Did you ever see through your Intelligence that type of advertising that was going on out in Hawaii in August of 1941? General Miles: I do not recall having done so, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Would it have excited your attention had you seen it, to learn that Lloyd's of London were offering a quick response for the sale of war risk and bombardment insurance to the people in Honolulu not later than August 26, 1941?

General Miles: I think it would have excited some interest, sir. Lloyd's were pretty sure that they were not going to be bombed.

Mr. Keefe: Well, I agree with you, General Miles; they are pretty smart operators. And would it have excited your interest had you read in the newspaper of August 13, 1944, the same newspaper, a statement of the local manager of Lloyd's as to the reason that they were offering this war risk and bombardment insurance to the citizens of Honolulu at that time?

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I cannot hear the gentleman.

The voice is going to the back and I would like to hear the voice so that I can hear the questions.

The Chairman: The chair did not think it made any difference which way the Congressman's voice went; it can be heard.

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Mr. Keefe: Well, I tried to raise it so that there would be no question about it, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: All right; go ahead.

Mr. Keefe: I am showing you this, General Miles, so that you can see from what I am about to quote.

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, on August 13, 1944 this article appeared in the Honolulu Advertiser. I will read a portion of it. (Reading)

"Twelve million dollars of war bombardment insurance has been sold in Hawaii, but the insurance was written not because of the fear of war but for possible sabotage, W. P. Brandt, Pacific Coast representative for Lloyd's of London, told the Star Bulletin today."

Would that have indicated to you as Chief of G-2, that action upon the part of Lloyd's of London, that they expected to excite some interest in the sale of their insurance because of the possibility that existed of sabotage out there?

General Miles: Yes, sir, but I would have wondered slightly how they could persuade anyb ody that that would be sabotage by bombardment.

Mr. Keefe: Well, I wondered exactly the same thing, because it is war risk and bombardment insurance, that is the ad that they put in the paper August 24th. If you had seen that

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would it have been significant to you at all as to what was going on out in Hawaii at this time?

General Miles: I do not think it would have told me anything that we did not already know, sir. Hawaii was a great outpost in the Pacific, as you have so ably stated before the committee, and in my years out there there were many times that we were fearing that war might come; they we re constantly worried, the American population, particularly the military, about the possibilities of Japanese subversive activities of all kinds. I am afraid that it would not have excited very much curiosity on my part to know that Lloyd's was trying to sell some of its goods out there under war risk.

Mr. Keefe: Well, as head of the G-2 did there ver come to your attention the so-called M-Day plan of the Yokohama Specie Bank on literature that was distributed to all their agents throughout the United States and the Hawaiian Islands?

General Miles: I do not recall that plan, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Did you ever hear that?

General Miles: I do not recall now hearing of it.

Mr. Keefe: As head of G-2 did you ever see the M-Day plan that was circulated throughout the United States to the agents of this Mitsuibushi outfit that was the big purchasing agent for Japan? I don't know whether that is the right name or not; that is as near as I can get to it, Mitsuibushi, or

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Questions by: Mr. Keefe

words to that effect?

General Miles: I do not recall, Congressman Keefe, having seen that.

"r. Keefe: Did you know that there was such an agency here in the United States, operating here?

General Miles: I have heard that name Mitsubbushi many times, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: You knew that they were purchasing airplanes and machine tools and everything else for Japan?

General Miles: We have all known that Japan was buying everything she could in this country.

Mr. Keefe: And that this outfit was one of the leading purchasing agents; you knew that, didn't you?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Did it ever come to your attention that in structions had come to all of their agents here in the United
States setting up a Jap specific M-day plan for the destruction of all of their correspondence, codes and all material
in 1941?

General Miles: No, sir, I have no recollection of ever having seen such a plan.

Mr. Keefe: And that the same M-day order directed from the Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd., to all of their agents in America, spoke about a full and complete detailed plain for

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the destruction of all their codes and the conversion of everything into cash? Did you ever hear of that as G-2?

General Miles: I have no recollection of ever having heard of that plan, sir.

Mr. Keefe: You never had any such information given to you by the FBI or the SEC or any other agency of government?

General Miles: I hesitated there because I do so clearly reme mber many talks with Mr. Hoover in our weekly meetings about the Japanese. I remember all of the joint operations that we went through, particularly in Southern California, on the Japanese question, but I do not recall having been told by the FBI of any such plan.

