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Vol. II  
TESTIMONY OF SUMNER WELLES, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY  
OF STATE

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Senator Ferguson. When did you first hear from any source that the Japanese Ambassadors in various places, for instance, here in Washington and in London, were destroying codes, or did you ever hear of it?

Mr. Welles. I recollect that shortly before December 7th an intercept gave an indication that the Japanese Embassy here was instructed to destroy its papers.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall when that was?

Mr. Welles. Without referring to a record I could not give you the precise day or time.

Senator Ferguson. Was it prior to the 7th?

Mr. Welles. Prior to the 7th.

Senator Ferguson. What did that signify to you as a diplomat and Under Secretary of State?

Mr. Welles. That signified to me that the last stage had been reached.

Senator Ferguson. I did not catch that.

Mr. Welles. That signified to me that the last stage had been reached.

Senator Ferguson. Would you say it indicated war?

Mr. Welles. A rupture of diplomatic relations at the very least and under the circumstances then existing the probability of war.

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TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES, UNITED  
STATES ARMY

Mr. Gesell (Chief Assistant Counsel). General, will you state for the record your full name and your present rank, and duty, please, sir?

General Miles. Sherman Miles, major general, Army of the United States; stationed in Boston, Mass.

Mr. Gesell. You were head of G-2, were you, General, on December 7, 1941?

General Miles. I was, sir.

Mr. Gesell. How long have you had that duty?

General Miles. I reported on May 1, 1940.

Mr. Gesell. What, in a general way, would you say are the duties and the functions of G-2?

General Miles. The Military Intelligence Division of the General Staff is charged with the collection, analysis, estimation, dissemination of information primarily for the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War.

G-2 is a staff officer of the Chief of Staff, an assistant chief of staff for intelligence.

Mr. Gesell. G-2 is another name for Military Intelligence Division, is that correct?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

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Mr. Gesell. May I ask you, General, what significance could properly be attached at this time to the number of messages which we had intercepted from the Japanese in the period from December 1 to December 5 and later indicating that the Japanese were destroying their most secret and confidential codes in Washington and in fact throughout the world?

General Miles. The inference would be that the Japanese had either planned for the outbreak of war, in other words, planned to initiate a war as they did or feared war coming suddenly though what was described in that message you recently read, a class of arms.

Mr. Gesell. Therefore, the information concerning code burning and destruction was of a specific and vital military nature, was it not?

General Miles. It was, sir.

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TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL R. E. INGERSOLL, UNITED STATES NAVY

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Mr. Richardson (General Counsel). Admiral, will you state your name to the reporter, please?

Admiral Ingersoll. R. E. Ingersoll, Admiral, U.S. Navy.

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Mr. Richardson. What was your assignment during November and December 1941?

Admiral Ingersoll. I was at that time Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. Richardson. Your immediate superior was Admiral Stark?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. What were your duties generally speaking in that assignment, Admiral?

Admiral Ingersoll. The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations had no duties assigned by law or by Navy regulations. By Executive

order he was a member of the joint board which was the forerunner of the joint chiefs of staff. By office regulations prescribed by the Chief of Naval Operations he had in general supervision of all officers of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. I had no original cognizance of any manner. As a matter of fact I had no office other than myself. And all heads of sections took up their questions with me usually before presenting them to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Once the Chief of Naval Operations had established a policy, I endeavored then to relieve him of all the load that I could of the details in carrying out that policy, in signing papers and releasing dispatches; I kept him informed of correspondence where I thought there was something of which he should be informed.

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Admiral Ingersoll. + considered that the information which we received regarding the destruction of the codes and which was sent out to the fleets as one of the two most important messages that were sent out by the Chief of Naval Operations during the entire period before Pearl Harbor, the other one being the dispatch stating that, "This is a war warning" in effect and that all hope of negotiations had broken off.

Now, the wording in that winds message did not say that we are going to be in a state of war or that hostilities now exist. It referred to a rupture of diplomatic negotiations or that the situation between the countries was becoming critical.

