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WAR DIARY


German Naval Staff Operations Division

PART A VOLUME 58

DECLASSIFIED FOR EOD MEMO OF 3 MAY 1978, SUBJECT
DECLASSIFICATION OF WWII RECORDS

JUNE 1944

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Editorial Note:


The translation of this German War Diary was made in London, England, under the guidance of Commander S.R. Sanders, USNR. When his London Office was closed and the translation project was discontinued, much unfinished material was sent to Naval History Division (Op-29). Volumes of these diaries have been periodically distributed as funds and other conditions permitted.

The translations and stencils have not been checked by Naval History Division for accuracy of interpretation, phraseology, and spelling of officers' names or geographical names. Distribution under these conditions seems justified because of the excellent reputation of the London personnel and because translators are not available in Naval History Division. Research to correct possible inconsistencies did not warrant the time involved.

The War Diaries of the German Naval Staff, Operations Division, Part A, are important because they contain a day by day summary of the information available to the German Naval Staff and the decisions reached on the basis thereof.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Naval History Division
Washington 25, D. C.
1958

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DECLASSIFICATION OF WWII RECORDS



By Officer Only!

WAR DIARY OF THE GERMAN NAVAL STAFF

(Operations Division)

PART A

June 1944

Chief, German Naval Staff:	Admiral Meisel
Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division	
till 28 June:	Rear Admiral Wagner
from 29 June:	Rear Admiral Meyer

Volume 58

begun:	1 Jun. 1944
closed:	30 Jun. 1944

1 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance

Sir Samuel Hoare returned to his post as Ambassador in Madrid.

Therefore, rumours of his resignation with its far-reaching implications are unfounded.

Roosevelt declared that the first draft of a post-war organization would be presented to Great Britain, the U.S.A. and China. The draft of the post-war organization for the preservation of peace would contain five points outlining the functions of a council of the United Nations.

Conference on the Situation with Commander in Chief, Navy

I. The situation, with regard to our own air defense, is marked by heavy losses of fighters, according to information from the Air Operations Staff I a Navy. In order to strengthen the defense of Reich territory, many front-line fighting units were withdrawn.

The output of new planes decreased temporarily because of the transfer of the production plants.

II. The Foreign Office sent a sharp note to the Spanish Government concerning the sinking of the German steamers "Hochheimer" and "Baldur" in Spanish territorial waters by a British submarine. The German Ambassador in Madrid suggested that strong measures should be taken by the German Navy, and these would have to be adopted without previously informing the Spanish Government.

III. Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Quartermaster:

a. At Lake Peipsi the first 3 naval artillery lighters were put into service. By 13 June probably five of these units will be ready for operations.

b. The German Air Force refused a temporary increase in the air defense of Monfalcone. Our heavy Flak battalion will be ready for action by the end of June. A statement from the Air Operations Staff regarding Flak defense of Hamburg - Bremen has not yet come in.

1 Jun. 1944

IV. According to a report received, the Commander in Chief, Navy decided that conditions on the Danube can only be dealt with by a special plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer. The main part of the tasks involved is by no means the responsibility of the Navy. The prevention of enemy mine-laying is of paramount importance. Armament of the vessels is the responsibility of the Army, Flak defense of the river banks that of the Air Force.

The strict cooperation of all departments concerned and the coordinating of their activities is important. Considering the number and the character of the departments concerned, success is possible only if the Officer in Charge is backed by the personal authority of the Fuehrer.

Commander in Chief, Navy made the above suggestion by telephone to General Jodl, and put forward the name of Admiral Boehm in case the Navy should be asked to appoint someone to the post.

Meanwhile the Navy will do everything possible to assist the Inspector of Mine Clearance, Danube. A separate directive for provision of sweeping gear will be necessary. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, (Inspector of Mine Clearance, Danube, Group South, for information) have been sent the following teletype message:

"1. Some of the measures taken by the Inspector of Mine Clearance, Danube are still in the initial stages and are not yet completely effective in reducing the danger from mines.

"2. At the moment, the control of the closing and opening of channels by Inspector of Mine Clearance, Danube is not yet in accordance with the degree of mine safety to be expected later.

"3. Closing and opening of channels, obligatory convoy system, etc. must remain under the control of the Inspector of Mine Clearance, Danube alone. Arbitrary action by the Armed Forces Transport Department, Southeast, might result in a slackening in the traffic discipline of the Danube States. Only by strict observance of traffic regulations will the measures of the Inspector of Mine Clearance, Danube provide the highest possible degree of mine safety.

1 Jun. 1944

"4. Complete cooperation of the Inspector of the Mine Clearance, Danube with the Armed Forces Transport Control is guaranteed as far as the Navy is concerned. Armed Forces High Command is requested to prevent arbitrary action by Armed Forces Transport Control so that the results of the measures taken by the Inspector of Mine Clearance, Danube will not be adversely affected even if complete control of the mine situation is not yet possible at the moment."

The Director of Naval Armaments received the following request from the Naval Staff:

"Enemy air raids on hydrogenation plants have resulted in considerable falling-off in the fuel supply. Improvements are only possible if fuel is transported on the Danube. Ammunition supplies for the entire southern sector of the Eastern Front also depend on the free use of the Danube route, mine clearance of which is therefore of utmost importance for the continuance of warfare. Requests from the Inspector of Mine Clearance, Danube for supplies of sweeping gear are, until further notice, to have priority over all other requests for equipment, and delivery is to be speeded up in every possible way."

In view of the development in the fuel situation, which can only be improved by undisturbed transport on the Danube, the Naval Staff furthermore agreed that 9 mine-sweeping planes are to be transferred from the area of Flag Officer in Charge, North Sea Defenses to operate in the Danube area. For copy of teletype message in question, see 1/Skl I E 16882 and 16891/44 GKdos in War Diary Part C, Vol. XIV a.

Commander in Chief, Navy agreed.

V. Chief, Naval Staff, Admiral Quartermaster suggested placing 300 tons fume acid at the disposal of the German Air Force, the total stock of fume acid being 8,000 tons and the monthly decrease amounting to about 1,000 tons. Commander in Chief, Navy concurred.

1 Jun. 1944

Fighter and heavy fighter planes 2,219 (1,859)

and in addition 550 from repair shops. (Compare the critical fighter situation according to Communication from German Air Force, Operations Staff I a Navy (Conference on the situation with Commander in Chief, Navy.))

III. Sea traffic off the Italian coast for carrying supplies to the front and for bringing back most valuable industrial goods, is becoming of ever increasing and perhaps decisive importance because of the systematic destruction of traffic routes on land. Sea traffic is being hindered mainly by well known enemy air supremacy. Besides this, increasing damage has recently been inflicted along the west coast by enemy motor torpedo boats, operating every night along the entire coast up to the area of Spezia, Genoa, Nice. The following losses were sustained in this area since 10 May 1944, as a result of motor torpedo boat operations:

sunk: 2 armed ferries, 2 submarine chasers, 2 naval ferry barges, 3 barges;

damaged: 1 submarine chaser, 1 freight barge.

Reconnaissance by the German Air Force and our own investigations reveal that the enemy motor torpedo boat base and repair base is still at Maddalena; the jumping-off point is almost without exception Bastia. The elimination of Bastia harbor as a motor torpedo boat base by naval bombardment is impossible, because suitable heavy artillery carriers are lacking and because of the enemy's air supremacy by day. Up to now, night bombardments have not achieved lasting results, especially as enemy motor torpedo boats were not encountered during night operations. Furthermore, short nights at present render any night operations impossible.

The Naval Staff is of opinion that a single blow at enemy motor torpedo boats and their base at Bastia would for some time bring about considerable relief for the traffic off the Italian west coast and thereby result - for the fighting on land- in a temporary and perhaps decisive improvement in the supply situation.

The Naval Staff asked Armed Forces High Command and High Command, Air Operations Staff to investigate the possibilities of this. An immediate surprise blow was of decisive importance in order that the expected increase in supplies might have its effect on the present fighting. Copy of teletype 1/Skl Im 1657/44 GKdos.Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

IV. Naval Staff informed Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff (Navy), (for information Naval Command, East) with reference to "Tanne":

1 Jun. 1944

"1. Embarkation and landing exercises of the 1st Landing Division and 416th Inf. Div. carried out on 16/17 May at Aalborg were not satisfactory and proved the necessity of carrying out further exercises under more difficult conditions (exercises at night and in bad weather).

"2. Besides exercises by Naval forces (firing practice on land targets) the Naval Staff intends to carry out about two embarkation exercises per month. Accordingly it was requested that orders be given to Commanding General, Armed Forces, Denmark to place the 416th Inf. Div. at the disposal of Naval Command, East as required.

"3. These exercises would not endanger the security of the operation."

V. The Naval Staff pointed out to Naval Command, East that when reviewing plan "Wallenstein", the instructions of Group North/Fleet concerning Submarine Group Centre should be revised.

VI. High Command, Air Operations Staff has made the following statement:

"The critical fuel situation at present no longer permits reconnaissance of enemy convoy routes in northern waters and in the Arctic Ocean to be carried out to the previous extent. Reconnaissance of estimated day's run is to be limited to those cases where there are definite indications of the approach of a PQ or QP convoy."

Naval Staff, Submarine Division is to be informed.

VII. The ever increasing losses and damage to Surface Forces, as a result of the enemy's continually intensifying his mine offensive and simultaneously increasing air attacks, latterly attained such proportions as to cause serious concern.

Naval Staff, Admiral Quartermaster directed the attention of the Director of Naval Armaments to the necessity of speeding up the repair of surface craft by all possible means, so that they might be out of action for the shortest possible time. Attention was drawn to the Commander in Chief. Navy's offer to provide Navy personnel temporarily in order to speed up completion work. All types of mine-sweeping craft, as well as the tankers necessary to ensure fuel supply, are of particular urgency.

VIII. For survey of our own Naval Forces in the area of Group South as of 30 May, see order 1/Skl 16769/44 GKdos. Copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

1 Jun. 1944

Situation 1 Jun. 1944

I. War in Foreign Waters

Nothing special to report.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

In the area of the 19th Group, 23 planes were observed on operations. Three British targets were located in the rendezvous area. In the Channel, targets were located during the night of 31 May/1 June northeast of Quessant, west of Antifer or north of Fécamp and north of Nieupoort.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast Area:

The laying of 80 KMA mines south of Gironde, as reported on 31 May, was not effected because the minesweeper M "13" was damaged by mines. Six mine-sweeping planes were sent out, three of them off St. Nazaire and one each off La Pallice, Gironde and Biarritz. Off Gironde two mines were cleared. Laying of mines off Lorient was reported. Ore traffic from North Spain has now been resumed also with large vessels.

Channel Area:

During the night of 31 May/1 June, Battery Landemer and the switch position in the Cherbourg area were attacked by enemy planes. At midnight very heavy bombs were dropped on the Air Force's jamming station "Nachtfalter" and Naval Transmitting Station "Olgalter" at Gris Nez. Material damage was done.

The 2nd degree of alarm was given for Port Commandant, Fécamp by order of the Division, in view of the enemy's being located from 0140 - 0245. Two mines were swept off Cape Antifer, eight off Le Havre and one off Boulogne.

On 31 May, two Thunderbolts were shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns near Calais. At 0830 on 1 June,

1 Jun. 1944

two Spitfires attacked battery position Mirus (Guernsey) with gunfire but caused no damage.

Further, Army Coastal Battery 3/1254, Army Coastal Battery 1/1252 and Naval Battery Le Havre were attacked by enemy planes during the day. Damage and casualties were sustained. To investigate the cause of frequent detonations recently observed off the Dutch Coast, the Navy will have to rely upon its own forces, as no further Air Force operations can be reckoned with for some time, owing to its known lack of strength. Therefore Group West, Naval Command, North, (Commander, PT boats for information) were sent the following directions on 29 May:

"1. A definite explanation of the cause of frequent detonations off the Dutch Coast can only be found by reconnaissance. More extensive operations by the Air Force cannot be reckoned with for some time. The Navy therefore has to rely on its own forces.

"2. Large scale use of PT boats cannot be advocated, as offensive operations are not to be restricted. Considering the anticipated invasion on the north coast of France, the Channel has to remain the focal point.

"3. The Naval Staff is of opinion that an incidental PT boat patrol immediately on receipt of a detailed report - which should be as accurate as possible - might produce further information regarding the detonation. A single reconnaissance sweep by 1st PT Boat Group is therefore justified and is to be arranged. A report on plans is to be made.

"4. Further, Naval Command, North is to continue its investigations with the means available."

Group West reported in this connection on 1 June:

"PT boat operation to investigate origin of detonations is planned as follows: In cooperation with 1st Coast Patrol Force and working on as accurate a location as possible, a single reconnaissance sweep in the Area concerned will be carried out by 1st PT Boat Group from Ostend or Ymuiden. During the full moon period this will only be carried out if there is adequate cloud cover."

1 Jun. 1944

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

North Sea:

One mine was swept off Elbe, Jade and Hook of Holland respectively. During the night of 31 May/1 June, unsuccessful attacks were made by enemy planes on boats of the 20th Patrol Flotilla north of Scheveningen and of the 32nd Mine-sweeping Flotilla south of Flushing. Antiaircraft guns at Heligoland shot down one out of four Mustangs making a low-level attack. Convoy, patrol and mine-sweeping services - nothing special to report. From Terschelling, Helder and Scheveningen heavy detonations of unknown origin were observed on 31 May and during the night of 31 May. Over the Kiel Canal during the afternoon two exhaustive enemy reconnaissance flights were again reported.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

In the area of the 18th Group, 31 planes were observed on operation over the Northern part of the North Sea. During the day, Hammerfest and Svanvik repeatedly located British vessels. The big ship reported on 30 May and 31 May was not located again. At 1920, a British unit - possibly the carrier unit - was located 180 miles west of Bodoe.

2. Own Situation:

Thirty-one ships were convoyed to the North, and twenty-two to the South. On the afternoon of 31 May there was a minor exchange of fire in the Petsamo area without results.

The 5th Coastal Patrol Flotilla gave the following preliminary report: "At 2140 convoy, consisting of the minesweepers M "468", M "421", Sperrbrecher "181", M "5210" under the command of S. O. 23rd Minesweeping Flotilla, with the steamer "Hans Leonhardt" (4,170 GRT) carrying material for the Armed Forces including 2,199 tons of ammunition, and the steamer "Florida" (5,542 GRT) carrying 3,636 tons of material for the Armed Forces, was attacked by about 40 enemy aircraft in 8544 AF. The "Hans Leonhardt" sank following an explosion. Sperrbrecher

1 Jun. 1944

"181" and the steamer "Florida" were set on fire by a bomb hit. No reports on type of planes have yet been received. Survey: Probably carrier-borne planes. Convoy had fighter protection until 2120. Attempts at salvage and rescue begun.

Thus the secret of the enemy carrier unit of the last few days may be revealed!

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

In the Gulf of Finland at 1555 our own air reconnaissance observed five minesweepers and one large vessel between Lavansaari and Kurgolovo, course S. E. Between 2322 and 0102 on 2 June, 3rd Minesweeping Flotilla reported four enemy motor torpedo boats on varying courses in Narva Bay. At the approach of our own units these laid smoke screens. Apparently this was a mine laying operation. Our own batteries fired on the motor torpedo boats without results being observed. At 2359 there were 15 fast motor minesweepers and 2 large vessels southwest of Vigrund proceeding on an easterly course. According to Finnish reports, at 2220 there were ten patrol motorboats west of Schepel proceeding on a westerly course, and at 2350, one submarine of the S-class east of Schepel proceeding on a westerly course. According to aerial photographs, the following ships were lying at 0900 off the mouth of the Luga: 16 fast motor minesweepers, 13 motorboats, 6 freighters, 7 tugs, 8 barges and 1 special vessel. Apparently part of the convoy sighted on 31 May off Schepel put into the mouth of the Luga, probably carrying supplies for the land front. At 1520 on the 31st, according to our own air-reconnaissance, the following enemy vessels were lying at Lavansaari: 24 motor torpedo boats, 41 patrol boats and motor-boats, 4 tugs, 2 freighters, 2 barges, 1 auxiliary gun-boat, 1 torpedo boat, 1 oil barge, 2 (apparently) net-layers, 3 (apparently) ferries and 4 fast motor minesweepers.

At 1542 on 31 May, the Finns reported sighting three submarines southwest of Kronstadt. At 2145 on the same day, a Finnish aircraft dropped four depth

1 Jun. 1944

charges on what appeared to be a submarine north-east of Revalstein. At 2256 a Finnish escort boat dropped further depth charges on an oil patch in the same area.

2. Own Situation:

Mine-sweeping was carried out by 38 boats in the Baltic Sea Entrances, and by 38 boats and 3 minesweeping planes under the Flag Officer in Charge, Baltic Defenses. Nine mines were swept at Halsbarre, 2 in the Samsøe Belt, 1 each in Kiel Bay, west of Fehmarn and off Roenne, 2 in Danzig Bay. In the course of mine-sweeping in Kiel Bay, patrol boat "55" was heavily damaged.

The fast motor minesweeper R "132" accompanied by three ferries and one artillery ferry barge serving as anti-aircraft escort left Esbjerg at 0500, together with two transport vessels, to continue laying of the KMA mine barrage.

During the night of 31 May, four enemy planes entered the Kattegat up to west of Anholt, obviously bent on laying mines round Skagen. In the night of 1 June, ten enemy planes flew north of Esbjerg as far as Aarhus Bay and Aalborg Bay, dropping bombs on vessels in Aarhus harbor. Mines are suspected in both bays. There were no reports of special events in the Gulf of Finland from the Narva patrol, submarine and net controls.

Owing to the danger of a possible enemy landing on the Estonian coast, the 6th Destroyer Flotilla at Baltic Port and boats of the 1st and 3rd Minesweeping Flotilla in Kotka were ordered to maintain degree of readiness 1 hr, and boats of the 6th PT Boat Flotilla in Finland and three artillery ferry barges in Aseri degree of readiness 30 minutes. Four PT boats at Kasparvik are in immediate readiness.

The 5th sector of the KMA (mine barrage) was laid according to plan. Escort duty in the Irben Narrows will be carried out by two patrol boats.

On Lake Peipus, patrol was maintained according to plan. Escort service was carried out. Four naval artillery lighters and the commandant's boat BALTENLAND completed their gunnery trials. Naval Command,

1 Jun. 1944

East reported definite fixing of anchorage A, B and C for "Rotbuche" and proposed arrival end of June. Naval Staff expressed approval. For copies of order 1/Skl I op 1643/44 GKdos, Chefs, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

V. Merchant Shipping

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division, in its service on "Foreign Merchant Shipping" (reports Nos. 8 and 9 and short report No. 8/44), gives information on:

Enemy attacks on neutral shipping from 9 Jan. 1943 to 1 May 1944,

Finnish Merchant Navy,

Lisbon shipping traffic,

Turkish shipping and goods traffic with enemy countries during the first quarter of 1944,

Italian ships within our own sphere of influence in Europe,

Merchant Shipping traffic in the Kiel Canal from 2 Jan. to 29 Apr. 1944,

The shipping of ore from Scandinavia etc.

VI. Submarine Warfare

The following corrections are made to the cargo of the submarine U "178" (compare War Diary 31 May):

110 tons tin, 27 tons rubber, 2 tons tungsten.

17 submarines are in the operational area in Northern Waters.

No special reports from the Atlantic.

1 Jun. 1944

VII. Aerial Warfare

West Area:

Unfavorable weather conditions prevented large-scale enemy air activity during the day in occupied western territories. Only one air field, two trains and one anti-aircraft position were attacked.

During the night, strong enemy formations entered the area Valery en Caux, east of Paris and north of Bordeaux, and also the Cherbourg area where one air field and various points were attacked by gun fire.

Reich Territory:

Isolated enemy planes entered the area of Heligoland, Flensburg, Kiel, Duisburg and Essen during the day without attacking. During the night, 10 - 15 enemy planes entered the area Aarhus-Aalborg. For details see Situation in the Baltic. In the Freiburg, Karlsruhe and Strassbourg areas, one plane was reported, but there were no attacks.

Mediterranean Theater:

The enemy continued daylight attacks on traffic targets in Central Italy on 31 May. The air field at Castelli on the island of Crete was attacked by eleven enemy planes. A strong attack by several hundred 4-engine planes, with fighter escort, coming from South Italy over the Adriatic and Belgrade, was launched against Ploesti. Three refineries, one radio station and the South Station were hit. Our own fighters and anti-aircraft artillery brought down 28 planes; 12 of our own planes were lost.

On the Italian Front, 1,500 enemy planes were counted on operation. One of them was shot down by anti-aircraft artillery. 38 of our own fighters carried out free-lance operations in the Rome Area and shot down three enemy planes without loss to themselves.

During the night of 31 May, 30 of our own bombers attacked Aprilia with noticeable effect and without losses.

1 Jun. 1944

East Area:

On 31 May, 1,641 of our own and 570 enemy planes were recorded on operation on the Eastern Front. During these operations, 93 enemy planes were brought down, and 14 of our own were lost.

Photographic reconnaissance of Poti and the mouth of the Shopi River was made by 4th Air Force. At Poti 1 battleship, 2 heavy cruisers, 3 destroyers, 10 submarines, 14 gunboats, 4 motor torpedo boats, 3 fast motor minesweepers, 5 landing boats, 2 tankers, 12 freighters, 28 tugs, among others, were identified. In the mouth of the Shopi River were 1 training cruiser, 2 destroyers under construction, 2 submarines, 2 tankers, 3 freighters among others.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea

1. Area of Naval Group West:

Enemy Situation:

No special reports.

Own Situation:

Off the south coast, 8,500 GRT of shipping were escorted. Seven vessels were engaged in anti-submarine activities. At 2150, a guard ship was sunk off the harbor entrance of Port de Bouc during a low-level bombing attack by an enemy plane.

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Situation:

No reports were received regarding convoys UGS 42 and GUS 41. According to radio intelligence, Tobruk gave an air alarm for convoy "Blackfeet" at noon.

According to photographic reconnaissance, only a few vessels were at Bastia. Ships could not be discerned as the photographs were not clear. In the area Livorno-Elba, the presence of enemy motor

1 Jun. 1944

torpedo boats was ascertained by radar location during the night of 31 May. According to radar observation and sighting reports, 2 ships and 1 destroyer were proceeding S. W., 1 torpedo boat and 1 patrol boat E., on the route Anzio-Bonifacio Narrows during the same night. In the area Anzio-Ischia, the normal enemy coastal patrol was observed. West of Ischia, 8 landing boats and 3 patrol boats were steering course for Anzio. Further, in the area Ischia, 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, 5 patrol boats, 2 landing boats and 5 small vessels were detected on various courses. Northwest of Anzio, 3 Liberty freighters were lying stopped. Radio Intelligence intercepted traffic indicating that bombardment of the Italian west coast had been proceeding since 1030.

According to an observation from the ground, a unit consisting of apparently 1 battleship, 3 large warships and 5 transport vessels was 8 miles northwest of the mouth of the River Tiber at 1755. Their course was not reported.

Own Situation:

On 31 May, enemy air attacks were carried out on Piombino, Rio Marina, Porto Ferraio and Longone, without causing serious damage.

Escort and patrol service during the night of 31 May was carried out according to schedule. During the month of May, 21 enemy planes were shot down by naval units, while 3 others were probably shot down. Furthermore, 3 motor torpedo boats were sunk, 7 others damaged, 1 corvette damaged and 1 submarine probably sunk.

3. Area of Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic:

The PT boats S "36" and S "61" entered Cattaro at 0400. From their waiting position in the area Dubrovnik-Mljet, the boats observed two enemy destroyers, but were unable to attack because of the moonlight.

During operation "Feuerzange", 14 prisoners were taken. Our own losses were small. 5 victualling stores were destroyed, 3,000 l. of fuel and one

1 Jun. 1944

radio station were seized. 400 bandits fled across the sea in the direction of Lissa, after putting up a stiff fight at Dugiotok. Resistance on Kornat was weak.

At 2100 on 31 May, southwest of Zirje, five of our PT boats putting out from Split sank six fully loaded coastal motor boats and motor fishing vessels and one small tanker; these could not be brought in, owing to lack of time. 159 men in uniform, including English, Russians, and Americans, and also 37 women and 5 children were taken on board. The presence of Russians was later disproved. For the night of 1 June, a special operation is planned, from Corcula, against the western part of the island. Two Infantry boats and one landing craft will take part in the operation.

b. Aegean

Enemy Situation:

According to a report from Naval Officer in Charge at Coos, three British PT boats were proceeding on a southeasterly course just off the Turkish coast at 0050. 1 submarine was sighted north of Iraklion at 0935 and one northeast of Rch-tymnon at 2000. Only minor reconnaissance activity in the Aegean Area.

Own Situation:

Commandant, 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla reported that the large Crete convoy consisting of the steamers TANAIIS, GERTRUD and SABINE, escorted by 4 torpedo boats and 3 submarine chasers as well as strong air cover, was attacked with bombs and torpedoes by enemy planes towards 1830, about ten miles north of Iraklion. The steamers GERTRUD and SABINE were rendered unmanoeuvrable. Submarine chasers "2101" and "2105" were sunk. The torpedo boat TA "16" was heavily damaged. The steamer TANAIIS entered Iraklion together with the torpedo boat TA "17" and one submarine chaser. The torpedo boat TA "16" and the motor minesweeper R "211", which were damaged, are also making for Iraklion. The torpedo boat TA "19" is towing the steamer GERTRUD with survivors of submarine chaser "2105" on board. TA "14" is with steamer SABINE

1 Jun. 1944

which is burning and on which explosions are occurring. Whether she can be brought in or not is doubtful.

These losses are extremely serious to our shipping in the Aegean, especially as regards Crete supplies.

At 2020, six enemy planes attacked Porto Lago and dropped about 20 bombs, most of which fell into the sea.

The boat GA "05" was hit by a drift mine and sank at 2100, about five miles north of Milos. This was the third drift mine in these waters within a few days.

Mining operations near Corfu were completed according to schedule. In the harbor and in the roads of Syra, two mines were swept on 31 May.

c. Black Sea:

The submarine U "18" sank a tug of 300 GRT sailing in convoy about 20 miles southeast of Gelendschik on the morning of 31 May. No other events of special importance were reported from the Black Sea.

On the Danube, minelaying was observed during the night of 31 May near km-indicators 1253, 1269, 1279, 1286, 1300, 1308, 1367 and from 1636 to 1639. In Hungarian territory, 50 more mines were reported dropped between km-indicators 1253 and 1556. No reports on shipping losses. Minesweeping planes swept two mines. The river is closed at various points.

IX. Situation in the Far East

No special reports.

(6 Initials)

2 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance

No special reports.

Commander in Chief, Navy went on leave and left his command station.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. Naval Staff, Admiral Quartermaster reported that, due to the enemy air raid on Ploesti refinery, output has decreased from 13,000 to 1,000 tons daily.

II. General Admiral Boehm is expected at the Command Station on 3 June in order to discuss his new duties as Danube Overseer.

III. Chief of Naval Staff, Intelligence Division: The first Intelligence Report was issued today from Reich Security Hq., indicating that this new organization has come into force.

A new Bulgarian Government was formed under considerable difficulties arising from internal and foreign politics.

Last German Consular personnel left Tangiers on 1 June.

The relations between Japan and Russia appear to be becoming closer. Agreements regarding courier flights are being handled most amicably.

IV. Army Situation:

In Italy our own counter-offensive against the area of penetration north of Velletri had no decisive success. Our positions had to be withdrawn to the rear of the C-position. Our own front was again penetrated near Valmontone. Strong enemy forces advanced in the direction Palestrina-Cave. The situation is most critical as no more of our forces are available to block the road to Rome.

2 Jun. 1944

Special Items

I. Concerning fighter protection of our convoys in the Norwegian coastal zone, Naval Staff made the following statement to High Command, Air, Operations Staff (Navy):

A survey of the months of March and April shows that within the area of Admiral, Norwegian West Coast, fighter protection of convoys was often insufficient, while in the area of Admiral, Norwegian North Coast, it was not possible to give any fighter protection at all. In the course of two enemy raids in the latter area, carried out by carrier-borne planes, four larger steamers were lost and one suffered damage. As these were ore transports which, in view of their automatic loading devices and tonnage, represent shipping space which cannot at present be replaced, attempts must be made to reduce these losses as far as possible or even to prevent them from occurring at all. The Naval Staff asked the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping to investigate once more the question of transferring a part of the ore transports from Narvik to the ore import traffic from Sweden. In addition to that, the Air Force was requested to consider the possibility of utilizing the small fighter forces available to protect a larger sector of the coast by transferring them when required. In this connection, the Naval Staff was thinking particularly of the advisability of transferring fighter units from the South Norwegian Area, for example, to the Bodoe Area in case aircraft carriers appeared and endangered our convoys. The appearance of the carrier group on 29 May would have called for such a transfer of fighter forces if any of our convoys had been under way.

The Naval Staff believes that, by close cooperation between Naval Command, Norway and 5th Air Force, a way may be found for additional and effective help in protecting our convoys bound for Norway and Northern Waters. The efficacy of all other measures regarding the composition of convoys has been investigated over and over again. It was requested that this matter should be followed up.

II. Group South sent in the assessment of the situation in the eastern part of the Mediterranean on 24 May. For details see 1/Skl 1666/44 GKdos. Chefs. in file 1/Skl I m.

2 Jun. 1944

In view of the location of enemy troops, especially in the jumping-off area Egypt, the Group came to the conclusion that operations are imminent.

After taking into consideration all possible objectives of an enemy offensive, Group South summarized as follows:

With the exception of troop concentrations, no assembly of shipping, landing craft and warships, or of the air force was observed up to now. Incomplete air reconnaissance has, of course, to be taken into consideration.

It will, therefore, be necessary to intensify our air reconnaissance and to extend it over the whole Egyptian Area as far as Suez and beyond. Furthermore, accurate observation and evaluation of enemy air activity in the Aegean will be necessary so as to enable us to recognize the enemy's intentions in good time. Unless more reliable information can be gained, it will be impossible to come to definite conclusions regarding the intended area of operation. It can only be said that - compared with winter - the situation has changed insofar as preparations are actually going on in the Eastern Mediterranean, and it is very doubtful that they are intended for operations in the Italian or in the Far Eastern Theatre. Also, Turkey is now adopting a much more conciliatory attitude since the breaking-off of negotiations with the British and Americans.

In view of the above, an operation against the Aegean is regarded as most likely, the most dangerous possibility which must be considered first of all being a penetration far into the Thracian area, whereas Turkey's compulsory participation in the war on the Anglo-American side - probably even then only in a passive capacity - is only to be regarded as a secondary factor.

Nevertheless, possible operations against Crete and Peloponnesus as well as the possible commitment of the forces assembled as reserves in Italy should not be overlooked. Finally, it is not out of the question that the concentrations in the Egyptian area might after all merely consist in an incidental increase in numbers resulting from east-bound and west-bound troop movements converging in this area. Only continued and constant observation will reveal the true state of affairs.

2 Jun. 1944

The Naval Staff has nothing to add to this assessment of the situation.

III. The Naval Staff gave directions to Naval Chief Command, East, concerning Fuehrer Instruction 51 "Wallenstein". These will have to be considered when revising the entire plan after Group North/Fleet has handed it over to Naval Command.

For copy of Order 1/Skl I op 1661/44 GKdos., see War Diary C, File "Large-scale landings by the Enemy."

IV. Mining and Barrage Experimental Command reported on recovering a new drift mine near Wesermuende (type ELM K 1002, designation ELM/AA 2-ZE).

For copy of report, see 1/Skl 17007/44 GKdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

V. Naval Staff, Admiral Quartermaster issued instructions to Naval Command, East, Fleet Command, Training Unit, Admiral Naval Command Stations, Captain Destroyers, 2nd and 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotillas and Inspectorate of Naval Artillery regarding loading exercises and firing practice on land targets, since the loading exercises carried out at Aalborg on 16 May by the 1st Landing Div. together with 416th Infantry Division proved the necessity of training the troops and units concerned.

VI. A list of enemy units located by radio monitoring and by means of deciphering from 22 till 28 May 44 is contained in Intercept Report No. 22/44.

Situation 2 Jun. 1944

I. War in Foreign Waters

The Naval Attaché in Tokyo reports that a Japanese supply submarine is to supply "Marco Polo II" on 5 July in L Z 10. The Japanese Navy is prepared, if necessary, subsequently to supply German boat, if 200-250 tons [Translator's Note: of material in exchange for] fuel, lubricating oil and victuals are available at the same supply point.

2 Jun. 1944

II. Situation West Area

Enemy Situation:

Twenty-five planes were observed in action in the area of the 18th Group. Five British ships were located at different positions in the rendezvous area.

In the Channel, several targets on varying courses were located between 0135 and 0230 W.N.W. of Antifer.

Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast Area:

The KMA minelaying operation was abandoned for the night of 1 June because of weather conditions.

One mine was swept off Brest, six off St. Nazaire and one off La Pallice.

Minelaying was suspected from St. Nazaire to Ile d'Oléron. Twenty enemy planes were observed.

Channel Area:

Mine sweeping and convoy service was suspended because of moonlight.

Naval and Army Coastal Batteries fired several salvos on the targets located W.N.W. of Cape Antifer. The targets sheered off.

During a raid on Naval Battery Landemer in the night of 31 May, about 4-500 bombs were dropped. One 7.5 cm anti-aircraft gun was destroyed, but the battery was not put out of action.

Bombing attacks on Boulogne harbor were carried out continually around noon on 2 June. Patrol boat "1810" sank on this occasion and there were casualties. The patrol boats "1814" and "1815" as well as the minesweeper M "3880" were damaged. In addition, 1 large and 1 small floating crane were sunk. The PT-boat shelter berth was hit, but no PT-boats were damaged. The report stated that shelter berth doors were attacked with rocket or

2 Jun. 1944

glider bombs. One door of the shelter berth sank. Two shelter berth entrances were damaged. Thus two PT boats are unable to leave at high tide. Furthermore, six Naval transport vehicles were destroyed.

One gun was damaged in each battery during air attacks on Army Coastal Batteries 3/1245 and 6/1245. During an attack on Naval Battery Cape de la Heve, barracks were damaged. Further air attacks were carried out against Air Force gear on Cape de la Hague and in the Theville area. One British air/sea rescue plane, which had alighted on the water four miles northeast of Cape de la Hague, following the shooting down of an enemy plane, was repeatedly fired upon by our own batteries but without success.

Towards 1600, fighter bombers attacked the German Air Force's main searching station Guernsey with rocket bombs and gunfire. Naval batteries and harbor patrol boats shot down two enemy planes. At the same time the Radar station at Cape Antifer and barracks nearby were destroyed by bombs and gunfire.

An attack on the anti-aircraft position at Dieppe was, however, ineffective, as was a fighter-bomber attack on battery "Grosser Kurfuerst", on Radar Station Joburg and on Army Coastal Battery 3/1261. Radar Station La Pernelle was damaged by an attack carried out by 30 enemy planes. Dive bombing attacks by ten fighter bombers on the position of Battery Todt, on Gris Nez and on Radar Control position. The Battery was not put out of action.

Between 1930 and 2015, unsuccessful air attacks were carried out on Naval Battery Longues and Naval Battery Marcouf west of Quistreham.

During the night of 2 June, Calais, the area of Gris Nez, Boulogne and Wissant were attacked. Other enemy planes were observed off Cherbourg and St. Malo. The laying of mines was, therefore, suspected.

Group West considers landings in the Dutch area, on the Channel coast and along the Atlantic coast possible during the night of 2 June.

2 Jun. 1944

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

North Sea:

Patrol positions in the Heligoland Bight and off the Dutch coast were occupied according to schedule. Mine-sweeping activity was curtailed owing to stormy weather. Fifteen mines were cleared off the Hook. Patrol boat "2004" was hit by a mine off the Hook, but it was possible to bring her into Rotterdam. The same thing happened to steamer RANDVIJK (2,439 GRT). During the night of 2 June, the tug RUESTERSIEL was sunk by a mine west of Foehr.

Slight casualties were sustained during enemy gunfire attacks from the air on the mole and lighthouse at Vlieland, on lightship FRITZ, in the outer Jade River and on harbor patrol boat off Hubertgatt.

In the waters off Zeeland, two convoys of 58,340 GRT were brought through.

Convoy 1231 Hook-Elbe consisting of six steamers arrived at 2230 from the Hook. The convoy is to enter Helder during the day.

Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

In the area of the 18th Group, heavy activity by 44 planes with focal point northeast of the Shetlands was detected. Frequent sightings of our own submarines in the northern part of the North Sea probably caused this increased activity in the area of the 18th Group, the area of the 19th Group on occasion not being covered.

Hammerfest continuously located British units.

Own Situation:

At 1546 a submarine alarm was given for Vest Fjord as a result of an aircraft sighting report. Shipping between Bodoe and Loedingen is suspended and anti-submarine activity has begun.

2 Jun. 1944

Referring to the attack on our convoy near Stadtlandet, the following is reported: Enemy air formation consisted mainly of single-engined fast fighters of uncertain type and a few twin-engined bombers. The daring execution of the operation and accurate bombing on the targets was most remarkable. Sperrbrecher "181" was entirely burned out after continuous explosions and became a total loss. Rescue and salvage on the steamer FLORIDA is being continued. Up to now, 35-40 men are reported dead and 80-90 injured.

One British officer of the Fleet Air Arm was taken prisoner. According to information from 5th Air Force, carrier-borne aircraft are assumed.

S.O. of convoy reported eight planes shot down. Relay escort reported three planes shot down and two planes on fire. For battle report of 23rd Minesweeping Flotilla, see W.T. message 2000.

Thirty ships were escorted to the North, 22 ships to the South.

Naval Command, Norway, reported the noticeable lack of fast and seaworthy vessels possessing some fighting strength for carrying out submarine rescue work and requested allocation of a subdivision of destroyers or torpedo boats in order to protect especially valuable convoys, for operations connected with enemy landings, and for defending our own submarines in coastal waters.

Naval Staff recognized the legitimacy of this request but had to state that it was impossible, because the necessary naval forces were not available, and other tasks were more urgent.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Enemy Situation:

In the Gulf of Finland, further numerous Russian war vessels were again sighted at 0249, obviously patrol and minesweeping units. Near Neugrund, four motor torpedo boats were also observed, which were probably engaged in minelaying.

2 Jun. 1944

South of Kronstadt, a submarine was sighted on varying courses.

Own Situation:

Thirty-seven boats were engaged in minesweeping duties in the Baltic Sea Entrances, and forty-two boats and four minesweeping planes in the Baltic.

A total of seven mines was cleared.

On the west coast of Jutland, three patrol positions were occupied. In the Baltic approaches, transport units of the 25th Tank Division were escorted with the destroyer Z "31" and the KARL GALSTER to Frederikshavn, and with the NUERNBERG to Copenhagen. With a further convoy of two transports from Oslo to Aarhus, the transport of the 25th Tank Division will be completed.

In the area of Commander Minesweepers, Baltic, three troop transports were escorted in each direction between Hangoe and Danzig.

On Lake Peipsi, escort and patrol duties were carried out according to schedule. The torpedoboat T "30" entered Reval.

No special events reported from the Narva patrol, submarine and barrage net control.

V. Submarine Warfare

Enemy Situation:

Every month, four large convoys put out from New York for England, and three convoys and one troop-transport formation leave for Gibraltar. The same number of convoys puts into New York.

The outgoing convoys assemble in CA 5230 and proceed to England on a mean course E. or S.E. to Gibraltar, keeping north of the Bermudas. According to observations to date, the traffic joining the convoys from the south keeps within the 20-200 metre line and, coming from the Windward Passage, proceeds on a northerly course for New York.

2 Jun. 1944

Own Situation:

On 30 May, the submarine U "547" sank with a Fat (torpedo) a single steamer of 5,000 GRT proceeding east in ET 6115. In Northern Waters, the patrol line was withdrawn at 1600 via position 1-AB 2818 and 9117 to position 2-AB 4643 to 8836. Position 2 is to be taken up at 1600 on 4 June.

In the morning, two boats sighted a periscope in all three times in the patrol line. The presence of an enemy submarine is to be assumed south of Bear Island.

VI. Aerial Warfare

West Area:

More than 3,000 enemy planes were reported during the day, operating under favorable weather conditions in the occupied western areas and attacking the defense zones at Boulogne, St. Pol as well as traffic installations and air fields in the areas of Brussels and Fécamp.

During the night, about 400 enemy planes entered the western area and attacked railway installations as well as anti-aircraft positions and the defense zone in the Calais-Boulogne area. A further 180 planes attacked the transformer station and railway installations near Trappes; where more than 150 wagons were set on fire and 1,000 were damaged.

Twenty planes dropped mines in the area off Brest. Fifty-two of our own night-fighters shot down twelve enemy planes.

Reich Territory:

During the day, 16 Mustangs entered the Heligoland Bight without attacking. In the night, 40-50 Mosquitoes were reported in the industrial area of the Rhineland and Westphalia; they dropped bombs on Cologne, Duesseldorf, and other places.

2 Jun. 1944

Mediterranean Theater:

At the front, about 1,150 enemy planes were observed in operation. Five fighter bombers sank one steamer in the harbor of Marina di Carrara. During an attack carried out by four Spitfires on the aerodrome at Bihac, three of our own planes were destroyed on the ground.

The Crete convoy sailing on 1 June was protected by strong air escort. When the enemy attacked, twenty-five of our own planes were over the convoy and shot down four of the fifty attacking enemy planes.

On the 2nd, our own planes carried out reconnaissance flights over Italian and Greek waters. On the Island of Brac, the transfer of 3-4,000 enemy troops was observed in the south of the island, during the early morning hours of 2 June. Two PT boats, 2 LCA's, 14 small boats and 3 sailing vessels were observed off the island.

East Area:

On the Eastern Front, 1,117 of our own planes were recorded on operation during 1 June, and 428 in the night of 1 June. The enemy sent out 880 planes. His losses amounted to 22, and our own to 9, 5 of these being over enemy territory.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Area of Naval Group West:

Enemy Situation:

On the 31st, a cruiser of the COVENTRY class and one destroyer put into Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

On the morning of the 2nd, one destroyer and three submarines passed Cape Spartel eastward bound. In the afternoon, an auxiliary aircraft carrier escorted by three destroyers left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

According to radio intelligence, the convoy "GUS 41" was in the waters off Oran on the morning of 1 June and in the area west of Oran during the night of 1 June.

2 Jun. 1944

Own Situation:

A search for submarines off the south coast of France was so far unsuccessful. At 0840, SG (high speed escort vessel) "11" was torpedoed by an enemy submarine off Port Vendres and sank with heavy casualties.

2. Area of German Naval Command Italy:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio monitoring, Bengasi gave an air-raid warning for three escort units at 0822.

Air reconnaissance at 0137 in the night of 1 June revealed that 1 destroyer, 2 escort vessels, 1 merchant ship and 1 landing craft were 21 miles E.N.E. of Porto Vecchio, making for the Straits of Bonifacio. Two small war vessels and three (presumably) minesweepers were observed en route from Naples to the Straits of Bonifacio. On the evening of the 1st, air reconnaissance reported smoke screens off the mouth of the Tiber and heavy artillery fire from the sea.

At 0130 on the 2nd, artillery fire from heavy units in the sector Fiumicino, west of Ostia, was observed from the ground. Presumably it came from the unit which had been sighted on the afternoon of 1 Jun. During the night of 2 June, vessels, probably PT boats, were located by radar in the Piombino Narrows. There was no contact with the enemy.

In the early morning of 2 June, northwest of Ponza, 4 (apparently) light PT-boat chasers, 1 destroyer, 1 escort vessel and 4 small war vessels were steering course for Anzio. In the Anzio area, the normal patrol service was observed. On the morning of the 2nd, there was a large number of ships in Anzio.

Own Situation:

On the morning of the 1st, a barge was sunk during an air attack on Marina di Carrara.

During the night, our convoy of naval ferry barges proceeding south was unsuccessfully attacked with

2 Jun. 1944

bombs and gunfire by enemy fighter bombers in the area of the Vada-Piombino Narrows.

Convoy and patrol duties were carried out according to schedule.

During the month of May in the area of the German Naval Command, Italy, 11,600 tons of supplies and 10,300 tons of other goods were unloaded on the west coast of Italy. On the east coast, supplies carried amounted to 6,400 tons, and other transport to 11,600 tons capacity.

In the Eastern Adriatic, a total of 54,600 tons was unloaded or loaded in Venice.

3. Area of Naval Group, South:

a. Adriatic:

Enemy Situation:

In the afternoon, according to air reconnaissance, there were three PT boats northeast of Bari steering on a northeasterly course, and 6 coastal patrol boats north of Bari. In the harbor of Lissa and in the bays, no unusual concentrations were noted.

Own Situation:

According to a supplementary report, a Sicbel ferry was sunk by fighter bombers south of Fiume about noon on the 30th. On this occasion, two of the attacking planes were shot down.

Our own artillery fired on the enemy, who had landed on the isle of Brac. Our counter operations on Brac are continuing.

The PT boats S "36" and S "61" will operate in those waters in the night of 2 June. Hvar was evacuated by our troops with the exception of the eastern part of the island.

b. Aegean:

Admiral Aegean reported further details about the heavy losses sustained by us in the air attack on the large Crete convoy on 1 June.

2 Jun. 1944

The steamer GERTRUD was towed into Iraklion at 0430 on the 2nd. The steamer sank in the evening, following a heavy explosion in the forward part of the ship.

The steamer SABINE burned out completely and sank.

There were several enemy air raids on Iraklion during the night of 1 June. The commanding officer and a large part of the crew of submarine chaser "2105" were rescued, as well as 66 men of submarine chaser "2101" including the flotilla commander and the commanding officer. The torpedo boat, TA "16" was heavily damaged. The Navy reported up to now six enemy planes shot down, four by the torpedo boat TA "16". For copy of the report in question, see teletype 0720.

c. Black Sea:

According to air reconnaissance during the night of 1 June, there were small coastal vessels for the first time in Otchakov harbor.

Apparently there was still no shipping in Odessa.

Own Situation:

War freighters HEIDELBERG, PELIKAN and ERPEL passed through the Dardanelles and entered the Aegean.

Mine sweeping in the area Varna-Burgas and Constanța-Sulina was without success.

Eight harbor defense boats left Constanța and Sulina, in the night of 2 June, for mine spotting duties.

Situation on the Danube:

The laying of two mines was observed near Km indicator 1526. On the 1st and 2nd, vessels cleared three mines on the river. Minesweeping planes cleared nine mines. No vessels were reported lost.

VIII. Situation in East Asia

Nothing to report.

3 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance

Nothing to report.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. Concerning the question of vessels for Coastal Mine A operations (compare War Diary, 30 May), Group West reported as follows:

"1. Results of enquiry: Scelocwe barges - apart from having completely insufficient speed (3-4 sm) - were entirely unfit for rebuilding them for minelaying. Under the best possible conditions, they might be employed for mine-dropping on a completely calm sea by tugging them backwards. At the present vessel situation, mine-planting in the Channel would come to an end within a short time. Up to now, 2,900 Coastal Mine A's were laid out. In connection with these operations, 2 mine layers, 3 Naval ferry barges sunk, 4 mine layers were so badly damaged that they would not be ready for war for a considerable time. Further losses were to be expected. Two Sicbel ferries which were on their way here would not bring about a noticeable improvement of the vessel situation, especially since one of the ferries still remained in the Netherlands and was not ready for war. The laying out of Coastal Mine A even now does not correspond to the already very slow production. About 20,000 Coastal Mine A's were still to be laid.

"2. Considering the present position of the enemy in the Channel, the use of torpedo boats for laying out flank barrages was no more within the right proportions compared with the effectiveness of these barrages. During the last month in the course of mine operations, 1 torpedo boat sank, 2 were heavily damaged, and one suffered minor damages. Because of losses and considering the worsened mine situation, none of the mines provided were laid during the month of May. Nevertheless, continuing of the mine operations by means of torpedo boats was intended until other vessels would be made available.

3 Jun. 1944

"3. Moreover, a quick laying-out of alarm barrages and the fouling with mines of the harbors was rendered doubtful, as not enough vessels were available.

"4. As the delivery of ten naval landing craft which had been asked for was refused by Naval Command and as the Seeloewe barges did not prove suitable, he reported that the Coastal Mine A program could not be fulfilled without delivery of auxiliary vessels at least temporarily fit for Coastal Mine A planting. He asked to examine the question whether it would be possible to make available by way of command ruling as an immediate program some artillery naval landing craft in construction or any other naval landing craft or artillery lighters.

"5. In addition to that, he asked for delivery of at least eight new naval landing craft out of the normal home production in order to replace losses- which already had occurred or the occurrence of which had to be reckoned with- of the naval landing craft group provided for the fouling of harbors. It was his intention to use them not only together with the torpedo boats for the Coastal Mine A program but also for laying out flank barrages."

The question urgently requires a solution as laying-out of the Coastal Mine A has to be continued under all circumstances.

II. Following the damage done to the gates of the PT-boat dug-outs on 2 June, Chief of Naval Staff asked for the protection of the dug-outs for submarines and PT-boats against rocket bombs or gliding bombs hitting from the side. The protection had to be provided quickly in order to prevent the enormous efforts of the dug-out building from becoming frustrated.

III. Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Intelligence Division:

Military attaché at Ankara disbelieved in offensive intentions of the enemy in the area of the eastern part of the Mediterranean.

3 Jun. 1944

IV. Situation of the Army:

The order of the British command to the French terrorist organisation to watch British broadcasting continuously in order to be able to catch the keyword, indicated the possibility of an immediately imminent invasion. Department for Foreign Armies, West regarded as favorable landing time the period from 5 June to 13 June.

In the East, our attacks in the battle area Jassy were continued with effective assistance of the Air Force in spite of strong counter-attacks.

According to reports of Army Group North Ukraine, a formation of about 300 U.S. bombing planes escorted by fighters crossed the front section of the 1st Hungarian Army for N.E. direction - apparently on a transfer flight to Russian aerodromes.

According to publications of the enemy, this was in accordance with an agreement which allowed airplanes of the Anglo-Americans and the Russians the mutual use of allied aerodromes in order to increase opportunities for raids against the Reich territory and the territories of our allies in the S.F. area.

In Italy, the enemy's penetration into our front line could be stopped to some extent. Yet the situation remained as critical as before. The main difficulty consisted in the severe limitation of the movements of our own reserves caused by the enemy's superiority in the air.

Special Items:

I. The statement regarding the question of an organization for the Danube, which was requested from Group South, has now arrived. Copy of the corresponding teleprint message as per 1/Skl 17124/44 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV a.

II. The development of mine warfare during the last month clearly showed that the enemy had enough forces and sufficient material on hand to intensify continuously the mine warfare, whereas our own defensive means are insufficient to prevent the enemy from doing so.

3 Jun. 1944

Mines Cleared:

		<u>Baltic Sea</u>		<u>North Sea</u>	
January	1944	24	British air-to-air mines	79	British air-to-air mines
February	1944	88	"	124	"
March	1944	157	"	163	"
April	1944	235	"	353	"
May	1944	431	"	177	"

Production of as many Sperrbrechers as possible was therefore urgently required.

As the enemy, among his many types of mines, employed a special Sperrbrecher mine, under the present conditions of Sperrbrecher equipment every Sperrbrecher was bound with great probability to be hit directly sooner or later and would not be available then for several months provided that she was not lost completely. In case of heavy damage, the Sperrbrecher burdened the dockyards for a long time with repair work. Therefore, in the opinion of Naval Staff, Operations Division, the installation of an additional coil is absolutely necessary for all new constructions, as this is the only remedy against the enemy's Sperrbrecher mine, even if, for the first time, the date of readiness is thereby postponed. In case the Sperrbrechers are equipped without the additional coil, the dockyards will be blocked for many months by many more damaged Sperrbrechers within a short time, and the Sperrbrechers will not bring the good results as expected.

Admiral Quartermaster was asked to study the question of installing additional coils in the wartime Sperrbrecher and to bring about -if possible- a decision on the a/m lines.

Corresponding order Naval Staff, 1/Sk1 I E 16262/44 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

III. Naval Command, North proposed to renounce the preparing of the first four new constructions of wartime Sperrbrechers for special purpose and asked to convert these ships into anti-aircraft escort vessels.

3 Jun. 1944

Naval Staff, Operations Division was of the opinion that this request should not be approved. The development of mine-warfare prohibited any adjournment in the production of Sperrbrechers and on the contrary made necessary- following the opinion of Naval Staff, Operations Division- every possible help for the Sperrbrecher programme.

Situation 3 Jun. 1944:

I. War in Foreign waters:

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

In the area of the 19th Group, 25 planes were observed in operation. In the rendezvous area, eight British units were located in various positions.

In the Channel, a target was located between 0232 and 0354 steering with varying course N.E. of Cherbourg.

According to reports from Reich Security Central Office, 28 preliminary alarm messages were intercepted which were sent out by Radio London on 1 Jun., destined for agent groups and which apparently represented orders for immediate readiness. For the time being, the orders were stipulated till 15 Jun. This way of communicating orders, which had been arranged since long time ago, has now been used for the first time. The beginning of the invasion till 15 Jun. has therefore to be reckoned with. Nevertheless, it is not impossible that it was only for training purposes. Receivers are mostly located in the Bretagne, Normandy, at Lille/Amiens. (See teletype 1320).

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast Area:

Off the harbors, seven mines were cleared. Submarine hunting by one subdivision off Bilbao was unsuccessful.

3 Jun. 1944

At noon the mine sweeper M"4003" was hit by a mine in the Camaret Bay near Brest and sunk without losses of the crew.

One arriving submarine was escorted.

Off Lorient, one submarine subdivision was attacked by bombs and gunfire of six Mosquitoes. Losses of the crew occurred.

During the night following 3 Jun., laying of a Coastal Mine A barrage south of Gironde is planned.

Channel Waters:

West of Nieuport and off Cherbourg, three mines were cleared.

The use of gliding bombs and rocket missiles on the occasion of the attack on the dug-out gates of the PT-boat dug-outs at Boulogne was not confirmed. An ordinary bomb carpet was dropped from an altitude of 6 - 7000 m from behind a ten tenth cloud base.

Many batteries at the Channel coast again underwent strongest air raids. In the harbor of Boulogne, one artillery carrier was heavily damaged. Battery "Grosser Kurfuerst" and the control position of battery "Todt" as well as the control position of battery "Stella Plage" and battery Cape de la Heve suffered minor damages. All batteries were embrasured. Further damages occurred at the Army batteries. A direct hit destroyed the dug-out for the crew of radar station Gris Nez. Dropping of rocket-bombs was reported at Cape Antifer, Cape de la Hague and Air Force main location station Guernsey. Other bombs fell on street bridges and on the city of Rouen. The Seine water way was closed by the crash of an iron bridge. No serious damages nor casualties were caused by bombs dropped in the harbor Calais as far as was reported up to now. For detailed specification of the results of the raid, see teletype 0600 and 1935.

Group West planned laying one coastal mine A barrage sector each North of Le Treport and West of Trouville during the night of 4 Jun., provided the weather conditions are favorable.

3 Jun. 1944

Special Items:

1. Group West thought that, considering the experience of our last operations, no strategic success could be expected in case the operation "Dragoner" would be repeated because of the strong enemy air force. The Group nevertheless has no objections that more submarines be sent into the operational area in order to complete experiences and to train the commanding officers for their duties under war conditions.

2. Group West reported that agreements between Naval Staff and Inspector of air-to-air mines fixing the sea areas for unrestricted mine laying for a longer period seemed unsuitable considering the experiences that had been made. Commander in Chief, German Air Force, had permitted the employment of 3rd Air Force for mine laying, but he had not ordered it. Apparently he did not like it, with the exception of dropping Bomb Mine "1000" on harbors and ship concentrations. Therefore, operations with air-to-air mines in the waters released by the Naval Staff were only started in case no opportunities existed of attacking harbors. Up to now, only one operation each was carried out on both sides of the Isle of Wight by the end of April. The next operation, according to information from 3rd Air Force, was not planned before 10 Jun. The Group suggested that on every single occasion decision on the release of sea areas for air-to-air mine operations should be left to the Group, because close cooperation with 3rd Air Force and IXth Fliegerkorps was guaranteed and as dropping of air-to-air mines outside harbors would not take place without previous discussion with Group West.

Naval Staff did not intend to interfere with temporary agreements between Group West and Air Force Commands regarding the mine laying in certain enemy coastal zones.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

West of Hook, eleven mines were cleared. Northwest of Walcheren, a Coastal Mine A barrage was laid.

In the Ijsselmeer and in the Zealand waters, ten convoys of about 79,000 BRT were escorted. No special events were reported from the mine-sweeping and patrol duties.

3 Jun. 1944

During the month of May in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses North, 254 ground mines were cleared. Sixteen planes were shot down and 4 PT-boats were sunk. 952 ships of 1,126,679 BRT were escorted. Twenty-seven of these, with a total of 383,615 BRT were escorted in the Netherlands area. In addition, 19 short escorts of supply ships and 10 escorts of war ships were carried out.

Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

In the area of 18th Group, 42 planes were located in the central and northern parts of the North Sea. Hammerfest (station) located a British unit in 268° at 0855.

Own Situation:

Naval Command, Norway reported on the successful carrying out of the operation "Bassgeiger".

Forty-nine ships were escorted to the North and twenty-four ships to the South.

On 2 Jun., enemy planes were reported in the Stadtlandet area and two planes in the Bergen area.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

In the Gulf of Finland, the air-reconnaissance in the areas of Lavansaari, Seiskari, Battaranaja Bay and mouth of the Luga was without special results. In AO 3716 West of Kurgalski reef, about ten buoys were sighted along a line N.W. - S.E. Apparently they were intended to mark the passage through the shallow waters North of Kurgalow.

According to a report from Tuetters, ten boats were sighted at 0410 Southwest of Lavansaari.

3 Jun. 1944

Own Situation:

In the Baltic Sea Entrances, 30 boats were engaged in the mine-clearance and 44 boats and 7 mine sweeping planes in the Baltic Sea. A total of seven mines was reported successfully cleared. Escort duties were carried out according to plan. Transfer of the 25th Tank Division to Denmark was completed at 1800. In the area of Commander Minesweepers, Baltic, 6th Destroyer Flotilla consisting of the destroyers Z"28", Z"39", Z"35" and Z"25" as well as the torpedo boat T"30" entered Reval. The minelayers "Elsass" and "Brummer" anchored off Reval. In the area Mummasaare, eight naval landing craft were engaged in laying a Coastal Mine A barrage. In the night following 3 Jun., four of our PT-boats were lying in a lurking position near Sillamee without result. No special events reported during the patrol of Narva Bay, submarine control and net control.

No special reports came in from Lake Peipsi.

V. Submarine Warfare:

No special reports came in from the Northern Waters, from the Indian Ocean, or from the Atlantic.

VI. Aerial Warfare:West Area:

Strong enemy air formations entered the occupied western territories during daylight and attacked the defense zones in the area Calais - Boulogne, as well as villages in Belgium and Northern France, aerodromes in Western France and the aerodromes at Rouen and Caen. During the night, the attacks on the defense zones between Calais and Boulogne as well as on the aerodromes were continued. Twenty planes laid mines in the waters around Brest.

Our own fighters patrolled along the coast between Cherbourg and Ostend without encountering the enemy.

3 Jun. 1944

Reich Territory:

During daytime, no enemy planes entered the Reich territory. In the night following 3 Jun., Mannheim was attacked by 50 enemy planes.

Mediterranean Theater:

On 2 Jun., 1200 enemy planes were operating in the front area in Italy. One of them was shot down by anti-aircraft guns. Other strong enemy formations attacked railway lines, bridges, roads as well as one aerodrome in middle Italy. Isolated planes attacked Ferraria at Elba. In the area of Air Force Command S.W., the harbor Iraklion was attacked by 30 enemy planes. One steamer was sunk on that occasion. Several hundreds of bombers escorted by fighters crossed the Serbian area and entered Hungaria, attacking railway stations and railway installations as well as towns in Hungaria including Szeged, Grosswardein, Klausenburg and others. The center of activities was Szolnok. Three hundred planes (200 bombers and 100 fighters) continued their flight to the Kiev area, where aerodromes for Anglo-American planes have been made available.

During the night of 2 Jun., in the Balcan area, 50 enemy planes were reported supplying the bandits. Coming from the South of Italy, 30 enemy planes were engaged in mine dropping in the Danube between Kalafat and Lom.

On 3 Jun., our own planes carried out reconnaissance flights in the Italian area. In the waters northwest of Bengasi, two convoys were observed.

Eastern Area:

On 2 Jun. at the Eastern Front, 1228 daylight operations and 392 night operations of our own planes were reported. Twelve of our planes were lost. 1085 daylight operations and 138 night operations of the enemy were counted. Twenty-six enemy planes were shot down.

3 Jun. 1944

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea:

1. Area of Naval Group. West:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

Submarine hunting off Toulon was without success.

Group West released a number of small ports of the southern coast for anticipated destruction. These ports include Mentone, St. Raphael and beside the mouths of the Orb and of the Aude. For details, compare teletype 1545.

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Situation:

At noon of 2 Jun., one PT-boat was sighted steering from Corsica to Capraia. In the night of 2 Jun., two convoys, escorted by 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers and 6 patrol boats, were steering on a N.W. course in the sea area Ponza-Ischia.

According to reconnaissance from the air at noon, strong increase of landing craft could be discerned in the harbor and off Anzio.

Own Situation:

Fighter-bomber attack on Porto Ferraio on 2 Jun. caused no serious damages. In the night following 2 Jun. south of Vada, motor mine sweepers engaged in channel sweeping were attacked with rocket bombs from planes flying at low altitude.

The motor mine sweeper R"212" was hit twice and had to be beached. One of the attacking planes was set on fire.

3 Jun. 1944

At 0050, a south-bound convoy consisting of naval landing craft and other barges sighted shadows of ships 16 miles S.S.E. of Spezia in southern direction.

At 0100 a south-bound convoy consisting of the motor mine sweeper RA"259" and the war freighter KT"35" had a brush with two enemy torpedo boats and five (apparently) PT-boats about ten miles S.S.E. of Spezia. The enemy did not answer our fire. Our ships managed to escape two torpedoes. Some of the enemy PT-boats were probably hit. The convoy entered Livorno undamaged. At 0130 north of Piombino, enemy fighter-bombers attacked with gunfire and rockets a south-bound convoy of naval landing craft and other barges. Control boat "7007" burned out and sank. Another control boat and one naval landing craft suffered minor damages. The convoy entered Piombino.

3. Area of Naval Group, South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

At 1240 about twelve vessels were sighted steering on a northern course about eight miles northwest of Saseno; apparently this was a bigger convoy. At 1850 at the Army strongpoint north of Sibenik, a cruiser or a destroyer was sighted in a distance of 20 km and approaching from S.W.

Own Situation:

Our own counter operations against Brac are going on. In the night following 1 Jun., our PT-boat flotilla had an engagement near the isle of Zirje with a heavily armed and armoured enemy artillery carrier which was hit. Two of our boats were damaged. Fighting was discontinued therefore at 0314. During the night following 2 May [apparently mistake for 2 Jun.] 7th PT-boat Flotilla was not operating, because only one boat was ready for operation.

3 Jun. 1944

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

In the night of 2 Jun., one submarine was reported at the northern end of Coos.

Own Situation:

During the same night near Chios, one of our convoys was fired upon, probably by PT-boats from Turkish territorial waters. The fire was returned. No damages occurred.

On the evening of 2 Jun., an auxiliary sailing vessel exploded in the harbor of Piraeus, probably by sabotage. One British plane, probably a mine-carrier, was shot down by GA boats near the Steno narrows.

The heavily damaged torpedo boat TA"16" sank with casualties of the crew following the explosion of steamer "Gerhard" at Iraklion. It was reported, in connection with the loss of the steamer "Gertrud", that the steamer was hit midship about 1800 on the occasion of the enemy air raid on the harbor of Iraklion. The fire reached the fore body and affected ammunition which exploded. Considerable damage was done to buildings in the harbor and in the town area. The steamer "Tanais" of the Crete convoy shot down one enemy plane between Milos and Crete on 1 Jun.

Group South sent in its judgment concerning the situation of Naval transport in the Aegean waters. For the supply of Crete, Dodecanese, part of the Peloponnesus and Western Greece, the monthly demand on transport amounted to 24,000 tons capacity. Including the last reinforcements from the Black Sea, 16,000 tons capacity with a circulation of once per month were available for this purpose. In addition to that, 3,500 tons capacity of german-manned auxiliary sailing vessels with a circulation of twice per month were available. Thus the transport of 23,000 tons capacity per month is possible without taking into account delay caused by weather conditions or by difficulties in the convoy system. The demand for transport could therefore only be complied with under normal weather conditions if further auxiliary sailing vessels were taken from the civilian sector and if losses and delay of the convoys could be avoided. The greatest danger came from the

3 Jun. 1944

enemy air force and enemy submarines. Protection against enemy planes could not be effected by the Navy. The supply traffic could, therefore, only be maintained if it was possible to check the enemy's air superiority by the employment of strong fighter and heavy fighter forces on our side. For copy of the corresponding report, see teletype 2035.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

No special reports.

Own Situation:

Convoys were escorted along the western coast according to schedule. The steamer "Lola" left Varna for the Bosphorus.

According to information from the Naval Attaché in Istanbul, the tug "Katja" was released by the Turkish Government with 566 men. She was ordered to leave the Bosphorus on 4 Jun. at dawn. It has been arranged that she will be met by one submarine-destroyer and three mine-sweepers.

The submarine U"23" destroyed an open fishing smack with hand-grenades at 1006 on 2 Jun. and sank by "Zaunkoenig" a motor gunboat north of Poti.

d. Situation on the Danube:

The river constructions of the Danube in the sector of the Iron Gate were attacked with explosive bombs for the first time. Group South suggested the use of smoke covers for the most important sectors in addition to an increased anti-aircraft protection, which had been asked for already.

VIII. Situation in East Asia:

Nothing to report.

4 Jun. 1944
Sunday

Items of Political Importance:

Nothing to report.

Conference on the Situation with the Head of Naval Staff:

I. Chief, Naval Staff, Admiral Quartermaster reported on the smoke exercise of the Battle-Group at Altafjord on 2 Jun. which had shown some progress. The air reporting service proved to be of decisive importance for the security of the Battle-Group. The warning time was reduced from 13 to 4 Minutes. It is necessary to install the big Freya set in order to locate the approaching air enemy as early as possible.

II. General-Admiral Boehm had to refuse acceptance of the duties concerning the Danube defenses because of health reasons. Now General-Admiral Marshall was asked to take over this post.

III. The Chief, Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division: The transfer of U.S. air forces to aerodromes in Western Russia was amply commented on in foreign newspapers. Shuttle-flights intend to obtain better attacking positions against the German armament-industries which shifted eastward! Aerodromes in Italy and North Africa would also be made available for this purpose.

Hints in the foreign press, indicating that the invasion of western Europe is imminent in the near future, appeared in ever increasing numbers: proclamations to the populations of the occupied territories, especially to the French, discussions about the intensified air warfare as a preparation for the invasion etc.

The Naval attaché in Lisbon reported that the British are now demanding a complete embargo on the tungsten imports to Germany and that they are referring to the treaty of alliance. Salazar will bring the matter before the cabinet conference.

The confirmed figures of enemy merchant shipping sunk during the month of May show 119,000 BRT.

4 Jun. 1944

In a highly restricted circle:

IV. Army Position:

The situation in front of Rome is most critical. The enemy turned the western side of the Alban Mount. At the other sectors of the Italian front the withdrawal of our troops was carried out according to plans. The 1st Air Force Infantry Division will be transferred from France. Our complete weakness in the air is affecting the situation in a most disturbing way.

Situation 4 Jun. 1944:

I. War in Foreign Waters:

Nothing to report.

II. Situation in the West Area:

Enemy Position:

In the area of 19th Group, 14 planes were located mostly between 1400 and 1700. Reports on the locations did not arrive.

Own Position:

Atlantic Coast Area:

Minesweeping planes cleared four mines off Brest and St. Nazaire. In the night following 2 Jun., the dropping of three mines was observed off Brest. At 0210 patrol boat "724" hit a mine and sunk off Carmaret Bay.

Channel Area:

Off Le Havre 32 mines were cleared. Near St. Malo the minesweeper M"4606" was damaged by mine explosion. The boat was able to enter the harbor.

4 Jun. 1944

The enemy's air offensive against the coastal defenses and inland defensive zones was continued with undiminished intensity. In the early morning hours an unsuccessful attack of fighter bombers against 38th Mine Sweeper Flotilla was reported. On the occasion of the attack on Battery Bastion on the 3rd Jun., one 19.4 cm gun was destroyed and one gun damaged. During attacks on the Batteries "Grosser Kurfuerst", Lindemann and Sangatte as well as during attacks on Boulogne, Wimereux, Calais and Gravelines no military damage was done. By a new attack on Rouen the lower Seine bridge broke down thus rendering water traffic impossible. Besides, one concrete barge sank. At Boulogne, patrol-boat "1810" was hit by a bomb and sunk. As the crew was in the dug out, the losses of the guard were small.

During attacks on the firing positions of Army Coastal Batteries 2/1260 and 3/1260, six guns were destroyed. Casualties occurred. Further attacks were directed against the radar-station and batteries at Cape de la Heve and at Cape Antifer. Some of the instruments and the barracks were damaged.

The Commanding Admiral, Channel Coast calculated the loss of guns as a result of enemy action as amounting to 2.7% up to now. He pointed to the increased use of rocket bombs and to the intensified attacks with gunfire from planes flying at low altitudes.

W. of Trouville 75 Coastal Mine A were layed and 80 N.E. of Le Treport.

Group West regarded landing possibilities during the night of 4 Jun. as improbable in the areas of the Netherlands and on the Channel coast but thought them possible at the Atlantic coast.

Special Items:

Commanding Admiral, Defenses West reported in the survey of the situation for May 1944: In the Bay of Biscay 54 vessels with a total of 7,100 BRT., excluding the ore traffic, were escorted. Besides 4,900 tons of ore were imported from Spain by 201 vessels with 84,000 BRT. In the Biscayan Waters 174 mines were cleared. Twenty eight submarines were escorted coming in and seventeen submarines going out.

In the Channel area, with the exception of the Channel Islands, 62 vessels with 23,000 BRT and in the area of the

4 Jun. 1944

Channel Islands 199 vessels with 730,000 BRT were escorted. There were 187 mines cleared. Eight enemy planes were shot down by the forces under the command of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses West during 42 air attacks.

Off the Southern Coast the forces under the command of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West escorted 25 vessels with 44,000 BRT. Five submarines coming in and six submarines going out were escorted as well as four submarines on trial trips.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

Off the Elbe 13 mines were cleared. Off the Dutch coast the patrol positions were not occupied because of the prevailing weather conditions. Mine-sweeping work was not carried out. North of Terschelling five mines were cleared.

In the Ijsselmeer and in the Zealand waters about 21,000 BRT were escorted.

On the East coast of Walcheren four sea-air-to-air mines were discovered and rendered inactive. In the morning hours of 4 Jun., off the Dutch coast, several detonations were heard which were attributed partly to mines and partly to bomb-droppings.

The convoy 1251 Hook-Elbe reached Borkum. The convoy 497 Elbe-Hook continued its voyage from Borkum at 1930.

Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Position:

In the area of 18th Group 32 planes were located operating over the North Sea.

Own Position:

On the afternoon of 3 Jun. one plane was reported in the Vardoe area. In the Petsamo area eight planes were

4 Jun. 1944

observed dropping bombs.

Twenty four ships in each direction were escorted to the North and to the South.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

Enemy Position:

In the Gulf of Finland the movements of enemy patrol boats and minesweeping vessels continued during the afternoon of 3 Jun. At 2352 the southern group of our Narva patrol was attacked by four to eight PT-boats. Two of the attacking boats were sunk by our own minesweepers and by boats of the 24th Landing Flotilla without losses on our side. The enemy withdrew behind smoke cover in S.E. direction.

At 0126 on the 4th Jun., three enemy PT-boats were steering on a southern course east of Hochland.

Our air reconnaissance sighted ten square pontoons in the harbor of Rutschi. On 4 Jun. our patrol boats identified again the enemy minesweeper formation and opened fire. Shortly after midnight of 4 Jun. a new encounter with several enemy PT-boats took place of which again two were sunk. On this occasion the minesweeper M"37" was hit by a torpedo and sunk. Most of the crew were rescued.

The Finns reported at 0900 one tug with a barge and four auxiliary mine-sweepers crossing W. of Kronstadt and at 1255 two torpedo-boats 12 sm east of Schepel steering for varying directions.

A supplementary report was received that gunnery practice of a destroyer had been observed near Kronstadt on 26 May. This is the first reappearance of a larger vessel in that area.

According to air reconnaissance 4 patrol boats, 2 minesweepers, 3 motor boats, 34 tugs and 23 smaller boats were present in the Gdovka- mouth.

4 Jun. 1944

Own Position:

Mine clearance duties were carried out in the Baltic Sea Entrances by 23 boats and in the Baltic Sea by 23 boats and minesweeping planes. A total of 13 mines were cleared.

At the West coast of Jutland three patrol positions were occupied. Laying of Coastal Mine A was given up because of the bad weather.

Convoys were escorted according to plans.

The 6th Destroyer Flotilla and both mine boats moved from Reval to Baltic Port. In the Irben Narrows an enemy plane running-in against a convoy was shot down by patrol boat "314". Net-laying in Loksa in order to prepare anchorage grounds will probably start on 8 Jun.

In the Gulf of Finland two more Coastal Mine A barrages were laid out.

Special Items:

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff ordered Commanding General, Armed Forces, Denmark to make available at the request of Naval Command, East, one reinforced Battalion of the 416. Inf. Div. at the time for carrying out one Landing exercise per month.

Naval Staff ordered Fleet Training Unit to report to Naval Staff, Army on all important knowledge and experiences in navigation in connection with the preparation and the carrying-out of "Rotbuche".

V. Submarine Warfare:

In the Atlantic the submarine U"548" on her way back from the coast of New Scotland twice identified parts of convoys and twice single vessels but was unable in spite of the comparatively weak defense to get into a firing position.

The submarine U"490" reported a convoy in AK 8868 at 1330. As no other submarines are present in the vicinity the submarine U"490" was ordered to carry on her supply task.

4 Jun. 1944

In the Northern Waters 17 boats of Group "Grimm" and Group "Trutz" remained in the patrol line from AB 4673 to 8836. The boat farthest to the North would be moved in N.W. direction in order to explore the ice-borders.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

West Area:

During the day again more than 1000 enemy planes entered Belgium, Northern France and Western France. Attacks were made on the defensive zone in the coastal area and in the areas of Dunkerque, Arras, Amiens, Boulogne, Calais, Chartres and Conflans. Coming from Italy 250 enemy planes entered Southern France and carried out attacks in the area of Grenoble, Chambery, Modane as well as again on the Var bridge at Nice. The latter remained passable. Twelve of our fighters on duty did not encounter the enemy in Southern France. During the night of 4 Jun., the attacks on the defense zones in the area of Calais-Boulogne were continued by 250 bombers. Other enemy planes entered the area Ymuiden-Cape Gris Nez without attacking, and Western France probably in order to supply agents, as well as the waters around Brest for mine-dropping. Twenty enemy planes again entered Southern France without attacking.

Reich Territory:

Nothing to report.

Mediterranean Theater:

On 3 Jun. about 1200 two-engined planes consisting of fighter-bombers, fighters and reconnaissance planes were observed in the front area in Italy. Strong enemy formations carried out attacks on railway lines, bridges and aerodromes in Middle Italy.

In the area of Air Force Command S.E. the enemy attacked targets in the area of Split as well as in the area of Mostar - Sarajewo - Travnik.

4 Jun. 1944

During the night of 3 Jun. only minor enemy reconnaissance activities were reported in the Aegean Waters and along the Albanian coast. In the western parts of the Balcans 57 planes were reported supplying the bandits. The harbor and the town of Rhodos were attacked again.

The systematic attacks on this island might under certain circumstances indicate operative intentions of the enemy.

Columns and enemy positions in the Valmontone area were attacked by 68 of our bombers during the night of 3 Jun. Good hits and outbreak of fires were observed. Two of our planes were lost. One enemy plane was shot down by night-fighters.

During the day our planes carried out reconnaissance flights.

East Area:

On the eastern front 1127 operations of our own planes and 765 of the enemy were reported on 3 Jun. During the following night 146 operations of our planes and 145 of the enemy were added. Thirty four enemy planes were shot down and five of our planes were lost over our own territory.

Eleven couriers, six of them traveling West and five traveling East were observed crossing Norway in the night of 4 Jun.

VII. War in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea:

1. Area of Naval Group, West:

Enemy Position:

On the morning of 4 Jun. 1 cruiser of the BIRMINGHAM-Class, 1 destroyer and 1 corvette passed through the Gibraltar Straits in eastward direction. At the same time a convoy consisting of 5 freighters in ballast accompanied by 1 French destroyer and 2 corvettes left Gibraltar for West. In the afternoon 6 US transporters carrying troops, 1 loaded tanker and 6 US destroyers passed the Gibraltar Straits for the West, 1 cruiser of the MONTE-CUCCOLI-Class left Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

4 Jun. 1944

Own Position:

The Var-bridge was hit twice. Repair work would probably take several days.

Off the southern coast of France 7,800 BRT. were escorted. Submarine hunting off Toulon remained without result.

Commanding Admiral, Group West asked to cancel the Naval Staff's allotment of KT 41's to the German Naval Command, Italy and asked furthermore to speed up by all means the delivery of suitable submarine-hunters for the French southern coast. Naval Staff decided on this request as follows:

"1. Naval Staff is not unaware of the insufficient stock of anti-aircraft vessels at the 6th Protective Flotilla. Considering the actual situation Naval Staff nevertheless has to maintain its order to allot to Naval Command Italy KT 4 to be used as transport vessels.

2. The situation in Italy and the heavy losses of small vessels and naval landing craft suffered there as well as the destruction of the communication lines in the rear of the landfront (railways and roads) make it necessary to use every suitable small transport vessel as means of supply for the heavily fighting front.

3. On the other hand the escort demand on the 6th Protective Flotilla, for arriving and outgoing submarines would be smaller as before up to the middle of July because of technical alternations to be made on the submarines.

4. The lack of anti-submarine vessels at 6th Defense Flotilla and 7th Coastal Patrol Force would have to be compensated, as had been done already before on several occasions, by a close cooperation, i.e. by combining the forces of both areas at certain concentration points.

5. Further anti-submarine vessels would be made available as fast and as much as possible.

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Position:

No further reports came in about the eastward convoy reported on the 3 Jun. in the area of Bengasi.

4 Jun. 1944

Uncomplete photographic night reconnaissance of Alexandria revealed ten merchant ships and one (apparently) warship in the harbor. . . Second phase interpretation of photographic reconnaissance of Biserte on 26 May accounted for: 1 anti-aircraft cruiser, 10 destroyers, 7 US convoy-destroyers, 2 US coastguard cruisers, 6 minor war-vessels, 4 PT-boats, 3 crash boats, 2 tank-transporters, 32 large landing vessels, 2 medium sized landing vessels, 20 LSM, 1 transporter, 2 tankers, 11 freighters and 28 landing stages. In the harbors of Ferryville and Lac de Biserte, 50 medium sized landing vessels and 6 more freighters could be discerned.

Second phase interpretation of the photographic reconnaissance of Maddalena on 28 May disclosed: 1 escort vessel, 19 minor war vessels, 31 PT-boats, 2 submarines, 3 landing vessels, 1 troop-transporter, 1 tanker and 7 freighters. According to air reconnaissance in the afternoon of the 3rd June one LST, 2 LCT, 1 protection vessel were steering South, 8 sm WSW of Porto Vecchio and 3 middle sized merchantships, 1 LST, 2 protection vessels were steering on a E.S.E.-course 22 sm E. of Maddalena. On the morning of 4 Jun. one protecting vessel was observed steering W., 53 miles E.N.E. of Porto Vecchio.

In the night of 3 Jun. in the sea area Anzio-Ischia four ships were sighted lying, stopped, and six protecting destroyers steering on various courses. In Anzio strong supply activities were observed continuing. Five miles West of Ostia what appeared to be mine clearance in our own mine field was reported.

In the waters around Leghorn targets presumably PT-boats were located by radar sets during the night following 3 Jun.

Own Position:

From 0130 to 0400 fighter-bombers constantly attacked our convoy of naval-landing craft and other barges which was steering North in the area Stefano-Piombino. One barge was sunk, one naval landing craft was heavily damaged and one suffered minor damages.

The boat RD"110" which had been beached South of Vada in the night following 2 Jun. burned out as a result of a new attack of fighter-bombers.

4 Jun. 1944

In the night following 3 Jun. two TA-boats successfully carried out the mine task "Gemse" South of Elba as had been planned.

From 0950 to 1305 an enemy air raid on Genoa took place. Many bombs were dropped in the harbor. Fighter directing ship CORSARO suffered leakage. One crane was rendered un-serviceable and the building of the Naval harbor Master was damaged. The shooting down of 5 four-engined planes was confirmed, 2 fighters were probably shot down.

The harbor of Savona and ships in the harbor remained unhurt during a minor attack of 17 enemy fighters flying at low altitude.

3. Area of Naval Group, South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Enemy Position:

No further information could be obtained regarding the North going convoy reported near Saseno at noon of 3 Jun.

During the night following 3 Jun., radar-stations located six ships in the sector N.E. - E.N.E. of Termoli without giving details as to the course.

According to reports of Army Group F, several larger war vessels were located in the afternoon 25 sm S.W. of Makarska. The locations were confirmed 1750 and 1803 by Air Force radar stations. At 1910, ships were reported off the coast of middle Albania. At 1941 one big and three medium sized warships were reported 55 kilometers West of Makarska steering westward and at 2021 one convoy was reported 60 miles West of Makarska. It remains uncertain to what extent these reports overlap (refer to the same targets).

According to our air reconnaissance ten motor-boats and twenty sailing boats were on their way to the isle of Brac at 0900. Sixteen smaller war vessels and six sailing boats were observed at the SW coast of this island. Our own strong points on Brac were surrounded by the enemy. During the night the enemy directed strongest air activity also against our supply vessels.

4 Jun. 1944

Own Position:

Contrary to previous similar operations Group South regards the enemy's operation on Brac as more serious and expects a large scale attempt to open a supply channel for Tito via Brac - Split. The sending of Yugoslav forces in order to strengthen the enemy's fighting morale was also expected. The Group gave the Admiral, Adriatic Waters the necessary instructions for counter action by PT-boats and asked Air Force Command S.E. for the assistance of the Air Force (Copy of the corresponding teletype find under teletype 1358).

During the night of 4 Jun. transfer of the PT-boats S"158, S"36" and S"61" from Split to Sibenik is planned. Three motor mine sweepers will be on duty to protect three pioneer landing boats which would sail from Cornat to Zara carrying troops.

b. Aegean Waters:

The war freighter MANNHEIM was hit on the stern by a mine near the Burtzi Narrows and was beached on the 3rd. The ship probably will be able to get afloat again by her own means. On the evening of the 3rd, Iraklion was attacked by 15 enemy planes. The steamer TANAIIS remained undamaged. Also no damage was done in the harbor during an attack on Rhodos which was carried out by seven planes. The harbor remained again undamaged when the attack was repeated by two planes on the evening of the 4th.

In the harbor Lavrion two mines were dropped by one enemy plane on the evening of the 3rd. More mines were dropped in the night of 3 Jun. in the harbor Coos and Porto Lago.

Four enemy planes attacked Porto Lago on the evening of the 4th dropping 16 bombs. No damages were reported. At the same time two coastal patrol boats opened artillery fire on one enemy submarine receding near Mythilene. The submarine escaped. One Englishman who apparently had fallen overboard was rescued.

During the month of May, 30 auxiliary sailing vessels carried 714 tons to Creta. Thirty auxiliary sailing vessels carrying about 2,000 tons were lost.

At the demand of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Group South gave its opinion concerning the supply-transport for

4 Jun. 1944

Creta. The Group regarded the sending of naval convoys as possible only if at least three TA-boats and three anti-submarine vessels as well as motor mine sweepers could be made available as protection. In the month of May this was possible only after the 22nd. Therefore, the big convoy for Creta was unable to leave earlier. Unusual weather conditions were then responsible for a further delay until 31 May. Pointing to the loss of GERTRUD and SABINE on 1 Jun., the Group reported, that the necessary supply for Creta could no more be guaranteed considering the present activity of the enemy and the absence of our own fighter protection.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Coastal Defense Branch, criticized this opinion. Copy of 1/Skl 17230/44 Gkdos find in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV. According to the opinion of Naval Staff the Admiral, Aegean Waters should have expected since several months ago that steamer traffic for the supply of Creta would become impossible. All endeavours should have been concentrated therefore on the use of auxiliary sailing vessels. In the Aegean Waters 230 Greek auxiliary sailing vessels could always be regarded as available for immediate use. No difficulty existed to employ a sufficient number of these units in the Creta traffic and to supply the island with 6,000 tons per month only with these vessels.

From 1 Jun. onward about 1200 tons of ferro concrete ships could be expected monthly and besides five wooden vessels of 400 tons each were to be expected from the MMR - program up to the end of June. In addition to that 3,500 tons capacity were on their way to be transferred from the Black Sea. A minimum of 9000 - 10000 tons capacity could be made available for Creta. The monthly loss of 24 auxiliary sailing vessels was not out of proportions and could be replaced. The armaments of the auxiliary sailing vessels had to be reinforced. It seemed that it would bring success if these units would sail in formations under the protection of small escort vessels. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Coastal Defense Branch, finds itself unable to agree with the opinion of Group South that the supply for Creta could not be guaranteed any more.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Position:

Nothing to report.

4 Jun. 1944

Own Position:

The submarine U"18" unsuccessfully fired Torpedoes on one gunboat and one coastal vessel NW of Tuapse and then went on her way back. The submarine U"23" had also left the operation area which will remain uncontrolled for several days until the arrival of the submarine U"19".

The tug KATJA sank in the Bosphorus following an explosion on 3 Jun. The crew was rescued. The origin of the explosion is still unknown.

The steamer LOLA entered the Bosphorus in the morning of 4 Jun. and the war freighter KASSEL left Varna in the afternoon for the Bosphorus.

d. Situation on the Danube:

During the night following 3 Jun., 10 enemy planes were observed in the area Kalafat - Lom, and 25 - 30 other planes in the area Giurgiu - Russe presumably for mine-dropping. No shipping losses were reported.

On 2 Jun., three mines were cleared near Kilometer indicator "1132". On that occasion one FRG -(Remote Clearance Gear)-boat sank and one was damaged. On 3 Jun. a mine sweeping plane successfully cleared a mine near Kilometer indicator "1118". Situation regarding the closed channels remained unchanged.

VIII. Situation in the Far East:

No special reports arrived.

5 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance

No special reports arrived.

Conference on the situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. Concerning the air situation the Chief, Naval Staff ordered the coordination of our submarine operations and of air reconnaissance in the Northern Waters. The problem will be settled between Naval Staff, Operations Division and Naval Staff, Submarine Division.

II. Naval Staff, Chief of Quartermaster Division reports on the fuel situation: The normal supply up to May amounted to a total of 184,000 cbm monthly, 55,000 cbm of which went to the Navy. Following the damages which had occurred since, the allotment for June was reduced to 100,000, of which 37,000 cbm were for the Navy. The stocks of the Navy amounted to 70,000 cbm on 1 Jun. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division ordered immediately a general cut of 33%. It has to be decided whether Submarines, Operations Division and Commanding Admiral, Submarines will have to be supplied with the normal allotment as before. If this is the case the cut in the allotment for the other formations and units will have to be bigger in proportion. At first the question will be examined to what extent the cuts are acceptable for the different units.

The Chief, Armed Forces High Command issued instructions concerning the defense of the North Sea coast by which - with reference to the order of the Fuehrer Nr. 40 - Naval Command, North was made responsible as Armed Forces, Operations Staff for the entire area.

III. Chief, Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division:

According to information from foreign countries the Americans entered Rome already. The declaration of the town as an open place was not accepted by the enemy. Therefore fighting started in the outskirts of the town. Eden's trip to Moscow which was reported in foreign countries in April was now definitely denied by the British.

5 Jun. 1944

IV. Chief, Naval Staff gave order to discuss the submarine positions for "Wallenstein" with Naval Staff, Submarine Division. Besides, the strengthening of the barrages in the Gulf of Finland would have to be taken into consideration. Furthermore it would have to be expected that, considering the arrangements made for the Danube, the Navy might be put in charge of the mine-clearance also of other rivers within our area of influence. Naval Staff, Operations Division should therefore state the military demand regarding the enlargement of a special program for clearance equipment which would have to be realized quickly by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division. Discussion with the Air Force was ordered concerning the employment of mine sweeping planes.

V. Army Position:

On the Eastern Front our offensive in the Jassy area developed into heavy fighting in which a considerable number of divisions were engaged which so far had been kept in readiness. The conquest of the mountain chain which we intend to take could not be completed up to now in spite of heavy attrition of our forces.

In Italy our forces were taken back across the Tiber River. Thus Rome has been evacuated.

VI. Chief of Naval Staff gave notice of the instructions of Armed Forces, High Command concerning the handling of the affair "Seydlitz" and reported on the declaration the field-m Marshals of the Army made to the Fuehrer through General Field-marshal von Rundstedt.

Furthermore, within the most limited circle, the Chief, Naval Staff informed the chiefs of the departments of the Naval Staff about the instructions on the political situation given upon an order of the Fuehrer by the secretary of state of the Foreign Office on 31 May to representatives of the Armed Forces, the Party and other offices. The instructions gave a complete survey of the situation in the different associated and neutral countries as far as Germany is interested, as well as about the conditions in enemy countries and about the relations among the enemy nations. Referring to the latter the secretary of state laid emphasis on the fact that the manifold and well known quarrels and difficulties within the enemy camp for the time being have only symptomatic importance and are of no political or military significance at present.

5 Jun. 1944

Situation on 5 Jun. 1944:

I. War in Foreign Waters:

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Position:

In the area of 19th Group only minor enemy reconnaissance was located in the Biscayan Waters. Detailed information was not available because of line fault. In the Rendezvous area two British vessels were located in two different positions.

In the Channel one radar fitted vessel was located from 0012 - 0424 at first N. and later E. of Cape de la Hague.

Commanding General West gives the following estimate of the situation of 30 May:

"Systematic attacks especially on all communication installations of the area carried out by the enemy air force reveals the enemy's intention to throw into confusion the network of communications and thus to paralyze troop movements and supply system far into the rear of the zone. The recent successful attacks on the Seine-bridges resulted in a considerable paralyzing of the traffic across the river between Paris and Rouen. Direct connection between the Channel-front N. of the Seine and Seine-Bay and Normandy was thus interrupted. This might indicate the enemy's intentions against the Normandy (establishing of bridge heads). Enemy's activities against our main defense line are still comparatively small in spite of an increased number of attacks. The danger of invasion has come nearer but is not yet immediately imminent judging from the intensity of air attacks."

5 Jun. 1944

2. Own Positions:

Atlantic Coast Area:

In the area Pallice one mine was cleared and five in the area St. Nazaire. Ninety Coastal Mines A were laid in the Coastal Mine A-barrage 46, South of Gironde.

Channel Area:

In the evening of the 4 Jun. and during the following night the enemy continued air attacks on the coastal defenses and in the defensive zone. At 0252 the batteries Oldenburg and Waldam, East of Calais were attacked. Up to now 700 four-engined and 120 twin-engined planes and many fighter or fighter-bomber-formations entered the coastal area between Ostend and Dieppe. The harbors of Calais and Boulogne were attacked without suffering serious damage. Besides, the Naval batteries Gris Nez, Grosser Kurfuerst, Friedrich August and Creche were attacked without reducing their fighting strength. Also the Army batteries 1/1261 NNW of Isigny, 9/1261 near St. Vaast and 2/1260 East of Grandcamp were attacked. Furthermore the batteries 3/1261 and 5/1261 near St. Vaast and the batteries 1/1255 and 4/1255 near Trouville were attacked. The losses had been comparatively small. Unsuccessful attacks were launched against German Air Force apparatus Guernsey and on the radar location set at Berck.

The Admiral of the Channel Coast gave a detailed report on the results of enemy air attacks on coastal batteries and radar stations from 11 May till 24 May. Copy of the report as per 1/Skl 17180/44 Gkdos find in War Diary, Part C, Vol. X. During the period covered by the report 37% of the Naval Batteries and Army Coastal Batteries in the Pas de Calais area were attacked, 48% in the Seine-Somme area and 22% in the Normandy. The casualties of the Navy amounted to 5 injured at the batteries and 2 killed and 9 injured at the radar stations. Losses of the guns amount to 6 guns = 3.5% in the Pas de Calais area, 3 guns = 4% in the Seine-Somme area, 2 guns = 1.2% in the Normandy.

Within the entire area of the Admiral, Channel Coast a total of 2.7% of the guns were lost.

5 Jun. 1944

The enemy's intention systematically to annihilate the radar sets in the area between Dunkerque and Cherbourg is clearly evident.

Our patrol positions were occupied and the control of channels carried out according to plans. A total of five mines was cleared. For the night of 5 May laying out of Coastal Mine A-barrage sections N.E. of Le Treport, W. of Trouville and N. of Bayonne was planned.

Group West declared landing possibilities in the night of 5 May as possible on the Dutch Coast and along the Channel Coast.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

Mine-sweeping and clearance duties as well as patrol duties and escorts were carried out according to plans. In the German Bight three mines were cleared. One coastal auxiliary sailing vessel was damaged by a mine West of the Elbe. At 1822 fountains of water were observed from Hoek van Holland 6 - 7 sm off the coast. During the night of 5 Jun. other explosions were observed in a far distance from Hook of Holland and Terschelling.

In the Zealand waters two convoys with 11,626 BRT were carried out. Convoy 497 Elbe- Hook continued its voyage from Borkum at 1930.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Position:

In the area of 18th Group, 31 planes were observed, the center of operations being the northern part of the North Sea. At 1857, Hammerfest located a British vessel in 247° and Svanik in 257°.

2. Own Position:

In the evening of 4 Jun. minor exchange of fire

5 Jun. 1944

was reported from the Petsamo area.

Twenty eight ships were escorted to the North and twenty ships to the South.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Position:

In the Gulf of Finland the usual movements of the enemy, clearing formations under escort and supply-convoys were observed. At 1438 on the Namsi Bank 2 (apparently) mine layers, 4 patrol boats and 2 (apparently) torpedo boats were sailing for Lavansaari putting up a smoke screen.

2. Own Position:

Mine clearance duty was carried out by 26 boats in the Baltic Sea Entrances and by 40 boats and 7 minesweeping planes in the Baltic Sea. In the western part of the Baltic Sea four mines were cleared. The Danish steamer JULIUS MADSEN (4,290 BRT) was hit by a mine and sunk North of Darsserort. At 0850 patrol boat "20" fired upon a Swedish airplane which passed at a distance of 1800 m at an altitude of 200 m and flying from the South to the North.

Along the western coast of Jutland no Coastal Mine A were laid out because no ready mines were on hand. The convoy traffic was carried out in the entire Baltic Sea area without incidents.

In the area of the Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic, two sections of Coastal Mine A-barrages were laid off the Estonian coast according to plans. The Finns reported the laying out of a net barrage within the islands near Porkalla. Besides, the barrage Silli 1 was laid. During the laying-out patrol boats sighted a submarine telescope off Hochland-harbor.

In the Tytters area strong enemy air activity was reported. Our own dive bombers attacked Lavansaari. During the encounter with enemy PT-boats in the Narva Bay on 4 Jun., not two enemy ships but only one was sunk but two others were set on fire.

5 Jun. 1944

Special Items:

1. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division reported that considering the losses suffered up to now and also in view of the lack of clearance-equipment no further vessels could be made available for the mine clearing duties in the Baltic Sea if the mine sweepers and motor mine sweepers would be left under the Commanding Admiral, Submarines as had been ordered. No vessels existed at the schools, especially not at the Inspectorate of Torpedoes, which could be equipped with magnetic cable gear or towed loop gear respectively. The Barrage Training Flotillas delivered as much of their suitable vessels as could be advocated without making it impossible to carry on the training.

2. Naval Staff informed High Command, Air Operations Staff that air reconnaissance and information obtained from prisoners as well as observation from the ground showed the quick advance of the fortification-works at the enemy strong point Lake Peipsi as well as concentration of vessels and building together of boats. Operation Staff ordered 1st Air Force to survey the enemy strong point Lake Peipsi in order to carry out occasional raids to destroy the enemy's preparations. Naval Command, East and Admiral Ostland had been informed on the subject by Naval Staff.

V. Submarine Warfare:

Nothing to report.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

West Area:

During the day about 1400 enemy planes entered the occupied territories in the West and attacked the harbors of Calais and Boulogne as well as coastal batteries, anti-aircraft positions and the aerodrome at Rennes. Further attacks were directed against targets in the areas Amiens-Rouen, Caen, against the aerodrome at Villa-Coublay, anti-aircraft positions near Capriquest and fortifications at Guernsey. Seven enemy planes entered the South without attacking.

Twenty-five enemy planes entered Southern France during the night, presumably supplying agents in the area Toulouse -

5 Jun. 1944

Perpignan.

Reich Territory:

During the day nothing to report. In the night following 5 Jun. Osnabrueck was attacked by 15 - 20 Mosquitoes.

Mediterranean Theater:

In the Italian front area 1000 planes of the enemy were operating. The traffic in middle Italy was attacked by 132 planes.

In the area of German Air Force Command S.E., ten planes dropped again bombs on Rhodos and several others bombed Paros. Ten reconnaissance planes were reported over the Dodecaneso. Nine heavy fighters swept over Corfu and several others over Brac as well as over different islands in the Aegean Waters. Fifteen planes coming from the Soviet Union crossed Roumania and advanced into the Karlstadt area.

During the night following 5 Jun., 100 enemy harassing planes were reported in the area South of Ancona till Viterbo - Rome. Attacks on railway installations were also reported. In the evening of 4 Jun., ten Italian planes attacked with aerial torpedoes ships in the harbor of Gibraltar. Six planes arrived at the target, three did not return. Four steamers of 6 - 10000 BRT each were hit.

Our own air forces in the area of German Air Force Command S.E. carried out reconnaissance flights on 5 Jun.

East Area:

On 4 Jun. 646 operations of our own planes and 562 of enemy planes were recorded during daylight and 186 operations of our planes and 375 of enemy planes during the night following 4 Jun. All together the loss of four of our planes and of forty-two enemy planes was reported.

5 Jun. 1944

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea:

1. Area of Naval Group, West:

Enemy Position:

On 3 Jun., a cruiser of the SIDNEY type entered the Mediterranean through the Gibraltar Straits. In the evening one "TROMP" and one "CAIRO" cruiser entered Gibraltar coming from East. At 2000 on the same day a convoy consisting of 13 freighters, 3 torpedo boats and 4 corvettes, and at 2330 a convoy formed by 30 freighters, 4 torpedo boats and 2 corvettes and at 1930 a convoy of 6 US transporters with 1 torpedo boat and 6 destroyers passed through the Gibraltar Straits for the West. The last convoy presumably was GUS 41.

Own Position:

Nothing to report.

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Position:

During the night following 4 Jun., in the Sea area Leghorn (presumably) PT-boats were located. No encounter took place. According to location by radar interception set, vessels were sailing 46 miles Southwest of Spezia. It was not impossible that these were Italian destroyers with German radar location sets.

According to air reconnaissance at 0602 on 5 Jun., a convoy consisting of 50 freighters, 4 torpedo boats with 5 escort vessels and 1 corvette was steering on a E.S.E. course ten miles N.E. of Derna.

From 0700 till 0800, six destroyers were cruising in the area of Cape de Gata and later sailed off for S.W.

According to air reconnaissance at 0855, 2 corvettes, 3 landing boats, 1 transporter, 2 freighters, 6 harbor or coastal vessels and 50 smaller boats were present at Ajaccio. Thus only minor changes have occurred compared with the situation on 25 May.

5 Jun. 1944

During the night following 5 Jun. the normal northbound ship-traffic was observed in the sea area Anzio-Ponza.

Own Position:

At 0121 a convoy of Naval ferry barges and other barges was attacked by enemy planes North of Orbetello. Two naval landing craft were set on fire by rocket-bombs and sunk after explosion of the ammunition. One naval landing craft was damaged. An attack with rocket bombs and gunfire from the air on a convoy of war freighters was warded off.

During the enemy air raid on Genoa on 4 Jun. in addition to the damages already reported one tug and two lighters sunk. On the occasion of a low-level attack on Savona on the 4th Jun., one coastal auxiliary sailing vessel and two lighters sunk. Air attacks on Viareggio and Piombino caused no serious damages.

On the 3 Jun., 1,005 tons were unloaded at Stefano.

3. Area of Naval Group, South:

a. Adriatic:

Enemy Position:

In the harbor of Lissa 8 motor boats, 25 big rowing boats, on the Northwest end of Hvar 8 auxiliary sailing boats, 2 smaller auxiliary war vessels and 1 warship, presumably a destroyer steering for Lissa, North of the western end of Hvar 2 (presumably) destroyers with 6 auxiliary war vessels were observed.

At 0110 South of Drvnik 2 destroyers were reported. At 0230, 3 destroyers were sighted off the Battery Lussin-Piccolo. They sailed off for Northwest putting up a smoke screen after they were fired upon. Also 3 miles South of Promontore 2 destroyers were sighted which sailed off on a southern course.

According to a summarizing report of the plane reporting post Podgora several convoys including heavy ships were sailing between Brac and Hvar on the afternoon of 4 Jun.

5 Jun. 1944

Forty-eight ships could be discerned without doubt. On the morning of 5 Jun., five landing boats and two motor boats were sighted in the bay of Brac which had been pulled ashore.

Own Position:

On the isle of Brac, Sumartin is definitely in our hand. Near Supetar the enemy was repulsed after suffering heavy losses. On the southern coast of Brac, four British gunboats were reported in Bol. The transfer of our troops from Split to Supetar was carried out according to plans in spite of strong enemy control. Further transports were planned for the night of 5 Jun. In the early morning, one engineer-landing boat was sunk by an enemy bomber Northwest of Supetar. Six men were lost. At noon coastal auxiliary sailing vessels were attacked by six fighter-bombers near Lussin. They suffered minor damages.

The PT-boats S"36", "61" and "158" avoiding a destroyer-patrol between Lissa and Cape Ploca entered Sibenik at 0200. On the evening the boats left for Lussin-Piccolo carrying on board the Commander, 1st PT-Boat Force.

b. Aegean Waters:

Enemy Position:

Nothing to report.

Own Position:

In the night of 4 Jun. sabotage attempts with explosives were carried out without results in the northern part of the harbor Chios. Sailors on shore were attacked by gangs. The unloading of the steamer TANAIIS was delayed by hits on the harbor street during the night air raid on Iraklion. The work was finished at 2100 of 4 Jun. Enemy patrol planes dropped bombs on Navarino and the northern part of Corfu. No damages occurred. One mine was cleared by minesweeping planes off Lavrion.

5 Jun. 1944

The war freighter KASSEL was held back in the Bosphorus for unknown reason.

Two mines each were cleared in Porto Lago and at Iraklion.

A torpedo net was laid out in Tsagesi. Four Siebel-ferries were put into service at Saloniki on 3 Jun. In the Piraeus 4 loaded steamers and 1 naval landing craft were ready to leave for Rhodes and 2 auxiliary sailing vessels were ready to start for Leros.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Position:

According to radio intelligence, activities of the naval forces and of naval air forces were unimportant as usual.

Own Position:

The steamer JOHANNA entered Constanza coming from the Bosphorus.

During the night following 5 Jun., six harbor patrol boats were on duty off Constanza in order to observe mine-droppings.

Situation on the Danube:

On 1 Jun. four mine droppings were observed near Km 1723. On 3 Jun. one mine each was cleared at the Kilometer indicators "1508" and "1120". On 4 Jun. two mines were cleared near Kilometer indicator "1507".

Group South transmitted the suggestion of the Inspector Mine-clearance Danube to set up barrage ballons along the walled Iron Gate-canal. For details compare teletype 1930.

VIII. Situation in East Asia:

Nothing to report.

6 Jun. 1944

Special Items:

The invasion has begun. Following an almost uninterrupted attack against our defense positions along the Channel coast between Cherbourg and Ostend carried out during the last days and nights by strongest air forces, the time has come - from the military point of view - for a large scale landing attempt as soon as the weather conditions are favorable. Although during the night of 5 Jun. the weather could not be regarded as favorable - Northwest wind with a velocity from 4 to 6 and even more, a strongly clouded sky and low cloud cover - the enemy decided to venture upon the undertaking, apparently hoping for an improvement of the weather conditions which have been forecasted for the next days. Thus all considerations and abstract speculations have been silenced. The strain that prevailed in all quarters was solved. The war entered into its decisive stage as far as Germany is concerned. Once again there is an opportunity to bring about a quick decision of the war by a short but energetic fight. There is no doubt that this actually is the big operation against Western Europe intended to decide the war, as the enemy supreme commanders, heads of state and ministers in their proclamations and radio speeches to the world had made solemn statements to this effect with a larger or smaller display of good taste. Furthermore there is no more any doubt possible as already in the early morning hours the considerable size of the military display of the enemy can be realized.

The first reports on the beginning of the offensive reached the command station of Naval Staff between 0200 and 0300 in the morning. Admiral, Channel Coast reported under "Most Immediate" with the time given as 0200: "Preliminary report. Since 0200 large numbers of parachutists and freight-carrying-gliders on the eastern coast of Cotentin-Peninsula and East of Trouville."

At 0240 Armed Force, High Command, Operations Staff, Navy was informed by wire.

Commander in Chief, Navy broke off his leave and returned to the command station before noon.

For further report compare Situation West Area.

6 Jun. 1944

Conference on the Situation with Commander in Chief, Navy at 1115:

1. Following a report of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Fleet Operations Section about the situation in the invasion area based on reports and investigations available at that time, Naval Staff, Chief Naval Intelligence Division reported on enemy reports on the invasion. The first announcement of the fact was made to foreign countries by DNB. This announcement was published 0800 by Reuter. The first communiqué of the Allied Headquarters was issued 0901. The Army Group carrying out the offensive consisted of British, American and Canadian units and was under the supreme command of General Montgomery. At 1005 the order of the day of General Eisenhower was published which was followed by a proclamation of the General to the people of Western Europe. The King of England and General de Gaulle will broadcast speeches in the evening and during the day respectively. Furthermore speeches of Dutch and Belgian ministers as well as of the King of Norway had been announced.

There can be no more doubt therefore about the nature of the event.

II. Naval Staff, Admiral Quartermaster: According to information from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, an order of the Fuehrer was to be expected this very day releasing replacement-units, instructional detachments and training units of the Navy in the occupied western territories for operations outside their garrisons. Furthermore a directive of the Fuehrer was expected - the time of which was not decided yet - calling up grade of dispensability "A" in the Home Area War Zone.

The figures for grade of dispensability "A" within the area of Naval Command North were about 5,000 men and about 10,000 men in the area of Naval Command, East. The Chiefs of Staff of Naval Commands, East and North were instructed that calling-up of grade of dispensability "A" according to Fuehrer directive 51 had to be reckoned with and that the Naval Commands had to take it into consideration for their further actions. Having inquired which preliminary measures were to be taken the attention of Naval Command, North was drawn to key-word "Blume I 305". Meaning: control of all preliminary measures.

6 Jun. 1944

III. Considering the development of the situation Commander in Chief, Navy regards as necessary concentration of all Naval forces in the Baltic Sea. As no doubt is possible that the big invasion has begun, further landings on other shores have to be reckoned with. Therefore the time has come, where considerations of training and instruction have to be dismissed. Of course no encroachment will be allowed upon our activities in the Gulf of Finland and upon mine clearance in the Baltic Sea. By issuing the key-word "Wallenstein" the preparations ordered by Commander in Chief, Navy had to be started. The furnace oil question would not make serious difficulties for this operation. But the Diesel oil situation remained difficult. Yet the general situation did not allow any loss of time. As the time required by the fighting forces to get ready was up to 72 hours no delay could be allowed in releasing the corresponding assembly orders.

Naval Command, East, North, Norway, by way of notice Fleet Command, Commanding Admiral Submarines and Naval Staff, Quartermaster General, Supply and Fuel Branch were informed: "Wallenstein" 1200 hours 6 Jun. 1944."

Commander in Chief, Navy in the meantime had a discussion with Naval Staff, Submarine Division concerning the submarine situation and the use of submarines in order to attack landing operations and to fight the enemy supply traffic.

Already at 0513 all boats of the Group "Landwirt", Group "Mitte" and of Commander, Submarines, Norway were ordered into immediate readiness. The boats cruising in the Atlantic were ordered to send in frequently reports on weather conditions. Commanding Admiral, Submarines decided that twelve boats should occupy attacking areas in the Bay of Biscay. Six other boats equipped with Schnorchel-devices were ordered to leave Brest for the western part of the Channel. Six boats sailing East of Iceland should remain in the area they had reached until the situation in the North Sea is clear.

Commander, Submarines, Norway will call four boats from the patrol service back to Hammerfest and three boats back to Narvik and will keep them in degree of readiness 12 hours.

IV. Upon an Order of Commander in Chief, Navy the following information was issued to the front-line stations:

6 Jun. 1944

"Enemy landing between Le Havre and Barfleur on the morning of 6 Jun. can be regarded as a large scale operation. The proclamations of the Allied leaders and the distribution of the enemy forces indicated that other big operations might be expected subsequently, the direction of which can not yet be concluded from the information on hand. Because sufficient reconnaissance is impossible, surprise attacks have to be reckoned with also in other areas."

V. Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Intelligence Division reported on British protests in Ankara against the passing of our ships through the Dardanelles. The granting of the passage was regarded to be contrary to the spirit and against the wording of the Montreux agreement.

Following the Allied occupation of Rome the King of Italy transferred the royal authority to the crown prince as general governor and abdicated as had been agreed upon previously.

In a captured British order to the British Naval Forces operating in the Aegean, a list was given of the places at which British Naval forces could call because of the attitude of the Turkish civil servants involved.

In a highly Restricted Circle:

VI. Army Position:

According to information obtained from "Foreign Armies East" the assembly of Russian troops on the Eastern Front is completed. The orders for the offensive exist but the day is still uncertain. The Crimea Army which became available was moved to the Tarnopol-Brody area. The question is whether the Russian offensive will start very soon or whether the Russians will wait first for the further development of the invasion in Western Europe.

Only few reports arrived from Italy. The situation near Rome is uncertain. The most characteristic feature is still the complete air superiority of the enemy. It is doubtful whether the "C" position which has been prepared can be held.

6 Jun. 1944

The enemy-operation on the isle of Brac turned out to be a commando-task. The bulk of the troops involved left the island again.

Conference on the Situation with Commander in Chief, Navy at 1800:

I. For the following night new enemy landings have to be expected in the areas Cherbourg and Le Havre respectively.

II. According to a report of Group West, 3rd Air Force suggested mine operations with DM 1-mines. Group West has objections because our own freedom of movements off Le Havre might be blocked. Naval Staff is of the opinion that the fighting against enemy landing operations and against the enemy supply system has to be carried out by all means. In view of this emergency all objections against the use of new firing devices by the Air Force must be given up. Our planes will have to avoid enemy occupied territories during their flights to the operation areas. Also objections against the use of DM 1-mines off Le Havre has to be abandoned. The use of the new mine by Naval forces must also be prepared.

III. Naval Staff, Quartermaster General reported that the order of the Armed Forces, High Command concerning the release of Naval Manning Divisions in the Western Areas for operations outside their garrisons has been meanwhile transmitted by telephone to Commanding General West. The Admiral, Fuhrer Headquarters informed Commander in Chief, Navy by telephone that Armed Forces, High Command temporarily postponed the calling up of grade of dispensability A.

According to a suggestion made by Naval Staff, Quartermaster General, Commander in Chief Navy decided as follows:

- a. The Naval forces of the Fleet, Commanding Admiral, Defenses North, Commanding Admiral, Defenses East, and Commanding Admiral, Defenses West have to be filled up.
- b. Cadets have to remain on board.
- c. Coastal Defenses West have to be filled up.

6 Jun. 1944

The corresponding instructions will be issued by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch. Naval Command, North was instructed to maintain all preparatory measures regarding the calling up of grade of dispensability A and to keep this question in mind.

IV. Commander Frauenheim reported on the dates for the first use of small battle weapons. In the Channel about 20 "Neger" and 21 "Linsen" (with 7 Command boats and 14 landing boats) could start operating when the transport problem was solved. 8-12 days would be required therefore. Commander in Chief, Navy ordered that these measures should be taken-up with all energy and in great hurry.

V. 3rd Air Force meanwhile cancelled its request for the release of DM 1-mines for operations as the planes available are not equipped with the corresponding discharge fittings. For the following night, bombing operations are planned of the bomber formations and perhaps the use of Bomb mine "1000". The 600 DM-mines of the Navy were stored in the home area as ordered. Probably a fortnight will be required to transfer them into the operation area in the Channel.

Miscellaneous:

I. Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief of Artillery Section reported on a conference held on 29 May with Inspector Mine Clearance Danube at Vienna. Copy of the report 1/Skl I E 16184/44 Gkdos find in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI. Naval Staff asked Bureau of Naval Administration; Naval Staff, Army and Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Communications Division immediately to start work on the question of vessels for the Danube, of allotting motor vehicles and fuel and the question of maps and means of communication.

II. Position of the Submarines on 1 Jun. 1944:

On 1 Jun. 1944, 443 submarines were in service and 8 foreign submarines.

The number of boats on front-line duty increased from 164 on 1 May to 181 on 1 Jun. The losses during the month of May amounted to 21 boats on the front and 1 boat in the home area.

6 Jun. 1944

The boats on front-line duty were distributed as follows:

108 boats in the Atlantic including the boats
of Group "Landwirt"

11 boats in the Mediterranean

56 boats in Northern Waters including the boats
of Group "Mitte"

6 boats in the Black Sea.

For copy of the corresponding report of Naval Staff,
Submarine Division as per 1/Skl 1685/44 Gkdos. Chiefs
compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

III. Armed Forces, High Command, Special Staff for
Mercantile and Economic Warfare investigated the import
demand from East Asia at the quarters concerned and reported
as follows:

After consuming the stocks on hand the demand will amount to:

a) caoutchouc	300 tons per month
b) concentrate of tungsten	200 tons per month
c) concentrate of molybdenum	35 tons per month
d) tin	400 tons per month
e) various other goods	<u>100 tons per month</u>
Total	1,035 tons per month

The alternations in the figures compared with the previous
demand had to be made because of the increase in the
import-demand of caoutchouc from 250 to 300 tons per month
and because of the fundamental change in the tungsten
situation.

Up to now the following decisions were made by the Navy for
the carrying-out of the raw-material transports from East
Asia:

1. The submarines of Type XX which were intended to be
used for the transport of raw-materials will not be con-
structed because owing to their properties they will be
unable to carry out the task.

6 Jun. 1944

2. The available boats of type Xb, IXd 1 and IXd 2 will be used for the transport of raw materials.
3. Commander in Chief, Navy would decide in July whether the boats of type XXI out of the present series under construction should be converted into transport submarines.

Situation on 6 Jun. 1944:

I. War in Foreign Waters:

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Invasion:

The first "Most immediate" report sent by the Admiral, Channel Coast at 0200 was supplemented by a telephone report of Operations Officer, Naval Group West at 0345. According to this report:

at 0330 landing vessels were reported in the Seine Bay in the area Grandcamp, Port en Bessin, Quistreham, Cabourg. Strong air-attacks were carried out against Cherbourg and Marcouf. The Quarter of the Naval Shore Commander was hit.

A large formation of planes crossed over the Channel islands at low speed. Apparently they were freight carrying gliders.

Considerable formations of planes were reported assembling over England.

at 0402 Group West sent a "Most Immediate" message to all, reporting enemy landings in the Seine Bay between Cabourg and Marcouf.

at 0435 Group West gave the first report on the situation. According to this report enemy landings from the air were reported near Beuerville, Auberville, Houlgate and North of Caen and besides near Ocdeville and Montivilliers (North of Le Havre) as well as at some places on the eastern coast of the Cotentin peninsula.

6 Jun. 1944

The 5th Torpedo Flotilla was sent to the area Port en Bassin - Grandcamp on a reconnaissance sweep. The 5th Minesweeper Flotilla was sent East around Cape Barfleur and the 9th Minesweeper Flotilla was sent West. Both Flotillas started from Cherbourg. North of Port en Bassin ten larger vessels were located which lay stopped seven miles off the coast since 0410.

at 0446 Group West limited T/P communication in the Western Area to "Emergency" and "Most Immediate" cases.

at 0504 Naval Communications Officer, Le Havre reported that three torpedo boats and six patrol boats put to sea.

at 0537 Commander PT-boats transmitted a report of the 4th Minesweeper Flotilla about destroyers West of Boulogne.

at 0541 Naval Shore Commander, Normandy reported: Communications with Battery Longues interrupted. The batteries at the East coast of Cotentin fire upon landing boats. Artillery fire from the Sea against Battery Marcouf.

at 0545 Operations Officer, Group West reported by telephone that the judgement of the situation of Commanding General, West did not agree with the opinion of Group West. Commanding General, West who apparently received much less reports, especially concerning the landings from the sea, was not yet convinced that the large scale invasion had begun. Neither did Armed Forces, High Command fully agree with the opinion of Naval Group, West and Naval Staff as was found out during a telephone discussion with Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff (Navy). According to the reports at that time available at Group West, strong enemy naval units were present East of Barfleur - North of Port Bessin. One of our patrol boats reported by teletype 0526 many vessels off the Seine Bay. Besides, dense smoke screens in the area Cabourg - Houlgate were reported from the Le Havre area where the radar stations were mostly undamaged. North of Guernsey and North of Le Havre one vessel each approached and receded again. The Group ordered back the minesweepers sent out from Le Havre.

6 Jun. 1944

at 0600 Group West transmitted by telephone a report of 3rd Air Force which had observed landing vessels near Dieppe.

By monitoring wireless-communications a radio message was intercepted at 0547 reporting that 80 medium sized warships were present North of Quistreham. By a further radio message of the Naval Shore Commander, Normandy it was reported that the enemy fired upon the coastal batteries and laid black smoke clouds in front of the guns. The same Naval Shore Commander reported

at 0549 on several hundreds of planes - probably freight carrying gliders - North of Cherbourg.

at 0510 eight PT-boats left Boulogne for the South.

at 0621 8th Destroyer Flotilla on the Gironde received a wireless order of Group West immediately to get ready for sea and to move to Brest.

According to a report of Naval Shore Commander, Pas de Calais, between 0611 and 0640 the Batteries "Todt" and "Grosser Kurfurst" fired upon located targets behind a smoke screen which were later confirmed as merchant ships steering West.

at 0722 Naval Shore Commander, Channel Islands reported on intermittent locations - probably air targets - during the early morning hours and on many planes flying in again since 0430.

at 0730 based upon reports available Group West gave the following survey of the situation:

The landing area is from St. Vaast up to Deauville. Centers of the landings are apparently Quistreham and St. Vaast. North of Barfleur a large landing formation is steering a South course. The landing formations include merchant ships. The formation is covered by smoke screens put up by planes.

At the flanks of the landing section two strong warship formations were observed. A large formation was sighted near Le Havre which consisted, according to the reports, of six battle ships (possibly cruisers) and twenty destroyers. Our 5th Torpedo Flotilla had

6 Jun. 1944

contact with this formation and fired all it's torpedoes and the major part of it's ammunition. Reports on the results did not arrive yet. The flotilla was sailing back for Le Havre.

15th Patrol Flotilla had also contact with the enemy. One boat sunk, the others are in a difficult position.

The other forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West entered the harbors or are doing so. The Battery Marcouf successfully fired upon the enemy. One vessel was sunk and one enemy cruiser was hit. No reports arrived from the other batteries between Vire and Orne. Army Coastal Battery 1/1255 was fired upon from the sea at a great distance.

This report was transmitted by telephone to Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff (Navy). Captain Assmann agreed that in view of this information Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff can no longer maintain its previous assessment of the situation.

at 0745 a report came in about landings on the mouths of Orne and Vire.

at 0754 Group West reported six battle ships and about 20 destroyers off Le Havre.

at 0710 many landing vessels were reported in the area St. Vaast. New parachute landings were made at the Vire mouth. Naval Command, Normandy reported heavy cruisers South of St. Vaast and light cruisers North of St. Vaast as well as assault boats landing on the coast.

at 0844 Naval Command, Normandy reported several vessels off the northern coast of Cotentin in a distance of about 40 kilometers.

at 0900 Commander, 5th Torpedo Flotilla reported after arrival with the torpedo boat T"28", the JAGUAR and MOEWE in Le Havre: "Wireless transmitter of the flag ship was destroyed. Therefore no reconnaissance reports were made. At 0535 we attacked 6 battleships protected by 15-20 destroyers with 15 torpedoes in

6 Jun. 1944

BF 3684 at a distance of 65 kilometers. Planes covered the enemy formation with a smoke screen. Results could not be observed. The enemy battleships laid intensive fire of heavy, middle sized, and Flak-artillery on our ships. The fire control was carried out by planes. The fire was answered from our side by 10.5 cm guns. Fighters were constantly near the formation. Enemy planes were continuously warded off by anti-aircraft machine weapons at a distance of about 1500 meters. No serious losses were sustained. Near the approach buoy a mine exploded 50 meters away from the side of the torpedo boat T"28". New ammunition is going to be taken on board. The boats are kept in immediate readiness. Only a few new torpedoes could be taken on board owing to the supply difficulties. It is impossible to supply the JAGUAR with new 10.5 cm ammunition. The stock amounts to 200 rounds.

Of this attack it was said in a British newspaper report, that three destroyers carried out a daring attack against the battleship formation which however was unsuccessful.

at 0900 38th Minesweeper Flotilla reported on an operation against an enemy landing formation near Quistreham carried out by 13 boats. Landing craft were not sighted but only two heavy units. Many attacks of fighter bombers and bombers were warded off. One enemy plane was shot down. At 0615 one mine of type EL M/A was cleared with clapper buoy type "I" 100 meters South of approach buoy. At 0735 the flotilla with all its boats entered Le Havre upon order.

at 0912 Naval Command, Normandy transmitted a message from Marcouf: "Very many landing boats approached the coast protected by battleships and cruisers."

at 0919 Naval Command, Normandy reported: "Heavy artillery fire laying on the area of Marcouf. Between Vire and Orne, especially near Vierville and Colleville, enemy tanks went on land. The enemy climbed with boarding-ladders the bluff near Port du Hoc. Fighting is going on. No reports arrived up to now from the area Ravenoville Vire mouth."

6 Jun. 1944

at 0920 Group West sent a report of 0730:

1. As far as can be seen up to now, enemy landings are confined to the area St. Vaast-Deauville with centers of activity at St. Vaast, Grandcamp, Riva Bella, Quistreham, Cabourg. The other parts of the coast up to Boulogne seem free from the enemy. The destroyers reported in that area do not seem to have any connection with the other operation.
2. During a reconnaissance sweep of 15th Patrol Flotilla, the Patrol Boat "1509" was sunk by artillery fire of heavy enemy ships. The flotilla's way back to Le Havre was barred by superior enemy forces. No further reports were obtained. Actually the flotilla entered the harbor with the exception of Patrol Boat "1509".
3. 5th Torpedo Flotilla (3 boats) attacked six battle ships and twenty destroyers in the Seine Bay. All torpedoes and a large part of the ammunition were fired. The flotilla is entering Le Havre.
4. 5th and 9th Minesweeper Flotilla carried out a reconnaissance sweep on both sides of Cherbourg without results. The boats entered Cherbourg.
5. According to a report of the Admiral, Channel Coast at 0630 5 heavy units and 7 destroyers were off St. Vaast.
6. Battery Marcouf reported that an enemy cruiser was hit and one ship exploded.
7. According to a report from Cape de le (Sic!) Here at 0642 a formation of about 30 vessels including battle ships, cruisers, destroyers and probably also merchant ships was observed in 270° at a distance of 12 miles. Low flying planes were putting up a smoke screen. An enemy ship fired upon the coast near Trouville over the Seine mouth. 500 US-fighters were on protection flights.

6 Jun. 1944

8. Our own measures and plans are the following:
- a. 8th Destroyer Flotilla will move to Brest.
 - b. the operation "Landwirt" will be carried out according to operation order.
 - c. emergency barrages will be laid out off Cherbourg, Le Havre, Dieppe and Boulogne during the night.
 - d. all the forces of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses West and all PT-boats will also be engaged in operations during the night.

This report was transmitted to the Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters, to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff (Navy), High Command Army, General Staff of the Army, Naval Liaison Officer and Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Naval Liaison Officer.

at 0925 Naval Staff, Submarine Division issued directives for Commander Submarines, West and Group West to make the necessary preparations in order to enable the "Landwirt" boats to start for operations from all harbors even during daytime. Definite orders will follow till 1200 at the latest. This would not influence the order given to the Schnorchel-Submarines to leave Brest.

at 0930 Reuter officially announced:

"The Allied Army landed on the northern coast of France."

USA Broadcasting Station for Europe announced:

"USA battleships and planes are taking part in the operations on the European West Coast."

at 0935 a report was intercepted by radio monitoring service stating:

"No details can be given up to now, but we landed."

Another report at 0814 said:

"First line of the enemy taken."

6 Jun. 1944

at 1002 a report of Naval Command, Normandy gave details about further developments of the enemy landing stating that five enemy tanks landed near Asnelles and that bigger landing operations seemed to be going on near Versurmer as strong formations were patrolling in that area. From Aromanches, heavy bombing attacks and the sighting of more than 200 vessels including destroyers were reported.

at 1010 Naval Command, Normandy reported that the previously reported ships North of Cotentin turned to the North-west.

at 1015 an enemy report was intercepted by radio monitoring service indicating that the position on the "Red Strand" was not good.

at 1044 Naval Command, Normandy reported that 35 enemy tanks were destroyed near Asnelles but that the landings continued. Our own artillery is in action. The enemy fire on Battery Longues continued.

at 1045 radio monitoring service transmitted an intercepted report of 0830 stating that in the first line all reached the shore. The situation seemed to develop in a satisfactory way but no reliable information was on hand as yet.

at 1047 Naval Command, Normandy reported that enemy landing vessels entered the Vire-mouth and

at 1048 that bomber formations attacked every 15 minutes our communication lines in the rear.

at 1054 about 600 parachutists were reported near Trouville.

at 1115 having entered Le Havre, Commander 15th Patrol Boat Flotilla made a preliminary report about the encounter. The Flotilla together with 5th Torpedo Flotilla had contact with heavy enemy units. Patrol Boat "1509" was sunk by fire of heavy artillery. The surviving members of the crew were rescued. By a new attack of 5th Torpedo Flotilla the enemy fire was temporarily diverted from the rescue operation. When entering Le Havre the flotilla observed laying of mines in that sea area.

at 1125 Naval Command, North transmitted assessment of the situation at 0900 to area Commanders and gave the

6 Jun. 1944

following directive:

- a. All formations of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses North in the area of 1st Coast Patrol Force to be held in immediate readiness.
- b. Westbound convoy to the area Netherland to be stopped for the time being.
- c. Patrol positions of the Dutch coast will immediately be occupied by reinforced formations from dawn to two hours after dusk at least.
- d. Laying vessels of the 32nd and 34th Minesweeper Flotilla for the laying of barrages off the Dutch coast will be kept in readiness in the jumping off ports in order to enable them to carry out the task within ten hours after arrival of the key-word. Final orders to be expected.
- e. Increased attention ordered for the area of the Commander of the Coastal Defenses Bight of Heligoland.

at 1139 Naval Command, Channel Islands reported gun fire air attack on the strong point Casquets carried out by four Typhoons at 0713. No losses in personnel were sustained.

In a conference with Air Force, Operations Staff it was confirmed that 3rd Air Force was ordered again to use all its forces which owing to the air situation can not be sent to the Channel area for reconnaissance at the flanks in the North Sea and in the Biscayan waters. Priority was given to the fighting against enemy landings. 3rd and 5th Air Force were again instructed to take all necessary steps in order to prevent surprise operations of the enemy in other areas.

at 1230 Group West transmitted report on the situation sent in by Naval Command Seine-Somme at 1150. No enemy landings took place in that area. One reserve division cleared the area East of Orne of enemy forces which had landed from the air. West of Orne the enemy landed along the entire front of the

6 Jun. 1944

neighboring division to the left. Also tanks were brought on land. Battery 3/1255 fired upon ten landing boats near Riva Bella and Battery 2/1255 fired on about 30-40 warships and many landing boats sailing for Le Havre in a distance of 16 Kilometers. This was the same formation which had been fired upon and which had been sailing up and down along the coast. Le Havre had not been attacked by enemy planes up to then.

at 1316 Naval Command, Normandy reported further unloadings near Asnelles and infantry and tank attacks against this place.

at 1325 Group West transmitted a report of the Naval Command, Seine-Somme of 1225 stating 5 big battleships, 15 light and heavy cruisers, about 50 destroyers and torpedo boats, 12 troop transporters, 25 L.S.T.'s, innumerable smaller landing vessels and many other vessels farther away which could not be discerned exactly.

at 1345 Naval Command, Channel Islands reported that PT-boats were sighted North of Guernsey beyond the range of our batteries:

"As far as can be seen at noon the enemy succeeded to a considerable degree to land and break through our main defense line on the beach, taking much advantage from surprise action. The only thing that matters at the moment is to prevent landings in other areas and to destroy the bridgeheads before they become too strong by further transfer of forces."

at 1400 Churchill announced in the House of Commons that a huge Armada of more than 4,000 ships and many thousands of smaller vessels started for the invasion. Most of the coastal batteries were silenced already and troops had landed from the air behind the German lines. The prepared barrages had not proved as dangerous as had been feared. More than 1,000 planes of the first wave were operating for the air defense. The hope was not unfounded that a tactical surprise had been possible. It could be expected that many more such surprise actions would be possible. The heavy fighting would continue

6 Jun. 1944

for many weeks. Up to now, he said, all operations had been carried out according to plans.

