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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

DIVISION OF FR

1947 JAN 20 PM 12 24

Tokyo, January 8, 1947.

CONFIDENTIAL MAIL ROOM

No. 803



MAR 8 - 1947

SUBJECT: Transmitting Report "The Anti-Government Movement".

ACTION
2 PE
COPIES
IO:
2 ESP
6000
2 SPA
1 DCX
1 CIG
1 FC

The United States Political Adviser has the honor to transmit copies of a report on "The Anti-Government Movement" prepared by Lt. Colonel P. K. Roest, Chief of the Political Affairs Division, Government Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

3 War
XK 740.00 119 Control (Japan)

(F. 20)
18

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Enclosure:

1. Copy of Report, as stated.

1947 JAN 17 PM 3 50

FACILITY BRANCH

Original and hectograph to Department.

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DCF NE Unit
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MAR 3 - 1947

FILED

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CS/A

894.00/1-847

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Enclosure No. 1
to Tokyo's 803
January 8, 1947

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section
Political Affairs Division

COPY

18 December 1946

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF, GOVERNMENT SECTION

SUBJECT: THE ANTI-GOVERNMENT MOVEMENT

1. The Opposition's Resolution of 17 December

The Social Democratic Party of Japan owes a real debt to the Co-operative Democrats for originating the resolution asking for dissolution of the Diet. Without this aid the Socialists would probably have been forced by pressure from their own left wing (backed by a powerful organization of working people of all types) to introduce a motion of non-confidence. Such a direct assault on the government would have alienated not only the government parties but also the middle-of-the-road parties in the Diet, and, last but not least, those present Cabinet members with whom they hope to be able to cooperate in the future. For the Socialists are not quite ready to take over the full responsibility of government, and would be satisfied with a coalition Cabinet of which they would form the economic core. This would give them only part of the responsibility, and would afford excellent in-service-training for the assumption of the full load later on.

In asking for dissolution, moreover, they achieved three important political gains:

- a. They solidified their popular support.
- b. They greatly increased their chances for future unity of action among all non-government parties ("Yato Renmei") in the Diet.
- c. They put a pressure on the Yoshida government which the latter cannot ignore, yet so diplomatically presented that its strong men were not alienated to the point of making future collaboration impossible.

2. Cabinet change possible.

Although the Opposition's motion was roundly defeated (236 to 160), the government cannot ignore the censure implied in this mass-supported Diet action. Therefore its opponents confidently expect it to respond not only with a better economic program, but with complete internal reorganization. A Kyodo-Minshu-to leader lists the following new names for important Cabinet posts:

Home Ministry	:	UEHARA Etsujiro (Liberal)
Agriculture	:	HIRANO, Rikizo (Socialist) <u>or</u>
	:	SAITO Takao (Progressive)
Education	:	SASAMORI Junzyo (People's Party)
Justice	:	KATAYAMA Tetsu (Socialist)
Finance	:	WIKAWA Tadao (Co-operative Democrat) <u>or</u>
	:	SUZUKI Mosaburo (Socialist)
	:	NISHIO Suehiro (Socialist)
Welfare	:	MIZUTANI Chozaburo (Socialist) <u>or</u>
Stabilization Board:	:	MIKI Takeo (Co-operative Democrat)

Enclosure No. 1
to Tokyo's 803
January 8, 1947

-2-

The Commerce-and-Industry and the Transportation Ministries would probably also be demanded by the Socialists. They would not, however, insist on the Premiership, but would accept either Yoshida or Shidehara for that post, preferably the latter.

This dream-list includes 5-7 Socialists, 1 or 2 Co-operative Democrats and 1 People's Party representative. The remainder would be Liberals and Progressives, but the non-party members of the present Cabinet (Home, Education, Justice and Agriculture) would have been replaced by party men. This is the National Coalition Cabinet envisaged by some to be necessary (and probable) before the Socialists are to take full control.

3. Developments in Diet parties' line-up.

There are indications that the smaller centrist parties in the House of Representatives may coalesce in the near future. The Co-operative Democrats are now quietly negotiating with the People's Party for a merger. The purging of the former's nominal leader, YAMAMOTO Sanehiko, is looked upon as good riddance by several members, and will bring the actual leaders (e.g. WIKAWA, MATSUMOTO, MIKI) to the front. These are anxious to unite all middle-of-the-roaders into one party big enough to hold the balance of power in the Diet. The People's Party seems receptive to the idea. Its leader, SASAMORI Junzyo, has a campaign manager who is Chairman of the Aomori branch of the Co-operative Democratic Party (Mr. OSANAI). About 16 or 17 People's Party Diet members are said to favor a merger under any name, but the other half of the party dislikes the "rural" implications of the word "Kyodo" (Co-operative) which the Co-operative Democrats insist on retaining. A compromise which changes the flavor of that word is sought in a name such as "Kokumin-Kyodo-tai" (People's Co-operative Body). Suggesting "co-operating masses" rather than "Farmer's Co-operative Societies," this name is expected to have the broader appeal needed to lure not only the remaining reluctant Kokumin-to members, but the undecided among the voters, the progressive malcontents in the Liberal and Progressive Parties, and even a few right-wing Socialists who resent their left-wing colleagues more than they care for party unity.

The Communists are significantly excluded from this smaller parties get-together. The Independent Club is to be wooed later. If the initial merger succeeds, each of the two parties may lose a few unwilling members, but the new group would count between 70 and 80 Diet members--a bloc not to be ignored by any major party. The question is: Can those engineering these transactions provide leadership capable enough to hold together such a mass of political odds-and-ends as these parties represent? The answer of the prime mover of the negotiations, Mr. WIKAWA, is that already those who were added to the originally small Kyodo-to nucleus have become enthusiastic believers in the co-operative ideas and methods. He believes that his party's principles are right, and that true acquaintance with them will convince the fair-minded and set them to work for those principles.

P. K. ROEST
Chief, Political Affairs Division

Noted: CLK



UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

DIVISION OF FR

Tokyo, January 27, 1947.

1947 FEB 6 PM 1 01

SECRET

No. 836 MAIL ROOM M-6

Handwritten notes: DC, P-O - m Low - FE, man + nam

SUBJECT: Control of Social Democratic Party of Japan.

Handwritten: 2/11/47

The United States Political Adviser has the honor to refer to the Intelligence Summary of January 20, 1947, issued by the Military Intelligence Section of General Headquarters, Far East Command (a copy of which was forwarded to the Department), and with reference to the recent negotiations between Premier Yoshida to achieve an agreement with the Social Democratic Party concerning a three-party coalition Cabinet, to quote from page four of the Summary, as follows:

"During the negotiations, doubts about the eligibility of Nishie (Suehiro) and Hirano (Rikizo) to hold office under the present scrutiny of qualifications developed, and this further weakened the Government's position. If these two leaders lose their seats in the Diet, the Right Wing of the Social-Democratic Party will be seriously impaired and the Left Wing elements may be able to take over control of the party. Party policy is expected to veer to the Left.

"These developments have caused a revival of the discussion regarding the merger of the Liberal and Progressive Parties. Left Wing Social-Democrats believe, however, that the prestige of the Yoshida Government has been so weakened by the failure of this maneuver that the Cabinet will have to resign. They predict the dissolution of the Diet and a new general election."

Original and hectograph to Department.

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894.001-2747

CS/A

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SECRET FILE

FEB 25 1947

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1947 FEB 5 PM 5

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : FE: Mr. Penfield
 : JA: Mr. Borton; Mr. Allison; Mr. Emmerson (Case Carbons)
 FROM : JA: R. Fearey
 SUBJECT: Current Japanese Political Situation.

DATE: January 31, 1947



With political developments in Japan apparently approaching a head, it may be useful to recapitulate the essential elements of the situation. Very little interpretive political material comes in from SCAP, except occasional Government Section reports weeks after the event.

Fundamental to all the agitation, likely in a day or so to lead to the Cabinet's reorganization or resignation or to a Diet dissolution, is the country's economic plight. Production and employment are not increasing, and with the workers' war accumulated savings exhausted, funds are lacking to buy even the limited volume of necessities available. A returned SCAP official states that the average working family's wages fall short by a third or a half of minimum necessary expenditures, and that workers are subsisting by borrowing and selling personal belongings.

A strike by 2 million government workers and private utility employees has been planned for February 1, the date of the Diet's scheduled opening. The Government's January 24 offer of a 43 percent average pay raise, and increase of the monthly individual expenditure limit from 500 to 700 yen, ~~were~~ ^{was} refused as inadequate. There can be no doubt, however, that the refusal was dictated in part by labor's conviction that material improvement of Japan's basic economic situation, of which wage problems are but one feature, could not be expected of the present government, and that its only real hope lay in political remedies. The recent FEC Labor Policy statement providing that Japanese unions should be allowed to "support political parties" has been seized upon as authority for labor to use almost any method in its power to bring the Government down. In the face of informal but express SCAP advice that a government workers' strike would not be tolerated labor leaders have taken the unprecedented course of appealing to members of the Allied Council "over SCAP's head". There is still a strong possibility that the strike will be called off, perhaps after one day's token stoppage, because of SCAP opposition. Last year at the time of the seamen's strike SCAP informed the Japanese Government that "strikes, walkouts, and other work stoppages which are inimical to the objectives of the occupation are prohibited", but it is not known how

the recent

894-00/1-3147

-2-

the recent FEC policy statement and SCAP's increased reluctance to issue ~~specific~~ orders to the Japanese will lead him to act in this case. *public*

Labor's political hopes are fairly well concentrated on the Social Democratic Party. This party, which came out third in the April 1946 elections, has always been confident that the inability of Liberal-Progressive governments to reverse worsening economic conditions, due to unwillingness to adopt sufficiently drastic measures and lack of working class confidence and support, would inevitably bring them to power in time. They have accordingly refused to enter any government whose economic policies they did not control, not wishing to associate themselves with a program only half their own, which if it failed would damage their reputation, and if it succeeded might merely serve to pull their rivals' chestnuts out of the fire.

Events have in large degree confirmed the Socialists in this policy. The Shidehara and Yoshida Governments have patently failed to act effectively in the face of the nation's worsening economic situation, and it is doubtful whether the Liberals and Progressives, though probably still, between them, controlling a comfortable majority of the national vote, could carry out even the best considered plan in the absence of Socialist support. While refusing, thus far, to resign en bloc or to dissolve the Diet and hold a new election, the Yoshida Government, accordingly, has endeavored throughout January to form a coalition cabinet in which Socialists would hold the three or four principal economic posts.

Reports conflict as to why these efforts have not yet succeeded. The Socialists on January 20 reportedly turned down an offer of one State Ministership and the Commerce and Industry, Labor and Construction portfolios, demanding in addition Agriculture and Forestry and the Directorship of the Economic Stabilization Board. The most hotly contested post, however, appears to have been the Finance Ministry, with the Liberals refusing to replace Ishibashi and the Socialists adamant that he must be replaced if their program is not to be entirely thwarted. One correspondent, in attempting to account for the continuing stalemate, ~~has~~ *offers* the very practical explanation that the recently extended purge program, reportedly eliminating leading Socialists Hirano and Matsuoka, has left the Socialists without sufficient men of ministerial caliber to fill the posts offered them! Another possible

explanation

-3-

explanation may have been the inability of the Socialist right and left wings to agree on tactics or ministerial candidates. The principal stumbling block, however, appears to be the Finance Ministry, because of the great importance which Yoshida's backers attach to a continuation of Ishibashi's conservative policies in this field.

If this obstacle can be overcome, possibilities of a coalition Liberal-Progressive-(Right Wing) Socialist government unprecedented by an en bloc cabinet resignation are fairly good. Socialist head Katayama reportedly stated on January 23 that he had personally decided to enter a coalition government, but that he had no intention of including left-wing Socialists, whose popularity, he stated, "has waned recently" due to growing public opposition to disruptive labor disputes. There has been nothing to indicate, however, that the Socialists have or will alter their established policy not to participate in any government whose economic policies they do not control, so that if a coalition government is formed, plans for the eradication of black markets, producer-consumer cooperation, nationalization of basic industries and financial institutions, and other announced Socialist programs are likely soon to be put forward.

JA:RAFearey:mls
2

INCOMING AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Office of TELEGRAPH BRANCH
FEB 17 1947
DIRECTOR
Department of State

JA



FEB 17 1947
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

2373

LONDON

DATED February 5, 1947

RECD Feb. 13, 10:02 a.m.

UNRESTRICTED

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ACTION: EUR
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Secretary of State

Washington

A-244, February 5, 1947

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DISTRIBUTION OFFICE
FEB 14 1947
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Following questions and answers in regard to developments in Japan took place in House of Commons on February 3, 1947:

1. Local Government

Mr. Rees-Williams (Labor M.P. for Croydon, South) asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will make a statement with reference to the elimination of undesirable persons from local government bodies now proceeding in Japan; and when it is anticipated that this process will be concluded.

Mr. Mayhew (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs): "According to the United States Chairman of the Allied Council for Japan, the process of eliminating undesirable persons from Japanese local government bodies is expected to be completed towards the middle of April next."

2. Municipal Elections

Mr. Rees-Williams asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the many postponements by the Japanese Government of the date of the municipal elections in Japan, he will instruct our representative on the Allied Council to press for the fixing of a definite unalterable date for these elections.

Mr. Mayhew: "A Japanese Government ordinance, dated
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must possess a certificate showing that they have been

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L.L.

FEB 26 1947

A-244
Feb. 5, 1947
From London

Page 2.

screened and do not fall under the provisions of the purge directives. The screening of candidates must, therefore, be completed before the elections can take place, but it is intended that these should be held as soon as possible after the middle of April."

Mr. Rees-Williams: "In view of the repeated postponements by the Japanese Government, will the Minister instruct our representative to hasten this elimination process?"

Mr. Mayhew: "We are anxious for it to be carried through as soon as possible, but there are 60,000 people involved, and it must take some time."

Mr. Rees-Williams: "Are the 60,000 all election candidates?"

Mr. Mayhew: "I could not say for certain. I believe so."

3. Ownership and Control of Broadcasting

Mr. Rees-Williams asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the desirability of State ownership and control of broadcasting stations and services in Japan, he will instruct our representative on the Allied Council to press for such ownership and control in opposition to the proposal to establish privately-owned and controlled systems.

Mr. Mayhew: "The Commonwealth representative on the Allied Council was instructed in December, 1946, to press for the continued state monopoly of the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation. He has, in fact, done so in subsequent Allied Council meetings."

Mr. Rees-Williams: "Can the Minister say whether his representations have had any success?"

Mr. Mayhew: "It is still under consideration by the Allied Council, and our representative still takes the same view."

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Copy to Political Adviser,
SCAP, Tokyo.

DC/R ROUTING SLIP

FROM Tokyo

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ACTION: 2 JA

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1 Navy

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17 Copies

UNCLASSIFIED

-2- A-157, February 7, from Moscow.

workers had been dismissed from factory, but took control of production. Young members of fascist "League of Youth of New Japan" and "Youth Party of Japan" then burst into plant with dogs but were driven out by Komsomol members, defending workers' interests. Another example was their work in district of Tokyo where twice a week they held lectures and talks on questions of Japanese history, drama, cinema and current policy, each lecture being attended by 100-150 people.

Two photographs which accompany article show worker in Osaka factory, and two young Japanese school girls.

S. ITH

ALittle:lyk

cc: Tokyo

Form DS-302
(7-2-46)

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 15 1947
DIRECTOR
Department of State

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
FEB 15 1947
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Control 4550

Rec'd February 14, 1947
3:35 p.m.

