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	FROM	DATE	TO	SYNOPSIS
		<u>1945</u>		
A		25 Oct		Japanese Officials Committing Suicide since Aug 1, 1945
B	GS	9 Nov	D C/S	Organizational Reports
C		14 Nov		Professors in Exile
		<u>1946</u>		
1	ESS/LA	1 Mar	GS	Request for Memorandum
		<u>1947</u>		
2	OIC	11 Aug		Eta in Public Office
3	GS	21 Nov	CI & E	Public Opinion Survey
4	GS	25 Nov		Weekly Report on the Political Situation as seen by the Liberal Party.
		<u>1948</u>		
5	Hiremito, Ku- mazawa	20 Feb	Sebald	An Appeal with regard to Establishing a provisional Gov't of Rep. form in Japan.
6				Dissolution of the Home Ministry

Politics

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Dissolution of the Home Ministry

The Law Abolishing the Home Ministry enacted by the Diet on 8 December provided for abolition of that once powerful agency of the Japanese Government on 31 December 1947.

The date will be a significant one in Japanese history, marking the end of an organ which had long been an instrument of oppression for the Japanese people. An agency similar to Home Ministry existed as early as 649 A.D. Its position was established more definitely in 1868 with the Meiji Restoration, when it became the most important ministry of government as created by the Meiji Constitution.

For a period of seventy-five years, because of its extremely extensive powers, the Home Ministry held a peculiarly important place in Japanese life. The police bureau alone, controlling every phase of Japanese domestic economy, dominated the daily living of every family in Japan. The Home Ministry,

moreover, by its former power to appoint and to remove prefectural governors, to discipline mayors and headmen, and to allot or to withhold funds, dictated to each small community in Japan exactly what should or should not be done. Its army of inspectors, local agents and secret investigators held each local government and subdivision wholly at the mercy of the all-powerful Home Minister in Tokyo.

Much of this strict control was stripped away by provisions of the new Constitution whereby local autonomy became possible and whereby voters in each town and prefecture gained the right to select and to dismiss their own officials. More of the centralized dictatorship was taken away by various reform laws passed since the surrender.

Much, however, remained to be done. Laws and practices dating back prior to the Meiji Restoration had developed the Home Ministry with a certain amount of authority not legally conferred but exercised through custom and tradition. Even more important

was the complexity of the extra-legal powers, the general prestige and the traditional deference that had gathered about the office of the Home Ministry and about the individual who at any time held the post of Minister. Next to the War and Navy Ministers, the Home Minister represented to the average Japanese the very essence of Imperial authority.

The abjectness of Japanese in approaching even the humblest Japanese policeman and the haughty arrogance of the latter in dealing with a common citizen was remarked upon by every observant pre-war visitor to Japan. This attitude had been typical of the privileged positions of the Home Ministry in Japanese affairs.

Home Ministry autocracy sprang not only from laws and practices whereby that ministry dictated virtually every detail of Japanese daily life but arose also from the fact that Home Ministry personnel was extraordinarily trained and thoroughly disciplined. The Home Ministry clique has been well known in Japan.

This clique operated not only as an administrative unit but also as a politically conscious group of career men who welded themselves together into a compact and, for control purposes, efficient organization.

To name Home Ministers would be to list, with few recent exceptions, the most anti-democratic, tyrannical figures in Japanese public life. From Yamagata to Shingawa, from Admiral Kabayama to Admiral Saigo, from Prince Katsura to Hara, they engaged in suppressing all democratic movements in Japan and served as the glue to bind the dominant economic clique to the militarists.

For many years the Home Ministry has been the special preserve of a coterie of leaders who, in the past, owed allegiance to the late Prime Minister Takashi Hara, organizer and administrator of the Tokyo city political machine familiarly known as "Japan's Tammany Hall." More recently, especially since the assassination of Prime Minister Hara in 1921, this faction has been under the control of Ichiro Hatoyama, prior to his purge

last year, leader of the Liberal party. Hatoyama's removal did not entirely remove the Hatoyama influence from within the ranks of the Home Ministry.

During the interval between Hara and Hatoyama the names of those who served as Home Minister indicate the manner in which the Cabinet portfolio has been used to further certain undesirable practices.

X Under the militaristic Terauchi Cabinet (1915-1918) Viscount Shimpei Goto held the post of Home Minister. Goto was known as a close associate of politicians who used their posts to extort commercial and financial advantage. As a later governor-general of Formosa, Goto was notorious for the way in which big business interests exploited the Chinese population. As Home Minister, his regime was marred by frequent contract scandals and by the use of the police for the control of elections.

Goto was succeeded by Rentaro Mizuno, another practical politician, who in 1918, gave way to Takejiro Tokonami, disciple

of Hara and heir to the Tammany Hall regime which Hara set up. The Home Ministry, particularly in conjunction with the city affairs of Tokyo, became a center for political manipulation. The Tokonami group of politicians then entrenched in power has continued until the present day. It was under Tokonami's regime that Hatoyama gained a firm foothold within the Home Office.

Another of Tokonami's close political associates was the late Mitsura Toyama, head of the notorious Black Dragon Society.

Tokonami, Goto and Mizuno constituted a triumvirate who, from 1915 to 1924, monopolized the Home Ministry under eight different Prime Ministers.

In 1924 a supposed reform administration brought in Reijiro Wakatsuki, later Prime Minister, but Wakatsuki gave way after only a year and a half to Yuko Hamaguchi, later Prime Minister, and to Kenzo Adachi, master political manipulator. Adachi, known as the "King of politics," frankly used the Home Ministry for political patronage and for the strengthening of his machine.

With the exception of the period during which the notorious General Giichi Tanaka, author of the "Memorial," held office concurrently with the Foreign Ministership, Adachi remained in power for nearly five years. This was during the so-called liberal-minded period when Japanese parliamentary government was strongest. It was largely owing to Adachi's corrupt bureaucratic control of the Home Ministry that Japan's pre-war democratic processes and the Japanese political party system fell into disrepute.

In December 1931, under the Seiyukai administration of the late Tsuyoshi Inukai, the Prime Minister himself held the Home Ministry post concurrently for a short time but, after Inukai's assassination in the February 1932 affair, Kisaburo Suzuki, yet another of the political managers, succeeded to the portfolio.