Enemy newspaper correspondents reported that British and American battle ships, cruisers and monitors opened fire upon the coastal batteries from a great distance. PT-boats, assault boats, special vessels, and landing vessels then approached the coast as soon as mine clearing vessels advancing in a broad line had cleared the way. The landing troops so far established two bridgeheads. At different other places along the coast approaches were made for diversion.

During the first hours of the afternoon all the guns of Battery Marcouf were temporarily put out of action. Nevertheless the crew hopes to get part of the battery ready for fire again.

at 1521 Group West reported on the plans of 9th Air Corps for the night of 6 Jun:

At 2325 a concentrated attack is planned on landing boats in the sea area between Seine-mouth and Bayeux.

Following further landings continuous air raids in waves of groups will be carried out in the same area.

at 1551 the Admiral Channel Coast reported that North of the Seine everything was quiet. The area South of the river was cleared of the enemy troops landed from the air. No landings from the sea took place. No enemy activity was reported from the area Pas de Calais either.

at 1700 it was clear that no landings were carried out in the area of the Channel Islands and on the Western side of Cotentin. But on the eastern side of the peninsula as well as on the coast up to the Orne mouth the enemy gained a foothold and encircled our coastal batteries and resistance positions of the Army. The village Isigny is in our hands whereas the bridge over the Caen-canal was occupied by the enemy during the noon hours.

at 1718 According to the directives of Group West, the Admiral, Channel Coast ordered to get ready for

6 Jun. 1944

all destruction measures in the harbors which had been planned.

at 1755 Group West reported its plans for the night of 6 Jun.:

- a. Laying out of emergency barrages between Le Havre and Boulogne.
- b. Torpedo attacks against the landing fleet to be carried out whenever the conditions will allow it by torpedo boats starting from Le Havre.
- c. Operations against the landing fleet in the Bay of Marcouf by 5th and 9th PT boat Flotilla starting from Cherbourg.
- d. Reconnaissance operations against enemy supply lines to be carried out by 4th PT boat Flotilla starting from Boulogne in western direction.
- e. All the forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West will patrol off the coast till dawn.

at 1932 Naval Command, Normandy reported that at 1810 Battery Marcouf and presumably Army Battery 3/1261 were fired upon by cruisers from the sea. At Battery Marcouf the gun which had remained ready for action forced a destroyer to withdraw. The firing of a new kind of rocket projectiles in the area of Marcouf was observed from the sea.

at 2004 Group West reported on the intended operations of 10th Air Corps for the night of 6 Jun:

"In the evening dusk an attack by air torpedoes is planned against the enemy landing fleet in the sea area off the East coast of Cherbourg peninsula. The center of the operation is to be off St. Vaast - Barfleur."

at 2200 Group West reported that the secondary center of the enemy attack between St. Vaast and Vire mouth which put the heaviest pressure against the area South of Marcouf is now under control. The area between Vire and Port en Bessin was cleared at 1930 with the exception of the small bridgehead St. Pierre. Apparently a new landing took place after that time.

6 Jun. 1944

Many freight carrying gliders landed near Beigeux and Caen. Between Vire and Orne many parachutists came down.

The main center of the enemy operation is situated West of Orne mouth up to Aromanches. Our own strong counter attack is going on. The enemy is standing North of Blaixville (Caen-canal) where he has occupied the bridges. During a new landing at that place 240 ships of all kinds were counted reportedly including also plane carriers.

In the area between Orne and Seine only landings from the air took place. This area was cleared of enemy forces. Artillery fire from heavy naval units was directed against the area West of Le Havre. Six bomb carpets were dropped on Villerville. No indications exist that the enemy landed North of Le Havre. There were no reports on the enemy from the western side of Cotentin, the Channel Islands and St. Malo.

at 2300 2nd Gun Carrier Flotilla left Boulogne with ten boats in a transfer move to Dieppe.

The British Admiralty announced that the danger zone for shipping in the Bay of Biscay and off the Channel was extended towards the North up to a point 25 miles off the Southwest coast of Ireland and led in straight direction East of the boundary of the Irish territorial waters.

In the afternoon Churchill gave a second report in the House of Commons in which he described the losses at sea as very small. Landings had been carried out, he said, along the entire front and two bridgeheads at least were established which at some places extended several miles into the country. Fighting was going on in Caen. Several important bridges which had not been blown up were taken. The resistance of the coastal batteries had been reduced first by air attacks and later by gun fire from the sea. The landing obstacles had been far less important in number and strength than had been anticipated. Heavy fighting was still to be expected.

It can be concluded from broadcastings of reporters

6 Jun. 1944

that the invasion originally was planned to take place 24 hours earlier but that it had been postponed because of weather conditions.

On the evening of the first day of the Invasion a complete survey of the situation is still impossible. The enemy succeeded in creating by surprise action a landing bridge head which is still interspersed by many of our resistance positions and coastal defenses. Our own assault divisions are on their way to the scene. For the second day it will be important whether the weather conditions enable the enemy air force to commit its full strength in fighting the approaching German forces. On the other hand our own Air Force which is concentrating strong bomber and fighter formations in the operation area is depending on good weather conditions for carrying out successfully attacks on the landing fleet and supply routes of the enemy.

The Navy did everything possible with its small forces to damage landing formations on their approach way. Exact information about the sinking and damaging of enemy shipping can not be obtained. Our own losses are small. One patrol boat sunk. Nothing is known about the effects of our mine barrages. Unfortunately Coastal Mine A-barrages were not yet laid out in the coastal zones of the Seine Bay.

The Navy coastal batteries together with the Army coastal batteries seem to have sustained the main blow of the enemy attack. The fate of the different batteries is still unknown. Extraordinary strong attacks seem to have concentrated on Battery Marcouf which was attacked from the land and was conquered and reconquered several times.

From the beginning of the Invasion onwards the offices concerned of the Navy were able to carry out an uninterrupted communication service. Commanding General, West as well as Army Group B and D got most of their first information about the developments off the coast and on shore by reports of the Navy. Naval Staff continuously informed Armed Forces High Command, Operations

6 Jun. 1944

Staff (Navy) as well as the Navy Liaison Officers at the General Staffs of the Army and Air Force. All reports and messages that were received as well as all directives and orders in connection with the Invasion were collected in a special file "Invasion", enclosure to War Diary, Part C, Vol II b.

2. Other Reports on the Situation:

Enemy Position:

In the area of the outer Bay of Biscay one British ship was located. Figures about the Operations of 19th Group were not available because of line fault. At 2029, planes of this Group reported sighting three of our own destroyers in 4614 North and 0307 West which were attacked by British planes. Apparently this was 8th Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Furthermore, planes of 19th Group repeatedly reported sighting of submarines.

Own Position:

Atlantic Coast Area:

South of Gironde Naval Batteries Carcaus, Le Porge, Contis, Hossegart were ready for action with four 8.8 cm guns each and Battery Hourtin with four 15 cm guns. Battery Bascarosse with three 10.5 cm guns left Amersfoort on the 22nd May. The Battery Cape de la Chevre would probably be ready for action make-shift. Nothing else to report.

Channel Waters:

The torpedo boat T"28" will not be ready for sail until the morning of 7 Jun. because a steel hawser was entangled in the propeller.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

6 Jun. 1944.

The patrol positions off the Dutch coast were reinforced. No contact with the enemy occurred. One mine each was cleared off Hook van Holland and off the Elbe. Patrol boat "1403" was hit by a mine West of Scheveningen and was towed into the harbor.

In the Zealand waters and in the Ijssel-Meer three convoys with about 40,000 BRt were carried out.

North of Schiermonikoog mine laying by two enemy planes was suspected.

At 0920 preliminary warning was given for the area of Commanding General, Armed Forces, Netherlands. The units of the 1st Coast Patrol Force were ordered into immediate readiness.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff (Navy) transmitted the Fuehrer's fears about a possible landing raid from the air on Heligoland.

An examination of the island defenses revealed that the armament equipment of the island could be regarded as sufficient.

Guns for naval targets = 3 - 30,5 cm, 3 - 17 cm, 4 - 7,5 cm.

Anti-aircraft artillery = 4 x 4 - 10,5 cm, 12 - 4 cm, 15 - 2 cm.

The defending forces consist of 1,699 men of the Navy and 201 of the Air Force for whom enough infantry weapons are on hand.

In addition to these defense forces the local conditions had to be taken into account (narrowness of the Oberland, obstacles, difficulties of landing or parachute descent on the Unterland etc.) which make landing on Heligoland from the air extraordinarily difficult and highly improbable. (Note in red pencil writing: Naval Command, North was ordered furthermore to increase the defense forces against troop landings from the air).

Commander in Chief, Navy intends to report to the Fuehrer on the subject during his next visit.

6 Jun. 1944

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Position:

In the area of 18th Group, 34 enemy planes were counted in operation.

2. Own Position:

In the evening of 5 Jun., minor exchange of fire was reported in the Petsamo area. Only small material damage was caused. At noon on 5 Jun., nine enemy planes entered the area of Petsamo and during the following night two enemy planes entered the area South of Banak.

28 ships were escorted to the North and 23 to the South.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Position:

Our air reconnaissance reported two small vessels burning near Kiskolski-Reef at 1825 on 5 Jun. TYTTERS reported five minesweepers on a Northwest course Northeast of Vigrund at 1853 of the same day.

On the morning of the 6th, our air reconnaissance revealed minesweeping activities and guard vessels in AO 3712 and 3725. At 1230, two bigger ships, four middle-sized guard ships, twelve motorboats, and at 1515, five minelayers were seen steering West in the same waters.

Many minesweepers, mine-clearing vessels, guard ships and motor boats were reported at Lavansaari, Luga-mouth and Battaranaya Bay as before.

2. Own Position:

Minesweeping duties were carried out in the Baltic Sea Entrances by 28 boats and by 44 boats and 7 minesweeping planes in the Baltic. Two

6 Jun. 1944

3. The using of the LAUTING as emergency barrage layer was approved as well as keeping her in readiness in the western exit of Lymfjord.
4. Considering the deep waters which make it doubtful whether landing vessels with a degaussing system will cause these mines to explode, it will be necessary to investigate once more the effectiveness of a moored mine barrage with anti-sweeping device. Supply of mines nevertheless will only be possible by the end of July.
5. Plans have to be reported.

2. Naval Command, Baltic reported its plan to reinforce "Seeigel" - Barrage VII b, VIII b and VI b by UMB with snap line against enemy PT-boat operations. Naval Staff approved this and reminded that stocks on hand would have to be used which can be restored only after a considerable time.

3. Referring to the barrage plans in the Gulf of Finland Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff (Navy) was informed that barrage plan "Krebs", approximately in the position of the former Juminda barrage, was cancelled in view of the mine shortness and in order to maintain the liberty of movements for the submarine chasers.

Commander, Mine-layers East has a reserve of about 1,500 mines against surface craft, 1,000 mines against submarines and 1,500 barrage protection devices. Laying out of mines off Nashorn was intended in case penetration of "Seeigel" had to be reckoned with, yet not too early in order not to hinder our own active submarine chasing. The number of mines is insufficient for the establishment of a new and independent barrage-system. Seeigel will be reinforced within the near future by mines with snap line against PT-boats.

4. The opinion of Naval Staff concerning a possible transport of personnel and material from the north-Estonian area in case of a withdrawal of our frontline there, to be found in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III under B. No. 1/Skl 1435/44 Gkdos, Chfs. Naval Staff does not intend to offer plans for the evacuation of Estonia to Armed Forces High Command or other services of the Armed Forces at a moment where the highest Command was strictly determined to defend the Baltic States.

6 Jun. 1944

V. Submarine Warfare:

Operations in connection with the invasion have been dealt with already. All the 36 boats of the Group "Landwirt" left their harbors. The submarine U"989" which is one of the six boats that left for the Channel returned to Brest because its commanding officer was wounded during an air attack.

In the Northern Waters the submarine U"347" reported the ice boundary in AA 3657. After the withdrawal of the boats in readiness the ten submarines which remained on sea would occupy the new patrol line from AB 7684 to AF 2674. The 20 boats of Group "Mitte" were ordered in immediate readiness.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

West Area:

In the Channel our fighters continuously carried out reconnaissance flights in order to locate invasion movements. The bulk of the enemy planes was engaged in the landing task. 17700 four-engined planes attacked the landing area in low level flights before the landing of troops. About 500 enemy fighters were constantly observed in the Seine Bay. During the evening hours the continuous influx of strong bomber formations and freight carrying planes was repeated in the area Caen-Cherbourg.

Our own fighter defenses in the landing area consisting of 170 fighters shot down 15 enemy fighters at a loss of 2 of our own planes. During the night of 6 Jun., 50 enemy planes entered Belgium and attacked two aerodromes. In western France 500 Liberators and Mosquitoes attacked railway installations and aerodromes in the areas of Somme mouth, Chateaudun, La Rochelle and St. Brioux between 2200 and 0300. During these operations 63 of our nightfighters shot down 13 four-engined enemy planes at a loss of 2 planes on our side.

Our own bomber formations attacked ships and unloading places in the landing area from 1430 till 0225 on 7 Jun. About 2300 a direct hit could be made on a transporter. One landing boat was sunk. More explosions were observed on boats and ships. One large formation of ships was identified.

During the night of 7 Jun, 30 Mosquitoes entered the Reich territory and attacked Mannheim.

6 Jun. 1944

Mediterranean Theater:

On 5 Jun. several hundreds of four-engined enemy planes protected by fighters entered the area of northern Italy coming from South Italy and flying over the Adriatic. They attacked Bologna as well as aerodromes and anti-aircraft positions. Four of the attacking planes were shot down. Further attacks were directed against the railway station and aerodrome of Verona. Besides, aerodromes, railway installations, and bridges in the area Parma and Verona were attacked by gun fire from the air. Forty-six of our own fighters were operating. Two of the attacking planes were shot down.

In the Italian front area 900 planes were counted in operations. Railway bridges and targets on the roads in central Italy were attacked by 250 two-engined planes and bomber-fighters.

During the night following 5 Jun., 75 planes were reportedly engaged in supplying bandits in the Balkans. Twenty of these came from Russia. Thirty planes carried out harassing attacks in the area of Viterbo. Seven of our own planes successfully attacked motor columns in the area Frascati.

On 6 Jun. enemy planes coming from South Italy and protected by fighters carried out strong attacks against Ploesti. One hundred and fourteen of our own fighters were engaged in the defense duty. They succeeded in shooting down eleven of the attacking planes. Five others were shot down by anti-aircraft guns. Six of our fighters were lost.

In the area of Air Command S.W. reconnaissance flights were made by our planes.

East Area:

On 5 Jun., 1,278 operations of our own and 1,075 of enemy planes were reported. Seven losses were sustained on our side and 46 on the enemy side. The aerodrome at Galaty was attacked by 90 or 100 enemy planes coming from the area of Kiev.

6 Jun. 1944

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea:

1. Area of Naval Group, West:

Enemy Position:

At 0730 a convoy consisting of 22 freighters and 1 tanker covered by 6 corvettes entered the Mediterranean coming from the Atlantic. Two tankers, 2 freighters and 6 escort vessels left Gibraltar and joined the convoy.

At 1015, two auxiliary aircraft carriers and five destroyers and at 1040 one cruiser of the COVENTRY-Class left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

Own Position:

Nothing to report.

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Position:

In the morning, according to radio interpretation the convoy UGS 42 was sailing in the Alexandria area. During the night following 5 Jun., one PT-boat was located off Cape Mele and several other enemy targets - presumably also PT-boats - were located in the sea area of Leghorn. At 1940 on 5 Jun., 100 miles Westsouthwest of Naples, four LST and one defense vessel were sighted on an easterly course, presumably coming from the western Mediterranean. Besides, during the same night landing equipment was brought to Anzio and presumably Corsica.

At 0210, two motor mine sweepers of foreign construction had contact with two enemy PT-boats of an Italian type eight miles Southeast of St. Remo. Hits were observed on the enemy boats. No counter action of the enemy took place.

At 1925 in the evening our air reconnaissance sighted ten merchant ships and three guardboats sailing on a south-course about 15 miles Northwest of Ponza.

6 Jun. 1944

Own Position:

At 2055 on 5 Jun. an enemy attack carried out by fighter-bombers against a convoy near Piombino was warded off by gunfire of the ships and of the batteries on land. The radar station Marinella (South of Civitavecchia) was blown up because the enemy approached. Sector Commandant Civitavecchia gave order for the fouling with mines and for the blowing up of the harbor. The sea traffic was reduced owing to bad weather conditions. Mine operations were postponed.

During the night of 6 Jun., the MAS boats (Italian M.T.B.'s) would operate on the convoy routes along the East coast of Corsica.

High Command, Air, Operations Staff ordered 2nd Air Force to prepare an attack on the PT-boat bases at Bastia and Maddalena. The attack would be carried out in correspondence with the developments of the general situation and in close cooperation with Commanding General, South-West and German Naval Command, Italy.

3. Area of Naval Group, South:

a. Adriatic:

Enemy Position:

At 2000 on 5 Jun., 1 destroyer, 2 torpedo boats and 2 freighters were reported steering West, South of Lissa. At 0100 on the 6th, two major vessels coming from Lissa passed Drvnik for the North sailing at a high speed. At 0035, two destroyers were steering East, two miles South of Solta. In the harbor of Lissa 7 landing boats, 28 coastal auxiliary sailing vessels and 80 small boats were identified. The boat traffic observed at Brac apparently was for the withdrawal of the enemy troops.

Own Position:

Enemy attacks on Brac stopped since 5 Jun. Our own troops are advancing. The 36 enemy prisoners include one British colonel and two lieutenants. In the evening, 7th PT-boat Flotilla will start for operations against the transport of enemy troops from the East coast of Brac. Our own troop transports to Brac and Solta are being carried out according to schedule. The PT-boats

6 Jun. 1944

"36", "61", and "158" were attacked by enemy planes during their transfer move from Sibenice to Lussin. On the S.O.'s boat losses of the crew were sustained. The boats entered Zara. In the night of 5 Jun. and on the morning of 6th, enemy planes unsuccessfully attacked Lussin-Piccolo. Towards noon Tintenfische D and G warded off a low level attack of four planes on camouflaged berth.

At 1310 about 40 bombs were dropped on Rimini. No damages were caused during a low level attack carried out by two planes against the harbor Ancona on the evening of the 6th.

b. Aegean Waters:

Only minor air reconnaissance was carried out by the enemy in the Dodecaneso and in the western Peloponnesus on 6 Jun. Steamer REAUMUR (549 BRT) was sunk by an enemy submarine North of the Doro-passage at 1142.

The Dodecaneso-convoy consisting of three steamers under the protection of two torpedo boats of foreign construction and one mine-sweeper left Piraeus on the evening of the 5th. The steamer CELSIUS which belonged to this convoy became unmanoeuvrable because of engine-trouble and was being towed back to Piraeus by mine clearance boats.

At 2140 a new attack against Rhodes was made by six or eight planes. No damages were caused in the harbor. North-east of Coos enemy PT-boats close to the Turkish coast were fired upon.

Group South referring to the loss of the steamer REAUMUR asked for the following in view of the increased difficulties in the supply duties:

- a. Additional submarine chasers should be provided.
- b. Transport-submarines under construction should be transferred to the Adriatic as soon as possible to be used for the supply of Crete and Dodecanesus.
- c. Air transport groups should be reinforced considerably as had been requested by Army Group A.

c. Black Sea:

6 Jun. 1944

On the occasion of the enemy air attack on Galatz carried out by 90 - 100 presumably four-engined American planes no damages were sustained by the Navy.

The submarine U"19" left Constanta for operations against the enemy.

No further reports came in about the war freighter KASSEL which was held back in the Bosphorus.

Situation on the Danube:

Between Semendria and Belgrade six cases of mine-laying from the air were observed. Drift mines were identified on the Theiss.

One minesweeper was hit by a mine and sunk near Kilometer indicator 1125.

On 5 Jun., two mines were cleared near Kilometer indicator 1736 and six mines between Kilometer indicator 1512 and 1543 on 6 Jun. One minesweeping plane was shot down by an enemy fighter.

VIII. Situation in East Asia:

No special reports.

7 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance

No special reports.

Conference on the situation with the Chief, Naval Staff at 1115

I. Report of Naval Staff, Operations Staff, Fleet
Operations Branch about "Wallenstein":

The large scale enemy operation which began by the landing in the Channel area leads to the conclusion that further landings on the coast of our zone of influence as well as increased activities of the Russians in the Gulf of Finland are to be expected. Plan "Wallenstein" which was enforced on 6 Jun. as a precaution will be maintained until the situation will have changed. Bringing the units to their full strength in personnel and the assembling of materials will be speeded up. Naval Staff gave the following directives to the front line stations involved concerning the distribution and the use of the surface naval forces:

- a. The forces in the Skagerrak area and in the Gulf of Finland will be increased by equal reinforcements.
- b. The convoys, mine-sweeping and patrol-duties will continue as before. The convoys for the Netherlands will be carried out according to the situation. The defense formations will be reinforced in order to safeguard an undisturbed convoy traffic and the keeping open of the approach and exit passages even if the enemy increases its air-to-air mine activities.
- c. The training of all units for their tasks will have to be improved by all means.

In particular, all ships of the training formation which are ready for action will continue fighting efficiency training in the same areas as before.

Forces of Commander Destroyers:

Of the nine torpedo boats that had been reported ready for war one flotilla consisting of four boats unconditionally ready for war is to move to Skagerrak, the

7 Jun. 1944

rest will go to the Gulf of Finland. The destroyers IHN, RIEDEL as well as the torpedo boats ready for action will continue the training in the Baltic Sea.

PT-boats:

2nd PT-boat Training Flotilla (8 boats) with the TSINGTAU will remain in the Skagerrak. The 10th PT-boat Flotilla (9 boats) with the TANGA would stay at Swinemunde in immediate readiness to move to Skagerrak or to the Gulf of Finland in accordance with the situation. The 1st PT-boat Training Flotilla (7 boats) with the LUDERITY will be at the disposal of Commander PT-boats for the carrying on of the training.

Patrol Forces:

The Coastal Patrol Force of Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic and of Commander, Mine-Sweepers, Baltic will be reinforced by vessels - suitable for mine defense and escort duties - of the schools, of the inspectorates and of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines as far as necessary for the carrying out of the "Wallenstein" operations. Vessels not suitable or not needed shall remain available for the carrying on of the training, but they will be kept ready for action and prepared to be called up within 24 hours.

The corresponding directives to Naval Command, East, North, and Norway, with copy to the Fleet; Commanding Admiral, Submarines; Training Formation, Fleet; Commander, Destroyers and Commander PT-boats were issued as per order 1/Skl I op 1696/44 Chfs. For copy see special file "Invasion 7 Jun."

Naval Command, North and Norway were ordered in this connection to report immediately their most required demand of defense forces. Naval Command, Baltic should make proposals concerning the distribution of the forces of Commander, Destroyers and of the Patrol Service. These proposals should provide for the sending of war experienced vessels to decisive points and to give newly made ships an opportunity to improve their training as much as possible.

Training Formation, Fleet reported that the PRINZ EUGEN, LUTZOW, NURNBERG, EMDEN, SCHLESIEN would become ready for operations during 7th Jun. Of these the PRINZ EUGEN would be "ready for war" whilst the others are only at reduced war readiness. The NURNBERG and the SCHLESIEN are on their way to Gotenhafen, the other ships are already at Gotenhafen.

7 Jun. 1944

The SCHEER, KOLN, LEIPZIG could be prepared for reduced war readiness within about eight weeks and the SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN and the HANSA within about four weeks if sufficient fuel would be allocated. The time required for the HIPPER could not yet be estimated as the dockyard works had not been completed by that time.

According to Naval Command, Baltic the "Wallenstein" measures are going on undisturbed.

Commander in Chief, Navy asked for precaution measures against a possible surprise landing of the Russians on the Estonian coast. In spite of the fact that clear nights now provide better opportunities for our air reconnaissance, Chief, Naval Staff should draw the special attention of Naval Command, Baltic to this possibility and explain the reasons that had been of decisive importance for the issuing of the order "Wallenstein". Under no circumstances should we allow ourselves to be caught by surprise. Naval Command, Baltic has the full right to rely on the "Wallenstein" forces also for operations in the East. The measure has to be maintained as long as any danger exists in the West or in the East.

II. Naval Staff, Quartermaster General reported on an order of the Armed Forces High Command canceling all building works in the occupied western area. Therefore it is possible to invest the building capacity in the improvement of the North Sea defenses. Commander in Chief, Navy ordered first of all to approach the Armaments Ministry which alone knows all existing possibilities.

III. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Chief of Organization and Mobilisation Branch reported on leadership questions concerning the East and about the proposed alterations on the lines of the organization of Admiral Skagerrak.

According to these suggestions an Admiral of the eastern part of the Baltic would be inserted as Commanding Admiral of the combined sea and land forces and as a link between Naval Command, Baltic and the Commander, Minesweepers East. The staffs required could be formed by personnel taken from the Black Sea staffs. Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, Baltic personally contributed to the approval of Naval Command, Baltic.

Commander in Chief, Navy agreed and ordered execution of this plan as soon as possible.

7 Jun. 1944

IV. Naval Staff, Chief of Operations Division reported That the transport to Paris of DM 1-mines would take about eleven days and that transport conditions were difficult. Probably it would be impossible to transport the mines by air from the Home Area directly to Le Havre.

Commander in Chief, Navy decided that now the emergency case has come in which all other considerations regarding to the use of DM-mines have to be abandoned. Commanding Admiral, Defenses West, and Group West were instructed therefore that the existing stocks of 600 LMB-mines with DM 1-firing device would be sent from the Home Area to the Barrage Command at Chateaudun by "most immediate" railway transport. Group West then would have to send them to the harbors in accordance with the war situation to be taken on board. At the moment, the waters off Le Havre seem to be of preeminent importance. Group West will be asked to state its opinions. For corresponding directive 1/Skl I E 1693/44 Gkdos Chefs. Compare Special File "Invasion 7 Jun."

Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff, Navy got the directive to ask for the Fushrer's approval to the employing of the new weapon and to report that in view of the development of the situation the Navy abandoned its objections against the use of DM-mines by the German Air Force. A corresponding teletype was sent to High Command, Air Operations Staff, Navy, and to High Command, Air, Inspector of Air to Air Mines, by order of 1/Skl. I E 1694/44 Gkdos. Chefs. For copy see Special File "Invasion 7 Jun."

V. Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Intelligence Division gave a comprehensive survey of the declarations concerning the invasion of the supreme commanders and statesmen of the enemy side at 6 Jun. In addition to these also Laval delivered a speech which was following the line of his politics.

The communiqué No.2 of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces announced at midnight of 6 Jun.:

"A short time before midnight of 5 Jun., Allied night-bombers began the attack which lasted till the morning dawn and in which very strong forces were engaged.

Between 0630 and 0730 of the 6th, two Task Forces of the Navy under the command of Vice Admiral Vian on board HMS SCYLLA and of Rear Admiral Kirk on board of the US cruiser AUGUSTA advanced their assault forces against the enemy coast.

7 Jun. 1944

Naval forces which had previously been assembled under the command of Admiral Ramsay left the harbors in a brisk weather. They were followed in the course of the night by bombarding forces which had been moved from the northern waters.

The clearing of passages through the vast enemy mine fields had been completed just before dawn. All the naval forces passed through the cleared passages following the mine clearance forces and steered for their destination. Enemy torpedo boats and patrol boats tried to disturb the operation just before the attack was opened. They were dispersed immediately. One patrol boat was sunk and one was heavily damaged.

The assault forces approached the coast under strong artillery protection of destroyers and other vessels supporting the operation. Heavy ships attacked enemy batteries which had been bombed already from the air. Some of them were silenced. The unloading took place under a fire cover which was maintained from the sea and from the air. Troop landings from the air were carried out successfully at suitable places by troop transporting planes and freight gliders carrying strong troop formations.

Reports on the operation available at present show that our forces successfully carried out the initial landings. The fighting goes on. The losses of the Navy are very small especially when taking into account the size of the operation."

The report furthermore deals with the role of the Air Force during the day and during the night which reportedly met only minor resistance from fighters and anti-aircraft guns.

According to further reports the British battleships WARSPITE, NELSON, RAMILLIES, the cruisers GLASGOW, BELFAST, ENTERPRISE, MAURITIUS, ORION and SCYLLA participated in the operation. Of the US units the names NEVADA, ARKANSAS, TEXAS, and the cruisers AUGUSTA and TUSCALOOSA were given. In a further report the Monitor EREBUS was mentioned.

President Roosevelt, at the press conference of the 6th, stated that the US Navy had lost only two destroyers and one landing vessel till the afternoon of the same day. The day of the invasion had been fixed at the Teheran conference.

Further instructions to the population of the occupied territories were issued by the Allied.

7 Jun. 1944

The Portugese Government agreed to stop all tungsten imports to Germany. The government prohibited completely any tungsten exports.

The Badoglio Cabinet announced its resignation. The Governor General Prince Umberto accepted the resignation and advised Badoglio to form a new cabinet including the political leaders of the liberated Rome,

VI. Army Position:

In the landing area the landed forces of the enemy started an offensive in the direction of Caen. The road to Bayeux was interrupted. During the night of the 6th, new landings took place between the mouths of Vire and Orne as well as on the boot of the Cotentin Peninsula. It was estimated that during the 1st day and in the following night six enemy divisions went ashore which had assembled in the area Portsmouth as part of the Army Group of General Montgomery.

Three of our task divisions and two other divisions under the command of Tank Group West were directed against the landing bridgehead. The center of activities was Caen. No detailed informations were available; the communications seem to be deranged to a considerable extent.

A further assault group under the command of General Marcks was ordered to operate against two U.S. airborne divisions in the area north of Carentan and Montebourg. A group under the command of General Meindl was sent against an airborne unit newly landed in the area Coutances in the morning of the 7th. The enemy's intention to cut off the Cotentin peninsula and to seize Cherbourg was emphasized by this new landing from the air.

Other large scale landing operations had to be expected almost certainly. Enemy landings in the eastern part of the Channel carried out by about 25 formations kept in readiness in the Thames area were expected to take place after the consolidation of the enemy bridgeheads which had so far been established.

In Italy the enemy was advancing on the coastal road from Northwest and had reached a point eight Kilometers Southeast of Civitavecchia in the morning of the 7th. The development of the situation is very strained.

From Syria and Egypt troop movements towards the harbors were

7 Jun. 1944

reported. Perhaps this means the beginning of an operation against the Aegean Islands and the Peloponnesus.

On the Eastern Front our own operation in the Jassy area was finished.

VII. Naval Staff, Operations Division, Naval Air and Air Force Liaison Section reported on a conference with High Command, Air, Operations Staff, on 3rd and 4th Jun. At the order of the Reichsmarschall the production of Ju 290 and 390 was stopped. No more Ju 290 will come out after December. Fifth Long-range Reconnaissance Group has at its disposal about fifteen Ju 290, five or six of which are in readiness every day.

In the future, long distance reconnaissance on the Atlantic will be carried out by the type 177.

Xth Fliegerkorps and 5th Long-range Reconnaissance Group strongly opposed this plan and asked for the employment of Ju 390 as soon as possible. In virtue of his knowledge of the air armaments situation the General, Air Reconnaissance objected to this demand and declared the projected Ju 488 as desirable type for the Atlantic Air reconnaissance. In the meantime the type 177 should be used.

Commander in Chief, Navy maintained his demand for long-range air-reconnaissance over the Atlantic. Air reconnaissance over large areas will become an absolute necessity for the new types of submarines operating to an increased degree under the surface. Commander in Chief, Navy reported to the Fuëhrer by teletype on 16 Dec., 1943 that submarine warfare with the new types of submarines could not be recommenced unless enough of the indispensable air reconnaissance was made available. The Fuëhrer completely agreed with this opinion on 17 Dec., 1943. For carrying out the submarine warfare, a numerically sufficient air reconnaissance by planes possessing a maximum range, sufficient stability and speed, remains an absolute necessity although no special types of planes were asked for. By employing new types the submarines will be ready for operations by the winter of 1944. Therefore all planning of long-range reconnaissance planes scheduled for a longer period would be too late. A relevant teletype was sent to High Command, Air through Chief of Operations Branch, Navy, with copy to General, Air Reconnaissance, and to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy. For copy see 1/Skl I L 1703/44 Gkdos, Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, vol. V.

7 Jun. 1944

Conference on the situation with Commander in Chief, Navy at 1800:

According to information from Armed Forces, Operations Staff, Navy, the Fuehrer himself started to discuss the question of using D--mines at noon of that day. Captain Assmann was ordered to report to the Fuehrer on the same evening that similar ideas have been ventilated at Naval Staff in the morning and that permission was asked to use the new weapon.

The Fuehrer and General Fieldmarshal Rommel held steady and optimistic views regarding the landings in the western area and expected our counter measures to be successful.

Armed Forces, High Command also observed definite indications of forthcoming operations in the eastern Mediterranean. Op. Navy expected the Fuehrer to ask again for increased submarine operations in this area.

Commander in Chief, Navy decided already in this connection that three submarines should operate in the Aegean and in the area of Rhodos whereas the four or five remaining boats which are ready for action should be kept at Toulon in view of the possibility of an attack against the southern coast of France.

Special Items:

I. Armed Forces High Command, Armed Forces Quarters transmitted drafts of a Fuehrer-order with provisions for its execution issued by the Chief, Armed Forces High Command concerning a stricter combining of all questions regarding Naval Transport within the Armed Forces. Commander in Chief, Navy would accept responsibility for a uniform handling of this question in the Armed Forces. The sphere of work and the responsibility of the [middle of sentence missing] as outlined by the Fuehrer-directive of 30 May, 1942 remained unaltered.

In the areas cut off from the home areas by enemy action, Commander in Chief, Navy would take over the command of naval transport in accordance with the Fuehrer order of 20 Oct., 1943. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Chief of Coastal Defense Branch will report on the projects on the 9th. For copy of the corresponding teletype as per 1/Skl 17482/44 Gkdos. compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

II. The statement of Group South of 2nd and 3rd Jun. concerning the problem of supply escorts in the Aegean,

7 Jun. 1944

particularly for Crete was not satisfactory. The Group must realize the fact that considering the present shortage and the enormous demand of forces at home no increase in the air activities can be reckoned with and that the supply of the islands should be maintained by the means available. The absence of corresponding suggestions in both reports of the Group is regretted.

The following directive was therefore again sent to the Commanding Admiral, Aegean:

I. No report of the Admiral, Aegean was received as an answer to the demand of Naval Staff that Admiral, Aegean should investigate the Crete supply situation and report on his plans. Therefore Naval Staff was not informed about the intended "Sabine" convoy.

II. As about 4/5 of the supplies which had to be transported by this convoy were lost by enemy action, Admiral, Aegean was now asked immediately to answer the following questions directly to Naval Staff:

1. Was it right to send the steamers in one big convoy?
2. For what reasons was Iraklion chosen as port of destination for all ships?
3. What were the factors deciding the time of arrival of the convoys which frequently arrived in the evening?
4. Was it true that other duties of the convoy vessels during the month of May were of such preeminent importance that these vessels could be used for the vital Crete supply only by the end of the month?
5. How many auxiliary sailing vessels were engaged in the Crete supply during the month of May?
6. How many auxiliary motor vessels engaged in the Crete supply were lost during the month of May?
7. To what extent was it possible to use auxiliary sailing vessels for the supply instead of other ships?
8. What other measures would be taken in future to maintain the supply system in spite of the difficulties of which also Naval Staff was fully aware?

7 Jun. 1944

III. Reinforcements of the air forces can not be expected at present because concentration of fighter defense forces in the western area and in the Reich territory is necessary. Apart from the ships transferred from the Black Sea the Group has to rely entirely on the means available.

III. Reichsfuehrer SS transmitted copy of the Fuehrer-order of 12 Feb. 1944 by which the Reichsfuehrer SS was commissioned to establish and to manage a central German secret reporting service as well as a copy of the fundamental agreement between the Chief, Armed Forces High Command and Reichsfuehrer SS of 14 May 1944. defining the limits of the spheres of work and furthermore the 1st order for the execution of the Fuehrer order issued by Reichsfuehrer SS on 23 May. Duplicates of the orders as per 1/Skl. 1612/44 Chfs find in the files of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief of Surface Vessel Construction, Planning Branch.

IV. Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division gave report 11/44 of 4 Jun. on the enemy position. For copy as per 1/Skl 81334 Gkdos compare file "Enemy position reports Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division".

Following this report the enemy succeeded to an increasing degree in covering the sea areas off the southern coast of England against reconnaissance from the air or from the sea. The enemy's desire to hide from our observation certain transport vessels destined for the invasion became quite obvious in recent times by the attempt to destroy our radar stations on the Channel coast. The statement about increased activities of enemy air and naval forces in the Channel as a preparatory step for the invasion was confirmed by later developments.

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division reckoned as before with transport facilities for four or five landing formations in the Mediterranean. In the area Corsica and Sardinia special attention has to be payed to an increase in the number of smaller vessels at Bastia and Maddalena and small landing devices in harbors which had not been used up to that time. Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division was of the opinion that in the eastern Mediterranean no knowledge can be obtained which indicates preparation of large scale operations in the Balcan area or in the Aegean respectively because no sufficient information is available on the naval situation. Checking of the manifold agent reports obtained from other sources is impossible.

7 Jun. 1944

The Japanese Admiral Staff conjectured the transfer of more British submarines from the Mediterranean to the India Ocean.

Considering the middle Pacific, Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division expected that the entire Micronesian glacis would fall into the hand of the enemy within a measurable time because the Marianas and Western Caroline Islands could not be considered as a fortified defense line of the Japanese.

The Japanese units which have been encircled at New Guinea and on Rabaul have to defend themselves in all around defenses until the counter offensive starting from the line Celebes-Formosa can be launched, probably in August of this year.

Moreover, Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division reported on the position in the war against merchant shipping and supposed the estimated figures for the tonnage capacity operated by the enemy to be still 22 million BRT as in the previous month. The tonnage capacity available for high sea traffic was estimated at about 25.5 million BRT. The total tonnage of merchant ships over 1,000 BRT at the enemy's disposal on 1 Jun. 1944 was estimated to be 42.2 million BRT.

Situation 7 Jun. 1944:

I. War in Foreign Waters:

Nothing to report.

II. Position in the West Area:

1. Invasion:

In the night of the 6th, radio monitoring service intercepted several enemy radio messages in which the place names Verneuil, Tillieres, Evreux, Pont Audemere, Valognes, La Haye du Petit were mentioned. Furthermore it was learned from enemy radio messages between 2130 - 2200 at the 6th that heavy and medium tanks coming from the West entered Carentan.

Another radio message of 2350 mentioned Rouen and Bayeux. Besides, something was said about a marching order Abbeville, Amiens, Beauvais and Dieppe.

7 Jun. 1944

Of course, no definite conclusions can be derived from this knowledge.

At 0143 Naval Command, Normandy reported from the north coast of Cotentin hundreds of freight carrying gliders continuously flying past, the first wave having landed at 2055 near St. Vaast.

At 1555 on the afternoon of the 6th, the town and the harbor of Granville at the western coast of Cotentin were attacked with bombs by ten enemy planes. Two of the attacking planes were shot down.

Further reports indicate that the landed troops of the enemy were partly supplied from the air.

Near the aerodrome Theville 30 parachutists were observed jumping off. It was reported that 40-80 planes were flying around in the direction of Carentan and finally flying off over the sea.

At 0620 Commander, 5th Torpedoboat Flotilla sent a preliminary report on a skirmish with enemy destroyers west of Le Havre. The Flotilla had left Le Havre with two boats at 0215 in order to attack the landing formations in the area off Quistreham. They steered for the enemy according to constant location. At 0335, three destroyers were sighted and attacked by both boats which fired a fan of six torpedoes each at a range of 4,500 meters when passing by. Two hits were clearly observed at 0341. One destroyer was set in flames and stopped. On its way back, from 0348 till 0435, the Flotilla was attacked with bombs by enemy fighter bombers.

At 0643 Naval Command, Normandy reported naval targets on varying courses off the north coast of Cotentin since 2305 on the 6th. Our coastal artillery did not go into action as locations were uncertain. The connections between Cherbourg and St. Lo are interrupted.

At 0753 Naval Command, Normandy again reported strong formations of freight carrying gliders in the direction south of St. Vaast and in the area Issigny - Carentan, and parachute landings southwest of Marcouf.

7 Jun. 1944

At 0805 Group West sent the first survey of the situation at 0600. According to this report the destroyers Z"32", "24", ZH"1" were continuously attacked with bombs and fire by enemy planes during their transfer trip to Brest. The boats sustained losses and minor damages. Regarding the operation of 5th Torpedoboat Flotilla, Group West reported two enemy destroyers hit by torpedoes, without giving further details.

The 5th and 9th PT-boat Flotilla carried out operations in the western part of the Seine Bay and repeated by sighted enemy gun-boats, destroyers and landing vessels. The PT-boat "139" and "140" were hit by mines east of Barfleur and sunk.

The 4th PT-boat Flotilla carried out a reconnaissance sweep in the central Channel between 2300 and 0500 without sighting the enemy. Also the reconnaissance sweep of the 2nd and 8th PT-boat Flotillas in Hoofden remained unsuccessful.

The forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West increased their patrol duties. Off Calais 36th Minesweeper Flotilla and north of Gris Nez the "Brommy" were unsuccessfully attacked by enemy planes. The submarines which were on their way to the Channel were repeatedly attacked by enemy planes. One of the submarines returned. The 10th and 14th Mine clearance Flotilla and 2nd Gun Carrier Flotilla laid emergency barrages "10", "19", "25", and the southern half of "18".

In the Channel Islands area north of Jersey and north of Cape de la Hague, enemy targets were located, which in some cases sheared off when fire was opened. No reports arrived about landings at the western coast of Cotentin.

One gun of Battery Marcouf was reported as still ready for fire after three guns had been put out of action, two of which by direct hits by 38 cm naval guns.

In the area south of St. Mere Eglise low level attacks of planes were reported in the early morning hours. Apparently preparations were being made in this area for further landings.

7 Jun. 1944

- At 0830 Group West reported an enemy air attack on Battery 7/1261 at 1400 on the 6th, and gunfire from battleships on Battery 2/1255 at 1535 on the 6th. Moreover it reported that one gun was put out of action at Battery 1/1255 while two others were temporarily put out of action. The Battery was only ready for curtain fire, Le Havre, with three guns.
- At 0830 Commander, 8th Destroyer Flotilla gave a concise battle report on the passage under war conditions from Royan to Brest. The enemy planes stuck to the formation until it entered the Brest net barrage.
- At 0937 Naval Command, Normandy reported, that landings of freight carrying gliders had not been confirmed in the area St.Vaast. But 2 battle cruisers, 2 heavy cruisers, 8 destroyers, 13 torpedo boats, 6 escort vessels, 10 transporters, 1 tanker and 3 big landing boats were reported off the eastern coast of Cotentin. Besides, landings of freight carrying gliders took place in the area Aserville - Ravenoville.
- At 0940 Commander 10th Mine Clearance Flotilla sent a preliminary report and a concise battle report about the carrying out of the mine task "Blitz 25" off Le Havre. During the trip to the operation area - owing to the heavy sea - a considerable number of mines fell into the sea in a safe condition. A short time before the mine laying was completed the Flotilla had contact with enemy gunboats which were followed by two destroyers. The flotilla managed to escape. The motor minesweeper R"49" was hit and damaged, some losses of the crew occurred.
- At 1103 Naval Command, Normandy reported that Battery Marcouf was encircled by parachute troops. Naval Command, Normandy ordered the crew of the battery to fight its way back to the relieving force. This order was cancelled by Commanding Admiral, Channel Coast. The battery will have to fight to the last.
- At 1111 Naval Command, Normandy reported, that the enemy covered our defense positions at the Vire-mouth with smoke screens. Our batteries opened harassing fire on the enemy in that area.

7 Jun. 1944

According to the battle report of 5th PT-boat Flotilla, this flotilla unsuccessfully attacked two destroyers with torpedoes in grid square BF 3562 upper right at 0023. On this occasion the PT-boat "139" hit a mine and was lost. The 2nd Group of the flotilla attacked destroyers in BF 3562 upper left at 0118 - also without success - and subsequently operated against the enemy landing formation which was heading for St.Vaast. One big landing vessel was sunk. Having fired all its torpedoes it withdrew over the sinking place of the PT-boat "139".

At 1145 according to a telephone message of Group West, six big units were reported by Battery Hamburg at 1045 East of Cherbourg and steering on a northern course at a distance of 26 km. At 1010, 20 big freighters were steering south in the area Deal and were fired upon by the Batteries "Todt" and "Lindemann". East of Barfleux, several enemy destroyers and torpedo boats were steering West.

At 1200 Battery 2/1261 successfully fired upon ships assembled East of St. Martin and forced landing boats to withdraw. The battery was then fired upon from the sea - the fire being directed from the air - and silenced.

At 1200 according to the noon-report on the situation by Group West, 46th Minesweeper-Flotilla was attacked with bombs and fire of fighter-bombers on the roads off St. Malo at 0910. The Hospital Ship HUXTER was hit by a bomb and let in water. An attack on St. Peterport was without results. The Group included in this report on the situation unconfirmed reports of Army Group B about alleged enemy landings from the air at Granville and Coutances.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff Foreign Agents transmitted a report of the Lisbon Legation of the evening of the 6th, coming from sources in the US-Embassy. According to this report the Allied planned a large scale landing operation on the French Mediterranean coast within the next days, whereas the Russians would start attacks simultaneously.

At 1245 Naval Command, P.C. reported three impacts of British long range batteries in and around

7 Jun. 1944

Battery "Lindemann" without causing damages, as a response to the firing of the Batteries "Lindemann", "Todt" and "Grosser Kurfuerst" against located targets off Blanc Nez.

At 1346 Naval Command, Normandy reported that an enemy naval formation was on the eastern side of Cotentin beyond the range of our batteries. Battery "Blankenese" fired on light enemy units which thereupon sheered off.

At 1414 Group West considered landing in the Netherland area and along the Atlantic coast possible during the night following 7 Jun.

At 1606 Naval Command, Normandy reported that the situation at Battery Marcouf was clear again. The order for the crew to fight its way back had been given by the division commander.

At 1633 Naval Command, Normandy reported that Battery 6/1261 hit the cruiser which had fired on Marcouf and forced her to sheer off.

For the night of 7 Jun. it was provided that 6th Gun-Carrier Flotilla would operate from Cherbourg in order to lay out emergency barrage "35" or "33" and "34".

At 1910 Group West resumed on the situation at the coastal batteries. A new item was that Battery 2/1255 had fired eight rounds on transporters in the Irne Mouth from 1145 till 1217. The targets immediately set up smoke screens and went out of the range of the battery. Battery 1/1254 at Cape de La Heve and heavy anti-aircraft guns fired on two landing boats without troops. The crews went into a pneumatic boat and showed the white flag.

The battery at Cape de la Heve fired four rounds on two cruisers of the "C" or "D" class at a range of 17 kilometers without success. No communication existed with Battery Longues since noon of 6 Jun. After heaviest bomb attacks and after strong artillery fire from heavy units at sea, the battery had still fired on the afternoon of the 6th.

Since noon of the 6th there were also no more reports available on the Batteries 1,2,3/1260 in the area of the landing bridge head.

7 Jun. 1944

At 1912 Naval Command, Normandy reported that one battle cruiser and one cruiser opened fire on La Peruelle between Marcouf and St. Vaast. Both ships were beyond the range of our batteries.

Commander PT-boats intended to transfer 2nd PT-boat Flotilla from Ostend to Boulogne during the night of the 7th, provided the weather conditions are favorable.

At 1950 Group West reported on the intended operations of the naval forces for the night of 7 Jun:

1. 5th Torpedo Flotilla would start for a combined torpedo and mine operation North of Quistreham.
2. Forces of the Commanding General, Defenses West:

Further emergency barrages will be laid out Southwest of the barrage "Blitz 25" which was laid out during the night of 6 Jun. near Le Havre, and one barrage was to be laid North of Cape de la Heve. Gun carriers would have to lay out emergency barrages in the areas Barfleur and St. Vaast. The laying out of three barrage sections South of Boulogne and of $2\frac{1}{2}$ sections near Dieppe was provided for.

3. PT-boats:

The 5th and 9th PT-boat Flotilla will patrol the waters off the coast and carry out torpedo attacks in the Seine Bay.

4. The 4th PT-boat Flotilla will sail from Boulogne over patrol line four to the eastern part of the Seine Bay where torpedo attacks are planned. It was left to the flotilla's decision whether it would return to Le Havre or Cherbourg.

The 2nd PT-boat Flotilla will patrol the waters off Ostend and move to Boulogne.

The 8th PT-boat Flotilla will patrol the waters off Ymuiden and move to Ostend.

5. The 24th Minesweeper Flotilla will patrol the waters West of Cotentin and subsequently enter the Channel ports. The 2nd Minesweeper Flotilla

7 Jun. 1944

will move to Brest and St. Malo.

6. The transfer of 8th Destroyer Flotilla to Cherbourg will be postponed by 24 hours because of the damages caused by the air attack last night.

All other forces of Commanding General, Defenses West, will control the waters along the entire coast and enter the harbors after dawn.

At 2000 Supplementing his preliminary report Commander, 5th Torpedo Flotilla sent the battle report on the contact with British destroyers during the night of 6 Jun. According to this report, at 0341 two certain hits could be made. One destroyer, which was probably hit by two torpedoes, stopped, heavily burning; and was in a sinking condition. Hits on two destroyers were certainly made. Heavy damage could be presumed. Copy of battle report according to 1/Skl. 17513/44 Gkdos. find in special file "Invasion 7 Jun."

At 2000 Group West transmitted a detailed survey of the landing situation early on 7 Jun. For copy as per 1/Skl. 17012/44 see special file "Invasion 7 Jun."

In this report it was said as follows:

"The center of enemy landings was between the mouths of Orne and Vire. Following a crushing fire of strong enemy naval forces (at that place there were amongst others 5 battleships, 15 cruisers, about 50 destroyers and torpedo boats) and a non-stop bombing attack of 500 - 1,000 bombers at the time the enemy established a landing bridgehead between Orne mouth and Asnelles. New types of mines blew up our own minefields. Barrages off the strand were mostly avoided by the tanks. A counter attack of our local reserves had no success. A further counter attack carried out by the 21st Tank Division at first advanced successfully up to the coast, but later the division was forced back to clear its own rear area because of new enemy landings from the air in the area Caen. In the evening of 6 Jun. the enemy advanced from the western part of the landing bridgehead till beyond the road Caen-Bayeux.

7 Jun. 1944

In the section between Asnelles and Vire mouth 352nd Infantry Division at first succeeded to annihilate in counter attacks all local enemy penetrations. New landings which were protected by heaviest artillery fire enabled the enemy to break through again on several places during the afternoon of the 6th.

Since 2100 new landings from the air took place amongst others reportedly in the area Falaise-Argentan. The center of enemy landings from the air was in the area north of Carentan-St. Marie du Mort - Azeville - Chef du Pont. The Group regards the elimination of this landing bridgehead to be of pre-eminent importance. The concentric attack of our forces made only slow progress. On both sides new forces were brought in. Further landing attempts have to be reckoned with. The Group expects the heavy and expensive fighting to continue. The enemy will try to strengthen the landing bridgehead by all means. The enemy's superiority in the air and the heavy naval artillery were of considerable effectiveness. The enemy's intention is doubtless to cut off the Cotentin peninsula and to take Cherbourg. In spite of the concentration of very strong forces in a comparatively small area it seems probable that this attack is only a forerunner of other invasions. The enemy forces which landed so far are estimated at eight or ten Infantry divisions and four air-borne divisions. Our own Army Group B was considerably reinforced by new divisions. The judgement concluded with the message:

"Many freight carrying planes operating against Cotentin and parachutists in the area Coutances and farther north. Our counter operations started."

At 2110 Naval Staff informed Armed Forces High Command; Admiral Fuehrer Headquarters; Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff, Navy; High Command, Air, Operations Staff, Navy, and High Command, Army General Staff, Naval Liaison Officer by teletype 1Sk1. I ops 17508/44 Gkdos. Copy find in special file "Invasion 7 Jun.". This report contained the enemy losses which had been ascertained during the day by radio monitoring. According to the report one vessel sank off Port en Bassin at 0320, one landing vessel was damaged by an explosion in BF 3648 at 0807 and one plane (sic! probably mistake for "vessel") was hit by a mine and sank south of Marcouf at 0840. During the day, further enemy losses were ascertained by air reconnaissance.

7 Jun. 1944

At 1340 a unit was hit by a moored mine in BF 3682. At 1341 rescue work was ordered for the crews of two liberty-ships. At 1545 a tug was assisting two LCT's. At 1636 a further LCT was reported sinking. At 1715 one LCT was tugged. At 1850, the hospital ship DINARD (2213 BRT) was in distress in BF 3649 after hitting a mine.

At 2203 Naval Command, Normandy reported that Battery 3/1261 opened fire on a cruiser which lay stopped. The cruiser went off for the north. Twelve destroyers were sighted twelve Kilometers northeast of Barfleur. They were followed by landing ships.

At 2245 Group West reported that it was of the same opinion regarding the use of DM-mines as soon as it had to be expected that the enemy would not abandon the bridge-head immediately.

The Group suggested to distribute the available mines as follows: Ostend 90, Boulogne 100, Dieppe 70, Le Havre 150, Cherbourg 70, St. Malo 70 and Brest 50. The Group asked for transport by trucks to Cherbourg and Le Havre. As these were not available arrangements were made for express-transport by railway (Pfëll transport). The first transport will start at 1200 on the 9th.

At 2300 Naval Command, Normandy in its evening return reported on strong resistance of about four US divisions in the landing bridgehead Ravenoville. St. Mère Eglise, which had been taken by our troops, was given up again. Gunfire from the sea in the area Quineville during the day indicated landing operations in the night. One US battleship of the CAROLINA class was located 25 Kilometers east of Barfleur. At Battery 7/1261 only two guns were still ready for action. The soldiers of the Italian Naval Corps showed a bad morale by throwing away their belts and arms. Strong measures were ordered.

Shortly after midnight a message of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff arrived saying that the Fuehrer had agreed in accordance with the suggestion made by Commander in Chief, Navy to lay mines with DM-firing device in the area of the enemy landing. The area of firing positions of the enemy's heavy naval forces and the approaches of the landing formations should be the center of mine-laying. In case the mines

7 Jun. 1944

would be laid by planes, precautionary measures had to be taken to prevent the mines to fall into the enemy's hands by dropping them over enemy occupied territory or in case planes were shot down. The areas of mine laying had to be fixed by mutual agreement of the Air Force and the Navy. Mine transports had to be carried out as fast as possible. If the weather conditions made it possible, transport by air would have to be taken into consideration.

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division informed the front stations by teletype on the naval position in the invasion area. For copy as per 1/Skl. 17555/44 Gkdos see special file "Invasion 7 Jun."

Also at the end of the 2nd day of the Invasion it is still undecided how things would turn out. Although the landing itself on large sections could not be prevented and notwithstanding the fact that the enemy succeeded in landing considerable forces including tanks, nevertheless our own reserve divisions did not yet have their opportunity to bring their full weight into action. An offensive of these forces is expected for the next day in the Caen area. It is planned to break through the small depth of the landing bridgehead up to the coast in a northwest direction, provided our troop movements are not hindered by the enemy air force. In case the break through up to the coast is successful it will have to be taken into consideration that the enemy will use his naval artillery of all calibres - as was observed previously at Salerno - to fight and neutralize our forces. It will be necessary therefore to face this danger by sending our bomber formations and fighters against the enemy naval forces.

2. Enemy position outside the invasion area:

In the area of 19th Group the up to now biggest number of enemy air operations was accounted for on the 6th with 97 planes operating in the inner Biscayan Waters and having their center south of Brest since 2000. Also during the 7th the reconnaissance activity of the enemy was most intense. In the rendezvous area British units and one US unit were located in six different positions. The intensified movements of our submarines could be gauged from many sighting - and attack reports of the enemy planes.

3. Own position outside the invasion area:

7 Jun. 1944

Atlantic coast area:

The patrol positions were reinforced. No contact with the enemy occurred.

Nantes was attacked in several waves by 120 enemy planes from 1900 till 2130. The harbor and naval installations remained undamaged.

At the same time a heavy air attack was carried out against Lorient. At 0139, the minesweeper M"4005" and the submarine U"256" were attacked with bombs and fire of a plane flying at low altitude west of Brest. The submarine was slightly damaged. One of the attacking planes was shot down.

Channel Area:

Two mines were cleared in the area Blankenberge - Fecamp on the 5th and 6th. One enemy fighter was shot down at Dunkerque harbor on the evening of the 6th by 18th Patrol Flotilla.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

Patrol duties, Escort and Mine Sweeping services were carried out according to schedule during the night of 6 Jun. Off the Elbe, Patrol boat "1107" was hit by a mine exploding close by at 1000. The boat was being towed in. Two mines were cleared west of the light-ship Elbe "1".

Patrol positions off the Dutch coast were only partly occupied because of the northwest gale. Minesweeping activities were suspended. One Dutch fishing boat was hit by a mine off Ymuiden and sank. During the night of the 7th, heavy explosions were again reported from Terschelling in a northwest direction. It was suspected that mines had been laid by planes northwest of Borkum.

The convoy 1252 Hook - Elbe started with six loaded steamers at 2230.

Naval Command, North reported that for the time being "Wallenstein" had been ordered as a precautionary measure. Therefore eastbound convoys coming from the Netherland area till further notice will be carried out as scheduled and in

7 Jun. 1944

accordance with the transport necessities and with the mine clearance in the convoy channels. The forces of Commanding General, Defenses North and the harbor patrol flotillas provided for the task "Wallenstein" were kept in degree of readiness 6 hours until recalled.

Northern Waters, Norway:

Enemy Position:

Our own air reconnaissance in the North Sea was without special results. Three patrol boats were steering a 20° course about ten miles west of Fanoe.

Own Position:

Four enemy planes entered the area Banak on the 6th, nine planes entered the area Bodoe, eighteen planes the area Petsamo and two planes the area Lister.

Twenty-six ships were escorted to the north and 25 to the south. Limited readiness for war of the TIRPITZ was reported by Fleet Command.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

Enemy Position:

According to reports of German Intelligence Service the steamers DICTO and LIONEL were still in the free harbor of Goeteborg as before. Following the declarations of the captains all sailing preparations were cancelled.

In the Gulf of Finland the usual minesweeping and patrol activity of the enemy was observed. Lavansaavi was heavily crowded by 46 minor war vessels and 50 smaller vessels.

On 6 Jun. the Finns discovered six Russian mines with snag line and depth setting one meter, about one meter north of the isle of Hall.

Own Position:

Admiral Skagerrak reported that four patrol positions on the western coast of Jutland were occupied. The patrol vessels were always eight miles off the coast during the day and advanced till the yellow channel during the night. Fishing permission for the Danes was maintained by Commanding General, Armed Forces Denmark. The naval forces and 2nd PT-boat Training Flotilla were in degree of readiness three hours.

7 Jun. 1944

Because of the lack of Coastal Mine A, which were ready for war, the laying out of mines was suspended also on that day.

Mine sweeping duties were carried out in the Baltic Sea Entrances by 36 boats, and by 47 boats and several mine-sweeping planes in the Baltic. Four mines were cleared in the western part of the Baltic, one each in the Pomeranian Bay and off Gotenhafen.

The cruiser NUERNBERG reported at 1150 a plane maintaining contact southwest of Falsterbo. The plane flew off after ten minutes when it was fired upon. Naval Command, East presumed that it was a Swedish plane. At 1505 the guard boat "20" reported two Swedish twin-engined planes at a distance of 4,000 meters. Fire was opened on them. At 1525, the guard boat "21" reported that it had opened fire on two Swedish shore based planes - one of which was hit - because they did not answer the recognition signal.

At 0918, one of our planes reported a sinking vessel northwest of Fehmarn. Convoys and transports were carried out according to schedule. There were no reports of special events in the Gulf of Finland from the submarine and net controls.

Naval artillery lighter "171" was put into service on Lake Peipsi. ~~One mine operation~~

One mine operation in order to reinforce Seeigel B with 480 A/S mine B-snag lines was planned for the night of 7 Jun.

V. Submarine Warfare:

Two submarines of the Group "Landwirt" had to return because they were damaged by enemy air attack. Planes of the 19th Group reported on the sighting of altogether about two submarines during reconnaissance flights.

No special reports came in from the Northern Waters.

On 8 Jun., eleven boats of Group "Mitte" will occupy the attacking area in the deep waters off the south-Norwegian coast from AN 2820 - 3680. Of these, five Schnorchel equipped submarines will be placed in the shallow waters at the east side of the Westwall off the Skagerrak. Thus 17 submarines will be operating in the attacking areas off the South Norwegian area between 57 and 63.5 North. Further, eleven boats were kept in readiness.

7 Jun. 1944

On the 6th and 7th, small air ships were operating again for the first time in the Mediterranean against submarines in the Gibraltar area.

Two submarines were ordered to foul the exits off the ports of southwest England with mines.

According to information received from the Spanish Navy, six US fighters presumably carrier borne planes were lost in the area of the Canary Islands on 3 Jun.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

West Area:

During the day the enemy with strong formations attacked railway installations and aerodromes in Belgium and Northern France. The bulk of the planes attacked in the landing area where considerable new landings of paratroops in the Coutances area, and landings of freight carrying gliders in the Caen area were reported. At noon our anti-aircraft positions in the Paris area and railway installations and aerodromes south of Paris were attacked. Further attacks were directed against railway installations in the areas of Tours, Nantes and against the war-time aerodrome Lorient.

During the night preceding 7 Jun., 217 of our planes were on operations, 18 of which were lost. About 100 bombers belonging to this force carried out a combined attack on the landing area in the eastern part of the Seine Bay. Altogether four hits were observed on landing ships and transporters. About 40 bombers attacked unloading operations of the enemy in the same area and observed explosions on a ship southwest of Le Havre.

During the day, 34 planes of the Ju 88 type attacked ships in the area Barfleur. Our fighters numbering 139 planes were engaged in fighting the landing units. Twenty-three of these planes were lost. Two enemy fighters were shot down.

In the night of 7 Jun., about 400 enemy bombers attacked railway stations in the Versailles area and anti-aircraft positions in the Etampes area. Seventy-nine of our night fighters shot down thirty enemy planes at a loss of five of our own. During the same night, 30 of our bombers were ordered to attack unloading operations west of the Orne mouth, whilst 17 planes of the Me 410-type attacked isolated targets in the area of South England.

Mediterranean Theater:

7 Jun. 1944

On the 6th, the enemy again attacked Ploesti with 400 bombers and 200 fighters coming from South Italy. A secondary attack was directed against Kronstadt, Belgrade and Turn Severin. Coming from Russia, 100 four-engined bombers, accompanied by 50 fighters attacked the Air Force Station and the town of Galatz as well as the Air Force Station Zilistea.

On the occasion of the attack on Ploesti, 190 of our own and Roumanian fighters shot down 13 enemy planes whilst anti-aircraft guns brought down another 6 planes. Eleven fighters of our own were lost. During the attack on Galatz, 61 of our fighters were on operations and shot down one enemy fighter.

In the Italian front area 1,300 operations of enemy planes were counted. About 40 enemy planes attacked the railway bridge St. Benedetto as well as Porto Giorgio. Our planes carried out moderate reconnaissance operations in the Mediterranean. Twenty-six flights were carried out by planes of the Ju 88 - type and fifty-four flights by the Arado 196 - type in order to protect convoys in the Aegean Waters. Nineteen planes of the Ju 52 - type were engaged in mine sweeping, fifteen of these were operating on the Danube, clearing successfully six mines.

In the night of 6 Jun., 20 planes of the Ju 88 - type were operating against supply traffic in the area west and south-west of Rome. Twelve enemy planes fouled the Danube with mines in the Esseg area. Further planes supplied the bandits in the Balcans. Besides, harassing flights were reported from the areas Leghorn, Firenze, Bologna, Spezia and Ankona.

East Area:

On the Eastern Front 1,168 operations of our own and 915 of enemy planes were reported on the 6th. At a loss of four of our planes, eleven enemy planes were shot down. Two hundred of our bombers attacked successfully the railway station Proskurow and Shmerinka in the night of 6 Jun.

On the 7th, in the Black Sea reconnaissance flights were made against the ports of Novorossisk and Gelendzhik. No special results were obtained.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea:

1. Area of Naval Group, West:

7 Jun. 1944

Enemy Position:

On the evening of the 6th, the Westbound convoy was sailing in the Oran waters. In the morning of the 6th, a convoy consisting of 22 freighters, 1 tanker and 6 corvettes passed through the Gibraltar Straits for the East. In addition to that, 5 submarines, 2 auxiliary aircraft carriers and 5 destroyers entered the Mediterranean.

Own Position:

Six vessels with 5,900 BRT were escorted along the coast of southern France during the 5th. The anti-submarine chasing off Toulon and in the area of Cape Sici was unsuccessful during the 5th and 6th.

On the 7th, the railway bridge Var was damaged by an enemy air attack.

Group West released the mole Banyuls - Carro for precautionary destruction.

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Position:

East of Maddalena one patrol boat and eight landing boats were observed on a westerly course, apparently on a supply trip for Corse.

In the sea area Anzio - Ischia seven ships were steering east at 0610. Only minor traffic of other isolated craft was observed. At 1000, one transporter, four LCT's, and fifty smaller landing boats lay stopped off Anzio.

Own Position:

At 2030 on the 6th, the harbor and the battery Carrara were attacked unsuccessfully by four fighter bombers flying at low altitude.

At 1140 on the 7th, one vessel was heavily damaged, two mine-layers and one naval landing craft were slightly damaged, during enemy attacks on the harbor Leghorn. At 0420, one naval landing craft was damaged by a rocket during its voyage from Piombino to Elba. One freight barge was destroyed by a fighter bomber attack after stranding south of Leghorn.

Sea traffic was reduced because of the bad weather. The mine operation had again to be postponed.

7 Jun. 1944

The harbor of Civitavecchia was fouled with mines according to plans. The last three unloading places were blown up. The Naval D/F station and Naval W/T station moved to Stefano.

3. Area of Naval Group, South:

a. Adriatic:

The 7th Minesweeper Flotilla had no contact with the enemy in the sea area Brac during the night of 6 Jun.

At 0600 on the 7th, our tug NEPTUNO was attacked by fighter bombers west of Lussin on its way to the North. The ship's anti-aircraft guns shot down two planes and lost five men by a rocket bomb.

In the night of the 6th, the mine task "Falle Sued" was carried out according to plans by four harbor patrol boats southeast of Ancona. For the night preceding the 9th, the mine task "Falle Mitte" was planned. One coastal auxiliary sailing vessel carrying 180 tons of ammunition was overdue since 30 May on its trip Trieste - Venice.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Position:

According to an agent's report from the Naval Attachée at Istanbul, strong troop concentrations in and around Haifa as well as ship assemblings between Haifa and Alexandria were reported since the middle of May. Mostly, sailing vessels were converted into landing boats. According to further agent reports from Cairo, 300 LCT's were ready at the Nile dockyards.

Naval Staff transmitted the following information of Armed Forces, High Command to Naval Group South, Admiral Aegean:

"Clear indications of forthcoming operations in the eastern Mediterranean require special attention." Naval Staff announced further directives concerning submarine operations in the eastern Mediterranean.

Own Position:

The Dodecaneso convoy entered Porto Lago in the night preceding the 7th. The torpedo boats of foreign construction started for their way back.

A new enemy air attack was carried out on Rhodos in the evening. No damages occurred. Off Khalkis one mine was cleared by

7 Jun. 1944

minesweeping planes.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Position:

According to radio interception the activity of small vessels along the eastern coast was increasing. At the western coast of the Crimea one PT-boat was located.

Own Position:

The submarines U"18" and U"23" entered Constanta.

The convoy along the western coast was carried out according to schedule.

Harbor Defense Group Sevastopol was transferred with eight boats to German Naval Command, Roumania.

The following directive was given to Group South: "Naval Staff regards PT-boat operations including also torpedo and artillery action as useful in the Sevastopol area in order to harass the Russian reconstruction works and the presumed supply traffic before the Russian coastal defenses and radar stations will be ready. Therefore, besides future mine operations, also torpedo activities of the PT-boats have to be provided for. Plans will be reported."

No report came in regarding the situation on the Danube.

An intercepted radio message of the Admiral Black Sea to Group South, dated 5 Jun., indicated the intention to lay barrages for the protection of our convoy routes as well as three offensive barrages off Sevastopol.

VIII. Situation in East Asia:

Pacific Ocean:

The enemy carried out continued air attacks on the Kurile - Marshall - and Caroline Islands, specially against Truk, Nauru and Ponape.

New Guinea:

American forces occupied the island of Karkar (north of Madang).

7 Jun. 1944

The landing operation going on since 27 May on the island of Biak met stiff Japanese resistance and resulted in only minor territorial gains.

According to a Japanese report, further American divisions were kept in readiness in the Solomon area. Therefore, for the future, larger landing operations had to be reckoned with.

Burma:

The town of Myitkyina was not in the enemy's hand but only encircled. The town was stubbornly defended by the Japanese troops.

Only minor fighting activities were reported from the other fronts as the rainy season had begun.

8 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance

The Portugese Government had decided to comply with the request of the British Government to stop tungsten exports. The order would be in force from 8 Jun. onward. In order to make black market transactions impossible, the police was ordered to close the tungsten mines.

Mr. Eden declared in the House of Commons that the declaration made by the British Government during the war regarding the former Italian possessions in other continents was still regarded as binding for the politics of the British Government and its allies.

The Swedish foreign minister declared, that it was possible in spite of all difficulties to bring the Swedish armed forces into their present state of efficacy. Nevertheless no guarantee could be given that thereby peace could be maintained for the country.

Conference on the Situation with the Commander in Chief, Navy at 1115:

I. Communications with France were partly interrupted. Sabotage was suspected. Also the traffic on the waterways leading from Paris to the north and west as well as on the Rhine-Rhone canal was blocked.

II. Naval Chief Command, East asked to replace the 7.5 centimeter guns by 12.8 centimeter guns in order to strengthen the anti-aircraft defense of Reval. This request had to be declined because the guns are not available.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

III. Army Position:

Only a few reports came in from the landing area as the connections with the fighting troops were interrupted. The enemy began to advance from the beachhead west of the Orne to the southwest. The British announced the conquest of Bayeux. In the area of the Vire-mouth and west of it apparently further strong landings took place whilst a landing attempt on the coast northwest of Cherbourg was warded off. News of enemy landings from the air in the area Granville still required

8 Jun. 1944

confirmation. No reports came in about the attack of our three tank divisions operating as reserve units in the Caen area. It seemed that the attacks of both sides had clashed. The movements of our troops might also have been impeded by strong enemy air activity.

Commander in Chief, Navy explained:

The most effective method of preventing the landing by naval operations against the approaching landing fleet is impossible for us because of lack of strength. The number of fighting forces available on our side - not to speak of larger ships - is insufficient for the purpose. The situation would be different, if a considerable number of torpedo-carriers, especially PT-boats, would be at our disposal. In this regard the measures taken by our side which would have to be prepared a long time ago are insufficient. The strand positions thus became the main defense line. The construction of the main battle line on the coast was based on experiences made in Sicily and Italy. After the enemy succeeded in penetrating this line to a considerable extent and to establish a beachhead it is urgently necessary to re-establish this defense line by all means and in a great hurry by employing the reserve troops of the army and of the Air Force. It is of decisive importance to push forward up to the sea in a quick and strong attack and to destroy the beachhead. Speedy action is necessary as every day of delay gives the enemy an opportunity to bring in new and much stronger forces over the sea than we can move on the land roads, subject to enemy air activity, in order to reinforce our fighting units. The situation might become serious if the coastal line is not reconquered within a very short time. Seen from this point of view it seems necessary to concentrate all available forces on operations in the endangered area. Considerations have to be given up regarding the safety of other areas which although they are in danger are not attacked yet.

Commander in Chief, Navy will immediately inform General Jodl about this opinion by telephone.

At the Italian front the enemy's advanced units reached Civitavecchia. Terni is in danger. In the eastern part of the front the situation was stabilized but withdrawal of our forces was necessary also in this area in order to prevent them from being cut off. Reports on strong enemy naval formations appearing off Genoa reportedly with the intention to land are unconfirmed.

On the Eastern Front everything is quiet. An enemy attack in the Jassy area resulted in a penetration at the Roumanian front section which was stopped by our troops. The fighting is going on. In the areas of the Army Groups Center and North, an

8 Jun. 1944

increase of local fighting activities consisting of reconnaissance raids was noticed which had to be regarded as preparations for a large scale offensive.

IV. The speeded up transport of DM-mines to Chateaudun for naval use has begun. The time required for the transport was estimated at eleven days. Commander in Chief, Navy ordered that Head of Naval Armaments should treat as most urgent all measures serving our defense in the landing area and that everything possible should be done in this connection in providing also for an eventual destruction of the harbors. Arrangements have to be made for laying out in the harbors mines with clockwork which do not show reaction to correspond to any clearance device but explode at the fixed time.

Conference on the Situation with Commander in Chief, Navy at 1830:

I. The Admiral at the Fuehrer Headquarters reported by telephone the following: the commandant of Crete had reported to the Fuehrer on the defense of the island. The Fuehrer asked Commander in Chief, Navy to transmit to all offices interested in the question all experiences already made in the course of the invasion in the western area regarding the coastal defenses and the arrangement of the batteries in particular. Furthermore the Fuehrer asked that a battle experienced officer from the Channel coast was put at the disposal of the offices at the spot. The S.O. of Battery Marcouf was thought to be the right man.

The commandant of the island reported that after the island had been supplied in advance for four months, an additional supply of 50 tons daily was still necessary. The Furhrer asked whether this supply could be made by submarines. The Furhrer agreed to the dispatching of three submarines for the Aegean waters which had been suggested by the Admiral of the Fuehrer Headquarters during the noon conference. Commander in Chief, Navy ordered to investigate whether it was necessary under certain circumstances to use these submarines for the required transport. The use of Italian transport submarines could not be taken into consideration. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch would report on the transport situation in the Aegean on 9 Jun.

II. In the early morning hours our air reconnaissance discovered a convoy in the waters about 120 - 130 miles west of

8 Jun. 1944

Brest, which reportedly included several troop transporters. The escort consisted in nine destroyers, the course was 210-240°. Furthermore, in the early morning, two cruisers and six transporters on a south-southeast course were reported south of Ireland. A reconnaissance report of 1800 reported a convoy with five destroyers and one ship borne plane, 130 miles west of Brest on a course 120°, without giving further details as to its structure. It remains uncertain to what extent these reconnaissance reports are correct. Commander in Chief, Navy regarded reliable reconnaissance as absolutely necessary and ordered that it should urgently be demanded from German Air Force, Operations Staff.

III. Commander in Chief, Navy informed General Jodl by telephone on his opinion regarding the necessity to destroy the enemy beach-head quickly. General Jodl said that the Fuehrer was of the same opinion with Commander in Chief, Navy. As the reports of enemy landings from the air in the area Granville were not confirmed, the units available on the west side of Cotentin would be hurried into the operation area Caen.

IV. Report of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief of Operations Branch on the transport situation in the Aegean. The Commanding General, Army Group E apparently reported to Armed Forces, High Command that only 5.6% of the supply demand of Crete and 2.8% of the supply demand of the southern Sporades - already restricted to the utmost - has been complied with. Of the current supply and of the supply in advance, 16,906 tons has not been transferred. All hopes have been concentrated on a large convoy which waited in the Piraeus for several weeks for escort and for better weather conditions. This convoy reached its destination port on 2 Jun. only after having sustained considerable losses. After the failure of this last attempt, the Commanding General reported that the supply of the island could not be safeguarded by the means used up to now and asked already for the time in which no important fighting took place and where no restrictions had to be taken into account, to send to the Aegean the four Italian supply submarines which were made ready at the Italian dockyards. The Commanding General asked furthermore for an increase of the small vessel shipping by using auxiliary sailing vessels and for constant operation of two air transport groups and sufficient fighter protection. In case large scale fighting should arise the demand would increase correspondingly.

8 Jun. 1944

Commander in Chief, Navy ordered to find out by what time the Italian supply submarines will be ready. Moreover, Quarter-master Division, Chief of Shipping and Transport Branch would make a statement on this subject on 9 Jun.

Special Items:

I. In the already mentioned directive issued by Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, High Command on 4 Jun. concerning the defense of the German coast of the North Sea it was said:

"I got information that ignorance and doubts still exist about the responsibilities and about the issuance of orders for the defense of the North Sea coast and for the preparatory measures. According to the Order of the Fuehrer No. 40, Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, North has been put in charge of the defense of the German North Sea coast as responsible Commander in Chief, Armed Forces. Naval Command, North thus has taken over the entire defense task in the North Sea area including the supervising of the work on all questions connected with the task. In case Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, North will put other authorities in charge of duties which have been clearly assigned to him (e.g. regarding the conduct of fighting on land, preparations in the civilian defense section etc.) he nevertheless will be fully responsible for the central command of the operation. The authorities put in charge by him are placed under the command of Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, North as far as the carrying out of the task is concerned. Armed Forces, High Command has neither the intention nor the possibility to put in charge already now a higher authority of the Army for the preparations and for the eventual fighting conduct in the North Sea coast area especially as no indications exist up to now for a landing on the German coast of the North Sea. If, in spite of all estimates, a large scale landing should take place in the German Bight, a higher commanding officer of the Army will be put in charge of the land operations at the right moment. A general rearrangement of authority will be made in this case.

II. Enemy reports revealed that in the course of the landings on the morning of 6 Jun. enemy harassing commandoes took advantage of the beginning dawn and the low tide in order to remove barrages at the intended landing places. This report in connection with the fact that landings in the Seine Bay on 6 Jun. actually were carried out at the beginning of the dawn

8 Jun. 1944

and at low tide may be regarded as an indication of the time of landings on other places.

Naval Staff informed Naval Command, East, North, and Norway, for the attention of Group West, South, Fleet and German Naval Command Italy.

III. The directive of Naval Staff concerning "Wallenstein" induced Naval Command East to draw the attention to the insufficient fuel allotment which did not allow to make full use of all training opportunities as had been ordered. Naval Staff informed the front stations concerned that an increase of the fuel allotment was impossible and that therefore all use of fuel exceeding the contingent was not allowed. To a certain degree, training could also be carried out with the present fuel allotment.

Situation 8 Jun. 1944

I. War in Foreign Waters:

No special reports.

II. Situation in the West Area:

1. Invasion:

The Supreme Command of the Allied Expeditionary Forces gave an account of the operations of 6 and 7 Jun. in its Report No. 3 and 4. The following is of particular interest:

"Strong formations of Allied fighters were flying over the enemy ships and the offensive area from the early morning till late in the evening. In the night of 6 Jun., strong formations of heavy night bombers attacked bridges as well as roads and railway lines in the rear of the invasion area including the railway junction Chateaudun. In the interior of the land, fighting is generally heavy. In the evening of 6 Jun. a counter attack carried out by tanks was repulsed in the Caen area. The unloading of troops and of supply over the sea is going on in spite of the northwest wind blowing since the beginning of the offensive. On 7 Jun., a short time before dawn, light coastal forces advancing in eastern direction met a superior enemy formation which suffered damages before it sheered off. The coastal batteries, which were still in action during 7 Jun.,

8 Jun. 1944

have been silenced by Allied naval forces. It is unknown whether all batteries definitely have been neutralised.

Large scale landing operations from the air were reopened on the morning of 7 Jun. Our fighting forces on the ground were supplied with victuals and tactical equipment.

In the morning of 7 Jun., medium and light bombers attacked in two operations strong enemy troop concentrations and buildings close behind the enemy lines, gun positions in the battle zone and railway lines south of the battle zone. Also in the morning, fighter bombers attacked roads, railways, armoured vehicles, troop concentrations, gun positions and ammunition dumps. On the early afternoon of 7 Jun., heavy bombers carried out a medium size attack on road junctions in the area south of Caen. The enemy air activity was increased compared with 6 Jun."

According to further enemy reports, General Eisenhower visited the area of the beachheads. Since 1630 German Mean Time a considerable improvement of the weather began in the Channel.

The total number of officers and men of the Allied Navy taking part in the operation exceeds the total strength of the British Navy at the beginning of the war (133,000 officers and men according to Reuter). A British destroyer was damaged by a mine.

The French cruisers GEORGES LEYGUES and MONTCALM participated in the landing operations.

On the evening of 6 Jun., five waves of freight carrying planes landed troops on the Cherbourg peninsula. Other freight carrying planes brought supplies. A total of twelve transport planes and twelve freight carrying planes were reported to be missing.

During the night preceding 5 Jun., 11,000 operations of enemy planes were accounted for; 7,000 on the 5th and during the following night; and 12,000 on the 6th and in the following night.

The convoys carrying the supply from England were divided in two groups. The US-group supplies the troops in the western coastal section and the British group supplies the eastern coastal section.

In the night of 6 Jun., Beaufighter planes attacked three German destroyers in the Biscayan and caused damages. On the morning of 7 Jun., the destroyers were attacked again.

8 Jun. 1944

One was left burning.

The enemy publishes further proclamations to the population of the occupied countries and gives detailed instructions. Further proclamations calling for sabotage and resistance were addressed to the transport and railway workers of Belgium.

According to radio press reports, the destruction forces had 20 minutes time on the morning of 6 Jun. between dawn and the return of the flood to blow up the shore barrages. Attention had already been drawn to the fact that the landing time was chosen at the coincidence of dawn and low tide.

The chronological course of events as seen by Naval Staff was the following:

At 0338 Commander PT-boats transmitted the position of an enemy cruiser on a southwest course in BF 3646 (off Port en Bessin).

At 0353 Naval Command, Normandy informed mine-layers and PT-boats that four artillery boats would occupy patrol positions northeast of Cherbourg since 0230.

At 0400 Group West reported that the entire crew of the PT-boat "139" and the commandant and 15 men of the PT-boat "140" were missing in the night of the 6th.

Since 2200 on 7 Jun., many enemy radar equipped vessels, presumably bigger targets, were located 35 miles northwest of Dieppe and slowly moving West. Since 0000 many radar locations were made of ships 25 miles northwest and 20 miles north of Barfleur on a south and southeast course respectively in the direction of Marcouf.

At 0555 Naval Command, Normandy reported that no important changes of the situation had taken place till 0500. Landings from the sea and from the air which had been expected in the area La Parnelle-Quineville did not take place. The northwest defense line of the 709th Infantry Division was as follows: Marcouf-Azeville-north of Fresville-Le Port Brehay. The report that US freight carrying planes had landed German "Volkswagen" motor cars wearing German markings and soldiers in German paratroop uniforms was so far unconfirmed. PT-boats and artillery-boats had contact with the enemy northeast of north Cotentin. The 7th Battery 1261 forced destroyers and landing boats to sheer off.

8 Jun. 1944

At 0730 Commander 5th Torpedo Flotilla sent a short battle report about the flotillas contact with enemy destroyers and PT-boats in the eastern part of the Seine Bay. The flotilla left Le Havre with three boats at 0210 in order to attack an enemy target located ten miles west of Cape de la Heve. The flotilla was located by radar of enemy destroyers when leaving the harbor still under escort and - after dismissing the escort - sailed for an enemy target located on a west course. The flotilla was attacked, at 0300, by torpedoes of enemy PT-boats and attacked with nine torpedoes a group of six or eight enemy destroyers on a counter course at 0332. Immediately afterwards it opened artillery fire on a gun-boat group. The flotilla escaped the torpedoes of enemy PT-boats. After due running time heavy explosions were heard in the destroyer formation. Hits could be taken for granted. Following its withdrawal the flotilla constantly fought attacking fighter bombers by barrage fire until it entered the harbor.

At 0731 Naval Command, Normandy reported that since dawn fire of heavy naval artillery was again directed on the battery positions Marcouf and 2/1261. East of Barfleur, a large number of transport vessels was sighted.

At 0135 Commander 38th Minesweeper Flotilla reported that the patrol of waterways had been carried out up to Grid Square "13". Enemy PT-boat attacks were warded off southwest of Cape Antifer and several fighter bomber attacks were repulsed without losses on our side.

At 0742 Group West reported:

2nd PT-boat Flotilla entered Boulogne,

4th PT-boat Flotilla entered Le Havre,

5th and 9th PT-boat Flotilla entered Cherbourg,

5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla entered Le Havre.

At 1830 on 7 Jun., air reconnaissance reported 2 cruisers, 15 destroyers, and 4 troop transporters in BF 3298 steering 180°.

At 0830 it was learned from an intercepted radio message, presumably of the Admiral Channel Coast, that on the evening of 7 Jun. parachute dummies carrying explosives were dropped near St. Brieux and that the harbor facilities Trouville and Honfleur had been destroyed as a precautionary measure.

According to a report of Naval Command, Bretagne:

8 Jun. 1944

At 0835 most of the telephone trunk lines and telephone connections for Concarneau and Landerneau were interrupted.

According to an announcement of the Allied Supreme Command on 6 Jun., enemy planes were marked by black and white ribbons on the body, the lower side and on the wings.

The troop transporters, cruisers and destroyers steering on different courses, as reported by our planes during the night between 0021 and 0130 in the area of the Channel-Islands, were reported.

At 0904 by 3rd Air Force: This information, which seemed already doubtful at the beginning, was later found out to be untrue. The ships were our own units of a different type.

Concerning the success of the PT-boats in the night of 7 Jun., Commander PT-boats reported that two landing vessels of 900 BRT each and two others of 400 BRT each were sunk out of a landing formation northwest of Cape Antifer, without losses on our side.

At 0906 Captain Assmann informed Quartermaster Division, Organisation and Mobilisation Branch by telephone that, considering the political situation in France, Armed Forces High Command intended to make available for Commanding General, West for defense duties 5,000 men emergency units of the Navy (not replacement - instruction and training - units) from degree of dispensability A in the home area. Naval Command, East and North would subsequently be informed and ordered to take the necessary steps and to prepare the departure. The teletype order of Armed Forces High Command arrived at 1507. Group West was asked to order Commanding General, West to transmit the assembly points. For copies of the separate orders compare special file "Invasion 8 Jun."

At 0910 Commander 15th Patrol Flotilla sent a short report on brushes with PT-boats and enemy landing boats during the patrol off the coast last night. The flotilla had contact with different PT-boats and gunboat groups at 0352 and at 0455, and fired on landing boats with flare shells. The fire was answered without results from a larger ship standing nearby, a destroyer or a corvette. Many hits of all calibres were made on the landing boats. One of the boats went out of control.

8 Jun. 1944

The sinking could not be observed. Losses of the crews could be presumed. During the fighting enemy planes had constantly to be warded off.

At 0920 Naval Command, Channel Islands reported: no special events 0700.

At 0939 air reconnaissance intercepted a report on serious damages sustained by two ships in uncertain positions from explosions below the surface. At the same place a destroyer, presumably one of the two ships, asked for immediate help by tugs.

At 1022 Naval Command, Normandy reported a considerable number of warships and other vessels in the direction of the Marcouf Island and east, as well as smoke screen operations northeast of Quineville.

At 1027 Naval Command, Normandy reported that heavy artillery fire from the sea was directed against Battery 7/1261. Telephone connections were cut off. The last gun of Battery 2/1261 was engaged in a fight with tanks.

At 1035 a radio request was intercepted by radio monitoring asking whether the damage on two destroyers was caused by acoustic mines.

At 1122 an intercepted enemy radiogram of 1015 indicated that one LCT was waiting on the shore to unload a heavy gun battery. Other results of radio monitoring also indicated that unloadings were going on. At 1020, for example, all LCA's were detached to a vessel BULOLO, possibly the auxiliary cruiser.

At 1220 the meteorological station at Cherbourg predicted southwest winds not stronger than velocity three or four, weather varying from bright to clouded.

At 1236 eight light cruisers were reported from Barfleur at a distance of 15 Kilometers to the east, followed at a distance of 20-25 Kilometers by heavy cruisers and 18 (presumably) transporters between them. Behind them a big number of ships followed in a widely dispersed order. Innumerable captive balloons were reported. Bombs were dropped on Neville.

At 1242 Naval Command, Normandy reported that one cruiser or destroyer was sunk by artillery fire southeast of Barfleur. Marcouf was fired upon from the sea. Smoke screens were set up. The battery was fighting against

8 Jun. 1944

enemy infantry. Up to now the guns fired independently. Battery 3/1261 changed its position.

At 1258 Naval Command, Normandy sent an intermediate report on the situation: 100 naval vessels are around the Isle of Marcouf. The naval formation east of Quineville set up smoke screens. Our attack on land was brought to a standstill along the line St. Mer Eglise - East of Montebourg - Breville and further on to the East; southern outskirts of Azeville - Marcouf and further on to the West; in southern direction along the railway. Carentan and the hill north of it was in our hands.

At 1315 it was revealed by radio interpretation that a battle was going on for the possession of Isigny.

At 1358 Naval Command, Channel Islands reported that the movements reported by 3rd Air Force in the area of the Naval Command were found out to be of our own vessels after checking the position and time.

At 1410 Group West sent its report on the situation at 1200: It has already been reported on the contact our 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla had with eight enemy destroyers. Definite results could not be observed as the enemy put up smoke screens. It has also been reported on the success of 4th PT-boat Flotilla which sunk four landing boats. The report that 9th PT-boat Flotilla sunk three landing vessels of 350 BRT each in BF 3642 was new. The 10th Mine Clearance Flotilla fouled the waters off the Seine mouth east of Orne with 112 LMB-mines. Furthermore the Group reported its intentions for the night of 8 Jun.

- a. 4th PT-boat Flotilla will carry out mine operations followed by torpedo operations and return to Boulogne.
- b. 5th PT-boat Flotilla will carry out mine operations against the daylight positions of the battleships.
- c. 9th PT-boat Flotilla was to start for torpedo operations in the western part of the Seine Bay.
- d. 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla will operate with torpedoes and mines off the Orne mouth.
- e. 8th Destroyer Flotilla will move from Brest to Cherbourg. A raid against Barfleur is planned.

8 Jun. 1944

Furthermore the Group confirmed the sinking of a cruiser or destroyer by artillery fire at 1100, southeast of Barfleur. One US battleship was made out at 1100 on the occasion of the bombardment of the coast in the Orne mouth area. According to a report of Naval Signal Station, Le Havre, one vessel out of a LCT-formation of ten boats disappeared following an explosion at 1135 in the direction 300°. Explosions were observed continuously in the southwest. Heavy ships were reported in 225° at a distance of about 16 miles and, at 1155, 40 ships (transporters and LST) were reported on a southern course in 270° at a distance of 19 miles.

At 1447 Naval Group, West prohibited air activities west of length 0°, 30 minutes East.

The "Schnorchel" equipped submarines which had been ordered to the Western approach of the Channel obtained the permission of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines to operate against the main traffic from Catharine Point and Owers light ship to the south and southeast somewhere in the area BF 3270. Later on a break through to the Seine Bay is planned as soon as observation of the enemy traffic reveals mine free channels. The five "Schnorchel" equipped submarines presently in AL were ordered to hurry to BF 25 on the shortest way at highest travelling speed and as far as possible on surface drive. One boat out of the AF 70 area and "Schnorchel" equipped boats of Group "Mitte" were also ordered to reach BF at maximum speed and sailing around England in order to operate according to circumstances. A report on the operations of Group "Landwirt" find under "Submarine Warfare".

Commander in Chief, Navy ordered the submarines U"214" and U"218" to carry out mine tasks off Plymouth and Falmouth in order to fight the invasion. The closing of the areas fouled with mines, for our own submarines operating in these waters, will be ordered by Commander, Submarines West after the submarine U"214" has left.

At 1500 radio messages intercepted by radio monitoring were transmitted, indicating that air attacks on our troop movements in the area Valogne - Montebourg were asked for during the forenoon. Besides, enemy air reconnaissance reported four of our railway guns in unknown positions.

8 Jun. 1944

At 1530 Group West regarded landing possibilities as possible for the night preceding 9 Jun. in the Netherland area and as favorable along the Channel and Atlantic coasts.

In the afternoon results of radio monitoring indicated that all unloaded vessels which had been damaged were being concentrated by the enemy at a certain point where preparations for towing them were being made.

At 1638 the Air Force's radio monitoring service intercepted the code word "Boston" which had been heard for the first time on 5 Jun.

At 1910 Group West transmitted a report of Naval Command, Normandy concerning fighting activities during the afternoon off the East coast of Cotentin where 100 enemy naval vessels were assembled. Occasional fire of naval artillery continued to be directed against our batteries. The fire was answered by the Batteries 3,6 and 10/1261. The batteries partly fired on land targets. Battery 7/1261 was attacked by bombs but remained ready for action. Battery 2/1261 was put out of action by fire from ships and tanks. Battery Marcouf had been encircled at 1420. A counter attack was going on. A new landing was expected in the area Quineville. At 1330, Battery Annes opened fire upon a naval target in BF 3541 upper right. The ship put up a smoke screen and sheered off. In the night of 7 Jun. communications with 709th Infantry Division were reestablished. In the course of these fightings the sinking already reported of the cruiser or destroyer near the Marcouf Island took place.

During the night preceding 9 Jun., the laying out of "Blitz" "33" and "34" by four artillery ferries starting from Cherbourg was planned.

At 2128 Naval Command, Normandy reported dense naval traffic northeast and east of Barfleur on southeast courses at a distance of 16-22 kilometers and larger landing boats at a distance of 15 kilometers. The range finder of Battery 7/1261 was destroyed.

At 2202 Commander 8th Destroyer Flotilla reported that the departure was postponed till 2015.

At 2220 the same Naval Command reported continued heavy enemy losses in the battle north of Carentan. Marcouf was

8 Jun. 1944

held. A tank battle was being fought near Bayeux. Our own reinforcements were on their way to the scene.

At 2250 an enemy radio message of 2015, intercepted by radio monitoring, was transmitted, indicating that the situation at W 59 was critical regarding our own tank operation. A little later, air attacks against our position at that place were asked for.

At 2309 A-Group reported the departure at 2330 of 46th Minesweeper Flotilla, with four boats, from Cherbourg for Amsel position and later on to Drossel.

At 2321 4th PT-boat Flotilla was ordered by Commander PT-boats to stop further operations after the fouling with mines was carried out and to return to Le Havre immediately because of the weather conditions.

At 2330 Naval Communications Officer, Cherbourg reported the departure of ten PT-boats. At the same time Commander, 24th Minesweeper Flotilla started with three mine layers from Aubine Roads in order to patrol off the coast. He reported his intention to enter Helier at dawn.

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division informed the front stations by teletype on the naval situation in the invasion area. For copy as per 1/Skl 17676/44 Gkdos, compare special file "Invasion 8 Jun.":

The 3rd day of the invasion elapsed without any indications that the Army and the Air Force succeeded in reconquering the lost shore and in bringing relief to the still defended coastal fortifications and points of resistance. On the contrary it can be concluded from the little information available that the beachhead between Orne and Vire expanded several kilometers up the country. Also the beachhead north of the Vire mouth at the eastern base of the Cotentin peninsula was completely maintained by the enemy. Apparently, a decisive role is played by the superior enemy air operations which seem only slightly to have been impeded by the bad weather at the beginning of the day. The situation on the sea enables the enemy to bring into action troops and supplies almost unhindered as before. The fast increase of the enemy forces will bring a strain on the general situation in case it is impossible to stop it very

8 Jun. 1944

soon. Everything possible has been done by our naval forces available. Submarine operations in the Channel are so dangerous even for Schnorchel-equipped boats that they can be advocated only under the present extraordinary conditions. The boats were mostly located and attacked by enemy planes already at the Channel approaches. One boat was sunk by air attack in BF 5211 during the night preceding 8 Jun. Five other boats had to return because of damages. Reports on the whereabouts of a 7th boat are still lacking.

2. Other reports on the enemy position:

The figures for the operations of 19th Group are unknown. Many British units were located in the rendezvous area.

Our own air reconnaissance sighted 4 cruisers, 15 destroyers, 4 troop transporters at 10,000 BRT each at 0600, 140 miles south-southwest of Brest on a course 240°; and 2 cruisers, 6 transporters at 0652, about 70 miles south of Ireland on a south-southeast course.

3. Other reports on our own position:

Atlantic Coast Area:

Twenty patrol positions were occupied. Five mines were cleared off St. Nazaire and one off Brest. During an air attack on the Lorient aerodrome Naval anti-aircraft guns shot down one plane. Bilbao ore traffic was stopped until further order.

Channel Waters:

Off Le Havre and Gravelines all together eight mines were cleared and 26 patrol positions in the Channel area were occupied.

At 0750, 2nd Gunboat Flotilla was attacked with rocket bombs of fighter bombers during a mine operation west of Treport. The artillery ferry AF"15" was hit. The boat was underpinned

8 Jun. 1944

and towed to Dieppe where it sank following the breaching of the support. Only minor losses of the crew occurred on the other eight boats which remained ready for action.

Starting from Ostend, 8th PT-boat Flotilla patrolled the waters off the coast.

Special Items:

Considering the situation, Group West asked to stop further shipments of torpedo cradles and "Spinne" equipment until further notice.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

Convoy, escort and mine duties were carried out without special events in the German Bight. All together four mines were cleared.

Off the Dutch coast our patrol positions had no contact with the enemy. At Terschelling heavy explosions were heard again in northwest direction during the night of 7 Jun.

The Convoy 1253 Hook-Elbe was 24 hours late because of the bad weather.

In the Ijsel Meer and in the Zealand Waters two convoys of about 70,000 BRT were carried out. The laying out of Coastal Mine-A was continued. Eight mines were cleared off Ymuiden.

Naval Command, North reported on measures regarding personnel and materials which were carried out in accordance with the increased precaution in the entire district of the Commanding Admiral, Coast Area. The crews of the islands of Norderney, Langeroog and Spiekeroog will be reinforced. The reinforcement depends on the possibility of a special supply of small fire arms and heavy infantry weapons. Special precautions against commando operations can be carried out only at a limited scale as the urgent requirements of materials have been approved but can not be fulfilled. Naval Command therefore emphatically pointed to the fact that unless sufficient materials for barrages and hindrances are supplied immediately, landings of paratroops and freight carrying gliders actually

8 Jun. 1944

can not be prevented on the vast and perfectly suitable strands in the eastern part of the islands of Borkum, Norderney, Langeroog, Spiekeroog, Wangeroog, on the Duene of Heligoland and on the land aerodrome Sylt; whereas it is possible only on the isles of Borkum, Norderney, Wangeroog, Heligoland and Sylt to fight them effectively with the artillery and heavy weapons available.

The question will be dealt with by Quartermaster Division.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Position:

Twelve planes were observed operating over the North Sea at 18th Group.

At 1732, Poljarnoje transmitted a radio message with highest degree of urgency to all naval forces in the Northern Waters.

2. Own Position:

In the night preceding 7 Jun., four penetrations into the Vardoe area were reported of 28 planes which unsuccessfully attacked cutter traffic as well as Berlevaag and one electric power station in the Kingsfjord with bombs and gunfire.

Thirty-three ships were escorted to the North and thirty to the South.

Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Meteorological Service suggested to establish meteorological apparatus in the northern area at the following places:

1. Position Jan Mayen - Iceland: instead of the originally planned establishing of meteorological radio land set at Shannon Wake at the east coast of Greenland somewhat south of the former "Bassgeiger" position, which was regarded as unsuitable by the scientific leader of "Bassgeiger" because of the ice conditions, it was suggested to plant one weather buoy each in the area Jan Mayen and Iceland by a submarine starting from Narvik.

2. Position Bear Island: establishing of a meteorological radio-land set on the Bear Island by a submarine starting from Tramsøe.

8 Jun. 1944

3. Position Spitsbergen: establishing of a meteorological radio-land set in northwestern Spitsbergen by a submarine operating from Tromsoe. This submarine would collect the crew "Kreuzritter" after having carried out the task.

Naval Staff, Operations Division agreed in principle to this suggestion and declared the two sets in the Northern Waters as of preeminent urgency in view of the importance continued weather reports have for our knowledge of the weather in England.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Position:

Movements in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland were at the usual scale. At 2310 of 7 Jun., 3rd Minesweeper Flotilla opened fire upon a mine clearance formation consisting of 19 smaller vessels in AO 3741. Two vessels were set on fire. The formation sheered off setting up a smoke screen. Later, from 0044 till 0055, 3rd Minesweeper Flotilla had contact with four PT-boats, which unsuccessfully fired six or eight torpedoes. Two of the PT-boats were clearly annihilated.

2. Own Position:

Mine sweeping duties were carried out in the Baltic approaches by 36 boats; and by 46 boats and 5 minesweeping planes in the Baltic Sea. Seven mines were cleared in the Gulf of Danzig, off Pillau, Gotenhafen and Neufahrwasser.

At 1507, a guard ship opened fire on 21 approaching Swedish planes.

After further 500 Coastal Mine-A had been completed the laying out of these mines in the area of Admiral Skagerrak was reopened.

Two naval landing craft with 355 LMB-mines will be kept ready at Esbjerg from 9 Jun. onward for laying out emergency barrages.

Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, Denmark partly loosened the orders concerning degree of readiness 1. The destroyers and PT-boats were kept in degree of readiness three hours.

8 Jun. 1944

Referring to "Rotbuche": During the conference with the Staff of the Finnish Naval Forces it was found out that it is impossible to establish light Finnish anti-aircraft guns on the enviroing islands because of geographical reasons, or better that it would require more time and material than could be justified. On request, Naval Staff therefore informed High Command, Air, Chief of Operations Staff, Navy about the plan to safeguard anti-air defense by light naval forces which should anchor around the mooring ground of the cruiser. Further conferences with the Finns about the subject are not intended.

V. Submarine Warfare:

Following the locating of an enemy formation presumably a convoy, in BF 1988, ten submarines were combined as Group "Tiger" and were ordered to steer for BF 5190.

The remaining Biscaya-boats were withdrawn from their former positions towards northeast, near the coast up to the 100 meter line. When reports of air reconnaissance indicated at 2200 that the sighted vessels presumably were not a convoy but an anti-submarine chaser formation, Group "Tiger" was dissolved. The attacking areas in the 100 meter line between BF 2773 and 9671 were occupied by 19 boats. In case of an enemy landing in the Bay of Biscay this measure will allow quicker concentration of the submarines at the landing spot.

It has already been reported on the loss of seven boats of Group "Landwirt". No special reports came in about the boats of Group "Mitte" and from the Northern Waters.

The three submarines laying in the ports of the eastern Mediterranean were ordered to speed up works on the "Schnorchel" equipment in order to get ready for war. It was planned to have these boats operate in the Creta area.

During an enemy air raid on Pola, the submarine U"596" was slightly damaged.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

West Area:

During the day the enemy attacked with strongest formations in northwestern France up to the Orleans area, but mostly in

8 Jun. 1944

the landing area. The attacks were continued also with strong forces during the night of 8 Jun.

During the day, 144 of our bombers of the IIInd Air Corps and 256 fighters of the IIInd Fighter Corps were operating to fight against the unloadings in the landing area. At a loss of 20 of our planes 24 of the enemy planes were shot down. In the night of 8 Jun., 49 of our bombers were operating in order to mine the waters northeast of Carentan. Twenty-one of these reached their goal and carried out the task. Ten of our planes carried out a harassing raid in the Asnelles area and 19 planes on Bayeux.

During the attacks in the night of 7 Jun. the following results were reported:

4 troop transporters of a total of 23,000 BRT were sunk,
4 troop transporters of a total of 38,000 BRT were damaged,
2 cruisers were heavily damaged and 1 cruiser slightly damaged.

Reich Territory:

In the night of 8 Jun., 15 enemy planes entered the area Laibach - Graz and attacked a train. Three planes were reported from the Muenster area.

Mediterranean Theater:

On 7 Jun. several hundreds of four engined enemy planes came from South Italy in order to attack Leghorn and Genoa. Part of the formation entered southern France.

Other forces of the enemy attacked traffic targets in Central Italy. In the front area 800 operations of enemy planes were reported.

In the night of 7 Jun., 50 enemy planes were reported supplying bandits in the Balcans. Four planes each attacked Rhodos and Iraclion.

Twenty-two planes of the Ju 88-type controlled the roads in the front area west of Rome without sustaining losses. Besides, reconnaissance flights were carried out off the Dalmatian coast.

8 Jun. 1944

East Area:

On 7 Jun., 668 operations of our own and 935 of enemy planes were reported from the Eastern Front. One of our planes was lost while seven enemy planes were shot down.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea:

1. Area of Naval Group, West:

Enemy Position:

At 1235, a convoy steering on an easterly course was reported from Cape Spartel. Thirty-two freighters and five escort vessels could be made out. At 1900, a convoy consisting of altogether 90 ships entered the Mediterranean by the Gibraltar Straits, 70 of these were freighters, 6 tankers, 7 landing boats, 3 destroyers and 4 corvettes.

Own Position:

The harbor guard boats off Sete sustained losses of the crew by enemy air attacks.

As the war transporter KT"41", according to a report of Group West, is unsuitable for use as transport vessel because it was rebuilt into a submarine chaser, the boat will remain with the 6th Coastal Patrol Flotilla and the previous order is cancelled.

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Position:

According to air reconnaissance, in the forenoon, a convoy of five transporters of a total of about 80,000 BRT accompanied by two escort vessels was steering on a course 300° about 150 miles northwest of Bengasi. In the night of 8 Jun., about midnight, a convoy was reported with a cruiser and destroyer steering 30°, 75 miles southwest of Naples.

In the sea area Ischia-Anzio, four merchant ships were sighted on a north-northwest course in the early morning.

8 Jun. 1944

On 7 Jun., enemy troops succeeded in breaking through our own right wing. The enemy spearhead advanced to a point between Civitavecchia and Tarquinia. North of Tarquinia enemy landings were reported on the evening of 7 Jun. The coastal road north of that place was under fire from the sea.

Various German Intelligence Service reports indicate enemy landings as imminent. It was known from diplomatic sources in Madrid that landings near Porto Maurizio and Ventimiglia are expected in the immediate future. The jumping off base would be Sardinia and Corsica. According to further information convoy traffic from North Africa to Corsica increased to such an extent that a landing is expected in the near future along the Ligurian coast in the vicinity of Leghorn. In a further report, forthcoming operations in the eastern part of the Mediterranean are concluded: from the strong troop concentrations at Haifa and its environs; as well as from the assembly of ships between Haifa and Alexandria mainly consisting of sailing vessels altered into landing craft; as well as from the recalling of all naval personnel on leave.

Own Position:

Convoy and escort duties along the western coast were strongly reduced because of bad weather. Our troops were ordered to withdraw to the D-line.

Radar station Marinella and the harbor Civitavecchia were blown up. The harbor was fouled with mines. The harbor Stefano is being removed. The operation commandoes of the assault boats and of the PT-boats were ordered to move to the Leghorn area. The evacuation of the isles of Pianosa and Elba is under preparation. The work at the coastal fortifications south of Pesaro was stopped (? Translators note: The meaning of the original German sentence is not clear). Preparations were made for the removal of the command station of the German Naval Command to Levico.

During the month of May the following shipping losses occurred on our side along the Italian West coast:

9 steamers with 26,243 BRT lost by bomb hits in the harbors.
2 steamers with with 5,700 BRT by damages caused by bad weather.

8 Naval landing craft, 4 of them lost by bomb hits in the harbors and 4 by enemy naval forces operating on the surface.

9 freight peniches, 6 of them lost by bomb hits in the harbors and 3 by enemy naval forces operating on the surface.

8 Jun. 1944

- 3 tank-peniches lost by bomb hits in the harbors.
- 5 coastal auxiliary sailing vessels by bomb hits in the harbors.
- 2 tugs and 2 schooners by bomb hits in the harbors.

The following damages occurred:

- 7 steamers with 13,277 BRT damaged by bomb hits in the harbors.
- 2 steamers with 2,8/61 BRT damaged by naval forces on the surface.
- 11 naval landing craft damaged by bomb hits in the harbors.
- 6 freight peniches, 3 of them damaged by bomb hits in the harbors, 2 by bomb hits on sea, 1 by running ashore.
- 8 tank peniches, 1 coastal auxiliary sailing vessel, 2 tugs damaged by bombs in the harbors.

3. Area of Naval Group, South:

a. Adriatic:

Enemy Position:

1 freighter with 2 lighters pulled alongside; about 30 fishing vessels, 3 (presumably) artillery carrying PT-boats, were sighted in the harbor of Lissa; and about 40 fishing vessels and 6 (presumably) artillery or torpedo PT-boats were sighted in the harbor of Comiza.

According to a report of German Intelligence Service an attack on Solta to be carried out by all partisan forces is expected between 15 and 25 Jun.

Own Position:

In the night of 7 Jun., enemy air attacks were directed against our supply transports to Brac. No losses were sustained. The Army carried on with the sweeping of Brac.

6th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla with four boats entered Trieste in the forenoon.

At 1300, 54 enemy planes carried out an attack on Pola. In the area which mainly sustained damages, the harbor piers, submarine base and repair equipment of the dockyards were heavily damaged. The damaging of a submarine had been reported before.

Along the East coast of Italy the following shipping losses were sustained:

8 Jun. 1944

1 steamer with 1,017 BRT hit by bombs in the harbor.
5 coastal auxiliary sailing vessels were lost, 4 of them by attacks of fighter bombers and one by mine.
1 yacht, 1 tug by bomb hits in the harbor.

The following ships were damaged:

3 coastal auxiliary sailing vessels, 2 of them by bomb hits in the harbor, 1 by running aground.
2 tank lighters by bomb hits in the harbor.

b. Aegean:

Enemy Position:

At 0415, a submarine was sighted 25 miles southwest of Navarino.

According to German Intelligence Service reports, neutral ships in the Mediterranean were requested by the enemy to enter the nearest ports. Concluding from these measures, the Security Police agent at Istanbul expected Allied attacks in the Aegean and perhaps in Greece.

Own Position:

No damages occurred during the air attack on Rhodos in the evening of 7 Jun.

At 1225 of 8 Jun., 21 enemy planes dropped 40 bombs on Iraklion. Two coastal guard boats were destroyed and a third was heavily damaged. The quarters of the port captain and the pier were damaged.

Two mines were cleared by minesweeping planes off Chalkis on 7 and 8 Jun. A tug removed an adhesive mine in the Piraeus.

The Admiral Aegean transmitted the battle report of Commander 9th Torpedo Flotilla concerning the big Creta convoy of 1 and 2 Jun., adding his own opinion and making our own air weakness responsible for the losses. Planes of the Arado-type are only to be used for submarine reconnaissance and the Ju 88 type were completely overrun by the fast enemy machines. Air escorts have only psychological value for our convoys.

8 Jun. 1944

Group South reported that the question of a big convoy repeatedly was examined by the Group together with Admiral, Aegean and that in the present case a big convoy has to be approved. The Group is accepting full responsibility for the decision. For this reason no previous reports on the intended operation were made. The Group submitted its opinion on the situation concerning the supply of the island after the Creta convoy has been completed (For copy of the teletype as per 1/Skl 17648/44 Gkdos compare War Diary, Part C, Vol XIV). Summing up the Group points to the serious vessel situation and asks therefore for a new allotment of transport submarines as a reserve for future aggravation of the situation.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Chief of Shipping and Transport Branch will discuss the question on the occasion of his conversation with Commander in Chief, Navy on 9 Jun.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Position:

No special reports came in.

Own Position:

Convoys along the West coast were carried out according to schedule. No other events of importance were reported.

Situation on the Danube:

No mine laying by planes was observed in the estuary of the Danube, off Sulina and Constanta. In the night preceding 7 and 8 Jun., the Danube was presumably newly fouled with mines east of Esseg or near kilometer indicator 744 respectively.

On 7 Jun., two tugged barges were hit by mines and sustained damages near kilometer indicator 1202. Vessels reported ten mines cleared and mine sweeping planes cleared five mines.

VIII. Situation in East Asia:

No special reports came in.

9 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance.

According to Reuter, Eisenhower and de Gaulle reached a complete agreement on the military questions.

The developments in Italy tend to the elimination of Badoglio and to the formation of a new cabinet under the former Italian prime minister, the socialist Bonomi. The political leaders in Rome did not accept Badoglio's conditions for collaboration.

Conference on the Situation with Commander in Chief, Navy at 1115:

1. Report of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief of Operations Branch, on the directives for the distribution of the naval forces for the plan "Wallenstein":

Naval Command, East reported:

- a. Commander 3rd Torpedo boat Flotilla was ordered immediately to move to Oslofjord with the torpedo boats T"18", "19", "21". The torpedo boat T"13" will probably follow on 12 Jun. Training as well as readiness was ordered for the flotilla.
- b. Commander 2nd Torpedo boat Flotilla will move to Gotenhafen with the torpedo boat T"3", "8", "11", "12", "17" (the speed of T"17" is limited to 24 knots). Training was ordered for the flotilla in cooperation with Training Unit, Fleet. In case of alarm or of "Rotbuche" the flotilla will move to the Gulf of Finland.
- c. The torpedo boat T"31" would again be ready for war on 10 Jun. and was ordered to move immediately to the Gulf of Finland in order to join Group "Kothe".
- d. Other forces becoming available:

The torpedo boats T"4", "10", will be ready for 2nd Torpedo boat Flotilla about 17 Jun. FRIEDRICH IHN, RIEDEL will reinforce the destroyer Z"30" at Galster Oslofjord about 20 Jun. The torpedo boats T"1", "9", will be ready for 2nd Torpedo boat Flotilla about the middle of July.

9 Jun. 1944

- e. The units will be placed under the command of:
Admiral Skagerrak those under a.
Commandant of Training Unit Fleet those under b.
Commander, Baltic Minesweepers those under c.

Admiral Skagerrak reported:

The boats of 8th Torpedo boat Flotilla are to serve as anti-aircraft defense for the Norway supply.

16th Patrol Flotilla thereby will become free for the reinforcement and for the extension of the patrol service towards the enemy at the west coast of Jutland.

Seven mine clearing vessels (former coal boats of the mine defense service Skagerrak/Kattegatt).

By this measure 29th Minesweeper Flotilla will become free for control of the sea routes.

Four motor mine sweepers, three auxiliary mine sweepers will be available for mine defenses in the Baltic Sea Entrances.

1st Landing Flotilla was provided for Lymfjord in case the bridges and ferries are to be destroyed. Furthermore three guard boats will go to the Lymfjord. M.T."1" and M.T."2" (mine transporter ? - transl. note) would be used for laying the emergency barrages Hanstholm, Aalbaeck-Bay.

Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic reported:

Four motor mine sweepers and three auxiliary mine-sweepers were provided for the mine defense, four C-steamers and four small guard boats for the Kiel Canal. Four mine layers will be ready for war after completion. Four boats of 25th Minesweeper Flotilla will thereby gradually become available for Commander, Baltic Minesweepers.

Commander, Baltic Minesweepers reported:

Artillery training boat FUCHS will be dispatched for the Narva patrol and F"10" for escort service.

Night fighter control ship TOGO was provided for the western part of the Baltic Sea and for the Baltic Sea Entrances.

9 Jun. 1944

The requirements of Naval Command, North, and Norway were not considered by this plan. The mine ship OSTMARK was reported available for Naval Command, Norway. Three mine layers, one motor minesweeper and five experimental vessels will again be put at the disposition of the experimental command under the condition that the boats be kept ready to be returned within 24 hours on demand. Furthermore Naval Command, East reported ready for action a certain number of ships which were called up on 9 Jun. by the keyword "Colani".

Naval Command, Norway had asked for six minelayers for the minesweeping in the Oslofjord, five minelayers for the laying of emergency barrages, one patrol flotilla or one motor minesweeper flotilla for escort duties in the waters of Kristiansand South, motor minesweepers for escort in the mine fields in the scerry area Floroey and Aalesund, eight patrol boats for the advanced patrol positions and one minesweeper flotilla or a patrol flotilla for the reinforcement of the convoy protection in the area Kristiansand South-Aalesund.

Naval Staff approved the suggestion of Naval Command, East but reserved for itself the right of possible alternations according to the development of the situation. The vessels reported ready for action by Naval Command, East were attached by Naval Staff in the following way:

- a. to Naval Command, Norway:
Four mine layers and four motor mine sweepers for escort and patrol service on the west coast with the center at Kristiansand South - Stavanger.
- b. to Naval Command, North:
the former Norwegian torpedo boats and six motor minesweepers for the reinforcement of the patrol positions along the Dutch coast and in the Heligoland Bight as requested.
- c. to Naval Command, East:
The boats which were allotted by the Naval Command to Admiral Skagerrak; Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic, and Commander, Baltic Minesweepers, less the ships which were ordered to be allocated to Naval Command, North, and Norway. Naval Staff agreed to the suggested plans for operation. Naval Staff reserved the decision on the mine

9 Jun. 1944

transporter MT"1" for itself. Naval Command, East has to order the details for the allotments and the moving of the ships and will have to report on the execution. It will submit suggestions as to the use of the vessels before they become ready and in consideration of the requirements of Naval Command, Norway.

Furthermore, in addition to the ships already named by Naval Command, East, the following vessels will have to be given back to the training schools under the condition that they be kept ready to be returned on demand within 24 hours:

- a. all vessels which are not needed for the operation "Colani",
- b. all those vessels which in spite of being provided for "Colani" because of their technical equipment or other qualities, have a greater value as training or experimental vessels than for military operations.

Commander in Chief, Navy concurred. A corresponding directive as per 1/Skl. I op 17747/44 Gkdos. was issued to Naval Command, East, North, Norway, with copy to Fleet; Commanding Admiral, Submarines; Training Unit, Fleet and Commander, Destroyers. For copy compare War Diary, special file "Large Scale Enemy Landing".

II. Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, North, referring to the preparedness for the defense of the German North Sea coast, pointed again to the necessity to carry on by all means with setting up landing obstacles on the shores of the islands where landings from the air are possible. These plans have been frustrated up to now because of lack of material.

Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, North declared:

"Although the most important islands can be regarded as safe against commando tasks, the entire North Sea area can not be called ready for defense. This is particularly so regarding the continental coast. In spite of all difficulties of a landing from the sea such landing is nevertheless thought possible. The river estuaries which are not protected by islands off the coast, as well as the areas Heide and Wesselburen and the Eiderstedt peninsula, are believed to be in a particular danger. With the units of 2nd Admiral of the North Sea (the only forces available in addition to the naval artillery battalions and the naval anti-aircraft battalions already on the spot), it is impossible to accept responsibility for the

9 Jun. 1944

defense. It is particularly so as long as the present orders are still in force which are limiting the use of these formations in the beachhead; and as long as the present situation in armaments and ammunitions does not improve. The taking part of Army units is regarded necessary.

No forces are available at present for the fortification of the continental coast. Therefore it is impossible to reinforce and build fortifications on the main coast even if construction materials are made available."

Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, North asked that:

- a. the home organization of Xth Army Corps Command should release formations to be garrisoned along the coast.
- b. materials for the construction of barrages and fortifications should be provided.
- c. small arms and ammunition should be provided.
- d. units of the Organization Todt be employed in the fortification of the continental coast, and he asked furthermore to transmit this request to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, and to Chief of Army, Ordnance Office, and Commander of Reserves.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division will be responsible for further treatment of the affair.

III. Naval Staff, Quartermaster General:

a. A directive of the Fuehrer arrived concerning the maintenance of railway traffic in the occupied Western area and at home. According to this directive, Commanding General, Armed Forces, West was entrusted with special authority regarding all offices concerned, also outside the Armed Forces, in order to be able to carry out the task. The Minister for Transport was ordered to make all preparations for an increase in repair work and he was assured of the assistance of all important offices.

High Command, Air was ordered to provide anti-aircraft protection for the railway installations, cars carrying anti-aircraft guns to be included in all important trains and smoke screen equipment for the bridges.

The Navy might be affected by this order in so far as smoke screen formations and security forces will perhaps have been withdrawn.

9 Jun. 1944

b. Work began for the installation of firing devices for 8.6 centimeter rockets on the mine clearance boats.

IV. Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division:

a. The enemy broadcasting stations transmitted a warning of the Allied Supreme Commander to all fishers in the coastal waters off Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. It was asked that all fishing should be stopped in these waters from 2100 of 8 Jun. till 2100 of 15 Jun. The fishers which were on the sea should immediately enter the harbors.

b. The German Foreign Office transmitted information given on 8 Jun. by the Japanese minister in Madrid to the German Embassy. According to this information the Japanese minister was informed on 21 May that the invasion would take place near Le Havre and Cherbourg and that three more offensives would be launched in the Mediterranean about eight days later in the following way: 1. against the section Grosseto-Leghorn and Pisa-Genoa. 2. against the section Wormes (east of Toulon) and Cachis west of Toulon and 3. against the section west of Marseille-Perpignan. The Japanese minister did not at first regard the information as of any importance but felt obliged to hand it over to Germany after the first part of the prediction proved true.

Group West; German Naval Command, Italy; Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean will be informed by Naval Staff.

c. According to a disclosure from the US Senate Committee for Naval Affairs the cruiser MILWAUKEE was ceded to the Soviet Union under the conditions of "Lend and Lease" and reservation of property rights.

V. Army Position:

West:

In the area Caen our own divisions remained defensive for the time being. The formations suffered heavy losses by enemy air action.

Divisions kept in readiness in the Bretagne are on their way to the scene. Besides, further divisions are coming from Central, Western and Southern France. Thus, at the moment, all forces are concentrated against the beachhead in the Seine Bay.

9 Jun. 1944

According to Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Armies West, ten divisions of the 21st British Army Group under the command of General Montgomery are so far operating in the area Dives - Bayeux. Furthermore, one US Army consisting of two corps is operating in the area northwest of Bayeux and on the Cotentin peninsula. One of these corps got the order to take Cherbourg from the South. Quick reinforcements by new formations in the Normandy area have to be expected. On the other hand operations of stronger forces against the Bretagne or against the Atlantic coast are not regarded as probable. The forces stationed in southeast and east England so far did not take part in any operation and are kept in readiness - as well as the bulk of the British close combat formations which are held together for further operations, probably directed against Belgium.

Our 15th Army Headquarters launched an attack east of the Orne mouth early on the 9th.

Following the capture of Port en Bessin, the enemy established a connection between his two bridge heads. Isigny was taken by the enemy. The enemy succeeded in extending the bridgehead north of Carentan towards the North and South. The general situation is regarded as serious. The approach of our own mobile reserves takes considerable time because of the enemy activity whereas the strength of the enemy is steadily increasing owing to the unhampered supply over the sea.

It seems advisable to face the reality of a 2nd front.

In Italy the withdrawal of our lines to the Dora-position is going on without major fighting. The Fuehrer intends, for the time being, not to withdraw to the Appenin position at once but to withdraw gradually. It remains to be seen whether this is still possible under the prevailing conditions.

VI. Report of Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Chief of Shipping and Transport Branch:

a. In the attitude of Group South and in the request of Commanding General, SouthEast, it was not sufficiently taken into consideration that it is possible to make use of the many auxiliary sailing vessels which are available in the Aegean area. Convoys of bigger ships are almost impossible. But it will not be difficult to increase the monthly supply to Creta to 6,000 tons by using the small ships available, especially after the arrival of the war transporters and of the fast motor ships from the Black Sea; and if for safety reasons the small vessels will be combined to larger groups under sufficient escort protection. It is not necessary to rely on submarines

9 Jun. 1944

for the transport. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Chief of Shipping and Transport Branch confirmed that no objections exist that this opinion be reported to the Fuehrer by Commander in Chief, Navy.

Commander in Chief, Navy intends to wait first for the opinion of Admiral, Aegean which was asked for (compare War Diary 7 Jun.)

b. Report on the draft of a Fuehrer order concerning sea transport prepared by Armed Forces, High Command; and provisions for the execution of the order to be issued by Chief, Armed Forces High Command. Objections were raised against the wording of the draft concerning the duties of the Director of Sea Transport of the German Armed Forces, which would include the planning of the central distribution of transport facilities, the program of new constructions and repair of merchant ships for the purpose of the conduct of warfare in cooperation with Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, as well as judging on all questions of sea transport for operational purposes. The following formulation was suggested instead:

- "a. Raising and advocating the demands of the Armed Forces before the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping when the latter is planning the general distribution of transport facilities, the program of war constructions, and repair of merchant ships, for the purpose of the conduct of warfare and judging on all questions of sea transport for operational purposes.
- b. Assisting the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping in the carrying out of sea transports for the Armed Forces."

The wording of the draft, saying that details of preparatory organization measures for safeguarding the undisturbed shift of the command of sea transport in the operation theatres has to be settled amongst High Command, Navy, General Staff of the Army, Quartermaster Division, Home Staff of the Forces in Scandinavia and Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, would also better be replaced by the following formulation:

"Navy and Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping will take preparatory organization measures in order to carry out the corresponding paragraph of the above Fuehrer order to safeguard an undisturbed shift of the command."

By putting it this way it will be avoided that the whole problem of competence is arising again.

Commander in Chief, Navy concurred.

9 Jun. 1944

Conference on the situation with Commander in Chief, Navy at 1800.

I. According to a discussion by telephone held by Chief, Naval Staff; Commanding Admiral, Group West gave the necessity of mine operations as reason for the intended transfer of 2nd Minesweeper Flotilla with the torpedoboat T"24" from Brest to the Channel area. The boats will be required as mine carriers for the laying out of "Blitz" barrages and for mine sweeping duties. The torpedoboat T"24" will be attached to 5th Torpedoboat Flotilla. The transfer will be carried out along the coast till St. Malo, for the time being, and with stops at the harbors on the way.

II. According to a report of Commanding Admiral, Naval Group West, at dusk of 6 Jun., a group of recruits of the 9th Naval Cadre consisting of 5 lance corporals and 50 men was attacked and kidnapped by armed terrorist forces numbering 150 men in their remote accommodation quarters at Paintreux, east of St. Dié. Most of the recruits were without arms. Because of this event, Commanding Admiral, Group West asked for immediate withdrawal of all unarmed recruit personnel of the naval cadres from the western areas.

Commander in Chief, Navy concurred with the opinion of Commanding Admiral, Group West and ordered withdrawal provided that arming of the recruits by own means of the units or by the Army is impossible.

III. Commander in Chief, Navy intends to visit the Fuehrer H.Q. on 11 or 12 Jun.

Special Items.

I. Concerning the problem of the Creta supply (compare War Diary 8 Jun.), Group South - with copy to Admiral Aegean - was ordered to investigate and report independently from the questions put by Naval Staff to Admiral Aegean, whether the monthly demand of 1,500 tons as reported to the Fuehrer by the commandant of Creta, presumably could be guaranteed by sea traffic with the forces available. Commander in Chief, Navy required informative material for his report to the Fuehrer because on this occasion it would perhaps be decided whether the submarines provided for operations in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean would have to be used for transport requirements.

9 Jun. 1944

II. Naval Staff, Operations Division prepared a demand for mine clearance equipment as ordered by Chief, Naval Staff and transmitted it to Chief, Naval Ordnance Office and to Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division. For copy of 1/Skl. IE 17610/44 Gkdos compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

III. Naval Staff asked Naval Attaché Department to inform the Roumanian naval attaché that at present it is impossible to deliver more than the four PT-boats which were promised because of the own requirements of the German Navy. The question of delivering further PT-boats to the Roumanian Navy will nevertheless be raised again in due time.

IV. Monitoring Radio Report No 23/44 contains a summary of enemy informations intercepted on 29 May and 4 Jun. by radio interpretation and radio intelligence service.

Situation 9 Jun.

I. War in Foreign Waters:

No special reports arrived.

II. Position in the West Area:

1. Invasion:

Excerpts from the reports No 5 and 6 of the Supreme Command of the Allied Expedition Forces: Report No 5 described mainly the operations of the Allied air forces on the 7th and in the night of the 8th. According to report No 6, the American bridgeheads were gradually extended. The Germans were fighting desperately and engaged their reserves along the entire frontline. As the convoys carrying supplies were arriving safely and in time and as weather conditions had improved the unloading went on quick and satisfactory. In the night of the 8th, four groups of German PT-boats were ascertained and more PT-boats in the morning hours of the 8th. A number of encounters occurred during which three of the attacking vessels were hit several times. One plane of the Coastal Command sunk a PT-boat for certain, three others were sunk or damaged.

The Allied air attacks were continued uninterruptedly and with great strength in order to assist the sea and land forces in their operations against tactical targets. The German air activity was limited.

9 Jun. 1944

Very heavy fighting was going on for the possession of Caen. Ten German divisions were counted in operations.

The Allied had prepared landing places in the attack area. According to further reports, one Polish cruiser and one destroyer, as well as two Dutch gunboats, took part in the operations. Besides, one ship was taking part which was equipped with rocket-guns in accordance with experiences made at Dieppe.

Churchill did not deliver the declaration before the House of Commons about the landing operation, as had been planned.

New proclamations were issued to the French people and to the Belgian transport and railway workers.

According to the various reports arriving at Naval Staff during the day, the course of events was as follows:

At 0035 Commanding General, West transmitted Bruxelles as assembly point for 1,500 men of alarm units and Epinal for 3 - 4,000 men. The troops will be at the disposition of the Military Governor Belgium and France respectively. Commanding General, West is very pleased about the fact that the alarm units are equipped with light artillery.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division will be responsible for the necessary arrangements. The transport trains are to leave at 2200 on the 9th. The transport will take two or three days.

At 0100 Group West reported on the already mentioned capture of the recruit platoon at Paintreux. The terrorists were equipped with machine-guns and machine pistols and arrived in three trucks. During the fight both sides suffered losses. All the kidnapped recruits meanwhile reported to the Naval Cadre Regiment with the exception of two men.

At 0124 Naval Command, Channel Islands reported that the night-positions 28 a, 29, 30 a and 31 a were occupied.

At 0152 3rd Coastal Patrol Force reported heavy damage on minelayer "4605" sustained on the occasion of the enemy fighter bomber attack on Granville.

