

Witness Clausen

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1 of General Powell, page 179 of my report, and he states  
2 in here what he did to try to locate the intercept 27065  
3 to which I have made reference.

4 Also No. 8007.

5 With regard to why the delay in sending that in; he  
6 also has some references. I asked him to also check on  
7 this G-2 message sent from Washington on 5 December No. 519.

8 Does the committee want me to read this?

9 The Vice Chairman: Yes.

10 Colonel Clausen (reading):

11 "1. With reference to the message sent #519 December  
12 5, 1941, which you handed me, I certify to the best of my  
13 knowledge and belief, there are no copies of clear or coded  
14 traffic of this particular message on file in the Signal  
15 Center, Fort Shafter. In fact, there are no copies of  
16 clear or coded traffic in the Signal Center prior to 1  
17 July, 1944."

18 Mr. Clark: Will you identify that message for me  
19 otherwise than by number?

20 Colonel Clausen: That is the message that the War  
21 Department G-2 sent on 5 December, 1941 to the G-2 Hawaiian  
22 Department, and said "Go see Captain Rochefort regarding  
23 the weather broadcast."

24 Mr. Clark: Thank you.  
25

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1           The Vice Chairman: What was that you just read about  
2 no message being available prior to July 1944?

3           Colonel Clausen: "In fact, there are no copies of  
4 clear or coded traffic in the Signal Center prior to 1  
5 July, 1944."

6           The Vice Chairman: Yes.

7           Colonel Clausen (reading):

8           "All coded traffic prior to 1 July, 1944 and all clear  
9 traffic dated prior to 1 March 1945 have been destroyed  
10 by burning. There are no records including the logs in  
11 the Signal Center which would give us any information as to  
12 whether or not this message was received at Fort Shafter.  
13 Search and inquiries have been made within the Signal Center  
14 as to whether this message had been received, and they have  
15 been negative.

16           "2. You have asked me to recall the circumstances  
17 concerning intercept numbered Army 8007 and dated 2 December  
18 1941. The procedure with respect to said intercept at the  
19 time stated was as follows:

20           "Search has been made as to whether such intercepts  
21 were intercepted by the Army SIS at Honolulu and transmitted  
22 to Washington. As to whether they were intercepted, I have  
23 this to report:

24           "There are at this time no records in the Hawaiian  
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1 Department to show whether or not these intercepts were  
2 made by MS-5. The fact that Washington gives an intercept  
3 date-time group tends to show that the intercept was made  
4 by MS-5, but the lack of a receiving operator's personal  
5 sign is an indication to the contrary.

6 "As to how they were transmitted to Washington, I have  
7 this to report.

8 "Intercepts of this type which were to be forwarded to  
9 Washington via airmail were handled as follows; on the day  
10 following the date of intercept, each message was given a  
11 log sheet number, and entered on an index sheet. The entire  
12 lot of airmail traffic for that particular date was then  
13 fastened together to await the next scheduled department  
14 of the Clipper.

15 "Upon notification of the impending department of  
16 the Clipper, all accumulated airmail traffic, together with  
17 a letter of transmittal, and a classified documentary sheet  
18 was taken to the classified files section of the Department  
19 Signal Office for packaging and was then forwarded to the  
20 classified files section of the Department AGO. The AGO  
21 forwarded this traffic via officer courier to the outgoing  
22 Clipper. The Clipper departed for the mainland approxi-  
23 mately once each week, but this schedule was frequently in-  
24 terrupted because of weather conditions. It is known that  
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1 that this traffic was at times forwarded by ship, because  
2 of the long delayed departure of a clipper. The only mes-  
3 sages transmitted to Washington by radio were those specially  
4 selected in accordance with instructions from the Chief  
5 Signal Officer.

6 "The message in question was not within the first  
7 priority mission and therefore is not believed to have been  
8 included in the special instructions.

9 "My search in this regard included:

10 "A search of all signal intelligence files including  
11 Communications Service, Central Pacific Base Command, and  
12 Monitor Station No. 5. Such records as have been found  
13 pertaining to the assigned mission of Monitor Station No. 5  
14 at the time in question, show that this station was inter-  
15 cepting traffic between Japan, Asia, and Europe.

16 "In this connection, I inquired of Washington on 14  
17 April, 1945, concerning the originals of intercepts, which  
18 I understood are or should be on file in Washington and  
19 received this information.

20 "Mailing date of traffic was 11 December. Receiving  
21 operator's sign does not appear on the intercept. Log sheet  
22 No. 014037 appears on traffic and listed on log forwarded  
23 under signature of C. A. Powell. Intercept time shows 0707  
24 on December 2, 1941.  
25

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1 "A copy of the forwarding letter cannot be located  
2 and no receipts for traffic forwarded are available pre-  
3 vious to 1943."

4 Then he talks about a scrambler phone. I don't think  
5 that is important.

6 Senator Ferguson: A scrambler phone to Washington?

7 Colonel Clausen: Well, I will read the whole thing:

8 "3. Concerning your inquiry as to the testimony I  
9 previously made relating to the commercial scrambler phone  
10 between Honolulu and the mainland, we did not monitor  
11 the commercial radio telephone. Previous to December 1937  
12 inverters were used on the Trans-Pacific radiophone circuit  
13 between Honolulu and the mainland. The same type inverters  
14 were used on the radiophone circuit between Tokyo and San  
15 Francisco. Because these inverters were of the same type  
16 and design Tokyo could monitor the Honolulu-San Francisco  
17 circuit.

18 "In December 1938 a new San Francisco-Honolulu radio-  
19 phone circuit was commissioned using a new type of privacy  
20 which was called the A-3 privacy. At the time of this in-  
21 stallation there were only two such A-3 privacy built; one  
22 for the Honolulu terminal and one for the San Francisco  
23 terminal. This type of privacy is much more complicated and  
24 furnished much more security than the previous old inverters.

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1           The old inverters were still used on the Tokyo-Honolulu  
2 circuit as the A-3 privacy was for use only on the Honolulu-  
3 San Francisco circuit.

4           Shortly after the installation of this new Honolulu-  
5 San Francisco circuit the Tokyo technical operator asked  
6 the Honolulu technical operator what kind of a new inverter  
7 was in use on the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit as he was  
8 not able to understand the conversation.

9           "Tokyo technical operator was advised that the equipment  
10 had just been installed and the only person who knew how  
11 this privacy worked was the Bell laboratory engineer who  
12 had just made the installation. This was proof that Tokyo  
13 had in the past been monitoring the Honolulu-San Francisco  
14 radiophone circuit."

15           Signed "General Powell".

16           Now, I come to the statements of Commander J. S.  
17 Holtwick, U. S. Navy. I interviewed him at Honolulu after  
18 I had been there enroute to the Philippines. I asked would  
19 he investigate and see whether he could find a winds code  
20 intercept by interviewing personnel who had been on duty  
21 at the Intercept Station before 7 December 1941. So this  
22 is what he gave to me:

23           "Memorandum to Lieutenant Colonel H. C. Clausen.

24           "Subject: Information.

## Witness Clausen

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1. I regret that results of search for amplifying information on the subject we discussed immediately prior to your departure has been quite disappointing.

"2. The officers concerned with the monitoring watch were (present ranks given) Commander F. R. Biard, U.S.N., Commander J. R. Bromley, U.S.N., Commander A. Cole, U.S.N., and Commander G. N. Slonim, U.S.N. In charge of the radio station at the time was Lieutenant Lankford.

"3. Commander Cole is the only officer currently present and available for questioning. He states that, as nearly as he can remember, a program issued by the Japan Broadcasting Company was obtained from the District Intelligence Office and used as a basic list. A few other frequencies were found by searching, but in practically all cases, they were merely duplicate transmissions of the listed broadcasts. Generally speaking, there were seldom more than three or more programs of the character being monitored on the air at the same time. In those cases, split-phone watches were used.

"4. All broadcasts that were regularly monitored were the Japanese Government Japanese language voice news broadcasts, with particular attention devoted to those schedules on the hour and half-hour which usually contained weather information.

"5. No positive results whatsoever were obtained from

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1 this monitoring at any time during the period under con-  
2 sideration. The monitoring watch was naturally secured  
3 immediately after it became obviously redundant."

4 That is at page 182.

5 Now, I come to the affidavit of Ship's Clerk Theodore  
6 Emanuel given me at Honolulu on April 17, 1945:

7 "Prior to 7 December 1941, and for over four years,  
8 I was assigned to the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth  
9 Naval District. About the year 1938 I became acquainted  
10 with Colonel George W. Bicknell. When Colonel Bicknell was  
11 called to active duty, about 1940 or 1941, I discussed with  
12 him and Lieutenant Colonel Muerlott matters of mutual  
13 concern relating to the Army and Navy intelligence activities.  
14 It is my understanding that Colonel Bicknell was cognizant  
15 of my functions and activities. These included the obtain-  
16 ing of the telephone conversations originating in and going  
17 to the Japanese Consulate and persons therein at Honolulu.  
18 Such conversations were obtained by me during the period  
19 from January 1941 to and including 7 December 1941 by means  
20 of covering some five or six lines. My procedure was to  
21 have these conversations recorded, translated and reported  
22 to the District Intelligence Officer. These reports were  
23 written. This traffic would average about 50 to 60 in and  
24 out telephone calls a day. The translator was Commander  
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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

(4)



1 Witness Clausen

2 Denzel Carr, U.S. Navy Reserve.

3 Signed "Theodore Emanuel, Chief Ship's Clerk".

4 I later talked with Commander Carr and got from him  
5 what is a wind code execute message dated 8 December 1941,  
6 after the attack. I have that in the exhibits and I am  
7 going to come to it. It is in a voice broadcast, in the  
8 middle and at the end, and it would be the one of war with  
9 Britain or breach of relations with Britain.

10 Senator Ferguson: The United States was not in that one?

11 Colonel Clausen: No, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: Where did you get that?

13 Colonel Clausen: From this Commander Carr that Emanuel  
14 mentions. Commander Carr was the translator who translated  
15 the telephone intercepts for the Navy during this time.

16 Senator Ferguson: In Hawaii?

17 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

18 The next affidavit I come to is that of General  
19 Sutherland, which I got at Manila.

20 You remember that some of the affidavits I read this  
21 morning said that Manila was sending information on to  
22 Hawaii and I was anxious to find out whether that was so.  
23 That is one of the reasons I went to General MacArthur  
24 and General Willoughby and General Sutherland. In other  
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1 words, what information, if any, they sent on to Hawaii.

2 The Vice Chairman: Go ahead.

3 Colonel Clausen: This is dated May 6, 1945:

4 "Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was Chief of  
5 Staff, USAFFE."

6 U.S. Army Forces in the Far East.

7 "I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated  
8 Top Secret Exhibit 'B', consisting of a file of intercepts  
9 of Japanese diplomatic messages. To the best of my recollec-  
10 tion, I did not see any of these, nor was I informed of the  
11 substance thereof, before 7 December 1941, except possibly  
12 some of those relating to negotiations at Washington, D. C.,  
13 of Kurusu. I did not see the messages described as the  
14 'winds code', nor any activating or implementing message.  
15 I saw every ultra message that was delivered to the head-  
16 quarters.

17 "I have not previously seen the British SIS messages,  
18 dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 1941. I do not know  
19 the basis or source of this intelligence, other than it  
20 appears to have been disseminated by a Major Gerald Wilkinson,  
21 British Army, who had liaison status with the headquarters  
22 and, as such, had contact with Major General (then Colonel)  
23 Willoughby, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

24 "The Signal Intelligence Service, United States Army,  
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1 operated an intercept station at Fort McKinley, immediately  
2 before December 7, 1941. Diplomatic messages in purple  
3 code which were intercepted by the Signal Intelligence  
4 Service were delivered to the Navy at Corregidor where they  
5 were decrypted and translated. Some or all of these messages,  
6 decrypted and translated, were delivered to the Signal  
7 Intelligence Service Officer who delivered them to the  
8 Headquarters, USAFFE.

9 "Among the messages picked up by the Signal Intelligence  
10 Service were reports by the Japanese Consul at Manila re-  
11 questing the arrivals and departures of ships in Manila Harbor.

12 "Headquarters USAFFE did not disseminate any ultra  
13 information. All dissemination was effected through Signal  
14 Intelligence Service channels."

15 Signed, "R. K. Sutherland".  
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18 follows  
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Witness Clausen

2 Colonel Clausen: Then I have the affidavit May 7, 1945  
3 of General MacArthur. (Reading)

4 "Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was Commanding  
5 General, USAFFE.

6 "I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has desig-  
7 nated as Top Secret Exhibit 'B', consisting of a file  
8 of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. I have  
9 no recollection of having seen any of these before. I  
10 did not see the messages described as the 'Winds Code',  
11 nor any activating or implementing message. I believe  
12 I saw every ultra message that was delivered to the Hq.  
13 USAFFE.

14 "I have not previously" --

15 Senator Ferguson: Are you re-reading that affidavit or  
16 is that another one? It sounds the same to me.

17 Colonel Clausen: It is not, Senator; it is not the  
18 same at all.

19 Senator Ferguson: Isn't that the same language that was  
20 used?

21 Colonel Clausen: No, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: All right, go ahead.

23 Colonel Clausen: (Reading)

24 "I have not previously seen the British SIS mes-  
25 sages, dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 1941. I have

## 1 Witness Clausen

2 no knowledge as to the basis or source of this intelli-  
3 gence, and I did not know that these or similar messages  
4 were being transmitted to persons at Honolulu, T. H.