Mr. Keefe: Very well, we will try to get to it later by another witness.

The Chairman: Congressman Cooper, I believe, has some questions.

The Vice Chairman: General Miles, I would like to ask you one question if I may, please, with respect to magic or the intercepted Japanese messages.

As I recall, General Marshall testified we had finally reached the point during the war that about ten thousand people in this country and about thirty thousand people in England were required in the decrypting, decoding and translation of these messages. Did you happen to hear General

General Miles: I did, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Is that about in line with your recollection of that?

General Miles: Well, I had no recollection, Congressman Cooper. He was speaking of what happened at the very end of the war when I was not in any way in contact with the SIS or the Naval communications.

The Vice Chairman: You would not have any further information to give us on that point?

General Miles: No, sir. As to the growth of that activity I have no further information to give.

The Vice Chairman: That was my recollection, that he stated about ten thousand people in this country and about thirty thousend in England were at one time during the war required to handle this decoding and translating process of these intercepted Japanese messages and that is about your understanding?

General Miles: That is my recollection of what the General testified.

The Vice Chairman: Thank you.

The Chairman: It is four o'clock and I don t know how much longer it will require to conclude with General Miles, but if we could stay a few minutes longer and conclude with

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Questions by: Sen. Lucas

him it might be desirable to do so. Is the committee willing? The Vice Chairman: I think Senator Lucas has some questions, too.

Senator Ferguson: I have some, too.

The Chairman: What is the wish of the committee, to conclude with General Miles? Well, without objection we will go on for a few minutes. Go ahead, Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas: General Miles, I became rather curious about that pouch that the Congressman from Wisconsin was talking about a little while ago.

Have you got one of those pouches left down there in the Department where you sealed up these magic messages?

General Miles: I have not seen one for many years, sir, but I think they still have them.

Senator Lucas: What kind of a pouch was that? I would like to get a little more information on it. There seems to be a very much mooted question around here about the pouch. Just describe it to me if you can.

General Miles: Why, it was a brief case very similar to that, that we had made by Becker & Company, I think, here in Washington.

Senator Lucas: Becker & Company?

General Miles: Yes.

Senator Lucas: Where do Becker & Company live, or where

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

do they produce this, what city?

General Miles: They are a leather shop on Connecticut Avenue.

Senator Lucas: Right here in Washington?

The Chairman: They are on "F" Street.

Senator Lucas: Are you sure now that we are not on "F" Street? It is very important to find out just where Becker & Company 1s.

The Chairman: Haemmler & Buckley are on Connecticut but Becker is on "F" Street.

Senator Lucas: What kind of a key did that pouch have, General Miles?

General Miles: What, sir?

Senator Lucas: What kind of a key didthis pouch have ?

General Miles: Well, the point was to get two keys which were quite separate from any other two keys for each pouch. That was the only point about insuring that they had the proper pouches.

Senator Lucas: Do you still think you could find one of those things, one of those keys and one of those pouches and bring them up here before the committee so that we can inspect them?

General Miles: I will try to do so, sir.

Senator Lucas: I think it is very important to the de-

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

termination of this Pearl Harbor hearing and investigation, the type of pouch and the type of key you had at that particular tire and as one member of the committee I would like to have you bring it in if you can find it. I want to inspect it thoroughly because it will have a great deal to do with my final judgment, what kind of pouch and key you had at that particular time.

Now, General Miles, one more question or two that I want to ask you. As G-2 you had under your control all of the magic messages that care in and all other information of every type and character, irrespective of where it might come from, with respect to what was going on at that particular time in our relations in the Far East.

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: Now, I want to ask you this question based upon all of that information that you had: Did you as Chief of Staff possess any information prior to December the 7th definitely pointing to an attack upon Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Murphy: The gentleman described the witness as Chief of Staff.

Senator Lucas: I mean as G-2.

General Miles: I did not, sir.

Senator Lucas: Did you have any specific and advance information as to the precise hour or day that Japan would

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

attack this country or the British or the Dutch prior to the time that it happened?

General Miles: Only as what one might infer from the one o'clock ressage that we received on the 7th of December.

Senator Lucas: I am not asking for your inferences or your implications. I am asking you whether you had any specific and direct information?

General Miles: The answer is no, sir.

