





REPORT

OF THE

JOINT COMMITTEE

ON

THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR,

AT THE

SECOND SESSION THIRTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS.

---

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.  
ATTLE OF PETERSBURG.

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WASHINGTON:  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.  
1865.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, *February 20, 1865.*

*Resolved by the Senate of the United States, (the House of Representatives concurring,) That in order to enable the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War to complete their investigations of certain important matters now before them, and which they have not been able to complete, by reason of inability to obtain important witnesses, they be authorized to continue their sessions for thirty days after the close of the present Congress, and to place their testimony and reports in the hands of the Secretary of the Senate.*

*Resolved further, That the Secretary of the Senate is hereby directed to cause to be printed of the reports and accompanying testimony of the Committee on the Conduct of the War five thousand copies for the use of the Senate and ten thousand copies for the use of the House of Representatives.*

Attest:

J. W. FORNEY, *Secretary.*

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, *March 1, 1865.*

*Resolved, That this House do concur in the foregoing resolution with the following amendment:*

*Strike out the words "thirty days" and insert the words *ninety days* in lieu thereof.*

Attest:

EDWARD McPHERSON, *Clerk.*  
By CLINTON LLOYD, *Chief Clerk.*

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SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, *March 2, 1865.*

*Resolved, That the Senate agree to the foregoing amendment of the House of Representatives.*

Attest:

J. W. FORNEY, *Secretary.*

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I certify the foregoing to be a true copy of the original resolution and the amendment of the House thereto and the concurrence of the Senate therein.

J. W. FORNEY,  
*Secretary of the Senate of the United States.*

REPORT  
OF THE  
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

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MAY 22, 1865.

Mr. WADE, from the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, in accordance with the preceding resolution, placed in the hands of the Secretary of the Senate the following, comprising the testimony taken before that committee, with accompanying reports, viz:

JOURNAL.  
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.  
BATTLE OF PETERSBURG.  
RED RIVER EXPEDITION.  
FORT FISHER EXPEDITION.  
LIGHT-DRAUGHT MONITORS.  
HEAVY ORDNANCE.  
SHERMAN—JOHNSTON.  
ICE CONTRACTS.  
CHEYENNE INDIANS.  
ROSECRANS'S CAMPAIGNS.  
MISCELLANEOUS.

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*The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the Present War submit the following report:*

Your committee, at the close of the labors in which the most of them have been engaged for nearly four years past, take occasion to submit a few general observations in regard to their investigations. They commenced them at a time when the government was still engaged in organizing its first great armies, and before any important victory had given token of its ability to crush out the rebellion by the strong hand of physical power. They have continued them until the rebellion has been overthrown, the so-called confederate government been made a thing of the past, and the chief of that treasonable organization is a proclaimed felon in the hands of our authorities. And soon the military and naval forces, whose deeds have been the subjects of our inquiry, will return to the ways of peace and the pursuits of civil life, from which they have been called for a time by the danger which threatened their country. Yet while we welcome those brave veterans on their return from fields made historical by their gallant achievements, our joy is saddened as we view their thinned ranks

and reflect that tens of thousands, as brave as they, have fallen victims to that savage and infernal spirit which actuated those who spared not the prisoners at their mercy, who sought by midnight arson to destroy hundreds of defenceless women and children, and who hesitated not to resort to means and to commit acts so horrible that the nations of the earth stand aghast as they are told what has been done. It is a matter for congratulation that, notwithstanding the greatest provocations to pursue a different course, our authorities have ever treated their prisoners humanely and generously, and have in all respects conducted this contest according to the rules of the most civilized warfare.

The investigations of your committee have embraced many subjects. The results of their investigations under the directions of the 37th Congress have already been made public. The subjects of their inquiry under the directions of the 38th Congress, some of which have already been reported upon, include the following :

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC ;  
BATTLE OF PETERSBURG ;  
RED RIVER EXPEDITION ;  
FORT FISHER EXPEDITION ;  
MASSACRE AT FORT PILLOW ;  
HEAVY ORDNANCE ;  
LIGHT-DRAUGHT MONITORS ;  
REBEL TREATMENT OF PRISONERS ; and  
MASSACRE OF CHEYENNE INDIANS ;

all of which are, or have been, specially reported upon. Testimony has been taken upon other subjects, which is submitted without reports, either because of the incomplete character of the evidence, or because special reports were not deemed necessary.

The investigation in relation to the army of the Potomac has been continued from the point reached by your committee in their former report, to the time when General Grant assumed the active direction of that army, and began the campaign which has resulted in the final overthrow of the military power of the rebellion. The operations of that campaign, with a single exception, specially directed by the Senate, your committee have not investigated. They did not desire to enter upon the inquiry while the campaign was still in progress, and it was concluded too late to enable them to investigate it as fully as its importance demands.

Your committee have still been unable to devote that attention to the operations of our armies in the western and extreme southern parts of the Union which was desired, and which they so amply merit. During the sessions of Congress the members of the committee have been obliged to attend to their duties here, except when some special subject of inquiry called them away for a short time. And during the last recess of Congress, when their presence was not required at the Capitol, the interest and importance of the presidential campaign then pending were so great that they felt it necessary to take an active part in it, thereby rendering it impossible for them to pursue

an investigation which could properly be carried on only by visiting our armies in the field in distant parts of the country and engaged in active operations.

For the purpose, therefore, of placing upon record a history of the operations of our western and southern armies, and the late campaign of the army of the Potomac, which shall be more permanent and satisfactory than is contained in the transitory publications of the day, your committee have prepared and forwarded to the principal officers engaged therein a series of interrogatories, with the request that full and complete answers to the same be transmitted to the chairman of the committee in season to enable him to lay them before Congress at its next session.

Your committee would refer to the record of their labors to show the spirit and purpose by which they have been governed in their investigations. They have not sought to accomplish any purpose other than to elicit the truth ; to that end have all their labors been directed. If they have failed at any time to accomplish that purpose, it has been from causes beyond their control. Their work is before the people, and by it they are willing to be judged.

In conclusion, your committee must return their thanks to those who have aided and assisted them in their labors. The officers of the War and Navy Departments have been prompt and ready in furnishing them with such papers and documents as they desired, and in supplying all facilities in their power to enable the committee to visit the various places to which they have been called in the performance of their duties. To the officers of the army and navy, who have everywhere shown themselves willing and anxious to promote in every way the comfort of the committee, and to aid them by every means in their power, the committee desire to offer especial acknowledgments for their kindness and attention. To them the committee owe to a great degree the success which has attended their efforts for the last four years.

Respectfully submitted:

B. F. WADE,  
*Chairman of Committee.*





# JOURNAL OF THE COMMITTEE.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES.

JANUARY 20, 1864.

*Resolved by the Senate, (the House of Representatives concurring,)* That a joint committee of three members of the Senate and four members of the House of Representatives be appointed to inquire into the conduct and expenditures of the present war; and may further inquire into all the facts and circumstances of contracts and agreements already made, or that may be made, and such contracts and agreements hereafter to be made prior to the final report of the committee, by or with any department of the government, in anywise connected with, or growing out of, the operations of the government in suppressing the rebellion against its constituted authority; and that the said committee shall have authority to sit during the sessions of either house of Congress, and during the recess of Congress, and at such times and places as said committee shall deem proper, and also employ a stenographer as clerk, at the usual rate of compensation.

SEC. 2. *And be it further resolved,* That the said committee shall have power to send for persons and papers; and that the Sergeant-at-arms of the House, or of the Senate, as the said committee may direct, shall attend in person, or by assistant, the sittings of the said committee, and serve all subpoenas put in his hands by the committee, pay the fees of all witnesses, and the necessary and proper expenses of the committee.

SEC. 3. *And be it further resolved,* That the Speaker of the House, or the Vice-President and President of the Senate, shall be authorized to issue subpoenas to witnesses during the recess of Congress, upon the request of the committee, in the same manner as during the sessions of Congress; and the said committee shall have authority to report in either branch of Congress at any time.

Attest:

JOHN W. FORNEY, *Secretary.*

JANUARY 20, 1864.

The Vice-President appointed

Mr. BENJAMIN F. WADE, of Ohio;  
Mr. ZACHARIAH CHANDLER, of Michigan; and  
Mr. BENJAMIN F. HARDING, of Oregon,

*The committee on the part of the Senate.*

JANUARY 21, 1864.

The Speaker of the House of Representatives appointed

Mr. DANIEL W. GOOCH, of Massachusetts;  
Mr. GEORGE W. JULIAN, of Indiana;  
Mr. MOSES F. ODELL, of New York; and  
Mr. BENJAMIN F. LOAN, of Missouri,

*The committee on the part of the House.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., *January 25, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to call of its chairman: present, the chairman, (Mr. Wade,) Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Julian, Odell, and Loan.

The chairman stated that Mr. Harding was compelled to be absent on business connected with the departments, but had authorized him to act for him in all matters coming before the committee.

The joint resolution authorizing the appointment of the committee was read.

Mr. William Blair Lord, (of New York city,) stenographer, was appointed clerk of the committee, and duly sworn.

On motion of Mr. CHANDLER,

*Ordered*, That for the purpose of taking testimony, less than a quorum of the committee shall be sufficient.

On motion of Mr. ODELL,

*Ordered*, That this committee adopt the same rule in regard to expenses that was acted upon by the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War of the last Congress, viz:

That for travelling and other expenses incurred by this committee in the discharge of their duties, there shall be allowed only the sums actually expended by the committee or its individual members.

On motion of Mr. GOOCH,

*Ordered*, That the clerk of this committee be directed to procure, from time to time, the necessary stationery for the use of the committee.

On motion of Mr. ODELL,

The chairman was instructed to address communications to the President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of the Interior, respectively, enclosing to each a copy of the joint resolution under which this committee is acting, and informing each of said officers that this committee have organized for business, and will wait upon him at such time as he may designate as most convenient.

Adjourned to 12 m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, *January 26, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Odell, and Loan.

The following resolution was received and read:

“IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

“*January 25, 1864.*

“On motion by Mr. WILSON,

“*Resolved*, That the Committee on the Conduct of the War be instructed to inquire into the character and efficiency of the heavy ordnance now provided for the armament of fortifications, the mode of fabrication, the amount of ‘royalty’ paid, and to whom, for the use of a patent in the manufacture; the tests to which these guns are subjected when received into service, the reasons for believing the tests satisfactory, what proportion of our sea and land armament is of rifled ordnance, when rifled guns were introduced, and the cause of the delay pertaining thereto.

“Attest:

“J. W. FORNEY, *Secretary.*”

Adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, *January 27, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Harding, Gooch, Odell, and Loan.

The following witness was examined:

Brigadier General George D. Ramsey.

The chairman laid before the committee communications from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Interior, in response to communications from the committee of January 25. The communications were read.

The committee accepted the invitation of the Secretary of War to meet him to-night at 8 o'clock.

Mr. GOOCH moved that a communication be addressed to the Secretary of War, inquiring the entire strength of the army, where located, and its condition at the present time; and also its estimated strength on the first day of May next, under present legislation.

Also, a similar communication in regard to the navy, to be addressed to the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. HARDING moved that Mr. Gooch be instructed to prepare said communications.

The further consideration of the subject was postponed until after the committee shall have had interviews with said Secretaries.

On motion of Mr. GOOCH,

The chairman was instructed to obtain from the Patent Office information concerning all patents for ordnance and material used therewith, now in use by the government, such information to embrace the dates of patents, subjects of patents, names of patentees, assignees, &c.

The committee then adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, *January 28, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: all the members present.

The following witnesses were examined:

Captain Henry A. Wise;

Captain S. V. Benét.

The chairman directed the clerk to enter upon the journal that the committee waited upon the Secretary of War, pursuant to appointment, and had a very satisfactory interview with him, and agreed upon certain principles to govern the committee in their investigations.

The committee adjourned to meet at 11 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, *January 29, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Harding, Gooch, Odell, and Loan.

The following witnesses were examined:

General John G. Barnard;

General William F. Barry.

The chairman laid before the committee a communication from the Secretary of the Navy, in reply to communication of the committee of the 25th instant.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. on Monday next.

WASHINGTON, *February 1, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment : all the members present.

The following witness was examined :

Captain Alfred Mordecai.

Adjourned to meet at 11 a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *February 2, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment : present, the chairman, Messrs. Gooch, Odell, and Loan.

The following witness was examined :

Captain James G. Benton.

On motion of Mr. GOOCH,

The chairman was instructed to obtain from the War Department copies of all contracts made since January, 1862, to supply the government in any of its departments with ice, embracing names of contractors, amounts contracted for, prices to be paid, and places of delivery.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *February 3, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment : present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Julian, Odell, and Loan.

The following witness was examined :

Commodore John Rodgers.

On motion of Mr. ODELL,

The chairman was instructed to apply to the War Department for information in relation to hospitals; what buildings are now used for hospital purposes; their locations; the rent paid; if hired, whether by the month or the year; if leased, for how long time; the number of beds in each; the number of patients in each at date of last returns; the force employed, and of what grade.

On motion of Mr. CHANDLER,

The chairman was instructed to address a communication to Admiral John A. Dahlgren, enclosing copy of resolution of Senate in relation to heavy ordnance, and requesting him to forward to the committee, as soon as convenient, such information on the subject as he may possess.

The following resolution was received from the Senate :

“IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

“ *February 2, 1864.*

“ *Resolved*, That the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War be instructed to inquire into the military administration, in all its departments, in the city of Alexandria, and especially into the system of military police there established, and the place and mode of imprisonment and punishment, and whether punishments of a ‘cruel and unusual character’ are not inflicted, without authority of law, in a place known as ‘the slave-pen’ in that city; and that said committee inquire what fines and forfeitures are declared and levied in said city, and how, and by whom, and by what authority they are levied and declared, and to what purpose they are appropriated; and especially whether imprisonment in ‘the slave-pen’ and douchings are resorted to by the military authorities for the punishment of soldiers.”

Adjourned to 12 m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, *February 4, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment : present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Odell, and Loan.

The following witness was examined :

Mr. Charles Knap.

The chairman laid before the committee a communication from Captain Henry A. Wise, Ordnance bureau, Navy Department, together with information asked for by the committee in relation to heavy ordnance.

*Ordered,* That the same be filed with the testimony of Captain Wise on that subject.

Also, a petition, received from the Senate, of citizens of Harrison county, Missouri, in relation to arming disloyal persons in that county and State.

Referred to Mr. Loan, as a sub-committee, with instructions to investigate the same and report to this committee.

On motion of Mr. GOOCH,

*Ordered,* That the doorkeeper of the House of Representatives be directed to furnish a page to attend upon this committee.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, *February 5, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment : present, the chairman, Messrs. Harding, Gooch, and Odell.

The following witness was examined :

Rear-Admiral Samuel F. DuPont.

On motion of Mr. GOOCH,

The chairman was instructed to apply to the War Department for additional information in relation to ice contracts, viz : the amounts delivered at each point, and the sums of money paid for the amounts delivered.

Adjourned to meet at 11 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, *February 6, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment : present, the chairman, Messrs. Harding, Gooch, and Odell.

A communication was received from the War Department, transmitting a portion of the information in relation to ice contracts called for by the committee on the 2d instant, and acknowledging receipt of communication from the committee of the 5th instant.

The following witnesses were examined :

Major A. B. Dyer ;

Major T. J. Rodman.

The chairman laid before the committee a communication from the President, received late this morning, appointing 3 p. m. to-day for receiving the committee, in accordance with their communication of the 25th ultimo.

The chairman was instructed to reply that the communication from the President was received at so late an hour, (Congress not being in session to-day,) that it was not possible to call the members of the committee together in time to attend upon him at the hour named.

The following witness was examined :

Mr. Addison Gage.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. on Monday next.

WASHINGTON, *February 8, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: all the members present.

After discussion,

The chairman was instructed to inform Mr. J. C. Tiffany that investigations were being made in regard to contracts for delivering ice to the government, in many of which, especially for the year 1863, he appears to have been interested; and that any evidence or information he desired to give the committee would be received.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, *February 9, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Julian, Odell, and Loan.

A communication was received from the Secretary of War, transmitting copies of contracts to supply ice to the government since January, 1862.

The following witnesses were examined:

Mr. L. J. Middleton;

Mr. Walter Godey.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, *February 10, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: all the members present.

The following witnesses were examined:

Mr. Robert A. Payne;

Mr. L. J. Middleton, (recalled;)

Mr. Walter Godey, (recalled;)

Mr. Manchester Eldridge.

The chairman laid before the committee a communication from the Secretary of War, requesting the committee "to investigate the operations of the quartermaster's department in the cities of New York and Philadelphia."

Read and placed on file for future consideration.

A delegation waited upon the committee from the legislature of Virginia, appointed under the following resolution:

*"Resolved by the general assembly of Virginia, That a committee of three members of the general assembly, one from the senate and two from the house, be appointed by the speaker of the house and the president of the senate, to aid and advise with the committee of Congress on the conduct of the war in their investigation of the affairs connected with the military government of Alexandria and elsewhere in Virginia.*

*"Passed February 6, 1864.*

*"LEOPOLD C. P. COWPER,*

*"President of the Senate.*

*"JAMES M. DOWNEY,*

*"Speaker of the House of Delegates."*

The following are the members appointed under the foregoing resolution:

Mr. W. F. Mercier, on the part of the senate; Mr. Reuben Johnston and Mr. J. W. Brownley, on the part of the house of delegates.

Mr. Mercier, on behalf of the delegation, (after explaining the reason for the absence of Mr. Brownley,) proceeded to state at some length the object had in view by the legislature of Virginia in appointing this delegation.

After some time spent in discussion,

It was agreed on the part of the committee that the Virginia delegation should, from time to time, lay before this committee in writing such suggestions in rela-

tion to affairs in Virginia as to them should appear important, with the names of witnesses, and the committee would take action thereon.

Whereupon the interview was closed.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *February 11, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Julian, and Odell.

The following witnesses were examined:

Dr. Henry Johnson;

Dr. R. O. Abbott.

The chairman laid before the committee a communication from Mr. George S. Jenkins, proposing, if the committee would accept his services, to devote his attention to obtaining information that he believed would tend to great saving to the government, asking no compensation at present, but leaving that entirely to the committee after his services had been rendered.

The chairman stated that this gentleman had been strongly recommended to him. After discussion,

On motion of Mr. CHANDLER, it was

*Ordered*, That the chairman be instructed to reply to Mr. Jenkins, that, while the committee had no authority to employ him, or any one else, as their agent in any way, they would consider any information he might furnish them, and, should it prove of service to the government, they would recommend to Congress that he be compensated accordingly.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *February 12, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Julian, Odell, and Loan.

The following witnesses were examined:

Lieutenant Colonel Henry H. Wells;

Mr. Manchester Eldridge, (recalled);

Captain John C. Wyman.

On motion of Mr. CHANDLER,

*Ordered*, That the committee, or such members as may desire to do so, will proceed to Alexandria to-morrow, at 2 p. m., for the purpose of examining into the condition of affairs there.

On motion of Mr. ODELL,

Mr. Gooch was authorized to obtain from the War Department such papers as may be necessary to enable the committee to pursue its investigation in reference to the supply of ice for government purposes.

On motion of Mr. GOOCH,

Mr. Odell was instructed to ascertain the tonnage of vessels engaged in supplying ice to the government under contracts.

Adjourned to Monday next, at 11 a. m.

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WASHINGTON, *February 15, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: all the members present.

The following witness was examined:

Dr. David L. Magruder.

Mr. CHANDLER made a verbal report to the committee, that the following members of the committee, Messrs. Chandler, Harding, Julian, Odell, and Loan,

proceeded to Alexandria on Saturday, pursuant to order of the committee, and proceeded to inspect the jail, slave-pen, &c., and found the condition of affairs generally, in Alexandria, in accordance with the testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Wells and Captain Wyman; also, that they had had an interview with General Slough, who would appear before the committee to-morrow and give testimony on such points as the committee might require.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *February 16, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: all the members present.

The following witness was examined:

General John P. Slough.

Mr. LOAN laid before the committee a letter addressed to Hon. B. Gratz Brown, United States senator from Missouri, from Mr. Michael English, complaining of the barbarous treatment of soldiers by General Guitar, in Missouri. Referred to Mr. Loan, with instructions to examine and report to the committee.

On motion of Mr. GOOCH,

The chairman was instructed to obtain from Hon. Mr. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, copies of all papers in his office relating to supplies of ice for the west during the present year.

Mr. ODELL stated to the committee that the Secretary of War had called his attention to the fact, that in the course of the examination yesterday, in the court-martial of Surgeon General Hammond, an order had been produced, signed by Surgeon R. D. Abbott, medical director for the department of Washington, requiring contracts to be made with the Sanitary Commission for hospital supplies in this department; and that the Secretary of War desired this committee to investigate the matter.

On motion of Mr. ODELL,

*Ordered*, That this committee will proceed to investigate accordingly.

The committee thereupon took a recess until 3 o'clock p. m.

The committee reassembled at 3 p. m.

The following witness was examined:

Hon. John A. Bingham.

Adjourned to 12 m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *February 17, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: all the members present.

After some time passed in the consideration of various subjects, the committee adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *February 18, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Julian, Odell, and Loan.

The following witnesses were examined:

Dr. R. O. Abbott;

Mr. Charles H. Travis.

The committee proceeded to consider communications from Hon. R. Johnston, chairman of joint committee of the general assembly of Virginia, in relation to



military affairs in Virginia, especially the military administration of General John P. Slough.

On motion of Mr. GOOCH,

*Ordered*, That the communications be placed on file, and that the chairman be instructed to reply that the committee have received the communications, and will examine reliable witnesses upon the subjects therein mentioned.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, *February 19, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Harding, Gooch, Julian, and Loan.

The following witnesses were examined:

Mr. Charles H. Travis;

Captain William M. Gwynne.

The chairman laid before the committee a communication from Hon: C. A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, with accompanying papers, in response to call of the committee on the 16th instant.

Also, a communication from Mr. J. C. Tiffany, in response to communication to him from the committee of the 8th instant, in which Mr. Tiffany states that as soon as he can obtain the information called for by the committee he will forward it to them.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. Monday next.

WASHINGTON, *February 22, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Julian, Odell, and Loan.

Mr. LOAN submitted the following, which was read:

*“To the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War:*

“The undersigned, a sub-committee to whom was referred the memorial of Howard T. Combs and others, of Missouri, relating to the arming of the disloyal population, and the return of fugitive slaves, would respectfully

REPORT:

“That he has had the same under consideration, and is satisfied that the following statements are substantially true, to wit:

“The military force used in Missouri for more than a year past consists chiefly of the militia of the State; that this force, prior to the middle of the summer of 1863, consisted of soldiers of undoubted loyalty. Subsequent to that time the Governor of the State, who assumed and exercised an unlimited and arbitrary authority over this force and in directing its organization, by his orders, disbanded the greater part of the loyal militia and disarmed them, and revoked the commissions of their officers. In lieu thereof, he organized, as the militia, returned soldiers from the rebel army, guerillas, bushwhackers, and rebel sympathizers, and placed officers of similar sentiments in command of them, so that the federal military authority in Missouri was under the control and direction of the disloyal sentiment of the State; and under it the loyal people have been compelled to submit to every insult, injury, and wrong that the most fiendish malignity and hate could devise, and the most relentless cruelty inflict. Wilful and deliberate murders have been committed on loyal citizens in the most cowardly and cruel manner.

“The superior officers of the federal troops in the State, in many instances, sympathize with the rebels, especially upon the subject of slavery; and they have directed their policy so as to protect, as far as possible, those entertaining disloyal sentiments. There is reason to believe that they have used the troops under their command to prevent the escape of slaves from their masters, and to return fugitive slaves, in violation of the provisions of acts of Congress, and of the additional articles of war.

“There is reason to believe that they have pursued a systematic course of persecution of the soldiers under their command, who are known to entertain radical sentiments, and by

means of packed court-martials have secured convictions upon frivolous charges, upon which unusually severe sentences have been pronounced and confirmed.

"It is believed that such officers have arbitrarily arrested, and confined in the guard house, officers in the federal service who were passing through their jurisdiction with colored recruits, and have taken possession of the recruits and sent them to parts of the State where the sentiment of the citizens was intensely disloyal.

"It is further believed that, for the purpose of oppressing and persecuting loyal citizens, and protecting those who are disloyal from being punished for offences alleged against them, the military authorities in Missouri have instituted military tribunals, commonly called 'military commissions,' which would exercise, or decline to exercise, jurisdiction arbitrarily, as would best subserve the objects they have in view. They have also intrusted to the arbitrary discretion of any officer, even one of the lowest grade, if he had command of a separate squad of men, the right to suspend or enforce the writ of habeas corpus.

"In conclusion, it is not improper to say that it is manifest that heretofore the administration of military affairs in Missouri has been so directed as to furnish the most ample protection to the disloyal, and conduce to the destruction of the interest of the loyal citizen in many cases, and to the most relentless and vindictive persecution of his person.

"All of which is respectfully submitted.

"BENJ. F. LOAN."

Mr. LOAN said that he had in his possession sworn statements of citizens of Missouri to substantiate all, or nearly all, of the assertions made in his report. He believed that the subject was one well worthy investigation by this committee. But he was aware that the state of the public business here was such as might not now justify the sending a sub-committee to Missouri to institute an investigation, and it would be too expensive to call the witnesses to this city. He therefore moved the further consideration of this subject be postponed for the present. Agreed to.

Mr. LOAN also submitted the following preamble and resolution, which were read:

"It appearing, from the evidence before this committee, that Captain William M. Gwynne, 66th Ohio volunteers, provost marshal of the city of Alexandria, Virginia, has seized liquors and other property, which have been condemned by him as forfeited:

"And it further appearing that he has issued part of said property upon requisitions drawn by surgeons at Alexandria and in its vicinity, but not containing any sufficient reasons showing the necessity for the issue of the same, and without approval by any one; and other parts of said property have been turned over to the proper quartermasters, as is alleged, without taking or filing any vouchers which will charge said officers with said property:

"And it further appearing that property, which has been seized and condemned by said officer or forfeited as aforesaid to the government, is disposed of by said provost marshal without any account thereof being made to any disbursing officer of the government, or any charge being made in any way against the said quartermaster or surgeons which would require them to account for the same: therefore,

"Resolved, That, in the opinion of this committee, it is inexpedient to continue as the agents of the government, in important and responsible positions, officers who, from carelessness or ignorance, so entirely neglect the most obvious duties demanded by their positions for the protection of the interests of the government."

After discussion,

On motion of Mr. JULIAN:

Ordered, That the consideration of the preamble and resolutions be postponed until further testimony upon the subject has been taken by this committee.

On motion of Mr. ODELL,

The committee then proceeded to consider the communication from the War Department, (see Journal, February 10,) requesting the committee "to investigate the operations of the quartermaster's department in the cities of New York and Philadelphia."

After discussion,

On motion of Mr. GOOCH,

Ordered, That a sub-committee of three members be appointed to confer with the Secretary of War, and who shall, if they deem it necessary, proceed "to investigate the operations of the quartermaster's department in the cities of New York and Philadelphia."

Mr. GOOCH moved that the chairman of this committee be one of the sub-committee, and be authorized to appoint the remaining members of the sub-committee.

Agreed to.

The chairman accordingly appointed, as the other two members, Messrs. Gooch and Odell.

Mr. ODELL moved that any other member or members of this committee who may desire to accompany this sub-committee and take part in this investigation be authorized to do so.

Agreed to.

The chairman stated that he doubted if he should be able to attend the sub-committee to New York and Philadelphia, but he should endeavor to get some other member to take his place.

The chairman also notified the sub-committee, and other members of this committee, to meet him at the War Department to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock, for the purpose of conferring with the Secretary of War upon this subject.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. on Wednesday next.

WASHINGTON, *February 24, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Harding, and Loan.

The chairman laid before the committee a communication from Rear-Admiral John A. Dahlgren, dated February 15, acknowledging receipt of communication from this committee of the 3d instant, and stating that he would forward the information asked as soon as he could obtain it;

Also, communications relating to affairs in Missouri and Arkansas; which,

On motion of Mr. LOAN were placed on file for future consideration.

Adjourned to 12 m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, *February 25, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Odell, and Loan.

The following witness was examined:

Major General Daniel E. Sickles.

Adjourned to 12 m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, *February 26, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Julian, and Loan.

The following witnesses were examined:

Major General Daniel E. Sickles, (resumed);

Mr. E. T. Fowler;

Mr. T. Tracy Edgerton.

The chairman laid before the committee a communication from Mr. J. C. Tiffany, giving information in relation to supplies of ice to the government, under his contract.

*Ordered,* That the same be filed with the testimony taken upon that subject.

Adjourned to 12 m. on Tuesday next.

WASHINGTON, *March 1, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler and Julian,

The chairman stated that Messrs. Gooch and Odell had gone to New York to investigate the affairs of the quartermaster's department, pursuant to the order of this committee on the 22d ultimo.

The chairman also stated that the sudden illness of his wife had prevented him from attending the rest of the sub-committee.

The following witness was examined:

Major General Abner Doubleday.

The following resolution, from the House of Representatives, was received and read:

"FEBRUARY 29, 1864.

"On motion of Mr. GARFIELD,

"Resolved, That the Committee on the Conduct of the War be instructed to inquire into and report upon the several acts of Congress touching commercial intercourse with the States declared to be in insurrection against the authority of the government, and of the regulations of the Treasury Department established by the Secretary and approved by the President on the 31st day of March and the 11th day of September, 1863, and of the military orders which have been made, from time to time, touching such commercial intercourse, by generals commanding departments or other officers; also, to ascertain and report in what manner said acts, regulations, and orders have been executed, and especially whether any frauds have been committed or favoritism shown to individuals or localities by the officers or agents of the government employed under the said acts, regulations, or orders, and to inquire into all other matters touching any of the points which affect the public interest or the character of any public servant."

The chairman said that the field of inquiry presented by the resolution was so general and extended that it was difficult to determine where to commence the investigation.

On motion of Mr. CHANDLER,

The chairman was instructed to address a communication to the mover of the resolution (Mr. Garfield) asking him to furnish the committee with any information he may possess upon the subject, with such suggestions as he may think important.

Adjourned to 9½ a. m. on Thursday next.

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WASHINGTON, *March 3, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman and Mr. Chandler.

The following witness was examined:

General A. P. Howe.

The following resolution was received from the Senate:

"MARCH 2, 1864.

"On motion by Mr. HENDRICKS,

"Resolved, That the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War be directed to inquire into the causes of, and circumstances attending, the recent military expedition into Florida; with whom the expedition originated; for what purpose it was undertaken, and what were its results, and that the committee be instructed to report at as early a day as practicable.

"Attest:

"J. W. FORNEY, *Secretary.*"

The chairman was instructed to forward a copy of the resolution to the President, Secretary of War, and General Halleck, and request each of them to furnish the committee, as soon as convenient, whatever information there may be in their possession in relation to the subject-matter of the resolution.

Adjourned to 9½ a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *March 4, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler and Loan.

The following witnesses were examined:

General A. P. Howe, (concluded;)

Rear-Admiral J. A. Dahlgren.

The chairman directed the stenographer to enter upon the journal that, having become impressed with the exceeding importance of the testimony taken by the committee in relation to the army of the Potomac, more especially in relation to the incompetency of the general in command of the army, he and Mr. Chandler had believed it to be their duty to call upon the President and the Secretary of War, and lay before them the substance of the testimony taken by them, and, in behalf of the army and of the country, demand the removal of General Meade, and the appointment of some one more competent to command. They accordingly did so yesterday afternoon; and being asked what general they could recommend for the command of the army of the Potomac, they said that for themselves they would be content with General Hooker, believing him to be competent; but not being advocates of any particular general, they would say that if there was any general whom the President considered more competent for the command, then let him be appointed. They stated that Congress had appointed the committee to watch the conduct of the war; and unless this state of things should be soon changed it would become their duty to make the testimony public which they had taken, with such comments as the circumstances of the case seemed to require.

The chairman said he had been informed that General Meade was in town.

On motion, it was

*Ordered*, That the Sergeant-at-arms be directed to notify General Meade that the committee desired to take his testimony to-morrow, or at such time as may be most convenient to him, considering the requirements of the service.

Adjourned to 12 m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *March 5, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman and Mr. Chandler.

The following witness was examined:

Major General George G. Meade.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. on Monday next.

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WASHINGTON, *March 7, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler and Julian.

The following witnesses were examined:

Major General Alfred Pleasonton;

Major General David B. Birney.

The chairman laid before the committee a communication from General J. W. Davidson, in reply to communication of committee of 24th of February, asking for information relative to affairs in Arkansas and Missouri. General Davidson wrote that as soon as he could get the information together he would forward it to the committee.

Adjourned to 12 m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *March 8, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Julian, and Loan.

The following witness was examined:

Colonel Thomas D. Johns.

The chairman laid before the committee a communication from the War Department transmitting information in relation to hospitals, called for by the committee of February 3, which was ordered to be placed on file.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *March 9, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Harding, Julian, and Loan.

The following witness was examined:

Major General G. K. Warren.

Francis Waldron, who had been summoned to appear before the committee and testify, then appeared, but refused to take the oath and testify, preferring, as he said, to take any consequences of refusal.

After some discussion,

Mr. Harding submitted the following resolution, which was agreed to unanimously:

*Resolved*, That Francis Waldron be ordered into the custody of the Sergeant-at-arms of the Senate, to be there safely and securely kept until further order of the committee—said Francis Waldron having refused to testify before this committee.

The Sergeant-at-arms of the Senate was then called into the committee room, and Francis Waldron delivered into his custody, in accordance with the above resolution.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *March 10, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: all the members present.

The following witness was examined:

Major General G. K. Warren—(concluded.)

The committee resumed the consideration of the case of Francis Waldron, now in custody of the Sergeant-at-arms of the Senate, for refusing to testify.

After some discussion,

The further consideration of the subject was postponed until to-morrow, in order that the members of the committee might make inquiries into the character of Francis Waldron for truth and veracity.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *March 11, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: absent, Mr. Harding.

After some conversation,

Mr. LOAN submitted the following resolution, which was adopted :

It manifestly appearing, from information before this committee, that Francis Waldron, now in custody of the Sergeant-at-arms of the Senate, by order of this committee, for refusing to testify, is a man of such a character that no confidence could be placed in any statement he might make under oath, and that nothing beneficial could result in compelling him to testify in the premises: Therefore,

*Resolved*, That said Francis Waldron be, and is hereby, discharged from custody.

Mr. LOAN submitted sundry papers in reference to the seizure of negroes in Missouri, after they had been employed in the United States service, by disloyal men claiming to be their owners.

Ordered to be filed with papers relating to Missouri.

The chairman laid before the committee a written statement from Brigadier General J. W. Davidson upon the administration of affairs in Arkansas, both military and civil, in response to call of the committee.

*Ordered*, That the same be filed with the evidence.

The following witness was examined :

Major General George G. Meade, (recalled.)

Adjourned to 11 a. m. on Monday next.

WASHINGTON, *March 14*, 1864.

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: absent, Mr. Harding.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, *March 15*, 1864.

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: absent Messrs. Julian and Odell.

A petition from citizens of Daviess county, Missouri, praying that the arming of disloyal men and returned rebels in their midst may be hereafter prevented, was received from the Senate and ordered to be filed with the other papers relating to affairs in Missouri.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. on Thursday next.

WASHINGTON, *March 17*, 1864.

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: absent, Messrs. Harding and Julian.

The following witness was examined:

General John W. Turner.

The chairman laid before the committee certain papers received from Hon. J. W. Edmunds, Commissioner of Pensions, relative to the administration of affairs in Arkansas, under General Blunt and General Steele.

Those papers, with the communication from General John W. Davidson, relating to the same subject, were read.

After considerable discussion, the further consideration of the subject was postponed for the present.

Adjourned to 12 m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, *March 18*, 1864.

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, and Loan.

On motion of Mr. CHANDLER,

*Ordered*, That the chairman of this committee be instructed to address a letter to Rev. Henry Ward Beecher, informing him that the committee, in their examination concerning the

battle of Chancellorsville, have not yet been able to obtain any testimony to substantiate the charge that General Hooker was under the influence of intoxicating liquor there; and inasmuch as he (Mr. Beecher) is reported to have made that charge in an address last year, in England, the committee desire him to give them his authority for the charge, and the names of reliable witnesses to substantiate the same.

After some discussion upon the order of business before the committee,  
Adjourned to 12 m. on Monday next.

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WASHINGTON, *March 21, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: absent, Mr. Julian.

The following witness was examined:

General Andrew A. Humphreys.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *March 22, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: absent, Messrs. Harding and Julian.

The following witness was examined:

Major General W. S. Hancock.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *March 23, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: absent, Messrs. Harding, Julian, and Odell.

The following witnesses were examined:

General E. B. Tyler;

General James S. Wadsworth.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *March 24, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: absent, Messrs. Julian and Loan.

After discussion, on motion of Mr. CHANDLER,

*Ordered,* That the Secretary of War be requested to order General Hooker to appear before the committee, if the exigencies of the service will permit.

Adjourned to 2 p. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *March 25, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: absent, Mr. Loan.

The following witness was examined:

Major General Daniel Butterfield.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *March 26, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: absent, Messrs. Harding, Julian, and Loan.

The following witnesses were examined:

Mr. John Morris;

Mr. J. C. Tiffany.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. on Monday next.



WASHINGTON, *March 28, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: absent, Mr. Odell.

On motion of Mr. CHANDLER,

*Ordered,* That the chairman of this committee be instructed to apply to the Secretary of War for copies of all orders, despatches, communications, &c., that have passed between the War Department, General Halleck, &c., and Generals Hooker and Meade, during the time those generals were in command of the army of the Potomac.

Also, copies of all maps in possession of the War Department relating to the operations of the army of the Potomac, so far as it may be convenient and expedient to furnish the same to the committee.

The following witness was examined:

Major General Daniel Butterfield (continued.)

Adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *March 28, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: absent, Messrs. Julian and Loan.

The following witness was examined:

Major General Daniel Butterfield (concluded.)

Adjourned to 11 a. m. on Friday next.

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WASHINGTON, *April 1, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: all the members present.

Witnesses examined:

Major General George G. Meade;

Brigadier General Gibbon.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. on Monday next.

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WASHINGTON, *April 4, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Julian, and Loan.

On motion of Mr. CHANDLER,

*Ordered,* That inasmuch as no reply has been received from Rev. Henry Ward Beecher to the letter of this committee of the 18th ultimo, the chairman of this committee is hereby instructed to again address Mr. Beecher as before.

Witness examined:

General H. J. Hunt.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. on Wednesday next.

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WASHINGTON, *April 6, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: absent, Messrs. Harding, Julian, and Odell.

The chairman laid before the committee a communication from the War Department transmitting information concerning the late expedition into Florida, under General Seymour, which was ordered to be filed with the testimony upon that subject.

Mr. LOAN laid before the committee a copy of a petition from citizens of Cooper county, Missouri, asking the removal of Brigadier General Brown from the command of that district.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, *April 7, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment : absent, Messrs. Harding, Julian, and Odell.

Witnesses examined :

Hon. J. W. McClurg ;

Hon. S. H. Boyd.

The chairman laid before the committee the following letter from Rev. Henry Ward Beecher.

“ BROOKLYN, *April 6, 1864.*

“ DEAR SIR : I did not make any ‘ public ’ remarks about General Hooker while in England. At a breakfast, of temperance men, strictly confidential, and pledged to make no report of proceedings, I alluded to Hooker’s condition. My remarks were published in violation of confidence.

“ As to my evidence, it was such as to produce moral conviction, but not to establish the fact, legally, that, during the last part of the battle of Chancellorsville, Hooker was under the influence of liquor.

“ I do not feel at liberty to mention my informant until I can see him and get his permission.

“ I am very truly yours,

“ H. W. BEECHER.

“ B. F. WADE, Esq.”

Adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *April 8, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment : absent, Mr. Harding.

Witness examined :

Major General John Sedgwick.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. on Monday next.

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WASHINGTON, *April 11, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment : present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Harding, and Loan.

The chairman laid before the committee a draught of a report to accompany the testimony taken under the resolution of the Senate instructing the committee to inquire into the origin, progress, and results of the late military expedition into Florida.

The report was read and adopted unanimously.

On motion of Mr. CHANDLER, it was

*Ordered*, That the chairman be, and is hereby, instructed to submit at once the report just adopted, together with the testimony upon the subject, and ask that 5,000 copies of the same be printed.

Adjourned, to meet on call of the chairman.

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WASHINGTON, *April 18, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to call of the chairman : all the members present.

Witness examined :

Brigadier General Seth Williams.

On motion of Mr. LOAN,

The committee proceeded to consider the petition of Cooper county, Missouri, with the testimony relating to the military administration of General Brown.

After discussion,

On motion of Mr. CHANDLER,

*Ordered*, That Messrs. Harding, Julian, and Loan be, and they are hereby, appointed a sub-committee, with instructions to wait upon the Secretary of War and lay before him the papers and testimony relating to the administration of General Brown, of Missouri, and make such representations to him as they may deem proper.

The chairman laid before the committee the following resolution of the Senate :

“APRIL 16, 1864.

“*Resolved*, That the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War be, and they are hereby instructed to inquire into the truth of the rumored slaughter of the Union troops after their surrender at the recent attack of rebel forces upon Fort Pillow, Tennessee; and also whether Fort Pillow could have been evacuated or sufficiently re-enforced; and if so, why it was not done; and that they report the facts to Congress as soon as possible.”

After discussion, it was

*Ordered*, That the chairman and Mr. Gooch be, and hereby are, appointed a sub-committee, with authority to proceed to such place or places as they may deem necessary, and to take testimony upon the subject of the foregoing resolution; and to take the stenographer of the committee with them, or employ one in his stead.

Adjourned, to meet on call.

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WASHINGTON, *April 22, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to call of Mr. Chandler, acting chairman: absent, Mr. Harding; Mr. Wade and Mr. Gooch being absent on Fort Pillow investigation.

The following witness was examined :

Major General N. J. T. Dana.

Adjourned, to meet on call.

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WASHINGTON, *April 27, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to call.

Witness examined :

Brigadier General S. W. Crawford.

Adjourned, to meet on call.

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WASHINGTON, *May 4, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to call of the chairman: all the members present.

The chairman laid before the committee a communication from the Secretary of War, accompanied by a report of Brigadier General Hoffman, Commissary of Prisoners, urging the committee to proceed to Annapolis and inquire into the condition of prisoners returned from Richmond.

On motion of Mr. GOOCH.

*Ordered*, That the committee proceed to Annapolis on Friday, the 6th instant, for the purpose of making the above-named investigation.

Mr. Chandler was excused from going, and his personal attendance in the Senate was necessary in relation to the banking bill there pending.

Mr. Loan was also excused, because the election case, in which his right to a seat in the House of Representatives was involved, was pending.

Adjourned to 12 m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *May 5, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: absent, Mr. Odell.

The chairman laid before the committee the report of himself and Mr. Gooch, as sub-committee, with the testimony taken by them in relation to the massacre of United States soldiers at Fort Pillow, Tennessee.

The report was read; and,

On motion of Mr. HARDING, it was

*Ordered*, That the report of the sub-committee be adopted as the report of the joint committee, and that the chairman and Mr. Gooch be instructed to submit the same to their respective houses, and ask that 20,000 copies of the report and testimony be printed for the use of the Senate, and 40,000 copies for the use of the House of Representatives.

Adjourned to meet on Monday next at 12 m.

On Friday, May 6, the committee (except Messrs. Chandler and Loan) proceeded, with the stenographer of the committee, to Annapolis and Baltimore, Maryland, and examined the condition of our soldiers returned from rebel prisons, and took some testimony.

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1864.

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: absent, Messrs. Loan and Odell. The chairman submitted to the committee a written report, to accompany the testimony taken on Friday last, in relation to the manner in which our soldiers had been treated while prisoners in the hands of the rebels.

The report was read and agreed to.

On motion of Mr. HARDING,

*Ordered*, That the chairman and Mr. Gooch be instructed to submit the report just read, with the accompanying testimony, to their respective houses, and ask that the same be printed and bound with the report and testimony in relation to the massacre of Fort Pillow.

The stenographer presented his bill for services rendered the committee to the 10th instant, which was approved, and the chairman directed to sign it.

Adjourned, to meet on call.

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1864.

The committee met pursuant to the call of its chairman: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Julian, Odell, and Loan.

The chairman laid before the committee the following resolution adopted by the Senate on the 29th of June:

“*Resolved*, That the Committee on the Conduct of the War be instructed to inquire what progress has been made in the construction of the iron-clad steam gunboats contracted for in the year 1862; by whom the contract was made on the part of the government; who planned the models of the same, and who is responsible therefor? Have any of them been finished? If so, what was the condition of the vessel after she was launched? Are the other vessels contracted for to be built on a plan or model similar to the Chimo, lately launched at Boston? and all information which may be had touching said gunboats.”

After some discussion as to the action of the committee during the recess of Congress,

On motion of Mr. CHANDLER, it was

*Ordered*, That any two members of the committee shall be empowered to take testimony during the recess of Congress: *Provided*, That before doing so they shall notify in writing the other members of the committee of the time and place, when and where, they propose to take such testimony.

At the suggestion of the chairman, it was

*Ordered*, That the arrearages due to the stenographer of the committee be paid upon the certificate of the chairman.

On motion of Mr. GOOCH, it was

*Ordered*, That the amount due to the messenger of the committee be paid on the certificate of the chairman.

Adjourned, to meet on call of the chairman.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 13, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to the call of its chairman: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Odell, and Loan.

The chairman stated to the committee that he had called the committee together in order that some action might be taken in regard to the business before the committee.

After some discussion,

On motion of Mr. CHANDLER, it was

*Ordered*, That a sub-committee of three, consisting of the chairman, Messrs. Gooch and Odell, be appointed and instructed to proceed to the cities of New York and Boston, and such other places as they may deem expedient, and take testimony, under the resolution of the Senate, dated June 29, 1864, in relation to the construction of iron-clad vessels for the navy.

On motion of Mr. GOOCH, it was

*Ordered*, That the chairman be instructed to communicate to the Secretary of the Navy a copy of the Senate resolution in relation to iron-clads, and to request that the Secretary furnish the committee with such information in relation to the subject as might be in possession of the department.

On motion of Mr. GOOCH,

The chairman was instructed to address the following communication to Major General N. P. Banks, now in this city:

COMMITTEE ROOM, CONDUCT OF THE WAR,  
*Washington, D. C., December 13, 1864.*

SIR: I am instructed by the Committee on the Conduct of the War to inform you that they will meet you to-morrow, at 10 o'clock a. m., for the purpose of taking your testimony in relation to the Red river expedition, provided you are to remain in the city, and are not otherwise occupied. We do not wish to detain you, or to have our request complied with if it conflicts at all with your instructions from the President or Secretary of War.

I remain, &c.,

B. F. WADE, *Chairman.*

Major General N. P. BANKS,  
*United States Army.*

Adjourned to 10 a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *December 14, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman and Messrs. Gooch, Odell, and Loan.

Witness examined:

Major General N. P. Banks.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *December 15, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Odell, and Loan.

After some conversation, adjourned till 11 a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *December 16, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, and Loan.

The chairman laid before the committee the following resolution adopted by the Senate yesterday:

*Resolved*, That the Committee on the Conduct of the War be instructed to inquire as to the truth of the alleged charge that large numbers of disloyal persons are in the employ of the government in the various navy yards, quartermaster and ordnance departments throughout the country, to the exclusion of loyal men, with power on the part of said committee to send for persons and papers."

Also the following resolution :

“ *Resolved*, That the Committee on the Conduct of the War be directed to inquire into and report the facts concerning the attack on Petersburg, on the 30th day of July, 1864.”

On motion of Mr. CHANDLER, it was

*Ordered*, that a sub-committee, consisting of Messrs. Chandler, Harding, Julian, and Loan, or so many of them as can go, be appointed to proceed, at their earliest convenience, to the lines of the army, before Petersburg, for the purpose of taking testimony in relation to the battle before Petersburg of July 30, 1864.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *December 17, 1864.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment : present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler and Loan.

The following witness was examined :

Major General A. E. Burnside.

Adjourned, to meet on call of its chairman.

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WASHINGTON, *January 5, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to call of its chairman : present, the chairman, and Messrs. Gooch and Loan.

The following witness was examined :

Major General William B. Franklin.

Mr. LOAN submitted a report from the sub-committee that visited the army of the Potomac to take testimony in relation to the battle before Petersburg on the 30th of July, 1864 : That Messrs. Chandler, Harding, Julian, and Loan, with the stenographer of the committee, left Washington on the 18th of December, on the steamer Baltimore, which had been furnished them by the Navy Department. They visited City Point and the headquarters of the army of the Potomac, examining the following witnesses :

Major General George G. Meade ;  
 Brevet Major General O. B. Wilcox ;  
 Major General G. K. Warren ;  
 Brevet Major General Robert B. Potter ;  
 Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Loring ;  
 Lieutenant Colonel J. L. Van Buren ;  
 Major General H. J. Hunt ;  
 Brevet Lieutenant Colonel James C. Duane ;  
 Major General E. O. C. Ord ;  
 Brevet Major General Edward Ferrero ;  
 Lieutenant General U. S. Grant.

Mr. LOAN also reported that other testimony was necessary to complete the examination.

Adjourned till to-morrow at 10 a. m.

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WASHINGTON, *January 7, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment : present, the chairman, Messrs. Gooch and Loan.

The following witnesses were examined :

Lieutenant Colonel George B. Drake ;  
 Colonel Isaac Dyer.

Adjourned to meet on call.

WASHINGTON, *January 11, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to call of its chairman: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, and Loan.

The following witnesses were examined:

Captain John Schuyler Crosby;  
Brigadier General A. L. Lee.

The chairman, from the sub-committee appointed to proceed to Boston and New York and take testimony under resolution of the Senate in relation to contracts for gunboats, stated that the sub-committee (the chairman, Messrs. Gooch and Odell) left Washington on the 17th of December, and proceeded to the places named, where they examined the following witnesses:

W. L. Hanscom,  
Aquila Adams,  
George Sewell,  
Nathaniel McKay,  
Eben Hoyt,  
Donald McKay,

George Holloway,  
Charles A. Crooker,  
Wm. W. Wood,  
John Ericsson,  
Admiral Francis H. Gregory.

The chairman also reported that, in the opinion of the sub-committee, it was necessary to take further testimony upon the subject of the building of light-draught monitors.

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WASHINGTON, *January 12, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Gooch, Julian, and Loan.

The following witnesses were examined:

Colonel J. G. Wilson;  
Major D. C. Houston;  
Captain Jerome Bradley.

Adjourned, to meet to-morrow at 10 a. m.

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WASHINGTON, *January 13, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Gooch, Odell, and Loan.

On motion of the chairman, communications were ordered to be addressed to the Secretary of War calling for copies of the correspondence between the War Department, General Halleck, and General Banks, in relation to the Red river expedition; also, calling for reports of commissions upon the Ames gun and the Ericsson gun.

The chairman laid before the committee the following resolution of the Senate:

“JANUARY 12, 1865.

“On motion of Mr. Wilson,

“Resolved, That the Committee on the Conduct of the War be directed to inquire into the causes of the failure of the late expedition against Wilmington, North Carolina, and to report the facts to the Senate.”

The following witnesses were examined:

Major General N. P. Banks, (recalled;)  
Mr. Horatio Ames;  
Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pleasants.

Adjourned, to meet on call.

WASHINGTON, *January 17, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to call of the chairman: all the members present.

The following witnesses were examined:

Major General Benjamin F. Butler;

Brigadier General John W. Turner.

Adjourned till to-morrow at 10 a. m.

WASHINGTON, *January 18, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Gooch, Julian, Odell, and Loan.

The following witnesses were examined:

Brevet Brigadier General J. S. Brisbin;

Mr. Robert C. Parrott.

Adjourned, to meet at 11 o'clock to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, *January 19, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Julian, and Loan.

The following witness was examined:

Brigadier General Francis Fessenden.

Adjourned, to meet at 11 a. m. on Saturday next.

WASHINGTON, *January 21, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Gooch, Julian, Odell, and Loan.

The following witness was examined:

Captain G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

Adjourned, to meet on Monday next at 11 o'clock a. m.

WASHINGTON, *January 23, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Gooch, Julian, and Odell.

The following witnesses were examined:

Captain James Alden, United States navy;

Surgeon Eugene F. Sawyer;

Mr. John Lenthall, Navy Department.

The chairman laid before the committee the following communication from the Secretary of War, which was ordered to be spread upon the journal:

“WAR DEPARTMENT,  
“*Washington City, January 19, 1865.*

“SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the communications below indicated, and to inform you that directions have been given that the several requests therein contained be complied with as early as practicable:

“1. Letter of January 13, requesting copies of certain reports in reference to the Ames and Ericsson guns.

“2. Letter of January 13, requesting copies of all correspondence between the War Department, General Halleck, and General Banks, in relation to the Red river expedition.

“3. Letter of January 16, requesting a copy of the testimony before the court of inquiry of which Major General Hancock was president, in relation to the explosion of the mine and the attack upon Petersburg of 30th July, 1864.

“4. Letter of January 16, asking that Lieutenant General Grant may be informed of the desire of the committee to obtain testimony in relation to the battle before Petersburg, July 30, 1864, sent to the army of the Potomac for revision.



"5. Letter of January 17, requesting that Lieutenant General Grant, Major General Weitzel, and Lieutenant Colonel Comstock may be directed to appear before the Committee on the Conduct of the War.

"6. Letter of January 18, requesting that Major General Hooker may be directed to appear before the committee as soon as his duties will permit.

"I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

"EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

"Hon. B. F. WADE,

"*Chairman of Committee on the Conduct of the War.*"

Adjourned, to meet on call of the chairman.

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WASHINGTON, *January 27, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to call of its chairman: present, the chairman, Messrs. Gooch, Julian, and Loan.

The following witness was examined:

Sergeant C. W. Thurston.

The chairman informed the committee that Senator Buckalew, of Pennsylvania, had been appointed upon the committee, in place of Senator Harding, of Oregon, resigned.

Adjourned, to meet on call.

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WASHINGTON, *January 30, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to call: present, the chairman, Messrs. Gooch, Julian, Odell, and Loan.

The following witnesses were examined:

Mr. Albert D. Richardson;

Mr. Junius Henri Browne;

Mr. Alexander Arnold;

Colonel John S. Clark;

Brigadier General William Dwight.

The chairman laid before the committee a communication from the War Department, transmitting copies of correspondence in relation to the Red river expedition.

Adjourned, to meet on call.

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WASHINGTON, *February 1, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to call of the chairman: present, the chairman, Messrs. Gooch, Julian, and Loan.

The following witness was examined:

Brigadier General M. R. Patrick.

Adjourned till to-morrow at 11 o'clock.

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WASHINGTON, *February 4, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, and Loan.

The following witnesses were examined:

Brigadier General Thomas Kilby Smith;

Mr. George P. Floyd.

The chairman laid before the committee a communication from the Navy Department, transmitting correspondence in relation to operations against the defences of Wilmington.

Adjourned till Monday next at 10 o'clock.

WASHINGTON, *February 6, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Julian, Odell, and Loan.

The chairman laid before the committee a draught of a report to accompany the testimony taken in relation to the explosion of the mine, and the assault upon the enemy's lines before Petersburg, on the 30th of July, 1864.

The report was read.

Mr. CHANDLER moved that the report be adopted, and that the chairman be instructed to report the same, with the accompanying testimony, at once to the Senate.

Mr. ODELL said that, as he was not present when the testimony was taken, and had not been able to read it, he could not express an opinion upon the subject, and, therefore, could not vote for the adoption of the report.

The motion of Mr. Chandler was then agreed to.

Adjourned till 10 o'clock a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *February 7, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, and Loan.

The following witnesses were examined:

Major General William H. Emory;

Major General Godfrey Weitzel.

Mr. GOOCH laid before the committee the following resolutions of the House, which were ordered to be spread upon the journal:

“JANUARY 30, 1865.

“On motion of Mr. GRINNELL,

“*Resolved*, That the Committee on the Conduct of the War be directed to inquire into the treatment of the men, women, and children of African descent (made free by the President's proclamation) by the 14th army corps, commanded by Major General Jefferson C. Davis, of General Sherman's army, on its recent march from Atlanta to Savannah, and report thereon at their earliest convenience.”

“FEBRUARY 6, 1865.

“On motion of Mr. GARFIELD,

“*Resolved*, That the Committee on the Conduct of the War be directed to make a full investigation and report upon the military campaigns of Major General W. S. Rosecrans, from the beginning of his service in Western Virginia to the conclusion of his recent campaign in Missouri.”

Adjourned, to meet on call.

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WASHINGTON, *February 11, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to call of the chairman: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Julian, and Odell.

The following witnesses were examined:

Lieutenant General U. S. Grant;

Engineer Alban C. Stimers.

Adjourned, to meet on Monday next.

WASHINGTON, *February 13, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Julian, Odell, and Loan.

The chairman laid before the committee a draught of a report to accompany the testimony relating to the heavy ordnance now in use in the army and naval services of this government.

The report was read.

On motion of Mr. JULIAN the report was unanimously adopted, and the chairman was instructed to report the same, with the accompanying testimony, to the Senate.

Adjourned, to meet on call.

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WASHINGTON, *February 16, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to call of the chairman: present, the chairman, Messrs. Gooch, Julian, Odell, and Loan.

The following witnesses were examined:

Major General Henry W. Halleck;

Brigadier General William Dwight.

Adjourned till 10 a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *February 17, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, and Messrs. Gooch and Loan.

The following witness was examined:

B. F. Isherwood.

Adjourned, to meet on call.

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WASHINGTON, *February 28, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to call: present, the chairman, Messrs. Gooch, Odell, and Loan.

The following witness was examined:

Brevet Brigadier General C. B. Comstock.

Adjourned, to meet on call of its chairman.

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WASHINGTON, *March 6, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to call: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Buckalew, Gooch, Odell, and Loan.

Some discussion took place in regard to the course to be pursued by the committee under the concurrent resolution of the two houses of Congress extending their time for ninety days.

The concurrent resolution is as follows:

*“Resolved by the Senate of the United States, (the House of Representatives concurring,) That in order to enable the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War to complete their investigation of certain important matters now before them, and which they have not been able to complete, by reason of inability to obtain important witnesses, they be authorized to continue their sessions for thirty days after the close of the present Congress, and to place their testimony and reports in the hands of the Secretary of the Senate.*

*“Resolved, further, That the Secretary of the Senate is hereby directed to cause to be printed the reports and accompanying testimony of the Committee on the Conduct of the*

War 5,000 copies for the use of the Senate and 10,000 copies for the use of the House of Representatives of the present Congress.

“Passed by the Senate February 20, 1865.

“Passed by the House of Representatives March 1, 1865, with an amendment extending the time to ninety days.

“Amendment of the House concurred in by the Senate on March 2, 1865.”

Adjourned till 10 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, *March 7, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Buckalew, Gooch, Odell, and Loan.

The following witness was examined:

Rear-Admiral D. D. Porter.

Adjourned till 10 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, *March 9, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Buckalew, Gooch, and Loan.

The following witnesses were examined:

Mr. Wellington W. Withenbury;

Mr. John M. Martin.

On motion of Mr. BUCKALEW,

*Ordered*, That arrangements be made for the immediate printing of the testimony taken by the committee, and that the Superintendent of Public Printing be directed to furnish the committee with a dozen copies, in sheets, as the same may be printed, in order to enable the members more conveniently to examine the testimony previous to drawing up the report.

On motion of Mr. LOAN,

*Ordered*, That a sub-committee proceed to North Carolina, or such places as they may deem necessary, to take testimony of officers in the field relating to the Fort Fisher expedition.

On motion of Mr. LOAN,

*Ordered*, That the War Department be requested to notify General Rosecrans to appear before the committee to testify.

Adjourned till 10 a. m. on Saturday next.

WASHINGTON, *March 11, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Buckalew, Gooch, and Loan.

The following witness was examined:

Major General Joseph Hooker.

Adjourned till 10 a. m. on Monday next.

WASHINGTON, *March 13, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Buckalew, Gooch, and Loan.

The following witnesses were examined:

Major General Joseph Hooker;

Mr. Jesse H. Leavenworth.

On the suggestion of the chairman, who stated that he was obliged to be absent from the city for ten days or a fortnight, it was

*Ordered*, That such members of the committee as may be present be authorized to act as the committee, both in regard to taking testimony and such other action as they may deem necessary in the performance of the duties required of them by Congress.

Adjourned to 10 a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *March 14, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, Messrs. Buckalew, Gooch, and Loan.

The following witnesses were examined :

Mr. John S. Smith ;  
 Lieut. Comd'r K. R. Breese, U. S. N. ;  
 Lieut. Comd'r T. O. Selfridge, U. S. N. ;  
 Captain S. M. Robbins ;  
 Mr. D. D. Colley ;  
 Major Scott J. Anthony ;  
 Mr. S. G. Colley ;  
 John Lenthall.

Adjourned to 7 p. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *March 15, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, Messrs. Buckalew, Gooch, and Loan.

The following witnesses were examined :

Mr. John Evans ;  
 Mr. A. C. Hunt.

On motion of Mr. LOAN :

*Ordered*, That the Secretary of War be requested to furnish the committee with copies of all papers in the possession of the War Department relating to the attack by Colonel Chivington upon the Cheyennes, on Sand creek, on the 29th of November last.

On motion of Mr. LOAN :

*Ordered*, That a list of interrogatories be prepared and sent by mail to Colonel Chivington in relation to the attack by him upon the Indians on Sand creek.

Adjourned, to meet on call.

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WASHINGTON, *March 27, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to call of its chairman: present, the chairman and Messrs. Gooch and Julian.

Mr. GOOCH reported that on the 23d of March he had called upon Governor Yates, at his room, directed the stenographer to read to Governor Yates the testimony of Captain Breese, of the United States navy, relating to Governor Yates's visit to the department of the Gulf in the spring of 1864, and had then taken the testimony of Governor Yates upon the subject.

*Ordered*, That the testimony of Governor Yates be printed with the testimony relating to the Red river expedition.

The chairman stated that since his return he had been informed that General Halleck had refused to send for General Rosecrans, as requested by the committee on the 9th instant.

On motion of Mr. JULIAN :

*Ordered*, That the chairman prepare and send to General Rosecrans certain interrogatories, to be answered in writing ; or, if General Rosecrans prefer, summon him to appear before the committee.

On motion of Mr. GOOCH :

*Ordered*, That the Secretary of War be requested to furnish the committee with a statement of the amounts and cost of ice used at the various hospitals connected with the army.

On motion of Mr. JULIAN,

*Ordered*, That the chairman instruct the Sergeant-at-arms of the Senate to make arrangements to enable the committee to go to North Carolina, or wherever they may deem necessary, to take the testimony of officers in the field.

Adjourned, to meet on call.

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WASHINGTON, *April 15, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to call of its chairman: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, and Julian.

*Ordered*, That it be entered upon the journal that the committee, according to previous arrangement, left Washington for the purpose of taking testimony, in pursuance of the order of the committee of March 27; proceeded to Fortress Monroe, from thence to Richmond, Virginia; and then, in view of the uncertainty of being able to reach the witnesses desired, it was determined to return to Washington, where the committee arrived last night.

After some discussion in relation to the murder of Mr. Lincoln and the attempted assassination of Mr. Seward, and the consequent change in the administration,

On motion of Mr. CHANDLER,

The chairman was instructed to address the following communication to President Johnson:

COMMITTEE ROOM, CONDUCT OF THE WAR,  
*Washington, D. C., April 15, 1865.*

SIR: I have been instructed by the Committee on the Conduct of the War to inform you that your old associates upon that committee would be pleased to wait upon you at such time as may suit your convenience. They have just returned from the city of Richmond, where they saw and heard many things which they deem it would be well to make known to you at the present time. Please be kind enough to communicate to us what time would be agreeable to you to receive us.

I remain yours, respectfully,

B. F. WADE, *Chairman of Committee.*

ANDREW JOHNSON, *President of the United States.*

Adjourned to 10 a. m. on Monday next.

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WASHINGTON, *April 17, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, and Julian.

*Ordered*, That it be entered upon the journal that, in pursuance to appointment, the members of the committee present, accompanied by Hon. John Covode, by invitation of the committee, waited upon the President yesterday, and had an exceedingly satisfactory interview with him.

Adjourned, to meet on call.

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WASHINGTON, *April 21, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to call: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, and Julian.

The following witness was examined:

Colonel Charles C. Dwight.

Adjourned to 10 a. m. to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *April 22, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, and Julian.

The following witness was examined:

Major General W. S. Rosecrans.

Adjourned to 10 a. m. on Monday next.

WASHINGTON, *April 24, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, and Julian.

The following witness examined:

Major General W. S. Rosecrans.

On motion of Mr. GOOCH,

*Ordered*, That the War Department be requested to furnish the committee copies of the following papers: Official reports concerning the battle of Rich mountain, by General McClellan and General Rosecrans, with sub-reports accompanying the same. Official reports of General Grant and General Rosecrans of battles of Iuka and Corinth.

Adjourned to 10 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, *April 25, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch and Julian.

The following witness was examined:

Mr. B. F. Isherwood.

Adjourned, to meet on call.

WASHINGTON, *May 3, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to call: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Julian, and Loan.

The chairman stated that there had been no formal meeting of the committee since the 25th of April, but the members had had informal meetings in the committee-room; that he had been engaged in carefully reading the testimony taken by the committee, and directing the preparation of reports to accompany the same, which he was ready to submit to the committee.

After some discussion,

On motion of Mr. LOAN,

*Ordered*, That the committee proceed to-morrow to read and pass upon the reports prepared under the direction of the chairman.

Adjourned to 12 m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, *May 4, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Julian, and Loan.

The chairman laid before the committee written reports to accompany the testimony upon the following subjects:

The massacre of Cheyenne Indians,

Light-draught monitors, and

Fort Fisher expedition.

The reports were severally read, and after discussion and amendment, were agreed to.

On motion of Mr. LOAN,

*Resolved*, That a copy of the report and accompanying testimony in relation to the massacre of Cheyenne Indians, on the 29th of November last, be submitted to the President of the United States; and that he be informed that it is the opinion of the Committee on the Conduct of the War that Governor Evans, of Colorado Territory, should be immediately removed from office, and that Colonel Chivington and Major Anthony should be at once arrested and brought before a military commission for trial, for acts unbecoming officers of the United States military service, and violating the usages of civilized warfare.

Adjourned to 12 m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, *May 5, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Julian, and Loan.

The chairman laid before the committee written reports to accompany the testimony upon the following subjects:

Army of the Potomac—General Hooker; and Red river expedition.

The reports were severally read, and, after discussion and amendment, were agreed to.

Mr. GOOCH said, in relation to the report upon the Red river expedition; that he differed from the conclusions in the report, and therefore he could not vote in favor of its adoption. He, therefore, asked leave to prepare and submit a statement expressing his views upon the subject, to accompany the report of the committee.

Leave was accordingly granted.

On motion of Mr. GOOCH,

*Ordered,* That the War Department be requested to furnish the committee with copies of the reports of General Howard and General Devens in relation to the battle of Chancellorsville.

On motion of Mr. CHANDLER,

*Ordered,* That the committee proceed to investigate the terms of surrender lately proposed to the rebel armies by Generals Grant and Sherman, and that the War Department be requested to direct Generals Grant, Sherman, and Weitzel, to appear before the committee as witnesses.

Adjourned to 1 p. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, *May 6, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Julian, and Loan.

The chairman laid before the committee a written report to accompany the testimony upon the following subject:

Army of the Potomac—General Meade.

The report was read, and, after discussion and amendment, was agreed to.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. on Monday next.

WASHINGTON, *May 8, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Julian, and Loan.

On motion of Mr. JULIAN,

*Ordered,* That the chairman be instructed to audit the accounts of the members of the committee, as rendered by them, for expenses incurred upon service of the committee; and also to audit the accounts of the stenographer and clerk.

Adjourned, to meet on call.

WASHINGTON, *May 15, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to the call of its chairman: present, the chairman, Messrs. Chandler, Gooch, Julian, and Loan.

After discussion,

On motion by Mr. CHANDLER,

*Resolved,* That the committee insist that Generals Sherman and Weitzel shall appear before them as witnesses at the earliest opportunity; and to that end, respectfully request that the Secretary of War make peremptory orders to that effect, unless considerations of public interest render it absolutely impracticable.

The chairman laid before the committee a brief general report, to accompany the special reports and testimony.



The report was agreed to.

Two or three of the members having expressed a desire to return home soon, if their presence here was not really necessary,

On motion of Mr. LOAN,

*Ordered*, That such members of the committee as remain in the city be authorized to take the testimony of those witnesses who have been sent for, but have not yet appeared before the committee; and that when that has been done, or sooner if they shall deem it advisable, the chairman shall deliver to the Secretary of the Senate the reports already adopted, together with the accompanying testimony; whereupon the committee shall be adjourned *sine die*.

Adjourned, to meet on call.

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WASHINGTON, *May 18, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to call: present, the chairman, Messrs. Gooch and Loan.

The following witnesses were examined:

Lieutenant General U. S. Grant;

Major General Godfrey Weitzel.

General Weitzel stated that the first notification he had received that the committee desired him to appear before them was on the night of the 16th instant, while he was in Virginia.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. on Saturday next.

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WASHINGTON, *May 20, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, and Mr. Loan.

The chairman laid before the committee a communication from Major General W. T. Sherman, dated the 19th instant, stating that he had just received, for the first time, notice that the committee desired him to appear before them, and that he would appear at such time as the committee might name.

On motion of Mr. LOAN,

*Ordered*, That the chairman notify General Sherman that the committee will take his testimony on Monday next.

Adjourned to 11 a. m. on Monday next.

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WASHINGTON, *May 22, 1865.*

The committee met pursuant to adjournment: present, the chairman, and Mr. Loan.

The following witness was examined:

Major General W. T. Sherman.

No further business appearing before the committee, in pursuance of order of 15th instant,

The committee adjourned *sine die*.

B. F. WADE. *Chairman.*



# ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

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The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War submit the following report :

## GENERAL HOOKER.

General Hooker was assigned to the command of the army of the Potomac on the 26th of January, 1863, succeeding General Burnside. At that time that army was encamped on the north bank of the Rappahannock, in the vicinity of Fredericksburg, Virginia, the Rappahannock river separating it from the army of the enemy under General Lee. The condition of the army of the Potomac at the time General Hooker assumed the command of it is well described by him in his testimony, together with the measures he took to render it more efficient. The statements of General Hooker are fully borne out by the testimony of other witnesses. He says :

“It (the army of the Potomac) had recently returned from two unsuccessful efforts to cross the river and drive the enemy from his position ; the first resulting so disastrously as to render a second effort soon after, even with propitious weather, almost futile. Before the second effort ended, the winter rains set in, and all operations for a while were suspended ; the army literally finding itself buried in mud, from which there was no hope of extrication before spring.

“With this prospect before it, taken in connexion with the gloom and despondency which followed the disaster of Fredericksburg, the army was in a forlorn, deplorable condition. Reference to the letters from the army at this time, public and private, affords abundant evidence of its demoralization ; and these in their turn had their effect upon the friends and relatives of the soldiers at home. At the time the army was turned over to me desertions were at the rate of about 200 a day. So anxious were parents, wives, brothers and sisters to relieve their kindred, that they filled the express trains to the army with packages of citizen clothing to assist them in escaping from service. At that time perhaps a majority of the officers, especially those high in rank, were hostile to the policy of the government in the conduct of the war. The emancipation proclamation had been published a short time before, and a large element of the army had taken sides antagonistic to it, declaring that they never would have embarked in the war had they anticipated this action of the government. When rest came to the army, the disaffected, from whatever cause, began to show themselves, and make their influence felt in and out of the camps.

“I may also state that at the moment I was placed in command I caused a return to be made of the absentees of the army, and found the number to be 2,922 commissioned officers, and 81,964 non-commissioned officers and privates. These were scattered all over the country, and the majority were absent from causes unknown. A copy of this return was furnished the commanding general of the army.

\* \* \* \* \*

"My first object was to prevent desertion; and when this was accomplished my whole attention was directed to securing the return of absentees, and rendering those present as comfortable and contented as circumstances would allow. I granted leaves of absence and furloughs to a limited extent, and in such manner as to enable all to be absent for a few days in the course of the winter. The disloyal officers were dismissed the service as soon as evidence of the fact was brought to my knowledge. The express trains were examined by the provost marshal, and all citizen clothing found was burned.

"Important changes were introduced into the various staff departments, and especially in that of the inspector general, which was thoroughly organized and filled with the most competent officers I could select in the army. Believing idleness to be the great evil of all armies, every effort was made to keep the troops employed; and whenever the weather would permit it they were engaged in field exercises.

"The cavalry was consolidated and placed in a higher state of efficiency than had before been known in our service; and whenever the state of the roads and the rivers would admit of a movement, expeditions were fitted out to attack the enemy's pickets and outposts, and gather supplies from the country in their possession; my object being to encourage and stimulate in the breasts of our men by successes, however small, a feeling of superiority over our adversaries. In this we were eminently successful. The infantry grew in confidence, and the cavalry in all their encounters acquired a character in both armies before unknown to that arm of the service.

"Our artillery had always been superior to that of the rebels, as was also our infantry, except in discipline; and that, for reasons not necessary to mention, never did equal Lee's army. With a rank and file vastly inferior to our own, intellectually and physically, that army had, by discipline alone, acquired a character for steadiness and efficiency unsurpassed, in my judgment, in ancient or modern times. We have not been able to rival it, nor has there been any near approximation to it in the other rebel armies.

"During the time allowed us for preparation the army made rapid strides in discipline, instruction, and *morale*, and early in April was in a condition to inspire the highest expectations. Its ranks had been filled by the return of absentees. All were actuated by feelings of confidence and devotion to the cause, and I felt that it was a living army, and one well worthy of the republic.

"Early in April, though the roads were still heavy and impracticable for artillery and wagons, I believed that the army was in condition to march on the enemy; and as I had about 40,000 nine-months and two-years men, whose terms of service would soon expire, I felt it necessary to commence operations at the earliest practicable moment."

The instructions given to General Hooker, and he says the only instructions he received for his government, will be found in the following extract from a letter from General Halleck under date of January 31, 1863:

"In regard to the operations of your own army, you can best judge when and where it can move to the greatest advantage, keeping in view always the importance of covering Washington and Harper's Ferry, either directly or by so operating as to be able to punish any force of the enemy sent against them."

General Hooker organized a campaign to start about the 13th of April, the cavalry under General Stoneman to proceed up the Rappahannock for some distance, then cross and sweep down behind General Lee's position and sever his communications with Richmond; the infantry then to cross below Fredericksburg and attack or pursue Lee's army, as occasion might require. But shortly after the cavalry

started a heavy rain-storm set in, which rendered the river impassable, and further operations were suspended until a more favorable opportunity should present itself.

It may be well to notice, in connexion with this movement, that General Hooker speaks in his testimony of the enemy having obtained information from the reports of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, with the accompanying testimony, of such crossings on the Rappahannock in the vicinity of Fredericksburg as were deemed by our officers to afford practical facilities for offensive operations, and had consequently taken measures to perfect their means of defence at the exposed points, thus rendering it the more difficult for our forces to operate successfully along that line. That General Hooker is laboring under a very erroneous impression will be seen at once by reference to the dates of the committee's report and the proposed movement by him. The movement was begun by the cavalry on the 13th of April. The committee submitted their reports to the Secretary of the Senate on the 6th of April, but one week before, and they were immediately sent to the government printer. The reports and accompanying testimony were not printed and distributed for some time after the committee concluded their labors. The enemy, therefore, could have derived no information from them which could have affected the movement begun on the 13th of April.

Towards the close of April General Hooker organized another movement, more comprehensive in its scope than the first, and different in its scene of operations. The cavalry portion was to perform about the same part which had been before assigned to it, viz., to strike and sever the communications of the rebel army with Richmond. In regard to the infantry, the principal scene of operations was transferred from below to above the city of Fredericksburg, and it seems to have been expected that a fatal blow would be struck at the rebel army under General Lee. The 1st, 3d, and 6th corps were left in the vicinity of Fredericksburg, under the command of General Sedgwick. The 5th, 11th, and 12th corps were ordered to move up the river and cross the Rappahannock and Rapidan and establish themselves in the vicinity of Chancellorsville. The movement was carried out with such secrecy and despatch that by the night of the 30th the position designated had been gained, with but little opposition from the enemy. This column General Hooker states did not exceed 36,000 men. Two divisions of the 2d corps, under General Couch, were held in readiness to take position at the United States ford so soon as the movement of the main column should render it practicable, and when the line had been established at Chancellorsville those divisions were directed to join the main column.

During these operations, the left of the army, under general Sedgwick, carried out the operations directed by the commanding general. The whole movement appears to have been conducted with little or no serious opposition from the enemy. Up to the morning of the 1st of May everything was favorable. On the 30th of April the 3d corps was ordered to join the right at Chancellorsville. On the 1st

of May a demonstration was made by the right of the army under the following order :

[Circular.]

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC,

“Chancellorsville, May 1, 1863.

“The 5th corps, including three batteries, will be thrown on to the river road by the most direct route; the head of it advanced to near midway between Mott and Golin runs. The movement to be masked by small parties thrown out in advance, and to be completed at 2 o'clock.

“The 12th corps, including its batteries, will be massed below the plank road, the head of it resting near Tabernacle church, and masked from the view of the enemy by small advance parties, and the movement to be completed at 12 o'clock, to enable the 11th corps to take its position.

“One division of the 2d corps, with one battery, will take a position at Tod's tavern, and will throw out strong detachments on the approaches in the direction of the enemy.

“The other divisions and batteries of the corps will be massed out of the road near Chancellorsville; these dispositions to be made at once.

“The 3d corps will be massed as fast as it arrives, about one mile from Chancellorsville, on the United States ford road, excepting one brigade with a battery, which will take position at Dowdall's tavern.

“General Pleasonton will hold his command, excepting those otherwise engaged, at Chancellorsville.

“After the movement commences headquarters will be at Tabernacle church.

“The 11th corps, with its batteries, will be massed on the plank road, about one mile in rear of the 12th; this movement to be completed at 2 o'clock.

“By command of Major General Hooker.

“WM. L. CANDLER,

“*Captain and Aide-de-Camp.*”

At that time the right of the Union army had obtained a position at Chancellorsville, about 11 miles distant from the city of Fredericksburg. The rebel army, under General Lee, had advanced from Fredericksburg to meet the movement of the Union army, and had taken position some three or four miles from Chancellorsville, and between that place and Fredericksburg. A force of from 8,000 to 10,000 men, consisting of Early's division and Barksdale's brigade, had been left by General Lee at Fredericksburg to hold that position and the rebel lines below. The two principal armies were separated by broken ground, covered with dense and almost impenetrable forests, traversed by deep ravines running at right angles to the Rappahannock.

The movement contemplated by the foregoing order was commenced. As the heads of the columns emerged from the dense forest, the enemy were discovered advancing in line of battle. General Hooker states that being satisfied, from the nature of the ground, that he could not throw his troops through the forest fast enough to resist the rebel advance, he gave instructions for his troops to return to the position they had just left, and there await the advance of the enemy. The enemy continued to advance, but were promptly and easily repulsed. The day closed without further active operations of importance on either side.

Early in the morning of the next day, May 2, orders were given for the 1st corps, under General Reynolds, to join the right of the army, leaving with General Sedgwick, opposite Fredericksburg, the entire 6th corps, and one division of the 2d corps, under General Gibbon. On the same morning General Hooker made an examination of his entire line at Chancellorsville, returning to his headquarters about nine o'clock. Not feeling satisfied with the dispositions made on the extreme right, held by the 11th and 12th corps, the following instructions were issued at half past nine a. m. :

[Circular.]

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“*Chancellorsville, May 2, 1863—9.30 a. m.*”

“I am directed by the major general commanding to say that the disposition you have made of your corps has been with a view to a front attack by the enemy. If he should throw himself upon your flank, he wishes you to examine the ground and determine upon the positions you will take in that event, in order that you may be prepared for him in whatever direction he advances. He suggests that you have heavy reserves well in hand to meet this contingency. The right of your line does not appear to be strong enough. No artificial defences worth naming have been thrown up, and there appears to be a scarcity of troops at that point, and not, in the general's opinion, as favorably posted as might be.

“We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right. Please advance your pickets, for purposes of observation, as far as may be safe, in order to obtain timely information of their approach.

“JAMES H. VAN ALLEN,

“*Brigadier General and A. D. C.*”

“Major General SLOCUM and Major General HOWARD.”

About the time General Hooker returned to his headquarters from the examination of his lines, information was brought to him that a heavy column of the enemy were moving towards his right, evidently for the purpose of making a flank movement. The foregoing instructions were promptly sent to the generals commanding the forces holding the right of our line, and General Sickles, with two divisions of his corps, (the 3d,) was ordered to advance and follow up the movement of the enemy, which was concealed from view to a great extent by the woods in front of our line. General Sickles advanced with great promptness, but did not reach the line of the enemy's movement until the main column had passed; still, in time to capture a large number of its rear-guard. From those prisoners it was ascertained that this column of the enemy consisted of Jackson's corps, numbering about 25,000 men, and that their route was over a by-road through the forest, passing diagonally across the front of the Union lines and approaching within two or three miles of the right of the 11th corps, which occupied the extreme right of the army.

About six o'clock in the afternoon a rattling fire of musketry was heard on the right, but nothing indicating a very serious engagement. Almost immediately, however, from some cause not fully evident from the testimony, the extreme right division of the 11th corps was stampeded, and, flying along the line of the 11th corps, threw that

whole corps into confusion and swept it from the field. Steps were at once taken to arrest the fugitives and prevent the panic being extended to the whole army. Berry's division of the 3d corps and a brigade of the 2d corps were directed to cover the rear of the 11th corps, and, if possible, to retake and hold the position they had abandoned. This, however, they were unable to do, the enemy occupying it in great force before our troops could reach it.

It will be remembered that some hours before General Sickles, with two divisions of his corps, had been ordered to advance for the purpose of operating against the column of the enemy under Jackson. The giving way of the right left General Sickles in a very exposed and critical position; but, upon being informed of the condition of affairs, he at once took measures to withdraw his force, which was successfully done, and without much loss. The enemy under Jackson continued to advance after the panic-stricken troops, until checked by General Pleasanton, who had collected and brought into position some artillery for that purpose. Although a cavalry officer, he handled the artillery with exceeding great judgment and effectiveness. His skill, energy, daring, and promptness upon this occasion contributed greatly to arrest the disaster which for a time threatened the whole army. His conduct upon this and many other occasions marks him as one of the ablest generals in our service, and as deserving of far higher consideration than, from some cause, he appears to have received.

It was during this attack that the rebel General Jackson was mortally wounded. The enemy were repulsed with great loss, and active operations ceased for the night. While this action was taking place on the right, an attack was made by General Lee upon the positions of the 12th and 2d corps, which attack was promptly repulsed.

In relation to the condition of affairs at the close of this action, General Hooker states:

"This was the condition of affairs when night overtook us. General Berry, after going, perhaps, three-fourths of a mile, reported that the enemy was already in possession of ground commanding my position, and that he had been compelled to establish his line in the valley on the Chancellorsville side of that high ground. As soon as this was communicated to me, I directed Generals Warren and Comstock to trace out a new line, which I pointed out to them on the map, and to do it that night, as I should not be able to hold the one I then occupied after the enemy should renew his attack the next morning.

"The bad conduct of the 11th corps had cost me the key of my position, and had very much embarrassed me by contracting my sphere of action. The position which had been held by the left of that corps was the most commanding one in the vicinity. In the possession of the enemy it would enable him with his artillery to enfilade the lines held by the 12th and 2d corps. He could drive from the plain, in front of the Chancellorsville house, all the artillery posted to command the junction of the plank road and the old pike; and he could drive from the plain all the force that might be upon it. To wrest this position from the enemy, after his batteries were established on it, would have required slender columns of infantry, which he could destroy as fast as they were thrown upon it.

\* \* \* \* \*

"Every disposition was made of our forces to hold our line as long as practicable, for the purpose of being in readiness to co-operate with the movement which had been ordered to be made on our left [under General Sedgwick.]"



While these operations were being conducted by the right of the army, the left, under General Sedgwick, had been engaged in making demonstrations before Fredericksburg and in its immediate vicinity; but nothing of importance had taken place there up to the close of the day of May 2.

After the close of operations on the right on that day, the following order was sent to General Sedgwick :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“Chancellorsville, Va., May 2, 1863—9 p. m.

“The major general commanding directs that you cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, on the receipt of this order, and at once take up your line of march on the Chancellorsville road, until you connect with him, and will attack and destroy any force you may fall in with on the road.

“You will leave all your trains behind except pack trains of your ammunition, and march to be in the vicinity of the general at daylight. You will probably fall upon the rear of the forces commanded by General Lee, and between you and the major general commanding he expects to use him up. Send word to General Gibbon to take possession of Fredericksburg. Be sure not to fail.

“JAMES H. VAN ALLEN,  
“Brigadier General and Aide-de-Camp

“Major General SEDGWICK.”

At midnight the following was also sent to General Sedgwick :

“MAY 2, 1863—12 midnight.

“Major General SEDGWICK :

“From the statements brought by General Hooker’s aid, it seems to be of vital importance that you should fall upon Lee’s rear with crushing force. He will explain all to you. Give your advance to one who will do all that the urgency of the case requires.

“DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,  
“Major General, Chief of Staff”

General Hooker also testifies :

“In order that there might be no failure about the movement, I also despatched General Warren to General Sedgwick, as that officer was familiar with the localities about Fredericksburg, and was informed of my own position, and could explain it to him. I pointed out to General Warren on the map where I wanted the 6th corps to go, and told him what time I desired it to be there. I also impressed upon him the necessity of a prompt compliance with my orders on the part of General Sedgwick.”

With General Gibbon to hold Fredericksburg with his division, General Sedgwick was left with his entire corps, amounting to from 22,000 to 25,000 men, to make the movement directed by General Hooker. The force of the enemy occupying the defences of Fredericksburg consisted of Early’s division and Barksdale’s brigade, amounting to perhaps 10,000 men. The main portion of the rebel army was confronting the force under General Hooker, some seven or eight miles above Fredericksburg.

General Sedgwick commenced his movement, but it was conducted slowly, and with but little energy. No demonstration was made on the heights of Fredericksburg until after daylight of the morning of

the 3d of May, and the assault that resulted in carrying the heights was not made until 11 o'clock in the day. By that time the enemy, discovering the movement, had sent re-enforcements to Fredericksburg, and were enabled to offer a pretty determined resistance to the assault. No advance was made beyond the heights until 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The 6th corps then moved forward, meeting small bodies of the enemy, which were driven before them. On the 4th of May some slight encounters took place, and General Sedgwick took his force to Banks's ford, and that night recrossed the Rappahannock.

From the testimony, which gives these transactions much more in detail than the committee deem necessary in their report, it will be seen that nearly all the witnesses concur in the opinion that the movement of General Sedgwick was not made with that energy and promptness which the peremptory character of his orders demanded and the importance of the emergency required; that the movement directed by General Hooker was perfectly feasible, and if his orders had been promptly carried out by General Sedgwick, in all probability a fatal blow would have been struck Lee's army. As it was, however, the movement was made without promptness and energy, was executed but partially, and proved entirely ineffective for the purpose for which it was ordered.

In reference to the operations on the right on the 3d of May, General Hooker says:

"The attack was renewed by the enemy about 7 o'clock in the morning, and was bravely resisted, with the limited number of troops I could bring into action, until 11 o'clock, when orders were given for the army to establish itself on its new line. This it did in good order. The position I abandoned was one that I had held at disadvantage, and I kept the troops on it as long as I did only for the purpose of enabling me to hear of the approach of the force under General Sedgwick."

The 3d corps, under General Sickles, received the brunt of this attack by the enemy. The corps fought most gallantly, losing very heavily. It was shortly after this attack commenced that General Hooker was injured by a cannon ball knocking against him a pillar of the house in which he was at the time. During the time he was incapacitated by this injury the command devolved upon General Couch as the senior officer. There seems to have been some confusion in relation to the conduct of affairs while General Hooker was disabled. The testimony fully proves that the want of energetic and prompt direction, while the action was in progress, prevented our forces from obtaining the advantage over the enemy which would otherwise have been gained.

No further active operations were carried on by either the right of our army or that of the enemy after the attack on Sunday. On Tuesday a heavy rain-storm set in, which raised the water in the Rappahannock so as to endanger the pontoon bridges; in fact, carrying away portions of them. The 11th corps had become so demoralized as not to be regarded as very efficient. The 6th corps, under General Sedgwick, had recrossed to the north side of the river. The cavalry,

under General Stoneman, had not been heard from. It was afterwards ascertained that he had failed almost entirely to accomplish the object of his expedition, viz: the severing of Lee's communications with Richmond. Under these circumstances, and in view of his instructions to cover Washington and Harper's Ferry, General Hooker decided to recross the river and return to his old camp. The army recrossed, without opposition from the enemy, during the night of Tuesday and morning of Wednesday, the 5th and 6th of May.

It would appear, from all the testimony, that there were three causes, perhaps four, which contributed much to render this campaign unsuccessful after it had been so successfully begun. Those causes were, the stampede of the 11th corps on the 1st of May, by which the enemy were enabled to obtain the possession of ground which commanded the position of the Union army at Chancellorsville; then the injury which General Hooker sustained on the morning of the 3d of May, by which the army was deprived of the direction which was so necessary at that time; then the failure by General Sedgwick to carry out the orders he had received to fall upon the rear of Lee's forces early on the morning of the 3d; and the entire failure of the cavalry, under General Stoneman, to perform the part assigned to it, the severing Lee's communications with Richmond.

In connexion with this Chancellorsville campaign, your committee have felt it their duty to investigate the report, so widely and industriously circulated in this and other countries, that General Hooker was under the influence of intoxicating liquor and incapacitated from exercising command during the latter portion of the campaign. The charge was one of so grave a character that your committee felt it should be fully investigated. It was either true or false. If true, then, as soon as established by sufficient proof, the officer who could be so regardless of his position and the important interests committed to his charge should be instantly dismissed the service. If false, then those who had circulated so atrocious a slander against a faithful public servant, who was perilling his life in defence of his country, without full authority to support the accusation, should be exposed and held up to the scorn of all honorable men.

Your committee have examined such officers of General Hooker's staff, and others who came before them, as from their position and opportunities would be presumed to have the most accurate knowledge upon the subject, and all, without exception, have testified that the charge was utterly unfounded. The examination upon this point would not have been pressed further but for one fact. There had appeared in the public press of England, and also in leading journals of this country, what purported to be a statement of some remarks made by Rev. Henry Ward Beecher on the 5th of July, 1863, at a breakfast given by the National Temperance League, in England. The *New York Independent*, generally recognized as Mr. Beecher's organ, in its issue of July 30, 1863, had copied that statement from an English paper, the *Alliance*, with editorial comments. The extract is as follows:

"If it were fit he (Mr. Beecher) could point out several great misfortunes which had befallen the north on the field, owing entirely to the drunkenness of officers. The battle of Chancellorsville was lost from this cause; but he had heard it from almost direct authority that the general thus implicated, knowing his weakness, had been previously abstaining, but that having received a severe contusion he had been prescribed whiskey medicinally, and it was taking it for that purpose that the old appetite had been revived and had overcome him."

Upon which the Independent proceeds to comment thus :

"Mr. Beecher stated this as a private communication; but the case of intemperance referred to is no secret here. That General Hooker was drunk, and thereby lost the battle of Chancellorsville, has been published wherever the English language is read; and it is due to the inculpated general that the explanation furnished by Mr. Beecher should be made known."

Accordingly, on the 18th of March, 1864, the chairman addressed a letter to Mr. Beecher in pursuance of the following order of the committee :

"*Ordered*, That the chairman of this committee be instructed to address a letter to Rev. Henry Ward Beecher, informing him that the committee, in their examination concerning the battle of Chancellorsville, have not yet been able to obtain any testimony to substantiate the charge that General Hooker was under the influence of intoxicating liquor there; and inasmuch as he (Mr. Beecher) is reported to have made that charge in his addresses last year in England, the committee desire him to give them his authority for the charge, and the names of reliable witnesses to substantiate the same."

Not receiving any reply, on the 4th of April, 1864, the chairman again addressed a letter to Mr. Beecher, in pursuance of the following order of the committee :

"*Ordered*, That inasmuch as no reply has been received from Reverend Henry Ward Beecher to the letter of the committee of the 18th ultimo, the chairman of this committee is hereby instructed to again address Mr. Beecher as before."

To this second communication he received the following reply :

"BROOKLYN, *April 6, 1864.*

"DEAR SIR: I did not make any 'public' remarks about General Hooker while in England. At a breakfast of temperance men, strictly confidential, and pledged to make no report of proceedings, I alluded to Hooker's condition. My remarks were published in violation of confidence.

"As to my evidence, it was such as to produce moral conviction, but not to establish the fact legally, that, during the last part of the battle of Chancellorsville, Hooker was under the influence of liquor.

"I do not feel at liberty to mention my informant until I can see him and get his permission.

"I am very truly yours,

"H. W. BEECHER.

"B. F. WADE, Esq."

Your committee regret to state that, although Mr. Beecher's attention was twice called to the subject, and he was explicitly asked, each time, to give his authority with the names of reliable witnesses to substantiate the charge he had circulated, he has made no reply to them but the one above quoted.

After the close of the Chancellorsville campaign, active operations

by the army of the Potomac were suspended for some time. Quite a large number of troops, whose time had expired, were mustered out of the service, and measures were adopted to reorganize the army so far as that was rendered necessary by the withdrawal of so many troops.

Towards the close of May it became evident that General Lee was making preparations for some important movement. General Hooker soon satisfied himself that it was a movement in which the whole rebel army, under Lee, would take part; and that he was probably contemplating a movement similar to the one which resulted in the battle of Antietam the year before. Comprehending its importance, and the necessity for prompt and energetic measures to meet it, he submitted the following proposition to the consideration of the President in a letter dated June 5, 1863:

"In view of these contemplated movements of the enemy, I cannot too forcibly impress upon the mind of his excellency the President the necessity of having one commander for all the troops whose operations can have an influence on those of Lee's army.

"Under the present system all independent commanders are in ignorance of the movements of the others; at least such is my situation. I trust that I may not be considered in the way of this arrangement, as it is a position I do not desire, but only suggest, as I feel the necessity for concert as well as vigor of action. It is necessary for me to say this much, that my motives may not be misunderstood."

This proposition was submitted by the President to General Halleck, who wrote General Hooker on that point:

"Heintzelman and Dix are instructed to telegraph directly to you all movements which they may ascertain or make. Directions have also been given to forward military information which may be received from General Schenck's command. Any movements you may suggest in these commands will be ordered if practicable."

General Hooker testified in regard to this:

"This was the first intimation I received from any quarter that I held the relation to General Dix and to General Heintzelman communicated to me in the despatch of the general commanding the army. It was then I called on those officers for the strength of their commands, the positions of their troops, and the movements, if any, they were making. But, at the same time, no authority was given me over them, nor was any commander appointed."

The testimony gives in detail the movements of the enemy and the movements made by General Hooker to meet them. Your committee do not deem it necessary, however, to do more than to state the general result of his operations, referring to two or three of the more important incidents connected with the movement. It being evident that General Lee had determined upon a movement into Maryland, and perhaps further north, the army of the Potomac abandoned its position in the vicinity of Fredericksburg, and moved by an interior line to the neighborhood of Washington, forcing Lee to pass along the Shenandoah valley line. As soon as information was received that the main body of Lee's army had crossed the Potomac, the army of the Potomac was crossed at Edwards's ferry, and assembled in the neighborhood of Frederick, Maryland.

While these operations were being carried on, General Pleasanton, in command of the cavalry, had an engagement with the cavalry of the enemy at Beverly ford, about the 8th of June, in which, though opposed by superior numbers, he succeeded in inflicting severe loss, and establishing a character for our cavalry which it has ever since maintained. He again met the enemy at Aldie, about the 20th of June, when our cavalry behaved with great gallantry and fully sustained their character for bravery and efficiency. These appear to have been the only engagements with the enemy of any importance during this period.

On the 24th of June, General Hooker sent his chief of staff, General Butterfield, to Washington and Baltimore, with instructions to make certain representations to the President and General Halleck, and "to organize a column of 15,000, to move without delay to Frederick." On the 27th of June, General Butterfield reported that he had visited Washington, but failed to obtain any troops there. He then proceeded to Baltimore, and had an interview with General Schenck, who gave him full authority to take from his (General Schenck's) command whatever troops could be used for the purpose General Hooker had in view; but that he had been able to organize a column of only about 2,500 strong, General Lockwood's brigade, which he had put on the road according to instructions.

It will be seen, upon examination of the testimony and accompanying documents, that from the time there were indications of what might be the character and extent of the campaign upon which Lee was entering, General Hooker had urged upon the authorities at Washington the necessity of employing actively against the rebel army all the troops which could be used for that purpose. He urged that the best way to defend Washington and Baltimore was to defeat Lee's army, and that all efforts should be directed to that end. He was not able, however, to obtain any material addition to his own immediate army, and was not clothed with the authority he deemed necessary to enable him to perform the duty required of him.

The immediate cause for General Hooker asking to be relieved from the command of the army of the Potomac was a difficulty between him and General Halleck in relation to the disposition to be made of the force at Harper's Ferry. That force consisted of 10,000 men, under the command of General French, and was embraced within the command of General Hooker. On the 27th of June he gave orders for the 12th corps to hold itself in readiness to march at 4 a. m. the next day, to be joined by a portion of General French's command; with this force it was intended to strike at the rebel communications across the Potomac, in order to cripple his supplies, "and also to intercept the commerce that Ewell had established in flour, grain, horses and horned cattle, which he was constantly sending to the rear."

The day before, the 26th, General Hooker had telegraphed General Halleck as follows :

“JUNE 26, 1863—7 p. m.

“Major General HALLECK :

“Is there any reason why Maryland heights should not be abandoned, after the public stores and property are removed? I propose to visit the place to-morrow, on my way to Frederick, to satisfy myself on that point. It must be borne in mind that I am here with a force inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, and must have every available man to use in the field.

“JOSEPH HOOKER,  
“Major General, Commanding.”

General Hooker testifies that he proceeded the next day to Harper's Ferry, made an examination of the place, and—

“After ascertaining that the public property could all be removed before 12 o'clock at night, I seated myself and was engaged in writing an order for its abandonment at daylight, when I received the following despatch from General Halleck :

“WAR DEPARTMENT, June 27, 1863—10.30 a. m.

“Major General HOOKER :

\* \* \* \* \*  
“Maryland heights have always been regarded as an important point to be held by us, and much expense and labor incurred in fortifying them. I cannot approve their abandonment except in case of absolute necessity.

“H. W. HALLECK,  
“General-in-Chief.”

To this General Hooker replied as follows :

“JUNE 27, 1863—1 p. m.

“Major General HALLECK :

“Have received your telegram in regard to Harper's Ferry. I find 10,000 men in condition here to take the field. Here they are of no earthly account; they cannot defend a ford on the river, and as far as Harper's Ferry is concerned, there is nothing of it. As for the fortifications, the work of the troops, they remain when the troops are withdrawn. No enemy will ever take possession of them; this is my opinion. All the public property could have been removed to-night, and the troops marched to where they would have been of some service; now they are but a bait for the rebels, should they return.

“I beg that this may be presented to the Secretary of War, and his Excellency the President.

“JOSEPH HOOKER,  
“Major General, Commanding.”

General Hooker testifies :

“On finding that I was not allowed to manœuvre my own army in the presence of the enemy, and conscious that I was standing in the way of the accomplishment of its mission, on the same day, the 27th of June, I sent General Halleck the following telegram :

“JUNE 27, 1863—1 p. m.

“Major General HALLECK :

“My original instructions were to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington. I have now imposed on me, in addition, an enemy in my front of more than my numbers. I beg to be understood, respectfully but firmly, that I am unable to comply with these conditions with the means at my disposal, and I earnestly request that I may be at once relieved from the position I occupy.

“JOSEPH HOOKER,  
“Major General, Commanding.”

General Hooker thereupon proceeded to Frederick, and directed the 12th corps to march to that place. On the following morning, June 28, Colonel Hardie arrived with an order from General Halleck relieving General Hooker from command, and directing him to turn it over to General Meade; and with that ended his connexion with the army of the Potomac.

In concluding their review of the operations of the army of the Potomac while under the command of General Hooker, your committee would say that while all the testimony establishes the fact that the rank and file had great confidence in him as a leader, this feeling was not shared by many officers of high rank. Indeed, it would appear that the impression prevailed that the general-in-chief was not friendly to him, and some of the witnesses state that that impression had its influence upon the feelings of the officers of the army. General Hooker states that at the time he received his appointment as commander of the army of the Potomac, he had reliable information that General Halleck had opposed his appointment; and that the only request he made of the President at the time he assumed the command was that he (the President) should stand between him and General Halleck. General Sickles testifies that many officers in the army were decidedly hostile to General Hooker, and that that feeling was strengthened by the well-known fact that General Halleck was hostile to him; and that the partisans of General McClellan, then in high command, were hostile to General Hooker. General Birney testifies that there was among officers high in rank a feeling against General Hooker. General Butterfield testifies that it was always the impression of General Hooker and officers about headquarters that General Halleck was unfavorable to him, and that he believes that was the sole reason why General Hooker asked to be relieved from command. Other witnesses testify that many officers entertained a want of confidence in him after the battle of Chancellorsville. This would appear to have been brought to the attention of the President, for in a letter to General Hooker, dated May 14, 1863, he writes:

“I must tell you I have some painful intimations that some of your corps and division commanders are not giving you their entire confidence. This would be ruinous, if true, and you should, therefore, first of all ascertain the real facts beyond all possibility of doubt.”

Upon the receipt of that letter, General Hooker, as he states, called upon the President, and ascertained from whom he had derived that information. He stated to the President that he did not desire to suspect any one wrongfully of a hostile feeling towards him, and asked the President to ascertain the feelings of his corps and division commanders, and for that purpose he would request those officers to call upon the President whenever they applied for leave to come to Washington. What was the result of the President's investigation does not appear. He never in any way, so far as the testimony and records before your committee show, manifested any want of confidence in General Hooker, even after that officer had felt compelled



to ask to be relieved from command by what he regarded as undoubted evidence of hostility towards him on the part of General Halleck.

In conclusion, your committee would observe that they consider it to have been extremely unfortunate that General Hooker was not permitted to have the use of such troops as he deemed necessary to enable him to carry out the plans he proposed to adopt for meeting and, if possible, destroying the rebel army. That those troops were disposable is clearly shown from the fact that his successor was immediately authorized to use them, together with other troops for which General Hooker had not asked. Nor can the committee doubt that had General Hooker been clothed with the power at once conferred upon his successor, and had been given the assistance which was so freely accorded to him, the result of the campaign might have been far more decisive than it was. Why the general-in-chief should have shown more desire to co-operate with and assist the one commander than the other, perhaps involves questions of motives and feelings which your committee refrain from commenting upon.

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#### GENERAL MEADE.

The assigning General Meade to the command of the army of the Potomac, which he assumed on the 28th of June, 1863, seems to have been attended by no immediate changes other than the transferring to that army of the force at Harper's Ferry, under General French, which force had been refused to General Hooker by General Halleck; the assigning General Couch and his force to his command, and the conferring upon him full powers for the organizing and officering his army. The plans and views of General Hooker were fully made known to him by General Butterfield, who continued to act as chief of staff.

General Warren states that "the troops continued to move on just the same as if the command had not been changed."

The two armies were approaching each other so closely that it was apparent a collision could not long be avoided, and the most important question undoubtedly was the selection of the field for the coming battle. General Pleasonton says that he several times informed General Meade that, from the knowledge of the country he had acquired the previous year during the Antietam campaign, he was satisfied that there was but one place to fight the enemy, and that was Gettysburg. With that view General Pleasonton, on the 29th of June, sent his strongest division of cavalry, under General Buford, to occupy Gettysburg, with instructions to hold that position to the last extremity until the army could be brought up there.

General Meade, however, decided upon making a stand at another point for the purpose of receiving the attack of the enemy, and selected a position the general line of which was Pipe creek, the left resting in the neighborhood of Middleburg, and the right at Man-

chester, and even down to somewhat late in the day of the 1st of July was engaged in making arrangements for occupying that position as soon as the movements of the enemy should indicate the time for doing so. To that end, on the morning of the 1st of July, a preliminary circular order was issued, directing his corps commanders to make the necessary preparations for carrying the order into effect as soon as circumstances should arise to render it necessary or advisable in the opinion of the commanding general; and it was not until information reached General Meade, in the afternoon of July 1, that the cavalry, under General Buford, had come in contact with a large force of the enemy near Gettysburg, and that General Reynolds, who had gone to his assistance with the 1st and 11th corps, had been killed, that the attention of General Meade seems to have been seriously directed to the position at Gettysburg for meeting the enemy. He sent General Hancock there to report the condition of our troops and the character of the ground. General Meade says that before he received the report of General Hancock he had decided, upon information received from officers from the scene of action, to concentrate his army at Gettysburg, and it was done that night and the next day, and the battle was there fought.

That circular order, with other orders and despatches of the same date, indicate the views of the commanding general and the circumstances which led him to turn his attention to the position of Gettysburg for the purpose of meeting the enemy. They are given here in full, as furnished by General Meade, and are as follows:

[Circular.]

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“Taneytown, July 1, 1863.

“From information received the commanding general is satisfied that the object of the movement of the army in this direction has been accomplished, viz: the relief of Harrisburg and the prevention of the enemy's intended invasion of Philadelphia beyond the Susquehanna.

“It is no longer his intention to assume the offensive until the enemy's movements or position should render such an operation certain of success. If the enemy assume the offensive and attack, it is his intention, after holding them in check sufficiently long to withdraw the trains and other impediments, to withdraw the army from its present position and form line of battle with the left resting in the neighborhood of Middleburg, and the right at Manchester; the general direction being that of Pipe creek.

“For this purpose General Reynolds, in command of the left, will withdraw the force at present at Gettysburg, two corps by the road to Taneytown and Westminster, and after crossing Pipe creek deploy towards Middleburg. The corps at Emmettsburg will be withdrawn by way of Mechanicsville to Middleburg, or, if a more direct route can be found, leaving Taneytown to their left, to withdraw direct to Middleburg.

“General Slocum will assume command of the two corps at Hanover and ‘Two Taverns,’ and withdraw them via Union Mills, deploying one to the right, and one to the left, after crossing Pipe creek, connecting on the left with General Reynolds, and communicating his right to General Sedgwick at Manchester, who will connect with him and form the right.

“The time for falling back can only be developed by circumstances; whenever such circumstances arise as would seem to indicate the necessity for falling

back and assuming this general line indicated, notice of such movement will at once be communicated to these headquarters, and to all adjoining corps commanders.

"The 2d corps, now at Taneytown, will be held in reserve in the vicinity of Uniontown and Frizelburg, to be thrown to the point of strongest attack, should the enemy make it. In the event of these movements being necessary, the trains and other impedimenta will all be sent to the rear of Westminster. Corps commanders, with their officers commanding artillery and the divisions, should make themselves thoroughly familiar with the country indicated, all the roads and positions, so that no possible confusion can ensue, and that the movement, if made, be done with good order, precision and care, without loss, or any detriment to the morale of the troops.

"The commanders of corps are requested to communicate at once the nature of their present position, and their ability to hold them in case of any sudden attack at any point by the enemy.

"This order is communicated that a general plan, perfectly understood by all, may be had for receiving attack if made in strong force upon any portion of our present position.

"Developments may cause the commanding general to assume the offensive from his present positions.

"The artillery reserve will, in the event of the general movement indicated, move to the rear of Frizelburg, and be placed in position, or sent to corps, as circumstances may require, under the general supervision of the chief of artillery.

"The chief quartermaster will, in case of the general movement indicated, give directions for the orderly and proper position of the trains in rear of Westminster. All the trains will keep well to the right of the road in moving, and in case of any accident requiring a halt the team must be hauled out of the line and not delay the movements.

"The trains ordered to Union bridge in these events will be sent to Westminster.

"General headquarters will be, in case of this movement, at Frizelburg.

"General Slocum as near Union Mills as the line will render best for him.

"General Reynolds at or near the road from Taneytown to Frizelburg.

"The chief of artillery will examine the line, and select positions for artillery. The cavalry will be held on the right and left flanks, after the movement is completed; previous to its completion he will, as now directed, cover the front and exterior lines well out.

"The commands must be prepared for a movement, and in the event of the enemy attacking us on the ground indicated herein, to follow up any repulse.

"The chief signal officer will examine the line thoroughly, and at once, upon the announcement, extend telegraphic communications from each of the following points to general headquarters near Frizelburg, viz., Manchester, Union Mills, Middleburg, and the Taneytown road.

"All true Union people should be advised to harass and annoy the enemy in every way, to send in information, and taught how to do it, giving regiments by number of colors, number of guns, generals' names, &c. All their supplies brought to us will be paid for, and not fall into the enemy's hands.

"Roads and ways to move to the right and left of general line should be studied and thoroughly understood. All movements of troops should be concealed, and our dispositions kept from the enemy. Their knowledge of these dispositions would be fatal to our success, and the greatest care must be taken to prevent such an occurrence.

"By command of Major General Meade.

"S. WILLIAMS,  
"Assistant Adjutant General."

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 1, 1863.*

“COMMANDING OFFICER, *First Corps* :

“The telegraphic intelligence received from General Couch, with the various movements reported from Buford, seem to indicate the concentration of the enemy either at Chambersburg, or at a point somewhere on a line drawn between Chambersburg and York, through Heidlersburg, and to the north of Gettysburg.

“The commanding general cannot decide whether it is his best policy to move to attack until he hears something more definite of the point at which the enemy is concentrating. This he hopes to do during the day. Meanwhile he would like to have your views upon the subject, at least so far as concerns your position.

“If the enemy is concentrated to the right of Gettysburg, that point would not at first glance seem to be a proper strategic point of concentration for this army. If the enemy is concentrating in front of Gettysburg, or to the left of it, the general is not sufficiently well informed of the nature of the country to judge of its character for either an offensive or defensive position. The number of the enemy are estimated at about 92,000 infantry, with 270 pieces of artillery, and his cavalry from 6,000 to 8,000. Our numbers ought to equal it, and with the arrival of General French's command, which should get up to-morrow, exceed it, if not too much weakened by straggling and fatigue.

“The general having just assumed command in obedience to orders, with the position of affairs leaving no time to learn the condition of the army as to morale and proportionate strength compared with its last return, would gladly receive from you any suggestions as to the points laid down in this note. He feels that you know more of the condition of the troops in your vicinity and the country than he does.

“General Humphreys, who is at Emmetsburg with the 3d corps, the general considers an excellent adviser as to the nature of the country for defensive or offensive operations. If near enough to call him to consultation with you, please do so, without interference with the responsibilities which devolve upon both. You have all the information which the general has received, and the general would like to have your views.

“The movement of your corps to Gettysburg was ordered before the positive knowledge of the enemy's withdrawal from Harrisburg and concentration was received.

“S. WILLIAMS,  
“*Assistant Adjutant General.*”

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“*July 1, 1863.*

“COMMANDING OFFICER, *Sixth Corps* :

“I am directed by the commanding general to state that it would appear from reports just received that the enemy is moving in heavy force on Gettysburg, (Ewell from Heidlersburg and Hill from Cashtown Pass,) and it is not improbable he will reach that place before the command under Major General Reynolds, (the 1st and 11th corps,) now on the way, can arrive there. Should such be the case, and General Reynolds finds himself in the presence of a superior force, he is instructed to hold the enemy in check and fall slowly back. If he is able to do this, the line indicated in the circular of to-day will be occupied to-night. Should circumstances render it necessary for the commanding general to fight the enemy to-day, the troops are posted as follows for the support of Reynolds's command, viz: On his right, at ‘Two Taverns,’ the 12th

corps; at Hanover, the 5th corps; the 2d corps is on the road between Taneytown and Gettysburg; the 3d corps is at Emmettsburg.

"This information is conveyed to you that you may have your corps in readiness to move in such direction as may be required at a moment's notice.

"S. WILLIAMS,

"*Assistant Adjutant General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"July 1, 1863—1.10 p. m.

"COMMANDING OFFICER, *Second Corps* :

"The major general commanding has just been informed that General Reynolds has been killed or badly wounded. He directs that you turn over the command of your corps to General Gibbon; that you proceed to the front, and by virtue of this order, in case of the truth of General Reynolds's death, you assume the command of the corps there assembled, viz: the 11th, 1st, and 3d at Emmettsburg. If you think the ground and position there a suitable one to fight a battle under existing circumstances, you will so advise the general, and he will order all the troops up. You know the general's views, and General Warren, who is fully aware of them, has gone out to see General Reynolds.

"*Later*—1.15 p. m.

"Reynolds has possession of Gettysburg, and the enemy are reported as falling back from the front of Gettysburg. Keep your column ready to move.

"DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,

"*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

"HEADQUARTERS 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION,

"July 1, 1863—3.20 p. m.

"General PLEASANTON :

"I am satisfied that Longstreet and Hill have made a junction.

"A tremendous battle has been raging since 9½ a. m., with varying success. At the present moment the battle is raging on the road to Cashtown, and in short cannon range of this town. The enemy's line is a semicircle on the height from north to west. General Reynolds was killed early this morning. In my opinion there seems to be no directing person.

"JOHN BUFORD,

"*Brigadier General of Volunteers.*

"We need help now.

"BUFORD."

"5.25.

"GENERAL :

"When I arrived here, an hour since, I found that our troops had given up the front of Gettysburg and the town. We have now taken up a position in the cemetery, and cannot well be taken; it is a position, however, easily turned. Slocum is now coming on the ground, and is taking position on the right, which will protect the right. But we have as yet no troops on the left, the 3d corps not having yet reported, but I suppose that it is marching up; if so, his flank march will in a degree protect our left flank. In the mean time Gibbon had better march on so as to take position on our right or left to our rear, as may be necessary, in some commanding position. General G. will see this despatch. The battle is quiet now. I think we will be all right until night. I have sent all the trains back. When night comes it can be told better what had best to

be done. I think we can return; if not, we can fight here, as the ground appears not unfavorable with good troops.

"I will communicate in a few moments with General Slocum, and transfer the command to him.

"Howard says that Doubleday's command gave way.

"Your obedient servant,

"WINFIELD S. HANCOCK,

"Major General, Commanding Corps.

"General Warren is here.

'General BUTTERFIELD, *Chief-of-Staff*."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"July 1, 1863—7 p. m.

"COMMANDING OFFICER, *Fifth Corps* :

"The major general commanding directs that you move up to Gettysburg at once upon receipt of this order, if not already ordered to do so by General Slocum. The present prospect is that our general engagement must be there. Communicate with General Slocum, under whose direction you were placed by the orders of this morning. The general had supposed that General Slocum would have ordered you up.

"DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,

"Major General, *Chief-of-Staff*."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"Taneytown, July 1, 1863—7.30 p. m.

"COMMANDING OFFICER, *Sixth Corps* :

"The major general commanding directs me to say that a general battle seems to be impending to-morrow at Gettysburg; that it is of the utmost importance that your command should be up. He directs that you stop all trains, or turn them out of the road, that impede your progress. Your march will have to be a forced one, to reach the scene of action, where we shall probably be largely outnumbered without your presence. If any shorter road presents itself without difficulty in getting up, you will use your discretion in taking it, and report the facts to these headquarters.

"General Sykes has been ordered up from Hanover to Gettysburg, and General Slocum from Littletown, and General Hancock's corps from here. The whole army is there (Gettysburg) or under way for that point. The general desires you to report here in person without delay the moment you receive this. He is waiting to see you here before going to the front. The trains will all go to Westminster and Union bridge as ordered.

"DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,

"Major General, *Chief of Staff*."

On the morning of the 1st of July, General Buford, with a division of cavalry, was fiercely attacked by the enemy in the immediate vicinity of Gettysburg. He held his ground with great gallantry, and General Reynolds, upon hearing of the attack, immediately moved up to his support with the 1st and 11th corps. The fighting on that day was on and near Seminary ridge, immediately west of the town of Gettysburg, and was conducted on our side entirely by the cavalry division of General Buford, and the 1st and 11th corps of infantry. Quite early in the fight General Reynolds was killed, and the command devolved upon General Howard, of the 11th corps. The fighting con-

tinued until about four o'clock in the afternoon, when our troops retired through the town and took up a position on Cemetery ridge, and the fighting ceased for the day. General Sickles, with the 3d corps, which, with the 1st and 11th, had constituted the command of General Reynolds, was at Emmetsburg, about ten miles distant. Upon hearing of the action at Gettysburg, General Sickles immediately put his troops in motion, and they began to arrive at Gettysburg about five o'clock in the afternoon, and were at once placed in position by General Hancock, who had arrived and assumed command shortly after the position upon Cemetery ridge had been taken by General Howard. The 12th corps, under General Slocum, arrived at Gettysburg about the same time. General Meade determined to concentrate his army at Gettysburg, and during the night of the 1st and morning of the 2d of July, the 2d, 5th, 12th, and most of the 6th corps were moved there, and placed in position upon Cemetery ridge, and other high ground connected therewith, as far as what is known as Round-top mountain; the line extending from Round-top mountain on the left to Culp's hill on the right.

The morning of the 2d of July was passed in strengthening the position of our army, and placing the troops in line to receive the attack of the enemy. Skirmishing began before noon, but the enemy did not make their attack in force until about half past three in the afternoon. The attack was directed mainly upon the 3d corps, under General Sickles, which was posted near the left of the line. It was very fierce, and the fighting continued until about seven o'clock, when the enemy retired. The 3d corps suffered severely in this day's engagement, and General Sickles received a wound resulting in the loss of a leg. General Meade and others criticize General Sickles for the disposition he made of his troops before the fighting commenced; claiming that by throwing forward his corps from the regular line he exposed himself to and invited the attack of the enemy. General Sickles in his testimony gives his reason for the course he pursued, and holds that the movement he made prevented a disastrous flank attack on our left, which was threatened, besides being advantageous in other respects. Some troops of the 2d and 5th corps were also engaged in support of the 3d corps.

There is testimony to show that during the 2d of July General Meade contemplated abandoning his position at Gettysburg and retiring to some other position. As there is some controversy on that point, your committee will quote from the testimony of various witnesses upon the subject. General Butterfield, who was acting as chief of staff to General Meade, says:

"General Meade then directed me to prepare an order to withdraw the army from that position. I stated to him that it would be necessary for me to know the exact position of the troops.

"Question. What day of the fight was this?

