

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED
(Reclassify when filled out)

I. GENERAL

(a) Unit Reporting VC-33 (b) Based on or at USS BARKER HAY (c) Report No. 43
 (d) Take off: Date 26 Febr. 1945 Time (LZT) 0645K (Zone); Lat. 25-00N Long. 142-00E
 (e) Mission Direct Support - Two Jins (f) Time of Return 0945K (Zone)

II. OWN AIRCRAFT OFFICIALLY COVERED BY THIS REPORT.

TYPE (a)	SQUADRON (b)	NUMBER			BOMBS AND TORPEDOES CARRIED (PER PLANE) (f)	FUZE, SETTING (g)
		TAKING OFF (c)	ENGAGING ENEMY A/C (d)	ATTACKING TARGET (e)		
<u>TBM-3</u>	<u>VC-33</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2-500# G.P. Mk. 64</u> <u>8-5" H.H. rockets</u>	<u>Mk 105A1 (inst)</u> <u>Mk 101A2 (n.d.)</u> <u>Mk 146 (n.d.)</u>
<u>TN-2</u>	<u>VC-33</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>8-5" H.H. Rockets</u>	<u>Mk 146 (n.d.)</u>

III. OTHER U. S. OR ALLIED AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED IN THIS OPERATION.

TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE	TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE
<u>TBM</u>	<u>VC-77</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>USS BARKER HAY</u>				
<u>TN-2</u>	<u>VC-77</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>USS BARKER HAY</u>				

IV. ENEMY AIRCRAFT OBSERVED OR ENGAGED (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE	(b) NO. OBSERVED	(c) NO. ENGAGING OWN A/C	(d) TIME ENCOUNTERED	(e) LOCATION OF ENCOUNTER	(f) BOMBS, TORPEDOES CARRIED; GUNS OBSERVED	(g) CAMOUFLAGE AND MARKING
			(ZONE)	<u>NONE</u>		
			(ZONE)			
			(ZONE)			

(h) Apparent Enemy Mission(s) _____
 Did Any Part of _____
 (i) Encounter(s) Occur in Clouds? _____ If so, Describe Clouds _____
(YES OR NO) (BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)
 Time of Day and Brilliance _____
 (j) of Sun or Moon _____ (k) Visibility _____
(NIGHT, BRIGHT MOON; DAY, OVERCAST; ETC.) (MILES)

V. ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED OR DAMAGED IN AIR (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE ENEMY A/C	(b) DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BY:				(c) WHERE HIT, ANGLE	(d) DAMAGE CLAIMED
	TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	PILOT OR GUNNER	GUNS USED		
			<u>NONE</u>			

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VI. LOSS OR DAMAGE, COMBAT OR OPERATIONAL, OF OWN AIRCRAFT (of those listed in II only).

(a) TYPE OWN A/C	(b) SQUADRON	(c) CAUSE: TYPE ENEMY A/C, TYPE GUN, OR OPERATIONAL CAUSE	(d) WHERE HIT, ANGLE (List armor, self-sealing tanks, equipment hit)	(e) EXTENT OF LOSS OR DAMAGE, (Give Bureau serial number of planes destroyed)
1		NONE		
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				

VII. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES (in aircraft listed in II only; identify with planes listed in VI by Nos. at left).

(a) NO.	(b) SQUADRON	(c) NAME, RANK OR RATING	(d) CAUSE	(e) CONDITION OR STATUS
		NONE		

VIII. RANGE, FUEL, AND AMMUNITION DATA FOR PLANES RETURNING

(a) TYPE A/C	(b) MILES OUT	(c) MILES RETURN	(d) AV. HOURS IN AIR	(e) AV. FUEL LOADED	(f) AV. FUEL CONSUMED	(g) TOTAL AMMUNITION EXPENDED				(h) NO. OF PLANES RETURNING
						.30	.50	20MM	MM	
TB-3	--	--	3	330	180	30				4
FB-2	--	--	2	255	110		2700			

IX. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED (Check one block on each line).