A series of comparatively unimportant Home Ministers followed, among them Fumio Goto, son of Shimpei, but beginning 9 May 1936 with the coming into power of the pre-militarist Prime Ministers, including

Koki Hirota, General Seijuro Hayashi, and Kiichiro Hiranuma (all currently on trial as war criminals), the Home Ministry became a mere appendage of the War Ministry. Among such holders of the portfolio were Admiral Nobumasa Suyetsugu and General Hideki Tojo.

Not one of the Home Ministers from the time of Reijiro Wakatsuki in 1926 until the surrender period made any move to use the undoubted powers of the Home Ministry for democratic or for progressive purposes. Instead, even during the period when Wakatsuki himself was in power, the Home Ministry sponsored such repressive legislation as the Peace Preservation Law.

The innergroup of Home Ministry officials, installed by Hara and continuing until subsequent years, political bosses had close associations with public works contractors, terroristic organizations, black marketeers and operators in commercialized vice and crime. Ordinary office-holders of the Home Ministry did

not, of course, participate in the contract awards nor did they grant the protection afforded such illicit operations, nor, as a general rule did the Home Minister himself direct such activities nor profit by them even if he were aware of the abuses practiced in his name, but the same sinister forces which controlled the activities of the officials and of the Home Minister reaped commissions, extorted bribes and manipulated public activities.

The close personal and political association governing the activities of the Home Office were reinforced by the growth within the Home Ministry, as within all other branches of the Japanese Government, of a highly specialized and closely knit bureaucratic group.

To many Japanese the term bureaucracy implied pre-eminently the Home Ministry itself.

Bureaucracy, always, even prior to the Meiji Restoration, the curse of the Japanese Government, has been furthered by special practices inherent in the Home Ministry organization.

Particularly since the surrender, Japanese civil service reformers and other Japanese striving toward democracy have sought to introduce new concepts into Japan only to find themselves opposed by the entrenched bureaucracy.

The term bureaucracy does not necessarily include all the scores of thousands of minor Home Ministry employees, such as policemen, firemen and office clerks. It does refer to a relatively small and well-integrated nucleus of several hundred high-level officials, principally stationed in Tokyo and before the Local Autonomy Laws in prefectural capitals, who, since the Meiji Restoration have dominated the administrative machinery of the Home Ministry.

The heart of this bureaucracy was, in the Japanese police state, centered in the Home Ministry.

The greatest defects of these officials as public servants flowed from the fact that they constituted a tightly knit professional class interested quite as much, if not more, in the promotion of their own special interests as in the furtherance of national affairs.

Regarding themselves as professional men, they constituted a career clique who alone were familiar with all the intricate laws, regulations and ordinances determining the course of public business. Pre-occupied with the letter of those rules and regulations rather than with the execution of true public service, their administration has been routine and deadening to initiative and to the development of democracy.

The Japanese Home Ministry bureaucrat, as a member of a special privileged class, has been intensively narrow-minded. Carefully selected for his work, he has been educated for his career in certain bureaucratically-minded schools which in the past enjoyed a virtual monopoly in training officials. He then passed an examination set by bureaucrats, after which his personal qualifications for entering public service were scrutinized by other bureaucrats. Once accepted in the fraternity, his contacts, socially and officially, were almost exclusively with the bureaucratic class. This close professional inbreeding was intensified not only by education but by experience.

Trained not in public administration but in routine procedure, the bureaucrat had little specific preparation for the post he was to fill and little sympathy with those associates who, outside the narrow bureaucratic circle, might possess special knowledge or special skill. Although the bureaucratic official may have worked in various fields, he did so not because of technical training as police expert, local government expert, domestic relations expert, reconstruction expert, or in any other single capacity but because he had a knowledge of the administrative process controlling any or all of these departments of home Ministry responsibility. For this reason he might be, and often was, transferred freely from one of these activities to another, regardless of the efficiency of operations. He was concerned only with the smooth functioning of the bureaucratic machinery.

The Home Ministry bureaucrat, therefore, developed a strong class consciousness at the same time that he came to feel increasing contempt for the rights and interests of those not members of his own small circle.

Technically the Home Ministry official acted with extreme care not to overstep his proper sphere of authority nor to disobey any single rule or regulation. Each document drafted in accordance with accepted and prescribed patterns, followed a set and tedious channel. This caused innumerable delays, especially where as many as twenty seals and signatures were required to approve even a comparatively unimportant matter.

His promotion to a better office, as well as his retention of whatever post he held, depended upon his ability to follow precedent and to pay proper deference to the hierarchy in control.

All this caused inertia to change either in the theory or the practice of government and the endless official repetition of stereotyped bromides of political pseudoscience.

Few, if any bureaucrats, wither within the Home Ministry or in any government department, understood that government should be conducted as an instrument of public service. Nurtured on the concepts that the government is all important, that the authority of the state is unchallengable and that the government alone,

and the Home Ministry in particular, knows what is good for the people, the Home Office petty autocrat, looked upon himself as the inviolable agent of an infallible Emperor.

Under the new Constitution, with the government subservient to the wishes of the people, this concept became anachronistic. By the exact terms of the democratic document, the bureaucratic regime came to a close. Instead of being masters of the people, bureaucrats became their servants.

This, however, was a concept that the Home Ministry proved not only unwilling but also unable to comprehend. Sensing threats to their continued monopoly on experience, knowledge and tradition, they would have worked to sabotage as far as possible the revolutionary changes required under the new dispensation. Attempts by outright action, or more subtly by evasion and delay to undermine the smooth transfer of power from the national government to the local areas, and to retain

within the framework of the new Constitution as much as possible of the spirit of the outworn ultranationalistic charter would have marked the efforts of the Home Ministry to retain its former domination over the lives and liberties of the people. But the first new Cabinet under the new Constitution nipped administrative sabotage in the bud within a month after its accession to office by its bold, swift, courageous action in proposing the liquidation of the citadel of centralized bureaucracy.

Desire to further decentralize government and to afford increased democracy in Japan brought about a Cabinet decision on 27 June of this year to recommend the abolition of the Home Ministry, with transfer of many of its functions to local bodies and the removal of all other duties to various governmental agencies. A bill for this purpose was introduced in the Diet on 21 November; it was passed by the House of Representatives on 28 November, and approved by the House of Councillors on 8 December.

The Law Abolishing the Home Ministry complements the transfer of powers in effect by other recent legislation enacted during the First National Diet. The Local Autonomy Law took the control of local affairs from the hands of the central government by granting local autonomy to the prefectural, city, town and village governments. A sweeping reorganization of the police and judicial systems, including the complete decentralization of the national police force and the establishment of an Attorney General's Office further reorganized other former important functions and responsibilities of the Home Ministry.