At 0332 it became known by monitoring our own radio communications that losses are small at the Army coastal batteries. Battery Marcouf suffered more losses. The commandant of the battery was slightly wounded, the battery officer

9 Jun. 1944

was heavily wounded. The remaining soldiers which are only fit for garrison duties at home showed a weak morale and had to be forced to fight. The battery was slightly reinforced by the Army and was now placed under Army command.

At 0405 our radio monitoring service transmitted an intercepted report of a British vessel to Portsmouth on the sighting of four destroyers. The location was about BF 2838. Apparently our destroyer flotilla which had left Brest was now located by the enemy.

At 0430 Naval Command, Channel Islands reported that everything was quiet on the sea and in the air at 0300.

At 0600 Naval Communication Officer, Cherbourg reported that eight PT-boats had entered the harbor at 0445.

At 0600 Commander 5th Torpedoboat Flotilla sent a battle report on the fight with enemy PT-boats in the eastern part of the Seine Bay:

The flotilla left Le Havre at 0145 with three boats for a combined mine and torpedo operation and had to ward off enemy fighter bombers when leaving the harbor. In the outward channel about 20 mine explosions were observed. When steering for the operation area the flotilla managed to avoid a torpedo attack of enemy PT-boats. The flotilla pursued the attacking PT-boats which fled in a high speed towards west. The pursuit was given up because the battle area was densely covered with smoke screens. Simultaneously one enemy formation each was sighted in the South and in the North. The mine operation was impossible because of this situation. Further hunting for PT-boats seemed not advisable as the battery was hampered by the mine load. The flotilla entered Le Havre at 0415. Our boats were hit several times by machine weapons and reported minor losses of the crew. The Commander, Flotilla reported as a result of the operation that the enemy protected the landing formation by strong PT-boat formations in 8'W. Destroyer formations were supposed to be in 15'W according to location of the observed flare shell fire. The mine barrage which was cleared when leaving the harbor had probably been laid out during the last days.

At 0800 Commander, 9th PT-boat Flotilla reported: mines were laid in Grid Square 3569 left center. Strong defense by enemy destroyers and cruisers. Two LST of 4,600 BRT each

9 Jun. 1944

were sunk in 3641 upper right at 0235. The flotilla had three brushes with destroyers and marked two channels with buoys north and south 0°55 W. and 0835 W.

At 0816 Commander 5th PT-boat Flotilla reported on mines laid by the flotilla in 3569 center. Strong defense by enemy destroyers and cruisers was met in square 3644 and 3641. An unsuccessful attack was launched against the cruisers. The flotilla had contact with M.G.B.'s and S.G.B.s off Barfleur.

At 0835 Commander, 15th Patrol Flotilla sent a short report on a fight with enemy PT-boats west of Fecamp. Hits on the enemy boats were observed. Our own boats suffered only minor damages by some hits but no losses of the crews occurred.

At 0800 Naval Staff knew from a report of Group West that the destroyers Z"32", Z"24", ZH"1" and torpedoboat T"24" had contact with enemy cruisers during the move from Brest to Cherbourg. Z"32" ran ashore near Ile de Bort. ZH"1" was missing. Z"24" and T"24" returned to Brest. No detailed reports had yet arrived.

Two mine boats of the 2nd PT-boat Flotilla were damaged by mines on their way from Brest to St. Malo. All the five boats returned to Brest. Furthermore Group West reported that many telephone and teletype lines were interrupted. Only one teletype line to Berlin is ready at the moment.

At 1007 Group West reported that a cruiser and several destroyers took part in the battle with 8th Destroyer Flotilla which lasted for several hours. The Commander Flotilla, the commanding officer and 215 men were rescued of the destroyer Z"32".

Apparently the enemy is firmly protecting his flank against the approach of further German naval forces.

At 1023 3rd Coastal Patrol Force was ordered by Commanding Admiral, Defenses West to order search for the survivors of the destroyer with all available forces.

At 1235 Group West reported on the situation at 1130:

No further news was available on the fight of the destroyers. It was known from a radio danger message that the destroyer ZH"1" was sunk at an unknown place about 0045. Furthermore the report contained the

9 Jun. 1944

already known report on the operations of 5th Torpedo-boat Flotilla and 5th and 9th PT-boat Flotilla. Besides, 4th PT-boat Flotilla met destroyers and fired three torpedoes unsuccessfully. In BF 3681 bomb hits were observed on a vessel. Finally, at 0330, 6th Gunboat Flotilla reported on a brush with ten enemy PT-boats in BF 3561 without losses on our side. The flotilla was fired upon by heavy enemy naval forces at 0220 off St. Vaast.

At 1300 Group West reported that convoy reconnaissance flights of two aircraft of the Ju 88 type brought no results in the waters north of Spain.

At 1356 Admiral, Channel Coast was ordered to send immediately the mobile group of the Naval Motor Transport Detachment, Granville and Repair Group, Cherbourg to Tressaint for the 2nd Parachute Corps in order to transport the paratroops to the western coast of Cotentin.

At 1456 Naval Command, Bretagne reported that two groups of light anti-aircraft guns were on their way to defend the place where the destroyer Z"32" went ashore.

At 1501 Naval Command, Normandy reported intensified ship movements east of Barfleur on northern and southern courses. Strong landings of tanks took place near Jevemoville. The batteries 9. and 10./1261 which defended the area were under fire from naval artillery. According to further reports the fourth gun was moved back to Battery Marcouf. During the night attempts will be made to supplement ammunitions. It is planned that the battery should operate on the eastern side of the land front against the eastern coast.

From this report it can be concluded that the battery position was again in our hands.

According to a report transmitted by Naval Command, Normandy also La Pernelle and our own batteries were under heavy artillery fire from the sea since 1445. Battery 2/1261 observed a hit on a transporter on the 7th and, on the 8th, opened fire on a cruiser which sheered off.

At 1623 2nd PT-boat Flotilla was ordered by Commander PT-boats to operate with torpedoes in BF 3610. The flotilla should leave Boulogne as soon as possible. It should then move to the operation area during the night and enter Cherbourg at dawn.

9 Jun. 1944

At 1634 Commander PT-boats ordered 4th PT-boat Flotilla to carry out mine operations as had been ordered for the night of the 8th. The flotilla will then continue with torpedo operations in the area between 4936 North, 4948 North, 0040 West and 0010 West. At dawn it will enter Le Havre. The plans for the operation will have to be made corresponding to the operations of 5th Torpedoboat Flotilla.

At 1648 torpedo operations were ordered for 5th and 9th PT-boat Flotilla in the western part of the Seine Bay. The flotilla will enter Cherbourg at dawn.

At 1700 based on a report of the Commander, Flotilla the following was reported by telephone about the battle of the destroyers near Ouessant:

The flotilla had a fight at 0130 in BF 2837 with an enemy formation of six destroyers at first. Later four cruisers were made out and enemy torpedoes could be avoided. One enemy cruiser and one destroyer were hit by two torpedoes. The targets were in flames for a considerable time. Our formation was dispersed soon after the fighting had started because of the enemy's superiority in artillery. After the fighting had lasted $1\frac{1}{2}$ - 2 hours it was intended to break through towards St. Malo. The destroyer Z"24" was released to Brest because of damages suffered in the course of the battle. The torpedoboat T"24" followed. At that time communications still existed with the destroyer ZH"1" but they were very faint, apparently maintained by the ultra short wave set. At 0430 the commander decided to break through to Brest with the destroyer Z"32". When turning, the boat was met by two cruisers and became unfit for maneuvering following a heavy fight. The boat was blown up by the crew. It went ashore at the north side of Ile de Bas and capsized. The last position of ZH"1" was probably north of Ile de Bas.

At 1713 Naval Command, Normandy reported about 100 bigger and medium sized vessels at a distance of ten kilometer on a south course east of Barfleur.

At 1730 Group West reported that our own Air Force had fouled the waters off the beachhead with mines of the BM 1,000-type in the night of the 8th. The sinking of a tanker west of Le Havre by our Air Force was observed by 4th PT-boat Flotilla.

9 Jun. 1944

At 1730 Commander PT-boats ordered 8th PT-boat Flotilla to move in the night of the 9th from Ostend to Boulogne along the outer fairway and to patrol the coastal waters on this occasion.

At 1735 5th and 9th PT-boat Flotilla got the directive to foul with mines the day light positions of the battleships in Grid Square 3569 from where the bombardment of the coast was carried out. The flotillas were put under the command of the Commander 9th PT-boat Flotilla. The center of the mine operation will be the lower left quarter of Grid Square 3569 and not more than 25 meters under the surface. On the way to the operation area only major targets should be attacked and all targets worth a torpedo attack on the way back. At dawn the flotillas will enter Cherbourg.

At 1737 Naval Command, Normandy reported enemy mine sweeping activities in the center of 3566.

Group West ordered, in order to transport 2nd Parachute Corps to the scene, to make available all transport facilities of the Navy. Since 7 Jun., about 700 tons of motor transport were put at the disposal of Commanding General, Armed Forces, West for troop transports. Thus the works at the dockyards and the carrying out of our own tasks were considerably reduced. All teletype and telephone lines from Paris to Cotentin, Bretagne, Atlantic Coast and Southern France have been cut off by sabotage.

Considering the seriousness of the developments, Captain Assmann suggested during the daily conference to find out whether the Navy is able to set up further defense units out of its own initiative, even if serious disadvantages are to be taken into account, and to make them available for the Army on quiet coastal fronts and for defense duties in order to replace Army divisions ready for battle which then could be used at the fighting front.

Furthermore Armed Forces, Operations Staff, Navy transmitted a suggestion of Armed Forces, Operations Staff, Army to carry out preparatory measures for the destruction of harbor facilities at Cherbourg as far as they were no more urgently required for our Naval forces because destructions carried out in the last minute will scarcely be an obstacle for the enemy if the developments are going that way.

9 Jun. 1944

Quartermaster Division ascertained that Group West will guarantee all necessary measures in this respect. The fouling with mines of Cherbourg harbor has already begun.

Furthermore, the Fuehrer asked for an immediate examination of the question of a precautionary mine barrage of DM 1 mines to be laid out off the Jutland, Dutch, and Frisian coasts in the waters which could be regarded as possible positions for enemy heavy naval formations bombarding the coast.

The total stock of DM-mines, consisting at present of 600 mines, is on the way to France. Up to about 25 Jun. further 300 mines will be ready. After that time 1,200 mines per month might be produced at the maximum, provided the production of all other firing devices be stopped. Precautionary laying out of mines on several places where landings can be expected is impossible at this rate of production. Commander in Chief, Navy thought it advisable, for the time being, to lay as many of these mines as possible in the area of the Seine Bay, especially off the Vire and Orne mouths and off Le Havre. In the second place it is necessary to lay mines off Cherbourg, Dieppe, Boulogne and Ostend and to decide on the distribution of newly arriving mines in due time according to the situation.

It is not regarded as justified to lay mines off the long and extended coast of Jutland as lengthened mine barrages can easily be penetrated by sacrificing a few Sperrbrecher. Commander in Chief, Navy intends to explain this opinion to the Fuehrer personally.

At 2104 Naval Command, Normandy reported a large assembly of troop transporters and passenger ships protected by fighters off St. Vaast at a distance of 15 kilometers.

At 2110 Group West reported that about 250 survivors of the destroyer Z"32" and 1 officer and 28 men of the destroyer ZH"1" landed at Ile de Bas. According to radio interception the enemy rescued further survivors from life-boats in BF 2217.

At 2114 Group West informed all that certain informations indicate that the enemy is planning landings on the Belgian coast for the following night.

9 Jun. 1944

At 2120 Group West reported:

1. Battery Marcouf was freed at 2157 on 8 Jun. At 2135 of the 8th, the Battery 3/1255 scored three hits on landing boats. The losses of the Army coastal batteries are small. At 0500 on the 9th, six Army coastal batteries successfully warded off a new landing attempt near Ravenoville by opening fire on cruisers, ship concentrations and on the bridge head. At 1107, the 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 10th Battery 1261 fired on tank concentrations east of Ravenoville. At 1125, the Battery 3/1255 fired on enemy unloading activities in the Orne mouth. At 1243, Army coastal battery 1255 opened fire on landing boats and ships off Rivabella and sunk a bigger ship.

Battery 2/1261 observed two hits before the PT-boats S"139" and "140" sank on 7 Jun.

At 2135 Group West reported on the plans for the night of the 9th:

- a. 5th Torpedoboat Flotilla will carry out torpedo operations in the eastern part of the Seine Bay.
- b. 5th and 9th PT-boat Flotilla will operate with torpedoes in the western Seine Bay.
- c. 4th PT-boat Flotilla will start for mine operations as in the night of 8 Jun. and will carry out torpedo operations in correspondence with 5th Torpedoboat Flotilla.
- d. 2nd PT-boat Flotilla would leave for torpedo operations in BF 3610. The flotilla will then enter Cherbourg.
- e. 8th PT-boat Flotilla will move from Ostend to Boulogne.
- f. A Coastal Mine-A barrage would be laid out south of the Somme mouth, Blitz-barrages 2122 on both sides of Fecamp, Coastal Mine-A barrages off the Seine mouth, Blitz-barrages on both sides of Cherbourg, and possibly Coastal Mine A-barrages in the Vauville Bay. Furthermore, Group West reported that the enemy formation cruising eight miles north of La Hague at 0500 on the 9th was presumably intended to operate against the moving of 8th Destroyer Flotilla which was recognized by the enemy. North of Port en Bessia up to north of La Hague, 300 mines (sic! transl. note) and smaller ships of all kind were sighted lying stopped 25 kilometers away from the coast. Dense enemy supply traffic west of Orne mouth and north of Vire mouth continued. In the afternoon, 2 battleships,

9 Jun. 1944

3 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 3 LST's, 15 LCT's were seen south of Cape de la Heve in a distance of 15 miles. At 1804 an enemy mine sweeping unit was seen twelve miles west of Cape de la Heve. At 1850, the NELSON was reported steering off on a northeast course accompanied by defense vessels.

According to radio interception, further survivors of the destroyer ZH"1" were taken aboard by the British from life-boats in BF 2917. A dinghy with 17 occupants was reported in BF 2835. The losses of harbor defense boats in the invasion area were unknown as communications were interrupted since 6 Jun. The dockyards Blainville near Caen were blown up by our troops on 6 Jun.

At 2250 Naval Location Division, Bretagne transmitted a report on an enemy vessel mooring together with two LCT's unfit for manuevring alongside HMS CAPETOWN.

At 2254 IXth Air Corps reported on its intention to lay out, at 2330, mines of the types LMB and BM 1,000 off the Vire mouth and to repeat this operation in the second half of the night according to the weather and according to the load.

At 2307 Commander PT-boats was ordered by Group West to direct 5th and 9th PT-boat Flotilla against a reported big assembly of transporters and passenger ships in the waters of St. Vaast and Marcouf.

At 2330 Naval Command, Normandy reported a convoy of 7 transporters, 3 passenger ships, 3 cruisers lying stopped eight miles south of the isle of Marcouf.

At 2348 Commander PT-boats was ordered by Group West, considering the situation, to keep 8th PT-boat Flotilla off the Belgian coast and to move the flotilla to Ostend at dawn.

2. Enemy Situation on the Other Theaters:

In the rendezvous area two British vessels were located. At 2354, an aircraft of 19th Group reported on a damaged submarine in BF 5552. Two more submarines were reported in BF 2933 and BF 5821. At 0100, the convoy which had been reported on the afternoon of the 8th was again located 100 miles west of Brest but no details as to its course or composition were contained in the report. Our own air reconnaissance reported a cruiser on a north course 50 miles north of Brest at 0610.

9 Jun. 1944

3. Own Situation on the Other Theaters:

Atlantic Coast Area:

Sixteen patrol positions were occupied. Thirty-nine mines of the ELM/A-type were cleared, nine of these in the Fromveur-Canal and twelve off Brest. During the night of the 8th, the mine layers M"9" and M"24" were hit by mines and suffered damage in the Fromveur-Canal on their way from Brest to St. Malo. The boats returned to Brest at 0315.

Channel Waters:

Fifteen patrol positions were occupied in the Channel and 45 mines were cleared, 38 of them off Le Havre. The 8th PT-boat Flotilla moved from Ymuiden to Ostend as had been scheduled. During an enemy air attack on 18th Patrol Flotilla in AN 7999 and BF 3332 one boat was slightly damaged. At 0227, 15th Patrol Flotilla had contact with enemy PT-boats in BF 3663. Hits were observed on the enemy boats. No damages or losses occurred on our side.

III. North Sea, Northern Waters, Norway.

North Sea:

In the Heligoland Bight, the patrol positions had no contact with the enemy. The escort services were carried out as scheduled. In the night of the 8th, one mine was cleared off the Weser. A mine explosion was reported from the Dutch coast, three kilometers off Katrijk at 0614. One mine exploded, at 1140, in the harbor of Kadzand, south of Flushing. Other explosions of unknown reasons were reported during the morning hours from Zandvoort.

The first part of the Coastal Mine-A barrage was laid off Roem. The barrages "3" and "6" of the Mining and Barrage Experimental Command were laid out off the eastern coast of the Netherlands as planned.

At 0835, Commanding General, Armed Forces, Netherlands ordered alarm "Danger Threatens" for his area of command. 2nd degree of alarm was ordered for the area of 1st Coastal Patrol Force since 2030.

Corps Command in the Netherlands ordered Admiral, Netherlands to close the Wielinger fair-way immediately by mines. Naval Command, North Sea was of the opinion that the closing of fairways

9 Jun. 1944

has to be carried out according to the requirements of the naval warfare.

This opinion was confirmed by Naval Staff and supplemented by the remark that the closing of the above fair way seemed advisable in the present situation provided that it was not urgently required for our own traffic. Naval Command North therefore submitted a barrage plan leaving a small passage at the southern side of the fair way and reported its intention to carry out the plan immediately. Admiral Netherlands was authorized to close this passage and the Ostgat according to the situation. The plan was approved by Naval Staff. Reinforcement of the barrage by mines with MA 2 firing device and by anti-sweeping and moored mines was suggested.

Naval Liaison Officer at the Army Group B supported the request of 15th Corps Command for closing the fairway by telephoning to Naval Staff.

Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Position:

Sixteen planes were accounted operating in the area of 18th Group.

Own Position:

Forty-three ships were escorted to the North and 27 to the South. The Fleet reported on the degree of readiness of TIRPITZ. After completing restricted war readiness on 20 Jun. and with the intention to continue the training during the repair work it is planned to move the ship for a short period to another place as a diversion according to the situation on sea. The ship will be ready for action already from 3 Jun. onward in case of emergency. Degree of readiness 6 hours will be reached probably from 20 Jun. onward.

For copy of the corresponding teletype as per 1/Skl 17769/44 Gkdos compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

9 Jun. 1944

In the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland the usual movements of the mine clearing and patrol services as well as for the supply in the Luga Bay were observed. Since 20 May, the mine clearing was noticed to be carried out by sometimes very strong mine clearance formations in the Lavansaari area and especially east of Tueters as well as north and east of Virgrund. The passage in the barrages which had thus been opened was used for the supply of the landfront. Besides, PT-boats appeared on several occasions in the inner Narva Bay. The passing of submarines was not noticed.

Own Position:

Thirty-four boats were operating in the mine clearance duties in the Baltic approaches and fifty-nine boats and three minesweeping planes in the Baltic Sea. One mine was cleared in the Pomeranian Bay and one near Rixhoeft. The explosion of a mine was observed in the Fehmarn Narrows. Four patrol positions were occupied on the western coast of Juteland. For all vessels taking part in "Wallenstein" degree of readiness three hours was ordered beginning on 10 Jun.

The 3rd Torpedoboat Flotilla was ordered to move immediately from Swinemuende to Oslofjord with three boats. After the move, training should be continued as far as was possible under the present fuel allotment. The flotilla left at 1800 on her way to the new station. In the area of Admiral, Eastern Baltic the 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla cleared the western side of the barrage "Seeigel" and "B" without finding mines. A reinforcement of the barrages by eight naval landing craft was planned for the night of the 10th. The Finns cleared eleven Russian mines in AO 3354 and mine of the M 12 type in AO 3346.

Two more naval artillery lighters and the commander's boat BALTENLAND were reported "ready for war" on Lake Peipsi.

In the afternoon and on the evening of the 8th, enemy artillery fired on the Battery Sillamae and on the mole. Battery Mere-Kuela carried out a successful surprise fire on an enemy machine gun and trench positions near Magerburg. In the night of the 8th, an attempt of twelve men to cross from Magerburg in a rowing boat was warded off.

V. Merchant Shipping:

Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping expected the following shipments for the month of July:

9 Jun. 1944

Supply of the Army and war industries in

Norway	about 374,000 tons
Finland - supply	" 25,000 tons
Baltic states - supply	" 140,000 tons

Coastal traffic along the German coast in both directions, excluding coal, 60 or 85,000 tons respectively. Coal traffic along the coast 211,000 tons. The shipments from Lulea began on 31 May. About 500,000 tons will have to be collected during the month of July whereas 65,000 tons are to be taken from the Oxeloe Sound.

VI. Submarine Warfare.

In the West Area:

In the night of the 7th, the submarine U"920" was sunk by a direct hit of a bomb in BF 9135. The commandant and 13 men were saved by a sea rescue plane after 23 hours. Thus 2 of the 36 "West"-submarines in operation were totally lost and 7 boats have returned following damages suffered during air attacks. Further losses by air attacks have to be expected.

It was ordered that the center of operations of the Schnorchel-equipped boats should be in Grid Square BF 3610 for three boats and in the waters farther north also for three boats. At 2354, a British plane reported a damaged submarine in BF 5552. Submarines which were near that place and minelayers from Brest were sent to the scene.

At Group "Mitte", submarines from the readiness harbors occupied the positions previously held by four Schnorchel-equipped boats which were ordered to the Atlantic. The submarine hunting carried out by submarines for Skudesnes and Lister was given up. Sixteen boats of the group were out in the reconnaissance areas and further twelve boats were lying in the readiness harbors.

According to intercepted radio, US steamers sighted a submarine in the Indian Ocean in LN 5390. At 1219, another steamer in the area 240 S.E. of Diego Gazia reported on an exchange of fire with a U-boat in LX 5619.

9 Jun. 1944

VII. Aerial Warfare.

West Area:

During the day only minor enemy air activity without attacks was reported in Belgium, northern France and western France. On our side 92 bombers operated against ship concentrations in the Seine Bay and hit several landing boats and searchlight and anti-aircraft positions. In the night of the 9th, 14 enemy planes were reported entering Belgium and 200 four-engined planes in Western France in the coastal area Dieppe, Valerie en Caux up to Paris - Evreux.

Landings in the area Arromanches up to the Orne mouth were attacked by 63 of our bombers with a loss of three on our side. Nine bombers with thirty fighters assisted the Army against terrorists in Southern France.

Reich Territory:

In the morning hours, a strong formation of four-engined planes escorted by fighters attacked Munich coming from the area of Foggia. It was a middle heavy attack, mainly directed against the dwelling quarters. No industrial damages were reported. Besides, the aerodrome at Riem and - on the way back - railway installations at Innsbruck were attacked. 172 of our fighters were operating, 90 of them starting from upper Italy. According to reports so far available, 18 of the attacking planes were shot down, eight of these by anti-aircraft guns. The shooting down of further five planes is probable. Eight losses were reported on our side.

In order to attack Berlin 30-40 Mosquitoes entered the Reich territory.

Mediterranean.

The enemy attacked the submarine base Pola with 50 planes coming from south Italy. The damages were comparatively small. In central Italy, traffic targets were attacked. In the front area 1,000 operations of enemy planes were counted. In the night of the 8th, 20 enemy planes were attacking Iraclion, 30 planes supplied bandits in the Balcan area and others were observed during reconnaissance flights in the Aegean. Ten of our planes were operating against traffic targets west and south-west of Rome. Other planes carried out photographic reconnaissance of Ajaccio and Calvi as well as visual reconnaissance in the Tyrrhenian Sea. Besides, photographic reconnaissance was made at Bizerte.

9 Jun. 1944

East Area:

On the Eastern Front 826 operations of our planes and 727 operations of enemy planes were counted. Twenty-nine enemy planes were shot down without losses on our side.

VIII. War in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea:

1. Area Naval Group, West:

Enemy Position:

At 1930 on the 8th one cruiser of the CAIRO class and at 0830 on the 9th a cruiser of the TROMP class left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean. The convoy which had been reported on the 8th on a course toward the Mediterranean was reported at 0830 from Tres Forcas to consist of 104 vessels.

Own Position:

In the night of the 8th, one of our artillery carriers had a brush with enemy PT-boats off Toulon. The artillery carrier was damaged. In the afternoon, Submarine Chaser 6073 avoided a submarine's torpedo off Toulon. The hunting of the submarine is going on. In the forenoon Submarine danger was reported off La Ciotat.

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Position:

Photographic reconnaissance of Bizerte according to the first evaluation, indicated a slight reduction of the freighters as compared with the observations on 26 May. On 9 Jun., 13 destroyers, 4 PT-boats, 3 LSTs, 41 medium landing boats, 25 small landing boats, and in the harbor Feroyville 3 (apparently) destroyers could be made out.

In Ajaccio were 4 submarines, 19 LCT's, 2 LCJ's, 1 troop transporters and 2 freighters besides 30 small boats etc. In Calvi were 14 auxiliary landing boats. In the night of the 9th, a short time after midnight, 20 big LCT's and 2 destroyers were reported on a west course 25 miles northeast of Maddalena. Shortly before midnight, 1 destroyer and 1 patrol boat were 15 miles west of Civitavecchia.

Based on further air reconnaissance it was reported: at 2105 on the 8th that 3 guard ships, apparently destroyers, were on an east course 14 miles south of Orbetello, and 8 landing boats 79

9 Jun. 1944

miles southeast of Orbetello; at 0527 of the 9th, that 5 smaller landing boats and 5 (presumably) LCT's, probably with the intention of supplying the advanced tank formations, were 17 miles west of Civitavecchia; at 0557, that 2 destroyers, 18 LCT's were on a west course 60 miles west of Ponza.

In the area Anzio - Ischia an increased supply traffic was observed during the night of the 8th.

The enemy landing, reported on the 7th, north of Tarquinia was not confirmed.

On the 8th, the enemy carried out uninterrupted air control along the entire west coast of Italy.

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division reported on the situation on sea:

The enemy carries out the necessary supply for the Mediterranean in the normal routine traffic of convoys. Therefore no conclusions can be drawn from these movements as to newly intended operations. It is impossible to obtain information about the damage available in the Mediterranean as the exact quota of transit traffic cannot be found out.

No heavy British or American naval forces are in the Mediterranean. Warfare is carried out by light vessels which are probably mostly in the western part of the Mediterranean. The number of PT-boats is considerably increased in the Tyrrhenian Sea (The bases are at Bastia and at Maddalena) in order to destroy our own supplies.

No further reports came in on the whereabouts of three auxiliary aircraft carriers which recently entered the Mediterranean. The assessment of the situation is rendered more difficult as the traffic in the Gibraltar Straits is no more under constant observation.

The number of naval forces and their distribution does not indicate any particular plans of the enemy. Four LST's and twenty-seven LCT's, possibly replacements, or to replenish the present formations, were newly brought in since 26 May. No assembly of landing craft or landing devices was noticed in the area Corsica - Sardinia. In the eastern part of the Mediterranean an increase in the reports on the assembly of smaller coastal vessels in the Syrian and Egyptian ports was noticeable. Forty coastal sailing boats of the British Navy were put into service presumably for the Aegean.

9 Jun. 1944

Summing up, Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division stated that the naval situation in the Mediterranean according to the information available does not indicate larger enemy operations in the near future. Operations of a smaller size are possible in the western as well as in the eastern part of the Mediterranean.

The front operation staffs and the highest operation staffs of the three services were informed on the lines of the above report. For copy as per 1/Skl. 17797/44 Gkdos. compare War Diary, Part D, Vol. "Materials on the Enemy Situation."

Own Position:

Escort and patrol service in the area of German Naval Command was reopened according to schedule. At present, only fuel is supplied to Leghorn. The mine task southeast of Ancona was carried out by four harbor protection cutters and southeast of Spezia by mineship DIETRICH VON BERN and three mine carrying naval landing craft. Two torpedoboats of foreign construction carried out the mine task "Tor" according to plans northwest of Elba.

In the night of the 8th, constant rocket bomb attacks were reported against our convoys in the area Genoa - Piombino. One naval landing craft was sunk by two direct hits. On the occasion of a rocket bomb attack on a northbound convoy only minor damages were sustained. At noon of the 9th, the torpedoboat of foreign construction TA"27" was damaged by a fighter bomber attack at Porto Ferraio.

3. Area of Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic:

Enemy Position:

At noon, one PT-boat was reported on an east course 20 miles east of Bari and a freighter of 4 - 5,000 BRT, south of Bari.

Five or six patrol boats were observed in the waters Barletta - Vieste.

Own Position:

On the early morning and during the forenoon the harbor Cherso was attacked. Oil tanks and railways were damaged at Mestre and the seaplane base Puntisella was attacked.

9 Jun. 1944

b. Aegean:

On the afternoon of the 8th, enemy submarines sunk three coastal sailing vessels by artillery fire north of the isle of Skopelos. At 0313 on the 9th, the steamer TANAIIS (1545 BRT) was sunk by torpedoes of a submarine south of Santorin. The convoy steamer LOLA was unsuccessfully attacked a little later by an enemy submarine west of Lemnos. During the night of the 8th, Corfu was attacked with bombs and gunfire by an enemy plane flying at low level. A short time after noon, three enemy planes attacked former Italian fortifications near Navarino. Admiral Aegean answered the question of Naval Staff concerning the Crete convoy. For copy of the teletype as per 1/Skl 17768/44 Gkdos compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Furthermore Admiral Aegean informed Naval Staff on the teletype of the special plenipotentiary for the occupied countries of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, Admiral Lewis to Gauleiter Kaufmann dated 7 Jun., concerning the supply conditions in the Aegean. The transport demand of the units concerned can only be met with, if the delay caused by the escort system would be considerably reduced and if the escort protection could be increased. It is feared that unsurmountable difficulties will arise for maintaining or for speeding up the program of new constructions and the repair work in case the financial restrictions are maintained. The report contained furthermore a remark on certain information that the Air Force is constructing high speed ferries in cooperation with Siebel at Rotterdam. The ferries would have a capacity of about 15 tons and would run 15 knots. The Commandant of Creta intends to ask for these ferries for the Aegean area at the Armed Forces, High Command. For copy of the corresponding teletype as per 1/Skl 17757/44 Gkdos compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

c. Black Sea:Enemy Position:

At the second evaluation of photographs of 30 May, mine clearance activities of minesweepers were noticed in the waters northwest of Cape Ehersones.

On 8 Jun., one cruiser of the Kirow-class, 1 light cruiser under steam, 3 destroyers, one of them under steam, besides 1 destroyer and 5 submarines, and several PT-boats and other ships were observed at Batum.

The reconnaissance of Novorossisk revealed many ships and showed that the harbor was again fully used as a naval base. Further results of reconnaissance are of minor importance.

9 Jun. 1944

Own Position:

No special reports. Answering a directive of Naval Staff (see War Diary 8 Jun.), Group South reported that the Admiral, Black Sea already received the order for the PT-boats to start for operations as soon as ship movements or supply traffic or naval supply traffic can be observed at Sevastopol. Regular reconnaissance flights during the day and in the night indicate that so far no naval traffic exists from or to Sevastopol. The harbor is empty. It is impossible for PT-boats to enter the Bay or the harbor of Sevastopol because of our own dense mine barrages.

Situation on the Danube:

No mine laying and no shipping losses were reported on the 9th. On the 8th, three mines were cleared by vessels and three by minesweeping planes.

Naval Staff informed Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff, Navy; the Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters; and the Inspector of Mine Clearance Danube on the number of ships on the Danube as per 1 Jun. according to a report of the Ministry for Transport. For copy of the teletype 1/Skl. I m 17738/44 Gkdos compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV a.

IX. Situation in East Asia:

No special reports.

10 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance

Admiral de Courten remained Minister of Naval Affairs in the new Italian cabinet formed by Bonomi.

Conference on the Situation with Commander in Chief, Navy at 1115.

I. Naval Staff, Quartermaster General:

a. Report on the setting up of a new priority list concerning smoke screen installations. Hydrogenetic plants are ranking in the first place contrary to previous list, followed by the Rhine bridges. Putting up smoke screens at the latter will partly have to be taken over by the Navy.

b. The examination of the possibilities to raise further defense units of the Navy (see War Diary 9 Jun.), as suggested by Captain Assmann, was carried out by General Navy Office as far as the question of arming the units was involved. Commander in Chief, Navy will probably agree to the suggestion. He ordered that in any case all Navy personnel in the occupied areas shall be equipped with arms as fast as possible.

II. Chief of Bureau of Naval Armament reported on the transport of DM-mines which is under way. The mines with clockwork firing device were reported ready.

The Chief, Bureau of Naval Armament asked Minister Speer for an increase in the production of mine clearance equipment. For the time being no emergency program is prepared but it is planned to obtain the same result of putting mine clearance equipment on the priority list.

About 10,000 men of the Navy were made available for the armament industries. 4500 of these were transferred already to the industries.

III. Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Broadcasting Stations issued orders of the enemy to the foreign workers in Germany. It was stated in Churchill's and Roosevelt's declaration in May on naval warfare that the Allied shipping losses during that month had been the smallest since the beginning of the war.

10 Jun. 1944

In a Highly Restricted Circle:IV. Army Position:West Area:

On the landing front a further considerable increase of the enemy fighting forces was noticed. Major parts of now about 16 - 17 big formations were ascertained which mostly belong to the divisions brought from Italy. Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Armies West expects further strong attacks from the area Orne - Vire with the intention to cut off the Cotentin peninsula where new troops have been landed from the air. The beginning of strong attacks has to be expected at the beachhead north of Carentan in order to gain jumping off bases for further operations in the direction of Cherbourg. The centre of enemy attacks on 9 Jun. was in the area southeast of Bayeux and east of Vire mouth. The approach of our own forces was seriously delayed by enemy air activities in spite of unfavorable weather but any major enlargement of the beachhead could be prevented. Between the 6 and 8 of Jun. 175 enemy tanks were destroyed and 1500 prisoners were taken. The enemy's casualties are very high. The fighting west of the Orne is mostly of a defensive nature. The landing area north of Carentan was enlarged by the enemy. For 10 Jun., an attack of our troops is planned in order to prevent a union of the enemy groups east of Vire with the groups north of Carentan. Besides it is planned that the tank infantry command shall make a further advance and that the defenses in the western part of Cotentin shall be reinforced against the enemy's advance to the north.

The Army Group in southeast England and the close combat formations belonging to it did not take part in the operations. Armed Forces, High Command, Foreign Armies West expects that these forces will be directed against Belgium. Four or five airborne divisions are also ready for that operation.

In Italy the fighting is now going on near Tarquinia and in the Viterbo area. In the eastern part of the operation theatre the enemy followed only slowly our retreating forces.

The convoy which entered the Mediterranean on the evening of 8 Jun. included 17 LCT's of the new type. Thus the number of big landing boats brought into the Mediterranean since May reached 40. Apparently the withdrawal of landing devices from the Mediterranean which was reported on several occasions consists at least partly in an exchange of old vessels against new ones. About 250 big landing boats have to be reckoned with in the Mediterranean at present to which figure the uncertain number of those built in the Mediterranean harbors has to be added. In the Nile - delta new troop movements towards the embarking harbors were reported.

10 Jun. 1944

The operation "Roesselsprung" against the center of the Tito-forces was carried out according to plans and most effectively with an successful attack against Tito's headquarters.

No special reports arrived from the Eastern Front.

V. Referring to the laying out of DM-mines off the coast of Juteland as suggested by the Fuehrer, Naval Staff, Chief of Operations Division pointed to the fact that laying out of these mines is useless in areas where the enemy ships probably run only very slow.

The state of affairs at the Coastal Mine A operation was the following on 5 Jun:

3,489 Coastal Mines A have been laid out off the French coast,

2,443 off the Dutch and Belgian coasts,

3,348 off the coast of Denmark and

1,060 off the Estonia coast.

Conference on the Situation with Commander in Chief, Navy at 1800.

In view of the progress the enemy made in both beachheads it has to be admitted that the invasion was successful. The second front has been established. Commander of Chief plans to offer to the Fuehrer all personnel provided for submarine training for the operations on land. The Quartermaster General gave a survey of all existing naval units including their armament equipment. There is still the rest of group B of the emergency units available but with due allowance to the order that no forces are to be withdrawn from the North Sea area. The main problem is the armaments question. In this regard, in the first place the still unarmed members of the Navy in France have to be taken into consideration.

Commander in Chief, Navy informed General Jodl by telephone. The General will find out whether arms for the still unarmed 9,000 men are still available.

Special Items.

I. Concerning the Creta-supply Group South reported that the monthly

10 Jun. 1944

supply of 1,500 tons can be guaranteed with the forces presently on hand, provided that no particularly unhappy events occur. In case of an enemy attack against the Aegean the supply possibilities will become very doubtful. Submarine transport will then become necessary.

During a conference of Group South and Admiral, Aegean with Army Group E it was found out that the statement of the Fortress Commandant, Creta was untrue and is not approved by Army Group E. The Army Group E stated that the current supply demand for Creta is 6,000 tons per month. In order to increase the stocks up to a reserve for 6 months in advance an increase in the transport is necessary. The minimum supply of 6,000 tons as required is only theoretically possible with the available means as also in future delay and losses have to be reckoned with which will probably not be met by the intended reinforcements from outside and by new constructions. The first and indispensable condition, sufficient fighter protection, cannot be granted anymore in the future. An increase of the reserve stocks is out of the question. If the losses continue as before, a further decrease in the transport output has to be reckoned with and even the current supply will then be in danger.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Chief of Shipping and Transport Branch will be asked for his opinion.

II. Naval Staff, Naval Radar Division prepared a term plan for the special weapons Type XXVII, Biber, Neger, Linsen, Meereskaempfer and assault boats. Admiral, Small Battle Units asked to advance the terms of readiness for Type XXVII and Biber in a conference with Armament Supply Office and Central Committee for Shipbuilding. The result of an inquiry of the subject could be expected within three or four days.

III. According to information from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy the Fuehrer said during a discussion of the question of withdrawing divisions from Denmark to the western territories that he would like to withdraw the divisions only when more protection against enemy landings is guaranteed by the laying out by the Navy of mine barrages with new firing devices. Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff, Navy pointed out that quick laying of barrages is impossible and that barrages of even the most effective mines can never prevent a landing. Captain Assmann thought that a report of the Commander in Chief in person is necessary in this case

10 Jun. 1944

as the Fuehrer apparently expects too much from the defensive power of new mines against enemy landings. (Compare War Diary, 9 Jun.).

IV. Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division ascertained other types of British and American landing boats and ships from enemy pictures. This kind of vessels seems to have been still more specialized. A small auxiliary landing boat armed with rockets (LCS (S)), a navigation landing boat (LCN), a landing craft dock-boat (LSD), a landing craft repair boat (LCE) has thus been developed. Besides, amphibian vessels are used. For copy of the report according to 1/Skl 22677/44 Geh. compare War Diary, Part D "Evaluation of Information on Foreign Navies."

Situation 10 Jun.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation in the West Area.

1. Invasion:

In the late evening report of the Allied Headquarters the extraordinary heavy fighting in the Caen area is mentioned. On Cotentin the US troops are said to have crossed the road Carentan - Valognes on several places and to have cut off the railway connection to Cherbourg. Allied air activity in the battle zone is said to have been reduced to a minimum because of bad visibility and stormy weather on 9 Jun. Before dawn on 9 Jun., 4 British, 2 Canadian and 2 Polish destroyers were said to have cornered a formation of German destroyers for fight off Quessant. One German destroyer is said to have been hit by a torpedo. The British destroyer TARTAR, the report says, suffered some damages and losses of the crew. After morning dawn of 9 Jun., German PT boats reportedly made a new attempt to penetrate from east and west into the fighting area.

In the forenoon report of 10 Jun., it was reported that US troops took Isigny. In spite of unfavorable weather the disembarkment was continued uninterruptedly. British and Canadian troops sustained heavy

10 Jun. 1944

German attacks in the Caen area. The German destroyer which was forced ashore on the Brest peninsula was wrecked by new attacks.

According to further reports the center of the fighting on Cotentin about 15 miles south of Cherbourg was kept under uninterrupted artillery fire from naval units. According to an Exchange-report the Allied airborne troops had considerable losses. The supply was impeded by the worsening of the weather and by the rough sea. The Allied formations required more forces than they had at present in order to be able to penetrate further into the country.

In accordance with the reports available the course of events as seen by Naval Staff was as follows.

At 0200, 2nd PT boat Flotilla reported that it left Boulogne at 2230 with four boats steering west. The Flotilla will enter Cherbourg probably at 0500.

At 0225, Naval Command, Bretagne reported about 80 - 100 rocket bombs and several bomb hits on the destroyer Z"32".

At 0342, 5th and 9th PT boat Flotilla reported that they had left Cherbourg with ten boats at 2330 and that the flotillas will enter the harbor at dawn.

At 0344, Naval Command, Channel Islands stated in his situation-report of 0300 that everything is quiet on the sea and in the air.

At 0420, Radio intelligence reported on an intercepted radio report about the locating of three of our PT boats at 0020 in 354° and ten miles off Point Barfleur. After that, radio locations of our own PT boats were transmitted.

At 0421, Commander PT boats reported a convoy in Grid Square 3627 lower right steering South and transmitted.

At 0458, the enemy recognition signal, the character "S", to the PT boats operating on the sea.

At 0610, the Admiral, Atlantic Coast pointed to the enemy's selections of the landing place Vire and asked Group West to lay a "Blitz" barrage from the southern end of Quiberon to Aaralo.

At 0630, radio intelligence transmitted further intercepted sighting

10 Jun. 1944

reports which had been given by enemy vessels, formation commanders, group leaders or by units between 0900 and 0220 about German PT boats in BF 3659, 3536, 3617, 3562 and 3664.

At 0630, Radio Monitoring Service transmitted an intercepted report of a British unit at 0317 on the sighting of three destroyers in 227°, 16 miles off Cape Antifer on a course 270°, apparently our 5th Torpedo boat Flotilla.

According to further results of radio monitoring, these so-called destroyers had carried out an attack at 0323.

At 0720, Group West gave its situation report of 0600. According to the reports, 5th Torpedo boat Flotilla had a fight with enemy destroyers at 0240 in BF 3659.

8th PT boat Flotilla, starting from Ostend, reconnoitered Grid Square AN 8747 upper right corner up to AN 8728 center. The PT boats S"180" and "190" returned after they had hit ELM/A mines. The flotilla then went back to Ostend because there was danger of an invasion in the Dutch area.

5th and 9th PT boat Flotilla entered Cherbourg with eleven boats at 0330.

The center of many radar locations in the landing area was north and east of Cape Barfleur and north and west of Cape de la Heve. One big or many small targets were located in the waters twelve miles north of Alderney steering a south course at 2300 on 9 Jun.

Two enemy convoy fairways marked by buoys were noticed on the length 0°55 and 0°35 West.

At 1000 on 9 Jun., one landing boat carrying a truck and ten men drifted ashore at Etretat and was seized.

Enemy planes attacked the submarines U"985" in BF 5585 at 0419, U"621" in BF 2765 at 0214 and U"608" in BF 7355 at 0414.

At 0140, parachutists were reported near Valognes and 20 kilometers south of Cherbourg.

At 0730, Commander 5th Torpedo boat Flotilla sent a battle report on the fight with enemy destroyers and gunboats in the night of 9 Jun. The flotilla left Le Havre in western direction

10 Jun. 1944

at 0030 with three boats for a torpedo attack and, at 0230, had attacked four destroyers from a distance of 50 - 60 kilometers without being noticed. The destroyers sheered off and opened fire. After action astern on a southeast course, the flotilla met six enemy artillery PT boats which were at the rendezvous position of our minesweepers. They were supposed to lay mines. During the ensuing short distance pursuit fight bombs of attacking fighter bombers fell on the enemy formation. Three enemy boats were damaged by our fire for certain, one of them was heavily damaged. The flotilla entered Le Havre.

At 0855, Naval Command, Normandy reported about 54 transporters, landing and escort vessels on a south course at a distance of 30 kilometer east to southeast of Barbleur at 0700.

At 1105, Radio Monitoring Service transmitted an intercepted radio message to Portsmouth about the sighting of five minelayers at 0720 in BF 3649 and of three minelayers in the same position at 0738.

At 1125, Naval Command, Normandy reported that Army Coastal Battery 4/1261 hit an enemy destroyer six kilometers off Quineville. The destroyer was burning and the crew left the ship.

At 1200, Naval Staff, Special Weapons Division reported to Naval Staff, Operations Division and to Group West:

1. Admiral, Special Weapons will soon move to the west the first parts of the flotillas of special weapons which are now being set up. The first operations will be carried out with mostly improvised equipment, as the flotillas are not yet filled up to war readiness and as the coastal organization which is planned is not perfectly ready.

2. One group of the K-Flotilla 211 (Linsen) under Lieutenant Commander Kolbe will be ready to start with motor transport from the Luebeck area about the 11th of Jun., and one further K-flotilla 361 (Neger) under Lieutenant Krieg about on 17th of Jun. from the Thuringen area.

3. Captain Boehme will take over responsibility for the preparation, administration and control of the operations of the K-flotillas under his command, as "Operations Staff Boehme of the K-formations". For operational purposes he will be under the command of Group West.

10 Jun. 1944

4. Operations Staff Boehme will arrive on the evening of 11 Jun. by land transport at Operations Staff, Group West in order to report and to receive directives about the operation possibilities of the K-flotillas. The Operations Staff Boehme will be in constant wireless communication with the submarine flotillas to make changes of the destination possible also during the transfer.

At 1308, Admiral, Channel Coast reported on the situation at 0400:

ship assemblies continued to be observed off the Orne mouth. Off St. Vaast, a larger formation as well as enemy minesweeping activities were observed. The ship traffic as a whole did not indicate landings on other places.

At 1325, Group West regarded landing possibilities for the night of 10 Jun. as favorable everywhere.

At 1440, Naval D/F Detachment Bretagne reported that a British unit reported a submarine in 3616 BF at 0455.

At 1507, Naval Command, Baltic reported that the small arms including ammunition which had been wanting at the 3rd Manning Regiment were sent from Kiel on 25 May. In case the arms have arrived in the meantime the withdrawal of the recruits will not be necessary anymore.

At 1507, Group West ordered Naval Command, Normandy to withdraw immediately all female personnel by all means becoming available.

At 1542, Naval Command, Normandy reported further and most dense ship concentrations off St. Vaast and Isle Marcouf beyond the range of our batteries and naval artillery fire directed against our batteries. In this area, one more gun was put out of action at Battery 4/1261. Battery Marcouf is still in our hands.

At 1624, Commander, Submarines West reported that the courier connection between Brest and Paris was cut off.

Commanding General, West will decide on the use of wire communications limited to important messages.

Group West was informed by radio intelligence of an intercepted request for close combat fighters against the radar station and a 15.5 centimeter gun before dusk at Cotentin, south of St. Vaast, and transmitted this information.

10 Jun. 1944

At 1756, to Naval Command, Normandy.

At 1940, Group West reported on our own activities during the night of 9th Jun:

a. 5th Torpedo boat Flotilla carried out a torpedo attack with 18 torpedoes against four destroyers without being noticed by the enemy. As the enemy turned unexpectedly towards our ships all torpedoes missed the targets. It has already been reported on the fight with artillery PT boats.

b. 5th and 9th PT boat Flotilla did not succeed in breaking through the destroyer barrage north of Barfleur. Many fights took place with destroyers. The Second Group of 5th PT boat Flotilla had a long fight with motor gunboats.

c. 2nd PT boat Flotilla sunk one steamer of 900 BRT and one of 1,500 BRT in the northern part of the Seine Bay. The flotilla was prevented by destroyers to proceed to Cherbourg and entered Le Havre at 0545.

d. 4th PT boat Flotilla in the central Seine Bay sunk a strongly protected ferryboat of about 5000 BRT (sunk by the PT boat S"188"), and two steamers of 2,000 BRT each (sunk by the PT boats S"172" and S"187" respectively). Grid Square 3653 left margin center was fouled with 24 mines of the LMB/M1 type.

e. The Blitz-barrage 21 west of Fecamp, the Coastal Mine A barrage south of Somme mouth and Blitz-barrage west of Cherbourg were laid out. The transfer of the torpedo boat T"24" and of 2nd Minesweeping Flotilla from Brest towards the East was given up because the ships were soon located by the enemy.

Furthermore Group West reported its intentions for the night of 10 Jun. as follows:

a. 2nd and 4th PT boat Flotilla will start for mine operations in BF 3658. The center of operation will be in the southern half of the grid square. Later the flotilla will carry out torpedo operations in the eastern part of the Seine Bay, and then proceed to Boulogne because of the lack of torpedoes at Le Havre. The total consumption of torpedoes of our forces at Le Havre was 60.

b. 5th and 9th PT boat Flotilla will operate with torpedoes in the western part of the Seine Bay.

10 Jun. 1944

c. 8th PT boat Flotilla will patrol Hoofden.

d. 5th Torpedo boat Flotilla will be kept in immediate readiness for a possible artillery operation against targets in the neighborhood of the harbors as not enough torpedoes are available. The supply of torpedoes was set in motion.

e. The forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West will lay out Blitz-barrages west of Fecamp and east of Cherbourg as well as Coastal Mine A barrages west of Dieppe, Southside of Seine mouth and Vauville Bay. The transfer of the torpedo boat T"24" and the remaining boats of 2nd Minesweeper Flotilla was given up as it is impossible to carry out the movements without being noticed by the enemy air force and as there is no chance of breaking through under these conditions.

Besides, Group West reported:

a. At 1300, one battleship, three cruisers, many transporters, landing boats and escort vessels under strong fighter protection could be observed.

b. At 1300, a low level air attack was carried out against the radar station at Cape de la Heve. "Mammut" was damaged by a direct hit.

c. At 0320, constant explosions were heard northwest of Zeebruegge, possibly in the barrage area AN 8767.

d. No shipping traffic was observed by reconnaissance planes in the eastern part of the Channel, in the Thames mouth and in the southern part of the North Sea.

At 2020, Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy transmitted the following:

"The Fuehrer ordered preparatory measures for the withdrawal from Norway of 89th Infantry Division which will have to be transported as fast as possible to the west Area in case of a further deterioration of the situation. The home staff of the forces in Scandinavia got orders correspondingly and reported that the first transport group can start on 13 Jun. at the earliest. The orders for carrying out this movement are not yet given. Further developments of the situation will undoubtedly necessitate the execution of this plan. Special priority seems therefore necessary for the preparing of transport facilities."

10 Jun. 1944

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch will provide transport and will inform Naval Command, East which has sufficient escort forces at its disposal.

At 2028, Naval Command, Channel Islands reported the sinking of two harbor guard boats by bomb hits. Carpet bombing was carried out by the enemy on both sides of Naval Anti-Aircraft Battery Granville. Two planes were shot down.

Naval Command, Normandy reported that salvage of the destroyer Z"32" was impossible. The boats commando will salvage materials as much as possible.

At 2050, Group West transmitted a report of Naval Command, Normandy of 0315. According to the report the batteries between Barfleur and Marcouf were repeatedly under heavy artillery fire from the sea. The third gun of the Battery 9/1261 was put out of action by a direct hit and one gun was damaged. Our own artillery damaged enemy minesweepers near the isle of Marcouf. The Battery 2/1261 was in the hands of the enemy since 1500 on 9 Jun. During the day, the Battery Marcouf was under artillery and trench mortar fire, while tanks were present in the vicinity. No reports came in about the Batteries Longues and 1/1260. At 0830, the Battery 3/1255 opened fire on smoke-shell boats off the Orne mouth at a distance of 18 kilometers. The targets sheered off.

At 0714, the Battery 4/1261 fought enemy destroyers off Quineville with the results already reported. One more gun of Battery 4/1261 went out of action at 1508.

At 2050, Group West ordered Port Captain at St. Malo, Chief of Naval Transport and F.O.I.C. Western Defenses to dispatch 30 torpedoes with heads and warhead pistols to Cherbourg by sea transport instead of land transport.

At 2124, Naval Command Normandy reported:

The Battery 10/1261 is fighting against ship concentrations east of Ravenoville. Hits on one ship have been observed as well as an explosion cloud. The position Marcouf was given up.

At 2222, Naval Command, Channel Islands reported enemy air attacks on two minelayers off Jersey. One boat was damaged. Two of the

10 Jun. 1944

enemy planes were shot down. Furthermore an attack on the radar station Jersey and Battery 5/1265 as well as on the harbor Sark was reported. No damages occurred.

Group West ordered that the keyword "Phoenix" has to be used since 1200 on 12 Jun. as the keyword "Hydra" became known to the enemy.

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division informed the front command stations by excerpts on the enemy situation as seen by German Air Force, Operations Staff, West on 9 Jun. According to that information all of the twin-engined formations of the heavy British Combat Corps, all the fighter bomber and fighter formations of the 1st and 2nd British Close Combat Corps and all British formations available for transport operations are almost completely kept back. Only British and American four-engined and American twin-engined bomber formations as well as fighter and fighter bomber forces of the VIIIth and IXth American Air Fleet have been observed so far. Only three Allied airborne divisions have been recognized during landing operations from the air. For copy as per 1/Skl. 17923/44 Gkdos. compare special file "Invasion 10 Jun."

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division informed the front command stations on the naval situation in the Channel Invasion area by a teletype as per 1/Skl. 18011/44 Gkdos". For copy compare the same special file. According to that statement the approach of the loaded ships, kept in readiness for the invasion, started from the harbors of the Bristol Channel. The ships withdrawn are being replaced by other vessels from the ship assemblies in places farther north. According to reliable reports of our agents on 9 Jun. many landing devices are kept in readiness perfectly camouflaged in the Thames mouth and farther north. Referring to the fight of the destroyers on 9 Jun. in the western part of the Channel the participation also of the cruiser FROBISHER was reported lately.

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division informed the front command stations about the situation on land in the invasion area and on the enemy forces kept in readiness in England. For copy of the corresponding teletype as per 1/Skl. 22212/44 Geh. compare special file "Invasion 10 Jun."

Naval Command, East reported that the following movements begun on the evening of 9 Jun:

28 officers and 2,150 men are on their way from Kiel to Epinal in two transport trains.

23 officers and 1,229 men are moving from Gdynia to Epinal and

32 officers and 1,117 men from Swinemuende to Bruxelles.

10 Jun. 1944

2. Enemy Position in the other Theatres:

In the area of 19th Group, strong reconnaissance activity was ascertained over the Bay of Biscay. In the rendezvous area, nine locations were made of British units in various positions.

Planes of 19th Group reported on eight sightings of submarines.

3. Own Position in the other Theatres:

Atlantic Coast Area:

Twenty three mines were cleared, nine of these off Brest and seven off St. Nazaire. The submarine U"821" was attacked by four enemy planes near Quessant and sunk after it was forced to come to the surface following a long submarine hunting because its accumulators were exhausted. A rescue boat which was sent for help was also sunk by an enemy plane. Four minesweepers left Brest in order to rescue the crew.

In the night of 9 Jun., minelaying by planes was observed off Brest and Lorient. At 0730 on 10 Jun., the aerodrome Navtes and the railway bridge north of the town were attacked.

At 1810, the minesweeper M"4010" was hit by a mine and slightly damaged off Brest. According to a Reuter report, British naval forces rescued 140 men of the destroyer ZH"1".

Channel Waters:

Ten mines were cleared in the Channel area. Twenty two patrol positions were occupied.

At 0730, the enemy dropped bombs behind the harbor of Boulogne, in the area of Battery Creches 1 and in the area Vimereux - Le Touquet. No damages or losses occurred.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

North Sea:

10 Jun. 1944

One mine was cleared north of Terschelling and one was cleared north of Ameland. Several explosions were heard from the Dutch coast in the night of 9 Jun.

The convoy 1253 from Helder to Borkum was completed. A mine-sweeper group and 13th and 20th Patrol Flotilla had contact with enemy PT boats from 0142 to 0256. The Patrol boats "1314", "2020" and "2021" were hit by torpedoes and sunk. At 0240, enemy PT boats were sighted at the position Rom.

The Wielinger fairway was fouled with mines by 32nd Minesweeper Flotilla according to plans. It is intended for the night of 10 Jun. to lay out the "Mining and Barrage Command - Barrage VII" provided that the weather improves.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Position:

In the area of 18th Group, 27 planes were observed in operation. No concentration centre of the enemy's reconnaissance could be made out.

According to British broadcasts on 2 Jun., the VICTORIOUS and the FURIOUS as well as five auxiliary aircraft carriers took part in the six aircraft carrier operations that were carried out during the last two months against our convoy traffic off the Norwegian coast. The planes have a larger range now. Therefore the ships can remain in a safety distance off the coast.

2. Own Position:

On the evening of 8 Jun., an enemy radio detachment of nine Norwegian men and three women was arrested south of Hammerfest. Considerable code material and deciphering devices were seized.

Thirty two ships were escorted to the north and twenty four to the south.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Position:

10 Jun. 1944

The usual minesweeping, patrol and supply activities were observed by radio intelligence and air reconnaissance in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland and in the Kronstadt Bay.

In the morning hours strong Russian air attacks were directed against the front area at the Karelian front, against fighter bases, traffic and communication installations without causing much damage.

2. Own Position:

Minesweeping duties were carried out in the Baltic Sea Entrances by 26 boats, and by 29 boats and 2 minesweeping planes in the Baltic Sea. Two mines were cleared southwest of Falsterbo, one each in the Pomeranian Bay and off Danzig. The German steamer EMSSTROM (4,517 BRT) hit a mine and was reported sinking southwest of Falsterbo.

New acts of sabotage were reported from Svendborg. One boat of the 2nd Mining and Barrage Training Flotilla and the torpedo carrier "51" sunk following an explosion in the interior of the ships. The engine was destroyed by an explosion at the Sperrbrecher under construction Nr. 190. An infiltration of water took place on the fishing steamer ZWICKAU following an explosion.

Drastic measures are necessary against the sabotage activities which are repeatedly occurring particularly at Svendborg.

3rd Torpedo boat Flotilla is on its way to Frederikshavn. The flotilla will be allotted to the 8th Coastal Patrol Force for escort service with the troop transports at 1200 on 11 Jun.

In the area of the Commanding Admiral, Eastern Baltic, eight naval ferry barges with four minesweepers left Loksa at 1200 in order to reinforce the Seeigel VII b - barrage.

Off the Esthonian coast 143 more Coastal Mine A, 76 of these with snag line, were laid according to plans.

Convoys and transports were carried out in the entire Baltic area without incidents.

No reports came in from Lake Peipsi.

10 Jun. 1944

V. Submarine Warfare.

Halifax repeated the SOS-call of the Portugese motorship MARIONELA from CC 8490.

It is planned that one of our submarines will meet "Tanne" on 22 Jun. It can be expected that "Tanne" will enter a harbor of western France by the end of Jul.

During the night, four boats without "Schnorchel"-equipment were on duty on the Biscayan positions. One boat with "Schnorchel"-equipment is on its way to the Channel.

The submarine U"984" returned because of damages sustained during an air attack. The boat fired three Zaunkoenig-torpedoes on three destroyers in BF 2769 on 7 Jun. and probably sunk one destroyer.

The submarines despatched for submarine hunting off the Norwegian coast are now attached to Group "Mitte". The submarine U"294", belonging to this group, twice reported an air attack in AF 8456 on 10 Jun. Two boats of Group "Mitte" left for the Atlantic.

No special reports arrived from the Northern Waters.

Special Items:

The position of a Commander, Submarines "Mitte" was established at Naval Command, East for conducting submarine warfare in the North Sea towards north up to the line Shetlands - Stadlandet. Commander Submarines "Mitte" will act according to directives or orders respectively of Naval Command, East.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

West Area:

During daylight 360 enemy planes entered Belgium and Northern France and attacked the defense zones in the area Boulogne - Fecamp.

Constant penetration of enemy planes, lasting the whole day, were reported in Western France concentrating on troop movements and on our positions in the landing area. Stronger attacks were carried out against the towns Le Mans, Laval, and Rennes, and further attacks were directed against aerodromes at Nantes, Conches, Evreux and Dreux.

10 Jun. 1944

In the night of 10 Jun., 125 enemy planes entered Belgium and Northern France without attacking whereas several hundreds of four-engined planes attacked a railway station north of Orleans and the stations at Versailles, Martelot and Acheres in western France.

Our own operations during daylight were conducted by 247 bomber and fighter planes. Thirteen enemy planes were shot down at a loss of also thirteen on our side.

During the night of 9 Jun., one destroyer and one passenger ship of 8 - 10,000 BRT was sunk and one troop transporter of 6,000 BRT damaged by eight of our planes attacking naval targets in the Seine Bay.

In the night of 10 Jun., 56 of our planes were in operation against St. Mer Eglise and twelve planes of the Me 110-type attacked isolated targets in southeast England. Besides, 70 of our night fighters were operating and shot down eleven four-engined enemy planes. Three planes of the Ju 88-type were lost.

Reich Territory:

No special events were reported during daylight. In the night of 10 Jun., 60 mosquitoes attacked Berlin dropping some mines and several high-explosive bombs. Twenty planes fouled with mines the waters around Heligoland. Four enemy planes, coming from the south, penetrated to the area of Wiener Neustadt without attacking.

Mediterranean Theater:

On 9 Jun., the enemy carried out 950 air operations over the Italian front area. One Spitfire was shot down during these operations. Traffic targets in central Italy were attacked by 150 twin-engined planes and fighter bombers. Six or eight planes were reported during the night of 9 Jun. presumably on minelaying operations in the waters around western Creta. Forty seven planes were supplying the bandits in the Balcans.

Nine planes of the Ju 87 type successfully attacked the supply traffic near Civitavecchia. Fifty two planes of the Ju 88 type were operating against naval targets off Nettuno. Hits were reported on six ships. Besides, the coastal section Anzio - Nettuno was attacked with bombs. Furthermore, reconnaissance flights were carried out.

10 Jun. 1944

East Area:

On 9 Jun., 301 operations of our own planes, 410 operations of enemy planes as well as the shooting down of two planes were reported from the Eastern Front. Nine courier planes were observed during the night of 10 Jun., on flights between England and Sweden.

VII. War in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea.

1. Area of Naval Group, West:

Enemy Position:

At 1945 on 9 Jun., 19 freighters and 2 tankers left Gibraltar for the Atlantic. At 2325, a convoy of 14 freighters and 6 corvettes passed the straits towards the west.

According to an agents report, the RICHELIEU and one French cruiser was in the waters about 40 nautical miles west of Mallorca for gunnery practice at 0700 on 31 May.

At 0915, an emerged submarine was reported off Toulon.

Own Position:

At 1132, the submarine chaser 6078 was sunk by a submarine's torpedo off La Ciotat.

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Position:

According to radio interception reports, a convoy formation was put under air alarm in the Taranto area from 0100 to 0145 on 10 Jun.

Photographic reconnaissance of Taranto revealed that 5 (apparently) cruisers, one of them in a floating dock, 14 freighters and 4 steamers as well as 25 - 30 smaller war vessels were in the harbor at 0230. Bigger landing vessels could not be made out.

During the final evaluation of the Biserte - reconnaissance of 9 Jun., as compared with 26 May, showed an increase in the merchant shipping and tanker tonnage as well as a slight increase in the landing devices. All together one (presumably) battleship, 2 cruisers, 16 destroyers,

10 Jun. 1944

4 PT boats, 5 auxiliary war vessels, 6 LST, 121 landing boats, 30 landing stages, 2 coastal defense cruisers as well as about 140,000 BRT of merchant ships and 16,500 BRT of tankers were made out. According to air reconnaissance in the night of 9 Jun., 20 landing boats and 2 destroyers were on a western course in the eastern approaches of the Bonifacio Narrows, and 2 destroyers, 2 patrol boats and one merchant ship were observed west and southwest of Civitavecchia.

In the Anzio - Ischia area, 1 light cruiser was located in 300°, 40 miles west of Ponza and 2 destroyers, 2 merchant ships and one patrol boat were observed on a north northeast course, 20 miles northwest of Ponza.

According to radar observations and sighting, enemy PT boats were made out receding in the waters north of Elba. Apparently, two boats were destroyed when hitting mines in the barrage "Widerhaken".

Own Position:

In the night of 9 Jun., the torpedo boat TA "27" capsized when going alongside at the pier following the reported hit at short distance. The torpedo boat of foreign construction TA "30" transferred the major part of the crew to Spezia and had contact with ten enemy PT boats northwest of Elba.

The radar station Zanca on the isle of Elba was put out of action by rocket-fire. No damage was caused by enemy air attacks on Benedetto and Carrara. The strike at the Ansaldo Dock-Yards in Genoa is still continuing. Further attacks were reported on the radar set in the Leghorn area. German Naval Command, Italy especially pointed to this fact.

German Naval Command, Italy reported on 9 Jun., that the quarter-master staff is moving from Montecatini to Levico. The rest of the staff will follow on 11 Jun. Besides, German Naval Command, Italy reported that the posts of the Sector Commandant, Civitavecchia and of the Naval Harbor Master, St. Stefano were abolished.

3. Area of Naval Group, South:

a. Adriatic

Enemy Position:

10 Jun. 1944

At 2100 on 9 Jun., three medium sized warships were steering on a north course off Guilianova.

Towards midnight, a bombardment was observed that probably came from these vessels.

According to air reconnaissance, 5 freighters, 45 small boats and sailing vessels were in Comiza, and 15 small boats and sailing vessels in the harbor of Lissa.

At 0130, the enemy landed with ten boats on Solta but apparently withdrew again as our troops had no contact with the enemy when they swept the island. Destroyers opened fire on Solta at 0300.

Two gunboats attacked two of our infantry landing boats at 0245 near Papatna Bay. The boats suffered damages and entered Doli. The attacking gunboats were warded off by an Army mountain battery.

Radio Monitoring Service intercepted reports of planes at 0935 on the sinking of a vessel in the area about 35 nautical miles west of Pola. Direct reports on this event did not come in yet.

At 2024, one torpedo boat and two PT boats were reported from Cape Linguetta on an east course in southern direction west of Valona.

Own Position:

One combat engineer landing boat and two infantry landing boats transported a company of grenadiers to Solta as reinforcements. One boat was damaged during the voyage.

In the night of 10 Jun., 7th PT boat Flotilla will operate in the area Solta - Lissa.

On 9 Jun., considerable damage was caused on traffic installations and fire broke out in gasoline dumps on the occasion of a heavy air attack on Mestre. At 0930, on 10 Jun. a heavy air attack was carried out against Trieste. Damages in the dockyards and in naval stocks are small but the armament factories are destroyed to a large extent. The hospital ship INNSBRUCK sunk

Aegean Sea:

Enemy Position:

10 Jun. 1944

Particularly strong submarine activity was noticed during the last days in the northern part of the Aegean. Eight submarines were reportedly sighted within two days.

Own Position:

In the night of 9 Jun., coastal defense boats were attacked with bombs between Milos and Cape Sunion. No losses occurred. The steamer LOLA, coming from the Dardanelles, entered the Piraeus. The war transporter MANNHEIM hit a mine and was damaged and was towed to Piraeus. On the evening of 9 Jun., sabotage action with an adhesive mine was carried out at Piraeus on a moveable port-crane for coals. One crane was damaged. No further events of importance were reported.

c. Black Sea.

Enemy Position:

The activity of naval air forces is still considerable. Minor traffic of small vessels along the eastern coast was observed by radio monitoring as well as five PT boats and two motor gunboats in the Crimean waters up to the northern part of the eastern coast.

Three large and three small motor gunboats, eight PT boats and three small armed vessels were observed in Yalta by air reconnaissance on 7 Jun.

In the night of 8 Jun., sound locators of the German Air Force located six minelaying planes operating off the Roumanian coast between Constantza and the mouth of the Danube. For the first time, enemy planes were operating from Odessa. Two planes were located west of the Crimean and one plane in the Gallipoli area on 9 Jun.

Own Position:

As an air attack of U.S. planes on Constantza was expected for the night of 9 Jun., according to intercepted radio messages, all vessels in sailing conditions were ordered to leave the harbor till 2200 on 9 Jun. The harbor area was covered with smoke screens from

10 Jun. 1944

the sea. The enemy formations which had started for the attack gave up their advance near 2300 because of bad weather and landed at Kiev. No further events of importance were reported.

Group South was ordered to begin immediately with the sea transport of naval landing craft taken to pieces to the Aegean. The steamers ARDEAL and ALBA JULIA are provided as transport.

Situation on the Danube:

No minelaying by planes was reported from the estuary of the Danube on 9 and 10 Jun. The situation report of the other sections of the Danube did not come in up to now.

VIII. Situation in East Asia.

No special reports came in.

11 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance.

Pravda made the following remark on the second anniversary of the Russian-US-agreement of 11 Jun. 1942: "Experience proved that no problems exist amongst the Allies which cannot be solved by mutual understanding. The enemy's only hope of defense is to prolong the war and to be able to create a fissure among the Allies. These hopes are spoiled by now. The reason for the failure of the enemy's plans in the political sphere is the same as the cause for his unsuccessful conduct of the war. It is his under-rating of the adversary. Just as he previously underrated the strength of the Red Army he now underrates the inner strength of the coalition."

Radio Moscow quoted a further article of the Pravda describing the Allied landing in France as a political defeat for Hitler because the agreement of the Teheran-Conference on mutual coordination of the Allied operations was now actually put into practice.

Conference on the situation with Commander in Chief, Navy at 1045.

I. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division reported: The Emergency Transports to the western area have increased unbearably. Quartermaster General decided on priority in the following way: 1. mine transports, 2. transports for the Admiral, Special Weapons, 3. transports especially for the invasion area. All other requests for transport have to wait.

II. Chief, Bureau of Naval Armament composed a list of personnel as per 10 Jun. in order to find out which of the Navy personnel is still available. Based on this information, Bureau of Naval Armament thinks that delivery of alarm units grade A (15,000 men) and furthermore of 10,000 men will be possible. Commander in Chief, Navy stated that the personnel side of the question is settled now. A decision of the Fuehrer is necessary on the armaments problem and whether the Baltic sarea can be stripped of arms to such an extent that all emergency formations can be armed properly. It is impossible to take away arms from the North Sea Station.

III. Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Intelligence Division reported on differences between the Anglo-Americans and de Gaulle which have to be expected as soon as the Allied will reoccupy French soil.

11 Jun. 1944

A further report was given on the Swedish note concerning the shooting down of a Swedish reconnaissance plane. For details compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

IV. Army Position:

East of Vire further territory was lost to the enemy in the direction towards St. Lo.

About 17 - 18 enemy formations are probably in Northern France at the moment. Forces of the 21st Army Group of about the same strength are still in England. The group of forces stationed in southeast England amounts to 27 large formations. Reinforcement of this group by further eight formations is possible. Twelve of our own divisions are operating or on the march against the enemy forces so far landed. Further five formations will be brought to the scene. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff is of the opinion that landings from the air in the rear of the German lines have been of a decisive importance for the enemy's successful landing operation which partly caught our troops unaware as apparently they had not been warned in time. Apparently the enemy suffered heavy losses during the landing from the sea, which would have failed without the landing from the air. The center of our activity is in the Seine Bay area and it is our intention to destroy the enemy forces east of the Orne mouth and to reconquer the area of the enemy's penetration near Tilly, to prevent the cutting off of Cotentin and to try to take back certain points in the landing beachhead. As the enemy is bringing in reinforcements quickly and constantly, a further worsening of the situation has to be reckoned with considering our own reserves of forces. The approach of our own forces suffers considerable delay by constant fighter bomber attacks and by the destruction of bridges (almost all of the bridges over the Seine from Paris down to Rouen) are destroyed.

Reports came in from the entire Eastern Front that the Russians have completed their preparations for an offensive and that formations were moved closer to the front.

No reports came in from Italy.

V. High Command, Navy, Underwater Obstacles Branch reported on the production of DM-mines. The comparatively small production is a result of the planning of mine production for offensive warfare and

11 Jun. 1944.

the fact that only a limited number of mines could be laid out. The question is now under consideration how the production can be increased quickly and at whose expenses this can be done. The total production of mines of all kinds is slowly increasing.

VI. In a highly restricted circle, Commander in Chief, Navy discussed the problem whether it would be justified to call 6th PT boat Flotilla from the Gulf of Finland as good chances of successful operations existed in the Seine Bay.

Conference on the Situation with Commander in Chief, Navy at 1800.

I. According to information coming from the Fuehrer Headquarters, the Reichsmarshall blamed the Navy for having advocated the theory that no heavy warships would participate in a possible landing operation on the Channel coast and that it prevented the laying out of D'-mines off the French coast. Commander in Chief, Navy thought a discussion of such questions as not appropriate for the moment. He will not nevertheless, refrain from making clear his own opinion to the Reichsmarshall at the next opportunity.

According to a communication from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, the Fuehrer pointed again to the necessity of quickly laying out D'-mines off the Dutch, Belgian, Western French and Danish coasts. Captain Assmann declared again that it is impossible, generally to protect all these areas already in view of the large number of mines required for the purpose.

II. The Fuehrer let the Commander in Chief, Navy know that, in case the Navy intends to use new weapons during the defense operations against the invasion, contrary to previous orders, no special permission of the Fuehrer is necessary anymore. Therefore orders for the use of new weapons can be issued by Commander in Chief, Navy.

III. Certain doubts were voiced at the Fuehrer's Headquarters whether the destruction of the harbor Cherbourg will be carried out effectively and in due time.

11 Jun. 1944

Naval Staff therefore issued the following directive to Group West:

"New orders clearly show that Cherbourg is the first aim of the invasion. This major port which is of great importance for the enemy should be given up only after complete destruction in case the loss of that place becomes unavoidable. A sudden beginning of the attack has to be expected. Because of the wide extent of the harbor measures will have to be prepared in time in order to guarantee absolutely the destruction of all important facilities. Receipt of this directive has to be confirmed."

IV. Naval Staff, Chief of Operations Division reported about a request of the German Foreign Office - as transmitted by Ambassador Ritter - that the Naval Staff's directive concerning the combatting of enemy submarines in Spanish territorial waters should be suspended for the time being until it is possible to clear the political side of the problem in accordance with the Spanish authorities.

Commander in Chief, Navy does not intend to expose our ships to enemy attacks without the possibility to fight back because of Spanish territorial rights. The a/m directive is in the line of this opinion.

Furthermore, Naval Staff, Chief of Operations Division reported on the incident of the war transporter KASSFL in the Bosphorus. When the ship was examined by Turkish officials it was discovered that depth charges and guns packed in boxes but declared as engine parts were hidden under the coal load. Most likely there would not have been any reason for stopping the ship if the real contents of the boxes had been declared openly as transporting of arms, as cargo of merchant ships is not forbidden. This affair will be pursued furthermore. For details compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

Special Items:

I. Commander in Chief, Navy promised the Commanding Admiral, Submarines that the former Norwegian torpedo boats as well as the mine-sweeper M"552" will be treated with special consideration as these boats carry special equipment which is of great importance for submarine training. Naval Staff allotted these torpedo boats to Naval Command, North (compare War Diary 10 Jun.). The Naval Command is particularly eager to have these vessels' because they are of special value

11 Jun. 1944

for reinforcing the defense of the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses North because of their high speed and fighting power.

Naval Staff, in accordance with the decision of Commander in Chief, Navy - ordered that the Norwegian torpedo boats are given back to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines under the condition that upon order they will again be placed at the disposal of Naval Staff within 24 hours. Naval Command, East was ordered to submit a suggestion for putting under the operational command of Naval Command, North about four vessels possessing combat power which became available by operation "Colani" and which will be ready for war within measurable time.

II. Commander, PT boats informed Naval Staff by way of notice of a suggestion made to the Fleet concerning the plans for building up the PT boat forces in accordance with the requirements for "Wallenstein". According to the suggestion:

- a. 2nd PT boat Training Flotilla including the TSINGTAU will be moved back to Swinemuende in order to make possible the change of the crew on 15 Jul.
- b. 10th PT boat Flotilla, after being reinforced up to at least six newly constructed vessels, will replace 2nd PT boat Training Flotilla in the Skagerrak simultaneously ceding the four attached boats to PT boat Training Division.
- c. Together with the movement of 10th PT boat Flotilla to the Skagerrak and the return of 2nd PT boat Flotilla to Swinemuende one PT boat Training Flotilla with seven boats will be placed in "Wallenstein" readiness according to the decision of the Commander, PT boat Training Division and depending on how far the training has been completed.
- d. The remaining boats of the two PT boat Training Flotillas will be at the disposal of Commander PT boat Training Division unrestrictedly for training purposes.
- e. If circumstances permit, a reduction of the present degree of readiness of 10th PT Boat Flotilla is asked for in order to carry out preparatory training for the operation in the Skagerrak.

Naval Command, East reported that it agreed in principle. Naval Staff transmitted its approval to the suggestions made by Commander PT boats

11 Jun. 1944

to the Fleet; Naval Command, East and Commander, PT boats and authorized Naval Command, East to order the loosening of the degree of readiness at 10th PT boat Flotilla in order to complete the training.

III. Armed Forces High Command examined the requests of 416th Infantry Division for the operation "Tanne" as submitted in the middle of May. The demand for combat troops cannot be complied with. The division in its present form will be able - according to the opinion of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff - to carry out its task in the "Tanne" case. It is impossible and seems to be unnecessary to rearm the Artillery Battalion 416 with German guns. The formation is well equipped with ammunition. The enlargement of the Engineer Company 416 into an engineer battalion was refused already several times. The company was reinforced already.

Naval Staff transmitted the decision of Armed Forces High Command to Naval Command, East.

IV. Armed Forces High Command, Field Economics Department reported:

"Up to now construction plans were given also to the Japanese only under the condition that the development of the devices concerned was completed up to the stage of readiness for front use. The Fuehrer decided now that the Japanese have to be informed in the most thorough way also on intended developments and that he does not wish to camouflage or to deceive the Japanese about our newest developments. Plans on such developments are also released for delivery to Japan on demand of the Japanese. The delivery of the plans will then be made in accordance with the usual procedure for patent licence."

V. In "Short reports on the enemy situation" No. 6/44, Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division reported on experiments with a new attacking tactic for planes against submarines on the operations of large size bombers in the submarine warfare, on the role of scientific research in the anti-submarine defense, on planes carrying rocket missiles, on the U.S. strength of aircraft carriers, on the activities of the Italian fleet, on personnel questions in the navies of England and America, etc. For copy of the report as per

11 Jun. 1944

1/SK1. 22615/44 Geh. compare War Diary, Part D, Vol. "Materials on the Enemy Position".

Situation on the 11 Jun.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation in the West Area.

1. Invasion:

According to the reports of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Forces No. 9 and 10, coastal planes cooperated with naval forces of the Fleet in a strong offensive against submarines which threaten to attack the communication lines in the invasion area. On the morning of 10 Jun. strong operations of the air force were resumed in order to assist the forces on land and on the sea. New landings of troops were carried out during 10 Jun. Allied warships continued their operations on the eastern and western flank of the landing area in order to assist the land forces. During the night of 9 Jun., Allied light coastal forces had contact with German PT boats on several occasions. The Allied suffered neither damages nor losses.

The following course of events was shown by the reports coming in at Naval Staff:

At 0010, Reich Security Central Office transmitted an agent's report of 9 Jun. stating that so far the first bunch of ships and parts of the third bunch of ships concentrated in the harbors of the Irish Sea and which later moved closer to the scene, were engaged in the invasion. The third bunch of ships assembled in the harbors of northwest Scotland was reduced by 150,000 BRT. A new bunch of ships was being built up since May in the ports of the Irish Sea totaling about one million BRT.

At 0013, 3rd Coastal Patrol Force was ordered by Commanding Admiral, Defenses West to take into consideration the using of 24th Minesweeper Flotilla as carriers and escort for the torpedo transport from St. Malo to Cherbourg as ordered by Group West.

11 Jun. 1944

At 0126, Naval Command, Normandy reported with reference to the directive of Group West concerning the withdrawal of female personnel that the major part of the Female Naval Auxiliaries was used as Red Cross nurses because of the great number of wounded. They will be moved on the next available occasion.

At 0234, Naval Command, Normandy reported on the position on 10 Jun: Further transports arrived east of Cotentin under heaviest escort protection. The batteries 4/, 10/, 9/, 3/, 6/ and 7/1261 went successfully into action against ship assemblies. One destroyer was sunk and a cloud resulting from an explosion was observed on a transporter. On the evening concentrated bomb attacks and fire of naval artillery were directed on our battery positions on the eastern coast. Battery Marcouf was given up at 1900, upon order of the Commandant of the Coast Defense Sector. The rest of the crew, 80 men of the original total of 297, including 30 Italians and 50 engineers are taking part in the defense on land. Many troops were withdrawn from the fortress Cherbourg resulting in an increased danger for the Navy batteries and strong points. The flare gun of Marcouf joined the defenses of the land front and the moving of the batteries 5/, 6/, 7/, and 8/1262 to the land front is under preparation.

At 0326, Naval Communication Officer, Cherbourg reported that five PT boats entered the harbor at 0255.

At 0400 Naval Command, Channel Islands reported everything quiet on the sea and no special events.

At 0544, Naval Communication Officer, Cherbourg reported that three PT boats entered the harbor at 0350.

At 0624, Naval D/F Detachment Bretagne transmitted in addition to the report of 0359 on an enemy PT boat unit: "alongside a burning PT boat". (Transl. note: German text is not clear).

At 0710, Group West reported on the situation at 0600:

8th PT boat Flotilla entered Ostend at 0400. The coming in of the other PT boat flotillas has not been reported yet. 5th Torpedo boat Flotilla was not operating. Forces of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses West: The Blitz-barrage west of Fecamp, the Coastal Mine A-barrage on the southern side of the Seine Bay and half of the Blitz-East barrage were laid out.

11 Jun. 1944

Very many locations were made in the supply traffic in the Seine Bay and northeast of Antifer. A patrol of presumably destroyers was located northwest of Sept Iles between 0230 and 0400.

Minelaying by planes is suspected off Le Havre in the direction 250° about five miles from the southern mole and by twelve planes north of Cherbourg.

At 1830 on 10 Jun., 229 vessels in the area west of Le Havre were counted for certain at Cape de la Heve.

At 0726, Naval Command, Channel Islands reported five enemy destroyers on an easterly course in the upper right corner of BF 2639.

At 0756, Location Reporting Station, Normandy reported that the radar stations Aromanches, Percee and radar location battery at Longues went out of action. The radar set at Aromanches was blown up by the crew. Radar station Pernelle was again put out of action by artillery fire. The other sets are still operating.

At 0959, Naval Command, Normandy reported the arrival of new transports east of Barfleur in which one troop transporter of 20,000 BRT could be discerned.

At 1120, Naval D/F Detachment, Bretagne reported on the results of radio monitoring during the preceding night. Reports on PT boats were intercepted constantly in the Seine Bay as well as on a fight lasting from 0049 till 0312. At 0327 one boat sunk and another boat was torpedoed by a plane. At 0359 one Allied PT boat was reported laying alongside a burning German PT boat.

According to a preliminary report the operations of our naval forces had the following results in the night of 10 Jun: 2nd PT boat Flotilla sunk an ammunition steamer of 3 - 4,000 BRT and another steamer of 2,000 BRT out of a south-going convoy in the eastern part of the Seine Bay. 10th Mine-clearance Flotilla with six boats had a fight with gunboats when carrying out a mine task close to the coast west of Trouville. Many hits could be observed on the enemy boats which sheered off behind a smoke screen. Damages and losses on our side were small. The armor was not perforated by the four centimeter shells. The laying out of Coastal Mine A could not be carried out as intended because exact navigation was impossible owing to the mist.

11 Jun. 1944

When entering Le Havre the flotilla cleared one mine. Subsequently, 4th Mineclearance Flotilla cleared eight mines near the rendezvous buoy.

5th and 9th PT boat Flotilla sunk two landing ships of 3,000 BRT each and one destroyer in the waters east of Barfleur and torpedoed one more landing ship and a medium sized steamer. The sinking of these ships could not be observed. The PT boat S"136" did not return up to now. Probably she is lost entirely. The report on the intercepted radio message of 1120 possibly refers to this boat.

Reports on the operations of 4th PT boat Flotilla did not come in yet.

In view of the extraordinary possibilities for PT boat operations in the Seine Bay, the following directive was sent to Naval Command, East: Group West, Commander PT boats with copy to Naval Command, North, Commander, Minesweepers East, Fleet and Commanding Admiral, Defenses West:

"6th PT boat Flotilla will move immediately to the western area for operations in the landing area."

At 1420, Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Army sent the following teletype to Commanding General, Armed Forces, West:

"1. Upon the order of the Fuehrer all command offices were again reminded that the Fuehrer has strictly ordered that all troops encircled in bases, points of resistance and other defense positions have to fight on the spot up to the last man and up to the last shot in order to make possible a German counter offensive and the reconquest of the coastal line. It is forbidden to give any orders for a break through towards the rear.

2. Commanding General, Armed Forces West will order officers especially qualified for the task to investigate the quickness and efficiency of the alarm system especially in the area of 15th Army Corps and in the rear of the Army Corps. It has to be made certain that in case of enemy landings, which inevitably have to be reckoned with, everybody up to the last soldier, clerk, Senderfuehrer and worker of the German Labor Service etc. will be ready within the shortest time to fight personally against enemies landing from the air and that these men will be organized for this purpose, properly armed and prepared.

11 Jun. 1944

3. The Assault Gun Training Brigade 902 has to be moved to the area north of Valognes in any case in order to prevent a breaking through of the enemy to Cherbourg. The brigade shall not be used for operations in the southern section."

Naval Staff informed the Naval Commands North, Norway, East; Group South; German Naval Command, Italy; Fleet correspondingly.

At 1607, Naval Command, Normandy reported that the situation on the land front north of Montebourg became worse. One emergency company of the port captain was already sent to the land front of the fortress. The Naval Command asked for the permission to put the harbor protection flotilla out of service and to use the formation made of the crews as a reinforcement of the land front. The protection of the coastal waters will be carried out by 46th Minesweeper Flotilla.

At 1629, Naval Command, Normandy asked for the permission of Group West and Commanding Admiral, Defenses West to foul with mines the waters off the eastern approach to Cherbourg with the LMF-mines and BMC-mines available and to have the minelaying carried out by the Atlantic coast forces of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses West presently available in Cherbourg.

At 1630, Reich Security Central Office transmitted an agent's report from the same sources which provided the correct prediction of the landing at Cherbourg, that a landing operation will be staged in the area Dieppe, Abbeville, Touquet on 14 or 15 Jun. Simultaneously, U.S. air-borne divisions would land in the Amiens area in order to take this town.

At 1631, The Admiral, Channel Coast approved the request for the putting out of service the harbor protection flotilla Cherbourg.

At 1743, Naval Command, Channel Islands reported that two patrol position boats had contact with enemy PT boats in BF 3548 at 0226 and that, at 1146, Battery Armes stationed on Alderney fired upon an enemy destroyer which sheered off.

At 1820, Group West regarded landing possibilities as possible everywhere in the night of 11 Jun.

At 1820, Group West pointed to the fact that forces of the Navy are

11 Jun. 1944

insufficient for the protection of the food, ammunition, and material stocks at Laon, Vigny, Samaur, Lyon and other places where strong uprisings broke out and that the Commanding General, Army in France refused to take over responsibility for the protection of these naval stocks with reference to an order of the Armed Forces High Command to the effect that every service of the Armed Forces is in charge of the protection of its own installations. The Group asked for immediate allotment of 1,000 men of the emergency formations of the Navy. Naval Staff, Organization and Utilization Branch, Quartermaster Division insisted that Commanding General, Army in France would have to accept responsibility for the task. A corresponding request to Armed Forces High Command was despatched by telephone at 1920 with the remark that the Navy has put at the disposal of Commanding General, Armed Forces West already more than 30,000 men for defense purposes.

At 1859, Admiral of the Channel Coast withdrew his approval to the employment of the crews of the harbor protection boats upon order of Naval Group West. The crew of the flotilla has to reinforce the naval units engaged in the harbor destruction work, as far as it is not required for its proper tasks, and then to be moved to Naval Command, Channel Islands.

At 1835, Group West transmitted a report on the situation at 1600. According to this report, 4th PT boat Flotilla fouled BF 3658 with 24 LMB/M 1 - mines during the night of 10 Jun. as was planned. The flotilla entered Boulogne because of lack of time after a fight with destroyers. It has been reported already on the activities of the other naval forces.

Half of the Blitz-barrages XXII west of Fecamp and Blitz East, east of Cherbourg were laid out. Besides, the Coastal Mine A - barrages in the Vauville Bay and off the Somme were laid out.

Furthermore, the Group reported on the intentions for the night of 11 Jun:

- a. 5th and 9th PT boat Flotilla will operate with torpedoes west of the Seine Bay.
- b. 2nd and 4th PT boat Flotilla will operate with torpedoes off Boulogne towards west and back to Boulogne.
- c. 8th PT boat Flotilla will operate at Hoofden.

11 Jun. 1944

d. 5th Torpedo boat Flotilla will operate off Le Havre if sufficient torpedoes are ready for at least two boats.

e. The forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West Blitz barrages will be laid out off the Somme and west of Ostend, as well as Coastal Mine A barrages south of the Seine mouth in case a diversion is possible by the operations of 5th Torpedo boat Flotilla. Otherwise the Coastal Mine A-barrage will be laid out off Etretat. The 6th Artillery carrier Flotilla will push along the coast towards Barfleur as a diversion movement for the PT boats. 24th Minesweeper Flotilla will transport torpedoes from St. Malo to Cherbourg.

In addition to that, the Group reported that the area of La Pernelle is kept under heavy artillery fire from the sea from beyond the range of our batteries. The radar station was seriously damaged. Dense traffic from the north and south and the arrival of considerable transport space was reported east of Barfleur.

At 2040, Group West reported:

On the evening of 10 Jun., concentrated bombing attacks were carried out combined with artillery fire upon our battery positions on the eastern coast. At 1600 on 10 Jun., the Battery 9/1261 fired upon a landing vessel approaching St. Vaast and hit a fully loaded boat which was towed away. The battery was fired upon by two cruisers since 1715.

At 2030, The Battery 10/1261 opened fire on ship concentrations east of Ravenoville and observed clouds of an explosion on a transporter. Also the Batteries 3/, 6/, 7/1261 took part in the action against the naval targets. The destroyer set in flames by Battery 4/1261 sunk.

At 2100, The light cruiser EMERALD fired upon land targets at the Orne mouth. At 0540 on 11 Jun., the Battery 3/1254 fired on targets located off Le Havre. Bombs were dropped on the Battery Stella Plage at 1710 and on Battery 10/1245 at 0735. The area La Pernelle was heavily fired upon from beyond the range of our batteries. One gun of the Emergency Anti-Aircraft Battery Hamburg went out of action by premature burst.

At 2353, Group West informed Commander, Submarines West of a report

11 Jun. 1944

of Commander, PT boats that the main line of enemy convoy traffic is leading from the center of the upper margin of BF 4635 on 0° 45 W. in a southwest direction.

2. Enemy Position in Other Theatres:

In the area of 19th Group, 63 planes were counted in operation. Again many submarine sighting reports of these planes were intercepted.

Three British units were located in different positions in the rendezvous area.

3. Own Position in Other Theatres:

Atlantic Coast Area:

The laying of mines by planes off Brest and Lorient was observed during the night of 9 Jun. One submarine was escorted on its way out. Thirty two ELM/A - mines were cleared. In the area Lorient, one enemy plane was shot down by 26th Minesweeper Flotilla during an anti-submarine search.

Channel Waters:

Ten enemy mines were cleared in the Channel area. Several heavy fighter bomber attacks were directed against the patrol-boat group off Boulogne causing only minor material damage and slight losses.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

North Sea:

1. Enemy Position:

According to air reconnaissance, 60 medium size freighters partly loaded with tanks were seen at 1200 between Dover and Dungenes steering southwest with high speed and setting up smoke screens when our planes approached.

11 Jun. 1944

At 1203, 20 small vessels were seen 10 - 20 miles south of Dungenes steering a northeast course in a widely deployed order and, at 1213, 20 heavy LCT and 10 smaller ships about 20 nautical miles south of Hastings on a northeast course. The convoy carrying tanks on deck was again sighted between 1500 and 1600 between Dover and Deal.

2. Own Position:

The patrol positions in the German Bight were occupied. The convoy service was carried out according to plans. Four mines were cleared off the Elbe mouth.

During the night of 10 Jun., about 15 planes were observed laying mines in the area Heligoland, Wangeroog and Elbe mouth.

In the morning hours, three enemy planes entered the Ost-Friesland area and fired on passenger trains. One plane crashed down.

The Sperrbrecher "167" was hit by several mines and suffered casualties near Borkum.

The tanker ELLEN, on her way from Bremen to Nordenham, was attacked with gunfire by enemy planes flying at low altitude at 0915. Casualties occurred.

The patrol positions off the Dutch coast were occupied according to plans. Three mines were cleared north of Vlieland and off Scheveningen.

8th Patrol Flotilla and 11th Minesweeper Flotilla had contact with the enemy at 0035 and 0207 in AN 8291 and 8523 respectively. Both attacks were repulsed. The destroying of one enemy vessel is supposed to be destroyed. No damages occurred on our side.

The motor minesweeper R"110" sunk with heavy casualties of the crew because of an explosion close to the ship off Scheveningen.

Ymuiden reported one explosion each at 1040, 1045 and 1112 in the direction 360° and at a distance of five kilometers.

The convoy 1255 Hook - Elbe started with four steamers at 2230.

Norway. Northern Waters:

11 Jun. 1944

1. Enemy Position:

In the area of 18th Group, 20 planes were located. According to intercepted radio messages, three Russian destroyers and the commander flotilla's ship BAKU were at sea. At 2020, an urgent key-word was sent to all Russian submarines in the operation area.

2. Own Position:

Minor exchange of fire was reported in the area of Petsamo at noon of 10 Jun. Isolated enemy planes entered the area Vardoe - Sognesjoen - Stavangeo Sola - Askevold.

Thirty-four ships were escorted to the north and forty-three ships to the south.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Position:

According to a report of Naval Command, Juteland, outgoing Danish vessels were forced by British planes to return to Esbjerg. From 9 till 11 Jun. 186 fishing smacks entered Esbjerg while 116 are still at sea. Also 70 - 80 % of the fishing flotillas of Thyboroen, Hirtshals and Skagen returned to the harbors.

According to Swedish radio reports, mines were laid out in the territorial waters between 5715 north and 5825 north. Obligatory pilot service was installed also for the Swedish outer territorial waters. Patrol boats are stationed north and south of the area of suspended navigation.

On 10 Jun., the Commander in Chief of the Swedish Navy gave a vigorous warning by radio to the Swedish fishermen in the Skagerrak waters not to enter the Skagerrak areas which Germany had declared as fouled by mines. The vessels were requested to keep well east off the line declared as boundry.

In the Gulf of Finland, according to Finnish reports, three convoys of minesweepers, barges, and other vessels were sighted by air reconnaissance on a west course in the waters north and northeast of Schepel during the night of 10 Jun. In the early morning, seven patrol boats were located north of Seiskaari and six mine clearance boats west of Schepel. The patrol boats north of Seiskaari had contact with Finnish naval forces.

11 Jun. 1944

The island fortresses and Kronstadt fired a total of about 1,250 shells on the Finnish land front.

Hochland reported at 1254 that a plane laid two mines.

2. Own Position:

Minesweeping duties were carried out in the Baltic Sea Entrances by 29 boats and by 37 boats and 6 minesweeping planes in the Baltic Sea. One mine each was cleared in the Fehmarn Belt, in the Pomeranian Bay and in the Danzig Bay.

It is planned that 13th Landing Flotilla will leave Swinemuende for Aalborg with 13 naval landing craft, three heavy artillery carriers and five command boats as soon as the weather has improved.

In the area of Commander, Minesweepers, East the patrol service was carried out according to plans. First section of the reinforcement of the Seeigel VII b-barrage was laid as scheduled. The formation carrying out the task entered Reval in order to take over new mines. The Finns laid the barrage Pisten I in the southern exit of the Koivisto - sound according to plans.

On Lake Peipsi, a convoy of engineer landing boats for Mehikorna was carried out according to plans as well as a further convoy to Ranna - Pungerja and Mustve.

The patrol line was occupied.

V. Merchant Shipping:

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division reported on the strength and schedule of the transit traffic of the Mediterranean convoys. For copy of the report including map according to 1/Skl. 18012/44 Geh. compare War Diary, Part D, Vol. "Material on the Enemy Situation". The transit traffic is connected with the fixed turn of the supply traffic for the Mediterranean, i.e. the convoys go to Alexandria - Port Said and start anew from that point. No reliable information is available on the strength of the transit traffic.

11 Jun. 1944

VI. Submarine Warfare:

In the night of 11 Jun., the submarine U"333", shot down a Sunderland in BF 5554. The boat was damaged and had to return.

The submarine U"737" is provided for the laying out of the meteorological land apparatus on Bear Island.

The submarine U"980" of Group "Mitte" reported an air attack in AF 7626.

According to intercepted radio messages, a submarine attacked enemy ships off the harbor entrance of Casablanca on 4 May. One ship was damaged. Presumably this was a mine-success of the submarine U"455". The barrage was laid out in April 1943.

VII. Aerial Warfare:

West Area:

The enemy entered Belgium and northern France during the day with 700 planes attacking aerodromes and one transport train. One aerodrome and one railway bridge was attacked in western France. One hundred and fifty enemy planes were reported in the landing area. During the night of 11 Jun. an aerodrome in Belgium was attacked by 130 enemy bombers. Strong enemy formations entered the area Fecamp - Le Havre - south of Paris - Rennes without attacking.

During the day 44 of our own planes were operating in free lance operations in the landing area. Eight enemy fighters were shot down at a loss of five of our own planes. Fifteen planes of the Ju 88 type attacked naval targets in the Seine Bay during the night of 11 Jun. In western France, 78 of our night fighters were on operation. They lost two machines.

Reich Territory:

Three enemy fighters entered the Ost-Friesland area during daylight. Trains were attacked with gunfire near Emden. During the night of 11 Jun., 60 Mosquitoes attacked Berlin.

11 Jun. 1944

Mediterranean Theater:

In the forenoon hours of 10 Jun., the enemy again attacked Ploesti and aerodromes in the Bucarest area with 100 planes coming from Italy. The damage caused in Ploesti was slight. Four planes were destroyed on the ground at the aerodromes and two were damaged. 191 of our defense fighters shot down 44 enemy planes and anti-aircraft gains brought down three planes. Seven planes were lost on our side.

A strong formation of four engined enemy planes entered north Italy, coming over the Adria from Foggia under fighter escort and carrying out strong attacks on Mestre, Trieste, Ferrara and Ancona. At Mestre, the oil harbor and railway installations were heavily damaged. The dockyards at Trieste were hit. Power and water supply were put out of action. Three planes of the Me 109 type were destroyed and eleven heavily damaged at the aerodrome of Ferrara. The naval ammunition dump at Ancona was blown up. Our defense carried out by 56 fighters resulted in the shooting down of one plane. Anti-aircraft guns shot down one other enemy plane. One hundred and sixty twin-engined enemy planes and fighter bombers attacked traffic targets at Rimini, Firenze, Siena, and Perugia as well as the aerodrome of Perugia where four planes were destroyed on the ground and three others were damaged. In the front area 900 operations of enemy planes were accounted.

In the night of 10 Jun., an attack on Brod was carried out by 50 twin-engined enemy planes. An ammunition train was hit at the station. Our own planes carried out reconnaissance flights on 11 Jun.

East Area:

On the Eastern Front, 259 operations of our planes and 396 of the enemy were reported on 10 Jun. Four of our planes were lost and one enemy plane was shot down.

In the night of 10 Jun., 110 of our bombers attacked the station at Shmerinka.

On 10 Jun., the Russians had about 1,000 planes operating in the area of the main defense line northwest of Leningrad. One aerodrome was attacked unsuccessfully. Finnish fighters shot down 15 enemy planes.

11 Jun. 1944

VIII. War in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea:

1. Area of Naval Group, West:

Enemy Position:

Gunnery practice of the cruiser RICHELIEU as reported on 10 Jun. was not confirmed.

At 1645 on 10 Jun., the Italian cruiser MONTE CUCCOLI entered Gibraltar coming from the Atlantic and left for the Mediterranean at 1830 on 11 Jun.

Own Position:

The patrol boat 7004 was attacked by a submarine torpedo at 0510 off Monaco. The torpedo did not explode.

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Position:

According to air reconnaissance, under bad sighting conditions, seven or eight convoys of eight or ten vessels each were reported between Palermo and Messina. At 0300, one cruiser was steering a west course 50 nautical miles north of Palermo. Many ships were reported in the harbors from Catania up to Siracusa.

Photographic reconnaissance of Biserte did not confirm the presence of a battleship.

Own Position:

The tug MONFALCONE was sunk by a torpedo of a PT-boat southeast of Leghorn. One enemy plane each was shot down during the air attacks on the torpedo boat of foreign origin TA"27", on Porto Ferraio as well as on the radar station Leghorn.

During the night of 10 Jun., an ammunition and mining and barrage dump east of Genoa was raided by bandits.

Castiglione and Portoglione were blown up according to plans.

11 Jun. 1944

3. Area of Naval Group, South:

a. Adriatic:

Enemy Position:

According to photographic reconnaissance, one warship (length 110 m), 10 small war vessels, 1 LCT, 1 tanker, 9 freighters and about 50 more small vessels were in the harbor of Bari at 0302.

At 2000, our reconnaissance planes sighted three cruisers of the LEANDER class on a north-west course off Ortona.

Own Position:

On the occasion of the enemy air attack in the afternoon of 10 Jun. on the base Solta one of our ammunition dumps exploded.

An unrecognized enemy fired on Battery 8/621 at 0222. Our battery answered the fire.

Three PT-boats which are not ready for war entered Lussin-Piccolo at 0215 on their transfer move to Pola. They will continue the voyage in the evening. At the southern end of Silba the boats sighted a destroyer which they could avoid by sheering off and setting up a smoke screen. An air attack on the boats with bombs had no success.

On 10 Jun., one auxiliary sailing vessel was sunk in the harbor of Cherso and another one was sunk off Albona. In the night of 10 Jun., an air attack was carried out against the harbor Lussin.

7th PT-boat Flotilla will leave Split in the evening in order to protect a tanker convoy to the north in the area Drvnik and Zlarin and to control the enemy traffic at Lissa.

b. Aegean Sea:

On 10 Jun., one enemy submarine each was reported northwest of Porto Kufo and east of Bali Bay respectively.

11 Jun. 1944

Three of our coastal patrol boats carried out as scheduled a mine operation on the southeast coast of the Peloponnesus. Two mines were blown up on 10 Jun. at Coos.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Position:

No special reports.

Own Position:

The submarine U"20" left Constanta for a war cruise.

In the forenoon a heavy air attack was directed against Constanta. No damages were reported from the harbor.

Position on the Danube:

On 11 Jun., the laying of mines by planes was reported between Kilometer indicator 1532 and 1561. Near kilometer indicator 1789 a lighter hit a mine and was totally lost. A total of seven mines was cleared on 10 Jun.

IX. Situation in East Asia:

According to a report of the military attache at Tokio on the situation in the Pacific the pressure of the U.S. has considerably decreased within the last weeks. Especially the operations of planes were on a reduced scale. The enemy's interest seems mainly to be directed against Europe but withdrawal of forces seems not likely.

The operations on Biak came to a temporary deadlock. Both sides try to bring in reinforcements. Parts of the U.S. forces were withdrawn from the outer islands Uqi and Woendi. The three existing aerodromes at Mokmer and Bosnik are still in Japanese hands. In view of the high strategic importance of the islands everything possible will be done to defend them. The Army Chief Command South moved to Manila.

12 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance

The Swedish Foreign Minister declared, according to a Transocean report, that one has to reckon with the possibility of Allied operations in northern Europe. Therefore Sweden has to be prepared all eventualities. Sweden was determined to maintain her neutrality.

Commander in Chief, Navy went to the Fuehrer Head Quarters. Naval staff, Chief of Operations Division is accompanying Commander in Chief, Navy.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff at 1115.

I. During the report on the situation, Chief Naval Staff ordered again to approach the German Air Force, Operations Staff for reconnaissance of the explosions which were reported continuously off the Dutch coast.

The following requests of Naval Staff will be transmitted to German Air Force, Operations Staff, Operations Branch, Navy:

a. It is absolutely necessary to obtain information on the strong explosions continuously reported from the outer Dutch coastal waters. Reconnaissance operations are urgently required. Nothing should be neglected as the enemy's activities are probably connected with the next landing operation. High responsibility is laid on the shoulders of the Air Force.

b. In connection with the situation of the submarine warfare on 12 Jun. the following was reported: "An aircraft carrier is supposed to be in the coastal waters west of Hammerfest. At 0444 Several waves of planes were reported in an altitude of 5,000 meters over Soeroy flying for Alta."

Naval Staff regards a base made of an aircraft carrier group as possible in the Spitsbergen Fjords. Reconnaissance operations are very necessary in order to make counter action possible if occasion arises.

II. Naval Staff, Quartermaster General:

a. After the calling up of 5,000 men of degree of dispensability A for the emergency units the remaining rest of this

12 Jun. 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

class still totals about 10,000. It is not planned, at the moment to call up further emergency formations in the area of Naval Command, North. In case Armed Forces High Command requires the remaining 10,000 men of degree of dispensability A, it is planned to call up 5,000 men of degree of dispensability B at area of Naval Command, East. Naval Command, East was ordered to prepare the necessary plans and to spare as far as possible the cadets and personnel trained as submarine replacement.

The strength of the manning divisions in the west area comes to nearly 40,000 as some of the soldiers in spite of having complete their training were not yet called up whereas the new recruits have arrived already. The shortage of small arms is also due to this surplus of strength. The Navy has placed at the disposition of Commanding General, Armed Forces, West already more than 30,000 men for defense purposes.

b. concerning the cancellation of leave.

III. Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Intelligence Division: Kalinin sent the following message to the King of England on the occasion of his birthday:

The landing of the allied British and American forces, which began in the area of northern France will Guarantee that the combined blows of the Allied against Hitler - Germany will bring about a complete and definite victory over our common enemy."

Statements were published at Moscow about the war supplies received from USA, Great Britain and Canada.

By a Document of the Moscow Foreign Trade Department covering several columns, Tass published in every detail the official figures of armaments, raw materials essential for the war, industrial equipment, and food delivered up to the present to the Soviet Union by USA, Great Britain and Canada.

In the preliminary remarks it is pointed out that the war supplies of the U.S. are carried out under the lend and lease bill, the supplies from Great Britain being sent in accordance with the mutual agreements of 16 Aug. 1941 and of 27 Jun. 1942 and finally the supplies from Canada being authorized by the law on the mutual assistance amongst the Allied. Canada's supplies for the Soviet Union were on account of the British obligation up to 1 Jul. 1943 and only after that date were they delivered on Canada's own account.

The total delivery these three countries made to the Soviet Union amounts roughly to the following:

12 Jun. 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

1. The USA supplied the Soviet Union during the time from 1 Oct. 1941 until 30 Apr. 1944 with altogether 8.5 million tons of armaments, raw materials important for the war, equipment for the armament industries and food for a total sum \$ 5,357,000.

Of the war material shipped from America, 7.4 million tons equivalent to the value of \$ 4,612 million arrived in the Soviet Union (Transl. note: the comparative figures \$ 5,357,000 and \$ 4,612 million are apparently rendered incorrectly). 112 million tons of these arrived in the years 1941 and 1942, 4.1 million tons in 1943 and 2.1 million tons in the first four months of 1944. On May 1944 there were 68,400 tons still on their way.

During this period the following important war materials were supplied besides others: 6,430 planes (plus 2,442 planes delivered on account of the British obligations), 3,734 tanks, 10 minesweepers, 12 large submarine chasers, 82 torpedo cutters and small submarine chasers, 206,771 motor cars, 5,397 other motorized transport cars, 17,017 motor cycles, 3,168 anti aircraft guns, 1,111 guns, 991.4 million rounds of ammunition and 879,000 tons of powder.

As for raw materials of special importance for the war the following was delivered amongst others: 476,000 tons of high quality aircraft fuel (aircraft gasoline and iso-octane), 99,000 tons of aluminum and duraluminum, 184,000 tons of copper and products made of copper, 42,000 tons of zinc, 65,000 tons of nickel, and 1,160,000 tons of steel and products made of steel.

Various industrial equipment for the sum of \$ 257.2 million as well as 2,199,000 tons of food were delivered.

2. Great Britain delivered to the Soviet Union in the time from 22 Jun. 1941 until 30 Apr. 1944 a total of 1,150,000 tons of armaments etc. Of these, 319,000 tons were war materials shipped as war auxiliaries without being taken into account, 815,000 tons were raw materials, industrial equipment and food. Goods for an amount of 83.8 million pounds were supplied in accordance with the credit delivery agreement of 16 Apr. 1941, and a large quantity of goods (2,000 tons for 6.5 million pounds) was shipped right at the beginning of the war against cash payment.

Of the shipped goods 1,041,000 tons reached the Soviet Union; 158,000 tons of these arrived in 1941, 375,000 tons in 1942, 364,000 tons in 1943 and 144,000 tons during the first four months of the current year. On May of this year there were still 44,000 tons of goods on the way to the Soviet Union.

Amongst the important war supplies there were: 3,384 planes (besides the 2,442 planes delivered by the USA on account of

12 Jun. 1944

the British obligations), 4,292 tanks, 12 minesweepers, 5,239 motor cars and armored tractors, 562 anti-aircraft guns, 548 anti tank guns, 17 million rounds of shells, 230 million rounds of ammunition, 173,000 tons of powder, 214 wireless sets for directing artillery and 116 devices for detecting submarines.

The following raw materials essential for the war were supplied: 103,500 tons of caoutchouc, 354,000 tons of aluminum, 334,000 tons of copper, 29,400 tons of tin, 47,700 tons of lead, 7,400 tons of zinc, 2,700 tons of nickel and 254 tons of cobalt.

3. Canada sent to the Soviet Union since the beginning of the war until 1 Jul. 1943 for British account and subsequently until 30 Apr. 1944 on her own account altogether 450,000 tons of armaments, raw materials important for the war and food (wheat and flour) for a total of 187.6 million Canadian dollars. Of all the goods shipped from Canada 365,000 tons reached the Soviet Union. 125,000 tons of these arrived in 1942, 124,000 tons in 1943 and 106,000 tons in the first four months of the current year.

Besides other things, Canada delivered to the Soviet Union: 1,178 tanks, 842 armored tractors, 2,568 trucks, 827,000 shells, 34.8 million rounds of ammunition and 5,000 tons of powder. As for raw materials important for the war, a total of 363,000 tons of aluminum, 9,100 tons of lead, 32,500 tons of copper, 6,700 tons of zinc and 1,324 tons of nickel were despatched. 208,600 tons of food mainly consisting of wheat and flour were supplied.

On 1 May of this year, 66,000 tons of various goods were still on the way to the Soviet Union.

IV. The Chief Naval Staff draws the attention to extraordinary measures of the enemy which may indicate operations in the Juteland area: increased mine clearance activity in the North Sea, pressure brought upon Swedish and Danish fishermen, an increase in the sabotage activities. Although Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Armies West does not expect that the enemy will dissipate his forces to a great extent and regards the area Boulogne - Dieppe as further target of landing operations, one has nevertheless to reckon with offensive activities with limited objective on other places.

V. Position of the Army:

West Area: The enemy began an offensive over the Orne towards east and is pushing strongly in southwestern direction towards St. Lo. Carentan is said to be taken by the enemy. The landing

12 Jun. 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

beachhead at Cotentin was not enlarged in any substantial degree.

On our side all reserves are being rushed to the scene even from as far as the Toulouse area. With the exception of 1st SS. Tank Division in the Belgian area eleven emergency divisions are being moved. The beachhead is now large enough for one army group.

General Air Force, Operations Staff, Intelligence Branch reckons also with an enemy attack against the area Loulogne - Dieppe followed by an advance on both sides of the Seine in the direction of St. Quentin / Paris.

Finland: On the Carelian front the Finnish lines were withdrawn to the old frontier positions of 1939 under strong enemy pressure.

The significance of this offensive is strongly emphasized by the Russians.

In Italy, some of the formations of 14th Army are badly hit by the enemy air force. It will be tried to transfer material to Genoa.

On 9 Jun. San Stefano was occupied by the enemy, according to enemy reports.

Commander in Chief, Navy returned in the evening to the Command station with Naval Staff, Chief of Operations Division coming back from the Fuehrer Head Quarters.

A written statement contains details on the conference with the Fuehrer. For copy as per 1/Skl I b 1750/44 Gkdos, Chfs. compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII.

Special Items.

I. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division ordered that, in accordance with the decision of Commander in Chief, Navy, the Submarine Division has also to reduce the fuel consumption by 33 1/3 % as compared with the month of May. A full supply of fuel will be allotted to Commanding Admiral, Submarines.

II. Naval Staff, Quartermaster General ordered the combining of the command of the coast and of the coastal waters in the area of Admiral, Baltic Countries as follows:

12 Jun. 1944

"A. 1. The designation "Admiral, Baltic Countries" will be changed, effective immediately, into Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea (Commanding Admiral of the Eastern Baltic Sea). He will be Commanding First Officer on land and on sea and his command station will be at Reval. No change will take place with regard of his being attached to Naval Command, East.

2. Commander, Minelayer East will be changed effective today, into a Coast Patrol Force and will be called 9th Coast Patrol Force.

3. The Commandant of the Sea Defenses of Libau will be changed from today into Commandant of the Sea Defenses of Latvia.

The port captain Riga who was independent up to now will be placed under the command of Sea Commandant Latvia.

B. The formations will be placed under the command of Admiral Eastern Baltic Sea in the following way:

1. Naval forces of the Fleet: Only for operations (Distribution of the forces upon order of Naval Staff).

2. 9th Coast Patrol Force: completely (The subordination of those sections of the naval forces of the Fleet which were, for operations, under the command of Commander, Minelayers East will be changed in accordance with (1.).

3. Formation on land: completely (provided that no orders for technical subordination exist as in the case of some technical branches)."

III. Our embassy at Ankara wired on 9 Jun. "The head of the diplomatic mission of a friendly neutral power had a long discussion with Mr. Steinhardt during which it was said with great certainty that the Russians would launch their offensive near 15 Jun. with one strong group against the Carpathian Mountains, with one group of medium strength in the Jassy area, and with one very strong group against the Roumanian front. The Turks would have to come to a final decision until 25 Jun. whether they will be ready to comply with their obligations of alliance. My informant concluded from this fact that about ten days after the beginning of the Russian attack - which was expected to result in a penetration of the Roumanian front - Turkey will be asked again to cede the air bases.

12 Jun. 1944

Therefore attacks on the Aegean Islands have to be reckoned with from 25 Jun. onward. During the later part of the discussion, Mr. Steinhardt made the interesting concession that we had completely arrived at our purpose in the Italian campaign, i.e. the containing of a strong enemy army and of a large tonnage. If the Allied troops were to be used on other places it would probably become necessary to withdraw them from Italy without their heavy equipment and to reequip them somewhere else in order to economise shipping space."

Similar statements of the US Ambassador at Ankara were transmitted already three days ago by the Finnish minister in Turkey.

Situation on 12 Jun.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

No special reports.

II. Situation in the West Area.

1. Invasion:

Excerpts of the enemy reports No. 11 and 12:
"As a result of a push carried out by tanks, British troops reached Tilly sur Seulles. Naval artillery effectively assisted our advance in this area during 10 Jun. A particularly effective bombardment was carried out in this area by the ships ARGONAUT and ORION.

Enemy PT boats were again active during the night of 10 Jun. Several vehement fights took place in the course of which one enemy ship was destroyed and others were damaged by gun fire."

According to information available at Naval Staff the course of events on 12 Jun. was as follows:

At 0011, Naval Communication Officer, Cherbourg reported the departure of six PT boats at 2315 on 11 Jun.

At 0315, the A-Group of 46th Minesweeper Flotilla reported the return to Cherbourg of five of our vessels at 0200.

At 0455, Naval Command, Channel Islands reported: The Batteries "Annes" and "Elsass" stationed at Alderney fired at 0240 on targets located in BF 3545 lower left corner. The targets thereupon sheered off towards west.

12 Jun. 1944

At 0505, Naval Communication Officer, Cherbourg reported the arrival of five PT-boats at 0405.

At 0530, Naval D/F Detachment, Bretagne reported in the Radio Monitoring Report on the situation of 0530 amongst others: From 2342 on the 11th until 0353 on the 12th, PT-boats and destroyers were reported in the Seine Bay which were later identified as partly being Allied vessels.

At 0600, Commander 15th Patrol Flotilla sent a short report on the sinking of Patrol boat V"1507" south of Cape Antifer, presumably hit by a torpedo. Fourteen men of the crew were lost.

At 0657, Commander 24th Minesweeper Flotilla reported that five Minesweepers entered Cherbourg at 0550.

At 0710, the first report on the situation at 0600 of Group West arrived. According to the report no specified news about the operations of our naval forces during the night of 11 Jun. came in yet. Many location reports were made about the flank protection of the landing formation north of Cape Barfleur and north of Cape de la Heve as well as from the waters off Cherbourg and north of Cape Levy. Besides, several isolated targets were located steering up and down 15 nautical miles north of Alderney. A convoy steering west was reported ten miles west of Alderney at 0500.

According to a report of Naval Signal Station, Fecamp, a fight going on eight or ten miles off the coast in 300 - 330° was observed at 0228 lasting for a considerable time. Flare shells heavy artillery fire seen continuously and aircraft was also presumed to have taken part.

At 1327, Naval Command, Normandy and Admiral, Channel Coast received the following directives from Group West:

"Most important of all precautionary measures is the blowing up of all dispensable wharf areas. The 'Normandie' and 'France' piers have to be prevented from falling into the enemy's hands undestroyed."

At 1400, Radio Monitoring Service transmitted an enemy Radio message, intercepted at 2116 of 11 Jun., asking for help by repair units for the minelayer ADVENTURE and for the seaplane parentship ALBATROS. Interception of the Radio Message was incomplete.

At 1750, Group West regarded the landing possibilities for the night of 12 Jun. as more difficult in the Dutch area,

12 Jun. 1944

as possible on the Channel coast and as favorable on the Atlantic coast.

At 2045, Group West reported on the further development of the situation as seen at 1600:

1. Our own activities during the night of 11 Jun.

a. After breaking through near Barfleur, assisted by our own coastal batteries, 9th PT boat Flotilla and 2nd Group of the 5th PT boat Flotilla probably hit with torpedoes a formation of several cruisers. Explosions were observed. 2nd Group of 5th PT boat Flotilla torpedoed a special ship of 10,000 BRT in BF 3664 upper center. Five ELM/A-mines exploded quite close to the formation.

b. 4th PT boat Flotilla did not meet any targets. The PT boat S"175" scored good hits on an enemy PT boat during a short encounter.

c. 2nd PT boat Flotilla reported three explosions of ELM/A-mines in BF 3662 at a distance of 50 meters resulting in minor damages.

d. Forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West reported that Blitz-barrage 1 off the Somme west of Ostend and 2nd half of Blitz-Ost-barrage east Cherbourg were laid out. The patrolboat VP "1507" was sunk by a British mine with snag line in 3664 and not by a torpedo as was reported originally.

2. Plans for the night of 12 Jun.

a. 5th, 9th, 4th, and 2nd PT boat Flotillas will operate with torpedoes and 8th PT boat Flotilla will operate at Hoofden as before.

b. 5th Torpedoboat Flotilla will start for artillery operations off Le Havre during the mine task of the forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West.

c. Forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West: Blitz-barrages will be laid out off Boulogne and Gravelines, Coastal Mine-A south of the Seine mouth and EMC-mines in the Vauville Bay. 24th Minesweeping Flotilla will be moved back to Malo for further transports to Cherbourg. The wounded will be carried back on this occasion.

12 Jun. 1944

3. Further reports:

a. At 1200, several big ships were observed off the Orne mouth including one ship of the NELSON-type, two cruisers and LCTs, besides, in 234° seen from Cape Heve, a larger number of vessels including destroyers, at a distance of 25 kilometers.

b. Fighter bombers attacked the Coast Patrol Forces at St. Helier (Jersey) and St. Malo without causing losses.

c. The boats of 46th Minesweeper Flotilla were fired upon by destroyers when entering Cherbourg.

d. State of precautionary destruction measures at Cherbourg at 1300

The eastern part of Grande Rade was fouled with mines. The steamer SOLGLINT (12,000 BRT) and two more big ships are ready for scuttling at the "Normandie" pier. Five of the six cranes on the "Normandie" pier were blown up. One half of the harbor railway station was undermined. Blowing up of buildings was prepared. All dispensable bollards and stair cases were blown up. The blowing up of the foundation of Homet was prepared. The dock-gates 5 and 6 were blown up and the dock was blocked. The crane-dock 5 and 6 are destroyed. Turning cranes and store building at the aerodrome were blown up.

e. The patrol boats VP "206", "212" and the motor minesweeper R "231" were blown up by the crews at Caen. The crews were ordered to take part in the fighting on land. Ten enemy planes were shot down by the combined fire of the boats.

Group West reported:

"The beginning of destructions was ordered already on 10 Jun. On 11 Jun., the carrying out of the measures was accelerated and put on a larger scale even when this results in restricting the activities of the vessels of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West. Everything that is still required for PT boat operations will be exempted for the time being"

Naval Staff will inform Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff (Navy) correspondingly upon a telephone request of the latter.

12 Jun. 1944

At 2047, Commander 5th PT boat Flotilla was ordered by Commander PT boats to carry out torpedo operations with the boats of 9th and 5th PT boat Flotillas, presently at Le Havre, and to return to Cherbourg. Only in case of need should the boats enter Le Havre again. 2nd and 4th PT boat Flotillas were ordered to make full use of the time for operations. The groups which would have fired all their ammunition early would have to enter Boulogne whereas the others will enter Le Havre.

At 2116, 24th Minesweeper Flotilla reported that it left Cherbourg for the West at 2230 with five boats and two boats of 6th Minesweeper Flotilla.

At 2140, Group West reported: The Batteries "Mirus" and "Steinbruch" shot down two planes when six Fortresses flew over Guernsey. The Batteries: "Brommy" and "Blankanese" forced six enemy minesweepers to sheer off at the northern coast of Cotentin at 2330 of 11 Jun. As was reported already, the batteries at the northern front at Cotentin most effectively assisted the operations of 5th and 9th PT boat Flotillas east of Barfleur by firing on five located and sighted enemy formations. At 0330, two enemy targets were repulsed by fire directed by location from the Batteries "York" and "Brommy". On the eastern coast of Cotentin, the artillery positions Monsalines and La Pernelle are fired upon by enemy cruisers since 0600. The fire was answered by the Batteries 9/1261 and 10/1261. Up to now, no landings have been reported in the area St. Vaast. At 1301, the Battery 3/1254 stationed at Cape de la Heve opened fire on two destroyers at a distance of 25 kilometers. The targets sheered off behind a smoke screen. One enemy plane was shot down at 1350 on the occasion of an unsuccessful enemy air attack with bombs on Battery "Blankenese". Two guns of Battery 7/1261 which went out of action owing to faults in material will again be made ready for war by the battery's own means. The fourth gun of Battery Marcouf which so far did not go into action is ready for use at the land-front after supply of ammunition. The supply of equipment, arms and ammunition for the rest of the crew of Battery Marcouf was carried out by an infantry task force.

12 Jun. 1944

According to information coming from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff Navy, Commanding General, West was ordered by Armed Forces, High Command to settle the question of protecting the Navy stocks by conferring directly with Group West.

2. Enemy Postion at the Other Theatres:

In the area of 19th Group, strong air activity was observed. The number of planes was not reported. Planes belonging to the group reported several of our own submarines in the western approaches of the Channel. In the rendezvous area west of Ireland three British units were reported. Our PT boat operations during the night of 12 Jun, could be clearly discerned in the enemy radio messages intercepted by our radio monitoring service.

3. Own Position at the Other Theatres:

Atlantic Coast Area:

Fifteen patrol positions were occupied. A total of 18 mines were cleared in the areas St. Nazaire, Lorient and Brest. Two submarines were escorted on their way out. On 11 Jun., a coastal Mine A barrage was laid out south of Gironde. One enemy plane was shot down during an air attack on patrol boat VP 7 in BF 5213.

Channel Waters:

During the day, 20 patrol positions were occupied. Three mines were cleared south of Boulogne.

Battery St. Pol shot down a Fortress near Dunkerque.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

North Sea:

The patrol postions in the Heligoland Bight were occupied only on a reduced scale owing to the stormy

12 Jun. 1944

weather. The convoy service was suspended for the same reason on 12 Jun. and in the night of 12 Jun. The convoy 1255 - Hook - Elba (Transl. note: apparently mistaken for Elbe) entered Helder. The carrying on of the voyage was postponed because of the bad weather. The Sperrbrecher "167" was towed into the Elbe. The enemy Mosquitoes flying over the German Bight on their way for an attack on Berlin were fired upon by heavy anti-aircraft artillery between 0023 and 0304 in the sections Wilhelmshaven, Brunsbuettel, Emden, Borkum, and Heligoland.

On the Dutch coast, the patrol group south west of Hook was repeatedly but unsuccessfully attacked by two enemy planes. Six planes attacked our returning patrol boats equally without success.

North of Vlieland one mine was cleared. In the morning hours of the 12th, heavy explosions on sea were in the area of Den Helder - Ymuiden - Scheveningen. The same observations were again made during the night of 12 Jun. when, besides the hearing of explosions flare shells and Flak fire were sighted.

"Imminent Danger" was ordered for the forces in the Netherlands during the daylight hours and degree of readiness "2" is maintained during the night.

Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Position:

In the area of 18th Group, 35 operations of planes were counted over the northern part of the North Sea and in the Shetland Narrows.

Russian air reconnaissance repeatedly reported on ships sighted in the harbor of Hammerfest as well as in Honningsvaag and Reppefjord.

At 1955, a British unit was located from Kirkenes in 244°.

2. Own Position:

Only a few planes were reported entering the area of Hammerfest, Vardoe, and Petsamo.

12 Jun. 1944

Thirty two ships were escorted to the north and thirty one ships to the south. Naval Staff suspected that enemy aircraft carriers are using bases in the southern part of Spitsbergen during the summer months and asked German Air Force, Operations Staff to reconnoiter that area, especially the Icefjord and Bellsound. Air Force, Operations Staff has issued a corresponding directive to 5th Air Force.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Position:

Radio monitoring and air reconnaissance in the Gulf of Finland had the same results as during the days before.

According to a report of the German Naval Liaison Staff in Finland the enemy succeeded to penetrate 17 Kilometers at the Finnish front on the Carelian coast. The Battery Kellomaeki (three 25.4 centimeter guns) was lost. The possibility of surveying the inner Kronstadt Bay has vanished owing to this break through.

2. Own Position:

Thirty six boats were on duty in the minesweeping service in the Baltic Sea Entrances and forty six boats and three minesweeping planes in the Baltic Sea. Seven mines were cleared in the Kiel Bay and in the central Baltic Sea. The boat VS "217" hit a mine and sunk without losses of the crew. 3rd Torpedoboat Flotilla is on the way to Oslo in order to escort the transport of the 89th Infantry Division.

No events of particular importance were reported from the area of Admiral Ostland and Commander Minesweepers Baltic respectively.

The laying out of the 2nd barrage section for the reinforcement of Seeigel VII b to be carried out by six naval landing craft was planned for the night of 12 Jun, as well as the departure of 6th PT boat Flotilla from Reval towards west.

The convoys were carried out successfully and without incidents in the entire Baltic area.

12 Jun. 1944

V. Submarine Warfare.

According to wireless messages intercepted by radio intelligence the steamer CASAMBRA was machine-gunned by a submarine off Curacao. The ship remained unhurt.

According to further interceptions, a merchant ship had contact with a submarine on 12 Jun., in the Windward Passage and was hit by a torpedo which apparently failed to explode.

In the western area all boats in the Biscayan waters not equipped with "Schnorchel" were ordered to return to the bases as strong enemy air activity leads to heavy losses which can be justified only in case an enemy landing on the Biscayan coast has to be expected as imminent in the near future. The submarines are kept in readiness under shelters.

At 2036, the submarine U "953" reported three destroyers in BF 2739. The boat which was to enter the channel is apparently on its way back now. Air attacks were reported by the submarine U "445" in BF 9223 and U "437" in BF 9276.

No special reports arrived from the Atlantic and from the Northern Waters.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

West Area:

The enemy entered Belgium with 1,400 planes during the day and attacked ten aerodromes.

Several hundreds of planes were reported entering western France under strong fighter protection. Three aerodromes, anti-aircraft gun positions and traffic installations were attacked. Increased air activity was reported from the Coutance area.

During the night of 12 Jun., three aerodromes were attacked in Belgium while 400 enemy planes carried out bombing attacks in the areas of Amiens, Albert and Cambrai. In western France several hundreds of planes were reported entering the area Le - Paris - Caen without attacking.

Our own air operations over the west area were carried

12 Jun, 1944

out by 169 planes. Twenty four enemy planes were shot down at a loss of nine on our side.

During the night of 11 Jun., 91 of our night fighters were operating. They brought down one enemy plane at a loss of three on our side.

Reich Territory:

During the day, isolated planes were flying over Paderborn, Dessau, Sylt and in the area Emden - Hamburg. One Spitfire, coming from the south, entered the area of Marburg on the Drau.

In the night of 12 Jun., 15 enemy planes entered the area Osnabrueck - Mainz without attacking. After midnight, several hundreds of enemy planes entered the industrial areas of the Rhineland and Westfalia where attacks were directed against Recklinghausen, concentrating on the hydrogenetic plants Gelsenberg, and Essen, Muelheim and Duisburg.