5 "The Signal Intelligence Service, United States  
6 Army, operated an intercept station at Fort McKinley,  
7 immediately before 7 December 1941. Diplomatic messages  
8 in purple code, intercepted by this SIS were delivered  
9 to the Navy at Corregidor where they were decrypted and  
10 translated. Some or all of these messages, decrypted  
11 and translated, were delivered to the SIS officer who  
12 delivered them to the Hq. USAFFE. The decrypting and  
13 translating of these messages was a function of the Navy.  
14 The Army SIS monitored some circuits and turned the ma-  
15 terial over to the Navy for decryption and translation.  
16 The Navy had facilities and personnel, not possessed by  
17 the Army, for such processing of this intelligence.  
18 Whether all messages were transmitted by the Navy to the  
19 Army I do not know. All transmission of this subject  
20 material was entirely in the hands of the Navy.

21 "Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample  
22 and complete information and advice for the purpose of  
23 alerting the Army Command in the Philippines on a war  
24 basis, which was done prior to 7 December 1941.

25 DOUGLAS MAC ARTHUR."

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2 Then his G-2, Major General C. A. Willoughby, on May 8,  
3 1945 --

4 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, is it the purpose to read into  
5 the record all of this mass of affidavits, is that the pur-  
6 pose?

7 The Vice Chairman: Well, the request to the committee  
8 yesterday, the request of Senator Lucas and Senator Ferguson  
9 was as stated this morning, may I say to the gentleman from  
10 Wisconsin.

11 Mr. Keefe: Well, I read that request in the record but  
12 it does not seem to me that reading these affidavits is the  
13 identifying or the tying-in; as I understand that request, it  
14 was references in the affidavits or to messages to identify  
15 them with our record. Now, it appears that list itself--

16 The Vice Chairman: No, the request was that Colonel  
17 Clausen bring to the attention of the committee all of the  
18 messages and information received in Hawaii between November  
19 25th and December 7th.

20 Senator Ferguson: As I understand it, this MacArthur  
21 affidavit does not put any of the messages in Hawaii, does it?

22 Colonel Clausen: No, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: Well, then, how is that material to  
24 the action?

25 Colonel Clausen: Well, I have no desire to read that,

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2 Senator. If you don't want it read, I don't want to read it.

3 Senator Ferguson: It did not put any messages in. The  
4 Sutherland affidavit put in messages in Hawaii.

5 Colonel Clausen: Sutherland?

6 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

7 Colonel Clausen: No.

8 Mr. Richardson: The explanation was that there had been  
9 language indicating that information had come from Manila to  
10 Honolulu and his investigation went to Manila for the purpose  
11 of ascertaining if any such information came what it was.  
12 Presumably, in reading these affidavits it was for the pur-  
13 pose of tracing some information that moved from Manila to  
14 Honolulu.

15 The Vice Chairman: That is the way I understood it.

16 Mr. Richardson: Now, if there was nothing in those affi-  
17 davits that had anything to do with the transmission of evi-  
18 dence, then, Congressman, it would not be responsive to the  
19 original question.

20 Senator Ferguson: And as I understand that is what the  
21 witness now says, that there wasn't anything in those two. I  
22 suppose we ought to have something from Willoughby.

23 Mr. Keefe: We are taking up time. I am perfectly will-  
24 ing to sit here and listen and I suppose the Colonel is  
25 willing to read all of this stuff.

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Colonel Clausen: I will if you want me to.

Mr. Keefe: Now, it seems to me that it is an awful burden on him to ask him to read all these affidavits.

Colonel Clausen: Mr. Keefe, as I understood it there was a question raised by somebody in one of the other affidavits as to what Manila did regarding the transmitting of information to Hawaii. These apparently prove the negative.

The Vice Chairman: You understood the request of the committee yesterday?

Colonel Clausen: Yes. I worked last night getting out the information for you.

The Vice Chairman: Go ahead then, please.

Senator Ferguson: I think the Willoughby affidavit will explain Wilkinson further.

Colonel Clausen: That is what I thought, Senator. I repeat, I have no desire, I, Henry C. Clausen, to sit here and read this stuff but there are some things in the Willoughby that tie in with the Wilkinson.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, I think that is true in the Willoughby, there is something that ties in with the Wilkinson.

Mr. Clark: Merely by way of divertisement, you have enlightened me in a good many respects. I don't think it has been in vain.



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2 Colonel Clausen: Well, I am perfectly willing, sir, to  
3 take whatever time is necessary for anything that the committee  
4 may want. General Willoughby. (Reading)

5 "Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was ACoS,  
6 G-2, USAFFE.

7 "I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has desig-  
8 nated as Top Secret Exhibit 'B', consisting of a file of  
9 intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. I did not  
10 see any of these, nor was I informed of the substance  
11 thereof before, except isolated fragments of the Kurusu  
12 diplomat message series. Concerning those which are known  
13 as the 'Winds Code' messages, neither I, nor anyone else  
14 in the USAFFE to my knowledge, received any information  
15 as to any activating or implementing message, nor any  
16 notice that such a message had been transmitted or re-  
17 ceived.

18 "Concerning the British SIS messages dated 27 Novem-  
19 ber 1941 and 3 December 1941, these were not seen by me  
20 before 7 December 1941. I do not know the basis or source  
21 of this intelligence, other than that it appears to  
22 have been disseminated by Mr. Gerald Wilkinson, subse-  
23 quently appointed Major, British Army, who had some liai-  
24 son status with the Philippine Department, later, Hq.  
25 USAFFE, and as such had contact with me and my predecessor,

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1  
2 in 1941. (See Appendix A)."

3 I might add that another reason for going to the Philip-  
4 pines was I had run across this British thing in Honolulu and  
5 it would have come from Manila, so I wanted to go to Manila  
6 to the G-2 and ask what they knew about this British set-up.

7 (Reading)

8 "Various intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages  
9 were received by the Army in the Philippines (Hq. USAFFE)  
10 before 7 December 1941. The decrypting, translating and  
11 processing of these messages were functions of the Navy.  
12 The Army monitored some circuits and turned the material  
13 over to the Navy for decrypting and translating. Under  
14 this system the intercepted Japanese code messages were  
15 given to the Navy at Corregidor where the Navy had a  
16 'purple' machine and other crypto-analytic facilities  
17 and personnel, not possessed by the Army, for decrypting  
18 and translating these messages. It was customary for  
19 the Navy, after these messages were decrypted and trans-  
20 lated, to give the Army (Hq. USAFFE) such portion of  
21 the sum total of this intelligence, and the details and  
22 source thereof, as the Navy considered necessary to the  
23 functions of the Army. (See Appendix B). Those which  
24 were shown me before 7 December 1941 were handed to me by  
25 Colonel Shearer, S.C., now deceased, who was the Army

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2 liaison with the Navy for that purpose. Certain of  
3 these messages concerned inquiries from Tokyo and replies  
4 by the Japanese Consul at Manila as to United States  
5 military and commercial ships in Manila Harbor. No re-  
6 cord was made by the Army of the dissemination or sub-  
7 stance of this intelligence, and the papers on which the  
8 intelligence was recorded have been destroyed.

9 "To the best of my knowledge and belief, the Army  
10 did not transmit any of this intelligence to the Hawaiian  
11 Department, since the dissemination thereof was exclu-  
12 sively a Navy function.

13 (Signed) C. A. WILLOUGHBY."

14 Appendix "A" refers to the Wilkinson material. This is  
15 it: (Reading)

16 "The British SIA messages, their purport and evolu-  
17 tion and the curious role played by Mr. Gerald Wilkin-  
18 son in Manila and Hawaii are an integral part of this inves-  
19 tigation, in my opinion.

20 "The whole story is one of duplicity, evasion, bar-  
21 gaining, horse-trading of information and/E Phillipps  
22 Oppenheim international intrigue.

23 "Wilkinson married into the Davies family and repre-  
24 sented his father-in-law in Manila as a sugar broker  
25 for many years; hence, the casual reference to a 'Colonel

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Wilkinson<sup>o</sup>, that appears in the affidavits of Mr. Russell and Dawson, suggesting a perfect stranger are obviously intended to be misleading. Wilkinson combined the convenient status of a respected local business man, with that of a secret agent, reporting to the British Ministry of Information; contrary to U.S. law, he never registered as a foreign agent. He apparently came out of hiding, in Manila, and contacted or obtained tolerance by the then G-2's Philippine Department, Colonels O'Rear, retired, and J. K. Evans, MID. When I took over, he approached me, quoting Evans, etc. I was not impressed; the intelligence material he desired to file with me, they contained mimeo reprints of old Jap military data and some sprinkling of China-based reports. It became apparent to me, though, that Wilkinson had dealings with Hawaii and the local Navy, that he possessed his own cryptographic systems and decoding clerks, etc. I became convinced that his main purpose was to ingratiate himself into some official Army-Navy recognition, that he was willing to trade information for that recognition but that he was and still is an agent of British authorities, reporting thereto and executing orders therefrom. This net of potential spies is world wide; it is still in operation; I employ both SIA and SOE, British, and

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2 find them loyal to no one but themselves and the Empire.

3 "My intelligence evaluation of his messages to  
4 Hawaii is not high - a horse trading proposition, pure  
5 and simple; I am convinced that this bundle represents  
6 not all of the messages sent; the commercial deductions  
7 are obvious; Davies cancelled sugar shipments in the nick  
8 of time.

9 "Wilkinson is a completely untrained civilian. His  
10 government gave him a military status to protect him,  
11 in case of capture. He attached himself to us at the  
12 outbreak of the war, leaving his wife and children to  
13 fend for themselves, in the Japanese-occupied city; they  
14 were promptly interned, in Sto Tomas, for the duration.

15 "We made use of him and his cypher system, to send  
16 an occasional message to Wavell and Singapore; he con-  
17 tinued to report 'hhome' though his stuff was severely  
18 edited by me; the General finally sent him to Wavell's  
19 Headquarters, as a sort of liaison, utilizing his cypher  
20 system; he then made his way deviously to Washington and  
21 London, where he capitalized heavily on his 'status' with  
22 GHQ, USAFFE; he was 'promoted' to Colonel and attempted  
23 to return to our Headquarters, as a 'liaison'; he even  
24 had the support of the Prime Minister; with a complete  
25 lack of military knowledge, such a position had its ludi-

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2       crous side, except for local espionage, and we declined  
3       to have him. He was promptly demoted and attached to duty  
4       with the British Office of Information at Washington -  
5       New York.

6                               (Signed) C. A. WILLOUGHBY."

7       Appendix "B" has reference to what we call the "ultra",  
8       what was called the "magic". (Reading)

9                "In 1941, the Navy obtained and maintained a highly  
10       efficient crypto-analytical service, specializing in  
11       Japanese material; though the Army had notably partici-  
12       pated in the development of this subject, the Navy ap-  
13       pears to have obtained a lead ; consequently, it can be  
14       said that the Navy enjoyed an almost monopolistic privi-  
15       lege. In an otherwise meritorious desire for security  
16       (though every modern nation knows that crypto-analysis  
17       is going on), the Navy has shrouded the whole enterprise  
18       in mystery, excluding other services, and rigidly cen-  
19       tralizing the whole enterprise. At this date, for exam-  
20       ple, this same system is still in vogue; as far as SWPA"--  
21       That is Southwest Pacific -- "is concerned, the crypto-  
22       analysis is made in Melbourne, forwarded via 7th Fleet  
23       D.N.I.; the Melbourne station is under direct orders of  
24       Washington, is not bound by any local responsibilities,  
25       forwards what they select, and when it suits them. The

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2 possibility of erroneous or incomplete selection is as  
3 evident now as it was in 1941. The only excuse the Navy  
4 has is that its field is primarily naval intercepts, but  
5 there is a lot of Army traffic or other incidental traf-  
6 fic. This collateral traffic is not always understood or  
7 correctly interpreted by the Navy, in my opinion.

8 "The solution to this vexing and dangerous problem  
9 is a completely joint, interlocking intercept and crypto-  
10 analytical service, on the highest level, with the freest  
11 interchange of messages and interpretation.

12 "The sequence of messages referred to, had they been  
13 known to a competent intelligence officer, with Battle  
14 Order and tactical background, beginning with November  
15 14th, would have led instantly to the inescapable conclu-  
16 sion that Pearl Harbor naval installations were a target  
17 for attack, with November 25th or November 29th as the  
18 deadlines, suggesting irresistibly that elapsed time was  
19 involved, for some sort of naval seaborne sortie.

20 (Signed) C. A. WILLOUGHBY."

21 Senator Ferguson: May I inquire, Mr. Chairman?

22 What credit did you give that part of the report where  
23 he analyzed that if he had had that information it would have  
24 been clear to him that an attack was going to be made upon  
25 Pearl Harbor?

Witness Clausen

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Colonel Clausen: The credit that we gave it was, of course, Senator -- I mean it is sort of presumptuous for me to say so and it is so easy to say so in hindsight, but he pointed out to me at the time that it showed target attack possibilities, target attack information.

Senator Ferguson: Well, is that referred to in any report either by the Secretary of War or the Adjutant General?

Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Or by you?

Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir. Colonel Stimson in his report pointed out that the Hawaiian command, - he spoke only so far as the Army was concerned, - that the Hawaiian command and that the Washington command were not operating in the highest degree of efficiency and he said that with regard to this type of information, especially the ships in harbor reports, that they should have been analyzed by a man with more analytical and imaginative insight to see the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson: You say that is in the report?

Colonel Clausen: It is in Secretary Stimson's report, sir, which he made after he had this report of mine.

Senator Ferguson: But you were getting this affidavit from the top General of Intelligence in the Philippine Islands?

Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.



## Witness Clausen

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Senator Ferguson: And he was making this comment when you showed him the exhibits of what they had in Washington?

