

-15-

FISHER: They'll need some ships to do that. Captain Dennison, are we going to allow Japan to rebuild her merchant marine?

DENNISON: We've got to allow her to rebuild a peacetime economy -- that's the price of disarming her. That means trade. But the question of whose ships shall carry this trade hasn't been decided yet. We know we must control Japan's imports, in order to keep her from rearming -- and the best way to do that may be to carry a good part of her trade on Allied ships.

FISHER: Captain Dennison, what about Japan's civil aviation? A lot of people were quite surprised recently when General MacArthur allowed some Japanese transport planes to resume operations.

DENNISON: That will not be continued, Mr. Fisher. Under the terms of General MacArthur's directive in this field, no civil aviation will be permitted in Japan.

VINCENT: Such aviation as General MacArthur did allow was to meet a specific emergency. It will not be continued beyond that emergency.

FISHER: In this revamping of Japan's economy, Mr. Vincent, will the hold of the big landholders be broken, as you have said the power of the big industrialists will be?

VINCENT: Encouragement will be given to any movement to reorganize agriculture on a more democratic economic base. Our policy favors a wider distribution of land, income, and ownership of the means of production and trade. But those are things a democratic Japanese government should do for itself -- and will, I have no doubt.

FISHER: And the labor unions? What about them?

VINCENT: We'll encourage the development of trade unionism, Mr. Fisher, because that's an essential part of democracy.

FISHER: I understand a lot of the former union leaders and political liberals are still in jail. What has been done to get them out?

VINCENT:  
General MacA

-15-



-16-

VINCENT: General MacArthur has already ordered the release of all persons imprisoned for "dangerous thoughts" or for their political or religious beliefs.

FISHER: That ought to provide some new leadership for the democratic forces in Japan. Captain Dennison, to what extent are we going to help those forces?

DENNISON: Our policy is one of definitely encouraging liberal tendencies among the Japanese. We'll give them every opportunity to draw up and to adopt a constructive reform program.

VINCENT: All democratic parties will be encouraged. They will be assured the rights of free assembly and public discussion. The occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political parties. The Japanese Government has already been ordered to remove all barriers to freedom of religion, of thought and of the press.

FISHER: I take all this to mean that all democratic and anti-militarist groups will all be allowed free rein. But, Mr. Vincent, suppose some nationalistic group tried to interfere with them, using gangster methods?

VINCENT: It would be wiped out. One of General MacArthur's directives calls for "the encouragement and support of liberal tendencies in Japan." It also says that "changes in the direction of modifying authoritarian tendencies of the government are to be permitted and favored."

FISHER: And if the democratic parties should find it necessary to use force to attain their objectives?

VINCENT: In that event, the U. S. Supreme Commander is to intervene only where necessary to protect our own occupation forces. This implies that to achieve liberal or democratic political ends, the Japanese may even use force.

DENNISON: We are not interested in upholding the status quo in Japan, as such. I think we should make that doubly clear.

-16-

FISHER: One



-17-

FISHER: One of the most interesting developments in recent weeks has been the apparent revival of liberal and radical sentiment in Japan. I understand that the leaders of several former labor and socialist political groups are getting together in one party--a Socialist Party. What stand will we take on that, General Hilldring?

HILLDRING: If the development proves to be genuine, we will give it every encouragement, in line with our policy of favoring all democratic tendencies in Japan. And we'll protect all democratic groups against attacks by military fanatics.

FISHER: You intend to do anything that's necessary, then, to open the way for the democratic forces.

HILLDRING: We're prepared to support the development of democratic government even though some temporary disorder may result -- so long as our troops and our overall objectives are not endangered.

FISHER: Mr. Vincent, will we do anything about reforming Japan's election laws?

VINCENT: The Japanese themselves have already advocated some reforms in the election laws, to reduce the age of male voters from 25 to 20, and to permit women of 25 years and over to vote. We'll give every encouragement to such reforms; but they can be brought about by the Japanese people themselves, if they have a government that does more than pay lip service to democracy.

FISHER: I have one more question of key importance, Mr. Vincent. What will be done about Shintoism, especially that branch of it that is called National Shinto?

VINCENT: Shintoism, insofar as it is a religion of individual Japanese, is not to be interfered with. Shintoism, however, <sup>insofar</sup> as it is directed by the Japanese Government, and is a measure enforced from above by the government, is to be done away with. People would not be taxed to support National Shinto and there will be no place for Shintoism in the schools. Shintoism as a state religion -- National Shinto, that is -- will go.

FISHER: That's

-17-



-18-

FISHER: That's the clearest statement I have heard on Shinto.

VINCENT:  
Our policy on this goes beyond Shinto, Mr. Fisher. The dissemination of Japanese militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology in any form will be completely suppressed. And the Japanese Government will be required to cease financial and other support of Shinto establishments.

FISHER: And what about the clean-up of the Japanese school system? That will be quite a chore, Mr. Vincent.

VINCENT: Yes, but the Japanese are cooperating with us in cleaning up their schools. We will see to it that all teachers with extreme nationalist leanings are removed. The primary schools are being reopened as fast as possible.

DENNISON: That's where the real change must stem from -- the school system. The younger generation must be taught to understand democracy. That goes for the older generation as well.

FISHER: And that may take a very long time, Captain Dennison.

DENNISON: How long depends on how fast we are able to put our directives into effect. It may take less time than you think, if we reach the people through all channels -- school texts, press, radio, and so on.

FISHER: What's the basis for your optimism, Captain?

DENNISON: Well, Mr. Fisher, I've had opportunity to observe a good many Japanese outside of Japan. The Japanese-Americans in Hawaii used to send their children to Japan at the age of about seven, I think, to spend a year with their grandparents. The contrast between the life they found in Japan and the life they had in Hawaii was so clear that the great majority returned to Hawaii completely loyal to the United States. They proved their loyalty there during the war.

FISHER: What accounts for that loyalty?

DENNISON: Simply

-18-



-19-

DENNISON: Simply that they like life in America better. At that age, it's the ice cream, the movies, the funny papers they like. Well, I believe that the people in Japan will like our ways too. I think once they have a taste of them -- of real civil liberties -- they'll never want to go back to their old ways.

HILLDRING: I'm inclined to agree, Captain. As a matter of fact, it's quite possible we may find Japan less of a problem than Germany, as far as retraining the people for democracy is concerned. The Nazis are hard nuts to crack -- they've been propagandized so well, trained so well. The Japanese are indoctrinated with one basic idea: obedience. That makes it easier to deal with them.

VINCENT: Or it may make it more difficult, General. It depends on how you look at it. That trait of obedience has got to be replaced by some initiative, if they're to have a real, working democracy.

HILLDRING: I don't mean to say it will be easy. It won't be done overnight. And we'll have to stay on the job until we're sure the job is done.

FISHER: Mr. Vincent, what can you tell us about the attitudes of the Japanese under the occupation?

VINCENT: Well, recent indications are that the Japanese people are resigned to defeat, but anxious about the treatment to be given them. There is good evidence of a willingness to cooperate with the occupying forces. But, because of the long period of military domination they've undergone, only time and encouragement will bring about the emergence of sound democratic leadership. We shouldn't try to "hustle the East", or hustle General MacArthur, too much. Reform in the social, economic and political structure must be a gradual process, wisely initiated and carefully fostered.

FISHER: Well

-19-



-20-

FISHER: Well thank you, Mr. Vincent, and thanks to you, General Hilldring and Captain Dennison, for a clear and interesting interpretation of our occupation policy for Japan. You've made it very plain that ours is a tough, realistic policy -- one which is aimed at giving no encouragement to the imperialists, and every possible encouragement to the pro-democratic forces which are now beginning to reappear in Japan.

ANNCR: That was Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air. He has been interviewing Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department; Major General John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs, War Department; and Captain R. L. Dennison, Navy representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee. The discussion was adapted for radio by Selden Menefee... This was the 34th of a series of broadcasts on OUR FOREIGN POLICY, presented as a public service by the NBC University of the Air. You can obtain printed copies of these broadcasts at ten cents each in coin. If you would like to receive copies of the broadcasts, send \$1.00 to cover the costs of printing and mailing. Special rates are available for large orders. Address your orders to the NBC University of the Air, Radio City, New York 20, New York. (Let me repeat that address for those of you who wish to write it down: Send your orders to the NBC University of the Air, Radio City, New York 20, New York. Ten cents in coin for one broadcast, \$1.00 for a series of thirteen reprints.) NBC also invites your questions and comments... Next week we expect to present a special State Department program on our Latin American policy, with reference to Argentina and the postponement of the Inter-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro. Our guests are to be Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden, who has just returned from Buenos Aires, and Mr. Ellis O. Briggs, Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs. Listen in next week at the same time for this important program. Kennedy Ludlam speaking, from Washington, D. C. ...

\* \* \*



By Joseph and Stewart Alsop

**At Least, A Good Plan**

A VERY BIG and fundamental question is being asked rather often these days. In the bad times ahead, can the American Government continue to do its job successfully in the old shambling, unsympathetic way, with 10 departments and innumerable agencies in constant and frequently embittered conflict? Doubts on this point are being frankly voiced by the very men whose testimony should be the most impressive—those who joined in leading the Nation during the war, and are now among the few who understand the gravity and complexity of the problems of the peace.

During the war, despite the terrible strain of those years, considerable thought was given to the American governmental system by several of the ablest and most distinguished of our public servants, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Eisenhower and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal can all be mentioned. Last September, acting in their capacity as public servants rather than military leaders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff initiated a study of the problem. They have now taken the remarkable step of recommending certain important adaptations of British methods for American use.

IF ACTED UPON, their recommendations would result in the first radical change in the American administrative system since the passage of the Civil Service Act in the nineteenth century. A Cabinet secretariat would be established, composed of civil and military officials, with a Secretary of the Cabinet at its head. It would be charged with the enormous task of giving coherence and continuity to American governmental policy. On all major questions of policy, internal and external, civil and military, it would collect and coordinate the views of the departments and agencies concerned. It would arrange meetings and prepare agenda with a view to securing agreed decisions on policy to be pursued. It would record these decisions, and would see to it that the appropriate action was taken by each of the departments and agencies where action was required. In short, it would provide the President with the directing and coordinative machinery which the White House has desperately needed for many years. Every recent President has tried to improvise such machinery, and has always ended by attempting the impossible feat of giving direction and coordination to the whole Government by himself alone.

The urgent need for directing and coordinative machinery is proved by the widespread discussion of plans similar to that which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have now put forward. The secretariat proposed by the joint chiefs would serve the whole Government. But it differs only in broadness of purpose, and not in kind, from the State-War-Navy secretariat to coordinate American foreign and defense policy, for which plans have been drawn by Secretary of State Byrnes' State Department reorganizers. Another example is

the Army-Navy secretariat to coordinate administration of the services, which has been proposed to the War Department by Secretary of the Navy Forrestal and Admiral Nimitz.

The truth is that in this general governmental area of the State, War and Navy Departments, where the immense difficulties and dangers of the world future are understood, the feeling is general that it is no longer safe to be inefficient.

The history of the joint chiefs' proposal is strikingly interesting. In their wartime association with the British, many important American officials were struck by the contrast between the American and British systems. The American system of policy-making and administration could boast a superior vitality and drive, but the value of this vitality and drive, which was primarily attributed to the self-confidence and wealth of the country, was largely dissipated because so many people were furiously driving in completely divergent directions. The British system, on the other hand, was superior in unity of purpose, coordination of policy, and continuity and unity of effort. One man put it:

"You can take the most important problem facing this country, ask twenty of the highest officials about the solution and get nineteen different answers and one stall. Ask the British. The answer takes longer in coming, but it's the answer of the whole British Government when it's given, and it represents the policy the government will follow thereafter, till doom's day if necessary."

DISASTROUS ADMINISTRATIVE failures in the Boer War led to the establishment of the British Cabinet Secretariat, which has the functions outlined in the joint chiefs plan. All those in this war who studied the difference between the American and British systems—and considerable actual reading was done by such men as General Marshall and Secretary Forrestal—came to the conclusion that the Cabinet Secretariat held the secret of the superior British coordination. As soon as the war ended, General Ismay, Churchill's chief military adviser and the dominant figure in the secretariat of Churchill's War Cabinet, was requested to prepare a memorandum on the British system. This memorandum was used by the joint chiefs of staff in preparing their paper on the subject.

Thus far, the proposal of the joint chiefs is just an idea that is going around. If the idea is adopted, the whole problem will not be solved. It will not be enough merely to create a Cabinet Secretariat. The new secretariat must also be staffed, if it is to succeed, with men of a quality very rare in the Government today. But it is at least a healthy and encouraging sign that in these times, when fear of the storms ahead haunts every thinking man, there are a good many men of weight and influence who are considering how to re-rig the ship of government so that it can ride through the worst that may come.

WASHINGTON

MAY, 1946

**Top U. S. Policy  
By Agency**

By Joseph and Stewart Alsop

Secretary of State Byrnes turned the spotlight Wednesday on a little known but important Government agency which is giving the United States its first effective cooperation between the State, War and Navy Departments.

He told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that legislation for military cooperation of Western Hemisphere nations had been drafted by "Swank." At least that's the way it sounded to committee men and reporters.

"The State, War and Navy coordinating committee," he explained, as they looked blank.

At the State Department, aides said that details about "SWANCC" or "SWNCC"—from the letters of its title—are no longer secret, and fully described its operations.

Set up about a year ago as a very hush-hush body, SWNCC is the policy-forming agency for top political-military matters. It is on a level with and counterpart of the joint chiefs of staff.

A charter approved by the President directs SWNCC to "reconcile and coordinate" all matters affecting the State, War and Navy Departments. An action or policy decided by the body normally is the final word of the American Government, with only occasional decisions being referred to the President.

Members are Assistant Secretary of State Dunn, chairman; Assistant Secretary of State Hilldring, Assistant Secretaries of War Peterson and of Navy Sullivan. Under them is a secretariat and some 11 subcommittees of high ranking Army, Navy and State Department officers who do the spade work.

One SWNCC subcommittee drafts American policy on peace treaty

WASHINGTON POST

MONDAY, MARCH 4, 1946



Alsop

Plan

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WASHINGTON POST

MAY, 1946

Top U. S. Policy Coordinated  
By Agency Called 'SWNCC'

By John G. Norris  
Post Reporter

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One SWNCC subcommittee drafts  
American policy on peace treaty

negotiations, another the directives  
sent to General MacArthur and  
General Clay on Japan and Ger-  
many. Others deal with the mili-  
tary phases of U. N., recommend  
what may be released about our  
weapons and other secrets, and  
handle the political-military prob-  
lems in four key areas—Europe,  
Far East, Near East and Latin-  
America.

Prior to and during the early  
days of the war, the only coordina-  
tion of political and military mat-  
ters was at the very top. The pres-  
ent set-up, ranking officials say,  
gives the Government an effective  
method of working out such im-  
portant problems.

NEW YORK TIMES

1946

MACARTHUR'S POWERS  
DEFINED BY TRUMAN

Message Sent Sept. 6 Directed  
General Not to Permit Japan  
to Question Authority

TOKYO'S ROLE CLARIFIED

Allies Are Declared to Have  
No Pact With Japanese on  
Post-War Treatment

WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 (AP)—  
President Truman has directed  
Gen. Douglas MacArthur not to  
let the Japanese question the scope  
of his authority as Supreme Com-  
mander for the Allied powers.

The directive was sent to Gen-  
eral MacArthur Sept. 6. It was  
made public by the White House  
today after Senator Kenneth S.  
Wherry, Republican, of Nebraska,  
contended that a "smear cam-  
paign" was being waged against  
General MacArthur with the aim  
of forcing his removal as Supreme  
Commander.

The newly-released directive was  
described as intended to clarify  
General MacArthur's authority in  
his position as head of occupation  
forces in Japan and Korea.

Three Points Stressed

Prepared by the Departments of



State, War and Navy, the message, which had President Truman's approval, made these three points:

- (1) The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government is subordinate to General MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
- (2) Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government as long as the arrangements produces satisfactory results without prejudice to General MacArthur's right to act directly and use force if necessary.
- (3) The Potsdam Declaration regarding the post-war treatment of Japan shall be given effect, not because of any contractual requirement, but because the declaration "forms a part of our policy stated in good faith with relation to Japan and with relation to peace and security in the Far East."

The text of the message to General MacArthur follows:

#### TEXT OF MESSAGE

- (1) The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an unconditional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope.
- (2) Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to an extent that such arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does not prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the orders issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary, including the use of force.
- (3) The statement of intentions contained in the Potsdam Declaration will be given full effect. It will not be given effect, however, because we consider ourselves bound by a contractual relationship. The statement will be rejected because it forms a part of our policy.



WIRELESS BULLETIN #92

April 17, 1946

- 4 -

Occupied Areas Policy.

STATE DEPT. Secretary of State Byrnes today outlined program for effecting United States policy on occupied areas in directive issued today. Program, which became effective April 8, concerns occupied areas in Germany, Austria, Japan and Korea. Announcement coincides with swearing in today of General John J. Hildring as Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas.

Secretary Byrnes' directive said: "1. Jurisdiction. (a) Consistent with existing international agreements and within scope of its charter of organization, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (hereinafter referred to as SWNCC) shall coordinate United States policy with respect to occupied areas. The term 'occupied areas' shall include Germany, Austria, Japan and Korea. The term 'United States policy' for purposes of this directive shall mean all policy which requires concerted study, consideration or coordination by State, War and Navy Departments. (b) War Department shall continue to be responsible for execution and administration of policy with respect to United States participation in occupation or government of occupied areas. (c) Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas shall be directly responsible to Secretary of State for coordination of State Department policy with respect to all occupation matters. He shall be State Department member of SWNCC on all matters of occupation policy. (d) Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas shall take initiative in submitting to SWNCC, or to any appropriate subcommittee thereof, such policy matters as may require concerted study, consideration or action. All occupation policy matters or decisions shall be presented by State Department to SWNCC or communicated outside State Department through him or with his concurrence.

"2. Departmental Secretariat. The coordination of departmental policy, whether political, cultural or economic, provided for in 1 (c) above, shall be accomplished by Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, and under his direction and control, through mechanism of secretariat herein provided for, to wit: (a) Germany-Austria secretariat: departmental position with respect to any and all matter of United States policy in respect of Germany and/or Austria shall be developed by secretariat organized and maintained for purpose under chairmanship and administration of chief, Division of Central European Affairs. (b) Japan-Korea secretariat: departmental position with respect to any and all matters of United States policy in respect of Japan and Korea shall be developed by a secretariat organized and maintained for the purpose under chairmanship and administration of director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, or his designee."

Directive added that each of secretariats should include representation from such State Department offices as Office of Research and Intelligence, Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs, Office of Economic Security Policy, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Legal Section and Offices of European and Far Eastern Affairs.

Chairmen of secretariats were made responsible to Assistant Secretary for Occupied Areas, and that office was given assurance of all Department resources in implementing its function.

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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

MAY 17, 1946  
No. 337*Source publicly*

CONFIDENTIAL RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION AT 6:00 P.M., E.S.T.  
(7:00 P.M., E.D.S.T.), SATURDAY, MAY 18, 1946. NOT  
TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM OR USED  
IN ANY WAY.

Following is the text of an NBC network broadcast, the 6th in a University of the Air series entitled OUR FOREIGN POLICY:

Subject: GERMANY AND THE OCCUPATION

- Participants:
1. The Honorable John H. Hilldring, Assistant Secretary of State.
  2. The Honorable Howard C. Petersen, Assistant Secretary of War.
  3. Mr. Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air.

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ANNOUNCER: Here is NEWS FROM WASHINGTON:

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE HILLDRING OUTLINES POLICY OF DECENTRALIZATION IN GERMANY, WITH CENTRAL CONTROL OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES: SAYS RE-EDUCATION OF GERMANS MAY TAKE A GENERATION.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR PETERSEN EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER EFFECT OF FAILURE TO EXTEND DRAFT ON SIZE OF OCCUPATION FORCES: PREDICTS DISEASE AND DISORDER IF MINIMUM FOOD QUOTAS NOT MET: SAYS MORALE AND DISCIPLINE ARE IMPROVING AMONG OCCUPATION FORCES.

The NBC University of the Air presents...OUR FOREIGN POLICY, a weekly discussion of international issues by leading Washington officials. This time, "Germany and the Occupation" will be discussed by Assistant Secretary of State John H. Hilldring, who is in charge of our policy in occupied areas, and Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Petersen, who is responsible for the administration of these areas. Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air, will serve as chairman of the discussion. Mr. Fisher:

FISHER: General



-2-

FISHER: General Hilldring, we're glad to have you with us again. It seems a little strange to have a soldier representing the State Department....

HILLDRING: An ex-soldier, Mr. Fisher. I'm a civilian now.

FISHER: ...and a civilian representing the War Department, Mr. Petersen.

PETERSEN: You've put your finger on an essential feature of our democratic form of government -- civilian control of our War Department.

FISHER: I realize that... Now, I should warn you gentlemen that I have collected a good many criticisms of the way Allied Military Government is being carried on in Germany. I'd like to use these criticisms as a device for getting a point-by-point progress report on our policies and accomplishments in Germany. First of all, here's a question that several of our listeners have asked: How has the 4-Power Allied Control Council in Berlin actually worked out? General Hilldring, hasn't it been a rather awkward arrangement, to say the least?

HILLDRING: Its workability has exceeded our fondest expectations. It wasn't our idea in the first place, to slice Germany into four sectors. We accepted this plan with great reluctance; but with V-E day coming up, we had to find a formula acceptable to all the major powers. However, the Allied Control Council has worked out better than the most optimistic U.S. officers believed possible a year ago.

FISHER: In what way, General?

HILLDRING: In a steady, unspectacular way the Control Council has been a forum in which four great Powers - Russia, Britain, France and ourselves - have for a year worked together on the most complex and vital problems. Let me be very specific: I'd like to recall the dire and gloomy predictions quite a few observers made about a year ago, that the 4-power arrangement would fall to pieces over two problems -  
reparations



-3-

reparations and the German standard of living. Yet we were able to get agreement on both of these questions, and many others.

FISHER: That raises an interesting question: How far can you permit production essential for her minimum needs without restoring Germany's war-making potential?

HILLDRING: After a full and frank debate, the Allied Control Council found a middle ground. The case of steel was typical. One of our partners in the Control Council wanted practically no postwar steel industry in Germany, the other wanted a 12-million-ton industry. Both sides exposed their views to the light of logic and of facts. In the end, thanks largely to the perseverance and ability of General Lucius Clay, we were able to bring the two sides together. This to my mind was an historic point in international negotiations.

FISHER: How did you work out the steel question?

HILLDRING: We did it by developing a plan which took account of Germany's minimum domestic and export needs. The Control Council agreed to reduce German steel capacity, which had been around 20 million tons before the war, to 7.5 million tons. But, the German steel industry never runs at 100 percent of capacity, and we are limiting actual production to only 5.8 million tons.

PETERSEN: You can compare that to our own steel industry, which has a capacity of 75 to 80 million tons a year. It's pretty obvious that 6 million tons or so of steel a year could never be a base for a major German war effort - particularly with careful controls over the types of steel products which Germany will be permitted to manufacture.

HILLDRING: So the British and the Russians -- and the French-- agreed on a formula completely in accord with our policy. But this is only one example of the way the Allied Control Council has operated. It has a long list of impressive  
achievements.



-4-

achievements. The reestablishment of trade unions, judicial reorganization, the de-Nazification program, and many others could be mentioned. Of course, I do not mean to make light of the difficulties inherent in four-power occupation, nor to assert that there are no unresolved problems remaining for continued discussion. What I want to emphasize is that in the Control Council we have a machine already in operation where the four powers can and must and do reconcile the most divergent ideas in an intelligent and friendly spirit.

FISHER: Now, several writers have alleged that under the four-power system, the British and Russian zones are rapidly becoming armed camps, directed at each other, while we sit up in the hills of Bavaria looking on. Mr. Petersen, what about that?

PETERSEN: I don't believe that. Take the recurrent story that the British have not disarmed the German armies they captured in Northwest Germany. That's simply not so. It's based on the fact that some former German army units have been disarmed but kept intact as work forces, like prisoners of war, to serve under the Military Government in the British zone. We don't follow that practice in our zone, but it's a very different thing from an armed German force.

FISHER: I have talked to some people who believe that we may be on the wrong track when we worry so much about disarming Germany. They believe German strategy now is to play the major powers against each other.