Mediterranean Theatre:

On 11 Jun., the enemy, coming from the Foggia area and crossing the Adriatic, entered the Ragusa area during daylight with 600 four-engined bombers protected by fighters. Two hundred planes advanced from this area further inland in order to attack Smederevo south east of Belgrad. The remaining 400 planes attacked Giurgiu. Part of the formation continued the flight presumably up to the Constanta area for an attack on the town and the harbor.

One hundred forty four-engined planes under fighter protection flew from Russia into the area of Kishine where they divided their strength in order to attack the aerodrome Focsani and Constanta. The formations, assembled at 1000 in the Giurgi area and left in a south western direction towards the base in southern Italy. Details about the damages caused by this attack are to be found in the Daily Report (Tageslage).

On our side 237 fighters were operating. They shot down 16 enemy planes at a loss of 13 on our side. Two more planes were reported shot down by anti-aircraft guns at Constanta.

12 Jun, 1944

In the Italian front area, 270 operations of enemy planes were reported. In the Firenze area one of 60 attacking fighter bombers was shot down by anti-aircraft guns.

During the night of 11 Jun., 50 four-engined and twin-engined planes attacked Plodi and Karlova. About 20 planes were observed coming from Russia in order to supply the bandits in the Agram area.

Our own planes carried out reconnaissance flights. Malta, Oran, Mersel Kebir, Arzeu as well as the harbors Lissa and Vela Luka were reconnoitered by photograph.

East Area:

On the Eastern Front 377 operations of our own and 665 of the enemy were accounted as well as seven enemy planes brought down at a loss of six on our side.

In the night of 11 Jun., strong formations of our bombers operated against traffic installations. Heavy fires started at the railway stations at Kiev and Fastov. Three major fires were also observed in the target at Kasatin station. Three of our planes were lost.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea:

1. Area of Naval Group West:

Enemy Position:

At 0730, five fighters carrying ballast left Gibraltar for the Atlantic under escort of two corvettes.

Own Position:

One Coastal Mine-A barrage was laid out off the southern French coast.

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Position:

12 Jun. 1944

In the night of 11 Jun., one M.T.B. - group, each consisting of three boats, was observed leaving for the west off Viareggio and in the waters south of Spezia respectively.

At 0020, two naval targets were south west of Civitavecchia and 8 naval targets south south east of Natturmo at 0028 as well as six or eight ships south of Ponza at 0040.

On the evening of 11 Jun., one enemy submarine was reported landing agents north east of Genoa.

According to air reconnaissance, four troop transporters and four escort vessels were steering 300° about 85 miles east south east of Malta at 1430 on 12 Jun.

According to photographic reconnaissance from the air, 1 mine cruiser, 1 large destroyer, 2 other destroyers, 4 submarines, 1 transporter, 39 freighters, 2 tankers, and about 100 sections of landing stages were at Oran harbor. The harbor was partly covered by clouds.

The battleship Lorraine, 2 auxiliary aircraft carriers, 1 cruiser, presumably of the ASTORIA-class, 3 destroyers, 3 transporters, 3 freighters, 1 tanker were at Mers el Kebir. This harbor was also partly covered by clouds.

3 freighters and 15 LCM were at Arzeu.

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division reported on enemy submarine activities in the Mediterranean during May 1944.

The report contains only insignificant changes in number and way of operating.

Furthermore, Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division reported on enemy M.T.B.-operations in the Mediterranean during May 1944. It is presumed that about 100 PT boats are in the Mediterranean, 70 of which are supposed to be M.T.B.'s and the rest being M.G.B.'s. Besides, at least 200 ML-boats (anti-submarine chasers) or USA-SC boats which are similar to the ML-boats have to be reckoned with.

The M.T.B. operations in the area Corsica - Elba especially on our convoy routes between Elba and La Spezia have furthermore increased. For copy of the report as per 18098 and 18099/44 Gkdos. compare War Diary, Part C, Vol.XIV.

Own Position:

12 Jun. 1944

On the land front, the center of the heavy fighting is on both sides of Lake Bolsena.

Submarine hunting in the Gulf of Genoa was without success. No results were obtained during a search for suspected mines south of Leghorn.

The convoy and patrol service as well as the patrolling of the reconnaissance line west of Spezia by two TA-torpedoboats was carried out as scheduled. The strike at Genoa continued. German Naval Command, Italy ordered the blowing up of the harbor installations at Benedetto and Civitanova. The port captain of Benedetto is moving to Ancona.

3. Area of Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic:

Enemy Position:

At 2330 of 11 Jun., two destroyers were sighted south of Pola.

Own Position:

The 7th PT boat Flotilla had contact with two enemy destroyers north of Zlarin island when on escort duty in the night of 11 Jun. Two boats entered Sibenik and one boat went to Primosten. The 4th boat S "153" was lost by an explosion. One of the convoys protected by the flotilla entered Sibenik and the second convoy reached Rogozinica. For battle report compare teletype 1341.

The supply traffic from Venice to Ancona was suspended with the exception of the fuel supply.

b. Aegean Sea:

The convoy "Anita" consisting of four steamers and protected by three TA-torpedoboats and two motor mine-sweepers left Piraeus for Porto Lago on the evening of 11 Jun.

12 Jun. 1944

During the night of 11 Jun., Rhodos was attacked by six or eight enemy planes. No serious damages occurred.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Position:

According to intercepted wireless messages the movements of small vessels are still on a reduced scale. Three M.T.B.s, two M.G.V.s and two submarine chasers were located in the waters of the Crimea up to the northern part of the east coast. At 1800, two PT boats left Constanta in order to place a weather buoy about 60 miles north east of the Bosphorus.

Convoys along the western coast were carried out as scheduled.

Situation on the Danube:

On the outer estuary of the Danube no laying out of mines by planes was observed. During the night of 11 Jun., mines were probably laid by planes between Hidin and Turno Magurele.

Three tankers and two freight tugs were damaged by mines. One freight tug and one tug sunk.

Five mines were cleared by vessels.

Ship traffic was resumed on 10 Jun. Thirty nine vessels were on their way in the Hungarian area, 46 in the Serbian area and 380 vessels in the Roumanian area between Moldava and Galatz.

VIII. Situation in the Far East.

No special reports arrived.

13 Jun. 1944.

Items of Political Importance.

The British press deplores the lack of understanding with de Gaulle. The "Times" complained that diplomatic preparations for the invasion are much behind the military preparations. British and American policy seems to be governed by a strange kind of inconsistency. Also as far as tactical problems are concerned, cooperation with de Gaulle is regarded to be inadequate. The paper declared it to be quite impossible that under the eyes of the enemy the dispute is being carried on whether de Gaulle is entitled to represent France or not.

A weekly paper demands that care should be taken in any case that the problem of the status of the de Gaulle movement will not become a danger to the Anglo-Americans who showed other weak points too.

According to an Exchange - report from Ankara, Turkey reduced all transports to Germany which somehow serve the conduct of war to 50% of the quota of the year 1943. The supply of chrome was stopped altogether.

Conference on the situation with Commander in Chief, Navy.

I. During the report on the situation it was reported that Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff pointed to the fact that the roads and the harbor of St. Vaast are particularly convenient for enemy unloadings. Group West was therefore ordered to investigate the possibilities of our mining the roads and to approach 3rd Air Force and to report on the results as well as to issue the necessary orders concerning the destruction of the harbor.

German Air Force, Operations Staff, Operations Officer, Navy was informed of the directive given to Group West and German Air Force, Operations Staff was asked to issue directives correspondingly.

II. Group West asked for a new examination on whether it is possible additionally to move torpedo boats of the 35/37 type to the west area. Fast torpedo boats are very useful for the operation area from the Schelde river to the Channel narrows considering a new enemy landing presently impending in the area of northern France and Belgium. In case of hesitations for training reasons the group suggested to use the specialists and the experienced crews of the destroyers Z"32", ZH"1", of GREIF and - under certain circumstances - of Z"23" and of KONDOR.

13 Jun. 1944

Naval Staff is also in favor of bringing new forces into the Channel water. First of all, the Fleet and Commander, Destroyers were asked to examine the plan from the point of view of the training.

III. Naval Staff, Quartermaster General reported on the opinion of Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping on the draft of the control of maritime shipping prepared by Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. The opinion was voiced that in the A-case the decision will have to be made according to circumstances in the areas threatened by the enemy. This would mean for the Norwegian area that the decision about the control would lay with the quartermasters of the divisions.

Commander in Chief, Navy concurred with the opinion of Naval Staff that this is not acceptable for the Navy.

IV. Naval Staff, Chief of Communication Service reported that communications with Paris are in operation again.

V. Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Intelligence Division:

On 12 Jun., Churchill visited the beachhead in Normandy. On both ways he went on board the destroyer "KELVIN". When Churchill was ashore the destroyer was unsuccessfully attacked by a German plane.

On the evening of 12 Jun., General Montgomery issued a long declaration to the press. According to this statement, the situation following the landing was temporarily most delicate for the Americans.

VI. The Chief, Naval Staff thought it advisable to transfer at the present moment about three submarines from the quota of Group "Mitte" to the Gulf of Finland. After the withdrawal of 6th PT boat Flotilla, this step will restore the balance, in the eyes of the enemy, most of all in the eyes of the Finns, but also in the eyes of our own troops.

Commander in Chief, Navy concurred.

VII. In view of the increasing pressure of the invasion the defensive mine type becomes of preeminent importance. Commander in Chief, Navy is therefore considering an order to increase the mine production still more. It has consequently to be examined how many and what kind of mines will be required and by which means the production can be increased.

Naval Staff, Operations Division was ordered to investigate how many of the mines already allotted to the different war theatres are still available.

13 Jun. 1944

VIII. The Chief, Naval Staff declared that it was necessary to prepare the submarine bases in Norway now. It has to be examined on which places and what number of submarine berths have to be provided.

Commander in Chief, Navy remarked in this connection that the constructing of concrete dug-outs will take a long time and was so difficult as to be definitely out of consideration in the case of Norway. Therefore it is necessary to provide protection of anti-aircraft guns and temporary defenses. Quartermaster Division was ordered to take up the matter immediately with Naval Staff, Submarine Division.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

IX. Position of the Army:

Situation on the Eastern Front:

Army Group, Southern Ukraina repulsed local enemy attacks. At the Narva front, Army Group, North warded off several enemy attacks carried out after strong artillery fire. The enemy pressure continued on the Finland front. The attacks against the 2nd position were repulsed.

West Area:

The enemy has furthermore increased his forces east of the Orne. Our own attack from the north did not penetrate because considerable difficulties arose owing to the coming into action of heaviest naval artillery. The enemy succeeded in increasing the beachhead east of the Orne towards the south. Our attack aimed at recapturing Carentan which had been lost owing to lack of ammunition had no success. Minor territorial gains by the enemy in western direction were reported from Cotentin. Our own movements are still furthermore hampered by strong enemy air activity and air attacks on road traffic. The supply of fuel and ammunition is considerably affected.

Italy:

The situation in the area of 14th Army was considerably aggravated by the enemy's break through in a broad front on the western flank. A further withdrawal of the front of the 10th Army is also necessary.

The Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters informed Commander in Chief, Navy on Fieldmarshal Rommels opinion about the situation of 11 Jun.

13 Jun. 1944

For copy as per l/Skl 1746/44 Gekdos, Chefs compare special file "Invasion 13 Jun." According to the fieldmarshal's opinion, the development of the fighting up to now clearly reveals the enemy's plans:

1. To gain a deep beachhead between Orne and Vire as a jumping off base for a future attack with strong forces towards the interior of France, probably Paris.
2. To cut off the Cotentin peninsula and to take Cherbourg as fast as possible in order to obtain a big harbor with a large capacity.

The general fieldmarshal regarded as decisive for the developments the extraordinarily strong and even crushing superiority of the enemy air force and "the effect of the heavy naval artillery. Up to 640 heavy guns went into action with such strong force that operations of infantry or tank formations became impossible in the area controlled by this rapid-fire artillery." Besides, the report pointed to the "superior material equipment of the Anglo-Americans with new weapons and armaments as well as the considerable and versatile use made of parachutists and airborne troops." The report concluded: "The troops of all services are fighting most stubbornly and with the greatest courage in spite of the overwhelming efforts of the enemy."

X. The Chief, Naval Staff pointed out that a change will be necessary in the naval construction program because the construction of motors for the destroyers is in danger owing to the actions of the enemy air force. The question is whether we have to rely on steam engines instead of the motors or whether another solution has to be found as for example to replace two destroyers by three torpedo boats. Naval Staff is ready to renounce the destroyers and to use the building capacity thus obtained for an acceleration of the increase of the other new constructions. It remains to be examined from which destroyer the stop in the building program would become effective. Commander in Chief, Navy emphasized that the production of small weapon units and of vessels which can be used for the defense of the coastal waters has to be increased.

A corresponding plan will be prepared by Naval Staff.

Conference on the Situation with Commander in Chief, Navy at 1800.

I. During the report on the situation, Naval Staff, Operations Division mentioned a report of our naval attache at Madrid that the consulate at Port Mahon reported on the intention of Italian warships to leave the harbor. Air reconnaissance was asked for.

13 Jun. 1944

Commander in Chief, Navy remarked in this connection that the actions of the Italian warships are only of minor importance for us.

II. In the report on the position of the Army, Naval Staff Operations Division, Army Liaison and Land Warfare Section reported that one tank corps is on the way from the Tarnopol - Kovel area to the west area.

III. Naval Staff, Quartermaster General reported that about 1000 cadets of all kinds are amongst the emergency formations that have been called up. Although the cadets were included in the quotas reported in the preparatory drafts of the station commands, special requests for exemption of the cadets arrived from various quarters. Hints were made to the serious consequences which would arise in a later period if the training would be cut off. Huge gaps would appear after one or two years in the officer replacement in the forces.

Commander in Chief, Navy decided that cadets should not be called up for the emergency units, not even the cadets of the naval artillery.

The Admiral, Small Battle Units (Rear Admiral Heye) reported that 23 Linsen (10 command boats and 13 landing boats) are at Aachen today and will proceed to Le Havre. Fifty Neger will start from Rudolstadt to Aachen on 18 Jun.

IV. Naval Staff, Quartermaster General reported on the Naval Staff's suggestion concerning the alternations in the war ship construction program:

Copy as per 1/Skl, 18240/44 Gkdos find in War Diary, Part B, V. Commander in Chief, Navy intends to talk about this question with Reichminister Speer on 15 Jun. The building capacity set free by abandoning the construction of motor destroyers and as far as necessary also the new building capacity to be made available will be used for an increase in the construction program of small battle weapons as well as for the securing or for the increase of the construction program for PT boats, motor minesweepers and submarines.

V. The Admiral, Small Battle Units reported on today's conference with Generaldirektor Merker concerning the new demand for the building up of the small battle weapon force up to 7 Oct. 1944. Copy of the program corresponding to Naval Staff, Operations Division 18184/44 Gkdos to be found in the files of Chief of Surface Vessel Construction Planning Branch at Naval Staff, Operations Division. The program, including the requirements for coastal organization, increased to a considerable volume. It contains in particular a considerable demand

13 Jun. 1944

in motor vehicles. Generaldirektor Merker promised, as far as the work within the scope of the Ship Construction Commission was concerned, that everything possible will be done to comply with the demand. The total number of personnel required will be 794 officers and cadets and 16,608 non commissioned officers and men. The program was approved by Commander in Chief, Navy who, on his own behalf, will enforce by all means the carrying out of the program.

Special Items:

I. Commander PT boats was ordered by Naval Staff to report the date on which 10th PT boat Flotilla will have completed its training in order to be ready to be used,

- a. in the Channel
- b. in the Gulf of Finland.

II. Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy reported to Naval Staff and by way of notice to Commanding General, Army Group C:

1. The enemy's position on 12 Jun. was about the line Orbetello - northern border of Lake Bolsena. The situation on both sides of Bolsena is not clear because of the enemy's break through. Our troops are withdrawing to the line Grosseto - Lake Trasimeno. No defensive positions have been prepared in the rear up to the main defense line of the "Goten-Line." Only temporary defense lines are provided.

2. Commanding General, Southwest fixed as the earliest date for the withdrawal from Elba - Pianosa the time when the line Grosseto - Lake Trasimeno will be penetrated. It is not likely that this line will be defended for a long time.

3. The Navy has prepared for a withdrawal within one night by concentrating all available defense and transport vessels because it seems hopeless to continue the operation in the second night because of the enemy activity which has to be expected. The time required for the preparation is estimated to be two days at least. Air reconnaissance which has been asked from 2nd Air Force was promised but it will be feasible only with minor forces. Fighter escort was declared impossible. A diversion attack on Bastia - Maddalena as required by this office and as provided by Commanding General, Southwest was refused by 2nd Air Force because of lack of strength. An increase in the anti-air defenses of Piombino and Leghorn has been promised by Commanding General, Southwest only conditionally but it cannot be reckoned with in practice.

13 Jun. 1944

4. Elba has only a limited value as a corner post of our defense position as it will be impossible to defend either the Grosseto - line or even the Piombino line. As the island is of only minor importance for the enemy as well, owing to our inferiority in every respect, there is no need for the enemy to take Elba by force and he will try instead to starve the island (lack of water).

For these reasons the order to evacuate could be given immediately.

5. This is impossible, nevertheless, according to information from Commanding General, Southwest, because of the Fuehrer-order that Elba has to be defended to the last.

In case the decision to evacuate Elba will be reached later anyhow when our front will be withdrawn furthermore, the transfer of the islands crew in view of the possibility of strongest activities of enemy naval and air forces, can be attempted only with heaviest losses of the forces to be transferred and by sacrificing the crews of warships and transport vessels as well as the ships themselves which are indispensable for our future operations. Owing to the far reaching consequences of such a decision it is necessary to examine whether the withdrawal of the crew of Elba shall be carried out at all by that time. This point of view has been explained to General Kesselring.

6. I feel obliged to point to the necessity for an early decision.

Naval Staff brought this report to the attention of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff because of its importance.

III. Following the conference of Commander in Chief, Navy at the Fuehrer Headquarters the following directives were sent to Group South and, by way of notice, to Admiral Aegean concerning the Creta supply:

1. The statement of the Fortress Commander Creta that only 50 tons daily are required for the current supply was not confirmed during the conference of Commander in Chief, Navy at Fuehrer's Headquarters. For the time being, 6000 tons per month required for the current supply have to be put into account. Naval Staff asked Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff to order the Army offices to investigate again the transport requirements of Creta and the Dodecaneso and to set up a priority list.

2. Commander in Chief, Navy pointing to the particular importance of fighter protection declared that he still regarded the transport of 6000 tons per month as possible but he explicitly made

13 Jun. 1944

no promises to this effect. Nevertheless it has to be tried by all means to comply with the above figure.

3. In accordance with the intentions of Group South and also according to the opinion of Naval Staff the goal can be reached by relying on small vessels, far more than has been done up to now for the Creta supply, and particularly by using auxiliary sailing vessels. The auxiliary sailing vessels would have to be combined into groups of three or four vessels under escort and the number of cruisers could be increased by strong control.

4. The Shipping Division of the High Command, Navy, contrary to the opinion of Group South, thinks that an increase of the auxiliary sailing vessels by at least 30 vessels is necessary for the Creta supply and that this is possible by certain arrangements within the area as well as by making available Greek auxiliary sailing vessels which have not yet been used for the military supply service. Group South has to study the problem again and will report on the results.

IV. According to information coming from diplomatic circles via German Foreign Office an invasion of Norway and Denmark will take place in the next days as soon as the operation in France will be consolidated. One source gave 15 Jun. as the date for the new invasion. 400 Norwegian sabotage agents would cross the Swedish-Norwegian frontier on 12 and 13 Jun.

From further reports from similar sources it may be understood that operations in Southern France are expected for the next future. The British and U.S. ambassadors made arrangements at Madrid to take care of transports of Allied wounded from Southern France.

Furthermore, it was said, a Yugoslav division from Bari would land in the next days between Omis and Split. The operation would be intended as a diversion for the main landing operation presumably around Marseilles. According to a report of our naval attache at Istanbul new reports arrived from two sources independent of each other, concerning concentrations of warships and merchant ships at Jaffa and Haifa as well as troop movements towards these two harbors.

A very reliable agent reported on the 12th that the reports about the alleged troop concentrations in the Near East were spread out purposely to mislead. Only certain reinforcements were made for inner political reasons in Palestine. The elite of the British Army is said to be in England whereas formations of only secondary importance are stationed in the Near East.

13 Jun. 1944

Situation on 13 Jun.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Invasion:

From the Report No. 14 of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces it can be seen that the uniting of both Allied beachheads has been completed and that thus a section of the coast over a length of about 60 miles and with constantly increasing depth is in the hands of the enemy. "Allied warships gave assistance by firing deep into the country at the centre as well as at the flanks of the armies." From further reports it can be concluded that the German resistance has considerably increased.

"Although it has been ascertained that German submarines moved towards north from the Biscayan waters, not a single one of these boats was observed in the invasion waters up to the present."

"The U.S. ships TEXAS, NEVADA, QUINCY and TUSCALOOSA as well as the British battleship WARSPITE took part in the bombardment of the German positions in the Northern part of the Cherbourg peninsula.

According to an official announcement, the NELSON silenced a concentration of 17 guns behind the beachhead by an artillery fire from the sea with nine tons per minute on 4 Jun.

The development of the situation was as follows, according to the reports received and according to information from Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division:

At 0237, Naval Command, Normandy transmitted a report from Battery "Hamburg" that enemy planes flying at a middle altitude dropped explosives which exploded in the air following a short hooting sound.

At 0625, an intercepted radio message was transmitted indicating that a plane of 16th Group attacked one minesweeper, two small vessels and four minesweepers at 0453 without observing the results.

At 0715, Group West reported on the situation at 0600:

13 Jun. 1944

1. Own activities during the night of 12 Jun:

- a. 5th PT boat Flotilla entered Le Havre at 0130 because of bad visibility.
- b. 2nd Group of 4th PT boat Flotilla entered Le Havre at 0205.
- c. 8th PT boat Flotilla was at Hoofden as had been planned.
- d. Forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West: The eastern entrance of Cherbourg was fouled by 35 EMC-mines.

2. Location reports:

- a. Supply traffic was located in BF 3610.
- b. Several medium sized and larger enemy targets were located northwest of Cape Barfleur with a speed of 10 - 15 knots and steering on varying courses.
- c. Many targets were located north of Cape Antifer and Fecamp in BF 3630 besides the flank defenses west and northwest of Cape de la Heve.
- d. The radar station at Granville and Cape Frehel were destroyed or heavily damaged by air attacks at 2130 on the 12th.

3. Other reports were:

- a. According to observations made at Commanding General, Armed Forces, West, the area up to Deal was covered by smoke at 1200 on the 12th and the area from Folkestone up to South Foreland at 0550 on the 13th.
- b. Six enemy motor minesweepers were observed working between 1530 and 2000 in BF 3682.
- c. In the area of 2nd Coast Patrol Force our vessels putting to sea were attacked by enemy fighter bombers.
- d. At 0035 on the 13th, for the first time an air attack was reported carried out from a low altitude against Le Havre and with bombs dropped on 9th PT boat Flotilla.
- e. Enemy mines with snag lines were ascertained in 3667, upper left.

13 Jun. 1944

At 0720, Commander 5th Torpedo boat Flotilla reported on a fight with enemy destroyers and M.T.B.s off Le Havre in the night of 12 Jun. The flotilla had to protect the flank of 4th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla. When leaving the harbor, the flotilla was illuminated by our own flare shells off the approach buoy and subsequently drove off a formation of enemy M.T.B.s towards the west.

According to intercepted radio reports, the enemy sent two destroyer groups against the flotilla which thereupon left for the east luring the destroyer formations away from the southwest. When they contacted the enemy the torpedo boat T"28" fired a salvo of two torpedoes at 0245 and MOEWE a salvo of six torpedoes at 0249. Explosions were heard. According to intercepted radio messages, the destroyer groups were ordered to illuminate the flotilla with flare shells for an attack by fighter bombers. The attack against one destroyer group had to be called off as it had no chance of success owing to the clear horizon enlightened by the moonlight and because the enemy made abundant use of flare shells. Repeated attacks by fighter bombers were warded off by barrage fire. In an illumination as bright as daylight, two series of bombs were dropped near the formation. West and northwest of the approach buoy explosions of mines occurred repeatedly. According to the report of Commander 4th Mine Clearance Flotilla on the execution of the task, the formation entered Le Havre at 0430. Commander 5th Torpedo boat Flotilla reported that apparently the operations of enemy naval and air forces were directed and controlled systematically from a control station against our formations as soon as they were detected by radar. The cooperation of destroyers, M.T.B.s and fighter bombers worked remarkably well. The operation area is limited by our own minefields.

At 1050, Admiral, Channel Coast ordered all Naval Shore Commanders of the area to arrange immediately for artillery fire barrages in cooperation with the naval forces in order to assist them in case they are attacked. The barrage fire lines should be marked by letters or numbers which would have to be called by radio in open text if needed.

At 1445, Group West regarded landing possibilities for the night of 13 Jun. in the Dutch area as slightly more difficult before midnight and as possible later on. Landing possibilities are regarded as possible along the Channel coast and as favorable on the Atlantic coast.

13 Jun. 1944

On the occasion of an enemy air attack on Granville, Battery St. Pair suffered a direct hit. Three of the four 7.5 centimeter guns were provisionally made ready for action against land and sea targets. According to a further report of Group West:

At 2030, the Battery Cape de la Heve fired upon a destroyer protecting clearance activities at 1525 on 12 Jun. at a distance of 14 - 18 kilometers and forced her to sheer off and to put up a smoke screen.

At 1545, one cruiser unsuccessfully fired against Cape de la Heve from behind a smoke screen.

During the night of 13 Jun., the beachheads were constantly reinforced from the sea and from the air (by freight carrying gliders). At 0200, the Battery "Blankenese" intervened several times, in an artillery fight between 6th Artillery - carrier Flotilla and enemy gunboats forcing the enemy each time to set up smoke screens and to sheer off.

At 0630, the Batteries "Todt", "Lindemann" and "Grosser Kurfuerst" opened fire on a convoy going east.

At 1450, the Battery 3/1254 fired upon a destroyer in 267° at a distance of 21 kilometers. The Battery "Brommy" repulsed 16 attacking enemy fighters. One landing barge carrying an amphibian car which had been damaged by artillery fire and equipped with communication devices was captured.

Group West sent a supplementary report on the operations during the night of 12 Jun:

The attack of 9th PT boat Flotilla on a south going convoy was frustrated by destroyers and M.G.B.s. The 1st Group of 4th PT boat Flotilla returned to Le Havre because the PT boat S"169" hit a mine. At the 2nd PT boat Flotilla the boats S"178", "179" and "189" were sunk during fighter bomber attack. The motor minesweeper R"97" was destroyed by a rocket hit in the fuel tank when engaged in rescue work for the PT boat S"179". Forces of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses West laid out a Blitz-barrage west of Ostend, the Blitz-barrage 10 near Boulogne and Coastal Mine A-barrage south of the Seine mouth. During these operations the motor minesweeper R"50" was sunk by artillery fire from one of our own infantry positions on land.

13 Jun. 1944

Group West reported the following plans for the night of 13 Jun:

- a. Laying out of Blitz-barrage 6 west of Ostend, Coastal Mine A-barrage off Trouville and EMC-mine barrage off Vauville Bay.
- b. 24th Minesweeper Flotilla will carry torpedoes from St. Malo to Cherbourg.
- c. All PT boat Flotillas will be on torpedo operations in the Seine Bay. 8th PT boat Flotilla will start for a reconnaissance sweep for Hoofden - Dungeness.
- d. 5th Torpedo boat Flotilla will operate as a diversion for the Coastal Mine A task off Trouville.

At 2340, Radio Monitoring Service transmitted an intercepted report of an enemy station sent to ten places at 1630, according to which the commanders reported that within 24 hours until 1800 of 12 Jun., 4742 tons of materials, 6800 persons and 1140 vehicles were unloaded.

Unfortunately no details on the circumstances can be realized and it is impossible therefore to obtain a true picture of the achievement.

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division informed the highest front command stations on the enemy situation as seen by General Staff, Foreign Armies West and German Air Force, Operations Staff. For copy of the corresponding teletype as per l/Skl. 18155/44 Gkdos compare special file "Invasion 13 Jun."

2. Enemy Position on other Theatres:

In the area of 19th Group, about 38 planes were accounted in operation some of which dispatched reports on the sighting of submarines and on air surface vessel locations in the waters west and southwest of Brest and north of Landsend. Six British ships were located on various positions in the rendezvous area.

3. Own Position:

Atlantic Coast Area:

Six mines were cleared in the waters between Brest and St. Nazaire. One submarine was escorted coming in and one going out.

13 Jun. 1944

Channel Waters:

During the night of 12 Jun., 2nd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla with the BROMMY was continuously attacked with bombs by enemy planes in the Boulogne area. The minesweeper M"402" was damaged. One plane was shot down. 4th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla was fired upon by planes west of Dunkerque and 18th patrol boat Flotilla was attacked with bombs off Ostend. 38th Minesweeper Flotilla was attacked by fighter bombers with rockets. Twenty-four mines were cleared northwest of Etaples and in the waters off Le Havre. Off Ostend, the A-group of 36th Minesweeper Flotilla was attacked by enemy planes one of which was shot down.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

About seven explosions of unknown origin were heard off the Dutch coast between 1025 and 1655.

Two convoys of 54,683 BRT were carried out in the Zeeland Waters. The convoy 1255 Helder-Borkum left Helder at 2230. The special convoy of the PT boat supply vessel NACHTIGALL and the newly constructed motor ship AMERSKERK (7900 BRT) moved from Hook to Helder.

On the occasion of the enemy air attack on the position "Kairo", two enemy planes were reported probably shot down and two for certain. Casualties among the crew occurred on two of our patrol boats.

Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Position:

In the area of 18th Group, 26 planes were accounted operating over the North Sea.

Own Position:

Thirty three ships were escorted to the north and thirty ships to the south.

Minor exchange of fire was reported in the Petsamo area on 11 Jun. Isolated enemy planes entered the Varanger area and opened fire upon Havniugsberg. Furthermore, other isolated planes were reported entering the area north of Sognefjord.

13 Jun. 1944

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

Enemy Position:

According to a report of Reich Security Central Office based on information obtained from Swedish government circles at Goeteborg, strong troops are being concentrated as well as naval forces assembled for invasion purposes in the ports of Scotland. The increase of Swedish preparatory measures on the western coast is due to this fact.

In the Gulf of Finland again strong activity of many light vessels and formations was observed. Eighteen motor minesweepers were steering east, northeast of Schepel. A formation of 19 patrol boats and motor minesweepers was sighted in the forenoon north-east of Kurgalov and a formation of 16 motor minesweepers was seen below Seivestoe.

Nine motor minesweepers were observed steering west in the neighborhood. Also northwest of Schepel, many motor minesweepers and auxiliary minesweepers were sighted.

Own Position:

On the western coast of Juteland three patrol positions were occupied. The Coastal Mine A operation was not carried out owing to the bad weather. The steamer NORDWEST was fired upon by Swedish land batteries during her voyage to Gotenburg and was requested by the Swedish navy to leave territorial waters. The steamer had been ordered to ask for the course and for instructions at the Swedish guard ship.

About noon, the Patrol boat "20" fired upon two planes of the Barracuda-type in position "green 06". One hit was observed on one of the planes.

Twenty five boats were engaged in mine clearance operations in the Baltic Sea Entrances as well as 42 boats and 7 minesweeping planes in the Baltic Sea. Two mines were cleared by minesweeping planes south of Copenhagen and one mine each cleared by vessels south of Halsbarre, near Rixhoeft and off Neufahrwasser.

In the area of Admiral, Eastern Baltic the Narva Bay, the net barrages as well as the Irben Narrows were patrolled according to schedule and without special events being reported.

The 2nd barrage section for the reinforcement of Seeigel VII b was laid out as planned. A further section of the Coastal Mine A barrage was laid out.

13 Jun. 1944

Owing to the bad weather, 6th PT boat Flotilla with seven boats entered Baltic Port on its way from Reval to Libau at noon.

On Lake Peipsi, two naval artillery lighters, ten patrol boats and four coastal mine boats were on duty at the patrol positions during the night of 12 Jun. Coastal PT boats were on patrol duty off the Russian coast. At 2336 on 12 Jun., four coastal mine boats had contact with two enemy patrol boats in the northeastern part of the lake and were strongly fired upon by land batteries using searchlights. The enemy suffered serious damage. One of our coastal mine boats is missing and one was damaged.

At 1142 on 13 Jun., one naval artillery lighter was attacked by two enemy planes.

Fifteen Torpedo Mines B were given to the Finns for operations in the night of 13 Jun.

V. Submarine Warfare.

Commander, Submarines "Mitte" asked Naval Staff, Submarine Division, with the approval of Naval Command, East, that three submarines be sent in order to ward off a surprise attack on the Estonian coast. In case of emergency these boats would be on a waiting position in the inner Gulf of Finland. The boats will have to use Reval or the Finnish Scaries near Hangoe as their bases and they have to be kept under camouflage.

In the west area, the submarine U"218" left the harbor in order to lay 15 MSA mines on the convoy route south of Landsend.

The submarine U"275" entered St. Peterport for refilling. On 12 Jun., the boat sunk a destroyer by "Zaunkoenig" torpedo in BF 2639. On 1 Jun., U"181" sunk a steamer (5872 BRT) in the southern Atlantic in FS 59.

No special reports arrived from the Northern waters and from the Mediterranean.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

West Area:

Strong enemy formations attacked numerous aerodromes in Belgium, Northern France and Western France during daylight.

13 Jun. 1944

Besides, our naval forces in the Channel were attacked. Three hundred eighty two of our fighters were on operations and shot down four enemy planes at a loss of eight on our side.

During the night of 13 Jun., many enemy planes were reported in Western France. No attacks were reported.

Troop concentrations in the landing beachheads were attacked by 131 of our bombers. Besides, the waters of the Orne mouth were fouled with mines. Two direct hits were scored on a freighter of 6 - 10,000 BRT.

Thirty two of our night fighters were operating over Western France. On the occasion of our operation in the night of 12 Jun., two destroyers and one LST of 4000 BRT were sunk and four steamers of a total of 30,000 BRT were damaged. We lost 19 of the 91 planes engaged in the operation.

Reich Territory:

During the day isolated planes were constantly reported entering the areas of Flensburg, Stralsund, Berlin, Kassel, Frankfurt/Main and Mannheim. One plane coming from the south penetrated into the Munich area during the noon hours. A strong formation of several hundreds of four-engined planes attacked the northern, western and southern parts of Munich between 1017 and 1038. Damages in the industries were small. For details compare "Situation on 14 Jun." A further attack was directed against the industrial aerodrome at Oberpfaffendorf where heavy damage was done and many planes were destroyed. Another attack was carried out against Innsbruck and concentrating on railway installations. Many villages in Bavaria were attacked with explosive bombs. Taking part in the defense, 224 of our fighters shot down 23 enemy planes at a loss of four on our side.

Mediterranean Theater:

The enemy had 520 planes operating in the Italian front area on 12 Jun. and 150 planes attacking traffic targets in central Italy.

During the night of 12 Jun., the usual air activity was observed in the Aegean and in the Balcans whereas 20 harassing planes were reported in the areas of Siena, Bologna and Padua. Nine of our own planes attacked targets in the area Monte Fiascone. Other planes carried out reconnaissance flights.

East Area:

13 Jun., 1944

On the Eastern Front, 307 of our own and 550 operations of enemy planes were reported on 12 Jun. Seven enemy planes were brought down at a loss of one on our side.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea:

1. Area of Naval Group, West:

Enemy Position:

Nothing to report.

Own Position:

One submarine was sighted off the southern coast in the area of Nice. Anti-submarine hunting was unsuccessful. Seven vessels of 2000 BRT were escorted.

2. German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Position:

According to photographic reconnaissance, two destroyers, two steamers and two tankers, one floating dock as well as several patrol boats were in the Maddalena Bay and smaller vessels including thirteen LCJs in the Palau Bay. Several M.T.B.'s were withdrawn from Bastia as compared with 3 Jun. A total of still twenty-six M.T.B.'s, one special vessel and one freighter were recognized in the harbor. The harbor Civitavecchia was also occupied on the evening of 12 Jun. Two medium freighters - presumably these are our own wrecked ships - and eight or ten smaller landing vessels were sighted.

On the morning of 13 Jun., one standard freighter was observed besides the landing vessels whereas three freighters, four - presumably - LST and 20 - 25 landing boats could be discerned in the roads. The harbor control from the air along the Italian western and eastern coasts was continued.

Own Position:

Escort and defense service as well as a reconnaissance sweep were carried out according to plans by three torpedo boats of foreign construction west of Spezia. During an enemy fighter bomber attack on Verazzo no military damage was reported. The block ship SECURITAS of 5366 BRT sunk during an air attack on Leghorn. The hospital ship ERLANGEN was attacked by fighter bombers at 0555 on her way from Viareggio to Genoa. The ship remained unhurt.

13 Jun. 1944

According to a report of German Naval Command, Italy, Italian soldiers and police become more and more unreliable. Desertions occur frequently. Partisan activities behind the front line and in the entire area of Italy are responsible for disturbances in the traffic and communication system as well as for casualties among our personnel. Due to the developments on land the necessity of increased supplies over the sea has disappeared. Only fuel - in addition to cement - will be transported from Genoa to the south by waterway. As no fuel is available at Genoa, the ships are lying idle. On the western side of the Adriatic all unloading has ceased with the exception of fuel. The vessels lying in the harbors between Venedig and Ancona were ordered back to Venice. Admiral, Adriatic was informed by Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch.

3. Area of Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic:

Enemy Position:

At 2030 on 12 Jun., two destroyers were east of Brindisi according to air reconnaissance. At 2150, one vessel was sighted near Rimini and one landing ship off Giulianova at 2330.

On the afternoon of 13 Jun., two war vessels were in the harbor of Lissa whereas two other vessels were entering the harbor. Three war vessels and 15 - 20 smaller boats were sighted in the North Bay of Comiza.

Own Position:

Three boats of 7th PT boat Flotilla entered Split in the night of 12 Jun. Operations in the night of 13 Jun. had to be cancelled because damages sustained during the fight with destroyers had to be repaired.

The tanker ISONZO ran ashore southwest of the entrance of Sibenice harbor following the fight with the destroyers. Four motor minesweepers entered Cherso after an unsuccessful sweeping operation in the Unie-Channel. During an enemy air attack carried out by four-engined formations in the Venice area, one oil tank was set afire. Two of the attacking planes were brought down by naval artillery.

In order to assist German police forces encircled at Arisia, three harbor patrol boats were sent carrying reinforcements from Pola.

13 Jun. 1944

On the Croatian torpedo boat T"7", one cadet, ten non-commissioned officers and ten men deserted. The rest of the crew consisting of 60 men was disarmed and arrested. The vessel was taken in custody by the sea commandant.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Position:

One submarine was cruising off the western coast of Corfu on the afternoon of 12 Jun.

Own Position:

On the 12th, a convoy of four auxiliary sailing vessels and one coastal defense vessel was unsuccessfully attacked with bombs by enemy planes while on the way from Milos to the Piraeus.

The convoy "Anita" cut short the scheduled route because of its low speed. During the night the convoy was located by enemy reconnaissance but no attack took place. It entered Porto Lago at 0630.

One mine each was cleared by minesweeping planes in the approaches of Rhodos and in the Burtzi Narrows. Salvage work was started at the foreign made torpedo boat TA"16" which has been sunk at Iraclion. Seven of the ships so far transferred from the Black Sea require an overhauling as far as can be judged at present.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Position:

According to air reconnaissance only small naval traffic was to be observed off Sevastopol in the night of 12 Jun. Increasing activities of small vessels were observed by radio monitoring - presumably originating in an anti-submarine operation.

Seven armed small vessels were observed operating with mine clearance equipment in the waters of Sevastopol.

According to an agent's report transporters are said to have left Feodosia for Odessa on 7 Jun. in order to transfer an air-borne brigade, one air-borne engineer battalion, one infantry battalion and one landing tank regiment.

In the night of 12 Jun., several Russian planes coming over the sea were operating in the Constanta area dropping twelve bombs near Mangalia and five bombs near the harbor of Constanta. Besides, mines were presumably laid out by planes in the waters off Constanta.

13 Jun. 1944

PT boats were sent out to place weather buoys in the waters southwest of Sevastopol.

Situation on the Danube:

Three freight barges were severely damaged hitting mines near Kilometer indicator 1128, two freighter barges near Kilometer indicator 1203 and three freight barges near Kilometer indicator 1797. Vessels cleared five mines near Kilometer indicator 1528, one mine near Kilometer indicator 1554 and two mines near Kilometer indicator 1556 whereas one mine was cleared by minesweeping planes near Kilometer indicator 1778.

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VIII. Situation in the Far East:

Nothing to report.
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14 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance.

According to press reports, De Gaulle is appointing commissioners for the French homeland and intends to obtain full recognition of his government by USA. According to Reuter, the exile governments of Belgium, Luxemburg and Czechoslovakia recognized the provisional French government.

The Portuguese decree on tungsten production and export was put into force on 13 Jun.

Commander in Chief, Navy is absent from the command station for a conference with Reichminister Speer in Berlin.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff at 1045

I. Commander PT boats reported that 10th PT boat Flotilla will be ready for action with six boats on 1 Aug. and with eight boats on 1 Sept. as scheduled. In case of emergency, operations will be possible at an earlier date if the limited state of training is taken into consideration.

II. Chief, Naval Staff points to the fact that a considerable amount of fuel is required by the 17 submarines of Group "Mitte" out on sea, whereas a few reconnaissance planes could survey a far greater area at considerably smaller costs. With regard to the increasing reports of the last time concerning an invasion in the area of Norway and Denmark and because of certain other indications reconnaissance of the North Sea and of the northern parts of the east coast of England is of particular importance. Supreme Command of the German Air Force, Operations Staff, with copy to Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff (Navy), Naval Command, North and Naval Command, Norway - was requested to take over the reconnaissance duty of Submarine Group "Mitte" with the Air Force and to carry out the daily reconnaissance of the North Sea area between 54 and 61° north. Naval Staff regards the areas of Newcastle, Firth of Forth and Orkney Islands as of preeminent importance. Naval Staff made this request by emphasizing that the enemy succeeded in carrying out the landing in the Seine Bay area as a surprise operation (the invasion fleet left the harbors already in the afternoon of 5 Jun.). In case High Command, Air should be unable to carry out the

14 Jun. 1944

reconnaissance owing to lack of strength or lack of fuel, Naval Staff plans to ask for a decision of Armed Forces, High Command. For copy of the corresponding teletype compare 1/Skl. I L 1763/44 Gkdos, Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

III. Position of the Army:

West Area:

Only few reports arrived as the communication lines to France are partly interrupted. Twenty or twenty one enemy formations have to be reckoned with in the beachhead by now. Some of the enemy divisions are probably badly hurt. As the groups concentrated in southeast England are still kept back and as the close combat formations are limited, a new large scale operation has to be expected between 16 and 20 Jun. A further postponement is possible. The aim of the terrorist movement in France is to concentrate strong resistance groups in the area of the central mountains in order to open large scale fighting between the Loire and Seine rivers. No bigger operations are expected in the Biscayan area.

East of the Orne the enemy reinforced his formations. Along the main landing front the impression was prevailing that a strong enemy offensive on a broad front is imminent. On 13 Jun. the enemy succeeded in breaking through northeast of St. Lo. Enemy forces advanced furthermore southwest of Carentan. A deep break through happened southwest of St. Mere Eglise.

Our own forces in the area Montebourg - Quineville are kept under constant fire of naval artillery directed against the flanks and the rear of our troops. This put heavy strain on our troops as strong enemy air attacks were also allowed to take place without counter action on our side.

East Area:

The General Staff of the Army expects the beginning of the enemy attack within the next few days. Russian mine clearing activities along the southern coast of Finland west of Antonals indicate possible landing operations in the rear of the Finnish front. The Fuehrer wishes that the planning and measures of the Navy cover this possibility.

In Italy the strong attacks along the entire front of 14th Army continue to center on both sides of Lake Bolsena. East of the lake a new deep breakthrough took place forcing our front to a further withdrawal. The enemy follows in a strong pursuit.

14 Jun. 1944

Referring to the opinion of German Naval Command, Italy (compare War Diary 13 Jun.), the Fuehrer decided upon a report of Chief, Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff that Elba has to be defended in any case even if the front should be withdrawn further to the north. The situation of the supplies will be examined. Further orders to be issued later were announced.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Army does not believe that the southern front line can be still defended with the forces available at this moment and regards withdrawal to the Goten-line as unavoidable. Operations Staff, Army fully agrees with the opinion of German Naval Command, Italy and with the statement on the importance of Elba. The memorandum of Naval Staff concerning this question was not reported in detail by Armed Forces High Command, Chief of Operations Staff, Operations Staff. Chief of Navy Section is personally of the opinion that the Fuehrer's decision is not the final decision but that changements are always possible according to the development of the situation.

Conference on the Situation with Commander in Chief, Navy at 1800.

I. During the discussion on the situation in the air, Naval Staff, Operations Division, Naval Air and Air Force Liaison Section reported that the first operations of the Air Force with DM-mines are planned for the night of 14 Jun. 4th Air Corps will be transferred to the west for mine operations at night with He 111 - planes. Also the last bombing group was withdrawn from northern Italy to the western area. Thus, only ground attack planes will remain in Italy.

II. As a supplement to the report on the situation of the Army, Naval Staff, Operations Division, Army Liaison and Land Warfare Section reported that the enemy did not start the big offensive at the landing front as expected. One enemy battalion which had broken through south of Bayeux was annihilated.

From Italy it was reported that bandits are taking part in the fighting in an ever increasing way.

Today the enemy began a new large attack against Viborg in Finland. Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Armies East regards the conquest of the 1939 frontier as the first operational aim of the Russians against Germany. Trends in the concentration of troops indicate the direction of a possible push against Warsaw - Brest Litovsk and towards the Baltic provinces. The situation was therefore regarded as difficult at the Army Group "Mitte".

14 Jun. 1944

III. According to information coming from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, the Fuehrer ordered an investigation whether naval personnel has been withdrawn from the Channel Islands and transported to the continent.

Nothing of this kind is known at Naval Staff. Investigations are being made.

Furthermore, the Fuehrer asked for information on the trial of the new types of submarines and on the results (this will be dealt with by Naval Staff, Submarine Division) as well as on the development of the "Zaunkoenig-torpedoes" for PT boats. A statement of Naval Armaments Department is required for the last item.

IV. Commander in Chief, Navy decided on the degree of readiness to be kept at 10th PT boat Flotilla that the boats should continue the training as planned in order to make the flotilla completely ready for war for later operations. Naval Staff Operations Division, Chief of Operations Branch reported that 6th PT boat Flotilla will move from Baltic Port tonight leaving for Kiel via Libau. The flotilla will stay at Kiel for two days in order to install armor protection and compasses on some of the boats. Naval Staff will insist that the movement has to be carried out as fast as possible and that stop overs will be shortened.

Commander in Chief, Navy ordered that care has to be taken for the speeding up of the work at Kiel.

V. Concerning the question of the withdrawal from Elba, Commander in Chief, Navy ordered that final directives of Armed Forces High Command have to be awaited. If necessary Commander in Chief, Navy will then approach the Fuehrer on the subject.

VI. Commander in Chief, Navy reported the following general results of today's conference at Berlin:

The submarine program will remain without reductions, efforts will be made to increase the PT boat production to twenty five boats per month and to speed up the enlarged construction program for

14 Jun. 1944

small battle weapons. On the other hand the building of motor destroyers was cancelled. The building capacity of submarines of type XXVI W will be used for the constructing of small battle weapons. Generaldirektor Merker will have completed his investigation on the building capacity within a fortnight and will submit specified suggestions. Thereupon, the Navy will make a detailed demand.

The mine program will be carried out separately. Explosives and wire ropes are the bottle necks. All possibilities will be examined by Naval Armament Department.

Commander in Chief, Navy drew the attention of Minister Speer to his fear that the industries in northern Italy will come to a stand still and that the program of small battle weapons will be considerably affected. A great number of these units is being constructed at the dockyards at Genoa and Monfalcone.

VII. Concerning the report of Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Intelligence Division on enemy reports about the invasion, Commander in Chief, Navy emphasized that the Navy is receiving only a comparatively small share of the military information from the secret information service as compared with the Army and the Air Force. Especially, the information of the Army on the distribution of the enemy forces, for example in England is almost complete. In comparison with this, the information important for the Navy is only very poor. Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Intelligence Division explained in this connection that it is very difficult to obtain information for the Navy owing to the great mobility of the units interesting our Navy. Besides, apparently for political reasons, the Navy was strictly forbidden up to the outbreak of war to do any counter intelligence work against Great Britain. After the outbreak of the war it was no more possible to send over efficient spies and agents which are now lacking.

Commander in Chief, Navy emphasized the necessity of an effective improvement of this situation which is most unsatisfactory for the Navy. A specially experienced naval officer will have to be included in the new organization of the Reich Security Central Office.

Special Items.

I. At 2100, Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy reported:

14 Jun. 1944

1. The Fuehrer stated in a directive to Commanding General, West that the mountain range of the Apennin from Spezia to Pesaro is the last barrage against the enemy's penetration into the Po valley which would have immeasurable political and military consequences. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy gave the following additional information referring to this question: At present, this mountain range is not a position providing security against a superior enemy. In order to be used as such enormous work will be necessary for many months. The fighting of Army Group C will have to be conducted with the purpose of gaining time. Orders are given in the Fuehrer's directive that the front has to be stabilized at the latest along the line Piombino - Lake Trasimeno - Civitanova and that this line should be defended. Elba will not be evacuated but has to be defended. The complete extermination of all erroneous speculations among officers and men about the existence of a fortified position in the Apennin is the condition sine qua non for the fulfilment of the task. The strength of a position depends on the strength of its weakest point. Nothing at all does exist in many parts of the Apennin at present.

Fighting conditions in the northern Apennin are not easier but on the contrary they are more difficult. The danger for the coastal flanks is increased because then the enemy will have harbors with a large capacity in the immediate neighborhood such as Leghorn and Ancona and the enemy's risk will be reduced the more the front comes near the intended landing beachhead.

2. The Fuehrer has again ordered that positions on Elba have to be maintained in any case and that the island has to be defended if the front should be withdrawn furthermore. An investigation of the supply conditions is being held. Further orders will be issued separately.

Later in the evening Captain Assmann reported by telephone that developments in Italy already rendered obsolete to a certain extent the directives corresponding to the above paragraph 1).

Naval Staff informed German Naval Command, Italy by telephone that a decision regarding the request of 13 Jun. cannot yet be expected today or tomorrow.

II. On 13 Jun., Naval Command, East, Operations Office reported by telephone:

"The Finns are suffering of a certain nervousness following the Russian

14 Jun. 1944

Russian attack on the Karelian isthmus. This could be felt also after the withdrawal of 6th PT boat Flotilla. The Russians operate with minesweepers along the newly conquered coast and the Finns do not quite know what to do against it.

Naval Command, East does not intend to ask for a permission for 6th PT boat Flotilla to remain at its present place but deemed it advisable as occasion offers to talk to the Finnish military attache about this matter in an assuring way."

Naval Staff informed Naval Attache Department and suggested occasionally to inform the Finnish Attache that Naval Staff is observing the developments in the Gulf of Finland as carefully as ever before even if - at the moment - the situation in the west makes necessary a concentration of German forces in that theatre.

III. German Foreign Office transmitted a telegram of the German minister at Helsinki of 13 Jun. concerning the conference of Generaloberst Dietl and General Erfurth at the German minister. General Erfurth regarded the Russian offensive on the Karelian isthmus as most serious and aiming at distant targets. But the Finnish government had taken all the countermeasures within its power in order to check the Russian advance. Supplies from Germany were a decisive factor in the Finnish defense. The morale of the Finnish Army was good. Generaloberst Dietl had the impression during today's visit that the Finnish president is optimistic regarding the development of the military situation on the Karelian isthmus. Reports, coming in during the conference, that negotiations with Germany about supplies of war material are making progress and that the British are suspecting political motives behind the Russian offensive contributed to increase the president's optimism.

IV. Concerning the operations with DM-mines, the following directives were sent to Group West:

"1. Distribution of the mines to the harbors used as bases for the operations.

2. Probable date of arrival of the mines at the harbors.

3. Plans for the operations have to be reported.

4. For the operation in the Seine Bay, it has to be taken

14 Jun. 1944

into consideration that a number of mines has to be reserved for mining the waters off Le Havre in order to close that harbor effectively if necessary.

5. An answer is required until 0800 on 15 Jun."

V. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Army issued fundamental instructions on the defense against enemy landings based on the experiences made in the Seine Bay to Commanding General West; Commanding General, Southwest; Commanding General, Southeast; Commanding General, Armed Forces Norway and Commanding General, Armed Forces Denmark.

Naval Staff transmitted the instructions to the highest commanding staffs of the Navy. For copy of the corresponding order 18280/44 Gkdos compare War Diary, Special File "Large Scale Enemy Landing."

VI. The Chief, Naval Staff decided that Commander, Submarines Mediterranean will be placed under the authority of Naval Staff, Submarine Division for operational purposes.

VII. Admiral, Black Sea submitted a final report on the withdrawal from the fortress Sevastopol as per 23 Jun. Naval Staff, Operations Division transmitted the report to the other two services as well as to the Fuehrer's Commissioner for Military Historiography and others. For copy of the order 1/Skl I m 16600/44 Gkdos compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV a. In the final summary, Admiral, Black Sea concludes by stating that the Navy has achieved as far as possible with its limited means the task of supplying the Crimean and the fortress Sevastopol as well as of removing the troops accepting full risk of its men and material. The supplying of the Crimean Peninsula and of the fortress Sevastopol was carried out completely and in accordance with the Army's request as far as supply goods had been assembled at the harbors. Thus the Navy met the entire demand of the Army for the defense of the peninsula. During the defense of the Crimea and finally during the defense of the fortress Sevastopol naval land forces made a splendid fight and carried out successfully the task for which they possessed neither the necessary equipment nor the training.

Naval Staff fully concurs with this opinion.

14 Jun. 1944

VIII. Survey of the situation in the convoy and transport service of the Navy during the month of May 1944 is given as an enclosure to "Situation of the Navy on 14 Jun." For copy compare War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

IX. On 14 Jun. Naval Staff, Operations Division, Artillery Section reported to Commander in Chief, Navy on the question of military requirements for mining and barrage equipment. The draft of the report which will be used by Commander in Chief, Navy in his conference with Reichminister Speer is to be found in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

X. At 1920, Naval Command, North reported that 3rd Air Force promised daily reconnaissance flights to be carried out as far as possible in the North Sea and in the western approach of the Channel. 3rd Squadron of Long Range Reconnaissance Group 122 was ordered to comply with the Navy's requirements in cooperation with 1st Coast Patrol Force. No other forces are available at 3rd Air Force. Reconnaissance flights during the day under fighter protection are impossible as all forces are engaged in the fighting area at present.

Naval Command reported in this connection that 1st Coast Patrol Force was ordered to submit its opinion on the prospects of possible reconnaissance operations in order to find out the origin of the explosions; Naval Command suggested to await the answer before taking further steps.

Chief of Naval Staff ordered immediate investigation.

Situation on 14 Jun.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Naval Attache Tokyo transmitted a report from Penang stating that the Japanese intend to land agents probably at Ceylon as well as on the eastern and western coasts of India in September and October respectively. As the Japanese thought German submarines more suitable for the task than Japanese boats, German assistance was asked for.

14 Jun. 1944

Naval Staff, Submarine Division answered that this operation can be carried out only if the boats would operate in the a/m areas starting from Penang. But it is planned to let the submarines return home from Penang without carrying out any operations. Therefore this task can probably not be accepted.

II. West Area.

1. Invasion:

It was understood from the Report No. 15 of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expedition Forces that Carentan was captured by U.S. troops following a fierce battle lasting two days whereas strong German resistance continued in the Tilly section.

According to Report No. 16, light German naval forces tried to approach the Allied communication lines in the night of 12 Jun. but were intercepted and dispersed by naval patrols. PT boats which were attacked by coastal planes near Boulogne early on 13 Jun. were later attacked again by rocket and gunfire from planes. Three ships were sunk at least while others were set afire or damaged. According to further reports, fighting for the possession of Carentan started again. Following the last reports from the front the Germans are again holding the town.

Further reports mentioned continuous and heavy fire of German artillery at the Channel in the Dover area during the night of 12 Jun. Sometimes the fire was sharp and heavy. British long range guns answered the German salvoes.

General Eisenhower reported in a message to Roosevelt that the satisfactory progress of the battle in Normandy is only the beginning of long battles which have to follow before final victory will be won. Operations up to now were only part of a much bigger plan of a combined attack against the fortress Germany which would be executed in cooperation with the Russian troops from the east and with the Allied troops from the Mediterranean. The landing operation across the Channel was hampered by incidents as had never before confronted an invasion army. The wave of Allied forces would now have to pour into the gap which had been opened now and which would be followed by others still to be opened.

According to reports received at Naval Staff the course of events were as follows:

14 Jun. 1944

At 0151, Commander 24th Minesweeper Flotilla reported that he left St. Malo with five boats at 2200.

At 0230, Radio Monitoring Service concluded from an intercepted report at 2113 that thirteen enemy transporters for motor vehicles were stopping anchored and that they would have completed the unloading probably by 0600 on 14 Jun.

At 0410, Naval Command, Channel Islands reported: A fight between our minesweepers and enemy destroyers in BF 3811 and 3815 lasted from 0040 till 0130. Due to lack of locations the coastal artillery was unable to come into action in time.

At 0433, a group commander of 46th Minesweeper Flotilla reported that he entered Cherbourg with five boats at 0305.

At 0805, Group West transmitted the report on the situation at 0600;

1. Bombs were dropped on the radar station Le Havre at 1910 on 13 Jun. and on radar station Antifer at 2000 without doing damage.

2. At 0135, Naval Command, Seine-Somme reported a fire observed since 2348 in 255° from Cape de la Heve probably on a big ship.

3. On 13 Jun., the mine clearance boat R"50" hit a mine and the stern of the boat sunk to the ground.

Besides, Group West reported:

a. All PT boat flotillas stayed in the harbors or discontinued operations owing to the heavy sea.

b. The laying out of "Blitz 6" and Coastal Mine A-barrage was cancelled because of the heavy sea.

c. On its way to Vauville Bay 6th Minesweeping Flotilla had a fight with enemy PT boats near Cape de la Hague. The Minesweeper M"83" sunk but the commandant and 23 of the crew were rescued. The flotilla entered Cherbourg since 0230.

d. At 0042, 24th Minesweeper Flotilla had a fight with enemy destroyers southwest of Jersey. Heavy damages were sustained.

The flotilla entered Jersey.

14 Jun. 1944

At 1040, Group West reported:

During the reported enemy air attack on Battery St. Pair small bombs were dropped producing a very high air pressure.

The bombs exploding at the slightest touching of the ground caused the veins to burst in the men taking shelter in the vicinity of the explosion. At 2140, Battery Blankenese was unsuccessfully attacked by eight enemy planes. Further bombs were dropped on the position of Battery 2/1255 without causing damage. On 13 Jun. the Army Coastal Battery 5/1261 was moved to a new position at the landfront four kilometers northeast of Montebourg. The 3rd Platoon of the Battery 6/231 was ordered to march from Brest for the reinforcement of the landfront at Cherbourg. The Battery 7/1261 reported three guns and one medium field howitzer ready for action again.

At 0235 and 0345 of 14 Jun., Battery Cape de la Heve fired two salvos each on located targets without results being observed.

At 1055, intercepted radio messages revealed that LST 499 sunk.

At 1120, Group West reported upon Naval Staff's request of 13 Jun:

1. The destroying of the harbor installations at St. Vaast was ordered by the Army.

2. The waters north of the roads were fouled with mines by "Blitz 33".

3. It is impossible to mine the roads by our own forces owing to the enemy situation and because of lack of suitable mines.

4. 3rd Air Force was asked to investigate whether the mining could be carried out by forces of 3rd Air Force.

At 1640, Naval Command, Bretagne reported increased enemy reconnaissance in the northern section since 1300.

At 1642, Naval Command, Channel Islands reported that two fighter bombers attacked Battery 1/1265 (Jersey) with gunfire at 0915 without damages or casualties sustained.

14 Jun. 1944

The short battle report on the movement of 8th Destroyer Flotilla from Brest to Cherbourg in the night of 8 Jun. has now been submitted. For copy as per l/Skl. 18270/44 Gkdos compare Special File "Invasion 14 Jun.". It was reported as certain that the results were several hits by artillery fire at the enemy's ships and one torpedo hit. One of the enemy destroyers was left at the scene burning and another destroyer sheered off in flames. During a new fight with two or three cruisers and one or two destroyers a hit by a salvo of ZH 1-torpedoes on what was presumably a cruiser can be taken for certain. A strong fire and explosions could be observed. The artillery fight with enemy destroyers had no visible results. The commander of the flotilla subsequently withdrew with the destroyer Z"32" to the south and later to the east in order to break through towards the Channel Islands. But he decided to give up the attempt to break through to the east and to join up the destroyer Z"24" and the torpedo boat T"24" after Z"24" reported that she had urgently to return to Brest for repair. During this operation, Z"32" was again located by two cruisers. In the course of the ensuing artillery fight which lasted until the ammunition was exhausted and the reloaded spare torpedoes had been fired the boat suffered so many casualties that it has to be beached and blown up under constant fire from the enemy near Ile de Bas at 0520. According to the statement of an officer rescued from the destroyer ZH"1" this boat had to be blown up at 0240 after the entire engine plant had ceased working and after the boat was hit by another torpedo.

At 1705, Group West reported on the situation at 1600:

1. Our own operations during the night of 13 Jun:

a. Because of the sinking of the minesweeper M"83" the presence of 46 sharp EMC-mines with snag lines has to be presumed in 4944,8 N. 0156,9 W.

b. 24th Minesweeper Flotilla had a fight with one enemy cruiser and four or five destroyers in BF 3811 and 3815 between 0042 and 0130. One destroyer was set in flames by artillery fire. The minesweeper M"343" sunk, M"412" entered St. Malo, the other boats, all heavily damaged, entered St. Helier.

2. Plans for the night of 14 Jun:

14 Jun. 1944

a. Plans for the PT boats, torpedo boats and forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West are the same as for last night with the exception of Vauville Bay. No more minelaying is intended from Cherbourg. All mines of Naval Command were released for fouling and destroying the harbor. The supply traffic to Cherbourg was also stopped. Instead, preparations are made for supplying Carteret by auxiliary sailing vessels.

At 1850, Group West reported:

Six bombs were dropped on the Battery 7/1240 at 0847 without causing damage in materials or personnel.

Between 1040 and 1149, the area of Cape de la Heve was kept under spotted fire by heavy naval artillery. Impacts occurred near the lighthouse, the radar station and the battery. Screening the area by smoke is under preparation.

The Battery 3/1254 fired on a heavy cruiser, landing vessels and several transporters at 1118 and 1134. The formation was dispersed.

The same battery fired on a destroyer from 1137 till 1142. Hits were observed on a heavy cruiser and on a destroyer. The targets set up smoke screens.

Trucks arrived safely with 21 centimeter ammunition for the gun of Battery Marcouf which is in action on the landfront.

At 0905, Group West reported:

1. A landing vessel drifting ashore near Etretat was captured carrying reportedly 8000 patrol cans with spirits. Six men of the British Navy were taken prisoner.

2. When engaged in salvage work for 24th Minesweeper Flotilla the boats VP"303" and M"4615" were slightly damaged by bombs and gunfire from planes. One plane was probably shot down.

3. Naval Command, Normandy reported at 1500:

Large convoys under escort observed at northern and eastern coasts of Cotentin. In the morning the town and

14 Jun. 1944

outer harbor of Granville were attacked by bombs and fire from planes. No damage was reported at the harbor.

According to air reconnaissance (Tr.N: sic!) an enemy station reported to nine addresses at 1000: "Returning after discharge. 6000 persons, 3,777 tons of material, 1,620 vehicles, 2,150 (presumably prisoners and wounded) have been loaded up to 1800 on 13 Jun."

No indications were noticed as to the time, place and about the formations taking part.

At 2131, the commanders of 9th and 5th PT boat Flotillas issued instructions for the moving of the base from Cherbourg where only the most urgently required personnel will remain for the time being.

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division received a report of a reliable agent at London of the evening of 11 Jun. According to the report it was the general impression that considerably more forces were engaged as had originally been provided in the invasion plan. The operation against the Seine mouth (Le Havre) was openly admitted by military circles at London to have been a failure. The casualties were declared to be heavy and partly to be very heavy, especially with the airborne divisions. Reports on casualties were strictly kept secret. Neutral observers in London expected a new operation against the Channel Coast, possibly in the direction of the Belgian coast. The situation is regarded confidently and partly optimistic even in serious military circles.

Political and military circles at Stockholm regard Eisenhower's warning to neutral fishers as part of the war of nerves. The same applies to utterances of Stockholm circles that many diversion measures would have to be reckoned within the near future. But the possibility of a diversion operation in southern Norway is regarded as serious.

2. Enemy Position on Other Theatres:

In the area of 19th Group, very active reconnaissance was observed during the day. One plane attacked an unknown target in BF 2693 at 2255. In the rendezvous area, three British and one American units were located in various positions.

3. Own Position in Other Theatres:

14 Jun. 1944

. Atlantic Coast Area:

Planes were observed laying mines off Brest and Lorient during the night of 12 Jun. The harbor guard boat HS"15" hit a mine off Brest on 14 Jun. The boat is being towed in. Three mines were cleared off Lorient and off Brest. At 2200, fighter bombers attacked the radar station Quessant. The radar set remained ready for operation. Six submarines were escorted coming in and one submarine going out.

Channel Waters:

Twenty three patrol positions were reported occupied. Two mines were cleared near Gravelines.

On the occasion of the enemy air attack on the 4th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla on 13 Jun. the crashing of two enemy planes was observed in the waters between Le Treport and Dieppe. Army Coastal Battery 3/1255 shot down a Fortress near Le Treport.

18th Patrol Flotilla shot down one plane together with 36th Minesweeper Flotilla off Calais in the night of 13 Jun.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

North Sea:

Five mines were cleared in the German Bight.

About 20 explosions were reported off the Dutch coast between 2005 and 0315. At 0500 on 14 May (transl. note: sic!) the boats at the patrol position off Hook had a fight with five enemy planes and shot down one of them. Three boats of 13th Patrol Flotilla were unsuccessfully attacked by 20 twin-engined enemy planes west of Hook at 0520.

The convoy 1255 Helder - Borkum was completed.

The special convoy steamer AMERSKERK entered Borkum at 2290, coming from Helder.

14 Jun. 1944

Norway/Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Position:

In the area of 18th Group, 33 planes were counted in operation.

At 0930, Poljarnøje sent a keyword of very high urgency to all submarines in the operation area. A U.S. unit was located in 275° from Svanvik at 2155.

In the afternoon our own air reconnaissance reported a number of freighters and tankers as well as several patrol boats in the waters of the Firth of Forth mouth and two merchantmen steering a southwest course southeast of Peter Head. Normal shipping traffic and patrol activities were also observed in the entrance of Firth of Tay.

2. Own Position:

During the night of 12 Jun., the harbor of Liinahamari was fired upon by the enemy. Considerable material damage was reported. Eleven enemy planes entered the Kiberg area on 12 Jun. and carried out unsuccessful attacks with bombs and gunfire. In the evening, the Battery Berlevaag was also unsuccessfully attacked by twelve enemy planes.

During 12 Jun., reconnaissance flights of the enemy were continuously reported in the Hammerfest area. Furthermore reports came in of 25 planes in the Vardoe area, six planes in the Banak area and 19 in the Petsamo area.

Twenty ships in each direction were escorted to the north and to the south.

Naval Command, Norway investigated the possibilities of laying out a Coastal Mine A barrage and notified that 7,000 mines would probably be required. Naval Staff agreed in principle with the operations proposed and ordered that detailed plans be submitted.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Position:

14 Jun. 1944

Movements of enemy small vessels in the Gulf of Finland were strong as usual. No new conclusions could be obtained from the reconnaissance results on hand.

2. Own Position:

Three patrol positions were occupied on the western coast of Juteland. The Coastal Mine A-operation was cancelled because of the bad weather.

Thirty seven boats were operating in the mine clearance service in the Baltic Sea Entrances as well as 49 boats and 5 minesweeping planes in the Baltic Sea. A total of nine mines was cleared in the western and central parts of the Baltic Sea.

The Guard ship "20" reported the approach of two Swedish planes at 0823 in the waters south of the sound. The ship opened fire on the planes.

On the 13th Jun., the 3rd section of the reinforcement of Seeigel VII b was not laid out in the area of Admiral Eastern Baltic because of the bad weather.

A Torpedo bomber unsuccessfully attacked the motor ship "Linz" north of Dagoe at 0103.

It has been arranged that 6th PT boat Flotilla will start in the evening from Baltic Port for Libau.

V. Submarine Warfare.

The submarine U"275" belonging to the "west boats" left St. Peter Port again and U"269" entered the port in order to charge the batteries. The submarine U"270" shot down a Liberator in BF 5244 in the night of 13 Jun.

The submarine U"671" sent a report that she passed the grid square AM 77 on her way from Group "Mitte" to the Channel.

At Group "Mitte", the submarine U"290" shot probably down an attacking Mosquito at 1508. The boat is returning to Bergen because of damage sustained.

14 Jun. 1944

In the Northern Waters, Group "Trutz" with ten boats moved the patrol line to AB 4828 till AF 2216.

The submarine U"737" left Tromsø in order to bring the weather station to the Bear Island.

In the Mediterranean all boats are on their way back to the bases. It was provided that the first boat having "Schnorchel" equipment will start for the operation area on 22 Jun.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

West Area:

During the day, strong enemy formations attacked air bases in Belgium and Northern France as well as the defense zones in the St. Pol area. This was apparently the reaction for the long range bombardment of the southeast of England by a few rockets beginning on 13th Jun. and for the camouflage of which long range fire of the batteries the Dover Narrows and simultaneous attacks by our planes had been provided.

A strong enemy formation escorted by fighters also attacked aerodromes in western France. Furthermore it was reported that enemy planes constantly entered and attacked the northern part of Le Havre where big fires started in the town. Taking part in the defense were 101 of our fighters which brought down 25 enemy planes. During the night of 14 Jun., strong enemy formations attacked two aerodromes in Belgium and Northern France. The attack on Le Havre was continued with strong formations concentrating on the harbor.

Reich Territory:

In the forenoon a formation of several hundreds of four-engined planes under fighter escort coming from Foggia via Croatia attacked Budapest and concentrated on the Czepelel peninsula and its environs. For the damages in industrial installations compare situation report of the day. Furthermore the aerodrome Kecskemet was attacked where six planes of the "Gigant"-type were destroyed. Our own defense was carried out by 82 fighters which shot down ten enemy planes at a loss of eleven on our side. During the night of 14 Jun., the hydrogenation work at Scholven was attacked.

14 Jun. 1944

About 20 planes coming from the east entered the Brest-Litovsk area presumably in order to supply the partisans.

Mediterranean Theater:

On 13th Jun., about 600 enemy planes were operating at the Italian front and 120 twin-engined fighter bombers in the central Italian area.

In the night of 13 Jun., 50 harassing planes were reported in Northern Italy and 35 planes supplying the bandits in the Balkans.

Eight of our own planes attacked enemy concentrations in the Orbetello-Viterbo area. Other planes were on reconnaissance operations.

East Area:

On the Eastern Front, 259 of our own and about 600 operations of enemy planes were reported on 13 Jun. Thirteen enemy planes were shot down at a loss of one plane on our side.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea.

1. Area of Naval Group West:

Enemy Position:

At 0945, the (convoy) KMS 53 consisting of 22 freighters was reported entering the Mediterranean. At 1700, Algeciras reported the passing of a convoy of 84 ships to the Atlantic.

On the evening of 13 Jun., a U.S. troop transporter carrying cargo entered the Mediterranean accompanied by two destroyers.

Own Position:

Submarine chasing off Nice was without success.

14 Jun, 1944

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Position:

According to air reconnaissance a convoy of 49 ships was steering 160° about 180 miles southeast of Malta at 0815.

One enemy M.T.B. was located by radar southwest of Leghorn in the night of 13 Jun. At 0238, a destroyer was steering north 30 miles south of Orbetello. At 0555, five landing vessels were seen on the beach, eight miles northwest of Tarquinia.

Own Position:

In the night of 13 Jun., two torpedo boats of foreign construction carried out according to plans the mine task "Weide" south of Piombino Narrows. On their way back, the boats sighted enemy M.T.B.'s but no encounter took place. South of Gorgona the boats observed explosions with glare of fire apparently resulting from enemy clearance activity.

On the afternoon of 14 Jun., the harbor defense of Leghorn was again attacked by enemy planes. On this occasion again one block-ship was sunk. German Naval Command, Italy presumed that the enemy intends to keep the harbor Leghorn open in order to use it for out flanking landing operations. The motor minesweeper RA "254" shot down one enemy plane during the attack on Leghorn on 13 Jun.

Three Italian assault boats were sunk by attacking fighter bombers off the Arno mouth at 0600.

During the night of 13 Jun., three mine clearance vessels entered our own barrages on account of a very strong current when on an exploratory sweep ten miles southeast of Leghorn. The exploration had no other results. The entire garrison of the militia barracks at Carrara went over to the bandits on 13 Jun.

3. Area of Naval Group, South:

a. Adriatic:

Enemy Position:

14 Jun. 1944

At 1115, a destroyer was steering east five miles north of Brindisi. According to photographic reconnaissance 2 destroyers, 1 (apparently) gunboat, 3 submarines, 16 freighters, 1 net barrage and many small vessels including 16 landing boats and 47 auxiliary landing boats were at Brindisi at noon.

Own Position:

For the report of 7th PT boat Flotilla about the loss of the PT boat S"153" on 12 Jun. compare teletype 1445.

At 1050, eighteen enemy planes attacked the cement works at Sucuraij. No damages of importance were reported. No other reports came in.

b. Aegean:

Enemy Position:

At 0940, a submarine was sighted south of Coos which submerged after fire was opened on it. Another submarine fired upon Plomarion on the southern coast of Mythelene at about 1700. At 0415, a plane attacked the town and the fortress Corfu with bombs. The Naval Signal Station was damaged.

Own Position:

At noon the convoy "Agatha" left Porto Lago for Rodos.

The Battery Zante Nord of 9th Naval Artillery Regiment 617 reported ready for action on 13 Jun.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Position:

Radio Monitoring Service located two M.T.B.'s, one submarine chaser and two vessels of unknown type on the northern

14 Jun. 1944

part of the east coast up to the waters around Cape Chersonnes. In the evening, the submarine "D" was probably in the south-eastern waters. Therefore the sinking of that submarine by anti-submarine chaser "104" which was presumed on 18 Apr. was not confirmed.

Own Position:

The laying out of the weather buoys was carried out according to schedule. Convoys were escorted along the western coast without incidents.

Situation on the Danube:

The report did not come in.

VIII. Situation in the Far East.

No reports of any particular interest are available.

15 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance

Churchill refused to have a discussion in the House of Commons on Great Britain's relations with de Gaulle at the present moment and remarked that this discussion would better be postponed until the relations between the USA and de Gaulle would be clarified.

Eden declared before the House of Commons that the British ambassador at Ankara had approached the Turkish government concerning the passing of German ships through the Dardanelles whereupon the prime minister had promised a new investigation of the question.

According to Reuter a communique from Washington dealt with the conclusion of the negotiations on the export of Swedish ball bearings to Germany. The communique states that the total export to Germany will be reduced about 50%.

According to a further Router report, the US ambassador at Madrid asked the Spanish Government to stop all export to Germany of goods important for the war.

Also the Polish exile-government recognised the French provisional government.

Conference on the Situation with Commander in Chief, Navy at 1115.

I. During the situation report, Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief of Operations Branch reported on the serious blow caused by the loss of many ships, especially PT boats, during the enemy's large scale attack on Le Havre in the night of 14 June.

Most remarkable was the fact that the shelters for the mine clearance vessels of a strength of three meters were penetrated by the bombs in two places. It has still to be found out up to what extent the dispersal of the vessels had been carried out in the big harbor and how far the shelters for the mine clearance vessels were used by the PT boats.

Long period weather forecasts expect a period of

15 Jun. 1944

maximum in western Europe for the time between 15th and 20th June. Therefore favorable weather conditions have to be reckoned with for landing and air operations.

II. Naval Staff, Quartermaster General reported that 6th PT boat Flotilla will not stop at Kiel on its way to the west but will move without delay to Rotterdam where the necessary supply work will be carried out.

III. Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Communication Service reported that all wire connections between Paris and Germany are cut off again.

IV. A representative of Chief of Naval Armaments Department reported on the question of using the T 5-torpedoes with the PT boats: experiments are being made in cooperation with Commander PT boats. The possibilities of using the T 5 - torpedo depend on the depth of the water and are limited to the G VII e - type as well as to a speed of the enemy of 10 - 18 knots because the speed of the torpedo is only 20 knots. Its military value is therefore limited. The result of the experiments is expected in about a fortnight.

The question of Commander in Chief, Navy whether the PT boats fire the torpedoes with distance ignition was answered as follows:

The TZ 3 torpedoes were released to a restricted extent for Commander PT boats and Commander Destroyers, eight days before the invasion. It could be reckoned therefore only with percussion ignition."

The question of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy will be answered correspondingly.

V. Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Intelligence Division: Concerning the question of passing through the Dardanelles and the resulting political tension it seems advisable to abstain from sending a floating dock through the Dardanelles to the Aegean as was planned.

15 Jun. 1944

The prohibition of fishing along the western European coasts was prolonged by the Allied Supreme commander until 22 Jun., that is to say by one week.

The British Admiralty announced that Vice Admiral Sir Henry Moore was appointed Commanding Admiral of the Home Fleet instead of Admiral Fraser. Admiral Moore has been in charge of the operations during which carrier borne planes attacked the TIRPITZ. No reports are available as to further appointment of Admiral Fraser, The Naval units operating in the waters of Normandy do not belong to the Home Fleet.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

VI. Position of the Army:

In the west the situation is generally consolidated. The enemy admitted that our troops captured the three villages Montebourg, Tilly and Troarn. The enemy air activity was particularly strong. On the enemy side, all battle experienced enemy divisions transferred from the Mediterranean are engaged in the operations with the exception of one airborne division. A total of 23 - 25 formations and many army troops of all kinds are reckoned particularly well equipped with supplies, especially as far as ammunition is concerned.

On the Karelian isthmus, the continued strong attacks of the Russians led to penetrations of the 2nd position at several places. The penetrations which partly went as far as from five to eight kilometers could be blocked as a whole but the situation near Viborg is critical.

In Italy, the heavy fighting is going on. The advanced units of the enemy went as far as five kilometers south of Grosseto. In the Ovietro area the enemy broke through with strong forces.

VII. Report of Naval Staff, Operations Division,
Chief of Operations Branch:

- a. Group West reported the intended distribution

15 Jun. 1944

of DM-mines: Ostend 90, Boulogne 150, Dieppe 100, Le Havre 150, Chateaudun 100 as a reserve to be used at Brest or Malo. The mines provided for Le Havre will arrive at about 17 Jun. The time of arrival of the railway transports via the Netherlands to Ostend cannot be foreseen. The other places will get the mines about on 19 Jun. It is planned to lay the mines in the Seine Bay starting from Le Havre north of 4926 north in the waters up to a depth of 30 meters and for the time being west of 0° 29 minutes west. Off the other harbors, the Blitz-barrages and flank barrage system will be reinforced according to the depths. Fifty mines were provided for the closing of Le Havre. The group reported that operations starting from Le Havre are not likely as a result of today's air attack.

b. Referring to the report on the Fuehrer's directive on the conduct of fighting in Italy (compare War Diary 14 Jun.), Commander in Chief, Navy ordered that Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command Italy should be informed on the Fuehrer's directive to Commanding General, South West in order to let him know the reasons for the non-acceptance of the statement on the withdrawal from Elba which had been transmitted by him.

The information was given by the teletype 1/Skl 1762/44 Gkdos, Chfs. For copy compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

c. Naval Command, Norway informed Naval Staff by way of notice on the directives given to the battle group concerning the operations of 4th Destroyer Flotilla in case of an enemy landing. Until the TIRPITZ will be ready for war from the technical as well as from the personnel point of view, it is intended to send 4th Destroyer Flotilla with all its boats to the landing scene. The battle group reported in this connection that in a very urgent case of emergency the TIRPITZ will be ready at any moment with certain reservations as reported before. The battleship will be in restricted war readiness from 26 Jun. onward and in full war readiness on 6 Jul.

In the opinion of the Naval Staff, the TIRPITZ will have to go into action also in restricted war readiness in case of an enemy landing operation in the Alta area.

15 Jun. 1944

d. Upon a suggestion of Naval Command, Norway Naval Staff - in order to make errors impossible - supplemented the directive for the operations of the battle group of 28 May by ordering Naval Command, Norway to submit a suggestion to Commander in Chief, Navy for his decision on the starting of operations. For copies of the teletypes exchanged with the Naval Command, Norway as per 1/Skl 1739/44 Gkdos, Chfs and 1527/44 Gkdos, Chfs 2nd copy compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

Conference on the Situation with Commander in Chief, Navy at 1800.

I. Due to the interrupted communications, no supplementary reports came in from the western area concerning the situation of the Army and on the aerial warfare.

II. Commander in Chief, Navy ascertained by a telephone call to Commanding Admiral, Naval Group West that the vessels in the harbor of Le Havre had been dispersed as far as possible and that also the shelters available for motor mine sweepers had been used. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff Navy will be informed before the evening conference in order to be able to report to the Fuehrer. The penetration of a three meter shelter is most alarming. The Fuehrer ordered the Director of Organisation Todt to make the necessary investigation. Commander in Chief, Navy ordered Chief of Naval Armaments Department / B to investigate the matter.

III. The Fuehrer ordered upon a report of the German embassy at Madrid to the German Foreign Office that Naval Staff be informed, that military actions should be abstained from in Spanish territorial waters and that the Spanish ore traffic should be carried on with due precautions as suggested by the ambassador.

Commander in Chief, Navy ordered to let Captain Assmann find out whether it is intended that our units should

15 Jun. 1944

sacrifice our crews without resistance in case they are attacked in the Spanish territorial waters by enemy submarines or planes.

IV. Naval Staff, Quartermaster General reported that the Air Force withdrew two anti-aircraft batteries and search light batteries, from the defense of Flensburg. The protest of the Navy was not taken into consideration.

Commander in Chief, Navy ordered that Naval Command, East should submit a suggestion on the possibility of dispersing our forces at Flensburg.

Furthermore, Quartermaster General reported that the Organisation of Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea will be established on 18 Jun.

V. Admiral, Small Battle Units reported upon a question of Commander in Chief, Navy that "Neger" and "Linse" are not depending on harbor facilities for their operations. They are able to operate also from the beach as soon as the formations will be equipped with the necessary vehicles.

VI. According to informations from the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff Navy the suspicions of intended enemy landings on the Finnish coast were again confirmed and proved true by reports of the alleged transfer of two landing brigades to Kronstadt. The Fuehrer ordered careful observation and asked for an immediate investigation whether and by which means the Navy will be able to assist the Finns by concentrating naval forces in the inner Gulf of Finland. The Fuehrer suggested immediately to move in cooperation with the Finns further German forces to Finnish ports, to Kotka for example or even further east in order to annihilate enemy landing attempts in the rear of the Finnish front.

Thereupon Naval Staff issued the following directive to Naval Command, East with copy to Admiral, Eastern

15 Jun. 1944

Baltic Sea:

A. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff Navy wired:

1. On 14 Jun.:

German Counter Intelligence Service confirmed that the first aim of the Russian attack on the isthmus of Karelia is to capture Viborg. Russian mine clearance activities on the south coast of Finland near Antonals in connection with the German Counter Intelligence Service report indicate landing operations in the rear of the Finnish front as possible.

2. On 15 Jun.:

The strong Russian attack against the Finnish front is going on. Several enemy penetrations at the second position were mostly removed. One has to reckon with a further continuation and increasing strength of the attacks. The suspicion of landing plans was confirmed by a report on the alleged transfer to Kronstadt of two landing brigades.

B. The present situation requires an increased alertness and concentration of all suitable forces for the assistance of the Finns in the inner Gulf of Finland, and it requires especially that a landing behind the front can be averted. For that purpose it is suggested that the lighter units shall advance with the approval of the Finns to the skerry area also east of Kotka and bringing the naval landing craft as close to the Finnish land front as possible in order to enable these forces to come into action immediately in case of a landing attempt of the enemy.

C. Naval Command, Baltic Sea will immediately take the necessary measures and will report on its plans and also on suggestions which it might have to make.

It has to be taken into consideration:

1. How the withdrawal of 6th PT boat Flotilla which became necessary because of the situation in the western area can be compensated by other forces.

2. Up to what extent reinforcements are required for the Gulf of Finland by bringing in forces from the Baltic Sea."

15 Jun. 1944

V.T. According to information coming from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff Navy, the situation at Cotentin on the front east of Montebourg is strained. The forces operating in that area are vanishing apace under the uninterrupted fire of the enemy's naval artillery and constant bombing attacks. Eliminating of the enemy heavy naval forces would be particularly required at that place. The situation in the bandit warfare in the interior of France has considerably improved following our swift and strong action.

Special Items

I. Referring to "Rotbuche":

Naval Command, East reported that it is planned to provide anti-aircraft protection for "Rotbuche" by four motor minesweepers and by withdrawing the Narva Patrol to the mooring grounds of the PRINZ EUGEN. The general situation in the Gulf of Finland may, under certain circumstances, frustrate these plans. In this case, anti-aircraft defense against low flying planes would have to be posted on the skerries. Four or six 2 centimeter guns of the 38-type are regarded as sufficient for each mooring place including the alternate position at Oerroe. Naval Command, East suggested to send the 2 centimeter guns mounted on land gun carriages together with the crews along with the PRINZ EUGEN on its first movement to the scene and subsequently to test the various positions.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division was asked by Naval Staff, Operations Division to speed up its further steps as the carrying out of "Rotbuche" is planned for the end of June and may become necessary any moment if the developments of the situation should indicate it. For copy of the corresponding order compare 1/Skl 1771/44 Gkdos, Chfs in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

II. Naval Staff transmitted to the German Air Minister and Commander in Chief, Air Force in helicopter aircraft for operations at sea. For copy of the letter 1/Skl I.L. 18054/44 Gkdos compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. V.

15 Jun. 1944

Situation on 15 Jun. 1944.

I. War in Foreign Waters

Naval Staff, Submarine Division submitted the operation order Colon for the submarine U "214". By this operation the waters off Colon and off the approach to Guantanamo will be fouled with mines. For copy as per 1/Skl 1675/44 Gkdos, Chfs compare the files 1/Skl I E.

II. Situation in the West Area.

1. Invasion:

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division learned from a reliable source in England on 12 Jun. that all Dutch war vessels in England including amongst others 2nd and 3rd Dutch Mine Sweeper Flotilla are concentrated with about 16 ships at Chatham and Sheerness. It was reported by the same source that the gross of the transporters assembled for the invasion totalling 5 - 600,000 BRT is still waiting in the harbors of the Briston Channel. The freight tonnage for the invasion concentrated in that area increased to 1.5 million BRT. The troop transporters and the bulk of the supply freighters would come into action only after a harbor of sufficient capacity would be made available.

Report No. 18 of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expedition Forces stated on the fight of 24th Mine-clearance Flotilla near Jersey in the night of 14 Jun. that seven German mineclearance vessels of the M-class were cornered by the Polish ship PIORUN and the large destroyer ASHANTI. Three of the seven German ships were allegedly sunk and one was reported apparently sunk. Two of the remaining three were left behind stopped and burning strongly. On the other hand the battle report of Commander, 24th Mineclearance Flotilla told of one cruiser with four or perhaps five destroyers and of the taking part of several M.T.B.s. It has been reported already on our own losses (compare War Diary of 14 Jun.)

By confronting these two reports one can see the tremendous difference of

15 Jun, 1944

the impressions and observations of both sides also during this night operation

The first heavy flow sustained by our own naval forces in the course of invasion was effected by the particularly heavy air attack which was carried out on Le Havre in the evening of 14 Jun. and in the early morning hours of 15 Jun. with the openly declared intention to fight our PT boats. The following important reports came in on the course of events:

At 0130, Group West reported a heavy bombing attack on Le Havre at 2233. The heaviest damages were reported on our naval forces. Fires started at about seven places in the harbor. This report was immediately to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy; German Air Force, Operations Staff, Navy and to Naval Liaison Officer at High Command, Army.

At 0720, Group West reported further details. The first attack at 2233 was carried out by 120 liberators. A further attack was carried out at 0100. Heavy damages occurred in the town and in the harbor. The following losses were reported up to 0600: the FALKE and the JAGUAR sunk. The MOEWE heavily damaged, the torpedoboat T "28" lightly damaged.

The patrol boats V "1505", "207", and three boats of Guard Ship Group were sunk. The patrol boat of foreign construction PA "2", and V "1506" are burning, V "1511" is still afloat.

Two boats of the Guard Ship Group are damaged. The minesweeper M "3855" and the motor minesweeper of foreign constructions RA "9" were sunk, M "3800" and "3801" suffered minor damages and M "3853" had heavy damages. All other RA-boats were damaged but are underslung and kept afloat.

The motor minesweeper R "182" and one boat of 4th Mine Clearance Flotilla sunk off the shelter. The shelter entrance is blocked at low tide. The roof of the shelter was penetrated twice. Some boats were damaged by the bombs. The PT boat losses are not yet known. Casualties are small.

At 0020, the Group reported on the activities of the

15 Jun. 1944

coastal batteries on 14 Jun. According to the report an enemy destroyer group and M.T.B.s were forced by coastal batteries to sheer off at the northern coast of Contentin in the night of 13 Jun. Between 1330 and 1400 the Battery 6/1255 successfully fired upon an enemy formation of one heavy cruiser, many smaller ships and boats in the north western part of the Orne section. The salvoes covered the heavy cruiser. The targets set up smoke screens. One kilometer further to the north, a second formation was fired upon. It dissolved putting up a smoke screen after being covered by artillery fire and carried on with only sporadic nuisance fire. From 1633 until 1644 the 3rd Battery of 1255 fired nine well marked rounds against a group of transporters. This formation also put up smoke screens. The battery was thereupon unsuccessfully bombarded by naval artillery. The 4th and 9th Batteries 1261 were withdrawn from the coastal positions. The division ordered their taking part in the land defenses. This was approved by Commanding Officer of Army Group B in spite of the objections of Group West.

At 0545 Radar Station Frehel was reported ready for operation again.

At 0720 Group West reported on its own activities during the night of 14 Jun.:

8th PT boat Flotilla did not leave the harbor owing to the rough sea. The other plans were cancelled because of the air attack on Le Havre. In the location reports of the night, enemy targets were reported at 2352, twenty miles west of Boulogne and between 2350 till 0218, twelve miles west and six miles north of Fecamp. Other targets were located west of Le Havre and in the waters off Barfleur in the section north to northeast of Cape de la Hague.

Air reconnaissance reported at 2315 larger ship concentrations densely covered by smoke screens in three waves, one behind the other from BF 3682 up to the Seine mouth and at 0235 an unusual number of landing boats along the entire east coast.

On her way from Peter Port to Malo, the submarine U "4610" shot down two fighter bombers and one four engined enemy plane.

15 Jun. 1944

According to a report by telephone of Commander PT boats to Commander in Chief, Navy, twelve or thirteen PT boats were sunk during the air attack on Le Havre.

At 1020 Radio Monitoring Service transmitted intercepted enemy reports of 0410 and 0514 on the laying out of mines with parachutes by our own planes in various areas.

At 1001 It was reported that LST 133 hit a mine near the buoy 14 C.

It can be concluded from further reports that the enemy suspects that mines have been laid out by planes in the channel near buoy C 34. Apparently mines were laid on one of the cleared routes.

At 1110 Group West supplemented its report on the losses at Le Havre:

1. The MOEWE sunk.

2. The PT boats lost nine boats completely. One boat was beached, on another boat the foreship was torn off, one boat tilted over in the dock and was destroyed. One PT boat is ready for war in a restricted sense and one is ready for war. Twenty men are missing up to now, Kirbach and two of the commanding officers are wounded. No reports came in of Commander, 5th Torpedo-boat Flotilla as he was probably on board of a torpedo boat during the attack.

At 1114 Naval Command, Channel Islands reported a strong attack of fighter bombers on the harbor Peter Port where the submarine U "269" was damaged and the patrol boat VP "250" was sunk. Only unimportant damage was done in the harbor.

At 1200 Group West reported the carrying out of further destructions at Cherbourg:

The dock-gate Homet was blown up. Along the "Normandie" pier LMF-mines were laid out. Explosion trials were satisfactory. The charges at "France" pier are going to be reinforced. Probably the work will be completed by noon on 15 Jun. The total destruction of the port-station will be guaranteed by minelayers.

15 Jun. 1944

At 1540 Commander PT boats was instructed by Group West to operate in the night of 14 Jun. as was ordered for the previous night.

Due to the loss of many PT boats at Le Havre the operational possibilities of this force which has been so very successful up to now is considerably reduced. According to investigations made at Naval Staff the following situation was prevailing at 1500 regarding the war readiness of the PT boats:

Cherbourg: 9th PT boat Flotilla, three boats ready for war.
5th PT boat Flotilla, S "112" ready for sailing.

Le Havre: Of 9th PT boat Flotilla, S "167" ready for war, S "144" restricted sailing readiness.

Boulogne: 2nd PT boat Flotilla, two boats ready for war.
4th PT boat Flotilla, two boats ready for war.

Ostend: 2nd PT boat Flotilla, two boats ready for war.
8th PT boat Flotilla, three boats ready for war.

In the channel there are altogether thirteen boats ready for war, one boat ready for sailing, one boat in restricted sailing readiness. Two boats of 2nd PT boat Flotilla at Amsterdam will probably become ready for war on 24 Jun.

The attack against Le Havre which was carried out by large forces shows how serious became the losses of the enemy inflicted by our naval forces. The War Diary of Group West contains the following compilation of successes during the period from 6 to 13 Jun.:

1. PT boats

a. war ships

sunk: 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers

probably sunk: 1 PT boat

torpedoed: 1 destroyer

hits heard: 1 hit in a formation of cruisers and destroyers, 2 probable hits on a cruiser formation.

15 Jun. 1944

b. landing boats:

sunk: 14 LST or landing vessels re-
spectively with 22,150 BRT, 1 landing
vessel of unknown tonnage.

probably sunk: 1 LST with 3,000 BRT

torpedoed: 1 LST of 3,000 BRT.

c. freight tonnage:

sunk: 5 freighters with 12,900 BRT

torpedoed: 1 steamer of medium size,
1 special vessel of 10,000 BRT

2. torpedoboats and destroyers

torpedoed: 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers

set in flames by artillery fire: 1 destroyer
explosions heard on 2 ships.

3. coastal artillery

sunk: 2 destroyers, 1 cruiser or destroyer,
several landing boats and one big landing
boat.

hits observed on 1 cruiser, 7 landing boats
and 1 transporter.

4. Forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West:

27 planes shot down, 8 PT boats and gunboats
damaged.

5. mine successes:

2 destroyers, 1 hospital ship, 3 unknown
vessels, 1 landing vessel.

Part of the above successes was confirmed
by radio monitoring.

On our side, the following losses were sustained up to
the noon of 15 Jun.: 2 destroyers, 3 torpedoboats, 16
PT boats (including 10 at Le Havre), 9 patrol boats, 3
mine sweepers, 6 motor minesweepers, 2 harbor guard ships.
Furthermore, heavy damages occurred on 1 destroyer, 4 PT
boats, 5 patrol boats and 1 minesweeper.

Casualties up to 13 Jun. were 102 killed and 223 injured.

15 Jun. 1944

Besides, the crew of the destroyer ZH "1" is missing with exception of 1 officer and 28 men. Furthermore about 17 to 20 men were killed on the destroyer Z "32" and several others were seriously wounded. Exact figures of the casualties at Le Havre did not come in yet.

These figures show the undaunted fighting spirit of the light naval forces which fought under the most difficult conditions against extraordinarily superior forces and which were exposed to the enemy's air superiority to an extent beyond imagination.

Lately, several commanding officers asked the Chief, Naval Staff in the course of telephone calls to issue detailed information on the general situation. Thereupon, Chief of Naval Staff sent the following directive to the commanding officers of Group South; Group West; Naval Command, Norway, North and East and to the Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy:

1. Naval Staff is always endeavoring to give the newest and most comprehensive information on the situation to the higher command stations of the Navy. Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division issue nine teletypes for this purpose from 7 to 13 Jun. which contained all information available at Naval Staff.

2. In addition to the usual information on the situation of the Navy, Operations Staff can issue special information only in case conclusions are to be drawn which do not directly result from our own or enemy information. The opinion of Naval Staff, Operations Division as given under 17346/44 Gkdos of 7 Jun. has not undergone any changes.

At 1915, Group West reported plans for the night of 15 - 16 Jun.:

1. The forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West will operate as planned yesterday. Furthermore, the remaining three boats of 24th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla will move to Malo.

2. PT boats:

a. Four boats of 2nd PT boat Flotilla, for the

15 Jun. 1944

time being, will start for reconnaissance cruises in the area Dover-Dungenes,

b. During the patrol of the coastal waters, 8th PT boat Flotilla will attack with torpedoes the convoy route in the Orfrodnes area.

3. Supplies for the Army to be carried by small vessels from Malo to Granvillo. Because of the urgency of the matter, Commanding Admiral, Defenses West was ordered by Group West to protect by all means and to assist the transports of Army-goods which are scheduled from St. Malo to Granville and which have to be carried as far as Requeville if possible. The convoy station Malo was ordered by Commanding Admiral, Defenses West to reconnoiter Regneville immediately and to man the transport vessels by personnel of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West as far as it becomes necessary.

At 2015, Group West sent a preliminary report on the casualties of 5th Torpedo boat Flotilla during the air attack on Le Havre:

About 80 men killed or missing and 70 - 80 injured. The commanding officers of the JAGUAR and of the FALKE as well as the first officer of the JAGUAR were killed.

- In the evening, Group West reported more details from Le Havre and transmitted its opinion as follows:

The situation in the naval warfare at the Seine Bay has fundamentally changed due to the air attack on Le Havre and owing to the increasing difficulties in supplying Cherbourg via land or sea. No other ports are suitable bases for operations against the enemy supply of the Seine Bay because distances are too long and the nights are too short. The attack on Le Havre proves that naval forces which became a serious danger for the enemy can always be destroyed in a harbor if they are not protected by shelters. Detail information on the situation:

1. Le Havre:

a. The fact that the enemy gave up the tactics

15 Jun. 1944

pursued up to the present of considerations for the harbor is an indirect confession of the considerable damages done by naval forces.

b. PT boats: The operational possibilities are strongly reduced following the loss of 18 boats (6 lost in battle, 12 lost at Le Havre). New successes of any importance are possible only after new forces have been added.

c. Mine warfare: Continuing of mine operations is possible only at a reduced scale owing to the losses sustained by the forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West and by the torpedoboats at Le Havre.

2. Cherbourg:

a. The possibilities of using the harbor as an operational base are heavily reduced because supplies are no more feasible on the routes from Malo which were used up to now because every night a formation of enemy cruisers and destroyers is operating in the waters of the Channel Islands. Transports are furthermore rendered more difficult by fighter bombers constantly patrolling the waters since our submarines appeared on the scene (three attacks on Peter Port and Guernsey within the last 24 hours). Investigations are being made at present transport possibilities for smaller cargoes via Carteret carried out by auxiliary sailing vessels.

3. Sea traffic from the Channel area to Brest is impracticable for the time being because the northern coast of Bretagne is constantly controlled by strong enemy formations.

4. Plans of Group West:

The operative warfare against the enemy supplies will be continued as far as possible with the means still at hand. Owing to the weakness of our forces successes will probably be smaller whilst the losses will increase.

5. No decision was made as yet on isolated operations of the torpedoboat T "28" after reparation works will be completed.

15 Jun. 1944

At 2115, Group West reported on the activities of the coastal batteries: From 1400 - 1900 and from 1930 - 2030 on 14 Jun. the Battery 3/1255 was unsuccessfully fired upon by one battleship, two cruisers, one destroyer and three or four artillery carriers with several hundred of rounds of all calibres at a distance of about 20 kilometers. The battery fired on enemy naval targets at 1730 while under a bombardment from a heavy enemy cruiser.

At 2020, the Battery "Blankenese" was fired upon by low flying planes. The guns remained ready for action.

From 0007 to 0148 on 15 Jun., located enemy targets were fired upon north of Cape de la Hague at a distance of 15 kilometers. Hits were probably made. At 0020, the Battery "Painpol" fired three salvos on located targets. The 3rd Battery 1255 fired against an enemy transporter at a distance of 16.5 kilometers from 1120 to 1200. The target set up a smoke screen. One barrage balloon was shot down. At 1120, the Battery 3/1255 was bombarded by a heavy cruiser and subsequently by two artillery carriers. No casualties occurred. Battery 4/1261 is operating at the landfront south east of Cherbourg. The transfer of Battery 9/1261 is being prepared for. 10th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla reported that the patrolboats "206", "212", and "221" which were blown up by their own crews at Blainville observed the shooting down of ten enemy planes.

At 2330, Group West transmitted a preliminary short report on the air attack against Le Havre. According to this report, the first attack was carried out from 2230 to 2255 by 5 - 800 bombers and the attack from 0115 - 0121 by 30 bombers dropping bombs of all calibers including phosphor bombs. In addition to the shipping losses already reported, the mining and barrage store with the ammunition kept in readiness for blowing up the harbor was destroyed. The LMB-mines and most of the EMC-mines on the switching yard were annihilated. Two 10.5 centimeter guns of Naval Artillery Regiment 266 are damaged. Most bridges are blocked in the harbor area. The roof of the shelter for mine clearance boats which had been penetrated was made ready for use again by filling. The torpedo regulating room was destroyed. Many torpedoheads burned out. Casualties of the Navy are about 200 dead and 100 injured. Commander, 5th

15 Jun. 1944

Torpedoboat Flotilla is missing.

Upon instructions on the situation issued by Armed Forces, Operations Staff, Navy concerning the strained situation at Cotentin on the front East of Montebourg, Naval Staff transmitted to Group West that the waters between the Vire-mouth and St. Vaast are to be released for unrestricted air to air mine operations because our own naval forces are not more in a position to operate in that area. Group West was instructed to arrange details in cooperation with 3rd Air Force.

2. Enemy Position on Other Theatres:

In the area of 19th Group, normal activities were observed. During the afternoon and in the evening, reports were intercepted on the sighting of submarines in the waters north of Cherbourg, south of Devenport and north of Brest. Four locations of British ships were made out in the waters west of Ireland and off the outer Biscayan and two locations in the invasion area.

3. Own Position on Other Theaters:

Atlantic Coast Area:

Nineteen patrol positions were occupied. Eight mines were cleared off Brest and four mines off Lorient. Seven submarines were escorted coming in and one submarine going out. The radar interception set at Brignonan near Brest was fired upon by two enemy planes at 1715.

Channel Waters:

Fifteen patrol positions were occupied. One mine was cleared off Calais. At 0154, enemy fighter bombers attacked patrol boats off Boulogne, causing slight damages.

From 2235 to 2308 a heavy air attack was carried out by several hundreds of four-engined planes against the harbor and the town of Boulogne as well as against the

15 Jun. 1944

environs. Reports on the damages caused did not come in yet.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

North Sea:

Danish fishermen observed minesweepers with mine-sweeping equipment 116 miles west of Esbjerg on the afternoon of 13 Jun. In this connection, Naval Command, East pointed to the necessity of investigating once more the possibilities of air reconnaissance.

On 15 Jun., three mines were cleared in the German Bight. Enemy air attacks were carried out in the Cuxhaven and Brunsbuettel area. No military damages occurred. Further bombs were reportedly dropped on the convoy Weser-Elbe off the Elbe mouth.

The Patrolboat VP "1104" was damaged by hitting a mine and was towed in. A defense cutter sank near List after hitting a mine.

From 0043 to 0340, again several explosions were observed off the Dutch coast. Four ELM/A-mines were cleared off Hook.

The Patrolboat Group 2016 was continuously attacked by PT boats from 0325 to 0439. The 9th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla was dispatched for assistance and took part in the fighting since 0345. One of the gunboats, apparently one of a newer type was sunk and another boat of the enemy being damaged was towed away. One of our patrolboats was slightly damaged.

At 0130, an enemy air attack on 34th Minesweeper Flotilla was warded off in LN 8579.

At 0557, the special convoy "Amerskork" was attacked with bombs and torpedoes by 40 enemy planes off the Ems-river. The steamer AMERSKERK sunk. The PT boat escort vessel NACHTIGALL (3,500 PRT) was heavily damaged and sunk 1630 following a new air attack after unsuccessful attempts of towing her in and after the inventory had been salvaged. Besides, the minesweeper M "103" was sunk.

15 Jun. 1944

The crew of the AMERSKERK and of the minesweeper H "103" were rescued.

Naval Command, North drew the attention of the Air Force "Reich" to the lack of fighter protection of this valuable convoy and asked for information whether - in view of this important success of the enemy - there was any hope of obtaining assistance in case of future requests for fighter protection.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Position:

In the area of 18th Group, 31 planes were observed operating over the North Sea.

Russian reconnaissance planes transmitted reports on many German planes in the Polar coast area. In the evening, Russian destroyers which were out on sea received an urgent radio message.

In the afternoon of 13 Jun., three reconnaissance planes were in the Alta area and one in the night of 13 Jun. Therefore it has to be suspected that the anchorage places were reconnoitered.

2. Own Position:

In the night of 14 Jun., one of our convoys on its way from Kirkenes to Petsamo was fired upon several times by enemy batteries off the Petsamo approach and was subsequently attacked by bombs and fire from 20 - 30 enemy planes. Minor damages were sustained on one of the steamers. The attacking planes were forced away by our fighters which shot down nine enemy planes. Immediately afterwards the convoy was attacked by four enemy PT boats which could be repulsed by the Battery "Sensenhauer". One of the PT boats was hit.

On the occasion of an enemy air attack on the battery and on the village Kiberg at 2323 on 13 June, one of the nine attacking planes was shot down.

15 Jun. 1944

Forty-nine ships were escorted to the north and twenty-five to the south.

On 6 Jun., the German Security Service observed strong enemy agent activities in the area of northern Norway. Considerable arms dumps were discovered. One group of agents had the order to seize an aerodrome upon receiving a keyword and to defend it until the arrival of air-borne troops.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Position:

According to reports of Danish fishermen a cruiser with two funnels escorted by planes was sighted in AN 6444 on 12 Jun.

The Finns reported strong Russian clearance formations on varying courses in the waters north east to north west of Schepel during the night of 14 Jun. These were again observed by our air reconnaissance at 1035 on 15 Jun.

2. Own Position:

The transfer of 89th infantry division from Oslo was ordered. The first group will leave Oslo for Aarhus at 0200 on 17 Jun.

Two patrol positions were occupied on the western coast of Juteland. The Coastal Mine A-operation had to be discontinued owing to the bad weather.

At 1654, the troop transporter NEIDENFELS received a leakage by hitting a mine on her way from Aarhus to Oslo. The ship returned to Aarhus by her own means.

Thirty-six boats were out on mine clearance duties in the Baltic Sea Entrances and seventeen boats, one Sperrbrecher and six minesweeping planes in the Baltic Sea, five mines were cleared in the Baltic Sea.

15 Jun. 1944

The Guardship "21" fired upon two Swedish planes at 1020 and Guardship "20" fired upon two planes of unknown nationality at 1040.

In the Narva defense 4 minesweepers, 1 patrol boat, 1 Flak carrier, 4 artillery ferry barges and 4 armed fishing vessels were on duty. Beginning at 0715, our defenses were attacked twice by 60 and 50 enemy planes under fighter escort. Casualties and damages at the weapons occurred at some of the boats. Five enemy planes were reported shot down.

At 2345 on 14 Jun., the motor minesweeper R "73" entered Section 2 of the reinforced Seeigel and sunk.

6th PT boat Flotilla left Baltic Port at 0300 and reached Libau at 1600. The Flotilla continued its voyage to Swinemuende at 2000.

Six Naval landing craft will be placed at the disposition of the Finnish Naval Staff on 16 June. Furthermore 39 cutting floats and 79 explosive floats were given to the Finns. The Finns laid out the Pistin II-barrage.

Commander 1st Minesweeper Flotilla reported a contact with three Russian PT boats in AO 3744 lasting from 2347 until shortly after midnight. The formation avoided several torpedoes and damaged one enemy.

The 2nd section of the Coastal Mine A-barrage was laid out according to plans.

As the Finnish front was penetrated and as the withdrawal from the Carelian coast has to be expected the Finnish naval forces will be concentrated in the waters of Koivisto with the exception of the armored ship.

At 1930 on 14 Jun., our reconnaissance planes observed the missing coastal mine boat surrounded by several smaller boats on the eastern shore of Lake Peipsi. The boat is to be destroyed by dive bombers. The navy artillery lighter MAL "17" was reported ready for war as number 5 of the boats.

V. Submarine Warfare.

15 Jun. 1944

Of the 17 submarines in the Bay of Biscay which were ordered back fourteen have so far returned to the harbors. According to report of Admiral, Submarines, the submarine U "269" was not damaged during the enemy air raid on Peter Port.

One of our returning submarines reported for certain that fishing vessels were locating in BF 6474.

No other events of importance.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

West Area:

During the day, the enemy attacked with stronger formations, towns and aerodromes in western France. Arles and several Aerodromes in the same area were attacked by 100 enemy planes coming from the south. Besides, the aerodrome Merignac was attacked by 150 enemy planes. On this occasion, two FW 190 planes, seven He 177, one FW 200 and two Ju 88 planes were destroyed.

In the night of 15 Jun. smaller enemy forces attacked aerodromes in Belgium and Northern France. An attack was carried out by strong forces against the harbor and the town of Boulogne. A further strong formation attacked the freight yard at Valenciennes.

The following reports arrived on our own operations:

On 14 Jun., 244 fighters were out for free lance fighting during daylight, and 44 planes for the defense of the approach roads. Thirtytwo enemy planes were shot down at a loss of 33 on our side.

In the night of 14 Jun., 53 bombers of 2nd Air Force Division were operating against naval targets in the area Barfleur-Wight. The following successes were reported: One transporter, six freighters with a total of 50,000 BRT and one destroyer were damaged. Two of our planes were lost.

Eightyone planes of the 9th Air Corps fouled the Seine Bay with mines and attacked naval targets. One trans-

15 Jun. 1944

porter and four freighters with more than 20,000 PRT were damaged. Besides, it was observed that one boat was hit in a concentration of landing boats on the beach. Seven of our own planes were lost.

On 15 Jun., 151 of our fighters were attacking targets in the landing beachhead and 49 fighters were operating for the road defenses.

In the night of 15 Jun., 48 bombers carried out the mine task in the Seine Bay (laying of DM-mines). Thirtysix bombers attacked unloading ships off the Orne and Vire mouths and twelve planes attacked aerodromes in the landing beachhead. Thirtyfive night fighters were active in western France and shot down one enemy plane without any losses on our side.

Reich Territory:

In the forenoon of 15 Jun., strong enemy formations of four-engined planes escorted by fighters attacked Hannover and its environs as well as Wesermuende, Geestemuende, and Wilster. The majority of the explosive bombs were dropped in the open fields near Hannover.

During the night of 15 Jun., 40 - 50 Mosquitoes carried out nuisance raids in the industrial areas of Rhineland and Westfalia. In this night, 73 of our night fighters which were on defense duty shot down 7 enemy planes without any loss on our side.

Mediterranean Theater:

On 14 Jun., strong formations of four-engined enemy planes escorted by fighters attacked Budapest and the towns of Esseg, Sisac and Split. In the Italian front area about 550 twin-engined planes, fighter bombers and fighters were reported. Traffic targets were attacked in Central Italy. At Leghorn one steamer was sunk. In the night of 14 Jun., Nish and Abbazia were attacked. Besides, three planes were reported fouling the Danube with mines east of Belgrade and two planes east of Kalafat.

15 Jun. 1944

Our own planes carried out photographic reconnaissance of Algier on 15 Jun.

East Area:

On the Eastern Front, 385 own operations and 1,010 operations of the enemy were reported on 14 Jun. Eleven enemy planes were brought down and one was lost on our side.

VII. War in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea.

1. Area of Naval Group West:

Nothing to report.

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, at 2008 on 14 Jun., one (apparently) torpedoboat was steering south 20 miles south of Anzio and at 2220 one destroyer steered north 14 miles west of Fiumicino. At 0130 during the night of 14 Jun., three ships were located 20 miles north of Fiumicino and two ships 15 miles north west of Fiumicino. At 0210, six ships were in the waters off Anzio, at 0215, three landing boats, one guard ship 16 miles west of Anzio steering north west and at 0555, one merchant and two destroyers steering north, 20 miles south of Civitavecchia. PT boats were heard or located north of Elba and in the waters off Leghorn.

According to radio monitoring Bengasi gave air alarm at 0848 on 15 Jun. for the convoy formation "Stubbs".

Photographic reconnaissance of the harbor Algier revealed at 1625:

2 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, 1 g nboat, 1 escort vessel, 3 minesweepers, 4 submarines, 18 landing boats, 5 tankers and 43 freighters with a total of 210,000 BRT

15 Jun. 1944

and 4 transporters of 47,000 BRT. One convoy destroyer was in the roads and 1 auxiliary aircraft carrier off the harbor.

Own Position:

During the night of 14 Jun., the foreign made torpedoboats TA "26" and "30" carried out the mine task "Nadel" north of Gerona according to plans. On their way back the boats were torpedoed by enemy PT boats 17 miles west of Spezia. According to reports that so far came in, the commandant of TA "30", three officers and twelve men were rescued. A sea rescue boat which left for the scene was beached after being fired upon by planes. The hospital ship ERLANGEN which was sent to the scene was repeatedly attacked by enemy planes and had to be beached burning near Sestri Levante after she was hit by a bomb. Salvage attempts are being made.

In the evening, one naval landing craft was damaged on the occasion of an enemy air attack off Longone. One of the attacking planes was shot down. Naval Battery Elba reported two planes shot down.

3. Area of Naval Group, South:

a. Adriatic

In the night of 14 Jun., isolated enemy planes attacked the town and the harbor of Lussin-Piccolo.

At 0135, harbor guard boat had contact with enemy PT boats and minesweepers east of Ravenna. The enemy set up a smoke screen after fire was opened and sheered off. It is not altogether impossible that the boats were on a minesweeping operation.

The naval units from bases south of St. Giorgia moved to the north.

15 Jun. 1944

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Position:

The submarine reported near Mythilene fired 30 to 40 rounds of 7.5 centimeter shells against the dockyards causing minor damages. At 2038 on 14 June, a submarine was sighted off the northern end of Skopelos steering north east.

Own Position:

The convoy "Agathe" was located by enemy air reconnaissance on its way from Porto Lago to Rhodos at 1922 on 14 Jun. Torpedoboats of foreign construction escorting the convoy attacked a telescope eight miles south west of the southern end of Coos at 1947. On the morning of 15 Jun., the convoy was unsuccessfully attacked by twelve enemy planes about ten miles west of Rhodos. No report on the convoys arrival at the harbor came in as yet.

In the afternoon and in the evening of 15 Jun. respectively one enemy air attack each was directed against Rhodos. No damages occurred in the harbor district nor on the vessels.

During the night of 13 Jun., one auxiliary sailing vessel was suddenly attacked and sunk by bandits when taking in coals at Neokoroni at the western side of the Gulf of Messenia. The crew was kidnapped.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Position:

According to an agents report of the German Air Force, 18 fast torpedoboats (presumably PT boats), 6 minelayers, 2 engineer boats and 2 tugs were said to have left Novorossisk for Sevastopol on 12 Jun., carrying explosives. The formation was said to be intended for operations in the area of the Danube estuary.

15 Jun. 1944

Own Position:

The Roumanian submarine RECHINUL left Constanta for operations against the enemy. No other events of any importance.

Situation on the Danube:

No report came in.

VIII. Situation in the Far East:

Pacific Ocean:

The islands of Truk, Nauru, Ponape and Ocean were attacked repeatedly by planes starting from American land bases.

On 12 and 13 Jun., the Kuril Islands were attacked by a plane of an American task force.

Between 10 and 12 Jun., an American combat force operated against the Caroline Islands and bombarded the isles of Guam, Tinian, Saipan, Rota and Pagan.

According to Japanese reports, 121 American planes were brought down and 141 Japanese planes were shot down according to American reports. Besides, 13 Japanese ships were said to be sunk. At the same time the isle of Palau was attacked by long range bombers.

New Guinea:

Japanese resistance against the enemy forces landed on the isle of Biak is very stubborn and causes many casualties to the enemy. After hard fighting, the enemy succeeded in taking one of the three aerodromes existing on the island.

Four Japanese destroyers were sunk according to American reports by an air attack south of Biak Island in the Geelvink-bay.

According to Reuter, Japanese losses in the Aitape area (Northern coast of New Guinea) were 4795 men including only 629 men taken prisoner.

16 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance

According to an A.P. report, de Gaulle cancelled the taking part of several hundreds of French officers in the first invasion group in order to bring about the recognition of the Liberation Committee as the loyal French government. The Turkish foreign minister retired from office. According to Reuter, the Turkish cabinet disapproved Numan's attitude regarding the question of passing of German ships through the Dardanelles. In fact, the general political course of the former foreign minister was probably the reason for the dismissal. The Turkish prime minister declared to press reporters that all German ships will be carefully searched in order to find out whether they are really merchant vessels. The warship types as the KASSEL would not be allowed under any conditions to pass the Dardanelles.

Conference on the Situation with Commander in Chief, Navy at 1115.

I. During the report on the situation in the Mediterranean, Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Intelligence Division observed that only a very small landing tonnage was made out in the big North African ports. A large scale landing operation in southern France is not to be expected at the moment. Also, he stated, the concentration of large ships which is necessary for such an operation was lacking. Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division instructed on these lines the highest command stations of the Navy and furthermore Armed Forces High Command, High Command, Army and Air.

For copy of the teletype as per 1/Skl 18479/44 Gkdos compare War Diary, Part D, Vol. "Materials on the Enemy's position.

II. Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief of Operations Branch:

a. 18th Army Corps Command issued a directive on the combat methods at Lake Peipsi as per 9 Jun. According to the directive our absolute superiority has to be enforced and maintained on that lake by all means. The fighting should be conducted in an offensive way. Therefore, enemy war vessels on the lake have to be attacked

16 Jun. 1944

and the enemy supply traffic as well as fishing should be prevented. Furthermore, operations against the enemy coast should be carried out (bombardments and landing expeditions in cooperation with the landing groups of the Army). Besides, the lake has to be regarded as the outer defense of the main line of resistance and has to be kept clear of the enemy. Our own supply traffic and our fishing vessels have to be protected. Offensive operations will be carried out chiefly by coastal PT boats, coastal minesweepers and ZPK-boats. The patrol sections will be reinforced by naval artillery lighters as soon as these will be ready for action. Besides preparations have to be made for the breaking through of the coastal PT boats, coastal minesweepers and ZPK-boats to Lake Pskov.

Referring to this directive, Chief of Naval Staff remarked, that it is contrary to the plans of naval reorganisation on Lake Peipsi. The original task of our forces operating on Lake Peipsi was to prevent the Russians from crossing the lake. It is to be feared that the forces will soon be exhausted and will then be too weak for defense in the decisive hour in case offensive operations carried out along the lines of the present directive of 18th Army Corps Command.

Commander in Chief, Navy concurred in principle but would like to observe the expenditure of forces first and to reserve further decision to himself according to the experiences made.

b. According to foreign reports, USA Superfortresses of Type B 29 for the first time attacked with bombs the industrial area of Moji and Shimonoseki in the Japanese homeland. In further reports it was said that also Tokyo was bombarded.

c. Group West reported referring to the anti-air defense during the large air attack on Le Havre:

3rd Air Force had at first asked for a stoppage of anti-aircraft artillery fire from 2245 till 2330 for a special operation of the German Air Force. As the leaving of our boats was only intended for a later hour, no objections were made in spite of certain hesitations because all vessels laying at the harbor were under the tactical command of Commander Anti-aircraft Artillery. A later

16 Jun. 1944

demand of 9th Air Corps to postpone the stoppage of anti-aircraft artillery to 2300 till 0045 was refused because the boats were leaving or were already on sea at that time. Naval Command, Seine / Somme reported on the course of events as follows: At 2135, the local anti-aircraft artillery officer ordered "stop" (prohibition to fire against air targets, our own formations going out). The order was issued to Naval Artillery Regiment 266 and to the port captain for the floating formations.

At 2202, the local anti-aircraft officer barred fire and alarm also against attacking planes because our own formations were passing through that area. In spite of urgent appeals of the Naval Command to the local anti-aircraft officer that this order should not be made obligatory for ships in the harbor in case of enemy planes approaching directly nor for ships out on sea, the local anti-aircraft officer insisted in the carrying out of his order also for naval forces in the harbor. Therefore, when at 2230 the heavy air attack began against Le Havre the anti-aircraft guns were not allowed to fire. This restriction of the anti-air defense when our air formations pass by is quite righteously regarded as unbearable by Group West. At the time when the attack on Le Havre was launched it was still bright, the enemy formation was clearly visible over a length of 20 kilometers and could not be mistaken for our own planes. Had not, in the present case, some of the light anti-aircraft guns opened fire against the order, the naval formations laying in the harbor with most of their crews on board half an hour before the time of sea-readiness would have been alarmed only by the falling bombs and this would probably have resulted in multiplying the casualties many times.

Commander in Chief, Navy ordered that Captain Assman report this event to the Fuehrer.

Commander in Chief, Navy ordered that for the distribution of the PT boat flotillas due consideration has to be made of the fact that the center of our operations is in the western areas at present and not in the Gulf of Finland.

IV. The Chief of Naval Communication Service reported that teletype connections are reestablished with Paris but that telephone service is still interrupted.

16 Jun. 1944

Director of Naval Armaments reported on a question of Commander in Chief, Navy that it will be impossible to cede further 10,000 men of the alarm units if all commissions up to 1 Jan. 1945 are to be carried out according to plans.

V. Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Intelligence Division:

Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expedition Forces announced the big attack on Le Havre in its report No. 19 in the following way:

"In the late afternoon of 14 Jun., several hundreds of heavy Lancaster planes escorted by fighters carried out the strongest daylight attack the bomber command has ever performed up to now. They dropped bombs on German PT boats in their bases in the harbor of Le Havre".

It was said in Report No. 20:

"Photographic reconnaissance revealed that the German naval forces in the harbor of Le Havre suffered heavily from the attack of our heavy bombers."

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy was informed of this report.

Opinion of General Staff of the Army on the enemy position on 15 Jun.: 20 large formations of the Army Group Montgomery were made out in the beachhead. The reserves consist of 15 - 17 formations which are supposed to be concentrated in the area of the jumping off bases in southern England. The American army group which is still in England without having taken part in the fighting up to now consists (excluding the 5 big formations supposed to be in Middle England) of about 23 - 25 large formations in the fighting value of which is probably not inferior to the fighting strength of Group Montgomery. As reliable informations are lacking, the only thing that can be said on the plans of this group is that nothing definite is known indicating that the group will not operate in the near future. In the Italian area the keeping back of strong British and American forces can be noticed. Nothing hints to further operations of these forces. Activities in the Egyptian area were again confirmed by reports on troop concentrations in Alexandria and Port Said. Leave orders

16 Jun. 1944

of one division indicate jumping off readiness at about 25 Jun.

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division is unable to estimate the jumping off readiness for bigger operations in the eastern Mediterranean because of lack of naval information on the harbors of that area.

In the House of Commons, the British Home Minister gave a statement on a new German weapon employed against England. He declared that a smaller number of the new missiles was used on the morning of 13 Jun. and that a bigger number was sent in the evening of 15 Jun. and in the morning of 16 Jun. The missiles he said were aimed at southern England. No further information would be given as to the places hit by the missiles. The attack during last night had been more serious than the previous ones.

Reich Security Central Office transmitted a report of a French staff officer from North Africa of 24 May which was obtained by counter espionage. According to this report, the Allied Supreme Command provided the carrying out of one or several of five invasion plans of which plan No. 1 was now under execution. The strategical aim of this plan is Paris. Tactical aims are bridgeheads at the mouths of Seine, Orne, Vire, the encircling of Cherbourg and the occupying of Contentin as operational bases. It is uncertain whether great efforts will be made for the conquest of Le Havre, the main target is the taking of Cotentin. The beginning of the invasion was announced for a day between 5 and 15 Jun. The plan No. 2 which is to follow in the second half of Jun. in case plan No. 1 is carried out successfully covers the tactical aim of landing between Somme and Schelde River, occupying the harbors of Pas de Calais and of the area between Abbeville and Dieppe. It is planned to advance on the eastern border of the Seine River with considerable forces. Simultaneously, several secondary diversion operations are said to be planned. In case of a large scale success against the Atlantic Wall it is not impossible that an attempt will be made to carry out further plans involving large investments. One of these plans provides for an attack against the Mediterranean coast of southern France.

The highest operation staffs of the Navy will be informed

16 Jun. 1944

by Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division.

VI. Situation of the Army:

In the western area, the enemy reshuffled its forces on 15 Jun. and subsequently again carried out strong attacks at the previous centers of activity. The enemy broke through north east of St. Lo and south west of Carentan but was stopped in most places. A new strong attack took place on both sides of the road Bayeux - St. Lo. Guineville was lost. The enemy started an attack with strong forces from the area of the break through west of St. Mere Eglise after strong artillery preparations and succeeded to penetrate to a depth of five kilometers. Our counter operations were started. The situation on the Cotentin peninsula is strained in general.

In Italy, the enemy succeeded to break through deep into our lines north west and north of Lake Bolsena and forced our front line to withdraw furthermore. Uninterrupted strong attacks were also reported from the area of 10th Army following the arrival of new enemy forces. Our former Appenin ("Goten-") position was given the new name "gruene Linie".

By using strong tank forces, the Russians succeeded, at the Karelian front, to enlarge the area of the breakthrough up to the second Finnish position. The situation is serious. The Fuehrer has again emphasized the necessity of a quick intervention of the Navy in case of a Russian landing behind the front.

The Fuehrer gave a directive to Commanding General, West in which it was said that the enemy while he is not yet able to start for bigger operations from the landing bridgehead, is trying to prevent us from using strong forces in Normandy by issuing many false reports. This plan has to be frustrated by strongest concentration of our own forces in order to cut the enemy bridgehead into pieces which will then have to be destroyed by a succession of separate attacks. This was followed by a directive to assemble for this attack as many fast formations as possible. A further weakening of the coastal front would have to be accepted for this operation with the exclusion of 15th Army.

16 Jun. 1944

The Fuehrer ordered particularly to dispatch the LXXVth Army Corps of the 1st Army, to speed up the concentration of the mobile formations which are being transported at the moment (1st SS Tank Division LAH, 2nd SS Tank Division, 9th and 10th SS Tank Division) and which will have to operate as one body and of Army forces as strong as possible. He ordered furthermore to replace the mobile formations now at the front - especially 12th SS Tank Division, Tank Training Division and 2nd Tank Division to be replaced by infantry divisions from the area of Commanding General, Netherlands. 363rd Infantry Division from Denmark, 89th Infantry Division from Norway and 98th Infantry Division from the home territory will be transferred to that area as a replacement. In addition, further emergency formations of the Navy, exact details on which will be given later. Commanding General, West was ordered to report on the measures taken and on his plans as well as to submit requests for the operations of the Navy and of the Air Force. The directive as per 1/Skl. 1773/44 Gkdos find in special file "Invasion 16 Jun."

VI. Referring to the PT boat operations in the west area or in the Gulf of Finland, Chief, Naval Staff pointed to the great danger threatening the PT boats in the west area because of the enemy superiority in the air. No matter how much the previous successes of the PT boats suggest increased activity in the west area, it would be dangerous if in case of a serious threat to the coasts of the Gulf of Finland, the PT boats would be no more available in that area.

Commander in Chief, Navy thinks that the decision of this question has to depend on the estimate of the danger of a landing in the Gulf of Finland.

Commander in Chief, Navy immediately discussed this question by telephone with Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, East who is of the opinion that destroyer and torpedoboat operations are impossible because the mine situation is not clear in the inner parts of the Gulf of Finland and in view of the almost absolute enemy superiority in the air. Naval Command East is planning flank barrages for the protection of the Finnish land front in cooperation with the Finnish Naval Staff which will be provided with German mines as well as with mine carriers as far as they are available.

16 Jun. 1944

Furthermore, six artillery ferry barges and as many minesweepers as possible will be withdrawn from the Narva patrol service. Admiral Kummetz did not take into consideration to keep back 6th PT boat Flotilla which can be used in the present clear nights only at a reduced scale. Commander in Chief, Navy is therefore also abstaining from withholding this PT boat Flotilla.

VIII. In order to relieve the land front at the eastern coast of Cotentin, Naval Staff regards necessary the opening of the entire area from St. Vaast up to the Orne - mouth for DM-mine operations of the German Air Force.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff at 1800.

I. The Admiral with the Army Group B submitted a report on battle experiences as per 1/Skl 1787/44 Gkdos. Chfs. in special file "Invasion 16 Jun.". According to the report, our counter attacks after the successful enemy landing had no success because, in spite of repeated requests of Fieldmarshal Rommel, the tank divisions and anti-aircraft artillery were not close enough to the front and because reconnaissance and assistance by our own Air Force were almost completely missing. Further developments are marked by an absolute enemy superiority in the air which paralyses our entire order of assembly as well as our supply system. Tank formations require up to ten times as much time for reaching the area as compared with the normal. Supply columns are able to move only at night and are suffering losses of about 15% at every operation.