The law transfers the remaining functions of the Home Ministry to other agencies created by appropriate legislation enacted by the Diet.

A Construction Board has been formed by amalgamating the Home Ministry's Public Works Bureau and the War Damage Rehabilitation Board. The law establishing the Construction Board was enacted by the Diet on 8 December. The agency is attached to the Prime Minister's office.

The National Election Management Commission, also under the Prime Minister, will handle the administration of all elections.

A Local Finance Committee was created by a law enacted by the Diet on 1 December. Operating at Cabinet level, this committee is charged with the responsibility of drafting a plan of local taxation which will be used as the basis for future legislation.

The remaining functions of the dissolved Home Ministry will be assumed by a provisional Domestic Affairs Bureau, with a secretariat made up of three members, a State Minister, one appointed from among representatives of local bodies, and one designated from among Diet members. This committee will exercise such powers as will remain under the jurisdiction of the Local Affairs Bureau of the Home Ministry after the transfer of Home Ministry powers to other agencies.

Beginning on 1 January 1948, one of the most important duties to be assumed by this temporary Domestic Affairs Bureau is jurisdiction over the police system during the 90-day transitional period, as provided by the new Police Reorganization Law. By 7 March 1948, the end of the 90-day transitional period, a National Public Safety Commission and Local Public Safety Commissions will have assumed all police responsibilities.

Also, according to the 90-day provision, the Prime Minister, through the Domestic Affairs Bureau, is permitted to retain control of police activities, including the enforcement of economic controls.

On 26 December, the government announced the appointment of two Democratic Party members of the government to key administrative posts created to take over certain functions of the dissolved Home Ministry: Kozaemon Kimura, incumbent Home Minister, to become President of the Construction Board, and State Minister Giichi Takeda to become Chairman of the Local Finance Committee.

The Cabinet session on the same day also decided to appoint Keizo Hayashi, at present chief of the Local Government Bureau of the Home Ministry, as Director of the provisional Domestic Affairs Bureau.

A simple ten-minute ceremony wound up the seventy-five year history of the Home Ministry. At noon on 27 December, 1,400 officials of the Ministry heard farewell addresses by Minister Kimura and Vice-Minister Mikio Suzuki.

FILE UNDER: POLITICS

I N D E X S H E E T

DATE: " 20 Feb. 1948

FROM: HIROMITO, KUMAZAWA TO: SEBALD

SUBJECT: An Appeal with regard to establishing a provisional gov't
of republican form in Japan

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER: CLASSIFIED FILE:

Letters from Japanese Individuals

5

Political

*Rec'd
Pol off Div.
26 Nov. 1947.*

Weekly Report on the Political
Situation, as seen by the Liberal
Party

Japan Liberal Party
November 25, 1947.

Reasons for the deadlock of the Proceedings of Business during a four-day period from the 22nd to 25th of November.

There have been many important factors which have made difficult a smooth progress of the proceedings of business in the House of Representatives. But one of the most important factors, in our view, was the appearance of an entirely new situation ----- a situation which has been brought about by an attempt on the part of the Government Parties to disregard the system of an Inter-Party Conference, which has as a longly-observed practice made such a contribution to the progress of deliberations within the House and to rush their wishes through either a sudden move or proposal at a plenary session of the House in order to compel the opposition Parties to make a hurried decision all at once without any time to consider it in advance.

At

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At the plenary session of the 22nd of November, the Government Parties suddenly introduced an urgent move, which demanded that the deliberation over the Bill be finished by the Coal-mining Industry Committee during the morning of the 24th and a report thereon be made by the Chairman of the Committee at a plenary meeting scheduled to be opened at one p.m. on the same day and its decision be made before any other move. When that move of the Government Parties was about to be considered by the House, the President Matsuoka of the House of Representatives, disregarding all established practices, fixed high-handedly the time limit of each debater to only 20 minutes. And as soon as Mr. Kanda's time limit was up, although his speech was still progressing, the President took a high-handed action, by ordering Mr. Kanda to get out of the floor with the forcible assistance of 10 odd guards.

More than that, in taking a vote on the move of the Government Parties, the President has also broken all precedents and made an arbitrary decision without any legal background. Namely, by making an announcement at his own discretion without being assisted by any provision of the Diet Law and the Rules of the House, the President went to the extremity of limiting the time allocated for voting to not more than 30 minutes after taking the roll-call. Thus, without giving the members present enough time to consider this important move introduced in such a rush manner, as soon as the voting time limit set by

his

his own decision was up, the President took a stern action by ordering the guards to intercept those members who were going to vote from polling and close the ballot-box, thereby rejecting 34 members to vote.

On the following day, that is, on the 23rd (Sunday), the Inter-Party Conference remained still uncalled. However, as for the Supplementary Budget Bill and the Economic Power Decentralization Bill, both of which were placed on the agenda of the day, the proceedings of deliberations thereon went in an extremely smooth manner, because they had already been subjected to full discussion and study at the standing Committees respectively from both the Government and opposition Parties.

Then came the noon of the 24th, the dead-line designated by the "supreme" decision of the House, when the Coal-mining Control Bill was supposed to have been completely deliberated on at the Coal-mining Industry Committee for submission to the plenary meeting of the House. As regards Chairman Ito of the said Committee, however, he let the precious time pass by idly for one and a half days, that is, for one full day on the 23rd and on the morning of the 24th, without entering into discussion of the measure at all. Rather, he tried to suppress the Committee with regard to matters outside the Bill in a manner to show that as if he had been a supervisor of the Committee, not a manager, as he should be. Thus, the present Bill was entirely abandoned. This action of the Chairman runs directly counter to the

dictate

dictate of the House's decision. It was only natural, therefore, that such high-handed attitude on the Part of the Chairman in complete disregard of the House's decision, should have given impetus to the prevalence of a dangerous atmosphere on the floor, by working ill upon the conscience of many Members with a willingness to respect justice and righteousness. Thus, a great number of the Members

Thus, a great number of the Members who respect the logical sequence began to advocate beyond the differences of their belonging to the Government or the opposite parties that "the Committee in charge should be requested to finish its examination on the bill first and after that a Committee's report should be made in the plenary session of the House".

At length, the Liberal Party together with other opposite parties submitted to the Secretariate a bill for a vote of non-confidence in the President of the House Mr. Matsuoka on the 23rd, and at the same time made up ~~their~~ mind to establish ^{their} ~~its~~ attitude of non-confidence toward the Committee Chairman Mr. Ito also.