"Answer. This was on the morning of the 2d of July, before the battle of that day had commenced. I stated to General Meade that I could not prepare that order properly without first going over the field and ascertaining the position of each division and corps of the army with relation to the roads.

General Meade replied that he could not wait for that; that he would show me where the troops were. He then took a pencil and a piece of paper and made a rough sketch, showing the positions of the different corps. I stated to him that the order was one requiring a great deal of care in its preparation; that it involved more than logistics, as we were in the presence of the enemy, and that while preparing it I must not be interrupted by anybody coming to me with despatches or orders. He said, 'Very well, you shall not be interrupted.' I told him I thought I could not prepare the order without a more accurate sketch, and I would have to send out to the corps commanders to give me a report of the positions of their troops in regard to the various roads; that in the meanwhile I could be studying the maps. He said 'Very well, do so.' I then went up stairs, and after carefully studying the maps, I prepared the order for the withdrawal of the army from the field of Gettysburg. After finishing it I presented it to General Meade, and it met his approval. I then stated to him that it would be a great deal better if that order was to be executed, as it might involve great consequences if not properly executed, to submit it for careful examination to such general officers as were there present, with a view of giving them an opportunity of finding any fault with it then, so that no misunderstanding should arise from the manner in which it was worded or expressed. He said there was no objection to having that done. I called General Gibbon, who was present, and, I think, General Williams and General Ingalls, and stated to them that I had been directed to prepare this order, and that I would be very much obliged to any of them if they would look it over and point out any faults in it then, rather than after it was put into execution; that I desired it scrutinized carefully, with a view of discovering anything in it which might be misunderstood. Some of these officers—I do not now remember which, I am very sure General Gibbon was one; I think General Hancock was there, but whether he read it over or not I am not sure—some of these officers read it over, and said that they thought it was correctly prepared. The corps commanders were then sent for by General Meade to report to headquarters. The order which I had prepared was given to General Williams, and was copied by the clerks or was in process of being copied by them. As General Sickles rode up to headquarters, in pursuance of the request of General Meade, the battle broke out in front of General Sickles's corps, and there was no council held. General Sickles returned immediately, and every corps commander there rode immediately to his command. Without my memoranda I cannot fix the hour of this occurrence, but it was during the 2d day of July."

The testimony of General Williams, the adjutant general of General Meade, is as follows:

"Question. Do you know anything about an order on the 2d of July to withdraw the army?"

"Answer. The orders for the movements of the army under the present arrangement are generally prepared by the chief of staff, and the manuscripts of the orders are turned over to me to have copies prepared for those to whom they are to be distributed; and I am held responsible that the orders are correctly copied, and that they are delivered to the persons for whom they are intended.

"In regard to the order of the 2d of July, to the best of my recollection and belief, the chief of staff either handed to me or to my clerk an order looking to a contingency which possibly might happen of the army being compelled to assume a new position. To the best of my belief such an order was prepared, and I presume it may have been signed by me, and possibly the copies may have been prepared for the corps and other commanders. Orders of such a character are usually made out in manifold, in order to save time. The particu-



lar order in question, however, was never distributed; no vestige of it is to be found among any of the records of my office; it must have been destroyed within a day or two after it was prepared. I have no reason to suppose, other than the fact that the order was given to me or my clerk by the chief of staff, that General Meade had any knowledge of it. It was not for me to look beyond the orders of the chief of staff. Whether or not a copy of that order was given to Major General Butterfield, who was then acting as chief of staff, I am unable to say, and I cannot certainly state whether the rough draught was ever handed back to him. I only know that there is nothing in relation to that order to be found among the records in my charge. The order was never recorded or issued in any sense. I do not now remember the exact tenor of the order, but to the best of my belief it was an order which, if carried out, would have involved a retrograde movement of the army."

General Gibbon says :

"There is a matter connected with a report in regard to the retreat of the army from Gettysburg which I think it proper to mention in my testimony. It is this: Some time during the day of the 2d of July, but before this fight with General Sickles's corps had taken place, I was at General Meade's headquarters, as I was frequently during the day. I consequently knew a great deal of the dispositions and orders given for the troops to come up. I had been urged frequently in the morning of that day, by General Meade, to hurry up to the field, and I heard of the other corps that were coming up. I therefore had but one idea in regard to General Meade's intention, which was to concentrate the whole army there for the purpose of fighting a battle. When, therefore, on coming out from the little room in which he had his office, I met General Butterfield, his chief of staff, and he asked me to read over with him and compare with a map he had there a draught of an order which he had, and I asked him what it was, when he told me that it was an order for the army to retreat, I was struck with a great deal of astonishment; and I recollect very well my exclamation: 'Great God! General Meade does not intend to leave this position?' General Butterfield did not say General Meade did intend to leave; he merely said something to the effect that it was necessary to be prepared in case it should be necessary to leave, or some remark of that kind. He then showed me the order, and either he read it over and I pointed out the places on the map, or I read it over and he pointed out the places to which each corps was to go. When he got through I remarked that it was all correctly drawn up.

"Until very recently I supposed that the order which General Butterfield showed me was an order in regard to the army falling back to a position which I heard General Meade had selected on Pipe-clay creek. But I am satisfied now that order must have been some different order from the one I had been thinking it was. Being firmly convinced, as I was at the time, that General Meade had no idea of falling back from the position there, it struck me as very remarkable that his chief of staff should be making such an order to retreat; and I still think so."

General Sickles says that he received some intimation that it was in contemplation to fall back from Gettysburg, and that the question was to be submitted to the corps commanders; that he was sent for to go to headquarters, but did not go until he received the second summons; and that just as he arrived there the battle began, and he returned to his corps without dismounting.

General Howe says in his testimony :

"I said to General Sedgwick, 'We ought to let our men have the best chance to rest that they can get right off; we are not likely to be called on to fight to-

night; let us give the men a chance to get some coffee and rest all they can, for there will be something done to-morrow undoubtedly.' He remarked to me, 'It is a little early yet; they are discussing whether we shall stay here, or move back to Westminister.' That is twenty-one or twenty-two miles. I said, 'It is some distance back there.' Said he, 'Can we move back?' I replied, 'Yes, if it is necessary; we have just come over the road, and we know it; the men are worn; but if it is necessary the 6th corps can go back after resting two or three hours.' General Sedgwick gave me to understand that our army would probably move back to Westminister.

"Question. This was the night after General Sickles was wounded?"

"Answer. Yes, sir; this was the second day of the fight, the 2d of July.

"Question. Who was in that council discussing the question of retreating?"

"Answer. I do not know; what I heard I had from General Sedgwick. He said, 'I think we are going to move back.' The impression he gave me was that General Meade had the question under consideration. General Sedgwick said the question of falling back was then being considered, and the impression given to me was that we should move back to Westminister. Soon after, however, it seemed to be decided that we were to remain there."

It will be seen that General Meade is very emphatic in his statement that he never gave or contemplated the giving any such order. He says :

"I have understood that an idea has prevailed that I intended an order should be issued on the morning of the 2d of July, requiring the withdrawal of the army, or the retreat of the army from Gettysburg, which order was not issued owing simply to the attack of the enemy having prevented it.

"In reply to that, I have only to say that I have no recollection of ever having directed such an order to be issued, or ever having contemplated the issuing of such an order, and that it does seem to me that to any intelligent mind who is made acquainted with the great exertions I made to mass my army at Gettysburg on the night of July 1, it must appear entirely incomprehensible that I should order it to retreat after collecting all my army there, before the enemy had done anything to require me to make a movement of any kind."

Subsequently General Meade appeared and said :

"I desire to add a little to my testimony, with the permission of the committee.

"The chairman. Certainly; you are at liberty to make such additional statements as you please.

"The witness. I wanted to say a few words to the committee, in extension of the remarks which I made the last time I was here, in reference to a charge which I expected then would be made against me, and which I understand has since been made against me, to the effect that I intended that an order should be issued, on the morning of July 2, withdrawing the army from the position it then occupied at Gettysburg, and retreating, before the enemy had done anything to require me to withdraw.

"It is proper that I should say that the fact of such a charge having been made here, or such a report given here, has reached me through outside sources, but in such a way that I can hardly disbelieve that such a statement has been made; and that it was made by an officer who occupied a very high and confidential position on my staff, the chief of staff, Major General Butterfield. Now, indulging in the utmost charity towards General Butterfield, and believing that he is sincere in what he says, I want to explain how it is possible that such an extraordinary idea could have got into his head.

"I utterly deny, under the full solemnity and sanctity of my oath, and in the firm conviction that the day will come when the secrets of all men shall be made

known—I utterly deny ever having intended or thought, for one instant, to withdraw that army, unless the military contingencies, which the future should develop during the course of the day, might render it a matter of necessity that the army should be withdrawn. I base this denial not only upon my own assertion and my own veracity, but I shall also show to the committee, from documentary evidence, the despatches and orders issued by me at different periods during that day, that if I did intend any such operation I was at the same time doing things totally inconsistent with any such intention.

“I shall also ask the committee to call before them certain other officers of my staff, whose positions were as near and confidential to me as that of General Butterfield, who, if I had had any such intention, or had given any such orders as he said I gave, would have been parties to it, would have known it, and have made arrangements in consequence thereof; all of whom, I am perfectly confident, will say they never heard of any such thing. I refer to General Hunt, chief of artillery, and who had artillery occupying a space of from four to five miles, drawn out on the road, and who, if I had intended to have withdrawn that army, should have been told to get his trains out of the way the very first thing, because the troops could not move until the artillery moved. I would also ask you to call upon General Ingalls, my chief quartermaster, who had charge of the trains. Also General Warren, my chief engineer, who will tell you that he was with me the whole of that day, in constant intercourse and communication with me; and that instead of intending to withdraw my army I was talking about other matters. All these officers will corroborate what I say, that I never mentioned any such purpose to any of them.

“General Butterfield remained at Taneytown on the night of the 1st July, and did not join me on the field until about 9 or 10 o'clock in the morning of the 2d, I having arrived there at one o'clock. Soon after he arrived I did direct him to familiarize himself with the topography of the ground; and directed him to send out staff officers to learn all the roads. As I have already mentioned, in my previous testimony here, I had never before been at Gettysburg, and did not know how many roads ran from our position, or in what directions they ran. My orders to General Butterfield were similar to this:

“General Butterfield, neither I nor any man can tell what the results of this day's operations may be. It is our duty to be prepared for every contingency, and I wish you to send out staff officers to learn all the roads that lead from this place; ascertain the positions of the corps; where their trains are; prepare to familiarize yourself with these details, so that in the event of any contingency you can, without any order, be ready to meet it.”

“It was in anticipation of possible contingencies, and not at all that I had made up my mind to do anything of that kind.

“I would furthermore call the attention of the committee to the absurdity of such an idea. If I had directed the order to be issued, why was it not issued? With General Butterfield's capacity it would not have taken him more than ten or fifteen minutes to prepare such an order. We were furnished with what you call manifold letter-writers; so that, after the frame-work of an order is prepared, ten or a dozen copies may be made at once. Why was not the order issued; or if issued, why was it not executed? There was no obstacle to my withdrawing that army if I had desired. The enemy presented none. There was not a moment from the time the first gun was fired at Gettysburg, until we knew the enemy had retired, that I could not have withdrawn my army; therefore, if I had entertained such an idea, it seems to me extraordinary that I did not execute it.

\* \* \* \* \*

“That General Butterfield may have misapprehended what I said to him, that he may himself have deemed a retreat necessary, and thought we would be compelled to retreat in the course of the day, and in the excess of zeal, and

desire to do more than he was called upon to do, may have drawn up an order of that kind, I do not deny; but I say he never showed me any such order, and it had not my sanction nor authority."

General Hunt says in his testimony :

"Question. Had you any knowledge of any order being prepared, during the battle of Gettysburg, for the withdrawal of the army from the position it then occupied ?

"Answer. No, sir; I know of no such order, and no such intention. I presume if any such intention had been entertained I should have known of it as soon as anybody, as the first thing to have been done was to get rid of the large reserve artillery and ammunition train under my charge, and which had been brought up on the morning of the 2d of July, under or by the direction of General Meade.

"Question. You say you had no knowledge or intimation of any such thing during the battle ?

"Answer. None at all. The only time I ever had a thought that such an idea might be entertained was on the night of the 2d of July. On that night I was down at the artillery reserve, refitting and reorganizing the batteries that had been cut up that day; I received a message from General Meade's headquarters, (I do not now recollect whether it was from General Meade himself, or from General Butterfield,) stating that both General Tyler, who commanded the reserve artillery, and myself were wanted at headquarters. I told General Tyler that it was impossible for me to go just then, but that if the question came up about falling back, to cast my vote against it. He remained for some time, and I went up with him, perhaps a half an hour afterwards. On arriving at headquarters I understood that the question had been spoken of as to what they should do, and there was no person at all in favor of leaving the ground we had taken; that was just as the conversation closed."

General Sedgwick testifies as follows :

"Question. Have you any knowledge of the preparation of any order for the withdrawal of the army at any time during the battle of Gettysburg, or the retreat of the army from the position it then held ?

"Answer. I never heard of any such order until within the last four weeks; and when I first heard it, I denied most positively that any such order could have been given. I was the second in command there. I reported to General Meade at a critical time, and if he contemplated so important a move he would have informed me. Besides, his urging my corps forward shows that he intended to fight the battle there. General Meade undoubtedly was apprehensive that the enemy might turn his flank, and in that event he would have had to take up a new position; but I do not think he ever contemplated any retreat.

"Question. Had it been the intention of the commanding general to retreat the army, was not the order to you to come up in direct conflict with any such intended movement ?

"Answer. Certainly it was. In the course of the night of the 1st and the morning of the 2d of July I received no less than three verbal messages from him to hurry up with all possible despatch."

On the night of the 2d of July a council was held at General Meade's headquarters to determine upon the best action to be taken. General Meade testifies as follows, in reference to that council :

"The questions discussed by this council were: First, whether it was necessary for us to assume any different position from what we then held; and, secondly, whether, if we continued to maintain the position we then held, our

operations of the next day should be offensive or defensive. The opinion of the council was unanimous, which agreed fully with my own views that we should maintain our lines as they were then held, and that we should wait the movements of the enemy, and see if he made any further attack before we assumed the offensive."

General Butterfield, in testimony, says :

"That evening, after the enemy were repulsed, a council of corps commanders was held. I kept minutes of that council, which I sent to General Williams, who informs me that they have been lost. The general question put to the corps commanders present at that council was, whether our army should remain on that field and continue the battle, or whether we should change to some other position. A vote of the corps commanders was taken in regard to that, and a majority were in favor of remaining on the field and fighting it out. General Slocum gave the first opinion; his answer was, 'stay and fight it out.' I will not be positive as to what corps commanders differed with him, but the majority were for remaining on the line which the army then held and fighting it out.

"Can you give the opinion of each corps commander? Because, perhaps, in justice to them, that ought to be known.

"Answer. My impression is that those generals can tell how they voted. I am clear in my memory that General Slocum voted to stay and fight it out, and that General Sykes so voted; that General Newton entered into a long discussion to show that that position was a disadvantageous one; that he was not prepared to vote to leave it, but he wanted the council to understand that he had objections to it. General Birney, I think, voted to stay and fight it out, as did General Hancock also. I do not remember what General Sedgwick's vote was, nor do I remember how General Howard voted. I think he had a great deal to say upon the subject. The reason I do not remember the vote exactly is because I intrusted the matter to the memorandum which I sent General Williams. After the council had finished, General Meade arose from the table, and remarked that, in his opinion, Gettysburg was no place to fight a battle; but it was settled to remain there, and the council dispersed."

General Birney also testifies that the council, on the night of the 2d of July, was divided on the question of retiring to another position; but that a majority were in favor of remaining at Gettysburg and awaiting the attack of the enemy.

On the 3d of July, no active operations took place until about noon, except on the extreme right, where the 12th corps drove the enemy from a position taken by them during the night, and which had been occupied by some of our troops that had been sent to the left during the fight of the 2d. Not long after midday the enemy opened a furious cannonade upon our line from a large number of guns, estimated at from 125 to 150 pieces. The cannonade is described by witnesses as exceeding anything that had occurred in any previous battle of the war. The cannonade and the assault that followed is thus described by General Hancock, who commanded that portion of the line against which it was directed :

"About one or two o'clock in the afternoon the enemy commenced a terrific cannonade from, probably, 120 pieces of artillery, on the front of the line connecting Cemetery hill with Round-top, the left centre commanded by me. That line consisted of the 1st, 2d and 3d corps, of which I had the general command. I commanded that whole front General Gibbon commanded the 2d corps in my

absence, General Newton the 1st corps, and General Birney the 3d. That cannonade continued for, probably, an hour and a half. The enemy then made an assault at the end of that time. It was a very formidable assault, and made, I should judge, with about 18,000 infantry. When the columns of the enemy appeared, it looked as if they were going to attack the centre of our line. But after marching straight out a little distance, they seemed to incline a little to their left, as if their object was to march through my command and seize Cemetery hill, which I have no doubt was their intention. They attacked with wonderful spirit—nothing could have been more spirited. The shock of the assault fell upon the 2d and 3d divisions of the 2d corps, and those were the troops, assisted by a small brigade of Vermont troops, together with the artillery of our line, which fired from Round-top to Cemetery hill at the enemy all the way as they advanced, whenever they had the opportunity—those were the troops that really met the assault. No doubt there were other troops that fired a little; but these were the troops that really withstood the shock of the assault and repulsed it. The attack of the enemy was met by about six small brigades of our troops, and was finally repulsed after a terrific contest at very close quarters, in which our troops took about thirty or forty colors, and some 4,000 or 5,000 prisoners, with great loss to the enemy in killed and wounded. The repulse was a most signal one, and that decided the battle, and was practically the end of the fight. I was wounded at the close of the assault, and that ended my operations with the enemy for that campaign."

Other witnesses also testify to the terrific character of the cannonade, and the furious assault, and its signal and complete repulse. The enemy fell back in great confusion behind their artillery line, leaving it insufficiently supported. General Hancock states that while wounded, and just before being carried off the field, he dictated a note to General Meade, urging that the 5th and 6th corps should be at once ordered to advance and pursue the retreating enemy. His testimony is as follows :

"I must say one thing here: I think it was, probably, an unfortunate thing that I was wounded at the time I was, and equally unfortunate that General Gibbon was also wounded; because the absence of a prominent commander who knew the circumstances thoroughly at such a moment as that was a great disadvantage. I think our lines should have advanced immediately, and I believe we should have won a great victory. I was very confident that the advance would be made. General Meade told me before the fight that if the enemy attacked me he intended to put the 5th and 6th corps on the enemy's flank. I, therefore, when I was wounded and lying down in my ambulance and about leaving the field, dictated a note to General Meade, and told him if he would put in the 5th and 6th corps I believed he would win a great victory. I asked him afterwards, when I returned to the army, what he had done in the premises. He said he had ordered the movement, but the troops were slow in collecting, and moved so slowly that nothing was done before night, except that some of the Pennsylvania reserves went out and met Hood's division, it was understood, of the enemy, and actually overthrew it—assisted, no doubt, in some measure by their knowledge of their failure in the assault. There were only two divisions of the enemy on our extreme left, opposite Round-top, and there was a gap in their line of one mile that their assault had left. And I believe if our whole line had advanced with spirit, it is not unlikely that we would have taken all their artillery at that point. I think that was a fault; that we should have pushed the enemy there, for we do not often catch them in that position. And the rule is, and it is natural, that when you repulse or defeat an enemy

you should pursue him; and I believe it is a rare thing that one party beats another and does not pursue him. And I think that on that occasion it only required an order and prompt execution."

Other witnesses concur in the opinion that if a prompt and vigorous advance had been made immediately after the repulse of the enemy, it would have resulted in a great victory, and the loss of the most, if not the whole, of the line of artillery from which the enemy had opened previous to their assault. Orders were given to General Sykes and General Sedgwick to advance with the 5th corps, but the movement was made so slowly that nothing practically resulted from it, except the capture of some prisoners on the left.

At the conclusion of the battle on Friday, our troops were in good condition, in the best of spirits, and anxious to be led against the enemy. The three days of the battle had been for the most of them comparatively days of rest, and though we lost heavily, our loss had not been so great as that of the enemy, while the morale of our troops was far better. General Howe speaks of the battle as the most orderly fight he had ever been in; that the position did the work for us; that there was no manœuvring, no combinations on our part, no great generalship displayed, for none was needed; and at the close of the fight our men were not much jaded or fatigued, but had plenty of fight in them, and were comparatively fresh.

The considerations which seemed to influence the general in command and the corps commanders, in relation to the pursuit of the enemy after their final repulse, are these: General Meade says that even on the 5th of July he was not satisfied that the enemy was in full retreat for the Potomac, or what his further movements would be, and was not aware of the injury he had inflicted upon the enemy in the battle that had just taken place. General Warren says, "there was a tone among most of the prominent officers that we had quite saved the country for a time, and that we had done enough; that we might jeopard all we had won by trying to do too much."

All the witnesses but General Meade state that it was very apparent, on the morning of the 4th of July, that the enemy were in full retreat, and Generals Pleasonton, Warren, Birney, and others state that they counselled an immediate pursuit. General Birney says that he asked and obtained permission to make an attack that morning on the enemy as they were crossing a point near him on the pike to Hagerstown; but just as he had commenced the movement to attack, a staff officer rode up with a written order from General Meade not to attack, but to let the enemy go, which was done. General Pleasonton states that when he urged General Meade to order an immediate advance of the army after the enemy, he replied that "he was not sure they might not make another attack on him, and to satisfy himself, he wanted to know first that they were in retreat, and for that reason I was to send the cavalry out to ascertain." He states that General Gregg, 22 miles on the Chambersburg road, reported at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 4th, "that the road was strewn with wounded and stragglers, ambulances and caissons, and that there was great demoralization and confusion." This was immediately reported to General Meade, but no pursuit was ordered.

But little was done on the 4th of July. General Warren says :

“On the morning of the 4th General Meade ordered demonstrations in front of our line, but they were very feebly made. And when the officers met together that evening to report the state of things in their front, there was so little definitely known as to the position and designs of the enemy, that after some consultation they determined, I believe, to try and find out something before they did move.”

That night a council of war was held. Its deliberations and results are thus described by General Butterfield, from memoranda taken at the time :

“I have here the minutes I kept of the council of the 4th of July. That council was held at the headquarters of General Neal ; he gave up his headquarters to General Meade. The council was opened by General Meade explaining his instructions, and asking the corps commanders for their advice as to what course he should pursue.

“Question. Can you state what General Meade said his instructions were ?

“Answer. I think he said his instructions were to cover Washington and Baltimore. He said he had no knowledge of General Foster's movements. There was a rumor that General Foster was coming up from Washington with re-enforcements. General Meade said he desired the earnest assistance and advice of every corps commander. The corps commanders commenced giving their opinions, beginning with General Slocum and followed by General Sedgwick and General Howard. Their advice, according to my memorandum, was as follows :

“General Slocum would move on an interior line as far as Emmettsburg, and then, if the enemy had not gone from Gettysburg, hold on there and push out a force at once with a view of preventing the enemy from crossing the Potomac.

“General Sedgwick would wait at Gettysburg until certain that the enemy were moving away.

“General Howard would like to remain at Gettysburg and ascertain what the enemy were doing, but thought it would do no harm to send a corps to Emmettsburg.

“General Meade then determined to change the manner of procedure in the council, and the following questions were written by his instructions ; a portion of these questions are in his handwriting and a portion in mine :

“The first question was, ‘Shall this army remain here?’ (That is, at Gettysburg.)

“Second. ‘If we remain here, shall we assume the offensive?’

“Third. ‘Do you deem it expedient to move towards Williamsport, through Emmettsburg?’

“Fourth. ‘Shall we pursue the enemy, if he is retreating on his direct line of retreat?’

“To the first question General Newton answered ‘No;’ to the second question, ‘No;’ and to the third question, ‘Yes.’

“General Slocum answered to the first question ‘No;’ the second question was involved in that answer ; to the third question, ‘Yes;’ to the fourth question, ‘To pursue on the direct line of retreat with cavalry, moving with the infantry to cut him off.’

“General Sedgwick to the first question answered, ‘Would remain here (at Gettysburg) until positive information concerning their movement;’ to the second question, ‘No;’ to the third question, ‘Yes;’ to the fourth question, ‘Only cavalry.’



“General Howard to the first question did not exactly say yes, and did not exactly say no, but would commence a movement to-morrow; to the second question, ‘No;’ to the third question, ‘Yes;’ to the fourth question, ‘By a show of force.’

“General Sykes to the first question, as to remaining at Gettysburg, answered, ‘Until we know where the enemy is gone;’ to the second question, ‘No;’ to the third question he made no answer, his answer to the first question involving that; to the fourth question he answered, ‘He would pursue with cavalry only.’

“General Birney to the first question answered, ‘Yes, until we see;’ to the second question, ‘No;’ to the fourth question, ‘He thinks not.’

“General Pleasanton to the first question answered ‘No;’ to the second question, ‘No;’ to the third question, ‘Move by that route;’ to the fourth question, ‘Would pursue with infantry and cavalry.’

“General Hays answered to the first question, ‘Yes, until we find out where the enemy are and what they are doing;’ to the second question, ‘No;’ to the third question, ‘Yes, if we move;’ to the fourth question, ‘No, only with cavalry.’

“General Warren as to the first question, whether we should remain there, answered, ‘Yes, until we see what they are doing;’ to the second question, about assuming the offensive, ‘Not if the enemy remains.’

“Those are the questions to the corps commanders and their answers. The summary which I made for General Meade in the council of the answers to the first question, whether we should remain at Gettysburg, was:

“Those in favor—Birney, Sedgwick, Sykes, Hays, and Warren.

“Opposed—Newton, Pleasanton, and Slocum.

“Doubtful—Howard.”

On the 5th of July the 6th corps commenced to follow the enemy, and on the 6th and 7th the rest of the army moved, going to Frederick rather than directly after the enemy, on account of some apprehensions of the difficulty of following the enemy through the mountain passes, which were reported to be strongly fortified. General Howe states that his division had the lead of the 6th corps, after passing Boonsboro’, but he was directed to move carefully, and not to come in contact with the enemy, as a general engagement was not desired. He states that when near Funkstown General Buford reported to him that his cavalry held a strong position some distance to the front, which, in his opinion, the enemy should not be allowed to occupy, but that he was pretty hardly engaged there; his ammunition was nearly out, and that he was expected to go further to the right; and asked General Howe to send forward a brigade and hold the position. General Howe applied to General Sedgwick for permission to relieve General Buford, but received in reply the answer, “No; we do not want to bring on a general engagement.” General Buford considered the position of such importance that General Howe applied the second time for permission to occupy it, representing that General Buford would soon be compelled to abandon it, as his ammunition was giving out. To this application he received the reply that he might occupy the position if General Buford left it. General Buford did leave it, and General Howe occupied and held the position. General Pleasanton states that on the morning of the 12th of July the cavalry in front of General Slocum’s command drove the

enemy from an important position, and could have held it, but General Slocum ordered it to halt, for fear of bringing on a general engagement, and the enemy afterwards brought a strong force there and held the point.

In reference to the movement of our army after the battle of Gettysburg, General Warren testifies :

“We commenced the pursuit with the 6th corps on the 5th of July, and on the 6th a large portion of the army moved towards Emmettsburg, and all that was left followed the next day. On July 7 the headquarters were at Frederick; on July 8 headquarters were at Middletown, and nearly all the army was concentrated in the neighborhood of that place and South mountain. On July 9 headquarters were at South Mountain house, and the advance of the army at Boonsboro' and Rohrersville. On July 10 the headquarters were moved to Antietam creek; the left of the line crossed the creek, and the right of the line moved up near Funkstown. On the 11th of July the engineers put a new bridge over the Antietam creek; the left of the line advanced to Fairplay and Jones's crossroads, while the right remained nearly stationary. In my opinion we should have fought the enemy the next morning, July 12.”

No attack was ordered, but the question was submitted to a council of the corps commanders on the night of the 12th of July.

General Meade says :

“I represented to those generals, so far as I knew it, the situation of affairs. I told them that I had reason to believe, from all I could ascertain, that General Lee's position was a very strong one, and that he was prepared to give battle, and defend it if attacked; that it was not in my power, from a want of knowledge of the ground, and from not having had time to make reconnoissances, to indicate any precise mode of attack, or any precise point of attack; that, nevertheless, I was in favor of moving forward and attacking the enemy, and taking the consequences; but that I left it to their judgment, and would not do it unless it met with their approval.”

Generals Howard, Pleasonton, and Wadsworth were in favor of attacking the enemy at once. General Warren, who was not then in command of a corps, says : “I do not think I ever saw the principal corps commanders so unanimous in favor of not fighting as on that occasion.” The opinion of the council being strongly against attacking the enemy at that time, the 13th of July was passed in reconnoitring the enemy's position. But General Meade says that the day was rainy and misty, and not much information was obtained. General Meade, however, ordered an attack to be made at daylight of the 14th; but when the army moved forward it was ascertained that the whole rebel army had crossed the night of the 13th, and had escaped.

General Meade says :

“It is proper I should say that an examination of the enemy's lines, and of the defences which he had made, brings me clearly to the opinion that an attack under the circumstances in which I had proposed to make it would have resulted disastrously to our arms. \* \* \* \* \* And my opinion is now that General Lee evacuated that position, not from any want of ammunition, or the fear that he would be dislodged by any active operations on my part, but that he was fearful that a force would be sent by Harper's

Ferry to cut off his communications—which I had intended to do, having brought up a bridge from Washington, and sent the cavalry down there—and that he could not have maintained that position probably a day if his communications had been cut. That was what caused him to retire.”

This opinion of General Meade is not sustained by that of any other general who has appeared before the committee. Generals Pleasanton, Warren, Birney, Doubleday, and Howe all concur in the opinion that an attack upon the enemy before he recrossed the Potomac would have been most disastrous to him, and have resulted in the dispersion if not the capture of the greater portion of his army.

The rebel army moved up the Shenandoah valley, while our army crossed in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry and followed on this side the mountains. On the 23d of July a column of our troops under General French, entering through Manassas Gap, came in contact with the enemy, but not much injury was inflicted upon him. General Warren says that, in his opinion, had General French made the attack with his whole corps, instead of with a brigade only, a decisive blow would have been inflicted on the enemy. Preparations were made for an attack the next morning, but during the night the enemy again escaped.

The enemy continued his retreat until he reached Culpeper, and then took up a position between the Rappahannock and Rapidan. Our forces withdrew from Manassas Gap and followed the enemy, reaching Warrenton and the Rappahannock about the 1st of August, when the pursuit ceased. General Meade says that he expressed the opinion to the government that the pursuit should still be continued, inasmuch as he believed our relative forces were more favorable to us than they would be at any subsequent time if the enemy were allowed time to recuperate; but that he was directed by the general-in-chief to take up a threatening attitude on the Rappahannock, but not to advance.

Shortly after this a division of troops were detached from General Meade's command and sent to South Carolina; and other troops were sent to New York to enforce the draft.

No active movements of our army took place until about the middle of September, when information was received that Lee's army had been weakened by the withdrawal of Longstreet's corps for operations in the southwest. Our cavalry was then sent across the Rappahannock, taking the enemy completely by surprise, but the army did not follow until three days afterwards. General Meade says that upon arriving before the enemy, who had retired behind the Rapidan, he considered his position there so strong, both naturally and artificially, that he deemed it impossible to attack him in front; and that, with the withdrawal of two corps of his troops for operations in Tennessee, led to a suspension of active operations until about the middle of October.

At that time General Meade says he regarded himself as about 10,000 men stronger than General Lee, and was contemplating an advance against the enemy. But General Lee made a demonstration upon the right flank of our army, whereupon General Meade deter-

mined to fall back, which he did until he finally reached the position of Centreville and Bull Run, destroying the bridge across the Rappahannock and abandoning the railroad communications to the enemy. As soon as our army stopped, General Lee began himself to fall back, destroying the railroad, and retiring to the line of the Rappahannock. There seems to be no doubt that the enemy might have been advantageously met at any one of several points between the Rappahannock and Bull Run; but no fighting of importance occurred, except at Bristow station, where the 2d corps, then under the command of General Warren, met the enemy and repulsed them with heavy loss. General Warren says that he thinks General Meade supposed that the enemy intended to fight him when he made his advance, and therefore General Meade desired to select the best position for that purpose; that General Meade had no idea that Lee would go off without attacking him. General Warren also says that General Meade was very much misinformed as to what was going on; and that some of his officers failed him in spirit. By this retreat and the destruction of our lines of communication with the Rappahannock, the remainder of the fall season was lost for active operations.

After the enemy had retired our army again advanced as far as Warrenton, arriving there the latter part of October. A delay of some days occurred for the purpose of repairing the railroad as far as that point; and then, about the 8th of November, the army again crossed the Rappahannock. The most of the witnesses express the opinion that had the army then moved promptly beyond the Rappahannock, it must have resulted most disastrously to the rebel army. The enemy had gone into winter quarters; their forces were scattered over a distance of some forty miles; the movement of our army took them completely by surprise, and a prompt advance would have divided their army. But a delay again took place, in order to rebuild the railroad from Warrenton to the Rappahannock, and no general advance was made until nearly the close of November.

On the 26th of November our army again advanced, but the movement was delayed in crossing the Rapidan, in consequence of the precipitous character of the banks at some of the places selected for crossing, and also because the pontoon bridges were found to be too short to span the river; and after the crossing was accomplished, which was done with little or no opposition from the enemy, there was a failure to concentrate at Robertson's tavern as directed by General Meade, the force under General French failing to reach there at the time indicated. This led to another delay, until his forces should come up. The army then advanced until it arrived before the enemy's position on Mine run.

Our forces, at that time, were greatly superior to those of the enemy. General Howe states that while our army was before the enemy at Mine run, General Meade himself estimated his own forces at 68,000 fighting men, while he did not consider the force of the enemy as exceeding 45,000 men.

General Warren says that he urged that if an attack was to be made on that line, it should be made at once, though he was of opin-

ion that the better plan was to turn the enemy's left and get beyond their works. But a day was spent in reconnoitring and examining the position of the enemy. An attack was ordered from both the left and right of our line the next morning; that on the left to be commenced by General Warren at 8 o'clock, that on the right by General Sedgwick an hour later. General Warren states that upon examining the position of the enemy by daylight on the morning appointed for the attack, he found it had been so strengthened during the previous night that he deemed it inadvisable to attack, and took the responsibility himself of suspending the attack until he could communicate with General Meade; that General Meade, upon receiving the information, rode out to the left of our line, and after full consultation with him (General Warren) General Meade said "that he thought it was best for us that we had not attacked; that the enemy he had no doubt was fully prepared for us."

Preparations had in the mean time been made for the attack on our right. General Howe says that during the night our troops took up a secure position, unobserved by the enemy, in some woods, where they could look right into the enemy's camp; that the troops were in good spirits and eager for the attack; that the artillery opened at the time appointed, but had fired only a few shots when an order came to suspend the attack, in consequence, as he understood, of the failure to make the attack on our left.

General Birney, in the centre, had moved with his division to the attack, had crossed the stream and penetrated beyond the first line of the enemy's works, when an aid rode up and directed him to fall back, stating that he had attacked by mistake. General Birney accordingly fell back to his former position.

No further demonstrations were made, and the following day our army retired without opposition to its former line upon the Rappahannock, and active operations, so far as the main army was concerned, then ceased for the winter.

It will thus be seen that no attack was made by the Army of the Potomac upon the rebel army, under Lee, from the time of the battle of Chancellorsville, under General Hooker, until Lieutenant General Grant assumed the active control of that army and commenced the campaign which has so lately resulted in the capture of the rebel capital and the annihilation of Lee's army, followed by the entire destruction of the rebel military power. The battle of Gettysburg, though important in its results, was purely a defensive battle on our part, and was not followed by such active measures as in the opinion of the majority of the witnesses were necessary and practicable to enable us to reap the full fruits of the victory there gained.

General Warren, who attributes the failure of the army of the Potomac, while under General Meade's command, to achieve and great and practical success over the enemy rather to the failure of the officers under him than to anything on the part of General Meade, gave the following testimony in March, 1864:

"Question. Is it not your opinion that we have lost a great many opportunities by hesitating and waiting at the decisive points?"

“Answer. Yes, sir; I will enumerate the points where, during the last year, I think we have lost opportunities.

“I think we should have advanced on the evening of the 3d of July, after the enemy were repulsed at Gettysburg, with all the force we had on our left.

“I think we should have attacked the enemy at Williamsport on the morning of the 12th of July; I think we were as ready then as we ever were, and the enemy was not ready at all.

“Then we lost another opportunity at Manassas gap, on the 23d of July, while the enemy were retreating.

“Then again we lost another opportunity when the enemy attacked us on the 14th of October, at Bristow. Perhaps not at that point exactly, but during that movement, we missed an opportunity that we should be very glad to have again.

“Then again we lost a good opportunity after we recrossed the Rappahannock on the 8th of November.

“And another opportunity was lost in not making the junction we should have had at Robertson’s tavern on the 27th of November.

“Nearly all these delays and failures are due, not so much to General Meade, as to his plans and expectations not being carried out.

“Question. And you think that, on the occasions you have enumerated, with promptness and energy of action serious injury might have been inflicted upon the enemy?

“Answer. Yes, sir; almost amounting to his destruction.”

Your committee could not forbear asking the witnesses before them, if the army, after all these indecisive advances and retrograde movements, still retained confidence in its commanding general. Various answers were returned to this inquiry, all, however, tending to establish the fact that much discouragement had been felt by the army at these ineffective operations, and that but for the highly intelligent character of the rank and file it could never have retained even its then effective condition. General Pleasonton states that the cavalry under his command did not retain confidence in the military ability of General Meade. General Birney states the same about his corps, stating that while General Meade was rather liked as a man, he was not regarded as a man of resolution, or one who is willing to assume that responsibility required by the position he occupies. General Howe states that, in his opinion, the rank and file of the army do not regard General Meade as possessed of that zeal, activity, and energy necessary to carry on an offensive warfare generally, but he admits that the most of the corps commanders would probably say that General Meade was eminently qualified for the command he now holds. That opinion General Howe qualifies, however, by stating that so far as he has observed, the most of the principal officers of the army of the Potomac, including its commanding general, are governed by the same sympathies, feelings, and considerations which were infused into the army by its commander during the Peninsular campaign. General Birney says that many of the principal officers believed that General McClellan was the only general who should command this army; although there is not as much of that feeling now as formerly. General Doubleday bluntly says: “There has always been a great deal of favoritism in the army of the Potomac. No man who is an anti-slavery man or an anti-McClellan man can expect de-

cent treatment in that army as at present constituted." General Warren states that after the battle of Gettysburg the army was deprived of many of its best corps commanders, General Reynolds having been killed, Generals Sickles and Hancock wounded, and General Meade made commander of the army; that since that time the corps commanders have not been all equal to their position, and consequently the army had been less effective in its operations.

Respectfully submitted.

B. F. WADE,  
*Chairman.*





## ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.—GENERAL HOOKER.

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*Testimony of Major General Daniel E. Sickles.*

WASHINGTON, *February 25, 1864.*

Major General DANIEL E. SICKLES sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?

Answer. My rank is that of major general of volunteers, and the commander of the third army corps.

Question. Were you with the army of the Potomac at the time when General Hooker took command of that army ?

Answer. I was.

Question. Did you serve under him as commander of a corps ?

Answer. At the time he took command I commanded the second division of the third corps, known as Hooker's old division, the one he formerly commanded. Upon the retirement of General Stoneman I was assigned temporarily to the command of the third corps, under a general order from the headquarters of the army of the Potomac. I was afterwards regularly appointed to the command of that corps by the President and promoted to my present rank.

Question. After General Burnside was relieved from the command of that army, General Hooker was assigned to the command ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Will you now please state, in your own way, the movements of the army from that time, while you were connected with it ?

Answer. When General Hooker took command the condition of the army presented several features indicating demoralization. Desertions were very numerous; the general tone of conversation in the camps was that of dissatisfaction and complaint. General Hooker, as its commander, found it necessary to address himself at once to the important duty of elevating the tone and improving the discipline and *morale* of the army.

Question. How did he succeed in that effort ?

Answer. He succeeded well; so well that, in my judgment, when he entered upon the Chancellorsville campaign that army was, for its numbers, more efficient in all respects than it had ever been before. Of course, I speak more especially with reference to the third army corps, because, being in command of that corps, my knowledge of it is more full and accurate than of the others; but, as corps commander, I had many opportunities of judging of the condition of the entire army, and what I say has general application to the whole army, special application to my own corps.

Question. Do you recollect about what was the strength of the army of the Potomac at that period ?

Answer. I have no official and precise knowledge of its strength; but my own corps was as strong as I have ever known it to be, except at the commencement of the peninsular campaign. Then it was much stronger; the regiments were full, at their maximum. My impression is that General Hooker had eighty thousand effective men of all arms—infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The force nominally present, including sick and detailed men of all kinds, of course, was considerably larger, probably ninety-five thousand men; but when I speak generally of the strength of an army, I refer to the number of men available for line of battle.

Question. What do you say of the plan and the execution of that Chancellorsville campaign? Please give your own version and views of it. We want to obtain all the information we can from those who took an active part in it.

Answer. The selection of the places for crossing the Rappahannock, the manœuvres by which the army was thrown across the river, and the placing it in position for battle, were all conducted with perfect success, and without any considerable loss on our part—with much less loss than is usual in such operations. In its main features it was conducted with so much address as to be a complete surprise to the enemy. That is all that any general could do in the initiation of a movement.

Question. To what do you attribute the ultimate failure of that movement?

Answer. To the giving way of the eleventh corps on Saturday.

Question. State particularly how that corps was situated, and the importance of its action upon the movement, giving us some idea of the order of battle, &c.

Answer. On Saturday General Hooker had concentrated his main force in and near Chancellorsville, with the exception of the sixth corps, and one division of the second corps, which was under General Sedgwick, operating upon the other line by the way of Fredericksburg. Early on Saturday morning I accompanied General Hooker on a reconnoissance which extended from the centre through the right centre and to the right flank of the army, which embraced the front that I occupied, which, on that morning, was a small front held by one division. My principal force was in reserve; but during Friday night, and early on Saturday morning, General Hooker concluded that the line held to the right, by the eleventh and twelfth corps, was perhaps a little too extended to be held as stoutly as he anticipated would be necessary. He therefore contracted the line so held, and directed me to throw in one of my divisions. This made it my duty—although the main body of my force, two divisions and a part of my artillery, were still in reserve—to give my particular attention to what was going on on the right. I therefore accompanied General Hooker in this reconnoissance, which was made about daybreak on Saturday morning. The condition of affairs, as it seemed to him, and I think to others who accompanied him, and as was reported to me by General Howard and General Slocum, was entirely satisfactory. The commanding officers on the right considered themselves fully able to hold their position. About nine or ten o'clock—nine o'clock, I should say—a movement of the enemy was reported to me by General Birney. I had then returned to headquarters, near my two divisions, which were in reserve, so as to be in a position to throw them into any part of the field where General Hooker might direct. A report was sent to me by General Birney, commanding the division in position in front, that a movement of the enemy was noticeable. I received other reports following that soon afterwards, showing it to be a movement in considerable force. On conveying this information to General Hooker, he thought it of sufficient importance to justify my going over in person to investigate it, which I did; and from the information which I gathered on the spot, I satisfied myself that it was a movement in great force. The direction which the enemy's column took, judging from what information we had of the country, and from the maps we had, was susceptible of two interpretations. It was, perhaps, a movement in retreat; for they had a large

train with them, a great many wagons, and all arms, except cavalry, were in large force. I pushed a battery forward, with a sufficient support, and shelled this column of the enemy. It was a rifled battery. The column was, perhaps, moving a mile or a mile and a half from the position of the battery, but within pretty easy range of a good rifled battery. I forced the column to abandon the road which they were taking, and, seeing no further movement of the enemy's troops, we supposed for a time that they had, perhaps, abandoned the operation, if it was a movement of a column for the purpose of attack; or if it was a movement for retreat, that they had taken a more available route. A reconnoissance was then pushed out, which resulted in ascertaining that the movement of the enemy still continued.

Upon reporting these facts to General Hooker, he directed me to strengthen the reconnoissance, and to ascertain all I could of the strength of the enemy's column, and the direction in which it was moving; which was done. I reported to the general, that if he would allow me to advance the whole of Birney's division, and support it with another division of infantry, I thought I would be able to get possession of the road upon which the enemy was moving, at all events; if it was a retreat, cut them off; and if it was a demonstration on our right flank, which was the other interpretation, it would prevent any more force being sent in that direction, and in effect divide Lee's army. The general authorized me to do so, enjoining upon me, however, great caution, lest I should find myself overwhelmed by a force with which I might be unable to compete. General Birney's division was immediately advanced a mile and a half; it took some time to do it, because he had to push his division across two or three marshes and streams that could not be forded, and he had to make bridges for them. The line of march was through what was called the Wilderness, and quite a mountainous part of the Wilderness. However, with great energy and activity he cut his way through, and got possession of the road. From prisoners, of which we took a large number, we ascertained that the column of the enemy consisted of Stonewall Jackson's corps, with the addition of other troops, making a force which was estimated by the prisoners that we took at some forty thousand men.

I reported the result of this operation to General Hooker, or despatched the report to him; and General Pleasonton's cavalry was sent to me by my request, for the purpose of co-operating in a flank attack on Jackson, which I asked permission to make. I also requested that the third division of my corps should be sent to me, in order that I should have my full command available for that purpose. We were continually taking prisoners, and everything seemed to indicate the most brilliant success as certain to follow from throwing this force upon Jackson's rear and flank. I was holding General Pleasonton's cavalry in hand, desiring to make the attack with my infantry first. I had advanced my second division to support the first; and General Hooker had sent directions to General Howard on my right, and General Slocum on my left, to support my movement. General Slocum sent General Williamson's brigade to report to me for that purpose, and General Howard sent Barlow's brigade. They were in position, and I was about to open my attack in full force—had got all ready for that purpose, when an aid of General Howard (I presume he was an aid, though he did not at that moment so announce himself) came to me and reported to me to be careful of my rear—that Stuart's cavalry was moving in my rear, and if I was not careful would cut me off; and he added that a strong column of Jackson's infantry was also very near me, and that our troops were retreating.

I felt very indignant at this communication; I utterly disbelieved it, for I felt assured that no such thing could have occurred without a serious engagement with General Howard's force, and of course I would have heard the musketry and the noise of battle. This officer left, having given his information;

or, as I thought at the time, having failed in an absurd effort to stampede me. In a minute or two another messenger, an officer who announced himself as an aide-de-camp of General Howard, and who seemed to be much more self-possessed and methodical in his communication, arrived and said that he came to me by General Howard's orders, begging me to send him a regiment of General Pleasonton's cavalry—that his corps had given way, and that our right flank had been carried by the enemy, and that Jackson was in my rear. I felt bound, of course, to give full heed to this communication, and did so; and I soon myself saw the troops of the enemy in the position which this communication informed me they had attained. There had been a little skirmishing, as I supposed, and an occasional rattling of musketry going along in the front, at different points, but no firing which would indicate a serious engagement, or anything more than was going on in my own front, where I did not consider myself actively engaged. I had come up with the enemy, and they had given way; I was making considerable captures of prisoners. I suppose I must have sent in eight or nine hundred during my movement. I immediately sent orders to General Birney to fall back, and about the same time received information from General Hooker that he could not send me the third division of my corps, (which communication I had anticipated when I heard of the giving way of the right flank,) for he had found it necessary to employ that division to stop the enemy who had broken through the eleventh corps. He had no other division to stop them, and sent me word that I must immediately withdraw my whole force and save as much of it as I could. General Birney's division and General Whipple's division were both withdrawn in good order, and without loss. Meanwhile the eleventh corps, a mass of fugitives, were sweeping across the field and stampeded my artillery, being the principal part of the artillery of General Birney's and General Whipple's divisions, which I had massed, with a small support of infantry, as it was not necessary to advance it in aid of the movement, and it was rather perilous to do so. With the aid of General Pleasonton, who fortunately remained with his cavalry near where my artillery was parked, we succeeded in stopping the effects of this stampede upon my own artillery, and General Pleasonton, at my request, took charge of it and supported it with his cavalry; and by a most effective use of it, under his personal direction, in connexion with the services of Major General Berry, commanding the second division of the corps which was operating under the immediate orders of General Hooker, he succeeded in checking Jackson.

This is a very cursory description of the affair, but it is fully detailed in my official report. If I had anticipated that your inquiries would have gone back to this operation, I would have brought my report with me. In connexion with these observations, I desire to say that it is my judgment, and I think it was the judgment generally of the commanding officers on the field on that day (Saturday,) that if the eleventh corps had held its ground, the result of that day's operations would have been that the battle of Chancellorsville would have been fought on Saturday under the most favorable circumstances, with Lee's army divided—Lee's column being at least between five and six miles from Jackson's. General Hooker's plan of operations for the day, as I understood it, was to allow this movement of the enemy to develop itself until he had divided their army, then to put my corps, well supported, on Lee's line of communication, so as to prevent the junction of their forces, and then gather his army in hand and fall upon the two wings of the enemy in detail and destroy them both. I have not the least doubt but that operation would have been entirely successful but for the giving way of the eleventh corps; and, so far as I can judge of the operations of Saturday, they were conducted by General Hooker with all the skill and address which the circumstances of the case admitted of or called for.

Question. Do you know any cause for the stampeding of that eleventh corps?

Answer. No, sir, I can say nothing upon that subject; that is, nothing more than mere gossip and speculations about the camp, in which, in the absence of means of testing its truth, I have never allowed myself to place any credit. I have understood that it has been made the subject of careful investigation by General Howard, and reported upon by him; but I have never seen that report, and I do not know anything of its character. The next important movement of which I have personal knowledge was made on that Saturday night. I had the authority of General Hooker for making a night attack upon Jackson's force. I was ordered by General Hooker generally during the day to avail myself of every opportunity to attack and harass Jackson's movement, and my position was such as enabled me to attack him on his right flank. I can furnish the committee with a plan of the battle, and a topographical sketch of the field and the position of the troops, which will enable them to understand more clearly all these movements. I have not that with me now. In furtherance of these instructions of General Hooker, when night came and the effects of the stampede had been removed, I did not feel at liberty to make a night attack without getting his special authority to do so. Upon reporting to him the position which I held, and Jackson's position, he ordered me to make a night attack, and directed General Slocum, who was on my right, to support it if necessary. The attack was made precisely at midnight by a brigade, or rather more than a brigade; General Ward's brigade, with the remaining part of General Birney's division, in support. It was admirably conducted under General Birney, and was in all respects successful. It was made entirely with the bayonet. We drove Jackson back to our original line, and reoccupied General Howard's rifle-pits, and recovered some several pieces of artillery, and some caissons which had been abandoned during the day. It was in that night attack that Jackson fell. His force was thrown into great confusion, and his own artillery opened upon his own men. The result of this attack was reported to General Hooker, and I was ordered to hold the advance line which I had recovered until further orders. I got up some troops in support, and held the line, expecting an effort upon the part of the enemy to recover it, until about four o'clock in the morning, when I was ordered to report in person to General Hooker at Chancellorsville. Communication in the mean while had been established between General Hooker's headquarters and myself, it having been cut off for some hours during the day. I reported in person to General Hooker, and he ordered me, a little before daybreak, to withdraw my troops and take up a new line. He had determined to occupy a line somewhat less extended than he had held on the previous day. The disorganization of the eleventh corps had practically left him with one corps less for Sunday's operation than before.

Question. What was the strength of the eleventh corps, as near as you can recollect?

Answer. I have no correct information about it. It consisted of three divisions, and I should estimate it at fifteen thousand men. I do not think it was more; and it may have been a thousand or so less; but assuming the strength of the divisions to have been about the average, I should judge it was about fifteen thousand strong. My own divisions were considerably stronger, and my own corps was about eighteen thousand.

Question. Their giving way made a long gap in the line?

Answer. Yes, sir, a very serious gap. General Hooker consequently felt himself obliged to take a less extended position, and that made it necessary for my troops to be withdrawn. It was a somewhat hazardous movement in the presence of the enemy, as the night was then so far advanced that it would have to be done in the daylight. However, that movement was executed with much less loss than I apprehended. I had had some experience in withdrawing troops, under similar circumstances, in the presence of the enemy, in the peninsular

campaign, during the seven days' battle. I had supposed that the enemy would be on the watch for movements of that character; and if we were attacked seriously while executing such a movement, I felt apprehensive of the result. But the enemy did not attack until the whole of my column had been withdrawn, with the exception of one brigade and a battery. The rear guard under General Graham was furiously attacked; but being promptly supported, and General Graham manœuvring his troops with great address, the steadiness and gallantry of the troops was such that they inflicted upon the enemy about as much damage as they received themselves. The whole force was withdrawn in good order and without loss, except one piece of artillery, I think, which got stalled in crossing a swamp, and a caisson, the horses of which were all killed. I suppose the piece of artillery would not have been stalled, had not two or three of the horses been killed.

We then took up our position in the line of battle assigned us for the combat of Sunday, which opened very soon after my troops had taken their position. The attack of the enemy on Sunday was made on my front in great force. They attacked as they generally do—the favorite field tactics of Jackson—in heavy columns. General Hooker, of course, not knowing precisely where the attack would be made, had his forces disposed as usual, in double line of battle, but of course sufficiently extended to cover all the points of attack available to the enemy. I reported to him the great force of the enemy in my front, and my ability, in my judgment, to hold my position as long as my ammunition would last; but that the force of the enemy enabled him to constantly bring fresh troops up to the attack—that my last reserves had been put into position, and it was very important, as that seemed to be the point that the enemy were bent upon attacking, that I should be supported. An aide-de-camp, Major Tremaine, took this last and most urgent communication to General Hooker. Of course I had made frequent reports to him of the progress of things in my immediate front. That communication I regarded as of the most important character. It was taken to him at the time when he had been struck down by a piece of the door or pillar of the apartment which he was occupying at Chancellorsville being knocked against him. He was knocked senseless, and Major Tremaine was unable to make the communication to him. Some of General Hooker's staff were present; and from his appearance and the character of the blow, they supposed at the time that the injury would result fatally.

I received a report of this from Major Tremaine, and sent him back again. I think I sent the same officer; at all events, I sent a staff officer, for the purpose of making the communication to the next senior officer who would take command. I received no official communication from headquarters, however, and no support came to me. And my artillery ammunition having been exhausted, I withdrew my artillery from the defences thrown up during the night— withdrew it in good order and without loss. I also withdrew my infantry, which had been somewhat in front, to the second line behind the works, expecting to hold them for a time with the bayonet, and looking every moment for support to come up. The enemy seemed to be satisfied with having forced me to withdraw my infantry from their front line to this second position; and the battle paused for half an hour or more. The loss inflicted upon the enemy, especially by my artillery, was most severe. Their formation for the attack was entirely broken up, and from my headquarters they presented to the eye the appearance of a mass, a crowd, without definite formation; and if another corps had been available at that moment to have relieved me, or even to have supported me, my judgment was that not only would that attack of the enemy have been triumphantly repulsed, but that we could have advanced on them and carried the day. And that undoubtedly would have been done in ample season, and before my ammunition gave out and compelled me to withdraw, but for the injury that General Hooker received.

However, no supports coming up, and the enemy meanwhile having had time to restore order in his own lines and bring up fresh reserves, I was again attacked, and having no means of resistance except the bayonet—having only one battery for which I had been able to obtain a supply of fresh ammunition—after repelling five successive attacks of the enemy with the bayonet, capturing eight of their colors from their second line, most of which were captured by the New Jersey brigade under General Mott, I again fell back to General Hooker's headquarters, which were then within easy range of the enemy's cannon, and were rapidly becoming a pile of ruins—almost every shot telling upon the building. I had just taken up my third line a little in the rear of his headquarters, when they were set in flames by the enemy's fire and consumed. Under the orders of General Couch, who had at this time, I believe, temporarily assumed command during General Hooker's disability, I then again fell back to the line for the army generally, which I believe was marked out by General Couch, three-quarters of a mile or so to the rear. The enemy, however, was so badly punished, had received such injury from the battle of the morning, that he was not in a condition to follow us up; and, in the execution of these several movements to the rear which I have described, I took prisoners instead of losing any, which is the most conclusive indication that I could give you of the good order in which these movements were executed, and the inability of the enemy to follow up or take any advantage of them, either in the capture of prisoners or material. At the conclusion of the battle of Sunday, Captain Seeley's battery, which was the last battery that fired a shot in the battle of Chancellorsville, had forty-five horses killed, and in the neighborhood of forty men killed and wounded; but being a soldier of great pride and ambition, and not wishing to leave any of his material in the hands of the enemy, he withdrew so entirely at his leisure that he carried off all the harness from his dead horses, loading his cannoneers with it; he even took a part of a set of harness on his own arm, and so moved to the rear. I think this is as significant a fact as I can state to you, indicating the inability of the enemy to follow up; also the additional fact that I lost no prisoners, but captured a considerable number, several hundred, from the enemy while they were making these last attacks of which I spoke. They were spirited attacks, but not such as indicated the enemy to be in a condition to follow up any advantage. As I said before, if another corps, or even ten thousand men, had been available at the close of the battle of Chancellorsville, on that part of the field where I was engaged, I believe the battle would have resulted in our favor.

Question. What was the result finally; did the battle then cease?

Answer. Yes, sir; and we withdrew. General Couch withdrew his corps—what of it was there—two divisions, I think. General Slocum withdrew his, and my corps was withdrawn to the general position. I do not remember the name of the house, although perhaps it is stated in my report. It was on a farm, and occupied by General Couch as his headquarters. It was about three-quarters of a mile or a mile in the rear, and toward the United States ford, where we took up a new position and intrenched. There we remained until we recrossed the river, in consequence of the rains having swollen the Rappahannock and carried away the bridges so as to interrupt our communications, our rations having been consumed.

Question. How long did General Hooker remain in this disabled state, resulting from the blow he received?

Answer. I was constantly present with my troops until we took up our final position in the afternoon, and I did not see General Hooker from the time the battle opened until rather late in the afternoon, when the battle was over. I had received orders in the mean time from General Couch and from General Meade, both my seniors. The order from General Meade I understood to be an order from General Couch, communicated to me through General Meade. Of

course I obeyed those orders, and put my troops in position in accordance with them. In the afternoon, I should say about three or four o'clock, I met General Hooker. I think he sent for me to know where my troops were, and I told him. He asked by what orders, and I told him. He said they were not in position as he desired, and told me where he wanted them. I regarded him then, of course, as having resumed his command, and changed my position from one somewhat to the rear, in support of General Meade, and took position in front, parallel with General Meade. General Meade held the front line on the right of the United States ford road, and I held the position on the left. There I proceeded to intrench. I cannot speak from any personal knowledge of General Hooker's condition, except as was reported to me by staff officers; but, as near as I can fix the time, I suppose he must have received this injury at quite an early hour in the morning—I should say, perhaps, between eight and nine o'clock—and I had no communication from him indicating him to be in command until, perhaps, between three and four o'clock in the afternoon. He was then, I should say, in a condition, from his injury, that forbade his reassuming command; he was evidently suffering great agony, and I suppose nothing but the highest sense of duty could have prompted him to resume command under such circumstances. He was mounted on his horse, and was perfectly clear in all respects as to orders and everything, but was evidently suffering great bodily pain.

Question. Were his mental faculties impaired in any way when you saw him?

Answer. No, sir; except that they might be by bodily suffering.

Question. Do you suppose, if he had been well enough to have answered your request for re-enforcements, it would have turned the whole tide of battle?

Answer. Yes, sir; I have no doubt the battle would have been won in thirty minutes; at least, it would have been won in an hour. It would have been won just as soon as you could have got ten thousand men from the right or left to have repulsed that attack.

Question. What was the reason that request was not complied with by the person who assumed the command after General Hooker's injury?

Answer. I cannot answer that question, because I do not know at what time the next senior officer did assume command. That would depend entirely upon whether the staff of General Hooker may have supposed that the general would revive and soon recover.

Question. Were there available troops to have met your request?

Answer. Yes, sir; because my corps was the only one actively engaged; or, I should say, with the 12th corps. My corps was the one most seriously engaged; the 12th corps was partially engaged. My losses would indicate that. I lost two hundred and sixty officers and about forty-five hundred men in a couple of hours; which was the principal loss of the day.

Question. I suppose the reports show nearly what the relative losses were; but do you recollect which was the greatest—our loss or the loss of the enemy?

Answer. I do not think the enemy has ever published his loss at Chancellorsville; I do not remember to have seen anything that I could regard as a reliable official statement of his loss, but it must have greatly exceeded ours, except that he took a great many prisoners, as I have understood, from the 11th corps on Saturday. His losses in killed and wounded, in the operations of Saturday and Sunday, must have greatly exceeded ours. I have never seen a more effective infantry and artillery fire brought to bear upon troops than was delivered from the line of battle under my eye, selected by General Hooker, on Sunday. Our position was a commanding one, and with one half of the force that was brought to bear against it could have been held.

Question. It seems obvious to me that when you were pressed in this way, and the other part of the army was not engaged; they could hardly have overlooked the necessity of re-enforcing you at once.



Answer. I cannot say that it was overlooked. It was not done, on account of those accidents which no human foresight could avoid. In the first place the injury to General Hooker prevented him from doing it. If the senior staff officer present regarded the injury to General Hooker as so serious as to deprive him of the power of command, it was his place to notify General Couch that General Hooker was seriously injured, and not able to continue in command; and upon that notification General Couch would undoubtedly have assumed command if he had received it in an official form, and had been within easy communication, which I suppose he was. If he was too far off to take command, the notification should have been sent to the next senior officer, whoever he was. Why that was not done, or if it was done, when it was done, I have no information.

Question. Probably if it had been done promptly it would have saved the day?

Answer. I have no doubt of it. Any means by which we could have received re-enforcements at that point would have saved the day, and turned it in our favor.

Question. The question has been asked, and there have been criticisms upon the subject, why General Hooker did not act in conjunction with Sedgwick when that attack was made. I have heard such suggestions; I do not know whether there is any reason in them or not. Have you anything to say on that subject?

Answer. I do not know that I have. I can only speak of that movement or any other so far as I was personally connected with it. General Hooker's chief of staff, or any other officer holding the same relation to him on his staff who would have a knowledge of all his plans, could testify about that better than I can. It is not usual to impart to a junior corps commander such as I was, and operating under the immediate orders of the commanding general, anything more than concerns his own corps and its operations, and those immediately on his right or left. General Sedgwick was operating upon an entirely different line—of course in conjunction with our army, and looking to the general result. My first participation in the operations of the campaign of Chancellorsville was with General Sedgwick. I was ordered around to the left to support him; I reported to him with my corps and took position with him, and remained there until the eleventh, twelfth, and fifth corps had effected their crossing on the right. Then I was ordered by General Hooker around to the right to report to him, and was relieved from further duty with General Sedgwick.

Question. After the battle of Sunday, when you had taken up your final position and intrenched, where had the enemy taken up his position?

Answer. The enemy occupied the ground that we evacuated, and were in pretty strong force. We felt him everywhere on our new front. Reconnoissances were made to ascertain the position of the enemy, and it was supposed at one time that they would concentrate and fall on Sedgwick. General Hooker took prompt steps to ascertain whether that was so, with a view to defeat any such movement. I think a whole division made one reconnoissance, they being sent out on our right flank, where, in case that theory should prove to be true, the enemy would be found either not at all or in very small force, because General Hooker was operating on our left. General Griffin's reconnoissance, however, developed the enemy in great force on our right flank.

Question. What was the nature of the ground that separated you from General Sedgwick?

Answer. It was covered with woods—dense forests, with here and there a clearing. In my front the enemy was in force; I was on the left of the road, and had position in what might be called the left centre. General Meade's position might be designated as the right centre, occupying the right of the road.

Question. How far from your lines was it that the battle on the heights of Fredericksburg was fought by Sedgwick?

Answer. Do you mean just after he carried the heights, and was driven across the river?

Question. Yes, sir.

Answer. I could not state the distance accurately in miles without consulting a topographical map; but I should say that it was at least five or six miles.

Question. You finally recrossed the river?

Answer. Yes, sir; after the terrible storm of Tuesday.

Question. What is your view about the generalship of that movement?

Answer. The most urgent reason for it—probably the controlling reason for recrossing the river, was the fact that our rations had given out. We had taken no subsistence with us except in the haversacks of the men. We went over as light as possible; we did not take any ammunition train, but carried our ammunition and forage on mules. We had been over there operating for several days, when a terrific rain-storm occurred; the Rappahannock became a rapid and swollen torrent, and carried away one or more of our bridges, and threatened all with destruction. Our bridges were under water, and the Rappahannock was rising at the rate of a foot an hour. The banks are very high there, and a number of streams are tributary to that river. The best that we could do was to take the pieces of the bridges that had been carried away, and keep repairing the one or two which remained, so as to preserve them. It was necessary for us to immediately fight a decisive battle, and a successful one, or to return. If, in view of our exigencies, we had been sure that the enemy would have accepted battle immediately, it might have been expedient for us to have tried the fortunes of another battle; but they were just as well aware of the condition of the river as we were, and they knew the condition of our supplies; and in all human probability, they would not have accommodated us with battle. They would have fallen back, and fallen back; being familiar with the country, they could have fallen back to good defensive positions, of which they had abundance; and in the mean while we would have been obliged to weaken ourselves to keep up our line of communication with the river. That is one reason. We might have been on a par with the enemy in that respect, had General Stoneman's cavalry expedition, which was mainly intended as an attack upon the enemy's communications, been successful, or if we had heard any intimation of it. But we had not heard of it, and General Hooker had in fact two corps less than he started with, for the sixth corps had been compelled to recross the river, and had already crossed when the question of our movement was considered; they had crossed at Banks's ford. And the eleventh corps were practically so broken up as to be perhaps hardly available for offensive operations so soon. The cavalry had not been heard from; and therefore General Hooker had to consider what he should do without his cavalry and with two corps unavailable to him—one actually across the river, the sixth corps, which was his strongest corps, together with one division of the second corps, say twenty thousand men; and the eleventh corps broken up, numbering, say, fifteen thousand more. The eleventh corps would have fought, and might have fought very well; yet very few in the army believed it would. General Howard had great and perhaps deserved confidence in his troops, notwithstanding what had occurred; but his opinion was not the opinion of General Hooker or of others.

Question. You have kept yourself informed to some extent of that corps since then; do you think they have redeemed themselves?

Answer. I should think they had certainly, from what we have heard of their operations; and I know that General Hooker's command in the west has greatly distinguished itself. In the grand operation of Lookout mountain I am not able to say whether the eleventh corps was engaged. I think the general of the eleventh corps had been detached from his command and sent to another part of the field, and that General Hooker's operation there was conducted with one

division of the twelfth corps and a considerable body of western troops ; therefore I cannot say what the eleventh corps has done.

Question. As a military man, under all the circumstances that you have already stated, was it good generalship to recross, or to continue there?

Answer. In my judgment it was good generalship to recross.

Question. What was the condition of the army after you recrossed the river, with regard to their *morale* and their confidence in their commanding officer?

Answer. The condition of the army was admirable, and the confidence, especially of the rank and file, was very slightly if at all diminished in General Hooker. I do not mean to say that there was not great disappointment felt, but I think it was felt that the failure was attributable to causes over which the commanding general had no control.

Question. You still continued with the army?

Answer. Yes, sir. I received a serious injury at the battle of Chancellorsville ; I cannot perhaps call it technically a wound, but I received a contusion from a fragment of a shell, which affected my general health very seriously, and it became necessary for me to avail myself of a leave of absence for the benefit of my health ; which leave I applied for about three weeks after we returned. I returned to the army when it was encamped at Frederick City, Md., the day that General Hooker was relieved and General Meade took command. I then assumed command of my corps, and continued with it until my wound at Gettysburg compelled me to relinquish the command.

Question. Were there not a considerable number of troops on the Peninsula, near Suffolk, under Generals Dix, Foster, &c.?

Answer. So I understood.

Question. Why were those troops not made available in that campaign? Could they not have been placed within striking distance?

Answer. I suppose so, but it would be a mere matter of conjecture if I should offer any opinion about that, for it would be an opinion formed without a sufficiently general knowledge of the facts to make it worth anything. As a general observation, in a military point of view, it would seem always most probable that when the army of the Potomac is engaged in an offensive campaign against General Lee, a co-operative movement on the Peninsula was most desirable ; and whenever we have the troops there in sufficient force to make it, it should always be made. It is calculated to distract the enemy's attention, and prevent their reinforcing General Lee ; and perhaps it would have the effect of weakening General Lee in order to cover their capital. Either all the force available should be concentrated in the army of the Potomac, the army of attack, or else if a considerable force is withheld from that army, it should be employed in co-operative movements bearing upon the same strategical line.

Question. Were you with the army when General Lee commenced his movement towards the Potomac, which resulted ultimately in the battle of Gettysburg?

Answer. No, sir. The commencement of Lee's movement, that which might be called his Pennsylvania campaign, took place a few days after my sick leave took effect. When it had developed itself, when he had crossed the Potomac or was about crossing it, I resumed my command. My health was not restored, and under other circumstances I should not have returned to the army for perhaps several weeks.

Question. You know historically the movements of Lee's army and of General Hooker's army?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What do you say of the disposition of our army in relation to that of the enemy? Was it judicious ; did it evidence good generalship, or was there anything on the part of our army or its movements that you would criticise?

Answer. So far as I can judge, the manœuvres and movements of General Hooker resulted in placing his army between Washington and the enemy, covering Washington and Baltimore; and by taking a shorter line he forced General Lee to move upon the outer line of a circle, and thus outmanœuvred General Lee by preventing his attack upon Washington or Baltimore, and protected our lines of communication. Those movements resulted in compelling General Lee to fight at Gettysburg, the most advantageous position, I think, that we could have taken for our battle-ground.

Question. You were with General Hooker's army when he was relieved?

Answer. Yes, sir; I arrived there the day he was relieved.

Question. Do you know what led to his being relieved?

Answer. Yes, sir, I think I may say that I do. General Hooker read to me the correspondence that led to it. He was relieved because he differed in judgment with General Halleck; or perhaps I should say, in the first place, he was relieved at his own request. That was the immediate cause; but he made the request because of irreconcilable differences of opinion between himself and General Halleck as to his operations, and especially the disposition of the garrison at Harper's Ferry. There were ten thousand troops there. General Hooker regarded the possession of that post as of no importance in comparison with the defeat of Lee in the general engagement that must be fought. He therefore advised the abandonment or evacuation of the post, and the concentration of those troops with the main army. I believe he had ordered it. On the other hand, he was required by General Halleck not only to occupy Harper's Ferry, but to cover it with more troops if necessary, and also to cover Washington and Baltimore, and protect his line of communication. In addition to all this, he was expected to fight and whip Lee. General Hooker represented that to do all that with a force which in the aggregate was not superior to that of General Lee, and possibly was inferior to it, was in his judgment to incur a very great risk, and in a military point of view might perhaps be regarded as impracticable. General Hooker stated that the differences of opinion seemed to him so important and so serious, that in his judgment it would be better for the cause and for the army if some other officer should be put in command, between whom and the general-in-chief greater uniformity of opinion existed. He therefore requested to be relieved, and he was relieved.

Question. How soon, after General Meade assumed command, were these same troops at Harper's Ferry concentrated with the main army?

Answer. Immediately; I understood that on the same day that General Hooker was relieved, or on the day after, General French's troops, which were the troops at Harper's Ferry, were ordered to join General Meade.

Question. I will ask you whether, in your judgment, General Hooker received a cordial support at Chancellorsville from all his corps commanders, or whether there was a dissatisfaction on their part, or on the part of any of them, with his being at the head of the army.

Answer. From some of the corps commanders he did receive co-operation and support, but not from all; and I think there were many officers in his command decidedly hostile to him, which seriously impaired the efficiency of their co-operation, and militated against General Hooker's success.

Question. Was that feeling strengthened by any knowledge or understanding of the relations between General Hooker and the general-in-chief?

Answer. It was in some measure strengthened by the well-known fact that the general-in-chief was hostile to General Hooker; and his relations, official and unofficial, with the general-in-chief were embarrassed by that fact. That was well known, and, as you can see, led the corps commanders and others to regard General Hooker's tenure as a brief one, and one quite certain to terminate with the first disaster. There was another reason. It was understood, from some expressions of opinion by General Hooker as to General McClellan's

campaign, that the relations between General Hooker and General McClellan had been antagonistical; and the partisans of General McClellan, then in high command, were hostile to General Hooker. These two facts I regard as the main causes of the antagonism towards General Hooker which existed in the army. With the rank and file he was a great favorite, and they were enthusiastically devoted to him as a leader.

Question. Is it your opinion that in the battle of Chancellorsville these feelings and considerations impaired the efficiency of the army?

Answer. I think they did, in the operations I could see. I do not mean to say that when troops are going into battle they think of these things; but in the operations of the campaign, while General Hooker had command, I think they had an important bearing.

Question. You have been in close intimacy as a brother officer with General Hooker for a long time, especially through the Chancellorsville campaign?

Answer. Yes, sir, I have served under General Hooker as a brigade, division, and corps commander respectively, all through the war, until he was relieved.

Question. Is he in the habit of using, or does he ever use, intoxicating liquors so as to impair his efficiency in any degree whatever?

Answer. No; I have never known him on duty to be in the least degree affected by the use of intoxicating drinks.

Question. It has been rumored that his mental faculties were impaired by liquor at Chancellorsville. Rumors have been going around to that effect. How was it?

Answer. I had frequent interviews with General Hooker between Friday, when I reported to him at Chancellorsville, and Wednesday, when we recrossed the Rappahannock, and retired to its north bank. A part of that time, my command being in reserve, I was constantly at his headquarters; and while my command was in front, I frequently met him at his headquarters, or on the field, at all hours of the day and night; and so far as I am qualified to judge, he was at no time under any such influence, but was as self-possessed as any officer on the field. I am not aware of any cause whatever that impaired his efficiency as a commander at that time, except the very serious injury that befell him at a critical moment during the battle of Sunday morning. That is God's truth; and as I have stated before, but for that unfortunate injury, the battle was ours beyond all doubt. That I believe to be just as true as that I sit here.

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*Testimony of Major General Abner Doubleday.*

WASHINGTON, *March 1, 1864.*

Major General ABNER DOUBLEDAY sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and position in the service?

Answer. I am a major general of volunteers, and lieutenant colonel of the 5th regular infantry.

Question. Did you belong to the army of the Potomac at the time General Hooker took command of it?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Please give us a brief statement of its operations under General Hooker, with your observations and opinions upon those operations?

Answer. I have no memoranda to help me as to dates, &c. The first prominent event after General Hooker took command was the battle of Chancellorsville.

Question. What was your position in the army at the time of that battle?

Answer. I was a major general, commanding the third division of the 1st corps.

Question. Give the particulars of that movement, with such observations as occur to you.

Answer. About the 18th or 19th of April last, just previous to the battle of Chancellorsville, I was ordered to make a diversion in favor of the coming movement, by taking my division, or the greater part of it, to a place called Port Conway, some twenty miles below Fredericksburg. The object of this movement was to draw the rebel General Jackson down that way, detaching him from the remainder of the army under Lee, so that General Hooker could cross above without having to contend with Jackson's forces. The movement I think was a good one. I went down to Port Conway, lighted fires all over that region of country in order to give the impression of a very large force about to cross there, and made a demonstration of crossing with some pontoons that I took down there.

Question. What was the strength of the force under you then ?

Answer. It consisted of two brigades only ; at that time probably 3,500 men. As I have said, we went down there and made these demonstrations—put up some quaker guns, and filled the whole country with fires, and then returned.

A second expedition then went down under Colonel Morrow, of the 24th Michigan, who was sent down with a regiment. He crossed on some pontoons over to Port Royal. These expeditions succeeded in drawing Jackson down there, detaching him from Lee's army ; so I was given to understand from the reports of the signal officers. I have no doubt of it, because I saw him coming from there afterwards. That was the first movement preliminary to the battle. It would have had important results, had it not been for some failure on the part of the cavalry to cross above, on account of an unexpected rise in the river from heavy rains. After returning we were probably eight or nine days in camp, perhaps a little longer.

On the 28th of April the 1st corps went down to the vicinity of the river, four or five miles below Fredericksburg, near a place called Pollock's mills. A crossing was made there on the morning of the 29th ; rifle-pits were thrown up to protect the crossing, and a pontoon bridge was laid down. We remained there two days under a heavy shelling from the enemy, experiencing some casualties. At that time Sedgwick was also there with his 6th corps, and the 3d corps was also in the vicinity. It was understood that the three corps were to cross there, try the fortifications, and capture them, should it prove that the enemy had been drawn off by the movement of General Hooker above.

General Hooker, however, soon sent for the 3d, (Sickles's corps,) leaving the 6th and 1st corps there ; subsequently he required the assistance of the 1st corps, and we marched on the morning of the 2d of May up to the United States ford, in the rear of Chancellorsville. I would say that, as a military man, I could not fully approve of the division of force thus made; that is, a strength of seven corps divided into strengths of four corps and three corps, with Lee in the middle. I thought it objectionable. It is proper to state, however, that a commanding general frequently has information of the enemy's movements which is unknown to his subordinates, so that the latter cannot always judge correctly of the propriety of a manœuvre.

We marched on the 2d of May from Pollock's mills to the field of Chancellorsville, a distance probably of twenty-two and a half or twenty-three miles. The men carried eight days' provisions, with their knapsacks and haversacks, and were very much oppressed with their march—perfectly worn out. We at first received orders to halt near the United States ford. Then came intelligence that the 11th corps had given way ; that the army was in danger of defeat, and the 1st corps was called upon to go forward and assist in saving the battle. We went forward several miles to the field, and took position along what is called the Ely's Ford road, and on the right of Sykes's regulars ; we there threw up breastworks, strengthened our position in every way with trunks of trees,

stakes, &c., but were not attacked during the battle. The action raged with the greatest fury near us on our left. On the 6th of May we retired across the river, in obedience to orders, to our old position near Fredericksburg.

Question. Your corps was not brought into action ?

Answer. It was not actively engaged ; but it captured several hundred prisoners. That is, little parties would go out into the thick undergrowth, and capture bands of the enemy, but we were not seriously engaged.

Question. What corps were principally engaged in that battle ?

Answer. All the corps there present but the 1st were engaged. The 6th corps was left at Fredericksburg.

Question. What was the reason that your corps was not brought into immediate action, when the other corps were so hardly pressed ?

Answer. I cannot tell. I thought that the simple advance of our corps would take the enemy in flank, and would be very beneficial in its result. General Reynolds once or twice contemplated making this advance on his own responsibility. Colonel Stone made a reconnoissance, showing it to be practicable.

Question. Where were you at the time that General Sedgwick fought the enemy at Fredericksburg ?

Answer. We were along this Ely's Ford road.

Question. How far from where Sedgwick was engaged ?

Answer. The distance varies from twelve to six miles. He was first engaged at Fredericksburg, and took the fortifications there. He then advanced towards us.

Question. How near to the army under General Hooker did he get at any time, so far as you know ?

Answer. I should estimate it at about six miles.

Question. What was the nature of the ground between where the battle of Chancellorsville was fought and where General Sedgwick fought ?

Answer. It is more open than it is at Chancellorsville.

Question. The question has frequently been asked why General Hooker, when he heard the guns of Sedgwick, did not order an advance of our troops to the assistance of Sedgwick ?

Answer. I do not know. General Hooker's force at that time was divided, with strengths of six corps and one corps. It seemed to me that we remained inactive while the enemy marched around us, and interposed between those two divisions of the army.

Question. Did you see general Hooker on the day of that battle ?

Answer. I did not. I was on the right flank, and he was in the centre, and I did not meet him. He told me afterwards that he expected Sedgwick to make his way to him, and reach the cross-roads, as he said ; I do not know what cross-roads he meant.

Question. Do you know what communication General Hooker held with Sedgwick on that day ?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Of course you do not know anything of General Hooker being wounded there ?

Answer. No, sir ; I did not see him.

Question. You then retreated and came back to your old position ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And you were still there when Lee commenced his movement into Maryland and Pennsylvania ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Describe the movements of our army at that time, stating any particular incidents which you may wish to mention.

Answer. I have none to state, except that I think it was clearly shown that a very large force of the enemy had gone into the valley. It was so reported

to me by an officer of the signal corps, who with his glass saw them crossing one of the gaps. I sent an express with the intelligence at once to General Reynolds, who I think at once communicated it to General Hooker. Notwithstanding this information, which was already known, we remained some days before we started. I thought we were in our position longer than was necessary. I do not know that I have anything to say in reference to the other movements.

Question. You finally marched with the army under General Hooker?

Answer. Yes, sir; crossing into Maryland at Edwards's ferry.

Question. Keeping all the time on the inside track, between Lee and Washington?

Answer. Yes, sir, and marched up to Marsh creek, within three or four miles of Gettysburg.

Question. Do you know the reason why General Hooker resigned his command just before the battle of Gettysburg, or asked to be relieved from it?

Answer. I have understood that it was in consequence of the refusal of the force at Harper's Ferry, which he desired to concentrate with his main army.

Question. Do you know any reason why that force was refused to General Hooker, and so soon afterwards handed over to General Meade?

Answer. No, sir; I cannot see any good reason for a distinction of that kind.

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*Testimony of General A. P. Howe.*

WASHINGTON, March 3, 1864.

General A. P. HOWE sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. I am a brigadier general of volunteers, and have been with the army of the Potomac since December, 1861. I was appointed a brigadier general of volunteers on the 11th of June, 1862.

Question. Will you give us a narrative of the principal transactions of the army of the Potomac, from the time that General Hooker took command of it? State those points that you consider material, and if there is anything I think of I will call your attention to it by questions.

Answer. Do you want the movements of the army?

Question. Yes, sir; and we shall want your opinions, as a military man, in regard to them.

Answer. General Hooker relieved General Burnside of the command of the army of the Potomac in the early part of 1863. The army, as a body, remained quiet until the latter part of April or the first of May last. On or about the first of May the 1st corps, commanded by General Reynolds, and the 6th corps, commanded by General Sedgwick, were ordered from their camps to the Rappahannock; the 6th corps to a point in the river known as Franklin's crossing, and the 1st corps to a point a short distance below.

Question. What position, if any, did you occupy in either of those corps?

Answer. I commanded the 2d division of the 6th corps. The remainder of the army, besides the 6th and 1st corps, crossed the river above and moved to the ground known as the battle-field of Chancellorsville. The 1st and 6th corps made demonstrations of crossing. The 1st corps afterwards left its position, passed up and crossed the river above and joined the main army with General Hooker. Early on the evening of the 2d of May, the 6th corps crossed the Rappahannock. About 8 or 9 o'clock p. m., of the 2d of May, orders from



General Hooker were received, which orders I saw, directing General Sedgwick to move with his (the 6th) corps, and take the Fredericksburg heights, and move out on the Chancellorsville road, and be there by daylight on the 3d of May.

Question. Was this after the so-called battle of Chancellorsville?

Answer. I cannot tell you at what time the battle of Chancellorsville, as it is called, was fought. They crossed the river above before we did below, and I understood they had two or three skirmishes and pretty hard fights, and they re-crossed the same night we did.

Question. Was this order given to General Sedgwick after the 11th corps had given way?

Answer. I think so; it is my impression that Jackson had already made his attack. This order from General Hooker to General Sedgwick stated that "everything depended upon this movement." General Newton commanded one of the divisions of the 6th corps, General Brooks commanded another, and, as I have already stated, I commanded one. General Newton's division was to lead in the movement. We started, I think, somewhere between 9 and 10 o'clock at night, and I judged the distance from where we crossed to the point from which we made the attack was about a mile and a half. It was some time after daylight when my division, which followed next to that of General Newton, reached Fredericksburg, or the position in front of the heights. About 8 or 9 o'clock in the morning of the 3d of May, as well as I remember the hour, a movement was made upon what is known as Cemetery heights—that is, the first heights near Fredericksburg. The exact strength of that movement I cannot say. It was made from General Newton's division, having with it what was known then as the light brigade, being regiments taken from the different divisions of the 6th corps, and commanded by Colonel Burnham, of the 6th Maine. That movement was not successful.

I waited in the position which I held in rear of General Newton's division, without receiving any order, until, I think, it was about 11 o'clock in the day. I then received notice, through a staff officer from General Sedgwick, that he was going to make an attack, or make another movement on the heights, and wished me to assist in it. General Brooks's division at that time, I think, was at or near the crossing where we were the night before. I say "near the crossing;" there might have been a portion of it in front near the crossing. I received no other orders from General Sedgwick, and of course I knew nothing of the particular point upon which he was going to make the attack, nor his order of attack, nor any of his arrangements for it. But having been over the river at the first Fredericksburg battle, as it is called, and examined quite carefully the heights known as Marie's heights, I got the impression then, which I still retained, that they were not so strong as was believed, and that they could be more easily carried than had been supposed. Accordingly, when I received this notice from General Sedgwick that he wished me to assist him in making the attack, I hurriedly formed my division into three columns of attack and placed my artillery in position. This I did, I may say, independently of the movements of General Sedgwick, not knowing what his arrangements were, but intending or expecting to be governed only by his time of attack. When I heard his first gun I ordered the batteries with me to open fire, and as soon as their fire bore with effect I moved two of the columns upon the heights. Two regiments of the right column entered Cemetery heights about the same time, I think, as the light brigade under Colonel Burnham. The works were carried. The two columns were turned immediately upon what is known as Marie's heights, and as soon as the attack from those two columns took effect I moved the third column partially to the rear of the heights and attacked. In a little more than an hour from the first movement all the works were carried.

I soon after received orders from General Sedgwick to move with my division out on the Chancellorsville road, following in rear of the other two divisions. General Brooks's division, which had been at the crossing, now took the advance, followed by General Newton's division, and my division bringing up the rear. After moving out two or three miles on the Chancellorsville road, a plank road, the advanced division, General Brooks, became engaged. Just before this engagement was commencing, or just about that time, I received orders from General Sedgwick, if I had not left Fredericksburg heights to remain there. But I was then on the way toward Chancellorsville, and so notified General Sedgwick, and continued my movement in that direction. The engagement with the enemy at this point was rather sharp and quite spirited, and mainly with the infantry.

It was about 3 o'clock in the afternoon when we started from Fredericksburg to go out on the Chancellorsville road. This engagement of our advance coming on brought us up to night, without our making any further progress. The enemy had not been dislodged or driven from their position, and I judged the head of our troops had been quite harshly handled. We made no further advance that night, but lay down on the field. Before the action closed that afternoon, or before the firing ceased, General Sedgwick sent notice to me that he thought our left was threatened, and wished me to protect it. I accordingly moved off to the left of the plank road; no demonstration was made by the enemy on that night, and I bivouacked for the night. Early the next morning I discovered indications of the enemy being on our left, towards Fredericksburg; that is, that the enemy was threatening our left and rear. I extended my lines towards the river, without any suggestions from General Sedgwick, being in the rear of the other two divisions; and believing then that our left and rear was the point most threatened, I soon became satisfied that a rear and flank movement was being made upon us. I prepared for an attack there, and sent to General Sedgwick somewhere about 9 o'clock a. m., I think, that the enemy were making demonstrations towards Fredericksburg, or on our left and rear. A short time after, he sent word to me that he wished I would extend my line to the river. A short time after, I received notice that he wished me to take the strongest position I could, or a message to that effect, giving me to understand that we were to be on the defensive instead of continuing our movements on towards Chancellorsville. I carefully examined the ground, and placed my troops so that they could best resist an attack from the left. About 11 o'clock, on the morning of the 4th of May, an attack was made upon my line. The attack was not a severe one; we drove them back with ease, capturing a flag and some 200 prisoners.

About 1 o'clock, a messenger passing from the balloon detachment on the other side of the river, brought me a despatch which was intended for General Sedgwick, who was then on the plank road some two miles to my right and front. The substance of the despatch was, that a large force of the enemy was assembling in rear of Fredericksburg heights, apparently preparing for an attack. As the despatch was directed to General Sedgwick I forwarded it immediately on, and heard nothing further.

Not receiving any instruction or assistance from General Sedgwick, I felt that we were left to take care of ourselves. It seemed to me, from the movements, or the arrangements made during the day, that there was a want of appreciation, or a misunderstanding, of the position which we held. Our advance on the Chancellorsville road had been checked; a night had passed, and time had been given for the enemy to make movements advantageous to him, and I was fully satisfied that a strong effort would be made to cut the 6th corps off from the river.

About 5 o'clock p. m. an attack was made upon my division from the Fredericksburg heights, or Marie's heights. My line, as I then occupied it, was nearly two miles in length, the left extending to the Rappahannock, and my

ight resting near what is known as Guest's house. I had less than 6,000 men on that line. The attack was made by three divisions of the enemy, delivered with a violence that I had never before encountered.

I had made arrangements to occupy two positions, the first to check them until their point of attack was developed, and the other, a stronger position, to be occupied afterwards. The troops with me understood the points to be occupied after the first dash. We resisted the first attack better than I expected, and our own loss was less than I had supposed it would be, and at a favorable time the left of my line was thrown back, partially behind some woods.

As I expected, the enemy seemed to be under the impression, from this movement, that we were giving way. They rallied and advanced, moving well towards the river, until they reached a point that we could have desired above all others they should have advanced upon, and where a reserve force which I had placed under cover had an opportunity to get a flank fire upon them with full effect. When the fire from our new position struck them, it was but a short time before they were entirely broken, and fell back in a rout. It was near dark when we had completely repulsed them. After this repulse the position of the 6th corps, in my judgment, was less liable to a serious attack than it had been at any time before since the 6th corps crossed the Rappahannock; and I saw no occasion or necessity for recrossing the river.

About half-past eight o'clock the chief of General Sedgwick's staff came to me and said that it was General Sedgwick's intention that I should fall back to Banks's ford, or words to that effect. I asked him if it was General Sedgwick's order that I should fall back to Banks's ford. I said to him at the time, "I will not leave this position until I get a positive order to do so;" remarking to him that I thought there was no occasion for leaving, as the enemy had been driven back. - General Sedgwick soon gave me the order to fall back to Banks's ford, and soon after that I received an order requesting me to hold my position for an hour, which I did. I then moved back to Banks's ford, which I judge was something like two miles, the way we went. In moving back I did so under the impression that some portion at least of the other two divisions was on the line in the direction of the enemy on the Chancellorsville road. It being dark, I could not see whether it was so or not. When I reached Banks's ford, however, I found the other divisions in the rifle-pits, or under the cover of the works at Banks's ford. No shot, however, was fired upon my division, though my flank and rear, without my being notified of it, was left entirely open to the enemy. I have ever considered that by the movement made at that time by the other two divisions of the corps, my division was virtually turned over to the enemy. As I have said, no disaster occurred. I reached Banks's ford, and that night the 6th corps recrossed the Rappahannock. I know nothing of the telegrams which passed between General Hooker and General Sedgwick during all this time, except the order given to us before we started, on the evening of the second of May, to cross and move upon the heights. That order was positive, peremptory, and urgent.

Question. Will you state again exactly what that order was, as near as you can?

Answer. As near as I recollect it, the order was to move upon and take the heights at Fredericksburg, and be out on the Chancellorsville road by daylight, as I understood it, near Chancellorsville. The order stated that everything depended upon it.

Question. Near where Hooker's force was?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was the object of the order from General Hooker?

Answer. It was understood that we were to make a flank movement. It stated that everything depended upon that movement. It was as urgent as a military order could be.

Question. How long was it after receiving that order before you moved, or before General Sedgwick gave the order to move?

Answer. The order from General Hooker was received just after dark, say eight o'clock, when we were in a little bit of a shanty on the south side of the river. General Sedgwick, General Newton, General Brooks, and myself were there, and we discussed the order.

Question. How long was it before you moved in compliance with that order?

Answer. My division moved the second, and followed the division of General Newton. I think it was near twelve o'clock that night when I started from the crossing.

Question. About what time did Newton's division start?

Answer. Not long after the order was received, General Sedgwick said to General Newton, "Newton, you move on; Howe will follow, and Brooks and I will take a little nap." It was bright starlight, so that I could see what was in the advance, and I think it was well on to twelve o'clock when General Newton's division had moved, so that I could move, and then, as I have stated, it was some time after daylight before the head of my division got up to the position from where I made the attack.

Question. How far was it from where you lay, when you received that order, to the enemy that Hooker was dealing with?

Answer. I think they call it eight or nine miles from Fredericksburg by the plank road, and we were a mile and a half below the plank road.

Question. Could that order of General Hooker have been complied with, so that you could have been by daylight where he ordered you to be?

Answer. I have never had any doubt but that we could have taken the heights of Fredericksburg, and moved out to Chancellorsville, or on that road, until we had encountered a force there, in good time, or at a very much earlier hour than we attempted it. The unnecessary delay in the movement of the 6th corps, after starting, developed to the enemy our intention, and gave them time to make dispositions to embarrass our movements. After taking the heights, we left Fredericksburg, to move out about 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the day after the order was received.

Question. Had the movement been prompt and with all the expedition you could have made, would you have been likely to have encountered the enemy on those heights?

Answer. I think not in anything like the strength in which we did meet them. If this movement had been made promptly, under cover of night, with the force which we had, we could have taken those heights, as I believe, with little loss, and in but little time. We would have taken them by surprise, and then the way would have been open to have gone immediately on towards Chancellorsville to General Hooker's assistance.

Question. In what force could you have gone to Hooker's assistance?

Answer. I think the 6th corps was about 24,000 strong, or in the vicinity of that. I did not see the returns, but I understood from the headquarters of the corps that we were about 24,000 strong.

Question. In your judgment as a military man, what would have been the effect of a prompt compliance with General Hooker's order, and an attack made by you upon the flank and rear of the enemy?

Answer. An attack by a force as large as the 6th corps upon the enemy's flank, where I suppose it was intended we should strike—I do not know as I could give any estimate of the damaging effect it would have had upon the enemy. If it had been made in connexion with a strong movement against their front, I have every reason to believe, from the character of our troops and the strength of our army over there, that we would have completely broken and routed them. Instead of that, we did not reach Fredericksburg until after daylight. The enemy saw what we were up to, and the attack which carried the works was not made until about eleven o'clock.

Question. What was the reason of that delay ?

Answer. I can give no reason for it, for I saw none. It was a matter of astonishment and surprise to me that the movement was so slowly made, and so long delayed after reaching Fredericksburg, in the face of such orders as we had received. I can give no explanation of it, from any knowledge I have.

Question. When you were attacked and repulsed the enemy, where was General Sedgwick ?

Answer. I understood he was out on the Chancellorsville road, to my right and rear. I did not see him from the time he left Fredericksburg heights until I reached Banks's ford.

Question. How came he to give an order for you to fall back to Banks's ford, after exposing your flank the way he did by withdrawing the other troops first ? Was he in a position to know how your flank was unprotected ?

Answer. I suppose he must have known it. When the attack was made on my division, I sent to him that I was hard pressed, and I should like some assistance. After the fight was over, or about that time, he sent me Butler's battery and the 5th Wisconsin regiment. Butler's battery opened fire and the 5th Wisconsin regiment came into the fight; other than that I received no assistance. It was some time after that before I had any talk about this movement. It was so strange and so inexplicable to me that I felt a delicacy in speaking to General Sedgwick about it. I understood afterwards that he ordered General Wheaton's brigade to my assistance, after I had sent to him for assistance. But I stated, when it was referred to, that Wheaton's brigade never gave me any assistance, nor did its commander report to me, or send any notice to me that it was the intention that he should do so.

Question. It was your division that had the principal fight on those heights ?

Answer. My division took four works on Marie's heights, and assisted in taking the work on Cemetery heights.

Question. It was also your division which repelled the attack the next day ?

Answer. Yes, sir, with the exception of Butler's battery and the 5th Wisconsin regiment, which came up when they were really not needed.

Question. Was the balance of the corps engaged with the enemy ?

Answer. Not that I am aware of. They seemed—I express my opinion and judgment—to be watching for the enemy in the direction in which there was no probability of his coming. After the enemy had checked our advance the evening before, it seemed to me idle to expect them from that quarter, for they had a better movement to move between us and the river. The prisoners taken all agreed that it was Early's, Anderson's, and McLaw's divisions that attacked my division, and that the movement was led by General Lee, who told them that it would be a sure thing to destroy the 6th corps, or capture it; that it could not get out the Chancellorsville way, and that the movement in our rear would cut us off. Judging from the movements made by the rest of the 6th corps, it seemed to me that the state of affairs was not appreciated; that the attack from the enemy was looked for in a direction in which there was no probability of one being made, and from which it did not come, and that there was an ignorance or indifference in regard to the point from which the safety of the 6th corps was seriously threatened.

Question. The question has frequently been asked, why General Hooker did not advance when he heard your fight on Salem heights, which seems to have been the only fight that the 6th corps had ?

Answer. I am unable to say. General Hooker's army was separated from us, and we had no communication with it. I was not with that army, and of course I can only give my impression from statements made to me by officers.

Question. You say the 6th corps consisted of 24,000 men ?

Answer. That was given me as the strength, and I have no doubt it was correct.

Question. Then there were 18,000 men on ahead of you, of that corps, that were not engaged?

Answer. The afternoon of the day that we took the heights those two divisions moved out, General Brooks's division moving first.

Question. What prevented their moving right on to comply with the order of General Hooker? you fought that battle yourself?

Answer. The afternoon of the 3d of May General Brooks's division was engaged, and it was said they could not get on. I am not aware they attempted to go on after that.

Question. But as they were not engaged on the 4th, but were still on the road towards Chancellorsville, what prevented them from pushing right on?

Answer. I do not think they were ordered to do so. I have always believed that if, when they started to move out on the Chancellorsville road on the afternoon of the 3d, although behind time, if the corps had been brought into action, with not even any great skill or judgment, we would have gone right on. I suppose I need not repeat what was said by officers in the advance.

Question. Let us hear it, for we want to get all the information we can.

Answer. The impression conveyed to me was that General Brooks got into the fight, the afternoon of the 3d, quite unexpectedly—that it was a sort of surprise; that the men were not prepared for it; that we lost pretty heavily there without any fight; that General Newton came up to assist, and the whole thing was badly managed. I was not there myself and cannot speak of my own knowledge, but I was told that we lost a great many men because they got into the fight without being prepared for it.

Question. And the result of the whole movement was that the army moved back to its old position?

Answer. Yes, sir; that night of the 4th of May we recrossed at Banks's ford, and finally came around to our former position.

Question. And General Hooker and his army also recrossed, and took up their old position?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Can you tell why it was that the troops under General Hooker's command did not meet with more success at Chancellorsville?

Answer. So far as the 6th corps was concerned, it did not make the movements which General Hooker required, and failed to give him the support he had a right to expect from it. It is my belief that if the orders to the 6th corps had been executed as given, the result of General Hooker's operations over the Rappahannock would have been far more successful than they were.

Question. Now you have got the army back to where it started from, give us a brief history of the movements of the army after that until the battle of Gettysburg.

Answer. There is one other point which I ought to state here.

Question. State whatever you deem to be material.

Answer. When we got back to Banks's ford, there was some telegraphing between General Hooker and General Sedgwick. I did not see the telegrams, but I understood General Sedgwick led General Hooker to believe that the 6th corps was, as we say, in a very tight place, had been pretty severely handled, and that there was a necessity for recrossing the river; as I am well assured General Sedgwick received a telegram from General Hooker, the night of the 4th, to remain on the south side of the Rappahannock. I was told that General Sedgwick replied to General Hooker that a portion of the corps had already recrossed. Then General Hooker's answer was, "Let the corps recross."

Some time after this movement, after we had returned to our old camps, I met General Hooker, and spoke to him of the movements we had made and the position we held. I stated to him that after the fight on the 4th of May, I could have gone with my division on to the heights at Fredericksburg, and

held them, or, if necessary, could have recrossed that way. He expressed his surprise that those heights could have been held the night of the 4th, and said: "If I had known that, you could have gone on those heights and held them, I would have re-enforced you with the whole army." That was the key of the position, and there was no difficulty in holding it. I told him that if I had not received orders to go back to Banks's ford, but had been allowed to go to the Fredericksburg heights, I could have marched there uninterruptedly after nine o'clock that night; for after the fight we had had the rebels abandoned the heights, and there was nothing to be seen of them. There was a bright moon that night, and we could see an object of the size of a man or a horse at a great distance.

Question. Was General Hooker zealously supported by his corps commanders; was not there a coolness on the part of some of them towards him?

Answer. I must unhesitatingly say that whatever might have been the animus of the 6th corps commander, his acts did not amount to a zealous support; for I do not think the 6th corps did anything as ordered which it was capable of doing in point of time. Our orders said that everything depended upon our being out to Chancellorsville by daylight, and I saw no reason then, and have discovered none since the fight, to have prevented our reaching there. If we had moved under cover of night we should have taken the enemy by surprise, in a measure, and, in my judgment, would have had but little or no fight. Instead of that we did not begin until after daylight, when the enemy had opportunity to discover our movements and to make dispositions to meet them partially.

Question. What number of men, in your opinion, assailed you on those heights when you repulsed them?

Answer. At the time, believing that Early's, Anderson's, and McLaw's divisions made the attack, and considering the average strength of their brigades and divisions, we calculated that there were between four and five to one against my division. But that numerical difference does not give a proper idea of the contest. My line was nearly two miles long, and any point of it was open to their attack; and their position, from which they could deliver the attack, was covered from view. I had to be ready at all points along my line, so that when I found where the attack was really to be made, I had to re-enforce that point as I best could. In order to do that, I had to choose two positions—one to make a partial fight on, and make them develop their attack, and the other position where I thought I could make the best fight, after I had fought them for a short time in the first position.

Question. Now go on, and give a brief history of the movements of the army after that.

Answer. We remained quiet in our old position until towards the early part of June, when there were indications that the enemy were assembling towards Culpeper Court House. Movements were made by the way of Fredericksburg by General Hooker, as I judged, to feel the enemy and see if they had gone. On the 4th of June, I think it was, he ordered his chief engineer to throw a bridge across the Rappahannock, leaving it to him where to do it. I was ordered to cover the laying of that bridge and make the crossing, which I did, and we took some hundred prisoners in making the crossing. I knew it was the impression that the enemy were going away, and I thought that if we attempted the crossing it would be as well to strike strongly at them, in order to give them the idea that we were going to move right across and operate there. The movement across, was made so suddenly that we took those prisoners I have mentioned. My division went across, and I remained there for three days, and was then relieved by another division. The force of the enemy that was found after crossing was such that it was not thought advisable by General Hooker to advance upon them. I say this, because I sent word by one of

General Hooker's staff officers, who had come down there, that I thought with another brigade I could attack the force in my front with success, and unless they had considerable supporting force there would be no risk—that I could successfully attack any force they had yet displayed there. No response was given to me, and no attack was made.

About the 5th of June the sixth corps left the Rappahannock. We moved along the Dumfries road, that is, near the Potomac, up to Centerville; and there we remained with the body of the army until we crossed the Potomac into Maryland. We moved from there and crossed the river near Edwards's ferry, and made good marches until General Hooker was relieved.

Question. Where was the army when General Hooker was relieved, and what caused him to be relieved, so far as you know?

Answer. The 6th corps had left Poolesville and were marching from there in the direction of Gettysburg at the time General Hooker was relieved. The cause of his being relieved I am unable to state.

Question. How far was the main body of the army from Gettysburg at that time?

Answer. I am unable at this time, without reference to data, to state the exact position of the different corps; they were all marching in supporting distance. I think notice of General Hooker being relieved by General Meade came to us on the march after we left Poolesville, perhaps the day after.

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*Testimony of Major General Alfred Pleasonton.*

WASHINGTON, *March 7, 1864.*

Major General ALFRED PLEASONTON sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. What is your rank and position in the service, and how long have you been connected with the army of the Potomac?

Answer. My rank is major general of volunteers, and my position that of commander of the cavalry corps of the army of the Potomac; and I have been in that army since the fall of 1861.

Question. Did you belong to that army at the time that General Hooker took command of it?

Answer. I did.

Question. In what capacity at that time?

Answer. I commanded the first division of cavalry in the cavalry corps which he formed.

Question. Will you give us a brief narrative of the operations of that army, or from that time, in your own way, touching those things which appear to you to be material, with such opinions as you may have in regard to them? If we think of anything in particular to inquire more closely about, we will call your attention to it.

Answer. From the time General Hooker took command up to the campaign of Chancellorsville, nothing very material occurred. In the beginning of that campaign General Hooker organized the Stoneman raid for the purpose of separating the rebel army from Richmond where our army attacked them. After that cavalry had crossed the river, and all of my command, except a small brigade of three regiments and one battery, had left on that raid, General Hooker assigned me to duty with this brigade, under General Slocum, who commanded three corps, to pass the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers to the right of General Lee's army. At a place called the Wilderness I captured a courier from Gen-



eral Lee with a despatch in Lee's own handwriting. It was dated at 12 o'clock that day, and I captured it at 1 o'clock, only one hour from his, Lee's, hands. It was addressed to General Anderson, and read, "I have just received reliable information that the enemy have crossed the river in force. Why have you not kept me informed? I wish to see you at my headquarters as soon as possible."

As soon as I got that despatch I went to General Slocum and showed it to him, and told him that the rebel army had not moved from Fredericksburg, and did not know of the crossing of the three corps at the Rapidan, and I advised him then to send one of his corps, the 11th, as that was the nearest one, immediately to Spottsylvania Court House, and to take up a position there and intrench. General Slocum said that he was ordered to concentrate his three corps at Chancellorsville. I told him that General Hooker never dreamed of getting three corps across that river in that position and Lee not know it, and without a fight, and that it gave us such an advantage that he ought to take the responsibility of putting that corps in that position. But he declined to do so, and concentrated his three corps at Chancellorsville.

I think it was about 5 or 6 o'clock in the evening that General Hooker arrived there and I saw him. I mentioned this fact to him, of the importance of the position at Spottsylvania Court House, and told him what I had recommended to General Slocum, and urged him by all means to put a corps there that night. General Hooker, however, said that he did not think it was necessary; that he had the rebel army, and it could not get away. Knowing that he had made other arrangements with General Sedgwick on the other side of Fredericksburg, and always yielding to my commanding officer the advantage of superior information in his own matters to what I might have, I presumed that General Hooker had other arrangements which would be carried out more completely than the one I suggested.

Question. Do you know what those arrangements were that General Hooker had agreed upon with General Sedgwick?

Answer. No, sir; I never knew anything of them. That night we lay at Chancellorsville; it was a beautiful moonlight night, and would have been equal to a day for us to make a movement. The next morning the army was in splendid spirits, and was ordered to move out towards Fredericksburg. They moved out about a mile and a half, when they were halted and brought back to the position at Chancellorsville by order of General Hooker. I have never heard any reasons given for that movement or for the counter-movement, but it produced among the soldiers a feeling of uncertainty. In the evening of that day, about 4 o'clock, I think, General Hooker sent for me, and said that the enemy were moving off in the direction of Gordonsville; that General Sickles had moved out with his corps on the plank road, and had taken the road to the south of them, and that he wished me to take what force I had, and, as soon as I could get through, follow them up, and do them all the damage possible. I asked him if I was under General Sickles's orders; or, if he considered me under General Sickles's orders. He said, "No; you will find Sickles, however, a very pleasant, agreeable man; you will have no difficulty with him, and I want an officer of experience in that part of the field." I started out, and found General Sickles about a quarter of a mile south of the plank road. His corps, at that time, was probably a mile in front, and there was pretty sharp skirmishing. The general told me that I would not be able to get through at that time, but that he was going on to the front, and he would send me word. I had noticed in the morning that the enemy had commenced on our line—that is, near Chancellorsville, and would throw in a couple of regiments or so of troops, with a yell and a volley; there would be a little skirmishing, and then there would be no more of it at that point. I then noticed that that would occur at intervals still further to our right, as if a body of troops was following us around. We were in a dense woods then. This thing had attracted my attention early in the

morning, and I was noticing these different attacks; that they would throw in a body of skirmishers, and if they found resistance from us they would go somewhere else. I had noticed that that sort of firing had extended beyond our right where we were then. I noticed the position of the artillery there, and of our line. This was done, I suppose, in the short time I remained there.

When General Sickles desired me to go to the front, I went up and found that he had met with more resistance than he had expected. He then told me that I would not be able to get through. I then suggested to him that, as it was thick woods there, I better take my cavalry back to the open space I had left, where they could act to better advantage if they were needed. He very kindly said, "Certainly; take any measures you may think best in case I am absent." As I was going back at a trot an aide-de-camp came up to me and said, "General, the 11th corps is falling back very rapidly, and some cavalry is necessary to stop it." I understood pretty well what that meant. I had only two regiments of cavalry with me; one of them having been retained by General Sickles at the front to protect his right, and there was one battery of horse artillery with me. When I came to this open space which I had before left, I found it filled with fugitives, caissons, ambulances, guns, and everything. I saw the movement was critical, and I called on Major Keenan, of the 8th Pennsylvania, and gave him his orders. I said to him, "Major, you must charge in these woods with your regiment and hold the rebels until I can get some of these guns into position." Says I, "You must do it at all cost." I mentioned the major, because I knew his character so well; that he was a man for the occasion. He replied to me with a smile on his face, though it was almost certain death, "General, I will do it." He started in with his whole regiment, and made one of the most gallant charges in the war. He was killed at the head of his regiment, but he alarmed the rebels so much that I gained about ten minutes on the enemy. Major Keenan had only from 400 to 500 men. I immediately ran up this battery of mine at a gallop, put it into position, ordered it unlimbered and double-shotted with canister, and directed the men to aim at the ground-line of the parapet that the 11th corps had thrown up about 200 yards off. Our artillery, as a general rule, overshoots, and I ordered them to fire low because the shot would ricochet. I then set to work with two squadrons of the remaining regiment to clear this field of fugitives, and to stop what cannon and ammunition that we could, and put them in position; and I managed to get 22 guns loaded, double-shotted, and aiming on this space in front of us for about a quarter or a half a mile, when the whole woods appeared alive with large bodies of men. This was just at dusk. I was going to give the word "fire." I had ordered those pieces not to fire unless I gave the word, because I wanted the effect of an immense shock. There was an immense body of men, and I wanted the whole weight of the metal to check them. I was about to give the word "fire," when one of the soldiers at a piece said, "General, that is our flag." I said to one of my aids, "Mr. Thompson, ride forward there at once and let me know what flag that is." He then went to within about a hundred yards, and those people cried out, "Come on, we are friends." He started to move on, when the whole line of woods blazed with musketry, and they commenced leaping over this parapet and charged on the guns; and at about the same time I saw from eight to ten rebel battle-flags run up along the whole line. I immediately gave the order "fire," and the fire actually swept the men away; it seemed to blow those men in front clear over the parapet.

Question. That flag was a federal flag carried by the rebels?

Answer. It was one of our flags that they had picked up on the field; they carried it as a ruse to win our guns. We had this fight between musketry and artillery there for nearly an hour. At one time they got within fifty yards of the guns. The great difficulty with me was to keep my people to fight the

guns in the dark. The men were all the time cutting the traces and slipping off with the horses whenever they could, and I had to start all my aids and my escort to bring them back. In fact, I was alone pretty much the whole time, working wherever I found anything going wrong. I would say, however, that there were two squadrons of the 17th Pennsylvania regiment left. This remaining regiment that I had was composed of raw men, new troops, and all I could do with them was to make a show. I had them formed in single line, with sabres drawn, with orders to charge in case the enemy came to the guns. They sat in rear of the guns, and I have no doubt the rebels took them for the head of a heavy column, as the country sloped back behind them, and they could not see what was back of them. That probably had some effect upon the rebels.

But I think the whole turn of the battle was the death of Stonewall Jackson, or his being mortally wounded. According to the statements of the prisoners taken that night he was wounded by this very fire. After the third heavy attack, the one I dreaded the most, the enemy fell back, and I ordered the troops to cease firing.

I then sent out into the woods and captured some prisoners, who were brought in to me. One of them said: "That was a pretty good trick you played us this time." I asked him what he meant. He replied, "Getting your infantry to fall back until we came to your guns, and then cutting us up." Said I, "Were you badly cut up?" "Very badly cut up," said he; "Stonewall Jackson is mortally wounded;" and he mentioned also a number of other high officers that they had lost; "and as to the men, they are disorganized." When I heard that, I understood why the last attack had been repulsed, for I had no supports whatever for these guns, except probably one hundred and fifty mounted men, who would have been nothing.

Shortly after that General Sickles came up and told me that he had had a severe engagement with his troops, but that hearing this firing, he had given directions to disengage them as fast as possible and bring them to my support. But his corps came in between 9 and 10 o'clock in the evening. And afterwards, with one of his divisions, General Birney's, I think, he cleared the country as far as the plank road, where the enemy had their position.

I immediately set to work, knowing the importance of this position, to fix it up for the fight the next morning. I managed to get forty pieces in position. And I cleared out behind us the debris of the 11th corps that had gone off, the caissons, guns, ambulances, &c., all piled up in great confusion in a marsh that was there. I built three bridges across the marsh, and with the support of General Sickles's corps we could have defeated the whole rebel army there that morning.

At three o'clock in the morning I received an order to fall back in rear of the position at the Chancellorsville house. Before I left, General Sickles informed me that that he also had orders to leave with his corps. I mentioned to him the importance of this position; and he agreed with me that we ought to make an effort to hold it. I moved my force and arrived in my position in rear of the Chancellorsville house about daybreak, when a very heavy fight commenced with the 3d corps, commanded by General Sickles. The rebels attacked him while he was withdrawing. I do not know how many troops were engaged; I do not know the particulars of the fight; but the rebels were repulsed. They, however, having this position I have referred to, could enfilade our whole line to the Chancellorsville house, with their batteries at that point, and we were obliged either to retake it or withdraw our lines towards the river. I found that evening that the lines had been drawn in from a half to three-quarters of a mile from the Chancellorsville house.

By Mr. Chandler :

Question. Was General Hooker struck before the lines were drawn in ?

Answer. I am under the impression that he was ; I am under the impression now that he was hit before this fight that I have been describing took place. I feel perfectly satisfied, that had General Hooker been able to see the position that I occupied there he never would have abandoned it ; and I looked upon it as a great misfortune that he did not see that point.

By the chairman :

Question. Did you notice, after your repulse of the enemy there with your artillery, that they were in a disorganized state, in a mere mass ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; I knew they were from this fact : I brought in out of the woods that they held three of our Napoleon guns, two caissons and a forge, that they had not even had time to use against us. Then I knew the effect of that fire upon them must have been terrible.

Question. General Sickles says that at this time he observed that the enemy were in disorganized masses, and that he sent to headquarters for re-enforcements.

Answer. General Sickles agreed with me in regard to the importance of holding that point, and he furnished me every assistance he could. In fact, I would say that I have never met an officer who worked more harmoniously on the field than General Sickles, or one who was quicker to take a suggestion from another.

Question. You are a cavalry officer, and yet you took charge of the artillery there. How was that ?

Answer. From the simple fact that I saw that if somebody did not save that field at once it was not going to be saved at that point. I considered it my duty to go in and do whatever I could, and that we were all up and would be driven into the river if I did not do it. When I came to count the artillery I had there, I found that I had the artillery of three corps in that line. I took it by the force of circumstances and necessity.

Question. You assumed command of the artillery ?

Answer. I assumed command by virtue of being a general, and I fought it as a general of artillery. Some of the cannon I stopped from the flying column ; I put it into line, too. Jackson had 35,000 infantry, and I knew that nothing but an immense shock of artillery, without a corresponding force of infantry, was the only thing to stop him. That was my only chance, and I had to do it instantly ; and I had to sacrifice my regiment of cavalry to do it. Circumstances combined and achieved the result ; and the officer who commanded that cavalry aided me more than anything else. It was just the same as saying to him, " You must be killed," when I ordered him to make that charge. He said, with a smile on his face, " General ; I will do it." I knew, when I gave the order, that he would do it. I felt confident of it, and I selected him for that purpose.

Question. You were in the gap made by the flight of the 11th corps ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Can you tell what produced that panic in the 11th corps ?

Answer. The combined effect upon their imagination of the sound of the musketry and the increasing yells of the rebels, and their increasing artillery fire. It was a theatrical effect that Stonewall Jackson could produce better than any other man I have ever seen on the field of battle. You could tell one of his attacks anywhere. And it was for that reason I would have preferred to have sent the 11th corps to Spottsylvania Court House. That was an open country there, and Europeans are accustomed to an open country ; they will fight better in the open country than they will in the woods. Our troops will fight in the woods better than any other people in the world. I would, there.

fore, have placed those troops in a position most like that they had been accustomed to.

Question. This 11th corps being principally foreigners ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; they were in circumstances disadvantageous to themselves. And I never would put any man, if I could help it, where I knew that his prejudices and habits were against fighting there.

Question. What would have been the result of that battle, had the 11th corps stood their ground with reasonable firmness ?

Answer. Well, sir, we ought to have totally defeated the rebels.

By Mr. Chandler :

Question. And you would have done so, would you not, if that corps had stood its ground with even reasonable firmness ?

Answer. I think so ; I think we could have swung around our left from Chancellorsville, and the enemy could not have got out ; and that, I suppose, was General Hooker's intention, though I have never heard him say so.

By the chairman :

Question. Proceed with your narrative, if you please.

Answer. The next day, about ten o'clock in the morning, I went up to General Hooker's headquarters, and General Van Allen was acting chief of staff. He wanted to go away, and General Hooker asked me to remain and attend to the business until General Butterfield, who was at Falmouth, should come. I remained there until about five o'clock in the afternoon. This was the first time I had seen General Hooker after his accident. He was under a fly—we were under fire—the shells were bursting over us, and I believe some of the staff were injured during the day. General Hooker was lying on the ground, and usually in a doze, except when I woke him up to attend to some important despatch that required his decision. When I did so his efforts appeared to me to be those of a person who was overcoming great physical pain by mental efforts, and I regretted that we had not at that time some one who was physically capable of taking the command of the army.

Question. You supposed he had not sufficiently recovered ?

Answer. He had not.

Question. You were with General Hooker until General Butterfield arrived. How long a time was that ?

Answer. It was from about ten o'clock in the morning until five o'clock in the evening.

Question. It has been loosely reported that General Hooker was under the influence of liquor at that time. Please state how that was.

Answer. It is my opinion, from what I saw of General Hooker at that time, that that impression is entirely erroneous. General Hooker did not drink anything while I was with him. His whole manner was that of a sick person, and nothing else. His eyes were perfectly clear ; but his whole appearance was that of a man who was suffering great pain.

Question. You state that he was suffering from pain. Was his mind, aside from that, clear in its workings ?