PETERSEN: I don't doubt that some Germans would like to do just that. They want to end the occupation, and probably figure that encouraging Allied differences may be their best strategy for accomplishing that. But I don't think there is any organized effort along those lines.

FISHER: General



-5-

FISHER: General Hilldring, what do you think of the suggestion that we work toward applying the American policy of political decentralization to all of Germany?

HILLDRING: This Government is committed to destroy the concentrated power of Prussia in Germany. In the U.S. Zone we have made very rapid strides in developing local responsibility in the "Laender", or States, in permitting free elections of local officials, and in encouraging the formation of decentralized political agencies in numerous ways. The peace and prosperity of all of Europe rest in large part on solving the historic problem of the rule of Prussia, and we have encouraged and will continue to encourage the greatest autonomy in municipal, county and provincial administration. It is our purpose to urge our partners to do the same.

FISHER: What about the charge that our economic policy in the Allied Control Council have been inconsistent with our policy of political decentralization?

HILLDRING: Under our original Directive, JCS 1067, and under the Potsdam Declaration, our policy is directed towards the decentralization of the political and administrative structure of Germany. This includes decentralizing the German economic structure. That remains our policy.

FISHER: But are these directives actually being carried out?

HILLDRING: As a matter of fact, in this case, the horseman has jumped clear over the horse. There is no central postal system, no unified transportation system. It is clear that this goes too far - four postal systems and four railroad systems, for example, make a completely unworkable arrangement. The Potsdam Declaration itself says - quote: "The Control Council may .. to a minimum extent .. permit centralized administration or .. central control of essential public services." The Potsdam Declaration expressly provides for the establishment of central agencies in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. We are seeking to carry out these provisions.

PETERSEN: Central



-6-

PETERSEN: Central administration of such essential functions is certainly not inconsistent with an overall policy of decentralization. What we are aiming at is a loose federation of German states with a minimum of central control. But we haven't been able to achieve any central administration. Without that, the American zone in Germany will continue to be unable to feed itself, and we shall face two alternatives: either serious malnutrition for the Germans, or a continuing WPA project in Germany.

FISHER: What has held up this minimum program of centralization, Mr. Petersen?

PETERSEN: We have been unable to get the unanimous agreement of the four powers on the Control Council principally because of French objections.

FISHER: General Hilldring, there are those who argue like the French that detaching the industrial Ruhr region from Germany would be the best possible safeguard against the emergency of a new German war machine.

HILLDRING: That's for the four major powers to decide. This Government recognizes the importance of settling this issue -- and promptly.

FISHER: The general public is a lot more critical of our German policy than of our Japanese policy. The commonest criticism is that we have been too easy on the Germans, or on the Nazis. As Assistant Secretary of State, General Hilldring, do you think we have been tough enough in the actual application of our policy?

HILLDRING: I am glad you asked me that question. I have wanted for a long time to say something about whether our policy in Germany was too tough or too soft. I think softness and toughness are completely irrelevant considerations in the determination of the policy we follow or don't follow in Germany. I think that to weigh our policy by its toughness or  
its



-7-

its softness is just about as sensible as to debate whether Texas is too big or too small. It has nothing whatever to do with the problem. Here's the real question: Does the policy we follow in Germany serve the ends we hope to achieve in Germany -- namely, to demilitarize and democratize the country? That question I can answer. The answer is yes.

FISHER: Can you give us an overall picture, Mr. Petersen, of how our Military Government is getting rid of Germany's war potential?

PETERSEN: The basic policy was laid down at Potsdam. The Military Government authorities of course worked through the Control Council, as in the case of steel. The first step was to eliminate all war industries -- ammunition, planes, and so on. Then the question was, how much of what was left should be kept in order to permit a German level of living no higher than the average of the other European countries, as provided in Potsdam? Once that question was answered, everything over and above that level was available for reparations.

FISHER: General Hilldring, you mentioned exports of steel. Isn't there a danger that in rebuilding their foreign trade, the Germans may reestablish ties with foreign cartels that will be useful to them if another war comes?

HILLDRING: I don't think so. We shall control Germany's export trade completely. We won't give them a chance to build their fences for another war. Our policy is four-square against any revival of the German cartel system.

FISHER: Mr. Petersen, what about the charge that our Military Government authorities have played ball with some of the cartel interests in the American zone?

PETERSEN: That's absolutely false. Our policy is to destroy cartels, and that we are proceeding to do. Some correspondents have seen factories of these cartels still in operation, but this doesn't mean they are not under strict control. In the case of the largest German cartel, I. G. Farben, only 15 percent of its



-8-

of its activities are in the American zone, but we have removed the Farben management from these plants. We have destroyed four or five of the Farben munitions plants. We have kept those which are needed in the German economy -- but not as a part of a cartel structure. One is a pharmaceutical plant -- the biggest aspirin factory in the world. Others are nitrate plants, which are needed for making fertilizer. These plants are still running, but under our close supervision. And I might add, the Control Council has agreed upon a law wiping out the Farben cartel in all four zones.

FISHER: What about the food situation over there? Is it as bad as it has been painted?

PETERSEN: It's the most immediate problem facing our military government today.

FISHER: I have here a letter from a lady down in Lynchburg, Virginia, who asks: "Why should we be 'committed' to give each German 1,500 calories a day when innocent people in Greece, Poland, France, and other countries which Germany ruthlessly invaded, pillaged and ruined are getting far fewer calories?" What do you say to that, Mr. Petersen?

PETERSEN: We are rationing not at the rate of 1,500-calories, but at the rate of only 1,275 calories a day -- but we'll be lucky to continue this standard. Enough food has been allocated, but people can't eat allocations. We shipped only one-third of the amount allocated to our zone in April. Unless our allocations are met, a cut to 1000 or 1100 calories will have to be made.

HILLDRING: That figure of 1,275 calories is lower than in any country in Europe, except Italy and portions of the British zone in Germany, where it is down to 1,000 calories. Our daily ration in the United States is about 3,300 calories, and people can't keep alive and healthy for long on less than 1,500.

FISHER: Does that mean, General, that mass starvation will soon begin in Germany?

HILLDRING: Not



-9-

HILLDRING: Not in the sense of people dropping in the streets.

But within a few weeks, diseases of malnutrition will begin to mount. What concerns me most, though, is that democracy just doesn't register with a hungry family.

PETERSEN: We have to bear in mind that the German crop will be only 50 percent of normal this year. The harvest comes late over there. It doesn't really start until September -- which is still four months away. And after that the crops must be processed and transported. ... It's true the Germans are still better off than some of their victims were, at Dachau, for instance. But we don't propose to put all of Germany on Dachau rations. No matter how little sympathy we have for the Germans, we've got to prevent the widespread disease and disorder that inevitably follows hunger. The food riots that have occurred in the British zone can happen to us. If we let the Germans starve, we might as well forget about trying to regenerate them.

FISHER: There have been some stories out of Germany claiming that in recent months, the Nazis are coming back into positions of importance. General Hilldring, what about that?

HILLDRING: There may be a few individual cases which haven't yet been dealt with. But I'd like to point out that we have thrown over 300,000 Nazis out of positions of importance, in the government, industry, the press, and education, in the American zone alone. I can show you press statements and official documents pointing out that de-Nazification has been more vigorously carried out in the American zone than in the other zones.

PETERSEN: Of course, it hasn't been an easy job. Suppose you told the FBI you wanted 18 million people -- about the population of New England plus New York City -- examined for subversive activities. Now, the FBI is a very efficient organization, but it would take considerable time for them to handle a task that large -- especially in a country where the language and the people are strange. Our Military Government has faced  
just



-10-

just such a job. Our officials have handled a total of 1,300,000 cases, and in 15 percent of them the evidence was strong enough to justify stripping the person concerned of his political rights and limiting him to employment at manual labor.

FISHER: It's a pretty impressive record when you put it that way.

... General Hilldring, one American correspondent said recently that there is no master file of Nazis and Nazi sympathizers in Germany. Is that true?

HILLDRING: It was true at one time. But we now have a master file.

We had to piece it together from 90 tons of wreckage we found at Marburg. The files were in a complete mess and it took time to reassemble them. But we have had a master file for nearly three months now. We have used it in two ways. We presented a list of American Nazis to the Kilgore Committee, and we have been employing the file in the de-Nazification program.

FISHER: And what's the next step in that program?

HILLDRING: To turn over as much of this work as we can to trustworthy Germans. Our business is to cleanse the German mind -- to democratize Germany. Now, we can't spoon-feed the German people indefinitely. So local boards are being set up to finish the job of de-Nazification under our strict supervision.

FISHER: But do you think they will really do the job?

HILLDRING: I think the prospects are pretty good, especially since we shall oversee the process, call the tune, and watch every move.

PETERSEN: I think it would be a good idea, General, for you to tell how the final delousing will operate.

HILLDRING: General Clay directed the three provincial Minister-Presidents in the American zone to work out a de-Nazification law. They did -- and General Clay told me that the provisions of the law they produced were even tougher than those Military Government had in mind. The Germans also devised a questionnaire which every adult German in our zone must fill out and sign. These will be checked against our files of Nazis and pro-Nazis. On the basis of this information, the local boards will finish cleaning house, under our supervision.

FISHER: Let's hope they will really catch the hidden Nazis. ... Of course, Mr. Petersen, the conspiracy that was recently uncovered among Nazi youth was not very encouraging.

PETERSEN: That .



-11-

PETERSEN: That was a very limited movement.....To be perfectly frank, Mr. Fisher, it's still too early to expect much underground activity. Most of the Germans are still too busy with the daily problems of living in their devastated country. Problems of food, fuel and shelter come first. But we are not overlooking the possibility of attempts of this kind in the future.

FISHER: That's a fair warning. But General Hilldring, if this is true, wouldn't it be pretty risky to withdraw our troops and depend on a system of inspection to keep the Germans in line, as Secretary Byrnes is said to have proposed in Paris?

HILLDRING: The Secretary's proposal was for a 25-year military alliance to guarantee German disarmament. It did not call for the withdrawal of our forces. But we have got to face the fact that we can't stay in Germany forever...

FISHER: Meanwhile, General, what is being done to reeducate the Germans?

HILLDRING: We're concentrating on reeducation now. I think we can say the schools have been completely screened, and all pro-Nazi teachers thrown out. The worst of the Nazi text books have been eliminated.

FISHER: Mr. Petersen, how do you account for the stubborn Nazi tendencies among German youth?

PETERSEN: What can you expect in a year, Mr. Fisher? Let's not be too naive or too optimistic about this. After all, Hitler was supreme dictator for 12 years. That means a German youth who graduated from the equivalent of high school last year spent his entire student life in Hitler schools, from the day he entered the first grade. There's no magic wand that can purge German youth of Nazi ideas in one year.

HILLDRING: Especially



-12-

HILLDRING: Especially since our Military Government had to spend a good part of that first year de-Nazifying the Germans, destroying military installations, taking custody of Nazi property, restoring loot, repatriating displaced persons and starting a reparations program. We're just entering the period when we can spend a major part of our energy on re-education.

FISHER: Now, General Hilldring, about the elections held last month in the American zone in Germany....

HILLDRING: They were more than anything else, a part of our training program for democracy.

PETERSEN: The Christian Social Union won the election. It is really a party of the center, by our standards. The Communists got only about 5 percent of the vote.

FISHER: There have been some reports that this Christian Social Union has furnished a haven for Nazis and Nazi sympathizers -- such men as Dr. Friederich Schaeffer, who was fired from a key position in the Bavarian government when his Nazi connections were exposed.

PETERSEN: He has also been barred from leadership in the Christian Social Union. All Nazis are prohibited from political activity.

FISHER: Mr. Petersen, one of the most disturbing reports to come out of Germany recently was about conditions in the camps where D.P.'s -- displaced persons -- are kept.

PETERSEN: These people are a matter of grave concern to us. There were a number of criticisms about conditions in the camps shortly after V-E Day, when the Army was in the midst of the tremendous job of maintaining and repatriating about three million displaced persons. I haven't heard such criticism recently. Conditions in the Jewish camps were investigated not long ago by Judge Simon Rifkind, General McNerney's advisor on Jewish affairs.

FISHER: What



-13-

FISHER: What did he have to say?

PETERSEN: His report was very favorable. He said that Jewish displaced persons were allowed broad freedom of movement and their camps were more like communities than concentration camps. He spoke of "the Army's warm-heartedness in dealing with all displaced persons." He cited, for example, the fact that the Army had gone to great trouble to provide plane service to bring in much needed instructors and supplies from Palestine to help in the rehabilitation of the Jewish displaced persons.

FISHER: Are the displaced persons getting enough to eat?

PETERSEN: As far as food is concerned, they're comparatively well off. Up to this month, they were getting 2,300 calories a day, and they're still getting 2,000 calories.

FISHER: It isn't primarily a matter of food, though, as I understand it.

PETERSEN: No, they're bitter about having to remain in the camps, and understandably so. They've had such a terrible existence, and seen so much horror, that you can hardly expect them to react any other way. Of course, conditions in the camps are far from ideal, but the real problem is not the day-to-day living conditions of these people, but their uncertainty as to their future. The only solution for the Jewish displaced persons is to give them some assurance of a reasonable life outside of Germany and outside of Europe. Almost all observers have pointed out that most of the Jewish D.P.'s want to go to Palestine. As long as they continue to remain in camps in Germany even under the best of conditions, there is an increased danger of breakdown of morale, violent protests and even large scale suicides.

FISHER: Hasn't there been a certain amount of friction between the American G.I.'s and the displaced persons?

PETERSEN: Yes, there have been a few minor incidents, but we're doing our best to avoid them. We have a program of education, to help our soldiers understand the problems of these refugees.

FISHER: In



-14-

FISHER: In that connection, Mr. Petersen, I'd like to ask you about the rather alarming reports concerning the morale of our occupation forces.

PETERSEN: There's been a good deal of exaggeration in these stories of low morale. We've had our troubles, of course -- mainly because of the tremendous turnover of personnel. We've had to demobilize so rapidly that a certain amount of confusion was inevitable. We had green men, new units with new officers, men who hadn't been welded together in combat. They haven't been together long enough to develop any pride in their units.

FISHER: Couldn't they have been indoctrinated a little better, so they would understand the importance of their assignment?

PETERSEN: With the rapid demobilization and the hurried need for replacements, we haven't had much time for indoctrination, but we are working on it. General McNarney has an excellent orientation program under way. Conditions should improve from here on in. General Eisenhower, speaking of conditions in the Pacific, recently said that the morale and efficiency of the Army has passed the low point and is definitely on the upswing. I think that is true of Germany, too.

FISHER: That's encouraging...Now, getting back to the policy-making side of the German question, General Hilldring, I'd like to ask you to tell us a little about your Occupied Areas office in the State Department. Isn't this a new setup?

HILLDRING: Yes, for the first time a single office has been charged by the Secretary of State with coordinating all State Department policy for occupied enemy territories -- not only Germany, but Austria, Japan and Korea as well. Our purpose is to establish clearly the leadership of the State Department in policy making.

FISHER: Mr. Petersen, I don't suppose the War Department begrudges the State Department this responsibility....

PETERSEN: Quite



-15-

PETERSEN: Quite the contrary, Mr. Fisher. We're delighted with the new alignment. The War Department never wanted responsibility for policy, and we are happy that General Hilldring's office has been created.

FISHER: General Hilldring, has this new arrangement given rise to any reorganization in the State Department?

HILLDRING: No fundamental changes. It's mainly a matter of coordinating the activities of each division that deals with occupied territories, and directing their activities toward a common objective. The work of the State Department's political, economic and information branches has to be coordinated. You can't deal with any major problem without these three. Unless their work is brought together somewhere near the top, disagreement will retard the emergence of sound policy. But with coordination at the top, you get policy and you get it on time.

FISHER: Then, Mr. Petersen, your representatives are charged with executing or administering State Department policy.

PETERSEN: That's right. A policy decision goes first to "SWNCC", the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, on which I am the War Department member and General Hilldring represents the State Department as Chairman. From there the policy is passed on -- in the case of Germany -- to "OMGUS" for execution.

FISHER: You're overwhelming us with initials, Mr. Petersen. What is OMGUS?

PETERSEN: "Office of Military Government, U. S. Zone". There are about 5000 Military Government personnel in the American zone under General Clay. The War Department has tried to get State to take responsibility for these forces. At one time a date was even set for the transfer -- June 1. We felt that a single agency should handle both policy and administration of military government.

HILLDRING: I



-16-

HILLDRING: I had long urged State Department responsibility for Military Government, as a soldier and an individual.

FISHER: Why then, General Hilldring, hasn't the State Department taken over the whole works?

HILLDRING: The Department didn't feel able to take on an additional job of such magnitude. So the War Department's Civil Affairs Division will continue to administer Military Government in Germany.

FISHER: But, General, what about the decision to introduce civilian control of military government?

HILLDRING: The War and State Departments are agreed on eventual civilianization. This means that a civilian administrator in Berlin will report to a civilian agency in Washington. Of course, in the meantime the replacement of military government officers by civilians is also going on rapidly....

PETERSEN: As a matter of fact, by June 30, two-thirds of our Military Government personnel will be civilians.

HILLDRING: But some military personnel will stay on, of course. There are some things they can do best -- such as looking after public safety and civilian supplies...One thing I'd like to make clear is, Military Government is quite separate and distinct from the occupation forces. General McNarney heads both the occupation forces and the Military Government of Germany.

FISHER: Isn't it a little awkward to have this division of responsibility in Germany?

HILLDRING: Not at all. The occupation forces are merely a reserve of police power, to back up the authority of Military Government. This division of functions is nothing new. For 30 years we had a civilian Governor General in the Philippine Islands, and also a large military garrison -- commanded for many years by General MacArthur. As soon as a civilian takes over military government, the situation in Germany will be similar to that. General McNarney will then be the Commander of the Occupation Forces.

FISHER: Mr. Petersen



-17-

FISHER: Mr. Petersen, how large are those forces today?

PETERSEN: I don't know about today, Mr. Fisher, but a week or two ago our forces in Europe totaled about 400,000.

FISHER: Mostly in Germany, I suppose.

PETERSEN: Well, there are about 60,000 American troops in Italy and Austria, and nearly all the rest are in Germany -- about 340,000. We will bring this figure down to 300,000 by next June 30, and we expect to make further reductions during the year following.

FISHER: Aren't those pretty modest figures considering the policing job they have to do?

PETERSEN: Of course they are. We could do a better job in almost all fields if we had more manpower. That is why we are so terribly concerned about the recent sham extension of the draft. I say "sham" because it forbids us to induct the only substantial group that is available, the 18 and 19 year olds. We fear we will not be able to meet even our minimum requirements in Germany.

HILLDRING: Our job is to make sure that Germany will never again be a threat to the peace of the world. We've got to have manpower to do that.

FISHER: In short, then, in one year Military Government in Germany has made great headway in cleaning out the Nazis and setting up a master plan for a peaceful Germany. Some problems are still to be solved -- such as getting a degree of centralized control in the essential services, getting enough food to maintain life and a minimum of order in Germany, getting the displaced persons resettled, and re-educating German youth. Is that about it, Mr. Petersen?

PETERSEN: Yes -- and let me add that what we've done in Germany has to be viewed in perspective -- in the light of the time we've had, and of the 4-power division of Germany. Our first job was to get life going again, on some sort of

bare-bones



-18-

bare-bones level. We're over the hump on that, if we can get the food we need. We're just getting to the point where we can turn our full attention to some of the more complicated problems-- such as re-education. My own notion is, a whole set of ideas completely opposite to ours is embedded in the mores of the German people, in their thinking and their way of life. It will take many years to change these ideas.

HILLDRING: We might as well face it: This is not a job we can do in one year, or two, or five. It may take a generation. The American public must approach this task with understanding, patience and vigor.

ANNOUNCER: That was the Assistant Secretary of State John H. Hilldring. He has been discussing "Germany and the Occupation" with Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Petersen and Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air. The discussion was adapted for radio by Seldon Menefee.

Next week we shall present a broadcast on "Our Policy in China", with John Carter Vincent, Director of the State Department's Office of Far Eastern Affairs; Representative Walter Judd of Minnesota; and Representative Hugh DeLacy of the State of Washington. The program will originate at a meeting of the Foreign Policy Association in Springfield, Massachusetts.

In succeeding weeks we expect to present a special series on the United Nations, dealing with the following topics:

- The United Nations in Action
- The World Food Crisis
- World Education for Peace
- Do We Need A World Government?
- World Maritime Problems
- The Trusteeship Issue
- The Problem of Southeast Asia
- Spain and the United Nations
- Oil and International Relations
- The Future of Our Dependencies
- The Coming International Trade Conference
- Freedom of the Airways
- The New International Court

Officials



-19-

ANNOUNCER: Officials of the United Nations, the State Department  
(Cont'd)  
and other government agencies, and Members of Congress, will  
discuss these important subjects. If you have questions  
which you would like to have us ask the participants, please  
send them to OUR FOREIGN POLICY, Box 30, Station J. New York  
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Department of State

Departmental Announcement 205  
(Classification 134)\*RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR  
OCCUPIED AREAS IN RESPECT TO THE FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

I PURPOSE. The purpose of this announcement is to define the responsibility of the Department of State and the Assistant Secretary for Occupied Areas, and to outline the channels of communication for the Far Eastern Commission (FEC).

II RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. Subject to the direction of the President, the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretaries of War and Navy through the mechanism of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), is responsible for the formulation and coordination of policy for the United States in respect to matters coming before or considered by the Far Eastern Commission. The instructions of the Secretary of State as to such matters shall govern the United States member of the Far Eastern Commission and shall be communicated to him as hereafter provided.

III RESPONSIBILITY OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR OCCUPIED AREAS. The Assistant Secretary for Occupied Areas (A-H) shall be directly responsible to the Secretary of State for the coordination of United States Government policy falling within the jurisdiction of the FEC.

IV CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION. The only official channel of communication for the Far Eastern Commission to U. S. Government agencies shall be through the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas.

Without restriction upon the right of the U. S. member of the FEC to consult such departments and agencies of the government as he deems appropriate, all formal requests by the U. S. member of the FEC, of any U. S. Government agency, for consideration of policy matters shall be forwarded through the Assistant Secretary for Occupied Areas, and all formal policy opinions or decisions emanating from SWNCC, the Department of State, or any other U. S. Government agency, shall be communicated to the United States member of the FEC through the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Occupied Areas.

The Assistant Secretary for Occupied Areas, as Chairman of SWNCC, shall be responsible for the initiation in SWNCC, or any appropriate subcommittee thereof, of action on such policy matters before the FEC as may in his judgment require concerted discussion or action by the three Departments.

\*TO BE FILED IN MANUAL OF DEPARTMENTAL REGULATIONS UNDER THE CLASSIFICATION SHOWN ABOVE UNTIL THE MATERIAL IS COVERED IN A DEPARTMENTAL REGULATION

(9-20-46)



BULLETIN

November 10, 1946

**NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE***by Perry N. Jester, F.S.O.*

*The creation of the National War College for the joint training of carefully selected officers in the higher ranks of all the armed services and of the Department of State and the American Foreign Service has established a matrix for the shaping of leadership for the years to come by bringing together the ingredients of proved capacity, experience, knowledge, and a vision of tomorrow in the terms of national welfare.*

The two great world wars of this century and the interval of peace or semi-peace between them have dramatically emphasized numerous fundamental requirements for both the victorious waging of war under modern conditions and the hoped-for successful conduct of peace, in a world in which time and space factors have suddenly diminished while all other operational factors have, during the same period, increased enormously in their complexity. Few of these fundamental requirements are more outstanding in their basic importance or in the far-reaching character of their implications than the following:

First, the necessity for extensive and continuous training for all positions of leadership right up to the highest level in both military and political spheres; and

Secondly, the need for greater and more effective

integration of effort and understanding on the part of all the services which operate to protect the national interest both in war and in peace. More simply described, the first requirement is the need for higher competence in command positions in situations of greater complexity, and the second, the need for more effective teamwork between services of varied backgrounds and functions.

These needs were pointed up more sharply than ever before in the second World War by the more extensive use of joint and combined staff work among the several fighting services at various levels of command and, as the war progressed, by the inclusion on some of these staffs of political advisers or political assistants representing the principal political and administrative authority of our Government in the field of foreign affairs, namely, the Department of State.