Naval Staff, Operations Division transmitted excerpts of the report to the highest operation staffs of the Navy and to the liaison officers of the services as well as to the Armed Forces, High Command.

II. Group West reported that no naval troops were withdrawn from Guernsey. Probably it was the normal traffic.

III. Armed Forces, High Command Operations Staff issued the following directive concerning the defense of Heligo-

16 Jun. 1944

land to Naval Staff, to Chief, Bureau of Army Armaments, and to Commander of the Replacement Army with copy to General Staff of the Army and Naval Command, North:

The Fuehrer ordered a reinforcement of the defense of the isle of Heligoland against landings from the air as well as a hurried setting up of obstacles against landings from the air by parachutists and freight carrying gliders at Heligoland. Chief, Bureau of Army Armaments and Commander, Replacement Army will immediately provide Naval Command, North Sea with 20,000 mines in order to replace mine fields against landings from the air and paratroop operations.

At 1620, Naval Command, East - in accordance with the directive of Naval Staff of 15 Jun. - reported on measures taken and on plans for the defense against enemy landings at the Finnish coast as follows:

1. Operations of destroyers and torpedoboats are impossible because the mine situation is not clear and as no freedom of movements exists in the operation area. Besides, the enemy is almost complete master of the air in that area.
2. Details of the mine situation: Outside of Koivistu Sund and south east of that area not clear. The same applies to south west of Koivussari. The route through the skerries and the waters south of it between Viborg and Kotka. The matter is taken up furthermore with the Chief, Finnish Naval Staff.
3. Mine Operations:

The plan of a flanking barrage for the defense of the Finnish Land Front is being discussed at present with General Valve. German mine material available was placed at the disposal of the Finns. In addition, further 500 KMA-mines were issued for the KMA-barrages. Naval landing craft are provided as mine carriers, six of them are already made available.
4. Six artillery ferry barges and, as far as possible, minesweepers of the Narva patrol service are or will be withdrawn for the reinforcement of the Finnish naval forces.

16 Jun. 1944

5. The weakening of our Narva patrol service by these transfers to the Finns will be made up by the following measures:

a. 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla will be used for operations.

b. The patrol boats of the net patrol service and of the defenses of the Irben Narrows will be ordered to participate.

c. Further suitable vessels of the "Wallenstein"-plan will be despatched as they become ready for war.

d. The boats of 25th Minesweeper Flotilla now operating under Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic will be recalled immediately.

e. The torpedoboats T "30" and "31" will be transferred from "Kothe".

6. Further details will follow in accordance with agreements to be made with the Finns.

7. Finally, the concentration and use of the special weapons of Admiral, Small Battle Units is suggested.

Commander in Chief, Navy is particularly concerned that the planned transfer of the forces is carried out as fast as possible. The Chief, Naval Staff will discuss the measures by telephone with Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, East and will inform him on the directive of Commander in Chief, Navy that the planned transfer of naval forces from the Narva patrol service to the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland in order to ward off a possible Russian landing attempt as well as the moving of the Torpedoboats T "30" and "31" to the Kotka area has to be carried out immediately.

The telephone call will be confirmed by KR-Fernschreiben 1/Skl 1791/44 Gkdos, Chfs.

IV. Upon the request of Naval Staff, 5th Air Force reconnoitered the Svalbard area on 14 and 16 Jun. The fjords which were surveyed are still under a strong cover of ice. It was impossible to reconnoiter the Ice Fjord but

16 Jun. 1944

an unbroken cover of ice has to be assumed also there. The area therefore is still unsuitable for bases of aircraft carriers and naval forces of the enemy.

Chief, Naval Staff, Admiral Quartermaster reported that the post of a Commanding Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea will not be established before 21 Jun.

General Valve urgently asked for the delivery of the torpedoes which had been promised.

Special Items:

1. Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, North Sea informed Chief, Naval Staff by telephone that the production of KMA-mines in the area of Naval Command, North has only the 5th degree of priority and asked for a higher degree of authority in view of the threatened coasts of the area. Naval Staff, Operations Division found out that the production of KMA-mines for the Dutch coast is going on with the same degree of priority as for the western area. Already one week ago, Bureau of Naval Armament, Underwater Obstacles Branch ordered the opening of the production and the carrying of the production for the German Bight under the same degree of priority as for Denmark. 600 complete KMA-mines were given from Esbjerg to the German Bight.

Naval Staff, Operations Division in cooperation with Bureau of Naval Armaments established a new list of priority for the delivery of KMA-mines as follows.

1. Western Area, 2. Dutch Coast, 3. Denmark and German Bight, 4. Estonia, 5. Italy.

II. Concerning the air defense with small weapons on railway trains, Chief, Armed Forces, High Command ordered the following:

"During attacks of enemy planes against trains of the civilian traffic, rifles, carbines and machine guns, if available, of all members of the Armed Forces travelling officially or privately have to be used for warding off the enemy planes immediately and without awaiting special orders. The engines will give whistle signs in case of air warning (alternating medium long and short sounds). The train will be

16 Jun. 1944

stopped if possible in case of an attack. After leaving the train which has to be done upon order of the railway officials, the weapons have to be used immediately. It is not allowed to fire from a moving train. The services will ensure that all travelling soldiers will be informed that every member of the Armed Forces equipped with one of the above weapons has actively to participate in the air defense.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division will issue the necessary orders.

III. Group South reported that the Roumanian General Staff of the Navy asked Commanding Admiral, Black Sea to inspect the Danube delta for a preparatory study of transporting back troops and the civilian population from southern Bessarabia via the Danube to the south in case the southern front is pushed back. It was emphasized from the Roumanian side that the entire task cannot be carried out by the Roumanian forces alone. Commanding Admiral, Black Sea was asked for advice and cooperation. He will comply with this request which he cannot possibly avoid and promised German cooperation as far as possible with the means available and within the framework of current tasks.

IV. Naval Attache, Istanbul wired on 15 Jun. that according to a statement of the ambassador, there are no objections against further transfer of our merchant ships to the Aegean. The Turks will closely investigate every ship as was done in the case of the KASSEL and not the cargo but determining of the ships type as a warship will be the main question. The usual armament may remain aboard but no additional equipment will be allowed to be carried on the same ship. The passage is closed for war transporters.

V. Enemy reports intercepted between 5 and 11 Jun. by Radio Decyphering and Radio Monitoring Service are collected in Radio Intercept Report No. 29/44. Among other things, the report deals with the destroyer combat, during the night of 8 Jun. near Ile de Bas and contains an evaluation of the radio messages intercepted on the occasion of the landing operation in the Seine Bay. Apparently, probably also midget submarines were used as channel markings, a fact

16 Jun. 1944

which so far has been unknown. Enclosure No. 5 of the report contains information on the interception of enemy losses.

Situation on 16 Jun. 1944

I. War in Foreign Waters:

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Invasion:

According to the reports of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expedition Forces the landing of troops and supplies is carried out at an ever increasing scale. At the eastern flank of the landing area the cruiser BELFAST was operating against our own troop concentrations. The NELSON bombarded the batteries of Le Havre. The USA cruiser AUGUSTA shot down one German plane.

The situation developed as follows according to reports coming in at Naval Staff:

At 0053, following the heavy air attack against naval forces at Le Havre, Commanding Admiral, Channel Coast ordered the naval shore commanders under his command to reckon with similar attacks at the other harbors also and to maintain strict air raid protection order.

At 0710, Group West transmitted a situation report of 1600. According to the report, enemy targets were located from 2300 to 0507 in the night of 15 Jun. in the waters of Gravelines, Dunkerque, Fecamp, in the sector west up to north west of Le Havre, from Cape de la Hague up to Barfleur, between Alderney and Guernsey as well as north of Ile de Bas. Further KMA-mines were laid out near Trouville and at the western side of the large roads of Cherbourg. At 2230, 24th Minesweeper Flotilla with three boats left St. Helier via Granville for St. Malo.

16 Jun. 1944

The PT boat Group Cherbourg returned to the harbor till 0250, the report on successes is still expected to come in. The departure of 2nd PT boat Flotilla was cancelled because of bad weather. The report of the return and of successes of 8th PT boat Flotilla did not come in yet.

From 2230 to 2310, a heavy enemy air attack was carried out against the harbor of Boulogne. The patrol boats GROEBEN and BROMMY, the LIPPE, the motor minesweeper R "232", the minesweeper M "402", three tugs and five harbor patrol boats were sunk and others were damaged. Two bunkers were penetrated by bombs including the PT boat concrete shelter with a ceiling of two meters. The anti aircraft weapons on the northern mole and the 60 centimeter search light on the Bretagne Embankment were destroyed.

At 1105. Group West submitted a supplementary report on casualties and damages sustained during the air attack on Le Havre. Copy as per 1/Skl 18444/44 Gkdos, Chefs find in Special File "Invasion 16 Jun.". According to this report, casualties at 38th Minesweeper Flotilla were 26 killed, 9 missing, 30-40 wounded. At 15th Patrolboat Flotilla, 19 killed, 13 missing, at 10th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla, 1 killed, 1 missing, at 4th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla 2 missing, at the patrolboat V "207" ten missing. On the artillery carriers 2 killed, 13 missing and 3 wounded. Casualties on 5th Torpedoboot Flotilla and on the ***E-boat Flotillas have already been reported.

At 0643. a radio order from New Castle issued to seven stations was intercepted. It said that all naval crews are forbidden to take leave ashore or to enter the town. One office, presumably a harbor office, was asked to inform all LST and LCT arriving on the text of this radiogram.

At 1215. Daventry reported that 46,000 tons of bombs including 5.2 ton bombs were dropped during the attack on Le Havre.

Excerpts from the battle reports:

2nd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla:

The flotilla was ready to sail at Boulogne at 2300 for the mine task "Blitz VI". Eight boats were in the bunker,

16 Jun. 1944

seven were at the pier including four loaded with mines and deployed. During the air attack against the harbor area between 2240 and 2315, the motor minesweepers R "81", "129", "125" sunk and R "130" was damaged. At 8th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla the motor minesweepers R "92" and "93" sunk and R "117" was damaged. The motor minesweepers R "96" and "100" were slightly damaged. The ceiling of the bunker was penetrated at one place. Two men were killed and two are missing. At 0630, a heavy explosion - presumably of our own fourteen LMA-mines took place at the spot where the motor minesweepers R "92" and "125" had sunk. 8th PT boat Flotilla: The flotilla left Ostend at 2315, inspected the convoy route near the buoy "52" and returned to Ostend without encountering the enemy.

9th PT boat Flotilla: After leaving Cherbourg had contact with - presumably - gunboat groups and destroyers in BF 3526. On this occasion the contact was lost with two of our own boats. The boats turned back because of bad sighting conditions and at 0255 all were moored again at Cherbourg.

Naval Staff transmitted the brief battle report of the Commanding Officer of 2nd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla to the Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters, Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff, Navy; to Air Force, Operations Staff, Operations Branch, Navy and to High Command, Army, Naval Liaison Officer and announced on this occasion our own shipping losses since the beginning of the invasion up to noon of 15 Jun. excluding submarine losses (compare War Diary, 15 Jun.).

At 1405, Group West transmitted the situation report concerning the coastal batteries:

At 0430 on 15 Jun., the Battery Landemer bombarded middle-sized naval targets which were approaching a ship that had been hit previously. The targets sheered off with increased speed after they were fired upon. The batteries at the northern coast were attacked by fighter bombers. No damages or casualties occurred at the naval installations. At 1000, the battery 7/1261 fired upon two destroyers who set up smoke screens and sheered off.

From 2010 till 2140, the battery 3/1254 was bombarded

16 Jun. 1944

by heavy cruisers at a distance of 19 kilometers without any results. At 2219, a battleship fired upon the Battery Cape de la Heve at a distance of 30 kilometers. The impacts did therefore not reach the battery ground. On the occasion of an air attack against Le Havre, one gun of the harbor battery was heavily damaged. Other damages were repaired in the meantime.

From 0258 till 0312 on 16 Jun., the Batteries "Annes" and "Bluecher" fired upon located enemy targets south of Alderney (torpedoboats or destroyers). The enemy withdrew at high speed. At 0825, a heavy cruiser bombarded the Battery 3/1255 with heavy calibres from the direction 185° and at a distance of 20 kilometers.

At 1500. Group West reported on the distribution of the naval forces at Le Havre on the evening of 14 Jun.

All vessels, including especially the ***E-boats, had been deployed as much as possible under the prevailing conditions at the harbor, accepting even a reduction in the degree of immediate readiness. Details of the distribution can be seen from the teletype as per 1/Skl 18468/44 gkdos, copy of which find in Special File "Invasion 16 Jun."

During the Evening Conference on the Situation, Captain Assman who has been informed reported to the Fuehrer on the circumstances reported from Le Havre. Concerning the prohibition to fire for the anti-aircraft artillery, the Fuehrer most decidedly asked the Air Force to clear up this affair and to alter the existing orders or to change these unbearable conditions. The Reichmarshall still repeated his opinion that the PT boats must certainly have been moored tied together.

At 1650, Group West sent in the situation report of 1600 and confirmed that the PT boats had no success during the night of 15 Jun. and that no losses occurred. Three boats of 24th Minesweeper Flotilla entered St. Malo. Several KMA-mines were laid out off the Seine mouth. Up to 1250, the

16 Jun. 1944

losses of all seagoing formations during the air attacks against Boulogne were reported as follows:

3 escort vessels, 7 motor minesweepers, 3 A-chasers, 3 patrolboats, 1 minesweeper, 3 tugs, 5 harbor patrolboats were sunk and several vessels were seriously damaged. The operations plan for the night of 16 Jun. are the same as for the last night.

At 1715, Group West transmitted a report of Naval Shore commander, Normandy from Cherbourg: "The situation becomes increasingly difficult. The combat group "von Schleiben" is preparing for a withdrawal towards the fortress. The order was given to bring into the fortress upon a code word all naval forces operating outside. Great difficulties exist at the supply depot as the transport situation is most serious. The chief and the Staff of von Schlieben are planning to move into the command station of the Naval Shore Commander. According to information from Armed Forces, Operations Staff, Navy, the Commanding General, West, did not approve the plans of combat group "Schleiben" and gave orders accordingly.

At 1810, Group West reported:

The Pier Normandy was blown up, the entire foundations broke down, it will be impossible for a long time to use the pier, the pier itself did not collapse. Further attempts are being made to make also the pier wall collapse. A 12,000 ton steamer which was scuttled and capsized is blocking the eastern part of the entrance to the Transatlantic Harbor. A lifting of the ship was made more difficult by later blasting. The blowing up of the France Pier was completed. The south western part of the main roads was fouled with mines. An additional fouling with EMC- and BMC-Stuhlstaende.

Group West ordered Commanding Admiral, Defenses West to open transport traffic of Army goods with small vessels from Malo to all suitable harbors of western Cotentin. Commanding Admiral, Western Defenses ordered the respective measures and does not plan big convoys in view of the danger from the air but intends if possible to dispatch always two vessels together at sighting distance.

16 Jun. 1944

At 2325, Naval Communications Officer, Cherbourg reported that three PT boats left at 2310.

Naval Staff transmitted to the highest operations staffs of the Navy the following assessment of the situation on Jun.:

"1. Invasion front:

The reason for the failure to eliminate the enemy bridgehead is the fact that the enemy by concentrated use of naval artillery and strongest air forces operations with simultaneous operations of air borne formations chiefly in the rear of our front succeeded in breaking through our main defense line at the shore much quicker than had been anticipated and that he was able to defend the landing areas against the local and operative German reserves. Our main defense line fought stubbornly and in a most self sacrificing way but was partly annihilated and partly pushed back to the strong points and defense posts after the first landing attempts which had been warded off were repeated. The strong points and defense posts carried on fighting most heroically in the rear of the enemy for many days. The approach and offensive operations of our other reserves on land is rendered very difficult by the enemy's overwhelming superiority in the air.

The enemy was successful in obtaining his first operation aim, i.e. an adequate bridgehead. It remains to be our objective to stop the enemy advance and to attack as soon as possible as long as the enemy is still occupied in landing further forces and supplies at the bridgehead. The Navy and the German Air Force will use all suitable means against the enemy maritime supply lines. Nevertheless the time is in favor of the enemy because our limited fighting forces are insufficient for applying decisive damage to the enemy supply over the sea.

The second aim of the enemy is undoubtedly to cut off and to occupy the Cotentin Peninsula in order to obtain the valuable harbor of Cherbourg. This operation which apparently was planned already for the first attack did not develop according to plans and is requiring much more strength and time now than expected.

16 Jun. 1944

The third aim is supposed to be an attack from the bridgehead through Orne towards east and south east respectively with a simultaneous landing in the area Fecamp - Boulogne or further to the east for a pincer attack against Le Havre. A strong group of forces is available for this purpose in south east England, possibly also intended to act against Belgium and the Netherlands.

The warding off of any future enemy landing is of decisive importance in order to be able to concentrate our forces still more against the present bridgehead and to prevent the enemy from getting the operative freedom of movements on land.

2. Northern Europe:

The enemy forces concentrated in middle and northern England are inadequate for large operations. Norway is therefore threatened only by a secondary operation. In view of the Russian offensive against Finland, the north Norwegian coast requires increased attention. Our weak point - of which the enemy is well aware - is the area southern Norway - Skagerrak - Juteland. The coasts of the North Sea in Germany and Juteland might be attacked from the Wash and from the Thames by the group of forces assembled in south east England in case the enemy gives up the idea of a concentrated operation at the channel coast. This seems improbable.

Finland in her difficult defensive war will be assisted by us as long as she is determined to carry on. It is not impossible that an Anglo-American landing at the northern coast of Norway will be carried out for political reasons.

3. Atlantic Coast:

As the main forces from the south west of England are operating in the bridgehead, the danger of a landing in the Bay of Biscay has decreased.

4. Mediterranean:

The Italian front has to offer delaying resistance in order to make possible the building up of a defense

16 Jun. 1944

line in the rear. Regarding the strength of the enemy forces, landing operations are possible at a limited scale (10 - 15 divisions) in southern France, for out-flanking landings in Italy, at the western coast of the Balkans or in the Aegean. The shipping space and landing vessels for one operation in the western Mediterranean and for another operation in the eastern Mediterranean are available. No reliable indications exist as to the enemy plans. Various reports of recent times point to the area Aegean - Peloponnesus."

2. Other Reports on the Enemy Situation:

Forty-six planes were observed operating in the area of 19th Group. The planes reported on several minesweepers and other vessels as well as on a submarine in the western exit of the channel.

Six British ships were located in the waters west of Ireland and in the outer Bay of Biscay as well as four British vessels in the invasion area.

On 10 Jun. new designations for "northern area" appeared in the home area of the British broadcast. The characteristic features of the radio traffic make it possible - according to the opinion of Naval Staff, Naval Communications Division - that the establishing of this new radio communication line indicates a technical preparation for an operation in a front sector further to the north.

3. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast Area:

Twelve mines were cleared off Brest and one mine off Gironde. Four submarines were escorted coming in and one submarine going out. Eighteen patrol positions were occupied.

Channel Waters:

Sixteen patrol positions were occupied. Three mines were cleared north of Trouville and three others north of Gravelines.

Naval Staff decided as follows on the additional trans-

16 Jun. 1944

fer to the western area of the torpedoboats T "35" and "37" which had been asked for by Group West (compare War Diary, 13 Jun.):

1. The transfer of new forces to the channel area is desirable in principle. This principle is limited by the great danger resulting from the lack of bunker protection for the torpedoboats at the channel bases.
2. Considering the material readiness and in view of the forthcoming operations in the Baltic Sea area (Gulf of Finland, Skagerrak), a transfer of only four or - at the maximum - six boats to the west is possible.
3. Because of the training situation, operations in the channel area are only possible after the necessary training in the flotilla has been completed. The training cannot be speeded up by employing specialists of other units.
4. In view of the present tasks, the training has to be carried out in the present operation areas. Fuel will be allotted separately.
5. On 26 Jun., the best six boats, as far as the degree of material readiness and the training are concerned, will be reported to the Fleet and to Commander, Destroyers. The decision on the transfer to the west will then be made according to the situation.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

Coastal Defense Commander, Heligoland Bight sent a supplementary report that on 15 Jun. about 180 explosive bombs fell on Wesermuende.

The attack on 15 Jun. against the convoy "Amerskerk" was carried out in three waves by 60 Beaufighters and Mustangs with torpedoes gunfire and bombs. About 15 - 20 torpedoes were fired upon the NACHTIGALL and the same number was also fired against the AMERSKERK.

16 Jun. 1944

In both cases one of the torpedoes hit the mark. At least ten of the attacking planes were shot down. For brief report see teletype 0947. One mine was cleared off the Elba.

In the night of 15 Jun., many explosions were again heard off the Dutch coast. Two ELMA-mines were cleared north of Zeebrugge.

Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Very strong activity of 34 planes was observed in the area of 18th Group.

Own Situation:

Strong enemy air activity was observed in the area of the northern coast of Norway. Seven enemy planes were reported entering the area of Banak, 22 in the Vardoe area 16 in the Petsamo area, four in the Hammerfest area and six in the Kirkenes area.

Thirty-four ships were escorted to the north and twenty-five ships to the south.

The Naval Command transmitted a report of the Cruiser Group of 14 Jun. on the secret radio transmitter discovered at Porsa which yielded considerable material especially on the TIRPITZ. The German Security Police continued communicating with the superior British station. The Cruiser Group plans from time to time to transmit reports on the TIRPITZ in which the readiness and the combat strength of the ship will be described as strongly reduced.

Naval Staff concurred with the plan.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

In the Lavansaari area, a formation of eleven guard-boats was sighted in the forenoon steering on a varying

16 Jun. 1944

course and returning towards east in the afternoon.

Between 1000 and 1200, the Finnish air reconnaissance sighted four patrol boats and one escort force south of Ino, 3 H-ships, five guard boats south of Saivaestoe and 32 guardboats, motor minesweepers, PT boats and two patrol boats steering an east course slightly further towards the west.

According to observation from land, at 1305, about 80 Russian ships including three bigger vessels were south of Saivaestoe beyond the range of the coastal batteries. Finnish and German planes were dispatched against this formation. No report came in so far. According to a report of German Naval Liaison Staff, Finland they were 50 or 60 vessels sailing in considerable distance from each other and consisting of patrol boats, motor minesweepers, guardboats and PT boats as well as three H-ships.

The report on this formation caused alarm as outflanking landings at the Finnish Coast might be expected from the assembled brigades.

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division reported on the submarines of the Baltic Fleet. For copy as per 1/Skl. 23970/44 geh. see War Diary, Part D, "Materials on the Enemy Situation".

Own Situation:

Three patrol positions were occupied at the western coast of Juteland. Twenty-eight boats were on minesweeping duty at the Baltic Sea Entrances, fifty-two boats and six minesweeping planes were on duty in the Baltic Sea. Four mines were reported successfully cleared.

Four minesweepers, one patrol boat, one anti aircraft chaser, four artillery ferries, and four coastal fishing vessels were on duty in the Narva Bay defenses. The net patrol was carried out by three patrol boats and the Irben Narrow was guarded by one patrol boat and two heavy artillery carriers.

At 1125, fourteen enemy planes attacked the boats of

16 Jun. 1944

the Narva patrol with bombs. Further bombs were dropped between 1310 and 1420. No casualties were sustained.

The reinforcement of the barrages "Seeigel VI b" and the last section of "VIII b" was carried out according to plans by 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla with six naval landing craft.

The artillery training boat FUCHS entered Reval and was placed under the command of 1st Minesweeper Flotilla for operational purposes.

The torpedoboats T "30" and "31" are on the way to Kotka.

330 KMA-mines were so far given to the Finns. Further 230 KMA-mines are ready to be delivered.

The Finns withdrew along the coast at the Karelian front up to about ten kilometers east of Saivaestoe.

In order to carry out the KMA-task and for the planned evacuation of the Finnish population from the threatened eastern part of Karelia, six naval landing craft were placed at the disposal of the Finnish Naval Staff at Kirkomansaari.

Off the coasts of Esthonia, 2559 KMA-mines have so far been laid out.

Coastal PT boats swept Lake Peipsi without particular events.

The patrol line will be occupied during the night of 16 Jun. by ten patrol boats, three coastal PT boats and four naval artillery lighters.

According to a report of Naval Attache, Helsinki, General Valve declared at noon on 15 Jun. that an early evacuation of Ino and Saivaestoe is expected as the Russians advancing with the heaviest tanks have already outflanked these places. Efforts will be made to defend the Kõivisto islands. General Valve asked urgently for the weapons which were promised a long time ago and the absence of which is now painfully felt namely torpedoes, about 20 captured 12 centimeter guns with ammunition and four naval range

16 Jun. 1944

finders (m EMS-Ceraete). The Swiss minister at Helsinki is of the opinion that shortly before or after the capture of Viborg an offer of peace will probably be made to Finland from Washington and Moscow.

V. Submarine Warfare:

The submarine U "1222" started for her return cruise from the waters south of Nova Scotia. On 8 Jun. the boat fired unsuccessfully a salvo of three torpedoes against a westbound convoy in CB 4379.

The submarine U "998" of Group "Mitte" suffered heavy damages on the occasion of an air attack. However, the boat was able to enter Bergen by her own means and under escort. The submarine U "804" coming to aid warded off a Mosquito in the same area but suffered casualties. The mosquito was probably shot down.

At 0445, a weather plane sighted a patrol boat lying north of Jan Mayen in AA 9382. Enemy forces were recognized neither on the island nor at the aerodrome. At 1845, one of our reconnaissance planes reported four enemy submarines north of Vardoe steering a course 320° at a speed of 14 knots.

Our submarines were informed that an escape of the Padoglio ships now at Port Mahor has to be reckoned with.

VI. Aerial Warfare

West Area:

During the day, strong enemy formations carried out attacks against the defense zones in Belgium and Northern France as well as against St. Pool and Lens. In western France, attacks were directed against an oil refinery and against aerodromes.

In the night of 16 Jun., 300 enemy planes attacked aerodromes in Belgium and northern France. Twenty-five enemy planes which entered western France did

16 Jun. 1944

not attack.

During daylight, 209 of our planes assisted the Army in Normandy and carried out free lance fighting in western France. Four enemy planes were brought down without any losses on our side. During the night of 16 Jun., two ME 410-planes carried out photographic reconnaissance of London. Two enemy planes were shot down in air fighting.

Forty-nine bombers were dispatched for the mining of the Seine Bay. Six planes were lost on each occasion. Thirty-five planes carried out night fighting in western France and nine planes were strafing the highways north of Carentan with attacks against anti-aircraft batteries.

Reich Territory:

During the day, a strong formation coming from the south attacked Vienna at 1028. The attack concentrated on industrial installations and oil refineries along the Danube. For damages in the industries compare Situation of the Day. Smaller forces attacked Bratislava.

In the night of 16 Jun., 30 Mosquitoes attacked Berlin whereas 300 four-engined planes attacked Duisburg, Essen, Oberhausen and Muehlhausen on the Ruhr, partly causing considerable damages.

Mediterranean Theater:

At 0600 on 15 Jun., enemy planes were operating over the Italian front area and other forces were attacking traffic targets in central and northern Italy. Further attacks by about 30 planes were directed against one of our convoys near Rhodos and against the Harbor of Rhodos.

During the night of 15 Jun., twenty-three planes supplying the partisans in the Balkans were reported as well as several harassing planes in the Northern Italian areas.

Our own planes carried out reconnaissance flights.

16 Jun. 1944

East Area:

On 15 Jun., 147 operations of German planes and 675 operations of enemy planes were reported at the Eastern Front. Twenty enemy planes were shot down at a loss of two planes on our side.

VII. War in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea.

1. Area of Naval Group, West:

According to a report of German Intelligence Service, two tankers from Gibraltar joined the big convoy that passed Tarifa for the west with 58 freighters and nine tankers at 1700 on 14 Jun.

Five freighters coming from the Mediterranean entered Gibraltar.

One cruiser and three destroyers (Italian) were made out at the harbor Mahon by photographic reconnaissance.

Own Situation:

On the occasion of the torpedoing of the fast escort vessel SG"11" on 2 Jun., furthermore on 9 Jun. when a salvo of four torpedoes was fired against the submarine chaser "6073" and on 30 May during an attack with a salvo of three torpedoes against the net-advice boat "38", it was observed that the torpedoes missing their target exploded in a distance of 100-200 meters in the wake of the ship or in front of the bow in the vicinity of the ship. It has to be assumed therefore that the enemy is using a firing device which has so far been unknown in this area. Nothing else to report.

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Situation:

According to photographic reconnaissance, six - presumably - LCT were at Civitavecchia on 15 Jun. A small ship was off the harbor and eight landing boats were observed in shuttle traffic. In the night of 15

16 Jun. 1944

Jun., one ship was located by the instruments north of Porto Ferraio and two ships probably supplying Bastia were located south south west of Giglio.

On the afternoon of 16 Jun., Pianosa reported the sighting of about 30 vessels steering northwest or southeast, 16 miles south of Pianosa. No details could be made out. Presumably this was a convoy returning from Bastia.

Photographic reconnaissance of Bastia showed two cruisers, 16 destroyers, 2 USA coastal cruisers, 6 PT boats, 11 smaller war vessels, 2 auxilliary war vessels, 2 special ships, 6 LST, 14 LCJ, 2 big LCT, 49 small LCT, 22 landing stages, 2 tankers, 30 freighters, 1 passenger ship etc. According to Radio Monitoring Service, part of the eastbound convoy UGS 42 destined for Port Said was detected in the Tobruk area in the night of 15 Jun. as well as the eastbound convoy KMS 53 in the Oran - Algier area with sections destined for Naples, Bari and the eastern Mediterranean.

Own Situation:

The convoy and patrol services were carried out as scheduled. The air attack on Viareggio at noon on 15 Jun. caused only slight damages. During repeated air attacks against Ancona, one harbor patrol boat was damaged.

One hundred sixty-seven men of the torpedoboats of foreign construction TA "26" and "30" were so far rescued.

The hospital ship ERLANGEN which had been damaged by air attack became afloat again after discharging 384 wounded and returned to Genoa.

3. Area of German Naval Group, South:

a. Adria:

Enemy Situation:

According to reports of Reich Security Central Office a landing at the largest scale is expected to take place between 15 and 25 Jun. in the

16 Jun. 1944

area Vis-Lastovo. Furthermore in the area Ploce isles - Neretva mouth up to Zara mainly in the direction towards Solta. Partisans are to land first followed by the Anglo-Americans. The report was handed over with certain reservations.

Own Situation:

At 0830 the steamer RAPIDO (5400 BRT) was found in a sinking condition five miles south of Grado. The reason is not yet known.

One tanker convoy to the north will be escorted by 6th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla from Fiume to Pola.

Three PT boats are controlling the waters in the area Sibonik - Split.

b. Aegean:

At 0645 on 14 Jun., one auxilliary sailing vessel was sunk by an enemy submarine off the southern coast of Mythilene. One auxilliary sailing vessel was sighted and towed in north of Milos. It was later found out that she was hit by gunfire from the air. The vessel had left for Milos on 9 Jun. The convoy "Agathe" entered Rhodos. The escort torpedoboats of foreign construction TA "14", "17", "19" returned to Porto Lago. According to radio interception, the Swedish steamer VENJA (8276 BRT) hit a mine in Turkish territorial waters and sunk. Naval Shore Commander Dodecaneso salvaged a Swedish life belt of the steamer and wreckage parts north of Coos.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

No special sighting reports came in. According to a report of Reich Security Office, several aerodromes are being constructed about 65 kilometers north west of Odessa for American bomber formations which will attack Ploesti and German supply routes from these aerodromes. The work will be completed when the new Russian offensive starts in the middle of July.

16 Jun. 1944

Own Situation:

During the night of 15 Jun., eight PT boats were operating in the waters Tarkhan Kutsk - Eupatoria, Khersones up to Balaklava. No shipping traffic was sighted. Neither mine clearance work nor convoys could be carried out because of the bad weather.

The war transporter KASSEL left the Bosphorus at 0700 towards Varna and was met by three of our motor minesweepers at 1012.

Situation on the Danube:

On 15 Jun. it was observed that mines were probably dropped between kilometer indicator 744 and 796, near kilometer indicator 953 and in the Moldova area. On 14 Jun., two tugs sank near kilometer indicator 1529 and one tanker was heavily damaged. On 15 Jun. an empty tug was damaged near kilometer indicator 1208. The successful clearing of mines was reported by vessels on or near kilometer 1292 on 10 Jun. and near kilometer indicator 1636 on 13 Jun. Minesweeping planes cleared two mines near kilometer indicator 1715 on 14 Jun. During the night of 15 Jun., mine laying by planes was suspected near kilometer indicator 1059. In the Hungarian area, 176 vessels were reported on their way and 145 vessels in the Serbian area. No reports came in from the Roumanian area.

The motor ship DANZIG hit a mine and sunk near kilometer indicator 1025. One tanker was damaged near kilometer indicator 1203 and one towed crane sunk near indicator 1267. Four other large barges were damaged.

Minesweeping planes reported the successful clearing of two mines near kilometer indicator 1741.

VIII. Situation in East Asia:

No reports came in.

17 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance.

The State Department handed over the passports to The Finnish Minister to the USA and to three counsellors of the legation, asking them to leave the States. The State Department remarked that this did not mean the break of diplomatic relations between the USA and Finland.

Conference on the situation with the Commander in Chief, Navy at 1115.

I. During the discussion of the situation in the air, Naval Staff, Operations Division, Naval Air and Air Force Liaison Section reported that the operations of 4th Air Force are strongly hampered by the lack of gasoline supplies from Roumania. For the rest of this month, fuel for not more than three operations is still available.

II. Report of Naval Staff, Operations Division, International Law and Prizes Section on the draft of an international agreement on the fixing of free zones for the aerial warfare. German Foreign Office took up this question which had been dealt with already in 1939 and asked for the opinion of the services. The Navy is in a position to agree unhesitatingly with this idea which is only of theoretical importance.

III. Report of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Assistant to Chief of International Law and Prizes Section on the affair of the war transporter KASSEL and on the political consequences resulting from this case.

Commander in Chief, Navy ordered an exact representation in a white book of the entire event from the German point of view.

17 Jun. 1944

Details on this question find in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

The same applies to the question of using arms in Spanish territorial waters.

IV. Situation of the Army:

West Area:

The center of the enemy attack was north east of St. Lo and west of St. Mere Eglise. The attacks were mostly brought to a standstill. The situation at Cotentin has worsened because of the enemy breakthrough towards St. Sauvoir which could not be stopped.

Our own attack east of Orne was stopped by the destructive force of combined artillery fire from the sea in spite of a successful start. It is planned to reopen the attack provided that it is possible to force back the heavy enemy units at sea. It is impossible with our own forces available at present to prevent the northern part of Cotentin from being cut off.

Italy:

The situation became considerably more dangerous by the formation of a bridgehead near Istia and by serious enemy penetrations in the area south of Perugia. The enemy landed on Elba. The eastern part of the island is defended by our troops.

As enemy landings may take place at the Ligurian coast and in the Genoa area, the Army asked for early destructions in the harbor and for preparations to be made for the blowing up and for the closing of the harbor Genoa within a short time.

According to a report of the Army preparations of this kind were allegedly not made so far because of lack of explosives and personnel.

At the Karelian front, the enemy broke through along the railway line to Viborg and is now trying to use this deep penetration for an advance towards that town.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 Jun. 1944

The military situation is grave. It is to be feared that the cutting off of Finnish forces at the Karelian front and the definite occupation of Viborg will bring about immediate political consequences of considerable importance. The Army asked urgently that the Navy should slow down the Russian advance and bring relief to the Finns by artillery fire against railways and roads in the areas near the coast.

Concerning the German eastern front it can be seen from documents from a courier plane which has been shot down that the center of the enemy attack in the area of Central Army Group will be the area Smolensk - Bobrisk. The southern center will be in the Tasi area. At the Army Group North the offensive will be made in the Vitebsk - Lake Peipsi area aiming at the Baltic countries whereas only diversion attacks will be carried out in the Narva area.

Our own forces were reshuffled according to this information.

Pointing to the serious situation at the Finland front and to its far reaching consequences, Captain Assman emphasized that the transfer of the cruisers to the Finnish waters (operation "Rotbuche"), formerly suggested by Naval Staff and approved by the Fuehrer, should be carried out in a hurry as, in case of a further deterioration of the situation, Russian operations have to be expected against the Aland islands and because - on the other hand - any early reinforcement of our forces in Finland - Aland area has to be regarded as an advantage for us. Perhaps the present situation might be suitable to repeat the suggestion to the Finnish High Command for the installation of a German base in the Aland islands for the German Naval Forces.

V. Commander in Chief, Navy concurred with the opinion on the situation of 16 Jun. as transmitted by Naval Staff to the highest commands of the Navy.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 Jun. 1944

VI. Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters reported on a conference of the Fuehrer with the Fieldmarshals von Rundstedt and Rommel in which the following conclusions were reached concerning our own situation in Normandy:

"1. Some of our own formations fighting in the front line are seriously hit by the strongest air superiority and heavy naval artillery of the enemy. The presence of the enemy air force renders most difficult the approach of our own reserves and supplies. Our own attacks do not make any progress within the range of the enemy naval artillery.

2. The enemy was successful in gaining territory towards west and north on the Cherbourg peninsula. Due to heavy losses of the divisions operating in that area and because it is impossible to bring in reserves quickly, the Fuehrer ordered our own fighting front in the west to withdraw to the north and to the south thus allowing the enemy to cut off Cherbourg peninsula.

3. The Fuehrer ordered a defense of Cherbourg and of the Channel Islands to the last.

4. In the bridgehead area we are forced to rely on defensive for the time being because of the enemy action until further reserves will be assembled behind the defense line. Only our attack east of Orne in the bridgehead which advanced so far successfully will be continued as long as possible within the range of the enemy naval artillery.

5. The Fuehrer regards elimination or impairing of the enemy naval forces particularly of the battleships as the only possible relief for the land front. The entire area in question should be mined quickly by the German Air Force - regardless of the freedom of movement for our own naval forces. The Fuehrer asked for a report by which time the first mine operations with the firing device DM 1 will be possible.

6. The Fuehrer thought it necessary to supply the fortress Cherbourg with anti-tank and anti-aircraft ammunition - which is still possible - for enabling a longer defense and asked for an investigation whether a supply of ammunition via the sea; perhaps by submarines, is regarded as still possible."

17 Jun. 1944

Submarines with Schnorchel-equipment would require about ten days each way for going from Brest to Cherbourg and retour.

Naval Staff ordered Submarine Division to keep submarines in readiness. Group West was ordered to examine again the possibilities of supplies via the sea also for the eventuality that combat operations - of PT boats for example - would be temporarily neglected as compared with supplying operations. The Group was ordered to agree on relevant measures with Commanding General, Armed Forces, West.

Subsequently, Naval Staff informed Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters and Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy that one submarine will be ready for the ammunition supply to Cherbourg on 17 and one on 18 Jun. as well as two submarines on 26 Jun. It will be necessary that Commanding General, West provides for the transport of the ammunition to the jumping off harbors.

Conference on the Situation with Commander in Chief, Navy at 1750.

I. Naval Staff, Operations Division is considering the transfer of PT boats to St. Malo for operations against warships in case they begin to bombard the western coast of Cotentin. The question of mine operations has also to be examined in this respect. It is doubtful, however, whether the transfer of PT boats to the west will still be possible. The attempted breakthrough to Cherbourg has failed already once as is well known.

II. On 18 Jun., a further 300 DM 1 - mines will be ready. Naval Staff suggested to bring them into the Dutch area. But Commander in Chief, Navy ordered to ask Group West whether operations are desirable or can be carried out in its area or whether a transfer of the mines to Naval Command North Sea for use at the Dutch coast is regarded more suitable. Further production of about 300 per week can be expected.

17 Jun. 1944

III. In accordance with the Directive of the Fuehrer, 3rd Air Force Command was ordered by High Command, Air, Operations Staff as follows:

"1. The Fuehrer regards a large scale mining of the Seine Bay carried out by the air force and by the Navy as the only possibility to ward off the enemy warships from the coast and thus to eliminate artillery activity chiefly east of the Orne.

2. 3rd Air Force Command will concentrate on mine operations of IX Air Corps using mines with pressure fuse box mixed with magnetic and acoustic mines. The operation area will be from about Le Havre up to Barfleur. Operations of our own Navy in the waters that will be mined need not be taken into account. Details will have to be arranged with Naval Group West.

IV. Naval Command East reported:

"1. Six artillery ferry barges were transferred to Kotka since noon of 17 Jun. according to plans and were placed at the disposition of the Finns for operations in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland under the command of Lieutenant Reinhardt.

2. The torpedoboats T "30" and T "31" are at Helsinki at present as the commandants have to be instructed by the Commander of 9th Coast Patrol Force. They will continue the trip to Kotka on the early afternoon.

3. 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla is being transferred to Kotka. It will be used from that place for the Narva defense and as minesweeper escort in case of operations of the torpedoboats T "30" and T "31".

4. Six naval landing craft of 24th Landing Flotilla are at Kirkomansaari at the disposition of the Finns.

5. The minesweepers of 1st, 3rd and 25th Minesweeper Flotillas will operate from the base Kotka according to the order MOK Ost Fuehrstb. 536/44 Chfs. A I Ziff. 4).

6. Commander of 9th Coast Patrol Force in close cooperation with the Finnish Naval Staff will be in charge of the central command.

17 Jun. 1944

7. According to a conference with the Finnish Naval Staff, the Finns do not regard operations of destroyers and torpedoboats as useful and necessary at present in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. The Finns believe the mine danger to be insignificant in the waters up to 6005 north 2900 east and are planning operations of their own submarines in that area under certain circumstances."

Naval Staff informed Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff, Navy on measures for the assistance of the Finns and added that a transfer of 200 MFC-mines and 100 M/R/K-mines by the BRUMER and auxiliary coastal sailing vessels to Kirkomansaari is planned to help in the Finnish barrage scheme. Furthermore, 530 KMA-mines were promised to the Finns.

V. Naval Staff, Quartermaster General reported on requests made by General Admiral Marschall. Among other things, 30 float-type magnetic blasters as well as Naval landing craft as mine exploding vessels were asked for. Furthermore, it is necessary to establish more deaussing stations at the Danube. The material required is available but there is a lack of additional personnel.

Commander in Chief, Navy ordered to fulfill the demand because the Danube is important. The inspector of Minesweeping Service, Danube was ordered to report everything he still needs to carry out his task.

VI. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch transmitted to all front stations concerned the directive of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff of 14 Jun. concerning experiences made during the landing in the Seine Bay as to the distribution of artillery and issued directives on the position of naval guns in view of the flat trajectory. For the relevant order as per 1/Skl 1 730/44 Ckdos compare the files 1/Skl I op.

Commander in Chief, Navy concurred.

17 Jun. 1944

Special Items.

I. Concerning "Wallenstein": Upon a request of Naval Staff; Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch investigated which of the vessels provided for "Wallenstein" would be required back by the inspectorates of naval training for the reopening of training at a reduced scale. After consultation with the inspectorates and with Naval Command, East, the following directive was transmitted to Naval Command, East and North with copy to Commanding Admiral, Submarines:

"1. For the reopening of training at a reduced scale the following vessels are given back to the inspectorates with the right of recalling the vessels within 24 hours notice reserved:

a. Until 20 Jun.: Torpedoboat T "111", MERKUR, minesweeper M "552", DELPHIN, motor torpedoboat MTB "208", BRACNE, VIME, TUTE, FASOLT, EDWARD, motor minesweepers R "170", R "55".

b. After completion of the task as per Blume 1.: the torpedoboats T "107", "108".

2. It is impossible to give back other vessels (especially minesweeping vessels) because the present situation makes necessary a reinforcement of our forces in the Gulf of Finland.

3. The motor minesweeper R "20" will be placed under Naval Command North for operational purposes instead of the motor minesweeper R "55". The mine carrier MT "1" will be allotted to Admiral, Small Battle Units at another place."

II. The fuel situation renders necessary also reductions in the use of minesweeping planes. The front stations concerned were therefore ordered by Naval Staff to avoid exploratory flights as far as possible and to ask for Ju 52 minesweeper planes only for checking of channels or for channel sweeping.

17 Jun. 1944

III. The increase of the enemy mine activity caused Naval Staff, Operations Division to emphasize at High Command, Air, Operations Staff that minesweeping planes have to be regarded as one of the most important means for warding off the enemy mine offensive. Minesweeping planes are capable to control long routes quickly without considerable danger to themselves. Naval Staff is of the opinion that the decision of High Command, Air, Operations Staff to stop the production of minesweeping planes merits reconsideration in view of the development of the situation. Considering the much increased possibilities for the use of minesweeping planes, this type of aircraft seems to be extraordinary suitable and useful, from the point of view of the general conduct of the war, to become one of the most promising devices to overcome the enemy mine offensive. Copy of the letter 1/Skl I E 1755^o/44 Gkdos. find in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

IV. The request of Group West to lay out a navigation cable on the outward routes of the submarines has been considered by Naval Staff since long ago and is still under further investigation. Trials are continued for the purpose of obtaining suitable route markations as soon as possible which cannot be located by the enemy from the air. Recently, Professor Kuepfmueller doubted the usefulness of further development of these cables because the receiving sets for mine exploding vessels and other vessels are not completed yet.

Group West was informed accordingly.

V. Naval Staff criticized the assessment of the situation of 24 May transmitted by Group South (see War Diary, 2 Jun., Special Items II) as follows:

"Naval Staff agrees with the assessment of the situation. The distribution of enemy forces and the enemy's plans remain uncertain, for the time being, because of lack of sufficient air reconnaissance from the numerical point of view as well as regarding types of planes. No indications exist as to the time and direction of operations of the enemy group in Egypt which is most

17 Jun. 1944

probably intended for action in the European Theater. Troop transporters and freight tonnage in the eastern Mediterranean must be regarded as sufficient. Increased informations which cannot be verified are coming in on the concentrating of landing craft and coastal vessels in the Levantine harbors. The difficult and uncertain attitude of Turkey as well as the British efforts in the Greek problem indicate at the present time enemy plans against Peloponnesus and Aegean.

Situation on 17 Jun.I. War in Foreign Waters.

Naval Staff informed Naval Attaches Section that the code name "Tanne" for the Japanese submarine will be altered as this word is used as code name for an operation plan for some time already. Naval Attaches Section was asked to inform all officers concerned that the code name "Tanne" has been altered to "Foehre".

II. Situation West Area.1. Invasion:

The course of events in the invasion area was the following according to reports coming in at Naval Staff:

At 0010 Reich Security Central Office transmitted the report of a reliable agent from circles of members of the French parliament that several Anglo-American divisions are being concentrated in the Hull area and that at least 25 divisions are ready to go into action in the area Dunkirk - Ostend.

At 0120 Group West reported that radar disturbances, ship concentrations and enemy air operations indicate an invasion against the Netherlands and Belgium during this night.

At 0220 Group West gave a detailed answer to the questions put by Commander in Chief, Navy by telephone to Commanding Admiral, Group West concerning the distribution of ships in the harbor of Le Havre

17 Jun. 1944

on 14 Jun. Copy as per 1/Skl 18520/44 Gkdos. find in special file "Invasion 17 Jun."

At 0303 Naval Communications Officer Cherbourg reported the arrival of three PT boats at 0130.

At 0745 Group West transmitted the invasion situation of 0600: 2nd PT boat Flotilla was out on a torpedo operation in the Seine Bay and entered Boulogne at 0300. No report came in.

8th PT boat Flotilla left Ostend at 2315 for a mine operation and had to ward off several air attacks in the course of which the PT boat S "83" was damaged. The Flotilla entered Ostend at 0130.

9th PT boat Flotilla was out in the sea with three boats from Cherbourg. It did not sight the enemy and entered Cherbourg again at 0130 in bad weather.

During the night, enemy targets were located from 0024 onwards ten miles north of Cape Antifer and from 2352 onwards ten miles west of Le Havre. From 2049 till 0340, enemy targets were located northeast and northwest of Barfleur and at 2149 and from 0400 till 0450 northwest of Cape de la Hague.

At 0251, two enemy cruisers were sighted northwest of Barfleur and one enemy cruiser was sighted north of Cherbourg at 0252. Furthermore, one enemy target was made out between Guernsey and Jersey between 0306 and 0403.

Observation of the invasion fleet off the Orne mouth was rendered difficult by the mist.

From 2340 till 0050 explosions and a conflagration extending over a wide area could be observed in the directions of the ship concentrations in the Seine Bay.

According to a further report of Group West, Communications between Naval Shore Commander, Normandy and 243rd Infantry Division as well as 709th Infantry Division are interrupted since 1300 on 16 Jun. The radar station at Carteret reported that it had received

17 Jun. 1944.

orders to blow up the station. Group West is unable to decide whether the enemy situation renders necessary the blowing up of this valuable installation already now. Anyhow, the western coast of Cotentin is devoid of naval radar equipment up to St. Malo.

At 1115 Commanding Admiral, Channel Coast reported on the present situation in the harbor of Boulogne among other things as follows:

1. As altogether 25 vessels sunk at the pier and as already three vessels had been lying sunk at the pier, large sections of the quay surface cannot be used.
2. Both dockyards not ready for use for the time being.
3. Floating dock damaged.
4. Most of the cranes cannot be used.
5. Off and at the sides of the PT boat berths, a number of KMA-mines sunk together with the motor minesweepers. They probably exploded already.
6. Altogether four bunkers reinforced for combat were partly heavily damaged.

It was said that the British had announced by broadcast that they would drop Atlantic crackers with a weight of 6,000 lbs during the attack.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff issued directives to the Attache Group concerning the attitude to be adopted regarding the situation at the invasion front. Copy as per 1/Skl 18596/44 Gkdos find in special file "Invasion 17 Jun."

Apparently 7th Army reported to Commanding General, West that the Navy does not make sufficient preparations for the destruction of the harbor Cherbourg. Anyhow, Group West explained the situation in a detailed teleprint to Commanding General, West with copy to Army Group B and to Naval Staff, Operations Division. For the teletype 1/Skl 18600/44 Gkdos. compare special file "Invasion 17 Jun."

17 Jun. 1944

Naval Staff, Operations Division informed Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff; Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters and Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff, Navy.

At 1514 Group West regarded landing possibilities for the night of 17 Jun. as more difficult in the Dutch area and in the eastern part of the Channel coast, as possible in the western part of the Channel and at the Atlantic coast.

According to the 1600 situation report of Group West, the emergency barrage west of Gravelines has been laid out and three boats of 46th Minesweeper Flotilla and the minesweeper M"206" moved from Cherbourg to St. Helier. It is planned for the coming night to lay out further K A-mines off the southern border of the Seine.

Land transports to Cherbourg have been cancelled.

Group West reported on the activities of the coastal batteries:

At 2350 on 15 Jun., the Battery Blankenese fired upon smaller naval targets which had been located. The targets sheered off.

At 0434 on 16 Jun., the Battery Hamburg located and fired upon a larger naval target which sheered off.

From 0730 to 0900, Army Coastal Battery 6/1255 fired upon two transporters at a distance of 16.4 kilometers. The ships withdrew and put up smoke screens.

From 0929 to 0943, Army Coastal Battery 3/1255 bombarded a heavy cruiser. The battery was fired upon by enemy heavy artillery. From 1030 to 1420 the battery and emplacement of 3/1255 were again bombarded by heavy cruisers.

The division ordered the withdrawal of Army Coastal Battery 2/1262 for operations on the landfront.

At 1245 on 17 Jun., Army Coastal Battery 3/1255 was again fired upon with 15 centimeter shells of heavy cruisers from the direction 186° and at a distance of 23 kilometers.

17 Jun. 1944

At 2140 Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff transmitted the directive of the Fuehrer to Commanding General, West concerning the conduct of fighting in Normandy with copy to Naval Staff, Operations Division. Copy as per 1/Skl 1806/44 Gkdos. Chfs. in special file "Invasion 17/6". It said under number 4) as follows: It is of decisive importance for the carrying on of the offensive east of the Orne, for the successful defense of the front at 1st SS Tank-Corps as well as for the successful defense of the fortress Cherbourg to use all available combat forces of the Navy and of the German Air Force against the heavy enemy naval forces and against enemy shipping space. Therefore, in addition to the ordinary operations, especially the new mines with pressure box fuses will have to be fully used without consideration for our own difficulties to move.

At 2340 Convoy Office Malo reported, the steamer LA FRANCE was hit by a bomb and sunk in the harbor St. Malo.

2. Other Reports on the Enemy Situation:

In the area of 19th Group, 33 planes were observed in operations. Four British ships were located in the rendezvous area.

3. Other Reports on Our Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast Area:

Five mines were cleared off Brest, one off St. Nazaire, one west of Bayeux and one off La Pallice. One submarine was escorted going out and two submarines coming in. Twenty two patrol positions were occupied.

Group West put the torpedoboat T"24" under the command of 8th Destroyer Flotilla for tactical purposes and placed the destroyer Z "24" and the torpedoboat T "24" under the authority of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West for operational purposes in escort tasks at the western coast, for the assistance of submarines and for the

17 Jun. 1944

control of the waters off the coast.

Channel Waters:

During the morning hours, 18th Patrol Flotilla was attacked by fighter bombers between Dunkerk and Calais, when controlling the waters off shore. An extraordinarily heavy bomb exploded 500 meters off the commanders boat. At 0257, the explosion of a new rocket was observed in the air about 12 miles north west of Calais.

Eight patrol positions were occupied in the channel. Twenty eight mines were cleared north of Gravelines.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

North Sea:

The patrol positions in the German Bight were withdrawn during the night because of the north storm. Neither escort nor minesweeping tasks were carried out because of the rough sea. One mine was cleared in the convoy routes north of Borkum and one west of the Elbe.

The patrol boat VP "1105" hit a mine in AN 9575 and was slightly damaged.

Three minesweepers of 32nd Minesweeper Flotilla hit mines and sunk in AN 8766 off the Dutch coast.

From 0059 to 0240 presumably PT boats were located between Scheveningen and Noord - Wijk.

At 0525 boats of 13th Patrolboat Flotilla were attacked from the air off Hook when returning from their positions. Casualties were sustained. Two of the attacking planes were shot down.

Three convoys with about 49,000 BRT were escorted in the Ijsel Sea and in the Zeeland waters.

Naval Command, North had already reported on 14 Jun.

17 Jun. 1944

that 3rd Air Force is trying to comply as much as possible with the reconnaissance demand for the North Sea and the western exit of the Channel by daily operations of the Squadron 3/F 122. Naval Command, North had ordered 1st Coast Patrol Force to submit as soon as possible its opinion on the value of possible reconnaissance operations to find out the origin of the explosions.

Now 1st Coast Patrol Force reported that due to the lack of planes no special operations to investigate the reason of the explosions are possible in addition to the daily reconnaissance. In its reconnaissance flights, the reconnaissance group will pay special attention to the German declared area off the Dutch coast and will look for minesweeping vessels. In case the number of planes available makes it possible, reconnaissance flights will be made upon request of 1st Coast Patrol Force in the direction of particularly many explosions perhaps in cooperation with radar carriers. 1st Coast Patrol Force asked to find out at Armed Forces, High Command whether the detonations can be explained by trials of special weapons of the Army and the Air Force. Naval Command, North observed in this connection that the southern Baltic Sea (Tr.N. ostensibly mistaken for North Sea) was reconnoitered up to about 3° east during the night of 16 and 17 Jun. without the enemy being sighted although many explosions were reported in both nights off the Dutch coast.

Norway. Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

In the area of 18th Group, 28 planes were observed operating over the northern North Sea. At 1710, all Russian submarines in the operation area were addressed by a code word with a high degree of urgency.

2. Own Situation:

On the afternoon of 15 Jun., 32 enemy planes attacked the harbor and the battery at Liinahamari which were simultaneously fired upon by enemy batteries.

17 Jun. 1944

Damages were suffered at the pier installations. During the night of 15 Jun., 55 planes were reported entering the Petsamo area. From 1319 to 1810 on 16 Jun. an exchange of fire of medium strength took place between the batteries of both sides.

Between 0742 and 0815 on 17 Jun. the eastbound convoy near Kiberg was attacked by about 60 enemy planes with bombs, torpedoes and gunfire. The steamer DIXIE (1,571 GRT) was hit by a torpedo and sunk. The steamer FLORIAN-OPOLIS was set on fire by bombs. It will be tried to tow the ship to Vardoe. Escort forces and anti aircraft guns on board shot down two of the attacking planes whereas our air force brought down 35 enemy planes so far.

Three Russian M 31 - mines still in good condition were cleared in the convoy routes in AC 8484.

Fifty four ships were escorted to the north and 39 ships to the south.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Our military attache, Stockholm reported on 15 Jun. that further investigations did so far not bring to light any definite facts which would confirm the report on an immediately imminent invasion of Norway or Denmark.

In the Gulf of Finland, eleven ships were counted at 1446 on 16 Jun. south of Lavansaari and twelve ships at 1504 south west of Lavansaari, the latter sheering off later towards east. At 2027, Hungerburg reported enemy vessels, the number of which could not be made out in the direction north north west.

In the morning of 16 Jun., two enemy patrol vessels bombarded the coast of Laivastoniemi with 30 centimeter shells at a distance of three kilometers. At 1118, Seivastoe was bombarded by three gunboats of the MOSKVA-class. The boats went out of sight towards the east at 1245.

17 Jun. 1944

At 0135 on 17 Jun., Russian PT boats advanced into the waters at Ristiniemi and had contact with Finnish patrol boats. One Russian boat was captured, another was slightly damaged and left by its crew. A third boat did probably sink and a fourth was damaged.

On 17 Jun., a formation of eleven patrol boats and motor minesweepers was made out cruising south east of Someri. The vessels were covered by a smoke screen after being fired upon from Someri. The fire was answered from Lavansaari. In the forenoon, four gunboats and 23 small vessels were reported in the Peivastoe area sailing in one line abreast.

According to a report of the minesweeper M "17", a periscope was sighted about five miles west of the northern end of Hochland. Submarine hunting carried out had to be discontinued after several hours.

At 0600, our air reconnaissance sighted four motor minesweepers or PT boats south of Lavansaari steering a north west course, three motor minesweepers north east of Schepel and three motor minesweepers behind them sailing in one line abreast on a north north west course.

2. Own Situation:

Four patrol positions were occupied at the western coast of Juteland.

Twenty two boats were on duty clearing mines in the Baltic Sea Entrances. 139 boats and three minesweeping planes in the Baltic Sea. Six mines were cleared.

The Guardship "6" fired upon two planes and observed hits at 1505 on 16 Jun. near Rot 05 A.

The new organization of Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea and 9th Coast Patrol Force went into force at 0000.

1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla completed the clearing of the area in which mines had been laid by planes in AC 3669 without finding any mines. Six naval landing craft of 24th Landing Flotilla were placed at the dis-

17 Jun. 1944

position of the Finnish Naval Staff in order to load KLA-mines at Ristinieri. Patrol service was carried out according to schedule off the Irben Narrows and along the net barrage. In the Narva Bay patrolling was confined to four minesweepers, three patrol boats and one anti-aircraft vessel.

No damages were so far reported during the enemy air attack carried out on 16 Jun. with strong forces against the boats of the Narva patrol.

The Finns reinforced the barrage Pistin 1 and laid out the barrages 3 and 4. Four PT boats laid out six TMB-mines in AO 3395. On 16 Jun., Finnish planes attacked enemy vessels south of Seivastoe sinking one boat and damaging several others.

The torpedoboats T "30" and "31" were placed under the command of 9th Coast Patrol Force for a special task. The boats will move to Hussalo near Kotka at 1730.

The destroyer Z "25", "28", "35", and "39" are at the Port. No special reports came in from Lake Peipsi.

V. Submarine Warfare.

The submarine U "953" of the "West"-boats sunk three destroyers of the H-class out of a group of five destroyers at 0945 on 8 Jun. in BF 2739.

On 16 Jun., the shooting down of a four-engined bomber was reported from the central Bay of Biscay.

All the 17 submarines not equipped with schnorchel have returned from the Bay of Biscay.

On 16 Jun., the submarine U "204" shot down a Mosquito-plane 65 miles south west of Bergen the crew of which consisting of two Norwegians was later rescued by the submarine U "1000". No other events were reported.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 Jun. 1944

VI. Aerial Warfare.

West Area:

During daylight, 350 enemy planes entered Belgium without attacking. The coming-in of partly very strong enemy formations was reported from western France during the whole day. 100 planes attacked the aerodromes at Tours, Angers, Laval and Chartres as well as in the nearer environs of Paris. In the night of 17 Jun., 380 enemy planes entered Belgium and attacked the aerodrome St. Trond and the railway station Montdidier with bombs and gunfire. 300 enemy planes were reported entering western France and attacking anti aircraft artillery positions in the Vannes area with gunfire.

During the day, 325 of our own planes assisted the Army and carried out free lance fighting in western France. Sixteen enemy planes were shot down at a loss of 25 of our own. In the night of 17 Jun., two Me 410 - planes reconnoitered the town area of London and observed isolated conflagrations all over the town.

Eighteen Ju 88-planes were out for night fighting over western France and four Ju 88-planes attacked battleships in the Seine Bay. One hit followed by a conflagration was observed on a heavy cruiser and one probable hit was observed on another cruiser. Sixty nine bombers attacked ship concentrations in the Seine Bay with aerial torpedoes and fouled the bay with mines. Three ships were observed burning and one ship was seen exploding on the sea. The mines were laid according to plans.

Reich Territory:

During the day isolated planes were reported from various areas of the Reich territory. Two planes attacked the hydrogenation work Schloven.

On the occasion of the enemy air attack on Vienna on 16 Jun., 230 flights were made by our fighter defenses. Thirty one enemy planes were shot down for certain and three were probably shot down. Seven of these were

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

17 Jun. 1944

brought down by the anti aircraft artillery at Vienna. Of the 16 planes which were lost on our side, ten were Hungarian planes.

During the enemy attack against Duisberg and Essen in the night of 16 Jun., 147 of our planes went up for the defense. Thirty six enemy planes were reported shot down for certain and four were probably shot down. Six planes were lost on our side.

Mediterranean Theater:

On 16 Jun., the enemy attacked the harbors of Porto Ferraio, Marina di Campo and Porto Longone on Elba with ten fighter bombers. About 250 two engined planes and fighter bombers attacked traffic targets in central Italy. Seven hundred enemy planes were counted over the Italian front area.

During the night of 16 Jun, minor reconnaissance activity was reported in the Aegean and in the Adriatic Sea. Several planes dropped bombs in the Temesvar area. Other planes in the same area laid mines in the Danube. Twenty harassing planes were active in Central Italy.

Ten enemy night fighters were reported off the western coast of Italy and ten enemy long distance sea reconnaissance planes were reported in the western Mediterranean and in the Adriatic.

One plane coming from Russia was observed in the Constanta area.

Eastern Front:

At the eastern front, 217 of our own and 320 enemy operations were counted on 16 Jun. Two enemy planes were shot down. 5th Air Force reported the shooting down of 35 enemy planes by our air escort defending one of our convoys in the Vardoe area.

On 15 Jun., Archangelsk and the neighboring harbors

CONFIDENTIAL

17 Jun. 1944

were reconnoitered by photographic reconnaissance. Destroyers and submarines under construction were made out in the naval port Molotovsk. Besides, one USA-cruiser of the OMAHA-class - probably the one ceded to the Russians - was lying in the harbor. Otherwise the number of ships in the harbor was not unusual.

VII. War in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea.

1. Area of Naval Group West:

Enemy Situation:

At 1055, two aircraft carriers of the FORMIDABLE-class and eight destroyers passed the Gibraltar Strait for the Mediterranean.

According to a report of Naval Attache, Lisbon of 16 Jun. from Japanese sources the following ships were at Casablanca on 9 Jun.: three battleships, four aircraft carriers, four heavy and five light cruisers and forty five landing vessels. Furthermore, eight troop transporters and thirty eight ships with ammunition and victuals arrived, of which sixteen ships left again with 16,000 men and ammunition for Italy.

Between 29 Mar and 5 Jun. 4,000 men commando troops and 14,000 parachute troops left Gibraltar allegedly for Corsica.

Own Situation:

At 1025, a periscope was repeatedly sighted near Port Vendres. Two Arado-planes went out for an unsuccessful hunt. Five steamers with 7,500 BRT were escorted in two convoys off the southern coast.

Anti-submarine hunting in the Marseille - Toulon was unsuccessful also on 17 Jun.

17 Jun. 1944

3. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Situation:

In the night of 16 Jun., air reconnaissance reported a destroyer steering east five miles west of Tarento and, at 1620, a diving submarine 180 miles south east of Malta.

On the evening of 16 Jun., reconnaissance was discontinued in the waters of Leghorn - Crb tello because of strong fighter defense. Nothing had been sighted. During the night of 16 Jun., the area around Elba was reconnoitered at an increased scale: at 2318, four small ships were observed by detecting device eight miles south west of Leghorn, at 2325, three small ships 14 miles south of Leghorn and, at 2345, three or five ships twelve miles west north west of Porto Ferraio. At 0005, eight or twelve small vessels were in the waters south of Elba, at 0250, from five to eight vessels 20 miles south south east of Longone, at 0030, ten ships ten miles south of Pianosa and at 0244, thirty vessels ten miles south east of Pianosa.

Between 0025 and 0050 on 16 Jun., from ten to fifteen ships were reported off the eastern coast of Corsica 33 miles north east of Porto Vecchia and five ships 22 miles east south east of Porto Vecchia without details as to the course.

Own Situation:

In the forenoon of 17 Jun., our air reconnaissance was strongly impaired by the weather.

According to a report of German Naval Command, the enemy landed on the isle of Elba at 0300 with 60 landing boats coming from the south. Following strong air attacks further landings west of Ferraio and at the south eastern end of Elba took place near 0330. At 1000, the batteries Ripalti and Enfola were still free from the enemy. At Enfola, three guns had gone out of action. The battery Ripalti scored a hit on a cruiser of the LONDON-class at 0928.

Marina di Campo and St. Piero at the southern coast of the island are occupied by the enemy. So far only de Gaulle

17 Jun. 1944

forces were recognized among the attacking troops. The situation is complicated by the desertion of many Italians. A larger concentration of ships can be observed north of Elba beyond the range of our batteries.

According to a further report of German Naval Command, five presumably LCT landed, at 0745, two miles south of Civitavecchia. The boats were kept under fire since 0735. Six other boats were recognized out in the sea. The landing troops penetrated into the interior of the land and the two boats which had landed left for the south at 1030. At 0955, five explosions were heard from the sea in an eastern direction.

The escort patrol service along the western coast was carried out according to schedule. Near Sestri Levante one of our convoys had contact twice with enemy PT boats which were hit.

Searches for the rescue of the torpedoboats of foreign construction TA "26" and "30" had no success during the night of 16 Jun. According to a report of the commander of TA "30" the boats were torpedoed by a salvo of four torpedoes of an enemy submarine.

At 0927, the attack of fighter bombers against a battery near Genoa was unsuccessfully repulsed.

According to a report of German Naval Command, Italy desertion of Italian soldiers with German units are increasing.

3. Area of Naval Group, South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, on the afternoon of 16 Jun., one small freighter was off Brindisi and one small boat between Bari and Brindisi. On 17 Jun., seven coastal freighters were made out between Brindisi and Bari.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 Jun, 1944

At 0430 on 16 Jun., one LCT of 250 tons with several trucks and guns suitable for cross-country work was set in flames by fire after it had landed on the shore. The crew had left the boat. Other landing boats and PT boats were recognized off the shore. Air reconnaissance at noon which had been ordered was unable to discover anything.

Concerning the landing at Civitanova compare German Naval Command, Italy.

Own Situation:

At 0120 the tanker GIULIANA (350 BRT) and two tanker-peniches escorted by motor minesweepers were attacked by an enemy destroyer and PT boats southeast of Pola. The GIULIANA exploded. Fifty men of the troops travelling on the ship are missing.

Our PT boats controlling the waters Sibenik - Split were detected by enemy night reconnaissance planes in the night of 16 Jun. The boats were at Split during daylight and left in the evening for operations in the waters Lissa - Hvar in order to disturb the enemy supply traffic.

The escort boat G "104" and three infantry landing boats shot down without casualties on our side, one of two enemy fighter bombers attacking at a low level in the afternoon of 16 Jun.

The steamer RAPIDO was probably lost on 16 Jun. by hitting a mine.

b. Aegean Sea:

At 0900 on 16 Jun., an enemy submarine was sighted on the surface three miles off Caloni (Mythelene). At 1325 on 17 Jun., a submarine unsuccessfully fired three torpedoes on a convoy near Antikythera.

On the afternoon of 16 Jun., three enemy planes attacked

CONFIDENTIAL

17 Jun. 1944

Navarino with bombs and gunfire. Damages and casualties were small.

In the forenoon, the convoy CK 91 was attacked by nine enemy planes with bombs and gunfire. Casualties occurred when one auxiliary sailing vessel sunk. Three enemy planes were shot down of which two were shot down by the convoy vessels and one by the air escort. Both Arado-planes escorting the convoy were lost.

On the evening of 16 and on the forenoon of 17 Jun., enemy planes attacked Rhodes.

During the night of 15 Jun., one auxiliary sailing vessel sunk in the harbor Piraeus presumably by sabotage.

c. Black Sea

The war transporter KASSEL returned to Varna in the evening. No other events were reported.

Situation on the Danube

No laying of mines from aircraft was observed on the outer Danube and off Salina. During the night of 16 Jun., mines were probably laid out by planes between Surduk and Banove.

In the Hungarian area 175 vessels were reported on their way and eight vessels in the Serbian area. One mine was cleared each near kilometer indicator 1529, 1724 and 1742.

VIII. Situation in East Asia.

Nothing to report.

18 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance.

The Yugoslav Government in Exile did also recognize the provisional de Gaulle government of the French Republic.

In a pamphlet, the Vice President of the USA, Wallace, who is at present in Russia, advocated the economical and political freedom of India and of all other colonial territories in the south west Pacific. He asked the British to begin as soon as possible with introducing the Indians into self government. On the other hand the USA should not withdraw after the war from the newly-acquired Pacific area but should maintain its leadership over the peoples of the Pacific.

The Althing of Iceland decided unanimously to break the union with Denmark and to adopt a republican constitution.

The Turkish government handed over to the German ambassador a note of protest concerning the attempted passage of the war transporter KASSEL.

According to information from the German Foreign Office the reasons and the consequences of the resignation of the Turkish foreign minister which came as a surprise cannot yet be perceived. The fact that Numan was the representative of the policy of Turkey's non-participation in the war leads to certain conclusions.

The Reuter-report, that Sweden envisaged a 50% cut in the delivery of ball bearings is wrong. The government of Sweden plans to comply with its obligations of delivery under the agreement.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff at 1100.

I. Naval Staff, Operations Division, Naval Air and Air Force Liaison Section reported during the discussion of the situation in the air that strong enemy air attacks against the building grounds in the areas of St. Omer and St. Pol had no serious results.

18 Jun. 1944

II. Group West reported that further use of LMB-mines with DM 1 firing device is planned for the area of the Group and will report on the harbors to be used as bases and on plans for the next 300 LMB-mines.

Furthermore the Group reported that since 14 and 15 Jun., DM-mines mixed with other firing devices are being laid out in the Seine Bay by our Air Force. The Group is planning additional DM operations of PT boats from Le Havre as soon as the mines will have arrived there and when the PT boats will have moved to Le Havre. The Group expects to begin with the operations of naval forces from about 20 Jun. onward. The DM 1 devices arrived at Dieppe but did not yet arrive at Ostend and Boulogne.

III. The Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division reported that the fuel situation had slightly improved since traffic on the Danube was reopened at a larger scale on 10 Jun. The gasoline situation makes necessary to alter the Siebel-ferries for other kinds of fuel.

Eleven more berths for PT boats are still available in the concrete shelters at Le Havre.

The Armed Forces, High Command approved in principle the withdrawal of the specialist personnel from the manning divisions at Beverloo for the purpose of commissionings. The Croat soldiers were also released for other purposes.

A total of about 4,600 loading tons were so far transferred from the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea.

IV. Chief of Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division reported on the results of the reconnaissance of the northern Scotland harbors. According to the reconnaissance, all heavy units of the Home Fleet are still in that area. The containing force of the TIRPITZ is thus still existent. Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters and Armed Forces, Operations Staff, Navy will be informed of these findings.

The fact of certain Russo-Japanese approachment is now

18 Jun. 1944

also hinted at in the reports of the agents of the secret information service. No samples of evidence were given during the report.

V. Situation of the Army:

West Area:

Our own attack east of the Orne was discontinued. Strong enemy attacks in the Caen area were warded off. The break through toward St. Lo which was attempted by the strongest enemy forces since 14 Jun. could so far be prevented in violent battles. The casualties of the enemy are extraordinarily high and losses on our side are serious. From 6 to 15 Jun., the Army and the military SS shot down 511 enemy tanks and 161 planes. Only 90 tanks and three assault guns were totally lost on our side.

According to a Reuter report of 1100, the American troops reached the western coast of Cotentin.

Commander in Chief, Navy remarked in this connection that Group West should lay as many mines as possible in the eastern part of the Seine Bay in order to make enemy bombardment from the sea more difficult.

Italy: Our own formations are seriously exhausted. The Italian formations are failing completely. The center of fighting is in the Perugia area. Since 17 Jun., a large scale attack is being launched against this town.

On the island of Elba our positions in the western part of the island were only lost after they had been destroyed by enemy naval artillery. The eastern part of the island is still defended. It seems worth mentioning that Slav, i. e. mostly Polish divisions are standing at the eastern flank of the 8th army of the enemy operating along the eastern coast of Italy. According to the opinion of the General Staff this indicates that a break through towards the Balkans via the Goriza area is planned.

At the Karelian front, the Finns plan to withdraw to

18 Jun. 1944

the line Viborg - Vuoksi in order to economize with their forces. It is planned to defend the isle of Koivisto.

VI. Report of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Operations Branch on the situation in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland:

The distribution of the naval forces in the Gulf of Finland as reported by Naval Command, East was subsequently discussed by telephone between Chief of Naval Staff, Operations Division and Operations Officer of the Naval Command. According to this information the conferences on the operations in the northern part of the Gulf of Finland were held between Commander of 9th Coast Force and the Finnish Naval Staff. It is planned to use the artillery ferry barges against enemy ship concentrations. The result of the negotiations will be reported. On 18 Jun., artillery ferry barges are operating for the defense of Finnish troop transfers in the Koivisto area. During the night of 18 Jun., exploratory minesweeps will be made in preparation of the torpedo operation. The artillery ferry barges remain under the command of the Commander, 9th Coast Patrol Force. For their operations, arrangements will be made with the Finns. No further rights were conceded to the Finnish Naval Staff concerning these vessels.

Naval Command, East reported the Finnish plan to defend the three islands off Koivisto in any case and to foul the Bjorko Sound strongly with mines. Besides, the barrage Pistin II is to be reinforced, the Bay of Viborg will be fouled with mines and a defensive barrage is to be laid out between Tiurinsaari and Kiuskerri. According to further information from Naval Command, East the Finns are planning operations of their own submarines and are advising against operations of German naval forces apparently because they intend to evacuate the coast as far as Viborg.

However, Commander in Chief, Navy is of the opinion that it is necessary to hit the Russian naval forces. More than anything else this would prevent them from carrying out landing operations. This point of view should be explained to the Finnish Naval Staff. As the danger from mines is only of minor importance

18 Jun. 1944

according to Finnish reports, the naval artillery lighters should be used unhesitatingly in an offensive way off the Finnish coast. Torpedoboat operations may also be taken into consideration under certain circumstances. However, the freedom of movement for destroyers is too much impeded in those waters.

After studying the distribution of the artillery ferry barges, Commander in Chief, Navy decided upon a suggestion of Naval Staff that nine of these vessels should be withdrawn from the area of Naval Command, Norway and given to Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea. The disadvantage has to be accepted in Norway considering the extraordinary importance of the necessity to prevent Finland from being pulled out of our front.

Concerning the suggestion of Captain Assman about "Rotbuche" (see War Diary 17 Jun.): Naval Staff is also of the opinion that the development of the situation in the Gulf of Finland makes necessary a support of the Finnish defense by all suitable means. Naval Staff issued directives therefore to Naval Command, East with copy to the Fleet; Training Formation, Fleet; Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea; Naval Liaison Staff, Finland; 9th Coast Patrol Force to carry out "Rotbuche" with the PRINZ EUGEN and torpedoboats as fast as possible and to report on plans. The fact that the technical preparations of the mooring grounds have not been completed yet has to be accepted and is to be taken into consideration if necessary when fixing the duration of the transfer.

Preparations will be made immediately for the LUETZOW for the same operation.

Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff, Navy will be informed as follows:

"1. The transfer of the PRINZ EUGEN and the torpedoboats was ordered. Another cruiser (LUETZOW) is being prepared for the same task and will follow if necessary. It is planned to move the ships only temporary because the mooring places are not ready yet (net barrage) and because, for the time being, anti aircraft artillery protection can be given only by torpedoboats and minesweepers anchoring near the cruiser.

18 Jun. 1944

2. It is not planned to approach the Finnish High Command again concerning the cession of a base on the Aland islands. The evasive answer given by the Finns in the beginning of May revealed that a new request would be useless and would expose us to the danger to get a negative answer this time."

Commander in Chief, Navy will personally talk with Commanding Admiral, Naval Command East in order to make our intentions completely clear.

Furthermore Commander in Chief, Navy ordered that the trip of the three submarines destined for operations in the east should be carried out as quick as possible. Naval Staff, Submarine Division ordered Naval Command, East and Commander, Submarines "Mitte" to provide that the operations of these submarines during the period of preparation i.e. during the assembling in the skerries and at Talinn will irritate the enemy and will demonstrate to the Finns the increase of the German fighting strength.

Special Items.

I. The following figures were reported concerning the state of the KMA-mine program: Up to 11 Jun. or 12 Jun. respectively,

3.994	KMA-mines	were laid out in France,
3.348	" "	in Denmark,
1.668	" "	in the Baltic countries,
2.443	" "	in the Netherlands and Belgium.

II. Captain Assman reported to the Fuehrer as he had been ordered on the question of repulsing enemy attacks in Spanish territorial waters. The Fuehrer thereupon ordered that combat operations have to be avoided in Spanish territorial waters and informed Commander in Chief, Navy by telephone of this desire to avoid by all means further political complications. Therefore, Naval Staff issued the following directive:

"Military actions in Spanish territorial waters even in

18 Jun. 1944

order to ward off enemy attacks have to be abstained from in any case. The order 1/Skl I i 16448/44 Gkdos of 27 May is canceled herewith. 4th and 6th Coast Patrol Force are requested to acknowledge the receipt of the directive."

Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff; Armed Forces, High Command, Foreign Countries Section; Admiral, Fuehrer's Head quarters; German Foreign Office and Naval Attache, Madrid were simultaneously informed of this order.

For further measures concerning this affair compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

III. In the course of the investigation on the raising of further alarm units which had been ordered by Commander in Chief, Navy, the following teletype, signed personally by Commander in Chief, Navy was sent to Armed Forces, High Command / Operations Staff, Navy:

"The Navy has so far provided 5,000 men alarm units from the home area and all training units garrisoned in the western area totalling 40,000 men. The remaining personnel is only sufficient for new commissionings of submarines, PT boats, minesweeping forces and small battle weapons at a maximum up to the end of the year. Minister Speer and I will try to hurry up as much as possible the production of these naval weapons which are urgently required. Supposing that these urgently needed naval weapons shall be commissioned only up to the end of this year, it is impossible to supply further alarm units exceeding the 45,000 men raised up to now. I ask therefore for a decision of the Fuehrer. If, by an unforeseen delay in the construction program, new possibilities of raising alarm units should arise before 31 Dec. 1944 I shall make a report."

IV. Group West advocated a request of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West to replace the recent losses of 5th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla operating in the area of 2nd Coast Patrol Force amounting to all motor minesweeper depot ships and 17 motor minesweepers by allotting

18 Jun. 1944

from another theatre a complete motor minesweeper flotilla in war readiness. It will be impossible to make allotments from the new construction program before Fall 1944.

Naval Staff declared in this respect that in spite of the importance of the defense forces for the operations especially before and during the opening of the enemy landing and although a strong concentration is necessary in the threatened area, the tasks outside of this area are still existant. After the landing has been carried out, the possibilities for operations of the defense forces are limited in the invasion area. Losses caused by the enemy superiority in the air and on sea are high. On the other hand, the importance of operations in other areas including the western theatre outside the invasion area has increased. Naval Staff is unable therefore at the moment to comply with the request of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West. This decision was made by the Order 1/Skl I op 18519/44 Gkdos. For copy compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. C.

V. On 15 Jun., Commander PT boats gave a summary report as had been ordered on the dislocation and replacements at the flotillas in the western area. Naval Staff although emphasizing the necessity of shelter protection, approved his plan to concentrate 2nd PT boat Flotilla with two boats of 4th PT boat Flotilla at the base Le Havre, to move 5th and 9th PT boat Flotilla to the base Cherbourg and to transfer 8th PT boat Flotilla with three boats to the base Ostend and to station this flotilla later at Boulogne after newly constructed boats will have joined it. Concerning 6th and 10th PT boat Flotilla, Naval Staff decided as follows: Due to the situation in the Gulf of Finland, the flotillas in the western areas can only be reinforced at present by transferring 6th PT boat Flotilla in a hurry. 10th PT boat Flotilla and PT boat Training Flotilla will remain in the Skagerrak and at Swinemuende. The creation of 10th PT boat Flotilla will be continued according to plans and the crews of 8th PT boat Flotilla may be used as they become free. 10th PT boat Flotilla has to reckon at any time with a transfer to the east or to the west according to the situation and 24 hours' readiness will be ordered.

For the suggestion of Commander, PT boats and for the order 1/Skl I op 18449/44 Gkdos compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. D.

VI. High Command, Air, Operations Staff informed Naval Staff by way of notice on its directive to 5th Air Force that 5th Air Force has to carry out occasional reconnaissance sweeps between 54 and 61° north as much as possible with the reconnaissance forces available. The reconnaissance flights should be made in such a way as to secure that in cooperation with the submarine reconnaissance, the departure and the

18 Jun. 1944

approach of enemy landing forces can be recognized promptly. The center of the reconnaissance should be Newcastle, Firth of Forth and the Orkney Islands (Scapa).

Concerning this item, Naval Staff sent the following statement to Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff with copy to High Command, Air, Operations Staff:

- "1. In view of the development of the general situation, landing operations against Norway, Denmark or the German Bight are not altogether impossible even as early as still in June in spite of the containing of strong enemy forces in the Channel area.
2. At present, Naval Staff has ordered about 17 submarines to the inshore water enlarged area between $65^{\circ} 40' N$ and $63^{\circ} 20' N$. The doubtful value of submarines as a means of reconnaissance and particularly in waters comparatively near our coast has been proved again. Furthermore the considerable expenditure of Diesel-oil will force us to withdraw the submarines soon.
3. As Naval Staff is unable, by its own means, to safeguard the security of our coasts against surprise operations, it approached High Command, Air and asked to accept responsibility for reconnaissance between $53^{\circ} N$ and $61^{\circ} N$ and to concentrate attention on the areas The Wash-Grimsby, New-Castle, Firth of Forth and Orkney Islands.
4. High Command, Air, Operations Staff is of the opinion that it can solve the task by occasional control sweeps in cooperation with submarine reconnaissance. This measure is not regarded as sufficient at Naval Staff because, in accordance with 2., submarines cannot be regarded as means of reconnaissance and as the boats will have to be withdrawn.
5. Naval Staff regards systematic daily reconnaissance as under 3. as the only guarantee against enemy surprise actions and wishes to bring this fact to general knowledge by pointing to the landings in the Seine Bay."

VII. Group West asked to send 150 of the next 300 LMB-nines with DM 1 firing devices becoming available to Dieppe and 150 to Ostend. Naval Staff issued the necessary orders.

VIII. In Brief Reports on the Enemy Situation No 7/44, Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division reported on the names of the enemy ships,

18 Jun. 1944

participating in the invasion, as far as they are known up to now, on the commanders of the enemy naval forces in operation, on new weapons, and on the reinforcement of the enemy fleet in the Far East etc. Furthermore, the declaration of General Montgomery concerning the first phase of the invasion up to 12 June is rendered in this report. For copy as per 1/Skl. 23976/44 geh. compare War Diary, Part D, Vol. "Materials on the Enemy Situation".

Further reports of Naval Staff, Intelligence Division deal with a British method of using depth charges for fighting against light surface forces, with the use of radar vessels during landing operations, protection of landing boats by torpedo nets, use of small air ships in landing operations etc. Furthermore, supplementary reports are given on the British-American landing operation in the area Nettuno - Anzio. For copy as per 1/Skl 24056, 24058 and 24060/44 geh. compare War Diary, Part D, Vol. "Materials on the Enemy Situation".

Situation on 18 Jun.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Invasion:

It can be seen from enemy reports that, during the whole day on 16 Jun., Allied cruisers and destroyers fired upon our artillery positions on the eastern border of the Orne. The RAMILLIES fired upon concentrations of German tanks northeast of Caen.

Reports received at Naval Staff conveyed the following impression of the situation.

at 0020, Admiral, Channel Coast reported the use of phosphor during an air attack against Boulogne. Subsequently, large conflagrations broke out on boats and in the town.

at 0035, Naval Communications Officer, Cherbourg reported the departure of four PT boats at 0000.

When strong enemy air formations flew over Fecamp on 17 Jun., the French crew allowed the flood gates to slam and run away. As it is

18 Jun. 1944

impossible to open the gates due to the pressure from inside, four armed fishing vessels are unable to leave Fecamp.

at 0225, Naval Communications Officer, Cherbourg reported the arrival of three PT boats at 0130.

Upon a request of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Group West reported:

at 0430, "1. It is no more possible under prevailing conditions to send supplies for Cherbourg via the sea to Carteret, Port Bail, Dielette.

2. In view of the very limited number of vessels a withdrawal of transport space from the Channel Island traffic is possible only by cutting down Channel Island supplies. Investigations are being made on the possible extent of such measures. Furthermore, it was ordered to register all suitable fishing vessels.

Plans:

The small boats will move independently in three stages via the Channel Island ports to Cherbourg. One round trip will last six days per boat. Three PT boats which are ready for sailing will be dispatched to Cherbourg-Malo as an urgent measure as soon as the Army supplies are ready at Malo. The number of PT boats will be increased according to the situation. Besides, the Army ordered to prepare for supplies by submarines. The submarines will leave the harbor as soon as the loading will be completed.

Naval Staff transmitted this report to Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff, Navy and to Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters.

at 0455, Radio Monitoring Service transmitted an enemy report of 0400 according to which planes were observed laying mines in various positions at 0040, at 0055 and at 0135.

A subdivision of the baggage unit of 5th PT boat Flotilla was transferred on land from Cherbourg to St. Malo where it has already arrived.

at 0700, Group West transmitted a situation report of 0600:

"1. Our own activity during the night of 17 Jun:

a. Three PT boats started from Cherbourg for an operation against enemy targets in order to assist a German westbound convoy. The boats returned to Cherbourg at 0200.

18 Jun. 1944

b. The convoy from Cherbourg to Jersey had contact with enemy PT boats in BF 3581. One PT boat was sunk. The minesweeper M "133" was hit by a torpedo and is being towed away. Casualties were sustained on the minesweeper M "4625".

c. The KMA-nine-barrage KK 35 was laid out according to plans off Bruneval near Cape Antifer.

2. Radar-locations: Locations were reported north of Antifer, northwest of Le Havre, north of Cape de la Hague, west of Alderney and between Alderney and Guernsey as well as in the waters from Ile de Bas up to Les sept Iles.

3. On the occasion of an air attack against St. Malo at 2030, the steamer LA FRANCE (751 BRT) (provided as hospital ship, no markings) sunk. In the roads, the minesweeper M "4618" shot down one plane."

at 1142, the Port Commander, Granville reported an air attack with incendiary and explosive bombs from 0000 till 0110 and conflagrations in the harbor district on lighters which had been damaged already on previous occasions. One barge sunk near the sluice entrance. The entrance became narrower.

at 1210, Group West transmitted the following:

"1. Naval Command, Normandy reported at 0322: the situation at the western coast is not clear, the western batteries are firing against targets of medium size. According to the impression gained from locations and light signals it may be concluded that hits were made.

2. Army Coastal Battery 1/1255 reported that it was fired upon for about ten minutes at 1300 on 17 June by naval artillery of unknown calibre. The left loophole post was perforated twice. One gun and one howitzer were destroyed."

According to Radio Monitoring Service it can be seen from an enemy report which was intercepted only incompletely that from 1800 on 16 Jun. until 1800 on 17 Jun., 2,709, 709 tons of material, 9,067 persons and 1,315 vessels were unloaded. The report was directed to the officer in charge of the unloading in the eastern landing sector.

at 1400, Group West regarded landing possibilities for the night of 18 Jun. as difficult at some places in the Dutch area and along the Channel coast, as possible at other parts of the coast and as favorable along the Atlantic coast.

at 1550, Naval Shore Command, Channel Islands reported that an attack of four fighter bombers against a convoy near Jersey was warded off with minor casualties.

18 Jun, 1944

According to a telephone report of Commander, PT boats, the PT boats operating from Cherbourg had no success in the night of 18 Jun. The other flotillas did not operate because of the weather.

at 1715, Group West reported:

- "1. The barrage KK 35 south of Antifer was laid out with 52 KMA-mines.
2. It is planned to extend this barrage towards the south during the night of 18 Jun.
3. Concerning the air attack against Granville as already reported.
4. Distribution of PT boat Flotillas:
 - a. 9th PT boat Flotilla will be in charge of the PT boat base Cherbourg.
 - b. 5th PT boat will establish a base at St. Malo.

at 2150, Group West reported on PT boat operations in the night of 18 Jun:

The Cherbourg group will move to St. Malo for transport tasks, the Boulogne group will move with six boats to Le Havre, 8th PT boat Flotilla will be kept in 30 minutes readiness with two boats at Ostend and one boat at Le Havre as it is too weak for combat operations. The other boats are not ready for war.

at 2306, Naval Shore Commander, Normandy reported to Admiral Channel Coast and Group West:

"Upon a most urgent request of the fortress commander I ask again to consider whether the harbor defense force at Cherbourg may be used for the fighting on land in order to make available crews with a good infantry training including the valuable light anti-aircraft artillery for the inadequately defended fortress. Provided the quay installations are being destroyed as completely as has been done so far the work will last still for another week. The crews of the boats will be urgently needed by the port captain for this work after two emergency companies have been withdrawn.

2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the West Area:

Sixty-six planes were counted operating in the area of 19th Group. Five locations of British vessels were reported from the rendezvous area.

18 Jun. 1944

3. Own Situation in Other Parts of the West Area:

Atlantic Coast Area:

Seventeen patrol positions were occupied. One submarine was escorted on her way in. Twelve mines were cleared in the Brest - Lorient area. On this occasion, the minesweeper M "413" hit a mine without suffering serious damage. Three anti-submarine chasers and one patrol boat were operating in the anti-submarine control off the northern coast of Spain.

Channel Waters:

Five patrol positions were occupied. No other events of any importance were reported.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

North Sea:

Escort and minesweeping service was carried out in the German Bight according to plans. Three mines were cleared. At 0907, about 35 enemy planes attacked the lock area at Brunsbuettel. A number of bombs fell into the water. Five explosive bombs were dropped near the new lock which remained ready for being served by hand-work. At the old lock one wing of the outer gate was blown away at the side facing the Elbe. The lock is not ready for operating. The batteries and weapons near the lock are ready for action.

At 1034, two bomb carpets were dropped in the town and harbor district during an air attack against Wesermuende. One gun and one search light went out of action at the Battery Langen. Barrack installations and four naval artillery lighters were seriously damaged and one third of them was destroyed. The barrack-camp of 6th Construction Training Company was completely destroyed. Besides, strong industrial and civilian damages were sustained.

Ten or twelve explosive bombs fell into the sea near Heligoland. Thirteen small anti-personnel bombs were dropped in the neighborhood of the Battery Langwarden at Wilhelmshaven and 30 medium explosive bombs fell near Voslapp as well as 30 explosive bombs which fell into the Jade river west of the Battery Seefeld. At Cuxhaven 17 explosive bombs fell on the signal installation at Nordholy. Further 40 bombs

18 Jun. 1944

were dispersed over the sectional area. One plane was reportedly shot down for certain, another plane was probably brought down. Heavy damages were caused at Nordenham.

A heavy attack was carried out by several hundreds of planes against Hamburg between 0915 and 1010. For a comprehensive report compare enclosure to Situation of the Day and teleprint of Naval Command, North of 1330; report of Admiral, Naval Office, Hamburg by teleprint 1845; report of Armed Forces High Command, War Economy Inspectorate X at Ministry of Armament and War Production as per teleprint 1910; furthermore the teleprint of Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping and Reichsstatthalter Kaufmann to Commander-in-Chief, Navy as per l/Skl 23391/44 geh. Copy find in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V. This report contained a statement on the damages sustained at the dockyards on the occasion of the air attack. The Reichsstatthalter informed Commander-in-Chief, Navy that all measures were taken for carrying on with the work or for the quickest repair of the dockyards.

It is planned to escort a steamer from the Elbe to Esbjerg during the night of 18 Jun.

No minesweeping work was carried out off the Dutch coast owing to the strong wind. The transfer of the 6th PT boat Flotilla from Cuxhaven to Ymuiden was postponed to the night of 19 Jun. The patrol positions off Ymuiden and off Hook were occupied. During the morning hours of 18 Jun., enemy planes were observed between Ymuiden and Texel presumably laying mines.

Special Items:

The sensibility of the ELM-firing device was so much increased recently that, according to estimates of Underwater Obstacles Branch, about 50% of the ELM-mines are lost by self-explosion in case, for example, the mine is only slightly moved by heavy sea or by the turn of the tide. Naval Command, North was ordered - with copy to Commanding Admiral, Netherlands and Commanding Admiral, Defenses North - to investigate previous observations to find out whether the frequency of the explosions observed is corresponding to these conditions.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

The number of planes operating in the area of 18th Group was not reported.

18 Jun. 1944

2. Own Situation:

Between 2100 and 2300 on 17 Jun. strong enemy formations attacked the town and the harbor of Kirkenes with bombs, phosphorus containers and gunfire. The steamer MARGA CORDS (1.912 BRT) suffered damage by fire after being hit by a bomb.

The number of enemy planes shot down by escort vessels and anti-aircraft artillery on the occasion of the air attack against the eastbound convoy near Kiberg on 17 Jun was increased to three planes. Besides, two planes were shot down by the Battery Kiberg.

Twenty eight ships were escorted to the north and 24 ships to the south. The Battle Group reported on the planned schedule for the TIRPITZ. For details compare teleprint 2230. Training under way is planned from 23 until 25 Jun., sub calibre fire is planned on 28 and 29 Jun. and calibre fire in the Altafjord on 4 and 5 July. It is planned to post two destroyers in the northern part of the Altafjord at the entrances of Stjern- and Vang-Sound during the days of gunnery practice. One of the destroyers will at the same time be used as target ship.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

Our air reconnaissance did not reveal any new facts concerning the presence of ships in the enemy harbors.

2. Own Situation:

Four patrol positions were occupied at the western coast of Juteland. Furthermore, the gap in the barrage at Hanstholm will be controlled. 140 KMB-mines arrived at Esbjerg for the Hanstholm emergency barrage. 3rd PT boat Flotilla arrived at Frederikshaven.

Twenty seven boats were clearing mines in the Baltic Sea entrances and 31 boats and seven minesweeping aircraft were on mine clearance duty in the Baltic Sea. One mine was cleared in the Kiel Bay.

According to a report of 9th Coast Patrol Force, a withdrawal of the Finnish front to Viborg has to be reckoned with within a comparatively

18 Jun, 1944

short time as no prepared defense positions exist between Viborg on the line reached by the Russians on 17 Jun. and as the territory is favorable for enemy tank operations.

The net patrol and the Narva patrol were carried out as scheduled. The armed fishing vessels were moored at Aseri or under the cover of the shore because of the bad weather.

1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla with the NETTELBECK and six boats is waiting in readiness at Kotka. The torpedo boat T "30" and T "31" anchored near Mussals.

Six naval landing craft of 24th Landing Flotilla were placed at the disposition of the Finnish Naval Staff two of which were ordered to assist in the evacuation of the civilian population of Karelia over the Viborg Bay and four of which were dispatched to A O 3353.

The laying out of the KMA-mine barrage in the night of 17 Jun. was canceled because of loading difficulties. The loading was interrupted by continued air attacks.

Six other naval landing craft are protecting the withdrawal of Finnish troops over the Viborg Bay.

In the afternoon, one artillery ferry barge was heavily damaged and casualties were suffered during an air attack. The naval landing craft and artillery ferry barges participating in the evacuation of the Karelian coast are continuously exposed to strong air attacks.

During the night of 17 Jun, the steamer FORTUNA and the coastal auxiliary sailing vessel ANTILOPE were unsuccessfully attacked with a torpedo and gunfire by an enemy plane in the Irben Narrows. The ships were defended by two heavy artillery carriers and one patrol boat.

The Finns reported the laying out of the emergency barrages Pistin 3, 4 and 1b off Tiurinsaari.

In the Gdovka mouth at Lake Peipsi, four motor minesweepers, six motor boats, one tug, one barge and five other boats of the enemy were made out.

No special events were reported from the escort and patrol service on Lake Peipsi.

V. Submarine Warfare:

Three VII c-boats ready for front service will leave Kiel on 19 Jun. and Pillau on the evening of 20 Jun. for Reval in order to operate in eastern waters.

18 Jun, 1944

VI. Aerial Warfare:

West Area:

During the day, enemy air activity was comparatively weak in the occupied western territories. The defensive zone near Hessin was attacked. Forty enemy planes entered the Montpellier area from the south without attacking.

The enemy air activity was very weak in the western area also during the night of 18 Jun. Our own operations on 18 Jun. were carried out by 255 fighters who shot down six enemy planes at a loss of four on our side. In the night of 18 Jun., 63 bombers fouled the waters of the Seine Bay with mines. Five bombers were lost in this operation. Forty two other bombers laid also mines in the Seine Bay and attacked naval targets off the landing area. One destroyer was sunk and three destroyers were damaged, two steamers sunk, one LSJ damaged, one tanker and three steamers damaged.

Reich Territory:

The attack on Hamburg has been reported upon. Two hundred anti-personnel bombs and many incendiary bombs were dropped at Bremen following the attack against Hamburg. On the occasion of the attack against Weser-Flugzeugbau aircraft factory at Nordenham, two planes were destroyed on the ground and 24 were damaged.

At the same time when the attack against Hamburg was going on, Hannover was bombed again.

No enemy air activity was observed over the Reich territory during the night of 18 Jun.

Mediterranean Theater:

On 17 Jun., the enemy sent 550 planes over the Italian front area, 200 planes for the support of the landing at Elba and 50 planes for an attack against traffic installations in central Italy.

An attack against the harbor and the town of Rhodos as well as an attack on a train near Salonika were reported from the area of Air Force Command, South East. No enemy air activity was reported in the night of 17 Jun.

18 Jun. 1944

East Area:

At the eastern front, 310 of our own and 585 enemy air operations were reported on 17 Jun. and 540 German and 615 enemy air operations in the night of 17 Jun. A total of 68 enemy planes were shot down at a loss of four planes on our side. Strong German formations attacked some railway stations in the rear of the enemy front during the night of 17 Jun.

On the occasion of the attack against Kirkenes carried out in the night of 17 Jun. by 150 enemy planes, our fighters succeeded in bringing down 27 enemy planes.

VII. War in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea:

1. Area of Naval Group, West:

Enemy Situation:

At noon, a convoy of 95 ships including 15 tankers, 11 LST's, 11 USA corvettes and 10 PT-boats and the rest Liberty freighters passed the Gibraltar Strait for the Mediterranean. A cruiser of the DELHI-type left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean at 1245. On the forenoon of 17 Jun., six big transporters entered Gibraltar coming from the Atlantic.

Own Situation:

At 1100, the naval battery east of Sete brought down one plane. The Army took part in the shooting down. Submarine hunting was carried out in the Toulon area.

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Situation:

At 0015, three big ships were reported with lights on at the northwest coast of Sardinia without details as to their course. In the morning of 18 Jun., air reconnaissance off the western coast of Sardinia and Corsica as well as in the Bonifacio Strait was incomplete because of the bad weather. No sightings were made.

18 Jun. 1944

Own Situation:

In the area Elba-Piombino enemy air attacks were continuously carried out. Anti-aircraft artillery positions were attacked by fighter bombers. At Longone (Elba) one naval landing craft was sunk and another one was heavily damaged. German Naval Command reported on the situation on Elba at 1100. The enemy advancing from the west and from the south and, assisted by strong air operations and artillery fire from the sea, made considerable territorial gains. The positions were mostly lost because the Italian crews were deserting. The defense line runs from the middle of Ferrais Bay to Longone.

Further attacks were warded off with the exception of one penetration of our lines where the Italians hoisted a white flag. The naval radio station and the battle headquarters of Naval Command, Elba moved to Rio di Elba in the night of 17 Jun, after they had been completely destroyed by naval artillery and fighter bombers. The Battery Enfola was dismantled after blowing up all its guns. The crew joined the troops fighting in the defense line. The Battery Ripalti was cut off. The battery is still fighting at Capo Liveri. The crew of the Battery Bianco joined the infantry front. No reports came in from Battery Poro. Only one 7.5 centimeter gun is still ready for action at Battery Fortino and three 7.5 centimeter guns at Battery Canelle whereas one army battery remains in action with three 7.5 centimeter guns. The enemy so far suffered heavy casualties. Motor minesweepers and combat ferries are maintaining the connection with the mainland.

During the night of 16 Jun., combat ferries had contact twice with PT boats off the southern coast of the island. The sweep of the PT boats for minelaying in the Piombino Strait was successful. On their way to that area the boats were unsuccessfully fired upon by a heavy enemy unit, probably a bigger destroyer north of Ferrais. When laying out the barrage south of Piombino, an exchange of fire took place at 0055 for about ten minutes with combined enemy PT boat and patrol boat formations (in some instances our boats lay alongside the enemy boats). One boat was sunk for certain, two others were heavily damaged. Our boats were able to avoid several enemy torpedoes. From 0123 till 0143, repeated PT boat attacks were warded off by using all weapons. On their way back, our boats located PT boats at 0244. The boats returned to Spezia having suffered only minor casualties and damages. The combat ferries returned to Piombino for a reconnaissance sweep. The motor minesweepers anchored in the bays of eastern Elba.

3. Area of Naval Group, South:a. Adriatic:

18 Jun. 1944

At 0730, a northbound coastal auxiliary sailing vessel was sunk by a fighter bomber southeast of Ravenna. The crew was rescued by a harbor guard boat.

In the evening of 17 Jun., the railway line Trieste - Monfalcone was blown up. Slight material damages occurred. Motor columns were attacked by low flying planes in the Albanian area. Several cars were lost.

b. Aegean:

At 1915, a periscope was sighted off the Suda Bay.

At 0730, an enemy plane, laid three mines off Rhodos harbor for the first time during daylight. In the evening, during the attack against Rhodos, three out of the 18 bombs dropped fell into the harbor basin. The steamer AGATHE was slightly damaged. One of the attacking planes was shot down.

It was again impossible to use the light PT boats because of the continuously bad weather. During the night of 17 Jun., an infantry observation station and one auxiliary sailing vessel in the harbor Langatha at the northeastern coast of Chios, were simultaneously attacked from the land and, by two motor boats, from the sea. Our auxiliary sailing vessel left the harbor but did not encounter the enemy.

Explosives detonated at 0430 on two boats of 9th PT Flotilla which were lying at Porto Lago. The PT boats of foreign construction TA 17 and TA 14 suffered leakages. Further explosions occurred on vessels at the pier. One armed fishing vessel and one tug were sunk. Further investigations are being made concerning this most successful enemy sabotage operation.

c. Black Sea:

The submarine U"19" reported that it fired a torpedo without success against a convoy of dumb barges escorted by three submarine chasers.

At 0203 on 18 Jun. the armed fishing vessel, submarine chaser "316" sunk off Sulina after hitting a mine, presumably in our own mine barrage.

The transfer of further ships from the Black Sea to the Aegean has started. One convoy will be off the Bosphorus at daybreak on 19 Jun.

18 Jun. 1944

Situation on the Danube:

No new laying of mines was reported on 18 Jun. On 17 Jun., 190 vessels were reported on their way in the Hungarian area, 62 vessels in the Serbian area and 61 vessels in the Roumanian area.

A freight barge hit a mine and sunk and another barge was damaged near kilometer indicator 1735. The clearing of altogether five mines was reported.

VII. Situation in East Asia:

Nothing to report.

19 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance.

The Finnish Prime Minister declared in a broadcast to the Finnish people that the decisive part of this big war is now approaching. Finnish morale would have to undergo its decisive test.

The Finnish press regards the expulsion from the U.S.A. of the Finnish ambassador as a friendly gesture of Roosevelt towards Moscow.

According to a report from a reliable source the Finnish government asked Sweden for armed assistance. The Swedish Government, however, had decided on 17 Jun. to prohibit any delivery of armaments to Finland.

According to a United Press report it is feared at Washington that the quarrel about and with de Gaulle would lead to a deep disagreement between U.S.A., England and France.

Conference on the Situation with Commander-in-Chief, Navy at 1115.

I. Because of the unreliability of the Italian soldiers, Commander-in-Chief, Navy ordered that the entire problem of using Italians in combat also in future should again be raised for investigation at Armed Forces, High Command. Group West and Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy were ordered to safeguard the protection of our troops by immediate measures already before Armed Forces, High Command would have decided on the matter and to report suggestions for avoiding difficulties for our own future operations caused by Italians.

19 Jun. 1944

II. Chief of Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division:

Naval Attache, Helsinki reported a statement of a neutral military attache who has close relations with the U.S.A. representative at Helsinki. According to this statement a new attempt of the U.S.A. to negotiate peace for Finland could be expected after the capture of Viborg at the latest. It is hoped at Washington that the Russian Government will accept this suggestion. In case Finland is refusing again, America would break off relations with Finland. It was transmitted from the same source that this year's aim of the invasion was confined to gain large bridgeheads as for example the Cotentin Peninsula including Cherbourg. The western powers together with Russia will not launch their general offensive against Central Europe before next year. No large scale operations were to be expected from the newly acquired bridgeheads already this year because the conquest of the bridgeheads would require several months.

According to a report of Military Attache, Helsinki the Japanese Military Attache at that place is of the opinion, based upon informations from Tokyo, that the center of the Russian offensive this summer would be in the south of the eastern front. It's objective would be to conquer Lwow and eastern Galicia, to penetrate into Rumania and to join the Tito formations. The offensive on the Karelian isthmus was called a military operation with political motives. The Japanese did also expect a new Russian offer for peace following the capture of Viborg.

III. Situation of the Army:

Situation in the West:

Today the situation had quieted a little. Our positions in the eastern part of the landing bridgehead could be defended. On the Cotentin Peninsula the enemy reached the western coast. No reports came in from the northern front on the peninsula. The Fortress Commander, Cherbourg was up to now Major-General Sattler.

Italy:

No further reports came in from Elba. The heavy fighting is continuing along the Italian front. The attack against Perugia has not begun yet.

Finland:

The withdrawal of the Finnish troops on the isthmus of Karelia is carried out in a hurry but in accordance with plans. The idea is to make the Aunus-front shorter in order to spare forces.

19 Jun. 1944

Special Items.

I. Concerning the situation in the Gulf of Finland:

Naval Command, East reported it's plan temporarily to move two destroyers of Group Kother to Helsinki in the next days.

Furthermore, Naval Command, East reported the results of the conference of Commander, 9th Coast Patrol Force with the Chief, Finnish Naval Staff on the afternoon of 18 Jun. According to the report the Bjorko Peninsula was evacuated by the Finns and was then occupied by small Russian forces. It is therefore impossible to assist the land front from the sea and the Finns themselves declare this to be impossible. In case of a shift of the front every opportunity which may offer itself will be used according to the orders.

The artillery ferry barges suffered heavy air attacks east of Tiurinsari lasting the whole day. The crossing of troops over the Bjorko-Sound was protected. On this occasion, one artillery ferry barge was damaged by a bomb hit. Two planes were shot down.

It was not yet possible to load the KMA-mines on the naval landing craft because of continued air attacks at Ristiniemi.

The Finns are planning to foul the Bjorko-Sound off the harbor Koivisto with TMB-mines and subsequently to set up a barrage in the northern exit of Bjorko-Sound. The islands Piisari, Tiurinsari and Koivusari will be defended upon an order of the Marshal. Withdrawal from the islands had been taken into consideration already. At present, the defense forces on the islands are the following: 2,500 men, three 25 cm, six 15 cm, six 17.5 cm guns and several field guns.

The barrage Pistin 5 will be laid out by the Finns tonight with 200 Finnish mines. It is planned to reinforce the barrage by EMC-mines with snaglines and cutting floats. The mine ship OTTER, carrying materials, will leave Reval for Kirkomaan at 2100 at 18 Jun.

On 19 Jun., the NETTELBECK and the minesweeper M "29" will move to Eskaari after replenishing their equipment. They will be kept in immediate readiness at that place to ward off landing vessels. The artillery ferry barges east of Tiurinsari will be kept in immediate readiness. They will be under the command of Commander von Ramm on the NETTELBECK.

The Finns asked for further 500 KMA-mines in order to mine the coast west of Viborg. The mines will be kept in readiness at Kirkomaan.

19 Jun. 1944

The defense line at the isthmus of Viborg will be defended under all circumstances. It has not been decided yet whether this will include or exclude Viborg. The southern coast west of Viborg will be occupied by strong forces.

Naval Command, East reported the following plans concerning "Rotbuche":

1. The PRINZ EUGEN together with the torpedo boats T "10", "11" and the naval landing craft F "10" will leave Gøttenham at 0600 on 19 Jun. They will travel at a speed of 17 knots and will be joined by two destroyers of Group Kothe off the Irben Strait.
2. Furthermore, the minesweepers M "403", M "423", M "460" of 25th Minesweeper Flotilla will be allotted.
3. The ships will move to the planned mooring grounds changing perhaps every day and including temporarily also Baltic Port, lasting about one week.
4. Fighter protection at the mooring grounds has been asked for at 1st Air Force.
5. The torpedo boats T "3", "8", "12" are provided as escort for the LUETZOW and will proceed to Libau for refuelling after the operation "Utoe" will have been accomplished.

Naval Staff approved this plan.

According to the order of Commander-in-Chief, Navy the Naval Command, Norway was ordered as follows:

- " a. The situation at the Karelian front renders it necessary to assist the Finns by all suitable means. Artillery ferry barges are particularly fit for the narrow waters in that area.
- b. Nine artillery ferry barges will be dispatched immediately from Norway to the Gulf of Finland. The boats will be placed under the command of 9th Coast Patrol Force for operational purposes. The numbers of the boats and the dates of departure will be reported.
- c. Although the importance of the artillery ferry barges for the coastal defense of Norway is fully recognized the requirements in the Gulf of Finland have to be given priority over the requirements in Norway."

High Command, Air, Operations Staff informed Naval Staff by way of notice on a directive to 1st Air Force concerning the transfer to Turku of one squadron of 1st Group of Fighter Wing 54 as part of the operation "Rotbuche". The squadron was ordered to cooperate with Naval Command, East and with the Operations Staff of the Finnish Air

19 Jun. 1944

Force. It will be the squadron's task to protect the Training Formation, Baltic Sea and, besides, to fight Russian air formations which may penetrate into the area.

Naval Staff informed Naval Command, East; Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea accordingly.

II. In the Aegean Sea, serious damages by detonation of explosives were caused again on war ships in the harbor. Naval Staff informed all the highest operation staffs of the Navy on the event and added as follows: "Without wishing to anticipate the results of the inquiry, attention is called again already now to the fact that the great danger of sabotage by explosives can be averted only by strictest precaution against the smuggling in (by dockyard workers) and against applying the explosives from outside (by boats or from the land)."

III. The Chief, Armed Forces, High Command appointed the General, Assault Division Rhodos to the position of a General, Eastern Aegean effective immediately. The general will still remain in charge of his previous duties. He will have - in the southern Sporades (Dodecaneso and the isles Samos, Ikaría, Furni) - the rank of a division commander and the authority of a Commander, Armed Forces. He is responsible for the entire defenses of that area and will be under the command of Commanding General, Army Group E. Regarding the defense of the coast he will act according to the Fuehrer Order No. 40.

Copy of the order as per 1/Skl 23842/44 geheim find in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

IV. Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division intercepted and issued new information on British auxiliary cruisers with landing boats as well as on British landing ships for personnel (LSP).

For copy as per 1/Skl 24544/44 geh. compare War Diary, Part D., Vol. "Feindlagematerial".

Situation 19 Jun. 1944:

I. War in Foreign Waters.

No reports came in.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Invasion:

19 Jun. 1944

On 18 Jun., Allied air activity was reduced in many parts of the combat area because of low clouds. The enemy estimates the German forces cut off in the Cherbourg area at 25 - 30,000 men.

According to an announcement of the British Air Ministry, the German naval forces at Boulogne were destroyed by a bombing attack in the evening of 16 Jun. According to a special report of Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expedition Forces, the Army of French Fighting Forces in the interior of France increased in size as well as concerning its chances for successful operations. The Army launched a big sabotage program for the paralyzation of the railway and road traffic as well as for the interruption of signals communications. It is said that road and railway traffic in the Rhone valley discontinued completely and that also most of the canals were closed. Furthermore, small German guard units and garrisons were attacked.

The strongest measures are adopted against these bandits by the German forces.

Casualties of the first eleven days up to 16 Jun. were stated by the American side to be 3,283 killed and 12,600 wounded. The Americans allegedly made 8,500 German prisoners in the landing bridgehead during the same time.

Reich Security Central Office transmitted a report of a reliable agent according to which the British Military Attache, Lisbon told Portuguese officers on 9 Jun. that the landing in Normandy was the final and only Anglo-American operation in case it would be possible to enlarge the bridgehead and to land in this area all the forces provided for the invasion. In case larger setbacks were imminent, landing attempts for relief would be taken into consideration along the Mediterranean coast at Mentone and in the Gulf of Rosas near the Spanish frontier. The Allied General Staff, he said, was surprised about the heavy casualties and losses of ships. They had expected strong German air attacks against the landing ships which, however, did not take place. On the other hand, most surprisingly, strong attacks were carried out at sea. Furthermore, the Allied had expected the civilian population to assist effectively the troops landing from the air. But in most cases it was the contrary. The military value of parachutists for the conquest of a harbor had been greatly overestimated.

According to the reports coming in, Naval Staff had the following impression of the situation:

From 0057 to 0105, according to a report of Naval Shore Commander, Channel Islands, Group Alderney located naval targets in BF 3543 which thereupon sheered off. From 0050 onward increased air activity of the enemy and laying of mines from the air was reported from the harbor and from the roads of Peter Port.

19 Jun. 1944

At 0715, Group West transmitted its situation report of 0600:

1. PT boats:

a. Cherbourg Group entered St. Malo at 0300.

b. Boulogne Group operating so far according to places,

2. KMA-mine barrage KK 36 as a southern extension of the barrage KK 35 as scheduled.

3. The minelayers M "206", M "4621" and the tug HERMES were attacked five times on the morning of 18 Jun. by a group of fighter bombers of 18 planes at each time when assisting the tow M "133". Some of the weapons were reportedly destroyed on our ships.

4. The convoy of the minesweeper M "4618" and of the patrol vessel V "1523" and the tank lighters NESTOR and TONKIN left Granville for Helier at 1900 on 18 Jun. Because of continued fighter bomber attacks, the NESTOR returned to Granville carrying wounded. The commander of the patrol boat V "1523" was killed. The other boats entered Helier.

5. Enemy targets were located in the area Fecamp - Antifer - Le Havre - Barfleur - Cape de la Hague - Alderney as well as southwest of Les Sept Iles.

6. According to a report of Naval Shore Commander, Normandy the enemy is using anti-personnel bombs of 23 lbs suspended on parachutes in cases containing three bombs each. The bombs explode vigorously and the range of efficiency is 10 meters.

At 0818, the harbor Jersey was attacked by eight enemy planes and at 0835, the harbor Guernsey was attacked by four planes. No military damages were done.

According to intercepted radio reports, the enemy landing activity was hampered during the forenoon by bad weather. The vessels were ordered to stay under the cover of the shore, others went adrift. Finally, the order was given therefore to stop landing activities until the weather would improve.

At 1230, Naval Shore Commander, Normandy reported that the enemy is approaching the fortress from the direction of Briqueback,

At 1245, Group West reported:

1. At 1104 on 18 Jun., a heavy cruiser fired upon the Army Coastal Battery 3/1255 from a distance of 20 kilometers. At 1721, the Battery

19 Jun. 1944

Painpol fired three salvos against a cruiser of the FIJI class. The cruiser set up a smoke screen and went beyond the range of the battery.

At 1420, the Battery Blankenese forced four boats to sheer off. At 2104, the Battery Steinbruch fired upon a destroyer eight miles north of Guernsey. The destroyer was hit and withdrew behind a smoke screen. The decoy position of Army Coastal Battery 10/1261 was destroyed by artillery fire.

At 0009 on 19 Jun., the Batteries Hamburg and Landemer opened fire against located naval targets off the northern coast of Cotentin. The targets sheered off.

The batteries reported readiness for action as follows:

Army Coastal Battery 3/1261, twelve guns, eight of these pointing to the sea. Battery 1/1261, twelve guns including seven directed to the sea. . . One gun of Battery 2/1255 and two guns of Battery 1/1255 were combined in the rear area under the name of Army Coastal Battery 6/1255.

At 1506, Group West, upon a relevant report of Naval Shore Commander, Normandy, ordered that the harbor patrol boats remain at the disposition of Naval Shore Commander who, following the destruction of the harbor, will decide whether and how many soldiers will be dispatched to the land front. The best and most powerful harbor patrol boats will be maintained in service for tasks which may still arise as escorting of supply ships from the approach point through the mined harbor and for maintaining sea communication with our forces which might be cut off as for example at the Jobourg Peninsula.

A report of Radio Monitoring Service makes possible a glimpse into the systematic enemy landing preparations a flotilla commander was ordered to submit as soon as the weather would improve a report on the condition of vessels on the "supplied form" so that replacements could be asked for!

At 1610, Group West reported its plans for the night of 20 Jun:

1. 8th Minesweeper Flotilla will move from Ostend to the west,
2. The group at Le Havre will operate with torpedoes against enemy supply shipping.
3. The transport PT boat group will return to Cherbourg carrying ammunition.
4. A KMA-mine barrage will be laid out as a southern extension of the KK 36 - barrage.

19 Jun, 1944

Further on in the course of the day, Radio Monitoring Service continuously intercepted reports on damaged enemy vessels which apparently are struggling heavily against the bad weather of this day.

At 1925, Naval Shore Commander, Normandy reported that the Operations Staff General von Schlieben is now at the battle headquarters of Naval Shore Commander, Normandy.

At 2020, Naval Shore Commander, Normandy reported that the first artillery fire against Cherbourg from the land front was opened at 1945.

At 2230, the steamer NESTOR left Granville for Helier.

2. Enemy Situation in other parts of the West Area:

In the area of 19th Group, several submarine sighting reports were intercepted presumably from the western Channel waters. Five British ships were located in the rendezvous area.

3. Own Situation in other parts of the West Area:

Atlantic Coast Area:

During the night of 18 Jun, several minelaying planes were reported off Lorient, six or eight minelaying planes off Brest and the laying of one mine was reported off Peter Port. The radar station at Le Conquet was attacked with bombs. No damages occurred. The naval anti-aircraft artillery at Ile de Bas shot down one enemy plane.

One submarine was escorted on her way in. Five mines were cleared. Fifteen patrol positions were occupied.

Channel Waters:

Three patrol positions were occupied. Four mines were cleared in the area of the Channel Islands including two mines off Peter Port and two off Le Havre.

At 1845 on 18 Jun, the lighthouse at the southern side of the Paimpol-Bay entrance was attacked and damaged by two planes with gunfire.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Escort tasks in the German Bight were cancelled with the

19 Jun, 1944

explosion of the Elbe - Ems traffic because of the stormy north-east wind. Minesweeping work near Borkum and Helder were carried out according to plans. Four mines were cleared north of Borkum. Naval Command, North submitted additional plans for mine barrages near Heligoland. Naval Staff approved the plan.

On the occasion of the air attack against Bremen on 18 Jun., damages occurred at the Deschimag shipyards resulting in a slight reduction in the submarine production of the type XXI. No other military damages were done.

The patrol positions in the Dutch area were partly occupied. Minesweeping work was cancelled because of the stormy northeast wind. A harbor patrol boat sunk off Ymuiden after being hit by a mine.

A convoy of 12,080 BRT was carried out in the IJssel Sea.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Only six planes were observed operating in the area of 18th Group. One British unit was located in AN 4580.

Naval Command, Norway gave the following estimate of the situation:

"1. Increased activity of the enemy in the northern area, continuous air reconnaissance extending as far as Tromsoe, increasing attacks against convoys as well as artillery and air attacks against Knes, Kiberg and Liinahamari, the discovery that the Russian PT boat flotillas were reinforced, the possibility that it is planned to send in the American cruiser MILWAUKEE and strong activity of agents are forcing us to increase our attention with regards Russian plans in the polar region.

2. All reports so far available on the dislocation of the Allied landing formations and on ships in the harbors of the England area - the latter partly confirmed by air reconnaissance - indicate that the forces in Scotland are capable of operations at a limited scale only."

Own Situation:

Three more Russian mines were cleared in the fairway near Eckeroe.

The attack against Kirkenes on 18 Jun. was carried out by 100 planes. Naval anti-aircraft artillery and the battery Suomi shot down one enemy plane each.

Thirty-seven ships were escorted to the north and 22 ships to the south.

19 Jun. 1944

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Our air reconnaissance in the Gulf of Finland sighted seven motor minesweepers and other small vessels northwest of Seiskari at 0525 and about 40 guardboats off Seivasto at 1900. Enemy vessels were reported south of the Bjorko Island at 1740.

At 2015, Russian gunboats of the Moskva class bombarded the coast southwest of Viborg.

2. Own Situation:

Upon a request of Naval Command, Norway, the mineship OSTMARK will be placed at the disposition of the Naval Command for carrying out the barrage program near Stadlandet (operation NW 107). Naval Command, Baltic Sea was ordered to load the mineship with as many EMP-mines as possible and to dispatch her to Norway.

All VP-positions along the coast of western Juteland as well as the gap in the barrage at Hanstholm were occupied. On 17 and 18 Jun., the KMA-barrage "K 10" was laid out with 480 KMA-mines in two rows. Minesweeping work was carried out in the Baltic Sea entrances by 27 boats, and by 34 boats and 7 minesweeping planes in the Baltic Sea. No reports came in on successful clearing of mines.

At 1037 on 18 Jun., a plane of the Liberator type was shot down by a patrol boat in the outer Kiel Fjord.

The second group of the transport of 89th Infantry Division left Oslo in the evening on four troop transporters accompanied by one escort vessel.

At 2340 on 18 Jun. the steamer NEPTUN was unsuccessfully attacked in the Irben Narrows with torpedoes by a plane.

The torpedo boats T "30", "31", the NETTELBECK, the minesweeper M "29" and all naval landing craft were ordered to attack the enemy vessels which had been reported south of Bjorko at 1740. At 2015, the torpedo boats T "30" and T "31" were ordered to attack a destroyer southwest of Viborg. At 2239 the two boats had contact with 15 Russian PT boats in the Bjorko-Sound. Hits were scored on two enemies. The enemy formation set up a smoke screen at 2243 and sheered off. Our torpedo boats therefore reported at 2255 that the waters south of the Bjorko-Sound and Seivasto were clear of the enemy.

Four enemy planes were shot down on 18 Jun. during the continuous air attacks against the artillery ferry barges in the Bjorko-Sound. Two artillery ferry barges are not ready for action at present. Ammunition will be replenished in the Essari Bay.

19 Jun. 1944

Four minesweepers, three patrol boats, one artillery ferry barge, four armed fishing vessels were on duty in the Narva Bight patrol and two patrol boats and eighteen armed fishing vessels were on duty in the Narva Bight patrol and two patrol boats and eighteen armed fishing vessels were guarding the net barrage.

Our boats in the Essari Bight were continuously attacked by strong enemy air formations from 1530 onward. One of the attacking planes was shot down.

The position of "Rotbuche" was reported at 2230 as being off Oesel (in AO 6182) according to dead reckoning.

The Commander, 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla left Turku for Libau with the torpedo boats T "3" and "12" at 1545.

The number of guns of the 10.5 cm batteries at Aseri, Valaste, Merekuola and Tytters-North was increased from three to four guns.

At 2100 on 18 Jun., a rowing boat with spies was caught on Lake Peipsi. A larger number of maps were captured.

According to a report of Naval Command, East, the Finns transferred one company and one engineer platoon from Suursaari to the 2nd Coastal Artillery Regiment. That regiment occupied the Koivisto islands.

V. Submarine Warfare.

The submarine U "741" left Brest for Cherbourg in order to transport ammunition. The submarine U "183" returned from the Far East.

The boat carried home 109 tons of tin, 11 tons of raw caoutchouc, 0.5 tons of quinine, 20 kg of opium and 12 tons of tungsten from Penang. No other reports came in.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. West Area:

During the day, 950 enemy planes penetrated into Belgium and northern France attacking Amiens, Gravelines and building sites in the area St. Omer up to Doullens. Strong enemy formations attacked several aerodromes in western France.

19 Jun. 1944

Enemy air activity in the occupied western territories was weak during the night of 19 Jun. Minor formations attacked two aerodromes.

2. Reich Territory:

During the day, 15 enemy planes were reported in the Borkum area as well as isolated planes in the area Kiel - Bremen - Wesermuende - Langeland - Bielefeld - Siegen. In the night of 19 Jun., two isolated planes flew over central Germany as far as Cottbus and crossing western Germany as far as Marburg on the Lalm respectively.

3. Mediterranean Theatre:

On 18 Jun., the enemy attacked Rhodos during daylight. No air activity was noticed in the Italian front area. One hundred eighty enemy planes were assisting in the landing operation on Elba.

Our planes carried out reconnaissance in the eastern Mediterranean as well as in the Italian and Greek area.

4. East Area:

On 18 Jun., 381 operations of our own planes and 765 operations of enemy planes were observed at the eastern front. Six enemy planes were reportedly shot down at a loss of one plane on our side. 5th Air Force reconnoitered Firth of Forth, Firth of Tay and the Tyne-mouth.

About 1,000 planes are operating from the Russian area against Finland. Details are not yet available.

VII. War in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea.

1. Area of Naval Group West:

Enemy Situation:

At 0730, six transporters, one cruiser and five destroyers left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean. Two (presumably) auxiliary aircraft carriers and three transporters entered Gibraltar coming from the Atlantic.

Own Situation:

At 1330, a submarine was sighted off the southern coast near

19 Jun. 1944

Nice. Anti-submarine hunting was ordered. Further danger of submarines was reported in the afternoon off Port Vendres. Between 1742 and 1743 a submerged submarine off Vendres was fired upon by our batteries. No escort service was rendered because of the weather situation.

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Situation:

According to investigations of Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division no aircraft carriers were in the Mediterranean at the beginning of this year. Since then, two aircraft carriers and eight auxiliary aircraft carriers, the last two this day, entered the Mediterranean. Further tracing of these ships lead only to the definite conclusion that two auxiliary aircraft carriers are in the Mediterranean and two are at Gibraltar. The whereabouts of the two aircraft carriers and of the four other auxiliary aircraft carriers are unknown. In case the two carriers and all eight auxiliary aircraft carriers are still in the Mediterranean their number would exceed the strength of the forces participating in the landing at Salerno.

In the course of further investigations of Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division, it was reckoned out that the maximum number of landing vessels confirmed last year in the Mediterranean including 154 LSTs and 428 LCTs with about 7,400 transport vessels decreased to 146 LSTs and 274 LCTs with 6,000 transport vessels. The considerable decrease of these ships which had been observed in the meantime has thus been nearly compensated recently. As reconnaissance of Oran, Algier, Biserte did not reveal any large-scale preparations for shipments, it has to be assumed that the enemy will keep the landing ships which have been added recently as replacements for vessels now in operation and needing overhauling. No reconnaissance reports came in on the areas Sicily - Malta which are closer to the front nor in the eastern Mediterranean. Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division, summing up its opinion declared that the but incompletely recognized distribution of naval forces and of the landing capacity does not indicate any large-scale operation for the near future. The increased number of aircraft carriers is astonishing. Their whereabouts have to be watched continuously.

In the night of 18 Jun., our air reconnaissance reported four apparently big landing boats north of Elba and steering for the Bight of Ferraiu. Furthermore, a number of ships was sighted south of Pianosa, southwest of Civitanecchia as well as a freighter and about 30 landing boats off the southeastern end of Elba.

19 Jun. 1944

At 1400 on 19 Jun., a destroyer and one landing boat were sighted off Rio Marina. The ships were forced by the Battery Piombino to sheer off towards south where they were met by a heavy cruiser.

Own Situation:

In the night of 18 Jun., escort and patrol services were strongly hampered by bad weather. Combat ferries are operating as escort for the ammunition transport to Elba. Motor mine-sweepers brought back wounded and prisoners from Elba to Spezia.

The enemy continued to gain territory on the island in spite of heavy losses. The defense line leads over the hills south of Rio di Elba and Monte Fico. One gun is still ready for action at the Battery Fortino. The Battery Canelle and the base Longone were cut off but succeeded in warding off all attacks in spite of continuous fighter bomber attacks and gunfire from the sea. The crew of the base Ripalti broke through to Longone early on 19 Jun. The naval radio station moved to Cave in the morning. Since 1600, the ultra short wave connection with Piombino was interrupted. Rio Marina and Cave on Elba are still free of the enemy.

