement, and marched the next morning towards Pocahontas, which place we reached on the first of October. From all the information I could obtain, the following was the "situation" of the Federal army at that time: Sherman at Memphis, with about six thousand men; Hurlbert, afterwards Ord, at Bolivar, with about eight thousand; Grant (headquarters at Jackson), with about three thousand; Rosecrans at Corinth, with about fifteen thousand; together with the following outposts, viz.:

* See Rebellion Record, vol. 5, page 488—Documents.

Rienzi, twenty-five hundred; Burnville, Jacinto, and Iuka, about six thousand. At important bridges, and on garrison duty, about two or three thousand, making in the aggregate about forty-two thousand (42,000) men ir West Tennessee. Memphis, Jackson, Bolivar, and Corinth were fortified, the works mounting siege guns, the outposts slightly fortified, having field-pieces. Memphis, Bolivar, and Corinth are in the arc of a circle, the chord of which, from Memphis to Corinth, makes an angle with due east line about fifteen degrees south. Bolivar is about equidistant from Memphis and Corinth, somewhat nearer the latter, and is at the intersection of the Hatchie River and the Mississippi Central and Ohio Railroad. Corinth is the strongest, but the most salient point. Surveying the whole field of operations before me, calmly and dispassionately, the conclusion forced itself irresistibly upon my mind that the taking of Corinth was a condition precedental to the accomplishment of anything in West Tennessee. To take Memphis would be to destroy an immense amount of property, without any adequate military advantage, even admitting that it could be held, without heavy guns, against the enemy's guns and mortar boats. The line of fortifications around Boliver is intersected by the Hatchie River, rendering it impossible to take the place by quick assault, and reinforcements could be thrown in from Jackson by railroad, and, situated as it is, in the angle of the three fortified places, an advance upon it would expose both my flanks and rear to an attack from the forces at Memphis and Corinth.

It was clear, to my mind, that if a successful attack could be made upon Corinth from the west and north-west, the forces there driven back on the Tennessee and cut off, Bolivar and Jackson would easily fall, and then, upon the arrival of the exchange prisoners of war, West Tennessee would soon be in our possession, and communication with General Bragg effected through Middle Tennessee. The attack on Corinth was a military necessity, requiring prompt and vigorous action. It was being strengthened daily under that astute soldier, General Rosecrans; convalescents were returning to fill his ranks; new levies were arriving to increase his brigades, and fortifications were being constructed at new points, and it was very evident that unless a sudden and vigorous blow could be struck there at once, no hope could be entertained of driving the enemy from a base of operations so convenient; that in the event of misfortune to Bragg, in Kentucky, the whole valley of the Mississippi would be lost to us before winter. To have waited for the arrival, arming, clothing, and organization of the exchanged prisoners would have been to wait for the enemy to strengthen themselves more than we could possibly do. With these reflections, and after mature deliberation, I determined to attempt Corinth. I had a reasonable hope of success. Field returns at Ripley showed my strength to be about twenty-two thousand men. Rosecrans at Corinth had about fifteen thousand, with about eight thousand additional men at outposts, from twelve to fifteen miles distant. I might surprise him and carry the place before these troops could be brought in. I therefore marched towards Pocahontas, threatening Bolivar, then turned suddenly across the Hatchie and Tuscumbia and attacked Corinth without hesitation, and did surprise that place before the outpost garrisons were called in. It was necessary that this blow should be sudden and decisive, and if unsuccessful, that I should withdraw rapidly from the position between the two armies of Ord and Rosecrans. The troops were in fine spirits, and the whole Army of West Tennessee seemed eager to emulate the armies of the Potomac and of Kentucky. No army every marched to battle with prouder steps, more hopeful countenances, or with more courage than marched the Army of Tennessee out of Ripley, on the morning of the twenty-ninth day of September, on its way to Corinth. Fully alive to the responsibility of my position as commander of the army, and after mature and deliberate reflection, the march was ordered. The ground was well known to me, and required no study to determine where to make the attack. The bridge over the Hatchie was soon reconstructed, and the army crossed at four o'clock A. M., on the second of October. Adams' brigade of cavalry was left to guard this approach to our rear, and to protect the train which was parked between the Hatchie and Tuscumbia. Colonel Hawkins' regiment of infantry, and Captain Dawson's battery of artillery, were also left in the Boneyard road, in easy supporting distance of the bridge. The army bivouacked at Chewalla, after the driving in of some pickets from that vicinity by Armstrong's and Jackson's cavalry. This point is about ten miles from Corinth.

At daybreak on the third the march was resumed, the precaution having been taken to cut the railroad between Corinth and Jackson with a squadron of Armstrong's cavalry. Lovell's division in front kept the road on the south side of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Price, after marching on the same road about five miles, turned to the left, crossing the railroad, and formed line of battle in front of the outer line of intrenchments, and about three miles from Corinth. Lovell formed line of battle, after some heavy skirmishing (having to construct a passage across the dry bed of Indian Creek for his artillery, under fire), on the right and in front of the same line of intrenchments.

The following was the first order of battle: The three brigades of Lovell's division, Villepigue's, Bowen's, and Rust's in line, with reserve in rear of each; Jackson's cavalry brigade on the right in echelon. The left flank of the division on the Charleston Railroad. Price's corps on the left, with the right flank resting on the same road, Maury's division on the right, with Moore's and Phifer's brigade in line; Cabell's in reserve. Hebert's division on the left, with

Gates and Martin's brigade in line; Colbert's in reserve. Armstrong's cavalry brigade on the extreme left, somewhat detached and out of view. Hebert's left was masked behind a timbered bridge, with orders not to bring it into action until the last moment. This was done in hopes of inducing the enemy to weaken his right by reinforcing his centre and left, where the attack was first to be made, that his right might be forced.

At ten o'clock all skirmishers were driven into the intrenchments, and the two armies were in line of battle, confronting each other in force. A belt of fallen timber, or abatis, about four hundred yards in width, extended along the whole line of intrenchments. This was to be crossed. The attacked commenced on the right by Lovell's division, and extended gradually to the left, and by half-past ten o'clock the whole line of outer works was carried, several pieces of artillery being taken. The enemy made several ineffectual efforts to hold their ground, forming line of battle at advantageous points, and resisting obstinately our advance to the second line of detached works. I had been in hopes that one day's operations would end the contest, and decide who should be the victors on this bloody field; but a ten miles' march over a parched country, on dusty roads, without water, getting into line of battle in forests with undergrowth, and the more than usual activity and determined courage displayed by the enemy, commanded by one of the ablest Generals of the United States army, who threw all possible obstacles in our way that an active mind could suggest, prolonged the battle until I saw with regret the sun sink behind the horizon as the last shot of our sharpshooters followed the retreating foe into their innermost lines. One hour more of daylight, and victory would have soothed our grief for the loss of the gallant dead who sleep on that lost but not dishonored field. The army slept on their arms within six hundred yards of Corinth, victorious so far.

During the night three batteries were ordered to take position on the ridge overlooking the town from the west, just where the hills dip into the flat extending into the railroad depot, with instructions to open on the town at four o'clock A. M. Hebert on the left was ordered to mass part of his division on his left; to put Cabell's brigade in echelon on the left also (Cabell's brigade being detached from Murray's division for this purpose); to move Armstrong's cavalry brigade across the Mobile and Ohio railroad, and, if possible, to get some of his artillery in position across the road. In this order of battle he was directed to attack at daybreak with his whole force, swinging his left flank in towards Corinth, and advance down the Purdy ridge. Lovell on the extreme right with two of his brigades in line of battle, and one in reserve, with Jackson's cavalry on the extreme right on College Hill, his left flank resting on the Memphis and Charleston railroad, was ordered to await in this order, or to feel his way along slowly with his sharpshooters until Hebert was heavily engaged with the enemy on the left. He was then to move rapidly to the assault, and force his right inwards across the low grounds south-west of the town. The centre, under Maury, was to move at the same time quickly to the front, and directly at Corinth. Jackson was directed to burn the railroad bridge over the Tuscumbia, during the night. Daylight came, and there was no attack on the left. A staff officer was sent to Hebert to inquire the cause. That officer could not be found.

Another messenger was sent, and a third; and about seven o'clock General Hebert came to my headquarters and reported sick. General Price then put Brigadier-General Green in command of the left wing; and it was eight o'clock before the proper dispositions for the attack at this point were made. In the mean time the troops of Maury's left became engaged with the enemy's sharpshoooters, and the battle was brought on, and extended along the whole centre and left wing, and I regretted to observe that my whole plan of attack was, by this unfortunate delay, disarranged. One brigade after another went gallantly into the action, and pushing forward through direct and cross-fire, over every obstacle, reached Corinth, and planted their colors on the last stronghold of the enemy. A hand to hand contest was being enacted in the very yard of General Rosecrans' headquarters, and in the streets of the town. The heavy guns were silenced, and all seemed about to be ended when a heavy fire from fresh troops from Iuka, Burnsville, and Rienzi, that had succeeded in reaching Corinth in time, poured into our thinned ranks. Exhausted from loss of sleep, wearied from hard marching and fighting, companies in regiments without officers, our troops (let no one censure them) gave way. The day was lost! Lovell's division was at this time advancing pursuant to orders, and was on the point of assaulting the works when he received my orders to throw one of his brigades (Villepigue's) rapidly to the centre to cover the broken ranks thrown back from Corinth, and to prevent a sortie. He then moved his whole division to the left and was soon afterwards ordered to move slowly back, and take position on Indian Creek, and prevent the enemy from turning our flank. The centre and left were withdrawn on the same road on which they approached, and being somewhat in confusion on account of loss of officers, fatigue, thirst, want of sleep, thinned ranks, and the nature of the ground, Villepigue's brigade was brought in opportunely and covered the road to Chewalla. Lovell came in the rear of the whole army, and all bivouacked again at Chewalla. No enemy disturbed the sleep of the weary troops. During the night I had a bridge constructed over the Tuscumbia, and sent Armstrong's and Jackson's cavalry, with a battery of artillery, to seize and hold Rienzi until the army came up, intending to march to and hold that point, but after consultation with General Price, who repre-

sented his troops to be somewhat disorganized, it was deemed advisable to return by the same road we came, and fall back towards Ripley and Oxford. Anticipating that the Bolivar force would move out, and dispute my passage across the Hatchie bridge, I pushed rapidly on to that point, in hopes of reaching and securing the bridge before their arrival; but I soon learned, by couriers from Colonel Wirt Adams, that I would be too late. I nevertheless pushed on with the intention of engaging the enemy until I could get my train and reserve artillery unparked and on the Boneyard road to the crossing at Crumb's Mills (this road branches off south from the State-line road, about two and a half miles west of the Tuscumbia bridge, running south or up the Hatchie). No contest of long duration could be made here, as it was evident that the army of Corinth would soon make its appearance on our right flank and rear. The trains and reserve artillery were, therefore immediately ordered on the Boneyard road, and orders were sent to Armstrong and Jackson to change their direction, and cover the front and flank of the trains until they crossed the Hatchie, and then to cover them in front until they were on the Ripley road. The enemy were then engaged beyond the Hatchie bridge by small fragments of Maury's division as they could be hastened up, and were kept in check sufficiently long to get everything off. General Ord commanded the forces of the enemy, and succeeded in getting into position before any number of our travel-worn troops could be got into line of battle. It is not surprising, therefore, that they were driven back across the bridge, but they maintained their position on the hills overlooking it, under their gallant leader, General Price, until orders were sent to fall back and take up their line of march on the Boneyard road, in rear of the whole train. At one time, fearing that the enemy, superior in numbers to the whole force I had in advance of the train, would drive us back, I ordered General Lovell to leave one brigade to guard the reserve to Tuscumbia bridge, and to push forward with the other two to the front. This order was quickly executed, and very soon the splendid brigades of Rust and Villepigue made their appearance close at hand.

The army corps of General Price was withdrawn, and Villepigue filed in and took position as rear guard to the army against Ord's forces. Rust was ordered forward to report to General Price, who was directed to cross the Hatchie at Crumb's mills, and take position to cover the crossing of the teams and artillery. Bowen was left at Tuscumbia Bridge, as a rear guard against the advance of Rosecrans from Corinth, with orders to defend that bridge until the trains were unparked and on the road. Then to cross the bridge and burn it, and to join Villepigue at the junction of the roads. In the execution of this order, and whilst in position near the bridge, the head of the Corinth army made its appearance and engaged him, but was repulsed with heavy loss, and in a manner that reflected great credit on General Bowen and his brigade. The army was not again molested on its retreat to Ripley, nor on its march to this place. The following was found to be our loss in the severest conflicts with the enemy, and on the march to and from Corinth, viz.: killed, 594; wounded, 2,162; prisoners and missing, 2,102. One piece of artillery was driven in the night by a mistake into the enemy's lines and captured. Four pieces were taken at the Hatchie bridge, the horses being shot. Nine wagons were upset and abandoned by teamsters on the night's march to Crumb's mills. Some baggage was thrown out of the wagons, not amounting to any serious loss.

Two pieces of artillery were captured from the enemy at Corinth by General Lovell's division, one of which was brought off. Five pieces were also taken by General Price's corps, two of which were brought off. Thus making a loss to us of only two pieces. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded, by their own accounts, was over three thousand. We took over three hundred prisoners. Most of the prisoners taken from us were the stragglers from the army on the retreat.

The retreat from Corinth was not a rout, as it has been industriously represented by the enemy, and by the cowardly deserters from the army. The division of General Lovell formed line of battle, facing the rear, on several occasions, when it was reported the enemy was near; but not a gun was fired after the army retired from the Hatchie and Tuscumbia bridges. Nor did the enemy follow, except at a respectful distance. Although many officers and soldiers who distinguished themselves in the battle of Corinth, and in the affair of Hatchie bridge, came under my personal observations, I will not mention them to the exclusion of others, who may have been equally deserving, but who did not fall under my own eye. I have deemed it best to call on the different commanders to furnish me a special report, and a list of the names of the officers and soldiers of their respective commands who deserve special mention. These lists and special reports I will take pleasure in forwarding, together with one of my own, when completed; and I respectfully request that they may be appended as part of my report. I cannot refrain, however, from mentioning here the conspicuous gallantry of a noble Texian, whose deeds at Corinth are the constant theme of both friends and foes. As long as courage, manliness, fortitude, patriotism, and honor exist, the name of Rogers will be revered and honored among men. He fell in the front of the battle and died beneath the colors of his regiment, in the very centre of the enemy's stronghold. He sleeps, and glory is his sentence.

The attempt at Corinth has failed, and in consequence I am condemned, and have been superceded in my command. In my zeal for my country, I may have ventured too far with in-

adequate means, and I bow to the opinion of the people whom I serve. Yet I feel if the spirits of the gallant dead who now lie beneath the batteries of Corinth, see and judge the motives of men, they do not rebuke me, for there is no sting in my conscience. Nor does retrospection admonish me of error or of a disregard of their valued lives.

Very respectfully, sir, I am,
Your obedient servant,
EARL VAN DORN,
Major-General.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL PRICE.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE WEST,
HOLLY SPRINGS, October 20, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this army, connected with the several engagements at Corinth and Davis' bridge, of the third, fourth, and fifth instants. Having arranged with Major-General Van Dorn to unite my forces with his for active operations, I joined him at Ripley on the twenty-seventh ultimo. My force at this time consisted of effective infantry, 10,498; effective cavalry, 2,437; effective artillery, 928 men and forty-four guns, including two twenty-four-pounder howitzers and four rifled pieces of three and five-eighths calibre. The infantry was divided into two divisions, commanded by Brigadier-Generals Maury and Hebert. Maury's division consisted of three brigades, commanded by Brigadier-General Moore and Acting Brigadier-Generals Cabell and Phifer. Hebert's division consisted of four brigades, commanded by Brigadier-General Green and Colonels Martin, Gates, and Colbert. The cavalry, except such companies as were on detached service, was under command of Acting Brigadier-General Armstrong. The artillery was apportioned as follows, with Maury's division: Hoxton's battery, Lieutenant Tobin commanding; Bledsoe's battery; McNally's battery, Lieutenant Moore commanding; Lucas' battery, and Sengstack's battery; Hoxton's and Brown's battery; Sengstack's batteries were held as reserves, under command of Lieutenant Burnett, acting Chief of Artillery of the division. With Hebert's division were Wade's, Landis', Guibo's, Dawson's, and King's. The cavalry force, under General Armstrong, reported to the Major-General commanding the combined forces, and afterwards acted under orders direct from him.

On the morning of the thirtieth ultimo we took up the line of march in the direction of Pocahontas, which place we reached on the first instant, and from which we moved upon the enemy at Corinth, bivouacking on the night of the second instant at a point nearly opposite to Chewalla—having left one regiment of infantry and a section of artillery with the wagon train as a guard. At four o'clock on the morning of the third instant, we resumed the march; my command moving on the main Pocahontas and Corinth road, in rear of General Lovell's. At a point about a mile and a half from the enemy's outer line of fortifications, my command made a detour to the left, with instructions to occupy the ground between the Memphis and Charleston and Mobile and Ohio Railroads. This done, my line, Maury occupying the right and Hebert the left, with Cabell's and Colbert's brigades in reserve, fronted the enemy's works in a south-easterly direction, the right resting upon the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. While these dispositions were making General Lovell engaged the enemy upon our right; all being now ready for the attack, my line was ordered forward at about ten o'clock A. M. Almost simultaneously with the movement the opposed armies became engaged in a desperate conflict along the whole extent of my line. My command had scarcely cleared the position of its first formation, when entering an abatis of more than three hundred yards it became unmasked before a position naturally exceedingly formidable, and rendered trebly so by the extent of felled timber through which it must be approached; and the most improved and scientifically constructed intrenchment, bristling with artillery of large calibre, and supported by heavy lines of infantry. My troops charged the enemy's position with the most determined courage, exposed to a murderous fire of musketry and artillery. Without faltering they pressed forward over every obstacle, and with shouts and cheers carried, in less than twenty minutes, the entire line of works; the enemy having fled, leaving in our hands many prisoners and two pieces of artillery—one a four inch Parrott gun, the other a twenty-four-pounder howitzer. Our loss in this attack was comparatively small. This is attributable to the impetuosity with which the charge was made and the works carried. It becomes my painful duty, in this connection, to revert to the distinguished services of two gallant officers who fell in this engagement: Colonel John D. Martin, commanding a Brigade of Mississippians, and Lieutenant Samuel Farrington, of Wade's battery. Colonel Martin fell mortally wounded while leading the charge against an angle in the enemy's works, exposed to the fire of enfilading batteries. The gallant bearing of this officer upon more than one bloody field had won for him a place in the heart of every Mississippian and the admiration and confidence of his superior officers. Lieutenant Farrington was struck and instantly killed by a shot from a rifled gun, while bringing one of the guns of his battery into position. This gallant soldier and courteous and chivalrous gentleman, forgetful of personal interest and mindful of the necessities of the service only, resigned a Lieutenant-Colonelcy in the service of his State for a Lieutenancy in the Confederate service, and gave up his life a glorious sacrifice upon the altar of his country's honor, in the seventh of the battles in which he has been conspicuous for cool, determined, and effective bravery. Though young, his country mourns no more valiant defender, his command no abler commander, his friends

no worthier recipient of their affection. The outer works being in our possession my line moved forward in pursuit of the retreating enemy until within about one mile of Corinth, where the enemy was encountered in position and in force. The necessary disposition being made, my whole line again moved forward to the attack at about three o'clock P. M. Here the fighting was of unparalleled fierceness along the whole extent of my line. The position of the enemy along the entire length of his lines was covered by fencing, heavy timber, or underbrush; while portions of my troops advanced through open fields exposed to a deadly fire of batteries, operating over the enemy's line of infantry. Here, as in the assault upon the outer works, we had little artillery in action, it being impossible to procure such positions for my batteries as would enable them to co-operate effectively with the infantry. After continuous and most desperate fighting along the whole extent of my line, of nearly two hours' duration, the enemy, notwithstanding his lines had been trebled by reinforcements, was driven from his positions and forced to take refuge in his innermost works in and around the town.

The troops of my command having nearly exhausted their ammunition in the heavy fighting through the day, were withheld from immediate pursuit, and the delay in procuring the necessary supply of ammunition forced me to close the fight for the day. My troops were withdrawn for cover, and laid on their arms during the night, in the position from which the enemy had been driven. About four o'clock on the morning of the fourth, three batteries of my command were placed in position and opened fire upon the town, under the immediate orders of the Major-General commanding. About daylight orders were received to advance my whole line. In the execution of this order a delay was occasioned by the illness of Brigadier-General Hebert, commanding a division. He was necessarily relieved from duty. The command devolved upon Brigadier-General Green, who moved forward as soon as he could make the necessary disposition of his troops. It was after nine o'clock when my line became generally and furiously engaged with the enemy in his innermost and most formidable works, from which his infantry and artillery could jointly operate against my troops. Here, as in the previous actions, my artillery could not be effectively brought into action, and but few of the guns were engaged. The fighting, by my command, was almost entirely confined to the infantry. My men pressed forward upon the enemy, and with heavy loss succeeded in getting into the works, having driven him from them, capturing more than forty pieces of artillery, and forcing him to take refuge in the houses of the town, and in every place that would afford protection from our galling fire. He was followed and driven from house to house with great slaughter. In the town were batteries in mask, supported by heavy reserves, behind which the retreating enemy took shelter, and which opened upon our troops a most destructive fire at short range. My men held their positions most gallantly, returning the fire of the enemy with great spirit until portions of them exhausted their ammunition and were compelled to retire. This necessitated the withdrawal of the whole line, which was done under a withering fire. The attack was not resumed, and we fell back to our supply train, the men being almost exhausted from exertion and want of food and water. General Villepigue's brigade moved over to our assistance, but did not become engaged, as the enemy was too badly cut up to follow us. We fell back in order to obtain water, some six miles from Corinth, where we bivouacked for the night, bringing off all our artillery and arms save one rifled piece, which had been inadvertently driven into the enemy's line while going into battery before daylight in the morning, and had been left. We brought off, also, the two guns captured at the outer line of fortifications on the third. It is impossible for me to do justice to the courage of my troops in these engagements, nor can I discriminate between officers and commands where all behaved so nobly. This is the less necessary, as the operations of my command were under the immediate observation of the Major-General commanding. For minute details of the actions, and particularly of the artillery, of the third and fourth instants, as well as for instances of personal and distinguished gallantry, I beg leave to refer the Major-General commanding to the reports of commanding officers herewith enclosed. On the morning of the fifth instant we resumed the march in the direction of Pocahontas, my command moving by division. Maury's in front, each in rear of its ordnance and supply train, except Moore's brigade, which constituted the advance guard. After crossing the Tuscumbia, Moore's brigade was hurried forward to protect Davis' bridge across the Hatchie, which was threatened by an advance of the enemy. It being found that the enemy was in force, the remainder of Maury's division was ordered forward, and finally I was ordered to move up the whole of my command. Moore's brigade, with a section of the St. Louis battery, and Sengstack's battery, were thrown across the Hatchie, but the enemy having possession of the heights commanding the crossing, as well as the position in which these troops were placed, and it being found that he was in very heavy force, it was deemed advisable to cross the Hatchie by another road, and these troops were withdrawn after serious loss to the east side of the Hatchie, where, being joined by Cabell's and Phifer's brigades, and assisted by the batteries of McNally, Hogg, Landis, and Tobin, they effectually checked the advance of the enemy. Green's divisions, which had been delayed by passing the wagon train that had unparked near the Tuscumbia, arriving on the ground, was formed in line of battle, but the enemy making no further effort to advance, the whole of my command was moved

off by another route, General Lovell's command being in our rear.

This was our last engagement with the enemy. In this last engagement we lost four guns, occasioned by the killing of horses. Our whole wagon train came off without molestation or loss, except of a few wagons that were broken down, and had to be abandoned.

The history of the war contains no bloodier page, perhaps, than that which will record this fiercely contested battle. The strongest expressions fall short of my admiration of the gallant conduct of the officers and men under my command. Words cannot add lustre to the fame they have acquired through deeds of noble daring, which, living through future time, will shed about every man, officer and soldier, who stood to his arms through this struggle, a halo of glory as imperishable as it is brilliant.

They have won to their sisters and daughters the distinguished honor, set before them by a General of their love and admiration, upon the event of an impending battle upon the same fields, of the proud exclamation, "My brother, father, was at the great battle of Corinth." The bloodiest record of this battle is to come. The long list of the gallant dead upon this field will carry sorrow to the hearthstone of many a noble champion of our cause, as it does to the hearts of those who are to avenge them. A nation mourns their loss, while it cherishes the story of their glorious death, pointing out to their associate officers in this mighty struggle for liberty the pathway to victory and honor. They will live ever in the hearts of the admiring people of the government, for the establishment of which they have given their lives. Of the field officers killed, were Colonel Rogers, Second Texas infantry, who fell in the heart of the town, of eleven wounds; Johnson, of Twentieth Arkansas, and Daly, of the Eighteenth Arkansas; Lieutenant-Colonels Maupin, First Missouri cavalry, dismounted, and Leigh, Forty-third Mississippi; Majors Vaughan, Sixth Missouri infantry; Doudell, Twenty-first Arkansas, and McDonald, Fortieth Mississippi. Many of my ablest and most gallant field officers are wounded, several mortally. Of this number are Colonels Erwin, Sixth Missouri infantry; Macfarland, Fourth Missouri infantry; Pritchard, Third Missouri infantry; Moore, Forty-third Mississippi, and McLean, Thirty-seventh Mississippi; Lieutenant-Colonels Pixler, Sixteenth Arkansas; Hedgespeth, Sixth Missouri infantry; Serrell, Seventh Mississippi battalion; Lanier, Forty-second Alabama; Hobson, Third Arkansas cavalry; Matthews, Twenty-first Arkansas; Campbell, Fortieth Mississippi, and Boone; and Majors Senteney, Second Missouri infantry; Keirn, Thirty-eighth Mississippi; Staton, Thirty-seventh Alabama; Timmins, Second Texas; Jones, Twenty-first Arkansas; Russell, Third Louisiana, and Yates; and McQuiddy, Third Missouri cavalry. For other casualties in officers and men, I beg leave to refer to lists enclosed. I cannot close this report without recognizing the eminent services and valuable assistance of Brigadier-Generals Maury, Hebert, (whose services I regret to have lost on the morning of the fourth, by reason of his illness), and Green, commanding divisions. I bear willing testimony to the admirable coolness, undaunted courage, and military skill of these officers in disposing their respective commands, and in executing their orders. Through them I transmit to Brigadier-General Moore, and acting Brigadier-Generals Cabell, Phifer, Gates, and Colbert, my high appreciation of their efficient services on the field.

Their skill in manœuvring their troops, and promptness and gallantry in leading them through the most desperate conflicts, elicit my highest admiration. And of my troops as a body, I can say no juster or more complimentary words than that they have sustained and deepened and widened their reputation for exalted patriotism and determined valor.

To my personal staff I return my thanks for their promptness in the delivery of my orders, and their gallant bearing on the field.

All of which is respectfully submitted,

STERLING PRICE,
Major-General.

Major M. M. KIMMEL,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of West Tennessee.

MAJOR-GENERAL M. LOVELL'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION
ARMY OF DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI,
HOLLY SPRINGS, October 13, 1862.

Major M. M. Kimmel, Assistant Adjutant-General:

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my division in the recent operations around Corinth. On the second instant the division repaired and crossed the Tuscumbia bridge, fifteen miles from Corinth, and moved forward, the cavalry under Armstrong and Jackson in advance. We moved to Chewalla, skirmishing lightly with the enemy several hours, and occupied the camp just abandoned, capturing some tents, quartermaster's and commissary's stores. On the third we moved forward, Villepigue's brigade in advance, skirmishing more heavily with a force of the enemy composed of two regiments of infantry, a section of artillery, and some cavalry, until we drove them across Indian Creek. At this point artillery fire became more frequent. Here we took an abandoned twelve-pounder howitzer. The bridge was repaired, under fire, and I crossed the whole division, consisting of Rust's brigade on the right, Bowen's in the centre, and Villepigue's on the left. The enemy occupied with his artillery a high hill at the crossing of the State line road with the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, with rifle-pits extending north and south, affording, with the hill, a strong position for about three thousand five hundred men. The skirmishers were there reinforced, and the whole line ordered to the assault, with reserve behind each brigade. The conflict was short and bloody. Our troops, emerging from the dense under-

growth, rushed upon the hill and rifle-pits with the most determined gallantry, routed and drove off the enemy, causing them in their hasty retreat to abandon a twenty-pounder Parrott gun and caisson, with the limber of another gun. In this assault the following regiments are named as particularly distinguishing themselves, viz.: the Ninth Arkansas, Colonel Dunlop, and Third Kentucky, Colonel Thompson, of Rust's brigade; the Twenty-second Mississippi, Captain Lester commanding; Caruthers' Mississippi battalion, and the First Missouri regiment, Colonel Riley, of Bowen's brigade; and the Third Mississippi, Colonel Hurst, of Villepigue's brigade. The hill was carried mainly by the Ninth Arkansas and Twenty-second Mississippi, each vieing with the other in the dashing gallantry of their charge. The enemy's camps, half a mile beyond the position, were taken and held by the First Missouri regiment. Rust and Villepigue were thrown in advance, in line of battle, and Bowen's was posted on the hill until we should hear from Price's command, on our left. On our right front was a strong redoubt well flanked with infantry and with an abatis of felled timber, half a mile in width, extending around it in one direction, but with no obstructions to the north, in the direction of Price's right. This fact I communicated to the Major-General commanding, and shortly afterwards the work was attacked and gallantly carried, from its right rear, by Moore's brigade, while Bowen was ordered to turn its left with his brigade from our side. Having replenished our ammunition, the whole division was moved forward and formed in line of battle on the bridge south of the railroad, Villepigue and Bowen in front and Rust in reserve. I received orders from the General commanding to move forward cautiously, feeling our way along the ridge to develop the position of the enemy.

Before advancing far, night put an end to the operations of an arduous and fatiguing, but glorious day.

In the night I was notified by the commanding General that early in the morning Price would open with a large battery of artillery and then attack in force with his left, and that while thus engaged my division should pass forward and attack with vigor on our right. Accordingly, at daylight, the division was moved forward, in line, along the ridge, for a mile and a half, with some very heavy firing of infantry on Villepigue's left, and artillery on Bowen's right. Rust, hitherto in reserve, moved up and occupied the centre, the line advancing until within a few hundred yards of two strong works of nine guns each, protected by heavy infantry forces. While reconnoitring these positions, with a view to the assault, I received an order from the commanding General to detach my strongest brigade to the support of Price's centre, which was being overpowered by large reinforcements of the enemy. This order was obeyed, and I was about to move the remaining brigades to the left, to close the gap made by detaching Villepigue, when the further order was received to retire, covering the retreat of the army. The division was withdrawn from under the very guns of the works without the slightest confusion, and in the most excellent order. Villepigue crossed the railroad, and with his artillery, under Major Watts, put an effectual check upon the pursuit by the enemy's cavalry.

Rust's brigade was put in position on the hill carried the day before, until everything had been withdrawn across Indian Creek, when he followed, bringing up the rear to Chewalla, where the division was reunited. The march was resumed on the fifth, this command acting as the rear guard to the army. Before reaching Tuscumbia bridge an order was received from the General commanding to press forward, with two brigades, to the support of Price, who was checked by large reinforcements of fresh troops at Hatchie bridge. Leaving Bowen's brigade as a rear guard on the Corinth road, Villepigue and Rust were pushed forward rapidly. The former, arriving first, was put in line of battle on the road to Hatchie bridge, to hold the enemy in check in that direction, while Rust was directed to proceed with General Price, in advance, to the crossing at Crumb's Mills, where it was decided to pass the army over.

Villepigue held the enemy back with skirmishers. Bowen, however, was attacked in force, on the other road, but repelled the attack, with great slaughter to the enemy and but little loss to his own command. They were clear from the field when he crossed the Tuscumbia and burned the bridge, all the wagons having been passed over in safety. The Fifteenth Mississippi distinguished itself particularly on this occasion. From the Hatchie to Hickory Flat (forty miles) this division continued as the rear guard to the army, frequently forming line of battle when the enemy was reported to be coming too near, cheerfully toiling along through heat and dust and undergoing long marches, loss of sleep, and want of food, with a fortitude worthy of the most unqualified admiration. Good order, discipline, and subordination suffered no detriment under this severe and trying ordeal.

To the commanders of brigades, Generals Rust, Villepigue, and Bowen, my thanks are especially due. Displaying their well-known and approved gallantry on the field, they evinced sound judgment, discretion, and ability in handling their troops, both in action and on the march, achieving signal success with small loss. The admirable condition in which the division returned to this point is the best proof of their merits. Surgeon Hawes, chief medical officer of the division, performed his duties quietly, systematically, and with the utmost efficiency. Our wounded, with very few exceptions, were brought to this depot. My thanks are due to the officers of my staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Ivy, Captain Toutant, and Captain Quitman, for their assistance in the field, and in the conduct of the retreat. Being few in number, additional labor devolved upon them. Their duties were per-

formed cheerfully, coolly, and with a deliberate gallantry which caused me to repose the greatest confidence in them. The following named commanders of regiments are mentioned particularly by their brigade commanders for their courage and efficiency: Captain Ashford, Thirty-fifth Alabama; Colonel Dunlop, Ninth Arkansas; Captain Lester, Twenty-second Mississippi; Colonel Riley, First Missouri; Colonel Hurst, Thirty-third Missouri; Colonel Shelby, Thirty-ninth Mississippi. For the names of other officers who particularly distinguished themselves, you are respectfully referred to the reports of the brigade commanders herewith transmitted. Colonel Jackson, commanding cavalry brigade, acted under my orders during a portion of the time, always displaying a coolness, courage, and efficiency for which he has heretofore been remarkable. The loss in my command, during the operations, was seventy-seven killed, two hundred and eighty-five wounded, and about two hundred missing.

Respectfully submitted,

M. LOVELL,
Major-General, commanding.

Report of Killed, Wounded, and Missing in First Division of the Army of West Tennessee, near Corinth, Miss., on third, fourth, and fifth October, 1862.

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
First Brigade, General Rust.....	25	117	83
Second " " Villepigue.	21	76	71
Third " " Bowen....	26	92	40
Cavalry " Colonel Jackson....	1	....	....
Battalion of Zouaves, Maj. Dupiere.	2	....	14
Totals.....	77	285	208

RECAPITULATION.

Killed.....	77
Wounded.....	285
Missing.....	208
Grand total.....	570

HOLLY SPRINGS, MISS., October 15, 1862.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL RUST.

HEADQUARTERS, FIRST BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI, HOLLY SPRINGS, October 13, 1862.

COLONEL: In response to Major-General Lovell's circular of this date, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my brigade near Corinth, on the second, third, and fourth inst. Moving from the Hatchie on Thursday, the second, my brigade in advance, when within eight miles of Corinth our cavalry came up with the enemy, and reported his presence. In obedience to orders I immediately formed my brigade in line of battle, and threw forward two companies of the Ninth Arkansas as skirmishers. Advancing rapidly, encountering no opposition except a few straggling shots which were not responded to, we came directly upon an abandoned camp of the enemy, in which were a redoubt or two, and some rifle-pits. These were all abandoned, and after passing them, without halting an instant, some half mile or more, we were ordered to bivouac in line of battle. At four o'clock on the morning of the third, the division moved, General Villepigue in front, towards Corinth. When within three miles of the town, General Villepigue's skirmishers encountered those of the enemy. This was on the extreme right of the line adopted by the General commanding the division. This being my position, I immediately formed my men in front of the supposed position of the enemy, relieving General Villepigue. Major Gibson was ordered to deploy his (Fourth Alabama) battalion as skirmishers, which order was promptly executed. The Ninth Arkansas, Colonel Dunlop, was on my left, and Third Kentucky, Colonel Thompson, on my right. The Seventh Kentucky, under Colonel Crosslove, was held in reserve.

These dispositions being made, an advance was ordered. Colonel Thompson on the extreme right, with a considerable interval between his regiment and the balance of the brigade, was purposely put in motion a short time before the other regiments were ordered forward. In a very short time the skirmishers of the opposing forces engaged each other. The engagement soon became general. On the right the firing between Colonel Thompson, Third Kentucky, and what was supposed to be two regiments of the enemy, posted on the south side of the M. & C. R. R. was extremely animated. While following up the Ninth Arkansas and Thirty-first and Thirty-fifth Alabama regiments in the direction whence came terrific volleys of shell, grape, and canister, I sent a staff officer to Colonel Thompson to know if he could continue to advance against the apparent odds opposed to him. He was pressing steadily forward, but was apprehensive his right might be turned. I instantly ordered the reserve regiment, Seventh Kentucky, to his support. Officers and men seemed impatient for the order, and rushed impetuously forward, but only reached the scene of conflict to witness the flight of the enemy from it. Meanwhile the left wing advanced through a heavy fire of artillery and musketry towards the enemy's battery and the infantry that (behind trenches) supported it. The dense forest through which we passed, while it lasted, was a partial protection. As we emerged from it with an unbroken line, in full view of the enemy in its strong position, beyond a deep cut in the railroad, not more than sixty yards distant in a straight line, the officers and men were subjected to a test that it is rarely the lot of soldiers to undergo. They were equal to the occasion.

MAJ. GEN. DON CARLOS BUELL.

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in a very short time it was announced by the Major-General commanding, that our friends on the left had been compelled to give way and abandon the field, and I was ordered to fall back while his comrades were falling thick and fast around him. When all behaved so well, the commanding General will not hazard injustice by mentioning those who particularly attracted

For a moment it appeared that the entire line would be swept away. The gaps that the enemy's artillery ploughed through the ranks were closed up with the coolness and steadiness of veterans of a hundred fields. On my left, Captain D. H. Norwood, and Lieutenants Kennebrow and Moore fell, killed, and Lieutenants Ken and Baily, of the Ninth Arkansas regiment, wounded, while on my right Captain Fulton was killed, and Captain Mitchell and Lieutenants Hunter, Lawler, and Collice, of the Thirty-fifth Alabama regiment, were severely wounded, bravely leading, and by their example inspiring their men with their own unquailing courage. In a few seconds I here lost over a hundred men and officers. To have halted or hesitated would have brought certain destruction upon my command. I ordered bayonets fixed and a charge made upon the battery. The order was obeyed with cheers and yells, and by making a detour to the left, to avoid the deep cut in the railroad, the Ninth Arkansas was soon in possession of the enemy's strong position (we had assaulted and taken one fine gun which the enemy was unable to get off), closely followed by the Thirty-fifth Alabama, under Colonel Crump. After advancing some three hundred yards down the railroad, I halted and formed my men and marched again to the south side of the railroad, and remained in position until a fort and large camp in front of us was evacuated, in consequence of a most determined attack by a portion of General Price's command, on their rear. Late in the evening I was ordered forward, and bivouacked in line of battle in the midst of the forts and camps of the enemy, and inside of an abattis which extended entirely around their exterior line of defence.

On the morning of Saturday, the fourth, the whole division advanced in line of battle towards the fortifications of the enemy on College Hill; General Villepigue on the left, General Bowen on the right, in front, and my own brigade following close in the rear, as a reserve, to support either or both as occasion might require. When within two or three hundred yards of several forts behind which long lines of infantry behind formidable looking breastworks, with abattis again in front, were plainly visible. The enemy opened a most rapid fire from their artillery, which my entire command sustained with the most gratifying steadiness, not an officer or man leaving his position or exhibiting, so far as I could perceive, the least discomposure. About nine and a half o'clock I moved my brigade to the front and left of the advance line occupied by General Bowen, who was ordered far to the right, and General Villepigue was withdrawn to reinforce a portion of General Price's line, which, after the most stubborn and heroic resistance to greatly superior numbers, of what was afterwards known to be fresh troops, was wavering. In a very short time it was announced by the Major-General commanding, that our friends on the left had been compelled to give way and abandon the field, and I was ordered to fall back to the position first taken from the enemy, near where the road from Chewalla to Corinth crosses the railroad, and there form line of battle in the most advantageous position to cover the retreat of our army. In perfect order, but as quickly as possible, I selected a line of great strength, with skirmishers displayed on a line a mile in extent and three-quarters of a mile in advance of my main line, from which I could repel an advance of the enemy upon the two roads, and the railroad leading to Corinth, and awaited the withdrawal of our forces. Remaining exactly forty minutes after Colonel Riley passed, I moved my brigade in the direction taken by our retreating columns until I came to the field hospital, where I found eight wounded soldiers, only three of whom were willing to be moved. Two of them I had carried beyond the reach of the enemy on litters, the third was able to ride on a caisson. I then continued my march without again confronting the enemy during the entire retreat. The good conduct of officers and men in performing the responsible duty of rear guard to a retreating army, cannot be too highly commended. There was not a semblance of panic or disorder, or even unusual excitement during the entire retreat, upon which my brigade marched in better order and with more deliberation than it had done at all before, or has done since. The signal good conduct which they displayed on the field of battle or in the face of dangers and death, and the fortitude and constancy with which they sustained themselves afterwards under privations and hardships and sufferings more trying to the soldier than the most appalling dangers, are, I trust, only an earnest to the country of what she may expect from them in the future. In conclusion, it is only necessary to say of the Third Kentucky, that Colonel Thompson, and the men and officers under him, fully sustained the reputation they had won on other fields. The only regret of Colonel Crosslove and his men, of the Seventh Kentucky, when ordered to the support of the Third, was that this regiment stood so little in need of it. The conduct of the Thirty-fifth Alabama, commanded by Captain Ashford, though deprived by illness of their accomplished Colonel (Robertson), could not have been improved by the presence of any officer. The Fourth Alabama battalion, under Major Gibson, deployed as skirmishers, performed well the part allotted to them. The Ninth Arkansas, under Colonel Dunlop, who was conspicuous for the activity and gallantry displayed in keeping his men in line, and moving steadily forward in the face of the deadly fire of the enemy's artillery, won the applause and admiration of all who witnessed its conduct. Its colors were borne by their intrepid Sergeant, John M. Pearce, upwards and onwards without faltering during the hottest of the fire, while his comrades were falling thick and fast around him. When all behaved so well, the commanding General will not hazard injustice by mentioning those who particularly attracted

his notice. I regret that a sense of duty to the service and of justice to the balance of the brigade, will not allow me to bestow the same unmixed praise upon the Thirty-first Alabama regiment. A portion of this regiment, in spite of the gallantry of their Colonel and his efforts to make them do their duty, following the example of some of its commissioned officers, behaved disgracefully. At a most critical moment it broke in disorder and all efforts to restore it were unavailing. I called the attention of their Colonel to the misconduct of several officers, whose example was evidently demoralizing to the men, and ordered them to surrender their swords and leave the field. Upon their earnest entreaties to be tried again, I permitted them to retain their swords and remain, with the hope and belief that hereafter their conduct may be in harmony with the brave members of the same regiments, whose conduct could not suffer by comparison with other commanders in the brigade.

I withhold their names, though there can be no controversy as to the regiments that were first in the strong position abandoned by the enemy and in possession of the Lady Richardson, which in their flight they left behind them. It is due to the right wing of General Bowen's admirable brigade, the Twenty-second Mississippi, under Lieutenant-Colonel Lester, to acknowledge that their advance upon our left and the right of the enemy's battery, attracted a portion of its fire, in concert with our advance greatly facilitated its capture, and entitles them to a full share of the honor.

I would here express my obligations to Captain Fall and Lieutenants Anderson, Ayers, and Bertrand, of my staff, for the prompt and intelligent manner in which they executed my orders. Lieutenant Sweeny, in command of the Hudson battery, attached to my brigade, had no opportunity to participate in the action, but executed quickly and cheerfully every order addressed to him.

Casualties on the field and upon the retreat, twenty-five killed, one hundred and seventeen wounded, and eighty-three missing.

The dense forest of heavy timber and thick undergrowth, under cover of which the brigade advanced until within a few rods of the enemy's battery, accounts for the comparatively small number of killed and wounded.

A. RUST,
Brigadier-General, commanding First Brigade, First Division, Army of the District of Miss.

EDWARD IVEY,
Lieutenant-Colonel and A. A. G.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN S. BOWEN.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, LOVELL'S DIVISION, HOLLY SPRINGS, October 12, 1862.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Ivey, Assistant Adjutant-General:

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith reports from my several commands in regard to the part taken by them in the actions of the third, fourth, and fifth instants, at and near Corinth. It will be seen that, passing over the deployments between Chewalla and the creek west of Corinth, where the enemy's outposts were driven in with little or no resistance, this brigade first formed line of battle to the east of Cypress Creek, with Rust's brigade on its right and Villepigue's on the left. A heavy line of skirmishers, composed of the First Missouri regiment and the Mississippi battalion of sharpshooters, proceeding in advance, supported by the Twenty-second and Fifteenth Mississippi regiment in line, and the Sixth Mississippi regiment (Colonel Lowry), and Watson battery (Captain Bursley) in reserve.

The line advanced steadily, forcing back the enemy's sharpshooters into their intrenchments, and pushing on, charged their works, capturing their battery at the salient near the railroad, and driving their entire infantry force from the trenches. Rust's and Villepigue's carrying the trenches in front of them about the same time, rendered the work comparatively easy for my brigade. The Twenty-second Mississippi regiment, Captain Lester commanding, deserves special mention for their gallant charge on this occasion. The Mississippi battalion of sharpshooters, Captain Caruthers commanding, were conspicuous for their coolness and courage, also for joining the Twenty-second Mississippi regiment in the charge in which they captured the battery. The First Missouri regiment, gathering in, charged, while deployed as skirmishers, and drove the enemy from the trenches before I could reach the position with the Fifteenth Mississippi regiment, which was advancing towards the same point. The First Missouri regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Riley commanding, proceeding onward, drove the enemy from one of their encampments nearly a mile inside of their works, holding the same, under fire, until the second line of battle was formed, towards sunset, for the attack on the right. The enemy having abandoned the works on our right, the second line, above alluded to, advanced and occupied their encampments, capturing a few stragglers in the evening. On the morning of the fourth, the brigade was formed in accordance with instructions received the night before, immediately in advance of the encampment occupied, and advanced steadily with Villepigue on its left and Rust in reserve, the whole moving together. Arriving within six hundred yards of a strong redoubt, supported on the right and left by a similar work, with a formidable line of infantry intrenched connecting them, it was halted, and after a protracted skirmish, which failed to develop the enemy's strength on the position, I determined, in absence of the Major-General commanding, to feel them more effectually and force them to show their strength. The Watson battery (four guns) was ordered to open on the works immediately in our front, and during the second round was answered by a terrific cannonade from the right,

left, and front, convincing me that the information given that there were only three guns at this point was erroneous, as I had thus developed at least twenty. The battery was ordered to the rear, and after the firing abated slightly I moved the brigade a short distance to the rear near Rust's line, in order to take advantage of the ground and save it from a repetition of the galling fire which had opened upon them.

The brigade's loss, during this shelling, was about fifty men killed and wounded, and the whole command deserves special commendation for their coolness under fire. After remaining for some time (two hours) in the new position, our skirmishers keeping up a continuous fire on our front and right, and after Villepigue had repelled the attack made on his line and moved to the left, my brigade was ordered to the rear, while Rust formed line of battle beyond, at the salient near the railroad crossing. The First Missouri regiment, deployed as skirmishers, covered the rear of both brigades. The command, after a successful evacuation, camped at Chewalla about sunset. Detailed, on the morning of the fifth, as the rear guard of the army, the brigade left its encampments, in rear of the train, at about ten A. M., marching slowly, very much annoyed and delayed by the wagons. At twelve M., the enemy's advance overtook us, and I formed line of battle with the Mississippi battalion and one section of artillery, under Lieutenant Barlow, in advance, our line then fronting the enemy. The attack was made by their cavalry and vigorously repulsed by two companies of Jackson's cavalry and the Mississippi battalion, and their rout completed by the rapid and effective fire of Lieutenant Barlow's section. Resuming the retreat we were not again molested until compelled to halt, for several hours, at the Tuscumbia River bridge, allowing the wagons to cross. The enemy arrived at our position near the bridge about sunset. Deploying, they endeavored to turn my left in order to cut me off from the bridge, at the same time advancing strongly on my front and centre. After heavy skirmishing, well maintained on both sides, and some artillery firing by the enemy, they advanced boldly in front of my centre, opposite the Fifteenth Mississippi regiment. Taking command of this regiment in person, I advanced it about fifteen paces, and then poured a deliberate, well-aimed, and simultaneous volley. This fire, which was handsomely seconded by several rounds of canister by Binley's first section under Lieutenant Toledano, on our immediate right, which enfiladed their line, followed up by a rapid, well-aimed, and continuous file fire from the Fifteenth Mississippi regiment, must have proved destructive, as the advance was not only thus checked, but their whole force fled from the field. I then crossed the Tuscumbia at my leisure, tore up and burnt the bridge, obstructed the ford near by, and joined the division about three miles beyond. My loss in the action of the Tuscumbia was two or three killed and eight or ten wounded. This brigade was subsequently detailed as the rear guard of the army, but had no other engagement with the enemy. I have the honor to transmit herewith a full list of the killed, wounded, and missing in the three days' actions alluded to. The officers of my staff were present, and untiring in the discharge of their respective duties. In addition to the assistance given by my Adjutant-General, Captain Hutchinson, my Inspector-General, Captain Percy, and Lieutenant Carter, Aide-de-Camp, I am indebted to Caldwell, of the Watson battery, for bearing orders in the field. All of these gentlemen were conspicuous for coolness and courage during the action, and on the retreat.

In closing, I would call the attention of the division commander to the unexampled courage and endurance displayed by the troops, who, under hardships and privations which can only be appreciated by those who experienced them, never faltered in the discharge of their arduous duties. The exceptions mentioned in the report of Colonel Farrel, Fifteenth Mississippi regiment, were conspicuous in a brigade which acted so well that they deserve to be immediately punished. I know of no better way of rewarding the two thousand brave men than by casting out the two or three cowards who happen to be among them. I, therefore, recommend that Second Lieutenant S. T. Clark, Company A, Fifteenth Mississippi regiment, be dismissed in disgrace, and that Corporal Bennett, and privates Applegate and Spiney, Company B, be drummed out of the service, and their names published with the sentence attached.

Very respectfully,

JOHN S. BOWEN,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL VILLEPIGUE.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION,
ARMY OF DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
October 14, 1862.

Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Ivey, Assistant Adjutant-General, First Division, Army District of the Mississippi:

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Second brigade, in the actions before Corinth, on the third and fourth instants:

In approaching Corinth on the third instant, the Second brigade was in advance. An outpost of the enemy was met about five miles from the fortress, and driven into the outer intrenchments without much opposition. On reaching a creek about three miles from the fortress, and quite near the outer intrenchments, the march of the column was delayed for some time by the enemy's artillery, and from the bridge over the creek having been destroyed. The passage, however, was effected in good time, and the brigade was engaged in heavy skirmishing with the enemy until the other brigades of the division had crossed and taken up their posi-

tions. The whole division then advanced, the Second brigade being on the extreme left. The enemy were driven steadily before us until we came in view of the outer intrenchments or rifle-pits. Our onward course was here checked for a short time, in consequence of the deadly fire of the enemy, and the nature of the obstructions in front of us.

After a slight pause, the Thirty-third Mississippi (Colonel D. W. Hurst, commanding) charged the intrenchments, and drove the enemy from them in gallant style. In consequence of the dense thickness of the undergrowth, I had lost sight of all of my regiments except the Thirty-third Mississippi; so that after capturing the intrenchments, considerable time elapsed before my scattered regiments could be collected and the line re-formed. During the rest of the day the brigade was engaged in executing orders from the Major-General commanding the division, but was not actively engaged with the enemy. Early the following morning, the brigade advanced as directed until under the fire of the enemy's artillery, which, together with the fire from the enemy's sharpshooters, was very heavy, causing many casualties. Under the circumstances, the conduct of the troops was excellent, and could not be surpassed. Later in the morning it became necessary to fall back from this advanced position, to defeat an attempt of the enemy to turn my left flank, which was accomplished in good order, and the enemy repulsed in gallant style, and with considerable loss. This last action having caused the whole left wing of the army to attack the enemy's right, the enemy did not again appear in my immediate front, and the brigade remained idle until ordered across the railroad to cover the movements of the left wing of the army, which had been withdrawn. While performing this service, the enemy's cavalry once appeared in sight, and it became necessary to disperse them, which was done by Major G. O. Watts, by a few rounds from one of his batteries. I wish to mention for conspicuous gallantry Colonel D. W. Hurst, Thirty-third Mississippi regiment, who drove the enemy from their intrenchments, at the head of his regiment, with empty guns; Colonel W. B. Shelby, Thirty-ninth Mississippi regiment, who rallied his men at great personal risk from a partial disorder into which they had been thrown by a flank fire of the enemy. The following officers of my staff were with me on the field, and rendered me important service in conveying orders, etc.: Captain Kinlock Falconer, Assistant-Adjutant General, and Major J. P. Carr, A. C. S., and Captain Belton, A. Q. M.

I transmit the reports of the different regimental commanders, giving detailed operations of the respective commands. I also enclose a list of the killed, wounded, and missing.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

JOHN B. VILLEPIGUE,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL MAURY.

HEADQUARTERS MAURY'S DIVISION,
CAMP ON TIPPAH, October 10, 1862.

Captain J. M. Loughborough, Assistant Adjutant-General:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that this division of the Army of the West moved from Ripley towards Corinth on the thirtieth September, numbering three thousand eight hundred and ninety infantry, five light batteries of four guns each, and eight hundred and eighty-one cavalry. On the morning of October third we moved, at daylight, from our camp near Chewalla to attack the enemy in Corinth. The division was formed in line of battle near Walker's house, north of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Moore's brigade, with its right resting near the railroad; Phifer's brigade was formed on Moore's left, extending to Hebert's division; and Cabell's brigade was held in reserve. The line faced Corinth and the enemy's advanced line of intrenchments.

The sharpshooters of Moore's and Phifer's brigades, under Colonels Rogers, Sherman, and Bridges, soon became briskly engaged with those of the enemy, and forced them back into their intrenchments. At ten A. M. our whole line moved forward, and the strong outworks of the enemy were carried without check. Moore and Phifer at once pushed on towards Corinth in pursuit of the retreating enemy. When within a little more than a mile of the town they were halted. Moore was moved towards his right to unite with the line of General Lovell, which was advancing along the south side of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and soon encountered a heavy force of the enemy, whom, after a fierce contest, he drove before him. Soon afterwards he was reinforced by two regiments of Cabell's brigade, under Colonels Johnson and Dockery. The advance was then resumed, and Moore soon became hotly engaged with the enemy, occupying a field-work, or intrenched camp. This he carried by assault, capturing the camp and its stores. Phifer, advancing, was met near the Mobile and Ohio Railroad by a strong force of the enemy, whom, after an obstinate combat, attended with a heavy loss on both sides, he drove back into Corinth, and was then halted, with his left resting within four hundred yards of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, his right being a little thrown back. Cabell was sent to support Phifer's right, now separated by a wide space from Moore, and was soon afterwards withdrawn to support Hebert's, who was threatened by a flank movement of the enemy towards his extreme left. About dark Moore was drawn in towards his left, until his line united with Phifer's; and the troops lay on their arms in these positions all night. Just before daylight, Major Burnett placed the batteries of Tobin, Sengstack, and McNally upon an advanced ridge about six hundred yards from Corinth, and opened fire upon the town. One of their pieces,

while taking position, being thrown by Captain Tobin rather too far beyond his support, was surprised and captured by the enemy's sharpshooters. Captain Tobin was made prisoner at the same time. At daylight all of those guns were withdrawn, and the fire of the division was maintained by the sharpshooters only, who, boldly and incessantly, under Rodgers, Sherman, and Bridges, harassed the enemy. I had been ordered to await the attack of Hebert's division on my left before advancing to storm the town. Soon after nine o'clock the firing upon my left became sharp, and Moore and Phifer were at once advanced. Cabell's brigade was moved closer up and held in reserve. In a few minutes the fusilade became general along the whole line of the Army of the West; and Cabell's brigade was ordered in to support of Gates' brigade, the next on Phifer's left. The brigades of Generals Moore, Phifer, and Cabell were gallantly led by their commanders to the assault of the enemy's work in the heart of Corinth. They carried them, planted their colors within them, drove the enemy from them, and held them until forced back by the overwhelming reserves of the enemy. The division was then re-formed and marched back to encamp near Chewalla. Next morning it moved towards Pocahontas. When within five miles of Davis' bridge, couriers from Colonel Wirt Adams, who had been guarding that point, apprised us that the enemy was advancing in force to seize it before we could cross. Moore's brigade, now reduced to about three hundred men, was pushed forward, and with the St. Louis battery and two guns taken from the enemy at Corinth (all under Major Burnett's orders), marched across the bridges and formed with the view of storming the heights of Matamoras; but they were too few and too late. The enemy's artillery and infantry, already in position, swept them away and were close upon the bridge before Phifer's brigade, commanded by Colonel Ross, could cross and form and meet them. (We lost four of our guns here.) Nothing remained for us now but to dispute the enemy's passage over the bridge, and to hold him in check as long as possible. This was gallantly done for more than an hour by the remnants of Moore's, Phifer's, and Cabell's brigades, and by the batteries of Hogg, Sengstack, Dawson, Lieutenant Moore and Lieutenant Miles, superintended by Major Burnett. They were all then ordered to retire and take up a position within the timber. This was done in good order, and the enemy not advancing, the whole division was withdrawn and put upon the march by another route, our rear being covered by General Villepigue's brigade. Last night the division bivouacked at this point. I enclose herewith the reports of the several brigade commanders, and refer you to them for more detailed accounts of these actions than I can give. I can bear honest testimony to the fidelity and valor of the officers and troops under my command. The instances of gallant conduct would include too many for me to mention here.

But there are two men of humble rank whose conspicuous courage and energy at Davis' bridge attracted general attention and admiration. One is Earnest Goolah, chief bugler of Ross' regiment; the other is Benjamin J. Chandler, a private of Company C, Slemm's cavalry. I recommend them to the most favorable considerations of the General commanding as worthy of the honors due to conspicuous courage upon the battle-field. My staff officers were always prompt, intelligent, and gallant.

I enclose the reports of our losses. You will observe that they have been very heavy. But, sir, we remember that our noble dead fell in the streets and in the innermost fortifications of Corinth, and that our torn colors have floated in triumph over the very stronghold of the foe.

I am, sir, very respectfully yours,

DABNEY H. MAURY,
Major-General, commanding Division.

(Official copy.)

MACERAN,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL GREEN.

October 19, 1862.

Acting Adjutant-General, Army of the West:

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by that portion of the army under my command in the recent engagement at Corinth:

On the morning of the third instant, being in command of the Third brigade of the First division, commanded by Brigadier-General Hebert, I was ordered to take position on the left of the Fourth brigade, forming a line in front of and about three or four hundred yards from the enemy's outer breastworks. Scarcely was the line formed when the enemy opened upon us with great fierceness a fire of shell and grape, doing us, however, but little harm—wounding a few men. About twelve o'clock we were ordered to advance; our skirmishers being in front of our lines, soon drove the enemy's skirmishers inside of the fortifications, where they endeavored to make a stand, and opened upon us with musketry. We continued to advance rapidly; the enemy fled and we took possession of the fortifications. The order being still to move forward, we moved in line until we came to an open field, where the enemy opened upon us a murderous fire from two batteries placed upon a hill beyond. I halted the brigade and ordered Captains Landis and Geuber, with their batteries, to take position and fire upon the enemy. We here had a brisk artillery fight which lasted about three-quarters of an hour. Our batteries having driven those of the enemy from their position, I then advanced my brigade until I came to another field where I found the enemy in line, under the cover of a fence on the far side of the field, awaiting our approach. Here we saw danger ahead, with a battery and a line of infantry firing upon us from the left, and a heavy fire in front. We moved forward at double-quick across the open field to meet the

enemy. Here was an unceasing fire of musketry for about one hour and a half, and as we would break the lines of the enemy they would bring fresh troops. I sent to Colonel Gates, whose brigade was not engaged, to try and relieve us of the cross-fire on the left, which he did by sending to my support the Second Missouri infantry, Colonel Cockerel commanding. We then soon succeeded in driving the enemy from the field, but not until we had lost many brave and gallant officers and soldiers. During this engagement I was enabled to see the whole length of my brigade, consisting of three Missouri and two Mississippi regiments, and I am proud to say there was no faltering, but all seemed eager for the combat. And nobly did they sustain it; no troops could have done better, nor could I distinguish between the regiments which behaved the most gallantly; each did vigorously the work assigned it. In this charge we lost largely in officers. Colonels Erwin and McFarland and Lieutenant-Colonels Ferrell and Hedgespeth were wounded. Colonel Ferrell fell while urging his men forward; He was at least twenty yards in advance of his command. I fear he will never again be able to take the field. In him we lose a gallant officer. Lieutenant-Colonel Leigh of the Forty-third Mississippi fell while gallantly leading his wing of the regiment. Major McQuiddy was severely wounded. Major Vaughn, of the Sixth Missouri, was killed. While leading this charge several officers of the line were killed, among whom were the following: Captain Taylor, Captain McKinney, and Captain Graves.

After the enemy fell back and the firing ceased, we gathered up the wounded and advanced our lines some two hundred yards beyond where the enemy had fought us, and slept on our arms all night.

About daylight, leaving our skirmishers out, we fell back about one hundred yards under cover of the hill, in order to get some refreshments. Before we were done eating the enemy opened their batteries upon us most furiously.

Just at this time I received a message from General Hebert informing me that he was unable to take the field, and that the command of the division would devolve upon me; in a few minutes I received an order from General Price placing me in command.

The command of the Third brigade now devolved upon Colonel Moore of the Forty-third Mississippi regiment.

At the time of assuming command I found the brigades placed as follows: the Third brigade on the left of General Phifer, its left resting near the Mobile and Ohio Railroad; First brigade (Colonel Gates) on its left, fronting the railroad; the Fourth brigade (Colonel McLean) on its left; and the Second brigade (Colonel Cobbert) in reserve. I immediately sent for the Second brigade and placed it in line where the Third was, and held the Third in reserve. In this position we skirmished for a short time with the enemy. Receiving word from Colonel McLean (commanding Fourth brigade) that there was danger of his left being turned by the enemy, and that if attempted he would be unable to prevent it, I ordered the Second to move to the left of the Fourth, placing the Third in its original position. I then ordered a forward movement, directing the Second and Fourth to move forward in echelon, throwing the left forward so as to come to a charge at the same time of the right.

At the time I ordered the forward movement I sent for reinforcements, believing that we would need them, for I could see the enemy had two lines of fortifications bristling with artillery and strongly supported by infantry. Our lines moved across the railroad, advancing slowly and steadily, our skirmishers constantly fighting with those of the enemy, driving them back. When within about two hundred yards the command was ordered to charge at a double-quick. The whole line now moved forward with great rapidity. Officers and men all seemed eager to be foremost in reaching the fortifications, but it was a hard road to travel, climbing over logs, brush, and fallen timber, while masked batteries of the enemy opened upon us at almost every step with great slaughter, but nothing daunted the divisions pressed forward. The First brigade (Colonel Gates commanding) arriving at the fortifications drove the enemy from their intrenchments, taking about forty pieces of artillery. The Fourth and Second brigades having worse roads, and the distance being greater, only a portion of them were able to reach the intrenchments, and the left being in danger of being outflanked, fell back. Lieutenant Colonel Maupin of the First Missouri cavalry (serving as infantry), fell while gallantly leading his regiment in the charge on the enemy's fortifications, bearing his regimental colors. Colonel Moore, I fear, was mortally wounded while leading the Third brigade on a charge in town; he fell near the depot and was left on the field.

Colonel McLean commanding Fourth brigade was severely wounded in the charge. Major McQuiddy, who was wounded on the day before in the arm, but would not leave his command (Third Missouri cavalry), was severely wounded in the thigh. Major Yates, of the Thirty-sixth Mississippi, was also wounded, as was also Colonel Pritchard, of the Third Missouri infantry. Reinforcements again being sent for, General Cabell came up with his brigade, but before he could get to the fortifications, Colonel Gates' ammunition was exhausted and he fell back. The fire then became terrific. General Cabell was unable to retake the fortifications, and the whole line fell back on the hill, in rear of the batteries. Here I received orders to move the division back on the hill beyond the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Before reaching that point, I received an order to continue the march until further orders.

We encamped early in the evening on the right of the road opposite. Sunday morning I

was ordered to resume the march, marching in the rear of General Maury's division. Before reaching the Hatchie, I received an order to push forward, "that General Maury's division had engaged the enemy on the Hatchie, and needed assistance." I pushed forward as rapidly as the men could possibly travel; when we arrived, however, we found General Cabell's force falling back in good order. I was ordered to form on the left of a road in a field, behind a fence. We threw out skirmishers, who soon engaged those of the enemy, and drove them back. The Fourth brigade came upon a body of the enemy's skirmishers, charged and repulsed them. We here lay still for about half an hour, the enemy in sight, every minute expecting to move forward, but instead, we received orders to "fall back," which we did without any interruption of the enemy, though they still continued throwing shell as they had been doing all the time; here I had three or four men slightly wounded, I was then ordered to move my division out on the "Boneyard Road." At the crossing of the Hatchie I received orders to proceed to the Ripley road, and bivouack for the night, which I did in line along the road towards Pocahontas, throwing out pickets to give notice of the approach of the enemy. The next morning I resumed the march in good order towards Ripley. During the fight and on the retreat, both officers and soldiers have shown themselves as brave as the most sanguine could desire. *All did their duty well*, and were I to particularize I would not know where to begin. I cannot, however, refrain from acknowledging my obligations to Captain Wm. B. Pittman, for his promptness in carrying an order through the field when the very atmosphere seemed filled with shot, shell, grape, and canister; also to Major Theo. Johnson, who acted as voluntary aid, and who conveyed orders with great despatch through the hottest firing regardless of danger.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
MARTIN E. GREEN.
Brigadier-General, commanding Division.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL CABELL.

HEADQUARTERS CABELL'S BRIGADE,
MAURY'S DIVISION, October 10, 1862.

Captain Flowerree, Assistant Adjutant-General, Maury's Division:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the part taken by my command in the engagements before Corinth, on the third and fourth, and at the Hatchie bridge, on the fifth instant.

My brigade consisted of the Eighteenth, Nineteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first Arkansas regiments, Jones' battalion of Arkansas volunteers, Rapley's battalion of sharpshooters, and the Appeal battery, under Lieutenant Hogg. These regiments were small, making an aggregate of thirteen hundred and sixty-seven (1,367) effective men. On the third instant, in obedience to orders from Brigadier-General Maury, commanding division, my brigade, after crossing the Mississippi and Charleston Railroad, was held in reserve to support the brigades of Generals Moore and Phifer, that was ordered to advance and attack the enemy. I remained within supporting distance of the two brigades with my whole brigade until half-past three o'clock, when I was ordered to send two regiments to support General Moore on the right. I sent, at once, the Nineteenth Arkansas regiment, under Colonel Dockey, and the Twentieth Arkansas, under Colonel H. P. Johnson, who became, after arriving on the field of battle, quickly engaged with the enemy, driving the enemy before them with great loss; our loss being small, not over five killed and ten wounded in each regiment. After these regiments had been sent off, I received an order from the division commander to move, with the remainder of my brigade, to the support of General Phifer. This order was obeyed promptly. After arriving on the field I found General Phifer's brigade, although much exhausted from heat and dust, had driven the enemy within less than eight hundred (800) yards of their breastworks around the city of Corinth. I immediately formed my line of battle, threw my skirmishers to the front, and engaged the enemy's skirmishers, which enabled General Phifer to withdraw his brigade. After his brigade had been withdrawn, I advanced with my skirmishers, fighting the enemy as far as I deemed it prudent with the small force I lead. I therefore contented myself with holding the position I had, and watching the movements of the enemy, my skirmishers in the meantime keeping up a brisk fire with the enemy's sharpshooters. I am confident they did terrible execution with the enemy's skirmishers. I then captured two fine ambulances and nine prisoners; the enemy during this time kept up a constant fire of grape and canister, which, although furious, did but little harm, as my loss was only two privates killed and five wounded. I was here struck myself on the foot with a spent Minnié ball, which gave me a great deal of pain at the time, but did not disable me. About sundown, after the enemy had drawn all their infantry and artillery inside the inner works, I received an order to report, with my brigade, to General Hebert, on the extreme left, to guard the crossing of a road leading from the Purdy road across to the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. I reported, as directed, to General Hebert, who gave me the necessary instructions, and ordered me (by the consent of General Armstrong) to retain a section of Kink's artillery and Colonel McCulloch's regiment of cavalry. After making such a disposition of the forces under my command, placing out my pickets to watch the movements of the enemy, and protect our left from a flank movement of the enemy, I remained there until seven o'clock A. M., on the fourth, when I was ordered by General Hebert to move up and report to General Green, to whom he had (being sick) turned over the command of the division. I moved up, as ordered, and reported to General Green

who ordered me to remain in supporting distance of his brigade, at the same time informing me that I would be subject to orders from my own division commander, Brigadier-General Maury. A short time had elapsed before I received an order from General Maury to move as near General Phifer as I could, taking advantage of the ground to protect my men from a terrific fire of artillery, which I was exposed to from a battery of the enemy on the south side of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. I placed my brigade on the side of a hill protecting them as much as possible from this furious discharge of grape, canister, and shell, that was kept up without a moment's cessation, sufficient to demoralize any troops except such as the troops which composed my brigade. This was within less than seven hundred (700) yards of the breastworks and the town of Corinth, where the First Missouri brigade, under Colonel Gates, was hotly engaged. About eleven o'clock A. M., I received an order from General Maury, delivered by Captain Flowerree, Adjutant-General, to move rapidly to the support of Colonel Gates, who had entered the enemy's breastworks and could not hold it for the want of ammunition. This order was received with a shout by the whole brigade, who had stood this terrible cannonading for more than an hour. Immediately after receiving the order, I moved by the left flank, at double-quick, until I crossed the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. After crossing the railroad, through a terrible fire of artillery, I faced to the front and moved on the enemy's works, the left in the open field and the right and centre through a skirt of woods about fifty yards wide, expecting to find the Missouri brigade. This brigade had, however, fallen back, taking a road on my extreme right. Instead of meeting the Missouri brigade as I had been informed I would, I found the enemy in line of battle just outside of the timber, and about three hundred yards in front of the breastworks. My left became engaged at once, after facing to the front, and the whole line in a few minutes afterwards, when I gave the word "charge." As soon as the command was given, the whole line moved at double-quick, almost as one man, shouting "Butler," and driving them until they reached the crest of the enemy's breastworks, where a greater force than I had driven in sprang up, delivering a tremendous volley in the very faces of the greater part of my whole line, which was at that time subject to fire, from the left front of the bastion near the college, as well as to the artillery fire from the battery on the south side of the railroad, and on the left of the work charged. A part of the Twentieth Arkansas regiment, under Colonel Johnson, went over the works inside of Corinth. The numbers of the enemy being so great in front, at the same time being exposed to such a dreadful cross fire of musketry and artillery on my flanks and rear, that my men were compelled to fall back with a very heavy loss of killed and wounded, officers and men.