FROM: Moscow

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 407, Fourteenth

TRUD February 13 carries article by A. Sibiriyakov on "situation in Japan" acclaiming movement for retirement of Yoshida Cabinet is spreading not only in trade unions, but also among intelligentsia and peasants. Article claims Government's unwillingness to democratize country caused October strikes, that in December committee was formed including representatives of all great trade unions to demand Government's overthrow, and has since organized mass meetings, that a general strike was announced for February 1 unless Government retired.

Quoting Asahi criticism of Socialist Party, article assails right Socialists for forming coalition with conservative parties while left Socialists insist on cooperation with Communists. At Socialist Party session in September, right gained control of party and opposed general strike. By willingness to form coalition government, right Socialists approved reactionary line of Yoshida Government which, according to MINPO editorial, hoped to place responsibility for economic crisis on Socialists.

Yoshida would not agree to inclusion of Socialists in Cabinet, and had succeeded in making Government more reactionary. MacArthur's order forbidding general strike was used by Japanese reaction to prevent any future strike and had resulted in campaign of terror against trade union leaders, and in protest of Kanagawa workers to MacArthur.

Article

PLAIN

FEB 26 1947

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894.00/2-1447

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PLAIN.

-2-#407, Fourteenth, from Moscow

Article concludes new cabinet will be unable to cope with reconstruction of country.

Department repeat to Tokyo.

SMITH

Repeated to Tokyo 6 p.m., 2/14/47 CWO-PEP

DES:RJM

PLAIN

PLAIN

-2- #474, Twentieth, from Moscow

Yoshida limited himself to changes within Cabinet and to leaving vacant two ministerial posts apparently reckoning on subsequent agreement with Socialists or other parties. Events in country show policy of US authorities requires alteration to conform with Potsdam decisions.

Department repeat to Tokyo.

SMITH

Note: Repeated to Tokyo 2:30 p.m.,
2-20-47 (CWC-NPL)

RB:ME

PLAIN

COMMITTEE FOR A CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY IN JAPAN

✓

Constituted by

THE FEDERAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES
OF CHRIST IN AMERICA


THE FOREIGN MISSIONS CONFERENCE
OF NORTH AMERICA

THOBURN T. BRUMBAUGH
Executive Director

Room 1124
156 Fifth Avenue
New York 10, N. Y.

CHelsea 2-3230

March 4, 1947



Mr. Hugh Borton, Chief
Division of Japanese Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Borton:

Under separate cover I am sending several copies of a report on my recent trip to Japan and "Conditions and Recommendations" as I have stated them for those interested in the Christian university in Japan. Please see that Mr. Schuler receives one of these. Mr. Lory already has one I am sure.

Again let me express appreciation of your cooperation in making possible the trip to Japan.

Very sincerely yours

T. Brumbaugh
Executive Director

TTB:me


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MAR 18 1947

894.00/3-447



In reply refer to
NA

MAR 7 1947

My dear Dr. Brumbaugh:

In the absence of Mr. Borton who is on a brief trip to Japan, I have received your letter of March 4, 1947 stating you are sending several copies of a report on your recent trip to Japan and "Conditions and Recommendations". I shall be glad to see that Mr. Schuler receives one set of these documents. Thank you for making them available to us.

Sincerely yours,

John M. Allison
Acting Chief
Division of Northeast Asian Affairs

894.00/3-447

DCR NE Unit
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CS/A

894.00/3-447

Thoburn T. Brumbaugh, D.D.,
Executive Director, Committee for a
Christian University in Japan,
156 Fifth Avenue,
New York 10, New York.

MAR 7 1947

ms
NA:JMAllison:mls
3-6-47



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

00 754

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

American Embassy
London, March 6, 1947

MAR 2 10 3 03

AIR MAIL

UNRESTRICTED ^{C/M}
S BRANCH

No. 4145

Subject: Transmitting Clipping Embodying Times'
Comment on Japan.

DIVISION OF JAPAN
MAR 2 1947
A
File
E

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose for the Department's
information a clipping from the March 4th, 1947, issue
of The Times on the subject of Japan.

The essence of the article is a call for the early
settlement of peace terms with Japan. Once a peace
treaty is concluded with Japan, The Times reasons,
Britain should be in a better position to exercise her
influence in reshaping the future of Japan.

VR 740.001/PW
(Peace)

Respectfully yours,

For the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim:

Everett F. Drumright
Everett F. Drumright
First Secretary of Embassy

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Enclosure: *att.*
✓ Clipping from The Times / *with orig*
March 4, 1947

(Original, hectograph and four copies
to the Department)
Copy to U.S. Political Adviser, SCAP, Tokyo

EFDrumright/wg

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 17 1947
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TO: []
FROM: []
SUBJECT: []
DATE: []
INITIALS: []

894.00/3-647

CS/R

MAR 31 1947

FILED

894.00/3-647

M

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 4145 of March 6, 1947
 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, London, England.

PAPER: THE TIMES

NUMBER

CITY: LONDON

DATE:

4 - MAR 1947

Changing Japan

The speech of DR. EVATT in the House of Representatives last week demonstrated the increasing readiness of Australia to assist Britain by shouldering the responsibilities which the situation in the Far East imposes upon the British Commonwealth. The extent and nature of these responsibilities depend in no small measure upon the future course of events in Japan, and Australia has as great an interest as any member of the Commonwealth in the success of the democratic experiments now being conducted in that country under American auspices. Many people in Britain as well as in Australia will agree with DR. EVATT in holding that the time has come to conclude a peace settlement with Japan. While the civilized world stands under a heavy obligation to the United States for the great work of moral and material reconstruction which she has accomplished for the Japanese people since the armistice, there is much to be said against the indefinite perpetuation of the present system. There is some evidence that the Japanese are now desirous of closer contact with the outside world, and particularly with Britain. The British people, remembering the predominant part they played in the historic process of Japan's emergence from isolation, cannot disinterest themselves in the efforts which the Japanese are making to adapt the national outlook to the dictates of international security and to operate a constitution which closely follows many of the characteristic features of the British Cabinet system.

It is interesting to notice that GENERAL MACARTHUR has recently condemned the delay in concluding the final peace treaty on the grounds that Japan's present status encourages excessive dependence upon the United States and hinders the progress of democracy. There is ample evidence to show that the Japanese people are now greatly interested in the working of the democratic machine they have been encouraged to construct. But whether the adoption of democratic forms will lead to the acceptance of democratic ideals is still uncertain. The Japanese are imbued with traditional reverence for authority; they possess little sense of individual civic responsibility as the West understands it;

and they have always been content to allow their governmental machine to be controlled by those whose business it has been to do so—namely, the official class. Unless they become aware that the affairs of the Government are the business of the citizen, the mere substitution of popular election for official nomination as a means to public office will accomplish little. GENERAL MACARTHUR hinted at this danger when he recently exhorted the members of the Diet to become genuine legislators, eager to exercise the powers entrusted to them. If the new institutions are to strike firm roots, what is now merely a concession to prevalent political fashion must acquire the sanction of settled habit. While a premature termination of the allied occupation would gravely prejudice the prospects of democratic thought and practice in Japan, the early settlement of peace terms would encourage a sense of responsibility in the Japanese people, and would stimulate a healthy sense of comradeship with other democratic nations. This sentiment cannot develop so long as the contacts between Japan and the outside world are subjected to the present limitations.

3-647

Form DS-302
(7-2-46)

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION COPY

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 12 1947
9:45am
Department of State

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✓

- Action: FE-
- Info:
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- U-E
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- OIC
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- DC/R

PLAIN

Control 3387

Rec'd March 12, 1947
3:15 a.m.

PROM: Moscow
TO : Secretary of State
NO : 751, Eleventh

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
MAR 12 1947
No action required
S. J. G.

Press:

Handwritten:
3-12-47
WMB

PRAVDA March 10 carries article "Internal Political Situation in Japan" by M. Markov, disputing MacArthur's claim in letter to Yoshida that time for general election in Japan had come, since enormous changes had occurred in economic countenance of country.

Zibatsu are stated to have kept dominant influence. Condition of tenant farmers has changed little. Political structure of Japan is not destined to serve principles of democracy. Two-chamber system is retained. Liberties of people are not guaranteed. Strikes are not permitted. Yoshida Government with support of American authorities shows no intention of yielding to popular demands for new government.

Department pass to Tokyo.

SMITH

Note: Repeated to Tokyo by Dept 7:00 a.m., 3/12/47, CWO-WPL

WMB:PPM

MAR 17 1947

FILED

894.00/3-1147

L.L.

PERMANENT RECORD COPY: THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED TO DC/R CENTRAL FILES WITH NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

001626

UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN

~~SECRET~~

DC/1A

Tokyo, March 25, 1947.

UNCLASSIFIED

No. 934

DIVISION OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS
APR 1 1947
U.S. STATE DEPT.

SUBJECT: The Anti-Government Movement; Memorandum Prepared by Chief, Political Affairs Division, Government Section, GHQ, SCAP

The United States Political Adviser has the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum dated December 18, 1946, which has recently come to the attention of this Mission, prepared by the Chief of the Political Affairs Division, Government Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, regarding the activities of the various opposition political parties against the Government of Premier Yoshida.

A. W. B.

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Enclosure: *att. 100*
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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN

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Tokyo, March 25, 1947.

UNCLASSIFIED

No. 934

DIVISION OF JAPAN
POLITICAL AFFAIRS
MAY 1947
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SUBJECT: The Anti-Government Movement; Memorandum Prepared by Chief, Political Affairs Division, Government Section, GHQ, SCAP

The United States Political Adviser has the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum dated December 18, 1946, which has recently come to the attention of this Mission, prepared by the Chief of the Political Affairs Division, Government Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, regarding the activities of the various opposition political parties against the Government of Premier Yoshida.

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as stated above

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section
Political Affairs Division

18 December 1946

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF, GOVERNMENT SECTION

SUBJECT: THE ANTI-GOVERNMENT MOVEMENT

1. The Opposition's Resolution of 17 December

The Social Democratic Party of Japan owes a real debt to the Co-operative Democrats for originating the resolution asking for dissolution of the Diet. Without this aid the Socialists would probably have been forced by pressure from their own left wing (backed by a powerful organization of working people of all types) to introduce a motion of non-confidence. Such a direct assault on the government would have alienated not only the government parties but also the middle-of-the-road parties in the Diet, and, last but not least, those present Cabinet members with whom they hope to be able to cooperate in the future. For the Socialists are not quite ready to take over the full responsibility of government, and would be satisfied with a coalition Cabinet of which they would form the economic core. This would give them only part of the responsibility, and would afford excellent in-service-training for the assumption of the full load later on.

In asking for dissolution, moreover, they achieved three important political gains:

- a. They solidified their popular support.
- b. They greatly increased their chances for future unity of action among all non-government parties ("Yato Renmei") in the Diet.
- c. They put a pressure on the Yoshida government which the latter cannot ignore, yet so diplomatically presented that its strong men were not alienated to the point of making future collaboration impossible.

2. Cabinet change possible.

Although the Opposition's motion was roundly defeated (236 to 160), the government cannot ignore the censure implied in this mass-supported Diet action. Therefore its opponents confidently expect it to respond not only with a better economic program, but with complete internal reorganization. A Kyodo-Minshu-to leader lists the following new names for important Cabinet posts:

Home Ministry : USHARA Etsujiro (Liberal)
 Agriculture : HIRANO Rikizo (Socialist) or
 SAITO Takao (Progressive)
 Education : SASAMORI Junzyo (People's Party)
 Justice : KATAYAMA Tetsu (Socialist)
 Finance : WIKAWA Tadao (Co-operative Democrat) or
 SUZUKI Mesaburo (Socialist)
 Welfare : MISHIO Suehiro (Socialist)
 Stabilization Board: MIZUTANI Chezaburo (Socialist) or
 MIKI Takeo (Co-operative Democrat)

The Commerce-and-Industry and the Transportation Ministries would probably also be demanded by the Socialists. They would not, however, insist on the Premiership, but would accept either Yoshida or Shidehara for that post, preferably the latter.

This dream-list includes 5-7 Socialists, 1 or 2 Co-operative Democrats and 1 People's Party representative. The remainder would be Liberals and Progressives, but the non-party members of the present Cabinet (Home, Education, Justice and Agriculture) would have been replaced by party men. This is the National Coalition Cabinet envisaged by some to be necessary (and probable) before the Socialists are to take full control.

3. Developments in Diet parties' line-up

There are indications that the smaller centrist parties in the House of Representatives may coalesce in the near future. The Co-Operative Democrats are now quietly negotiating with the People's Party for a merger. The purging of the former's nominal leader, YAMAMOTO Sanehiko, is looked upon as good riddance by several members, and will bring the actual leaders (e.g. WIKAWA, MATSUMOTO, MIKI) to the front. These are anxious to unite all middle-of-the-roads into one party big enough to hold the balance of power in the Diet. The People's Party seems receptive to the idea. Its leader, SASAMORI Junzyo, has a campaign manager who is Chairman of the Aomori branch of the Co-operative Democratic Party (Mr. OSANAI). About 16 or 17 People's Party Diet members are said to favor a merger under any name, but the other half of the party dislikes the "rural" implications of the word "Kyodo" (Co-operative) which the Co-operative Democrats insist on retaining. A compromise which changes the flavor of that word is sought in a name such as "Kokumin-Kyodo-tai" (People's Co-operative Body). Suggesting "co-operating masses" rather than "Farmer's Co-operative Societies," this name is expected to have the broader appeal needed to lure not only the remaining reluctant Kokumin-to members, but the undecided among the voters, the progressive mal-contented in the Liberal and Progressive Parties, and even a few right-wing Socialists who resent

their left-wing colleagues more than they care for party unity.

The Communists are significantly excluded from this smaller parties get-together. The Independent Club is to be wooed later. If the initial merger succeeds, each of the two parties may lose a few unwilling members, but the new group would count between 70 and 80 Diet members--a bloc not to be ignored by any major party. The question is: Can those engineering these transactions provide leadership capable enough to hold together such a mass of political odds-and-ends as these parties represent? The answer of the prime mover of the negotiations, Mr. WIKAWA, is that already those who were added to the originally small Kyodo-to nucleus have become enthusiastic believers in the co-operative ideas and methods. He believes that his party's principles are right, and that true acquaintance with them will convince the fair-minded and set them to work for those principles.

P. K. ROEST
Chief, Political Affairs Division

Noted: CLK

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 22, 1947

To : JVA

JKP

JCV

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 22 1947

From: JKE

Subject: Interview with NOZAKA Sanzo

The attached memorandum of an interview in Tokyo with NOZAKA, leading Japanese Communist, is worth reading in full.

Whatever you may say about Nozaka, he has remained consistent. He is saying now to officials of the Government Section almost exactly the same things he said to me in Yenan in 1944. In all his conversations with me, both in China (almost daily for a period of two months) and in Japan (numerous occasions in December, 1945 and January, 1946), he preached the same doctrine for Japan: "democracy", socialism, communism, in consecutive stages.

I doubt that the other leaders of the Japanese Communist Party see eye to eye with Nozaka. Certainly they are far behind him in intelligence and perspicacity. A high official in the Government Section recently in Washington said to me that he considered Nosaka head and shoulders above other Japanese politicians and, except for the fact that he is a Communist, the best *qualified* man for the office of Prime Minister of Japan.

JKE
JC

April 18

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Despatch encloses memoranda of two Government Section interviews, the one with INUKAI Ken and the other with NOZAKA Sanzo. I recommend glancing at least at the marked passages in the first (Inukai) memo, which is somewhat outdated but provides useful insight into Inukai's character should he escape the purge and achieve new political prominence. The second contains to my mind a highly interesting and informative exposition by Nozaka of current Communist thinking and plans and I would recommend at least a hasty reading of the whole.

UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

DIVISION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
APR 15 1947
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Tokyo, March 25, 1947.

Organization and Plans of the Progressive and Communist Parties; Memoranda Prepared by Chief, Political Affairs Division, Government Section, GHQ, SCAP

RAF:pm

a very interesting report - jma

The United States Political Adviser has the honor to refer to this Mission's despatches Nos. of March 25, 1947, regarding activities of political parties in opposition to the Government of Premier Yoshida, and to enclose memoranda dated February 27, 1947 and March 10, 1947, regarding interviews between Lt. Col. P. K. Roest, Chief, Political Affairs Division, Government Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and Ken INUKAI of the Progressive Party, and Sanzo NOZAKA, Japan Communist Party leader, respectively, regarding the organization and plans of the Progressive and Communist Parties.

A. W. B.

2 Enclosures: *att. 1/100*
Copies of Memoranda as stated above.

Original and hectograph to the Department

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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN

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
Tokyo, March 25, 1947.

UNCLASSIFIED

No. 936

APR 1 5 1947

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



SUBJECT: Organization and Plans of the Progressive and Communist Parties; Memoranda Prepared by Chief, Political Affairs Division, Government Section, GHQ, SCAP

The United States Political Adviser has the honor to refer to this Mission's despatches Nos. 934 and 935 of March 25, 1947, regarding activities of the various political parties in opposition to the Government of Premier Yoshida, and to enclose memoranda dated February 27, 1947 and March 10, 1947, regarding interviews between Lt. Col. P. K. Roest, Chief, Political Affairs Division, Government Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and Ken INUKAI of the Progressive Party, and Sanzo NOZAKA, Japan Communist Party leader, respectively, regarding the organization and plans of the Progressive and Communist Parties.

A. W. B.

2 Enclosures: *att. 1/15/47*
Copies of Memoranda as stated above.

Original and hectograph to the Department

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section
Political Affairs Division

27 February 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, GOVERNMENT SECTION

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH INUKAI Ken (Progressive Party)

PRESENT AT INTERVIEW:

INUKAI Ken
Lt. Col. Roest
Capt. Diamantes
Mr. McLean
Miss Kuwaye

The following subjects were discussed with INUKAI Ken:

1. Party Developments and Personalities
2. Election Plans
3. Party Finances
4. Party Membership

Mr. INUKAI was invited to the Government Section for an interview at 1100 on 27 February 1947. He spoke very freely and apparently without reservation and revealed current developments about the Progressive Party, and about the Liberal Party besides.

Changes

Concerning the plans to form a new party with progressive elements from the Liberal Party joining the Progressive, INUKAI said that he had overestimated the strength of ASHIDA Hito^{shi} in the Liberal Party, and the influence of the younger members who rebel against the yoke of boss-rule. INUKAI said that ASHIDA does not have a strong enough personality to assume bold leadership, but that his efforts in the interest of the Progressive Party were appreciated nevertheless.

INUKAI revealed that he has been adviser to both the young Progressives' SHINSHINKAI and the CHUROKAI (Middle-aged Society). The leaders of both groups were listed by him as follows: SHINSHINKAI; KOZAKA, KAWASAKI and TSUBOKAWA: CHUROKAI: CHIZAKI, NAGAO and HORI.

INUKAI's being an adviser to both these groups explains why Baron SHIDEHARA had little difficulty in controlling the SHINSHINKAI movement, and to replace it with a Progressive-Liberal merger proposal. When the Liberal Party declined the merger offer, INUKAI switched to a "change of name" for the Progressive Party. This proposal is still under consideration. Baron SHIDEHARA is not in favor of the suggested name "Democratic Party" since he considers it "too vulgar."

INUKAI states that Baron SHIDEHARA does not always share the same views with YOSHIDA although he is personally attached to him. ONO's policies are not relished by the Progressives, and they feel that the Premier is too much influenced by ONO. The Progressives were not satisfied with YOSHIDA's cabinet changes, and openly showed their dissatisfaction. INUKAI stated that he personally does not agree with many of the present government's policies. "I like ISHIBASHI personally, he is so frank and simple, yet I do not agree with his policies," he remarked. "YOSHIDA and KATAYAMA have a great personal regard for each other, yet they too differ in their major views."

At present ASHIDA and his friends, YANO and KOZINA, are continuing to build up their movement within the Liberal Party. There is now but a very small minority wishing to join the Progressives. INUKAI thought they numbered about fifteen members. Baron SHIDEHARA expects a union between the Liberal and Progressive Parties after the election. SHIDEHARA is not in favor of any drastic changes, recalling public criticism in the past to radical changes, even when they were definite improvements.

In regard to the Co-operative Democratic Party and People's Party merger, INUKAI revealed that MIKI Takao (a chief of the former party) still feels that a union with the Progressive Party would be preferable to a merger of the two small parties alone. INUKAI stated that MIKI "appreciates" the Progressive Party's policies.

Election Plans

The Progressive Party will have about 300 candidates for the Diet, but as all of these will have to be carefully screened only 250 may actually run. Approximately 26 present Diet members will be lost because of the expanded purge. INUKAI gave the following answers to questions put forth by Lt. Col. Roest:

Q. - How will purged candidates be replaced?

A. - We already have successors for these men who will carry on with their policies.

Q. - Do you mean that each of the affected Members has recommended someone to run in his place, and the Party has confirmed these nominees as its candidates?

A. - Yes, exactly.

Q. - And are these new men free to follow a different policy or are they obligated to continue the policies of their appointers?

A. - Oh yes, they are bound to maintain the policies of their predecessors!

Party Finance

Regarding Party funds, INUKAI revealed that the Party had not raised money for the election yet, whereas the Liberal Party had already received huge sums from "new contractors." The new contractors receive guarantees for big contracts and contribute both to individual Liberal candidates and to the Party treasury. INUKAI emphatically denied that the Progressive Party received such contributions. "We are keeping ourselves pure from these practices," he stated. Mr. Gordon Walker, newspaper correspondent, had told Lt. Col. Marcum that INUKAI had been offered Y20,000,000 by CHIZAKI Saburo, a wealthy Hokkaido contractor. INUKAI was asked if this were true. CHIZAKI, he said, had made an offer to give the Party a large sum of money but INUKAI had definitely refused, and had demanded that these offers be stopped. He said that the Party needs Y10,000,000 for election expenses, and is able to obtain Y7,000,000 from his own backers and Baron SHIDEHARA's alone, leaving Y3,000,000 yet to be obtained from Diet members. The candidates would receive Y30,000 each for campaign expenses and will not be required to contribute to the Party coffers.

Membership

Rank and file membership of the Progressive Party is relatively small, but formal and definite, requiring two sponsors and being certified by a membership diploma. Since the Party has not yet organized local branches in all prefectures, INUKAI will campaign for the Progressive Party and will visit Hiroshima, Yamaguchi, Kagawa, Tokushima and Miyazaki where he expects local branches will be established. As to platform he pointed out that in May 1946 his ideas were not popular with the other Party leaders, but that by December 1946 his views were accepted officially. Correspondence indicated that in this election the Party will gain from SHINYUKAI leadership, but the Party will not change the platform announced in May 1946.

Evaluation

The Progressive Party is not likely to change in form or substance in spite of all the merger and New Party talk. It is still the vehicle for Mr. INUKAI's ambition and Baron SHIDEHARA's Toryism. By deftly playing both ends against the middle, INUKAI, "adviser" of both the rebels and the "bosses," sees to it that the Party remains intact, and will make a bid for an even stronger Diet position than it has now. Chief means for doing so is to be a Y30,000 contribution to each Party candidate's campaign--sixty times what it was in the 1946 election! Whether all this money will be as "pure" as INUKAI says he desires it to be remains an open question. One thing is sure: selection of candidates is done by the "bosses". The Progressive Party may play a part in the democratization of Japan, but there is nothing democratic about its management.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section
Political Affairs Division

10 March 1947

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF, GOVERNMENT SECTION

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH Sanzo NOZAKA

On 5 March 1947 at 1400, the Political Affairs Division staff interviewed Mr. NOZAKA Sanzo in regard to his political views and the Communist Party's plans for the coming elections. Because of the basic nature of some of the questions discussed, a brief report of the interview is hereby submitted.

Election Platform

NOZAKA stated that since the April 1946 election the "democratic revolution" has made great strides. Yet many remnants of feudal power and conditions still remain. The Communist Party in Japan desires to carry this democratic revolution through to its completion. For this reason it advocates in its election program:

1. A more thorough purge of persons tainted with war-guilt. Men like HIRANO (right-wing Socialist) should not remain unaffected by the purge. Post-purge activities of men like HATOYAMA, and appointing of "dummy" candidates by purges should be stopped.
2. The whole governmental system must be democratized; the power of the bureaucrats and cliques should be broken; bills should come from the Diet not the Government; the central and local systems of administration should be changed as outlined in the program prepared by the Union of Government Office Workers.
3. The police system must be democratized. Local Police Chiefs are to be elected. All ex-TOKKO personnel must be eliminated and revival of the TOKKO in any form must be prevented.
4. All feudal remnants, both economic and political, in the villages are to be eliminated. The tenancy system must be abolished; all land not tilled by the owner is to be nationalized, as well as forests and uncultivated land.
5. All big industries should be nationalized, i.e. nationally owned and operated.

A sixth point on the program, NOZAKA said, was not to be made use of in the election campaign; this was "to amend the

Constitution so as to strip the Emperor completely of all political power, e.g. the appointment of a Premier.

In connection with point 4, NOZAKA was asked whether collective farming would not be affected by this proposed measure of allowing private title only to land tilled by the owner. He replied that his party advocated collective farming only on a small cooperative scale, but considered collective farms of the Russian type unsuited for Japan.

Asked whether he did not think the farmers were pretty well off now, NOZAKA replied that he thought this to be true for a small minority only. He admitted that most farmers are still conservative, and accused the Government of paving the way for farmer support of the government parties by an increase in the price of rice.

Basic Policy

The Communist Party's first aim, NOZAKA stated, was to complete the democratization of Japan, simultaneously taking one step towards Socialism. For instance, it advocates the immediate nationalization of all banks and other financial enterprises, and of such key industries as coal, mining, transportation, electric power, and fertilizer. Yet this is not made into an election issue except as a general principle (See 5 above); the first step only--national control or management--will be advocated for immediate execution.

The next goal is the change from a semi-competitive democracy to a fully socialist state. The ultimate objective is the transformation from a socialist to a communist State.

Relation to the Socialists

Since both Communists and Socialists aim at a socialist State, "What is the difference between them which keeps them apart?" NOZAKA was asked. "On paper," he replied, "there is no essential difference, but the activities of the two parties differ widely." E.g. The Socialists approve of the present Land Reform bill, but the Communists say it is far from perfect. The Socialists approved of compulsory rice delivery last year; the Communists opposed it. The Socialists frown on strikes; the Communists support strikes "if they are necessary."

Right wing Socialists speak loudly of Socialism, but in practice betray it by repeated compromise with capitalists. Nevertheless, the two parties should cooperate in the effort to form a truly "democratic" government.

It was explained to Mr. NOZAKA that in a democracy the capitalists, being part of the people, are also entitled to representation; whereas he obviously used the word "democratic" in the sense of "laboring class only." He seemed a bit startled at this revelation but admitted that we used the word differently.

When asked what he thought of the recent elections in Poland he coyly remarked that he did not know since he had "no reliable information" on the matter!

Fundamental Differences between Socialism and Communism

NOZAKA explained that before Japan's surrender the Communists advocated armed revolution, while the Socialists chose parliamentary ways. The Communists had no other course, NOZAKA said, because the government ruthlessly suppressed them.

At present, however, conditions are radically different. The power of the militarists is broken, and the police has little oppressive authority left; the organization of reactionary forces is relatively weak. The Diet, once a mere debating society, is now to become the supreme organ of State power. While therefore in the past there was no chance to carry out a socialist program through parliamentary means, there is now. Hence the Communists now favor the parliamentary method of bringing about political, social and economic change, and in this respect can join the Socialists. But there is one fundamental difference: the Socialists do not recognize the use of mass action outside the Diet as a proper instrument, while the Communists do. They use extra-parliamentary mass pressure, NOZAKA said, as a necessary auxiliary weapon "because the Diet is still weak."

In Europe several countries such as France, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, etc. had now "democratic" governments. Such "people's governments" are a new way of achieving a bloodless revolution. Therefore if such a government can be formed here in Japan, establishment of a Socialist State in a peaceful way becomes possible.

This led to a question about British Socialism. NOZAKA quickly remarked that Britain proves that the way of the Socialists is a way of compromise and eventual defeat at the hands of vested interests. In fact, he said, Socialism was not really carried out in any country where Socialists were in control. So far only Russia has established a true Socialist State.

Class War?

Since NOZAKA had indicated his disapproval of the "compromising" attitude of the Socialists, an Australian story was related to him of labor-bosses deliberately breaking up an industrial scheme for labor-participation in stockholding, control and management, and profits on the ground that "it destroyed the unity of the labor-front." He was asked whether he would have held the same all-out class-war view, and if so would still support it now. He replied in the affirmative. He must have, he stated, a "democratic" front of workers, farmers, intellectuals, small and medium industrialists, and "some bigger ones," against big finance and monopolistic capitalists.

This plan seemed to include a good deal more than the usual proletarian masses on the "democratic" side. So NAZAKA was asked whether the front he proposed was not much further to the right than the "struggling masses" generally were supposed to form against the whole employer class. He admitted this was so. Actually the fight is only against the very top crust of capitalism: Zaibatsu, high-finance, the "new-yen class" and the big black-marketeers, he explained. Even the big firm of HIDACHI, he said, was on the labor side of the battle.

Under these conditions the class-war of "workers" against "employers" begins to look very abstract and theoretical! It appears more correct to say that Communists use strife as a means to gain political power which it would take them a long time to obtain otherwise.

Communist Relations Abroad

NOZAKA was asked in what respects the Japan Communist Party differed from the Communist Party in other lands. "The doctrine, Marxism," he replied, "is everywhere the same. But the application in each country is different, due to different conditions." In Yena^a for instance, there is no question of aiming at Socialism at present. The people are far too backward for that. So Japan has its own needs which the Japanese Communists try to meet.

"What about Russia?" he was asked. "Isn't Russia helping the Communist Party everywhere, including here in Japan?" The answer was a definite "No" as far as Japan is concerned. In the twenties, NOZAKA explained, there was definite assistance given. Even as late as 1943 there was some contact, NOZAKA himself being Japan's Communist representative in Moscow. But it was weak due to police watchfulness, and the distance involved. Since 1943 however there has been no contact at all. Mr. Noble of the Saturday Evening Post says Japanese Communists get advice, money, etc. from Russia; but NOZAKA avows this is not true. "We receive neither money nor political advice," he stated, "simply because we do not need it; we know Japan best."

Thus Communist policy is applied as conditions require. For instance: It is impossible to nationalize Japan's medium and small industries now; hence "we want to help them" in their individual struggle for survival.

Election Funds and Prospects

All Party campaign funds, NOZAKA stated, come from individual contributions. For the April elections a drive to gather Y10,000,000 has just started. Only Y130,000 is at hand now. Candidates will be given financial assistance as needed. The Party has already 170 candidates for the House of Representatives, 12 for the House of Councillors, 7 for Governor, and an undetermined number for other offices. It will concentrate its greatest effort on the House of Representatives election; but local elections will not be neglected. There is a scarcity of candidates, however.

Candidates are selected largely by local recommendation. Those for more important offices (Diet, Ken-governors, and big city executives) are decided on by the Politburo of the Central Executive Committee; but so far no candidate proposed by a local branch has been rejected.