As now seen in retrospect, the record of our efforts for peace in the years between the two world wars might have been more fruitful if there had been closer working relations and a closer integration of policy between the political forces of our Government and the armed forces. It is now the opportunity of the present to correct the omissions of the past.

Building on the experience of many decades in the operation of the Army War College and the Naval War College and in view of the new emphasis in World War II on joint operations and the need for joint training in the higher echelons of command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in June 1943 established the Army and Navy Staff College. The purpose was to provide an organizational focus for the simultaneous training and indoctrination of ranking officers of all the armed services. This joint effort in training proved to be highly successful not only as an educational and training activity in itself but also as a contribution to the better integration of staff work and field operations between the several fighting services.

The experiences of the war, and even more the global requirements of our Government in the aftermath of the war, indicated the further desirability and even necessity not only of continuing such joint training on the command levels but of seeking better understanding as well between the various levels of high command in the armed forces and comparable positions of authority and responsibility in the Department of State and the Foreign Service of the United States.

Accordingly, in January 1946 the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed the establishment of a combined institution for the joint training of carefully selected officers in the higher ranks of all the armed services and of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. On February 1, 1946, the Secretary of State agreed to the joint sponsorship of the new institution by the Department of State together with the War Department and the Navy Department and to the active participation of the organizations under his authority.

Planning went forward rapidly for an early beginning of actual training operations. The in-

terests of the Department and the Foreign Service in these initial negotiations were represented by the Director of the Office of the Foreign Service, Selden Chapin. Outstanding authorities in many fields, leading educators, and representatives of the great universities of the country were consulted in the formulation of the curriculum. The name, "National War College", was adopted, probably as the result of the taking over of the facilities of the old Army War College which had ceased to function as an institution during the war. On June 30, 1946 the Army and Navy Staff College also discontinued its independent status, and its staff, faculty, and functions were taken over by the new National War College, which began its official existence on July 1, 1946.

The announcement of plans for the establishment of a joint training institution for ranking officers of the three Departments and the services under their jurisdiction was widely acclaimed in the press of the nation as a forward step of great significance.

The National War College is admirably located in the buildings and grounds of the old Army War College, which was developed on the site of Fort Humphreys at Greenleaf Point where the Anacostia River and the Washington Channel come together, just a short distance from the junction of the former with the Potomac River. A well-developed library, gymnasium, and other facilities serve the needs of the faculty, staff, and students.

On the same grounds and associated with the National War College in its joint training activities is the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, which, as the name implies, has a more specialized function.

There has thus been created, under the direct authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with the full participation of the Department of State, a new high-level training institution which constitutes the apex of the training organizations and command schools in the several services, such as the Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; the Air University, Maxwell Field, Alabama; the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia; the Naval War College, Newport,



Rhode Island; and the Foreign Service Institute which was recently authorized by Congress to take over the training functions of the personnel of the American Foreign Service and the Department of State.

The Commandant of the National War College is Vice Admiral Harry W. Hill, U.S.N., former Commandant of the Army and Navy Staff College. Deputy Commandants are Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, U.S.A., and Brig. Gen. T. H. Landon, Army Air Forces. George F. Kennan, F.S.O., who was until recently Counselor of the American Embassy at Moscow, is Deputy for Foreign Affairs. The collaboration of the Department of State and the Foreign Service in this joint training venture is under the general supervision of Donald Russell, the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration.

The initial course of the National War College began on September 3, 1946, with a class composed of 30 Army Ground officers, 30 Army Air Force officers, 30 Naval officers, and 10 Foreign Service officers. In addition, there are 90 part-time students of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. The students are senior officers of the four services who have been carefully selected from among those who have qualifications for high command. The ranks of the Army officers attending are made up of brigadier generals and colonels, the Navy officers have the rank of captain, and the Foreign Service officers are principally of classes II to IV. These ranks represent officers with 15 to 20 years of experience in each of the several services.

The Department of State and the Foreign Service are represented in this first class of officer-trainees by the following Foreign Service officers: William P. Cochran, Jr., John M. Cabot, Raymond A. Hare, Perry N. Jester, Foy D. Kohler, John J. MacDonald, Carmel Offie, Charles W. Thayer, William C. Trimble, and Walter N. Walmsley.

The first semester, from September 3 until December 20, is devoted primarily to politico-military subjects, with special attention to the integration of our foreign policy with our military policy. Detailed study will also be directed to the foreign

policy of the United States in all its regional aspects and to its relation to the foreign policies of other major powers. The impact of the atomic age upon international and military problems will be investigated and discussed. Problems of national defense will be covered with special attention to the United Nations, the aims and objectives of other nations, methods of pressure and adjustment between nations in accordance with international law, customary procedures in the past, and possible procedures in the future. Members of the class will be assigned problems of the type which are being continually handled by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

The second semester, from January 2 until June 21, will be devoted to problems of military strategy and joint operations, chiefly from the viewpoint of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Theater Commander. The impact of new weapons on future warfare will be studied. Analytical studies will be assigned covering specific operations and problems encountered in World War II. Special emphasis will be placed to determine the procedures on a national level which will utilize effectively scientific methods and scientific organizations.

Instruction will be principally by the lecture system, with committee studies, reports, and analyses by individual students. Extensive use will be made of problems in which realistic situations will be assumed and solutions will be required by student groups.

Members of the faculty have been and will be drawn chiefly from the larger universities, the armed forces, and the Department of State. Among the distinguished civilian members of the faculty are Professor Hardy C. Dillard, University of Virginia, who serves as director of studies; Professors Bernard Brodie and Sherman Kent, Yale University, and Professor Walter L. Wright, Jr., Princeton University. Prominent scientists, professors, and other civilian specialists have been and are being invited to deliver lectures.

Among the notable lecturers from without the faculty addressing the students of the National War College during the first month of its initial course (September 1946) were the following persons:



Dr. W. A. McNail, director, Bell Telephone Laboratories; Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, U. S. A.; Dr. Carleton J. Hayes, Columbia University; Dr. Charles A. Thomas, vice president, Monsanto Chemical Co.; Dr. Edward M. Earle, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N. J.; Mr. John M. Hancock, War Resources Board; Senator Brien McMahon, United States Senate; Dr. James B. Conant, president, Harvard University; Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, University of California; Mr. Joseph Barnes, foreign editor, New York *Herald Tribune*; Professor Harold J. Laski, University of London, England; Field Marshal Viscount Bernard L. Montgomery of Alamein; Dr. Jacob Viner, Princeton University; Vice Admiral Russell Willson, U.S.N.; Professor Arnold Oscar Wolfers, Yale University; Professor Grayson Louis Kirk, Columbia University; Professor Philip C. Jessup, Columbia University; Professor Denis William Brogan, Cambridge University, England; Professor Harold Sprout, Princeton University; Dr. Isaiah Bowman, president, Johns Hopkins University.

There has thus been founded a college which in itself takes rank as the highest-level educational institution of the United States Government, and an organization where, under skilled guidance, the defense of the United States, the protection of its interests, and the furtherance of its policy may be jointly studied and possibly furthered by officers of those services which are called upon to implement such policy both in times of war and in times of peace. It would be a mistake, however, to regard this process and probable result as arising solely from the study of books or the expounding of themes. The by-products of the association of this group of officers, in terms of reciprocal friendship and mutual regard, loom large in the thinking of its planners. As usual in complex human affairs, the imponderables may be decisive. The hours spent in athletic pursuits, although brief, in relaxation together, and the opportunity afforded for the cross-fertilization of ideas arising from different modes of past training and experience, may lay the foundation for vital cooperation in the interests of the nation in days to come.

It would also be a mistake to view the objective of this joint training as a preparation for war.

On the contrary, the emphasis rests on the discovery of means for the maintenance of peace. In this sense, the institution is unsuitably named. It should be called, at least, the National Defense College or College of National Security. In this sense also, the contribution of the Department of State may well be constructive and forceful.

Lastly, it would be a mistake to assume that the method of approach to the problems posed by these objectives is confined to an over-intensive study of the past or to an emphasis on the differences which have, up to the present, divided and separated these varied services. The purpose of the institution is to orient this carefully selected cadre of officers into the requirements of the future, into the demands of times unborn; and a premium is therefore placed on imagination, foresight, and the ability to learn to pull together as one high command team.

There is one final observation which arises from a consideration of the importance of this new institution. A matrix has been established for the shaping of leadership for the years to come, by bringing together the ingredients of proved capacity, experience, knowledge, and a vision of the needs of tomorrow in terms of national welfare. It is therefore quite within the realm of possibility that this college may afford the mechanism for bringing together on a very high level the requirements of national policy and strategy as seen by the armed services; the long-range planning in the field of international relations which will be carried out by the Department of State and the Foreign Service; the specific training and background preparation in that field which will be developed by the Foreign Service Institute; the considerations of national welfare in the domestic field as these may be interpreted by the other Departments of the executive branch of the Government; and the equally useful participation of political leaders from the Congress of the United States who are concerned with both domestic and foreign issues. In this joint effort, there may be found in the National War College a suitable meeting-place for the contributions of many minds and many types of experience to the problems which surround the achievement of peace and the path of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for millions of Americans.

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(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State

No. 75

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS AND RADIO NEWS CONFERENCE,  
TUESDAY, JANUARY 7, 1946

At his press and radio news conference this afternoon Secretary Byrnes, when asked the purpose of General Spaak's visit, said he could not answer that question.

ANTARCTIC

Secretary Byrnes, when asked if the United States favored the suggestion that an international conference be called to settle various nations' claims in the Antarctic, said that on December 27 Mr. Acheson had made a statement with reference to that subject which fully covered the matter. (See Press Release No. 936) Mr. Byrnes said that with all the conferences that were being held concerning important things in world affairs, it would not be essential to immediately call a conference on the Antarctic question. He explained that the United States Government had never formally asserted any claim, although claims had been asserted in its behalf by American citizens.

GERMAN PEACE TREATY

When asked if the United States would support Ambassador Lange's suggestion that the German peace treaty be signed at Warsaw, Secretary Byrnes stated that no consideration had been given to the signing of the peace treaty at any specific place.

A correspondent wished to know if the Department had received from the Soviet Union any information concerning the number of American correspondents who would be permitted to attend the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Moscow. The Secretary said we had received no information on this matter but as soon as it did Mr. McDermott would make it public without waiting for a press conference. The Secretary, when questioned if he had ever been asked by the American correspondents in Berlin to take up at Moscow the question of granting correspondents the privilege of moving in all the zones of Germany, particularly the Soviet zone, explained that the request was not made to him in the Department although it did appear in the newspapers.

ARGENTINA

When asked about Ambassador Messersmith's return to United States, Mr. Byrnes said that he was discussing with the Ambassador the proposal submitted to Congress in the last session by the President, which asked for authority to supply arms to the South American governments out of surplus property, a proposal which is now being reviewed in the Department by the SWINC organization. Mr. Byrnes explained that the representatives of State, War and Navy Departments were considering this proposal in the light of changed conditions in order to determine whether or not the President should again submit it to Congress.



-2-

When a correspondent asked if the supplying of arms to Argentina was a general question; Mr. Byrnes answered in the affirmative and said that, according to the War Department, forty-three per cent of the arms and weapons were in surplus and further investigations were being made in order to conclude from the estimates just what the costs would be and so on. He explained that until the costs, etc., were determined no decision could be made on this question.

The Secretary, when asked what President Peron had to do in order to fulfill the State Department's demands for compliance with inter-American commitments, referred the correspondents to the April 8 statement on this matter.

#### SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIAL

A correspondent asked Mr. Byrnes if the State Department had answered the Soviet Union's request to hand over to their authorities the former Soviet official in Mexico, Kyril Alexeiev, who supposedly was seeking refuge in the United States. A correspondent also wanted to know if the United States had an extradition treaty with the Soviet Union. Mr. Byrnes said that we had no such treaty and that the Soviet request had been presented on Saturday afternoon and the Department officials had it under study, but as yet had not reported on it.

#### PREMIER DE GASPERI

When asked what progress had been made in the talks with Premier de Gasperi, the Secretary stated that the Premier was talking to various Government officials concerning various matters. He explained that in a general way he had talked to the Secretary about Italy's desire to buy additional Liberty ships on the same terms they bought some a few months ago. Mr. Byrnes said he also wished to discuss Italy's situation in regard to food and coal. Mr. Byrnes went on to say that the Premier was discussing with the directors of the Export-Import Bank the question of a loan, although he did not know the status of those conversations. When asked if he could give Mr. de Gasperi any specific promise as yet for any particular type of help, the Secretary said no, because the shipping matter, for instance, had to be referred to the Maritime Commission. He explained that he did not know of any specific promises which had been made to Mr. de Gasperi but, he said, conversations were proceeding this afternoon. When asked if the Secretary anticipated giving Mr. de Gasperi any such specific promises before he left, Mr. Byrnes said he hoped to be able to do so. A correspondent asked if the Premier was discussing the peace treaty and the Secretary replied that the Premier had not made any statement on that subject to him.

When asked if the National Advisory Council had cleared the principle of an Italian loan, Mr. Byrnes answered in the negative and explained that if it had been discussed or determined he did not know of it. He stated that he had not been advised that Mr. de Gasperi had been to the International Bank, although



-3-

he was having a conference with the Export-Import Bank.

CHINA

Secretary Byrnes, when asked if it was anticipated General Marshall would return to China when he completed his personal report, said that the situation in China would be reviewed when the General arrived in this country and his return would be a matter of determination by the General, the President and the Secretary of State after the situation has been reviewed.

POLAND

Mr. Byrnes, when asked to comment on the free election situation in Poland, released context of a note addressed to the Soviet and British Governments concerning the subject. (See Press Release No. 12) When asked if this note involved the possibility of supervising the elections, Mr. Byrnes replied in the negative and said it was merely keeping the records straight.

TRIESTE

A correspondent, referring to the Security Council action which called attention to the Trieste statute, asked if this Government was ready to put forth any nominations for Governor. Mr. Byrnes said that we had been considering the matter but that he was not in a position to make any statement about it. He explained that the matter had been considered ever since he returned and we wished to take care of it as soon as possible in order to save delay.





## It's time for plain talk about home buying

ARE YOU considering a deal on a home? A bigger, nicer house for your growing family . . . or an all new wonder-home . . . or just anything with a roof that you can call your own? Take sixty seconds, please, to review the common-sense rules of home buying—reprinted here as a friendly public service.

Nobody could know better than we do how separate you are to get those papers signed. Let us say to you earnestly: *take time for one long, slow, careful thought before you sign.* And to safeguard your money, your home and your happiness, abide by these time-tested rules:

**1. Don't Buy "Over Your Head".** You simply can't make it good business to assume a \$15,000 mortgage on a \$3,000 income. The debt you take on should be not more than two-and-a-half or three times your present or anticipated annual income.

**2. Don't Make Monthly Payments Too High.** If you make \$300 a month and pay \$125 on your contract, the law of averages says you will lose your home. A good, safe rule (proved by our own experience of more than a half a century) is—not more than 25% of your monthly income for principal, interest and taxes.

**3. Pay Down As Much As You Can.** The bigger the down payment, the more interest you save. On a \$9,000 home, paying \$47.55 monthly, you actually save \$1,359 in interest by making a \$3,000 down payment, as compared to \$1,500 down. And you own your home five years sooner.

**4. Get Professional Advice** from your mortgage banker, lawyer, architect, contractor or realtor on matters involved in buying. It's too big a deal—and too technical—for amateur guesswork.

Viewing every application in the light of these rules, Investors Syndicate is currently making real estate loans amounting to about two million dollars every week. If you want personal attention, it is available through our loan correspondents located in principal cities of the United States and Canada. Write us, if you wish, for the name of our correspondent nearest to you.

### INVESTORS SYNDICATE

One of America's leading makers of home loans

Robert E. Macgregor, President

MINNEAPOLIS 2, MINNESOTA



LIFE Magazine 1946



## It's time for plain talk about home buying

Are you considering a deal on a home? A nicer house for your growing family . . . or a new wonder-home . . . or just anything with a roof that you can call your own? Take a few seconds, please, to review the common-sense rules of home buying—reprinted here as a public service.

Nobody could know better than we do how important it is to get those papers signed. We say to you earnestly: *take time for one slow, careful thought before you sign.* And to guard your money, your home and your peace of mind, abide by these time-tested rules:

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**2. Don't Make Monthly Payments Too High.**

If you make \$300 a month and pay \$125 on your contract, the law of averages says you will lose your home. A good, safe rule (proved by our own experience of more than a half a century) is—not more than 25% of your monthly income for principal, interest and taxes.

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**MILES GLACIER COMES TO END, TOPPLING  
200-FOOT PINNACLES OF ICE INTO A LAKE**



# THE STATE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Rebuilt after demobilization, they give us security for five y  
But the uncertain future is in the hands of the scien

by CHARLES J. V. MURPHY

**P**ROBLEM X: A certain government having broken the peace, and the Security Council of the United Nations having assigned to the U.S. a leading role in putting down the aggressor, how would the U.S. ground commander, in the face of the enemy's given dispositions, go about securing a beachhead?

Fort Leavenworth, Kan., on the green hills overlooking the Missouri, is a kindly place in which to study war. Shady elms and oaks. Well-kept lawns. Solid red-brick buildings. In one of them, in a quiet and tidy classroom, a colonel's chalk deployed imaginary battalions over the blackboard while his instructor's voice grated, with the gravelly thrust of a landing barge, among the assumptions. This was the last war class to pass through the Command and Staff College. When selected, it was expected to cope directly with the command problems of a going war. But before the class ever reached Leavenworth that war was over, and in July, as it wound up its studies, the blackboards were reasserting the axiom that for a great power history never rests.

Half a continent away, at Fort Bragg in the North Carolina hills, many of the jerry-built barracks are boarded up. The paint is peeling off the walls; the stoops are rotting away. But in the heat and sand the famous 82nd Airborne Division is once more in training. Its strength is down to 4,000 against an authorized 13,000 men. But recruits and veterans alike have a gleam in their eyes; they are working diligently at their exotic trade, as diligently as anybody else in the country; and their 39-year-old commander, Major General James M. Gavin, says with a zealot's fire, "The only authoritative textbooks in this racket will be written by us."

At Fort Knox, Ky., some 95,000 Americans were initiated into the art of armored warfare. The gentle hills that rise up from the Ohio have been chewed bare by the tanks; half a foot of fine, dry, sifting dust covers the practice fields. Last spring the Armored School was virtually deserted. But nowadays a coppery cloud of dust billowing into the hot summer sky over the testing grounds testifies to the fact that it has reopened for business. At Camp Hood, Texas is the famous 2nd Armored Division, part of the General Reserve, with an authorized strength of 10,000 men. Last spring, home from the great battles of North Africa, Sicily and the European continent, it could muster only 60 men—not enough to form a headquarters staff. But it is now filled out with recruits; it has resumed training.

The point of all this is the simple one: the pathology of demobilization has run its course; the Army has got a fairly firm grip on its affairs back upon the process, we see for the first time what a hair-raisingly lunatic, business it really was. If the rise of American military organization, one of the monumental acts of organization of modern times, its breakdown was an equally colossal exercise in disorganization—General Eisenhower's bitter term, "disintegration."

The low point was reached last April when, under the point system Eisenhower found himself "running out of Army" while Congress was under the responsibility of writing a new draft law. The magnificent 8,309,000 men (including Air Forces), which at its flood tide numbered 12,000,000, did not at that moment have one fit to fight.

But it was not merely a case of running out of "bodies." The U.S. military machine was built around technicians; when they departed the machine stopped. In the Army Air Forces the over-all efficiency of crack combat units plunged to 10%; hardly a group was technically or emotionally fit to fight. The Navy was but little better off. The Atlantic fleet was almost upside down to produce a couple of electronics technician's manuals in North Carolina and Washington before they left on the summer cruises.

To professional soldiers this haphazard dissolution was a tragedy—a voluntary liquidation of an empire of power. Yet neither Congress nor the citizen is likely ever to regret the decision. Under a democracy a different course was possible. The citizen soldier fulfilled his obligation by going to the enemy; it was the nation's duty to return him, with the least delay, to his ordinary life. And, by and large, the compact has been kept—about 7,700,000 men discharged from the Army since V-E Day, 3,000,000 from the Navy since V-J Day.

So now the only questions that really mean anything are: Who stands? Is the nation really secure? Is it strong enough in the military to fulfill its international commitments and to maintain its present world still largely influenced by power and, to a considerable extent, under arms?

The optimum of postwar strength of the U.S. Army as of July 1945 has been fixed at about 1,070,000 men, of whom about 400,000 are to

## RISING U.S. MILITARY LEADERS ARE CHIEFLY AIR-MIND



**VICE ADMIRAL BLANDY**, 56, deputy chief of naval operations, is in charge of new weapons. He has 37 years of Navy service, headed bureau of ordnance during the war, ran Bikini atomic bomb tests.



**MAJOR GENERAL LEMAY**, 39, deputy chief of the air staff for research and development, is tough ex-commander of the 20th Air Force. LeMay directed the highly successful B-29 raids against Japan.



**VICE ADMIRAL RADFORD**, 50, deputy chief of naval operations for air, is carrier expert, skilled in supporting land operations. During the war he led task force operating in Japanese home waters.



**VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN**, deputy chief of naval operations, aviation expert. In 1941 he was aboard the *Wasp*, sunk by Japs. Later he planned for the attack on Pearl Harbor.







Air Forces. The Navy has settled on 500,000 men, plus 100,000 in the Marine Corps. At the moment both services have considerably more men, but they are being brought down rapidly as occupation chores (which currently require more than 800,000 troops) diminish, as unneeded bases are shut down and the leftover material is worked off.

Thus the U.S. peacetime military establishment will require nearly 1,700,000 regulars—a puny force alongside the 13,000,000 mobilized for war but five times as big as the prewar one. Backing up the regular establishments are to be a National Guard of 25 ground and two armored divisions (about 592,000 men) and a combined air reserve of 57,000 men in the National Guard and 26,100 in the Navy air groups. Congress actually appropriated nearly \$11,500,000,000 for military purposes for the current fiscal year—nearly \$7,300,000,000 for the Army, \$4,200,000,000 for the Navy. This was just about all they asked for and is 10 times the average prewar military budget. However Mr. Truman a few weeks ago, in a panicky effort to balance the budget, blocked part of the sums, throwing the program into confusion.

Even the original program was none too large for the world's No. 1 power, with commitments all over the globe. It is, or was, the product, as General Eisenhower recently pointed out, of several optimistic assumptions: that the U.S. will not be involved in a war in the foreseeable future; the Germans and Japanese will remain well-behaved, and the big powers in the Security Council will remain friends.

Any other assumption would mean a return to quasi mobilization—a matter not for the armed services but for Congress to decide. Furthermore the fact that American military strength has melted away among the people does not mean that Mr. Byrnes is playing the international poker game with hollow chips. So far as any immediate danger is concerned, practically all the skills and resources that made the U.S. the most mobile and most heavily armed power on earth, though widely dispersed, are still in existence—subject, of course, to natural depreciation; an airman turned lawyer can deteriorate, as a military asset, quite as rapidly as a crated glider. And there still remain the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic moats. The interim fleet, though scarcely one seventh its wartime size, will have nearly 300 major fighting ships. The Navy insists that, despite a severe shortage in all technician categories, it is an effective force. There will at all times be in ready reserve

in each ocean a complete fleet capable of going into action in 30 interim Army Air Forces will consist of 70 air groups. On the ground in the air the U.S. has no peer and as long as this is true no one will ever attack us.


However this comfortable advantage is not likely to persist in the long run. The general opinion is that our present margin is good for a few years. Five years is presumably enough for knowledge of the atomic bomb to become general and for other first-class nations to build up their stock of weapons. In the interim if the United Nations is not formed, in any sense, the U.S. will have to reorganize its military machine according to a new set of assumptions. The interim force now being formed must therefore be regarded, in General Eisenhower's phrase, as an "interim" force for the interim gap affair.

This interim force, as we have said, has begun to put on flesh. The interim Air Forces, after expanding to 70 groups for war, then shrinking back to 30 for peace, is forming new groups on a skeletal basis) at the rate of one every two months. The Navy is being established on the traditional volunteer basis. The Army, for its part, has raised since V-J Day more than 1,000,000 recruits, largest volunteer force in the world. But unless the draft is tightened, it is certain to be in a substantial deficit after the present term enlistments begin to run out.