The courage and daring of my men, who shot the enemy down in their trenches, is beyond all praise; the ground in front of the breastworks was literally covered with the dead and wounded of both friend and foe, the killed and wounded of the enemy being nearly, if not fully, two to one. Those left presented the appearance of men nearly whipped, and convinced me that it was nothing but their reinforcements and superior numbers that kept them from a total rout. My loss, in officers especially, was, I regret to say, very great at this time; a great many, both officers and privates, were wounded and taken prisoners. I lost here three brave and valuable field officers killed—Colonel H. P. Johnson and Major Dane W. Jones, Twentieth Arkansas regiment, and Major Dowdle, Twenty-first Arkansas, and Colonel Daly, Eighteenth Arkansas, mortally wounded (since dead). Lieutenant-Colonel Matheny, Twenty-first Arkansas, wounded. Captain Lynch, Eighteenth Arkansas, and Captain Atkins, Rapley's battalion, two gallant officers, were killed. Colonel Cravens, Twenty-first Arkansas, acted nobly, and had his horse shot under him. Colonel Dockey, Lieutenant-Colonel Disunke, Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, Major Williams, and Major Wilson, distinguished themselves by their gallantry and daring; also, Captain Ashford, who commanded the battalion of sharpshooters (Major Rapley being absent, sick). After being repulsed by an overwhelming force, I received an order to fall back with what was left of my brigade, with the remainder of the army, which I did, taking all the knapsacks and blankets I could with me to the camp on Chewalla, on the south side of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, where we remained until the morning of the fifth. I only numbered, all told, on the morning of the fifth, previous to marching to Davis' bridge, across the Hatchie River, five hundred and fifty (550) men. Mine was the rear brigade in the division, and was, owing to the order of march of that day, some distance in rear of the advance brigade, which became engaged with a greatly superior force of the enemy immediately after crossing the Hatchie River. When the cannonading was first heard in front, I was then crossing the Tuscumbia River, a distance of five miles. I received an order from General Maury, while crossing the river, to move rapidly to the front to the support of General Moore. I moved forward, then, as rapidly as possible, at the double-quick most of the way, until I reached the field of battle, which was then on the east side of the river, and where General Phifer's brigade, with my battery of artillery, which I had sent in the advance, was hotly engaged with the enemy. I immediately, after ascertaining the position of the enemy, formed line of battle, and placed my line on the right of General Phifer's brigade. The enemy opened fire on us at once; we replied instantly, and continued to keep up a perfect musketry duel for about an hour, when I found my cartridges giving out. I immediately issued about ten (10) rounds of cartridges to the men and renewed the fire, which was continued until the enemy ceased

firing (except their skirmishers) and my cartridges had given out. I sent word to General Maury that my ammunition had given out, and that I could only hope to hold the ground with the bayonet should the enemy's cavalry attempt to charge us. General Maury then ordered me to fall back to the timber and get ammunition. After receiving this order, I withdrew my men in good order, with a loss of not more than two killed and eight wounded, a thing unprecedented, considering the obstinacy of the fight that had been going on for nearly an hour and a half. While withdrawing my men, my horse, who had become very frantic, fell on me and injured my thigh and hip very seriously, completely paralyzing my left leg. I, however, formed my line and gave the command of the few that were left to Colonel Dockey, as I was unable to walk. In this action, as well as in the engagements of Friday and Saturday, I cannot particularize. Every officer and man seemed willing and anxious to meet the enemy, and the daring and gallant charge made on the enemy's breastworks, and the obstinacy with which they stood in an open field and fought the enemy partly concealed in the woods, for an hour and a half, at Hatchie River, will bear testimony to the fact, and give them a just claim to the admiration and gratitude of their State and country, and will cause them to mingle their tears with the survivors for the *heroes who have fallen*. My personal staff, Major John King, Adjutant-General, Captain Balfour, Inspector-General, and Lieutenant Marshall Hairston, A. D. C., were all distinguished for their daring and bravery. I am under many obligations for the promptness with which they assisted me in every engagement; also, to my volunteer Aids, Lieutenant Shepherd and Mr. Templeman, who were conspicuous for daring and gallantry in every engagement, under every fire. Major Hooper, Brigade Quartermaster, and Major Smith, Brigade Commissary, as well as the Surgeons of the whole brigade, deserve my especial thanks for the zeal and energy displayed in the field and everywhere during the whole expedition.

Captain Burnett, Chief of Artillery, and Lieutenant Hogg, commanding Appeal battery, with his officers and men, deserve special notice for the skill and efficiency with which they handled the battery and poured the shot and shell into the enemy's ranks.

Before closing, I must return my sincere thanks to the officers and men who have survived, for the promptness, daring, and cheerfulness with which they have executed every order, and ask them never to forget the daring and heroism of the noble dead. Arkansas, though for a time cast in gloom for her lost sons, can look with pride to the daring and gallantry of her sons, and console herself with the happy thought that her soldiers are equal to any and second to none amongst those who are battling for Southern independence.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. L. CABELL,

Brigadier-General, commanding Brigade.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL MOORE.

HEADQUARTERS MOORE'S BRIGADE, ARMY OF THE WEST,
CAMP AT LUMPKIN'S MILL,
NEAR HOLLY SPRINGS, October 13, 1862.

Captain D. W. Flowerree, A. A. General:

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this brigade in the action on the third, fourth, and fifth instants.

This brigade was composed of the following regiments, to wit: Second Texas, Colonel W. P. Rogers; Lyle's Arkansas regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Pennington; Boone's Arkansas regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Boone; Thirty-fifth Mississippi regiment, Colonel Wm. L. Barry; Forty-second Alabama regiment, Colonel John W. Portis; Bledsoe's battery, Captain H. M. Bledsoe—making five regiments and one battery; total effective strength, eighteen hundred and ninety-two (1,892), about.

On the morning of the third we formed in line of battle near the road leading from Pocahontas to Corinth, and distant about one-half mile from the enemy's outer works. Our brigade here occupied the right of the line formed by Maury's division, our right resting on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and Lovell's forces on our right beyond the road. Soon Lovell's forces engaged the enemy, and our brigade was ordered forward across a corn-field to their support, with instructions to halt on reaching the timber on the opposite side, and await further orders. On reaching the point designated, a part of the Second Texas and one company of the Thirty-fifth Mississippi were thrown forward as skirmishers, and at once engaged the enemy's sharpshooters, when they were driven back within their intrenchments. We here lost a few men, and Major W. C. Simmons, commanding the skirmishers, was wounded. We were now ordered forward to assault the enemy's works. We advanced in a well-preserved line of battle, considering the difficulties of the ground, and on reaching the fallen timber, in front of the enemy's intrenchments, we charged and carried the works with but little opposition, except on our left, where the Forty-second Alabama was exposed to a heavy fire, though their loss in killed and wounded was but eight or ten, including one officer. This regiment advanced with remarkable steadiness, this being their first engagement. Advancing about one-fourth of a mile we were halted to form a junction with Lovell's forces, now on our right, which we failed to do. Our skirmishers again soon engaged the enemy and were driven back on our line, which led to a severe but short engagement, in which we soon routed the enemy and drove them from their position. Here an unfortunate mistake was committed, the Forty-second Alabama firing on our skirmishers, mistaking them for the enemy, and killing and wounding several officers and men. At this time a heavy cannonading was kept up at some distance to our right, from a strong work of the enemy about two hundred yards south of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Being now reinforced by Colonel Johnson's and Colonel Dockey's Arkansas regi-

ments we changed directions to the right, and throwing forward the left wing, moved in the direction of the firing. We soon reached the railroad, having our line nearly parallel to it, and in crossing, the enemy opened on us a most terrific fire from the brow of a hill not more than seventy-five yards distant. The enemy opposed to us with a heavy force, being formed in two lines, the front lying on the ground and the other firing over them. This awful fire staggered us but for a moment, and as soon as our line was steadied a little, we charged, drove them from the position, and carried their works, capturing a few prisoners, and taking a large camp with their supplies of commissary and quartermaster's stores. On discovering our approach, the enemy removed and saved their guns. This we found to be a strong work in a firm position, and well constructed. From the position, we judged this to be the point from which a cannonading had been kept up during the day.

Being now separated from our division, and night approaching (it being between three and four o'clock), we despatched Lieutenant McFarland to report to General Maury our success, and asked for orders. In the course of half an hour General Lovell and staff came up, and, on consultation, we agreed to form a line of battle perpendicular to the railroad, our left resting on the road, and advance towards Corinth. In about an hour his forces came up, and moved to our right. At about dusk, while awaiting for a notification from General Lovell to advance, which he said he would give when ready, we received orders from General Maury to rejoin the division, and take position on Phifer's right, which brought us on the hill in sight of Corinth, about an hour and a half after dark, where we slept on our arms until morning.

At early dawn on the morning of the fourth, our batteries having been placed in front of our lines, to open fire on Corinth, the brigade was moved by the left flank and placed in rear of Phifer's, sheltered by timber in front. When the firing from the batteries ceased, we moved forward and took position obliquely to the right and front of Phifer's. Our skirmishers were again thrown forward, and kept up a sharp engagement with the enemy until about ten o'clock. We had been previously notified by General Maury that we would advance when Hebert's division made the attack on our left—our brigade being supported by Cabell's on the right and Phifer's on the left. About ten o'clock the firing on our left became heavy, and we at once gave the command, "forward," sending Lieutenant McFarland to notify General Maury of our advance movement. We had not gone one hundred yards before the enemy seemed to discover our designs, and at once opened upon us and kept up the severest fire I ever imagined possible to concentrate on one point in front of a fortification. Yet we suffered but little, being protected by the timber, until we reached the fallen timber and open space which extended about one hundred yards in front of their works.

On reaching this point we charged and carried the enemy's works, the whole extent of our line, and "penetrated to the very heart of Corinth," driving the enemy from house to house, and frequently firing in at the windows and driving them out. The enemy were driven from the breastworks in great confusion, leaving their guns, some with their teams still hitched, while others had their horses cut loose and ran off. Our men brought off two or three horses which they found hitched in the streets near the Corinth House, their owners being absent. The Forty-second Alabama, from their position in line, were brought in front of a strong bastion, the walls of which they found too high to scale, but rushing to the embrasures they fired three or four volleys, driving the enemy from their guns, and then entering the works mounted the parapet and planted their flag on the walls. After entering the works we found ourselves opposed by an overwhelming force, and being without support and our line being broken and disordered in the assault, we had no alternative but to fall back, which was done. Our loss in this assault was very severe. Three of the five regimental commanders were either killed or wounded. I can bear testimony to the coolness and gallantry with which our men and officers made this assault. I do not believe that any troops ever displayed greater courage in so desperate a charge. This was our last engagement in the vicinity of Corinth. Our division being reformed we fell back on the road to Pocahontas and bivouacked for the night. At an early hour, on the morning of the fifth instant, our brigade was ordered to the front to act as an advance guard; when within two or three miles of Davis' bridge across Hatchie, received orders to push forward, cross the bridge, form a line of battle on the right of the road, and then advance, take and hold the Heights of Matamoras, which commands the crossing at Davis' bridge. We pushed forward with all possible despatch, but the men being greatly exhausted and weak for the want of food, and the previous two days' hard marching and service, when we reached the crossing and formed line, we did not have more than two hundred and fifty or three hundred men in ranks. We formed on the right, opposite the battery established by Major Burnett on the left of the road. As we filed off to the right, the enemy's batteries opened on us from the hill at Matamoras. The Second Texas, being in the rear, was cut off by the fire, and did not form in line with the other regiments. Our position was now in a narrow strip of woods, with open fields in front and rear, that in front extending up to the enemy's position. We had been ordered to advance with our left on the road, which would have carried us through the open fields up to the very muzzles of the enemy's guns.

Being now satisfied that the hill was occupied

in force, and to advance with our small force would only prove its total annihilation, we despatched Lieutenant McFarland to the rear for reinforcements, and to report to the commanding General that we not only could not advance, but we thought we could not hold our present position long without assistance.

During this time the enemy continued to pour a heavy fire into the battery and woods occupied by our line, in which we lost several men killed and wounded. The batteries being soon withdrawn, the enemy soon gave us their whole attention, but we still held our position until they reached our left flank and poured into us a most destructive fire. This threw our line into some confusion; but, rallying, we moved to the left, faced the enemy, and opened on them.

We had not fired more than two or three rounds before a perfect shower of balls was poured into our right flank from the direction of the corn-field which was at first our front. I am satisfied that this fire came from a line which had been previously formed in the field, and had been concealed by lying down in the grass and corn. We now saw that we must either fall back or be surrounded. The order was given, and the bridge being now swept by the enemy's fire, the men crossed at such points of the stream as they found to be most convenient. In crossing, many of them lost their guns. This manner of crossing caused the men to become much scattered, but as they were collected, they joined Cabell's and Phifer's brigades and continued the fight. Our loss at the bridge was considerable, making the entire loss of the brigade during the three days fight very heavy, as will be seen by the accompanying report. It is impossible at present to make an accurate report of the killed, wounded, and missing in battle, as the Thirty-fifth Mississippi dispersed after the fight at Davis' bridge, there being now present some forty men, and one line-officer, Lieutenant Henry. From the best information we can obtain we are assured that many of the officers and men have gone to their homes. This conduct on their part is astonishing and unaccountable, for the regiment acted nobly and did good service during the three days' fighting. It is to be regretted that their commander, Colonel Barry, was not present, he having been sent to Corinth, under flag of truce to bury the dead. He is a gallant and efficient officer, of whom his State may well be proud.

Without a single exception, to our knowledge, the officers, one and all, did their duty nobly during the severe engagements. If I mention one in this connection, I must mention all or do injustice. Corporal J. A. Going, of the Forty-second Alabama, deserves particular notice. He was color-bearer, and though once shot down, he gallantly bore the flag through the fight on the fourth.

Private Morgan, of Company H, Boone's regiment, is reported as having acted with great gallantry. The flag of Lyle's regiment was torn into tatters by the enemy's shots, and when last seen, the Color-bearer, Herbert Sloane, of Company D, was going over the breastworks, waving a piece over his head and shouting for the Southern Confederacy.

I am, Captain, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
M. C. MOORE,
Brigadier-General, commanding Brigade.

REPORT OF COLONEL W. H. JACKSON.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
WATERFORD, November 18, 1862.

Major M. M. Kimmel, A. A. G., Army of West Tennessee, Abbeville, Miss.:

MAJOR: I have the honor to make report of the operations of my brigade of cavalry (First Mississippi cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel F. A. Montgomery, and my own regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. Stocks), at the late battle of Corinth and retreat from that place.

During the battle my brigade was divided; squadrons attached to brigades of infantry and acting on the flanks. With eight companies I made a reconnoissance south of Corinth, engaged the enemy's cavalry and repulsed them in gallant style. Returning, I advanced the command to the fortifications on College Hill, where I engaged the enemy in force after the main body of our troops had withdrawn. I then withdrew my command without serious loss and brought up the rear of the army. I was then ordered to Rienzi, under General Armstrong; received orders countermanding that move on our arrival at Kossuth.

The firing having commenced at Davis' bridge, near Pocahontas, we proceeeded with both commands to the Ripley and Pocahontas road; advanced up that road to within one mile and a half of Pocahontas, threatening the enemy's rear, engaging them in a brilliant skirmish, which was a move very favorable towards saving the train of wagons. I held that position all night with my brigade, and fell back before the enemy next day. From that time the brigade was engaged in bringing up the rear of the army, skirmishing all the time with the enemy to Ripley.

Owing to unavoidable circumstances, the brigade was without rations for three days. The officers and men all behaved with coolness and gallantry, and suffered all the hardships incident to the march, with a spirit worthy of good soldiers. Where all behaved so well, it would be difficult to mention by name. I would especially notice, however, Lieutenant Henry W. Watkins, Company A, Jackson's regiment cavalry; also, Corporal Brochus and Privates Britton and Barton, Company C, same regiment; also, Captain Gadi Herron, Lieutenant Cravens, and Lieutenant Foote, First regiment Mississippi cavalry. The latter (Lieutenant Foote) engaged the enemy's advance and checked them

in a most gallant manner. The report from Armstrong's brigade does not mention any one especially by name. They all behaved with coolness and gallantry.

I am, Major, with high respect,
Your obedient servant,
H. W. JACKSON,
Colonel and Chief of Cavalry, Army West Tenn.

GENERAL PRICE TO GENERAL VAN DORN.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE TENNESSEE,
TUPELO, August 4, 1862.

Major-General Earl Van Dorn, commanding District of the Mississippi:

GENERAL: I telegraphed you yesterday that despatches from General Bragg make it almost impossible for me to reinforce General Breckinridge. He says, very pointedly, that West Tennessee is now open to my army, intimating that he expected me to enter it; and I do not feel at liberty to disregard such an intimation, when I consider the very important relations which this army bears to that in East Tennessee. I cannot get possession of the railroad before Thursday. It will then take at least a week to transport to this point the troops, etc., which will be brought hither preparatory to a forward movement. I regret very much that I have to submit to this unavoidable delay, and I cannot think of protracting it, except under compulsion of the greatest necessity. To attempt to reinforce General Breckinridge would protract it indefinitely. The success of the campaign depends now upon the promptness and boldness of our movements, and the ability which we may manifest to avail ourselves of our present advantages. The enemy are still transporting their troops from Corinth and its vicinity eastward. They will, by the end of this week, have reduced its force to its minimum. We should be quick to take advantage of this, for they will soon begin to get in reinforcements under the late call for volunteers. The present obstructed condition of the railroad is another reason for instant action. In fact every consideration makes it important that I shall move forward without a day's unnecessary delay. I earnestly desire your co-operation in such a movement, and will, as I have before said, be glad to place my army and myself under your command in that contingency. The very names of yourself and General Breckinridge would bring thousands to our ranks, and carry dismay to those of the enemy. You speak in your dispatch of the frightful amount of sickness in General Breckinridge's division. I fear that the sweltering heats of this latitude will soon begin to tell fearfully upon my own ranks, and am, for that reason, the more anxious to take them northward, where, too, we may gain accessions from those Tennesseeans and Kentuckians who have seen and felt the wretchedness of Northern domination.

Captain Loughbrough will deliver this communication to you, and explain more particularly the condition of things in this vicinity. Please inform me, by telegraph, of your determination, so that in the event of its being favorable, we may concert a plan of operations.

I am, General,
With the profoundest respect,
Your obedient servant,
STERLING PRICE,
Major-General.

M. M. KIMMEL,
Major and A. A. G.

GENERAL BRAGG TO GENERAL VAN DORN.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NO. 2,
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., August 11, 1862.

Major-General E. Van Dorn, commanding Department of the Mississippi:

GENERAL: In view of the operations from here it is very desirable to press the enemy closely in West Tennessee. We learn their forces there are being rapidly reduced, and when our movements become known it is certain they must throw more forces into Middle Tennessee and Kentucky or lose those regions. If you hold them in check, we are sure of success here; but should they reinforce here so as to defy us, then you may redeem West Tennessee, and probably aid us by crossing the enemy's rear.

I cannot give you specific instructions, as circumstances and military conditions in your front may vary materially from day to day. To move your available force to Holly Springs by railroad, thence into West Tennessee, co-operating with General Price, who will move soon towards Corinth; or to move to Tupelo by rail and join Price, are suggestions only. Positive instructions, except to strike at the most assailable point, cannot be given when so little is known, and when circumstances may change daily. Of course, when you join Price, your rank gives you command of the whole force. I enclose a copy of Captain Jones' inspection report. Many of the points in it require your immediate attention: 1st. Most important is the prompt reduction of your light artillery. You have enough for an army of one hundred thousand men. It is impossible to keep it all up and be effective. To keep it all ineffective must be avoided. Eight batteries of four (4) guns each is ample for your present force. As you cannot discharge the companies without authority from the War Department, I suggest that you dismount them, giving such horses and material as they have to make other corps effective, and transfer the officers and men to your heavy batteries, relieving infantry; or you could arm them as infantry and put them in the field. Some companies, I see, are still being equipped. Put a stop to it immediately. Other parts of the report, too, require your prompt consideration, especially in the staff department. The reports from the Medical Inspector, coming in, are equally unsatisfactory.

Your short time in command and close engagement at Vicksburg have allowed you but little time for these matters, but I trust you will be able, through intelligent and effective staff officers, in correcting some of the evils soon. It is with deep regret I see you lose General Vil-

lepigue, as I consider him equal to any officer in the service. Brigadier-General Duncan, and perhaps others exchanged, will soon be with us, when you shall be attended to.

I am, General,

Most respectfully and truly yours,

BRAXTON BRAGG.
General, commanding.

M. M. KIMMEL,
Major, and A. A. G.

GENERAL BRAGG TO GENERAL VAN DORN.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT No. 2,
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE, August 27, 1862.

Major-General Earl Van Dorn, commanding District of the Mississippi, Jackson, Miss.:

GENERAL: We move from here immediately—later, by some days, than expected, but in time, we hope, for a successful campaign. Buell has certainly fallen back from the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and will probably not make a stand this side of Nashville, if there. He is now fortifying at that place.

General E. K. Smith, reinforced by two brigades from this army, has turned Cumberland Gap, and is now marching on Lexington, Kentucky. General Morgan (Yankey) is thus cut off from all supplies. General Humphrey Marshall is to enter Eastern Kentucky from Western Virginia. We shall thus have Buell pretty well disposed of.

Sherman and Rosecrans we leave to you and Price, satisfied you can dispose of them, and we confidently hope to meet you upon the Ohio.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

BRAXTON BRAGG,
General, commanding.

M. M. KIMMEL.

GENERAL ARMSTRONG TO GENERAL PRICE.

MIDDLEBURG, FIVE MILES SOUTH OF BOLIVAR,
August 30, 1862.

Major Sneed, Assistant Adjutant-General:

Just finished whipping the enemy in from off Bolivar. Ran in town. I believe they will leave the country. West Tennessee is almost free of the invaders. All needed is an advance of the infantry. They estimate their force at ten thousand. I believe they have only about six thousand. Captain Pryor will give you the details. I send seventy-one prisoners to General Villepigue—four commanding officers. There are strong works in the rear of Bolivar, and I did not enter the town, as it would only have caused them to shell it, without giving me any advantage..

You will hear from us again in a day or two.

F. C. ARMSTRONG.

M. M. KIMMEL,
Major, and A. A. G.

GENERAL PRICE TO GENERAL VAN DORN.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE TENNESSEE,
TUPELO, September 2, 1862.

Major-General Van Dorn, commanding District of the Mississippi, Jackson, Miss.:

GENERAL: I received, last night, a despatch of which the following is a copy:

"LIQUATCHIE VALLEY, August 29.

"*To General Sterling Price:*

"Buell's force is in full retreat upon Nashville, destroying their stores. Watch Rosecrans and prevent a junction; or if he escapes you follow him closely.

"BRAXTON BRAGG."

I feel that this order requires me to advance immediately, and I shall have my whole command ready to move in three days. That portion of my cavalry which did not accompany General Armstrong, has been ordered forward to Booneville, and General Little is moving his division to Guntown and Baldwin. I hope that nothing will prevent you from coming forward without delay, with all your disposable troops. Be pleased to telegraph your determination in such way, however, that it will not be understood by others, and to write to me fully by my Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenant Wood, who will hand this to you.

I enclose for your information copies of a letter from General Bragg, dated August twenty-seventh, and of a despatch from General Armstrong, announcing the result of an engagement in front of Bolivar.

I am, General, with the greatest respect,

Your obedient servant,

STERLING PRICE,
Major-General.

M. M. KIMMEL,
Major, and A. A. G.

FROM GENERAL PRICE TO GENERAL VAN DORN.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE TENNESSEE,
TUPELO, September 4, 1862.

Major-General Earl Van Dorn, commanding District of the Mississippi:

GENERAL: One of your staff officers, Colonel Lomax, having requested me to do so, I state, for your information, that I can put in the field thirteen thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry, and eight hundred artillery, *effective total;* that they are supplied with transportation and ammunition, as prescribed in General Bragg's last general orders; that subsistence has been provided to the first day of October; that the commissary trains will transport seven days' provisions, and that I will have arms for all my troops, including those exchanged prisoners that General Bragg has been ordered to be sent to me.

I am, General, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

STERLING PRICE,
Major-General, commanding.

M. M. KIMMEL,
Major, and A. A. G.

GENERAL PRICE TO GENERAL VAN DORN.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE TENNESSEE,
TUPELO, September 5, 1862.

Major-General Earl Van Dorn, commanding District of the Mississippi, Jackson:

GENERAL: I have received your reply to my letter of the second instant, and regret very

much that you cannot move in this direction at once.

I feel that General Bragg's instructions and the situation of affairs within my district, alike compel me to keep near the line of the road. If I move towards Holly Springs, as you suggest, I not only endanger the safety of the road, which is essential to the supply of my army, but I expose my supplies of every kind, and the valuable workshops and public property at Columbus and Gainesville, to destruction by the enemy. I learn that a cavalry force of thieves, seventeen thousand strong, is even now within forty-eight hours' march of Columbus.

General Bragg's orders also compel me to keep close watch upon Rosecrans, and I hear that he is now at Iuka, and crossing his army at Eastport. I am, therefore, pushing my army slowly forward, and shall remove my own headquarters to Guntown on Sunday; I shall then determine by what route to advance. I shall keep you fully advised of my movements, so that we may co-operate or unite our forces, as may be most advisable.

I am, General, very sincerely,

Your friend and obedient servant,

STERLING PRICE,
Major-General.

M. M. KIMMEL,
Lieutenant-Colonel, and Inspector-General.

GENERAL PRICE TO GENERAL VAN DORN.

By telegraph from Iuka.

SUNDAY, September 14, 1862.

General Van Dorn:

Rosecrans has gone westward with about ten thousand men. I am ready to co-operate with you in an attack upon Corinth. My courier awaits your answer. STERLING PRICE,
Major-General.

M. M. KIMMEL.

GENERAL PRICE TO GENERAL VAN DORN.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE TENNESSEE,
IUKA, September 17, 1862.

Major-General Earl Van Dorn, commanding District of the Mississippi:

GENERAL: I entered this town with my army on last Sunday morning. The rear guard of Rosecrans' army evacuated it at my approach, and are retreating westward. I telegraphed you immediately, proposing a combined movement upon Corinth, and sent the despatch by special messenger to Guntown, with instructions to forward it to you immediately, and to await your reply. This has not been received yet. I hope that you will answer me at once, for General Bragg has just sent me another despatch, in these words:

"EN ROUTE TO KENTUCKY, September 12, 1862.

"By the proceedings of a council of war in Nashville, captured by us, it seems Rosecrans, with part of his army, is there. I have anxiously expected your advance, and trust it will not longer be delayed. BRAXTON BRAGG."

I cannot remain inactive any longer, and must move, either with you against Rosecrans, or towards Kentucky. The courier who takes this to you will bring your reply.

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

STERLING PRICE,
Major-General.

M. M. KIMMEL,
Major, and A. A. G.

GENERAL PRICE TO GENERAL VAN DORN.

Telegram.

IUKA, September 19, 1862.

General Van Dorn:

I will make the movement proposed in your despatch of the sixteenth instant. Enemy concentrating against me. Please make demonstration towards Rienzi. Have written by courier. Send your telegrams to Tupelo.

STERLING PRICE,
Major-General, commanding.

M. M. KIMMEL,
Major, and A. A. G.

GENERAL PRICE TO GENERAL VAN DORN.

BALDWIN, September 23, 1862.

General Earl Van Dorn:

I will leave here on Friday morning, twentieth. Wrote you this morning stating that I would meet you at Ripley. As you know more of the country, if any point be better state it, and I will meet you there.

A few days ago the enemy's strength was thirty-five thousand. I learn that they are leaving in the direction of Jackson, and whether we attack them or not before receiving our exchanged prisoners, it is important that we should unite.

STERLING PRICE,
Major-General.

M. M. KIMMEL,
Major, and A. A. G.

GENERAL BRAGG TO GENERAL VAN DORN

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NO. 2,
BARDSTOWN, KY., September 25, 1862.

Major-General Van Dorn:

GENERAL: We have driven and drawn the enemy clear back to the Ohio. Push your columns to our support and arouse the people to reinforce us. We have thousands of arms without men to handle them.

Nashville is defended by only a weak division, Bowling Green by only a regiment. Sweep them off and push up to the Ohio. Secure the heavy guns at these places and we will secure the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. All depends on rapid movements. Trusting to your energy and zeal, we shall confidently expect a diversion in our favor against the overwhelming force now concentrating in our front.

Respectfully and truly yours,

BRAXTON BRAGG,
General, commanding.

M. M. KIMMEL,
Major, and A. A. G.

Doc. 55.

THE BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN, VA.

REPORT OF GENERAL T. J. JACKSON.

HEADQUARTERS VALLEY DISTRICT, NEAR MT. JACKSON, April 9, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the battle near Kernstown,* Va., on Sunday, the twenty-third of March, 1862. On the preceding Friday evening a despatch was received from Colonel Turner Ashby, commanding the cavalry, stating that the enemy had evacuated Strasburg. Apprehensive that the Federals would leave this military district, I determined to follow them with all my available force. Ashby with his cavalry and Chews' battery were already in front. Colonel S. E. Fulkerson's brigade, consisting of the Twenty-third and Thirty-seventh regiments Virginia volunteers, and Shumaker's battery, was near Woodstock.

Brigadier-General R. B. Garnett's brigade, consisting of the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Twenty-seventh, and Thirty-third regiments of Virginia volunteers, and McLaughlin's, Carpenter's, and Waters' batteries, was near two miles below Mount Jackson.

Colonel J. S. Burks' brigade, consisting of the Twenty-first, Forty-second, and Forty-eighth regiments Virginia volunteers, and the First Virginia battalion P. A. C. S., and Marye's battery, was near two miles above Mount Jackson. The three brigades were ordered to march at dawn of the following morning.

All the regiments except the Forty-eighth, Colonel John Campbell, which was the rear guard, arrived within a mile or two of Kernstown by two o'clock P. M. on the twenty-third, and directions were given for bivouacking. During the march, information had reached me from a reliable source that the Federals were sending off their stores and troops from Winchester; and after arriving near Kernstown, I learned from a source which had been remarkable for its reliability, that the enemy's infantry force at Winchester did not exceed four regiments. A large Federal force was leaving the valley, and had already reached Castleman's Ferry, on the Shenandoah. Though it was very desirable to prevent the enemy from leaving the valley, yet I deemed it best not to attack until morning.

But subsequently ascertaining that the Federals had a position from which our forces could be seen, I concluded that it would be dangerous to postpone it till the next day, as reinforcements might be brought up during the night. After ascertaining that the troops—part of which had marched over fourteen miles since dawn, and Garnett's and Burks' brigades, which had made a forced march of near twenty-five miles the day previous—were in good spirits at the prospect of meeting the enemy, I determined to advance at once. Leaving Colonel Ashby with his command on the Valley turnpike, with Colonel Burks' brigade as a support to the batteries, and also to act as a reserve, I moved with one piece of Carpenter's battery and Colonel Fulkerson's brigade, supported by General Garnett's to our left, for the purpose of securing a commanding position on the enemy's right, and thus, turning him by that flank, force him back from his strong position in front, which prevented a direct advance. Soon after Captain Carpenter brought up his other pieces, also McLaughlin's and Waters' batteries came forward, the eminence was reached, and the three batteries, under their respective Captains, commenced playing upon the enemy, whose position was now commanded. We continued to advance our artillery, keeping up a continuous fire upon the Federals upon our right; whilst Colonel John Echols with his regiment, the Twenty-seventh, with its skirmishers thrown forward, kept in advance and opened the infantry engagement, in which it was supported by the Twenty-first, under Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Patton, as no other regiment of Garnett's had yet come up. Well did these two regiments do their duty, driving back the enemy twice in quick succession. Soon a severe wound compelled the noble leader of the Twenty-seventh to leave the field, and the command devolved upon its Lieutenant-Colonel, the dauntless Grigsby; great praise is due to the officers and men of both regiments. Colonel Fulkerson having advanced his brigade, consisting of the Twenty-third and Thirty-seventh, which were respectively under Lieutenant-Colonel Taliaferro, and Lieutenant-Colonel R. P. Carson, to the left of Colonel Echols, judiciously posted it behind a stone wall, towards which the enemy was rapidly advancing, and opened a destructive fire, which drove the Northern forces in great disorder, after sustaining a heavy loss, and leaving the colors of one of their regiments upon the field.

This part of the enemy's routed troops having, to some extent, rallied in another position, were also driven from this by Colonel Fulkerson. The officers and men of this brigade merit special mention. Soon after the Twenty-seventh had become engaged, General Garnett, with the Second, Fourth, and Thirty-third regiments, commanded respectively by Colonel J. W. Allen, Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Ronald, and Colonel A. C. Cummings, moved forward and joined in the battle, which now became general.

The First Virginia battalion, P. A. C. S., under Captain R. D. Bridgford, though it unfortunately became separated in advancing, was in the engagement, and from near five to half-past six P. M., there was almost a continuous roar, of musketry. The enemy's repulsed regiments were replaced by fresh ones from his large reserve. As the ammunition of some of our men became exhausted, noble instances were seen of their borrowing from comrades by

* This battle is generally known as the battle of Winchester (See vol. 4, Rebellion Record, page 228.)

whose sides they continued to fight, as though resolved to die rather than give way. Lieutenant-Colonel Ronald, commanding the Fourth, having been injured during the early part of the engagement by being thrown from his horse, the command of the regiment devolved upon Major A. G. Pendleton. Though our troops were fighting under great disadvantages, I regret that General Garnett should have given the order to fall back, as otherwise the enemy's advance would, at least, have been retarded, and the remaining part of my infantry reserve have had a better opportunity for coming up and taking part in the engagement, if the enemy continued to press forward. As General Garnett fell back he was pursued by the enemy, who thus turning Colonel Fulkerson's right forced him to fall back. Soon after this the Fifth regiment, under Colonel W. H. Harman, came up, and I directed it to advance and support our infantry; but before it met the enemy, General Garnett ordered it back, and thus the enemy were permitted unresisted to continue the pursuit.

So soon as I saw Colonel Harman filing his regiment to the rear, I took steps to remedy, as far as practicable, this ill-timed movement, by directing him to occupy and hold the woods immediately in his rear; and calling General Garnett's attention to the importance of rallying his troops, he turned and assigned the Fifth to a position, which it held until the arrival of Colonel Burks, with the Forty-second, under Lieutenant-Colonel D. A. Langhorne. Colonel Burks and the officers and men of the Forty-second proved themselves worthy of the cause they were defending, by the spirit with which this regiment took and held its position until its left was turned by the Federals pressing upon the Fifth as it fell back.

Colonel John Campbell was rapidly advancing with his regiment to take part in the struggle, but night, and an indisposition on the part of the enemy to press further, had terminated the battle, which had commenced at four o'clock P. M.

Leaving Ashby in front, the remainder of my command fell back to its wagons and bivouacked for the night. Our artillery had played its part well, and though we lost two pieces, one belonging to Waters' and the other to McLoughlin's—the former from having upset when hard pressed by the enemy, and the latter from having its horses killed, when it was on the eve of leaving the field which it had so well swept with canister as to have driven back the enemy from a part of it, over which he was pressing near the close of the battle.

During the engagement, Colonel Ashby, with a portion of his command, including Chews' battery, which rendered valuable service, remained on our right, and not only protected our rear in the vicinity of the Valley turnpike, but also served to threaten the enemy's front and left. Colonel Ashby fully sustained his deservedly high reputation by the able manner in which he discharged the important trust confided to him.

Owing to most of our infantry having marched between thirty-five and forty miles since the morning of the previous day, many were left behind. Our number present on the evening of the battle was, of infantry 3,087, of which 2,742 were engaged; twenty-seven pieces of artillery, of which eighteen were engaged. Owing to recent heavy cavalry duty and the extent of country to be picketed, only two hundred and ninety of this arm were present to take part in the engagement.

There is reason to believe that the Federal infantry on the field numbered over eleven thousand, of which probably over eight thousand were engaged. It may be that our artillery engaged equalled that of the enemy, and that their cavalry exceeded ours in number. Our loss was: killed, six officers, twelve non-commissioned officers, and sixty-two privates; wounded, twenty-seven officers, fifty-three non-commissioned officers, and two hundred and sixty-two privates, of which number some seventy were left on the field; missing, thirteen officers, twenty-one non-commissioned officers, and two hundred and thirty-five privates. Nearly all the missing were captured. A few days after the battle a Federal officer stated that their loss in killed was four hundred and eighteen.

Their wounded upon the supposition that it bears some relation to their killed, as ours, must be such as to make their total loss more than three times that of ours. Our wounded received that care and attention from the patriotic ladies of Winchester, which they know so well how to give, and our killed were buried by the loyal citizens of that town. The hospitality of Baltimoreans relieved the wants of the captured. For these acts of kindness, on both sides of the Potomac, I am under lasting obligations. The officers and men of the various regiments and batteries deserve great praise. In consequence of Major F. B. Jones, Second Regiment Virginia Volunteers, being familiar with the locality, he was detached from his regiment and acted as a staff officer during the engagement, and from his familiarity with the country, added to his zeal and daring, rendered very valuable service.

Dr. Hunter McGuire, Medical Director, discharged his duties in a manner which proved him admirably qualified for his position.

Major J. A. Harman, Chief Quartermaster, ably discharged his duties.

Major W. J. Hawkes, Chief Commissary, with his usual foresight, had the wants of his department well supplied.

First Lieutenant G. G. Junkins, A. D. C., and A. A. A. General, faithfully and efficiently devoted himself to his duties until near the close of the engagement, when I regret to say he was captured by the enemy.

First Lieutenant A. S. Pendleton, A. D. C., who

is an officer eminently qualified for his duties, discharged them in a highly satisfactory manner.

First Lieutenant J. K. Boswell, Chief Engineer, rendered valuable service.

Though Winchester was not recovered, yet the more important object of the present, that of calling back troops that were leaving the valley, and thus preventing a junction of Banks' command with other forces, was accomplished in addition to his heavy loss in killed and wounded. Under these circumstances, I feel justified in saying that though the field is in possession of the enemy, yet the most essential fruits of the battle are ours.

Respectfully your obedient servant,

T. J. JACKSON,
Major-General.

Major T. G. RUFFIN,
A. A. General D. N., Va.

Doc. 56.

BATTLE NEAR COFFEEVILLE, MISSISSIPPI.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL BIGHAM'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, FIRST CORPS, A. W. T.
December 6, 1862.

Lieutenant-Colonel E. Ivey, A. A. General:

COLONEL: I have the honor to make the following report of the action of the fifth instant, between the Federal advance guard, near Coffeeville, and the troops placed under my command by Major-General Lovell, commanding First corps.*

At about half-past two o'clock P. M., on Friday afternoon, fifth instant, whilst engaged in the town of Coffeeville with the various duties of my command, I learned that the enemy, emboldened by their successes heretofore, had pushed their advance within one mile of the town, and that having commenced skirmishing with our rear guard of cavalry, Major-General Lovell, commanding First corps, had gone out with a portion of my division to check them, I immediately rode out with a portion of my staff and body-guard, to the point selected by General Lovell, on which to form, and found that he had pushed forward a portion of the First brigade, under General Baldwin, on the right of the main road to Water Valley, whilst the Ninth Arkansas, of General Rust's division, commanded by Colonel Dunlop, was placed in line of battle on the left of the same road. Colonel A. P. Thompson, commanding brigade, of the Second division, had also been ordered to place the Third Kentucky regiment of his brigade upon a road leading out from Coffeeville to the west of the main road spoken of, in order to watch our left flank. Upon the main road and in rear of the First brigade, upon a small eminence, four pieces of artillery had been placed, being part of Captain Bouchard's company of the Point Coupee artillery; whilst at three hundred yards to the rear of this battery two Parrott guns from Captain Hodden's battery, of my own division, were placed on a still higher point, and in a position not to endanger the infantry or the battery in front, should occasion present itself to open upon the enemy. Before reaching the point at which General Lovell was stationed, I heard brisk cannonading, and on joining General Lovell, near where the rear battery was placed, found that it proceeded from our advanced battery, which was being replied to by a rifle gun of the enemy.

I immediately reported for orders to General Lovell, who directed me to ride with him to the position held by the advanced battery. On reaching that point and finding that the enemy had obtained the exact range of our guns, I retired, with General Lovell, to the rear battery, and was immediately ordered to open fire with the Parrott guns, at short intervals. This was done, and in a few moments the fire of the enemy's battery ceased.

I then asked permission of the Major-General commanding to press the enemy and drive them back, and upon receiving his orders to do so, with information that General Rust had been ordered to manœuvre on my right with parts of two of his brigades, rode rapidly to the front, ordering, at the same time, the Fourteenth Mississippi regiment, under Major Doss, which had been held in reserve, to move up at double-quick and take position on the extreme right of my line. The cavalry, under Colonel Jackson, numbering about seven hundred, were placed at my disposal also. The proper disposition of the forces was soon made; orders were given to General Baldwin, on the right, and to Colonel A. P. Thompson, of the Second division, who had assumed the direction of the Ninth Arkansas, of his own brigade, to deploy the right companies from each regiment, as skirmishers, one hundred paces in front of the main line. A greater distance was not deemed prudent, as the woods were very dense and the enemy known to be in close proximity. The cavalry was formed in the main road and ordered to move with caution in rear of the main line. The line of skirmishers being formed and everything prepared, orders were given to the men to hold their fire until within fifty yards; to move with caution until the enemy was reached, but then to press them with all their energy. The command, "forward," was given, and both skirmishers and the main line moved. The line had not advanced two hundred yards before the enemy opened on our left a brisk fire. This was answered first by a yell along our whole line, the men moving rapidly and with great enthusiasm until they were within good range, when the Ninth Arkansas, directed by Colonel A. P. Thompson, and the Eighth Kentucky, under Colonel H. B. Lyon, opened fire in return. Very soon the fire extended towards our right, along the Twenty-third Mississippi, under Lieutenant Colonel McCarley, and the Twenty-sixth Mississippi, under Major Parker. The order to press the enemy was fully carried out, and they were

* See Volume 6, Rebellion Record, Documents, page 226.

not allowed time to breathe, and though making two gallant stands in the first mile, they were driven from their positions, without our men faltering for a moment. The tactics of the enemy did them great credit; their whole force consisted of *mounted infantry*, armed with Colt's, Smith's, and Sharp's most approved weapons, with two pieces of artillery. The country over which they had to pass was an alternate wood and field. On being driven to the edge of a field, they mounted and retreated across it, dismounting and sending their horses to the rear. They had all the advantage of position, being covered by the woodland, whilst our men advanced across the open field. At these points the fire of the enemy was terrific, but nothing could stop the onward movement, and our men moved forward without slackening their pace in the least. Having driven the enemy for more than a mile, it occurred to me that should the troops of General Rust's command not have moved to their left far enough to guard my right flank, that I might run some risk of being outflanked. To guard against this, I detached Lieutenant Barbour, commanding my body-guard, with a portion of his men, with orders to move at full speed to my extreme right and take position, with his men well extended, and watch my right flank. No sooner had he reached the point and commenced moving up with our main line than he was fired upon by the enemy. Lieutenant Barbour immediately sent a courier informing me of the fact, when I ordered the Fourteenth Mississippi, under Major Doss, to move at double-quick, by the right flank, until he reached the point occupied by Lieutenant Barbour, then to assume his original front and press them again. During all this time the enemy were interruptedly driven from every position, and forced back to a point three miles from Coffeeville, when, on reaching a commanding position, they opened fire from their artillery again, supported by the severest fire of musketry we had yet encountered. The heaviest fire was encountered by the Ninth Arkansas regiment and the Eighth Kentucky regiment. Their efforts were, however, useless; nothing could check the advance of our men, and the position was carried without a moment's delay, just at dark.

It occurred to me a few moments before this, that a dash of our cavalry might have secured the piece of artillery in its last position; but it would have involved a heavy loss of life, not warranted under the circumstances, and I did not give the order. Having already driven the enemy much further than was ordered by a message from General Lovell, I gave order to halt and cease firing, very much to the chagrin of both officers and men, who, notwithstanding the severe duties and deprivations of the last week, seemed to forget everything but the desire showed by all to repay the injuries suffered by them during their long and barbarous imprisonment at the North.

The Fourteenth Mississippi, Major Doss commanding, towards the close, became too far separated from the main command, but was abundantly able to take care of itself, and drove back the enemy in their front, killing and wounding a number, among them Lieutenant-Colonel McCullough, who was shot dead within twenty paces of our line. This regiment also captured seventeen prisoners, with all horses, arms, and accoutrements. The loss on our part, as stated in my note to Major-General Lovell, of the sixth instant, is known to be accurately as follows: Killed, seven; wounded, forty-three. That of the enemy, thirty-four killed; among them Lieutenant-Colonel McCullough and a Second-Lieutenant, who gave his name as Woodbury (of the Third Missouri) just before expiring. The wounded of the enemy could not be accurately ascertained, inasmuch as all who were not too badly wounded were removed on horseback as fast as they fell. Estimating their wounded by the number killed, in the same ratio as that known to exist on our part, the wounded may be given at two hundred and thirty-four, which, from the number seen in the act of being removed, is under rather than over the actual loss. Sixteen of their severely wounded fell into our hands. Thirty-five prisoners, with seventeen horses and all their arms and accoutrements, were captured.

Among the prisoners were one Captain and several non-commissioned officers. The wounded on both sides were removed at once to Coffeeville, and every care taken of them. The dead were buried next morning. The body of the Federal Lieutenant was decently buried, and the headstone marked so that it could be recognized. The body of Lieutenant-Colonel McCullough was not secured. The command returned to its first position near Coffeeville, and bivouacked in line of battle. The whole affair was a complete success, and taught the enemy a lesson I am sure they will not soon forget. The troops behaved in the most gallant manner; officers and men emulated each other. All did their duty nobly. I take especial pleasure in mentioning the names of Brigadier-General W. E. Baldwin, of my own division, and Colonel A. P. Thompson (commanding brigade in General Rust's division). These officers in command on my right and left, displayed the greatest good judgment and gallantry. The brunt of the battle was borne by the Ninth Arkansas, Colonel Dunlop; Eighth Kentucky, Colonel H. B. Lyon; the Twenty-third Mississippi, Lieutenant-Colonel McCarley; and the Twenty-sixth Mississippi, under Major Parker.

I have seldom seen greater good judgment and impetuous gallantry shown by any officers or men. The cavalry, under Colonel Jackson, maintained the most perfect order, and were always in position to answer any summons. The batteries engaged rendered the most efficient service up to the time of my ordering the advance. The first shot fired from the Parrott guns of Captain Hedden's battery, under the direction of Captain Culbertson, Chief of Artil-

lery of my division, wounded Colonel Misner, and killed his orderly and three men. These facts were related by a non-commissioned officer among the prisoners.

My thanks are especially due to those of my personal staff who were present. Major Watts, Inspector-General; Major Halliday, Chief Commissary; Lieutenant George Moorman, Aide-de-Camp; Lieutenant Tilghman, Aide-de-Camp; rendered the most efficient and valuable service.

I notice with great pleasure, also, Lieutenant Barbour, commanding my body-guard, together with Lieutenant Lundy, of that company. These officers and their men rendered me great aid. The timely service of Lieutenant Barbour, on my right wing, may have saved us probably from serious injury. The whole force engaged on our side may be stated as not exceeding thirteen hundred men, whilst the enemy is known to have had not less than five regiments, numbering not less than thirty-five hundred men. Enclosed I have the honor to submit a correct list of the killed and wounded on our side.

I regret the absence of Captain Powhatan Ellis, Chief of Staff, during the action. He was engaged at my headquarters in an important business; and I was thus deprived of his valuable services. The same may be said of others of my staff who were absent on duty at various points.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

LLOYD TILGHMAN,

Commanding First Division, First Corps, Army West Tenn.

Casualties in the Action.

First Brigade—First Division—First Corps. W. E. Baldwin, commanding.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
Twenty-sixth Mississippi, Major Parks commanding	3	3	1	7
Eighth Kentucky, Colonel Lyon commanding	1	6	4	11
Twenty-third Mississippi, Lieutenant-Colonel McCarley commanding	2	14	4	20
Fourteenth Mississippi, Major W. L. Boss commanding	..	3	..	3
Second Brigade—Second Division—First Corps. Colonel A. P. Thompson, commanding.				
Ninth Arkansas Volunteers	1	17	1	19
Grand Total	7	43	10	60

I certify that the above is a correct return, as reported.

LLOYD TILGHMAN,

Brigadier-General, commanding First Division.

Doc. 87.

THE FALL OF NEW ORLEANS, LA.

MAJOR-GENERAL LOVELL'S REPORTS.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT No. 1, JACKSON, MISS., May 27, 1862.

General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General, Richmond, Virginia:

SIR: Herewith I have the honor to enclose my report of events attendant upon the fall of New Orleans. Also the reports of General Smith and General Duncan, the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins and Captain Squires, and a report of the killed and wounded at these points.

Respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

M. LOVELL,

Major-General, commanding.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL LOVELL.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT No. 1, VICKSBURG, May 22, 1862.

General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General, Richmond, Virginia:

SIR: Herewith I have the honor to transmit the reports of Brigadier-Generals Duncan and Smith, with the accompanying documents, of the operations preceding and attendant upon the fall of New Orleans.

The department is fully aware, from my official correspondence and telegraphic despatches, of the exact nature of the defences erected for the protection of that city; consisting, in general terms, of an exterior line of forts and earthworks, intended to prevent the entrance of the armed vessels of the enemy, and an interior line in the immediate vicinity of the city, which was constructed almost entirely with reference to repelling any attack made by land with infantry. Where this line crossed the river below the city, it was intended to have a battery of twelve thirty-two and ten forty-two-pounders, which it was considered would enable us to drive back any small number of ships that might succeed in passing the obstructions at the forts, under the fire of their guns. But, whether sufficient or not, no more were to be had, and subsequently, at the earnest request of the naval authorities, I transferred the forty-two-pounders to the steamers Carondelet and Bienville, for service on Lake Pontchartrain, in connection

with Forts Pike and Macomb. Immediately after I assumed command of the department, finding that there were no guns of the heaviest calibre, I applied to Richmond, Pensacola, and other points, for some ten-inch columbiads and sea-coast mortars, which I considered necessary to the defence of the lower river, but none could be spared; the general impression being that New Orleans would not be attacked by the river, and I was therefore compelled to make the best possible defence with the guns at my disposal. Twelve forty-two-pounders were sent to Forts Jackson and St. Philip, together with a large additional quantity of powder, and being convinced that with the guns of inferior calibre mounted there we could not hinder steamers from passing, unless they could be detained for some time under the fire of the works, I pushed forward rapidly the construction of a raft, which offered a complete obstruction to the passage of vessels up the river, except through a small opening, and then only one at a time. The forts had seventy-five or eighty guns that could be brought successively to bear upon the river, were manned by garrisons of well-trained artillerists, affording a double relief to each gun, and commanded by officers who had no superiors in any service. Under these circumstances, although I feared the high water in the Spring, with the accompanying drift, would carry away the raft, yet every confidence was felt that the river would remain closed until such time as the iron-clad steamers Mississippi and Louisiana could be finished, which I was confidently informed would not be later than the first of February. The first raft constructed was not carried away by the high water and drift until the latter part of February. But with funds placed at my disposal by the citizens of New Orleans, another was placed in position in March, by the energetic labors of Colonel Higgins and others, and the position was again temporarily secure. No heavy guns had yet been received, although strenuous applications were made by me to get some from Pensacola, when that place was abandoned. The general impression of all those to whom I applied was, that the largest guns should be placed above New Orleans, not below, although I had notified the department, on the twenty-second of March, that in my judgment the fleet only awaited the arrival of the mortar vessels to attempt to pass up the river from below. By means, however, of an energetic and persevering officer, Major W. P. Duncan, Commissary of Subsistence, three ten-inch columbiads and five mortars were finally procured and brought over just in time to be put up as the firing commenced. Thinking that the enemy's troops at Isle Breton were intended to land at Quarantine and act in rear of Fort St. Philip, I ordered Colonel Szymanski's regiment of ninety days' men, armed with shot guns, to that point as a protection. I had, likewise, organized two companies of sharpshooters and swamp hunters, under Captains Mullen and Lartique, which were sent down for operation upon the enemy's vessels from the banks of the river, but the high water keeping the men day and night nearly waist deep in water, soon compelled them to abandon their positions. I will here state that every Confederate soldier in New Orleans, with the exception of one company, had been ordered to Corinth to join General Beauregard, in March, and the city was only garrisoned by about three thousand ninety day troops—called out by the Governor, at my request—of whom about one thousand two hundred had muskets, and the remainder shot guns of an indifferent description.

The river rose rapidly in April, and soon drove out Szymanski's regiment, which was removed to the west bank, about six miles above Fort Jackson. The whole country became one vast sheet of water, which rose in the forts and covered places heretofore safe from its encroachments. Under the tremendous pressure of this current and a storm of wind and rain, the second raft was broken away in the night of Friday, the eleventh of April, two days before the enemy first opened fire. The fourteen vessels of Montgomery River defence expedition had been ordered by the department, when completed, to be sent up to Memphis and Fort Pillow, but believing the danger of attack to be greater from below, I detained six of them at New Orleans, of which change the department was fully advised. At my suggestion, Governor Moore had also fitted up two steamers, which were sent to the forts below the city. A large number of fire-rafts were also constructed and steered down, and two small steamers were employed for the special purpose of towing these rafts into position where they could be most effective, so as to leave the armed vessels free to operate against the enemy. I telegraphed General Beauregard to send down the iron-clad ram Manassas, and when the Secretary of the Navy ordered the steamer Louisiana to be sent also up the river, I protested through the War Department, being satisfied that we required more heavy guns below. She was eventually permitted to go down the river on Sunday, the twentieth of April, but not in a condition to use her motive power with effect.

It was hoped that, notwithstanding this, she would be able to assume a position below Fort St. Philip, discovering the location of the mortar boats, and being herself proof against direct fire, dislodge the enemy with her guns, which were of very heavy calibre. Knowing, also, that the incessant bombardment kept General Duncan closely confined to Fort Jackson, so that he could give no orders to the river defence steamers, I placed the whole under the control of Captain Mitchell, the armed steamers as well as the tugs intended to tow down the fire-rafts. I will here state, that the river defence fleet proved a failure, for the very reasons set forth in my letter to the department of the fifteenth of April. Unable to govern themselves, and unwilling to be governed by others, their almost total want of sys-

tem, vigilance, and discipline, rendered them useless and helpless, when the enemy finally dashed upon them suddenly in a dark night. I regret very much that the department did not think it advisable to grant my request to place some competent head in charge of these steamers. Learning, subsequently, that the Louisiana was anchored above the forts and that the fire-rafts were not sent down, I telegraphed Captain Mitchell, requesting him to attend to it, and afterwards called upon Commodore Whittle and entreated him to order the steamer to take the desired position below the forts. This he declined to do, but telegraphed Captain Mitchell, telling him "to strain a point to place the vessel there, if, in his judgment, it was advisable." No change, however, was made, and in the night of the twenty-third March, I went down myself in a steamboat to urge Captain Mitchell to have the Louisiana anchored in the position indicated, also to ascertain why the fire-rafts were not sent down. A few moments after the attack commenced, and the enemy succeeded in passing with fourteen ships, as described in General Duncan's report, and the battle of New Orleans, as against ships of war, was over, I returned at once to the city, narrowly escaping capture, and giving orders to General Smith, in command of the interior lines, to prepare to make all possible resistance to the enemy's fleet at the earthwork batteries below the town, instructed Colonel Lovell to have several steamers ready to remove, as far as possible, the commissary and ordnance stores, being satisfied that the low developments at Chalmette could offer no protracted resistance to a powerful fleet, whose guns, owing to the high water, looked down upon the surface of the country, and could sweep away any number of infantry by an enfilading fire. These lines, as before remarked, were intended mainly to repel a land attack, but in a high stage of water were utterly untenable by infantry against guns afloat. It having been reported to me that a sufficient number of desperately bold men could easily be got together to board the enemy's vessels and carry them by assault, I authorized Major James to seize such steamers as might be necessary for his purpose, and to attempt it. He called for one thousand men by public advertisement, but being able to find but about a hundred who would undertake it, he abandoned the project. On the morning of the twenty-fifth the enemy's fleet advanced upon the batteries and opened fire, which was returned with spirit by the troops as long as their powder lasted, but with little apparent effect upon the enemy. The powder intended for this battery of thirty-two-pounders had been transferred by me to the steamer Louisiana a few days before, under the supposition that it would render much better service from her heavy rifles and shell guns than with a battery of light thirty-twos. For the operations at these works, you are respectfully referred to General Smith's report. The greater portion of the ordnance stores, provisions, and quarantine property, were sent from the city by rail or steamer, and a portion of the volunteers also took the cars for Camp Moore, seventy-eight miles distant on the Jackson Railroad. The greater part of the ninety-days' troops disbanded and returned to their homes. There were two or three regiments and smaller bodies of men raised for Confederate service, in the city at the time, but being entirely without arms of any kind they could be of no service, and were also ordered to Camp Moore. I adopted this course, recognizing the perfect absurdity of confronting more than one hundred guns afloat of the largest calibre, well manned and served, and looking down upon the city, with less than three thousand militia, mostly armed with indifferent shot guns. It would, in my judgment, have been a wanton and criminal waste of the blood of women and children, without the possibility of any good result, for the enemy had only to anchor one of his ships at Kenner to command the Jackson Railroad, and he could have reduced the city to ashes at his leisure, without being able to make any resistance whatever.

Why he did not occupy Kenner and cut off all exit from the city immediately, I do not understand. Presuming that he would do so, as a matter of course, I had requested Captains Poindexter and Gwathney, of the navy, to have all the steamers ready in Lake Pontchartrain, to carry the troops over to Madisonville, whence they could reach Camp Moore. A portion of them were taken over by this route. Knowing that the enemy would at once seize the Opelousas Railroad, and thus cut off the troops occupying the works on the coast of West Louisiana, I sent orders to the different commanding officers at Forts Livingston, Guiorr, Quitman, Berwick, and Chene, to destroy their guns, and taking their small arms, provisions, and ammunition, to join me at Camp Moore. Major Joy brought away the troops at the two latter forts in a very creditable manner, but those at the other works became demoralized, disbanded, and retired to New Orleans. I gave verbal instructions to Colonel Fuller to have the garrisons of Forts Pike and Macomb, battery Bienvenu, and Tower Dupre, ready to move at a moment's notice, as their posts were dependent on the city for provisions, and frequently for water. It was understood that the naval steamers, in connection with other vessels in the lake, should bring away these garrisons when called upon to do so; and after my arrival at Camp Moore, orders were given on the twenty-sixth to go for them, as I had been informed that Forts Jackson and St. Philip had been surrendered. Finding that this report was untrue, I immediately countermanded the orders, giving instructions that they should be held until further notice, but before either could reach Madisonville it was reported that the whole command was already at Covington. I advised Captain Poindexter to make his way to Mobile with his armed steamers, but he concluded to destroy them. We, however, procured from them some of the guns

and ordnance stores, which I ordered immediately to Vicksburg, to be put in position there.

On the twenty-fifth, Captain Bailey, of the Federal Navy, demanded the surrender of the city, and that the flags should be taken down, and the United States flag put up on the mint, custom-house, and other public buildings. To this demand I returned an unqualified refusal, declaring that I would not surrender the city or any portion of my command, but added, that feeling unwilling to subject the city to bombardment, and recognizing the utter impossibility of removing the women and children, I should withdraw my troops and turn it over to the civil authorities. This I did in compliance with the expressed opinion of all the prominent citizens around me—that it would be a useless waste of blood, without being productive of any beneficial results to the cause, for the troops to remain. Captain Bailey then returned to his ship, under escort through the city, at his own request, of two officers of my staff, Colonel Lovell and Major James, and I then advised the Mayor not to surrender the city, nor to allow the flags to be taken down by any of our people, but to leave it to the enemy to take them down himself. This advice was followed by the city authorities; but the idea being held out in their subsequent correspondence with the Federal officers, that they were placed in a defenceless condition by the withdrawal of the troops, but for which a different course might have been pursued, I promptly telegraphed to Major James, of my staff, then in the city, offering to return at once with my whole command, if the citizens felt disposed to resist to the last extremity, and remain with them to the end. I had deliberately made up my mind, that although such a step would be entirely indefensible, in a military point of view, yet if the people of New Orleans were desirous of signalizing their patriotism and devotion to the cause by the bombardment and burning of their city, I would return with my troops and not leave as long as one brick remained upon another. The only palliation for such an act would be, that it would give unmistakable evidence to the world that our people were in deadly earnest. This determination, plainly expressed in my despatches to Major James (herewith transmitted marked A), was read by him to the Mayor, and also to the city council, in presence of one or more prominent citizens. The opinion was generally and freely expressed by the Mayor and others, that the troops ought not to return. (See report of Major James, hereunto appended, marked B.) I went to the city myself, however, on the night of the twenty-eighth of April, and in order that there might be no mistake, made the same proposition in person to the Mayor. He said he did not think it advisable for the troops to return—that such a step would only be followed by a useless sacrifice of life, without any corresponding benefit, and urged decidedly that it be not done. I, however, addressed him a letter (herewith appended, marked C) declaring my willingness to return and share a bombardment with them, and waited until the night of the twenty-ninth for an answer, but receiving none in writing returned to Camp Moore. The same proposition was made by me, in the course of the day, to several prominent citizens, but was invariably discountenanced by them.

For a week after the withdrawal of the troops I had a number of officers in the city, and kept trains running regularly, which brought out a large amount of government property and stores, as well as those of the State of Louisiana. Nearly everything was brought away except the heavy guns and some property which persons in their fright had destroyed, and everything might have been saved had not persons refused to work for my officers, fearing that they might be subjected to punishment by the enemy. Many, also, refused to work for Confederate money, which occasioned some delay and difficulty in the removal of stores. I feel gratified, however, in being able to state that we brought away all the troops that would leave, and, including the property of the State, a greater amount in value than belonged to the government. What we failed to bring was from inability to get transportation. In this duty I was mainly assisted by Colonel Lovell, Major James, Major Ball, Captain Venables, and Lieutenant McDonald, to whom the government is greatly indebted for the safety of much valuable property. It was a source of great distress to me to see the result of months of toil and labor swept away in a few hours, but it was, in my opinion, mainly attributable to the following causes, which I could not by any possibility control:

1st. The want of a sufficient number of guns of heavy calibre, which every exertion was made to procure, without success.

2d. The failure through inefficiency and want of energy of those who had charge of the construction of the iron-clad steamers Louisiana and Mississippi, to have them completed in the time specified, so as to supply the place of obstructions; and, finally, the desertion of the officers in charge of the Louisiana to allow her (though not entirely ready) to be placed as a battery in the position indicated by General Duncan and myself. On these last points I could only advise and suggest, as they appertained to a separate and independent department, over which I had no control whatever. (See letter of Major James, hereunto appended, marked D.)

Opened fire on the thirteenth of April, which was kept up, at intervals, for five days, when the mortars opened, and, from that time, with but a single interruption of a few hours, a bombardment was kept up for seven days and nights, which, for great rapidity and accuracy of range, has no parallel. More than twenty-five thousand shells were thrown, of which not less than one-third fell within the limits of Fort Jackson, yet the garrison held out, although wet, without change of clothing, and exhausted for

want of rest and regular food, with a heroic endurance which is beyond all praise. That the enemy succeeded in passing a large portion of his fleet by the forts on a dark night, under a heavy fire, is due to no fault of the garrison of the forts. They did their whole duty, nobly and heroically, and had they been seconded, as they should have been, by the defences afloat, we should not have to record the fall of New Orleans.

To the officers of my staff, who underwent months of severe and arduous labor, collecting supplies, creating resources, with the most limited means, and preparing all sorts of materials and munitions of war by ingenious makeshifts, I return my thanks. Left in the city with a small force of badly armed militia, all opportunity for distinction or glory was cut off; yet they never flagged in their zeal and devotion to the cause. When the country knows all that was done, and under what disadvantages it was accomplished, I feel confident that their verdict will do ample justice to those who shared equally in the labors of preparation, while they were denied the glory of taking part in the defence. The battle for the defence of New Orleans was fought and lost at Forts Jackson and St. Philip.

The extraordinary and remarkable conduct of the garrisons of these forts, in breaking out in open mutiny, after covering themselves with glory by their heroic defence, is one of those strange anomalies for which I do not pretend to account. The facts are recorded and speak for themselves. The causes will, probably, never be known in full.

For the detailed accounts of the bombardment of the forts, and the engagements at the time of the passage of the fleets by them and the batteries at Chalmette, you are respectfully referred to the accompanying reports of Generals Duncan and Smith. There were no batteries except at these two points, for the reason that no guns could be procured to place in them. I had frequent occasion to regret that it was found impossible to give me control of the defences afloat as well as here. A single controlling head might have made all the resources more available and efficient in working out the desired result.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
M. LOVELL,
Major-General, commanding.

(A.)

CAMP MOORE, April 28, 1862.

Major James, New Orleans:

If the people are willing to stand the result, I will bring four thousand five hundred men down, as soon as I can give them arms and powder, and stay as long as a brick remains. It is their interest I am endeavoring to consult, not the safety of my men. I have nothing but infantry and two batteries of field artillery, which would be of no use against ships. I will come down myself if they wish it, and bring the men along as fast as ready. They are newly raised regiments, and are being now armed and equipped, as you know. Can begin to bring them down to-morrow, if that is the desire of the citizens. Shall I come down myself to-night? Will do so if I can be of any assistance, and leave General Smith to complete the organization, and bring down the five regiments when ready. The citizens must decide as to the consequences. I will come if it is wished, cheerfully.

M. LOVELL,
Major-General, commanding.

CAMP MOORE, April 28, 1862.

Major James, New Orleans:

I shall start down myself with an aid now, and am perfectly ready, if it is the desire of the city, to hold it to the end. It is for them to say, not me.

M. LOVELL,
Major-General, commanding.

(B.)

General M. Lovell:

SIR: I have the honor to report, that while I was in the city of New Orleans, on the twenty-seventh of April, executing your orders to assist in removing the government and State property, and while the negotiations were going on between the city authorities and the Federal officers for the surrender, I was informed that the nature of the replies to the naval commander was such as to throw some censure upon yourself, for leaving them, as the Mayor styled it, without military protection.

I deemed it my duty to advise you of this immediately, the result of which was the enclosed despatches from you, offering to return with your troops, and afford them all the protection in your power, but that the responsibility of any results that might ensue must rest upon the citizens themselves. I read your despatches to the city council, which was then in session, in presence of Mr. Pierre Soulé, who happened to be there at the time. That gentleman, who seemed to speak for the Mayor and council, most emphatically declared that you ought not to return with your troops, as did also the Mayor and members of the council. Several of them, however, declared that they would be glad to have you return alone, and see matters for yourself, to which effect I telegraphed you. You came to the city that evening, with a single Aide-de-Camp, and went with me to the Mayor's house, where you, in my presence, told him that the citizens should have no cause to say that they were obliged to submit for want of military protection; that you were ready and willing to bring your whole command into the city within twenty-four hours, and undergo a bombardment with them, if that was their desire. That you had withdrawn, to enable the citizens to decide the matter for themselves, as it was they, and not you, who had their families and property at stake. In reply, the Mayor earnestly declined your offer, stating that you

had done all in your power, and that it would be a useless waste of life to bring the troops into the city. He also urged you, by all means, to retire from the city for your own safety, and subsequently asked me to persuade you to leave as soon as possible, as he would be hung if the United States authorities found you were at his house.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
L. L. JAMES,
Volunteer Aide-de-Camp.

(C.)

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT No. 1, NEW ORLEANS.

Hon. John T. Monroe, Mayor of New Orleans:

SIR: When the enemy, having succeeded in passing our defences on the river with his fleet, anchored abreast the city, it was apparent that the infantry troops under my command could offer no effectual resistance, and their presence would only serve as a pretext and justification for them to open their guns upon a city crowded with women and children, whom it was impossible to remove. Under these circumstances, I determined at once to withdraw my troops, and leave it to the citizens themselves to agree upon the course of action to be pursued, in relation to the welfare of their families and property. I now beg leave to say, that if it is the determination of the people of the city to hold it at any and all hazards, I will return with my troops, and share the danger with them. That my return will be followed by bombardment, is, in my opinion, certain; but if that is the conclusion come to, I will afford all the protection in my power.

Very respectfully,
M. LOVELL,
Major-General, commanding.

(D.)

CAMP MOORE, April 30, 1862.

General M. Lovell, Commanding Department No. 1:

GENERAL: At your request, upon my return from Forts Jackson and St. Philip, I accompanied you to call upon Commodore Whittle, of the navy, at his headquarters in New Orleans, for the purpose of getting that officer, if possible, to place the iron-clad gunboat Louisiana in a position below Forts Jackson and St. Philip, from which she could enfilade the position of the enemy's mortar fleet, and drive them from it, thereby relieving the forts, for a time at least, from the heavy bombardment then going on, which would allow Brigadier-General Duncan to make such repairs as were necessary, and what was equally necessary, give the garrison some rest. The position designated for the vessel to be placed in was in an eddy upon the Fort St. Philip side of the river, and under the protection of the guns of both forts, and entirely out of the line of the bombardment; and it would require a change of position of the mortar fleet to enable them to strike the vessel with shell, if she could have been struck at all. All these facts were fully explained by yourself to Commodore Whittle, and he was requested by you, by all means, to place the vessel in said position, even if she was lost, as the maintaining the position then held by your troops in the forts, without this assistance, was merely a question of time. To this earnest appeal upon your part, Commodore Whittle telegraphed to Commander Mitchell, of the fleet stationed just above the forts, "to strain a point, *if in his judgment it was necessary*, to comply with your request, and place the Louisiana in the position before spoken of." As the result shows, the request of Commodore Whittle to Commander Mitchell was not complied with.

I make this statement *voluntarily*, in order that, if ever the question of the defences of New Orleans should arise, that you can have every evidence to show that it was not certainly the want of proper exertions on the part of the land forces which caused the fall of New Orleans.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
L. L. JAMES,
Volunteer Aide-de-Camp.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. K. DUNCAN.

NEW ORLEANS, LA., April 30, 1862.

Major J. G. Pickett, Assistant Adjutant-General, Department No. 1, Camp Moore, La.:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the bombardment of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, La., from the sixteenth to the twenty-fourth of April, 1862:

About the twenty-seventh of March I was informed by Lieutenant-Colonel E. Higgins, commanding Forts Jackson and St. Philip, composing a part of the coast defences under my command, that the enemy's fleet was crossing the bars, and entering the Mississippi river in force. In consequence, I repaired at once to that post, to assume the general command of the threatened attack upon New Orleans, which I had always anticipated would be made from that quarter. Upon my arrival, I found that Fort Jackson was suffering severely from transpiration and backwater, occasioned by the excessive rise in the river, and the continued prevalence of strong easterly winds. Notwithstanding every effort which could be made, the water kept daily increasing upon us, partly owing to the sinking of the entire site, and to the natural lowness of the country around it, until the parade-plain and casemates were very generally submerged to the depth of from three to eighteen inches. It was with the utmost difficulty, and only then by isolating the magazines, and by pumping day and night, that the water could be kept out of them.