The importance of the messages regarding the destruction of the codes is this: If you rupture diplomatic negotiations you do not necessarily have to burn your codes. The diplomats go home and they can pack up their codes with their dolls and take them home. Also, when you rupture diplomatic negotiations you do not rupture consular relations. The consuls stay on.

Now, in this particular set of dispatches they not only told their diplomats in Washington and London to burn their codes but they told their consuls in Manila, in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Batavia to burn their codes and that did not mean a rupture of diplomatic negotiations, it meant war, and that information was sent out to the fleets as soon as we got it and it made no difference whether we ever got an execute from the winds after that or not, and that is why I think officers in high positions are vague about it. It did not make any difference.

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Mr. Gearhart (Representative from California). . . . Now the reason why you knew that the destruction of the codes meant war and not merely breaking off of negotiations was the fact that if they were merely breaking off diplomatic negotiations with us they would not have to destroy their codes?

Admiral Ingersoll. Not necessarily.

Mr. Gearhart. They could pack them up, as you said with their second suit of clothes and take them home if they were merely breaking off diplomatic relations.

Admiral Ingersoll. Correct.

Mr. Gearhart. So that it was a dead tip-off, a foregone conclusion in the estimations of the higher ranking military officers that the order for the destruction of their codes within our areas meant nothing but was?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes; and the fact that the consulates were included cinched it in my opinion that it was war and not a rupture of diplomatic negotiations or diplomatic relations.

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Senator Ferguson. But would you say that all Navy men would come to the conclusion that the moment that codes were going to be destroyed that that meant war between the countries?

Admiral Ingersoll. That was what we construed it and I think everybody construed it, that it would mean that.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now you know of no one in the high command in the Navy that construed the destruction of the codes in any other way than you construed them?

Admiral Ingersoll. I think everybody in the Navy Department construed the destruction of the codes as the fact that Japan expected to be at war very shortly with the three countries that were involved in that series of messages.

Senator Ferguson. Then we come to this conclusion, that at least on the 4th--I think that is the date they sent the messages out, was it not?

Admiral Ingersoll. Third or fourth.

Senator Ferguson. Third or fourth, that everyone in the Navy, as far as the high command was concerned, were alerted that war was going to occur between America and Japan?

Admiral Ingersoll. Those instructions were sent to certain commanders, to the commanders of the fleet, to the naval attaches in Peiping and to the Marine detachments and others and the purpose of sending it to them was to inform them that we expected to be at war--or that Japan expected to be at war with those countries in a very short time.

Senator Ferguson. And our country was one of them?

Admiral Ingersoll. And our country was one of them.

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TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY

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Senator Ferguson. Now I want you to look at page 249, the top message from Tokyo to Washington, December the 7, 1941,

"Extremely urgent." The other one was listed, 907, "Urgent, very important," but this is "Extremely urgent" and I will read it:

After deciphering part 14 of my #902<sup>a</sup> and also # 907<sup>b</sup>, 908 and 909. please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine--

You will notice it says:

the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes.

Dispose in like manner also secret documents.

Now, I will ask you when that message was received and decoded.

Capt. Kramer. I cannot state, sir, from first-hand knowledge when it was received and when it was decoded. I do know that it was not received, or at least seen by me, until about the middle of Sunday morning.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what hour would that be?

Captain Kramer. I believe that this particular one, 910, which you read, was seen by me first when I returned from my appointment at the State Department.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that it was seen at the same time as the 1 o'clock message?

Captain Kramer. That is my recollection, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now I have information here that a 910 and 907--907--there are two short messages I have just read--was filed in Tokyo on 4:18 a.m. on the 7th of December. This is Exhibit 41. It is page 248 of Exhibit 1. And it was intercepted in Japanese code by the Navy station at Bainbridge Island, Washington, at 4:35 a.m.

Captain Kramer. It says 4:37".

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Senator Ferguson. You don't know; all right.

Now, let us get to 910, this message about:

Please destroy at once--after deciphering part 14 of my #902 and also #907, #908 and #909, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes--

and so forth.