As to quality, it seems highly probable that the officers in the interim force are diligent and zealous. They include pride in a calling which requires apology. There is a widespread complaint that under a pay scale which allows Army colonels and majors to obtain only \$4,400 in base pay it is hard to hold men with a gift of leadership or having a special knack. On the other hand the junior officers who have elected to pursue military careers are a full cut above the prewar average.

Meanwhile the services are under new commanders but the continuity have been scarcely disturbed. Marshall, King and Arnold have passed the way to Eisenhower, Nimitz and Spaatz. But the transfer was accomplished by a symbolic laying on of hands. The link with orthodoxy is supplied by the venerable Admiral Leahy, chief of staff to President Truman, a lieutenant to Roosevelt, and senior to all the chiefs of staff. During the war he spoke into the President's ear the last word—a dogmatic and somewhat intolerant word—on the U.S. strategic position. He is 69 years old.

CONTINUED ON



Above is a supersonic guided missile, the weapon of future war. The U.S. already has a design for this weapon. But do we have the men, the matériel and scientific knowledge necessary to produce such weapons for war? Will our military minds know how to use them? Can we keep the present advantage which the atomic bomb has given us? Charles J. V. Murphy, who covered the last war from the strategic airman's point of view and who studied postwar developments, gives some hard, factual answers to these questions.


## CONCERNED WITH WEAPONS AND STRATEGY OF FUTURE



**MAJOR GENERAL NORSTAD**, 39, bright young man of AAF during war as Pentagon director of 20th Air Force, is now director of plans and operations.



**MAJOR GENERAL AURAND**, 52, heads Army's new Research and Development division. A wartime ordnance and supply expert, he is now supervising creation of new



**LIEUT. GENERAL VANDENBERG**, 47, is the over-all intelligence chief. He has Army, Navy and State Department personnel on his staff, hopes to centralize intelligence activities.



**MAJOR GENERAL GRUENT** is deputy commander, National War College, where qualified officers are trained in strategy. During war, he planned operations in Italy as chief of staff of Fifth Army.



Navy has settled on 500,000 men, plus 100,000 in the Marine Corps. At the moment both services have considerably more men, but they are being brought down rapidly as occupation chores (which require more than 800,000 troops) diminish, as unneeded bases are closed and the leftover material is worked off.

The peacetime military establishment will require nearly 1,000,000 men—a puny force compared with the 3,000,000 mobilized in 1945, ten times as big as the regular Army (592,000 men) and a National Guard and two armored divisions (57,000 men) and a Marine Corps (26,100 men). Congress actually appropriated nearly \$11,500,000,000 for the current fiscal year—nearly \$7,300,000,000 for the Army, \$4,200,000,000 for the Navy and is 10 times the military budget. However, a few weeks ago, in an effort to balance the budget, the sums, throwing the military into confusion.

The program was none other than the world's No. 1 power, the U.S., and its all over the globe. The product, as General Curtis LeMay pointed out, of the present assumptions: that the U.S. will be involved in a war in the near future; the German and Japanese will remain well-armed; the big powers in the world will remain friends. The assumption would mean a massive mobilization—a mobilization of the armed services but for the purpose of defense. Furthermore the military strength among the people

at Mr. Byrnes is playing the international poker game with the U.S. as far as any immediate danger is concerned, practically all the resources that made the U.S. the most mobile and most heavily armed nation on earth, though widely dispersed, are still in existence—subject to natural depreciation; an airman turned lawyer can determine the value of an asset, quite as rapidly as a crated glider. And there still are the Pacific and Arctic moats. The interim fleet, though reduced to wartime size, will have nearly 300 major fighting ships. It insists that, despite a severe shortage in all technician categories, it is an effective force. There will at all times be in ready reserve

in each ocean a complete fleet capable of going into action in 30 days. The interim Army Air Forces will consist of 70 air groups. On the sea and in the air the U.S. has no peer and as long as this is true no nation will ever attack us.

However this comfortable advantage is not likely to persist indefinitely. The general opinion is that our present margin is good for about five

years. Five years is presumably long enough for knowledge of the atomic bomb to become general and for the other first-class nations to add it to their stock of weapons. In five years, if the United Nations is not making sense, the U.S. will have to revamp its military machine according to a new set of assumptions. The Army now being formed must therefore be regarded, in General Eisenhower's phrase, as an "interim" force, a stop-gap affair.


This interim force, as we have seen, has begun to put on flesh. The Army Air Forces, after expanding 300% for war, then shrinking back to 20% for peace, is forming new groups (on a skeletal basis) at the rate of five every two months. The Navy is re-established on the traditional volunteer basis. The Army, for its part, has raised since V-J Day more than 900,000 recruits, largest volunteer army in the world. But unless the draft law is tightened, it is certain to have a substantial deficit after the present short-term enlistments begin to run out.

As to quality, it seems high. Taken as a whole the officers in all branches are diligent and zealous; they exclude pride in a calling which no longer requires apology. There is a general complaint that under a pay scale that allows Army colonels and Navy captains only \$4,400 in base pay, it is hard to hold men with a gift for management or having a special technical

knack. On the other hand the junior officers who have elected to make military careers are a full cut above the prewar average.

Meanwhile the services are under new commanders but the lines of continuity have been scarcely disturbed. Marshall, King and Arnold have given way to Eisenhower, Nimitz and Spaatz. But the transfer was accompanied by a symbolic laying on of hands. The link with orthodoxy is supplied by the venerable Admiral Leahy, chief of staff to President Truman as earlier to Roosevelt, and senior to all the chiefs of staff. During the war Leahy spoke into the President's ear the last word—a dogmatic and sometimes intolerant word—on the U.S. strategic position. He is 69 years old and his

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE



Above is a supersonic guided missile, the weapon of future war. The U.S. already has a design for this weapon. But do we have the men, the matériel and scientific knowledge necessary to produce such weapons for war? Will our military minds know how to use them? Can we keep the present advantage which the atomic bomb has given us? Charles J. V. Murphy, who covered the last war from the strategic airman's point of view and who studied postwar developments, gives some hard, factual answers to these questions.


## ARMY OFFICERS TURNED WITH WEAPONS AND STRATEGY OF FUTURE WAR




MAJOR GENERAL NORSTAD, 39, is deputy commander, National War College, where qualified officers are trained in strategy. During war, he planned strategy in Italy as chief of staff of Fifth Army.



MAJOR GENERAL AURAND, 52, heads Army's new Research and Development division. A wartime ordnance and supply expert, he is now supervising creation of new



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with Orchestra conducted by Sylva  
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

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"*Our young people have learned that the railroads are an essential partner in the business of living... because only the railroads have the enormous carrying capacity required to transport*

*most of the food the children eat, the clothes they wear, and the things they need and use every day.*

"*Yes, 'R' for Railroads means a real partnership—one which has been firmly interwoven into the whole pattern of our American life.*"


The partnership of the American railroads with the American people reaches deep down into thousands of towns and villages all over the nation, for the railroads are a home-town partner in every

community they serve. They employ local buy supplies locally, own local property and pay local taxes on it.

These railroad taxes are the same kind *you* pay. They are not spent on railroad stations, but help support local public services of all sorts, including public health, fire and police protection, highways, and public schools.

Last year railroad taxes alone paid for the education of more than a million children throughout the United States.

ASSOCIATION OF **AMERICAN RAILROADS** WASHINGTON 6, D. C.



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## “I’d like to suggest a *fourth* ‘R’”

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*We dare you:* Let this daisy-fresh Martini compete with *your best!*

WE HOPE you're mighty good. And think that no bottled Martini could even tie one you can mix.

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These Martinis are made from one of the world's finest gins and a grand vermouth *and* by experts—that's why we dare you to let one compete with your best!

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
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... the ready-to-serve Martini that tastes daisy-fresh!

*Hiram Walker's*  
dry martini



JUST STIR  
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under intense heat and pressure. And on the basis of what they have already found, American scientists say it should be possible to construct a fairly dependable rocket of transatlantic range within 10 years. The principal unresolved problem is control—but preliminary research in several scientific fields promises a solution.

Not insignificantly the common language in the assembly sheds at White Sands is German. The fact of our dependence upon German scientists in this epochal development in the art of war explains in large measure the unprecedented preoccupation of our military planners with pure research. For in many fields of research—guided missiles (of which they invented 138 types), supersonic flight and submarine warfare—the Germans were far ahead of us. The real reparations prize of the war was not German machinery but German brains and research records.

Under the Potsdam partitioning of Germany, the Russians ended up with all the guided-missile proving grounds and most of the factories, the principal supersonic research centers (with wind tunnels far in advance of our own) as well as the underground mass-production and V-2 plant at Nordhausen. Equally precious were masses of official records, of which the some 400 tons plucked out by a handful of American intelligence officers represent but an inadequate sampling. Chance delivered into our hands the two leading V-2 research men, but the rank and file of German technicians in nearly all branches of the war sciences—nuclear physics, jet propulsion, supersonics and so on—were left in the Russian zone. The Russians have not only put them to work, but they have begun to coax across the Elbe scientists and other technicians from the American and British zone. Top-flight men are being offered the equivalent of \$35,000 a year, with assurance of freedom of research and of person.

The possibility that these wandering talents, embodying billions of dollars worth of research knowledge, may drift into Russia worries U.S. strategists far more than the stripping of German machinery. An American general observes, "These German scientists are the new mercenaries."

### Bidding for German brains

A deadly game is now being played for possession of these displaced brains. Being civilians, the German scientists could not be put to work like ordinary prisoners of war; and for obvious reasons the State Department was not of a mind, at the outset, to encourage a general immigration of our former enemies. The few hundred brought in at the Army's insistence were gingerly classed as State Department special employes and are paid \$10 a day plus expenses. But Russian competition has compelled the State Department to swallow its scruples. It hopes to bring to these shores a fairly large number of technicians whom our intelligence services have already tagged. Citizenship will be assured those who qualify in the customary way, and salaries will be more nearly commensurate with the talents.

Our early scruples may in time cost us dear. The unmannerly rockets that harass the Swedes from across the Baltic suggest that the Russians have put German military science back in business. And they give point to the observation of Rear Admiral Luis de Florez, the Navy's assistant director of research: "If we had only been smart enough to grab Germany's top 1,000 scientists and technicians and cart them off to a kind of scientific St. Helena, Europe would have remained disarmed for a generation."

Last year, in his speech before Congress, British Prime Minister Attlee said, "Defensive frontiers, mountain barriers, the seas and even the oceans are no obstacle to attack. The old discontinuity of earth and sea has been replaced by the continuity of the air. In our atlases that show the division of land and water, of the countries and states, there should be a blank page which should represent the air to make our children realize that these old and historic divisions do not exist in the element in which men now move. . . ."

Now this is substantially what the airmen have been trying to say ever since the great days of the late "Billy" Mitchell. The difference is that what was prophecy is fact. Nowadays one hears a good deal of talk in the Pentagon about the Polar Concept. General Spaatz keeps beside his desk an enormous globe, with the north polar axis tilted toward him, a persistent reminder that the Great Circle courses between the U.S. and all the centers of power in Europe and Asia lie across the polar seas.

A rustle of activity is running through the region. Just the other day, with only a paragraph appearing in the newspapers, a B-29 bomber flew from Alaska to the North Pole. American airmen make frequent, prolonged flights over the polar seas. This fall and

Virginia Huston appearing in "Woman on the Beach," her latest RKO picture.

Hazel Rogers, Hair Stylist  
at RKO, designs the

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


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—that's why  
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**Smooth, comfortable shaves**

Williams super-soaking lather takes the "fight" out of tough beards. It lets you shave easily—leaves your face feeling smoother and refreshed.

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in a new Williams Brushless Cream.

winter the Army, Navy and Air Forces will inaugurate a series of exercises, on a considerably larger scale than the Canadian Musk-Ox show, which will no doubt take them deep into the arctic. If a conspiratorial atmosphere surrounds these polar enterprises, it is because the Russians seek to undermine the American strategic position in Iceland and Greenland. "The flowers in Greenland were remarkably pretty this summer," muses General Frederick L. Anderson. A new course in strategic geography is beginning for the American military man.

Meanwhile the classical American defensive dispositions are being revised or are under fierce debate. Nimitz and his swash-buckling air admirals expound a doctrine of seapower based on tremendous task forces, throwing out fiery spines of airpower and carrying offensive war to all the world's continents. But the really new idea, expounded by the Air and favored by Eisenhower, is to form a strategic air reserve, secure in the heart of the nation, which in the event of attack could be swung as a mass in any direction. From time to time this force will maneuver, as the fleets do, over either ocean.

In the Atomic Age, as in less fissionable times, war, by a famous definition, will be politics continued by other means; but because shifts in state policy can be made with blinding speed the need is upon us to mesh military and foreign politics as never before.

Instead of conducting their affairs at arm's length, War, Navy and State now work together continuously on matters of common policy through a committee established last year by the joint chiefs of staff, called SWNCC (from State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee and pronounced "swink"). Mr. John L. Sullivan, the Under Secretary of the Navy, and Mr. Kenneth Royall, the Under Secretary of War, meet every two weeks, or daily if emergency requires, in the office of Major General John H. Hildring, the Assistant Secretary of State, who during the war was the Army's director of civil affairs. Under General Hildring's aggressive chairmanship SWNCC functions as a central switchboard between State and the armed services in such current matters as the status of the mandated islands in the Pacific, the size of the force required in Trieste, the policy to be pursued with respect to Greenland and so on. If SWNCC can maintain the present atmosphere of free and enlightened exchange, the fatal gap between diplomatic commitments and military policy that made Pearl Harbor possible may perhaps be avoided.

**The best warning: intelligence**

**B**UT between the substance of diplomatic negotiation and the real intent of a possible enemy there exists at all times an area of speculation which neither State nor the armed services is set up to deal with.

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winter the Army, Navy and Air Forces will inaugurate a series of exercises, on a considerably larger scale than the Canadian Musk-Ox show, which will no doubt take them deep into the arctic. If a conspiratorial atmosphere surrounds these polar enterprises, it is because the Russians seek to undermine the American strategic position in Iceland and Greenland. "The flowers in Greenland were remarkably pretty this summer," muses General Frederick L. Anderson. A new course in strategic geography is beginning for the American military man.

Meanwhile the classical American defensive dispositions are being revised or are under fierce debate. Nimitz and his swash-buckling air admirals expound a doctrine of seapower based on tremendous task forces, throwing out fiery spines of airpower and carrying offensive war to all the world's continents. But the really new idea, expounded by the Air and favored by Eisenhower, is to form a strategic air reserve, secure in the heart of the nation, which in the event of attack could be swung as a mass in any direction. From time to time this force will maneuver, as the fleets do, over either ocean.

In the Atomic Age, as in less fissionable times, war, by a famous definition, will be politics continued by other means; but because shifts in state policy can be made with blinding speed the need is upon us to mesh military and foreign politics as never before.

Instead of conducting their affairs at arm's length, War, Navy and State now work together continuously on matters of common policy through a committee established last year by the joint chiefs of staff, called SWNCC (from State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee and pronounced "swink"). Mr. John L. Sullivan, the Under Secretary of the Navy, and Mr. Kenneth Royall, the Under Secretary of War, meet every two weeks, or daily if emergency requires, in the office of Major General John H. Hildring, the Assistant Secretary of State, who during the war was the Army's director of civil affairs. Under General Hildring's aggressive chairmanship SWNCC functions as a central switchboard between State and the armed services in such current matters as the status of the mandated islands in the Pacific, the size of the force required in Trieste, the policy to be pursued with respect to Greenland and so on. If SWNCC can maintain the present atmosphere of free and enlightened exchange, the fatal gap between diplomatic commitments and military policy that made Pearl Harbor possible may perhaps be avoided.

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# FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS

October 1, 1946

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Influence of Armed Forces on  
U. S. Foreign Policy

BY BLAIR BOLLES

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## Influence of Armed Forces on U. S. Foreign Policy

BY BLAIR BOLLES

IN stating to newspapers at Rio de Janeiro on August 6 that the most important step the United States could take for the improvement of its relations with the other American Republics would be "to establish large and efficient army and navy missions" in the Latin American countries,<sup>1</sup> William D. Pawley, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, drew attention to the reliance this country now places on military means to achieve the political aims of its foreign policy. The War and Navy Departments and army and naval officers today participate in the formulation and execution of foreign policy to a degree unknown in any former peacetime period. This influence has declined slightly since the end of World War II hostilities in September 1945, but President Truman on June 15, 1946 recommended that Congress give a permanent place to military agencies in the making of foreign policy. He proposed the establishment of a Council of National Defense, in which a Secretary of National Defense (who would combine the present duties of the Secretaries of War and Navy) would have authority to make decisions with the Secretary of State for the integration of American foreign and military policies.<sup>2</sup> Although the 79th Congress adjourned without honoring that recommendation, Mr. Truman is expected to submit it during the first session of the 80th Congress in January 1947.

As additional preparation for long-term use of military personnel and instruments in the conduct of peacetime foreign policy, the President in 1946

1. See George Dixon, *New Orleans Times-Picayune*, August 7, 1946; also Frank Kluckhohn, *New Orleans States*, August 9, 1946; and Jerry Green, *New York Daily News*, August 26, 1946.  
2. For Presidential message on the unification of the armed services, see *New York Herald Tribune*, June 16, 1946. The basis for collaboration between military and civilian agencies already exists in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (*State Department Bulletin*, November 11, 1945), which serves a useful purpose by reducing, although not eliminating, friction and rivalry over foreign affairs among the principal executive departments. It does its basic work through six subcommittees: European Affairs, the Far East, Latin America, the Near and Middle East, Technical Information, and the Security Council and Rearmament. By keeping a State Department civilian in the chair, it honors the theory that civilians take precedence over the military in political matters.

asked Congress for authorization to exchange weapons with other American governments. As a step toward political unification of China, he also sought Congressional authority to reorganize opposing Chinese armies into a single national military force under American military supervision. Without interference from the President, officers of the Army Air Forces and the Navy have been making foreign policy in the Pacific Ocean by urging publicly that the United States establish permanent exclusive hegemony over a number of islands which Japan, before World War II, either owned outright or held under mandate from the League of Nations. The demand that other powers be excluded from even a nominal share in the administration of those islands has adversely affected this country's relations with wartime allies, especially because we have simultaneously insisted on the right to participate in making policy for areas where other states contend they have a dominant interest.

Despite strong recommendations from military men for the establishment of civilian supervision over the occupation of defeated enemy countries, President Truman has maintained the Army as occupying agent in Germany and Japan (as well as in two non-enemy occupied countries, Austria and Korea), and military men continue to execute foreign policy in both those countries. In the belief that military and political problems are today closely interwoven, the President has appointed military officers in active service and retired military officers to a number of major foreign policy posts—Lt. Gen. Walter B. Smith as Ambassador to Russia,<sup>3</sup> General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff during World War II, as special envoy to China, Maj. Gen. John H. Hildring as Assistant Secretary of State in charge of relations with occupied countries, and Maj. Gen. Frank R. McCoy as U.S. representative on the Far Eastern Commission.

The continued importance of the military in the formation and execution of foreign policy is a striking

3. At Truman's request, Congress authorized Smith to retain his active military status when he assumed his diplomatic post.

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ing phenomenon of these politically uncertain times. "The world is still unsettled," the members of the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives stated last spring as they recommended that the House grant the War Department \$7,091,034,700 to spend in 1947—the largest sum ever appropriated for that purpose in peacetime.<sup>4</sup> The reliance on the military in foreign affairs may cease when the Allied governments have concluded formal treaties of peace, if those treaties succeed in allaying present fears of another world conflict. The important role played by the military in this field which, in the opinion of many Americans, should be reserved to civilians, deserves general recognition and acceptance. The problem is not whether it is good or bad for the military to participate in the making of foreign policy. But the fact that they do, places responsibility on the President and on Congress to work out arrangements for the integration of military activities in foreign affairs with those of other agencies, so that the military can make the most valuable contribution possible toward the development of a foreign policy that will safeguard our national interests.

#### GOAL IN USE OF MILITARY

Truman's principal aim in using military men and means in the conduct of foreign policy is the preservation of peace. In contrast to 1918 and 1919 when, at the close of World War I, governments hoped to find lasting peace through limitation of national armaments, this time they hope to avert war by remaining armed. "Only so long as we remain strong can we insure the peace of the world," President Truman said in his Army Day address on April 6, 1946.<sup>5</sup> The concept that peace can be kept by arms pervades the United Nations Charter, which calls on the Big Five members of the Security Council to make military forces available to the organization. "The military collaboration of the great powers . . . will be continued and developed for the purpose of insuring peace," Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., at that time Personal Representative of the President of the United States, told the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on July 9, 1945.<sup>6</sup> Truman also pointed out in his Army Day address that the United States needs military strength in order to fulfill its responsibilities abroad. The desire for peace impelled the War Department to ask for a large appropriation this year. Secretary

4. Report No. 2311, H.R. Committee on Appropriations, 79th Congress, 2d Session, on H.R. 6837, *Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1947*, June 20, 1946, p. 2.

5. *State Department Bulletin*, April 14, 1946, p. 622.

6. *Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Charter of the United Nations*, Part 1, 79th Congress, 1st Session, p. 37.

of War Robert Patterson told the military subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee that the "overriding requirement" of the United States is to "preserve the peace of this country in a world which is still unsettled."<sup>7</sup>

The activities of the military in relation to foreign policy fall into four categories. First, military agencies can make foreign policy, as the Navy and Air Forces make it, by their attitude toward the islands in the Pacific Ocean. Sometimes political policy is the result, not consciously planned, of military policy. For example, in the autumn of 1945, in order to facilitate the removal of Japanese troops from the Netherlands East Indies after Japan's surrender, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, a wartime agency composed of British and American military officers, requested Britain to send forces into the Indies at the very time natives of that archipelago were revolting against further rule by the Dutch.<sup>8</sup> The dispatch of British forces served not only to round up the Japanese but, by interfering with the rebels in their fight against legitimate authority, to preserve the colonial *status quo* in the Indies, although the United States, through Secretary of State Cordell Hull, had in 1944 expressed the hope that the colonial powers would gradually prepare their subject peoples for liberation.

Second, military agencies can execute foreign policy which others have formulated; execution is the principal task of military commanders of the occupations, although they also participate in the formulation of policy. Third, military agencies can simply furnish the instruments by which the United States asserts or seeks to achieve goals in foreign policy, as through the weapons which President Truman proposes to send to Latin American governments. Fourth, military considerations in the minds of non-military persons sometimes affect the nature of foreign policy. Thus Congress on June 29, 1944 approved a Joint Resolution that gave a military coloration to our policy in the western Pacific. The resolution advocated that this country reserve the right to use sites for military, naval and air bases in the Philippine Islands after July 4, 1946, when they would have gained their freedom and would be able to negotiate as an independent nation.

Responsibility for political matters in the Navy

7. *Hearings on H.R. 6837, Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1947*, p. 4. (Also, "World conditions are such as to necessitate keeping the Navy and the Marine Corps in the highest state of combat efficiency," Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations. *Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations*, on H.R. 6496, *Navy Department Appropriation Bill for 1947*, p. 1.)

8. For disclosure by the Earl of Halifax, British Ambassador to the United States, see *New York Times*, December 15, 1945.



and War Departments rests with the Secretaries. The Navy Department has a Politico-Military Affairs Section in the Office of Naval Operations, the chief of which is responsible to Secretary Forrestal. This section deals with questions of high political policy, while other sections are concerned with island governments, U.S. naval missions, and affairs of naval attachés. The officers of the last three sections are responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations. In the War Department, the Policy and Strategy Group in the Plans and Operations Division of the General Staff deals with questions of high political policy, and is responsible to Secretary Patterson through the office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. The War and Navy Departments cooperate in the formulation of political policy in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

#### PRECEDENTS IN U.S. HISTORY

Precedents for military participation in the making and execution of foreign policy can be found in this country's history only in relatively small-scale undertakings. The U.S. Army established a military government in Mexico during the war of 1846-48 and, when that war ended, General William O. Butler for a brief period had authority from the Mexican government to use American troops to suppress revolution in Mexico.<sup>9</sup> The War Department from 1867 to 1877 supervised the government of Alaska, the purchase of which affected our relations with other powers. The Army maintained military government over the principal territories acquired from Spain by the Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898, which ended the Spanish-American War. Military government controlled Puerto Rico from October 18, 1898 to May 1, 1900; the Philippine Islands from 1898 to July 4, 1901 (except for a few areas kept under military government until July 4, 1902); and Cuba from January 1, 1899 to May 20, 1902, when the island became independent. Naval governors with the power to issue decree-laws have controlled the administration of eastern Samoa since the United States came into its possession by the treaty of November 14, 1899, and the Navy has been in charge of the administration of Guam, Midway and Wake Islands since they first became possessions of this country in 1899 (except during Japanese occupation in World War II). The Navy administered the government of the Virgin Islands from 1917, when they were purchased from Denmark, to January 30, 1931, when President Herbert Hoover

transferred them to the Department of the Interior. The War Department administered the government of Puerto Rico from the termination of military government to May 29, 1934, and the government of the Philippines to November 15, 1935. By Executive Order, President Franklin D. Roosevelt transferred control of Puerto Rico to the Department of the Interior,<sup>10</sup> and the Tydings-McDuffie Act of March 24, 1934 provided for the creation of the Commonwealth of the Philippines with a government independent of the War Department.