Senator Lucas: And what information that you obtained as head of G-2, which was practically all the Intelligence information of the country, was transmitted to -- not all of it, but the principal parts of it, or anything that you deemed important was transmitted on to the Chief of Staff?

General Miles: What is the question, sir?

Senator Lucas: I say any information that you obtained as head of the Intelligence Department of the War Department at that time, if you believed that it was important enough you saw that the Chief of Staff got that information?

General Miles: I did, sir.

Senator Lucas: And in turn the Chief of Staff saw that the Secretary of State or the President of the United States obtained that information?

General Miles: Presumably so.

Senator Lucas: And the Secretary of War as well?

General Miles: Presumably so.

Senator Lucas: I think that is all, Mr. Chairran.

The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson: General Miles, this may refresh your memory about this insurance. You were not able to see the Honolulu papers. Did you take the New York Times?

General Miles: Yes, sir, I personally took the New York Times. It was also taken by my Division.

Senator Ferguson: Well, on August the 25th, 1941, on page 8 of the New York Times the headline is:

"Lloyd's stops writing Hawaiian bomb insurance polloy," by the Associated Press.

"Honolulu, August 24th. Lloyd's of London has discontinued writing bombing insurance for this outpost of the United States Pacific defense. W. B. Brandt of San Francisco, Lloyd's Pacific Coast representative, said new insurance was being refused inot because of fear of war but because of possible sabotage. Rates on bomb insurance here have risen from 10 to 50 cents for a hundred dollars protection. Policies total more than ten million dollars, Mr. Brandt said."

Now, if you would have seen that and you knew that a note was delivered after the President returned from the Atlantic conference parallel with England's note, would that

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have been of any significance, that Lloyd's of London had stopped writing bomb insurance on Hawaii?

General Miles: Well, Senator, I knew, of course, which was cormon public knowledge, that in those years, particularly after the first blitz of London, there was a lot of insurance business done in war risk and borbing of all sorts.

That Lloyd's had offered borbardrent insurance in Hamaii and then had withdrawn the offer would not of itself have been particularly significant, only that they found certain people out there that would take up their bet and then when they recovered enough money they withdrew. I would certainly not have connected it with the rather secret message which the President of the United States had given on his return from Argentia to the Japanese admiral. I would certainly not have assured that that was known to Lloyd's.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know at that time that the British government was very close to Lloyd's and this was at a time that Mr. Churchill had returned from the conference?

General Miles: I had heard that the British government was pretty close to Lloyd's, yes, sir, but I did not know of my own knowledge and I do not remember ever suspecting that the British government turned over their rather important secrets about the results of a meeting with the President of the United States to Lloyd's. I certainly would not have

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

assured it without some definite knowledge.

Senator Ferguson: Well, as I understand it, you had no knowledge whatever about this Lloyd's stopped writing, as the headline says, Hawaii borb policies.

General Miles: I do not recall that at all.

Senator Ferguson: I think you ought to see this. I think it will just refresh your memory if you come and see it, the way it is written, right under the picture.

Does that refresh your memory in any way? It is in right under the picture that has, "Keeping the Soviet soldiers in touch with events."

General Miles: No, sir, I do not now recall either the picture or that particular article.

Senator Ferguson; Just one more question about the winds Was that in the purple code or the secret code ressage. messages, or was that in the so-called embassy code which was, as a remark had been made in the record, "even the Dutch could break." Did you ever hear that expression before, "Even the Dutch could break 1t"?

General Miles: I think I have, Senator. I do not remember, sir. I would have to look that up, Senator.

S enator Ferguson: Well, would you do that and find out on that?

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

General Miles: That is the wind code message? Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Miles: The two of them?

Senator Ferguson: Yes. Do you know whether or not there was any sabotage at all at or after the attack in the Hawallan Islands?

General Miles: After or befor e? Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Miles: I believe that there was very little sabotage. I might note, however, that, Senatoro from my point of view I was not talking only of sabotage. You will notice that in my G-2 message I spoke of subversive activities which includes sabotage and espionage.

Senator Ferguson: Is that all you included under that? General Miles: Well, propaganda to destroy the loyalty or morale of our troops, any other subversive activity but principally sabotage and espionage.

S enator Ferguson: Did you spend more time on that than you did on the other magic, and so forth, your department? Did they spend more time on espionage and counter espionage, and so forth, rather than on the magic?