Answer. The impression upon me was that his mind was affected by the pain ; that it was not as active as it was when he was in good health. I will relate a circumstance to illustrate that. A despatch arrived from the President, saying, "I have just heard that Sedgwick has been compelled to leave the heights about Fredericksburg. Is this so ?" It was one of those despatches that I had to wake him up for. I woke him up, and said to him, "General, this is a despatch from the President." He looked at it, read it, and waited for some time without saying a word. He then said, "Answer it is so ; but I do not attach any importance to it." I wrote the despatch, handed it to him, and read it. He made a motion of assent, and I sent it off. Though it struck me

that it was of very vital importance, it was not a time for me to discuss it with him. I mention this as an illustration of why I did not think his mind, on account of his physical condition, was in the state it ought to be in.

Question. Do you know at what time he gave the order to General Sedgwick to come up there by daylight, and how important it was that he should be there?

Answer. I do not. The time I have mentioned was the only time I was brought in connexion with General Hooker. After that, I was sent to cover all the fords, and prevent the enemy crossing at Fredericksburg until the army had got over, and I started that night at 12 o'clock to perform that duty. I did not see General Hooker at that time again after I left him.

Question. Go on and state, briefly but succinctly, the operations of the army until General Hooker was relieved. The army retired to Falmouth, to its old position?

Answer. Yes, sir; the army reoccupied its old position?

Question. What of importance next occurred?

Answer. After General Stoneman returned from his raid, he went off, I think, on leave of absence, and the command of his corps devolved upon me. On the 7th of June General Hooker sent for me, and directed me to make a cavalry reconnoissance by the way of the upper Rappahannock and Culpeper, to see whether General Lee's army was moving in force up the valley. The cavalry corps was then so small that I asked him for some infantry support, and he gave me 3,000 men. It was with that force that I fought the battle of Beverly ford, which proved conclusively that the bulk of Lee's army was then around Culpeper, and that Stewart, with 15,000 cavalry, was about to make a raid to destroy the Orange and Alexandria railroad, to prevent our army going by that way into Pennsylvania after them. Their plan was this: They knew that if we could not march our army across the country we would have to go by water, and that it would take us six weeks to transport our army up the Potomac and around to Pennsylvania, and by destroying the Orange and Alexandria railroad, and then the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, they expected to accomplish their object. Stewart was to cross to destroy this road the day after I attacked him at Beverly ford, and that fight defeated his plan.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. You repulsed Stewart?

Answer. Yes, sir; we whipped him there, but they brought up infantry. He was backed by 26,000 infantry. We fought fourteen hours that day. It was a very heavy fight.

By the chairman:

Question. And a very important one?

Answer. Yes, sir, in developing their plan and defeating this very movement. The army was then moved by General Hooker in the direction of Manassas and Fairfax, and the cavalry were kept on the flank towards the mountains to cover the movement. On reaching Manassas, General Hooker directed me to take my command and see if the enemy were in Loudon valley. I started to do so on the 17th of June, and had marched about half way, when Colonel Dahlgren, then Captain Dahlgren, came up with an order from General Hooker stating that he wished me to halt where I was; that he intended to halt the whole army there, and to receive battle from the enemy in that position at Manassas. The country between Manassas and Aldie is a very wooded country, and one in which the enemy's cavalry could annoy us exceedingly—in fact, it was a country in which we would be taken at every disadvantage. These facts presented themselves to my mind with such force that I sent back word to General Hooker, by Captain Dahlgren, that I considered it of such great importance to know whether the enemy were in Loudon valley or not

that I would take the responsibility of moving on through the Bull Run range to see if they were there, and would give him the information as soon as possible; that I did not wish him to consider this as a disobedience of orders, as I was satisfied he would act the same way if he knew all the circumstances as well as I did. I moved on until we got near to Aldie, when the head of my column halted. I had such a presentiment that it was necessary for me to go through that gap and see what there was on the other side, that I sent word by an aide-de-camp for the command to go on immediately, and not to stop until we got through. They had hardly marched a half of a mile before the enemy opened upon them in force, and I met Stuart, who had just made a march of forty miles in order to get into this very wooded country that I have been speaking of. We had a fight, and fought there until 9 o'clock, and drove the enemy back about eight miles to a place called Middleburg. The next day I sent General Gregg to Middleburg, where he had a heavy fight. Finding that he could not hold the position, on the 21st I moved up there with my whole force, and General Hooker sent a division of infantry to support me as far as Middleburg, and I drove the entire rebel cavalry back to Ashby's gap, through Upperville. As I wanted to know whether they had any infantry there beyond the mountains, I directed General Buford to send a small scouting party up to the top of the mountain, and to the north of Ashby's gap. He did so, and saw two heavy divisions of the rebel infantry marching down on the west side of the valley to take position in the gap. As soon as I learned this fact, I withdrew my force back to Aldie, and reported to General Hooker that there were none of the enemy east of the Blue ridge.

General Hooker then immediately issued orders for the army to cross the Potomac near Poolesville, and concentrate at Frederick city. On our arrival at Frederick city, about the 28th of June, General Hooker was relieved from the command of the army of the Potomac by General Meade.

By Mr. Chandler :

Question. Have you any personal knowledge of the cause of the change of commanders of the army of the Potomac at that time ?

Answer. Not a word. I had been so constantly to the front, and so occupied with my own business, that, until an event occurred, I hardly ever knew anything about it.

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*Testimony of Major General David B. Birney.*

WASHINGTON, March 7, 1864.

Major General DAVID B. BIRNEY sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?

Answer. Major general of volunteers, commanding the first division of the 3d corps.

Question. How long have you been with the army of the Potomac ?

Answer. Since August, 1861.

Question. Will you give a brief history of the movements of the army of the Potomac after General Hooker took command ?

Answer. The first movement made under General Hooker was that at Chancellorsville.

Question. Give us your observations of that movement, and the points which seem to you to be important.

Answer. The Chancellorsville movement was admirably conceived. The

6th corps, supported by the 3d corps, made a demonstration below Fredericksburg; the 6th corps actually crossed the river, and threw up small earthworks and *tete-de-ponts*. Whilst the attention of the enemy was drawn to this movement, the 11th, 12th, and 5th corps crossed above, and by quick movement had flanked the rebel position at Fredericksburg by taking position at Chancellorsville, with 11th corps on our right, 12th corps in the centre, and 5th corps on the left. On Thursday, at 2 o'clock p. m., the 3d corps, to which my division belonged, received orders to join the three corps at Chancellorsville, some twenty-five miles distant, and to conceal the movement from the enemy at Fredericksburg in our front. By a circuitous route, and late night marching, we reached Chancellorsville next morning at 10 o'clock, and reported to Major General Hooker. The corps was massed in rear of the Chancellorsville house until two o'clock p. m. on Friday, when I received an order through General Sickles from General Hooker to send a brigade and a battery to Dowdall's tavern on the plank road, the right of our position, to strengthen the 11th corps. Under this order I sent Graham's brigade and a battery of light twelves. At Dowdall's tavern General Howard met General Graham, and seemed surprised that he had been sent there; stated that his position was very strong, and 11th corps fully able to hold it. He told him to halt and not take position until he (Major General Howard) could advise Major General Hooker of the situation of affairs. General Graham sent me word of this, and soon after I received an order countermanding the previous one, and Graham with brigade and battery rejoined the division at the Chancellorsville house. During this Friday afternoon there was constant musketry and artillery fire, as the enemy were feeling our position. I was also informed that the 6th corps and the 2d corps, excepting one division, had been ordered to join the army, so that we could fight our full force in the coming battle. The halt at Chancellorsville was to effect the concentration of the army. During Friday afternoon my first brigade supported the centre of the 12th corps during a severe artillery attack, and at night I massed my division on the extreme right of the 12th corps, and at the request of Brigadier Generals Williams and Knipe relieved three of their regiments that were in the front line. Major General Howard consented, early Saturday morning, to give me the position in the front line occupied by his left regiments, so that I occupied almost a brigade front between the 12th and 11th corps, with two of my batteries in position. About 8 o'clock Saturday morning I first saw the enemy's column moving continuously across our front towards the right. It was in plain sight, with trains, ambulances, &c. Superior headquarters were immediately advised of this, and at 10 o'clock a m., as the column still was passing, by the consent of Major General Sickles, I ordered Clark's rifled battery to open upon it. Clark managed his guns admirably, and threw the column into great disorder, and finally compelled it to abandon the road. At about 1 o'clock on Saturday, General Sickles ordered me to attack the passing column with my division, and that my flanks would be protected. Whipple's division of the 3d corps, and a division from the 12th corps, were ordered to cover my left, and Barlow's brigade, from 11th corps, my right flank. Bridging the small creek in the front with rails, I crossed with my division and two batteries, and struck the column in flank. I captured and brought off over five hundred prisoners. At dusk I found my division, with Barlow's brigade, in the rebel army, and that the two divisions on my left had not advanced equally with me. I formed my division into a large square, with my artillery in the centre, holding the main road over which Jackson had passed. About this time several of the fugitives from the 11th corps reached me, and informed me that the right of the army, held by the 11th corps, had utterly given way, and that the enemy had the position that I had left in the morning to make the attack. I determined to retrace my steps, and making proper dispositions, and capturing some eighty more prisoners, reached the front of the position held by me before. I found



here Major General Sickles and General Pleasanton, with the artillery of the corps and a thousand cavalry with which they had managed to stay Jackson's corps, pursuing the fugitives of the 11th corps, and, in my opinion, saved the army from a great disaster.

The enemy had possession of the plank road, and of the earthworks thrown up by us. At about midnight of Saturday Major General Sickles ordered me to attack Jackson's corps with my division, driving them from the plank road and the small earthworks.

I made proper disposition of Hayman's and Ward's brigades, and by the bayonet drove them from it, and at one o'clock reported to Major General Sickles that we held the road and works, and had recaptured the artillery and caissons taken from us during the stampede of the 11th corps.

At daylight on Sunday the 3d corps, with my division bringing up the rear, commenced the movement ordered by Major General Hooker, to take position on the heights, in rear of the right of the 12th corps, and to make dispositions to hold the plank road.

In making the movement my rear was subjected to a severe musketry fire, but the troops behaved admirably, and withdrew by successive formations. I at once relieved by Graham's brigade the brigade of the 12th corps next to the plank road, sent Ward's brigade to support Berry's division on the right of the plank road, and held Hayman's brigade as a reserve. The artillery of the corps was admirably placed, and I have never seen such terrible execution as it effected upon the hostile masses. The attack upon us was furious and in masses, but the 3d corps held its position until eleven o'clock a. m., when we were ordered to retire and take position in a second line of battle formed like a flattened cone, with the flanks resting on the river. The position of my division in the new formation was at the apex. My division as well as the corps had suffered most severely—some forty-eight hundred, I think, killed and wounded; among the killed were Major Generals Berry and Whipple; and among the wounded, Brigadier General Mott. Notwithstanding this, at General Hooker's special order, the corps was again placed at the post of honor and danger.

Question. Do you know the cause of the giving way of the 11th corps, and whether it made any reasonable resistance?

Answer. I think the 11th corps, through disregard of rules of warfare, had its pickets too close to the main body, and was surprised by the sudden massed attack of the enemy on its right flank and rear, and fled in instant confusion. Portions of it may have been fought, but the flight, stampede of artillery, transportation, officers and men, has been described to me, by officers who saw it, as disgraceful in the extreme.

Question. What have you to say about the crossing of the river? Was it planned with ability or otherwise?

Answer. I think that it was. I think the position was very strong, and if the 11th corps had held its ground and fought with any reasonable pertinacity we would have achieved a great success.

Question. What do you know about General Hooker being wounded by a shell or something?

Answer. I heard of that early in the morning. I saw him at eleven o'clock, as I withdrew. He was at the Chancellorsville house, and rode up to me and said that he was suffering a great deal from the concussion. That is all I know about it. I was not present when he was injured. He seemed to suffer a great deal from the accident; so I judged from his manner.

Question. What disposition did he make of the troops after the 11th corps gave way? A new position was taken up, if I remember rightly. Had that become necessary in consequence of that failure?

Answer. Yes, sir; it had become necessary to shorten our lines and protect our communications by resting our flanks on the river, instead of in air.

Question. What was the finale of that battle? Were the enemy repulsed before your lines, or did you retreat?

Answer. We held the enemy there from half past five in the morning until eleven o'clock with our corps, with great loss, and we inflicted more injury upon them. When we fell back, it was done in good order, as far as troops that had suffered so much could do so. We lost no guns, and no material. The corps fell back in order to assume a position in the new line of battle. The new position was of the form of a cone, with our corps occupying the left of the apex. The loss of the enemy was very heavy, must have been, from the very heavy artillery and musketry fire that was concentrated upon their massed columns.

Question. In your judgment, which of the armies really suffered the most loss in killed, wounded, &c.?

Answer. I think that the enemy did. The 11th corps suffered no loss as it fled, except in prisoners. I know that the enemy suffered great loss, from information derived from the wounded officers of my command who remained upon the field within their lines; and from my surgeons who were left there, and who said that the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was at least two to one, as compared with our loss.

Question. How long was it after that that our army finally recrossed the river?

Answer. On Saturday was the flight of the 11th corps, and on Sunday was this fight, in the morning, with our corps and a part of the 2d corps, and the 12th corps. We fell back to this new position at Sunday noon. We then remained there the rest of Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday; and on Tuesday night, I think, the recrossing was decided upon.

Question. Was the new position you took up on Sunday as advantageous a position as circumstances would allow?

Answer. It was a very strong one.

Question. And judiciously taken?

Answer. Yes, sir. At that time the army was very much reduced, from the stampeding of the 11th corps, the absence of the 6th corps and a portion of the 2d corps at Fredericksburg, and the heavy loss sustained by the 3d corps. It was necessary, therefore, to shorten the line. The new position, in my judgment, was as strong a line as could have been selected for defence. The enemy made only one attempt upon it. They made an attempt Sunday afternoon to take it, but were repulsed with great loss.

Question. What do you know about General Hooker's orders to General Sedgwick to come up to Chancellorsville?

Answer. My information about that would be hearsay merely. His appearance on Saturday or Sunday would have changed the result.

Question. You know the position of the forces under General Hooker Saturday night?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Suppose that General Sedgwick with his corps, consisting of about 24,000 men, had got up by daylight, in the rear of the enemy and commenced an attack upon them, what, in your opinion, would have been the effect?

Answer. Complete disaster to the enemy. I think that if on Sunday morning we had been properly supported—that is, if the troops that were there had been brought up, the enemy could have been defeated then. I regard not doing this a great mistake.

Question. Why was not that done?

Answer. I have understood that it was owing to the accident to General Hooker early in the morning.

Question. How long a time, as you understood, was General Hooker really incapable of taking the charge of affairs there?

Answer. It was some two hours that he was reported to me as being almost insensible.

Question. And that during the most essential and critical time there was?

Answer. In the height of it. I understood that the injury resulted from a round shot striking a pillar of the house against which he was leaning, the severe concussion knocking him insensible. I saw a great deal of him during the afternoon. He remained a part of the afternoon at the position I occupied upon the road.

Question. What was his condition after that accident?

Answer. He seemed to show its effects a great deal in his manner; that is, he was more quiet than usual with him; it seemed to have the stunning effect a very severe blow would naturally have upon any one.

Question. And you have reason to suppose that that had a very disastrous effect upon the operations of the army?

Answer. I think so; that is, the movements early in the morning of Sunday. The statements that I have heard that he was under the influence of liquor I think are utterly false.

Question. Did you ever see General Hooker under the influence of liquor when on duty or in the field?

Answer. No, sir, at no such time.

Question. The army recrossed the river and resumed its old position?

Answer. Yes, sir; upon Wednesday morning we returned to our old camps. There was no further movement of the army until June, when we followed Lee to Gettysburg. At that time I commanded the 3d corps, General Sickles being absent on sick leave. That corps was upon the left of the army in that movement. The army was formed into two wings, the 3d, 11th, and 1st corps forming the left wing under command of General Reynolds.

Question. What have you to say in regard to General Hooker's dispositions of the army in following Lee?

Answer. They were, I think, careful and judicious. We had information at every step of Lee's movements, and I think General Hooker's dispositions were all promptly made to meet them, and cover Washington and Baltimore.

Question. Do you know the reasons why General Hooker was relieved from the command of that army?

Answer. On the 28th June I was commanding the 3d corps, and was ordered to move my command from Middleburg to Frederick city and encamp near there. On the march I rode to General Hooker's headquarters and reported to him. He told me that he had been relieved, and that General Meade had been assigned to the command. He showed me the correspondence between him and the headquarters at Washington, in which he had asked that certain troops at Harper's Ferry, some 10,000, be permitted to join his army; stating that he did not regard Harper's Ferry as a position of any military importance to be held by either party; that permission had been refused, and then, I think, he had expressed himself as preferring to be relieved, as he had not the confidence of the general-in-chief, stating that he considered it essential to the strength of the army and its final success in the approaching conflict, that he should have all the available troops and possess the entire confidence of the commander-in-chief. He told me that he had been relieved in answer to that communication.

Question. Had the army, so far as you know, confidence in General Hooker as its commanding general?

Answer. I think the rank and file had very great confidence in him. There was great enthusiasm for him. He was a man who inspired great enthusiasm. I know that my own corps, in which he was, during the peninsular and Pope campaigns, a division commander, had the most implicit confidence in him, and great admiration for him. I know of no general for whom as enthusiastic regard, love, and confidence was felt as General Hooker.

Question. How extensive was this confidence in him? Did it extend to the regimental officers?

Answer. Yes, sir; I am speaking more particularly of the 3d corps, and of the rank and file of the army. I know that there was some feeling among officers high in rank against him. But I think the rank and file of the army, and all of the 3d corps, had the strongest possible confidence in him.

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*Testimony of Colonel Thomas D. Johns.*

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1864.

Colonel THOMAS D. JOHNS sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. What is your rank and position in the service, and how long have you been in the army of the Potomac?

Answer. I am a colonel of the 7th Massachusetts volunteers, and have been in the army of the Potomac a little less than a year. My commission bears date the 22d of February, 1863; I joined the army of the Potomac on the 27th of March, 1863.

Question. Did you belong to the army of the Potomac at the time General Hooker had command of it?

Answer. Yes, sir; he had command of it when I joined it.

Question. Where was the army at that time?

Answer. At Falmouth and vicinity.

Question. You belonged to it at the time of the battle of Chancellorsville?

Answer. I did.

Question. What part did your regiment take in that movement?

Answer. We were not at Chancellorsville; we operated upon a different part of the field.

Question. What division of the army did you belong to?

Answer. I belonged to the 3d division of the 6th corps; General Newton had command of the division, and General Sedgwick commanded the corps.

Question. Go on and state in your own way what took place there.

Answer. The 6th corps left its camp on the 28th of April; its camp was near Falmouth. The Rappahannock was about two and a half miles distant, and we moved down to the bank of the river that day. We remained there manœuvring and feinting back and forth until the night of Saturday, the 2d of May. We were drawn up in line of battle along the river, moving to the left and right at times.

Question. Which bank of the river was that?

Answer. That was the north bank.

Question. Where was the rest of the army?

Answer. A portion of the 1st corps was on the left, that is, further down the river. They recrossed on Saturday, and passed along our front to our right, and went up and crossed at one of the fords. We were threatening to cross at different times and at different points, not intending, however, to cross at that time.

Question. At that time General Hooker, with the main army, had crossed and gone to Chancellorsville?

Answer. Yes, sir; they had crossed over and, as we supposed, were in rear of the left of the enemy; we supposed so from the time they started, and from what we understood to be the plans; they started two days before we did; and then from the continuous firing we heard we could judge somewhat of their position, and supposed that they had got around in rear of the enemy. On Saturday night, just about dark, our corps had orders to move to the right, to-

wards Fredericksburg; we were then perhaps two and a half or three miles below Fredericksburg; still on the right bank of the river.

Question. From whom did those orders come?

Answer. They came from General Sedgwick to us. We crossed the river about two and a half or three miles below Fredericksburg about 10 o'clock on the night of the 2d of May, crossing on pontoon bridges; we then bivouacked on the south bank of the river for an hour and a half or two hours; I am speaking now only of our division, though there were other divisions which bivouacked there. In the mean time some troops of our corps, I think it was a brigade called Shaler's brigade, advanced at once towards Fredericksburg for the purpose of occupying the town; that was about midnight; that was successfully accomplished, and in a very short time; when that was announced as accomplished, we had orders to move to Fredericksburg; we moved along quite leisurely, and reached there probably about 3 o'clock in the morning, halting quite often along the road. As we were approaching Fredericksburg, passing along the plain south of Fredericksburg, we had orders from General Sedgwick to be very careful and very quiet, because we were passing a dangerous position; we passed, however, in perfect safety; there was not a shot fired nor an alarm or noise of any kind until we got into the streets of Fredericksburg. As I said before, we got into Fredericksburg, I should judge, about 3 o'clock in the morning; we remained in the streets of Fredericksburg at least two hours; I think it was fully 5 o'clock before we moved from the street in which we lay in line of battle; in the mean time, however, other troops had been deployed and thrown in line of battle to our front. I think it was about 4 o'clock in the morning, at all events it was some time after we were drawn up in the main street leading into Fredericksburg from the southeast side, that the first shot was fired by the enemy from the heights, that is of artillery; there had probably been some musketry firing previous to that by the skirmishers.

About 5 o'clock in the morning I had orders from General Newton, commanding the division, to take a position with my regiment in the right portion of the town, or on the front towards the heights, in order to prevent the enemy, in case they came down to attack us, from taking that portion of the town; and, in order to make no mistake in regard to the proper position I should occupy, I asked him to send an aid with me to designate the point. He did so, and the aid designated about the general position I should take, leaving it to me to select the exact point. I selected the point behind the wall of a cemetery, which is actually within the town. It is quite a large piece of ground, and would hold my regiment very readily. There was a brick wall all around it, which would enable me to hold the position against very great odds in case of an attack. We took position there not far from 5 o'clock in the morning. I had orders to hold myself in readiness at any moment. We remained there lying behind the wall until 10 o'clock in the day. We did not fire a gun, and made no movement until that time.

In the mean time, however, there were other troops engaged both on our right and our left; and about 6 o'clock in the morning artillery firing commenced very heavily on both sides, and continued for fully two hours—very briskly indeed—our side firing the greater number of shots. That firing continued until half past 9 or very nearly 10 o'clock, when there was an almost entire cessation of firing.

I noticed in the firing of the rebels that they seemed to be short of artillery. I noticed them moving their pieces from one point to another; that is, on the summit of Marie's hill they had numerous earthworks, and by looking at them through a glass I could see that some of their works on the right and some on the left were neither manned nor armed, and in the course of the firing I noticed that they would move their artillery from one point to another. I could see their operations distinctly.

About half past 10 o'clock General Newton sent for me to come to his headquarters. General Sedgwick's headquarters were in a house just on the left of my regiment, and General Newton's headquarters were directly opposite. I went there and found General Sedgwick present, with General Newton, General Gibbon, and one or two others, all standing near the headquarters. General Newton told me that I had been designated to take a brigade and to make an assault upon the works of the enemy; that they had been trying to make an opening all the morning, but thought it was impossible to do so, and the only alternative left was to make a close assault and take the chances of success in that way. He told me to take my regiment and the 36th New York, and to take command of the two regiments as a brigade, and to go on and do the best I could.

I went back, ordered the men to unslung their knapsacks and take off their blankets, leaving them with nothing but their arms, accoutrements, and their haversacks, with their provisions in them. About 11 o'clock General Newton told me it was time to move. I had had some conversation with General Sedgwick about the matter. He told me he thought I could get through there pretty easily, and not lose many men; if I found I could not get through there, then to fall back in good order.

At ten minutes past 11 o'clock I moved by the flank on the telegraph road. This road led through the enemy's works. The stone wall near the base of Marie's hill crossed the road, extending on each side of it. I moved my troops up in good order. I noticed the rebels looking at us, and was surprised that they did not fire sooner. They did not fire at us at all until we got within perhaps three hundred yards of the wall. They then opened upon us with a howitzer battery, with which, however, they did not effect much, as they could not get depression enough to strike us. But we had a strong enfilading fire from both sides. I noticed, as we approached, men poking their heads up over the wall. They commenced firing upon us. It seemed to me that the men inside the wall stood as thick as they possibly could. I think there were two ranks of them; the front rank would fire, and then be relieved by the rear rank. At all events, apparently the greatest portion of their force was crowded in there behind the stone wall on each side of the road. I advanced at the head of the brigade, and made a charge; but we were repulsed. They broke the head of my column badly at the first fire. The men were moving up in good order, but this tremendous fire coming so suddenly broke the head of my column; the rear of the column did not break.

I rallied them, and got up perhaps about fifty yards nearer. This firing continued all the time, and it is very difficult to rally men under actual fire. Still I rallied them in about two minutes, and came up again; but the head of my column broke again, it, of course, receiving the severest part of the fire. I was struck myself at that charge, but was not disabled.

I got my men up the third time, and we went right ahead then and did not stop at all. We pushed right ahead. A portion got through on the road, and a portion went off on the right and got over the wall and behind the enemy, and that gave us possession of the works. At that last charge I was struck again and very seriously injured, and was carried off the field. In about fifteen minutes one of my wounded men came back, and said that the regiment had carried the heights, and our colors were there.

As I was being carried back to the hospital—in fact, just when I got past where I had left General Sedgwick and General Newton—I met General Sedgwick coming out on horseback. He stopped and spoke to me, inquired about my wound, and complimented me upon my success. That is the last I saw of the army until I recovered. In twenty minutes after we began the first assault, the brigade I had charge of carried the heights.

By Mr. Chandler :

Question. How many men did you lose in that assault ?

Answer. I do not know exactly how many men I lost altogether ; but I lost in killed and wounded, 111 or 112.

Question. You know nothing about the operations there after that ?

Answer. No, sir ; for I was carried off the field then.

By the chairman :

Question. Did that end the fighting ?

Answer. No, sir ; the command went on about two miles towards what is called Salem heights ; and I was told that they there met the enemy and had a pretty vigorous contest, which lasted until dark.

Question. Why did you move so cautiously and leisurely along up to Fredericksburg ? Was there anything in your way ?

Answer. We found nothing after we got there ; but I suppose the general thought the enemy might be in force there, and did not want to be taken by surprise.

Question. How far was it from Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville, to where the fight was there ?

Answer. About eight miles, I believe.

Question. Suppose an order had been received at 8 o'clock on Saturday evening for you to be at Chancellorsville the next morning at daylight, was there anything to prevent your accomplishing it ?

Answer. I think not—not to my knowledge. At least, when we did go there we found nothing to prevent it ; and the supposition is that there would not have been anything before. The enemy was undoubtedly re-enforced after daylight in the morning.

Question. So that you found no impediment to prevent your going right on to General Hooker that night ?

Answer. Apparently not. I examined with my glass in the morning, and the enemy did not seem to be at all plenty there. I do not think there was more than a division in the whole line of works, running along for miles ; and in our immediate front there was only a small brigade. We made an attack at all points, but mine happened to be the main point of attack.

Question. So that there was really nothing that you know of to prevent the 6th corps marching on to Chancellorsville that night ?

Answer. No, sir, not that I know of. I think that the assault could have been made with much less loss immediately upon our arrival at Fredericksburg, and we could have moved right on from there, for aught I know.

Question. At what time did General Sedgwick receive his orders to carry those heights ?

Answer. I am not aware of what time he received his orders. We received our orders to move towards Fredericksburg between 8 and 9 o'clock Saturday night. We all supposed that the moment we reached Fredericksburg we were going right-ahead to join General Hooker. In fact, we knew the night before that we were ordered to join General Hooker, for an aid of General Sedgwick came to me and told me so as we were marching up towards Fredericksburg.

Question. After receiving the order from General Hooker to repair to Chancellorsville with all expedition, how many hours would it have taken the 6th corps to reach General Hooker's forces ?

Answer. That depends entirely upon the obstacles they would meet.

Question. I mean considering all the obstacles they would have been likely to meet with if they had marched right along.

Answer. In the ordinary course of events, taking all due precautions, it would take them say six hours, making full allowance for everything. You would have to delay occasionally to reconnoitre, &c. But taking all contingencies into

consideration, from the time the order was received until we could get there it would be about six hours perhaps, and that would have enabled us to fight a pretty good battle, too.

Question. Then it was not difficult for General Sedgwick to have complied with that order to get there by daylight, for anything you could see.

Answer. No, sir; and the order, I understood, was for him to be there at early daylight.

Question. You are a West Point graduate, and have been in the regular army?

Answer. Yes, sir; but I am not in the regular army now.

Question. In your opinion, as a military man, what would have been the effect at Chancellorsville of this 6th corps, consisting of say 24,000 men, if it had been there by daylight, as ordered?

Answer. My opinion of the matter is this: that if we had got there before the disaster happened to the 11th and 12th corps, which I think were on the right of General Hooker's line, we would have got General Lee right between us; General Hooker would have been in his front, and we would have been in his rear.

Question. Suppose you had got there on Sunday morning, after General Hooker had taken up a new position?

Answer. The result would have been just about the same. The relative positions of General Hooker's column and our column to the rebel army would not have been materially changed.

Question. Where would your column have struck the enemy, in the natural course of events, if you had marched there Sunday morning?

Answer. I think we would have taken them in their rear.

Question. What would have been the effect of that upon Lee's army?

Answer. It would have ruined it, as a matter of course. If I understand the position of General Hooker—and I think I do—Lee's army would have been annihilated. I do not see what could have saved it. That, however, is an opinion merely.

Question. That is what I ask; I merely want your opinion as a military man.

Answer. That was the impression among officers and men generally, and our men know a great deal more than people think they do. A great many of our soldiers are very intelligent, and they understand matters a great deal better than it is supposed they do.

Question. Was it the general impression there that you did not move with that celerity that the exigencies of the case required?

Answer. That was the impression; yes, sir; although we supposed, from the fact that we did not move, that there was some more serious obstacle than there really was. The men supposed that the general in command had reconnoitred, and understood what was in front of them. At the time they took it for granted that it was right, but afterwards they did not think so.

Question. Do you consider it good generalship to forego a movement of that kind for fear you may meet with trouble?

Answer. No, sir; I do not think so. We understood that General Sedgwick's orders were to join General Hooker at daylight. We moved pretty soon after the order was received; but we lay an hour after we got to the pontoon bridge before we crossed the river. Then after we had crossed we lay there perhaps two hours more. And we waited also when we had got to Fredericksburg. It is my opinion that we might have made the assault much sooner than we did. I suspected what they were going to do from the position they put me in, and for that reason I examined the ground very carefully with my glass, and examined the enemy's works and rifle-pits, and I noticed that the enemy were re-enforced from some quarter.



Question. Did you ever hear General Sedgwick give any reason why he did not march with more celerity to join General Hooker?

Answer. No, sir; I never heard him say anything about it.

Question. Where was the rest of the 6th corps while you were making the assault?

Answer. They were deployed in line of battle on each of my flanks.

Question. Waiting for you to carry the heights?

Answer. Yes, sir; and as soon as we carried them they came up. I saw them coming up just as they were carrying me off the field.

Question. There was no other point to carry than those heights?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. And no other point to carry between them and Chancellorsville?

Answer. No, sir; I believe not. When they met the rebels they drove them back very successfully, and without much loss on our side.

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*Testimony of Major General G. K. Warren.*

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1864.

Major General GOUVERNEUR K. WARREN sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. What is your rank in the service, and your position in the army of the Potomac; and what has it been from the time General Hooker took command of that army?

Answer. When General Hooker took command, I was a brigadier general of volunteers, commanding the third brigade of the second division of the 5th corps. General Hooker detailed me as chief topographical engineer at headquarters of the army, and I remained in that position until after the battle of Chancellorsville; then, in accordance with the law, the corps of engineers and the topographical engineers were united, and General Hooker made me chief engineer of the army at headquarters. I remained in that position until August 12, 1863, when I was assigned temporarily to the command of the 2d army corps. I received my appointment as major general of volunteers on the 8th of August last, and on the 12th of August I was assigned to that command, and have held it ever since.

Question. You belonged to the regular army, did you not, and were a graduate of West Point?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did you participate in the movement resulting in the battle of Chancellorsville? If so, state in what capacity you acted.

Answer. Preliminary to that movement, as topographical engineer I had devoted myself specially to gaining information of the country, and preparing maps of it. As to whatever General Hooker's plans were, they were kept perfectly secret from everybody until the movements themselves developed them. I did not know any of his plans until I saw them being carried into operation.

On the 29th of April I received instructions to go to United States ford and assist in laying a pontoon bridge at that place. I went there that night, and we spent all the next morning in preparing a roadway down to the river and getting the bridge laid. It was laid about 2 o'clock. The 2d corps was there, under General Couch, to aid in the operation.

Whilst we were carrying on this work, the advance of General Meade's column that had crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's ford, and the Rapidan at Germania, came down in sight. That was about the first that I understood of what

his movement had been. It had been rainy and misty, so that we could not observe anything. But that assured us that the enemy had all abandoned United States ford. The 2d corps crossed during that evening.

I then went on to Chancellorsville, and got there about 5 o'clock, General Hooker, with a portion of his staff, got there about the same time.

There were at Chancellorsville that night the 11th, 12th, 5th, and 2d corps. The 2d corps was on the right, near by there, on the road. The advance of our cavalry was about three miles from Chancellorsville towards Fredericksburg. The army that was there prior to General Hooker's arrival was commanded by General Slocum, who, I think, was the ranking officer, and he had taken up the camps for the evening, as I believe he had been instructed to do.

The next morning early I went out towards Fredericksburg to reconnoitre the road; I went out a little over three miles, until I came in sight of the enemy's lines. I came back and reported, and then found that General Hooker had ordered an advance of all our forces. That advance began, I think, about 11 o'clock in the morning. Two divisions of General Meade's corps, the 5th corps, took the road along the river. The third division, under General Sykes, took what is called the macadamized road, and it was to be followed by the 2d corps; and General Slocum, commanding the 12th corps, to be followed by the 11th corps, was to take the plank road. That movement began and I went out with General Sykes's column over the road I had been before. When we had advanced about a mile and a half, we found the enemy advancing and driving in our cavalry. General Sykes moved forward at double-quick, and drove the enemy back, and gained the position that had been assigned him.

General Hooker's plan was that all the troops should take up a position about two miles out, as near as we could designate, advancing on all these three roads, and be in line of battle by 2 o'clock in the afternoon, when he intended to advance the whole line. General Sykes very soon encountered a very much heavier force than his own, and the enemy quite outflanked him on all sides. His movement had been rather more rapid and more direct than that of the other columns. I then went back to General Hooker and reported the circumstances. When I got back I found that he had countermanded the order to advance, and ordered the troops back again into their position of the night before. Why he did that I do not know. The troops all withdrew and came back to their former position. The enemy followed us up and made some slight demonstrations on that position around Chancellorsville, but accomplished nothing. During that night the 3d corps arrived.

Question. Describe, if you please, the position the troops then occupied.

Answer. The Chancellorsville house was a very large single building, and was surrounded by a very good-sized farm, with cleared land in front of it towards the enemy; the cleared land extended about 300 yards, and also to the rear of it, a little more in some places, and a little less in others. In front of that, and all around it in every direction, were very dense woods, not very large trees, but very difficult to get through, mainly of scrubby oak, what they call black-jack there, so that a man could hardly ride through it, and a man could not march through it very well with a musket in his hand, unless he trailed it. A further disadvantage about it was that the highest ground was in the possession of the enemy, especially towards what might be called the left of the line. I do not think General Hooker had examined the ground himself. I do not think he had had an opportunity to examine it carefully before that time. But he had ordered them back into this position because it was the one they had occupied the night before, and was about the best that could be designated in the hurry of making a change of plan in the face of the enemy, though I think it was probably not the best that might have been taken if he had had more time to select it.

The troops that took up position there that night were the 5th corps on the left, the 12th corps next; then there was an interval or space occupied by one division of the 3d corps, and then on the extreme right was the 11th corps. Portions of the 2d corps were in reserve.

There was a great deal of discussion that night about what was best to be done. General Hooker himself, I think, was decidedly in favor of receiving the enemy's attack on the ground, and for drawing back the line so as to make it stronger. But through the assurances of others that they could hold their positions against anything that the enemy could send, and to prevent the demoralization that might be produced by withdrawing troops, it was determined to hold on there.

In the morning, about 6 or 7 o'clock, the enemy opened his artillery from our left on the open field in front of the Chancellorsville house, and drove out all our wagons, and everything that was loose, into position. A little while afterwards he made a demonstration down what is called the plank road. Then later on in the day they made a demonstration still further on towards our right. Then we caught a view of a portion of the enemy's column passing on towards our right, and General Sickles went out with two of his divisions and what cavalry we had under General Pleasonton, for the purpose of harassing it. He captured quite a number of prisoners. At that hour of the day there was a general feeling in the army that Lee's army was running away.

During the morning General Hooker had visited the whole of the line, but I was not with him at that time. About 5 o'clock in the afternoon I went out with Captain Comstock to examine the line. Captain Comstock was nominally the chief engineer on General Hooker's staff at that time. When we had got out a little way we heard firing begin on the right very rapidly. We then rode up in that direction as fast as we could. By the time I got there all of the 11th corps that I saw had run away, or were running away; that is, all the infantry, though the artillery was still fighting, and the enemy's infantry had hardly made any attack on that part of the front.

Question. How can you account for that stampede of the 11th corps?

Answer. In the first place, I think they were attacked by a very superior force; and I have a theory of my own, that they had allowed their ambulances, and ammunition wagons, and pack-mule train, and even beef cattle, to actually come up on their line, and, as a matter of course, when the fighting began all these ran away. I know that the first drove of fugitives I saw was nothing but these ambulances and pack-mules, enough to run any man down who attempted to go in an opposite direction. And that, I think, together with the attack of the enemy in front, shook the line, and they thought everything was going.

Question. The fact was that they made no resistance to speak of?

Answer. Not where I was, they did not. It began, probably, on the right of the line, but there was no resistance made to speak of by their infantry at all. I sent word at once to General Pleasonton, who was somewhat in the woods out of sight, that the whole of our right was gone, and I sent an officer to tell him which way the enemy was coming. General Pleasonton faced about and went into position with all his artillery, and all of General Sickles's. Then we reformed the line on the right, at right angles to it, about half a mile from the Chancellorsville house. I sent word to General Sickles and to General Pleasonton, as I have already stated, and then I rode back towards headquarters to help to form a new line at what was called Fairview. Colonel Best was afterwards put in command of the artillery at that point. Captain Comstock had informed General Hooker before, and about that time he came up. We reformed our right again, and opened on the enemy with about thirty pieces of artillery, right down the plank road, and General Sickles and General Pleasonton attacked on the flank of the enemy's column. That lasted until after dark;

and it was under that fire that Stonewall Jackson was killed. We took prisoners who told us that that force of the enemy was Jackson's corps. We had two divisions of the 3d corps, and our cavalry, between Jackson and General Lee, who had the other wing of their army. Another division of the 3d corps and portions of the 2d corps formed on the line that night; and just at dark the 1st corps came up and took position to the right of that; so that our right was then really stronger than it had been in the morning.

What happened after that I do not know, because I got directions from General Hooker to go down that night to General Sedgwick, who was ordered to advance from Fredericksburg.

Question. You have stated the position of your line when you were directed to go to General Sedgwick with orders?

Answer. Yes, sir; the orders were sent before I went, because I had not then got in from this part of the field. But I was sent with another copy of them, and somewhat confidentially to explain to General Sedgwick the exact position of things where we were, that he might know the importance of it, and I knew the road better than anybody else.

Question. At what time did you start and did you reach General Sedgwick's headquarters?

Answer. I started from Chancellorsville about half past ten o'clock at night, and got to where General Sedgwick was, across the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, at three o'clock in the morning. General Sedgwick had got his orders through a Russian officer that General Hooker had as a staff officer; he had got them some time before I arrived, and his troops had already begun to move when I reached there. And I do not know but what he had also received them by telegraph. General Newton's division had the advance of the movement.

Question. You were sent there to explain those orders more particularly and the importance of the movement?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What were the orders that you communicated to General Sedgwick?

Answer. The substance of it was that there was but a small force in front of General Sedgwick at Fredericksburg; as General Hooker had learned from prisoners and other sources of information; and that he wanted General Sedgwick to march as rapidly as possible up the plank road, or the other road, and attack General Lee in the rear.

We expected that Jackson's forces would assault us in the morning at Chancellorsville, and the intention was that General Sickles, with all his force, was to meet him at once, and the 1st corps was also to attack him and envelop him, and, if necessary, more forces were to be drawn from the left of our line, leaving only force enough to hold Lee's forces in check. The night General Hooker determined to stay, we intrenched the position of our left. General Sedgwick was ordered to be in his position by daylight; of course that implied if he could be there. I do not know at what time he got his first orders, those sent him before I started.

Question. What was the distance that General Sedgwick had to march to comply with that order?

Answer. He would have had to march about twelve miles before he struck the main line of General Lee.

Question. What kind of a road had he to travel?

Answer. An excellent road.

Question. Suppose he had received the order at 8 o'clock on Saturday night, could he have reached the place by daylight on Sunday morning?

Answer. That would depend upon how much the enemy opposed him.

Question. I mean without any considerable delay from the enemy?

Answer. If the enemy had not delayed him, there would have been no trouble

in getting there in time. You could count on their making full two miles an hour with the whole army.

Question. Considering your situation and the situation of the enemy, what would have been the effect of an attack by General Sedgwick, in conjunction with the main army, on the enemy's lines, provided he had been there at daylight, according to his orders?

Answer. I think we ought to have destroyed Lee's army. But it would depend a great deal upon how hard the other part of the army fought, for General Sedgwick, with his 20,000 men, was in great danger of being destroyed if he became isolated.

Question. I am inquiring upon the hypothesis that he reached there at the time ordered.

Answer. If he had got over there, and the other part had fought as they ought to have done, I think we should have pretty nearly destroyed General Lee's army.

Question. Whereabouts would General Sedgwick's force have struck General Lee's army, had that order been complied with as designed—in rear or on the flank?

Answer. I suppose he would have struck him, if anything, to the rear, and to the right of his centre.

Question. If there was no great force to have interrupted the progress of General Sedgwick, and he received at 8 o'clock in the evening his orders to march, he could easily have arrived on the spot by daylight?

Answer. I say he could if there was no force to oppose him. I will tell you why I say that: it takes some men just as long to clear away a little force as it does a large one. It depends altogether upon the man how long a certain force will stop him. I have seen two pieces of artillery hold an army in check for two or three hours.

Question. Did you remain with General Sedgwick and accompany him?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What impediments did he meet with along the road?

Answer. The enemy had left about one division—perhaps 10,000 or 12,000 men—at Fredericksburg to watch him. They established a kind of picket line around his division, so that he could not move anything without their knowing it. Just as soon as General Sedgwick began to move a little random-fire began, and that was kept up until daylight. At daylight the head of General Sedgwick's troops had got into Fredericksburg. I think some little attempts had been made to move forward a skirmish line, but that had been repulsed. The enemy had considerable artillery in position.

Question. Did you arrive there before or after Colonel Johns had assaulted their line and repulsed the enemy?

Answer. Long before that; that did not occur until quite late in the day, after we reached Fredericksburg. In the morning, at fair daylight, General Gibbon laid a pontoon bridge at Fredericksburg, and crossed over with his division, and I went with him to try and see if we could not break through. He made a very considerable demonstration, and acted very handsomely with the small force that he had—not more than 2,000 men. But so much time was taken that the enemy got more troops in front of him than he could master. Besides, to the right was a canal without any bridge, which was very bad. That drew off a large portion of the enemy's force. I then went back to General Sedgwick, and told him that the only way to take the hill, in my opinion, was to assault it with all the force he had, if necessary.

Question. Was there any more difficulty in assailing it immediately on the receipt of the order than there was fourteen hours after?

Answer. No, sir. I think the difficulties kept increasing all the time.

**Question.** Can you say that there was a vigorous and energetic movement of that corps, in order to comply with that order of General Hooker? And was there really any such impediment as should have retarded them for that length of time?

**Answer.** In my opinion there was not such an impediment. My opinion was, that, under the circumstances, the most vigorous effort possible ought to have been made without regard to consequences, because the order was peremptory.

**Question.** Is it your opinion that such an attempt would have been effectual?

**Answer.** Yes, sir, I think it would, because it succeeded afterwards under worse circumstances.

**Question.** Then, if I understand you, it would seem that if the 6th corps under General Sedgwick had vigorously and energetically attempted to comply with the order of General Hooker, in your judgment the result of that battle would have been very different from what it was?

**Answer.** Yes, sir; and I will go further, and say that I think there might have been more fighting done on the other end of the line. I do not believe that if General Sedgwick had done all he could, and there had not been harder fighting on the other end of the line, we would have succeeded.

**Question.** Why did not they fight harder on the other end of the line?

**Answer.** I was not there, and do not know. All I know is that the 1st corps did not fight at all. And from the time we made this advance under General Sedgwick, we kept firing pretty heavily, and whipped that division of the rebels all to pieces. There was a little slowness afterwards. In the afternoon, about 6 o'clock, we met an attack from a division that General Lee sent down. The battle at Chancellorsville stopped at 1 o'clock, when we were beginning down below; so General Lee turned around on us.

**Question.** You were not with General Hooker when he was injured?

**Answer.** No, sir, I was down with General Sedgwick.

**Question.** Did you understand how long he was disabled by that injury?

**Answer.** I have never heard any statement about it.

**Question.** When did you see General Hooker first after his injury?

**Answer.** The night after, about 12 o'clock. General Sedgwick carried the heights at Fredericksburg, and then moved on about three miles further, and had a fight at Salem heights, but could not carry them. I think that by fighting the battle at Salem heights differently, we might have won that place also.

**Question.** Explain that, if you please.

**Answer.** The attack at Salem heights was made by General Brooks's division, General Newton having then the second division. General Newton's division carried the heights at Fredericksburg. General Brooks carried Salem heights, but not being closely enough supported by other troops he could not hold the heights. It was just one of those wavering things that a moment settles. If we had been stronger at that moment we would have won; not being so, they won. I know I urged a different arrangement of the troops before we got to that place.

**Question.** You retired across the river after that fight was over?

**Answer.** After that fight at Salem heights I went back to General Hooker and reported to him what happened down there. From what I saw of General Hooker, as I talked with him, he seemed to be very much exhausted, and declined to give any special instructions to General Sedgwick. He said he had none to give, and gave me to infer that he would have to depend upon himself, and I sent word to General Sedgwick to that effect. I sent the orders without General Hooker seeing them, upon which General Sedgwick acted the next day. General Sedgwick was attacked very heavily on Monday, fought all day and retreated across the river that night. We lay quiet at Chancellorsville pretty nearly all day.

Question. Can you give any reason for lying there quiet while General Sedgwick was fighting ?

Answer. I cannot ; I did not think it was right.

Question. Why did not General Hooker order an assault when he heard General Sedgwick fighting there ?

Answer. I do not know why he did not.

Question. What, in your judgment, would have been the effect if he had ?

Answer. I think it very probable we would have succeeded ; at least, I would have made it myself with that expectation.

Question. You say General Hooker appeared to be very much exhausted. Did he appear to be injured by this accident that had happened to him, or had he entirely recovered from that when you saw him ?

Answer. I should think the word "tired" would express it. I think he had been asleep before I got back there, and I waked him up to talk with him.

That day General Sedgwick recrossed the river. The next day the army at Chancellorsville did nothing but make preparations to cover their falling back, and just at dark on Tuesday the army began to move, and during the night and the next morning they all withdrew to the north side of the river.

Question. Were you impeded in your retreat across the river ?

Answer. Not at all by the enemy, except some little firing of artillery. A heavy rain came up and raised the river.

Question. Why did not the enemy follow you up more vigorously ?

Answer. I expect they were glad enough to get rid of us.

Question. Which army, in your judgment, suffered the most in killed, wounded, &c., in that battle of Chancellorsville ?

Answer. I should think it was about equal ; perhaps we suffered a little the most, taking it altogether.

Question. The army went back and took up its position in its old place ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And you remained there, if I understand it, until General Lee made his movement into Maryland ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What dispositions did General Hooker make of his army to meet the movements of Lee as he proceeded up the valley and finally across the Potomac ?

Answer. I cannot give very positive information about that, because it was not in my province to know. I only know very vaguely about that, that he kept sending one corps after another up the river, and kept following Lee to be ready for him in that direction.

Question. You accompanied the army up to the time General Hooker was relieved ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Can you tell us the reason why he was relieved so short a time before the battle of Gettysburg ?

Answer. No, sir, I do not know. Perhaps I might say I learned nothing more than from General Halleck's report. I know that General Hooker was determined to remove the garrison at Harper's Ferry. I went with him to examine the place the day before he was relieved, and I think he determined upon ordering that garrison to join his army after he had learned all the facts.

Question. Was it your opinion that Maryland heights at that time was a military point of any great importance ?

Answer. I considered that it was of no military importance whatever under the circumstances. We had occupied that place both times that General Lee crossed the Potomac. The one time he crossed below that place and the other above it, and had not minded it either time. The first time he captured all that were there, and he might have done it the second time if he had not been

whipped at Gettysburg. The force there did not do General Lee any harm, and whenever he chose to do so he might capture it.

Question. And therefore General Hooker was determined to use those troops in the coming battle?

Answer. Yes, sir; and that was a third reason against keeping them there.

Question. Did you understand that General Halleck refused those troops to him?

Answer. I judged so from General Halleck's report. General Hooker never told much to his staff about what he was doing or going to do. I never knew much about what he intended doing. He talked a great deal about what was going to be done, and how to do it. But what he was going to do he kept to himself, so far as I was concerned at least; he might have told others; if so, I did not know it.

Question. Was it not extraordinary, after General Hooker had led the army so far, that the commander of the army should be changed right on the eve of a battle? Was it not an unusual thing in military affairs?

Answer. I do not know as it is so very unusual. I think, as a general principle, it is unsound to change commanders at such a time unless you had a much better one that you knew of to put in his place.

Question. Or unless he had committed some very great fault?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. How did General Hooker stand in the army? Did the officers and the rank and file have confidence in him?

Answer. I have understood that a great many of the high officers did not have confidence in him after the battle of Chancellorsville.

Question. How was it with the other officers—say brigadier generals and colonels, and down to the rank and file?

Answer. I do not know how far that opinion extended; I think that some of the corps commanders and a great many of the generals lost confidence in him from that battle. I do not know how far that loss of confidence extended. I must confess that, notwithstanding the friendly terms I was on with General Hooker, I somewhat lost confidence in him from that battle.

Question. You do not consider him a man of high military talent?

Answer. I do not think he fought that battle as well as he might have done; if I may say so, he did not fight it as I would have fought it.

Question. Was he energetically backed by his corps commanders in that battle?

Answer. I think he was, pretty well; but all his most prominent corps commanders were not called into action at all, although they were right at hand; that is, General Meade and General Reynolds; their corps scarcely fought at all.

Question. Why was that—from want of orders from the general commanding?

Answer. That is what I have understood; that is, on Sunday, the day I refer to; I was not there that day.

Question. That was the day he was hurt?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. Might not that injury have had some effect upon his conduct of the battle afterwards?

Answer. Yes, sir, it might; but I never should have stopped at Chancellorsville; I should have kept advancing, and fought the enemy, instead of waiting for him to attack me. The character of the country was the great reason for advancing, because as we advanced we kept getting out into more open country.



*Copy of General G. K. Warren's report of the operations in which he took part connected with the Chancellorsville campaign, with introductory observations on the topography of the country and the military situation.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Engineer Office, May 12, 1863.*

GENERAL: I present the following report of the operations connected with the battle of Chancellorsville, as they came within my knowledge and observation. Accompanying it is a map, on a scale of two inches to the mile, embracing nearly all the field operated upon by our troops (exclusive of the cavalry) from the time they began to leave their winter bivouac, on the 27th of April, until their return on the 6th of May. The region not included in this map lies between Hartwood church and Kelly's mill, and contains a portion of the routes marched over by the 5th, 11th, and 12th corps to turn the enemy's left flank by way of Kelly's mill, on the Rappahannock, and Germania and Ely's fords, on the Rapidan. Accompanying it, also, is another map, on a scale of one inch to the mile, containing all our known topography in the entire region from the Potomac to the James river, and from the Blue Ridge to the Chesapeake, a region whose characteristic is a dense forest of oak or pine with occasional clearings, rarely extensive enough to prevent the riflemen concealed in one border from shooting across to the other side; a forest which, with but few exceptions, required the axeman to precede the artillerist from the slashings in front of the fortifications of Washington to those of Richmond. No pains has been spared to make the forest topography on this map as complete as possible. It will be of great assistance in future operations, and it will aid those seeking to understand why the numerous bloody battles fought between the armies of the Union and the secessionists should have been so indecisive. A proper understanding of the country, too, will help to relieve the Americans from the charge, so frequently made at home and abroad, of want of generalship in handling troops in battle—battles that had to be fought out hand to hand in forests where artillery and cavalry could play no part, where the troops could not be seen by those controlling their movements, where the echoes and reverberations of sound from tree to tree were enough to appall the strongest hearts engaged; and yet the noise would often scarcely be heard beyond the immediate scene of strife. Thus the generals on either side, shut out from sight or from hearing, had to trust to the unyielding bravery of their men till couriers from different parts of the field brought word which way the conflict was resulting before sending the needed support. We should not wonder that such battles often terminated from the mutual exhaustion of both contending forces, but rather that in all these struggles of Americans against Americans no panic on either side gave victory to the other, like that which the French, under Moreau, gained over the Austrians in the Black Forest.

In order to do justice to the sources from which this topographical information was obtained, I will state that up to the time this campaign ended the engineering department of the army of the Potomac had been divided into three parts.

The topographical engineers formed a distinct branch of the staff attached to headquarters. The engineers and regular engineer battalion formed another, also attached to the staff at headquarters. The third part was the engineer brigade, a volunteer organization, originally about 2,500 strong, under the command of a regular engineer officer, holding the rank of brigadier general of volunteers. During the past session of Congress a law had passed consolidating the corps of engineers and topographical engineers. No order, however, was published uniting the two offices at these headquarters till our return from Chancellorsville, so that my report is not designed to embrace the operations of

the officer in charge of the engineer brigade, General Benham, nor those of Captain Comstock, of the engineers.

The engineer brigade, under its previous commander, General Woodbury, made a great deal of accurate topographical reconnoissance along the Rappahannock river from Skenker's Neck to the Rapidan, particularly of that part above Fredericksburg, and in the triangle of which that city, Hartwood church, and the mouth of the Rapidan formed the vertices. A very considerable portion of the reconnoissances between Falmouth, Hartwood church, Stafford Court House, Acquia Landing, and King George Court House, was made under my predecessor in the topographical department, First Lieutenant Nicholas Bowen, topographical engineers, (now Lieutenant Colonel Bowen, A. A. G.) Very extensive reconnoissances had been made in the campaign under General Pope by Captain W. H. Paine, A. D. C., and published under direction of Colonel Macomb, chief topographical engineer to General Pope, which extended from Manassas south to the Rapidan station. The surveys about the defences of Washington, under Major Whipple, topographical engineer, (the late Major General Whipple,) form the northern limit of the map, and those in the operations on the Peninsula by General Humphreys and Captain (now Colonel) Abbott the southern limit. The coast surveys of York and Rappahannock rivers and reconnoissances of the Potomac river form the basis of the map. I was placed in charge of the topographical engineers on the 2d February, 1863. All the other topographical engineers were then relieved, and Captain W. H. Paine and Lieutenant — Mitchell were assigned to assist me, as well as several very competent non-commissioned officers and privates and a large force of civil assistants. Captain Paine especially aided me with much knowledge of the country, past experience, and zeal. With this force every part of the country afterwards occupied by our troops was mapped. Much information, too, was gained from negroes and deserters, and in a few cases by captures of maps from the enemy. All of this is embodied on the map to a scale of one inch per mile.

In order to make my report more easily understood and interesting, I will mention in brief some of the more general operations of which mine were but a part, and give also a sketch of the situation. At the time the operations resulting in the battle of Chancellorsville, and those attending it, began, the enemy occupied in strong force the heights south of the Rappahannock river from Skenker's Neck to Banks's ford, having continuous lines of infantry parapets throughout, (a distance of about twenty miles,) his troops being so disposed as to be readily concentrated on any threatened point. Interspersed along these lines of intrenchments were battery epaulements advantageously located for sweeping the hill-slopes and bottom-lands over which our troops would have to march to the assault, and which effectually protected the enemy's artillery from our own. Abatis, formed of fallen timber, and impassable swamps in places, still further strengthened his line and reduced the number of assailable points. The crests of the main hills where the enemy had prepared to receive us were from three-quarters to a mile and a half from the margin of the river, but this margin was strongly guarded by men sheltered behind rifle-pits, which guard and its cover were made quite formidable at every available crossing place. In front every little rise of ground that could shelter the enemy and enable him to check our advance was intrenched and prepared for us.

To gain the immediate banks opposite the centre of the enemy's line, however, was practicable in several places where the high ground on our side approached the river and enabled our artillery to command it, but the prospect of then gaining a footing on the heights, exposed as our troops would be for a long distance to concentrated artillery fire, and finally to meet fresh infantry behind parapets fully prepared, seemed hopeless. Previous exposure in attempting it under General Burnside, when the enemy's preparations were far less complete, had made this a conviction in the mind of every private in the ranks.

To turn the enemy's right flank and cross the river, so as to gain the heights below his intrenchments, required a secret move of pontoon trains and artillery for more than twenty miles, over a broken and wooded country, with clayey soil, which, in the condition of the roads at that time, was impossible. The difficulty of constructing practicable roads towards King George's Court House was great. The side streams running into the Rappahannock and those running into the Potomac interlaced each other at their sources so as to quite destroy the continuity of the main dividing ridge, and on every road presented transverse ravines with steep hills and oozing springs of water, which our wheels soon mixed with the clay and turned literally to streams of mud. So greatly was the country in this section cut up by ravines that it seems as if the former geological influences that shaped the course of these streams well-nigh made the Rappahannock join the Potomac at this the narrowest part of the northern neck which separates them.

General Lee's spy system was so perfect that the movement could not have been kept from him, and it is not saying too much that he could have extended his intrenchments down the river as fast as we could have built practicable roads. Add to this the rapidly increasing width of the river which our pontoons could not span, and which required a thousand feet of bridging at the first available point below Skenker's Neck, and the impracticability of this flank movement is obvious.

On the enemy's left even the crossing of the river was a matter of the greatest difficulty. Above Beck's island, about two and a half miles above Fredericksburg, the high banks on each side close in upon the river, having a height above it of perhaps 150 feet, with slopes generally well wooded, very steep, and deeply cut by side ravines. Favorable conditions of approach to the river from either side first present themselves about six miles by the road we had to take above Fredericksburg, at a place called Banks's ford, not then fordable. Here, too, a foothold on the opposite hills gave a command of all the enemy's line. A place of such importance was guarded by the enemy with the utmost care. His earth parapets, placed so as to sweep with musketry every crossing place and practicable slope, were in three lines from the water's edge to the summit of the slope, and traversed so as to quite protect the defenders from our artillery fire. It might seem that these successive lines would be of little use after the first one was carried, as those who fled from the first would mask the fire of the others, so that pursued and pursuers might enter together. The tactics of the rebels, however, provided for this. The first lines generally surrendered when overpowered instead of running, and thus no confusion is produced in the succeeding lines. At Banks's ford, moreover, two of these lines were so close to each other that both could in places bring their fire upon a party crossing the river, the rising slope permitting the rear line to shoot over that in front. The obstacles here were so great to our forcing a passage that the enemy forebore to place a redoubt on the summit of the hill, thus, as it were, inviting us to try it. A large force constantly near the place rendered a surprise impossible, and in addition the bend in the river was such that though Fredericksburg was but three miles distant over a good plank road for the enemy, it was six miles for us through a forest. The next point on the enemy's left which offered a practicable approach to the stream was at the United States Mine ford, (not then fordable,) about seven miles by the roads above Banks's ford. The intermediate space along the river was so difficult in its approaches to the water on either side that any work of ours to make them practicable would have given time to the enemy so to fortify the opposite side as to render the attempt abortive. At the approaches to the United States Mine ford, too, the enemy had erected long lines of infantry parapets with battery epaulements, and an ample force was camped near to occupy them. The junction of the Rapidan, occurring just above the United States Mine ford, involved the passage of that stream also in any attempt to turn the enemy's left by going further up

the river. The passage of two streams not fordable, and having a width of 200 to 300 feet at such a long distance from our base by a flank movement with heavy pontoon and artillery trains, in the presence of an enemy who was also supposed to be supplied with pontoons by which he could cross in our rear over roads almost impassable, and through interminable forests, seemed so unlikely that the enemy gave himself no concern about it, nor adopted any contingent precautions against such an attempt. Indeed, he was at the time rebuilding the Germania bridge where a portion of our troops crossed.

Stafford county, in which the Union army was located, is noted for its poverty. A lack of fertility in the soil has discouraged enterprise, and the country is wanting in public improvements, such as are usually to be found in more prosperous communities. Dense woods and thickets of black-jack oak and pine cover most of the ground. The general character of the country is that of a wilderness, and it forms part of that distinguishing belt of country which continues through Orange and Spottsylvania county, and southwesterly in a general direction parallel with the Blue Ridge. It forms, where it crosses the Rappahannock, a high ridge, composed in part of quartzose rocks, in which the gold mines are located. The soil, however, in the main is clayey, with occasional thin strata of gravel. In wet wintry weather there was no practicable roadway for our heavy trains, except what had been prepared by ourselves with a pavement of logs. Language fails to describe the weary struggling marches of our trains, prolonged, in many instances, all through the nights, and the picture of helplessness they presented on such marches as that of the 22d of January. Orange and the western part of Spottsylvania county, on the south side of the Rappahannock, in which Chancellorsville (a single large house at that time, now in ruins) is situated, are much of the character of Stafford just described. There are two excellent roads leading from Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville—one macadamized, the other planked; these were routes open to General Lee. The term "Wilderness" is localized in common parlance for a portion of this country, and no one can conceive a more unfavorable field for the movements of a grand army than it presents between these roads and the river. Between Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg the country becomes more open and clear as you approach the latter place, and for several miles along the plank road the country is clear and even-surfaced, and affording a fine field for the use of all arms.

I have thus described, in somewhat of a general way, the field of operations. In this, though I have been at some length, I feel that I have not allowed more than the importance of the subject demands in order to aid in comprehending the campaign. The plan which the commanding general formed was kept a profound secret until its successful initiation disclosed it to friend and foe. Three corps, the 5th, 11th, and 12th, were put in motion on the 27th of April to pass around the enemy's left flank, crossing the Rappahannock at Kelly's mill, a distance of 30 miles from Fredericksburg, thence to cross the Rapidan by Germanna ford and Ely's ford. The Rappahannock was successfully crossed by the morning of the 28th on a canvas pontoon bridge laid by Captain Comstock, engineer, with but slight opposition from a small observing force. The Rapidan proved barely fordable, and was crossed by the morning of the 30th. To divert the enemy's attention from the main movement, the passage of the Rappahannock was forced by the 6th corps, opposite our left, at the place known as Franklin's crossing, on the night of the 28th of April. Two pontoon bridges, about 300 feet each in length, were constructed here under General Benham, and the troops crossed in force during the day. Up to this time I had remained at headquarters. At 5 p. m. on the 29th I set out, as directed, for the United States Mine ford to assist Major Spaulding, of the engineer brigade, if necessary, in throwing the pontoon bridges across at that place. About the same time it began to rain and so continued through most of the night. I found the bridge train on the road between Banks's ford and United

States ford. The road was a crooked one, through forests, and very muddy, and the night was very dark. Great difficulties attended the movement of the train, which did not all reach its destination till about 8 a. m. on the 30th, though everybody worked with energy all through the night with extra teams furnished by Colonel Ingalls, quartermaster, and General Couch, from their trains. On the morning of the 30th I reconnoitred the approaches to the crossing place, and found that to make any one of them practicable was a difficult undertaking. General Couch detailed 500 men under my direction, and this force went to work in earnest, working right down to the edge of the water. The mist of the morning so obscured the view that we could not ascertain whether the enemy, who had occupied the opposite bank on the preceding night, had withdrawn or not. But our freedom from molestation encouraged the idea that he had; and about 9 a. m. the appearance of some cavalrymen from General Meade's column showed us that the grand flanking movement had succeeded. The work on the road was pushed with all possible despatch, the men working with the greatest spirit, and by 1 p. m. it was made practicable for artillery and pontoon wagons; by 3 p. m. the bridge was laid and the 2d corps was crossing the river. The road up the opposite bank was soon completed, and great was the enthusiasm of the men as they found we had turned these formidable intrenchments without losing a man and gained the advantage of meeting the enemy in an open field. The force assembled at and near Chancellorsville on the night of the 30th consisted of the 2d, 5th, 11th, and 12th corps, with General Hooker there in person in command.

In the morning of May 1st I went out three miles on the turnpike towards Fredericksburg to reconnoitre. As far as I went I found the road good and broad. The country along the road for the first mile is wooded on both sides, and was generally so to the left of it (except some cleared fields,) nearly to the river. The inhabitants reported the roads and communications to be indirect and in bad condition between the road and river. To the right of the road it was rather more open, and in places the clearing extended across from this road to the plank road. These two roads diverging at Chancellorsville were separated in the widest place perhaps a mile, but gradually converging were said to meet again in about six miles.

The small streams crossed the turnpike and ran to the Rappahannock, the ridges being nearly perpendicular to the road. The plank road keeps around the sources of these little streams and follows the ridge between the waters that flow to the Rappahannock and the sources of the Mattaponi river. I found the 8th Pennsylvania cavalry picketing the roads for three miles, and to within sight of the enemy's breastwork thrown across the road, which was as far as I could go. The clearing in front of the Chancellorsville house to the southward did not extend more than 200 yards, but it widened as you went westward towards Culpeper for about half a mile, where a good position was to be found at a place called Fairview. Just beyond this a small stream, one of the sources of the Ny river, crossed the plank road, and here the woods were standing on both sides of the road, and the westerly bank of the stream commanded all the open plain about Chancellorsville. Woods and clearings alternated with each other further on to our right.

On my return to headquarters, about 10 a. m., I found that an advance had been ordered. The 1st and 3d divisions of the 5th corps were to take the road along the river towards Banks's ford, the 3d division, 5th corps, the turnpike, to be followed by a portion of the 2d corps; and the 12th corps to move out on the plank road towards Fredericksburg. This was a movement to take up a line of battle about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles in front, preparatory to a simultaneous advance along the line at 2 p. m. I went back over the route I had examined, which was that given to the 2d division of the 5th corps, under General Sykes. On gaining the ridge about  $1\frac{1}{4}$  mile from Chancellorsville, we found the enemy advancing and driving back our cavalry. This small force resisted handsomely, riding up

and firing almost in the faces of the 11th Virginia infantry, which formed the enemy's advance. General Sykes moved forward in double-quick time, attacked the enemy vigorously and drove him back with loss till he had gained the position assigned him. This he attained about 12 o'clock. No sound yet reached us indicating that any other of our columns had encountered the advance of the enemy. In General Sykes's front the enemy deployed to the right and left, in lines far outreaching the whole of ours, and I have never seen the steadiness of our troops more tried and proved. Captain Weed brought his battery into the front line on the ridge, where it could operate against the enemy, who was able to reply to him with musketry, and used his guns with great effect. When the division had all been deployed to extend the line of battle the lack of numbers compelled a regiment to be deployed as skirmishers. No connexion, however, could even thus be made with our own troops on the right, and my aid, Lieutenant James, in attempting to communicate with the presumed position of General Slocum, ran against the enemy's skirmishers, from which he fortunately escaped, though many shots were fired after him. A similar effort by one of General Sykes's aids was foiled in the same way. General Sykes bravely resolved to hold the position assigned him which his command had so gallantly won from the enemy, and I set out with all possible speed to report the condition to the commanding general. From information received since the advance began, the general decided to countermand it and receive the enemy in the line occupied the night before. Unfortunately the line had been taken up the day before by tired troops towards the close of the day, and without much prospect of fighting a pitched battle upon it. It was a bad line, and had several commanding positions in its front for the enemy to occupy. It was, perhaps, the best that could be designated for such a sudden change of programme in the face of an enemy. I carried the order to fall back to General Sykes, and he then withdrew his command in perfect order, bringing off his wounded, with the exception of a few who were cut off in the extreme right of his extended skirmish line. All the other columns withdrew to the vicinity of Chancellorsville without having engaged the enemy. The enemy advanced cautiously till he came upon our new line and made some feeble demonstrations easily repulsed, and the day closed without any real trial of strength. During the evening the 3d corps joined us at Chancellorsville.

Two general plans of operation were now considered. One was to choose a position and intrench; the other to choose our point of attack, and advance with our whole force of five corps upon it. The saving of our men and the advantages of resuming the offensive after a successful repulse favored the one; the increased élan of our men and the choice of our point of attack, the other.

I was in favor of advancing, and urged it with more zeal than convincing argument. I thought with our position and numbers to beat the enemy's right wing. This could be done by advancing in force on the two main roads towards Fredericksburg, each being in good supporting distance, at the same time throwing a heavy force on the enemy's right flank by the river road.

If this attack found the enemy in extended line across our front, or in motion towards our right flank, it would have secured the defeat of his right wing and consequently the retreat of the whole. The advantages of the initiative in a wooded country like this, obscuring all movements, are incalculable, and so far we had improved them.

The general's original determination to await the attack had in it also the design to contract our line and throw back the right to a better position, our left being secure. On the assurance of the commander on the right that they were abundantly able to hold their position against any force the nature of the ground in their front would enable the enemy to bring against them, and because they thought to fall back would have some of the demoralizing influence of a retreat, it was decided to make no change in the line, but to strengthen it with breastworks and abatis.

The sound of the axe broke the stillness of the night along the lines of both armies. The position thus determined is marked with a dotted line (A) on the map, and was about ——— miles long.

On the morning of Saturday, May 2, the enemy from the heights on our left opened his guns upon our wagons in the open field near Chancellorsville, but without much effect. He also made his appearance on the plank road near, and our fire wounded a few men who reported they had missed the road, and that they were marching towards our right. During the forenoon the enemy made several feints of attack by a sudden rush upon our lines, seizing our advanced skirmishers, drawing our fire and getting the location of our line and its strength. These operations were repeated at intervals, gradually extending to our right. Later in the day the enemy became visible from our line to the right of Fairview, moving off still to our right. General Sickles, with two of his divisions of the 3d corps, were sent out to make a demonstration against this body, and he succeeded in capturing numerous prisoners cut off from the rear of Jackson's corps.

General Pleasonton with his cavalry and artillery also moved out in this same direction following General Sickles, and the effect of this was to place a considerable force of ours between the two wings of the rebel army.

I was near this part of the field about 5 p. m., when a heavy firing of musketry began on our right, and hastened to the spot. The 11th corps, infantry on the left, made no stand at all behind its breastworks, but ran away while yet the enemy's bullets scarcely reached them, and while their own artillery heroically served still to hold the enemy in check. I tried in vain to assist some of the officers in rallying their men, but soon saw it was a waste of precious time. I immediately sent my aid to inform General Pleasonton and General Sickles of the rout of the 11th corps, which task he promptly executed, and the enemy's advance soon began to slacken from the effective fire poured in upon his right flank.

I then proceeded to Fairview, where Captain Best, chief of artillery of the 12th corps, had already trained all of his available guns to meet the advancing enemy. I placed all the artillery I could find pointing in the same direction, with orders to fire solid shot over the heads of our troops upon the enemy, and left the whole in charge of Captain Best. To the credit of the artillery of the 11th corps that came off the field, it went into battle on this line with the greatest alacrity.

Before this was completed, General Berry's division, unaffected by the flying crowd around it, moved up in the most perfect order and held the crest which I have before mentioned as commanding the field between Fairview and Chancellorsville. General William Hays, with a brigade of the 2d corps, took up the line on the right of General Berry.

With this combination, General Jackson's assault was stayed, and he himself mortally wounded.

This flank move in our very presence which General Lee had decided upon, and whose execution he had intrusted to General Jackson, was one of great risk under almost any circumstances. On the present occasion it offered more advantages than it generally does.

His army found its line of intrenchments, on which so much labor had been bestowed, and on whose strength he had so far relied as to submit to the detaching of a large force under General Longstreet for operations south of James river, most unexpectedly turned and rendered of no value; and he was in the presence of an army greatly outnumbering his. A retreat in good order towards Richmond would seem to be a satisfactory escape from the situation.

Advancing then promptly as he had done on the 1st, he was prepared to dispute with us the possession of Banks's ford, which would have brought the two wings of our army together, and given time. Our falling back to Chancellorsville left us with a divided army, and our lying quiet enabled him to accumulate his force on our right flank, where he could make his most threatening assault, and where, in case of a repulse, he would have the main line of retreat open to

him; the left wing over the plank road to Gordonsville, the other by the direct road south, and uniting again at our next objective point, Richmond. Its conception was well adapted to the situation, and its execution by General Jackson was excellent, though the lateness of the day in which his blow was struck gave him but little advantage of the manœuvre, except so far as it facilitated his safe retirement to Gordonsville.

Thus the day closed. Jackson's desperate assault was foiled, the 11th corps, though routed, was saved from destruction, and the 1st corps had just joined us to take its place in the line. The position of the 3d corps and our cavalry on the right flank of Jackson's column, cut off, it seemed, all direct communication with General Lee's right. No thought of retreating during the night was entertained on our side, and, unless the enemy did, the next day promised a decisive battle. By our leaving a sufficient force in front of the right wing of the enemy to hold our breastworks, the whole of the rest of our force was to be thrown upon his left at dawn of day, with every prospect of annihilating it.

To render the success more complete, General Sedgwick, with the 6th corps, about 26,000 strong, was to leave its position in front of the enemy's lines at Fredericksburg, and fall upon General Lee's rear, at daybreak.

The information obtained from prisoners we had captured rendered it probable the enemy had withdrawn all his force, except enough to keep a mere show at Fredericksburg for a decisive blow upon our divided army at Chancellorsville. Instructions to this effect were sent by telegraph, and also by Captain R——n, to General Sedgwick, to move at once.

Knowing much of the road that General Sedgwick would thus have to march over in the night, I advised that I should go and guide the column, and give such information and assistance as I could, and I was directed to do so. I set out from headquarters with Lieutenant James, at 10½ p. m., and reached General Sedgwick at the crossing of the river at 3 a. m., on the 3d of May. As I passed down I saw the enemy's camp-fires at Banks's ford, and occasional ones along the bluff from Marie's hill southeastward to the Massaponax creek.

When I arrived General Newton's division, which had been given the advance, had begun its movements, and firing was going on among the pickets. The enemy seemed so to enclose our forces with his sentinels that it was impossible to move without drawing their fire, which slight resistance caused frequent halts to our whole column. At daylight the head of the column of the 6th corps had not yet passed out of the city. The small force of the enemy in it had then withdrawn to the hills, and the inhabitants as they awoke were surprised to find our troops in possession.

Daylight enabled me to see, as I thought satisfactorily, that there was not more than two field-pieces on Marie's heights, and no infantry in the rifle-pits, to our right of it. The stone wall breastwork at its foot was occupied, in how large a force it was difficult to ascertain, as our skirmish line had been repulsed in approaching it. At this time the 6th corps was deployed as follows: General Brooks's division along the road covering the bridge head, and closely watched by an enemy in his front; General Howe's division confronting the force on the hill southeast of Hazel run; General Newton's extending to the right as far as the telegraph road in Fredericksburg, forming a continuous line of battle of about two miles front along the road.

General Gibbon's division of the 2d corps, about 2,500 strong, began to cross on a pontoon bridge soon after sunrise, and the sound of the renewed conflict at Chancellorsville began to reach us. In company with General Gibbon I reconnoitred the ground to our right, to attempt to gain the heights there. Here there are two canals to cross, one near the river, the other near the foot of the hills. On the first the bridge remained intact, and could be crossed at once. I waited on the other side of this, what seemed a long time, for General Gibbon's division to come up, though it moved I believe with despatch, and as soon



as the 1st brigade arrived (Colonel Hall's, a small one) I galloped to the front to reconnoitre for a point to assault. Our object then became apparent to the enemy, and a single horseman rode out to meet me, while at the same time a gun was limbered up on Marie's hill, and sent at a run to command the nearest bridge over the second canal. Not a man or a gun was at that moment there to resist us. I found the planks only taken up from the bridge, and hurrying back directed the pioneers to pull boards from the siding of the nearest house as rapidly as possible to replace the planks. While this was being done the single gun opened upon us with shrapnell effectively, and seemed quite to paralyze our men. Soon another gun was added to it, and before we could get ready to cross the bridge a regiment of the enemy's infantry filed into the rifle-pits at double-quick time, and the opportunity was lost. General Gibbon had rapidly brought up artillery to reply to the enemy, but only to suffer itself without doing any damage in return, as those on the hill were completely sheltered by epaulements. General Gibbon also moved his other brigade rapidly to the right to attempt the passage of the second canal by the bridge near Falmouth, but this movement was also anticipated by the enemy's infantry extending themselves to our right. This movement, however, had compelled the enemy to distribute his forces along a very extended line, and thus weaken it at all points, but more artillery had been placed on Marie's hill. I returned to General Sedgwick about 8½ a. m., and told him I thought the only thing left for us to do was to carry Marie's hill, by main force, as speedily as possible.

The plan adopted by General Sedgwick was to assault by two strong columns moving on the plank road and telegraph roads, and to be followed by a heavy fire in line against the stone wall. Great care was taken to conceal these preparations from the enemy.

About 11 a. m. the dispositions were completed, and the columns moved out on the road, taking the double-quick step as soon as the enemy's fire began. His artillery on the heights had no effect, for the pieces could not be sufficiently depressed and the shells burst in the town, doing no injury to us. These columns suffered severely, however, from the musketry, and the colonels leading the columns both fell, one killed, the other mortally wounded. A portion of the column continued to advance, and the troops in line, now rushing forward in gallant style, drove the enemy from the stone wall and captured the hill with the artillery upon it.

General Howe's division then assaulted the heights southeast of Hazel run and took them, with the guns there posted.

The enemy's line was thus cut in two; those on the left withdrew towards Hamilton's crossing, and those on the right towards Banks's ford.

It would have been easy now to have driven all the troops around Hamilton station and the Massaponax away and destroyed the depot and transportation there. The orders, however, required the movement towards Chancellorsville, and no disposition was made to accomplish the other object. General Gibbon's division remained in Fredericksburg to prevent any of the enemy crossing to the north side, and the 6th corps moved out on the plank road as soon as the troops, somewhat disorganized by the assault, could be reformed. General Brooks's division was now given the advance; and as he was furthest in the rear, not having yet moved from the crossing place, this necessarily consumed a considerable time, and before it was completed the sound of the cannonading at Chancellorsville had ceased.

The country being open, General Brooks's division was formed in a column of brigade fronts, with an extended line of skirmishers on the front and flank in advance, and the artillery in the rear. This was, I think, a proper disposition, as it prepared us to fight the enemy as soon as we struck him, without waiting to form, or losing time of so much importance as in the present case. General Newton's division came next in order, but it marched in flank along

the road, which greatly extended the column, made it liable to an enfilading fire, and put it out of support, in measure, of the division in advance.

When we reached the summit along the road, about one mile from Salem church, we met a few cavalry skirmishers, and two rifled guns opened with solid shot from a point near the church.

The intervening space was quite open on both sides of the road; halfway, a small stream crossed it and ran into the Rappahannock. The heights at Salem church are inconsiderable; but here the road bends, and woods enclosed it; a ravine headed close up to it, running into the Rappahannock above Banks's ford, and furnishing a short and strong line.

These two pieces of artillery, by their fire, checked the advance a great deal, and it is probable that they exhausted all their ammunition before retiring. The enemy used no more artillery during the day.

General Brooks's division finally advanced and steadily attacked the enemy, fighting bravely, and finally succeeded in driving the enemy from his position along the road. The next division, not being close at hand to advance at once to General Brooks's support, the enemy succeeded in forcing his men back, not, however, till they had made a praiseworthy fight and used up most of their ammunition, and suffered severe loss.

General Newton's division re-enforced and restored the line, but was unable to drive the enemy from this hill and wooded ravines which sheltered him from our artillery. The day closed with the enemy holding his position. As soon as General Sedgwick's advance had caused the retreat of the troops at Banks's ford, General Benham had thrown a bridge across and communicated with him. By this route, and the United States Mine ford, I returned to headquarters near Chancellorsville, which I reached at 11 p. m.

I found, as the result of the battle at that point, that our line had fallen back from the Chancellorsville house about a mile. After reporting to the general, and getting his ideas, I telegraphed the following to General Sedgwick at midnight:

"I find everything snug here. We contracted the line a little and repulsed the last assault with ease. General Hooker wishes them to attack him to-morrow if they will. He does not desire you to attack again in force unless he attacks him at the same time. He says you are too far away for him to direct. Look well to the safety of your corps, and keep up communications with General Benham at Banks's ford and Fredericksburg. You can go to either place if you think best. To cross at Banks's ford would bring you in supporting distance of the main body, and would be better than falling back to Fredericksburg."

This despatch was written at a time when I was exceedingly exhausted. It did not reach General Sedgwick till late in the forenoon of the 4th, so I have been told, and was the only instructions he received. The enemy attacked him in strong force the next day, and having resisted them till the evening, he withdrew across the river at Banks's ford.

On the 4th our main army, near Chancellorsville, remained in its lines, both of us being concealed from each other by the thick forest. This line is marked (B) on the map. On the night of the 4th it was decided to withdraw the whole army to the north bank of the Rappahannock, and I received instruction to prepare next day a new and shorter line in our rear to secure us against any attempt of the enemy to interrupt the movement.

On the 5th Captain Comstock and myself prepared this line, he to the west, and I to the east of the road. A continuous cover and abatis was constructed from the Rappahannock, at Scott's dam, around to the mouth of Hunting run, or the Rapidan, a distance of three miles. This line is marked (C) on the map. The roads were also put in good order, and a third bridge laid. A heavy rain set in about 4½ p. m., and lasted till late at night. The movement to recross was begun by the artillery, as per orders, at 7½ p. m., and was suddenly

interrupted by a rise in the river so great as to submerge the banks at the ends of the bridges on the north bank, and the velocity of the current threatened to sweep them away. Captain Comstock was then to assist in this emergency. The upper bridge was speedily taken up and used to piece out the ends of the other too, and the passage was made again practicable. Considerable delays, however, resulted from this cause. I remained behind to see to the completion and occupation of the new line. No troops, however, took up position in it except the rear guard, composed of the 5th corps, under General Meade, which was done about daylight on the sixth.

The pioneers from the different corps were nearly all retained by me till this time, and we soon completed the line across the road and obstructed it with timber. I then sent them to their different corps.

I cannot speak in too high terms of the energy and good discipline displayed by the pioneer parties and the officers over them, with but few exceptions.

The proper dispositions were made for holding the line till all but the rear guard was passed the river, and then it quietly withdrew, no enemy pursuing.

The last of the army recrossed about 8 a. m. General Meade detailed General Barnes, and his brigade, to assist in taking up the bridges, and all were safely drawn to the top of the hill by 4 p. m., Major Spaulding of the engineer brigade superintending.

Captain Comstock was not under my orders during these operations, but I am indebted to him for perfect co-operation in all my duties. Captain Paine, A. D. C., and Lieutenant Mitchell, rendered most essential service in the direction and making of reconnoissances and repairing roads. Their labors carried them much under fire of the enemy.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. K. WARREN,

*Brig. Gen. of Vols., Chief Engineer, Army of the Potomac.*

Major General D. BUTTERFIELD,

*Chief of Staff.*

*Testimony of Major General Andrew A. Humphreys.*

WASHINGTON, *March 21, 1864.*

Major General ANDREW A. HUMPHREYS sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?

Answer. I am a lieutenant colonel of the corps of engineers and major general of volunteers, by the appointment of the President.

Question. How long have you been attached to the army of the Potomac ?

Answer. I have been attached to the army of the Potomac since the last day of November or the first day of December, 1861.

Question. You were attached to that army at the time General Hooker assumed command of it ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Will you give us an account of the movements of that army while under his command, more especially the battle of Chancellorsville ?

Answer. I commanded the third division of the 5th corps when General Hooker took command of the army of the Potomac. The latter part of April, when the army moved, I marched with that corps, crossing the Rappahannock at Kelly's ford, and the Rapidan at Ely's ford, and moved up to Chancellorsville, where my division arrived about 7 o'clock, I think, or perhaps 8 o'clock, in the morning of Friday, the 1st of May. I then received from General Meade,

who commanded the corps, in the presence of the commanders of the other divisions, General Sykes and General Griffin, instructions as to the movements which the corps was to make. The final result of those orders was that my division followed the first division, commanded by General Griffin, along the river road, moving up in the direction of Banks's ford, with instructions for me to take a position intermediate between the first and second divisions of that corps—the second division being on the right towards the plank road running to Fredericksburg, and in rear of them, along in the rear of a certain ridge overlooking a little stream that empties into the Rappahannock about Banks's ford, the name of which I now forget. I followed closely on the first division, and, as I understand, we had nearly approached the place, were within a mile or two of the position that we were to take, when General Meade received an order countermanding the one under which we had been acting, and we were immediately brought back to Chancellorsville. By direction of General Meade, I examined towards the left to see what was the best position for my division to take in connexion with holding the ground down to the river and close the roads leading to the United States ford on that flank. I made this examination very rapidly, and put my division in a strong position, with its left resting on the river. The first division was posted on my right. I do not know what ground the other division took. I was directed to hold that ground, and there I remained during that night and during Saturday. I sent out small parties to feel the enemy and see what they were about on my front, and there I heard the operations that were going on on our right, more particularly on Saturday evening.

Very early in the morning of Sunday, that is, between midnight and daylight, I received instructions to move up to the right near Chancellorsville, as soon as I was relieved by a certain division of the 11th corps; this I did, and about seven o'clock in the morning massed my division in rear of the first division (Griffin's) on the Ely's Ford road; subsequently I moved it to the left of Griffin.

Question. What do you, as a military man, say of the plan of that battle? Was it advantageous or otherwise?

Answer. A division commander does not often see the whole scope of the movement of an army. He is not made acquainted with the whole plan, except it may be accidentally, or he may be put in a position where he has to use his own judgment in connexion with the operations. In regard to the battle of Fredericksburg and other battles I could probably tell a great deal. But probably I know less in regard to the battle of Chancellorsville than any other battle I ever took part in.

On Sunday morning about nine o'clock I was directed to send one of my brigades in to the assistance of General French, which I did. I was requested not to accompany that brigade, but to remain near my other brigade. The brigade I sent in was briskly engaged, losing nearly two hundred men in killed and wounded, when General French's command and my brigade retired from that wood. Part of my other brigade I had thrown forward towards the brick building called the Chancellor house, to the edge of the wood bordering the open ground around the house, and held that while the 3d corps, and probably the 12th corps, came in and took up the new position assigned to them. This was a defensive position, part of which was formed by the ground I had myself examined, running down along a little stream to the river, and also along the road which passes from Chancellorsville to Ely's ford, and from that road over to the Rapidan river. I was rather amused at the idea of my two regiments holding that ground. They were directed to advance to the edge of the open ground, where the enemy was expected to be in full force. I went along with them, as I expected it would be a very difficult and dangerous operation. When I found that the enemy simply opened their artillery upon me, but did not press me, and allowed my two regiments to remain there for a couple of hours

I began to think they were not coming through there. They did not renew the attack after that. My men were engaged skirmishing with the enemy, and lost smartly; that is, the two regiments I have mentioned.

I must give my opinion, since you ask me, for I have an opinion, as a military man, from the general facts I know, and that I suppose I am obliged to express. My opinion is that we should not have been withdrawn—called back—on Friday afternoon. We had advanced along the road to Fredericksburg to attack the enemy. The troops were in fine spirits, and we wanted to fight a battle. I think we ought to have fought the enemy there. They came out and attacked one division of the corps I belonged to, just at the time we returned to Chancellorsville. What caused General Hooker to return after advancing some miles on this general position, which was about perpendicular to the plank road leading to Fredericksburg, I am not able to say, because, being only a division commander, the facts were not stated to me. But I have heard it said that he received some erroneous information about the enemy's advancing on his flank from the direction of Orange Court House. It is my opinion we should have attacked the enemy, instead of withdrawing and awaiting an attack from the enemy.

The expedition, so far as moving to Chancellorsville, was admirably planned. It was an expedition in which, up to that point, we accomplished everything we could have desired. We surprised the enemy completely, and crossed the river without their knowing anything about it apparently. It was admirably planned, so far as that was concerned, and admirably executed. Why it was that we were so suddenly withdrawn I do not know. It was totally unexpected to me. I thought it was a part of the plan to attack them as quickly as possible. We had surprised them, and we were strong enough to attack them. That is only a general opinion, of course. As to what force of our own army in actual numbers were present or available at that time, I am not able to tell you. I know the 3d, 2d, 12th, 11th, and 5th corps were there.

Question. To what do you ascribe the final failure—to this falling back?

Answer. I must confess that after that Friday I was apprehensive we should not have that success we had expected. I had left my division massed near the brick house (Chancellor house) upon our return after we were ordered back on Friday afternoon, and had ridden rapidly down the Mineral Spring road to the Rappahannock, the extreme point I wished to reach. Upon returning to my command I found large bodies of troops massed around there, and so far as I could see they were not going into position to fight a battle anywhere. The enemy were pressing up on the troops that were thrown out to the front. I got my division down to its position immediately. I think it was a mistake to fight a defensive battle after we had surprised the enemy. I think we should have attacked the enemy immediately. What were the numbers the enemy were supposed to have I do not know. The impression I have might be a very erroneous one. I know that we had a very large army then, and that it was believed that we were equal to carrying out the operation if we took the offensive.

Question. If you did not intend to take the offensive, you think you should not have gone over there?

Answer. Yes. But General Hooker took up a pretty strong position, expecting the enemy to attack him. They had been pressing forward an attack on our right, and he seemed to think they would continue the attack, but they did not. It may be their plans were changed after the death of Jackson, who was aiming, it was said, to get around to and take possession of the United States ford, and thus get in our rear.

Question. You say that you think we ought to have attacked the enemy immediately after getting in position?

Answer. Yes, after concentrating and getting into position.

Question. And you say that when ordered to fall back our men did not seem to be in position—that there seemed to be confusion ?

Answer. That was some hours later than the time I refer to on Friday and after I had returned from examining the ground that the 5th corps afterwards occupied.

Question. Therefore they were not really in a condition to advance ?

Answer. That was simply at that hour ; they were in a condition to advance earlier in the day.

Question. Whose fault was it that the men were all massed up together in that way ?

Answer. That I cannot tell you ; I cannot tell you who gave the orders that brought them together in that limited space, as I was a division commander, and not in immediate communication with the commander of the army. The troops were withdrawn on Friday afternoon from the advanced position I have mentioned, and there were large masses of troops about the open ground near Chancellorsville when I returned from examining the ground near the river. The troops, that is, the separate bodies, the divisions and brigades, were not in confusion within themselves, but they seemed to be unoccupied—to be doing nothing. How long that lasted I do not know.

Question. It occurs to me, that with that condition of things right in the face of an enemy, if they had made an attack upon that mass of men we should have been in a bad fix, and somebody ought to have seen that such things did not take place.

Answer. The commander of the army is responsible for that, of course. He knows who came there under orders, and who did not, and who did not go away at the proper time, and why it was that everything was brought together in that place.

By Mr. Odell :

Question. What portion of the army was engaged at Chancellorsville ?

Answer. I think the second division of the 5th corps was engaged in front on Friday. The next day, Saturday afternoon and Saturday night, as I understand it, the 11th corps was the one that had the fighting ; probably some of the 12th corps. I only speak from what I heard. And the 3d corps, I think, did some fighting that night. They certainly did early the next morning. They were very severely attacked the next morning, and lost very heavily. I have not a perfect knowledge of that matter. But on Sunday the fighting continued, and some part of the 2d corps was engaged, and some part of the 5th corps ; not heavily, but briskly. That was after the 3d corps had been withdrawn. I do not know whether they were repulsed or not ; but they came in, having lost very heavily.

By the chairman :

Question. What do you know about the 11th corps giving way there ?

Answer. I do not know anything about it. They were a far way off to my right. I know they came down the next morning and relieved me.

Question. After that battle the army retired across the river to their old position ?

Answer. Yes, we came back to the vicinity of Falmouth. About the 11th or 12th of June, about midday, I received orders, and we marched up to Beverly ford, holding the Rappahannock down towards Kelly's ford, having directions to hold that part of the river against the enemy. We threw up some works, and I remained there a couple of days, when it became evident that the enemy were not going to attempt to cross there. We then received orders to move up along the line of the railroad, which we did, stopping a day or so at Manassas. I know we made some very severe marches ; my division made a continuous

march during a night and a day, with the exception of a halt of a few hours in the day, of from twenty-five to twenty-nine miles. From there we moved along with the army up to Tarrytown, where, I suppose, the history of the battle of Gettysburg begins.

Question. Was it there that General Meade succeeded to the command?

Answer. No; it was previous to that that he succeeded to the command.

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*Testimony of Major General W. S. Hancock.*

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1864.

Major General W. S. HANCOCK sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. I am a major general of volunteers in the army of the United States, and at present command the 2d army corps, now in the army of the Potomac.

Question. How long have you been connected with the army of the Potomac?

Answer. Since its organization, directly after the first battle of Bull Run, in 1861.

Question. Will you go on and give a narrative, in your own way, of those things which you deem important in regard to the movements and operations of the army of the Potomac, from the time that General Hooker took command of it?

Answer. The first event of importance, after General Hooker assumed the command, was the battle of Chancellorsville. The great feature of that battle was the fighting on the morning of Sunday, the 3d of May. I then commanded a division in the 2d corps under General Couch. The movement of that corps commenced on the Tuesday previous to the 28th. The movement of the three corps, which went up the river and crossed the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, commenced before that—a day or two previous; I think on the 27th. They crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's ford, divided into two bodies, one under General Slocum and one under General Meade, came down across the Rapidan at different fords, and formed a junction at Chancellorsville on the Thursday previous to the battle, (May 31,) arriving at that point about noon. Two divisions of the corps to which I belonged (French's and my own) crossed the Rappahannock at United States ford, about five miles distant from Chancellorsville, the same evening; and about 10 o'clock on Thursday night arrived at Chancellorsville, and formed a junction with the other troops there. General Sickles's command, the 3d corps, followed us, arriving some time the next morning—about 11 o'clock. General Gibbon's division, 2d corps, remained at Falmouth. In the mean time, on the 29th, I think, General Reynolds and General Sedgwick, each commanding an army corps, had crossed the Rappahannock at different points below Fredericksburg, probably for the purpose of distracting the attention of the enemy. The enemy were not encountered at Chancellorsville until some time in the afternoon of Friday. An order was issued directing an advance movement towards Fredericksburg, about 1 p. m. on Friday, May 1, in which one command, the 12th corps, or a part of it, took the plank road from Chancellorsville. General Sykes's command, subsequently supported by my division, took the old turnpike road—the command of General Griffin being on our left, between us and Banks's ford. General Meade, with a large command, was advancing towards Banks's ford. None of those commands met the enemy, save the one commanded by General Sykes. General French's division, 2d corps, was ordered to Todd's Tavern, on the Spottsylvania road, (five miles distant,) and met the

enemy, but, without engaging him, was ordered to return. General Sykes met the enemy immediately on leaving Chancellorsville and forced him back about two miles. According to the order of the day, the headquarters of General Hooker that night were to have been at a point on the Fredericksburg road some distance in advance of the point at which General Sykes's advance had arrived, the distance from Chancellorsville to Fredericksburg being about ten miles. General Sykes was subsequently forced back some distance. He then received an order to return to his first position, and I was directed to return also, taking the place of General Sykes's command in the column and bringing up the rear. The movement was made, and all other troops that had started out on this expedition, on the different roads, returned and took up the positions they had previously occupied at Chancellorsville, or were placed in position by General Hooker, he connecting his lines and establishing a line of battle.

Question. What do you, as a military man, say as to this movement, and the position General Hooker took there?

Answer. I consider that the position of Chancellorsville was not a good one; it was a flat country, and had no local military advantages. At the same time I may say, that for a commander who felt that he was forced to retire, that was the best position, and the only one for the time being. But I have no doubt that we ought to have held our advanced positions, and still kept pushing on, and attempt to make a junction with General Sedgwick. No doubt this retrograde movement was based on information which General Hooker received from Fredericksburg as to the movements of the enemy. It was the head of Jackson's column coming from Fredericksburg which we met. We were ordered to retire to Chancellorsville, and take up that position, placing it in a defensive attitude by abatis and rifle-pits.

Matters remained in that condition until towards the morning of the 2d, when a new line of battle was established in some places, and in others the line corrected. There were no movements of the enemy then save that we knew they were passing in column along our front, being separated from us by a broad belt of woods which concealed their movements, as they had occupied those woods and prevented us from looking through them. The enemy continued their march, passing along our whole front, shielded by this belt of woods, until they had massed on our extreme right. The end of their column, supposed to be their trains, was seen, but from the reports of deserters, &c., it was supposed that that command of the enemy was retreating to Orange Court House. With that belief General Hooker ordered General Sickles in pursuit. It turned out, however, that General Jackson had concluded his operation of massing in front of our extreme right, and this was the last of his train which were being rapidly driven out of the road for the purpose of being placed in rear of his command. General Sickles passed out on our left of Jackson. But while he was performing his operation Jackson attacked General Howard very suddenly on his right flank and rear, and overthrew the 11th corps almost immediately. I have no doubt that proper precautions had not been taken; I do not know who was in fault. The ground in front of General Howard, and on his right, had not been properly examined to see what was going on there, or this could not have occurred. There should have been scouts, cavalry or infantry, sent out there, so that we should not have been attacked in that sudden manner.

Before this, during that afternoon, (the 2d,) there was an attack made on the enemy in front of the 12th corps, by a portion of that command attempting to break through this belt of woods on the plank road, but it failed. I think the troops were thrown in without judgment; thrown in as if they felt certain that they would break through. But there was not enough care taken in the development of their front; they went too much in mass, I think. They were now forced back, for the enemy happened to be prepared for them. The position I held was on the line facing Fredericksburg. I held that line during the



battle. The enemy attacked on both days, on several occasions, but they were always repulsed by the 1st line, under Colonel Miles, 61st New York. Although the 11th corps had been overthrown, still the enemy were stayed by the operations of the remaining division of Sickles's corps—for the whole of his corps did not go out to the front—together with other troops which General Hooker put in.

Notwithstanding we had lost some ground, and the 11th corps was overthrown, yet things remained in an apparently sound condition. I felt no discouragement. I went to General Hooker late on that morning, and told him that I did not think because the 11th corps had been beaten that there was any reason why we should despond, for the 11th corps had never been considered a part of the original army of the Potomac, and not much dependence had been placed upon it; and we were about as strong, of the original army of the Potomac, as before. General Hooker appeared to be a great deal despondent, and was affected no doubt by the sudden blow we had received in the destruction or rout of that corps.

Question. Was that before or after his injury?

Answer. I think it was before. As I have understood, his injury was received the next morning. I do not know what occurred during that night; but about midnight, or after, I was awakened by General Couch, who told me that we were ordered to withdraw, I supposed to some new position, and that the 2d corps was to form the rear guard. But at daylight, just as the movement was to commence, as I understood, General Couch informed me that no movement would take place; that we were going to remain there and fight a battle. What the proposed movement was to have been I never ascertained. Early in the morning the fighting again commenced on the same line where it had last terminated. Our operations that morning seemed to be for the purpose of getting inside of our lines the part of General Sickles's command which had been sent out the afternoon before. I should say that during the night, near midnight, there was a furious battle on the line of the 3d corps, which continued about an hour, our troops gaining considerable ground.

Question. It was that night and in that battle that Jackson was killed?

Answer. Yes, sir; it was a furious fight, and a very noisy one, principally from the fact that we had an immense mass of artillery placed there in order to stop any advance the enemy might make in the night. The enemy attacked the next morning, and the heaviest assault was thrown on this command of Sickles—General Berry's division, the 12th corps, and the troops on the right of General Sickles. While this fighting was going on, the force of Birney, which was in front, was engaged in forcing its way through in the angle between Berry's division and a portion of the 12th corps. I think one of the disadvantages of that fight was owing to this fact: that these men were fighting their way in, and it had the appearance as if there was a disaster in that portion of the field. The men were not running, but they were coming in very rapidly, but they came in in good order. I think that appearance of falling back had a bad effect upon the troops.

A great many lines of battle were formed to strengthen our front line. My position was on the other side of the Chancellor house, and I had a fair view of this battle, although my troops were facing and fighting the other way. The first lines referred to finally melted away, and the whole front appeared to pass out. First the third corps went out; then the twelfth corps, after fighting a long time; and there was nothing left on that part of the line but my own division—that is, on that extreme point of the line on the side of the Chancellor house towards the enemy. I was directed to hold that position until a change of line of battle could be made, and was to hold it until I was notified that all the other troops had gotten off. This necessitated my

fighting for a time both ways. I had two lines of battle, one facing towards Fredericksburg, and the other line behind that. And I had to face about the troops in the rear line, so as to be ready for the enemy in that direction, who were coming on. I had a good deal of artillery, and although the enemy massed their infantry in the woods very near me, and attempted to advance, and always held a very threatening attitude, I judge they had exhausted their troops so much that they dared not attack me, although I remained there for some time alone in this position, very heavily engaged with artillery all the time, and some of my men of the rear line occasionally being shot by their infantry at a distance of several hundred yards. There was no forcible attack on me, and when the time came I marched off to my new position, probably three-quarters of a mile from the old position, towards United States ford, where the new line of battle was laid out.

We immediately commenced to fortify that position by throwing up rifle-pits, and held it until we recrossed the river. In the mean time we had given up all those great roads connecting with Fredericksburg. The enemy took possession of the belt of woods between us and those roads, and held us in the open space, and commenced using the roads we had abandoned, and marched down and attacked Sedgwick, as it proved afterwards. And after accomplishing all they could with him, which was to drive him across the river, they came back to attack us. In the meantime, however, we were ordered to recross the river, and the movement commenced about daylight on Tuesday morning. It was to have commenced about 8 or 9 o'clock the evening previous. But, owing to a rise in the river, we had not enough boats, and had to reduce the number of bridges from three to two, which took some time. We recrossed unmolested, the enemy apparently not having gotten back there in force before we left. My pickets saw nothing of the enemy on my front that morning.

I should say one thing here: that after the movement I first spoke of, on the 1st—the one where General Sykes was attacked, when we were suddenly ordered to return—General Warren, who brought the order, suggested to General Couch that he should not fall back, although the order was to that effect; that the position we held was a very formidable one, and he should not vacate it. But General Couch did not feel at liberty to follow that suggestion, having received peremptory orders to fall back. It appears, however, that General Warren rode off to General Hooker, and explained the advantage of the position we held, and came back with an order that it should be held. But in the mean time the position had been abandoned, and the enemy had taken possession of it.

While this was going on General Meade had approached Banks's ford, and had practically opened it, that is, he had met no enemy and had got close to it. General Griffin, who was in command on our left, between us and General Meade, had gone further to the front than either of us, and had met no enemy. So that the only forces of ours which met any enemy were those at the head of General Sykes's column and those of General French. But General Hooker, for reasons best known to himself, concluded to fall back to Chancellorsville and take a defensive attitude.

I consider the mistake in the matter was in ever stopping at Chancellorsville at all. There was the cause of the whole trouble. General Hooker did not arrive there until Thursday night, about the same time we did. If his troops had marched on even on Thursday afternoon, and opened Banks's ford, we would then have been within three miles of Fredericksburg, and would have been practically connected with the force under General Sedgwick, although separated by the town of Fredericksburg. There, no doubt, was the mistake. That movement might have been made on Thursday afternoon, or even on Friday morning. General Lee had evidently been deceived by the movements of General Hooker, and had sent his troops down the river, below Fredericksburg, and had not been

able to get them back in time to have resisted such a movement. I believe if we had not stopped at Chancellorsville, but had marched right down to Banks's ford, the whole movement would have been a perfect success. The mistake was, that when we had started to fight an offensive fight, we stopped and fought a defensive one before the concentration was complete.

Question. That, you say, was in consequence of some information General Hooker received about the enemy?

Answer. That was on Friday afternoon. I understood that General Butterfield, who was at Falmouth, telegraphed that a large column of the enemy were marching on General Hooker. But I say that on Thursday, before General Hooker had arrived at Chancellorsville, if the troops which had united at Chancellorsville at noon had continued right on and marched down, we should have succeeded perfectly on that day. Couch's command might in that case have crossed at Banks's ford, three miles below, then we should have had four corps on that side of Fredericksburg, while Sedgwick would have been below with two corps, and General Sickles could have joined either wing, and we would have been within sight of the smoke of each other's guns, and each could have gone to the assistance of the other when necessary. Instead of continuing the offensive until we had made a practical junction, either by fighting or by the retreat of the enemy, we commenced the movement and then changed it, owing to some information or other, before we had made that junction.

Question. What do you say as to the original plan, as you understand it?

Answer. The original plan was full of risk, I think. To separate the army by so great a distance in the immediate presence of so wide-awake an enemy as we had was a movement very full of risk. A river was between us—picketed by us—and the country was wooded, so as to screen the movement, and it had been so secretly conducted that it was really a success up to the time that we changed the plan of the whole operation. No matter whether it was full of risk or not, it had succeeded up to that time.

Question. You do not know much of the movements of General Sedgwick's forces, I suppose?

Answer. No, sir; I know nothing of those movements except from my knowledge of the country, and what I learned afterwards. I do not know anything about the movements from my own observation.

Question. You finally recrossed the river and took up your old position?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was the extent of the loss to our army in that movement?

Answer. I only know from the reports which have been published; I have forgotten the number. I suppose our losses were in the neighborhood of 15,000 men.

Question. Have you any idea what were the losses of the enemy there?

Answer. I have no doubt their losses in killed and wounded were fully equal to our own. I have no question but that we far outnumbered the enemy on that field, showing that we ought to have succeeded. Part of their forces were at Suffolk, and as soon as they found that we had really crossed the river, that command of Longstreet's commenced marching up. None of it, however, I believe, got up until after the battle; some of it passed through Richmond several days afterwards.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. What do you suppose was the relative strength of the two armies?

Answer. I think that the enemy had not more than 60,000 men. I consider that we could have brought 100,000 men into line of battle had we ever united. I have no doubt that, at the time when we had the most troops at Chancellorsville, we had more than 80,000 men; and our whole army, I consider, was

120,000 men. But we fought a defensive fight; and the result was that the enemy massed their forces opposite some one portion of our line, in a measure, from the fact that the country enabled them to screen their operations, and we always met those forces with an inferior force.

By the chairman :

Question. Has not that been the great defect of most of the battles fought by this army ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; and it arises from the very nature of our battles : we have been fighting defensive battles habitually.

Question. Why is it that we, who undertake to conquer an enemy, and have gone into an enemy's country, always fight defensively ?

Answer. I think it is due, in a great measure, to the character, peculiarities, and ideas of policy of the commander.

Question. Do you not, as a military man, believe that that is a disadvantage to our army ?

Answer. I think it is a decided disadvantage. The morale will always be with the troops that go ahead, and if it is practicable for one army to advance and attack another, the one which advances will have the greatest chance of success. I think, however, if I knew that an enemy was going to engage me and meet me directly to the front, and I had an opportunity to secure a good position, I would sooner occupy it and get ready to meet his attack. But if I did not know that he was going to meet me in that manner, and I could only judge by the ground or information, I should not take a position, for I would be waiting while he was acting. It is my conviction that we ought to take the offensive.

Question. Did you see much of General Hooker on the field at Chancellorsville ?

Answer. Not on the last day ; I only saw him on horseback at a distance. I recollect the confusion incident upon the occasion when he was hurt. I saw the colonnade fly when the ball struck it, but I had no conversation with him on that day.

By Mr. Odell :

Question. Was this retreat the result of a council of war ?

Answer. I do not know that it was. I understood that a council of war was held, and I also understood that a retreat was ordered by General Hooker, but my belief was that it did not result from the opinions of a majority of that council. I was not in the council ; my impression at the time was that General Hooker had made up his mind as to what he thought was best to be done, and had concluded that it was wise to recross the river. A council of war was held, at which I do not know even that General Hooker was present ; but General Sickles was present, and advocated the recrossing from political as well as military reasons. But I understood at the same time that, with the exception of General Couch, who is a person naturally very cautious about making a decision, the other corps commanders thought it would be better to continue the fight ; and I think myself, although it is only a matter of opinion, that even at the moment the fight stopped on Sunday if we had pushed in all our troops we might have won that battle ; none of General Reynolds's corps had been engaged, and I did not consider that all of my troops had fought as they could fight in such a battle. Without reference to General Couch's opinion or expression, I understood from him always that he was in favor of fighting then.

By the chairman :

Question. You speak of political reasons—what political reasons ?

Answer. I was not present at the council ; but I heard that the question of Washington was urged, as to what effect it would have upon the country should

it fall in consequence of our persisting in that operation. It was thought that, aside from military reasons, it would have a bad effect upon the future of the country should we persist in the fight, and be beaten there so badly that Washington should fall in consequence; whereas if we recrossed the river we would be enabled to prevent any such result. I termed them political reasons in that respect only, from the effect the fall of Washington would produce in our country as well as in Europe. It was not in reference at all to partisan politics, but merely as to the general policy and effect upon the country.

By Mr. Odell :

Question. What effective force could have been taken in after Sunday's fight?

Answer. I consider that General Reynolds's corps might have gone in; it was a very large corps, and had not fought. I consider that General Meade's corps, though it had been fighting, was still in a perfect condition to fight. I consider that a part of the 2d corps was disposable. Without going into detail, I will say, generally, that I think we were not whipped when we gave up the fight. I think that, considering our great numbers, we ought to have fought until we could have fought no longer, if necessary. I believe that the reason the enemy did not attack me with more persistence was that they had already exhausted themselves. I was waiting there one-half an hour in their immediate presence, after they had driven everything else away, and they did not attack me, but allowed me to move away unmolested. General Hays, who was taken prisoner at that battle, would be a very good witness as to what he saw at the time. He was taken to Richmond, and knows exactly the condition of the enemy at the moment of his capture; how many disposable troops they had there, and how many troops he met between there and Richmond; showing how many divisions of their army were really in that battle. I understood him to say that he considered that there were but six divisions of the enemy at Chancellorsville, out of ten divisions that belonged to their army. He told me that the enemy were in an exhausted condition; that they had apparently put everything in, and that after the fight was over their army was greatly shattered. We had some fight in us still, and I think that up to the time we vacated that ground we ought to have won that battle.

By the chairman :

Question. Go on with your narrative of the operations of the army from that time?

Answer. We continued in our old position at Falmouth until the movements commenced which finally culminated at Gettysburg. I formed the rear-guard of the army when we left Falmouth. Although a great many movements were made during the march from Falmouth to Frederick, none of them were of any great importance. When we got to Frederick city, I found that General Meade had been placed in command of the army.

(See testimony, "Army of the Potomac: General Meade.")

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*Testimony of General James S. Wadsworth.*

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1864.

General JAMES S. WADSWORTH sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. I am a brigadier general of volunteers, and am now under orders to report to the army of the Potomac.

Question. You have been in the army of the Potomac for some considerable time?

Answer. Yes, sir; a great deal of the time since its organization.

Question. Did you participate in the battle of Chancellorsville?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Will you tell us what position you then occupied; and also give us a brief description of that battle, so far as it came under your observation?

Answer. At that time I commanded the first division of the first corps, then consisting of about 8,000 troops, about half of whom left the service before the battle of Gettysburg, their term of service having expired. Three or four days before the movement on Chancellorsville, General Reynolds showed me an order to General Sedgwick, placing him in command of the 6th, 3d, and 1st corps, and directing him to cross below Fredericksburg, and, in certain contingencies which I do not now recollect, to advance on Bowling Green. I inferred from the order that it was settled that General Sedgwick was to advance on the enemy's right with those three corps, while the other four corps were to cross above and advance on the enemy's left. This plan, if I am right in understanding that that was the plan, as I believe I am, was subsequently changed; and after General Hooker had crossed at United States ford, General Sickles with his corps, the 3d, was ordered up to him; and subsequently the 1st corps was ordered up also.

In the mean time my division of the 1st corps had crossed a short distance below the point where General Sedgwick with his corps had crossed, and occupied a position on the southerly side of the river for about 36 hours. It was intended that the order to withdraw my division and to move the corps up to Chancellorsville should have been executed in the night. But the order came too late, and we had to cross my division after daylight, under a very severe artillery fire which broke our pontoon bridge while a regiment was crossing. But it was soon repaired, and we got over without serious loss. We made a forced march to the position the army occupied near Chancellorsville. We arrived there about daylight on the day that the attack was made upon the 3d corps by the enemy to recover Chancellorsville, the other division of the 1st corps having arrived the evening previous. General Reynolds placed the corps in line of battle on the extreme right of our army, where we waited further orders for about 36 hours; we then received orders to recross the river. The 1st corps was not engaged at Chancellorsville.

Question. Can you tell why it was not ordered to attack the enemy at the time General Sickles with his 3d corps was driven back; or why it was not ordered to attack the next day, when you heard the sound of General Sedgwick's engagement with the enemy?

Answer. I have no means of knowing; at the time we were ordered to recross the river, so far as I could judge of the spirit and temper of the officers and men of the army, they were ready to take the offensive. I do not know why we were withdrawn then. I think we should not have withdrawn. I think the enemy were whipped; although they had gained certain advantages, they were so severely handled that they were weaker than we were.

Question. Is it your opinion, as a military man, that if our army had been ordered to take the offensive vigorously we would have gained a victory there?

Answer. I think we should have taken the offensive when the enemy attacked General Sedgwick. The enemy had gained several advantages over us; our forces were in a thickly wooded country, one very difficult to move in. But I am not sufficiently acquainted with the condition of the army to give a decided opinion upon that point. Our army was not depressed or disorganized, but was ready to take the offensive.

Question. From all the information you have, which side do you think suffered the most in killed and wounded in that battle?

Answer. I have no means of judging with accuracy; but I think it must have been about equal.

Question. Did you see General Hooker during that fight?

Answer. I saw General Hooker and rode along the line with him, after the retreat of Sickles's corps from Chancellorsville. It was about that time that he received an injury.

Question. When he received that injury were you near him?

Answer. I was not; he had received it a few hours before he came down to look at the line of the 1st corps, at which time I rode along the line with him. As some remarks have been made about General Hooker's condition at that time, I will say I never saw him more himself in every respect than when I then saw him.

Question. Can you tell the extent of the injury General Hooker received?

Answer. I cannot, any further than I have already stated.

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*Testimony of Major General Daniel Butterfield.*

WASHINGTON, *March* 28, 1863.

Major General DANIEL BUTTERFIELD sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

(See testimony, "Army of the Potomac: General Meade.")

Question. Did you serve under General Hooker after he was appointed commander of the army of the Potomac; and if so, in what capacity?

Answer. General Hooker called me to act as his chief of staff the day he assumed the command of the army, and I served in that capacity with him during his command of the army of the Potomac.

Question. Do you recollect about what time General Hooker assumed command of that army?

Answer. On the 26th of January, 1863.

Question. What was the condition of our army at the time he assumed the command? What orders did General Hooker have in regard to that army, and what steps were taken by him to put that army in condition, &c.? and give us a history of the campaign and what General Hooker endeavored to accomplish.

Answer. When General Hooker was assigned to the command of the army of the Potomac, that army was not in good condition. Desertions were very large, and an unpleasant feeling existed through the army—a lack of confidence in its ability to accomplish anything. Much of this feeling was found to come from friends of the soldiers at home. Packages frequently came by express with citizens' clothing, and letters urging the soldiers to desert; packages also came by mail. An order was issued directing a return of all the absentees from the army, with the causes of their absence, whether by desertion, leave of absence, sickness, or otherwise. The returns, under that order, showed 80,000 and odd men absent from that army, who were borne on its rolls; and of that number at least one-half, if my memory serves me correctly, were improperly absent; that is, were not sick or wounded, or properly absent. The exact figures of that return General Hooker has now.

Immediate steps were taken to prevent this desertion and bring about a better state of feeling in the army. The army had been previously organized into grand divisions, consisting of two corps each. This organization General Hooker broke up, resuming the organization by corps, as it had been before that time, and as it has been since. The general order issued making that change states the reason why the organization was changed.

The cavalry of the army had no organization as a whole—as a corps. It was organized by brigades or divisions, and scattered among the grand division commanders. This organization of this arm was changed, and it was organized into a corps. From that day the cavalry began to improve and to perform better service than it had ever done before.

A system of furloughs to deserving men was instituted, giving to regiments that bore proper inspection and were in good condition leaves of absence for ten days to two officers of each regiment; and furloughs for ten or fifteen days, according to the State from which the men came, to two out of every one hundred men present for duty. This order gave great satisfaction.

The system of picket duty by the army was changed. The lines were made perfect; the duty was vigilantly performed; the pickets were constantly inspected, and, finally, desertions were stopped through the means of all these measures of which I have spoken.

A better spirit soon manifested itself in the army, and it gradually came up to as fine condition as I have ever known it to be during my service with it from its organization—I think better than I ever knew it before; great *esprit du corps* obtained throughout the army, and a great feeling of confidence.

The orders which General Hooker received upon assuming the command of the army were in a letter from General Halleck, directing him to cover Washington and Harper's Ferry; otherwise the operations of the army were left somewhat to General Hooker's discretion. General Hooker will, I presume, give the committee a copy of these instructions. The nature of the country and its streams, the season of the year, with its mud, made it impracticable to commence any campaign until the roads should become settled. The intervening time—after General Hooker assumed the command—was taken up in this improvement of the army. General Hooker devoted himself constantly to personally ascertaining the condition of the army, and devising and improving means and remedies for any evils that existed. Great care was given to the commissariat. Commissaries were required by general orders to issue to the troops vegetables and fresh bread twice a week. This order was rigidly enforced, and greatly improved the general health of the army. The ratio of sickness decreased from something above ten per cent. to below five per cent. The results of this foresight in caring for and improving the physical condition of the troops can be more clearly explained to your committee by the medical staff of the army, Surgeon Letterman or Clements. It saved the lives of many wounded men subsequently. The subject of the campaign was one to which General Hooker gave much thought and attention. But while getting the views of everybody else, he did not give his own, but kept his intentions, in regard to the proposed campaign, an entire secret from every one, fearing that otherwise what he intended to do might come to the knowledge of the enemy. I ought to have stated that when General Hooker assumed command of the army, there was not a record or document of any kind at headquarters of the army that gave any information at all in regard to the enemy. There was no means, no organization, and no apparent effort to obtain such information. And we were almost as ignorant of the enemy in our immediate front as if they had been in China. An efficient organization for that purpose was instituted, by which we were soon enabled to get correct and proper information of the enemy, their strength and their movements.