As the officers and men were all obliged to live in these open and submerged casemates, they were greatly exposed to discomfort and

sickness, as their clothing and feet were always wet. The most of their clothing and blankets, besides, were lost by the fire hereinafter mentioned. Fort St. Philip, from the same causes, was in a similar condition, but to a lesser extent.

No attention having been previously paid to the repeated requisitions for guns of heavy calibre for these forts, it became necessary, in their present condition, to bring in and mount, and to build the platforms for the three ten-inch and three eight-inch columbiads, the rifled forty-two pounder, and the five ten-inch sea-coast mortars, recently obtained from Pensacola on the evacuation of that place, together with the two rifled seven-inch guns, temporarily borrowed from the naval authorities in New Orleans. It was also found necessary to prepare the old water battery to the rear of and below Fort Jackson, which had never been completed, for the reception of a portion of these guns, as well as to construct mortar-proof magazines and shell rooms within the same.

In consequence, also, of the character of the expected attack by heavy mortars, it was deemed advisable to cover all the main magazines at both forts with sand-bags to a considerable depth, to protect them against a vertical fire.

After great exertions, cheerfully made by both officers and men, and by working the garrisons by reliefs night and day, this work was all accomplished by the thirteenth of April. No sooner had the two rifled seven-inch navy guns been placed in position, however, than orders arrived to dismount one of them immediately, and to send the same to the city at once, to be placed on board of the iron-clad steamer Louisiana. I strongly remonstrated against this removal, by telegraph, but was informed in reply that the orders were imperative, and that the gun must be sent without fail. It was accordingly sent, but with great difficulty, owing to the overflow and the other causes stated. The garrisons of both forts were greatly fatigued and worn out by these labors, performed as they were under pressure, and within sight of the enemy, and owing to the many discomforts and disadvantages we were laboring under, in consequence of high water. In the mean time I had called upon the General commanding the department, for two regiments, to be stationed at the quarantine buildings, six miles above the forts, to act as a reserve force, and to co-operate with the forts, in case of a combined land and water attack. I also asked for Captain W. G. Mullen's company of scouts and sharpshooters, to be stationed in the woods below Fort Jackson, on the right bank of the river, for the purpose of picking off the officers and men from the enemy's vessels, when assuming their several positions of attack. Captain Mullen's company, of about one hundred and twenty-five men, was sent down as requested, and stationed in part in the point of woods below Fort Jackson, and the remainder on the Fort St. Philip side, opposite the raft obstructing the river. The Chalmette regiment, consisting of about five hundred men, Colonel Sysmauskie commanding, was sent to the quarantine. A part of it was stationed there, and company detachments were placed at the head of the several canals leading from the river into the back bays of the same, to guard against a land force being thrown in launches above us.

Four steamers of the river fleet, protected, and to a certain extent made shot-proof with cotton bulk-heads, and prepared with iron prows to act as rams, viz., the Warrior, Stonewall Jackson, Defiance, and Resolute, commanded by Captains Stephenson, Philips, McCoy, and Hooper, respectively, were sent down to report to and co-operate with me. The steamers Governor Moore and General Quitman, prepared as those before mentioned, and commanded by Captains B. Kennon and A. Grant, were sent down in like manner to co-operate with the forts, and ram such vessels of the enemy as might succeed in passing. The naval authorities also sent down the C. S. steam ram Manassa, Captain Warly, C. S. navy, commanding. She was stationed a short distance above Fort Jackson, with her steam up constantly, to act against the enemy as occasion might offer. Subsequently, also, Captain F. B. Renshaw, C. S. navy, arrived in command of the C. S. steamer Jackson. The raft of logs and chains, which had formerly been placed across the river, having proven a failure, upon the rise in the stream and the constant velocity of the drift-bearing current, a new obstruction had been placed across the river, opposite Fort Jackson, by Lieutenant-Colonel E. Higgins, prior to his assumption of the command of the forts. This consisted of a line of schooners anchored at intervals, with bows up stream, and thoroughly chained together amidships, as well as stern and stem. The rigging, ratlines, and cable, were left to trail astern of these schooners, as an additional impediment, to tangle in the propeller wheels of the enemy. This schooner raft was seriously damaged by the wind storm on the tenth and eleventh of April, which parted the chains, scattered the schooners, and materially affected its character and effectiveness as an obstruction.

In addition to the wind, the raft was also much damaged by allowing some of the fire-barges to get loose and drift against it, through the carelessness of those having them in charge. A large number of these fire-barges were tied to the banks above both forts, ready at all times to be towed into the current, and against the enemy, for the double purpose of firing his ships, and to light up the river by night to insure the accuracy of our fire. My instructions to the river fleet, under Captain Stephenson (see attached document A), were to be in the stream above the raft, with such boats as had stern guns, in order to assist the forts with their fire, in case the enemy should attempt the passage, as well as to turn in and ram at all hazards, all such vessels as might succeed in

getting above the raft. He was also required to take entire control of the fire-barges (see attached document B), to reconnoitre the enemy above the head of the passes, and to keep a watch boat below every night, near the point of woods, to signal the approach of the enemy. The diagram will illustrate all the points referred to in this report.

The same instructions were given to Captains Kennon and Grant, and, upon his arrival, Captain Renshaw was duly informed of the arrangements made, in which he promised heartily to co-operate. While the enemy remained at the head of the passes, twenty-two and a half miles below the forts, and, subsequently, when he came up to the Jump, or Wilder's Bayou, the boats of the river fleet took turns in running down and watching his movements. For a few nights, also, at this time, one of them was kept below as a guard boat. We had telegraphic communication, besides, down to within half a mile of the Jumps, nine miles below the forts, which, together with scouts operating in the bays to the east and west of the river, in skiffs and perogues, kept us duly posted, meanwhile, of the enemy's movements below, as far down as the South-west Pass. The enemy was not, meanwhile, idle in the interim. His large vessels worked over the South-west Bar, after failing to make an entrance at Pass a l'Outre, and the mortar fleet was brought up as far as the South-west Pilot Station, where the mortars were scaled and afterwards tested. From seven to thirteen steam sloops of war and gunboats were constantly kept at the Head of the Passes or at the Jump, to cover his operations below, and to prevent our observing his movements by way of the river. By gradual and regular approaches he carefully closed up the forts, day by day, and opened the attack as hereinafter detailed.

April 9.

One of our reconnoitring steamers was chased and followed up by two of the enemy's gunboats as far as the point of woods below Fort Jackson, but were soon forced to retire by a few shots from our batteries. This was his first reconnoissance and our fire was not returned.

April 13.

Several of the hostile gunboats again came up to make observations. They would occasionally show themselves, singly or in pairs, above the point of woods, and exchange a few shots with the forts, and then retire again behind the point. Our sharpshooters obtained a few shots on this occasion, but with very partial result, owing to the lowness of the surrounding country and the extreme rise in the river. Many of the men were up to their waists in water, and in consequence, sickness prevailed among them, and unfitted them for duty.

The enemy spent the principal part of the day in firing grape and canister, and in shelling the woods to drive them out. This was repeated the following day, the enemy not coming within range or sight of the forts, but confining himself to shelling the woods below. The sharpshooters were all driven out by this second day's firing. Our telegraphic communication below was also broken up, as the wires were removed, and many of the posts cut and torn down by the enemy.

There being no other point, above or below, where the sharpshooters could profitably act in that capacity, and as many of them were, unfit for duty from exposure, I deemed it advisable to dispense with their services and send them to the city, which was accordingly done.

It being of the highest importance, however, to keep up the telegraphic communication below, Lieutenant T. J. Royster's Company, sappers and miners, Twenty-second Louisiana volunteers, volunteered his services with fifteen men of his company, to act as sharpshooters in perogues, and cover the operator in repairing the line and re-establishing the connection with the forts above, as well as to annoy the enemy. This also failed, from the great difficulty of managing the perogues effectively in the dense undergrowth of the swampy woods below, and the telegraph and the sharpshooters had to be abandoned in consequence.

April 15.

The enemy brought up his whole fleet, extending the same from the Head of the Passes to the point of woods below the forts. Orders were repeatedly given to Captain Stephenson, of the river fleet, to cause the fire-barges to be sent down nightly upon the enemy; but every attempt seemed to prove a perfect abortion, the barges being cut adrift too soon, so that they drifted against the banks directly under the forts, firing our wharves and lighting us up, but obscuring the position of the enemy. In consequence, I turned the control of them, as well as the boats employed to tow them into the stream, over to Captain Renshaw, the senior naval officer present. I also directed Captains Kennon and Grant to report to him for orders, as I found great difficulty in communicating with or controlling the vessels afloat, and directed Captain Stephenson, with his four boats, to co-operate with Captain Renshaw in every possible way. These boats of the river fleet, it seemed, could not be turned over directly to the immediate command of naval officers, owing to certain conditions imposed by the Navy Department.

April 16.

From half-past seven o'clock A. M., the enemy's gunboats came round the point repeatedly for observation, but were invariably forced to retire by our fire. In the meantime he was locating the position of the mortar-flotilla, composed of twenty-one schooners, each mounting one thirteen-inch mortar and other guns, close against the bank on the Fort Jackson side, and behind the point of woods. At half-past four o'clock P. M., the enemy run out a gunboat and fired upon the fort, under cover of which two mortar-boats were brought out into the stream.

These boats opened fire upon Fort Jackson at five P. M., which was continued for an hour and a half, the enemy, under our fire, retiring behind the point of woods.

One fire-barge sent down successfully against the enemy at four o'clock A. M., which drifted in among his vessels and was fired upon by them, creating considerable movement and perturbation. During the day Captains Renshaw, Kennon, Scant, Stephenson, and Hooper passed in turn with their boats below the raft, now very much disconnected and scattered, and exchanged a few shots with the hostile gunboats and mortar-boats.

Two more abortive attempts were made to send down fire-barges against the enemy during the night.

April 18.

At nine o'clock A. M., the enemy opened upon Fort Jackson with his entire mortar-fleet of twenty-one vessels, and with rifled guns from his gunboats. Fifteen of them were concealed behind the point of woods, and the other six hauled out in the stream at an angle with them (see diagram), just at the extreme range of our heaviest guns. Our fire disabled one gunboat and one mortar-boat, causing those in the stream to retire behind the cover of the woods. Generally our shots fell short for lack of elevation, and in consequence of the inferiority of our powder compared to that of the enemy. Even our nearest gun—a ten-inch seacoast mortar—would not reach his boats with the heaviest charges. The enemy ceased firing at seven o'clock P. M., having fired this day two thousand nine hundred and ninety-seven mortar shells.

The quarters in the bastions were fired and burned down early in the day, as well as the quarters immediately without the fort. The citadel was set on fire and extinguished several times during the first part of the day; but later it became impossible to put out the flames, so that when the enemy ceased firing it was one burning mass, greatly endangering the magazines, which, at the time, were reported to be on fire. Many of the men, and most of the officers, lost their bedding and clothing by these fires, which greatly added to the discomforts of the overflow. The mortar fire was accurate and terrible, many of the shells falling everywhere within the fort, and disabling some of our best guns. I endeavored to get the naval forces to carry down fire-barges against the enemy so as to disperse it, but they were all let go above the raft, and with such a lack of judgment that they only lodged under the forts and did not reach the enemy.

(See attached document C.)

None of the boats acted as a guard-boat below the raft at night, so that in consequence the enemy sent up two launches to examine the character of the raft obstructing the river.

April 19.

The mortar-fleet again opened at half-past six o'clock A. M., and the fire was constantly kept up throughout the day. Gunboats constantly came above the point during the day to engage the forts, but were as constantly driven back by our fire. One of them we crippled, which was towed behind the point of woods. The enemy's fire was excellent, a large portion of his shells falling within Fort Jackson. The terre-plain, parade-plain, parapets, and platforms were very much cut up, as well as much damage done to the casemates. The magazines were considerably threatened, and one shell passed through into the casemates containing fixed ammunition. One ten-inch and one eight-inch columbiad, one thirty-two and one twenty-four pounder, and one ten-inch siege mortar, were disabled in the main work. Also two thirty-two-pounders in the water battery.

Bombardment continued very regularly and accurately all night. Failures again made in sending down fire-barges.

April 20.

Some rain in the morning. Bombardment constant throughout the day, with occasional shots from the gunboats around the point. Wind very high. No fire-barges sent down to light up the river or distract the attention of the enemy at night. In consequence, between eleven and twelve o'clock P. M., under cover of the heaviest shelling during the bombardment thus far, one of the enemy's gunboats came up in the darkness and attempted to cut the chains of the raft and drag off the schooners. A heavy fire was opened upon her, which caused her to retire, but not until she had partially accomplished her purpose. The raft after this could not be regarded as an obstruction. The fire continued uninterruptedly all night.

April 21.

Firing continued all day and all night without interruption. Several guns disabled. Disabled guns were repaired, as far as practicable, as often as accidents happened to them or their platforms. Fort Jackson by this time was in need of extensive repairs almost everywhere, and it was with extreme pleasure that we learned of the arrival, during the night, of the iron-clad steamer Louisiana, under the cover of whose heavy guns we expected to make the necessary repairs.

April 22.

By the direction of the Major-General commanding the department, everything afloat, including the towboats, and the entire control of the fire-barges, was turned over to Captain John K. Mitchell, C. S. Navy, commanding the C. S. Naval Forces, Lower Mississippi River. I also gave Captain Mitchell one hundred and fifty of our best men from Forts Jackson and St. Philip, under Lieutenants Dixon and Gandy, and Captain Ryan, to serve a portion of the guns of the Louisiana, and to act as sharpshooters on the same vessel. In an interview with Captain Mitchell, on the morning of this date, I learned that the motive power of the Louisiana was not likely to be completed within any reason-

able time, and that in consequence it was not within the range of probabilities that she could be regarded as an aggressive steamer, or that she could be brought into the pending action in that character. As an iron-clad, invulnerable floating-battery, with sixteen guns of the heaviest calibre, however, she was then as complete as she would ever be. Fort Jackson had already undergone, and was still subjected to, a terrible fire of thirteen-inch mortar shells, which it was necessary to relieve at once, to prevent the disabling of all the best guns at that fort. And although Fort St. Philip partially opened out the point of woods concealing the enemy, and gallantly attempted to dislodge him or draw his fire, he nevertheless doggedly persisted in his one main object, of battering Fort Jackson. Under these circumstances I considered that the Louisiana could only be regarded as a battery, and that her best possible position would be below the raft, close in on the Fort St. Philip's shore, where her fire could dislodge the mortar-boats from behind the point of woods, and give sufficient respite to Fort Jackson to repair in extenso. This position (X on the diagram herewith sent) would give us three direct and cross-fires upon the enemy's approaches, and at the same time insure the Louisiana from a direct assault, as she would be immediately under the guns of both forts. Accordingly, I earnestly and strongly urged these views upon Captain Mitchell, in a letter of this date (copy lost) but without avail, as will be seen by his reply attached as document D.

Being so deeply impressed myself with the importance of this position for the Louisiana, and of the necessity of prompt action, in order to insure the success of the impending struggle, I again urged this subject upon Captain Mitchell during the latter part of the same day, as absolutely indispensable and imperative to the safety of New Orleans, and to the control of the lower Mississippi. My efforts were ineffectual to get him to move the boat from her original position above the forts. His reply is attached as document E, in which he is sustained by all the naval officers present having the command of vessels. I also addressed him two other notes through the day, the one in regard to sending fire-barges against the enemy, and the other relative to keeping a vigilant lookout from all his vessels, and asking for co-operation, should the enemy attempt to pass during the night. (See attached document F.)

Bombardment continued during the day and night, being at times very heavy. During the day our fire was principally confined to shelling the point of woods from both forts, and with apparently good results, as the mortar-fire was slackened towards evening. The casemates were very much cut up by the enemy's fire, which was increased at night. There was little or no success in sending down fire-barges, as usual, owing in part to the condition of the tow-boats Mosher, Music, and Belle Algerine, in charge of the same, explained by attached document G. This does not excuse the neglect, however, as there were six boats of the river fleet available for this service, independent of those alluded to, and fire-barges were plentiful.

April 23.

The day broke warm, clear, and cloudless. No immediate relief being looked for from our fleet, the entire command was turned out to repair damages under a very heavy fire of the enemy.

The bombardment continued, without intermission, throughout the day, but slackened off about twelve o'clock M., at which hour there was every indication of an exhaustion on the part of the mortar-flotilla. Hence it became evident that the tactics of the enemy would necessarily be changed into an attack with broadsides by his larger vessels. In consequence, these views were laid before Captain Mitchell, and he was again urged to place the Louisiana at the point before mentioned, below the raft and near the Fort St. Philip bank of the river, to meet the emergency. (See attached Document H.) Captain Mitchell's reply is attached in documents E, I, J, and K, wherein he positively declines again to assume the only position which offered us every possible chance of success, and Captains McIntosh, Huger, and Warly sustain Captain Mitchell in his views of the case. Just before sundown, under a very heavy mortar-fire, the enemy sent up a small boat, and a series of white flags were planted on the Fort St. Philip bank of the river, commencing about three hundred and eighty yards above the lone tree upon that shore. This confirmed my previous views of an early and different attack from the usual mortar bombardment, especially as I presumed that these flags indicated the positions to be taken up by the several vessels in their new line of operation. As nothing was to be expected from the Louisiana, after the correspondence during the day, I could only inform Captain Mitchell of this new movement of the enemy (see attached document L), and particularly impress upon him the necessity of keeping the river well lit up with fire-barges, to act as an impediment to the enemy, and assist the accuracy of our fire in a night attack. Lieutenant Shyrock, C. S. N., Captain Mitchell's aid, came on shore about nine o'clock P. M., to inform me that the Louisiana would be ready for service by the next evening—the evening of the twenty-fourth.

I informed him that time was everything to us, and that to-morrow would, in all probability, prove too late. Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins warmly seconded my opinion, and warned Lieutenant Shyrock that the final battle was imminent within a few hours.

In regard to lighting the river, Lieutenant Shyrock stated that fire-barges would be regularly sent down throughout the night, every two hours, and as none had been sent up to that hour (9.30 o'clock P. M.), he left, informing

me that this matter would be attended to as soon as he arrived on board.

To my utter surprise, not one single fire-barge was sent down the river, notwithstanding, at any hour of this night. It was impossible for us to send them down, as everything afloat had been turned over to Captain Mitchell, by order of the Major-General commanding, and the fire-barges, and the boats to tow them into the stream, were exclusively under his control. In consequence of this criminal neglect, the river remained in complete darkness throughout the entire night. The bombardment continued all night, and grew furious toward morning.

April 24.

At 3.30 A. M., the larger vessels of the enemy were observed to be in motion, and, as we presumed, to take up the positions indicated by the small flags planted by them on the previous evening. I then made my last and final appeal to Captain Mitchell, a copy of which is attached as document M.

The Louisiana was still in her old position above Fort St. Philip, surrounded by her tenders, on board of which was the majority of her cannoniers and crew, and the other boats of the fleet were generally at anchor above her, excepting the Jackson, Captain Renshaw, C. S. N., commanding, which had been sent the day before, at my suggestion, to prevent the landing of forces through the canals above. The McRae lay near and above the Louisiana, and the steam-ram Manassas, with her tender, remained in her constant position above Fort Jackson, both with steam up, and ready for immediate action. The enemy evidently anticipated a strong demonstration to be made against him with fire-barges. Finding, upon his approach, however, that no such demonstration was made, and that the only resistance offered to his passage was the expected fire of the forts—the broken and scattered raft being then no obstacle —I am satisfied that he was suddenly inspired, for the first time, to run the gauntlet at all hazards, although not a part of his original design. Be this as it may, a rapid rush was made by him, in columns of twos in echelon, so as not to interfere with each other's broadsides. The mortar-fire was furiously increased upon Fort Jackson, and in dashing by, each of the vessels delivered broadside after broadside of shot, shell, grape, canister, and spherical case, to drive the men from our guns.

Both the officers and men stood up manfully under this galling and fearful hail, and the batteries of both forts were promptly opened at their longest range, with shot, shell, hot shot, and a little grape, and most gallantly and rapidly fought, until the enemy succeeded in getting above and beyond our range.

The absence of light on the river, together with the smoke of the guns, made the obscurity so dense that scarcely a vessel was visible, and in consequence, the gunners were obliged to govern their firing entirely by the flashes of the enemy's guns. I am fully satisfied that the enemy's dash was successful, mainly owing to the cover of darkness, as a frigate and several gunboats were forced to retire as day was breaking. Similar results had attended every previous attempt made by the enemy to pass or to reconnoitre, when we had sufficient light to fire with accuracy and effect. The passage was of short duration, having been accomplished between three and a half A. M., and daylight, under a very rapid and heavy pressure of steam. Of the part taken in this action by the Louisiana, Manassas, and the other vessels composing the co-operating naval forces, I cannot speak with any degree of certainty, excepting that the Louisiana is reported to have fired but twelve shots during the engagement. But to the heroic and gallant manner in which Captain Huger handled and fought the McRae, we can all bear evidence. The Defiance, Captain McCoy commanding, was the only vessel saved out of the river fleet.

Shortly after daylight the Manassas was observed drifting down by the forts. She had been abandoned and fired, and was evidently in a sinking condition.

The McRae was considerably cut up in this action by shot and grape.

The Resolute was run on shore about a mile above the forts, where she hoisted a white flag, but by the prompt action of the McRae, she was prevented from falling into the hands of the enemy. She was subsequently wrecked and burned. The Warrior was run ashore and fired on the point just above Fort St. Philip.

Nothing was known by us of the movements of the Stonewall Jackson, the Governor Moore, or the General Quitman. The steamers Moshier, Music, and Bell Algerine, in charge of the fire-barges, were all destroyed. So was also the Star. The heroic courage displayed by the officers and men at both forts was deserving of a better success, especially after the fortitude which they constantly exhibited through the long tedium of a protracted bombardment, unsurpassed for its terrible accuracy, constancy, and fury.

Thirteen of the enemy's vessels, out of twenty-three, succeeded in getting by, viz.: the Hartford, Pensacola, Richmond, Brooklyn, Mississippi, Oneida, Iroquois, Cayuga, Wissahickon, Sciota, Kineo, Katahdin, and Pinola. In addition to the foregoing, and to Varuna, and such other vessels as were sunk, there were six gunboats and one frigate engaged in this action, besides the mortar-flotilla. Heavy chains were flaked along the sides of the most of these vessels as an iron-proof protection. The extent of the damage which was done to the enemy we have no means of ascertaining. The vessels which passed all came to an anchor at or below quarantine, six miles above the forts, where they remained until about ten o'clock A. M., when they all passed slowly up the river, with the exception of two gunboats left at the quarantine as a guard.

Shortly after the fleet above got under weigh, a gunboat from below made her appearance with a

flag of truce, and verbally demanded the surrender of the forts, in the name of Commander D. D. Porter, U. S. Navy, commanding the mortar-flotilla, under the penalty of reopening the bombardment, which had ceased shortly after the passage, in case of refusal. The demand was rejected, and the bombardment was reopened about twelve o'clock M. It continued until near sundown, when it ceased altogether. The entire mortar-fleet, and all the other vessels excepting six gunboats, then got under weigh and passed down the river and out of sight, under full steam and sail. A vigilant lookout was kept up above and below during the night, but all remained quiet. So long as the mortar-fleet remained below, the position wherein the Louisiana could render the greatest assistance to the forts was the one below Fort St. Philip hereinbefore mentioned, where the fire from her batteries could dislodge the enemy from behind the point of woods.

After the mortar-fleet had left, however, and when the enemy had got in force above the forts, the question was materially changed, in consequence of the fact that all of our heavy guns at both forts had been mounted to bear upon the lower approaches, and not on those above.

The most effective position which the Louisiana could then take as a battery, was in the bight above Fort Jackson, where her guns could protect our rear, and sweep the long reach of river above, towards the quarantine. This would still insure her safety, as she would be under the guns of both forts. This is evident by a reference to the point (XX) on the diagram.

In several personal interviews, and by correspondence with Captain Mitchell on this date (see attached documents N, O, P, Q, and R), I requested him, during the morning of the twenty-fourth, while the mortar-fleet was below, to place the Louisiana below the raft and dislodge it; and later in the day, when the mortar-fire was nearly exhausted, to place her in the position (XX), above Fort Jackson, to assist in repelling an attack from the vessels above.

During the day she was in an unfit condition to assume either position, for the reasons given by Captain Mitchell in his letters to me. The intoxicated volunteers referred to were none of my men, nor did they get their liquor at the forts, as there was none on hand there during the bombardment, excepting the small supplies of hospital stores in the medical department.

April 25.

No attack attempted during the day by the enemy, either from above or below. The gunboats from the quarantine and from the point of woods below occasionally showed themselves for observation, but without firing. During the day all the principal guns that would admit of it at both forts were prepared at once so as to traverse in a full circle, and bear above or below as necessity might require. Some of the twenty-four pounder barbette guns at Fort Jackson were also replaced by guns of heavier calibre, to bear on the river above.

Permission was granted by the enemy to the Confederate States Steamer McRae to proceed to New Orleans, under a flag of truce, with the wounded. Availing ourselves of the offer of Captain Mitchell, the seriously wounded of both forts were sent on board of her. As it was late when the wounded were all gotten on board, the McRae did not get off until the next morning. Still failed during the day in getting Captain Mitchell to place the Louisiana in the bight above Fort Jackson, where she could act against the enemy from above. One of the raft schooners was burned during the night to light the river, and all remained quiet.

April 26.

A gunboat with a white flag dropped down from the quarantine to escort the McRae on her mission. The McRae did not again return to the forts. Four of the enemy's steamers were in sight at the quarantine at dawn. A gunboat occasionally showed herself below to reconnoitre. In the direction of Bird Island, and back of the salt works, a large steam frigate and an ordinary river steamer appeared in sight, the latter working her way up the bay behind Fort St. Philip, apparently towards the quarantine. During the day Captain Mitchell communicated with the enemy above, under a flag of truce, and learned that the city had surrendered, and that the Confederate States steam ram Mississippi had been burned by our authorities. The wreck of the floating dock or battery drifted by the forts about four o'clock P. M.

The Louisiana was not placed in the position required of her during the day, Captain Mitchell promising to put her there the next day, the twenty-seventh. Another raft-schooner burned for light, and all quiet during the night. No shots exchanged during the day.

April 27.

At daylight, the steamer which had been observed the day before working her way up the back bays, was in view, immediately in the rear of Fort St. Philip, and near the mouth of the Fort Bayou. A frigate and five other vessels were also in sight towards Bird Island, one of which was seen working her way up the bay. From ten to thirteen launches were visible near the boat, back of Fort St. Philip, by means of which troops were being landed at the quarantine above us. About twelve o'clock M., one of the enemy's gunboats from below made her appearance, under a flag of truce, bearing a written demand for the surrender of the forts, signed by Commander David D. Porter, U. S. N., commanding mortar-flotilla. (See attached document S.) The forts refused to surrender. (See attached document T.) About four o'clock P. M., the French man-of-war Milan, Captain Clouet commanding, passed up to the city, after asking and obtaining permission to do so. The position of the Louisiana still remained unchanged.

So far, throughout the entire bombardment and final action, the spirit of the troops was

cheerful, confident, and courageous. They were mostly foreign enlistments, without any great interests at stake in the ultimate success of the revolution. A reaction set in among them during the lull of the twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, and twenty-seventh, when there was no other excitement to arouse them than the fatigue duty of repairing our damages, and when the rumor was current that the city had surrendered, and was in the hands of the enemy. No reply had been received from the city to my despatches, sent by couriers, on the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth, by means of which I could reassure them. They were still obedient, but not buoyant and cheerful. In consequence, I endeavored to revive their courage and patriotism, by publishing an order to both garrisons, attached hereto as document U. I regret to state that it did not produce the desired effect. Everything remained quiet, however, until midnight, when the garrison at Fort Jackson revolted *en masse*, seized upon the guard and posterns, reversed the field-pieces commanding the gates, and commenced to spike the guns, while many of the men were leaving the fort in the meantime, under arms. All this occurred as suddenly as it was unexpected.

The men were mostly drawn up under arms, and positively refused to fight any longer, besides endeavoring by force to bring over the St. Mary's cannoniers, and such other few men as remained true to their cause and country. The mutineers stated that the officers intended to hold out as long as possible, or while the provisions lasted, and then blow up the forts and everything in them; that the city had surrendered, and that there was no further use in fighting; that the enemy were about to attack by land and water, on three sides at once, and that a longer defence would only prove a butchery. Every endeavor was made by the officers to repress the revolt, and to bring the men to reason and order, but without avail. Officers upon the ramparts were fired upon by the mutineers, in attempting to put a stop to the spiking of the guns.

I am greatly indebted to the Rev. Father Nachon for his efforts to quell the mutineers, through some of whom he learned that the revolt had been discussed among them for two days, and yet there was no one man true enough to communicate the fact to his officers. Signals also were said to have been passed between the forts during the night, and while the mutiny was at its height. Being so general among the men, the officers were helpless and powerless to act.

Under these circumstances, there was but one course left, viz.: to let those men go who wished to leave the fort, in order to see the number left, and to ascertain what reliance could be placed upon them. About one-half of the garrison left immediately, including men from every company, excepting the St. Mary's cannoniers, volunteers and regulars, non-commissioned officers and privates, and among them many of the very men who had stood last and best to their guns throughout the protracted bombardment and the final action when the enemy passed. It was soon evident that there was no fight in the men remaining behind, that they were completely demoralized, and that no faith or reliance could be placed in the broken detachments of companies left in the fort.

In the mean time we were totally ignorant of the condition of affairs in Fort St. Philip, and as all of our small boats had been carried away by the mutineers, we could not communicate with that fort till the next morning. As the next attack upon the forts was likely to be a combined operation by land and water, and as Fort St. Philip was the point most threatened, from the nature of the country around it, and from the character of the work itself, with narrow and shallow ditches, and but little relief to the main work, it was self-evident that no reduction could be made in its garrison to strengthen that of Fort Jackson, even if all the men there remained true. In fact, two additional regiments had been asked for at quarantine, in anticipation of such an attack, to act as a reserve to strengthen the garrisons of both forts. With the enemy above and below us, it will be apparent at once, to any one at all familiar with the surrounding country, that there was no chance of destroying the public property, blowing up the forts, and escaping with the remaining troops. Under all these humiliating circumstances, there seemed to be but one course open to us, viz.: to await the approach of daylight, communicate then with the gunboats of the mortar flotilla below, under flag of truce, and negotiate for a surrender under the terms offered us by Commander Porter, on the 26th inst., and which had previously been declined.

April 28.

A small boat was procured, and Lieutenant Morse, Post-Adjutant, sent over to convey the condition of affairs to Fort St. Philip, as well as to Captain Mitchell, on the Louisiana. Captain Mitchell and Lieutenant Shyrock, C. S. N., came on shore and discussed the whole question; after which they left, remarking that they would go on board, and endeavour to attack the enemy above at the quarantine, notwithstanding that reasons had been given, from time to time, for not moving this vessel into her proper position, only a few hundred yards distant. Captains Squires and Bond, Louisiana artillery, and Lieutenant Dixon, commanding the company of C. S. regular recruits, came on shore shortly afterwards from Fort St. Philip, and concurred with us that, under the circumstances, we could do nothing else than surrender, as they were not at all confident of the garrison there, after the unlooked-for revolt at Fort Jackson, although none of their men had left, or openly revolted.

For these reasons, a flag of truce was sent down to communicate with the enemy below, and to carry a written offer of surrender under the terms offered on the 26th instant. (See attached Document V.) This communication

brought up the Harriet Lane and three other gunboats opposite the fort, with white flags at the fore, white flags being displayed from the yards of the flag-masts at both forts, while the Confederate flags waved at the mast-heads. While negotiations were pending on the Harriet Lane, it was reported that the steamer Louisiana, with her guns protruding, and on fire, was drifting down the river towards the fleet. As the wreck, in descending, kept close into the Fort St. Philip shore, the chances were taken by the enemy without changing the position of his boats.

The guns of the Louisiana were discharged at random as she floated down, and the boat finally blew up near Fort St. Philip, scattering its fragments everywhere within and around the fort, killing one of our men and wounding three or four others.

Captain McIntosh, C. S. N., who had been severely wounded in the discharge of his duty on the night of the enemy's passage, and who was then lying in a tent at that fort, was nearly killed also. As far as I could learn, however, the Louisiana was fired prior to the time that the enemy's boats, with white flags, came to an anchor abreast of the forts to negotiate. She was fired in her first and original position, without any change of any kind since her arrival at the forts.

The terms of capitulation are attached hereto as Document W, in addition to which Commander Porter verbally agreed not to haul down the Confederate flag or hoist the Federal, until the officers should get away from the forts.

The officers of Fort Jackson and the St. Mary's cannoniers left about four o'clock P. M., for the city, on board of the United States gunboat Kennebeck, and arrived on the morning of the twenty-ninth in New Orleans. The officers of Fort St. Philip were sent up the next day, and all the men subsequently, within a few days, as transportation could be furnished, excepting the men who revolted on the night of the twenty-seventh, many of whom enlisted with the enemy. Upon my arrival in the city I found the enemy's vessels were lying off the town, and that no flag, excepting that of the State of Louisiana, on the City Hall, was visible upon the shore. I also learned that Flag-officer Farragut had directed it to be hauled down and the United States flag hoisted in its stead, upon the penalty of shelling the city within forty-eight hours if the demand was not complied with, and that he had warned the city authorities to remove the women and children within the time specified.

I therefore deemed it my duty to call at once upon the Mayor at the City Hall, and inform him of the fate of the forts below, which I did accordingly. Learning there, from one of his aids, that the Major-General commanding the department was still in the city, I called upon him in person, and verbally reported the main incidents of the bombardment, the passage of the enemy, and the capitulation of the forts.

I have the honor to enclose herewith the report of Lieutenant-Colonel E. Higgins, Twenty-second regiment Louisiana volunteers, commanding Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and those of the different company and battery commanders, together with the Surgeon's reports of the killed and wounded. The report of Colonel Szymanski, commanding the Chalmette regiment at quarantine, has not been received by me, so that I am unable to report upon his operations.

I fully endorse the just praise bestowed in the enclosed reports upon the officers at both forts, and warmly return them my thanks. They all distinguished themselves by cool courage, skill, and patriotism throughout the entire bombardment, and by the patient fortitude with which they bore the several trying ordeals of water, fire, and the energetic fury of the enemy's protracted and continuous fire.

I must also bear testimony to the cheerful courage and prompt and willing obedience with which the men performed their duties throughout the bombardment, and up to the sad night when they took the rash and disgraceful step of rising against their officers, breaking through all discipline, and leading to such disastrous and fatal consequences. I can charitably account for it only on the grounds of great reaction after the intense physical strain of many weary days and nights of terrible fire, during which they were necessarily subjected to every privation from circumstances beyond our control, but which they had not the moral courage to share and sustain with their officers, all of whom were subjected to the same hardships in every particular.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins, commanding the forts, my thanks are especially due, for his indefatigable labors in preparing his heavy batteries, preparatory to the attack, almost in the face of the enemy, and for the quiet, skilful, and judicious manner in which he caused them to be fought. He was present everywhere, and did his whole duty well and thoroughly. Captain M. T. Squires, Louisiana regiment of artillery, as senior officer in charge of Fort St. Philip, under orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins, commanding, fully sustained every anticipation entertained of his gallantry, skill, and efficiency.

During the first day's bombardment, when Captain Anderson was wounded, my Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenant William M. Bridges, Louisiana artillery, volunteered to command the ten-inch columbiads on the main work, and I return him my thanks for the gallant and efficient manner in which he fought them during the rest of the action.

I take great pleasure in making personal mention of my volunteer aides, Captain William Y. Seymour and Captain Y. R. Smith, for the valuable assistance which they rendered me at all times. My thanks are also due to Doctors Bradbury and Foster, who volunteered their services to assist Assistant Surgeons L. Burk and C. D. Lewis, at Forts Jackson and St. Philip

respectively, and most efficiently did they aid in this department. Doctor Bradbury remained at Fort Jackson until its fall, and was paroled. Doctor Foster, at my request, accompanied the wounded soldiers to the city on the Confederate steamer McRae.

Messrs. Fulda, Stickney, and Sergeant Y. R. Poindexter, Fourth Mississippi volunteers, telegraphic operators, rendered the most valuable services in keeping open our communication above and below, under the most dangerous and difficult circumstances. Although we have failed in our mission of keeping the enemy's fleet from passing the forts, and have been subjected to the deep humiliation of surrendering the charge intrusted to our keeping to the enemies of our country, I must nevertheless state, in common justice to myself and those under my command, that to the very best of our ability, with the means at our disposal, our whole duty was performed faithfully, honestly, and fearlessly. If all had to be gone through with again, under similar events and circumstances, I know that we should be forced to the same results and consequences.

Great as the disaster is, it is but the sheer result of that lack of cheerful and hearty co-operation from the defences afloat, which we had every right to expect, and to the criminal negligence of not lighting up the river at night, when the danger was imminent, and the movements of the enemy absolutely known, almost to the hour of the final attack. Except for the cover afforded by the obscurity of the darkness, I shall always remain satisfied that the enemy would never have succeeded in passing Forts Jackson and St. Philip.

I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. K. DUNCAN,
Brigadier-General, late commanding Coast Defences.

NEW ORLEANS, LA., May 13, 1862.

Major J. G. Pickett, Assistant Adjutant-General, Department No. 1, Camp Moore, La.:

MAJOR: In addition to the foregoing report, I wish to add, that upon the arrival of the paroled enlisted men from Forts Jackson and St. Philip in this city, I endeavored, to the best of my ability, to see that they were properly cared for, until such time as they could be sent out of town. As far as it could be done, they were paid in part for the time due, and arrangements were also made through the City Safety Committee to have them boarded and lodged temporarily, all with the view of preventing them from going over to the enemy through distress and starvation. In this I was very much assisted by Captain M. T. Squires, and First Lieutenant L. B. Taylor, Louisiana regiment of artillery. Notwithstanding that they were thus amply provided for, scores of them have been daily going over to the enemy and enlisting since, until now there are but a very few left from either fort not in the ranks of the enemy. Although I really did think, at the time of the surrender, that some few of the men were loyal, the facts which have since come to light have perfectly satisfied me that nearly every man in both forts was thoroughly implicated and concerned in the revolt on the night of the twenty-seventh of April, with the exception of the company of St. Mary's cannoniers, composed mostly of planters.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. K. DUNCAN,
Brigadier-General, late commanding Coast Defences.

(DOCUMENT A.)

FORTS JACKSON AND ST. PHILIP, LA., April 6, 1862.

Captain Stephenson, commanding River Fleet, present:

CAPTAIN: Keep your boats in constant readiness at all times for the enemy's approach. Should he attack, all your fleet must be kept above the raft, and such of your boats as have stern guns should lay in the middle of the stream above the raft, and without the field of our fire, and use these guns against the enemy.

Should any boat of the enemy by any means get above the raft, you must instantly ram it with determination and vigor, at all risks and at every sacrifice. All signal mast-head lights should be kept extinguished at night, or never hoisted. Trusting to your known energy, and to the great expectations anticipated of the river fleet by your friends, I have every confidence that your whole duty will be thoroughly performed.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. K. DUNCAN,
Brigadier-General.

(B.)

HEADQUARTERS FORTS JACKSON AND ST. PHILIP, April 9, 1862.

Captain Jno. A. Stephenson, commanding River Fleet, present:

CAPTAIN: Keep one of your boats constantly below, night and day, opposite the wooded point, where you can watch the movements of the enemy. Signal us his approach, and the number of vessels seen coming up, and give me a copy of the signals for our government at the forts.

I wish you to take the entire control of the fire-rafts, and you will be assisted therein by the steamers Star, Algerine, and such other boats as I can procure from the city for the purpose.

Your own knowledge of the river and the currents will enable you to set them adrift at such time as your judgment warrants.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. K. DUNCAN,
Brigadier-General, commanding Coast Defences.

(C.)

JACKSON, April 18, 1862.

Colonel Higgins:

DEAR SIR: Yours just received. The fire-barge was sent down, as I supposed, by your

order. Captain Grant accompanied me to select a proper place to let her go. She was fired by my order, but was not aware that she was too close to the fort, but the *eddy* current, after firing, probably brought her into too close proximity to the fort. I regret the affair was an abortion.

Respectfully,
T. B. RENSHAW,
C. S. N.

(D.)

C. S. STEAMER LOUISIANA, OFF FORT JACKSON, April 22, 1862.

General J. K. Duncan, commanding Coast Defences, Fort Jackson:

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of yours of this date, asking me to place the Louisiana in position below the raft this evening if possible.

This vessel was hurried away from New Orleans before the steam power and batteries were ready for service.

Without a crew, and in many respects very incomplete, and this condition of things is but partially remedied now, she is not yet prepared to offer battle to the enemy; but, should he attempt to pass the forts we will do all we can to prevent it, and it was for this purpose *only* that she was placed in position where necessity might force her into action, inadequately prepared as she is at this moment.

We have now at work, on board, about fifty mechanics, as well as her own crew, and those from other vessels, doing work essential to the preparation of the vessel for battle. Under these circumstances, it would, in my estimation, be hazarding too much to place her under the fire of the enemy.

Every effort is being made to prepare her for the relief of Fort Jackson—the condition of which is fully felt by me; and the very moment I can venture to face our enemy with any reasonable chance of success, be assured, General, I will do it, and trust that the result will show you that I am now pursuing the right course.

I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JNO. K. MITCHELL,
Commanding C. S. Naval Forces, Lower Miss.

P. S.—The Jackson, with launch No. 3, will go up to the quarantine this afternoon, to watch the enemy, as suggested in your note this morning.

Respectfully, etc.,
J. K. M.

(E.)

C. S. STEAMER LOUISIANA, NEAR FORT JACKSON, April 23, 1862.

General J. K. Duncan, commanding Coast Defences, Fort Jackson:

GENERAL: On the receipt, last night, of your second communication of yesterday's date, asking me to place this vessel under the fire of the enemy, I consulted the commanding officers of the C. S. naval vessels present on the subject, and herewith annex a copy of their opinion, sustaining my own views on the subject.

I feel the importance of affording relief to your command as soon as possible; but, General, at the same time I feel, and I *know*, the importance to the safety of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and the city of New Orleans, of having this vessel in proper condition before seeking an encounter with the enemy. If he seeks one, or attempts the passage of the forts before this vessel is ready I shall meet him, however unprepared I may be.

We have an additional force of mechanics from the city this morning, and I hope that by to-morrow night the motive power of the Louisiana will be ready, and in the meantime her battery will be in place, and other preparations will be completed, so as to enable her to act against the enemy. When ready, you will be immediately advised.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JNO. K. MITCHELL,
Commanding C. S. Naval Forces, Lower Miss.

C. S. STEAMER LOUISIANA, NEAR FORT JACKSON, April 22, 1862.

Two communications having this day been received from Brigadier-General Duncan (herewith attached, marked Nos. 1 and 3, and also the answer of Commander J. K. Mitchell, No. 1, marked No. 2), requesting that the Louisiana be placed in position below the raft in the river, near Fort Jackson, a consultation was held by Commander J. K. Mitchell with Commander McIntosh and Lieutenants commanding Huger and Warley, who fully sustained the views of Commander Mitchell, as expressed in his reply (marked No. 2), declining to comply with the request of Brigadier-General Duncan.

C. F. MCINTOSH,
Commanding C. S. N.
T. B. HUGER,
Lieutenant, commanding.
N. S. WARLEY,
Lieutenant, commanding.
GEORGE S. SHYROCK,
Lieutenant C. S. N., Aide to commanding officer.

(F.)

C. S. STEAMER LOUISIANA, FORT JACKSON, April 22, 1862.

General J. K. Duncan, commanding Coast Defences at Fort Jackson:

GENERAL: Your two notes of this date have been received. A fire has been ordered to be built below St. Philip, as you requested, except that it will be on the beach, and a raft will be kept ready to fire and turn adrift, as you requested, near Fort Jackson, in the event of the apprehended attack being made by the enemy to-night. I shall also direct a vigilant lookout to be kept by all the vessels, and to co-operate with you to prevent the passage of the forts at every hazard.

Your request respecting the report of the bad

condition of the engines of the Mosher will claim my attention as soon as possible.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JOHN K. MITCHELL,
Commanding C. S. Naval Forces, Lower Mississippi.

(G.)

C. S. STEAMER LOUISIANA, OFF FORT JACKSON, April 22, 1862.

To Lieutenant commanding Huger, Assistant Engineer ———, Assistant Engineer ———, C. S. Steamer McRae, off Fort Jackson:

GENTLEMEN: The steamers Mosher and Belle Algerine having been represented as being unfit for service, you will please to examine them carefully, without delay, and report to me in duplicate their condition. In the performance of this duty, please state the cause of any damage you may discover, with such recommendations as, in your judgment, you may deem proper.

I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JOHN K. MITCHELL,
Commanding C. S. Naval Forces, Lower Mississippi River.

Captain Huger will fill up the blanks with the names of the two engineers he thinks most suitable for the service, belonging to the McRae.

C. S. STEAMER LOUISIANA, April 22, 1862.

Samuel Brock, Senior Engineer, McRae:

SIR: In obedience to your order, we have held a survey upon the steamer Belle Algerine and the tug Mosher. The latter has, we think, loosened the after-bearing of her shaft. This we can, I think, obviate in a few hours. The Belle Algerine leaks badly in the bows from two holes knocked in her, the Captain reports, while working in the raft, and also while landing guns at Fort St. Philip. This we can also remedy, and are now doing so. I trust by to-night both vessels will be serviceable.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
T. B. HUGER,
Commanding McRae.

John K. Duncan, Commanding Coast Defences:

GENERAL: Above you will see the report on the vessels reported to you as unfit for service. I send it for your information.

Respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JOHN K. MITCHELL,
Commanding C. S. Naval Forces.

(H.)

FORT JACKSON, LA., April 23, 1862.

Captain J. K. Mitchell, commanding Naval Forces, Lower Mississippi River:

CAPTAIN: I am of the opinion that the mortar practice of the enemy against Fort Jackson must be nearly exhausted, and that there is every indication that the enemy, as the next plan of attack, is about to move his large vessels to the point of woods, and open upon us with his broadsides. One of the large vessels has already been brought up and placed in position. Should the above prove to be the case, it is imperatively and absolutely necessary that the batteries of the Louisiana should be brought into action, as well as those of Forts Jackson and St. Philip.

A proper position for the Louisiana would be on the Fort St. Philip side, a short distance below the raft and close to the shore, which will give us three direct and cross-fires upon the point of attack.

Earnestly calling your attention to this subject, and as you can see from your position the movements of the enemy, you will, consequently, know when to act,

I remain, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. K. DUNCAN,
Brigadier-General, commanding Coast Defences.

(I.)

C. S. STEAMER LOUISIANA, NEAR FORT JACKSON, April 23, 1862.

Brigadier-General J. K. Duncan, commanding Coast Defences, Fort Jackson:

GENERAL: I am in receipt of your letter of this date, in which you express your belief that the enemy is about to change his place of attack, and open the broadside of his larger ships on the forts, and in which you make certain suggestions as to the position to be taken by this ship.

By reference to a letter of mine to you of yesterday's date, and of (No. 1) of this date, you will be apprised of the condition of this ship. Should an attack be made as anticipated, I shall be governed by circumstances, and do all I can against the enemy.

I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JOHN K. MITCHELL,
Commanding C. S. Naval Forces, Lower Mississippi

(J.)

C. S. STEAMER LOUISIANA, OFF FORT JACKSON, April 23, 1862.

General J. K. Duncan, commanding Coast Defences, Fort Jackson:

SIR: I enclose herewith a copy of a communication received on the twenty-first inst., from Captain Stevenson, from which you will perceive that, notwithstanding General Lovell's order to him, this letter so qualifies my authority as to relieve me from all responsibility as to the movements of the vessels of the river fleet under his command.

I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JOHN K. MITCHELL,
Commanding C. S. Naval Forces, Lower Mississippi.

(K.)

RIVER DEFENCE, C. S. GUNBOAT WARRIOR, FORT JACKSON, April 21, 1862.

Commander J. K. Mitchell, Confederate States Navy:

SIR: I am in receipt of an order from Major-General M. Lovell, dated twentieth instant, in which I am directed to place myself and my whole command at this point under your orders. Every officer and man on the river defence expedition, joined it with the condition that it was to be independent of the navy, and that it would not be governed by the regulations of the navy, or be commanded by naval officers. In the face of the enemy I will not say more. I will cooperate with you, and do nothing without your approbation, and will endeavor to carry out your wishes to the best of my ability, but in my own way as to the details and the handling of my boats. But I expect the vessels under my charge to remain as separate command. All orders for their movements, addressed to me, will be promptly executed if practicable, and I undertake to be responsible for their efficiency when required. I suppose this is all that is intended by the order of Major-General Lovell, or that will be expected from me by you.

Respectfully yours, &c.,
JOHN A. STEVENSON,
Senior Captain, commanding River Fleet at Fort Jackson.

Our signals should be made to assimilate at once. Captain Renshaw and myself could arrange this if you wish, as no doubt but you are greatly fatigued, and still much to do and arrange. Anything I can do, rely on it being done promptly and cheerfully.

Yours, &c., J. A. S.

(L.)

FORT JACKSON, LA., April 23, 1862.

Captain J. K. Mitchell, commanding Naval Forces, Lower Mississippi River:

CAPTAIN: The enemy has just sent up a small boat, and planted a series of white flags on the Fort St. Philip side, commencing about three hundred and fifty yards above the lone tree. It is the probable position of his ships in the new line of attack which, in my opinion, he contemplates for attacking Fort Jackson with his large vessels. As you may not have seen this operation, I furnish you with the information. Please keep the river well lit up with fire-rafts tonight, as the attack may be made at any time.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. K. DUNCAN,
Brigadier-General, commanding Coast Defences.

(M.)

FORT JACKSON, LA.—3½ o'clock A. M., April 24, 1862.

Captain J. K. Mitchell, commanding Naval Forces, Lower Mississippi River:

CAPTAIN: As I anticipated, and informed you yesterday, the enemy are taking up their position at the present moment, with their large ships on the Fort St. Philip shore, to operate against Fort Jackson. They are placing themselves boldly, with their lights at their masthead. You are assuming a fearful responsibility if you do not come at once to our assistance with the Louisiana and the fleet. I can say no more.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. K. DUNCAN,
Brigadier-General.

(N.)

C. S. GUNBOAT LOUISIANA, NEAR FORT ST. PHILIP, April 24, 1862.

Brigadier-General J. K. Duncan, commanding Coast Defences, Fort Jackson:

GENERAL: On returning to the Louisiana, I find that we have no tender on whose steam-power we can rely, and many of the volunteer troops on board of the W. Burton are intoxicated. Under these circumstances, as well as the exhausted condition of our own crew, and excessive difficulty in handling the vessel, will prevent our taking the position, at least to-day, that I proposed, and was arranged between us this forenoon.

I will, however, as you suggested in your communication, take up a position above, to protect the approaches in that direction.

Having no adequate motive power of our own, it will be an easy matter for the enemy's vessels that have it to take up such a position that our guns cannot reach him for want of elevation, or be brought to bear upon him. I will, however, do all I can to keep him back from above.

The McRae has lost her nine-inch gun; of course we cannot expect much assistance from her.

I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. K. MITCHELL,
Commanding C. S. Naval Forces, Lower Miss.

(O.)

C. S. STEAMER LOUISIANA, FORT ST. PHILIP, April 24, 1862.

General J. K. Duncan, commanding Coast Defences, Fort Jackson:

GENERAL: Your second and third notes of this date, are at hand. We are in a helpless condition for the want of tug-boats. The W. Burton is crippled, and the Landis also, and the gunboat Defiance will not do anything for us. If she comes within my reach I will deprive her captain of his command, by force if necessary.

The anchor we have down cannot purchase, and we are afraid to ship it, to move about three hundred yards higher up, where we can be better secured.

We shall probably remain where we are, and do all we can to defeat the enemy, should he attack us again.

It will be out of our power, I am afraid, to light up the bank below St. Philip to-night, or to set adrift fire-boats, as none are at hand, and they have all disappeared, apparently.

I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JNO. K. MITCHELL,
Commanding C. S. Naval Forces, Lower Miss.

(P.)

FORT JACKSON, LOUISIANA, April 24, 1862.

Captain J. K. Mitchell, commanding C. S. Naval Forces, Lower Miss.:

CAPTAIN: From all we can see and learn, the enemy, with the exception of one or two gun-boats, has passed up the river, so that there will be no use in changing your present position to one further above. I regret to learn the condition of the volunteer troops on board the W. Burton. This, together with the exhausted condition of your crew, will prevent your taking up the position below, which was agreed upon this morning, for the present. You may be able to take it up, however, when your crew recover from their fatigue, and when you are able to quell the irregularities of the volunteers.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. K. DUNCAN,
Commanding Coast Defences.

(Q.)

FORT JACKSON, LOUISIANA, April 24, 1862.

Captain J. K. Mitchell, commanding C. S. Naval Forces, Lower Mississippi:

CAPTAIN: As I have no boats of any kind, I must ask of you to light up the river with fire-barges to-night, if it possibly lies in your power. The absence of light greatly impairs the accuracy and effectiveness of our fire upon the enemy. Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. K. DUNCAN,
Brigadier-General, commanding Coast Defences.

(R.)

FORT JACKSON, April 24, 1862.

Captain J. K. Mitchell, commanding C. S. Naval Forces, Lower Mississippi:

CAPTAIN: The lower schooner will be lighted by firing her from a rowboat from Fort St. Philip at early dusk. As this light dies away the next one above will be fired, and so on, all night.

Unless you can better yourself materially, I would not advise any movement on your part from your present position, owing to all the adverse circumstances mentioned in your letter.

In regard to the Defiance, the authority over her which I formerly had has been transferred to you; but we will freely lend you any assistance which you may require in deposing her commander, or in exercising your authority over her.

Keep a vigilant lookout for another attack to-night, when we will mutually support each other, and do all that we possibly can.

Captain Squires has been directed by Colonel Higgins to furnish you such assistance as you may require.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. K. DUNCAN,
Brigadier-General, commanding Coast Defences.

(S.)

MISSISSIPPI RIVER, April 26, 1862.
U. S. STEAMER HARRIET LANE.

Colonel Edward Higgins, commanding Confederate Forces in Forts Jackson and St. Philip:

SIR: When I last demanded the surrender of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, I had no positive assurance of the success of our vessels in passing safely the batteries on the river. Since then I have received communications from Flag-officer Farragut, who is now in possession of New Orleans. Our troops are or will be in possession of the prominent points on the river, and a sufficient force has been posted outside of the bayous to cut off all communications and prevent supplies. No man could consider it dishonorable to surrender, especially under these circumstances, when no advantages can arise by longer holding out, and by yielding gracefully he can save the further effusion of blood.

You have defended the forts gallantly, and no more can be asked of you. I feel authorized to offer you terms sufficiently honorable to relieve you from any feeling of humiliation. The officers will be permitted to retire on parole with their side-arms, not to serve again until regularly exchanged. All private property will be respected. Only the arms and munitions will be surrendered to the U. S. Government, and the vessels lying near the forts. No damage must be done to the defences. The soldiers also will be paroled, and be permitted to return to their homes, giving up their arms.

I am aware that you can hold out some little time longer, and am also aware of the exact condition, as reported to us by a deserter, which convinces me that you will only be inflicting on yourself and those under you unnecessary discomforts without any good result arising from so doing.

Your port has long been closed to the world, by which serious injury has been experienced by many loyal citizens. I trust that you will not lend yourself to the further injury of their interests, where it can only entail calamity and bloodshed, without any possible hope of success or relief to your forts.

Your surrender is a mere question of time, which you know is not of any extent, and I therefore urge you to meet my present proposition. By doing so you can put an end to a state of affairs which will only inflict injury upon all

those under you, who have strong claims upon your consideration.

I remain, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
DAVID D. PORTER,
Commanding Mortar Fleet.

(T.)

HEADQUARTERS FORTS JACKSON AND ST. PHILIP, April 27, 1862.

Commodore D. D. Porter, U. S. Navy, commanding Mortar Fleet:

SIR: Your letter of the twenty-sixth instant, demanding the surrender of these forts, has been received.

In reply thereto, I have to state that no official information has been received by me, from our own authorities, that the city of New Orleans has been surrendered to the forces of Flag-officer Farragut, and until such information is received, no proposition for a surrender can for a moment be entertained here.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
EDWARD HIGGINS,
Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding.

(U.)

FORT JACKSON, LA., April 27, 1862.

Soldiers of Forts Jackson and St. Philip:

You have nobly, gallantly, and heroically sustained, with courage and fortitude, the terrible ordeals of fire, water, and a hail of shot and shell, wholly unsurpassed during the present war. But more remains to be done. The safety of New Orleans and the cause of the Southern Confederacy—our homes, families, and everything dear to man—yet depend upon our exertions.

We are just as capable of repelling the enemy to-day as we were before the bombardment. Twice has the enemy demanded your surrender, and twice has he been refused.

Your officers have every confidence in your courage and patriotism, and feel every assurance that you will cheerfully and with alacrity obey all orders, and do your whole duty as men, and as becomes the well-tried garrisons of Forts Jackson and St. Philip. Be vigilant, therefore, and stand by your guns, and all will yet be well.

J. K. DUNCAN,
Brigadier-General, commanding Coast Defences.

(V.)

HEADQUARTERS FORTS JACKSON AND ST. PHILIP, April 28, 1862.

Commodore David D. Porter, United States Navy, commanding Mortar Fleet:

SIR: Upon mature deliberation, it has been decided to accept the terms of surrender of these forts, under the conditions offered by you in your letter of the twenty-sixth instant, viz.: that the officers and men shall be paroled—officers retiring with their side-arms. We have no control over the vessels afloat.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
EDWARD HIGGINS,
Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding.

(W.)

UNITED STATES STEAMER HARRIET LANE, FORTS JACKSON AND ST. PHILIP, MISSISSIPPI RIVER, April 28, 1862.

By articles of capitulation, entered into this the twenty-eighth day of April, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, between David D. Porter, Commander U. S. Navy, commanding U. S. Mortar Flotilla, of the one part, and Brigadier-General J. K. Duncan, commanding the Coast Defences, and Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Higgins, commanding Forts Jackson and St. Philip, of the other part, it is mutually agreed:

First. That Brigadier-General Duncan and Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins shall surrender to the Mortar Flotilla Forts Jackson and St. Philip, the arms, munitions of war, and all the appurtenances thereunto belonging, together with all public property that may be under their charge.

Second. It is agreed by Commander David D. Porter, commanding the Mortar Flotilla, that Brigadier-General Duncan and Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins, together with the officers under their command, shall be respected. Furthermore, that they shall give their parole of honor not to serve in arms against the Government of the United States, until they are regularly exchanged.

Third. It is further agreed by the Commander, David D. Porter, commanding the Mortar Flotilla, on the part of the United States Government, that the non-commissioned officers, privates, and musicians, shall be permitted to retire on parole, their commanding and other officers becoming responsible for them, and that they shall deliver up their arms and accoutrements in their present condition, provided that no expenses accruing from the transportation of the men shall be defrayed by the Government of the United States.

Fourth. On the signing of these articles by the contracting parties, the fort shall be formally taken possession of by the United States naval forces composing the mortar flotilla. The Confederate flag shall be lowered, and the flag of the United States hoisted on the flag-staffs of Forts Jackson and St. Philip.

In agreement of the above, we, the undersigned, do hereunto set our hands and seals.

DAVID D. PORTER,
Commanding Mortar Flotilla.

W. B. RENSHAW,
Commander.

W. W. WAINRIGHT,
Lieutenant, commanding U. S. steamer Harriet Lane

J. K. DUNCAN,
Brigadier-General, commanding Coast Defences.

EDWARD HIGGINS,
Lieutenant-Colonel C. S. A., commanding Forts Jackson and St. Philip.

Witnessed by

ED. T. NICHOLS,
Lieutenant, commanding U. S. gunboat Winona.

C. H. RUSSELL,
Lieutenant, commanding U. S. gunboat Kennebeck.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ED. HIGGINS.

HEADQUARTERS FORTS JACKSON AND ST. PHILIP,
April 27, 1862.

Lieutenant W. M. Bridges, A. A. Adjutant-General, Second Brigade, Department No. 1, New Orleans:

SIR: I have the honor to report that on Friday, the eighteenth instant, the naval force of the United States, which has been for some weeks in the river, making preparation for an attack on these forts, commenced the bombardment of Fort Jackson.

Fire from their mortar-fleet was opened at nine o'clock A. M. The force employed by the enemy against us consisted of twenty-one mortar vessels, and a fleet of about twenty-one steam vessels of war, carrying more than two hundred guns of the heavest calibre. The mortar vessels when they opened fire, were all concealed from our view save six, which took position in sight of the forts, and within our longest range. These we soon forced to retire. They joined the rest of their fleet behind the point of woods, and, concealed from view, renewed their fire.

Orders had been issued to the officers and men of my command to retire to the casemates of the forts the moment the bombardment commenced. The order being obeyed, nothing was left for us to do but receive the furious storm of shell which was hailed upon us. Our citadel was soon destroyed by fire. All the buildings around and in connection with the fort shared the same fate.

From Friday morning until the following Thursday we sustained this terrible battering. Several times during the bombardment the enemy's gunboats attempted to pass up the river, under cover of their mortar-fire, and on each occasion our batteries were promptly manned, and the enemy's advance gallantly repelled.

At half-past three A. M., on Thursday, it was observed that the mortar-fire was increased to an intensity of fury which had not been previously reached. At the same time a movement was observed in the steam-fleet below. Our batteries were instantly in readiness, and were at once engaged in a most terrific conflict with the enemy's fleet of fourteen steamships, which, dashing by the fort in the darkness of the night, pouring in their broadsides of shot, shell, grape, canister, and shrapnel, succeeded in getting beyond our range and in our rear. During the forenoon a demand was made by Commodore Porter, commanding the mortar-fleet, for a surrender of the forts. This proposition was promptly refused, and the bombardment was again commenced and continued until four P. M., when all firing ceased.

I enclose you the reports of company and battery commanders, also the Surgeon's report of killed and wounded. I fully endorse the encomiums of the company commanders upon the officers under their command, and feel myself bound to record my high admiration of the coolness, courage, and fortitude of all the officers of both forts.

Captain J. B. Anderson, Company "G," Louisiana artillery, was wounded early in the conflict, while heroically fighting his guns. Notstanding his severe wound, he rendered the most gallant and efficient service to the last.

Captain W. B. Robertson, who commanded a detached work called the water battery, remained with his command during the whole of the protracted ordeal, without cover of any kind, although suffering from severe physical disease, and scarcely able, at times, to walk around his battery. He was most ably and gallantly assisted by Captain R. J. Bruce, Louisiana artillery.

First Lieutenant Eugene W. Baylor, who was in command of the 42-pounder barbette battery, and First Lieutenant Richard Agar, of the same battery, did all that gallant officers and men could do.

The officers stationed at the heaviest batteries, on the river front, were, the greater part of the time, fatigued as they were, obliged to be constantly with their detachments at their guns to prevent surprise. Lieutenants A. N. Ogden, Bevuet Kennedy, and William T. Mumford, of the Louisiana artillery, particularly distinguished themselves in this service.

Although not under my immediate command, I cannot omit to mention the devoted conduct of your aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Wm. M. Bridges, who, upon the disability of Captain Anderson, immediately volunteered his services, and took charge of the two 10-inch columbiads, and fought them night and day with ceaseless energy.

Lieutenant J. U. Gains, in command of the 32-pounder battery, on the river front, assisted by Lieutenant E. D. Woodlief, Captain S. Jones, company "I," Louisiana volunteers, Captain F. Peter, company "I," 22d regiment, Louisiana volunteers, fought their batteries gallantly and well. Lieutenant Thomas K. Pierson, 23d Louisiana volunteers, was killed in the thickest of the fight, while gallantly fighting his guns.

The St. Mary's Cannoniers, Captain S. O. Comay, have my warmest gratitude and admiration for their whole conduct, both in face of the enemy and in the severe and arduous fatigue duties, which they discharged, always and at all times, with alacrity and energy. They are an honor to the country, and well may their friends and relations be proud of them.

The report of Captain M. T. Squires, who was the senior officer at Fort St. Philip, is enclosed, with the reports of the other officers. Captain Squires fought the batteries of Fort St. Philip most gallantly. He was in charge of that fort during the whole bombardment. The severe work at Fort Jackson required my constant presence there. I had every confidence in the coolness, courage, and skill of Captain Squires and his officers, and most satisfactorily did they discharge their duties. I refer you to his report for the mention of the individual conduct of his officers.

The floating battery "Louisiana," the steam ram Manassas, and the Confederate steamer McRae, together with a number of vessels which had been fitted up by the Confederate and State Governments, were in the river above the forts at the time the enemy made the dash by. I am unable to state what assistance, if any, was rendered by the greater portion of these. At daylight I observed the McRae gallantly fighting, at terrible odds, contending, at close quarters, with two of the enemy's powerful ships. Her gallant commander, Lieutenant Thomas B. Huger, fell during the conflict, severely, but I trust not mortally wounded.

The Manassas I observed under weigh, apparently in pursuit of one of the vessels of the enemy, but I soon lost sight of her.

I would here observe, that I think an investigation should be demanded into the conduct of the authorities afloat, whose neglect of our urgent entreaties to light up the river during this sad night contributed so much to the success of our enemies

My adjutant, Lieutenant C. N. Morse, was indefatigable in the discharge of his important duties, which required his constant presence near my person, and has my sincere thanks.

Surgeon Somerville Burke, C. S. A., and Dr. Bradbury (who kindly volunteered his services when he became aware of the attack on the forts), were unremitting in their attention to the wounded, fearlessly exposing themselves, at all times, in the discharge of their duties.

Lieutenant Charles Warmes, ordnance officer, distinguished himself by the self-sacrificing attention to arduous and important duties. Day night he was at his post, and, by his great exertions, our magazine was saved from being flooded, the water having risen considerably above the floor.

Lieutenants Mann and Royster, of Captain Ryan's company, rendered fearless and efficient service.

Captain Ryan was with a detachment of his company, on board the Louisiana, during a portion of the bombardment, and in the fight of Thursday morning. At all times his services were most promptly rendered.

Mr. James Ward rendered me the most important services during the bombardment. In charge of the firemen, he made almost superhuman exertions during the burning of the citadel. He has my warmest gratitude.

I have the honor to remain,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
ED. HIGGINS,
Lieutenant-Colonel, C. S. A., commanding
Forts Jackson and St. Philip.

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF LIEUT.-COL. HIGGINS.

NEW ORLEANS, April 30, 1862.

Lieutenant Wm. M. Bridges, Aide-de-Camp and A. A. Adjutant-Gen., Second Brigade:

SIR: I have the honor to report, that on the morning of the twenty-seventh of April, 1862, a formal demand for the surrender of Forts Jackson and St. Philip was made by Commander David D. Porter, commanding United States mortar-fleet.

The terms which were offered were of the most liberal nature; but so strong was I in the belief that we could resist successfully any attack which could be made upon us either by land or water, that the terms were at once refused. Our fort was still strong. Our damage had been, to some extent, repaired. Our men had behaved well, and all was hope and confidence with the officers, when, suddenly, at midnight, I was aroused by the report that the garrison had revolted, had seized the guard, and were spiking the guns. Word was sent us, through the Sergeants of companies, that the men would fight no longer. The company officers were immediately despatched to their commands, but were driven back. Officers were fired upon when they appeared in sight upon the parapet. Signals were exchanged by the mutineers with Fort St. Philip. The mutiny was complete, and a general massacre of the officers, and a disgraceful surrender of the fort, appeared inevitable.

By great exertion we succeeded, with your influence, in preventing this disgraceful blot upon our country, and were fortunate in keeping the passion of the men in check until we could effect an honorable surrender of the forts, which was done by us, jointly, on the morning of the twenty-eighth instant.

As the facts and documents relating to this matter are in your possession, it is unnecessary for me to dwell longer on this humiliating and unhappy affair. I wish to place on record here the noble conduct of Captain Comay's company, the St. Mary's Cannoniers, who alone stood true as steel, when every other company in Fort Jackson basely dishonored their country.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
ED. HIGGINS,
Lieutenant-Colonel, C. S. A., late commander
Forts Jackson and St. Philip.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN M. T. SQUIRES.

FORT ST. PHILIP, April 27, 1862.

Lieutenant Charles N. Morse, Post-Adjutant Fort Jackson, Louisiana:

SIR: I have the honor respectfully to submit the following report:

Early on the morning of Friday, the eighteenth instant, perceiving by the movements of the enemy that they were about taking up their position, the heavy guns were ordered to open upon them, to annoy them in the execution of their purpose as much as possible; but the distance being great, and the range extreme, with but very little success, the enemy taking little or no notice of our fire, only answering by a few rifle shells, at long intervals. The thirteen-inch mortar after the thirteenth round became useless, the bed giving way under it, breaking in two, and the mortar coming upon the ground. The

enemy retired from our sight at eight o'clock P. M., and nothing more was heard of him that night.

At an early hour of the morning of the nineteenth instant, the enemy again took up a position identical with that of the previous, excepting that no mortar-boats were on this shore, all keeping close behind the point of woods, and opening fire upon Fort Jackson, which was allowed to continue without interruption from this side. Fearing the effect and having ascertained the exact range and distances, I determined to open upon them and draw off some of the fire to this side if possible. It was immediately done, and with partial success, three of the mortar-boats opening upon us with but little effect.