The Communists will run candidates in all 53 districts this year. In spite of the Social Democrats' refusal to cooperate, in several districts local Socialist and Communist branches are on friendly terms and will help each other regardless of Social Democratic Party headquarters' wishes.

The prefectures where the Communist Party is strongest were listed by NOZAKA as follows, with the number of seats the Party "expects" to win:

Tokyo	10
Hokkaido	9 or 10
Kanagawa	6
Nagano	6
Osaka	5
Kobe	5
Northern Kyushu	5 or 6
Aichi	1
Total in 8 Ken	<u>47 or 49</u>

P.K. ROEST
Chief, Political Affairs Division

Notes: CLK

DAILY REPORT - 7 March 1947

Ritsu Ito, member of the Communist Party's central committee, charges in the party newspaper AKAHATA that the government's refusal to raise the purchase price of rice is responsible for the current delivery delay. "It is unreasonable to ask farmers to deliver rice at Y550 per koku," he said.

001572

UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN

Tokyo, March 25, 1947.

UNCLASSIFIED

No. 935

SUBJECT: Recent Political Developments; Memorandum
Prepared by Chief, Political Affairs Division,
Government Section, GHQ, SCAP

The United States Political Adviser has the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch No. 934 of March 25, 1947, regarding the activities of various opposition groups in an effort to upset the Government of Premier Yoshida, and to enclose a copy of a memorandum dated February 14, 1947, prepared by the Chief of the Political Affairs Division, Government Section, of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, regarding recent political developments, particularly in connection with the activities of the various political parties in opposition to the Government of Premier Yoshida.

P. W. P.

Enclosure: *Att. MMS*
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Government Section
Political Affairs Division

14 February 1947

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF, GOVERNMENT SECTION

SUBJECT: Recent Political Developments.

1. Coalition Failure. This afternoon the curtain will fall on the fourth and probably final act of the play by which the Yoshida Cabinet tried to obtain popular support, by means of inducing the Socialists to enter the government.

The Social Democratic Party's Central Executive Committee yesterday decided unanimously to abandon all Coalition efforts, "until the next election," it was stated. The negotiations this time, led by Minister of Welfare Kawai and Finance Minister Ishibashi personally, with Nishio and Nizutani acting for the Socialists, broke down on the government's insistence that Ishibashi be retained as Finance Minister, without yielding on the following basic changes in financial policy:

- a. Suspension of payment of interest on War Bonds for one year. (Compromise term of all three Opposition Parties - the Social Democratic Party itself wanted 10 years.)
- b. New note issuance for the purpose of registering and taxing hoarded funds.

On these issues, 5-party negotiations yesterday broke down, the Liberals and Progressives remaining unwilling to yield. Kawai still would not accept failure and demanded that each of the parties represented report back today with the official party decision. Since the Socialists made theirs last night the meeting today has merely ceremonial value. Coalition for the time being is a dead issue.

2. Background. On the 6th and 9th of February it seemed the Ishibashi stumbleblock would be removed. Mr. Ishibashi himself was willing to yield his post, so he stated to Nishio on the 9th. But on the 11th and 12th he affirmed his (Liberal) Party's decision that he was to stay. Why?

It seemed there is too much at stake financially. Although we have no positive proof, no less a person than Imukai, Progressive Party leader, has stated that up to 30 million yen has been paid into the Liberal Party coffers for campaign purposes through Mr. Ishibashi, the money coming from black-market brokers who have profited enormously

- 2 -

from the present inflation. The financial policy advocated by the Opposition Parties would ruin this sort of income from "free enterprise" profiteering. Mr. Yoshida is reported to have confessed that he has no power to go against the Liberal Party's decision on Ishibashi's retention, although he was privately in favor of his replacement. In this, the "Matoyama faction," led by Shao, the Secretary General, seems to have won out again over the anti-boss faction led by Ashida. Even the Coalition-anxious right-wingers, especially Nishio, finally reached the end of their rope of compromise. It now remains to be seen how the Progressive Party will handle the "New Party" movement, which it soft-pedaled for the sake of this last Coalition effort.

3. The New Party Movement. The previously reported movement, inaugurated by the Shinshinkai within the Progressive Party, for the formulation of a "streamlined conservative party," has had tough sledding at the hands of experienced political operators. As soon as the movement showed dangerous vigor, the party bosses who had at first been "cool" towards it, adopted a friendly attitude and captured the leadership of the movement by a party endorsement. The next day Baron Chidokara came out with a statement that this was going "too far," that it was "not kind to Mr. Yoshida" and indicated "lack of trust" in himself as Party President. He requested the movement to be held in abeyance until the outcome of the new coalition efforts, meanwhile frantically begun by his friend Izumi. Supposedly, failure of this effort would re-open the way for the Shinshinkai movement. But it is doubtful whether that will be the result! It has become pretty clear meanwhile that a new party of "progressive" Liberals and Progressives would be merely a capture of half of the Liberal Party by the Progressive leaders, and for a friend of Mr. Yoshida and the Liberals that would indeed be "going too far." The Socialists, too, soon saw that this movement would be to no advantage except to the Progressives, and so they and their friends, the Cooperative Democratic Party and the People's Party, declared themselves as staying out of this movement. Moreover, Mr. Ashida, its Liberal Party leader, has had to change his outspoken enthusiasm for the "New Party" for a chicken-hearted statement that he was "not too much concerned" and would keep the interests of the Liberal Party, to which he owes allegiance, at heart.

Thus it appears that the future is none too bright for the rebellious group of conservatives. Once more boss-politics has dominated - at least for the time being.

4. The Social Democrats. The rivalry between the right and left wingers of the Socialist Party became quite bitter during the Coalition negotiations. Nishio and his friends staked their all on a coalition which would, they hoped, secure them the conservative farmers' and citizens' support in the next election. Kato and Suzuki never ceased to attack them for both the idea of entering this "discredited" cabinet, and the method by which negotiations were carried out without

- 3 -

full party-authority. The left wingers feared as much to lose their popular (labor union) support as the right wingers feared to lose the "country" vote.

Now that coalition is dead, the party may rally around their common ideals and objectives. To assist such unification, Mr. Ienokubo, C. E. Committee member, manager of the party organ Shakai Shinbun, and head of the Party's Liaison Office, was asked to head a "Thursday Club" (formed on Thursday, 13 February 1947) composed of some forty Socialist members of the House of Representatives. This group will seek to bring the two extreme "wings" together on a common platform of devotion to the Party and its ideals, and ask them to forget their differences which after all are largely personal. The C. E. Committee meeting which will be held at 10 A.M. on the fifteenth February, will be their first opportunity to perform this task of reconciliation.

5. Conclusion. It appears that the ill-fated coalition movement has run its course and left - not a changed Cabinet but a clarified picture of the political and economic issues at stake in Japan. The Socialists will doubtlessly be the gainers, as far as public support is concerned. They have shown their willingness to share the responsibility in a crisis, but held firm on issues which they considered vital for a solution. Thus the Yoshida Cabinet stands clearly revealed as unwilling to take measures which the Socialists advocate. Rightly or wrongly, popular distress is likely to vent itself in renewed attacks upon this government, and in a belief that the Socialists might do better with their program. Thus the latter may have gained in voting support. Only the election itself can determine how much - or how little - the change really is.

Pieter K. Boest, Chief,
Political Affairs Division

Noted: F.E.E.

April 25

POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

Encloses a detailed behind the scenes account, based on official police and court records, of officer corps insurrectionary movements and attempted coups d'etats during the thirties. More personalized side-lights than a coherent historical account. Worth looking through, depending on time available. Account of Gen. Mazaki's dismissal and Gen. Nagato's subsequent murder, pages 68 and 69, an example of material contained.

Tokyo, March 26, 1947

Report Concerning Japanese Nationalism Issued Intelligence Section of General Headquarters, Command.

Political Adviser has the honor to forward as copies of a special report dated September 23, "The Brocade Banner", published by the Civil Intelligence Military Intelligence Section, General Headquarters. This report is a story of Japanese on official police records, court records of beginning in 1930, and other published in-

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DIVISION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS APR 21 1947 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Accompaniment: Five copies of "The Brocade Banner", September 23, 1946.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

Tokyo, March 26, 1947

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No. 941

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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SUBJECT: Special Report Concerning Japanese Nationalism Issued
by the Civil Intelligence Section of General Headquarters,
Far East Command.

The United States Political Adviser has the honor to forward as
an accompaniment five copies of a special report dated September 23,
1946, entitled "The Brocade Banner", published by the Civil Intel-
ligence Section of the Military Intelligence Section, General Head-
quarters, Far East Command. This report is a story of Japanese
nationalism based upon official police records, court records of
trials during the decade beginning in 1930, and other published in-
formation.

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
APR 21 1947
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Accompaniment:
Five copies of
"The Brocade Banner",
September 23, 1946.

Original and hectograph to the Department.

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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISOR

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Apr. 11, 1947
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Tokyo, March 26, 1947

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

APR 22 1947

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Special Report Concerning Japanese Nationalism Issued
by the Civil Intelligence Section of General Headquarters,
Far East Command.

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The United States Political Adviser has the honor to forward as an accompaniment five copies of a special report dated September 25, 1946, entitled "The Brocade Banner", published by the Civil Intelligence Section of the Military Intelligence Section, General Headquarters, Far East Command. This report is a story of Japanese nationalism based upon official police records, court records of trials during the decade beginning in 1936, and other published information.

Accompaniment:

Five copies of
"The Brocade Banner",
September 25, 1946.

Original and hectograph to the Department.

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Tokyo, March 26, 1947

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ACTION:
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INFO:
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FC-enc. SUBJECT: Special Report Concerning Japanese Nationalism Issued
 by the Civil Intelligence Section of General Headquarters,
 Far East Command.

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The United States Political Advisor has the honor to forward as an accompaniment five copies of a special report dated September 23, 1946, entitled "The Brocade Banner", published by the Civil Intelligence Section of the Military Intelligence Section, General Headquarters, Far East Command. This report is a story of Japanese nationalism based upon official police records, court records of trials during the decade beginning in 1930, and other published information.

DIVISION OF
 NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

APR 22 1947

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Accompaniment:
 Five copies of
 "The Brocade Banner",
 September 23, 1946.

Original and hectograph to the Department.

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DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

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Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 27 1947
DIRECTOR
Department of State

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FROM: Moscow

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1037, Twenty-sixth

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
MAR 27 1947
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Noted - reaction required
file - jmg*

Rec'd March 24, 1947
1:40 a.m.

IZVESTIA, March 26th, "Pre-Election Machinations of Jap Reaction" by V. Kudryavtsev, states attempt Yoshida government to retain old order relying on anti-popular Parliament and support of occupation authorities has produced unprecedented growth in democratic movement. Nevertheless many trump cards still in hands Jap reactionaries.. Large sums have been collected for pre-election bribery. Political purges being eased by parties to save government's friends. Attacks continue on trade unions and Communist Party. Although plural voting system was decided, old pre-election trick was revived on March 20 of altering election law. Return urged to 1925 "arch-reactionary system" of voting despite Communist and Socialist protests.

Department please pass to Tokyo.

SMITH

Note: Repeated to Tokyo March 27, 2 a.m. (CWO-FED)

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Martin 1094

UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

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Tokyo, March 26, 1947

April 24.

Despatch encloses a SCAP report prepared in August 1946 describing in detail the origin and development of the IRAA, IRAPS and the Great Japan Political Association. The apparent purpose of the report, implied in the forward, which you may wish to read, is to show that membership in these organizations was not the sin some Sections of SCAP in the early months of occupation considered it to be.

JAPANESE AND KOREAN
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1947

"War Politics in Japan", a Special Report Issued by the Intelligence Section of General Headquarters, Far

Political Adviser has the honor to forward as copies of a special report dated August 15, 1946, Intelligence Section of the Military Intelligence Headquarters, Far East Command, entitled "War Politics

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DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
APR 17 1947
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

"War Politics in Japan",
August 15, 1946.

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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

Tokyo, March 26, 1947

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No. 942

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THE JAPANESE AND KOREAN
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUN 6 1947

SUBJECT: "War Politics in Japan", a Special Report Issued by the Civil Intelligence Section of General Headquarters, Far East Command.

XIR 740 00117 Control (Japan)

The United States Political Adviser has the honor to forward as an accompaniment five copies of a special report dated August 15, 1946, published by the Civil Intelligence Section of the Military Intelligence Section, General Headquarters, Far East Command, entitled "War Politics in Japan".

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
APR 17 1947
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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August 15, 1946.
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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

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Apr. 11, 1947
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Tokyo, March 26, 1947

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ONI-enc. SUBJECT: "War Politics in Japan", a Special Report Issued by the
CIG Civil Intelligence Section of General Headquarters, Far
East Command.

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The United States Political Adviser has the honor to forward as an accompaniment five copies of a special report dated August 15, 1946, published by the Civil Intelligence Section of the Military Intelligence Section, General Headquarters, Far East Command, entitled "War Politics in Japan".

Accompaniment:
Five copies of
"War Politics in Japan",
August 15, 1946.

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

APR 23 1947

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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

Tokyo, March 26, 1947

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ONI-enc. SUBJECT: "War Politics in Japan", a Special Report Issued by the
Civil Intelligence Section of General Headquarters, Far
CIG East Command.

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The United States Political Adviser has the honor to forward as an accompaniment five copies of a special report dated August 15, 1946, published by the Civil Intelligence Section of the Military Intelligence Section, General Headquarters, Far East Command, entitled "War Politics in Japan".

Accompaniment:

Five copies of
"War Politics in Japan",
August 15, 1946.

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

APR 23 1947

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

Tokyo, March 31, 1947

DIVISION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

APR 16 1947

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SPECIAL ASST. TO THE SECRETARY
APR 25 1947
MR. McDERMOTT

RESTRICTED

No. 952

SUBJECT:

Special Meeting of Allied Council for Japan concerning General Election.

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The United States Political Adviser has the honor to refer to this Mission's telegram no. 71, March 28, 1947, on the subject of a press release concerning a special meeting of the Allied Council for Japan and to enclose a self-explanatory memorandum dated February 7, 1947 on the subject "General Election in Japan: Letter of Instruction to the Japanese Prime Minister", prepared by Mr. Max W. Bishop, Chairman pro tempore and Representative of the Member for the United States on the Allied Council for Japan.

General MacArthur's letter to Prime Minister Yoshida is set forth in full in the enclosed memorandum. It will be noted that no objection to the Supreme Commander's letter and proposal to hold a general election was raised by any Member of the Council.

Enclosure: *att. MBS*

Memorandum dated February 7, 1947.

Original and hectograph to Department.
Copies to: American Embassy, London.
American Embassy, Moscow.
American Embassy, Canberra.
American Embassy, New Delhi.
American Legation, Wellington.

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APR 22 1947

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Enclosure to Despatch No. 952 dated March 31, 1947 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Special Meeting of Allied Council for Japan concerning General Election".

COPY

ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN
Tokyo
Office of the Member
for
The United States of America

February 7, 1947.

RESTRICTED

MEETING OF GENERAL MacARTHUR WITH MEMBERS OF THE ALLIED COUNCIL
FOR JAPAN

PARTICIPANTS: General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur.
Members of the Allied Council for Japan.

SUBJECT : General Election in Japan: Letter of
Instruction to the Japanese Prime Minister

General MacArthur called the Members of the Allied Council to consult with him at his office at 11 a.m. on February 7, 1947. In addition to General MacArthur, those present were: Max W. Bishop, Chairman pro tempore and representative of the Member for the United States; Lieutenant General Chu Shih-Ming, Member for China; Lieutenant General Kuzma N. Derevyanko, Member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, who was accompanied by two interpreters; and Mr. E. E. Ward, who was designated by Mr. W. MacMahon Ball, Member representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and India, as his representative.