Question. Who was employed on that service?

Answer. I called Colonel Sharpe, commanding a regiment of New York troops, to headquarters, and put him in the charge of that bureau as a separate and special bureau. General Hooker finally determined upon a plan of campaign, the intent and purpose of which was to destroy the army of General Lee where it then was; not merely to fight a battle and gain possession of the battleground and have the enemy fall back to Richmond, but to destroy him there;



for General Hooker believed that we could better afford to fight the enemy nearer Washington than Richmond. The first movement for this campaign was a movement of the cavalry corps, to place them in rear of the enemy and destroy their bridges and communications, prevent their retreat, and harass them pending the operations of our infantry columns. The cavalry were started out early in April with letters of instruction, which I presume General Hooker will furnish this committee. Under these instructions the cavalry moved up to Rappahannock station. They were required to cross the Rappahannock there, move down, and cross the Rapidan and destroy the enemy's communications between Fredericksburg and Richmond, and destroy all the bridges across the streams. The movement of the infantry was to be made to correspond with the cavalry movement. Upon the arrival of the cavalry corps under General Stoneman at their crossing places on the Rappahannock river, and during their march there, a heavy rain-storm came on, which prevented their crossing the river, and they were detained some two weeks or more in consequence.

Meanwhile, the whole campaign was held in abeyance. Finally the Rappahannock river fell, and the movement was commenced. The positions and locations of both armies were such that it was almost impossible for our army to make any movement without its being plainly visible to the enemy. The greatest precaution and the greatest secrecy were necessary to enable the army successfully to execute the plan which General Hooker had devised.

The movement commenced on the last Monday in April. The 12th corps, under General Slocum, and the 11th corps, under General Howard, were sent from their camps on the right of our line, to cross the Rappahannock in the vicinity of Kelly's ford, and cross the peninsula between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan; to cross the Rapidan and move down to the vicinity of Chancellorsville, uncovering the United States ford, so as to make a short line of communication between the right and left of our army. It had been originally proposed that General Meade, with the 5th corps, should cross at United States ford, as these corps moved down. General Meade made some representations concerning the difficulties likely to ensue, and the 5th corps, later on the same day, followed those corps, and moved with them, the cavalry moving on the outer flank on the right of those columns. The orders and letters of instruction, which your committee can obtain, will give a clearer idea of the movements than any narrative which I can give at this time, without these documents before me.

It was necessary, in order to get across the river, that a large force should be left in front of the enemy's position at Fredericksburg, to deceive them as to our movements, and to hold them to their works. After these movements had gotten under way, the 6th, 3d, and 1st corps were moved down to the bank of the river, bridges were thrown over, and a portion of those troops were crossed over and made a demonstration upon the enemy, and held them in their works at Fredericksburg until the movement of crossing the river above, and turning their left flank without opposition, should be successfully accomplished. This demonstration was very successful.

As soon as this movement was executed, and the three corps then comprising the right of the army had crossed the Rapidan, and by their movement down uncovered the United States ford, the 3d corps was withdrawn from below, and sent up to join the three corps on the right; and, subsequently, the 1st corps was sent up there. These movements occupied from Monday until Wednesday or Thursday.

General Hooker then crossed over and joined the right of the army, directing me to remain at Falmouth, with instructions appertaining to the proper execution of his orders with regard to the forces composing the left of the army. As to what transpired on the right of the army during the battles of Saturday and Sunday, I have no personal knowledge, as by General Hooker's direction

I was at Falmouth. I am familiar with it from the descriptions and conversations of the generals there, but the correct source of information is from those who were there.

During the operations at Chancellorsville on Friday and Saturday, a part if not all of the 6th corps still remained across the river below Fredericksburg. On Saturday night about 10 o'clock I received a despatch from General Hooker directing that the 6th corps should cross the river, move up through Fredericksburg and out on the Chancellorsville road, and attack General Lee, who was between General Hooker and General Sedgwick—to move so as to be there by daylight. This order was immediately communicated to General Sedgwick, both by telegraph and by an aid, and shortly afterwards a duplicate of the order arrived direct from General Hooker, by an aide-de-camp. The order required General Sedgwick to be there by daylight the next morning. The despatch wound up something in this way: that General Lee was between General Sedgwick and General Hooker, and the general expected, between General Sedgwick and himself, to use up General Lee's army.

General Sedgwick's assault on the heights at Fredericksburg was not made until 10 or 11 o'clock the next morning. The information which I had led me to believe that the forces of the enemy in the vicinity of Fredericksburg did not exceed 7,000, or 8,000 at the outside; that is, the forces prepared to resist General Sedgwick's advance in the direction in which he was ordered to move. General Sedgwick was under the impression that the enemy's force there was stronger than that. I presume he will give you his reasons therefor, and all his knowledge in regard to it. All my despatches and information are with the records, which are in the possession of General Hooker.

Question. You say the order from General Hooker for him to advance and be there by daylight the next morning was received about 10 o'clock in the evening?

Answer. Between 10 and 11 o'clock on Saturday night.

Question. What was there to prevent the advance from commencing immediately?

Answer. It was at night, a bright moonlight and clear, sufficiently light for staff officers to write despatches by moonlight. From the best information I had at the time the order came, there was not over a brigade of the enemy in the vicinity of Fredericksburg. This information was confirmed afterwards by prisoners taken on Sunday by General Sedgwick. They told me that they were left there with orders that if they did not receive re-enforcements by a certain time to withdraw; that they did withdraw about 11 o'clock on Saturday night, but met re-enforcements coming up and turned back and reoccupied the works. The statement may have been false or it may have been true. If true, it would show that a bold movement of General Sedgwick's command on Saturday night would have taken Marie's heights, and put him well on the road towards General Hooker before daylight.

Question. In your opinion, as a military man, was there anything to have prevented that order being complied with by General Sedgwick and his corps?

Answer. There was a force of the enemy there, but in my judgment not sufficient to have prevented the movement if made with a determined attack. Night attacks are dangerous, and should be made only by very disciplined troops. But it seemed to me at the time that the order could have been executed.

Question. Suppose it had been executed. What, in your judgment, would have been the effect upon the army of the enemy?

Answer. I think, from all I have gathered since, that if General Sedgwick had made the junction as ordered and fallen upon General Lee's rear, General Hooker would have been entirely successful there. That is my impression. General Hooker subsequently informed me that he had waited for the sound of Sedgwick's guns to make a vigorous and desperate attack. The best opinion

upon the results of the execution of the orders can be given by those officers who were with the right of the army at Chancellorsville.

General Sedgwick carried the heights of Fredericksburg between 11 and 12 o'clock on Sunday morning, and captured six or eight guns, and a number of prisoners. He then moved on through Fredericksburg toward Chancellorsville, making a distance of two or three miles on Sunday, the enemy opposing him.

I was telegraphed by General Hooker on Monday morning to join him immediately in the vicinity of Chancellorsville, which I did. Upon my arrival there a reconnoissance was just being made by General Griffin's division to ascertain the position and strength of the enemy in our front. The reconnoissance was made, and the enemy were found to be in strong force there.

Meanwhile nothing had been heard from our cavalry to indicate any success on their part. On Sunday I received Richmond papers of that day, which showed conclusively to me that their line of communication was open so that they could reach Fredericksburg from Richmond in one day. I got those papers in about the same time that we had usually gotten papers before any operations had been undertaken. General Hooker then was of the opinion that the cavalry had failed entirely to accomplish their orders; for what reasons he did not know.

That being the case, and General Sedgwick not having made his junction with him as he had expected, subsequent telegraphs announcing that Sedgwick could not hold his position to enable General Hooker to join the two wings of the army, General Hooker came to the conclusion that his original intention of destroying the enemy there could not be carried out. He felt that he could remain perfectly well on the south side of the river, and possibly force the enemy to fall back; but as the enemy would fall back towards Richmond, they would constantly become stronger and go into their fortifications there, while we should grow weaker.

Some 38 regiments of New York troops, two years' troops, had begun to leave the army at that time. I met some of the regiments on Monday leaving as I was going over. Their time had expired on Sunday. This would reduce General Hooker's effective force 38 regiments; and his opinion was that it was better to withdraw and fight with the whole army under his own eye and at a point where the country would admit of it; keep the enemy nearer Washington than to have them fall back. He was in hopes if General Sedgwick could maintain his position which he had got on Taylor's hill near Banks's ford, that he could withdraw the forces near Chancellorsville and join Sedgwick's corps at Taylor's heights, which was considered a sort of key position, if I may use such an expression, on that bank of the river.

A despatch was accordingly sent to General Sedgwick during the night of Monday, asking him if he could hold his position on the south side of the river. General Sedgwick's reply was that he thought his force was in danger there.

Question. What force had he there?

Answer. He had upwards of 22,000 men when he started from below. He had met with losses in the fight of Sunday, and during Monday. He was attacked on Monday by a strong force, which was detached from Lee's army in General Hooker's front. Orders were then sent to General Sedgwick to withdraw by the pontoon bridge which was laid at Banks's ford. Soon after that a telegraphic despatch was sent to General Sedgwick to withdraw; another despatch was received from General Sedgwick saying that he thought he could hold his position there. The interval of time I do not remember; it was very short; the despatches themselves are all copied, with their dates, hours, &c. A reply was sent to that despatch directing General Sedgwick to hold his position, and General Hooker would move around and re-enforce him. But before that despatch reached General Sedgwick (there seems to have been a delay in its reaching him) he had crossed over the main portion of his forces, as I said before. That position was the key point of the position about Fredericks-

burg. General Hooker then called together the commanders of the corps on the right with a view of ascertaining their feelings with regard to making a bold and desperate assault from that position, or whether the army better return across the river and undertake such other operations as circumstances might determine to be best. When the corps commanders came together General Hooker addressed them briefly, and stated that he desired to leave them perfectly free to exchange their views in regard to the situation of affairs, and unembarrassed by his presence. He laid before them the situation of General Sedgwick's command, and the despatches that had passed between them. He gave them his views as to the only sort of attack that could promise success, considering the nature of the country, the woods, &c., and then, in order that they might talk freely among themselves, General Hooker and myself retired from the tent. Such of the corps commanders as were there entered into consultation among themselves. General Slocum was absent, not having arrived in time. When they had concluded their deliberations, the general and myself returned, and they announced their views. General Sickles gave his in detail, and at some length, in favor of withdrawing the army, and his reasons therefor. General Howard was in favor of moving out and attacking the enemy. He remarked that he felt as though the army was in its present position by the disaster to his corps, and under any and all circumstances he should favor an attack. I may say that everybody considered that General Howard would favor an attack under any circumstances, in consequence of some aspersions that had been cast upon his command, the 11th corps; he desired to retrieve their reputation. General Meade opposed the withdrawal, because he thought the army could not be withdrawn. General Hooker thought that, so far as that was concerned, General Lee would throw up his hat to have us withdraw, and would not fire a gun or molest us at all; only be too glad to have us go back. I do not remember the views of the others; I have no record of it with me; but the majority of those present favored the return. The army was withdrawn, I believe, with the intention, in General Hooker's mind, of making a movement below, and crossing the river again. Before the withdrawal was executed, a very heavy rain-storm came up, and raised the Rappahannock river so as to float the ends of the three bridges, and one had to be taken up in order to lengthen out the others to enable the army to recross. When the army had recrossed the mud was deep on the other side. The trains and a great deal of the artillery had to be parked on the north bank of the Rappahannock, and troops were left there to protect them until they could be moved. This return was effected on Wednesday morning, the 6th of May. The army then returned to the position it had occupied before the commencement of the movement.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. How far was General Sedgwick from that portion of the army under General Hooker when he made his advance on Sunday ?

Answer. From six to eight miles.

Question. Did Lee's army lie between them ?

Answer. Lee's army lay in front of General Hooker, and a portion of it between General Sedgwick and General Hooker.

Question. Was it known to General Hooker that fighting was going on with General Sedgwick's corps ?

Answer. Despatches concerning the state of affairs were constantly sent by me to General Hooker, as fast as I became acquainted with them. Every despatch that was received from General Sedgwick was immediately transmitted to General Hooker by telegraph and courier; and all those despatches General Hooker now has. General Warren was also sent down by General Hooker to look after the movement of General Sedgwick, and to keep him advised of what occurred there. General Warren also communicated with General Hooker.

Question. When General Hooker inquired of General Sedgwick if he could hold the position he then occupied, did he intimate to him that he intended to re-enforce him?

Answer. I do not remember whether that was in the despatch or not. That was General Hooker's intention, but I do not remember what the despatch stated in that respect. The copies of the orders and despatches are all in General Hooker's possession.

Question. Before General Sedgwick sent his second despatch, in which he stated that he could hold the position, was he informed that General Hooker did intend to re-enforce him?

Answer. I do not know whether General Sedgwick was governed by that in coming to that conclusion, or by further information he had in regard to the strength of the enemy, and his own position and strength.

By the chairman:

Question. Go on with your narrative, if you please.

Answer. About the latter part of May information received at headquarters, and the movements of the enemy, led General Hooker to the belief that General Lee intended to repeat his campaign of the year previous—crossing the Potomac. General Hooker communicated this information in a despatch to the authorities at Washington, stating his belief that General Lee intended to repeat that campaign, and asked permission to so far depart from his instructions which required him to cover Washington and Harper's Ferry as to take advantage of the separation of General Lee's forces, which he would make necessarily in executing that movement, considering the relative situation of the two armies. General Hooker presumed that Lee, in making that movement, would leave one corps, about one-third of his army, at Fredericksburg, to detain and hold our army there, while he would move with his two other corps towards the Upper Potomac, and General Hooker desired permission, in that event, to cross between the two portions of Lee's army and attack him. By this movement General Hooker expected to destroy Lee in detail, fully believing that he would thwart Lee's purposes and prevent his invasion, and that by this move he would cut off all his supplies and communications with his rear, compel him to return, and destroy him. A reply was received from the President, giving his opinion against the plan, in which General Halleck coincided. This prevented General Hooker executing what he had proposed. About this same time, (I do not recall the exact dates without the documents,) having in view this movement that Lee was about to execute, General Hooker asked that all the forces that could by any possibility operate upon Lee's army, which would include those in the department of Western Virginia, in the middle department at Baltimore, the defences of Washington, and, perhaps, the department at Fortress Monroe, (of the latter I will not speak positively,) be united with the army of the Potomac under one commander, so as to give concentration to their movements, and secure perfect cooperation. He also stated in that despatch that, in order that his motives might not be misunderstood, he expressly desired that some other person than himself should have that command. This arrangement was not made by the authorities here—for what reason I do not know.

During the first week in June, the enemy began to concentrate a large force of cavalry in the vicinity of Brandy station, either with the purpose of making a raid or covering their movements. The information brought in placed the force of their cavalry at from 10,000 to 12,000; some placed it as high as 15,000. General Hooker, by letter on the 7th of June, directed the commandant of the cavalry corps, General Pleasonton, to concentrate his available cavalry force in the vicinity of Kelley's ford and Rappahannock station, cross the river, and attack the enemy at daylight on the morning of the 9th. General Pleasonton's cavalry force was not as large as the force of the enemy. The

movement of General Stoneman had disabled from 4,000 to 6,000 of the cavalry; thereby reducing our mounted force to that extent. Two brigades of infantry, under General Ames and General Russell, were therefore added to General Pleasonton's force, to make his numbers nearer an equality to the enemy. He attacked the enemy as directed on the 9th, and drove them successfully out of their camps, and it was believed that but for the unexpected death of Colonel Grimes Davis, a very able officer, who commanded one of the columns, and was killed near the camp where the enemy's artillery was situated, we should have captured the most of their artillery.

After having attacked as directed, General Pleasonton returned across the river, and reported to General Hooker that he thought the enemy's raid was broken up; that they would abandon their intended move. General Hooker sent this despatch to the authorities at Washington, but stated that he did not coincide with General Pleasonton in his opinion that the enemy's intended move was broken up, but thought that it might be delayed a day or two by this attack; he advised, either in that despatch or in one sent about the same time, that all of General Stahl's cavalry, then acting here under orders from Washington, should be thrown into the Shenandoah valley; that every man on the Upper Potomac should be vigilant and watchful, for the movement of Lee would still continue.

On the 11th or 12th of June positive information came of the movement of the head of Lee's column through Sperryville. During these operations General Hooker had made dispositions of the 5th corps along the Rappahannock, and of other corps up in the vicinity of Rappahannock station, to prevent any crossing of the enemy which would enable them to get between him and Washington. At the same time he had thrown a bridge across the Rappahannock in front of Fredericksburg as a demonstration and a feint, by which he could ascertain the nature and strength of the force the enemy had left behind him. This was successfully done; a number of prisoners were captured, and the force of the enemy under A. P. Hill were held to their works at Fredericksburg. General Hooker then determined to move up his army, with the centre at Fairfax Court House, and the corps so disposed as to prevent any movement of General Lee across the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, and at the same time, if possible, to compel General Lee to cross the Potomac. General Hooker's ideas as he expressed them to me at the time, were that after General Lee crossed the Potomac he would be enabled, if all the forces available were placed at his disposal, to guide his march outside of the South Mountain range, and concentrate all the troops under General Couch, all that could be spared from the defences of Washington and Baltimore, and those along the Potomac, and thus greatly outnumber Lee and destroy him.

With this view, while remaining in the position I have described, with the centre at Fairfax Court House, and the corps spread out in fan-shape—the 12th corps at Leesburg; the 11th between Leesburg and Aldie, on Goose creek; the 5th near Aldie; the 2d corps at the next pass in the mountains below; the 6th corps in the centre; the 3d corps at Gum Springs, ready to move to assist the 5th or the 2d as occasion might require, and the 1st corps in the same relation to the 12th or the 11th—at this time General Hooker despatched me with an order directing me to proceed to Washington and Baltimore and organize from the troops in those two places a column of 15,000 men and put them on the road to Frederick, with the view of keeping Lee outside of that mountain range towards Pennsylvania, intending to meet Lee in the open country of Pennsylvania, and fight a battle there with all our troops concentrated; expecting and hoping to so far outnumber Lee as to destroy his army. General Hooker's belief, as he had always expressed it to me, was that the rebellion rested upon that army, and when it was destroyed the end was at hand.

Under these orders I visited Washington. My orders required me to call upon General Halleck and the President, and I did so. General Halleck stated that no troops could be spared from the defences now. He said that there were several millions of public property here; that Washington was a great depot; and that the state of feeling here was such that it would be dangerous to withdraw reliable troops from guarding it, for there was a liability at any time of the secessionists and their sympathizers here burning these buildings and destroying these stores, and therefore it was necessary to have a strong guard here. General Halleck stated that General Hooker had received from the south side of the Potomac all the troops that were available. I was unable to get any troops from the defences of Washington. I then went on to Baltimore. On my arrival there General Schenck placed before me the returns of the troops in his department, and gave me liberty to take whatever I saw fit, leaving him such garrison as I deemed proper for the defence of Baltimore. He had but about 5,000 troops for duty there. I took General Lockwood's brigade, the Maryland brigade, and put them on the road according to orders, leaving the balance of the troops, consisting principally of militia regiments lately arrived from New York, to garrison the works about Baltimore and guard the public property there. The orders under which I came here and went to Baltimore, the reports of the interviews I had, and of my proceedings under those orders, are all in the possession of General Hooker, and will give full particulars to the committee.

Question. Do you know what number of troops were at Suffolk and in that vicinity?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Did General Hooker apply for those?

Answer. I will not be certain; I think he did in his general letter asking for a consolidation of all the forces that could operate against Lee's army.

Question. What reasons were given why they should not come up and take part in the coming battle?

Answer. I never heard any reasons assigned. General Hooker telegraphed me to return immediately from Baltimore, which I did, and arrived at Fairfax Court House just as the army was breaking up to cross the Potomac. The headquarters and two or three corps crossed the Potomac on that day near Poolesville. We crossed the river, I think, on the 26th of June. On the morning of the 27th of June General Hooker dictated a despatch to General Halleck, asking if there was any reason why the garrison at Harper's Ferry should not be used to strengthen his army; if there was any reason why the large force there, about 10,000 men, should remain there. The general then left Poolesville and went to Harper's Ferry to inspect the position personally and to see if there was any reason for keeping that number of troops there. A portion of the army was put in motion for Frederick. The 12th corps, under General Slocum, was at Knoxville, with three corps at Middletown. General Hooker's intention, under the supposition that the garrison at Harper's Ferry would be placed at his disposal, was to take that garrison, numbering about 10,000 men, unite it with General Slocum's command, numbering 12,000 or 13,000 men, and throw them in the rear of Lee's army, and break up and destroy his bridge and communications, capture his trains, break up Ewell's horse, beef, and flour trade, and then reunite his army for the coming battle. He attached great importance to breaking up Lee's communications across the Potomac.

I left Poolesville that morning, shortly after General Hooker left for Harper's Ferry, and went to Frederick. General Hooker went to Harper's Ferry, and there received a reply from General Halleck, stating that the garrison at Harper's Ferry must not be taken away; that the post was an important one. General Hooker from there—I did not know it at the time, and not until he came over to Frederick that evening—upon receiving this refusal of General Halleck to give him those troops, telegraphed to Washington asking to be re-

lieved from the command of the army. He came over to Frederick in the evening, and, after the corps commanders and others had gone out, stated to me that he had asked to be relieved from the command of the army, and read the despatches that had passed between General Halleck and himself as the reason for so doing. He said that he felt that it was a very important and critical period in the campaign, one bearing an important influence upon the whole country; he said that if every available man could not be concentrated and used against Lee, the enemy might be successful, and in that event the consequences would be most disastrous; that he felt General Halleck did not give him that cordial assistance and co-operation which he had a right to expect; and that he thought he had no right to allow private feelings to stand in the way of the good of the country; that it was his duty to withdraw from the command and give way to some one else to whom perhaps everything would be given to enable him to destroy Lee's army, or at least prevent him from making a successful invasion; that he would rather go into the ranks as a private soldier than to hold the position he then held; that he had too much respect for the position of general of the army of the Potomac to continue to hold it when he was not allowed to exercise all its powers fully; that he would wait for history to do justice to him and his motives; but now he must look only to the good of the country. The next morning, at 4 o'clock, Colonel Hardee, from the War Office, arrived with orders assigning General Meade to the command of the army of the Potomac. General Hooker turned the command over to General Meade, and issued orders, which are published and accessible to the committee, resigning the command. In taking leave of his staff and other officers, he endeavored by his directions and conversation to impress upon all the necessity of the change, the benefits likely to result from it, and endeavoring to give to them all confidence in General Meade, and calling upon all to do everything in their power to assist General Meade; assuring them that it would all be for the best, that the army of the Potomac would have a successful campaign, and that it was the duty of every one to give General Meade a cordial support; and General Meade assumed the command of the army of the Potomac.

Question. Did General Hooker put General Meade in possession of his plans and purposes in reference to the campaign?

Answer. Yes. He gave him the fullest information in regard to his plans and purposes. General Meade was totally surprised at being placed in command of the army. It came over him like a thunder-clap; he did not expect it at all.

Question. Was it not a rash and unwise act to displace the commanding general in the face of the enemy in that way? Was it not hazardous?

Answer. In my opinion it was a very hazardous and dangerous act, but General Hooker had asked to be relieved from the command, and the authorities may have felt that they had no other recourse than to comply with his request; it was done at his request. I have no idea it would have been done if he had not requested it.

Question. Was he not led to believe, from the constant refusal of what he asked, that the commanding general here at Washington was unfavorable to him?

Answer. That was always his impression, and that of other officers about headquarters.

Question. Was not that the only reason that prompted him to ask to be relieved?

Answer. I believe that was the sole reason.

Question. Can you give any reason why those Harper's Ferry troops were refused to General Hooker, and immediately afterwards permitted to come under the command of General Meade?

Answer. I do not know that General Meade's orders anticipated that he would take that garrison. General Meade showed me at the time the letter and orders he received when he was placed in command. I have not seen them since.



Question. Does it not appear singular that General Halleck should have refused those troops to one commanding general, and then given them to another?

Answer. General Meade did not ask for them, but took them under the general order giving him command of all the troops.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Had General Meade a more comprehensive order than General Hooker ?

Answer. Far more. General Meade had an order which gave him authority to displace any commander—to relieve him from, and put some other in, his place. All the troops under General Couch were put under his command. His orders gave him much fuller power and authority than General Hooker had previously.

By the chairman :

Question. General Hooker had previously asked that whoever commanded that army should have control of all the troops you have mentioned ?

Answer. Yes.

Question. That was refused to General Hooker, and then authority conferred upon General Meade large enough to cover all General Hooker had asked ?

Answer. It did not cover the troops at Fortress Monroe, but it did cover all the troops that could operate upon General Lee's army, as it was then situated. I think it had some restrictions in regard to troops in the defences of Washington.

Question. Have the commanders of corps and other generals in the army of the Potomac always supported the general commanding that army with zeal and alacrity ?

Answer. I have never wanted to attribute to any corps commander any want of zeal and co-operation in support of the general commanding. I never could bring myself to believe that there was any such feeling, and it never appeared to me that any such feeling was evinced previous to the operations at Chancellorsville. General Hooker would not allow himself to believe any such thing, though it was sometimes endeavored to be represented to him that there was such feeling. He had the highest confidence in every one of his generals ; and I believe he thinks to this day that if there was anything which might be considered as showing such a feeling, it was a lack of ability rather than a lack of desire to do well. He was informed from pretty high authority that there was a conspiracy against him among the corps commanders ; but he declined to enter into any inquiry, or to have any conversation with them upon the subject, because he felt that would imply on his part a lack of confidence in them. He said that so long as he was in command of the army he was bound to believe that everybody supported him ; that he could not believe otherwise ; that he could not have so poor an opinion of men ; and that those higher in authority than himself must undertake to find out whether he was supported or not. With that view some inquiries were made by higher authorities than General Hooker here at Washington ; what the result was I do not know. The results of the campaign, of the movements of the different commands, and the acts of the different corps commanders, are all accessible to the committee, and they can form an opinion for themselves with regard to them. I do not like to give opinions, where I can avoid it, which will bring me in conflict with other officers and my superiors. Such opinions, when published, naturally tend to break up good will and cordial co-operation among officers.

The chairman :

I have some questions at my room that I have been requested to ask you. If you will come to-morrow morning I will then complete your examination.

WASHINGTON, *March 29, 1864.*

Major General DANIEL BUTTERFIELD recalled and examined.

By Mr. Loan :

Question. The chairman, who is required to be present in his seat in the Senate, has given me some questions to be asked you. (See testimony, "Army of the Potomac: General Meade.") How long have you served under General Hooker, and what opportunities have you had to know his personal habits ?

Answer. I commenced service immediately under General Hooker, in November, 1862; he commanded the 5th corps, and I commanded a division in it. General Hooker afterwards commanded a grand division consisting of the 3d and 5th corps, and I commanded the 5th corps under him. I have served with him from that time until the present time constantly, with the exception of the time I served under General Meade as his chief of staff, preceding and during the battle of Gettysburg, and my absence from the army in consequence of the wound I received at Gettysburg; all except that time I served under General Hooker, and being so constantly with him, seeing him at all hours, day and night, I suppose that I know his personal habits as well as any one can.

Question. Have you ever seen him under the influence of liquor, or known of his being so ?

Answer. Never; and if he had been so I should have known it, because I saw him at all hours of the day and night.

Question. To what do you attribute the rumors to the effect that he was at times intoxicated ?

Answer. I do not know, unless it is malice; upon the general principle that when a man attains a high position people are always found to carp at him and endeavor to pull him down. General Hooker said he always had a good character until he had the command of the army of the Potomac; that they had charged General McDowell with drunkenness, when it was well known he never touched liquor of any kind, and he could not be surprised if similar charges were brought against him. It always has been, and I presume will continue to be, the case, that the commander of that army, or any other army, will be more or less maligned. It is almost impossible to command an army, or any force, properly, and enforce discipline, without offending many. High commands have many unpleasant surroundings. McDowell, Pope, McClellan, Burnside, have all had their share of this sort of attack; some have been called drunkards, some cowards, some fools. It is the nature of our people; the arduous duties and responsibilities of commanders are not fully appreciated by all.

Question. Was there ever, to your knowledge, any disagreement or misunderstanding between General Hooker and General Meade; and if so, what was it ?

Answer. The relations between General Hooker and General Meade were always very cordial and very friendly; the only thing that ever occurred, to my knowledge, to prevent that, was a matter that grew out of the consultation held at Chancellorsville before the army recrossed the Rappahannock. When the opinions were given in as to whether the army should return to the north bank of the Rappahannock, or remain, or make an attack upon the enemy, General Meade gave the opinion that the army should remain on the south side of the river, for the reason that it could not be withdrawn. Afterwards, when the newspapers got to commenting upon the subject, it was asserted, in a way that came to General Hooker's knowledge, that General Meade had opposed the withdrawal of the army under any circumstances. A correspondence sprang up between General Hooker and General Meade upon the subject; the result of the correspondence was, that General Meade denied having stated what General Hooker understood him to have stated, that is, that he opposed the withdrawal because the army could not be withdrawn. General Meade then addressed a letter to each of the corps commanders, asking them for a statement of what he

did say; and the corps commanders generally gave his statement as General Hooker had understood it. General Meade then, being convinced that he was wrong in his recollection, so acknowledged, and I supposed that was the end of it. I do not know of anything else that ever occurred, and I do not think that was anything very serious. There was some correspondence between Governor Curtin, General Meade, and General Hooker, the details of which I do not know; but it never appeared to me to cause General Hooker to show or evince any feeling against General Meade, and I think General Hooker recommended General Meade as his successor in case he should be removed.

Question. There seemed to be cordial and kind feelings existing between them after this explanation?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Was the information concerning General Lee's movement through Sperryville in the direction of Winchester, mentioned in your testimony as about the 11th of June, communicated to General Halleck?

Answer. That information came from General Pleasonton, who was at Rappahannock station, by telegraph to General Hooker, at Falmouth. In its passage to General Hooker it had to pass through the War Department telegraph office at Washington, coming over the wires from Rappahannock station to Washington, and then going from Washington down to Falmouth. The inquiry had been made a day or two before whether it was necessary to repeat to Washington the despatches that came to us in that way, and the reply was that it was not, as the despatches were copied and copies retained as they passed through the War Office.

Question. The conclusion, then, is that that information was not communicated to General Halleck by sending it back from Falmouth?

Answer. No; but that he already had it as it came over the wires through the War Department.

Question. Was that information communicated to General Milroy?

Answer. I have no means of knowing. If it was communicated to him it would be through his superior officer, General Schneck, who commanded the department of Baltimore.

Question. If it had been communicated to General Milroy, would it have enabled him to have withdrawn his forces from Winchester, or prevented a surprise?

Answer. I think so, certainly.

Question. Was it ever urged upon General Hooker to break up the 11th corps and distribute it among the other corps after the battle of Chancellorsville?

Answer. It was.

Question. By whom?

Answer. By several officers of rank in the army.

Question. Do you know what were General Hooker's views on the subject?

Answer. His views were that the 11th corps at Chancellorsville, so far as the men were concerned, would have done well if his orders had been executed as they should have been; that they were not so much at fault as some of the officers. He said, also, that he had no authority to break a corps; that rested alone with the President; that at some future day he would make the men fight and make them proud of their organization. But then, at that time, gold was very high, and the draft was about coming on, and General Hooker thought if the question was brought up it would precipitate an unpleasant subject upon the administration; and he thought it more judicious to give the men and officers another chance. But he did not think his orders were fully complied with at Chancellorsville.

Question. How seriously was General Hooker injured at Chancellorsville?

Answer. I was not present at the time he was struck. I know that several days afterwards his body was black and blue down one side. After the cam-

paign was over he showed me its effects. He was very stiff, and I judged from that, and from the statements that others of the staff officers gave to me of the nature of the blow, that he was stunned very severely, and rendered insensible for a considerable time. This may have been, probably was, one cause of the lie concerning his being intoxicated at the time.

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*Testimony of General John Gibbon.*

WASHINGTON, April 1, 1864.

Brigadier General JOHN GIBBON sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

(See testimony "Army of the Potomac: General Meade.")

Question. What was your rank and position in the army of the Potomac, while under the command of General Hooker?

Answer. The same as now—brigadier general of volunteers.

Question. In what part of the army were you during the attack on Chancellorsville?

Answer. I was in the same division that I have now—the 2d division of the 2d corps; General Couch had command of it. Two divisions of the corps went to Chancellorsville, but my division was kept down at Fredericksburg; and on the night of the 2d of May I was ordered to go down and take possession of Fredericksburg, General Sedgwick being on his way up to Fredericksburg from his crossing below.

Question. Will you give us an account of the operations of that portion of the army with which you were connected at that time?

Answer. We were directed to cross at night, but we did not get our bridge across until after daylight the next morning. The division crossed over, and I reported to General Sedgwick, who was then in town. The first idea was that I should deploy on the plain above the town, and attempt to carry the heights there. The division was deployed there, and the enemy brought out several pieces of artillery, on the heights above, and fired upon us. General Warren made a reconnoissance, and discovered that the canal at the foot of the slope, on the inside of this plateau, was impassable, all the bridges having been taken up. The only way, then, to carry the position would have been to have built a bridge under fire, and rush a storming party across it. I did not think that was very feasible, and I went back to see General Sedgwick, and reported to him; and he decided that we would make the attack from the town. Our deployment on the plain, however, called off a great many of the enemy's troops, and some of their artillery, too, from in front of Sedgwick to above the city. As soon as the arrangements were completed, Sedgwick's storming party went up the road, and carried Marie's hill by assault; and as soon as I saw our colors on the top of that hill, we ceased firing with our artillery, which we had previously directed there, and the division was brought up through the town, and immediately moved up on top of the hills and opened our artillery, and supported Sedgwick's corps as he went up.

We then went a mile and a half in rear of the town, the enemy retreating in every direction, and we were firing at and receiving the fire of the enemy on top of those hills. General Sedgwick then informed me that it was the understanding I was to return to Fredericksburg and keep possession of the river and the bridges there. So I brought my division back, while General Sedgwick's corps went on in the direction of Chancellorsville. The right bank of the river could not be defended very well with the force I had; and I brought two of my brigades over on the north side of the river and put my artillery in position on the bluffs on this side, leaving one brigade in the town.

The next day a severe attack was made on Sedgwick by the enemy, who seemed to come from the direction of Hamilton's crossing, and he was driven back towards Banks's ford, and some time that night I got orders to retire from the town, which I did, and took up the bridges. That is about all I had to do with that battle.

Question. Do you know anything of the order sent from General Hooker to General Sedgwick, on Saturday night, to advance towards Chancellorsville?

Answer. I do not.

Question. What would you say, as a military man, was the duty of the general commanding at Fredericksburg—that is, General Sedgwick—in case he had received an order on Saturday at 10 or 11 o'clock, directing him to advance immediately towards Chancellorsville, so as to be there at daylight the next morning?

Answer. I should think his first duty would be to inform his commanding general that before he could do that he must take some very strong positions in front of him. And the next thing to do would be, of course, to attempt to take those heights, and I take it he would take them just as speedily as he possibly could; and until he did take them, of course any advance in the direction of Chancellorsville was out of the question.

Question. In your opinion, would a judicious military commander deem it a practicable thing to attempt the taking of those heights in the night?

Answer. I should think not.

Question. Then you would regard the order as one not possible to be executed?

Answer. I do not consider that an order sent to General Sedgwick on Saturday night, to be at Chancellorsville at daylight on Sunday morning, was a practicable one.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Will you assign the reasons?

Answer. In the first place, the distance. In the second place, the opposition which he had to encounter on those heights, which, we all know, were exceedingly strong, and which were pretty well defended. In the third place, Lee's army, or that portion of it between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville.

Question. What was the distance?

Answer. About twelve miles. But it is a very difficult thing for any man to put himself in another man's shoes after the thing is over, and then say what was the best thing to be done. These things can only be decided with any propriety by the men themselves.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. You were present when the works were carried on Sunday?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. With the knowledge you now have, having been present at that time, would there have been any reasonable prospect that a night attack would have been successful?

Answer. My opinion is that it would not, although I have not the proper data upon which to base an opinion. I was in the first Fredericksburg battle, in December, 1862, and I know the trouble we had in trying to take them at that time.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. What distance would General Sedgwick have had to march before he would have met this force which you speak of as occupying those heights at Fredericksburg?

Answer. The skirmishers were in contact all the time.

Question. I understood you to say that General Sedgwick would have had to take those heights before he could go to Chancellorsville?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was the distance between General Sedgwick's position, at that time, and those heights?

Answer. His command was under artillery fire, say two or three miles from the heights, and his skirmishers were in contact with those of the enemy all night.

Question. Do you know the force of the enemy occupying those heights?

Answer. I have not the slightest idea.

Question. Do you know whether they were re-enforced the next morning before the assault was made upon those heights?

Answer. No, sir, I do not. I have no reason to suppose they were, although of course they might have been.

Question. Then why have you stated that it would have been impracticable to comply with General Hooker's order, supposing that to have been the order?

Answer. On account of the distance, the trouble of taking those heights, and the presence of Lee's army between him and Chancellorsville.

Question. How do you know what trouble there would have been, without knowing what force the enemy had there?

Answer. There is no question about their being in force there.

Question. Would they have furnished an impediment to his progress?

Answer. That question I cannot answer, because General Sedgwick's corps was below the city of Fredericksburg, and I was not down there the day before at all. I do not know the force in his front. I only know what opposition we had when he came up to Fredericksburg with one or two of his divisions, and my division joined him, and my opinion of the opposition he would have met with is based on that.

Question. It was impracticable at the time you were there the next morning?

Answer. Yes, sir; my opinion is based entirely on that, and of course it was then impracticable to obey the order because it was then after daylight.

Question. If there had been a small force only there during the night, that would have impeded him but an hour or so; was the distance such as to prevent his complying with that order?

Answer. I reckon not. I suppose if he could have taken the heights without much loss, he could have made the march of twelve miles by daylight without trouble, if he had not met with opposition from Lee's army.

Question. At what time on Sunday morning was this assault made on the heights?

Answer. I cannot tell exactly.

Question. Was it not as late as 10 o'clock in the day?

Answer. I judge it was.

Question. How long did it require to carry those heights then?

Answer. When the column was once formed and started, I do not think it was more than ten or fifteen minutes from the time the heavy firing opened that our flags were on top of the hill. I do not think a thing was ever more gallantly done in the world.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Do you know any reason why that assault could not have been made at an earlier hour on Sunday morning?

Answer. I do not know what dispositions General Sedgwick was making. I recollect being very impatient at the time, waiting for him, and supposed he was getting his troops up and into position. I do not know of any other reason than that.

Question. From your knowledge of the position of General Sedgwick's troops at that time, had he been ordered at eleven o'clock the night of Saturday to make an assault immediately, could he not, in your opinion, have made the assault at an earlier hour than it was made?

Answer. Yes, sir, I think so.

Question. And still have had the advantage of daylight in making the assault?

Answer. Certainly, I think so. Without any reference to General Sedgwick, I think a military commander could do that, from the fact that he would have time to get his troops in position.

*Testimony of General Henry J. Hunt.*

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1864.

Brigadier General HENRY J. HUNT sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. What is your present rank and position in the army, and how long have you been connected with the army of the Potomac?

Answer. I am a brigadier general of volunteers, and chief of artillery for the army of the Potomac. I have been connected with that army from the time of the first battle of Bull Run, from July 19, 1861.

Question. How long have you been chief of artillery for that army?

Answer. Since September 5, 1862.

Question. Were you present with the army during the movement upon Chancellorsville, and the operations that took place at that time?

Answer. I was.

Question. Will you state to the committee all you know in relation to the movements of the army at that time that you deem interesting and of importance?

Answer. My information is not very complete in regard to that battle. I was the chief of artillery, it is true; but shortly after General Hooker took command, by a new distribution of the duties, I simply had the administration of the artillery, without its military command, of which he deprived me at that time. Consequently I did not know all the movements, even of the artillery, until the battle was well under way. On the morning that the troops crossed at Fredericksburg I was put in command of the artillery—that is, so far as to be made responsible for the safe passage of the army at those points where the bridges were safely laid by the engineers, and I was to cover the crossing with the artillery. For that purpose all the artillery of the corps crossing at that point, together with the reserve artillery, was placed at my disposal. I performed that duty, and when it was over my powers then expired.

I also made a reconnoissance, and selected the position for throwing across the bridge at Banks's ford, and made dispositions for crossing the troops there, if necessary. On Thursday I crossed with General Hooker at United States ford, the artillery having all been ordered, through the chief of staff, without any knowledge on my part of what had become of it, except what I could pick up from time to time. We arrived at Chancellorsville on Thursday night. On Friday morning the troops pushed forward. I remember especially the 12th corps, under General Slocum, and the 5th corps, under General Sykes. Soon after being engaged they made demands upon me for artillery, or rather upon General Hooker, which were handed over to me, and which I filled so far as was practicable.

But the greater part of the artillery having been moved without my knowledge or orders, I hardly knew where to lay my hands on it, although the woods seemed to be full of it. Soon after the attack commenced, news was received, as I understood at the time, by telegraph, that the enemy were moving a large

force up from the direction of Port Royal. General Hooker told me to recross the river immediately, and get all the artillery which had been left on the other side of the river—part of which I had myself left where it covered the crossing at Fredericksburg—and assemble it at Banks's ford, as he expected to fight the army of the enemy between his then position at Chancellorsville and Banks's ford; and he directed me not to allow the enemy to effect any crossing at that point.

I returned to United States ford; telegraphed from there to General Butterfield, who was on the north side of the river at headquarters, to send up to me at Banks's ford all the batteries that were below. While there awaiting his answer, I learned, to my great surprise, that the troops that had been advanced at Chancellorsville had been ordered back into their intrenchments. I proceeded to Banks's ford and made all the arrangements there I had been directed to make to oppose the passage of the enemy should it be attempted. I remained there for two days. In the mean time General Sedgwick, who had been at Fredericksburg, received a telegram from General Hooker, of which I saw a copy—it was given me at Banks's ford—directing him to push forward by way of Chancellorsville. He became engaged nearly opposite Banks's ford, on Sunday evening, I think. As soon as he became engaged, bridges were thrown across under direction of General Benham, who was also there; and I crossed the river to offer the services of what artillery was at Banks's ford, should he need it, and to inform him what it was. About the same time I received a telegram from General Hooker directing me to proceed at once to his headquarters and report to him, and I did so; and he then, for the first time, put me in command of the artillery, with directions to get it in order, as it was in great confusion. In the mean time General Hooker's battle had taken place, of which I can say nothing, as I was at Banks's ford, though within sound of it. On Monday I reorganized the artillery, and distributed it. I was present at the affair of General Griffin, on Monday evening, I think, in which there was some little fighting. A short action took place there, growing out of a reconnoissance made by General Griffin. I understood from General Hooker that we were to make an attack the next morning, Tuesday morning. At daylight General Hooker sent for me, and told me to attend to the recrossing of the artillery to the north bank of the river, under cover of the fog; to see that the roads on the other side were kept clear, and to direct General Patrick to allow no vehicles to cross from the north to the south side. I then posted artillery on the north side of the river to command all positions on the south side from which our bridges could be reached, and then returned to headquarters.

A storm arose soon after. Just before sunset the general and his staff recrossed the river to the north side. I separated from him in order to see to the destruction of some works of the enemy on the south side of the river which perfectly commanded our bridges. Whilst I was looking after them in the darkness to see that they had been destroyed as directed, an engineer officer reported to me that our bridges had been carried away, or were being carried away, by the flood. I found the chief engineer, Captain Comstock, and we proceeded together to examine the bridges, and we found that they were all utterly impassable. I then proceeded to General Meade's camp and reported the condition of affairs to him. All communication with General Hooker being cut off, General Meade called the corps commanders together, and as the result of that conference, I believe, by order of General Couch at any rate, I was directed to stop the movement of the artillery, which was withdrawing from the lines, and let them resume their positions, thus suspending the crossing. On my return to the bridges I found that one had been re-established, and the batteries that were down there had commenced recrossing the river. I then sought General Hooker upon the north side of the river, and proposed to him to postpone the movement for one day, as it was certain we could not all cross over in a night. I stated,



to him that I doubted whether we could more than get the artillery, which was ordered to cross first, over before daylight. He refused to postpone the movement, and it proceeded. No opposition was made by the enemy, nor was the movement disturbed, except by the attempt to place batteries on the points from which our bridges could be reached, and to command which I had already posted the necessary batteries on my own responsibility. A cannonade ensued and they were driven off with loss, and one of their caissons exploded; we lost three or four men killed and a few horses in this affair. That is about all that I remember.

My position was a peculiar one; without a command, I had not many opportunities for observation. On the return of the army to the north side of the river my power over the artillery ceased.

Question. Under whose direction was the artillery before you were placed in command of it?

Answer. Under no direction at all, I believe, but that of General Butterfield and General Hooker; that is, until after the battle of Chancellorsville, and before recrossing, when, everything being in confusion, I was told that Colonel Wainwright, being the ranking artillery officer at Chancellorsville, was directed to assume the command of the artillery and get it in order.

Question. When was that?

Answer. That was after the main battle at Chancellorsville. Colonel Wainwright told me that he had done all that he could to get things into order, and then reported to General Hooker that it was more than he could manage, as his previous knowledge of the condition of the artillery and the army was not such as would enable him to act understandingly, and he requested that I might be sent for. I will say for Colonel Wainwright, that his arrangements were very excellent; he did a great deal under the circumstances, and with excellent results.

Question. Are you sure there was no officer who, during this period, had command of the artillery?

Answer. Soon after General Hooker took command of the army of the Potomac, I asked him to define my position and duties. At the first organization of the army of the Potomac the artillery was distributed as follows: two-thirds of it among the divisions, and the other third constituted a strong artillery reserve. There were but few officers in the artillery of any rank who had experience. This led to an organization by General McClellan, in which he took the oldest artillery officer he had, General Barry, and made him chief of artillery, as he made General Stoneman chief of cavalry, to organize and arrange batteries to the troops. Their duties were made administrative simply. Under this arrangement I was placed in command of the reserve artillery, as my experience in Mexico had all been in that arm of the service. One regular battery and three volunteer batteries were attached to each division. The captains of the regular batteries, although they had not, as a general rule, had experience in the field, had gone through the school of instruction in field batteries in times of peace; and as we were almost destitute of field officers for the artillery, this arrangement put all the artillery in divisions under the commands of captains of regular artillery, who had gone through schools of instruction. As experience was gained in the field, and as those regular captains were taken out of their positions, and promoted, some as brigadier generals of volunteers and some to staff appointments—for they received no promotion in their own arm—they were withdrawn from the artillery. About the 1st of June, 1862, one-half of the artillery was taken from the divisions, and formed a reserve in each corps, under the command of such officers as might be designated by the commanders of the corps, which enabled him to put experienced officers at their head. In the orders defining the duties of chief of artillery and chief of cavalry, it was stated that their duties would be purely administrative, unless directed to take command of troops of

their arm by the commanding general, which he did from time to time. General Stoneman took command of the cavalry immediately after the capture of Yorktown. I commanded the artillery reserve, and therefore was not in a position to be cognizant of everything that took place in regard to those two arms. On the 5th of September, 1862, General Barry, the former chief of artillery of the army of the Potomac, was put upon duty as inspector general of artillery for the whole army of the United States, and I was appointed chief of artillery to succeed him in the army of the Potomac. That was immediately after the Virginia campaign under General Pope. When I was then assigned to duty I was informed by the general in person that I had the absolute command, as well as the administration, of all the artillery in the army, and would be held responsible for it. I had but few days thus to reorganize before the battle of Antietam, which organization I made on the road. I found the artillery in very bad condition on account of the expenditure of ammunition in those campaigns, its losses in men and material, it having been unable to refit. On the 7th or 8th of September, when I reached Rockville, I had to order some 200 or 300 wagon loads of ammunition partly to fill deficiencies then existing in the batteries, and which I had ascertained by my inquiries along the road.

At Antietam I was placed in absolute command of all the artillery, both that of divisions and that in reserve, with the power to use the name of the general whenever I came in contact with any one of superior rank to my own.

Inasmuch as no order had been issued except a verbal one, as provided for in General McClellan's first order of organization, as soon as General Burnside took command I reported the facts to him, and asked for his directions. He told me to consider myself in the same position as under his predecessor. I therefore continued in command of the artillery down to the time that General Hooker took the command. In the mean time many of the orders for the administration of the artillery and for its command, existing before the administration and the command were united in one person, had become obsolete or had been suspended by other orders, growing out of the new state of affairs.

When General Hooker took command, I received some orders and directions which were inconsistent with my new position; and I then brought the whole subject before him. He told me that I would not have command of the artillery, but that I would have the administrative duties of the arm.

Question. What is the administration of artillery?

Answer. It consists in seeing it supplied with horses, men, and ammunition; that it is properly instructed and properly equipped; that the ammunition is of proper quality; that the officers are fitted for their duties, &c. The command would involve the command of the troops, with the right to issue orders outside of those relating to its internal economy and administration.

Question. To control the movements of the troops in battle?

Answer. Yes, sir. The command involves the control of all the troops not attached to corps or divisions, and under the immediate command of other officers at the time. The separation of the duties of command and administration is anomalous; I do not know of any other army in which it exists. The arrangement in our army grew out of our position, and the want of field officers of experience.

After General Hooker had informed me what my position would be, I received orders through the Adjutant General and otherwise which involved the exercise of military command, and which were inconsistent with the limit placed upon my duties. This led to an interview with General Hooker, who told me then that he would hold me responsible for the organization, equipment, efficiency, and supplies of the artillery. I asked what would be my duties in battle? He told me, as near as I can remember, that he expected me to "be about" and see the artillery was properly used, and give such orders in his name as I found necessary. I explained to him that I believed that would include all the duties

of a commander, without his power over those I was to command. He told me he had commanded Pillow's division at Chapultepec an hour after Pillow was wounded, and did it as his adjutant general, without knowing the general was wounded. I told him I declined to command troops in another man's name. I said I would prepare and lay before him an order which would cover the case. I did so, and placed in it all the duties which I thought the chief of artillery ought to have, including among others the command of the troops, and the responsibilities which he must take with the command, and drew a pencil line around those two clauses, and stated to him that if he excluded the one he should exclude the other, for the two must go together. He indorsed the order, stating that I would confine myself strictly to the administrative duties, according to the first orders issued; that I would not take command of the troops, or give any orders to the artillery, unless specially authorized to do so, and that all my powers to command troops would expire with the occasion.

The artillery reserve, which had still been under my command, was ordered to report directly to the Adjutant General, and not through me; therefore I received no military reports excepting such as I sought and obtained for my own information and use, when I considered it necessary, expecting to be called upon the first time there was a battle. I received no orders, excepting when I was sent for, from time to time, to give information, until the morning before the army was crossed at Fredericksburg; that morning I received an extract from a letter sent from headquarters to General Sedgwick, giving him his instructions for crossing the river—he taking command of the three corps that were to cross below Fredericksburg. That extract directed him to furnish me all the artillery of those corps for which I should ask, in order to cover the crossing of the troops, for which duty I would be held responsible. Excepting that, two days before, General Hooker had asked me to examine the positions there and at Banks's ford, with a view to throw bridges across and to cover the passage of the troops, this was the first intimation I had that that responsibility would be upon my shoulders; and as throwing a bridge a hundred yards above or below any point selected would, in many instances, lead to an entirely different arrangement for the artillery, it would have left me without sufficient time to have provided against a serious resistance, had it not been that I had made a thorough examination of the river for ten miles above and below, and of every position where a bridge could be thrown, at the time of the battle of Fredericksburg. I do not know that any person commanded the artillery, in the proper sense of the word, from the time General Hooker deprived me of the command down to the time he was relieved from the command of that army, excepting the orders I had for throwing the bridges across the Rappahannock and protecting them, and the command I had after the battle of Chancellorsville, when I relieved Colonel Wainwright. Under my orders from General Hooker, of course, my command ceased the moment those specific duties were performed.

Question. General Hooker knew, did he not, that you had before that time made this thorough examination of the crossings?

Answer. I presume so. He knew at the time of the battle of Fredericksburg that I made all the arrangements to cover the laying of the bridges, and the passage of the troops. I asked him where those bridges should be thrown across. He said one would be thrown where General Franklin had thrown one before; that settled that point; and another he said would be thrown across somewhere below the mouth of White Oak creek. As soon as I discovered where it was to be thrown, I knew the ground well enough to know what arrangements to make.

Question. What was the arrangement of the artillery at Chancellorsville, while you were not in command of it?

Answer. The artillery was distributed to divisions, and the divisions, as I

learned, marched with only a part of their artillery. The batteries had not been redistributed since the battle of Antietam. I had submitted several projects for its proper distribution, which had not been attended to, for reasons given by General Burnside at the time; but General Hooker stated that he did not wish to separate any batteries from the divisions with which they had served. I stated to him that some of the divisions had artillery which had never been regularly assigned to them; that while some divisions had one or two batteries only, others had five or six, and that there should be a redistribution. He declined to order it, until after the battle of Chancellorsville, when he sent for me, and ordered a very large portion of the artillery to be withdrawn from the divisions, and put it in reserve, leaving but one battery to each division. I gave it an alternative organization, which he finally adopted, of attaching the artillery to the corps. There was no officer that I know of put in command of the artillery, from the time I was notified by General Hooker down to the time that General Hooker was relieved from the command of the army, excepting on the occasions which I have mentioned. Nor could the arrangement that was in operation at first, under General McClellan, at the time the command of the artillery was given to the chief of artillery, be again established, as the reasons for which that organization was made did not exist; that is, the presence of a certain number of instructed artillery officers. Those officers had then been removed or promoted. There was a great deficiency of field officers to command the artillery of the different corps and divisions. In fact, including the horse artillery, there were over 400 guns in the army at the time of the battle of Chancellorsville, with nearly a thousand artillery carriages, large trains of ammunition, some 10,000 men, and 8,000 or 9,000 artillery horses; and for the command and management of that force, including the administrative duties, there were but five field officers in the army, and including myself, but six above the grade of captain. There were two or three officers on my staff who were engaged most generally in office work, and whom I employed in active command on the field of battle.

Question. You were not on the field of Chancellorsville during the battle there, and, of course, cannot tell whether the artillery there was as effective as it should have been?

Answer. No, sir; I could not tell from my own observation. I can only judge from the character of the country and what I heard. We were in the woods, which did not present a good field for artillery. To have made it thoroughly effective, the artillery should have been in the open ground. In General Sedgwick's corps it was very efficient, as reported to me in conversation by himself and others. I also heard of occasions at the battle of Chancellorsville where it was very effective. The attack on the battery on Monday, that I spoke of, was very handsomely and effectively replied to by Weed's artillery; but that was not a battle in which artillery could be well used.

Question. Did you see the order which General Hooker sent to General Sedgwick, directing to advance immediately to Chancellorsville?

Answer. Yes, sir. I was at Banks's ford, and whenever there was anything at the telegraph station that they thought was of importance for me to know, they would send a copy to me. They brought this with another at the same time.

Question. At what time did that order reach General Sedgwick, and what did he do in pursuance thereof?

Answer. I do not know. It reached me, I think, about 12 o'clock in the day on Sunday. With that a telegram was handed me from General Sedgwick that he had carried the heights below. The two came to me together.

Question. That is the first order you know of General Hooker sending to General Sedgwick to advance?

Answer. Yes, sir; that is the only one I remember to have seen.

Question. You have stated that you expected a battle to be fought on Tuesday morning; were you so informed on Monday night?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And instead of that you were ordered to recross your artillery?

Answer. Yes, sir; I inferred so from what General Hooker said to me.

Question. Do you know what caused that change of intention on the part of the general commanding?

Answer. I do not, except that he told me "we would have to get out of that," or something of that sort. I was a great deal surprised when he told me, for when I was sent for I supposed it was preliminary to an attack.

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*Testimony of Major General John Sedgwick.*

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1864.

Major General JOHN SEDGWICK sworn and examined.

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. I am major general of volunteers, and am now, and have been for the last sixteen months, in command of the 6th corps of the army of the Potomac.

Question. Will you state in your own way such incidents of the campaign of Chancellorsville as appear to you to be important? If any questions occur to us as you proceed, we will ask them.

Answer. On the 28th of April I was directed to take command of the 1st, 3d, and 6th corps, and to proceed to Franklin's crossing, about three miles below Fredericksburg. The 6th corps was to cross there; the 1st corps, under Major General Reynolds, was to cross about a mile and a half below; and the 3d corps, under General Sickles, was to be in reserve. The 1st and 6th corps were to be in position at or before 3½ a. m. of the 29th; the 3d corps at or before 4½ a. m. of the same day. My own corps consisted of 22,000 men. I think the 1st and 3d corps together had perhaps 35,000 men. On the morning of April 30 I was directed to send General Sickles with his corps to report to General Hooker at Chancellorsville, and he accordingly left for that part of the army. On the morning of May 2, General Hooker directed General Reynolds with his corps to march at once to Chancellorsville, and the bridges to be taken up at Franklin's crossing and below before daylight. This was by telegraph from Chancellorsville. The despatch was dated at 1.55 a. m., but was not received by me until after daylight in the morning. The bridges, therefore, were not taken up; General Reynolds was immediately put in motion, being withdrawn under the enemy's fire. I telegraphed General Hooker that the bridges could not be taken up without attracting the observation of the enemy, and leaving him free to proceed against General Hooker. To this despatch I received no reply. Just before dark that evening I received directions, as follows:

"The general commanding directs that General Sedgwick cross the river as soon as indications will permit; capture Fredericksburg, with everything in it, and vigorously pursue the enemy. We know the enemy is flying, trying to save his trains; two of Sickles's divisions are among them."

Immediately after this despatch was received came another, dated 7.05 p. m., directing as follows—the two despatches were received at almost the same moment:

"The major general commanding directs you to pursue the enemy on the Bowling Green road."

I immediately ordered my entire force across the river, one division being already across, and pushed forward, skirmishing sharply with the enemy, and driving him from the Bowling Green road. At 11 p. m. I received a despatch, dated at 10.10 p. m., directing as follows:

"The major general commanding directs that you cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg on the receipt of this order, and at once take up your line of

march on the Chancellorsville road until you connect with him. You will attack and destroy any force you may fall in with on the road. You will leave all your trains behind except the pack-mule train of small ammunition, and march to be in the vicinity of the general at daylight. You will probably fall upon the rear of the force commanded by General Lee, and between you and the major general commanding he expects to use him up."

This despatch, as I have said, was received at 11 o'clock at night, on May 2. Chancellorsville, I think, is eleven miles from Fredericksburg, and we were three miles below. At the time of the receipt of this despatch I was in line of battle on the river, about three miles below Fredericksburg and fourteen miles from Chancellorsville, which place I could not have reached before daylight had there been no enemy to impede my progress. The entire army of the enemy was between me and General Hooker, aside from a force in my immediate front about equal to my own, and in a strong position, as was shown by General Early's letter published in the Richmond papers in May last. General Early was accused of negligence in permitting me to carry the heights of Fredericksburg and proceed towards Chancellorsville. In his vindication he published a statement of the forces that he had there. I saw the letter, but it is so long ago that I do not recollect the particulars. He stated, however, that he had seven brigades, one of which was stationed at Banks's ford, about three miles above Fredericksburg; the other six brigades were in my front; and it was this force I fought on Sunday in carrying the heights of Fredericksburg.

I placed my command in column, and marched without any delay, with the exception of one division, which, being still engaged skirmishing with the enemy, had to be left in line of battle to cover the movement of the rest of the command. I moved by the flank on the south side of the river towards Fredericksburg. To obey the order literally was impossible, as no bridges had been laid at Fredericksburg. General Hooker expected me to cross at Fredericksburg; but to have recrossed to the north bank, take up the bridges, relay them at Fredericksburg, and cross again there, would have occupied me until long after daylight. Moving by the flank, I was at once resisted by the enemy, and it was just daylight when the head of my column forced its way into the town and to the front of the intrenchments.

An assault was immediately made by the four leading regiments, who advanced against the rifle-pits, but were repulsed. The force displayed by the enemy was sufficient to show that the intrenchments could not be carried except at great cost.

My position at that time was as follows: one division in Fredericksburg, another between the town and Franklin's crossing, and another covering Franklin's crossing, skirmishing with the enemy on the Bowling Green road.

I sent to General Howe, commanding the division between the town and the crossing, to endeavor to turn the right of the enemy's position on Marie's heights. I also ordered General Gibbon, who was then on the north bank of the river, to cross as soon as the bridge was completed at Fredericksburg, take position on my right, and endeavor to turn the enemy's left. General Gibbon's division belonged to the 2d corps, but was ordered to cross and report to me at Fredericksburg. In the mean time I proceeded to organize a storming party to attack the centre again, should the other arrangements fail. General Howe soon reported that the character of Hazel run, and the force displayed in his front, destroyed any hope of success on his part, and General Gibbon reported that he was checked by a canal which ran parallel to the enemy's position, and covered their entire left. Accordingly, as soon as the storming parties were organized, I assaulted their central position on Marie's heights, and carried it, capturing many prisoners and all of their guns with the exception of one battery.

Question. At what time was that assault made?

Answer. It was about 11 o'clock in the morning when we carried the heights, and halted there for a few minutes for our troops to assemble a little. We left the position three miles below Fredericksburg, and we were engaged all night in skirmishing that distance. The command was immediately put in motion for Chancellorsville, pursuing the enemy, who made such resistance as he could for tiring. In the afternoon the enemy made a determined stand at Salem heights, about half way between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, having been reinforced from the latter place. We attacked him at once, and the battle continued until dark without cessation, the enemy still holding his position. During the night he was re-enforced, and it was evident that he was surrounding us. I notified General Hooker during the night of my position, and was directed by him not to attack again unless he (General Hooker) attacked, and to look to the safety of my corps, and to fall back on Fredericksburg or cross at Banks's ford; that he was too far away to advise or direct me. Here is a despatch from Major General Warren, from Chancellorsville, on the morning of the 4th:

"I find everything snug here. We contracted the lines a little and repulsed the last assault with ease. General Hooker wishes them to attack him to-morrow, if they will; he does not desire you to attack again in force unless he attacks him at the same time. He says you are too far away for him to direct. Look well to the safety of your corps, and keep up communication with General Benham at Banks's ford or Fredericksburg. You can go to either place you think best; but Banks's ford would bring you in supporting distance of the main body, and would be better than falling back to Fredericksburg."

General Warren left me at 12 o'clock on the night of May 3 to go to Chancellorsville, and immediately upon reaching Chancellorsville wrote me this despatch:

"I have reported your situation to General Hooker. I find that we contracted our lines here somewhat during the morning, and repulsed the enemy's last assault with ease. The troops are in good position. General Hooker says you are separated from him so far that he cannot advise you how to act. You need not try to force the position you attacked at five p. m. Look to the safety of your corps. You can retire, if necessary, by way of Fredericksburg or Banks's ford; the latter would enable you to join us more readily."

The enemy reoccupied the heights of Fredericksburg on the morning of May 4, and we were threatened on three sides. The line of battle at that time was about five miles long. We were pressed at various points during the day, and in the afternoon we were attacked in strong force from the direction of Fredericksburg. This attack we repulsed, and during the night we marched to Banks's ford.

General Hooker had notified me during the day that I must hold a position on the south bank of the river until the following afternoon; that he intended to advance the next day and would relieve us; that in such case my position was as good as he could desire.

Here is a despatch dated 11 a. m., May 4:

"The major general commanding desires me to say that he does not wish you to cross at Banks's ford unless you are compelled to do so. The batteries at Banks's ford protect the position. If it is practicable for you to maintain a position on the south side of the Rappahannock, near Banks's ford, do so. It is very important that we should occupy the position at Banks's ford; General Tyler commands the batteries there."

Here is a despatch dated 11.50 a. m., May 4:

"If the necessary information can be obtained to-day, and if it shall be of the character the commanding general anticipates, it is his intention to advance upon the enemy to-morrow. In this event the position of your corps on the south bank of the Rappahannock will be as favorable as the general could de-

sire. It is for this reason that he desires that your corps should not cross the Rappahannock."

Here is one dated May 4, but without naming the hour :

"I expect to advance to-morrow morning; will be likely to relieve you; you must not count on much assistance unless I hear heavy firing. Tell General Benham to put down the other bridge, if you desire it."

That is, a bridge at Banks's ford. It was late in the night when the position near Banks's ford was taken, the enemy shelling us in the mean time. The position was a bad one.

About 1 a. m. of May 5 General Hooker telegraphed me to cross the river and take up the bridges. This is the despatch :

"Despatch this moment received. Withdraw; cover the river and prevent any force crossing. Acknowledge receipt."

This was immediately done, as the last of the column was crossing, between 3 and 4 o'clock; the orders to cross were countermanded, and I was directed to hold a position on the south bank. The despatch is dated 1.20 a. m., and was received at 3.20, as follows :

"Yours received, saying you could hold position. Order to withdraw countermanded. Acknowledge both."

In explanation of this I should say that I had telegraphed to General Hooker that I could hold the position. He received it after he had ordered me to cross over. But receiving his despatch to cross, I had commenced the movement, and, as I have said, I had very nearly taken my force over when the order to cross was countermanded. To return at that time was wholly impracticable, and I telegraphed that fact to General Hooker.

Question. Did you ever receive a despatch from General Hooker asking if you could hold your position there ?

Answer. I presume I did; and I presume my reply was that I could. But before he received it he had sent me the order to cross the river; and upon that I immediately acted, and had nearly crossed over when I received a despatch countermanding that order.

Question. What was your distance from General Hooker at that time ?

Answer. I should think it was five miles, at Banks's ford.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Did the enemy lie between you and General Hooker at that time ?

Answer. Yes, sir. I should like to attach to my testimony a copy of my official report, written immediately after the battle. (Report read; see A, appended to this testimony.)

By the chairman :

Question. The whole army then recrossed the river and reoccupied its old position at Falmouth ?

Answer. Yes, sir. I recrossed on the morning of the 5th of May; General Hooker retired on the night of the 5th.

Question. Had you informed General Hooker previous to the order to you to recross the river that your position was untenable ?

Answer. I think I informed him that I could hold it.

Question. I know you have already said you informed him you could hold it; but the order from General Hooker to you to hold it did not come until you had got pretty much across ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What I desire to know is this: did you ever give him to understand, before you received the order to cross, that you could not hold that position ?

Answer. I think I did; but I do not think he had received it.



By Mr. Loan :

Question. You replied to General Hooker that you could hold the position you occupied ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Had you at any time previous to that informed General Hooker that you could not hold that position ?

Answer. During the day I informed him that the position we took up in front of Salem heights was a bad one, having been assumed for the purpose of assailing the enemy, and not for a defensive position.

By the chairman :

Question. Is there anything further in this connexion that you desire to state ?

Answer. At 9 a. m., May 4, I sent this despatch to General Hooker :

"I am occupying the same position as last night. I have secured my communication with Banks's ford. The enemy are in possession of the heights of Fredericksburg in force. They appear strongly in our front, and are making efforts to drive us back. My strength yesterday a. m. was 22,000 men ; I do not know my losses, but they were large ; probably 5,000 men. I can't use the cavalry. It depends upon the condition and position of your force whether I can sustain myself here. Howe reports the enemy advancing from Fredericksburg."

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Is that the despatch to which you refer, when you say you informed General Hooker that you could hold your position ?

Answer. No, sir ; the despatch you mention referred to the position taken up that night near Banks's ford. Here is another despatch, dated 11 a. m. : "I hold the same position. The enemy are pushing me hard. If I can hold my own till night, I shall cross at Banks's ford under instructions from General Hooker, given to Brigadier General Warren." Here is another despatch to General Hooker, dated May 4—11½ a. m. : "The enemy threaten me strongly on two fronts. My position is bad for such attack. It was assumed for attack, and not for defence. It is not improbable that bridges at Banks's ford may be sacrificed. Can you help me strongly if I am attacked ? My bridges are two miles from me. I am compelled to cover them above and below from attack with additional assistance of General Benham's brigade alone." Here is a despatch to General Hooker, dated 1.40 p. m. of the same day : "I occupy the same position as yesterday when General Warren left me. I know no means of judging the enemy's force about me ; deserters say 40,000. I shall take a position near Banks's ford and near the Taylor house, at the suggestion of General Warren. Officers have already gone to select a position. It is believed that the heights of Fredericksburg are occupied by two divisions of the enemy. I shall do my utmost to hold a position on the right bank of the Rappahannock until to-morrow." I have read these despatches because I thought they might elicit some questions from some gentleman here. I have understood that evidence has appeared before this committee censuring me very much for not being at Chancellorsville at daylight, in accordance with the order of General Hooker. I now affirm that it was impossible to have made the movement if there had not been a rebel soldier in front of me.

By the chairman :

Question. Where did you get any such information as that about testimony before this committee ?

Answer. I have seen it in the papers, I think.

The chairman. I thought it hardly likely that any member of this committee could so far have forgotten his pledge of honor as to state to any one what has transpired here. As for the papers, they contain a great many assertions that are without foundation or authority.

The witness. I know I have been censured by General Hooker for that, and I did not know but what it might have been done here. I lost a thousand men in less than ten minutes' time in taking the heights of Fredericksburg.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Do you know whether the enemy were re-enforced at Fredericksburg during the morning of the 3d of May?

Answer. I do not think they were. I believe they had the same troops when I was there at 11 o'clock, on the morning of the 3d, that they had there all the night before. I believe that General Early was there with six brigades around Fredericksburg; and the seventh brigade at Banks's ford marched down and met us just as the heights were carried.

Question. You received, at 11 p. m. of the 2d, a telegraphic despatch directing you to carry the heights and march on Chancellorsville?

Answer. Yes, sir; my troops were then ready to march, and were then skirmishing with the enemy, under a previous order to put myself on the Bowling Green road and move in another direction. We started in fifteen minutes after receiving that order. But, before the head of my column had left their position, they were met by the enemy's skirmishers; and it took us from that time until daylight to make a little over three miles.

Question. In consequence of the enemy?

Answer. Yes, sir; that and the darkness together; it was a very foggy night.

Question. That brought you where at daylight?

Answer. To Marie's heights, a mile from Fredericksburg.

Question. And about what hour did you commence the assault on the heights?

Answer. We made an assault immediately, but were repulsed. The final assault was made between 10 and 11 o'clock. We were all that time in forming our storming parties and placing our troops in position.

By Mr. Odell :

Question. You say you made an assault immediately. What do you mean by "immediately?"

Answer. I say the head of our column arrived there about daylight, and we made an assault then, but it was not successful.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. When you were in the position on the 4th, to which you have referred, were you where you could have co-operated with the army at Chancellorsville in an attack upon the enemy?

Answer. I could not proceed in that direction. I think General Hooker might have probably relieved me if he had made an attack at that time. I think I had a much larger force of the enemy around me than General Hooker had in front of him. There were two divisions of the enemy on the heights of Fredericksburg, which was in my rear; and they would have attacked me the moment I undertook to proceed towards Chancellorsville.

By Mr. Odell :

Question. What was the distance between the two wings of our army?

Answer. It could not have been over five miles.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. If General Hooker had attacked the enemy on that day, then both your force and his could have operated against the enemy?

Answer. Yes, sir; but General Hooker did not make an attack; there was no firing that day at Chancellorsville, and I would add that the position I was in then was within one mile of the position General Meade had occupied on the Saturday previous.

Question. Do you know the force of the enemy that lay between you and General Hooker?

Answer. I do not positively; I think there were 40,000 men around me on the 4th, and I do not think the enemy had more than 60,000 men then.

Question. When you say there were 40,000 men around you on the 4th, do you mean that your force engaged the attention of 40,000 men?

Answer. I do.

By the chairman:

Question. In that case there would not have been more than 20,000 of the enemy in the neighborhood of General Hooker?

Answer. That is my impression, if the enemy had not more than 60,000 men there, which was the number I estimated them at.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Did you ever see any reports of their generals to give you any information of their forces?

Answer. No, sir, with the exception of this letter of General Early published in May last, and that gives only the force he had to defend Fredericksburg.

By the chairman:

Question. About how many men had General Hooker with him at that time.

Answer. I believe he had from 75,000 to 80,000 men.

Question. Exclusive of what you had with you?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And you had how many?

Answer. I had 22,000 men when I started; about 17,000 men when I recrossed. I believe we crossed 100,000 men when we left our old position.

Question. Do our troops fight as well as those of the enemy?

Answer. Yes, sir; I have no reason to believe that they do not.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Were any of General Hooker's 80,000 men on this side of the river?

Answer. If any, it must have been a very small force.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Will you state why the army was divided at that time in making that movement, and the advantages that resulted from it?

Answer. I think it was divided, and the 6th corps left to retain as many of the enemy as possible in front of Fredericksburg; that General Hooker supposed he had taken force enough with him to drive everything in front of him down to Fredericksburg. I think the 6th corps were left there only to make a demonstration.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Did not your order giving the disposition of the troops show that?

Answer. There is an extract from a communication from General Butterfield, dated April 30. Speaking of the general commanding, he says: "He expected when he left here, if he met with no serious opposition, to be on the heights west of Fredericksburg to-morrow noon, or shortly after; and if opposed strongly, to-morrow night."

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. If General Hooker had but 20,000 men opposed to him, and he had 80,000 men with him, how do you account for it that he did not make an attack, and why should he withdraw?

Answer. I believed if he had ordered an advance they could have gone right through. I can offer no explanation why he did not attack, and I cannot tell why he withdrew.

By the chairman :

Question. Do you know what number of men he had lost in the previous battles at Chancellorsville?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Have you any means of knowing the losses of the enemy, then, at Chancellorsville?

Answer. No, sir, I have not.

Question. What do you understand the paragraph to mean that you have read from General Butterfield's communication of the 31st of April?

Answer. General Hooker expected to move right down at once from Chancellorsville on to the heights of Fredericksburg. He expected to overcome all opposition, and would have done it if he had kept on. General Meade, with the 5th corps, at one time, two days previously, was within one mile of the position on Salem heights. Under date of April 28, I received the following: "In reference to the circular letter sent you last evening, the major general commanding directs me to say to you that your operations for to-morrow are for a demonstration only, to hold the force of the enemy, while the operations are carried on above, unless the enemy should leave his position, or should weaken his force materially by detaching." And I would say in connexion with this that General Hooker told me that he did not expect me to lose a man in taking the heights of Fredericksburg. I will append to my testimony my first letter of instructions, the substance of which I have embodied in my official report.

Question. Is there anything you deem important to state in relation to the further movements of the army up to the time General Meade was assigned to the command?

Answer. I do not think of anything now.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
April 27, 1863.

Major General SEDGWICK, *Commanding, &c.* :

The major general commanding directs that the 6th corps, Major General Sedgwick; 1st corps, Major General Reynolds; 3d corps, Major General Sickles, put themselves in position to cross the river as follows: 6th corps at Franklin's crossing; 1st corps at the crossing below, at Pollock's Mill creek; the 3d corps, as a support, to cross at either point.

These movements to be made so that the respective corps are in position—the 1st and 6th, on or before 3½ a. m. of the 29th; the 3d corps, on or before 4½ a. m. of the 29th.

The ambulances and trains to be parked in the rear, and concealed behind the range of hills visible to the enemy, and ready to move when desired.

The troops, as far as possible, ought to be concealed, up to the moment the demonstration is made.

Such batteries of the corps mentioned, and of the reserve artillery, as are required, to be placed in position under the direction of the chief of artillery, to cover the crossing. The orders of the chief of artillery, for the necessary disposition of the batteries to carry out the purposes and plans of this movement, will be complied with, and he will be charged with the responsibility of the duties intrusted to him.

Trains will be loaded with supplies of forage and provisions, to include at least eight days' short forage for the animals. Whenever an opportunity occurs, without interference, the supplies that may have been consumed, will be replaced. The troops will have the eight days' rations, as heretofore provided in orders.

The bridges, two at each crossing, to be laid complete before 3½ a. m. of the 29th, under the supervision of General Benham, who is charged with the re-

sponsibility thereof. Any troops needed to assist the engineer brigade in the performance of this duty will be furnished to General Benham, under the direction of General Sedgwick.

General Sedgwick, pending the operations, will be charged with the command of the three corps mentioned, and will make a demonstration, in full force, on Wednesday morning upon the enemy's defences, with a view to securing the telegraph road.

In the event of the enemy detaching any considerable part of his force against the troops operating at the west of Fredericksburg, he will attack and carry their works at all hazards, and establish his force on the telegraphic road, cutting off all communication, by the enemy, in order to prevent their turning his position on that road. In case the enemy should fall back in the direction of Richmond, he will pursue them with the utmost vigor, fighting them whenever and wherever he can come up with them. The major general commanding suggests that a part of his force be thrown on the Bowling Green road in case the enemy retire, and pursuit be made on both those lines. The columns, if they move with equal rapidity, will be within supporting distance, and should be required to march to each other's assistance as circumstances may require.

The ammunition trains and ambulances will be held in readiness to move first.

General Sedgwick will give such further instructions as may seem to him necessary to carry out the plans and wishes of the major general commanding.

By command of Major General Hooker :

S. WILLIAMS,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*April 30, 1863.*

GENERAL: I am directed by the major general commanding to inform you that his headquarters will be at Chancellorsville to-night. It is proposed that the army now at that point will assume the initiative to-morrow morning, and will advance along the line of the plank road, uncovering what is called Banks's ford, where bridges will be at once thrown across the river, which route will then become the shortest line of communication between the two wings of the army. Major General Butterfield will remain at the present headquarters, and will at once transmit to the major general commanding any communications you may desire to send him. It is not known, of course, what effect the advance will have upon the enemy; and the general commanding directs that you observe his movements with the utmost vigilance, and should he expose a weak point, attack him in full force and destroy him. If he should show any symptoms of falling back, the general directs that you throw your whole force on to the Bowling Green road, and pursue him with the utmost vigor, turning his fortified positions by the numerous by-roads, which you can make use of for that purpose. If any portion of his organized forces should pass off to the east of the railroad, you will by detachments pursue until you destroy or capture him. Simultaneous with the advance of your column on the Bowling Green road, if at all, a column will also advance on the telegraph road, and between you will sweep the country between the two highways and the railroad. You will be within easy communicating distance, and both columns will spring to one another's assistance in case of encountering any considerable resistance, which can best be judged of by the magnitude of the fire. Keep your provisions and forage and ammunition replenished, leaving as much of your train to be brought afterwards as practicable. Trains will only embarrass and check your forward movement, and must not accompany you, unless it be the park train.

It may be expedient for you to join the right wing on the south bank of the river, and under cover of it to Fredericksburg. Be observant of your opportunities, and when you strike let it be done to destroy. When you move forward, if you want all your artillery the batteries of the reserve here can be called for.

The enemy have at Hamilton's a pontoon train. The general expects that you will not permit them to cross the river.

You will find an able commander in Major General Reynolds.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD,

*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

Major General SEDGWICK,

*Commanding left wing, Army of the Potomac.*

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A.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY CORPS,

*May 7, 1863.*

GENERAL: I respectfully submit the following report of operations on the left:

On Tuesday, (the 28th ultimo,) in compliance with the orders of the commanding general, received that morning, the 6th corps moved to the vicinity of Franklin's crossing, near the mouth of Deep run; the 1st corps, Major General Reynolds, to a position about one mile further down the river, and the 3d corps, Major General Sickles, took position slightly to the rear, and between the positions of the 6th and 1st corps. All the troops camped that night without fires behind the heights, and concealed from the observation of the enemy. During the night the pontoons were carried to the river by hand, at the upper crossing, and shortly before daylight Brooks's division of the 6th corps crossed in boats, Russell's brigade taking the lead and receiving the fire of the enemy's pickets and reserves. The enemy's rifle-pits were immediately occupied, and three bridges were rapidly laid, under the direction of Brigadier General Benham.

At Reynolds's crossing, one mile further down, the passage was delayed by a severe fire from the enemy's sharpshooters, but was at length gallantly accomplished, General Wadsworth crossing with a portion of his division in the boats, and driving the enemy from their rifle-pits.

During the day, Wednesday, April 29, the command was held in readiness to cross, while the enemy was rapidly intrenching on his entire front, and occasionally shelling Reynolds's position on the left.

On Thursday, the 30th, Sickles's corps was detached from my command and ordered to United States ford, and during the night one of the bridges at the upper and one at the lower crossing were taken up under orders from head quarters, and sent to Banks's ford.

On Friday, May 1, at 5 p. m., an order was received from the commanding general to make a demonstration in force at one o'clock of that same day; to let it be as severe as possible, without being an attack; to assume a threatening attitude, and maintain it until further orders. It was already some hours after the time fixed for the movement, but the last clause of the order, as here stated, determined me to execute it without delay. Reynolds's corps was accordingly displayed in force; General Newton was directed to send one division of the sixth corps to Reynolds's support, to cover his bridges in case of an attack, and the light brigade across at the upper bridges to support General Brooks, who was to display his force as if for advance. When these movements had been executed an order was received countermanding the order for the demonstration.

The following day, Saturday, May 2, Reynolds's corps was withdrawn from my command and ordered to proceed to headquarters of the army at or near Chancellorsville. One division, General Wheaton's, of the 6th corps, being sent by General Newton to cover his crossing and take up his bridge, I was also ordered to take up all the bridges at Franklin's crossing and below before daylight. This order was received after daylight, at 5.25 a. m., and could not of course be executed without attracting the observation of the enemy, and leaving him free to proceed against the forces under General Hooker.

At 6.30 in the evening the order to pursue the enemy by the Bowling Green road was repeated, and my command was immediately put under arms, and advanced upon the right, driving the enemy from the Bowling Green road, and pushing him back to the woods. That night at 11 p. m. I received an order (dated 10.10 p. m.) directing me to cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg immediately upon the receipt of the order, and move in the direction of Chancellorsville until I connected with the major general commanding; to attack and destroy any force on the road, and be in the vicinity of the general at daylight. I had been informed repeatedly by Major General Butterfield, chief of staff, that the force in front of me was very small, and the whole tenor of his many despatches would have created the impression that the enemy had abandoned my front and retired from the city and its defences, had there not been more tangible evidence than the despatches in question that the chief of staff was misinformed. The order to cross at Fredericksburg found me with my entire command on the south side of the river ready to pursue by the Bowling Green road. To cross for the purpose of crossing again at Fredericksburg, where no bridges had been laid, would have occupied until long after daylight. I commenced, therefore, to move by the flank in the direction of Fredericksburg on the Bowling Green road, General Newton taking the advance, followed by the light brigade and Howe's division; a sharp skirmish commenced as the head of the column moved from the immediate vicinity of the bridges, and continued all the way to the town, the enemy falling slowly back; at the same time a sudden attack was made upon the pickets in front of the Bernard house. When the head of the column entered the town, four regiments from Wheaton's and Shaler's brigades were sent forward against the rifle-pits, and advanced within twenty yards of the enemy's works, when they received a sudden and destructive fire; an immediate assault was made, but repulsed by the fire of the rifle-pits and the batteries on the heights.

It was evident that the enemy's line of works was occupied in considerable force, and that his right, as it appeared from reports from General Brooks, extended beyond my left. It was now daylight, and batteries were placed in position to shell the enemy until the troops could be formed for another attack. General Gibbon was ordered to cross the river as soon as the bridge opposite the Lacy house was completed, and about 7 o'clock proceeded to take position on my right. General Howe was directed to move on the left of Hazel run to turn the enemy's right. Upon advancing as directed he found the works in his front were occupied, and that the character of the stream between his command and that of General Newton's prevented any movement of his division to the right. General Gibbon, upon moving forward to turn the left of the enemy, was checked by the canal and compelled to halt. Nothing remained but to carry the works by direct assault. Two storming columns were formed, composed as follows: Right column commanded by Colonel George C. Spear (who fell mortally wounded gallantly leading it,) 61st Pennsylvania volunteers, Major Dawson, and 43d New York, Colonel Baker. This column was supported by the 67th New York (1st Long Island,) Colonel Cross, and 82d Pennsylvania volunteers, Major Bassett, under command of Colonel Shaler. Left column, 7th Massachusetts, Colonel Johns, (who fell severely wounded in the assault,) and the 36th New York, Lieutenant Colonel Walsh.

Line of battle, Colonel Burnham: 5th Wisconsin, Colonel Allen, as skirmishers; 6th Maine, Lieutenant Colonel Harris; 31st New York, Colonel Jones; 23d Pennsylvania, Colonel Ely, (this latter regiment volunteering.) The column moved on the plank road and to the right of it directly up the heights. The line of battle advanced on the double-quick to the left of the plank road against the rifle-pits, neither halting nor firing a shot until they had driven the enemy from their lower line of works. In the mean time the storming parties had moved forward to the crest, and carried the works in rear of the rifle-pits, capturing the guns and many prisoners. These movements were gallantly executed under a most destructive fire. In the mean time Howe advanced rapidly on the left of Hazel run, in three columns of assault, and forced the enemy from the crest in front, capturing five guns. The entire corps was at once put in motion, and moved in pursuit. Considerable resistance was made on the next series of heights, but the position was carried without halting. A section of horse artillery on our right occupied every successive crest upon our line of march, and much annoyed our advance. At Salem chapel the enemy were re-enforced by a brigade from Banks's ford and by troops from the direction of Chancellorsville, and made a determined resistance. Brooks's division formed rapidly across the road, and Newton's upon his right, and advanced upon the woods which were strongly held by the enemy. After a sharp and prolonged contest we gained the heights, but were met by fresh troops pouring in upon the flanks of the advanced portion of the line. For a short time the crest was held by our troops with obstinate resistance, but at length the line was forced slowly back through the woods. The advance of the enemy was checked by the splendid firing of our batteries (Williston's, Rigby's and Parsons's.) Wheaton still holds his position on the right, gallantly fighting. On the left the troops are rapidly reformed, and after a short interval again advance upon the works. The enemy is once more forced back in much confusion on our right, but steadily resisting on our left. This is the condition of things when night puts an end to the battle. The troops rested on their arms until morning.

During the night the enemy was re-enforced heavily, and our wounded as far as was practicable were collected and sent to Fredericksburg. The following morning I was at an early hour informed that a column of the enemy 15,000 strong, coming from the direction of Richmond, had occupied the heights of Fredericksburg, cutting off my communications with the town. Expecting a movement of this kind, I had already formed Howe's division in line of battle to the rear. General Howe promptly extended his left to the river, and admirably checked an effort of the enemy to cut us off from Banks's ford, where a pontoon bridge had been laid the day previous. In this affair he captured two hundred prisoners and a battle flag. While these things were occurring on my left, I received a despatch from the major general commanding, informing me that he had contracted his lines; that I must look well to the safety of my corps, preserve my communications with Fredericksburg and Banks's ford, and suggested that I fall back upon the former place or recross in preference at Banks's ford where I could more readily communicate with the main body. To fall back upon Fredericksburg was out of the question; to adopt the other alternative, except under cover of night, was equally so, for the enemy still maintained his position on Salem heights, and was threatening my flanks and rear from the direction of Fredericksburg. My line was formed with the left resting on the river about midway between Fredericksburg and Banks's ford; thence extending slightly beyond the plank road, where it turned at right angles to the right, following the direction of the plank road for a mile, and then again turning to the right at right angles and recrossing the plank road in front of Salem heights, my right resting where it had been placed in the engagement of the previous evening. A line of battle of such length was necessarily weak, yet to contract it would inev-



itably provoke immediate attack from vastly superior forces. Batteries were skilfully posted by Colonel Tompkins, chief of artillery, to maintain the weaker points, and rendered valuable service. Thus fronting in three directions, I was compelled to wait attack, determined to hold the position until dark, and then to fall back upon Banks's ford. A despatch from the major general commanding had informed me that he could not relieve me, as he was in a position in which he hoped to be attacked, and that he was too far away to direct my operations. Subsequent despatches directed me to hold a position on the right bank of the river until the following morning. During the day there was more or less skirmishing on the whole front, and in the evening a most determined attack was made upon Howe's line for the purpose of cutting our communications with the river, and at the same time Brooks was attacked further towards the right. The attack on Brooks was readily repulsed, chiefly by the skirmish line, and the firing by the battery of McCartney's 1st Massachusetts battery. That on Howe was of a more determined character, being made in echelon of battalions and in columns. It was gallantly resisted by our infantry by a counter-charge, while the artillery of the division played with fearful effect upon their advance. At length our line was forced back upon the left, and General Howe directed his right to retire to a less advanced position. The movement was quietly executed, the enemy still pressing forcibly on his front. Wheaton's brigade and two regiments of the light brigade had been sent from the extreme right to his support, and Butler's battery G, 2d United States artillery, was sent rapidly by a road through the woods to his rear. The division reformed promptly, the batteries keeping up a most effective fire upon the woods, the advance of the enemy was checked, his troops were scattered and driven back with fearful loss, and the new position was easily maintained until nightfall. Several hundred prisoners, including one general officer and many others of rank, and three battle flags, were captured from the enemy in this engagement.

As soon as it was dark Newton's and Brooks's divisions, with the light brigade, fell rapidly back upon Banks's ford, and took position on the heights in that neighborhood and in the rifle-pits. When these movements were completed, Howe was directed to fall back, and at once abandoned his position and moved to the river, taking position on Newton's right.

On Tuesday the 5th, at 2 o'clock a. m., I received the order of the commanding general to withdraw from my position, cross the river, take up the bridge, and cover the ford. The order was immediately executed, the enemy meanwhile shelling the bridge from commanding positions above us on the river. When the last of the column was on the bridge I received a despatch from the commanding general countermanding the order to withdraw. My command was on the left bank; it could not recross before daylight, and must do it then, if at all, in the face of the enemy, whose batteries completely commanded the bridges. I accordingly went into camp in the vicinity of the ford, sending an adequate force to guard the river and watch the ford.

The losses of the 6th corps in these operations were 4,925 killed, wounded, and missing. We captured from the enemy, according to the best information we could obtain, five battle flags, fifteen pieces of artillery, nine of which were brought off; the remainder fell into the hands of the enemy (when the town was reoccupied) and 1,400 prisoners, including many officers of rank. No material of any kind belonging to the corps fell into the hands of the enemy except two wagons and a forge that were passing through Fredericksburg at the time of its occupation by his forces.

I must add, in closing, that the conduct of the troops, from the first crossing of the river until our return at Banks's ford, was such as to merit my heartiest approbation. To Major General Newton, commanding 3d division, and Brigadier General Brooks, commanding 1st division, I am indebted for excellent counsel, and for the gallant and spirited manner in which they carried out their

orders. To Brigadier General Howe, for his determined bravery in resisting repeated charges of an overwhelming force of the enemy, the safety of the command was greatly indebted. The gallant conduct of Colonel Burnham, in leading the light brigade to the assault on the rifle-pits in rear of Fredericksburg, is worthy of the highest admiration. It is no disparagement to the other regiments of the corps to say that the steadiness and valor of the 6th Maine, 5th Wisconsin, 7th Massachusetts, and Vermont brigade could not be excelled. The skill and personal gallantry of Brigadier Generals Bartlett, Russell, and Neill, Colonels Grant, Shaler, W. H. Brown, 36th New York, and H. W. Brown, 3d New Jersey, displayed in the management of their respective brigades, deserve the special notice of the commanding general. Colonel Brown, of the 36th New York, I regret to say, was severely wounded in the action of Sunday afternoon, and the command of the brigade devolved upon Colonel H. L. Eustis, who is especially mentioned by his division commander for gallant service. Colonel Brown, of the New Jersey brigade, was also wounded, and the command of the brigade passed to Colonel Buck, 2d New Jersey; he, too, fell wounded, and the command devolved on Colonel Penrose, 15th New Jersey. Both these officers performed their duty with admirable coolness. I desire also to call the special attention of the commanding general to the officers named, in connexion with the assault on the heights of Fredericksburg. For a further mention of officers who deserve his notice I respectfully refer to the report of division commanders herewith transmitted.

To the following named officers of my staff I am indebted for prompt and efficient assistance rendered at all times during the operations I have reported, and often under circumstances of exceeding danger and confusion:

Lieutenant Colonel M. T. McMahon, assistant adjutant general and chief of staff; Colonel C. H. Tompkins, chief of artillery; Lieutenant Colonel J. Ford Kent, inspector general and acting aide-de-camp, slightly wounded in the action of Sunday morning; Major C. A. Whitten, aide-de-camp; Major T. W. Heyd, provost marshal and acting aide-de-camp; Major H. H. Janaway, acting aide-de-camp; Captain R. F. Halsted, aide-de-camp; Captain H. C. Platt, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant J. N. Andrews, commissary of musters and acting aide-de-camp; Lieutenant W. H. Farren, acting aide-de-camp, taken prisoner while conveying important orders.

The management of the artillery under Colonel Tompkins was singularly effective. The different details of the quartermaster and commissary departments were excellently conducted by Lieutenant Colonel C. W. Toller, chief quartermaster, and Captain J. R. Schofield, chief commissary. Those officers are entitled to much credit. I notice with particular approbation the arrangements made for the prompt removal of the wounded by Surgeon Charles O'Leary, medical director of the corps, and Surgeon Charles F. Crehun, medical inspector. These arrangements were well carried into effect by Captain W. H. Robinson, chief of ambulance corps.

I respectfully request that the regiments and batteries of the corps be permitted to inscribe Fredericksburg and Salem heights on their colors. It is an honor they have bravely earned.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Brigadier General S. WILLIAMS,  
*A. A. General, Army of the Potomac.*

JOHN SEDGWICK,  
*Major General.*

[Telegrams.]

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS,  
May 2, 1863—8 p. m.

General Brooks has taken the Bowling Green road, in front of him; is still skirmishing, and will advance as long as he can see, and will then take position

for the night. Newton is moving in the direction of Hamilton's crossing, and at daylight the entire corps will be in motion.

JOHN SEDGWICK,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General BUTTERFIELD,  
*Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS,  
*May 2, 1863—11 p. m.*

This command will move at once in the direction of Chancellorsville, General Newton taking the advance, followed by the light brigade and the second and first divisions, in the order herein named. The enemy will be vigorously attacked wherever overtaken. No trains will accompany the troops but the pack-mule ammunition trains.

By command of Major General Sedgwick:

M. T. McMAHON,  
*A. A. G. and Chief of Staff.*

NEAR SALEM CHAPEL, *May 4, 1863—1.30 a. m.*

We were checked last night here, and held until dark. I believe the enemy have been re-enforcing all night, and will attack me in the morning. How is it with you? Send me instructions.

JOHN SEDGWICK,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General HOOKER.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS,  
*May 4, 1863—6.20 a. m.*

I am anxious to hear from General Hooker. There is a strong force in front of me strongly posted. I cannot attack with any hope of dislodging them until I know something definite as to the position of their main body and ours. I have sent two or three messages by Banks's ford, but none have returned, nor have I heard from the general since yesterday.

JOHN SEDGWICK,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General BUTTERFIELD,  
*Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS,  
*May 4, 1863—9 a. m.*

I am occupying the same position as last night. I have secured my communication with Banks's ford. The enemy are in possession of the heights of Fredericksburg in force. They appear strongly in our front, and are making efforts to drive us back. My strength yesterday a. m. was 22,000 men; I do not know my losses, but they were large, probably 5,000 men. I can't use the cavalry. It depends upon the condition and position of your force whether I can sustain myself here. Howe reports the enemy advancing from Fredericksburg.

JOHN SEDGWICK,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General HOOKER.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS,  
*May 4, 1863.*

I am occupying the same position as last night. The enemy made an attack on Howe; did not amount to much. I think I have made secure my communi-

cation with Banks's ford. I think they will attempt to drive me back. I await instructions.

JOHN SEDGWICK,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General BUTTERFIELD.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS,  
*May 4, 1863—11 a. m.*

I hold the same position. The enemy are pressing me hard. If I can hold my own till night I shall cross at Banks's ford under instructions from General Hooker given to Brigadier General Warren.

JOHN SEDGWICK,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General BUTTERFIELD.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS,  
*May 4, 1863—11½ a. m.*

The enemy threaten me strongly on two fronts. My position is bad for such an attack. It was assumed for attack and not for defence.

It is not improbable that bridges at Banks's ford may be sacrificed. Can you help me strongly if I am attacked?

JOHN SEDGWICK,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General HOOKER.

P. S.—My bridges are two miles from me. I am compelled to cover them above and below from attack, with the additional assistance of General Benham's brigade alone.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS,  
*May 4, 1863—1.40 p. m.*

I occupy the same position as yesterday when General Warren left me. I have no means of judging the enemy's force about me—deserters say 40,000. I shall take a position near Banks's ford and near the Taylor house, at the suggestion of General Warren; officers have already gone to select a position.

It is believed that the heights of Fredericksburg are occupied by two divisions of the enemy.

JOHN SEDGWICK,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General HOOKER.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS,  
*May 4, 1863—12½ p. m.*

I shall do my utmost to hold a position on the right bank of the Rappahannock until to-morrow.

JOHN SEDGWICK,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General BUTTERFIELD.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS,  
*May 4, 1863.*

General Howe has had a sharp fight; has taken a flag and two hundred prisoners.

JOHN SEDGWICK,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General BUTTERFIELD.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS,  
*May 4, 1863.*

The enemy are pressing me. I am taking position to cross the river whenever it is necessary.

JOHN SEDGWICK,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General BUTTERFIELD.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS,  
*May 5, 1863—3.20 a. m*

Yours just received countermanding to withdraw; almost my entire command has crossed over.

JOHN SEDGWICK,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General HOOKER.

WASHINGTON, *March 11, 1865.*

Major General JOSEPH HOOKER sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and present position in the army?

Answer. I am a major general of volunteers and a brigadier general in the regular army. I am at present on duty as a major general of volunteers, commanding the northern department, embracing the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan.

Question. At what time did you assume the command of the army of the Potomac?

Answer. On the 26th of January, 1863.

Question. Will you now state to the committee, without any interrogatories from us, all the facts connected with your command of the army of the Potomac, which you deem material for the public to know? When you have concluded your statement we will ask such further questions as we may consider necessary.

Answer. On the morning of the 26th of January, 1863, I left for Washington, and the following morning reported in person, by request, to the commanding general of the army, (General Halleck,) the Secretary of War, and his excellency the President of the United States.

Inquiry was made by the former if, in addition to the command of the army of the Potomac, I desired that of the department of Washington, and also, I believe, that of the troops on the upper Potomac; in other words, the same command that had been exercised by my predecessor. This I declined, assigning as a reason that it would require all my time to place the army of the Potomac in proper condition for field service before the coming of spring. My experience of the previous winter had satisfied me that a winter campaign in that climate, and on that soil, would be unwise and more likely to be ruinous to ourselves than to the enemy. The army acting on the offensive would be more exposed and its losses greater in men and animals, the extent of difference depending of course upon the character of the campaign.

In my interview with the President, among other subjects relating to the new position I had been called to fill, I stated the apprehension I entertained relating to the army, but said that I should cheerfully enter upon the performance of my duties. I hoped to succeed, provided he would stand between me and the commanding general of the army. This was the only request I made of

the President in assuming command. As I then stated, I deemed it necessary, for the reason that the commanding general had, to a limited extent, been identified with the army of the west and seemed to think that there was no other army in the republic. He wrote and spoke freely of the army he had commanded at the expense of one he had never seen. His disparaging comparisons and reflections had been communicated to the army, and neither it nor its commander expected justice at his hands.

Besides, I had been reliably informed that he had opposed my appointment to the command of the army against the wishes of the President and a majority of the cabinet, when the removal of Major General McClellan from command was in contemplation on two occasions; and that I was again opposed by him on the removal of Major General Burnside. The reasons for making these statements will appear in the sequel of my testimony. The 9th corps was withdrawn from my army, by an order from the major general commanding, dated January 31, 1863.

With these preliminaries, I will return to the army, and, as briefly as I can, proceed to describe its condition. It was encamped on the north bank of the Rappahannock, that river separating it from the rebel army. It had recently returned from two unsuccessful efforts to cross the river and drive the enemy from his position; the first resulting so disastrously, as to render a second effort soon after, even with propitious weather, almost futile. Before the second effort ended, the winter rains set in, and all operations for a while were suspended; the army literally finding itself buried in mud, from which there was no hope of extrication before spring.

With this prospect before it, taken in connexion with the gloom and dependency which followed the disaster of Fredericksburg, the army was in a forlorn, deplorable condition. Reference to the letters from the army at this period, public and private, affords abundant evidence of its demoralization, and these in their turn had their effect on the friends and relatives of the soldiers at home. At the time the army was turned over to me, desertions were at the rate of about 200 a day. So anxious were parents, wives, brothers and sisters to relieve their kindred, that they filled the express trains to the army with packages of citizen clothing to assist them in escaping from service. At that time perhaps a majority of the officers, especially those high in rank, were hostile to the policy of the government in the conduct of the war. The emancipation proclamation had been published a short time before, and a large element of the army had taken sides antagonistic to it, declaring that they never would have embarked in the war had they anticipated this action of the government. When rest came to the army, the disaffected, from whatever cause, began to show themselves, and make their influence felt in and out of the camps.

I may also state that at the moment I was placed in command I caused a return to be made of the absentees of the army, and found the number to be 2,922 commissioned officers, and 81,964 non-commissioned officers and privates. These were scattered all over the country, and the majority were absent from causes unknown. A copy of this return was furnished the commanding general of the army.

From these and other causes of less importance, I entered upon my duties with many misgivings and apprehensions. When it was announced to me that I had been placed in command of the army of the Potomac, I doubted, and so expressed myself, if it could be saved to the country. I make this statement to vindicate myself from the aspersion that I made use of improper influences to obtain the command. No being lives who can say that I ever expressed a desire for the position. It was conferred on me for my sword, and not for any act or word of mine indicative of a desire for it.

My first object was to prevent desertion, and when this was accomplished, my whole attention was directed to securing the return of absentees, and render-

ing those present as comfortable and contented as circumstances would allow. I granted leaves of absence and furloughs to a limited extent, and in such manner as enabled all to be absent for a few days in the course of the winter. The disloyal officers were dismissed the service as soon as evidence of the fact was brought to my knowledge. The express trains were examined by the provost marshal, and all citizens' clothing found was burned.

Important changes were introduced into the various staff departments, and especially in that of the inspector general, which was thoroughly organized and filled with the most competent officers I could select in the army. Believing idleness to be the great evil of all armies, every effort was made to keep the troops employed; and whenever the weather would permit it, they were engaged in field exercises.

The cavalry was consolidated, and placed in a higher state of efficiency than had before been known in our service; and whenever the state of the roads and the river would admit of a movement, expeditions were fitted out to attack the enemy's pickets and outposts, and gather supplies from the country in their possession, my object being to encourage and stimulate in the breasts of our men, by successes, however small, a feeling of superiority over our adversaries. In this we were eminently successful. The infantry grew in confidence, and the cavalry in all their encounters acquired a character in both armies before unknown to that arm of the service.

Our artillery had always been superior to that of the rebels, as was also our infantry, except in discipline, and that, for reasons not necessary to mention, never did equal Lee's army. With a rank and file vastly inferior to our own, intellectually and physically, that army has, by discipline alone, acquired a character for steadiness and efficiency unsurpassed, in my judgment, in ancient or modern times. We have not been able to rival it, nor has there been any near approximation to it in the other rebel armies.

During the time allowed us for preparation, the army made rapid strides in discipline, instruction, and morale, and early in April was in a condition to inspire the highest expectations. Its ranks had been filled by the return of absentees. All were actuated by feelings of confidence and devotion to the cause, and I felt that it was a living army, and one well worthy of the republic.

Early in April, though the roads were still heavy, and impracticable for artillery and wagons, I believed that the army was in condition to march on the enemy, and, as I had about 40,000 nine-months and two-years men whose terms of service would soon expire, I felt it necessary to commence operations at the earliest practicable moment. Accordingly, on the 12th of April, I gave Major General Stoneman the following instructions:

A.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
" *Camp near Falmouth, Va., April 12, 1863.*

*"Commanding Officer Cavalry Corps :*

"I am directed by the major general commanding to inform you that you will march at 7 o'clock a. m. on the 13th instant, with all your available force, except one brigade, for the purpose of turning the enemy's position on his left, and of throwing your command between him and Richmond, isolating him from his supplies, checking his retreat, and inflicting on him every possible injury which will tend to his discomfiture and defeat.

"To accomplish this, the general suggests that you ascend the Rappahannock by the different routes, keeping well out of the view of the enemy, and throwing out well to the front and flank small parties to mask your movement, and to cut off all communication with the enemy by the people in their interest living on this side of the river. To divert suspicion, it may not be amiss to have word

given out that you are in pursuit of Jones's guerillas, as they are operating extensively in the Shenandoah valley, in the direction of Winchester. He further suggests that you select for your place of crossing the Rappahannock some point to the west of the Alexandria and Orange railroad, which can only be determined by the circumstances as they are found on the arrival of your advance.

"In the vicinity of Culpeper you will be likely to run against Fitzhugh Lee's brigade of cavalry, consisting of about two thousand men, which it is expected you will be able to disperse and destroy without delay to your advance, or detriment to any considerable number of your command.

"At Gordonsville the enemy have a small provost guard of infantry, which it is expected you will destroy, if it can be done without delaying your forward movement. From there it is expected that you will be able to push forward to the Aquia and Richmond railroad, somewhere in the vicinity of Saxton's Junction, destroying along your whole route the railroad bridges, trains of cars, depots of provisions, lines of telegraphic communication, &c. The general directs that you go prepared with all the means necessary to accomplish this work effectually.

"As the line of the railroad from Aquia to Richmond presents the shortest one for the enemy to retire on, it is more than probable that he will avail himself of it, and the usually travelled highways on each side of it, for this purpose; in which event you will select the strongest positions, such as the banks of streams, commanding heights, &c., in order to check or prevent it, and, if unsuccessful, you will fall upon his flanks, attack his artillery and trains, and harass him until he is exhausted and out of supplies. Moments of delay will be hours and days to the army in pursuit.

"If the enemy should retire by Culpeper and Gordonsville, you will endeavor to hold your force in his front, and harass him day and night, on the march and in camp, unceasingly. If you cannot cut off from his column large slices, the general desires that you will not fail to take small ones. Let your watchword be *fight*, and let all your orders be *fight*, FIGHT, FIGHT, bearing in mind that time is as valuable to the general as the rebel carcasses.

"It is not in the power of the rebels to oppose you with more than five thousand sabres, and those badly mounted, and, after they leave Culpeper, without forage and rations. Keep them from Richmond, and sooner or later they must fall into our hands.

"The general desires you to understand that he considers the primary object of your movement the cutting of the enemy's communication with Richmond by the Fredericksburg route, checking his retreat over those lines, and he wishes to make everything subservient to that object. He desires that you will keep yourself informed of the enemy's whereabouts, and attack him wherever you find him.

"If, in your operations, an opportunity should present itself for you to detach a force to Charlottesville, which is almost unguarded, and destroy depots of supplies said to be there, or along the line of the Aquia railroad in the direction of Richmond, to destroy the bridges, &c., or the crossings of the Pamunkey, in the direction of West Point, destroying the ferries, felling trees to prevent or check the crossing, they will all greatly contribute to our complete success.

"You may rely upon the general's being in communication with you before your supplies are exhausted. Let him hear from you as often as necessary and practicable.

"A brigade of infantry will march to-morrow morning at eight o'clock for Kelly's ford, with one battery, and a regiment to the United States ford and Banks's ford to threaten and hold those places.

"It devolves upon you, general, to take the initiative in the forward movement of this grand army, and on you and your noble command must depend, in a great measure, the extent and brilliancy of our success. Bear in mind that



celerity, audacity, and resolution are everything in war, and especially is it the case with the command you have, and the enterprise on which you are about to embark.

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“S. WILLIAMS,  
“Assistant Adjutant General.”

I may add, that, after having been assigned to command, the only instructions I received for my government will be found in the following extract from a letter from the major general commanding the army :

[Extract.]

B.

“HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
“Washington, January 31, 1863.

“GENERAL :

“In regard to the operations of your own army you can best judge when and where it can move to the greatest advantage, keeping in view always the importance of covering Washington and Harper’s Ferry, either directly, or by so operating as to be able to punish any force of the enemy sent against them.

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“H. W. HALLECK,  
“General-in-Chief.”

“Major General J. HOOKER,  
“Commanding Army of the Potomac.”

Neither the condition of the army nor the state of the roads admitted of an earlier movement, and even then I did not regard it as practicable to move trains and artillery belonging to the infantry corps over the latter; and, accordingly, as the order explains my object in moving, the cavalry was to cut the enemy’s communications with his base, and when this was done, to cross the infantry below Fredericksburg and attack him or pursue, as occasion might require. As he kept but a limited amount of stores at Fredericksburg, it was believed that he would have to abandon his defences immediately in our front, and retire in the direction of Richmond. In order to appreciate the difficulties and the hazardous nature of the movement, it may be proper to add that the line of the Rappahannock occupied by the enemy was a position of a formidable character, and, as I found it, one that I could not reasonably expect to carry by force. The river flows through a deep channel, not fordable at any point at this season of the year, and from its precipitous and mountainous banks admitted of no approach except at a few points, and these had been indicated to the enemy by the unsuccessful efforts of my predecessor in command. Besides, the merits and demerits of all the crossings for twenty-five miles up and down the river from Falmouth had been published in the report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and the opinions of the more prominent officers respecting them were well known to the rebel army through this source, and advantage had been taken of the information to perfect the means of defence at the exposed points. In this way the river had been rendered impracticable of passage for a distance of fifty miles except by stratagem. In fact the southern bank of the river may be said to have been protected by a continuous line of defence for this space, and at the only points admitting of the passage of our army two or three

lines of rifle-pits had been thrown up, with epaulments for artillery. Especially was this the case at what is called Banks's ford and the United States ford, each of which was held by a sufficient force to defend it. Near Fredericksburg, and below that city, the high banks receded from the river, leaving low or bottom land between them and the river; here the line of the enemy's defence followed the high ground, and the obstacle was not so much in crossing the river as in forcing his defences afterwards. There were no fords in the river below Fredericksburg at any stage of water, and none above where the river forks with the Rapidan practicable at this season of the year. Ten or twelve miles above the junction was Kelly's ford, pitted and abatised, but feebly defended. Crossing at this point involved the passage of two rivers, both mountain torrents, and sensitive to the slightest rains; bridges were out of the question, as they could not be transported over the treacherous roads at the time the cavalry was ordered to march. The movement projected was, therefore, the only one open to me, with no reasonable chance of succeeding even in this unless conducted with secrecy and despatch.

The cavalry left on the 13th, and after marching two days succeeded in throwing one division across the river, above Rappahannock station, but they were obliged to return, by swimming their horses, from the sudden rise in the river. The second day out it commenced storming, and the river was so much swollen as to render its passage impossible. Instructions were given for the cavalry to remain in position where the storm found them, and, as the river continued impassable until the 27th, the movement was suspended until that time. During this interval several of my infantry regiments were discharged from expiration of term of service, while the term of others was so nearly out that several corps commanders recommended that they should be left in camp during the march, which was soon to follow.

As an evidence of the light in which the army was regarded by me in the position in which I had received it, I may be permitted to introduce a telegram addressed by me to Major General Peck, then at Suffolk, dated April 21:

"Am glad to hear good tidings from you. You must be patient with me. I must play with these devils before I can spring. Remember that my army is at the bottom of a well, and the enemy holds the top."

But as the season was now more advanced, and the roads firmer, with a prospect that the rainy season had ended, I concluded to change my plan and strike for the whole rebel army instead of forcing it back on its line of retreat, which was as much as I could hope to accomplish in executing my first design.

As modified, the problem was to throw a sufficient infantry force to cross at Kelly's ford, descend the Rappahannock, and knock away the enemy's forces holding the United States and Banks's fords by attacking them in rear, and as soon as these fords were opened to re-enforce the marching column sufficiently for them to continue the march upon the flank of the rebel army until his whole force was routed, and, if successful, his retreat intercepted. Simultaneous with this movement on the right, the left were to cross the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg and threaten the enemy in that quarter, including his depot of supplies, to prevent his despatching an overwhelming force to his left.

In pursuance of this plan the following instructions were given the 11th, 12th, 2d, and 5th corps:

#### E.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"Camp near Falmouth, Va., April 26, 1863.

"Commanding Officer 11th Corps and Commanding Officer 12th Corps:

"I am directed by the major general commanding to inform you that the 11th and 12th corps, in the order named, will begin their march at sunrise to-

morrow morning; the former to encamp as near Kelly's ford as practicable without discovering itself to the enemy, and the latter as nearly in its rear as circumstances will permit. They will be established in their camps on or before 4 o'clock p. m. on Tuesday, the 28th instant. Corps commanders will be held responsible that their men are kept in camp and do not go to the river.

"Each corps will march with one battery and two ambulances to a division and the pack train of small ammunition. If necessary, a small number of wagons can accompany the column to the camp with forage for animals. The balance of the trains will be parked in the vicinity of Banks's ford, off the road, and convenient to crossing the river at that point. The ammunition wagons and ambulances being in readiness to take the lead in the column, no extra guards for this part of the train will be required.

"Corps commanders can leave behind such men of those whose time of service is about to expire as they think proper, with such instructions for the safety of the camps and preservation of the public property as they may deem necessary. All property not removed with the troops must be turned in to the quartermaster.

"Corps commanders will consider so much of the above as relates to the destination of their commands as strictly confidential.

"Very respectfully, &c.,

"S. WILLIAMS,  
"Assistant Adjutant General."

("Copy furnished commanding officer of 5th corps.")

F.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"Camp near Falmouth, Va., April 27, 1863.

"Commanding Officer 2d Corps :

"GENERAL : The major general commanding directs that you move at sunrise to-morrow morning two divisions of your corps, to encamp as near as practicable at Banks's ford, without exposing your camps to the view of the enemy. That one brigade and one battery of one of these two divisions take position at United States ford. The movement to be made quietly; the officers and men restrained from exhibiting themselves, or making any show or appearance upon the river beyond the necessities of picket duty. The division left in camp should be the one whose camps are most exposed to the view of the enemy. All of the artillery attached to the two divisions moving up the river must move with them, and be ready to be thrown into position to cover the passage of the river, and to drive the enemy from his defences thrown up opposite that point. Two ambulances to each division will move with them, and a few wagons only allowed, to carry sufficient forage for the animals for four or five days. The pack mule train, for small-arm ammunition, will move with the column, or, in lieu of it, General Couch having none organized, a reserve of ammunition in wagons, to be kept out of the way of troops and the communications, ready to move forward if needed. The troops will have the (eight days) rations heretofore provided in orders. The trains left will be parked to the rear of Falmouth station, and out of the sight of the enemy, and out of the way of the business of the station. The division left in camp will be directed to keep up the picket line on the river, and in readiness to repel any attempt that may be made by the enemy to cross the river. Should the demonstration of the enemy prove of sufficient strength to indicate such a purpose, the 3d corps will be available for support. The division left in camp, as well as the divisions at Banks's and United States fords, will be held in readiness to follow up any successful movements without delay.

“In moving from camp or breaking camps the practice of large fires and burning camp rubbish will not be permitted.

“If there are any two-years men that you consider unreliable in consequence of the near expiration of their term of service, you will leave them on duty with the division left behind. The commanding general desires that you command in person the two divisions going up the river.

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“S. WILLIAMS,  
“*Assistant Adjutant General.*”

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“*Camp near Falmouth, Va., April 27, 1863—1 a. m.*

“*Commanding Officer 5th Corps :*

“The major general commanding directs me to inform you that your corps is to march to-morrow, so as to reach the vicinity of Kelly’s ford by Tuesday at 4 p. m. The corps of Generals Slocum and Howard take the same direction (and will be on the same route, probably) from Hartwood. The provisions as to rations in former circular (eight days) will be complied with. The trains will be left at the vicinity of Stoneman’s switch. Such two-years men as you may desire to leave for the purpose may remain with them as guards. Further details of the orders will be sent you early to-morrow morning. Two ambulances and one battery only will accompany each division, with the pack-train of small-arm ammunition. A few wagons only to accompany the column, sufficient to carry forage for the animals.

“The destination of your command will be strictly confidential. General Couch has been directed to send a regiment to Banks’s ford to relieve your regiment there.

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,  
“*Major General, Chief of Staff.*”

These corps marched as directed, and on the night of the 28th bivouacked in the vicinity of Kelly’s ford. Knowing that the passage of the river would be resisted, and perhaps defeated, if brought to the knowledge of the enemy, I had taken every precaution in my power to keep it a profound secret. I had not even communicated it to my corps commanders, or the officers of my staff. On the 28th I proceeded to Morrisville to superintend in person the passage of the river, and while there communicated the following instructions to the advanced column, consisting of the 5th, 11th, and 12th corps :

H.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“*Morrisville, Va., April 28, 1863.*

“*Commanding Officer 5th Corps :*

“I am directed by the major general commanding to request that you will exercise all of your accustomed zeal and devotion in hastening the passage of the troops across the Rappahannock. He feels assured that you will.

“It is a great object to effect the passage of the Rapidan to-morrow, as you well know, and in so doing the United States ford will be uncovered, and our line of communication established with the left wing of the army.

“I enclose herewith copies of instructions to Major General Slocum, Brigadier General Pleasonton, and Captain Comstock, and also reports of the strength of the enemy’s forces holding fords on the Rappahannock above its junction with the Rapidan. I hope that you will be able to pick up some of them. Use your cavalry freely, and send them well out to bring you timely information. Would it not be well to detach a division to seize the ford? From the most reliable

information in our possession the ford must be a good one now. The cavalry can ascertain.

"The general will join you as soon as he can, probably not until the United States ford is opened. A portion of Couch's corps now hold it on our side. The general will direct two aides-de-camp to report to you to furnish him with information. Use them freely. Brigadier General Warren will report as soon as you cross the Rapidan.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"WILLIAM L. CANDLER,  
"Captain and A. D. C."

G.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"Morrisville, Va., April 28, 1863.

"Major General SLOCUM,

"Commanding 11th and 12th Corps :

"I am directed by the major general commanding to inform you that so long as the 11th and 12th corps are operating on the same line, you will exercise the command of both.

"The general directs that the 11th corps cross to the opposite side of the river to-night, and that the 12th corps commence crossing at daylight to-morrow morning, and to be thrown over with all possible rapidity, and both corps march by the most direct route, without delay, and seize the bridge, if standing, and the ford at Germania mills. He suggests that you make use of a cavalry regiment and three or four smart marching regiments to execute this duty, and that you cross both of your corps over the Rapidan river to-morrow. You will find guides in General Pleasanton's cavalry.