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Colonel Clausen: My Top Secret "B".

5

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

6

Colonel Clausen: Just like he said, Senator.

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Senator Ferguson: He made this comment on what they had in Washington?

9

Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

10

Mr. Richardson: Will you tell us again just who Willoughby was?

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Colonel Clausen: C. A. Willoughby was a Major General who was one of those that left with MacArthur after the fall of Bataan and then returned with MacArthur as his G-2 during all that time, sir.

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The Vice Chairman: All right. Go ahead, Colonel.

17

Colonel Clausen: I come now to --

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Mr. Clark: Let me get one point straight. Is your Secret "B", - I believe you call it?

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Colonel Clausen: Exhibit "B", sir?

21

Mr. Clark: Yes.

22

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Colonel Clausen: That is the one that General Russell brought to the Board.

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Mr. Clark: Does that contain these intercepts only from Washington?

Witness Clausen

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Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir. It contains the file of intercepts that were here in Washington in part.

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Mr. Clark: Did it contain anything that you picked up at Hawaii?

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Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir. You see, I referred by numbers to these other people in Hawaii who had them. In other words --

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Mr. Clark: The Senator's question to you was whether or not what was in this B-2 came from Washington. I want to know whether there is anything else now other than from Washington in it?

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Colonel Clausen: Well, the Top Secret Exhibit "B" that we have referred to were a sheaf of intercepts that General Russell had obtained from G-2. Now, the intercepts were intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages that had been received in Washington and some of those -- as I have pointed out here now in other affidavits, the substance of them at least were known to some people in Hawaii.

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Mr. Clark: I understand now. Thank you, sir.

21

The Vice Chairman: Go ahead.

22

Mr. Murphy: May I ask one question? Did General Russell also have the dispatches in regard to the Aleutians and in regard to Panama and in regard to the Philippines?

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Colonel Clausen: Mr. Murphy, I do not know. When the

1 Witness Clausen

2 Board got the winds code last week --

3 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, the one that General Russell  
4 concentrated upon was those segregated particularly as to  
5 Hawaii, is that right?

6 Colonel Clausen: That is what I understand.

7 Mr. Murphy: That is all.

8 The Vice Chairman: Go ahead.

9 Colonel Clausen: The next affidavit is that of General  
10 Fielder which I have read already for Senator George.

11 The Vice Chairman: Yes.

12 Colonel Clausen: Now, in looking over the Hart report,  
13 Captain Safford in there said that General Betts was one of  
14 the people that would know about the winds code execute mes-  
15 sage, so I got ahold of General Betts at Frankfort on Main,  
16 in Germany. This is his affidavit. June 13, 1945. (Reading)

17 "During the months of November and December 1941 I  
18 was the Executive Assistant of the Chief of the then In-  
19 telligence Branch, Military Intelligence Division, War  
20 Department General Staff, Washington, D.C.

21 "In that capacity I was required to have a general  
22 knowledge of the major intelligence problems confronting  
23 the Military Intelligence Division and with reference to  
24 the Japanese situation I generally obtained this know-  
25 ledge from Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, GSC, who was in

Witness Clausen

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charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch and to whom was decentralized the handling of all Ultra messages concerning Japan which came to the War Department. Colonel Bratton was assisted by Major Dusenbury, GSC. I know that Major Dusenbury, as Colonel Bratton's representative, received certain Ultra messages concerning Japan both from Army and Navy sources. I think that on occasion Colonel Bratton employed Major Dusenbury to transmit messages so received to authorized persons in the War Department.

"In consequence I have no first hand knowledge of the handling of these messages, from whom they were received or to whom they were shown. To the best of my knowledge and belief I received no Ultra messages either in written form or by oral transmission on behalf of the Military Intelligence Division during the period in question. I believe, however, that during the period in question Colonel Bratton either showed me or informed me of the gist of most of the Ultra messages which he handled. I am certain that Colonel Bratton informed me of the message which established the so-called Japanese 'Winds Code'. I further recall inquiring of him on several occasions whether any message implementing the message on the 'Winds Code' had been received. I do not

## Witness Clausen

1  
2 recall that he informed me at any time of such a message  
3 being received and I further believe that if he had re-  
4 ceived such a message he would have told me and I would  
5 have remembered it. To the best of my knowledge and be-  
6 lief no other person informed me prior to 7 December 1941  
7 that an implementing message had been received.

8 (Signed) THOMAS J. BETTS,

9 Brigadier General."

10 He was on the staff of General Eisenhower.

11 Next is an affidavit of Lieutenant General Walter B.

12 Smith, which I obtained at Frankfort on Main on 15 June  
13 1945, Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, and it had to do  
14 with some testimony of Colonel Bratton and Colonel Sadtler  
15 and it had to do with whether or not he had received on the  
16 night of 6 December, as had theretofore been testified, the  
17 pouch containing the thirteen parts.

18 Mr. Keefe: Is that the fellow that is sometimes re-  
19 ferred to as "Beetle Smith, as General Beetle Smith?

20 Colonel Clausen: That is the same one, yes, sir.

21 Mr. Keefe: The same one?

22 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir. Do you want me to read this?

23 The Vice Chairman: I think Senator Ferguson asked you  
24 questions about this. Do you want the affidavit read, Sen-  
25 ator?

## Witness Clausen

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2           Senator Ferguson: Is there anything in it in relation  
3 to Hawaii?

4           The Vice Chairman: While your attention was directed on  
5 something there, Senator, Colonel Clausen stated that it re-  
6 lated to the delivery of the thirteen part message, something  
7 in that connection.

8           Colonel Clausen: The general nature of the delivery of  
9 the Ultra to the Chief of Staff. General Beetle Smith at  
10 that time was Secretary to the General Staff here in Washing-  
11 ton in 1941.

12           Senator Ferguson: And this is an affidavit, - this is  
13 not the Beetle Smith affidavit?

14           Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

15           Senator Ferguson: Oh, all right. Yes, I think you  
16 ought to read that.

17           Colonel Clausen: All right, sir.

18           Mr. Keefe: May I inquire here the date of that affi-  
19 davit?

20           Colonel Clausen: June 15, 1945.

21           Mr. Keefe: Did you have that affidavit when you con-  
22 tacted Colonel Bratton?

23           Colonel Clausen: I showed it to him, sir, so that he  
24 could see what the others had said.

25           Mr. Keefe: Then you already had that affidavit at the

Witness Clausen

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time you took the affidavit from Colonel Bratten?

Colonel Clausen: Yes. Let me just make sure because, Mr. Keefe, I showed Colonel Bratton various papers and I listed them down in the first part as to just what I showed him. Yes, I did, I showed him that affidavit.

Mr. Keefe: All right, that is all I wanted to know.

Colonel Clausen: Do you want the list of those that I showed him?

Mr. Keefe: Not now.

Colonel Clausen: All right.

Mr. Keefe: I may want to ask you about that later.

Colonel Clausen: All right. (Reading)

"During the months of November and December 1941, I was stationed at Washington, D. C. as Secretary of the War Department General Staff. In that capacity and during the period mentioned, I received from representatives of G-2, for delivery to the Chief of Staff, containers carrying especially secret information which I later learned included various intercepts of Japanese radio diplomatic messages which had been decrypted and translated, and were then called 'Magic'. These were also delivered on occasions for the same purpose to whichever Assistant Secretary General Staff was on duty in the office of the Chief of Staff."

## Witness Clausen

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Mr. Keefe: Now, may I inquire, Mr. Chairman, right at this point? General Smith had not been a witness before the Army Pearl Harbor Investigating Board?

Colonel Clausen: No, sir.

Mr. Keefe: This is his first statement?

Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir. I had about fifteen witnesses that testified before the Grunert Board that I re-interviewed and got additional affidavits or testimonh from and then there were thirty-five, about thirty-five entirely new witnesses.

Mr. Keefe: Of which he is one?

Colonel Clausen: Of which General Smith is one.

Mr. Keefe: Very well.

Colonel Clausen: (Reading)

"I did not personally see these intercepts. I did not know what messages were delivered to the various distributees, nor the method of distribution or screening, nor to whom or when they were delivered. They were always given to me in a locked pouch, the key to which was not available to me. I would always give the locked pouch to the Chief of Staff as promptly as possible. If received in the Chief of Staff's absence, these pouches were given him as soon as he returned to the office. I recall several occasions when the pouch was delivered to



## Witness Clausen

1  
2 him at his home when the A.C. of S., G-2, considered  
3 the contents urgent. The Chief of Staff would occasional-  
4 ly mention to me matters connected with these intercepts,  
5 but I do not recall ever having seen a complete one,  
6 nor do I recall specific details.

7 "Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is  
8 stated to have been the testimony before the Army Pearl  
9 Harbor Board to the general effect:

10 "1. On 5 December 1941, Colonel Otis K. Sadtler,  
11 SC, after receiving information from Admiral Noyes, then  
12 Chief of Navy Communications, that the Japanese 'Winds  
13 Code' had been implemented to signal rupture of diplo-  
14 matic relations or war between Japan and Great Britain,  
15 and after talking this over with General Sherman Miles  
16 and Colonel Rufus S. Bratton of G-2, gave the information  
17 to General Leonard T. Gerow of WPD, and asked him to give  
18 the Hawaiian Department more warning. General Gerow  
19 stated, "I think they have had plenty of notification."  
20 Colonel Sadtler then gave the information to me, and made  
21 the same request of me. I replied that since the War  
22 Plans Division had acted I did not want to discuss the  
23 matter further."

24 Now, do you want me to skip down to where he answers  
25 that number 1?

Witness Clausen

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2 Mr. Keefe: Read the whole affidavit as long as you are  
3 about it.

4 Colonel Clausen: Well, you see I went down from 1, 2,  
5 3, 4 and then he answered 1, 2, 3 and 4, so if you want me  
6 to I will answer one by reading one.

7 Mr. Keefe: All right.

8 The Vice Chairman: Go ahead.

9 Colonel Clausen: This is in response to what I just  
10 read. He says:

11 "My recollection of the facts concerning these  
12 subjects is as follows:

13 "I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as  
14 he has stated. However, since the matter in question  
15 was obviously a difference of opinion between the A.C.  
16 of S., G-2 and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division, both  
17 of whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it  
18 was not one in which I had any responsibility or author-  
19 ity, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadtler would  
20 have asked me to intervene in a question of this kind,  
21 particularly since I was not at that time an 'Ultra' of-  
22 ficer, and it would have been impossible for him to give  
23 me any information to support his contention that I  
24 should step out of my rather minor province."

25 Number 2. This is what the general testimony before the

## Witness Clausen

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Army Pearl Harbor Board was:

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"Colonel Bratton delivered the pouches containing the radio intercepts always in person to the officers concerned; and, when the Chief of staff was not there, he delivered the pouches to me for delivery to the Chief of Staff."

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This is his answer. Number 2:

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"Not only Colonel Bratton, but at least one other officer of G-2 delivered the pouches referred to. These were delivered not only to me, but to whichever Assistant Secretary General Staff happened to be on duty at my desk in my absence. When delivered to myself or to one of my assistants, our standard procedure was to place it immediately on the desk of the Chief of Staff if he were in his office, or, in his absence, to lock it in the safe until his return unless instructed that the contents should reach him at once. There were several occasions when we were so informed. On these occasions the Duty Officer of the General Staff Secretariat would take the pouches to General Marshall at his quarters or wherever he happened to be. On at least several occasions I recall definitely that I personally sent the G-2 officer to deliver the pouch to General Marshall at his quarters in the absence of a Duty Officer."

## Witness Clausen:

## Number 3:

"During November and December 1941, Colonel Bratton reminded me that the intercepts were of such value and importance that they should be shown the Chief of Staff without delay."

## Answer to Number 3:

"Both I myself and the Assistant Secretaries understood that these pouches contained information of such value and importance that they should be shown to the Chief of Staff without delay, and the officers of the Intelligence Division who handed them to us were aware of the procedure followed in the Chief of Staff's office as indicated above."

## Number 4 of general testimony before the Board:

"On December 6 1941, before midnight, Colonel Bratton delivered to me for the Chief of Staff 13 parts of a 14 part intercepted radio message from the Japanese Government which in terms terminated peace negotiations with the United States. (I understand this testimony may possibly be qualified by other testimony to the effect that instead of giving these to me it 'may have been one of others.')"

## Answer Number 4:

"To the best of my recollection, I left the office

## Witness Clausen

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2 at the usual time on the evening of 6 December 41, that  
3 is, about 7 PM., turning over to the Night Duty Officer.  
4 I am quite certain that I was not at the office after 10  
5 PM. If the intercepted radio message referred to by  
6 Colonel Bratton was delivered either to me or to the Night  
7 Duty Officer, it would have been delivered in the locked  
8 envelope which I have previously described, and unless  
9 the officer who received it were so informed by Colonel  
10 Bratton, he would have had no definite knowledge of its  
11 contents as neither I nor any other officer of the Secre-  
12 tariat was classified as 'Ultra'. If he had been in-  
13 formed of the contents or of their urgent nature, it would  
14 have been delivered to the Chief of Staff in accordance  
15 with our usual procedure, either by the officer on duty  
16 or by Colonel Bratton himself.

17 (Signed) W. B. SMITH."

18 I come now to the affidavit of General Gerow.

19 The Vice Chairman: I believe that has already been read  
20 into the record, unless some member wants it read again.

21 Senator Ferguson: I have no desire to have it.

22 Colonel Clausen: All right. May I just say that the  
23 number of the intercepts referred to there, - that there are  
24 two that have not already been referred to by myself. One is  
25 Number 23570, and you have that as your exhibit 1, page 68,

Witness Clausen

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and the other is Number 23859 and you have that as your exhibit 1, page 81.