General MacArthur in opening the discussion stated that he had asked the members to come in order to obtain any comment they might have on a letter which he proposed to send to the Japanese Prime Minister. General MacArthur then read the following letter:

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I believe the time has come for a general election. Momentous changes in internal structure, in economic outlook, and in the whole fabric and pattern of Japanese life have occurred since the last general election nearly a year ago. It is necessary, in the near future, to obtain another democratic expression of the people's will on the fundamental issues with which Japanese society is now confronted. In this way we will once more advance in the process of democracy which now governs this state. The exact time and details are matters which I leave to the discretion of the Japanese Government, but the election should take place as soon as practicable after the close of the present session of the diet so that a new legislative body may initiate and synchronize with the introduction and effectuation of the new constitution. The past year has been one of accomplishment. I look with equal confidence to the future.

Very sincerely,

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR."

After

- 2 -

Enclosure to
Tokyo's No. 952,
March 31, 1947.

After reading the letter General MacArthur called on each of the members in turn for his comment. Mr. Bishop, General Chu, Mr. Ward and General Derevyanko each in turn expressed views in full accord with the letter which General MacArthur had read. Thus there was complete unanimity of agreement that it was desirable to issue such a directive to the Japanese Government regarding the holding of a general election.

In discussing the matter with the Members, General MacArthur pointed out inter alia that this action was an administrative one made necessary to assure a new diet and a new expression of the will of the Japanese people in synchronization with the coming into effect of the Constitution; that the action in no way reflected upon the present Diet which had done, on the whole, a good job; that the present Japanese Cabinet had not taken the initiative in calling such an election; that the matter of timing had been left flexible in order to assure a sufficient period for the Japanese people to acquaint themselves with the problems at issue and to express their free opinion; that being an administrative action, it was important once the decision had been made, that it be carried out promptly in order that it not interfere with the functioning of Government; and that he was glad to have the comments of the Members of the Council.

General Derevyanko after expressing agreement requested some additional time to consider details. Upon General MacArthur's explanation of the urgency of the matter, General Derevyanko made no further request for delay. General Chu expressed his view of the importance of timing the coming elections and expressed complete concurrence in General MacArthur's flexible program.

After asking the Members if there were any other matters which they wished to discuss, General MacArthur cordially invited each one to call upon him at any time to discuss any matter.

The foregoing record was prepared by the Chairman pro tempore immediately upon conclusion of the meeting.

MAX W. BISHOP
Chairman pro tempore and
Representative of the
Member for the United States.



UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

DCR
~~*NA FE*~~
DCR

Tokyo, April 4, 1947.

UNCLASSIFIED

No. 958

SUBJECT: Forwarding Copies of Memoranda of Conversations Regarding the Japan Farmers' Party, the People's Co-operative Party, and the Tokyo-to Elections, dated March 18, 1947.

894.00/4-447

The United States Political Adviser has the honor to forward herewith copies of three memoranda dated March 18, 1947, from the Chief of the Political Affairs Division, Government Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, regarding the election plans of the Japanese Farmers' Party and the People's Co-operative Party, and the Tokyo-To Elections.

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Enclosures:

1. Memorandum, "Japan Farmers' Party";
2. Memorandum, "The People's Co-operative Party";
3. Memorandum, "Tokyo-To Elections".

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DIVISION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 958, dated April 4, 1947, from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Forwarding Copies of Memoranda of Conversations Regarding the Japan Farmers' Party, the People's Co-operative Party, and the Tokyo-to Elections, dated March 18, 1947".

COPY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section
Political Affairs Division

18 March 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: JAPAN FARMERS' PARTY (INTERVIEW WITH KITA Masakiyo)
(Party officially inaugurated on 22 February 1947)

The Diet members who head the Japan Farmers' Party are:

KITA Katsutaro
KITA Masakiyo
ITO Jitsuo
HARAJIRI Tsukasa
NAKANO Shiro

In the general election, Mr. KITA said, only NAKANO would be eligible to run for the House of Representatives. The remainder of the party chiefs with the exception of KITA Masakiyo had been Village Heads of IRAA and would come under the Japanese Government Purge Ordinances, and KITA is apprehensive that having been president of the ZAIGO GUNJIN RENGO BUNKAI (Veterans Military Organization) would also disqualify him.

The following questions were asked Mr. KITA to obtain information for motivating a cause seemingly lost even before it started:

Q. - With the knowledge that the members of the Diet forming the Japan Farmers' Party would be unable to run for reelection, why was the party formed?

A. - If we are purged we will be unable to continue in politics and will therefore be unable to give the farmers political guidance and assistance. We are, however, trying to organize the farmer unions which are numerous and without leaders. We feel that the farmers are being bitterly suppressed, and are being hindered and in most cases discouraged from producing their quotas.

Q. - What will the purged Diet members be contributing to the farmers' cause in the future?

A. - We will have no connections with the farmers' unions but it is our hope that our present work will give the farmers the incentive to continue on with their cause, without our guidance.

Q. - How many farmers are organized now in this movement?

A. - Since we did not start until 20 February 1947 we have not had time to do very much organizing. There are local farmers' unions independent of each other which we hope to combine on a national basis.

Q. - Has

Encl. No. 1 to
Tokyo's 958,
April 4, 1947

- 2 -

How long? Q. - Has there been any campaigning in this regard?

A. - Yes. We have been active since 20 February 1947.

Q. - Has the party stressed Farmers' Unions rather than political interests?

A. - The party interest is primarily farmers, and politics comes second.

Q. - For whom are the farmers, in your opinion, going to vote?

A. - The farmers are not unified now and there is no way of knowing for whom they will vote. The Socialists and Communists are doing most for the farmers but just for the sake of getting votes.

Q. - How does your party regard the All Japan Farmers Union?

A. - This was organized by the Socialists and Communists and not by the farmers. The farmers will not support it for this reason.

Mr. KITA concluded with the statement that the only political party that could truly represent the farmers would be one in which its members are actually farmers and who would understand the farmers' needs and problems, as e.g. the Japan Farmers' Party.

Conclusion:

The KITA brothers might have succeeded in staying in Japan's politics, and capitalized on the farmers' movement through their seats in the House of Representatives, if they were not scheduled to be purged.

This political party of five doubtful Diet members cannot be expected to contribute anything vital to Japan, and it is just as well that the House of Representatives shall soon be rid of it.

P.K. ROEST
Chief, Political Affairs Division

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 958, dated April 4, 1947, from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Forwarding Copies of Memoranda of Conversations Regarding the Japan Farmers' Party, the People's Co-operative Party, and the Tokyo-to Elections, dated March 18, 1947".

COPY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section
Political Affairs Division

18 March 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: THE PEOPLE'S CO-OPERATIVE PARTY
(Inaugurated 8 March 1947)

MIKI Takeo and MATSUMOTO Yakizo provided the Political Affairs Division with up-to-date information regarding the new People's Co-operative Party (KOKUMIN KYODO TO).

On 6 March 1947 the heads of the Co-operative Democratic and People's Parties met, ironed out merger problems, and drew up a new platform. From the first meeting of this kind there existed a common accord on the co-operative idea, and at the numerous merger conferences the People's Party accepted the platform of the Co-operative Democratic Party in its entirety.

The new platform therefore does not differ from the old Co-operative Democratic platform, except that "electrification of all facilities through utilization of Japan's water power" has been added.

The People's Co-operative Party includes 78 Diet members as follows:

Co-operative Democratic (former)	- 42
People's Party (former)	- 32
Independent Club (former)	- 4
	<u>78</u>

The four members from the Independent Club are:

TANAKA Isaji
NUNO Toshiaki
NAKAYAMA Eiichi
KIKUCHI Yutaka

Election Plans and Candidates

There are now 41 branch headquarters in the People's Co-operative Party, of which 38 belonged to the former Kyodo Minshu To, and only 3 to the Kokumin To. These were all consulted prior to the merger and necessary changes for the election campaign were initiated.

150 Candidates will be run for the House of Representatives and an additional 50 Independent candidates will be solicited to join the new party. For the House of Councillors, 100 candidates will run. Of these only 1 candidate is a woman, as compared with 10 women who will run for the House of Representatives.

The

Encl. No. 2 to
Tokyo's 958,
April 4, 1947

- 2 -

The recently announced grace period granted to candidates, extending the deadline for submitting questionnaires to 24 March, will materially assist the new party in providing valuable soliciting time for recruiting new candidates. It is believed by Mr. MIKI that 8 candidates belonging to the party will run for governor.

The following is the official list of the new party's officers:

Secretary General

MIKI Takeo

Chairman, Central Executive Committee

OKADA Seiichi

Vice-Secretary General

HAYAKAWA Takashi

Senior Floor Leader

ITO Iwao

Auditors

AWAMURA Eiichi
MASUI Keitaro

Central Executive Committee

AKITA Daisuke
AWAMURA Eiichi
ITO Kotaro

Information

ISHIZAKI Senmatsu
ISHIDA Ichimatsu
UDA Kunie
OGAWA Ippei
OHARA Hiroo

Inter-party Liaison

KAWANO Yoshimitsu
KINOSHITA Sakae
KUBO Takeo
TANAKA Isaji
NOMOTO Shinakichi
HAYASHI Heima
HIRUTA Toshio
FUJIMOTO Toraki
HOZUMI Shichiro
MATSUMOTO Rokutaro
MARUYAMA Shuichiro
MORI Yukio
YONEKURA Tatsuya

Floor

Encl. No. 2 to
Tokyo's 958,
April 4, 1947

- 3 -

Floor Leaders

ANDO Hatsu
ITO Kotaro
OTSU Keiichi
OMIYA Gosaburo
KAGAWA Kenkichi
KASHIMA Tooru
KIKUCHI Yutaka
KONO Kinsho
KOMAI Tohei
SUZUKI Yagoro
TAKEYAMA Yutaro
TANAKA Tatsu
TOYOSAWA Toyoo
NAKATA Eitaro
NAKAYAMA Eiichi
HASHIMOTO Jiro
HARA Kuni
MATOBA Kinomon
YOSHIDA Sei

Chief of Information and Publicity

IIDE Ichitaro

Chief of Public Relations

MATSUMOTO Takizo

Chief of Affairs on Religion

INOUE Tokumei

Chief of Social Affairs

IIDA Yoshishige

Chief of Educational Affairs

OSHIMA Tazoo

Chief of Women's Section

OKU Mumeo

Chief of Young Men's Section

KAWAGOE Hiroshi

Chief of the Section of Organization

NIKAIDO Susumu

Chief of the General Affairs

HIRAKAWA Atsuo

Chief

Encl. No. 2 to
Tokyo's 958,
April 4, 1947

- 4 -

Chief of Lecture Bureau

FUJII Masao

Chairman of the Caucus

SASAMORI Junzo

Chairman of the Political Research Committee

FUNADA Kyoji

Vice-Chairman of the Political Research Committee

HIGASHI Takashi
IKEGAMI Tasuku

Political Complexion

The new party's political complexion is less indefinite than might be expected of such a miscellaneous group, since they are all middle-of-the-roaders. The party thus takes its place between the Progressives on the right and the Social Democrats on the left. There are no clear-cut factions yet, but Co-operatives MIKI, MATSUMOTO, OMIYA and HAYASHI may be called its right-wing leaders, while AZUMA Takashi, Hokkaido member of the former Kyodo-Minshu-To, and HAYAKAWA Takashi, Wakayama member of the former Kokumin-To, are recognized as leading members of the left wing which favors close collaboration with the Socialists. But these differences do not disturb at present the "complete harmony" which has led to the merger. //

As might be expected, the Co-operatives dominate the new combination. They have an idea (co-operative enterprise, and the substitution of strife by co-operation on the basis of mutual interests) and evidently have had little trouble selling this idea first to the newcomers who formed the Co-operative Democratic Party with them, and now to the 32 members of the People's Party and the 4 Independents who joined them on 8 March. Even the Progressive Party, they pointed out, now has a plank encouraging co-operative enterprise in its election platform.

Election Campaign Plane

MIKI reports that the goal for the party's campaign fund is set at ¥5,000,000, to be collected in both big and little contributions. This is half of what the Progressive and the Social Democratic parties are each planning to get.

Of the new party's candidates, 10% can run without financial aid, MIKI estimated; about 60% will need some help, while 30% will need to be almost completely financed by the party--to the tune of ¥30,000 each.

Number of candidates to run was set at 200, if possible. There are at most 150 suitable candidates in the party now, but MIKI hopes to induce about 50 now-independent candidates to run on the People's Co-operative ticket.

The

Encl. No. 2 to
Tokyo's 958,
April 4, 1947

- 5 -

The concrete election platform is to be published by 20 March. It will stress that in Japan today capitalism has but limited usefulness, as is the case with socialism, and that co-operativism will fill the vital need left by these limitations. MIKI pointed out how, for example, Marxism with its stark antithesis of exploiters and exploited does not apply to a large section of Japan's economic life: millions of farmers are small-scale landowners, while in industry there is a vast number of small-scale employers who share the work in their own shop. Most Japanese are small capitalists, and they should work together to establish a "socialized" type of capitalism. Only key industries require national control, but bureaucrats are the wrong people to exercise such control rightly. Hence business talent must be engaged, co-operation must become the principle in all fields, not merely in that of co-operatives for farmers and for consumers. Labor and management must collaborate to fight inflation and renounce class-strife.

MIKI stated that each candidate will get a "textbook" with these ideas for use in his campaign; so that the voters would know for what the party stands.

President

The People's Co-operative Party has no president yet. It hopes to enlist some high-class person to serve in that capacity. Negotiations with NAMBARA, TOHARA, and SATO Shobu have not yielded satisfactory results so far, but efforts to obtain a brilliant standard-bearer will continue.

P. K. ROEST
Chief, Political Affairs Division

Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 958, dated April 4, 1947, from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Forwarding Copies of Memoranda of Conversations Regarding the Japan Farmers' Party, the People's Co-operative Party, and the Tokyo-to Elections, dated March 18, 1947".

COPY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section
Political Affairs Division

18 March 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: TOKYO-TO ELECTIONS

Since all administrative bodies below the ward level are expected to be dissolved before the elections, political activity will be confined to the election of the Tokyo Metropolitan District governor, the ward chiefs, the Metropolitan and ward assemblies, and headmen and assemblies of cities, towns, and villages. The number of wards in Tokyo-shi is being reduced from 35, the present number, to 22, on 15 March.

As of 10 November 1946, registered voters in Tokyo prefecture numbered 2,378,359 for Diet elections, 2,424,506 for the gubernatorial and Metropolitan assembly elections, and 2,433,813 for city, ward, town, and village elections, an increase of more than 297,094 over the 1946 number. Registered women voters comprise nearly one-half the total.

Beginning 18 March and continuing for one week, a special registration period will allow repatriates and others who have resided in the Tokyo area six months or longer to register. In an effort to encourage greater participation in voting, the number of polling places will be increased from last years 440 to 2,500. A large number of abstentions occurred in the previous election because of the crowded conditions that prevailed and the limited voting facilities.

P. K. ROEST
Chief, Political Affairs Division

~~NA~~
DGR

April 11, 1947

In reply refer to
NA 894.00/4-747

RESTRICTED

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN,
FAR EASTERN COMMISSION**

With reference to the consultative message from the Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers dated March 26, 1947, relative to the House of Representatives Election Law, there is enclosed a copy of a message from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers dated April 12, 1947.

It is requested that the Chairman make this message available to the members of the Far Eastern Commission.