CALIBER	NONE	MEAGER	MODERATE	INTENSE
HEAVY — Time-fused shells, 75mm and over	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
MEDIUM — Impact-fused shells, 20mm-50mm	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
LIGHT — Machine gun bullets, 6.5mm-13.2mm	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			

X. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE, OWN AND ENEMY AIRCRAFT (use check list at left).

- SPEED, CLIMB,
at various altitudes
 - TURNING
 - DIVES
 - CEILINGS
 - RANGE
 - PROTECTION
 - ARMAMENT

~~NONE~~

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(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

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XI. ATTACK ON ENEMY SHIPS OR GROUND OBJECTIVES (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

- (a) Target(s) and Location(s) Installations Iwo Jima (FOR SHIPS INCLUDE ALL IN AREA UNDER ATTACK) (b) Time Over Target(s) 0800-0820Z (Zone)
- (c) Clouds Over Target 300 Stratus (BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)
- (d) Visibility of Target 1st aiming point: Clear but rough terrain
2nd aiming point: Obscured by clouds (e) Visibility 5 (MILES)
- (f) Bombing Tactics: Type Glide (LEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE) Bomb Sight Used 1st. 2 (TYPE)
- Bombs Dropped per Run 2 (NUMBER) Spacing 0 (FEET) Altitude of Bomb Release 1800 (FEET)
- (g) Number of Enemy Aircraft Hit on Ground: Destroyed _____ Probably Destroyed _____ Damaged _____

(h) AIMING POINT	(i) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE	(j) NO. A/C ATTACKING (k) SQUADRON	(l) BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED, EACH AIMING POINT	(m) NO. HITS On Aiming Point	(n) DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk)
2	Dugouts & gun emplacements	4 TRM, 4 FM-2 VC-88	8-500 ^{lb} G.P. 2500 rds. .50 cal.	8 bombs	Partial destructive rest unobserved
3	Sugar & sulphur refineries	4 TRM, 4 FM-243 VC-88	6-5" H.E. rockets 5" H.E. rockets 200 rds. .50 cal.	6 rcts 43 rcts	Unobserved
4					
5					
6					
7					
8					

(o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary).

- #1 Dugouts and gun emplacements in target area 216 H, in northwest Iwo Jima, were bombed strafed and attacked by rockets. All hit in the area. Due to the difficult terrain it was difficult to spot the positions from the air at the altitude flown. Several dugouts were seen, however; one was directly hit by a 500^{lb} bomb; bombs appeared to hit on or very close to the others.
- #2 The area in which the sugar and sulphur refineries were located, 201 K and 200 E, in central Iwo Jima, were thoroughly saturated by the rocket attack, all 43 rockets fired hitting these areas. The low ceiling of 300 feet with almost solid overcast, prevented observation of target prior to and subsequent to attack. There is no knowledge of the damage done.

(p) Were Photographs Taken? Yes Photographs of Damage, When Taken, Should Be Attached By Staple.

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XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY

OWN AIRCRAFT

Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack and
Their Effectiveness
Distance of Opening Fire
Defense Tactics and
Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance
Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack
Distance of Opening Fire
Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses
Enemy Weaknesses
Offensive Tactics, Own
" " , Enemy
Defensive Tactics, Own
" " , Enemy
Flexible Gunnery, Own
Escort Tactics
Fighter Direction
Use of Radar
Night Fighting
Recognition, Aircraft

ATTACK

OWN TACTICS

Method of Locating Target
Approach to Target
Altitudes, Speeds
Approach
Dive
Pull-Out
Dive Angle
Strafing
Retirement
Defensive Tactics
Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships
Concealment
Searchlights
Night Fighter Tactics
Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics
Torpedo Tactics
Effectiveness of
Bombs, Torpedoes
Selection of Targets
Fuzing
Strafing Tactics
Defensive Tactics
Use of Radar
Reconnaissance
Photography
Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation
Homing
Rendezvous
Recognition, Ships
Communications
Flight Operations
Search and Tracking
Base Operations
Maintenance