On the twentieth, twenty-first, and twenty-second, the fire of the enemy still continued from their mortar-boats, with an occasional shot from the gunboats. The only damage done during these days was the damaging the platform of the twenty-four-pounder gun in salient near the main magazine, the shell passing under and throwing it up, but not rendering it useless. Our fire was slow and deliberate, with no visible results more than the driving back of two of the mortar-boats, which were partially exposed around the wooded point. The fire of the enemy, although warm, well-directed, and sustained, was, for the most part, either short or very much over. Up to this time the only guns used were the columbiad battery in the main work, and the thirteen-inch mortar, disabled on the first day. In the lower water battery, one eight-inch columbiad and one seven-inch rifle gun, worked by Captain R. C. Bond's company; four ten-inch sea-coast mortars, by Captain J. H. Lamon's company. On the twenty-third, the enemy still kept up a regular fire, to which we did not reply all day. At 3½ o'clock of the morning of the twenty-fourth, the men were ready, and standing at their guns, having received information that there was a movement by the enemy. No vessels were to be seen, and the first notice of an enemy nearing us was the reply to the shots from Fort Jackson, and the gunners were ordered to fire by the flashes of the enemy's guns, which was done, but the fire was entirely too high, and passed over them. Immediately after this a vessel came in sight, and they followed each other in rapid succession, seemingly in pairs, one of the two keeping back far enough to enable her to deliver her fire from her broadsides. The fire from our guns was rapid, and from the little that could be seen and heard, was accurate, but after the first discharge, the smoke almost hid them from sight, and we were again compelled to judge by the flashes of their guns. As to the effect of the fire, it is impossible to state what it was, as the darkness, aided by the smoke, rendered seeing out of the question. A three-masted propeller ran ashore, during the engagement, above the upper water-battery, and, remaining there several minutes with a fire-barge alongside, her rigging had caught fire, but was immediately extinguished. We were not able to open upon her, as one of the columbiads had been previously dismounted, and the other could not be brought to bear; besides, their hands were full with other vessels coming up, and the twenty-four-pounder in the salient of the upper water-battery, bearing directly upon her, had been broken in two near the trunnions. The vessels passed close under our guns, taking advantage of the eddy, which runs up with considerable force, and it was found impossible to get more than one or two shots at any one vessel, they passed with such rapidity.

All our guns were worked with courage, energy, and skill, excepting the upper water-battery, where some confusion arose, caused by the men not being so thoroughly drilled as they should have been. Company C, of the Confederate Recruits, Lieutenant J. K. Dixon, were fully prepared to work the guns of this battery, and would have done so with effect, but were two days before ordered on board the floating battery Louisiana, and their place was supplied by Captain Assanheimer's Company B, Twenty-fourth regiment Louisiana volunteers, who had only been drilled a few times, and Captain Massicott's Company D, Chalmette regiment, who were raw, undrilled, perfectly ignorant even of the use of the shot-guns with which they were armed, and had never been drilled at artillery. As soon as it was seen that the guns did not open, Lieutenant A. J. Quigley, with such men as could be gathered, was sent to attend to them, which was done, so far as they were concerned, to the satisfaction of that officer. The company of Confederate recruits, under Lieutenants Dixon and Blow, were detailed to report to Captain Mitchell, C. S. Navy, for duty on board the Louisiana, as per instructions dated headquarters Forts Jackson and St. Philip, April twenty-first, 1862, where they remained until the evening of the twenty-fourth instant. Captain Lartigue's company did good service as scouts and sharpshooters, many of them being out at all times. On the night of the twenty-third, seven of them were sent to ascertain the movements of the enemy, and all returned without accomplishing anything. Two other scouts, one from Company K and the other of Company F, were out on the same mission, and had it not been from the failure of the rockets, which by an accident became wet, would have signalled their approach much sooner. As it was, the only intimation I received was the firing of one of their muskets. The following is the number of projectiles used, etc.: six hundred and seventy-five (675) eight-inch solid shot, one hundred and seventy-one (171) eight-inch shells, thirteen thirteen-inch from columbiad battery, etc., in main work; one hundred and forty-two ten-inch mortar shells from lower mortar battery, four hundred and seventy shot, shell, and grape, lower water-battery; one hundred and twenty shot, grape, and canister, from upper water-battery. Captain R

C. Bond, assisted by First Lieutenants Carleton Hunt and Wm. E. Ellis, and his Company K, Captain J. H. Lamon, with the assistance of First Lieutenant H. W. Fowler, with his Company C, in the lower battery, manning the forty-two and thirty-two pounders respectively; Lieutenants Lewis B. Taylor and W. B. Jones, with Company F, at the columbiad battery, and Lieutenant A. J. Quigly, with supernumeraries of Company F, taken from main work to man guns of upper water-battery, behaved with gallantry, energy, coolness, and bravery, worthy of imitation; and all, both officers and men, deserve the highest praise that could be given to any one, for the honorable part they performed during the whole time since the commencement of this trying conflict. Captain Charles Assanheimer's Company B, did their best, both his officers and men. Individual acts of heroism are numerous; but where all did so well, it would appear invidious to mention names. Suffice it to say, that were everything to be done again, or anything else required to be performed, one could ask no other privilege than to have the same men to do it—feeling satisfied it would be as well carried out as possible. The injury to the fort was slight. Of the guns, one banded seven-inch rifle was bursted by the explosion of a shell in its bore near the muzzle, and one twenty-four pounder gun was broken in two about fourteen inches in front of the trunnions, by being struck by a solid shot. An eight-inch columbiad was dismounted, but only temporarily useless, the gun being uninjured and soon remounted. The platform of one twenty-four-pounder gun was undermined by a shell, but not rendered entirely useless. One of the uprights of a forty-two-pounder gun-carriage was partly shot away, but can still be of service.

With many thanks to all officers and men for their assistance and efficient aid, and humbly bowing before the will of Almighty God,

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

M. T. SQUIRES,

Captain Louisiana Artillery.

Casualties During the Bombardment.

	KILLED.	WOUNDED.	TOTAL.
In Fort Jackson	9	33	42
In Fort St. Philip	2	4	6
Totals	11	37	48

SOMERVILLE BURKE,

CHARLES D. LEWIS,

Assistant Surgeons, C. S. A

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL M. L. SMITH.

CAMP MOORE, TANGIPAHOA, LA., May 6, 1862.

Major J. G. Pickel, Assistant Adjutant-General:

MAJOR: I herewith submit a report of the operations of the troops under my command at the Chalmette and McGee lines, on the approach of the enemy's vessels from Forts Jackson and St. Philip to the city of New Orleans. These interior lines of defence are constructed with special reference to an attack by land, but, terminating them on the river banks, were two batteries calculated for twelve and twenty guns respectively, and at the time of the action containing five and nine. Ten forty-two-pounders, intended for this battery, were turned over to the navy for the defence of New Orleans by water. This has been considered as depending upon the forts mentioned, which are well-constructed, permanent works, rather well armed, and far stronger than any other that could be hastily erected. With this view, all the available material, both of guns and ammunition, had been concentrated there prior to the bombardment, and during its continuance was being added to in such quantities daily as the means of the department admitted of, it being evident that the decisive struggle was there to be made. As soon, therefore, as it became certain that the large vessels of the enemy had succeeded in passing, there no longer existed a chance of preventing them from reaching New Orleans, and the short resistance made by the few guns mounted in the two batteries of the interior lines was made through a sense of duty, but without any expectation of success, the enemy numbering as many vessels, less one, as we had guns.

On the side of the river, where I was in person during the action, were stationed three companies of Lieutenant-Colonel Pinckney's battalion of sharpshooters. With the five guns on the other side were Captain Patton's company of the Twenty-second Louisiana volunteers, one company from Fort Pike, under Lieutenant Butter, one company Beauregard battery, besides two battalions of infantry collected in camp for instruction, as well as to guard the line in case of the enemy's landing and attacking by land—all under immediate command of General Buisson.

The enemy's vessels had approached to within about the fourth of a mile before we opened on them, the first gun being from Pinckney's battery, and immediately followed by several from the battery on the opposite side, and as promptly replied to from the enemy's vessels. The engagement lasted until every round of ammunition on hand was fired, both officers and men displaying a coolness and intrepidity that was gratifying, especially as regards the men, who then for the first time in their lives discharged a heavy gun. The firing on our side was spirited, perhaps a little uncertain; on the enemy's, heavy and well directed.

During the engagement their vessels gradu-

ally lessened the distance, until near enough to open with grape and canister.

The ammunition being expended, and every sense of duty satisfied, permission was given to Colonel Pinckney to withdraw his command along the line of field works affording shelter, which was done deliberately, officers and men retiring together. The casualties were one killed and one wounded. The battery on the Chalmette side seemed well served, and no doubt was so, judging from the character of the officers present.

The enemy, steaming up between us and the city, prevented the retreat of the troops to that point. They were accordingly directed to gain the Opelousas Railroad and reach Camp Moore *via* Lafourche, or such route as might be found best. Lieutenant-Colonel Pinckney has already reported with his command, but somewhat reduced in numbers.

In concluding this report, I wish particularly to call attention to the admirable assistance rendered by Lieutenants McDonald and B. M. Harrod, on engineer duty, both before and after the action. Their conduct could not have been better. Lieutenant Frost, on special duty, was also of material assistance, but in carrying out some instructions, was accidentally absent during the engagement.

Having received no report from General Buisson concerning the operations on his side of the river, I am unable to refer to them more particularly. Respectfully submitted,

M. L. Smith,
Brigadier-General, commanding Third Brigade.

Doc. 58.

OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE.

GENERAL JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON'S ORDER.

Headquarters Army of Tennessee, July 17, 1864.

General Orders No. 4.

In obedience to orders of the War Department, I "turn over to General Hood the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee."

I cannot leave this noble army without expressing my admiration of the high military qualities it has displayed. A long and arduous campaign has made conspicuous every soldierly virtue—endurance of toils, obedience to orders, brilliant courage. The enemy has never attacked but to be repulsed and severely punished. You, soldiers, have never argued but from your courage, and never counted your foes.

No longer your leader, I will still watch your career and will rejoice in your victories. To one and all I offer assurances of my friendship, and bid an affectionate farewell.

J. E. Johnston,
General.

A. P. Mason,
Major, and A. A. G.

Colonel B. S. Ewell,
A. A. General, Atlanta, Ga.

GENERAL J. B. HOOD'S ORDER.

Headquarters Army of Tennessee, "In the Field," July 18, 1864.

Soldiers: In obedience to orders from the War Department, I assume command of this Army and Department. I feel the weight of the responsibility so suddenly and unexpectedly devolved upon me by this position, and shall bend all my energies and employ all my skill to meet its requirements. I look with confidence to your patriotism to stand by me, and rely upon your prowess to wrest your country from the grasp of the invader, entitling yourselves to the proud distinction of being called the deliverers of an oppressed people.

Respectfully,

J. B. Hood,
General.

Kinlock Falconer,
A. A. A. G.

Colonel Ewell,
A. A. General.

GENERAL JOHNSTON'S OFFICIAL REPORT.

Vineville, Ga., October 20, 1864.

Sir: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the Army of Tennessee, while it was under my command. Want of the reports of the Lieutenant-Generals, for which I have waited until now, prevents me from being circumstantial:

In obedience to the orders of the President, received by telegraph at Clinton, Mississippi, December eighteenth, 1863, I assumed command of the Army of Tennessee, at Dalton, on the twenty-seventh of that month.

Letters from the President and Secretary of War, dated respectively twenty-third and twentieth of December, impressed upon me the importance of soon commencing active operations against the enemy. The relative forces, including the moral effect of the affair of Missionary Ridge, condition of artillery horses, most of those of the cavalry, and want of field-transportation, made it impracticable to effect these wishes of the Executive.

On the thirty-first of December the effective total of the infantry and artillery of that army, including two brigades belonging to the Department of Mississippi, was 36,826; the effective total of the cavalry, including Roddy's command at Tuscumbia, was 5,613. The Federal force in our front, exclusive of cavalry and the Ninth and Twenty-third corps at Knoxville, was estimated at 80,000.

The winter was mainly employed in improving the discipline and equipment of the army and bringing back absentees to the ranks. At the end of April more than five thousand had rejoined their regiments.

The horses of the artillery and cavalry had been much reduced in condition by the previous campaign. As full supplies of forage could not be furnished them at Dalton, it was necessary to send about half of each of these arms of service far to the rear, where the country

could furnish food. On that account, Brigadier-General Roddy was ordered, with about three-fourths of his troops, from Tuscumbia to Dalton, and arrived at the end of February. On the second of April, however, he was sent back to his former position by the Secretary of War.

On the fifteenth and sixteenth of January, Baldwin's and Quarles' brigades returned to the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, to which they belonged. His Excellency Joseph E. Brown added to the army two regiments of State troops, which were used to guard the railroad bridges between Dalton and Atlanta.

On the seventeenth of February the President ordered me, by telegraph, to detach Lieutenant-General Hardee, with the infantry of his corps, except Stevenson's division, to aid Lieutenant-General Polk against Sherman in Mississippi. This order was obeyed as promptly as our means of transportation permitted.

The force detached was probably exaggerated to Major-General Thomas—for on the twenty-third the Federal army advanced to Ringgold—on the twenty-fourth drove in our outposts—and on the twenty-fifth skirmished at Mill Creek Gap, and in the Crow Valley east of Rocky Face Mountain. We were successful at both places. In the latter, Clayton's brigade, after a sharp action of half an hour, defeated double its number. At night it was reported that a United States brigade was occupying Dug Gap, from which it had driven our troops. Granbury's Texan brigade, returning from Mississippi, had just arrived. It was ordered to march to the foot of the mountain immediately, and to retake the Gap at sunrise next morning, which was done.

In the night of the twenty-sixth the enemy retired.

On the twenty-seventh of February I suggested to the Executive by letter, through General Bragg, that all preparations for a forward movement should be made without further delay. In a letter, dated fourth of March, General Bragg desired me "to have all things ready at the earliest practicable moment for the movement indicated." In replying, on the twelfth, I reminded him that the regulations of the War Department do not leave such preparations to commanders of troops, but to officers who receive their orders from Richmond.

On the eighteenth, a letter was received from General Bragg, sketching a plan of offensive operations, and enumerating the troops to be used in them under me. I was invited to express my views on the subject. In doing so, both by telegraph and mail, I suggested modifications, and urged that the additional troops named should be sent immediately, to enable us, should the enemy advance, to beat him, and then move forward; or should he not advance, do so ourselves. General Bragg replied by telegraph, on the twenty-first: "Your despatch of nineteenth does not indicate acceptance of plan proposed. Troops can only be drawn from other points for advance. Upon your decision of that point further action must depend."

I replied, by telegraph, on the twenty-second: "In my despatch of nineteenth, I expressly accept taking offensive—only differ with you as to details. I assume that the enemy will be prepared for advance before we are, and will make it, to our advantage. Therefore I propose, both for offensive and defensive, to assemble our troops here immediately." This was not noticed. Therefore, on the twenty-fifth, I again urged the necessity of reinforcing the Army of Tennessee, because the enemy was collecting a larger force than that of the last campaign, while ours was less than it had been then.

On the third of April Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. Cole arrived at Dalton to direct the procuring of artillery horses and field-transportation, to enable the army to advance.

On the fourth, under Orders 32 of 1864, I applied to the chief of the conscript service for 1,000 negro teamsters. None were received.

On the eighth of April, Colonel B. S. Ewell, A. A. G., was sent to Richmond to represent to the President my wish to take the offensive with proper means, and to learn his views. A few days after Brigadier-General Pendleton arrived from Richmond to explain to me the President's wishes on that subject. I explained to him the modification of the plan communicated by General Bragg, which seemed to me essential—which required that the intended reinforcements should be sent to Dalton. I urged that this should be done without delay—because our present force was not sufficient even for defence—and to enable us to take the offensive, if the enemy did not.

On the first of May I reported the enemy about to advance. On the second, Brigadier-General Mercer's command arrived, about 1,400 effective infantry. On the fourth I expressed myself "satisfied" that the enemy was about to attack with his united forces, and again urged that a part of Lieutenant-General Polk's troops should be put at my disposal. I was informed by General Bragg that orders to that effect were given.

Major-General Martin, whose division of cavalry, coming from East Tennessee, had been halted on the Etowah to recruit its horses, was ordered with it to observe the Oostanaula from Resaca to Rome, and Brigadier-General Kelly was ordered with his command from the neighborhood of Resaca, to report to Major-General Wheeler.

The effective artillery and infantry of the Army of Tennessee, after the arrival of Mercer's brigade, amounted to 40,900; the effective cavalry to about 4,000. Major-General Sherman's army was composed of that of Missionary Ridge (then 80,000) increased by several recruits: 5,000 men under Hovey, the Twenty-Third (Schofield's) from Knoxville, and two divisions of the Sixteenth from North Alabama. Major-General Wheeler estimated the cavalry of that army as 15,000.

On the fifth of May this army was in line between Ringgold and Tunnel Hill, and after skirmishing on that and the following day, on the seventh pressed back our advanced troops to Mill Creek Gap. On the same day Canty reached Resaca with his brigade, and was halted there. On the eighth, at 4 P. M., a division of Hooker's corps assaulted Dug Gap, which was bravely held by two regiments of Reynolds' Arkansas brigade, and Grigsby's brigade of Kentucky cavalry fighting on foot, until the arrival of Lieutenant-General Hardee with Granbury's brigade, when the enemy was put to flight. On the ninth five assaults were made on Lieutenant-General Hood's troops on Rocky Face Mountain. All were repulsed. In the afternoon a report was received that Logan's and Dodge's corps were in Snake Greek Gap. Three divisions under Lieutenant-General Hood were therefore sent to Resaca. On the tenth Lieutenant-General Hood reported the enemy retiring. Skirmishing to our advantage continued all day near Dalton. Major-General Bates repulsed a vigorous attack at night. On the eleventh Brigadier-General Canty reported that the enemy was again approaching Resaca. Lieutenant-General Polk arrived in the evening with Loring's division, and was instructed to defend the place with those troops and Canty's. The usual skirmishing continued near Dalton.

Rocky Face Mountain, and Snake Creek Gap, at its south end, completely covered for the enemy the operation of burning Dalton. On the 12th the Federal army, covered by the mountain, moved by Snake Creek Gap towards Resaca. Major-General Wheeler, with 2,200 of ours, attacked and defeated more than double that number of Federal cavalry near Varnell's Station. At night our artillery and infantry marched for Resaca. The cavalry followed on the thirteenth. On that day the enemy approaching on the Snake Creek Gap road, was checked by Loring's troops, which gave time for the formation of Hardee's and Hood's corps, just arriving. As the army was formed, the left of Polk's corps was on the Oostanaula, and the right of Hood's on the Connasauga. There was brisk skirmishing during the afternoon on Polk's front and Hardee's left.

On the fourteenth the enemy made several attacks—the most vigorous on Hindman's division (Hood's left). All were handsomely repulsed. At six P. M. Hood advanced with Stevenson's and Stewart's divisions, supported by two of Walker's brigades, driving the enemy from his ground before night. He was instructed to be ready to continue the offensive next morning. At nine P. M. I learned that Lieutenant-General Polk's troops had lost a position commanding our bridges, and received from Major-General Martin a report that Federal infantry was crossing the Oostanaula near Calhoun, on a pontoon bridge. The instructions to Lieutenant-General Hood were revoked, and Walker's division sent to the point named by Major-General Martin.

On the fifteenth there was severe skirmishing on the whole front. Major-General Walker reported no movement near Calhoun, Lieutenant-General Hood was directed to prepare to move forward, his right leading, supported by two brigades from Polk's and Hardee's corps. When he was about to move, information came from Major-General Walker that the Federal right was crossing the river. To meet this movement Lieutenant-General Hood's attack was countermanded. Stewart's division not receiving the order from corps headquarters in time, attacked unsuccessfully. The army was ordered to cross the Oostanaula that night, destroying the bridges behind it.

On the sixteenth the enemy crossed the Oostanaula. Lieutenant-General Hardee skirmished with them successfully near Calhoun.

The fact that a part of Polk's troops were still in the rear, and the great numerical superiority of the Federal army, made it expedient to risk battle only when the position or some blunder on the part of the enemy might give us counterbalancing advantages. I therefore determined to fall back slowly, until circumstances should put the chances of battle in our favor—keeping so near the United States army as to prevent its sending reinforcements to Grant—and hoping, by taking advantage of positions and opportunities, to reduce the odds against us by partial engagements. I also expected it to be materially reduced before the end of June, by the expiration of the terms of service of many of the regiments which had not re-enlisted. In this way we fell back to Cassville, in two marches. At Adairsville, about midday on the seventeenth, Polk's cavalry, under Brigadier-General Jackson, met the army, and Hardee, after severe skirmishing, checked the enemy. At this point, on the eighteenth, Polk's and Hood's corps took the direct road to Cassville—Hardee's that by Kingston. About half the Federal army took each road.

French's division having joined Polk's corps on the eighteenth, on the morning of the nineteenth, when half the Federal army was near Kingston, the two corps at Cassville were ordered to advance against the troops that had followed them from Adairsville—Hood's leading on the right. When this corps had advanced some two miles, one of his staff officers reported to Lieutenant-General Hood that the enemy was approaching on the Canton road in rear of the right of our original position. He drew back his troops and formed them across that road. When it was discovered that the officer was mistaken the opportunity had passed, by the near approach of the two portions of the Federal army. Expecting to be attacked, I drew up the troops in what seemed to me an excellent position—a bold ridge immediately in the rear of Cassville, with an open valley before it. The fire of the enemy's artillery commenced soon after the troops were formed, and continued until night. Soon after dark Lieutenant-Generals Polk and Hood together expressed to

me, decidedly, the opinion, formed upon the observation of the afternoon, that the Federal artillery would render their positions untenable the next day, and urged me to abandon the ground immediately and cross the Etowah. Lieutenant-General Hardee, whose position I thought the weakest, was confident that he could hold it. The other two officers were so earnest, however, and so unwilling to depend on the ability of their corps to defend the ground, that I yielded, and the army crossed the Etowah on the twentieth, a step which I have regretted ever since. Wheeler's cavalry was placed in observation above and Jackson's below the railroad.

On the twenty-second Major-General Wheeler was sent with all his troops not required for observation to the enemy's rear, and on the twenty-fourth beat a brigade at Cassville and took or burned two hundred and fifty loaded wagons. In the meantime the enemy was reported, by Jackson's troops, moving down the Etowah, as if to cross it near Stilesboro, and crossing on the twenty-third. On the twenty-fourth Polk's and Hardee's corps reached the road from Stilesboro to Atlanta, a few miles south of Dallas, and Hood's four miles from New Hope Church, on the road from Alatoona. On the twenty-fifth the enemy was found to be intrenched near and east of Dallas. Hood's corps was placed with its centre at New Hope Church, and Polk's and Hardee's ordered between it and the Atlanta road, which Hardee's left was to cover. An hour before sunset Stewart's division was fiercely attacked by Hooker's corps, which it repulsed after a hot engagement of two hours. Skirmishing was kept up on the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh. At half-past five P. M., on the twenty-seventh, Howard's corps assailed Cleburne's division, and was driven back with great slaughter. In these two actions our troops were not intrenched. Our loss in each was about four hundred and fifty killed and wounded. On the twenty-seventh the enemy's dead, except those borne off, were counted—six hundred. We therefore estimated their whole loss at three thousand at least. It was probably greater on the twenty-fifth, as we had a larger force engaged then, both of infantry and artillery.

The usual skirmishing was kept up on the twenty-eighth. Lieutenant-General Hood was instructed to put his corps in position during the night to attack the enemy's left flank at dawn next morning, the rest of the army to join in the action successively from right to left.

On the twenty-ninth Lieutenant-General Hood, finding the Federal left covered by a division which had intrenched itself in the night, thought it inexpedient to attack—so reported and asked for instructions. As the resulting delay made the attack inexpedient, even if it had not been so before, by preventing the surprise, upon which success in a great degree depended, he was recalled.

Skirmishing continued until the fourth of June—the enemy gradually extending his intrenched line toward the railroad at Acworth. On the morning of the fifth the army was formed, with its left at Lost Mountain, its centre near Gilgath Church, and its right near the railroad. On the seventh the right, covered by Noonday Creek, was extended across the Marietta and Acworth road. The enemy approached under cover of successive lines of intrenchments. There was brisk and incessant skirmishing until the eighteenth. On the fourteenth the brave Lieutenant-General Polk, distinguished in every battle in which this army had fought, fell by a cannon shot at an advanced post. Major-General Loring succeeded to the command, which he held until the seventh of July with great efficiency.

On the fourth of June a letter from Governor Brown informed me that he had organized a division of infantry and placed it under my orders. These troops, when ready for service, under Major-General G. W. Smith, were employed to defend the crossings of the Chattahoochee, to prevent the surprise of Atlanta by the Federal Cavalry.

On the nineteenth a new line was taken by the army—Hood's corps with its right on the Marietta and Canton road, Loring's on the Kennesaw Mountain, and Hardee's with its left extending across the Lost Mountain and Marietta road. The enemy approached, as usual, under cover of successive lines of intrenchments. In this position there was incessant fighting and skirmishing until July third—the enemy gradually extending his intrenched right toward Atlanta. On the twentieth of June, Wheeler, with eleven hundred men, routed Garrard's division of Federal cavalry on our right. On the twenty-first Hood's corps was transferred from right to left, Wheeler's cavalry taking charge of the position which it left. On the twenty-second Lieutenant-General Hood reported that Hindman's and Stevenson's divisions of his corps being attacked, drove back the enemy, taking a line of his breastworks, but were compelled to withdraw by the fire of fortified artillery. In the twenty-fourth Hardee's skirmishers repulsed a line of battle, as did Stevenson's, of Hood's corps, on the twenty-fifth.

On the twenty-seventh, after a furious cannonade of several hours, the enemy made a general advance, but was everywhere repulsed with heavy loss. The assaults were most vigorous on Cheatham's and Cleburne's divisions of Hardee's corps and French's and Featherstone's of Loring's. Lieutenant-General Hardee reports that Cheatham's division lost in killed, wounded, and missing, one hundred and ninety-five; the enemy opposed to it, by the statement of a staff officer subsequently captured, two thousand: the loss of Cleburne's division, eleven; that of the enemy in his front, one thousand. Major-General Loring reported two hundred and thirty-six of his corps killed, wounded, and missing; and the loss of the enemy, by their own

estimates, at between two thousand five hundred and three thousand, which he thinks very small.

On the first of July Major-General Smith's division was ordered to support the cavalry on our left. Their effective total was about one thousand five hundred. On the second, the enemy's right being nearer to Atlanta by several miles than our left, the army fell back during the night to Smyrna Church. On the fourth, Major-General Smith reported that he should be compelled to withdraw on the morning of the fifth to the line of intrenchments covering the railroad bridge and Turner's Ferry. The army was therefore ordered to retire at the same time to that line to secure our bridges. The cavalry crossed the Chattahoochee, Wheeler observing it for some twenty miles above, and Jackson as far below. The enemy advanced as usual, covered by intrenchments. Skirmishing continued until the ninth. Our infantry and artillery were brought to the south-east side of the river that night, because two Federal corps had crossed it above Powers' Ferry on the eighth, and intrenched. Lieutenant-General Stewart took command of his corps on the seventh.

The character of Peachtree Creek, and the numerous fords in the Chattahoochee above its mouth, prevented my attempting to defend that part of the river. The broad and muddy channel of the creek would have separated the two parts of the army. It, and the river below its mouth, were therefore taken as our line. A position on the high ground south of the creek was selected for the army, from which to attack the enemy while crossing. The engineer officers, with a large force of negroes, were set to work to strengthen the fortifications of Atlanta, and mount on them seven heavy rifles borrowed from Major-General Maury. The Chief-Engineer was instructed to devote his attention, first, to the works between the Marietta and Decatur roads; to put them in such condition that they might be held by State troops, so that the army might attack the enemy in flank when he approached the town: this in the event that we should be unsuccessful in attacking the Federal army in its passage of Peachtree Creek.

After the armies were separated by the Chattahoochee, skirmishing became less severe. On the fourteenth a division of Federal cavalry crossed the river by Moore's Bridge, near Newnan, but was driven back by Armstrong's brigade, sent by Brigadier-General Jackson to meet it. On the fifteenth Governor Brown informed me orally that he hoped to reinforce the army before the end of the month with near ten thousand State troops.

On the seventeenth the main body of the Federal army crossed the Chattahoochee between Roswell and Powers' Ferry. At ten o'clock P. M., while I was giving Lieutenant-Colonel Prestman, Chief Engineer, instructions in regard to his work of the next day on the fortifications of Atlanta, a telegram was received from General Cooper, informing me, by direction of the Secretary of War, that, as I had failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta, and expressed no confidence that I could defeat or repel him, I was relieved from the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee, which would be immediately turned over to General Hood. This was done at once. On the morning of the eighteenth the enemy was reported to be advancing, and at General Hood's request I continued to give orders until afternoon, placing the troops in the position selected near Peachtree Creek.

In transferring the command to General Hood, I explained my plans to him: First: to attack the Federal army while crossing Peachtree Creek. If we were successful, great results might be hoped for, as the enemy would have both the creek and the river to intercept his retreat. Second: if unsuccessful, to keep back the enemy by intrenching, to give time for the assembling of the State troops promised by Governor Brown, to garrison Atlanta with those troops, and when the Federal army approached the town, attack it on its most exposed flank with all the Confederate troops.

These troops, who had been for seventy-four days in the immediate presence of the enemy, laboring and fighting daily, enduring toil, exposure, and danger with equal cheerfulness, more confident and high-spirited than when the Federal army presented itself near Dalton, were then inferior to none who ever served the Confederacy.

Under the excellent administration of Brigadier-General Mackall, Chief of Staff, the troops were well equipped, and abundantly supplied. The draught animals of the artillery and Quartermaster's Department were in better condition on the eighteenth of July than on the fifth of May. We lost no material in the retreat, except the four field-pieces mentioned in the accompanying report of General Hood.

I commenced the campaign with General Bragg's Army of Missionary Ridge, with one brigade added (Mercer's), and two taken away (Baldwin's and Quarles'). That opposed to us was Grant's army of Missionary Ridge, then estimated at eighty thousand by our principal officers, increased, as I have stated, by two corps, a division, and several thousand recruits —in all, at least thirty thousand men. The cavalry of that army was estimated by Major-General Wheeler at fifteen thousand.

The reinforcements which joined our army amounted to fifteen thousand infantry and artillery, and four thousand cavalry. Our scouts reported much greater numbers joining the United States army—garrisons and bridge-guards from Tennessee and Kentucky, relieved by "one-hundred days' men," and the Seventeenth corps with two thousand cavalry.

The loss of our infantry and artillery from the fifth of May had been about ten thousand in killed and wounded, and four thousand seven hundred from all other causes—mainly slight

sickness produced by heavy cold rains, which prevailed in the latter half of June. These and the slightly wounded were beginning to rejoin their regiments. For want of reports I am unable to give the loss or the services of the cavalry, which was less under my eye than the rest of the army. Its effective strength was increased by about two thousand during the campaign.

The effective force transferred to General Hood was about forty-one thousand infantry and artillery and ten thousand cavalry.

According to the opinions of our most experienced officers, daily reports of prisoners, and statements of Northern papers, the enemy's loss in action could not have been less than five times as great as ours. In the cases in which we had the means of estimating it, it ranged from seventy to one to ninety to one, compared to ours, and averaged thirteen to one. The Federal prisoners concurred in saying that their heaviest loss occurred in the daily attacks made in line of battle upon our skirmishers in their rifle-pits. Whether they succeeded in dislodging our skirmishers or not, *their* loss was heavy and *ours* almost nothing.

At Dalton the great numerical superiority of the enemy made the chances of battle much against us, and even if beaten, they had a safe refuge behind the fortified pass of Ringgold, and in the fortress of Chattanooga. Our refuge, in case of defeat, was in Atlanta, one hundred miles off, with three rivers intervening. Therefore, victory for us could not have been decisive, while defeat would have been utterly disastrous. Between Dalton and the Chattahoochee we could have given battle only by attacking the enemy intrenched, or so near intrenchments that the only result of success to us would have been his falling back into them. While defeat would have been our ruin.

In the course pursued, our troops always fighting under cover, had very trifling losses compared with those they inflicted, so that the enemy's numerical superiority was reduced daily and rapidly, and we could reasonably have expected to cope with the Federal army on equal ground by the time the Chattahoochee was passed. Defeat on this side of that river would have been its destruction. We, if beaten, had a place of refuge in Atlanta—too strong to be assaulted, and too extensive to be invested. I had also hoped that by the breaking of the railroad in its rear the Federal army might be compelled to attack us in a position of our own choosing, or to a retreat easily converted into rout. After we crossed the Etowah five detachments of cavalry were successively sent with instructions to destroy as much as they could of the railroad between Dalton and the Etowah. All failed—because too weak. We could never spare a sufficient body of cavalry for this service, as its assistance was absolutely necessary in the defence of every position we occupied. Captain Harvey, an officer of great courage and sagacity, was detached on this service with one hundred men on the eleventh of June, and remained for several weeks near the railroad, frequently interrupting, although not strong enough to prevent its use. Early in the campaign, the statements of the strength of the cavalry in the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, given me by Lieutenant-General Polk, just from the command of that department, and my telegraphic correspondence with his successor, Lieutenant-General S. D. Lee, gave me reason to hope that a competent force could be sent from Mississippi and Alabama, to prevent the use of the railroad by the United States army. I therefore suggested it to the president directly on the thirteenth June and sixteenth July, and through General Bragg on the third, twelfth, thirteenth, sixteenth, and twenty-sixth June, and also to Lieutenant-General Lee on the tenth May and third, eleventh, and sixteenth June. I did so in the belief that this cavalry would serve the Confederacy better by insuring the defeat of Major-General Sherman's army, than by repelling a raid in Mississippi.

Besides the causes of my removal alleged in the telegram announcing it, various other accusations have been made against me, some published in newspapers in such a manner as to appear to have official authority, and others circulated orally in Georgia and Alabama, and imputed to General Bragg.

The principal are:

That I persistently disregarded the instructions of the president.

That I would not fight the enemy.

That I refused to defend Atlanta.

That I refused to communicate with General Bragg, in relation to the operations of the army.

That I disregarded his entreaties to change my course and attack the enemy.

And gross exaggerations of the losses of the army.

I had not the advantage of receiving the president's instructions in relation to the manner of conducting the campaign, but as the conduct of my predecessor in retreating before odds less than those confronting me had apparently been approved, and as General Lee in keeping on the defensive, and retreating towards Grant's objective point, under circumstances like mine, was adding to his great fame, both in the estimation of the administration and people, I supposed that my course would not be censured. I believed then as I do now, that it was the only one at my command which promised success.

I think that the foregoing narrative shows that the Army of Tennessee did fight, and with at least as much effect, as it had ever done before.

The proofs that I intended to hold Atlanta are, the fact that under my orders the work of strengthening its defences was going on vigorously, the communication on the subject made by me to General Hood, and the fact that my family was in the town. That the public workshops were removed and no large supplies deposited in the town, as alleged by General

Bragg, were measures of common prudence, and no more indicated an intention to abandon the place, than the sending the wagons of an army to the rear on a day of battle proves a foregone determination to abandon the field.

While General Bragg was at Atlanta, about the middle of July, we had no other conversation concerning the army there, than such as I introduced. He asked me questions regarding its operations past or future—made no comments upon them, nor any suggestions, and had not the slightest reason to suppose that Atlanta would not be defended. He told me that the object of his journey was to confer with Lieutenant-General Lee, and communicate with General E. K. Smith, in relation to reinforcements for me. He talked much more of affairs in Virginia than Georgia, asserting, what I believed, that Sherman's army outnumbered Grant's, and impressed me with the belief that his visits to me were unofficial.

A brief report by General Hood as Lieutenant-General, accompanies this.

Most respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. E. JOHNSTON,
General.

Doc. 59.

THE AFFAIR AT PRINCETON, VA.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL HUMPHREY MARSHALL.

CAMP NEAR JEFFERSONVILLE, VA., May 22, 1862.

R. E. Lee, Commanding, &c., Richmond:

GENERAL: In my last letter I advised you that the opportune return of Brigadier-General Heth with his force to Dublin depot rendered it unnecessary for me to proceed in that direction. But I ventured to suggest to that officer that a lateral movement, by me, cutting the line of the enemy's communication at Princeton, might assist him materially in clearing the country of the column which was endeavoring to penetrate to the railroad. General Heth approving the idea, I moved my whole force at once, *via* Saltville, towards this place, arriving here on the twelfth inst. I took the responsibility of ordering to the field some skeleton companies, just recruited, and intended to form part of a new regiment, authorized by an order of the Secretary of War, of ninth April, issued to Major McMahon, formerly General Floyd's Aide-de-camp. This corps, composed of seven companies, so called, did not number more than four hundred men, and none of them were trained at all. Under my order, they elected a lieutenant-colonel, for the time, only to lead them on this expedition. I also took the responsibility of placing in their hands the old muskets turned in to General Dimmock by Colonel Trigg, which I found at Abingdon. I left Abingdon with a force composed of the 54th Virginia, six hundred men; the 29th Virginia, four hundred and twenty men (four companies, wholly recruits, three raised by me this spring, and one by Lieutenant March); the 5th Kentucky, five hundred men; Dunn's battalion of recruits, four hundred men; Bradley's Mounted Kentucky Rifles, about two hundred and seventy-five men—making an aggregate of two thousand one hundred and ninety-five men, to which, add Jeffree's battery of six pieces, manned by recruits almost entirely.

General Heth desired a delay of a day or two to reorganize the companies in Floyd's brigade, which were under his command. Having despatched couriers to Colonel Wharton, directing him to meet me in Princeton, on the night of the sixteenth, by advancing from Rocky Gap; and, having informed General Heth (who was in position at the mouth of Wolf creek), that he should attack the enemy at the mouth of East river, on the morning of the seventeenth, I put my column in motion on the fifteenth, and reached Princeton on the night of the sixteenth. My advance was unexpected by Brigadier-General Cox, who had his headquarters and body-guard at Princeton at the time, with a force variously estimated at from five hundred to twelve hundred men—the former probably nearer the truth than the latter. The pickets of the enemy were encountered by my advance guard about four miles from Princeton, and a skirmish continued from that place, through the woodlands and brushwood, to a point something over one mile from the Court House. This skirmish was conducted by the Fifth Kentucky, from which I lost Captain Leonidas Elliott, who fell mortally wounded (since dead) at the head of his company, while bravely beating the enemy back. In this skirmish the enemy lost some sixteen or twenty, who were left on the field. We had only four wounded, including Captain Elliott. None killed. I directed Colonel Trigg to move on the right of the Fifth Kentucky, and take the enemy in flank, and so to press on to Princeton. Arriving at the hill (subsequently occupied by me), from which the land drops into the level vale, in which Princeton stands, a halt was ordered by Brigadier-General Williams, and a line of battle formed, with a view of bringing up the artillery to shell the town from that point. I thought it best to take the place by small arms, and, though daylight was now nearly gone, I ordered the battalions forward—Trigg leading to the right, May next, Moore's and Bradley's men next, so as to move on the place through the meadows and by the road we had traveled. In half an hour a sharp, hot fire on the right, announced Colonel Trigg in contact with the enemy. Fire, from a regiment, is seldom more steady than this I refer to. Succeeded by a general shout, and then by absolute silence, which lasted at least an hour and a half before I received any message from the troops in front, really I did not know but that we had met a check, and that regimental commanders were arranging for a new assault. As everything had to be left to them, under such circumstances, I waited about half a mile from town, placing my

battery in position at once, to command the town and our road. I supported the battery with Dunn's battalion. After a while I was informed that the enemy had fled before us, leaving his tents, clothes, swords, officers' uniforms, and even the lights burning in his tents.

It is probable had we not halted before nightfall, we might have captured many prisoners, possibly the General himself; for I was informed he did not leave town until twilight. But none of us could foresee, and so far as I know, every one acted for the best. The regiment went in with hearty good will and promptly. Major Bradley lost one of his men, Weeden, of Halladay's company. Trigg had some six men wounded, one of whom, private Carter, of Company I, was mortally wounded. So the town of Princeton fell into my hands about ten P. M., on the sixteenth of May; the line of the enemy's communications with Raleigh was cut, and the headquarters of the "Kanawa division" was abruptly stampeded. A mass of correspondence fell into my hands. Letters and orders, dated from the tenth down to the sixteenth of May—fully disclose the intentions of the enemy and his strength. I send you several of these for your perusal. I learned from the inhabitants of Princeton that on the morning of the fifteenth, the two regiments, about nine hundred men each, had passed through town toward East River, and that two regiments had been expected to arrive at eight P. M., from Raleigh, the very evening I came. I had a knowledge that one or more regiments had passed on to the mouth of East River by the road from Dunlap, without coming through Princeton. Combining the information I had from the letters captured with the news I received from the people in Princeton, I learned that I was in the neighborhood of at least four regiments, of which General Heth had no knowledge.

My own position had suddenly become very critical. I had only heard from Colonel Wharton that he had not passed East River Mountain on the morning of the fifteenth. He had not arrived at Princeton on the night of the sixteenth, as I had directed and desired. I did not know the direction in which General Cox had retired, whether to East River or Raleigh; but whether in the one or the other direction, I had no assurance but that the morrow would find me struggling with my force, more than half of whom were undrilled recruits, against largely superior numbers of well-trained troops, of every arm. Casting about as well as I could at night, to catch an idea of the topography, I found that the ruins of Princeton occupy a knoll in the centre on some open level meadows, entirely surrounded by woodlands, with thick undergrowth, which fringe the open grounds, and that through the entire circuit about the town, the central position at the court house can be commanded by the Enfield rifle. Roads lead in through these woods in several directions. My men had marched nineteen miles during the day, had slept none, and were scattered among the houses and tents to discover what had been left of the enemy. I at once determined to withdraw from the ruins before dawn, and to take position within range of the town site so as to cover the road by which I entered. This I effected, the dawn finding me in the act of completing the operation. My force was marched from the town. After daylight I received a despatch from Colonel Wharton, dated the sixteenth, at the Cross-roads, eleven miles from Princeton, promising to come to town by nine A. M., on the seventeenth. Before he arrived the enemy had re-entered the town, a force I could not estimate, but which was provided with artillery, and displayed more than two full regiments. Colonel Wharton arrived in the neighborhood by the road leading in from the Cross-roads, a little after nine A. M. The enemy was at the time throwing forward his skirmishers, to dispute with mine the woods and points overhanging the road, which led in from the Cross-roads to Princeton, which road ran nearly parallel to the one by which I had advanced. I had written to Colonel Wharton to press on, and he would have the enemy in flank. The Colonel opened with his single piece of artillery, a little after nine, upon my right, and the batteries in town and at my position at once opened upon each other at long range. Colonel Wharton soon came to me to report his position and force. The force was about eight hundred men. My estimate is, I now had some two thousand eight hundred men, of whom one-half were raw recruits. A regiment of the enemy coming down from the direction of Cross-roads to Princeton, about this time, appeared in the rear of Colonel Wharton's command, and were attacked by it furiously. The struggle lasted but a short time. The havoc in the enemy's ranks was terrible. Colonel Wharton reports to me two hundred and eleven as the dead and wounded of the enemy. I understand that more than eighty bodies were buried on the field. The enemy appeared with a flag of truce, asking to bury their dead, and to remove their wounded. I refused, but hearing, after about an hour, that some officer had allowed it, and that the enemy were engaged in burying, I directed Brigadier-General Williams to permit the ambulances of the enemy to pass along my right for the purpose of carrying away the wounded also. There was no further battle. I waited for news from Brigadier-General Heth, or to learn of his approach to Princeton, as the signal for a general engagement with the enemy. If Brigadier-General Heth had successfully attacked at the mouth of East River in the morning, as requested to do, he might be hourly expected to communicate his approach to Princeton by his couriers or his artillery. If he had not attacked, but was still at the mouth of Wolf Creek, it would be imprudent in me to assail the enemy, for the probability was strong that he would hazard the assault himself against any position, attempting to beat me, while he preserved his front against Heth.

If General Heth could by means of my diver-

sion, get through the narrows of New River, our forces should join the night of the seventeenth, and then, combined, we could fight on the eighteenth the whole force of the enemy, and, if successful, could pursue his vanquished column to Raleigh, burn his stores, and press our advantage as far as we desired. This was my reasoning. I would not move upon the town in the evening of the seventeenth; first, because the result would then be problematical, and that problem would likely be favorably solved on the arrival of General Heth's command. A grand result would then be easily obtained. Had I attacked under the circumstances, and had I failed, nothing could have shielded me from condemnation as a rash officer, who perilled all and lost all, when a few more hours would have doubled his force. I confidently expected at nightfall on the seventeenth, that the enemy, in superior force, would attack me in the morning, or that a junction with General Heth would enable me to attack his whole force, which was apparently concentrated around Princeton. He was in plain view under my glass—his wagons deliberately parked, his regiments exercising, and all the appearances given which indicate the purpose to give battle. My forces were masked to him. He could have no idea of its amount. In this fact was my safety, until Heth could come up. It seems Brigadier-General Heth did advance to the mouth of the East River, and found the enemy had abandoned tents and camp-equipage, both there and at French's, where he had been fortifying. The General passed on until he came within four or five miles of Princeton, on the evening of the seventeenth, when, hearing in the country from somebody that I had been repulsed and was retreating, he fell back in the night to the mouth of East River. His courier arrived at my position (one mile from the courthouse) about nine A. M., on the eighteenth, conveying to me the information that General Heth's force was now so required in another direction as to forbid further pursuit of the enemy, with a request to return Colonel Wharton to a post in the district of New River, indicated by the General commanding said district. The enemy had, during the night, vacated Princeton, taking the Raleigh road, his rear passing Blue Stone River about sunrise. I ordered my battalion of mounted-rifles to follow him. I ascertained that on the night of the eighteenth he encamped about ten miles from Princeton, in a very strong position, having some seven regiments with him in retreat, in all from five to seven thousand men. On the nineteenth, I again sent forward on his line of retreat, and ascertained that he had passed the Flat Top Mountains, had burned some of his caissons and gun-carriages, and had abandoned some of his wagons the preceding night. He was now twenty-five miles from Princeton. Nothing was now left to me but to return to the district whose interests are under my charge. I left a company of mounted men at Princeton, with orders to remain until General Heth could relieve them, and with the rest of my command I returned to this point. I left seventy-one of the enemy wounded in Hospital at Princeton, too badly shot to be moved at all. His surgeons were left in attendance, and a chaplain was permitted to be with them. I return a list of twenty-nine prisoners. The men themselves have been marched to Abingdon, where three others from the same army have been confined, whose names you have already. My Quartermaster has made return of our captures, among which I may mention about thirty-five miles of telegraph wire, horses, mules, saddles, pack-saddles, medical instruments, medicines in panniers, tents, a few stores, eighteen head of cattle, a number of wagons, and some excellent muskets and rifles. These last have been taken in charge by my ordnance officers, and will be issued to my command, unless otherwise ordered.

Reviewing the whole movement, I have only to regret that Brigadier-General Heth did not join me on the seventeenth, and did not communicate to me his whereabouts during the day or night. All was accomplished that I anticipated from the movement, *except the capture of prisoners*. The invasion has been signally repulsed, and the enemy has been demoralized and broken. The country he threatened so imminently has been relieved. It is a triumph of strategy merely, without loss on our part. My list of casualties will only exhibit two killed on the field, and two seriously wounded, who will die; and some ten or twelve wounded, but not dangerously. The enemy has lost largely; and indeed I should not be surprised if, in killed and wounded, his loss reaches four hundred. One of his regiments scattered in the woods, threw away guns and uniforms, and its members are daily picked up by the country people.

Your obedient servant,

H. MARSHALL,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

Articles Captured from the Enemy.

CAMP AT TWIANT'S, May 21, 1862.

Brigadier-General Marshall, commanding, etc.:

GENERAL: I have to report the following articles captured from the enemy at Princeton, Va., on the sixteenth and seventeenth instant, viz.:

Twelve bell tents, two wall tents and flies, five horses, eighteen mules, thirty-five pack saddles, four wagons, a lot of incomplete harness.

Respectfully,

W. F. FISHER,
Major and Chief Quartermaster, Army E. Kentucky.

List of Prisoners Captured.

May 16, 17, 18, 1862.

Twenty-eighth Ohio, Colonel Moore.—Privates Charles Cross, Daniel Chantemp, Company G; John Yagel, H. A. Miller, Company H; Charles Hertwick, Company F; Christian Ludwig, Corporal John Keen, Company C.

Twelfth Ohio, Colonel White.—Private John Klein, Company E.

Thirty-seventh Ohio, Colonel Seiber.—Privates Frederick Rock, M. Kohl, Company A; Thomas Kemper, Company C; Frank Krobs, Company K; Henry Bergeichen, Company F; Paul Kapff, Charles Groth, Corporal Jacob Rauft, Company H; Private Henry Rothenberg, Company K.

Twenty-third Ohio, Colonel Scammon.—Privates Leonard Beck, W. B. Waterhouse, Company C.

Thirty-fourth Ohio, Colonel Pratt.—Captain O. P. Evans, Company B; Privates George W. Thompson, Company K; David Coleman, Company C; Frank M. Curl, Anthony Eblehart, Company F; Michael Kelly, Jacob Fasnacht, Company I; M. A. Blakeman, Company D.

Second Virginia Cavalry, Colonel Bowles.—Private Robert Murphy (Irishman), Company K.

CAMP NEAR JEFFERSONVILLE, VA.

The above is a list of prisoners, except one wounded man, in hospital, whose name I have not yet learned. They consist of seventeen Germans, one Irishman, and ten native Ohioans. Some of the Germans are not naturalized. Besides these, there are two citizens of Mercer county, not reported herein, taken up on charge of disloyalty.

HIRAM HAWKINS,
Major and Officer of the Day.

General MARSHALL.

Doc. 60.

CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.

REPORT OF COLONEL J. M. SIMONTON.

JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI, September 24, 1862.

General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General, C. S. A.:

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit a report of the action and casualties of the brigade I commanded at the battle of Fort Donelson, on the fifteenth of February, 1862. I have been prevented from doing so sooner from the discourtesy of the Federal authorities either to allow me to make it to a superior officer in captivity with me (but in a different prison), or in any other way; and I now make this report to you direct, because I do not know the whereabouts of the proper division commanders, and from a desire to do justice to the gallant officers and men under my command upon the bloody field; also that the government may know who not only bravely met the invading foe, but shed their blood in the defence of the most holy cause for which freemen ever fought; and that their families, in after times, may reap the benefits of their noble deeds and costly sacrifices.

On Saturday, February fifteenth, 1862, about one o'clock A. M., I received a verbal order from Brigadier-General Pillow to take command of the brigade, commanded up to that by Colonel [illegible] the Third Mississippi (and properly the brigade of Brigadier-General Clark of Mississippi,) composed of the following regiments, viz., Third Mississippi, Colonel Davidson, Lieutenant-Colonel Wells commanding; First Mississippi, Colonel Simonton, Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton commanding; Seventh Texas, Colonel Gregg commanding; Eighth Kentucky, Colonel Burnett, Lieutenant-Colonel Lyons commanding; Forty-second Tennessee, Colonel Quarles commanding. The last regiment named, however, was detached previous to going into the action, and from which I have received no report. In obedience to orders, the brigade was formed in column under the crest of the hill in the rear of and to the left of the rifle-pits occupied by our army, and in rear of the brigade commanded by Colonel Baldwin of the Fourteenth Mississippi, in which position we remained until five o'clock A. M. The enemy were in position behind the crests of a number of small hills in front, and to the right of our rifle-pits, and encircling our entire left wing. At the hour above mentioned Colonel Baldwin received orders to move in the direction of the enemy and attack them on the right. I was ordered to follow with my command, which order I obeyed, but, owing to the ground and timber, we were compelled to march by the flank, and had not moved more than four hundred yards when the head of the column was fired upon. I immediately sent an order to Lieutenant-Colonel Wells to face his right wing to the right, and wheel it to the right, so that I might occupy a position on Colonel Baldwin's right (the one General Pillow had directed), but by some misunderstanding of the order, or its being miscarried, Lieutenant-Colonel Wells charged his front forward on first company, breaking my line at the left of his regiment. I then ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon, of the Eighth Kentucky, to file right, and move by the flank, at double time, which the gallant officer obeyed, under a heavy fire of the enemy's musketry. Before they had completed the movement many of his noble men had bravely fallen, but they held the position determinedly, and immediately I ordered Colonel Gregg of the Seventh Texas and Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton, of the First Mississippi, to move their respective regiments, at double-quick, in rear and beyond the Eighth Kentucky, which movement those officers executed with as much coolness, and their commands in as good order, as if they had been on review. I at the same time despatched an order to Lieutenant-Colonel Wells to occupy the position on the left of the Eighth Kentucky. (I make this explanation to show how the regiments changed position in going into action, and that justice may be done to all, as near as possible.) This threw me in line of battle in the following order: Seventh Texas on the right, first Mississippi regiment second, Eighth Kentucky third, and Third Mississippi on the left, and in front of the left of General McClernand's division of the Federal army. During this entire time the

enemy kept up a continuous volley of musketry, with, however, but little effect—most of the balls passing over us. I now ordered the entire command to advance and occupy the crest of the hill, which was executed with a coolness and steadiness that would have done honor to soldiers of a hundred battles. That heroic band of less than fifteen hundred in number, marched up the hill, loading and firing as they moved, gaining inch by inch on an enemy at least four times their number. For one long hour this point was hotly contested by the enemy, and many gallant officers and brave men fell in the faithful discharge of their duty; among whom was the lamented and daring Lieutenant-Colonel Clough of the Seventh Texas, together with a number of company officers, whose names are mentioned in the list of killed and wounded.

At this moment I was informed by an Adjutant that the command was running short of ammunition. I immediately despatched an aid, Captain Ryan, to General Pillow for reinforcements, and at the same time ordered Colonel Gregg to move his regiment further to the right to prevent a flank movement I discovered the enemy were attempting to make, and the remainder of my command to charge the enemy's lines, which movements were executed with a spirit and determination that insured success. The enemy's lines gave way, and the rattle of musketry was drowned by the shouts of victory that rose along the lines of men conscious of superiority and right. The enemy, however, again rallied and formed in line of battle a few hundred yards in rear of their first position, and in rear of *four* pieces of artillery (of Swartz's battery). The line of my brigade, in the charge over the hills and in passing through the enemy's camp, having become somewhat broken, I ordered the commandant to halt and rectify their alignment, which was quickly done; and being now informed by Captain Ryan that the Fifty-sixth Virginia regiment was on my left, I again ordered an advance, which was promptly obeyed by all; and soon the enemy was again driven from his position, and four pieces of Swartz's battery in our possession. The enemy continued to fall back, contesting the crest of every hill, until we had driven them over one and a half miles, and had possession of the ground occupied by the left of McClernand's and Wallace's division of the Federal army. The enemy had disappeared behind the crests of a range of hills about half a mile in our front, and in the direction of their transports. At this point I was ordered to halt my command and await further orders. In the meantime the brigade was furnished with ammunition (chiefly gathered from the slain of the enemy), the lines rectified, and the command brought to a rest; in which position we remained for a considerable time, until orders came for us to march inside the rifle-pits, which order was obeyed *without the fire of a gun* or even a sight of the *foe*, unless he was wounded or a prisoner. I had not fully occupied my position in the *rifle-pits* when an order came to me to move at double-quick to the right of our line. The men were again ordered into line, and moved in the direction indicated, but before arriving at the specified point another order was received to return. Thus ended the battle of February fifteenth, 1862, so far as the brigade I commanded participated.

The number killed and wounded in each regiment, as per Adjutants' reports is as follows:

	Men and Officers.	Killed.	Wounded.
Third Mississippi regiment.....	546	5	46
Eighth Kentucky "	312	27	72
Seventh Texas "	305	20	39
First Mississippi "	331	16	61
	1494	68	218

Making a total of 286 killed and wounded out of 1494 officers and men. I respectfully refer you to documents for the names of the killed and wounded of the different regiments. I cannot call especial attention to one of the field officers under my command without doing injustice to others. Lieutenant-Colonel Wells, assisted by Captains Kennedy and Wells, of the Third Mississippi; Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon, assisted by Major Henry of the Eighth Kentucky; Colonel Gregg, Lieutenant-Colonel Clough, and Major Granbury of the Seventh Texas; Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton and Major Johnston, of the First Mississippi, all won for themselves the confidence of their commands, and are entitled to the highest commendation of their countrymen. Captain R. B. Ryan and Sergeant-Major T. H. Wilson acted as my aids, and discharged their duty gallantly. It would give me much pleasure to mention the names of company officers who distinguished themselves for efficiency and gallantry, but their conduct will be made known by their respective regimental commanders.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN M. SIMONTON,

Colonel First Mississippi regiment, commanding brigade.

Doc. 61.

VICKSBURG AND BATON ROUGE.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL VAN DORN.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
JACKSON, MISS., September 9, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit, for the information of the War Department, the following report of the defence of Vicksburg, and of operations in this district, up to the present time:

Pursuant to orders I assumed command of this district, and of the defences of Vicksburg, on the twenty-seventh day of June, 1862. Prior to my arrival, Major-General Lovell having resolved to defend the city, had ordered a detail of his force, under the command of Brigadier-General M. L. Smith, to garrison the place and construct works for its defence. I found the city besieged by a powerful fleet of war vessels and an army. The inhabitants, inspired by a noble patriotism, had determined to devote the city to destruction, rather than see it fall into the hands of an enemy who had abandoned many of the rules of civilized warfare. This voluntary sacrifice, on the altar of liberty, inspired me with the determination to defend it to the last extremity. Orders to this effect were at once issued, to which my army responded with the liveliest enthusiasm. The citizens retired to the interior, while the troops marched in and pitched their tents in the valleys and on the hills adjacent, in convenient position to support batteries and strike assailants. The batteries of heavy guns already established by the skill and energy of General Smith, on the crest of the hills overlooking the river, were placed in complete readiness for action. Other guns were brought up from Mobile, from Richmond, from Columbus, and elsewhere, and put in battery. Breckinridge's division occupied the city. Smith's brigade, which, previous to my arrival, had furnished the garrison of the place, manned the batteries, and with details from Breckinridge's division, guarded the approaches in front and on the flanks. Wither's light artillery was placed in such position as to sweep all near approaches, while Stark's cavalry watched, at a distance, on our flank on the Yazoo, and below Warrenton, on the Mississippi.

Prior to my assuming command, the attacking force of the enemy was confined to Porter's mortar-fleet and Farragut's gunboats (with their attendant array in transports), which had ascended the river from New Orleans. For the operations of this force in attack, and for the successful and heroic resistance made by General Smith and the troops under his command, I refer the Department to the satisfactory and graphic report of that officer, herewith communicated.

The evacuation of Fort Pillow and the fall of Memphis opened the new danger of a combination between the upper and lower fleets of the enemy. This junction was effected early in July, and thus an added force of more than forty gunboats, mortar-boats, rams, and transports lay in menace before the city. On the twelfth of July it opened fire, and kept up a continuous attack until the bombardment of the city ceased. Having received authority from the President to use the ram Arkansas, as part of my force, some days prior to the fifteenth of July, I issued an order to Captain Brown to assume command of [illegible] are her for immediate and active [illegible] all reliable sources I learned that she was a vessel capable of great resistance, and armed with large offensive power. Making the order imperative, I commanded Captain Brown to take her through the raft of the Yazoo, and after sinking the Star of the West in the passage to go out and attack the upper fleet of the enemy to the cover of my batteries. I left it to his judgment to determine whether on reaching the city his vessel was in condition to proceed down the river and destroy the lower mortar-fleet. Captain Brown properly substituted a vessel of inferior quality in place of the Star of the West, entered the Mississippi, and on the memorable morning of the fifteenth of July, immortalized his single vessel, himself, and the heroes under his command, by an achievement, the most brilliant ever recorded in naval annals. I deeply regret that I am unable to enrich my report by an authentic account of the heroic action of the officers and men of the Arkansas. Commodore Lynch declines to furnish me with a report of the action, on the ground that he was an officer out of the scope of my command. The glory of this deed of the Arkansas stung the pride of the Federal navy, and led to the most speedy, but unsuccessful efforts of the combined fleets to destroy her. I refer the Department to the accompanying report of General Smith for an accurate detail of those efforts, as also for a connected and faithful relation of the important events which make the history of the siege and defence of Vicksburg. With the failure to destroy or take the Arkansas, the siege of Vicksburg practically ended. The attack on the batteries soon ceased, and the enemy, baffled and enraged by an unexpected, determined, and persistent defence, vented his wrath in impotent and barbarian efforts to destroy the city. On the twenty-seventh of July both fleets disappeared, foiled in a more than two months' struggle to reduce the place. The casualties on our side, during the entire siege, were twenty-two killed and wounded. Not a gun was dismounted, and but two were temporarily disabled. The successful defence of Vicksburg is due to the unflinching valor of the cannoneers, who, unwearied by watchfulness night and day, stood by their guns unawed by the terrors of a fierce and continuous bombardment; to the sleepless vigilance and undaunted courage of the troops, who lay, at all hours, in close supporting distance of every battery, ready to beat back the invader so soon as his footsteps should touch the shore; to the skilful location of scattered batteries, and last, not least, to that great moral power—a high and patriotic resolve pervading and swelling the breasts of officers, soldiers, and citizens, *that, at every cost, the enemy should be expelled.* I refer the department to the specific enumeration of the names of officers and men who won distinction by meritorious service during the siege, as reported by General Smith, and I heartily indorse his commendations. Satisfied that the enemy disappeared from Vicksburg, under the mortifying conviction that it

was impregnable to his attack, I resolved to strike a blow before he had time to organize and mature a new scheme of assault.

The enemy held Baton Rouge, the capital of Louisiana, forty miles below the mouth of Red River, with a land force of about three thousand five hundred men, in conjunction with four or five gunboats, and some transports. It was a matter of great necessity to us that the navigation of Red River should be opened as high as Vicksburg. Supplies, much needed, existed there, hard to be obtained from any other quarter, and strong military reasons demanded that we should hold the Mississippi at two points, to facilitate communications and co-operation between my district and the Trans-Mississippi Department. The capture of Baton Rouge, and the forces of the enemy at that point, would open the Mississippi, secure the navigation of Red River, then in a state of blockade, and also render easier the recapture of New Orleans. To this end I gave orders to General Breckinridge to move upon Baton Rouge with a force of five thousand men, picked from the troops at Vicksburg, and added to his command the whole effective force of General Ruggles, then at Camp Moore, making a total force of six thousand men. To ensure the success of the plan, I ordered the Arkansas to co-operate with the land forces by a simultaneous attack from the river. All damages sustained by the Arkansas from the fleets of the enemy had been repaired, and when she left the wharf at Vicksburg for Baton Rouge, she was deemed to be as formidable, in attack or defence, as when she defied a fleet of forty vessels of war, many of them iron-clads. With such effective means, I deemed the taking of Baton Rouge and the destruction or capture of the enemy on the land and water, the reasonable result of the expedition. By epidemic disease, the land force under Major-General Breckinridge was reduced to less than three thousand effective men, within the period of ten days after he reached Camp Moore. The Arkansas, after arriving within a short distance of Baton Rouge, in ample time for joint action at the appointed hour of attack, suddenly became unmanageable, from a failure in her machinery and engine, which all the efforts of her engineers could not repair. The gallant Breckinridge, advised by telegram every hour of her progress towards Baton Rouge, and counting on her co-operation, attacked the enemy with his whole effective force, then reduced to about two thousand five hundred men, drove him from all his positions, and forced him to seek protection under the cover of his gunboats. I regret to state that the labors of General Breckinridge, in a distant field of operations, have thus far prevented him from making to me a report of his action; but enough has transpired to enable me to assure the department that the battle of Baton Rouge illustrated the valor of our troops, and the skill and intrepidity of their commander. His report will be forwarded as soon as it is received. It will be thus manifest to the department that an enterprise, so hopeful in its promise, met with partial failure, only from causes which were not only beyond my control, but out of the reach of ordinary foresight. I could not anticipate the sudden illness of three thousand picked men, and the failure of the Arkansas at the critical hour appointed to her for added honors, was a joyful surprise to the startled fleet of the enemy, and a wonder to all who had witnessed her glory at Vicksburg. Advised of the result of the expedition, I immediately ordered the occupation of Port Hudson, a point selected for its eligibility of defence, and for its capacity for offensive annoyance of the enemy, established batteries, manned them with experienced gunners, and guarded them by an adequate supporting force, holding Baton Rouge, in the meanwhile, in menace. The effect of these operations was the evacuation of Baton Rouge by the enemy, and his disappearance from the Mississippi between the capital of Louisiana and Vicksburg. The results sought by the movements against Baton Rouge have been, to a great extent, attained. We hold two points on the Mississippi—more than two hundred miles—unmolested by the enemy, and closed to him. The navigation of the Mississippi River from the mouth of Red River to Vicksburg was at once opened, and still remains open to our commerce, giving us also the important advantage of water connection, by Red River, of the east with the west. Indispensable supplies have been, and continue to be, drawn from this source. The desired facilities for communication and co-operation between this district and the Trans-Mississippi Department have been established. The recapture of New Orleans has been made easier to our army.

I think it due to the truth of history to correct the error, industriously spread by the official reports of the enemy, touching the destruction of the Arkansas. She was no trophy won by the Essex, nor did she receive injury at Baton Rouge from the hands of any of her adversaries. Lieutenant Stevens, her gallant commander, finding her unmanageable, moored her to the shore. On the cautious approach of the enemy, who kept at a respectful distance, he landed his crew, cut her from her moorings, fired her with his own hands, and turned her adrift down the river. With every gun shotted, our flag floated from her bow, and not a man on board, the Arkansas bore down upon the enemy, and gave him battle. Her guns were discharged as the flames reached them, and when her last shot was fired the explosion of her magazine ended the brief but glorious career of the Arkansas. "It was beautiful," said Lieutenant Stevens, while the tears stood in his eyes, "to see her, when abandoned by commander and crew, and dedicated to sacrifice, fighting the battle on her own hook." I trust that the official report of Commodore Lynch will do justice to the courage, constancy, and resolution of the officers and men who were the last crew of the Arkansas.

I deem it eminently proper to say to the department, that neither the spirit which resolved to dispute at Vicksburg the jurisdiction of the Mississippi River, nor the energy which successfully executed that resolution, was local in its character, nor was it a spirit bounded by State lines, or circumscribed by State pride. It was a broad, catholic spirit, wide as our country, and unlimited as the independence we struggle to establish. The power which baffled the enemy resided in the breasts of the soldiers of seven States, marshaled behind the ramparts of Vicksburg. Mississippians were there, but there too, also, were the men of Kentucky, of Tennessee, of Alabama, of Arkansas, of Louisiana, and of Missouri, as ready to defend the emporium of Mississippi as to strike down the foe at their own hearthstones. I incorporate with my report a schedule of the forces under my command at Vicksburg, as a proper contribution to the archives of the Confederacy.

General Helm.—Fourth Kentucky volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Hynes; Fifth Kentucky volunteers, Colonel Hunt; Thirty-first Alabama volunteers, Colonel Edwards; Fourth Alabama battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Snodgrass; Thirty-fifth Mississippi volunteers, Colonel Orr; Hudson battery.

General J. S. Bowen.—First Missouri volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Riley; Tenth Arkansas volunteers; Ninth Arkansas volunteers, Colonel Dunlop; Sixth Mississippi volunteers, Colonel Lowry; Second Confederate battalion; Watson's battery, Captain Bursley.

General Preston.—Third Kentucky volunteers, Colonel Thompson; Sixth Kentucky volunteers, Colonel Lewis; Seventh Kentucky volunteers, Colonel Crossland; Thirty-fifth Alabama volunteers, Colonel Robertson; Cobb's battery, Lieutenant Gracy.

Colonel W. S. Statham.—Fifteenth Mississippi volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Farrell; Twenty-second Mississippi volunteers, Captain Hughes; Nineteenth Tennessee volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Moore; Twentieth Tennessee volunteers, Colonel Smith; Twenty-eighth Tennessee volunteers, Colonel Brown; Forty-fifth Tennessee volunteers, Colonel Searcey; McClung's battery, Captain McClung.

General M. L. Smith.—Company of sappers and miners, Captain Winters; Twenty-sixth Louisiana volunteers, Colonel DeClouett; Twenty-fifth Louisiana volunteers, Colonel Thomas; Sixth Mississippi battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Balfour; Twenty-seventh Louisiana volunteers, Colonel Marks; Third Mississippi volunteers, Colonel Mellon; Seventeenth Louisiana volunteers, Colonel Richardson; Fourth Louisiana volunteers, Colonel Allen; Company I, Thirty-seventh Mississippi volunteers, Captain Randall; First Mississippi Light artillery, Colonel Withers; regiment heavy artillery, Colonel Jackson; Eighth Louisiana battalion, Pinckney; First Louisiana battalion, Major Clinch; Twenty-eighth Mississippi cavalry, Colonel Stark; battalion Zouaves, Major Dupiere; cavalry escort, Lieutenant Bradley.

To the members of my staff, Majors Kimmel and Stith, Assistant Adjutant Generals; to Majors Joseph D. Balfour and A. M. Haskell, Inspectors; to Surgeon Choppin, Medical Director; to Surgeon Ryan, Medical Inspector; to Lieutenants Sullivan and Shoemaker, my Aides; to Lieutenant-Colonel Lomax, Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General; to Lieutenant-Colonel J. P. Mayor, Acting Engineer; to Captain A. H. Cross, Captain Thyssing, Engineers; to Colonel Fred. Tate, and to Majors Uriel Wright and Welchler, volunteer Aides, I return my thanks for the ready and efficient services rendered by them in their respective departments.

I am, sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
EARL VAN DORN,
Major-General.

Since this report was written I have received the report of Major-General Breckinridge, of his operations at Baton Rouge and Port Hudson, herewith forwarded. It gives me pleasure to commend to the special notice of the department the names of all who won distinction in the service.

EARL VAN DORN,
Major-General.

MAJOR-GENERAL BRECKINRIDGE'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS BRECKINRIDGE'S DIVISION,
September 30, 1862.