On the 24th day, when all Members entered the floor and the House was going into session, the representatives of the two parties happened to go into an unexpected and hot dispute as to which bill should be taken up first before the session, a bill for a vote of non-confidence in the President of the House submitted by the Liberal Party or a bill for a vote of

confidence

confidence in the President submitted by the Government parties, since there were no Inter-Party Conference held about it. The wranglings have lasted for nearly two hours, but no conclusion was attained on the Floor of the House. Amidst the above circumstances, all members were sitting and waiting for the opening of the plenary session without a recess. Finally, the Inter-Party Conference was to be held in the room traditionally used for its purpose long before. The Inter-Party Conference had been suspended since the 20th day inst.

In the meantime, while the Secretary-General of the House Mr. Oike and the Vice-President Mr. Tanaka were earnestly trying to mediate between the two parties at the Inter-Party Conference, at about half past eleven o'clock the Social Democratic Party suddenly caused the President Mr. Matsuoka to announce on the Floor that "to-day's meeting should be adjourned and a Committee report on the Coal Mining Control Bill would be made in the plenary session scheduled to be held at the usual hour to-morrow." Thus, the meeting rose immediately after his announcement. It was a matter of regret that the above announcement set the necessary procedures at naught and might be said to be another mistake made by the President.

The following points were the reasons for presenting a vote of non-confidence in the President Matsuoka by the Liberal Party and other Opposition parties.

1. Disregarding the existence of the long established practices concerning Inter-Party Conference, the President intentionally averted to open the conference and proceeded with the business solely in confirmity with the requests presented by the Social Democratic Party and the Government parties.

2. An authority to set the time-limit on discussion is vested in the power of the President under Article 61 of the Diet Law. However, in case of fixing the time-limit it was a long established practice for the Diet to perform it after obtaining each parties' understanding. While, as the matter of fact, the President unfairly fixed the time-limit from his own standpoint and took a step to make an interpellator getting out of the floor by the guard of the House.

3. With regard to the time-limit on voting in the floor there is no legal background to fix at all. According to the usage of the House the matter has been entirely left to the self-commanding of each Member. In spite of that, the President declared to fix the time limit on voting at his own authority. And at last, by utilizing the physical power of many guards, he took a stern action by ordering them to intercept those Members who were going to vote from polling, thereby rejecting 34 members to vote.

4. It is presumed that the President should support the minority opinion as far as possible so as not to be overridden

by

by the strength of the majority all the time.

But, on the contrary, he himself has sided with the majority and supported the undue requests made by the majority.

5. The President Mr. Matsuoka has not taken any proper measures against the Committee Chairman Mr. Ito who was not obedient to the decision of the House. Despite that non-confidence in the Chairman was expressed by the majority Members of the Committee, and the President has left the matter to its natural course without even calling his attention.

6. The President has forgotten his position as a presiding officer in the whole House and has acted as if he was a boss in the Labor Union's assembly.

7. Despite that the President should conduct his functions as fairly as possible by splitting from his own political Party; he has been apt to act as a Member of the Social Democratic Party for the sake of ^{his} own party's interest. It seems to us that he has no intention of doing his best as the President.

At the Inter-Party Conference resumed on the 25th inst., 1 p.m., the Liberal Party insisted upon steering the business of the House in the normal condition, and as ^{the} following demands were approved, so the bill for a vote of non-confidence in the President Mr. Matsuoka was ^{temporarily} withdrawn:

(1) For the present, the report of the Committee Chairman in the plenary session will be made with the approval of the Committee.

(2) The deliberation over the bill should be finished by the Committee and after a committee's report in the plenary session, a vote will be taken on the bill.

(3) The President will proceed with the business of the plenary session in accordance with the decision of the Inter-Party Conference.

Liberal Party

Mr. Marcum

G. S.

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CHQ, SCAP
CIVIL INFORMATION AND EDUCATION SECTION
Analysis and Research Division

File: *Politics*

11 August 1947

INTRASECTION MEMORANDUM TO: Chief, - A & R
FROM: OIC, Public Opinion & Sociological Research Unit
SUBJECT: Eta in Public Office

The various elections held throughout the country in April of this year gave the Eta or Tokushu Buraku (special communities) an opportunity to achieve much more political representation than they have ever had before. In most areas it would seem that systematic efforts were made by Buraku people to elect their candidates. Political activity seems to run high, and group consciousness is also very strong. As a consequence a fairly sizeable number of persons of Eta derivation was elected to public office. In most cases their status was known locally, at least to the Eta themselves, although in some instances their origin seems to have been concealed from other people.

The figures given below include all known persons of Eta origin, but there may be others who have so successfully crossed the line that their origins are undetectable. The data here reported is concerned with the House of Councillors, the Diet, Prefectural Assemblies, and Prefectural Land Commissions. It is hoped to secure data on city, town, and village mayors, city, town, and village assemblies, and village land commissions. In terms of the assimilation of the Eta and problems of local discrimination and community relations, the lower level political phenomena are perhaps even more important than what occurs on national or prefectural level.

The Eta have not as yet achieved fully proportional representation in political assemblies of the country, but the emergence of such a large group is itself a testimonial to the decline of hostile prejudiced feelings among the general population.

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1.* The House of Councillors. Two persons of Eta origin are known to have been elected to the House, one of them, Jiichiro MATSUMOTO, by the fourth highest national vote in the country. MATSUMOTO is Vice-President of the House of Councillors. Both members are Social-Democrats from Fukuoka Prefecture.

2. The Diet. Seven persons were elected to the Diet. Of these, 6 are Social-Democrats, and 1 a Democrat. Four are from Fukuoka Prefecture, 1 from Chiba, 1 from Gunma, 1 from Shimizu, 1 from Wakayama, and 1 from Kumamoto.

3. Prefectural Assemblies. 37 known Eta successfully campaigned for position in the various prefectural assemblies. In terms of party affiliation, they breakdown as follows:

Independent	12
Social-Democrat	11
Democrat	3
Liberal	1
Peoples' Cooperative	1
	<u>27</u>

The prefectural representation is as follows:

Fukuoka	5
Wakayama	5
Kara	5
Saitama	4
Okayama	3
Edino	3
Nie	1
Nyogo	1
Kochi	1
Tokushima	1
	<u>27</u>

* Information contained in this and succeeding paragraphs, based upon the data in the Appendix, were prepared for CIE by the Buraku Kaisha Iinkai (Buraku Emancipation Committee), headed by Jiichiro MATSUMOTO.