"Major General Meade will move on almost a parallel line at the same time, and will be in easy communication with you. He will cross at Ely's ford. If his passage should be disputed, as you will probably be able to learn from the firing, or through your communication with that officer, the general directs that you dispatch a corps along the south bank of the Rapidan, to knock away the enemy to enable him to cross, and when the 5th corps is across, that you push on with both of your corps to Chancellorsville, at which point the three corps will come together, and which you will command by virtue of your seniority.

"The enemy have a brigade holding the United States ford, which they will abandon as soon as they hear of your approach. This will open the United States ford to us, when bridges will at once be thrown across the river, and will afford you a direct communication with headquarters. Telegraphic communication is established from that point.

"If your cavalry is well advanced from Chancellorsville you will be able to ascertain whether or not the enemy is detaching forces from behind Fredericksburg to resist your advance. If not in any considerable force, the general desires that you will endeavor to advance at all hazards, securing a position on the plank road, and uncovering Banks's ford, which is also defended by a brigade of rebel infantry and a battery. If the enemy should be greatly re-enforced you will then select a strong position, and compel him to attack you on your ground. You will have nearly forty thousand men, which is more than he can spare to send against you. Every incident of your advance you will communicate to the general as soon as communication is established by the United States ford. Two aides-de-camp are sent to report to you for the service. You are already advised of the operations going on below Fredericksburg.

"The general desires that not a moment be lost until our troops are established at or near Chancellorsville. From that moment all will be ours. A copy of this will be furnished Major General Meade.

“It will be much easier to replenish batteries, ammunition, &c., by Banks’s ford than by the United States ford if you should succeed in uncovering it.

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“WM. L. CANDLER.

“*Captain and A. D. C.*”

The 11th corps crossed the Rappahannock that night, followed by the 12th and 5th corps next morning, and all took up the line of march down the river, the 11th and 12th corps in the direction of the Germania ford, and the 5th that of Ely’s ford on the Rapidan river, and that day and night effected the passage of that river. I may remark that the movement had been made with so much secrecy and despatch that the head of the columns had reached the crossings of the Rapidan before the enemy was apprised of their approach. Three hours after these corps had passed in rear of Richard’s ford the enemy continued to picket it with his cavalry, forty of whom were captured by my aide-de-camp on approaching the ford to forward despatches to me. The following morning, the 30th, the enemy were driven from their position at the United States ford, where bridges were thrown and the column moved on, and at night established their line of battle near Chancellorsville, within eleven miles of the main body of the enemy. As great misapprehension has existed regarding the strength of this column, I may state that the monthly returns of the three corps showed an aggregate of 44,661 for duty on the 30th of April, including the artillery, but, as the bulk of the latter did not march with the corps, and excluding heavy detachments left with the trains as well as regiments left behind for discharge, it is not probable that the whole force established at Chancellorsville exceeded 36,000 men. Of their achievements within the preceding four days, the marches they made—a part of the time resisted by the enemy’s cavalry and infantry—and the passage of two rivers, it is not necessary for me to speak; soldiers and citizens who give the subject their attention will appreciate the sublimity of their exertions.

Leaving the right wing for a moment, I will testify regarding the operations of the left wing of the army, which commenced under the following instructions to Major General Sedgwick, dated April 27:

### K.

#### “HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“*Camp near Falmouth, Va., April 27, 1863.*

“*Commanding Officer 6th Corps :*

“The major general commanding directs that the 6th corps, Major General Sedgwick, 1st corps, Major General Reynolds, 3d corps, Major General Sickles, put themselves in position to cross the river as follows: 6th corps at Franklin’s crossing; 1st corps at the crossing below, at Pollock’s Mill creek; the 3d corps, as a support, to cross at either point.

“These movements to be made so that the respective corps are in position, the 1st and 6th on or before 3½ a. m. of the 29th; the 3d corps on or before 4½ a. m. of the 29th.

“The ambulances and trains to be packed in the rear, and concealed behind the range of hills visible to the enemy, and ready to move when desired.

“The troops, as far as possible, ought to be concealed up to the moment the demonstration is made.

“Such batteries of the corps mentioned, and of the reserve artillery as are required, to be placed in position under the direction of the chief of artillery to cover the crossing. The orders of the chief of artillery for the necessary disposition of the batteries to carry out the purposes and plans of this movement

will be complied with, and he will be charged with the responsibility of the duties intrusted to him.

“Trains will be loaded with supplies of forage and provisions, to include, at least, eight days’ short forage for the animals. Whenever an opportunity occurs, without interference, the supplies that may have been consumed will be replaced. The troops will have the eight days’ rations as heretofore provided in orders.

“The bridges, two at each crossing, to be laid complete before 3½ a. m. of the 29th, under the supervision of General Benham, who is charged with the responsibility thereof. Any troops needed to assist the engineer brigade in the performance of this duty will be furnished to General Benham, under the direction of General Sedgwick.

“General Sedgwick, pending the operation, will be charged with the command of the three corps mentioned, and will make a demonstration in full force on Wednesday morning upon the enemy’s defences, with a view to securing the telegraph road.

“In the event of the enemy detaching any considerable part of his force against the troops operating at the west of Fredericksburg, he will attack and carry their works at all hazards, and establish his force on the telegraph road, cutting off all communication by the enemy, in order to prevent their turning his position on that road. In case the enemy should fall back on Richmond, he will pursue them with the utmost vigor, fighting them whenever and wherever he can come up with them.

“The major general commanding suggests that a part of his force be thrown on the Bowling Green road in case the enemy retire, and pursuit be made on both these lines. The columns, if they move with equal rapidity, will be within supporting distance, and should be required to march to each other’s assistance as circumstances may require. The ammunition trains and ambulances will be held in readiness to move first.

“General Sedgwick will give such further instructions as may seem to him necessary to carry out the plans and wishes of the major general commanding.

“By command of Major General Hooker :

“S. WILLIAMS,  
“Assistant Adjutant General.”

The movements indicated in this order were executed with no less precision and despatch than had been observed on the right. The corps moved to their positions and threw their bridges across the Rappahannock, under a severe fire of the rebel sharpshooters, and troops were crossed to defend them.

On the 30th General Sedgwick was directed to make a demonstration under the following orders :

#### L.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“Camp near Falmouth, Va., April 30, 1863—8½ a. m.

“Major General SEDGWICK,

“Commanding Left Wing Army of the Potomac :

“I am directed by the major general commanding to instruct you to make a demonstration on the enemy’s lines in the direction of Hamilton’s crossing at 1 o’clock, the object being simply to ascertain whether or not the enemy continues to hug his defences in full force ; and if he should have abandoned them, to take possession of his works and the commanding ground in their vicinity. In his opinion a corps should be used for this service—a portion of it advanced, while the balance is held in supporting distance, and your whole force held in readiness to spring to their relief should an effort be made to overpower them

or to cut them off. This demonstration will be made for no other purpose than that stated. The enemy must not be attacked behind his defences if held in force. No train but that of a few ambulances should accompany the column. As soon as the required information is obtained the column can return. Look well after the defences of your bridge heads during this movement.

"If you are certain that the enemy is in full force in your front, I am instructed by the commanding general to say that the demonstration herein directed will not be made. The general must know the position of affairs, and be advised fully; also as to what you do, at once.

"The enemy have at Hamilton's a pontoon train. The general expects that you will not permit them to cross the river.

"When you move forward, if you want all your artillery, the batteries of the reserve here can be called for.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"S. WILLIAMS,

"*Assistant Adjutant General.*"

Demonstrations were made on the enemy's positions on his right, and it was reported to me that they were held in force.

As soon as intelligence reached me that the United States ford had been opened, the following orders were communicated to the commanding officer of the 2d corps, two divisions of which had already taken position at that ford:

### H 3.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"*Camp near Falmouth, Va., April 30, 1863.*

"Major General COUCH, *United States Ford* :

"The major general commanding directs me to enclose you copy of instructions to Generals Slocum and Meade. You are directed to cross as speedily as practicable with your infantry, artillery, ammunition wagons, and a few wagons for forage, and two ambulances to a division. You will have the bridge laid without delay as soon as the enemy leaves. Don't let a small force keep you back. Establish rapid communications with the telegraph at Banks's ford, and with Meade and Slocum, as the telegraph from Banks's to United States ford works so slow. You will move to support Slocum. Be careful that no trains cross at United States ford until further orders, as they will only be in the way. Meade's ammunition wagons may have to cross. The trains should cross at some point to be designated.

"The general directs me to add, in moving in support of Slocum, move towards the heaviest firing, in the event of his advance being disputed. The general wishes you to be up with him to-night.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,

"*Major General, Chief of Staff.*"

The remaining division of this corps had been left in Falmouth, as its camp, which was in full view of the enemy, could not be moved without exciting his suspicions. On the 30th, the following orders were sent the commanding officer of the 3d corps :



## H 2.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*“ Camp near Falmouth, Va., April 30—1863. 12.30 p. m.*

“*Commanding Officer 3d Corps:*

“Upon the receipt of this order you will proceed with your corps, without delay, by the shortest road, concealed from view of the enemy, to United States ford. The batteries taken from your command and placed in position to cover the crossing will be relieved, it is expected, in time to join you. It is desired that your troops and your trains, entire, in marching, should be concealed from the sight of the enemy, that they may not be aware of your movement. Your pack mules, small arm-ammunition train, and two ambulances to a division, to accompany you. Forage for animals for two days from to-day.

“The greatest promptness in executing this movement and arriving at your destination is expected of you. As much of your corps as can cross on the bridge at United States ford to cross to-night, and all to cross by seven a. m. to-morrow. General Couch precedes you, and the batteries left by General Meade also. After crossing, you will take up your line of march towards Chancellorsville. Keep your troops in as good condition, while fully complying with your orders.

“Don't burden yourself with any transportation not absolutely needed. Every wagon is one too many in the way where they can be dispensed with. Send some one ahead to see your road clear, and use your pioneers when necessary.

“By command of Major General Hooker :

“DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,  
*“ Major General, Chief of Staff.”*

The following instructions for the officer in command of the left wing, dated April 30, and orders for the two divisions of the 2d corps to re-enforce the column at Chancellorsville, were also sent. I then left to join the troops at Chancellorsville, which I did that night.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*“ Camp near Falmouth, Va., April 30, 1863.*

“Major General SEDGWICK, *Commanding Left Wing Army of the Potomac:*

“I am directed by the major general commanding to inform you that his headquarters will be at Chancellorsville to-night. It is proposed that the army now at that point will assume the initiative to-morrow morning, and will advance along the line of the plank road, uncovering what is called Banks's ford, where bridges will be at once thrown across the river, which route will then become the shortest line of communication between the two wings of the army. Major General Butterfield will remain at the present headquarters, and will at once transmit to the major general commanding any communications you may desire to send him.

“It is not known, of course, what effect the advance will have upon the enemy, and the general commanding directs that you observe his movements with the utmost vigilance, and should he expose a weak point attack him in full force and destroy him. If he should show any symptoms of falling back, the general directs that you throw your whole force on to the Bowling Green road, and pursue him with the utmost vigor, turning his fortified positions by the numerous by-roads which you can make use of for that purpose. If any portion of his organized forces should pass off to the east of the railroad you will, by detachments, pursue until you destroy or capture him.

"Simultaneous with the advance of your column on the Bowling Green road, if at all, a column will also advance on the telegraph road, and between you will sweep the country between the two highways and the railroad. You will be within easy communication, and both columns will spring to one another's assistance in case of encountering any considerable resistance, which can best be judged of by the magnitude of the fire.

"Keep your provisions and ammunition and forage replenished, leaving as much of your train to be brought afterwards as practicable. Trains will only embarrass and check your forward movement, and must not accompany you, unless it be the pack train.

"It may be expedient for you to join the right wing on the south bank of the river, and under cover of it to Fredericksburg. Be observant of your opportunities, and when you strike let it be done to destroy. When you move forward, if you want all your artillery, the batteries of the reserve here can be called for. The enemy have at Hamilton's a pontoon train. The general expects that you will not permit them to cross the river. You will find an able commander in Major General Reynolds.

"Very respectfully, &c.,

"DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,  
"Major General, Chief of Staff,"

Major General Butterfield remained at camp, as from that point, it being central, and the wires meeting there, it was necessary I should leave some one in whose capacity and judgment I had confidence. On reaching Chancellorsville I found the troops had arrived there in season to send out in advance and ascertain by reconnoissance the position of the enemy. Directly on hearing that my forces had crossed the Rapidan river the rebel commander withdrew his army except Early's division and Barksdale's brigade, and marched out to oppose a further advance of our troops. As soon as Couch's divisions and Sickles's corps came up I directed an advance for the purpose, in the first instance, of driving the enemy away from Banks's ford, which was six miles down the river, in order that we might be in closer communication with the left wing of the army. The following is a copy of the order :

### I.

[Circular.]

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC,  
"Chancellorsville, May 1, 1863.

"The 5th corps, including three batteries, will be thrown on to the river road by the most direct route, the head of it advanced to near midway between Mott and Golin runs, the movement to be masked by small parties thrown out in advance, and to be completed at 2 o'clock.

"The 12th corps, including its batteries, will be massed below the plank road, the head of it resting near Tabernacle church, and masked from the view of the enemy by small advanced parties, and the movement to be completed at 12 o'clock to enable the 11th corps to take its position.

"One division of the 2d corps, with one battery, will take a position at Tod's tavern, and will throw out strong detachments on the approaches in the direction of the enemy.

"The other division and batteries of the corps will be massed, out of the road, near Chancellorsville. These dispositions to be made at once.

"The 3d corps will be massed, as fast as it arrives, about one mile from Chancellorsville, on the United States ford road, excepting one brigade with a battery, which will take position at Dowdall's tavern.

“General Pleasonton will hold his command, excepting those otherwise engaged, at Chancellorsville. After the movement commences headquarters will be at Tabernacle church.

“The 11th corps, with its batteries, will be massed on the plank road, about one mile in rear of the 12th. This movement to be completed at 2 o'clock.

“By command of Major General Hooker :

“WILLIAM L. CANDLER,

“*Captain, and Aide-de-Camp.*”

Two roads lead from Chancellorsville to Fredericksburg, which intersect about four miles from Chancellorsville, in the direction in which we were marching. It was at this point that the enemy had established his main force, his right reaching to the south of the plank road, and his left resting on the Rappahannock.

The ground in our vicinity was broken and covered with dense forests, much of which was impenetrable to infantry. The ravines to the north of the road were deep, and their general direction was at right angles to the Rappahannock, affording the enemy a formidable position behind each of them. Here was the enemy's entire army, with the exception, as I have already stated, of Early's division and Barksdale's brigade, making a force of about 8,000 men, which had been left to hold the line from below Hamilton's crossing to the heights above Fredericksburg, a distance of between five and six miles. They had left one entire brigade to guard their depot at Hamilton's crossing; and two regiments, the 18th and 21st Mississippi, to defend Fredericksburg.

The 12th corps had been ordered to advance on the plank road, to be followed by the 11th corps; the 5th corps had been ordered to advance on the road nearest the river, to be followed by the 2d corps. They had proceeded but a short distance when the head of the column emerged from the heavy forest and discovered the enemy to be advancing in line of battle. Nearly all of the 12th corps had emerged from the forest at that moment, but, as the passage-way through the forest was narrow, I was satisfied that I could not throw troops through it fast enough to resist the advance of General Lee, and was apprehensive of being whipped in detail.

Accordingly, instructions were given for the troops in advance to return and establish themselves on the line they had just left, and to hold themselves in readiness to receive the enemy. In the execution of this order a part of the 12th corps and one division of the 5th corps had a skirmish with the enemy, but returned and established themselves on the line in good order. The enemy continued his advance, and upon reaching the forest, with a contracted front, fell upon the 12th and 2d corps, but were promptly and easily repulsed. Nothing more transpired that night, except perhaps some random firing among the pickets.

May 2d, the following order was sent the 1st corps, and they joined me the following morning :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“*Chancellorsville, Va., May 2, 1863—1.55 a. m.*

“Major General BUTTERFIELD :

“Direct for all of the bridges to be taken up at Franklin's crossing and below before daylight, and for Reynolds's corps to march at once, with pack train, to report at headquarters.

“JOSEPH HOOKER,

“*Major General, Commanding.*”

On the morning of the 2d May I made an examination of the line, and returned to Chancellorsville about 9 o'clock a. m., after having pointed out to the corps commanders where I found their lines were weak, and told them what dispositions to make to render them stronger. At 9.30 a. m., the following was addressed to the commanding officers of the 11th and 12th corps :

J.

[Circular.]

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
 “Chancellorsville, Va., May 2, 1863—9.30 a. m.

“Major General SLOCUM and Major General HOWARD :

“I am directed by the major general commanding to say that the disposition you have made of your corps has been with a view to a front attack by the enemy. If he should throw himself upon your flank, he wishes you to examine the ground and determine upon the positions you will take in that event, in order that you may be prepared for him in whatever direction he advances. He suggests that you have heavy reserves well in hand to meet this contingency. The right of your line does not appear to be strong enough. No artificial defences worth naming have been thrown up, and there appears to be a scarcity of troops at that point, and not, in the general’s opinion, as favorably posted as might be.

“We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right. Please advance your pickets, for purposes of observation, as far as may be safe, in order to obtain timely information of their approach.

“JAMES H. VAN ALLEN,  
 “Brigadier General and Aide-de-Camp.”

At that time it had been reported to me that the enemy had been making a flank movement to our right, and I gave directions, as will be seen by the instructions just read, to hold the 11th and 12th corps in readiness to receive an attack in that direction, at the same time suggesting that heavy reserves be held well in hand prepared for that contingency ; and also directing that pickets be well advanced for the purpose of observation, and in order that we might have timely information of the approach of the enemy. These movements of the enemy, it should be remembered, were made in broad daylight, and were observed from the headquarters of the 1st division of the 11th corps, which was then holding the right of the army.

As a still further precaution, I directed two divisions of the 3d corps to follow up the movement. This order was promptly executed, but the two divisions did not reach the line of the enemy’s flank movement until after the main column had passed, (still in season to capture nearly a regiment of its rear guard,) and they were ordered to follow up the enemy’s column that had passed off to our right. I learned from the prisoners that this column was Jackson’s corps, numbering about 25,000 men. His route had been over a by-road through the forest, diagonally across my front, and approaching within two or three miles of the right of the 11th corps.

By 6 o’clock a rattling musketry fire was heard on the right, and I dispatched two aides-de-camp to that point ; but before they reached there the whole of the right division (Deven’s) was flying, panic-stricken, to the rear along the line of defence held by the 11th corps, and sweeping the corps before it as they went. Soon after the enemy appeared in sight. Fearing that the fugitives would stampede the whole army, I directed the cavalry with me, assisted by my staff, to charge them, sabre in hand, but no human power could arrest their flight.

Seeing this, I double-quickened Berry’s division of the 3d corps, a division that had never failed me, and a brigade of the 2d corps, then near me, both in reserve, to cover the rear of the 11th corps, and, if possible, to seize, and hold, at all hazards, the high ground which had been abandoned by that corps. Directions were also given for the two divisions of the 3d corps, under General Sickles, then

far in advance of the line which had been occupied by the 11th corps, under General Howard, to attack the enemy on his flank, in order, if possible, to check his further advance. The position of General Sickles was extremely critical, as the enemy had it in their power to cut off his communication with the main army.

While these operations were progressing on the right a front attack was made under Lee on the 12th and 2d corps, but it was handsomely repulsed.

This was the condition of affairs when night overtook us. General Berry, after going perhaps three-fourths of a mile, reported that the enemy was already in possession of the ground commanding my position, and that he had been compelled to establish his line in the valley on the Chancellorsville side of that high ground. As soon as this was communicated to me, I directed Generals Warren and Comstock to trace out a new line which I pointed out to them on the map, and to do it that night, as I would not be able to hold the one I then occupied after the enemy should renew his attack the next morning.

The bad conduct of the 11th corps had cost me the key of my position, and had very much embarrassed me by contracting my sphere of action. The position which had been held by the left of that corps was the most commanding one in the vicinity. In the possession of the enemy, it would enable him with his artillery to enfilade the lines held by the 12th and 2d corps. He could drive from the plain in front of the Chancellorsville house all the artillery posted to command the junction of the plank road and the old pike, and he could drive from the plain all the force that might be upon it. To wrest this position from the enemy after his batteries were established on it would have required slender columns of infantry, which he could destroy as fast as they were thrown upon it.

The 11th corps had been completely surprised and disgracefully routed. Despite my instructions to be in readiness for the enemy, at the time the attack was made upon it on the right their arms were stacked, and the men were away from them and scattered about for the purpose of cooking their suppers and for other purposes. No disposition had been made to receive an attack, and there were no pickets on the alert to advise of the approach of an enemy.

It has been reported to me that the corps commander was under the impression that the enemy was retiring. How this may be I do not know; I only know that my instructions were utterly and criminally disregarded. I cannot learn that my instructions were ever communicated to but one of his division commanders, and he happened to be with him at the time they were received.

In order that no blame may be attached to the commander of the 12th corps, after the publication of the circular which has been made a part of my testimony, it is but just for me to exonerate him. Under his instructions he was expected only to look out for and protect his own right.

Nothing of importance transpired during the night of the 2d of May with the exception of some firing along the picket lines, and in Sickles's front. General Sickles established his communication with the main army, and placed his troops in position to be ready for the renewal of the conflict in the morning.

I may add, that during this night the rebel General Jackson was killed by his own men.

Every disposition was made of our forces to hold our line as long as practicable, for the purpose of being in readiness to co-operate with the movement which had been ordered to be made on our left, an account of which I will give hereafter.

The attack was renewed by the enemy about 7 o'clock in the morning, and was bravely resisted with the limited number of troops I could bring into action until 11 o'clock, when orders were given for the army to establish itself on its new line. This it did in good order. The position I abandoned was one that I had held at disadvantage, and I kept the troops on it as long as I did only

for the purpose of enabling me to hear of the approach of the force under General Sedgwick.

I may add here that soon after the action commenced, on the morning of the 3d of May, I received a severe contusion from a column of the building, near which I was standing, being thrown violently against me by a cannon shot. This rendered me insensible for half an hour or more. As soon as I had sufficiently recovered to mount my horse, I did so, under the impression that I was all right. In the effort of mounting the acute pain returned, and after riding a few steps I became faint, was taken from my horse, and again placed in the hands of the medical director. I may have been disqualified for command by this accident an hour or an hour and a half, during which time Major General Couch exercised my office. The enemy mistaking our movement attempted to follow it, and, in their confidence, advanced on the new position we had taken, and were quickly and severely chastised.

I will now return to the operations on the left. It will be borne in mind that the 6th corps was at Franklin's crossing, where it remained after the transfer of the 1st and 3d corps to the right, and the bridges below Franklin's crossing had been removed to Banks's ford. Near General Sedgwick, at Falmouth, was Gibbon's division of the 2d corps, which gave the former, according to the return of April 30, an aggregate for duty of 32,420; the 6th corps, being much the largest in the army, numbered 26,233, not the whole of which by a few thousands is it reasonable to suppose appeared in line of battle. One brigade of Gibbon's division was at Banks's ford.

May 1 General Sedgwick was ordered to make a demonstration in his front under the following telegram, and also, by the following telegram, to throw his whole force on to the Bowling Green road :

“MAY 1, 1863—5.05 p. m.

“Following from General Hooker, dated 11.30 a. m.; received at 4.55 p. m.:

“*Commanding Officer 6th Corps:*

“Direct Major General Sedgwick to threaten an attack in full force at 1 o'clock, and to continue in that attitude until further orders. Let the demonstration be as severe as can be, but not an attack.

“Major General HOOKER.”

“MAY 1, 1863—11.20.

“*Commanding Officer 6th Corps:*

“General Hooker telegraphs you to throw your whole force on the Bowling Green road, and no other. My telegraph communication to the general is round-about, and takes about three hours time.

“DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,

“*Major General and Chief of Staff.*”

The following telegram was also forwarded General Sedgwick for his information :

“MAY 2, 1863—9.55 a. m.

“*Commanding Officer 6th Corps:*

“General Hooker telegraphs ‘that you are all right; you have but Early's division in your front; balance all up here.’

“DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,

“*Major General, Chief of Staff.*”

These despatches were delayed in reaching him, and I had not been informed of the position of his troops when I despatched the following telegram for his government by an aide-de-camp, who delivered it some time before 11 o'clock the same night :

## M.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“Chancellorsville, Va., May 2, 1863—9 p. m.

“Major General SEDGWICK :

“The major general commanding directs that you cross the Rappahannock, at Fredericksburg, on the receipt of this order, and at once take up your line of march on the Chancellorsville road until you connect with him, and will attack and destroy any force you may fall in with on the road.

“You will leave all your trains behind except pack trains of your ammunition, and march to be in the vicinity of the general at daylight. You will probably fall upon the rear of the forces commanded by General Lee, and, between you and the major general commanding, he expects to use him up. Send word to General Gibbon to take possession of Fredericksburg. Be sure not to fail.

“JAMES H. VAN ALLEN,  
“*Brigadier General and Aide-de-Camp.*”

It was written under the impression that his corps was on the north bank of the Rappahannock, instead of which it found him already across the river. The night was so bright that staff officers could see to write their despatches by moonlight, many of which I have in my possession, and no special difficulty was apprehended in executing the order. As will be seen, the order was peremptory, and would have justified him in losing every man of his command in its execution. It was based on reports which I considered reliable as to the force left in his front, and their position as communicated to me by prisoners, and had been confirmed by telegrams, of which the following are specimens. These also, as will be seen, had been communicated to Major General Sedgwick :

“MAY 1, 1863—10.25 a. m.

“*Commanding Officer 6th Corps :*

“The following despatch of a column of infantry and artillery wagons in motion towards our right just received.

“A column of the enemy’s infantry, artillery, and wagons, extending whole length of ridge and south of Tyler’s battery, head of column out of sight, moving from direction of railroad station towards our right. The force is apparently heavy. The stone wall under Maire’s heights is apparently not occupied this morning.

“There is also reduction of force in railroad cut and trenches from the city to a mile south of it.

“The trench in rear of Henderson’s is evacuated from that house and Hazel run.

“DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,  
“*Major General and Chief of Staff.*”

“MAY 1, 1863—11.32 a. m.

“Major General HOOKER :

“The column of enemy’s troops has been seen passing Captain Hamilton’s house by new road on the ridge through Temple’s to the plank road near Barren’s since the sun cleared up the fog. Not so many troops passing now as trains visible.

“DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,  
“*Major General and Chief of Staff.*”

" MAY 2, 1863—12.35 p. m.

" *Commanding Officer 6th Corps :*

" Gibbon reports all quiet in his front. Few enemy to be seen. The hills back of Fredericksburg, near telegraph road, occupied. Small force in rifle-pits opposite Falmouth. This force increased last night. Probably anticipated a dash on our front.

" DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,

" *Major General and Chief of Staff.*"

At midnight the following was also sent :

" MAY 2, 1863—12 midnight.

" Major General SEDGWICK :

" From the statements brought by General Hooker's aid, it seems to be of vital importance that you should fall upon Lee's rear with crushing force. He will explain all to you. Give your advance to one who will do all that the urgency of the case requires.

" DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,

" *Major General and Chief of Staff.*"

The following order was sent on the same day (2d) to General Gibbon, and the commanding officer of the 6th corps informed of it :

" HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

" *Camp near Falmouth, Va., May 2, 1863.*

" Brigadier General GIBBON :

" Your command must cross the river to Fredericksburg to-night. Pontoon bridge now at Lacy house. Get under way soon. General Sedgwick is ordered to move through Fredericksburg towards Chancellorsville. Look out you do not come in contact with him. You must see to the laying of the bridges.

" DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,

" *Major General and Chief of Staff.*"

I have already stated what troops remained in front of General Sedgwick and the length of line they occupied, (between five and six miles,) one entire brigade being stationed at the depot at Hamilton Crossroad's.

In order that there might be no failure about the movement I also despatched General Warren to General Sedgwick, as that officer was familiar with the localities about Fredericksburg, and was informed of my own position and could explain it to him. I pointed out to General Warren on the map where I wanted the 6th corps to go, and told him what time I desired it to be there; I also impressed upon him the necessity of a prompt compliance with my orders on the part of General Sedgwick.

I supposed, and am still of the opinion, that if General Sedgwick's men had shouldered arms and advanced at the time named, he would have encountered less resistance and suffered less loss; but, as it was, it was late when he went into Fredericksburg, and before he was in readiness to attack the heights in rear of the town, which was about 11 o'clock a. m. on the 3d, the enemy had observed his movements and concentrated almost their entire force at that point to oppose him. The enemy's re-enforcements of infantry and artillery were observed as they came up by several officers of the 6th corps. When the attack was made it had to be upon the greater part of the enemy's force left on his right; nevertheless the troops advanced, carried the heights without heavy loss, and leisurely took up their line of march on the plank road, advancing two or three miles that day.



My object in ordering General Sedgwick forward at the time named was to relieve me from the position in which I found myself at Chancellorsville on the night of the 2d of May. I was of the opinion that if that portion of the army advanced on Lee's rear, sooner than allow his troops to remain between me and Sedgwick, Lee would take the road that Jackson had marched over on the morning of the 2d, and thus open for me a short road to Richmond, while the enemy, severed from his depot, would have to retire by the way of Gordonsville.

In my judgment General Sedgwick did not obey the spirit of my order, and made no sufficient effort to obey it. His movement was delayed so long that the enemy discovered his intentions, and when that was done he was necessarily delayed in the further execution of the order.

This, it will be remembered, was while the battle was being fought on the morning of the 3d on the right, and while I was endeavoring to hold my position until I could hear of his approach.

In connexion with this matter, I have to add that General Warren returned on the morning of the 4th, and reported to me verbally that, in his judgment, General Sedgwick would not have moved at all if he (General Warren) had not been there; and that when he did move, it was not with sufficient confidence or ability on his part to manœuvre his troops.

As General Gibbon was directed to cross at the same time that General Sedgwick did, and to hold the city, it gave the latter the use of his whole corps with which to make the advance.

On General Warren reporting to me the condition of General Sedgwick, and informing me that the enemy in his front appeared to have been re-enforced, I directed General Warren to address him the following letter:

N.

“UNITED STATES FORD, *May 4, 1863.*

“General SEDGWICK:

“I find everything snug here. We contracted the lines a little and repulsed the last assault with ease. General Hooker wishes them to attack him tomorrow if they will. He does not desire you to attack them again in force unless he attacks him at the same time. He says you are too far away for him to direct. Look well to the safety of your corps, and keep up communication with General Benham, at Banks's ford and Fredericksburg. You can go to either place if you think it best to cross. Banks's ford would bring you in supporting distance of the main body, and would be better than falling back to Fredericksburg.

“G. K. WARREN,

“*Brigadier General.*

From information received through General Warren I was apprehensive that General Sedgwick might fall back, or cross the river at Banks's ford, and accordingly addressed him as follows:

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“*Chancellorsville, Va., May 4, 1863—11 a. m.*

“Major General SEDGWICK:

“The major general commanding directs me to say that he does not wish you to cross the river at Banks's ford unless you are compelled to do so.

“The batteries at Banks's ford command the position. If it is practicable for you to maintain a position south side of Rappahannock, near Banks's ford, you will do so. It is very important that we retain position at Banks's ford; General Tyler commands the reserve artillery there.

“JAMES H. VAN ALLEN,

“*Brigadier General and A. D. C.*

And in case he did fall back, on the same day he was addressed as follows :

“MAY 4, 1863.

“Major General SEDGWICK,

“*Commanding 6th Army Corps :*

“The commanding general directs that in the event you fall back, you reserve, if practicable, a position on the Fredericksburg side of the Rappahannock, which you can hold securely until to-morrow.

“Please let the commanding general have your opinion in regard to this by telegram from Banks’s ford as soon as possible.

“S. WILLIAMS,  
“*Assistant Adjutant General.*”

Q.

Afterwards I received the following from General Sedgwick :

[From General Sedgwick’s headquarters.]

“MAY 4, 1863—11.15 a. m.

“General HOOKER :

“The enemy threatens me strongly on two fronts. My position is bad for such attack. It was assumed for attack, and not for defence. It is not improbable that the bridges at Banks’s ford may be sacrificed. Can you help me strongly if I am attacked ?

“JNO. SEDGWICK,  
“*Major General.*”

“As my bridges are two miles from me, I am compelled to cover them above or below from attack with the additional assistance of General Benham’s brigade alone.

“JNO. SEDGWICK,  
“*Major General.*”

“BANKS’S FORD, May 4, 1863—11.45 a. m.

“General HOOKER :

“My army is hemmed in upon the slope covered by the guns from the north side of Banks’s ford. If I had only this army to care for I would withdraw it to-night. Do your operations require that I should jeopard by retaining it here ? An immediate answer is indispensable. I may [unintelligible] to withdraw.

“JNO. SEDGWICK.”

Received at 1 a. m., May 5, 1863.

Answered, “Withdraw and cover.”

D. B.

On the receipt of the latter, General Sedgwick was directed to recross the river if he could not defend himself. At 1 o’clock a. m., May 6th, the following was received :

“BANKS’S FORD, May 5, 1863.

“General HOOKER :

“I shall hold my position, as ordered, on south side Rappahannock.

“SEDGWICK.”

And he was then telegraphed as follows :

"MAY 5, 1863—1.20 p. m.

"General SEDGWICK :

"Yours received 1 a. m., saying you should hold position. Order to withdraw countermanded. Acknowledge both.

"JOSEPH HOOKER,  
"Major General, Commanding."

Soon after the following was received :

"BANKS'S FORD, May 5, 1863—5 a. m.

"Generals BUTTERFIELD and HOOKER :

"The bridges at Banks's ford are swung and in process of being taken up. The troops are much exhausted. The despatch countermanding my movement over the river was received after the troops had crossed.

"JOHN SEDGWICK."

In the correspondence I had indicated to General Sedgwick that in case he returned from Banks's ford he should take a position near Dr. Taylor's house. This stood on the highest ground in the hills encircling Fredericksburg, and is really the key to all of the enemy's defences in the vicinity of that city. It is where the hills terminate abruptly on the Rappahannock, and was, I know, a position that a corps could defend against an army. Of Banks's ford I was not so confident, as I had had no opportunity to examine it minutely. It was, however, protected by thirty-four pieces of artillery in position, and that alone should make the place formidable for a time at least. General Sedgwick replied to me that he could not hold that place, and I said, "Then recross the river."

My desire was to have General Sedgwick retain a position on the south side of the river in order that I might leave a sufficient force to hold the position I was in, and with the balance of my force recross the river, march down to Banks's ford and turn the enemy's position in my front in so doing. In this, too, I was thwarted. It may not be out of place to tell how it happened. As I am informed, and I believe correctly, soon after sending the despatch that he could not hold his position I received one from him that he could hold it—showing the importance of minutes on a field of battle. I then directed him to hold on—to stay where he was. To that came the reply that when my despatch reached him his corps had recrossed the river. The history is as follows : The messenger with the first despatch had to ride perhaps three miles to reach the place of telegraphing, and after he was sent off General Sedgwick sent another messenger immediately with the despatch that he could hold the position, expecting that he would be able to overtake the first messenger and intercept the message that he had. But instead of that the first messenger rode the fastest, and the message he bore reached me perhaps ten minutes before the second. Both were answered immediately on their receipt, but in some way the last was delayed in reaching General Sedgwick.

During the 3d and 4th, reconnoissances were made on the right from one end of the line to the other, to feel the enemy's strength and find a place and way to attack him successfully; but it was ascertained that it could only be made on him behind his defences and with slender columns, which I believed he could destroy as fast as they were thrown on to his works. Subsequent campaigns have only confirmed the opinion I then entertained.

As soon as I heard that General Sedgwick had recrossed the river, seeing no object in maintaining my position where I was, and believing that it would be

much more to my advantage to hazard an engagement with the enemy at Franklin's crossing, where I had elbow room, than where I was, the army on the right was directed to recross the river, and did so on the night between the 5th and 6th of May. The following telegram and letter to the President will explain my reasons for recrossing:

"MAY 6, 1863, 3 o'clock.

"His Excellency A. LINCOLN, *President, &c.* :

"Have this moment returned to camp. On my way received your telegram of 11 and 12.25 o'clock. The army had previously recrossed the river, and was on its return to camp. As it had none of its trains of supplies with it, I deemed this advisable. Above I saw no way of giving the enemy a general battle with the prospect of success which I desire; not to exceed three (3) corps of the troops on the right have been engaged; for the whole to join, there is a better place nearer at hand. Will write you at length to-night; am glad to hear that a portion of the cavalry has at length turned up; one portion did nothing.

"JOSEPH HOOKER,

"*Major General, Commanding.*"

#### T.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"*Camp near Falmouth, Va., May 7, 1863.*

"His Excellency PRESIDENT UNITED STATES :

"I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of this date, and, in answer, have to state that I do not deem it expedient to suspend operations on this line, from the reverse we have experienced in endeavoring to extricate the army from its present position. If in the first effort we failed, it was not from want of strength or conduct of the small number of the troops actually engaged, but from a cause which could not be foreseen, and could not be provided against. After its occurrence, the chances of success were so much lessened that I felt another plan might be adopted in place of that we were engaged in which would be more certain in its results; at all events, a failure would not involve disaster, while, in the other case, it was certain to follow the absence of success. I may add, that this consideration almost wholly determined me in ordering the army to return to its old camp.

"As to the best time for renewing our advance upon the enemy, I can only decide after an opportunity has been offered to learn the feeling of the troops. They should not be discouraged or depressed, for it is no fault of theirs, if I may except one corps, that our last efforts were not crowned with glorious victory. I suppose that details are not wanted of me at this time.

"I have decided, in my own mind, the plan to be adopted in our next effort, if it should be your wish to have one made. It has this to recommend it, it will be one in which the operations of all the corps, unless it be a part of the cavalry, will be within my personal supervision.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"JOSEPH HOOKER,

"*Major General, Commanding.*"

Being resolved on recrossing the river, on the night between the 4th and 5th I called the corps commanders together, not as a council of war, but to ascertain how they felt in regard to making what I considered a desperate move against the enemy in our front. There were present Generals Meade, Reynolds, Howard, Couch, and Sickles, and for a portion of the time my chief of staff, General Butterfield. I showed them my instructions, stated our circum-

stances, as clearly as I could, and explained to them the only means that was left, in my judgment, for extricating myself. General Slocum was not present, for the reason that the messenger who was despatched for him failed to find him. He, however, came up after the other corps commanders had dispersed. After stating to the corps commanders the condition of affairs, and what measures I proposed to take if we advanced, I said I would withdraw for a time and let them confer among themselves, and come in again when they had determined their opinions upon the subject.

When I returned, I called upon them individually for their opinions. General Meade stated that he was for an advance, for the reason that he did not believe we could recross the river in the presence of the enemy. General Reynolds had thrown himself on a bed, being very tired that night from hard work, and had gone to sleep, saying, before he did so, that his opinion would be the same as General Meade's. General Howard voted for an advance, assigning as a reason that he felt as though the army had been placed in the position in which it was by the conduct of his corps, and he had to vote for an advance under any circumstances. His opinion was received for what it was worth. General Couch and General Sickles were of the opinion that the army should recross the river. I stated to General Meade that the army could be withdrawn without loss of men or material, and that I had no idea that a gun would be fired by the enemy as we did so.

Subsequently, on learning that General Meade was saying that he was unconditionally for an advance, and that he wished the bridges had been carried away so as to have prevented our return, I sent for him soon after our return to camp, and asked him if he had made such a report. He told me that he had. Believing that he was in error, I so stated to him. At my suggestion, he addressed a circular to the corps commanders who were present, asking their recollection upon the subject. I submit the replies of two of them, being the only ones in my possession, as a part of my testimony.

## U.

### “HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY CORPS, *May 26, 1863.*”

“GENERAL: Your letter, dated 22d instant, was received yesterday at my camp. You inform me that an issue has been raised between the commanding general and yourself in regard to the construction to be placed on the language you used at the consultation of corps commanders held on the night of the 4th instant, and you desire me to state my recollection of what you said, and the impression your observations made on me at the time.

“Before proceeding to comply with your request it will not be irrelevant to refer to the regret which I expressed when the consultation began, that written inquiries or propositions were not submitted to the council, upon which each member might vote yea or nay, thus excluding all occasion for doubt or disagreement as to the advice given, and contributing much to the precision of the opinions expressed. If my suggestions, predicated upon the unsatisfactory mode in which the deliberations of the council were to be conducted, had not been disregarded, the issue of which you inform me could not have arisen.

“You expressed the opinion that General Hooker should attack the enemy; that a retrograde movement in his presence—flushed with the success of his flank attack, the retreat of Sedgwick and the reoccupation of Fredericksburg—had become impossible. This opinion afterwards yielded somewhat to other considerations; among these were our deficiencies in supplies; our imperilled communications; the hazards of a general engagement with an enemy whose forces we could not estimate, and who could choose his own time and place to accept battle; the instructions which required the commanding general to protect Washington; and the consequences to the north which would follow dis-

aster to this army. At the close of the discussion my impression was that your original preferences appeared to have been surrendered to the clear conviction of the commanding general of the necessity which dictated his return to the north bank of the Rappahannock, and his unhesitating confidence in the practicability of withdrawing his army without loss of men or material.

"I am, general, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

"DANIEL E. SICKLES,

*"Major General, Commanding Third Corps."*

"Major General GEORGE G. MEADE,

*"Commanding Fifth Corps."*

V.

"HEADQ'S ELEVENTH CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

*"May 26, 1863."*

"GENERAL: Your letter was received only yesterday, and I hasten to reply. You request me to state my recollection of what you said at the consultation of corps commanders on the night of May 4, instant, and the impression it made upon me at the time.

"I understood you at first to say that you thought it best to attack, for you believed a retreat would be disastrous. After General Hooker returned to the tent, just before we broke up, and gave his decided opinion that he would withdraw the army in safety, I think you made no further objections; and from something you said, what I do not precisely recall, the impression I had was, that your opinion in favor of an attack was contingent upon the practicability of withdrawing the army to this side of the Rappahannock.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"O. O. HOWARD,

*"Major General, Commanding."*

"Major General MEADE,

*"Commanding Fifth Corps."*

An official copy:

T. A. MEYSENBERG, A. A. G.

It has been stated that the army returned from the south side of the Rappahannock by my own desire, and in conflict with the judgment of the corps commanders who were with me. That is not the case. All desired to return, with the exception of General Howard, for reasons named. It has been stated, further, that some of the officers named have since expressed their regret that the bridges had not been carried away in order that the return could not have been made. I only know that if that was the feeling of any of them at that time they had a wonderful way of showing it. So far as my experience extends, there are in all armies officers more valiant after the fight than while it is pending; and when a truthful history of the rebellion shall be written, it will be found that the army of the Potomac is not an exception.

In regard to myself, I may be permitted to say that I was opposed to an advance from the position we were in, for the reason that I was not sanguine of success, and without that, with a river difficult of passage immediately in our rear, disaster and ruin were inevitable. Incentives of a personal and professional character were not wanting to urge me to a renewal of the conflict, but to have been influenced by them against my judgment and sense of duty would have rendered me unworthy of command.

To return to the cavalry. My cavalry force of the army of the Potomac numbered upwards of 13,000 men for duty at the time the cavalry left camp at Falmouth, and of this force but one brigade was retained for duty with the in-

fantry, and that under the command of General Pleasanton. The character of the country we were to operate in precluded the use of a large cavalry force except in raiding. It will be remembered in my testimony that I left them on the upper Rappahannock, arrested in their march by its swollen waters. They were there under instructions, dated April 12. These continued in force until it was reported to me that the river was fordable, and the time had arrived when they could resume their raid. As the plan of operations had been somewhat changed during the interruption in their march, and not knowing but that the enemy had strengthened his posts at Culpeper and Gordonsville, in view of their proximity I concluded to divide the cavalry into two columns, each one outnumbering the entire cavalry force of the enemy between the Rappahannock and James rivers. They were to cross the Rappahannock the same day with the infantry, the 29th, and one column was to move directly to its destination, while the other was threatening Culpeper and Gordonsville, and as soon as one had passed, the other was to follow and join it. Buford commanded the first column; Averell the second; the corps commander attaching himself to the former. The object was to have no time lost in severing Lee's communications with Richmond.

The instructions were as follows :

C.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“*Morrisville, Virginia, April 28, 1863.*”

“*Commanding Officer Cavalry Corps :*”

“I am directed by the major general commanding to inform you that the instructions communicated for your government on the 12th instant are so far modified as to require you to cross the Rappahannock at such points as you may determine between Kelly's and Rappahannock fords, and for a portion of your force to move in the direction of the Raccoon ford and Louisa Court House, while the remainder is engaged carrying into execution that part of your original instructions which relates to the enemy's forces and positions on the line of the Alexandria and Orange railroad, and the line itself; the operations of this column to be considered as masking the column which is directed to move by forced marches to strike and destroy the line of the Aquia and Richmond railroad.

“You are further directed to determine on some point for the columns to unite, and it is recommended that it be on the Pamunkey, and near that line, as you will then be in position with your full force to cut off the retreat of the enemy by his shortest line. In all other respects your instructions, as before referred to, will remain the same.

“You will direct all your force to cross to-night, or, if that shall not be practicable, to be brought to the river, and have it all thrown over before 8 o'clock to-morrow morning. If the fords should be too deep for your pack animals and artillery, they will be crossed over the bridge at Kelly's ford.

“You will please furnish the officers in command of these two columns with a copy of this, and of your original instructions.

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“WM. L. CANDLER,  
“*Captain and Aide-de-Camp.*”

From the place of crossing the river, Kelly's ford, the infantry had about twenty-five miles to march to Chancellorsville, and the cavalry between fifty and sixty to their post on the Aquia and Richmond railroad. Hence I concluded that they would reach their respective destinations about the same time. The infantry, it will be remembered, reached Chancellorsville on the 30th of April;

the cavalry, without encountering any resistance deserving mention, not until the 3d and 4th of May, and was disposed of in utter disregard of the spirit and letter of their instructions in a manner to be of no service to us or injury to the enemy. A reference to the following extract of General Stoneman's official report affords the best explanation of the disposition of the column with which he moved :

[Extract.]

“HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS,  
“*Army of the Potomac, May 13, 1863.*”

“GENERAL : \* \* \* \* \*

“At this point (Thompson's Crossroads) the James and South Anna rivers are less than twelve miles apart, and here I determined to make the most of my 3,500 men in carrying out my previously conceived plan of operations. I called together all my regimental commanders, showed and explained to them the maps, and gave them an idea of what I wished done. I gave them to understand that we had dropped in that region of country like a shell, and that I intended to burst it in every direction, expecting each piece of fragment would do as much harm and create nearly as much terror as would result from sending the whole shell, and thus magnify our small force into overwhelming numbers ; and the results of this plan satisfied my most sanguine expectations. I pointed out to them the routes to be taken, and the objects to be accomplished on each route. One party, the 1st New Jersey, under Colonel Wyndham, was to strike the James river at Columbia, at the junction of the James and Rivanna rivers, to destroy, if possible, the large canal aqueduct over the Rivanna, and from thence proceed along the canal in the direction of Richmond, doing all the harm possible. If thought expedient, (and this was left to the discretion of the commanding officer,) a party was to be sent across the James river, and to make a dash on the railroad bridge over the Appomattox.

“Another party, 2d New York, Colonel Kilpatrick, was to push on to the railroad bridges over the Chickahominy, destroy them and the telegraph, and operate in the direction of Richmond, four miles distant from the bridge.

“Another force, 12th Illinois cavalry, Colonel Davis, was to strike the two railroads at or in the vicinity of Ashland, on the Fredericksburg, and Atlee's, on the Virginia Central, and do all the harm it could.

“Another party, 1st Maine and 1st Maryland, with a section of artillery, all under General Gregg, was to follow down the South Anna river, destroy all the road bridges thereon, and, if possible, the two railroad bridges across the river.

“Another party, 5th cavalry, under Captain Drummond, was to follow this last, and see that the destruction was complete.

“Captain Merritt, with a flying party of the 1st Maryland, was sent out to do what he thought he could accomplish in the way of destroying bridges, &c.

“These different parties all got off by 3 a. m. on the 3d. After all these parties had moved, and outposts established, one of which was to hold the only bridge across the South Anna, which was to be left undestroyed for our own use in case of need, I found myself with but about 500 men of General Buford's brigade, and near 200 partially broken down horses of General Gregg's division, which was to serve as a nucleus, and upon which the different parties could rally in case of necessity after they had performed the work assigned them to do.

\* \* \* \* \*  
“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“GEORGE STONEMAN,

“*Major General, Comd'g Cav. Corps.*”

“Brigadier General S. WILLIAMS,

“*Assistant Adjutant General, Army of the Potomac.*”



From the foregoing it will be seen that on reaching Thompson's Crossroads, Buford's column was broken up into six separate detachments, and despatched in every direction—all, as the sequel shows, incapable of accomplishing results of any moment to the army, from the direction in which they were sent, as well as from lack of numbers. By the instructions of April 12, General Stoneman was informed that from Gordonsville it was expected that he would push forward to the Aquia and Richmond railroad; and again, to understand "that I considered the primary object of his movement to be the cutting of the enemy's communications with Richmond by the Fredericksburg route, checking his retreat over those lines, and that I wished him to make everything subservient to that object." And in his modified instructions of April 28, he was directed to regard the foregoing as unchanged.

In a letter addressed that officer April 22, he was advised as follows: "After breaking through the enemy's advanced line you will find no force in the direction of Richmond, that city itself being without a sufficient force to keep out your own command should you advance on it. This, however, is not expected." What I wanted was Lee's army; with that Richmond would have been ours, and, indeed, all of Virginia; and it was with this view that instructions were given General Stoneman.

In regard to Averell's column, soon after it had crossed the Rappahannock, the following letter was addressed to General Averell by the cavalry commander, again showing his utter disregard of the instructions under which he was acting:

"HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS,

"April 30, 1863.

"Brigadier General AVERELL, *Commanding, &c.*:

"The major general commanding directs me to say that we have been delayed by high water, &c., and that he desires you to push the enemy as *vigorously as possible*, keeping him fully occupied, and, if possible, drive him in the direction of Rapidan Station. *He turns the enemy over to you.*

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"A. J. ALEXANDER,

"Assistant Adjutant General."

This column had been directed to follow and join the first column by the most practicable route after the first had passed to the south of Culpeper and Gordonsville, and in order that there might be no failure from misapprehension of orders, I had directed the corps commanders to furnish each of his commanders with copies of his own instructions in mine to him of 28th April.

On the 1st of May I received word that General Averell was at Rapidan Station awaiting orders, and on the 2d received the following report from him:

"EN ROUTE TO UNITED STATES FORD,

"May 2, 1863—7.20 a. m.

"Captain CANDLER, *A. D. C., &c.*:

"Your despatch of yesterday, stating that the major general commanding did not understand what I was doing at Rapidan Station, was received at 7.05 a. m. to-day, and I have the honor to state, in reply, that I have been engaged with the cavalry of the enemy at that point and in destroying communications, and beg to enclose a copy of an order received from headquarters cavalry corps.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"WILLIAM W. AVERELL,

"Brigadier General."

On the 3d, hearing that he was at Ely's ford, the following order was sent him. Up to this time his loss had been, by his official report, two officers and two men wounded, and one man killed:

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“Near Chancellorsville, Va., May 3, 1863.”

“Brigadier General PLEASANTON :

“Will assume command of the division of cavalry now commanded by Brigadier General Averell. Upon being relieved, Brigadier General Averell will report for orders to the Adjutant General of the army.

“By command of Major General Hooker :

“JAMES H. VAN ALLEN,  
“*Brig. Gen. and Aide-de-Camp.*”

On the 4th the cavalry column, under General Stoneman, commenced its return. One party of it, under General Kilpatrick, crossed the Aquia and Richmond railroad; and the fact that on the 5th the cars carried the rebel wounded and our prisoners over the road to Richmond will show to what extent the enemy's communications had been interrupted. An examination of the instructions General Stoneman received, in connexion with the official report of his operations, fully sustains me in saying that no officer ever made a greater mistake in construing his orders, and no one ever accomplished less in so doing. The effect of throwing his body of cavalry in the rear of the enemy and on his communications at the time it was in his power to have done it can readily be estimated. But instead, that important arm of the army became crippled to an extent which seriously embarrassed me in my subsequent operations. Soon after General Stoneman applied for and obtained a sick leave, and I requested that it might be indefinitely extended to him. It is charitable to suppose that Generals Stoneman and Averell did not read their orders, and determined to carry on operations in conformity with their own views and inclinations.

By Mr. Loan :

Question. At the time your troops first took position at Chancellorsville, what were the relative positions of your army and that of General Lee ?

Answer. Lee's army was between three and four miles in advance of my position, between me and Fredericksburg, nearly to the east of my position.

Question. What was the distance from Chancellorsville to Fredericksburg ?

Answer. About eleven miles.

Question. You took your position there on the 30th of April ?

Answer. Yes, sir; in season for the advance corps to go out and make a reconnaissance of the position of the enemy.

Question. What action was taken on the 1st of May ?

Answer. I went out to attack the enemy.

Question. Was that the time you met the enemy, as you were emerging from the timber ?

Answer. Yes.

Question. And on the 2d of May Jackson moved to the west and the north, on your right ?

Answer. Jackson moved off in a southwesterly direction, and turned my right.

Question. If I remember the testimony rightly, Jackson passed to the right of the plank road running south of Chancellorsville, and turned rather northwesterly to the right of your position.

Answer. Yes.

Question. What time in the day was it that Jackson's command passed the plank road running south ?

Answer. His movement was not discovered by me. It was nine o'clock in the morning when I came in from visiting the line; it was pretty long and I visited the right first, and the other portion of the line afterwards. It was about nine o'clock when I returned from this visit; at that time I had not heard anything of this move. About half past nine o'clock it was reported to me that from General Devins's headquarters troops were seen moving. Soon afterwards I despatched two divisions of Sickles's corps, to pass out by way of the furnace, to the line on which these troops were seen to move, with instructions to follow up the movement with his two divisions, which he did. In order to go there, Sickles had to pass between the right of Slocum's line and the left of Howard's. I could not find out anything about that country, except I knew that it was called the Wilderness. I could find out nothing about roads there, either before I crossed the river or afterwards. No one seemed to know anything about the country; even the people who lived there could not tell me where roads were to be found. Much of that region was swampy at the time, and a great deal of it is covered with undergrowth, and is impenetrable even to infantry. I directed General Slocum to send a force through this forest in his front, and he reported to me that he could not do it.

Question. How did Jackson manage to pass across that road, and to the right of your line?

Answer. Jackson passed out on a road that leaves the plank road between Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, and about six miles from Fredericksburg. There was a road running off towards Germania ford, which intersects the plank-road running from Chancellorsville to Germania ford, striking that road some three or four miles from Chancellorsville; Jackson passed out on that road.

By the chairman:

Question. What you call the old road?

Answer. Yes, sir. The principal part of my line was in advance of this plank road; the part of the line lying to the right of Chancellorsville lay, a part of it, along that line. The right was thrown back to an old mill that was called Hunting's mill or Hunting's run, and in the rear of that was what is called the Old road; this I knew nothing of. A part of Jackson's troops advanced on this road, and a part came up on the identical road that our line was standing on. A portion of Jackson's forces came up in rear of Howard's right, and a larger part on a line close to that held by his troops. The great misfortune was that the troops that occupied the right were away from their arms when the enemy advanced on them, and they did not know of the presence of the enemy until they actually opened fire on them, and then they quit their arms, which were stacked along the line of defence running along the line of works held by our troops, stampeding the whole of them as they passed.

No pickets appear to have been thrown out, and I have reason to suppose that no effort was made by the commander of the corps on the right to follow up and keep himself advised of Jackson's movements, although made in broad daylight, and with his full knowledge. In this way the 11th corps was lost to me, and more than that, because its bad conduct impaired the confidence that the corps of the army had in one another. I observed this fact during the night, from the firing on the picket lines, as well as from the general manner of the troops, if a gun was fired by the enemy; after that the whole line would let off their pieces. The men seemed to be nervous, and during the coming in of the 11th corps I was fearful at one time that the whole army would be thrown into confusion by it. Some of my staff officers killed half a dozen of the men in trying to arrest their flight.

Question. What was the strength of that corps?

Answer. About 11,000 men. My position was one in which I could use but little artillery, and where cavalry would have been of little or no use.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. Did Jackson have to cut his way through the timber as he marched northwesterly and turned your right flank?

Answer. No, sir; he had roads which vehicles could pass over.

I would like to speak somewhat further of this matter of Chancellorsville. It has been the desire and aim of some of General McClellan's admirers, and I do not know but of others, to circulate erroneous impressions in regard to it. When I returned from Chancellorsville, I felt that I had fought no battle; in fact, I had more men than I could use, and I fought no general battle for the reason that I could not get my men in position to do so; probably not more than three or three and a half corps on the right were engaged in that fight. When I marched out on the morning of the 1st of May, I could get but few troops into position; the column had to march through narrow roads, and could not be thrown forward fast enough to prevent their being overwhelmed by the enemy in his advance. On assuming my position, Lee advanced on me in that manner, and was soon repulsed, the column thrown back in confusion into the open ground. It could not live there. The roads through the forest were not unlike bridges to pass. A mile or more in advance of the position I had would have placed me beyond the forest, where, with my superior forces, the enemy would in all probability have been beaten.

Throughout the rebellion I have acted on the principle that if I had as large a force as the enemy, I had no apprehensions of the result of an encounter. Many officers thought otherwise. I think there is reason for our troops being superior to those of the enemy, physically and intellectually, in or out of battle.

Question. You say Jackson was killed on the night of the 2d of May by his own troops?

Answer. Yes, sir; he was riding along the road and one of the pickets shot him.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Accidentally?

Answer. Yes, sir; his staff was with him, and their pickets mistook them to be a part of our cavalry.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. At what time was the assault made by Jackson upon Howard's troops?

Answer. About six o'clock in the evening.

Question. It was about half past nine that Jackson crossed the plank road to the south of your position of that morning?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What distance was it from the front of your troops to the route travelled by Jackson in crossing the plank road?

Answer. I have already stated in my testimony that his route lay diagonally across my front; where he branched off from the plank road, between Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, may have been five or six miles out from Fredericksburg. In passing diagonally across my front he passed within perhaps three miles of the right of the line held by Howard. A dense forest intervened, but he had a hill to cross, and it was on that that his troops were seen from Devins's headquarters, and it was in that direction that General Sickles moved.

By the chairman:

Question. Where was Lee with his army at the time you recrossed the river; and why did he not follow you up?

Answer. I felt all along his line on the 3d and 4th of May, and found that

Lee's army was from half to three-quarters of a mile in my front, and could make no impression on them. A reconnoissance on the 4th of May enabled his whole line to be examined, which was found to be strong; he had thrown up heavy defensive works from a half a mile or more in advance of me in the forest.

Question. Intrenched there?

Answer. Yes, sir; and to follow me he would have had to go through the forest all the way, and over the same character of ground I have described, with narrow roads, which he did not dare to do. Not a gun was fired either on me or on General Sedgwick in crossing the river.

Question. The same causes that prevented your advancing prevented Lee from following you?

Answer. Yes, sir. I may say here the battle of Chancellorsville has been associated with the battle of Fredericksburg, and has been called a disaster. My whole loss in the battle of Chancellorsville was a little over 17,000, as will be seen from the following detailed statement of the killed, wounded, and missing of the several corps:

First corps.....	292
Second corps.....	2,025
Third corps.....	4,039
Fifth corps.....	699
Sixth corps.....	4,601
Eleventh corps.....	2,508
Twelfth corps.....	2,883
Engineer corps.....	3
Signal corps.....	2
Cavalry.....	145
	<hr/>
Total.....	17,197
	<hr/> <hr/>

From a controversy that grew out of the defence of Fredericksburg, between Generals Early and Barksdale, on the enemy's side, the official list of their killed and wounded was published. Those troops could not have suffered so much as the troops that were with General Lee. If the loss of the latter was in proportion to that of Early's and Barksdale's, the whole loss of the rebel army would be between 12,000 and 13,000; but Jackson's corps was the one which suffered most; they were very severely punished; and the troops with Lee advanced twice upon my men, who were in rifle-pits, and necessarily suffered severely. In support of the above, I may say that the enemy's surgeons admitted to the surgeons I left on the field at Chancellorsville that their loss was not less than 18,000 men in that battle.

Further, I desire to submit in this connexion the following:

"WASHINGTON, 2 p. m., May 8, 1863.

"General HOOKER:

"The news is here of the capture by our forces of Grand Gulf, a large and very important thing. General Willich, an exchanged prisoner just from Richmond, has talked with me this morning. He was there when our cavalry cut the roads in that vicinity. He says there was not a sound pair of legs in Richmond, and that our men, had they known it, could have safely gone in and burnt everything, and brought Jeff. Davis, captured and paroled three or four hundred men. He says as he came to City Point there was an army three miles—Longstreet, he thought, moving towards Richmond. Milroy has captured a despatch of General Lee, in which he says his loss was fearful in his late battle with you.

"A. LINCOLN."

“WASHINGTON, *May 8, 1863—3.20 p. m.*

“To Major General HOOKER :

“Following just received from General Dix :

“WEST POINT, *Va., 9 p. m., 7th.*

“Honorable E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War :*

“Since telegraphing you, an extra of the Dispatch of yesterday, found on a prisoner, has a note indorsed by a surgeon in one of the Richmond hospitals to his wife, stating the rebel loss at eighteen thousand (18,000.)

“JOHN A. DIX,  
“*Major General.*”

I said that Chancellorsville had been called a disaster. I lost, under those operations, one piece artillery, I think five or six wagons, and one ambulance. Of course, many of the 11th corps lost their arms and knapsacks.

In my opinion there is nothing to regret in regard to Chancellorsville except the failure to accomplish all I moved to accomplish. The troops lost no honor, except in one corps, and we lost no more men than the enemy; but expectation was high, the army in splendid condition, and great results were expected from it. It was at a time, too, when the nation required a victory.

By Mr. Loan :

Question. What corps had you in the action of the 3d of May?

Answer. The 12th and part of the 2d, the 3d and a small part of the 5th. The 11th corps I put on the left, where it was not exposed. The 11th and 1st corps were not engaged at all; as was also the case with perhaps two-thirds of the 5th corps.

Question. Why were not those corps brought into action?

Answer. They could not be put into position. When the corps commanders assembled on the night of the 4th and 5th, I submitted to them the mode of attack I should have to adopt in case of an advance; that it could only be with slender columns, if an advance was made at all. On the roads that we would have to make use of for that purpose the enemy was particularly strong, and was behind his defences throughout the line. Early in the campaign I had come to the conclusion that, with the arms now in use, it would be impossible to carry works by an assault in front, provided they were properly constructed, and properly manned. I was of that impression at the battle of Fredericksburg, and requested General Burnside not to insist upon an attack being made under those circumstances; I said to him that I would advise him not to attack there; he said it was necessary, and of course I made it, and it was made with great vigor, and with all the force that men ever carried into action with them. I concentrated my artillery fire upon the point where I was to make my attack, and kept it up till sundown, making the attack at the very last possible moment, but the nearest I could get my men to their works was perhaps fifteen paces, and there the heads of the columns would vanish. They could destroy men faster than I could throw them on their works; it was the cotton-bags of New Orleans over again.

Again, in the west, I was ordered to make an attack on New Hope church, and lost nearly 2,000 men, while the enemy's loss did not probably exceed 50. Sherman had divided his army into two parts at Etowah, and we were to concentrate at Dallas. Dallas was three miles from us, but one only for the enemy at Allatoona. Johnston threw his army between the two columns to prevent a junction; and, in order to bring it about, I fought from Pumpkin Vine creek, driving the enemy before me, until I reached New Hope church, a distance of four miles, where I found the enemy in position and intrenched, where I at-

tacked him, but with the same result that I had experienced at Fredericksburg. The most that I could do was to establish my corps on a line about eighty paces distant from that of the enemy; and it was on that that the army developed itself, taking a week to accomplish it. I do not know of an instance in this war where rifle-pits, properly constructed and properly manned, have been taken by front assaults alone, either on our side or that of the enemy.

By the chairman :

Question. Do you attribute that to the efficiency of our new guns and rifles ?

Answer. Yes, sir; those acting on the defensive can commence killing at a more remote distance and can kill faster.

Question. In your judgment, as a military man, what would have been the result at Chancellorsville had the 11th corps not broken, but stood their ground reasonably well ?

Answer. I never entertained a doubt on that subject. I not only expected a victory, but I expected to get that whole army. I had reason to expect it, and I struck for that object.

Question. Do I understand you to say that you now know of nothing that then prevented General Sedgwick from complying with your order ?

Answer. Nothing.

Question. Had he carried out your orders vigorously, what do you think would have been the result ?

Answer. My impression was that Lee would have been compelled to move out on the same road that Jackson had moved on, and pass over to my right. I should add in my testimony that before leaving Falmouth to make this move I had a million and a half of rations on board lighters, and had gunboats in readiness to tow them up to points on the Pamunky river, in order to replenish my provisions to enable me to reach Richmond before the enemy could, in case I succeeded in throwing him off that line of retreat. When I gave the order to General Sedgwick I expected that Lee would be whipped by manœuvre. I supposed that he would be compelled to march off on the same line that Jackson had. He would have been thrown on the Culpeper and Gordonsville road, placing me 50 or 60 miles nearer Richmond than himself.

Question. What was your reason for leaving so large a reserve force under Sedgwick at or near Falmouth ?

Answer. I left Sedgwick's corps and Gibbon's division there for this reason, in part: they were encamped in sight of the enemy, and to have moved their camps would have betrayed our movements. I knew I could not cross the river in the presence of Lee's army if he was informed of my movement. The great difficulty I apprehended was in crossing the river. I apprehended no serious trouble after I had crossed. At the same time I had to leave a force at Falmouth to keep the rebel force there. I did not want the enemy to throw a force to meet me on the Rapidan; and, besides, I was informed that they had a pontoon bridge at Hamilton's crossing, and did not want them to cross the river while I was away, as that would enable them to strike at my depots. Mine were large and full, and the enemy would have willingly exchanged theirs for them, for theirs were comparatively empty. I did not suppose that by leaving that force at Falmouth they would necessarily be out of the fight; by the way of Banks's ford the two wings of the army were within six miles of each other, and within supporting distance.

Question. What was the distance General Sedgwick would have had to march to comply with your order ?

Answer. The order found him on the south bank of the Rappahannock and near Fredericksburg; he would have had to march six or seven miles to reach the point designated in the order.

Question. How long ought it to have taken so many troops to march that distance, making a reasonable march ?

Answer. This column would have been from two and a half to three miles long. He was ordered to move without wagons, to get under arms, and march that distance. The head of his column might have reached there in three hours, while the rear of it might have required two or three hours more; that would be allowing a reasonable time.

By Mr. Loan :

Question. I understand you to say that he would meet with no serious obstruction ?

Answer. Yes ; he was fully informed of the condition of the enemy's forces.

By the chairman :

Question. And his delay caused him to be threatened by the troops of the enemy ?

Answer. He delayed his movement until the enemy could see what he was about ; they could not tell at first but he might be going down to Hamilton Crossroads, for his movement threatened the whole line. By delaying, and moving slowly, until it was eleven o'clock before he made the attack, he enabled the enemy to concentrate their whole force to meet his attack.

Question. He was ordered to be at the point designated at daylight ?

Answer. Yes, sir. General Warren was the best informed officer on the roads that I had on my staff, and knew exactly what I wanted, and I sent him to report to General Sedgwick and accompany him.

Question. Do you know how much of a battle General Sedgwick really had at Fredericksburg ?

Answer. He had the whole force of the enemy there to run against in carrying the heights beyond Fredericksburg, but he carried them with ease ; and, by his movements after that, I think no one would infer that he was confident in himself, and the enemy took advantage of it. I knew General Sedgwick very well ; he was a classmate of mine ; and I had been through a great deal of service with him. He was a perfectly brave man, and a good one ; but when it came to manoeuvring troops, or judging of positions for them, in my judgment, he was not able or expert. Had General Reynolds been left with that independent command, I have no doubt the result would have been very different.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. What despatches did you send to General Sedgwick before you sent the one for him to march immediately and join you ?

Answer. I sent him a despatch at 4 o'clock to cross the river at Franklin's crossing. In the despatch at 9 o'clock, not having heard that he had crossed the river, that order was repeated, together with the order for him to take Fredericksburg, and march up to me.

Question. Did you send him a despatch to this effect: "The general commanding directs that General Sedgwick cross the river as soon as indications will permit, and capture Fredericksburg, with everything in it, and vigorously pursue the enemy ; we know the enemy is flying."

Answer. There was a despatch of that character sent him. The exact despatch is annexed:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

*"Chancellorsville, Va., May 2, 1863—4.10 p. m.*

**"General BUTTERFIELD :**

**"The major general commanding directs that General Sedgwick cross the river as soon as indications will permit, capture Fredericksburg, with everything**



in it, and vigorously pursue the enemy. We know that the enemy is flying, trying to save his trains. Two of Sickles's divisions are among them.

“JAMES H. VAN ALLEN,

“*Brigadier General and Aide-de-Camp.*”

It was based on a report, sent in from General Sickles, that the enemy was flying at the time that he was sent out to follow up Jackson's column. At the time this news was received by me I was of the impression that the general was mistaken, but nevertheless felt that no harm could follow from its transmission to General Sedgwick. This, it will be seen, was dated in the afternoon of May 2.

Question. General Sedgwick says that immediately after this despatch was received, another came, dated five minutes past 7 p. m., directing him to pursue the enemy on the Bowling Green road?

Answer. A despatch of that character was sent. In order that it may be understood, I annex it:

“COMMANDING OFFICER, 6th Corps:

“General Hooker telegraphs you are to throw your whole force on the Bowling Green road, and no other. My telegraphic communication to the general is roundabout, and takes about three hours' time.

“BUTTERFIELD,

“*Major General and Chief of Staff.*”

Question. What did you understand to be the position of General Sedgwick at the time you sent him the despatch to cross the river, and come up and join you?

Answer. As I had not heard of his crossing the river—and I may say here, that I felt as though General Sedgwick did not make proper exertions to keep me informed of his movements—and not knowing but that he was at Franklin's crossing, the order to cross was reiterated. Perhaps I should add that our communication by telegraph between Chancellorsville and Falmouth was imperfect, and sometimes unusual delays occurred in the transmission of communications.

Question. He states that at the time he received that despatch he was three miles below Fredericksburg, and was at that very moment engaged with the enemy. Were you aware of that fact?

Answer. No, sir; and nobody else. The left of his line may possibly have been three miles below Fredericksburg, but his right brigade, under General Neal, was very near Fredericksburg, and was pressed by Captain Oliver, an aide-de-camp of Major General Butterfield, to advance on it, but declined, as he said he had no orders to do so. Captain Oliver reports that two shots were fired at this time, but so far off that he did not know whether they were fired at them or not. I should like for Captain Oliver to be examined by the committee.

Question. General Sedgwick states that his troops at that time were three miles below Fredericksburg?

Answer. Franklin's crossing, where he was directed to cross, may be a mile or a mile and a half below Fredericksburg; if he marched down the river, I did not know it before.

Question. General Sedgwick also states that he was also engaged with a large body of the enemy in his immediate front; did you understand such to have been the case?

Answer. If such was the fact, it is singular that he did not report it to me. I never heard of it before; and I am sure it was not heard by my staff officers on the opposite side of the river, or even by those with him.

Question. General Sedgwick also states that immediately he received your order, he left a small portion of his force in front of the enemy, and commenced

his march to Fredericksburg, reaching the intrenchments of the enemy about daylight, and commenced an assault with his four leading regiments, which was repulsed.

Answer. Fredericksburg, as I have before stated, was occupied by the 18th and 21st Mississippi regiments, and I can only say that if General Sedgwick's troops were repulsed, the attack would not appear to have been a vigorous one.

Question. And that he then immediately concentrated his army for the purpose of making an assault upon the enemy's works, and carried them about 11 o'clock, or as soon as he could do so?

Answer. The advance was made on the enemy's works at 11 o'clock a. m.

Question. Do you know whether or not he encountered the enemy during the subsequent marching of that day?

Answer. In his official report he says the enemy marched off to his left, and about two miles from him. I have no recollection of his having had another engagement that day.

Question. What portion of the enemy lay between you and General Sedgwick?

Answer. Lee's army, at Fredericksburg, numbering 60,000, not including the artillery, cavalry, and the forces stationed up the river, occupying the posts of Gordonsville and Culpeper. I think my information on this point was reliable, as I had made use of unusual means to ascertain. The enemy left 8,000 men to occupy the lines about Fredericksburg; Jackson marched off to my right with 25,000 men, and Lee had the balance between me and Sedgwick.

Question. Did you expect General Sedgwick to form a junction with you?

Answer. No, sir; but I expected that while he attacked Lee's rear, I would attack him in front, and compel him to move off towards Gordonsville. He had no defences in his rear, but had thrown up defences in his front. I wanted to get him between our forces.

Question. What change had been made in the disposition of the forces of the enemy, or in your force, that caused the whole result to be changed by Sedgwick arriving in the afternoon instead of in the morning, as you expected?

Answer. As I have already stated, the position I held before Lee was enfiladed by his batteries, which the enemy had established on the high ground abandoned by the 11th corps. I knew that my line would not be tenable for any great length of time, for while Lee was attacking in front with his musketry, their batteries would be enfilading my line; and no line could live there. Hence I did not want to attempt to hold the line any longer than was necessary. I, however, did hold it till 11 o'clock, or near that time, expecting to hear from Sedgwick momentarily, although my troops were there maintaining their position at a disadvantage.

Question. At what time did General Sedgwick arrive at the point designated by you?

Answer. He did not arrive there at all.

Question. How near to that point did he get?

Answer. Within three or four miles, perhaps; when General Warren returned to me from him, and reported the condition of things, I directed him to say to General Sedgwick that if he could not succeed, not to attack. General Warren represented to me that General Sedgwick had said he could do no more; then it was I wanted him to take some position and hold it, that I might turn the enemy in my immediate front. I proposed to leave troops enough where I was to occupy the enemy there, and throw the rest of my force down the river and re-enforce Sedgwick then the whole of Lee's army except that which had been left in front of Sedgwick would be thrown off the road to Richmond, and my army would be on it.

Question. Then I understand you to say that, not hearing from General

Sedgwick by eleven o'clock, you withdrew your troops from the position they held at the time you ordered General Sedgwick to join you.

Answer. Yes, sir; not wishing to hold it longer at the disadvantage I was under. I may add here, that there is a vast difference in corps commanders, and that it is the commander that gives tone and character to his corps. Some of our corps commanders, and also officers of other rank, appear to be unwilling to go into a fight; in my judgment, there are not many who really like to fight. In the campaign in the west I never ventured to engage a force that I could not whip myself, as I was not confident that I would be promptly and vigorously supported in case I required it; but I should add that this was, in part, owing to the defective organization of that army.

Question. What prevented General Sedgwick from getting to the position you indicated?

Answer. General Warren told me, when he came back, that General Sedgwick would not have marched at all if he (Warren) had not gone down there; also, that he had not sufficient confidence in himself to move, and not ability enough to manœuvre his troops when he did move.

By the chairman :

Question. Is there anything else you desire to state in regard to the campaign of Chancellorsville?

Answer. There is one matter to which I have not referred, that is, the calumny uttered by the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher, at a meeting of temperance men somewhere in England, in reference to my condition during the affair at Chancellorsville. It was stated by him that that battle was lost by my being intoxicated. I hear that the committee have requested him to furnish his authority for making that statement, and that he has declined to do it. So far as I know, he has never withdrawn it; I must, therefore, regard him as its inventor, and will add that a more untruthful statement never passed from the lips of man. I hope that, in justice to himself and to myself, whatever correspondence has taken place between the committee and that gentleman may be published in connexion with this testimony.

Examination suspended.

WASHINGTON, *March* 13, 1865.

Major General JOSEPH HOOKER's examination resumed.

By the chairman :

Question. When last before the committee, I believe you concluded your statement in regard to the campaign of Chancellorsville; will you now go on from that point?

Answer. In order that the history of the campaign may be known in detail, I prefer to have it confirmed by documentary testimony as far as practicable; accordingly I submit the following letter to the President of the United States, showing the reasons why an effort to cross the river was not made prior to the date of the letter.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“*Camp near Falmouth, Va., May* 13, 1863.

“My movements have been a little delayed by the withdrawal of many of the two-years and nine-months regiments, and those whose time is not already up it will be expedient to leave on this side of the river. This reduction imposes upon me the necessity of partial reorganization. My marching force of infantry is cut down to about eighty thousand, while I have artillery for an army of more than double that number. It has always been out of proportion, considering the character of the country we have to campaign in, and I shall be more efficient by leaving at least one-half of it in depot.

"In addition Stoneman's cavalry returned to camp day before yesterday, and will require a day or two more to be in readiness to resume operations. I know that you are impatient, and I know that I am, but my impatience must not be indulged at the expense of dearest interests.

"I am informed that the bulk of Longstreet's force is in Richmond. With the facilities at hand he can readily transfer it to Lee's army, and no doubt will do so if Lee should fight and fall back, as he will try to do.

"The enemy's camps are reported to me as being more numerous than before our last movement, but of this I have no positive information. They probably have about the same number of troops as before the last battle. But with these and Longstreet's they are much my superior, besides having the advantage of acting on the defensive, which, in this country, can scarcely be estimated.

"I hear nothing of Peck's movements, and of the force at West Point, which is too small to be of much importance in the general movement. If it is expected that Peck will be able to keep Longstreet's force in and about Richmond I should be informed of it; and if not, a reserve infantry force of twenty-five thousand should be placed at my disposal in this vicinity. I merely state this for your information; not that I know even that you have such a force, or, if you have, that you would be disposed to make use of it in this way. I only desire that you should be informed of my views.

"In my opinion the major part of the troops on the upper Potomac, in and around Washington and Baltimore, are out of position, and if great results are expected from the approaching movements every man and vessel at the disposal of the government should be assigned their posts.

"I hope to be able to commence my movement to-morrow, but this must not be spoken of to any one.

\* \* \* \* \*

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"JOSEPH P. HOOKER,

*Major General, Commanding.*

"His Excellency the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES."

The next day I received the following reply from the President :

"EXECUTIVE MANSION,

*Washington, May 14, 1863.*

"MY DEAR SIR : When I wrote on the 7th I had an impression that possibly, by an early movement, you could get some advantage, from the supposed facts that the enemy's communications were disturbed, and that he was somewhat deranged in position. That idea has now passed away, the enemy having re-established his communications, regained his positions, and actually received re-enforcements. It does not now appear probable to me that you can gain anything by an early renewal of the attempt to cross the Rappahannock. I therefore shall not complain if you do no more for a time than to keep the enemy at bay, and out of other mischief, by menaces and occasional cavalry raids, if practicable, and to put your own army in good condition again. Still, if, in your own clear judgment, you can renew the attack successfully, I do not mean to restrain you. Bearing upon this last point I must tell you I have some painful intimations that some of your corps and division commanders are not giving you their entire confidence. This would be ruinous if true, and you should, therefore, first of all, ascertain the real facts beyond all possibility of doubt.

"Yours truly,

"A. LINCOLN."

On receiving this letter I called on the President and requested him to inform me which of my generals were dissatisfied with me if it was proper for him to do so. I learned that he had derived his information from Governor Curtin, of Pennsylvania, and a citizen of Philadelphia by the name of Barclay. Those gentlemen had visited the army a few days before, and, on leaving, the former had congratulated me, in the presence of some members of my staff, on the condition in which they had found the army. After leaving me they had visited General Meade and General Stoneman at their headquarters, and had then proceeded directly to the steamer, which conveyed them to Washington that night.

I said to the President that if any of the corps or division commanders were not supporting me I had not been informed of it, and that sooner than suspect any one wrongfully, I desired the President himself to ascertain their feelings on their coming to Washington, and that whenever they applied for permission to come I would request them to call on him, and he could then learn their views for his own information. I said I had no idea who the disaffected were, did not suspect any one, and did not wish any of my officers to feel that I did suspect them. From time to time most of the corps commanders visited the city, but I never learned the result of their interviews with the President.

On the 28th of May I sent the following despatch to the Secretary of War :

“MAY 28, 1863.

“HON. E. M. STANTON :

“It has been impossible for me to give any information concerning the movements of the enemy at all satisfactory. I have had several men over the river, but, as they do not return, I conclude that they have been captured.

“The enemy's camps are as numerous and as well filled as ever. It was reported to me this morning, by General Gregg, that the enemy's cavalry had made their appearance in the vicinity of Warrenton; on the strength of which I have ordered on to that line Buford's division to drive them across the river, and to keep them there, and, if necessary, I will send up additional forces. Major General Stahel should be instructed to look into the Shenandoah valley and see what is going on over there. In the event a forward movement should be contemplated by the enemy, and he should have been re-enforced by the army from Charleston, I am in doubt as to the direction he will take, but probably the one of last year, however desperate it may appear—desperate if his force should be no greater than we have reason to suppose. The enemy has always shown an unwillingness to attack fortified positions; still, you may rest assured that important movements are being made, and, in my opinion, it is necessary for every one to be watchful. The enemy has all of his cavalry force, five brigades, collected at Culpeper and Jefferson; this would indicate a movement in the direction of the Orange and Alexandria railroad, and this it is my duty to look after.

“If Stoneman had not almost destroyed one-half of my serviceable cavalry force I would pitch into him in his camps, and would now if General Stahel's cavalry were with me for a few days.

“Please send this to the President.

“JOSEPH HOOKER,

“*Major General, Commanding.*”

I deem this despatch important, because in it I informed the Secretary of War of the probable direction the enemy would take in the movement I observed from their camp. I may state here that the Richmond papers had announced that an important movement was projected, and that rumors and counter rumors were reaching me from every direction that an extensive raid or invasion was contemplated. I also saw an excitement in their camp, and had good reason to believe that they were planning a movement.

To that communication I received the following response from the Secretary of War :

“MAY 29, 1863.

“Major General HOOKER :

“Your telegram addressed to me of last evening was submitted to the President, and also to Generals Halleck and Heintzelman. General Halleck reports as follows : ‘There is no other cavalry force about Washington than that of General Stahl, which is now engaged on scouting duty towards Bull Run mountain, and in picketing Bull Run and Occoquan rivers. If it be removed, there will be no force in front to give notice of enemy’s raids on Alexandria or Washington.’

“E. M. STANTON,  
“*Secretary of War.*”

On the 25th of May and 2d of June the following despatches were received from General Dix :

A.

“FORT MONROE, *Virginia, May 25, 1863.*

“Major General HOOKER :

“I am informed from three different sources, and I do not doubt, that troops have gone from South Carolina and Georgia, but whether to Bragg or Lee is not quite certain. The greater part of Longstreet’s force, recently on the Blackwater, is near Richmond, ready to move either on Fredericksburg or West Point.

“JOHN A. DIX, *Major General.*”

“FORT MONROE, *June 2, 1863—3.30 p. m.*

“Major General H. W. HALLECK :

“I have just received the following despatch from General Peck. Will you please communicate it to General Hooker :

“‘I have a man who left Richmond last week. He says Pickett’s division passed through the day before he left for Fredericksburg. It had been there and participated in the funeral of Jackson. General Elsey commands in the city. Citizens and soldiers talked of Lee’s moving into Maryland with 85,000 men. Says the most of Longstreet’s troops that left Blackwater stopped about Richmond in consequence of the alarm resulting from the raids. General Ewell made lieutenant general.’

“Major General DIX.”

On June 4th I sent the following despatch to General Halleck :

“JUNE 4, 1863.

“Major General HALLECK,

“*Commanding, &c., &c., Washington :*

“Following received from General Buford June 4, 1863 :

“‘Nothing noteworthy to report yesterday. Colonel Duffie’s picket reported enemy crossing in considerable force at Sulphur Springs. Preparations made to welcome them, but they did not come. Country and river as high up as Orleans, New Baltimore, and Thorougfare gap visited yesterday and last night. Nothing was seen or heard.

“‘JOHN BUFORD.’

“The movements of the enemy in our front do not indicate what their purpose or object may be.”

Not being able to ascertain what was going on on the opposite side of the river I directed two bridges to be thrown at Franklin’s crossing, and on the 6th of June I directed General Sedgwick to make a reconnoissance in front of the bridges for the purpose of developing the enemy’s forces.

The following is the order to General Sedgwick :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“*Camp near Falmouth, Va., June 6, 1863—6.45 a. m.*”

“COMMANDING OFFICER, *6th Corps* :”

“The major general commanding directs that you make a reconnoissance in front of the bridges and ascertain the position and strength of the enemy. Throw your corps over the river, if necessary. The absence of his pickets from General Couch’s front would seem to indicate his removal. Let this be done as speedily as possible. Seize any citizens as prisoners who could give any information.

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,

“*Major General, Chief of Staff.*”

The enemy was found in full force, and apparently no movement was under way at that time—certainly none by his infantry or artillery.

On the 5th of June I addressed the following to the President :

“JUNE 5, 1863.

“His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, *President, &c.* :

“Yesterday morning appearances indicated that during the night the enemy had broken up a few of his camps and abandoned them. These changes were observed on the right of his line, in the vicinity of Hamilton’s crossing. So far as I was enabled to judge, from all my means of information, it was impossible for me to determine satisfactorily whether this movement had only been a change of camp, or the enemy had moved in the direction of Richmond or up the river ; but taken in connexion with the fact that some deserters came in from the divisions of Hood and Pickett, I concluded that those divisions had been brought to the front from their late positions, at Gordonsville and Taylorsville, and that this could be for no other purpose but to enable the enemy to move up the river with a view to the execution of a movement similar to that of Lee’s last year. He must either have it in mind to cross the Upper Potomac, or to throw his army between mine and Washington. In case I am correct in my conjecture, to accomplish either he must have been greatly re-enforced, and, if making this movement, the fair presumption is that he has been by the troops from Charleston. Of this I have no evidence further than that furnished me by General Dix that they had come to Richmond.

“This morning some more of their camps have disappeared ; the picket line along the river is preserved and as strong as ever. General Buford, with three divisions of cavalry and ten pieces of artillery, is on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, and yesterday was along the river beyond Sulphur Springs, and reports no enemy.

“As I am liable to be called on to make a movement with the utmost promptitude, I desire that I may be informed, as early as practicable, of the views of the government concerning this army. Under instructions from the major general commanding the army, dated January 31, I am instructed to ‘keep in view always the importance of covering Washington and Harper’s Ferry, either directly or by so operating as to be able to punish any force of the enemy sent against them.’

“In the event that the enemy should move, as I almost anticipate he will, the head of his column will probably be headed towards the Potomac, *via* Gordonsville or Culpeper, while the rear will rest on Fredericksburg.

“After giving the subject my best reflection, I am of opinion that it is my duty to pitch into his rear, although in so doing the head of his column may reach Warrenton before I can return. Will it be within the spirit of my instructions to do so ?

“In view of these contemplated movements of the enemy, I cannot too forc-

bly impress upon the mind of his excellency the President the necessity of having one commander for all of the troops, whose operations can have an influence on those of Lee's army.

"Under the present system all independent commanders are in ignorance of the movements of the others—at least such is my situation. I trust that I may not be considered in the way to this arrangement, as it is a position I do not desire, and only suggest it as I feel the necessity for concert, as well as vigor, of action. It is necessary for me to say this much, that my motives may not be misunderstood.

"JOSEPH HOOKER,  
"Major General, Commanding."

I will say in connexion with the foregoing that the army of the Potomac, the army of General Dix, including General Peck at Suffolk, the commands of Generals Heintzelman and Foster, and the portion of General Schenck's in the Shenandoah valley, were operating against a common enemy. Each commander was in ignorance of the position, force, and movements of the other. Sometimes they acted in concert, and as often in opposition to each other; hence I made that request of the President, and in order that my motives might not be misunderstood, I requested that it might be given to some one else.

I will also call the attention of the committee to that part of my despatch where I requested authority, in case the enemy should move as I anticipated, and stating what my anticipation was, to fall upon his rear, as the movement could only be made in conflict with the authority under which I was acting.

I received the following, in answer to mine, from Major General Halleck, dated June 5, and on the same day I also received the following from the President:

"JUNE 5, 1863.

"Major General HOOKER:

"The President has directed me to reply to your telegram to him of 10 a. m. to-day. My instructions of January 31, which were then shown to the President, left you entirely free to act as circumstances in your judgment might require, with the simple injunction to keep in view the safety of Washington and Harper's Ferry. In regard to the contingency which you suppose may arise of General Lee's leaving a part of his forces in Fredericksburg, while with the head of his column he moves by Gordonsville or Culpeper towards the Potomac, it seems to me that such an operation would give you great advantage upon his flank to cut him in two and fight his divided forces. Would it not be more advantageous to fight his movable column first instead of first attacking his intrenchments with your own forces separated by the Rappahannock? Moreover, you are aware that the troops under Heintzelman are much less than the number recommended by all the boards for the defence of Washington. Neither this capital nor Harper's Ferry could long hold out against a large force. They must depend for their security very much upon the co-operation of your army. It therefore would seem perilous to permit Lee's main force to move upon the Potomac while your army is attacking an intrenched position on the other side of the Rappahannock. Of course your movements must depend in a great measure upon those made by General Lee. There is another contingency not altogether improbable, that Lee will seek to hold you in check with his main force, while a strong force will be detached for a raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania. The main force of the enemy in North Carolina have probably come north, but I think all available troops in South Carolina and Georgia have been sent to re-enforce Johnston in Mississippi; such is the information here. Heintzelman and Dix are instructed to telegraph directly to you all movements which



they may ascertain or make. Directions have also been given to forward military information which may be received from General Schenck's command.

"Any movements you may suggest in these commands will be ordered, if practicable. Lee will probably move light and rapidly. Your movable force should be prepared to do the same. The foregoing views are approved by the President.

"H. W. HALLECK,  
"General in-Chief.

"JUNE 5, 1863.

"Major General HOOKER :

"Yours of to-day was received an hour ago. So much of professional military skill is requisite to answer it that I have turned the task over to General Halleck. He promises to perform it with his utmost care. I have but one idea which I think worth suggesting to you, and that is, in case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock, I would by no means cross to the south of it. If he should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, would fight in intrenchments and have you at disadvantage, and so, man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would in some way be getting an advantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled up on the river like an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear without a fair chance to gore one way or to kick the other.

"If Lee would come to my side of the river I would keep on the same side and fight him, or act on the defensive, according as might be my estimate of his strength relatively to my own. But these are mere suggestions which I desire to be controlled by the judgment of yourself and General Halleck.

"A. LINCOLN."

I will say, in regard to the former, that this was the first intimation I received from any quarter that I held the relation to General Dix and to General Heintzelman communicated to me in the despatch of the general commanding the army. It was then I called on those officers for the strength of their commands, the position of their troops, and the movements, if any, they were making. But at the same time no authority was given me over them, nor was any commander appointed. Major General Halleck held that position, and I leave it for others to decide of the manner in which he exercised it.

On the 5th of June I again reported to the President the changes in the position of the enemy's forces by the following telegram :

"JUNE 5, 1863.

"MR. PRESIDENT: I should very much like to have Captain Moore ordered to this army. Since writing this morning I concluded to make a demonstration on the enemy by throwing a couple of bridges across the river at Franklin's crossing, and to learn, if possible, what the enemy are about. As soon as we got to work they began to assemble in great numbers from all quarters, and the more remote are still arriving.

I took about 50 prisoners, and they report that the changes remarked in their camps proceeded from the reorganization of their army and the assignment of them to new camps. All of Longstreet's command are now with Lee, but no part of the Charleston forces.

"They have no infantry force higher up the Rappahannock than its junction with the Rapidan.

"Their cavalry is assembled around Culpeper, but the threat to make a crossing may cause them to return.

"I shall keep my bridge down a few days.

"JOSEPH HOOKER,

"Major General, Commanding.

"His Excellency A. LINCOLN,

"President of the United States."

In view of these changes the 5th corps had been ordered to the bank of the river between Banks's and United States fords. Not feeling fully satisfied with the information in my possession in regard to the enemy's movements around Culpeper, I telegraphed General Halleck twice on the 6th, as follows:

"JUNE 6, 1863—3 p. m.

"Major General HALLECK:

"As the accumulation of the heavy rebel force of cavalry about Culpeper may mean mischief, I am determined, if practicable, to break it up in its incipency. I shall send all my cavalry against them, stiffened by about 3,000 infantry.

"It will require until the morning of the 9th for my forces to gain their positions, and at daylight on that day it is my intention to attack them in their camps.

"As many of my cavalry are still unserviceable, from the effect of Stoneman's raid, I am weak to cope with the numbers of the enemy if as large as reported.

"It would add much to my efficiency if some of Stahl's forces could advance and hold the fords at Beverly and Sulphur Springs some time during the forenoon of the 9th. If this should be done, I desire that the officer in command should not be informed of the object of his march, but merely to hold these fords. It is next to impossible to confine information to its proper limits.

"I have 5,200 sabres on a reconnoissance to-day in the vicinity of Jefferson. Jones's brigade, which has been hovering around Milroy all winter, numbering 1,600, is among them; also an additional brigade from North Carolina.

"JOSEPH HOOKER,

"Major General, Commanding."

"JUNE 6, 1863—8 p. m.

"Major General HALLECK:

"I request that I may be informed whether or not I am to receive assistance in my attack on the rebel forces at Culpeper from any portion of Major General Heintzelman's forces; and if so, what?"

"JOSEPH HOOKER,

"Major General, Commanding."

To these I received the following reply:

"JUNE 7, 1863.

"Major General HOOKER:

"A considerable portion of General Heintzelman's cavalry is out scouting and cannot be communicated with. General Stahl will co-operate with General Buford as far as he has means. To prevent delays please telegraph to General Heintzelman, and he will consult me if necessary. It is impossible to ascertain how much aid can be given to General Buford till the cavalry comes in.

"H. W. HALLECK,

"General-in-Chief."

The attack was made and the enemy were driven two miles before Pleasanton at Beverly ford, and many prisoners were taken. But for the appearance of a corps of infantry, of which I had no knowledge, General Pleasanton would have succeeded in routing their entire cavalry force. From the prisoners taken I learned that the whole of the enemy's cavalry had been assembled there. The cavalry from North Carolina and from the Shenandoah valley had been brought in and had been reviewed by General Lee, whose headquarters were then at Culpeper, preparatory to making the movement which followed. This satisfied me that it was more than a raid; that an invasion was contemplated. As a full account of the fight I submit the following from General Pleasanton, and my reply to him :

[Cipher.]

“HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY,

“*Rappahannock Station, June 9, 1863—10.45 p. m.*”

“Major General HOOKER :

“A short time after my last despatch to you, General Gregg, with his infantry and cavalry, joined me about two miles from the river, to which point I had driven the enemy. He reported that he had encountered a much superior number of the enemy's cavalry and had a severe fight, also that a train of cars had been run up to Brandy Station filled with infantry, who opened on his men. I also received information from letters and official reports captured in the enemy's camp, as well as from prisoners, that the enemy had upwards of twelve thousand (12,000) cavalry, which was double our own force of cavalry, and twenty-five (25) pieces of artillery. I also learned from contrabands and prisoners that a large force of infantry had been sent for from Culpeper, as well as Longstreet's command at Ellis's ford. Having crippled the enemy by desperate fighting so that he could not follow me, I returned with my command to the north side of the Rappahannock. Gregg's command crossed at Rappahannock bridge. To-morrow morning Stuart was to have started on a raid into Maryland; so captured papers state. You may rest satisfied he will not attempt it. Buford's cavalry had a long and desperate encounter, hand-to-hand with the enemy, in which he drove back before him, handsomely, very superior forces. Over two hundred prisoners were captured, and one battle flag. The troops are in splendid spirits and are entitled to the highest praise for distinguished conduct.

“A. PLEASANTON,

“*Brigadier General, Commanding.*”

“JUNE 10, 1863.

“COMMANDING OFFICER, *Cavalry Corps :*

“I am not so certain as you appear to be that the enemy will abandon his contemplated raid. With this impression I have felt a little hesitation in withdrawing the infantry.

“Will you be able to keep him from crossing the river with the cavalry and batteries with you? If not, and you consider that the infantry will be of service in preventing a passage, please have it retained until further orders. I desire that you will send me your opinion on this subject.

“We shall be able to send up to you 1,000 more cavalry to-morrow. There has been great delay in the transmission of despatches.

“JOSEPH HOOKER.

“*Major General, Commanding.*”

The enemy continued to occupy his line in front of Fredericksburg, as before. The corps which was found encamped a mile from Culpeper was Ewell's. The enemy had reorganized his army into three corps, each numbering about 30,000 infantry. At the review there were 11,000 cavalry.

On the 12th I received the following from General Pleasonton :

“WARRENTON JUNCTION, *June 12, 1863—7 p. m.*

“General S. WILLIAMS, *A. A. G.* :

“A colored boy captured on (Tuesday) the 9th states that Ewell's corps passed through Culpeper on Monday last on their way to the valley, and that part of Longstreet's has gone also. A second negro just across the river confirms the statement. I send a reconnoissance to find out the truth.

“A. PLEASONTON,  
“*Brigadier General.*”

This news reached me through the War Department, where I was officially informed they kept copies of all letters and despatches. Deeming it of great importance, the following telegram was despatched to Major General Halleck, to which I received the following reply :

“JUNE 12, 1863—8.40 a. m.

“Major General H. W. HALLECK :

“Brigadier General Pleasonton, without additional cavalry, I fear, will not be able to prevent the rebel cavalry from turning his right. I have not been able to ascertain his precise strength, but know that it is near 7,500, while that of the enemy is certainly not less than 10,000. He now pickets beyond Sulphur Springs. He will, however, do the best he can. If he should be turned, you will perceive that I shall be constrained to abandon the Aquia line of operations.

“JOSEPH HOOKER,  
“*Major General, Commanding.*”

“JUNE 12, 1863.

“Major General HOOKER :

“There is no possibility of sending you more cavalry. Horses will be sent as fast as they can be procured.

“H. W. HALLECK,  
“*General-in-Chief.*”

Had this information been communicated to General Milroy, probably the disaster at Winchester might have been averted, as that officer would have had sufficient notice of their approach to have withdrawn his command.

In view of the information I had received from General Pleasonton, of the presence of an infantry corps at Culpeper, I had, on the 11th, ordered the 3d corps to take post on the river from Rappahannock Station to Beverly ford; on the 12th, for the 1st corps to proceed to Bealton, and the 11th to Catlett's Station; and on the 12th and 13th despatched the following instructions to Major General Reynolds :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“*Camp near Falmouth, Va., June 12, 1863.*

“COMMANDING OFFICER, *1st Corps* :

“In view of the position of affairs on the right, the absence of any specific information as to the objects, movements, and purposes of the enemy—the necessity for the presence of the commanding general here—he directs me to

say to you that you will assume command of the right wing of the army until such time as he may arrive there. You will move with your corps up to the vicinity of Bealton to-morrow. General Howard, with the 11th corps, is or should be at Catlett's to-morrow afternoon; he left here at 12 to-day. The positions of Meade and Birney you are advised of by previous letters. General Pleasonton, with all the cavalry, is on the right, and will, of course, be subject to your orders. The enemy must not be permitted to cross the river to make his intended raid. Circumstances may make it proper for you to attack him. Of this you must judge. Use all possible endeavors to get information. Our latest intelligence, partly through Pleasonton's fight, and partly through other sources, developed the intention of the enemy to commence a raid with his cavalry on the morning of the 10th; whether his infantry were to accompany him or not we have not ascertained. General Lee's headquarters are said to be in the vicinity of Culpeper. Longstreet's and Ewell's corps (infantry) and Stuart's (cavalry) corps are reported in that vicinity. Please call for information as reported from all sources that you may be informed of, and transmit the same to the general.

"The general expects to be able to leave here to-morrow. He desires that you will cause particular attention to be paid to Rappahannock and Beverly fords. A communication, in the shape of a circular, is enclosed, which you will issue or not at your discretion.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,

"Major General, Chief of Staff."

"JUNE 13, 1863.

"COMMANDING OFFICER, 1st Corps:

"After receiving all the information you can from Pleasonton put your command in best position possible to accomplish prevention of enemy's movements, whatever they may be. It is probable that a movement is on foot to turn our right or go into Maryland. The information is not of such settled character as to warrant abandonment of this line, but still it will need watching at your end. When it is settled, then we must concentrate at once one way or the other. As it is, our line is unnecessarily extended, and consequently weak.

"The general's instructions require him to cover Washington and Harper's Ferry. To do this and hold the Fredericksburg line are impossibilities if the enemy move as last year. He cannot abandon this line on any uncertainty. With this understanding you can act advisedly. Bealton was named as a central point for supplies, and for an *appui*, until their movements are determined. Change it if necessary, and advise the general.

"DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,

"Major General, Chief of Staff."

The cavalry, under General Pleasonton, picketed from Sulphur Springs to Rappahannock Station, and from there down, holding the bulk of the cavalry on the right, with instructions to attack the enemy if he appeared.

It is proper for me to state here that it was in view of this contingency that I had requested of his excellency the President, on the 5th instant, authority to so far depart from my instructions as to allow me to cross the river and attack the enemy's rear. If an invasion was intended, as I anticipated, the present exposed condition of the enemy's forces was inevitable. He was compelled to make his advance with a part of his force, while the residue remained in our front. On the 12th A. P. Hill's corps held the line of the enemy's works from the Rapidan to below Hamilton's Crossroads, a distance of more than twenty miles. Longstreet's corps was in the vicinity of Culpeper, and Ewell and a

part of the cavalry were marching down the Shenandoah valley. Reference to the map will satisfy any one of the perilous position of the enemy. At this moment I had two bridges thrown at Franklin's crossing, and the 5th corps at Banks's and United States fords, both weakly held, and both practicable, as reported, for crossing. Bealton was held by the 3d corps. It will be remembered that this despatch was referred to Major General Halleck, and my request denied.

As the movement of the enemy continued, with the exception of Hill's corps, and apprehending that the enemy would endeavor to turn me on the right, I withdrew the 12th, 6th, and 2d corps from the left, and directed them to march to Fairfax Station. I directed General Reynolds, in command of the cavalry, the 1st, 3d, and 11th corps, to march for the Alexandria and Orange railroad, and take a position at Manassas, as far in advance of Washington as I thought it would be proper for them to be. I had previously despatched a force to hold Thoroughfare gap. They reached their respective positions by rapid marching in two days. The depots at Aquia were broken up, and all the public property removed.

As soon as my troops withdrew from before Fredericksburg the corps of A. P. Hill took up its line of march and followed Longstreet. I may say there was an interval of several days between the marching of the respective corps of the enemy.

It was in this condition of the two armies when I telegraphed his excellency the President as follows, and received the following reply :

“NEAR FAIRFAX STATION,

“June 15, 1863—12 p. m.

“His Excellency the PRESIDENT UNITED STATES :

“I have received your despatch of this evening. The army of the Potomac is in this vicinity, excepting the 2d and 6th corps, and as they are marching in rear of all the trains they will not be up before some time to-morrow. Perhaps the 2d corps will not be here until some time during to-morrow night. The 1st and 11th corps were first to arrive on this line, but I have not yet learned whether they have drawn their supplies in readiness to march to-morrow morning or not. As soon as they are provided, they, as well as the others, will be put ‘en route.’ I have been informed that the enemy nowhere crossed the Rappahannock on our withdrawal from it, but General Hill's troops moved up the river in the direction of Culpeper this evening, for the purpose, I conclude, of re-enforcing Longstreet and Ewell, wherever they may be. I request that I may be informed what troops there are at Harper's Ferry, and who is in command of them, and also who is in command in this district.

“JOSEPH HOOKER,

“Major General, Commanding.”

“JUNE 16, 1863.

“Major General HOOKER :

“Your despatches of last night and this morning are just received. I shall have General Halleck to answer them carefully; meanwhile I can only say that, as I understand it, Heintzelman commands in this district. What troops, or very nearly what number are at Harper's Ferry, I do not know, though I do know that Tyler is in command there. Your idea to send your cavalry to this side of the river may be right, probably is; still, it pains me a little that it looks like the defensive merely, and seems to abandon the fair chance now presented of breaking the enemy's lengthy and necessarily slow line stretched now from the Rappahannock to Pennsylvania.

“A. LINCOLN.”

The suggestion in the letter, that I should attempt to break the enemy's line, I did not think it prudent to attempt in the then condition of the two armies. With all deference to the views of his excellency the President, it appeared to me that the wisest course for me to pursue was to move the army on a concentric but inner circle to the one followed by the enemy and endeavor to keep abreast of his main column. This would relieve me from all embarrassment concerning my communications and supplies, and would enable me to act promptly, with my force concentrated, in thwarting the general designs of the enemy. To have followed the plan suggested, it seemed to me that I would be marching the army away from the point at which it was most needed. At the time I suggested that authority might be given me to cross the river in the event the enemy moved as I anticipated he would have to, it was as much my object, in making the movement, to check the further advance of the column en route and cause it to return, as to overthrow and destroy the corps opposite me at Fredericksburg.

When this corps took up its line of march, following those of Ewell and Longstreet, I was clearly of the opinion that it was my duty to be governed in my operations by those of the whole rebel army, and not a part of it, and accordingly I directed my marches with that view.

The following despatches will explain:

“JUNE 15, 1863.

“His Excellency the PRESIDENT UNITED STATES:

“Your telegram of 8.30. p. m. received. It seems to disclose the intention of the enemy to make an invasion; and if so, it is not in my power to prevent it. I can, however, make an effort to check him until he has concentrated all his forces. I may possibly be able to prevent the junction and commence the movement during to-morrow. On so short reflection I am not prepared to say this is the wisest move, nor do I know that my opinion on this subject is wanted. A. P. Hill moved up towards Culpeper this morning, indicating his intention to re-enforce their forces on upper Potomac.

“JOSEPH HOOKER,  
“Major General, Commanding.”

“JUNE 15, 1863—10 p. m.

“His Excellency the PRESIDENT UNITED STATES:

“Your despatch 8.30 received. My despatch to General Halleck shows my position to-night. With regard to the enemy, your despatch is more conclusive than any I have received.

“I now feel that invasion is his settled purpose. If so, he has more to accomplish, but with more hazard, by striking an easterly direction after crossing than a northerly one.

“It seems to me that he will be more likely to go north and to incline to the west.

“He can have no design to look after his rear. It is an act of desperation on his part, no matter in what force he moves. It will kill copperheadism in the north. I do not know that my opinion as to the duty of this army in the case is wanted; if it should be, you know that I will be happy to give it.

“I have heard nothing of the movements of the enemy to-day, except that he has not attempted to follow me across the Rappahannock.

“I have only heard that all A. P. Hill's forces moved up the river this morning in the direction of Culpeper. If it should be determined for me to make a movement in pursuit, which I am not prepared to recommend at this time, I may possibly be able to move some corps to-morrow, and can reach

the point of the enemy's crossing in advance of A. P. Hill. If I should move at once, he would probably wait until his forces are concentrated. If they are moving towards Maryland, I can better fight there than make a running fight. If they come up in front of Washington, I can threaten and cut their communications, and Dix can be re-enforced from the south to act in their rear. I could sit still and have them turn my right. My sources of information could not successfully cover such an extent of country as their movements indicate.

"I add these suggestions for your consideration.

"JOSEPH HOOKER.

"*Major General, Commanding.*"

The next day the following despatch was sent to the President, and the following reply was received from General Halleck the same day.

"JUNE 16, 1863—7 a. m.

"His Excellency the PRESIDENT UNITED STATES :

"It appears to me, from General Couch's despatch of last night, received this a. m., that nearly all the cavalry of the army of the Potomac should be at once sent into Maryland by the most direct route. General Stahl has an abundance to perform all cavalry duty that will be required south of the Potomac. I merely make the suggestion. If any considerable body of the enemy's infantry should be thrown across the Potomac, they will probably take the direction of his advance pickets; and in that event it seems to me that a heavy column of ours should be thrown as speedily as possible to cross the river at Harper's Ferry, while another should be thrown over the most direct line covering Baltimore and Philadelphia.

"I only speak with reference to this army, as I know nothing of the location or number of troops at the disposal of the government elsewhere.

"JOSEPH HOOKER.

"*Major General, Commanding.*"

JUNE 16, 1863.

"Major General HOOKER :

"I do not think there is reliable information that the enemy has crossed the Potomac in any force. Where his main corps are is still uncertain, and I know of no way to ascertain except through your cavalry, which should be kept near enough to the enemy to, at least, be able to tell where he is. My suggestion of yesterday, to follow the enemy's advance by moving a considerable force first to Leesburg and thence as circumstances may require, is the best one I can make. Unless your army is kept near enough to the enemy to ascertain its movements, yours must be in the dark or on mere conjecture. Tyler is in command at Harper's Ferry with, it is said, only nine thousand men; but, according to returns of the 11th, he should have at least thirteen thousand six hundred. Heintzelman, as you must be aware, commands this department. Besides the divisions of Abercrombie and Stahl near you, he has little or no movable troops.

"Telegraph direct to him on all matters connected with the use of his troops.

"H. W. HALLECK.

"*General-in-Chief.*"

I may here state that while at Fairfax Court House my cavalry was re-enforced by that of Major General Stahl. The latter numbered 6,100 sabres, and had been engaged in picketing a line from the Occoquan river to Goose creek. This line was concentric to, and a portion of it within, the line held by my army. The force opposed to them was Moseby's guerrillas, numbering about



200, and if the reports of the newspapers were to be believed this whole party was killed two or three times over during the winter. From the time I took command of the army of the Potomac, there was no evidence that any force of the enemy, other than that above named, was within one hundred miles of Washington city, and yet the planks on the chain-bridge were taken up at night during the greater part of the winter and spring. It was this cavalry force, it will be remembered, I had occasion to ask for, that my cavalry might be strengthened when it was numerically too weak to cope with the superior numbers of the enemy.

June 16, 11 a. m., the President was telegraphed as follows, and I received the following reply :

“JUNE 16, 1863—11 a. m.

“His Excellency the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES :

“Please accept my suggestions in regard to what should be done, in the spirit with which they were given. They were suggestions, merely, for I have not the data necessary to form an enlightened opinion in the case. Upon general principles I thought those were the movements to make.

“You have long been aware, Mr. President, that I have not enjoyed the confidence of the Major General commanding the army, and I can assure you, so long as this continues we may look in vain for success, especially as future operations will require our relations to be more dependent upon each other than heretofore. It may be possible now to move to prevent a junction of A. P. Hill’s corps with those of Ewell and Longstreet. If so, please let instructions to that effect be given me.

“As will appear to you, the chances for my doing this are much smaller than when I was on the Rappahannock, for should he hold the passes stoutly, he can cause me delay. You may depend upon it we can never discover the whereabouts of the enemy, or divine his intentions, so long as he fills the country with a cloud of cavalry. We must break through that to find him.

“JOSEPH HOOKER,  
“Major General, Commanding.”

“JUNE 16, 1862.

“Major General HOOKER :

“To remove all misunderstanding, I now place you in the strict military relation to General Halleck of a commander of one of the armies to the general-in-chief of all the armies.

“I have not intended differently, but it seems to be differently understood. I shall direct him to give you orders, and you to obey them.

“A LINCOLN.”

With the highest respect for his excellency the President, I may be permitted to state that the paragraph in my telegram relating to Major General Halleck had been misapprehended by him. Never for a moment had I mistaken my relation to that officer, and it will be impossible for any one to produce evidence of that fact. Without one exception, I forwarded to that officer all the reports and returns and information concerning the army, and furnished them regularly and promptly, and, as I think, as no other army commander has done. It is true that he stated in his official reports of the army, and also in his report to the Secretary of War, dated the 18th of May, that I had ignored him in my correspondence ; but in making this statement he should have borne in mind that if in some instances I had addressed the President and the Hon. Secretary of War, it was for the reason that in their correspondence they had addressed me in the same manner, and that common courtesy required me to respond as I did.

They were his superiors. His complaints of any infractions of the regulations, or any neglect of his official position, should have been of them, not his inferior in rank. Be this as it may, this record furnishes abundant testimony that my despatches, to whomsoever addressed, were referred to him, and I do not know of a solitary exception to this practice. In one instance, and one only, while in command of the army, did I address a confidential communication on any subject to those in authority, and that was a copy of my instructions to General Stoneman on his starting on his raid. I marked those confidential in order to have them kept a profound secret, as I had reason to know that the enemy obtained information of our movements in Washington, and that if this was communicated to them I could not hope to succeed. It will be remembered that the first intelligence of the intended withdrawal of McClellan's army from the Peninsula reached us through posters on the walls of Richmond. I had uniformly yielded not only a prompt but a willing obedience to every order I received from the major general commanding the army, when they were orders. On his "suggestions," in conflict with my own judgment, it was otherwise. I then requested orders. A few examples will illustrate the manner in which orders were usually communicated to me, as well as my action on them. Orders were luxuries to me in comparison with "suggestions" and "expectations," which carried with them no responsibility and no force. The committee will recollect that this same mode of conveying orders was adopted with my predecessor on the transfer of the army from Warrenton to the Aquia and Richmond line, and the use then made of it. The following telegrams about sending a cavalry force to General Milroy, also telegrams in reference to marching on Harper's Ferry, and the replies, will illustrate my meaning :

" MARCH 6, 1863—11.45 a. m.

"Major General HOOKER :

"General Milroy thinks that a large cavalry force is collecting in front of Winchester, and asks re-enforcements. We have no cavalry to send him, except from your army. If Milroy's suspicions are well founded, your cavalry should move so as to cut off the enemy, or compel him to fall back.

" H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*."

" MARCH 6, 1863—1 p. m.

"Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

"I have no means of verifying the suspicions of General ———; I only know that his general character is that of a stampeder, and that if a large cavalry force is in his front, I am puzzled to know where it came from—certainly not from the army in my front. If my cavalry is to be sent there on my present information, a positive order will be required; that trip will disable my cavalry for service for six weeks. If General ——— has four thousand infantry, he should be able to take care of himself against any cavalry force the enemy can send against him.

" JOSEPH HOOKER,  
" *Major General, Commanding*."

" MARCH 16, 1863.

"Major General HOOKER :

"Reports received here to-day, apparently more reliable than heretofore, indicate that the enemy has concentrated some 10,000 men near Strasburg to threaten the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. You have the only cavalry force to cope with that of the enemy, and it is expected that you will observe or occupy it, so as to prevent any large body from moving towards Harper's Ferry.

" H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*."

“MARCH 16, 1863—6.30 p. m.

“Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

“I have just received a telegram from the major general commanding the army, informing me that it is expected that I will despatch all my cavalry force to the protection of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. As this movement will involve consequences of the most momentous character, I have applied to him for unconditional orders. Please see that they are sent me. See my telegram to General Halleck.

“JOSEPH HOOKER,

“*Major General, Commanding.*”

“MARCH 16, 1863—6.30 p. m.

“Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Commander-in-Chief* :

“Have just received your telegram of this p. m. This morning I despatched three thousand cavalry to attack and break up the cavalry camp of Fitzhugh Lee and Hampton, in the vicinity of Culpeper.

“Is it ordered that the residue of my cavalry force shall be sent on to the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, so as to prevent any large body from moving towards Harper’s Ferry ?

“Can no one tell where all the enemy’s cavalry come from ?

“JOSEPH HOOKER,

“*Major General, Commanding.*”

“MARCH 16, 1863—9.30 p. m.

“Major General HOOKER :

“I am not aware that any of your cavalry has been ordered to the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. It is expected, however, that you will not permit a very large cavalry force to pass from your front to destroy that road without intercepting or destroying it. Very possibly Milroy’s report of over 10,000 in his front is the old story. It was supposed that you would know from your scouts whether or not there was good foundation for the report.

“H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*”

JUNE 16, 1863—7.30 p. m.

“Major General HALLECK :

“In compliance with your instructions, I shall march to the relief of Harper’s Ferry. I put my columns again in motion at 3 a. m. to-morrow. I expect to reach there in two days, and, if possible, earlier. The partial rest of to-day was not lost, being necessary to recruit from forced and heavy marches and fill up supplies. My headquarters at Fairfax Station to-morrow night.

“JOSEPH HOOKER,

“*Major General, Commanding.*”

“JUNE 16, 1863.

“Major General HOOKER :

“I have given no directions for your army to move to Harper’s Ferry. I have advised the movement of a force, sufficiently strong to meet Longstreet, on Leesburg to ascertain where the enemy is, and then move to the relief of Harper’s Ferry or elsewhere, as circumstances might require, with the remainder of your forces in position to support this. I want you to push out your cavalry to ascertain something definite about the enemy. You are in command of the army of the Potomac, and will make the particular dispositions as you deem proper ; I shall only indicate the objects to be arrived at. We have no positive informa-

tion of any large force against Harper's Ferry, and it cannot be known whether it will be necessary to go there till you can feel the enemy and ascertain his whereabouts.

“H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.”

“JUNE 16, 1863.

“Major General HOOKER :

“There is now no doubt that the enemy is surrounding Harper's Ferry, but in what force I have no information. General Schenck says our force there is much less than before reported, and cannot hold out very long. He wishes to know when he may expect relief. He can hope for none except from your army.

“H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.”

On receiving the above, and also having heard that Harper's Ferry had been abandoned, the movement of the infantry corps was suspended; the cavalry was already out, operating in the direction of the enemy, and on the 17th ran against Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry at Aldie. At this point it was learned that Longstreet's corps was holding Snicker's gap, and that Hill's corps was in the vicinity of Winchester. Pleasanton was ordered to throw forward his cavalry, and the infantry corps were advanced, the 12th corps to Leesburg and the 5th to Aldie; the remaining corps were held in support. Soon after, on the 20th, the 2d corps occupied Thoroughfare gap. On the 20th the cavalry followed up their success at Aldie, and drove the enemy through Middleburg, and on the 21st through Upperville and beyond. All of these fights were decided successes for the cavalry, and resulted in giving me information of a positive character relating to the enemy. It was found that the passes in the Blue Ridge were strongly held by the enemy's infantry, and this tended to satisfy me that the enemy designed making use of them for the passage of the bulk of his army, and it was in view of this that the army took the position they now held.

Before leaving Fairfax I had been re-enforced by Abercrombie's division and two brigades of Crawford's division; but as the term of service had nearly expired with the greater part of the former, it added no material strength to my command.

On the 18th the following despatch was received from the commanding general :

“JUNE 18, 1863.