J. H. HILLDRING

**J. H. Hilldring
Assistant Secretary**

Enclosure:

Message from SCAP,
April 2, 1947

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A true copy of
the signed original.
CR/ZK

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COPIED: PM
COMPARED: XA

ENCLOSURE

2 April 1947

The Diet on 31st March passed amendments extending the provisions of article two of the additional provisions of the House of Councillors election law to the election of the House of Representatives. Forthcoming election of House of Representatives will be held under the same liberal provisions as the House of Councillors election law.

The franchise for the House of Representatives is now extended to all of voting age except incompetents or quasi-incompetents and those in prison or those who have received a sentence involving penal servitude or confinement and have not yet served their term.

English and Japanese copies of bill for amendment of the House of Representatives election law were airmailed to War Department on 14th March. Japanese copies of amendments to bill were airmailed 31st March. English translation of amendments as passed by the Diet will be airmailed on 3rd April.

Other substantial changes in House of Representatives election law include:

A. Election districts increased in number from 53 to 117 with each district returning from 3 to 5 members to the lower house for a total membership of 466.

B. Supervision of elections has been removed from the House Ministry and placed in the hands of democratically chosen election administration committees who will appoint election officials and supervise polling and counting.

C. Filing deposits have been raised from 2,000 Yen to 5,000 Yen, and fines for violations have generally been increased about 10 times.

D. Restricted plural voting has been replaced by the single ballot.

E. Use of school children below the age of 20 in campaigns illegal.


All changes will be applied to the forthcoming general elections.

RESTRICTED

THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

FE
DC/R

SWN-5291
7 April 1947



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:
(Attn: Mr. J. K. Penfield, FE)

Subject: Request for Consultation with Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers Relative
to the House of Representatives Election
Law.

11894.03

At the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the enclosed message from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, in response to a request by the Far Eastern Commission for consultation with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers relative to the House of Representatives Election Law dated 25 March 1947, is forwarded for transmittal to the U.S. Representative of the Far Eastern Commission.

894.00/4-747

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

Memo for Chairman FEC
4/9/47
all file

H. W. Moseley
H. W. MOSELEY,
Secretary

Enclosure
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WAR DEPARTMENT
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PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED. HANDLE AS RESTRICTED
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From: SCAP Tokyo, Japan sgd McArthur

To: War Department for JCS for General McCoy

Nr: C 51434

2 April 1947

Reurad WAR 94856 March 27th. The Diet on 31st March passed amendments extending the provisions of article two of the additional provisions of the House of Councillors election law to the election of the House of Representatives. Forthcoming election of House of Representatives will be held under the same liberal provisions as the House of Councillors election law.

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Other substantial changes in House of Representatives election law include:

A. Election districts increased in number from 53 to 117 with each district returning from 3 to 5 members to the lower house for a total membership of 466.

CM-IN 394

(2 Apr 47)

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COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

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Page 2

From: SCAP Tokyo, Japan sgd MacArthur

Nr: C 51434

2 April 1947

B. Supervision of elections has been removed from the House Ministry and placed in the hands of democratically chosen election administration committees who will appoint election officials and supervise polling and counting.

C. Filing deposits have been raised from 2,000 Yen to 5,000 Yen, and fines for violations have generally been increased about 10 times.

D. Restricted plural voting has been replaced by the single ballot.

E. Use of school children below the age of 20 in campaigns illegal.

All changes will be applied to the forthcoming general elections.

End.

ACTION : JCS

INFO : AAF, Adm Leahy, ASW, CAD, ID, Adm Nimitz, P&O, CSA

CM-IN 394

(2 Apr 47) DTG 02/0705Z ags

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COPY NO.

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Form DS-302 (7-2-46)

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION COPY

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Office of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS APR 17 1947 DIRECTOR Department of State

Routing slip with checkboxes for NA, Info, UN, CA, HA, PI, SEA.

PLAIN

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Action: FE

Info :

- S/S, A-B, A-H, SA/M, EUR, SPA, OCD, CIG, DC/L, FC, OIC, PA, EUR/X, DC/R

FROM: Moscow

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1416, April 17

Control 4994

Rec'd April 17, 1947 DIVISION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

APR 17 1947

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Noted - no action required file

IZVESTIA April 16 "Shadow of General Tanaka over Japan" by V. Kudryavtsev calls electoral law of March 31 return to system existing under rule militarists in Japan. High lights follow:

"Japanese ruling classes to save own skins and authority hastened to introduce 'democratic' gloss to old re-actures of reactionary monarchy. At that time they still took first directives to American occupation authorities seriously, at any rate those which appeared to proceed from Potsdam decisions...."

"What will be significance of victory of Liberal Party so much hoped for by Yoshida and supporters? Let answer be given by Njrahasi formerly secretary general to Shidehara cabinet. As far back as April 1946 he stated 'in its policy Liberal Party adheres to direction of old school, that to which cabinet of late General Tanaka adhered'...."

"It is not hard guess that Yoshida and his Liberal Party wouldn't be averse to return to times of Tanaka, asking his retrograde movement with cries for need for combatting 'Left-Wing ideologies', more so as this finds favorable reaction on other side Pacific."

"Amendment of electoral law at ninety-second session of Parliament is new and glaring attempt on Yoshida's part turn history of Japan back to times of Tanaka. It is unnecessary state

PLAIN

PERMANENT RECORD COPY:

THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED TO DC/R CENTRAL FILES WITH NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

Handwritten notes and stamps: MAY 2 1947, DC/R, PERSON OFFICE

894.00/4-1747

HH

APR 25 1947

PLAIN

-2-#1416, April 17, from Moscow

unnecessary state that recently adopted measure of Yoshida Government is in strike (*) which stated inter alia 'Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles in way of revival and consolidation democratic tendencies among Japanese peoples'....

"Question arises: how do US occupation authorities, who are pledged control actions of Japanese Government react to this violation of Potsdam declaration? On February 29 San Francisco radio broadcast talk on theme 'is Japan changing and in what direction?' Atcheson, US representative on allied council for Japan, took active part in discussion and declared 'Japan is changing and in direction of democracy.' In light of activity of Yoshida Government, Atcheson's reply sounds at least like attempt mislead world public opinion....

"It is useless expect democratization of Japan from Yoshida Government and 'liberal' Party over which hovers spirit of General Tanaka-spirit of Japanese militarism...."

Department report Tokyo.

SMITH

(*) Omission

Note: Relayed to Tokyo 10 a.m. 4/17/47 CSB

MH:EG

PLAIN

May 19

B

Encloses a very good study of the merits (or rather demerits) of the new electoral system. Summarized in last paragraph but recommend reading in full.

UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN

DCIR
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Tokyo, April 24, 1947.

RESTRICTED

No. 998

SUBJECT: Merits of the Electoral System Proposed by Prime Minister Shigeru YOSHIDA.

The United States Political Adviser has the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum dated March 17, 1947, prepared by the Chief of the Political Affairs Division, Government Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, regarding the merits of the electoral system proposed by Prime Minister Shigeru YOSHIDA.

894.00/4-2447

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COPIES
TO:
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Enclosure:

10/34
Copy of Memorandum dated March 17, 1947.

file
DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
MAY 15 1947
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 998 dated April 24, 1947 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Merits of the Electoral System Proposed by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru".

COPY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section
Political Affairs Division

COPY

17 March 1947

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF, GOVERNMENT SECTION

SUBJECT: THE MERITS OF THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM PROPOSED BY MR. YOSHIDA

Instead of the restricted plural vote and the present 53 districts (39 prefectures forming one single district, and the 7 biggest being divided into two each) the Liberal Party is pressing for 127 small districts with from 2-5 members each, combined with a single vote. This system was in use before 1945 and notorious for its well-controlled "machines"; which is the chief reason why it is opposed by the non-government parties; both the Liberal and the Progressive parties having inherited most of the MINSEITO and SEIYUKAI traditions and personnel entrenched in these local machines.

Objectively, the following differences in election results are significant.

1. Candidates

The smaller the district, the smaller the choice of candidates. It is easier to find qualified persons in a whole prefecture than in every small subdivision of it. For the same reason the caliber of candidates is likely to be lower on the average than in the prefectural size district, since so many have only limited local views and interests. Therefore "the smaller the district the smaller the candidates" -- taking the country as a whole.

2. Voter's choice

Many a voter will prefer a good candidate from any district in his prefecture to a poor one from his own small bailiwick. Yet he can vote only for those running in his own district. Apart from that, under the restricted plural voting scheme he could select 2 or (where there are 11-14 seats to be filled) 3 candidates to represent his various interests. In the proposed scheme he has only one choice and that from a far smaller number of candidates. The proposed scheme therefore unquestionably reduces the voter's choice of representatives both in quality and quantity.

3. Minority representation

Secondary parties (Socialists and People's Co-operatives for instance) are not evenly supported throughout Japan, like the government parties with their long history of entrenchment. They will lose out in many small districts for lack of support, whereas their support in a few districts may be far in excess of that needed for election. Thus they prefer the larger district both for its better choice of candidates and for its wider support with better chances of election.

Small

Tokyo's No. 998
April 24, 1947.

-2-

Small districts therefore work against minority representation. This is greatly aggravated by the replacement of restricted plural voting with the single vote. Many voters who have lingering loyalties to the old politicians will vote for one, but express their desire for a change or for some new blood by voting for a minority candidate. This is the main reason given by the Liberals themselves against the present system. By limiting the voter to one choice only he loses this chance to take a risk with a new-party man or an independent he likes.

4. Women

The above is particularly true in regard to women. Where parties choose candidates for 2-5 seat districts they will rarely risk a woman's name, while they can afford to do so with districts having 10 to 14 seats to be filled. The voter, likewise, will rarely risk his one-and-only vote on a woman candidate (if there is one in his district) while many were perfectly willing to do so with their second or third choice last year.

Mathematically speaking, women will have no chance at all in small districts even if the voting system were kept the same. For 39 women elected last year represent 8.3% of the total number of members elected. In a district with 10-14 seats such an average percentage will frequently yield a seat to a woman; but in districts with a maximum of 5 seats it is almost impossible for a woman to get elected. Small wonder then that women Diet members are dead set against the proposed return to small districts and the single vote.

5. Summary and Evaluation

Apart from facilitating the machine politics whereby the old political interests perpetuated their influence, the proposed return to small districts and the single vote is bound to:

- a. Lower the average candidate quality.
- b. Restrict the voter's choice and lower the average quality of the representatives elected.
- c. Reduce minority representation with the overall effect of increasing the power of the plurality party beyond proportion to its electoral support.
- d. Practically eliminate women from the Diet.

It is argued that if the Socialists expect to become the plurality party, they should favor the proposed change since it will work to their advantage. While this may be true from the point of view of numbers of Socialist representatives only, it is clear that they need the support of other secondary parties to gain a working majority which they almost certainly cannot get by themselves this year. They are therefore consistent in opposing the return to the pre-1945 system.

While there is nothing undemocratic about the proposed system it is, in comparison to the existing system, definitely advantageous to the parties now in power, and unfavorable to minority representation and to women.

P. K. ROEST
Chief, Political Affairs Division

UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN

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DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

Tokyo, April 25, 1947.

RESTRICTED

No. 1000

MAY 19 1947
file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Political Views of NOZAKA Sanzo and the Communist Party's
Plans for Coming Elections.

894.00/4-2547

The United States Political Adviser has the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch No. 936 of March 25, 1947, and to enclose a copy of a memorandum dated March 10, 1947 covering an interview between Lt. Col. P. K. Roest, Chief, Political Affairs Division, Government Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and Nozaka Sanzo, Japan Communist Party leader, regarding his political views and the Communist Party's plans for the coming elections.

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Enclosure:

Copy of memorandum dated March 10, 1947, re Sanzo Nozaka's Views and Plans of the Communist Party for Coming Elections.

Original & hectograph to Department.

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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 1000 dated April 25, 1947, from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Political Views of NOZAKA Sanzo and the Communist Party's Plans for Coming Elections".

COPY

COPY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section
Political Affairs Division

10 March 1947

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF, GOVERNMENT SECTION

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH NOZAKA

On 5 March 1947 at 1400, the Political Affairs Division staff interviewed Mr. NOZAKA Sanzo in regard to his political views and the Communist Party's plans for the coming elections. Because of the basic nature of some of the questions discussed, a brief report of the interview is hereby submitted.

Election Platform

NOZAKA stated that since the April 1946 election the "democratic revolution" has made great strides. Yet many remnants of feudal power and conditions still remain. The Communist Party in Japan desires to carry this democratic revolution through to its completion. For this reason it advocates in its election program:

1. A more thorough purge of persons tainted with war-guilt. Men like HIRANO (right-wing Socialist) should not remain unaffected by the purge. Post-purge activities of men like HATOYAMA, and appointing of "dummy" candidates by purges should be stopped.
2. The whole governmental system must be democratized; the power of the bureaucrats and cliques should be broken; bills should come from the Diet not the Government; the central and local systems of administration should be changed as outlined in the program prepared by the Union of Government Office Workers.
3. The police system must be democratized. Local Police Chiefs are to be elected. All ex-TOKKO personnel must be eliminated and revival of the TOKKO in any form must be prevented.
4. All feudal remnants, both economic and political, in the villages are to be eliminated. The tenancy system must be abolished; all land not tilled by the owner is to be nationalized, as well as forests and uncultivated land.
5. All big industries should be nationalized, i. e. nationally owned and operated.

A sixth point on the program, NOZAKA said, was not to be made use of in the election campaign; this was "to amend the Constitution so as to strip the Emperor completely of all political power, e. g. the appointment of a Premier.

In connection with point 4, NOZAKA was asked whether collective farming would not be affected by this proposed measure of allowing private title only to land tilled by the owner. He replied that his

party

Tokyo's No. 1000
April 25, 1947.

-2-

party advocated collective farming only on a small cooperative scale, but considered collective farms of the Russian type unsuited for Japan.

Asked whether he did not think the farmers were pretty well off now, NOZAKA replied that he thought this to be true for a small minority only. He admitted that most farmers were still conservative, and accused the Government of paving the way for farmer support of the government parties by an increase in the price of rice.

Basic Policy

The Communist Party's first aim, NOZAKA stated, was to complete the democratization of Japan, simultaneously taking one step towards Socialism. For instance, it advocates the immediate nationalization of all banks and other financial enterprises, and of such key industries as coal, mining, transportation, electric power and fertilizer. Yet this is not made into an election issue except as a general principle (See 5 above); the first step only--national control or management--will be advocated for immediate execution.

The next goal is the change from a semi-competitive democracy to a fully socialist State. The ultimate objective is the transformation from a socialist to a communist State.

Relation to the Socialists

Since both Communists and Socialists aim at a socialist State, "What is the difference between them which keeps them apart," NOZAKA was asked. "On paper," he replied, "there is no essential difference, but the activities of the two parties differ widely." E. G. The Socialists approve of the present Land Reform Bill, but the Communists say it is far from perfect. The Socialists approved of compulsory rice delivery last year; the Communists opposed it. The Socialists frown on strikes; the Communists support strikes "if they are necessary."

Right Wing Socialists speak loudly of Socialism, but in practice betray it by repeated compromise with capitalists. Nevertheless, the two parties should cooperate in the effort to form a truly "democratic" government.

It was explained to Mr. NOZAKA that in a democracy the capitalists, being part of the people, are also entitled to representation; whereas he obviously used the word "democratic" in the sense of "laboring class only." He seemed a bit startled at this revelation but admitted that we used the word differently. When asked what he thought of the recent elections in Poland he coyly remarked that he did not know since he had "no reliable information" on the matter!

Fundamental Differences between Socialism and Communism

NOZAKA explained that before Japan's surrender the Communists advocated armed revolution, while the Socialists chose parliamentary ways. The Communists had no other course, NOZAKA said, because the government ruthlessly suppressed them.