4. Sixteen persons were elected to positions in prefectural land commissions throughout the country in the following prefectures:

Wakayama	4
Saitama	3
Sara	3
Fukuoka	2
Okayama	1
Hyogo	1
Mie	1
Kyoto	1
	<u>16</u>

Details are contained in the 4 tables in Appendix I.

APPENDIX I

NTA ELECTED TO PUBLIC OFFICE

TABLE I

House of Councillors

NAME	PARTY	PREFECTURE
Jiichiro MATSUMOTO	SD *	Fukuoka
Senju SHIMADA	SD	Fukuoka

TABLE II

House of Representatives

NAME	PARTY	PREFECTURE
Kanemitsu YOSHIKAWA	SD	Chiba
Toyokichi MATSUI	D	Gunma
Shime KATO	SD	Shizuoka
Ofinochin TANAKA	SD	Wakayama
Shogetsu TANAKA	SD	Fukuoka
Hayashi ITO	SD	Fukuoka
Natahachi MIYAMURA	SD	Kumamoto

 * SD = Social Democrat; D = Democrat; L = Liberal; PC = Peoples' Cooperative;
 Ind. = Independent.

TABLE III

Prefectural Assemblies

NAME	PARTY	PREFECTURE
Takeichi KONOTO	SD	Saitama
Yasaburo IWASAKI	SD	Saitama
Shoichi YAMAGUCHI	SD	Saitama
Ishinosuke YOSHINO	D	Saitama
Saburo TANAKA	SD	Saitama
Sakichi IBA	SD	Nie
Kakusaburo SUGI	Ind.	Wakayama
Jun NAKADA	L	Wakayama
Keiichi MATSUMOTO	PC	Wakayama
Nobuo FUJIMOTO	Ind.	Wakayama
Yoshiaki HOSOKAWA	Ind.	Wakayama
Ichitaro WAKAYASHI	Ind.	Kara
Montaro NISHIKAWA	Ind.	Kara
Yasushi MATSUDA	D	Kara
Haruji HIRAYAMA	Ind.	Kara
Shinji KOMIYAMA	SD	Kara
Koichi KAWAKAMI	Ind.	Hyogo
Hajime KAWASAKI	Ind.	Okayama
Hiroshi ONISHI	IND.	Okayama
Mitsuyoshi KAWAGUCHI	Ind.	Shimo
Munenori TOMIHARA	Ind.	Shimo
Shotaro SASAKI	Ind.	Kochi
Kanzo NODA	Ind.	Tokushima
Kenichi YOSHIMURA	SD	Fukuoka
Fujimasa KIMURA	SD	Fukuoka
Takao SAKATA	SD	Fukuoka
Minoru INAKAZU	SD	Fukuoka

TABLE IV

Prefectural Lead Commissioners.*

NAME	PREFECTURE
Shoichi YAMAGUCHI	Saitama
Hikohachiro MATSUMOTO	Saitama
Kase TAKANE	Saitama
Tetsuro YANAKA	Wakayama
Matzaburo IKEDA	Wakayama
Seinojo NAKAI	Wakayama
Matoutaro MATSUSAKA	Wakayama
Shincho TAKASAKI	Nara
Ryuso YONEDA	Nara
Jinshiro FUJIOKA	Nara
Fujinasa YAMAMOTO	Okayama
Haraichi TAKEMOTO	Hyogo
Kanshiichi IKIBATA	Nie
Teiichi HORIOUCHI	Nie
Yoshikiyo NISHIMURA	Kyoto
Sakasa YAMAMOTO	Fukuoka
Yoshie URANO	Fukuoka

* Candidates did not stand as political representatives, hence no place is provided in this table for 'party'.

Polite

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets) CW/CLK/CPM/jd

Subject: Public Opinion Survey

File No.:

Date: 21 Nov. 1947

Note No.:

From: Govt. Sec.

To: C I & E
Public Information Div.

1. This Section is interested in the results of Public Opinion Surveys on matters of political significance.
2. It is requested that this type of information be made available to the Government Section for reference purposes.

CD

-C.W.-

2

1st Ind

From: CIE

To: Government Section

Date: 1 Dec 47

1. Reference is made to check note from Government Section to CIE dated 21 November 1947 on subject of public opinion surveys.
2. The results of public opinion surveys on matters of political significance which are analyzed by CIE Section will be made available to the Government Section for reference purposes.

DRN

-D.R.N.-

3

Politics

WFM/TC/Jep

K

461.01

Request for Memorandum

46A

1 ESS/LA

Govt Sec
Att: Lt Kaman

1 Mar 46

1 Request that a copy of a memorandum on "The Japanese Bureaucracy," prepared by Government Section, be furnished for use of ESS/LA and the Advisory Committee on Labor assisting them.

W. F. M.

P.A.D. File copy

2

FROM: Govt Sec

TO: ESS/LA

DATE: 7 Mar 46

Memorandum copy attached as requested. The recommendations contained in paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 are those of the officer only, and are not submitted as this Section's recommendations at this time. This Section has taken no action upon this memorandum.

Incl: As indicated

-----C. W.-----

THE JAPANESE BUREAUCRACY

1. The Imperial bureaucracy has been one of the mainstays of totalitarian Japan. Now that the military clique is broken and the financial clique is tottering, the bureaucracy alone remains unimpaired, its power relatively greater than ever before. In the turmoil of politics, it has successfully outlasted its erstwhile allies, military and economic. It continues to operate the day to day affairs of Japanese government, and the day the Allied forces leave Japan, the bureaucracy will still be functioning. In long run terms, the character of the Japanese Public Service must assume a paramount position in Allied thinking, for of all the major Japanese institutions, the bureaucracy is the one which will definitely survive the occupation and contribute a powerful influence on the structure of Japanese society.
2. This unreformed bureaucracy developed as an adjunct of latter day Japanese feudalism. Control of personnel has been an Imperial Prerogative, never challenged by the Diet. The morale of public personnel was predicated on Imperial service. In his official behaviour, each public official bore a segment of the Imperial authority. The rights and interests of private citizens were never deemed serious obligations in the Japanese bureaucratic mind. The concept of public service never seriously concerned them, nor were they ever taught to regard themselves as servants of the community.
3. Faithful to its Prussian model, the Japanese bureaucracy developed a highly legalistic bias, without concurrently stressing technical proficiency which distinguished the Prussian service. Soon legal learning supplanted all other requirements for admittance to the Higher Civil Service. When governmental activity was restricted to regulation, and the business of government was not complex, it was sufficient to issue regulations and rely on the police and courts to enforce them.
4. Modern conditions, however, entail the assumption by government of increased responsibilities. The efficient discharge of these responsibilities requires the development of expertise in government, based on a large and efficient corps of technically trained personnel. The Japanese government, however, has failed to achieve this transformation. So rigid has become the entrenched control of the legalistic clique that functional specialization has failed to develop in the policy making reaches of the Higher Civil Service. Unavoidable concessions to technical and expert personnel have been yielded when no other course has been possible, but the weight of such persons in the hierarchy has always been deliberately minimized. Consequently, the Japanese government, still under the control of formal legalists from Tokyo Imperial University, has failed to develop efficient, specialized civilian operating agencies. When operation and enforcement became necessary,