“Major General HOOKER :

“Your telegram for a signal station at Crampton's Pass and South mountain has been sent to Colonel Myer, with directions to carry out your wishes, if he has the means. General Schenck has been notified that you will have control of any of his forces who are within the sphere of your operations. If you want anything of General Schenck or General Heintzelman, telegraph to them direct. Copy of such telegrams are always retained at the War Department for the information of the government. Major Haller is under serious charges, which are being investigated.

“H. W. HALLECK.”

In compliance with the above, I sent General Heintzelman the following despatch:

“JUNE 19, 1863—6.30 p. m.

“General S. P. HEINTZELMAN :

“I learn that you have a force of 2,000 infantry and two batteries at Poolesville. I request that they be ordered to seize the South Mountain pass, and *to hold it at all hazards*. It is important that they should take possession of it to-morrow.

“JOSEPH HOOKER,  
“*Major General, Commanding.*”

And received the following in reply :

“HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF WASHINGTON,  
“*June 19, 1863.*

“General BUTTERFIELD, *Chief of Staff* :

“There are two strong regiments of infantry, (800 each,) five troops of cavalry, and one battery, at Poolesville. South Mountain pass is in the middle department. General Schenck's troops, at Poolesville, have a long line to cover. Cannot General Schenck seize the pass ?

“S. P. HEINTZELMAN, *Commanding.*”

I had deemed it of great importance to seize this pass at an early moment, in order to confine the enemy to one line of invasion, and embarrass him as much as possible in collecting his supplies. I was also apprehensive that the enemy might make use of the pass to throw a force on to the left bank of the Potomac to embarrass my crossing that river, should it become necessary. As I had no troops in Maryland, and as those at Poolesville were out of position, in the existing state of affairs, and were close at hand, I did not dream that departmental limits would be regarded at such a crisis. However, I sent a reply that I would try to get along without the troops at Poolesville.

June 22, I received the following telegram :

“WASHINGTON, *June 22, 1863—3.15 p. m.*

“Major General HOOKER :

“In order to give compactness to the command of troops in the field, covering Washington and Baltimore, it is proposed to place that part of the “middle department” east of Cumberland, and commanded by General Schenck, under your direct orders. The President directs me to ask you if that arrangement would be agreeable. Please answer as early as possible.

“H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*”

And returned the following reply :

“JUNE 22, 1863—4.30 p. m.

“Major General HALLECK :

“Your telegram of 3.15 p. m. to-day is received. In reply I have to state, *yes*, provided the same authority is continued to me that I now have, which is to give orders direct to the troops in the departments of Generals Schenck and Heintzelman.

“JOSEPH HOOKER,  
“*Major General, Commanding.*”

June 25, received the following telegram from General Crawford :

“UPTON HILL, *June 25, 1863.*

“General D. BUTTERFIELD :

“Orders to march just received. It is very important that the 2d brigade, now at Alexandria, receive orders to join me from your headquarters, otherwise they will not be allowed to come. That brigade is an important part of this division, is commanded by the senior colonel, and I beg that it receive the necessary orders at once, as it reports itself ready to move.

“S. W. CRAWFORD, *Brigadier General.*”

And the following answer was received to my order for it to join :

“WASHINGTON, *June 25, 1863.*

“Major General HOOKER :

“The 2d brigade, to which you refer in your telegram, forms no part of General Crawford’s command which was placed at your orders ; no other troops can be withdrawn from the defences of Washington.

“H. W. HALLECK.”

In answer, I telegraphed as follows :

JUNE 25, 1863—11 a. m.

“Major General HALLECK :

“Subjoined is a despatch this moment received. I request that General Slough be arrested at once, and charges will be forwarded as soon as I have time to prepare them. You will find, when it is too late, that departmental lines will be fatal to the cause and the country.

“JOSEPH HOOKER,  
“Major General, Commanding.”

June 24 I despatched the following telegram to Major General Halleck, and on the same day I received a copy of the following report from General Tyler :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“*June 24, 1863.*

“Major General HALLECK :

“The aspect of the enemy is not much changed from yesterday. Ewell, I conclude, is over the river, and is now up the country, I suppose, for the purposes of plunder. The yeomanry of that district should be able to check any extended advance of that column, and protect themselves from their aggression.

“Of the troops that marched to the river at Shepardstown yesterday, I cannot learn that any have crossed, and as soon as I do, shall commence moving myself, and indeed am preparing, by new acquisitions, for that event. The others are ready.

“General French is now on his way to Harper’s Ferry, and I have given directions for the force at Poolesville to move and report to him, and also for all of Stahl’s cavalry ; and if I can do it without attracting observation, I shall send over a corps or two from here, in order, if possible, to sever Ewell from the balance of the rebel army, in case he should make a protracted sojourn with his Pennsylvania neighbors.

“If the enemy should conclude not to throw any additional force over the river, I desire to make Washington secure, and with all the force I can muster strike for his line of retreat in the direction of Richmond. I cannot learn the strength of Heintzelman’s and Schenck’s commands, nor where they are stationed, and hence I send my chief of staff to Washington and Baltimore to ascertain,

and also to start out a column of about fifteen thousand men on the national road as far as Frederick city. In any contingency, whether of an advance or retreat of the enemy, the defence of Washington or Baltimore, this amount of force should be there, and they should be held in readiness to march, which fact I will not be able to know until I put them on the road. I will send the best body.

"I desire that instructions may be given Generals Heintzelman and Schenck to direct their commands to obey promptly any orders they may receive from me. Last evening the colonel commanding at Poolesville responded to his orders to march, that he did not belong to my command, but would refer his orders to General Heintzelman. Such delays may bring us reverses. When these instructions are given, I shall not be necessitated to repeat orders to any part of my command to march on the enemy.

"Allow me to suggest that the new troops arriving in Baltimore and Washington be at once put in the defences, and the old ones, except those serving with the artillery, be put in marching condition. If this should be done, and quickly, I think that we may anticipate glorious results from the recent movement of the enemy, whether he should determine to advance or retreat. I request that my orders be sent me to-day, for, outside of the army of the Potomac, I don't know whether I am standing on my head or feet.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"JOSEPH HOOKER,  
"Major General, Commanding."

"MARYLAND HEIGHTS, *June 24, 1863.*

"Major General HALLECK :

"Mr. Benjamin Brown tells me he left Hagerstown at 8 o'clock this morning; he says Jenkins came to Hagerstown on the 15th at 4 o'clock p. m., with about 2,000 mounted men, and on the same day Ewell, with 12,000 men and sixteen pieces of artillery, arrived in Williamsport. Jenkins went down the valley and returned Saturday evening to Hagerstown with about 1,000 head of cattle and as many horses. On Monday, the 22d, Jenkins and Ewell both started down the valley towards Chambersburg. On Tuesday, (yesterday,) the 23d, Johnston's division, about 22,000 men, arrived in Hagerstown, and passed on to join Ewell. On Sunday I saw General Ewell go into the Catholic church; he has but one leg. Johnston has forty-three pieces of artillery. I passed six regiments at Sharpsburg as I came down; they passed on towards Boonsboro'; the men told me they were a part of Longstreet's corps that were coming on.

"I consider the above reliable.

"D. TYLER, *Brigadier General.*"

General Lee states in his official report, that not being able to ascertain the position of my army, he concluded to follow Ewell, and move over into Maryland. As soon as I ascertained that another corps of his was crossing the Potomac, I commenced crossing my own army, and by the time that I was over, the whole rebel army was on the north side of the Potomac. From Edwards's ferry, where I crossed, I directed General Reynolds to send detachments to seize the passes of the South mountain, Turner's and Crampton's, in order to anticipate the enemy passing through them, and confine him to one line of invasion, and directed him to follow those detachments with the 1st, 3d, and 11th corps, and take position at Middletown.

At this time all sorts of reports were in circulation respecting Ewell. All the country north of me seemed to be wild and crazy with excitement; but

from the most reliable information I could obtain, Ewell had first visited York, and from there had gone to Carlsile, where he was at this time, June 25. After crossing the river, A. P. Hill's corps made no delay, but followed on after Ewell; Longstreet went soon after, Lee accompanying Longstreet's corps. In order to cripple him as much as possible, I detached the 12th corps to march in the direction of Harper's Ferry, and the 2d and 6th corps to take up their line of march to Frederick. I should state that before leaving Fairfax Station, I had reason to believe that the force of the enemy was larger than my own; and being conscious of what was expected of me, I despatched my chief of staff, General Butterfield, on the 24th of June, to Washington and Baltimore, under the following instructions:

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ June 24, 1863.

“Major General D. BUTTERFIELD,  
“ *Chief of Staff:*

“You will proceed without delay to Washington; get the return, character, and position of troops in General Heintzelman's command; deliver the letter intrusted to you to Major General Halleck; make the representations concerning the troops, &c., to his excellency the President and the general-in-chief which I have charged you with. Proceed to Baltimore; get the returns of the troops in General Schenck's department; organize a column of fifteen thousand troops to move without delay to Frederick. You will report your progress by telegraph, and rejoin headquarters as soon as you have accomplished your mission. It is expected that you will complete this duty in two days. You will lose no time in fulfilling your instructions and returning.

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“JOSEPH HOOKER,  
“ *Major General, Commanding.*”

In addition to these, verbal directions were given General Butterfield to state to the officers he might meet that, in my judgment, the proper place to defend Washington and Baltimore was in advance of those cities; that it was the duty of all to despatch every available man from those cities to assist in the conflict; and then, if the worst came to the worst, to take our places behind the defences afterwards. The following is the report General Butterfield made to me of the result of his mission:

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ *Poolesville, Md., June 27, 1863.*

“Major General J. HOOKER, *Commanding Army of the Potomac:*

“GENERAL: In compliance with your letter of which the following is a copy:

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ June 24, 1863.

“GENERAL: You will proceed without delay to Washington. Get the returns, character, and position of troops in General Heintzelman's command; deliver the letter intrusted to you to Major General Halleck; make the representations concerning the troops, &c., to his excellency the President and the general-in-chief which I have charged you with. Proceed to Baltimore; get the returns of the troops in General Schenck's department; organize a column of fifteen thousand troops to move without delay to Frederick. You will report



your progress by telegraph, and rejoin headquarters as soon as you have accomplished your mission. It is expected that you will complete this duty in two days. You will lose no time in fulfilling your instructions and returning.

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“JOSEPH HOOKER,

“Major General, Commanding.

“Major General D. BUTTERFIELD, *Chief of Staff*”—

“I visited Washington and Baltimore on the 25th and 26th.

“Before starting I telegraphed Major General Heintzelman requesting that a copy of his returns might be at my disposal when I reached Washington.

“On my arrival there I was unable to find General Heintzelman, or any of his staff, at his headquarters, therefore from him could get no report of the forces in and about the defences of Washington. I then called immediately upon Major General Halleck, general-in-chief, handed him my letter of instructions to read, and stated to him the purposes of my visit. General Halleck replied that no troops could be spared from the defences of Washington. I stated to him that General Hooker desired me to say that he deemed it proper to give the enemy battle in front of Washington or Baltimore rather than near those places, as the most proper place to defend them.

“Receiving no assurance of any troops from General Halleck, in accordance with my letter of instructions, I called upon his excellency the President and laid my letter of instructions before him, repeating your verbal instructions. The President sent for Major General Halleck, before whom my instructions were again laid, with the inquiry from the President if he could furnish any troops. General Halleck replied that he considered it unsafe to take any more troops from the defences of Washington; that there were several millions of public property in the shape of quartermaster and commissary supplies and ordnance stores; that the secessionists might rise and burn this property at any time, unless it was strongly guarded. He considered the state of public feeling such as to justify him in anticipating such results in case any portion of the troops were withdrawn. He alluded also to the public buildings as well as the property of the civil government, and considered it unwise to weaken further the garrison of the city.

“The President stated to me that I had heard what General Halleck’s views were, and that it would be impossible to get any more troops from Washington. I requested of his excellency that I might be permitted to examine the returns of the troops, in accordance with my instructions. Major General Halleck was directed to exhibit these returns to me. From them I took the following memoranda, showing the strength, &c.:

“Garrison, 10,347; City Guard, 5,402; (Abercrombie,) 6,772; (Crawford,) 3,518; (Leudt,) added to army Potomac, 1,221; (Stahl,) added to army Potomac, 3,742. Paroled prisoners, 2,284; dismissed, 682; detached Pennsylvania reserves, 782.

“Total footing of General Heintzelman’s report, and not the footing of the above, 36,640.

“By these memoranda it will be seen that the garrison of Washington and Alexandria numbered as follows:

I. Garrisons.....	10,347
II. City Guards.....	5,402
III. Paroled prisoners.....	2,284
IV. Detached Pennsylvania reserves.....	782

“Of the troops marked as added to the army of the Potomac, two brigades were to leave the service in a very short time. General Halleck stated to me that in the item of ‘City Guards’ were included all the hospital guards, guards

for storehouses, depots, railroads, magazines, &c.; also, orderlies, and the President's guard. The total footing of General Heintzelman's tri-monthly return for June 10 or 20 (I don't remember which) was 36,640.

"I then proceeded immediately to Baltimore and laid my orders before Major General Schenck, commanding the middle department. He evinced the most earnest desire to comply entirely with your wishes as expressed in my letter. In reply to your verbal instructions, he stated that he coincided entirely with your views, that it was better to defend Washington or Baltimore in the front of either place than at the *very gates*. He laid before me the returns of his command, a copy of which is enclosed. These returns show that, while nominally carrying 36,000 troops, there were actually only a few thousand about Baltimore available for the purposes specified in my instructions.

"General Kelly's division of about 12,000 (officers and men for duty) were at Harper's Ferry; General Milroy's command of about 7,500 composed the forces at Winchester, and were in the late engagement there. That portion not captured were scattered and in a disorganized condition in Pennsylvania and elsewhere, not available. The division of General Scamon, of about 4,800, (officers and men for duty,) were out of the line of operations, now west on the Kanawha river, with headquarters at Charlestown, Va. The whole force being spread over about one hundred miles between Mount Pleasant, on the Ohio river, and Fayetteville.

"Scott's 900, New York cavalry, had been withdrawn and sent to Washington. The brigade of General Morris, a small command, was at Fort McHenry and Baltimore. The Purnell Legion was at Annapolis, Maryland, guarding parole camp. Two regiments and two batteries were with General Schoepf, at Fort Delaware. General Schenck had also a provost guard at Philadelphia, and videttes and pickets on all the roads leading to Baltimore. He had troops also guarding the lower Potomac.

"This statement of the location and condition of General Schenck's command will sufficiently explain to you that it was impossible for me to comply fully with your instructions. I could not but reflect how much easier your plans and purposes could have been accomplished if it had been thought proper to comply with your telegraphic request of last month to the authorities at Washington, that all those troops capable of having any effect upon the operations against Lee's army should be concentrated under one commander. Had this been done, most of the troops in General Schenck's department could have been placed in position heretofore to be available.

"General Schenck freely accorded to me authority to take from his command whatever troops could be used for the purpose of my instructions.

"After consultation and examination, I took all the available troops, consisting of General Lockwood's brigade, about 2,500 strong, put them on the road, in accordance with my instructions, leaving a small garrison for the city of Baltimore, consisting chiefly of New York militia, and in accordance with your telegraphic instructions returned to headquarters.

"I trust that this hastily written report will sufficiently explain to you the reasons which prevented my accomplishing the mission with which I was intrusted, and prove to you that nothing was neglected by me that could have been done in the premises.

"I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,

"Major General and Chief of Staff."

The committee will remember that the general-in-chief has assigned to them as a justification for the great number of troops kept in Washington, and has also repeatedly made use of it in his official correspondence, especially in his

report to the Secretary of War on the 18th of May, 1863, the estimate that was formed at a meeting of the corps commanders at the time it was proposed to withdraw the army of the Potomac from the vicinity of Washington and transfer it to the Peninsula. If the army of the Potomac had not been removed, it is but reasonable to suppose that they would have considered any force for that service as unnecessary. In my case Washington had not been uncovered, and my army was held between it and the enemy. I was myself defending Washington. Nevertheless it appears no troops could be drawn from its defences, and but 2,100 from the middle department; those, I may say, participated in the great battle of Gettysburg.

In this connexion it is but justice to say of the commander of the middle department that he promptly and cheerfully responded to my call by sending me every available man at his disposal, and that was 2,100. With regard to the enemy's force I had reliable information. Two Union men had counted them as they passed through Hagerstown, and, in order that there might be no mistake, they compared notes every night, and, if their counts differed, they were satisfactorily adjusted by compromise. In round numbers Lee had 91,000 infantry and 280 pieces of artillery; marching with that column were about 6,000 cavalry. It will be remembered that a portion of the enemy's cavalry crossed the Potomac below Edwards's ferry and went into Maryland to join Ewell between me and Washington; this column numbered about 5,000 men. This made the rebel army numerically equal to mine with all the additions I could receive. Certainly there could not be a difference of 2,000 men between the two armies at that time.

It was expected of me by the country that I would not only whip the army of the enemy, but prevent it from escaping. This I considered too much for the authorities to expect with the force I had. It may be very easy for one man to whip another of corresponding strength; but to do that, and at the same time prevent the other from running away, required, in my judgment, a little superiority of one over the other.

On the 27th of June the following instructions were communicated to the 12th corps:

“JUNE 27, 1863.

“COMMANDING OFFICER of the 12th Corps:

“Hold your command ready to march at 4 a. m. to-morrow. Colonel Lovell, with a regiment of cavalry, is ordered to report to you; also two brigades of General French's command will join you at 6 a. m. at Harper's Ferry as you pass. Orders will reach you during the night. Return the regiment of cavalry now with you to General Pleasanton here. Your command can march light, with ambulances and little or no trains.

“DAN'L BUTTERFIELD,

“Major General and Chief of Staff.”

It was to march in the direction of Harper's Ferry, where I was going myself. It had been placed under my command by the orders of the general-in-chief. Before starting to leave I telegraphed General Halleck as follows:

“JUNE 26, 1863—7 p. m.

“Major General HALLECK:

“Is there any reason why Maryland heights should not be abandoned after the public stores and property are removed? I propose to visit the place to-morrow, on my way to Frederick, to satisfy myself on that point. It must be borne in mind that I am here with a force inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, and must have every available man to use in the field.

“JOSEPH HOOKER,

“Major General, Commanding.”

My object in sending this despatch was to ascertain from him if there were any reasons I did not know of why Maryland heights should not be abandoned. I knew of none, and therefore had directed the 12th corps to march in that direction for the purpose of being joined by the garrison there, and moving upon Lee's rear upon the Potomac. My object was to destroy his bridges, if he had them; to drive away the guard that was left on the river, and also to intercept the commerce that Ewell had established in flour, grain, horses, and horned cattle which he was constantly sending to the rear.

I made an examination of Maryland heights and Harper's Ferry; sent for the engineer, Colonel Reynolds, who was in charge, and asked him what was the object of holding that point. He replied that he had asked the same question twenty times, and had received no answer. I could see no reason myself, unless it was to protect a railroad bridge across the river, in value not equal to the expenses of the army of the Potomac to the country for half a day. I could not consider this a sufficient reason for throwing out of service ten thousand men at a time so critical as the present. The post at Maryland heights defended no ford in the river, nor was it a defence to the Cumberland valley; nor was it in itself defensible. Its value may be estimated by the manner in which the rebel army had regarded it. It presented no obstacle to the invaders; how could it to their withdrawal? If it ever had virtue as a military position, it is presumed that it ceased when the rebels gave it the go-by, certainly so far as they were concerned. After ascertaining that the public property could all be removed before twelve o'clock at night, I seated myself, and was engaged in writing an order for its abandonment at daylight, when I received the following despatch from General Halleck:

"WAR DEPARTMENT, *June 27, 1863—10.30 a. m.*

"Major General HOOKER:

"Major Duane and Captain Mendall were ordered to your army, and it is presumed they are *en route*. I do not know where they now are, unless in your army.

"Maryland heights have always been regarded as an important point to be held by us, and much expense and labor incurred in fortifying them. I cannot approve their abandonment except in case of absolute necessity.

"H. W. HALLECK,

*"General-in-Chief."*

In connexion with this I may state that I was unwilling to send one corps upon Lee's rear, apprehending that he might turn upon it and crush it. I had taken the further precaution to send three corps to Middletown, to be in position to attack in flank in case it was attempted. On receiving General Halleck's despatch I sent him the following telegram:

"JUNE 27, 1863—1 p. m.

"Major General HALLECK:

"Have received your telegram in regard to Harper's Ferry. I find 10,000 men in condition here to take the field. Here they are of no earthly account; they cannot defend a ford on the river, and, as far as Harper's Ferry is concerned, there is nothing of it. As for the fortifications, the work of the troops, they remain when the troops are withdrawn. No enemy will ever take possession of them; this is my opinion. All the public property could have been removed to-night, and the troops marched to where they would have been of some service; now they are but a bait for the rebels should they return.

"I beg that this may be presented to the Secretary of War and his excellency the President.

"JOSEPH HOOKER,

*"Major General, Commanding."*

On finding that I was not allowed to manœuvre my own army in the presence of the enemy, and conscious that I was standing in the way of the accomplishment of its mission, on the same day, the 27th of June, I sent General Halleck the following telegram :

“ JUNE 27, 1863—1.p. m.

“ Major General HALLECK :

“ My original instructions were to cover Harper’s Ferry and Washington. I have now imposed upon me, in addition, an enemy in my front of more than my numbers. I beg to be understood, respectfully, but firmly, that I am unable to comply with these conditions with the means at my disposal ; and I earnestly request that I may be at once relieved from the position I occupy.

“ JOSEPH HOOKER,

“ *Major General, Commanding.*”

I may add, as my conviction, that if the general-in-chief had been in the rebel interest, it would have been impossible for him, restrained as he was by the influence of his excellency the President, and that of the honorable the Secretary of War, to have added to the embarrassment he caused me from the moment I took command of the army of the Potomac to the time I surrendered it.

After receiving instructions not to withdraw the troops from Maryland heights I proceeded to Frederick and directed the 12th corps to march to that place. The following morning Colonel Hardie arrived with an order from General Halleck relieving me from command, and directing me to turn it over to General Meade. The same messenger brought a letter of instruction to General Meade, which I heard read, but did not read myself, and was to the effect that he could make such disposition of the troops at Harper’s Ferry as he thought proper ; and it also added to his command the troops under Major General Couch, which, I was informed, numbered 20,000 men. I may state, further, that although I had asked for only 15,000 men, and had been refused them, large re-enforcements were subsequently sent to General Meade from the department of Washington, and also from that under the command of General Dix.

On being relieved, I was ordered to proceed to Baltimore and report to the Adjutant General’s office for orders. After remaining in that city three days, without receiving any orders, I came over to Washington ; but before I had been out of my carriage ten minutes I was placed under arrest by the orders of the general-in-chief. It is only necessary for me to say that up to that time I had repeatedly visited Washington without orders, and had never before been arrested for going there without them. With this ended my connexion with the army of the Potomac.

By the chairman :

Question. How early was it known to the President and Secretary of War that this state of feeling existed on the part of General Halleck towards yourself?

Answer. I think it may have been known to the President at the time they talked of a new commander to succeed General McClellan in the first instance. I was informed by a member of the cabinet that the President and five members of it were in favor of placing me at the head of the army of the Potomac, and one or two members of the cabinet and General Halleck were opposed to it. This is all I know about it.

Question. When did you first discover that General Halleck was so disposed towards you?

Answer. I may say that not only myself, but my adjutant general and my chief of staff, felt it from the beginning of my exercise of the command of the army of the Potomac. They had access to my correspondence with that officer, and knew that almost every request I made of General Halleck was refused. It was often remarked that it was no use for me to make a request, as that of

itself would be sufficient cause for General Halleck to refuse it. My books of correspondence will show this to be a fact.

Question. I think you have stated that the President suggested to you that you might not have been properly supported by your corps commanders.

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did he ever inform you what led him to suppose that such a feeling existed?

Answer. He had obtained that idea through Governor Curtin and Mr. Barclay. I do not know that he ever learned it from any other source; it was the only one he ever named to me. I said to the President that if such was the fact I did not know it, and that sooner than have any officer feel that I suspected him, I preferred to have the command taken from me. I said that when the corps and division commanders applied for leave of absence I would request them to call upon him, in order that he might ascertain for himself. I do not even know whether any of them visited him or not, and to this day I do not know who these officers were to whom Governor Curtin referred. I am free to confess, however, that I supposed they were Generals Meade and Stoneman. It is well known that I was very much dissatisfied with the manner in which General Stoneman used his cavalry in the Chancellorsville campaign, and had applied to have his sick leave indefinitely extended to him. With regard to General Meade, an issue had arisen between us relating to his conversation at the meeting of the corps commanders at Chancellorsville, which I presume is sufficient evidence as to the part that officer took in that consultation relating to the recrossing of the river. He had talked a great deal about it, and stated that he was for not recrossing, which I knew to be an error. After these answers had been received from two of the corps commanders, General Meade afterwards stated, in the presence of one of my staff officers, "I find that I have been blowing too much." I doubt if he ever felt right towards me after that. At one time I think he expected that I would relieve him from duty with that army.

Question. Did you have, at any time, any consultation with the President, Secretary of War, or General Halleck, or either of them, in regard to the propriety of the commander of the army of the Potomac having command of all the forces within striking distance of Lee's army?

Answer. I did. I addressed them a communication requesting that that might be done. It was not acceded to. Subsequently portions of these commands were placed subject to my orders, but when I gave them orders they did not obey them. For instance, I requested that the troops at Poolesville might be sent to seize and hold Turner's Pass and Crampton's Pass, in South mountain—they being near there—and deeming it of great importance to have those passes occupied and held, in order to confine the enemy to one line of invasion, thinking that he would be more embarrassed by so doing in supplying his army. This, it will be seen, was not done. Again, while at Fairfax, Crawford's division was assigned to my command, but only two brigades joined me. The remaining brigade was in Alexandria; and on sending word for it to report, I was told, in reply, by the commanding officer, that he had received instructions from General Halleck not to obey my orders. I requested the commanding general to have him arrested, and informed him that I would present him with charges for his trial. The reply was that he did not belong to my command, and I do not know that any action was ever given to my request.

Question. What was there to prevent nearly all the troops under General Dix from coming up here and operating against Lee's army?

Answer. I knew of nothing to prevent it, nor do I know of anything to prevent his troops going into Richmond. In order to make the invasion, Richmond had been stripped of everything but a police force, numbering, perhaps, from 1,000 to 1,500 men. I knew of no other troops within two or three days'

march of there. Subsequently I was informed that some portion of General Dix's command was ordered up; but, if I recollect aright, they did not reach Washington or Baltimore until after the battle of Gettysburg had been fought, and after Lee's army had been whipped. When they did arrive, they were sent out to re-enforce General Meade, who had already more men than he knew what to do with. The proper place to have sent these men, it seems to me, would have been on the south side of the Potomac, for the purpose of preventing Lee's army from crossing. A few troops in that position could have prevented General Lee from crossing the river.

Question. In your judgment, what would have been the result if you had been allowed to use such troops as could have been concentrated against Lee's army?

Answer. I should have felt very confident of the result if I could have had the troops at Harper's Ferry, even. As I have before stated, I was reliably informed that the enemy had taken no pontoon train into Maryland; from that fact I concluded that Lee had no idea of crossing the Susquehanna river, but that his true objective point was Washington, either by a direct route or by way of Baltimore. For this reason I felt that it was for me to say when and where I should fight him. I felt that I could choose my position and compel him to attack me.

On being relieved from command, I had communicated this fact to General Meade, and that I felt very much aggrieved at not being allowed to pursue the plan I had adopted, which was to sever Lee, with everything in his rear. As an evidence of the correctness of the course I adopted, General Lee says in his report that he was very much embarrassed in his movements from fear his communications would be interrupted; that they were liable to be cut off. This indicates that I was striking him at a vital point when I was moving to undermine him. As it was, by not giving me this force at Harper's Ferry, I did not feel safe in making the movement, and was made to appear in a ridiculous attitude by marching the 12th corps thirty miles out of its way in order to join the troops at Harper's Ferry, and then requiring them to march back again without an object. I said further to General Meade, that the enemy had made the invasion without any pontoon bridges, and of course, in my judgment, did not intend to cross the Susquehanna river; indeed, I told him everything which I deemed of importance to him in the position which he held. I told him that I had already directed my cavalry to advance on the Emmettsburg and Gettysburg line, and to extend their wings to the right as far as the Susquehanna, and to the left as far as South mountain—this in order to get information of the movements of the enemy. It was, perhaps, ten o'clock in the day that General Meade was informed of this. This was the day on which I was relieved, the 28th. In the evening General Butterfield came to me, saying that he had been directed by General Meade to see in what order I thought the troops should march, on what routes, and with what object. I gave him my ideas, while he transcribed them, and which I presume was the order in which the troops did march. The main column was to march due north, with a column within supporting distance, in the direction of the railroad from Baltimore to Harrisburg, keeping it in mind to make that a line of supply as well as the one that we were on. I stated that my sole object would be to cover Washington and Baltimore, and should endeavor to keep the troops nearer to either one of these places than the enemy. The order of march, I suppose, was the order I gave. I do not know anything to the contrary.

Question. Had you been permitted to take the 10,000 troops at Harper's Ferry, what, in your judgment, would have been the result of that campaign?

Answer. I had a great deal of confidence that Lee's army would be thoroughly whipped, I could not say destroyed. Had I anticipated the rise in the river, I would say that the army was in great danger of being destroyed.

Question. Can you assign any reason why General Halleck refused those troops to you, and immediately afterwards transferring them over to the command of General Meade, permitted him to have them?

Answer. I know of no reason.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. General Meade, immediately after coming into command, caused Maryland heights to be abandoned?

Answer. He ordered it to be abandoned the following day. When I came to Washington the Secretary of War informed me that he regretted very much the step that I had taken; that it was the intention of the President to give me the command of all the troops I had asked for; but that fact had never been communicated to me, nor had I any intimation of it before. I inquired of the President why he had not given me a corps in that army, after he had relieved me; and he said it was for the reason that he thought it would not be agreeable to me, or to General Meade. Subsequently he communicated his desire to this effect by letter to General Meade, which was acceded to by the latter first, and afterwards objected to by General Meade.

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RICHMOND, VA., *April 12, 1865.*

Brigadier General CHARLES DEVENS, United States volunteers, sworn by Hon. D. W. Gooch, testifies as follows:

Question. Please state your name, rank, and position in the army.

Answer. My name is Charles Devens, jr.; my rank is that of brigadier general in the United States volunteers, and I am at present commanding the 3d division in the 24th army corps.

Question. Were you at the battle of Chancellorsville?

Answer. I was at the battle of Chancellorsville.

Question. State your rank and command at that time.

Answer. I commanded the 1st division of the 11th corps; Major General Howard commanding the corps.

Question. State particularly the operations of that battle, and all the facts connected with the 11th army corps, so far as they came within your knowledge.

Answer. The 11th corps, having crossed the Rappahannock, and subsequently the Rapidan at Germania Mills, was on Friday, May —, placed in position along the turnpike road leading from Fredricksburg through Chancellorsville to Orange, facing southwardly; the 12th corps was formed along the same road between it and Chancellorsville. These two corps were thus formed at a right angle to the principal line, which extended from Chancellorsville to the Rappahannock river at Banks's or United States ford, and faced eastwardly towards Fredericksburg. General Steinwehr's division of the 11th corps was at a point on the turnpike road east of where what is called the plank road leaves it, General Schurz's division about opposite that point, and the 1st division on the turnpike road to the west of General Schurz's division, forming the extreme right of the army. This division consisted of two brigades, in all less than four thousand (4,000) men; one of these brigades, that commanded by Brigadier General McLean, was formed along the turnpike; the other was formed one third along the turnpike, the remaining portion being re-formed and thrown back across the turnpike, facing westwardly. The right flank rested on no obstacle, and was what is technically termed "in air;" and it was of course evident that if a force of the enemy should approach from the west, moving down the turnpike and towards Fredericksburg, it would move with its front upon the end of our line facing southwardly, and would encounter no efficient resistance except from the portion of the brigade mentioned, until front could be changed. This con-



tingency was probably little anticipated, as the main force of the enemy was at Fredericksburg, and to accomplish such a manœuvre a considerable flank march would be requisite across our front. A battery of artillery was with the division, a section (two pieces) was placed upon the turnpike road, facing westwardly, and the remainder upon the turnpike road at the right of the division, and facing southwardly; these dispositions were ordered by Major General Howard, commanding the corps, and were examined by him after they were made. The whole division was in line, with the exception of two regiments, which I was directed to keep in reserve; these were faced by me so as to be ready to move at once up the road and support the portion of the line thrown across the road, and facing westwardly. On Friday night the troops were engaged in throwing up breastworks; and having laid down at about daybreak on Saturday morning, I was informed in about an hour after that Major General Hooker, commanding the army, was approaching the portion of the line occupied by my division, with General Howard. My headquarters being upon the line, I immediately joined them; and General Hooker, after having carefully examined the line, was inquired of by General Howard if the dispositions were satisfactory, and replied that they were. At about 10 or 11 o'clock on Saturday morning a large force was observed coming across our front, and towards our right. When observed by me it was on quite high ground, and apparently opposite Chancellorsville. It moved, as I suppose, (I had not then a map of the country,) on the road called the Catharpine road, or some road between that and the turnpike. It was evident either that the enemy were endeavoring to retreat towards Gordonsville, or were moving so as to turn our right flank, as it was clearly a movement in force. I immediately sent my personal aid, Lieutenant H. G. Davis, to report this movement to General Howard. To this General Howard replied that he had already observed it, and that it was observed at the general headquarters at Chancellorsville.

Soon after the skirmish line along my front (which had been pushed out beyond the main line to the distance of from half to three-quarters of a mile) was smartly attacked by the enemy's skirmishers, who did not, however, drive it back. These attacks were renewed several times within the next few hours, one of the smartest of them occurring when Major General Howard (who visited me two or three times during the day) was with me, and, although smart, seemed rather intended to feel our line at the points where they were made than actually to force it back, and were most strong indications of an intention to move upon this portion of the line. These were reported as they occurred; and about two or three in the afternoon two soldiers who had been sent out to observe the enemy's lines as spies, from one of the other commands, came in and reported that the enemy were massing heavily on our right. As this information was of importance, and fully confirmed my own strong opinion of the intention indicated by the movements of the enemy, I sent these men at once to the headquarters of General Howard, with direction to the officer in charge to see that they went at once, after communicating with General Howard, to the headquarters of General Hooker. Whether this information reached General Hooker I cannot say, but have been informed by General Howard that all information sent by me was communicated to the general headquarters. No direction having been received by me to make any change, my troops remained in substantially the position heretofore stated. At about half past five or six in the afternoon the enemy attacked vigorously all along the front of my division. Being fully satisfied, from the previous indications, that the heaviest attack would come from the west down the turnpike road, notwithstanding my line facing southwardly along that road was attacked, I ordered up the only two regiments I had in reserve to the support of this part of my line, and I at once sent one of my aids to inform Major General Schurz that the attack was in earnest; that it would come mainly down the road, and

advised him to change front across the road ; whether this message was received by General Schurz I cannot say, but I learned subsequently that that officer did make great exertions to effect this movement. Being fully engaged all along my front, it was clearly my duty to receive the attack where I was as resolutely as possible, and to hold the enemy (who, if he was attacking down the road, had completely outflanked us) as long as possible until dispositions could be made of the other forces to receive him.

The skirmish line resisted the enemy with great determination, but as it was forced back and the main line of the enemy came in sight, it was a question of time only how soon he would overcome the resistance offered by the 1st division. He was moving down the road in very large force, at least twenty or twenty-five thousand (20 or 25,000) men, with his line extended on both sides of it, (apparently in a line of battalions in mass,) and was able almost at once to pour a heavy fire into our rear as well as front, by bending his line towards that of the 1st division; such an attack it was impossible long to resist, but great determination was exhibited by the officers and most of the men. The division was, however, soon forced back, and, it must be admitted, in some confusion. On arriving at the point on the line originally held by General Schurz, it was found that this division had already retreated, but I attempted here to reform my division, with only temporary success, although the 17th Connecticut, commanded by Major Brady, (the lieutenant colonel having been killed, and the colonel severely wounded,) and the — Ohio, commanded by Colonel Richardson, made resolute efforts to sustain the movement. The remnants of the division were forced back to the position of General Steinwehr, who had formed across the turnpike road, having succeeded in changing front by command of Major General Howard, who personally now directed, with most distinguished gallantry, the movements on this part of the field.

This position was, however, carried by the enemy, who then advanced upon the 12th corps. Having received very early in the action an exceedingly painful wound in the foot, against the effects of which I had been struggling with difficulty, as soon as the 11th corps was forced from the field I was compelled to resign the active command of the 1st division to Brigadier General McLean, although I remained on the field that night and the next day in an ambulance. Having heretofore made to Major General Howard a full report of the operations of the 1st division 11th corps, and answering these questions in camp without the means of referring to any memoranda, I respectfully ask that the committee will obtain that report from the office of the Secretary of War, and accept it as a part of my answer. Should it be found to differ in any respect from this statement made from recollection, I desire that so far it may be considered as substituted for this.

As the conduct of this 1st division of the 11th corps has been made the subject of severe, and, as it seems to me, unjust comment, I deem it proper to say that when Lieutenant General G. F. Jackson, (Stonewall,) with 25,000 men had been enabled to place himself without opposition on our right flank, he had gained a tactical victory, which required only that he should strike to be a complete one over a corps so posted as was the 11th corps; that it could hardly be expected that a division no larger than the first, unsupported as it must necessarily be by other divisions, could long withstand the assault of such a body, and that the fact that out of this division of less than 4,000 men 1,600 by name are included in the list of killed, wounded and missing, (nearly every regimental, brigade, and division commander being on the list,) shows that the utmost was done by it to prevent the disaster which threatened the army, until it could be placed in position to receive this assault. In this connexion, to show that my own efforts were not unworthy of the trust confided to me, I deem it proper to add the following extract from a note addressed to me by Major General Howard, a few days after:

“ I take pleasure in assuring your friends that your own conduct was noble and self-sacrificing in the extreme. More than an hour after the attack I saw you still rallying men ; forming lines to resist the enemy’s attack, though suffering from a severe and painful wound received early in the action.

“Be assured of my confidence and affectionate regards.”

CHAS. DEVENS, JR.,

*Brigadier General U. S. Vols.*

# PAPERS FROM WAR DEPARTMENT.

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WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, May 9, 1865.*

SIR: Referring to your letter of March 13, 1865, I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of all orders, despatches, communications, &c., between this department, General Halleck, and Generals Hooker and Meade, in relation to the operations of the army of the Potomac from January 25, 1863, to July 15, 1863, inclusive. This embraces the whole period in which General Hooker was in command, which I understood from members of your committee was the subject of inquiry. The correspondence after that period is so voluminous that it would not be practicable to furnish it for some weeks yet with the force belonging to this office.

Your obedient servant,

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

Hon. B. F. WADE, *Chairman, &c.*

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GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 20. }

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
*Washington, January 25, 1863.*

I..The President of the United States has directed:

*First.* That Major General A. E. Burnside, at his own request, be relieved from the command of the army of the Potomac.

*Second.* That Major General E. V. Sumner, at his own request, be relieved from duty in the army of the Potomac.

*Third.* That Major General W. B. Franklin be relieved from duty in the army of the Potomac.

*Fourth.* That Major General J. Hooker be assigned to the command of the army of the Potomac.

II..The officers relieved, as above, will report, in person, to the Adjutant General of the army.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. D. TOWNSEND,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Official:

E. D. TOWNSEND,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, January 25, 1863.*

GENERAL: The President directs me to say that he wishes an interview with you at the Executive Mansion as early as possible.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General J. HOOKER,  
*Commanding, &c.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, April 5, 1865.*

Official copy:

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 1. }HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Camp near Falmouth, January 26, 1863.*

By direction of the President of the United States the undersigned assumes command of the army of the Potomac. He enters upon the discharge of the duties imposed by this trust with a just appreciation of their responsibilities. Since the formation of this army he has been identified with its history. He has shared with you its glories and reverses, with no other desire than that these relations might remain unchanged until its destiny should be accomplished. In the record of your achievements there is much to be proud of, and with the blessing of God we will contribute something to the renown of our arms and the success of our cause. To secure these ends your commander will require the cheerful and zealous co-operation of every officer and soldier in this army. In equipment, intelligence and valor, the enemy is our inferior. Let us never hesitate to give him battle wherever we can find him. The undersigned only gives expression to the feelings of this army when he conveys to our late commander, Major General Burnside, the most cordial good wishes for his future. My staff will be announced as soon as organized.

JOSEPH HOOKER,  
*Major General, Commanding Army of the Potomac.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*January 26, 1863.*

Brig. Gen. L. THOMAS, *Adjutant General:*

It will be a great happiness to me to have Brig. Gen. Stone ordered to report as chief of staff.

JOSEPH HOOKER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., January 29, 1863.*

Major Gen. HOOKER,  
*Headquarters Army of the Potomac:*

Will you be in Washington soon, or shall I arrange to meet you at Aquia on business?  
H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Camp near Falmouth, January 30, 1863.*

GENERAL: By General Orders No. 61, War Department, 1862, leaves of absence cannot be granted in the field, except to prevent death or permanent disability. This rule has never been strictly regarded in this army. It is understood that the Adjutant General gave a construction of this order to General Burnside that permitted leaves for a short period.

The order organizing grand divisions gave to the grand division commanders the authority usually exercised by the general commanding the army.

Grand division commanders had no uniformity of action in the premises. I have thought proper to issue the enclosed order. I believe by it much desertion will be stopped, and a more contented feeling pervade the army. At the same time I desire, in view of existing orders, that it should receive proper sanction.

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*  
Major General HALLECK, *Commander-in-Chief U. S. Army.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 6, 1865.*

Official:

RICHD. D. CUTTS, *Colonel and A. D. C.*

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 3. }

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
Camp near Falmouth, Va., January 30, 1863.

The following rules will govern officers empowered to grant leaves of absence:

- I. No leave will exceed fifteen days.
- II. Leaves to commanders of corps, divisions, and cavalry brigades will only be granted upon approval at these headquarters. One brigade commander only in a corps to be on leave at one time.
- III. Not more than one field officer of a regiment to be absent on leave at one time, where the full complement of field officers are present; when less than that number, leaves to be granted only in extreme cases.
- IV. Not more than two line officers to be given leave from any regiment at the same time. Not more than one from any battery or detachment.
- V. Leaves not to exceed ten days, except to residents of the following States, when it may be given for fifteen days, viz: Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont; Ohio, Michigan, and the States west of these last named.
- VI. Furloughs to enlisted men must in no case exceed two for every one hundred men present for duty in the regiment, battery, or detachment, and not to be granted to any men but those having the most excellent record for attention to all duties.
- VII. In case of the failure of any officer or soldier to return before their leave expires, leaves will not be granted to others from the same commands until their return. All applications will, by indorsement or otherwise, state the number of officers or men absent on leave from the command, and the failure to return of any person will be notified immediately to the Provost Marshal General, with a memoranda of the leave, residence of the party, and description of enlisted men.
- VIII. A return from each regiment, battery, and detachment will be forwarded to these headquarters within eight days from the date of this order, showing the number of officers and men absent from duty, from any cause whatever; this return will be made out in form as follows:

Name.	Rank.	Regiment.	Company.	Remarks.
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IX. Under the head of "Remarks" for all enlisted men absent will be given a complete description, age, height, &c., &c.; where enlisted; whether or not dropped from the rolls; when and where deserted; where supposed to be; furloughed; detailed at hospital, where, &c., &c.

X. Under the head of "Remarks" for officers, when the absence is of such a nature as to cause dismissal from service, it should be so stated, that action may be taken thereon.

XI. The officers will be placed at the head of the list. The enlisted men in the following order: 1st, furloughed men; 2d, detached; 3d, absent, sick and wounded, in hospital; 4th, deserters. The list will be aggregated at the end as follows:

Total absent—Officers.....	—
Furloughed men.....	—
Detached.....	—
Absent, sick and wounded, in hospital, &c.....	—
Deserters.....	—
Total.....	—

Tables of these returns will be consolidated by brigades and divisions and accompany them.

By command of Major General Hooker:

JOSEPH DICKINSON, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

Official:

\_\_\_\_\_, *Captain, A. D. C.*

[Telegram—Received 12.30 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
January 30, 1863—12.30 p. m.

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

Have no business requiring my presence in Washington, but will meet you there or at Aquia, as you may desire.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 7, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., January 30, 1863.

Major General HOOKER, *Headquarters Army of the Potomac*:

As some of the matters on which I wished to meet you may require a reference to the War Department or to the President, I will meet you here at your earliest convenience.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 2 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 11, 1865.

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Received 2.20 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, January 30, 1863.

Colonel J. C. KELTON, *Assistant Adjutant General*:

I desire that Major Nelson H. Davis, of Inspector General's department, may be ordered to report to me for duty. Can this be done?

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding*.

[Telegram, in cipher.—Received 6.10 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
January 30, 1863—5.30 p. m.

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief U. S. A.*:

I will be in Washington to-night to report in the morning.

J. HOOKER, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, April 7, 1863.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, January 31, 1863.

GENERAL: The 9th army corps, now under your command, will be sent to Fort Monroe to report to Major General Dix.

The troops at Harper's Ferry and in the Shenandoah valley have been placed under the command of Major General Schenck, headquarters at Baltimore; Brigadier General Kelly, headquarters at Harper's Ferry, is in the immediate command. Major General Heintzelman is in the command of the troops in the immediate vicinity and for the defence of Washington.

These officers will cordially co-operate with you to the full extent of the means at their command. Their forces, however, are not sufficient to resist a strong attack from the main army of the rebels, and we must, therefore, look to the army of the Potomac to either cover these places, or to succor them in case they should be seriously threatened by the enemy.

On your recommendation, the Pennsylvania reserves will be exchanged with General Heintzelman for an equal number of Pennsylvania troops. Requisitions will be made on the quartermaster's department for transportation to effect this exchange, and to transport the 9th army corps to Fort Monroe.

In regard to the operations of your own army, you can best judge when and where it can move to the greatest advantage, keeping in view always the importance of covering Washington and Harper's Ferry, either directly, or by so operating as to be able to punish any force of the enemy sent against them.

I enclose herewith a copy of my letter of the 7th instant to Major General Burnside, in answer to an inquiry from him if I approved his crossing the Rappahannock with his army. That letter was submitted to the President and approved by him. It embodies my views in regard to the duty of the army of the Potomac to act against the enemy in its front whenever circumstances will permit.

All requisitions for supplies will, of course, be made on the proper departments ; but should any one fail to duly respond to such requisitions, you will please report the fact to these headquarters.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Major General J. HOOKER,  
*Commanding Army of the Potomac.*

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, April 5, 1865.

Official copy:

J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, January 7, 1863.*

GENERAL: Your communication of the 5th was delivered to me by your aide-de-camp, at 12 m. to-day.

In all my communications and interviews with you since you took command of the army of the Potomac I have advised a formal movement across the Rappahannock. At our interview at Warrenton, I urged that you should cross by the fords above Fredericksburg, rather than fall down to that place; and when I left you at Warrenton it was understood that at least a considerable part of your army would cross by the fords, and I so represented to the President. It was this modification of the plan proposed by you that I telegraphed you had received his approval.

When the attempt at Fredericksburg was abandoned, I advised you to renew the attempt at some other point, either in whole or in part, to turn the enemy's works, or to threaten their wings or communications; in other words, to keep the enemy occupied till a favorable opportunity offered to strike a decisive blow. I particularly advised you to use your cavalry and light artillery upon his communications, and attempt to cut off his supplies and engage him at an advantage. In all our interviews, I have urged that our first object was, not Richmond, but the defeat or scattering of Lee's army, which threatened Washington and the line of the upper Potomac.

I now recur to these things simply to remind you of the general views which I have expressed, and which I still hold. The circumstances of the case, however, have somewhat changed since the early part of November. The chances of an extended line of operations are now, on account of the advanced season, much less than then. But the chances are still in our favor to meet and defeat the enemy on the Rappahannock, if we can effect a crossing in a position where we can meet the enemy on favorable or even equal terms. I therefore still advise a movement against him.

The character of that movement, however, must depend upon circumstances, which may change any day and almost any hour. If the enemy should concentrate his forces at the place you have selected for a crossing, make it a *feint*, and try another place. Again, the circumstances of the time may be such as to render an attempt to cross the entire army not advisable. In that case, theory suggests that while the enemy concentrates at that point, advantages can be gained by crossing smaller forces at other points, to cut off his lines, destroy his communications and capture his rear-guards, outposts, &c. The great object is to *occupy* the enemy, to prevent his making large detachments or distant raids, and to injure him all you can, with the least injury to yourself. If this can be best accomplished by *feints* of a general crossing, and detached real crossings, take that course; if by an actual general crossing, with *feints* on other points, adopt that course. There seems to me to be many reasons why a crossing at *some* point should be attempted. It will not do to keep your large army inactive. As you yourself admit, it devolves on you to decide upon the time, place and character of the crossing which you may attempt. I can only advise that an attempt be made, and as early as possible.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Major General BURNSIDE,  
*Commanding, &c., Falmouth.*

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, April 6, 1865.

Official copy:

J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.



## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

February 1, 1863.

COLONEL: I enclose herewith a copy of a letter received from General Robert E. Lee, commanding the enemy's forces.

I desire to know if there are any instructions from the War Department pertaining to this question, or if the matter is left entirely at my discretion.

I also desire to know if the requirements of Order No. 7, headquarters of the army, January 29, 1862, are to be enforced. A different custom has arisen in this army previous to my assuming command of it.

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

Col. J. C. KELTON, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 6, 1865.*

Official:

RICHARD D. CUTTS, *Col. and A. D. G.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

January 30, 1863.

GENERAL: Lord Huntington and Colonel Leslie, of England, who are now in Richmond, have requested me to make application to you for a pass through your lines for them. I have the honor to submit their application to you, and on receipt of your answer will make it known to them.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE, *General.*

Major General A. E. BURNSIDE, *Commanding United States Forces.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

February 2, 1863.

COLONEL: General Orders No. 19, February 22, 1862, provide for the inscription upon the colors of all regiments and batteries in the service of the United States the names of the battles in which they have borne a meritorious part. Most if not all the regiments and batteries now in the service with this army are entitled to this distinction.

Boards have been organized and have reported upon the claims for these honorable inscriptions.

There are no records at the headquarters of these proceedings; but I am reliably informed that the recommendations of this board have been forwarded to the headquarters of this army, although they are not here now.

I desire information as to what the instructions of the department are in carrying out this order. If these records are on file at the headquarters of the army or of the War Department, I trust that they may receive prompt and immediate action. If there are no records there, I would respectfully request proper instructions that these much to be desired ends may be accomplished at once. No better incentive could be given to this army for future effort than this honorable recognition of their past services.

I am, respectfully, yours, &c.,

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

Col. J. C. KELTON, *Assistant Adjutant General, Washington.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 6, 1865.*

Official:

RICHARD D. CUTTS, *Col. and A. D. C.*

## HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

Washington, February 3, 1863.

GENERAL: Yours of the 1st instant is just received. General Order No. 7, 1862, has not been revoked, and should be strictly enforced.

Foreign officers will not be permitted to pass our lines without a pass from the War Department, and such papers are given only on the application of the minister or diplomatic agent who represents their government.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Major General J. HOOKER, *Commanding Army of the Potomac.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 5, 1865.*

Official copy:

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, February 3, 1863.*

GENERAL: Yours of January 30, enclosing your General Order No. 3, is just received.

General Orders of the War Department, No. 61, 1862, have never been rescinded in regard to the army of the Potomac. The Secretary of War, however, authorizes you to give leaves within the limits established by your Order No. 3. Great care, however, must be taken to restrict them even below this limit, where it can be done. In no case will commanders of grand divisions, army corps, &c., be allowed to grant leaves. The number of applications sent to the War Department, approved by such officers, shows a recklessness and carelessness exceedingly reprehensible; for if one-half so approved were granted, the efficiency of the army would be completely destroyed.

All leaves to officers to *visit* Washington without the consent of the War Department are deemed null and void, and hereafter all general officers who come here on leaves not properly granted will be dismissed. The mere passage through the city, when that is the shortest or only line of travel, is not considered *visiting*; but any officer who remains here twenty-four hours without authority will be arrested.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Major General J. HOOKER, *Commanding Army of the Potomac.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 5, 1865.*

Official copy:

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

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[Telegram, in cipher.—Received 10 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

*February 3, 1863—9.30 p. m.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

Before the departure of the 9th corps permit me to recommend that General Smith be assigned by the President to command it, and that General Sedgwick be assigned to the command of the sixth corps.

General Sedgwick is now on duty with the ninth without assignment. The consequence of this, I think, will be good.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 7, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

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[Telegram.—Received 10.20 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, D. C., February 4, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Commanding Army of the Potomac*:

Major General Burnside is the permanent commander of the 9th army corps. Make such temporary changes as you may deem proper.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 10.55 a. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

*February 5, 1863.*

Colonel J. C. KELTON, *Ass't Adj't General, Washington*:

It is much to be desired that the recommendations heretofore made from this army for brevet rank for meritorious services on the part of officers of artillery of the regular service serving with this army should receive favorable action. In the organization of the artillery arm of the service, it becomes necessary for its effectiveness and proper care that officers of experience and education should be assigned to duty as chiefs of artillery of the respective corps. The officers best fitted for this service are the captains of artillery on duty with bat-

teries. Many, if not all, of these officers have performed meritorious service during the campaigns of this army, and are justly entitled to some consideration and reward therefor. Their assignment to duty as chiefs of artillery of corps, while it gives them no increased rank, deprives them of a portion of their pay, and most of them have families dependent upon them for support.

I would earnestly request that the commanding general should select from the list of officers thus recommended, from this army, the names of a sufficient number to be made chiefs of artillery of corps, and urge upon the proper authorities that the brevet rank in the regular service recommended for them should be given them and they assigned to duty according to their brevet rank to fill these positions. Such a course is not only due to these officers, but would be the greatest benefit to this army.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, April 6, 1865.*

Official:

RICHARD D. CUTTS, *Colonel and A. D. C.*

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[Received 9 a. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*February 6, 1863—9 p. m.*

Major General JOHN A. DIX, *Fortress Monroe, Va.:*

The 9th army corps are under orders to join you. The first brigade are embarked, ready to start.

JOSEPH HOOKER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Camp near Falmouth, Va., February 6, 1863.*

COLONEL: I have the honor to enclose herewith copies of Special Orders Nos. 35 and 36, directing the movements of the 9th corps and of the Pennsylvania reserves. By the former it will be observed that Major General W. F. Smith has been ordered to the 9th corps, and Major General Sedgwick to the 6th corps. This change, I am satisfied, will conduce to the good feeling and efficiency of this army, and perhaps to that of the 9th corps. Not knowing at what point it was desired to have the reserves landed, I considered it advisable to send them to Alexandria, from which point their destination can be readily changed to meet the wishes of the officers in command of the troops in Washington and vicinity.

As desertions from this army are now at an end, or nearly so, I respectfully recommend that no infantry from my command be sent into Maryland. The dragoons now there, in my opinion, is a sufficient force to arrest all deserters attempting to make their escape from service in that direction. If, however, it should be determined to send a regiment of infantry from my command to Maryland, I desire that it may be understood that such regiment is not removed from my command.

The 9th corps will be shipped as rapidly as the transportation is furnished for that movement. The same will be the case with the reserves. One brigade of the former embarked to-day. I have the honor to enclose a copy of General Orders No. 6, breaking up the grand divisions and consolidating the cavalry of this army.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Colonel J. C. KELTON, *Ass't Adj't General, Washington.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, April 6, 1865.*

Official:

RICHARD D. CUTTS, *Colonel and A. D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
Camp near Falmouth, Va., February 6, 1863.

COLONEL: In compliance with orders received from the general-in-chief, directions have been given for the embarkation of the 9th corps for Fortress Monroe, and the Pennsylvania reserves for Alexandria. I enclose extract from the report of the reserves, and trust the commanding general will bear in mind that these men are enlisted for three years, or the war, and that in replacing them the same number of men of like terms of enlistment may be ordered here.

I should be pleased to have the regiment commanded by Colonel George D. Wells (I think the 34th Massachusetts) sent me, he having served in my old division for a long time.

The limited facilities afforded for the embarkation of troops, and the severe storm, may cause some delay in executing these orders, but they will be hurried off with all possible despatch.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER,  
Major General, Commanding.

Colonel J. C. KELTON, *Ass't Adj't Gen'l, Washington.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, April 6, 1865.

Official:

RICHARD D. CUTTS, *Col. and A. D. C.*

[Received 7.30 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
February 7, 1863—7 p. m.

Major General JOHN A. DIX, *Fortress Monroe, Va.:*

A battery with horses embarked at Belle Plain. Harlan's brigade, eighteen hundred and fifty men, and one regiment of Hawkins's brigade, four hundred and fifty men, sailed from Aquia creek. Two brigades, first division, will be shipped to-night from Aquia creek—all of 9th corps.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., February 8, 1863.

Major General HOOKER, *Headquarters Army of the Potomac:*

Brigadier General Burns will be detached from the 9th army corps, and will report for duty to Major General Rosecrans, at Murfreesboro', Tennessee.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 10.54 a. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, February 8, 1863.

GENERAL: Yours of the 6th are just received. The orders abolishing grand divisions and concentrating your cavalry into a single corps are steps in the right direction.

General Heintzelman has been ordered to furnish General Schenck an infantry regiment for the Maryland shore. He will also send you Pennsylvania regiments to replace the reserves.

The Adjutant General's office has been engaged for several weeks in preparing a full list of recommendations for brevets. I hope it will be acted on this week.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Major General J. HOOKER, *Commanding Army of the Potomac.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 5, 1865.

Official copy:

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

[Received 12 m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
February 8, 1863.Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:Brigadier General Burns has already been ordered to report to you in Washington.  
JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General*.

[Received 1.45 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
February 8, 1863—1 p. m.Major General S. P. HEINTZELMAN, *Commanding Defences of Washington*:

Your despatch concerning a reconnoissance to be made by Colonel Wyndham to-morrow received 12.30 p. m. to-day. A cavalry force with artillery sent out from this army returned yesterday from a successful reconnoissance to Rappahannock station. They reported the roads generally in a very bad condition.

D. BUTTERFIELD,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff*.HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., February 13, 1863.

GENERAL: Your communication of the 2d instant, asking what action, if any, has been taken upon the reports of boards organized in orders from headquarters army of the Potomac, for the purpose of designating the regiments and batteries entitled to inscriptions on their colors, is received. The only report transmitted to these headquarters was from the board instituted in the 5th corps. It was approved by the general-in-chief, and submitted to the Secretary of War December 23, 1862.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Major General HOOKER, *Commanding, &c., &c., &c.*J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

Official:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 5, 1865.

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

[Received 1.25 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
February 13, 1863.Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War*:

Have granted leave for five days to Lieutenant Henry Minell, Gibson's battery, 3d artillery, as requested.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major Gen'l Com'dg.*HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
February 13, 1863.

GENERAL: I have the honor herewith to transmit a copy of a communication, which has been received from Major General French, setting forth that it has become a practice for the public mails to be used for sending citizens' clothing to soldiers to facilitate desertions, and I request that such measures may be taken by the government, with reference to this subject, as will put a stop to the evil presented.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Brigadier General L. THOMAS,  
*Adjutant General of the Army, Washington.*JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major Gen'l, Com'dg.*

Official:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, April 6, 1865.RICHARD D. CUTTS, *Col. and A. D. C.*

## ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

HEADQUARTERS 3D DIVISION, 2D CORPS,  
February 6, 1863.

CAPTAIN: I respectfully request that the attention of the headquarters of the army of the Potomac may be brought to an act which has just been presented for my consideration.

A few days since the commanding officer of the 132d Pennsylvania regiment volunteers received an anonymous note from a town in that State, advising him that citizens' clothing was being mailed to soldiers in this army to facilitate their desertion.

He had the mails supervised, and yesterday he brought to me two packages of clothing (citizens') which had arrived in the mail, and upon which had been stamped, on one \$2 04, and on the other \$2 25. There was also a letter of advice, from a female relative, clearly stating the object of the transmissal.

The lieutenant colonel of the 132d Pennsylvania is of opinion that many men are assisted in this matter through the government mails, and I deem it of such importance as to request a reference where the evil can be corrected.

The letters and packages are in the lieutenant colonel's possession.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. H. FRENCH,  
Major Gen'l Vols., Com'dg 3d Division.

Captain HOWARD,  
A. D. C. and A. A. G., Headquarters 2d corps.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
February 13, 1863.

Official:

S. WILLIAMS, A. A. G.

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[Received 12.20 p. m.]

WASHINGTON, D. C.,  
February 14, 1863.

COMMANDING GENERAL, *Army of the Potomac*:

Leave of absence to include the 17th instant, with permission to visit Washington for the purpose of attending the funeral of his sister Chilley, is granted Lieutenant E. H. Martindale, (now with General Patrick.)

By order of the Secretary of War:

ED. R. S. CANBY, *Brig. Gen'l.*

Sent 12.45 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., February 16, 1863.

GENERAL: In reply to your communication of the 13th,\* in reference to granting passes to citizens to visit the army of the Potomac, I have the honor to inform you that the Secretary of War has directed that an order be published that all passes to visit the army of the Potomac, by whatever authority issued, must be countersigned by Lieutenant Colonel Conrad before they will be recognized as valid.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.

Major General HOOKER,  
*Commanding Army of the Potomac.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 5, 1865.

Official copy:

J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.

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\* No letter of the 13th on file.

[Received 12.30 p. m.]

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 17, 1863.*Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac* :

Application is made to exchange the 10th Maine and 28th New York for two regiments now in Maryland. If such exchange is approved by you, and you deem it beneficial to the service, orders will be issued as soon as the roads are passable.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 12.45.

[Received 1.30 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*February 17, 1863.*Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

After my experience in exchanging the Pennsylvania reserves, by which I gave two hundred and seventy (270) more officers and men than I received, no further exchange will be made with my consent.

JOSEPH HOOKER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*HEADQUARTERS 3D DIVISION 1ST ARMY CORPS,  
*February 20, 1863.*

GENERAL: Yours of the 19th instant has just been received. You say, "the general commanding directs that you report what agreement was entered into by you with General Heintzelman with respect to the exchange of the Pennsylvania reserves." In answer to this, I have to state that no special agreement was entered into between us. It was understood that I was to have an equal number of men with those I furnished. I never supposed I should have a less number until the reserves had actually arrived in Alexandria, and a report of their number was laid before General Heintzelman. He then informed me that the aggregate would be less than that furnished by some 230 men.

I am asked why I did not give my personal attention to this subject. In reply, I have to state that I visited General Heintzelman's office every day and frequently several times a day in relation to it. I was also a daily visitor at the Adjutant General's office of the general-in-chief in relation to it. The order from General Halleck directed General Heintzelman to furnish Pennsylvania troops. The understanding was, an equal number of Pennsylvania troops, if they could be furnished. The governor of Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania delegation had interested themselves in the business, and it was understood to be a matter of State pride to furnish an equal number from Pennsylvania; hence the order was so worded. General Heintzelman, I think, was not in favor of the exchange, as the reserves had hardly any officers with them, and it was necessary absolutely that they should be reorganized on account of the law which compelled them to elect their officers. I asked General Heintzelman for a regiment from another State, but he said he would not approve the application. I then went to General Halleck and asked for Colonel Wells's Massachusetts regiment, but it was refused. I should have pressed the application still further had I not at this time received a telegram from General Reynolds, stating that he did not recognize my authority to be absent. This obliged me to give up everything and return. General Heintzelman mistakes when he says the number of men at his disposal was well understood by me when I made the application. I repeatedly asked for information on this and other points, and was invariably told he would not touch the matter until the reserves arrived, and then he would issue the necessary orders.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. DOUBLEDAY,

*Brigadier General Volunteers, Commanding Division.*Brigadier General S. WILLIAMS, A. A. G.,  
*Headquarters Army of the Potomac.*HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC  
*March 2, 1863.*

Official copy :

JOS. DICKINSON, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

## ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, April 6, 1865.

Official :

RICHARD D. CUTTS, *Col. and A. D. C.*

[Received 2.30 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
February 20, 1863.

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

I have to request that Major Hayden, 10th infantry, may be relieved from duty on court-martial now in session at Washington, and ordered to report back for duty here.

JOSEPH HOOKER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., February 21, 1863.

GENERAL: In reply to your telegram of yesterday, requesting that Major Hayden, 10th infantry, be relieved from duty on the court-martial in session in this city, I have the honor to inform you the general-in-chief decides that he cannot be relieved.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

Major General HOOKER, *Commanding, &c., &c.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, April 5, 1865.

Official copy :

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., February 21, 1863.

GENERAL: The general-in-chief directs me to say that General Buford is on a court for the trial of an officer of your command, and cannot be relieved until the trial is over.

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

Major General HOOKER, *Commanding, &c., &c.*

Sent 2 p. m.

[Received 11.05 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
February 23, 1863.

Major General HOOKER, *Willard's Hotel* :

Couch reports enemy's pickets apparently withdrawing except when flag-of-truce boat crosses. Have despatched Moore and Caudler to investigate and report.

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Received 3 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
February 23, 1863.

Major General HOOKER, *Willard's Hotel* :

Report of examination says: Supposed to be simply withdrawal of position of pickets for shelter by reduction of detail. As weather improves, more appear.

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*



[Received 7.55 p. m.]

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 24, 1863.*Major General J. HOOKER, *Headquarters Army of the Potomac:*

The Secretary of War directs that Lieutenant T. A. Whitney and Captain Whitney, of the independent cavalry, at General Gregg's headquarters near Belle Plains, be ordered to Washington immediately to report to Judge Advocate General Holt, as witnesses before a court-martial now in session. They should be here to-morrow if possible.

P. H. WATSON,  
*Assistant Secretary of War.*

Sent 8 p. m.

[Telegram—Received 2.30 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Near Falmouth, Va., February 25, 1863.*

COLONEL: Information from deserters, contrabands, and citizens received within the past two or three days, when compared and collated, seems to corroborate the following statement:

That the enemy have decreased their force in our front; that two or more divisions of Longstreet's corps have gone to Tennessee and South Carolina; that the enemy are under the impression that we are evacuating from Aquia, leaving a sufficient force to keep Lee's army in front of us.

The foggy atmosphere prevents the balloon being serviceable; the roads are impassable for reconnoissances; as soon as further definite and positive information can be obtained, it will be forwarded.

The general tenor of the statements received makes it appear that Jackson's corps is left to guard the passage of the river; Ransom's division of Longstreet's corps is one mentioned as gone to Tennessee or South Carolina; Pickens's division as one gone to Charleston; commencing their departure February 17.

I shall probably give more information before night.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Lieut. Col. J. C. KELTON,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, April 6, 1865.*

Official:

RICHARD D. CUTTS, *Col. and A. D. C.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 25, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac.*

Stephensburg lies about six miles southwest from Kelly's ford, on the Rappahannock.

General Longstreet passed through Richmond on the 18th instant. A portion of his army went to Charleston, S. C.; the balance to Suffolk. General Stewart is now at Auburn, near Warrenton.

General Jackson and his army are at Staunton, with the intention of making a raid on Maryland, with the help of General Stewart.

Very respectfully, yours,

G. YAGER.

Official copy:

C. H. POTTER, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

## ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

[Telegram—Received 5 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *February 25, 1863.*Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War :*

From information which I cannot discredit, General Jackson, with his whole command, was yesterday across the Rappahannock from me. His corps was visible from the balloon this morning.

JOS. HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

[Received 6.45 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

*February 25, 1863—6.30 p. m.*Major General HEINTZELMAN, *Headquarters Defences :*

A large cavalry force has made its appearance in front of our right; said now to be moving towards Stafford Court House. We send out up the river to try and get between them and the Rappahannock. Can you send out from Fairfax towards Catlett's and Rappahannock Station to intercept them, if they move that way? Answer and advise me what you can and will do.

JOS. HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 9.10 p. m., February 25.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *February 25, 1863.*Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War :*

A mystery hangs over the despatch of Yager. It is a physical impossibility for the enemy to make a raid into Maryland at this season of the year; besides, the Potomac, I should judge, is not fordable. The rebels have a cavalry force on this side of the river, outside of my exterior pickets, which I hope to hibe before morning.

JOS. HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF WASHINGTON,

*February 25, 1863.*Major General BUTTERFIELD, *Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac :*

I have sent out a force of cavalry two thousand (2,000) strong towards Catlett's and Rappahannock Station, by the way of Fairfax, to intercept the enemy. This force will leave by eight o'clock, February 26, (if possible sooner.) The commanding officer will have a copy of the telegram received from you at seven o'clock this evening.

Respectfully,

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, *Major General, Commanding.*

(Telegraph operator, please send in cipher.)

[Received 12 midnight.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *February 25, 1863.*

Major General HEINTZELMAN :

The force is F. Lee's and Hampton's brigades; crossed at Kelly's ford last night and camped near Morrisville. Their horses are well tired. We are pushing all out to-night.

Can't you push out to-night and push this side of the railroad and Rappahannock Station? Look out for any collision with our forces. Our parties are ordered to capture them if possible. Answer.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF WASHINGTON,  
February 26, 1863.

Major General BUTTERFIELD, *Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac:*

I have ordered the cavalry at Fairfax Court House, about six hundred strong, to leave camp immediately for Rappahannock Station; to be supported by the force leaving camp to-morrow morning.

Respectfully,

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, *Major General, Commanding.*

Send in cipher.

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[Telegram in cipher—Received 10 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
February 26, 1863—9 a. m.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War:*

The report of an intended raid into Maryland by the united forces of Jackson and Stewart is entirely without foundation.

About two thousand of the enemy's cavalry felt of my pickets yesterday afternoon, were repulsed, and Stoneman is now after them at full chase, with instructions to follow them to their camps; should it be necessary, to destroy them. These are on the south side of the Rappahannock and near Culpeper. The rebels crossed the river at Kelly's ford.

JOS. HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 8, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

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[Received 2.20 p. m.]

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 27, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac:*

The authority given to you to grant leaves of absence cannot be delegated by you to commanders of corps. Leaves not signed by your orders are null.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 3 p. m.

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[Received 7.20 p. m.]

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *Washington, February 27, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER:

If it will be no detriment to the service, I will be obliged for Captain Henry A. Merchant, of company I, 23d Pennsylvania volunteers, to come here and remain four or five days.

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 7.20 p. m.

[Received 8.10 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
February 27, 1863.

His Excellency A. LINCOLN, *President of the United States* :

The necessary order, as requested, has been issued in the case of Captain Merchant, 23d Pennsylvania volunteers. General Hooker just left for Washington.

DAN'L BÜTTERFIELD,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Telegram—Received 1 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 1, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

The following despatch has just been received from General Geary, at Stafford Court House, who says the party communicating the information is entirely reliable. The portion of it relating to Fitz Hugh Lee is verified by his late appearance here :

“FEBRUARY 26, 1863.

“DEAR SIR: I wish to inform you that the rebels have sent one thousand cavalry to Frank Adams's, near Aldie, Loudon county, Virginia. Major White's battalion, Major Strayhern's battalion, and a Virginia regiment of cavalry, of General Stuart's, have also arrived at the same place. All of the above rebel troops were there February 22, and issued orders that no citizen should bring any provisions within our lines, and that they come to enforce an order that no provisions or supplies of any kind shall be sent out of their lines.

“Fitz Hugh Lee has moved with five thousand troops, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, to Culpeper Court House, and I have also reliable information that General Jackson is now encamped ten miles below Fredericksburg.

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“ENOS RICHMOND.

Brigadier General JOHN W. GEARY.”

JOS. HOOKER, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Received 1 p. m., March 2, 1863.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*March 2, 1863.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

The collector of the customs at Baltimore refuses to grant a clearance on my letter. Can you advise him on the subject?

JOS. HOOKER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington City, March 2, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Falmouth* :

I have requested the Secretary of the Treasury to order the collector at Baltimore to grant clearances of supplies for your personal staff, upon your application, which no doubt will be done.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

Sent 2.20 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Camp near Falmouth, Va., March 3, 1863.*

COLONEL: I have the honor to acknowledge a telegram from the major general commanding the army, directing that in future all applications for leaves of absence and fur-

loughs be acted on at those headquarters, and that the right to grant must not be delegated to corps commanders.

Soon after assuming command of the army of the Potomac I had issued an order on the subject, for the purpose of establishing uniformity throughout the army in granting leaves of absence to the officers and men, and under the restrictions therein named, in which corps commanders were required to perform this duty, holding them responsible for any infraction of this order. A copy was furnished the major general commanding, and, as I supposed, was approved by him. It was issued under the conviction that it would be productive of beneficial results to the army, which have been fully realized.

In order to prevent circumlocution and delay, and also to relieve the Adjutant General's office at headquarters of a vast number of unimportant communications, the authority to exercise this power, under well-defined restrictions, was conferred on corps commanders, and I never have heard of its having been abused by them. If officers holding these high positions cannot be intrusted with this duty, it seems to me that they should be replaced by others who can.

The delay incident to applications for leave will be appreciated when you are informed that my camp is nearly one hundred miles in circumference, and if acted on immediately on their receipt at these headquarters, would, in the majority of cases, delay the departure of the applicant eight-and-forty hours.

On being informed of these facts, I cannot but request, for convenience, as well as for the despatch of the current business of this army, that corps commanders may continue to grant leaves of absence, in conformity with General Orders No. 10, Headquarters Army of the Potomac, dated February 7, 1863.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Colonel J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.,  
*Headquarters of the Army.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 6, 1865.*

Official:

RICH'D D. CUTTS, *Colonel and A. D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC, *March 3, 1863.*

GENERAL: The field return for February 28, of the troops sent to replace the Pennsylvania reserves, exhibits the following discrepancy in numbers, viz:

	FOR DUTY.		EXTRA DUTY.		SICK & ARREST.		Aggregate officers and enlisted men.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Sent as per field return, Pennsylvania reserves, Jan. 29, 1863..	153	3, 516	24	477	21	330	4, 521
Received as per field return, 135th 143d, 149th, 150th, 151st Pennsylvania vols., Feb. 28, 1863 ..	153	2, 549	5	249	11	321	3, 288
Aggregate of each class sent from here in excess of those returned.	.....	967	19	228	10	9	1, 233

The "extra duty" men of the Pennsylvania reserves have all been sent to join their command with General Heintzelman. I have to request that two regiments, of an aggregate strength of 1,233 officers and men, may be sent to me to make up this deficiency. The absentees from the Pennsylvania reserves that will undoubtedly soon rejoin their commands are

## ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

so much in excess of those from the regiments sent here, that 1,500 officers and men would not more than make the exchange equal.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

Major General HALLECK, *Commander-in-Chief, &c. &c.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 6, 1865.*

Official:

RICHARD D. CUTTS, *Col. and A. D. C.*

[Received 4.45 a. m., March 4.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*March 4, 1863.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War:*

I am informed that Brigadier General D. P. Birney has not been nominated for promotion. I hope the report is not correct. He now commands Kearney's old division, and a better division commander is not in this army. The influence that defeats it is not one that has the interest of this army at heart, nor is it an informed one.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, March 5, 1863.*

GENERAL: Your letter of the 3d instant, in relation to leaves of absence, is just received. You will perceive, by referring to General Orders 61 and 100, series of 1862, that authority to give leaves of absence, except on a specified surgeon's certificate, was denied to all commanders of armies and army corps.

This rule has been relaxed only in regard to yourself and General Rosecrans. From all other commands the applications for leave must go to the Adjutant General, and no leaves can be granted but by order of the Secretary of War.

As many officers presented themselves here in Washington with leaves from commanders of army corps, I applied to the Secretary to ascertain if such authority had been granted. He replied that he had conferred that authority only on *you*, and that it could not be given to commanders of army corps. To give it to your generals of army corps, and refuse it to other commanders of armies and departments, would not be just.

Last reports show that *nine thousand six hundred and ninety-two officers* are absent from their commands! It is the determination of the War Department to diminish this number by retaining to itself the power to grant leaves, and by refusing them, except in the most urgent cases.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Major General HOOKER, *Commanding Army of the Potomac.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 5, 1865.*

Official copy:

J. C. KELTON, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

[Received 11.20 p. m.]

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *Washington D. C., March 5, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Commanding Army of the Potomac:*

For business purposes, I have extended the leave of absence of Captain Henry A. Merchant, 23d Pennsylvania volunteers, five days, hoping that it will not interfere with the public service. Please notify the regiment to-day.

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 11.28 a. m.

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., March 6, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER:

General Milroy thinks that a large cavalry force is collecting in front of Winchester, and asks re-enforcements. We have no cavalry to send him except from your army. If General Milroy's suspicions are well founded your cavalry should move so as to cut off the enemy or compel him to fall back.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 12 m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major and A. A. G.*

[Telegram—Received 1.28 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC, *March 6, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

I have no means of verifying the suspicions of General Milroy. I only know that his general character is that of a stamper, and that if a large cavalry force is in his front I am puzzled to know where it came from—certainly not from the army in my front. If my cavalry is to be sent there on the present information, a positive order will be required; that trip will disable my cavalry for service for six weeks. If General Milroy has four thousand infantry he should be able to take care of himself against any cavalry force the enemy can send against him.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General.*

Official copy:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 8, 1865.*

D. C. WAGER, *Major and A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., March 6, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER. *Army of the Potomac:*

Despatches just received from the south state that D. H. Hill's forces are in North Carolina, and Longstreet's in Charleston or Savannah.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 2 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major and A. A. G.*

[Received 1.50 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 7, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

The officer who met our flag of truce yesterday p. m. stated to our officer that the United States vessels had retired from Fort McAlister; that their forces still held Vicksburg.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

WINCHESTER, VA., *March 8, 1863.*Brigadier General KELLY, *Harper's Ferry :*

Various rumors reach me of a large rebel force having come across Luray ; some say it is Hampton's legion, others that it is A. P. Hill's force.

R. H. MILROY, *Brigadier General.*

Official copy:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 8, 1865.*D. C. WAGER, *Major and A. A. G.*HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 9, 1863.*

COLONEL: The absence of Colonel Kellogg, 17th Pennsylvania cavalry, from his command is a very serious detriment to his regiment and the service.

He is reported to me as the only instructed officer in that command.

He is detained as a witness in some court-martial case in Washington, or so reported ; has been there four weeks for this purpose.

I have to request that he may be ordered to join his regiment at once.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*Colonel J. C. KELTON, *Assistant Adjutant General.*HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *March 10, 1863.*

Respectfully forwarded to the Judge Advocate General for report in regard to the detention of Colonel Kellogg.

By order of Major General HALLECK.

J. C. KELTON, *Assistant Adjutant General.*JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S OFFICE, *March 11, 1863.*

The court-martial before which Colonel Kellogg has been attending as a witness adjourned *sine die* on yesterday. He is, therefore, released from this duty, and should be directed to return at once to his regiment.

HOLT, *Judge Advocate General.*

Notify General Hooker that Colonel Kellogg is discharged as a witness before the court-martial, and should immediately return to his command.

H. W. HALLECK, *Major General and Chief of Staff.*

Official copy:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 6, 1865.*J. C. KELTON, *Colonel and A. A. G.*

[Received 4.45 p. m.]

WASHINGTON, D. C., *March 11, 1863.*Major General HOOKER, *Commanding, &c., &c., Falmouth, Va. :*

Colonel Kellogg, 17th Pennsylvania cavalry, was yesterday discharged as a witness before the court-martial.

J. C. KELTON, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

Sent 5.18 p. m.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, March 11, 1863.*

Major General J. E. HOOKER,

*Commanding Army of the Potomac, near Falmouth, Va. :*

The Secretary of War directs that First Lieutenant Robert H. Hall, 10th infantry, be ordered to report in person at the War Department.

ED. R. S. CANBY, *Brigadier General.*



[Received 8.28 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
March 11, 1863—8.20 p. m.

Major General HOOKER, *Willards' Hotel* :

Sharp's signals have all day indicated, as yesterday, a move. He will explain. A signal station of enemy's reported broken up and moved. Scout in, named Skinner, reports Stuart in the Valley with one brigade; also reports a raid contemplated on Potomac bridge.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Received 9.50 a. m., March 12.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 12, 1863.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

More infamous calumnies were never fabricated by a set of damned hounds connected with newspapers than those of which you informed me yesterday relating to Butterfield. The latter never saw or heard of Tully until he was sent here, it was supposed with the knowledge of General Martindale, to regulate the importation of newspapers to our camp, and has never had any exclusive privilege granted him from myself or any officer of my staff. If he has any of which I do not know they must have come from the Military Governor of Washington. With regard to Duff, I gave him the only authority he has for supplying the officers attached to headquarters with necessary stores, and did it solely from the consideration that I was satisfactorily assured of his loyalty, and in order to clean out a number who were engaged in this traffic; and all of them, so far as I know, were tinctured with McClellan and Burnside issue. They were trading under authority obtained from those officers. It seems to me that unscrupulous reports from irresponsible persons should not be received as truths when they disparage the fair fame of a high and brave officer until after they have been established by searching investigation. Permit me to request that a copy of this may be furnished Senators Wilson and Nesmith at an early hour, as I am informed that the confirmation of General Butterfield's promotion is to be reconsidered by the Senate to-day in consequence of these infamous reports.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *Washington, March 13, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

General Stahl wishes to be assigned to General Heintzelman, and General Heintzelman also desires it. I would like to oblige both if it will not injure the service in your army or incommode you. What say you?

A. LINCOLN.

[Received 10.05 a. m., March 14.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 14, 1863.*

His Excellency the PRESIDENT :

No serious loss will result to the service by the transfer of General Stahl to General Heintzelman's command, provided Colonel Wyndham, now on duty with General H., be ordered to join his regiment.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 11.15 a. m., March 14.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 14, 1863.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

I hope the names of Brigadier Generals Carr and Bartlett may not be omitted in your list of nominations. They have held the letters of appointment for several months and been in the exercise of their commands.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

## ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

[Received 8. 15 p. m., March 14.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 14, 1863.*Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War :*

Can you inform me whether or not Generals Newton and Brooks have been nominated for promotion, or if they are to be ?

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, D. C., March 14, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

Generals Newton and Brooks were not renominated. The limitation upon the number of brigadiers and major generals left out several who had been appointed before the session of Congress commenced, and the whole number was filled up.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

Sent 8.45 p. m.

[Received 1 p. m., March 15.]

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 15, 1863.*Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War :*

I deeply regret the non-promotion of Brigadier Generals Newton and Brooks, and request that letters of appointment may be furnished these officers to fill the first vacancies. I had been led to suppose that their nomination would have been sent to the Senate in case the increase in the number of major generals had not been provided for by the last Congress. It will be impossible to keep our army alive if the rewards of services are not bestowed upon the meritorious.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 12.40 p. m., 16th.]

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 16, 1863.*Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War :*

Your despatch desiring that a leave be granted to Lieutenant Heissen, 10th United States infantry, did not reach me in season for him to take the boat of to-day. He has been dismissed by a general court-martial, and the sentence has been confirmed by me. The order is in the hands of the printer. A transcript in his case will be sent to Lieutenant Heissen to-day, so that he can leave to-morrow.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 1.45 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, March 16, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

My telegram of this morning referred to Lieutenant Reese E. Fleeson, 10th United States infantry, whose residence is Pittsburg. Your answer mentions Lieutenant Heisson. Do you refer to the same person, or is there a telegraphic mistake as to the name?

E. M. STANTON.

Sent 2 p. m.

[Telegram in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., March 16, 1863.*Major General HOOKER, *Commanding Army of the Potomac :*

Reports received here to-day, apparently more reliable than heretofore, indicate that the enemy has concentrated some ten thousand men near Strasburg, to threaten the Baltimore

and Ohio railroad. You have the only cavalry force to cope with that of the enemy, and it is expected that you will observe or occupy it so as to prevent any large body from moving towards Harper's Ferry.

Sent 1.30 p. m.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Received 5.45 p. m., March 16.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 16, 1863.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of State*:

My telegram of this morning was intended to refer to Lieutenant Reese E. Fleeson, 10th United States infantry. The error in my despatch was a clerical one.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 7 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 16, 1863—6.30 p. m.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

Have just received your telegram of this p. m.

This morning I despatched three thousand cavalry to attack and break up the cavalry camp of Fitzhugh Lee and Hampton in the vicinity of Culpeper. Is it ordered that the residue of my cavalry force shall be sent on to the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, so as to prevent any large body from moving towards Harper's Ferry?

Can no one tell where all the enemy's cavalry come from?

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

Official:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 8, 1865.*

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received 7 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 16, 1863—6.30 p. m.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War*:

I have just received a telegram from the major general commanding the army, informing me that it is expected that I will despatch all my cavalry force to the protection of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad.

As this movement will involve consequences of the most momentous character I have applied to him for unconditional orders. Please see that they are sent me. See my telegram to Major General Halleck.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., March 16, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Falmouth*:

I am not aware that any of your cavalry has been ordered to the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. It is expected, however, that you will not permit a very *large* cavalry force to pass from your front to destroy that road without intercepting or destroying it. Very possibly Milroy's report of over ten thousand in his front is the old story. It was supposed that you would know from your scouts whether or not there was good foundation for the report.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 9 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 17, 1863.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that, in obedience to the requirements contained in its closing paragraph, I have transmitted a copy of General Order No. 49, of the 28th ultimo, in regard to paroles, to the general commanding the forces in my front.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brig. Gen. L. THOMAS, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 5, 1865.*

Official copy :

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 49. }

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
*Washington, February 28, 1863.*

I. The following rules in regard to paroles, established by the common law and usages of war, are published for the information of all concerned :

1. Paroling must always take place by the exchange of signed duplicates of a written document, in which the name and rank of the parties paroled are correctly stated. Any one who intentionally misstates his rank, forfeits the benefit of his parole, and is liable to punishment.

2. None but commissioned officers can give the parole for themselves or their commands, and no inferior officer can give a parole without the authority of his superior, if within reach.

3. No paroling on the battle-field; no paroling of entire bodies of troops after a battle; and no dismissal of large numbers of prisoners, with a general declaration that they are paroled, is permitted, or of any value.

4. An officer who gives a parole for himself or his command on the battle-field is deemed a deserter, and will be punished accordingly.

5. For the officer, the pledging of his parole is an individual act, and no wholesale paroling by an officer, for a number of inferiors in rank, is permitted or valid.

6. No non-commissioned officer or private can give his parole except through an officer. Individual paroles not given through an officer are not only void, but subject the individual giving them to the punishment of death as deserters. The only admissible exception is where individuals, properly separated from their commands, have suffered long confinement without the possibility of being paroled through an officer.

7. No prisoners of war can be forced by the hostile government to pledge his parole, and any threat or ill treatment to force the giving of the parole is contrary to the law of war.

8. No prisoner of war can enter into engagements inconsistent with his character and duties as a citizen and a subject of his State. He can only bind himself not to bear arms against his captor for a limited period, or until he is exchanged, and this only with the stipulated or implied consent of his own government. If the engagement which he makes is not approved by his government, he is bound to return and surrender himself as a prisoner of war. His own government cannot at the same time disown his engagement and refuse his return as a prisoner.

9. No one can pledge his parole that he will never bear arms against the government of his captors, nor that he will not bear arms against any other enemy of his government not at the time the ally of his captors. Such agreements have reference only to the existing enemy and his existing allies, and to the existing war, and not to future belligerents.

10. While the pledging of the military parole is a voluntary act of the individual, the capturing power is not obliged to grant it, nor is the government of the individual paroled bound to approve or ratify it.

11. Paroles not authorized by the common law of war are not valid till approved by the government of the individual so pledging his parole.

12. The pledging of any unauthorized military parole is a military offence, punishable under the common law of war.

II. This order will be published at the head of every regiment in the service of the United States, and will be officially communicated by every general commanding an army in the field to the commanding general of the opposing forces, and will be hereafter strictly observed and enforced in the armies of the United States.

By order of Major General H. W. Halleck.

L. THOMAS, *Adjutant General.*

Official :

—————, *A. A. G.*

[Received 8.20 p. m., March 19.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 19, 1863.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War :*

Only a portion of the number of books on out-post duty promised have been sent. When shall we get the balance to supply the army?

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 8.45 p. m., March 19.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 19, 1863.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War :*

I see by the papers of this evening that Major General Cadwallader has been assigned to the command of the 2d corps. I trust that this is a mistake. I cannot afford to lose Major General Couch in command of that corps. Its efficiency would be greatly impaired by that change. I earnestly request that the present corps commanders may remain unchanged.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 9.10 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, March 19, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

I saw the article referred to in the papers this morning. It is a part of the military operations manufactured outside of the department. No such assignment has been made. No assignment to command in your army will be made without consultation with you and your concurrence. This you may reckon upon with a sure faith. But operations here that have no existence, as well as operations in your army, will often appear in newspapers, so long as a lie sells a paper as well as the truth. Your action in respect to the Herald correspondent is cordially approved, and more of the same sort will do much good.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

Sent 9.20 p. m.

[Received 9.40 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, March 19, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

The Adjutant General reports that the residue of the books, except about five hundred, have been forwarded to you, and that the rest will be sent as soon as they can be procured from New York.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

Sent 9.45 p. m.

[Received 9.45 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, March 19, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

I congratulate you upon the success of General Averill's expedition. It is good for the first lick. You have drawn the first blood, and I hope now soon to see "the boys up and at them." Give my compliments and thanks to Averill and his command.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

Sent 9.50 p. m.

[Received 12 m., March 20.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 20, 1863.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War :*

Has the resignation of Major General Sigel been accepted, or is that officer to be removed from the command of the 11th corps? I desire to ascertain, in order that, if so, Major General Howard, the highest in rank in this army for advancement to corps commander, may be assigned to it. General Howard is an officer of uncommon merit, is favorably known to this army, and is fully identified with its history. I would consider the services of an entire corps as entirely lost to this army were it to fall into the hands of Major General Schurz, the senior officer now on duty with it. It is highly important that the commander of the 11th corps should be named, and that he should be on duty with it.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 10.35 p. m., March 21.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 21, 1863.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War :*

When may I look for the 2d regiment New Hampshire volunteers to return? I have not received the letter referred to in your telegram of Monday last.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Camp near Falmouth, March 20, 1863.*

SIR: Since my letter of yesterday was written, recommending, in the event of the application of Lieutenant Colonel N. H. Davis, assistant inspector general, to be relieved from duty with this army, being favorably considered, that Major Julius Hayden, 10th infantry, be given the rank of lieutenant colonel and assigned to duty at my headquarters as assistant inspector general. I have received Special Orders No. 119 from the Adjutant General's office, conferring upon Major Hayden the rank of lieutenant colonel, and assigning him to duty at the headquarters of the 3d army corps.

I will, therefore, in a few days present the name of another officer as the successor of Lieutenant Colonel Davis, should he be relieved.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Colonel J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.,  
*Headquarters of the Army.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 5, 1865.*

Official copy:

J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Camp near Falmouth, March 22, 1863.*

COLONEL: I have the honor to request that Brigadier Generals Robert O. Tyler, J. S. Mason and E. M. Hinks, volunteer service, may be directed to report to me for assignments to duty with this army.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Colonel J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.,  
*Headquarters of the Army.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 5, 1865.*

Official copy:

J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
Camp near Falmouth, Va., March 23, 1863.

COLONEL: In view of the fact that when this army moves, the sudden stoppage of all visitors to this camp would be a preliminary notice thereof; also, that the attention of all officers and men is now absolutely required to be free from interference of such visitors, I would respectfully suggest that hereafter permits to visit this army be restricted to cases of absolute positive necessity, and that the permission heretofore granted to females be denied.

It is advisable that these notifications be gradually introduced within the next few days, and not upon the ground that anything is likely to occur here requiring such a course.

It cannot be foreseen at what moment this army will move, and the action in respect to the stoppage of travel heretofore has invariably been such as to indicate to the country pretty nearly the precise time of a movement.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER,  
Major General, Commanding.

Colonel J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.,  
Headquarters of the Army.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, April 6, 1865.

Official:

RICHARD D. CUTTS, Col. and A. D. C.

[Received 1.50 p. m., March 24.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, March 24, 1863.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

Leave for ten days has been granted to Lieutenant E. G. Scott, 5th artillery, as requested by you.

JOSEPH HOOKER,  
Major General, Commanding.

[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, MD., March 24, 1863.

Have you any information of rebel cavalry movements in Loudon county? General Roberts last night telegraphed me a report from Colonel Scheley, Point of Rocks, that Stuart with his cavalry had passed Leesburg in the direction of Nolan's ferry.

R. C. SCHENCK, Major General.

Major General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, April 8, 1865.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, March 25, 1863.

GENERAL: Yours of the 23d is just received. I give no passes to the army of the Potomac. Those given are given under the direction of the War Department. I have shown your letter to the Secretary, who will see that your wishes are complied with.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
General-in-Chief.

Major General HOOKER,  
Commanding Army of the Potomac.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 5, 1865.

Official copy:

J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, March 25, 1863.*

Major General J. HOOKER,  
*Commanding Army of Potomac, Falmouth, Va. :*

The President has extended General Sigel's leave of absence from his command, but without relieving him from the command permanently.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

Sent 12.35 p. m.

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[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, D. C., *March 25, 1863.*  
*Winchester, Va., 23d, via Martinsburg March 25, 1863.*

Major General SCHENCK, *Baltimore :*

The enemy has fallen back beyond Mount Jackson. Heavy firing heard yesterday in the direction of Culpeper or to the left of that place.

GENERAL MILROY.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 8, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

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[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, MD.,  
*March 27, 1863.—2.30 p. m.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General in Chief :*

General Milroy reports four (4) regiments rebel cavalry and a battery near Front Royal.  
Very respectfully,

R. C. SCHENCK, *Major Gen'l, Com'dg.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

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[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., March 27, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Falmouth :*

Despatches from Generals Dix, Foster and Hunter, and from the west, indicate that the rebel troops formerly under Lee are now much scattered for supplies, and for operations elsewhere. It would seem, under these circumstances, advisable that a blow be struck by the army of the Potomac as early as practicable. It is believed that during the next few days several conflicts will take place, both south and west, which may attract the enemy's attention particularly to those points.

H. W. HALLECK, *General in Chief.*

Sent 2.30 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*



WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
Washington, April 1, 1863.

Major General HOOKER, *Commanding Army of the Potomac* :

There will be made, on the 10th of April, or as soon thereafter as practicable, a general muster of all troops in the service of the United States, wheresoever they may be. The muster-rolls will be immediately sent to the Adjutant General of the army for the use of the Provost Marshal General in making drafts to fill up regiments and batteries to the proper complement.

By order of the Secretary of War :

E. D. TOWNSEND, *Asst. Adj. General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., April 3, 1863.

GENERAL : Please direct Sergeant Joseph B. Stevens, company F, 5th regiment Ohio volunteer infantry, to report to Colonel Holt, judge advocate general, United States army.

By order of Major General Halleck :

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

Major General HOOKER,  
*Commanding, &c., &c.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 5, 1865.

Official :

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

[Cipher.]

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
Washington, April 3, 1863.

Major General HOOKER :

Our plan is to pass Saturday night on the boat ; go over from Aquia creek to your camp Sunday morning ; remain with you till Tuesday morning, and then return. Our party will probably not exceed six persons of all sorts.

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 2.30 p. m.

[Received 3.10 p. m.]

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1863.

Major General HOOKER, *U. S. Volunteers,*  
*Commanding Army of the Potomac, Falmouth, Va. :*

I am instructed to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram concerning Captain J. E. Harrison, 5th United States cavalry, and to inform you that Special Orders 147, from headquarters army, dated March 31, gives Captain Harrison permission to remain in Washington for ten days under medical treatment. A copy of order has been sent to you by mail.

By order of the Secretary of War :

ROBERT WILLIAMS, *Asst. Adj. General*.

Sent 3.45 p. m.

[Received 5 p. m., April 4.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, April 4, 1863.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

I request that you will have the kindness to inform me of the hour the President will leave Washington for Aquia. I take it for granted that you and Mrs. Stanton will be of the party.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding*.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, April 4, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

The President and Mrs. Lincoln left here for Aquia about five o'clock last evening, intending to remain on the boat all night. It was impossible for me to leave here in the President's absence, and Mrs. Stanton would not go without me; but we are obliged by your invitation.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

Sent 8.30 p. m.

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[Received 11.50 a. m.]

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *April 8, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Commanding Army Potomac :*

Where, from consolidation of forces, officers are rendered supernumerary, and consequently mustered out, all supernumeraries, whether present or absent, should be mustered out as absent, and cause stated.

Like rules apply to enlisted men.

Recently, mustering officers have not complied with foregoing; in consequence, attention is invited to the fact.

By order of Secretary of War :

THOMAS M. VINCENT, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

Sent 12 m.

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[Received 3 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, D. C., April 8, 1863.*

Major General JOSEPH HOOKER,

*Commanding Army of the Potomac, Falmouth, Va. :*

Application has been made by John O'Hara for permission to carry sanitary supplies to the Michigan troops in the army of the Potomac. Have you any objection to a pass being granted him for that purpose ?

P. H. WATSON, *Assistant Secretary of War.*

Sent 3.07 p. m.

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[Received 6.30 p. m., April 9.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *April 9, 1863.*

Hon. P. H. WATSON, *Assistant Secretary of War :*

With regard to the application of Mr. J. O'Hara for permission to bring sanitary supplies to the Michigan troops in this army, conveyed in your despatch of the 9th, it is respectfully suggested that a list of the articles should be furnished before any instructions are given. The health of this army is now good, and it is not thought the indiscriminate use of luxuries increases the effective strength of the troops, and in the event of a movement such supplies could not be transported. Whenever the troops are encamped for any length of time such articles as are not objected to by the medical department might be permitted to be sent forward.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

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[Received 2 55 p. m.]

WASHINGTON CITY, D. C., *April 11, 1863.*

Major General JOSEPH HOOKER,

*Commanding Army of the Potomac, Falmouth, Va. :*

Referring to your telegram of the 9th, I have now to state that the supplies which John O'Hara desires to carry to the army of the Potomac are as follows :

Twenty-four boxes and one barrel containing cakes, cheese, dried fruits, jellies, preserves, pickles, stationery, &c.; four bundles of smoked beef, dried fruit and preserves; four barrels and forty kegs of butter—all intended for Michigan troops, and weighing in the aggregate about six thousand pounds.

Shall they be sent? The surgeons think such supplies useful for the hospitals.

P. H. WATSON, *Assistant Secretary of War.*

Sent 3.05 p. m.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington, D. C., April 11, 1863.*

Major General JOSEPH HOOKER,  
*Commanding Army of the Potomac, Falmouth, Va. :*

The articles enumerated in my despatch to-day are intended as gifts from the people of Michigan to their troops in your army. Mr. O'Hara is not a trader, but a State agent, and does not want to sell the articles, but to distribute them gratis.

P. H. WATSON, *Assistant Secretary of War,*

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[Received 3.35 p. m, April 11.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *April 11, 1863.*

Hon. P. H. WATSON, *Assistant Secretary of War :*

In order to prevent being overrun by traders an order was issued confining all the traffic in corps to sutlers; they keep on hand for sale to the troops all the articles enumerated in the list of Mr. O'Hara.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General.*

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[Telegram—Received 10.30 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., April 12, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Falmouth :*

Despatches from Fortress Monroe say that the enemy attacked Williamsburg and Suffolk in large forces yesterday. They were also pressing General Foster in North Carolina very closely.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 10.45 a. m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 11, 1863.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major and A. A. G.*

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[Received.]

WASHINGTON, D. C., *April 12, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

Your letter by the hand of General Butterfield is received, and will be conformed to. The thing you dispense with *would* have been ready by mid-day to-morrow.

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 12.10 a. m.

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[Telegram in cipher—Received 2.30 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., April 13, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac :*

Despatches just received from Fort Monroe say that the enemy is investing Suffolk.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 3.40 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 11, 1863.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major and A. A. G.*

## ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

[Received 9 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

April 13, 1863—8.50 p. m.

Major General PECK, *Suffolk, Va.* :

All of Longstreet's forces that have gone from here left in January and February last; none have left since. The enemy will be disappointed in the expectations you mention in your despatch.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Telegram—Received 9.35 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC, April 13—9 p. m.

GENERAL: If it is deemed of importance to keep open telegraph communication to this point it will require that a regiment of cavalry be sent from Washington to patrol and guard the line *via* Occoquan to Dumfries. My cavalry have other duties that will prevent their attending to this. The force should be sent without delay.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General.*

Major General HALLECK.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, April 8, 1865.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

[Telegram—Received 10.40 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

Washington, D. C., April 13, 1863.

Major General HOOKER, *Commanding, &c.*:

I do not think that the safety of Washington depends upon the maintenance of communications with your army; but I think it is your duty to maintain your communications with Washington, and to keep the War Department advised of all your movements and intended movements. You therefore have my orders to keep up such communication.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 10.45 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, April 11, 1865.

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major and A. A. G.*

[Received 7.50 a. m., April 14.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, April 14, 1863.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of my telegram to Major General Halleck and his reply thereto. I respectfully request that these be laid before the President of the United States without delay.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

" APRIL 13, 1863.

"GENERAL: If it is deemed of importance to keep open telegraphic communication to this point it will require that a regiment of cavalry should be sent from Washington to patrol and guard the line *via* Occoquan to Dumfries. My cavalry have other duties that will prevent their attending to this. The force should be sent without delay.

" JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

" Major General HALLECK."

[Telegram.—Received 7.58 a. m., April 14.]

“WASHINGTON, *April 13, 1863.*

“Major General HOOKER, *Headquarters Army of Potomac :*

“I do not think that the safety of Washington depends upon the maintenance of communication with your army; but I think it is your duty to maintain your communications with Washington and to keep the War Department advised of all your movements and intended movements. You therefore have my orders to keep up such communications.

“H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*”

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[Received 10.20 a. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *April 14, 1863.*

To the POSTMASTER, *Washington :*

Major General Hooker, commanding this army, would like to have the entire mails of to-day from his army detained twenty-four hours in your office if you can do so with propriety. He has very urgent reasons for making the request, as you may readily imagine. Inform me whether or not you will comply.

R. INGALLS, *Colonel and Quartermaster.*

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[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., April 14, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac :*

General Heintzelman has ordered a regiment of cavalry to scout south of the Occoquan to Dumfries.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 11 a. m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major and A. A. G.*

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WASHINGTON, *April 14, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

Would like to have a letter from you as soon as convenient.

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 5.30 p. m.

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[Received 11.15 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*April 14, 1863—11 p. m.*

His Excellency A. LINCOLN, *President United States :*

I had supposed the enemy were attacking Peck to prevent his re-enforcing Foster; but if with the numbers alleged, it must be for a more important purpose. As soon as Stoneman's designs are discovered to the enemy, Peck will be relieved; the reason that the enemy, have not to exceed thirty-five thousand men between Richmond and Suffolk, including both of these towns.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 9, 15 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
April 15, 1863—8 p. m.

His Excellency A. LINCOLN, *President United States* :

Just heard from General Stoneman. His artillery has been brought to a halt by the mud, one division only having crossed the river. If practicable he will proceed without it; all the streams are swimming.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 9, 30 a. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, April 16, 1863.

For information of the President and Secretary of War :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, April 15, 1863.

“To General S—— :

Your despatches of 9 and 10, 35 o'clock of this date are this moment received. As you stated in your communication of yesterday that you would be over the river with your command at daylight this morning, it was so communicated to Washington, and it was hoped that the crossing had been made in advance of the rise in the river. If your artillery is your only hindrance to your advance, the major general commanding directs that you order it to return, and proceed to the execution of your orders without it. It is but reasonable to suppose that if you cannot make use of that arm of the service, the enemy cannot. If it is practicable to carry into execution the general instructions communicated to you the 12th instant, the major general commanding expects you to make use of such means as will, in your opinion, enable you to accomplish it, and that as speedily as possible. This army is now awaiting your movement. I am directed to add that, in view of the swollen condition of the streams, it is not probable, in the event of your being able to advance, that you will be troubled by the infantry of the enemy.

“S. WILLIAMS. A. A. G.”

[Received 9.30 a. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, April 16, 1863

Copies of instructions to General S——, for the President and Secretary of War :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“April 15, 1863.

“To General S—— :

“Depatches of April 15, from ——, signed by the chief of your staff, have been received.

“The commanding general desires me to call your attention to your letter of instructions. The tenor of your despatches might indicate that you were manœuvring your whole force against the command of General Lee, numbering not over two thousand men. The commanding general does not expect, nor do your instructions indicate, that you are to act from any base or depot. When any messengers are coming this way, please acknowledge the receipt of the despatch concerning the telegram from General Peck sent for your information.”

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 12.20 p. m., April 18.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, April 18, 1863.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

I am informed by Commander Magraw that three of his gunboats are ordered to Newport News. I desire to know how long these boats will be absent, and, also, if the fleet under Commander McRea are still at my disposal for purposes of co-operation.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 12.30 p. m., April 18.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *April 18, 1863.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War :*

Has any action been made on the application of Major General Reynolds and Brigadier General Wadsworth to have Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Paul made brigadier general, or if not, the brevet rank given him, in order that he may continue in command of brigade in first corps? The letters in his case were addressed to the Adjutant General of the army.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 1.30 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, April 18, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Falmouth:*

The appointment of Colonel Paul as brigadier has been ordered, and will be sent to your headquarters to-morrow.

The two gunboats were ordered away by the Navy Department in ignorance of your design; the order has been countermanded, and if you need them will be sent back immediately. The fleet under Commander McRea is at your disposal. Admiral Harwood, at the navy yard, has also been ordered to co-operate with you and send you everything of the Potomac fleet that is available.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

Sent 1.40 p. m.

[Received 3.05 p. m., April 18.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *April 18, 1863.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War :*

I do not require the two gunboats just now, and will give you timely notice when I need them.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

WASHINGTON, D. C., *April 18, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER:

The President will leave here for Aquia to see you to-morrow (Sunday) morning at 7, expecting to reach there about 10 a. m. Can you meet him there?

EDWIN M. STANTON.

Sent 9.30 p. m.

[Received 10.45 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*April 18, 1863—10.30 p. m.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War :*

I have received your telegram of this evening.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, MD., *April 21, 1863—3.30 p. m.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

Many circumstances now tend to indicate that the rebels are preparing to make some movement in force into Western Virginia. General Milroy telegraphed to me yesterday that,

except some small scattering parties, the enemy had fallen back, with all troops, as far as Harrisonburg. In a despatch to-day he says, from information received, which I deem reliable, the baggage of Jackson's army and some artillery and ordnance stores arrived at Staunton some ten days since.

These things corroborate the reports I get from Generals Scammon and Roberts.

ROBERT C. SCHENCK, *Major General.*

Official copy:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 8, 1865.*

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received 6.05 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *April 21, 1863.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War:*

Will you please direct that a correct transcript be sent me by telegraph of the date proper of muster of the regiments whose terms of service are expiring now. A difference of opinion on the subject makes trouble here. I have sent a list of the regiments to the Adjutant General's office, and would like the statement from original records there to compare with the statements of officers here.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*April 21, 1863—10 p. m.*

Major General PECK, *Suffolk, Va.:*

Am glad to hear good tidings from you. You must be patient. I must play with these devils before I can spring. Remember that my army is at the bottom of a well and the enemy hold the top.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Camp near Falmouth, Va., April 22, 1863.*

GENERAL: For the information of the War Department I have the honor to transmit herewith a statement of the number of men soon to be discharged from this army by expiration of term of enlistment. They are the nine-months and two-years regiments.

From recent information I have reason to believe but few, if any, will re-enlist at this time. They appear to be of opinion that they will be under less restraint to retire from service before incurring new obligations, and that, if they should conclude to return to the service, they will be able to realize a larger bounty as substitutes for conscripts than is provided by law. The large bounties heretofore paid by the State and federal governments seem to be uppermost in their minds, and they will be likely to hold back for this recurrence. At all events, they are unwilling to re-enlist now.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General.*

Brigadier General L. THOMAS, *Adjutant General of the Army.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 6, 1865.*

Official:

RICHARD D. CUTTS, *Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*



*Statement showing the number of two-years and nine-months men serving in the army of the Potomac.*

	Two-years men.	Three-y'rs men.	Total strength.
2d regiment Maine volunteers .....	90	365	455
10th...do.....do.....	482	261	743
1st regiment New York volunteers .....	612	25	637
2d...do.....do.....	454	129	583
4th...do.....do.....	526		526
5th...do.....do.....	302	351	653
7th...do.....do.....	555	63	618
8th...do.....do.....	543	71	614
10th...do.....do.....	478	240	718
12th...do.....do.....	261	300	561
13th...do.....do.....	375	130	505
14th...do.....do.....	461	124	585
15th...do.....do.....	568	382	950
16th...do.....do.....	426	147	573
17th...do.....do.....	435	83	518
18th...do.....do.....	565	41	606
20th...do.....do.....	744	56	800
21st...do.....do.....	448		448
22d...do.....do.....	489	15	504
23d...do.....do.....	604	13	617
24th...do.....do.....	406	41	447
25th...do.....do.....	308	47	355
26th...do.....do.....	393	138	531
27th...do.....do.....	553	6	559
28th...do.....do.....	512	32	544
29th...do.....do.....	436	61	497
30th...do.....do.....	462	159	621
31st...do.....do.....	414	75	489
32d...do.....do.....	491	84	575
33d...do.....do.....	492	183	675
34th...do.....do.....	521	9	530
35th...do.....do.....	623	68	691
36th...do.....do.....	474	21	495
37th...do.....do.....	584	299	883
38th...do.....do.....	385	351	736
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>16, 472</b>	<b>4, 370</b>	<b>20, 842</b>
8th New York independent battery .....	8	77	85

## NINE-MONTHS REGIMENTS.

122d regiment Pennsylvania volunteers .....	871
126th...do.....do.....	761
129th...do.....do.....	769
134th...do.....do.....	688
123d...do.....do.....	834
131st...do.....do.....	799
133d...do.....do.....	766
153d...do.....do.....	933

**Total nine-months men..... 6, 421**

## ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

[Received 11 a. m., April 22.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *April 22, 1863.*Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

I am informed that I should have a brigadier and a major general's commission somewhere; can you tell me what has become of them?

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding*

[Received 12.10 p. m., April 23.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *April 23, 1863.*Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

In view of the loss of two regiments to-day by the expiration of their term of service, I would respectfully urge your attention to the return of the second New Hampshire regiment, or a regiment of equal strength in its place, in accordance with the assurance upon which I consented to its departure.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 11.48 a. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, April 24, 1863.*

Major General JOSEPH HOOKER,

*Commanding the Army of Potomac, Falmouth, Va.:*

The second New Hampshire regiment will be immediately ordered to join you. Please send me copies of any letters from Doctor Smith or the Surgeon General that have been addressed to you in relation to the publication of Doctor Letterman's report.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

Sent 1.30 p. m.

[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, MD., *April 24—8 p. m.*Brigadier General B. F. KELLY, *Harper's Ferry* :

The following telegram of this date has just been received from Buckhanon :

"Since 2 p. m. I have received from Colonel Latham, commanding at Beverly, four telegrams. The first stating that the enemy were advancing on him; by the last, he informs me that he has opened upon him with artillery, and that they were within one mile of him. He believes Imboden's and Jackson's forces are combined. Forces from Harper's Ferry should be pushed on towards Grafton.

"B. S. ROBERTS, *Brigadier General.*"

You will send such troops as you can spare at once from Harper's Ferry to Grafton or Clarksburg to the support of General Roberts, being governed by circumstances.

By order of Major General Schenck :

W. H. CHESEBROUGH, *Lt. Col. and A. A. G.*Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received 4.45 p. m., April 25.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *April 25, 1863.*Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

Has Brigadier General R. O. Tyler been directed to report to me for duty with this army? You will remember that I spoke to you of this on Sunday last.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

WARRENTON JUNCTION, *April 26, 1863—1.30 a. m.*General S. WILLIAMS, *Army of the Potomac* :

A man by name of George W. Lake, a resident of Maine, and townsman of Colonel Sawtelle, quartermaster, and a very intelligent and apparently a very reliable gentleman, has just arrived within our lines from Stanton *via* Harrisonburg, New Market and Thornton's Gap. He reports that on Tuesday, the 21st, Jones was at Harrisonburg, and Imboden not far off; their united forces, about six thousand, mostly cavalry. There had just been issued ten days' rations, and it was understood that they were intending to turn Milroy and destroy possibly the railroad bridge on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad at the mouth of south branch of the Potomac and Cacapon river, which has heretofore been done by Imboden.

The people of the country are expecting an advance of Hooker's army on Gordonsville *via* Culpeper, and it was rumored that pontoon bridges had been thrown across the river for that purpose. He estimates the confederate army at six hundred thousand strong, and, from what he heard, should judge that we had a large force in front of us at Fredericksburg. Hill had fifty thousand in North Carolina when Mr. Lake left there, six weeks ago; from fifty thousand to sixty thousand at Charleston, during the recent engagement; two iron-clads at Wilmington, North Carolina—one at least completed by this time, built to run the blockade, which is run with great regularity. Danville railroad not completed yet.

Major General STONEMAN.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *April 26, 1863—9.30 a. m.*Major General GEO. STONEMAN, *Warrenton Junction* :

Your despatch respecting the statement of Mr. Lake received. I am directed to say that we have much more reliable information than this man has furnished. We know the strength of the enemy in front of us, and he is looking for us to advance in this vicinity. Jones has an irregular force of not to exceed three thousand; his intentions we know nothing of.

S. WILLIAMS, *A. A. General.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, *April 26, 1863.*Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

General Hooker is certainly mistaken about the small number of troops with Jones and at the west; but Jones has not yet advanced on New creek. I think he can have little with him but cavalry. Scouts report that he could not get his artillery across the South branch at Moorfield, and Elliott may arrive in time to capture it; then I hope we may capture his entire force. Colonel Smith, with re-enforcements, will reach New creek from Martinsburg by five o'clock to-day. Nothing more from Roberts. Colonels Wilkinson and Mulligan go to his support from Grafton and Clarksburg. I think his communication by telegraph has been interrupted.

ROBT C. SCHENCK, *Major General, Commanding.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *April 27, 1863—3½ p. m.*

Major General HOOKER :

How does it look now ?

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 3.30 p. m.

[Received 4.10 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, April 27, 1863.*Major General HOOKER, *Falmouth* :

General Tyler is under orders to report to you.

I am glad to see that you estimate Stoneman's "reliable information from a copperhead Yankee" at the same value that it is estimated here. What can he mean by repeating such stories, and is it possible he believes them?

EDWIN M. STANTON.

Sent 5.10 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *April 27, 1863.*

Major T. T. ECKERT :

The major general commanding desires me to express his obligations to you for the suppression of the infamously false despatch you enclosed to-day. If there are any drunken men in this army, they have not been visible. A better behaved body of men can nowhere be found. Such a despatch would have created great mischief and uneasiness throughout the country, and been of infinite service to the copperhead community. The general desires that you will furnish the Secretary of War a copy of the document, with this despatch.

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD.

[Received 10.15 a. m., April 28.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *April 27, 1863.*Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

I have the honor respectfully to request that the agents in Washington of the New York Times and Philadelphia Inquirer may be called upon to give the names of their correspondents with this army who furnished the information upon which was based the statement, offered for transmission to those papers last night, in Washington, respecting a submarine cable said to be in use by the enemy between Falmouth and Fredericksburg; also the information upon which was founded the article in the Inquirer of Saturday last upon the same subject. If the names of these parties are not given, it is my intention to suppress the circulation of the two papers named in the army of the Potomac, and to exclude their correspondents from its lines.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 12.40 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, April 30, 1863.*Major General HOOKER, *Falmouth* :

The military supervisor of telegraphs, Major Eckert, will send you by mail all the information that has yet been received in respect to the story about the submarine telegraph. You will have to protect yourself by rigid measures against the reporters in your army, and the department will support you in any measure you are pleased to take on the subject. Unless some one is punished you may suffer great injury. I have just been told that detailed and no doubt exaggerated reports of the crossing at Kelly's ford, with lists of killed and wounded, have been sent to the Times and Herald by mail. Nothing has been allowed to pass by telegraph.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

Sent 1.10 p. m.

[Received 1.20 p. m., 30th, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *April 30, 1863.*

Brigadier General HAUPT :

Be in readiness to commence work on this line of road by day after to-morrow morning. Date of this, April 30, noon.

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Received 2.55 p. m.]

WASHINGTON, *May 1, 1863*

Major General J. HOOKER,  
*Commanding Army of the Potomac, Virginia :*

Hereafter, regiments of volunteers leaving the field on account of expiration of term of service will be permitted to take their arms and accoutrements to the place of discharge, to be delivered to the governor of the State, or to the officers appointed by him to receive them.

By order of the Secretary of War :

E. D. TOWNSEND, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

Sent 5.45 p. m.

[Telegram, in cipher. ]]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*May 1, 1863—7.30 p. m.*

J. J. PECK, *Major General, Suffolk, Va. :*

Hood's and Pickett's divisions of Longstreet's are in our front—so reported by deserters and prisoners captured to-day. This will leave nothing of Longstreet's command in your front but Ransom, if he is there.

D. BUTTERFIELD, *Chief of Staff.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram—Received 10.20 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*May 1, 1863—10.05 p. m.*

Colonel J. C. KELTON, *Assistant Adjutant General. :*

SIR: General Hooker directs me to telegraph all information concerning re-enforcements of the enemy from Richmond, as it may have an important bearing on movements elsewhere, and to say that all their cavalry are in his immediate presence. Our information is as follows: Two deserters from a Louisiana regiment of Early's division, who came in this morning, (born in New York,) state, for some time residents south report that while detailed to the rear of their lines yesterday, near Hamilton's crossing, to cook provisions for their company, they saw Hood's division pass by; that they talked to the troops, and asked where they belonged. The character of these men, and the information they gave as to the position of the enemy in front of the left wing of the army, causes me to rely upon their statements. Colonel Sharpe, deputy provost marshal general, advises me that deserters from Early's division had heard their captain say on Wednesday that Hood and Pickett would be here in time for the fight.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, May 2, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

We cannot control intelligence in relation to your movements while your generals write letters giving details. A letter from General Van Allen to a person not connected with the War Department describes your position as intrenched at Chancellorsville. Can't you give his sword something to do, so that he will have less time for the pen?

EDWIN M. STANTON.

Sent 11 a. m.

## ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

[In cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *May 2, 1863.*Major General KEYES, *Yorktown, Va.:*

Our cavalry ought yesterday or to-day to have been in rear of the enemy on the Richmond and Fredericksburg road, at the crossing of the Pamunky, or in that vicinity, and have destroyed it. Use every possible means to get any information, and telegraph it to us, and oblige. Things are very lively here now.