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The Vice Chairman: General Gerow's affidavit, as I recall it, was read into the record while he was testifying before the committee.

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Colonel Clausen: All right, sir. Now, another that has been mentioned by Captain Safford before Admiral Hart as being a person that would have some light to shed on the winds message was Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, so I reached him at Casserte, Italy June 26, 1945.

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Senator Ferguson: Colonel Schukraft is present in the room, - do you know whether he is present in the room?

11

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Colonel Clausen: He is right here, yes, sir.

13

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Senator Ferguson: Well, then, is there any need of reading his affidavit, Mr. Chairman?

15

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Senator Lucas: There is unless we are going to call him as a witness.

17

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Senator Ferguson: I understood he was to be a witness.

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Colonel Clausen: This is a short one.

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The Vice Chairman: Well, read it. Maybe we can read it in less time than we can talk about it.

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Witness Clausen

1           Colonel Clausen: "On 7 December 1944, and for some  
2 time prior thereto, I was stationed at Washington, D. C.,  
3 in charge of radio intercepts for the Signal Intelligence  
4 Service, War Department. As such, my duties included the  
5 direct supervision of radio intercept stations operated  
6 by the Chief Signal Officer. In the course of these duties  
7 I saw at various times some of the intercepts which had been  
8 decrypted and decoded and translated.

9           "Regarding the so-called 'Winds Code', I recall seeing,  
10 at about the time of their translation, the intercept in  
11 Top Secret Exhibit 'B', numbered 25432. When I saw this  
12 message I directed the San Francisco intercept station to  
13 intercept all plain text Japanese messages and to pick up  
14 the news reports from Tokyo. The station did this and sent  
15 the messages and reports in to me. To the best of my know-  
16 ledge none of these containing the code words were ever  
17 picked up. I did, however, see an intercept of a telephone  
18 conversation between Kurusu and a person in Tokyo, who I  
19 believe was Yamamoto, similar in form to the intercepts in  
20 Top Secret Exhibit 'B' numbered 25349 and 25497," --

21           Now 25349 is your Exhibit 1, page 179, and No. 25497,  
22 is your Exhibit 1, page 206.

23           I continue:  
24  
25

## Witness Clausen

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1 " -- but in which the person at the Tokyo end gave to  
2 Kurusu the 'Winds Code' signal indicating breach of diplo-  
3 matic relations between Japan and the United States. Kurusu  
4 in reply said something to the effect that he was sorry to  
5 hear this. The message to which I refer came to the Signal  
6 Intelligence Service from the Navy, as a Navy intercept or  
7 translation, during the period about 28 November 1941 to  
8 6 December 1941. I think this message also contained some  
9 code words translated as "It is a boy." I did not know the  
10 meaning of this latter code. When the message mentioned  
11 was received from the Navy the Signal Intelligence Service  
12 sent it immediately to G-2.

13 "As additional leads in connection with the foregoing,  
14 I suggest interrogation of my former superior Colonel  
15 Minckler; also especially Lieut. Colonel Rowlett and Miss  
16 Prather. Additional information may possibly be obtained  
17 from Colonel Doud, Miss Ray Cave (wife of Sgt. Liparini),  
18 and Mrs. Hazel Adams."

19 Signed, "Robert E. Schukraft."

20 Now then, the next affidavit is that of George L.  
21 Renchard, and following that is the affidavit of John F.  
22 Stone, whom I saw in London, and who at the time of Pearl  
23 Harbor was assistant to Secretary Hull. I do not think  
24 there is any reference there to Hawaii, unless the committee  
25



Witness Clausen

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1 wants them read.

2 The Vice Chairman: Go ahead with the next one.

3 Colonel Clausen: The next affidavit is that of Major  
4 General John R. Deane, which is a very short affidavit. It  
5 has to do with the fact that he was one of the Assistant  
6 Secretaries to the General Staff in December, 1941, and  
7 he said:

8 "On 6 December, 1941, I was not on duty after 5 p.m.,  
9 and did not receive from Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, nor from  
10 Colonel Carlisle Dusenbury, or any other person, any pouch  
11 for the Chief of Staff."

12 Then he says on the next morning he got down to work  
13 about 9 or 9:30 a. m.

14 The next affidavit is that of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton.  
15 I will read that if the committee wants. So far as Hawaii  
16 itself is concerned, it refers to the fact that he sent the  
17 5 December Rochefort message.

18 Mr. Keefe: He has been here for several weeks and  
19 he is in the room right now. He is going to be a witness,  
20 so I see no object in reading it.

21 The Vice Chairman: All right, Colonel, the reading is  
22 off.

23 Colonel Clausen: He refers in here to intercept 25483  
24 which you will find at page 239 of your exhibit 1, and also  
25

Witness Clausen

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1 to intercept 25850, which you will find at page 248 of  
2 Exhibit 1. He also refers to the ABCD Block.

3 The next affidavit is that of Colonel Otis K. Sadtler.

4 Mr. Keefe: Colonel Sadtler is going to be a witness,  
5 isn't it?

6 Mr. Kaufman: He is scheduled to be a witness.

7 Colonel Clausen: All right. I will skip that.

8 Next is the affidavit of Major General Charles D.

9 Herron.

10 Major General Herron preceded General Short as Commanding  
11 General of the Hawaiian Department, and in this affidavit he  
12 tells of his briefing of General Short concerning the matters  
13 that had to do with the Hawaiian Command. I may be import-  
14 ant for the part that had to do with the 1940 alert, and  
15 as to what he told General Short concerning subjects of  
16 that kind.

17 The Vice Chairman: Does any member of the committee  
18 desire that affidavit read?

19 Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, I would think that it  
20 would directly involve General Short, if this consists of  
21 directions which were given to General Short by Herron on  
22 Short's succeeding to the command out there.

23 The Vice Chairman: Go ahead and read it, Colonel.

24 Colonel Clausen: This was given to me in Washington,  
25

## Witness Clausen

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1 D. C. on August 13, 1945.

2 "Referring to my testimony given the Army Pearl Harbor  
3 Board on 9 August 1944, I wish to state further that when  
4 arrangements had been made for General Short to relieve me  
5 as Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, which command  
6 I had held since October 1937, I desired to acquaint him  
7 as fully as I could with my experience and knowledge of  
8 the affairs pertaining thereto. Since he was to arrive and  
9 I was to depart on the same ship, there was only a limited  
10 time in which to do this by personal conferences, namely,  
11 two and one-half days. Accordingly, in order that he might  
12 be prepared for his conferences with me, I sent to San  
13 Francisco for delivery to him there certain papers and  
14 material relating to the command, for his preliminary review  
15 on the ship's journey of five days. These papers and  
16 material comprised in effect an agenda and exhibits. Upon  
17 my meeting General Short when he arrived at Hawaii, I asked  
18 him whether he had received the data at San Francisco and  
19 whether he had read the papers and material. He replied  
20 that they had been received by him at San Francisco but that  
21 he had not given them much time while en route.

22 I did what I could in the limited time of two and one-  
23 half days then remaining to brief General Short personally on  
24 matters pertaining to the command. This included my giving  
25

## Witness Clausen

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1 him my opinions on the officers and men. I told him of my  
2 estimate as to the efficiency of the staff officers and,  
3 with respect to G-2, that Colonel George W. Bicknell, a  
4 Reserve Officer, was an experienced and qualified, efficient  
5 man for that position, and that it had been my intention to  
6 make him my G-2. I further told him of the G-2 work being  
7 done, of the liaison with the Navy, the FBI and related  
8 sources of information, of the defense plans, of my exper-  
9 ience and measures taken in the all-out alert of 1940 which  
10 I had ordered on receipt of a communication from the War  
11 Department, dated June 17, 1940, reading as follows:

12 'Immediately alert complete defensive organization  
13 to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid, to the  
14 greatest extent possible without creating public  
15 hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers  
16 or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain  
17 alert until further orders. Instructions for secret  
18 communication direct with Chief of Staff will be  
19 furnished you shortly. Acknowledge.'

20 "I also told him of the relations and cooperation which  
21 had existed with the Navy, of the civilian population, of  
22 the Japanese situation, of the assumption that alien agents  
23 conducted espionage for the Japanese Government. I took  
24 him around the Island of Oahu, showing him the installations  
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Witness Clausen

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1 and gave him my ideas of possible attack and defense of  
2 that Island.

3 "Following my talks with General Short at the time  
4 mentioned, in Hawaii, he did not ever ask my opinions or  
5 for information or correspond with me on the subject of  
6 command or related problems.

7 "Concerning your question as to whether correct  
8 military practice, current in 1941, permitted a Commanding  
9 General of an overseas department to revise a War Department  
10 estimate of the situation, without consulting with or re-  
11 porting to the War Department, my answer is that the Com-  
12 mander may and should take whatever action he believes dic-  
13 tated by necessity but must so report to the War Department  
14 at the earliest possible moment."

15 Signed "Charles D. Herron, Major General, U. S. A."

16 The next affidavit is that of General Miles.

17 The Vice Chairman: He has already appeared as a witness.

18 Colonel Clausen: All right, sir .

19 In his affidavit he refers to quite a series of inter-  
20 cepts which I have looked up and tied into your exhibits.

21 If you want, I will read them and show where they are  
22 in your exhibits.

23 The Vice Chairman: All right.

24 Colonel Clausen: 24573, on page 100 of Exhibit 1.  
25

## Witness Clausen

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25322 on page 126 of Exhibit 1

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24878 on page 137 of Exhibit 1

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25432 on page 154 of Exhibit 1

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25138 on page 165 of Exhibit 1

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25435 on page 180 of Exhibit 1

6

25445 on page 195 of Exhibit 1

7

25496 on page 199 of Exhibit 1

8

25552 on page 204 of Exhibit 1

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25553 on page 204 of Exhibit 1

10

25554 on page 205 of Exhibit 1

11

25555 on page 206 of Exhibit 1

12

25727 on page 213 of Exhibit 1

13

25545 on page 208 of Exhibit 1

14

25640 on page 215 of Exhibit 1

15

25785 on page 227 of Exhibit 1

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25836 on page 236 of Exhibit 1

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25838 on page 238 of Exhibit 1

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25843 on page 239 of Exhibit 1

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The General in this affidavit also referred to the ABCD Block, and his assumption that the Navy in Hawaii was doing some decrypting, and refers to some studies he had made on what he called an "out of the blue" attack on Pearl Harbor.

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Senator Ferguson: Will you read what he said about the ABCD Block?

Witness Clausen

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Colonel Clausen: I will read it, Senator.

"Further concerning the intercepts mentioned as contained in Top Secret Exhibit 'B', and those which related to Joint Action by the ABCD Bloc or members thereof I knew at the time about the Joint Action Agreement."

The next affidavit is also an officer who was referred to by Captain Safford in his testimony before Admiral Hart, and that is Colonel Rex W. Minckler.

Shall I read that?

The Vice Chairman: Go ahead.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Clausen

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Colonel Clausen: "On 7 December 1941, and for some months prior thereto, I was stationed at Washington, D. C. as Officer in Charge of Signal Intelligence Service. Colonel Robert E. Schukraft and Colonel Harold S. Doud were my subordinates in the Signal Intelligence Service at the time, and Colonel Otis K. Sadtler was my superior. My duties included the direct supervision of the receipt and dissemination of intercepted radio messages. In the course of these duties I saw at various times most of the intercepts of Japanese radio.

"Regarding the so-called Japanese 'Winds Code', I recall having seen, and at about the time of its translation, the intercept numbered 25432 in Top Secret Exhibit 'B', before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. I recall the action which was taken under my supervision to monitor for the execute message contemplated by the 'Winds Code'. I never saw or heard of an authentic execute message of this character either before or since 7 December 1941. It is my belief that no such message was sent. Before 7 December 1941 there were one or two 'false alarms', one of which I think discussed with representatives of G-2 and the Navy, and which was to the effect that a possible execute message had been received indicating a breach of Japanese and British relations. My opposite number in the

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



## Witness Clausen

1  
2 Navy was Captain L. F. Safford. I was in almost daily  
3 contact with Army and Navy representatives who were also  
4 on the lookout for such an execute message, and it is my  
5 belief that if an authentic execute message had been re-  
6 ceived, some of these persons would have discussed it  
7 with me.

8 "The normal procedure in the reciprocal sending of  
9 messages by the Army and Navy, one to the other, was to  
10 send six copies.

11 "Concerning the two messages shown me by Colonel  
12 Clausen, Army Serial numbers 25874 and 25877," --

13 and they are to be found on page 29 of your Exhibit 2  
14 and pages 27 and 28 your Exhibit 2. I will continue:

15 "-- which appear to have been intercepted on 6 December  
16 1941 and translated on 8 December 1941, I believe the time  
17 indicated for decrypting and translation by the Army was  
18 normal and then required for decrypting and decoding Code  
19 PA-K2. The Navy time was about four days. The Code  
20 indicated was not top priority and involved manual process-  
21 ing. When the intercepts were received by the Signal  
22 Intelligence Service they were sorted into categories of  
23 priority, and then after being decrypted and translated,  
24 one copy was retained by the Signal Intelligence Service  
25 and additional copies were then sent to G-2 and the Navy ONI  
for dissemination."

1 Witness Clausen

2 Signed, "Rex W. Minckler, Colonel, SC."

3 The next affidavit I have is that of General Marshall.

4 Senator Lucas: Colonel, do I understand in that last  
5 affidavit Colonel Minckler was the opposite of Captain  
6 Safford?