#### RESURGENCE OF MILITARY

The causes for the resurgence of military authority in foreign affairs after its almost complete disappearance in the 1930's, when the War Department relinquished administration of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, and the Navy Department the administration of the Virgin Islands, lie first, in the nature of World War II, and second, in the lasting commitments of world-wide responsibility which the United States assumed as the war drew to a close. The fact that the war involved an unprecedented use of air power both in combat and transportation, that it developed into the greatest naval war in history, and that it was fought in populated areas all over the globe, led the military services to espouse the acquisition, for use as bases, of territory which this country previously had not possessed and in which it had no rights, and to accept the task of governing populated territories on the continents of Europe and Asia. The War and Navy Departments during the war stated that "the theater commander bears full responsibility for military government,"<sup>11</sup> and after the cessation of hostilities military governors in Germany, Japan, Austria and Korea assumed independent powers which far exceeded the authority held by commanders of American military forces of occupation during and after World War I (December 1, 1918 to January 10, 1920), northern Russia (April 1918 to October 1919), and Siberia (August 1918 to April 1920), or by the commander of the naval force of occupation in Yugoslavia (November 1918 to September 1921). Even if military agencies and persons soon cease to make and execute foreign policy, and military considerations cease to guide civilian policy-makers, the Army and Navy will have left a lasting imprint on the nature of our relations with other powers.

10. State Department Press Releases, January 6-June 30, 1934, p. 335.

11. *Army-Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs* (Washington, Government Printing Office, December 22, 1943), p. 1.

9. J. M. Callahan, *United States Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations* (New York, Macmillan, 1932), p. 184.



## MILITARY INFLUENCE IN WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The military influence over foreign policy developed gradually after the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939. It appeared first in areas where the United States traditionally had pursued an active foreign policy—the Western Hemisphere, China and the Pacific. In the Western Hemisphere the Roosevelt Administration from 1940 to 1945 arranged for the use of military bases on territory that did not belong to this country in the Atlantic Ocean, in the Caribbean Sea and in South America, and also strengthened prewar inter-American solidarity by programs of military cooperation and consultation. The object of this territorial expansion and military collaboration was, in the beginning, the defense of the Western Hemisphere from possible German attack and penetration, and later the use of the Western Hemisphere as a base for combat and transport operations against Germany and Japan.

While the original reasons for military-political arrangements in the Western Hemisphere disappeared with the defeat of the Axis in 1945, the political policy of the United States in the New World continues to have a military as well as an economic character. The war has left this country a power in the Atlantic Ocean far beyond our own shores. The War Department this year is improving seven of the eight Atlantic bases obtained on 99-year lease from Britain on September 2, 1940;<sup>12</sup> the base in Iceland which the United States first occupied in July 1941; North Atlantic bases on territory belonging to Canada and Denmark in Labrador, Greenland and Baffin Island; and bases in two South American countries, Panama (aside from the Canal Zone) and Brazil.<sup>13</sup>

While Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles on March 6, 1943 said that the United States government did not intend to take any action to acquire permanent bases which affect the territory of any one of the American Republics,<sup>14</sup> this country has not yet withdrawn from bases provided for our troops on the territory of American Republics. These bases were made available by individual agreements, reached in 1942, with each of the countries affected, principally Cuba, Panama, Ecuador and Brazil, in accordance with the

terms of the resolution on "Reciprocal Assistance and Cooperation for the Defense of the Nations of the Americas," adopted at the meeting of the Ministers on Foreign Affairs in Havana, July 21-30, 1940. The status of many of the bases remains confidential. The United States on May 20, 1946 returned to the Cuban government the air bases which this country built during the war at San Antonio de los Baños, San Julian and Pinar del Río, and soon afterward returned to the Ecuadorean government the base on the Galapagos Islands in the Pacific.<sup>15</sup> Under-Secretary of State Dean Acheson on May 7, 1946 declared during a press conference that he could not say whether this country was negotiating for permanent use of any bases in Latin America. Rear Admiral Marshal R. Greer, U.S.N., implied during testimony before the naval subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee that the United States has a standing arrangement with Brazil for the use of Brazilian bases. "It is hard to put into dollars and cents the fact that we have the use of their [Brazil's] bases and flying fields if we need them," Greer said.<sup>16</sup>

The military character of our political relations with the American Republics takes a number of forms in the postwar era. Congress has appropriated funds to finance United States participation this year in the Inter-American Defense Board, created by resolution of the Conference of American Foreign Ministers at Rio de Janeiro in January 1942.<sup>17</sup> The President expects the Board, in time, to give way to a permanent military organization composed of representatives of the general staffs of the American Republics, in accordance with a proposal adopted by the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace at Chapultepec, Mexico, February 21 to March 8, 1945, and included in the Final Act of that conference as Resolution 4.<sup>18</sup>

Another form of military-political cooperation is the provision of American military and naval missions to other Western Hemisphere governments for the training of troops. The War Department spent \$408,390 on that undertaking during 1946-47, and will spend \$1,240,000 on it in 1947-48. The aim of the increased use of the military mission "is to bring about hemisphere solidarity and to provide unified hemispheric defense through a training in our methods and utilization

12. See A. R. Elliott, "U.S. Strategic Bases in the Atlantic," *Foreign Policy Reports*, January 15, 1941. The current improvement program affects Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, Trinidad, British Guiana, Bermuda and Newfoundland, but not the Bahamas.

13. *Hearings before House Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1947*, p. 748.

14. For indirect discourse from press conference statements, see *Department of State Bulletin*, March 13, 1943, p. 215.

15. *Time Magazine*, July 15, 1946, p. 45.

16. *Hearings on Navy Department Appropriation Bill for 1947*, p. 1685.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 1073.

18. See Olive Holmes, "The Mexico City Conference and Regional Security," *Foreign Policy Reports*, May 1, 1945.



of our equipment by Latin-American armies," according to Col. R. B. Richards, Military Intelligence Division, War Department.<sup>19</sup>

In February 1946 this country had 17 military missions in 13 countries in Latin America. The Navy late in 1945 began to expand its program of missions in South America, sending a new one to Chile and increasing the size of the mission in Brazil.<sup>20</sup> The use of military missions in Latin America long antedates World War I. Congress authorized missions to Cuba and Panama on April 19, 1910. The Act of May 19, 1926 authorized missions to all countries in the Western Hemisphere. Congress on June 4, 1938 authorized the U.S. Navy to help train Latin American forces. President Roosevelt by Executive Orders on August 29, 1938, and June 21, 1941 implemented that authorization.

The difference between the use of missions before and during the war and the use of missions today is that now they perform a political purpose of first importance. They unify the military programs of the American Republics and strengthen the military potential of the United States by strengthening its probable allies.

#### EXCHANGE OF ARMS

Another form in which President Truman wants to cast the military aspect of our political relations in the Western Hemisphere is the exchange of arms among the American Republics and Canada. This exchange began during World War II through the provisions of lend-lease. Under the authority of the Surplus Property Act, the Navy continued to send small craft and planes to South American countries after the war and the termination of lend-lease arrangements.<sup>21</sup> On May 6, 1946 President Truman submitted to Congress the proposed Inter-American Military Cooperation Act (H.R. 6326), "authorizing a program of military collaboration with other American States including the training, organization and equipment of the armed forces of those countries."<sup>22</sup> Indicating the political importance of the proposal, Secretary of State Byrnes on May 29 told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that "the long-range objective of the military cooperation which this bill would authorize is the continued and closer coordination of the efforts

which the American nations have made over many years to promote their mutual security and preserve their peace." The bill did not progress during the second session of the 79th Congress beyond the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which reported it favorably on June 7.<sup>23</sup> But United States diplomatic representatives in South America negotiated during the summer of 1946, after Congress adjourned, for the completion of military agreements with Latin American governments.<sup>24</sup>

#### CHINA AND THE PACIFIC

Military and political problems have been inextricably interwoven in China since March 10, 1942, when Lt. Gen. Joseph Stilwell became Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Stilwell urged upon Chiang the political policy of uniting his government and armies with those of the Chinese Communists, who maintained separate forces and refused to acknowledge allegiance to Chiang's government. The proposal, as well as Stilwell's desire for a military offensive, displeased Chiang, and on October 29, 1944 President Roosevelt recalled Stilwell.<sup>25</sup>

The elimination of military and political rivalry between the Chinese government and Communist groups is the chief aim of United States policy in China today, and the Administration uses both military means and military men to reach its goal. This policy developed after an effort made during 1945 to help the Central government by military means, in the hope that it could suppress the Communists. When Japan surrendered on August 15, 1945, the U.S. Army transported Chinese troops to the north so that Chiang could effectively assert his claim to territory the Japanese had held and the surrender of Japanese forces could then be carried out. The United States also sent American troops, soldiers and marines to China to protect Chiang's communication lines. When those measures failed to enable Chiang to suppress the Communists, whose armies fought Chiang's troops in northern China, this country modified its policy in favor of union instead of suppression. President Truman in December 1945 ordered General Marshall to China as his special envoy, with instructions to unify the government and the Communists.

To bring about political unity, Marshall tried to achieve military unity among the two great

19. *Hearings before House Subcommittee on Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1947*, p. 876.

20. *Hearings before House Subcommittee on Navy Department Appropriation Bill for 1947*, p. 1668.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Document No. 548, House of Representatives, 79th Congress, 2d Session, p. 1.

23. Report No. 2230, House of Representatives, 79th Congress, 2d Session.

24. Frank Kluckhohn, *New Orleans States*, August 9, 1946. "This may have the effect of facing the United States Congress with a fait accompli when next it meets."

25. See *China: Internal Disunion and the War*, in *The World Today* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs), February 1946.



dissenting factions. After the People's Consultative Committee recommended on January 10, 1946 that all political parties in China be granted equal status, the All-Party Conference, meeting in Chungking on January 31, agreed that the Chinese military forces should be reorganized and the opposing armies merged. On February 25 the Kuomintang (the party of the government), and the Communists agreed to the military merger. In March the two armies opposed each other in civil war in Manchuria but, hoping that in spite of trying circumstances General Marshall could realize his purpose, the Administration in June proposed that Congress authorize the United States to reorganize and train a Chinese army of 60 divisions that would bring together government and Communist forces. The bill for military assistance (H.R. 6795)<sup>26</sup> provided also for sending to China a military advisory group consisting of 750 U.S. Army and 250 U.S. Navy personnel. Emphasizing the political importance of this military proposal, Under-Secretary of State Dean Acheson on June 19, 1946 told the House Foreign Affairs Committee: "A well-trained and adequately equipped peacetime army of reasonable size, such as is contemplated in the military reorganization program sponsored by General Marshall, would be of the greatest benefit to China, not only in the maintenance of peace and in setting its own house in order, but also in the fulfillment of such obligations as may devolve upon it under the Charter of the United Nations."<sup>27</sup> At the same time, this country continued to keep a small force of American troops in China to assist in the realization of the unity proposal. Chinese Communists have criticized this manifestation of our policy, but Under-Secretary Acheson announced in June that United States armed strength would remain at 20,000 marines.<sup>28</sup>

#### PACIFIC ISLANDS

The character of the war with Japan, fought across vast stretches of water by Americans attacking naval and air forces, intensified the long-existing political interest of the United States in the Pacific and its islands and gave a predominantly military flavor to that old political interest. The U.S. Navy was unable until February 1, 1944 to dislodge the Japanese from military control of any of the islands they possessed outright or for which they held a League mandate. On that date American forces attacked Kwajalein, in the

Ralick Group of the mandated Caroline Islands, and when the American flag had been substituted for the Rising Sun, the Navy established a military government to administer affairs of the island. The Navy set up similar military government units on other Japanese islands as, during the ensuing nineteen and a half months, the task forces progressed across the Pacific to Japan itself. Today the Navy administers all Japanese island possessions and mandates north, south, east and west of Kwajalein, in the Marshall, Caroline, Palau, Mariana, Bonin and Ryukyu groups. The difficulties which the Navy and Air Forces suffered in capturing the islands, and the advantage their possession gave to the enemy in warfare with us, has inspired naval officials and officers, along with Army Air Force officers, to urge that the United States retain the islands, without regard to the claims of other powers to control them jointly with this country.

The islands are currently administered under authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Ocean Areas and the Pacific Fleet, Admiral John H. Towers. The Bureau of Island Territories in the Office of Naval Operations, Navy Department, maintains contact for the Chief of Naval Operations with the military governments of the islands. The Navy's administration of the islands reverses the trend of the 1930's, when both the War and Navy Departments surrendered the administration of important insular possessions to the Department of the Interior. The Navy, which not only wants the United States to keep the islands but also wants its own bureaus to maintain administration over them, proposed in 1946 that Congress give the Navy Department specific statutory authority to govern those areas.<sup>29</sup> The permanent international status of the islands will depend on arrangements made in the treaty of peace with Japan. The Navy Department on September 5, 1945 recommended that this country should maintain permanent peacetime bases on Saipan, Tinian, Iwo and Okinawa, all of which our forces captured from Japan in the name of the Allies.<sup>30</sup> Maj. Gen. George J. Richards, Budget Officer for the War Department, in the spring of 1946 proposed more broadly that the United States keep what islands it needed.

29. *Hearings before House Subcommittee on Navy Department Appropriation Bill for 1947*, pp. 878-79.

30. *New York Times*, September 6, 1945. The Navy exceeded the earlier recommendation of Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal that Guam, already an American possession, and Saipan "be part of the pattern of American security for the Pacific." *Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations on Navy Department Appropriation Bill for 1946*, Part 1, 79th Congress, 1st Session, p. 24.

26. Reported by House Foreign Affairs Committee June 27, 1946. No further legislative action.

27. State Department Press Release No. 430, June 19, 1946.

28. *New York Times*, June 29, 1946.



"Those bases which were established during the war . . . must continue to be outwards to our national defense."<sup>31</sup> Of the islands taken from Japan, General Richards referred especially to the Marianas and Okinawa. He suggested that the islands would be part of the long-term American defense system when he said: "The program of establishing permanent overseas bases is so developed that it will be spread over a period of years. . . . The program is a result of close study based on the strategic needs for bases at strategic points overseas and in support of the perimeter defense of the United States."<sup>32</sup>

Congress has encouraged the development of a bases system in the Pacific that would include not only islands taken from Japan but those belonging to countries within the British Commonwealth of Nations. Congress appropriated funds for the Army and Navy during the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1946 to develop defenses on islands which before the war belonged to Japan—Saipan, Tinian, the Ryukyus (Okinawa), Eniwetok, Kwajalein, Truk, Palau, Majuro, and the Bonins<sup>33</sup>—as well as in the Philippines, Guam, Manus (Australian mandate in the Admiralty Islands), Espiritu Santu (British possession in the New Hebrides), Hawaii, Wake, Midway, Christmas and Johnston Islands, together with Alaska and the China coast.<sup>34</sup> Control of those bases would give the United States command of the whole Pacific Ocean north of the Equator (in some sections north of 20 degrees south latitude) and west of 155 longitude west of Greenwich.

President Truman said on January 15, 1946 that those Japanese mandated islands captured by United States forces which were needed by America would be kept as long as necessary, but he added that those we did keep we would hold as an individual United Nations trusteeship.<sup>35</sup> An island held in such trusteeship would probably be subject to inspection by the United Nations.

#### EUROPE AND JAPAN

Military influence over United States foreign policy was extended to other areas of the world after American troops began to fight on the African and European continents. The invasion of Morocco and Algeria on November 8, 1942, pre-

liminary to the invasion of Europe through Sicily on June 1, 1943, led in time to the defeat of the Axis and to the present post-defeat occupations of Germany, Japan, Korea and Austria.

Although today the military commanders of the forces of occupation in those areas follow directives submitted by their governments, which base the directives on international agreements, the commanders derive from several sources large original and independent powers over the making of policy. These powers come in the first place from the fact that the victorious governments have assigned military personnel to supervise the task of reforming the economies of the defeated countries and erasing warlike tendencies of the defeated peoples to insure that they will not foment war again. The second source of policy-making power is the fact that the victorious powers have entrusted to the commanders responsibility for the execution and administration of policy in the occupied areas.

"You will assure that the German economy is administered and controlled in such a way as to accomplish the basic objectives set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5 (relating to economic affairs) of this Directive," the Administration in Washington directed the Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation in Germany in April 1945.<sup>36</sup> Moreover, the commander in Germany serves as the United States member of the Control Council, which "will be the supreme organ of control over Germany."<sup>37</sup> The executive power given the commander in Japan is even more sweeping: "The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government to rule the State is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied powers. You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission."<sup>38</sup> The subordination of MacArthur, by the decisions reached at the Moscow Conference, December 16-24, 1945, to the Far Eastern Commission on questions relating to Japan has not deprived him of all independence. The Far Eastern Commission, also, does not claim jurisdiction over Korea, and MacArthur is responsible for the administration of the American zone through Lt. Gen. John Hodge, Military Governor of Korea.

The commanders in the occupied areas have another source of power in that they are invited to make recommendations respecting policy and to provide Washington with reports on economic,

31. *Hearings before House Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee on Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1947*, p. 113.

32. *Ibid.*

33. See *ibid.*, pp. 113, 748; also *Hearings on Navy Department Appropriation Bill for 1947*, pp. 877-87.

34. *Ibid.*

35. *New York Times*, January 16, 1946.

36. Paragraph 16, Part II, of Directive made public on October 17, 1945 in Department of State Press Release No. 769.

37. See *The Axis In Defeat*, Department of State Publication 2423, p. 40.

38. From message transmitted on September 6, 1945 through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur, Supreme Commander. See *The Axis in Defeat*, cited, p. 114.



industrial, financial, social and political conditions in their zones of occupation, "to serve as a basis for . . . the progressive formulation and development of policies to promote the basic objectives of the United States."<sup>39</sup> The commander in Japan is authorized, with some reservations, to judge for himself whether he will accept the advice of the representatives of the four government members of the Advisory Council for Japan (the United States, Russia, China and the British Commonwealth of Nations),<sup>40</sup> and the commander in the U.S. zone in Germany is charged with the important persuasive political task of urging "the adoption by the occupying powers of the principles and policies set forth in this directive."<sup>41</sup> The commander and his subordinates can use discretion in interpreting policies and regulations,<sup>42</sup> and commanders sometimes subordinate political considerations to their military "convenience."<sup>43</sup> The commanders enjoy the semi-autonomy in military affairs which the practice of decentralization in military organizations allows them, and this they sometimes exploit in assuming independence in political matters. General Clay, deputy commander in Germany, promulgated Law No. 9 for denazification in industry and approved the selection of a Nazi as president of Bavaria without notifying the War or State Departments, or informing political adviser Murphy. Such independence of action is due to the inadequacy of the policy-making machinery in Washington as much as to any desire of the military men for autonomy. The machinery is cumbersome and sometimes fails to act within a reasonable time.<sup>44</sup> Disagreement within the United States and among the governments of

the United Nations concerning the best method of taking advantage of the victory contribute to the indecision in Washington.

#### DURATION OF OCCUPATION

The military can be expected to remain influential in the affairs of Germany and Japan until the occupations end. "As long as you need an army of occupation, it is felt that the army should have control of the administration and execution of policies and the detailed sources of information," Maj. Gen. O. P. Echols, Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department, said during hearings on the 1947 Military Establishment Appropriation Bill before the House Committee.<sup>45</sup> The area under occupation is diminishing, however. Where the U.S. Army once was the government of Italy,<sup>46</sup> it now controls only the northeastern province of Venezia Giulia, and is to withdraw ninety days after conclusion of the peace treaty with Italy. The Austrian occupation is expected to end shortly, but American troops will still be in Korea on July 1, 1947, and the occupation of Germany and Japan will probably continue for many years, although government officials do not forecast how many.<sup>47</sup> Congress has appropriated \$350,000,000 to finance the occupations this year. War Department estimates of its manpower needs call for one American in Germany for every 110 Germans in the U.S. zone and one American in Japan for every 650 Japanese.<sup>48</sup> Although General Eisenhower, then Commander-in-Chief in Germany, recommended to President Truman in the autumn of 1945 that administration of the occupation in Germany be turned over to the State Department, the latter refused to accept it, although President Truman at one time had fixed June 1, 1946 as the date on which the War Department would withdraw from the administration of occupied territories in favor of a civilian agency. The War Department consequently continues to be responsible for the administration of policy.<sup>49</sup>

The War Department began to prepare for political occupation in 1942, many months before American troops got a foothold in Europe. As early as 1940, before the United States was a combatant in World War II, the office of the Judge Advocate General in the War Department published a 63-page brochure on military government. The legal

39. Directive to Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation in Germany, paragraph 1.

40. Moscow Agreement, December 26, 1945.

41. Directive to Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation in Germany, paragraph 1. Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson in a letter on April 5, 1946 congratulated Secretary of War Patterson on the successful fulfillment of this role by General Joseph T. McNarney, Commander, and Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, Deputy Commander, through the "negotiation of the level of industry settlement, recently agreed by the four occupying powers in the Control Council, Berlin." Department of State Press Release No. 247, April 12, 1946.

42. For reports of "variance in interpretations of Law No. 8 (Denazification)" from province to province, see *Monthly Report of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone, Germany*, No. 7, February 20, 1946.

43. "General [Dwight D.] Eisenhower is today—or was—preventing the Czech government from expelling treacherous German Sudetens into Germany lest it 'inconvenience' the American occupying forces." See Edgar A. Mowrer, *New York Post*, October 20, 1945.

44. "The United States has set up a capable administration to discharge its responsibilities in occupied Germany but Washington has left it out on a limb by failing to keep the supply line open." Parker La Moore, Scripps Howard Newspaper Alliance reporter, quoted in *Military Government Information Bulletin*, No. 38, April 22, 1946.

45. *Hearings*, p. 883.

46. *Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on the 1946 Military Establishment Bill*, 79th Congress, 1st Session, p. 50.

47. *Hearings on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1947*, p. 28.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

49. *Washington Daily News*, March 8, 1946.



basis for military government is found in Annex Section III of the Hague Convention No. IV, 1907, which states that "it flows from the basic principle of military necessity that the commander must always have full responsibility for military government."<sup>50</sup> The highest military officers in the United States realized that this country has in the past invariably been unprepared for military government.<sup>51</sup> On May 11, 1942 the office of the Provost Marshall-General established a school in Charlottesville, Va., for the training of military government officers, and on April 7, 1943 as the army, fighting in Tunisia, progressed toward the Mediterranean and its assault on the European soil of Sicily, the War Department established the Civil Affairs Division in the Office of the Chief of Staff. At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee established a Joint Civil Affairs Committee to assure coordination between the army and navy, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee to make it possible for the British and American forces to work together. British and American civil affairs officers went ashore with the assault troops for the first time in Sicily.<sup>52</sup>

#### UNITED MILITARY NATIONS

The international arrangements for keeping the peace now and after the occupations end give long-term importance to army and navy officers and to the War and Navy Departments in the execution, if not the making, of foreign policy. The United Nations Charter signed by 51 nations at San Francisco on June 26, 1945, and ratified as a treaty by the United States on August 5, 1945, is in one sense a military organization. If diplomacy fails, the United Nations intends to use arms to fulfill its purpose of keeping the peace in the

event of "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression" (Article 39, United Nations Charter). Article 42 empowers the UN Security Council to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to restore international peace and security." Article 43 directs all UN members "to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." And Article 45 provides that "in order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action." President Truman said on July 9, 1946: "If we can implement the United Nations with a police force behind it sufficient to make its mandates stand up, we can have world peace just as we finally after 80 years—at the end of the Civil War—obtained peace in the United States."<sup>53</sup>

Despite their potential importance in the United Nations, however, military men and military agreements have so far been subordinate to civilian political considerations in the development of the UN into a working and workable agency.<sup>54</sup> The dissensions that marked the relations of the great Allies during the spring and early summer months of 1946 prevented the great powers from determining what armed forces each of them would make available to UN, although Article 43 provides for the negotiation "as soon as possible" of agreements governing "the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of facilities and assistance to be provided," by the United States and each of the other members. Important American political and military figures alike have offered suggestions about the type of armed assistance we should offer to the United Nations. "I am convinced that if the United Nations Organization is to be given a reasonable opportunity of success, the present maintenance of our armed power is essential—and that means the maintenance of a truly effective sea and naval air power," Secretary of the Navy Forrestal told a Congressional committee on March 13, 1946.<sup>55</sup> Harold E. Stassen, a leading member of the Republican party and a member of the U.S. delegation to the San Francisco Conference on the United Nations, suggested in November 1945 that this

50. *Army-Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs*, cited, p. 5.