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Received 11.10 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *May 2, 1863.*Colonel KELTON, *A. A. G.:*

Two deserters here from Pickett's division; left him on the Blackwater April thirtieth, (30th,) and no sign of a movement there.

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[In cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*May 2, 1863—8 p. m.*Major General PECK, *Suffolk, Va.:*

Our latest and most reliable information from Richmond is as follows; am inclined to the belief that this will prove true:

"Our friend just returned. The works around Richmond are most formidable; at Meadow Bridge and Mechanicsville road they are intended for field artillery; no guns in position. At Richmond are the city battalion and some artillery; 2,700 rations issued to troops in Richmond in active service. General Wise has five thousand on the Peninsula; Longstreet has three divisions at Suffolk. When they left Lee they were each eight thousand strong; their effective force, all told, not over fifteen thousand men. D. H. Hill is ordered from Washington to re-enforce Longstreet's corps; he may, however, take Longstreet's place at Suffolk, and Lee may be re-enforced by Longstreet."

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[In cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *May 3, 1863.*His Excellency A. LINCOLN, *President U. S.:*

Though not directed or specially authorized to do so by General Hooker, I think it not improper that I should advise you that a battle is in progress.

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Received 2.45 p. m., May 3.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*May 3, 1863—1.30 p. m.*His Excellency A. LINCOLN, *President U. S.:*

From all reports yet collected the battle has been most fierce and terrible; loss heavy on both sides. General Hooker slightly, but not severely, wounded. He has preferred, thus far, that nothing should be reported, and does not know of this; but I cannot refrain from saying this much to you. You may expect his despatch in a few hours, which will give the result.

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Received 4 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, May 3, 1863.*Major General BUTTERFIELD, *Chief of Staff:*

The President thanks you for your telegrams, and hopes you will keep him advised as rapidly as any information reaches you.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

Sent 4.15 p. m

[Received 4 p. m., May 3.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*near Chancellorsville, 1.25 p. m. May 3, 1863,*  
*by orderly to United States Ford, thence by telegraph 3.30 p. m.*

His Excellency A. LINCOLN, *President United States :*

We have had a desperate fight yesterday and to-day, which has resulted in no success to us, having lost a position of two lines which had been selected for our defence. It is now 1.30, and there is still some firing of artillery. We may have another turn at it this p. m. I do not despair of success.

If Sedgwick could have gotten up there could have been but one result. As it is impossible for me to know the exact position of Sedgwick, as regards his ability to advance and take part in the engagement, I cannot tell where it will end. We will endeavor to do our best. My troops are in good spirits. We have fought desperately to-day. No general ever commanded a more devoted army.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding*WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, May 3, 1863.*

Major General BUTTERFIELD :

Where is General Hooker? Where is Sedgwick? Where is Stoneman?

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 4.35 p. m.

[Received 8.15 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*May 3, 1863—8 p. m.*

His Excellency A. LINCOLN, *President United States :*

I have had no time to advise you. We have to-day here about 800 prisoners, six guns, handsomely taken at point of bayonet. I can give no general idea of how affairs stand; last reports all quiet in front of Chancellorsville, and Sedgwick fighting at 6.15 p. m; will try after a while to advise you, if an interval occurs.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Received 11 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *May 4, 1863.*Major General PECK, *Suffolk, Va. :*

Our cavalry bring information of fifteen or twenty thousand (20,000) of Longstreet's forces getting off from the cars at Gordonsville.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., May 4, 1863.*Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac* :Major General Dix telegraphs that Longstreet is in full retreat from Suffolk.  
H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 12 m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major and A. A. G.*WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, May 4, 1863.*

Major General BUTTERFIELD :

We have news here that the enemy has re-occupied heights about Fredericksburg. Is that true ?

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 3.10 p. m.

[Received 10.45 a. m., May 6, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*In the Field, May 5, 1863—11 a. m.*His Excellency A. LINCOLN, *President United States* :

General Hooker is not at this moment able, from pressing duties, to write of the condition of affairs. He deems it his duty that you should be fully and correctly advised. He has intrusted it to me. These are my words, not his.

Of his plans you were fully aware. The cavalry, as yet learned, have failed in executing their orders. Averell's division returned; nothing done; loss of two or three men. Buford's regulars not heard from. General Sedgwick failed in execution of his orders and was compelled to retire, and crossed river at Banks's ford last night; his losses not known. The 1st, 3d, 5th, 11th, 12th, and two divisions of 2d corps, are now on south bank of Rappahannock, intrenched between Hunting run and Scott's dam. Trains and artillery reserve on north bank of Rappahannock. Position is strong, but circumstances, which in time will be fully explained, make it expedient, in the general's judgment, that he should retire from this position to the north bank of the Rappahannock for its defensible position; among these is danger to his communications by possibility of enemy crossing river on our right flank and imperilling this army, with present departure of two-years and three-months troops constantly weakening him. The nature of the country in which we are prevents moving in such a way as to find or judge position or movements of enemy. He may cross to-night, but hopes to be attacked in this position.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[In cipher.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington City, D. C., May 6, 1863—11.40 a. m.*

Major General HOOKER :

We have, through General Dix, the contents of Richmond papers of the (5th) fifth. General Dix's despatch in full is going to you by Captain Fox, of the navy. The substance is General Lee's despatch of the (3d) third, Sunday, claiming that he had beaten you, and that you were then retreating across the Rappahannock; distinctly stating that two of Longstreet's divisions fought you on Saturday, and that General Paxton was killed, Stonewall Jackson severely wounded, and Generals Heth and A. P. Hill slightly wounded. The Richmond papers all state, upon what authority not mentioned, that our cavalry have been at Ashland, Hanover Court House, and other points, destroying several locomotives, and a good deal of other property, and all the railroad bridges to within five (5) miles of Richmond.

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 12.25 p. m.



[Received 1.35 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
May 6, 1863—1.15 p. m.

His Excellency A. LINCOLN, *President United States* :

I have just returned from above, and find here your two despatches to General Hooker, and one from him to me directing me to telegraph you that the army has recrossed the river, that the bridges are up, and that all are under orders to return to camp. Your despatches were sent to him, and by this time he has probably received them.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Received 6.20 p. m., May 6, 1863.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
May 6, 1863—3 p. m.

His Excellency A. LINCOLN, *President United States* :

Have this moment returned to camp. On my way received your telegrams of 11 a. m. and 12.30. The army had previously recrossed the river and was on its return to camp. As it had none of its trains of supplies with it, I deemed this advisable. Above I saw no way of giving the enemy a general battle with the prospect of success which I desire. Not to exceed three corps, all told, of my troops have been engaged. For the whole to go in there is a better place nearer at hand. Will write you at length to-night. Am glad to hear that a portion of the cavalry have at length turned up; one portion did nothing.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General Commanding.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., May 6, 1863.

General HOOKER :

Just as I had telegraphed you contents of Richmond papers showing that our cavalry has not failed, I received General Butterfield's of 11 a. m. yesterday. This, with the great rain of yesterday and last night, securing your right flank, I think puts a new face upon your case; but you must be the judge.

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 12.30 p. m.

[Received 2.55 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
Washington, May 6, 1863.

Major General HOOKER,

*Commanding Army of Potomac, Falmouth, Va.:*

Under the circumstances of the case, May ninth (9th) will have to be taken as date of muster out of the 123d Pennsylvania, nine-months men.

By order of the Secretary of War :

THOMAS M. VINCENT,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Sent 3.35 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF WASHINGTON, May 6, 1863.

Major General D. BUTTERFIELD, *Chief of Staff, Army of Potomac* :

I send you some information received here this morning.

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, *Major General.*

“FAIRFAX COURT HOUSE, *May 6, 1863.*”

“Major General HEINTZELMAN :

“John P. Devall, brakeman on the Culpeper and Gordonsville road, who came in our lines at Warrenton Junction yesterday evening claiming protection, reports that he left Gordonsville Saturday at 4 p. m.; at that time there were about 200 rebel infantry and 300 cavalry at Gordonsville. A rebel train, which started out from Gordonsville for Charlottesville, was compelled to return on account of a portion of our forces being at Cobhan’s Station. Lee’s cavalry force passed through Gordonsville on Friday last for Louisa Court House, where a fight occurred on Saturday evening, with what result Devall did not know. He reports that there are three trains at Gordonsville which could not leave on any of the railroads.”

“Major General STAHL.”

Have you any force holding Rappahannock Station?  
Respectfully,

S. P. HEINTZELMAN,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, D. C., May 6, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

The President and general-in-chief left here this afternoon at 4 o’clock to see you. They are probably at Aquia by this time.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

Sent 8.30 p. m.

[Received 12.05 a. m., May 8.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *May 7, 1863—10.30 p. m.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War :*

Major General Stoneman’s aide-de-camp, Captain Sumner, is just in—left his chief at Raccoon ford this morning, having, as reported, disarranged all the enemy’s railroad communications between this and Richmond, and one party having extended their operations to James river, destroying the canal, &c. Three regiments of the command left his to destroy the railroad bridges across the Chickahominy, with instructions to go into Yorktown; the party will recross the Rappahannock to-morrow.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 11.25 a. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, May 7, 1863.*

Major General D. BUTTERFIELD, *Chief of Staff, &c., Camp near Falmouth :*

Many applications are now being made for passes to the army for the purpose of recovering the bodies of friends who have been killed, and the Secretary of War desires me to ask if passes for this purpose can be given, without causing embarrassment or injury to the service.

EDWARD R. S. CANBY, *Brigadier General.*

Sent 12.20 p. m.

[Cipher.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, May 7, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

Richmond papers of Tuesday received at this department are full of accounts of the panic and destruction accomplished by Stoneman. From the several papers, and the statement of General Stoughton, just arrived, the following among other facts appear :

1st. That a portion of Stoneman’s force were within two miles of Richmond on Monday. This is stated by the Richmond papers. General Stoughton reports that there was not at that time a single soldier in Richmond.

2d. The road was torn up at various points, and General Stoughton says the canal broken, but the papers assert that it was not broken.

3d. Stoneman's force is represented to be divided into detachments operating in different directions and producing great panic everywhere in that region. Other details are given at great length, but the above are the principal points.

The result at Chancellorsville does not seem to have produced any panic. Gold has only risen six per cent. in New York, and at the close to day had gone down four. The public confidence seems to remain unshaken in the belief of your ultimate success.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

Sent 9.30 p. m.

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[Received 8 a. m., May 8.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, May 8, 1863—8 a. m.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

Have you received any late news from Yorktown? I am extremely anxious to know what damage three regiments of dragoons did to the Aquia and Richmond railroad after they were detached from Stoneman's column. They went to Gloucester Point, where Major General Keyes had communication with them three days ago. Stoneman has recrossed the Rappahannock, and is now on his way to this camp.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding*.

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[Received 10.50 a. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, May 8, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

Has any arrangement been made to recover our wounded soldiers and officers who fell into the hands of the enemy? Some arrangement can probably be effected through Colonel Ludlow, the agent for exchange at Fortress Monroe. But I desire to know your wishes before giving him instructions.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War*.

Sent 11 a. m.

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[Received 10.30 a. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington, D. C., May 8, 1863.*

Major General D. BUTTERFIELD, *Chief of Staff, &c., Camp near Falmouth* :

The Secretary of War desires to know if the agents of States that have troops in the army of the Potomac can be of any service in caring for the wounded from their States. Will it be advisable to permit them to go down?

EDWARD R. S. CANBY, *Brigadier General*.

Sent 11.05 a. m.

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[Received 11.20 a. m., May 8.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, May 8, 1863.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

Provision has been made for having our wounded properly cared for here. They are now in houses near Chancellorsville, and to-day medical attendance and supplies will be sent there. As soon as the river is fordable they will be brought to this camp.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding*.

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., May 8, 1863.*Major General HOOKER, *Falmouth:*

General Dix had moved his troops before he received my order to suspend his operations, and probably occupied West Point in force yesterday.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

Sent 12 m.

[Received 2 p. m.]

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *Washington, May 8, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER:

The news is here of the capture by our forces of Grand Gulf—a large and very important thing. General Willich, an exchanged prisoner, just from Richmond, has talked with me this morning. He was there when our cavalry cut the roads in that vicinity. He says there was not a sound pair of legs in Richmond, and that our men, had they known it, could have safely gone in and burned everything, and brought us Jeff. Davis. We captured and paroled three or four hundred men. He says, as he came to City Point, there was an army three miles long (Longstreet's, he thought) moving towards Richmond.

Milroy has captured a despatch of General Lee's, in which he says his loss was fearful in the late battle with you.

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 4 p. m.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, May 8, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER:

DEAR SIR: The tone of two telegrams received—one from General Curtis, and the other from Rosecrans—I think will please you, and I therefore send them to you as the cheering voice of brother soldiers, that will be welcome to you. I also send one from Governor Seymour. My telegram was a simple announcement of results, and was sent to all the governors and commanders in order to let the public know the truth. Several of the governors have answered, and all manifest their unshaken confidence in you and your army.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

Sent 8.30 p. m.

"ST. LOUIS, MO., 11.10 a. m., *May 8, 1863.*"Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War:*

"I thank you for your tidings from the army of the Potomac.

"Partial reverses should only stimulate new energy and immediate recovery. The general result is far worse for the enemy.

"Even small re-enforcements and persevering assaults will force him to retire.

"The country and troops of the west are inspired with confidence, and send back a voice of cheer and sympathy to their comrades in the army of the Potomac.

"S. R. CURTIS, *Major General.*""MURFREESBORO, TENN., *May 8, 1863.*"Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War:*

"Thanks for your despatch. It relieves our great suspense. What we want is to deal with their armies piece for piece, which is good when we have the odds. We shall soon be ready here to try that.

"W. S. ROSECRANS, *Major General.*""ALBANY, N. Y., *May 8, 1863.*"Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War:*

"Thanks for your telegram. The information is most acceptable and encouraging.

"HORATIO SEYMOUR."

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *May 9, 1863.*

GENERAL: I enclose herewith a copy of an order relieving Brigadier General Averell from duty with this army, and directing him to report in person to you. My reasons for adopting this course towards this officer will be found in the accompanying papers, as follows: My instructions to Major General Stoneman, dated April 12 and 28, copies of which were furnished Brigadier General Averell; the report of the operations of the second division of cavalry under Brigadier General Averell, dated May 4.

From these it will appear that my instructions were entirely disregarded by that officer, and in consequence thereof the services of nearly four thousand cavalry were lost, or nearly lost, to the country during an eventful period, when it was his plain duty to render services of incalculable value.

It is no excuse or justification of his course to allege that he received instructions from General Stoneman in conflict with my own, and it was his duty to know that neither of them affords an excuse for his culpable indifference and inactivity. If he disregarded all instructions, it was his duty to do something. If the enemy did not come to him, he should have gone to the enemy. General Averell's command numbered about four thousand sabres and a light battery, (a larger cavalry force than can be found in the rebel army between Fredericksburg and Richmond,) and yet that officer seems to have contented himself between the 29th of April and 4th day of May with having marched through Culpeper to Rapidan, a distance of twenty-eight miles, meeting no enemy deserving the name, and from that point reporting to me for instructions; from there he marches to Ely's ford, twenty-three miles, and recrosses the Rappahannock at the United States ford May 4.

It is unnecessary for me to add that this army will never be able to accomplish its mission under commanders who not only disregard their instructions, but at the same time display so little zeal and devotion in the performance of their duties. I could excuse General Averell in his disobedience, if I could anywhere discover in his operations a desire to find and engage the enemy.

I have no disposition to prefer charges against him, and in detaching him from this army my object has been to prevent an active and powerful column from being paralyzed in its future operations by his presence.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

Please have this referred to the War Department.

J. H.

Brigadier General L. THOMAS, *Adjutant General of the Army.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 6, 1865.*

Official:

RICHARD D. CUTTS, *Colonel and A. D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Camp near Chancellorsville, May 3, 1863.*

Brigadier General Pleasanton will assume command of the division of cavalry now held by Brigadier General Averell.

The latter will, on being relieved, report for orders to the Adjutant General of the army.  
By command of

Major General HOOKER.

J. H. VAN ALLEN, *Brigadier General and A. D. C.*

General Pleasanton will please deliver the above to General Averell.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Camp near Falmouth, May 8, 1863.*

Official:

S. WILLIAMS, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *April 12, 1863.*

GENERAL: I am directed by the major general commanding to inform you that you will march at 7 o'clock a. m., on the 13th instant, with all your available force, except one brigade, for the purpose of turning the enemy's position, on his left, and of throwing your command between him and Richmond—isolating him from his supplies, checking his retreat,

and inflicting on him every possible injury which will tend to his discomfiture and defeat. To accomplish this, the general suggests that you ascend the Rappahannock by the different routes, keeping well out of the view of the enemy, and throwing out well to the front and flanks small parties to mask your movement, and to cut off all communication with the enemy by the people in their interests living on this side of the river. To divert suspicion, it may not be amiss to have word given out that you are in pursuit of Jones's guerrillas, as they are operating extensively in the Shenandoah valley, in the direction of Winchester. He further suggests that you select for your place of crossing the Rappahannock some point to the west of the Alexandria and Orange railroad, which can only be determined by the circumstances as they are found on the arrival of your advance. In the vicinity of Culpeper you will be likely to run against Fitz Hugh Lee's brigade of cavalry, consisting of about two thousand men, which it is expected you will be able to disperse and destroy without delay to your advance, or detriment to any considerable number of your command. At Gordonsville the enemy have a small provost guard of infantry, which it is expected you will destroy, if it can be done without delaying your forward movement. From there it is expected that you will be able to push forward to the Aquia and Richmond railroad, somewhere in the vicinity of Saxton's Junction, destroying along your whole route the railroad bridges, trains of cars, depots of provisions, lines of telegraphic communication, &c. The general directs that you go prepared with all the means necessary to accomplish this work effectually. As the line of the railroad from Aquia to Richmond presents the shortest one for the enemy to retire on, it is more than probable that he will avail himself of it, and the usually travelled highways on each side of it, for this purpose; in which event, you will select the strongest positions, such as the banks of streams, commanding heights, &c., in order to check or prevent it; and, if unsuccessful, you will fall upon his flanks, attack his artillery and trains, and harass him until he is exhausted and out of supplies. Moments of delay will be hours and days to the army in pursuit. If the enemy should retire by Culpeper and Gordonsville, you will endeavor to hold your face in his front and harass him day and night, on the march and in camp, unceasingly. If you cannot cut off from his column large slices, the general desires that you will not fail to take small ones. Let your watchword be fight, and let all your orders be fight, fight, fight, bearing in mind that time is as valuable to the general as the rebel carcasses.

It is not in the power of the rebels to oppose you with more than five thousand sabres, and those badly mounted, and, after they leave Culpeper, without forage and rations. Keep them from Richmond, and, sooner or later, they must fall into our hands.

The general desires you to understand that he considers the primary object of your movement the cutting of the enemy's communications with Richmond by the Fredericksburg route, checking his retreat over those lines, and he wishes to make everything subservient to that object. He desires that you will keep yourself informed of the enemy's whereabouts, and attack him wherever you find him.

If, in your operations, an opportunity should present itself for you to detach a force to Charlottesville, which is almost unguarded, and destroy depots of supplies said to be there, or along the line of the Aquia railroad in the direction of Richmond to destroy the bridges, &c., or the crossing of the Pamunkey in the direction of West Point, destroying the ferries, felling trees to prevent or check the crossing, they will all greatly contribute to our complete success.

You may rely on the general's being in communication with you before your supplies are exhausted.

Let him hear from you as often as necessary and practicable.

A brigade of infantry will march to-morrow morning at eight o'clock, for Kelley's ford, with one battery, and a regiment to the United States ford and Banks's ford, to threaten and hold those places.

It devolves upon you, general, to take the initiative in the forward movement of this grand army, and on you and your noble command must depend, in a great measure, the extent and brilliancy of our success. Bear in mind that celerity, audacity, and resolution are everything in war, and especially is it the case with the command you have, and the enterprise on which you are about to embark.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. WILLIAMS, A. A. G.

Major General STONEMAN, *Commanding Cavalry.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 6, 1865.*

Official :

RICHARD D. CUTTS, *Colonel and A. D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *Morrisville, April 28, 1863.*

GENERAL : I am directed by the major general commanding to inform you that the instructions communicated for your government on the 12th instant are so far modified as to require you to cross the Rappahannock at such points as you may determine between Kelly's and Rappahannock fords, including them ; and for a portion of your force to move in the direction of the Raccoon ford and Louisa Court House, while the remainder is engaged in carrying into execution that part of your original instructions which relates to the enemy's forces and positions on the line of the Alexandria and Orange Railroad, and the line itself; the operations of this column to be considered as masking the column which is directed to move by forced marches to strike and destroy the line of the Aquia and Richmond railroad.

You are further directed to determine on your point for the columns to unite, and it is recommended that it be on the Pamunkey, and near that line, as you will then be in position with your full force to cut off the retreat of the enemy by his shortest line. In all other respects your instructions, as before referred to, will remain the same.

You will direct all your force to cross to-night, or, if that should not be practicable, to be brought to the river and have it all thrown over before eight o'clock to-morrow morning. If the fords should be too deep for your pack animals and artillery, they will be crossed over the bridge at Kelly's ford.

You will please furnish the officers in command of these two columns with a copy of this and your original instructions.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. L. CHANDLER, *Captain and A. D. C.*

Major General STONEMAN, *Commanding Cavalry Corps.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC, *May 8, 1863.*

Official :

S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

UNITED STATES FORD, RAPPAHANNOCK, *May 4, 1863.*

GENERAL : Pursuant to the instructions which I had the honor to receive from you yesterday evening, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the 2d cavalry division since it crossed the Rappahannock :

On the 28th ult. the division was in bivouac near Warrenton. In obedience to orders received from the major general commanding the cavalry corps, it moved from that place about 10 p. m., and reached the vicinity of Rappahannock bridge and ford about 5 a. m. 29th, ready to cross the river in the morning. At 6.25 a. m. a copy of your instructions to the major general commanding the corps was received, dated April 12, and a copy of a modification of those instructions from the same source, dated April 28. I reconnoitred the Rappahannock ford at 7 a. m. with Colonel J. B. McIntosh and other officers. The force of the enemy and the defences on the opposite side were insignificant, but the ford, upon trial, was found too deep for the passage of my command with safety. The swimming of 3,000 cavalry across a deep, swift river, when there was a practicable ford four miles below, and in view of the immediate active operations which must take place on the other side, I regarded as unsafe, unnecessary, and imprudent. A staff officer from the major general commanding the corps brought me a message to the effect that, if I found the ford impracticable, I should be guided by my own judgment as to the place of crossing.

I marched my command to Kelly's ford, over which half of it was crossed, while the other half passed over the bridge. The cavalry was over before 3 p. m., but the pack train was delayed a short time by a break in the pontoons.

My command consisted of Colonel B. F. Davis's brigade, the brigades of Colonels McIntosh and Sargent, with Tidball's battery, in all about 3,400 sabres and six guns. With it I was directed by the major general commanding the corps to proceed in the direction of Brandy Station, reach there if possible that night, and communicate with Buford, who would be at Stevensburg. On the day following I was to proceed to Culpeper Court House and Rapidan Station, attacking the cavalry of the enemy and keeping him occupied, while Buford proceeded with the major general commanding corps to execute that portion of the original instructions which referred to operations in rear of the enemy's main body.

I attacked the enemy's cavalry and artillery half an hour after starting, and drove him until it was too dark to distinguish friend from foe. From information received from a

deserter and from an intercepted despatch, it was ascertained that Stuart's headquarters were at Brandy Station, and that he was awaiting our approach with his entire force, consisting of four brigades and fifteen pieces of artillery. This information was confirmed the day following.

On the morning of the 30th I received the following despatch, at 7 a. m., viz :

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, *April 30, 1863.*

To Brigadier General AVERELL, *Commanding, &c. :*

The major general commanding directs me to say that we did not get off this morning as soon as was anticipated, but will endeavor to carry out our original instructions in the next twenty-four hours. Keep your communication open with your infantry support. Our pack train with 11th corps.

Very respectfully,

A. J. ALEXANDER, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

The infantry support referred to was probably the infantry division at Kelly's ford. My division arrived at Culpeper Court House 11 a. m., driving out, dispersing, and capturing a small force of the enemy. Sixty barrels of confederate flour, a large amount of salt, bacon, &c., were found, and what we could not use was distributed among the poor people of the place. The enemy was pursued rapidly twelve miles further, by Cedar mountain, towards the Rapidan. From prisoners taken and from contrabands it was learned that at least two brigades of the enemy's cavalry were flying before us. At Culpeper Court House a mail was captured, from the letters of which the intelligence was gathered that the army of the Potomac was advancing over the line of the Orange and Alexandria railroad, and that General Jackson was at Gordonsville with 25,000 men to resist it. This was corroborated by subsequent statements of prisoners, &c. At 6.30 p. m. the following order was received, viz :

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, *April 30, 1863.*

Brigadier General AVERELL, *Commanding, &c. :*

The major general commanding directs me to say that we have been delayed by high water, &c., and that he desires you to push the enemy as *vigorously as possible*, keeping him fully occupied, and, if possible, drive him in the direction of Rapidan Station. *He turns the enemy over to you.*

Very respectfully,

A. J. ALEXANDER, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

We had heard that the brigade of W. H. F. Lee had taken the road to that ford, and that the ford was impracticable. With the hope of catching him we pushed on until we arrived at the station, 7.30 to 8 p. m., when the enemy opened an artillery fire upon my advance. Halting in the road until morning, I pursued my instructions of fully occupying the enemy by first reconnoitring his position and then attacking him, in which operation his left was nearly turned. My right was within three miles of Orange Court House, and he lost his position of the night before, and some prisoners and killed and wounded.

From intercepted letters and the other usual sources of information it was found that the enemy contemplated a general engagement near Gordonsville. At 6.30 a. m., on the 2d instant, in obedience to your order, I withdrew my force from the direction of Orange Court House, and marched to Ely's ford, on the Rappahannock, where I arrived 10.30 p. m. At 11.30 the camp was attacked by the 16th North Carolina regiment of infantry, but he was quickly repulsed. On the 3d instant, when the battle opened between your army and that of the enemy, I sent an officer with a party of men to reconnoitre the enemy's left to see if it was possible to reach him with the cavalry. It was found impracticable, but the officer captured nine prisoners. Before receiving your written instructions you observed that the bridge across the Rapidan must be destroyed. It was done more effectually by the enemy himself, under the impression that you were advancing with your army over that line ; that impression was created by the 2d cavalry division. And other bridges, together with the telegraph communications, were destroyed in obedience to the following in your original instructions, not modified, viz :

"In the vicinity of Culpeper you will be likely to come against Fitzhugh Lee's brigade of cavalry, consisting of about 2,000 men, which it is expected that you will be able to disperse and destroy without delay to your advance, &c. At Gordonsville the enemy have a small provost guard of infantry, which it is expected you will destroy, if it can be done without delaying your forward movement. If the enemy should retire by Culpeper and Gordonsville, you will endeavor to hold your face in his front. \* \* \* \* Keep them from Richmond, and sooner or later they must fall into our hands."



And from the modifications of the original orders the following, viz :

"\* \* \* \* and for a portion of your force to move in direction of Raccoon ford and Louisa Court House, while the remainder is engaged in carrying into execution that part of original instructions which relates to the enemy's force and position on the line of the Orange and Alexandria railroad and the line itself. The operations of this column to be considered as masking the column which is directed to move by forced marches to strike and destroy the line of the Aquia and Richmond railroad."

I beg to state that the column first referred to was Buford's ; the second mine.

My losses have been two officers and two men wounded, one man killed. Have taken from the enemy, besides the scores mentioned, thirty-one prisoners.

I have, in conclusion, to acknowledge the receipt of your order relieving me from the command of the 2d division.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. W. AVERELL, *Brigadier General Volunteers.*

Major General HOOKER, *Commanding Army of the Potomac.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *May 8, 1863.*

Official :

S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

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[Received 11.30 a. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, D. C., May 9, 1863.*

Major General BUTTERFIELD, *Chief of Staff :*

There are a number of State agents and surgeon generals clamoring to go down and look after their wounded. They have been held back. But is there any objection now to their going down? Whatever General Hooker's wishes are shall be enforced.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

Sent 12 m.

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[Received 10.55 a. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington, D. C., May 9, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

Measures have been taken to get as full and exact report of what was done by your cavalry, and the condition of the enemy's communication, as possible, which will be transmitted as soon as it is received.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

Sent 12 m.

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[Received 12.45 p. m., May 9.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *May 9, 1863.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War :*

General Hooker directs me to say, on the information of the medical director of this army, that all the wounded within our lines are properly cared for and have everything they need. Those of our wounded within the enemy's lines the enemy will not permit any person to visit, but they are all to be sent over to us. If any aid is required it will be telegraphed for. The effect of the presence of these agents has been to interfere with the necessary and proper system. The medical director does not desire them to be here at this time.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

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WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington, D. C., May 9, 1863.*

Major General BUTTERFIELD :

Governor Curtin, I am informed, has taken his medical staff with him to Aquia creek. If so, it is without the knowledge and consent of this department, and against its repeat-

edly expressed wishes. The same rule should be applied equally to all the States, and Governor Curtin's medical agents should not be allowed a privilege denied to the surgeon general of New York and other States, who are now clamoring because Curtin has gone. This information is given that the general may know that the violation of his wishes by Governor Curtin has not been sanctioned by this department.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

Sent 3.15 p. m.

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WASHINGTON, D. C., *May 9, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Falmouth, Va.:*

Mrs. General Hays is here and wishes to join her husband. Can you tell me where he now is, or where she can meet him?

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

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[Received 7. p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *May 9, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

General Hays is supposed to be on his way to Richmond, wounded and a prisoner. Mrs. Hays's most direct way would be *via* City Point.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General Commanding.*

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[Received 9.40 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, May 9, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

The cable between Cherry Stone and Fortress Monroe being broken, the only communication across is by boat, and hence no answer has been received to the inquiries made respecting the exact amount of breakage on the railroads by Stoneman's commands. The intelligence will be forwarded as soon as it is received.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

P. S.—A despatch for you is now coming over the wires from Fortress Monroe, and will be forwarded immediately, and also one from General Dix, on the same subject, which is being deciphered.

Sent 9.50 p. m.

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WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington, D. C., May 9, 1863—10 p. m.*

Major General HOOKER :

The President this morning instructed General Dix to ascertain whether the four bridges over the North and South Anna rivers were destroyed. The following answer has just been received from Colonel Kilpatrick :

“General Gregg was ordered to destroy the bridges referred to. I only burned them over the Chickahominy. I do not know that he succeeded, but was told by prisoners that he did.

“J. KILPATRICK.”

EDWIN M. STANTON.

Sent 10.10 p. m.

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[Received 11.59 p. m., May 9.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *May 9, 1863.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War:*

The surgeon general of Pennsylvania has stopped at Aquia.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Received 10 a. m., May 10.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *May 10, 1863.*Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

From the most reliable information I have been able to gather, railroad communication between Fredericksburg and Richmond, by the direct route, was interrupted for one day. The bridges of importance appear to have remained untouched. With the exception of Kilpatrick's operations, the raid does not appear to have amounted to much. However, some reports have yet to come in. My instructions appear to have been entirely disregarded by General Stoneman. I shall know particulars soon. Please inform me what force is at West Point. What is General Peck doing, or expected to do? The bulk of Longstreet's army is reported to be at City Point, within easy supporting distance to Lee's army, on my resuming operations.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[In cipher.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,

*Washington, D. C., May 10, 1863.*Major GENERAL HOOKER, *Falmouth* :

General Dix's forces at West Point are five thousand infantry, two batteries and one hundred cavalry. Peck at last accounts was pushing the forces of the enemy in front of Suffolk, in order to ascertain their strength. General Dix reports Longstreet at Richmond. General Peck's forces are about twenty thousand.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

Sent 11.30 a. m.

[Received 12 m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

*May 10, 1863—10.30, a. m.*Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

I have just heard from the enemy opposite me. For several days they have been returning to their camps, and that by to-night they expected to be re-established in them—their location very nearly the same as before the fight.

JOSEPH HOOKER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

[In cipher.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,

*Washington City, May 11, 1863.*

Major General BUTTERFIELD :

About what distance is it from the Observatory we stopped at last Thursday to the line of enemy's works you ranged the glass upon for me?

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 4.10 p. m.

[Received 3.30 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

*May 12, 1863.*Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

We have Richmond papers of yesterday containing obituary notices of General Jackson who died Sunday at 3.30 p. m.

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[In cipher.]

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *Washington, May 13, 1863.*

If it will not interfere with the service, nor personally incommode you, please come up and see me this evening.

A. LINCOLN.

Major General HOOKER.

Sent at 1 p. m.

[Received 10.35 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*May 13, 1863—10.30 p. m.*

A deserter from the 3d Alabama reports Pickett and Hood arrived. The provost marshal's department seems to place confidence in his statement. I have not seen him.

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

Maj. Gen. HOOKER—(*Care of the President.*)

[Received 4.20 p. m., May 14.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*May 14, 1863—3.05 p. m.*

Yager, scout, reports as follows: I crossed about one o'clock this a. m. at Rappahannock Station. No force at Culpeper except a few scouts of Stuart's cavalry. Longstreet's forces are guarding the Rapidan. The bridge will be done by to-morrow. They expect Longstreet's division at Culpeper soon. The rumor at Culpeper is, that General Beauregard is to re-enforce Lee as soon as the roads are repaired. The greater part of Stuart's cavalry went towards the Peninsula yesterday.

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

Major General HOOKER, *Washington, D. C.*

[Received 10 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*May 14, 1863.*

The following is a copy of an original letter of Jeff. Davis in my possession.

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

His Excellency A. LINCOLN,  
*President of the United States.*

“RICHMOND, VA., *Sunday, a. m., May 1, 1863.*

“MY DEAR SIR: Enclosed I send you a telegram from Isaac, as requested by him. The news from Mississippi is not definite beyond the fact that Bowen, after engaging the enemy south of Port Gibson, had, under cover of night, fallen back across the Bayou Pierre, and that Loring was moving his support from Vicksburg. The enemy landed in large force near Brulinsburg, and have made cavalry raids as far as the New Orleans and Jackson railroad. General Pemberton, as you are aware, is very deficient in cavalry, and is greatly outnumbered in infantry. We are looking with intense anxiety to the operations of your army, and I have made earnest though not very successful efforts to give it prompt re-enforcements.

“With best wishes, I am ever your friend,

“JEFF. DAVIS.

“Col. ———.”

[Received 8.50 a. m., May 16.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *May 16, 1863.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War:*

Our wounded are all in our hospitals in camp. I have no objection to your permitting such State or sanitary agents, in limited numbers, as you may judge fit and proper, to visit them.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 4.30 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington, D. C., May 25, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Commanding Army of the Potomac:*

No confederate officers will be paroled or exchanged till further orders. They will be kept in close confinement and strongly guarded. Those already paroled will be confined.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

*Office of the Provost Marshal General, Bureau of Information. May 27, 1863.*

GENERAL: By direction of the general commanding I furnish the following memoranda of the position of the enemy, and other data, obtained within the last few days:

1. The enemy's line in front of us is much more contracted than during the winter. It extends from Banks's ford, on a line parallel with the river, to near Moss Neck. Anderson's division is on their left, McLaws's is next, and in rear of Fredericksburg Early's is massed about Hamilton's crossing, and Trimble's is directly in the rear of Early; Rhodes's (D. H. Hill's old division) is further to the right and back from the river, and A. P. Hill's is the right of their line, resting nearly on Moss Neck. Each of these six divisions have five brigades.

2. Pickett's division, of six brigades, has come up from Suffolk, and is at Taylorsville, near Hanover Junction.

3. Hood's division, of four brigades, has also left from the front of Suffolk, and is between Louisa Court House and Gordonsville.

4. Ten days ago there was in Richmond only the city battalion, 2,700 strong, commanded by General Elzey.

5. There are three brigades of cavalry three miles from Culpeper Court House towards Kelly's ford. They can at present turn out only 4,700 men for duty, but have many dismounted men, and the horses are being constantly and rapidly recruited by the spring growth of grass. These are Fitz Lee's, Wm. H. Fitzhugh Lee's, and Wade Hampton's brigades.

6. General Jones is still in the valley, near New Market, with about 1,400 cavalry and twelve pieces of light artillery.

7. Mosby is above Warrenton with 200 men.

8. The confederate army is under marching orders, and an order from General Lee was very lately read to the troops, announcing a campaign of long marches and hard fighting in a part of the country where they would have no railroad transportation.

9. All the deserters say the idea is very prevalent in their ranks that they are about to move forward upon or above our right flank.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE H. SHARPE, *Colonel, &c.*

Brigadier General S. WILLIAMS, *Acting Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *May 27, 1863.*

Respectfully forwarded for the information of the general-in-chief.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 6, 1865.*

Official:

RICHARD D. CUTTS, *Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

## ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

[Received 6.40 p. m., May 27.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *May 27, 1863.*Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War:*

Allow me to request that you will have me furnished with a copy of Major General Halleck's report on the strength and location of the troops in and around Washington. This information may be of vital importance to me. General Butterfield, now at Willards', will bring it to me to-morrow morning, should you make no objection. I called to see you again last night, but you had left the War Office. I regret it. From information forwarded to the major general commanding the army this a. m. it seems that the enemy will soon be in motion. It was derived from deserters, but I place a good deal of confidence in it.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 6.55 p. m.. in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *May 27, 1863—6.30 p. m.*Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

I have forwarded to the Adjutant General of the army to-day a tri-monthly report of my command for May 20, to which I respectfully invite your attention.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 8, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *Major and A. A. G.*WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, May 27, 1863.*Major General HOOKER, *Falmouth:*

Your telegram received. My clerks are now making a copy of General Halleck's report, which will be forwarded to you by General Butterfield. I hoped to have seen you again. Command whatever service I can render you. Nothing yet from Vicksburg since you were here.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

Sent 8.30 p. m.

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
*Washington, May 27, 1863.*To Major General J. HOOKER, U. S. V.,  
*Commanding Army of the Potomac:*

I am instructed to inform you that Major Alexander Doull, 2d New York artillery, has been detailed as a member of a general court-martial to convene at Annapolis, Md., on the 1st of June next, and to request you to relieve him, and instruct him to report to the Adjutant General as soon as possible.

By order of the Secretary of War:

ROBT WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

[Received 11 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington, D. C., May 27, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER:

Have you Richmond papers of this morning? If so, what news?

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 11.02 p. m.

[Received 11.40 p. m., May 27.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*May 27, 1863—11.20 p. m.*His Excellency A. LINCOLN, *President of the United States:*

I have received your telegram of eleven o'clock p. m. Rumors and reports of rumors indicate that important changes are being made by them. Nothing, however, so far as I know, is sufficiently developed to determine what these changes are. The Richmond paper of yesterday I have, but it contains no news. I will keep you fully advised.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *May 28, 1863.*

COLONEL: I have the honor herewith to transmit, for the information of the general-in-chief, a statement showing the two-years and nine-months regiments to be discharged from the army of the Potomac subsequent to May 20, 1863, the date of the last return, also the strength of those regiments. It will be seen that, between May 20 and the last of June, we shall lose by expiration of service alone nearly 16,000 men.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

Colonel J. C. KELTON, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 6, 1865.*

Official:

RICHARD D. CUTTS, *Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

*Statement showing the list of regiments, two-years and nine-months, serving with the army of the Potomac whose term of service expires subsequent to May 20, 1863.*

State.	No. of reg't.	When mustered in.	Period.	Expiration of service.	Strength.	
New York .....	12	April 21, '61, to Jan. 31, '62	2 years.	Jan. 31, 1864	261	
	15	June 17, 1861.....	..do...	June 17, 1863	568	
	22	June 5, 1861.....	..do...	June 5, 1863	489	
	25	June 13 to 26, 1861 .....	..do...	June 26, 1863	308	
	27	May 21, 1861.....	..do...	May 21, 1863	553	
	28	May 22, 1861.....	..do...	May 22, 1863	512	
	29	June 6, 1861 .....	..do...	June 6, 1863	436	
	30	June 1, 1861 .....	..do...	June 1, 1863	462	
	31	May 24 to June 18, 1861..	..do...	June 18, 1863	414	
	32	May 31, 1861.....	..do...	May 31, 1863	491	
	33	May 22, 1861.....	..do...	May 22, 1863	492	
	34	June 15 to 16, 1861.....	..do...	June 16, 1863	521	
	35	June 11, 1861 .....	..do...	June 11, 1863	623	
	36	June 17 to July 4, 1861 ..	..do...	July 4, 1863	474	
	37	June 7, 1861.....	..do...	June 7, 1863	584	
	Maine .....	37	June 8, 1861.....	..do...	June 8, 1863	385
		2	May 28, 1861.....	..do...	May 28, 1863	90
New Jersey .....	10	October 4 and 5, 1861.....	..do...	Oct. 5, 1863	482	
	21	September 15, 1862.....	9 mo's	June 15, 1863	769	
	22	September 22, 1862.....	..do...	June 22, 1863	702	
	23	September 13 to 23, 1862..	..do...	June 23, 1863	520	
	24	September 16 to 24, 1862..	..do...	June 24, 1863	425	
	26	September 18, 1862.....	..do...	June 18, 1863	840	
	28	September 22, 1862.....	..do...	June 22, 1863	409	
	29	September 20, 1862.....	..do...	June 20, 1863	592	
	30	September 17, 1862.....	..do...	June 17, 1863	643	
	31	September 17, 1862.....	..do...	June 17, 1863	677	
Pennsylvania .....	128	August 10 to 30, 1862.....	..do...	May 30, 1863	604	
	130	August 9 to Sept. 11, 1862	..do...	June 11, 1863	404	
	133	August 12 to 29, 1862.....	..do...	May 29, 1863	565	
	134	August 11 to 22, 1862.....	..do...	May 22, 1863	516	
	136	August 13 to 23, 1862.....	..do...	May 23, 1863	458	
	137	August 12 to 28, 1862.....	..do...	May 28, 1863	678	
	151	Oct. 20 to Nov. 25, 1862..	..do...	Aug. 25, 1863	534	
	153	Sept. 12 to Oct. 24, 1862..	..do...	July 24, 1863	792	
	155	Sept. 2 to Oct. 7, 1862....	..do...	July 7, 1863	487	
Total.....					18,760	

May, 1863, (2 years).....	2, 138	
Do.....(9 months).....	2, 821	4, 958
June, 1863, (2 years).....	4, 790	
Do..... (9 months).....	5, 981	10, 771
July, 1863, (2 years).....	474	
Do.....(9 months).....	1, 279	1, 753
August, 1863, (9 months).....		534
October, 1863, (2 years).....		482
January, 1864, (2 years).....		261
		<u>18, 760</u>

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, April 6, 1865.*

Official:

RICHARD D. CUTTS, *Col. and A. D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*May 28, 1863.*

COLONEL: I have the honor herewith to transmit, for the information of the general-in-chief, a copy of a statement which has been addressed to these headquarters by Brigadier General A. Pleasonton, at present commanding the cavalry corps, setting forth the condition of that command at this time.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

Colonel J. C. KELTON,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, April 6, 1865.*

Official:

RICHARD D. CUTTS, *Col. and A. D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS,  
*Army of the Potomac, May 27, 1863.*

GENERAL: I assumed the command of this corps on the 22d instant, relieving Major General Stoneman, and I desire to submit to the major general commanding the army of the Potomac the condition of the cavalry as it comes under my command.

1st division, (late my own command;) 1st brigade, 1,546 serviceable horses, 371 unserviceable; 2d brigade, 1,223 serviceable horses, 364 unserviceable; 2d division, Colonel Duffie, The commanding; 3d division, Brigadier General Gregg, commanding; of these two divisions, General Gregg reports that a close inspection of the horses of these two divisions, on the 31st ultimo, will show one-half of the whole number of horses unfit for active offensive operations. The average of each of these divisions is about 3,000 men; consequently the two have only about that number at present fit for service.

The reserve brigade, under Brigadier General Buford, is reported as follows: There are 549 horses in the command that cannot be recruited in a month. I will require 1,396 horses to remount the whole command. This brigade, on the last of March, had 2,226 serviceable horses. The difference leaves only 830 horses fit for service at this time.

*Recapitulation.*

	Serviceable horses.
1st division .....	2,774
2d division .....	1,212
3d division.....	1,861
Regular brigade .....	830
	<u>6,667</u>
Deduct Kilpatrick's force and detachments, say.....	2,000
Effective strength.....	<u>4,677</u>



The effective strength of the corps, by the March return, was upwards of 12,000 men and horses. It is now one-third of that strength, and, as far as I can ascertain, is not fit to take the field.

In taking this command, I cannot do myself such an injustice as to remain silent as to the unsatisfactory condition in which I find this corps.

I shall use every exertion to bring it to a state of efficiency at the earliest possible moment, but the responsibility of its present state, it is proper the major general commanding should know, does belong to me.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. PLEASNTON,

*Brigadier General, Commanding Cavalry Corps.*

Brigadier General S. WILLIAMS,  
*Adjutant General, Army of the Potomac.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Camp near Falmouth, Va., May 28, 1863.*

Official:

S. WILLIAMS, *Asst. Adjt. General.*

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[Received 11.20 a. m., May 28.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*May 28, 1863.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War:*

The rebel pickets shout across the river this morning that we have taken Vicksburg, and that General Grant is killed.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

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[Received 10.30 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*May 28 1863.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War:*

It has been impossible for me to gain any information concerning the movements of the enemy at all satisfactory. I have had several men over the river, but as they do not return I conclude that they have been captured. The enemy's camps are as numerous and as well filled as ever. It was reported to me this morning, by General Gregg, that the enemy's cavalry had made their appearance in the vicinity of Warrenton, on the strength of which I have ordered on to that line Buford's division, to drive them across the river and to keep them there, and if necessary I will send up additional forces. Major General Stahl should be instructed to look into the Shenandoah valley and see what is going on over there. In the event a forward movement should be contemplated by the enemy, and he should have been re-enforced by the army from Charleston, I am in doubt as to the direction he will take, but probably the one of last year, however desperate it may appear—desperate if his force should be no greater than we have reason to suppose. The enemy has always shown an unwillingness to attack fortified positions; still you may rest assured that important movements are being made, and in my opinion it is necessary for every one to be watchful. The enemy has all of his cavalry force (five brigades) collecting at Culpeper and Jefferson; this would indicate a movement in the direction of the Orange and Alexandria railroad, and this it is my duty to look after. If Stoneman had not almost destroyed one-half of my serviceable cavalry, I would pitch into him in his camps, and would now if Major General Stahl's cavalry would join me for a few days.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

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[In cipher.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., May 19, 1863.*

Major General J. HOOKER,  
*Commanding Army of the Potomac, Falmouth, Va.:*

Your telegram addressed to me, of the last evening was submitted to the President and also to General Halleck and General Heintzelman. General Halleck reports as follows: There is no other cavalry force about Washington than that of General Stahl, which is now

engaged in scouting duty towards Bull Run mountains, and in picketing Bull Run and Occoquan rivers. If it be removed, there will be no force in front to give notice of enemy's raids on Alexandria or Washington.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

Sent 1 p. m.

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[Received 9.40 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *May 29, 1863.*

His Excellency A. LINCOLN,  
*President of the United States:*

Following taken from enemy's signals to-day:

"Any news from Vicksburg?"

"Captain F."

Answer:

"It is certainly taken, with all its ———."

The last part of the message failed to be read, on account of dust intervening.

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

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[Received 8.40 p. m., May 31.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *May 31, 1863.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War:*

Our officer who crossed under flag of truce to-day brought no newspapers, but says "the latest news reported was a despatch from General Johnston, dated 27th, to the effect that up to that time the federals had been repulsed at every point, with immense slaughter, the dead still unburied, and very offensive."

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

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EXECUTIVE MANSION, *Washington, June 2, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER:

It is said that Philip Margraff, in your army, is under sentence to be shot on Friday, the 5th instant, as a deserter. If this be so, please send me up the record of his case at once.

A. LINCOLN.

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[Telegram.]

FORT MONROE, VA., *June 2, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

I have just received the following despatch from General Peck. Will you please communicate it to General Hooker?

"I have a man who left Richmond last week. He says Pickett's division passed through the day before he left, for Fredericksburg. He had been there and participated in the funeral of Jackson. General Elzey commands in the city. Citizens and soldiers talked of Lee's moving into Maryland, with 85,000 men. Says the most of Longstreet's troops that left Blackwater stopped about Richmond, in consequence of the alarm resulting from the raids. General Ewell made lieutenant general."

JOHN A. DIX, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 8, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Received 9.35 a. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 3, 1863.

His Excellency A. LINCOLN,  
*President of the United States :*

Rebel signals yesterday p. m. say, "Nothing new from Vicksburg."  
DAN'L BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Received 10.55 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 3, 1863.

His Excellency A. LINCOLN,  
*President of the United States :*

We read the following despatches from the enemy's signals to-day :

"JUNE 2.

"To \_\_\_\_\_:

"Report is, General J. has crossed the Big Black, captured Grant's left and centre. Yesterday's papers don't confirm it." [No signature.]

"JUNE 3.

"To Major COLLINS :

"Yankees admit their loss to be five thousand ; ours half that number." [No signature.]

Answer :

"That was the Yankee loss before stated."

"To Captain B\_\_\_\_\_ :

"Grant gives Pemberton three days to surrender. Yankee loss, ten thousand. General. Our army demoralized. Our army will die in the trenches.

"Captain F\_\_\_\_\_."

The above are despatches as we read them. We prefer that no one should know that we read these signals, as the information might get to the enemy, and we should lose our opportunities.

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Received 9.50 a. m., June 4.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 4, 1863.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War :*

It has this moment been reported to me that several of the enemy's camps were removed during last night. Shall be able to determine the direction shortly, if this should be found to be the case.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Telegram.—Received 12 m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 4, 1863.

Major General HALLECK :

Following received from General Buford, June 4 :

"Nothing noteworthy to report yesterday. General Duffie's picket reported enemy crossing in considerable force at Sulphur Springs ; preparations to welcome them, but they did not come. Country and river as high up as Orleans, New Baltimore, and Thoroughfare gap visited yesterday and last night. Nothing was seen or heard.

"JOHN BUFORD, *Brigadier General.*"

The movements of the enemy in our front do not indicate what their purpose or object may be. Has General Dix's forces moved to White House, or beyond there ? His position,

strength, or movement may govern or influence the enemy somewhat. I should like to be fully advised.

J. HOOKER, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

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[Telegram.—Received 1.55 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., June 4, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Falmouth :*

Nothing heard from General Dix for several days. He is directed to inform you of any movement he makes.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

Sent 2.05 p. m.

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[Received 6.20 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 4, 1863.*

His Excellency A. LINCOLN,  
*President of the United States :*

The Richmond Sentinel of June 3 says:

“JACKSON, *June 1.*

“Grant demanded the surrender of Vicksburg on Thursday, giving three days to Pemberton to consider the demand. Pemberton replied that he did not want fifteen minutes, and that his troops would die in the trenches before they would surrender. The federal troops are demoralized, and refused to renew the attack on Saturday. The enemy’s gunboats are firing hot shot at the city. The federal loss is estimated at 25,000 or 30,000, including Generals Kerr, Lay, Burbridge, Bonan, and one other. Port Hudson is invested.”

Nothing in Enquirer of June 4.

DAN’L BUTTERFIELD, *Major, Chief of Staff.*

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[Received 6.20 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 4, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief :*

The following is from one of our scouts :

“I heard from at least three (3) different parties, who I know had the means of obtaining the correct information, that General Jones had come from the Shenandoah valley; that his headquarters were either in Rappahannock or Culpeper, and not very far distant from Culpeper Court House; and that this information was obtained from some of his cavalry, whose houses were in Fauquier, and who had been over to see their friends.”

DAN’L BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

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WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 4, 1863.*

Major General BUTTERFIELD :

The news you send me from the Richmond Sentinel of the 3d must be greatly if not wholly incorrect. The Thursday mentioned was the 28th, and we have despatches here directly from Vicksburg of the 28th, 29th, 30th, and 31st; and while they speak of the siege progressing, they speak of no assault or general fighting whatever; and, in fact, they so speak as to almost exclude the idea that there can have been any since Monday, the 25th, which was not very heavy. Neither do they mention any demand made by Grant upon Pemberton for a surrender. They speak of our troops as being in good health, condition, and spirits. Some of them do say that Banks has Port Hudson invested.

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 7.50 p. m.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *Washington, June 4, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

Let execution of sentences in the cases of Daily, Margraff, and Harrington be respited until further orders from me, they remaining in close custody meanwhile.

A. LINCOLN.

[Received 9.20 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 4, 1863.*His Excellency A. LINCOLN,  
*President of the United States :*

Your despatch directing that the sentences in the cases of Privates Daily, Margraff, and Harrington, 146th New York volunteers, be suspended until further orders from you, has been received.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 5, 1863.*

SIR: I have the honor herewith to transmit a copy of an order I have issued directing Major General Stoneman, at the expiration of his leave of absence, to report to the Adjutant General of the army for instructions.

I am clearly of the opinion that the efficiency of this army will not be promoted by the continued connexion of that officer with it.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*Colonel J. C. KELTON, *Assistant Adjutant General.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 6, 1865.*

Official:

RICHARD D. CUTTS, *Colonel and A. D. C.*SPECIAL ORDERS, }  
No. 153.HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*June 5, 1863.*

[Extract.]

\* \* \* \* \*  
6. At the expiration of the leave of absence granted to Major General George Stoneman for the benefit of his health, by Special Orders, No. 137, current series, from these headquarters, he will report in person to the Adjutant General of the army for further instructions.  
\* \* \* \* \*

By command of Major General HOOKER :

S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

[Received 11.15 a. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 5, 1863—10 a. m.*His Excellency A. LINCOLN,  
*President of the United States :*

Yesterday morning appearances indicated that during the night the enemy had broken up a few of his camps and abandoned them. These changes were observed on the right of his line, in the vicinity of Hamilton Crossing. So far as I was enabled to judge from all my means of information, it was impossible for me to determine satisfactorily whether this movement had been merely a change of camps—the enemy had moved in the direction of Richmond, or up the river—but, taken in connexion with the fact that some deserters came in from the divisions of Hood and Pickett, I conclude that those divisions have been brought to the front from their late positions at Gordonsville and Taylorsville, and that this could be for no other purpose but to enable the enemy to move up the river with a view to the execution of a movement similar to that of Lee's last year. He must either have it in mind to cross the upper Potomac, or to throw his army between mine and Washington. In case I

am correct in my conjectures, to accomplish either he must have been greatly re-enforced; and, if making this movement, the fair presumption is that he has been by the troops from Charleston. Of this I have no evidence further than that furnished me by General Dix, that they had come to Richmond. This morning some more of their camps have disappeared. Their picket line along the river is preserved and as strong as ever. General Buford, with three divisions and ten pieces of artillery, is on the Alexandria and Orange railroad, and yesterday was along the river beyond Sulphur Springs, and reports no enemy. As I am liable to be called on to make a movement with the utmost promptitude, I desire that I may be informed as early as practicable of the views of the government concerning this army. Under instructions from the major general commanding the army, dated January 31, I am instructed to keep in view always the importance of covering Washington and Harper's Ferry, either directly or by so operating as to be able to punish any force of the enemy sent against them. In the event the enemy should move, as I almost anticipate he will, the head of his column will probably be headed towards the Potomac, *via* Gordonsville or Culpeper, while the rear will rest on Fredericksburg. After giving the subject my best reflection, I am of opinion that it is my duty to pitch into his rear, although in so doing the head of his column may reach Warrenton before I can return. Will it be within the spirit of my instructions to do so? In view of these contemplated movements of the enemy, I cannot too forcibly impress upon the mind of his excellency the President the necessity of having one commander for all the troops whose operations can have influence on those of Lee's army. Under the present system all independent commanders are in ignorance of the movements of the others—at least such is my situation.

I trust that I may not be considered in the way of this arrangement, as it is a position I do not desire, and only suggest it as I feel the necessity for concert as well as vigorous action. It is necessary for me to say this much that my motive may not be misunderstood.

JOSEPH HOOKER,

*Major General, Commanding Army of the Potomac.*

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[Telegram.—Received 2 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

June 5, 1863—1.30 p. m.

Major General W. H. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief:*

I respectfully invite your attention to the tri-monthly report of this army for May 31, forwarded to-day to the Adjutant General, in connexion with my letter to you of May 28, enclosing a statement of the two-years and nine-months men with this army.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 11, 1865.

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

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[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

Washington, D. C., June 5, 1863.

Major General HOOKER, *Falmouth:*

Prisoners and deserters brought in here state that Stuart is preparing a column of from fifteen to twenty thousand men, cavalry and artillery, for a raid. They say it will be ready in two or three days.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 3 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 11, 1865.

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[In cipher.]

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 5, 1863.

Major General HOOKER :

Yours of to-day was received an hour ago. So much of professional military skill is requisite to answer it that I have turned the task over to General Halleck. He promises to perform it with his utmost care. I have but one idea which I think worth suggesting to you, and that is, in case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock I would by no means cross to the south of it. If he should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, it would fight in intrenchments, and have you at disadvantage, and so, man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would in some way be getting an advantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over the fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other. If Lee would come to my side of the river I would keep on the same side and fight him, or act on the defence, according as might be my estimate of his strength relatively to my own. But these are mere suggestions, which I desire to be controlled by yourself and General Halleck.

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 4 p. m.

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., June 5, 1863.Major General HOOKER, *Falmouth* :

The President has directed me to reply to your telegram to him of 10 a. m. to-day.

My instructions of January 31, which were then shown to the President, left you entirely free to act as circumstances, in your judgment, might require, with the simple injunction to keep in view the safety of Washington and Harper's Ferry.

In regard to the contingency which you suppose may arise of General Lee's leaving a part of his forces in Fredericksburg, while with the head of his column he moves by Gordonsville or Culpeper towards the Potomac, it seems to me that such an operation would give you great advantages upon his flank to cut him in two and fight his divided forces. Would it not be more advantageous to fight his movable column first, instead of first attacking his intrenchments, with your own forces separated by the Rappahannock? Moreover, you are aware that the troops under General Heintzelman are much less than the number recommended by all the boards for the defences of Washington. Neither this capital nor Harper's Ferry could long hold out against a large force. They must depend for their security very much upon the co-operation of your army. It, therefore, would seem perilous to permit Lee's main force to move upon the Potomac while your army is attacking an intrenched position on the other side of the Rappahannock. Of course, your movements must depend in a great measure upon those made by Lee.

There is another contingency not altogether improbable: that Lee will seek to hold you in check with his main force, while a strong force will be detached for a raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania.

The main force of the enemy in North Carolina have probably come north; but I think all available troops in South Carolina and Georgia have been sent to re-enforce Johnston in Mississippi. Such is the information here.

General Heintzelman and General Dix are instructed to telegraph directly to you all movements which they may ascertain or make. Directions have also been given to forward military information which may be received from General Schenck's command. Any movements you may suggest of troops in these commands will be ordered, if deemed practicable.

Lee will probably move light and rapidly. Your movable force should be prepared to do the same.

The foregoing views are approved by the President.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 4.40 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, April 11, 1865.

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Received 6.45 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 5, 1863.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

The following is a despatch which has been received from Brigadier General Buford, commanding at Warrenton Junction.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[In cipher.]

“WARRENTON JUNCTION, June 5, 1863.

“Colonel ALEXANDER, *A. A. Gen.* :

“I have just received information, which I consider reliable, that all the available cavalry force of the confederacy is in Culpeper county. Stuart, the two Lees, Robertson, Jenkins, and Jones are all there. Robertson came from North Carolina, Jenkins from Kanawha, and Jones from the Valley. Jones arrived at Culpeper after the others on the third. Since the Chancellorsville fight their cavalry has been very much increased from the infantry—eight hundred Texans from Hood’s command have been recently mounted on horses from Richmond. My informant, a refugee from Madison county, says that Stuart has twenty thousand; can’t tell his intentions, but thinks he is going to make a raid.

“JOHN BUFORD, *Brigadier General.*”

[Received 7.06 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 5, 1863.

His Excellency A. LINCOLN, *President of the United States* :

The following taken from the enemy’s signal-flag to-day : “News from Vicksburg encouraging. The enemy repulsed in every attempt to storm the works.” Signature, “Capt. F.”

The following from the Richmond Whig of June 5 : “Jackson, June 3.—The result of the siege of Vicksburg, so far, is very encouraging to our side. The enemy have been repulsed with immense slaughter in every attempt to storm the works. Grant must be compelled to raise the siege in a few days. It is reported that he is returning to Grand Gulf. The storming of the works is looked for in the next forty-eight hours. So reads the despatch.”

The Memphis Bulletin of the 30th claims five thousand prisoners at Young’s Point, and says the news from Vicksburg is not stimulating; that the slaughter on the part of the federals was not as large as reported; that the place is closely invested, and no apprehensions felt for the result at Vicksburg.

DAN’L BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Received 9.45 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 5, 1863.

His Excellency A. LINCOLN, *President of the United States* :

I should very much like to have Captain Moore ordered to this army. Since writing this morning I concluded to make a demonstration on the enemy by throwing a couple of bridges across the river at Franklin’s Crossing, and to learn what the enemy are about. As soon as we got to work they began to assemble in great numbers from all quarters, and the more remote arriving. I took about fifty prisoners and they report that the changes remarked in their camps proceeded from the reorganization of their army, and the assignment of them to their new camps. All of Longstreet’s command are now with Lee, but no part of the Charleston forces. They have no infantry force higher up the Rappahannock than its junction with the Rapidan. Their cavalry is assembled around Culpeper, but the threat to make a crossing may cause them to return. I shall keep my bridges down a few days.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*



WASHINGTON, D. C., June 6, 1863.

Major GENERAL HOOKER, *Falmouth, Virginia* :

Captain C. B. Comstock, corps of engineers, will immediately report to Brigadier General J. G. Barnard for temporary duty at Pittsburg, Pennsylvania.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

[Received 11.45 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 6, 1863.

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

I have received your telegram removing Captain Comstock from this army. His loss will be irreparable to me. I know of no officer in the army of the Potomac the loss of whose services would be of greater detriment to the public good.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding*.

[Received 2.30 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 6, 1863.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

My camp is in more danger of being taken by the women than by rebels. They arrive by steamboat loads. Yesterday was not a good day for them; only eighteen (18) arrived by the steamer John Brooks; of these 15 held passes from the War Department. They may have been forgeries. Can you advise me?

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding*.

[Received 2.55 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington City, D. C., June 6, 1863.Major General HOOKER, *Falmouth* :

I have been trying hard to keep the women out of your camp, but, finding that they were going in troops under passes, as they said, from your provost marshal and commanders, I have given up the job. I think no officer or soldier should have his wife in camp or with the army. In other military districts the order of the department excludes them. If you will order them away, and keep your provost marshal and other officers from issuing passes, not one shall be issued here, and all that profess to come from the department will be forgeries.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

Sent 3.40 p. m.

[Telegram in cipher.—Received 3.30 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 6, 1863—3 p. m.

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

As the accumulation of the heavy rebel force of cavalry about Culpeper may mean mischief, I am determined to break it up in its incipience. I shall send all my cavalry against them, stiffened by about three thousand infantry. It will require until the morning of the ninth (9th) for my forces to gain their positions, and at daylight on that day it is my intention to attack them in their camps. As many of my cavalry are still unserviceable from the effects of Stoneman's raid, I am weak to cope with the numbers of the enemy, if as large as reported. It would add much to my efficiency if some of Stahl's forces could attack and hold the fords at Beverly and Sulphur Springs some time during the forenoon of the ninth (9th.) If this should be done, I desire that the officer in command should not be informed of the object of his march, but merely to hold these fords. It is next to impossible to confine information to its proper limits. I have twenty-five hundred sabres on a reconnoissance in the vicinity of Jefferson to-day. Jones's brigade, which has been hovering around Milroy all winter, numbering sixteen hundred, is among them; also an additional brigade from North Carolina.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, April 11, 1865.

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

## ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

[Telegram.—Received 8.45 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
June 6, 1863—8 p. m.Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

I request that I may be informed whether or not I am to receive assistance in my attack on the rebel forces at Culpeper from any portion of Gen. Heintzelman's forces; and if so, what?

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General*.HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865*.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received at 10 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, June 6, 1863*.Major General HOOKER, *Falmouth*:

I will see that you have an answer early to-morrow to your telegram of this evening to General Halleck, who is in the country just now.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War*.

Sent 10.30 p. m.

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., June 7, 1863*.Major General HOOKER, *Falmouth*:

A considerable portion of Heintzelman's cavalry is out scouting, and cannot be communicated with. Gen. Stahl will co-operate with Gen. Buford as far as he has means.

To prevent delays, please telegraph directly to Gen. Heintzelman, and he will consult me if necessary.

It is impossible to ascertain how much aid can be given to Buford till the cavalry comes in.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 10.30 a. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865*.

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Received 4.30 p. m., June 8.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 8, 1863*.Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War*:

Was not aware that I should so soon be called on to recede from my complaint in regard to female visitors. Miss Chase sends word that she was intending to make a flying visit here to-morrow. I hope the order does not apply to her case; it is more particularly directed to sojourners.

JOSEPH HOOKER,  
*Major General, Commanding*.

[Confidential.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington, D. C., June 9, 1863*.

Major General HOOKER:

I can give a command to General Couch if you can spare him. Please answer immediately.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

Sent 11 a. m.

[Received 12 m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
June 9, 1863—11. 30 a. m.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War*.

I can spare General Couch.

JOSEPH HOOKER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 9, 1863.

Major General HOOKER, *Falmouth*:

The Secretary of War directs that Major General Couch be ordered to immediately report to him in Washington.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 3.15 p. m.

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 9, 1863.

Major General HOOKER:

I am told there are fifty incendiary shells here at the arsenal, made to fit the 100-pounder Parrott gun now with you. If this be true, would you like to have the shells sent to you?

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 3.35 p. m.

[Received 6 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 9, 1863.

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

General Pleasanton reports that after a severe encounter with the rebel cavalry over the Beverly ford, he has not been able to make head against it. He reports that his movement was anticipated.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, April 11, 1865.

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received 6.40 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, 1 p. m., June 9, 1863.

Major General JOHN A. DIX, *Fortress Monroe, Va.*:

We have reliable information that Pickett's division, which was lately at Taylorsville, near Hanover Junction, has come up this way, and gone towards the Rapidan. Hood's division preceded it in the same direction.

We have also reason to believe that the available troops have been withdrawn from Richmond this way, leaving it nearly, if not wholly, unoccupied.

The country between Fredericksburg and Richmond, and below the right flank of Lee's army, which extends only five miles below the city, is open and unoccupied, except by small bodies and a force which has just gone down on account of a false alarm made by us in that direction. The thirtieth Virginia alone is left near Hanover Junction. It is a weak regiment. Our scouts penetrate to Hanover Junction, and we believe the above reliable from previously reported information confirming it, and the character of the scouts.

The movements in your direction have been countermanded, probably, by my demonstrations.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General.*

(Copy to Major General H. W. Halleck, general-in-chief, Washington, D. C.)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, April 11, 1865.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received 9.15 p. m., June 9.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 9, 1863.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

Will General Couch require his aide-de-camp and horses in the discharge of the duties upon which he is going?

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 8 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 10, 1863—8 a. m.

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

Have just received the following despatch from General Pleasonton.

Major General HOOKER.

[In cipher.]

“CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS,  
“Rappahannock Station, June 9, 1863—8 p. m.

“Major General HOOKER :

“A short time after my last despatch to you, General Gregg, with his infantry and artillery, joined me about two miles from the river, to which point I had driven the enemy. He reported that he had encountered a much superior number of the enemy's cavalry and had a severe fight. Also, that a train of cars had been run up to Brandy Station, filled with infantry, who opened on his men. I also received information from letters and official reports captured in the enemy's camp, as well as from prisoners, that the enemy had upwards of twelve thousand cavalry, (which was double our own force of cavalry,) and twenty-five pieces of artillery. I also learned from contrabands and prisoners that a large force of infantry had been sent for from Culpeper, as well as Longstreet's command at Ellis's ford. Having crippled the enemy by desperate fighting, so that he could not follow me, I returned with my command to the north side of the Rappahannock. Gregg's command crossed at Rappahannock bridge. To-morrow morning Stuart was to have started on a raid into Maryland; so captured papers state. Rest satisfied he will not attempt it. Buford had a long and desperate hand-to-hand encounter with the enemy, in which he drove ——— before him handsomely—very superior forces. Over two hundred prisoners were captured, and one battle-flag. The troops are in splendid spirits, and are entitled to the highest praise for their distinguished conduct.

“A. PLEASONTON, *Brigadier General.*

“8.30 p. m.—The infantry under Generals Russell and Ames will move back to Bealton, the cavalry to Warrenton Junction, where I will await further orders. Lee reviewed the whole of Stuart's cavalry yesterday.

“A. PLEASONTON.”

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 12, 1865.

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

[Received 11.40 a. m., June 10.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 10, 1863.

General A. PLEASONTON, *via Bealton* :

I am not so certain as you appear to be that the enemy will abandon his contemplated raid. With this impression, I have felt a little hesitation in withdrawing the infantry. Will you be able to keep him from crossing the river with the cavalry and batteries with you? If not, and you consider that the infantry will be of service in preventing a passage, please have it retained until further orders. I desire that you will send me your opinions on this subject. We shall be able to send up to you a thousand more cavalry to-morrow. There has been great delay in the transmission of despatches.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 5.10 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 10, 1863—2.30 p. m.

His Excellency A. LINCOLN, *President of the United States* :

General Pleasonton, by telegraph, forwarded to the major general commanding the army, this morning, reports that he had an affair with the rebel cavalry yesterday, near Brandy Station, which resulted in crippling him so much that he will have to abandon his contemplated raid to Maryland, which was to have started this morning. I am not so certain that the raid will be abandoned from this cause—it may delay the departure a few days. I shall leave the cavalry, which is all that I have mounted, where they are—near Bealton—with instructions to resist the passage of the river by the enemy's forces. If, to effect this, he should bring up a considerable force of infantry to force a passage, that will so much weaken him in my front that I have good reason to believe that I can throw a sufficient force over the river to compel the enemy to abandon his present position. If it should be the intention to send a heavy column of infantry to accompany the cavalry on the proposed raid, he can leave nothing behind to interpose any serious obstacle to my rapid advance on Richmond.

I am not satisfied of his intention in this respect, but from certain movements in their corps I cannot regard it as altogether improbable. If it should be found to be the case, will it not promote the true interests of the cause for me to march to Richmond at once? From there all the disposable part of this army can be thrown to any threatened point north of the Potomac at short notice; and until they can reach their destination a sufficiency of troops can be collected to check, if not to stop, his invasion. If left to operate from my own judgment, with my present information I do not hesitate to say that I should adopt this course, as being the most speedy and certain mode of giving the rebellion a mortal blow. I desire that you will give it your reflection. At present the enemy have one corps of infantry at Gordonsville, with the advance at Culpeper, with the manifest tendency of other corps to drift in that direction. I now have two bridges across the Rappahannock, ready to spring over the river below Fredericksburg, and it is this, I believe, that causes the enemy to hesitate in moving forward. Major General Dix informs me that he intends moving two columns up James river to-morrow, but if organized to correspond in number to the troops as they have of late been posted, neither column will be successful—the one on the north side of the river will be too small, and on the south side, with his whole column, I question if Richmond can be taken at all, provided two or three thousand men could be assembled to defend it. The columns should unite at City Point, or below, and move on the north side of the river. From information which I deem reliable the only troops remaining in Richmond are the provost guard—1,500—and all the troops between here and there are brought well to the front. It would be of incalculable service to this army to be transferred to some more remote point from Washington and Alexandria.

The stampedes gotten in towns, gotten, no doubt, by people in the rebel interest, have their influence on my men, for many of them have no means of knowing whether they are with or without cause. They think there must be some fire where there is so much smoke.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[In cipher.]

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 10, 1863.

Major General HOOKER:

Your long despatch of to-day is just received. If left to me, I would not go south of the Rappahannock upon Lee's moving north of it. If you had Richmond invested to-day you would not be able to take it in twenty days; meanwhile your communications, and with them your army, would be ruined. I think Lee's army, and not Richmond, is your true objective point. If he comes towards the upper Potomac, follow on his flank, and on the inside track, shortening your lines while he lengthens his. Fight him, too, when opportunity offers. If he stays where he is, fret him and fret him.

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 6.40 p. m.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, D. C., June 11, 1863.

Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac* :

The President has just referred to me your telegram, and his reply of yesterday, with directions to say to you whether or not I agree with him. I do so fully.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 12.40 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 11, 1865.

Official:

C. D. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Received 9.35 p. m., June 11.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 11, 1863.*

General PLEASANTON, *Warrenton Junction:*

Our information is that Colonels S. Hampton and Williams, of Hampton's brigade, were killed; Colonels Butler and Harmon and General W. Lee wounded, day before yesterday.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Received 10.30 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*June 11, 1863—9.30 p. m.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

I have just been reliably informed that Pettigrew's and Durnell's brigades, from North Carolina, are in Heath's division, near Hamilton crossing. I have no information concerning the residue of the forces drawn from North Carolina. A. P. Hill's corps is on the right, opposite to Franklin's crossing. Ewell is in rear of Fredericksburg, and Longstreet's corps and the cavalry are at Culpeper. I have to-day despatched the 3d corps to picket the river from Meade's right, at Kelly's ford, to Beverly ford, in order to relieve the cavalry in aid of Pleasanton, who is looking after the district of country from Beverly to Sulphur Springs. Pleasanton is weak in cavalry, compared with the enemy.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 12, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 8.40 a. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*June 12, 1863—7 a. m.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

It is reported from the balloon that several new rebel camps have made their appearance this morning. There can be no doubt but that the enemy has been greatly re-enforced.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 12, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received 8.45 a. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*June 12, 1863—8.30 a. m.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

General Pleasanton, without additional cavalry, I fear will not be able to prevent the rebel cavalry from turning his right. I have not been able to ascertain his precise strength, but know that it is near seventy-five hundred, while that of the enemy is certainly not less than ten thousand. He now pickets beyond Sulphur Springs. He will, however, do the best he can. If he should be turned, you will perceive that I shall be constrained to abandon the Aquia creek line of operations.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 12, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., June 12, 1863.*Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac:*

There is no possibility of sending you more cavalry. Horses will be sent as fast as they can be procured.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 1.30 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Received 1.40 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 12, 1863.*Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

Learning that the enemy had massed his cavalry near Culpeper, for the purpose of a raid, I despatched General Pleasonton to attack him on his own ground. General Pleasonton crossed the Rappahannock on the 9th at Beverly's and Kelly's fords, attacked the enemy, and drove him three miles, capturing over two hundred prisoners and one battle-flag. This, in the face of vastly superior numbers, was only accomplished by hard and desperate fighting by our cavalry, for which they deserve much credit. Their morale is splendid. They made many hand-to-hand combats, always driving the enemy before them.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[In cipher.]

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *Washington, June 12, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

If you can show me a trial of the incendiary shells on Saturday night, I will try to join you at 5 p. m. that day.

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 2 p. m.

[Answer.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 12, 1863.*Major General DIX, *Fortress Monroe, Virginia:*

All of Lee's army, so far as I know, is extended along the immediate banks of the Rappahannock from Hamilton's crossing to Culpeper. A. P. Hill's corps is on his right, below Fredericksburg; Ewell's corps joins his left, reaching to the Rapidan, and beyond that river is Longstreet's corps, with not less than ten thousand cavalry under Stuart. These bodies have been very much swollen in numbers of late, the enemy's divisions corresponding with our corps. Several brigades of D. H. Hill's army in North Carolina are now with Lee. From my balloon it can be seen that he is daily receiving acquisitions. He has a numerical superiority over me. For several days past Lee has been at Culpeper.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 7 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*June 12, 1863—6.20 p. m.*His Excellency A. LINCOLN, *President U. S.:*

If I am not very much mistaken, I shall be constrained to move my army on to the Alexandria and Orange railroad before that time. I have three (3) corps near there at this time. I presume that General Halleck showed you my despatch of this morning. Also, please see copy of my despatch to General Dix of to day.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Telegram.—Received 7.10 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC, *June 12, 1863.*Major General STAHL, *Fairfax Court-House:*

It is important that the country beyond Bull Run mountains and towards New Baltimore, Salem, Middleville, &c., should be thoroughly scouted and watched. Can you send us any news from them? Please keep me informed of all you have by telegraph, and General Pleasonton at Warrenton Junction. What force is there at Manassas Junction?

JOSEPH HOOKER.

(Copies to Major Generals Halleck and Heintzelman.)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 12, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

FAIRFAX COURT HOUSE, *June 12, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

In reply to your telegram of 7.10 this p. m., I would respectfully state that I have scouting parties in the following directions, viz: One to scout beyond the Bull Run mountains to New Baltimore, Salem, Middleburg, Upperville, and the surrounding country; another to Drainsville, Leesburg, and from there to the Blue ridge; a third I sent to the Shenandoah valley, which has crossed at Front Royal, and arrived at Winchester a few days ago, the report of which last mentioned party I communicated personally to General Pleasonton. This force I expect will return here by to-night or to-morrow morning.

As soon as I receive any information from any of these parties, I shall take pleasure in communicating it to you, as well as any other information which I may obtain. Up to the latest information there is no enemy this side of the Blue ridge, excepting White's and Moseby's guerillas. I have about six hundred men at present at Kettle run, and infantry is at Manassas Junction and Bristow.

Respectfully,

JUL. STAHL, *Major General.*

(Copies to Generals Halleck and Heintzelman.)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 12, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

*June 13, 1863—9 a. m.*General REYNOLDS, *Bealton:*

Following from Stahl: "No enemy this side of Blue ridge, excepting White's and Moseby's guerillas. I have about six hundred (600) men at present at Kettle run, and infantry is at Manassas Junction and Bristow."

I send three aids to-day.

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Received 10.45 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 13, 1863.*General PLEASONTON, *Warrenton Junction:*

Ascertain speedily which road troops passing through Culpeper took—Sperryville, Madison, or Chester gap. Can you push a light reconnaissance or scout to Sperryville?

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*



[In cipher.]

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *Washington, June 13, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

I was coming down this afternoon ; but if you would prefer I should not, I shall blame you if you do not tell me so.

A. LINCOLN.

[Telegram.—Received in cipher 7.45 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*June 13, 1863—7 p. m.*Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

All my sources of information confirm the statement that Longstreet's and Ewell's corps have passed through Culpeper to Sperryville towards the valley. The instructions of the President, approved by yourself, and your original letter of instructions, compel me, in view of this movement of the enemy, to transfer the operations of this army from the line of the Aquia creek to the Alexandria and Orange railroad. Accordingly, directions have been given for the first, third, fifth, and eleventh corps to rendezvous at Manassas Junction with the cavalry. The second, sixth, and twelfth, with the reserve artillery, after covering the withdrawal of government property from depots, have been directed to march to Dumfries, and from thence to be governed by the movements of the enemy, the object being to bring the two wings together as far in advance on that line as the movements of the enemy will justify. The corps will be withdrawn from their positions to-night, the line being held by pickets until proper time arrives for their withdrawal.

To-morrow afternoon my headquarters will be at Dumfries.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 12, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

DUMFRIES, *June 14, 1863—5 p. m.*

Major General HALLECK :

At 3 o'clock p. m. Major General Hancock informs me that the rebel troops opposite Franklin crossing are moving up the river on the plank road in a continuous column. Major General Hancock covers the withdrawal of the forces and property at that point. No effort has been made to force the passage of the Rappahannock, except at Banks's ford.

Major General JOSEPH HOOKER.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 12, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[In cipher.]

WASHINGTON, *June 14, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

Do you consider it possible that fifteen thousand of Ewell's men can now be at Winchester?

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 1.14 p. m.

[Received 5.40 p. m., June 14.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

*Dumfries, June 14, 1863—5.30 p. m.*HON. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War*:

Have received despatch from General Milroy dated yesterday. Will act on it as soon as I can hear from the column on the Alexandria and Orange railroad. Instructions were given for Thoroughfare gap to be taken possession of and held by my cavalry last night. If the enemy should be making for Maryland, I will make the best dispositions to come up with him in my power. You may rely upon his being in great force wherever he is.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 14, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

So far as we can make out here, the enemy have Milroy surrounded at Winchester and Tyler at Martinsburg. If they could hold out a few days, could you help them? If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg and the tail of it on the plank road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere: could you not break him?

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 5.50 p. m.

[Received 9 p. m., June 14.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

*Dumfries, June 14, 1863—8.30 p. m.*His Excellency A. LINCOLN, *President United States*:

I have reason to believe that Longstreet's and the greater part of Ewell's corps marched from Culpeper, on the Sperryville road, on Sunday last, and that a column which occupied four hours in passing followed on Thursday. If this were true the head of the column has had time to reach Winchester, and if it is a movement for invasion, it is a fair presumption to conclude that the bulk of his cavalry is with him. The enemy has in this column, at least, between seventy and eighty thousand men. A. P. Hill's corps of about thirty thousand is still on the south side of the Rappahannock, and General Hancock has just informed me that present appearances indicate that he intends to force the passage of the river in the morning; his troops have all been halted at and below Banks's ford. My trains are this side of Stafford Court House, and the public property, I am informed, will be removed from Aquia to-morrow, the sick to-night. The 1st corps is at Kettle run, the 2d on the Rappahannock, the 3d and 5th at Catlett's Station, the 6th at Potomac creek, the 11th at Centreville, and the 12th at Dumfries. To-night the 2d will probably withdraw, the 1st march to Manassas, and the 6th to Stafford Court House during the night.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, Md., *June 14, 1863.*Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

My orders to Generals Milroy and Kelly have been to get everything possible to Maryland heights, but I have nothing from Milroy later than 11 p. m. last night, his telegraphic communication being interrupted. The enemy appear to have pushed on impetuously to the westward of him, approaching Martinsburg. General Tyler is there directing, with a view to get all to Harper's Ferry, but it is not yet known whether the reported approach to Martinsburg is in force.

R. C. SCHENCK, *Major General.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 12, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 11.30 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Dumfries, June 14, 1863—11.15 p. m.*

His Excellency the PRESIDENT :

Has anything further been heard from Winchester? Will the President allow me to inquire if it is his opinion that Winchester is surrounded by the rebel forces?

I make this inquiry for the reason that General Trimble was recently assigned in orders to the command of that district, and it is not known what command he had, unless his old, which had Louisiana regiments in it, and it was Jackson's, now Ewell's corps. I do not feel like making a move for an enemy unless I be satisfied as to his whereabouts. To proceed to Winchester, and have him make his appearance elsewhere, would subject me to ridicule. With this feeling, unless otherwise directed, I feel it my duty to proceed to execute the movement indicated yesterday. I will not, however, issue my orders of march until the last moment, in the hope that further information may be received.

Major General HOOKER.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 12, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, June 14, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Dumfries :*

No doubt is entertained here that Milroy is surrounded at Winchester, and so closely invested that no scout or other information has been had from him later than eleven o'clock Saturday night. Tyler was also surrounded to-day at Winchester. Jenkins was there and demanded the surrender of the place. Heavy firing was heard in that vicinity until seven o'clock and then ceased. The telegraphic communication was broken at the same time, and nothing is known here of the result. The report here is that Ewell's force is at Winchester. This comes from Milroy by the last despatch sent by him Saturday night to General Schenck.

Your despatch has been sent to the President, who will probably reply soon.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

Sent 12 midnight.

[In cipher.]

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *Washington, June 14, 1863—11.55 p. m.*

Major General HOOKER :

Yours of 11 30 just received. You have nearly all the elements for forming an opinion whether Winchester is surrounded that I have. I really fear, almost believe, it is. No communication has been had with it during the day, either at Martinsburg or Harper's Ferry. At seven p. m. we also lost communication with Martinsburg. The enemy had also appeared there some hours before. At nine p. m. Harper's Ferry said the enemy was reported at Berryville and Smithfield. If I could know that Longstreet and Ewell moved in that direction so long ago as you stated in your last, then I should feel sure that Winchester is strongly invested. It is quite certain that a considerable force of the enemy is thereabout, and I fear it is an overwhelming one compared with Milroy's. I am unable to give any more certain opinion.

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 12.30 a. m., June 15.

[Received 7.45 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Dumfries, June 15, 1863—7 a. m.*

General REYNOLDS, *Warrenton Junction :*

General headquarters to-night Fairfax Station. Twelfth corps ordered to camp to-night at Fairfax Court House. Their trains moving there now from Occoquan crossing. Sixth

## ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

and second corps trains moving there *via* Wolf Run shoals. Reserve artillery ditto. Headquarters train moves *via* Occoquan. Pontoon bridge there. Anything to report this morning?

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Received 8.10 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Dumfries, June 15, 1863—8 a. m.*

HON. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War:*

I receive many despatches from General Pleasonton. I wish them all known to the proper authorities at Washington. Is it necessary for me to copy them all by telegraph again, or are copies retained there? If not so, I would like to have it done.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 8.30 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *Dumfries, June 15, 1863.*

General REYNOLDS, *Warrenton, Manassas, or Centreville:*

General directs all corps and cavalry must fill up trains with supplies, and three days in haversacks, ready for any order. General Ingalls says forage from Captain Ferguson, Alexandria. Colonel Clarke will be at Fairfax Station to-night. General desires this done to-day if practicable. Retain two corps at Manassas if more easily supplied.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Telegram.—Received 9.15 a. m.]

DUMFRIES, *June 15, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK:

The first, third, sixth, and eleventh corps, with the cavalry, will be assembled at Manassas and Centreville to-night. They have instructions to replenish their forage and rations, which I trust they will be able to do to-day. The second corps will be at Dumfries, the sixth at Wolf Run shoals, and the twelfth at Fairfax Court House to-night. Major General Hancock reports that the rebel forces about Fredericksburg have moved in the direction of Culpeper this morning. To-night my headquarters will be at Fairfax Station. If your information of the upper Potomac should be of a character to justify a movement in that direction, I request that I may be informed of it at the earliest possible moment.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 12, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., June 15, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac:*

No information of enemy in direction of Winchester and Harper's Ferry as late as that from General Pleasonton. The forces at Martinsburg are arriving at Harper's Ferry.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 12.52 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., June 15, 1863.*Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac:*

Garrison of Martinsburg has arrived at Harper's Ferry. Milroy did not obey orders given on the 11th to abandon Winchester, and probably has been, or will be, captured. Harper's Ferry ought to hold out some time. Pleasonton's telegrams to you contain all the information we have of enemy's movements. They are very contradictory. Your army is entirely free to operate as you desire against Lee's army, so long as you keep his main army from Washington. It is believed that Longstreet and Stuart are crossing the Potomac above and below Harper's Ferry. They certainly should be pursued. The force used for that purpose must depend upon your information of the movements or position of the remainder of Lee's army. Leesburg seems about the best point to move on first. The information sent here by General Pleasonton is very unsatisfactory. His suggestion to send batteries from here to the mouth of the Monocacy cannot be adopted. If we had them to send they would only be lost.

Sent 2 p. m.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Official:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., June 15, 1863.*Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac:*

General Meigs is apprehensive that you have not allowed time enough to withdraw materials from Aquia creek. Please prevent such wanton and wasteful destruction of public property as took place when Burnside withdrew from there last year.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 4.05 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

DUMFRIES, *June 15, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK:

Two of our best scouts returned from the interior above Fredericksburg yesterday, Sunday morning. They report A. P. Hill, with sixty guns and 20,000 men, left on the height about Fredericksburg on Saturday p. m. Four thousand of this force marched towards Culpeper. On the same day General Lee's headquarters were on the Lacey farm, between Brandy Station and Culpeper Court House. Citizens say that the cavalry expedition was intended for Alexandria, while Lee was to go up the valley. They believe that a great cavalry raid is now given up, as the cavalry is divided, a considerable part being still near Brandy Station. The passage of the infantry is traced across the Hazel river. The Richmond papers of the 13th blame Stuart much for allowing himself to be surprised in his camp by Pleasonton, and call upon him to do something to retrieve his reputation. Anxiety expressed concerning the movements on the Peninsula. Will send the papers to you.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General and Chief of Staff.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 12, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

## ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

[Télegram.]

BALTIMORE, MD., June 15, 1863.

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

Nothing from General Milroy since 11 p. m. Saturday. Is it not possible to have a cavalry movement in the front as a diversion in his favor?

R. C. SCHENCK, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 12, 1865.

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 7.30 p. m.]

FAIRFAX STATION, June 15, 1863.

Major General HALLECK:

I have a brigade at Aquia, and ordered them to hold it. I apprehend no danger there.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 12, 1865.

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington City, June 15, 1863—8½ p. m.

Major General HOOKER, *Fairfax Station*:

The facts are now known here that Winchester and Martinsburg were both besieged yesterday. The troops from Martinsburg have got into Harper's Ferry without loss. Those from Winchester are also in, having lost, in killed, wounded, and missing, about one-third of their number. Of course, the enemy holds both places, and I think the report is authentic that he is crossing the Potomac at Williamsburg. We have not heard of his yet appearing at Harper's Ferry, or on the river anywhere below. I would like to hear from you.

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 9.15 p. m.

[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, June 15, 1863—9.15 p. m.

Major General H. W. HALLECK:

Have not yet received report from Milroy. General Kelly, here on his way, *via* Har risburg, to New creek, says before he left Harper's Ferry, at 1 this p. m., about two thousand of Milroy's men had arrived. The rebels appeared before Winchester in four divisions, commanded by Ewell, Evans, Early, and Rhodes, numbering 40,000. Milroy fought until two this morning, when he determined to evacuate and cut his way out. Spiking his guns and destroying stores, he marched some distance before his movements were discovered. He was then pursued and attacked six miles from Winchester, and was shelled for several miles. His loss is probably two thousand men, but that may be exaggerated. Will send, as soon as received, further and more exact reports.

R. C. SCHENCK, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 12, 1865.

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND, June 15, 1863.

General HALLECK :

General Milroy has cut his way through, and arrived at Harper's Ferry. His losses reported considerable, with great damage to the enemy. He will telegraph soon. Tyler brought troops from Martinsburg to Maryland heights, and is in command there. Have sent Kelly around to New creek to concentrate troops on western portion of railroad. Ordered Averell to concentrate at Gratton, with a view to covering approaches to Wheeling, and to come eastward, perhaps also to New creek, to hold as much as possible of the railroad eastward towards Martinsburg.

R. C. SCHENCK, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 12, 1865.

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 1.15 a. m., 16th.]

FAIRFAX STATION, June 15, 1863.

His Excellency the PRESIDENT :

I have received your despatch of this evening. The army of the Potomac is in this vicinity, excepting the 2d and 6th corps, and, as they are marching in rear of all the trains, they will not be up before some time during to-morrow. Perhaps the 2d corps will not be here until some time to-morrow night. The 1st and 11th corps were first to arrive on this line, but I have not yet learned whether they have drawn their supplies in readiness to march to-morrow morning or not. As soon as they are provided, they, as well as the others, will be put *en route*. I have been informed that the enemy nowhere crossed the Rappahannock on our withdrawal from it. But General Hill's troops moved up the river in the direction of Culpeper this morning, for the purpose of, I conclude, re-enforcing Longstreet and Ewell, wherever they may be. I request that I may be informed what troops there are at Harper's Ferry, and who is in command of them, and also who is in command in this district.

Major General HOOKER.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 13, 1865.

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 8.35 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
Fairfax Station, June 16, 1863.

His Excellency President LINCOLN :

It appears to me, from General Couch's despatch of last night, received this a. m., that nearly all the cavalry of the army of the Potomac should at once be sent into Maryland by the most direct route. General Stahl has an abundance to perform all cavalry duty that will be required south of the Potomac. I merely make this suggestion. If any considerable body of the enemy's infantry should be thrown across the Potomac, they will probably take the direction of his advance pickets, and, in that event, it seems to me that a heavy column of ours should be thrown as speedily as possible to cross the river at Harper's Ferry, while another should be thrown over the most direct line covering Baltimore and Philadelphia. I only speak with reference to this army, as I know nothing of the location or numbers of troops at the disposal of the government elsewhere.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 12, 1865.

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 16, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

Your despatches of last night and this morning are just received. I shall have General Halleck to answer them carefully. Meanwhile, I can only say that, as I understand, Heintzelman commands here in this District; that what troops, or very nearly what number, are at Harper's Ferry I do not know, though I do know that Tyler is in command there. Your idea to send your cavalry to this side of the river may be right—probably is; still, it pains me a little that it looks like defensive merely, and seems to abandon the fair chance now presented of breaking the enemy's long and necessarily slim line, stretched now from the Rappahannock to Pennsylvania.

A. LINCOLN.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 13, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., June 16, 1863.*Major General HOOKER, *Fairfax Station :*

I do not think there is reliable information that the enemy has crossed the Potomac in any force. Where his main corps are is still uncertain, and I know of no way to ascertain except through your cavalry, which should be kept near enough to the enemy to at least be able to tell where he is. My suggestion of yesterday, to follow the enemy's advance, by moving a considerable force first to Leesburg, and thence as circumstances may require, is the best one I can make.

Unless your army is kept near enough to the enemy to ascertain his movements, yours must be in the dark, or on mere conjecture.

Tyler is in command at Harper's Ferry, with, it is said, only 9,000 men; but, according to the returns of the 11th, he should have at least 13,600. Heintzelman, as you must be aware, commands this department. Besides the divisions of Abercrombie and Stahl, near you, he has little or no movable troops. Telegraph direct to him in all matters connected with the use of his troops.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 11.30 a. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, Md., *June 16, 1863—1.30 p. m.*Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief :*

The attack on Harper's Ferry is about commencing. I fear Tyler cannot hold out long, even on Maryland heights, without speedy aid. General Kelly's official report appears to have been strangely erroneous. Tyler reports total effective force at Harper's Ferry and on the heights 4,680. Can you promise any re-enforcements? If so, when?

R. C. SCHENCK, *Major General.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 12, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*



[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., June 16, 1863.

Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac* :

There is now no doubt that the enemy is surrounding Harper's Ferry, but in what force I have no information. General Schenck says our force there is much less than before reported, and cannot hold out very long. He wishes to know when he may expect relief. He can hope for none except from your army.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 3.50 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 11, 1865.

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Received 4.50 p. m., June 16.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
Fairfax Station, June 16, 1863—4 p. m.

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

Just received your telegraph. Please inform me whether our forces at Harper's Ferry are in the town or on the heights, and if the latter, whether we hold Bolivar, Loudon, or Maryland heights, and which, if any. What bridges at Harper's Ferry, and where ; from what direction is the enemy making his attack ? I suppose that it is a couple of long marches from here for troops without trains, but this, of course, will depend upon the position of the enemy.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding*.

[Telegram.—Received 7 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
Fairfax Station, June 16, 1863.

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

In compliance with your directions, I shall march to the relief of Harper's Ferry. I put my column again in motion at 3 a. m. to-morrow. I expect to reach there in two days, and if possible earlier. The partial rest of to-day was not lost, being necessary to recruit from forced and heavy marches, and fill up supplies. My headquarters at Farrell Station to-morrow night.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 12, 1865.

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., June 16, 1863.

Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac* :

Information of enemy's actual position and force in front of Harper's Ferry is as indefinite as that in your front. Nearly everything is conjecture. The only position of enemy mentioned is Hallstown. The bridges across both rivers at Harper's Ferry are believed to be intact, and most of Tyler's troops on Maryland heights. Loudon heights are not fortified, but swept by Maryland batteries. Your questions have been sent to Tyler, and his answer will be forwarded as soon as received. Any troops you can send to his relief should be in motion.

A few of the enemy have shown themselves at Poolesville and Point of Rocks. No definite information of his movements from any place.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 8.20 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

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[Telegram.—Received 9.50 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 16, 1863.*

His Excellency the PRESIDENT :

My orders are out to march at 3 o'clock to-morrow morning. It will be likely to be one of vigor and power. I am prepared to move without communication with any place for ten days. I hope to reach my objective point before the arrival of Hill's corps, should it be moving in that direction. If I do not know this fact now, I will shortly. But of information to the north of the Potomac I really have nothing. I wish that it might be made the duty of some person in the telegraph office in Washington to keep me informed of the enemy's movements in Maryland.

Major General HOOKER.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 12, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

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[Telegram]

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *Washington, D. C., June 16, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

To remove all misunderstanding, I now place you in the strict military relation to General Halleck of a commander of one of the armies to the general-in-chief of all the armies. I have not intended differently; but as it seems to be differently understood, I shall direct him to give you orders, and you to obey them.

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 10 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

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WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 16, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac :*

I have given no directions for your army to move to Harper's Ferry. I have advised the movement of a force sufficiently strong to meet Longstreet, on Leesburg, to ascertain where the enemy is, and then move to the relief of Harper's Ferry, or elsewhere, as circumstances might, require. With the remainder of your force in proper position to support this, I want you to push out your cavalry to ascertain something definite about the enemy. You are in command of the army of the Potomac, and will make the particular dispositions as you deem proper. I shall only indicate the objects to be aimed at.

We have no positive information of any large forces against Harper's Ferry, and it cannot be known whether it will be necessary to go there till you can feel the enemy and ascertain his whereabouts.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 10.15 p. m.

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[Received 10.45 p. m., June 16.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 16, 1863.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War :*

If General Cadwallader has gone to Pennsylvania, please request him to send me information of the rebel movement to the south of here; also, please have the newspapers announce that I am moving on to the James river line. I will mask my real movement in these parts.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, June 16, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Fairfax:*

General Cadwallader has not gone to Pennsylvania, but is here waiting for orders. You shall be kept posted upon all information received here as to enemy's movements, but must exercise your own judgment as to its credibility. The very demon of lying seems to be about these times, and generals will have to be broke for ignorance before they will take the trouble to find out the truth of reports.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

Sent 10 a. m. 17th.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Fairfax Station, June 17, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK, *Commanding, &c.:*

Your despatch of 10 p. m. received by me at 1 a. m. Will make the disposition of my forces to comply with the objects aimed at in your despatch.

The advices heretofore received by telegraph from Washington have stated successively that Martinsburg and Winchester were invested and surrounded; that Harper's Ferry was closely invested, with urgent calls upon me for relief; that the enemy were advancing in three columns through Pennsylvania, and had driven in General Couch's pickets. Now I am informed, in substance, that General Schenck thinks it all arises from one of his wagon trains; that General Tyler, at Harper's Ferry, whose urgent calls, as represented to me, required under my instructions rapid movements in this direction, seems to think that he is in no danger.

Directions have been given for my cavalry to make a reconnoissance in the direction of Winchester and Harper's Ferry, for the purpose of ascertaining the whereabouts and strength of the enemy, and, while this is being done, some of the infantry corps will be advanced by easy marches.

As soon as the intentions of the enemy are known to me, I shall be able to advance with rapidity.

Telegraph operator just reports to me that Harper's Ferry is abandoned by our forces. Is this true?

My headquarters will be at Fairfax Station to-night.

I should very much like to have reliable and correct information concerning the enemy on the north side of the Potomac.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, April 6, 1865.*

Official:

RICHARD D. CUTTS, *Colonel and A. D. C.*

[Received 9.30 a. m.]

WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 17, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER:

Mr. Eckert, superintendent in the telegraph office, assures me that he has sent, and will send you, everything that comes to the office.

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 9.37 a. m.

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., June 17, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac:*

No reliable information of rebel movements in Maryland. All telegrams received here of importance are immediately sent to you.

All telegrams from you or to you are subject to the hourly inspection of the Secretary

of War and the President. No important instructions have or will be sent to you without their knowledge.

It is important that the department be kept advised of all your movements—not in detail, but their general character. Also send all information you get of the enemy's movements and position.

Sent 11.40 a. m.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Official :

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., June 17, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac :*

I regret equally with you that reports from north side of the Potomac are so unreliable and contradictory, but they are given to you as received. What is meant by abandoning Harper's Ferry is merely that General Tyler has concentrated his forces in the fortifications on Maryland heights.

No enemy in any force has been seen below Harper's Ferry north of the river, and it is hoped that Tyler's cavalry may get something reliable above. So far we have had only the wild rumors of panic-stricken people.

Sent 2.10 p. m.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Official :

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.—Received 4 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Fairfax Station, June 17, 1863—3 p. m.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief :*

Advice of the abandonment of Harper's Ferry rendering forced marches unnecessary to relieve it, this army will be in position as follows to-night :

One corps at Drainsville, one corps at Guilford Station, one corps on Goose creek, near Trappe Rock ; one corps at Gum springs, one corps at Centreville, one corps at Sangster Station, one corps at Fairfax Station. Headquarters at Fairfax Station to-night. Cavalry feeling up through Aldie towards Winchester.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

Official :

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 13, 1865.*

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 17, 1863.*

Captain C. N. TURNBULL, *Georgetown :*

The general commanding directs that you have your pontoons and appurtenances at the mouth of the Monocacy to-morrow evening. Two regiments of infantry and a cavalry force will be there. General Benham, when last heard from, was at the navy yard, Washington.

S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., June 17, 1863.*Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac:*

My telegram of this morning has informed you what is meant by the abandonment of Harper's Ferry—a mere change of position. It changes in no respect the objects you are to keep in view.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 7.45 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Received 8.20 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 17, 1863.*General RUFUS INGALLS, *221 Pennsylvania avenue:*

Try and hunt up somebody from Pennsylvania who knows something, and has a cool enough head to judge what is the actual state of affairs there with regard to the enemy. Seven or eight thousand men are reported at Williamsport. Couch reports his pickets driven in; enemy reported to have appeared at Poolesville and everywhere else in Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Western Virginia. Cavalry enough is reported to have appeared to fill up the whole of Pennsylvania, and left no room for the inhabitants. Since we were not allowed to cross and whip A. P. Hill, while Longstreet and Ewell were moving off through Culpeper and Sperryville, we have lost that opportunity of doing a thing which we knew to a certainty we could accomplish. My impression is now that there is not a rebel, except scouts, this side of the Shenandoah valley; that Lee is in as much uncertainty as to our whereabouts and what we are doing as we are to his; that his movement on the upper Potomac is a cover for a cavalry raid on the north side of the river, and a movement of his troops further west where he can turn up at some weak spot. Our signal despatches about gunboats, fleets, transports, troops landing at Urbana, Rappahannock; making junction with Dix, disabled transports to go to Fortress Monroe, pontoon bridges to Port Royal, and column to march down the neck, which we kept up systematically for a week or so to occupy their signal officers, may have fooled them into the belief, together with Dix's movements, that we were going to cross the Rappahannock down there, and he may be trotting back some of his force. Our scouts to-night will be in Fredericksburg, Culpeper, Warrenton, Salem, and one on the way in from Richmond. These sent up to western Maryland cannot get there before to-morrow night. We cannot go bogging round until we know what we are going after. Get any news you can that you know is definite and reliable and bring out with you. Will they cashier any of these people that send in such stampeding reports? Bring me out a haversack or satchel for carrying maps on the march.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Telegram.—Received 10.35 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 17, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK :

I am in constant receipt of copies of despatches from General Couch with regard to enemy at Chambersburg. Is there, in your opinion, any foundation for the reports? All my cavalry are out, and I have deemed it prudent to suspend any further advance of the infantry till I have information that the enemy are in force in the Shenandoah valley. I have just received a despatch from Pleasonton, dated 4.15 p. m. He ran against Fitzhugh Lee's brigade of cavalry near Aldie, and from prisoners learned that Stuart is at Middleburg; and it is further reported that there is no infantry this side of the Blue Ridge. When the orderly left, Pleasonton had charged and driven Lee out of Aldie. All my cavalry are out. Has it ever suggested itself to you that this cavalry raid may be a cover to Lee's re-enforcing Bragg or moving troops to the west?

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 13, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 7.51 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 18, 1863.*

General HALLECK :

At my last advices from Pleasonton he had captured eight officers and the greater portion of two squadrons of Fitzhugh Lee's brigade of Stuart's cavalry and driven them out of Aldie. My instructions to him were to find out what was behind them. At 1 a. m. we received advices that looked as though White, with 400 cavalry, was at Point of Rocks. The 12th corps were immediately ordered to Leesburg, and to hold it and the fords of the Potomac in that vicinity. I ought to have a large cavalry force and two regiments of infantry at the mouth of the Monocacy last night. Having no means of telegraphic communication there, I am unadvised as to their arrival, and unable to give them orders by telegraph. A bridge, sufficient to cross the Potomac, is also to be at that point by noon to-day.

JOSEPH HOOKER.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 13, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 10 a. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 18, 1863.*

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief :*

Prisoners from Pleasonton's fight, nine officers and sixty-six men, now on the way to this camp. Advices received of arrival of my cavalry and pontoons at mouth of Monocacy. Sixth corps moved up to Germantown. I would request that signal officers be established at Crampton's pass and South mountain. They can see the whole country north of the Potomac, and telegraph movements of any column. If my advices of to-day make it advisable, I shall seize and hold those passes. It may be necessary to use General Schenck's troops for that purpose.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received 10 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 18, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief :*

I would request that Major Haller, 7th infantry, be ordered to report to this army without delay.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 10.20 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 18, 1863.*

COMMANDING OFFICER, *Mouth of Monocacy :*

Seize and hold Nolan's and Hawling's fords. General Slocum's corps may be in that vicinity to-day, this side of the Potomac.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Received 10.45 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 18, 1863—10.20 a. m.

GOBRIGHT, *Agent Associated Press, Washington* :

Please have the following despatch telegraphed confidentially to the editors throughout the country.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff*.

GENTLEMEN : I have particularly to request that the following rules may be observed in publishing anything concerning this army or its movements :

1. Under no circumstances should be published the location of any corps, division, brigade, or regiment, and especially the location of my headquarters never to be named, except during a fight.

2. That official reports, when furnished without the sanction of the War Department, may never be published. After any fight the reporters can open their fire as loudly as they please ; but avoid, unless it be a general battle, giving the designations of forces engaged. Require all reporters' signatures to their published letters. These rules being observed, any facility possible will be given to the reporters and newspapers in this army, including the license to abuse or criticise me to their hearts' content.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General*.

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[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., June 18, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac* :

I can get no information of enemy than that sent to you. Rumors from Pennsylvania are too confused and contradictory to be relied on. Officers and citizens are on a big stampede. They are asking me why don't General Hooker tell where Lee's army is—he is nearest to it? There are numerous suppositions and theories, but all is yet mere conjecture. I only hope for positive information from your front.

General Heintzelman has a signal line to Sugar Loaf mountain, and is directed to send you all the information he obtains. General Kelly is observing the passes west of the Shenandoah, and will give you, through General Schenck, all information he can get. He is very reliable.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 11 a. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

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[Telegram.—Received 11.20 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 18, 1863—10.15 a. m.

Major General HALLECK :

I have to request that Brigadier General Pleasonton, for his gallant conduct at Chancellorsville, his services there, his attack and surprise of Stuart's force, superior in numbers, on the Rappahannock, June 9, may be made major general, and assigned to command the cavalry corps.

J. HOOKER, *Major General*.

(Copy to President and Secretary of War.)

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 12.35 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., June 18, 1863.Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac*:

Your telegram for a signal station at Crampton's Pass and South mountain has been sent to Colonel Myer, with directions to carry out your wishes, if he has the means. General Schenck has been notified that you will have control of any of his forces who are within the sphere of your operations. If you want anything of General Schenck or General Heintzelman, telegraph to them direct. Copies of such telegrams are always retained at the War Department, for the information of the government.

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H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 1 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, *June 18, 1863—1 p. m.*H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

I have kept General Tyler instructed to have cavalry patrols constantly on the Potomac, from Harper's Ferry down to mouth of the Monocacy, but I have no infantry to guard the fords or ferries.

R. C. SCHENCK, *Major General*.HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 8, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

SANDY HOOK, *June 18—10 p. m.*

Major General HOOKER:

I have information that I deem reliable that Rhodes and his division were in Williamsport yesterday, the 17th instant. I have a pass signed by him at that time, and countersigned to-day by Jones, at Sharpsburg. Three regiments belonging to Jones's division, and about one hundred cavalry, passed over the ford, about one mile below Shepardstown, at four o'clock to-day; there was no artillery with them. I have reason to suppose that before these men passed the ford to-day Jones had three regiments and some cavalry about three-quarters of a mile from Sharpsburg, on the road towards Antietam. To-day Jones is building a bridge over the canal, so as to cross right from the ford. This looks like preparation for the cavalry retrograde by-and-by, and I think it probable Ewell may fall back on the Winchester line; at all events it looks like it. This moment the signal officer reports camp-fires in the direction of Williamsport. This bridge is significant. He cannot use it now, as his troops have already passed. It is represented to be constructed with very heavy sills, and he was hauling plank to cover it with. My impression is that Jones means to hold this position until he sees if Ewell will require it in any retrograde he may make. In other words, I think Jones is remaining here to cover Ewell's possible retreat. Will investigate to-morrow.

D. TYLER, *Brigadier General*.HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 8, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*



[Received 10.05 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
June 19, 1863.

Major General HEINTZELMAN :

General Hooker desires that you will advise him as soon as possible the position, number, and character of your troops, exclusive of the artillery and garrisons for the defences.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,  
Major General, Chief of Staff.

[Telegram.—Received 12 m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 19, 1863.

Major General HALLECK :

I have just been furnished with an extract from the New York Herald of yesterday, concerning the late movements of this army. So long as the newspapers continue to give publicity to our movements we must not expect to gain any advantage over our adversaries. Is there no way of stopping it? I can suppress the circulation of this paper within my lines, but I cannot prevent their reading it to the enemy. We could well afford to give millions of money for like information of the enemy.

JOSEPH HOOKER, Major General.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 8, 1865.

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

[Telegram.—Received 12.55 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, D. C., June 19, 1863.

Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac* :

I appreciate as fully as yourself the injury resulting from newspaper publications of the movements, numbers, and position of our troops; but I see no way of preventing it so long as reporters are permitted in our camps. I expelled them all from our lines in Mississippi. Every general must decide for himself what persons he will permit in his camps.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 1.55 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 11, 1865.

Official :

D. C. WAGER, Major, A. A. G.

[Telegram.—Received 2.10 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 19, 1863.

Major General HALLECK :

Do you give credit to the reported movements of the enemy, as stated in the Chronicle of this morning?

J. HOOKER, Major General.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 8, 1865.

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., June 19, 1863.*Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac* :

I do not know to what particular statement in the Chronicle you refer. There are several which are contradictory. It now looks very much as if Lee had been trying to draw your right across the Potomac, so as to attack your left. But of that it is impossible to judge till we know where Lee's army is. No large body has appeared either in Maryland or Western Virginia.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 3.55 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Received 4 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 19, 1863.*Major General SLOCUM, *Leesburg* :

Do you know of any troops (enemy) in your vicinity? Have you heard of any of Longstreet's troops in Union during the week past? Is your position a strong one?

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Received 4.05 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 19, 1863—4 p. m.*Colonel J. C. KELTON, *Assistant Adjutant General* :

The stragglers and others, army Potomac, should be sent to Fairfax station to-night.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Received 8.40 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 19, 1863.*General TYLER, *Harper's Ferry* :

General Hooker desires to know how long you can hold your position if attacked by 30,000 men; also, if you are satisfied in your own mind that Ewell's corps has crossed the Potomac and is now in Maryland

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Telegram.—Received 9 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 19, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK :

Reports just received from General Pleasanton, at Aldie, state General Gregg been fighting nearly all day; driven the enemy through Middleburg, in the direction of Upperville. Has sent in between fifty and sixty prisoners, one a lieutenant colonel, and a number of officers of less rank, all from North Carolina. The force encountered was Robertson's brigade North Carolina troops, supported by two other brigades, all under command of Stuart. Considerable loss inflicted upon the enemy. My corps are to-night as follows: 12th, (Slocum's,) Leesburg; 11th, (Howard's,) on Goose creek, four miles from Leesburg, towards Aldie; the 5th, (Meade's,) at Aldie; 1st, (Reynolds's,) at Herndon Station and vicinity, on Loudon and Hampshire railroad; 3d, (Birney's,) at Gum Springs; 2d, (Han-

cock's.) at Centreville; 6th, (Sedgwick's,) at Germantown. Pleasonton rests his cavalry at Aldie to-night. Notwithstanding despatch sent me by General Tyler, at Williamsport, his delay in my front has caused me to doubt his intention of throwing over any considerable force on Maryland shore. It is the impression of General Pleasonton that his infantry are still on opposite side of Blue Ridge, and that it is his intention to attack in this direction.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 9, 1865*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 19, 1863.*

GENERAL: Officers and soldiers joining your army have for several days received directions to proceed to Fairfax Station. Shall the military governor continue to direct them to the same points?

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

Major General HOOKER, *Commanding, &c.*

Sent 10.15 p. m.

[Received 10.30 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 20, 1863.*

JOHN C. BABCOCK, *Frederick, Md:*

Employ and send persons on to the heights of South mountain to overlook the valley beyond, and see if the enemy have camps there; direct them to avoid the roads, and employ only such persons as can look upon a body of armed men without being frightened out of their senses; tell me whether it is infantry, cavalry, or artillery they have seen. If they take a position in the forest they can even count them, as they pass on the road, with impunity; send me no information but that which you know to be authentic. It is necessary for me to know if the enemy has any considerable number of his forces on the north side of the Potomac. Be vigilant and active; use money and it shall be returned to you.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, *June 20, 1863.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK :

Following just received from Frederick :

“FREDERICK, *June 20.*

“Major General SCHENCK :

“Rebels are within sight of the town.

“Lieut. UPSON.”

R. C. SCHENCK, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 9, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, *June 20, 1863—4.30.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

By telegraph this moment from Harrisburg I learn that Major General Couch is directing General Milroy, and wishes me to give him no orders without its passing through his head-

quarters ; I had ordered General Milroy, when I sent him after his men in that department, to confer with or report to General Couch.

ROBT. C. SCHENCK, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, *June 20, 1863—6.30.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

Following just received from New Creek :

“To Lt. Col. DENN. PIATT :

“A German, formerly my groom, left Williamsport Thursday and reports that General Rhodes was encamped on the Virginia side opposite that place with twenty thousand (20,000) troops ; that General Jenkins, with his force, was at Hagerstown, and that large numbers of horses were being brought in from Pennsylvania. This is unquestionably reliable except as to number of Rhodes’s forces.

“B. F. KELLY, *Brigadier General.*”

DENN. PIATT, *Lt. Col. and Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 10.40 p. m.]

BALTIMORE, MD., *June 20, 1863—9.40 p. m.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief :*

As it is now certain that the enemy has advanced to Monocacy, and his scouts were this afternoon within seven miles of Westminster, still nearer, I suggest that Couch’s forces at Harrisburg may be more needed here than there. The rebel cavalry, it appears, have entirely left Chambersburg and fallen back to Hagerstown. It is important, if possible, to keep open the Northern Central railroad.

R. C. SCHENCK, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 9, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received 10.20 a. m., June 21.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 21, 1863.*

General D. TYLER, *Sandy Hook :*

Our cavalry attacked Stuart in the vicinity of Aldie this morning ; you will probably hear the firing.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Received 2 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 21, 1863.*

S. WILKESON, *Correspondent Times :*

For the purpose of contradicting erroneous reports and giving quiet to the public mind, the following facts are authorized to be stated :

There has been no engagement whatever up to this date involving any portion of General Hooker’s army, except the cavalry. Cavalry skirmishes, fights, and reconnoissances are

taking place daily, with the advantage uniformly with our forces. Two hundred and fifty prisoners have arrived at headquarters, taken within the last three days. The alarm existing at the north during the past few days is utterly without cause. No enemy is on or near the old Bull Run battle-field, and the panic-stricken report of the appearance of Hill's rebel force, *via* Dumfries, is equally false.

L. L. CROUNSE.

P. S.—I get permission to send this on condition that you furnish it to all the papers. Don't fail.

CROUNSE.

Approved:

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 21, 4 p. m., 1863.

Major General HOOKER:

Operator at Leesburg just now tells us that firing commenced about 7 this morning in direction from him of Aldie's gap and Middleburg; has continued all day, and has receded from him, and is apparently now about White Plains. Was very heavy this morning, but lighter now.

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 4.20 p. m.

[Received 5.30 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

June 21, 1863—5 p. m.

His Excellency the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

Pleasanton's cavalry and two brigades of Meade's infantry were directed to attack Stuart's cavalry this morning. The fight commenced about seven o'clock, and for several hours raged with great violence. As the sound receded from us I conclude that the enemy were whipped, and I feel confident that our forces are now driving them across the Blue Ridge, perhaps at Snicker's gap. All the passes in the Blue Ridge, so far as I know, are stoutly held by the enemy, but I was in hopes that Pleasanton would be able to push his adversary so closely as to cross the mountain in their company. This cavalry force has hitherto prevented me from obtaining satisfactory information as to the whereabouts of the enemy; they have masked all of their movements. I have not yet received a word from the front since the beginning of the fight; from this I conclude the space between me and them has been lengthened since morning. The cavalry and all the troops are in-glorious spirits; the former have achieved wonders in the last few days.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 22, 1863—9 a. m.

Major General HOOKER:

Operator at Leesburg just now says: "I heard very little this a. m., about daylight, but it seems to have stopped now. It was in about same direction of yesterday, but further off."

A. LINCOLN.

Sent 9.20 a. m.

[Telegram.—Received 10.30 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

June 22, 1863—10.30 p. m.

Major General HALLECK:

The following report has this moment been received from General Pleasanton.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General.*

"HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS CAMP,

"Near Upperville, June 21—5.30 p. m.

"GENERAL: I moved with my command this morning to Middleburg, and had the assistance of General Barnes's division in the operations of the day. I left two of General Barnes's

brigades at Middleburg to hold the town, and with my corps and Colonel Vincent's brigade attacked the cavalry force of the rebels under Stuart, and steadily drove him all day, inflicting a heavy loss at every step. I drove him through Upperville into Ashby's gap, and assured myself that the enemy had no infantry force in Loudon valley. We took two (2) pieces of artillery, one (1) being a Blakely gun, and three (3) caissons, besides blowing up one; also upwards of sixty (60) prisoners, and more are coming in; a lieutenant colonel, major, and five other officers, besides a wounded colonel and a large number of wounded rebels left in the town of Upperville. They left their dead and wounded upon the field of the former; I saw upwards of twenty (20.) We also took a large number of carbines, pistols and sabres; in fact, it was a most disastrous day to the rebel cavalry. Our loss has been very small, both in men and horses. I never saw the troops behave better, or under more difficult circumstances. Very many charges were made, and the sabre used freely, but always with great advantage to us. Ewell's corps went towards Winchester last Wednesday, Longstreet on Friday, and another corps, I think A. P. Hill's, is to move with Longstreet into Maryland. Such is the information given by the negroes here. I have not been able to send to the top of the Blue Ridge, and Stuart has the gap covered by heavy Blakely and ten-pound Parrotts. I shall return to-morrow to Aldie. My command has been fighting almost constantly for four (4) days, and must have a day or two rest to shoe up and get things in order.