7 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir. The next affidavit is that  
8 of General Marshall.

9 The Vice Chairman: General Marshall has appeared as  
10 a witness.

11 Colonel Clausen: All right, sir.

12 Now the next is another man mentioned by Captain Safford  
13 in his testimony before Admiral Hart as a lead on this  
14 winds execute business, and that is Colonel Harold Doud.

15 "On 7 December 1941, and for some time prior thereto,  
16 I was stationed at Washington, D. C., in charge of the B  
17 Section, Signal Intelligence Service, which was the Code  
18 and Cipher Solution Section. My duties included the super-  
19 vision of the solution of Japanese radio diplomatic and  
20 military messages. In the course of these duties my  
21 section solved and translated at various times many Japanese  
22 messages which had been intercepted.

23 "Regarding the so-called Japanese 'Winds Code' I recall  
24 seeing at about the time of its translation the intercept  
25 in top secret Exhibit B, No. 25432," - that exhibit was the

## Witness Clausen

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code - "I recall that when this intercept was translated arrangements were made to monitor for the execute message contemplated by the 'Winds Code'. I did not see any execute message as thus contemplated and so far as I know there was no such execute message received in the War Department.

My attention has been called to certain testimony of Captain L. F. Safford, USN, to the effect that I may have some knowledge concerning such an execute message. I do not know the basis for this testimony of Captain Safford as I did not have any information of an execute message.

"My attention has also been called to the testimony on the subject of 13 parts of a 14-part message, which 13 parts was received the afternoon and evening of 6 December 1941 and is numbered SIS 25843. I recall having seen the message but do not remember the details connected with its receipt and solution. I went on duty on the afternoon of 6 December and came off duty sometime on the 7th of December, the exact times, however, I do not recall.

"Concerning the time required to solve and disseminate the Japanese radio diplomatic messages in Code PA-K2, it is my present belief that the average time required was at least two days.

"I have been shown top secret Exhibit 'B' before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. The translation dates indicated

Witness Clausen

1 thereon were not always the dates of receipt. Reference  
2 to the records of the Signal Intelligence Service should  
3 be made to show the time required between the dates of  
4 receipt and the actual solutions and disseminations.

5 "Prior to 7 December 1941, according to my recollection,  
6 we did not solve any current Japanese military codes."

7 Signed, "Harold Doud, Colonel, Signal Corps".

8 The next affidavit is an additional affidavit by  
9 Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, whose other affidavit  
10 I read this morning in connection with my giving the top  
11 secret Exhibit "B" and was asked to find out the points  
12 of interception. Now it developed that there were two  
13 additional messages which are referred to in the affidavit  
14 of Colonel Minckler. I understood those were intercepted  
15 at San Francisco on 6 December. So I wanted to know why  
16 they were not decrypted sooner than 8 December, because  
17 those two were very significant ones pointing to Pearl  
18 Harbor, talking, I believe, about barrage balloons -- maybe  
19 not barrage balloons but anti-torpedo nets and barrage  
20 balloons. Colonel Rowlett was the man to see on that and I  
21 interviewed the Colonel and he gave me this affidavit.  
22 It relates to that subject, if the committee wants to  
23 hear it.

24 The Vice Chairman: Go ahead and read it.  
25

Witness Clausen

1 Colonel Clausen: "The average length of time required  
2 for processing" --

3 These two messages I mentioned came in a code called  
4 PA-K2.

5 "The average length of time required for processing  
6 the messages in the Japanese system known by us as PAK-2,  
7 calculated on 19 messages for the period of 1 November  
8 to 6 December 1941, shows 3.5 days as average. Only messages  
9 which were actually published were included in the data on  
10 which the average was calculated.

11 "No military systems which were in use by the Japanese  
12 Army or Military Attaches previous to the date of 6 December  
13 1941 were readable. Some intercepts were available but  
14 not in sufficient quantity to permit the solution of any  
15 military system.

16 "a. No written record has been discovered which would  
17 indicate positively the exact hour at which intercept  
18 traffic was received by teletype from San Francisco by the  
19 Signal Intelligence Service in the Munitions Building."

20 Where that question mark occurred with regard to those  
21 two messages, was whether they were sent in by mail or  
22 sent in by teletype. I have been given conflicting stories  
23 and that is the reason that point was run down.

24 "My recollection is that the first call to initiate  
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## Witness Clausen

1 the use of the circuit with San Francisco was placed  
2 sometime after six o'clock in the evening of 6 December  
3 1941. The response from Station 2 at San Francisco indi-  
4 cated that they had already forwarded by air mail the  
5 messages intercepted that day and that it would be necessary  
6 for them to use the station file copy for preparing the  
7 intercepts for transmission by teletype. This preparation  
8 required some time because tapes had to be punched for  
9 the material to be forwarded. To the best of my recollection  
10 it was not until after midnight that actual intercept  
11 traffic was received by the Signal Intelligence Service  
12 from San Francisco.

13 "b. Since this was the first time the Army had used  
14 teletype facilities to forward traffic to Signal Intelligence,  
15 my recollection is very clear. Also, I actually helped to  
16 operate the teletype equipment in the Munitions Building  
17 in both the preliminary discussions in which traffic was  
18 requested and also in receipting for the traffic. Colonel  
19 Robert E. Schukraft and Miss Mary Jo Dunning were present  
20 and also operated the teletype equipment. The conditions  
21 under which we operated were very unusual in that ordinarily  
22 we operated only day shifts, and this also tended to  
23 impress the matter on my memory."

24 Signed "Frank B. Rowlee, Lieutenant Colonel, Signal Corps."  
25 That was dated September 12, 1945.

## Witness Clausen

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1 On the same subject, an affidavit of Captain Howard  
2 W. Martin:

3 "At approximately 8:00 p.m. PST on 6 December 1941  
4 I was in my quarters at Fort Scott, Presidio of San Francisco  
5 when the telephone rang and the man on duty at the station  
6 (MS #2) said Washington had called us on the teletype  
7 machine and had requested we transmit immediately all the  
8 day's intercepted traffic. It being Saturday night I had  
9 only one man on duty and other personnel could not be reached  
10 readily. Therefore I went down to the station immediately  
11 and began transmitting all of Saturday's traffic using our  
12 retained copy, as the original traffic had been airmailed  
13 to Washington at approximately 4:00 p.m., on the same day.  
14 Because the following day the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor  
15 I have always associated the two things in my memory, and  
16 am certain that the TWX machine was not used for traffic  
17 prior to 6 December and the hours as given are approximately  
18 correct.

19 "I was NCO in charge of MS #2 at that time."

20 Signed "Howard W. Martin, Captain, Signal Corps."

21 On the same subject, the affidavit of Mary J. Dunning:

22 "On 6 December, 1941, I left the Munitions Building  
23 around 1:00 p. m., the regular hour for the close of busi-  
24 ness on Saturdays. Between 2:15 and 2:45 that afternoon,  
25

Witness Clausen

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1 I received a telephone call from Colonel Minckler's office  
2 requesting me to report for work as soon as possible. I  
3 fixed the hour by the length of time it takes me to drive  
4 from my home to the Munitions Building and by 3:00 p.m.  
5 I was in Colonel Minckler's office ready to work. I remember  
6 the hour because later in the evening when I was asked to  
7 report at the same time on the following day I asked to be  
8 allowed to report at 5:00 p.m. instead, since I had made  
9 plans to spend the day out of town.

10 "I can't recall being told why we were called back to  
11 work, but the general assumption was that we wanted to pro-  
12 cess traffic without delay since the Japanese Ambassador  
13 was in conference with the President.

14 "I was asked to work in the 'cage' (a room where machine  
15 traffic was processed, so called because of the grille work  
16 at its entrance to restrict admittance) where I had not  
17 worked for some time. I think that as I entered the room, I  
18 was surprised to see a teletype machine. How long it had  
19 been installed, I don't know, but I thought it could not  
20 have been there more than a few hours, since I often had  
21 occasion to go to the door of the cage and it was clearly  
22 visible from the door. It must have been roughly around  
23 four o'clock that representatives of the teletype company came  
24 to instruct us in the operation of the machine. After that we  
25



Witness Clausen

1 spent some time practicing.

2 "It is difficult to fix the time very definitely because  
3 time spent in waiting always seems longer than it really is,  
4 and we were expecting traffic from San Francisco at any  
5 moment. I remember that I was getting hungry but could not  
6 leave the room to get supper since we were waiting for S. F.  
7 to call. When Colonel Minckler came into the cage, I  
8 spoke to him about getting someone to relieve me just long  
9 enough for me to buy a sandwich. This conversation I remember  
10 because we joked about my teaching him to operate the tele-  
11 type. To the best of my knowledge, we were in communication  
12 with our intercept station in S. F. not later than 7:00 p.m.,  
13 although I cannot say whether or not they actually had any  
14 traffic for us at that time.

15 "I believe I went home around midnight or 1:00 a.m.  
16 and I recall processing some traffic during the course of  
17 the evening before I left. I cannot say, however, whether  
18 it came to us by teletype, or not, since the Message Center  
19 had been asked to deliver traffic to us as soon as it arrived.  
20 That was traffic from Honolulu and the Philippines.

21 "I did not return to the office until five o'clock on  
22 7 December 1941."

23 Signed, "Mary J. Dunning."  
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WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Clausen

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The next is on the same subject, the affidavit of Louise Prather:

"To the best of my knowledge, the teletype machine was used to transmit traffic from San Francisco for the first time during the night of 6 December 1941.

"This particular point is clear in my memory because of the unusual circumstances. In the evening of 6 December I was called at home and told our unit was being placed on a 24-hour basis immediately and that I should report for work at 7:00 a.m. the following morning, 7 December. When I arrived at the office at this unusual hour I learned that the teletype was being operated and the reason for the urgent call had been to process this, and other, traffic as rapidly as possible. Since for some months, the highest priority had been given Japanese traffic between Washington and Tokyo by our unit, the transmission of such traffic by teletype seemed to me to be a matter of major importance. This further served to impress the event on my memory."

Signed "Louise Prather."

That is the end of the testimony.

Then the committee asked that I --

Mr. Clark: Mr. Chairman, before the witness leaves that subject, I would like to ask a question.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Clark will inquire.

Witness Clausen

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1           The next is on the same subject, the affidavit of  
2 Louise Prather:

3           "To the best of my knowledge, the teletype machine  
4 was used to transmit traffic from San Francisco for the  
5 first time during the night of 6 December 1941.

6           "This particular point is clear in my memory because of  
7 the unusual circumstances. In the evening of 6 December  
8 I was called at home and told our unit was being placed on  
9 a 24-hour basis immediately and that I should report for  
10 work at 7:00 a.m. the following morning, 7 December. When  
11 I arrived at the office at this unusual hour I learned  
12 that the teletype was being operated and the reason for  
13 the urgent call had been to process this, and other, traffic  
14 as rapidly as possible. Since for some months, the highest  
15 priority had been given Japanese traffic between Washington  
16 and Tokyo by our unit, the transmission of such traffic by  
17 teletype seemed to me to be a matter of major importance.  
18 This further served to impress the event on my memory."

19           Signed "Louise Prather."

20           That is the end of the testimony.

21           Then the committee asked that I --

22           Mr. Clark: Mr. Chairman, before the witness leaves  
23 that subject, I would like to ask a question.

24           The Vice Chairman: Mr. Clark will inquire.

25

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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1 Mr. Clark: This seems to refer to the magic that  
2 had some reference in it to the submarine nets and the  
3 balloons, or something of that kind?

4 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Clark: Just what was the sense of that message?

6 Colonel Clausen: You will find them in your Exhibit  
7 No. 2. If you will let me have Exhibit No. 2, I will find  
8 them. That is on page 29, and is Army No. 25874, and this  
9 is the message:

10 "From Honolulu

11 "To Tokyo

12 "December 6, 1941

13 "#254

14 "1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships  
15 which entered port were" -- and there is a blank line,  
16 "- and one submarine tender. The following ships were ob-  
17 served at anchor on the 6th:

18 "9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders,  
19 17 destroyers, and in addition there were four light cruisers,  
20 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane  
21 carriers have all left.

22 "2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being  
23 conducted by the fleet air arm."

24 The other one is on page 27 and 28 of the same exhibit 2.  
25 That is SIS No. 25877. From Honolulu to Tokyo:

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Witness Clausen

"December 6, 1941.

"#253 Re the last part of your #123-a.

"1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Insofar as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

"2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results

Witness Clausen

1 of my investigation."

2 Mr. Kaufman: Does the record show whether or not it  
3 was received, and when it was translated?

4 Colonel Clausen: It was translated on December 8,  
5 1941, as was the one I first read.

6 Senator Ferguson: Do any of your affidavits, Colonel,  
7 show when they were transferred here, or came here to  
8 Washington?

9 Colonel Clausen: Those that I just read, sir, were  
10 supposed to have been sent in on the teletype.

11 Senator Ferguson: Saturday night?

12 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: And they were supposed to be sent  
14 in, as I understood those affidavits, so they could be  
15 decrypted and decoded immediately?

16 Colonel Clausen: Well, it was in PA-K2, and those  
17 other witnesses said that not being the highest priority  
18 they took that length of time for the messages to get out.

19 Senator Ferguson: Did you ascertain at any time why  
20 they put this teletype work on at Saturday night, called  
21 these people back, sent these two messages over from San  
22 Francisco to Washington, and then did not translate them  
23 that night?

24 Colonel Clausen: No. I understood, Senator, that  
25

Witness Clausen

1 the two messages in question were in a volume. In other  
2 words, they were merely two of many that constituted the  
3 day's work on the 6th.