At present however, conditions are radically different. The power of the militarists is broken, and the police has little oppressive authority left; the organization of reactionary forces is relatively weak. The Diet, once a mere debating society, is now to become
the supreme

Tokyo's No. 1000
April 25, 1947.

-3-

the supreme organ of State power. While therefore in the past there was no chance to carry out a socialist program through parliamentary means, there is now. Hence the Communists now favor the parliamentary method of bringing about political, social and economic change, and in this respect can join the Socialists. But there is one fundamental difference; the Socialists do not recognize the use of mass action outside the Diet as a proper instrument, while the Communists do. They use extra-parliamentary mass pressure, NOZAKA said, as a necessary auxiliary weapon "because the Diet is still weak."

In Europe several countries such as France, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, etc. had now "democratic" governments. Such "people's governments" are a new way of achieving a bloodless revolution. Therefore if such a government can be formed here in Japan, establishment of a Socialist State in a peaceful way becomes possible.

This led to a question about British Socialism. NOZAKA quickly remarked that Britain proves that the way of the Socialists is a way of compromise and eventual defeat at the hands of vested interests. In fact, he said, Socialism was not really carried out in any country where Socialists were in control. So far only Russia has established a true Socialist State.

Class War?

Since NOZAKA had indicated his disapproval of the "compromising" attitude of the Socialists, an Australia story was related to him of labor-bosses deliberately breaking up an industrial scheme for labor-participation in stockholding, control and management, and profits on the ground that "it destroyed the unity of the labor-front." He was asked whether he would have held the same all-out class-war view, and if so would still support it now. He replied in the affirmative. We must have, he stated, a "democratic" front of workers, farmers, intellectuals, small and medium industrialists, and "some bigger ones." against the big finance and monopolistic capitalists.

This plan seemed to include a good deal more than the usual proletarian masses on the "democratic" side. So NOZAKA was asked whether the front he proposed was not much farther to the right than the "struggling masses" generally were supposed to form against the whole employer class. He admitted this was so. Actually the fight is only against the very top crust of capitalism: Zaibatsu, high-finance, the "new-yen class" and the big black-marketeers, he explained. Even the big firm of HIDACHI, he said, was on the labor side of the battle.

Under these conditions the class-war of "workers" against "employers" begins to look very abstract and theoretical! It appears more correct to say that Communists use strife as a means to gain political power which it would take them a long time to obtain otherwise.

Communist Relations Abroad

NOZAKA was asked in what respects the Japanese Communist Party differed from the Communist Party in other lands. "The doctrine, Marxism," he replied, "is everywhere the same. But the application in each country is different, due to different conditions." In Yenan

for

Tokyo's No. 1000
April 25, 1947.

-4-

for instance, there is no question of aiming at Socialism at present. The people are far too backward for that. So Japan has its own needs which the Japanese Communists try to meet.

"What about Russia," he was asked. "Isn't Russia helping the Communist Party everywhere, including here in Japan," The answer was a definite "No" as far as Japan is concerned. In the twenties, NOZAKA explained, there was definite assistance given. Even as late as 1943 there was some contact, NOZAKA himself being Japan's Communist representative in Moscow. But it was weak due to police watchfulness, and the distance involved. Since 1943 however there has been no contact at all. Mr. Noble of the Saturday Evening Post says Japanese Communists get advice, money, etc. from Russia; but NOZAKA avows this is not true. "We receive neither money nor political advice," he stated, "simply because we do not need it; we know Japan best."

Thus Communist policy is applied as conditions require. For instance: it is impossible to nationalize Japan's medium and small industries now; hence "we want to help them" in their individual struggle for survival.

Election Funds and Prospects

All Party campaign funds, NOZAKA stated, come from individual contributions. For the April elections a drive to gather ¥10,000,000 has just started. Only ¥130,000 is at hand now. Candidates will be given financial assistance as needed. The Party has already 170 candidates for the House of Representatives, 12 for the House of Councillors, 7 for Governor, and an undetermined number for other offices. It will concentrate its greatest effort on the House of Representatives election; but local elections will not be neglected. There is a scarcity of candidates, however.

Candidates are selected largely by local recommendations. Those for more important offices (Diet, Ken-governors, and big city executives) are decided on by the Politburo of the Central Executive Committee; but so far no candidate proposed by a local branch has been rejected.

The Communists will run candidates in all 53 districts this year. In spite of the Social Democrats' refusal to cooperate, in several districts local Socialist and Communist branches are on friendly terms and will help each other regardless of Social Democratic Party Headquarters' wishes.

The prefectures where the Communist Party is strongest were listed by NOZAKA as follows, with the number of seats the Party "expects" to win:

Tokyo	10
Hokkaido	9 or 10
Kanagawa	6
Nagano	6
Osaka	5
Kobe	5
Northern Kyushu	5 or 6
Aichi	<u>1</u>
Total in 8 Ken	47 or 49

P. K. ROEST
Chief, Political Affairs Division

May 19
B

STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN

Handwritten initials and marks:
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Encloses record
of a not very int-
eresting or important
interview held on
March 13 regarding
prospects for the
local elections in
the Kwanto area.

Tokyo, April 26, 1947

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

MAY 14 1947

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ng Local Elections.

tical Adviser has the honor to enclose a copy
13, 1947, prepared by the Chief of the
Government Section of General Headquarters,
llied Powers, regarding local elections and
s from Tokyo Prefecture.

894.00/4-2647

Enclosure:

1. Copy of Memorandum dated March 13, 1947 re: Local Elections and Election of Diet Candidates from Tokyo Prefecture.

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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN

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Tokyo, April 26, 1947

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No. 1004

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
MAY 14 1947
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Interview Regarding Local Elections.

1/ The United States Political Adviser has the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum dated March 13, 1947, prepared by the Chief of the Political Affairs Division, Government Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, regarding local elections and elections of Diet candidates from Tokyo Prefecture.

894.00/4-2647

Enclosure:

- 1. Copy of Memorandum dated March 13, 1947 re: Local Elections and Election of Diet Candidates from Tokyo Prefecture.

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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 1004 dated April 25, 1947 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Interview Regarding Local Elections".

COPY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section
Political Affairs Division

13 March 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH OKUBO Tomejiro

In interview was held on 12 March with OKUBO Tomejiro, Liberal Party whip and campaign manager for the Liberals in the Kwanto area, concerning local elections and elections of Diet candidates from Tokyo Prefecture.

Candidates for the Diet and Prefectural assemblies have not yet been decided upon, although the names of NAKAJIMA Moritoshi and TAKEUCHI Shigeo were mentioned in the newspapers last month as candidates for the House of Representatives. Apparently, there is a great deal of behind-the-scenes activity at the present time--not only between the Liberal and Progressive Parties, which are planning close co-operation in the coming election, but between the boss-dominated clique in the Liberal Party, led by Secretary-General ONO, and the younger, more progressive-minded new party faction, represented by ASHIDA and YANO.

Given the strength of the Social Democrats in the last election in which they received over 900,000 votes compared to 850,000 for the Liberals and 350,000 for the Progressives, plus the increasing dissatisfaction with the Liberal regime in this predominantly industrial area, it is quite likely that the Liberals now find it necessary to make a deal with the Progressives in order to capture the governorship, as well as to preserve their present political strength in Tokyo. Evidence of this recognition of the necessity to work together is the projected withdrawal of the three Liberal Party candidates and the Progressive candidate for governor and the decision to back YASUI Seiichiro for re-election. Up to now YASUI, the present governor and a strong candidate, who had refused overtures from the Social Democrats to run on their party ticket, had indicated that he will run as an Independent. Mr. OKUBO stated, however, that YASUI will shortly enter the Liberal Party ranks and run as the Liberal Party candidate with Progressive support.

Candidates for the Diet and Metropolitan assembly will not be announced until the end of the month; 50 Liberal members of the Metropolitan assembly met again on 12 March to continue discussions on this question.

OKUBO believes that the Liberals will not only retain their present strength of 8 Lower House representatives from Tokyo-to, but will increase their number to 9 to be elected from the 16 candidates who will run for election to the House of Representatives (No figure was mentioned for the candidates to the House of Councillors). In the case of the Metropolitan assembly elections, the deal with the Progressives will, in his opinion, result in a roster of 120 candidates (70 Liberals and 50 Progressives) which will be supported by both parties. Expected to win are 50 Liberals and 30 Progressives, which would give the two parties 80 seats out of a total of 120 seats in the assembly.

Mr. OKUBO

Encl. No. 1 to
Tokyo's No. 1004
April 25, 1947.

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Mr. OKUBO indicated that ¥500,000 out of the Liberal campaign fund, which is expected to total ¥15,000,000, will be spent in the Tokyo area.

Party strength is said to be strongest in Setagaya, Oji, Koishikawa, Omori, Kamata, Katsushika, Edogawa, Yodobashi and Kanda wards. It is obvious that Liberal Party strength is greatest in the business districts, wealthier residential areas, and in the country areas, such as Kita-tama, Minami-tama, and Nishi-tama Gun, and islands included within the jurisdiction of Tokyo-to.

Questioned as to the party platform Mr. OKUBO stated that no special appeals would be made to attract the Tokyo-to vote and that the national platform based on broad general principles would be used by candidates for local elections as well. Such slogans as "A free or a fettered economy?", "Build or Destroy?", "All the people, or classes?" will be used. When pressed for specific details, he mentioned that the party advocated gradual abolition of controls over the country's economy. With respect to commodities, controls would be taken off fish and vegetables but allowed to remain temporarily on rice as well as on gasoline and coal. No special taxes are contemplated for the "new-yen" classes. When questioned about the popularity of the present Yoshida regime among Tokyo voters, OKUBO said he believed that, except for the proletarian and Socialist elements, the mass of citizens were in favor of the administration policies; that even Finance Minister ISHIBASHI's policies were endorsed by between 60 and 70% of the Tokyo population. "In that case," he was asked, "why did Mr. ISHIBASHI choose to stand for election in Shizuoka Prefecture instead of Tokyo (where he was defeated last year)?" "Because Mr. ISHIBASHI's temple is now in Shizuoka," Mr. OKUBO replied.

As far as the local elections are concerned, most of the present incumbents who survive the purge will probably run either on the Liberal Party ticket or with Party support, according to OKUBO. There is only one possible purgee among the Liberal Party members in the Diet representing Tokyo, he believes, but many headmen will probably be purged. Those that remain are well known to the voters however. Smiling broadly, Mr. OKUBO remarked that after all personalities, not platforms, will decide the elections. Moreover the strongest asset of the Liberal Party appears to be the large supply of funds available for use in the Tokyo-to elections. Success in the elections will also depend to a great extent on how complete the cooperation will be between the Liberal and the Progressive Parties in an area where the governorship and many Diet and Metropolitan assembly seats will probably be very closely contested.

P. K. ROEST
Chief, Political Affairs Division

Prepared by John K. McLean
Noted: CIK

May 19

Encloses memo of interview with Narahashi, attended by HB and written up in his circulated memos of conversation. Somewhat overtaken by events but of interest if Narahashi should be cleared. While Chiizaki and Ishiguro were just cleared, Narahashi's and Innkai's cases are still pending before the Appeals Committee.

HB
J/E

UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

DIVISION OF EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS Tokyo, April 25, 1947

JUN - 3 1947
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DC/R

Narahashi Wataru Regarding Plans of Reorganization of Party Into the Democratic Party.

Political Adviser has the honor to enclose a copy of report dated March 31, 1947 prepared by the Chief of the Liaison, Government Section of General Headquarters, United States Armed Forces in Japan, covering an interview with Narahashi Wataru regarding plans for the reorganization of the Progressive Party.

894.00/4-2547

Enclosure:

1. Copy of Memorandum, dated March 31, 1947, concerning Narahashi's Plans for Reorganizing the Progressive Party.

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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

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DIVISION OF
NORTH EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
JUN - 3 1947
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Tokyo, April 25, 1947

RESTRICTED

No. 1001

SUBJECT: Interview with Narahashi Wataru Regarding Plans of Reorganizing Progressive Party Into the Democratic Party.

894.00/4-2547

1/ The United States Political Adviser has the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum dated March 31, 1947 prepared by the Chief of the Political Affairs Division, Government Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, covering an interview with Narahashi Wataru concerning plans for the reorganization of the Progressive Party into the Democratic Party.

Enclosure:

- 1. Copy of Memorandum, dated March 31, 1947, concerning Narahashi's Plans for Reorganizing the Progressive Party.

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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 1001 dated April 25, 1947 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Interview with Narahashi Wataru Regarding Plans of Reorganizing Progressive Party Into the Democratic Party".

COPY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

31 March 1947

MEMO FOR: The Chief, Government Section

SUBJECT: Interview with NARAHASHI Wataru

Introductory: At 10:30 A.M. on 29 March 1947 Mr. NARAHASHI Wataru was interviewed by the writer on his plans in connection with the reorganization of the Progressive Party into the Democratic Party (MINSHU-TO), scheduled for today. It will be recalled that NARAHASHI was forced into political oblivion after the failure of his efforts immediately following the April 1946 election to form a new party composed of all middle-of-the-road members in the House of Representatives. On 18 February 1947 he announced his intention to become active again in a new party movement, and on 6 March he came out of his political "hibernation" (his own word) by joining the Progressive Party. Immediately the talk of a new party (which had agitated the Progressive ranks in February but was repressed by Baron Shidehara) was resumed. Strengthened by ASHIDA's transfer from the Liberal to the Progressive Party, the latter decided on 26 March to dissolve in order to make way for the new party which is now being inaugurated. In all this NARAHASHI has been the driving force and the directing intelligence, by his own statement.

At the interview NARAHASHI was accompanied by his interpreter HOSHIJIMA. Others present were Dr. Borton from Washington, D. C., Dr. Williams, Miss Kuwaye, and the writer.

Narahashi Outlines His Purpose: NARAHASHI was his old vigorous, over-confident self, and talked almost continuously. He began by stating his purpose in renewing, now, his efforts to organize a party to the right of the Socialists and to the left of the Liberals, which would act as a "stabilizing force" in Japanese politics. The Progressive party was handicapped by its past, having lost the people's confidence at the outset by losing most of its original personnel in the January 1946 purge. It could get no labor support in its existing form, but its antipathy to some of the recent Liberal policies and its endorsement of various "Socialist" proposals (for at least emergency use) made it the most suitable vehicle for the realization of NARAHASHI's plans. A thorough overhaul and renovation were required. So "like buying an old run-down building and getting to work on its transformation," NARAHASHI said, he had joined the Progressive Party, rekindled the suppressed desire for a change, enlisted ASHIDA's support to get the most progressive Liberals behind him, enlisted the cooperation of INUKAI who had long wanted to rename the Progressive party, and was now mapping out a program to get a reasonable amount of labor support for the "new" party. With over a dozen People's Co-operatives and nearly all of the Independent Club members willing to join, the projected "Democratic Party of Japan," NARAHASHI mentioned, may become the first party even before the coming election. (NOTE: Confirmed by events, 31 March 1947.)

With amazing aplomb NARAHASHI recounted how HE had "put YOSHIDA at the

head

Encl. No. 1 to
Tokyo's 1001
April 25, 1947

-2-

head of the Progressive Party" last year to achieve a progressively oriented conservative combination, but how YOSHIDA had "succumbed to boss rule," and SHIDEHARA had been "unable to control his party," so that the reactionary elements in the conservative camp had become dominant and had alienated the working masses. This had led on the left to a dangerous increase of Communist influence. Hence ASHIDA in the Liberal Party and INUKAI among the Progressives had tried to bring about the dissolution of these two parties and the formation of a new Conservative party "with New Deal policies." Since they did not succeed NARAHASHI had come out of his political exile and decided to use the Progressive Party as the center of his activity. He was determined to develop it as the leading political group in favor of "a modified capitalism," with moderate labor unions and agricultural unions supporting it. The present government parties are out of touch with the masses of the people and this dangerous condition had to be remedied.