only the police were available to wield the authority of government. So as the functions of government increased and the Japanese bureaucracy failed to meet the requirements of technical specialization, the power of the police increased proportionately. The formal legalism and the technical backwardness of the Japanese Civil Service contributed markedly to the modern development of the Japanese police state. As it stands today, the Japanese bureaucracy is not competent to manage a modern, democratic society.

5. Today that bureaucracy is more than a full generation behind Western governments, though its obligations and functions are equally complex, and, in many cases, even more difficult. The Japanese have been piling on their 1890 personnel system, modification after modification, in efforts to adopt a thoroughly inadequate structure to emerging situations for which it was never designed. At present, the Civil Service system is so intricately complex, such a confusion of patch work, that even Japanese authorities on the subject are frequently baffled by its provisions. Inefficient and undemocratic, it is no fit instrument for modern democratic management.

6. Some of the features of this feudal Civil Service will catalog its major deficiencies:

a. There is no central personnel agency in the Japanese Government. The various functions of personnel administration are performed in the Ministries and Ken Governments. In many cases, even the Ministries exert little authority; bureaus and even section chiefs are left to manage their own personnel problems without uniform standards, even on the Ministerial level. Such major personnel issues as salary scales (for classified personnel only) are debated in the Cabinet and settled by Imperial Ordinance. But on most questions, no Government policy can be said to exist. Uniform standards, scientific personnel management have not yet penetrated the Japanese system. The absence of a central personnel agency is an index of the backwardness of Japanese personnel administration.

b. There is no classification of positions in the Japanese system. There has been no analysis, no standardization even of positions in the same agencies, not to mention entire Ministries or the Government itself. Pay is only incidentally related to position, and varies widely from agency to agency. This indispensable tool of scientific personnel management has not yet been introduced into the Japanese system.

c. Instead of classifying positions, the Japanese classify individuals. This hierarchial system of personal rank is a residue of the feudal status system. Tremendous importance is attached to an individual's personal rank since it denotes his relationship to the Throne and related matters of official precedence. Promotions are periodically granted to civil officials with automatic regularity, with little regard to the quality of their performance and little relationship to the positions they occupy.

d. The pay scale is extremely complex and, in the Higher Civil Service, not directly related either to personal rank or to the position occupied. The pay scale is so low, especially for lower ranking officials, that the Government has resorted to two expedients:

- (1) An intricate schedule of special allowances.
- (2) Bonus payments, in the feudal tradition, now totalling ten or eleven months additional pay each year.

For lower grade employees, (as distinguished from classified officials), no Government pay schedule is provided. Officials as low as section chiefs in the Ministries and Ken Government set their own scale for these employees.

e. The Japanese service is highly stratified. The gap between "employees" and "officials" separates those who gain prestige, precedence and security in public employment from those who do not. In the Higher Civil Service, horizontal stratification is supplemented by strict vertical barriers. Between the administrative, technical, and office management groups in the Higher Civil Service, no lateral movement is permitted. Below them are ordinary Civil Service officials, and below the latter, the class of "Employees" without Civil Service status.

f. Except for Zinukan (Administrative elite, who will be treated in section g. below) the Japanese Civil Service has no systematic machinery for testing candidates for public positions. Ministries recruit their own personnel as they see fit, with or without examination. No service wide examinations are required or provided. Since the Ministries, bureaus and Ken Governments are without trained testing personnel (or any other professional personnel administrators), what tests they may at their discretion give are not scientifically drafted. A great many civil servants are recruited without examination; even when some form of examination is required, the same officials who formulate and administer the tests, themselves hire the successful candidates. The abuses to which this arrangement is subject need no elaboration. All appointments and promotions in the Higher Civil Service are formally approved by a Cabinet agency, but this review is entirely perfunctory. Ministries and subordinate agencies recruit and promote personnel with few central controls and all the abuses to which such a system is inevitably subject.

g. The Zinukan section of the Higher Civil Service is not adequate to its present responsibilities. This administrative elite of the Japanese bureaucracy is selected by a Higher Civil Service Examination Committee, composed of high ranking officials and University professors. The preponderance of Zinukan are recruited from the Law Faculty of Tokyo Imperial University.

Their examination is almost entirely a difficult memory test of legal knowledge. The young legalists thus recruited are promoted rapidly, and soon arrive at the responsible higher positions which are reserved exclusively for them. Since their rapid promotion is hastened by frequent changes of position, the *Zimukan* never learn the functional work of their agencies. They rather assert their authority by emphasis on legal regulations, at which they are expert, often casting about official procedures an inextricable net of administrative regulations. Their automatic promotions, their rapid shifting from position to position, encourages a time-serving attitude toward their official responsibilities. Their Tokyo Imperial University Law School training prepare them neither for public administration nor for functional specialization, and the experience to which this elite is subjected in the Government service exacerbates rather than ameliorates these deficiencies.

h. Organized and systematic in-Service training and efficiency rating are practically unknown to the Japanese bureaucracy. The absence of a central personnel agency leaves no overall responsibility for these important functions. A few agencies have developed training and efficiency rating programs for selected officials, but generally these functions are either neglected or carried out haphazardly by individual Ministries, bureaus and Ken Governments.