4 Senator Ferguson: I understand that, but they put  
5 people to work that night, called them back, and had this  
6 traffic sent in to Washington Saturday evening.

7 Colonel Clausen: Just like those people said.

8 Senator Ferguson: Yes. That included these two messages?

9 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: Then they were not translated or  
11 decoded or deciphered until after the attack.

12 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: And you did not go in to find out  
14 in the Navy Department here why they were not decrypted  
15 and decoded?

16 Colonel Clausen: I certainly did.

17 Senator Ferguson: What is the affidavit that relates  
18 to that?

19 Colonel Clausen: Those that I read, Senator.

20 Senator Ferguson: What ones? I want you to name them.

21 Colonel Clausen: Those of Prather, Dunning, Rowlett,  
22 and those other people, because we wanted to find out just  
23 what you have in mind.

24 Senator Ferguson: Why?  
25

Witness Clausen

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2 Colonel Clausen: Why these two very significant  
3 ones had taken this long. I understood the PA-K2 code  
4 was an easy code to unravel, and I asked these people those  
5 questions.

6 Senator Ferguson: Did you find out how many they did  
7 translate that night and the next morning?

8 Colonel Clausen: They translated these two on the 8th.

9 Senator Ferguson: I am talking about the night of the  
10 6th and the morning of the 7th. Did you find out how much  
11 of this traffic that they had sent from San Francisco on  
12 the new teletype machine to Washington that they actually  
13 decoded and deciphered?

14 Colonel Clausen: I understood from what they told me,  
15 Senator, that they did not have any of it finished until  
16 the 8th. That is what I gathered.

17 Senator Ferguson: So then the fact that they wanted  
18 it sent in did not mean they wanted it translated that  
19 night?

20 Colonel Clausen: That is what I understand.

21 Senator Ferguson: Or the next morning?

22 Colonel Clausen: I understand the arrangement, Senator,  
23 for the teletype equipment had been made sometime before.  
24 In other words, the telephone company had been asked to  
25 set this up for sometime before and that there had naturally



1 been delay in having the equipment installed, but that  
2 the first working operation was on the night that they  
3 have indicated.

4 Senator Lucas: Colonel Clausen, as I understand it,  
5 from your investigation that was made, the people in the  
6 Department were decoding and translating, but they were  
7 working on a code that had a higher priority than the one  
8 that came in from San Francisco.

9 Colonel Clausen: Yes, that is what they told me,  
10 Senator.

11 Senator Lucas: That is the time they were working on  
12 the 13-parts message?

13 Colonel Clausen: The purple, yes. Here is what they  
14 also said: You get a bunch of intercepts and you segregate  
15 those into their priorities, and you naturally put into one  
16 pile for decrypting those relating to the purple, you get  
17 to work on them first, and then you put in a pile those  
18 that have priority and you go to work on those, but there  
19 is no way to tell until the child is born what it is going  
20 to be.

21 Senator Lucas: Shortage of manpower was one of the  
22 things that was involved in the translation and decrypting  
23 of these important messages?

24 Colonel Clausen: Yes, that is what they said.

25 Senator Ferguson: Colonel, did you inquire as to whether

AL-6

Witness Clausen

1 or not they knew in the Department here in Washington  
2 that this traffic in relation to the ships was coming in  
3 on this priority and in this code, and that they knew that  
4 the diplomatic messages were coming in in the purple?

5 Colonel Clausen: They knew that.

6 Senator Ferguson: What?

7 Colonel Clausen: They knew how the messages were coming  
8 in because they would decrypt them, Senator, and naturally  
9 they would read it as they decrypted it.

10 Senator Ferguson: Did not they have different people  
11 on different codes?

12 Colonel Clausen: Oh, they had quite a set-up. Some  
13 of these people here that I mentioned worked on the different  
14 phases of that, just like the girls mentioned.

15 Senator Ferguson: Now the diplomatic messages would  
16 have a tendency to show where it was coming from, and these  
17 other messages coming in this other type of code would  
18 indicate where they were coming from, isn't that true?

19 Colonel Clausen: Well, I prefer to say they speak for  
20 themselves, Senator.

21 Senator Ferguson: Certainly they speak for themselves.  
22 They show that, as I read them.

23 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Clark had not quite finished,  
24 Colonel.

25

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1           Mr. Clark: I am interested in these two messages,  
2 but you read about three affidavits and I may be a little  
3 confused. I wish you would state in your own way, from the  
4 affidavits and your examination of the facts, where and when  
5 these messages were intercepted, translated and transmitted,  
6 giving the dates.

7           Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir. They were picked up out  
8 of the air by a station at San Francisco on 6 December. The  
9 messages in question were from the Japanese Consul at  
10 Honolulu to Tokyo, and when the intercept station picked  
11 them out of the air at San Francisco, following their usual  
12 routine they mailed them into Washington, and these had  
13 been included with the mail. Later on that same day the  
14 intercept system for sending in material to Washington was  
15 augmented by the teletype system, so the San Francisco station  
16 was requested to teletype the material in, and they replied,  
17 "Well, we have already mailed it to you, but we will also  
18 teletype it to you", and they did that.

19           Mr. Clark: Do you have any information now as to what  
20 time they reached Washington?

21           Colonel Clausen: Nothing except from what I have seen  
22 here, sir.

23           Mr. Kaufman: Mr. Chairman, there was read into the  
24 record sometime ago the facts relating to these two messages,  
25

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1  
2 and I have before me, called to my attention by Lieutenant  
3 Boskey, message No. 25877, dated December 6, translated 8  
4 December, sent in code system PA-K2, intercepted by the  
5 Army Station 2, San Francisco 0022 GMT 7 December (7:22  
6 Washington time December 6), sent by teletype to Army SIS.

7 Mr. Clark: Hold on a moment. Will you go back to  
8 7:22? What did you say about that?

9 Mr. Kaufman: 7:22 p.m. Washington time, December 6.

10 Mr. Clark: You say p.m. now, as I understand it.

11 Mr. Kaufman: Yes, 7:22 p.m. December 6 Washington time.  
12 Sent by teletype to Army SIS. Teletype sheet does not show  
13 the time sent by teletype.

14 Another copy sent by courier by Army Station 7, Fort  
15 Hunt, Virginia, was received by Army SIS not later than 7  
16 December. Time not shown, and is marked "Dupe" (A), indi-  
17 cating that teletyped copy had arrived previously, decoded  
18 and translated by Army SIS. That is with respect to the  
19 first message.  
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1 Mr. Clark: Before you leave that, does that mean that  
2 that message got to Washington 7:22 p.m.?

3 Mr. Kaufman: Yes, on December 6th.

4 Mr. Clark: Now see if you can fix it for the other  
5 one.

6 Mr. Kaufman: SIS 25874 is dated December 6, translated  
7 December 8, sent in code system PA-K2 and is Exhibit 2,  
8 page 29, intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco,  
9 at 0574 GMT, 7 December, 12:42 a.m. December 7, Washington  
10 time. That is early in the morning, Washington time.

11 That was 18 minutes of 1, December 7, in the morning.  
12 It was sent by teletype to Army SIS (A). Teletype sheet  
13 does not show time sent by teletype.

14 Another copy sent by Station 2 by airmail was received  
15 by Army SIS at 2:33 8 December and is marked "Dupe (A),"  
16 indicating that the teletype copy had arrived previously.

17 The Congressman asked me as to whether or not the  
18 times given here were the times of receipt in Washington.  
19 The time shown here shows the time of interception at San  
20 Francisco. The first one was intercepted at 7:22 December  
21 6, 7:22 p.m.

22 Mr. Clark: I thought you said that is the time they  
23 arrived in Washington?

24 Mr. Kaufman: No, that is the time they were intercepted  
25

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Clausen

h2

1 in San Francisco.

2 Then I proceeded to read that the sheet does not  
3 show the time that it was received in Washington. It must  
4 have been after 7:22 p.m.

5 Mr. Clark: I did not understand that the affidavit  
6 showed any interception at San Francisco, as late as 12  
7 o'clock.

8 Colonel Clausen: The affidavits show interception of  
9 the messages on 6 December, but not the precise time of  
10 the interception.

11 Mr. Clark: Well, 12-something p.m., would be 7  
12 December.

13 Mr. Kaufman: 12:42 a.m. 7 December. That is 42 minutes  
14 after midnight.

15 Mr. Clark: If there is any way that you can fix here  
16 definitely when these messages arrived in Washington, I  
17 would like to see it.

18 Mr. Kaufman: The record from the Navy Department says  
19 the teletype sheet does not show when they arrived in  
20 Washington. All they have is the interception time in  
21 San Francisco.

22 The Vice Chairman: Can you give us any help on that,  
23 Colonel? Did you secure that information?

24 Colonel Clausen: Nothing more than I have given to  
25

Witness Clausen

h3

1 the committee.

2 Each message is dated December 6, so it would have to  
3 be intercepted on December 6, if that is the date it went  
4 from Honolulu, because the time at Honolulu and the time  
5 at San Francisco are both the same day.

6 Senator Lucas: Colonel Clausen, did you investigate  
7 as to why the Navy apparently did not use a time stamp on  
8 any of these messages when they came in?

9 Colonel Clausen: Yes, I went into that question. There  
10 is no doubt, Senator, that some of these matters could have  
11 been handled this way:

12 Perhaps the receipts could have been copied and the time  
13 when people got the intercepts indicated, they could have  
14 put numbers down and the distribution accurately recorded,  
15 but those were all things which were not done. The fact  
16 is they were just not done, and I was getting what the  
17 facts were.

18 Senator Lucas: That question has arisen several times  
19 in connection with the hearing. We have never been able to  
20 ascertain the exact time when they arrived in Washington.

21 Colonel Clausen: Yes.

22 Senator Lucas: We had the date of the interception but  
23 not the time of the receipt.

24 Senator Ferguson: Is the same thing true of the Army?  
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Witness Clausen

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Colonel Clausen: No, they kept records there. I do not want to make a broad, sweeping statement, Senator, about the time of receipt, because the Signal men would be able to give more accurate information on that.

Senator Ferguson: These messages were not to the Navy. They were to the Army.

Colonel Clausen: They were Army messages.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, but I understood the counsel was reading from a Navy record.

Mr. Kaufman: No, Army.

Colonel Clausen: Army.

Senator Ferguson: Did the Army keep the hour of receipt of the messages?

Colonel Clausen: I did not get more than what Colonel Rowlett fixed for me on this sheet here.

Senator Ferguson: You answered Senator Lucas that the Navy did not keep the hour. Now, did the Army keep the hour?

Colonel Clausen: I said I did not know, Senator. The dates of receipt of some of these I tried to get from the standpoint of time. I understand there is some system, but what I did was to get the dates.

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Witness Clausen Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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The Vice Chairman: Are you through?

Senator Ferguson: I am through with that, but I have some questions along other lines.

The Vice Chairman: Have you finished, Colonel?

Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: I would like to ask you a question, if I may, in connection with these two messages we have been discussing here with you and also with counsel.

As I got it from the information given by counsel, the first of these two messages was intercepted in San Francisco about 7:22 p.m. December 6th.

Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: And the other one shortly after midnight, December 6.

Mr. Kaufman: December 7.

The Vice Chairman: Shortly after midnight.

Mr. Kaufman: Of December 7.

The Vice Chairman: Of December 6, or very early in the morning of December 7. They were intercepted at the monitoring station in San Francisco, is that it?

Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Well, now, did that monitoring station in San Francisco have facilities to advise Hawaii about those messages as well as it could have advised

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Clausen                      Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1  
2 Washington here?

3            Colonel Clausen: I think not, sir.

4            The Vice Chairman: It did not?

5            Colonel Clausen: No, sir.

6            The Vice Chairman: Did you find out why not?

7            Colonel Clausen: Well, it was an intercept station,  
8 as I understand, that sent the traffic in to Washington for  
9 decrypting and decoding.

10           The Vice Chairman: Is it something like 1,000 miles  
11 closer from San Francisco to Hawaii than it is from San  
12 Francisco to Washington?

13           Colonel Clausen: I understand that the decoding and  
14 decrypting, sir, involves an intricate problem of security  
15 and personnel, and a great many people required to do that  
16 work.

17           The Vice Chairman: You did not understand then that  
18 they had the required facilities?

19           Colonel Clausen: At San Francisco?

20           The Vice Chairman: At San Francisco, to send it to  
21 Hawaii?

22           Colonel Clausen: That is right.

23           The Vice Chairman: And it was sent to Washington?

24           Colonel Clausen: That is right, sir.

25           The Vice Chairman: All right. Did you get through

Witness Clausen

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Senator Lucas?

Senator Lucas: Yes.

The Vice Chairman: Did you get through, Mr. Clark?

Mr. Clark: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: I have some questions.

Colonel Clausen: I was going to go through the exhibits, if you want me to do that.

Senator Ferguson: There are some general questions that I want to ask him.

The Vice Chairman: You are not through, then, Colonel?

Colonel Clausen: You asked me to pick out in my study what they had in Hawaii, so what I was going to do was go through my exhibits and show the documents that I got out of the G-2 office in Hawaii.

The Vice Chairman: Go ahead. I am sorry I misunderstood you.

Colonel Clausen: I have concluded with the affidavits and I am now going to the exhibits. They are set forth in my report as Exhibit C, and in this volume is contained the index of each volume of exhibits, so I go first to Exhibit No. 1.

The Vice Chairman: Go ahead in your own way, Colonel.