Major M. M. Kimmel, Assistant Adjutant-General:

SIR: I have the honor to report the operations of a portion of my division, recently ordered from Vicksburg to Camp Moore and Baton Rouge, Louisiana, by Major General Van Dorn:

I left Vicksburg on the twenty-seventh of July with somewhat less than four thousand men, and arrived at Camp Moore the evening of the twenty-eighth. The Major-General commanding the district having received intelligence that the enemy was threatening Camp Moore in force, the movement was made suddenly and rapidly by railroad, and having but few cars, nothing could be transported except the troops, with their arms and ammunition. Brigadier-General Charles Clark, who had reported for duty a few days before our departure from Vicksburg, promptly and kindly consented to accompany the expedition. Brigadier-General Ruggles was already at Camp Moore, in command of a small force, with which he had kept the enemy in check. The troops were immediately organized in two divisions, General Clark taking command of the First, and General Ruggles of the Second division. The rumor of an advance of the enemy in force upon Camp Moore proved to be unfounded. On the thirtieth of July, in obedience to a despatch of the twenty-ninth, from the Major-General commanding the district, the troops were put in motion

for Baton Rouge. During the march I received information that the effective force of the enemy was not less than five thousand men, and that the ground was commanded by three gunboats lying in the river. My own troops having suffered severely from the effects of exposure at Vicksburg, from heavy rains, without shelter, and from the extreme heat, did not now number more than thirty-four hundred men. Under these circumstances, I determined not to make the attack unless we could be relieved from the fire of the fleet. Accordingly I telegraphed to the Major-General commanding the condition and number of the troops, and the reported strength of the enemy, but said I would undertake to capture the garrison, if the Arkansas could be sent down to clear the river, or divert the fire of the gunboats. He promptly answered that the Arkansas would be ready to co-operate at daylight on Tuesday, the fifth of August. On the afternoon of Monday, the fourth, the command having reached the Comite river, ten miles from Baton Rouge, and learning by an express messenger that the Arkansas had passed Bayou Sara in time to arrive at the proper moment, preparations were made to advance that night. The sickness had been appalling. The morning report of the fourth showing but three thousand effectives, and deducting those taken sick during the day, and the number that fell out from weakness on the night march, I did not carry into the action more than twenty-six hundred men. This estimate does not include some two hundred partisan rangers, who had performed efficient service in picketing the different roads, but who, from the nature of the ground, took no part in the action; nor about the same number of militia, hastily collected by Colonel Hardee in the neighborhood of Clinton, who, though making every effort, could not arrive in time to participate. The command left the Comite at eleven o'clock P. M., and reached the vicinity of Baton Rouge a little before daybreak on the morning of the fifth. Some hours before the main body moved, a small force of infantry, with a section of Semmes' battery, under Lieutenant Fauntleroy, the whole commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Shields, of the Thirtieth Louisiana, was sent by a circuitous route to the road leading from Clinton to Baton Rouge, with orders to drive in any pickets of the enemy, and attack his left as soon as the action should begin in front. This service was well performed, but for details reference is made to the report of Brigadier-General Ruggles, from whose command the force was detached. While waiting for daylight to make the attack, an accident occurred which deprived us of several excellent officers and enlisted men, and two pieces of artillery. The partisan rangers were placed in rear of the artillery and infantry, yet during the darkness a few of them leaked through, and riding forward encountered the enemy, causing exchange of shots between the pickets. Galloping back, they produced some confusion, which led to rapid firing for a few moments, during which Brigadier-General Helm, was dangerously injured by the fall of his horse, Lieutenant Todd, his aide-de-camp, killed, Captain Roberts, of the Fourth Kentucky, severely wounded, several enlisted men killed and wounded, and two of Captain Cobb's three guns rendered for the time wholly useless. After General Helm was disabled, Colonel Thomas H. Hunt assumed command of his brigade. Order was soon restored, and the force placed in position on the right and left of the Greenwell Springs' road. I was obliged to content myself with a single line of battle, and a small regiment of infantry, with one piece of artillery to each division as a reserve. The enemy (expecting the attack) was drawn up in two lines, or rather in one line, with strong reserves distributed at intervals. At the moment there was light enough, our troops moved rapidly forward. General Ruggles, commanding the left, brought on the engagement with four pieces of Semmes' battery, the Fourth and Thirtieth Louisiana, and Boyd's Louisiana battalion, under command of Colonel Allen, of the Fourth Louisiana, and the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Kentucky, and the Thirty-fifth Alabama, under command of Colonel Thompson, of the Third Kentucky. These troops moved forward with great impetuosity, driving the enemy before them, while their ringing cheers inspired all our little command.

The Louisiana troops charged a battery and captured two pieces. At this point Colonel Allen, commanding the brigade, while pressing forward with the colors in his hand, had both legs shattered, and Lieutenant-Colonel Boyd received a severe wound. This produced confusion, and the enemy at the same moment throwing forward a strong reinforcement, the brigade was forced back in some disorder. It was rallied by the efforts of Colonel Breaux, Lieutenant-Colonel Hunter, and other officers, and although it did not further participate in the assault, it maintained its position under a fire from the gunboats and land batteries of the enemy. During this time, Thompson's brigade, which composed the right of Ruggles' division, was behaving with great gallantry, often driving back superior forces, and towards the close of the action took part in the final struggle from a position immediately on the left of the First division. Colonel Thompson, being severely wounded in a charge, the command devolved on Colonel Robertson, of the Thirty-fifth Alabama, whose conduct fully justified the confidence of his troops. The Louisiana battery, Captain Semmes, was admirably handled throughout. The First division, under General Clark, being the Second brigade, composed of the Fourth and Fifth Kentucky, Thirty-first Mississippi, Thirty-first and Fourth Alabama, commanded by Colonel Hunt, of the Fifth Kentucky, and the Fourth brigade, composed of the Fifteenth and Twenty-second Mississippi, and the Nineteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-eighth, and Forty-fifth Tennessee, consolidated into one

battalion, commanded by Colonel Smith, of the Twentieth Tennessee, together with the Hudson battery, and one piece of Cobb's battery, advanced to the right of the Greenwell Springs road. On the right, as on the left, the enemy was constantly pressed back, until after several hours of fighting he was driven to his last encampment in a large grove just in rear of the penitentiary. Here the contest was hot and obstinate, and it was here the First division suffered the greatest loss. Colonel Hunt was shot down, and upon the fall of that excellent officer, at the suggestion of General Clark, and with the consent of the officers concerned, I placed Captain John A. Buckner, Assistant Adjutant-General on my staff, in command of the Second brigade. In the management of his command he displayed so high a degree of skill and courage that I commend him especially to the notice of the government. General Clark pressed the attack at this point with great vigor, until he received a wound, which was supposed to be mortal, when, through some misapprehension, the Second brigade began to fall back down the slope, but without confusion. Captain Buckner learning, upon inquiry from me, that I did not desire a retrograde movement, immediately, aided by Major Wickliffe, of the Fifth Kentucky regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Caldwell, who was injured by the accident of preceding night, having been obliged to retire), and other regimental officers faced the brigade about and renewed the attack. At the same time Colonel Smith, commanding Fourth bribade, composed of the consolidated Tennessee regiments, and the Twenty-second Mississippi, Captain Hughes, was ordered forward, and moved against the enemy in fine style. In a few moments Captain Hughes received a mortal wound at the head of his regiment. Observing some troops on the left, partially sheltered by a shallow cut in the road, who proved to be the remnant of Thompson's brigade, and out of ammunition, I ordered them to advance to the support of the First division with the bayonet. The order was promptly obeyed, and in executing it, I happened to observe, as distinguished for alacrity, Colonel Crossland, of the Seventh Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel Goodwin, of the Thirty-fifth Alabama, and Lieutenant Terry, of the Eighth Kentucky, on duty with sharpshooters. At this critical point, Major Brown, chief commissary, and Captain Richards, one of my aids, were conspicuous in urging on the troops. In this assault we suffered considerably from the fire of the fleet until the opposing lines approached each other so closely that a regard for their own friends obliged them to suspend. The contest at and around this last encampment was bloody, but at the end of it the enemy were completely routed, some of our men pursuing them and firing at them for some distance down the street, running in front of the arsenal and barracks. They did not reappear during the day. It was now ten o'clock. We had [illegible]ain for the guns of the Arkansas. I saw around me not more than one thousand exhausted men, who had been unable to procure water since we left the Comite river. The enemy had several batteries commanding the approaches to the arsenal and barracks, and the gunboats had already reopened upon us with a direct fire. Under these circumstances, although the troops showed the utmost indifference to danger and death, and were even reluctant to retire, I did not deem it prudent to pursue the victory further. Having scarcely any transportation, I ordered all the camps and stores of the enemy to be destroyed, and directing Captain Buckner to place one section of Semmes' battery, supported by the Seventh Kentucky, in a certain position on the field, withdrew the rest of the troops about one mile to "Ward's Creek," with the hope of obtaining water, but finding none there fit for man or beast, I moved the command back to the field of battle, and procured a very imperfect supply from some cisterns in the suburbs of the town. This position we occupied for the rest of the day.

The citizens of the surrounding and thinly settled country exhibited the warmest patriotism, and with their assistance, conveyances enough were procured to carry off all our wounded who could bear removal. A few, armed with shot guns and other weapons, had been able to reach the field in time to join in the attack. Having neither picks nor shovels, we were unable to dig graves for the burial of the dead. I still hoped for the co-operation of the Arkansas, and, in that event, intended to renew the attack. But late in the afternoon, I learned by express that before daylight, and within five miles of Baton Rouge, her machinery had become disabled, and she lay helpless on the right bank of the river. Upon receiving this intelligence, I returned with my command to the Comite river, leaving a force of observation near the suburbs of the town. The Hudson battery, Lieutenant Sweeny, and Cobb's one piece, in charge of Sergeant Hawk Peak, played their part well. I am unable to give the exact force of the enemy, but by comparing all my information with the number and size of their camps, and the extent and weight of their fire, I do not think they brought into action less than forty-five hundred men. We had eleven pieces of field artillery. They brought to bear on us not less than eighteen pieces, exclusive of the guns of the fleet. In one respect the contest between the opposing forces was very striking. The enemy were well clothed, and their encampments showed the presence of every comfort and even luxury. Our men had little transportation, indifferent food, and no shelter. Half of them had no coats, and hundreds of them were without either shoes or socks; yet no troops ever behaved with greater gallantry, and even reckless audacity. What can make this difference, unless it be the sublime courage inspired by a just cause? The wound of Brigadier-General Charles Clark being thought

mortal, and the least motion causing great agony, he was left on the field at his own request, his aid, Lieutenant Yerger, remaining with him. The next morning they gave themselves up to the enemy. I cannot speak in terms too strong of the skill, coolness, and courage of General Clark. He played the part of a perfect soldier. Brigadier-General Ruggles conducted the attack on the left with uncommon rapidity and precision, and exhibited throughout the qualities of a brave and experienced officer. In addition to the officers of my staff already mentioned, I desire to express my acknowledgments of the zeal and gallantry of Major Wilson, Chief of Artillery, Major Hope, Inspector-General, whose horse was shot under him, Captain Nocquet, Chief of Engineers, Lieutenant Breckinridge, Aide-de-Camp, and Doctor Pendleton, Medical Director, assisted by Doctor Weatherly, on temporary service. A number of gentlemen from Louisiana and elsewhere, rendered efficient service as volunteers, among whom were Lieutenant-Colonel Pinckney, Mr. Addison, and Captain Bird, of Louisiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Brewer, of Kentucky, and Mr. William B. Hamilton, of Mississippi. The thanks of the army are due to the Hon. Thomas J. Davidson, for his attention to the hospitals, and to all the inhabitants of that part of Louisiana for their devotion to our sick and wounded. Colonel Pond and Major DeBaum, in command of partisan rangers, were efficient before and after the battle, in observing and harassing the enemy. The inability of General Clark and the failure of several officers to make reports, may prevent full justice to the conduct of the First division. Any omission here, will, when brought to my notice, be embodied in a supplemental report. The report of General Ruggles is very full, as to all that occurred on the left. I send herewith a list of the officers and men specially mentioned in the division, brigade, and regimental reports, for gallant conduct, with the request that it be published and the names brought to the favorable notice of the government. I transmit, also, the reports of the subordinate commanders, and the returns of the killed and wounded. It will be seen that our casualties amounted to four hundred and sixty-seven. I have reason to believe that the loss of the enemy was much greater. We captured two flags and a few prisoners. Nothing was left by us but one caisson, which was so much injured as to be wholly unserviceable, one of the enemy's being brought off in its place. After the battle, the enemy, who had previously been plundering, burning houses, and other property, stealing negroes, and seizing citizens through a large region of country, never ventured to send out another marauding force. Our pickets continued to extend to the immediate vicinity of Baton Rouge, and very soon the enemy abandoned the place, and retired to New Orleans. A few days after the engagement, knowing the desire of the Major-General commanding to secure a strong position on the Mississippi, below the mouth of Red River, I occupied Port Hudson with a portion of the troops under the command of Brigadier-General Ruggles. The next day I received orders to remove all the troops to that point. Brigadier-General Bowen, who had just arrived, was left with his command on the Comite River, to observe Baton Rouge from that quarter, to protect our hospitals, and to cover the line of communication between Clinton and Camp Moore. I directed General Ruggles to select eligible positions at Port Hudson for heavy batteries, and ordered Captain Nocquet, Chief Engineer, to report to him temporarily for this duty. Upon my arrival there, I found that rapid progress had been made, and some of the works under charge of Captain Nocquet, were ready to receive the guns, which the Major-General commanding wrote me were on the way. Port Hudson is one of the strongest points on the Mississippi, which Baton Rouge is not, and batteries there will command the river more completely than at Vicksburg. On the nineteenth day of August, in obedience to orders from the headquarters of the department, I moved from Port Hudson for Jackson, Mississippi, with a portion of the force, leaving Brigadier-General Ruggles in command with ——— troops. In concluding this report, I have to express my obligations for the prompt and cordial support which I received at all times from the Major-General commanding the department.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE,
Major-General.

I omitted to mention that the Fifteenth Mississippi, Major Binford, was not brought into action. This admirable regiment, much reduced by long and gallant services, was held as a reserve.

JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL DANIEL RUGGLES.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, FIRST DISTRICT,
ARMY EAST OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
CAMP BRECKINRIDGE, August 9, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit, for the consideration of the Major-General commanding the forces, the following report of the part taken by my division in the action of the fifth instant, at Baton Rouge:

The Second division was composed of two brigades, the First consisting of the Third Kentucky regiment, Captain Bowman; Sixth Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel Cofer; Seventh Kentucky, Colonel Crossland; and Thirty-fifth Alabama, Colonel Robertson. The Second brigade, of the Fourth Louisiana regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Hunter; battalion of Thirtieth Louisiana regiment, Colonel J. H. Breaux; battalion of Stewart's Legion, Lieutenant-Colonel Boyd; and Confederate light battery, Captain J. O. Semmes with two companies mounted men, and some two

battalion, commanded by Colonel Smith, of the Twentieth Tennessee, together with the Hudson battery, and one piece of Cobb's battery, advanced to the right of the Greenwell Springs road. On the right, as on the left, the enemy was constantly pressed back, until after several hours of fighting he was driven to his last encampment in a large grove just in rear of the penitentiary. Here the contest was hot and obstinate, and it was here the First division suffered the greatest loss. Colonel Hunt was shot down, and upon the fall of that excellent officer, at the suggestion of General Clark, and with the consent of the officers concerned, I placed Captain John A. Buckner, Assistant Adjutant-General on my staff, in command of the Second brigade. In the management of his command he displayed so high a degree of skill and courage that I commend him especially to the notice of the government. General Clark pressed the attack at this point with great vigor, until he received a wound, which was supposed to be mortal, when, through some misapprehension, the Second brigade began to fall back down the slope, but without confusion; Captain Buckner learning, upon inquiry from me, that I did not desire a retrograde movement, immediately, aided by Major Wickliffe, of the Fifth Kentucky regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Caldwell, who was injured by the accident of preceding night, having been obliged to retire), and other regimental officers faced the brigade about and renewed the attack. At the same time Colonel Smith, commanding Fourth bribade, composed of the consolidated Tennessee regiments, and the Twenty-second Mississippi, Captain Hughes, was ordered forward, and moved against the enemy in fine style. In a few moments Captain Hughes received a mortal wound at the head of his regiment. Observing some troops on the left, partially sheltered by a shallow cut in the road, who proved to be the remnant of Thompson's brigade, and out of ammunition, I ordered them to advance to the support of the First division with the bayonet. The order was promptly obeyed, and in executing it, I happened to observe, as distinguished for alacrity, Colonel Crossland, of the Seventh Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel Goodwin, of the Thirty-fifth Alabama, and Lieutenant Terry, of the Eighth Kentucky, on duty with sharpshooters. At this critical point, Major Brown, chief commissary, and Captain Richards, one of my aids, were conspicuous in urging on the troops. In this assault we suffered considerably from the fire of the fleet until the opposing lines approached each other so closely that a regard for their own friends obliged them to suspend. The contest at and around this last encampment was bloody, but at the end of it the enemy were completely routed, some of our men pursuing them and firing at them for some distance down the street, running in front of the arsenal and barracks. They did not reappear during the day. It was now ten o'clock. We had listened in vain for the guns of the Arkansas. I saw around me not more than one thousand exhausted men, who had been unable to procure water since we left the Comite river. The enemy had several batteries commanding the approaches to the arsenal and barracks, and the gunboats had already reopened upon us with a direct fire. Under these circumstances, although the troops showed the utmost indifference to danger and death, and were even reluctant to retire, I did not deem it prudent to pursue the victory further. Having scarcely any transportation, I ordered all the camps and stores of the enemy to be destroyed, and directing Captain Buckner to place one section of Semmes' battery, supported by the Seventh Kentucky, in a certain position on the field, withdrew the rest of the troops about one mile to "Ward's Creek," with the hope of obtaining water, but finding none there fit for man or beast, I moved the command back to the field of battle, and procured a very imperfect supply from some cisterns in the suburbs of the town. This position we occupied for the rest of the day.

The citizens of the surrounding and thinly settled country exhibited the warmest patriotism, and with their assistance, conveyances enough were procured to carry off all our wounded who could bear removal. A few, armed with shot guns and other weapons, had been able to reach the field in time to join in the attack. Having neither picks nor shovels, we were unable to dig graves for the burial of the dead. I still hoped for the co-operation of the Arkansas, and, in that event, intended to renew the attack. But late in the afternoon, I learned by express that before daylight, and within five miles of Baton Rouge, her machinery had become disabled, and she lay helpless on the right bank of the river. Upon receiving this intelligence, I returned with my command to the Comite river, leaving a force of observation near the suburbs of the town. The Hudson battery, Lieutenant Sweeny, and Cobb's one piece, in charge of Sergeant Hawk Peak, played their part well. I am unable to give the exact force of the enemy, but by comparing all my information with the number and size of their camps, and the extent and weight of their fire, I do not think they brought into action less than forty-five hundred men. We had eleven pieces of field artillery. They brought to bear on us not less than eighteen pieces, exclusive of the guns of the fleet. In one respect the contest between the opposing forces was very striking. The enemy were well clothed, and their encampments showed the presence of every comfort and even luxury. Our men had little transportation, indifferent food, and no shelter. Half of them had no coats; and hundreds of them were without either shoes or socks; yet no troops ever behaved with greater gallantry, and even reckless audacity. What can make this difference, unless it be the sublime courage inspired by a just cause? The wound of Brigadier-General Charles Clark being thought

mortal, and the least motion causing great agony, he was left on the field at his own request, his aid, Lieutenant Yerger, remaining with him. The next morning they gave themselves up to the enemy. I cannot speak in terms too strong of the skill, coolness, and courage of General Clark. He played the part of a perfect soldier. Brigadier-General Ruggles conducted the attack on the left with uncommon rapidity and precision, and exhibited throughout the qualities of a brave and experienced officer. In addition to the officers of my staff already mentioned, I desire to express my acknowledgments of the zeal and gallantry of Major Wilson, Chief of Artillery, Major Hope, Inspector-General, whose horse was shot under him, Captain Nocquet, Chief of Engineers, Lieutenant Breckinridge, Aide-de-Camp, and Doctor Pendleton, Medical Director, assisted by Doctor Weatherly, on temporary service. A number of gentlemen from Louisiana and elsewhere, rendered efficient service as volunteers, among whom were Lieutenant-Colonel Pinckney, Mr. Addison, and Captain Bird, of Louisiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Brewer, of Kentucky, and Mr. William B. Hamilton, of Mississippi. The thanks of the army are due to the Hon. Thomas T. Davidson, for his attention to the hospitals, and to all the inhabitants of that part of Louisiana for their devotion to our sick and wounded. Colonel Pond and Major DeBaum, in command of partisan rangers, were efficient before and after the battle, in observing and harassing the enemy. The inability of General Clark and the failure of several officers to make reports, may prevent full justice to the conduct of the First division. Any omission here, will, when brought to my notice, be embodied in a supplemental report. The report of General Ruggles is very full, as to all that occurred on the left. I send herewith a list of the officers and men specially mentioned in the division, brigade, and regimental reports, for gallant conduct, with the request that it be published and the names brought to the favorable notice of the government. I transmit, also, the reports of the subordinate commanders, and the returns of the killed and wounded. It will be seen that our casualties amounted to four hundred and sixty-seven. I have reason to believe that the loss of the enemy was much greater. We captured two flags and a few prisoners. Nothing was left by us but one caisson, which was so much injured as to be wholly unserviceable, one of the enemy's being brought off in its place. After the battle, the enemy, who had previously been plundering, burning houses, and other property, stealing negroes, and seizing citizens through a large region of country, never ventured to send out another marauding force. Our pickets continued to extend to the immediate vicinity of Baton Rouge, and very soon the enemy abandoned the place, and retired to New Orleans. A few days after the engagement, knowing the desire of the Major-General commanding to secure a strong position on the Mississippi, below the mouth of Red River, I occupied Port Hudson with a portion of the troops under the command of Brigadier-General Ruggles. The next day I received orders to remove all the troops to that point. Brigadier-General Bowen, who had just arrived, was left with his command on the Comite River, to observe Baton Rouge from that quarter, to protect our hospitals, and to cover the line of communication between Clinton and Camp Moore. I directed General Ruggles to select eligible positions at Port Hudson for heavy batteries, and ordered Captain Nocquet, Chief Engineer, to report to him temporarily for this duty. Upon my arrival there, I found that rapid progress had been made, and some of the works under charge of Captain Nocquet, were ready to receive the guns, which the Major-General commanding wrote me were on the way. Port Hudson is one of the strongest points on the Mississippi, which Baton Rouge is not, and batteries there will command the river more completely than at Vicksburg. On the nineteenth day of August, in obedience to orders from the headquarters of the department, I moved from Port Hudson for Jackson, Mississippi, with a portion of the force, leaving Brigadier-General Ruggles in command with ——— troops. In concluding this report, I have to express my obligations for the prompt and cordial support which I received at all times from the Major-General commanding the department.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE,
Major-General.

I omitted to mention that the Fifteenth Mississippi, Major Binford, was not brought into action. This admirable regiment, much reduced by long and gallant services, was held as a reserve.

JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL DANIEL RUGGLES.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, FIRST DISTRICT,
ARMY EAST OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
CAMP BRECKINRIDGE, August 9, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit, for the consideration of the Major-General commanding the forces, the following report of the part taken by my division in the action of the fifth instant, at Baton Rouge:

The Second division was composed of two brigades, the First consisting of the Third Kentucky regiment, Captain Bowman; Sixth Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel Cofer; Seventh Kentucky, Colonel Crossland; and Thirty-fifth Alabama, Colonel Robertson. The Second brigade, of the Fourth Louisiana regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Hunter; battalion of Thirtieth Louisiana regiment, Colonel J. H. Breaux; battalion of Stewart's Legion, Lieutenant-Colonel Boyd; and Confederate light battery, Captain J. O. Semmes with two companies mounted men, and some two

hundred and fifty partisan rangers, detached on scouting and outpost service.

On the night of the fourth of August this division proceeded from Corinth bridge, marching left in front; Semmes' light battery in the rear of left battalion Fourth Louisiana volunteers, a detachment commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Shields; Thirtieth Louisiana volunteers, consisting of one company from his regiment, commanded by Captain Boyle; one company partisan rangers, commanded by Captain Amiker; one company mounted rangers and a section of Semmes' battery, under Lieutenant Fauntleroy, had preceded the march of the division, having left camp at four and a half P. M. to operate on the Plank road leading from Baton Rouge to Clinton, on our extreme right. The head of the division column, preceded by a company of mounted rangers and advanced guard, reached Ward's Creek bridge, on the Greenwell Springs and Baton Rouge road, about three o'clock A. M., where a temporary halt was called preparatory to the formation of the division line of battle. During this halt, while the advance was driving in the enemy's pickets, some stragglers from the column were mistaken for the enemy's pickets and fired on. The mistake being mutual, in the darkness, a few shots were exchanged, unfortunately disabling General Helm and killing Lieutenant Todd. This necessarily caused some confusion. Order, however, was soon restored, and the column marched to the point whence the deployment was to commence. The line was formed a little before daylight. Colonel Thompson's brigade (the First), with the right resting near the Greenwell Spring road, Colonel Allen's brigade (the Second) on the left, his left extending through a wood and resting on a large field. Semmes' battery (four pieces) in the centre, occupying the space between the two brigades; a squadron of cavalry, under command of Captain Augustus Scott, was ordered to proceed to the extreme left of the line to observe and endeavor to prevent any attempt to outflank us in that direction. At a little after daylight, during the prevalence of a thick fog, the order was given to advance. The line proceeded but a few hundred yards before it encountered a brisk fire from the enemy's skirmishers, strongly posted on our extreme right, in some houses surrounded by trees and picket fences. Almost simultaneously a battery of the enemy opened on our line from the same direction. Semmes' battery was ordered forward to our indicated position, to drive off the skirmishers and silence the enemy's battery, and the whole line moved rapidly forward firing and cheering. The effect was instantaneous. The enemy's skirmishers fled, and his battery was compelled to change position and seek shelter under the guns of the arsenal to prevent being captured, where it remained, continuing to fire on our advancing line. Semmes' battery took position on the right of the division, to keep up the engagement with the battery of the enemy. Colonel Thompson's brigade continued to advance, under an occasional fire, across an open field and through some corn-fields, just beyond which they encountered a heavy fire from the enemy, strongly posted in a wood. Here the contest was warmly maintained on both sides for a considerable time, during which the First division succeeded in entering a regimental camp on our right. The enemy were finally driven back into and through another camp immediately in our front. The enemy at this period were strongly reinforced, and a heavy battery a little to the left of the centre opened an oblique fire on both brigades. About the same time the enemy attempted to break our centre, by pushing a column between the two brigades. This movement being discovered Semmes' battery was ordered forward and opened on this column at short range, with grape and canister with marked effect, for a few rapid discharges scattered the enemy and drove him back in confusion. A similar attempt was made on the right of the division, which was defeated with equal success by a timely and well-directed fire from the Thirty-fifth Alabama and Sixth Kentucky regiments. The two brigades, which, from the nature of the ground, had become separated, were ordered, in advancing, to gain ground, to the right and left respectively, in order to subject the enemy's position in front to a converging fire. In executing this movement the First brigade met a portion of the First division falling back in some disorder. Colonel Thompson halted and was attempting to reform them when he was informed by a mounted officer that the order was for the whole line to fall back. In obedience to this supposed order he fell back a short distance, but soon reformed his line and charged the enemy under a galling fire. Unfortunately, while leading his men in this charge, Colonel Thompson fell, severely wounded, and was borne from the field, and about the same time Colonel Allen also fell, dangerously wounded, while leading, with unsurpassed gallantry, his brigade against a battery of the enemy. These circumstances prevented the further prosecution of this movement. About this time the Major-General commanding arriving upon this part of the field, directed the final charge upon the enemy which drove him in confusion through his last regimental encampment to the river under the protection of his gunboats. His camps, containing a large quantity of personal property, commissary stores, and clothing, were destroyed. Finding it fruitless to remain longer under the fire of the gunboats, and disappointed in the expected co-operation of the Arkansas, the exhausted troops were withdrawn in good order to the suburbs of the town; the Seventh Kentucky regiment and a section of Semmes' artillery being left on the field to protect the collection of the stragglers and wounded, which was thoroughly accomplished. Colonel Allen's brigade, on the left, moved forward through a wood and into some corn-fields. They soon encountered the enemy in superior force, protected by houses and fences. They successively

charged these positions, driving the enemy steadily back until within a few hundred yards of the river, where they were subjected to a destructive fire from the batteries before mentioned and the enemy's gunboats. They charged and took a section from one of the enemy's batteries, Colonel Allen leading the advance with the colors of one of his battalions in his hand. It was at this critical juncture that, as before stated, this gallant soldier fell from his horse severely wounded, and during the confusion which followed this misfortune, the enemy succeeded in recapturing the pieces.

The enemy pressed heavily upon this brigade and poured into it such a galling fire from infantry and artillery that it fell back in some disorder. Colonel Breaux, who assumed command upon the fall of Colonel Allen, succeeded, with the aid of officers of the brigade and two officers connected with the staff, who were sent to his assistance, in rallying a sufficient number to show front to the enemy until Semmes' battery was brought up, as already stated, to their support, and succeeded, by a well-directed fire, in preventing the enemy's advance. This position was maintained despite the heavy firing on the brigade from the enemy's gunboats and land batteries until the troops were withdrawn, with the rest of the army, to the suburbs of the town. Lieutenant-Colonel Shields had been ordered, as already stated, to take position on the Plank road leading from Clinton to Baton Rouge, and as soon as he heard the fire of our main body, to attack a battery of the enemy, said to be stationed at the junction of the Clinton and Bayou Sara roads. This service was promptly and gallantly performed. He drove in the enemy's pickets, followed them up, and opened fire on a regimental encampment to the right of the Greenwell Springs road, driving the enemy from it. He was here met by two regiments of the enemy, but succeeded in holding them at bay till he was fired upon by our own artillery, but fortunately without injury. Four of the artillery horses being disabled, and the infantry unable to withstand the heavy fire of the enemy, he withdrew to his original position, where the wounded horses were replaced by others, when he returned to his advanced position, which he held till General Clark's division came up on his left, when the two companies of infantry were, by order of the Major-General commanding, attached to the Twenty-second Mississippi regiment. The section of artillery under his command retained its position until the army retired, when it rejoined the battery in the suburbs of the town. In concluding this report of the battle, I have the satisfaction of stating that the conduct of both officers and men was gallant and daring, every movement being performed with characteristic promptitude. I respectfully commend the reports of the commanders of brigades, as well as those of regiments, battalions, and independent companies, to the special consideration of the Commanding General, and also recommend the following officers and soldiers, specially named in these reports, to favorable consideration: First, Colonel A. P. Thompson and Colonel H. W. Allen, brigade commanders, both severely wounded. Fifth Kentucky, commanded by Captain Bowman. Seventh Kentucky, Colonel Crossland, and his color-bearer, James Rollins. Sixth Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel Cofer; Captains J. Smith, Utterback, and Thomas Page, and First-Lieutenant H. Harned. Thirty-fifth Alabama, Colonel Robertson and Lieutenant-Colonel Goodwin. Of the second brigade, the Fourth Louisiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Hunter. In this regiment, Lieutenant Corkern, Company B, Lieutenant Jetter, Company H, and Serjeant-Major Daniels. Battalion of Stewart's Legion commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Boyd, who was disabled by a severe flesh wound in the arm. Captain Chum also was wounded. The command devolved upon Captain T. Bynum, who acted with gallantry. The battalion Thirtieth regiment of Louisiana volunteers, commanded by Colonel J. A. Breaux, who speaks in high terms of the officers and men of his regiment, especially Captain N. Trepagnier and Lieutenant Dapremont, both wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel Shields, Thirtieth Louisiana, commanding separate detachment, who speaks in high terms of the intrepidity of Lieutenant Fauntleroy, commanding section of guns in his detachment. Captain Semmes, commanding battery, and his officers, Lieutenant Barnes and J. A. West, performed gallant service. Captain Blount, Brigade Inspector of Second brigade, rendered gallant service in the field, where it is believed he has fallen, as nothing has been heard of him since. I also have the gratification to name the members of my staff who served with me on this occasion, viz.: Lieutenant L. D. Sandidge, corps artillery Confederate States army, A. A. A. and Inspector-General; Captain George Whitfield, Chief Quartermaster; Major E. S. Ruggles, acting Ordnance Officer, and Acting Chief Commissary of Subsistence; First Lieutenant M. B. Ruggles, Aide-de-Camp. Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Jones, who was severely wounded, and Colonel J. O. Fuqua, District Judge Advocate and Provost Marshal-General, who were all distinguished for their efficiency, coolness, and gallantry throughout the conflict. The following officers, attached to the general staffs, also rendered gallant service: Captain Samuel Bard, on special service; Lieutenant A. B. De Saulles, engineer; Lieutenant H. H. Price and Lieutenant H. C. Holt. Other officers on special service, amongst whom were Captain Augustus Scott, commanding squadron on temporary service; Captains Curry, Kinderson, and Behorn, as volunteer aids for the occasion, and Captain J. M. Taylor served with zeal and gallantry. The entire division entering the fight numbered about nineteen hundred and fifty, infantry and artillery, with a few irregular cavalry and partisan rangers, numbering in all some

three hundred and fifty or four hundred. The casualties—killed, wounded, and missing—being two hundred and seventy-seven (277).

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
DANIEL RUGGLES,
Brigadier-General, commanding Second Division.

Captain JOHN A. BUCKNER,
A. A. General.

REPORT OF A. A. GENERAL J. A. BUCKNER.

HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,
CORNER RIVER TEN MILES FROM BATON ROUGE,
August 9, 1862.

GENERAL: In compliance with your request, I have the honor to submit the following report of the late engagement at Baton Rouge, so far as the First brigade of First division was concerned, after its commanders, Brigadier-General Helm, and subsequently Colonel Thomas Hunt, were wounded, and I had the honor to receive the command at your hands. The enemy had been repulsed from one of his encampments, and the different regiments constituting the First brigade were drawn up in line in one of his camps, not, however, fully deployed. After moving the two regiments on the left of the brigade, by the flank to the left, the whole were formed in line of battle, and were ordered to advance. The movement was spiritedly made up to the second encampment, through a somewhat sharp volley of musketry, in as good style as the broken and confined limits of the ground would admit, and immediately the enemy was hotly and determinedly engaged. After a few volleys, I ordered the brigade forward, which order was being promptly obeyed by the Fourth and Fifth Kentucky, the other regiments being just in the act of advancing, when I received, from General Clark, the order to face about and retreat. This order was then given by myself and General Clark's aids. The troops fell back reluctantly, and not in very good order, the General himself and a number of others being wounded in the retreat. I immediately reported to you to know whether you had ordered the retreat, and was informed that you had not. The Second brigade of this division was then ordered by yourself to advance. It went up in good style, Captain Hughes, commanding Twenty-second Mississippi regiment, leading them gallantly. By your presence and assistance, the first brigade was rallied and led by yourself, in person, to the same position from which it had fallen back, when it joined with the Second brigade, and moved conjointly through the second encampment, driving the enemy before them through the third and *last* of their camps to the river, under cover of their gunboats. This being accomplished, which was all that was expected of the land force, the Arkansas failing to make her appearance, nothing remained but to destroy what had been captured (inasmuch as no arrangement had been made for bearing it off, though the battle-field was in our possession sufficiently long), and retire from the range of the enemy's batteries on the river. Accordingly, you gave me the order to withdraw the division out of range of the fire of the fleet, to await the movements of the gunboat Arkansas. This was done in good order, though with some degree of reluctance, the cause of the movement not being fully understood. Your order to fire the enemy's tents and stores was well executed. Their loss must have been very heavy in Quartermaster and Commissary supplies, and particularly so in Sutlers' stores, considerable quantities of new goods and general equipments being burned. The position in which you left me near the house where General Clark lay wounded was held more than two hours after the main body of the troops were withdrawn, with a section of Semmes' battery, and the remnant of the Seventh Kentucky regiment, Colonel Crossland commanding, as support. Learning that Cobb's battery had left its position and been ordered to the rear, the section, with its support under my command, was removed to occupy the better position left by Captain Cobb, at which point it remained a half hour, and would have remained the whole evening, but for the erroneous information of the enemy's advance in force being given by a surgeon who was moving rapidly to the rear. Leaving pickets at this point, just in the edge of town, I withdrew the artillery and its support slowly back to the point at which you found me. A flag of truce was hoisted early in the evening by the enemy, and on being met by an officer whom I sent to the front, the privilege of bearing off the dead and wounded was requested and granted for four hours by yourself, upon condition that the agreement be reduced to writing. No communication being received in writing for some time, twenty minutes longer were given, shortly after the expiration of which time a note was received, signed by the commanding officer at Baton Rouge, disclaiming the flag of truce.

I cannot conclude my report without speaking of the cool courage and efficient skill with which Brigadier-General Charles Clark led his command into the action, and the valuable assistance rendered him by his Aids, Lieutenants Spooner and Yerger; of the efficiency of Major H. R. Topp, of the Thirty-first Mississippi, in leading his regiment; of Major Brown, Chief Commissary of the division, whose fearless exposure of himself where the contest was hottest, in urging on the troops to a charge; of Captain J. H. Miller, commanding Fourth Kentucky regiment, who displayed conspicuous gallantry in leading his regiment; of Colonel Crossland, commanding Seventh Kentucky regiment, whose regiment, after being in front and assisting in bearing the brunt of the battle, remained upon the field while the shells from the enemy's gunboats were falling thickly around them; and of the valuable service rendered me by Major C. Wickliffe, of the Fifth Kentucky, towards the close of the engagement, where his constant presence at the head of his regiment, inspired confidence and

courage, not only among his own men, but all who were near him in the closing contest, which decided the engagement so favorably and so gloriously for the Confederate arms. For list of casualties I would refer you to papers "A" and "B," concerning the battle.

I have the honor to be, General,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JOHN A. BUCKNER,
A. A. General.

REPORT OF COLONEL L. B. SMITH.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION,
CAMP ON COMITE RIVER, August 10, 1862.

Major-General Breckinridge:

SIR: The following is a correct report of the part the Fourth brigade took in the late engagement in front of the city of Baton Rouge, on the fifth instant. By order of General Clark, I moved the Fourth brigade across a corn-field, perpendicular to the road, throwing the Fifteenth Mississippi regiment in the woods, deployed as skirmishers, to protect the right. We then moved forward across several fields to the outskirts of the town, when the division was halted till I was ordered to move by the left flank to the road, and then by the front, till they fired on me, which was returned. At that moment we were not more than twenty yards from their lines. About three rounds from our men put them to flight. The fog being so thick, we could not see more than twenty steps. We were then on a line with their camps on the left of the road, and the firing had ceased, when General Clark ordered me to fall back in the ravine some hundred yards to the rear. I about-faced the brigade, and marched back in good order, walking my men in a gully. Soon after, the Second brigade moved obliquely to the left, and engaged them on the left of the road; the right of the Second brigade began to give way, and in twenty or thirty minutes, I suppose, I moved forward to their support, and to their right, engaging the enemy, and a general forward movement was made by our division. About the time we had reached the tents and tops of the hills, orders came to fall back to the bridge, where the stampede had taken place that morning, which we did in as good order as we could after having so severely engaged them. I would beg leave to mention the names of Lieutenant-Colonel Moore, of the Nineteenth Tennessee; Captain Hughes, of the Twenty-second Mississippi, and Adjutant Fitzpatrick, of the Twenty-second Mississippi, as acting gallantly all through the engagement. Captain Hughes fell in the last charge at the head of his men. The Fifteenth Mississippi was held in reserve with a battery, and was not in the fight. The men behaved well, and observed the commands I gave them.

Respectfully submitted,
L. B. SMITH,
Colonel, commanding Fourth Brigade.

REPORT OF COLONEL J. EDWARDS.

HEADQUARTERS THIRTY-FIRST ALABAMA REGIMENT,
CAMP NEAR COMITE RIVER, LA., August 8, 1862.

Major John A. Buckner, Assistant Adjutant-General:

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the Thirty-first Alabama regiment, in the action at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on the fifth instant. At early dawn on the morning of the fifth instant, the different regiments, composing the Second brigade, of which my regiment formed a part, were assigned their positions in line of battle. After having advanced for considerable distance over very difficult ground, my regiment, with the Thirty-first Mississippi and Fourth Kentucky, was ordered to commence the attack on the enemy's left, which order was executed vigorously, but cautiously, skirmishers being thrown out at different times and places. The fog hovering over the field rendered it impossible to discover what was in our front at a distance of but a few paces. The enemy retired slowly before the well-directed fire which we constantly poured upon them, falling back from their first encampment. On reaching that encampment, my regiment was exposed to a galling fire in front and on the left flank, when we were ordered to fall back. At this point, Lieutenant Childress, of Company K, was mortally, and Lieutenant Hays, of Company G, and Sergeant Loughlin, of Company B, were severely wounded while gallantly fighting, and left on the field. Having fallen back to a small ravine, the line was re-formed, and advanced to dislodge the enemy from their last encampment to our left, which was gallantly done after a severe contest. The order then being given for us to retire, it was executed in good order. Sickness and death had thinned my ranks to such an extent that I only carried into action ninety-seven, rank and file, of which number two were killed and nine wounded. I take pleasure in saying that, although neither of my field-officers were with me, both being absent, sick, I found but little or no difficulty in rallying my men. I saw not a single instance in my regiment, amidst all the galling fires of the enemy, which they withstood, of any officer or soldier being disposed to shrink from his duty, but all seemed to vie with each other in the stern determination to conquer or die. In the last charge made upon the enemy, when they were driven from their last encampment, I am proud to say my regiment was side by side with the foremost in the charge, and when the work was accomplished of driving the enemy from their position, and we were ordered to fall back, they did so in perfect order. Very respectfully,

J. EDWARDS,
Colonel, commanding Thirty-first Alabama Regiment.

REPORT OF MAJOR TOPP.

HEADQUARTERS THIRTY-FIRST REGIMENT MISSISSIPPI VOLS.
August 7, 1862.

Major John A. Buckner, A. A. General:

DEAR SIR: I have the honor to make the fol

lowing report. About the time, or immediately after the repulse of the Second division, a portion of our brigade, of which the Thirty-first Mississippi regiment was a part, under the command of Colonel Hunt, of the Fifth Kentucky, was ordered forward through several corn-fields, in which the enemy was discovered by my skirmishers, thrown out for that purpose, towards the second encampment, to which we approached within two hundred yards or less, driving constantly the enemy before us, when a terrific fire from the enemy in the direction of the second encampment checked our advance, and where well-nigh all of my casualties occurred. At this point we were ordered to fall back, by Colonel Hunt, and the retreat had hardly begun when Colonel Hunt was wounded and taken off the field. Here I attempted to rally my regiment, but the confusion had become so general that I found it impossible to do so. We then fell back to the ravine in advance of the first encampment, and formed under the cover of the ravine. General Clark, commanding division, came up at this juncture. I told him that we were without a brigade commander, Colonel H. having been wounded and requested him to assign some one to the command of the brigade, Colonel Edwards, of the Thirty-first Alabama, having lost his horse, and expressing an unwillingness to assume the command. General C. then left, and very soon Major Buckner, as I was informed, took the command, and ordered us to march by the left flank in the direction of the enemy's second encampment, and having fairly gotten us in a position to advance, ordered us forward. The command was instantly obeyed, and the brigade, with the exception of the two regiments on the right, was soon engaged with the enemy. My regiment was lying down firing, with very little damage to themselves, and gradually approaching the encampment, when to our surprise we observed the right of our brigade falling back in disorder. I have no idea who gave the command, as I was on the extreme left. I then ordered my regiment to fall back, which it did, in confusion, to the cut in the road. At this time the regiments held in reserve were carried forward by General Clark, and we rallied again in the road under the direction of Major Buckner. We were a second time ordered to forward, and this time there was no halting or falling back. We advanced at a double-quick to within seventy-five yards of the encampment, fired, and charged bayonets, when the enemy began to give way, and finally ended in a rout. We were entering the encampment when we were ordered to halt, by Major B., and formed upon the color-line of the second encampment. We remained in this position some five minutes or more, when the same offier called "attention," gave the command, "about face, forward, march," the whole line marching in admirable order.

Respectfully submitted,

H. E. TOPP,

Major, commanding Thirty-first Mississippi Volunteers.

REPORT OF MAJOR J. C. WICKLIFFE.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH KENTUCKY REGIMENT,
CAMP NEAR COMITE RIVER, LOUISIANA,
August 7, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor of submitting to you the following report of the part taken by the Fifth Kentucky regiment in the action of the fifth instant, at Baton Rouge.

The Fifth Kentucky, with the commander of the brigade, was placed in line of battle early on the morning of the fifth of August. The line was advanced towards Baton Rouge steadily. In obedience to an order of my brigade commander, my regiment was held as a support to the battery attached to this brigade, where it remained until I received an order in person from Major-General Breckinridge to post one company, as pickets, to the right and at some distance from the arsenal. In obedience to this order, I placed Captain Gillum, with his company, consisting of one lieutenant, four sergeants, one corporal and twenty-four men, upon the ground designated by the General, and in obedience to another order from him, left Captain Gillum there, when my command was ordered to join the brigade and engage the enemy in their camps. Captain Gillum remained at his post until ordered away, when the brigade retired to the point where the line of battle was first formed. Thus this company was prevented from engaging in the battle, and this will account why none were killed or wounded in company A, of this regiment. When ordered by Major-General Breckinridge to join the brigade to which my regiment is attached, I was placed on the left of the Fourth Kentucky regiment, which was the first regiment in the brigade. Immediately after this, an order from you was given to advance. My command did so, and until the fire was drawn from the enemy, who were secreted in and about the tents of the third and last encampment. The fire was immediately returned by the men under my command. It continued warm and heavy for about twenty or twenty-five minutes, our line, as far as I could see, advancing very little, but steadily, and the enemy as slowly retreating. At this time an order was given by Brigadier-General Clark, commanding the division, to fall back to a small ravine a short distance in the rear, and re-form, which was executed in good order. In a few moments we were again ordered to advance, and did so, never halting until the enemy had been driven from the last of their encampments. After the brigade line had been formed, in obedience to an order from you, we retired slowly and in good order. My command numbered two hundred and twenty-two, rank and file. From this deduct Company A, numbering thirty-one officers and men, and seven detailed to carry off the wounded, thus reducing the number of men actually engaged in the fight, under my command, to one hundred and eighty-four men.

The following is a list of the casualties which occurred in my regiment: In Company A, none.

Engd by A. H. Ritchie

MAJ. GEN. H. G. WRIGHT.

In Company B, L. P. Smith, mortally wounded, and since dead; H. Osborne, slightly. In Company C, Lieutenant H. H. Harris, wounded; private R. S. Brooks, killed; privates J. S. Jackson, J. T. Taylor, D. Tinsley, and J. B. Young, wounded. In Company D, Lieutenant Oscar Kennard, wounded; private Wm. Hicks, killed; privates John Essill and John Henry, wounded. In company E, Sergeant R. M. Hague, wounded; privates James Bowers, and Isaac Rutledge, killed; privates Elbert Gramor, B. Logan, and J. L. Thompson, wounded. In Company F, A. P. Fowler, W. P. Ratliff, J. Leach, J. W. Wallace, and D. P. Howell, wounded. In Company G, Lieutenant P. V. Daniel, privates N. M. Beauchamp, Thomas Stith, Miche Meardin, Allen Dereby, Frank Keath, Green Woorley, and M. S. Newman, wounded. In company K, Sergeant John H. Hughes, Corporal Moses Lafeiter, privates Alexander Barry, Charles Freeburg, and Thomas Lively, killed; Sergeant T. H. Atwell, privates Edmond Elliott, Peter Frilty, James Hunt, G. Polfers, L. Hotsenburg, A. J. Williams, and W. McFatridge, wounded.

I cannot close this report without stating that the officers and men under my command discharged their duties in the action at Baton Rouge in a manner creditable alike to themselves, and the cause for which they are battling.

Very respectfully,

J. C. WICKLIFFE,
Major, commanding Fifth Kentucky Regiment.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN J. H. MILLETT.

CAMP NEAR COMITE RIVER, August 7, 1862.

Captain John A. Buckner:

SIR: Through an unfortunate circumstance I was placed in command of the Fourth Kentucky at about three o'clock A. M., on the fifth instant. After being placed in line, our brigade moved forward until it reached the outskirts of Baton Rouge, when we moved by the left flank as far as the camp of the Fourteenth Maine regiment. We then moved forward; the smoke being so dense, my command was here separated from the brigade. Having thrown out my right company as skirmishers I continued to move forward, but discovering that the enemy were on my left, supported by a battery, all concealed by the houses and fences, and not being able to change direction without placing my regiment immediately under the fire of our own troops, I rejoined the brigade. I had just taken my position on the right when you took command, and ordered us forward. I moved my regiment obliquely to the left until my right had cleared the fence in front, when I ordered them forward in the direction of the enemy's camp, which they did with a cheer. We had advanced probably two hundred yards when an aid, whom I took to be on General Clark's staff (not being personally acquainted with any of them), ordered me to fall back. Seeing the balance of the brigade retiring, I gave the command to my regiment, which they were very unwilling to execute, seeing the enemy retiring from their camps. After re-forming my regiment, I was again ordered by you to advance. In this charge the enemy were driven completely from their camps. It is not necessary, Captain, for me to say how my command acted in this charge. You, being in front of my left, could judge for yourself. I think that you will agree that they did not abuse the confidence the Commanding General has in "ragged Kentuckians." The Fourth Kentucky lost in

Killed	5
Wounded	14
Missing	1
Total	20

Respectfully,

J. H. MILLETT,
Captain, commanding Fourth Kentucky Regiment Volunteers.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHN SNODGRASS.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ALABAMA BATTALION,
August 6, 1862.

Colonel J. Edwards, commanding Second Brigade:

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the Fourth Alabama battalion, in the battle of Baton Rouge, on the fifth instant. In the accidental affair on the road before daylight the following are the casualties: Lieutenant W. B. Stokes, Privates Morgan, O'Connel, Stephen Oliver, Y. Freeman, P. Andrews, M. Y. Haine, and P. Mattison, Company C, slightly wounded. Private A. Lewis, Company A, slightly. Privates M. L. Sewel, G. W. Lisk, Company G, slightly. Private J. J. Carlton, Company E, slightly. When the positions of the various regiments, etc., were assigned, the battalion with the Fifth Kentucky regiment was ordered to support the Hudson battery, which position it occupied until between seven and eight o'clock A. M., when I was ordered to advance to the support of our forces then engaging the enemy at their second encampment. The battalion continued in the engagement until the enemy's infantry were driven from the field, and their batteries were playing heavily upon the position we occupied, when we were ordered to withdraw.

The following is a list of the casualties during the engagement: Major G. L. Alexander, mortally wounded in the left breast by a Minnié ball—died shortly after. In Company A, wounded—private W. B. Moore, seriously; privates A. J. Allen, A. M. Cannon, J. P. Wilson, slightly. Company C, wounded—private W. T. Harbin, slightly. Company D—Captain Randall, slightly wounded; T. J. Lovell, mortally Company E—private William Anderson, mortally wounded, since died. Company G, killed—private J. K. P. Jenkins; wounded, privates H. McCoy and William McBrown, severely; corporals A. T. Hannah and T. R. Moon, mortally.

Recapitulation.

Killed	3
Wounded	22
Total	25

I take pleasure in calling your attention to the gallant and enthusiastic conduct of private John Thompson, Company F, and J. M. Byrd, Company G, who boldly moved in advance of the command and discharged their arms with due caution and alacrity. They were the first to open fire and last to quit the field, and I am happy, while reporting the especially worthy conduct of those two privates, not to have a solitary instance of cowardice or wavering to report, the whole command having advanced and stood under the fire from which older troops and greater numbers had retired.

Very respectfully,

JOHN SNODGRASS,
Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding Fourth Alabama Battalion.

Return of the Casualties in the First Division.

COMMANDS.	KILLED.	MORTALLY WOUNDED.	SEVERELY WOUNDED.	SLIGHTLY WOUNDED.	MISSING.	REMARKS.
SECOND BRIGADE.						
Fifth Regiment Kentucky Volunteers	9	2	9	13	1	
Fourth " " "	5	..	..	13	1	
Thirty-first Regiment Mississippi Volunteers	10	6	15	16	..	
Thirty-first " Alabama "	2	..	..	9	1	
Fourth Alabama Battalion	3	3	3	16	..	
Hudson's Battery	..	..	3	3	..	
FOURTH BRIGADE.						
Nineteenth Regiment Tennessee Volunteers	..	..	1	..	1	
Twentieth " " "	..	..	1	1	..	
Twenty-eighth " " "	1	..	1	1	..	
Forty-fifth " " "	1	..	1	1	..	
Fifteenth " Mississippi "	..	..	..	..	1	This regiment was held in reserve.
Twenty-second " " "	13	..	18	16	1	
Cobb's Battery	..	..	..	..	..	
Total	44	11	52	89	6	

Respectfully submitted,

T. B. SMITH,
Colonel, commanding First Division.

To CAPTAIN BUCKNER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Officers mentioned for Gallant Conduct at the Battle of Baton Rouge, Exhibit "A," Report of the First Division.

Captain Hughes, commanding Twenty-second Mississippi regiment.

Brigadier-General Charles Clark and his Aides.

Lieutenants Spooner and Yerger.

Major H. E. Topp, of the Thirty-first Mississippi regiment,

Major Brown, Chief of Subsistence.

Captain J. H. Miller, commanding Fourth Kentucky regiment.

Colonel Crossland, Seventh Kentucky regiment.

Major J. C. Wickliffe, of the Fifth Kentucky.

Privates John Thompson, Company H, and J. M. Byrd, Company G, Fourth Alabama battalion.

Lieutenant-Colonel Moore, of the Nineteenth Tennessee regiment.

Adjutant Fitzpatrick, Twenty-second Mississippi regiment.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL M. L. SMITH.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DISTRICT,
VICKSBURG, August —, 1862.

Major M. M. Kimmel, A. A. G.:

MAJOR: The following report of the attack and defence of Vicksburg is respectfully submitted to the Major-General commanding the District of Mississippi:

I assumed command of Vicksburg and its defences on the twelfth of May, in obedience to orders from Major-General Lovell, and proceeded at once to prepare for the approach of the enemy, then known to have passed Baton Rouge with a formidable fleet, having in view to open the river to Memphis and Fort Pillow, then in our possession. At the time of arriving, the state of preparation for defence was as follows: Of the ten batteries that have been in use, three were mostly completed, and the fourth begun. The armed troops present consisted of the remnant of the Eighth Louisiana battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Pinckney, and the Twenty-

seventh Louisiana volunteers, Colonel Marke; both of my brigades which had preceded me some six or ten days. Colonel J. L'Antry, ordered here by General Bragg, was found in command, pushing the works forward vigorously through his Chief Engineer, Captain D. B. Harris, who afterwards remained with me in the same capacity until most of the works were completed. From the twelfth until the eighteenth, the works were pushed forward night and day with all possible vigor, at the end of which the First division of the Federal fleet, together with transports, carrying some three thousand men, made their appearance and found us in a condition to dispute, with a fair prospect of success, a further advance; that is to say, six batteries were complete, the cannoniers at their posts and fairly drilled. The arrival of this advanced division was immediately followed by a demand for the surrender of Vicksburg and its defences, couched in the following terms:

"U. S. S. ONEIDA, NEAR VICKSBURG,
May 18, 1862.

"*To the Authorities at Vicksburg:*

"The undersigned, with orders from Flag-Officer Farragut and Major-General Butler, respectfully demand, in advance of the approaching fleet, the surrender of Vicksburg and its defences to the lawful authorities of the United States, under which private property and personal right will be respected.

"Very respectfully, yours,
"J. PHILLIPS LEE,
"U. S. N., commanding Advance Naval Division.
"P. WILLIAMS,
"Brigadier-General."

The subjoined reply was returned:

"HEADQUARTERS VICKSBURG,
May 18, 1862.

"SIR: Your communication of this date, addressed to the authorities of Vicksburg, demanding the surrender of the city and its defences, has been received. In regard to the surrender of the defences, I have to reply that, having been ordered here to hold these defences, my intention is to do so as long as it is in my power.

"Very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,
"M. L. SMITH,
"Brigadier-General, commanding.
"J. PHILLIPS LEE,
"U. S. N., commanding Advance Naval Division."

I here remark that the citizens of the town had, with great unanimity, made up their minds that its possession ought to be maintained at all hazards, even though total demolition should be the result. This determination was enthusiastically concurred in by persons of all ages and both sexes, and borne to my ears from every quarter. Thus cheered on and upheld, the defence became an affair of more than public interest, and the approving sentiment of those so deeply interested unquestionably had its influence on the ultimate result, as affairs stand to-day. Our cause probably needed an example of this kind, and assuredly a bright one has been given. The inhabitants had been advised to leave the city when the smoke of the ascending gunboats was first seen, under the impression that the enemy would open fire immediately on arrival; hence, the above demand found the city sparsely populated, and somewhat prepared for an attack, although, when it really commenced, there were numbers still to depart, besides many who had determined to remain and take the chances of escaping unharmed, a few of whom absolutely endured to the end. As bearing immediately upon the defence of this place, measures had also been taken to push the Arkansas to completion. It was reported the contractor had virtually suspended work; that the mechanics and workmen were leaving; that supplies were wanting; finally, that a very considerable quantity of iron prepared for covering her had been sunk in the Yazoo River. Steps were taken to promptly furnish mechanics and supplies, and a bell-boat being obtained and sent up to the spot, the prepared iron was soon recovered. It was considered fortunate that, soon after this, Captain Brown was assigned to the duty of completing the boat, as after his assignment this important work gave me no further concern. The enemy remained apparently inactive until the twenty-eighth, during which time the advance division of the fleet was joined by other gunboats, making ten in all. My force had, in the meantime, been increased by the twentieth and twenty-eighth Louisiana volunteers, numbering for duty some five hundred each, by five companies of Starke's cavalry; one battery; Wither's artillery, Captain Ridley; and four companies Sixth Mississippi battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Balfour; but all were troops just mustered into service, and indifferently armed. These were thrown forward toward Warrenton, and disposed for disputing inch by inch the approach by land. This force was subsequently increased by the Fourth and fifth Louisiana. The ensuing ten days I consider the most critical period of the defences of Vicksburg. Batteries incomplete, guns not mounted, troops few, and both officers and men entirely new to service, and not a single regular officer to assist in organizing and commanding. Had a prompt and vigorous attack been made by the enemy, while I think the disposition made would have insured their repulse, still the issue would have been less certain than at any time afterwards. The enemy opened fire on the afternoon of the twenty-fifth for the first time, and continued about two hours, apparently with a view of getting our range. The orders given to the batteries were not to return their fire at extreme range, and at ordinary range only at considerable intervals. This policy was adhered to throughout, at first, because little ammunition had then arrived; afterwards, for the reason that our works could not be injured by

direct firing, and by saving the men they were fresh night and day to meet close and serious attacks, such as occurred before the termination of the bombardment; besides, the enemy were thus kept ignorant of our real strength as well as the effect of their own shot. It was not long before they apparently came to the conclusion that no impression could be made on our works by their gunboats, nor the erection of new batteries prevented whenever attempted; and the remaining six batteries, of the ten first mentioned, were constructed under their eyes.

From the twentieth of May to the middle of June the firing was kept up at intervals, and more or less heavy the latter part of the time, directed mainly at the town, and at localities where they apparently thought troops were encamped. From the fourteenth to the eighteenth of June there was an entire cessation of the attack, the mortar-fleet that had bombarded Fort Jackson and Fort Philip being on the way here to join in the attack. They began to arrive on the eighteenth, and to the number of eighteen or nineteen were in position on the twentieth, on the afternoon of which day the bombardment again opened. Prior to this a new source of anxiety arose. Fort Pillow and Memphis had fallen, and in addition to the attack we were enduring, Vicksburg was threatened by a combined land and naval force from above. From the twentieth to the twenty-seventh the bombardment was pretty constant during the daytime, at times very heavy, but generally ceasing at ten or eleven o'clock at night. On the evening of the twenty-seventh the firing began to increase in fury, and for some time a shower of bomb-shells was rained upon our batteries that severely tried the nerve and courage of both officers and men, still the damage was quickly repaired, and the men held their places at the guns. At daylight, on the twenty-eighth, the enemy recommenced with the same fury, and it was soon perceived that the entire gunboat fleet was in motion, moving rapidly up in front of the batteries and city, and it became apparent that the decisive struggle was at hand. Some thirty-five vessels were soon firing as rapidly as possible, the mortars filling the air with shells, and the sloops-of-war and gunboats delivering broadside after broadside of shot, shell, and grape, according to their distance. Our batteries opened as soon as the vessels were within range, and, for the first time, in full force. The roar of cannon was now continuous and deafening, loud explosions shook the city to its foundations, shot and shells went hissing and tearing through trees and walls, scattering fragments far and wide in their terrific flight. Men, women, and children rushed into the streets, and, amid the crashing of falling houses, commenced their hasty flight to the country for safety. This continued for about an hour and a half, when the enemy left; the vessels that had passed the lower batteries continuing on up the river, apparently as the quickest means of getting out of range; those that had not passed, rapidly dropping down. The result of this effort on the part of the enemy was most satisfactory. Not a single gun was silenced or disabled, and, to their surprise, the serious bombardment of the preceding seven days had thrown nothing out of fighting trim. It also demonstrated to our satisfaction that, how large soever the number of guns and mortar-boats, our batteries could probably be successfully held, consequently that the ultimate success of our resistance hinged upon a movement by land. The enemy evidently came to the same conclusion, as, after one week's bombardment with their mortars, and the final attempt, on the morning of the twenty-eighth of June, to silence and take our guns, the attack sensibly decreased in vigor and persistency. Up to the twenty-eighth there had been great pressure on my command, owing to the limited number of men. The situation of the enemy's fleet, and the peculiar shape of the river in this vicinity, combined with the proximity of the Yazoo and the expected descent of a large force from above (as reported), had necessitated a rather heavy line of pickets, extending along a distance of twenty miles. To keep up this line, and sustain a heavy attack at the same time, taxed the energies of my men to a great extent. The arrival of the advance brigade of Major-General Breckinridge's reserve corps was a great respite, and, as the force was gradually increased, thus bringing us to an equality in numbers with that which accompanied the fleet, it was almost felt that Vicksburg was no longer besieged. The general command of these defences was assumed by Major-General Earl Van Dorn on the twenty-eighth of June, Major-General Lovell having been relieved by him from the command of the Department. Being authorized to make requisitions on the reserve corps for whatever force was deemed necessary to carry out the plan of defence, the picket front was, after the twenty-eighth, divided into five divisions, the two extreme ones guarded, by detachments from my brigade (Third Louisiana), the remaining three by detachments from Brigadier-Generals Preston's, Helm's, and Colonel Statham's brigades, reinforced by light batteries from Colonel Withers' artillery. The fleet from Memphis began to make its appearance above on the twenty-sixth of June, and continued to receive accessions until it numbered, in all, forty odd gunboats, mortar-boats, rams, and transports. Firing commenced from this fleet on the twelfth of July, and although at no time as heavy as from the lower fleet, continued, with but little interruption, until the final bombardment of the attack. On the morning of the fifteenth, the daring passage of the ram Arkansas, out of the Yazoo, through the enemy's fleet, seemed to necessitate a prompt descent of those vessels that had passed up on the twenty-eighth, and everything was accordingly placed in readiness for them. A new battery of twenty-four-pounders, just erected, was manned by a light artillery detachment from Preston's brigade, under Lieutenant Gracie, and sharpshooters, from

the same brigade, placed along the bank, wherever the ground was favorable. As conjectured, the enemy were in motion at sundown, and at dusk descended amid the roar of cannon, the flashing of musketry, the glare of lightning, and scenes in every respect such as had distinguished their passage up, except that the action was of shorter duration, and the Arkansas was on the river returning their broadsides. The firing was mainly over in the course of an hour, and, at the batteries, not a single casualty from the enemy's shot occurred. From the fifteenth to the eighteenth the enemy were mainly occupied in endeavoring to sink the Arkansas with their mortars, and on the morning of the eighteenth a daring attempt was made to cut her out from under one of our batteries. It resulted, however, in no injury to the Arkansas, but in the destruction of one of their boats. This was really the termination of the attack, although the bombardment was kept up until the twenty-seventh, when both fleets disappeared. It will thus be seen that the enemy were in front of Vicksburg sixty-seven days, during which the combined efforts of two powerful fleets have been foiled, and the accompanying land force, from four to five thousand, held at bay.

The number of shot and shells thrown by the fleets is unknown. It has been estimated as high as twenty-five thousand, and put as low as twenty thousand. The number, however, is unimportant, and mentioned only to illustrate the fact, that the loss to a land battery when attacked by one afloat is comparatively small. The casualties from the enemy's firing was seven killed and fifteen wounded. In the town two only are reported. The enemy fired at least ten shots to our one, and their number of killed and wounded can, from information, be safely put down at five times as great. It is a matter of surprise that not a single gun was dismounted during the whole time, and only two temporarily disabled, both being repaired in one night. The number of guns brought against us, including mortars, could not have been much less than three hundred. The number on our side, as you are aware, was considerably less. After this general description given, it would be great injustice not to mention the commands and their officers that have been instrumental in so signal a success. The batteries were manned by three companies of the First regiment Louisiana artillery, two companies of the Twenty-second, two companies of the Twenty-third Louisiana volunteers, Major Clinch; four companies heavy artillery from Fort Pillow, Major Headley; three companies Eighth Louisiana battalion, Major Ogden. Colonel Jackson and Lieutenant-Colonel Sterling, both of the heavy artillery, were, respectively, in immediate command of the upper and lower batteries, and Colonel Fuller, Chief of Heavy Artillery, Lieutenant-Colonel Pinckney, Eighth Louisiana battalion, in command of two of the lower batteries for a portion of the time, was temporarily relieved, under a special organization, which reduced the battalion to a Major's command. The officers commanding these companies were as follows: Captains Capers, Grayson, Butler, Tissot, Purvis, Herrod, Todd, Disumkes, Parks, Morman, Postlethwait, Durives, Kerr, and Lieutenants Eustis, Butler, and McCrory. The names of the above-mentioned officers are given for the reason that, in connection with their Lieutenants and men, they have passed through an ordeal that troops are but seldom called upon to undergo! For more than seventy-five days and nights have these batteries been continuously manned and ready for action at a moment's warning. During much of this time the roar of cannon has been unceasing, and there have been portions of it during which the noise of falling shot and the explosions of shells have been such as might make the stoutest heart quail. Yet none faltered. The blazing sun, the fatiguing night watch, the storm of battle—all were alike cheerfully endured, and, whenever called upon, heavy and telling blows were dealt upon our foes in return. I feel a pride in having such officers and such men under my command, for they have nobly sustained our cause in time of need, have added to the country's glory, and deserve well of her gratitude. Some officers possibly attracted my attention more than others by their chivalric courage and inspiriting manner; yet the conduct of all was so noble and unexceptionable that I do not venture to particularize. The distant picketing was most efficiently and faithfully performed by the cavalry, commanded at different times by Colonel Starke, Lieutenant-Colonel Ferguson, and Major Jones, according as they were present. The nearer picket duty, together with that of being at all times guarded against surprise, and ready to meet an attack, was so patiently and carefully performed by the Twenty-sixth, Twenty-seventh, and Twenty-eighth Louisiana volunteers, under Colonels Declonet, Marks, and Allen Thomas; the Fourth and Seventeenth Louisiana volunteers, Colonel Allen and Colonel Richardson; also by the Third regiment and Sixth battalion Mississippi volunteers, Colonel Mellon and Lieutenant-Colonel Balfour, together with Withers' Light Artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Parker, that I felt secure in giving most of my attention to the bombardment going on. Whenever events demanded a united movement of all, I found a most reliable and efficient officer to represent me and carry out my instructions, in the person of my present Assistant Adjutant-General, Colonel Girault, whose judgment and zeal were never at fault. Of Captain Lockett, the accomplished engineer officer of my staff, I have to speak in terms of unqualified praise, both as regards skill in his profession and qualities as a soldier. The services of such an officer are so important and indispensable as to have all the effect of a positive increase of force in determining the issue of a contest. I most cordially recommend him to notice. Captain McDonald, brigade ordnance officer, and Captains Frost and Harrod, aids, have in turn performed almost every duty, during the siege, known to

the service; always prompt, they are distinguished for intelligence and perseverance in the performance of duty that merits constant praise. To the Brigade Quartermaster, Major J. St. Patton and Brigade Commissary, Major Reed, are due such mention as devoted attention to their duties and the interests of the service merits; both have performed all the duties pertaining to a department, and both having been compelled almost to create what they have had. The part borne during the latter days of the bombardment by a detachment from Major General Breckinridge's division, requires special mention. Captain Cobb's company of light artillery, under Lieutenant Gracie, manned a battery which was so spiritedly served as to attract attention on both occasions in which it was engaged, and was even noticed by the enemy. The sharpshooters, detailed from the same command, kept up a galling fire on the enemy during the passage of the vessels on the evening of the fifteenth, and drove them from the tops. The lamented Colonel Statham's brigade, under his own lead, showed a bravery in guarding the front of attack assigned him, that could not be surpassed. On one occasion, having forced his way through a swamp, deemed impassable, he made a rush upon the mortar-boats moored to shore, driving the force guarding on board, and had the positions of the boats been accurately known, would have taken possession of and destroyed several. The engineer company under Captain Winter was steadily occupied in the repairs of batteries, and did admirable service.

The report of the struggle at Vicksburg would be incomplete without the following merited tribute: During the engagement of the twenty-eighth, an estimable lady, Mrs. Gamble, lost her life by the fragment of a shell striking her while leaving the city. This lady deserves more than a passing notice. Burning with patriotism, she inspired all around her with the noble spirit of resistance to oppression, and confidence in the success of our cause. Ever present in the hospitals, ministering to the sick and wounded soldiers, she was among the last of her sex to leave the desolated city, when she yielded up her life in attestation of her faith and devotion. Though but the type of a class of which our southern land can boast, she is a martyr to the cause she loved, and without her name the history which Vicksburg has made for herself would be incomplete. To the citizens of Vicksburg a nation's thanks are due for their noble example in surrendering their property and homes to almost certain destruction, and that so little damage was done does not detract from the merit of the act, but rather serves to call for gratitude to the Supreme Being who has not only preserved from destruction the homes of a patriotic people, but in mercy granted a victory over their enemies. In conclusion, I deem it proper to remark upon the manner in which the bombardment was conducted. In locating the batteries, pains had been taken to place them without the limits of the town, advantageous positions even, having been rejected with that view, so that in the approaching struggle the fight might, if the enemy so chose, be confined to the armed points, and the city itself, which could have no bearing upon the ultimate result, be made to suffer as little as an enlightened and humane method of conducting war would lead us to expect, and which, under the same circumstances, I think most enemies would have pursued. Events did not justify our expectations. The bombardment opened upon both batteries and town. This was expected, and could not be objected to, and no fault is found at its continuing so as long as the enemy had hopes of accomplishing their object; but when the attack on the batteries ceased, when the bombarding force began even to gradually leave, when it was notorious that they deemed their attack a failure, then to continue to throw shells into a beautiful town, as was done day after day, with the sole purpose of injuring it, of defacing it, and of destroying private property, indicated a spirit of wanton destruction scarcely pardonable in the uncivilized Indian. This seemed to be the special mission of the upper fleet. Shame to the man who commanded it!

I am, respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
M. L. SMITH,
Brigadier General, commanding Defences, Vicksburg.

REPORT OF COLONEL J. W. ROBERTSON.

HEADQUARTERS, FIRST BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION,
CAMP ON COMITE RIVER, August 7, 1862.