1. The retirement system is highly defective. Employees (as distinguished from officials) enjoy no pension rights whatever. Classified officials who share in the contributory retirement scheme are victims of its injustices. Because of the pressure of lower ranking officials spurred by low salaries and rapid promotions, experienced public officials are forced to retire at the peak of their efficiency between the ages of 45 to 50. Their pension benefits are inadequate to support them, forcing them to begin new careers in business. With the grim prospect of early retirement, many high officials spend their last years in the Service making business contacts to facilitate profitable employment after retirement. Both the Government Service and its personnel suffer from this ill-considered and wasteful system.

j. Civil servants have no remedy against arbitrary treatment. Against discrimination in employment, in the grading of examinations, they are not protected. They may be dismissed for the "convenience of the Government" without explanation, and with no recourse, administrative or judicial.

7. This brief treatment of a very complex administrative institution outlines only some of its more obvious inadequacies and injustices. This list should, however, suffice to demonstrate the need of a thoroughgoing reform in the Japanese Civil Service system.

8. Palliative reforms will not satisfy the requirements of the occupation. Elimination only of the more obvious abuses will fail to affect the major problem. The functions, the responsibilities of modern government are extensive and complex; they will probably grow even more so. Modern democratic society especially requires a highly trained and efficient bureaucracy devoted to the Public Service. As the organ of continuing administration, the bureaucracy must effectuate the policies decided by politically responsible leaders. Any failure to translate popular policies into practice will undermine popular faith in the democratic system. This is especially true in Japan where the nascent democratic spirit needs all the help that sound and efficient machinery can provide. If the Civil Service, under democratic political auspices, operates inefficiently in Japan, democracy itself will be discredited. People will begin to look to familiar police techniques and police organization for the minimum public service which an incompetent bureaucracy under democratic political auspices had failed to provide.

9. The Allied Powers are definitely concerned with the development of an efficient democratic administrative apparatus in Japan, manned by highly competent public officials. The present bureaucracy, operating under an unreformed feudal Civil Service structure and archaic procedures is entirely incompetent to guide a progressive democratic society. The ultimate success of this occupation may hinge on the efficiency of administrative organization and the calibre of the public personnel we leave behind.

10. Comprehensive reforms are required. The time to begin is now.

MILTON J. ESMAN
1st LT, TC

Politics
misc.

14 Nov 45

"Professors in exile"

During and even before the war, countless professors and their assistants were ousted from universities and thrown into prison by the hands of the Zaibatsu, militarists and government under the pretext of being "Reds" and "Liberalists".

These professors had great influence upon thinking circles of modern Japan, through their lectures they gave or books they wrote.

A swarm of small fry, that is the right-winged thinkers and the totalists took their places and held their positions as "yes men" of the militarists -- thus causing a state of unrest and disorder in our thinking world.

Chronicle of events is as follows:

1928 -- "Tokyo University incident"

The victim was the then assistant-professor of the economics department, the late Mr. Y. Omori. He was ousted because of his left-winged ideas.

1933 -- "Kyoto University was pounced upon".

This incident began with the prohibition of publication of a book, Professor K. Takikawa, of the Law Department, had written. It developed to the resignation of the whole Law Department staff numbering 40 men.

It is a fact to be noted that the then Education Minister who took the chief oppressive measures, is now the head of the New Japan Liberal Party, Mr. Hatoyama, and that one of the members who resigned happens to be Professor S. Sasaki who is now revising the constitution.

1936-1938 -- The "Public Front" professors were arrested. Professors A. Hyone (Tokyo), R. Minobe (Hosei), T. Hayase (Yokohama College) and several others were the victims. All the professors that were termed "red" were caught in this wholesale arrest, and one of the modern thoughts in economics, Marxism, was wiped out from all universities throughout the country.

1938-1943 "Professor Kawaai's incident"

This was the final attempt of the militarists to suppress the world of thought. Many books written by the Professor Kawaai were banned and in February 1939 the professor was prosecuted with the charge of violating the Publishment Law. From thence the professor has been fighting the court against the authorities oppression, and the struggle of learning against oppression was a long and bitter one that lasted full four years.

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Thus Marxism then Democracy and lastly even Liberalism was wiped out from all universities in Japan. That is all modern theories and progressive thoughts were wiped out from our educational backbones.

The government recommends that these exiled professors will return to institutions of learning. Most of them, however, will undertake more difficult but fruitful tasks in reestablishing their fatherland. They will go to the masses and the world of reality rather than to universities.

But be what it may be, when all these professors reappear again, then "flowers of truth will blossom again in the universities and the peoples thoughts and ideas will make great strides toward progress".

Only when we achieve this end, we can hope the world will recognize us as a "modern cultural democratic nation".

Asaki Oct 20

Trans. by Obyama.

Politics

Reading *bk*

Organizational Reports

9 Nov 45

Government Section.

D C/S for Approval.

**Return to GS for
stencil.**

WEC/CLK/ARR/jmh

A Memorandum to the Imperial Japanese Government, AG 091 (19 Sep 45)HG (Tab "A"), requests detailed information relating to composition and structure of Imperial Japanese Government. The information requested has been supplied as of 20 September 1945. However, changes are taking place in the structure of government and in its personnel. For this reason, and in order to keep abreast of the times, the attached Memorandum (Tab "B") has been prepared.

----- W. E. C. -----

P.A. Still

*Distribution of these reports is shown
on accompanying sheet.*

B 

OFFICE OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER
FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 091 (19 Sep 45) NG

19 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo
SUBJECT : Organizational Reports

1. In order that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers may be accurately informed with respect to the current composition of the Imperial Japanese Government and its principal sub-divisions, charts of present organization, accompanied by statements outlining functions, duties and principal officials by name, title and rank, of the following are necessary:

- a. The Cabinet of the Imperial Japanese Government and each of its Bureaus and Boards.
- b. The Ministries of the Imperial Japanese Government and each Bureau thereof
- c. The Board of Audit
- d. The Privy Council
- e. The Court of Administrative Litigation
- f. Each of the eight (8) Superintendencies General
- g. Each of the forty-three (43) prefectures and the Metropolitan Districts of Kyoto, Osaka and Tokyo
- h. Cities which are prefecture capitals or have a population in excess of one hundred thousand (100,000)
- i. Extra-constitutional offices and any major policy-making or administrative agencies of the Imperial Japanese Government not specified herein.

2. This required information should be prepared immediately and delivered without delay, in sections as completed.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

HAROLD FAIR,
Lt Col, AGD,
Asst Adjutant General.

Copy

TAB A

AG 319.1 (Nov 45)GS

17 November 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT : Organizational Reports.

1. By memorandum dated 19 September 1945, AG 091 (19 Sep 45)MG, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers directed the Imperial Japanese Government to furnish certain information relating to the composition of the government.