Four TBM-3 of VC-33 piloted by Lt.(jg) G. L. HIGGINS, Lt(jg) G. H. PETERMAN, Ens. P.H. Fairhurst and Ens. H. P. FROVOST and four FM-2 of VC-33 piloted by Lieut's (jg) J. A. OGDONNAN, P. A. O'BRIEN, H. A. WHITE, and Ens. L. O. PATTERSON, joined by 4 TBM's and 4 FM-2's of VC-76, composed a direct support group which attacked Iwo Jima on 26 Feb. 1945. Two separate attacks were made. The first, at about 800 feet, was made on gun emplacements and dug-outs in the northeastern part of the island which were reported to be causing trouble. The torpedo bombers made glide bombing attacks from 4000 ft. altitude in a 35-40° glide, releasing at 1800 foot altitude. At least one emplacement was seen to blow up; there were hits or near misses on other emplacements. The terrain conceals most of such emplacements and it is unusual to see any results from bombing. One torpedo pilot also fired 6 rockets into the area, the other two hanging fire. The fighters made individual strafing runs in coordination with the bombing, 35-40 degree glides begun at 3800 feet, pulling out at 500 feet. There was no enemy anti-aircraft fire during the attack. The air coordinator reported satisfaction with the attack.

At 0820 this group was ordered to attack the area in central Iwo Jima where originally sulphur and sugar refineries had been located. These places had been hit before but apparently it was believed that large chimneys still standing might be used as look-out positions. The weather conditions were poor inasmuch as large stratus clouds at 2000 foot altitude covered the target area, almost complete overcast. To attack the refineries it was necessary to duck through small holes or come through the clouds. The rocket attacks by the TBM's was made from the southwest to the northeast, starting about 3800 foot altitude in about a 30 degree glide, pulling out just below the cloud base at 800 foot altitude. The FM-2's, also firing rockets began their individual runs at about 4800 foot altitude, in a 45 degree dive, pulling out above the cloud base at about 1800 feet. Under these conditions any observation of the area by the torpedo bombers was hasty and incomplete; the fighters had no opportunity to see the area. Torpedo pilots and aircrews reported, however, that the rockets saturated the area designated.

In the Iwo Jima operations sufficient maps of the island were provided so that each aircrewman received at least one type of map. This was not true at Lingayen. In this flight and on others during the current operations it has been quite apparent that when aircrews have maps which will provide them with exact knowledge of where attacks are made, more complete information is obtained as to the results of an attack, positions of anti-aircraft and general data as to position of front lines and enemy activity. It is recommended that sufficient copies of maps and charts of the objective area be provided for each operation so that the aircrewsman have the same advantage as the pilots in studying and recognizing the areas over which they are to fly.

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XIII. MATERIAL DATA. (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.
Use additional sheets if necessary).

ARMAMENT

Guns, Gunsights
Turrets
Ammunition
Bombs, Torpedoes
Bomb Sights
Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar
Homing Devices
Visual Signals
Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

IFF
Signals
Battle Lights
Procedures

PROTECTION

Armor; Points and Angles
of Fire Needing Further
Protection
Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes
Life Belts, Life Rafts
Safety Belts
Emergency Kits
Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses
Driftsights
Octants
Automatic Pilots
Charts
Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

Flight
Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

**CAMOUFLAGE AND
DECEPTION DEVICES**

STRUCTURE

Airframe
Control Surfaces
Control System
Dive Flaps
Landing Gear
Heating System
Flight Characteristics
At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

Engines
Engine Accessories
Propellers
Lubricating System
Starters
Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Auxiliary Plant
Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

Plane Servicing Equipment
Personnel Facilities

The only difficulty encountered on this flight was with rockets on one TBM-3. The pilot attempted to fire all rockets at once, placing switch on "automatic". Two rockets hung up and later fired as plane was pulling out of glide.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

H.D. SCHMAD, Lt. USNR, ACIO, VC-88

SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

E. L. KIPP, Lt. USNR, Commanding

SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

4 March 1945

DATE