51. *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War*, p. 90.

52. A number of War Department and army publications about military government are now available to the general public. Among them are *AMGOT, Plan Proclamations and Instructions*, 2d Edition, September 1943 (Palermo, Sicily). *Allied Military Government of Rome under the 5th Army, 5th to 15th of June, 1944; Report to the Army Commander* by Edgar Erskine Hume (Rome, 1944). *Military Government Handbook, Germany, Proclamations, Ordinances and Laws Issued by Allied Military Government in Germany* (Washington, 1945). *Austria, Miscellaneous Proclamations, Orders and Decrees for the Government of Territory in Austria Occupied by Allied Powers prior to the Establishment of an Allied Commission for Austria* (1945). *Italy, Review of the Allied Military Government and of the Allied Commission in Italy, July 10, 1943 to May 2, 1945* (Rome, Public Relations Branch, Allied Commission, United States Army, 1945). *Allied Military Government, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, Standard Policy and Procedure for Combined Civil Affairs Operations in Northwest Europe*, Revised May 1, 1944.

53. Address to Conference on Emergency Problems in Higher Education, *Washington Star*, July 9, 1946.

54. Hanson Baldwin, *New York Times*, May 21, 1946.

55. *Hearings before Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on 1947 Naval Appropriation Bill*.



country turn over to the United Nations twenty-five atomic bombs to be used by the police force. The United States subsequently decided, however, not to place any atomic bombs at the disposal of the UN but, on the contrary, proposed to the Security Council on June 14, 1946 a series of steps to outlaw the manufacture of bombs exploded by atomic fission.<sup>56</sup>

During this long period of political disagreement, the permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France and China) took one of the important preliminary steps in the creation of a world-wide military system by establishing the Military Staff Committee. Article 47 provided for the creation of this Committee "to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament." The Committee, which consists of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members and their representatives, met for the first time on February 4, 1946 in London. The United States named as the Chief of Staff's representatives on the Committee: Gen. George C. Kenney, Commanding General of the United States Strategic Air Command; Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, former Commander of the 82nd Air Borne Division and later of the 18th Corps; and Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, former Chief of the Navy War Plans Division. The Committee resumed its meetings in New York on March 25, and began to consider, first, the forces they should recommend that each nation contribute; second, whether the forces should be unified; third, whether each contributing country should make available units from land, sea and air forces, or whether one country should supply air forces, another land forces, and another sea forces, exclusively. When the first session of the Security Council closed in July, decisions on none of these matters had been reached. The position of the five-power Staff Committee, moreover, remained anomalous because the two-power (Anglo-American) Combined Chiefs of

56. *New York Times*, March 31, 1946.

Staff Committee in Washington continued to function.

#### NEED FOR MILITARY POLICY

Congress has not fully supported President Truman in his reliance on the military in the conduct of foreign policy. One member formally deprecated the reliance the President places on military power. Representative Ellis Patterson, Democrat of California, introduced on April 17, 1946 a concurrent resolution urging that the "utmost caution and discretion be exercised in all dealings which might jeopardize the Nation's domestic and international position through unnecessary emphasis on military strength rather than on civilian statesmanship."<sup>57</sup> While Congress ignored Patterson's resolution, it nevertheless failed to act on two proposals respecting military policy which Truman called "essential if we are to maintain our leadership on the road to peace and freedom."<sup>58</sup> He meant unification of the armed forces.

So long as the President encourages the military to share in the formulation and execution of foreign policy, Congress will have the serious responsibility of laying the foundations for a consistent and sound military policy. Army and Navy officers and the civilian heads of the War and Navy Departments can best contribute to the conduct of foreign affairs when they are confident they are performing a clear and recognized task, and can therefore feel secure in their relations with civilian agencies of the Federal government. As long as military policy is uncertain, the foreign policy which the military help to formulate will also be uncertain. The President, in turn, bears the responsibility of making sure that military agencies do not gain domination over foreign policy. The danger that they will dominate, rather than simply participate in, the formulation of foreign policy will be slight so long as Congress retains authority to investigate the activities of officials of the Executive branch of the Federal government through special and standing committees, and so long as freedom of reporting and comment exists in the United States.

57. H. Con. Res. 144, 79th Congress, 2d Session, referred to Committee on Military Affairs.

58. Army Day Message, 1946.

In the October 15 issue of FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS:  
UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT

by Walter H. C. Laves and Donald C. Stone



## Foreign Service Reform

By O. K. D. RINGWOOD AND BLAIR BOLLES

The foreign policy of the United States can be effective only when the country is well represented abroad. Recognition of this fact led Congress last summer to pass a bill for the improvement, strengthening and expansion of the Foreign Service, and for the consolidation and revision of the laws relating to its administration.<sup>1</sup> President Truman signed the bill on August 11, 1946.

The Foreign Service is the professional diplomatic organization with whose officers the State Department fills most of the executive posts in the embassies, legations, consulates-general, and consulates abroad. The President chooses from the ranks of Foreign Service officers many of the Ambassadors and Ministers who represent him and the United States in dealings with foreign governments. The posts of Under-Secretary and Assistant Secretary in the State Department are often held by former Foreign Service officers, and Foreign Service officers frequently are the chiefs and directors of the political offices in the State Department. The officers and clerks in the Foreign Service number more than 6,700.

The new bill is intended to facilitate the recruitment of officers and lesser personnel for the Foreign Service, and to improve the training of that personnel. The bill raises salaries, increases the tax-free allowances granted to chiefs of mission and diplomats of lesser rank, and liberalizes the scale of retirement pay. It establishes the Foreign Service Reserve, whose members are to be drawn from various professions. From the Reserve, the Foreign Service can call for specialists to work at official tasks for short-term periods. It creates the Foreign Service Institute, which is to give in-service training in all phases of Foreign Service work to officers and other employees throughout their careers. It sets up a system of "promotion-up and selection-out," according to which these officers who fail to win promotion within a prescribed number of years will be separated from the Service.

Serious problems remain concerning the organization of the Foreign Service. They arise out of the greater problem of how the United States, can best formulate and conduct foreign policy, now that it has assumed lasting responsibilities all over the world. Should control of such formulation and conduct be monopolized by the State Department? Or should it be divided among other agen-

1. For a Congressional analysis of the bill, see House Report No. 2508 to accompany H.R. 6967, 79th Congress, 2d Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 12, 1946.

cies, civilian as well as military? President Roosevelt, before the outbreak of World War II, had the foreign agents of the Department of Commerce, Agriculture, and Interior transferred to the Foreign Service (Reorganization Act of 1939); but these Departments have received no direct voice in the formation of the foreign policy executed by the Foreign Service, which now supplies those agencies with the information formerly sent in by their own representatives. The Foreign Service is administered within the State Department, but independently of other bureaus in the Department. Representative Chester E. Morrow, Republican of New Hampshire, said in the House of Representatives on July 16 that this administrative separation "results in an unfortunate caste system with petty jealousies and rivalries flaring up between those who belong to the fraternity [the Foreign Service] and those who do not." The new law, moreover, creates for the diplomatic and consular missions abroad the sort of stratification whose existence in the State Department Mr. Morrow criticized. Section 415 establishes the staff branch of the Foreign Service, whose members will not be classified as officers, nor will they be trained to assume the high responsibilities of chiefs of mission. While many employees of the staff branch will deal with technical subjects requiring only slight skills, others will have tasks in which judgment and professional experience are needed, such as petroleum experts, and air and cultural attachés. The gulf between Foreign Service officers and specialists in economics and informational activities within the State Department has already resulted in misunderstandings over suggestions made by the specialists respecting policy. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs explained on July 12, 1946 that "the reason for having two arms of the Service lies in the necessity of having provision for selecting and training personnel for positions of leadership and the exercise of command." Yet no law or regulation prevents the President from choosing a person completely untrained in foreign affairs for the highest position of diplomatic leadership abroad—that of Ambassador.

The problem raised by the Foreign Service is whether the United States can maintain a corps of well-trained diplomatic representatives without maintaining an élite society. This problem cannot be dealt with adequately until the President or Congress examines the whole matter of how the United States makes and executes foreign policy.



*Foreign Affairs Outlines***BUILDING THE *Peace***

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**What We Are Doing In Japan—And Why****THE SITUATION****Americans in Japan**

More than 160,000 Americans in uniform and 2,000 civilian Americans are in Japan doing a job. Their job is occupation.

**The Country They Are Occupying**

Japan is operating under its own Government, which is subordinate to and carries out the orders of the Allied Powers. The Japanese people, who suffered 300,000 civilian and an estimated 400,000 military casualties in the war out of a total population of 70,000,000 have been docile and obedient—despite the pangs of wide-spread hunger. The Japanese for 700 years lived under a feudal regime; yet their nation is by far the most highly industrialized and the greatest trading power in the Far East—a vital factor, for good or ill, in the economy and life of the Far East and the world.

**OBJECTIVES OF OCCUPATION****The First Is Demilitarization**

To insure that never again shall Japan be able to become an aggressor nation.

**The Second Is Democratization**

To insure that there shall be established in Japan a responsible, democratic government which will cooperate with other nations for lasting world peace and security.

**The Ultimate Purpose Is World Stability**

The occupation of Japan is part of the program of the United States and its associates among the nations to create in the Far East and the whole world a peaceful order based upon political stability, economic progress, intellectual freedom, and social well-being.

**LENGTH OF OCCUPATION****Pledges**

Democratization of a totalitarian, militaristic nation

takes many years. Uniformed and civilian Americans will remain in Japan until the job is finished. This is the solemn pledge of the Government of the United States, made against the backdrop of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the death march on Bataan, the invasion of the Aleutians, and the entirety of World War II.

**Personnel**

Occupation is a cooperative, international job. Troops representing Australia, Great Britain, New Zealand, and India are also in Japan, and they may be joined soon by forces of others of the Allied Powers. They too have memories on which they have based their own pledges—Hong Kong, Singapore, Java, Burma, and Darwin.

**MACHINERY OF OCCUPATION****Planning**

The policies which control the course of action followed by the forces of occupation are developed by two organizations which have headquarters in Washington, D.C. One is the *Far Eastern Commission* (FEC), made up of representatives of 11 nations—the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, India, and the Philippines. FEC formulates general policy for Japan. The other is the *State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee* (SWNCC), a United States Government organization. SWNCC formulates those policies which the Joint Chiefs of Staff (United States Army and Navy leaders) transmit as directives to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. SWNCC also formulates those policies which are submitted by FEC.

**Administration**

From the time of Japan's surrender, on September 2, 1945, occupation has been administered by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as *Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers* (SCAP). In Tokyo, SCAP works closely with the *Allied Council for Japan* (ACJ), which is composed of SCAP or his deputy as chairman and



U. S. member, one representative from the Soviet Union, one from China, and one representing jointly Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and India. It is ACJ's job to consult with and advise SCAP on problems of occupation, according to policies laid down by FEC.

To carry out the job of occupation, SCAP has a carefully planned and specially staffed organization. This organization is made up of staff sections set up within General Headquarters at Tokyo. These special sections are concerned with virtually every phase of life in Japan—government, economy, natural resources, education, public health, communications, war crimes, et cetera. They recommend what should be done to achieve the objectives of occupation and evaluate progress. Their recommendations, after approval by SCAP, are issued to the Japanese Government which carries out the orders.

## ROOTS AND GROWTH OF POLICY

### The Allies

The development and building of policy for occupation of Japan began during the war. They are the products of long-time planning and concrete commitments by the United States and other Allied Powers. The first step was taken in November 1943 at the Cairo Conference of the Chiefs of State of the United States, Great Britain, and China. The second was taken in February 1945 at the Yalta Conference of the Chiefs of State of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The third step—a projection of the Cairo and Yalta Conferences—was the proclamation drawn up during the Potsdam Conference. The Potsdam Proclamation, also known as the Potsdam Declaration, was issued on July 26, 1945 by the United States, Great Britain, and China, and concurred in by the Soviet Union after she entered the war against Japan on August 9, 1945. This document states that until a new order of peace, security, and justice is established in Japan "and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth . . ."

The Potsdam Proclamation was given added force through references in subsequent historic documents. The Instrument of Surrender, signed by the Japanese and nine Allied Powers, stipulated the complete acceptance and fulfillment by Japan of the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation. The Allied Powers' statement of General MacArthur's authority as SCAP declared that "the statement of intentions contained in the Potsdam Declaration will be given full effect . . ."

### The United States

A consolidation and projection of all Allied planning for

Japan was drafted by SWNCC, approved by the President, and published by the United States on August 29, 1945. This document, the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, reiterated that the policies of the occupation would be regulated by consultation among the advisory bodies of the Allied Powers concerned.

Ten months later, on June 21, 1946, the United States published a proposed treaty which it had offered for the consideration of China, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. This draft of a treaty for the disarmament and demilitarization of Japan pointed out that the four powers had "declared their intention to effect the total disarmament and demilitarization of Japan. This intention was expressed in the Potsdam Declaration . . ." But, the proposed treaty emphasized, "It remains to ensure that the total disarmament and demilitarization of Japan will be enforced as long as the peace and security of the world may require. Only this assurance will permit the nations of Asia and the world to return singlemindedly to the habits of peace."

## POLICY IN ACTION

### The Job as a Whole

The task of translating the policies of the United States and its Allies into the actuality of demilitarization and democratization, toward the goal of world stability, is a gigantic one. Demilitarization and democratization, which are being carried on simultaneously, involve:

#### Disarmament

Military disarmament was the immediate task of occupation. SCAP issued the orders and the Japanese Government disbanded the Imperial General Headquarters, the nation's war-planning organization. It disarmed and demobilized the well-equipped and undefeated armies in Japan which far outnumbered the forces of occupation. Disarmament of Japanese forces outside Japan proper was placed in the hands of the local Allied commanders. At the same time steps were taken in Japan toward economic disarmament, which would prevent the Japanese from building up another war-machine. The manufacture of arms, munitions, and airplanes and aviation research were banned.

#### The Economy

Economic disarmament is part of the task of tearing down the highly centralized and highly militarized economy of Japan and rebuilding it on a new basis. Japan's economic life was in the hands of the Zaibatsu, which are economic combines or cartels comparable to the Nazis' world-girdling I. G. Farbenindustrie. The bigger Zaibatsu combine often controlled, through one board of directors, such diverse interests as mines, plantations, fac-



ories, steamship lines, steel mills, banks, railroads, newspapers, and political parties. The Zaibatsu, from the 1930's onward, had converted their industrial and financial empires from a peacetime to a wartime economy and thus made it possible for the militarists to carry on aggressive warfare.

SCAP ordered certain steps to be taken in preparation for the dissolution of economic combines and the termination of monopolistic practices. On the basis of a detailed report secured from the Japanese Government on industrial, manufacturing, and mining companies, SCAP ordered permanently liquidated 21 major banks and development companies and placed restrictions on the activities of 180 firms and subsidiaries.

Concurrently SCAP began securing the necessary facts for the exaction of reparations to indemnify those nations which had suffered from Japanese aggression. Data is being compiled for reparations—materials, machinery, and industrial equipment available beyond Japan's needs for a peacetime economy.

On the premise that a spreading of ownership of basic industry will provide a wider distribution of income and a more democratic ownership of the means of production, the Japanese Government has been ordered to prepare to sell to the general public, shares in Zaibatsu companies. Meanwhile, the Diet—the Japanese legislature—prepared a law to create a Holding Company Liquidation Commission. The Diet also legislated to improve the legal status of labor, granting the right to organize and bargain collectively, and to amend the Agricultural Lands Adjustment Law, which had kept farming land in the hands of a few and had restricted most Japanese farmers to sharecropper status.

The Japanese Government was ordered to work on this agrarian-reform project and submitted a plan to help tenants and small farmers and stimulate production. The plan called for forced sale by absentee owners and "gentlemen farmers". Farmers would get technical information, cheap credit, and insurance against crop losses. Farmers' cooperatives would be democratized. SCAP was not satisfied that this plan went far enough and ordered further measures to be taken.

#### **Government**

Japan's political and social system, which focused all power in the instrument of the Emperor, had made it possible for the Government to control the people, for the Zaibatsu to achieve control over the economic life of the nation, and for the militarists to wage aggressive war against other peoples. SCAP issued orders and instructions on specific steps to be taken to replace dictatorship with democracy.

SCAP's "Bill of Rights" directive ordered the Japanese Government to release political prisoners and said what should be done to "remove restrictions on political, civil and religious liberties and discrimination on the grounds of race, nationality, creed or political opinion . . ."

The Government was ordered to stop all financial assistance to the cult of State Shintoism, which every Japanese previously had had to embrace in addition to his personal religious beliefs. This cult officially linked love of country and the duties of Japanese subjects with Emperor-worship and belief in the divine origin and destiny of the Japanese people. State Shintoism fostered beliefs that the Japanese people were destined to bring all mankind under the rule of the Japanese Emperor.

The Japanese Government was ordered to abolish its secret police forces, dismiss undesirables from public office (what was meant by undesirable was specifically defined), and put an end to anti-democratic political parties, associations, and societies such as the terroristic Black Dragon Society. As a result of these "purge" orders, 5,000 police officials were fired and approximately 150,000 other persons were affected.

The greatest step away from dictatorship and toward political democracy was the drafting, by the Japanese Government on SCAP's orders, of a new constitution. This new constitution, in the words of General MacArthur, "places sovereignty squarely in the hands of the people. It establishes governmental authority with the predominant power vested in an elected legislature, as representative of the people, but with an adequate check upon that power, as well as upon the power of the executive and the judiciary, to insure that no branch of government may become autocratic or arbitrary in the administration of affairs of state." The document also radically reduces the power of the Emperor, permitting him no more than the role of a figurehead, and renounces war "forever", prohibiting the maintenance by Japan of an army, navy, or air force.

The Japanese were ordered to hold elections to replace those members of the Diet who had been affected by the purge orders and to bring true representatives of the people into this legislature which now had become, in fact, a law-making body. Under a law enacted by the purged Diet, women voted for the first time in Japan's history. Political parties of all complexions, banned under the dictatorship and encouraged by SCAP, were active in the democratically run elections.

#### **Prosecution of War Criminals**

By 1946 more than 600 Japanese had been accused of war crimes on the basis of documentary evidence and handed over by the Japanese Government for trial. There was set up an International Military Tribunal to try the



major culprits according to the new legal concept set up for the trials at Nürnberg. Persons in public or private roles who had formulated policies which the military had put into effect against other nations shared the guilt for those acts of aggression. The Allied machinery of justice is removing from the Japanese scene the most powerful directors of dictatorship and natural opponents to the growth of democracy. The Japanese people are being informed of the evidence and testimony at the trials and thus are getting an insight into how they, as well as other peoples, were victimized by dictatorship.

#### Education

Under occupation the press, radio, motion pictures, and other media of information were freed from the strait-jacket of dictatorship. With the influence and assistance of reliable and qualified Japanese these media now are being used not only to inform the people but also to educate them in such things as the fundamentals of democracy, the democratic meaning of the vote, and the responsibility of the people to use the ballot.

In the schools, teachers who were anti-democratic were removed from their jobs and replaced by reliable educators. Military training was abolished and replaced by sports programs. The aggressively nationalistic Students' Corps was disbanded and replaced by new, localized youth organizations. An end was put to discrimination in favor of applications for admission from former military-school students. State Shintoism was abolished. All school texts containing false or anti-democratic content were banned, and teaching in those subjects was halted while new texts were prepared.

A mission of United States educators visited Japan to investigate the Japanese system of education and to make recommendations. One of their recommendations was that some sort of Roman alphabet be substituted for the involved ideographs used in Japanese printed matter.

They pointed out that it takes a knowledge of at least 2,000 of these ideographs just to read a newspaper, and the average Japanese knows far less than that number. They declared that the Japanese people must be given a writing system which will not require the excessive time now necessary to master the ideographs if the people are to be able to read intelligently and acquire the information they need to understand political, economic, and social issues—basic requisites for democratic living and action.

#### THE ROAD AHEAD

##### Problems

Demilitarization, the first necessity of occupation, often adds to the problems of democratization. Demobilized soldiers and purged job holders mean additions to the army of the unemployed—already swelled by the thousands who were thrown out of work when the arms, munitions, and aviation industries were shut down. Jobless people are not good recruits for democracy.

The Japanese economy is burdened by (a) the unsettled problem of reparations, (b) the lack of raw materials which can be supplied only from abroad and (c) the lack of food which is handicapping production.

Disarmament and physical demilitarization can proceed under such conditions. They are the will of the forces of occupation. Democratization is another matter. That must stem largely from the Japanese people themselves. We can give them the teachings and trappings of democracy and even install democratic procedures. But only they can destroy permanently the pattern of thinking and behavior set by 300 years of repression and feudalism and replace this pattern with a functioning, democratic way of life. So far the job of democratization we have helped the Japanese to do is only skin deep. A long and difficult job lies ahead.



# MONITOR

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## Diplomatic-Military Planning Merger?

*An Intimate Message from Washington*

Registered in U. S. Patent Office

By William H. Stringer

WASHINGTON

When Congress gets around to writing Army-Navy unification into law, it will find at the pinnacle of the agreed compromise a unique organization which so far has been little noticed: the Council of National Defense.

This will be worth watching. For here Congress will be asked formally to establish a relationship which heretofore has operated informally under Presidents Wilson, Roosevelt, and Truman chiefly as a wartime necessity. It will be establishing, in short, a working co-partnership between the Secretary of State and the civilian heads of the armed services, a legal co-ordination between the framers of foreign policy and the formulators of the military power which bulwarks foreign policy and often determines its persuasiveness.

The Council of National Defense would consist of the Secretary of State (as Chairman), the proposed new Secretary of National Defense, the Secretaries of War, Navy, and Air, and the Chairman of the proposed National Security Resources Board (a semi-military agency planning war preparedness in terms of national resources).

This permanent co-ordination may be long overdue. Some policy-framers are a bit apprehensive at the way the Council is weighted with representatives of the armed services. One does not need to add the fact that the Secretary of State and several key ambassadors are ex-military men to wonder whether the military viewpoint may not become over-persuasive in the topmost councils of the United States.

An organization with some parallel features has existed in Britain since 1904—the Committee for Imperial Defense. On this, the Prime Minister sat as President, together with the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, War, and India; First Lord of the Admiralty, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the military heads of the services. In the United States, the principle of civilian control of all military determinations has been so vigilantly guarded that Congress up to now has been reluctant to bring the views of the military thus directly to bear on State Department policy.

Obviously, one of the great long-term weaknesses of American foreign policy was that it was often loftily promulgated without anybody's looking to see whether there was sufficient military power to support it.

Today, as Washington comes to grips with such problems as German demilitarization, atomic controls, and global bases, the need to consider solutions from the standpoint of military security is plain.

President Wilson in 1916 set up a kind of Council of National Defense but he counter-weighted the Secretaries of War and Navy by adding the Secretaries of the Interior, Labor, Agriculture, and Commerce. President Roosevelt, when the shadow of World War Two fell across America, regularly summoned the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, plus the Chiefs of Staff, to consult on national strategy. Former Secretary of War Stimson has testified that he met regularly with Messrs. Hull and Knox from State and Navy.

To make such joint consultation mandatory and permanent, President Truman has outlined the proposed Council to Congress as designed "to integrate our foreign and military policies and to enable the military services and other agencies of Government to co-operate more effectively in matters involving our national security."

