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# Implications of Soviet Use of Chemical and Toxin Weapons for US Security Interests

Special National Intelligence Estimate

Secret

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activities remained low key until Iraq's ill-fated invasion of Iran in September 1980. With the adverse turn of events in that war, the Iraqis began a process of direct purchase of chemical agent precursors, munitions for fill, and production facilities from Western Europe and Egypt. West Germans have provided technical assistance in field trials of nerve agents. We have identified three possible CW production facilities and two possible storage sites. (S NF NC OC WN)

39. The effective use by the Iraqis of tear gas (CS) to turn back an Iranian offensive in 1982 has been documented, and there has been reporting of the use of a chemical agent with lethal effects in 1983. If the contracts with West European firms concluded in 1982 and 1983 for acquisition of laboratories, factories, and munitions are fulfilled, Iraq could have a strong chemical agent production capability by the end of the year. CW tactics are not as yet well integrated into the Iraqi military structure, and troop training is weak. These deficiencies, however, can be overcome if the Iraqis recognize them as critical to their security. (S NF NC OC WN)

40. ~~Libya~~ also a major recipient of Soviet CW assistance, probably has the ~~most advanced chemical warfare capability~~ in the Arab world with the possible exception of Egypt. Both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union provided the chemical agents, delivery systems, and training that flowed to Syria. As long as this support is forthcoming, there is no need for Syria to develop an indigenous capability to produce CW agents or materiel, and none has been identified. (S NF NC OC)

41. ~~Libya~~ the largest purchaser of Soviet military assistance (at least in financial terms), must be assumed to have also benefited from Soviet CW indoctrination and training. Its attempts, however, to develop a CW capability since the mid-1970s through the acquisition of facilities and materiel from East and West European sources have met with little success. The Libyans reportedly received some CW agents from Poland in 1980. They probably have a modest supply of protective equipment and riot-control agents for offensive use. We do not believe they possess lethal chemical agents, however, except perhaps for test or experimental purposes. Libya has made efforts to contract with West German and Swiss firms for construction of CW production and storage facilities. Because Qadhafi is

widely viewed as unstable and belligerent, however, Libya has encountered difficulties in concluding these contracts. As long as Qadhafi remains in power, we expect this pattern to continue. (S NF NC OC)

42. ~~Libya~~ finding itself surrounded by frontline Arab states with budding CW capabilities, became increasingly conscious of its vulnerability to chemical attack. Its sensitivities were galvanized by the capture of large quantities of Soviet CW-related equipment during both the 1967 Arab-Israeli and the 1973 Yom Kippur wars. As a result, Israel undertook a program of chemical warfare preparations in both offensive and protective areas. While we ~~are confident~~ that the Israelis possess lethal ~~chemical~~ agents, several indicators lead us to believe that they have available to them at least persistent and nonpersistent nerve agents, a mustard agent, and several riot-control agents, matched with suitable delivery systems. The existence of chemical test kits has been known since the early 1970s and possible tests were detected in January 1976. In late 1982 a probable CW nerve agent production facility and a storage facility were identified at the Dimona Sensitive Storage Area in the Negev Desert. Other CW agent production is believed to exist within a well-developed Israeli chemical industry. (S SF WN)

43. Extensive defense exchange agreements with the United States assist the Israelis in achieving their CW development objectives. They nevertheless remain somewhat dependent on Western nations for protective materiel. There are few technological constraints that would prevent them from achieving self-sufficiency in this area. Financial constraints and competing priorities are more likely inhibitors. (S NF)

44. Beyond the Middle East, a number of other countries, principally in the Horn of Africa and in East Asia, have moved toward chemical capabilities. (U)

45. ~~Libya~~ involvement with CW is also heavily ~~dependent~~. It has acquired chemical agents, munitions and ~~decontamination~~ equipment as well as CW training from the Soviet Union, but has not developed an indigenous capability to produce CW agents or materiel. There are numerous allegations of Soviet participation in the planning and supervision of chemical operations, but confirmatory evidence is fragmentary. There are also unconfirmed reports of lethal