2. That memorandum specified no date for completion. The structure of the Japanese Government has already been changed in some measure. Further changes are contemplated.

3. In order that the Supreme Commander may be fully advised at all times, the Imperial Japanese Government is directed to report every change that has taken place between 1 September 1945 and 1 November 1945 in the agencies of government described in the said memorandum dated 19 September 1945 and referred to in Paragraph 1, including the changes in official personnel. This information is to be furnished within twenty (20) days of the receipt of this memorandum.

4. The Imperial Japanese Government is further directed to report all changes in the said agencies of government referred to in Paragraph 3, supra, taking place hereafter. These reports will be submitted on the 15th day of each month starting with the 15th day of January 1946, and will include all changes made during the preceding calendar month, except that the report to be made on 15 January 1946 will give all changes made since 1 November 1945.

5. All information required to be submitted by this memorandum shall be submitted in English with six (6) copies thereof. Whenever the text of a statute, rescript or administrative order is important to the understanding of a change, copies in English of such statutes, rescripts or orders shall be submitted for the Supreme Commander.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

Mailed

TAB-B

DISTRIBUTION OF ORGANIZATIONAL REPORTS
SUBMITTED BY JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

17 October 1945

- Copy No. 1 -- Lt. Col. Patrick
- Copy No. 2 -- Col. Kades
- Copy No. 3 -- Lt. ^{Comdr.} ~~Sol.~~ Swope
- Copy No. 4 -- ^{Lt.} Comdr. Hussey
- Copy No. 5 -- Librarian
- Copy No. 6 -- Files

Pol. Misc. 01

From OCCIO - 25 Oct

DP/jap
25 Oct 45

JAPANESE OFFICIALS COMMITTING SUICIDE SINCE AUG. 1, 1945.

SOURCE: The following names and information was extracted from "The Nippon Times", issues dated Aug. 1, 1945 to Oct. 20, 1945, with the exception of issues for Aug. 7, Sept. 1, 4, and 20 which were not available to the writer.

AKIYAMA, Yoshitane, Lt. General

Akiyama was a reserve officer. In 1944 he was appointed commander of the Zentsuji Division. In March 1945 was transferred to the central defense Hqs. as chief of the Military Recruitment Department and in June 1945 was appointed the Commander of the Chosen Special Division, the post held at the time of his death.

Date of suicide: Aug. 16, 1945.

ANAMI, Korechika, General

War Minister in the Suzuki cabinet.

Date of suicide: Aug. 14, 1945.

CHENG KUNG-PO

Former acting President of the National Government of China at Nanking reportedly committed suicide on Aug. 28, 1945 but another report stated that he was missing. The above was extracted from The Nippon Times, dated Aug. 31, 1945.

GHIBA, Shinichi

Ghiba, 50 years old, was former Japanese Minister to France and at the time of his death was staying at the Japanese Embassy in Ankara. His wife, Miyoko Ghiba, committed suicide jointly with her husband.

Date of suicide: July 26, 1945.

HAMADA, Hitoshi, Lt. General

Lt. General Hamada was Deputy Chief of the Staff of Japanese Forces in Siam.

Date of suicide: Sept. 19, 1945.

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HASHIDA, Kunihiko, Dr.

Dr. Hashida was Education Minister in the Tojo Cabinet.

Date of suicide: Sept. 14, 1945.

KOIZUMI, Chikahiko, Surgeon General

Surgeon Lt. General Koizumi was Welfare Minister in the Tojo Cabinet at the time of the outbreak of the G.E.A. War.

Date of suicide: Sept. 13, 1945.

MIRUTANI

Colonel Mirutani and two other Army men of the 3rd Aviation Technique Hqs. at Shimoda committed suicide on Sept. 6, 1945.

MORISUMI, Matsuo, Vice Admiral

Vice Admiral Morisumi was Chief of the Munitions Control Department of the Osaka Naval Defense Hqs.

Date of suicide: Sept. 2, 1945.

NAKANO, Takeshi, 2nd Sub-Lt.

2nd Sub-Lt. Nakano was an Engineer attached to the Nakajima Airplane Factory.

Date of suicide: Sept. 6, 1945.

ONISHI, Fukihiro, Vice Admiral

Vice Admiral Onishi was Chief of the Navy General Staff and has been credited by the Japanese as a pioneer pilot and influence in the development of Japan's Air activities. He also had assisted the late Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet.

Date of suicide: Aug. 16, 1945.

SAKAI, Motoyoshi, Sergeant Major

Special Sergeant Major Sakai was attached to the Nakajima Airplane Factory.

Date of suicide: Sept. 6, 1945.

SHIMADA, Tomosaburo, Lt. General

Lt. General Shimada was head of the Judicial Department of the East Army.

Date of suicide: Sept. 4, 1945.

SHINOZUKA, Yoshio, Lt. General

Lt. General Shinonaka was a reserve officer. At the outbreak of War he was a member of the Supreme War Council but had retired from active service in June 1942.

Date of suicide: Sept. 17, 1945.

SHIROKURA, Yoshio, Lt. General

Lt. General Shirokura was a reserve Army officer and director of the Chubu National Labor Training Institute. Previously he had been commander of the Kwantung Gendarmerie and principal of the Gendarmerie College.

Date of suicide: Sept. 13, 1945.

SUGIYAMA, Field Marshal General

Marshal Sugiyama was commander of the 1st General Army for the defense of the Japanese Mainland and Chief of the Army General Staff at the time of the outbreak of the G.E.A. War.

Date of suicide: Sept. 12, 1945.

SUYA, Colonel

Colonel Suya, Commander of War Prisoner Camp at Borneo was charged with responsibility for the deaths of 600 War Prisoners.

Date of suicide: Sept. 17, 1945.

TANAKA, Shizichi, General

General Tanaka was commander of the Eastern Army Area Hqs.

Date of suicide: Aug. 24, 1945.

TERAMOTO, Kuzoichi, Lt. General

Lt. General Teramoto was Commander of the Army Air Hqs.

Date of suicide: Aug. 15, 1945.

YOSHIMOTO, Sadaichi, General

General Yoshimoto was Chief of the 1st General Hqs.

Date of suicide: Sept. 14, 1945.

YOSHINARI, Hiroshi, Lt. Colonel

Lt. Col. Yoshinari was aide to His Highness Prince Gu Ri who succumbed to injuries incurred in the Hiroshima atomic bombing.

Date of suicide: Aug. 9, 1945.