The Council is not essential to Army-Navy unification. It was first trundled in by the Navy via its famous Eberhardt Report as representing a kind of top-level co-ordination-to-substitute-for-unification. Interestingly, the British Parliament on Dec. 19 established a new Defense Committee, to succeed the old "Imperial" Committee, which includes Britain's new Defense Minister and the Foreign Secretary. But it is to be of flexible composition and its role is particularly the organization of defense and mobilization of resources.

A lower-level counterpart of the proposed Council exists here today in the war-established State, War, and Navy Co-ordinating Committee, pronounced "Swink" and headed by assistant secretaries of the three departments. It is usefully recommending and integrating high policy ranging from German reparations to the building of an airfield in Saudi Arabia. This agency would probably continue under the Council, doing the day-to-day spade work.

Possibly the Council is a "must" in America's new world role. Its recommendations will carry great weight. Congress may need to assure, perhaps by making its Cabinet membership more flexible, that the representatives of diplomacy and creative statesmanship are not submerged by the representatives of the armed forces.



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, February 23, 1947.

## Return of Looted Objects of Art to Countries of Origin

### MEMORANDUM BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT MEMBER OF SWNCC<sup>1</sup>

The American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas (the Roberts Commission) in May made to the State and War Departments certain proposals for the return of cultural objects imported into this country by members of the Armed Forces. The text of the letter from the Secretary-Treasurer of the Commission to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas is attached as Appendix "A".

The introduction of looted objects of art into this country is contrary to the general policy of the United States and to the commitments of the United States under the Hague Convention of 1907 and in case of objects of a value of \$5,000 or more is a contravention of Federal law. It is incumbent on this Government, therefore, to exert every reasonable effort to right such wrongs as may be brought to light.

The following program is proposed to that end:

1. The Department of State should send to all museums, libraries, university departments of fine arts, art and antique dealers and auction houses and booksellers a circular of the following content:

a. The responsibility and the desire of this Government to return to their countries of origin those cultural objects which have been wrongfully taken and brought to the United States during and after the war;

b. A request that recipients of the circular be vigilant to note objects in that category, when feasible to invite deposit of such objects pending settlement, and to notify the Department of State immediately of any obtainable information concerning such objects.

A copy of a circular sent out some time ago by the Roberts Commission is attached as Appendix "B".

2. The Department of State should address letters to all known holders of such objects who have been unwilling to give them up to the circu-

<sup>1</sup> State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. For article on the Committee, see BULLETIN of Nov. 11, 1945, p. 745.

larized groups formally requesting the surrender of the objects in question.

3. In the case of objects having a value of \$5,000 or more the Department of State should request the Department of Justice to bring suit under the National Stolen Property Act in case a request is not satisfactorily answered.

4. When the ownership of surrendered objects can be easily determined and such objects are known to belong in countries having diplomatic representation in the United States, the Department of State should make arrangements to have the objects in question suitably packed and delivered to the indicated embassy or legation in Washington and receive an authenticated receipt therefor. If there is some question as to ownership or the local mission does not wish to accept responsibility for return of the property, such property shall be returned to the United States Military Government from whose jurisdiction it was removed so that restitution may be made through the usual channels.

5. When surrendered objects are determined to belong in Germany or Austria or Japan or Korea the State Department should make arrangements for suitably packing and delivery to the War Department for transport to United States Military Government authorities in the country of origin. Should conditions obtaining in a given occupied country make it unwise immediately to return a surrendered object, the State Department should ask the National Gallery of Art to assume temporary custody.

6. The expenses of this program should be borne in the following manner:

a. If the person surrendering a given object acquired it while serving in the Army or under Army jurisdiction, the War Department should defray the necessary costs of return.

b. If the person surrendering a given object acquired it while serving in the Navy or Marine Corps or Coast Guard or under Navy or Marine Corps or Coast Guard jurisdiction, the Navy Department should defray the necessary costs of return.



c. Should it be impossible to determine the manner in which a looted cultural object has been brought into the United States the Department of State should meet the costs.

#### Appendix "A"

THE AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION AND SALVAGE OF ARTISTIC AND HISTORIC MONUMENTS IN WAR AREAS

Office of the Secretary, National Gallery of Art, Washington 25, D.C., May 28, 1946.

General John H. Hilldring, Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, Room 278, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

DEAR GENERAL HILLDRING: At this time, the American Commission, anticipating the conclusion of its activities on June 30, 1946, respectfully submits to you the following plan for the return of cultural objects imported into this country by returning members of the Armed Forces. This plan is presented to you after discussion with the members of the American Commission, officials of the National Gallery of Art, and members of the Government Affairs staff of the Civil Affairs Division.

The Commission, to assist in inaugurating a program for the return of such objects to the countries to which they rightfully belong, would write letters to the individuals on the attached list<sup>1</sup> (ten objects or collections reported to the American Commission in the past year), who are the present holders of the objects, instructing them to inform the War Department, Civil Affairs Division, that they are prepared to turn over the material to the local Service Command, together with all information concerning the material, and particularly its destination, if known. The War Department would then instruct the local Service Command to secure the material and give a receipt for it to its present holder. The material would be packed and shipped by the Quartermaster Division. All objects on the attached list do not require special packing. If in the future an object might be reported for return which would require expert advice on packing, a local museum official might be consulted. Museums throughout the country have indicated their willingness to assist by providing the services of their staff members.

All material of German and Japanese origin would go either to the Office of Military Government (U.S.) Economics Division, Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Section, in Berlin or to General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Civil Information and Educa-

February 23, 1947

#### THE RECORD OF THE WEEK

tion Section, in Tokyo, for distribution to the military governments of the areas in which it originated. In cases of material the exact location or origin of which is not known, the offices would hold the material until it could be identified by local scholars and would then send it to its point of origin.

Objects from all other countries would be handled in the same manner as the material from Germany and Japan except that they would be shipped to the American Embassies in each country concerned, and returned to their points of origin through the Embassies.

It is anticipated that possessors of such material, at rather infrequent intervals during the next two years, would take it for advice to local museums, customs authorities, universities, libraries, and dealers. When they are informed that the material is from a museum collection or could be identified as properly belonging in the country of its origin, many possessors, of their own volition, would wish that the material be returned. Therefore, if this plan is approved, the Commission would undertake to circularize all institutions, dealers, etc., likely to receive this material, instructing them to gather all pertinent information on the objects at the time they are received for temporary custody, and to notify the War Department, Civil Affairs Division, requesting further instructions.

A copy of this letter is being presented simultaneously to General Echols, Director, Civil Affairs Division, War Department, for concurrence or suggestions on this plan as it might affect policy or administration.

Sincerely,

HUNTINGTON CAIRNS  
Secretary-Treasurer

#### Appendix "B"

THE AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION AND SALVAGE OF ARTISTIC AND HISTORIC MONUMENTS IN WAR AREAS

Office of the Secretary, National Gallery of Art, Washington 25, D.C.

To Museums, Art and Antique Dealers and Auction Houses:

This Commission has had numerous reports of objects being offered to museums and to the trade by present and former members of the armed forces. Where the source or origin of these ob-

<sup>1</sup> NOTE: List referred to in second paragraph not furnished as a part of this paper.



**THE RECORD OF THE WEEK**

jects may be obscure or suspicious and where the objects may be of special artistic importance, the Commission would appreciate being informed of the facts with as full and specific information as possible concerning the objects themselves and the circumstances under which they came to your attention.

The above information will be made available to the Customs and the Foreign Funds Control officials in the Treasury Department for their attention and any further investigation that may be required. The source of the information will be treated as confidential.

It is, of course, obvious that no clear title can be passed on objects that have been looted from public or private collections abroad. We believe, therefore, that it is to the advantage of both public institutions and the trade, as well as for the good name of this Government and its armed forces, that any specific examples of looting of works of art or cultural materials be brought to light as soon as possible.

**TAX-TREATY NEGOTIATIONS WITH DENMARK**

[Released to the press February 11]

A draft convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income has been prepared after discussions in Washington between a delegation of Danish Government officials and officials of the United States Government. The Danish delegation is returning to Denmark.

The subject of estate taxes was discussed, but no draft convention on this subject was prepared.

The discussions were conducted for Denmark by S. Hiort-Lorenzen and E. Thielsen, of the Danish Ministry of Finance, and M. J. Clausen, of the Danish Ministry of the Interior, who comprised the Delegation, together with the Counselor of the Danish Legation in Washington, Hans Bertelsen. The United States Delegation was headed by Eldon P. King, Special Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The Department of State was represented in the discussions by Frederick Livesey, Adviser, Office of Financial and Development Policy, and William V. Whittington, Treaty Adviser, Treaty Branch, Office of the Legal Adviser.

The draft convention relating to income taxes

360

will be submitted by the negotiators to their respective governments for further consideration, with a view to the eventual signing of the convention if found by the two governments to be satisfactory.

**Foreign Commerce Weekly**

The following article of interest to readers of the BULLETIN appeared in the February 1 issue of *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, a publication of the Department of Commerce, copies of which may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, for 15 cents each:

"Swiss Lumber Situation—Struggle Against Shortages", based on reports from the American Consulates in Basel and Bern.

**"Pipeline" Contracts—Continued from page 346**

to purchase the material as surplus. The payment which has already been made could not be refunded, because it has been deposited into miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury, from which it can presumably be extracted (in response to the inquiry by Senator Thomas) only by Congressional action. Furthermore, as shown in the separate statement already mentioned, the United States Government would suffer a considerable ultimate loss because of the small return that would be likely to be realized, as distinguished from the amount to be paid under the pipeline agreements. It is clear, furthermore, that if, as suggested by Senator Tydings, the foreign governments were asked to pay immediately in cash for goods which the United States has contracted to sell to them on credit terms, they would rather have the material declared surplus, because it might in many instances provide an opportunity to obtain it at a considerable discount. This would be so particularly in the case of goods procured under foreign specifications. Such a result would be of no benefit to the United States.

Since the questions to which the foregoing is intended to provide answers were asked by a number of the members of your Committee, I am furnishing herewith extra copies of this letter for distribution to such other members. If the Committee wishes any further information, I am prepared, of course, to furnish whatever I can.

Sincerely yours,

CHESTER T. LANE,  
*Lend-Lease Administrator.*

*Department of State Bulletin*



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

MARCH 15, 1947  
No. 197

CONFIDENTIAL RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION AT 9:00 P. M., E.S.T.,  
SUNDAY, MARCH 16, 1947. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY  
PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM OR USED IN ANY WAY.

UNITED STATES POLICY ON EXCHANGES OF CULTURAL  
MATERIALS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRIA

The following statement of United States Policy is being released simultaneously in the United States by the Departments of State and War and in Austria by Headquarters, United States Forces in Austria. It is hoped that it will encourage organizations and institutions in both countries to promote and engage in cultural exchanges and thereby to contribute to the increase in understanding and to the strengthening of those ties which will be of greatest benefit to the two countries:

"1. In accordance with the United States Policy, based on the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943, of regarding Austria as a liberated country and promoting the reestablishment of a free and independent democratic Austrian state, it is the aim of the United States Government to foster the speedy restoration of normal cultural relations with Austria. As one of the powers occupying Austria, the United States also shares a responsibility which is defined as follows in the four-power agreement on a new control machinery for Austria of June 28, 1946: 'To ensure the institution of a progressive long-term educational program designed to eradicate all traces of Nazi ideology and to instill into Austrian youth democratic principles.'

"2. The revival of the exchange of cultural materials between the United States and Austria is regarded as an essential contribution toward the accomplishment of these objectives. Therefore:

"(a) The United States Government shall encourage and facilitate the revival of the exchange of cultural materials between the United States and Austria.

"(b) Whenever appropriate, the advice, cooperation and support of the Austrian Government or of official Austrian agencies or institutions shall be sought in connection with projects involving the exchange of cultural materials.

"(c) Private organizations, institutions and individuals in the United States and in Austria shall be encouraged and assisted to engage in, and to take an increasing share in, activities within the scope of this policy, and to undertake such activities on their own initiative.

"3. Cultural materials to be exchanged under this policy  
must



NEW YORK TIMES,  
APRIL 4, 1947

## U. S. SPEEDS GRANTS OF JAPAN'S ASSETS

*in N.Y. Times April 4, 1947*  
Allied Lands in Orient to Get  
Part Indemnity Now Because  
of Need, Despite Protest

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, April 3—The United States Government today authorized Gen. Douglas MacArthur to make some advance reparations transfers from Japan to four Allied powers for urgent relief purposes.

The Far Eastern Commission had decided that certain industrial facilities should be available for removal but had not actually ordered the transfers.

Under the United States interim directive, China will receive 15 per cent of the facilities now available; the Philippines 5 per cent; The Netherlands 5 per cent, for the Indies, and the United Kingdom 5 per cent, for Burma, Malaya and its colonial possessions in the Far East. The United States will receive nothing under the advance-transfer program.

The percentages assigned, it was said, do not prejudice the interest of the four countries or any other country in the final national percentage shares of Japanese reparations.

It was learned that the action had brought protests from the Russian, French, Indian and Australian representatives on the Commission. The supporters were Canada, China, The Netherlands, the Philippines and New Zealand.

Today's directive, under the commission's rules, cannot be changed unless the United States, which has a veto power, agrees.

The United States took unilateral action after the Far Eastern Commission had not acted for nearly two months. The proposal was first submitted to the Commission by the United States on Feb. 13, with the assertion that "this was an urgent first move in getting reparations removals started."

An interim directive by the United States to cover urgent needs is provided for in the scope of the Commission.

In announcing the action, Maj. Gen. Frank R. McCoy, United States member of the Commission, said today at the group's session that the four states "are in extreme need of industrial equipment for the immediate relief of their economies."

"Protracted delay in removing this equipment," he added "is resulting in deterioration of assets usable for relief purposes. Also,

delay in initiating any program of actual removals of industrial equipment from Japan has impeded the Supreme Commander's occupation program."

The Far Eastern Commission had already made several important policy decisions on reparations matters, but it had not yet reached agreement on percentage shares for claimant countries. Therefore, no actual removals were made.

"The start of actual reparations removals from Japan," General McCoy said, "has now been delayed for over a year. All members of the Far Eastern Commission agree as to the urgency of commencing such removals."

He promised that the interim directive, as well as accompanying administrative regulations, would be placed before the Commission for review. He added that "the Commission will continue to consider this as well as all other aspects of the reparations problem."



*For publicity file*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

MARCH 31, 1947  
NO. 270

CONFIDENTIAL RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION AT 12:00 NOON E.S.T.,  
MONDAY, MARCH 31, 1947. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED,  
QUOTED FROM OR USED IN ANY WAY.

Interchange of Persons between the United States  
and Austria

The Department of State, War Department and Navy Department announce today a policy permitting the interchange of certain categories of persons between the United States and Austria. The policy is intended to further the re-establishment of normal cultural relations with Austria, to assist Austria in the restoration and maintenance of a democratic state and society, and to strengthen the ties of mutual understanding between the two countries. Arrangements of projects and selection of individuals in accordance with this policy shall be in consideration of specific needs in the fields of education and religion, and fields important to the forming of public opinion, such needs to be determined by the Department of State, the War Department, and the United States military authorities in Austria in consultation with the Austrian Government or with recognized Austrian organizations and institutions.

The program to be developed under this policy is conceived as a cooperative undertaking of the United States Government and private institutions and organizations interested in furthering democratic reconstruction in Austria. In the planning and execution of projects best designed to serve the general purposes of the policy, the assistance of institutions and organizations active in the fields of education, religion and information will be enlisted. Within the general framework of the program established by the government, projects financed wholly from private sources may be undertaken at once. There are no government funds available during the current fiscal year which may be used for the purposes of this program. Such funds are being requested from Congress as a part of the War Department appropriation for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1947. They will be used, if available, to supplement private funds in the financing of particular projects. Government projects will be planned so that together with those wholly or partially financed by private funds, they will constitute a balanced program.

Under



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Under the provisions of this policy, United States experts and specialists may visit Austria to work with leading Austrian personalities in the following fields: education; religion; informational and related fields of activity, such as press, radio and films; civic, welfare, youth and other social organizations; occupational and professional organizations; art, letters, music and the stage. United States professors and teachers may visit Austria to accept temporary teaching assignments at Austrian educational institutions. For the time being, because of the shortage of facilities and teachers and over-crowded conditions at Austrian educational institutions, it will not be possible for United States students to visit Austria for the purpose of studying at Austrian educational institutions.

It is contemplated that there will be brought to the United States a carefully selected group of Austrian specialists in the aforementioned fields to observe practices in this country; trainees for specialized training, including persons of outstanding promise who are about to enter upon or who are in the early years of their careers in such fields; and students to study at United States educational institutions. Only such persons will be selected for this program as can be expected to play a part in the revival of Austrian cultural life and in Austrian democratic reconstruction. Austrian nationals coming to the United States must have a satisfactory record as regards past and present political activity and affiliation, and preference will be given to persons who have demonstrated their opposition to Nazism and their belief in democratic principles. Such persons will be brought to the United States in order to complete a carefully planned program generally lasting between six and twelve months, and they must return to Austria when the program has been completed.

The trip of each individual must be recommended or sponsored by a recognized American non-governmental organization or institution, or by an agency or institution of the United States Government. The participation of suitable Austrian representatives in the recommendation and invitation of Austrian nationals to visit the United States under the program is also contemplated. The eligibility of each person and that of his sponsor under the provisions of this policy, the length of his stay, and the program of his visit must be approved by the United States military authorities in Austria, the War Department, and the Department of State.

United States private organizations and institutions desiring to participate in the program may do so either by paying the expenses of United States experts proceeding to Austria under the conditions and for the purposes of this policy, or by paying the expenses, providing placements for training, and furnishing accommodations in the United States to experts, students and trainees from Austria. Offers for training and accommodation of Austrians in the United States will be of maximum value to the program when they are made in terms of training which can be provided for persons of specified type rather than by designating specific individuals whom it is desired to accommodate. Where individuals are specified, each case will be considered on its merits within the framework of the policy as a whole and in consideration of the general program of cultural exchanges developed by the Department of State.

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-3-

The number of persons admitted in accordance with this policy will be determined by the nature and scope of programs developed, by facilities and placements offered by participating agencies, and by the extent of funds available for the execution of such programs.

Inquiries concerning the program and applications for participation by private organizations and individuals should be addressed to the Civil Affairs Division, War Department, Washington, D. C.

The foregoing program, which will provide for exchanges of an important category of persons between the United States and Austria, does not, however, indicate a relaxation of the present general restrictions on travel to Austria which have been imposed by the Allied occupation authorities because of the current exigencies of food, housing and transportation. The United States desires the removal of all obstacles to the normal, private interchange of all categories of persons between the United States and Austria at the earliest possible date and restrictions will be removed as rapidly as is consistent with the welfare of Austria. It is hoped that steps in this direction may be taken upon the conclusion of the Austrian Treaty and the end of the Allied Occupation.

\* \* \*



BASED ON SWNCC 226 SERIES

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

APRIL 9, 1947  
NO. 299

The Department of State announced today that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan will establish commercial accounts with American and foreign banking institutions when and as needed in connection with the administration of the dollar proceeds of Japanese exports to countries other than the United States.

It was explained that heretofore the sole depository of dollar proceeds of Japanese exports consisted of a trust fund receipt account established within the framework of the Army accounting system. This account was designed primarily to handle financial transactions involving trade between Japan and the United States and is not readily adaptable to financial transactions arising out of trade with other countries. The need for commercial banking facilities of this nature arises out of the expansion of Japanese foreign trade with all areas capable of supplying Japan with food and raw materials and in which profitable markets for Japanese exports may be found.

State Department officials indicated that since the National City Bank of New York is the only American bank operating a branch office in Japan at present, it is likely that the first commercial account of this nature to be opened by SCAP Headquarters will be with that institution. It is expected, however, that as the volume of Japanese foreign trade grows, commercial accounts will be opened with other American banks and with foreign banks in keeping with this Government's policy of utilizing on a non-discriminatory basis the services of any qualified institution interested in acting as a depository of dollar funds arising out of Japanese foreign trade.

\* \* \*



WASHINGTON POST - APRIL 1947  
(SWNCC 186/23)

# Allies Will Divide 239 Jap Warcraft

## Of Trieste Acts

### Yugoslavia Gets Protest From U. S.

The United States has protested to Yugoslavia against unlawful removal of Italian property from Trieste, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson revealed yesterday. Acheson said the United States note was delivered to Yugoslav Ambassador Sava Kosanovic March 27. He said no reply had yet been received.

The note, Acheson told a news conference, described the seizure as without the consent of the owners, without compensation and without legal authority. It said the action was unlawful and very damaging to the economy of the area.

Now under administration of the Yugoslav army, Trieste will become an international zone when the Italian peace treaty becomes effective.

Acheson said also that the Yugoslav government had rejected a United States protest of February 17 against condemnation as prizes of nine Italian vessels. The United States had contended seizure of the ships, including the 50,000-ton liner Rex, off the Istrian Peninsula was in violation of the Italian surrender terms.

The Yugoslav government replied March 14, Acheson said, that it did not agree with the contention of this Government. It declared the vessels in question were not included in the armistice terms because they had engaged in operations subsequent to the surrender.

## Ship Distribution Will Be by Lot Among 4 Powers

By Marshall Andrews  
Post Reporter

The United States has informed England, Russia and China that 239 small Japanese warships are now available for equal distribution in conformity with the Moscow declaration of 1943.

Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson told a news conference that General Douglas MacArthur had notified this Government that 140 of the vessels were ready for immediate delivery. The remaining 99 can be put into operating condition within 60 days.

Acheson said distribution of all operable Japanese warships of destroyer size, or smaller, among the four powers had been agreed upon at the Moscow Conference in October, 1943. Distribution will be by lot, so some powers may receive a larger proportion of destroyers than others.

### 27 Destroyers Included

Included in the 239 vessels are 27 destroyers, 76 destroyer escorts, five patrol craft, 18 light patrol craft, 62 auxiliary submarine chasers, 11 mine layers, 14 mine sweepers, four cargo ships, 12 transports, nine air rescue craft and one unclassified. All have been disarmed and all military equipment removed.

Under the Moscow declaration, Acheson pointed out, all Japanese warships larger than destroyers and all submarines have been scrapped. Many of the smaller vessels, he said, were wrecked when seized or were so badly damaged that they could not be put into operating condition.

NEW YORK TIMES  
JULY, 1947

## QUITS WAR DEPARTMENT



Howard C. Petersen  
The New York Times Studio, 1946

## PETERSEN TO QUIT WAR DEPARTMENT

Assistant Secretary Is Praised  
by Truman for Supervision  
of Military Governments

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, July 14—President Truman today made known the resignation of Howard C. Petersen, Assistant Secretary of War, effective July 31.

In his letter of resignation Mr. Petersen said he could not afford to stay in government service any longer. A reason given by several retiring government officials since the end of the war. Mr. Petersen's salary is \$10,000 a year.

President Truman accepted the resignation with "genuine regret" and said that Mr. Petersen's service "has been of outstanding quality and entitles you to the gratitude of the country." He added:

"You have assisted materially in the solution of some of the most important problems with which the Government has had to deal, and have made an important contribution toward the solution of others which are still before us."

In his letter Mr. Petersen said: "My reason for resigning is an all too familiar one to you. I have been in the War Department over six and one-half years; for the last year and a half as Assistant Secretary. In fairness to my family, I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that I cannot afford to stay in Government service any longer.

"I regret leaving, for I have had great personal satisfaction from my work. I regret also that I leave at a time when so many important problems remain in one of the principal fields in which I have been engaged, military government in occupied areas. Nevertheless, circumstances require that I go."

From September, 1933, until January, 1941, he was engaged in the practice of general corporation, financial and public utility law as an associate of Cravath deGersdorff, Swaine & Wood, a firm now known as Cravath, Swaine & Moore, of New York City.

Mr. Petersen supervises military government activities of the Army in Germany, Japan, Korea, Austria and Italy. He is also the War Department's principal representative at the State Department on all matters involving political policy, and the department's member of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. He has traveled extensively overseas in carrying out his duties.

He entered the War Department on Jan. 2, 1941, as an assistant to the then Under-Secretary Robert P. Patterson.