All political parties in Japan, NARAHASHI asserted, "lack the full realization of defeat," which requires concentrated devotion to RECONSTRUCTION and hence wholehearted cooperation between capital and labor.

While ASHIDA's change-over from the Liberal to the Progressive Party had deprived the former of all its attractiveness for liberal thoughtful Japanese and was "worth many members" to the Progressives, the number of Diet members was not the main issue, NARAHASHI said. The real question was: "Can the new party get the support of the Japanese people?"

New Name, or Reorganization? NARAHASHI was asked why the projected "new" party had not shown any intention to get rid of the "bosses" against which the younger members had rebelled earlier in this year. He replied that he fully realized this situation, but planned to "control these bosses" so they would lose their power over the party. He would do this by bringing in new party members from all strata of society, thus "making the party truly a new thing."

He was reminded that so long as the organization of the party remains oligarchic, bringing in new members would not help. He answered that he was now drawing up a plan whereby officers of the party will be elected by the rank and file, thus changing it into a democratic organ. He would bring pressure to bear on the bosses and let the younger members express themselves. Outside the party, he would organize many intelligent and public spirited men to support it. Thus a far more democratic political organization would be developed.

Within the party there is opposition to his plans, particularly from KAWAI, HITOTSUMATSU, TANAKA, and KIMURA. To counter this opposition NARAHASHI, ASHIDA and INUKAI will organize the younger members. There was no doubt in his mind as to who would be the real boss: "I shall come into full control of the party in the near future, NARAHASHI said.

What to Do With Shidehara? NARAHASHI volunteered the information that the greatest problem in the Progressive Party was how to control Baron SHIDEHARA. In the new party he would devote special attention to this problem, because he is "the only man in Japan who knows how to handle Shidehara." The secret was "not to anger him, but to bring him around gradually to new ideas and

new

Encl. No. 1 to
Tokyo's 1001
April 25, 1947

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new action." Shidehara's position in the new party had not yet been decided. It would probably be settled by a general convention, but NARAHASHI was in favor of making SHIDEHARA the party's "Senior Adviser" and settling the ticklish question of the Presidency AFTER the election.

Presidential Possibilities: Apart from Baron SHIDEHARA, others have been named as presidential possibilities for the new party. NARAHASHI mentioned well-known candidates like SAITO, ASHIDA and even OZAKI, but added another, SATO Naotake, one-time foreign minister, Ambassador to France, and Japan's representative to the League of Nations, and now a candidate for the House of Councillors. Of OZAKI he said that in spite of his age, this dean of Japanese parliamentarians fully understood him and stood by him even during the storm of abuse which broke over NARAHASHI last year.

Narahashi's Place in Politics: With NISHIO of the Social Democratic Party NARAHASHI said he had a full understanding, although there was no complete agreement on every issue. Although the Socialist Right Wing is in control of the party, the Left Wing had recently captured control of most of the local organizations. By seeking to win the support of "enlightened" labor groups, NARAHASHI said, the new party would lay the foundation for co-operation with the Social Democratic Party whose strength is also in its labor support. The election would give no party a clear majority, but place the new Democratic Party either first or second, under the revised election scheme. This would necessitate a coalition government in which the new party would have the balance of power, if not the primary position. Without mentioning himself as a possible Prime Minister, NARAHASHI quoted "old-timers" as stating, when he came back from his political seclusion, that "NARAHASHI will control Japanese politics." So far things had gone well, he said. The situation demanded a strong man. Japan's house had to be set in order before the signing of the peace treaty. Stable, enlightened government with that task in mind was his intention, the guiding principle in all his activities.

Conclusion: One cannot escape the impression that NARAHASHI is fully convinced of being Japan's "man of the hour," the leader whose keen vision and strength of purpose will bring Japan back to an honored place among the nations of the world. This sense of mission may somewhat explain an egocentrism and conceit which would otherwise be intolerable. NARAHASHI is unquestionably Japan's most vigorous political personality today. In spite of his Lincoln-complex, and maybe because of it, he charges the atmosphere with his confidence and decisiveness. He has galvanized the sickly Progressive Party to new life, and within three weeks transformed it into the most promising political party in Japan. If he can convey his self-assurance to the Japanese people they will quickly overcome their present malaise and get to work. His danger lies in over-eagerness and over-strong self-assertion. Last year's failure taught him some wisdom. Events will show whether the lesson was enough.

Pieter K. Roest
Chief, Political Affairs Division

Noted: C.L.K.

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APR 30 1947
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM: Moscow
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1685, Twenty-ninth

PRAVDA April 26 "on parliamentary elections in Japan" by M. Markov reviews April elections, stating under new constitution function of Chamber of Advisors is that of brake on Lower Chamber.

"Preparations for present parliamentary elections were held clearly in haste. The elections were announced in February immediately after General MacArthur had forbidden general strike being prepared by Japanese trade unions. A moment of special pressure on labor movement was considered favorable for holding new elections *** what paths does reactionary Liberal Party indicate for solution of economic crisis? This party is mostly concerned to preserve Japan's industrial war potential. The Japanese Liberals are strongly campaigning for a rapid establishment of "business" relations with American capital, in order to obtain a loan in USA for "restoration of Japan's economy" *** electoral program of another reactionary party - Democratic (recently established through merger of former Progressive Party with several groups of Liberal Party) - differs in nothing vital from program of Liberals *** real economic program of Japanese reactionaries contemplates a further offensive upon standard of living of Japanese workers while retaining economic positions of tycoons of trade and industry. As for domestic political program, it reduces fundamentally to a struggle against Communists; they apply label Communist to members of trade unions and to all democratic organizations generally *** reactionary parties understood that at parliamentary elections democratic forces would represent a far more dangerous opponent than in elections of 1946 *** Japanese Communist Party alone has grown ten times as large and now has around 70,000 members; membership of

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Socialist

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MAY 6 1947

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-2-, 1605, Twenty-ninth, from Moscow

Socialist Party is around 65,000; and trade unions and peasant unions have almost 6,000,000 members workers employees and peasants. Despite resolute protest of democratic parties, parliament on eve of its dissolution adopted amendments to electoral law which restored old system of "average" electoral districts in which henchmen of bourgeois - landlord parties who enjoy age-old political and business ties in localities and possess enormous funds to be used for bribery, have more chance of election *** dissolution of Progressive Party and formation of "Minseito" (Democratic) Party was another maneuver of Japanese reaction deliberately calculated for most acute moment in election campaign *** Yoshida Government has in every way assisted reactionary camp during election campaign. One of forms of such aid was artificially to slow down purge, *** Yoshida himself should have been disqualified as a person closely connected with Japanese imperialistic foreign policy.

However, he is looked upon as an extremely "suitable" political figure by those American circles which intend to consolidate their control over Japan and to use her as tool in their expansionist plans. And actually by all his policy, with every public speech Yoshida shows the American imperialist circles that they have someone on whom to rely in Japan, that Japanese reaction is ready for sake of preserving its position, to transform country into an American protectorate.

Alongside staging of wholesale campaign of slander against Communist Party and democratic organizations Japanese reaction has not been squeamish in using other means also in election struggle. Thus in a number of prefectures acts of terror took place against Communist candidates and agitators participating in election campaign *** chief tool of democratic forces against onslaught of reaction is to strengthen and broaden united democratic front. Despite refusal of leaders of Socialist Party to cooperate with Communists in election campaign, in districts a bloc of democratic organizations was formed, including Communists, Socialist, members of National Congress of Industrial Trade Union and Peasant Union. Main political slogans of democratic camp were: Democratization of country and

establishment

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-3-, 1605, Twenty-ninth, from Moscow

establishment of peoples government, unmasking of machinations of reaction dragging country backwards to police purge of state and public organizations of fascist and militarist elements *** democratic parties, as was case also at recent elections of administrative organs, upset calculations of reaction for complete victory which had been celebrated in advance. Thus in Chamber of Counselors candidates of democratic camp obtained 1/3 of all seats and this in spite of fact that 50% of voters did not participate in voting.

Department repeat Tokyo.

SMITH

Note: Repeated to Tokyo April 29, 7 p.m., CWO/FED.

DM:RB

PLAIN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

file
mm
May 12, 1947

~~Mr. Secretary:~~

Mr. Vincent submits for information a review of the recent Japanese elections.

Mr. Acheson has seen this.

C. H. Humelsine

Executive Secretariat
CHH;djb

Attachment: *gem*

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~FE~~ Mr. Vincent

TO FE - Mr. Vincent

DATE: April 29, 1947

FROM NA - Mr. Allison

SUBJECT: The Japanese Elections

The elections to the Japanese House of Representatives on April 25 returned 132 Liberals, 122 Democrats, 143 Socialists, 4 Communists and 65 minor party representatives and independents. Although the conservative Liberal and Democratic Parties, the parliamentary basis of the present Yoshida Government, thus retain a working majority if they continue to act together, the moderately leftish Social Democratic Party has markedly improved its position. The Communist Party lost two of the six seats it possessed in the last Diet.

The elections to the new upper house of the Diet, the House of Councillors, on April 20, returned 35 Liberals and 29 Democrats (out of a total membership of 250), plus 120 successful independent candidates of predominantly conservative stamp. The Socialists with their increased popular following achieved a plurality, winning 46 seats. The Communists elected 4.

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(Cabinet)
(Japan)

The character of the next Japanese government and future course of Japanese politics would appear to depend on whether the two conservative parties continue to work together or whether the Democrats, some of whose leaders are ideologically closer to the Socialists than to the Liberals, decide to work with the Socialists. The Democratic Party holds the balance of power in the current negotiations for the formation of the new Cabinet.

It is gratifying that the Japanese should have rejected the extreme left even more decisively than a year ago, while at the same time moving a step further away from the extreme right. The Socialist pluralities in both houses of the Diet, the third ranking position of the new right-centrist Democratic Party, and the poor Communist showing all indicate a strengthening of the moderate right and left over the extreme right and left.

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MAY 19 1947

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EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

London, May 2, 1947

AIR MAIL

UNCLASSIFIED

No. 798

Subject: Transmitting News Comment on Japanese Election

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DOP

BB
10/16
FE-enc
FC-enc
CID-enc

DIVISION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

MAY 19 1947

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OIC EUROPEAN AREA DIVISION (ADE)

JUN 6 - 1947

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Honorable Secretary of State, Washington

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose copies of editorials appearing in The Times and the Manchester Guardian on the subject of the Japanese elections.

The Times regards the election returns as a triumph for Japanese conservatives and as an unhappy augury for the future of democracy in Japan. The Guardian, on the other hand, interprets the election results as a "slight shift from Right to Centre," though leaving the "Conservative parties in power."

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Everett F. Drumright
Everett F. Drumright
First Secretary of Embassy

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED JUN 1 8 1947 OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED JUN 27 1947 DIVISION OF BIOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE

Enclosures:

- 1. Clipping from The Times, April 29, 1947
- 2. Copy of editorial from the Guardian, April 28, 1947

(Original and four copies to Department)
Copy to U.S. Political Adviser, SCAP, Tokyo

EFDrumright/wg

DCB NE Unit
B.P.T.

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PAPER: THE TIMES

NUMBER:

CITY: LONDON

DATE:

29 APR 1947

Democracy in Japan

April has been a month of elections in Japan. It began with the choice by popular vote of the prefectural governors and heads of towns and villages; it continued with the polling for the House of Councillors; and it has ended with the elections for the House of Representatives. Broadly speaking, the nature and the result of these three contests are hardly reassuring to those who held that the Japanese people would readily assimilate western democracy when they were afforded the opportunity of doing so. In the election of governors and mayors about half the total electorate, and more than half of the newly enfranchised women, did not trouble to go to the polls. The left wing or progressive candidates made a poor showing, and thirty-three of the former prefectural governors, nominated officials though they were, obtained large majorities. Similar apathy, with comparable results, characterized the elections for the House of Councillors which under the new constitution replaces the old nominated House of Peers. The Social Democrats made some gains, but on the whole the conservatives triumphed, and their control over the first popularly elected Upper House that Japan has known will be complete. For the election of the House of Representatives there was a keener contest. The Social Democrats, who formed the principal opposition to the present Government, put forward a programme of economic reform, including State control over such key industries as coal, iron and steel, and fertilizers. They secured 143 seats, but the Liberals and the Democrats, who rank as conservatives, command 259 seats between them, and as the Prime Minister is elected by a majority vote in the Lower House of 466 a conservative administration is to be expected. The Communists have suffered a decisive defeat all along the line, to which the frankly critical attitude of the Allied Command unquestionably contributed.

The result of these elections would no doubt be taken as a symptom of political stability in any country familiar with a system of western democracy. In Japan, accustomed to a totalitarian régime, the readiness of the electorate to be content with minor change is perhaps disquieting. It confirms the fear expressed recently by DR. EVATT in the foreign affairs debate at Canberra that the persons responsible for the past aggressions of Japan may not have been effectively excluded from political and economic influence. Irrefutable evidence has lately become available of the deliberate refusal of the Japanese Government to carry out allied instructions ordering a firm control of wages and prices and an equitable rationing of essential commodities. There have been evasions of the orders for ridding the administration of officials identified with the policy of aggression; and in recent meetings of the Allied Council the existence of something resembling a concerted

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No doubt GENERAL MACARTHUR is right in believing that the Japanese people cannot be expected to settle down to work their new constitution until a definite peace is concluded and until their relations with the outside world have been settled. At the moment they hardly know where they stand; and their reluctance, as shown in the elections, to commit themselves wholeheartedly to the uncharted waters of democracy is understandable. The recent decision to encourage the restoration of Japan's external trade by inviting some 400 business men from allied countries is a move in the right direction. If the Japanese people can be convinced that there is a prospect of restored commercial relations with the outside world, they may be encouraged to face the undoubted need for an effective regulation of their internal economy. Equal opportunities must be

given to all allied countries in the restoration of private trade. This requires the early reopening of British banks. Without their facilities there can be no satisfactory resumption of Anglo-Japanese commercial relations.

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 798 dated May 2, 1947,
from American Embassy, London, England.

Source: Manchester Guardian

April 28, 1947

JAPAN AT THE POLLS

In the Japanese election on Friday the Social Democrats increased their strength in the Lower House from 99 seats to 140. They thus replace the Liberals as the largest party, though the Liberals, with 137 seats, and the Democrats, with 124, still represent a Right-wing majority. This slight shift from Right to Centre has earned the paternal blessing of General MacArthur, who congratulated the Japanese on choosing a "moderate course sufficiently centred from either extreme to ensure the preservation of freedom and the enhancement of individual liberty." The question is whether the change will lead to a Government willing and able to enhance the regeneration of Japan and save her, in the first place, from social and economic disaster. According to a correspondent of the "Neue Zurcher Zeitung," the value of the yen, which was recently reduced from fourpence to a penny, is now little more than a farthing. Inflation has greatly encouraged Japanese exports, but it has naturally also sent the cost of living soaring. Strikes and general unrest among the workers are one result of this, though one hardly sees their effect in the election results. General MacArthur may well be relieved that the Communist party, which polled a million votes last year, has not made more ground than it has. The Government of Mr. Yoshida has been so lax in maintaining the firm control of wages and prices required by the Supreme Commander's own directive that even the Supreme Commander four weeks ago felt bound to call his protege sharply to order. The elections have left the Conservative parties in power. They will need something more dynamic than a "moderate course" to deal with the present situation. |||