General Miles: Well, magic, Senator, as, of course, you know, was only one part of our Intelligence branch, the branch that was charged with getting information and collat-

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

information, analyzing it and distributing it.

The other big branch of the Military Intelligence Division was counter-intelligence. I think we spent more time, however, and devoted more effort on the getting of information and its final distribution than on the counter-intelligence as we call it; in other words, the prevention of subversive activities of all kinds against the United States.

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Witness Miles

Senator Ferguson Questions by: Mr. Gesell

Senator Ferguson: How many people had you in the magic department at the time of Pearl Harbor?

General Miles: I cannot tell you accurately, sir. Colonel Bratton undoubtedly can when he comes to the stand.

Senator Ferguson: That is all.

The Vice Chairman: Does counsel have any further questions? Mr. Gesell: Just a few questions, Mr. Chairman, to straighten one or two matters in the record.

You have been asked, General Miles, whether the reference to sabotage in General Short's reply to General Marshall's message would have resulted if that message had been routed to you as a matter of course.

You recall that message says, "Report department alerted to prevent sabotage." Would not that reply be routed to you?

General Miles: The reply was not routed to me. The reply was routed, undoubtedly, by whoever handled it, which I never knew, by number.

In other words, it was a reply to a numbered telegram of the War Department and the reply was sent to that division of the General Staff, in this case the Chief of Staff, who had signed the original message.

Mr. Gesell: Now with respect to sabotage, do you know of any acts of sabotage that were committed at Hawaii before or during the attack by any Japanese-American or Japanese

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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aliens on the Island?

General Miles: I do not, sir.

Mr. Gesell: With respect to the question of whether or not you were ordered by General Marshall not to send magic to the field, there is a contradiction, I believe, in the testimony between you and General Marshall. I understood you to say General Marshall ordered you not to send magic to the field, and I understand General Marshall to say you were authorized to send magic to the field as long as you did not send it in the form of a directive command.

What is the fact in regard to that?

General Miles: I do not think, sir, that I did testify that I was ever ordered by General Marshall not to send magic to the field. If I did, I was certainly wrong.

Mr. Gesell: I may have misunderstood you.

General Miles: What I did testify to was General Marshall's very keen interest, as well as my own, to preserve the secret of magic, and I felt sure he wanted it limited to as few people as possible, that really had to get the information that magic was conveying.

Mr. Gesell: So that we understand it clearly, there was no order of General Marshall, or anyone superior to you, written or oral, which prevented you from sending the summary or gist of the magic message to the field?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

General Miles: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Now one other matter I think we should clarify.

You have been questioned at some length as to whether or not you knew of certain messages which President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull handed to the Japanese Ambassadors. It is a fact, is it not, that those messages, the formal messages that appeared in the various publications we have here, when they were transmitted by Secretary Hull or President Roosevelt to the Japanese, were in turn submitted by the Japanese to their government through magic?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: And that as a result of reading magic
you knew at that time of every message that was handed by
Secretary Hull or President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassadors'

General Miles: There again, sir, I question whether I have ever testified that I did not know of diplomatic exchanges between the United States Government and the Japanese Government or the Japanese Ambassadors here. If I have given that impression I certainly regret it.

I did know it through my liaison with the State Department in general terms. I did know it on the Japanese side through magic.

What I did testify to, Counsel, was that I was not in

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

the group or called in for consultation or discussion by the group of higher policy-making individuals of the Government as between themselves and with the President of the United States.

Mr. Gesell: I was not referring to that testimony. I recall specifically your testimony in response to a question by Senator Ferguson that you did not know of the oral message handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador in August of 1941, referred to sometimes here as the parallel action.

That was reported, was it not, in magic at the time by the Japanese Ambassador to his Government in Tokyo? General Miles: That was, sir.

Mr. Gesell: And is it not a fact, General Miles, that all persons who were on the list to read magic, through that source saw all of the diplomatic exchanges, the formal diplomatic exchanges between this Government and Japan that were going on during these negotiations?

General Miles: It is a fact that we saw all the exchanges as viewed in the Japanese eyes. Those messages which the Japanese repeated verbatim to their Government we read verbatim in magic.

Mr. Gesell: That is my point.

Ganeral Miles: Exactly.