Captain L. D. Sandidge, A. A. A. General Second Division:

CAPTAIN: On receiving the order to report the part taken in the action of the fifth instant by the First brigade, I referred the order to Colonel A. P. Thompson, who commanded the brigade during the action, with the exception of the closing half hour that the troops were under fire, when he was borne from the field severely wounded, and I submit, by his request, the following report:

On reaching the angle of the main road leading into Baton Rouge, the brigade was formed in line of battle in a common to the left of the main road, the right of the brigade resting on that road, and the left near a dense forest, into which Colonel Allen's brigade had passed. The brigade was composed of the following regiments, positioned from right to left in the order named: Third Kentucky, Captain J. H. Bowman commanding; Seventh Kentucky, Colonel Edward Crossland commanding; Thirty-fifth Alabama, Colonel J. W. Robertson commanding, and the Sixth Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel M. H. Cofer, commanding. As soon as the line was established, the command, "forward," was given by General Ruggles in person, which was promptly obeyed by the brigade, moving forward beyond the dwelling-house immediately to the front. The line was

at this time found to be somewhat deranged, caused by the numerous fences and houses over and around which the troops had to pass. The brigade was consequently halted and the alignment rectified, when the command, "forward," was again given. The brigade moved directly to the front, parallel to the main road, preceded by a company of sharpshooters deployed as skirmishers, and commanded by Lieutenant J. C. Hubbard. At this point the firing commenced first, the line of the enemy having been unmasked by the skirmishers. The firing was continued but a short time when an order was received for the brigade to charge, and the troops rushed forward with a cheer, the enemy breaking before them. Having reached the middle of the field, the brigade was exposed to a fire from the right which could not be returned without exposing the troops of General Clark's division to the fire of the brigade, and was consequently halted until the firing ceased. An advance was made, skirmishing covering the front. The second line of the enemy was thus unmasked and exposed to the fire of the brigade. They gave way precipitately before the steady advance of our troops. On clearing the fields and reaching the enemy's encampment, the right wing was found to be covered by a portion of General Clark's division. An officer approached from the right and stated that friends were exposed to our fire, when the firing ceased, and the charge ordered by Colonel Thompson, he leading the brigade into the encampment of the enemy to the left, which was nearly cleared by this brigade, when troops were met on the right returning without any apparent cause, and were ordered by Colonel Thompson to halt and advance, when a mounted officer informed Colonel Thompson that it was the order for all the troops to fall back. This movement became general in the brigade. In retiring the Thirty-fifth Alabama and Sixth Kentucky, forming the left wing, became separated from the right, and occupied a position in line one hundred yards to the left and rear. The enemy re-formed in heavy force behind their tents, rapidly advancing, firing, and cheering. The Third and Seventh Kentucky regiments were thrown under cover and met this advance with a steady fire. The Thirty-fifth Alabama and Sixth Kentucky were ordered forward, but advanced before the order reached them, opening a heavy fire upon the enemy, whose advance was thus checked. At this point Colonel Thompson was severely wounded and taken to the rear. The command devolving upon Colonel Robertson, who being, from complete exhaustion, in no condition at that time to assume command, and finding the right wing separated from the left, placed Colonel Crossland in command of the right and Lieutenant-Colonel E. Goodwin in command of the left, with orders to maintain the line, which was firmly held for nearly an hour, in the face of a terrible fire from musketry and artillery, when the charge, which closed the action, was made in person by the Major-General commanding. It is the request of Colonel Thompson, that his entire approbation of the conduct of all the field and acting field officers engaged, and Captain W. P. Wallace and Lieutenant Charles Temple, Aids, and Acting Adjutant R. B. L. Soney, of the Third Kentucky, be specially expressed in this report. To the deportment of the Thirty-fifth Alabama regiment he desires attention to be called. This regiment, although for the first time under fire, on the fifth instant, proved itself a worthy comrade for the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Kentucky regiments, who in this action sustained the enviable reputation won by them on the field of Shiloh. Colonel Robertson would call special attention to the gallant conduct of Colonel E. Crossland and Lieutenant-Colonel E. Goodwin, who, the first with his regimental colors in hand, and the second with his hat on his sword, led the brigade in the final charge. To the reports of regimental commanders you are referred for notices of gallant conduct in other members of the command. The medical staff deserve the highest praise for their prompt and unceasing attention to the wounded.

By order of

G. C. HUBBARD,
Lieutenant, and A. A. G.

J. W. ROBERTSON,
Colonel, commanding First Brigade, Second Division.

REPORT OF COLONEL H. W. ALLEN.

EAST BATON ROUGE, August 18, 1862.

Captain Buckner, Assistant Adjutant-General:

SIR: On the morning of the fifth instant, in pursuance to orders of Brigadier-General Ruggles, I formed the Second brigade, Second division, in line of battle; the left of the brigade resting upon Bernard's fence, in the rear of Magruder's Institute, and the right resting upon the First brigade. On the right was placed Colonel Breaux, of the Thirteenth Louisiana; on the left, Lieutenant-Colonel Hunter, of the Fourth Louisiana, and in the centre was the battalion of Lieutenant-Colonel Boyle. At dawn of day I received orders to advance. The brigade was put in motion and advanced steadily through thick woods, underbrush, corn-fields, and picket-fences. In the midst of the forest we encountered a battery supported by infantry. We halted and delivered several volleys in quick succession. The enemy fled in every direction, taking off his artillery with him. We started in pursuit, and after considerable desultory firing upon the retreating foe, I discovered a battery on the extreme left (said to be Mimen's), supported by a large amount of infantry. It was evident that this was a flanking movement, and required my immediate attention. I ordered a movement to be made to the left, and advanced in the direction of the battery. At the command "charge," the whole brigade raised a shout and made as gallant a charge as was ever witnessed. Here I fell, my legs terribly shattered with canister-shot. What trans-

pired after this on the battle-field I do not know. The loss of blood and extreme pain had rendered me almost senseless. To my successor in command I must refer you for further particulars of the fight. The officers and soldiers of this brigade fought with much gallantry, and, with few exceptions, did their duty nobly. I have been informed that, upon my fall, the brigade could not be rallied. This has often happened with the best of troops and the bravest veterans, and should not attach any disgrace to the soldiers. No one charges that the brigade retreated from the enemy, or even retired from the place of danger. The enemy had been whipped, and had fled in every direction. Captain Semmes' battery came up, fired a few rounds upon the retreating foe, and all was over. To my Adjutant, Lieutenant B. W. Clarke, and to my voluntary aid, Lieutenant H. H. Walsh, I am much indebted. They performed their duties with great gallantry, coolness, and bravery. Captain Blount was assigned to duty as Inspector of the brigade. During the journey from Camp Moore he lost his horse, and had been relieved from duty as Inspector by the commanding General. He, however secured a horse, and, in the thickest of the fight, reported himself for duty to me. I gave him, from time to time, several orders to execute, which he did in a very prompt and gallant manner. I see that he is reported a prisoner in New Orleans. This is a mystery to me. Many acts of individual heroism came under my eye, and I shall ever feel proud that I had the honor to command the second brigade in the battle of Baton Rouge. Among all the officers and men who distinguished themselves in that battle, I shall mention only one by name, that is private Cedars, of the West Feliciana Rifles, Fourth regiment Louisiana. He took the colors from me as I fell, and at the same moment received a terrible wound in the thigh.

With respect, I am, truly,
Your obedient servant,
H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, commanding Second brigade Second division.

REPORT OF COLONEL G. A. BREAUX.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE,
CAMP NEAR COMITE RIVER, August 8, 1862.

Lieutenant L. D. Sandidge, Acting Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General:

SIR: Colonel H. W. Allen, commander of the Second brigade, Second division, having fallen towards the close of the action of the fifth May, 1862, it becomes my duty, as next in command, to make the report, as far as my knowledge enabled me to do so. My attention was exclusively directed to the action of the Thirtieth Louisiana regiment, which I commanded until the fall of the Colonel commanding.

At 4½ o'clock A. M., our line was formed on the extreme left of the forces, in a point of woods adjoining open and cultivated fields. The ground was broken. We advanced in conjunction with the entire line. As we were about passing out of a little field, we met the enemy, who at once opened a brisk fire upon us, which we returned with good effect, since, in a few minutes, they fled before us. We were ordered "forward." As the extreme right of the brigade was advancing on a line parallel to a fence, behind which sharpshooters lay in ambush, harassing our flank, the Thirtieth Louisiana was constantly called on to dislodge them, which it did by occasional fires. We soon discovered that the enemy were in considerable force behind a fence, awaiting our approach, at a point from which they fired on our line at an angle of about forty-five degrees. We faced the Thirtieth regiment to them and soon silenced them by a well kept up and directed fire. Meanwhile the Fourth regiment and Boyd's battalion advanced, driving, also, all obstacles before them. It became apparent that the exact location of a battery of the enemy planted in our front, was not known, the fog was too thick to enable us to see well. We, however, advanced, having changed the direction of the line to the left. The fire of the enemy soon revealed its exact position, and to the charge, was sounded. The entire brigade advanced at a double-quick, and in good order, notwithstanding the galling fire poured into our lines. The gallant Colonel Allen, whose bravery cannot be too much extolled, flew at the head of the men, flag in hand, on to the battery, and was soon in possession of its guns, surrounded by his men, while the right drove the infantry away by a destructive fire. Unfortunately, Colonel Allen was wounded, and the shock was terrible among the men of the Fourth regiment, whose confidence seemed to repose mainly on him, and they withdrew in disorder, bearing away their wounded chief. At a short distance I rallied them partially on the line formed by the regiment, on the right of the brigade, but to no good, since enough could not be gathered to push on our advantage. Some time previous to this charge, as I infer from not seeing him in it, Colonel S. Boyd had been wounded and removed from the field. His battalion, stripped of its influence, did not rally after the first charge on the battery. Previous to this, the troops had all behaved with great gallantry. It now became evident that fatigue and thirst were overpowering our men; they could scarcely answer the appeals made to them by courageous men, to whose names justice will be done by those who witnessed their conduct throughout, and which I cannot give, as I only saw them there for the first time. At this time a second Federal battery entered the field, and was opportunely met by a section of Captain Semmes' Confederate States battery. It affords me pleasure to bear testimony to the cool and effective response made by Captain Semmes and Lieutenant West, whom the Fourth and Thirtieth Louisiana regiments fell back to support in this encounter. After a brief and quick fire of the opposing batteries, it was found necessary to withdraw, and the infantry left with it. From

this time there was no more fighting on the left. Coming into command of the brigade at the close of the battle, and after it became disorganized, I am unable to give any particulars beyond those which refer to my regiment. I cannot close, however, without bearing witness to the bravery and gallantry of Colonel Allen, so conspicuous to us all.

I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
G. A. BREAUX,
Colonel, commanding Second Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS THIRTIETH LA. SUMTER REGIMENT,
IN CAMP NEAR COMITE RIVER.

Lieutenant L. D. Sandidge, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General:

SIR: For the action of my regiment in general, during the battle of the fifth of August, at Baton Rouge, I beg to refer you to the report circumstances have compelled me to make in the stead of Colonel Allen. For troops who had never been under fire before, the Thirtieth Louisiana acted with great bravery and gallantry. Conspicuous among the officers who distinguished themselves, I take pleasure in mentioning Captain Trepagnier, who lost his life in all probability, and Lieutenant Dupremont, of Picket cadets, who was also wounded. I have the satisfaction of stating that men and officers were zealous in their efforts to beat off a superior force. The regiment, throughout, rallied and presented a good line whenever called on. After the partial disorganization of the brigade, which the loss of its commander temporarily produced, and when it became evident that the left must fall back, this regiment did so in an orderly manner and under orders.

Very respectfully,
G. A. BREAUX,
Colonel, commanding Thirtieth Louisiana.

REPORT OF COLONEL M. H. COFER.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH KENTUCKY REGIMENT VOLUNTEERS,
COMITE RIVER, August 7, 1862.

G. C. Hubbard, First Lieutenant, and A. A. A. General:

SIR: Pursuant to circular order, just received, I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the Sixth regiment Kentucky volunteers in the battle of the fifth instant, and the orders received from the commanding Generals. This regiment occupied the extreme left of the First brigade, Second division, Colonel A. P. Thompson commanding. At a little before daylight the troops were drawn up in line, this regiment in the open field, the left resting about two hundred yards to the right of a dense forest, in which Colonel Allen's brigade was formed. At daylight the command, "forward," was given by General Ruggles, and we moved forward a short distance and halted by the order of the same officer, who was present in person. We were very soon ordered forward again, when we moved, encountering rough ground, hedges, fences, ditches, and a luxuriant growth of weeds and grass, altogether rendering even tolerable alignment and steady marching impossible. Passing on over this character of ground for nearly one mile, the enemy's skirmishers fired on us, doing no injury, but falling back as we advanced, until we arrived immediately in front of the enemy's camp. Here he engaged us warmly from a strong position in a heavy forest, but charging forward we drove him from his position, and my regiment passed nearly through the camp, when we observed a battery on our left, say one hundred yards, and a little in front. This battery was nearly silenced by an oblique fire from my left wing, and would have been easily taken but for the fact that the right of the brigade was retiring. Seeing no cause for the retreat on account of any movement or fire of the enemy, my regiment was ordered back, presuming the brigade was ordered to retire, which I since learned to have been the case. This retreat enabled the enemy to regain his battery, which he did promptly, and opened a furious fire with grape, canister, and shrapnell, on our flank. From the nearness of the guns, he did no serious damage. We continued to move to the rear some two hundred yards, when we re-formed and returned to a fence in front of a graveyard, where we halted and opened fire on the enemy who had re-formed and reoccupied his original position, from which we had just driven him. This position both parties held with great stubbornness, and an almost incessant fire was kept up for one hour. At this place I sustained nearly all the loss of the day. My position was very much exposed during this time, having no shelter but a thin picket-fence, and being on ground elevated some eighteen inches above any ground in front between my line and the enemy. This position was maintained until an order to charge was given, and the enemy driven under his gunboats, when the regiment returned with the brigade to camp, having sustained a loss of five killed and seventy-three wounded, several mortally. I cannot allow this opportunity to pass without returning my thanks to the officers and men of the regiment for the gallant manner in which they bore themselves during the whole engagement. From a want of commissioned officers, I caused the eight companies of the regiment to be consolidated into four companies, placed respectively under Captains Isaac Smith, Utterback, and Thomas G. Page, and First Lieutenant Frank Harned. It is proper for me to say that I was not in the last charge, having been carried off the field too much exhausted and overcome to be able to go forward.

I have the honor to be, sir,
Your obedient servant,
M. H. COFER,
Colonel, commanding Sixth Kentucky Regiment.

REPORT OF COLONEL CROSSLAND.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH KENTUCKY REGIMENT, August 7, 1862.

Lieutenant G. C. Hubbard, A. A. A. General:

LIEUTENANT: In obedience to an order from your officer, I return the following statements of the action of my regiment in the battle at Baton Rouge, on the fifth. The brigade was formed in an open field, and ordered to "march forward." My regiment crossed a lawn into a field, and received a fire from the enemy's skirmishers, when we were ordered to charge. The skirmishers were routed and the regiment halted in a pea patch and ordered to lie down. Here we received a heavy fire, wounding three men. We were again ordered to forward and to charge, which order was executed in gallant style. Passing over the ground occupied by the enemy, we saw the bodies of two dead and three wounded. Another charge brought us into a road near the enemy's camp, through which we charged, and were halted and ordered to fall back by Captain Buckner, of General Breckinridge's staff, who received the order from General Clark, which would have been done in order, but for a regiment in advance of our right, which broke in wild confusion through my regiment, which caught the panic and retired disorderly for a short distance. Aided, however, by the coolness of my company officers and Adjutant, I succeeded promptly in rallying and reforming them in front of the road. Colonel Thompson ordered me to fall back to the road, where we opened fire on the enemy, then advancing from their camps, and kept it up briskly for an hour. The enemy advanced cautiously from their camp, under cover of a grove of timber, with the evident intention of turning our left flank. I saw two lines of infantry, with cavalry in the rear. They charged, and the Thirty-fifth Alabama regiment opened and kept up a hot fire from our left, which broke the enemy's lines, and they retired in confusion. Our ammunition was nearly exhausted, the wagons not having come up. General Breckinridge came up on our right, and I reported the want of ammunition to him, and he ordered me to charge the camp with my regiment and the Third Kentucky. We went through the camp and were halted by Captain Buckner, and ordered to retire, which was done in good order. Captain Buckner, by order of General Breckinridge, ordered my regiment to remain and support a section of Semmes' battery, which was posted and remained to protect those engaged in recovery of the wounded and retreat of the stragglers. Captain Wess Jetton, with five men, was sent back to fire the camps. A cloud of smoke soon told that his mission of destruction had been faithfully executed. He reports the burning of large quantities of commissary stores and quartermaster stores, together with numerous boxes of guns and valuable camp equipage. With a single exception, the officers bore themselves gallantly, and too much cannot be said in praise of the conduct of the men. Our infirmary corps kept close at our heels, and promptly removed and took care of the wounded.

I beg to mention the gallant conduct of Joseph Rollins, our color-bearer.

EDWARD CROSSLAND,
Colonel, commanding Seventh Kentucky Regiment.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL S. E. HUNTER.

CAMP NEAR CORINTH, August 7, 1862.

Colonel G. A. Breaux:

SIR: At nine o'clock P. M., of the fourth instant, pursuant to orders, I marched the Fourth Louisiana regiment, left in front, from this place in the direction of Baton Rouge. Just before daylight I was ordered to halt in an open field. Only a few minutes elapsed before firing began between our pickets and those of the enemy. We were then ordered to fall back behind a hedge, where we remained a very short while, when we recrossed the hedge and marched by the left flank through a narrow strip of wood to a field, enclosed by a thick and impassable hedge fence. Here we formed our line of battle, and were joined by the remainder of the brigade. The word "forward" was given, and all moved off in gallant style. We had not proceeded far when we received a desultory fire from the enemy, which was promptly and effectively returned, causing the enemy to retire. The advance continued, with occasional firing, until we reached an open field on our left. Here the enemy was discovered in considerable force in front and to the left. We were marched by the left flank until our brigade had nearly cleared the woods, when we filed to the left. The Fourth Louisiana had thus filed expecting to meet the enemy at right angles to our original line, when a battery opened on us to our right and in front of the original line. The order was given to charge this battery, which was done in gallant style, the brigade being in a sort of wedge-shape, gradually assuming a line as it approached the battery. A heavy and galling fire was kept up on us by the enemy, who were concealed in the rear of the battery. When within a few paces of the guns of the enemy, Colonel Allen, who was in front, bearing the colors of one battalion of the brigade, was severely wounded, and fell from his horse. Seeing him fall the line faltered, and finally gave way, the troops on the right and centre giving way first. The brigade retired in confusion across the field, through which it had so gallantly advanced. Here, after some little delay, my regiment was re-formed and remained so for some time. No order to advance was given. A section of Semmes' battery came up and prepared for action on our right and the left of the brigade. We were ordered to form in its rear to support it. After great exertion a line was partially formed, but at this point the enemy's artillery opened on us at short range. The right again gave way, followed rapidly by the whole line. The troops, exhausted by fatigue and cry-

ing for water, were thrown into utter confusion, and all attempts to rally them were fruitless. From this time no more fighting was done by our brigade.

I would not close this report without mentioning among the names of those among my officers who were conspicuous for gallantry on the field, Lieutenant Corkern, who was in command of Company B; Lieutenant Jeter, Company F; Sergeant-Major Daniels, and Adjutant Clark. I hear of others who distinguished themselves, but only these came under my especial observation.

Respectfully submitted,

S. E. HUNTER,

Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding Fourth Louisiana.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL TOM SHIELDS.

IN THE FIELD, August 7, 1862.

Lieutenant L. D. Sandidge, C. S. A., A. A. A. and Inspector-General:

SIR: For the information of Brigadier-General Ruggles, commanding Second division, I beg leave to make the following report of the operations of the detachment under my command, in the battle of Baton Rouge:

In obedience to orders, I proceeded, with a section of Semmes' Confederate States artillery, under command of T. K. Fauntleroy, two companies of infantry (company E, Sumter Thirtieth Louisiana regiment, Captain Roger T. Boyle, and Beaver Creek rifles, Captain Amicker), and one company of mounted partisan rangers, Captain Beckham, the whole numbering about one hundred and fifty, rank and file, at about four and a half P. M., the fourth inst., to take position on the Clinton plank road, there to engage the enemy, supposed to be posted, with a battery of artillery, at the junction of that and the Bayou Sara road. After a fatiguing night's march, we reached that desired point just at dawn of day of fifth inst., prepared to execute orders at the given signal—the firing of small arms by the main body on my left. Exactly at four and a half A. M., the sound of musketry being distinctly audible, I ordered the advance, at double-quick, of the entire command, having previously dismounted the rangers, with a view to greater efficiency. The enemy's pickets fled precipitately at our approach, leaving accoutrements and equipments hanging to the posts and walls of the house where they were stationed, and on the trees immediately around it, and sought shelter in the woods to the right of the Bayou Sara road, gaining which they fired one feeble volley, but immediately retreated in confusion in the direction of the arsenal. The infantry was now posted in a corn-field on the right of a street leading to a Federal camp, with instructions to advance closely in support of the artillery, which was placed at the same time in raking position at the head of the same street. The enemy here appeared in force, two regiments of infantry disputing our further advance. The artillery opening obliquely on the camp, enabled us, by its well-directed fire, to advance within two hundred and fifty feet of the camps of the Fourteenth Maine regiment (judged to be so by papers, etc., found subsequently in the tents); again opening a rapid fire of artillery in the direction of this camp, we maintained our position until the infantry, suffering before the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, were compelled to fall back, and some four horses of the section becoming unmanageable and unserviceable from wounds received, I consented to the withdrawal of the section to the junction of the roads above mentioned, there to await reinforcements from the main body, then seen to be advancing in our direction. In this new position we were unfortunately taken for the enemy, and fired upon, but luckily without casualty of any kind. Disengaging the disabled horses, and supplying their places with others, the section was again placed in position, where it was kept until the termination of the engagement. The infantry force under my command was attached, by order, to the Twenty-second Mississippi regiment on the arrival of that regiment in the field, leaving me with the artillery, where I remained until relieved by one of the staff of Major-General Breckinridge, upon the withdrawal of the army. I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of the men of the command, artillery and infantry, and beg to commend to favorable notice the officers of company E, Sumter regiment (Thirtieth Louisiana), Captain Boyle, Lieutenant H. C. Wright, D. C. Byerly, and William B. Chippendall, for gallant behavior. To Lieutenant T. K. Fauntleroy, commanding section of artillery, I am indebted for valuable services; his conduct throughout being marked with coolness and decision, and worthy of the highest praise. His artillery, as efficient as it was, would have been more so but for the inferiority of the friction primers, nine out of ten of which proving worthless, rendering the working of the pieces, at times, difficult and unsatisfactory. Of the casualties, I have to mention the following: In the Beaver Creek Rifles, Lieutenant Amicker, severely wounded in the shoulder; Sergeant Wilson, wounded in the hand, slightly; private J. L. Perryman, in the back, dangerously. In Fauntleroy's section of artillery, Sergeant Bellum, severely wounded, and four horses killed. In conclusion, I have to state that my object was to obey to the letter instructions received, and every effort was made on my part to that end, and but for the inadequacy of my force, I believe more important results could have been obtained. I hope what we have been able to accomplish may meet the approval of the General commanding.

Respectfully submitted,

TOM SHIELDS.

Lieutenant-Colonel, Sumter Thirtieth Louisiana regiment, commanding detachment.

REPORT OF COLONEL J. H. ROBERTSON.

HEADQUARTERS THIRTY-FIFTH ALA. VOLS.
CAMP ON COMITE RIVER, LA.,
August 8, 1862.

Captain L. D. Sandidge, A. A. A. General Second Division:

I have the honor to make the following report

of the part taken in the action of the fifth instant, by the Thirty-fifth regiment of Alabama volunteers, up to the moment I was relieved of the command of the regiment by assuming command of the brigade. Before leaving the Comite River, I deemed it advisable to consolidate certain companies in which there were but few men, and in two instances no commissioned officer, the regiment having been decimated by sickness, and accordingly divided the regiment, only one hundred and eighty-five strong, rank and file, into four companies, placing them in command of the following officers, from right to left, in the order named: Captain S. S. Ives, Lieutenant Thomas E. Ellett, Captain John S. Dickson, and Lieutenant S. D. Stewart. The regiment thus organized, occupied the left centre of the brigade, and kept this position during the action, passing immediately to the front of the line first formed on the common, over and through many obstacles, to a position near the river, when the fight ended. The regiment never having been under fire, much anxiety was felt, by both myself and the brigade commander, as to the probable effect upon the men of a close fire of musketry. I am highly gratified to say that never once did the regiment, men or officers, falter; but when ordered to charge did, on three occasions, bear themselves most gallantly, and once obstinately held, for an hour, a position exposed to a fire from overwhelming numbers. On reaching the first encampment of the enemy, in the third charge made by the brigade, this regiment passed entirely through the camp, driving the enemy before them, when, on looking to the right and rear, I found my command was not supported, but the right wing was falling back to cover. Receiving no order, and fearing the enemy would attempt to flank the left wing, I immediately ordered the regiment to retire, being followed in the movement by the Fifth Kentucky on the left, and formed line of battle on the right of the cemetery in which the Sixth Kentucky was formed. The regiments were immediately moved forward, and checked the advancing enemy by heavy firing. Being called to command the brigade, I, at this time, turned over the regiment to Lieutenant-Colonel Goodwin, who reports its further action. I desire to say that I am greatly indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel E. Goodwin, my only associate field officer, for the coolness and gallantry displayed by him during the action. The officers commanding the companies were conspicuous for coolness and courage. Dr. J. F. Delany, a private of Company D, was detailed to act as Assistant Surgeon, during the action, and deserves particular mention, he being up with the regiment at all times, caring for the wounded and encouraging the men. I respectfully ask that Dr. Delany be discharged, that I may contract with him as Assistant Surgeon.

Respectfully submitted,

J. H. ROBERTSON,
Colonel, Thirty-fifth Regiment Alabama Volunteers.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, August 8, 1862.

Captain L. D. Sandidge, A. A. A. General Second Division:

CAPTAIN: Colonel Robertson desires me to say that he wishes to amend his brigade report by stating that Major John Throckmorton, A. Q. M., rendered very efficient service in taking off the wounded from the field, showing great fearlessness of personal danger in the discharge of his duties.

G. C. HUBBARD,
A. A. A. General.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GOODWIN.

HEADQUARTERS THIRTY-FIFTH REGIMENT ALABAMA VOLS., CAMP ON COMITE RIVER, August 7, 1862.

Lieutenant Geo. C. Hubbard, A. A. A. G. First Regiment, Second Division:

LIEUTENANT: Colonel J. W. Robertson, who had so gallantly led on the Thirty-fifth Alabama in two separate charges, having been called to the command of the brigade, Colonel A. P. Thompson having been seriously wounded while cheering on his men, the command of the Thirty-fifth Alabama was handed over to me.

I held the position which we were ordered to maintain, by Colonel J. W. Robertson, in front of the enemy's encampments, for more than an hour, all the while under the most galling fire of the enemy. I learned that the enemy, both infantry and cavalry, were drawn up in line of battle on my left, as if preparing to charge over line on the right. I, therefore, directed my command to fire upon them, when, after three well-directed volleys, the enemy fled precipitately. A charge was immediately ordered by Major-General Breckinridge. We promptly replied to the command, driving the enemy from their encampments, under cover of their gunboats, when the order was given to fall back for ammunition.

I desire especially to call attention to the zeal and daring of the men, both officers and privates, under my command—the last charge having been made without a round of cartridges on hand.

Very respectfully,

EDWARD GOODWIN,
Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding Thirty-fifth Regiment Alabama Volunteers.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN J. H. BOWMAN.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD KENTUCKY REGIMENT, August 7, 1862.

George C. Hubbard, Lieutenant and A. A. A. General:

LIEUTENANT: In obedience to an order from your office, I return the following statement of the action of the Third Kentucky regiment in the battle of Baton Rouge, on the fifth:

The brigade was formed in an open field, the Third Kentucky regiment on the right flank, and ordered to march forward. The Third crossed a lawn into a field, received a fire from the ene-

my's skirmishers, when we were ordered to charge. The skirmishers were routed, and the regiment halted in a "pea patch," and ordered to lie down here. We received a heavy fire, killing one man and wounding five men. We were again ordered forward and to charge, which order was executed in gallant style. Passing over the ground occupied by the enemy, we saw the bodies of a few dead of our enemy. Another charge brought us into a road near the enemy's camp, through which we charged and halted, and remained for some time; and seeing that our line, to the left, was not up on line with us, I placed Captain Edwards in command temporarily, until I went to the rear to see where to form the line, with instructions to remain in position until I could return. After obtaining the necessary information, I started on my return, with the regiment falling back in good order. When I demanded to know why the regiment was doing so, I was informed it was by order of Brigadier-General Clark. I then resumed command and formed on line with the brigade. Soon Colonel Thompson ordered me to fall back to a cut in the road, which order was promptly executed. We remained in this position for nearly one hour, firing nearly thirty rounds of ammunition at the enemy, at times they being in short range of our rifles. The regiment was then ordered to charge forward, by Colonel Crossland, which order was promptly executed, and again we passed through their encampment, and were ordered to fall back, which order was executed without any confusion or excitement. Without a single exception, the officers of the regiment bore themselves gallantly, and too much cannot be said in praise of the conduct of the men. Our infirmary corps kept close on our heels, and promptly removed and took care of our wounded.

J. H. Bowman,
Captain, commanding Third Kentucky regiment.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN TOM BYNUM.

Headquarters Battalion of Infantry of Stewart's Legion,
Comite Bridge, August 8, 1862.

Captain Morrison, A. A. A. G. Second Brigade:

Sir: I herewith submit the report of the participation of this battalion, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Sam Boyd, in the action of the fifth inst. Its force consisted of the following: one field, three staff, and nine company officers, and one hundred and ninety enlisted men. They composed the centre of Colonel Allen's brigade, the Thirtieth Louisiana regiment, Colonel Breaux, on the right, and the Fourth Louisiana regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Hunter, on the left. The line of battle was formed in the woods back and leftward of the residence of Captain E. W. Robinson, and about three-fourths of a mile to the rear of a central portion of Baton Rouge. As soon as the line was formed, it was put in forward motion, feeling its way slowly through tall weeds, in the morning's haze, for the enemy's first line of force. Marching straight to the front through briers, hedges, and over picket fences, the brigade was halted in the face of a line of the foe drawn up to receive us, and after giving them two well-directed volleys, charged upon them, when they fled. The brigade having paused a few moments, resumed its line as well as the nature of the undergrowth would permit, and marched some two or three hundred yards forward in a left oblique direction. Receiving reports of a battery of the enemy supported by a regiment right on our front, about a hundred and fifty yards distant, our commander, after calling for three cheers for the Confederacy, ordered us to charge. Alarmed at our shouts and dash, the enemy broke, taking off their battery, but leaving heaps of slain and wounded. It was here that Captain Chinn fell, from a wound in the leg, while gallantly responding, at the head of his company, to Colonel Allen's orders. Resuming our course, we soon found ourselves upon the edge of an old field, on the opposite side of which is the Benton Ferry road, and the enclosure of the race track. Square in our front was posted, along the roadside, a number of the enemy's skirmishers or sharpshooters, and to their left a battery was planted at the mouth of a street in front of the outskirts of the corporation of Baton Rouge. A regiment (the Sixth Michigan) supported the battery, and its men were placed behind the fences and houses in the neighborhood of Hockney's. Colonel Allen, taking the colors of his command in his hand, rapidly drew up his command in line, which, at his call and example, rushed, under a galling fire of grape, canister, and Minnié, across the field. There was not a shrub, even as a screen, upon it, and over the three hundred yards of that open space the foe sent many a missile of death and shaft of anguish within a hundred yards of the cannon.

Lieutenant Causey, of Buffington's company, and commanding it, fell, shot through the brain. No victim in this great struggle against fanaticism and the principles of rapine and spoliation, leaves to his family and friends a brighter memory for chivalrous courage and unsullied patriotism. A few yards further on Lieutenant-Colonel Boyd fell, shot through the arm, and was borne off the field. In a moment or so after the enemy retreated, leaving two cannon and a Lieutenant, and eight or ten prisoners in our hands. In passing beyond the fence enclosing Turner's house, and getting partially into the street, the gallant leader fell, helpless, from his horse into the arms of his trusty soldiers, and was by them carried from the field. His fall was peculiarly unfortunate. It completely paralyzed his old regiment (the Fourth, at whose head he was) even in that moment of victory Notwithstanding his repeated shouts to go forward, it became confused and huddled up, lost in a maze of stolidity and dismay. At this critical moment the undersigned first became apprised, by Colonel Breaux, now commanding the brigade, that it was his duty to assume

command of this battalion. With serious misgivings in his capacity in this emergency, and sorrow felt at the necessity, he arrived to do his best in seconding the gallant fearlessness and conspicuous example of the commanding officer, to save his troops from a panic and to rally them into line. His efforts were supported by the daring courage of Lieutenant Barrow, commanding Captain Chinn's company, by the energy of Lieutenant Burnett, Captain Bynum's company, and by the cool and noble example of Lieutenant Brown, of the same company. A partial success only rewarded their exertions. We were saved a panic, but the annoying fire from the enemy's sharpshooters left them no other alternative but to fall back across the field to the shelter of the woods. Here another effort was made to rally the brigade into line, now massed confusedly. The commanding officer employed every incentive and expedient that courage could suggest, but with haggard results. The men made no response to his appeals. They were not cowed or panic-stricken; they were simply exhausted, hopelessly exhausted, and seemed to be staggering under the half of that last ounce which breaks the camel's back of endurance. Having been under arms for more than sixteen hours; having neither supper, breakfast, nor sleep; having marched over twelve miles, and having gone through four hours fighting, is it a matter of surprise or for blame that they paid but little heed to the rallying cries of their leaders? Their conduct was, however, only in accordance with the example of troops who had been under fire, and were reported veterans. Many vicissitudes of this battle must remain unnoticed. The undersigned was not called to command till a late hour, and many events, doubtless, noted by the experienced eye of Colonel Boyd, must be unchronicled because of his absence. While Colonel Boyd was in command, his promptitude and courage ably sustained the policy of Colonel Allen. His Adjutant, Lieutenant Breeden, was conspicuous for daring devotion to duty throughout the trials of the day. The men generally behaved with coolness and courage. Upon returning to headquarters, near Ward's Creek bridge, the undersigned was relieved of his command by Lieutenant Barrow.

I am, sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
TOM. BYNUM,
Captain, commanding Battalion Infantry, Steward's Legion.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN O. T. SEMMES.

IN CAMP, NEAR BATON ROUGE, August 8, 1862.

SIR: I was ordered to take part in the action of the fifth instant, which I did. My men behaved well. The officers, Lieutenants J. T. M. Barnes and J. A. West, acted with great coolness and bravery, at times firing their pieces personally. Lieutenant T. F. Fauntleroy was detached with a section, and I did not see him during the action. The casualties were five men killed, five severely wounded, five slightly wounded; nine horses killed, two badly wounded, two missing; one caisson exploded by an enemy's shell, the rear carriage of another rendered worthless, and left on the field. Four sets of harness lost. I fired two hundred rounds of smooth bore six-pounder ammunition, and one hundred and twenty rounds of six-pounder rifled. Dr. Lewis, A. S., C. S. A., rendered efficient service to my wounded on the field. I am, sir, respectfully,

O. T. SEMMES,
Captain, commanding C. S. Light Battery.

At 4½ o'clock P. M. of the fifth instant, I took position between Colonel Allen's and Colonel Thompson's brigades, filling a vacancy of some eighty yards, moved forward with the infantry line half a mile, opened fire on an enemy's battery, driving them back, moved to the right of the Second division, General Ruggles commanding, when I opened on a battery with effect, at about two hundred and fifty yards, then occupied my first position, opening on a column of infantry, doing much execution; was ordered to the support of Colonel Allen's brigade. I took position on its right and silenced a battery. This was my last firing, after which I rejoined the main forces. O. T. S.

Return of Casualties in the Second Division.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Killed, Wounded, and Missing.	
	Officers.	Privates.	Officers.	Privates.	Officers.	Privates.	Total.	Aggregate.
First Brigade	1	11	13	65	..	6	92	96
Second "	2	26	4	82	6	60	180	181
Cavalry	..	..	..	..	..	.	..	..
Grand Total	3	37	17	147	6	66	261	277

R. M. HOOE,
A. A. General.

DANIEL RUGGLES,
Brigadier-General, commanding division.

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
First Division	40	141	6
Second Division	44	165	72
	84	306 84 78	78
Aggregate		468	

Officers and Soldiers mentioned in the Report of Brigadier-General Ruggles:

Colonel A. P. Thompson and Colonel H. Wallen, brigade commanders, both severely wounded; Fifth Kentucky regiment, Captain Bowman; Seventh Kentucky, Colonel Crossland, and his color-bearer, James Rawlings; Sixth Kentucky regiment, Captains Isaac Smith, Utterback, and Thomas Page, and First Lieutenant F. Harned; Thirty-sixth Alabama, Colonel Robertson and Lieutenant-Colonel Goodwin; of the Second brigade, the Fourth Louisiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Hunter, Lieutenant Corkern, Company B, Lieutenant Jeter, Company F, and Sergeant-Major Daniels; Battalion of Stewart's Legion, Lieutenant-Colonel Sam Boyd, who was disabled by a flesh wound in the arm. Captain Chinn also was wounded, the command devolved upon Captain Bynum, who acted with gallantry. The battalion Thirtieth regiment Louisiana volunteers, commanded by Colonel G. A. Breaux, who speaks in high terms of the officers and men of his regiment, especially Captain N. Trepagnier and Lieutenant Dapremont, both wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel Shields, Thirtieth Louisiana, commanding separate detachment, who speaks in high terms of the intrepidity of Lieutenant Fauntleroy, commanding section of guns in his detachment; Captain Semmes, commanding battery, and his officers, Lieutenants Barnes and J. A. West, performed gallant service. Captain Blount, Brigade-Inspector of Second brigade, rendered gallant service in the field, where it is believed he has fallen, as nothing has been heard of him since. I also have the gratification to name the members of my staff, who served with me on this occasion, viz.: Lieutenant L. D. Sandige, corps artillery, C. S. A., A. A. A., and Inspector-General, Captain George Whitfield, Chief Quartermaster, Major E. S. Ruggles, acting ordnance officer, and acting chief commissary of subsistence, First Lieutenant M. B. Ruggles, aide-de-camp, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Jones, who was severely wounded, and Colonel J. O. Fuqua, District Judge Advocate and Provost Marshal General, who were all distinguished for their efficiency, coolness, and gallantry throughout the conflict. The following officers, attached to the general staff, also rendered gallant service: Captain Sam. Bard, on special service; Lieutenant A. B. DeSaulles; Engineers, Lieutenant H. H. Price and Lieutenant H. C. Holt. Other officers on special service, amongst whom were Captain Augustus Scott, commanding squadron on temporary service, Captains Curry, Henderson, and Lieutenant Behcum, as volunteer aids for the occasion, and Captain J. M. Taylor served with great gallantry.

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HOISTING THE BLACK FLAG—OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE AND REPORTS.

GENERAL S. D. LEE TO GENERAL COOPER.

Headquarters Department Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, Meridian, June 30, 1864.

General: I have the honor to transmit copies of correspondence between General Washburn, U. S. A., General Forrest, and myself, which I consider very important, and should be laid before the Department. It will be my endeavor to avoid, as far as is consistent with my idea of the dignity of my position, resorting to such an extremity as the black flag; and the onus shall be with the Federal commander.

I would like that the onus be put where it properly belongs, before the public, should the extremity arise. The correspondence is not complete yet, and the Department will be informed of the result at the earliest practicable moment.

I am, General, yours respectfully,

S. D. Lee,
Lieutenant-General.

General S. Cooper,
A. and I. G., Richmond, Va.

GENERAL FORREST TO GENERAL WASHBURN.

Headquarters Forrest's Cavalry, in the Field, June 14, 1864.

Major-General Washburn, commanding United States Forces, Memphis:

General: I have the honor herewith to enclose copy of letter received from Brigadier-General Buford, commanding United States forces at Helena, Arkansas, addressed to Colonel E. W. Rucker, commanding Sixth regiment of this command; also a letter from myself to General Buford, which I respectfully request you will read and forward to him.

There is a matter also to which I desire to call your attention, which, until now, I have not thought proper to make the subject of a communication. Recent events render it necessary—in fact, demand it.

It has been reported to me that all the negro troops stationed in Memphis took an oath on their knees, in the presence of Major-General Hurlbut and other officers of your army, to avenge Fort Pillow, and that they would show my troops no quarter.

Again, I have it from indisputable authority that the troops under Brigadier-General Sturgis, on their recent march from Memphis, publicly and in various places proclaimed that no quarter would be shown my men. As his troops were moved into action on the eleventh, the officers commanding exhorted their men to remember Fort Pillow, and a large majority of the prisoners we have captured from that command have voluntarily stated that they expected us to murder them, otherwise they would have surrendered in a body rather than taken to the bushes after being run down and exhausted. The recent battle of Tishemingo Creek was far more bloody than it otherwise would have been but for the fact that your men evidently expected to be slaughtered when captured, and both sides acted as though neither felt safe in surrendering even when further resistance was useless. The prisoners captured by us say they felt condemned by the announcements, etc., of their own commanders, and expected no quarter. In all my operations since the war begun, I have conducted the war on civilized principles, and desire still to do so, but it is due to my command that they should know the position you occupy and the policy you intend to pursue. I therefore respectfully ask whether my men in your hands are treated as other Confederate prisoners, also the course intended to be pursued in regard to those who may hereafter fall into your hands.

I have in my possession quite a number of wounded officers and men of General Sturgis' command, all of whom have been treated as well as we were able to treat them, and are mostly in charge of a Surgeon left at Ripley by General Sturgis to look after the wounded. Some of them are too severely wounded to be removed at present. I am willing to exchange them for any men of my command you may have, and as soon as they are able to be removed will give them safe escort through my lines in charge of the Surgeon left with them.

I made such an arrangement with Major-General Hurlbut when he was in command of Memphis, and am willing to renew it, provided it is desired, as it would be better than to subject them to the long and fatiguing delay necessary to a regular exchange at City Point, Virginia.

I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
N. B. FORREST,
Major-General

GENERAL WASHBURN TO GENERAL LEE.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE,
MEMPHIS, TENN., June 17, 1864.

Major-General S. D. Lee, commanding Confederate Forces near Tupelo, Miss.:

GENERAL: When I heard that the forces of Brigadier-General Sturgis had been driven back, and a portion of them probably captured, I felt considerable solicitude for the fate of the two colored regiments that formed a part of the command, until I was informed that the Confederate forces were commanded by you. When I learned that, I became satisfied that no atrocities would be committed upon those troops, but that they would receive the treatment which humanity as well as their gallant conduct demanded.

I regret to say that the hope that I entertained has been dispelled by facts which have recently come to my knowledge.

From statements that have been made to me by colored soldiers who were eye-witnesses, it would seem that the massacre of Fort Pillow had been reproduced at the late affair at Bryce's Cross-roads. The detail of the atrocities there committed I will not trouble you with. If true, and not disavowed, they must lead to consequences too fearful to contemplate. It is best that we should now have a fair understanding upon this question, of the treatment of this class of soldiers. If it is contemplated by the Confederate government to murder all colored troops that may by the chance of war fall into their hands, as was the case at Fort Pillow, it is but fair that it should be freely and frankly avowed. Within the last six weeks I have, on two occasions, sent colored troops into the field from this point. In the expectation that the Confederate government would disavow the action of their commanding General at the Fort Pillow massacre, I have forborne to issue any instructions to the colored troops as to the course they should pursue towards Confederate soldiers that might fall into their hands; but seeing no disavowal on the part of the Confederate government, but, on the contrary, laudations from the entire Southern press of the perpetrators of the massacre, I may safely presume that indiscriminate slaughter is to be the fate of colored troops that fall into your hands. But I am not willing to leave a matter of such grave import, and involving consequences so fearful, to inference, and I have therefore thought it proper to address you this, believing that you would be able to indicate the policy that the Confederate government intend to pursue hereafter on this question.

If it is intended to raise the black flag against that unfortunate race, they will cheerfully accept the issue. Up to this time no troops have fought more gallantly, and none have conducted themselves with greater propriety. They have fully vindicated their right (so long denied) to be treated as men.

I hope that I have been misinformed in regard to the treatment they have received at the battle of Bryce's Cross-roads, and that the accounts received result rather from the excited imaginations of the fugitives than from actual fact.

For the government of the colored troops under my command, I would thank you to inform me, with as little delay as possible, if it is your intention, or the intention of the Confederate government, to murder colored soldiers that may fall into your hands, or treat them as prisoners of war, and subject to be exchanged as other prisoners.

I am, General, respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
C. C. WASHBURN,
Major-General, commanding.

GENERAL WASHBURN TO GENERAL FORREST.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE,
MEMPHIS, TENN., June 19, 1864.

Major-General N. B. Forrest, commanding Confederate Forces:

GENERAL: Your communication of the fourteenth instant is received. The letter to Brigadier-General Buford will be forwarded to him.

In regard to that part of your letter which relates to colored troops, I beg to say that I have already sent a communication on the subject to the officer in command of the Confederate forces at Tupelo.

Having understood that Major-General S. D. Lee was in command there, I directed my letter to him—a copy of it I enclose. You say in your letter that it has been reported to you that all the negro troops stationed in Memphis took an oath on their knees, in the presence of Major-General Hurlbut, and other officers of our army, to avenge Fort Pillow, and that they would show your troops no quarter.

I believe it is true that the colored troops did take such an oath, but not in the presence of General Hurlbut. From what I can learn, this act of theirs was not influenced by any white officer, but was the result of their own sense of what was due to themselves and their fellows who had been mercilessly slaughtered.

I have no doubt that they went into the field, as you allege, in the full belief that they would be murdered in case they fell into your hands. The affair of Fort Pillow fully justified that belief. I am not aware as to what they proclaimed on their late march, and it may be, as you say, that they declared that no quarter would be given to any of your men that might fall into their hands.

Your declaration that you have conducted the war, on all occasions, on civilized principles, cannot be accepted; but I receive with satisfaction the intimation in your letter that the recent slaughter of colored troops at the battle of Tishemingo Creek resulted rather from the desperation with which they fought than a predetermined intention to give them no quarter.

You must have learned by this time that the attempt to intimidate the colored troops by indiscriminate slaughter has signally failed, and that, instead of a feeling of terror, you have aroused a spirit of courage and desperation that will not down at your bidding.

I am left in doubt, by your letter, as to the course you and the Confederate Government intend to pursue hereafter in regard to colored troops, and I beg you to advise me, with as little delay as possible, as to your intentions.

If you intend to treat such of them as fall into your hands as prisoners of war, please so state; if you do not so intend, but contemplate either their slaughter or their return to slavery, please state *that*, so that we may have no misunderstanding hereafter. If the former is your intention, I shall receive the announcement with pleasure, and shall explain the fact to the colored troops at once, and desire that they recall the oath they have taken; if the *latter* is the case, then let the oath stand, and upon those who have aroused this spirit by their atrocities, and upon the Government and people who sanction it, be the consequences.

In regard to your inquiry relating to prisoners of your command in our hands, I have to state that they have always received the treatment which a great and humane Government extends to its prisoners. What course will be pursued hereafter towards them must, of course, depend on circumstances that may arise. If your command, hereafter, does nothing which should properly exclude them from being treated as prisoners of war, they will be so treated.

I thank you for your offer to exchange wounded officers and men in your hands. If you will send them in, I will exchange man for man, so far as I have the ability to do so.

Before closing this letter, I wish to call your attention to one case of unparalleled outrage and murder that has been brought to my notice, and in regard to which the evidence is overwhelming.

Among the prisoners captured at Fort Pillow was Major Bradford, who had charge of the defence of the fort after the fall of Major Booth.

After being taken prisoner, he was started, with other prisoners of war, in charge of Colonel Duckworth, for Jackson. At Brownsville they rested over night. The following morning two companies were detailed by Colonel Duckworth to proceed to Jackson with the prisoners.

After they had started, and proceeded a very short distance, five soldiers were recalled by Colonel Duckworth, and were conferred with by him; they then rejoined the column, and after proceeding about five miles from Brownsville the column was halted, and Major Bradford taken about fifty yards from the roadside and deliberately shot by the five men who had been recalled by Colonel Duckworth, and his body left unburied upon the ground where he fell.

He now lies buried near the spot, and, if you desire, you can easily satisfy yourself of the truth of what I assert. I beg leave to say to you that

this transaction hardly justifies your remark, that your operations have been conducted on civilized principles; and until you take some steps to bring the perpetrators of this outrage to justice, the world will not fail to believe that it had your sanction.

I am, General,

Your obedient servant,

C. C. WASHBURN,
Major-General, commanding.

GENERAL FORREST TO GENERAL WASHBURN.

HEADQUARTERS FORREST'S CAVALRY,
TUPELO, June 20, 1864.

Major-General C. C. Washburn, commanding U. S. Forces, Memphis, Tenn.:

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt (per flag of truce) of your letter of the seventeenth instant, addressed to Major-General S. D. Lee, or Officer commanding Confederate forces near Tupelo. I have forwarded it to General Lee, with a copy of this letter.

I regard your letter as discourteous to the commanding officer of this department, and grossly insulting to myself.

You seek by implied threats to intimidate him, and assume the privilege of denouncing me as a murderer and as guilty of the wholesale slaughter of the garrison at Fort Pillow, and found your assertion upon the *ex parte* testimony of (your friends) the enemies of myself and country. I shall not enter into the discussion, therefore, of any of the questions involved, nor undertake any refutation of the charges made by you against myself; nevertheless, as a matter of personal privilege alone, I unhesitatingly say that they are unfounded and unwarranted by the facts. But whether those charges are true or false, they, with the question you ask as to whether negro troops, when captured, will be recognized and treated as prisoners of war, subject to exchange, etc., are matters which the Governments of the United States and Confederate States are to decide and adjust, not their subordinate officers. I regard captured negroes as I do other captured property, and not as captured soldiers; but as to how regarded by my government, and the disposition which has been and will hereafter be made of them, I respectfully refer you, through the proper channel, to the authorities at Richmond. It is not the policy or the interest of the South to destroy the negro, on the contrary to preserve and protect him, and all who have surrendered to us have received kind and humane treatment.

Since the war began I have captured many thousand Federal prisoners, and they, including the survivors of the "Fort Pillow Massacre," "black and white," are living witnesses of the fact that, with my knowledge or consent, or by my order, not one of them has ever been insulted or in any way maltreated.

You speak of your forbearance in not giving your negro troops instructions and orders as to the course they should pursue in regard to Confederate soldiers that might fall into their (your) hands, which clearly conveys to my mind two very distinct impressions. The first is, that in not giving them instructions and orders you have left the matter entirely to the discretion of the negroes as to how they should dispose of prisoners. Second, an implied threat to give such orders as will lead to "consequences too fearful" for contemplation. In confirmation of the correctness of the first impression (which your language now fully develops), I refer most respectfully to my letter from the battle-field, Tishemingo Creek, and forwarded you by flag of truce on the fourteenth instant. As to the second impression, you seem disposed to take into your own hands the settlements which belong to, and can only be settled by, your government; but if you are prepared to take upon yourself the responsibility of inaugurating a system of warfare contrary to civilized usages, the onus as well as the consequences will be chargeable to yourself.

Deprecating, as I should do, such a state of affairs; determined, as I am, not to be instrumental in bringing it about; feeling and knowing, as I do, that I have the approval of my government, my people, and my conscience as to the past, and with the firm belief that I will be sustained by them in my future policy, it is left with you to determine what that policy shall be, whether in accordance with the laws of civilized nations or in violation of them.

I am, General, yours,

Very respectfully,

N. B. FORREST,
Major-General.

GENERAL FORREST TO GENERAL WASHBURN.

HEADQUARTERS FORREST'S CAVALRY,
IN THE FIELD, June 23, 1864.

Major-General C. C. Washburn, commanding District of West Tennessee, Memphis, Tenn.:

Your communication of the nineteenth inst. is received, in which you say "you are left in doubt as to the course the Confederate government intends to pursue hereafter in regard to colored troops."

Allow me to say that this is a subject upon which I did not and do not propose to enlighten you. It is a matter to be settled by our governments through their proper officers, and I respectfully refer you to them for a solution of your doubts.

You ask me to state whether "I contemplate either their slaughter or their return to slavery." I answer that I slaughter no man except in open warfare, and that my prisoners, both white and black, are turned over to my government to be dealt with as it may direct. My government is in possession of all the facts as regards my official conduct, and the operations of my command since I entered the service, and if you desire a proper discussion and decision, I refer you again to the President of the Confederate States. I would not have you understand, however, that in a matter of so much importance I am indisposed to place at your command and

disposal any facts desired, when applied for in a manner becoming an officer holding your rank and position, for it is certainly desirable to every one occupying a public position to be placed right before the world, and there has been no time, since the capture of Fort Pillow, that I would not have furnished all the facts connected with its capture, had they been applied for properly, but now the matter rests with the two governments. I have, however, for your information, enclosed you copies of the official correspondence between the commanding officers at Fort Pillow and myself; also copies of a statement of Captain Young, the senior officer of that garrison, together with (sufficient) extracts from a report of the affair by my A. D. C., Captain Chas. W. Anderson, which I approve and endorse as correct.

As to the death of Major Bradford, I knew nothing of it until eight or ten days after it is said to have occurred.

On the thirteenth (the day after the capture of Fort Pillow) I went to Jackson, and the report I had of the affair was this: Major Bradford was, with other officers, sent to the headquarters of Colonel McCulloch, and all the prisoners were in charge of one of McCulloch's regiments. Bradford requested the privilege of attending the burial of his brother, which was granted, he giving his parole of honor to return. Instead of returning, he changed his clothing and started for Memphis. Some of my men were hunting deserters and came on Bradford just as he had landed on the south bank of the Hatchie, and arrested him. When arrested, he claimed to be a Confederate soldier belonging to Bragg's army, that he had been on furlough, and was then on his way to join his command.

As he could show no papers he was believed to be a deserter, and was taken to Covington, and not until he was recognized and spoken to by citizens did the guards know that he was Bradford.

He was sent by Colonel Duckworth, or taken by him to Brownsville.

All of Chalmers' command went from Brownsville *via* La Grange, and as all the other prisoners had been gone some time, and there was no chance for them to catch up and place Bradford with them, he was ordered by Colonel Duckworth or General Chalmers to be sent south to me at Jackson.

I knew nothing of the matter until eight or ten days afterwards I heard that his body was found near Brownsville. I understand that he attempted to escape and was shot. If he was improperly killed, nothing would afford me more pleasure than to punish the perpetrators to the full extent of the law, and to show you how I regard such transactions.

I can refer you to my demand upon Major-General Hurlbut (no doubt upon file in your office) for the delivery to Confederate authorities of one Colonel Fielding Hurst and others of his regiment, who deliberately took out and killed seven Confederate soldiers, one of whom they left to die after cutting off his tongue, punching out his eyes, splitting his mouth on each side to his ears, and cutting off his privates. I have mentioned and given you these facts in order that you may have no further excuse or apology for referring to these matters in connection with myself, and to evince to you my determination to do all in my power to avoid the responsibility of causing the adoption of the policy which you have determined to press. In your letter you acknowledge the fact that the negro troops did take an oath on bended knees to show no quarters to my men, and you say further "you have no doubt they went to the battle-field expecting to be slaughtered," and admit, also, the probability of their having proclaimed on their march that no quarters would be shown us. Such being the case, why do you ask for the disavowal on the part of the commanding General of this department or the government, in regard to the loss of life at Tishemingo Creek? That your troops expected to be slaughtered, appears to me, after the oath they took, to be a very reasonable and natural expectation. Yet you who sent them out, knowing and now admitting that they had sworn to such a policy, are complaining of atrocities, and demanding acknowledments and disavowals on the part of the very men you sent forth sworn to slay whenever in your power.

I will, in all candor and truth, say to you that I had only heard these things, but did not believe them; indeed, did not attach to them the importance they deserved, nor did I know of the threatened vengeance as proclaimed along the line of march until the contest was over. Had I and my men known it, as you admit it, the battle of Tishemingo Creek would have been noted as the bloodiest battle of the war. That you sanctioned this policy is plain, for you say now "that if the negro is treated as a prisoner of war, you will receive with pleasure the announcement, and will explain the facts to your colored troops, and *desire* (not *order*) that they recall the oath; but if they are to be either slaughtered or returned to slavery, let the oath stand." Your rank forbids a doubt as to the fact that you and every officer and man of your department is identified with the policy and responsible for it, and I shall not permit you, notwithstanding by your studied language in both your communications you seek to limit the operations of your unholy scheme, and visit its terrible consequences alone upon that ignorant, deluded, but unfortunate people, the negroes, whose destruction you are planning in order to accomplish ours. The negroes have our sympathy, and so far as consistent with safety will spare them at the expense of those who are alone responsible for the inauguration of a worse than savage warfare. Now, in conclusion, I demand a plain, unqualified answer to two questions, and then I have done with further correspondence with you on this subject This matter must be settled. In battle and on

the battle-field do you intend to slaughter my men who fall into your hands? If you do not intend so to do, will they be treated as prisoners of war?

I have over two thousand of Sturgis' command prisoners, and will hold every officer and private hostage until I receive your declarations, and am satisfied that you carry out in good faith the answers you make, and until I am assured that no Confederate soldier has been foully dealt with from the day of the battle of Tishemingo Creek to this time. It is not yet too late for you to retrace your steps and arrest the storm.

Relying as I do upon that Divine power which in wisdom disposes of all things—relying also upon the support and approval of my government and countrymen, and the unflinching bravery and endurance of my troops, and with a consciousness that I have done nothing to produce, but all in my power, consistent with honor and the personal safety of myself and command, to prevent it, I leave with you the responsibility of bringing about, to use your own language, "a state of affairs too fearful for contemplation." I am, General,

Yours, very respectfully,
N. B. FORREST,
Major-General.

OFFICIAL MEMORANDA.

CAHABA HOSPITAL, CAHABA, ALABAMA, May 11, 1864.

Colonel H. C. Davis commanding Post Cahaba:

COLONEL: I herewith transmit you, as near as my memory serves me, according to promise, the demand made by Major-General Forrest C. S. A., for the surrender of Fort Pillow, Tennessee:

Major Booth, commanding U. S. Forces, Fort Pillow, Tennessee:

I have force sufficient to take your works by assault. I therefore demand an unconditional surrender of all your forces. Your heroic defence will entitle you to be treated as prisoners of war, but the surrender must be unconditional. I await your answer. FORREST,
Major-General, commanding.

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES, FORT PILLOW, TENNESSEE, April 12, 1864.

Major-General Forrest, commanding Confederate Forces:

GENERAL: Your demand for the surrender of United States forces under my command, received. I ask one hour for consultation with my officers and the commander of gunboat No. 7, at this place. I have the honor to be

Your obedient servant,
L. F. BOOTH,
Major, commanding U. S. Forces.

Major L. F. Booth, commanding United States Forces:

I do not demand the surrender of the gunboat No. 7. I ask only for the surrender of Fort Pillow, with men and munitions of war. You have twenty minutes for consideration. At the expiration of that time if you do not capitulate, I will assault your works.

Your obedient servant,
FORREST,
Major-General, commanding.

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES, FORT PILLOW, TENNESSEE, April 12, 1864.

Major-General Forrest, commanding Confederate Forces:

GENERAL: Your second demand for the surrender of my forces is received. The demand will not be complied with.

Your obedient servant,
L. F. BOOTH,
Major, commanding U. S. Forces, Fort Pillow

Colonel H. C. Davis:

I give you the above for your own satisfaction from memory. I think it is true in substance. My present condition would preclude the idea of this being an official statement.

I am Colonel, your obedient servant,
JOHN T. YOUNG,
Captain Company A, Twenty-fourth Missouri Inf. Vols.

CAPTAIN J. T. YOUNG TO MAJOR-GENERAL FORREST.

CAHABA, ALABAMA May 19, 1864.

Major-General Forrest, C. S. A.:

GENERAL: Your request, made through Judge P. T. Scroggs, that I should make a statement of the treatment of the Federal dead and wounded at Fort Pillow, has been made known to me. Details from Federal prisoners were made to collect the dead and wounded. The dead were buried by their surviving comrades. I saw no ill treatment of their wounded on the evening of the battle, or next morning. My friend, Lieutenant Leaming, Adjutant Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry, was left wounded in the sutler's store near the fort, also a Lieutenant Sixth U. S. Artillery; both were alive next morning and sent on board U. S. transport, among many other wounded. Among the wounded were some colored troops—I don't know how many.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JNO. T. YOUNG,
Captain Twenty-fourth Missouri Volunteers.

P. S.—I have examined a report said to be made by Captain Anderson (of) A. D. C. to Major-General Forrest, appendix to General Forrest's report, in regard to making disposition of Federal wounded left on the field at Fort Pillow, and think it is correct. I accompanied Captain Anderson on the day succeeding the battle to Fort Pillow, for the purpose above mentioned.

JOHN T. YOUNG,
Captain Twenty-fourth Missouri volunteers.

A true copy:
SAMUEL DONALSON,
Lieutenant and A. D. C.

Official: HENRY B. LEE,
A. D. C.

GENERAL WASHBURN TO GENERAL FORREST.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE, MEMPHIS, TENN., July 2, 1864.

Major-General N. B. Forrest, commanding Confederate Forces near Tupelo:

GENERAL: Your communications of the twentieth and twenty-third ult. are received. Of the tone and temper of both I do not complain. The desperate fortunes of a bad cause excuse much irritation of temper, and I pass it by. Indeed, I received it as a favorable augury, and as evidence that you are not indifferent to the opinions of the civilized world.

In regard to the Fort Pillow affair, it is useless to prolong the discussion.

I shall forward your report which you did me the favor to enclose, to my government, and you will receive the full benefit of it.

The record is now made up, and a candid world will judge of it. I beg leave to send you herewith a copy of the report of the Investigating Committee from the United States Congress on the affair. In regard to the treatment of Major Bradford, I refer you to the testimony contained in that report, from which you will see that he was not attempting to escape when shot. It will be easy to bring the perpetrators of the outrage to justice if you so desire.

I will add to what I have heretofore said, that I have it from responsible and truthful citizens of Brownsville, that when Major Bradford was started under an escort from your headquarters at Jackson, General Chalmers remarked that "he would never reach there."

You call attention, apparently as an offset to this affair of Major Bradford, to outrages said to have been committed by Colonel Fielding Hurst and others of his regiment (Sixth Tennessee cavalry). The outrages, if committed as stated by you, are disgraceful and abhorrent to every brave and sensitive mind.

On receiving your letter I sent at once for Colonel Hurst, and read him the extract pertaining to him. He indignantly denies the charge against him, and until you furnish me the names of the parties murdered, and the time when, and the place where the offence was committed, with the names of witnesses, it is impossible for me to act. When you do that, you may rest assured that I shall use every effort in my power to have the parties accused tried, and if found guilty, properly punished.

In regard to the treatment of colored soldiers, it is evidently useless to discuss the question further.

Your attempt to shift from yourself upon me the responsibility of the inauguration of a "worse than savage warfare," is too strained and far-fetched to require any response. The full and cumulative evidence contained in the Congressional Report I herewith forward, points to *you* as the person responsible for the barbarisms already committed.

It was *your* soldiers who, at Fort Pillow, raised the black flag, and while shooting, bayoneting, and otherwise maltreating the Federal prisoners in their hands, shouted to each other in the hearing of their victims that it was done "by Forrest's orders."

Thus far I cannot learn that you have made any disavowal of these barbarities.

Your letters to me inform me confidently that you have always treated our prisoners according to the rules of civilized warfare, but your disavowal of the Fort Pillow barbarities, if you intend to make any, should be full, clear, explicit, and published to the world.

The United States Government is, as it always has been, lenient and forbearing, and it is not yet too late for you to secure for yourself and your soldiers a continuance of the treatment due to honorable warriors, by a public disclaimer of barbarities already committed, and a vigorous effort to punish the wretches who committed them.

But I say to you now, clearly and unequivocally, that such measure of treatment as you mete out to Federal soldiers will be measured to you again.

If you give no quarter, you need expect none. If you observe the rules of civilized warfare, and treat our prisoners in accordance with the laws of war, your prisoners will be treated as they ever have been, with kindness.

If you depart from these principles, you may expect such retaliation as the laws of war justify.

That you may know what the laws of war are, as understood by my government, I beg leave to enclose a copy of General Orders No. 100 from the War Department Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, April twenty-four, 1863.

I have the honor to be, sir,

Very respectfully yours,

C. C. WASHBURN,
Major-General.

GENERAL LEE TO GENERAL WASHBURN.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT ALABAMA, MISSISSIPPI, AND EAST LOUISIANA, MERIDIAN, June 28, 1864.

Major-General C. C. Washburn, commanding Federal Forces at Memphis, Tennessee:

GENERAL: I am in receipt of your letter of the seventeenth inst, and have also before me the reply of Major-General Forrest thereto. Though that reply is full, and is approved by me, yet I deem it proper to communicate with you upon a subject so seriously affecting our future conduct and that of the troops under our respective commands.

Your communication is by no means respectful to me, and is by implication insulting to Major-General Forrest. This, however, is overlooked in consideration of the important character of its contents.

You assume as correct an exaggerated statement of the circumstances attending the capture of Fort Pillow, relying solely upon the evidence of those who would naturally give a distorted history of the affair.

No demand for an explanation has ever been

made either by yourself or your government, a course which would certainly recommend itself to every one desirous of hearing truth; but, on the contrary, you seem to have been perfectly willing to allow your soldiers to labor under false impressions upon a subject involving such terrible consequences. Even the formality of parades and oaths have been resorted to for the purpose of inciting your colored troops to the perpetration of deeds which, you say, "will lead to consequences too fearful to contemplate."

As commanding officer of this Department I desire to make the following statement concerning the capture of Fort Pillow—a statement supported in a great measure by the evidence of one of your own officers captured at that place.

The version given by you and your government is untrue, and not sustained by the facts to the extent that you indicate.

The garrison was summoned in the usual manner, and its commanding officer assumed the responsibility of refusing to surrender after having been informed by General Forrest of his ability to take the fort, and of his fears as to what the result would be in case the demand was not complied with.

The assault was made under a heavy fire, and with considerable loss to the attacking party.

Your colors were never lowered, but retreated from the fort to the cover of the gunboats, with arms in their hands, and constantly using them.

This was true, particularly of your colored troops, who had been firmly convinced by your teachings of the certainty of their slaughter in case of capture. Even under these circumstances many of your men—white and black—were taken prisoners.

I respectfully refer you to history for numerous cases of indiscriminate slaughter, even under less aggravated circumstances.

It is generally conceded by all military precedents that where the issue has been fairly presented, and the ability displayed, fearful results are expected to follow a refusal to surrender.

The case under consideration is almost an extreme one.

You had a servile race armed against their masters, and in a country which had been desolated by almost unprecedented outrages.

I assert that our officers, with all these circumstances against them, endeavored to prevent the effusion of blood; and, as evidence of this, I refer you to the fact that both white and colored prisoners were taken, and are now in our hands.

As regards the battle of Tishemingo Creek, the statements of your negro witnesses are not to be relied on. In this panic they acted as might have been expected from their previous impressions. I do not think many of them were killed—they are yet wandering over the country, attempting to return to their masters.

With reference to the status of those captured at Tishemingo Creek and Fort Pillow, I will state that, unless otherwise ordered by my government, they will not be regarded as prisoners of war, but will be retained and humanely treated, subject to such future instructions as may be indicated.

Your letter contains many implied threats; these you can of course make, and you are fully entitled to any satisfaction that you may feel from having made them.

It is my intention, and that also of my subordinates, to conduct this war upon civilized principles, provided you permit us to do so; and I take this occasion to state that we will not shrink from any responsibilities that your actions may force upon us.

We are engaged in a struggle for the protection of our homes and firesides, for the maintenance of our national existence and liberty; we have counted the cost and are prepared to go to any extremes; and although it is far from our wish to fight under the "black flag," still, if you drive us to it, we will accept the issue.

Your troops virtually fought under it at the battle of Tishemingo Creek, and the prisoners taken there state that they went into battle with the impression that they were to receive no quarter, and I suppose with the determination to give none.

I will further remark that if it is raised, so far as your soldiers are concerned, there can be no distinction, for the unfortunate people whom you pretend to be aiding are not considered entirely responsible for their acts, influenced as they are by the superior intellect of their white brothers.

I enclose for your consideration certain papers touching the Fort Pillow affair, which were procured from the writer after the exaggerated statements of your press were seen.

I am, General, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
S. D. LEE,
Lieutenant-General, commanding.

ENCLOSURE IN THE FOREGOING.

CAHABA, ALABAMA, May 16, 1864.

I was one of the bearers of the flag of truce, on the part of the United States authorities, at Fort Pillow. A majority of the officers of the garrison doubted whether General Forrest was present, and had the impression that it was a ruse to induce the surrender of the fort. At the second meeting of the flag of truce, General Forrest announced himself as being General Forrest; but the officers who accompanied the flag, being unacquainted with the General, doubted his word, and it was the opinion of the garrison, at the time of the assault, that General Forrest was not in the vicinity of the fort. The commanding officer refused to surrender. When the final assault was made, I was captured at my post, inside the works, and have been treated as a prisoner of war.

JOHN T. YOUNG,
Captain, Twenty-fourth Missouri Volunteers.

F. W. UNDERHILL,
First Lieutenant Cavalry.

GENERAL WASHBURN TO GENERAL LEE.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, July 3, 1864.

Lieutenant-General S. D. Lee, commanding Department Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, C. S. A., Meridian, Miss.:

GENERAL: Your letter of the twenty-eighth ult., in reply to mine of the seventeenth ult., is received.

The discourtesy which you profess to discover in my letter I utterly disclaim. Having already discussed at length, in a correspondence with Major-General Forrest, the Fort Pillow massacre, as well as the policy to be pursued in regard to colored troops, I do not regard it necessary to say more on those subjects. As you state that you fully approve of the letter sent by General Forrest to me in answer to mine of the seventeenth ult., I am forced to presume that you fully approve of his action at Fort Pillow.

Your arguments in support of that action confirm such presumption. You state that the "version given by me and my government is not true, and not sustained by the facts to the extent I indicate." You furnish a statement of a certain Captain Young, who was captured at Fort Pillow, and is now a prisoner in your hands. How far the statement of a prisoner under duress and in the position of Captain Young should go to disprove the sworn testimony of the hundred eye-witnesses who had ample opportunity of seeing and knowing, I am willing that others shall judge.

In relying, as you do, upon this certificate of Captain Young, you confess that all better resources are at an end.

You are welcome to all the relief that that certificate is calculated to give you. Does he say that our soldiers were not inhumanly treated? No. Does he say that he was in a position to see in case they had been mistreated? No. He simply says that "he saw no ill treatment of their wounded." If he was in a position to see and know what took place, it was easy for him to say so.

I yesterday sent to Major-General Forrest a copy of the report of the Congressional Investigating Committee, and I hope it may fall into your hands. You will find there the record of inhuman atrocities, to find a parallel for which you will search the page of history in vain. Men—white men and black men—were crucified and burned, others were hunted by bloodhounds; while others, in their anguish, were made the sport of men more cruel than the dogs by which they were hunted.

I have also sent to my government copies of General Forrest's reports, together with the certificate of Captain Young.

The record in the case is plainly made up, and I leave it. You justify and approve it, and appeal to history for precedents.