One naval landing craft sunk off the eastern coast of Elba during the night of 15 Jun.

The torpedo boat of foreign construction TA "31" was put into service at Genoa. The boat is not ready for war.

3. Area of Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic:

No new results were obtained by photographic reconnaissance of the harbor of Lissa.

On 18 Jun., one coastal motor vessel of 400 loading tons was sunk by a fighter bomber southwest of Porto Corsini. Only slight losses were sustained on our side during the clearing up of the area Monte di Capidistria carried out by 60 men of the Navy, the Army and Militia forces.

For political reasons, the Croate crew of the torpedo boat T "7" was not disarmed and arrested as had been planned originally but was removed from the boat and garrisoned at Sibenik.

The 1st Battery of 730 Naval Artillery Battalion took up position and is ready for action at Monfalcone with fourteen 4 cm guns, twelve four-barrelled 2 cm guns and seven search lights.

19 Jun. 1944

b. Aegean Sea:

According to an intercepted radio message, Commander 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla reported an attack by eight low flying Beaufighters, 15 miles southwest of Leros. The torpedo boat of foreign construction TA "19" was hit by four rockets and casualties occurred. One of the attacking planes was shot down. The boat returned. At noon, the harbor area at Kalamata was attacked by three enemy planes.

On the occasion of an air attack of nine enemy planes against a convoy of auxiliary sailing vessels near Monemvasia on the forenoon of 18 Jun., three auxiliary sailing vessels shot down two of the attacking planes.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, strong sea traffic was going on off the Turkish coast on 18 Jun. At the same day, according to evaluation of photographs, 10 war vessels, 3 motor launches, and 5 boats were at Otchakov as well as 22 motor landing boats and about 16 boats at Sevastopol.

No ships could be made out at Eupatoria, Ak Metchet nor at Odessa.

Own Situation:

On the evening of 19 Jun., two Rumanian torpedo boats left Constanta for Sulina for a patrol sweep. Escort service along the western coast was according to plans.

4. Situation on the Danube:

In the night of 18 Jun., the laying of mines was reported on the Danube sea-channel between mile indicator 18 and 22. No reports came in from other parts of the Danube.

VIII. Situation in East Asia.

Naval Attache, Tokyo reported:

Japan:

On 15 Jun., Super-Fortresses of Type B-29 starting from their base in China attacked the Japanese mainland and bombed the industrial

19 Jun. 1944

areas of Meji and Shimonoseki. According to Japanese reports the damages are unimportant. Seven of the attacking planes were shot down.

Marianas Islands:

On 15 Jun., the enemy carried out two landing attempts on Saipan Island which were repulsed. Only the third landing attempt carrier out by 160 landing boats and amphibian tanks was successful. The landing was made by a combat group of 8 battleships, 20 carriers and auxiliary carriers and about 16 transporters carrying about two divisions. The Japanese forces on the island are numbering about one division. Heavy fighting is going on in which the artillery of the enemy ships is participating. According to American reports the landing troops succeeded in capturing one aerodrome. An amphibian counterattack of the Japanese on 17 Jun. is said to have been repulsed.

According to Japanese reports, Japanese coastal batteries sunk one battleship and one destroyer in the course of these battles. Some of the enemy forces bombarded the isle of Guam on 16 Jun.

On 14 Jun., enemy planes starting from an aircraft carrier attacked the Bouin Islands and destroyed 47 Japanese planes according to a Reuter report and sunk two Japanese ships.

New Guinea:

The strong Japanese resistance on Biak against the landed troops is continuing.

According to a Reuter report, Allied bombers carried out a heavy attack against the last aerodrome on New Guinea still in Japanese hands and destroyed about 50 planes on the ground.

20 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance.

According to reports reaching New York via Stockholm efforts are again being made to come to a separate peace with Finland. There are rumors about the forming of a new government under the leadership of Mannerheim. The necessary measures to prevent this development have been taken by the German side.

The restriction of diplomatic rights in England which had been ordered in connection with the preparations for the invasion has been abolished effective today.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. During the discussion on the situation in the air, Naval Staff, Operations Division, Naval Air and Air Force Liaison Section reported on the enemy air attack which was carried out this morning against Hamburg and furthermore against Poelitz near Stettin as well as against Magdeburg. On this occasion the locks at Brunsbuettel were attacked again.

According to a preliminary report, the new lock was put out of control. Locking service is still possible for smaller vessels through the old lock.

II. During the conference on the situation at sea, Naval Staff, Operations Division, Operations Branch reported on a fight of the torpedo boats T "30" and "31" on the evening of 19 Jun. in the Bjorko area. The enemy ships were not destroyers of the MOSKWA class but artillery barges. The activity of our torpedo boats did probably prevent an enemy landing on Bjorko. It has to be considered whether a reinforcement of our forces in the Gulf of Finland has become necessary as a replacement for the loss of the torpedo boat T "31" who was hit by a torpedo on her way back when attacking a large number of PT boats. Commander-in-Chief, Navy will discuss the matter by telephone with Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, East who is of the opinion that operations of destroyers in the inner Gulf of Finland cannot be advocated in view of the reduced freedom of movements because of the uncertain mine situation and owing to the navigatory difficulties in these water; as well as due to the strong superiority of the enemy in the air while our own fighter protection and anti-aircraft artillery was insufficient and inadequate. According to the opinion of Admiral Kummetz the risk is out of proportion as compared with the possibility of success. During their sweep the torpedo boats T "30" and "31" did not sight any targets. The PT boat attacks resulting in the loss of the torpedo

20 Jun. 1944

boat T "31" prove the difficulty existing for the destroyers to ward off such attacks in areas which are difficult for navigation and where the mine situation is not clear. The same applies to air attacks. For this reason, Naval Command, East abstained from destroyer operations for the time being and asked Commander, 9th Coast Patrol Force to report his opinion on the matter. The torpedo boats T "10" and T "11" of 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla will be dispatched from the operation "Rotbuche" as replacements for the torpedo boat T "31". Later on, the torpedo boat T "11" which has to pass a dockyard period will be replaced by the torpedo boat T "4" who becomes ready at Swinemuende today. Commander-in-Chief, Navy gave Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, East the liberty to operate within the limits of his own forces. He has to report on his plans and has to submit requests in case his forces are inadequate.

A north and northeast wind of a velocity as high as "8" was reported from the landing bridgehead in Normandy.

A request submitted by Commanding General, Southwest for a reinforcement of the coastal defenses in Istria will be examined.

The assembly for the operation "Wallenstein" was somewhat broken up by the dispatch of several vessels to the Naval Artillery School and to the Torpedo Inspectorate.

III. Quartermaster General: Nine naval artillery lighters will be ready on Lake Peipsi by the end of Jun. whereas three are being transferred and are being mounted at present. Two others are expected until 15 Jul. and four more in the second half of Jul.

Commander-in-Chief, Navy ordered an investigation on whether three of the last mentioned four vessels can be used in the Gulf of Finland. Chief, Naval Staff will issue the necessary orders.

IV. Naval Staff, Chief of Operations Division reopened again the discussion on the operations of our submarines in Spanish territorial waters. Commander-in-Chief, Navy remarked that the strict prohibition to use Spanish territorial waters refers also to our submarines.

V. Situation of the Army:

Situation in the East:

Strong enemy attacks continued along the Karelian front between the coast and Vaugsi. A worsening of the situation has to be expected as the enemy is being reinforced. The Finns are determined to defend the line Viborg - Vaugsi. At our own eastern front it can be

20 Jun. 1944

noticed that the enemy is concentrating his forces in the Smolensk area. The majority of the air forces and part of the ground forces from the Crimean arrived in this area.

Situation in the West:

It is planned to continue to clear up the bridgehead east of the Orne by small raids.

Stronger activity of partisans was reported from the Bretagne. The bandits are being reinforced by strong supplies from the air and by the arrival by air of leaders.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff does not expect any new invasion landings in the Bretagne.

Special Items.

I. Naval Command, East asked for a definite approval for the transfer of the destroyers IHN and RIEDEL to the Skagerrak after completion of the training on 20 Jun.

Naval Staff concurred.

II. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff transmitted the following:

1. The Fuehrer ordered the immediate transfer of one assault gun brigade from Army Group North to Finland. Port of embarkation Reval. He asked for an assembling of the required shipping space as fast as possible. Details on the strength of the brigade and the earliest date for the embarkation will be found out in direct discussions between High Command, Navy Quartermaster General, Shipping and Transport Branch and General Staff of the Army, Operations Division, Department "Anna".

2. Furthermore, General Staff of the Army is considering at present the transfer of one division of Army Group, North to Finland. In preparation for this operation the shipping space required has to be assembled in order to avoid delay. The decision on the carrying out of the operation will be transmitted later.

III. The Japanese Liaison Officer was verbally informed on 16 Jun. on the opinion of Naval Staff concerning the situation in the Pacific as follows:

"Naval Staff regards the American landing on Saipan Island as the

20 Jun. 1944

decisive part of the American attacks up to now. A foothold on the Marianas would enable the Americans to use the valuable Japanese bases (Saipan, Tinian and Guam) and to operate from these bases with air as well as with naval forces against the Japanese mainland and against the Philippines.

Naval Staff is of the opinion that the present fighting on the Marianas is offering an opportunity for the Japanese Fleet to attack with superior forces sections of the American Fleet operating for the assistance of the landing, and to beat them, thus inflicting heavy damages upon the enemy."

The Japanese Liaison Officer confirmed that the Japanese Liaison Staff in Germany has come to the same conclusion. But Rear Admiral Kojima who arrived recently in Germany coming from Japan brought along the contrary opinion of the Japanese Admiralty which plans to spare the Japanese Fleet for a big naval battle with the American Fleet still expected to come and which fears that isolated attacks against combat groups will result in a reduction of the total strength.

The German Naval Staff on the contrary, based on its knowledge of the situation which might possibly be incomplete, is of the opinion that attacks against isolated groups of the American Fleet have greater chances of success than waiting for the big naval battle in the Pacific. Naval Staff thinks that the United States are not at all forced to accept a big naval battle with the Japanese provided their present advance, apparently directed via the Philippines towards China, will be successful. The Japanese Liaison Officer was invited to ask the Japanese Admiralty for an official assessment of the situation concerning this question.

IV. Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division submitted its Report on the Enemy Situation No. 12/44. Copy as per 19372/44 gh find in War Diary, special file "Feindlageberichte 3/Skl". The report contains a summary of the essential conclusions drawn from the enemy situation at the invasion front and is repeating the well known assessment of the enemy forces in the Mediterranean.

Concerning the northern Atlantic, it is stated that the number of convoys carrying supplies and replacements on the north Atlantic route decreased from six to four per month whereas the strength of the convoys did increase. This measure was apparently adopted in order to save escort forces. The replacement of the former Commanding Admiral of the United States naval forces in the southwestern Pacific indicates - in the opinion of Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division - that the center of activity in the Pacific naval war has ceased to be in the southwest Pacific.

20 Jun. 1944.

Situation on 20 Jun. 1944.

I. War in Foreign Waters:

Nothing to report.

II. Situation in West Area:

1. Invasion:

During the night of 19 Jun. our own naval forces were unable to operate because of the wind and the heavy sea. According to observations of Radio Monitoring Service the enemy supply traffic decreased considerably. No locating results were obtained.

A number of reports on enemy sea damages and losses could be intercepted.

The transport of ammunition to St. Malo for the supply of Cherbourg will be speeded up by all means. The attempt to bring 21 cm ammunition to Cherbourg on the land route was unsuccessful and the ammunition was brought back to St. Malo. It is planned to transfer the ammunition from St. Malo by PT boats.

Naval Staff transmitted to Group West the statement of Commander-in-Chief, Navy that the difficulties for submarines in the Channel are constantly on the increase. The Group was ordered therefore to urge Commanding General, West to make ready immediately the supplies which should be transported by submarines.

At 0343, Naval Command, Normandy reported that the German withdrawal of the landfront at Cherbourg has begun.

The positions of the batteries 7/1261 and Blankenese were given up after demolishing and after the moveable equipment had been brought back. The Battery 3/1262 and one gun of "Hamburg" are maintaining harassing fire on the approach road. The dug-out of the Naval Shore Commander's battle headquarters and the railway station were bombarded from the landside on several occasions.

Group West transmitted the following additional reports on the activity of the naval artillery and of the Army coastal batteries on 19 Jun:

At 0315, the Battery 1/1254 protected our returning boats by firing against enemy naval targets. Between 1925 and 1940, Army Coastal Battery 3/1255 fired upon three rocket boats off Franceville. The boats set up smoke screens.

At 1232, Group West ordered Naval Shore Command, Normandy to dispatch to the Channel Islands in the night of 20 Jun. all coastal motorships and tugs which are no more needed and to send back as much as possible of the valuable equipment short in supply in particular for the PT boats.

20 Jun. 1944

At 1325, Group West regarded landing possibilities in the night of 20 Jun. as difficult but on the improving in the Dutch area, also as difficult and improving along the Channel coast and as possible at the Atlantic coast.

Naval Shore Command, Normandy reported on the destructions at Cherbourg. Quay Normandie: completely destroyed, Quay France: a deep and wide gap along the entire length of the pier just behind the jetty wall. The jetty wall itself broken down at several places. Already as it is now, the pier cannot be used for a long time. The destruction work is being continued. Quay Homet: at nine places the jetty wall was blown into the water from holes which had previously been made by blasting. The order to blow up the foundations of the jetty wall was still withheld.

An enemy air attack was directed against the depot of 5th PT Boat Flotilla in the vicinity of Cherbourg. Casualties occurred. The depot was given up.

As the Army communications were interrupted, communications between Cherbourg and the superior Army Command Stations were maintained through the Navy radio net. Naval Staff is thus in a position to obtain information on a number of reports and directives concerning the Army.

At 1557, Commanding Admiral, Channel Coast issued an order that Naval Shore Commander, Normandy is discharged from his duties as area commander outside the encircled territory. The port captain at St. Malo will take over command in the area Granville up to the boundary of Naval Shore Commander, Bretagne 1600 on 20 Jun.

At 1648, Naval Shore Command, Normandy reported that two coastal auxiliary sailing vessels and one tug were dispatched to the Channel Islands at 2200. Equipment short in supply is being transferred on this occasion.

At 1745, Group West reported on its plans for the PT boats:

1. St. Malo-Group (three boats) will carry out transports to Cherbourg.
2. Le Havre-Group (seven boats) will start for operations in the upper half of the grid square BF 3682 with DM 1-mines and subsequently with torpedoes.
3. 8th PT Boat Flotilla will move from Ostend to Boulogne.
4. The forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West will lay out one KMA-minefield south of Antifer and one west of Dieppe.

20 Jun. 1944

At 1900, Group West reported that, according to Commanding General, West, the supplies to be transported by submarines were ready in due time and that part of the transport task was being carried out already.

The K-Flotilla 211 (small battle unit - remote control explosive motor boats "Linse") arrived at Bolbec east of Le Havre on the evening of 19 Jun. The first half of the flotilla will move to Barfleur on the Tancarville - Canal on 20 and the second half on 21 Jun.

Simultaneously, the K-Flotilla 361 (small battle unit - one-man human torpedoes "Neger") is moving to the Le Havre area, starting from Rudolstadt on 19 Jun.

At 2046, Naval Shore Commander, Normandy reported that the coastal auxiliary sailing vessels are unable to leave the harbor because of the bad weather. Commanding Admiral, Defenses West ordered 6th Artillery Carrier Flotilla to escort the coastal auxiliary sailing vessels and tugs up to Cape de la Hague.

2. Enemy Situation in other parts of the West Area:

In the area of 19th Group, no reliable figures could be made out concerning the operations. Submarine sighting reports of planes belonging to this group were intercepted in the western Channel and in the Bay of Biscay.

Two British ships were located in the Bay of Biscay.

3. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast Area:

Sixteen patrol positions were occupied. Five mines were cleared off Brest. One submarine was escorted on her way out and one submarine on her way in. The 8th Minesweeper laid out the minefield north of Bayonne according to plans.

Channel Waters:

One patrol position was occupied and one mine was cleared off St. Malo.

At 0217 the Batteries "Todt", "Lindemann" and "Gr. Kurfuerst" located and fired upon a westbound convoy off the English coast and observed fires breaking out.

20 Jun. 1944

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

1. North Sea:

Patrol positions in the German Bight were occupied. Escort service and minesweeping was carried out according to schedule off the river estuaries. In the forenoon hours, anti-aircraft artillery went into action against enemy bomber and fighter formations in the German Bight.

From 0912 till 0925, bombs fell on the decoy installations at Ostermoor, in the sluice area at Brunsbuettel as well as on the air base Nordholz. Furthermore on several villages in the Cuxhaven district. Naval anti-aircraft artillery at Wesermuende and at Cuxhaven reported one enemy plane shot down at each place. Two vessels of the harbor patrol flotillas at Cuxhaven were destroyed by bombs at the Flint dockyards at Hamburg. Neither of the two new sluices at Brunsbuettel is ready for operating. The old Sluice North is ready for operating by hand. The ferry steamer sunk.

The attack against Hamburg was chiefly directed against oil- and fuel-installations. The submarine base Deutsche Werft, the dockyards of Blom & Voss, Stuelken and the Howaldtswerke remained undamaged. The working capacity of the Norderwerft was reduced by 40 - 50%. For a list of the damages sustained at Hamburg compare teleprint 1800.

From the Dutch coast an attack of six Mustangs dropping bombs on the Helder roads at 1325 was reported. The minesweeper M "443" was damaged on this occasion by the impact of a bomb near the boat. During the night as well as in the morning and noon hours a number of explosions was again heard in a long distance. In the Ijsel Meer and in the Zeeland Waters four convoys were carried out with about 40,000 BRT.

2. Norway/Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

In the area of 18th Group, 13 planes were detected operating over the North Sea.

According to radio monitoring a code word of the next higher degree of emergency was issued at noon and in the evening to all submarines in the operation area and to six minesweepers.

Own Situation:

On 19 Jun., two enemy reconnaissance planes were reported in

20 Jun. 1944

the Hammerfest area as well as eight planes entering the Vardoe area and eleven planes penetrating in the Petsamo area.

At 0340 on 20 Jun., submarine warning was reported off Vardoe. Operations of our anti-submarine group had no results. At 1612, submarine warning was reported southeast of Sletnes.

Thirty-five ships were escorted to the north and fifteen ships were escorted to the south. The Battle Group reported that the first training of the TIRPITZ will take place already on 21 and 22 Jun.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

According to a Finnish report, 1 gunboat and 18 motor patrol boats were steering varying courses during the whole day between Lavansaari and Tiurinsaari. Our air reconnaissance reported ten enemy boats southeast of Lavansaari between 0800 and 0900 and six PT boats steering a northern course south of Vigrund at 1657.

2. Own Situation:

The patrol positions off the western coast of Juteland were occupied.

The laying out of Swedish fishery sea-marks in the Skagerrak carried out by a Swedish minesweeper was controlled by boats of 1st Minesweeper Flotilla.

The Kiel - Canal was closed. The assembly of ships off Holtenau was loosened up. The naval shore commanders were ordered to keep back all ships destined for the canal.

Admiral, Skagerrak reported on the problem of switching over the merchant ship traffic to the North Sea:

In case of a transfer of the Norway traffic to the North Sea it has to be expected that heavy air attacks will be directed against these convoys within a very short time and that the sea routes will be fouled strongly with mines. Therefore a transfer of the traffic is possible only under the following conditions:

1. Strongest "direct escort" for all convoys and transfer of fighter forces to the Danish area.

2. Strong protection of every convoy by patrol boats or minesweepers and reinforcement of the ground mine escort because route:

20 Jun. 1944

"Weiss", from the waters off Esbjerg towards the north, and route "Wiking" were not swept for ground mines at all for several months. The forces of 8th Patrol Force are insufficient. It is therefore necessary to supply one additional minesweeper flotilla and two mine exploding vessels.

Naval Command, East made the following statement on the situation:

1. Ground mine danger is not regarded as particularly serious. Nevertheless, ground mine escort is necessary. Sweeping forces for this purpose are not available in sufficient numbers in the area of Admiral, Skagerrak.

2. Strong danger from the air is assumed in agreement with Admiral, Skagerrak. Fighter protection is urgently required. The anti-aircraft defenses of Admiral, Skagerrak are insufficient. It is planned to carry out the patrol service by 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotilla after completion of the operation "Blume 1".

Naval Command, East reported on 17 Jun. on the barrage plans off the coast of Juteland as had been ordered:

Naval Command asked for 1,000 EMC-mines and 800 sweep obstructors for the planned minefield in the Hanstholm barrage gap.

It is planned to close the barrage gap by the emergency barrage XXVIII. Furthermore, Naval Command plans to foul with mines the waters north of Nordmannstief and Fanoe Bight which presumably will be used as firing positions.

Naval Staff is forced, in view of the present situation of the mine production, to reduce the amount of mines for the closing of the Hanstholm barrage gap to 600 EMC-mines and 400 EMR-mines. The right of a future reinforcement is being reserved. Naval Staff approved the emergency barrage 28 and the barrages off Esbjerg and north of Blavanshuk. Our own routes for the northern traffic have to be kept open. Furthermore, Naval Command, East submitted plans for the barrage in the Aalbeck Bight. Naval Staff concurred with the preparations but not with the carrying out because during the good weather period in the summer months, the enemy does not depend on these areas for landing operations. The situation will be changed as soon as the autumn weather begins.

Naval Staff agreed with the order of succession of the mine operations as suggested by Naval Command: barrages in the harbors of Esbjerg, Hvittesund, Tyboroen, emergency barrage "28" if necessary, and barrage in the Aalbeck Bight. Naval Command, East postponed the closing by mines of the Nordmannstief for the time being. Thirty boats were operating in the minesweeping service in the Baltic Sea Entrances

20 Jun. 1944

and 42 boats and 7 minesweeping vessels (Tr. N. should probably read "planes" as "Fahrzeuge" seems to be mistaken for "Flugzeuge") were operating in the Baltic Sea. Three mines were cleared.

Troop transports were carried out without any special events being reported.

During the night of 19 Jun., our own forces south of Viborg Bay were attacked by altogether 84 enemy bombers under fighter escort, and on the morning of 20 Jun. they were again repeatedly attacked with bombs by 19 enemy planes. Casualties were sustained and damages occurred on vessels. The artillery ferry barge AF "32" was hit by a bomb and sunk.

Commander, 3rd Minesweeper Flotilla reported from the Narva patrol service that a brush with six enemy PT boats took place between 2340 and 2400. In the night of 19 Jun., an enemy ship was destroyed by a direct hit in AF 3745. Another boat sunk presumably after contacting a mine. Artillery hits were scored on other enemy boats.

At 0220 Finnish PT boats had contact with Russian patrol boats in AO 3355. The enemy sheered off towards the south after German forces went into action.

Concerning the fight of the torpedo boats T "30" and T "31", the torpedo boat T "30" reported that altogether three enemy PT boats were destroyed and five were set on fire by shells. Hits were scored on other enemy ships.

Five naval landing craft carried out transport tasks for the Finnish Naval Staff. Four naval landing craft were loaded with 158 KMA-mines at Hamina. 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla entered Kotka. According to a report of Naval Command, East, ammunition transports to areas beyond Kotka are dangerous in view of the present situation in the air. At 1735, Kirkomansaari was attacked by 18 Russian planes. The OTTER was sunk by a nearby impact shortly after the unloading was completed. One transport barge carrying 76 KMA-mines was blown up and one ferry barge burnt out. A large number of the 200 EMC-mines delivered to the Finns exploded on shore.

All vessels operating near the Bjorko Islands were continuously being attacked during the day by strong enemy air forces.

On the evening of 19 Jun., the steamers LANGSNE and MAX BORNHOFEN were unsuccessfully attacked with aerial torpedoes and bombs.

The torpedo boats T "10" and T "11" were placed under the command of 9th Patrol Force for operations in the Gulf of Finland.

20 Jun. 1944

21st Landing Flotilla with one light artillery carrier, one coastal auxiliary sailing vessel, two artillery ferries and nine naval landing craft left Sonderburg for the east. The formation will refuel at Stralsund.

"Rotbuche" anchored at 0620 as scheduled.

V. Submarine Warfare:

On 5 Jun. the submarine U"183" sunk a freighter of 5 000 BRT in the Indian Ocean in LN 8325.

The submarine U"984" remained undamaged during an air attack in the West Area at St. Peterport. Three other submarines carrying ammunition are on their way to Cherbourg and three more submarines were provided for the same task.

The degree of readiness in the harbors of the boats under the command of Commander, Submarines "Mitte" was fixed at five hours until recalled.

The submarine U"481" was ordered to proceed to Reval via Helsinki and Kotka and to stay one day at each of the Finnish harbors. The submarines U"748" and U"1193" will follow on the same route starting from Pillau.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

West Area:

During the day, 4500 planes were reported entering the occupied western territories including 600 four-engined planes which carried out attacks against the defensive zones in the rear, against villages in the areas of St. Omer, St. Pol, Doullens, Abeville, as well as against railway installations and traffic targets. Only minor enemy air activity was reported during the night of 20 Jun. No reports on attacks came in.

Our own fighters numbering 359 were carrying out free lance fighting and patrol flights along the roads. They shot down 15 enemy planes at a loss of seven on our side.

In the night of 20 Jun. four Ju 88 planes attacked naval targets in the Seine Bay, one of our planes was lost. Simultaneously, 58 bombers were laying mines in the same area according to plans. Two of our planes were lost on this occasion.

20 Jun, 1944

Three Me 410 planes were on reconnaissance flights over London

Reich Territory:

During the day, 40 enemy fighters attacked the decoy aerodrome near Rheine and set afire 15 dummy planes by gunfire.

During the forenoon stronger formations under fighter protection attacked Hamburg, Harbur, Wilhelmsburg, Hannover-Misburg, Cuxhaven, Poelitz as well as the town and the aerodrome of Magdeburg. Furthermore, aerodromes in the Magdeburg area and in Mecklenburg were attacked by gunfire.

Enemy night operations were insignificant in the Reich territory.

Mediterranean Theater:

On the 19th, 100 enemy planes attacked railway targets in central Italy. Two enemy planes were shot down by our anti-aircraft guns on this occasion. No enemy air activity was reported from the front area.

One of our own convoys was attacked by nine Beaufighter planes in the Aegean Sea.

Two Me 109 planes were shot down when on reconnaissance flights off the shore between Leghorn and Elba. Other German planes carried out reconnaissance flights.

East Area:

On 19 Jun., 307 operations of our own and 575 operations of enemy planes were reported from the East Front. Four of our planes were lost and one enemy plane was shot down. When the Russian planes entered Finland on 19 Jun. German fighters shot down 24 enemy planes whereas Finnish fighters brought down 19 enemy planes. No losses were reported on our side.

Our own reconnaissance off the eastern coast of Scotland made out one cruiser anchoring off Edinburgh during the night of 19 Jun. At the eastern exit of the Firth of Forth a convoy of 25 freighters with ten patrol vessels was made out as well as 18 steamers steering south, north of Blyth and one passenger ship of 20,000 BRT off the Thyne mouth.

VII. War in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea.

1. Area of Naval Group West:

20 Jun, 1944

Enemy Position:

According to radio monitoring, mooring in certain closed areas is prohibited in the Casablanca area.

Own Position:

Nothing to report.

2. German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Position:

According to radio monitoring, Alexandria gave air alarm at 1135 for three convoys or formations and at 1400 for another formation. At 1603 a formation had air alarm in the Malta area.

During the night of 19 Jun, PT boats were located by instruments in the waters south of Leghorn.

Our own submarine chasers had contact with four PT boats west of Spezia. The PT boats sheered off after being fired upon. Strong unloading activity was observed on the isle of Elba in the evening of 19 Jun. During the night of 19 Jun, altogether eight or nine ships were made out in the waters around Elba. One convoy was reported north of Stefano and another east of Alistro (Eastern coast of Corsica). Normal supply traffic was observed in the waters of Civitavecchia.

Photographic reconnaissance of Haifa on 18 Jun, revealed one destroyer of probably Greek origin, two escort vessels, nine small war vessels, five tankers, and nine freighters.

Own Position:

The evacuation of Elba was ordered for the night of 19 Jun. The transport formation for the evacuation anchoring at Piombino and consisting of four armed trawlers and two naval landing craft was attacked by fighter bombers. Two enemy planes were shot down. The occupation troops on Elba were successfully transferred to Piombino under the command of Commander Wehrmann. Nearly 600 men were transported. The transport formation warded off an attack of PT boats when on its way to Cavo. A new PT boat attack was carried out off Cavo and three torpedoes exploded at the mooring places causing underwater damages on the boats. After setting up a smoke screen the troops went on board according to plans.

On its way back the formation again warded off PT boat attacks. One of the attacking boats was set on fire by gunfire and subsequently

20 Jun. 1944

sunk. The crew of the isle of Palmaiola consisting of 13 men was rescued. The formation entered Piombino because of the wounded. The harbor Piombino was blown up at 0520 after the evacuation of the crew of Elba was completed. On the way from Piombino to Leghorn our formation had again contact with PT boats and fighter bombers. It was additionally reported that four motor minesweepers penetrated as far as Campo during the night of 17 Jun. in order to relieve the land front on Elba. Landing places in the night were fired upon. The boats suffered minor damages by current fighter bomber attacks. In the night of 17 Jun. a German combat ferry sunk one of the attacking enemy boats during a fight with eight enemy PT boats south of Campo and damaged two others heavily. The combat ferry at Campo was destroyed by surprise fire from the coast.

A fighter bomber attack against Savona took place on the 19th and an air attack was carried out against Carrara in the forenoon of 20 Jun.

At Carrara all vessels of the Todt Organization concrete transport were sunk because of the absence of any anti-air defense.

Furthermore, fighter bombers attacked the cruiser BOLZANO at Spezia which was provided as a block-ship for Leghorn.

Nine fighter bombers attacked Genoa in the afternoon.

Escort and patrol service was carried out according to schedule.

3. Area of Naval Group, South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Enemy Position:

At noon two destroyers, three (apparently) torpedo boats, five small war vessels, thirty-one landing boats and twenty-eight freighters with a total of 103,000 BRT were in the harbor of Bari. No new conclusion could be drawn from the number of ships at Comiza and Lissa.

Own Position:

In the evening of 19 Jun. naval landing craft were unsuccessfully attacked by fighter bombers off Rimini.

On the evening of 20 Jun. the torpedo boat TA "21" with two steamers left Pola for Arsa.

During the night of 20 Jun., three PT boats were sent from Pola against

20 Jun. 1944

emergency targets in the waters off Cape Promontore. Three PT boats of 7th PT boat Flotilla entered Pola early in the morning of 20 Jun. coming from Venice. After their transfer from the Tyrrhenian Sea the boats first require some training under war conditions as they did not participate in operations for six or eight months.

b. Aegean Sea:

At 1512 three enemy planes attacked Navarino dropping bombs and causing conflagrations in Italian ammunition dumps.

Investigations on the carrying out of the sabotage operation against our torpedo boats of foreign construction at Leros did not produce any more hints so far. Guards were on duty and precautionary measures had been taken on the boats.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Position:

Night reconnaissance along the coastal route between Odessa and Sevastopol had no results. According to radio monitoring the activity of Russian naval forces was insignificant as before. The activity of Russian naval air forces is increasing.

Own Position:

On the evening of 19 Jun. the submarine U"20" sunk the Russian steamer PESTEL (1850 BRT) northeast of Trabzon. The steamer was sailing under strong escort. Our own convoys proceeded according to schedule. No mines were cleared during the channel sweeping operations. Two motor minesweepers were searching for an AT-mine at the place where the submarine chaser "316" had sunk but they had no success. No results were reported from the submarine control service off Sulina nor from the patrol operations of the Roumanian torpedo boats.

Situation on the Danube:

Mine clearance work in the sea channel of the Danube had no results on 19 and 20 Jun. The sea channel of the Danube was closed between Tulcea and Sulina. During the night of 18 Jun. mines were probably laid by planes between the kilometer indicators 878 and 895. No reports came in on minelaying activities of planes on 20 Jun.

In the central section of the Danube 121 vessels were on the way and 7 vessels were proceeding on the lower Danube. One steam tug hit a mine and sunk, one tanker and four freight barges were damaged. Mines were cleared near the kilometer indicators 1723, 1789, 1208, 1202, and 1192.

20 Jun. 1944

A survey of mines cleared, mineclearance vessels, minesweeping planes (Tr.N.-MS-Fahrzeuge should probably read MS-Flugzeuge) and on planned positions for anti-aircraft guns was compiled as per l./Sk1 19111/44 gKdos. For copy compare War Diary, Part C. Vol. XIVa.

VIII. Situation in East Asia:

Nothing to report.

21 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance.

According to information from the German Foreign Office the President of Turkey explained during a conference with the British ambassador the Turkish legal point of view whereas the ambassador relied on a policy of the strong hand and asked Turkey to join the Allied. It was said furthermore in the report that the Dardanelles-affair concerning the war transporter KASSEL was probably the immediate reason for the sudden resignation of the foreign minister as well as the fact that Numan was offended by neglect of the British ambassador. On the other hand it was said that the recalling of the foreign minister as well as the stop in the chromium supplies was probably caused by the personal decision of the President of State.

According to statements of neutral diplomats the U.S. Ambassador Steinhardt declared that Turkey has to reach a decision on her participation in the war until 25 Jun.

Conference on the Situation with Commander-in-Chief, Navy:

I. Situation in the Air:

Naval Staff, Operations Division, Naval Air and Air Force Liaison Section reported on the opinion on the situation at 1800 on 15 Jun. of 3rd Air Force Command. For copy as per l./Sk1 19001/44 Gkdos. compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. V. It is important that the operative activity of the enemy air force against the Reich territory was reopened since 14 Jun. whereas a certain reluctance could be observed in this respect during the first week of the invasion.

Concerning the attack against Le Havre on 14/15 Jun., 3rd Air Force is of the opinion that the extraordinary success of that operation increases the probability of a repetition against similar targets and possibly also against fortifications of smaller size. In general

21 Jun. 1944

3rd Air Force does not think that the present distribution of the enemy air force gives any hint as to further landing plans of the enemy in other areas - considering the mobility of the formations in operating and in assembling - such plans must not necessarily manifest themselves in advance.

German Air Force, Operations Staff, Intelligence Section explained in its Report No. 41 on The Situation in the Air, West of 19 Jun:

According to radio monitoring supplemented by newspaper reports the appearance of the new German weapon is embarrassing the British home defenses of the air. Daylight and night fighter formations are continuously in operation for the defense as well as the forces of the anti-aircraft artillery. The success was small so far.

The enemy's intention to destroy the German fuel industries was emphasized by the last daylight and night attacks of British and American fighter formations. The enemy operations from the south are also aimed at these targets. The Mosquito attacks recently directed against Berlin and western Germany were frequently exceeding the scope of mere harassing raids and may possibly be regarded as preparation for combined large-scale attacks by 100 or 200 planes in pure Mosquito formations. The increased efficiency of our anti-aircraft artillery was responsible for the operations of American four-engined bomber formations against the anti-aircraft artillery factories and against the fitting work-shops for anti-aircraft guns as well as against the ammunition and explosive industries.

Concerning the question of air operations in the Adriatic it was explained that strong forces may be used at any time without any long preparations.

Reich Security Central Office reported on the results of the new weapon according to a reliable agents report of 19 Jun:

The results continue to be considerable. Foreign journalists are not allowed to report on the effects on military targets. Some districts of London are particularly heavily affected. Three ships with 14,000 BRT were destroyed. Railway stations and traffic installations were damaged. The traffic between London and Southampton was said to be considerably reduced. For details compare teletype 2300.

II. Naval Staff, General Quartermaster reported that High Command, Air, Operations Staff refused to cover the Iron Gate by smoke screens.

21 Jun. 1944

III. Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Intelligence Division: The capture of Viborg was announced at Moscow.

IV. Situation of the Army:

In Normandy local fighting was reported from the Tilly area. In the Cotentin Peninsula our own forces were withdrawn from the area Montebourg-Valogne to the fortifications of Cherbourg.

It can be seen from a report of General von Schlieben to 7th Army Corps Command, Army Group "B" that the bulk of 709th Infantry Division has taken up positions in the landfront of the fortress Cherbourg. The division has suffered heavily. It will be reorganized replacements of naval and anti-aircraft crews from stationary batteries put out of action. The staffs and offices will be combed out. It was furthermore said in the report: "Disadvantages: heavy casualties among the officers, the morale of the troops without battle experience is bad. The fact that the enemy is treating our prisoners well is very dangerous. Strongly reduced movableness of our stationary divisions. The attitude of the voluntary formations of Soviet Russia is varying. Shortage of anti-tank weapons and mines." In Italy the center of fighting is in the Grosseto area.

General Staff of the Army, Foreign Armies, West had the following opinion on the situation on 20 Jun:

I. British Isles and Vicinity:

It can be seen in an increasingly clear way from Anglo-American declarations that it is planned to crush the German forces fighting at the bridgehead and the reserves on their way to that theater as soon as they are recognized by using superior numbers of Anglo-American forces and materials and, simultaneously, by air operations to create or to increase the difficulties of supplying our forces. Therefore we have to expect also in the future that the Anglo American leaders will continue by all means to transport new forces to the landing area and even to increase the transports as far as possible. Indications of operational preparations for the British VIIIth and XIIth Corps in the landing area are confirming this opinion.

It has to be presumed that the enemy command will try to stabilize the successful cutting off of the Cotentin Peninsula by quickly reinforcing its forces in the newly gained positions in order to launch a combined attack in the direction towards Cherbourg soon. It can be seen that the enemys hopes are based to a considerable degree on the presumed limited supplies of the fortress. The time of the beginning of the attack from the Tilly - St. Lo sector towards southeast cannot be recognized as yet. An extraordinary display of forces and materiel has to be reckoned with for certain.

21 Jun. 1944

The increased partisan activities in the Bretagne maintained by current and ample supplies by air and by the sending in of leaders are probably aimed at containing German forces. No indications do so far exist of comprehensive operation plans against this area - with the exception of one air attack against the radar set at Brest. Neither does the assembling of forces in England give any hints. On the contrary, all movements that could be recognized during the last weeks went to the southeast or east simultaneously evacuating the southwest area. Further indications came from south-east England of an assembling of the formations of the American 1st Army Group (Fusag) towards the southeastern coast. The announced but so far unconfirmed transfer to the County of Kent of the units of the British IIInd Army Corps supposed to be stationed in Middle England has to be regarded as part of this concentration in the south-east. Attention has to be paid to a report coming from a particularly reliable source that the Fusag will be assisted during the offensive by strong formations of the heavy air forces which would mean operations against stronger fortifications. This would also be in conformity with previous estimates (central Channel coast). No information is available yet on the date of the planned operation. Neither are there any indications that the German rocket attack may become responsible for the advancing of the date of the Fusag operation. The evaluation of a captured operation order (Normandy) in which emphasis was laid on the relieving effects for the invasion of possible Anglo-American operations in the Mediterranean whereas the influx of German reserves from the Scandinavian area to northern France was taken into account as being undisturbed does not suggest large scale operation plans against the Scandinavian area.

II. Mediterranean Theater:

a. Western Mediterranean:

A big number of alarming reports is characteristic for the situation in the western Mediterranean. All the reports were apparently spread out by the enemy for camouflage, declaring every important coastal area as a target for landing operations.

On the other hand, the forces available - particularly the shipping capacity - will only allow operations of a smaller scale. Whereas the forces available consist of 14 or 16 divisions, the tonnage of landing vessels will permit the simultaneous transport of much smaller forces (four or six formations). Nevertheless, the arrival of naval forces and transporters observed during the last days seems remarkable. The number of aircraft carriers available was thus increased to two large carriers and four or five auxiliary carriers which makes possible the air defense of a larger operation. The freighter tonnage is to a large extent equally distributed in the entire Mediterranean area and does therefore not indicate any large operations in the near future.

21 Jun. 1944

The landing ships which would be sufficient for the transport of about five big formations is actually engaged in the supply traffic to a considerable degree. The whereabouts in detail of 85% of the landing ships could not be made out. Anyhow it can be realized that during the last days the enemy command has considerably increased its naval possibilities for landing operations.

The reported but unconfirmed visit of the American General Marshall (Chief of Staff) at Algiers is also an example of the increased activity in the area of French North Africa, whereas the sending of the French 1st Army Command to Italy and the attack of the French 9th Colonial Infantry Division (Corsica) against Elba leads to a decrease of the forces which are so far freely available. General Staff of the Army, Foreign Armies, West gives the following estimate of the situation in the western Mediterranean:

The enemy successes in Italy which presumably exceed all previous expectations of the enemy and which quite unexpectedly are offering a chance for the enemy command to annihilate strong German forces did perhaps influence it's decision to improvise smaller operations at a limited scale against the German western flank which originally were not included in the plans. The considerable worsening of the relations to de Gaulle may also be responsible for the desire to engage as many French forces outside France as possible. The attack against Elba can be regarded as a result of such considerations and it may perhaps be followed by similar operations further north. Yet it is not believed that the enemy command will deviate from it's main idea to influence the final decision of the war which can be reached only in northern France by forces from the western Mediterranean as strong as possible. Therefore it has to be reckoned with the possibility that the enemy command will send limited forces at the maximum to the Italian area and that it will reserve the majority of the forces available in order to contain the German forces in southern France.

b. Eastern Mediterranean:

According to several reliable sources the already known mutiny of Greek troops led to a temporary postponement of the Balcan operations originally planned for the beginning of Jun. This would also indicate that we have to expect the center of the enemy operational planning in the Greek area.

Enemy activities in the Near East continued as could be seen from landing exercises in northern Syria, from new air attacks against Rhodes and from the transfer from Cairo to Alexandria of parts of an important subdivision of the Wilson Staff. The urgency of the time factor could be perceived also in the alleged declarations of the U.S. Ambassador Steinhardt (Ankara) who hopes to be able to force Turkey to a decision in favor of the Allied till 25 Jun. It is believed - in particular

21 Jun. 1944

because of the political situation - that the enemy is still planning to free the Aegean by an outflanking operation of one stronger group against the western Greek (possibly also against the southern Albanian) area concentrating on Salonika and of another smaller group against the Dodecaneso (Rhodos?).

Concerning the Situation in Finland.

Naval Staff, Operations Division, Army Liaison and Land Warfare Section reported that Viborg was taken by the enemy. General Staff of the Army ordered the immediate assembling in Reval of one assault gun brigade and of one infantry division, if possible the 122nd Infantry Division, for being transported to Finland. There is no doubt about the firm decision of the Finns to carry on as far as the military side is concerned. But the Finnish Government has to be regarded as weak.

V. Report of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief of Operations Branch:

a. Concerning the assessment of the situation in Finland, Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy transmitted on the evening of 20 Jun:

The Fuehrer wishes to assist the Finns as much as possible. The Fuehrer is apprehensive about the further developments concerning the Aaland Isles. The preparations for the operation "Tanne" were ordered therefore. The order did not arrive yet. Besides, the Fuehrer ordered to find out whether it is possible to extend the stay of the PRINZ EUGEN in the western exit of the Gulf of Finland for over one week.

Naval Staff is considering the transfer of the ammunition required by the Finns by fast war vessels (the LUETZOW and torpedo boats). Preparations are being made for the start of the operation "Tanne".

b. According to information coming from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy concerning the supply situation of Cherbourg it is estimated that the stocks of the fortress will last 56 days after refilling the gap in the ammunition caused by the arrival of new weapons. Concerning the Channel Islands the Fuehrer ordered that the supply of victuals by sea transport has to be increased still in order to prevent the islands from starving.

c. According to information from a reliable source the Fuehrer Headquarters is of the opinion that the long range bombardment of southern England has considerable results and does also indirectly

21 Jun, 1944

influence the invasion. The fact that the situation is regarded as grave by military quarters was confirmed in detail by the effects of hits. (Compare teletype as per 1/Skl 1837/44 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V). Up to 20 Jun., 784 rounds were fired 17% of which were failures.

d. The Liaison Officer of the Reichsmarshall at the Fuehrer Headquarters asked for information at which air defense points the new 12.8 centimeter anti-aircraft guns would be stationed which are allotted monthly to the Navy and where the 12.8 centimeter anti-aircraft guns of the Navy had been used up to now. The question will be answered by Naval Staff, Quartermaster General.

e. Admiral, Small Battle Units reported concerning the small weapons that operations in the Gulf of Finland are being taken into consideration and that details on the plans would be transmitted soon.

VI. Naval Staff, Quartermaster General:

The Army gave information that the crews for the coastal artillery provided by the "Tanne"-plan for manning the coastal guns of Hochland in order to replace the naval gunners are no more available as had been planned originally. Field-gunners would be supplied instead. Naval Command, East regards these as inadequate and suggests to withdraw for Hochland the two companies of Naval Artillery Detachment 531 presently fighting as infantry at the Narva-front and to replace them by field gunners.

Commander-in-Chief, Navy concurred.

VII. Group South reported on conferences with the chief of the Bulgarian Navy on 8 and 13 Jun. concerning the new military naval organization in the Bulgarian coastal area. For copy of the relevant teletype as per 1/Skl 1838/44 Gkdos. Chfs. compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIVa.

Special Items.

1. On the occasion of the visit at Commander-in-Chief, Navy of the Inspector of Mineclearance, Danube, Captain Lautenschlager a

21 Jun. 1944

technical conference was held at Naval Staff, Quartermaster General. In the presence of Inspector of Underwater Obstacles; of Naval Ordnance Division, Chief of Underwater Obstacles Branch; of Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Chief of Organization and Mobilization Branch; of Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch and representatives of Naval Staff, Operations Division as well as of Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch all questions of organization as well as of supplying the sweeping gear were discussed with Inspector of Mineclearance, Danube. The reason for holding these conferences was a teletype of the Special Plenipotentiary, Danube, General-Admiral Marschall who was asking for strong measures. It was confirmed at the conference that sufficient sweeping equipments are on the way and that one can therefore expect that the mine-clearance work of the Inspector of Mineclearance, Danube will result in a complete bringing under control of the mine danger in that river in the near future. All necessary orders were given also concerning the supply of vessels and personnel.

II. Concerning the sluices of the Kiel Canal that became unavailable, Commander-in-Chief, Navy ascertained by a report of Bureau of Naval Armament, Chief of K VI Section that even in case all sluices become unavailable there is no danger of a complete stop in the canal traffic nor of a destruction of the bed of the canal and of the canal installations. The water level of the canal will continue to be higher than 60 centimeters above the low tide anyhow and ships of a considerable size will be able to pass through the canal after the water level has been normalized.

III. Concerning "Tanne" operation:

The order for "Tanne" which had been announced by Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy was issued at 1920 by Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff. It says:

"Degree of emergency I is herewith ordered for "Tanne-West" and "Tanne I" with the following restrictions:

1. The removal of the naval battery from the Netherlands (Scheveningen-North) which had been provided will not be carried out. The battery will remain at its present place.

2. For the time being, no aircraft transport space will be prepared as yet for "Tanne I" in order to economize fuel.

21 Jun. 1944

3. The Parachute Infantry Battalion "Division Brandenburg" (presently at Stendal) will be moved to Danzig immediately in preparation of a quick transfer for the operation "Tanne-West" which may become necessary. High Command, Navy, Naval Staff will immediately provide transport space in the port of embarkation Danzig for the transport of the battalion by sea. Details on the strength of the battalion will be given separately.

4. The assembling of the aircraft transport space for carrying out the operation "Tanne I" will be ordered later in case the development of the situation makes it necessary. For this case, in addition to Parachute Infantry Battalion "Division Brandenburg", also the SS Parachute Infantry Battalion 500 (presently at Laibach) has been provided for the operation.

Thus the preparatory plans for the operation "Tanne" have been altered as far as one important point is concerned as a large new transport task for the Navy was added.

Naval Command, East reported that Commander Cellarius of the German Wartime Intelligence Organization, Finland plans to hire a seaworthy yacht in order to make cruises in the coastal waters up to the area of the "Tanne West" operation. Naval Command, East asked a good helmsman for this task to be sent through Armed Forces, High Command, Intelligence Division to German Wartime Intelligence Organization, Finland. Commander Cellarius has not been informed on the operation "Tanne".

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch will issue the necessary orders.

IV. Commanding Admiral, Defenses West reported on 20 Jun. that 2nd Artillery Carrier Flotilla lost seven boats so far and 6th Artillery Carrier Flotilla lost five boats. Four boats were forced away to the waters west of the invasion area. Pointing to the excellent results of the artillery naval landing craft during the invasion battle and in patrolling the coastal waters, Commanding Admiral, Defenses West asked urgently for an artillery naval landing craft group from another area to be placed under his command for operational purposes.

The artillery naval landing craft are distributed at present as follows:

Commanding Admiral, Defenses North, 15; Commanding Admiral, Skagerrak, 6; Commanding Admiral, Defenses West 21. The remaining boats are kept in the Gulf of Finland in order to reinforce the Karelian front. It is

21 Jun 1944

impossible therefore to allot further artillery naval landing craft to Commanding Admiral, Defenses West. The relevant order of Naval Staff, Operations Division was transmitted to Commanding Admiral, Defenses West with copy to Group West. For copy as per 1/Skl I op 18884/44 Gkdos, compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. D.

V. Reich Security Central Office transmitted an agent's report from Japanese embassy circles in Berlin. According to the report the attache in Berlin was ordered from Tokio to emphasize the following principles:

1. The Anglo-American coalition remains the enemy No. 1 for Japan and Germany.
2. It will be useful to concentrate chiefly against England because her vital points can be reached in a comparatively easy way.
3. We must try to isolate the U.S.A. by weakening Great Britain.
4. We will endeavor to separate Russia who completely depends on Anglo-American assistance from the enemy coalition.
5. Germany will have to concentrate her war efforts toward the west.
6. Suspicions that Japan is planning to come to a closer agreement with Russia are unfounded.
7. German efforts to reach an agreement with England are completely wrong.

It remains to be seen to what extent this information will prove to be of any value. During the discussions with the Japanese at Berlin it will be possible to find out whether they will act along these alleged instructions or not. This is not the proper place to discuss whether the directives from Tokio for Germany are justified or not. But it has to be stated that politics is the art of doing only what is possible. All other deliberations and wishes have to be considered in this aspect.

VI. Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division transmitted excerpts from the assessment of the situation of German Air Force, Operations Staff of 20 Jun to the highest command stations of the Navy. For copy as per 1/Skl 19037/44 Gkdos, compare War Diary, Part D, Vol. "Feindlage-material".

21 Jun. 1944

Situation on 21 Jun:

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Invasion:

According to report No. 30 of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expedition Forces the Allied troops started the attack against the outer defense positions of the fortress Cherbourg. Montebourg was occupied by the enemy and Valogne was turned.

From 1935 to 0340 during the night of 20 Jun. many locations were reported which were partly confirmed by radar. Patrolling ships which were probably destroyers were located in the waters northwest of Sept Iles.

Neither our PT boats nor the forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West were out on operations because of the storm and the rough sea.

Constant and heavy air attacks were directed during 20 Jun. against the harbor and the roads of Cherbourg as well as against all coastal batteries along the northern coast of Cotentin.

The base of 9th PT boat Flotilla was moved from Cherbourg to Jersey.

Also today, according to radio monitoring results the enemy was hindered by greater cargo damage averages and breakdowns.

Group West repeated for the night of 21 Jun. the order which had been given for the night of 20 Jun.

The group regarded landing possibilities as difficult in the Dutch area and along the Channel coast and as possible at the Atlantic coast.

During air attacks against batteries at the northern coast of Cotentin the Battery Hamburg suffered a direct hit in its two centimeter anti-aircraft guns. One time-fuse bomb of 500 kilograms could be removed and the battery was therefore only slightly damaged.

The Army Coastal Battery 3/1262 kept the enemy approaches under harassing fire. Commanding Admiral, Defenses West ordered to find out whether under favorable stream conditions auxiliary coastal sailing vessels can proceed at the eastern side of Jersey up to Cherbourg between dusk and dawn and suggested to start from Guernsey. Group West

21 Jun. 1944

pointed to the fact that the repeated air attacks during the last days against the radar organization in the Bretagne may be very serious indications of landing plans in that area. In particular, the group cited the Bay of St. Briéux which is well protected against the west wind as being in strong danger from landing operations. However, the coastal batteries in the Bretagne and particularly the Battery Paimpol has so far not been attacked.

In the evening of 21 Jun. three PT boats were at St. Malo, seven at Le Havre and three at Ostend all ready for war and belonging to 2nd, 4th, 5th, 8th and 9th PT boat Flotillas. Furthermore there are three PT boats at St. Malo and at Amsterdam temporarily not ready for war.

2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the West Area:

The number of operations in the area of 19th Group was not made out. Several submarine reports were intercepted from the exit of the western Channel and from the waters southwest of Lamdsend. Two British targets were located northwest and south of Ireland.

3. Own Situation in Other Parts of the West Area:

Atlantic Coast Area:

Eighteen patrol positions were occupied. Three submarines were escorted on their way out. Two mines were cleared off Brest and two others off La Pallice.

Channel Waters:

During the evening hours the Battery "Todt" fired upon an east-bound convoy near Folkstone and observed impacts near the target which was immediately covered by smoke screens.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

Mineclearance work in the Heligoland Bight was carried out as

21 Jun. 1944

scheduled. During the forenoon hours about 30 bombs were dropped in the Cuxhaven and Elbe section without causing any damages. Furthermore, the Kiel Canal was again but unsuccessfully attacked with bombs near Breiholz. The harbor patrol flotillas Cuxhaven and Borkum reported one enemy plane shot down each. One mine was cleared off the Elbe mouth. In the night of 21 Jun. the German steamer MEMELLAND (1,890 BRT) carrying cement hit a mine and sunk northwest of the Elbe.

At 1142 and at 1230 explosions were heard off the Dutch coast. One Liberator plane was shot down near Ijmuiden. During the night of 20 Jun., two radar carriers were located southwest of Hook of Holland. Reconnaissance of our patrol forces had no results.

The patrol positions were only partly occupied. Minesweeping work was cancelled for the night of 21 Jun. owing to the rough sea.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Position:

Twenty-one planes were detected operating in the area of 18th Group.

At midnight on 20 Jun. our air reconnaissance made out one merchantman and one destroyer in the waters at Scapa Flow. One aircraft carrier without a through deck presumably the FURIOUS, one auxiliary aircraft carrier, one battleship of an unknown type as well as presumably one more battleship and two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, four harbor vessels and one destroyer were made out between Cava, Fara and Flotta. The training ship IRON DUKE and 17 vessels each of about 1,000 BRT were between Fara and Flotta. No other ships could be recognized because of the darkness.

2. Own Position:

One 19 Jun. an enemy battery fired five rounds against the Battery Petsame. On the afternoon of the same day ten enemy planes attacked the naval signal station "Jakobselv" at Kirkenes with bombs and gunfire. At 1525 on 20 Jun. a small convoy was attacked by an enemy submarine northeast of Nordkyn. The anti-submarine chaser "1209" was sunk by two torpedoes.

CONFIDENTIAL

21 Jun. 1944

Fifteen ships were escorted to the north and nine ships to the south. The reports of Commanding Admiral, Western Coast are not included in these figures.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Position:

Strong movements of the enemy light naval forces continued in the Gulf of Finland south of Vigrund and in the waters Schepel - Lavansari - Tiurinsari. Our own patrol forces had contact with the enemy repeatedly. No new reconnaissance results were reported.

2. Own Position:

Mineclearance work was carried out in the Baltic Sea Entrances by 36 boats and in the Baltic Sea by 47 boats and 7 minesweeping planes. Three mines were cleared. On 20 Jun. one four-engined plane was shot down by the boat VS "248" off the northern entrance of Stralsund. Troop transports and convoys were carried out as scheduled. No incidents were reported.

The minesweeper M "29", the NETTELBECK, four artillery naval landing craft and four motor minesweepers were dispatched upon a Finnish report on an expected enemy landing in Piisaari in order to assist the Finnish formations and to relieve the occupation troops on the island. On it's way to the island the formation had repeated contact with enemy patrol boats and PT boats and air attacks had to be warded off continuously. Two enemy planes were shot down and one enemy patrol boat was set afire by gunfire. The NETTELBECK was damaged by a blind bomb and is being towed to Helsinki. The minesweeper M "29" was also damaged and has to be docked.

1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla with four boats and four artillery ferry barges under the command of Commander, 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla was operating between 1100 and 1530 against Russian troops which had landed at the eastern coast of Piisaari. Bunkers and sheds at the landing place were set in flames by gunfire. Many air attacks had to be warded off. The landing boats of the enemy were destroyed. The motor minesweepers R "120" and R "119" were damaged. Both guns of the artillery ferry AF "49" were put out of action.

It was additionally reported that on 20 Jun. a small enemy landing group was annihilated on Koivisto. One 25 centimeter gun of the Battery Saarenpaee on Koivisto was put out of action by a direct hit.

21 Jun. 1944

At 2342 on 20 Jun. boats of the Narva patrol forces opened fire upon an enemy mineclearance formation which sheered off after setting up a smoke screen. At 1400 on 21 Jun. an enemy mineclearance formation under fighter escort was again attacked by artillery fire. The enemy set up smoke screens and sheered off.

Nine naval landing craft will lay out a KMA-mine barrage in the Viborg Bight during the night of 21 Jun. All other naval landing craft will transport ammunition and wounded.

Three German boats entered Reval.

In order to replace the strong losses in the inner Gulf of Finland, four minesweepers of 25th Minesweeper Flotilla will be withdrawn from the operation "Rotbuche" as well as the boat F "10" for carrying out escort duties. Two destroyers of the Group Kothe will be dispatched to replace these boats. Furthermore, Naval Command, East is of the opinion that it is absolutely necessary to reinforce the forces in the Gulf of Finland by PT boats as the Russians are operating with mass attacks of PT boats. The battle report T 30 contains experiences on this subject. For copy compare FS 2358. The enemy is operating not with ten boats as reported but with twenty boats at least.

Naval Command, East plans to change the mooring place of "Rotbuche" in about two days. The formation was sighted on it's way by a Swedish destroyer who passed at a short distance at 1715 on 19 Jun. in 57 N 2006 E. The first net-cage will be completed on 27 Jun. The construction work was so far carried out according to schedule. Naval Command, East asked for a decision on the duration of the operation of the PRINZ EUGEN as well as concerning the anti-aircraft defense.

Naval Staff is unable to decide on the duration of the operation already now. The question of anti-aircraft artillery depends on the supply of further two centimeter ammunition.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch decided upon a request of Commander Destroyers that for the time being the torpedo boats T "3", "11" or T "4" and T "12" at Libau, T "8" and T "10" at Reval will be equipped with one 3.7 centimeter double gun-carriage instead of the aft barrels and one two centimeter double gun-carriage instead of one two centimeter gun on the middle deck-house for operations in the east. Provisions have to be made that a reinstallation of the former armament is still possible within a short time in case of a transfer to another theater.

Upon a request of Naval Command, East concerning the transfer of the merchant traffic to the North Sea because of the closing of the Kiel

21 Jun. 1944

Canal (see War Diary 20 Jun.) naval Staff decided that it is planned to allot four minesweepers of the operation "Wallenstein" presently at Naval Command, Norway to the Oslo-Aarhus traffic and that therefore 29th Minesweeper Flotilla will be available for the North Sea traffic. Anti-aircraft protection will be rendered by 3rd Torpedo boat Flotilla as far as the fuel situation permits. Fighter protection can probably not be expected. Naval Command, East was ordered to report on it's plans concerning the carrying out of the convoys. The decision on the beginning of the traffic will probably be made on 23 Jun.

V. Submarine Warfare.

West Boats:

The submarine U "218" reported from a minetask south of Landsend that she was attacked with bombs when "schnorkeling" and that she had to avoid attacks with acoustic depth charges for 60 hours. The schnorkel was located.

The submarine U"621" returned from the operation area south of Protsmouth and reported strong enemy defense and patrol forces as well as heavy traffic. It is not yet clear how far the boat entered the Channel.

As a bombardment of Cherbourg by heavy enemy ships has to expected, five boats were ordered to withdraw from their former operation area to the waters north of Cherbourg.

The cargo of the first ammunition transport submarine U "741" consists of altogether 71 tons of ammunition of all calibres from 15 centimeters downward.

Atlantic:

The loss of three boats owing to the strong enemy air activity presumably on their way in the waters off the Norwegian coast has to be reckoned with. Two of the boats were not equipped with schnorkel.

Mediterranean:

No boats are out on sea at present. The first schnorkel-equipped boat will leave Toulon on 1 Jul.

21 Jun. 1944

VI. Aerial Warfare.

West Area:

During daylight 780 enemy planes entered Belgium and Northern France and attacked the defense zones in the rear as well as aerodromes and railway installations. In Western France 220 enemy planes attacked anti-aircraft batteries and railway installations in the Paris area.

In the night of 21 Jun. 485 enemy planes were reported entering the occupied western territories. No attacks were reported. During daylight 214 of our fighters assisted the Army in the occupied western territories. Nine enemy planes were shot down at a loss of thirteen planes on our side. In the night of 21 Jun. nine Ju 88 planes were operating as night fighters in Western France and 59 bombers were mining the Seine Bay.

Reich Territory:

Strong formations of four-engined bombers under fighter escort entered the Reich territory in two groups during the day. One group attacked Berlin in four waves. Part of the forces penetrated as far as Dresden. One hundred fifty Fortresses under fighter escort proceeded to the Poltava area via Breslau - Warsaw. The second group went into the Stettin area and advanced from there in five waves for an attack against Berlin. The attack against Berlin was the heaviest daylight attack so far directed against the city. Further attacks were aimed at villages in the Brandenburg province. On their way back the planes attacked trains in Westfalia. Besides, some aerodromes were attacked unsuccessfully. The defending German fighters numbered 210. They succeeded in bringing down 20 enemy planes for certain at a loss of 15 of their own.

In the night of 21 Jun. some harassing planes entered the area Bremen - Lueneburg - Osnabrueck - Muenster - Koblenz - Trier without attacking.

Thirty or forty Mosquitos attacked Berlin with air-to-air mines, explosive and incendiary bombs. Furthermore, about 200 four-engined planes attacked the industrial area of Rhineland-Westfalia concentrating on Gelsenkirchen and causing minor industrial damages. During the night 55 enemy planes were shot down.

21 Jun, 1944

Mediterranean Theater:

During daylight the enemy attacked trains in the area from Genoa up to Pavia. Seven hundred planes were observed operating in the Italian front area. Our own planes carried out reconnaissance flights. Harassing planes were reported in the night of 20 Jun. in Central and Northern Italy as well as planes supplying bandits in the Balkans.

Eastern Front:

On 20 Jun. 251 operations of our own and 824 operations of enemy planes were reported from the Eastern Front. Five enemy planes were shot down at a loss of one on our side.

It has already been reported on reconnaissance of the eastern harbors of Scotland.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea.

1. Area of Naval Group West:

Enemy Situation:

A cruiser of the MONTECUCCOLI-class and one corvette entered Gibraltar at 1500 on 20 Jun. coming from the Mediterranean and returned to the Mediterranean at 1230 on 21 Jun.

Six freighters and three corvettes left Gibraltar for the Atlantic at 0715 on 21st Jun.

Own Situation:

Ships of a total tonnage of 8,750 BRT were escorted off the southern coast of France.

At 2143 an enemy submarine fired six rounds against positions near Port Vendres. The batteries answered the fire and observed impacts of two centimeter shells in the cunnage tower.

At 2224 the submarine attacked harbor patrol boats south of Marseille and sunk the boat FM"06" by a torpedo.

21 Jun. 1944

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Position:

According to radio monitoring results the eastbound convoy UGS 44 was in the Algiers area during the night of 20 Jun. Part of the convoy is destined for the Adriatic. A section of the eastbound convoy KMS 53 was in the Napoli area in the same night and another section was in the waters northeast of Malta. A part of the eastbound convoy UGS 43 was located on sea in the Alexandria area at noon on 20 Jun. and the westbound convoy UGS 43 as well as part of the westbound convoy MKS 53 was located on sea in the eastern Mediterranean. From 1725 till 1745 on 21 Jun. Alexandria transmitted air alarm for a convoy or for a formation.

According to a report of our information service at Alexandria of 13 Jun., one British aircraft carrier and several British warships passed the Suez Canal coming from the Indian Ocean. It is not known whether the ships remained at Alexandria or whether they proceeded to Malta.

No sighting reports came from the waters between Genoa and Elba. Three (presumably) small freighters were at Porto Ferrajo. At 2130 on 20 Jun. two PT boats steering east were located by radar south of Spalato and other PT boats were located in the waters near Leghorn at 2150.

Own Position:

The torpedo boats TA "25" and "29" carried out the mine operation west of Vadabank as planned. On her way back the torpedo boat TA "25" was hit by a torpedo south southwest of Viareggio at about 0230. Subsequently the boat was fired upon by four centimeter guns of four PT boats. It is impossible to salvage the torpedo boat T "25". One hundred seven members of the crew were rescued.

Enemy ship formations the types of which could not be made out were repeatedly sighted from Piombino in the early morning hours until the afternoon and part of them were fired upon. It is regarded as possible that this was a reconnaissance sweep of cruisers and destroyers or an operation of minesweepers under escort.

Five motor minesweepers of foreign construction made an unsuccessful reconnaissance sweep and entered Spezia.

Four minelayer naval landing craft carried out the mine operations in the waters of the Arno mouth.

21 Jun. 1944

German Naval Command, Italy submitted a concised brief report on the evacuation of Elba. For copy compare teletype 0240 and 1935.

On the afternoon of 20 Jun. the bridges on the lower Arno River were constantly attacked by fighter bombers and partly destroyed. Enemy air reconnaissance was particularly concentrated on all dock-yards. The independent targets that had been reported were attacked by fighter bombers after a short while. An aircraft carrier was reported for example at Genoa at 1210 and at 1615 an attack was made against the AQUILA.

On 19 and 20 Jun. the naval anti-aircraft guns Piombino - Arno mouth brought down seven fighter bombers and one fighter bomber was shot down by naval anti-aircraft artillery at Genoa. The block-ship TELLARO (2,234 BRT) was scuttled in the southern entrance of Leghorn.

Escort and patrol services were rendered according to schedule.

3. Area of Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic:

During the night of 20 Jun. three boats of 7th PT boat Flotilla were operating in the waters around the island Drvnik. Destroyers and gunboats were sighted but there was no opportunity to open fire. In the same night, naval landing craft warded off two attacks of enemy PT boats off Ancona. One of the attacking boats was damaged. One naval landing craft sunk on the occasion of an air attack against Ancona at noon on the 21st.

b. Aegean Sea:

At 2216 on 20 Jun. a Greek auxiliary sailing vessel sighted two submarines steering a northeast course in the Olympia Bay (Khalkidike). Other submarines were reported by observation stations of the Army.

The convoy "Sybille" was attacked by an enemy submarine at the southeast coast of the Peloponnese at 1652.

21 Jun. 1944

On the occasion of the air attack against Navarino in the afternoon of 20 Jun. German ammunition stocks were destroyed. No casualties occurred.

c. Black Sea:

Nothing to report.

Situation on the Danube:

Mine clearance work in the sea channel of the Danube had no results. One hundred eighty vessels were reported en route on the middle Danube and fifty five vessels on the lower Danube. On 19 Jun. a freight barge contacted a mine and was damaged and one tug sunk on 20 Jun. One mine was cleared near kilometer indicator 1723 and two mines near kilometer indicator 1730.

VIII. Situation in East Asia.

No reports came in.

22 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance.

Nothing to report.

Commander-in-Chief, Navy left for the Fuehrer Headquarters.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff at 1115.

I. Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief of Operations Branch reported on urgent measures and suggestions reported by German Naval Command, Italy upon order of Naval Staff in order to meet the unreliability of the Italian soldiers. German Naval Command, Italy declared that the most effective method would be to declare the remaining part of Italy as occupied territory, to disarm the Italian armed forces, to eliminate the higher command and to transfer the Italian soldiers to internment camps with the exception of volunteers. Naval Staff transmitted its opinion and the suggestions of German Naval Command to Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff, Navy in order to inform Commander-in-Chief, Navy. The decision on this highly political question lies with Armed Forces High Command. For copy of the relevant order 1/Skl Im 1848/44 Gkdos. compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

II. Naval Staff, Chief of Operations Division:

Stronger Russian pressure against Bulgaria also affects the Bulgarian assistance of the German war effort. The Fuehrer has ordered accelerated investigation by the [German] Navy of the consequences which compliance with the Bulgarian wish to yield [to the demands of Russia] would have for the German war effort, and what proposals could be made by the Navy.

From a purely military point of view Naval Staff regards the giving up of the Bulgarian coasts and of the dockyards as impossible. The opinion of Group South was asked for. A preliminary statement in detail of Naval Staff was given in the teletype to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy. For copy as per 1/Skl I op 19151/44 Gkdos. compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV a.

The final attitude of Naval Staff will depend on the weight of the political necessities.

22 Jun. 1944

III. Naval Staff, Quartermaster General:

a. Referring to the directive of Armed Forces High Command of 23 Mar. 1944 concerning the destruction of harbors and harbor facilities, Naval Command, North issued provisions for the carrying out of the directives within its area of command and submitted them to Naval Staff. No orders were given for the time being for the large scale preparations of such destructions in the big harbors Hamburg and Bremen which are situated outside the area of command of Coastal Defense Commander, Heligoland Bight because these de truchiens, in addition to the necessary materials would require a large number of personnel for a considerable time and as it is impossible to foretell to what extent the consequences of these measures will be regarded as acceptable by the political authorities. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch will ask Armed Forces High Command for a decision on the question of preparing the destruction of the harbors at Hamburg and Bremen and will emphasize that it would be better to abstain from such measures.

b. Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, North pointed to the fact that progress in the construction of permanent fortifications on the East Frisian Islands including the area Emden - Delfzyl is still quite unsatisfactory in spite of all efforts. Not more than 29 buildings were completed on 15 Jun. out of a total of 139. At the present working rate it will require at least six months still to complete only the bare brickwork of the fortifications of the first degree of priority. Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, North asked urgently to take all measures regarding materiel and personnel in order to speed up the construction work effectively. Copy of the relevant report 1/Skl 19131/44 Gkdos. find in War Diary, Part C, Vol. X. Under these conditions Quartermaster Division made an attempt - which was so far unsuccessful - to obtain the workers and the building capacity becoming available owing to the stop in the work in the west area for a reinforcement of the North Sea coast as ordered in a directive of the Fuehrer. (compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII, memorandum on the conference with the Fuehrer on 21 Mar. 1944) Naval Staff is of the opinion that we should not relinquish this claim but that it is necessary to insist again and again in the carrying out of the Fuehrer directive.

IV. Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Communications Division reported that yesterday's large scale attack against Berlin did heavily disturb the communication service. However, the damages in general have been repaired meanwhile.

22 Jun. 1944

V. Executive Office of the Commander-in-Chief, Navy, Officer Personnel Department reported that the commandant of Battery Marcouf is not available. Neither can any other suitable battery command of the naval artillery be made available for the task at present. Commander-in-Chief, Navy was informed by Officer Personnel Department.

VI. Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Intelligence Division:

According to a report of the German Ambassador at Helsinki the Finnish left-wing socialists planned to visit Marshal Mannerheim at the headquarters in order to induce him to enter armistice negotiations with the Russians before the capture of Viborg. The marshal refused to see the delegation. At the cabinet session on 18 Jun. during which a very grave mood was prevailing, all ministers were in favor of continuing the war but their only hope for a solution is armed assistance from Germany either by a relieving attack at Narva or by the dispatch of German troops to the Finnish war theater.

VII. Situation of the Army:

Situation in the East:

Many strong enemy attacks partly prepared by artillery fire and apparently intended as armed reconnaissance in preparation for a large scale offensive were reported from the front of the Army Group South- and North Ukraina as well as Army Group Center.

On the Karelian front strong enemy pressure continued to prevail and laid to the evacuation of Viborg on the evening of 20 Jun.

Situation in the West:

The estimate of the general situation remains unchanged.

The Fuehrer granted to General von Schlieben full authority which he may require for the carrying out of his duties as commandant and defender of Cherbourg. It was said in the relevant order as follows:

"I expect you to fight this battle as Gneisenau carried out the defense of Kelberg in his times. As long as you still have any ammunition and supplies you must ward off every enemy attack with the help of your undaunted spirit, your efficiency, your ability and the gallantry of your troops. Even if it comes to the worst it will be your duty to

22 Jun. 1944

defend even the last dugout and to let the enemy not have a harbor but a field covered with ruins. Let the strongest men join your staff and eliminate any indications of cowardness or irresolution. The German nation and the entire world are spectators in your fight on which depends the conduct and the success of the operations for the annihilation of the landing bridgehead, the honor of the German Armed Forces as well as the honor of your own name."

Thereupon, General von Schlieben reported by radiogram to General Fieldmarshal Rommel, Army Group B as follows:

"In accordance with the authority given to me by the Fuehrer I feel obliged to report that the troops of 709th Infantry Division which did participate in the fighting have strongly suffered as far as their numbers and morale are concerned and that the original garrison of the fortress is unable to resist a serious siege. The percentage of older soldiers is too high, they are untrained and demoralized by a prolonged bunker-life. The figures give not the right impression. The high number of casualties among the officers during the fighting since 6 Jun. is very serious. The isolated groups of 77th and 243rd Division without regular leadership are more of a debit than a credit. The insufficient equipment of the original garrison troops is a disadvantage for the conduct of the fighting. The Russians can be used in France for Germany against Americans only at a reduced scale. There are two weak battalions with insufficient armament. I believe that reinforcements are absolutely necessary to carry out the task which the Fuehrer so emphatically declared as being of decisive importance."

The situation in Italy remained also unchanged in general.

VIII. According to information from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy it is expected that our assisting measures will increase the Finnish determination to resist. The Fuehrer regards Swedish influences as particularly dangerous and does not think that a yielding of the Finnish government or perhaps a shift to the left wing is impossible. The Finns withdrew also their front on the isthmus of Aunus to the second fortified line. The Fuehrer believes that the withdrawal at this moment is a definite mistake as the troops are leaving well fortified positions without being pressed by the enemy. The sluice installations of the Svir canal were blown up. The Finnish front was also withdrawn along the Maaselkai. The withdrawal was carried out in this case under strong enemy pressure. In order to assist the Finns it was ordered to transport as fast as possible new armament supplies including assault guns, anti-tank artillery, ammunition and bazookas. The Navy was ordered to investigate the possibility to transport ammunition in emergency transports to Finland.

22 Jun. 1944

also by fast war vessels with the utmost speed. The final decision on the transfer of 122nd Division from Reval to Finland has not been made yet. The division is already on the way to the area of embarkation. The Navy has to arrange for the transport space for a quick transfer.

Naval Staff postponed the movement of the LUETZOW which had been provided as part of the operation "Rotbuche" until probably 24th of Jun, because the urgently required 30 tons of ammunition can be ready for loading by that date. The ammunition has to be carried along to the mooring place and will be reshipped from there by coastal vessels.

In the meantime it became known that the provided ammunition is stored in Norway. Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces in Scandinavia ordered the transport to Gdynia where it will arrive about on the morning of 24 Jun.

Naval Staff ordered Naval Command, East to see that Naval Office Danzig in cooperation with the LUETZOW will take care for the loading of the ammunition immediately. After bringing the ammunition on board the operation "Rotbuche" will be carried out for the LUETZOW and 2nd Torpedo boat Flotilla. The ships will have to be equipped with light anti-aircraft armament. The ammunition will be transported by torpedo boats and minesweepers from the mooring place to Helsinki.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy was informed correspondingly and was advised that further movements of the LUETZOW are not desirable as the ship is equipped with light and medium anti-aircraft guns for the mooring places.

Furthermore, Commander-in-Chief, Navy was informed through Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy on the plan to withdraw the PRINZ EUGEN after the arrival of the LUETZOW in order not to expose the ships unnecessarily as their anti-aircraft defense at the mooring place will not be complete. anyhow. Besides, in the case of the PRINZ EUGEN the fuel consumption is of importance. Naval Command, East will distribute the escort forces. Two destroyers are with the PRINZ EUGEN at present and three torpedo boats are provided for the LUETZOW.

Special Items.

I. Operation "Tanne":

Naval Command, East informed Naval Staff by a copy of the

22 Jun. 1944

directive to Naval Command, Norway concerning the immediate removal and the assembling of the naval batteries which have to be dispatched for the operation "Tanne". Naval Command, East declared that 220 men of these batteries will be dispatched from Oslo to Aalberg in ten days at the latest.

Naval Staff informed Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy that the strength of the land formations of all three services for the operation "Tanne" is 13,000 and about 4,000 men of the naval forces.

II. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy informed Naval Staff on the report of 20th Mountain Corps Command of 21 Jun. to Armed Forces High Command concerning the Fuehrer directive No. 50. For copy as per l/Skl 1846/44 Gkdos. Chefs. compare War Diary, Special File "Large Scale Enemy Landings". The following questions are of importance for the Corps Command:

1. Which office of the Navy is concerned with the preparation and the carrying out?

2. How much shipping space can reach Oulu within the first three days in case an evacuation becomes necessary?

3. Which forces of the Navy can be reckoned with for the protection of the convoys in the Gulf of Bothnia, of the loading operations at Oulu and of a possible dispatch of covering troops?

Concerning these questions, Naval Staff informed Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff and 20th Corps Command as follows:

1. Preparations for the sea transport will be made by High Command, Navy; Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch (Bismarck).

Commanding Admiral Eastern Baltic Sea at Kiel under the supervision of Naval Command, Baltic Sea will be in charge of the general military planning and carrying out of the measures for the evacuation via the western Finnish ports. For the sea transport he will have under his command the Chief, Supply and Transport, Baltic Countries at Reval.

2. An answer concerning the question on the volume of shipping space for Oulu will be given later.

22 Jun. 1944

3. The convoys will be escorted by the forces of Commanding Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea. The strength of the immediate escort will depend on the general situation at the time. In case there is no change of the naval situation in the Gulf of Finland, the indirect defense will be provided by the barrage patrol in the Gulf of Finland and the direct defense will be secured by the anti-aircraft and anti-submarine escort. At present 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, 3 torpedo boats, 15 minesweepers, 1 motor minesweeper flotilla, several patrol boats and artillery ferries are under the command of Commanding Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea.

4. Commanding Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea will get into communication with 20th Corps Command as soon as possible in order to discuss the details.

III. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Coastal Defense Branch issued important information for the Navy taken from the report on invasion experiences of Armed Forces High Command and transmitted it to the front command stations concerned. For copy of the order as per 1/Sk1 19140/44 Gkdos. compare War Diary, Special File "Invasion 22 Jun.",

IV. The following figures concerning the entire KMA-mine operation were available on 18 Jun:

In total the following numbers of mines were laid out:

In western France	4,209 mines
French coast of the Mediterranean:	475
Netherlands, Belgium	2,582
off the Danish coast	3,828
in the Baltic countries	1,971
in the German Bight	626

Altogether 14,221 of the total number of 17,086 KMA-mines were laid out. No important minelaying has been done in the meantime.

22 Jun. 1944

V. In the Short Information on the Situation in the East No. 10/44 Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division reported among other things on the lifting of a floating dock at Noveresseek, on the giving of one USA cruiser to Russia, on the possibility of the salvage of the battleship MARAT, on the development of the merchant port Archangel and on USA air-bases in Russia. Copy of l/Skl 24483/44 geh. find in War Diary, Part D, Vol. "Materials on the Enemy Situation",

Situation on 22 Jun.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Invasion:

According to radio monitoring, British vessels observed minelaying by German planes between 0010 and 0042. The position was given by fixed points which are unknown.

In the evening and in the night of 21 Jun. several enemy targets were located in the waters northwest of Ile de Bas and Les Sept Iles as well as one enemy target 10 miles north of Antifer and North-northwest of St. Valery on Caux. A further enemy target was located between 0414 and 0422 twenty-three miles north of Cape de la Hague.

At 2336 on 21 Jun. about 40 transporters with landing boats under destroyer escort were 15 miles west of the Orne mouth. The laying of mines by planes was observed off St. Malo.

Our own PT boats were not operating in the night of 22 Jun. because of the bad weather.

At 0049 Commanding Admiral, Naval Group West announced the following order of Commanding General West:

"In the common fight against the enemy landing all naval and land forces of the Navy participating had fine results of their gallant operations thus making considerable contributions to the warding off of the enemy. I wish to express to all these formations my highest acknowledgment and my gratitude."

Group West transmitted an excerpt of the War Diary of 20 Jun. which

22 Jun. 1944

deals with the coastal artillery defense against the invasion. Copy as per 1/Skl 19141/44 Gkdos. find in War Diary, Special File "Invasion 22 Jun.". In summing up the group concludes that the enemy was successful during the first part of the landing at a definitely weak spot of the artillery coastal defense and that in addition to the medium rapid-fire guns of the Navy also the numerically strong Army coastal artillery had considerable results in warding off the landings in spite of their well known weakness against naval targets.

Naval Shore Commander, Channel Islands reported at 1530 that the Battery "Strassburg" fired upon two planes at 0650 and that the area off the harbor Peter Port in the grid square 2693 right side, center and 3571 left side, center was strongly fouled by mine-laying planes.

At 1534 Group West informed the commandant of St. Malo that 24 Army officers for Cherbourg will arrive in the evening who will have to be assigned to the PT boats for the transfer provided they arrive in time.

At 1642 Naval Shore Commander, Normandy reported enemy harassing fire of light and medium calibre against Cherbourg and Octeville. The batteries against naval targets and the emergency anti-aircraft batteries as well as the Army coastal batteries are maintaining a harassing fire against troop and tank concentrations behind the enemy land front. Masses of bombers and planes flying at a low level are attacking our fortified area since 1300. Fourteen or fifteen enemy planes were shot down.

The German troops are fighting for the recovery of points of resistance which were occupied by the enemy. The enemy forces that had infiltrated the eastern part of the land front were repulsed in a counter attack. One emergency company of 120 men is being formed of dispersed groups at the port captain. Furthermore, a company will be formed of crews from the harbor patrol flotillas to be given to the Army. Two drifters of the harbor patrol group remain ready for operations.

At 1700 Group West regarded landing possibilities for the night of 22 Jun. as difficult in the Dutch area, as slightly difficult along the Channel coast and as possible at the Atlantic coast.

According to telephone reports of Group West about 4,100 men of the Navy are closed up in the area of the fortress Cherbourg. A relevant inquiry of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy was answered.

22 Jun. 1944

The same operation orders as during the night of 21 Jun. were given to the naval forces for the night of 22 Jun.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy transmitted at 1850:

"Lieutenant-General von Schlieben is appointed commanding general of the fortress Cherbourg effective immediately. His rights and duties are defined in the relevant orders and in the radiogram of the Fuehrer. Major-General Sattler the former fortress commandant is discharged from his duties and placed under the authority of the new commandant."

At 2045 Group West reported the following on the situation:

"At 1745 on 21 Jun. the Army Coastal Battery 3/1255 was fired upon by cruisers.

At 2137 the Battery "Todt" fired upon an eastbound enemy convoy south of Folkestone. The convoy set up a smoke screen after the first well aimed salvoes. The Battery "Hamburg" and other batteries against targets on sea at the fortress Cherbourg fired against tank concentrations and approach roads. Harassing fire of enemy naval artillery was directed against the area east of Barfleur, against Cherbourg and against the approach roads. At 0925 on 22 Jun. the Army Coastal Battery 3/1255 was fired upon by medium artillery at a distance of 20 or 25 kilometers."

It can be seen from a further report that the electric power station at Cherbourg was destroyed. The current and water supplies were interrupted. No other damages were reported.

Naval Shore Commander, Normandy reported on further destructions of the installations at Cherbourg as follows: The blowing up of the France Quay has been completed. The other parts of the harbor were fouled with mines. The last passage was close by the scuttling of the ship H "32". The remaining parts of the quay at the old harbor railway station have been blown up. Further destructions on the Homet Quay are planned for 22 Jun. Besides the destruction of the quay wall at the Homet Dock is taken into consideration as it can be possibly used for landing. Group West was ordered to release for destruction also those harbor installations which had been spared so far with the exception of mooring places for three supply PT boats. The torpedoes available have to be used for destructions except a rest of six.

It can furthermore be concluded from the enemy radio communications that one landing vessel went aground. Furthermore a command station

22 Jun. 1944

issued orders concerning the landing program on 22 Jun. in the area of Aromanches whereas the commanding admiral of the heavy battle groups issued data of targets for bombardments in the area east of the Orne mouth. Orders were given to the repair ships for getting afloat all stranded lighters and ships as soon as the weather permits.

On the evening of 22 Jun. three PT boats were ready for war at St. Malo and one PT boat not ready for war, whereas seven PT boats were ready for war at Le Havre, three PT boats ready for war at Ostend and two PT boats not ready for war until 24 Jun. at Amsterdam.

2. Enemy Position in other parts of the West Area:

In the area of 19th Group 40 planes were observed in operation. On the afternoon and in the evening submarine sighting reports of these planes were intercepted from the area around Cherbourg and from the western Channel. Four British units were located in the rendezvous area.

3. Own Position in other parts of the West Area:

Atlantic Coast Area:

Eighteen patrol positions were occupied. Two mines were cleared off St. Nazaire. Commanding Admiral, Defenses West informed Naval Staff by copy of his report to Group West concerning the plans for the group consisting of the two boats destroyer Z"24" and torpedo boat T"24". Their base will be at La Pallice. They will move there as soon as they are ready.

The coastal patrol force will be ready to assist submarines.

Escort for convoys along the western coast will be rendered for particularly important convoys according to orders of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West.

There are no fixed plans for the operations of the off-shore patrol forces but the boats will be kept in readiness at their base for a reconnaissance sweep in case enemy ships are made out in the Bay of Biscay which indicate possible landings or commando operations.

22 Jun. 1944

Channel Waters:

The patrol positions were not occupied because of the weather.

Special Items:

Naval Group West transmitted a report of Naval Artillery Detachment 242 saying that the enemy dropped a considerable number of heavy bombs of a new type on the occasion of a daylight attack against Cape Gris Nez and the Battery Kurfuerst on 5 Jun. The bombs made very deep holes like a well. Then they move six or eight meters to the side producing an earth wall. Apparently these are bombs with great delay in order to blow up bunkers. Six of the bombs are dropped close together. An old ferro-concrete foundation of 50 centimeter strength were easily perforated.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

North Sea:

Shipping traffic in the German Bight is restricted by the destruction of the sluices at Brunsbuettel. The date of completion work at the new sluices cannot be foreseen yet. New damages were discovered at the northern sluice of the old sluice. Therefore the completion of the repair on 23 Jun. has become doubtful. The southern sluice can be used by ships drawing five meters of water and having a maximum length of 120 meters and a width of not more than 20 meters. One mine was cleared off the Ems.

Three detonations were again heard off the Dutch coast.

In the Ijssel Meer and in the Zealand waters two convoys with about 45,000 BRT were escorted. On the Maas River the patrol boat VP"1300" was slightly damaged by collision.

Minesweeping and patrol service in the area from Borkum up to Zeebrugge were carried out as scheduled.

Norway, Northern Waters:

22 Jun. 1944

1. Enemy Position:

Twelve planes were observed operating in the area of 18th Group.

Our own air reconnaissance reconnoitered Thorshaven and the adjacent harbors and bights on 21 Jun. without any remarkable results.

From 1600 on 22 Jun onward our submarines sighted carrier planes in the waters east of Jan Mayen. One destroyer was sighted at 2300 in the grid square AB 7626. It cannot be recognized as yet whether a carrier group is concerned or whether it is a PQ convoy just beginning to depart.

2. Own Position:

Four of the artillery ferry barges to be transferred from the Norwegian area to the Gulf of Finland are at Kristiansand South where they were unable to continue their cruise because of the bad weather. The fifth artillery ferry passed Kristiansand North in the evening. Two others were dispatched from the Molde area.

At 2010 a small convoy proceeding from Vardoe to Berlevaag was attacked with bombs and gunfire of four planes. Casualties were sustained by hits on the artillery ferry barge AF"39".

A report on the dispatch of submarines against the reported enemy will be given under "Submarine Warfare". The convoy traffic which had been stopped after the sighting reports on carrier planes between Bedoe and Reppefjord was reopened because the weather is unfavorable for the enemy planes.

Twenty-eight ships were escorted to the north and twenty ships were escorted to the south.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

In the evening of 21 Jun. and in the following night, groups of small vessels up to 15 boats were repeatedly sighted in the waters east of Lavansaari and east of Tytters.

22 Jun. 1944

According to radio decyphering 13 PT boats were ready for combat operations at Narva at 2200 on 19 Jun. Four patrol boats moved from Seiskari to Narva at 0800 on 20 Jun. Furthermore movements were observed between Kronstadt and Rutchi.

At 0330 on 21 Jun. three PT boats proceeded from Yavamari to the Narva Bight. In the evening the positions in 6005 N. 2837 E. and in 5941 N. 2751 E. were occupied by two patrol boats. Besides, ship movements from Kronstadt to Lavansaari and from Kronstadt to Ustluga and Rutchi were observed. Several of the boats were PT boats again. At 1900 on 21 Jun. a minefield was discovered in 6005 N. 2910 E. Other mines were reported in 6009 N. 2905 E.

2. Own Position:

At the western coast of Juteland four patrol positions and the gap in the Hanstholm barrage were occupied. The KMA-mine operation was continued from Esbjerg. One artillery ferry barge was serving as anti-aircraft escort.

Concerning the alternative traffic route around Skagen, Naval Command, East reported it's plan to provide about two or three convoys per week in each direction consisting of three or four seaworthy steamers with a minimum speed of nine knots. One mine exploding vessel and one minesweeper will be provided for each convoy as an escort against ground mines and three or four patrol boats for the anti-aircraft defense. It is planned in order to fix the time of command for the convoy in such a manner that the command will go over from Commanding Admiral, Defenses North to 8th Coast Patrol Force at about three hours before dusk. Because of the continuous enemy air reconnaissance off the western coast of Juteland, Naval Command, East is expecting enemy attacks with aerial torpedoes and bombs for certain.

Twenty-nine boats were operating in the minesweeping service in the Baltic Sea entrances as well as forty-two boats and four minesweeping planes in the Baltic Sea. A total of four mines was cleared in the western Baltic Sea and north of Samsee. One cutter sunk after hitting a mine.

The shipping deadlock in the Kiel Bay is affecting 32 vessels by now.

Commander, 5th Destroyer Flotilla together with the FRIEDRICH IHN and the THEODOR RIEDEL as well as with the torpedo boat T"13" are on their way to Oslofjord. 121st Landing Flotilla on it's way to the east entered Stralsund at 0630 in order to be reequipped.

22 Jun. 1944

In the night of 21 Jun. the minesweeper M"30" continuously reported PT boat attacks together with air attacks in AO 3346. Our boats southwest of Viborg were also kept under constant air attacks.

The minesweeper M"17" went aground south of Tuuhelma but remained ready for operations.

Commander 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla reported strong enemy fire with anti-tank guns and shrapnel shells from both coasts during the operation east of Piisaari. Two anti-tank guns were annihilated. The bombardment of the Russian landing vessels was carried out against strong artillery defense and under constant air attacks of up to 30 planes. Two enemy planes were shot down on this occasion.

Another KMA-mine barrage was laid out by a group of naval landing craft in the Vilalajiti sector.

Two naval landing craft and two coastal auxiliary sailing vessels were operating in the ammunition supply.

No special events were reported from the patrol and escort service.

The destroyer Z"39" was hit by a bomb and damaged when an enemy plane flying at low level attacked at Baltic Port shortly after midnight.

No further reports came in yet.

During the night of 22 Jun. the naval forces were distributed as follows:

Two destroyers and four minesweepers in the roads of Reval;

two destroyers and the boat F"10" at Baltic Port;

the torpedo boats T"3", "8" and "10" at Helsinki.

Commander, 9th Coast Patrol Force reported on a conference at 1445 on 21 Jun with General Valve on the defense of the islands off Koivisto. According to the report it is planned only to pretend that the islands will be defended in order to gain time for the fortification of the southern coast of the mainland. Commander, 9th Coast Patrol Force had the impression that the Finns had made up their minds from the beginning to give up the islands but that they did not admit it in order to prevent the arising of any doubts on their readiness to fight. It is planned to withdraw the entire garrison of the island numbering 2,300 men in one movement during the night of 22 Jun. and to leave behind the equipment if necessary.

22 Jun. 1944

V. Submarine Warfare.

Situation in the West:

One enemy plane sighted a submarine periscope in BF 3127 south of Southampton. Because of the sighting of carrier-borne planes, Commander Submarines, Norway ordered for the Arctic Ocean degree of readiness five hours for the boats which are ready for action at the harbors Tromsø, Narvik and Hammerfest. Three boats of the Group "Trutz" were moved to the north and the other boats were ordered furthermore towards southwest because the enemy probably knows our submarine positions. When the sighting of a destroyer was reported all boats were dispatched to the scene. The boats will take up positions in the patrol line from AB 5299 up to 6782 at 1900 on 23 Jun. The 13 boats in readiness at the harbors were ordered after the sighting of the destroyer to depart immediately and to sail for AB 64. Reconnaissance with three BV 138 planes against the presumed PQ convoy is planned at 2300.

In the Gulf of Finland the three submarines U"481", "1193" and "748" which entered Reval will proceed via Helsinki to Kotka stopping for one day at each place and will then go back to Reval.

No special reports came in from the Atlantic nor from the Indian Ocean.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

West Area:

At 1430 our reconnaissance made out a ship formation of 12 or 14 warships including presumably one heavy cruiser and about 20 transporters lying stopped in the waters north of Caen. Besides, landing boats were observed. Evaluation of photographic air reconnaissance of the waters northwest of the Orne-mouth in the afternoon hours revealed 34 small landing boats, 20 big landing boats, 20 freighters with a total of 150,000 BRT, 4 cruisers and 2 battleships. Fifteen freighters with altogether 120,000 BRT and accompanied by six escort vessels were sighted off this group towards the sea. Two empty LSTs were recognized between both groups.

During daylight about 2,400 enemy planes entered Belgium and Northern France. They attacked building sites in the Schelde mouth and Somme area as well as traffic installations and railways. Several hundred enemy planes entered also Western France and attacked

22 Jun. 1944

railway installations near Paris and in other parts of the northwestern areas of France as well as aerodromes.

During the night of 22 Jun. 250 enemy planes attacked the towns and the railway stations at Reims and Laen.

During daylight 414 of our fighters were assisting the Army in Normandy. Nine enemy planes were shot down at a loss of 14 on our side.

Many motor vehicles were set afire by gunfire.

In the night of 22 Jun. 63 planes of 9th Air Corps were laying out mines. Fourteen planes of the same corps attacked naval targets and scored hits on one merchantman and on one destroyer. Furthermore they hit a cruiser by one PC 1400 armor piercing bomb and succeeded in placing two PC 1400 armor piercing bombs on one big ship.

Forty-two night fighters of the enemy and four four-engined planes were shot down without any losses on our side.

Six Me 410 planes attacked independent targets in southeast England. Two Me 410 planes were reconnoitering over London and dropped several explosive bombs.

Reich Territory:

During the day only isolated enemy planes were reported entering the Reich territory. In the night of 22 Jun. 35 enemy planes attacked the Hamburg area. Isolated enemy planes which did not attack were reported from northwest and west Germany.

Mediterranean Theater:

On 21 Jun. 730 enemy planes were operating over the Italian front area and 250 planes attacked traffic targets in the area Genoa - Ancona. During the night of 21 Jun., 44 planes were reported supplying the bandits in the Balkans and 45 planes were reported carrying out harassing attacks in the rear of the front near Florence.

Our own planes were reconnoitering and sighted at 1529 two large aircraft carriers, two presumably auxiliary aircraft carriers, two

22 Jun. 1944

destroyers, two merchantmen and one warship of medium size unfortunately without reporting the course about 150 miles northwest of Benghazi.

East Area:

On 21 Jun. 271 German planes and 786 enemy planes were reported operating at the eastern front. Three enemy planes were shot down at a loss of one on the German side.

During the night of 21 Jun. 226 German bombers attacked the aerodrome at Poltava scoring very good hits. Presumably about 35 planes were set afire. No losses were sustained on our side.

VII. War in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea.

1. Area of Naval Group West:

Enemy Situation:

At noon on 21 Jun. four transporters left Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

It was reported from Port Mahon that the Italian warships in the harbor were put into war readiness and were making preparations for leaving the harbor.

Own Situation:

The sighting of a submarine was reported at 1740 southeast of Toulon and at 1937 off Cape Sicil. Anti-submarine hunting had no success. At 1611 an enemy submarine fired four torpedoes on two blockships which had been scuttled in the harbor entrance in the Cassis Bight between Toulon and Marseilles.

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Situation:

It has been reported already on the locating of the aircraft carriers north northwest of Benghazi.

22 Jun. 1944

It could be concluded from radio activities that a part of the eastbound convoy UGS 43 was on the way from Alexandria to Famagusta during the night of 21 Jun.

Parts of the eastbound convoy UGS 44 were located in the morning in the waters Sicily-Sardinia and in the Strait of Sicily and a part of the eastbound convoy KMS 53 was made out in the waters southeast of Malta in the evening of 21 Jun. The westbound convoy GUS 43 was in the Algier area on 21 Jun. A part of the westbound convoy MKS 53 was located in the eastern Mediterranean.

According to the opinion of Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division the reported carrier formation presumably is on it's way to the east. The two aircraft carriers are most probably identical with the carriers of the FORMIDABLE-class which entered the Mediterranean on 17 Jun. It is not impossible that the entire group will proceed to the Indian Ocean but it is more probable that the appearance of a strong carrier formation in the eastern Mediterranean is to be regarded as a further indication of enemy operations in the eastern Mediterranean in the near future. In this connection Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division pointed to the Russian offensive which seems to begin today.

Own Position:

Vade south of Savona was strongly attacked by enemy planes with explosive and incendiary bombs. Three freight barges in the dockyards were destroyed by fire. No damages were sustained at Savona.

At Spezia a blockship was scuttled in the eastern harbor entrance which was completely closed for passage.

On 21 Jun., naval anti-aircraft guns shot down one enemy plane near Genoa. According to the opinion of German Naval Command, Italy, strong enemy air activity in the Leghorn area is suggesting enemy plans in that area.

3. Area of Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic:

Pola was attacked with bombs by enemy planes at noon. The administration building of the Main Depot burned down following a direct hit. The arsenal was hit by 17 bombs. Several motor boats sunk.

22 Jun. 1944

In the night of 21 Jun. two PT boats were unsuccessfully attacked with bombs by enemy reconnaissance planes in their waiting position near Cape Promontore. The waiting position in the same area will again be occupied by the same boats in the night of 22 Jun.

Four boats of the 7th PT boat Flotilla will move from Zara to the south. One coastal auxiliary sailing vessel hit a mine and sunk in the Gulf of Cattaro.

b. Aegean Sea:

The submarine-chasers "2106" and SF"284" escorting the convoy "Sybille" were sunk by an enemy submarine. The convoy was proceeding from Monemvasia to Kalamata. The convoy "Sybille" returned to Monemvasia.

The two submarines reported in the Olympia Bight on the evening of 20 Jun. were found out to be our own patrol boats.

At noon, Kalamata was attacked with bombs.

The torpedo boats TA"14" and "19" left Porto Lago in the evening for Peiraiëvs. Three auxiliary sailing vessels were blown up by unknown agents in the dockyards at Mytilene. During the night of 22 Jun. an attempt with explosives was also made against an auxiliary sailing vessel in Peiraiëvs.

c. Black Sea:

The submarine chaser "2307" sunk at about 0900 south of Varna presumably after hitting a mine laid by planes. No other reports of importance were reported.

Situation on the Danube:

According to a Romanian report, a German tug sunk apparently after hitting a mine in the Kilia-branch of the Danube at 1630 on 21 Jun.

No other reports came in concerning the Danube.

VIII. Situation in East Asia

According to Japanese reports the Americans landed two divisions

22 Jun. 1944

on Saipan. The landing was assisted by naval artillery and carrier borne planes. No further landings took place so far on the Marianas Islands, but the aerodromes on these islands are under constant air attacks.

Almost the complete USA fleet in the Pacific did participate in the operation against Saipan according to Japanese reconnaissance. The fleet was subdivided into four groups, one of them about 200 miles west and another about 200 miles east of the island, a third group was near the Bonin Islands and the fourth group was directly covering the landing. The number of carriers was supposed to be ten real aircraft carriers, ten carriers reconstructed from what were originally cruisers and at least thirty auxiliary aircraft carriers. The American supply fleet including more than 30 tankers are presumed to be half way on the route to the Marshall Islands. In view of the extraordinary strategic importance of Saipan the main body of the Japanese fleet has apparently been sent against the USA operation. According to a communique of the USA Admiral Nimitz, two aircraft carriers and one battleship were superficially damaged on the occasion of an attack of Japanese carrier-borne planes against USA ships on 18 Jun. The fighting power of the ships was not diminished. During the battle 353 Japanese and 21 American planes were lost. The American attack of the 5th Fleet under the command of Admiral Spruance against Japanese naval forces on 19 Jun. had the following results according to American reports: one aircraft carrier was hit by three bombs. One carrier was sunk, one carrier heavily damaged and left behind in burning condition. One light aircraft carrier was hit by at least one bomb. One battleship (Kongo-class), one cruiser and three destroyers were damaged including one destroyer which was presumably sunk. Furthermore, three tankers were sunk and two tankers were heavily damaged and left behind burning. Between 15 and 20 Japanese and 49 American planes were lost.

According to further reports from the USA, the Japanese fleet formation consisted of four battleships, five or six carriers and many cruisers and destroyers.

According to a Domei-report, Japanese planes seriously damaged another US aircraft carrier on 20 Jun. The total number of damaged USA aircraft carriers was said by the Japanese to be five.

Although it is impossible to obtain from the reports of both sides a clear impression of this undoubtedly important operation, it can nevertheless perhaps be recognized already now that the Americans successfully have attained their objective by occupying Saipan. The importance of this success should not be underestimated.

CONFIDENTIAL

22 Jun. 1944

Naval Staff took care to inform Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy quickly so that the representative of the Navy can report this important naval operation in the Pacific at the Fuehrer's conference on the situation.

CONFIDENTIAL

23 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance.

Nothing to report.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

I. During the discussion of the situation in the west area possibilities were ventilated of dispatching one infantry regiment to Cherbourg over the sea in accordance with the directive of the Fuehrer. The transfer will be possible only by PT boats and by submarines.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy will be instructed accordingly in order to inform Commander-in-Chief, Navy. The situation at sea and in the air as well as the mine-situation does not permit any more the use of larger and slow transport vessels under the prevailing conditions.

II. Armed Forces High Command issued instructions concerning the participation in the fighting on the German side of voluntary Frenchmen. According to a Fuehrer order a formation raised for this purpose will only be used in the interior against bandits and parachutists and it will not be dispatched to the Anglo-American front. The matter will be dealt with by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch.

III. According to an order of Armed Forces High Command, 500 tons of diesel oil are to be given to the Army. The delivery will be made by Group West. Armed Forces High Command plans to concentrate the motor vehicles of all Services in France in an Armed Forces motor vehicle pool. Considering the peculiar requirements of the Navy (torpedo transports etc.) this measure cannot be regarded as quite unobjectionable. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division informed Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters of these objections.

IV. Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Intelligence Division:

According to a report of German Foreign Office the Finnish foreign minister informed the German envoy on 20 Jun. that the negotiations on a reorganization of the cabinet aiming at a rejuvenation have failed to come to a successful conclusion. No mention was made on this occasion of Passikivi as a possible prime minister or minister.

According to further information of the envoy, Mannerheim will approach the Fuehrer about German armed assistance. Nothing is known at the Wilhelmstrasse of Finnish negotiations with the western powers. But there are indications of a new intervention of Stockholm as go-between with Russia. However, the Russian advance over the Karelian

23 Jun. 1944

isthmus had very disenchanting results in Sweden. It is suspected that the Finns do not inform Germany correctly.

Following unconfirmed indications Russia may perhaps have explained already her conditions to Sweden asking new, it is said, for an additional surrender of naval and air bases in southern Finland that is to say of Helsinki and the Aland Island. According to press reports from Stockholm of 22 Jun., the alleged armistice conditions were published. The frontiers of 1940 are taken as a basis for the negotiations. In addition to that the following conditions of transitory nature were made by pointing to the requirements of the war against Germany:

1. The right to march through the entire territory of Finland.
2. Aerodromes in Oester Otten.
3. Bases on the Aland Islands.

German Foreign Office newly informed Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff on the situation in Turkey. According to the report, the British are very angry because a large number of war-freighters, the suitability of which as submarine chasers is well known, did pass the Dardanelles with the approval of Numan. Upon a question of Mr. Papen whether the change in the foreign minister would mean that also a change of the political line was planned, Mr. Saracoglu answered strictly in the negative and emphasized his opinion that the British and the Russians had already partitioned Turkey among themselves. The Turkish policy was, he said, to avoid as before the pressure of the Allied as far as possible and to maintain the Turkish forces unimpaired until the end of the war. The necessity of economic relations with Germany was confirmed by Saracoglu.

The declarations of Mr. Saracoglu before the National Assembly show that the Turkish decision not to allow any more war-freighters to pass the Dardanelles cannot be changed by negotiations. The Allies are of the opinion that it is easier to come to an agreement with Saracoglu and that the system of ruthless pressure has proved successful in general.

The Russian Ambassador has himself subsequently intervened in the English negotiations with the Turkish government.

V. Naval Staff, Chief of Operations Division:

According to a telephone report from Naval Command, East General Valve expressed his gratitude for the assistance of the Finnish cause rendered by the dispatch of warships.

23 Jun. 1944

Thus the demonstration which this measure regarding Finland has been planned for has proved to be successful.

VI. Situation of the Army:

West Area:

After the strongest preparation by air attacks and artillery fire from land and sea lasting for many hours the American infantry began attacking the fortress Cherbourg.

The enemy successfully penetrated our lines from the south and from the east. All our reserves were brought into action.

The appointment of Lieutenant-General Schlieben as fortress commander was reported already on 22 Jun. The situation is serious.

Casualties on the German side since 6 Jun. in the entire invasion area are 560 officers including 50 higher officers and about 24,000 non-commissioned officers and men.

In general, the situation is stabilized at the other fronts. The 2nd SS Tank Corps is being unloaded in the Nancy area.

The approach roads from the Paris area to the Normandy are kept under the strongest enemy air attacks.

Heavy fighting continues in Italy. The battle at Lake Trasimeno is going on. Our own divisions which suffered already heavily are showing a remarkable power of resistance against 31 enemy divisions which are constantly being replenished.

According to the opinion of Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Armies, West an outflanking landing operation in the Genoa area does not seem impossible. Also in the eastern Mediterranean the possibility of an operation is not quite out of the question in the next future. In this connection the observed aircraft carriers and the transfer of one division to Port Said require special attention. The situation in Finland is balanced. The Finns were successful in scoring several successes in the defensive. The enemy started to attack in the Annus Isthmus and north of the Lake Onega.

At our own eastern front strong enemy reconnaissance attacks were warded off in the southern front section.

The fighting activity in the area east of Lwow has considerably increased. Ukrainian bandits are fighting behind the enemy front partly against the Russians and partly against the Soviet-Poles. The situation is not clear.

23 Jun. 1944

The large-scale Russian attack in the area of Central Army Group began on both sides of the motor highway Smolensk-Minsk. The Russians are operating with three or four tank armies. In their first assault they succeeded already in the Vitebsk area to break through unexpectedly with strong forces. German troops will be dispatched against this area.

In the area of Army Group North, the 16th Army warded off several enemy attacks. At the few places where the enemy had been able to break through, the lost territory could be recovered later. The situation is still quiet in the area of 18th Army. The enemy's main offensive against the 9th Army is expected for today.

VII. Report of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief of Operations Branch:

a. The departure of the LUETZOW according to schedule was delayed by the necessity to transport the ammunition. The ship will leave the harbor together with three torpedo boats on the evening of 24 Jun. It is planned to withdraw the PRINZ EUGEN subsequently in view of the fuel oil consumption.

b. Commanding Admiral, Task Force asked that 4th Destroyer Flotilla should penetrate into the area of the Bear Islands without any particular operational target. Reasons of training were of decisive importance. The destroyers did not sail in the open sea for many months.

The operative leadership must be with Naval Command, Norway and not with the Task Force as suggested by Commanding Admiral, Task Force.

Naval Command, Norway has already taken up this matter and plans to order another target for the operation. Further reports were promised.

VIII. Quartermaster General reported that Quartermaster Division, Chief of Shipping and Transport Branch is discussing with Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping the big transport problems which arose during the last days from the requirements for the troop movements. He will then proceed to Reval in order to deal with the transport tasks there on the spot.

IX. Naval Staff, Chief of Operations Division thinks it advisable for the dispatch of German submarines to the Gulf of Finland that all naval commands be informed at all events that the movements of submarines have to be announced at everywhere. Furthermore, investigations are being made at Naval Staff whether a destroyer has to be sent to the Gulf of Finland to replace the destroyer Z"39". One ship of the Skagerrak Group is taken into consideration for the purpose.

Special Items:

23 Jun. 1944

I. Concerning "Tanne":

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff gave information that the development of the situation in Finland may require the execution of the operation "Tanne West" and "Tanne Ost" at a short time's notice and that alternations of the previous plans may become necessary. It ordered therefore as follows:

a. "Tanne West":

1. The Parachute Infantry Battalion of the Brandenburg Division and the SS-Parachute Infantry Battalion 500 concentrated at Danzig and Gdynia respectively are provided as the first wave for "Tanne West". They will probably be transferred by sea transport only. High Command, Navy, Naval Staff, Operations Division will order the assembling of the transport capacity in order to make possible the transfer of both battalions within a short time. Arrangements have to be made to carry out the sea transport if possible as an emergency transport on warships (possibly by cruisers). Naval Staff will report on it's plans and on the time required from the issuing of the order up to the departure as well as on the duration of the journey from the departure till the landing.

2. High Command, Air will provide planes for the transport at a limited scale in order to transfer by air transport parts of the parachute battalions as a first fighting group if necessary. The right to issue the relevant orders is reserved.

3. The plan to dispatch 416th Infantry Division for "Tanne West" is maintained. In case 122nd Infantry Division, presently on the way to Finland, arrivestoo late for participating at the Finnish front if the situation turns worse, the division may be transferred directly from Finland to the operation "Tanne West". This possibility however does only exist within the next six or eight days. The measures of the navy for the carrying out of the sea transport must be taken in consideration of this possibility.

b. "Tanne Ost":

The carrying out of "Tanne Ost" remains with General Staff of the Army, Operations Division through Army Group, North. In accordance with the development of the situation the preparations have to be made so that it is possible to carry out the operation in an improvised manner within the shortest time. General Staff of the Army will report on the time required until the beginning of the operation in cooperation with High Command, Navy, Naval Staff."

Naval Staff, Operations Division informed Naval Staff, Quartermaster

23 Jun. 1944

Division, Shipping and Transport Branch and asked for information as early as possible concerning the assembling of the required shipping space as well as for the contribution to the report required for paragraph a. 1.

Naval Command, East was ordered to wire suggestions as soon as possible. Naval Staff is of the opinion that the best solution would be to maintain the previous plan for the operation "Tanne" and to supplement it by transferring in advance the battalions mentioned in the directive of Armed Forces High Command.

Naval Staff asked Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff to inform Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch and Naval Command, East immediately on the numerical strength of the two battalions as well as on the respective vehicles and equipment.

High Command, Army, General Staff of the Army, Operations Division was asked by Naval Staff, Operations Division to confirm that the plans of Naval Command, East concerning "Tanne Ost" which have so far been transmitted are in accordance with the plans of General Staff of the Army.

Furthermore, Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff ordered:

1. As ordered already the Parachute Infantry Battalion of the Brandenburg Division (parts arrived already at Danzig) and SS-Parachute Infantry Battalion 500 (the concentration of this formation at Gdynia has been ordered) were provided as the first wave for carrying out "Tanne" West.

2. It is planned, in case "Tanne I" is not to be carried out, to transfer these battalions by fast sea transport in order to bring into action as fast as possible a combat formation for "Tanne West". Detailed information will follow later.

3. The battalion commanders were ordered to report to Naval Command, Baltic (Chief of Staff) at Kiel by telephone after arrival at Gdynia and Danzig respectively. Further orders, instructions on the tasks, on the embarkation in case of sea transport, on the command of operation and on the tasks after the landing will be given by Naval Command, Baltic, Naval Command, Baltic will order furthermore the establishment of communications with 1st Air Force by the commanders for information on the order "Tanne" in case "Tanne I" is not being carried out.

The same version of the order was transmitted by Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff to Naval Staff, Operations Division, Naval Command, East with copy to operations Staff of the Air Force.

23 Jun. 1944

Finally, Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff informed Naval Staff on the directive to Reichsfuehrer SS and High Command, Air, Operations Staff concerning the Fuehrer order that the SS-Parachute Infantry Battalion 500 has to be transferred for special tasks from the Ljubljana area to Gdynia where a quick replenishing by Reichsfuehrer SS has been asked for.

The order for further employment of the troops will be given by Naval Command, Baltic Sea.

Naval Staff, Operations Division will inform Naval Command, Baltic Sea accordingly.

II. The Fuehrer directive No. 50 contains orders for the preparation of the withdrawal of 20th Mountain Army Corps to northern Finland and northern Norway in case Finland should withdraw from participating in the war. (compare War Diary 22 Jun.). It will then be the task of the Army Corps to defend the northern area which is of decisive importance for our war economy by withdrawing the army front to the present battle area of XIXth Army Corps.

This plan was ordered by Armed Forces High Command on 28 Sept. 1943.

Armed Forces High Command issued the following supplementary order on 4 Apr.:

"Preparations for the removal of parts of the Army and of 5th Air Force via the ports of the Gulf of Bethnia if it is possible under the then prevailing conditions. The withdrawal of the supply troops will have to be protected against Russian interference by the units possessing fighting power which will also subsequently be removed by sea transport.

On 9 Apr. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff decided on the codeword "Birke" for the Fuehrer directive No. 50 in the area of 20th Mountain Army Corps. According to a directive of Armed Forces High Command of 8 Apr., probably also measures according to Fuehrer directive No. 50 will be ordered simultaneously with "Tanne". This has to be taken into account for the preparations.

The operation "Tanne" has to be given priority. A delay in the transport from the harbors of the Bethnian Sea has to be accepted if necessary.

20th Mountain Army Corps reported on 21 Jun. to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff that it does not possess any information on the plans in case of the evacuation over the sea route of formations and material from the western Finnish harbors back to the Reich.

For further treatment of this question compare War Diary 22 Jun.

23 Jun. 1944

Naval Staff informed Naval Command, East; Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea and Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch on these arrangements by the order I op 1864/44 gK. Chefs. For copy compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

Referring to the same subject, Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff asked Naval Staff as per 23 Jun. to take preparatory measures to provide for the Fuehrer order No. 50 possibly coming into force in order to secure all shipping space available in the Finnish harbors.

The removal by the Army without the help of the Navy of this shipping space will only be possible if the Finnish crews will continue to do duty on board which cannot be expected with absolute certainty. Otherwise the Navy would have to provide emergency crews for this purpose.

All preparations for the removal or - should this prove impossible - for the destruction of the Finnish ships have to be made in cooperation with 20th Mountain Army Corps. The date of the carrying out will be transmitted by Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff asked for information on the measures taken.

III. According to information from High Command, Air, Operations Staff, the Chief of the Operations Branch suggested to the Chief, General Staff, of the Air Force in view of the Army situation in the northern part of the eastern front to withdraw for use at the Army front the fighter squadron provided for the protection of the operation "Rotbuche" and moved to Turku already. Naval Staff reminded Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff with copy to High Command, Air, Operations Staff of the dispatch of the LUETZOW and of the necessity implied therein to withdraw several formations, so far employed as anti-aircraft defense, for the reinforcement of the front at sea and as escort for transports. As it is still not clear whether and to what extent it will be possible to establish light anti-aircraft guns on the skerries near the mooring place of "Rotbuche", Naval Staff pointed to the danger arising for the PRINZ EUGEN and the LUETZOW from the planning of the Air Force and asked for a decision in accordance with this situation.

IV. Concerning the question of the coastal defense in the German Bight (compare War Diary 22 Jun.), Naval Staff, Operations Division informed Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division on the report of Commander in Chief, Navy to the Fuehrer on 20 and 21 Mar. 1944 concerning the weakness of the defense against landings and of the coastal defenses in the German Bight in general which has to be taken into account although at present an enemy landing in that area was regarded unlikely, as well as on the Fuehrer's promise

23 Jun. 1944

that something would be done for the reinforcement of that weak spot as soon as the plans in the west would be accomplished (in spring, end of Apr.). The relevant note l/Skl. I a 19186/44 gkdos. find in War Diary, Part C, Vol. X.

V. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff informed Naval Staff by copy of the following directive to Commanding General, West:

The stocks in the fortresses seem to be provided only for the troops which are garrisoned there at normal times as was seen in the case of Cherbourg.

Additional considerable forces from the immediate neighborhood will be ordered into every fortress which may be in danger of being encircled. Their number will vary depending on the situation and on German forces available in the vicinity as well as on the size of the fortress. Commanding General, West will take care immediately that the stocks of the fortresses are increased as ordered until they are sufficient to secure the defense of the fortress. The Fuehrer asked for a report on the measures taken and on the stocks of all fortresses which are not attacked at present.

VI. The statement of Group South concerning the naval war base Bulgaria came in meanwhile and was transmitted by Naval Staff to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy for Commander-in-Chief, Navy.

Copy of the relevant order l, Skl. 19744/44 gKdos. find in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV a.

Summing up Naval Staff transmitted it's own opinion to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff with copy to Group South, For copy of the teletype l, Skl. I m 19216/44 gkdos. compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV a.

VII. German Naval Command Italy reported that the development makes necessary administrative measures without the possibility of asking for approval in detail previously. For the time of the crisis the Naval Command asked as an administrative measure for the permission to dissolve and to establish anew offices, to transfer officers and men to other posts, to employ temporarily soldiers of the naval anti-aircraft Battalions afloat as well as crews of lost TA-torpedo boats for the reinforcement of the anti-aircraft defenses and for the manning of the coastal batteries. The latter is of particular importance because of the unreliability of the Italians.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch was ordered by Chief, Naval Staff to approve the request.

23 Jun. 1944

VIII. Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division informed the highest command stations of the Navy by excerpts of the assessment of the situation of General Staff of the Army of 22 Jun. According to this assessment 22 or 24 large formations of the Army Group Montgomery were observed in operation at present. The reserves in England would consist of from 10 to 20 formations. The strength of the 1st USA Army Group in eastern and southeastern England was assumed to be 28 large formations and three or four airborne divisions. Special attention has to be paid to the area of western Bretagne and to the coastal area Morlaix - Brest. A surprise attack against Brest does not seem impossible. There is no change in the assessment of the situation in the Mediterranean.

IX. Based upon a teleprint from the Plenipotentiary South-East of Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping concerning the supply situation in the Aegean Sea, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch informed Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff on the currency situation in Greece. Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch pointed to the absolute necessity of a quick and thorough reorganization of the currency system in Greece and asked Armed Forces High Command to explain most emphatically to German Foreign Office, the Office of the Four Year Plan and the Reich Ministry of Economics most emphatically that from the military point of view it is absolutely necessary to supply immediately banknotes and coins in the course of the negotiations between the Reichsbank and the Reich Ministry of Economics and to clear as soon as possible the Greek currency question. Copy of the letter as per l. Skl. 24397/44 geh. find in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

X. A summary of the enemy reports intercepted by radio monitoring and radio decyphering in the period from 12 to 18 Jun., find in Special Intercept Report No. 25/44. The report does not bring any new results of importance which have not been reported already.

Situation on 23 Jun.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Invasion:

23 Jun. 1944

Group West reported as per 18 Jun. on the losses so far sustained in the harbors at the landing bridgehead Seine Bay. The letter as per l. Skl. 19120/44 gKdos. find in Special File Invasion 23 Jun.

From 2015 to 2030 on 22 Jun. naval and anti-aircraft batteries as well as the harbor Alderney were unsuccessfully attacked with bombs and gunfire from 30 enemy planes.

Three PT boats left Cherbourg for the west at 2335 on 22 Jun.

At 0145, Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Operations Division ordered Commanding General, Armed Forces, West and Naval Staff to investigate immediately together with Naval Group, West the possibility of transporting over the sea to the Cherbourg area another infantry regiment in addition to the planned transfer to the fortress of a parachute regiment. Naval Staff informed Naval Group, West and asked for the group's opinion after having conferred with Commanding General, Armed Forces, West.

After a careful study it was found out that there is only the possibility of using three PT boats. An operation of these boats was offered and prepared.

At 0217, Naval Shore Command, Channel Islands reported suspected minelaying by planes off Peterport.

At 0515, Naval Communications Officer, Cherbourg reported that three PT boats entered Cherbourg at 0240.

At 0526, Naval Shore Command, Normandy reported on the situation at 0400:

New attacks by bombers and planes flying at low level against batteries and military installations. One 2 centimeter and eight vehicles were lost or damaged. Enemy planes bombed the southern landfront for three hours. Twenty-one planes were shot down. Naval batteries and Army coastal batteries took again part in the fighting against land targets by harassing fire lasting several hours.

At 0720, Group West reported on the situation at 0600 (Tr.N. or 0500, the figure is not clear due to misprint). Later, during the whole of 22 Jun. locations were reported between 6 and 22 miles from Ile de Bas, presumably a destroyer patrol. Furthermore, isolated as well as many enemy targets were reported north and east of Barfleur, in the waters from 4 to 15 miles north of Antifer as well as between Guernsey and Cape de la Hague.

23 Jun. 1944

The 10th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla laid out the coastal mine A barrage "KK 3" south of Antifer. The motor minesweeper R "213" was damaged on this occasion by an exploding mine. She was supported and towed to Le Havre.

The convoy of minesweepers, patrol boats and supply vessels was attacked at 0210 by enemy PT boats on it's way from Malo to Jersey. Two PT boats were sunk for certain. The supply ship HYDRA did probably sink. Two minesweepers were heavily damaged. One of them sunk later.

Three PT boats left St. Malo at 2345 carrying supplies for Cherbourg. The boats entered Cherbourg at 0240 as reported. The 2nd PT boat Flotilla with seven boats left Le Havre at 2330 for mine and torpedo operations in the Seine Bay and returned at 0300 with six boats after the PT boat S "190" had been lost for reasons which are so far unknown.

8th PT boat Flotilla was constantly attacked by the enemy on her way from Ostend to Boulogne. A detailed report did not come in yet.

The artillery group at Alderney opened fire at 0310 against located targets in the grid square BF 3548.

At 1240, Commanding Admiral, Naval Group West reported on the situation and on the destruction measures taken at Cherbourg. For copy of the report as per l.Sk1.19181/44 gk. compare Special File "Invasion 23 Jun.".

According to the report the destruction of all installations was ordered with the exception of the unloading facilities for the supplies of PT boats and submarines.

The PT boats transferred 19 tons of anti-tank artillery ammunition and sabotage materials of the Army last night.

At noon, Group West and Commander PT boats were ordered by Naval Staff at noon to move to St. Malo in the night of 23 Jun. the PT boats from Cherbourg and the PT boats which are at present in war readiness at Le Havre. Free lance torpedo operations will be allowed on the way to St. Malo.

At 1330, Group West reported on the activities of the coastal batteries:

23 Jun. 1944

Between 0820 and 1013 and from 1730 to 1940 on 22 Jun. the Army Coastal Battery 7/1255 fired at enemy landing boats successfully at a distance of 13 kilometers.

This battery was fired upon by heavy naval artillery from 1940 till 2040. No casualties were sustained.

From 0905 till 0945 on 22 Jun. the Army Coastal Battery 6/1255 fired upon transporters and smaller vessels at a distance of 16.5 kilometers. Hits were observed. The targets sheered off and were covered by smoke screens.

At 1340, Group West transmitted the battle report of the patrol boat V "203" of the coastal patrol concerning the convoy operation from Malo to Jersey during which the HYDRA was sunk.

Copy as per l.Skl.19278/44 gk. find in Special File "Invasion 23 Jun.". According to the report serious hits were scored on all enemy boats two of which were sunk for certain and one of which was probably sunk. No life was lost with the HYDRA. It was impossible to salvage the HYDRA. The ship had to be scuttled because of her explosive cargo.

At 1439, General von Schlieben reported to Army Group B:

At four places assault groups of the enemy penetrated our landfront which is fortified only provisionarily and are advancing in concentric movement. Part of the artillery positions and of the combat command posts are engaged in close combat. The strong points of the landfront that have not been destroyed by artillery fire are still defending themselves. The blowing up of the roads is being carried on. Preparations have been made for the defense of the outskirts of the town by taking into account a weakening of the defenses towards the sea. The Navy is of the opinion that the harbor has been destroyed effectively. The regiments were ordered to carry on fighting in the rear of the enemy. The Jobourg Peninsula is in our hands and is being defended against enemy reconnaissance forces.

At 1456, Naval Shore Command, Normandy reported the plan to foul the harbor with mines tonight after the departure of the PT boats, gunboats, the last coastal auxiliary sailing

23 Jun. 1944

vessels and of the tugs which will carry along the remaining torpedoes. The sea rescue boats and two harbor patrol drifters will stay outside the harbor off the area fouled with mines for supplying Fort Chavagnac. They will no more be able to enter the harbor.

At 1523, Naval Shore Command, Normandy asked for six complete breechblocks and other artillery parts to be dropped by planes.

At 1525, Group West informed Naval Staff, Operations Division by copy of a teleprint to Commanding General, West. According to the report Group West ordered on 22 Jun. that Naval Command, Normandy should decide independently on the final closing of the harbor depending on the situation at the landfront. Four artillery carriers were placed under the operational command of Naval Command, Normandy for the purpose. Thereupon Naval Command, Normandy reported it's plans at 1458. Thus the entering of the harbor Cherbourg is no more possible from the evening of 23 Jun. onward. Supplies over the sea, the transfer of the infantry regiment and of the hospital ships has to be cancelled therefore. It seems necessary to entrust the right of decision of this important question to the naval shore command because the time lost in obtaining the decision might under certain circumstances bring about disastrous results and because a correct assessment of the situation can only be made at the spot so as to enable valuable ships which are required for the final fouling with mines of the harbor to leave the harbor after having completed their task. The group pointed to the radio intercept report of 1230 according to which the enemy is strongly interested in the conditions of the harbor entrance at Cherbourg asking for armed reconnaissance in order to prevent evacuation or destruction from the sea and prohibiting attacks against targets on land. Group West asked Commanding General, Armed Forces West to approve the decision of the naval shore commander which according to the opinion of Naval Group, West is now necessary especially as the transfer over the sea of the infantry regiment will require 48 hours at least plus the time required for the transfer at Malo. According to the situation report of von Schlieben it has to be expected that the besieged will have met their fate by that time. The teletype was transmitted to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy for Commander-in-Chief, Navy simultaneously.

23 Jun. 1944

At 1526, Group West reported that our PT boats in the Seine Bay were forced away by enemy destroyers of the enemy supply service. The PT boat S "190" was heavily damaged on this occasion and had to be blown up by her crew. The Army coastal batteries reported two hits on enemy transporters.

At 1550, Radio Monitoring Service reported that the battleship RODNEY appeared in the radio traffic at 0810.

At 1600, Group West regarded landing possibilities for the night of 23 Jun. as "possible" in the Dutch area and as "favorable" at the Channel coast and along the Atlantic coast.

At 1630, Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff transmitted the following to Commanding General, Armed Forces West and to Naval Staff with copy to High Command, Air, Operations Staff:

The Fuehrer ordered that 15th Parachute Infantry Battalion of 5th Parachute Infantry Division has to assemble immediately in the St. Malo area for the reinforcement of the fortress Cherbourg. Naval Staff will be in charge of the transfer to Cherbourg and will use all PT boats available in the area. Air transports will not be made as the conditions make it impossible at present. The order of 0145 is therefore cancelled herewith.

At 1640, Group West emphasized that because of the short nights the PT boats can proceed from Le Havre to Cherbourg in one night only if there are no combat operations. Otherwise a stop is necessary at Peterport which is fouled with mines or if need be at St. Helier. Air attacks during the day have to be reckoned with for certain at that place and in case of larger concentrations of PT boats air attacks have also to be expected at Malo where there is only a weak anti-aircraft defense.

Naval Staff brought the same objections to the attention of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy already in the morning by telephone.

This objection and the previous directive of Armed Forces High Command lost significance as Armed Forces High Command cancelled it's directive for the carrying out of the special operation. According to information by telephone the plans were changed because of the changing situation.

Naval Staff, Chief of Operations Division informed Commanding Admiral, Naval Group, West by telephone on these

23 Jun. 1944

developments. Group West has the freedom of using the PT boats and to close the harbor Cherbourg. The transport-submarines were ordered to return.

At 2040, the following directive was issued accordingly:

"Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff approved the plan of Commanding General, Armed Forces, West to leave the decision of closing and of destroying completely the harbor in accordance with the development of the situation to the commander of the fortress Cherbourg. The parachute infantry regiment will not be transferred to Cherbourg.

At 2240, Group West transmitted by radio to Naval Command, Normandy it's approval for the closing of the harbor and for the final destruction.

Torpedo operations of the PT boat group at Le Havre are planned against the landing bridgehead off the Orne mouth for the night of 23 Jun.

A Coastal Mine A-barrage will be laid out south of Antifer. The three PT boats that left Cherbourg were ordered to try to break through to Le Havre.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy informed Naval Staff by excerpts of the directive of Commanding General, Armed Forces West of 21 Jun. concerning the further conduct of warfare in Normandy. For copy as per 1. Skl. 1869/44 gkdos. compare special file "Invasion 23 Jun."

2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the West Area:

In the area of 19th Group 59 planes were observed in operation. Some planes reported locations which later were revoked and a suspicious wake in the area west southwest of Landsend.