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Questions by: Mr. Gesell

Mr. Gesell: In other words, that formal communication was handed to the Japanese by our Government and they sent it verbatim to Tokyo and you, and others who read magic, read that message?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Now with respect to the question of intercepting Japanese messages at Manila, do I understand your testimony to be this, that you now know there were, with the Navy at the Philippines, facilities for reading Japanese intercepts, but that at Manila, as far as you now understand it, Manila was able to decode only those messages which Manila itself intercepted. Is that a correct statement?

General Miles: That I do not know, sir, whether they were confined to only the messages which they themselves had intercepted. I testified originally that so far as I knew, or perhaps I made it positive because I wanted to be positive whenever I could, the only decoding, decrypting facilities that we, the Army, had, or the Navy had, were in Washington. Then when I was confronted by General MacArthur's affidavit to Colonel Clausen, which I had never seen before, in which he said he was receiving magic, I thereupon asked my ex-Naval colleague at that time, the head of ONI, "how about this?" He told me that was true, that they had a secret naval cryptographic section for the service of the Fleet and it was

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

lodged in Corregidor. I did not go into the question of what codes they could break, or what messages they could break.

Mr. Gesell: For the information of the committee,

Commander Leitweiler, or Captain Leitweiler -- I forget what

his rank was -- is on our list of witnesses. He was in charge

of that unit in the Philippines, and I think he can give the

information to the committee that you are seeking on that

point.

With respect to the question of Japanese ship movement,
I think Congressman Keefe inadvertently referred to the fact
that you obtained information concerning Japanese ship movements from magic.

That is not true, is it? The information concerning Japanese ship movements came from special radio direction finders that the Navy had, which was distinct from magic? Is that not a fact?

General Miles: That is true, sir. There may have been some reference to ship movements in magic, but the great mass of information which Naval Intelligence was accumulating on the Japanese Navy and on Japanese merchant ships came from radio intercepts.

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Mr. Gesell: Now, on page 2470 of the record you were asked a question by Senator Ferguson to this effect

"You knew that the Navy had a high-powered radio that you could have reached Havaii with," referring to the event I believe, of the 7th,, and you said, "I think I did, yes, sir."

Did you have any knowledge as to whether or not that radio was in fact able to communicate with Hawaii on the morning of the 7th, or did you mean only to testify that you knew the Navy had the radio station?

General Miles: The latter, sir. I think that is the question.

Mr. Gesell: Now, at page 2437 of the record, referring to the 14th part, you said, "It has been delivered to the recipients about coincidentally with its delivery to me."

Do you know that as a fact of your own knowledge, that the 14th part was delivered to the recipients at the same time it was delivered to you?

General Miles: Not of my own knowledge, sir, because I did not deliver it to the other recipients, or see it delivered to the other recipients.

When did Colonel Bratton tell you that Mr. Gesell: he had called General Marshall on the morning of the 7th? General Miles: I cannot place that hour, except it was

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Witness Miles Questions by: Mr. Gesell Sen.Ferguson fairly early on the morning of the 7th.

Mr. Gesell: Did he tell you when he had called, what time he called?

General Miles: I do not remember that he told me what time he called.

Mr. Gesell: That is all.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Senator Ferguson?

Senator Ferguson: I would like to clear up something. Would you show us the magic in the book, Exhibit 1, that sent the message of the 17th of August?

Mr. Gesell: That is not in the book, Senator Ferguson. You will recall when that exhibit was introduced, we called the committee's attention to the fact that we had not reproduced the formal documents that had been exchanged between the Government, inasmuch as they were printed in the official publications of the Department of State.

Senator Ferguson: General Miles, did not you say that you got the interpretation of the Ambassador to the message that was delivered to him on the 17th of August, 1941, from magic, in the last questions here from Mr. Gesell?

General Miles: I think not, Senator. What I did say was that whenever the Japanese ambassadors in Washington transmitted notes or conversations or documents received

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from the American Government to Japan through magic that I saw it in magic.

Senator Ferguson: All right.

Now, what I want to know is where is that magic that transmitted the message of the 17th? There were two messages on that day, the 17th of August, 1941. You were asked here by Mr. Gesell whether or not those messages did not come to your attention, and the interpretation of them, through magic, and you answered "yes."