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

MARCH 14, 1947  
NO. 193AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE  
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES CONCERNING MILITARY BASES*(Based on  
340/1)*

WHEREAS, the war in the Pacific has confirmed the mutual-ity of interest of the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines in matters relating to the defense of their respective territories and that mutuality of interest demands that the Governments of the two countries take the necessary measures to promote their mutual security and to defend their territories and areas;

WHEREAS, the Governments of the United States of America and of the Republic of the Philippines are desirous of cooperating in the common defense of their two countries through arrangements consonant with the procedures and objectives of the United Nations; and particularly through a grant to the United States of America by the Republic of the Philippines, in the exercise of its title and sovereignty, of the use, free of rent, in furtherance of the mutual interest of both countries, of certain lands of the public domain;

WHEREAS, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines has requested United States assistance in providing for the defense of the Philippines and in developing for such defense effective Philippine Armed Forces;

WHEREAS, pursuant to this request the Government of the United States of America has, in view of its interest in the welfare of the Philippines indicated its intention of dispatching a military mission to the Philippines and of extending to her appropriate assistance in the development of the Philippine defense forces;

WHEREAS, a Joint Resolution of the Congress of the United States of America of June 29, 1944, authorized the President of the United States of America to acquire bases for the mutual protection of the Philippines and of the United States of America; and

WHEREAS, Joint Resolution No. 4 of the Congress of the Philippines, approved July 28, 1945, authorized the President of the Republic of the Philippines to negotiate with the President of the United States of America for the establishment of bases provided for in the Joint Resolution of the Congress of the United States of America of June 29, 1944, with a view to insuring the territorial integrity of the Philippines, the mutual protection of the Philippines and the United States of America, and the maintenance of peace in the Pacific;

THEREFORE the Governments of the United States of America and of the Republic of the Philippines agree upon the following terms for the delimitation, establishment, maintenance and operation of military bases in the Philippines:

## ARTICLE I

GRANT OF BASES

1. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as the Philippines) grants to the Government of the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the United States) the right to retain the use of the bases in the Philippines listed in Annex A attached hereto.

2. The Philippines



-2-

2. The Philippines agrees to permit the United States, upon notice to the Philippines, to use such of those bases listed in Annex B as the United States determines to be required by military necessity.

3. The Philippines agrees to enter into negotiations with the United States at the latter's request, to permit the United States to expand such bases, to exchange such bases for other bases, to acquire additional bases, or relinquish rights to bases, as any of such exigencies may be required by military necessity.

4. A narrative description of the boundaries of the bases to which this Agreement relates is given in Annex A and Annex B. An exact description of the bases listed in Annex A, with metes and bounds, in conformity with the narrative descriptions will be agreed upon between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments as soon as possible. With respect to any of the bases listed in Annex B, an exact description with metes and bounds, in conformity with the narrative description of such bases, will be agreed upon if and when such bases are acquired by the United States.

## ARTICLE II

### MUTUAL COOPERATION

1. It is mutually agreed that the armed forces of the Philippines may serve on United States bases and that the armed forces of the United States may serve on Philippine military establishments whenever such conditions appear beneficial as mutually determined by the armed forces of both countries.

2. Joint outlined plans for the development of military bases in the Philippines may be prepared by military authorities of the two Governments.

3. In the interests of international security any bases listed in Annexes A and B may be made available to the Security Council of the United Nations on its call by prior mutual agreement between the Philippines and the United States.

## ARTICLE III

### DESCRIPTION OF RIGHTS

1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the rights, power and authority within the bases which are necessary for the establishment, use, operation and defense thereof or appropriate for the control thereof and all the rights, power and authority within the limits of territorial waters and air space adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the bases which are necessary to provide access to them, or appropriate for their control.

2. Such rights, power and authority shall include, inter alia, the right, power and authority:

(a) to construct (including dredging and filling), operate, maintain, utilize, occupy, garrison and control the bases;

(b) to improve and deepen the harbors, channels, entrances and anchorages, and to construct or maintain necessary roads and bridges affording access to the bases;

(c) to control



-3-

(c) to control (including the right to prohibit) in so far as may be required for the efficient operation and safety of the bases, and within the limits of military necessity, anchorages, moorings, landings, takeoffs, movements and operation of ships and water-borne craft, craft and other vehicles on water, in the air or on land comprising or in the vicinity of the bases;

(d) the right to acquire, as may be agreed between the two Governments, such rights of way, and to construct thereon, as may be required for military purpose, wire and radio communications facilities, including submarine and subterranean cables, pipe lines and spur tracks from railroads to bases, and the right, as may be agreed upon between the two Governments to construct the necessary facilities;

(e) to construct, install, maintain, and employ on any base any type of facilities, weapons, substance, device, vessel or vehicle on or under the ground, in the air or on or under the water that may be requisite or appropriate, including meteorological systems, aerial and water navigation lights, radio and radar apparatus and electronic devices of any desired power, type of emission and frequency.

3. In the exercise of the above-mentioned rights, power and authority, the United States agrees that the powers granted to it will not be used unreasonably or, unless required by military necessity determined by the two Governments so as to interfere with the necessary rights of navigation, aviation, communication, or land travel within the territories of the Philippines. In the practical application outside the bases of the rights, power and authority granted in this Article there shall be, as the occasion requires, consultation between the two Governments.

#### ARTICLE IV

##### SHIPPING AND NAVIGATION

1. It is mutually agreed that United States public vessels operated by or for the War or Navy Departments, the Coast Guard or the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and the military forces of the United States, military and naval aircraft and Government-owned vehicles, including armor, shall be accorded free access to and movement between ports and United States bases throughout the Philippines, including territorial waters, by land, air and sea. This right shall include freedom from compulsory pilotage and all toll charges. If, however, a pilot is taken, pilotage shall be paid for at appropriate rates. In connection with entrance into Philippine ports by United States public vessels appropriate notification under normal conditions shall be made to the Philippine authorities.

2. Lights and other aids to navigation of vessels and aircraft placed or established in the bases and territorial waters adjacent thereto or in the vicinity of such bases shall conform to the system in use in the Philippines. The position, characteristics and any alterations in the light or other aids shall be communicated in advance to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines.

3. Philippine commercial vessels may use the bases on the same terms and conditions as United States commercial vessels.

4. It is



-4-

4. It is understood that a base is not a part of the territory of the United States for the purpose of coastwise shipping laws so as to exclude Philippine vessels from trade between the United States and the bases.

## ARTICLE V

EXEMPTION FROM CUSTOMS AND OTHER DUTIES

No import, excise, consumption or other tax, duty or impost shall be charged on material, equipment, supplies or goods, including food stores and clothing, for exclusive use in the construction, maintenance, operation or defense of the bases, consigned to, or destined for, the United States authorities and certified by them to be for such purposes.

## ARTICLE VI

MANEUVER AND OTHER AREAS

The United States shall, subject to previous agreement with the Philippines, have the right to use land and coastal sea areas of appropriate size and location for periodic maneuvers, for additional staging areas, bombing and gunnery ranges, and for such intermediate airfields as may be required for safe and efficient air operations. Operations in such areas shall be carried on with due regard and safeguards for the public safety.

## ARTICLE VII

USE OF PUBLIC SERVICES

It is mutually agreed that the United States may employ and use for United States military forces any and all public utilities, other services and facilities, airfields, ports, harbors, roads, highways, railroads, bridges, viaducts, canals, lakes, rivers and streams in the Philippines under conditions no less favorable than those that may be applicable from time to time to the military forces of the Philippines.

## ARTICLE VIII

HEALTH MEASURES OUTSIDE BASES

It is mutually agreed that the United States may construct, subject to agreement by the appropriate Philippine authorities, wells, water catchment areas or dams to insure an ample supply of water for all base operations and personnel. The United States shall likewise have the right, in cooperation with the appropriate authorities of the Philippines, to take such steps as may be mutually agreed upon to be necessary to improve health and sanitation in areas contiguous to the bases, including the right, under such conditions as may be mutually agreed upon, to enter and inspect any privately owned property. The United States shall pay just compensation for any injury to persons or damage to property that may result from action taken in connection with this Article.

## ARTICLE IX



-5-

## ARTICLE IX

SURVEYS

It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right, after appropriate notification has been given to the Philippines, to make topographic, hydrographic, and coast and geodetic surveys and aerial photographs in any part of the Philippines and waters adjacent thereto. Copies with title and triangulation data of any surveys or photomaps made of the Philippines shall be furnished to the Philippines.

## ARTICLE X

CEMETERIES AND HISTORICAL SITES

1. The United States shall have the right to use and maintain such United States military cemeteries and such sites of historical significance to the United States as may be agreed upon by the two Governments. All rights, power and authority in relation to bases granted under this Agreement shall be applicable, in so far as appropriate, to the cemeteries and sites mentioned in this Article.

2. Furthermore, it is recognized that there are certain cemeteries and historical sites in the Philippines revered in the memory of the People of the United States and of the Philippines, and it is therefore fitting that the maintenance and improvement of such memorials be the common concern of the two countries.

## ARTICLE XI

IMMIGRATION

1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right to bring into the Philippines members of the United States military forces and the United States nationals employed by or under a contract with the United States together with their families, and technical personnel of other nationalities (not being persons excluded by the laws of the Philippines) in connection with the construction, maintenance, or operation of the bases. The United States shall make suitable arrangements so that such persons may be readily identified and their status established when necessary by the Philippine authorities. Such persons, other than members of the United States armed forces in uniform, shall present their travel documents to the appropriate Philippine authorities for visas, it being understood that no objection will be made to their travel to the Philippines as non-immigrants.

2. If the status of any person within the Philippines and admitted thereto under the foregoing paragraph shall be altered so that he would no longer be entitled to such admission, the United States shall notify the Philippines and shall, if such person be required to leave the Philippines by the latter Government, be responsible for providing him with a passage from the Philippines within a reasonable time, and shall in the meantime prevent his becoming a public responsibility of the Philippines.

## ARTICLE XII

INTERNAL REVENUE TAX EXEMPTION

1. No member of the United States armed forces, except Filipino citizens, serving in the Philippines in connection with the bases and residing in the Philippines by reason only  
of such



-6-

of such service, or his dependents, shall be liable to pay income tax in the Philippines except in respect of income derived from Philippine sources.

2. No national of the United States serving in or employed in the Philippines in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defense of the bases and residing in the Philippines by reason only of such employment, or his spouse and minor children and dependent parents of either spouse, shall be liable to pay income tax in the Philippines except in respect of income derived from Philippine sources or sources other than the United States sources.

3. No person referred to paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be liable to pay to the Government or local authorities of the Philippines any poll or residence tax, or any import or export duty, or any other tax on personal property imported for his own use; provided that privately owned vehicles shall be subject to payment of the following only: when certified as being used for military purposes by appropriate United States authorities, the normal license plate fee; otherwise, the normal license plate and registration fees.

4. No national of the United States, or corporation organized under the laws of the United States, resident in the United States, shall be liable to pay income tax in the Philippines in respect of any profits derived under a contract made in the United States with the Government of the United States in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation and defense of the bases, or any tax in the nature of a license in respect of any service or work for the United States in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation and defense of the bases.

#### ARTICLE XIII

#### JURISDICTION

1. The Philippines consents that the United States shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over the following offenses:

(a) Any offense committed by any person within any base; except where the offender and the offended parties are both Philippine citizens, not members of the Armed Forces of the United States on active duty or the offense is against the security of the Philippines, and the offender is a Philippine citizen;

(b) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the Armed Forces of the United States in which the offended party is also a member of the Armed Forces of the United States; and

(c) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the Armed Forces of the United States against the security of the United States.

2. The Philippines shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over all other offenses committed outside the bases by any member of the Armed Forces of the United States.

3. Whenever for special reasons the United States may desire not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to it in paragraphs 1 and 6 of this Article, the officer holding the offender in custody shall so notify the fiscal (prosecuting attorney)



-7-

attorney) of the city or province in which the offense has been committed within ten days after his arrest, and in such a case the Philippines shall exercise jurisdiction.

4. Whenever for special reasons the Philippines may desire not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to it in paragraph 2 of this Article, the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) of the city or province where the offense has been committed shall so notify the officer holding the offender in custody within ten days after his arrest, and in such a case the United States shall be free to exercise jurisdiction. If any offense falling under paragraph 2 of this Article is committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the United States

(a) while engaged in the actual performance of a specific military duty, or

(b) during a period of national emergency declared by either Government and the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) so finds from the evidence, he shall immediately notify the officer holding the offender in custody that the United States is free to exercise jurisdiction. In the event the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) finds that the offense was not committed in the actual performance of a specific military duty, the offender's commanding officer shall have the right to appeal from such finding to the Secretary of Justice within ten days from the receipt of the decision of the fiscal and the decision of the Secretary of Justice shall be final.

5. In all cases over which the Philippines exercise jurisdiction the custody of the accused, pending trial and final judgment, shall be entrusted without delay to the commanding officer of the nearest base, who shall acknowledge in writing that such accused has been delivered to him for custody pending trial in a competent court of the Philippines and that he will be held ready to appear and will be produced before said court when required by it. The commanding officer shall be furnished by the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) with a copy of the information against the accused upon the filing of the original in the competent court.

6. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, it is mutually agreed that in time of war the United States shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over any offenses which may be committed by members of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines.

7. The United States agrees that it will not grant asylum in any of the bases to any person fleeing from the lawful jurisdiction of the Philippines. Should any such person be found in any base, he will be surrendered on demand to the competent authorities of the Philippines.

8. In every case in which jurisdiction over an offense is exercised by the United States, the offended party may institute a separate civil action against the offender in the proper court of the Philippines to enforce the civil liability which under the laws of the Philippines may arise from the offense.

#### ARTICLE XIV

##### ARREST AND SERVICE OF PROCESS

1. No arrest shall be made and no process, civil or criminal, shall be served within any base except with the permission



-8-

permission of the commanding officer of such base; but should the commanding officer refuse to grant such permission he shall (except in cases of arrest where the United States has jurisdiction under Article XIII) forthwith take the necessary steps to arrest the person charged and surrender him to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines or to serve such process, as the case may be, and to provide the attendance of the server of such process before the appropriate court in the Philippines or procure such server to make the necessary affidavit or declaration to prove such service as the case may require.

2. In cases where the service courts of the United States have jurisdiction under Article XIII, the appropriate authorities of the Philippines will, on request, give reciprocal facilities as regards the service of process and the arrest and surrender of alleged offenders.

#### ARTICLE XV

##### SECURITY LEGISLATION

The Philippines agrees to take such steps as may from time to time be agreed to be necessary with a view to the enactment of legislation to insure the adequate security and protection of the United States bases, equipment and other property and the operations of the United States under this Agreement, and the punishment of persons who may contravene such legislation. It is mutually agreed that appropriate authorities of the two Governments will also consult from time to time in order to insure that laws and regulations of the United States and of the Philippines in relation to such matters shall, so far as may be possible, be uniform in character.

#### ARTICLE XVI

##### POSTAL FACILITIES

It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right to establish and maintain United States post offices in the bases for the exclusive use of the United States forces, and civilian personnel who are nationals of the United States, and employed in connection with the construction, maintenance, and operation of the bases, and the families of such persons, and for domestic use between United States post offices in the bases and between such post offices and other United States post offices. The United States shall have the right to regulate and control within the bases all communications within, to and from such bases.

#### ARTICLE XVII

##### REMOVAL OF IMPROVEMENTS

1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right to remove or dispose of any or all removable improvements, equipment or facilities located at or on any base and paid for with funds of the United States. No export tax shall be charged on any material or equipment so removed from the Philippines.

2. All buildings and structures which are erected by the United States in the bases shall be the property of the United States and may be removed by it before the expiration of this Agreement or the earlier relinquishment of the base on which the structures are situated. There shall be no obligation on the part of the United States or the Philippines to rebuild or repair any destruction or damage inflicted from

any cause



-9-

any cause whatsoever on any of the said buildings or structures owned or used by the United States in the bases. The United States is not obligated to turn over the bases to the Philippines at the expiration of this Agreement or the earlier relinquishment of any bases in the condition in which they were at the time of their occupation, nor is the Philippines obliged to make any compensation to the United States for the improvements made in the bases or for the buildings or structures left thereon, all of which shall become the property of the Philippines upon the termination of the Agreement or the earlier relinquishment by the United States of the bases where the structures have been built.

## ARTICLE XVIII

SALES AND SERVICES WITHIN THE BASES

1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right to establish on bases, free of all licenses; fees; sales, excise or other taxes, or imposts; Government agencies, including concessions, such as sales commissaries and post exchanges, messes and social clubs, for the exclusive use of the United States military forces and authorized civilian personnel and their families. The merchandise or services sold or dispensed by such agencies shall be free of all taxes, duties and inspection by the Philippine authorities. Administrative measures shall be taken by the appropriate authorities of the United States to prevent the resale of goods which are sold under the provisions of this Article to persons not entitled to buy goods at such agencies and, generally, to prevent abuse of the privileges granted under this Article. There shall be cooperation between such authorities and the Philippines to this end.

2. Except as may be provided in any other agreements, no person shall habitually render any professional services in a base except to or for the United States or to or for the persons mentioned in the preceding paragraph. No business shall be established in a base, it being understood that the Government agencies mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall not be regarded as businesses for the purposes of this Article.

## ARTICLE XIX

COMMERCIAL CONCERNS

It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right, with the consent of the Philippines, to grant to commercial concerns owned or controlled by citizens of the United States or of the Philippines such rights to the use of any base or facility retained or acquired by the United States as may be deemed appropriate by both Governments to insure the development and maintenance for defense purposes of such bases and facilities.

## ARTICLE XX

MILITARY OR NAVAL POLICE

It is mutually agreed that there shall be close cooperation on a reciprocal basis between the military and naval police forces of the United States and the police forces of the Philippines for the purpose of preserving order and discipline among United States military and naval personnel.

## ARTICLE XXI



-10-

## ARTICLE XXI

TEMPORARY INSTALLATIONS

1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall retain the right to occupy temporary quarters and installations now existing outside the bases mentioned in Annex A and Annex B for such reasonable time, not exceeding two years, as may be necessary to develop adequate facilities within the bases for the United States Armed Forces. If circumstances require an extension of time, such a period will be fixed by mutual agreement of the two governments; but such extension shall not apply to the existing temporary quarters and installations within the limits of the City of Manila and shall in no case exceed a period of three years.

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the port of Manila reservation with boundaries as of 1941 will be available for use to the United States Armed Forces until such time as other arrangements can be made for supply of the bases by mutual agreement of the two Governments.

3. The terms of this Agreement pertaining to bases shall be applicable to temporary quarters and installations referred to in paragraph one of this Article while they are so occupied by the Armed Forces of the United States; provided, that offenses committed within the temporary quarters and installations located within the present limits of the City of Manila shall not be considered as offenses within the bases but shall be governed by the provisions of Article thirteen, paragraphs two and four, except that the election not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to the Philippines shall be made by the Secretary of Justice. It is agreed that the United States shall have full use and full control of all these quarters and installations while they are occupied by the Armed Forces of the United States, including the exercise of such measures as may be necessary to police quarters for the security of the personnel and property therein.

## ARTICLE XXII

CONDEMNATION OR EXPROPRIATION

1. Whenever it is necessary to acquire by condemnation or expropriation proceedings real property belonging to any private persons, associations or corporations located in bases named in Annex A and Annex B in order to carry out the purposes of this Agreement, the Philippines will institute and prosecute such condemnation or expropriation proceedings in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. The United States agrees to reimburse the Philippines for all the reasonable expenses, damages and costs thereby incurred, including the value of the property as determined by the Court. In addition, subject to the mutual agreement of the two Governments, the United States will reimburse the Philippines for the reasonable costs of transportation and removal of any occupants displaced or ejected by reason of the condemnation or expropriation.

2. Prior to the completion of such condemnation or expropriation proceedings, in cases of military necessity the United States shall have the right to take possession of such property required for military purposes as soon as the legal requisites for obtaining possession have been fulfilled.

3. The properties



-11-

3. The properties acquired under this Article shall be turned over to the Philippines upon the expiration of this Agreement, or the earlier relinquishment of such properties, under such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by the two Governments.

## ARTICLE XXIII

CIVIL LIABILITY

For the purpose of promoting and maintaining friendly relations by the prompt settlement of meritorious claims, the United States shall pay just and reasonable compensation, when accepted by claimants in full satisfaction and in final settlement, for claims, including claims of insured but excluding claims of subrogees, on account of damage to or loss or destruction of private property, both real and personal or personal injury or death of inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, when such damage, loss, destruction or injury is caused by the Armed Forces of the United States, or individual members thereof, including military or civilian employees thereof, or otherwise incident to non-combat activities of such forces; provided that no claim shall be considered unless presented within one year after the occurrence of the accident or incident out of which such claim arises.

## ARTICLE XXIV

MINERAL RESOURCES

All minerals (including oil), and antiquities and all rights relating thereto and to treasure trove, under, upon, or connected with the land and water comprised in the bases or otherwise used or occupied by the United States by virtue of this Agreement, are reserved to the Government and inhabitants of the Philippines; but no rights so reserved shall be transferred to third parties, or exercised within the bases, without the consent of the United States. The United States shall negotiate with the proper Philippine authorities for the quarrying of rock and gravel necessary for construction work on the bases.

## ARTICLE XXV

GRANT OF BASES TO A THIRD POWER

1. The Philippines agrees that it shall not grant, without prior consent of the United States, any bases or any rights, power, or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases, to any third power.

2. It is further agreed that the United States shall not, without the consent of the Philippines, assign, or under-let, or part with the possession of the whole or any part of any base, or of any right, power or authority granted by this Agreement, to any third power.

## ARTICLE XXVI

DEFINITION OF BASES

For the purposes of this Agreement, bases are those areas named in Annex A and Annex B and such additional areas as may be acquired for military purposes pursuant to the terms of this Agreement.

## ARTICLE XXVII



-12-

## ARTICLE XXVII

VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENT OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS

It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right to recruit citizens of the Philippines for voluntary enlistment into the United States Armed Forces for a fixed term of years, and to train them and to exercise the same degree of control and discipline over them as is exercised in the case of other members of the United States Armed Forces. The number of such enlistments to be accepted by the Armed Forces of the United States may from time to time be limited by agreement between the two Governments.

## ARTICLE XXVIII

UNITED STATES RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS

It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right to enroll and train all eligible United States citizens residing in the Philippines in the reserve organizations of the Armed Forces of the United States, which include the Officers Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps, except that prior consent of the Philippines shall be obtained in the case of such persons who are employed by the Philippines or any municipal or provincial government thereof.

## ARTICLE XXIX

TERM OF AGREEMENT

The present Agreement shall enter into force upon its acceptance by the two Governments and shall remain in force for a period of ninety-nine years subject to extension thereafter as agreed by the two Governments.

Signed in Manila, P. I. , in duplicate this 14th day of March , 1947.

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America:

PAUL V. MCNUTT  
UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO  
THE REPUBLIC OF THE  
PHILIPPINES

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines:

MANUEL A. ROXAS  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC  
OF THE PHILIPPINES

ANNEX "A"



-13-

## ANNEX "A"

Clark Field Airbase, Pampanga  
Fort Stotsenberg, Pampanga  
Mariveles Military Reservation, POL Terminal & Training Area,  
Bataan  
Camp John Hay Leave and Recreation Center, Baguio  
Army Communications System with the deletion of all stations  
in the Port of Manila Area.  
U.S. AF Cemetery No. 2, San Francisco, Delmonte, Rizal  
Angeles General Depot, Pampanga  
Leyte-Samar Naval Base including shore installations and  
air bases  
Subic Bay, No. West Shore Naval Base Zambales Province and  
the existing naval reservation at Olongapo  
and the existing Baguio naval reservation  
Tawi Tawi Naval Anchorage and small adjacent land areas  
Canacao - Sangley Point Navy Base, Cavite Province  
Bagobantay Transmitter Area, Quezon City, and associated radio  
receiving and control sites, Manila Area  
Tarumpitao Point (Loran Master Transmitter Station) (Palawan)  
Talampulan Island, C. G. #354 (Loran) (Palawan)  
Naule Point (Loran Station) (Zambales)  
Castillejos, C. G. #356 (Zambales)

## ANNEX "B"

Mactan Island Army and Navy Airbase  
Florida Blanca Airbase, Pampanga  
Aircraft Service Warning Net  
Camp Wallace, San Fernando, La Union  
Puerta Princesa Army and Navy Air Base including Navy Section  
Base and Air Warning Sites, Palawan  
Tawi Tawi Naval Base, Sulu Archipelago  
Aparri Naval Air Base.

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