Colonel Clausen: On page 11 of No. 1, the first exhibit in this No. 1, is the Japanese operation orders which we

Witness Clausen

(11)

1 captured, showing that they had set up the big Y-Day of  
2 7 December 1941, a month in advance. I think that has  
3 already come before the committee.  
4

5 The following papers after that in this Exhibit No. 1  
6 are documents that were obtained in the main from the  
7 files of the headquarters and of the contact office, Hawaiian  
8 Department, unless I otherwise indicate.

9 In other words, in Hawaii they had these papers --

10 The Vice Chairman: (Interposing) In other words,  
11 everything you are going to bring to the attention of the  
12 committee now is documentary evidence that you secured in  
13 Hawaii?

14 Colonel Clausen: That is right, sir.

15 The Vice Chairman: All right, go ahead.

16 Colonel Clausen: On page 11 I just merely noted the  
17 fact that General Short had initialled what we call in the  
18 Army the buck sheet regarding the information in regard to  
19 the Burma Road for the reason it tied in with his testimony.  
20 That is, whenever you have a paper that contains his initials  
21 it shows his familiarity with the subject and the procedure  
22 that was followed, I presume.

23 Page 27-E is a document which we got in Washington  
24 and which I identified in Hawaii, that was sent in by  
25 General Fielder 6 September 1941, to the War Department G-2,

Witness Clausen

1  
2 in which it says:

3 "It has been noted that many of the summaries of  
4 information received from your office originate with Office  
5 Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District and have already  
6 been furnished this office by the Navy.

7 "The cooperation and contact between Office Naval  
8 Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the  
9 Military Intelligence Division in this Department, is most  
10 complete and all such data is received simultaneous with  
11 the dispatch of information to the respective Washington  
12 offices.

13 "Inasmuch as such advices are received in duplicate  
14 and unless there are other reasons to the contrary it is  
15 recommended that such notices from your office be discontinued  
16 in order to avoid the duplication of effort."

17 Signed, "Kendall J. Fielder, Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry,  
18 Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2."

19 The Vice Chairman: That is from Colonel Fielder to  
20 whom?

21 Colonel Clausen: To the War Department, Washington.

22 Senator Lucas: Let me ask right there, what was he  
23 discussing in particular there?

24 Colonel Clausen: The summaries of information. He  
25 calls for summaries of information received "from your office

Witness Clausen

1 originate with Office Naval Intelligence". I will show you  
2 a few examples of what he has in mind when I come to them.

3 The Vice Chairman: What is the date of that?

4 Colonel Clausen: 6 September, 1941.

5 The Vice Chairman: In other words, on the 6th of  
6 September, 1941, G-2 of the Army in Hawaii notified the War  
7 Department in Washington that he wanted this information  
8 discontinued?

9 Colonel Clausen: Yes. He said, "The cooperation and  
10 contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau  
11 of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division,  
12 in this Department, is most complete and all such data is  
13 received simultaneous with the dispatch of information to  
14 the respective Washington offices."

15 In other words, he was saying it was duplicating the  
16 work.

17 The Vice Chairman: And asked to have it discontinued?

18 Colonel Clausen: He recommended that such notices be  
19 discontinued in order to avoid duplication of effort.

20 The Vice Chairman: All right.

21 Colonel Clausen: Then on page 30-E there is the start  
22 of an estimate of the international (Japanese) situation,  
23 prepared by the G-2, Hawaiian Department, signed by Colonel  
24 George W. Bicknell, obtained from his office. He had told  
25

Witness Clausen

1 me to go to his office and get these papers. That was  
2 referred to yesterday when I spoke of what he called digests.  
3 In other words, this G-2 estimate was prepared in the so-  
4 called Contact Office under the direction of Colonel Bicknell.  
5 He speaks of the ABCD Bloc and other things in here, and  
6 the "mounting situation".

7 I read portions into the record yesterday.

8 The Vice Chairman: All right, go ahead.

9 Colonel Clausen: Then on page 41 is a similar digest.  
10 signed by Colonel George W. Bicknell, and this contains  
11 the initial at the top of General Short, showing that it  
12 came to him, in which there is a continuation. This is a  
13 carry-on of the one I just referred to of October 17.

14 On page 48 there is one of these summaries of informa-  
15 tion from the War Department to Hawaii, and this is the  
16 type of thing that was sent out. This has a covering letter  
17 transmitting information to Hawaii, and in this case it  
18 sent along an analysis of information it received from the  
19 Orient on a one-page document dated November 3, 1941,  
20 and it says:

21 "The following information received from the Orient,  
22 dated August 26, 1941, is considered reliable:

23 "1. Mr. Hirota, a presiding officer at directors'  
24 meeting of the Black Dragon Society, told of an order issued  
25

Witness Clausen

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2 by War Minister Tojo (now Premier) 'to complete full pre-  
3 paration to meet any emergency with the United States in  
4 the Pacific. All guns to be mounted in the islands of the  
5 Pacific under Japanese mandate. The full preparation to  
6 be completed in November'.

(13) 7 "2. Hirota and others are said to have stated: 'War  
8 with the United States would best begin in December or in  
9 February.'

10 "3. 'Very soon', they say, 'the Cabinet will be changed.  
11 The new Cabinet would likely start war within sixty days.'"

12 And there is a G-2 note:

13 "Full name of individual mentioned above is Koki Hirota,  
14 who is reported to be a member of the House of Peers, former  
15 Premier of Japan and director of the Bureau of Intelligence,  
16 U.S. Section."

17 Then it has an evaluation placed on it as to the source,  
18 it is reliable; as to the information credible.

19 Senator Lucas: Who sent that out?

20 Colonel Clausen: The War Department sent it to Hawaii.

21 Senator Lucas: Did that come under G-2?

22 Colonel Clausen: That was sent by the War Department, G-2.

23 Incidentally, that contains at the top what appears to be  
24 again the initials of General Short. If you compare that  
25 with the others at the top you will see it is very similar.



## Witness Clausen

1           Senator Lucas: Now do I understand this is one of  
2 the messages that G-2 in Hawaii said they did not care to  
3 receive?

4           Colonel Clausen: Some recent information, yes, sir.

5           Senator Ferguson: What is the date of that?

6           Colonel Clausen: I do not say this is the type. It  
7 may not be exactly the type. I will come to some soon.  
8 This is of a special category.

9           Senator Lucas: This is one of the examples that you  
10 proposed to give to the committee?

11          Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

12          Senator Ferguson: What is the date of this?

13          Colonel Clausen: 3 November 1941, Senator.

14          Senator Ferguson: You referred back to a message  
15 sometime in September, and this is related to that, that  
16 this was not to be sent out, is that correct?

17          Colonel Clausen: I did not say this is the type not  
18 to be sent out. This, I believe, was a special type.

19          Senator Ferguson: You do not include this in the type  
20 not to be sent?

21          Colonel Clausen: No, sir, I do not include this in  
22 that type.

23          Senator Ferguson: Why did you read it then?

24          Colonel Clausen: Because this went from the War Department  
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Witness Clausen

1 Colonel Clausen: This is a communication that I  
2 came across in the Office of the District Intelligence  
3 Office, 14th Naval District at Honolulu and it is from the  
4 District Intelligence officer to the Director of Naval  
5 Intelligence, Office of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C.

6 "Subject: British Secret Agent in Manila, Exchange of  
7 Information With.

8 "Reference: (a) DIO conf. 14th ltr. dated 27 June, 1941.  
9 Subject Mr. Gerald H. Wilkinson.

10 "(b) Opnav dispatch on same subject.

11 "(c) DIO conf. 14th ND ltr. dated 22 August, 1941.

12 Subject, British Secret Agent in Manila, Information Received  
13 From.

14 "1. Subject British Agent in Manila continues to for-  
15 ward information via Lock Box in Pan American clipper planes  
16 to the District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District.  
17 Much of this information is of value to the Military Intelli-  
18 gence in Hawaii, and to this office as well as to the Office  
19 of Federal Bureau of Investigation. Reference (c) listed  
20 by numbers some of the cards containing this information  
21 which have been disseminated by the Office of the DIO,  
22 14th Naval District.

23 "2. Paragraph five of reference (c) stated that the  
24 District Intelligence Officer considered this information  
25

Witness Clausen

1 to be valuable and requested authority by dispatch to  
2 permit the sending of information by the local representa-  
3 tive of subject agent to Manila in the Lock compartment  
4 of Pan American Airways planes.

5 "3. The dispatch reply requested in paragraph five  
6 of reference (c) has not been received to date."

7 Signed "I. H. Mayfield," British Secret Agent, Far  
8 East.

9 On page 232, also obtained from the Navy in Hawaii,  
10 referring to this subject is a letter dated August 22, 1941,  
11 from the District Intelligence Officer to the Head of Domestic  
12 Intelligence Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence.

13 "In reference (a), the District Intelligence Officer  
14 outlined the proposal of a Mr. Wilkinson, a British secret  
15 agent in the Far East, that an arrangement be effected  
16 whereby correspondence between him and his Honolulu agent,  
17 Mr. Harry Dawson, be carried in the special locked compart-  
18 ments of Pan American Airways clippers flying between Honolulu  
19 and Manila in return for which accommodation Mr. Wilkinson  
20 would furnish the District Intelligence Officer and the  
21 Military Intelligence Division with information gathered by  
22 himself and his aids in the Far East, and of particular  
23 interest to the United States Army and Navy. It was proposed  
24 that the District Intelligence offices of the 14th and 16th  
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## Witness Clausen

1 Naval Districts should make the necessary arrangements  
2 with Pan American Airways.

3 "Reference (b) stated that the Department could not  
4 authorize the above plan at this time because of the status  
5 of the matter and the small amount of information submitted.  
6 The District Intelligence Officer informed Mr. Dawson of  
7 the Department's decision, and has decided to forward any  
8 further correspondence from Mr. Dawson to Mr. Wilkinson.  
9 However, every clipper from the Orient brings confidential  
10 mail from Mr. Wilkinson to Mr. Dawson, forwarded by the  
11 District Intelligence Officer, 16th Naval District.

12 "By dispatch from the District Intelligence Officer,  
13 16th Naval District, the Commandant, 14th Naval District  
14 was informed that Mr. Wilkinson was thoroughly reliable  
15 and trustworthy. Investigation in Honolulu discloses that  
16 Mr. Wilkinson is the properly accredited branch manager  
17 in Manila for Theo H. Davies & Co., Ltd., and that his  
18 wife is a granddaughter of the original Mr. Theodore H.  
19 Davies. This company is one of the five largest corpora-  
20 tions in the Territory of Hawaii and, although incorporated  
21 as an Hawaiian corporation, the majority of its stock is  
22 held by members of the Davies family who are British subjects  
23 and live in England.  
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Witness Clausen

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"Mr. Harry Dawson, above mentioned, is manager of the steamship department of Theodore H. Davies & Company, Ltd., a British subject, and British Vice-Consul for Hawaii.

"The District Intelligence Officer considers the information received from Mr. Wilkinson to be of value and requests authority by dispatch to effectuate the arrangement proposed by Mr. Wilkinson.

"Information so far received by this office from Mr. Wilkinson has been furnished the Director of Naval Intelligence on 14th Naval District dissemination cards."

Larry  
fls

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

## Witness Clausen

1 Now, on page 57 of my exhibit 1, I have three examples  
 2 of how they got these phone intercepts, recordings, in  
 3 Hawaii. This all came from Hawaii. These three were done  
 4 by the Navy. You will find them on page 57, starting at  
 5 page 57, going through 57, 58, and 59.

6 The last remark on page 59, as I said this morning,  
 7 it says:

8 "At four p. m. Honolulu time in the 1941st of our  
 9 Lord, December 2nd inst. I bade my adieu to you, my friend  
 10 of 22 months standing. Darn if I won't miss you!!"

11 And then there is some Latin. I will look to Mr.  
 12 Gearhart.

13 It means "rest in peace."

14 The Vice Chairman: That is where the Navy quit?

15 Colonel Clausen: That is when they quit.

16 Now, then, the same thing, that is, phone intercepts,  
 17 and, incidentally, they are here if you want them read, but  
 18 there is hash and conversation going back and forth, but  
 19 on page 60 of this same exhibit I quote three from the FBI.  
 20 You see they send these around to the FBI and the Army. The  
 21 FBI have three. The last one was November 30.

22 The Vice Chairman: I think you made it clear, Colonel,  
 23 that after the Navy in Hawaii quite the FBI continued.

24 Colonel Clausen: With the one.  
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Witness Clausen

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The Vice Chairman: With the one that it had.

Colonel Clausen: To the cook.

The Vice Chairman: To the cook's quarters.

Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: All right.

Colonel Clausen: Now, there is at page 75 in Exhibit 1 some memoranda which I quote from headquarters of the Hawaiian Department showing some notes made by the people there at the time as to why this message from General Marshall took so long to reach General Short on 7 December, 1941.

The Vice Chairman: All right. Let's have that.

Colonel Clausen: They run over to page 80 and page 81. These look like rough drafts. These were rough drafts, apparently, in part of a proposed answer to Washington.

Washington had sent a wire, which is on page 80, on December 9, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

"PLEASE ADVISE IMMEDIATELY EXACT TIME OF RECEIPT OF OUR NO. 529 DECEMBER 7 AT HONOLULU EXACT TIME DECIPHERED MESSAGE TRANSMITTED BY SIGNAL CORPS TO STAFF AND BY WHAT STAFF OFFICE RECEIVED."