Five British units were located in the northern rendezvous area. According to radio monitoring, an unknown vessel hit a mine in the Channel waters at 1859 and another vessel was reported burning at the beach at 2049. Presumably this was in the operation area but exact verification is not possible.

3. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast Area:

23 Jun. 1944

Fourteen patrol positions were occupied. One mine was cleared off La Pallice and one off Lorient. Two submarines were escorted on their way out and two submarines were escorted coming in. A convoy was unsuccessfully attacked with bombs by an enemy plane off Brest. One plane was shot down on this occasion. During a new attack against a submarine convoy off Brest casualties were sustained on one submarine.

Channel Waters:

On the occasion of the transfer of five boats of 2nd and 8th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla from Dunkirk to Boulogne during the night of 22 Jun., the formation was continuously attacked off the entrance of Boulogne at about 0423 with rockets and gunfire in altogether 25 simultaneous attacks. The motor minesweeper R "79" was hit by two rockets and sunk.

A conflagration in the engine room which could be extinguished was caused by gunfire from the air on the motor minesweeper R "83". One enemy plane was shot down while hits were scored on several others.

At 0300 our 18th Patrol Flotilla was unsuccessfully attacked by fighter bombers north of Calais.

Thirteen patrol positions were occupied. Six mines were cleared in the waters off St. Malo.

At noon the radar station west of Morlaix was attacked by planes.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

The patrol positions in the German Bight were not occupied because of the rough sea. The convoy service off the river estuaries was carried out according to schedule.

None of the Brunsbuettel sluices was ready for service until 23 Jun. Therefore the order to take the round about way was issued to the ships as had been provided. In the Dutch area the 9th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla was attacked with bombs by enemy planes southwest of IJmuiden at 0138. The motor minesweeper R "88" was slightly damaged. The patrol boat "416" hit an ELM-mine in AN 8769 and was towed to Flushing carrying casualties.

Two Liberators were shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns at Flushing at 2038. During the night of 23 Jun. three explosions were again heard off the Dutch coast.

23 Jun. 1944

Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

In the area of 18th Group, 30 planes were observed in operation.

At 0931 one British unit was located in AN 4520 and at 2155 a unit was located in a western direction at Kirkenes and Svanvik.

Uninterrupted air reconnaissance against the destroyers and carrier planes reported on 22 Jun. had no results.

According to the report from Stockholm of an agent who was so far regarded as being reliable, official political and military circles in Sweden believe that a large scale operation against northern Jutland or southern Norway is quite out of the question not only for the moment but also for the next future. Only small diversion operations would be possible. The agent is of the opinion that the Anglo-Americans lost interest in such operations to a considerable degree as the Allied shipping space was engaged by the operations in Normandy much more than had been planned. No larger ship concentrations can be made out in northern England and Scotland. The present state of alarm readiness in Sweden was caused only by the threatening developments in Finland.

According to the opinion of Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division it has to be considered that the enemy has sufficient shipping space for a second operation of equal size to start from the England area in spite of his engagement in the present operation.

Own Situation:

Naval Command, Norway is of the opinion that the reported carrier group is not cooperating with the convoy but that it is engaged in a combat operation against the coast.

In the night of 23 Jun. all convoys between Aalesound and Bodoe were stopped and entered refuge ports because of the enemy situation.

At 0957 a second attack was carried out against the convoy of naval landing craft near Vardoe. The attackers were warded off by our fighters who shot down three enemy planes.

Naval forces succeeded in bringing down another plane.

Thirty-three ships were escorted to the north and twenty-eight ships were escorted to the south.

23 Jun. 1944

The TIRPITZ reported restricted war readiness regarding personnel after completion of a training trip of two days. The ship is ready for war restrictedly as far as materiel is concerned since 4 Jun. Further repair work was carried out according to plans so far. The date of final completion will probably be postponed until the middle of Dec. because the labor was not supplied as had been requested. A six hours readiness was arranged.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

The isle of Narvi is occupied by the Russians since the evening of 22 Jun. Patrol Boats and PT boats as well as one torpedo boat of the S-class were observed in the landing area. At Tytters 29 boats were observed south of Lavansaari steering a southwest and later a northeast course. The enemy formation was sighted again at 2005 steering a west course eight miles southwest of Lavansaari and was fired upon by the Battery Tytters from 2045 till 2120. Two enemy vessels were sunk for certain on this occasion and a third vessel was probably sunk.

On lake Peipsi our own air reconnaissance made out six patrol boats and motor boats, one PT boat, five motor boats and nine smaller vessels.

Own Situation:

Forty three ships are waiting off Kiel because of the closure of the canal. Concerning the reorganization of the maritime traffic through the North Sea due to the closing of the Kiel Canal, Naval Staff issued the following directive to the naval commands and other offices concerned:

1. The round about way has to be taken up as soon as possible in accordance with the suggestions made by Naval Command East. Priority is to be given to the western traffic to the north. Report by which time the traffic can begin.
2. The ships which have to be directed the new route will be reported continuously to Naval Command, North and Naval Command, East by Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping.

23 Jun. 1944

3. The four minesweepers of the "Wallenstein"-operation that are presently at Naval Command, Norway will immediately be put under the command of Naval Command East (Commanding Admiral, Skagerrak) for operational purposes.

Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping will be informed that the taking up of traffic as soon as possible was ordered on the detour route and he will be asked to report currently the ships which have to be directed the detour route directly to Naval Command, North, Operations Staff and to Naval Command, East, Operations Staff with copy to Naval Staff, Operations Division.

Naval Command East reported that the escort can be given on the route "white 7" from 25 Jun. onward with the forces which have been provided.

Patrol positions were occupied at the western coast of Jutland because of the weather situation. No further KMA-mines were laid out.

Thirty boats were operating in the minesweeping service in the Baltic Sea entrances and thirty-five boats as well as four mine-sweeping planes in the Baltic Sea. Three mines were cleared.

The guard boat north of Kolberg reported one Swedish plane.

At 0010 the destroyer Z "39" was hit by a bomb of a low flying plane at Baltic Port. The boat has to be transferred to a dock-yard at home.

The destroyers Z "28" and Z "39" left Baltic Port for Libau at 1800. The torpedo boats T "8" and "10" are at the mooring places in the inner leads west of Kotka and the minesweepers M "15" and M "18" together with four artillery ferry barges are in immediate readiness in the inner leads east of Hamina.

During the night of 22 Jun four naval artillery lighters of the 4th Artillery Carrier Flotilla had a fight with five Russian guard boats and Russian coastal batteries. The guard boats left at high speed. The fire of the 10.5 centimeter heavy anti-aircraft coastal batteries was well aimed but casualties were not sustained. For the short battle report of 4th Artillery Carrier Flotilla compare teletype 0500.

On the occasion of the evacuation of Piisaari the minesweeper M "17" and four artillery ferry barges were operating under escort of six Finnish PT boats. During this operation the minesweeper M "17" had contact several times with enemy artillery carriers, PT boats and motor minesweepers.

23 Jun. 1944

The Finnish moved back their troops assisted by seven German naval landing craft without suffering any casualties. The patrol service in the Gulf of Finland was carried out without incidents.

No reports came in from lake Peipsi.

Naval Command, East transmitted the opinion on the situation of Commanding Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea. According to the report the Russians appear more in the western part of the outer Viborg Bight following the loss of Viborg and after the evacuation of the islands off Koivisto. Therefore the fighting has shifted more to the inner leads and the Russians are able to move undisturbed in the waters Shepel - Tiurinsaari - Lavansaari.

The minesweepers and the motor minesweepers the number of which has to be increased urgently are particularly suitable for the fighting in the inner leads whereas the speed and the mobility of the torpedo boats is strongly hampered. Operations for offensive tasks of the torpedo boats are therefore planned mostly in the open sea in cooperation with Finnish PT boats as long as the appearance of Russian PT boats (Fugas) of superior firing capacity makes it necessary to assist the minesweepers in the inner leads. The torpedo boats of the type 35/37 are also inferior to the Fugas from the artilleristic point of view as soon as they are unable to take profit from their speed. At present the torpedo boat T "30" is representing our strongest force. The more torpedo boats and minesweepers we will have, the easier it will be to distract the Russian PT boat formations and the smaller will be our own losses. An increase of both types of boats would be appreciated. The cooperation with the Finnish PT boats in the night of 22 Jun. was satisfactory from the tactical point of view. Presently there are in Finland one divebomber group and one fighter group. Because of the ground fog these were not sent into action by the Finns chiefly for the assistance of the minesweepers protecting the evacuation of Piisaari carried out successfully last night. For the first time a Russian torpedo boat of the slow S-class armed with two 10.5 centimeter guns has appeared.

According to the report of Naval Liaison Staff, Finland, the German General issued preparatory orders for the moving of offices because of the situation on the land.

Naval Staff therefore called the attention of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy - at the same time for the information of Commander-in-Chief, Navy - to the absolute necessity of defending the southern coast of Finland for the naval warfare and for the supply of the forces of General Dietl. So far only one German assault gun brigade and some air forces did arrive as a reinforcement and are announced to come.

23 Jun. 1944

The transfer of the assault gun brigade is under way. The ships for the transfer of 122nd Division has been assembled so that the transfer will probably begin on 23 Jun.

V. Merchant Shipping:

The situation created by the closing of the Kiel Canal resulted definitely in a bottleneck for the traffic of the ships carrying ore from the east and carrying coal from the west. As in the German area only the harbors of the North Sea are capable to transship the bigger part of the ore and coal (70%), it is impossible to increase the transshipment of the harbors in the Baltic Sea to more than 30% of the tonnage because of the traffic conditions on land and because of the facilities for transshipment in the harbors. Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping is concentrating all his efforts therefore to increase the carrying away of coal and ore from the Baltic area.

The supply transports of the Armed Forces to Norway will be switched over to the Baltic harbors in the future. No fear is necessary for the time being concerning the supplies of the Armed Forces in Norway.

The ships becoming available in the Baltic and in the North Sea by the closing of the Kiel Canal are being used at present to carry out urgent transport programs of the German economy as for example supplying Hamburg with fuel. The future harbors of transshipment for the supplies of the Armed Forces to the east and to the north will be Luebeck, Stettin and Danzig. These harbors will therefore have to be provided with adequate anti-aircraft guns and billeting ships and naval forces should only stay at these harbors if absolutely necessary.

VI. Submarine Warfare:

Northern Waters:

In the Northern Waters Group "Trutz" was ordered to occupy a new patrol line from AB 5471 to 8694. The boats which left the harbors newly were ordered to return. The submarine U "992" reported an unsuccessful air attack in AB 8198 at 1247. Two boats of the Group "Mitte" entered Bergen. Of the boats which had been ordered to return the submarine U "280" did not report upon the order of 18 Jun. The boat had reported an air attack in the operation area on 11 Jun.

23 Jun. 1944

West Area:

The submarines operating in the Channel for ammunition transports were ordered to return.

The submarines U "621" and U "764" returned from their operation area in the Seine Bay and entered Brest. They reported on their experiences in general.

Very strong enemy traffic was observed on the marked supply routes. Chances of success against targets ranging from battleships to landing vessels exist especially in BF 35 and 36. The defense is not particularly strong because of the unfavorable acoustic sounding and locating conditions. The approach is very difficult. It is of decisive importance therefore not to be observed by the enemy. The two boats sunk one destroyer and one LST of 3000 BRT and torpedoed another destroyer. Besides, several torpedoes failed to explode for unknown reasons.

The operations of both boats permit encouraging conclusions concerning the chances in battle for the new types of submarines XXI and XXIII. The schnorkel-equipment and the Lut-torpedo have proved most satisfactory. One of the two boats traveled 18 days under water using the schnorkel.

No reports came in from the Atlantic.

According to radio monitoring a US steamer reported a submarine attack in the Indian Ocean in LN 8670 and opened fire on a sighted periscope.

Nothing to report from the Mediterranean.

VII. Aerial Warfare.

West Area:

During the day the enemy invaded Belgium with 540 planes attacking defensive zones in the rear. The harbor Boulogne was attacked by 190 fighter bombers. Attacks of 250 enemy planes against the railway bridge over the Seine at Nogent were reported from western France. Further 300 planes attacked freight trains with gunfire. Several hundreds of bombers under fighter escort attacked the aerodromes at Coulommieres. During the night of 23 Jun. 700 enemy planes attacked the defensive zones in the Belgian area whereas 200 planes attacked the railway station Saintes south-east of Rochefort.

23 Jun. 1944

During daylight, 288 of our fighters were assisting in the operations of the Army in the west area. They shot down 23 enemy planes and lost 16 of their own.

In the night, 77 German bombers were engaged in the mining of the waters in the Seine Bay and 8 were sent against naval targets. Two Me 410 carried out reconnaissance over London. Fifty of our night fighters brought down three enemy planes over western France and lost one of their own.

Reich Territory:

No reports came in on enemy planes entering the Reich territory during daylight. Bremen was attacked in the night by 30 Mosquitoes. Independently flying planes were reported from the areas of Hannover, Stendal, Magdeburg, Luebeck, Ludwigshaven, and Aalborg.

Mediterranean Theater:

In the morning of 22 Jun. about 500 four-engined enemy planes under strong fighter escort advanced from southern Italy over the Adriatic Sea to the north and attacked aerodromes and traffic installations in Bologna, Forli, Parma, Ferrara as well as the arsenal in Pola, the harbor of Rimini and the Fiat works at Turin. Our own defense forces brought down three enemy planes which were shot down by 74 German fighters without losses to themselves. Eleven enemy planes were shot down by anti-aircraft guns.

Four hundred enemy planes were attacking targets in the rear of the German front. No reports of importance came in on enemy air activities during the night. The German planes carried out reconnaissance flights during daylight on 22 Jun.

Supplementing West Area:

2nd Air Force reported about the night of 22 Jun. that two destroyers, one transporter, and one freighter were sunk on the occasion of the air attack against naval targets in the Seine Bay and that one cruiser, one destroyer, three transporters and one freighter were heavily damaged (altogether 46,000 BRT merchant shipping tonnage).

East Area:

On 22 Jun., 225 German and 1,984 enemy planes were reported operating at the eastern front. Two German planes were lost whereas nine enemy planes were brought down. In the night of 22 Jun. 235 German bombers attacked two enemy aerodromes. Good hits could be

23 Jun. 1944

made out by photographs on the aerodrome Mirgorod. The attack against the other aerodrome could not be carried out because the place could not sufficiently be illuminated.

According to an agent's report of Reich Security Central Office the increased activity of the German Air Force and particularly the increased night operations against naval targets in the landing bridgehead were strongly felt by the Allied. The shipping losses of the Allied had thereby increased quite unexpectedly. Material losses and casualties were admitted to be high. It was therefore of decisive importance to conquer Cherbourg most quickly.

VIII. War in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea.

1. Area of Naval Group West:

Enemy Situation:

According to a report of Naval Attache, Lisbon, 1 battleship, 1 aircraft carrier, 17 destroyers, 14 torpedo boats, 50 medium and 280 small vessels were at Casablanca on 16 Jun. At the same day 10,000 Italians, 3,000 French and 18,000 colored were transhipped to Italy.

Between 13 and 16 Jun. transporters carrying American and Canadian troops as well as 123 ammunition ships also destined for Italy have left Gibraltar.

At 1345 on 23 Jun. a convoy of 16 freighters, 3 tankers and one destroyer entered the Mediterranean.

Own Situation:

At 1200 an enemy submarine fired three torpedoes against two harbor patrol boats near Cape Bonet. The torpedoes exploded on land.

Ships totaling 2,000 BRT were escorted along the southern French coast.

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Situation:

In the night of 22 Jun. two ships were reported east of Pianosa and six or eight ships between Cape Linaro and Ostia, presumably carrying supplies for Civitavecchia. Our own reconnaissance

23 Jun. 1944

plane carrying out routine reconnaissance in the morning were unable to advance along the western coast of Italy because of the enemy fighters.

According to photographic reconnaissance on 21 Jun., small war vessels, 10 LCT, 5 LCG, 5 PT boats and one small freighter were in the harbors of Elba. In the afternoon of 23 Jun. the enemy brought artillery into position on the isle of Elba and was fired upon by the Naval Artillery Detachment, Battery Piombino-West.

The enemy air reconnaissance reported every movement and all changes in the harbors including the sinking of blockships at Leghorn and Spezia as well as the width of the passages left.

Own Situation:

Escort and patrol services were carried out according to plans. South southeast of Genoa two German submarine chasers had a fight with enemy PT boats. Our boats were able to avoid five torpedoes on this occasion. Hits were scored on two enemy boats, one of which was probably sunk. A northbound convoy succeeded in warding off an attack of enemy PT boats off Sestrelivante. The sinking of the block-cruiser BOLZANO in the roads of Spezia was done by a two-man submarine the crew of which could escape on land.

A further 63 men arrived from Elba at Piombino in a fishing boat.

On 22 Jun. the landfront in Italy was along a line from a point 20 kilometers northwest of Grosseto to Paganico and to Lake Trasimeno then running immediately north of Perugia, crossing Camarino and a point 5 kilometers south of Magerata to the Chienti River.

3. Area of Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Our own air reconnaissance over Lissa did not bring any particular results. Two of our PT boats were made out by enemy planes in their waiting positions near Cape Promontore in the night of 22 Jun.

b. Aegean Sea:

At 0330 the patrol boat GN "61" was sunk by artillery fire of an enemy submarine in the Skiathos passage. It is assumed that the boat GN "62" was also sunk. On both sides of the Oreos Bay and

23 Jun. 1944

along the northern shore of Evvoia our ships were kept under fire by the reinforced bandits. The Air Force was asked to attack the bandits.

c. Black Sea:

Nothing to report.

d. Situation on the Danube:

Mineclearance work in the outer estuary of the Danube had no results. No laying of mines by aircraft was reported from other parts of the Danube. On 23 Jun. 169 vessels were on their way on the central Danube and 96 vessels were traveling on the lower Danube.

The clearing of three mines was reported by vessels and minesweeping planes reported one mine cleared.

IX. Situation in East Asia:

Concerning the situation in the Pacific the German Military Attache, Tokio reported as follows:

1. As the Admiral Staff announced, the Americans landed two divisions on Saipan south of Tanapag near the sugar refinery. Heavy fighting is going on with two Japanese Divisions. The American forces are constantly assisted by heavy naval artillery and carrier aircraft. No further landings were so far made on the Marianas but the aerodromes on Tinian, Rota and Guam are kept under constant air attacks.
2. According to Japanese reconnaissance nearly the whole Pacific Fleet of the US is operating against Saipan. The number of aircraft carriers is supposed to be ten regular aircraft carriers, ten carriers reconstructed from cruisers and at least thirty auxiliary aircraft carriers. The fleet is subdivided into four groups, one each about 200 miles west and east of the island, one near the Bonin Group and one participating in the fighting on land and as a protection for further landings. A supply fleet with more than 30 tankers is supposed to be half way to the Marshall Islands.

23 Jun, 1944

3. Considering the extraordinary strategic importance of Saipan which has to be regarded as the last major outer position the loss of which was described as unbearable, all possible countermeasures were taken by the Japanese side according to statements of officers of the Admiral Staff. Repeatedly it was definitely declared that operations of the entire Japanese fleet were ordered and that decisive developments had to be expected within the next days.
 4. It was so far impossible to obtain details concerning the sinking of ships reported in the report of High Command, Army.
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24 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance.

Nothing to report.

Commander-in-Chief, Navy returned from the Fuehrer Headquarters in the evening of 23 Jun.

No memorandum of the conference was made. Details are to be found in Special File "Items of the Conference on 22/23 Jun. 1944".

Conference on the Situation with Commander-in-Chief, Navy at 1115.

- I. During the discussion of the situation in the air, Naval Staff, Operations Division, Naval Air and Air Force Liaison Section reported on the opinion of German Air Force, Operations Staff, Intelligence Section concerning the use of the special weapons:

The defensive measures against the expected use of German special weapons prepared by the enemy in the field of wireless technics have failed according to a British press report. Considerable defense forces are engaged in warding off the special weapons. They include daylight and night fighter formations of the Commanding General of the British Air Defenses reinforced by fighter forces of the British close combat corps and of the 9th US Air Force. After the first surprise has settled down the enemy developed defense methods concentrating on the organization of command of the British daylight and night fighters. In order to make surprise impossible, fighter patrols are continuously carried out over the Channel up to the London area.

The anti-aircraft artillery was reinforced by formations from the north. Balloon barrages and possibly other kinds of barrages are being used. Allied fighter bombers, medium and heavy bomber formations including also four engined planes are being sent against the starting points of the special weapons, against their supply installations and against the approach roads. It can be noticed that the fighter and fighter bomber formations so far operating in the landing bridgehead are contained to a certain degree by the German special weapons.

We can take as a further proof of the effectiveness of the special weapons and of the caution of the enemy the transfer

24 Jun. 1944

of shipping space from the Thames area to the north which can be assumed from the results of radio monitoring and which is probably not caused by landing plans against the German Bight and Jutland. In the mean time Air Force, Operations Staff reckons until further landing operations with new daylight and night attacks against the German fuel production as well as with terror attacks against German towns, especially against the capital of the Reich as an answer to the new German weapons.

Air reconnaissance carried out in the eastern Mediterranean on 18 and 22 Jun. did not reveal any indications of an assembling of enemy air forces. A general assessment of the situation can nevertheless only be made after reconnoitering the aerodromes in the Beirut/Aleppo area. According to a report of Reich Security Central Office, American pilots in London are surprised about the strong German defense especially by fighters.

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- II. During the report on the situation in the invasion area, Commander in Chief, Navy ordered to release for the Air Force minelaying in the area of Cherbourg with the exception of the DM-mines because of the considerable danger to security in the shallow waters.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy will be informed of this directive still before the conference on the situation at the Fuehrer Headquarters. The following teletype was sent to Group West; High Command, Air, Operations Staff, with copy to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff and to Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters:

The harbor and the waters of Cherbourg are released for mine operations. No mines with D-equipment will be used as the mines can explode in the roads when the ships travel at reduced speed and as the danger to security is high because of the narrowness of the waters suitable for minelaying because of the depth."

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- III. Report of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief of Operations Branch:

On the occasion of an air attack against German destroyers in Baltic Port, the anti-aircraft weapons of the destroyers did

24 Jun. 1944

not come into action although there was an interval of 32 minutes between the first and second attack. Naval Command, Baltic noticed the lack of reliability of the air report service and ordered an investigation of the respective orders concerning the readiness of the anti-aircraft artillery.

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- IV. Naval Staff, Quartermaster General reported on the plan to establish a plenipotentiary of the Armed Forces in France for motor vehicles. The Army asked for 1000 tons of motorized transport space from the Navy including the already delivered 600 tons.

Commander in Chief, Navy declared that the conduct of naval warfare should not be affected under any circumstances. As this is already the case, according to the report of Group West, Armed Forces High Command will be informed that Commander in Chief, Navy ordered not to deliver any more vehicles.

Furthermore, Quartermaster General submitted the answer to General-Admiral Marschall concerning the request made by the General-Admiral for the Danube area. The answer was approved by Commander in Chief, Navy.

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- V. Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Communications Division reported that Commanding General, Group West expressed his appreciation of the work of the naval communications service. Commander in Chief, Navy had also the impression that the communications service of the Navy did not fail in its efficiency under the prevailing difficult conditions.

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- VI. Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Intelligence Division reported on the declaration of the British Home Minister in the House of Commons about the new German weapons. The Home Minister explained that the bomb is exploding with force of a 1000 kilogram bomb with a corresponding explosion pressure. Only minor damages of national importance had occurred and public installations were so far but slightly affected. A considerable number of bombs fell on uninhabited fields. The minister criticized the German publications and declared that the number of

24 Jun. 1944

killed during the first five nights of the attack was smaller than the number of persons killed in the course of five nights of normal attacks between 18 and 25 Feb. British fighters and anti-aircraft guns had successfully been fighting the flying bombs. The morale of the British people was imperturbable. Finally the minister asked the people to remain calm.

VII. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Chief of Organization and Mobilization Branch reported on the suggestion of Group South concerning the reorganization in the Black Sea area and on the opinion of Naval Staff which was formed still without taking into consideration the relations between Bulgaria and Russia as was ordered meanwhile.

Commander in Chief reported the matter to the Fuehrer according to the suggestion of Group South. The Fuehrer again emphasized the importance of further reductions of the German offices and plans to discuss the matter once more with the foreign minister. Subsequently a directive will be issued on further treatment of the affair. Naval Staff, Chief of Operations Division had objections against the plans of Group South which regards a reduction of the naval Forces in the Bulgarian area as possible to a far greater extent than Naval Staff, Operations Division.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch suggested the following directive to Group South:

- "1. The problem of the organization in Bulgaria depends on the political decision. This decision which is the base of the military measures is still to be made. It will depend on this decision whether Bulgaria will continue to be available as a base for the German naval warfare. Therefore the order on the organization in Bulgaria has not been drafted as yet. No measures should be taken which might anticipate the final decision in any way.
2. The organization for Roumania was approved in principle as suggested. Details will follow by letter. Instead of German port captains as was the custom up to now, there will be liaison officers at the respective Roumanian offices. The net barrage flotilla will be under the command of German Naval Shore Commander, Roumania.

24 Jun, 1944

3. The date of the carrying out of the reorganization of the naval forces will in accordance with the suggestion remain at the decision of the offices at the spot. The dissolving of 10th Coast Patrol Force was approved in principle as suggested by Group South. The formation of a coastal patrol flotilla in Bulgaria was not approved for the time being. It was left on the decision of Group South to combine the patrol vessels in one or two coastal patrol flotillas under the German Naval Shore Commander, Roumania. The flotillas would be called: 1st or 2nd Coast Patrol Flotilla, Black Sea.
4. The allotment of naval forces suggested by Group South is still being thoroughly studied by Naval Staff as it is doubtful whether the suggested strength will be sufficient. Further details on this subject will be given later.
5. Group South has to report on it's plans concerning 3."

Commander in Chief, Navy concurred.

VIII. Situation of the Army:

Situation West Area:

The center of the fighting shifted again to the area Tilly - Caen. The attack of the Americans against Cherbourg resulted in a break through in four places. General von Schlieben reported at 0650 that he has no more mobile reserves and that the troops were ordered to fight at the spot until the last round was fired. Thus the loss of Cherbourg is unavoidable. The only thing which remains to be seen is whether it will be possible to delay it for a few days in order to contain the attacking forces as long as possible.

In Italy the enemy started for a large scale attack in the Grosseto area and succeeded in penetrating our lines to a depth of three or four kilometers. New enemy forces are concentrated west of Lake Trasimeno and in the Perugia area.

The assembling of American divisions in the Nettuno - Anzio area indicates operations against the Ligurian Coast. The

24 Jun. 1944

enemy carries out all his movements without being hindered by any actions of our own air forces. On the other hand, sabotage activities in the rear of our lines are on the increase. At the Finnish war theater the enemy succeeded to enter the Finnish lines at two minor places on the Viborg front. But the Finns were able to defend their positions. West of Lake Ladoga the Finns withdrew the front according to plans. The Fuehrer asked what kind of vessels the Finns have on Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega.

In the southern part of our east front the situation remained calm as before. In the area of Central Army Group strong enemy attacks resulted in considerable penetrations of our lines. Vitebsk is in danger of becoming encircled. The Fuehrer ordered to defend the place. So far the enemy successes are chiefly due to artillery, ground attack planes and infantry. Tank formations did not so far participate in the battle to a large extent. Perhaps they are concentrated in the south for an offensive against the Army Groups North and South Ukraina.

IX. Admiral, Small Battle Units reported that eleven "Linse" are ready in the Le Havre area today at 2300 provided the weather situation makes it possible. One "Biber" will be dispatched against the bridge in the Orne Canal.

By the end of next week, further twenty "Linse" from Lake Mueritz will go to the Seine Bay. The first two groups of the "Neger"-flotilla are still on their way. It is planned to have them operate in the area Honfleur - Trouville. The third group will follow. The distribution of the next flotilla within about a fortnight will depend on the success of the first flotilla.

Three boats with a crew of two men each are ready at La Spezia. A further boat was damaged by air attack.

X. Report of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief of Operations Branch:

- a. The LUETZOW is ready for leaving the harbor at Gdynia from 0700 onward. Naval Command, East was ordered to withdraw the PRINZ EUGEN after the arrival of the LUETZOW.

24 Jun. 1944

- b. Commander in Chief, Navy was informed on the directive of Armed Forces High Command concerning the operation "Tanne West" and "Tanne Ost". Naval Command, East was asked to submit suggestions concerning a quick transfer aboard cruisers and destroyers.

Commander in Chief, Navy put forward the question whether the LUTZOW should also be used for this operation. Commander in Chief discussed the value of southern Finland with the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer is not without certain doubts as to whether the military leaders of Finland are still possessing the necessary moral strength for the final resistance.

XI. Naval Staff, Chief of Operations Division gave information on the report of Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, Baltic Sea concerning the gratitude expressed by General Valve for the valuable help of the formations of the German Navy which disregarding losses successfully warded off enemy landing attempts and which participated effectively in the evacuation of troops and materials as well as in the defense of the operation in the Bjorko area. Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, Baltic Sea in his answer expressed the belief that also in the future the German authorities will do everything in order to assist the Finnish Navy in it's heroic struggle as we are both fighting the same enemy.

XII. Naval Staff, Quartermaster General reported that the transfer of the assault gun brigade has been carried out and that the transport of 122nd Infantry Division to Finland has begun. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Chief of Shipping and Transport Branch is present at the spot.

The preparations ordered by Armed Forces High Command concerning the supply of shipping space for the operation "Birke" have been started. A naval liaison officer will be sent to 20th Mountain Army Corps Command. According to another order of Armed Forces High Command the 393rd Assault Gun Brigade will be transferred on 1 Jul. from Denmark to Finland using sea transport from Danzig.

XIII. Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief of Operations Branch reported on a request of the Combat Group concerning an operation of 4th Destroyer Flotilla up to the Bear Island.

Referring to this subject the Fleet reported that the carrying out during not too calm weather conditions would be appreciated in order to

24 Jun. 1944

accustom the crews to the sea and that it does therefore not seem advisable to fix a certain date.

Naval Command, Norway is of the opinion that responsibility for the operation in the suggested form can only be accepted in case of sufficient air reconnaissance which was refused by 5th Air Force because of the fuel situation. Nevertheless the naval command declared training in the open sea as absolutely necessary and ordered the carrying out within the waters between 50 and 80 miles off the coast without air reconnaissance so that there is no danger of being cut off and in order to enable the ships to enter the inner leads at any time. The naval command asked to release 700 cubic meters of fuel oil from the operational stock.

Naval Staff approved the plans of Naval Command, Norway. The operational command of the task must lay with Naval Command, Norway. The adjusting of the command stations and of the communication service is particularly important in addition to the training of the flotilla.

Commander in Chief, Navy concurred.

Naval Command, Norway, Combat Group with copy to the Fleet and to Commander Destroyers will receive orders accordingly.

Special Items.

- I. The Fuehrer reminded Commander in Chief, Navy of the possibility of the Russians crossing the Dniester estuary in the course of the offensive just beginning.

Group South was ordered with copy to Commanding Admiral, Black Sea to investigate and to report on possible counter-measures the Navy can take by employing naval forces and by coastal defense.

II. Concerning the situation in the Gulf of Finland:

1. Naval Command, East approved the assessment of the situation made by Commanding Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea (compare War Diary 23 Jun.). Commanding Admiral, Eastern Baltic

24 Jun, 1944

sea pointed to the importance of occupying if only temporarily Hangoe for the operation "Tanne" and "Birke".

According to information from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy it is planned in case of unfavorable developments in Finland to occupy Hangoe with defense forces. As the Army is unable allegedly to man the coastal batteries of that area, Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy suggested a precautionary investigation on whether the Navy is able to provide the crews for the coastal batteries in the Hangoe section.

The answer will be given by Quartermaster General.

2. Concerning the operation "Tanne", Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff transmitted to Naval Staff and to Naval Command, East the strength of Parachute Infantry Battalion of the "Brandenburg" Division and of SS Parachute Infantry Battalion 500 as requested and asked that Naval Command, East should order in accordance with the capacity of the transport vessels how many vehicles of both battalions are to be transshipped.

Naval Command, East submitted a plan for the quick transport of the troops. Naval Staff thereupon reported to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff as follows:

a. Transport is possible:

1. by transporters as well as by the NORDENHAM and the TANGA and from 30 Jun. onward by the WARTHELAND. The time required for loading the ships will be about nine hours. The cruise up to the landing will require from 35 to 40 hours. To this the time has to be added which will be lost by delay between the issuing of the order and the beginning of work in loading the ships.
2. on board of the cruisers NUERNBERG, EMDEN and on four destroyers who have to be transferred from Sagerrak to Gdynia. The time required for loading will be six hours in case the troops are near the mooring place and twenty hours for the approach march. The cruisers and destroyers are unable to take vehicles on board.

- b. Unloading at the point of destination will be done by the boats of the ships and by motor minesweepers of 13th

24 Jun. 1944

- or 21st Landing Flotillas which have to leave their harbors in order to arrive at the landing place at the right time. Armed Forces High Command will be asked to find out whether it is possible to move the vessels towards the prospected landing place as far as Hanko.
- c. The most serious objections were made against the plan to replace 416th Infantry Division by 122nd Infantry Division as the former has been prepared extensively for the task as far as training and equipment are concerned. The division carried out maneuvers together with landing flotillas. It is no more possible to instruct 122nd Infantry Division adequately as is absolutely necessary.
- d. Naval Staff is of the opinion that in view of the difficulty of the task especially as far as the landing is concerned and in view of the preparations in every detail as well as considering the training which was carried out in cooperation with 416th Infantry Division, it would be the best to maintain the previous operational plan for the operation "Tanne". If the development of the situation enforces the carrying out within a short time, the maintaining of the previous plan by transferring in advance the two battalions assembled at Danzig and Gdynia as a first wave should be taken into consideration.

It is of greater advantage to carry out the transport by transporters escorted by the NUERNBERG, the EMDEN and destroyers than to transfer the troops on warships only as by taking into account a delay of only 15 hours it will be possible to take along the equipment and as boats and loading gear are available for the unloading and because the warships would then be more mobile and would be able to defeat a possible enemy resistance. Naval Staff therefore asked for approval to transfer the troops in advance by transporters. It is necessary to arrange for a code word for this operation.

It is possible to reinforce the first wave by concentrating the crews of the batteries from Norway in the Danzig or Libau areas.

Copy as per order 1/Skl 1884/44 Gkdos. Chefs. find in War Diary Part C, Vol. III.

24 Jun. 1944

3. "Birke" operation:

Naval Command, East plans to escort and protect the convoys in the Gulf of Bothnia by 3rd Torpedo boat Flotilla (three boats) which at present is kept in readiness for an advance movement and which is to be reinforced by the boat F"10" and the patrol boats of 9th Coast Patrol Force and of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic as far as these boats are not required for other current tasks. In case torpedo boats are to participate it is necessary to dispatch the destroyers from the Sagerrak as these are absolutely indispensable for the operation "Tanne West" and for the protection of the PRINZ EUGEN and of the LUETZOW during the operation "Tanne Ost".

III. Naval Staff, Quartermaster General asked Naval Construction Commission to install torpedo firing gear on the after deck of the PT boats in accordance with the request of Commander PT boats in order to ward off pursuing destroyers successfully. For military reasons installation is possible only on the boats that are going to be equipped with the new motor MB 518 and which are armed with the ordinary artillery equipment. At present Bureau of Naval Armament, Torpedo Branch is carrying out ballistic trials. Naval Staff asked to investigate and to prepare already now the method of installing the torpedo firing gear.

IV. According to the request of Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch of 19 Jun., Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff issued the following directive:

- "1. The development of the situation in Italy led to an increase in desertions of members of the Italian Armed Forces in some cases of even complete units which join either the enemy or the bandits.
2. Commanding General, Southwest reported his plan gradually to withdraw from front service the troops of the new Italian Armed Forces in which desertions occur or which seem to be unreliable, to disarm them by and by, and to use them as construction battalions or as auxiliary workers with the troops. A sudden disarmament by force does not seem advisable for political reasons.

24 Jun. 1944

3. Armed Forces High Command approved this plan and authorized also the commanding generals of the other war theaters to act likewise. As far as formations of the Navy and of the Air Force are concerned, uniform action of the commanding generals and commanding admirals at the different war theaters has to be arranged for."

Situation on 24 Jun.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Invasion:

- At 0020 Group West informed Naval Command, Normandy on the decision of Armed Forces High Command that no more supplies would be sent by sea. Naval Shore Commander was authorized to close the harbor.
- At 0054 Naval Liaison Officer, Cherbourg reported the departure of four gunboats and three coastal auxiliary sailing vessels at 0000. Furthermore, at the same time two tugs left Cherbourg.
- At 0325 the Port Captain, Alderney reported suspected mine-laying of planes off the harbor barrage.
- At 0405 Naval Shore Commander, Channel Islands reported fighting with enemy PT boats in BF 3813 at 0210 and in BF 3551 at 0300.
- At 0445 Naval Command, Normandy reported the position of the enemy front line and the heaviest gunfire on our own positions. The enemy infantry is keeping back. Our own artillery including the emergency anti-aircraft guns is firing against the approach roads and against the assembling area. The town is kept under harassing fire. Many located targets were fired upon by German guns on the northern coast. The PT boats succeeded to break through to the west. The artillery carriers together with three coastal auxiliary sailing vessels and two tugs had a fight with enemy PT boats off shore near the Battery York. The artillery ferry barge AF"66" sunk. Other

24 Jun. 1944

targets which were approaching were turned off by our coastal batteries. The harbor railway station was blown up. The mining of the harbor was completed.

Group West transmitted:

At 0715 the situation report of 0600:

- a. Three PT boats went from Cherbourg to Malo. It was impossible to break through to the east as had been planned because the boats were carrying a heavy cargo.
- b. Six boats of 2nd and 4th PT boat Flotilla are operating in the Seine Bay.

Details will follow later.

- c. 6th Artillery Carrier Flotilla with three coastal auxiliary sailing vessels is on the way from Cherbourg to Alderney. The flotilla had a fight with enemy PT boats in BF 3552. One artillery ferry barge sunk after being hit by a torpedo. Twelve men were rescued. Reports on the arrival of the coastal auxiliary sailing vessels did not come in yet.
- d. 46th Minesweeper Flotilla had a fight with PT boats off St. Malo at 2350 and at 0230. The formation is going to Helier carrying wounded.

Naval Shore Commander, Seine/Somme reported at 0100 about 20 transporters, escorted by 4 battleships, 5 cruisers and destroyers north of the Orne mouth.

Low flying planes dropped bombs on the Dives bridge near Cabourg.

A number of locations were made in the ordinary positions as usual.

At 1232 Naval Liaison Officer Cherbourg transmitted the report of the fortress commander to Army Group B. Among other things the report says as follows:

"No enemy fire from the sea. The harbor area is completely destroyed."

At 1340 Group West regarded landing possibilities for the night of 24 Jun. as slightly more difficult in the Dutch area, as possible and even favorable along the Channel coast and as favorable at the Atlantic coast.

24 Jun. 1944.

At 1600 Group West transmitted the situation report:

1. Additions to the situation report of 0600:

- a. 1st Group of 2nd PT boat Flotilla missed two destroyers with six torpedoes at 0016 because the destroyers sheered off. The upper right quarter of grid square BF 3682 was widely fouled with twelve DM 1 - mines. On their way back the boats had a short fight at 0015 with three MGBs at a distance of 100 meters. Good hits could be observed. The 2nd Group was chased by two destroyers at 0056 when steering a northeast course. The PT boat S"175" was hit by direct hit in the chart house. The fuel tank in the bow has a leak.
- b. 6th Artillery Carrier Flotilla with two coastal auxiliary sailing vessels entered Alderney at 0705. Investigations are being made on the whereabouts of the third coastal auxiliary sailing vessel.

2. Naval Shore Command, Seine/Somme reported:

- a. At 0735 a heavy explosion on a destroyer in 289⁰ at a distance of 20 kilometers. The destroyer listed and is sinking.
- b. At the same time a heavy explosion occurred on a transporter in 287⁰ at a distance of 22 kilometers. The stern of the transporter is burning.

Remarks concerning a. and b.: presumably the ships hit mines.

3. Plans for the night of 24 Jun.:

a. PT boats:

1. The Le Havre Group will carry out mine and torpedo operations in the Seine Bay.
2. The Malo Group will move to Helier and in the following night to Le Havre.

b. Commanding Admiral, Defenses West:

A KMA-mine barrage will be laid out off Dieppe and Le Havre if possible.

24 Jun. 1944

At 1613 Naval Shore Command, Normandy reported on the destructions:

1. The foundations of the Quay Homet blown up over about 100 meters,
2. Harbor railway station blown up, the ruins are ruptured and of no use. The tower fell over the quay wall into the overseas basin and closed the quay wall which was destroyed by a tremendous explosion.
3. The fouling of the harbor as well as the outer barrage west were completed. The entrance to the arsenal was blocked by blowing up a French submarine salvage ship.
4. Further parts of Quay Homet will be blown up today.

At 1627 Naval Shore Command, Normandy reported the following on the situation:

1. Our own coastal batteries and emergency anti-aircraft guns maintain their harassing fire against targets on land effectively and giving remarkable relief to our infantry. In the morning hours the enemy dropped a bomb carpet between Fort Duroule and the harbor railway station as well as on the battery "Brommy". Fort Duroule and the hill south of it are kept under concentric artillery fire of independent naval formations steering a west course off the northern coast. The batteries "Hamburg" and "Brommy" fired on cruisers and destroyers which were sighted or located. Hits were observed. The enemy answered the fire and sheered off after setting up smoke screens.
2. On the occasion of the sinking of the artillery ferry barge AF"66" and of the HOLSATIA (the third coastal auxiliary sailing vessel which was missing) about 60 wounded, 15 officers and workers were drowned.

Commander in Chief, Navy sent the following radiogram to Naval Shore Commander, Normandy:

"My thoughts are with you in the hard and heavy struggle which the soldiers of the Navy are fighting under your command for the Fortress Cherbourg. Every day which is gained in preventing the enemy from taking this large harbor will be of decisive importance. I know that I can rely upon you and that you will fight for every yard of territory gallantly and stubbornly and that you will defend yourself heroically."

24 Jun. 1944

At 1642 Naval Shore Commander, Normandy, Commanding Admiral Hennecke answered:

"We will do our duty. The harbor and the quay installations are destroyed and rendered valueless for any use to a degree which was so far regarded as impossible. Long live the Fuehrer and our country!"

At 1836 Naval Shore Commander, Normandy transmitted the following report on experiences made:

1. All the batteries of the northern front are practically undestroyed and ready for action. As the batteries are under gun shelters they cannot be used against the land-front. They now all point to the wrong direction.
2. The gun shelters without armored belt are uncompleted. Several impacts in the gun shelters. Solution: Only concrete and armored cupolas.
3. It is an absolute necessity for a successful defense to equip the batteries extensively with trench mortars and close combat anti-tank weapons.
4. The emergency anti-aircraft batteries which successfully participated in the ground fighting were equipped with impact fuzes.
5. Forward observation posts equipped with telephone and wireless connections have to be prepared.
6. Foxholes for anti-tank protection with covers proved useful also during the infantry battles.
7. Only a few telephone connections were interrupted.
8. The enemy soldiers are cowards. By naval guns, airplanes, artillery and trench mortars the enemy tries to crush everything before he is advancing hesitatingly. Our wounded who did not see the enemy ask constantly; "Where is our artillery and where are our airplanes?".
9. The morale of our soldiers is satisfactory at the guns and in the pillboxes. But outside they are unreliable and easy to embarrass because of the previous orders to take shelter in the pillboxes in case of air alarm. The commanders of the units will have to take energetic measures.
10. It is necessary to provide phosphorus smoke shells.

24 Jun. 1944

At 1938 Naval Shore Command, Normandy reported: The Situation is most serious. The infantry does not put up resistance any more. The enemy advanced close to the town. The Battery "Blankenese" fought most gallantly. The Battery "Brommy" is fighting against tanks.

At 1854 Naval Liaison Officer, Cherbourg reported: the radio transmitter station was blown up at 1740. The pillbox will be defended. The transmitter station remains occupied for receiving on the coastal short wave or on the special wave.

At 1959 Commanding Admiral, Naval Group West transmitted by wireless to Naval Shore Commander, Normandy as follows:

"Your and your men's deeds during these hard times are worth of our imitation. I thank you, all of you and I know that you will stand firm and resolute up to the last in your fight for the Fuehrer and the Reich."

At 2000 the Battle Group Schlieben reported to Group West for Army Group B:

"The enemy is strongly attacking from the south and from southeast and, with parts of his forces, at the southwestern outskirts of Octeville. The morale of the troops is badly shaken by the enemy fire, by losses and casualties and by the adversities of battle. There are among the troops too many Russians and soldiers of the "Volksliste 3" (Tr.N.:list of persons of German descent compiled in occupied and annexed territories in Europe). The communication lines are decreasing constantly. It is no more possible therefore to maintain centralized leadership.

At 2020 Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff issued the following directive to Commanding General, West with copy to Naval Staff, Operations Division:

"The Fuehrer ordered:

In addition to the plans of attacks so far reported investigations have to be made immediately on the possibility of an advance with the forces becoming available within the very next days roughly over the line Coigny - Trouville - Canville in a general northeastern and northern direction into the gap of the 1st American Army which is attacking Cherbourg and to annihilate these forces. It would then become the target of further operations to relieve Cherbourg. A plan should be submitted immediately by teletype including details on forces and the time required for supplies.

24 Jun. 1944

At 2028 Army Group Schlieben reported the successes and enemy planes shot down since 6 Jun. during the battles in the Cherbourg area by the battle group in cooperation with the Air Force and Naval units under its command. The report includes 1 torpedo boat, 1 destroyer, 5 smaller landing boats sunk and 1 minesweeper, 1 big landing boat and many smaller landing boats damaged.

At 2040 Group West ordered Naval Shore Commander, Normandy to report whether the quay installations off the harbors Napoleon and Charles as well as the coal pier and the other parts of the small tide basin were also blown up. The firing posts for the controlled nine barrages have to remain occupied until they are captured by the enemy.

At 2158 a new report came in from Army Group Schlieben on the situation at the landfront:

"Concentrated enemy fire and bomb attacks led to a splitting up of our frontline. Many batteries were annihilated or have their ammunition supplies exhausted. Our troops forced back into a small area will hardly outlive the coming attack on 25 Jun. Isolated groups and command posts are still fighting but they are only capable to delay and not to ward off the concentric enemy attack. Cherbourg cannot be regarded as a fortress as far as the land side is concerned because there are only provisional fortifications on the landfront. This fact is mentioned in order to render possible a just appreciation of the enemy and of our own troops.

At 2235 Naval Command, Normandy was ordered by Group West: "Aerial mine operations off the harbor entrance are cancelled."

At 2235 Group West transmitted the following survey of the situation to all offices of its area:

1. The PT boats were laying mines off the landing bridgehead during the night of 23 Jun. They had contact with enemy destroyers and MGBs. Our patrol forces had a fight with enemy PT boats off Cherbourg and south of Jersey. One of our artillery carriers was hit by a torpedo and sunk. Explosions were observed on a destroyer and on a transporter off the Orne mouth. The destroyer sunk. The transporter is burning. Presumably the ships hit our mines. The coastal batteries are fighting against naval forces and against transport space. Hits were scored on one destroyer and on one transporter.

24 Jun. 1944

2. At the Cherbourg front the enemy broke through our main defense line with several spearheads. The garrison of the fortress strongly reduced by the heavy fighting is struggling heroically up to the last against a far superior enemy - in some cases in pockets of resistance and in groups behind the enemy lines. It is no more possible to bring in reinforcements neither through the air nor over the sea. The harbor installations are blown up, blocked and fouled with mines.

3. The Air Force during the night of 22 Jun:

The following ships were sunk by torpedoes and bombs off the landing bridgehead: 2 destroyers, 3 ships with 29,000 BRT. Damaged: 3 cruisers, 2 destroyers, 2 ships with 17,000 BRT. Hits were scored on several landing ships. Reconnaissance flights over London revealed good results of the German long range weapons.

At 2305 the Port Captain, Cherbourg reported that it is still possible to enter the harbor through the western entrance up to a small mooring place left over west of Fort Chavagnac. There are still two boats of the sea rescue service and two harbor patrol boats.

At 2310 Group West transmitted the battle report of Commander, PT boats on the operation of the PT boats from Le Havre during the night of 23 Jun. The report corresponds in general with the report of Group West at 1600 and added that the carrying out of the task of the PT boats was rendered easier by the operations of the German Air Force in the southern Seine Bay.

At 2317 Naval Shore Command, Normandy reported as follows concerning the directive of Group West of 2040:

"The blowing up of the outer harbors Napoleon and Charles is impossible because the harbor is built in a natural rocky ground and because there is no time. All entrances and passages were blocked by sinking of ships and bridges blown up over the ships. Moreover the harbor was fouled with mines. The coal pier and the approaches from land were blown up.

During the night of 23 Jun. our radio monitoring service intercepted many reports on minelaying planes in the invasion area. At 1859 on 23 Jun. it was reported that an Allied vessel hit a mine and at 2017 it was reported that a further vessel was burning out.

24 Jun. 1944

Contrary to the previous days comparatively few reports on the movements of landing vessels were intercepted on 24 Jun. However, assembly orders for a number of transporters and landing boats for 25 Jun. were intercepted. The warships HAWKINS and Capetown were made out.

2. Enemy Situation in other parts of the West Area:

In the area of 19th Group 55 planes were observed in operation. Many submarine and periscope sighting reports were intercepted from the western part of the Channel. Six British units were located in the rendezvous area.

3. Own Situation in other parts of the West Area:

Atlantic Coast Area:

One submarine was escorted on her way in and one submarine on the way out. Fourteen patrol positions were occupied. Three mines were cleared off Brest. The roads were partly closed because of suspected mines. The naval ration supply depot at the railway station Saintes was damaged during the air attack in the night of 23 Jun.

Channel Waters:

Thirteen patrol positions were occupied.

In the night of 23 Jun., 18th Patrol Flotilla north of Calais and 36th Minesweeper Flotilla were unsuccessfully attacked by fighter bombers. The 18th Patrol Flotilla reported two enemy planes shot down. For the brief report of 18th Patrol Flotilla compare Teletype 0545 and for the brief report of 36th Minesweeper Flotilla see Teletype 0625.

Between 1425 and 1603 the Batteries "Lindemann", "Todt" and "Grosser Kurfuerst" fired upon an enemy convoy between

24 Jun. 1944

Dover and Folkestone. The targets were visible only for a short time in the gaps of a smoke screen. A large freighter was hit. Strong explosions and fire were seen.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

North Sea:

Patrol, escort and mineclearance service were carried out in the German Bight as scheduled. Five mines were cleared off the Elbe and off the Weser.

During the night Bremen was attacked by several Mosquitoes from 0115 till 0135. No particular military damages were done on this occasion. In the noon hours of 24 Jun. a heavy attack of strong enemy bomber formations was carried out against Bremen and its environs. Considerable damage was done by six or seven bomb carpets. Another attack was directed against Wesermuende where the motor minesweeper R"141" and the patrol boat VP"1250" was sunk. The patrol boat VP"1206" and the artillery ferry AF"85" were damaged. The hospital ship HUMBOLD sunk. The sluice was damaged. Further damages occurred in the Deschimag Works Seebeck.

Railway installations in the harbor of Bremen and the Fishery Harbor at Gestemuende were affected. Only fields were damaged at Cuxhaven. The Finnish steamer DAGMAR was heavily damaged at Bremen. Sixteen barges and one fire boat sunk.

Concerning the sluice installations at Brunsbuettel it is expected that the Old Northern Sluice can be reopened for traffic by manual operation on 25 Jun. Twenty ships passed the sluices already on 24 Jun. to the west and eighteen ships to the east.

The date of completion of the new sluices cannot be foreseen. A dud or a bomb with long time fuse is in the gate No. 6 of the southern sluice.

In the area of the Dutch coast escort and minesweeping service were carried out as scheduled. In the Zeeland waters and in the Ijsel Meer six convoys with about 68,000 BRT were escorted. Explosions were observed in a great distance in the Scheveningen, Hook and Terschelling areas.

In the night of 23 Jun. planes were observed dropping mines in the Vielinger fairway. Altogether 17 mines were cleared in these waters during the last nights. Enemy planes attacked 7th Minesweeper Flotilla with bombs off the Schelde mouth in the night of 23 Jun.

24 Jun. 1944

6th PT boat Flotilla with eight boats left Cuxhaven for Ijmuiden at 1800. Two boats returned to Cuxhaven temporarily because of engine trouble. The boats plan to follow on 25 Jun.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

In the area of 18th Group 28 planes were observed in operation. One British ship was inaccurately located in AF 1915 at 2156.

2. Own Situation:

The convoy traffic between Florø and Aalesund as well as between Roervik and Loedingen was stopped on 24 Jun. because of the enemy carrier planes reported on 23 Jun.

At 1853 an enemy reconnaissance plane was reported in the Alta area. It is probable that the enemy plane sighted the mooring places of our ships. Twenty-eight ships were escorted to the north and nineteen ships were escorted to the south.

Naval Command, Norway asked for an exchange of 5th Minesweeper Flotilla in the Polar Coast area against a flotilla with coal engines and suggested the transfer of 25th Minesweeper Flotilla of Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic or of 29th Minesweeper Flotilla of 8th Coast Patrol Force as the strained fuel situation and the difficulties of supply caused by the lack of tankers is affecting the convoy service in the Polar waters to a particularly strong degree.

Naval Staff decided:

- "1. An exchange of flotillas of different areas of command is undesirable as the flotillas are experienced in their present operation areas and know the peculiarities of the respective theaters.
2. It is not advisable to exchange 25th Minesweeper Flotilla which is in the Gulf of Finland at present. It would require a long journey. The advantage would be small only because the difficulty of supply would be shifted from the fuel oil to coal.

24 Jun. 1944

3. The advantages gained by an exchange with 29th Minesweeper Flotilla can be reached to an almost equal degree by an exchange with 23rd or 30th Minesweeper Flotillas stationed in the area of Commanding Admiral, Western Coast.
4. Therefore an exchange as per paragraph 3. is left to the discretion of Naval Command, Norway. Plans should be submitted."

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

No reports came in on new reconnaissance results.

2. Own Situation:

3rd Torpedo boat Flotilla will also be transferred to Esbjerg for escort service. One mine-exploding vessel (Sperrbrecher) is operating in the Skagerrak and in the eastern North Sea for the control of ground mines.

The laying out of the KMA-mine barrage from Esbjerg had to be discontinued because of the bad weather. The patrol positions at the western coast of Juteland were occupied.

The 5th Destroyer Flotilla with the GALSTER, the RIEDEL, the IHN and with the destroyer Z"30" is at Oslofjord. Seven artillery ferry barges left Kristiansand South for Frederikshavn. The eight and ninth artillery ferry barge will follow from Bergen.

The fourth transport group of 89th Infantry Division left Oslo for Aarhus at noon on 23 Jun.

On it's way to Esbjerg 3rd Torpedo boat Flotilla reported the locating of a submarine and the sighting of a bubble trace north of Skagen. Anti-submarine chasing was unsuccessful and was given up after two and a half hours. It is possible that the location and the observation were mistaken. Commanding General, Armed Forces Denmark cancelled "degree of readiness 1".

Twenty seven boats and one mine exploding vessel (Sperrbrecher) were operating in the mineclearance work in the Baltic Sea

24 Jun. 1944

Entrances as well as thirty eight boats and three minesweeping planes in the Baltic Sea. One mine was cleared in the Kiel Bay and one in the Gulf of Danzig. The German steamer FEODOSIA (3,075 BRT) hit a wreck near Greifswalder Oie and sunk.

In the area of Commanding Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea the Narva patrol and the net patrol were reduced because of the bad weather. A barge carrying 124 KMA-mines sunk near Kuorsala.

The LUETZOW left Gdynia at 0700. The ammunition transport had arrived at 0039. The taking over of the ammunition was completed at 0500.

The torpedo boats T"12", "3" and "4" left Libau at 1500 and met the LUETZOW at the ordered rendezvous place in AO 5998 at 1800. The formation "LUETZOW" reported it's prospective arrival at Utoe at 1000 on 25 Jun.

The destroyer Z"39" dismissed the destroyer Z"28" off Libau and is continuing to move westward with the assistance of tugs.

The transfer of the assault gun brigade from Reval to Finland begun. The first steamer carrying 1,271 men etc. entered Hanko already. The other transport movements between Danzig and Hanko and Riga - Gdynia are going on without incidents. The patrol and escort service on Lake Peipsi was carried out as planned.

At the Viborg front the Koivisto Isles were completely evacuated. Commander, 9th Coast Patrol Force reported that Marshal Mannerheim ordered that the present front line should be defended.

Three German ferry barges are on the way from Kotka to Emsaloe, the minesweepers M"18" and "15" and four artillery ferry barges are in immediate readiness in AO 3344 and the torpedo boats T"8" and "10" in AO 3257 as well as the torpedo boat T"30" in AO 3264 are in two hours readiness.

V. Merchant Shipping.

24 June 1944

In its report No. 10/44 Foreign Merchant Shipping, Naval Staff, as well as on the French/Anglo-American agreement concerning the employment of the French merchant fleet. Furthermore, Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch reported on merchant ship tonnage engaged in the traffic USA - England. According to the report the strength of the convoys traveling regularly from New York to England was doubled since the beginning of April and has to be assumed to reach 60 or 70 ships by now, mostly freighters. From the point of view of tonnage there does not exist any difficulty for the enemy to maintain the traffic in the newly observed strength even if it would be confirmed that about three million BRT of merchant shipping space are being kept in constant readiness in England for invasion purposes.

VI. Submarine Warfare.

Situation West Area:

Orders to return were given to the last two submarines without schnorkel in the Channel waters and to the submarine U"441" which of all the schnorkel equipped boats has been operating in the Channel for the longest time. The submarine U "953" entered the Seine Bay coming from Brest.

No special reports came in from the Atlantic.

The submarine U "737" will operate in the Northern Waters in order to deliver the new meteorological observation team at Spitsbergen and to bring back the old team.

In the area of Group "Mitte" nine boats were ordered to return. Thus only six boats are constantly out in the sea. They will take positions in the reconnaissance areas between 61 and 57° N. Group "Mitte" will be reduced to 25 boats because of other operation plans and training for the new type XXI submarine. In the Black Sea the submarine U "19" sunk by gunfire four motor cutters in the waters around Tuapse. An attack with torpedoes against two ships had no success.

Naval Staff, Submarine Division ordered to withdraw from active service four submarines, the crew of which will be allotted to Commanding Admiral, Submarines in order to man type XXI submarines.

VII. Aerial Warfare.

24 Jun. 1944

West Area:

During the day the enemy operated with about 4500 planes in the occupied territories in the West and attacked defensive zones in the rear along the entire coast, railway installations and aerodromes in northwestern France. Strong enemy air activity and attacks in northwestern France were reported also in the night of 24 Jun.

Forty-three German bombers were ordered against naval targets in the Seine Bay and 62 bombers were mining the waters off the landing bridgehead. Three of our planes did not return. Twelve bombers attacked targets on the ground in the Valogne area and seven FW 200 planes carried out reconnaissance over the sea as well as a bomb attack in the Atlantic. During the day, 431 German fighters were operating. They shot down 14 enemy planes and lost 10 of our own.

Reich Territory:

During daylight 400 four-engined planes escorted by fighters and flying in four formations launched a concentrated attack against Bremen, Wesermuende and Geestemuende. It has already been reported on the results. On their way back the enemy planes carried out several attacks with gunfire and flying at low level against goods trains in the Hamm area. Our own fighters had assembled in the Berlin - Magdeburg area and did not contact the enemy therefore.

Mediterranean Theater:

On 23 Jun. the enemy coming from southern Italy penetrated and attacked with 500 four-engined planes under fighter escort the areas of Giurgio - Ploesti - Nish. On our side 295 fighters were engaged in warding off the enemy. They shot down 16 enemy planes. Two more enemy planes were brought down by anti-aircraft guns. Twelve of our fighters were lost.

German traffic targets were attacked in central Italy.

In the front area the enemy had 400 planes operating. During the night of 23 Jun. the town and the harbor of Rhodes were again attacked by isolated enemy planes.

Our own planes carried out reconnaissance flights.

24 Jun. 1944

East Area:

On 23 Jun., 333 German and 2680 enemy air operations were reported at the East Front. Our planes shot down 55 enemy planes without any losses to themselves.

VIII. War in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea.

1. Area of Naval Group West:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

Off the southern coast of France 8600 BRT were escorted. Besides, two submarine chasers hunted enemy submarines in the waters of Cape Sicie - La Ciotat.

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Situation:

PT boats were again made out in the Gulf of Genoa during the night of 23 Jun. German escort forces had contact with these PT boats.

In the early morning hours our air reconnaissance located ten medium sized merchantmen and two destroyers steering a west course south southeast of Anzio presumably carrying supplies to Corsica. Many ships were in the harbor and in the roads of Anzio. Four big and four small freighters as well as two, presumably, light cruisers were observed steering varying courses 30 miles west and two patrol boats 16 miles south southwest of Anzio. According to a report from a consulate the closure of the frontier against Spanish Morocco which was ordered by the Algier Committee is to be regarded as a preparatory measure for a new landing operation which presently is being prepared in North Africa for an invasion of the Mediterranean coast.

24 Jun. 1944

Own Situation:

Two submarine chasers escorting a convoy had a fight with PT boats off Sestri Levante. During an artillery battle lasting two hours the radar station Piombino West was partly destroyed. In the night of 23 Jun. the mine task southeast of Vadabank was carried out according to plans by four minelaying naval landing craft. During the night of 22 Jun., mine tasks along the east coast in the waters off Ancona and Ravenna and during the night of 23 Jun. in the Waters of Venice were carried out as had been planned.

One naval landing craft sunk on the occasion of the enemy bombing attack against Ancona. The mine-ship DIETRICH VON BERN together with four motor minesweepers of foreign construction moved to Leghorn for minelaying operations. On 23 Jun. the transfer to Spezia of the two men assault boats "328", "330", "332" begun.

The two-men assault boat "210" which had been reserved for torpedo trials was damaged during a fighter-bomber attack at Spezia on 21 Jun.

German Naval Command, Italy reported that the output of mines has strongly decreased in Italy. Instead of the 500 mines planned for every month beginning 1 Jul. there will be no mines at all ready in July, only 50 each in Aug. and Sep., 300 mines in Oct., 400 in Nov., and 500 in Dec. The naval command asked for an allotment and despatch in a hurry of at least 500 mines per month.

Naval Staff decided as follows: The mine production at home is only about one fourth of the military demand at present. Therefore it will probably not be possible to provide the full number and all the types of mines which were asked for by German Naval Command Italy. All mines available should be concentrated at the most important places. Allotments of mines will be made as they become available.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

It has already been reported on the carrying out of the mine operation. Two of our PT boats were constantly observed by enemy reconnaissance planes when they were operating near Cape Promontore in the night of 23 Jun. No other contact was made with the enemy. Two PT boats which had started from Split were operating for the defense of the south bound convoy of tanker-barges. They sighted two enemy destroyers. No contact was made with the enemy.

24 Jun. 1944

The convoy traffic in the northern Adriatic Sea was carried out without special incidents.

In the evening of 22 Jun, the naval base at Corcula was fired upon by bandits. No casualties occurred. The bridgehead Tignesne on the isle of Morter was occupied by the 7th Battery of Naval Artillery Regiment 540.

b. Aegean Sea:

At 1120 an enemy submarine was sighted on the surface northwest of Santorin.

At 1500 the harbor Mandracchio at the northwestern end of the isle of Nisyros was fired upon by an enemy submarine. The fire was answered by Army guns. During the night of 23 Jun, two enemy PT boats unsuccessfully attacked a German convoy south of Samos. The convoy entered Porto Lago at 0700 without suffering any damage.

According to a report of Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea 20 concrete ships out of the complete construction program of 32 concrete ships were launched so far at Piraeus nine of which are completed already. Two of these have been lost up to now.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Two freighters with 4000 BRT each were made out by photographic reconnaissance at Sevastopol. In the forenoon there were apparently ten PT boats and six gunboats at Otchakov.

Own Situation:

The mine barrages "S 103", "S104", "S105" were laid out according to plans southeast of San Georghe during the night of 23 Jun. In the afternoon 1st PT boat Flotilla in two groups of two boats each left Constanta for an operation in the waters of the southwestern coast of the Crimea against Yalta and the enemy sea traffic.

24 Jun. 1944

It has already been reported on the submarine success off Tuapse.

Situation on the Danube:

On 23 Jun. 243 vessels were on their way on the central Danube. One motor tug sunk near kilometer indicator 1736 on 23 Jun. On 24 Jun. one mine was cleared near kilometer indicator 1104. No new laying of mines by planes was reported.

IX. Situation in East Asia.

The Special Political News Service of the German Foreign Office reprinted an article of the Saturday Evening Post of 20 May under the headline: Offensive against Japan to start not prior than six months after the end of the European War. The article explains the difficulties which are preventing the opening of an offensive in the Pacific theater immediately after the conclusion of the European war. Excerpts of the article find in War Diary Part C, Vol. XVII. No other reports of any importance came in.

25 Jun. 1944
Sunday

Items of Political Importance.

Nothing to report.

Conference on the Situation with Commander in Chief, Navy at 1100.

I. Group South reported the required supplies for Creta and for the southern Sporades as had been ordered (compare War Diary 13 Jun.). Provided the islands receive only the bare necessities of life without reducing the defensive strength which has been reached by this time, the monthly requirements will be 5690 tons for Creta and 3360 tons for the Sporades. Considering the possibilities of sea transport our forces require 10,500 tons per month at Creta and 4600 tons monthly at the Sporades as current supplies in order to carry out their mission.

The transport space still required for a complete replenishing of the stocks amounts to 31,255 tons for Creta and 12,300 tons for the Sporades. In this connection Group South reported the probable transport capacity for Creta as 4000 tons and as 6000 tons in July. Efforts are being made to fulfil and possibly to increase these figures.

At present, Creta is only supplied by small vessels. The auxiliary sailing vessels are traveling in groups of three or four. The circulation is delayed by constant repairs. Auxiliary sailing vessels of at least 70 tons capacity and a speed of five knots have already been withdrawn from other theaters for the Creta supplies. It is planned to increase this figure by withdrawing 14 auxiliary sailing vessels from the civilian sector of Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping and by other methods.

Naval Staff, Operations Division informed Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy and Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters.

II. Armed Forces High Command issued a directive concerning the release of 414 French prisoners in connection with the case "Laconia". For details compare War Diary Part C Vol. VIII.

III. Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Intelligence Division reported on an information of Reich Security Central Office concerning the military background of the British-Turkish tension. Copy as per l.Skl.24295/44 geh. find in War Diary Part D Vol. "Materials on the Enemy Situation".

IV. In a Highly Restricted Circle:

25 Jun. 1944

PT boat Training Division submitted it's report of readiness for the time from 26 Jun. till 2 Jul. as ordered:

1. 1st PT boat Training Flotilla, ten boats restricted war-readiness. The boats are in a 24 hours readiness at their base at Svinemuende.

2. 2nd PT boat Training Flotilla is ready for war with nine boats in the Northern Area for the operation "Wallenstein".

3. 10th PT boat Flotilla with nine boats in restricted war readiness. The boats are in a 24 hours readiness at their base at Svinemuende. Two boats of the PT boat Training Division are in restricted war readiness and five boats are ready for sailing. The boats are at Svinemuende in 24 hours readiness.

Commander PT boats was ordered by Naval Staff with copy to the Fleet and to PT boat Training Division to wire a plan for the transfer to the Gulf of Finland of one flotilla of nine boats out of the boats which are at present in the Baltic Sea or in the Skagerrak.

The following has to be taken into consideration:

- a. The training program should not be affected.
- b. If possible the new boats of 10th PT Flotilla should not be included so that a transfer of these boats to the West Area at a later date should remain possible. However, the Gulf of Finland has priority over the West Area. Reports are to be made as to what extent the readiness for the operation "Wallenstein" will be influenced.

V. Situation of the Army:

West Area:

The enemy launched his final attack against Cherbourg. Lieutenant-General von Schlieben expects the decision to come today. The enemy has apparently been reinforced in order to attack in large masses. A new attack with reinforced strength is expected from the direction of Caen. General Staff of the Army concluded from photographic reconnaissance that the Army Group Montgomery is aiming in an eastern direction towards Paris. Thus it is reasonable to assume that the First USA Army Group will operate in the Seine-Somme area. Operations of this group need not be expected to start before the end of Jul. or the beginning of Aug.

25 Jun. 1944

A report on the final battle of Cherbourg will be given under "Invasion". The French divisions in Italy have a remarkable fighting strength. General Staff of the Army estimates very high the fighting value of the seven or nine French formations which are concentrated in North Africa, and regards it as possible that for the time being the enemy high command will use the entire forces in North Africa amounting to from ten to fifteen formations only for the containing of the German forces in South France and that it will use these forces only after the German forces will have been withdrawn. Anyhow, it would be difficult to understand if no use should be made of this possibility.

At the Finnish front the situation remained unchanged in general.

Our own situation at the Eastern Front is not particularly favorable. Fighting activity in the southern part of the front is still slight. Central Army Group reported that the enemy penetrated deeply into our lines in the area of 9th Army. The enemy air force appeared in the battlefield in unimaginable numbers. Our artillery was thus completely kept down by the enemy planes. Our losses are considerable. Vitebsk was completely cut off. The enemy crossed the Duna near Ula. Heavy fighting was also reported from the Polozk area. As long as an enemy attack has to be expected in the southern part of the East Front, German reserves are not available in any numbers worth mentioning.

VI. Further reports of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief of Operations Branch:

a. Commanding Admiral, Naval Group West repeated his request for the laying out during the coming night of aerial mines with new firing devices off the harbor entrance of Cherbourg and suspected that the objections raised by Naval Staff yesterday were based on incorrect assumptions. It is not planned to mine the roads because mines have been laid there already.

Admiral Krancke regards the mining of the approach to the harbor entrance in addition as a favorable and unique opportunity for laying out DM 1 mines. In the entire coast area there was no other place as suitable for the DM firing devices which can be used only under very limited and particularly specified conditions. The request was based on the following arguments:

1. The moles will presumably be still in our hands tonight. Therefore the enemy will be unable to obstruct or to open fire from the mole.
2. The depth of water is particularly suitable for DM mines along a stretch of water two miles broad. In view of the

25 Jun. 1944

current prevailing in that area, it is absolutely necessary for the entering big ships to have sufficient speed in order to bring the DM 1 firing devices into action. The concentration of traffic off the harbor entrance provides a fine chance for the mines. Light vessels which presumably will enter in advance will not cause any gaps in the barrage.

3. The danger to security is less in these waters than off the Orne mouth because the coast lighting and beacons for the minelaying planes will be maintained by coal fire. Probably there will still be a possibility to eliminate mines which might fall on land in spite of this precaution. Naval Staff did not give up it's objections concerning the danger to security.

Commander in Chief, Navy decided, that the refusal of the renewed request of Group West will be maintained.

Group West and High Command, Air, Operations Staff were therefore ordered by teletype as follows:

Mines with D-device were released for use in the landing bridgehead under the condition that any danger to security has to be avoided by all means. The imitation of this device by the enemy would bring about unimaginable damage for our conduct of war. It is impossible to accept responsibility for laying out these mines in waters where there is danger to security. In the case of Cherbourg it is not certain whether danger to security can be prevented as the development of the situation cannot be foreseen and because the danger of the mines falling on the sand is great in spite of the markations of the target area. The laying out of mines with D-device has to be given up therefore under all circumstances in spite of the good chances of success in the waters off Cherbourg. Aerial mines with other firing devices have also chances of success in the Cherbourg waters and the Air Force is urgently requested herewith to lay out such mines.

- b. Commanding Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea gave the report of Naval Liaison Officer, Hochland to Naval Command, Baltic Sea which transmitted it to Naval Staff. According to the report, one of the three alarm companies garrisoned on the island was transferred to the continent because of the military situation. The removal of the second company is being prepared. Thus the strength of the garrison of the island

25 Jun. 1944

numbering at present about 1500 men has been reduced considerably. According to a statement of the island commander, future reinforcements cannot be reckoned with. It can no more be expected that in case of danger one battalion can be transferred from the continent as originally planned. The island commander intimated that the Finnish brigade commander concerned would approve a possible reinforcement by German formations. The anti-air defense of the island continues to be weak. All landmines along the coast became inefficient. Difficulties of supplies prevent a new laying out of mines.

Naval Command, Baltic Sea advocated the suggestion to dispatch German Forces and pointed to the order of Marshal Mannerheim that the Viborg front has to be defended.

Naval Staff is also of the opinion that with the Finns approving the transfer of German forces to Hochland before the carrying out of operation "Tanne Ost" will be a decisive and important relief of the situation in the Gulf of Finland.

Commander in Chief, Navy ordered, to transmit a corresponding statement to Armed Forces. High Command, Operations Staff, Operations Branch and to High Command, Army, General Staff of the Army.

- c. During the report on the assessment of the situation of Commanding Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea (compare War Diary 23 Jun.), Commander in Chief, Navy ordered to discuss on 26 Jun. the possibility of a transfer of torpedo boats with Commander, Destroyers who on that day will arrive at this office together with Commanding Admiral, Fleet.

Commander in Chief, Navy was informed on the development of the plans for the operation "Tanne" and "Birke" in accordance with the proceedings on 24 Jun.

Concerning the operation "Tanne", Commander in Chief, Navy ordered that the transfer of troops has to be carried out by transporters. The decision on the transfer to the east of the Skagerrak destroyers is reserved until the further development of the transport situation in Norway can be judged. Naval Command, Baltic Sea was ordered by Naval Staff as follows:

Subject "Tanne":

1. Preparations and plans have definitely to provide for the transfer of the first wave by transporters escorted by destroyers and cruisers.

25 Jun. 1944

2. However, if necessary, the transfer must also be possible by warships only.
3. Suggestions for the reinforcement as soon as possible of the first wave have to be wired. The "Office 7000" and Battery crews from Norway are taken into consideration.
4. The time of the transfer of the destroyers to Gdynia depends on No. 3, as the destroyers may be required for transport or escort services.

Special Items:

I. Concerning the situation in the Gulf of Finland.

1. According to information from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, the Chief of Operations Staff of the Air Force reported that no transfer is planned for the fighter squadron which had been moved to Turku for the protection of "Rotbuche" although, in view of the situation of our forces, operations in that area will put a heavy strain upon us. A transfer will nevertheless have to be taken into consideration if required for the carrying out of the operation "Tanne" because no other fighter forces will be available for the tasks arising in that case.
2. Concerning the question of the reinforcement of Hochland and also according to information from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, the German General in Finland reported at 2020 that the Finnish High Command admitted that one company was withdrawn from Hochland. No further withdrawal of forces was planned. On the contrary, it was envisaged to bring back the company withdrawn. The reinforcement of the island's crew by German troops which has been offered, was gratefully acknowledged by the Finns, but for the time being they would not accept the offer. Therefore, a dispatch of German forces to Hochland is out of the question. The Finnish opinion on this subject might however change any moment in accordance with the further developments. Naval Staff informed Naval Command, Baltic Sea by referring to the above information.

Naval Command, Baltic Sea informed Naval Staff by copy of its directive to Commanding Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea to constitute immediately the Artillery Regiment 531 as a naval artillery regiment with four medium batteries at three guns each for the operation "Tanne Ost". It should include the

25 Jun. 1944

staff and the two companies withdrawn from infantry service as well as the specialists and key-personnel of Naval Artillery Regiment 530. If necessary the formation can be constituted as a cadre unit in so far as, for the time being, the lacking naval gunners without special training could be replaced by army gunners. For copy of the report as per l. Skl. 1906/44 gK. Chfs. compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

II. Commander Destroyers suggested the following distribution of torpedo boats:

6th Torpedo boat Flotilla:

The torpedo boats T "22", "23", "24", "28", "30", "32", "33".

5th Torpedo boat Flotilla:

The torpedo boats T "34", "35", "36", "37", "38", "39" and, for the time being, the CONDOR the putting out of service of which is being asked for in view of the docking period of eight month required for the ship.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster General approved this plan of subordination of the boats as desired.

III. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff issued the following directive:

"The Fuehrer ordered upon a suggestion of Reichminister Goebbels that the device "FZG. 76" should be called "V 1" in official and public use. (Retaliation No. 1). The character "V" in this connection is intended as a propaganda measure against the enemy using this character (Victory). The figure "1" is meant to hint at further possibilities of increasing this kind of long range warfare against England.

IV. Naval Staff informed Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff as required on the measures envisaged by the Navy for the reinforcement of the defensive strength of the Istrian area.

The relevant orders l. Skl. I m 1889/44 gKdos. Chfs. and l. Skl. 19517/44 gKdos. find in the files of I m/ 1/Skl.

V. Concerning the plans for the establishment of a Commanding Admiral, Black-Sea submitted by Group South, Naval Staff transmitted the following statement to Group South:

25 Jun. 1944

1. Naval Staff does not regard as justified the giving up of the patrol service. Optical observation and air reconnaissance depend on the weather situation and on German reconnaissance planes being available which cannot always be taken for granted. Neither does the radar net give a reliable protection against surprise actions. In Italy and in the Channel the enemy annihilated or at least eliminated for a considerable time the radar stations over wide areas by air attacks. Therefore, under certain circumstances, the protection of the coast against surprise actions from the sea is only possible by a patrol service kept in constant readiness. At a length of the coast of more than 300 miles, the number of naval formations so far provided for the service seems to be insufficient. When making a decision on the dispensability of vessels in the Black Sea it should also be considered whether the possible entrance into the war of Turkey would perhaps make necessary a greater number of vessels.
2. Naval Staff draws attention to the fact that for the time being it will remain impossible to send war freighters and armed fishing vessels through the straits. It is most uncertain whether it will be possible to obtain the permission of the Turks for a transfer of naval landing craft when they are taken to pieces.
3. Plans should be reconsidered in accordance with 1. and 2.

VI. Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division issued a statement on the "Tass"-declaration of 11 Jun. concerning the Allied supplies to Russia. For copy as per l. Skl. 24260/44 geh. compare War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division is of the opinion that the Russian statement seems true as it corresponds in general with the latest publications in England and America. It has to be kept in mind that the British and American commentators are giving the actual transshipments from the Allied ports whereas the declaration of the "Tass" deals with the supplies that have arrived.

Based on the figures of the first four months of 1944 Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division believes that a total supply of six million tons per year, 2.4 million tons are going via the southern route, 1.1 million tons via the northern route and 1.5 million tons via the Far Eastern route. As to the shipping space, 2.3 million BRT of freighter space or 9% of the freighter

25 Jun. 1944

space available in the overseas traffic of the Allied are engaged in the transport of the supplies to Russia. The fact that this big freighter tonnage could be branched off is a proof of the favorable situation of the Allied in general. The quantity of goods supplied shows the importance of the supplies for Russia.

Situation on 25 Jun. 1944.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Invasion:

Our radio monitoring service observed very strong supply traffic. A number of reports were intercepted on convoys, unloadings, sailing readiness and on organization measures. A station Southeast Ferry Control reported of 1800 on 22 and on 23 Jun:

2243 tons supply goods, 2966 vehicles and 14,012 men. For the next 24 hours until 1800 on 24 Jun., 5309 tons of supplies, 1896 vessels and 7879 men were reported disembarked.

On 24 Jun. the mine-cruiser ADVENTURE was mentioned in the Channel area.

At 1300 on 25 Jun. a British sighting report was intercepted of a submerged submarine in BF 3611. Another submarine was reported by a British plane in BF 3179. Four heavily damaged vessels were reported to be beached in the invasion area whereas seven vessels were said to be no more fit for service.

The center of activity was the final battle for Cherbourg. The development of the situation as seen from the reports arriving at Naval Staff was the following:

25 Jun, 1944

According to the situation report of Group West which was transmitted at 0150, the following events of 24 Jun, have to be added:

The Army Coastal Battery 15/1265 on Guernsey fired upon four enemy PT boats west of the island from 0936 till 0945 and forced the boats to sheer off. Between 0945 and 1115 the Army Coastal Battery 7/1255 fired upon a monitor steering for the Orne mouth at a distance of 14 kilometers. The target ceased firing, put up a smoke screen and then re-opened fire on our battery and on the battery's firing position.

The Army Coastal Battery 2/1255 maintained harassing fire on a gunboat between 1220 and 1230.

The Army Coastal Battery 6/1255 fired upon a transporter of about 5000 BRT from 1307 till 1340 and scored a direct hit on the midship which started a strong conflagration.

From 1345 till 1408 the Army Coastal Battery 7/1255 attacked a gunboat which was firing against the coast. The target was protected by smoke screens.

At 0310, Commander, Small Battle Units reported that 211th Small Battle Weapon Flotilla was unable to leave the harbor at 2300 on 24 Jun, as planned because of difficulties with the sluices.

Operations of the A-Group of 361st Small Battle Weapon Flotilla are planned in the Orne mouth for the night of 23 Jun.

At 0606, Naval Shore Commander, Channel Islands reported strong enemy PT boat activities during the night.

Between 2200 and 2210 the Battery 15/1265 on Guernsey fired on four enemy torpedo boats and from 0031 till 0046 the Group Alderney fired upon located enemy targets in BF 3545 whereas the Battery 5/1265 (Jersey) attacked a located enemy target in BF 3811 at 0100.

All targets withdrew on reversed course after being fired upon.

At 0635, General von Schlieben reported to Army Group B:

"Strong enemy artillery fire on Cherbourg. The enemy reached the southern and southwestern outskirts of the town. The attack against Cherbourg is expected to come during the day. Our own air force did not come into action so far."

25 Jun. 1944

At 0647, Naval Shore Commander, Normandy reported: "Connection with Naval Artillery Regiment 260 interrupted."

No special events since 2300 except harassing fire on Cherbourg.

At 1100, a telegram from Brussels was transmitted by German Foreign Office saying that a landing has to be expected within the next days in the area of the Somme mouth or at Ostend, Amsterdam, Rotterdam or possibly at both places. For this operation probably 40 divisions including from 12 to 15 tank divisions were made available. The Belgian underground movement was ordered to keep quiet and to wait.

At 1125, the Combat Group von Schlieben asked Army Group B:

"Where is our Air Force, where are the fighters of the Small Battle Units?"

At 1209, the Combat Group von Schlieben reported:

"The enemy superiority in materials and it's supremacy in the air are overwhelming. The majority of our batteries exhausted their ammunition or have been destroyed. Since 6 Jun. the forces of the Group are strongly worn out. The Group was forced back into a small area and is fighting with it's back to the sea. The harbor and all other important installations were destroyed effectively. The loss of the town within the shortest time is unavoidable as the enemy entered the outskirts of the town already. There are 2000 wounded who cannot be transported away. Is it necessary, in view of the situation in general, to wait for the final annihilation of the remaining German troops which has to be expected because of the lack of effective defensive weapons? Relevant orders are urgently awaited."

At 1217, Combat Group von Schlieben reported: "Our seriously worn out troops require urgently some kind of inspiration. They still hope for the Air Force operations which have been promised."

At 1254, Group Schlieben reported:

"Enemy fire from ships firing from behind smoke screens on the open sea."

At 1312, Naval Shore Command, Normandy reported: Situation:

25 Jun. 1944

The Battery "Brommy" is kept constantly under fire from the land and does not answer on being called. Communications do still exist with the Batteries "York" and "Landemer". The Battery "York" is firing against an enemy cruiser formation at 1330 at a distance 13 kilometers off the harbor. The battery itself is under strong fire from the sea. As before, the strongest artillery and trench-mortar fire is kept against our field positions thus strongly demoralizing our soldiers. They do not see the enemy. Heavy artillery fire and dropping of bombs on Cherbourg"

At 1340, Naval Shore Commander, Normandy reported:

"The Battery "York" scored hits on heavy cruisers."

At 1340, Army Group von Schlieben reported:

"In addition to the overwhelming superiority in materials as far as artillery, air force, and tanks are concerned, the enemy is now firing from the sea with heavy guns directed by artillery observation planes. It is our duty to report that further sacrifices cannot alter the situation."

At 1344, Naval Shore Commander, Normandy reported:

The Batteries "York" and "Brommy" are kept under aimed heavy fire from land and sea.

At 1355, Bomb attacks and low-level attacks against the Battery "York".

At 1358, a battleship of the CALIFORNIA-class was fired upon by a naval battery.

At 1405, the enemy fleet withdraws after being fired upon by the coastal battery. New hits were scored on the cruisers. Strong development of smoke.

At 1405, Naval Shore Command, Normandy reported that a ship of the PRINCE OF WALES - class was recognized.

At 1433, smoke bombs were dropped in front of the Battery "York".

At 1447, the Bastion Cherbourg is kept under naval gunfire.

At 1500, Naval Shore Command, Normandy reported: according to the report of Artillery Group Commander, Major Kueppers on the

25 Jun. 1944

eastern corner: the Battery "Hamburg" sunk one cruiser and damaged heavily another cruiser. The battery keeps firing."

At 1510, Naval Shore Command, Normandy reported: report of Major Kueppers: the crew of the Battery "Hamburg" is fighting splendidly.

At 1533, Naval Shore Command, Normandy reported:

the crew of the Battery "York" is carrying ammunition to the guns under heavy artillery fire. The battery reported again hits on a cruiser. The enemy sheered off at once.

At 1548, the following radiogram of General Fieldmarshal Rommel was transmitted to von Schlieben on the command wave:

"According to the order of the Fuehrer you have to continue to fight until the last round of ammunition is fired."

At 1600, Group West regarded landing possibilities for the night of 25 Jun. as favorable along all coasts.

At 1630, Naval Shore Command, Channel Islands reported that following the reported gunfire against enemy targets carried out by Group Alderney two conflagrations were observed on sea, probably on damaged targets.

At 1631, Commanding Admiral, Naval Group West sent the following radio message to Naval Shore Command, Normandy for Naval Artillery Regiment 260:

"Bravo, in spite of all!"

At 1647, Group West transmitted the following situation report to all:

1. The PT boat operations were discontinued because of bad sighting conditions. Coastal batteries and emergency anti-aircraft guns assisted our infantry in the Cherbourg area by harassing fire against land targets. When firing against naval targets our batteries scored one direct hit on the midship of a transporter of 5000 BRT. The Long-Range Battery Channel Narrows scored a hit on a big freighter of 7000 BRT. Twenty five explosions with high darting flames were observed. A burning steamer was beached west of Dover.

25 Jun. 1944

2. The enemy penetrated from southwest and southeast of the fortress up to the outskirts of Cherbourg. Strong artillery fire against the town which is also fired upon from the sea by the battleship CALIFORNIA and by a cruiser formation. The Battery York scored hits on a heavy cruiser and on tank concentrations. The situation is very bad.
3. Our own air forces continued laying mines off the landing bridgehead during the night of 23 Jun. Planes which attacked naval targets damaged one transporter, night fighters shot down two enemy planes. Reconnaissance planes observed many explosions at London. It can be seen from further reports of Group West that three boats of 8th PT boat Flotilla moved to Le Havre during the night of 24 Jun. and that the boats entered the harbor at 0400. Five PT boats of 2nd PT boat Flotilla left Le Havre at 2315 on 24 Jun. and returned because of the bad sighting conditions.

Three boats of 9th PT boat Flotilla moved from St. Malo to Alderney.

At 1730 Naval Shore Command, Normandy reported:

"Fort Flamand exploded. The second cruiser which had been heavily damaged by the Battery "Hamburg" was observed sinking and did probably sink."

At 1742, General von Schlieben reported to 7th Army Corps Command: "I ignored two written invitations for surrender by the commanding general of the American troops".

At 1755, Group West reported the plans for the night of 25 Jun:

The PT boats will start for mine and torpedo operations in the Seine Bay. The Group "Rabe" will move to Alderney and to Le Havre.

At 1810, Naval Shore Command, Normandy reported that fighting with infantry and tanks started in the arsenal.

At 1833, Battle Group von Schlieben reported:

"The enemy penetrated to the western outskirts of Cherbourg. Fighting is going on in the arsenal."

25 Jun. 1944

At 1905, Naval Communication Officer, Cherbourg reported: "All secret matters destroyed, security of codes maintained. Long live the Fuehrer, the people and the country!"

At 1920, the following report of Battle Group von Schlieben came in:

"The fight for the command post of the Combat Group Schlieben has begun. The enemy is attacking with tanks."

At 1947, Command Post Schlieben reported:

"The last struggle for Cherbourg has started. The general is fighting among the troops. Long live the Fuehrer and Germany!"

According to intercepted radio messages,

At 2113, Commander, Heavy Battle Forces informed all mine-formations:

"Cherbourg has been lost to the enemy!"

At 2215, Group West reported that according to a report of Naval Shore Commander, Seine-Somme an apparently French battleship which probably had been damaged by mines was seen beached in 234⁰, 18.6 kilometers off Cape de la Heve.

Naval Shore Commander added that apparently the battleship had established land connections by pontoons or lighter bridge.

At 2240, Group West transmitted to all that Cherbourg does not answer any more since 1947.

From 1315 till 1530 a new motorized 17,5 centimeter battery (not an army coastal battery) fired 16 rounds against a transporter near Hanegate at a distance of 22.9 kilometers and scored three hits.

From 1345 till 1403 the Army Coastal Battery 2/1255 maintained harassing fire against a gunboat at a distance of 15.6 kilometers.

At 2245, Commanding Admiral, Channel Coast reported that radio communications with the fortress Cherbourg had ceased since 2007. The Fuehrer expressed his desire that the SS Fatigue Battalion should be removed from the Channel Islands because under no circumstances it should fall into the hands of the enemy.

25 Jun. 1944

Naval Staff informed Group West accordingly and ordered that further measures should be arranged with Commanding General, Armed Forces West.

Concerning the question of mine operations with D-devices, Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy transmitted at 1925:

"The Fuehrer ordered that in view of the danger to security mine operations with D-devices should be abstained from in the Cherbourg waters and that operations with aerial mines should be carried out with other firing devices in the waters off Cherbourg. The avoiding of any danger to security should be made a preliminary condition.

Group West declared by telephone that in the group's opinion there had been already a breach of security as far as the D-mines were concerned.

Naval Staff transmitted therefore once more the following directive to the group:

"Although in releasing the mines with D-device the former objections concerning the danger to security and concerning the fact that these mines cannot be cleared by our own forces were deliberately cut down, nevertheless, considering the whole problem, the necessity to avoid a breach of security as far as possible remained to be a question of the greatest importance. In the teletype to High Command, Air, Operations Staff (1, Skl. 1694/44 Chfs.) it was explicitly said that operations of great numbers of planes and the avoiding of territories occupied by the enemy were absolutely necessary in order to keep small the danger to security. In the decision of the Fuehrer it was explained again that during the operations of the Air Force care should be taken to prevent the mine to fall into the hand of the enemy by dropping it over territories occupied by the enemy or in case one of the planes should be shot down (teletype OKW/WFST Op M 771804/44 Chfs, to Naval Staff and to High Command, Air, Operations Staff).

In case the group has any evidence for it's opinion that a breach of security has taken place already as reported by telephone to Naval Staff, Operations Division, Mine Warfare and Anti-Submarine Section by the operations officer of the group, such evidence should be transmitted immediately.

25 Jun. 1944

The areas to be mined by the German Air Force should be defined as before in any case in order to avoid a discovery of the device by dropping the mines at places which are not always covered by the sea."

2. Enemy Situation in other parts of the West Area:

In the area of 19th Group 60 planes were observed in operation. Five British ships were located in the rendezvous area.

3. Own Situation in other parts of the West Area:

Atlantic Coast Area:

Fifteen patrol positions were occupied. Five mines were cleared off Lorient, twelve off Brest, three near St. Nazaire and three off La Ballice. A mine exploding vessel shot down one enemy plane off Lorient.

On 24 Jun., 2nd Minesweeper Flotilla was attacked south of Brest by enemy planes with bombs, gunfire and rockets. The minesweeper M"10" was damaged. The minesweeper M "4014" hit a mine off Brest and entered the harbor.

Channel Waters:

One mine was cleared off St. Malo, three mines were cleared off Le Havre, and six off Peterport. In the morning hours, an enemy fighter bomber formation attacked 4th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla, 18th Patrol boat Flotilla, and 8th Gunboat Flotilla west of Dunkerq. The minesweeper M "4621" hit a mine off Peterport and entered the harbor. During the morning and noon hours, heavy batteries of the Channel coast fired upon located targets in the convoy route near Dover. In the morning hours, batteries in the Gris Nez area fired upon a located enemy target about ten kilometers west of the cape.

Special Items:

Group West transmitted a report of Commanding General West, Naval Liaison Officer, that Army Group B made a request for the dispatch of 20,000 men of the manning divisions and of emergency units of the Navy to the areas threatened by the withdrawal of 346th Infantry Division in order to ward off landings from the air. Army Group B is of the opinion that it is possible to speed up this movement by releasing the manning divisions from the railway guard duties and by replacing them by emergency units of the Navy.

Commanding General, West asked Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff on 19 Jun. to dispatch from the Navy forces at home further units

25 Jun. 1944

of degree of dispensability "A" and "B" amounting to 20,000 men for Commanding General, West and to stress the fact that the previously promised forces of degree of dispensability "A" were much more than merely 5,000 men. Group West recalled that no more arms for the above mentioned forces are available in the area of the group.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

Six mines were cleared in the German Bight.

The big sluice at Wesermuende was reported ready for service again.

In the Dutch area our position "Windhuk" had contact with enemy PT boats one of which was probably sunk whereas others were damaged.

Our own casualties were small. One mine was cleared west of Flushing and one mine was cleared in the Zeebrugge waters. During the day and in the night of 25 Jun. a considerable number of explosions was again heard out in the sea. The blast-furnace works at Ijmuiden was again attacked by enemy planes; the damages caused by the attack were only slight.

Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

In the area of 18th Group 30 planes were observed operating over the northern and central North Sea.

The closing of the convoy traffic along the western coast was cancelled at 0800. Twenty nine ships were escorted to the north and 22 ships to the south.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

During the night of 24 Jun. two PT boats were steering a southern course in the Narva Bay.

25 Jun. 1944

Own Situation:

The patrol positions along the western coast of Jutland were occupied. The laying out of coastal mine A was cancelled because of the bad weather. 3rd Torpedo boat Flotilla entered Esbjerg with three boats.

The fifth group - being the last one - of the transport of 89th Infantry Division left Oslo.

Minesweeping service was carried out by 16 boats in the Baltic Sea Entrances and by 28 boats, one mine exploding vessel and four minesweepers in the Baltic Sea. Four mines were cleared.

The boat VS "103" hit a mine in the Eckernfoerde Bay and had to be beached. The RICHARD BEITZEN started from Swinemuende for the east.

The destroyer Z "31" left Libau for Kiel.

The torpedo boats, minesweepers and artillery ferry barges in the leads of southern Finland are kept in readiness as reported. Two naval landing craft will move from Emsaloe to Reval in order to be at the disposal of Training Brigade North. The barrage and anti-submarine patrol was temporarily withdrawn because of the bad weather. The patrol positions in the Narva Bay and in the Irben Narrows were occupied according to schedule.

The submarine U "481" carried out her trip to Finland as planned and returned to Reval. A second boat will leave subsequently.

No particular reports came in from Lake Peipsi.

Naval Command, East reported the plan suggested by Commanding Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea for an assault task against Narvi with concentrated artillery assistance by German formations. The Russian radio station is a very annoying observation post. The carrying out of the plan is still possible if done immediately as long as the enemy is not blasting dug-outs in the rocky ground. Naval Command, East approved under the condition that the mine situation is sufficiently clear and at the same time, pointed to the fact that in the long run it will probably be impossible to prevent the enemy to establish himself at Narvi.

Furthermore, Naval Command, East reported the results of the conferences and plans of Commanding Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea with the Finnish Naval Staff.

The main task is the warding off of landing attempts. The patrol system is concentrating on Vilanieme. It is impossible to protect the

25 Jun. 1944

coast by the fleet. The Finns are planning to reopen the patrol at the Rukarjeros-barrage as well as the convoy service Hochland-Kotka. It is planned to divide the coastal patrol into a German section in the western part and a Finnish section in the eastern part. In case of good sighting conditions, the patrol group will anchor in immediate readiness in the inner leads and, in case of bad sight, the boats will be on their positions behind the barrages.

The German forces consist of 3rd Minesweeper Flotilla, 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla and eight artillery ferry barges, the Finnish forces being six guard boats, three gunboats and two auxiliary gunboats. The Finnish PT boats are preparing for the cooperation with German motor minesweepers. Concerning the operation "Rotbuche", Commander, Training Formation, Fleet reported to Naval Command, East:

The enemy is well informed about the mooring places by the commercial plane flying daily between Helsinki and Stockholm. The danger from the air has considerably increased. In case enemy planes are approaching from the south it is not always possible to warn our ships in time. Net enclosures are of no value against bombers flying at low altitude as it is impossible to recognize the targets in time because of the skerries. Bringing into position light anti-aircraft guns would mean a slight improvement of the situation, it cannot, however, remove completely the danger from the air (see the TIRPITZ). So far, only one net enclosure has been completed. It can be used only after the tugs have arrived. The alternative mooring places Oeroe and Baltic Port are not available as the danger from the air is greater there. Further alternative mooring places but without the protection of anti-aircraft guns and without security, are therefore to be found only on the route to Turku. A concentration of the ships in the Aspoe area can at present only be advocated in case of urgent military necessities.

Referring to the last statement, Naval Command, East reported that a dispersal of the ships has been ordered in the meantime.

The PRINZ EUGEN will return to Gdynia early on 27 Jun. together with 2nd Torpedo boat Flotilla. The torpedo boats will be released off Libau in order to enter that harbor. It is planned to use the TOGO after her becoming ready for war on 29 Jun. for the defense of the mooring places mostly as an air reporting vessel and to put her into the second net enclosure which becomes ready on 5 Jul.

Naval Command, East suggested to replace the LUETZOW by the PRINZ EUGEN after about ten days. It is therefore unnecessary to supply her in the operation area neither is it necessary to move the supply ship. No additional fuel is required as two training days per week

25 Jun. 1944

are required anyhow and, as, for the time being, further escort is only necessary north of Lithuania. According to a report of Naval Liaison Staff, Finland the Finnish forces on Lake Ladoga are two Siebel ferries, three old naval artillery ferries without torpedo equipment and one armed steamer, and on Lake Onega there are two armed paddle steamers, one armored guardboat and one armed tug.

V. Submarine Warfare.

No reports came in from the six boats.

The submarine U "719" met only insignificant sea and air defenses in the North Channel. The boat missed one guardboat with a Zaunkoenig-torpedo on 24 Jun. In the Northern Waters, the submarine group "Trutz" moved its attacking area to the waters around Jan Mayen.

No reports came in on operations in the Mediterranean.

The Schnorchel-equipment dispatched in April for the boats at Salamis has now arrived. The time required for the installation will be six weeks considering the situation at the dockyards there.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

West Area:

During the day strong enemy forces continuously attacked the defense positions in the rear in Belgium and northern France as well as the towns of Boulogne, Calais and Ijmuiden and one aerodrome. In western France, a number of aerodromes and railway targets in the area Chartres - Orly and Nantes were attacked.

In the night of 25 Jun, aerodromes in Belgium were attacked by isolated enemy planes.

During the night of 24 Jun, 93 German fighters were operating. They shot down 21 enemy planes at a loss of six of their own. On the occasion of the attack against Berlin which took place in the same night, eleven German fighters shot down one enemy plane whereas anti-aircraft guns brought down another. The following successes were reported from attacks against naval targets in the Seine Bay during the night of 24 Jun: one PC 1800 bomb hit a cruiser or a battleship, another PC 1800

25 Jun. 1944

hit the stern of a larger warship, presumably a battleship, one PC 1800 bomb hit a cruiser or a freighter and one PC 1800 bomb was observed hitting a larger vessel, presumably a freighter.

During the day 423 German fighters were operating in the west assisting the Army. They shot down 20 enemy planes and lost 32 of their own.

The mining of the Seine Bay in the night of 26 Jun. was carried out by 71 German bombers. Two He 111 planes were lost when supplying our forces at Cape de la Hague.

Reich Territory:

Isolated enemy reconnaissance planes were reported during the day over northern, western and southern Germany.

In the night of 25 Jun. 60 Mosquitoes attacked places in the industrial area of Rheinland and Westfalia. Budapest was attacked by 50 enemy planes coming from the south.

Mediterranean Theater:

On 24 Jun. 3 - 4000 four-engined enemy planes coming under fighter escort from southern Italy carried out a daylight attack against Ploesti where one refinery was hit. Forty four of our fighters shot down 23 enemy planes. On our side, 27 Bulgarian and German fighters were lost.

In the Italian front area 550 enemy planes were operating, chiefly concentrating on Firenze. The railway bridge near Mozzani was destroyed. About 50 fighterbombers attacked traffic targets in the Genoa - Alessandria area. Ten planes attacked the harbor Ancona and damaged the southern mole.

On 25 Jun. 200 enemy planes coming from the Foggia area attacked aerodromes in the Toulon area and other 200 four-engined planes attacked Sete, the railway station at Avignon and the Rhone bridges.

East Area:

At the eastern front 394 operations were carried out by our planes during daylight and 77 operations during the night whereas 5085 operations of enemy planes were observed during the day and 447 enemy operations during the night. Four of our planes were lost. Forty three enemy planes were shot down including thirteen which were brought down by anti-aircraft guns.

25 Jun, 1944

VII. War in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea:

1. Area of Naval Group West:

Enemy Situation:

At 2330 on 24 Jun. a convoy of 78 ships in ballast passed Ponte Carnero for the Atlantic. Both ships entered Gibraltar.

Own Situation:

During the attack against Sete 4 - 500 bombs were dropped. The Naval Ammunition Depot burnt out. Seventeen tank-cars were destroyed; one French steamer was set afire. Naval anti-aircraft artillery shot down two enemy planes.

At 0925 the French destroyer "Le Bison" which had been used as a smoke screen vessel was rammed by a German submarine in the harbor of Toulon. The destroyer sunk.

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio monitoring results, Alexandria transmitted air raid warning for two convoys or formations at 2158. In the afternoon one LCT was sighted steering north about 30 miles south of Crotona. In the night of 24 Jun. PT boats were observed moving in the Gulf of Genoa and in the waters off Leghorn.

No more concentrations of ships were made out off Anzio by our air reconnaissance. During the forenoon hours 33 ships were observed in the supply traffic for Anzio.

According to radio monitoring results, part of the eastbound convoy KMS 53 was in the Alexandria waters during the night of 24 Jun. The eastbound convoy KMS 54 was observed in the waters east of Oran in the night of 25 Jun. Parts of this convoy are destined for Tarent and eastern Sicily.

Own Situation:

During a fight of two submarine chasers with enemy PT boats off Sestre Levante in the night of 23 Jun. four of the eight enemy PT boats were sunk for certain and another PT boat was set afire.

In the night of 24 Jun. a northbound convoy of naval landing craft had contact with enemy PT boats off Levanto and in the Moneglia Bay. A

25 Jun 1944

A southbound convoy was attacked by PT boats off Marina di Pisa. Both convoys reached their destination without suffering damages. The enemy PT boats were sighted on their way back west of our minefields.

The naval battery and the office at Piombino West answered the enemy artillery fire on the isle of Elba until the battery was withdrawn. The ammunition of the anti-aircraft guns, the radar station and important materials were removed. On the afternoon of 25 Jun. the Naval Radio Station Piombino was dismantled and moved to the north.

In the night of 24 Jun. the mineship DIETRICH VON BERN carried out the mine operation southwest of the Vada Bank according to plans.

No special reports came in from the escort and patrol service.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster General approved, for the time being, the measures concerning the command system as reported by Naval Command, Italy (compare War Diary 23 Jun.).

Armed Forces High Command informed Naval Staff on the following directive to Commanding General, Southwest:

In view of the decisive importance of the harbors of Genoa, La Spezia, and Leghorn for the enemy and considering the very long time required, as seen from previous experience, for the preparation of effective destructions, Commanding General, Southwest will make available immediately engineer forces as strong as possible and possibly explosives for German Naval Command, Italy. Commanding General, Southwest will report what number of forces can be made available.

3. Area of Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio monitoring of the Army, a partisan station asked Lissa for supply of rifles and ammunition. It can be derived from this report that Lissa is still serving as a supply base for the Tito formations.

Own Situation:

On the evening of 22 Jun., an auxiliary sailing vessel was stranded in the Arsa Bay. Salvage attempts had to be given up as useless.

25 Jun. 1944

On the same day, the naval base at Korcula was fired upon by bandits. No casualties were sustained.

At 0230 on 24 Jun. a coastal motorboat met enemy PT boats north of Senegallia.

At 2300 on the same day one of our convoys of infantry landing boats and one auxiliary sailing vessel were fired upon from the land near Peljesac. The auxiliary sailing vessel sunk. One of the anti-aircraft gunners of this boat who was rescued reported that the enemy was taken aboard from the land by PT boats.

On the occasion of the transfer under escort of two German PT boats of the Croatian torpedo boat T "7" from Sibenik to Fiume our boats had contact in the night of 24 Jun. with three big enemy PT boats in the waters west of Murter. The torpedo boat T "7" was set afire by gunfire and was rediscovered offshore at the western side of Murter. Eleven men of the crew including the commandant are missing. It is possible that they were made prisoners. The PT boats had no opportunity to attack and entered the harbor of Zara.

On the morning of 25 Jun. the torpedo boat TA 22 was continuously attacked by eight or ten fighterbombers during a trial trip at the dockyard southeast of Trieste. The boat was hit by two bombs and by strong gunfire from the air and entered the San Marco dockyards with a heavy list. One enemy plane was reported shot down for certain and another was reported probably shot down.

In the night of 24 Jun., the mine operation east of Ancona was carried out by four harbor patrol cutters as scheduled. Thus the coastal route south of Ancona has been fouled with mines.

The mineship FASANA and one anti-submarine chaser carried out a mine operation early on 25 Jun. Presumably it was the mine task "Zobel" 3.

In the evening, the mineships KIBITZ and FASANA left Trieste together with the torpedo boat of foreign construction TA "38" in order to carry out the mine operation "Feh".

At 1120 the dropping of four magnetic mines was observed south of Grado. The traffic route "Lerche" was therefore temporarily closed.

b. Aegean Sea:

On the occasion of an enemy air attack against Rhodes in the evening of 25 Jun. the ships remained undamaged. On 24 Jun.

25 Jun. 1944

a sabotage agent carrying an adhesive mine was arrested in the harbor Piraeus. Escort service was carried out according to plans. Otherwise, no particular events were reported.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance on the afternoon of 24 Jun., three freighters and one tanker were steering an east course off the Turkish coast.

The report on the alleged locating during the night of 23 Jun. of two freighters in the harbor of Sevastopol was now corrected. The two vessels were sighted out in the sea in the waters west of Chersones.

Own Situations:

In the night of 24 Jun. the PT boat operations which had been ordered were carried out as scheduled. The first group did not make out the mole of Yalta exactly because of the mist. The group did therefore not fire its torpedoes. The second group had no contact with the enemy off the Crimean coast between Cape Chersones and Cape Sarytch. The group was not discovered by the enemy and returned to Constanta at 1030.

The convoys along the western coast were postponed because of the bad weather.

Situation at the Danube:

No reports came in.

VIII. Situation East Asia:

According to information given to the German naval attache by the Japanese Navy, the attack against the Port Bleir aerodrome at 0915 Tokyo time on 21 Jun. was carried out by 13 bombers of the type Barracuda and by 22 fighters of the Corsaire type. Six planes were shot down. Officers who were made prisoners declared that the formation was 100 miles west and consisted of the ILLUSTRIOUS, VALIANT, RENOWN, NEWCASTLE, CEYLON, NIGERIA and seven destroyers. The formation had left Tricomali on 18 Jun. and had orders to return to that place after the attack. In addition to these ships, two auxiliary aircraft carriers with 20 planes each, three cruisers and a few destroyers were said to be at Tricomali or at Colombo. The prisoners said that great difficulties were existing in the production of British merchant ships.

26 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance.

The Swedish Prime Minister declared in a speech on the invasion that it's extensions reached as far as Scandinavia. Both belligerent parties were apparently reckoning with operations also in that area. Sweden was therefore well aware that it might be confronted with serious problems. That was the reason why the military preparedness had been increased.

The German Foreign Minister went to Helsinki in order to ask the Finnish President and the Finnish Government to pledge their word that Finland will not negotiate nor conclude any armistice or peace without German cooperation.

The Finnish President has so far refused to give this promise which was asked for as a condition for further German assistance alone for himself. Therefore the Finnish parliament held a session today to discuss this matter.

The question of a reshuffle in the Finnish cabinet has not been decided yet. The President of the State is personally in favor of an unconditional carrying on of the war. The military leaders do not seem to be sufficiently determined. According to information from Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff, Navy the Fuehrer wishes the Foreign Minister to obtain a definite declaration that the Finns are determined to a stubborn resistance and that any readiness to negotiate with the Russians will stop immediately. Further German assistance will depend on this promise to be given by the Finns.

Conference on the Situation with Commander in Chief, Navy.

Commanding Admiral, Fleet and Commander, Destroyers are present.

I. High Command, Air, Operations Staff in cooperation with Naval Staff dispatched the night-fighter command ship TOGO as aircraft reporting ship and anti-aircraft artillery ship for the operation "Rotbuche" and "Tanne". The ship will remain under the authority of 1st Air Force. The trip to the operation theater and the participation of the ship in the operation "Rotbuche" and "Tanne" will be arranged by 1st Air Force in direct cooperation with Naval Command, East. The ship will be ready from 30 Jun. onward. She is presently at Gdynia. Copies of the relevant orders of High Command, Air, Operations Staff were simultaneously sent to Naval Command, East.

26 Jun. 1944

II. A landing boat of the "Linse" type exploded at Le Havre. Two commando boats, two landing boats and one motor minesweeper sunk on this occasion. The Transport Group O of Small Battle Flotilla 361 with 20 devices left Saalburg on 24 Jun.

The formation Small Battle Flotilla 211 which left the harbor at 2300 on 25 Jun, returned because of trouble in the towing device. The flotilla entered the harbor again and no operations took place therefore.

III. On 15 Jun, the Spanish Government answered the German note concerning the sinking by a British submarine of the steamers HOCHHEIMER and BALDUR in Spanish territorial waters. The Spanish Government explained that the British Government gave the satisfaction which had been asked for by the Spanish Government. For details compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

IV. Naval Staff, Quartermaster General:

a. In case Finland will leave us, further developments may lead to the necessity to establish a Commanding General, Finland. Naval Staff informed Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff that it would approve in such case.

b. Naval Command, North asked for an allocation of 12.8 centimeter anti-aircraft guns for Brunsbuettel. Commander in Chief, Navy ordered to investigate whether the guns can be taken from the stock provided for Memel. The protection of the canal is of great importance.

c. German Naval Command, Italy is of the opinion that, in view of the unreliability of the Italian soldiers which is increasing every day, an infantry guard is necessary for the batteries manned with Italian only. Forty men would be required for each of the existing six batteries. Commanding General refused because of lack of forces and suggested to replace 60 or 70% of the Italian soldiers by Germans. The army coastal batteries are doing the same already. The problem is urgent as the desertions of Italian soldiers are constantly increasing. German Naval Command, Italy asked for the necessary personnel.

The matter will be dealt with by Naval Staff, Quartermaster General.

d. Concerning the transfer of motor vehicles to the Army, Commanding General, West complained at Armed Forces High Command on the

26 Jun. 1944

refusal of Naval Group, West. Armed Forces High Command answered by reminding him of the already existing powers of Commanding General, West. Therefore, Commanding General, West has absolute authority to use also the motor vehicles of the Navy. Commander in Chief, Navy ordered to protest as much as necessary for the carrying out of the duties of the Naval Staff. The following directive was therefore issued by Naval Staff, Quartermaster General to Group West with copies to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy and to Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters:

"Naval Staff fully recognizes that in the present situation the Navy must assist the Army by all means with its motor vehicle space in the west area. At least 600 tons of motor vehicle space were therefore already made available for the Army. However, the decision on the volume of the assistance must remain with Commanding Admiral, Naval Group West because only he is in a position to judge the consequences of the transfer of transport space for the conduct of naval warfare and in particular of the submarine warfare. Commander in Chief, Navy believes that the Fuehrer Directive No. 40 does not entitle the Commanding General to order the volume of the motor transport space to be supplied by the Navy. Commanding Admiral, Naval Group West is responsible for the reservation of the interests of naval warfare."

e. The attitude of Naval Staff concerning the request for 20,000 men of new emergency units of the Navy remains unchanged (compare War Diary 25 Jun.). The decision that the specialists required for commissioning etc. are still to be withdrawn from the nearly 40,000 men already made available in the west area will be maintained.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

V. Situation of the Army:

West Area:

Isolated defense positions at Cherbourg are still putting up resistance. On both sides of Tilly the enemy gained some territory. All other attacks were warded off.

The 9th and 10th Armored Infantry Division which had been transferred from the East is assembling northwest of Paris.

German casualties in Normandy between 6 and 22 Jun. were reported to total 30,000 men. In Italy the heavy fighting on both sides of Lake Trasimeno is going on.

26 Jun. 1944

In Finland enemy attacks were warded off at the Karelian front. The second Finnish position in the Isthmus of Aunus was evacuated. The Finns are planning to defend the forest position in that area which they defended successfully in 1939.

At our own Eastern Front it was suspiciously quiet in the sections of Army Group South- and North-Ukraina.

In the area of Central Army Group the enemy enlarged the territories gained in former penetrations and new breaking through was reported from other areas. Our XXXVth Army Corps is threatened by enclosure. In the Orsha area the enemy reached the Dnjepr. Our troops trying to break away from Vitebsk were repulsed. The road Orsha - Wilno was cut off by the enemy. The situation in general is very serious.

No reports came in on larger fighting operations in the area of Army Group North.

Special Items.

I. After conferring with Commanding Admiral, Fleet and Commander, Destroyers, the Naval Staff issued the following directive to Group West; Naval Command, East; to the Fleet and to Commander, Destroyers concerning the request of Group West for a transfer of torpedo boats to the west (compare War Diary 16 Jun.):

"A. The transfer to the west area of torpedo boats of the type 35/37 is impossible because of the general situation as

1. 3rd Torpedo boat Flotilla is indispensable for the defense of the troop transporters between Oslo and Aarhus as well as for the traffic which has to make a detour because of the closure of the Kiel Canal,

2. 2nd Torpedo boat Flotilla is required for the operation "Rotbuche" in the Gulf of Finland,

3. special tasks ("Tann" and "Birke") will presumably make necessary operations of both flotillas, and as

4. training and equipment with radar location finding sets which is a necessary condition for operations in the west were so far impossible because of the above mentioned duties.

B. The training has to be improved in the present operation areas. Naval Command, East has to provide training opportunities for the flotillas as far as possible in view of the operational tasks and considering the fuel situation.

26 Jun. 1944

C. The opportunities for operations of the torpedo boat T "28" which is the only torpedo boat in the operation area have to be regarded as being very small. A transfer of the boat to the east as soon as possible seems therefore to be desirable. Group West shall transmit its opinion and report by which time the boat can be ready for the transfer to the east."

Naval Command, East reported thereupon that 2nd and 3rd Torpedo boat Flotillas were released effective immediately and until further notice for training purposes, that is to say within the ordered operation areas.

II. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff transmitted the following directive to Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway, to Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces in Scandinavia and to Naval Staff, Operations Division:

"It is not planned for the time being to withdraw 196th Infantry Division from the central Norwegian area. As the division has to be transferred by rail to a south Norwegian harbor in case it should be moved to the west, Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces in Scandinavia will be informed in due time. It will be sufficient if the naval transport space is ready at the port of embarkation eight days after the issuing of the transfer order."

Therefore, we have to reckon with new troop transports from Oslo within the next future. This has to be taken into consideration in case of a possible withdrawal of torpedo boats or destroyers from the Skagerrak.

III. Concerning the operation "Tanne":

Naval Command, East reported that the commander of the parachute infantry battalion of Brandenburg Division was informed on the task and provided with the necessary particulars by Chief of Staff, Naval Command, East and by Operations Officer, 1st Air Force.

Naval Staff reported to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Operations Branch that the infantry landing craft command of 416th Infantry Division with 60 infantry landing craft is urgently required for the first wave. Immediate transfer by special transport from Aalborg to Swinenuende was asked for in order to embark the formation on the special vessel H "27" of 1st Landing Division. The vessel H "27" is equipped with heavy loading gear and has a speed of 12.5 knots. Naval Staff will make further suggestions after conferring with the Battalion commander.

26 Jun. 1944

IV. Concerning the use of DM-mines, Group West reported that no concrete evidence is available that a breach of security took place already by previous air operations. It is only feared that the training of the Air Force formations for mine operations is generally poor. Every possible precautionary measure has been taken by the Air Force. The area released by Group West for DM-mines is three miles off shore.

V. Ministerialdirektor Bauer of the Reich Ministry for Transport expressed by telephone to Naval Staff, Operations Division his concern over the situation at the Danube where losses do not cease occurring which lead already to the refusal of the Hungarians to sail on that river.

For the note on the telephone discussion l/Skl I a 24479/44 geh. compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV a.

VI. According to an information from High Command, Air, Operations Staff, the fuel consumption of the minesweeping planes far exceeds the allotments which have been provided. The carrying on of air activities at this extent was declared impossible. High Command, Air, Operations Staff was informed that in view of the present deficiency in other minesweeping areas it is impossible to do without increased operations of minesweeping planes and that even a reduction at a later time would have to be thoroughly discussed with Special Plenipotentiary, Danube. Naval Staff communicated this opinion to Inspector, Minesweeping, Danube with copies to Group South and to Special Plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer for Danube Problems and transmitted the following declaration to High Command, Air, Operations Staff with copies to Special Plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer for Danube Problems and to High Command, Air, Inspector of Aerial Mines:

"A curtailment of the fuel for minesweeping planes is impossible at present, because other minesweeping devices are not yet available in sufficient quantity and because the situation is very grave. Even after the arrival of the minesweeping equipment which is on the way already, any reduction of the operations of minesweeping planes has to be closely investigated with Special Plenipotentiary, Danube because the Danube in particular is of the utmost importance for the fuel transports. It is asked therefore to obtain from Armed Forces, High Command an adequate special allotment of aircraft fuel."

26 Jun, 1944

VII. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division ordered Bureau of Naval Armament, Naval (Ship) Construction Division and Chief Committee for Ship Construction to prepare as soon as possible 25 artillery naval ferry barges and 12 minelaying naval ferry barges by reconstructing newly built naval landing craft.

Situation 26 Jun.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Invasion:

According to informations of Naval Staff the situation developed as follows: Further landing and unloading orders were intercepted by radio monitoring. The number of intercepted messages was however smaller than on the previous days. Warships observed were: the destroyer CALVIN, the auxiliary cruiser SOUTHERN PRINCE and ROYAL ULSTERMAN.

In the morning our own air reconnaissance reported one battleship steering south about 20 miles north northwest of Caen and two destroyers and three medium steamers in the same area as well as 20 smaller vessels lying stopped 12 miles north northwest of Caen.

At 0101 Group West gave orders through Naval Communications Officer, Channel Islands to 3rd Battery I/1262 to collect information through the artillery radio net from the other batteries in the Cherbourg area and to report to Group West currently on the situation at the other front sections as radio communications with Cherbourg are interrupted since 1900 on 25 Jun. Furthermore, Naval Communications Officer, Channel Islands will try to maintain constant radio communications with this and possibly other batteries in the Cherbourg area.

At 0655 Group West transmitted the situation report of 0600:

1. 2nd and 9th PT boat Flotilla did not operate because of bad sight.
2. Transfer of the St. Malo PT boats.

The PT boats S "130" and S "140" are entering Dieppe. The

26 Jun. 1944

PT boat S "145" returned to Alderney because of engine trouble with two engines. The report of the boats arrival at Alderney is still to come. Concerning the fight of 6th Gunboat Flotilla in the night of 23 Jun. with enemy PT boats it was additionally reported that two PT boats were probably sunk. The tug PILLKOPPEN sunk after being hit by a torpedo. The tug JOHANN is missing.

The following report came in from Cherbourg at 2300 through Commanding General, Armed Forces West:

The Arsenal Fort Du Roulo and the Jobourg Peninsula as well as some unnamed naval batteries are still putting up resistance.

Locations of enemy targets were reported west of Etaples, northwest of Fecamp, northwest of Malo as well as near Cape de la Hague and near Cherbourg.

At 0752 Port Commander, Alderney reported the arrival of the PT boat S "145".

It was possible, although defectively, to set up radio communications with the Battery I/1262.

At 1135 Naval Communications Officer, Channel Islands transmitted the following report of that battery:

"The outskirts of Cherbourg have been penetrated. Fighting goes on in isolated groups. Communications with Naval Artillery Detachment were interrupted this morning. Communications are still maintained with the Batteries "York" and "Landemer". Preparations have been made for the blowing up of the Quay Homet. The combat group is defending a wedge shaped position between the Battery "Landemer" and Cape de la Hague."

Further radio messages could not be deciphered.

According to intercepted radio messages, the mine-cruiser ADVENTURE reported that close by an unknown vessel had stranded and that assistance of tugs was required. The stranded vessel was damaged under the surface and was in urgent need of assistance.

At 1255 Group West reported:

Port Commander, Cherbourg reported (time of origin 1130):

26 Jun. 1944

1100 fighting for the harbor railway station. Defense forces of the town were partly pushed back. PT boat shelter completely destroyed by torpedoes. Final destruction of the arsenal is going on by fire. The firing control panels in the outer forts are ready for operating.

The Radar Station Jobourg and Radar Station Cape de la Hague reported everything all right at 1030 and 1100 respectively.

According to radio monitoring results which were transmitted at 1640 a minesweeper apparently reported at 1123 mineclearing in 4927 N 0026 W (BF 3681).

At 1700 Group West reported:

The engine trouble on the TB boat S "145" was caused by artillery impact. The PT boats S "130" and S "168" entered Dieppe at 0430.

Plans for the night of 26 Jun:

a. Torpedo and mine operations of the PT boats in the Seine Bay.

b. Laying out of a mine barrage with new firing devices north of Dieppe.

At 1920 Group West regarded landing possibilities for the night of 26 Jun. as favorable along all coasts.

At 2006 Group West transmitted to all radar stations on the Jobourg Peninsula that at 0300 in the night of 26 Jun. victuals for all units will be dropped by parachute near Fort A.

At 2015 Group West transmitted information from 3rd Air Force obtained by monitoring the radio communications of 835th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion saying that Battery "Hamburg" engaged enemy ships from 1200 to 1500 on 25 Jun. One heavy cruiser sunk with list and one heavy cruiser of the CUMBERLAND-class was set afire, exploded and sunk. Further hits were scored on light cruisers. The remaining ships set up smoke screens and sheered off. The battery is still ready for action in spite of the heavy bombardment. Group West added that thus all major naval defense forces of the Fortress Cherbourg are still in action.

26 Jun. 1944

Concerning the further activities of the coastal batteries, Group West reported as follows:

From 1700 to 1900 on 25 Jun. the Army Coastal Battery 6/1255 bombarded the strand La Breche west of Quistreham. At 0110 on 26 Jun. the Army Batteries 3/, 4/, and 8/1245 and the Battery Stella Plage fire upon located targets west of Berck Plage.

From 0230 till 0322 the Army Coastal Batteries 1/, 2/, 3/, 4/, and 8/1245 together with Battery Monte Coupie fired upon located targets west of Le Touquet. The targets sheered off sharply after the first salvo. From 1058 till 1307 the Army Coastal Battery 6/1255 fired upon two transporters at a distance of 17.5 kilometers. The targets set up smoke screens. From 1238 till 1253 the Army Coastal Battery 2/1255 fired upon two destroyers and one escort vessel at a distance of 17.6 kilometers.

At 2140 Group West transmitted the report of an eyewitness according to which on 6 Jun. enemy landing boats fired packages from a horizontal distance of about 30 meters up to the bluff which is 60 meters high. When the packages hit the ground rope-ladders were rolling down on which soldiers climbed the bluff. Some of the ladders slipped down in some instances together with the soldiers.

At 2300 the PT boat S "145" left Alderney for St. Malo.

At 2336 Admiral Krancke broadcast to all in the Cherbourg area:

"The Navy is proud of your stern resistance the duration of which will be of decisive importance for the final victory."

At 2345 Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff transmitted the following directive to Commanding General, Armed Forces West with copy to Naval Staff:

1. It is not to be expected that the enemy will attack the Channel Islands. All the more he will try to take the islands by cutting off the supplies.

2. In order to eke out the stocks of the Channel Islands and in addition to the increase of the stocks as ordered already, every opportunity has to be used immediately to transfer all forces to the continent which are not required for the defense of the island as far as this can be done without more than the normal risk.

26 Jun. 1944

3. Therefore, first of all, the SS Construction Brigade with its concentration camp inmates has to be transferred to the continent. Furthermore, all forces of the Todt Construction Organization which are no more required for the fortification of the island will be sent back. In this connection it has to be taken into consideration that no supplies worth mentioning, in particular of concrete and steel, can be reckoned with. Naval Staff transmitted the directive to Group West and dispatched the following abridged preliminary order:

1. The Fuehrer ordered that men of the Todt Construction Organization and construction laborers (criminals) are still to be moved to the continent, as construction labor is urgently required there and as presently they are merely a burden at the islands.

2. As far as this removal of labor has not yet been arranged by Group West, further orders should be issued by the group."

Upon a suggestion made by Commander in Chief, Navy, the Fuehrer conferred the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross to Naval Shore Commander, Normandy, Rear Admiral Hennecke and to Commander, Battery "Hamburg", Lieutenant (Naval Artillery) Gelbhaar.

On the evening of 26 Jun. eight PT boats were ready for war at Le Havre, one PT boat ready for war at Alderney, two PT boats ready for war at Dieppe, one PT boat ready for war at Ijmuiden.

2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the West Area:

In the area of 19th Group 54 planes were observed in operation. Isolated submarine sighting reports were intercepted from the exit of the western Channel. Three British vessels were located in the rendezvous area.

The British Admiralty announced the entire Bay of Biscay as a declared area up to 15° W.

Reich Security Central Office transmitted the report of a very reliable agent of 25 Jun. concerning the results of the special weapon "V 1": according to the report the incendiary power is higher than in any of the previously used incendiary bombs. The explosive pressure is also higher than in the explosives which were used up to now. The effects

26 Jun. 1944

against human beings reached in some cases over a distance of 250 or 300 meters. During the first days the low flying apparatus made a very strong impression on the morale. Gradually people became accustomed to it. The number of duds was apparently low. Manufactures and offices are continuing to work in spite of the bombardment.

3. Own Situation in Other Parts of the West Area:

Atlantic Coast Area:

Fifteen patrol positions were occupied. One mine was cleared off Lorient, two were cleared in the Lorient area and two others were cleared off St. Nazaire. From 0100 till 0300 an enemy target was located 25 miles west up to south of Point du Raz.

Channel Waters:

Nineteen patrol positions were occupied. One mine was cleared off Le Havre. From 0312 till 0333 Group B of 15th Patrol Flotilla consisting of four armed fishing vessels had contact with enemy PT boats at a distance of 4 - 500 meters northeast of Fecamp. One PT boat was set afire by our gunfire. The enemy boats set up smoke screens and sheered off to the north. Slight damages and casualties were sustained on two of our boats all of which remained ready for war.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

North Sea:

One mine was cleared in the Elbe mouth. The Old Northern Sluice of the Kiel Canal is being operated by hand during high water.

In the Dutch area six more mines were cleared in the western exit of the Vielingen channel.

The strong mining of the Schelde River is possibly intended as a flank protection for the Belgian coast.

26 Jun. 1944

9th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla suffered light damages and casualties during an enemy air attack in the night of 26 Jun. The Coastal Mine A - barrage was laid out south of Helder and off Walcheren. During the day, 20 explosions were observed off the Dutch coast.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Twenty six planes were observed operating in the area of 18th Group. They dispatched two submarine sighting reports.

In the morning, Russian reconnaissance planes reported a German convoy near Kirkenes. Isolated reconnaissance planes were reported over Vardoe, Banak, Trondheim, Sognefjord and Arnoe.

2. Own Situation:

The mineship OSTMARK moved from Copenhagen to Kristiansand.

Forty seven ships were escorted to the north and twenty eight ships to the south.

Naval Command, Norway transmitted the following report on the situation:

The carrier planes repeatedly reported our submarines on 22 and 23 Jun. suggest the presence of a carrier group in the Jan Mayen waters. It is not impossible but not very likely that the planes are taking off from Jan Mayen, as no traces of an enemy occupation were discovered during the last photographic reconnaissance on 1 Jun. It has to be assumed that the destroyer which has been sighted was belonging to the carrier group. It is not probable that the carrier group is permanently controlling the waters in which the enemy suspects our submarine patrol line because other planes would be available for that purpose. The presence of the carrier group may also be due to a PQ-convoy which remained unnoticed. In view of the agent's radio equipment captured on 6 Jun. a planned attack against the TIRPITZ seems most probable. It could be seen from the captured documents that the operation was cancelled several times because of the bad weather but it became also clear that the enemy plans to eliminate the TIRPITZ by

26 Jun. 1944

renewed air attacks. The fact that the attack was so far not carried out is probably due to the insufficient height of the clouds in the Alta area. In addition to that, sudden raids against the coast including attacks on our convoy traffic have to be taken into consideration. Naval Command is of the opinion that the carrier group has now entered a harbor.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to radio monitoring, four groups of two PT boats each were in the inner leads southwest of Hamina in the evening of 25 Jun. Air reconnaissance in the evening of 25 Jun. sighted at Levansaari seven very small vessels and one submarine not ready for diving. On 26 Jun., minesweepers and four PT boats advanced up to north of the Isle of Narvi.

On the afternoon of 26 Jun. a number of boats was sighted from Tytters northwest of Vigrund.