As I have said, history furnishes no parallel. True, there are instances where, after a long and protracted resistance, resulting in heavy loss to the assailing party, the garrison has been put to the sword, but I know of no such instance that did not bring dishonor upon the commander that ordered or suffered it.

There is no Englishman that would not gladly forget Badajos, nor a Frenchman that exults when Jaffa or the caves of Dahra and Shelas are spoken of. The massacre of Glencoe, which the world has read of with horror for nearly two hundred years, pales into significance before the truthful recital of Fort Pillow.

The desperate defence of the Alamo was the excuse for the slaughter of its brave survivors after its surrender, yet that act was received with just execration, and we are told by the historian that it led more than anything else to the independence of Texas.

At the battle of San Jacinto the Texans rushed into action with the war cry, "Remember the Alamo," and carried all before them.

You will seek in vain for consolation in history, pursue the inquiry as far as you may.

Your desire to shift the responsibility of the Fort Pillow massacre, or to find excuses for it, is not strange. But the responsibility still remains where it belongs, and there it will remain.

In my last letter to General Forrest I stated that the treatment which Federal soldiers received would be their guide hereafter, and that if you give no quarter you need expect none. If you observe the rules of civilized warfare I shall rejoice at it, as no one can regret more than myself a resort to such measures as the laws of war justify towards an enemy that gives no quarter.

Your remark that our colored soldiers "will not be regarded as prisoners of war, but will be retained and humanely treated," indicating that you consider them as of more worth and importance than your own soldiers who are now in our hands, is certainly very complimentary to the colored troops, though but a tardy acknowledgment of their bravery and devotion as soldiers; but such fair words can neither do justice to the colored soldiers who were butchered at Fort Pillow after they had surrendered to their victors, nor relieve yourself, General Forrest, and the troops serving under you, from the fearful responsibility now resting upon you for those wanton and unparalleled barbarities.

I concur in your remarks that if the black flag is once raised, there can be no distinction so far as our soldiers are concerned. No distinction in this regard as to color is known to the laws of war; and you may rest assured that the outrages we complain of are felt by our white soldiers, no less than by our black ones, as insults to their common banner, the flag of the United States.

I will close by a reference to your statement that many of our colored soldiers "are yet wandering over the country, attempting to return to their masters." If this remark is intended for a joke, it is acknowledged as a good one; but, if stated as a fact, permit me to correct your mis-

misapprehensions by informing you that most of them have returned to their respective commands, their search for their late "masters" having proved bootless; and I think I do not exaggerate in assuring you that there is not a colored soldier here who does not prefer the fate of his comrades at Fort Pillow to being returned to his "master."

I remain, General,
Yours, very respectfully,
C. C. WASHBURN,
Major-General.

CAPTAIN J. T. YOUNG TO GENERAL WASHBURN.

MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, September 13th, 1864.

Major General C. C. Washburn, commanding District West Tennessee:

GENERAL: I have the honor to address you in regard to certain papers forwarded you by Major-General Forrest, of the so-called Confederate army, signed by me under protest, whilst a prisoner of war at Cahaba, Alabama. I would first call your attention to the manner by which these papers were procured. About twenty-seventh April last, all Federal prisoners (except colored soldiers) were sent to Andersonville and Macon, Georgia, myself among the number. About ten days after my arrival at Macon prison, a Confederate Captain, with two men as guard, came to that prison with an order for me to return to Cahaba. I appealed to the officer in command to know why I was taken from the other officers, but received no explanation. Many of my friends among the Federal officers who had been prisoners longer than myself felt uneasy at the proceedings, and advised me to make my escape going back, as it was likely a subject of retaliation. Consequently I felt considerable uneasiness of mind. On returning to Cahaba, being quite unwell, I was placed in hospital, under guard, with still no explanation from the military authorities. On the day following, I was informed by a sick Federal officer, also in hospital, that he had learned that I had been recognized by some Confederate as a deserter from the Confederate army, and that I was to be court-martialed and shot. The colored waiters about the hospital told me the same thing, and although I knew that the muster-rolls of my country would show that I had been in the volunteer service since first May, 1861, I still felt uneasy, having fresh in my mind Fort Pillow, and the summary manner the Confederate officers have of disposing of men on some occasions. With the above impressions on my mind, about three days after my return to Cahaba I was sent for by the Provost Marshal, and certain papers handed me, made out by General Forrest for my signature. Looking over the papers, I found that signing them would be an endorsement of General Forrest's official report of the Fort Pillow affair. I of course returned the papers, positively refusing to have anything to do with them. I was sent for again the same day, with request to sign other papers of the same tendency, but modified. I again refused to sign the papers, but sent General Forrest a statement, that although I considered some of the versions of the Fort Pillow affair, which I had read in their own papers, said to be copied from Federal papers, exaggerated, I also thought that his own official report was equally so in some particulars.

Here the matter rested about one week, when I was sent for by Colonel H. C. Davis, commander of post at Cahaba, who informed me that General Forrest had sent P. T. Scroggs to see me, and have a talk with me about the Fort Pillow fight. I found the Judge very affable and rather disposed to flatter me; he said that General Forrest thought that I was a gentleman and a soldier, and that the General had sent him (the Judge) down to see me and talk to me about the Fort Pillow fight; he then went on to tell over a great many things that were testified to before the Military Commission, which I was perfectly ignorant of, never having seen the testimony. He then produced papers which General Forrest wished me to sign. Upon examination, I found them about the same as those previously shown me, and refused again to sign them, but the Judge was very importunate, and finally prevailed on me to sign the papers you have in your possession, pledging himself that if I wished it they should only be seen by General Forrest himself, that they were not intended to be used by him as testimony, but merely for his own satisfaction.

I hope, General, that these papers signed by me, or rather extorted from me while under duress, will not be used by my government to my disparagement, for my only wish is now, after three years' service and over, to recruit my health, which has suffered badly by imprisonment, and *go in for the war.*

I have the honor to be, General,
Your obedient servant,
JOHN T. YOUNG,
Captain Company A, Twenty-fourth Missouri, Infantry.

Doc. 63.

THE BATTLE OF IUKA.

MAJOR-GENERAL GRANT'S REPORT.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT WEST TENNESSEE,
JACKSON, TENN., October 22, 1862.

Colonel J. G. Kelton, A. A. G., Washington, D. C.:

COLONEL: I have the honor to make the following report of the battle of Iuka, and to submit herewith such reports of subordinates as have been received.

For some ten days or more before the final move of the rebel army under General Price eastward from the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, it was evident that an attack upon Corinth was contemplated, or some change to be made in the location of that army. This caused great vigilance to be necessary on the part of our cavalry,

* See Rebellion Record, vol. 5, page 490, Documents.

especially that to the southern front, under Colonel Mizner. The labor of watching, with occasional skirmishing, was most satisfactorily performed, and almost every move of the enemy was known as soon as commenced.

About the eleventh of September, Price left the railroad, the infantry and artillery probably moving from Baldwin, and the cavalry from the roads north of Baldwin, towards Bay Springs. At the latter place a halt of a few days seems to have been made; likely for the purpose of collecting stores and reconnoitring on the eastern flank. On the thirteenth of September the enemy's cavalry made their appearance near Iuka, and were repulsed by the small garrison under Colonel Murphy, of the Eighth Wisconsin infantry, still left there to cover the removal of stores not yet brought into Corinth. The enemy appearing again in increased force on the same day, and having cut the railroad and telegraph between there and Burnsville, Colonel Murphy thought it prudent to retire to save his forces.

This caused a considerable amount of commissary stores to fall into the hands of the enemy, which property should have been destroyed. Price's whole force then soon congregated at Iuka.

Information brought in by scouts, as to the intention of the enemy, was conflicting. One report was that Price wanted to cross Beer Creek and the Tennessee River, for the purpose of crossing Tennessee and getting into Kentucky. Another that Van Dorn was to march by way of Ripley and attack us on the south-west, while Price should move on us from the east or north-west. A third that Price would endeavor to cross the Tennessee, and, if pursuit was attempted, Van Dorn was in readiness to attack Corinth.

Having satisfied myself that Van Dorn could not reach Corinth under four days, with an army embracing all arms, I determined to leave Corinth with a force sufficient to resist cavalry, and to attack Price at Iuka. This I regarded as eminently my duty, let either of the enemy's plans be the correct solution. Accordingly, on the sixteenth, I gave some general directions as to the plan of operations.

General Rosecrans was to move on the south side of the railroad to opposite Iuka, and attack from that side with all his available force, after leaving a sufficient force at Rienzi and Jacinto, to prevent the surprise of Corinth from that direction.

Major-General Ord was to move to Burnsville, and from there take roads north of the railroad, and attack from that side. General Ord having to leave from his two divisions, already very much reduced in numbers, from long-continued service and the number of battles they had been in, the garrison at Corinth; he also had one regiment of infantry and a squadron of cavalry at Kossuth, one regiment of infantry and one company of cavalry at Chewall, and one regiment of infantry that moved, under Colonel Mower, and joined General Rosecrans' command, reduced the number of men of his command available to the expedition, to about thirty thousand.

I had previously ordered the infantry of General Ross' command at Bolivar to hold themselves in readiness to move at a moment's warning; had also directed the concentration of cars at Jackson to move these troops.

Within twenty-four hours from the time a despatch left Corinth for those troops to "come on," they had arrived—three thousand four hundred in number. This, notwithstanding the locomotive was thrown off the track on the Mississippi Central Road, preventing the passage of other trains for several hours. This force was added to General Ord's command, making his entire strength over six thousand to take into the field. From this force two regiments of infantry and one section of artillery were taken, about nine hundred men, for the garrison or rear guard, to be held at Burnsville. Not having General Ord's report, these figures may not be accurate. General Rosecrans was moving from Jacinto eastward, with about nine thousand men, making my total force with which to attack the enemy about fifteen thousand. This was equal to or greater than their number, as I estimated them.

General Rosecrans, at his suggestion, acquiesced in by me, was to move northward from his eastern march in two columns: one, under Hamilton, was to move up the Fulton and Eastport road; the other, under Stanley, on the Jacinto road from Barnett's.

On the eighteenth General Ord's command was pushed forward, driving in the enemy's pickets and capturing a few prisoners, taking position within six miles of Iuka. I expected, from the following despatch, that General Rosecrans would be near enough by the night of the eighteenth to make it safe for Ord to press forward on the morning of the nineteenth, and bring on an engagement:

"September 18, 1862.

"GENERAL GRANT: One of my spies, in from Reardon's, on the Bay Spring road, tells of a continuous movement, since last Friday, of forces eastward. They say Van Dorn is to defend Vicksburg, Breckinridge to make his way to Kentucky, Price to attack Iuka, or go to Tennessee. If Price's forces are at Iuka, the plan I propose is, to move up as close as we can to-night and conceal our movements; Ord to advance from Burnsville, commence the attack, and draw their attention that way while I move in on the Jacinto and Fulton road, and crushing in their left, cut off their retreat eastward.

"I propose to leave, in ten minutes, for Jacinto, whence I will despatch you by line of vedettes to Burnsville. Will wait a few minutes to hear from you before I start. What news from Burnsville?

"W. S. ROSECRANS,
Brigadier-General."

To which I sent the following reply:

"HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT WEST TENNESSEE,
BURNSVILLE, MISS., September 18, 1862.

"GENERAL ROSECRANS: General Ross' command is at this place, McArthur's division is north of the road, two miles to the rear, and Davis' division south of the road, north. I sent forward two regiments of infantry, with cavalry, by the road north of the railroad toward Iuka, with instructions for them to bivouac for the night at a point which was designated, about four miles from here, if not interrupted, and have the cavalry feel where the enemy are. Before they reached the point on the road (you will see it on the map—the road north of the railroad) they met what was supposed to be Armstrong's cavalry. The rebel cavalry were forced back, and I sent instructions there to have them stop for the night where they thought they could safely hold.

"In the morning troops will advance from here at 4½ A. M. An anonymous despatch, just received, states that Price, Magruder, and Breckinridge have a force of sixty thousand between Iuka and Tupelo. This, I have no doubt, is the understanding of citizens, but I very much doubt this information being correct. Your reconnoissances prove that there is but little force south of Corinth for a long distance, and no great force between Bay Spring and the railroad. Make as rapid an advance as you can, and let us do to-morrow all we can. It may be necessary to fall back the day following. I look upon the showing of a cavalry force so near us as an indication of a retreat, and they a force to cover it.

"U. S. GRANT,
Major-General."

After midnight the following despatch was received:

"HEADQUARTERS RECAMPMENT,
September 18, 1862.

"GENERAL: Your despatch received. General Stanley's division arrived after dark, having been detained by falling in the rear of Ross through fault of guide. Our cavalry six miles this side of Barnett's; Hamilton's First brigade eight, Second brigade nine miles this side; Stanley's near Davenport's Mills. We shall move as early as practicable—say 4½ A. M. This will give twenty miles march for Stanley to Iuka. Shall not, therefore, be in before one or two o'clock, but when we come in will endeavor to do it strongly.

"W. S. ROSECRANS,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A."

Receiving this despatch, as I did, late at night, and when I supposed these troops were far on their way toward Iuka, and had made my plans accordingly, caused some disappointment, and made a change of plans necessary. I immediately despatched General Ord, giving him the substance of the above, and directions not to move on the enemy until Rosecrans arrived, or he should hear firing to the south of Iuka. Of this change General Rosecrans was promptly informed by despatch, sent with his return messenger. During the day General Ord returned to my headquarters at Iuka, and in consultation we both agreed that it would be impossible for General Rosecrans to get his troops up in time to make an attack that day. The General was instructed, however, to move forward, driving in the enemy's advance guards, but not to bring on an engagement unless he should hear firing. At night another despatch was received from General Rosecrans, dated from Barnett's, about eight miles from Iuka, written at 12:40 P. M., stating that the head of the column had arrived there at 12 M. Owing to the density of the forests, and the difficulties of passing the small streams and bottoms, all communications between General Rosecrans and myself had to pass far around—near Jacinto—even after he had got on the road leading north. For this reason his communication was not received until after the engagement. I did not hear of the engagement, however, until the next day, although the following despatch had been promptly forwarded:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
TWO MILES SOUTH OF IUKA, Sept. 19, '62, 10½ P. M.

"GENERAL: We met the enemy in just about this point. The engagement lasted several hours. We have lost two or three pieces of artillery. Firing was very heavy. You must attack in the morning, and in force. The ground is horrid—unknown to us, and no room for development; couldn't use our artillery at all; fired but few shots. Push in on to them until we can have time to do something. We will try to get a position on our right which will take Iuka.

"W. S. ROSECRANS,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A."

This despatch was received at 8:35 A. M., on the twentieth, and the following immediately sent:

"BURNSVILLE, Sept. 20, 1862, 8:35 A. M.

"GENERAL ORD: Get your troops up and attack as soon as possible. Rosecrans had two hours' fighting last night, and now this morning again, and unless you can create a diversion in his favor he may find his hands full.

"Hurry up your troops—all possible.

"U. S. GRANT,
Major-General."

The statement that the engagement had commenced again in the morning was on the strength of hearing artillery. General Ord, hearing the same, however, pushed on with all possible despatch, without awaiting orders.

Two of my staff—Colonels Dickey and Logan—had gone around to where General Rosecrans was, and were with him during the early part of the engagement. Returning in the dark, and endeavoring to cut off some of the distance, they became lost and entangled in the woods, and remained out over night, arriving at head-

quarters next morning about the same hour that General Rosecrans' messenger arrived. For the particular troops engaged, and the part taken by each regiment, I will have to refer you entirely to the accompanying reports of those officers who were present.

Not occupying Iuka afterward for any length of time, and then not until a force sufficient to give protection for any great distance arrived (the battle was fought about two miles out), I cannot accompany this with a topographical map. I send, however, a map showing all the roads and plans named in this report. The country between the road travelled by General Ord's command, to some distance south of the railroad, is impassable for cavalry, and almost so for infantry. It is impossible for artillery to move southward to the road travelled by General Rosecrans' command. Soon after despatching General Ord, word was brought by one of my staff, Colonel Hillyer, that the enemy were in full retreat. I immediately proceeded to Iuka and found that the enemy had left during the night, taking every thing with them except their wounded and the artillery taken by them the evening before. Going south by the Fulton road, Generals Stanley and Hamilton were in pursuit.

This was the first I knew of the Fulton road; with it occupied, no route would have been left them except east, with the difficult bottom of Bear Creek to cross, or north-east, with the Tennessee River in their front, or to conquer their way out. A partial examination of the country afterwards convinced me, however, that troops moving in separate columns by the route suggested, could not support each other until they arrived near Iuka. On the other hand an attempt to retreat, according to the programme, would have brought General Ord, with his force, on the rear of the retreating column.

For casualties and captures, see accompanying reports.

The battle of Iuka foots up as follows:

On the sixteenth of September we commenced to collect our strength to move upon Price, at Iuka, in two columns; the one to the right of the railroad, commanded by Brigadier-General (now Major-General) W. S. Rosecrans; the one to the left commanded by Major-General E. O. C. Ord. On the night of the eighteenth the latter was in position to bring on an engagement in one hour's march. The former, from having a greater distance to march, and through the fault of a guide, was twenty miles back. On the nineteenth, by making a rapid march, hardy, well-disciplined, and tried troops arrived within two miles of the place to be attacked. Unexpectedly the enemy took the initiative and became the attacking party. The ground chosen was such that a large force on our side could not be brought into action; but the bravery and endurance of those brought in was such that, with the skill and presence of mind of the officer commanding, they were able to hold their ground till night closed the conflict. During the night the enemy fled, leaving our troops in possession of the field, with their dead to bury and wounded to care for. If it was the object of the enemy to make their way into Kentucky, they were defeated in that; if to hold their position until Van Dorn could come up on the south-west of Corinth, and make a simultaneous attack, they were defeated in that. Our only defeat was in not capturing the entire army, or in destroying it, as I had hoped to do.

It was a part of General Hamilton's command that did the fighting, directed entirely by that cool and deserving officer. I commend him to the President for acknowledgment of his services.

During the absence of these forces from Corinth, that post was left in charge of Brigadier-General T. J. McKean. The southern front from Jacinto to Rienzi was under the charge of Colonel DuBois, with a small infantry and cavalry force. The service was most satisfactorily performed, Colonel DuBois showing great vigilance and efficiency. I was kept constantly advised of the movements of flying bodies of cavalry that were hovering in our front.

The wounded, both friend and enemy, are much indebted to Surgeon J. G. F. Holbrook, Medical Director, for his untiring labor in organizing hospitals and providing for their every want.

I cannot close this report without paying a tribute to all the officers and soldiers comprising this command. Their conduct on the march was exemplary, and all were eager to meet the enemy. The possibility of defeat I do not think entered the mind of a single individual, and I believe this same feeling now pervades the entire army which I have the honor to command.

I neglected to mention in the proper connection that to cover our movement from Corinth, and to attract the attention of the enemy in another direction, I ordered a movement from Bolivar towards Holly Springs. This was conducted by Brigadier-General Lauman.

Before completing this report the report of Major-General Ord was received, and accompanies this:

I am, Colonel, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT,
Major-General.

Doc. 64.

THE AFFAIR AT VIENNA, VA.

GENERAL SCHENCK'S STATEMENT.

In a debate in the House of Representatives, at Washington, in April, 1864, Mr. Voorhees alluded to the affair at Vienna, which took place in June, 1861, which called forth the following from General Schenck:

"The gentleman's allusion to the achievement at Vienna, he now refuses to explain with that

ingenious boldness with which he usually expresses himself upon all subjects. It is all idle to pretend that it was not intended as a sneer and a slur. The same attack on me was ventured by one or two other members of this House, but not here; and this is the first time that anybody has ever done it in my presence, or where there was an opportunity to reply or correct.

"I wish now, once for all, to speak of this matter myself; and the House will excuse the egotism which the circumstances force upon me.

"Early in the war, in June, 1861, happening to be the first Brigadier-General of volunteers ordered across the Potomac, I proceeded with my brigade under these orders to a point where I established my camp on the Loudon and Hampshire Railroad, south of this city, and a few miles above Alexandria.

"Brigadier-General Daniel Tyler, of Connecticut, soon afterwards arrived and encamped in the same neighborhood. He was ordered a few days afterwards, by our commanding General, to proceed with a force of four hundred men up the railroad, in a train of cars, and did so, extending his reconnoissance not only to, but some distance beyond, Vienna. The next day, or the second day after, I was directed to send, by similar conveyance, one of my regiments up the road to go as far as that point, picketing the line of road by leaving companies at intervals along it, and afterwards to establish the regiment at a crossing on the road to Fall's Church, some seven miles below Vienna. A train was sent to me for that purpose from Alexandria. When the cars arrived at my camp the colonel commanding the regiment (the First Ohio volunteer infantry) which I had detailed for that service not having returned from this city, where he was for the day on leave of absence, though he subsequently overtook us on the road, I took the command of the regiment and proceeded on the duty.

"When we slowly approached Vienna, having then still three or perhaps four companies remaining, we found a largely superior force of rebels had taken position at a bend of the railroad, who delivered their fire on us with three pieces of artillery. They were brought there probably from Centerville, in consequence of the alarm given by the expedition of the day before.

"The enemy's force was subsequently ascertained to consist of two regiments of infantry, a body of cavalry, and three pieces of artillery. At that time we had neither artillery nor cavalry attached to our Union brigades. By the rebel fire, although at first it was believed and was reported that the loss was greater, the casualties proved to be eight killed and four wounded—two of them mortally. None of us officers or men had ever been under fire before. But I had no reason to complain of the conduct of any. Our troops were ordered from the cars, rallied, formed, and afterwards, the night then coming on, fell slowly back, marching along the railroad to the point or crossing six or seven miles below, which we afterwards continued to hold. All the wounded but one were brought away. So far as my conduct in that matter is concerned, it is not for me to comment upon it.

Doc. 65.

NEW ENGLAND SOLDIERS' RELIEF ASSOCIATION.

FINAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT.

The labors of this association, which was organized on the ninth of April, 1862, in the hope of mitigating the hardships of the soldier's lot, are now, by the return of peace, and the dissolution of the principal armies of the republic, happily ended. Having sent the last wounded soldier, who needed our aid, rejoicing on his homeward way, and finally closed the doors of our hospital, we resign into the hands which conferred them upon us, the responsible trusts we have undertaken to discharge, and we respectfully tender to those, whose constant and lavish charity has made our labors efficient, a final account of our stewardship.

Where such an infinite amount of service was to be done, we could not expect to accomplish all that we might wish or that might be demanded of us; and if those who have placed in our hands the means of usefulness shall be satisfied that we have done all that we could, we shall cease from our labors with grateful hearts, and seek no other praise than that which springs from the recollection of the incalculable good which their generous bounty has enabled us to do.

The first efforts of the New England Soldiers' Relief Association were directed to meeting and supplying, if possible, the imperative need of a hospital for sick and wounded soldiers in this great metropolis. They came here crowding back from the battle-field wounded, sick, weary, suffering. For a time the Government of the United States gladly availed itself of our facilities for this service. Then, benefiting by its own experience, it so increased its means of usefulness that we were left to other departments of duty which the Government could not undertake—such as the care of soldiers discharged from service, often houseless, of soldiers on furlough, of soldiers passing to and from the war, and in transit through New York. In addition we had to provide hospital shelter and care for wounded and sick men who were constantly falling into our hands when the regular governmental channels of relief were crowded and overworked. The work rapidly increased until, as our Association was formed "to aid and care for all sick and wounded soldiers passing through the city of New York on the way to and from the war," our efforts were extended to soldiers from every State. We have, therefore, been enabled to give shelter,

comfort, and cheer to thousands of men. This labor has taxed our resources to an extent, of which, in the beginning, we did not even dream. The vast and novel experience of the years through which we have just passed demanded far more than could be done by the constituted public authorities. To follow such armies as it put into the field, beyond the usual provision for ordinary expenses, or, at most, beyond the most pressing need of sickness and disaster, was not in its power. The love and sympathy of the people, for whom these gallant men suffered, was left to do the rest. To step in between the provision which official authority could make, and the eager readiness of personal affection, to hand over tenderly the subject of disease and suffering from the one to the other, to supply the lack of home and love to those for whom no home and no love waited and watched, was left to the considerate wisdom and the prompt and diligent kindness of hearts glowing with a generous patriotism and Christian devotion. To do this great work the New England Soldiers' Relief Association was organized in April, 1862. A suitable building was provided, and the work placed in trustworthy hands. I am sure that a concise statement of the duties this Association has performed, as the almoner of their bounty, cannot be wearisome or uninteresting to those whose liberal and unsparing charity has furnished the means of all its usefulness.

From the ninth day of April, 1862, to the first day of September, 1865, we have received, registered, lodged, fed, aided, and clothed sick, wounded, and disabled soldiers, coming from almost every State, to the number of 86,073:

Maine	11,330
New Hampshire	7,216
Vermont	5,420
Massachusetts	18,546
Rhode Island	2,655
Connecticut	5,451
New York	11,850
New Jersey	1,253
Pennsylvania	5,783
Delaware	391
Maryland	285
District of Columbia	334
Virginia	189
West Virginia	18
North Carolina	56
South Carolina	46
Georgia	50
Alabama	19
Mississippi	625
Louisiana	65
Texas	22
Ohio	2,523
Indiana	1,514
Illinois	1,366
Michigan	442
Wisconsin	1,035
Minnesota	163
Florida	10
Iowa	219
Kentucky	140
Tennessee	20
Arkansas	6
Missouri	77
Kansas	5
California	31
Vet. Res. Corps	4,234
U. S. Navy	74
U. S. Troops	2,097
U. S. Colored Troops	509
Total	86,073

We also received, welcomed, and entertained New England regiments passing through our city on the way to the field, caring and providing for their wants to the aggregate number of 278,496 men. In like manner it has been our privilege to welcome, of the returning veterans of our glorious armies, 34,383 men, bearing upon their standards the names of those memorable battle-fields upon which they have won such immortal renown.

The foregoing figures are made irrespective of detachments of men otherwise provided for, and of a very large number of outside recipients, whose names do not appear upon our records, but who have, from time to time, received our aid.

This does not include the regiments which have passed through the city from the States of Connecticut and Rhode Island, the care, reception, and entertainment of which has devolved upon their energetic and able military agent, Colonel John H. Almy, whose entire time has been so industriously devoted to their interests, and whose early and constant co-operation with me has been of infinite value to the association.

We beg leave to call especial attention to our Hospital Record, the value of which will be evident upon a moment's consideration. Herein we have secured and recorded, from personal visitations at the bedsides of our suffering soldiers in hospitals in and near this city, the *names, company, regiment, residence, hospital, date of admission, wound, disease, and final disposition* of every soldier who has been admitted within their wards.

The countless inquiries that came to us from burdened hearts, and the eager, painful, and often disappointed search for some single sufferer, led us to the adoption of this complete and systematic record, which has amply recompensed us.

Of the labor and care bestowed upon this portion of our work, some estimate may be formed from the fact that it contains the *names, regiments, company, residence, date of admission, wound or disease, and final disposition* of 91,609 soldiers. They were from the following States:

Maine	5,123
New Hampshire	3,103
Vermont	2,191
Massachusetts	8,685

Rhode Island	1,174
Connecticut	3,920
New York	27,233
New Jersey	7,300
Pennsylvania	5,661
Delaware	143
Maryland	369
Virginia	97
Ohio	5,307
Indiana	1,247
Illinois	2,052
Michigan	2,128
Wisconsin	1,576
U. S. Troops	3,013
Vet. Res. Corps	1,326
Pris. of War	3,007
District of Columbia	39
North Carolina	35
South Carolina	43
Alabama	29
Louisiana	18
Kentucky	157
Tennessee	35
Iowa	633
Minnesota	18
Florida	4
Missouri	132
Georgia	14
Mississippi	5
U. S. Colored Troops	1,635
Signal Corps	25
Miscellaneous	524
Total	91,609

Thus, it will be perceived that, during the three years and four months this institution has been in operation, it has aided, lodged, and generally provided for, within its walls, besides the numerous calls upon its resources for out-door relief, the large number of 86,073.

And it will be seen by the footings of the "General Hospital Register" of this association, that the names, companies, regiments, residences, disease or wound, and final disposition of all soldiers who have been admitted to hospitals in this city and vicinity, have been permanently and systematically recorded, to the number of 91,609.

The number of soldiers and regiments received and cared for in their passage to the war, was 278,496—viz.: from Massachusetts, 155,234; from New Hampshire, 33,258; from Vermont, 34,555; from Maine, 55,449.

The number of soldiers received and entertained upon their return from the war, was 34,383.

The total number of sick, wounded, enfeebled, discharged, furloughed, and passing soldiers aided and provided for, was 490,661.

The gross amount of our expenditure during the above period will be seen by reference to the report of Marvelle W. Cooper, Esq., our energetic Treasurer, whose hearty and sympathetic action has been so strongly enlisted for the welfare of the association and its objects.

Amount of expenditures of the New England Soldiers' Relief Association from April 9th, 1862, to its close, September 1st, 1865 (forty-two months), $60,518.29, being an average per month of $1,440.91.

In this connection it is my duty, as well as my pleasure, to acknowledge the attention of the U. S. Sanitary Commission throughout the war, to our interests, and their final action in assuming the debts of the association, amounting to seven thousand three hundred and seven dollars and four cents ($7,307.04).

In this rapid review of the benefits which have been secured by this association, we find that it has been to the passing soldier his "Midway Home" to and from the battle-field, where he might tarry for a night, or wait until transportation could be furnished; to the discharged veteran, weary, maimed, and feeble, a place of refuge and shelter; to the homeless soldier an asylum where he has ever been made welcome to the charities it has dispensed, until proper provision could be made for him, or until he has been called to that eternal rest which lies beyond this battle-field of life.

To the anxious ones at home it has been a central bureau of information, always open to all inquiries, and a key and military guide to all matters concerning their interests.

To mention all to whom we are specially indebted for their active sympathy and assistance in accomplishing these results, and to measure out to each his adequate portion of thanks, would be altogether impossible; but, not to make any distinctions, we cannot close this Report without placing upon record in the most earnest manner, an acknowledgment of our constant obligations to the Young Men's Night Watchers' Association, R. B. Lockwood, Esq., President, who have maintained, during four entire years, their most commendable organization, and have never permitted a night to pass without two of their number watching, as faithful nurses, at the bedsides of our brave defenders. While writing my report I have received the sad intelligence of the death of the former estimable President of this association, Mr. Charles T. Coggeshall, who has passed to that rest the pathway to which he had done so much to smooth for many a sick and weary soldier in our rooms. To the benevolent and soldiers' relief societies, and to town and church organizations, and individuals in the Eastern States and New York, our thanks are especially due. It is a matter of regret that the limits prescribed to this report render it impossible to make that detailed acknowledgment which the tender charities and forethought of the donors deserve. This stream of charity has never ceased to flow. If ever our supplies have fallen short, it has required but a whisper of our needs to bring a most substantial answer. To Mrs. E. A. Russell, our Matron, also, we tender, on behalf of the many thousand sufferers whom she has relieved, the fullest and warmest thanks—the only limit to whose labor has been her prompt and

sympathetic compliance with the demands her onerous and trying positions have imposed. Dr. Everett Herrick, too, deserves the special thanks of all who have been interested in our labors, for the unremitting care and marked skill which he has exhibited in his attendance at the hospital. To S. E. Low, Esq., our former Treasurer, whose protracted absence from the city last year made his resignation necessary, the association is indebted for the ability, prudence, and systematic care with which he so successfully managed our financial concerns, as well as for the hearty, zealous, and earnest co-operation which he gave to all matters which appertained to the interests of the sick and wounded soldiers. To the Reverend Alex. R. Thompson, D. D., our Chaplain, whose self-imposed and efficient labors at the altar of our institution, and whose devoted ministrations by the bedside of our sick, wounded, and dying men, have won the love of all; and finally, to the Ladies' Committee, whose untiring labors have been only an illustration of that self-sacrificing devotion to the cause which has so marked and characterized the women of our country throughout the war, we tender the homage of our gratitude and honor. I cannot close this portion of my report without acknowledging in some feeble manner the opportune aid and counsel at all times so courteously rendered to this association by Major-General John A. Dix, late commanding officer of this Department, in the midst of the multiplied and onerous duties of his position. It is also eminently due to Brigadier-General R. S. Satterlee, Medical Purveyor of the Department, that a proper acknowledgment should be made for his kindly co-operation in assisting us to provide for the necessities of our soldiers; as well as to Colonel W. J. Sloan, Medical Director, whose humane co-operation in all matters appertaining to the interests of our sick and wounded soldiers was so freely and constantly afforded. And finally, of Charles A. Stetson, his most estimable family, and the Astor House, I must not forget to remind you, and to return our thanks for their long-continued kindness. The near proximity of our rooms to the Astor, impelled us at all hours of the day and night to call upon them for the luxuries and delicacies of the market, and especially on the sudden arrival of sick and wounded officers and men, which has been always afforded with an unsparing hand and a hearty will, refusing to receive in return anything but our thanks.

I have said that the labors of our association are now formally brought to a close, but the sacred duties of charity still remain. Amid the rejoicings which have filled the national heart at the final success of our arms, the restoration of peace, and the eager return of our people to the pursuits of industry, we must not forget the claims of poverty and bereavement heard on every hand. We cannot forget the soldier's widow, his fatherless child, his childless parents, nor the soldier himself, broken down and disabled in the service of our common cause. Let us see to it that the debt of gratitude we owe these stricken and mourning children of the Republic is fully paid. From beneath the simple and unlettered head-boards that stud the battle-fields of the rebellion, marking the resting-places of its heroic defenders, there comes an appeal telling us, in language not to be misunderstood, that the work of humanity, so well begun and carried on, is not fully completed, until every crippled and disabled soldier shall have been adequately and tenderly cared for, and until every helpless widowed heart that has laid its dearest offering upon the altar of our country, shall have received such consolation and such relief as it is in the power of a grateful people to bestow.

Respectfully submitted,
FRANK E. HOWE,
Superintendent.

Treasurer's Report.

The concise and admirable report of our Superintendent, detailing the results of the operations of this association, has prepared you for the final report of its Treasurer.

It has been a matter of sincere regret that Mr. S. E. Low, the former Treasurer, who labored with so much zeal and earnestness in all matters connected with the best interests of the association, and to whom it is indebted for the practical business ability and hearty co-operation he gave to all objects promotive of its welfare, was obliged to resign his position, after over three years' service, on account of necessary absence from the city.

Those who have listened to the simple, truthful testimony which the statistics afford of the benefit and relief which the generous and loyal offerings of our people have enabled the association to dispense to our sick and wounded soldiers, will join me in surprise at the comparative small sum which it has cost through the economy and system which has marked its management.

On July 1, 1865, at which time the books and accounts of the association were transferred to my hands, there was in bank a balance of....	$3,969 29
Donations from that time to the close of the association.....	1,350 00
Amount advanced by Treasurer.....	130 06
	$5,449 35
The expenditures for the same period, to wit, for the months of June, July, August, and September, have been for rent, salaries, and current expenses.....	$5,449 35

Thus closing my account for moneys received.

This statement does not include a number of long-standing unpaid accounts of the association for rent, etc., etc., which have been generously assumed by the United States Sanitary Commission to the amount of $7,307 04.

In this connection the fact must not be lost sight of, that the association has been greatly relieved in a pecuniary point of view from the location of several military agencies at its rooms, represented by Colonel Howe, through whom many expenditures have been met in his capacity of Military Agent, which otherwise would have devolved upon the association to pay.

I cannot close this brief summary of the official connection I have had the privilege of holding with this association, without expressing my deep convictions of the great good that has been accomplished in its continued work of love and mercy, of the energy, unremitting labor, and watchful sympathy which has characterized each and every department, and of the earnest, hearty direction, and consummate ability which has marked its superintendence.

Few who are not conversant with the details of an association similarly established upon the basis of voluntary offerings can imagine the amount of unceasing anxiety which its constant demands beget, to meet and adequately provide for the hundreds of cases of suffering and need which are confidently seeking it for relief, apart from the labor and watchfulness its operations continually impose.

The bright record which this association exhibits of its service during the rebellion, is a proper subject of rejoicing not only for the pains that have been assuaged, wounds that have been healed, sick, suffering, and enfeebled that have been ministered to, but as a continued evidence of that sympathy and devotion to the success of the cause, and prompt, timely succor of its defenders, which has characterized us as a people.

M. W. COOPER,
Treasurer.

Minutes of the Final Meeting.

A final meeting of the members of the New England Soldiers' Relief Association was held, February 12, 1866, at 57 Broadway, Room No. 12; Hon. Wm. M. Evarts, President, in the chair.

On motion of Colonel F. E. Howe, Colonel J. H. Almy was appointed secretary *pro tem.*

Members present—Wm. M. Evarts, Samuel E. Low, Hon. Rufus F. Andrews, L. W. Winchester, Prosper M. Wetmore, Charles Gould, Henry M. Taber, William H. Fogg, Hon. B. W. Bonney, Major J. A. Pullen, Henry A. Coit, Dr. Eleazar Parmly, Elliot C. Cowdin, George Cabot Ward, D. Randolph Martin, William H. Lee, L. I. Howe, Levi P. Morton, Hon. Henry W. Hubbell, Charles A. Peabody, Josiah Hedden, Rev. Alex. R. Thompson, D.D., R. B. Lockwood, Colonel J. H. Almy.

The reports of the superintendent, Colonel Frank E. Howe, and treasurer, M. W. Cooper, were presented, after which remarks were made by General P. M. Wetmore, in which he referred to the early history of the association—the great labor performed and beneficent results. He also alluded, in terms of high eulogium, to the devoted labors of the superintendent; to his disinterested love and zeal, which had won the admiration of all; and closed by offering the following resolution, passed unanimously:

Resolved, That the grateful acknowledgments and high appreciation of this association are due, and are hereby tendered, to Colonel Frank E. Howe, for his patriotic and humane devotion to the interests of the soldiers, who, disabled and suffering, were the recipients of his thoughtful kindness and care.

On motion of Hon. R. F. Andrews, it was

Resolved, That the able and comprehensive report of the superintendent be accepted and adopted, and published in the leading New York dailies, including those of the New England States, and, also, that it be printed in pamphlet form.

On motion of Hon. R. F. Andrews, it was

Resolved, That the thanks of this association are due, and are hereby tendered, to Hon. Wm. M. Evarts, president, for the able and efficient manner in which he has discharged his duties, and for the benefits which the association has received from the influence of his name.

Mr. Evarts, in thanking the meeting for the honors done him, briefly referred to his connection with the association, and the pride and satisfaction he had taken in being so honorably identified with its service. In closing, Mr. Evarts pronounced the New England Soldiers' Relief Association dissolved.

J. H. ALMY,
Secretary *pro tem.*

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OPERATIONS AT RAPPAHANNOCK BRIDGE.

REPORT OF GENERAL R. E. LEE.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
November 20, 1863.

General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General, Richmond, Virginia:

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that, after the return of the army to the Rappahannock, it was disposed on both sides of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, General Ewell's corps on the right and General Hill's on the left, with the cavalry on each flank. The troops were placed as near the river as suitable ground for encampments could be found, and most of the artillery sent to the nearest point in the rear where the animals could be foraged.

To hold the line of the Rappahannock at this part of its course, it was deemed advantageous to maintain our communication with the north bank, to threaten any flank movement the enemy might make above or below, and thus compel him to divide his forces, when it was hoped that an opportunity would be presented to concentrate on one or the other part. For this purpose, a point was selected a short distance above the site of the railroad bridge, where the

hills on each side of the river afforded protection to our pontoon bridge, and increased the means of defence.

The enemy had previously constructed some small earthworks on these hills to repel an attack from the south. That on the north side was converted into a *tête-de-pont*, and a line of rifle-trenches extended along the crest on the right and left to the river bank. The works on the south side were remodelled, and sunken batteries for additional guns constructed on an adjacent hill to the left. Higher up on the same side and east of the railroad, near the river bank, sunken batteries for two guns, and rifle-pits were arranged to command the railroad embankment, under cover of which the enemy might advance.

These works were slight, but were deemed adequate to accomplish the object for which they were intended. The pontoon bridge was considered a sufficient means of communication, as, in the event of the troops north of the river being compelled to withdraw, their crossing could be covered by the artillery and infantry in the works on the south side. Four pieces of artillery were placed in the *tête-de-pont* and eight others in the works opposite.

The defence of this position was entrusted to Lieutenant-General Ewell's corps, and the troops of Johnson's and Early's divisions guarded them alternately, Rodes' division being stationed near Kelly's Ford.

The enemy began to rebuild the railroad as soon as we withdrew from Bristoe Station, his army advancing as the work progressed. His movements were regularly reported by our scouts, and it was known that he had advanced from Warrenton Junction a few days before the attack.

His approach towards the Rappahannock was announced on the sixth of November, and about noon next day his infantry were discovered advancing to the bridge, while a large force moved in the direction of Kelly's Ford, where the first attack was made. At the latter point the ground on the north side of the Rappahannock commands that on the south, and preparations had been made only for such resistance to the passage of the river as would suffice to gain time for putting the troops in a position selected in rear of the ford, with a view to contest the advance of the enemy after crossing.

In accordance with this intention, General Rodes had one regiment, the Second North Carolina, on picket along the river, the greater part of it being at Kelly's with the Thirtieth North Carolina in reserve, supporting a battery. As soon as he perceived that the enemy was in force, he ordered his division to take the position referred to in rear of the ford. While it was getting into line, the enemy's artillery opened upon the Second North Carolina, and soon drove it to shelter, except a few companies near the ford, which continued to fire from the rifle-pits. The Thirtieth was advanced to the assistance of the Second, but in moving across the open ground was broken by the concentrated fire of the enemy's artillery, and took refuge behind some buildings at the river, The enemy being unopposed except by the party at the rifle-pits, crossed at the rapids above the ford, and captured the troops defending it, together with a large number of the Thirtieth North Carolina, who refused to leave the shelter of the houses.

A pontoon bridge was then laid down, on which a large force crossed to the south bank. General Rodes, in the mean time, had placed his division in position, the resistance of the Second North Carolina having delayed the enemy sufficiently for this purpose.

The advance of the Thirtieth does not appear to have contributed to the result, which, as previously stated, was the object of contesting the passage. It was not intended to attack the enemy until he should have advanced from the river, where it was hoped that by holding in check the force at the bridge, we would be able to concentrate upon the other. With this view, General Johnson's division was ordered to reinforce General Rodes.

In the meantime a large force was displayed in our front at the bridge, upon receiving information of which General A. P. Hill was ordered to get his corps in readiness, and Anderson's division was advanced to the river, on the left of the railroad. The artillery was also ordered to move to the front. General Early put his division in motion towards the bridge and hastened thither in person. The enemy's skirmishers advanced in strong force with heavy supports, and ours were slowly withdrawn into the trenches.

Hoke's brigade of Early's division, under Colonel Godwin (General Hoke being absent with one regiment on detached service), reinforced General Hays, whose brigade occupied the north bank. No other troops were sent over, the two brigades mentioned being sufficient to man the works, and though inferior to the enemy in numbers, the nature of the position was such that he could not attack with a front more extended than our own. The remainder of Early's division was placed in supporting distance, one regiment being stationed in the rifle-trenches on the south bank east of the railroad. A gun from the works on the left of the road was also ordered to be placed in the battery at this point, to command the approach by the railroad embankment on the opposite side, but the enemy's sharpshooters had advanced so near the river that the order was countermanded, the preparations already made being deemed sufficient. The enemy placed three batteries on the hills, from which our skirmishers had been forced to retire, and maintained an active fire upon our position until dark, doing no damage, however, so far as has been reported.

Our batteries replied from both sides of the river, but with so little effect that the two on the south bank were ordered to cease firing. Light skirmishing took place along the line.

It was not known whether this demonstration was intended as a serious attack, or only to cover the movement of the force that had crossed at Kelly's Ford, but the lateness of the hour and the increasing darkness induced the belief that nothing would be attempted until morning. It was believed that our troops on the north side would be able to maintain their position if attacked, and that in any case they could withdraw, under cover of the guns on the north, the location of the pontoon bridge being beyond the reach of a direct fire from any position occupied by the enemy.

As soon, however, as it became dark enough to conceal his movements, the enemy advanced in overwhelming numbers against our rifle-trenches, and succeeded in carrying them in the manner described in the reports of Generals Early and Hays.

It would appear from these reports, and the short duration of the firing, that the enemy was enabled to approach very near the works before being seen. The valley in our front aided in concealing his advance from view, and a strong wind effectually prevented any movement from being heard. It was essential to the maintenance of the position under these circumstances, that sharpshooters should have been thrown forward to give early information of his approach, in order that he might be subjected to fire as long as possible, but it is not stated that this precaution was taken. The breaking of the enemy's first line and the surrender of part of it, as described in the reports, also contributed to divert attention from the approach of the second and third, and enabled them to press into the works. No information of the attack was received on the south side of the river until too late for the artillery there stationed to aid in repelling it, and it does not appear that the result would have been affected, under the circumstances, by the presence of a larger number of guns. The artillery in the works at the south end of the bridge was relied upon to keep it open for the retreat of the troops, as it could sweep the crest of the opposite hill at short range. The darkness of the night, and the fear of injuring our own men who had surrendered, prevented General Early from using it. The bridge, however, seems to have remained accessable to the troops on the left, up to the last moment, as Lieutenant-Colonel Tate, with a few men, crossed just before it was fired, by order of General Early.

The suggestions above mentioned afford the only explanation I am able to give of this unfortunate affair, as the courage and good conduct of the troops engaged have been too often tried to admit of question.

The loss of this position made it necessary to abandon the design of attacking the force that had crossed at Kelly's Ford, and the army was withdrawn to the only tenable line between Culpepper Court-house and the Rappahannock, where it remained during the succeeding day. The position not being regarded as favorable it returned the night following to the south side of the Rapidan. The loss of General Rodes at Kelly's Ford was five killed, fifty-nine wounded, and two hundred and ninety-five missing. General Early's loss, including that of the artillery, was six killed, thirty-nine wounded, and sixteen hundred and twenty-nine missing. Some reported as missing were probably killed or wounded and left in the hands of the enemy, and others failed to report to their commands.

Among the wounded were Colonel Cox, of the Second North Carolina, and Lieutenant-Colonel Sillars, of the Thirtieth, the latter, it is feared, mortally.

I forward herewith the reports of Generals Rodes and Early, the latter enclosing those of General Hays and Lieutenant-Colonel Tate, of Hoke's brigade.

A map of the locality is also annexed.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE,
General.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL EWELL.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, A. N. V.,
November 12, 1863.

Colonel R. H. Chilton, Chief of Staff:

COLONEL: I have the honor to enclose the report of Major-General Early, in reference to the attack on the *tête-de-pont* on the Rappahannock, near the railroad, on the seventh instant.

I received information that the enemy was moving on Kelly's Ford in force, and had turned my whole attention to that point, towards which two divisions were moving, knowing that both the General commanding and Major-General Early were at the *tête-de-pont*, and as I heard no report of artillery or other indications of an attack, I did not visit it. I had paid frequent visits to the works at the *tête-de-pont*, where much labor had been bestowed.

I differ from Major-General Early as to the necessity for more artillery, the darkness and nature of the ground making what was there of but little use in the final attack, and I think the same would have been the case had there been more.

I have the honor to be, Colonel,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
R. S. EWELL,
Lieutenant-General.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL EARLY.

HEADQUARTERS EARLY'S DIVISION,
November 11, 1863.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Pendleton, A. A. General Second Corps, A. N. Va.:

COLONEL: I submit the following report of the circumstances attending the storming of our advanced work across the Rappahannock, at Rappahannock Station, and the capture of a battery and a large portion of two brigades of this division, by the enemy, on the seventh instant.

Having received, on the fifth, an order to re-

lieve the brigade of Johnson's division which was on picket at Rappahannock Station, by a brigade from my division, on the morning of the sixth, I ordered Brigadier-General Hays to send his brigade to the point indicated, at the time specified, under the command of Colonel Penn, of the Seventh Louisiana regiment, as the General himself was then engaged on a court of inquiry, at that time sitting. Colonel Penn accordingly moved with the brigade to the station on the morning of the sixth, and relieved Walker's brigade of Johnson's division. My camp was fully five (5) miles from the point picketed, and I received no report from Colonel Penn on the sixth; but on the seventh, a little before two P. M., I received a despatch from him stating that the enemy was advancing on him, with infantry and cavalry, in force. I immediately sent a despatch by signal both to General Lee and Lieutenant-General Ewell, to the following effect:

"FOR GENERAL LEE AND GENERAL EWELL: Colonel Penn, commanding Hays' brigade, on picket at the bridge, reports the enemy advancing on him, with infantry and cavalry, in force. I shall move down at once."

And without awaiting orders, I directed my other brigades to get ready as quick as possible, and march to the bridge as rapidly as they could. The men were engaged at the time in building and making preparations for building huts, and the consequence was it required some time to get them together, though this was done with all the despatch practicable.

I started to the river in advance of the brigades, and at Brandy Station received another despatch, informing me that the enemy was in line of battle still in his front, and that a force was moving towards Kelly's Ford, with a train of wagons and ambulances. I sent this despatch to General Lee, by Mr. Hairston, a volunteer Aid, and at the same time sent my Adjutant-General, Major Daniel, to meet General Ewell, who, I was informed, was coming up to Brandy, and communicate to him the contents of the despatches I had received, and my movements. Before reaching the river I was overtaken by General Lee, who had not received my despatch by signal, though it reached General Ewell. General Lee and myself proceeded together to the river, where we arrived about, or a little after, three o'clock. Crossing over myself to the position occupied by Colonel Penn, on the north of the river, I ascertained that a heavy force was in line something like a mile or more in front, and extending some distance both to the right and left.

This force, preceded by a heavy line of skirmishers, was gradually, but slowly, and very cautiously, moving up towards our position. Our skirmishers were then some distance out to the front, and on the right and left, and the trenches were occupied by the remainder of Colonel Penn's force, which, however, was manifestly too small for the length of the works. Green's battery of four rifled guns occupied two works on the right of the pontoon bridge, one being an enclosed redoubt and the other an open work, consisting of a curtain with two short flanks or wings.

The works on the north side of the river were, in my judgment, very inadequate, and not judiciously laid out or constructed. They consisted of a rifle-trench on the right circling round to the river; then the enclosed redoubt spoken of, which was constructed by the enemy to be used against a force approaching on the south side, which had been turned, but sloped towards the enemy; then there was another short rifle-trench, then the open work spoken of, the curtain and flanks of which were pierced with four embrasures near the angles, and with such narrow splays as to admit of a very limited fire. It had been originally a lunette, constructed by our troops, and the enemy had cut off the angle and filled up the ditches, and constructed an epaulement, which operated as a curtain, connecting the two flanks, and was so arranged as to place guns in barbette on the side opposite to the river, and a trench was made on the side next to the river, which prevented guns from being mounted in barbette on that side. The consequence was it was of very little value, as the guns placed in the embrasures had very limited range, leaving dead angles at some of the most important points. To the left of this work a rifle-trench extended some distance, running down the slope of the ridge next to the river, and extending through a piece of woods on the left to the river bank. The whole of this rifle-trench in front of the bridge, and for some distance to the left, was in full view of the bridge, and in short musket range of it, so that the enemy, coming up to the trench, could command the bridge, and make use of the embankment as a protection. For a good portion of the rifle-trench on the left it was so far down the slope that the enemy might get within very short musket range before he could be seen by our men in the trenches. There was no ditch on the outside of the work. On the right the railroad embankment afforded a safe cover for the approach of the enemy to within a short distance of the work, and through this was a passway for a road, which would enable a force coming under its cover to debouch suddenly upon the works at a very assailable point, and there had been no effort made to obstruct this passage. To remedy the danger afforded by the cover of the railroad embankment, pits for guns on the south side of the river had been constructed, but they were not occupied. In the rear of the whole line of the work a dam made the river too deep for fording, and one solitary pontoon bridge afforded the only means of communication with the southern bank, and the only avenue of escape in case of disaster. I am thus particular in describing the character of these works in order that the difficulties under which a part of my command labored, in the strait to which it was subsequently reduced, may be appreciated.

I had, myself, pointed out some of the defects of the works to the Engineers having charge of them, and I had urged the necessity of having another bridge further up the stream. The fact is, in my opinion, the position was susceptible of being made very strong, but in order to enable a small force to hold it against a large attacking force the works ought to have been entirely enclosed, and with a deep ditch on the outside, so that an attacking column could have had its progress checked. But the works were so constructed as to afford no obstacle in themselves to an attacking enemy, and only furnished a temporary protection to our troops. An attacking force could walk over the rifle trenches without difficulty, and even the works in which the guns were posted could be readily passed over when once reached. On the south side of the river were two hills immediately in the rear of our works, one crowned with a redoubt, constructed by the enemy, which had been remodeled and turned; the other was crowned with sunken pits for guns. In the first I found Graham's battery, and in the latter Dance's battery, both of Brown's battalion. Besides these works, were two pits for guns in the flat on the right of the railroad, constructed for posting guns, for the purpose of enfilading the east side of the railroad embankment on the north of the river. These pits, which were not occupied, had attached to them a short rifle trench, and further to the right was another rifle trench, covering the point at which the enemy had had a pontoon bridge. This presents the state of things as I found them, and I must here state that the defence of this position had not been entrusted to me. I had merely been called upon to furnish a detail for picket duty; alternating with both the other divisions of the corps for some time, and latterly with Johnson's only, I hurried to the spot myself, and ordered my command to follow, because I regarded my brigade in danger, and I doubted not I was but anticipating the order which would have been given as soon as the facts reached General Lee and Lieutenant-General Ewell.

I carried no artillery with me, because none was at my disposal. As soon as I had ascertained the condition of things in front and in the works, I rode back across the river to see if my other brigades were coming up, and communicated with General Lee, who had taken his position on the hill on which Graham's guns were posted. Shortly after I reached this point our skirmishers commenced falling back, and the enemy commenced advancing more rapidly, and I sent back to hurry up my brigades. The enemy, having gotten possession of the range of hills in front of our position, now planted a battery of artillery on a prominent point in front and opened, no artillery having been previously displayed by him. The guns were replied to by Dance and Graham, but with little or no effect, as the distance was too great. The enemy's skirmishers, in very heavy line, continued to advance until ours from the front and flanks were compelled to retire into the works, and the enemy's, on the right, advanced to the river bank, about half a mile below the bridge. About this time General Lee ordered one of Dance's guns to be sent to the pits on the right of the railroad, but, before the order was executed, the enemy's sharpshooters had advanced so close that General Lee countermanded the order, as he thought the guns might be disabled by having the horses shot down. About four o'clock General Hays arrived and took command of his brigade; and in a short time after the advance of my column, Hoke's brigade, under Colonel Godwin, arrived, and I sent Colonel Godwin, with the brigade, across the river to report to General Hays, and occupy that part of the trenches which Hays' brigade could not occupy. This plan met with the approval of General Lee, and he directed me to send no more troops across the river, but retain the other brigades on the south side. I sent Gordon's brigade to occupy Jamieson's hill to the right, and the river bank in front of it, and formed Pegram's brigade in rear, out of range of shells, sending the Thirty-first Virginia regiment from it to occupy the rifle-trenches at the gun-pits, on the right of the railroad. About this time the enemy opened another battery in front of our left on the road from the direction of Warrenton, and very shortly afterwards another battery was opened on the right from the edge of a woods. The fire from these batteries crossed and, in a great measure, enfiladed our position, and rendered the bridge quite unsafe. The battery on the hill, in front, also continued to fire, and the fire from all of them was continued until near dusk. The fire from Dance and Graham's batteries was stopped by order of General Lee, I believe, as it was manifestly producing little or no effect, and resulted in a mere waste of ammunition. Green's battery, however, continued to fire as well as it could. During all this time the wind was blowing very hard towards the enemy, so that it was impossible to hear the report of the guns, even at a very short distance. I had remained with General Lee at his request, who, in the latter part of the afternoon, had taken his position on the hill occupied by Dance's battery. About dark the artillery fire ceased, and some movements of the enemy took place, which we could not well distinguish. In a short time, however, some firing of musketry at and in front of the rifle-trenches was observed from the flashes of the guns, it being impossible to hear the report by reason of the wind, though the distance was but short. After this firing had continued for some minutes it slackened somewhat, and, not hearing from it, we were of opinion that it was from and at the enemy's skirmishers, and General Lee, expressing the opinion that the movement by the enemy on this part of the line was intended merely as a reconnoissance or feint, and that it was too late for the enemy to attempt anything serious that night, concluded to retire.

It was then nearly or quite dark, and while

I must confess that I did feel considerable anxiety for the result of a night attack, if the enemy should have the enterprise to make it, yet the confident opinion expressed by the commanding general disarmed my fears. The firing at the trenches continued, and while I was making arrangements to send off two despatches for General Ewell left with me by General Lee, Major Hale of my staff, who had been previously sent on foot across the river with messages for General Hays and Colonel Godwin, returned and informed me that when he left General Hays the enemy was advancing against him, that he had then gone to Colonel Godwin, and as he returned across the bridge he had seen some of Hays' men, who told him that Hays had been driven from the trenches; but he stated that he did not believe this statement, as he left Hays and his men in fine spirits, and I did not believe it myself, as the firing seen by us did not warrant any supposition. I, however, sent Major Daniel, of my staff, immediately to ascertain the state of things, and ordered Pegram to move up to the bridge with his brigade, and Dance and Graham to man their guns. I then started towards the bridge and met Major Daniel returning, with the information that he had just seen General Hays, who had made his escape, and received from him the information that the greater part of his brigade was captured, Hoke's brigade cut off, and the enemy in possession of the north end of the bridge. Pegram's brigade was hurried up and so disposed as to prevent a crossing of the bridge, and Gordon was sent for from the right, and a messenger sent to General Lee. I then went near the river to ascertain if anything could be done to retrieve the disaster, but found it would be a useless sacrifice of my men to attempt to throw any of them across the bridge, as the enemy were in line just beyond the opposite end, and were in possession of the trenches commanding it. I could not see the artillery by reason of the darkness, and I feared firing into my own men, who were prisoners in the hands of the enemy. Hoke's brigade had not at this time been captured, as I subsequently ascertained. Nor had the Fifth and Seventh Louisiana regiments of Hays' brigade, but they were hopelessly cut off from the bridge, without any means of escape and with no chance of being reinforced; and while making the preparations for defending the bridge and preventing an increase of the disaster, I had the mortification to hear the final struggle of these devoted men, and to be made painfully aware of their capture, without the possibility of being able to go to their relief. I might have fired canister across the river, and, perhaps, done some damage to the enemy, but the chances were that more damage would have been done to my helpless men, and I felt that it would have been cruel and barbarous to have subjected them to this result for any amount of damage I could then inflict on the enemy. This contains as much of this affair as I am capable of describing from actual observation.

From the reports of General Hays, and Lieutenant-Colonel Tate, of Hoke's brigade, as well as from the statements of other officers, who were fortunate enough to make their escape, I learn that as soon as it became dark enough to conceal his movements, the enemy advanced in very heavy masses along the whole line, his troops being in some two or three lines preceded by a very heavy line of skirmishers, that the line of skirmishers was repulsed, many of them surrendering themselves prisoners. But this act was immediately followed by a rush to the front of some two or three lines of the enemy, and at the same time a heavy column, which had moved down the east side of the railroad under cover of the embankment, suddenly debouched through the passway (which has been mentioned), and made a rush upon the works, in which Green's guns were posted, and carried them. At the same time, an effort made by General Hays to retake the guns was defeated by the attack on the rifle-trenches, immediately on the left of the guns and in front of the bridge. This attack, though resisted to the last, was successful—the enemy coming in such numbers as actually, by mere brute force, to push our men out of the trenches. The enemy then poured over the trenches, and all further struggle was hopeless, as there was no point for our men to fall back upon, and the bridge was completely commanded by the enemy. Our men, however, continued to struggle until they became completely surrounded. Many of them effected their escape in the confusion—some by swimming the river, and others by making their way to the bridge amidst the enemy, and passing over under a shower of balls. General Hays owes his escape to the fact that after he was completely surrounded, and was a prisoner, his horse took fright and ran off; and as the enemy commenced firing on him, he concluded to make the effort to escape across the bridge, where he was exposed to no more danger, as he had to run the gauntlet any way; and he fortunately succeeded, without injury.

Godwin's position in the trenches was to the left of the bridge, and the Fifth and Seventh Louisiana regiments were to his left. The location of the trenches here was such as to cut off from Colonel Godwin all view of the columns advancing against General Hays. An attack of the enemy moving down the river, on Godwin's left, was repulsed by the Fifty-fourth North Carolina regiment, a few minutes before the attack on Hays; and when Colonel Godwin ascertained that Hays had been driven from the trenches, he made an effort to send a portion of his force to the relief of Hays, but this was prevented by the advance of the enemy immediately in his front. He then, discovering his own situation, and that he was cut off from the bridge, threw a portion of his line across the interval between the trenches and the river, and endeavored to form his men so as to cut his way to the bridge. The enemy, however, after getting possession of the trenches

formed successive lines across the same interval, lower down, and moved up against Godwin, at the same time moving up other forces against the trenches, which had to be abandoned by our men. Godwin's men, with the Fifth and Seventh Louisiana regiments, were thus completely surrounded—the enemy making an arc of a circle around the front and flanks; and the river, which is here a deep pond, being in the rear, Colonel Godwin's efforts to extricate his command proved unavailing, as the enemy completely overwhelmed him with numbers. He continued, however, to struggle, forming successive lines as he was pushed back, and did not, for a moment, dream of surrendering; but, on the contrary, when his men had dwindled to sixty or seventy, the rest having been captured, killed, wounded, or lost in the darkness, and he was completely surrounded by the enemy, who were, in fact, mixed up with his men, some one cried out that Colonel Godwin's order was for them to surrender. He immediately called for the man who made the declaration, and threatened to blow his brains out if he could find him, declaring his purpose to fight to the last moment, and calling upon his men to stand by him. He was literally overpowered by mere force of numbers, and was taken with his arms in his hands. These facts I learn from Captain Adams, assistant adjutant-general of Hoke's brigade, who managed to make his escape, after having been captured, by slipping away from the enemy and swimming the river almost naked. They are in accordance with the character of Colonel Godwin, and the fate of this gallant officer, a prisoner in the hands of a barbarous enemy, is most deeply to be deplored; and I most respectfully, through the commanding General, call the attention of the government to his case, and ask that if any special exchanges are made, he may be embraced among them. The Fifth and Seventh Louisiana regiments shared the fate of the three regiments of Hoke's brigade, which were under Godwin. Some of all the regiments, taking advantage of the darkness and confusion, managed to escape, after they were overpowered. But I call attention to the fact that there was no flight, no giving back of my men from the trenches upon the approach of the enemy, but they maintained their position until overpowered by numbers and mere brute force. This fact was fully shown by the circumstance that there was no rush upon the bridge, and no crowd of fugitives to be seen anywhere; but the men who did escape did it quietly, taking advantage of such opportunities as were afforded.

After I was made aware of the disaster, and Pegram's and Gordon's brigades came up, steps were taken to guard the river, and prevent a crossing by the enemy. A regiment was immediately sent to the south end of the bridge, and Pegram's brigade thrown in its rear, with orders to defend the passage at all hazards. After waiting for some time, to give such of our men as might be able to do so an opportunity to slip over the bridge, and after it was ascertained definitely that Hoke's brigade and the Fifth and Seventh Louisiana regiments were overpowered, and that the enemy had a guard immediately at the northern end of the bridge, it was fired at the south end by my order, and before we moved back it had burned so far as to prevent all crossing over it. After sending back Dance's and Graham's batteries, in accordance with orders, I moved back at three o'clock next morning to the vicinity of my camp.

My loss in this affair was as follows:

Killed, officers	0
Killed, enlisted men	5
Wounded, officers	3
Wounded, enlisted men	32
Missing, officers	117
Missing, enlisted men	1,473
Total	1,630

Those reported killed are those who were certainly known to be killed, and the wounded are those who were brought off—some of them were wounded while escaping. Among the missing are doubtless a number of killed and wounded. The loss in Hays' brigade was less than one-half of the men present with the army, and less than one-fourth of the entire strength of the brigade. In the regiments of Hoke's brigade, to wit: the Sixth, Fifty-fourth, and Fifty-seventh North Carolina regiments, the loss was very nearly three-fourths of the men present with the army—about two-fifths of their entire strength, and less than one-third of the entire strength of the brigade.

Near three hundred of Hays' men present at the action made their escape, and between one hundred and one hundred and fifty of Hoke's men escaped.

The loss in Green's battery, commanded by Lieutenant Moore, was as follows:

Killed, enlisted men	1
Wounded, enlisted men	0
Missing, officers	2
Missing, enlisted men	39
Total	42
Rifle guns, with their caissons	4
Horses	45

Twenty-eight enlisted men of this battery escaped. My loss in small arms and sets of accoutrements is something over sixteen hundred.

With the conduct of my brigade commanders and their men, I have no fault to find. They were not surprised, nor were they negligent in any respect, that I am aware of. They remained at their posts, and fought the enemy until overpowered. They were unfortunately in a position untenable, by so small a force as theirs, against the large force brought against them, and there was no means of retreat, by reason

of the inadequate communication across the river. There was no means of reinforcing them while engaged in the struggle, for the same reason, and there was no opportunity of retiring and renewing the contest, because there was but a narrow slip of land between the works and the river. I must, therefore, exempt my brigade commanders from all responsibility for the disaster which befel their commands. I am satisfied they made the best struggle the nature of the case admitted, and all accounts concur in stating that the men fought with great coolness and courage, and I am informed that the loss of the enemy must have been very severe; perhaps more than ours.

The immediate cause of the disaster was the weakness of the position, owing to defective engineering, the want of sufficient bridges, the want of sufficient artillery in suitable positions on the south bank of the river, and the superior force of the enemy, which consisted of two army corps, under Sedgwick, as since ascertained; the attack of the enemy being favored by the darkness and the high wind. My troops were all that were brought up, but I do not know that any amount of infantry on the south bank of the river could have altered the result, unless by its exhibition the enemy had been deterred from making the effort. I am conscious of having done all in my power to defend the position, but I must candidly confess that I did concur in the opinion of the commanding General, that the enemy did not have enterprise enough to attempt any serious attack after dark, as such attacks are so foreign to his usual policy, and I therefore was inclined to believe that the position would be safe until morning, though I felt there would be very great danger in a night attack, if vigorously made. A different estimate, however, of the enemy's enterprise would have had no effect, as I had no discretion about withdrawing the troops, and, in fact, they could not have been withdrawn with safety, after the enemy had gained their immediate front.

This is the first disaster that has befallen this division since I have had the honor to command it, and I hope I may, therefore, be pardoned for referring to the history of the past campaign, in which the division captured twenty-seven pieces of artillery and prisoners, amounting to more than double the amount of its entire loss on this latter occasion. Those of the guns of the Louisiana Guard battery captured on the seventh, had been previously taken from the enemy by Hays' brigade by actual assault, and the other was brought off from Sharpsburg by the men of the battery, after the enemy had been compelled to abandon it, by one of the brigades of this division, it being the only piece of artillery captured by our troops at that battle.

Accompanying this report are the reports of Brigadier-General Hays and Lieutenant-Colonel Tate, with a statement from Captain Carrington, commanding Jones' artillery battalion.

Respectfully, J. A. EARLY,
Major-General, commanding division.

ENDORSED.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, ARMY NO. VA., November 13, 1863.

Respectfully forwarded. Brilliant as have been the services of this division and its gallant commander during the past campaign, it is but justice to the other troops engaged, to say that the capture of the artillery at Winchester, to which I suppose General Early refers, was due in great part to the presence and handsome conduct of Major-General Johnson and his brave division.

R. S. EWELL,
Lieutenant-General.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL RODES.

HEADQUARTERS RODES' DIVISION, November 13, 1863.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Pendleton, A. A. G. Second Corps, Army of Northern Virginia:

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the recent operations of my division on the Rappahannock.

On the seventh, and for some days previous thereto, my division was camped between the Rappahannock and Mountain Run, about one and a half miles in rear of Kelly's Ford, which, together with Wheatley's, Norman's, and Stephens' Fords, it was the duty of the division to watch. About noon on the seventh, the enemy's cavalry, which had for several days been stationed in small force on the opposite side of the river, was suddenly replaced by his infantry, and immediately his skirmishers were thrown forward to the river.

The Second and Thirtieth North Carolina regiments, of Ramseur's brigade, were on outpost duty at the river. The former, numbering about three hundred and twenty-two effective total, was guarding Wheatley's Ford, three-quarters of a mile above, and Stephens' Ford, one and a quarter miles below Kelly's and Kelly's Ford itself. The two first named fords being obscure and difficult, the bulk of the regiment was placed partly in rifle-pits and partly deployed, so as to command Kelly's Ford, and the site of the enemy's pontoon bridge, used on their former crossing.

The Thirtieth North Carolina regiment, numbering about five hundred men, was in reserve, protecting the solitary battery (Napoleon) under my command. The battery and regiment were about three-quarters of a mile from the river, in the edge of the nearest woods to the ford.

At Kelly's Ford the bluffs are on the extreme side, close to the river, and encircle the ground which my outpost force was compelled to occupy. On our side, the land for a mile or more from the river bank, is cleared and slopes gently to the river. It is necessary to notice these facts to account properly for the losses of the two regiments mentioned.

Upon my arrival on the field only five or six regiments of the enemy's infantry were in sight,

and one battery. Nevertheless, I ordered the division to be in readiness to move in line of battle, and the wagons to be parked. Very soon, however, it became apparent that a large force was in my front, and that the enemy was endeavoring to affect a crossing at and above the ford. The division was at once placed in position in the woods with its left flank on the river, near Wheatley's Ford, its right extending towards the road from the ford to Stephensburg: Daniel's brigade remaining on the right of this road watching my right.

Before these dispositions were completed the enemy's batteries, from front and flanks, and his infantry along the opposite bank, had driven all of the Second North Carolina to shelter, except three or four companies stationed along the river from the ford to the pontoon site. These companies had slight protection from the musketry, but were very much exposed to the artillery fire.

The Thirtieth North Carolina, going to the assistance of the Second, was speedily broken and demoralized, under the concentrated artillery fire which swept the ground over which it had to march. The battery of Napoleons, commanded by Captain Massie, did its best, but could not hold its own against the three batteries opposing it, and was obliged speedily to cease firing. The men of the Second North Carolina, who remained in the rifle-pits at the ford, still kept up their fire, but no opposition now existing at any other point, the enemy crossed in the rapids, just above the ford, and speedily enveloped the remaining force at the ford, compelling it to surrender. After crossing, the enemy's force moved, as I had expected, upon my left, and continued to advance until within long range of my skirmishers. No advance being made on the Stevensburg road, General Daniel was ordered to move his brigade from the right to the left, where he was placed in reserve, and every arrangement was made to give the enemy a warm reception. He, however, halted before reaching the woods, and having by this time laid his pontoons, continued to cross his troops rapidly, and by the time my arrangements for resistance were completed, had massed in front of me too great a force to admit of my attacking him with any reasonable chance of success. Under the circumstances, and expecting General Johnston's division every moment, I determined to remain on the defensive, at least till its arrival. No further demonstration was made by the enemy during the night. General Johnston's division arriving some time after dark, was placed in continuation of my line of battle on the right, the two divisions forming a continuous line from the river to Mountain Run, and in front of my encampment.