Now, I show you Exhibit 1, and ask you where that information is.

General Miles: I would have to look that up. I have just been told by Mr. Gesell that it has not been published in Exhibit No. 1, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Then how could you answer his question that you did get it by magic? Do you have a special recollection that you got those messages by magic?

General Miles: Not at all, sir. I believe I testified, and I believe Mr. Gesell's question was to the
effect: Did I receive, from my reading of magic, information
that the Japanese were transmitting, as they were being sent
by the Japanese ambassadors to the Japanese Government.
That was the general question, and not specific as to the
massage on August 17. Was that not your question?

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Senator Ferguson: Will you bring in tomorrow morning the magic that went out covering those two messages delivered on the 17th of August, 1941?

Mr. Gesell: That is exactly right.

I will ask you this question in relation to Colonel

Bratton and the Navy Radio. Did you hear General Marshall
in a statement saying something to the effect that that
radio had been offered on that day, and declined; that the
Navy radio was offered and declined?

General Miles: I heard General Marshall's testimony to that effect, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you ever know that?

General Miles: I do not remember ever to have known it.

I heard one side of the telephone conversation between

General Marshall and Admiral Stark. I know nothing of

what Admiral Stark said to General Marshall, except what

General Marshall told us at the time Admiral Stark had

told him.

Senator Ferguson: Did he mention that he had been offered the Navy radio and declined it?

General Miles: I am very sure that he did not.

Senator Ferguson: Then you haven't any knowledge as to why the radio station of the Navy, which was a higher-powered station than yours, was not used?

Witness Miles Questions by: Senator Ferguson General Miles: I have no knowledge of that fact, sir, h5 at all. Senator Ferguson: Is there anything in the Army's 4 record () of the you could not raise the Army radio that morning? G General Miles: I do not know, Senator. Senator Ferguson: Will you look it up and bring in that 8 information? Mr. Gesell: Colonel French is going to testify to that, 10 Senator. He is with the Communications Office. 11 Senator Ferguson: I want to know if there are any records. 12 You will look and see and bring that in if there are any? 13 General Miles: They would be in the Signal Corps, sir. 1.1 Mr. Mitchell: Cannot we wait until we get some Signal 15 Corps witnesses? 16 17 17th. 18 Mr. Gesell: We will bring it in for you. 19 Senator Ferguson: All right. 20

Senator Ferguson: I would like to have the magic on the

The Chairman: Is that all?

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Senator Ferguson: That is all.

The Chairman: General, is there any other information in your knowledge pertinent to this inquiry about Pearl Harbor that has not been elicited by the questions asked of you at

this inquiry that you would like to give to the committee?

General Miles: Senator, at the risk of taking up too much of the committee's time, I was asked by a Senator, or a member of the committee, if I had been investigated by any agent of the Secretary of War, or the Chief of Staff. I would like to answer that question very definitely, "no."

Also questions were asked me as to my relief as G-2 in connection with Pearl Harbor. I am perfectly willing to rest that matter on the testimony of the Chief of Staff, adding solely that I did nave the honor and pleasure of serving as an Assistant Chief of Staff to General Marshall something between two and three times as long as any other officer served as head of one of the General Staff's departments while I was there.

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Witness Miles

The Chairman: Anything further?

General Miles: Nothing further, sir.

The Chairman: Well, the committee thanks you, General, for your very cooperative effort to bring out the information which the committee seeks, and the committee appreciates it very much.

On behalf of the committee, I thank you.

General Miles: Thank you, sir.

The Chairman: Before we recess, the Chair has obtained, through the courtesy of Senator Walsh, Chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, two volumes of information called, "A Narrative Statement of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigation," consisting of volumes 1 and 2. This narrative was prepared at the suggestion of the Committee on Naval Affairs for its benefit. Senator Walsh has been kind enough to furnish enough of these to provide each member of the committee with one, that is, one set of two volumes each. They are marked "Confidential", but they are not confidential, and therefore they are public property now.

The Chair asks that they be distributed to each member of the committee at this time, so that they may have the benefit of them for their perusal. I think there may be two or three sets in my office that the press might use, if they wish.

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The committee will recess until 10:00 o'clock tomorrow. (Whereupon, at 4:35 o'clock p.m., the committee recessed until 10:00 o'clock a.m., of the following day, Friday, December 14, 1945.)