2. Own Situation:

The patrol positions along the western coast of Jutland were occupied. The laying out of KMA-mines was cancelled because of the bad weather. The first convoy North Sea - South left the harbor with seven steamers and one tanker. The convoy going in the opposite direction with four steamers will leave on 27 Jun.

Seven artillery barges for Commanding Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea are on the way from Frederikshavn to Aarhus. The two remaining barges entered Kristiansand.

Thirty boats were operating in the mineclearance service in the Baltic Sea entrances and thirty six boats as well as seven minesweeping planes were operating in the Baltic Sea. One mine was cleared near Rixhoeft and another mine was cleared near Fehmarn.

21st Landing Flotilla with three gunboats, nine naval landing craft and three other vessels left Gdynia in the evening for Windau. The BEITZEN arrived at Pillau at noon.

26 Jun. 1944

The torpedo boat T "4" entered Helsinki in the night of 25 Jun. carrying ammunition. Four naval landing craft were ordered to transport mines for the Finns. The submarine U "481" entered Reval coming from the east. The submarine U "748" started for Finland. The submarine U "1193" will follow on 27 Jun.

In the course of the transfer of 122nd Infantry Division, 6,059 men, 1227 horses, 1478 vehicles, 1300 tons of ammunition etc. had embarked by 0800.

After the arrival at Reval of 4,000 rounds the temporary shortness of 8.8 centimeter shells was overcome.

1st Motor Mine-Sweeper Flotilla reported contact with four enemy PT boats at 2349 during an exploratory sweep in the waters near Narvi. Further details are still to be reported.

The first net enclosure for the operation "Rotbuche" was installed on 25 Jun. and is ready for service now. The second net enclosure will probably be completed on 5 Jul.

No reports came in from Lake Peipsi.

A Finnish PT boat operation is planned for the night of 26 Jun.

V. Submarine Warfare.

No particular reports came in from the West Area.

In the Atlantic the submarine U "530" met the Japanese submarine FOEHRE in order to hand over a radar set together with an instruction officer and the submarine U "183" met the submarine U "537" in order to supply her.

The operation areas of Group "Trutz" in the Northern Waters are from grid square AA 6940 up to grid square AF 1660.

At 0704 the submarine U "771" of Group "Mitte" reported an air attack in AF 8447 and the shooting down of one Liberator. At 1618 the submarine U "999" reported an air attack in AN 3777.

In the Indian Ocean the station Colombe transmitted at 1838 on 24 Jun. a submarine sighting report of a British steamer in MS 9780.

26 Jun. 1944

VI. Aerial Warfare.

West Area:

During the day, only very slight air activity without attacks was reported from the occupied western territories. No enemy planes at all entered German controlled territory during the night of 26 Jun. Four enemy planes were shot down during the day by 271 German fighters who lost nine of their own. In the night of 26 Jun. no German operations were carried out either.

Reich Territory:

Several hundreds of enemy bombers under fighter escort entered the area Vienna - Bratislava coming from the south. An attack of medium strength was carried out against Vienna concentrating on the industrial works and on the outskirts of Greater Vienna. The Heinkel Aircraft Factory was hit. The enemy planes did not attack when flying over Hungary. In the night of 26 Jun. 40 Mosquitoes dropped bombs on several villages in the Goettingen area. Damage was done chiefly to fields.

Mediterranean Area:

On 25 Jun. about 100 enemy planes under fighter escort attacked traffic targets in the German occupied Italian area as railway stations and traffic installations. Three hundred planes were reported over the front area. Five ground attack planes attacked a German torpedo boat in the Gulf of Trieste. The hydroplane base Pola was attacked with gunfire by an enemy plane. Our fighters shot down four enemy planes during free lance operations. One enemy plane was shot down by anti-aircraft guns in the front area.

During the night of 25 Jun. 60 planes were reported supplying bandits in the Balkans 40 of which came from the Italian area and 20 came from Russia. About 30 planes carried out harassing flights in the north Italian area.

German planes made reconnaissance flights in the Adriatic Sea and over the Tyrrhenian Sea.

26 Jun. 1944

East Area:

On 25 Jun. 475 German and 4,552 enemy air operations were reported from the Eastern Front. Forty seven enemy planes were shot down at a loss of five of our own.

In the night of 25 Jun. 105 German bombers attacked the railway station at Smolensk. Good hits were observed.

VII. War in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea.

1. Area of Naval Group West:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

Submarine hunting was without results.

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Situation:

In the night of 26 Jun. enemy PT boats were again made out in the Gulf of Genoa and south of Spezia. Piombino is occupied by the enemy.

Own Situation:

On the afternoon of 25 Jun. Viareggio was attacked by enemy planes. Early on 26 Jun. the last harbor entrance of Leghorn was closed.

Escort and patrol services were carried out according to schedule.

3. Area of Naval Group South:

26 Jun. 1944

a. Adriatic Sea:

Concerning the fight the torpedo boat T "7" and German PT boats had on the evening of 24 Jun. (compare War Diary 25 Jun.) it can be seen from the battle report that the torpedo boat T "7" did not follow the leading PT boats but passed between the islands Cocogliari and Murter. During that time the boat was probably attacked with torpedoes which however missed the target and the explosions of which at the shore could be heard. After the three vessels had reunited they had contact with three particularly large enemy PT boats which at first attacked the torpedo boat T "7". The torpedo boat did not answer. Our own PT boats could not attack with torpedoes because the torpedo boat T "7" was in an overlapping position. Whereas two of the enemies kept our own PT boats busy the third enemy boat approached the torpedo boat with the searchlights put on. The commandant of the PT boat S "157" is of the opinion that the torpedo boat T "7" was destroyed or had been beached.

In the night of 26 Jun. a south bound naval landing craft had contact with two unknown vessels east of Fane. One hit was observed on the target. No damages were sustained on the occasion of enemy air attacks against Rimini and Ancona in the afternoon of 25 Jun.

b. Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

c. Black Sea:

Nothing to report.

Situation on the Danube:

No dropping of mines was reported. Three towed barges were damaged when hitting mines near kilometer indicator 1540. No mines were cleared. The operations of minesweeping planes had to be discontinued temporarily because of lack of fuel.

26 Jun. 1944

VIII. Situation East Asia.

According to a Reuter report, a further Japanese destroyer was sunk between the Marianas and the Philippine Islands during the battle of 19 Jun. On 18 Jun. a submarine probably sunk an aircraft carrier. Altogether the Japanese were said to have lost 638 planes and 44 ships. The losses of the USA are: four ships damaged, 98 planes lost.

An unofficial Japanese statement claimed the following Japanese successes:

Battleships	1 sunk
	1 sunk or damaged
	2 heavily damaged
Carriers	5 sunk or damaged
	4 heavily damaged
Cruisers	2 sunk
	4 heavily damaged
Destroyers	1 sunk
Transporters	6 heavily damaged
Submarines	1 damaged
Planes	400 shot down

According to American reports, 76 Japanese planes were shot down during an attack against the Bonin Islands on 24 Jun. Two enemy aircraft carriers were sunk on the occasion of this attack according to a Domei report.

27 Jun, 1944

Items of Political Importance

The Finnish Parliament decided to continue the war. The declaration asked for by the German Foreign Minister was not brought before the House. Therefore, as this declaration was made by the President of State it is not an absolutely binding obligation in a strictly constitutional sense.

Conference on the Situation with Commander in Chief, Navy at 1115.

I. Chief, Bureau of Naval Armament reported on the result of the armament conference, Generaldirektor Merker will be able only by the beginning of Jul to know how the naval construction program will develop.

The entire air armament was taken over by Reich Minister Speer. General Fieldmarshal Milch as an area deputy of Reich Minister Speer is placed under the authority of the latter.

II. Situation of the Army:

The situation in the central part of the Eastern Front has furthermore deteriorated quite extraordinarily. The enemy attacks concentrated on the 9th Army and on the gap between 4th and 3rd Tank Army. Thus the danger for the center of the army group to be outflanked from both sides became quite imminent. The enemy enlarged his territory gained in the break through towards Bobruisk. Enemy tank formations are advancing towards southwest through the gap between 3rd and 4th Tank Army.

In the area of Army Group North heavy fighting started east of Polotsk and south of Pskov.

In the west the possibility of new enemy plans became apparent for an offensive towards the Seine and Somme. According to information from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy the Fuehrer regards it as possible that the enemy will be forced to an operation against the Channel coast by the German long range offensive with the new weapons. The next operational target of the Army Group Montgomery is an offensive in an eastern direction towards Paris and an advance towards La Havre. The Fuehrer said on 26 Jun: "The decision of this war will come in the west area. All interests of the three Services have to be subordinated to this fact. The last

27 Jun. 1944

man who can be made available for the warding off of new landings must be brought into action now." On 26 Jun. it was possible - by using up our last reserves - to prevent an enemy break through for the occupation of the Caen area."

The situation in the Italian theater remained unchanged in general.

Special Items.

I. According to a telephone report of Operations Officer, Group South, the Bulgarian Navy asked Group South for a friendly discussion on the presence of German naval forces in the Bulgarian harbors. The request was apparently caused by the visit of the new Bulgarian foreign minister at Varna and Burgas. The Group can not avoid to accept this invitation for a conference and asked - if necessary - for instructions. Naval Staff, Operations Division approved the holding of such conference. No new instructions are required as Group South was informed by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch on 26 Jun.

In this connection, the Foreign Office transmitted a report of German Embassy, Sofia asking for the opinion of Naval Staff whether the presence of the hydroplanes at Varna is absolutely necessary or what would be the consequences of a transfer to another place. As this is concerning the German Air Force, the matter was already handed over to the Air Force by Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy.

II. Concerning the operation "Tanne":

Naval Command, East reported further plans for the transport of the first wave in case it has to be carried out by transporters and in case it is to be carried out by cruisers and destroyers only. Naval Staff transmitted these plans to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy and pointed especially to the fact that in case of a transport only by warships the advantage of a higher cruising speed will be neutralized to a considerable extent because it is necessary for unloading the equipment to take along the special vessel H "27" with a maximum speed of 12.5 knots and that the large cargo of troops and equipment will reduce the ability of the cruisers to use their weapons. For copy of the letter l/Skl I op 1916/44 Gkdos. Chefs. compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

27 Jun. 1944

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff ordered in accordance with the request of Naval Staff that the infantry landing craft formation of 416th Infantry Division with 60 infantry landing craft has to be transferred immediately by special transport from Aalborg to Swinemuende in order to embark there on the transport vessel H "27" of 1st Landing Flotilla.

III. Commander, Destroyers reported that because of the previous operations in the Skagerrak and in the Baltic Sea the training and the material readiness of the torpedo boats could not be improved. Therefore, none of the boats is ready for operations in the west area at present. This fact is already known from the personal report of Commander, Destroyers on 26 Jun. and it was taken into consideration for the decision concerning the transfer to the west.

IV. Naval Staff sent the following directive to Naval Command, East and Naval Command, Norway:

"In case the situation in Finland is going to deteriorate - no indications of such a development do exist at present - there is a possibility that Finnish ships will try to avoid German seizure by escaping particularly to Swedish harbors. Any suspicious ship movements as far as can be detected by unobtrusive observation should be reported immediately."

V. Referring to the hint the Fuehrer gave to Commander in Chief, Navy concerning the possibility of the Russians crossing the Dniester Liman, Naval Staff reported to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Operations Division as follows:

"A. The following measures can be taken by the Navy:

1. Operations of PT boats, motor mine-sweepers and naval landing craft as a protection of the flank on sea.

2. Operations of midget vessels on the Liman (motorboats with one 2 centimeter gun or one machine gun each and of naval artillery barges with light anti-aircraft guns).

3. Dispatch to the Liman of all (six) available Army coastal batteries which were provided for the Roumanian area.

27 Jun. 1944

B. Operations of vessels on the Liman are strongly hindered and cannot therefore be advocated because of the lack of camouflaging facilities and because of the insufficient defense against the enemy air force.

Naval Group South was ordered to take the necessary steps in accordance with Army Group South Ukraina."

Group South was informed and got order to report on the measures taken.

VI. Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division, in an evaluation of informations on foreign navies, reported on a British method of camouflaging ships and vessels. For copy as per l/Skl 20781/44 Gkdos. compare War Diary, Part D, Vol. "Materials on the Enemy Situation".

Situation on 27 Jun.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Invasion:

According to intercepted radio messages the enemy disembarked between 25 Jun. and 1800 on 26 Jun. 5,747 tons of supply goods, 1,173 vehicles and 7,205 men in the area of Southeast Ferry Control. During these two days the destroyer JERVIS, the seaplane parent ship ALBATROS, the escort vessel ROCHESTER and the auxiliary cruiser SOUTHERN PRINCE were observed among the British warships. In the morning a big lighter in BF 3675 which had a load of trailers for trucks asked for help of tugs.

In the afternoon our own air reconnaissance sighted four big warships and twenty transporters north of Courseulles and seven or ten big war vessels as well as thirty transporters, including two burning, north of Port en Bessin.

According to reports coming in at Naval Staff, further developments were as follows:

At 0100, Commanding General, Group West transmitted the report of

27 Jun. 1944

the port captain Cherbourg of 2058 on 26 Jun: Harbor railway station captured by the enemy. Fort Roule ceased fire. No communications. The guns of Bastion Battery were surrendered to the enemy unnecessarily by General Sattler whose command station is situated there. The arsenal together with the outer forts W 216 and W 217 but without Fort Flamand are still defended by a very small number of gallant men.

Commanding Admiral, Group West declared the step of General Sattler as quite uncomprehensible. The group expected the modern 10.5 centimeter Naval Battery Bastion on the outer mole to prevent the enemy for a long time from penetrating into the harbors. It is almost impossible to destroy by gunfire the battery on the narrow mole protected by concrete shelters. Only small boats which can easily be warded off could land on the mole. Minesweeping in order to clear the harbor entrances is impossible for the enemy as long as the battery remains ready for action. The firing control panels for the dependent minefields on the mole cannot be eliminated as long as they are protected by the battery. I regard the order of General Sattler as contrary to the Fuehrer Directive No. 40 and as evidence of lacking understanding for the problems of shore defense. This report with the exception of the last sentence was transmitted to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy.

At 0955. Captain Assmann was informed by telephone that it is necessary to wait for the opinion of Commander in Chief Navy concerning the Battery Bastion and that the report of the Port Captain, Cherbourg should not be submitted earlier. Captain Assmann said that he had informed already the relevant expert of the Army and General Warlimont. During the investigation of the matter doubts were raised as to the correctness of the conclusions drawn by Group West because, according to the maps available at Naval Staff, the Battery Bastion had its position partly west of the arsenal on land and partly on the big outer mole. Following a telephone discussion with the operation officer of Group West and after the group had made its own investigation, the group withdrew its first declaration but submitted a new declaration in the afternoon.

At 0420. Naval Shore Commander, Channel Islands reported that a German convoy had contact with enemy PT boats at 0230 in map square BF 3813. Our convoy suffered no damage.

27 Jun. 1944

At 0434, Naval Staff was informed by Command, Small Battle Units that owing to the bad weather operations of Small Battle Flotilla 211 are impossible.

At 0445, Location Center, Bretagne reported that the Radar Station Jobourg was closed at 0105 and blown up.

At 0459, the same location center reported to 7th Army Command as of 0115: Heavy defensive fighting at the eastern corner with the landfront Guelker.

Upon a request of Group West: "Who is in command and who defends the outer mole?", Port Commander, Cherbourg reported: "Commander Witt".

At 0928, Port Commander, Cherbourg reported still as of the evening of 26 Jun: No more fighting can be observed all around Cherbourg. Telephone connections were reestablished with Battery "York" which reported the destruction of a small cruiser on 25 June. This battery and apparently also the Battery "Hamburg" are still ready for action without being attacked from the land. Telephone communications exist with Group Keil.

At 1000, Group West transmitted the report of Port Commander, Cherbourg of 0925:

"Early on 27 Jun. and after the Fort A 3 had given up resistance, fighting ceased also at Fort A 4. The Fort A 5 under the command of Lieutenant (E) Moczinski and the Fort W 216 under the command of Leading Seaman Adam were still fighting heroically. The connection between Dock Homet and the Large Roads was blown up as the last act of destruction. Commander (E) Wist is defending Fort Homet. At 0330 the Port Commander moved his command post with a sailing yacht and rowing boats to Fort West in order to defend the minefield together with the rest of his staff and fellow-combatants of the last days as well as with part of the staff of Rocket Projector Regiment 101 including the commander of that regiment. The situation at Fort Ile de Pelee is not clear. Fort West has neither machine-guns nor anti-aircraft guns since the attack from the sea on 25 Jun.

At 1255, Port Commander, Cherbourg reported:

"No more fighting at Cherbourg since dawn."

Group West reported on the activities of the coastal batteries:

27 Jun. 1944

At 1505 and 1640 on 26 Jun. the Army Coastal Batteries 6 and 7/1255 fired upon one freighter and one transporter respectively. A hit was scored on the freighter. The targets put up smoke screens.

From 1530 till 1700 the Battery 7/1255 was bombarded by heavy naval guns without sustaining damages or casualties.

From 2120 till 2200 and from 2300 till 2400 the Battery 6/1255 fired on landing activities near La Breche. The same target was fired upon by Army Coastal Battery 3/1255 at 0035 and at 0210 on 27 Jun.

Army Coastal Battery 2/1255 fired on located targets north of Fecamp from 0314 till 0336. The target sheered off.

At 1310, Group West reported concerning the affair of Naval Battery Bastion: "The Naval Battery Bastion was not on the outer mole but west of the town area in a bastion near the arsenal.

The measure taken by General Sattler is regarded as quite uncomprehensible here. The group expected the modern 10.5 centimeter Naval Battery Bastion which is completely protected by concrete shelters and which had its position opposite the western harbor entrance to delay for a considerable time the enemy advance into the harbor. Minesweeping off the harbor entrance is impossible for the enemy as long as the battery is ready for action. The minefield control shelter on the mole for the dependent minefields could not be annihilated as long as it was under the protection of the battery. I regard the order of General Sattler as contrary to the Fuehrer Directive No. 40 and displaying a lack of understanding for the problems of naval defense."

At 1645, Group West reported on the situation at 1100: The minefield L 24 A north of Dieppe was laid out according to schedule. The patrol boat V "1531" had contact with two enemy PT boats from 0212 till 0217 in the area of Fecamp. The boat reportedly observed hits on the enemy and had a fire in her own foreship. Plans for the night of 27 Jun. are as follows:

- a. PT boats mine- and torpedo-operations in the Seine Bay.
- b. Laying out of minefield northeast of Dieppe if possible.

27 Jun. 1944

At 2125, Group West transmitted to all that the parachuting of victuals which was cancelled yesterday would take place today at the same hour and at the same place.

At 2130, Group West reported: At 2000 the Battery "York" opens fire on a destroyer with six PT boats off the harbor entrance. The destroyer sheered off behind a smoke screen. Two PT boats sheered off 1000 meters off the western entrance. Fire could not be opened because of lack of weapons. Off the eastern entrance a mine exploded behind one of the PT boats. Fighting on land is going on in the area of Battery "York" and further west. In the east they fight south of Cape Levi. The Radar Station Cape Levi did not answer any more since 0300.

Upon a suggestion of Commanding Admiral, Naval Group West, the Golden German Cross was conferred by Commander in Chief, Navy upon Commander Witt.

Concerning the question of the enemy freighter space for the invasion, Naval Staff Naval Intelligence Division declared:

Reports which came in currently from reliable sources on considerable concentrations of freighters carrying full cargo could not be checked or confirmed by air reconnaissance before the landing. Without considering the size of the concentrations which were differing in the various reports but which seemed quite possible in general in view of the tonnage surplus, it had to be assumed according to the impression gained from all information available that the reports were actually based on facts. The presence of freighters confirmed already during the first days of the invasion by radio monitoring and eye witnesses, the Liberty - and coastal freighters made out at the landing place near Carentan by photographic reconnaissance, the freighter space of 270,000 BRT seen off the Orne mouth on 22 Jun., as well as mooring places for freighters marked on a captured map were sufficient evidence that the enemy was currently using large freighter space from the beginning even without having possession of a big harbor. With the progress of the fighting and following the occupation of Cherbourg we have to reckon with the use of freighters corresponding to the requirements of the planned campaign. The freighters moved to the operation theater are constantly being replaced. This is not only indicated by the informations which are coming in but particularly since the end of April by the suspected increase of the supplies on the route USA - England."

27 Jun. 1944

2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the West Area:

In the area of 19th Group 30 planes were observed in operation. Four British ships were located in the rendezvous area.

3. Own Situation in Other Parts of the West Area:

Atlantic Coast Area:

Seventeen patrol positions were occupied. Seven mines were cleared off Brest. The patrol vessel LG "1" was sunk by an enemy plane south of St. Nazaire.

Channel Waters:

Fifteen patrol positions were occupied. Traffic to the Channel Islands was maintained. The Batteries "Lindemann" and "Todt" fired at 0900 upon a ship (3,000 BRT) south of Folkestone without observing results.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

North Sea:

One ELM/A- mine was cleared off the Elbe. On 26 Jun. the mail steamer between Amrum and Foehr was attacked with gunfire by two Mosquitoes. The captain was killed. The northbound convoy 847 with four steamers will be escorted by 11th Minesweeper Flotilla and by the boat K "4" up to Graadyb. The convoy left the Elbe in the morning for Kristiansand. At Graadyb the southbound convoy will be met by the escort forces.

Naval Command, North was ordered by Naval Staff, Quartermast Division to give priority to the setting up of two 12.8 centimeter anti-aircraft batteries of the type 40 M which for the time being will be established on steel foundations that can be dismantled. Plans for permanent positions for four 12.8 centimeter batteries have to be made.

Off the Schelde mouth the position Windhuk was attacked by seven enemy PT boats from 0300 till 0330. On both sides hits were scored. Our own boats suffered light damages and minor casualties.

27 Jun. 1944

Naval anti-aircraft guns shot down one British barrage balloon. Four convoys with about 54,000 BRT were carried out in the IJssel Meer and in the Zeeland waters. On 26 Jun. a fishery patrol vessel hit a mine and was slightly damaged off IJmuiden. Eighty four KMA-mines were laid out off Scheveningen.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

In the area of 18th Group 13 planes were observed in operation. On 26 Jun. eight planes were reported over Vardoe and three planes were seen over Petsamo.

2. Own Situation:

Forty one ships were escorted to the north and twenty eight ships were escorted to the south.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to Finnish radio monitoring on 26 Jun. a Russian patrol boat hit a mine in the southern exit of the Bjoerkoe Sound. Five mines were cleared in the fairway southeast of Vigrund. In the afternoon of 27 Jun. three larger and several small mine clearance vessels were seven miles south of the Namsi Bank.

2. Own Situation:

The patrol positions along the western coast of Juteland were occupied. The mine layer formation left Esbjerg in order to lay out KMA-mines. In the convoy traffic around Skagen one northbound convoy of four ships and one southbound convoy of three ships are on their way. Further convoys will probably not become necessary because the big North Sluice at Brunsbuettel will again be ready for service from 30 Jun. onward.

27 Jun. 1944

Mineclearance work was carried out by 23 boats in the Baltic Sea entrances and by 41 boats and 3 minesweeping planes in the Baltic Sea.

In the Koenigsberg Sea Channel a wooden motor lighter sunk after a mine explosion. The enemy mineclearance vessels sighted south of the Namsi Bank were attacked and driven back to the north by 1st Minesweeper Flotilla. An enemy air attack on the Flotilla with bombs and gunfire of eight planes had no success.

The submarine U "1193" entered Helsinki.

The figures on the transport of 122nd Infantry Division reported on 26 Jun. were corrected as follows:

3,349 men, 830 horses, 784 vehicles, 1,768 tons of Army goods. The transport is going on as scheduled.

At 2000 on 26 Jun. 21st Landing Flotilla left Gdynia for Ventspils.

An operation against Narvi is planned for the night of 27 Jun. The forces participating in the operation are three German torpedo boats, five minesweepers, four motor minesweepers and ten Finnish patrol boats and ten Finnish PT boats as well as four artillery ferry barges. Furthermore the laying out by four naval landing craft of the minefield Pistin VI is planned for that night.

No particular reports came in from Lake Peipsi.

V. Merchant Shipping.

According to information from Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces in Scandinavia, Sweden will stop all coal and cement transit-traffic to Norway on 31 Jul. This will mean the loss of 200,000 tons per year of most important supplies required in Norway. The Swedish Railways are said to have declared upon order of the Swedish Government that the decision is final. As this measure would necessitate a considerably increased employment of German shipping, Naval Staff together with Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping asked the German Foreign Office to take appropriate steps to prevent if possible the planned measures from being carried out.

VI. Submarine Warfare.

No particular reports came in from the boats of group "West".

27 Jun. 1944

The boats in the Atlantic were ordered to take over from the Portuguese steamer ANGOLA en route from Laurence Marques to Lisbon two former Italian consulate officials in order to prevent them from disclosing former secret activities of German and Italian General Consulates. The steamer is at present in FH 49.

In the Indian Ocean the supply submarine U "490" was ordered to proceed to Penang in order to supply four returning IX C boats. On their way back the boats will carry cargo important for the war.

No particular reports came in from Group "Trutz" in the Northern Waters.

VII. Aerial Warfare.

West Area:

During daylight several hundreds of enemy planes penetrated into the occupied western territories and attacked railway installations in Northern France as well as aerodromes southwest of Paris. In the night of 27 Jun. 600 four-engined enemy planes entered the Belgian area and attacked two aerodromes and the defensive zones. Only minor operations of enemy planes were reported from the area of Western France.

Our own forces numbering 241 fighters were operating during the day in order to assist the Army. During the night one plane was reconnoitering over London. Thirteen planes attacked independent targets in the south of England. Fourteen planes were attacking ships and eighty planes were fouling the Orne mouth with mines. Four planes of the last two groups were lost.

Reich Territory:

No enemy planes were reported over the Reich territory during daylight. Budapest was attacked by 400 four-engined planes under fighter escort entering the Hungarian area from the south. On our side 98 fighters were operating. Sixteen enemy planes were reported shot down for certain including eight planes brought down by anti-aircraft guns, and six planes were probably shot down. Eight planes were lost on our side. During the night only one enemy plane was reported over Aarhus.

27 Jun. 1944

Mediterranean:

On 26 Jun. about 90 four-engined enemy planes coming from Russia penetrated the Hungarian area for an attack against the oilfields of Drohovica. The attacking formation was met by about 50 fighters in the Hungarian area.

In the rear of the Italian front, traffic targets in the area of Firenze, Bologna and Spezia were attacked by strong enemy formations. During the night of 26 Jun. about 70 enemy planes coming from southern Italy attacked Trieste. Other planes carried out harassing raids in upper Italy.

East Area:

On 26 Jun. 453 planes were operating on the German side at the eastern front and 4,680 planes on the enemy side. Twenty eight planes were reported shot down and five of our planes were lost.

VIII. War in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea.

1. Area of Naval Group West:

Enemy Situation:

At 1430 a convoy of 60 freighters, 10 tankers with 1 auxiliary cruiser, 1 destroyer and 9 corvettes entered through the Strait of Gibraltar. Twenty five of the freighters had set up barrage balloons. Besides, the convoy was escorted by two airships flying at a height of about 100 meters.

Own Situation:

The steamer CAP BLANC (3,317 BRT) traveling under escort was sunk by enemy submarine off Nice. The steamer PALLAS (5,260 BRT) was sunk when entering the harbor of Nice. Both ships had been provided as blockships for Nice. Torpedo tracks were neither sighted nor located by the escort vessels.

Two Arado planes were dispatched for anti-submarine hunting in the waters St. Tropez - Mentone.

27 Jun. 1944

Commanding Admiral, Naval Group West informed Naval Staff by copy of his message to Commanding General, Armed Forces West concerning the preliminary destructions in the harbors of the French southern coast in particular of Marseille. For copy as per 1/Skl 19737/44 Gkdos. compare War Diary Part C, Vol. XIV. The group is of the opinion that harbors which have an adequate artillery defense cannot be taken from the sea by surprise action as seen from the experiences made at Cherbourg and that in case of a capture from the land there is sufficient time for carrying out the destructions provided the preparations have been made carefully. Naval Group, West asked therefore to abstain, as long as it does not become necessary owing to the situation, from ordering the preliminary destruction by explosion in the harbors of the southern coast, and to inform Army Group G as well as 19th Army Command accordingly.

2. Area of German Naval Command Italy:

Enemy Situation:

Photographic reconnaissance of Taranto revealed 2 light British cruisers, 1 Italian cruiser, 1 cruiser in dock, 11 destroyers, 1 monitor, 3 minelayers, 12 small war vessels, 4 (apparently) torpedo boats, 3 submarines, 11 small boats, 8 LCT, about 21 auxiliary landing craft, 8 tankers and 8 freighters as well as 12 coastal freighters.

No further information could be obtained on a (presumably) auxiliary aircraft carrier which had been reported steering an east southeast course north of Benghazi at 1044 on 26 Jun.

According to air reconnaissance, 15 coastal freighters were sailing in the Gulf of Taranto. No details on the course were given.

Strong supply traffic was observed during the night of 26 Jun. in the waters of Civitavecchia. According to photographic reconnaissance on 26 Jun, the number of PT boats at Bastia has increased. No concentrations of landing craft and freighter space could be made out.

Strong naval traffic was observed in the Elba waters. In the night of 26 Jun. enemy PT boats were operating again between Leghorn and Elba and this time moreover within our own barrages. At 0403 two PT boats observed a burning ship which presumably had hit a mine 18 miles south of Leghorn in the position barrage "Schneide".

27 Jun. 1944

Own Position:

A harbor patrol boat shot down one enemy plane on the occasion of an enemy air attack in the evening of 26 Jun. carried out by low flying planes. No damages were sustained during a fighter-bomber attack on Sestri Levante.

The mineship DIETRICH VON BERN carried out the mine-operation southeast of Rapallo according to plans. One coastal auxiliary sailing vessel was sunk on the occasion of an enemy air attack against Ancona.

German Naval Command, Italy reported desertions of the Italian marines in an ever increasing degree also at the naval anti-aircraft artillery aboard. Besides, increasing partisan activities were reported causing considerable delay in the transport service by destroying communication lines.

3. Area of Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance a convoy of seven freighters of 5 - 7,000 BRT each and two tankers entered Brindisi coming from southeast. According to a report of the Army, two cruisers and five other warships were eight miles south of Civitanova at 0745.

On the afternoon of 27 Jun. the number of ships in the harbors Lissa and Konisa was found to have remained unchanged.

Own Situation:

Operations of four German PT-boats during the night of 26 Jun. in the waters of Solta and further to the east had no results. In the night of 27 Jun. five boats of 7th PT boat Flotilla will move from Spalato to Dubrovnik in order to carry out minor repair works there during the noon period.

On the occasion of an enemy air attack against Trieste at 2310 on

27 Jun, 1944

26 Jun., the dockyards at St. Marco were hit by bombs. Only a small number of ships was at the harbor. At the same time four Spitfire planes attacked two infantry landing craft near the isle of Saipan. The boats were slightly damaged.

Two coastal auxiliary sailing vessels were sunk by air attack in the Kherson area on 24 and 27 Jun.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

At 0245 on 26 Jun. a submarine was reported west of Kynthos.

Own Situation:

The Nausa Bay (Isle of Paros) was closed for traffic because mines have been laid by aircraft.

The carrying out of all convoys was postponed owing to the strong northwind. At 0910 enemy planes attacked the boat GK "53" and a tanker in the Mirabell Bay on Crete. The tanker suffered damages in the engine and has to be towed by the boat GK "53". Further enemy air activities were directed against one train, against the Freia-Station on the Isle of Kerkyra and against the airbase at Iraklion. No damages were reported. One ELM/J-mine was cleared in the harbor entrance of Syra.

c. Black Sea:

In the afternoon the submarine U "19" fired a T3-torpedo against a convoy of barges in tow escorted by five anti-submarine chasers. One vessel was probably sunk.

No other reports came in.

Situation on the Danube:

No reports came in.

IX. Situation in East Asia.

CONFIDENTIAL

27 Jun. 1944

Concerning the situation in the Pacific the German Military Attache reported that it is impossible to obtain in addition to the official Announcement of the Japanese High Command any detail worth mentioning on the naval battle near the Marianas. The Japanese Admiralty regards the situation as very grave and admits openly that the attempt to bring relief for the land defenses on Saipan has failed and that, on the contrary, the enemy was able to land further reinforcements so that the loss of the island has to be reckoned with. The loss of the Japanese large aircraft carrier was caused by a submarine and the tanker was lost in a bombing attack.

On the isle of Biak the enemy is in possession of three aerodromes. The island has practically been given up.

CONFIDENTIAL

28 Jun, 1944

Items of Political Importance.

On 26 Jun. the Finnish President of State addressed a letter to the Fuehrer in which he expressed his satisfaction that Germany will comply with the Finnish Government's request for armed assistance and that in view of the Russian attack in Karelia immediate help will be given by the dispatch of German troops and materials. Accepting the promise made by the Reich Foreign Minister that Germany will also in the future give to Finland any military assistance of which she is capable, the State President confirmed that Finland is determined to continue on the German side the war against Soviet Russia until the danger to which Finland is exposed by Soviet Russia has disappeared. In his capacity as President of the Finnish State he declared that only in cooperation with the German Government he will conclude a peace with the Soviet Union and that he will not allow the Finnish Government appointed by him nor any other person to negotiate, without the approval of the German Government, on an armistice or peace nor to take up negotiations for that purpose. Roosevelt declared that he would receive de Gaulle at the beginning of Jul.

Conference on the Situation with Commander in Chief, Navy at 1120.

I. During the discussion of the Situation in the Air, Naval Staff, Operations Division Naval Air and Air Force Liaison Section reported:

A member of the British Embassy returning on 26 Jun. from London to Stockholm declared that the damages caused by the German pilotless planes were considerable. The German had succeeded to distract from it's task that part of the Royal Air Force which ought to have been used for a new invasion operation. The defense against the new German weapon was extraordinarily difficult he said. The moral effects on the population were very disagreeable. According to another report, fighter forces of the 2nd T.A.F. were branched off for the defense against the new weapon.

According to a further report the casualties in London are very high and are increasing every day.

II. Report of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief of Operations Branch:

On the assessment of the situation by Naval Command, Norway concerning

28 Jun. 1944

the appearance of the enemy carrier group; on the report of German Naval Attache, Tokyo concerning the situation in the Pacific; and on the Fuehrer order concerning the treatment of members of the commando units outside the battlefield proper as reported.

III. Chief Naval Staff put the question whether for safety reasons a transfer of the TIRPITZ from the Alta-fjord should be taken into consideration. After a thorough discussion it was agreed that the Kaa-fjord has to be regarded as the best mooring place for the battleship in the Polar area also for the future, especially when the experiences concerning the possibilities of the anti-air defense will have been evaluated. Commander in Chief, Navy ordered that nevertheless these conditions will be reexamined over and over again.

Commander, Coast Defense Forces should submit his personal opinion on the situation including the Narvik area as soon as possible after having acquainted himself with the local conditions and he should add a report on the possibility of a daily transfer to alternative mooring grounds in order to mislead the enemy.

For copy of the order l. Skl. Ia. 1941/44 gK. Chefs. compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

IV. Further report of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief of Operations Branch:

a. Commander, PT boats reported on the operations of the PT boats that eight PT boats will be ready for operations as soon as 2nd PT boat Training Flotilla will be given up. The flotilla could operate in the Gulf of Finland from 1 Jul. onward. A withdrawal of the flotilla for three months is possible without any disadvantage for the training. Naval Command, East concurred.

Commander in Chief, Navy did also concur and approved the following directive to Naval Command, East, to the Fleet, to Commander, PT boats and to PT boat Training Division:

The suggestion of Commander, PT boats gKdos.3600 C of 27 Jun. is approved. Therefore

- A) 1. transfer of 2nd PT boat Training Flotilla to Swinemuende.
2. Establishing a flotilla of eight suitable boats (calotte boats) taken from the boats of PT boat Training Division for the Gulf of Finland.

Commander, PT boats has to report when the flotilla can be ready for war and ready to be transferred.

28 Jun. 1944

3. Commander PT boats has to make a request for the withdrawal of this flotilla from action in due time if the boats will again be required for training purposes. (about three months).
- B. 1. 10th PT boat Flotilla will remain in 24 hour's readiness at Swinemuende.
2. The presence of the PT boat Flotilla in the Skagerrak will not be required for the time being. If necessary, the right remains reserved to use 10th PT boat Flotilla.

Supplement:

The Fleet will inform Naval Command, East on this matter.

Copies of the above mentioned correspondence including the order find under 1. Skl. I op 19757/44 gKdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. D.

b. On the report to Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff concerning the transport of the first wave for the operation "Tanne" by transporters or fast naval forces in accordance with the statement in the War Diary of 27 Jun. Commander in Chief, Navy concurred. The decision of Armed Forces High Command has now to be awaited. Armed Forces High Command regards the situation in Finland as less dangerous for the moment. But it believes, according to information of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, that in view of the still very heavy defensive fighting and in view of the possibility of a worsening of the military situation the precautions planned by us have to be maintained to their full extent and that the preparations for the operation "Tanne" have to be continued as planned.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

V. Situation of the Army:

West Area:

In the Caen area the enemy started again an offensive in order to keep going the operative mobile warfare.

On the Cotentin Peninsula the enemy forces are being reorganized following the capture of Cherbourg.

In Italy, 27 Jun. was a day of large scale fighting. On both sides of Lake Trasimeno as well as in the Perugia area our troops successfully warded off the enemy. At the Eastern Front no particular events

28 Jun. 1944

took place at the southern part of the front. The beginning of the attack in that area will apparently be coordinated with other operations, possibly with an Anglo-American landing in the Balkans. The development of the situation in the area of Central Army Group lead to an extraordinary deterioration of the situation. Our 9th Army was cut off in the Bobruisk area. The units are trying independently and so far unsuccessfully to penetrate the enclosure. Our 4th Army is seriously shattered in the Orsha area. The town of Orsha was captured by the enemy. It is impossible to obtain a clear picture of the situation at Vitebsk. The enemy reported large numbers of prisoners taken in that area. Besides he succeeded in making a new large scale break through towards Polotsk. The defeat of Central Army Group was found to be considerably larger than it had so far been feared. Undoubtedly it was caused by the unimaginable superiority of the enemy in materials.

Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief of Army Liaison and Land Warfare Section is personally of the opinion that in view of the actual number of forces available on our side the war in the east can only be carried on with some chance of success if it is waged in an operative and mobile way. Our forces are insufficient to defend such a long frontline against concentrated attacks of the enemy. The problem is whether at the present time our forces are still strong enough, especially as far as fuel and vehicles are concerned, to maintain even a mobile defense. The development of the situation has already brought about an actual threat for the important town of Minsk. Thus also the Army Group North is in considerable danger. It can only avoid that danger by retreating immediately in order to get out of the enclosure before it will be definitely closed. Only in that case the Army Group North can still participate in an effective defense outside the Reich frontiers. The effects this would have on Finland and the other problems of the Baltic Sea are well known. However, the situation seems to be so urgent that even great disadvantages have to be accepted in order to prevent this Army Group from meeting the same fate as Central Army Group. Commander in Chief, Navy is of the opinion that apparently the moment has come when important decisions have to be made but that mobile warfare is impossible for us because the Russians are even more superior in that kind of war.

VI. Further report of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief of Operations Branch:

a. Group West transmitted the report of Port Commander, Cherbourg according to which a certain officer Kirgaso surrendered at 2100 on 27 Jun. in spite of the fact that all fortified positions with the exception of the fort MF 210 and Fort Flanand were still

28 Jun. 1944

in our hand and in spite of the possibility of further resistance. Kirgaso acted without being authorized by the port commander and did then capitulate, thus threatening our entire defenses. The report of the port commander was confirmed by the officer Rasmer, the commander of 101st Rocket Projector Battalion. Group West believes that the officer was apparently Ordnance Captain Kirgasser, the commandant of the Naval Arsenal, Cherbourg.

Asked by Group West whether the severe judgement against Kirgasser can definitely be proved, Port Commander, Cherbourg answered:

"Yes, the witness for our report is Ordnance Lieutenant Schmidt who did not carry out the order and placed himself under my command."

Naval Staff submitted (Tr. N. : to Commander in Chief, Navy for approval) a teletype to Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff and to Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters in which an account is given of the affairs of the Battery Bastion and of the surrender of the arsenal, adding that neither of the reports can be confirmed because of lack of further evidence but that the reports seem to be of some importance in view of the steps taken by Port Commander, Cherbourg. In case the report on the Battery Bastion is confirmed, the early destruction of the battery - the importance of which for the defense of the harbor was perhaps unknown to General Sattler - will cause considerable disadvantages for the future defense of the harbor because it could be expected that the modern and fully fortified 10.5 centimeter battery would put up a long resistance from its favorable position opposite the western harbor entrance. Mine-sweeping off the harbor entrance and elimination of the minefield control shelter on the mole for the dependent minefields is impossible for the enemy as long as the battery is ready for action. Concerning Kirgasser, Naval Staff remarked that it is unknown nor can it be found out which were the battle orders of this ordnance officer and which positions he surrendered.

For the relevant order l. Skl. 19751/44 gK. compare Special File "Invasion 27 Jun.". Commander in Chief Navy concurred.

Special Items.

I. The Fuehrer ordered that contrary to previous orders, 393rd Assault Gun Brigade should be dispatched to Central Army Group in a

28 Jun. 1944

hurry. High Command, Army, General Staff of the Army was asked to suggest another assault gun formation for Finland which can become ready for service within the next time.

II. The Fleet reported that, provided the training will be carried out according to schedule, the cadets on the LUETZOW, the NUERNBERG, the LEIPZIG, the EMDEN and on the SCHLESIEEN will change at the end of Jul. Therefore the ships will not be ready for war for two months as far as personnel is concerned. Only the PRINZ EUGEN would therefore still be available for the operation "Rotbuche". Naval Staff will suggest to Commander in Chief, Navy to cancel the exchange of the cadets as far as necessary in view of the particular situation.

III. Concerning the operation "Tanne", Naval Command, East reported on the state of the preparatory measures as well as on the concentration of naval forces for the preliminary transports.

For copy as per l. Skl. 1940/44 gKdos. Chefs. compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

IV. Group South transmitted once more its opinion concerning the giving up of the permanent patrol service in the Black Sea. Copy of the relevant report as per l. Skl. 19781/44 gKdos. find in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV a.

V. Naval Staff, Naval Communications Division reported that it was possible during the last days to uncover the British locating system to such an extent that some of the location reports are completely understood by us. It is worth mentioning in this connection that the same target, a submarine in most cases, is being located by a larger number of locating stations.

In the home area, in many cases, up to twelve stations participate in one locating operation and they are assisted, generally, by a number of locating stations from the south Atlantic and from the Indian Ocean. Therefore, it is by no means an exception that more than twenty stations are locating simultaneously. Furthermore it is worth mentioning that the locating hours are generally exactly coincident with the beginning of the radio transmitting hours of the submarines and that the frequencies observed are exactly the same as ours with an accuracy of from one to five kilocycles. The investigations on how far the submarines are being located when dispatching short signals and weather reports are still going on.

Naval Staff, Naval Communications Division will have to investigate most carefully all conclusions which can be derived from this intelligence. Anyhow the report is a proof for the assumption that

28 Jun. 1944

the enemy is capable of locating any submarine transmitting radio messages

For copy of the report as per 1/Skl 19818/44 Gkdos, compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

VI. In view of the decision that the construction of the submarines of Type XX and Type XIV has to be discontinued, Naval Staff advocated a suggestion of Chief, Bureau of Naval Armament to complete three submarines of the former type the construction of which is well advanced already and three or five of the latter type in order to use the boats for fuel supplies and for the transport of minor quantities of small supply goods in the Baltic Sea and in the Norwegian area. Furthermore it is possible to use them as tugs for the underwater dumb barges which were ordered by Naval Staff.

The matter will be submitted to Commander in Chief, Navy by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Submarine Branch or by Bureau of Naval Armament.

Situation on 28 Jun.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Invasion:

No particular results were obtained by radio intelligence in the Seine Bay area. Of warships, the cruiser FROBISHER and the minelayer ADVENTURE were observed. One LST ran ashore with a large leakage in the bottom. Our own air reconnaissance observed strong naval traffic including many cruisers during the whole day in the waters off the landing bridge-head, off the Orne mouth, off Port en Bessin, and in the outer Seine Bay.

The following was the development of the situation according to the reports received at Naval Staff:

Port Commander, Cherbourg reported as per 1904 on 27 Jun. that there were still strong conflagrations in the arsenal and that in the

28 Jun. 1944

afternoon light bombing attacks were carried out against the Battery "York" as well as artillery fire from the land. At 1700 the Fort Querqueville was taken by the enemy. Fort Chavagnac and the harbor patrol boats were left to the enemy without armaments. Fort Central fired constantly with light guns against enemy planes. It has already been reported on the attack of Battery "York" against one destroyer and six PT boats of the harbor entrance.

At 0214, Commanding Admiral, Naval Group West transmitted to Port Commander, Cherbourg for all batteries and defense positions in that area: "You were mentioned in today's report of the German High Command. That will be the finest reward for your stubborn fighting and will encourage you to further resistance."

At 0405, Port Commander, Cherbourg reported: Fort Chavagnac gave up. Fort Central is heavily damaged.

Ile de Pelee does not answer.

At 0421, Radar Location Center, Bretagne reported that the Radar Station, Cape Levi was blown up and that secret matters were destroyed.

At 0448, Naval Shore Commander, Channel Islands reported: Our patrol boats had a fight with British destroyers in BF 3842 from 0123 till 0150.

Group West reported on the situation at 0600 as follows:

1. 2nd and 8th PT boat Flotilla started at 2330 with four boats from Le Havre to the northwest. No results are obtainable as yet.
2. The patrol boats Vp "213" and the minesweeper M "4611" had a fight with enemy destroyers in the position south of Jersey. Casualties on our side. Details are to follow.
3. Radar locating between 2330 and 0329 revealed strong patrol activities from Fecamp up to Cape de la Heve as well as the presence of the enemy in the waters of Ile de Bas, west of Alderney, north and northwest of St. Malo, and north of Le Sept Iles.

At 0745, Commander, Small Battle Units reported:

1. 211th Small Battle Flotilla had no opportunity for operations because of the bad weather.

28 Jun. 1944

2. 65th Naval Special Operations Command which was established for special tasks on sea arrived at Rouen.

At 1325, Port Commander, Cherbourg reported the central mole still in our hands. So far no new attempts to penetrate into the harbor nor any mine clearance activities. The net barrages East and West as well as the firing control panel are still in working condition. Fire from the mole on land. No fighting can be observed in the west. Troops are moving to the west on the coastal road.

It can be seen from the battle report of the patrol boat V "203" that the boat had contact with two large ships probably cruisers or destroyers. When two enemy destroyers penetrated into our smoke screen, one of the destroyers which tried to ram our minesweeper M "4611" was attacked from the back by our patrol boat V "213" and was covered by the shells of the 8.8 centimeter gun for 15 minutes without being able to answer. The destroyer remained on the spot burning. Later, explosions were observed on the ship. The minesweeper M "4611" was sunk quite near the patrol boat V "213" which entered Jersey ready for action and having suffered but very slight casualties.

At 1650, Group West regarded the landing possibilities for the night of 28 Jun. as difficult for the Dutch area, as possible for the Channel coast and at the Atlantic coast as difficult in the northern part and as possible in the southern part.

In its situation report of 1600, Group West reported that 2nd and 8th PT boat Flotillas discontinued their operations because of the high sea and because the sighting conditions had worsened. 2nd PT boat Flotilla cleared one ELM/A-mine in the grid-square BF 3664.

Fifty one men and twenty one dead were rescued from the minesweeper M "4611". Operation orders for the PT boats in the night of 28 Jun. were the same as in the night of 27 Jun. Furthermore, the Coastal Mine-A barrage west of Dieppe and the DM 1-mine barrage "L24" northeast of Dieppe will be laid out.

2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the West Area:

No figures were reported on the enemy planes operating in the area of 18th Group. One British ship and one merchantman were located in the rendezvous area.

28 Jun, 1944

3. Own Situation in Other Parts of the West Area:

Atlantic Coast Area:

Fifteen patrol positions were occupied. One mine was cleared off Brest and one was cleared off St. Nazaire. One submarine was escorted on her way out.

Channel Waters:

Seven patrol positions were occupied. In the Channel Island traffic 1400 BRT were escorted. Two mines were cleared off Le Havre. At 0855, five or six enemy ships were sighted north of Les Sept Iles. The ships went out of sight at 1100.

At 1345, six ships, presumably destroyers were steering a west course ten miles northwest of Ile de Bas.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

Patrol and escort services were carried out according to schedule in the German Bight. Two mines were cleared in the Elbe mouth. The new northern sluice at Brunsbuettel will presumably be ready for service again on 29 Jun. The patrol position off Hook of Holland was unsuccessfully attacked with bombs by enemy planes. One enemy plane was shot down. In the morning hours of 28 Jun, and in the following night explosions were again heard between Flushing and Katwijk as well as between Den Helder and Hook. Three mines were cleared west of Walcheren. Eighty four KMA-mines were laid out off Schouwen.

Three convoys with about 39,000 BRT were carried out in the Ijsel Meer and in the Zeeland waters.

Norway/Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Twenty nine planes were observed operating in the area of 18th Group.

28 Jun, 1944

Own Situation:

From 1630 till 1700 on 27 Jun., 55 enemy planes attacked the town and the harbor of Kirkenes. The steamer HERTHA (717 BRT) was damaged by bombs and had some casualties. Furthermore, many houses and barracks were damaged and the traffic was disturbed. Shortly after midnight of 27 Jun., Kirkenes was again attacked. The steamer FLORIANOPOLIS (4,719 BRT) was set afire and had to be beached. The quay was seriously damaged. At the same time the Petsamo convoy was also attacked by planes. The steamer VULCAN (989 BRT) was damaged by simultaneous gunfire and had to be beached. A convoy on the way back was attacked by PT boats at 0400. The steamer NERISSA (9992 BRT) was sunk by a torpedo.

On the occasion of the attack against Kirkenes and against the Petsamo-convoy, our fighters and anti-aircraft guns shot down about 77 of the attacking planes. At 0310 an (apparently) one-man submarine was reported at Bergen. Investigations are being made.

Thirteen ships were escorted to the north and the same number of ships was escorted to the south in the area of Commanding Admiral, North Norwegian Coast. No reports came in from the other sub-areas of Naval Command, North because of trouble in the communication lines.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Many ship movements were observed in the Gulf of Finland by radio intelligence. The Russian 4th Motor Minesweeper Force reported the destruction of four mines in the waters of the Namsi Bank on 27 Jun. The minesweepers are protected by gunboats. Further mines were reported cleared in the Kronstadt Bay. Movements of our own naval forces were reported by enemy ships.

At noon, two PT boats and three patrol boats were steering west between Lavansaari and Narvi. At midnight on 28 Jun., several small vessels were sighted south of Vigrund.

Own Situation:

The GALSTER and the IHN entered Oorten, the RIEDEL and the destroyer Z "30" entered Holmestrand and 2nd PT boat Training Flotilla together with the TSINGTAU entered Soon.

28 Jun, 1944

The torpedo boats T "107" and "108" were dispatched to the Torpedo School. The patrol positions along the western coast of Juteland were occupied.

On 27 Jun. 320 KMA-mines were laid out. Part of the mine-laying formation entered Esbjerg and the rest went to Hvidesand.

Within the last days, eight Danes were executed in Seeland because of sabotage. Martial law was proclaimed.

Mineclearance work was carried out by 29 boats in the Baltic Sea entrances and by 39 boats, one mine exploding vessel and ten minesweeping planes in the Baltic Sea. One mine each was cleared in the Sansoe Balt, in the Kiel Bay and in the Fehmarn Belt.

The steamer HERNIA (1700) hit a mine north of Sansoe and was beached. The mine exploding vessel "131" was damaged when hitting a mine in the northern exit of the Sound. The boat requires assistance by tugs.

According to a report of the German news agency DNB from Stockholm, foreign journalists there are discussing the possibility of Germany's occupying the Aland Islands about in the night of 27 Jun. Heavy warships with parachute and other troops aboard were lying in readiness.

Commander, Training Formation entered Gdynia with the PRINZ EUGEN.

The LUETZOW moored at 1600 on 27 Jun. in the net enclosure off Aspoe. The battle group is under the command of the commandant of the LUETZOW.

The transfer of 121st Infantry Division was so far carried out as scheduled. Altogether 8,355 men, 2,496 horses, 1,643 vehicles and 3,298 tons of goods of the Armed Forces were loaded up to 1800.

The laying out of the barrage "Pistin 6" was carried out according to plans. Eight naval landing craft of 24th Landing Flotilla entered Ensaloë in order to lay out the last KMA-mine field of the Finns.

During the night of 27 Jun. the operation against Narvi was carried out at a reduced scale. A combat group of German and Finnish naval forces had to fight down the enemy resistance and had to occupy the isle of Narvi for a short time in order to destroy the installations on the island. Commanding Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea regarded an occupation of the island for a longer time as impossible. The

28 Jun. 1944

armaments of the island were supposed to be three Russian 7.5 centimeter guns. The whole operation was under Finnish command under which Commander, 3rd Mine-sweeper Flotilla was in charge of the German Forces. The combat group did only fire upon the isle of Narvi and silenced the batteries on the island with the exception of one gun at a distance of seven kilometers. The landing attempt was not carried out upon order of the Finnish commander.

No reasons for his decision are known so far. Boats of 2nd Torpedo boat Flotilla sunk one Russian patrol boat during the operation.

The results seem rather poor in comparison with the relatively strong forces on our side. A more detailed report has to be expected, however.

V. Submarine Warfare.

Two snorkel equipped submarines left western France for the operation area in the Channel.

In the Indian Ocean the submarine U "537" was allowed free lance fighting in the waters off Colombo.

In the Northern Waters, Group "Trutz" with twelve boats is moving to the patrol line from AB 4411 up to 8821 which will be occupied on the afternoon of 29 Jun. In the Mediterranean the submarine U "642" will move on 1 Jul. to the eastern waters south of Creta. The operation area will be chosen so that the boat is ready any moment for a possible defense of Creta.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

West Area:

During the day strong enemy operations were reported from the occupied western territories, particularly from Belgium and Northern France.

Five aerodromes in the area south of Paris were attacked by 600 bombers. Part of this formation penetrated to Saarbruecken and carried out a medium attack against railway and industrial installation of that town.

28 Jun. 1944

Strong fighterbomber formations attacked the aerodrome and anti-aircraft positions at Champfleury. In the Bourges area considerable damage was caused in the railway installations. Further strong enemy forces entered in the Seine area and in the battle area of the landing bridgehead. Reports on our own daylight operations did not come in yet.

The enemy continued his strong attacks in the night of 28 Jun. The attack against Saarbruecken was repeated with 40 Mosquitoes. Metz was attacked with about 300 explosive bombs.

The Seine Bay was mined by 69 German bombers.

Reich Territory:

No operations of enemy planes were reported during daylight. Twenty five Mosquitoes appeared in the industrial area of Rhineland and Westfalia during the night and carried out harassing raids.

Mediterranean:

On 27 Jun. about 500 bombers carried out attacks on aerodromes, traffic targets, and artillery positions in the rear of the front in Italy. Two enemy fighterbombers were shot down by anti-aircraft guns. Traffic installations and gun positions in the Rimini - Leghorn area were attacked by 70 twin-engined planes. In the eastern Mediterranean the aerodrome of Candia was attacked by 16 enemy planes.

In the night of 28 Jun. 47 enemy planes were reported supplying the partisans in the Balkans and six or eight planes were reported carrying out harassing raids in upper Italy and mining the Danube in the Lom area.

German planes carried out photographic reconnaissance at Brindisi and reconnoitered the western and eastern Mediterranean.

East Area:

At the Eastern Front, 663 German and 3,560 enemy air operations were reported on 27 Jun. At a loss of 11 German planes, 102 enemy planes were shot down. Strong German formations attacked during the day and in the night shunting stations of Smolensk and in the rear of the enemy front. The success against the enemy planes in the Kirkenes area on 27 and 28 Jun. was reported to be in total 77 enemy planes shot down.

28 Jun. 1944

VII. War in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea.

1. Area of Naval Group West:

Enemy Situation:

At 2030 on 27 Jun. a large transporter with troops under escort of one destroyer and one corvette entered Gibraltar coming from the Mediterranean. At 0015 on 28 Jun. one auxiliary aircraft carrier and four destroyers entered Gibraltar also coming from the Mediterranean. The transporter left the harbor in the night of 27 Jun. on an unknown course.

Furthermore, in the evening of 27 Jun. one cruiser of the BIRMINGHAM class and one destroyer entered Gibraltar coming from the Mediterranean whereas a French transporter of 17,000 BRT left the harbor for the east in the evening hours of the same day.

According to further reports, two aircraft carriers of 14,000 BRT each entered Gibraltar coming from the Mediterranean at 1100 on 27 Jun. At 1640 of the same day two auxiliary aircraft carriers and three corvettes left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

Own Situation:

According to a report of Group West, the two steamers sunk off Nice on 27 Jun. were protected by all naval forces available. Altogether they were four patrol boats.

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Situation:

No further reports came in so far on the large eastbound convoy which entered the Mediterranean on the afternoon of 27 Jun. According to radio intelligence, the westbound convoy MKS 57 was in the waters east of Algier in the morning. The eastbound convoy KMS 43 was in the Sicily Narrows in the night of 27 Jun. Our own air reconnaissance reported at 0845 a convoy of 22 standard freighters with three escort vessels steering a course 300° about 180 miles east southeast of Malta.

Alessandria gave air warning for three convoys or formations at 2129. In the forenoon one submarine was sighted steering west 160 miles east of Malta.

According to photographic reconnaissance of Brindisi the following ships were in the harbor at noon: 1 apparently minelayer, 4 destroyers,

28 Jun. 1944

12 small war vessels, 4 submarines, 1 special ship, 53 small boats, 7 LCM, 74 auxiliary landing boats, 1 tanker, 20 freighters, 3 sailing vessels and 2 floating docks.

At 1900 our air reconnaissance over the Balearic Islands made out the Italian cruiser and the three destroyers at the former common mooring place.

Air reconnaissance over the Ligurian Sea was rendered difficult by the weather. No enemy ships were sighted.

Own Situation:

The destructions at Leghorn have been carried out with the exception of the blowing up of a few bridges. Three 3.7 centimeter guns are ready for action at the northern river bank of the Arno.

On the evening of 27 Jun. a tug sailing with an outgoing convoy was sunk by gunfire of enemy planes off the Arno mouth. Another tug had to be beached.

3. Area of Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Between 1945 and 2040 on 27 Jun., six naval targets were observed in the waters of Ravenna by radio intelligence.

Own Situation:

No particular damages were caused on the occasion of the air attack against Rimini on 27th and on Ravenna on 28 Jun. No further reports did come in so far.

b. Aegean Sea:

On 27th and 28 Jun. the enemy carried out minor air reconnaissance over the Docecanese, Crete, Central Aegean, Peloponneses, Athens and over western Greece as far as Salonika. Five destroyer patrols were made out in the waters between Salonika and Larissa. Railway trains and stations were attacked. One fighter-bomber patrol was over Corfu.

Two freight barges and one tug together with two auxiliary sailing vessels left the Dardanelles for Mytilene at 2000 on 28 Jun.

c. Black Sea:

Nothing to report.

28 Jun. 1944

Situation on the Danube:

No dropping of mines was observed on 27 Jun.

One mineclearance vessel hit a mine near kilometer indicator 1084 and sunk. One mine was cleared near kilometer indicator 1006 and one mine was cleared near kilometer indicator 1797.

Operations of the minesweeping planes taking off from Craiova have been reopened. The report on the situation on the Danube of 28 Jun. did not come in yet.

VIII. Situation East Asia:

No particular reports came in.

29 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance.

According to a report of the German news agency DNB, the former Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko arrived at Stockholm on 28 Jun. His trip is said to be in connection with Finnish peace negotiations. According to further reports from Helsinki, Minister Tanner is said to have announced his resignation as he did not agree with the decision to continue the war. In the night of 27 Jun. the Information Minister of the Vichy Government Henriot was murdered at his official residence in Paris.

The Swedish Parliament will discuss foreign affairs in a secret session on 29 Jun. According to press reports the session will be chiefly devoted to the Finnish question.

Commander in Chief, Navy together with Rear Admiral Wagner left for the Fuehrer Headquarters.

Rear Admiral Wagner handed over to Rear Admiral Meyer(Hans) his duties as Section Chief of the Operations Division at Naval Staff. For the time being, Rear Admiral Wagner will remain at the Command Station "Koralle" as Admiral at the disposition of Chief, Naval Staff.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff at 1115.

I. According to information from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, the Fuehrer asked for an investigation on whether it is possible to assist the Finns on the Lakes Ladoga and Onega by German vessels which, if necessary, would have to be transferred by land transport. The Flotilla on Lake Peipsi, however, should not be weakened by a cession of boats.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster General reported in this connection that it would be possible to alter the course of four naval artillery lighters destined for Lake Peipsi and having not yet arrived at their point of destination. The carrying out of this plan depends, however, on the possibility of railway transport.

II. Chief, Bureau of Naval Armament reported on an armaments conference on 28 Jun. in which Minister Speer did not participate. Chief,

29 Jun. 1944

Bureau of Naval Armament gave a survey of the military situation in accordance with the discussion of Commander in Chief, Navy with Reichminister Speer and put forward the following demands:

- a. Giving priority and increasing the general program.
- b. Immediate demand for small battle weapons.
- c. Utmost increase of the mine production.
- d. Efficient carrying out of the submarine program as before.

Then the new order of priority was announced. According to the new list, Degree of Priority O will be granted to the submarine type XXI and XXIII, to the PT boats and to the small battle weapons with a time limit until 30 Sept.

The enclosing in the list of the motor mine-sweepers was promised by Armaments Supply Office. Degree of Priority O is not advisable for the snorkel. That demand has to be complied with by a special program.

All other submarines and the urgent production for the Navy including also the mines fall under the Degree of Priority 1.

The snorkel, the small battle weapons, mines, submarines and other vessels will be dealt with separately.

The snorkel program as being of the highest urgency will be given immediate priority together with the West Area. The delivery of the small battle weapons "Hecht", "Neger", "Biber", "Molch" and "Linse" in the quantities required was granted in general. The situation of the one-man assault boats is unsatisfactory in view of the situation at the Italian dockyards. The same applies to the small battle weapon of the type "Seehund" one construction plans of which were completed however. The production figures for the "Seehund" were declared to be quite unsatisfactory by Admiral, Small Battle Units. An increase of the output up to 150 per month at least was asked for. It was alleged that Chief, Naval Staff had approved in principle that the capacity of the torpedo boat new-construction program should be used to effect the said increase.

Referring to this allegation, Chief, Naval Staff declared that the opinion of Admiral, Small Battle Units is wrong. Chief, Naval Staff did not give a promise of this kind. On the contrary, the problem has to be investigated.

29 Jun. 1944

The output of mines is increasing. In view of the many bottle-necks it was asked for an investigation whether a production of 5,000 EMC-mines instead of the 8,500 required at first can be accepted by Naval Staff. Efforts are being made for an increase in the production of mine-sweeping equipment. Concerning the submarines of type XXI, the Chief Committee for Naval Construction is hoping to fulfil the plan in spite of delay at the beginning. The situation concerning the submarine type XXIII is not clear. The main problem seems to be the elastic suspension of the batteries which, however, will probably not be solved before the 80th boat. Chief, Bureau of Naval Armament decided that anyhow, serial production will be continued in the former way.

Notes made by Naval Staff, Quartermaster General on the armaments conference as per l/Skl 20175/44 Gkdos.find in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

III. The first of the new submarines of the type XXI was put into service in Jun. It is planned to put into service 9 boats in Jul., 15 boats in Aug., 18 boats in Sept., 25 boats in Oct., 30 boats in Nov., 33 boats in Dec. Thus 131 boats of this type will be put into service during this year.

IV. Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Intelligence Division:

The Supreme Command of the Allied Expeditionary Forces announced the Allied casualties from 6 till 20 Jun. to be altogether 40,549 men. Of these there are about 24,000 Americans, 13,500 British and 2,800 Canadians. Of the total of 40,549 there are 5,287 dead, 12,183 missing and 23,079 wounded.

The US Secretary of the Navy issued a declaration concerning the war against Japan. According to the statement, most of the southern Japanese islands including Tokyo are now within the range of operations of the US Navy. The final occupation of the Isle of Saipan would enable the Americans to begin with naval and air operations which would include the Japanese homeland, the Philippine Islands and the major part of the Dutch East Indies. The operational range of the Super fortresses taking off from the newest bases in the Pacific would include the most important part of the Japanese mainland, Formosa, the Philippine Islands, Borneo and part of Java. It was impossible for the Japanese now to obstruct with their fleet the American offensive operations. The Japanese carrier borne air

29 Jun. 1944

force was practically annihilated in the decisive sea and air battle west of Saipan on 16 Jun. 1944

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

V. Situation of the Army:

West Area:

Strong fighting is continuously going on in the area of Caen - Tilly. Large scale unloading operations are assisted by heavy artillery fire east of the Orne. High Command, Army, Foreign Armies, West is of the opinion that the 2nd Army Group concentrated in southeast England will start for a new offensive aiming at Paris-Reims in the middle of Jul. High Command, Army, Foreign Armies, West does not see any indications of any offensive plans against the Bretagne.

Commanding General, Armed Forces, France reported that the economic situation in southwest and northwestern France will lead within a short time to a closing down of vital industries in case it is impossible to send coal trains. On the other hand the water and fuel supply as well as the supply of electric current for the troops, for the ground organization of the German Air Force and for the installations of the Navy will be threatened most seriously.

The situation in Italy is stabilized in general. Near Perugia our troops reportedly gained even some territory. The partisan situation in the rear has worsened.

In Finland the withdrawal of the Finns is carried out according to plans. Heavy fighting is going on for Viborg. There is no reason for serious apprehension over the military situation.

Our own Eastern Front is still quiet in the area of Army Group South and North-Ukraine. In the center, the advance forces of the enemy are concentrating on Minsk. Nearly 75 enemy infantry divisions and 10 tank corps are assembling in the Bobruisk area. The enemy succeeded to a large extent to eliminate our artillery. General Fieldmarshall Model took over the command of the Army Group. At the moment the bulk of the 9th Army is cut off from its connections in the rear and encircled. In the area of 3rd Tank Army the southern section of the defense line was penetrated and driven back to the west.

The situation at the right wing of Army Group, North is becoming more difficult. General Staff of the Army expects that the enemy

29 Jun. 1944

will deal at first with Minsk and that therefore there will be an opportunity to reinforce our positions at Dvinsk. Anyhow the situation is most dangerous for Army Group, North.

Special Items:

I. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff once more recalled the order issued already on 28 Jun. that according to the Fuehrer Order all coastal batteries which have not yet shell-proof shelters will have to be withdrawn and that fortified positions for indirect firing shall be constructed for these batteries. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division supplementing it's directives previously issued gave orders that fortified positions for batteries should in the future only be constructed in indirect firing positions provided such positions are possible in accordance with the previous directives.

II. Concerning the air defense measures in the Alta fjord, Naval Staff, Operations Division transmitted it's opinion to Quartermaster Division that it is absolutely necessary to give the orders for smoke screens definitely in such a way that also in case of a temporary absence of the ship from Kaafjord the mooring place will be covered by smoke screens as if the ship was present in order to deceive the enemy. Copy of the directive l/Skl I a 19895/44 Gkdos. find in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

III. Naval Command, East with reference to the code word "Colani" asked to make the motor mine-sweeper R "31" available for Naval Command, East for special operations in the east after the boats becoming ready for war about on 30 Jun. Naval Staff concurred.

IV. The Swedish Government submitted the prescribed course for the steamer HALLAREN for the departure of the ship from Venice on 15 Jun. with the request for a general approval. The course is via 4509.3 N, 1256 E to 4430.7 N, 1313.5 E and then to 4420 N, 1355.2 E. From there on the ship will follow the usual route. The Swedish request said that, at present, the captain of the HALLAREN has still the order to

29 Jun. 1944

sail on the former course, thus confirming our previous suspicion that the enemy powers are being informed by Sweden of all orders given in connection with the course of the HALLAREN.

Naval Staff informed Group South and Commanding Admiral, Adriatic Sea of these facts and declared that in view of the said development of the situation in the northern Adriatic Sea it is necessary

1. to avoid under all circumstances to give to the enemy powers any information on our minefields by giving directives to Sweden concerning the course of the Swedish steamers,
2. to make use of this opportunity to mislead the enemy powers as far as possible concerning our minefields in the northern Adriatic Sea.

Group South and Commanding Admiral, Adriatic Sea are therefore ordered to reexamine the entire problem of the routes of the Swedish steamers in the northern Adriatic Sea and to submit well-founded suggestions to be transmitted to the Swedish Government concerning the future handling of the affair and concerning the route of the HALLAREN. It is the idea of Naval Staff that the HALLAREN and any other steamer sailing for the harbors of the northern Adriatic Sea should take on board at fixed points a pilot who would bring the ship to the port of destination without giving a course fixed in advance. The point for taking over the pilot should as far as possible be situated within the range of our own coastal batteries. Furthermore it has to be taken into consideration whether it is possible to deceive the enemy by announcing declared areas for the entire northern Adriatic Sea - either in general or for Sweden only.

V. Concerning the fuel allotments: The fuel situation as compared with the preceding month did not improve in Jul. Therefore, also this time the fuel demand of the parties entitled to an allotment cannot be complied with to the full amount.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Supply and Fuel Branch allotted altogether 80,000 cubic meters for the Navy for the month of Jul. This is 5,000 cubic meters more than in Jun. and 6,000 less than in May.

Due to the petrol situation caused by enemy action it is necessary to fix quotas also for Diesel oil beginning from Jul. Only the requirements of the submarines operating offensively will remain exempt from

29 Jun. 1944

the quota system. The allotments for the quota holders in Jul. were fixed at 2/3 of the quantity consumed in May as reported to High Command, Navy. Altogether 29,500 tons were allotted as compared with 43,700 tons of Diesel oil issued in May and 32,550 tons issued in Jun. of this year.

VI. Naval Staff was asked by Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy for it's opinion concerning the question of giving up the planes of the type He 177 as was discussed during the conference on the situation at Fuehrer Headquarters on 26 Jun. Naval Staff transmitted it's opinion in this matter to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff after having conferred with Commanding General, Air Reconnaissance Forces.

A copy of the statement will be sent to High Command, Air with the request for a statement concerning the above question. According to the opinion of Commanding General, Air Reconnaissance Forces which is completely approved by Naval Staff, it is impossible to comply even but approximately with the requirements of the submarine warfare even if the production of the HE 177 B 5 f planes is carried on according to the Rest Program 226. Naval Staff asked therefore urgently to begin with the construction of the planes of type Me 264 for the long range reconnaissance over the sea. Copy of l/Skl I L 19876/44 Gkdos. find in War Diary, Part C, Vol. V.

VII. Armed Forces High Command, Quartermaster Division transmitted as per 26 Jun. a Fuehrer order on the appointment of a military special plenipotentiary for the maintenance and the increase of the naval traffic on the Danube. Copy as per l/Skl 24849/44 geh. find in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV a.

VIII. Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division reported on the use by the Allied of the harbor of La Maddalena after the occupation by the Americans. The report is based on the declarations of the crew of an Italian PT boat which deserted to our lines on 10 Apr 1944. For copy of the report as per l/Skl 26101/44 geh. compare War Diary, Part D, Vol. "Evaluation of reports on Foreign Navies". Furthermore, chiefly based on photographic reconnaissance from Jan. to May 1944 Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division reported on harbor construction works and on the building up of

29 Jun. 1944

balloon and anti-aircraft artillery defenses at Biserte. Copy of the report as per l/Skl 26100/44 Gkdos. find in War Diary, Part D, Vol. "Evaluation of reports on Foreign Navies".

Situation on 29 Jun.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Invasion:

According to radio intelligence, SO Ferry Control reported the unloading of 5,559 tons supply goods, 1,212 vehicles, 6,183 men from 27 Jun till 1800 at 28 Jun, and of 4,611 tons supply goods, 1,727 vehicles and 11,260 men from 28 till 29 Jun.

On 29 Jun. radio messages were again intercepted concerning the cruiser FROBISHER. On 28 Jun. the cruiser CERES was located in the Issigny Channel and the cruiser AJAX in the Portsmouth waters. In the morning 25 Army transporters and landing vessels were on their way to the King Section. At noon seven vessels carrying ammunition were located in one position and sixteen motorships were located when unloading in another position. Several ships reported dropping of mines by planes during the night.

During the night of 28 Jun. and during the day until 1600 our own air reconnaissance observed many landing craft, larger ships and transporters, several cruisers, seven destroyers and three (presumably) battleships off the Orne and Vire mouths between Arromanches and Grave. sur Mer. From a source regarded as reliable the following losses of the Allied Navies were reported up to 23 Jun:

1 cruiser sunk, 1 cruiser heavily damaged, cannot be used for further operations, 11 destroyers sunk, 1 destroyer cannot be used any more, 7 destroyers damaged, 8 PT boats sunk, 2 PT boats slightly damaged, 18 freighters and transporters with their cargo sunk, 3 freighters and transporters without cargo sunk, 23 freighters unserviceable, 37 freighters more or less damaged. 15 fully loaded landing craft sunk, 3 empty landing craft sunk, 26 landing craft damaged, 1 big troop transporter with full cargo hit a mine and sunk. The crew was rescued with the exception of 18 US soldiers. Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division compared that information with the successes reported by our own forces during the same time. They were: 1

29 Jun. 1944

cruiser sunk, 2 or 3 cruisers damaged, 7 destroyers sunk, 4 or 5 destroyers damaged, 3 PT boats sunk, 1 PT boat damaged. The reported successes of our naval forces against merchant shipping are being reexamined at present.

The development of the situation was as follows according to the reports arriving at Naval Staff:

At 0150, Command, Small Battle Units reported that 211th Small Battle Flotilla could not start for operations yet because of sea motion "4". Group A of 361st Small Battle Flotilla reached the assembling place 20 miles south of Trouville on the morning of 28 Jun. Group B is expected to arrive at the same place on 29 Jun. Operations will not be carried out from Honfleur but from Villers. An iron bridge under construction over the Orne Canal between Bennouville and Blainville will be destroyed by a special operation of "Biber" or "Meereskaempfer". As the canal walls are destroyed it is doubtful whether the "Biber" will be able to approach the target. Therefore, the torpedoes will be brought to the target by "Meereskaempfer" if necessary. The Army is very interested in the destruction of the river bridge. Therefore it is planned to blow up the two old bridges over the canal and over the river by one torpedo each. For the time being, the operation is planned for the night of 29 Jun.

At 0240, Group West transmitted a radio message of Port Commander, Cherbourg: "All men under my command thank you for the commendation. We know what we are fighting for. With some weapons and with a few men I will defend the position as long as possible."

In it's situation report of 0600 Group West reported as follows:

1. Sighting report of Naval Shore Command, Seine-Somme of 2130: The usual situation off the Orne mouth. The French battleship run aground is still there. Close to her one cruiser and one destroyer also run aground. The three ships are constantly kept under smoke screens, did not fire. At 0030 strong naval traffic of ships of all sizes was observed in the same area.

2. Army units observed on 28 Jun. a sinking freighter 37 kilometers off Cape de la Heve in the direction 256°.

29 Jun, 1944

3. At 0025, the Battery 2/1255 fired eight rounds against 20 or 30 gunboats between Franceville and Cabourg.

4. 2nd and 8th PT boat Flotillas left Le Havre for mine and torpedo operations. They discontinued the operations for unknown reasons and returned to the harbor with all boats at 0320.

5. The KMA-minefield west of Dieppe was laid out as planned.

6. The artillery ferry barge AF "8" sunk on the occasion of the laying out of the minefield L 24 north-east of Dieppe. The report on the carrying out of the operation did not arrive yet.

7. From 2030 till 0400 enemy targets were located in the waters west northwest of Les sept Iles up to north of Quessant. Further locations were made between 2318 and 0209 southwest up to north northwest of Le Havre and north of Cape Antifer.

At 0730, Group West transmitted the brief report of 2nd and 8th PT boat Flotillas. Both Flotillas at first went to the north up to grid square BF 3667 upper left. From that point 2nd PT boat Flotilla turned to the west and 8th PT boat Flotilla to the northwest as a flank protection against a stationary location target in BF 3653. The sighting conditions becoming constantly worse, 8th PT boat Flotilla went on its way back after 2nd PT boat Flotilla was to have completed the mine task. 2nd PT boat Flotilla fouled the area between grid square 3656 upper left and 3655 lower right sparsely with 16 DM 1-mines. The laying out of the mines was apparently carried out unnoticed.

At 1145, Group West transmitted the report of 46th Mine-sweeper Flotilla on the skirmish northwest of Malo on 28 Jun. as a supplement of the report of the patrol boat VP "203". For copy as per l/Skl 24864/44 geh. compare special file "Invasion 29 Jun." Naval Staff sent the following directive to Group West:

"Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff plans to transfer one battalion from the Channel Islands to the Jobourg Peninsula in order to reinforce the splendid resistance of that position. The Group will have to

29 Jun. 1944

examine the possibilities in cooperation with Commanding General, Armed Forces West who will be informed by Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff. The result of the investigation has to be reported."

At 1425, Group West regarded landing possibilities for the night of 29 Jun. as possible at all coasts.

Radio reports of Port Commander, Cherbourg were discontinued at 1100 on 29 Jun. Our radio intelligence showed that the enemy planned dive bomber attacks against the western, central and eastern forts of the fortress at 2100 on 28 Jun. before darkness. Nothing is known about the carrying out.

Furthermore, Group West reported on the activities of our coastal batteries:

From 1835 till 1850 on 28 Jun., Army Coastal Battery 6/1255 fired 9 rounds against a transporter. The ship set up smoke screens and sheered off. Between 1920 and 1225 the same battery was unsuccessfully attacked with 150 or 200 rounds from three destroyers. Army Coastal Battery 8/1255 fired seven rounds on destroyers between 1845 and 1915.

From 0040 till 0050 on 29 Jun., Army Coastal Battery 2/1255 fired eight rounds on gunboats off Neville whereas Army Coastal Battery 8/1255 opened harassing fire with 15 rounds against Quistrehan, St. Aubin and Benenville between 0030 and 0200.

At 1735, Group West, supplementing its report on the morning situation, reported that the artillery ferry barge AF "8" was sunk during an air attack on the occasion of the mine operation of 2nd and 8th Gunboat Flotillas north of Treport. The artillery ferry barge AF "102" was hit by a bomb and had to be towed to the harbors. Two of the attacking planes were shot down. The mine task was not carried out. For the night of 29 Jun., mine operations were ordered for 8th PT boat Flotilla and torpedo operations in the Seine Bay were ordered for 2nd PT boat Flotilla. Furthermore, the barrages LO V a and V b will be laid out north of Ostend.

At 2035, Group West transmitted to all:

"The PT boats carried out the mine operation in the Seine Bay. The Fuehrer conferred the Knights Cross

29 Jun. 1944

of the Iron Cross to the commandant of the patrol boat VP "203", Lieutenant (Navy) Martinsen. Communications with Port Commander, Cherbourg are interrupted since 1100. The Jobourg Peninsula is still being defended. Our own Air Force continued the laying out of mines off the Orne mouth during the night of 27 Jun. Fine successes of our mine operations are beginning to become apparent. One LCT of 1,000 BRT was set afire by aircraft bombs. Nightfighters shot down seven planes."

At 2339, Naval Shore Commander, Channel Islands reported:

The Battery Steinbruch (on the Isle of Guernsey) opened fire on six destroyers in BF 3544. The target set up smoke screens and withdrew to the west.

2. Enemy Situation at Other Parts of the West Area:

In the area of 19th Group, 71 planes were observed in operations. Two British ships were located in the rendezvous area.

3. Own Situation at Other Parts of the West Area:

Atlantic Coast Area:

In the night of 28 Jun., three or four mine-laying planes were reported off the Loire mouth, five or eight planes off Lorient and several enemy planes off Brest. The laying of mines was observed.

Two mines were cleared off Brest and two off Lorient. One mine was cleared off St. Nazaire and one was cleared off La Pallice. The oil depot at Donges was attacked in the morning by ten enemy fighter bombers. One empty tank was destroyed. Other damages were only slight. One submarine was escorted on her way in and two submarines were escorted out.

Channel Waters:

From 1632 till 1712 on 28 Jun., the Batteries "Lindemann" and "Todt"

29 Jun. 1944

as well as "Grosser Kurfuerst" fired upon a convoy off the coast of England. As the fire was opened, the convoy set up smoke screens. A black mushroom-shaped smoke and the becoming loose of a small barrage balloon was observed.

In the night of 28 Jun. fighterbombers attacked the patrol boat VP "1812" north of Gris Nez, the Group A of 36th Mine-sweeper Flotilla off Ostend, the Group B of the same Flotilla off Gravelines, Group C and 18th Patrol boat Flotilla off Calais. Slight damages and casualties occurred. The patrol boat VP "1812" reported one enemy plane shot down.

Fourteen patrol positions were occupied in the Channel.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

North Sea:

The patrol positions in the German Bight were occupied.

The Harbor Patrol Flotilla, Wilhelmshaven cleared two mines off Wesermuende. The northern sluice at Brunsbuettel was fully reopened for traffic at 2200 on 28 Jun. Patrol and minesweeping services along the Dutch coast were carried out as planned. At 1145 one Liberator was shot down. On the occasion of an air attack of four enemy planes against a water-police boat in the Ijsel Meer, the boat remained undamaged. Two men were killed.

Four explosions were heard off the Dutch coast in the forenoon hours and four explosions were heard in the night of 29 Jun.

During the reported attack of 10 enemy planes against the patrol group off Hook, three enemy planes were confirmed shot down and two other enemy planes were set afire. Our vessels suffered slight damages and had some casualties.

One mine was cleared off Ijmuiden. Towards noon, three boats of the Escort Group, Ijsel Meer were unsuccessfully attacked by eight enemy planes. One of the attacking planes was shot down.

On 18 Jun., Naval Command, North has asked for the immediate return to Commanding Admiral, Defenses North of the boats ready for sailing of 1st Mine-sweeper Flotilla as replacements for six minesweeping vessels that had become unavailable. Naval Staff decided that in spite of the shortage of vessels in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses North, it is impossible, at present, to return the boats

29 Jun. 1944

to Commanding Admiral, Defenses North. Although the docking period of 3rd and 25th Minesweeper Flotillas has come to an end, 1st Minesweeper Flotilla is indispensable there because of the strained situation in the Gulf of Finland.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

In the area of 18th Group, 31 planes were observed in operation. Our own Sea Rescue Service sighted a burning ship 80 miles west southwest of Lister at 1930. Two Mustangs were flying over the ship and two lifeboats were near her. Planes were reported near Vardoe, Banak and Obrestad.

2. Own Situation:

Twenty eight ships were escorted to the north and thirty one were escorted to the south.

Naval Command, Norway submitted an excerpt of the operation order for the training operation of 4th Destroyer Flotilla (code word "Suedwino").

The operative command is with the Naval Command. The training is planned for the time from 30 Jun. till 1 Jul. As bad weather is desired, a postponement is possible. The training area will be in AB 9315 and 9358 up to AC 4815 and 4858.

Action against an enemy outside the training area will be taken only upon order of the Naval Command.

5th Air Force promised reconnaissance as far as possible with the forces available in case the enemy situation makes it necessary.

Naval Staff has nothing to add to this directive.

Naval Staff informed Armed Forces High Command accordingly, adding that operations of the ship borne planes are planned for reconnaissance and for escort. Radio and ultra-shortwave silence were ordered on the sea. When encountering an enemy of equal or inferior strength he will be attacked. Contact with superior enemy has to be avoided.

29 Jun. 1944

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, patrol boats in the Gulf of Finland maintained strong radio traffic among each other. A German formation operating near Narvi was reported in the night of 28 Jun, as consisting of 18 cutters.

Commander, 1st Minesweeper Flotilla observed the clearing of four mines of our minefield "Seeigel IV b" on 27 Jun. Thus the information from yesterday's radio intelligence was confirmed.

2. Own Situation:

The patrol positions along the western coast of Juteland were occupied. No KMA-mines were laid out because of the bad weather.

Mineclearance work was carried out in the Baltic Sea Entrances by 27 boats and by 38 boats and 3 minesweeping planes in the Baltic Sea.

The steamer LIBAU (332 BRT) hit a mine north of Kelberg. The ship was damaged and had to be beached.

The transport of 122nd Infantry Division was continued according to plans. 9,829 men, 3,468 horses, 2,088 vehicles and 3,444 tons of goods of the Armed Forces went aboard up to 1800.

The mineship ELSASS is traveling under escort from Baltic Port to Gdynia. The 21st Landing Flotilla left Windau for Reval.

The steamer PHILA was attacked by enemy planes in the Irben Narrows without suffering damages. The torpedo boat T "3" moved from Libau to Koenigsberg for exchanging the propeller.

The 9th Coast Patrol Force submitted a provisional brief report on the operation against Narvi in the night of 27 Jun. For copy as per 1/Skl 19974/44 Gkdos. compare War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

The Finnish battle report was promised to be transmitted in two or three days. Only then it will be possible to make a final statement and a judgement on the decision to discontinue the operation. The 9th Coast Patrol Force is of the opinion that the enemy did not observe the intention to land and that he regarded the bombardment of the island as our only aim.

29 Jun, 1944

It is clear from the informations available at present that the common German/Finnish operation failed. The lack of a uniform central command capable of directing the operation according to its own will is probably responsible for the failure. In order to avoid a repeating of this mistake in the future, Naval Command, East was ordered by telephone by Chief, Naval Staff to take appropriate measures immediately. According to information of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, the Fuehrer also declared that the operation Narvi was a poor affair. Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, East is of the same opinion, as could be ascertained by telephone. Chief, Naval Staff will discuss the matter in the same sense on 30 Jun. in the conference with the Finnish General Oestermann and with the Finnish Naval Attache.

V. Submarine Warfare.

The submarine U "214" carried out the mine task off Plymouth and is now on her way back to western France.

In the South Atlantic the submarine U "547" started for the return from the Ivory Coast. On 14 Jun. the boat sunk a steamer of 6,000 BRT and probably one escort vessel sailing in a small convoy in the grid square EU 49.

The submarines leaving the Norwegian ports for the Atlantic were ordered in view of the reinforced enemy air activity to sail, if possible, only by using the snorkel and without emerging.

No other reports of any importance arrived.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

West Area:

Strong enemy air activity was observed in the West Area. During daylight, 450 four-engined planes attacked defense zones in the rear and building places in Belgium/Northern France and 600 fighterbombers and fighters attacked railway installations and shunting stations at Nantes, Viercon and Bourges.

Reports on our own air operations in the West Area during the day

29 Jun. 1944

did not come in yet. In the night of 29 Jun. only minor enemy air activity was observed over the occupied western territories.

Reich Territory:

More than 1,000 four-engined enemy planes under very strong fighter escort entered from 0700 onward the area Bornburg - Magdeburg - Leipzig - Wittenberg - Chemnitz coming via the Netherlands and Hannover. The attacked area was screened off by strong fighter forces especially towards the south. Attacks were directed against nine works of the German air armament industries, against hydro-generation plants in the Magdeburg - Leipzig area as well as against works of the tar-oil-, and fat-production of the central German industrial area. Altogether 22 towns were attacked. Besides, 9 aerodromes were attacked with gunfire. Ten German planes were destroyed on the ground on this occasion. Fifteen locomotive engines and many trucks and motor cars were lost due to low level attacks against roads and railways. Reports on the successes of our own defenses did not come in yet. During the night, 40 Wellington planes coming from the south penetrated to the Vienna area and attacked the aerodrome at Fels.

Mediterranean Theater:

On 28 Jun. 250 enemy operations during which attacks against traffic targets were carried out were reported from the rear of the Italian front area. Operations of our own fighters had no success.

During the morning hours about 400 four-engined enemy planes under strong fighter escort entered the Ploesti area. The bulk of the planes attacked Bucuresti and a small section attacked the aerodrome Karlova. Damages at the railway stations occurred at Bucuresti. Three oil pipelines from Ploesti to Giurgiu were set afire. One Roumanian refinery-plant was hit in its refugee compound. At the aerodrome, 25 Me 109 - planes were damaged or destroyed. Twelve of the attacking planes were shot down by the 127 German fighters which were defending the area.

During the night of 28 Jun., 60 or 80 Liberator and Wellington planes attacked Giurgiu. The bombs fell mostly on open fields.

Nineteen German night-fighters reported two enemy planes shot down

29 Jun. 1944

and our anti-aircraft guns reported the shooting down of another three enemy planes.

In the Balkans, 50 planes were observed supplying the bandits and 20 planes were observed in Northern Italy carrying out harassing raids.

East Area:

On 28 Jun. 712 German and 432 enemy planes were operating at the eastern front. Twenty five enemy planes were shot down and three German planes were lost.

Special Items:

1. High Command, Air ordered 3rd Air Force Command to transfer the 1st Squadron (Long-range Reconnaissance) of 129th Wing from Biscarosse with one squadron-half to Oslo and one squadron-half to Tromsoe. Upon its arrival in the area, the squadron will be placed under the command of 5th Air Force Command.

2. According to information of High Command, Air, Operations Division, Naval Liaison Officer, the bases of 6th Air Force are seriously threatened by the quick advance of the Russians. Large permanent aerodromes were lost. As a precautionary measure the base for operations was withdrawn to the line Pinsk-Wilna. The number of operations was reduced in the area of Central Army Group in spite of the dispatch of new formations from 4th Air Force and from the Reich, because difficulties of supply have arisen from the moving of the bases. The enemy is operating with enormous numbers of planes against the area of Central Army Group, between 3000 and 4000 operations being observed daily. On the other hand, our own activity is confined to 300 or 400 operations per day. Fortunately, the enemy does not yet try to attack in the rear with its overwhelming forces but concentrates his attacks on the first line in front of his advanced tank units.

VII. War in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea.

1. Area of Naval Group West:

Nothing to report.

29 Jun. 1944

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance in the early morning hours observed a ship eight miles west of Leghorn and three PT boats steering south 17 miles north northeast of Cape Corse. At 0425, fourteen vessels, presumably for the supply of Bastia - Elba were made out north-east of Porto Vecchio. At 0800, a large landing craft was steering east south of Campo at the southern coast of Elba. Three boats were presumably carrying out mine clearance work.

Eight (presumably) LCT's were at the harbor Anzio, one patrol boat and three destroyers were off the harbor and others were steering a northwest course. Three presumably cruisers and three patrol vessels were sighted 19 miles south of Anzio, one passenger ship 40 miles west northwest of Anzio and two destroyers and nine landing boats were seen steering northwest 26 miles west of Anzio. PT boats were again active in the Ligurian Sea during the night of 28 Jun. They had contact with German torpedo boats of foreign construction which scored several hits. Our boats were able to avoid two torpedoes of the four or six enemy PT boats. Referring to invasion preparations in Northern Africa, Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division reported from a reliable source that definite preparations could not be observed until 19 Jun. Troop and ship concentrations in the Oran and Algiers area led only to the conclusion that no major operations are to be expected.

Own Situation:

On the occasion of an enemy fighter bomber attack against the eastern coast of the Spezia Bay, the Artillery Weapon Command was damaged. Detailed reports are still to come.

The mineship DIETRICH VON BERN carried out the mine task "Hut" south of Sestri Levante according to plans.

3. Area of Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

At 2245 on 27 Jun, our coastal battery fired unsuccess --

29 Jun. 1944

fully against three enemy PT boats which were in a waiting position off Primosten. On the occasion of an enemy air attack against Trieste on the evening of 26 Jun., the steamer LUCIANA MARIANA burned out.

At 0237 on 28 Jun., five of our PT boats sighted two enemy destroyers and three PT boats at the eastern end of Hvar. The boats returned to Spalate where they arrived at 0440.

Aegean Sea:

The usual enemy air activity was observed over the Aegean Sea. In the afternoon of 28 Jun., hand-grenades and cartridges were set afire by sabotage on the ammunition island in the Salamis Bay. The fire was extinguished at 1900 in the evening. On the evening of 29 Jun., Rhodos was attacked with twelve bombs by three or four enemy planes. No damages were sustained in the harbor. The laying out of mines was not observed.

c. Black Sea:

Nothing to report.

Situation on the Danube:

The laying of mines was reported from the kilometer indicators 430, 555, 670 and 795. Two tugs and one barge sunk after hitting mines. Another vessel sunk on 28 Jun. Two mines were cleared near kilometer indicator 1276.

VIII. Situation in East Asia.

The German Embassy at Bangkok reported that the command in the Southeast Area was rearranged. Fieldmarshal Terauchi as commanding general of the Army forces in the Southeast Area moved to Manila.

An enemy attack against the Philippine Islands is expected by the end of the year.

30 Jun. 1944

Items of Political Importance.

The Governor of New York, Dewey was nominated by the Republicans for the presidential elections in the United States. Dewey accepted the nomination and made it clear in his first speech that a change in the Government in January next year cannot and will not mean any change in the military conduct of the war. The military conduct of this war was lying beyond the range of this election campaign.

Thus, as far as foreign politics and the conduct of the war are concerned, the elections will be held under an agreement of public peace.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff at 1115.

I. During the discussion of the situation in the air, Naval Staff, Operations Division, Naval Air and Air Force Liaison Section reported:

According to a report of a reliable agent from the entourage of the British Air Marshal Harrison the Allied will give up the principle of concentrated air attacks of from 7 to 900 four-engined planes against a single target. The methods of attack will vary. In any case, attacks against two and possibly three different targets will be carried out in the same night with simultaneous harassing attacks. The idea is to reduce the losses by any means.

Our batteries at the Channel coast reported conformably that during last night British fighters are flying in waiting positions in several sections from Boulogne to the coast of England in order to attack from good firing positions in case of V 1 rocket attacks. As the British fighters are slower than the V 1 rockets they will succeed only if the first salvo is in the mark. Otherwise the fighters of the next zone will have to attack. Last night, six of eight V 1 rockets following each other after certain intervals were shot down by this method. Therefore, chances of success seem to be greater if the rockets are fired during the day or when the sky is clouded or during mist.

Naval Shore Command Seine Somme reported on 29 Jun. also on the shooting down of V 1 rockets over the sea.

These observations were transmitted to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff and to High Command, Air, Operations Staff.

30 Jun. 1944

According to the assessment of the situation by 3rd Air Force of 26 Jun., the center of the enemy bomber attacks during daylight is in the area of the special weapons and against traffic targets in the Loire line. In the area of the rear defense zones the attacks are directed against the firing positions, traffic installations, power centers and are thus additionally helping to cut off the supplies for the special weapons and to isolate the area as far as traffic and communications are concerned. Heavy RAF bomber formations are increasingly participating in the daylight operations. It was so far impossible to recognize a systematic bombing of the coastal fortifications and of the off-shore obstacles. Our own movements were observed up to the slightest detail by reconnaissance continuous in space and in time. The building up of a ground organization in the landing area is making fast progress. The attacks against our own ground organization is being continued in the previous scope. It is still expected that the close-combat formations concentrated in the southeastern area are provided for a further landing operation east of the present landing area. According to the opinion of High Command, Air, Operations Staff this plan is even more probable because it would open the possibility of occupying the German special installations (for V 1 rockets - Tr.N.) and landing craft space becoming available if Cherbourg could be used for the supply traffic.

After a long time, American formations were again active on 25 Jun. against traffic installations at the lower Rhone and along the southern coast of France.

It was said in an agents report of 28 Jun. that due to the long-range rocket attack against Portsmouth and Southampton the British squadron stationed in the two harbors is moving to Weymouth and to the bights up to Dartmouth. Three divisions are ready for transshipment at Brighton.

II. Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Intelligence Division: The Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces prolonged by one further week the warning to the fishermen off the western coasts of Europe which had been valid up to 29 Jun. This time, however, the declared area has been reduced. Fishing has to discontinue only in the coastal waters from Bayonne up to the West Frisian Islands. Nevertheless, the Supreme Command warned the fishermen in other coastal waters that fishing may become extremely dangerous and that it will not be possible to issue special warnings shortly before future operations.

The Military Attache at Stockholm transmitted his impressions of the Swedish officers corps concerning the decision about Finland.

30 Jun. 1944

The decision is welcomed in these circles quite positively and partly even with a feeling of relief and joy. A reliable agent reported that a tension arose between the military leaders and the Swedish press over differences in opinion concerning the Finnish question as had not been the case so openly for a long time.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

III. Naval Staff, Operations Division, Mine Warfare and Anti-Submarine Section:

a. Naval Command, Norway reported its plans concerning the reinforcement of the barrage plans in the Follafjord and on the planned barrages near Stadlandet as well as the mine indents. For the carrying out of the barrage-plan near Stadlandet, Naval Command, Norway asked for the mineship OSTMARK. Naval Staff approved both barrage plans. The dispatch of the mineship OSTMARK had been ordered already on 19 Jun.

b. Naval Staff approved also the plans submitted by Group West for the minefields off the Schelde and off the Belgian coast.

c. Inspector for Aerial Mines asked Bureau of Naval Armament, Underwater Obstacles Branch for an allotment of DM-mines for the Air Force, 800 of which were required until 15 Jul and altogether 1,900 mines would have to be delivered up to 1 Sept. In view of the total stock of the Navy being 2,100 mines and as the monthly production is 1,200 mines it cannot be advocated to deliver the quantity which was asked for, as the Navy then would not have a sufficient reserve of its own during the next months. It was suggested to comply with the demand of the Air Force under the condition that the quota to be delivered at every time would depend on the situation.

Chief of Naval Staff concurred.

IV Situation of the Army:

West: The center of the fighting was in the Caen area. 2nd SS Tank Corps started a counter offensive against the enemy break-through. The enemy losses are extraordinarily high.

In Italy the enemy gained only little territory.

30. Jun. 1944

At the Karelian Front the Finnish positions near Viborg were pushed back at one place. It is planned to dispatch one German assault gun brigade. Also 122nd Infantry Division will probably go into action in the Viborg area. The withdrawal at the Isthmus of Anus is being carried out according to plans. The Russians are now in the possession of the entire Murman railway line.

At our own Eastern Front the situation in the area of Central Army Group has furthermore deteriorated. The enemy crossed the Beresina in a wide front. The hope to be able to defend Minsk is but very small. The communications to Brest-Litovsk are in danger. Bobruisk was lost. The enemy announced to have taken 16,000 prisoners. 3rd Tank Army was pushed further back towards west. Fighting is going on at Poloczka. Three more German corps commanders were lost. General Staff of the Army is of the opinion that the enemy is probably planning to advance as well in the direction of Dvinsk - Baltic coast as also from the Kowel area towards Lwow and Warsaw. By the annihilation of the four armies of Central Army Group our reserves were weakened so much that we can only fight with regiments and battalions against armies.

Armed Forces High Command, Chief of Operations Staff transmitted the result of the conference with the Fuehrer on the afternoon of 29 Jun. According to the report, at the Western Front the attack against the enemy east of the Orne depends on the arrival of 16th Air-borne Division and on the forcing away of the enemy naval forces from their firing positions off the coast. An attack from the area of 84th Army Corps is impossible at present. The most important tasks for the near future were:

- a. Flank attack for the annihilation of the landing forces which are advancing via Baron towards the Orne.
- b. The Army should avoid to be pushed into the open territory.
- c. A successful attack depends on sufficient supplies. A thorough collection of all motor vehicles available in France is necessary.
- d. Strongly defended convey supply roads should be established to the landing bridgehead as well as some cross-connections.
- e. Systematic mining at the Orne and at the Vire, reinforcement of the fighters and ruthless attack of all special weapons against the enemy naval forces.

The other tasks are concerning the Army and the Air Force.

The time has not yet come for a diminution of 15th Army. It has

30 Jun. 1944

however to be prepared for the future. Victualling of the Channel Islands has to be provided for a long period.

V. Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief of Operations Branch:

a. Group West transmitted the earliest date for the war readiness of the torpedo boat T "28" to be 10 Jul. The Group regards diversion and harassing operations for the assistance of the PT boats off Le Havre in tactical cooperation with the coastal artillery as still possible for a short time although the torpedo boat will have to accept full risk. The Group is planning therefore to transfer the boat to the east during the new moon period in Jul after having carried out some operations. The movement to the east will also have to be done under a strong risk. The boat will therefore sail independently and at high speed. The torpedo boat will be assisted by the forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West which will occupy many patrol positions in a relay system. Naval Staff is of the opinion that the transfer has to be carried out as soon as the necessary readiness of the ship is accomplished and if the weather conditions are favorable without depending on the moon phase. Isolated operations off Le Havre would render a surprise movement to the east more difficult. Moreover the chances of success are most limited for the boat operating independently.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred. Group West with copy for the information of Fleet and Commander, Destroyers was ordered accordingly. For copy as per 1/Skl I op 19991/44 Gkdos. compare War Diary, Part C, Vol IIb.

b. The Fleet reported on 28 Jun. that in case of the normal training routine being maintained the LUETZOW, NUERNBERG, LEIPZIG, EMDEN, and SCHLESSEN will not be ready for war for two months as far as personnel is concerned because of an exchange of cadets. Naval Staff is of the opinion that the development of the situation in the Baltic Sea will make necessary within a short time the dispatch to front service of units of the Training Formation. Naval Staff, Operations Division is therefore unable to desist from an at least reduced war-readiness of the cruisers PRINZ EUGEN, LUETZOW, SCHEER, NUERNBERG and EMDEN. It was assumed in this connection that one cannot yet reckon with the war readiness of the HIPPER and of the KOELN in Jul. and Aug. Chief, Naval Staff agreed with this opinion. Naval Staff, Operations Division asked therefore Quartermaster Division to investigate the possibility of maintaining the war readiness of the above ships.

Bureau of Naval Armament remarked that the remaining on board of the

30 Jun. 1944

cadets for more than the time provided in the training plan would derange the entire training program for the cadets. Chief Naval Staff observed that the decision of this question would depend on the situation and would have to be made as soon as the coming development can be foreseen.

Special Items.

I. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff issued the following directive concerning the emergency units of the Navy:

"1. The Fuehrer ordered upon a report of Commander in Chief, Navy that for the time being no further emergency units are to be withdrawn from the home area in addition to the emergency units and manning divisions of altogether 43,700 men from the Home Area) so far made available by the Navy in the West Area because, in the interest of the general conduct of the war, the naval forces becoming available from the ship-construction program 1944 will have to put into service. The request of Commanding General, Armed Forces, West for further emergency units of the Navy can therefore not be complied with. On the other hand, the land formations of the Navy actually remaining in the West Area will have to be fully used for defense and patrol duties with the following exception:

2. The Navy will be entitled to withdraw in due time the highly qualified and urgently required personnel which has been trained in the manning divisions for the warships to be put into service in the future. The specialists will be withdrawn up to the following maximum strength:

2,150 men till 1 July 1944,

3,500 men till 15 July 1944,

3,800 men till 1 Aug. 1944.

Details concerning the withdrawal will be settled by High Command, Navy directly with Commanding General, Armed Forces, West. In view of the situation in the west, High Command, Navy will gradually have to dispatch replacements or recruits who have obtained their first training in order to compensate as much as possible for the withdrawal of the specialists. Plans have to be reported."

30 Jun. 1944

II. Upon order of Commander in Chief, Navy the Naval Staff transmitted the directive to Group South that upon order of Commander in Chief, Navy no ships should be transferred from the Black Sea through the Dardanelles to the Aegean Sea. Copies of the order went to Commanding Admiral, Black Sea and to Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea.

III. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff ordered that because of the development of the situation preparations for the operation "Gisela neu" have to be discontinued immediately as far as they provide for the need of facing the enemy on the Spanish Peninsula in order to prevent him from occupying the northern coast of Spain. The measures taken for this eventuality have to be cancelled.

IV. Chief, Naval Staff discussed the unsuccessful attack against Narvi (compare War Diary of 29 Jun.) during a conference with General Oostermann, the Finnish Naval Attache, and the assistant of the Finnish Military Attache. The German opinion was fully approved by the Finnish gentlemen. Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, East was asked to see that the operation is repeated.

V. A summary of the enemy information obtained by radio intelligence and radio decyphering during the time from 19 Jun. to 25 Jun. will be found in the Radio Intercept Report No. 26/44.

VI. In its evaluation of information concerning foreign Navies, Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division reported on the average of the high pressure turbines of the modern Russian destroyers of the GNEWNY-class and on the construction of a dry-dock at the Ice Sea base Jokonga. Further reports were given on the condition and on the use being made of Italian ships and bases in the hand of the enemy, on the harbor of Bastia as well as on British instructions for ships sailing in Turkish territorial waters and for the contact with Turkish offices. The information was filed in War Diary, Part D, Vol. "Materials on the enemy Situation".

30 Jun. 1944

Situation on 30 Jun.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Invasion:

The cruisers DESPATCH and ENTERPRISE were located in the landing area. It was furthermore found out by radio intelligence that a number of convoys were present presumably in the landing area and that seven transporters arrived in the central landing area. Besides, radio intelligence service intercepted hints that the battleship NELSON was torpedoed during the night of 12 Jun. Thereafter, the commandant of a combat group informed Commander, Western Task Forces on the evening of 13 Jun, on enemy contact of the NELSON who was torpedoed during the preceding night (pencil-remark on the margin: later the date was found out to have been 12 Jun. Therefore it is a success of the PT boats). The enemy had approached at a speed of 15 miles which was then reduced to 8 miles. The torpedo was fired upon a call for the recognition signal. The enemy had withdrawn at a speed of 25 or 30 miles on a zigzag course and setting up a smoke screen. All destroyers were informed that the enemy is answering any call with gunfire and torpedoes. According to the opinion of Group West it was most probably a success of 5th Torpedo boat Flotilla. The torpedo boat T "28" fired a salvo of two torpedoes in the night of 12 Jun, and the MOEVE fired a fan of six torpedoes. Explosions were heard. Our PT boats had no opportunity to fire their torpedoes during that night.

Our own air reconnaissance made out very strong naval traffic in the Seine Bay during the day. Between the Orne mouth and Lion sur Mer there were near 0700 about 90 vessels including 3 big transporters off the coast. At about 1050, from ten to fifteen medium sized ships were observed north of Port en Bessin and furthermore presumably one cruiser and several destroyers. Northwest and north of the Orne mouth two big transporters and six or eight small vessels were observed. At noon the ship concentrations were confirmed again. This time, particularly strong concentrations of about 300 landing boats in the area north of Arromanches and of 80 landing boats, 3 large transporters, 1 cruiser and 5 destroyers off the Viremouth could be made out.

According to the reports arriving, the development of the situation

30 Jun. 1944

was as follows: It was announced in British broadcasts that the Port Commander, Cherbourg, Rearadmiral Hennecke and Lieutenant General von Schlieben were taken prisoners by the Americans.

At 0030, Group West referring to the task of transporting one battalion to the Jobourg Peninsula as ordered by Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, transmitted its assessment of the situation concerning possible landing places, vessels available and concerning the enemy situation as follows: The St. Martin Bay is protected against western winds but the bay is fouled with mines to such an extent that entering the bay at night cannot be advocated. The harbor of Jobourg is suitable only for ~~very~~ small boats and cannot be reached at night. All suitable parts of the Vauville Bay are fouled with mines. The Calgrin roads cannot be used in case of west wind.

Only harbor patrol boats and artillery ferry barges can be used for transport. The capacity of both types is small.

The risk of the transfer is very high in view of the constant control by the enemy of the Channel Island waters and particularly of the waters around Alderney. The Group recalled the fight in the night of 28 Jun. when one cruiser, six destroyers and six PT boats attacked the inferior German patrol boats near St. Malo. The control by the enemy air force of the waters around Jobourg was proved by our radio intelligence. Heavy casualties are to be expected during the transfer of the battalion. In view of this situation, Group West asked Commanding General, Armed Forces, West for an order whether preparations for the transfer have to be made.

At 0145, Naval Shore Command, Channel Islands transmitted to Group West the following telephone report of Group Keil:

"No communications with "York". The battery seems still to fire. The Battery "Landemer" is undisputedly in our hand. Casualties are small. One gun only was lost at Army Coastal Battery 3/1262."

At 0315, Command, Small Battle Units reported the departure of 211th Small Battle Flotilla and of 4th Motor Mine-Sweeper Flotilla at 2400.

At 0546, Naval Shore Command, Channel Islands reported:

30 Jun. 1944

"Since 2230 many destroyers perhaps also cruisers and PT boats in BF 3517, 3515, 3516, 2664, and from 3544 up to 3511."

It was reported that these forces were bombarded by Battery "Steinbruch". The Batteries "Annes", "Bluecher", "Elsass" and 1/197 twice opened surprise fire against located targets presumably destroyers in BF 3546. The targets sheered off towards west at high speed.

2nd and 8th PT boat Flotillas did not operate because of a thunderstorm and bad sight. According to new radio interceptions, the cruiser CERES is not in the Issigny-Canal but off the Canal.

At 1202, Naval Communications Officer, Channel Islands transmitted a report from Jobourg of 1025: "The enemy is here".

At 1400, Group West regarded landing possibilities for the night of 30 Jun. as possible in the Dutch area, as difficult at the Channel coast, as improbable at the Atlantic coast as far as the Bretagne coast is concerned and as slightly more difficult in general.

In the night of 29 Jun., 15th Patrol Flotilla had constantly contact with two enemy gunboats near Cape Antifer. One of the attacking boats was damaged. Our own formation returned to Le Havre undamaged but with one casualty.

Group West transmitted a supplement by Commander, 2nd Patrol boat Flotilla to the battle report of the patrol boat V "203" of 27 Jun: According to the report the boats V "213" and M "4611" sunk. It has definitively to be concluded that the enemy himself sunk the destroyer which has been reported burning at 0132 by the commandant of the patrol boat V "202".

At 1600, Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy gave information by telephone that the plan to reinforce our forces at Jobourg by dispatching forces from the Channel Islands was definitely given up. Group West was informed through Commanding General, Armed Forces, West.

At 1605, Group West reported concerning the Operation Command "Boehne", Le Havre: "The first operation was carried out in the night of 25 Jun. with 8 control-"Linses" and 9 explosive-"Linses". 4th Motor Mine-Sweeper Flotilla had

30 Jun. 1944

been dispatched for the navigatory command and for the towing of the weapons during the first part of the operation. Due to an operational mistake one of the explosive-"Linses" exploded along side the motor mine-sweeper R "46". This boat, two control-"Linses" and one explosive-"Linse" sunk. Casualties were sustained. Because of the towing gear being in disorder the operation was cancelled for the other small weapons which were still ready for service.

On the occasion of a new start for the operation in the night of 29 Jun., two explosive-"Linses" were not ready for action. On the way to the operation area, two other "Linses" rammed each other and sunk. Of the remaining four control-"Linses" and five explosive-"Linses", one "Linse" lost its connection and another sunk. One "Linse" sunk in the Orne mouth owing to a rising storm. Because of technical deficiencies at the two remaining "Linses", the rest returned and entered Trouville."

At 1730, Commander in Chief, Navy asked by teletype whether it is possible to equip with DM firing devices the MTA-mine-torpedoes to be used by the submarines. They would be fired by submarines from deep water where the submarines are not threatened by mines against the waters off the outer mole of Cherbourg. Naval Staff, Operations Division answered as follows:

"1. It is impossible to equip the MTA-mine-torpedoes with DM-firing devices within a short time. A new construction of the mine-heads is necessary.

2. The stock of MTA-mine-torpedoes is 35."

At 1740, Group West reported the plans for the night:

a. 2nd and 8th PT boat Flotillas as yesterday, 9th PT boat Flotilla will move from Dieppe to Le Havre.

b. Laying out of LO 4 minefield west of Ostend and of the KMA-Coastal-Mine A barrage west of Dieppe.

At 1755, Group West transmitted its assessment of the enemy activity in the coastal waters which is increasing every day. Several destroyer patrols in the waters from Fecamp up to Le Havre were observed in the night of 29 Jun. The destroyer patrol line from Le Havre to Cape Antifer

30 Jun, 1944

and further north is so strongly occupied every night that not a single PT boat was able last week to penetrate the line or to outflank it to the north. The enemy established in that area a locating service which is in no way inferior to the service at the coast of England. Other destroyers are patrolling almost constantly between Guernsey and Alderney as well as south of Jersey. All the planned movements had to be cancelled therefore last night. The transfer of the SS construction brigade to Malo could therefore not be carried on. The vessels at St. Helier were unable to move to the north to St. Peter Port. The mail was not collected at Jobourg.

A destroyer patrol reinforced by cruisers is continuously patrolling day and night along the northern coast of the Bretagne, simultaneously operating in several groups off Ouessant, Ile de Bas as far as Lezardrieux. The groups are being sighted every day several times and are being located at night regularly. Naval traffic between the Channel Island area and Brest is therefore impossible for the time being.

Last night there was also for the first time a destroyer patrol at the southern coast of the Bretagne between Brest and Benodet. The planned transfer of the destroyer Z "24" and the torpedo boat T "24" was therefore cancelled because it was assumed that the enemy was there in anticipation of the transfer. It remains to be seen whether the enemy will extend the patrol system down to this coast. No counter action is possible against the enemy destroyer activity close to the shore, except by coastal artillery the effective range of which is generally avoided by the enemy.

Commanding Admiral, Naval Group West ordered a court-martial against Captain (Ordnance) Kirgasser (see War Diary 27 Jun.) because of disobedience against a Fuehrer order and surrender to the enemy.

At 2111, Naval Shore Commander, Channel Islands transmitted a report of Combat Group Keil of 1700:

"Four small enemy ships near Cherbourg. Apparently nine clearance vessels. Destroyers in the background. The Naval Batteries do not fire."

Radio Intelligence Service intercepted the report of a ship of 1540, according to which the ship had cargo for Cherbourg and was waiting for further orders.

30 Jun. 1944

At 2219. Naval Shore Commander, Channel Islands transmitted a further report of Group Keil stating that the fighting is nearing its final stage. The ammunition for the guns is almost exhausted, part of the guns was blown up, the blowing up of others is being prepared. No communication with Battery "Landemer". Communications still existing with Cape de La Hague. Since 2130 the Army Coastal Battery "Bluecher" on Alderney opened harassing fire against the area Berqueville and Jobourg upon a request of Group Keil.

At 2245, Group West transmitted to all:

"1. No operations of the PT boats because of the weather. The coastal batteries east of the Orne are successfully firing against the enemy landings.

2. The situation at the Jobourg Peninsula is unclear at present. The fighting west of Caen became heavier and extended over a wider area. An enemy attack north of Lo was repulsed.

3. Only part of the forces of the Air Force continued mine laying on 27 and 29 Jun. because of the bad weather. Night fighters shot down 14 four-engined enemy planes."

At 2319, Naval Shore Commander, Channel Islands reported that communications with Group Keil are interrupted since 2240. The gunfire from Alderney was discontinued for the time being.

According to an Exchange Report from the headquarters of General Montgomery the weather in the Channel was so bad after the second week of the landing that it had almost caused a very critical situation with far reaching consequences for the entire operation of the Allied. A storm lasting four days made any landing impossible and every attempt to land materials and troops in spite of the storm were frustrated.

2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the West Area:

In the area of 19th Group, 33 planes were observed in operation and four British ships were located in the rendezvous area.

30 Jun. 1944

3. Own Situation in Other Parts of the West Area:

Atlantic Coast Area:

Fifteen patrol positions were occupied. Four mines were cleared off St. Nazaire and two mines were cleared off Lorient. At 0930 a fire broke out in the main ammunition depot Jonzac east of the Gironde mouth. An explosion followed. Sabotage is suspected. In the afternoon 30 Mosquitoes attacked the harbor Concarneau with bombs and gunfire. The anti-submarine chaser "1408" was sunk, two mine-sweepers and one anti-submarine chaser were damaged. On the evening of 29 Jun., enemy fighter bombers attacked 26th Minesweeper Flotilla south of Penmarch. One tug was put out of action, one enemy plane was shot down. Furthermore, the flotilla was attacked with bombs and gunfire by 18 Mosquitoes. Two of the attacking planes caught fire owing to our gunfire. All boats were hit by gunfire. Casualties occurred on the flotilla.

One submarine was escorted on her way out. It is planned for the night of 30 Jun. to move the destroyer Z "24" and the torpedo boat T "24" from Cherbourg to Gironde.

Channel Waters:

Thirteen patrol positions were occupied. On the afternoon of 29 Jun. our heavy batteries in the Channel narrows fired upon an enemy convoy covered under a smoke screen south of Dover. The fire was apparently successful as later on, when the sight was good, a large tanker was seen run aground and rising high above the sea together with a tug and one small vessel.

An enemy fighter bomber attack shortly after midnight of 29 Jun. against the patrol boat BP "1812" off Gris Nez had no results. One fighter bomber was shot down.

At 0103 the B-Group of 15th Patrol boat Flotilla had contact with gunboats during an escort operation between Fecamp and Le Havre (see Invasion).

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

North Sea:

30 Jun. 1944

Patrol-, mine-sweeping-, and escort services were rendered according to plans. One mine was cleared by a mine-exploding vessel off the Elbe mouth. The harbor patrol boat DW "07" hit a mine north of Wangeroog and sunk. North of Spiekeroog the buoy-layer NORDEN also lost after hitting a mine. The new northern sluice at Brunsbuettel is open for service in its full length. Mine sweeping work off the Dutch coast was reduced because of the weather situation. The laying out of KMA-mines was continued.

At 1515, an aircraft-like apparatus fell on North Beverland, northeast of Walcheren. Presumably it was a V 1 rocket.

Five convoys with altogether about 72,000 BRT were escorted in the IJsel Meer and in the Zeeland Waters.

Norway, Northern Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

In the area of 18th Group 26 planes were located operating over the southern part of the Northern Waters. A plane attacked a submarine northeast of the Faeroes. The plane was damaged by the defense fire of the submarine.

Russian reconnaissance planes reported German convoys in the Busse- and Sylte-fjords.

The Russian flotilla leader BAKU appeared in the radio area Pol-jarnoje.

2. Own Situation:

Thirteen enemy reconnaissance planes were reported over Petsamo, ten over Vardoe, and one each over Hammerfest, Banak and Kirkenes.

Twenty seven ships were escorted to the north and thirty seven ships were escorted to the south.

Naval Command, Norway reported that an internal exchange of flotillas is impossible because of the necessity of maintaining a sufficient number of coalboats.

30 Jun. 1944

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Five minesweepers with their sweeping gear were sighted steering south in the Gulf of Finland east of Seiskari.

On the evening of 29 Jun. and in the morning of 30 Jun. up to ten vessels were sighted west and northwest of Kieperort. These were apparently attempts of the enemy to penetrate further into the Viborg Bay. One of these vessels sunk, according to Finnish observations, three miles north of Kieperort presumably in the Finnish minefield.

2. Own Situation:

3rd Torpedo boat Flotilla entered Horten coming from Kristiansand South. 2nd PT boat Training Flotilla will move to Svinemuende on 1 Jul.

At Copenhagen a general strike broke out in the morning, apparently as a result of Communist propaganda. The Danish central administration and the unions are making efforts for a quick settlement. The severest German countermeasures were agreed upon between Commanding General, Armed Forces Denmark in cooperation with Commanding Admiral, Skagerrak and Commanding General, Air Force Denmark and Commanding General, SS-Police Forces. In case the strike does not come to an end by noon of 1 Jul, the executive power will go over to Commander, Higher SS-Command, Copenhagen who will send stronger occupation forces to the inner city and who will suppress any disturbances with the strongest means. Formations available of the Navy and of the Air Force were placed under the command of the Higher SS Command for this purpose.

Twenty two boats were operating in the mineclearance service in the Baltic Sea Entrances and forty five boats as well as eight minesweeping planes were operating in the Baltic Sea. One mine was cleared in the northern exit of the Sound and one mine was cleared in the Swinemuende Bay. The Swedish steamer LIBAU who had been damaged off Kolberg has sunk. The closing of the sea-canal at Koenigsberg will be suspended from 1 Jul. onward.

One Russian mine was destroyed by gunfire on Lake Peipsi.

The transfer of 122nd Infantry Division was completed on the afternoon. By 0800, 10,609 men, 4,008 horses, 2,333 vehicles and 3,477 tons of Army goods had gone aboard.

30 Jun. 1944

The Naval Anti-Aircraft Battery "Baltisch Port" having four 7.5 centimeter guns is ready for action since the evening of 29 Jun.

21st Landing Flotilla entered Tallinn. One group of five Naval landing craft are destined for operations in Finland and the other four naval landing craft will be used for transport tasks at the Estonian coast. Two light artillery carriers and one light artillery carrier will join the patrol forces in the Irben narrows. No particular reports came in from the Narva patrol.

The laying out by the Finns with three naval landing craft of the barrage "Pistin VII" is planned for the night of 30 Jun. The mine-laying formation will be protected by three motor mine-sweepers, four artillery carriers, four mine-sweepers and four Finnish PT boats in the grid square AO 3349 upper right. Furthermore it is planned to lay out a minefield off Kiuskeri with two naval landing craft and two Finnish patrol boats. A Finnish submarine will be placed in AO 3355 and 3352 as an observation post.

All three German submarines are at Tallinn.

Naval Staff had ordered on 23 Jun. that Commanding Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea had to transmit until further notice the regular situation reports also directly to Naval Staff, Operations Division in order to inform Operations Division more quickly on the developments in the most important Gulf of Finland. This order was confined on 30 Jun. to the special reports as far as Commanding Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea and 9th Coast Patrol Force are concerned.

V. Submarine War.

The submarine U"107" reported from the western Atlantic the sinking by gunfire of an auxiliary sailing vessel in grid square BB 77 on 13 Jun. and the firing of a Zaunkoenig-torpedo which missed the target against a destroyer in BB 75 on 19 Jun. The submarine U "478" reported an air attack in AF 4852 in the Northern Waters. According to radio intelligence, the attacking plane was damaged and discontinued the attack after dropping depth charges.

Four submarines arrived at Kiel on their way from Norway to the Gulf of Finland. No other reports of any importance came in.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

30 Jun. 1944

West Area:

During daylight, medium air activity was reported over Belgium and strong air activity of about 700 planes of all types was reported from western France, Aerodromes and railway installations were attacked particularly in the area of Amiens and Arras. During the day, 602 German fighters were assisting the Army. They shot down ten enemy planes at a loss of thirty one German planes. Twenty German planes were attacking bandits in the area east of Valence.

In the night of 30 Jun. 150 four-engined enemy planes attacked a goods and shunting station in western France and 30 enemy planes attacked three aerodromes in Belgium.

Sixty six German bombers were operating for the fouling with mines and for aerial torpedo attacks against naval targets off the Orne mouth. The mine operations were carried out as planned. Reports on the success of the operations with aerial torpedoes are still to come. Furthermore, eight FW 190-planes had been ordered to attack naval targets in the Orne mouth. They attacked targets on the ground as alternative targets. At a loss of two planes on our side, 79 night fighters operating in western France shot down 13 four-engined enemy planes.

Reich Territory:

No penetrations of enemy planes into the Reich Territory were reported during daylight. Coming via Creatia from the south, 200 four-engined enemy planes under fighter escort entered the Balaton Lake area. The formations were surprised there by bad weather and the bulk of the planes sheered off. Some of the planes penetrated up to the Teschen area and others advanced up to the outskirts of Budapest. They dropped isolated bombs without doing much damage. In the night, 30 or 40 Mosquitoes carried out attacks in the industrial area of Rhineland and Westfalia. Among other places, the hydrogenation plant Meerbeck was attacked.

Mediterranean Theater:

On 29 Jun. strong enemy air activity was reported from the rear of the Italian front area including attacks against battery positions and traffic targets. Fifty German fighters were operating. One Spitfire was shot down. German anti-aircraft guns shot down five enemy

30 Jun. 1944

planes. During the night, enemy harassing activity in Upper Italy and supplying of bandits in the Balkans were reported. Nine harassing planes were between Ploesti and Bucuresti. Two planes were observed laying mines in the Danube in the Weisskirchen area. Six planes attacked the town of Rhodos. Nineteen German Ju 87 planes attacked marching columns and battery positions south of Perugia.

East Area:

At the eastern front there were 684 German and - according to incomplete reports - 460 enemy air operations on 29 Jun. Twenty three enemy planes were shot down at a loss of four German planes.

VII. War in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea.

1. Area of Naval Group, West:

Enemy Situation:

On the evening of 29 Jun. a convoy of eight fully loaded freighters and one tanker left Gibraltar for the Atlantic. At the same time, eight freighters entered Gibraltar coming from the Mediterranean. At 2130 a cruiser of the BIRMINGHAM-class left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean. At noon of 30 Jun., one French freighter and one British freighter as well as two Italian submarines left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

Own Situation:

Commanding Admiral, Naval Group West reported that according to information from Naval Liaison Officer at Commanding General, Armed Forces West it has to be reckoned with the possibility that Commanding General, Armed Forces West does not approve the opinion of Commanding Admiral, Naval Group West concerning the early destruction of the larger ports at the southern coast and that he will ask for the decision of Armed Forces High Command. In view of the previous opinion of Armed Forces High Command it has to be reckoned with

30 Jun. 1944

an order for unnecessarily early and large scale destructions of the harbors of Marseille and Toulon in that case. Experiences made at Cherbourg show that the time required for preparations is of decisive importance for the carrying out. In comparison with careful preparations and the possibility to carry out the destructions at any time by firing the charges in case of enemy danger, there is no advantage in preliminary destructions. On the contrary, it would have consequences of immeasurable importance in the case of Marseille and Toulon if the enemy landing does not take place.

2. Area of German Naval Command, Italy:

Enemy Situation:

On the evening of 29 Jun., enemy forces were made out for the first time at Piombino. Eight small landing boats and two small war vessels were at the harbor. In the forenoon, 12 or 15 ships were observed off the coast between Orbetello and Cape Circeo bringing supplies to the front.

According to photographic reconnaissance, Bastia is still being used as the main PT boat base. A small part of the PT boats seems to have been withdrawn to the harbors of Elba.

Own Situation:

Two Italian PT boats had contact with enemy gunboats north-east of Porto Ferraio on the occasion of an operation towards the northern coast of Elba in the night of 29 Jun. The Italian PT boat MAS "562" was hit and had to be left behind. Two minelayer naval landing craft carried out according to plans the mine tasks "Huegel" and "Garten" on both sides of the Vada Bank.

During an enemy air attack against Spezia on the afternoon of 29 Jun., one third of the ammunition at the Artillery Ordnance Command exploded. Furthermore, installations of the Underwater Obstacle Command were heavily damaged.

A patrol boat shot down one enemy plane during a fighter bomber attack against Sestri Levante.

30 Jun. 1944

3. Area of Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

On the afternoon of 28 Jun., a submarine was sighted leaving for the west near Hvar. It was additionally reported that on 26 Jun. an enemy PT boat was sunk off Pesaro by the anti-aircraft guns of 22nd Naval Anti-Aircraft Artillery Detachment aboard an auxiliary sailing vessel. On 28 Jun., an auxiliary sailing vessel was beached after an attack of low flying aircraft at Valona.

Command of the Small Battle Units reported that 90th Naval Special Operations Unit brought in after previous reconnaissance and during several operations on Corcula, Brac and Hvar altogether 39 auxiliary sailing vessels of from 3 to 70 tons which were placed at the disposition of Naval Shore Command to be used as transport vessels.

It was planned for the night of 29 Jun. that four PT boats would leave Grado for Trieste, that two PT boats would leave Split for Dubrovnik, that three PT boats would leave Split for Zara and that one PT boat each would go from Grado to Pola and from Venice to Grado.

The three boats leaving for Zara attacked with torpedoes a patrolling destroyer who withdrew under a strong development of smoke.

Reich Security Central Office transmitted information from a Greek agent according to which three areas were provided for the planned landing operation:

- a. Western coast of Greece from Provesa up to the Albanian frontier,
- b. Evvoia, Miles, Volos,
- c. area of Athens.

For copy of the report as per 1/Skl 20032/44 Gkdoes. compare War Diary, Part D, Vol. "Materials on the Enemy Situation".

b. Aegean Sea:

During an enemy air attack in the night of 29 Jun. against the harbor and the old town of Rhodes, twelve bombs were dropped without causing any damage at the harbor. According to a

30 Jun. 1944

report of Group South, it was ordered by Army Group E that effective immediately the Dodecanese has priority of supplies even to the disadvantage of Crete. Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea ordered therefore to supply Crete only by auxiliary sailing vessels and to use the other shipping space for the Dodecanese. Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea informed the Army Group that the supplies to Crete would thus probably fall below 4,000 tons for the month of Jun. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division informed Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff accordingly.

c. Black Sea:

Nothing to report.

Situation on the Danube:

Planes were observed laying mines near Neusatz, Beograd, Kalavat and Lom as well as on the Save. Two tank barges hit mines and sunk near kilometer indicator 1224.

One mine was cleared near the kilometer indicator 1277 and one near 1783 as well as one on the Tisa River near kilometer indicator 228. On the central Danube 86 vessels were reported on their way.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

The Air Force and Naval Attache, Tokyo gave a supplementary report on the operation near Saipan on 19 Jun:

"1. On the forenoon of 19 Jun., Japanese carrier-borne planes attacked the American forces of about ten aircraft carriers and eight battleships sailing in three groups 400 miles west of Saipan. A second attack was launched in the afternoon of the same day. In the evening dusk of 20 Jun., both sides carried out attacks.

2. The Japanese Admiral Staff is unable to give details and to announce the sinking of enemy ships in addition to the Announcement of the Headquarters of 1530 on 23 Jun. Very strong enemy defense and high Japanese losses had made exact observation impossible.

3. The published press reports on the battle were issued as propaganda and do not correspond with the military situation. The Japanese Naval Air Force was hit so severely that the remaining planes apparently are not sufficient for escort and air protection as required for fleet operations. Therefore, operations for the relief of Saipan cannot be expected in the near future."

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