Now, in answer to that, the Hawaiian Command, who were drafting some radios and one on page 75, which says:

## Witness Clausen

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1 "RADIO WAR DEPARTMENT 529 RECEIVED FILED AT WASHINGTON  
2 D.C. 12:18 P.M. WASHINGTON TIME (OR 6:48 A.M. HAWAIIAN TIME)  
3 (AS RCA 1549 WS) RECEIVED BY RCA AT HONOLULU 7:33 A.M.  
4 DELIVERED TO SIGNAL OFFICE AT 11:45 A.M. NOT MARKED PRIORITY  
5 OTHER PRIORITY MESSAGES HANDLED FIRST DELIVERED TO DECODING  
6 OFFICE 2:40 P.M. DECODED AND DELIVERED TO COLONEL DUNLOP  
7 2:50 P.M. DELIVERED TO CAPTAIN TRUEMAN IN OFFICE OF CHIEF  
8 OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AT 3 P.M."

9 On the following page, page 76, there is an account  
10 by Captain William B. Cobb with respect to that message  
11 and what he did in taking certain action.

12 In other words, he confirms some of the things that I  
13 said about the message getting to the headquarters about 3  
14 p.m., and what they did when they got the message. That  
15 was after the attack. I will read it if you want me to.

16 Now, page 84 --

17 The Vice Chairman: Is that on the same thing?

18 Colonel Clausen: No, sir. I am passing to a different  
19 subject.

20 The Vice Chairman: Going back to that, I would like  
21 for you to give me those times again.

22 Colonel Clausen: Yes.

23 The Vice Chairman: I got the impression that the Marshall  
24 message arrived in Hawaii at 7-something.



Witness Clausen

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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Colonel Clausen: That is what it says: "Received by RCA at Honolulu 7:33 a.m."

The Vice Chairman: Yes.

Senator George: You gave one time as 6:28. What was that?

Colonel Clausen: 6:48.

Senator George: Oh.

Colonel Clausen: Hawaiian time is the same as 12:18 p.m., Washington time which this says was the time the message was filed.

Senator George: Oh, yes.

The Vice Chairman: Let me ask you this question, Colonel:

Did your investigation there in Hawaii disclose any information similar to that given to this committee by Mr. Justice Roberts when he appeared here to the effect that the Marshall message arrived at the radio station office, the RCA office, I think it is -- is that the proper designation?

Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: The RCA office in Honolulu, and the agent on duty there was unable to raise General Short's headquarters and couldn't get the message to him, couldn't get any response from General Short's quarters, and got a

Witness Clausen

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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boy on a bicycle to deliver the message and the boy was on the way with the message when the first bomb fell and he took to the bushes, and stayed in the bushes until the raid was over and then proceeded to deliver it.

Did you secure any information similar to that given us by Mr. Justice Roberts?

Colonel Clausen: Well, sir, while you have been asking the question I have been trying to read the statement of Captain Cobb. He had something to do with the message and he may refer to that.

Senator Lucas: I don't believe they had any means of delivery there on Sunday morning, did they?

Colonel Clausen: No, he doesn't mention that, those details. He was there when the message came. He had been assigned to the office of the Chief of Staff and this message came while he was there. He says it came in a 3 o'clock.

The Vice Chairman: I don't have Justice Roberts' testimony before me, but I have a recollection that for some reason, either because they couldn't raise General Short's headquarters, or couldn't get into communication with it for some reason, he had to get a boy on a bicycle to deliver the message.

Mr. Murphy: He said the teletype wasn't working on Sunday.

Witness Clausen

Questions by: The Vice Chairman  
Senator Lucas

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The Vice Chairman: Is that the way you recollect it?

2

The teletype wasn't working and he had to get a boy to  
3 deliver it. Did you get any information on that?

3

4

Colonel Clausen: I got no further information, no,  
5 sir.

5

6

Senator Lucas: Colonel, before you leave that episode  
7 will you give to me the exact amount of time that ensued  
8 from the time that message left Washington until it arrived  
9 in Hawaii?

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Colonel Clausen: You mean these dates that I have  
11 referred to?

11

12

Senator Lucas: It left at 12-something. 12:18. How  
13 many minutes was it before it actually arrived?

13

14

Colonel Clausen: You see, what I found in the Hawaiian  
15 Department, were these rough notes on the subject so I  
16 had the photostats taken. It appears in response to the  
17 wire from Washington inquiring about times this message  
18 was sent by General Short:

15

16

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19

"RE YOUR 549. RADIO 529 DELIVERED HONOLULU VIA RCA  
20 7:33 MORNING SEVENTH RECEIVED SIGNAL OFFICE FORT SHAFTER  
21 ELEVEN FORTY-FIVE MORNING PAREN THIS TIME APPROXIMATE BUT  
22 WITHIN FIVE MINUTES PAREN SEVENTH STOP DECIPHERED MESSAGE  
23 RECEIVED BY ADJUTANT GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT TWO FIFTY  
24 EIGHT AFTERNOON SEVENTH SHORT."

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Witness Clausen

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: In view of the fact that I am not familiar with the various timetables between Hawaii and Washington, I would like to know from you the number of minutes it took after that message was sent to Washington before it actually arrived in Hawaii.

Colonel Clausen: This data, page 75-E, says:

"RADIO WAR DEPARTMENT 529 RECEIVED FILED AT WASHINGTON D.C. 12:18 P.M. WASHINGTON TIME (OR 6:48 A.M. HAWAIIAN TIME.)"

Senator Lucas: I understand that, but all that I am asking for and maybe I haven't made myself clear, I was asking how many minutes it took this message to go from Washington to Hawaii.

Colonel Clausen: 7:33 a.m.

Mr. Kaufman: Forty-five minutes.

Colonel Clausen: Forty-five minutes.

Senator Lucas: Is that correct?

Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir. Colonel French so testified, it was about 45 minutes.

Senator Lucas: Let me ask you this:

Did you make an investigation as to why it took 45 minutes for that message to get through?

Colonel Clausen: No, sir.

Colonel French testified before the Grunert Board that

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Senator Lucas  
Senator Ferguson

h8

1 he thought that was pretty good time.

2 The Vice Chairman: As I remember, evidence came to  
3 this committee that General Marshall, or somebody inquired  
4 how long it would take to get that message out there, and  
5 was told about 30 minutes.

6 Colonel Clausen: About 30 minutes.

7 The Vice Chairman: So that wouldn't be over ten or  
8 15 minutes difference.

9 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir. Colonel French thought it  
10 was pretty good time.

11 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, may I ask:

12 Did you make inquiry, Colonel, as to whether or not  
13 there was a teletype from the radio station in Hawaii to  
14 the Army.

15 Colonel Clausen: No, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: At the time of the sending of this  
17 message?

18 Colonel Clausen: No, sir; but it is my understanding  
19 there was, but it was not working.

20 Senator Ferguson: Had it been completed?

21 Colonel Clausen: I don't know, Senator.

22 Senator Ferguson: Was it not working because they  
23 were asleep, or because it had not yet been installed?

24 Colonel Clausen: That is what I don't know, Senator.  
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Witness Clausen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: You didn't inquire about that?

Colonel Clausen: No, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Justice Roberts led us to the inference that it was not working because it was Sunday morning, but I think we ought to clear that up.

Senator Ferguson: But it hasn't been cleared up yet.

Mr. Murphy: No.

Colonel Clausen: On page 84 of Exhibit 1, there is a buck sheet with an attached copy of wire to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, General Short, from Merle Smith. The significance of that, the reason I picked that out to include here, is because we had testimony before the Grunert Board that Australia, where Merle Smith was, I believe the Attache, sent a warning message to Hawaii, and the warning message forecast some action, some military move by Japan. And I remember that the question was raised before the Grunert Board as to whether Hawaii could decode the message, and I remember the witness who testified said that it could.

So, when I saw this in the files, at Hawaii, it substantiated the fact that Merle Smith made direct communication to the Commanding General at the Hawaiian Command with respect to the information. And you can tell from this, on page 85, the type of information that he would send. He is reporting

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson  
The Vice Chairman

on changes of situations in the Malay Peninsula, and  
speaks of military information.

The Vice Chairman: Message from where?

Colonel Clausen: Merle Smith is in Australia.

The Vice Chairman: And sent the information to the  
Commanding General in Hawaii?

Colonel Clausen: Yes.

The Vice Chairman: When was that?

Colonel Clausen: That was, well, this only came in  
after December 7, but it indicates to me, it tied in with  
what went into the Grunert Board proceedings, and as testi-  
fied by, I believe, in the last few days, by a Lieutenant,  
I think, Odell, this should tie in with Lieutenant Odell's  
testimony before the Grunert Board.

The Vice Chairman: All right.

Colonel Clausen: That is all for Exhibit 1.

Passing now, to Exhibit 2. This exhibit, as I have  
noted on the cover sheet, contains the following papers,  
obtained by me from the files of Contact Office, Hawaiian  
Department. It says:

"The following papers were obtained from the files  
of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, as noted on the  
cover sheets A through H." Pages 51 and 53 I have already  
read yesterday. That is a portion where I read the excerpts

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Clausen  
from the digest.

Here is an interesting document, pages 56 and 57,  
the G-2 gives the situation as of 7:30, 7 December.

The Vice Chairman: Let's have that. That is the G-2  
in Hawaii?

Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: G-2 of the Army?

Colonel Clausen: It is on stationery, "Headquarters  
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H," 22 December, 1941.

That is when it is made. But it is a summary of  
the situation as of 7:30, 7 December, 1941.

Do you want me to read the whole thing?

The Vice Chairman: Yes.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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## Witness Clausen

1 Colonel Clausen: (Reading)

2 "A. NAVAL OPERATIONS:

3 "No knowledge --"

4 Mr. Richardson: Just a minute, please. Was that  
5 the division that was in charge at the time of the Pearl  
6 Harbor attack?

7 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir; this is made by -- it is  
8 not signed. This is a carbon copy. I was told to look  
9 for this by Colonel Bicknell and it is made for the signature  
10 of Lieutenant Fielder.

11 The Vice Chairman: Go ahead and read it.

12 Colonel Clausen: (Reading)

13 "A. NAVAL OPERATIONS:

14 "No knowledge of Japanese Naval vessels in waters  
15 farther east than the China Sea, although it was known that  
16 they had bases in the Mandate Islands and in all probability  
17 had naval craft in those waters. Nothing had been received  
18 from the Naval Intelligence, between November 27 and December  
19 7, to indicate any movement of carriers east of the Mandate  
20 Islands.

21 "B. AIR OPERATIONS:

22 "No information to indicate operations of Japanese  
23 aircraft other than on the Asiatic Mainland and areas adjacent  
24 thereto. It was known that no land based Japanese aircraft  
25

Witness Clausen

1 could operate from nearer than the Mandate Islands (approx-  
2 imately 2100 miles). It was also known that no nation  
3 possessed aircraft which could operate from that distance  
4 and return to its base.

5 "C. LOCAL SITUATION:

6 "Instructions from the War Department announced that  
7 the International situation was critical and directed pre-  
8 cautions be taken against possible sabotage and subversive  
9 acts.

10 "(1) DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES:

11 "On Saturday, December 6, it was learned through  
12 local investigative agencies that the papers at the Japanese  
13 Consulate were being destroyed by burning.

14 "(2) CONCENTRATION AND MOVEMENTS OF LOCAL ALIENS:

15 "None. The entire local population was quiet and no  
16 indications of domestic unrest appeared.

17 "(3) SABOTAGE:

18 "Warnings were prevalent that acts of sabotage were  
19 impending but no action on the part of the residents of the  
20 territory indicated that subversive acts would be committed.

21 "On Saturday evening, December 6, at about 6:00 p.m.,  
22 a transcription and translation of a trans-Pacific telephone  
23 conversation between a local alien and an unknown party in  
24 Tokyo was received. This conversation had taken place on  
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Witness Clausen

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December 5th. There were certain features about this conversation which were suspicious, although the communication in its entity appeared innocuous. Efforts were made Saturday night to evaluate this conversation but it was impossible to reach any specific conclusion as to the meaning thereof.

"D. PRECAUTIONS TAKEN:

"Alert No. 1 was in operation and had been since November 27, 1941, with the counter-subversive section of the G-2 office in a fully alerted condition. In addition thereto the Aircraft Warning Service was in operation from two hours before dawn until one hour after dawn each day.

"CONCLUSION:

"A. CAPABILITIES:

"(1) There was a possibility that disruption of relations, or war, might result at any time from overt acts by Japan either in the form of military action in the Far East, sinking of transports enroute to the Philippines or other similar acts.

"(2) With the large part of the American Navy based in the Hawaiian waters the probability of an attack by the Japanese carriers was believed to be negligible."

Page 69, I got a copy of a wire from General Short to the Adjutant General giving his estimate regarding the Nomura

Witness Clausen

1 mission, just tying in to the intelligence over there that  
2 passed back and forth.

3 Page 77, part of the files of the Contact Office, and  
4 there is a memorandum for Colonel Bicknell dated 1 August  
5 1941 giving high lights on the Japanese activity in the  
6 islands and in general the diplomatic and impending picture.

7 Page 78 is that cable of 27 November, 1941 from  
8 Wilkinson to Hawaii.

9 Page 79 is a buck sheet apparently signed by General  
10 Short concerning the general Japanese situation, information  
11 relative to the Japanese situation.

12 Page 82 is a War Department transmittal of information  
13 to the G-2 Hawaiian Department.

14 This was the type of thing from Washington.

15 This was a letter that Washington sent to Hawaii,  
16 copy of a letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Adolf A. Berle, Jr.,  
17 Assistant Secretary of State, July 28, 1941, which says:

18 "As of possible interest to you, information has been  
19 received from a confidential source, the reliability of which  
20 has not been determined, to the effect that if Great Britain  
21 were to suffer a major military set-back, the Japanese  
22 military party would force Japan's entry into the war, in  
23 which case Shanghai and Tientsin would be immediately  
24 occupied by the Japanese Army and would be completely  
25