Receiving orders early in the evening to do so, my division, as soon as General Johnston had cleared the way, moved *via* Stevensburg to Pony Mountain, where it arrived at daybreak.

The losses in the division were as follows:

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Aggregate.
Daniel's brigade	..	..	2	2
Doles' brigade	..	5	..	5
Ramseur's brigade	5	35	290	330
Battle's brigade	.	2	15	17
Johnston's brigade	..	3	2	5
	5	45	309	359

The missing reported in Ramseur's brigade are confined to the Second and Thirtieth North Carolina, and include fourteen wounded men in the hands of the surgeon not reported by their regimental commanders as wounded, so that the total wounded is fifty-nine and the missing two hundred and ninety-five. It is probable, however, that many reported missing were left in the hands of the enemy, killed or wounded. The Second North Carolina, under its gallant commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Stallings, behaved very handsomely. The loss of prisoners in this regiment resulted from Lieutenant-Colonel Stallings holding the regiment in position in order to save the Thirtieth, which had come to his relief on his left, he believing that it had engaged the force which crossed at the rapids above the ford. The Thirtieth did not sustain its reputation. It arrived at the mills in great confusion, and became uncontrollable; its leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Sillers, behaved gallantly and did his duty, but many of his men refused utterly to leave the shelter of the houses where he ordered the regiment to fall back. All who refused were of course captured, and hence the large number of prisoners from this regiment. The whole line of battle was under artillery fire, and hence the casualties in the brigades of Doles, Battle, and Johnston. The missing in the brigades, other than Ramseur's, were either deserters or stragglers, probably the latter.

Some valuable officers were killed and wounded. The most distinguished among these are Colonel Cox, Second North Carolina, who was wounded immediately after his entrance upon the field, and Lieutenant-Colonel Sillers, Thirtieth North Carolina, who, it was feared, was mortally wounded.

In consequence of many of the baggage wagons of the brigades having been sent after forage, and of the want of transportation in the division, a small amount of baggage and a few cooking utensils were left in camp. A statement of these losses, which were really slight and unavoidable, was forwarded to the commanding General, through Colonel Chilton.

The outpost force at the other fords named herein were withdrawn without loss and in good order.

Very respectfully, etc.,

R. E. Rodes,
Major-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL HAYS.

HEADQUARTERS HAYS' BRIGADE,
November 10, 1863.

Major J. W. Daniel:

MAJOR: In pursuance of orders from division headquarters, my brigade, under command of Colonel D. P. Penn, Seventh Louisiana regiment, I myself being engaged in conducting a court of inquiry in the case of Colonel Skinner, Fifty-second Virginia regiment, left camp at sunrise, the sixth instant, and proceeded to the Rappahannock River, near the point where the Orange and Alexandria Railroad bridge formerly spanned that stream. Arrived there, Colonel Penn relieved Walker's brigade, Johnston's division, then on picket duty. The regiments of the command were placed in position in the following order: the Sixth Louisiana regiment, Colonel William Monaghan commanding, was stationed on the right of the works, on the northern side of the river, about a quarter of a mile in advance. The Ninth Louisiana regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel William R. Peck commanding, was retained in the works in reserve. To the left of the Ninth regiment, about a quarter of a mile in advance, was placed the Eighth Louisiana regiment, Captain Gusman commanding; the Seventh Louisiana regiment, Colonel F. M. Terry, being on the extreme left. The Fifth Louisiana regiment, Captain J. G. Angell commanding, was placed on picket, at a point on the southern side of the river, about half way between Norman's Ford and Rappahannock Bridge, at a distance of half a mile from the latter. Between the Sixth regiment and the Ninth regiment were two pieces of artillery, of Green's battery, and between the right and left wings of the Ninth regiment were two other pieces of the same command, these last two guns being somewhat to the right of a point in the works opposite the pontoon bridge.

During the sixth instant, the enemy's vedettes were observed just in advance of the woods bordering the open field, in front of the work, about a mile's distance. There was no firing that day between the pickets.

About eleven o'clock on the morning of the seventh instant, our vedettes reported a regiment of the enemy's infantry passing down the Warrenton and Fredericksburg road, in the direction of the right of our line, followed shortly afterwards by another body of infantry, proceeding towards the same point.

Colonel Penn immediately went to the vedettes' posts to observe the movements of the enemy; and, at a quarter of twelve o'clock, a despatch was sent to Major-General Early, informing him that the enemy in force, both infantry and cavalry, was advancing and forming lines of battle. At a quarter-past one o'clock another despatch was sent to General Early, that the enemy were still in line of battle in front, and that his skirmishers had advanced a short distance from the woods; and that a large force had moved down the river, towards our right, accompanied by wagons and ambulances. At two o'clock the enemy formed another line of battle, about two hundred yards in advance of the wood above mentioned. At this time the Fifth Louisiana regiment, with the exception of one company and sixteen men, left on picket on this side of the river, at the point already indicated, rejoined the brigade, and was placed in position on the right of the Seventh Louisiana regiment. At half-past two o'clock the enemy's whole line advanced, supported, as they appeared, by two lines. The Sixth, Eighth, Fifth, and Ninth regiments were then gradually drawn in, and at three o'clock our skirmishers fell back to the road, distant about a hundred yards from our works, where they remained for half an hour, when they were compelled to retire by a movement of the enemy to flank them. The brigade was then disposed in the rifle-pits. A few moments from this, the enemy opened fire from a four-gun battery on our left, from a high hill which we had been forced to abandon by the approach of a heavy force. Colonel Penn immediately sent an order to a battery on this, the southern side of the river, to reply, which was done slowly, and with but little effect. At four o'clock I arrived upon the field, and took command of the brigade. I found heavy firing progressing between the enemy's skirmishers and our line. This continued for an hour, without any marked result. About half-past four o'clock, Hoke's brigade, under the command of Colonel Godwin, crossed the river, and was placed between the left wing of the Eighth regiment and the right wing of the Fifth regiment, to fill up a gap in our lines, created by a change in the position of these two regiments, rendered necessary by a movement of the enemy on the left. About five o'clock a battery was opened on our right, and another opposite our centre. The firing from the enemy's guns on the right, left, and centre, converging on the point occupied by us, was rapid and vigorous, until some time after dark. It was then under cover of the darkness that a simultaneous advance was made of the entire force of the enemy. In the centre, the skirmishers were driven back, and his first line was so broken and shattered by our fire, that the few who arrived at the works surrendered themselves prisoners. But the second and third lines continued to advance at a double-quick, arms at a trail, and a column formed, as well as the obscurity of the evening permitted me to descry, by companies, moving down the railroad, was hurled upon our right, which, after a severe struggle, was forced back, leaving the battery in the hands of the enemy. I immediately ordered a charge of the Ninth Louisiana regiment, for the purpose of retaking our guns, but our centre having been broken, and the two forces opposed to our right and centre having joined, rendered the execution of my purpose impracticable. Forming a new line after this juncture, facing up the river, the enemy advanced, moving behind our works towards our left, while a line which he had formed in a ravine above our

extreme left, its (the enemy's) right resting on the river, moved down the stream, thus enclosing Hoke's brigade, and the Seventh and Fifth Louisiana regiments, in a manner that rendered escape impossible. My men continued at their posts in the works, fighting well to the last; and it was only when the command was cut in two, and the enemy in complete possession of the entire hill, that any thought was entertained of falling back. Indeed, there was no effort made by any one in my command to recross the river until nothing else remained but to surrender. Many then escaped by swimming or fording the river, and some few on the pontoon bridge.

The force under my command was small, being between eight and nine hundred. That of Hoke's brigade, consisting of three regiments, was also small, as owing to the suddenness with which it left camp to proceed to the river, many of its members were absent. The force of the enemy, I am confident, could not have been less than twenty to twenty-five thousand. But few of my brigade were wounded or killed, owing to the enemy's advancing without firing. I am satisfied that the loss we inflicted upon the attacking force was heavy, as our firing was collected and steady.

For particulars of the movements of Hoke's brigade, and its casualties, I respectfully refer you to the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Tate, Sixth North Carolina regiment, herewith appended, marked "A."

My loss is as follows:

Officers killed	0
" wounded	2
" missing	58
Enlisted men killed	2
" " wounded	14
" " missing	626
Aggregate	702

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
HARRY T. HAYS,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

Doc. 67.

OPERATIONS IN LOWER LOUISIANA.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL E. K. SMITH.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT TRANS-MISSISSIPPI,
SHREVEPORT, LOUISIANA, November 7, 1863.

General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General, Richmond, Virginia:

GENERAL: Enclosed, herewith, I have the honor to forward reports of engagements with the enemy in Lower Louisiana, from the twenty-sixth of June to the thirteenth of July, 1863, inclusive.

I am, General, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
E. KIRBY SMITH,
Lieutenant-General.

REPORT OF GENERAL WALKER.

HEADQUARTERS WALKER'S DIVISION,
DELHI, July 10, 1863.

Major E. Surget, A. A. G., Alexandria, La.:

MAJOR: Since the date of my last report, the forces under my command have broken up the plantations engaged in raising cotton, under Federal leases, from Miliken's Bend to Lake Providence, capturing some two thousand negroes, who have been restored to their masters, with the exception of those captured in arms, and a few the property of disloyal citizens of Louisiana. I consider it an unfortunate circumstance that any armed negroes were captured, but in the cavalry expedition which broke up the plantations below Lake Providence, Colonel Parsons, commanding two cavalry regiments, from the district of Arkansas, acting under my orders, encountered a force of one hundred and thirteen negroes and their three white officers, in a fortified position, and when the officers proposed to surrender, upon condition of being treated as prisoners of war, and the armed negroes unconditionally, Colonel Parsons accepted the terms. The position, upon a high mound, the side of which had been scarped and otherwise strengthened, was of great strength, and would have cost many lives and much precious time to have captured by assault. Under these circumstances, Brigadier-General Tappan, who came up before the capitulation was consummated, approved the convention.

This was on the thirtieth ultimo, and I had made all my arrangements to push, the next day, towards Providence and Ashton, some miles above, where I intended to establish my batteries for the annoyance of the enemy's transports.

That night I received General Taylor's instructions to march my division to Berwick's Bay. I immediately returned to this point and had embarked one of my brigades on the railroad train, when I received instructions from Lieutenant-General Smith to remain in this vicinity.

On the fifth instant General Smith was here in person, and directed me to proceed to Ashton, on the Mississippi, and endeavor to blockade the river against the enemy's transports and supply boats. In accordance with these instructions, I marched from here on the ninth instant. The same morning Captain Janes, who had been sent with a flag of truce to deliver a communication from General Taylor to General Grant, returned and reported the delivery of the despatch to the enemy's pickets at Young's Point.

He brought intelligence, derived from sources that I did not wholly credit, that Vicksburg had capitulated on the fourth instant. Not considering this entirely certain, I continued my movements, but the same day I received the intelligence, unfortunately too well authenticated to admit of a doubt. At the same time I received instructions from Lieutenant-General Smith to return to this point, and if forced to abandon

the Washita Valley by superior numbers, to fall back on Red river to Natchitoches.

I am now engaged in burning all the cotton I can reach, from Lake Providence to the lower end of Concordia Parish, and shall endeavor to leave no spoil for the enemy. I have also instructed the cavalry to destroy all subsistence and forage on abandoned plantations, that, from its proximity to the river, may give the enemy facilities for invasion. When this destruction is effected, I shall withdraw the greater portion of my forces towards the Washita River, to some more healthy locality.

The ravages of disease have fearfully weakened my force, and I consider it essential to its future usefulness that it should be removed from here as early as practicable.

I am, Major, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. G. WALKER.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL TAYLOR.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT WESTERN LOUISIANA,
BERWICK, July 14, 1863.

Major E. Surget, A. A. G.:

MAJOR: Your despatches of the tenth and eleventh came to hand. I had received from New Orleans news of the fall of Vicksburg. I trust the doubt you express may be well founded. Port Hudson surrendered on the ninth instant, literally from starvation.

The plan I had arranged for an attack on New Orleans fell through, as soon as I was advised that Walker's division would not join me. My active force (not including the garrison of this place) is less than four thousand. That the plan referred to would have succeeded, any time before the ninth instant, I do not entertain the slightest doubt. Whether the city could have been held is another question. The fall of Port Hudson, and the almost certain fate of Vicksburg, render my present position in the Lafouche extremely hazardous, and not to be justified on any military grounds. The defences of this bay are far from satisfactory; and the entrance of a hostile fleet would ruin my little army. The enemy will doubtless throw troops across the Atchafalaya at Morgan's ferry, twenty-eight miles from Washington. He has already a brigade in the Grasse Tete. I cannot hope to unite with the forces now in north Louisiana; and the whole country between this point and Monroe is open. Since the communications of General Johnston led me to look forward to the fall of Vicksburg, I have been forming depots on the line from Lafayette to Niblett's bluff. In case I abandon this country, I expect to follow this line, and you will lay your plans regarding the limited amount of public property at Alexandria accordingly. I send, to-day, a staff officer to Morgan's ferry, to watch and report the enemy's movements. The reports will be forwarded also to you. You will take steps to secure early and accurate information of the enemy's movements on lower Red River and at Simmsport. Where is General Polignac's brigade? Is it armed and ready for service? At junction of the Huffpower and Boeuf, or on the latter, near Washington, as the enemy may move, would be the place for it. Communicate the contents of this to department headquarters. I have no staff officer with me, and am fatigued and jaded beyond description.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. TAYLOR,
Major-General.

P. S.—Nothing of the boats, which left Alexandria on the seventh ultimo. Afraid they have come to grief on the Atchafalaya.

R. T.
M. G.

MAJOR SURGET,
A. A. G.

Upon the foregoing report was the following endorsement:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT WESTERN LOUISIANA,
ALEXANDRIA, July 17, 1863.

Respecfully forwarded for the information of the Lieutenant-General commanding, with the remark, that the boats of which General Taylor speaks in the P. S., met the enemy's gunboats at the mouth of the Atchafalaya, and returned safely to this post.

E. SURGET,
A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT WESTERN LOUISIANA,
LAFOURCHE, July 13, 1863

Brigadier-General W. R. Boggs, Chief of Staff:

GENERAL: I have the honor to announce a brilliant success gained by a portion of my forces under the command of Brigadier-General Green, over Weitzel and Dwight. The enemy, over four thousand strong, advanced to-day, six miles from Donaldsville, where he was met by General Green, with his own and a part of Major's brigade (in all twelve hundred men), and driven from the field, with a loss of about five hundred in killed and wounded, some three hundred prisoners, three pieces of artillery, many small arms, and the flag of a New York regiment. The gallant and noble Green dismounted from his horse, placed himself at the head of his old regiment, captured the enemy's guns, and drove his forces into the fort, and under the guns of the fleet. In the generalship and daring of the commander, and the devotion of the troops, this action will compare favorably with any I have witnessed during the war.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. TAYLOR,
Major-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL GREEN.

FORD AND DAVENPORT PLANTATION,
Saturday, June 27, 1863.

GENERAL MOUTON: I have been all the morning collecting together all the information relative to the situation and strength of the defences of Donaldsonville. After travelling all night we

arrived here at sunrise this morning, eight or nine miles from Donaldsonville.

I learn from citizens that the fort contains from three to five hundred Yankees, and that there are five gunboats there now. The approach to the fort is through an open plain, nine hundred yards, and the ditch around it is sixteen feet wide and twelve feet deep, making it impossible to scale it, except by having strong plank or suitable ladders. I have had a full consultation (which, by the bye, is not the best thing to be governed by). They think that an attempt to storm will be attended with great loss, and no adequate benefit, even if successful, and this is my opinion. The object of the expedition being to annoy and take, if possible, the enemy's transports, can be better and more safely done by taking a position below Donaldsonville. I am making a bridge of sugar coolers at this camp to cross one regiment, intending to swim the horses. I will push that regiment close upon Donaldson, throwing pickets upon the river. I am about sending another regiment down on this side, near the fort, throwing pickets above where the river can be seen. My pickets above and below will be able to see what number of gunboats there are at the fort, and I propose to fire the bridge during the day so that I can get artillery on the Mississippi. With one rifle section I can make the transports coming up retreat. Come down and take command. I want you badly, as I do not know fully what are your views, and would not like to take any steps in conflict with them. Until I came down here, I had no idea of the position, strength, or feasibility of taking the fort, or the value when taken. I think now the fort can be rendered nugatory by taking a position below it. Adopting the latter view will induce the Yankees very probably to abandon the fort or come out and fight us.

Come down as soon as you can.

Yours, GREEN.

A true copy:

JOHN M. AVERY,
First Lieutenant and A. D. C.

Upon the foregoing report was the following endorsement:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT WESTERN LOUISIANA,
THIBODEAUXVILLE, July 6, 1863.

Respectfully forwarded. The reply of Brigadier-General Mouton approving the views of General Green as to turning the fort was not received by the latter officer until the attack had been made.

R. TAYLOR,
Major-General commanding.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL GREEN.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY BRIGADE,
CAMP ON LA FOURCHE, NEAR PARA COURT,
July 8, 1863.

Major Louis Bush, A. A. General, Thibodeaux:

MAJOR: In accordance with the order of General Mouton, commanding, of the twenty-sixth ultimo, dated at Thibodeauxville, commanding me to take possession of the Federal fort at Donaldsonville, I took up the line of march from Thibodeaux about eight o'clock at night, with Hardeman's, Shannon's, and Herbert's regiments of my brigade, and Lane, Stone, and Phillips, of Colonel Major's brigade, and Semmes' battery. After marching the entire night, I encamped in nine miles of the fort, about sunrise the next morning.

During the twenty-seventh I rested our jaded troops and horses, getting all the information which could be procured in relation to the situation of the fort, its force, defences, etc. I placed a pontoon bridge across the Lafourche, made of sugar coolers, and crossed over Stone's regiment to the east of the bayou, and ordered him to advance towards Donaldsonville, on that bank, and attract the attention of the enemy, and if possible, to attack him on that side. With the balance of the command, I advanced during the night of the twenty-seventh to within one and a half miles of the fort, where I dismounted the command. Having determined on the plan of attack, I called the officers commanding regiments together, and explained to them specifically the position each one was to occupy in the assault.

Major Shannon, of the Fifth T. M. V., was to perform a circuit around the fort, reach the Mississippi a mile above, and advance down the levee to the stockade of upright timbers set in the ground between the levee and the water's edge, and there make an entrance. Colonel Hardeman, with the Fourth T. M. V., was to move up the bayou road, along the levee of the Lafourche, and as soon as he heard the fire opened by Shannon or a fire opened by the enemy, to assault the fort at the water's edge, along the stockade, and simultaneously with Shannon, to make an entrance through the stockade, and with Shannon, assault the garrison *within*, hand to hand. Both Shannon and Hardeman were charged that they were expected to take the fort, while Phillips, Lane, and Herbert, with their regiments, were to envelop the works, moving up around them to the brink of the ditch, shooting down the cannoniers and their supporters from the ramparts at a distance of only sixteen or eighteen feet.

After a full explanation to the commanding officers of regiments of the plan of attack, and furnishing Shannon and Hardeman with guides, and the head of the column of the three regiments which were to envelop the fort, I moved Shannon and Hardeman forward. Waiting a short time for Major Shannon to fire from the circuit around the fort to the Mississippi above, I moved the column which was to envelop the ditch, with Colonel Major at the head. Before this column had advanced to the place intended for it, preparatory to the assault, Major Shannon, of the Fifth Texas, encountered the pickets of the enemy, and a fire from above was opened upon him by the artillery of the fort and from

two gunboats in the river. He advanced down the levee of the Mississippi, next to the water's edge, to the stockade of upright timbers behind the levee, driving the enemy from the stockade and firing upon them through their own port holes. He pushed a portion of his men over their works (the men helping each other over), the balance of his men moved around the stockade through the water, which was shallow, into the fort. Hearing the small arms of Major Shannon amidst the roar of artillery, I ordered an advance of the whole line. Colonel Phillips, at the head of the column under Colonel Major, made a circuit of the fort, and, with most of his men and officers, made our entrance into the fort with Shannon, of the Fifth; Colonel Herbert, with the Seventh, enveloped the ditch as directed. The fight was desperately contested on every part of the ground. Colonel Hardeman, with the Fourth Texas, being unable to control his guide, was delayed in his attack on the stockade on the Lafourche side until nearly daylight, but his casualties show with what determined courage that veteran regiment stood its ground after it came into action. By some mistake Colonel Lane's regiment did not get into action. He was waiting for and expecting a guide, while I supposed, and was informed, that he was at the head of the column under Colonel Major. There is no blame attached to Colonel Lane for the mistake.

The attack on the fort was made at two o'clock A. M., being before daylight, for the purpose of preventing the gunboats from seeing our advance. The columns of attack, of Shannon above and Hardeman below, were expected to move along under the levee, sheltered from the artillery and musketry of the fort, until they reached the stockade, the weeds on the margin of the water, as I was informed, preventing a full view of them by the gunboats. Shannon succeeded in making the entrance with little or no loss, and he and Colonel Phillips (entering on the same side) would doubtless have succeeded in capturing the works had it not been for the existence of a ditch fronting and inside the levee, of which I had no knowledge or information. All my guides) and some of them resided within two miles of the fort) assured me that when we got through the stockade between the levee and the river, we had an open way into the fort without impediment other than the bayonets of the enemy. We were not repulsed and never would have been until we found, after getting into the stockade, there was yet a ditch to cross, running in front of and parallel with the river, and no means whatever on hand to cross it. At this ditch a most desperate fight ensued between the commands of Shannon and Phillips and the enemy. Our men here used brickbats upon the heads of the enemy, who returned the same. Captain Killough and Lieutenant Land and other officers and men were wounded on their heads with bricks, thrown by the enemy, which had first been thrown by our men. There never was more desperate courage displayed than was shown by our men engaged in this assault. The enemy have been shown an example of desperate courage which will not be without its effect. But for the false information in relation to that part of the fort fronting the river, it would most certainly have fallen into our hands. Had we known of the existence of this ditch we would have been prepared to have crossed it.

We fought from two o'clock A. M., until daylight, without intermission, and our dead and wounded show the desperation of the assault.

The garrison contained between five and six hundred Federals, our assaulting party engaged was about eight hundred strong.

At daylight I sent in a flag of truce, asking permission to pick up our wounded and bury our dead, which was refused, as I expected. My object in sending a flag so early was to get away a great number of our men who had found a little shelter near the enemy's works, and who would have been inevitably taken prisoners. I must have saved one hundred men by instructing my flag of truce officer, as he approached the fort, to order our troops still there away.

We mourn the fall of many of our bravest and best officers and men; among the former are Major Shannon, Captain Ragsdale, Lieutenants Starby and Cole, of the Fifth, Major Redley, of Phillips' regiment, and A. Cartwright, of the Fourth, and others.

The fort was much stronger than it was represented to be, or than we expected to find it. Had it fallen into our hands, I am satisfied, with a little work on it, we would have held it against all the gunboats below Port Hudson. Its capture and occupation would doubtless have caused great uneasiness and inconvenience to the Federal army besieging that fortress. In this river much risk was justified in its attempted capture.

I cannot say too much in commendation of the officers and men who were engaged in this assault.

Colonel Major, commanding the second cavalry brigade, lead the head of the column enveloping the fort, carrying his men to the ditch amidst a storm of shot and shell, in the most dauntless manner, and where he was himself wounded.

The conduct of the lamented Shannon and his officers, Colonel Phillips and his officers, and Colonel Herbert and his officers, and, in fact, all the officers whose conduct came under my observation, is above all praise.

My own staff came fully up to my expectations. Captain C. B. Sheppard, my Aide-de-Camp, and my volunteer Aids, W. G. Wilking and Leander McAnelley, rendered me good service, and behaved themselves as they had on former occasions, with coolness and courage.

I herewith submit a list of casualties—full reports showing the killed, wounded, and missing, are enclosed.

Fourth Texas cavalry—Killed, two; wounded, twenty-three; missing, three—twenty-eight.

Fifth Texas cavalry—Killed, twelve; wound-

ed, in hands of the enemy, eighteen; wounded, present, twenty; missing, forty-nine—ninety-nine.

Seventh Texas Cavalry—Killed, six; wounded, twenty-seven; missing, forty-two—seventy-five.

Stone's Regiment—Killed (no wounded or missing), one.

Lane's Regiment—No killed, wounded, or missing.

Phillips' Regiment—Killed, eighteen; wounded, eighteen; missing, twenty-one—fifty-seven.

Total casualties, two hundred and sixty.

Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS GREEN,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

Upon the foregoing report was the following endorsement:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT WESTERN LOUISIANA,
THIBODEAUXVILLE, July 6, 1863.

Respectfully forwarded. Personal observation satisfies me that if the guide of Hardeman's regiment had not failed to conduct it to the fort, its capture would have been accomplished. No engagement during the war has illustrated more signally the desperate valor of Confederate troops than the attack of this position, although the attack may have been, in some respects, an unadvised one. I am not disposed to attach the slightest censure to so gallant a soldier as General Green, whose disposition it is to attack the enemy wherever he finds him.

R. TAYLOR,
Major-General, commanding.

Report of Casualties in the First and Second Cavalry Brigades in the Assault upon Donaldsonville, June 28, 1863.

REGIMENTS.	KILLED.	WOUNDED.			MISSING.	TOTAL.	REMARKS.
		SLIGHTLY.	SEVERELY.	MORTALLY.			
Fourth Texas Cavalry	2	15	7	1	3	28	
Fifth Texas Cavalry	12	17	21	.....	49	99	
Seventh Texas Cavalry	6	19	15	1	34	75	Of the wounded, eight are missing.
Phillips' regiment	18	9	9	.....	21	57	
Stone's regiment	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	1	
	39	60	52	2	107	260	Killed, wounded, and missing.

THOMAS GREEN,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL MOUTON.

HEADQUARTERS FORCES SOUTH OF RED RIVER,
THIBODEAUX, LA., July 4, 1863.

Major E. Surget, A. A. G., District Western Louisiana:

MAJOR: In obedience to instructions from Major-General R. Taylor, commanding District of Western Louisiana, on the twenty-second day of June, after surmounting difficulties amounting to almost impossibilities, I succeeded in collecting some thirty-seven skiffs and other row-boats, near the mouth of the Teche, with a view to co-operate, from the west side of the Atchafalaya, with Colonel Major's command, then on the Lafourche. An expedition, numbering three hundred and twenty-five gallant volunteers from the different regiments under my command, under the gallant Major Sherod Hunter, of Baylor's regiment, started at six o'clock P. M. to turn the enemy's stronghold at Brashear City. General Thomas Green, with the Fifth Texas mounted volunteers, the Second Louisiana cavalry, Waller's Texas battalion, and the Valverde and Nicholls' batteries, advanced under cover of night, to opposite the enemy's camp. The Seventh Texas, Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert commanding, the Fourth Texas, Lieutenant-Colonel Hampton, and Baylor's regiments, were thrown across the Atchafalaya to Gibbons' Island during the night. General Green was to attract the enemy's attention and fire, while the troops on Gibbons' Island were to be thrown across to the support of Major Hunter, as soon as the boats returned from the latter's landing point, in rear of the enemy's position. Everything remained quiet; and the enemy were aware of our purpose only when awakened by the shots from the Valverde battery. The enemy's whole attention was drawn to General Green's position—the land batteries concentrating their fire upon him, while their gunboat shamefully retreated in the beginning of the action. At about half-past six A. M. of the twenty-third, the shouts from Hunter's party were heard in the rear of the railroad depot. Our gallant men charged the enemy's guns, one after the other; and when they arrived near the main fort (Buchanan), the garrison surrendered without a struggle. The enemy surrendered a force of over twelve hundred men, strongly posted and intrenched, and eleven heavy guns—all protected by a gunboat—to a force of three hundred and twenty men. Our

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Photograph by [illegible]

James A. Akin

BREVT BRIG. GEN. JAMES A. EKIN.

loss was two killed and eighteen wounded. The amount of quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance stores is very large. Our troops crossed the bay as rapidly as possible, but were delayed on account of want of transportation—nothing larger than skiffs could be had. As rapidly as possible General Green was ordered to the Bayous Ramos and Boeuf, to capture those of the enemy who had escaped, and also to prevent them from burning the bridges, locomotives, and cars. Unfortunately they had already destroyed the railroad and wagon bridge over the Ramos, and had retired to the Boeuf. Our troops pushed on, and at daylight of the twenty-fourth, the enemy surrendered to a scouting party under the command of General Green's daring scout, McAnally. The force consisted of four hundred and thirty-five officers and men, three siege guns, and a twelve-pounder gun. At this point General Green's and Colonel Major's command connected. Their troops were pushed forward to the Thibodeaux and Lafourche railroad-crossing, capturing twenty-five Federal sick and wounded and four pieces of light artillery.

On the twenty-seventh the troops marched to Donaldsonville. On the twenty-eighth, at one o'clock A. M., the fort (Butler) was attacked; and at daylight, after the most desperate struggle, we were repulsed, with two hundred and sixty casualties. Too much cannot be said of the gallantry and devotion of the brave men who stormed this stronghold. Colonel Phillips, Lieutenant-Colonel Shannon, and Major Ridley are among the missing. They fell in a desperate hand-to-hand fight; but I hope they are only wounded. As one of the main objects of this campaign was to take possession of the Mississippi, I immediately threw, by roads passing through plantations, troops on the river bank. I have the honor to report that, on the third instant, the Federal transport Huville was badly crippled by Colonel Hardeman's regiment and the rifle section of Semmes' battery. To-day one section attacked the flag-ship Monongahela. The work is going on bravely. While General Green and Colonel Major were marching upon Donaldsonville, Major Boone, with Waller's battalion and Pyron's regiment, pushed on to Raceland, and thence to the Des Allemands, at which latter place the enemy had abandoned a piece of artillery and burned the railroad bridge. Major Boone, with his usual energy, swam some of his horses and pushed on, driving the enemy from Boulton station. But his force being small, he had to return to the Des Allemands.

This, Major, covers the whole field of operations on the west side of the bay. The other part of the operations, under the accomplished and gallant soldier, Colonel Major, will be found in his enclosed report.

The conduct of General Green, Colonel Major, Major Hunter, and the officers and men under them, is beyond all praise, and deserves the thanks of the country.

I beg leave to tender my thanks to the officers of my staff for their energy and faithful performance of all the arduous duties imposed upon them—Major Louis Bush, Assistant Adjutant-General; Lieutenant A. J. Watt, Aide-de-Camp; Captain A. Schruber, Ordnance Officer; Major R. W. Sanders, Assistant Quartermaster, and Captain M. T. Squires, Chief of Artillery, who were with me all the time. I will again, in this report, particularly mention Private Alfred Fuselin, to whose indomitable energy and devotion to duty I owe mostly the successful collecting of boats for Major Hunter's expedition.

Accompanying this report please find those of General Green, Colonel Major, and Major Hunter.

I am, Major, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
A. MOUTON.
Brigadier-General, commanding.

Upon the foregoing report was the following endorsement:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT WESTERN LOUISIANA,
THIBODEAUXVILLE, July 6, 1863.

The zeal, energy, and ardor manifested by Brigadier-General Mouton, commanding forces south of Red River, merit the highest praise. The conduct of Brigadier-General Green fully justified the high expectations which I had formed, based upon the previous services of this officer in the field, under my own observations.

R. TAYLOR.

REPORT OF COLONEL MAJOR.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CAVALRY BRIGADE,
NEAR NAPOLEONVILLE, June 30, 1863.

Major Lewis Bush, A. A. G.:

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my brigade since June tenth, pursuant to orders received from your headquarters, dated eighth instant:

I left Washington on the tenth, and arrived at Morgan's Ferry, on the Atchafalaya, on the eleventh. I was detained there one day, in making preparations to cross the river, the entire command, owing to conflicting orders, not arriving until the fourteenth, and on the fifteenth I moved for Hermitage; arrived within five miles the same night, found the bridge burned across Bayou Seria, halted until daylight, then moved on Waterloo, four miles above Hermitage. The enemy were reinforced from Banks' army at Port Hudson. I made demonstrations of an attack during the day; at night drove in the enemy's pickets, and, under cover of darkness, withdrew my force, leaving a strong picket force in the rear, and moved for Grosse Tete.

On the seventeenth, went down Grosse Tete to Rosedale; fed horses and men. At dark started for Indian village; arrived at two A. M., on eighteenth. Crossed Phillips' regiment, who made a dash into Plaquemine, taking eighty-seven prisoners, burning three fine steamers,

two steam flats, one hundred bales of cotton, and capturing a large quantity of commissary stores.

There were no facilities for crossing Bayou Plaquemine; it took until five P. M. to cross the entire brigade. At six P. M. started down Mississippi River, and at daylight on the nineteenth arrived at Bayou Goula. In marching down the river, three large gunboats passed the column, and did not discover us; as an attack on them would have given our locality, which I was anxious to conceal, I allowed them to pass unmolested. At Bayou Goula took commissary and quartermaster's stores, destroyed Federal plantations, recaptured over one thousand negroes, stolen by Banks from planters living in St. Landry and Rapids parishes; found them starving, and in great destitution; kept them men and left women and children. Heard that a Federal force was intrenched in strong works at Donaldsonville, and conceiving that if I took the place, it would be at a great sacrifice of life, and unable to hold it against the gunboats, and believing I could operate to better advantage on the river below in cutting off Banks' supplies from New Orleans, I made a feint on the fort, and at dark sent a portion of Lane's and Phillips' regiments, under Colonel Lane, through the swamp direct to Thibodeaux, with instructions to take the place, possession of the railroad, and cut the telegraph wires. At midnight I withdrew the remaining force, and moved to Thibodeaux. Found that the cut-off road had been blockaded by Federals, and pronounced entirely impracticable for artillery. Sent a party of negroes, with a guard, under Lieutenant West, of Semmes' battery, to open it, and by ten o'clock on the twentieth passed my entire column through I moved on to the Lafourche, striking it six miles below Donaldsonville; here made another feint on the fort, and at night moved down the Lafourche. At Paincourtville received a despatch from Colonel Lane, stating he had captured the town, taking one hundred and forty prisoners and a large amount of stores, also a small force at Terrebonne station, and that there was a force in a strong position, with artillery, at Lafourche crossing. I pushed on and arrived at Thibodeaux at 3½ P. M., on the twenty-first. Pickets reported reinforcements from New Orleans, during the night, and at sun up reported the enemy advancing. I posted Pyron's regiment, West's battery, and two squadrons of cavalry on the east bank of the Lafourche, and moved them down towards the railroad bridge. Lane, Stone, and Phillips were posted at Terrebonne station, and they were moved forward to Lafourche crossing. The enemy fell back, and my pursuit was checked by one of the heaviest rains I ever saw fall; it rained until five P. M., and having only thirty rounds of ammunition to the man when I started, and not over one hundred cartridge boxes in the entire command, my ammunition was nearly all ruined, and I found myself with an enemy in front, rear, and on the flank, with only three rounds of ammunition to the man. I directed Pyron, as soon as it stopped raining, to strengthen his pickets and feel the enemy, find his position and test his strength, giving him some discretion in the matter. He advanced his pickets, driving the enemy into his stronghold, and then charged his works, taking four guns, and causing a great many of the Federals to surrender; but night had come on, it was very dark, the ammunition nearly all gone, and just at that moment a train with about three hundred fresh men arrived from New Orleans, and Pyron was forced to retire from a position won by a daring assault, unequalled, I think, in this war. Had I known his intention to assault the works, I could have sent him such reinforcements as would have insured success. Pyron's strength in the attack was two hundred and six, the enemy's force, reported by themselves, was over one thousand.

The next day, twenty-second, it rained again, and finding it impossible to dry my ammunition, and not hearing anything from our forces at Berwick's Bay, knowing that I had only one avenue by which to connect with General Green's brigade, and that the enemy were intrenched on the route at Bayou Boeuf, and at Brashear City, that their forces at those points were greater than mine, besides the advantage of position, and in consequence I would be compelled to cut my way to Berwick's Bay, unless General Green cut towards me, I therefore refrained from attacking with my whole force, the enemy at Lafourche crossing, although I could certainly have demolished him; and the temptation was great to revenge the death of those gallant men who fell in Pyron's assault. I then gave the order to march on Brashear City. The movement began at night-fall. Making demonstrations of a night attack, and opening a heavy fire on their position with my artillery, I withdrew my force and commenced marching at nine P. M., moving all night. I arrived at Chachahoula station just before dawn on the twenty-third, and at the same instant heard, with no little pleasure, the cannonade at Brashear.

I rested my command two hours, feeding the horses and men, and arrived at Bayou Boeuf at 4:20 P. M., having driven in the pickets of the enemy for six miles. I at once took possession of the east bank, the enemy being intrenched on the opposite bank. Made a reconnoissance of his position and began crossing at two A. M., on the twenty-fourth. At daylight, had Lane and Stone entirely surrounding the fort, while Phillips, Pyron, and the artillery were posted in front on the eastern bank. Just as I had arranged to open from my batteries, I discovered a white flag flying from a large house near the crossing, and, on sending to inquire the reason, was surprised to learn that the fort had surrendered to General Mouton, whose advance was five miles off on Bayou Ramos—a scouting

party, under General Green's intrepid scout, McAnally, being the only force of their command near, and to him the flags were delivered. The colonel (Federal), however, on my asking to what force he had surrendered, said to mine, supposing it to be a portion of Mouton's, who had made a previous demand for surrender, and seeing McAnally had sent to him a white flag. I mention this merely to show that, although the flags were delivered to others, the surrender was in fact to my force, and the gallant General Green waived the honor of the capture to me. The prisoners here captured were two hundred and seventy-five, four guns, ammunition, small arms, commissary and quartermaster stores, and about three thousand negroes. Too much praise cannot be awarded to the gallant band who comprise the second cavalry brigade, who, without murmur, shared in the trials and hardships incident to so extended and rapid a march through country occupied by the enemy, passing many sleepless nights and fasting days, subsisting through the entire march on one ration per day, and averaging but three hours of rest in every twenty-four. To the citizens on the route I have to acknowledge many favors, who generously furnished the infantry with transportation, until I mounted them upon animals captured from the plantations cultivated by the Federal authorities. This command, composed of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, marched one hundred and seventy-six miles in four days, an average of forty-four miles per day; it moved in an orderly manner, never depredating on private property, and bore their hardships without a murmur. It is, however, with sorrow that I have to report the death of the noble men who fell in the charge under the gallant Colonel Pyron at Lafourche, and under Colonel Phillips at Plaquemine, of which casualties I will make a detailed report. To the members of my staff, Captains Wade and Zacharie, I am indebted for a hearty co-operation throughout the trip. Also to Lieutenant West, for his efficiency in his department. The services of Captain Ratcliffe, volunteer aid, were invaluable, owing to his thorough knowledge of the country and indefatigable exertions. Volunteer aids, Major McGoffin and Captain Duzenberry, also rendered me great service.

I am, Major, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JAMES P. MAJOR,
Colonel, commanding Second Cavalry Brigade.

Upon the foregoing report was the following endorsement:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT WESTERN LOUISIANA,
THIBODEAUXVILLE, July 6, 1863.

The conduct of Colonel Major, during the service herein mentioned, has been above all praise. He has shown energy, industry, and capacity which render him fit for any command, and I respectfully recommend and request that his command as colonel commanding brigade may be made permanent, as I am sure the interests of the service and the country will be promoted by his promotion.

R. TAYLOR,
Major-General, commanding.

REPORT OF MAJOR SHEROD HUNTER.

BRASHEAR CITY, June 26, 1863.

Brigadier-General A. Mouton, commanding South Red River:

GENERAL: I have the honor to report to you the result of the expedition placed under my command, by your order, June twentieth, 1863. In obedience to your order, I embarked my command, three hundred and twenty-five strong, on the evening of the twenty-second June, at the mouth of Bayou Teche, in forty-eight skiffs and flats, collected for that purpose. Proceeding up the Atchafalaya into Grand Lake, I halted and muffled oars, and again struck, and after a steady pull of about eight hours, reached the shore in the rear of Brashear City. Here, owing to the swampy nature of the country, we were delayed some time in finding a landing place, but at length succeeded, and about sunrise commenced to disembark my troops, the men wading out in the water from two to three feet deep to the shore, shoving their boats into deep water as they left them, thus cutting off all means of retreat; we could only fight and win. We were again delayed here a short time in finding a road, but succeeded at length in finding a trail that led us by a circuitous route through a palmetto swamp, some two miles across, through which I could only move in single file. About half-past five we reached open ground in the rear of a fence, in full view of Brashear City, about eight hundred yards distant.

I here halted the command, and after resting a few minutes, again moved on under cover of a skirt of timber, until within four hundred yards of the enemy's position, where I formed my men in order of battle. Finding myself discovered by the enemy, I determined to charge at once, and dividing my command into two columns, ordered the left, composed of Captains Clough of Green's regiment, McDade of Waller's battalion, Hamilton of Perndtree's battalion, and Blair of Second Louisiana cavalry, to charge the fort and camp below and to the left of the depot, and the right, composed of Captains Price, Carrington, and Boyce, all of Baylor's Texas cavalry, to charge the fort and sugar-house, above and on the right of the depot, both columns to concentrate at the railroad buildings, at which point the enemy were posted in force and under good cover. Each column having nearly the same distance to move, would arrive simultaneously at the point of concentration.

Everything being in readiness, the command was given, and the troops moved on with a yell. Being in full view, we were subjected to a heavy fire from the forts above and below—

the gun at the sugar-house and gunboats below—but, owing to the rapidity of our movements, it had but little effect. The forts made but a feeble resistance, and each column pressed on to the point of concentration, carrying everything before them. At the depot the fighting was severe, but of short duration; the enemy surrendered the town.

My loss is three killed and eighteen wounded. That of the enemy, forty-six killed, forty wounded, and about thirteen hundred prisoners.

We have captured eleven (twenty-four and thirty-two pounder) siege guns. Twenty-five hundred stand small arms (Enfield and Burnside rifles), and immense quantities of quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance stores. Some two thousand negroes, and between two and three hundred wagons and carts. I cannot speak too highly of the gallantry and good conduct of the officers and men under my command. All did their whole duty and deserve alike equal credit from our country, for our glorious and signal victory.

I am, sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
SHEROD HUNTER,
Major Baylor's Texas Cavalry, commanding Mosquito Fleet.

Upon the foregoing report was the following endorsement:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT WESTERN LOUISIANA,
THEODEAUXVILLE, July 6, 1863.

I would respectfully call the attention of the Lieutenant-General commanding, to the gallantry and meritorious services of Major Hunter and the officers commanding the detachments which composed his expedition, and earnestly suggest that they may be brought to the notice of the Government.

R. TAYLOR,
Major-General, commanding.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL GREEN.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY BRIGADE,
NEAR PANCO ON THE LAFOURCHE, June 30, 1863.

Brigadier-General Mouton, commanding:

GENERAL: Early in this month I was ordered by you to the lower Teche, for the purpose of reconnoitring the enemy at Brashear, and to collect together and fit up light boats, preparatory to making a descent upon the enemy, if practicable. While engaged in the execution of these orders, you came down and assumed command, ordering me to advance toward the bay.

On the night of the twenty-second instant, in accordance with orders, I moved to Cochran's sugar-house (two miles distant from the bay), with the Fifth Texas, Second Louisiana cavalry, and Waller's battalion, and the Valverde and a section of Nicholl's batteries; leaving our horses at that place, I advanced the troops, above mentioned, on foot before daylight, to the village of Berwick, opposite the enemy's encampment. At the dawn of day, finding the enemy quiet and asleep, I opened fire upon them from the Valverde battery; the first shot exploded in the centre of his encampment, causing the greatest confusion, the distance being only about nine hundred yards. We fired about forty or fifty shots from our battery into the enemy before he replied to us at all. The first shot from the enemy was fired on us from his gunboat, which was at anchor in the bay, a short distance below our position. After daylight the gunboat advanced towards us as if to contest with our battery the position we occupied on the water's edge, but a few shots, well directed from the Valverde battery, drove the boat a mile below, where she opened on us with her heavy guns; about the same time several batteries from the opposite shore opened on us; the shot of the enemy was so well directed that we found it necessary several times to shift the position of our guns and caissons. The heavy gun on shore, which first opened fire on us from the principal fort above Brashear, with the garrison of that fort, was brought down nearly opposite my position, and opened fire on me with the running of the gunboat, and drawing out this heavy gun and most of the garrison from Fort Buchanan, left the waters above free to the approach of Major Hunter's command, in our little flotilla, to Tiger Island.

Major Hunter, who had moved under your orders, from the mouth of the Teche, during the night of the twenty-second, on board our mosquito fleet, landed, unperceived and unsuspected by the enemy, above their defences, and making his way through the swamp, about seven o'clock, on the morning of the twenty-third, attacked the enemy in his rear, while I was occupying him in front, completely surprising and routing him. The enemy surrendered the defences and the town of Brashear, to Major Hunter, about half-past seven o'clock on the morning of the twenty-third. Major Hunter's command consisted of about three hundred men from Baylor's, the Fifth Texas, and Wallar's battalion, and Second Louisiana cavalry (picked men). After crossing a part of the troops, I was ordered to pursue the enemy to the Boeuf. During the evening of the same day I had quite an animated skirmish with him at the Ramos, where he had burnt both the railroad and public bridges, and was well fortified on the east bank; but finding that I had flanked him with a part of my command, on the east side of the Boeuf, he hastily retreated. I threw a small detachment over the Ramos, on the night of the twenty-third, and moved them as close as possible to the enemy, on the Boeuf; Colonel Major's command being behind the enemy, and it being difficult for him to escape (about four hundred strong) surrendered to us about daylight on the morning of the twenty-fourth. Our troops, during the three days' campaign, did their duty with great alacrity, and behaved with gallantry on all occasions.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
THOMAS GREEN,
Brigadier-General, commanding First cavalry brigade.

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THE FIGHT AT ROGERSVILLE, TENN.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL SAM JONES.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT W. VIRGINIA AND E. TENNESSEE, DUBLIN, December 11, 1863.

General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General C. S. A., Richmond:

GENERAL: I have the honor to forward, with this, the reports of Major-General R. Ransom, Jr., and his subordinate commanders, of the attack on the enemy near Rogersville, Tennessee, and the reports of Brigadier-General John Echols and subordinate commanders of the battle at Droop Mountain, in Pocahontas county, Virginia. Both of these affairs occurred on the same day, the sixth ultimo.

The affair at Rogersville was a complete success, and reflects great credit on the officers and men concerned. The affair at Droop Mountain was by no means so disastrous as at first reported. Our troops seem to have contended gallantly against vastly superior numbers, and, though driven from the field, the artillery and trains were brought off and secured; and the enemy seems to have been so severely punished as to deter him from pushing on and following up the advantage he had gained. After a long and fruitless march he retreated, having suffered heavier loss than he inflicted. I was in Tennessee when Brigadier-General Echols informed me of the movement of the enemy through Pocahontas, and I reached Dublin on the sixth ultimo, about the hour the firing commenced at Droop Mountain. I met Brigadier-General Echols' command on Salt Pond Mountain. It was promptly supplied with the necessary arms and clothing, and in four days moved back and reoccupied the points it had occupied before the engagement of the sixth ultimo.

With great respect,
Your obedient servant,
SAM. JONES,
Major-General, commanding Department.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL RANSOM.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT S. W. VIRGINIA AND E. TENNESSEE, CAMP NEAR BLOUNTVILLE, TENN., Nov. 14, 1863.

Major C. S. Stringfellow, Assistant Adjutant-General, Dublin, Va.:

MAJOR: I have the honor to enclose reports of Brigadier-General Jones and Colonel Giltner, relative to both attacks upon the enemy at Rogersville. General Jones has supplied copies of my letters to him, and they accompany his report. Colonel Giltner's report was sent to General Jones for endorsement. I enclose both the note of my adjutant-general to General Jones and his reply to him. Also, my letter of instructions to Colonel Giltner.

I regret that there should be any discrepancies in the two reports, but I am satisfied they are not irreconcilable. It was intended for the attacks by both brigades to be independent, but simultaneous, and, of course, when the two forces came together, the senior officer was to be in command of the whole. I did not intend to unite the brigades, as my instructions show. The result of the expedition is the best proof that it was conducted well, and I am unwilling to create or sustain bickering or jealousy, when there should be mutual good feeling. General Jones was verbally instructed to change the point of crossing the river if, upon fuller information, it should become advisable. The first report gave, as captured, eight hundred and fifty prisoners, four pieces of artillery, sixty wagons, and one thousand animals. About seven hundred and seventy-five prisoners arrived; the artillery, as at first reported, thirty-two wagons and three ambulances. The regimental colors and one garrison flag are in my hands. One regimental flag was captured, but in some way lost.

I regret that, up to this time, I have been unable to have accounted for more than about three hundred animals, all told. I much fear they have been appropriated by the men, and have been sent off and sold. There is no other reasonable conclusion.

The affair was a decided success, and I have thanked the officers and soldiers engaged in it.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
R. RANSOM, JR.,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. E. JONES.

HEADQUARTERS JONES' BRIGADE, NEAR CARTER'S STATION, TENNESSEE, November 12, 1863.

Major T. Rowland, A. A. G., District S. W. Va. and East Tennessee:

MAJOR: In accordance with enclosed instructions from headquarters, district of south-western Virginia and East Tennessee, my command rendezvoused at Bauckman's Ford on the fourth instant. On inquiry, finding if it crossed here there would be danger of alarming the enemy, I deemed it best to cross near Spurgeon's mill, and camped for the night a few miles below. Moving early next morning, the command halted at Easly's, on Horse Creek, five miles from Kingsport, and fed the horses. From this point I communicated with Colonel Giltner, near noon, my intention to execute the original plan of attack. Arriving seventeen miles from Rogersville, on the Beach Creek road, near dark, we halted to feed and cook rations. Here it was ascertained the road leading to Smith's and Dodson's Fords ran within six miles of the camps of the enemy. It was also ascertained both fords were difficult and dangerous, and the night was dark and rainy. To reach the point assigned me by the hour designated, required me to cross the Holston before daylight. By intricate mountain paths, exacting the utmost care on the part of all, we reached Long's shoals, twelve miles above Rogersville, and

crossed in safety. Reaching the old stage road, nothing could be heard of Colonel Giltner's command, but I determined to turn the position of the enemy at the mouth of Big Creek, by way of the Carter's Valley road, my brigade crossing the old stage road for this purpose. Soon a messenger overtook me with tidings of Colonel Giltner, also reporting about one hundred Federal Tennessee home guards at Kincael's. Pushing ahead part of the Eighth Virginia cavalry to surround and capture this force, they encountered near where the home guards were expected a scout of fifty men from the Second Tennessee Federal regiment. The attack was made with such vigor that but seventeen men of this force escaped this onset.

Moving on briskly to the junction of the roads, the Eighth regiment turned east on the old stage road, and took position on the first eminence. As it was now long after Colonel Giltner should have made his attack, and no engagement could be heard, I felt assured the enemy must have made his escape, but moved the Eighth across the river road from Big Creek to Dodson's Ford, in hopes of intercepting fugitives. The men of the Twenty-seventh battalion Virginia cavalry, under Captain J. B. Thompson, were ordered to charge into Rogersville, and in so doing captured upwards of one hundred prisoners and some army supplies. For the same reason the Eighth was ordered to the river road. Colonel Witcher was ordered with his own and the Thirty-seventh battalion of Virginia cavalry to Smith's Ford. The Thirty-sixth battalion Virginia cavalry was held in reserve near town, and the Twenty-first regiment Virginia cavalry in the position first held by the Eighth regiment. The Twenty-seventh battalion Virginia cavalry was ordered, after the captures in Rogersville, by the railroad to the river. After these dispositions had been made, a party of fifty-five home guards (Federals) attacked the town from the west, but were easily dispersed by a small party under Lieutenant W. M. Hopkins, A. D. C.

After all the prisoners had been collected and marched out east of the town, the wagons loaded, hitched to, and driven to the forks of the main roads, was heard the first firing in the direction of Big Creek. The Twenty-first regiment was immediately ordered up the old stage road, with directions to be guided by the firing and to join in the battle. The Thirty-sixth battalion was ordered up from town, and all the other commands were recalled in haste. The old stage road being open, the Twenty-first having moved across towards the river, a party of one hundred and twenty-five of the enemy attempted to escape towards Rogersville, but were intercepted and all captured by the timely arrival of Witcher's, Claiborne's, and Smith's commands.

By this time firing had ceased in front, and I felt assured of the surrender of the enemy, as proved to be the case. Two hundred and ninety [illegible] ers were taken by my brigade acting alone. The Eighth Virginia took nine wagons and teams, seven of which were secured. The remainder of the command took three wagons and two ambulances, all of which were secured.

From Colonel Comes' report, it will be seen the roads west of the position of the enemy were held by the Eighth Virginia cavalry, and a large part of the five hundred and fifty-six prisoners taken here were taken by the Eighth, and sent in charge of an officer to Colonel Giltner. Had Colonel Giltner made a prompt and bold attack that would have discovered the position of the enemy before my dispositions were made under the impression of his having abandoned his position, it is believed none would have escaped. The unaccountable delay doubtless has proved very detrimental to our interests.

To Captain McKinney, of General Jackson's staff; to Mr. W. H. Watterson, clerk of my brigade quartermaster; and to Mr. Phipps, and other guides, my thanks are especially due for their activity, energy, and judgment on this occasion. To Lieutenant W. M. Hopkins, of my personal staff, I am under great obligations for the efficient discharge of his official duties.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant
W. E. JONES,
Brigadier-General.

REPORT OF COLONEL GILTNER.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CAVALRY BRIGADE, NEAR KINGSPORT, TENNESSEE, November 10, 1863.

Major T. Rowland, A. A. G.:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the troops under my command during the recent expedition into the enemy's lines:

In obedience to orders from district headquarters, I moved out of Kingsport at six P. M., on the fifth instant. You are already furnished with the general order containing the different corps of the command, and their order of march. The whole force did not exceed twelve hundred, as the return of my Adjutant-General for that day exhibits. Such was the secrecy with which the movement was conducted that not only the citizens, but the officers, had no idea of its contemplation until it had progressed considerably towards its execution. Some delay occurred in crossing the river, on account of the darkness of the night, and the difficult passage of the horses and artillery over a bad ford. All was, however, soon in order, and the march continued in a cold, chilling rain, without further obstacle until we were unexpectedly halted by the passage of Brigadier-General Jones' brigade across our road to the Carter's Valley road upon our right. I did not see General Jones, but learned from his staff officer that this change in the original plan was rendered necessary by the impracticability of the road to, and across the river, at the ford he proposed at first to cross.

As soon as General Jones' brigade had crossed I moved on slowly, intending to halt a short time at Surguinsville, in order to give General Jones time to reach the enemy's flank and rear, before attacking him in front. But just as my advance reached Surguinsville, it was fired upon by a scouting party of the enemy which had reached there that morning (now four and a half o'clock A. M.), as I afterwards learned. I communicated this fact to General Jones. The enemy, about thirty in number, retired precipitately on being pressed by a squadron of the First Tennessee, which constituted my advance. On arriving within two miles of Big Creek, where the enemy were understood to be encamped, we came upon a body of the enemy in a strong position, and, though not discovering more than twenty-five or thirty, furnished reason for the suspicion of a larger force masked behind the ridge and under cover of dense pine thickets. Some time was consumed in revealing their intention and force, by throwing forward flanking and skirmishing parties, before which they again retired. We moved forward without delay, and on approaching Big Creek discovered that the enemy were in the act of crossing at Russell's Ford. Colonel Carter (First Tennessee) was sent at double-quick to cut them off, which he did in most gallant style. Being cut off from the ford, the enemy took a strong position on the opposite side of Big Creek, where they had been encamped. Leaving one section of Phillips' battery, supported by three companies of the Second East Tennessee mounted infantry at Russell House, three hundred yards in front of their position, and on this side of Big Creek, Lieutenant-Colonel Trimble (Tenth Kentucky) and Major Parker (Fourth Kentucky) were brought forward and dismounted in five hundred and fifty yards of this section, and moved up. The men all went forward with the greatest enthusiasm, making no halt for balls, shells, or bullets. Colonel Carter, after intercepting their retreat by the ford, turned upon these two guns, and, advancing by a shorter route, was the first to reach them, capturing, at the same time, a large number of wagons, which had moved out to cross the river. Without halting a simultaneous advance was made by the three regiments (Tenth Kentucky, First Tennessee, and Fourth Kentucky) across Big Creek (which, though deep and rapid, proved no obstacle) and up the hill, on which was posted their other section of artillery, supported by their main force.

At this time, Captain Lowry's battery (detained by difficult roads) arrived upon the field, and engaged the battery of the enemy, delivering its fire most effectually. Immediately on crossing the creek our forces encountered the enemy in a chosen position, where, after an hour's sharp conflict, they succeeded in capturing the other section of Phillips' battery and about four hundred and fifty (450) of the enemy. The remainder endeavored to effect their escape by precipitate flight. Here I ordered forward Major Clark, Sixteenth Georgia, and Colonel Slemp, Sixty-fourth Virginia, whom I had held in reserve, mounted, and sent them at double-quick to pursue and overhaul the fugitives, which was done in the most praiseworthy manner, the Sixteenth Georgia following them across the river, and the Sixty-fourth to Rogersville. A party of these endeavoring to escape by a lower ford, was met by the Eighth Virginia, of General Jones' command, and most of them captured. In all about five hundred and fifty prisoners were taken by the forces under my command, four brass six-pounder James guns (Company M, Second Illinois light artillery), some thirty wagons loaded with all manner of quartermaster and commissary, medical, and ordnance stores, together with all their camp and garrison equipage, the horses and arms of the prisoners, all the papers appertaining to the Adjutant-General's department, containing most valuable information, etc., etc., etc.

As already mentioned, our forces did not exceed twelve hundred, of which not more than six hundred were engaged actively. The forces of the enemy (commanded by Colonel Israel Garrard, Seventh Ohio cavalry) consisted of Second East Tennessee mounted infantry, about full; Seventh Ohio cavalry, five hundred and eighty strong, and Phillips' battery, all composing half of Colonel James P. T. Carter's brigade (Third brigade cavalry, Fourth division, Twenty-third army corps). Colonel Garrard, commanding, escaped with the first who crossed the river. One Major, several Captains, and one acting Adjutant-General, were among the prisoners. Our loss will not exceed ten killed and wounded. The enemy's about twenty-five or thirty. Seven wounded were paroled and left in charge of a Surgeon.

Every exertion was used to secure all the captures, and the artillery and about thirty wagons were brought off safely, but owing to a want of harness for the teams, two caissons and some twenty wagons were disabled and abandoned.

It was my intention to retire to where I could find a good position and obtain forage, and remain until everything valuable was secured and sent to the rear But General Jones coming up, ordered me to fall back that night beyond the river, which was accomplished by nine A. M. the next morning.

Two stands of colors captured by the Fourth Kentucky cavalry, were sent up this morning. One captured by the Tenth Kentucky, was delivered to you by Brigadier-General Jones, and another taken by the First Tennessee, was afterwards stolen from the regimental wagon.

No discrimination can be made in the gallantry of troops, where every corps commanded the admiration of its officers, and the gratitude of their country. Their soldierly bearing in the presence of the enemy, furnishes a just cause for pride, and receives the unqualified approbation of their commander. Those actively engaged, and those held in check, manifested alike

an equal willingness, even anxiety, to discharge their full duty as soldiers, even the most dangerous. Any discrimination among individuals would be invidious, and no one is slighted when it is asserted that all (with a trifling exception) may remember their actions that day with a just pride.

I am especially indebted to Colonel Heiskell, volunteer aid, Captain Flusser, acting aid, and Captain Guerrant, A. A. G., for invaluable services on the field, and throughout the expedition.

I am, most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
H. S. GILTNER,
Colonel, commanding Brigade.

REPORT OF COLONEL COMES.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH VIRGINIA CAVALRY, November 13, 1863.

Brigadier-General W. E. Jones,
Commanding Cavalry Brigade:

GENERAL: At your request, I make the following report of the part taken by the Eighth Virginia cavalry at Rogersville, on the sixth instant. After a forced march of twenty-four hours, my regiment arrived at and crossed the Holston River, near Rogersville. At this point I was ordered across the country, on a by road, to the Carter's Valley road, at a point some eight miles above the town, and there await the arrival of Colonel Giltner. I had not waited but a few minutes, when I was informed by you that Colonel Giltner was moving on the road between me and the river. At this juncture, being informed by you that there was a company of cavalry on picket, some four miles in advance of me, I threw forward Company E, of this regiment, with instructions, when they arrived at the enemy's pickets, to charge down upon them, and not to permit any of them to reach Rogersville, to give the alarm. This order was carried out to the letter, not one of the enemy being permitted to enter the town; Company E, led by Captain H. C. Everett, having captured some forty of them, dispersed the remainder of them in the woods. Meeting with no further obstruction, my command was moved, by your direction, immediately in rear of the enemy, on a road leading to a ferry below Rogersville. Whilst moving my command through the woods (the undergrowth is very dense at this point), I found myself within twenty yards of the wagon train of the enemy, which had been sent to the rear—their pickets being already driven in from the front by Colonel Giltner. Finding the enemy's wagon train about to move, I ordered my command to charge the guard, composed of about seventy-five or eighty men, which they did, capturing the whole of the wagon train and nearly all of the guard.

I then immediately moved on with my regiment, and soon found myself closely engaged with the main force of the enemy. I immediately posted my command behind a fence and on a wooded hill-side, in easy range of the enemy's camp, where we remained, under a heavy fire, about fifteen minutes. The enemy were about to charge my position when Colonel Giltner commenced the action in front, which appeared to disconcert the enemy so much that, although they made an effort, in considerable force, to dislodge me, they were quickly repulsed, and driven back on their former position. Colonel Giltner attacking vigorously about this time, the enemy threw down their arms and fled in every direction. Large numbers of them surrendered on the field, others were captured in squads through the neighborhood. A few of them, however, made their escape across the river.

My command succeeded in capturing, in this affair, upwards of three hundred prisoners, nine wagons and teams, loaded with quartermaster's stores, seven of which we succeeded in bringing with us. We also captured a large number of small arms, saddles, and about ninety horses and mules, in addition to the mules that were attached to the wagons. The command was moved, by your direction, on the Carter's Valley Road creek to Blountville, where we arrived safely, on the eighth instant, bringing with us, besides captured property above mentioned, some eight hundred prisoners. Our loss in this affair is one killed, and two or three slightly wounded.

I am, General, with the highest respect,
Your obedient servant,
J. M. COMES,
Colonel Eighth Virginia cavalry

MAJOR ROWLAND TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL JONES.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT S. W. VIRGINIA AND E. TENNESSEE, NEAR BLOUNTVILLE, TENN., November 12, 1863.

Brigadier-General W. E. Jones, commanding, etc.:

GENERAL: The Major-General commanding directs me to enclose the report of Colonel Giltner for your endorsement, inasmuch as the two brigades were united in the latter part of the affair of the sixth instant. He requests that you forward your report of the same affair as soon as possible.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
T. ROWLAND,
A. A. G

GENERAL JONES TO MAJOR ROWLAND.

HEADQUARTERS JONES' BRIGADE, November 13, 1863.

Major T. Rowland, A. A. G., District S. W. Va. and E. Tenn.:

MAJOR: In reply to yours, enclosing a report of Colonel Giltner, relative to the attack on the enemy near Rogersville, the sixth instant, I can say, if by endorsement you wish me to confirm his statements, such is not in my power. My report will show you the affair appears to me in a different light from what it does to Colonel Giltner. As the report is not addressed to me,

and is not sent through me, I presume it was not intended I should correct errors in it. I was under the impression I commanded in this affair, and the statement of Mr. Watterson will show Colonel Giltner was of the same opinion before the fight.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
W. E. Jones,
Brigadier-General.

ORDERS OF GENERAL RANSOM.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION,
CAMP NEAR BLOUNTVILLE, November 3, 1863.

Brigadier-General John S. Williams, commanding Cavalry Brigade:

GENERAL: It is represented that there is at Rogersville a body of two or three regiments of the enemy, and it is desired to capture that force. You will drop down the river with your brigade, having pickets at the fords, cross the north fork of Holston, and attack at Rogersville at daylight on the morning of Friday, the sixth instant. Brigadier-General W. E. Jones will proceed by the Horse Creek and Beach Creek Valley roads and attack simultaneously with you. Your march, after getting across the North Fork, should be rapid, and in the night. You can go a few miles below Kingsport, so as to reach Rogersville easily in the night of Thursday and make the attack as directed. No wagons, except for ammunition, will be taken. You can carry the battery now with you if you desire it. Have prepared enough cooked rations for the movement. After executing the movement and the attack, you will return rapidly to your present position. Concert between you and Brigadier-General Jones will be necessary. General Jones has been directed, after the attack, to return to his present position.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
R. RANSOM,
Major-General.

Copy of endorsement on the above letter:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT S. W. VIRGINIA AND E. TENNESSEE,
BLOUNTVILLE, TENNESSEE, November 4, 1863.

Brigadier-General John S. Williams having been relieved of his command, and Colonel Giltner assigned to the command of his brigade, the latter officer will execute the order herein conveyed.

R. RANSOM, Jr.,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION,
CAMP NEAR BLOUNTVILLE, November 3, 1863.

Brigadier-General W. E. Jones, commanding Cavalry Brigade:

GENERAL: It is represented that there is at Rogersville a force of two or three regiments of the enemy, and it is desired to capture that force. You will please collect your brigade, throwing a force in the direction of Jonesboro', and with the greater part proceed to Rogersville by a route leading up Horse Creek and down Beach Creek Valleys, across the Holston at one of the fords near Rogersville, and attack at daylight on Friday morning, the sixth instant. You will cover the roads leading to your rear by small pickets, so as to convey information both to yourself and to the infantry on the north side of the Holston, east of Kingsport. Brigadier-General Williams, commanding cavalry brigade, will move, by way of Kingsport, across the North Fork of Holston, and join in the attack at the same time as yourself. After starting directly for Rogersville, rapidity will be required both in the execution of the march and attack, and in your return to your present position. I need hardly caution you as to your left flank. The force sent towards Jonesboro' should cover it, as well as check a direct advance in that direction. You will have enough cooked rations prepared, and take nothing else, except ammunition. No wagons except for ammunition, will taken. I leave it to your discretion to take the battery of artillery now with you or not, as you may deem it best. If not carried, have it properly posted, so as to do good service, if needed, and not to be subject to capture.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
R. RANSOM,
Major-General.

GENERAL RANSOM TO GENERAL JONES.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION,
NEAR BLOUNTVILLE, TENN., November 3, 1863.

Brigadier-General W. E. Jones, commanding Cavalry Brigade:

GENERAL: I enclose a letter of instructions and a map for your guidance. I find the Horse Creek Valley too much to your right. You must take the most direct road, or the one you think best. Dodson's Ford is represented to me as the best. I will send to you Captain McKinney, of General Jackson's staff, who knows the country thoroughly about Rogersville. It looks as though it would rain, and we may be prevented from making the movement. Williams will be relieved to-morrow, and I shall have to send the letter of instructions to Colonel Giltner.

You had best have the battery come to this side of the Holston, and let me know where you have it.

I shall move up towards the junction of the two rivers to-morrow, on the Jonesboro' road.

It may rain and cause the river to rise after you get to Rogersville. In that event you may make your way out by Kingsport.

Reports from Kingsport and Rogersville represent the enemy camped on Big Creek, four miles above Rogersville.

Give directions so that your wagons may not get into any difficulty.

If you can do so, it would be well for you to come here to-night.

* * * * * * *

Giltner will have orders to attack at the same

hour you do, that is, at daylight on Friday morning. Neither should wait for the other, as both have the same orders.

Yours truly,
R. RANSOM,
Major-General.

STATEMENT OF W. H. WATTERSON.

HEADQUARTERS JONES' CAVALRY BRIGADE, Q. M. DEPARTMENT.
November 12, 1863.

Being called upon by Brigadier-General W. E. Jones to give a statement of my connection with the affair at Big Creek, Hawkins county, Tennessee, I most respectfully submit the following:

I was left by General Jones at the house of Mr. William Lyons, where the road from Lowry's Ford crosses the old stage road, in order to see that the brigade under his (General Jones') command took the right road, when I saw that Colonel Giltner's column had arrived. I went to the head of it, and, while there, *understood from him* that he was going to halt his brigade at Surguinsville until he heard from General Jones.

This was concluded upon, I supposed, since General Jones had crossed the river, at least fourteen miles from and above the ford at which it was intended when the expedition begun, and to have an understanding as to the plan of attack.

When the rear of Jones' brigade had passed the crossing of the roads, I hastened on to inform General Jones of Colonel Giltner's intention. I overtook General Jones about three miles from where he came into Carter's Valley road, going very rapidly, at the head of his column. When I told him that Colonel Giltner was awaiting at Surguinsville to hear from him, he seemed surprised, and ordered me to go immediately and tell Colonel Giltner to move on and attack the enemy in front.

I started back to the first cross-road, and had got about one and a half miles, when I met a courier from Colonel Giltner, who said that his whole brigade had passed down the old stage road in a great hurry, having routed the Yankee pickets at Surguinsville. I then hurried to follow on after General Jones, and had gone on the Carter's Valley road to within five miles of Rogersville, when I learned that Colonel Giltner had not gone on down further than C. C. Miller's, eight miles east of Rogersville. I immediately *about-faced* and went back to the road leading from the Carter's Valley road to the old stage road, coming out at Mr. C. C. Miller's, where Colonel Giltner was understood to be. When I turned back I was about four miles from C. C. Miller's (or Yellow Store), but when I got there all of the brigade under Giltner had passed along, except the artillery (Lowery's battery) and the rear guard. I went on after Colonel Giltner, passing about half of his column (the rear half) in motion, and overtook him only a few hundred yards east of Mr. John Shields, six miles east of Rogersville. Colonel Giltner was, at the time, with a portion of two companies of Colonel Carter's First Tennessee cavalry, together with Major Goforth and Captain Fulkerson, in a field on the right hand side of the road. The squadron was made the command of Major Goforth, so I soon after learned. I delivered General Jones' orders to Colonel Giltner to attack as soon as possible. The squadron under Goforth went on the right to flank the movement of the main column in its advance to attack the enemy, who were understood to be about a mile distant, on an elevation, in the woods to the left of the road. I think the attack was made about nine A. M., nearly thirty minutes after I delivered General Jones' orders to Colonel Giltner.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. H. WATTERSON.

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EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS IN THE INDEX.

D. stands for *Diary of Events*; Doc. for *Documents*; and P. for *Poetry, Rumors, and Incidents.*

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