“A. PLEASANTON, *Brigadier General*.

“Brigadier General S. WILLIAMS.”

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 9, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

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[Received 10.50 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 22, 1863.*

His Excellency the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

My latest advices from General Pleasanton dated 4.30 p. m. the 21st. At that time he had driven the rebel cavalry through Upperville, capturing some of his artillery and still pursuing. Appearances favorable.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

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[Telegram.]

HARRISBURG, PA., *June 22, 1863.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

Rebel cavalry have crossed South mountain and are at Millerstown; seem to be moving east, but not north.

D. N. COUCH, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 9, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

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[Received 12.10 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 22, 1863.*

Generals ABERCROMBIE, SLOCUM, Leesburg; HOWE, Bristow; CRAWFORD, Upton's Hill; FRENCH, Gainesville; TYLER, Sandy Hook; Captains McKEE, Monocacy, TURNBULL, Edwards's Ferry:

General Pleasanton reports he attacked the enemy's cavalry under Stuart yesterday; he was assisted by Barnes's division of 5th corps; drove him steadily all day through Upperville into Ashby's gap, and inflicted heavy loss upon them at every step; captured a large number of small-arms, sabres, &c.; two pieces of artillery, one a Blakely gun, three caissons, and exploded one, a number of prisoners, and a large number of wounded left in Upperville; enemy left dead and wounded on the field; our loss small; a disastrous day to the rebel cavalry; many charges made and the sabre used freely with great advantage to us. Please inform the commanders in your vicinity of the above, and let it be made known to the troops.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Telegram.—Received 3.15 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., June 22, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac* :

In order to give compactness to the command of troops in the field covering Washington and Baltimore, it is proposed to place that part of the middle department east of Cumberland, now commanded by General Schenck, under your direct orders. The President directs me to ask you if that arrangement would be agreeable.

Please answer as early as possible.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 3.40 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

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[Telegram.—Received 4.45 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 22, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK :

Your telegram of 3.15 p. m. to-day is received. In reply, I have to state, Yes, provided that the same authority is continued to me that I now have, which is to give orders direct to the troops in the departments of Generals Schenck and Heintzelman.

J. HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 9, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

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[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., June 22, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac* :

Orders will be issued placing all that part of the 8th corps and of the middle department east of Cumberland under your immediate orders. The department of Washington will continue as heretofore, your orders being given direct to General Heintzelman, he reporting them to headquarters before executing them where they conflict with his special instructions.

Affairs in middle department are represented as unsatisfactory. I go immediately to Baltimore to ascertain their condition.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

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[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, *June 23, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

The following despatch has just been received by Mr. Smith, master transportation Baltimore and Ohio railroad, from a gentleman at Monocacy who is reported as reliable.

ROBERT C. SCHENCK, *Major General.*

"Rebel pickets, one east South Mountain house, on South mountain; rebels reported in large force; infantry and artillery in Hagerstown and vicinity, and are reported moving in direction of Pennsylvania, which I think is correct.

"GEORGE R. DENNISON."

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 9, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 23, 1863.*

Major General BUTTERFIELD:

Please send word to General Stahl to return with his command to Fairfax Court House to-night.

Major General HOOKER.

Sent 1.40 p. m.

[Received 6.50 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 23, 1863—6.15 p. m.*

Major General SLOCUM, *Leesburg:*

General Reynolds reports a column of dust on Snicker's gap and Leesburg turnpike.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 24, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

The aspect of the enemy is not much changed from yesterday. Ewell, I conclude, is over the river, and is now up the country, I suppose for purposes of plunder. The yeomanry of that district should be able to check any extended advance of that column and protect themselves from their aggression.

Of the troops that marched to the river at Shepardstown yesterday, I cannot learn that any have crossed, and as soon as I do I shall commence moving myself, and, indeed, am preparing my new acquisitions for that event; the others are ready.

General French is now on his way to Harper's Ferry, and I have given directions for the force at Poolesville to march and report to him, and also for all of Stahl's cavalry; and if I can do it without attracting observation, I shall send over a corps or two from here, in order, if possible, to sever Ewell from the balance of the rebel army in case he should make a protracted sojourn with his Pennsylvania neighbors.

If the enemy should conclude not to throw any additional force over the river, I desire to make Washington secure, and, with all the force I can muster, strike for his line of retreat in the direction of Richmond.

I cannot learn the strength of Heintzelman's and Schenck's commands, nor where they are stationed, and hence I send my chief of staff to Washington and Baltimore to ascertain, and also to start out a column of about 15,000 men on the national road as far as Frederick city. In any contingency, whether of an advance or retreat of the enemy, the defence of Washington or Baltimore, this amount of force should be there, and they should be held in readiness to march, which fact I will not be able to know until I put them on the road.

I will send the best officers I have to command this body. I desire that instructions may be given Generals Heintzelman and Schenck to direct their command to obey promptly any orders they may receive from me. Last evening the colonel commanding at Poolesville responded to his orders to march, that he did not belong to my command, but would refer his orders to General Heintzelman. Such delays may bring us reverses. When these instructions are given I shall not be necessitated to repeat orders to any part of my command to march on the enemy. Allow me to suggest that the new troops arriving in Baltimore and Washington be at once put in the defences, and the old ones, except those serving with the artillery, be put in marching condition. If this should be done quickly I think that we may anticipate glorious results from the recent movement of the enemy, whether he should determine to advance or retreat. I request that my orders be sent me to-day, for outside of the army of the Potomac I don't know whether I am standing on my head or feet.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 6, 1865.*

Official:

RICHARD D. CUTTS, *Col. and A. D. C.*



[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., June 24, 1863.Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac*:

General Schenck has been notified that the troops of his department in Harper's Ferry and vicinity would obey all orders direct from you, and that he would obey your orders in regard to the other troops of his command. They, however, are nearly all militia.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 2.30 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 11, 1865.

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, June 24, 1863—3.40 p. m.

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

The following despatch has just been received from the officer in command of the block-houses at Monocacy:

My scouts are in; have been through Middletown; report no rebels this side of Boonsboro. Large bodies of men of all arms are moving north through Hagerstown. The Mercersburg school are here to take the train. They report Ewell and Hill passed through Hagerstown yesterday.

ROBERT C. SCHENCK, *Major General, Commanding*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 9, 1865.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

SANDY HOOK, MD., June 24, 1863.

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

Have just captured some cavalry near Centreville, or Keedysville, as it is called here, and one of General Lee's couriers, who left him at Berryville at six o'clock yesterday evening, with orders for General Ewell, who is at Hagerstown. He says he delivered his orders to another courier, who took them to Ewell. He says Longstreet's corps is with Lee at Berryville, this side of Winchester.

DANIEL TYLER, *Brigadier General*.

(Copy sent to General Hooker.)

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 9, 1865.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

MARYLAND HEIGHTS, June 24, 1863—11 a. m.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

A careful examination of seven men, one of them a courier from Lee to Ewell, captured last night, seems to establish clearly as follows: That Ewell's entire corps has passed forward towards Hagerstown; that Lee was at Berryville on Monday, now with Longstreet's corps, following the march of Ewell's corps; that Hill's corps is at Fredericksburg; Lee left Fredericksburg sixth of June and reached Longstreet's corps, at Berryville, the eighteenth, and was there when the courier left on the twenty-second. Longstreet's corps is represented to have thirty thousand men and thirty guns, two or three drawn by ten horses. Lee passed from Fredericksburg by Culpeper, where he remained five days, by Aldie, and through Ashby's gap.

DANIEL TYLER, *Brigadier General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 9, 1865.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

MARYLAND HEIGHTS, June 24, 1863.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

The following just received from signal station: The wagon train that was near Shepherdstown last night is now crossing the river near Sharpsburg. A large train, extending as far as I can see on the Berryville road, is passing through Charlestown towards Shepherdstown. I see artillery with it. I am satisfied this is Longstreet's corps, and that it is following Ewell. I am also satisfied that Lee was at Berryville yesterday at 4 p. m.

DANIEL TYLER, *Brigadier General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 9, 1865.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

[Telegram.]

MARYLAND HEIGHTS, June 24, 1863.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

Longstreet's corps, which camped last between Berryville and Charlestown, is to-day in motion, and before six o'clock this morning commenced crossing by the ford one mile below Shepherdstown to Sharpsburg. I have reports from reliable parties that at least fifteen thousand men have crossed the ford this morning, mostly infantry and artillery. The troops are halted at Sharpsburg, and the wagon trains at ten o'clock were crossing.

DAN'L TYLER, *Brigadier General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 9, 1865.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

[Telegram.]

HARRISBURG, June 24, 1863—4 p. m.

Major General HALLECK:

I am of the opinion that not less than ten thousand (10,000) rebel infantry, cavalry, and artillery are between Shippensburg and Greencastle.

D. N. COUCH, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 9, 1865.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

[Telegram.]

MARYLAND HEIGHTS, June 24, 1863.

Major General HALLECK:

Mr. Benj. Brown tells me he left Hagerstown at 8 o'clock this morning. He says Jenkins came to Hagerstown on the 15th at 4 o'clock p. m., with about two thousand mounted men, and on the same day Ewell, with twelve thousand men and sixteen pieces of artillery, arrived in Williamsport; Jenkins went down the valley, and returned Saturday evening to Hagerstown, with about one thousand head of cattle and as many horses. On Monday, the 22d, Jenkins and Ewell started down the valley towards Chambersburg. On Tuesday, yesterday, Johnston's division, about twenty-two thousand men, arrived in Hagerstown and passed on to join Ewell. On Sunday I saw General Ewell go into the Catholic church.

Johnston has forty-three pieces of artillery. I passed six regiments at Sharpsburg as I came down. They passed on towards Boonsboro'. The men told me they were a part of Longstreet's corps, which were coming on.

I consider the reports reliable.

D. TYLER, *Brigadier General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 9, 1865.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

[Received 10 a. m., in cipher.]

BALTIMORE, June 25, 1863.

Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac* :

The thirty guns, spoken of in my letter, should be thirty-three—consisting of twenty siege guns, and thirteen light; the number effective, that French will find, will not vary much from number in letter. Perkins takes you.

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Telegram.—Received 11 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
June 25, 1863.

Major General HALLECK :

Subjoined is a despatch this moment received. It speaks for itself. I request that General Slough be arrested at once, and charges will be forwarded as soon as I have time to prepare them. You will find, I fear, when it is too late, that the effort to preserve department lines will be fatal to the cause of the country.

Major General HOOKER.

UPTON'S HILL, June 25, 1863.

General BUTTERFIELD :

A despatch has been received during the night from General Slough, military governor of Alexandria, informing me that the commanding officer of the 2d brigade P. R. corps has been instructed by him not to recognize the orders sent to him to prepare to join the division, as directed in your despatch of June 23.

S. W. CRAWFORD,  
*B. G., Commanding Division.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 10, 1865.

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received 11 a. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
June 25, 1863—11 a. m.

Major General BUTTERFIELD, *Baltimore* :

The small body of troops you speak of will be of more bother than use, in my opinion. You had better abandon all hope of getting assistance from that quarter. There are good reasons why you should return to-night.

JOSEPH HOOKER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C.*, June 25, 1863.Major General HOOKER, *Army of Potomac* :

The immense loss and destruction of horses in your army, and the difficulty of supplying this loss, render it necessary that you should impress every serviceable animal likely to fall into the hands of the enemy. There are many animals in Loudon county and the adjacent part of Maryland. These should be seized to save them from the enemy, as well as to supply yourself.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 11 a. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 11, 1865.

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., June 25, 1863.*Major General SCHENCK, *Baltimore* :

Under general orders in force it is the duty of military commanders to take possession of such military supplies as are likely to fall into the hands of the enemy, or which may be necessary for the immediate wants of our own troops in the field of actual hostilities.

All horses and beef cattle in such exposed regions should be removed or taken possession of, and converted to the government uses. Staff officers should be sent out with sufficient escorts to seize and remove all horses suited for cavalry, artillery, or wagon teams, giving receipts, stating the character of the animal and the service to which it is suited.

Where not required for immediate use when taken, they should be sent into the nearest depot and turned over to the depot quartermaster and commissary.

If possible, a quartermaster and commissary, or an officer acting in those capacities, should accompany every expedition.

The vicinity of railroads in our possession should not be disturbed, unless in immediate danger from approaching raids.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Copies to be sent to Major Generals Couch and Brooks and Brigadier General Kelly.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Received 11.45 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 25, 1863.*Major General SLOCUM, *Leesburg* :

Please have word sent at once to Major General Stahl that after leaving a sufficient escort for General French to report with his cavalry to Major General Reynolds. General Stahl crossed the river this morning near Edwards's ferry, on his way to Harper's Ferry, and General Reynolds is on the way to cross. General Reynolds has been assigned to the command of the 1st, 3d, and 11th corps; also, inform General French, at Harper's Ferry, if practicable.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 12 m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 25, 1863.*Major General REYNOLDS, *Edwards's Ferry* :

Directions have been given for General Stahl to report to you with his command. Please send him in advance in the direction of Frederick and Gettysburg, and drive from that country every rebel in it. His operations must extend from the South mountain to the east as far as he finds rebels; to report to you as often as necessary to a full knowledge of the enemy's movements.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 12.10 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 25, 1863.*

Major General DIX :

One of our men came from Richmond June 9th, highly intelligent and trusty. Force on the Blackwater one brigade and one battery, not to exceed twenty-five hundred, under General Jenkins, of North Carolina; the battery is at Blackwater bridge; no other artillery in that direction; two regiments at Drury's bluff. In Richmond nothing but city battalion; about four hundred at Camp Lee, near Richmond; generally one regiment in transit; nothing else nearer than the forces in North Carolina, which do not exceed five thousand men, under

General French. General Elsey at Richmond; General D. H. Hill at Petersburg; Tredegar Iron works making two thousand carbines, two thousand Richmond rifles, and one thousand revolvers per month; also large cannon and mortars. At Petersburg four long thirty-two pounders and several smaller brass pieces in position, but not provided with artillerymen. Forces from Charleston and Savannah gone west. Beauregard is massing troops at Tullahoma to act in concert with Jo. Johnston.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

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[Received 1.30 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
June 25, 1863.

Major General REYNOLDS, *Edwards's Ferry:*

Your telegram is just received. Will be at Poolesville at nine (9) a. m. to-morrow. Your instructions should have reached you long ago. Please direct General Howard to have every led animal in his train, except officers' horses, sent to the rear, and shall not accompany the column.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

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[Telegram.]

MARYLAND HEIGHTS, June 25, 1863.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

Two intelligent sergeants from the ninth Alabama regiment have just come in; they say they belong to A. P. Hill's corps, and that it is all on the Maryland side of the Potomac. They say Longstreet's corps is between Charlestown and Berryville, coming on.

The officers and men captured yesterday, and these rebels, will be sent to Baltimore to-day.

DANIEL TYLER, *Brigadier General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 10, 1865.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

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[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., June 25, 1863.

Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac:*

The 2d brigade, to which you refer in your telegram, forms no part of General Crawford's command, which was placed at your orders. No other troops can be withdrawn from the defences of Washington.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 2 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 11, 1865.

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

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[Received 5.10 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
June 25, 1863.

General BUTTERFIELD:

It seems to me that the best point for Lockwood to await orders is at Monocacy railroad bridge. With regard to the batteries, I have this morning ordered into Washington fourteen, having

more batteries than I have infantry to guard them. I have had artillery for two hundred thousand men, and have but seventy-five thousand at all reliable. In my opinion Milroy's men will fight better under a soldier. I have telegraphed General Halleck for men until I will do so no longer.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

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[Received 6.35 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
June 25, 1863.

[Orders.]

General SLOCUM, *Commanding 12th Army Corps, Leesburg:*

The 12th corps will march at 3 a. m. to-morrow, leaving a sufficient force to hold Leesburg until the 5th corps comes up; will cross the upper bridge at Edwards's ferry, the Monocacy at its mouth, and proceed up the Potomac as far as Tramelstown, Point of Rocks, and then to Middletown, unless otherwise ordered. The detachment that remains behind will rejoin the corps on the arrival of the 5th corps at Leesburg. The 5th corps will march at four (4) a. m., crossing Goose creek at Carter's mill, thence to Leesburg, crossing the Potomac at the upper bridge at Edwards's ferry, and the Monocacy at its mouth, and follow the river road in the direction of Frederick city; general headquarters at Poolesville to-morrow night. Please acknowledge.

By command of Major General Hooker:

S. WILLIAMS, *A. A. G.*

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[Received 6.40 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
June 25, 1863.

[Orders.]

General R. O. TYLER, *Commanding Artillery Reserve, Edwards's Ferry:*

The 5th corps, Aldie, will march at 4 a. m. to-morrow, crossing Goose creek at Carter's mill, thence to Leesburg, crossing the Potomac at the upper bridge at Edwards's ferry, and the Monocacy at its mouth, and follow the river road in the direction of Frederick city. The reserve artillery will cross on the lower bridge at Edwards's ferry, and follow the 5th corps. Please acknowledge.

By command of Major General Hooker:

S. WILLIAMS, *A. A. G.*

---

[Received 7.25 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
June 25, 1863.

[Orders.]

General J. F. REYNOLDS, *Poolesville:*

The following movements of troops will take place to-morrow, the 26th instant, viz:

1. The 12th corps, Leesburg, will march at 3 a. m. to-morrow, leaving a sufficient force to hold Leesburg until the 5th corps comes up; will cross the upper bridge at Edwards's ferry, and the Monocacy at its mouth, and proceed up the Potomac as far as Tramelstown, Point of Rocks, and then to Middletown, unless otherwise ordered. The detachment that remains behind will rejoin the corps on the arrival of the 5th corps at Leesburg.

2. The 5th corps, Aldie, will march at 4 a. m., crossing Goose creek at Carter's mill; thence to Leesburg, crossing the Potomac at the upper bridge at Edwards's ferry, and the Monocacy at its mouth, and follow the river road in the direction of Frederick city. The reserve artillery will cross on the lower bridge at Edwards's ferry, and follow the 5th corps.

3. Headquarters will leave at 3 a. m. via Hunter's mill to Poolesville, where the camp will be to-morrow.

4. The 2d corps, Gum spring, will march at 6 a. m. to-morrow, via Farmwell, Farmwell Station, and Frankville, cross on the lower bridge at Edwards's ferry, and take the road crossing the Monocacy a little below Frederick city.

5. The 6th corps, Centreville and Fairfax, will march at 3 a. m. via Chantilly church, Frying Pan, Herndon Station, and Drainesville, to Edwards's ferry, and after covering the withdrawal of the bridges, will follow the 2d corps.

6. The cavalry corps will cover the movement till all the trains have crossed the Potomac, when one division will be thrown forward to Middletown. Please acknowledge.

By command of Major General Hooker :

S. WILLIAMS, A. A. G.

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[Received 7.25 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
June 25, 1863—5.30 p. m.

Major General FRENCH, *Harper's Ferry* :

Please order your men to have three days' rations cooked and kept on hand for the present, supplied with ammunition, prepared to march at a moment's notice. I have not heard a word from your post to-day. If there should be any considerable force remaining there I should like to make a dash at them. By feeling, if not without, you can find out if they are there, or that they continue to cross. I should like to learn this to-morrow. My headquarters will be at Poolesville 9 o'clock a. m. to-morrow.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

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[Received 8 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 25, 1863.

Brigadier General TYLER, *Maryland Heights* :

Despatch of 6 p. m. just received. Please tell me why you suppose the rebels are taking the route to Emmettsburg.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding.*

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[Received 3 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
June 26, 1863—2.30 p. m.

Major General SCHENCK, *Baltimore* :

Major General French has been assigned to the command of the troops at Harper's Ferry. In compliance with your request he has been instructed to order General Tyler to report to you the moment we can dispense with his services.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

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[Received 5.40 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Poolesville, Md., June 26, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

I respectfully request that Major Duane and Captain Mendell, engineers, may be directed to report to me at once for duty. I understand both these officers are in Washington.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General Commanding.*

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[Telegram.—Received 7.50 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
June 26, 1863—7 p. m.

Major General HALLECK :

Is there any reason why Maryland heights should not be abandoned, after the public stores any property are removed?

## ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

I proposed to visit the place to-morrow, on my way to Frederick, to satisfy myself on that point. It must be borne in mind that I am here with a force inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, and must have every available man to use on the field.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General*.

Official copy :

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 8, 1865.*

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

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[Telegram.—Received 8.45 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*June 26, 1863—8.15 p. m.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

I desire every facility to be in readiness for supplies to be thrown to Frederick by rail.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General*.

Official copy :

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 8, 1865.*

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

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[Received 9.10 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*June 26, 1863—8 p. m.*

His Excellency A. LINCOLN, *President United States* :

You need not believe any more than you choose of what is published in the associated press despatch, concerning this army, to-morrow. Was it from the newspapers that you received a report that I was in Washington last night?

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding*.

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[Received 9.15 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*June 26, 1863—8 p. m.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

I would respectfully request that Major General Stahl may be ordered by telegraph to report to General Couch, with a view to organizing and putting in an efficient condition any mounted troops that can be raised for service there. His presence here as senior major general will much embarrass me and retard my movements.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding*.

---

[Received 9.15 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*June 26, 1863—8 p. m.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

I would respectfully request that Captain Wesley Merritt, 2d cavalry, be made a brigadier general for distinguished services at Beverly ford and Upperville, June 21. It is of importance for the good of the service that this appointment should be made at once, that his services may be had as a brigade commander in the cavalry.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General, Commanding*.



[Telegram.]

HARRISBURG, PA., *June 26, 1863.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War*, or  
General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

I presume Gettysburg is occupied by the rebels.

D. N. COUCH, *Major General.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Sent 8 a. m.]

WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 27, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER :

It did not come from the newspapers, nor did I believe it ; but I wished to be entirely sure it was a falsehood.

A. LINCOLN.

[Received 8.20 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 27, 1863.*

GENERAL-IN-CHIEF and WAR DEPARTMENT :

General Hooker, personally, has just left here for Harper's Ferry, where he will be about eleven o'clock, Point of Rocks about ten a. m., and at Frederick to-night. Copies of all despatches should be sent to Frederick and Harper's Ferry up to eleven a. m., and after that to Frederick. The staff are just leaving here for Frederick.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Telegram.—Received 9 a. m., 27, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *Poolesville, Md., June 27, 1863.*Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

That there may be no misunderstanding as to my force, I would respectfully state that, including the portions of General Heintzelman's command and General Schenck's, now with me, my whole force of enlisted men for duty will not exceed one hundred and five thousand (105,000.) Fourteen batteries of the artillery reserve have been sent to Washington. Of General Abercrombie's force, one brigade has just been sent home from expiration of service, and the others go shortly. One brigade of General Crawford's force has not reported with it.

I state these facts that there may not be expected of me more than I have material to do with.

My headquarters at Frederick to-night. Three corps at Middletown, one corps at Knoxville, two at Frederick, and the remaining infantry corps very near there to-night.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General.*

(Copy for President.)

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., June 27, 1863.*General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac:*

\* \* \* \* \*

Maryland heights have always been regarded as an important point to be held by us, and much expense and labor incurred in fortifying them. I cannot approve their abandonment except in case of absolute necessity.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 10.30 a. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 12 m.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., June 27, 1863.*Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac:*

\* \* \* \* \*

Lowell's cavalry is the only force for scouts in this department, and cannot be taken from General Heintzelman's command.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 12.10 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, *June 27, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK:

GENERAL: Couch reports the rebels in possession of Gettysburg and moving east, five thousand strong, and expect to-day or to-morrow to hear of the Northern Central railroad being cut. I direct Colonel Rodgers to defend block-houses and stockades on my part of the line to the utmost. I have completed nearly all of my line of defences around this city, but have few guns for them.

My infantry outside of the old forts are the 69th New York, 462 men; and the 55th New York, 200 men; with three small companies of 2d Eastern Shore; total, about 800, and all raw. My cavalry are out as scouts on all the roads. The rest of my troops were sent, as ordered, to Monocacy, and are there or on the march.

ROBERT S. SCHENCK.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 8, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 2.55 p. m.]

SANDY HOOK, *June 27, 1863.*Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

I have received your telegram in regard to Harper's Ferry. I find ten thousand men here in condition to take the field. Here they are of no earthly account. They cannot defend a ford of the river; and, as far as Harper's Ferry is concerned, there is nothing of it. As for the fortifications, the work of the troops, they remain when the troops are withdrawn. No enemy will ever take possession of them for them. This is my opinion. All the public

property could have been secured to-night, and the troops marched to where they could have been of some service. Now, they are but a bait for the rebels should they return. I beg that this may be presented to the Secretary of War, and his Excellency the President.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 3 p. m., in cipher.]

SANDY HOOK, *June 27, 1863.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief :*

My original instructions require me to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington. I have now imposed upon me, in addition, an enemy in my front of more than my number. I beg to be understood, respectfully but firmly, that I am unable to comply with this condition, with the means at my disposal, and earnestly request that I may at once be relieved from the position I occupy.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

FREDERICK, MD., *June 27, 1863—6 p. m.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief :*

Statements of a lady from Richmond *via* Staunton and Hagerstown are, that there are no troops left in Richmond but a small guard. Many prominent citizens leaving for Staunton and Hagerstown. People in this morning from there report Longstreet's rear passing through there this morning. General Lee passed through yesterday.

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD, *Major General.*

[Received 6. 15 p. m.]

FREDERICK, MD., *June 27, 1863.*

Major General SCHENCK, *Baltimore :*

Passengers from Hagerstown this morning report the rear of Longstreet's corps passing through there this morning. A. P. Hill had preceded him. Where is General Lockwood, and what is now with him ?

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., June 27, 1863.*

Major General HOOKER, *Army of the Potomac :*

Your application to be relieved from your present command is received. As you were appointed to this command by the President, I have no power to relieve you. Your despatch has been duly referred for executive action.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 8 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ALMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Received 8 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

June 27, 1863—6. 30 p. m.

Hon. S. P. CHASE, *corner 6th and E streets :*

Been in motion constantly since I left, and unable to send the papers promised in consequence. I have a report from a lady who left Richmond three weeks ago—reports nothing left there but a small detachment doing guard duty; she came *via* Staunton; reports many prominent citizens of Richmond gone to Staunton for security. This confirms other reports. What a pity Kelly, Scammon, and Averell could not go in *via* Lynchburg, and Dix from below, at once.

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD, *Major General.*GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 65. }

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

*Frederick, Md., June 28, 1863.*

In conformity with the orders of the War Department, dated June 27, 1863, I relinquish the command of the army of the Potomac.

It is transferred to Major General George G. Meade, a brave and accomplished officer, who has nobly earned the confidence and esteem of this army on many a well-fought field. Impressed with the belief that my usefulness as the commander of the army of the Potomac is impaired, I part from it, yet not without the deepest emotions. The sorrow of parting with the comrades of so many battles is relieved by the conviction that the courage and devotion of this army will never cease nor fail; that it will yield to my successor, as it has to me, a willing and hearty support. With the earnest prayer that the triumph of this army may bring successes worthy of it and the nation, I bid it farewell.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General.*BALTIMORE, MD., *June 30, 1863.*

GENERAL: In obedience to the orders of the major general commanding the army to repair to Baltimore and report to the Adjutant General of the army for orders, I have the honor to report that my address is at the Eutaw House, in this city.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major General.*ADJUTANT GENERAL *of the Army.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 6, 1865*

Official :

RICHARD D. CUTTS, *Col. and A. D. C.*

## GENERAL MEADE.

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*Testimony of Major General Daniel E. Sickles.*

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1864.

Major General DANIEL E. SICKLES sworn and examined.

[See testimony—"Army of the Potomac—General Hooker."]

By the chairman :

Question. I believe we reached yesterday that point in your testimony where General Meade assumed command of the army of the Potomac. Please resume your narrative from that point, and proceed with it in your own way.

Answer. I joined the army at Frederick, Maryland, and reported to General Hooker on Sunday, the 28th day of June. He informed me that he had been relieved from command, and that General Meade was assigned to the command. I then reported to General Meade, who had just reached headquarters to assume command. Immediately thereafter I joined my corps, which was then moving by the way of Frederick towards Taneytown. My corps moved to Taneytown, and from there I was ordered to Emmettsburg. I reached Emmettsburg on the night of the 30th of June, and encamped near there, taking position somewhat in front and to the left of Emmettsburg, on the morning of the 1st of July. On that morning I received a circular from General Meade's headquarters having reference to the occupation of a new line. The army was to fall back, and not to follow up the enemy any further; the general regarding the objects of the campaign to have been accomplished, and considering Washington, Baltimore, and Pennsylvania to have been relieved. The circular indicated a line of retreat, the new position to which we were to fall back being substantially the line of what was known as Pipe creek.

Question. How many days was that before the battle of Gettysburg commenced?

Answer. It was the day the battle commenced; the day Reynolds fell; that is, it was the day which is popularly understood to be the day that the battle commenced. We in the army do not regard the operations of the two corps under General Reynolds as properly the battle of Gettysburg. We regard the operations of Thursday and Friday, when the whole army was concentrated, as the battle of Gettysburg.

Question. Was this contemplated retreat before or after General Reynolds had fallen?

Answer. It was coincident with it, on the very same morning; but I suppose it was before General Meade had heard that General Reynolds was

seriously engaged. I do not know, but I presume it undoubtedly was before he heard it. I have that order among my papers here, and I will read an extract from it, so as to show that I have stated it correctly :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“July 1, 1863.

[Circular.]

“From information received, the commanding general is satisfied that the object of the movement of the army in this direction has been accomplished, viz., the relief of Harrisburg, and the prevention of the enemy’s intended invasion of Pennsylvania, &c., beyond the Susquehanna. It is no longer his intention to assume the offensive, until the enemy’s movement or position renders such an operation certain of success. If the enemy assume the offensive and attack, it is his intention, after holding them in check long enough to withdraw the trains and other *impedimenta*, to withdraw the army from its present position and form a line of battle with the left resting in the neighborhood of Middleburg, and the right at Manchester, the general direction being at Pipe creek.”

[The rest of the order indicates the method in which that is to be done, so far as my corps is concerned.]

“For this purpose, General Reynolds, in command of the left wing, will withdraw the force at present at Gettysburg, two corps, by the road to Taneytown and Westminster, and after crossing Pipe creek, deploy towards Middleburg. The corps at Emmettsburg (my corps) will be withdrawn *via* Mechanicsville to Middleburg.”

That is sufficient of the order to cover the operations of my corps.

Question. What was the distance to which they intended to retreat, from where the battle actually took place?

Answer. I suppose in a straight line.

Question. I mean by the way you would have to go.

Answer. I suppose it was about fourteen miles, as near as I can tell without looking at the map. I proceeded to make such preparations as would enable me to execute my part of that movement. I soon ascertained that the principal part of my train had been already ordered to the rear by a staff officer from headquarters. I was giving my troops a little repose during that morning. They had been very severely marched for many days, and a great many of them were barefooted. I had expected shoes and clothing to be issued for them that morning. Between two and three o’clock in the afternoon I got a despatch from General Howard, at Gettysburg, informing me that the first and eleventh corps had been engaged during the day with a superior force of the enemy, and that General Reynolds had fallen; that he (Howard) was in command, and was very hard pressed, and urging me in the most earnest terms to come to his relief with what force I could. I, of course, considered the question very anxiously. My preliminary orders in going to Gettysburg were to go there and hold that position with my corps, as it was regarded as a very important flanking position, to cover our rear and line of communication. Then on the other hand was this order of General Meade which I had received that morning, contemplating another and an entirely different line of operations. Then there was this new fact which I assumed was not known to General Meade when the order to retreat was issued. The emergency did not admit of the delay that would have been required in order to communicate with General Meade, who was ten miles or so distant. I therefore determined to take the principal part of my corps and move as promptly as possible to Gettysburg. I took all except two brigades and two batteries, which I left to protect

Emmettsburg and that line. I regarded that force as ample, because careful reconnoissances made in the vicinity of Emmettsburg disclosed the presence of no enemy there, and the information which I received from General Howard, in connexion with other circumstances, convinced me that the main body of the enemy was in his front. I therefore moved to Gettysburg on my own responsibility. I made a forced march, and arrived there about the time that General Howard had taken position on Cemetery hill. I found his troops well posted in a secure position on the ridge. The enemy in the mean while had not made any serious attack upon him during my march. The arrival of my force seemed to reassure General Howard in the security of his position. Soon after my arrival I met there General Hancock and General Slocum. In the evening General Slocum, being the senior officer present, assumed command, although there were no troops of his corps or of General Hancock's corps there; but he assumed command by virtue of his seniority of rank. By his orders my troops were massed on the left of Cemetery ridge. Early in the night, about nine o'clock or so, there was a consultation. The question was whether we should remain in that position, or whether we should fall back. There was a difference of opinion on that point. I wrote to General Meade, either directly or through his adjutant general or chief of staff; I am not positive to whom I addressed the letter; the usual official way would have been to have addressed it either to General Williams or General Butterfield, and I presume I adopted that course; at all events, I addressed a written communication to General Meade, begging him by all means to concentrate his army there and fight a battle, stating that in my judgment it was a good place to fight; that the position of General Howard was an admirably chosen one, and that the enemy would undoubtedly mass there in great force, and that in my judgment it would be most destructive to the *morale* of the army to fall back, as was apparently contemplated in his order of that morning. The soldiers were eager to fight a battle there, and so were a great number of the officers. I sent that communication by an officer; I do not remember his name now, but he was an officer from General Meade's headquarters, who had been sent by him to Gettysburg. Late in the night I understood that it was determined to concentrate there, and that the army was moving up to Gettysburg as rapidly as possible, and during the night considerable bodies of troops arrived. At a very early hour on Thursday morning I received a notification that General Meade's headquarters had been established at Gettysburg, and I was directed by him to relieve a division of the 12th corps, (General Geary's division, I think,) which was massed a little to my left, and which had taken position there during the night. I did so, reporting, however, to General Meade that that division was not in position, but was merely massed in my vicinity; the tenor of his order seemed to indicate a supposition on his part that the division was in position. I also received a notification from General Meade that he approved of my course in moving up to Gettysburg. Of course, as soon as I had determined to do that, I addressed a communication to General Meade from Emmettsburg, informing him of what I had done, and expressing my anxiety to have his sanction of it. I received a communication from him informing me that he approved of my course, and that the two brigades and two batteries which I had left at Emmettsburg would be relieved and ordered to join me. I brought them up during the night, under General Graham, and they arrived in the neighborhood of daybreak. Not having received any orders in reference to my position, and observing, from the enemy's movements on our left, what I thought to be conclusive indications of a design on their part to attack there, and that seeming to me to be our most assailable point, I went in person to headquarters and reported the facts and circumstances which led me to believe that an attack would be made there, and asked for orders. I did not receive

any orders, and I found that my impression as to the intention of the enemy to attack in that direction was not concurred in at headquarters; and I was satisfied, from information which I received, that it was intended to retreat from Gettysburg. I asked General Meade to go over the ground on the left and examine it. He said his engagements did not permit him to do that. I then asked him to send General Warren with me, or by himself; but General Warren's engagements were such as to make it inconvenient for him to go. I then asked him to send General Hunt, his chief of artillery, and that was done. General Hunt accompanied me upon a careful reconnoissance of the whole position on the left, in reference to its topography and the best line for us to occupy, and also with reference to the movements of the enemy. I pointed out to General Hunt the line that on a subsequent part of the day, when the battle opened, I actually occupied; that is, a line from Round Top on the left, perpendicular to the Emmettsburg road, but somewhat *en echelon*, with the line of battle established on Cemetery ridge. I asked for General Hunt's sanction, in the name of General Meade, for the occupation of that line. He declined to give it, although he said it met with the approval of his own judgment; but he said that I would undoubtedly receive such orders as soon as he reported to General Meade. Before making my dispositions on that line, I waited for some time for orders, but received none. The enemy's demonstrations became more and more decided.

I had strengthened and supported my outposts in order to give me timely notice of the attack, which I knew was very imminent. Buford's cavalry, which had been on the left, had been withdrawn. I remonstrated against that, and expressed the hope that the cavalry, or some portion of it, at all events, might be allowed to remain there. I was informed that it was not the intention to remove the whole of the cavalry, and that a portion of it would be returned. It did not return, however.

My outposts became engaged, and were being driven back from their supports. I determined to wait no longer the absence of orders, and proceeded to make my dispositions on the advanced line, as it is called. I took up that position, which is described in the report of General Halleck as a line from half to three-quarters of a mile in advance, as he says, and which, in his report, he very pointedly disapproves of, and which he further says I took up through a misinterpretation of orders. It was not through any misinterpretation of orders. It was either a good line or a bad one, and, whichever it was, I took it on my own responsibility, except so far as I have already stated, that it was approved of in general terms by General Hunt, of General Meade's staff, who accompanied me in the examination of it. I took up that line because it enabled me to hold commanding ground, which, if the enemy had been allowed to take—as they would have taken it if I had not occupied it in force—would have rendered our position on the left untenable; and, in my judgment, would have turned the fortunes of the day hopelessly against us. I think that any general who would look at the topography of the country there would naturally come to the same conclusion.

While I was making my dispositions on this line I received a communication from headquarters to attend a consultation of corps commanders. I sent word verbally by the officer who brought me the communication, begging, if possible, to be excused, stating that the enemy were in great force in my front, and intimating that I would very soon be engaged, and that I was making my dispositions to meet the attack. I hastened forward the movements of my troops as rapidly as possible, and had got my batteries in position, when I received another and peremptory order to report at once in person at headquarters, to meet the corps commanders. I turned over the command temporarily to General Birney in my absence, feeling assured that before I could return the engagement would open. I hastened to headquarters with all speed, but before I got



there the sound of the cannon announced that the battle had opened. However, I was quite near headquarters at the time and pushed on, but found that the consultation had been broken up by the opening of the battle. General Meade met me just outside of his headquarters and excused me from dismounting. He remarked that he observed, from the sound of the cannon, that my troops were engaged with the enemy. He said that I should return at once, and that he would follow me very soon.

On my way I found that the enemy were moving up to the attack in great force, in two lines of battle, supported by three columns. Fortunately, my left had succeeded in getting into position on Round Top and along the commanding ridge to which I have referred; and those positions were firmly held by the 3d corps. General Meade soon afterwards arrived on the field and made a rapid examination of the dispositions which I had made, and of the situation. He remarked to me that my line was too extended, and expressed his doubts as to my being able to hold so extended a line, in which I coincided in the main—that is to say, I replied that I could not, with one corps, hold so extended a line against the rebel army; but that, if supported, the line could be held; and, in my judgment, it was a strong line, and the best one. I stated, however, that if he disapproved of it it was not yet too late to take any position he might indicate. He said “No;” that it would be better to hold that line, and he would send up the 5th corps to support me. I expressed my belief in my ability to hold that line until supports could arrive. He said he would send up the 5th corps on my left, and that on my right I could look to General Hancock for support of my right flank. I added that I should want considerable artillery; that the enemy were developing a strong force of artillery. He authorized me to send to General Hunt, who commanded the reserve of the artillery, for as much artillery as I wanted. I then assured him of my entire confidence in my ability to hold the position; which I did. The 5th corps came up, somewhat tardily, to be sure. It was three-quarters of an hour, or an hour, I suppose, before it got into position. My request to General Hancock for supports was promptly met; and I feel myself under obligations principally to General Hancock and the troops of his command for the effective support which enabled me, in connexion with my own corps and the artillery which I received from the reserve, to hold the position during that very desperate encounter of Thursday, where the principal operations of Thursday occurred. The position was held, and the attacks of the enemy, which were made in great force and with great obstinacy and determination, were successfully repulsed, with terrific loss to them and a very heavy loss on our side, until I was wounded and carried from the field. The command of the 3d corps then devolved on Major General Birney, and, of course, I only know about the subsequent operations from the perusal of his report.

Question. You were not with the army, then, after that, up to the time when the enemy recrossed the Potomac?

Answer. No, sir; I was carried to the rear. Major General Birney was with the army, and continued in command of the corps.

Question. It was the second day of the fight that you were wounded?

Answer. The second day of fighting; but, as we in the army consider it, the first day of the battle. When I speak of the general engagement I mean that engagement which occurred after we had concentrated at Gettysburg. The fighting of Wednesday, although important and sanguinary, was an engagement in which only two corps of our forces took part.

Question. If I have understood you all through, it was not contemplated by the commander of that army to fight a battle at that place?

Answer. I think not, on Sunday. I suppose that on Wednesday night he undoubtedly intended to fight there, else he would not have concentrated there; but I have reason to know that his plan of operations was changed again on

Thursday, and that he resumed, in substance, the plan that he had on Wednesday morning, which was to fall back to Pipe creek, or to some place in that neighborhood.

Question. In your opinion, as a military man, what do you think of the propriety of again encountering the enemy at the river before he recrossed?

Answer. He should have been followed up closely, and vigorously attacked before he had an opportunity to recross the river.

Question. Under the circumstances, as you understand them, could there have been any great hazard to our army in venturing an engagement there?

Answer. No, sir. If we could whip them at Gettysburg, as we did, we could much more easily whip a running and demoralized army, seeking a retreat which was cut off by a swollen river; and if they could march after being whipped, we certainly could march after winning a battle.

Question. Do you know any reason why none of the forces here at Washington were moved up the river to prevent the enemy's recrossing there? Was there anything to prevent that?

Answer. If there were available forces here, as I have understood—

Question. General Heintzelman's corps was here, was it not?

Answer. I presume he had some troops here. I think the main body of his cavalry had been previously ordered to join General Hooker. I have no information of what force of infantry he had here.

Question. Did you understand that any of the troops stationed at Baltimore, under General Schenck, were brought into that engagement at Gettysburg?

Answer. No, sir; I do not think any troops were engaged there except those of the army of the Potomac proper. They may have been employed in guarding the line of communication, but I heard of no troops participating in the battle of Gettysburg except those that belonged to the army of the Potomac.

Question. Suppose there had been ten thousand troops in Baltimore, was there any difficulty in bringing them into the fight?

Answer. No, sir; communication was open with Baltimore, with occasionally slight interruptions; but the best way to protect Baltimore was to win that battle.

Question. And would you not say the same about Washington?

Answer. Certainly; the only way to save Washington was to win that battle.

Question. In your judgment now, should not all the troops disposable about Washington, Baltimore, and Maryland heights have been brought together and concentrated to assist in the fighting of that battle?

Answer. Yes, sir, except those required to guard the line of communication—the railroad. I should say most clearly that all the disposable forces should have been concentrated; and all posts not absolutely essential to be held were secondary and of minor importance compared with strengthening that army for the battle.

Question. Were there any reasons why the troops from the Peninsula, say at Suffolk, could not as well have been brought up before the battle as afterwards?

Answer. None at all; they could have been, unless employed in a co-operative movement on the Peninsula, if an attack on Richmond should have been contemplated.

Question. Do you know what was the reason why General Halleck would not allow the withdrawal of the troops at Harper's Ferry?

Answer. The reason assigned was, that that post was necessary for the protection of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad; that is, there was an important bridge there, which had been put up at considerable cost, and it would otherwise be destroyed by the enemy.

Question. Are you certain that that bridge was there then—that there was anything more there, at the time the battle was fought, than a pontoon bridge?

Answer. I do not speak of the time the battle was fought; I speak of the time that General Hooker wanted to withdraw the force there, some eight or

ten thousand men, and add them to his army. The difference of opinion between General Halleck and General Hooker on that point was the immediate cause of General Hooker's being relieved from command. The reason assigned by General Halleck for not permitting General Hooker to withdraw that force was the one I have stated—that it was necessary to retain it there for the protection of that bridge and the public property that was there.

Question. Was not the true way to protect that bridge to destroy the army of the enemy?

Answer. The destruction of that army was of far more importance than the bridge, or even the railroad itself. That was the great aim and object of our army and of the country at that time, upon which everything appeared to depend.

Question. Do you know whether General Hooker requested these disposable troops to be concentrated with his army for the purpose of fighting that battle?

Answer. He did.

Question. Now, as a military man, and one of a great deal of experience, in your opinion was there any difficulty, under all the circumstances, after the battle of Gettysburg, in destroying Lee's army? If so, will you state from what circumstances that difficulty arose?

Answer. In my judgment as a military man, from all the light I have been able to gather upon the subject, from a careful examination of the subject, and from information that I have obtained from officers of the army who followed up Lee's army, I do not think there was any military difficulty to prevent a decisive attack upon General Lee, which must have resulted in the destruction of his army. I think the *morale* of our own troops was never better. I think they would have endured any amount of hardship, marching, and exposure. They were enthusiastic in their wish to attack, as I have reason to know. I believe the enemy were substantially out of ammunition, and were in no condition to fight a battle. I have information to that effect from an intelligent officer of my command, General Graham, who was wounded and taken prisoner at Gettysburg, and who accompanied General Lee's army on its retreat. Our prisoners expected that we would follow up our success, and so did the enemy. The enemy had no hope of escaping the consequences of another attack, if made. That is to say, that was the statement made by many intelligent officers of the army who conversed with General Graham. If you desire information on that subject, you could probably get it from General Graham more fully and satisfactorily than I could be able to give it to you.

Question. But that would be judging of the matter after the battle, and from information that our officers could not be in possession of at the time.

Answer. Those were the facts, and we had reason to suppose that to be the case, because General Lee had to bring all his ammunition with him; he was far away from his base; he had no means of supplying himself in Pennsylvania with any more ammunition than he had brought with him in his column; and every military man knows that three days of fighting will exhaust not only the supplies that men carry with them, but also exhaust the ammunition train, such as is practicable for an army invading an enemy's country to take with it. And that presumption, which would naturally suggest itself to any military mind, was in accordance with the facts.

Question. I was about to ask you whether, after three days' fighting so far from the base of supplies, a military man would not have reason to suspect that the ammunition of the enemy's army was very low?

Answer. Yes, sir; he would be entitled to assume that.

Question. Then I must ask you this question: you have already stated that after that battle, as you understand it, our troops were in good condition and eager to renew the fight?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And that the enemy were on the bank of the river, so that it is a

very plain case to you, as you have stated, that they should have been vigorously attacked?

Answer. Yes, sir, I think so.

Question. How, then, do you account for the fact that, under these circumstances, a council of war, by a two-thirds vote, should say that the attack should not be made?

Answer. I cannot account for it in any other way than by the supposition that the immediate purpose of the enemy having been defeated by the result of the battle of Gettysburg, it was not deemed prudent to incur the chances of another fight; that they seemed to be satisfied with what they had done, and did not think it necessary to follow up the advantage.

Question. Do you suppose that that want of harmony and unity of action, to which you have already alluded in your former deposition, had anything to do with the result of that council?

Answer. I could only say that I have understood that that cause had some influence; but I cannot state any facts of my own knowledge that would indicate that, not having attended any council. I did not attend any council that was held under General Meade. There were several councils held, as I understood. There was a council held on Thursday morning, before the battle opened. There was another one held on Thursday night, and I understood that there were those who voted on Thursday night to retreat. And I have understood that there was another council held on Friday night, the night after the battle, and that there was a pretty strong disposition then to retreat; and, as I have understood from reliable authority, the reason why the enemy was not followed up was on account of differences of opinion whether or no we should ourselves retreat or follow up the enemy.

Question. After the final battle?

Answer. Yes, sir. It was by no means clear in the judgment of the corps commanders, or of the general in command, whether we had won or not. I was not present at the council, and cannot state that of my own knowledge; I have understood that to be the fact. What I am now stating is the result of inquiries which I made in order to find some solution of the query why the enemy was not followed up. As an officer of the army, I expected to hear of nothing else but that the enemy would be followed up. I therefore sought such information as I could get, and that is the result of my inquiries.

Question. What did you understand the real meaning of General Meade to be when, in that circular to which you have referred, he stated that the object of the movement had been already accomplished, inasmuch as Washington and Baltimore were covered, and the enemy prevented from crossing the Susquehanna, or something like that?

Answer. I understood by that that General Meade considered that General Couch had force enough at Harrisburg to prevent the enemy's crossing the Susquehanna, and that he himself was in sufficient force between General Lee and Washington to cover Washington and Baltimore, and that therefore he need not attack, but might fall back towards Washington, take up a defensive line, and wait until he was attacked in his works.

Question. Will you state whether, in your opinion as a military man, it was not a very rash and hazardous movement to displace the commanding officer of the army while in the vicinity of the enemy and on the eve of a battle, as was the case when General Hooker was relieved?

Answer. At the time I considered it a misfortune to the army, and apprehended that disaster might result from it.

Question. Was not its tendency to weaken the confidence of the army in their leader?

Answer. Yes, sir. I think the rank and file had entire confidence in General

Hooker. I should always regard it as a most hazardous expedient to change the commander of an army in such exigencies as then existed.

Question. Can you give any satisfactory reason why the troops at Harper's Ferry should have been refused to General Hooker, and immediately awarded to General Meade?

Answer. The only solution I can give of it is that General Meade had the confidence and friendship of General Halleck, while General Hooker had not, and that General Halleck would accede to suggestions made by General Meade, while he would not accede to suggestions made by General Hooker.

Question. The request was the same in both cases?

Answer. It is for that very reason that I must say I can see no military reason that could have altered the circumstances, and therefore I must look for it in personal reasons. I suppose the personal relations which existed between General Halleck and General Hooker disinclined him to accede to General Hooker's request. The personal relations being altered, that obstacle did not exist.

Question. Was it not eminently hazardous to withhold ten thousand men from such a battle, when our numbers were not superior to those of the enemy?

Answer. It was sacrificing a great end for a minor consideration; it was perilling our success in a general battle, upon which everything depended, to enable us to hold a subordinate post, of no importance whatever if we lost the battle, and which could not be held by the enemy if he lost the battle.

Question. Can you really find anything else in this than a willingness in the general-in-chief to jeopard the army to personal considerations—can you place it upon any other ground?

Answer. I cannot conceive of any military reason which explains that extraordinary inconsistency. That is all that, as a soldier, I can judge of.

Question. After you were wounded at Gettysburg, and taken from the field, how long were you detained from the army, and when did you again rejoin it?

Answer. I was convalescent in October—my general health re-established; my wound not yet entirely healed; but anticipating, from the movements of the army, that there would be another engagement—General Lee manœuvring on the right flank of General Meade, and General Meade falling back towards Washington—I came to Washington, *en route* to the army. Ascertaining from official sources that a battle was expected to be fought by our forces, I went down to the front and reported for duty. I found the headquarters established at Centreville, our army having fallen back and taken position on the Occoquan on the left, and towards Chantilly on the right, resting substantially in the defences of Washington.

Question. Did you rejoin the army before they fell back, or afterwards?

Answer. Just at the time. I found that the army had fallen back. I did not expect to meet the army quite as near Washington as that.

Question. Do you know any reason why it did fall back?

Answer. I suppose it fell back under the impression that the enemy was eager for battle, and would give battle wherever General Meade was willing to accept it, and that under that impression the general had fallen back as near his base as he could get, availing himself of a line where success was most certain. The result was that, such obviously not being the plan of the enemy, the opportunity to fight a decisive battle was lost. The object of the enemy evidently was to outmanœuvre us by manœuvring to get our army out of the advantageous position which it then occupied on the line of the Rapidan, and to enable him to detach his forces to other assailable points. General Lee fell back as soon as he found General Meade out of his way, and destroyed the railroad, going back to his old position.

Question. When we fell back were not our forces superior in number to those of the enemy?

Answer. It was so understood.

Question. Was it not the same army that had not long before defeated the army of Lee at Gettysburg?

Answer. Yes, sir. From all the sources of information accessible to me, I suppose that General Lee was not near as strong as he was after he retired from Gettysburg, because he had detached Longstreet with a large force to the west.

Question. In your judgment, was it good generalship to retreat before the enemy in order to find an eligible place to fight a battle? Would that not have more tendency to demoralize our troops than to fight a battle under circumstances perhaps less advantageous, besides hazarding all our advanced communications?

Answer. I think the army felt humiliated by that retreat; I think it was an unfortunate retreat.

Question. To a military man, was it not an unaccountable retreat?

Answer. I can discover no good military reason for it, regarding as I do our force to have been greatly superior to that of the enemy, and believing as I do that we could have given battle without falling back, under circumstances which indicated every probability of success.

Question. If you fell back at all, why not fall back to the defences of Washington, and stay there?

Answer. I can see no reason.

Question. Will you please resume your narrative again?

Answer. I have nearly completed it. I reported for duty, wishing, as I expressed myself to General Meade, to resume the command of my corps for the coming battle, although not able to report for duty permanently, feeling great doubts as to my ability to hold out for permanent command and active campaigning; but I had a conviction that my presence with my corps would perhaps be of some advantage to the service, as it would certainly be most gratifying to my own feelings. I therefore solicited leave to take command of my corps, under the existing circumstances, notwithstanding my apparent disability. But General Meade expressed his disinclination, on account of his doubts as to my physical ability to meet the exigencies of the position of a corps commander. He instanced the case of General Ewell, of the rebel army, who had also lost a leg, and who did not resume command for eight or nine months. I very reluctantly yielded assent to this intimation of General Meade, and after reviewing my corps, I left the army on the morning—Saturday, I think it was—that they took up the line of march to try to find General Lee, with the intention of catching him, as I understood. In the mean time General Lee had made good his retreat, destroyed the bridges across Broad run, Cedar run, and the Rappahannock, and destroyed the railroad, and successfully eluded pursuit. I then reported for duty, in person, to the Secretary of War and to the President. I could but express my sense of reluctance in again presenting myself to headquarters for assignment to duty without an order from the general-in-chief, which would relieve me from the embarrassment of again tendering my services and exposing myself to the disappointment of having them again declined or again deferred. From that time I have been waiting orders.

Question. You were, then, not with the army in its late advance over the Rapidan and back again?

Answer. No, sir; I waited orders, meanwhile giving my best attention to the entire re-establishment of my health and strength for active duty. General French and General Birney have meanwhile alternately commanded the corps. General French was assigned temporarily to the command of the corps by General Meade, but in his absence General Birney has commanded by seniority.

*Testimony of Major General Abner Doubleday.*WASHINGTON, *March 1, 1864.*

Major General ABNER DOUBLEDAY sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

[See testimony—"Army of the Potomac—General Hooker."]

Question. You were with the army of the Potomac when the battle of Gettysburg was fought?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Give the committee an account of that battle in your own way.

Answer. When we marched to Marsh creek there was a rebel force on our left flank at Fairfield. When General Meade assumed the command of the army he gave General Reynolds the command of the right wing of the army, consisting of the 1st, 3d, and 11th corps. General Reynolds told me that his duties frequently required him to absent himself from the 1st corps—his own corps—and that I must assume command of it, which I did.

After we got to Marsh creek it was found that the force of the enemy which had been at Fairfield had left—had gone north—so that we had then no enemy directly to the west of us. General Buford's cavalry had gone to Gettysburg, and were engaged in feeling the enemy on the roads leading from that town. They reported that the enemy were in heavy force at Cashtown and Mummasburg, places to the northwest of Gettysburg. Cashtown is on the great road from Chambersburg.

On the 30th of June General Meade sent a circular to the effect that the enemy were apparently marching in heavy force on Gettysburg, stating that we should remain as we were until the enemy developed his intentions. This was very much like saying that he would give us orders after the battle was fought, for he had already stated the intention of the enemy to be to take Gettysburg. That place was a point of very great importance. It is like the hub of a wheel, having seven great roads and a railroad leading out of it, namely, the roads to Hagerstown, Chambersburg, Carlisle, Harrisburg, York, Frederick, and Taneytown, all of which places may be considered as on the circumference of the wheel. With our troops in possession of Gettysburg we could check the enemy on any one of these roads, as we would hold the centre. The enemy in possession of that point would have gained a great advantage, in my opinion; shortening and strengthening his line to Williamsport, from which place his supplies of ammunition, &c., were supposed to come, and being in a condition to strike in any direction.

General Reynolds, believing that it was the best policy to fight the enemy as soon as he could meet him, and prevent his sending off those immense quantities of supplies from Pennsylvania, and finding on the morning of the 1st of July that Buford's cavalry were hard pressed, directed me to put the 1st corps in motion to go to the assistance of Buford. He told me that he had already ordered Wadsworth's division to go forward, and that it was already under way. I think this was about half past seven o'clock in the morning. General Reynolds read his telegrams to me, showing where our troops were, and what they were doing. He then sprang on his horse and rode forward to join Wadsworth's division, which had started, directing me to bring up the balance of the corps and the batteries. Wadsworth's division had but one battery with it, Hall's Maine battery.

I waited until I had drawn in my pickets, and put the other two divisions and the batteries of the 1st corps in motion; I then heard rapid cannon firing, showing that the cavalry were briskly engaged. I say "cavalry," for there had not been time for Wadsworth's division of infantry to reach there. Hear-

ing this cannon firing I put spurs to my horse, and with my staff galloped in advance of the last two divisions of infantry, and reached the ground just as the head of Wadsworth's division was going into action. I had previously sent my adjutant general and an aid to General Reynolds for orders. There are two roads leading into Gettysburg from the westward, the one from the northwest, and the other from the southwest. It was on the road from the northwest that the main force of the enemy were approaching.

To the west of Gettysburg is an eminence that we called Seminary ridge, because there is a seminary situated on it, between the two roads referred to. This ridge runs north and south, and is about a quarter of a mile to the west of Gettysburg. About four hundred yards to the west of the first ridge there is another, also running north and south. Nearly parallel to the road from the northwest there is a railroad grading, part of it embankment and part of it deep cut, passing through these ridges. General Reynolds simply said to me, "I will defend this Cashtown road," or rather, "I will hold on to this road, and you hold on to the other." These were the orders he sent to me. He established a brigade and a battery to hold the road which came from Cashtown, placing his men under shelter of the most westerly of the ridges. Wadsworth's division now going into action consisted of two brigades—one under General Cutler, and the other, usually called the Iron brigade, under General Meredith—and one battery, called Hall's battery. General Reynolds took Cutler's brigade and Hall's battery to hold his part of the line, and directed the other brigade to be placed on a line with the first in a piece of woods which lay between the two roads. These woods were already occupied by the enemy, who opened fire upon us, killing General Reynolds almost at the first volley.

The Iron brigade charged with great gallantry; rushed into the woods, and on the left and somewhat on the right of the woods, and drove the enemy before them into a little ravine called Willoughby's run; there they captured a large number of prisoners, with general officers. They formed on the high ground on the other side of the run. This was being accomplished as I rode up. I sent word to them that this movement had carried them too far to the front, and they must fall back on a line with Cutler's brigade. They had got several hundred yards beyond that. I think some one else gave a similar order—whether General Meredith or General Wadsworth I do not know. They returned and took up a position in the woods and on the left of the woods. In the mean time Cutler's brigade had been ordered back by General Wadsworth. Its right flank had been turned and the battery attacked, and it was ordered back to Seminary ridge, as I have stated, leaving the battery and two regiments standing on the left of the battery. The right of the battery was now uncovered. The enemy charged up the railroad grading and attacked the right of the battery, killing, I think, all the horses and wounding all the men at one piece—doing a great deal of damage. The battery was directed by General Wadsworth to take up a new position, and finally was withdrawn by way of the railroad grading—the captain of the battery said, by an aid of General Wadsworth. He complained of this route, inasmuch as once on the grading there was no getting off it for a long distance, and the enemy had guns planted to enfilade it. He states that he finally reached Seminary ridge and took shelter behind it, and was again ordered to the front by another aid of General Wadsworth; that he advanced towards the position indicated until he found that the enemy held the ground he had been ordered to take, and that if he went any further he would lose his battery; he then returned. That gives the history of the battery so far.

Cutler's brigade, as I have stated, fell back, with the exception of two regiments—the 14th Brooklyn and the 95th New York. When this condition of affairs attracted my attention, I found the enemy massing themselves in front of Cutler. I had kept one regiment, the 6th Wisconsin, as a reserve. I or-



dered that regiment to attack on the flank of the enemy as he formed, if he formed in front of Cutler. That regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Dawes, together with the 14th Brooklyn, under Colonel Fowler, and the 95th New York, under Colonel Biddle, made a most gallant charge, and surrounded the enemy, who had rushed into the railroad cut, and after a short but desperate conflict we captured two rebel regiments, with their battle-flags. The remainder of the enemy retreated to their first position. I ordered the line of battle to be resumed as it was originally. The enemy, to all appearance, were repulsed, and we were perfectly successful at this stage, having captured Brigadier General Archer and a large number of prisoners from his brigade, two regiments, with their battle-flags, from Davis's rebel brigade, and driven the enemy back so that their attack had become comparatively a feeble one. Shortly after this the remaining divisions of the 1st corps, with the batteries, came up. One of these divisions (Robinson's) I kept in reserve behind the Seminary. I placed one brigade of the other division on the right, and one on the left, of the woods; and General Howard arrived at Gettysburg about the same time with the 11th corps. The most prominent successes of the day occurred before he assumed command of the field. I now received information from General Buford, in person, that the troops of the enemy with which we had been contending were A. P. Hill's corps, numbering altogether, I suppose, some 30,000 or 35,000 men; opposing them we had the 1st corps, numbering about 8,200 men.

General Buford now reported to me that the rebel General Ewell, with his whole corps, was coming down from York on my right flank, making another 30,000. I sent word to General Howard, and requested him to keep Ewell off of my flank, as I had as much as I could do to attend to A. P. Hill. About the same time I received an order from General Howard to this effect: "Tell Doubleday to fight on the left, and I will fight on the right." About the same time he sent word to me that if forced back I must try and hold on to the Seminary. These were all the orders I received from him during the day that I remember. He also sent me word of Ewell's approach about the same time that I informed him of it, and formed the 11th corps to keep Ewell off. Ewell now made a junction with A. P. Hill's corps, so that Ewell's line was northwest and east of me, and A. P. Hill's was nearly west. The men on our side were in very fine spirits, and were elated to the highest degree. One division that I had was composed almost entirely of Pennsylvanians. I made short speeches to each regiment as it passed and went into action, and the men were full of enthusiasm.

I had assigned one brigade, under Colonel Stone, to quite an open position, where they were shelled pretty severely. Colonel Stone remarked, as he took the position, "*We have come to stay.*" This went quickly through his brigade, the men adopting it as a watchword; they all said, "*We have come to stay,*" and a very large portion of them never left that ground.

My attention was called to a wide and dangerous gap between the 11th and 1st corps, and I sent two regiments of Baxter's brigade, Robinson's division, to fill it and keep the enemy out. After a short time I found that that force was inadequate, and I then sent the remainder of the brigade. This left me but one brigade in reserve. But I found that even that force was inadequate, and with the greatest reluctance was compelled to send General Robinson and the last brigade of my reserve to assist in holding the position, which was on our extreme right. They held it successfully, capturing a large number of prisoners, estimated as high as a thousand, and taking several battle-flags from the enemy. But the division of the 11th corps on our right fell back about half past 2 o'clock. The time is given by General Wadsworth in his report. I did not look at the time myself. One of my generals—General Baxter—said that

division fell back before the enemy's line of skirmishers. General Wadsworth, in his report, says they "partially" engaged the enemy.

The enemy entered into this interval and folded their lines right around my right flank. I did not think I ought to retreat until General Howard gave the order, as he was then the ranking officer on the field, and I held on until a quarter before 4 o'clock, when the whole country was filled with the advancing lines of the enemy, double lines, in some cases treble lines, with reserves of battalions in mass. Our forces had fought with desperation, a portion of them for nearly six hours. Regiments were reduced to mere squads. They had made repeatedly the most heroic bayonet charges against overwhelming masses and driven them back. It was not possible to remain a moment longer. I had given orders in the morning to throw up a little rough rail intrenchment, a feeble pile of rails, around the seminary, and behind this the remnants of my line rallied. They fought by the seminary until the artillery, ambulances, and everything had retired in safety. When they were overpowered and fell back, I wanted to gain a little longer time, and I threw my personal guard of forty men around and into the building, and then fought a whole brigade for twenty minutes. In the onslaught upon us at this point, our artillery gained an enfilading fire on the front line of the enemy and swept it away. But the other rebel lines came up and outflanked us on all sides, and when we fell back we did so in fact between two lines of the enemy. I remained at the seminary myself until I thought everything had been got off, and was among the last to leave. I then rode through the streets of the town and rejoined my command.

I think the retreat would have been a very successful one, if it had not been unfortunately the case that a portion of the 11th corps, which had held out very well on the extreme right, had been surrounded and had fallen back at the same time that my right flank fell back. These two bodies of men became entangled in the streets of the town, and quite a number were captured. I lost but one gun and two or three caisson bodies. The men behaved in the most heroic manner in falling back. They would retreat a hundred or a hundred and fifty yards and then turn around and face the enemy again, fire upon them and keep them off for a time; then fall back another hundred yards, turn around and make a further stand. They passed through the town quietly and calmly; I saw no running, no undue haste. We re-formed our lines about a mile and a half from our first position, on an eminence called Cemetery hill, where the battle of the next day was fought.

During this time General Meade was at Taneytown, some ten or twelve miles off, engaged in laying out a very long line of battle—I should judge ten miles long at least—from Taneytown to Manchester, along Pipe creek. He seemed to have determined that the battle should take place there. It is inexplicable to me that he could hear the thunder of that battle all day without riding up to see something in relation to it, as he could have come up in an hour. Had he done so, there were two corps in our vicinity which he could have ordered to our assistance. General Sickles did start for that purpose without orders, though too late to be of service. There was no enemy in front of either of those two corps, but Slocum refused to leave without orders from General Meade, and I suppose he was right on strict military principles.

At the close of the day an order arrived from General Meade displacing both Howard and myself, placing me under the command of a junior officer, General Newton; and placing General Howard under General Hancock, who was his junior officer also. I thought this was done as a token of disapprobation at our fighting at all that day. When General Meade issued the order he was absent from the field and knew but little of the battle. He never asked me a single question in relation to the operations of that day.

Question. Had you received any orders from General Meade before this battle commenced, with regard to what you should do?

Answer. If any orders were received they are buried with General Reynolds; his staff know of none. When we went into this battle we supposed, as General Reynolds was very high in General Meade's confidence, that it was understood that the remainder of the army would come to our assistance. I think everything was left at loose ends, and there were no orders at all. I do not believe that our forces actually engaged, belonging to the two corps, amounted to over 14,000 men. There was a reserve of 3,000 or 4,000 of the 11th corps which did not join actively in the fight. It fired some shots from Cemetery hill, but the most of them fell short into our own front line. Now, 14,000 men were wholly inadequate to contend against two immense corps of the enemy, amounting to 60,000 men. I do not mean that 60,000 of the enemy were in the front line opposed to us, but that there were 60,000 including the reserves of the two rebel corps, enabling them to bring up fresh troops continually to attack us while our men were worn out.

The long, feeble line of battle on Pipe creek, laid out by General Meade, seemed to be chosen for defensive purposes, to cover Washington and Baltimore. It appears to me that the result of occupying that line would have been that the enemy would simply have let us severely alone, and either have taken Harrisburg or gone on *ad infinitum* plundering the State of Pennsylvania.

Question. You have described the first day of the fight?

Answer. Yes, sir. According to the reports rendered to me, we entered the fight with 8,200 men in the 1st corps, and came out with 2,450.

Question. Go on and describe the fight of the second day.

Answer. On the second day I was in command of a division stationed behind Cemetery hill. Nothing remarkable occurred in which I was engaged until towards sundown, when Sickles, who was pretty far advanced to the front, was driven in, and a part of Hancock's force sent to help him was also thrown back. I had been joined the night before by a Vermont brigade under General Stannard, increasing my force to about 2,500 men.

I received orders on the evening of that day to bring up this force with all haste to Hancock's assistance, who was suffering severely and being driven back. My division was formed in several lines, I think five lines in all. Having arrived at the place, a charge was ordered. This was about dusk. General Newton issued orders that that charge should be stopped. My front line, however, kept on at the request of General Hancock, who happened to be near them. He told them that he had lost four guns, and asked them to try and retake them, as the enemy were retiring. This front line continued on their charge and did not halt, but went in and regained Hancock's four guns which he had lost, and captured two guns from the enemy, and brought in quite a number of prisoners. They apologized to me for not halting, and I accepted the apology. We remained in that position for the remainder of the battle.

About 2 o'clock in the afternoon on the third day of the battle a tremendous cannonade was opened on us from at least 125 guns. They had our exact range, and the destruction was fearful. Horses were killed in every direction; I lost two horses myself, and almost every officer lost one or more, and quite a large number of caissons were blown up. I knew this was the prelude to a grand infantry charge, as artillery is generally massed in this way, to disorganize the opposing command, for the infantry to charge in the interval. I told my men to shelter themselves in every way behind the rocks, or little elevations of ground, while the artillery firing took place, and to spring to their feet and hold their ground as soon as the charge came.

When the enemy finally charged, they came on in three lines, with additional lines called, in military language, wings, the object of the wings being to prevent the main force from being flanked. This charge was first directed towards my lines, but seeing that they were quite strong, five lines deep, and well strength-

ened with rails, stones, and behind which the men lay, the enemy changed his mind, and concluded to make the attack on the division of 2d corps, on my right, where there were but two lines. He marched by his right flank, and then marched to his front. In doing this, the wing apparently did not understand the movement, but kept straight on. The consequence was, that there was a wide gap between the wing and the main charging force, which enabled my men on the right, the brigade of General Stannard, to form immediately on the flank of the charging column, while the enemy were subjected to an awful fire of artillery in front. It is said some few of them laid their hands on our guns. The prisoners state that what ruined them was Stannard's brigade on their flank, as they found it impossible to contend with it in that position; and they drew off all in a huddle to get away from it. I sent two regiments to charge them in front at the same time. While this was going on the enemy were subjected to a terrific artillery fire at short range, and the result was that they retreated with frightful loss.

Some five minutes after the charge was broken up and they began to retreat, a large number of batteries and regiments of infantry reported to me, as I sat on horseback, for orders to repulse the attack. I posted them, with the approval of the corps commander, though they were a little too late to be of essential service.

I would state that the wing of the enemy which got astray was also met by part of Stannard's brigade, which also formed on its flank, and it also retreated. Thus the day was won, and the country saved.

Question. That was the last day of the battle?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. In your judgment, which army suffered the most in those three days' battles?

Answer. I think the enemy suffered far more than we did. We suffered heavily the first day, on account of the overpowering army brought against us. But the other days we were partially sheltered by stone barricades, &c., which protected our men from musketry fire, while the enemy advanced through the open fields.

By the chairman:

Question. How far was General Meade from where the battle of the last day was fought?

Answer. The battle-field was very contracted, and he could not have been very far from it.

Question. If I have understood you, from what you could learn, the plan and intention of General Meade was not to fight the battle where it was fought?

Answer. It would seem not; and yet the enemy was in General Reynolds's immediate front. They were three or four miles from Gettysburg on one side, and we were three or four miles on the other. Under those circumstances it was almost impossible to prevent a collision, unless one party or the other withdrew.

Question. Do you know whether there were any orders from General Meade to retreat before this battle of the first day?

Answer. I do not think there were when General Reynolds commenced the fight. About the close of that day's fight I have no doubt such orders were issued. I have alluded to a circular informing us that the enemy was marching in heavy force on Gettysburg. It was of vital importance to know whether we were to defend the place or give it up. But we got no orders, although the enemy were marching on the town, and something had to be done immediately.

Question. Did you know that General Reynolds and General Sickles had an order to retreat just before that battle commenced?

Answer. I do not know that General Reynolds had such an order. He was a man who always obeyed orders literally.

Question. You do not know whether General Sickles had such an order?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Which army outnumbered the other?

Answer. He thought the enemy had 90,000 men, while we had but 70,000. That is the best information I could gather.

Question. Did you have to assist you in that battle the troops stationed in and around Baltimore under General Schenck?

Answer. Not to my knowledge.

Question. Can you tell why, after that fight, General Howard and yourself were removed from your command?

Answer. I was removed from the command of the 1st corps. General Howard was not removed from command of his corps, but was directed to obey General Hancock, who was his junior, after the first day of the fight.

Question. Why was that?

Answer. I think General Meade thought a couple of scapegoats were necessary; in case the next day's battle turned out unfavorably, he wished to mark his disapprobation of the first day's fight. General Meade is in the habit of violating the organic law of the army to place his personal friends in power. There has always been a great deal of favoritism in the army of the Potomac. No man who is an anti-slavery man or an anti-McClellan man can expect decent treatment in that army as at present constituted.

Question. Has that, in your judgment, led to great disasters, from time to time, in the army of the Potomac?

Answer. Yes, I think it has.

Question. You speak of political favoritism. Explain what you mean by that.

Answer. I think there have been pro-slavery cliques controlling that army, composed of men who, in my opinion, would not have been unwilling to make a compromise in favor of slavery, and who desired to have nobody put in authority except those who agreed with them on that subject.

Question. Do you believe that this feeling of rivalry and jealousy, that seems to have actuated the high corps commanders of that army, has been detrimental to the public service, and led to checks and defeats?

Answer. Undoubtedly. I cannot but think that there has been an indifference, to say the least, on the part of certain officers, to the success of our army. I do not believe that General Pope received all the co-operation he was entitled to; and I do not believe that General Burnside received it.

Question. Can you give any reason why, after you had whipped the enemy, and they finally retreated, they were not followed up vigorously?

Answer. I have no idea why they were not pursued. I believe the 6th corps had not been very actively engaged—at least not so much as the other corps. They were comparatively fresh, and could have been thrown upon the enemy.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. After the repulse of the enemy, were our troops so much exhausted by the three days' fighting, that it was impossible for them to follow up the enemy vigorously?

Answer. I think not; our troops for two days had been lying down a great deal in a defensive position.

By the chairman:

Question. Could our troops have been as much fatigued after the fight as the troops of the enemy?

Answer. No, sir; I think the enemy must have been the most fatigued, as they made the attack.

Question. Were you down at Williamsport, or near there, where the enemy effected a recrossing of the Potomac ?

Answer. I was not. I left the army on the 7th of July.

Question. You have heard that a council of war was held down there ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And you know how they voted ?

Answer. I have heard partially how the vote was. I am not sure as to the vote of every member.

Question. Can you give any reason, satisfactory to yourself, why that council came to the conclusion that it was not best to attack the enemy before they recrossed the river ?

Answer. I can give no reason; it is perfectly absurd to suppose that the enemy would choose a position on the bank of a deep river for the purpose of fighting us. You would as soon expect a man to place his back to a precipice, and then engage in a life and death struggle with another.

Question. Have you any doubt that, after the enemy got to the river, and were unable to cross on account of the water being so high, it was in the power of our army to have conquered them ?

Answer. I have no doubt; not a particle.

Question. You know the march General Lee had been compelled to make; the distance he was from his base of supplies, and the amount of ammunition he must have spent in such a battle as you had witnessed there ?

Answer. I think he must have almost completely exhausted his ammunition.

Question. I was going to ask whether, as a military man, you would not come to the conclusion that, after the battle, the enemy must have been very destitute of ammunition ?

Answer. I certainly should.

Question. You left the army on the 7th of July ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Where were you then ?

Answer. I was on the battle-field of Gettysburg.

Question. So that you know nothing personally of what occurred after that ?

Answer. I do not.

*Testimony of General A. P. Howe.*

WASHINGTON, *March 3, 1864.*

General A. P. HOWE sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

[See testimony—"Army of the Potomac—General Hooker."]

Question. General Meade succeeded General Hooker in the command of the army of the Potomac.

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Go on and state the operations of the army under his command, particularly the battle at Gettysburg; how it was brought on, and all about it, so far as you know.

Answer. We continued our movement until the 6th corps reached Manchester. We reached there the last day of June, I think. We remained there one night, and the next evening about 8 o'clock, I think, we received orders to move on Gettysburg. The other corps had been moving on our left and rear as we reached Manchester. From my own knowledge, I cannot tell what positions the other corps had, only as given in the reports. The evening that we received

orders to move on Gettysburg, news came that General Reynolds, who commanded the 1st corps, had met the rebels in considerable force, had had a fight with them, and been killed. General Newton was sent for by General Meade to take command of the 1st corps, because it was said the officer left in command was wounded, or was not satisfactory, or something of that kind.

We moved on Gettysburg, my division in the rear of the 6th corps. I left Manchester between 12 and 1 o'clock on the morning of the 2d of July, and reached Gettysburg about 4 o'clock p. m. on the 2d of July. We were then being threatened with an attack, as I understood, and with but a short halt the 6th corps was ordered up to support the 5th corps. We moved up and found not a heavy fight going on, but pretty spirited.

After the fight was over, it soon was dark. The 6th corps had stood upon the ground. I do not think they had fired a shot; there was no occasion for them to do so, for the position was a strong one, and the troops that were there had not given way at all that we could see. The 6th corps, of course, was pretty well jaded, for it had made a long march. Night was coming on, and it was very evident that there would be no more fighting that day. I said to General Sedgwick, "We ought to let our men have the best chance to rest that they can get right off; we are not likely to be called on to fight to-night; let us give the men a chance to get some coffee, and rest all they can, for there will be something done to-morrow undoubtedly." He remarked to me, "It is a little early yet; they are discussing whether we shall stay here, or move back to Westminster." That is twenty-one or twenty-two miles. I said, "It is some distance back there." Said he, "Can we move back?" I replied, "Yes, if it is necessary; we have just come over the road, and we know it. The men are worn; but if it is necessary, the 6th corps can go back, after resting two or three hours." General Sedgwick gave me to understand that our army would probably move back to Westminster.

Question. This was the night after General Sickles was wounded?

Answer. Yes, sir, this was the second day of the fight, the 2d of July.

Question. Who was in that council discussing the question of retreating?

Answer. I do not know. What I heard I had from General Sedgwick. He said, "I think we are going to move back." The impression he gave me was, that General Meade had the question under consideration. General Sedgwick said, "The question of falling back was then being considered." And the impression given to me was that we should move back to Westminster. Soon after, however, it seemed to be decided that we were to remain there.

Question. Go on and state all about the fight there, so far as you know.

Answer. As I have said, the 6th corps got up the latter part of the second day of the fight. The next day all the troops of our army were there. Nothing was done until the beginning of the afternoon, when the enemy opened with artillery, and we replied. The first fire was heavy all around, and was of such a character that I took out my watch and looked at it to see what time it was, and how long the fire would continue. I believed, at the time, that the position we were in was so strong that there was no possibility of the enemy dislodging us from it. This artillery fire, as I timed it, was kept up for a little over an hour and forty-five minutes; and I have never heard a more furious cannonading, nor one where there was a greater expenditure of ammunition on both sides. The result of the day was that the enemy met with no success. They did not drive us from the position.

Question. After the artillery ceased, did the enemy make an infantry charge?

Answer. Yes, sir; there was an attack with infantry, but it was repulsed. The enemy gained no success in advancing, and, of course, lost heavily in their attack. The attack was characteristic of rebel attacks. I have always found that their best fight is at first; and if any change is made which requires

a change in their order of attack after it is commenced, they go down in efficiency 50 per cent. at once. My experience has been that they are easily demoralized if any new state of affairs arises after their first attack. This attack was of the same character. They opened with the best they had at first, and kept up this violent cannonading for a long time, and then made their infantry attack, but did not succeed. It appeared to me that they were staking largely upon gaining their point, and that if they failed they would be correspondingly depressed and dispirited. I inferred that from the impression I had of their way of fighting, and when, on the 3d, they gave up the contest, I considered them badly whipped, because they had tried in an unusually spirited manner to succeed, and had failed.

But I did not consider that the fighting on our side was such as taxed us to the utmost, because our position was naturally a very strong one; and, as it seemed to me, a large portion of the strength of our army was not brought to bear. Our position mainly did the work for us. The enemy worked at great disadvantage. I was under the impression at the time, and have been ever since, that General Lee made a mistake there, for he evidently thought he could carry the place very much easier than the result proved; and after the fight of the 3d of July, I considered that our army had plenty of fight in it, if I may so express myself. Our army was not badly cut up; we had had quite a number of disabled men, to be sure, but it was an orderly fight. We were in a position where there was no straggling and demoralization; we had some pretty sharp cuts from that cannonading, but it was the most orderly fight I have ever been in, growing out of the position. In a military point of view it was not much of a battle; it was a very ordinary affair as a battle. In its results it was immensely important, for it checked the rebel advance upon vital points; but as a military operation on our side, no particular credit can attach to it. There was no great generalship displayed; there was no manœuvring, no combinations.

Question. Such a fight was not calculated to fatigue our men like some other fights?

Answer. No, sir; it was an orderly, economical fight on our side, although we lost pretty heavily. In other words, when the fight was over our troops were by no means exhausted, but they were comparatively fresh.

Question. Can you, as a military man, tell us why, when the enemy had retreated, dispirited as you say they were, our army did not follow them up vigorously? You say that our troops were not jaded; that a large portion of our forces had not been engaged at all. Then why were not the enemy followed up vigorously?

Answer. I cannot answer that question. It is like a great many other questions that have been asked me, which I cannot answer. I can see no reason why we did not follow them more vigorously than was done. This action was on the 3d of July. On the 4th of July it seemed evident enough that the enemy were retreating. How far they were gone we could not see from the front. We could see but a comparatively small force from the position where I was. On Sunday the 5th and 6th corps moved in pursuit. As we moved, a small rear guard of the enemy retreated. We followed them, with this small rear guard of the enemy before us, up to Fairfield, in a gorge of the mountains. There we again waited for them to go on. There seemed to be no disposition to push this rear guard when we got up to Fairfield. A lieutenant from the enemy came into our lines and gave himself up. He was a northern Union man, in service in one of the Georgia regiments, and, without being asked, he unhesitatingly told me, when I met him as he was being brought in, that he belonged to the artillery of the rear guard of the enemy, and that they had but two rounds of ammunition with the rear guard. But we waited there without re-



ceiving any orders to attack. It was a place where, as I informed General Sedgwick, we could easily attack the enemy with advantage. But no movement was made by us until the enemy went away. Then one brigade of my division with some cavalry was sent to follow on after them, while the remainder of the 6th corps moved to the left. We moved on through Boonsboro', and passed up on the pike road leading to Hagerstown. After passing Boonsboro' it became my turn to lead the 6th corps. That day, before we started, General Sedgwick ordered me to move on and take up the best position I could over a little stream on the Frederick side of Funkstown. As I moved on it was suggested to me by him to move carefully. "Don't come into contact with the enemy; we don't want to bring on a general engagement." It seemed to be the general impression that it was not desired to bring on a general engagement. I moved on until we came near Funkstown. General Buford was along that way with his cavalry. I had passed over the stream referred to and found a strong position, which I concluded to take and wait for the 6th corps to come up. In the mean time General Buford, who was in front, came back to me and said, "I am pretty hardly engaged here; I have used a great deal of my ammunition; it is a strong place in front; it is an excellent position." It was a little further out than I was—nearer Funkstown. He said, "I have used a great deal of my ammunition, and I ought to go to the right; suppose you move up there, or send up a brigade, or even a part of one, and hold that position." Said I, "I will do so at once if I can just communicate with General Sedgwick; I am ordered to take up a position over here and hold it, and the intimation conveyed to me was that they did not want to get into a general engagement; I will send for General Sedgwick and ask permission to hold that position and relieve you." I accordingly sent a staff officer to General Sedgwick with a request that I might go up at once and assist General Buford, stating that he had a strong position but his ammunition was giving out. General Buford remained with me until I should get an answer. The answer was, "No, we do not want to bring on a general engagement." "Well," said I, "Buford, what can I do?" He said, "They expect me to go further to the right; my ammunition is pretty much out. That position is a strong one, and we ought not to let it go." I sent down again to General Sedgwick, stating the condition of General Buford, and that he would have to leave unless he could get some assistance; that his position was not far in front, and that it seemed to me that we should hold it, and I should like to send some force up to picket it at least. After a time I got a reply that if General Buford left I might occupy the position. General Buford was still with me, and I said to him "If you go away from there I will have to hold it." "That's all right," said he, "I will go away." He did so, and I moved right up. It was a pretty good position, where you could cover your troops. Soon after relieving Buford we saw some rebel infantry advancing. I do not know whether they brought them from Hagerstown, or from some other place. They made three dashes, not in heavy force, upon our line to drive us back. The troops that happened to be there on our line were what we considered in the army of the Potomac unusually good ones. They quietly repulsed the rebels twice, and the third time they came up they sent them flying into Funkstown.

Yet there was no permission to move on and follow up the enemy. We remained there some time, until we had orders to move on and take a position a mile or more nearer Hagerstown. As we moved up we saw the rebels had thrown up some light field-works, hurriedly thrown up, apparently to cover themselves while they recrossed the river. I think we remained there three days, and the third night, I think, after we got up into that position, it was said the rebels recrossed the river.

Question. From your experience as a military man, had you not reason to believe, after that terrible cannonading at Gettysburg, and the fight there, and

considering also the distance Lee's army was from its base of supplies, and the great distance they had to carry their ammunition, that they must have very nearly exhausted their supply of ammunition?

Answer. There can be no question about it; I think that it was. I said to some officers, "I am more surprised than I have been at any time during this war, that this force does not attack the enemy, or make some attempt to attack him. We are morally certain that their ammunition is about out; we ought to know that from the cannonading at Gettysburg." I told them that I had timed them at Gettysburg; that I knew from the rate and duration of artillery firing, and from the transportation they had, they must have very nearly exhausted their artillery ammunition, and the artillery officer we had captured from their rear guard, whom I believe spoke truthfully, stated that there were only two rounds of artillery ammunition left for the rear guard.

Question. Can you give us the course of reasoning that brought General Meade and a majority of his corps commanders to the conclusion that, under these circumstances, it was not best to attack the enemy?

Answer. I was not in the council, and I could not presume to give you the logic by which they arrived at that conclusion.

Question. Can you give any reason, satisfactory to yourself as a military man, why you did not attack the enemy there?

Answer. No, sir, I cannot; the reasons were all the other way, as it seemed to me. Our forces had not been demoralized or dispirited by the orderly fight at Gettysburg; they had had plenty to eat; they had ammunition; they had not been hard marched from Gettysburg up there. In fact, I looked upon our army at that time as in good fighting condition. We had lost some; but the rebel army had lost much more than we had, and were, besides, demoralized and dispirited by the retrograde movement they had made. General Neil, who was in command of a brigade of my division that followed the retreat of the rebels from Fairfield, when he came back and rejoined us, before we got up to Hagerstown, stated to me that "the mountains," to use his expression, "were full of rebels who had fallen out and were going in every direction." Said he, "They were so plenty that we would not stop and pick them up," showing the demoralizing, dispiriting effect upon the rebels of that retrograde movement. I expressed my astonishment that we should remain there without attacking, with the river so high that the rebel army could not cross it, and were almost without ammunition, while our men were in good fighting trim, and the rebels dispirited and demoralized.

Question. Can you have any doubt, under these circumstances, that a vigorous assault by our army would have been fatal to that under Lee?

Answer. That is only a matter of opinion.

Question. I know that; but it is your opinion, as a military man, that we want.

Answer. It is my opinion that, with a comparatively small fight, the rebels would have been thrown into utter disorder, and could not have got across the river.

Question. And must have surrendered?

Answer. They must have been captured or killed. I have never had any doubt that if our force had attacked, it did not matter much how or in what order, the morale was so much in our favor; the supply of ammunition was so full with us and so nearly exhausted with them, we should have overcome them easily, if we had made anything like a formidable attack upon them. It is my belief they would have caved right in; that was my impression. It was replied to me by an officer, "Suppose they whip us here; wouldn't they go to Washington?" I replied to him, "This is as safe a place to fight as we could desire; if they whip us, as is possible in the course of human events, we have only to move back to South mountain, and this whole force of rebels cannot drive out

of those passes one-fourth of the force we have; after they have whipped us, what is left of them will be able to do but little mischief in Washington." But I can see no reason why we should have been whipped there, when, as far as I could judge, everything was in our favor.

Question. If you were whipped anywhere it would endanger Washington, I suppose. But was not that the best place to have a fight?

Answer. I thought so. I thought it was one of those opportunities that occur but once in a long time.

Question. Can you have great confidence in the ability of officers who counsel to forego such an opportunity?

Answer. As an officer, I must say, as you ask me, that I lost my respect for the judgment of the council which it is said voted not to attack.

Question. Was not such overcaution well calculated to weaken the confidence of the army in the ability and resolution of their officers?

Answer. I am decidedly of the opinion that it was.

Question. You remained there until the enemy had recrossed the river, and for some time afterwards. How long was it before you started to follow them up?

Answer. They crossed in the night. We found it out the next day, in the morning; and that afternoon, if I remember rightly, the 6th corps moved back on the pike towards South mountain and encamped. Then we crossed the South mountain range and made a little circuitous move and came down to the old crossing place at Berlin, I think it is. There we crossed with the army, and moved along slowly until we reached different points. The 6th corps moved up towards Manassas gap—not up to it, but towards it, as if going there. When at a point some miles distant from the gap—I do not remember the name of the place—we were ordered to move up towards Gaines's Crossroads, which was a pretty long march. We started in the afternoon, and got up there quite late at night. My impression was that we were not in the way to strike the enemy, for they were on the other side of the mountains and well out of our reach, except a rear guard. We remained there for a little time, when a rumor was circulated abroad in the army from headquarters that the rebels had ingloriously fled from their camp and gone off, declining to give battle. Then we moved down on to the Rappahannock again, near Warrenton.

Question. Did you pursue the enemy with vigor after they recrossed the river?

Answer. I cannot say how other portions of the army moved; but it seemed to me that the 6th corps moved quite leisurely, except that march in the afternoon. Other than that, we went along very moderately, as it appeared to me, waiting for the enemy to move off.

Question. You did not see any disposition to want to come up with them?

Answer. No, sir. I did not see any exhibition of energy indicating that we were in earnest pursuit, only that we were keeping along in that direction. I had no idea we should strike them except in some little skirmishing party. The movement was very like the movement we made when we were over there before, after the battle of Antietam. We were following along, but in a manner that indicated to me no purpose or determination to compel the enemy to give battle.

Question. You went on, and finally the enemy made a stand somewhere?

Answer. When it was announced that the enemy had ingloriously fled we moved off to the Rappahannock, and they passed around further to the right. We went up to the Rappahannock, near Warrenton. I cannot state the day in July when we got there, and there we remained, the 6th corps on the right of the army. We remained there quietly and undisturbed until in October, I think, when we moved to Culpeper; afterwards our corps moved on to the Rapidan.

On the Friday evening before we started back to Centreville, General Meade came out there with his staff, and was joined at Miller's Station by General Sedgwick and his staff. They came out to the right, and wanted to look at the state of the country around there. I said to them that Bald Top mountain was a point from which they could get a better view than from any other point about there. There was a signal officer on the station there, and he was then reading the signals of the rebels, the key to which he had got. They rode up, and looked about, and it seemed to me that the view was new to General Meade; it was as if he was getting a first impression.

Question. What was the substance of the conversation—the observations which led you to suppose that?

Answer. I do not think I could remember exactly what he said; and I do not think it would enlighten you much if I could remember his exact words; for, in the army, among military men, there seems to be a kind of freemasonry, a peculiar language or manner of communicating ideas that you could not understand.

Question. State the impression you received from General Meade, and what his opinions were then.

Answer. The impression that I got was, that he thought he could not go on; that it was hardly worth while to make further inquiries then. I remember that while standing there with General Meade, I said to him, "Well, I do not see, as our army is placed, and Lee stands here, that there is more than one thing that he can do to his profit." For we had good fighting places, plenty of them, from the Rappahannock up, strong positions into which our army could be thrown, and get great advantage over an opposing force. I knew that Lee had been over that ground with his army, and had occupied it, and that there were persons there who could tell him all that it was necessary for him to know. I spoke to General Meade from what I supposed must be General Lee's knowledge of the position. I said to General Meade, "I do not see but one thing that Lee can do with advantage with his army; and that is, to throw himself suddenly upon our rear." General Meade replied: "Oh! he cannot do that; he would not think of doing such a thing as that." I felt pleased that General Meade was so confident that he could meet Lee at what I considered was our most vulnerable point. My impression at the time was, and had been, that Lee would not undertake to attack us where we were, but must make a movement upon our rear. General Meade expressed himself with entire confidence that that could not be done. And I inferred from what he said that there need be no anxiety about our position, and the only question was about what we could do in getting ahead. Some remarks were made about the comparative strength of the two armies. I did not at that time know accurately what our strength was; and having tried to estimate it, from all the information I could gather, his statements about our strength made a strong impression upon me, so that I remembered it.

Question. What was the strength of our army?

Answer. General Meade remarked that our strength was 74,000 men, and of that number he said that 68,000 were armed, and in a condition to fight. Then he spoke of the strength of Lee's army. He run over data that he had obtained from divers and sundry sources, and made out that Lee could not have more than 45,000 men. He referred to the different corps and divisions of the rebel army; to the movements that had been made, with which he seemed to be familiar. And, as I remember, he stated that Lee's army could not be over 45,000 men; showing that we had such a preponderance of force that with anything like a fair ordinary chance we could have our own way. That was on Friday. The next afternoon, on towards the latter part of it, movements were being made on the Madison Court House way by the enemy, which we could discover from Bald Top mountain, indicating that the enemy were moving around to our right. And well on towards evening sharp firing was heard at James

City on my right, where our cavalry had been. I was told that a division of the 3d corps had been sent up to support the cavalry. The firing was of such a character that I felt confident that the enemy was coming there in much stronger force than we were ready to meet. That evening I had orders to move back to Culpeper Court House as soon as night came on, which I did. I moved through the town of Culpeper, and got over there about 12 or 1 o'clock at night. Soon after I received orders to move to Rappahannock Station at 3 o'clock a. m. I was led to believe, in falling back from the Rapidan, that we were going to fight the enemy at Culpeper; but when the order came for us to fall back still further, I was at a loss to tell what was meant. We moved back the next day, Sunday, to Rappahannock Station. The whole army was moving that way, and we crossed over the Rappahannock. The next day we recrossed the Rappahannock. I had the order of battle, and may have it now; it was shown to me to read. General Meade gave the order for the 6th corps, and, I think, the 2d corps, to cross the Rappahannock and move up to Brandy Station. This was on Monday. This order stated that we were going to meet the enemy over there, and that we would be re-enforced to the whole strength of the army if necessary to check the enemy. We moved up to Brandy Station in the afternoon of Monday. Some picket force that was there fell back in a body, and we did not come into collision with the enemy. About 9 o'clock that night the provost marshal of my division brought in to me a civilian living near there. Before he brought him in he said to me, "This man knows the movements going on around here, but he does not exactly want to tell; he knows what rebels have been here, and what way they have gone." I told him that I would make some little arrangements to suit the condition of things, and that I wanted to draw out of that man by some means what was the amount of the rebel force he had seen, and which way it had gone. I saw the man, and so addressed myself to him that he thought it better to state everything he knew about it. He told me what movements the rebels had made; that they were all up above Sulphur Spring, at the crossing of the river there; that the last of the cavalry had left Brandy Station at 11 o'clock that day, and had gone up to our right, where the main body of Lee's army was. I sent this man to General Sedgwick, and I believe he sent him to General Meade. From the circumstances under which he made his statements, and from the corroborative evidence that we had there, I had no doubt that the rebel army was on our right. That night about 10 or 11 o'clock we were again ordered to fall back, my division, with General Buford's cavalry, being directed to cover the movement. We started about 12 o'clock, I think, and got back to Rappahannock Station about daybreak. When we got there I found the engineers making arrangements to burn the railroad bridge there and blow it up, though there was good fording there, and the river could be easily crossed. That was the first intimation I received that we were going to fall back still further. The evidence was conclusive to me that we were not going to fight there, but that we were going still further back.

The next day we moved back on the railroad to Warrenton Junction. When we left Rappahannock Station to go back there, knowing where the rebel army had been the day before, I felt certain that we should have a fight at Warrenton Junction, if not before. General Lee was in a position where he could deliver a blow upon us—certainly at the Junction, if not before we arrived there. When the 6th corps got back to the Junction there were two or three other corps assembled there. But there were no indications of the enemy at all; no skirmishing on our left, to indicate that the enemy were near. In the afternoon, quite late, we started on again.

It was evident to me then that General Lee did not intend to fight. He had Warrenton heights, a strong position, at his back, from which he could attack us on the flank. The position and the distance was in his favor, so that he could have compelled us to fight if he had desired. And when he did not deliver battle, or offer to fight, it became clear to me that he intended to merely harass

our rear, and, with only two-thirds of the force we had, follow our rear smartly as if he was driving us before him.

We continued to fall back until the body of the army reached Centreville and the Chantilly road. There was no attack by the enemy, except on our rear at Bristow Station. They attacked Warren's flank as he was moving along in the rear, but there was evidently no intention on the part of Lee to encounter our army, for I believe he was so well posted in regard to our strength that he did not wish it. All he apparently desired to do was to make movements of a threatening character in order to cause us to make movements that would be greatly to our disadvantage.

Question. It did not require a very threatening attitude on his part, it seems, to drive you?

Answer. Not at all.

Question. Were many military stores destroyed in your retreat?

Answer. There was considerable loss, I believe. The bridge at Rappahannock Station was blown up, which I considered a very important bridge to us. Its destruction inflicted no injury on the enemy, for there was a good ford there by which the enemy could cross the river.

Question. And what you did not tear up of the railroad the enemy tore up, I suppose?

Answer. When we came back to Centreville the enemy followed us up. They were on the line of the railroad, and when they retired they tore it all up, of course, so that we could not avail ourselves of it immediately.

Question. Was this retreat satisfactory to the army?

Answer. I think not. My impression is that they felt mortified by it.

Question. Can the army have any confidence in its general who gives such orders as those under the circumstances?

Answer. I think the effect is not good.

Question. If you had not the best material for an army in God's world, it would be a wonder that the army is not utterly demoralized, since its constant business is retreating?

Answer. I think it is due to the good character of the material that the army stands up as well as it does under these mortifying movements. It seems to me, sometimes, that the men take a more intelligent and sensible view of things than does the guiding intelligence of the army.

Question. Can you, as a military man, give any reason why you made such a disastrous retreat before such inferior numbers? do you know any good reason for it?

Answer. No, sir, I do not. I can only judge from what took place. We waited for a fight at Centreville and Chantilly, in the position we occupied; we did not attempt to go beyond that.

Question. You say there were many strong positions where you could have made a stand before you got to Centreville?

Answer. I think our army might have fought the rebel army with success without going back to Centreville.

Question. If you were so much superior in numbers to the enemy, why did you not become the assailing party when they had got outside their intrenchments? was there any good reason for it?

Answer. I do not know of any good reason that can be given.

Question. If your object in leaving the Potomac and following up the rebel army was not to fight them, why did you go out of your works here at all? why follow up the enemy on their retreat, if, when they made a stand, you were going to retreat yourselves?

Answer. I think that Centreville is a place where we could fight the enemy at a great advantage. I understood when we went out to Culpeper that General Meade selected that as a battle-ground, if the enemy made any movement.

Question. Did you not lose the whole season for campaigning by reason of this causeless retreat?

Answer. It caused the loss of valuable time.  
[Examination suspended till to-morrow.]

WASHINGTON, *March 4, 1864.*

General A. P. HOWE. Examination resumed,

By the chairman:

Question. The last question I asked you yesterday, I believe, was, whether by reason of this retreat of General Meade, this tearing up of bridges, &c., the fall campaign was very much impeded?

Answer. The retreat occurred near the close of a season of the year when it was favorable for active operations. When we fell back the distance we did, we gave the enemy full opportunity to destroy our means of railroad communication. When the railroad was in a condition to be used again, the season had so far advanced that any active operations to any extent would by many be thought to be bad economy. I know that there are some persons who think we can work in winter. I am a great deal of that opinion myself; but when we took Rappahannock Station again, the season was so far advanced that active operations to any extent, in a movement in advance, were out of the question, unless it was determined to operate in the winter season.

Question. When you reached Rappahannock Station, you went into winter quarters?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. While there, what transpired of a military character?

Answer. After the army moved from Centreville back to Warrenton, we moved from Warrenton on the force of the enemy stationed in the works at Rappahannock Station and captured them, and also captured some at the crossing below. The next day we moved over to Brandy Station, which is some four or five miles from Rappahannock Station. The enemy showed but little force, and gave way without any serious resistance. The army of the Potomac occupied the position at Brandy Station until about the 24th of November, I think, when orders were given for a forward movement. The weather changed immediately upon the issuing of that order, and the movement was delayed until the 26th, Thanksgiving day. The orders of movement required the 3d and 6th corps to move together, the 6th following the 3d. The 3d corps was ordered to move early in the morning, and the two corps were to cross the Rapidan at a designated point. Two other corps were ordered to cross the Rapidan just below where we were to cross, and another corps was to cross a little further below them, but near them, so that they were all to be in supporting distance.

In the movement of the 6th corps, on the morning of the 26th of November, my division in its turn was to follow General Terry's division. I left camp immediately behind him, and we moved a mile or so, when the leading division of the 6th corps was stopped. We waited there well on to an hour, I think, and the inquiry was made, "What are we stopping for?" Men and officers seemed surprised at a halt like that at the very commencement of the movement. In the course of the day, on the march, I met General Terry, whose division was leading the 6th corps, and said to him, familiarly, "Why were you not up this morning?" or something like that. He replied that the delay was not on his account; that when he came up to the 3d corps, General

Birney's division of which was next preceding him, he went to see General Birney, in order to ascertain why they were not moving; that General Birney said he had not got his breakfast, remarking, "I never move unless I have orders; I have no orders to move." We waited some time for the 3d corps to move, and then resumed the march. The 3d and 6th corps crossed the Rapidan that night, and the 6th corps bivouacked that night on the south bank of the river. It was nearly two o'clock when my division got across and got into position, and another division of the 6th corps was following mine.

In the morning the 6th corps had orders to follow immediately behind the 3d corps; my division was to lead the 6th corps that day. My recollection is that the 3d corps was to move by daylight. I did not see the written order, but, as I understood it, the 3d corps was to move very early, and move up to Robertson's tavern and connect with the 2d corps, which was at that point. The distance from our position to Robertson's tavern was short; I think three miles would cover it. I was delayed in the movement that morning—I cannot say how long, but until officers and men were all out of patience, so far as I could see—waiting for the 3d corps to start. I have no knowledge why there was so long a delay there. After a time I was able to move on, and I followed closely behind the 3d corps, or I kept behind the 3d corps, until about four or five o'clock that afternoon, we making little or no progress during the day.

About that time I heard some firing in the front, and it began to warm up a little. During this last halt or delay General Sedgwick had passed along to the front. The position of the 3d corps, or that portion of it that I could see having a brush with the enemy, was near at hand. I asked General Sedgwick if I might bring my division into position, so that we might take part in the affair if it was necessary. And I did so. General Wright's division, of the 6th corps, was following mine, and some of his troops came up. I got my division into position, together with a portion of General Wright's division on my left, which was sent to me. But we were not engaged. It became dark, and the enemy seemed to draw off. Previous to this I heard that General Meade had sent two or three times, urging the 3d corps to move up and join the 2d corps. An officer was sent after night to communicate with General Meade, who was in the direction of Robertson's tavern, or further to our left.

About eleven o'clock that night orders were received to be ready to move. The understanding and reports then were that the 3d corps had got on the wrong road, and were all out of place, and the whole thing had become disjointed in consequence. We were near the river, and but a little distance from where the corps immediately on our left had crossed. The orders were to move around to Robertson's tavern by going to the left, leaving the road we were upon. About twelve o'clock that night the 6th corps moved to the left, and came around to near Robertson's tavern. We got there and connected with the 2d corps about daylight on Saturday morning, the 28th of November. Soon after getting there I was told that General Warren, who was in command of the 2d corps, had sent word to General Meade that there was no enemy in his front. At all events, the 6th corps was ordered to move on.

This Robertson's tavern is on one of the two roads known as the plank road and the pike road from Orange Court House to Fredericksburg. They run for some distance nearly parallel to each other, and are good roads for men and carriages. When we moved on Saturday morning we moved on the road nearest the river; we moved on a mile or so, and found that the enemy had occupied some small field-works that had been hastily thrown up, but that they had fallen back. We moved on until we came up near Mine run. The 6th corps was then on the right of the line and on our right of the road nearest the river. There we found that the enemy had another position behind Mine run, I may say on the other side of Mine run. We there halted and got into line of battle, taking up a position on this side of Mine run. My division was



then on the right of the 6th corps, and the 6th corps was on the right of the army, as we stretched across those two roads. I judged, from the general position of things, that the enemy were holding those two roads, with the best selection of ground that they could get, to stop our advance on Orange Court House. As I have said, it was Saturday morning that we got up there.

That part of the enemy's left which was opposed to the 6th corps was quickly looked at by most of the ranking officers of the 6th corps, and of course they discussed it among themselves, and formed their opinion as to the practicability of carrying the position. I did not know what strength the enemy had on our left, covering the other road, but from the character of the country I supposed it was about the same natural strength that he had opposed to us. Nothing was done that day excepting this inspection of their position.

On Sunday morning, I think not very early in the morning, but some time in the forenoon, I was given to understand that there was going to be an attack. I was up to the front of the 6th corps, and General Sedgwick and General Wright were there, and we were looking at the ground. I do not know who, but some one suggested that they would like to have General Meade look at the ground there. He was sent for and asked if he would take a look at the position in front. Soon after he came up, and he, General Sedgwick, General Wright, and myself, went down towards Mine run, where we could view the entire ground, the nature of the enemy's defences, and the strength they had. I cannot remember the conversation that was had, but the impression I got was that we were not to attack the enemy there.

Question. You derived that impression from the conversation of the commanding general?

Answer. Yes, sir; as I said yesterday, there is with officers of the army who know each other, and have served together, a sort of instinct and intuition by which they know one another's views by means of a very few words or suggestions. The remark was made by General Meade, I think, "This is another Gettysburg," or "We have got another Gettysburg in front of us." The impression with me was that we were not going to attack at all.

Question. If you were not going to attack, what was the object of that advance of the whole army out there?

Answer. That involves the animus and intentions of the commanding general, which I cannot answer. I can only give my impressions.

Question. That was an advance of the whole army of the Potomac?

Answer. Yes, sir; we were all up there.

Question. How far were you from your former position at Brandy Station?

Answer. I reckon it was some eight or ten miles from where we crossed.

Question. For how many days did you take rations with you on that march?

Answer. I think we had eight days' rations.

Question. Did you not learn from the commanding general what was the object of this movement—what he expected to accomplish by it?

Answer. No, sir; there was nothing in his orders that I saw that indicated it.

Question. You found the enemy in force on one side of Mine run, while our army was on the other side?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was the character of their defences there, as you judged from seeing them? You called the commanding general to look at them. Did they appear to be formidable?

Answer. To look at the positions, and what the rebels had done to strengthen them, at a glance they appeared to be pretty strong; but, as I have said, the 6th corps held the right of our army, and we were opposed to the rebel left. Upon a little examination I considered the position was not a strong one, for after this inspection was had in the morning with General Meade—when I received the impression that there was to be no attack—I went around towards

the enemy's left. Mine run bends to the enemy's left from where their left tested. I went around that day and looked at their left very carefully; for, at the time we were looking at them in our front, I was fully of the belief that their left was weak and could be carried beyond question; but after I went around there and examined it, I was confirmed in my opinion; I saw that there was nothing to arrest us if we attacked their left. I communicated with General Wright, and told him what my ideas were; that I thought the enemy's position could easily be carried from that point; that the ground was favorable to us, and that great advantages were offered by a wood that was near at hand, where we could cover our troops until we were ready to strike the blow; that we could carry the position by surprise by a dash, and I made an appointment with him to go and look at it. But he did not come at the time, and we did not go out there together; but he went afterwards in the day and looked at the position for himself. In the evening he sent for me to come to his headquarters, saying that he had looked at the ground. I went there, and was told that he had gone to General Sedgwick's headquarters, and that they wanted me to go up there. I went up there and found General Sedgwick, General Sykes—who commanded the 5th corps—and General Wright there. General Wright said to me, "I went around and looked at the point to which you referred." I do not remember now the exact expression he used, but the substance of it was that he thought as favorably of an attack there as I did.

When I got to General Sedgwick's headquarters and met these officers there, it seemed to be the purpose to have a consultation as to what could be done on our right, and inquiries were made as to what examination General Wright and myself had made there. General Sedgwick and General Sykes had not been around there. Some considerable inquiries were made as to the features of the ground, and the practicability of an attack there. I told them what my opinion was about it, and said that I thought an attack there would be quite certain to be successful. After discussing the matter for some time, General Sedgwick said, I think, that he would take the opinions of those of us there. Being the junior officer there, I was first asked by General Sedgwick, officially and formally, what my opinion was as to the practicability of an attack there, and the possibility of our carrying the enemy's left. I had before that said to General Wright that I could, in my opinion, carry the enemy's left with my division, if they would let me go up there and take position in those woods, so that I could strike them suddenly. But in answer to General Sedgwick's inquiry as to what I thought about it—supposing that the 5th and 6th corps would go around there together and take position in those woods without being seen by the enemy, which could easily be done—I at once answered that in my judgment the 5th and 6th corps in that position would carry the enemy's left and take possession of what seemed to be considered by all as the key-point of their left, in twenty-five minutes from the word go.

Then came in one of those unofficial expressions which are peculiar among officers, and seem to influence judgments and opinions. General Sedgwick said, "I am glad that you are so confident." That remark, I may say, was unimportant except to those of us who were there and knew what such things mean in these councils, when the senior officer gives his opinion upon a matter, and yet it is in words but an acknowledgment of what another has said.

Question. The amount of it was that he considered you over-confident?

Answer. It was more than that; it rather signified that it was not well, officially, to record opinions that things can be done, unless those things were wanted to be done. That was the impression from his remarks. General Wright was then asked what his opinion was. He said, "I do not know that we can carry the position in twenty-five minutes, but I think we can in an hour;" and General Sedgwick made no further inquiries. General Sykes had not looked at the ground, and knew nothing about it.

Question. Why did not the commanding general go and look at it himself; was it a great way off?

Answer. No, sir; it was not a great way off. When he came up in the morning we were looking to the front, the strong part of the enemy's line.

Question. Well, what you had disclosed to the general was so important that if the conclusion you had arrived at had been acted upon, it would have had an important bearing upon the campaign; why did he not view the ground himself, if he doubted your judgment about it?

Answer. I can only give you the impression made upon me then, which was similar to what it has been in a great many other cases.

Question. Well, give us that.

Answer. My impression is that there is a want of heart, of earnestness of purpose in the man who is in command. He looked at enough that was strong; but, as I said to them then, that looks strong, and it is strong in some points; but there are some weak points there, and it is at our discretion where we shall attack. We can just as well attack a weak point as to attack here where it is strong; and if there is a weak point the strength of the works is to be measured by that. Now, I believe we could have carried the position if we had attacked it in front, and I so expressed myself to General Sedgwick. But, then, we had a much better opportunity, and I looked upon the attack on the enemy's left as sure a thing as any military movement could be. In the course of that evening, late in the evening, the order was given for the 5th and 6th corps to move around and take position under cover of those woods, and we did so; and it was understood that at 8 o'clock on Monday morning we were to make the attack. We had made the movement around under cover of the night, and placed the men where we could look right into the enemy's camp, which was at but a little distance from us. I had asked a number of citizens about this Mine run, what was the character of it, &c. I learned that it was but a small stream, with two feet of water in some places, and in other places only eight inches of water; one of those little mountain streams which it is not at all difficult for infantry to cross. There seemed to be an entire confidence throughout my division that it was an easy as well as a sure thing to carry the enemy's left. One of the officers who commanded a brigade in my division, and who has been in the service for some years—General Neil—said, "I believe I can carry that with my brigade." Another brigade commander in my division expressed this opinion: "I believe there is one regiment in the Vermont brigade that can take the key of that position," which was an opening that commanded the position. They were under some little excitement, and were pretty sanguine. We had got into a good position, where we could strike with success. The men were fired up, and all seemed eager for the order to attack. Our artillery was brought into position on the left of the two corps, an admirable position both as to its artillery effect and its favoring this movement on the flank of the enemy. We waited there some time after the hour appointed for the order to move, but it did not come. I had met General Sedgwick just before 8 o'clock, when the artillery was not yet in position, and I remember saying to him that attention should be called to the artillery in order that it should be on time; that if we were to attack at 8 o'clock the artillery would want all the time that was left in order to get ready; and that any movements they might make on the left of our line would rather draw the enemy's attention from where we were going to deliver our blow. At 8 o'clock, or about that time, our artillery opened fire. They had fired but a few shots, when I was told that an order had come from General Meade suspending the attack. The order was to suspend the attack, but that we should begin it again in a few moments, or soon. But I understood by it that we were not going to make any attack; the attack was suspended, and it remained suspended.

Question. Where was General Meade at this time?

Answer. I do not know at what point he was; I suppose he was near the plank road.

Question. Within easy communication of you?

Answer. Yes, sir; I judge so.

Question. Had he been informed of the advantageous position which you held there?

Answer. He must have been. I think I understood the result of the council held at the headquarters of the 6th corps was made known to him about 11 o'clock the night before the 5th and 6th corps were ordered to move into this position. I was told that General Meade had sent some 28,000 men around on our left, where General Warren had informed him there was a favorable place to attack. I know that forces had been drawn from other corps to re-enforce the left of our line. I heard afterwards that when the hour of attack came General Warren had come to the conclusion that we could not succeed there.

There were a great many officers on our part of the line who were very much excited that the movement should have been made to our left, and so much interest had been got up about it, and then when the time came to make the attack it should have been considered that we could not succeed. There were a great many angry remarks made, for the men on our part of the line were all out of temper at losing such an advantage as we had, because some one on another part of the line thought they could not succeed where they were. I will not say what opinions were expressed, for we were all a great deal excited.

We remained there until nightfall without making any attack, and were then ordered to move back into the position which we had before occupied, where we remained until we were ordered to recross the river. We recrossed the river without any molestation. I refer to this because when we got to Robertson's tavern my division came down on a road to the left of the plank road, which I had previously examined and found to be practicable, and by moving on it it would avoid choking up the other roads; and I had asked to move on Robertson's tavern that way. The whole army moved across the river, I believe, without a shot being fired, which gave me the impression that, with their usual alertness and readiness to obtain information, the enemy were by no means our equal in strength, or they would not have allowed us to come away from there undisturbed.

In the engagement which we had had on the Friday before we came back we took some prisoners, and, so far as I could learn, there seemed to be but one idea prevailing among them, which was, "You are 25,000 men too strong for us, and you have come over here to drive us into Richmond and then starve us out." That seemed to be the prevailing idea with the rebel prisoners—that we had the advantage of them by about 25,000 men, and they had got to go back to Richmond and there do the best they could to subsist themselves.

When we got back, a large portion of our army that I came in contact with were, to say the least of it, mortified at the unsuccessful movement we had made.

Question. And that ended the campaign?

Answer. Then we went to Brandy Station, and there the army has remained since, with the exception of some little movements and expeditions.

Question. You say the army was mortified?

Answer. Yes, sir, so far as I discovered their sentiments; that, however, is, perhaps, a mild term; there was more of a feeling of disgust that when we had a promising chance before us we should have turned our backs upon it and come away.

Question. Tell me, if you can, whether, after all you have stated here, the officers of that army with whom you are well acquainted retain confidence in the ability of General Meade as the commander of that army?

Answer. I cannot answer that question without going somewhat into matters which do not lie right on the surface.

Question. You can give your general impression from all you know. I ask the question because it seems to me that these constant mortifications of missing opportunities to do something would lead them to think that there was some want of ability in the head of the army.

Answer. I do not know exactly how to answer that question. I may say that I think there are some officers of high rank in the army of the Potomac who, if you asked them that question, would express themselves as having full confidence in General Meade as the commander of that army.

Question. Is that class of officers composed of those whose hearts are really in the vigorous prosecution of this war?

Answer. It seems to me that those officers have a sympathy with the policy that has been heretofore pursued in the command of the army of the Potomac while under General McClellan. I look upon our army upon the Peninsula as having been unfortunate in the character and state of mind of its commander at that time, and that policy has been transferred in a great degree to its present commander, perhaps, as I am led to believe, from the connexion the present commander had with that one. There are certain sympathies, feelings, and considerations of action which seem to govern now as they did then. And from my experience of the army, the disposition of its commanding general, and the view which he takes of the general state of things, has a very marked effect upon some of those who are immediately associated with him; and hence I say that if some of those officers I speak of were asked the question they would say that the present commander of the army of the Potomac is fully competent for his position.

Question. Do you speak now of the corps commanders principally?

Answer. Yes, sir, of those who affect the movements of the army, whose views are taken when a council of war is called, which seem to be given as the sentiment of the army.

Question. Take the other officers, commanders of divisions, brigadiers, and the colonels and the other officers, do they retain full confidence in the ability of the commanding general?

Answer. I do not think they have full confidence in the ability or state of mind of General Meade. What I mean by that is the animus that directs the movements of the army. They do not think there is that heart, and energy, and earnestness of purpose in the war to make every use of the means at his command to injure the enemy and carry on the war successfully. I do not think they have, I will not say confidence, but faith in him. They do not expect from him what the crisis seems to call for. They believe that if he is attacked he will do all he can to defend his position. But that he will act with zeal and energy, or that his whole heart and soul are in the bringing all the means successfully to bear to break down the enemy, as far as I can judge, they do not look for that; they do not expect it. As far as I can judge, a great many officers think he can do very well in a defensive fight. If he was called upon to guard the Potomac or Washington, he will make good marches to stop the enemy; but that he will be active, zealous, energetic, in using his means to strike successful offensive blows against the enemy, not at all; he is not the man for that, at least that is my impression.

Question. The same observation you apply to General Meade will apply to the corps commanders you refer to, will it not?

Answer. I think so. I do not know as it would be proper for me to state here the terms we use in the army. However, we say there is too much copperheadism in it. This is so for different reasons: with some there is a desire to raise up General McClellan; with others there is a dislike to some of the measures of the government; they do not like the way the negro question is handled. And,

again, the impression is made upon my mind that there are some who have no faith in this war, who have no heart in it; they will not do anything to commit themselves; but there is a wide difference between doing your duty so as not to commit yourself, and doing all that might reasonably be expected of you at these times. I do not know as I can express myself better than saying that there is copperheadism at the root of the matter.

Question. Do you mean that many of the high officers sympathize with those politicians of the north who are called "peace men?"

Answer. I am fully of that opinion. If I was asked to state the acts and sayings of those officers, to any one who has not been connected with military matters, and who has not caught the real meaning of expressions and manners and all those little things, I might not, perhaps, be able to satisfy him of what I mean, but I must say that it is my opinion that there is too much sympathy with men and measures in opposition to the principal measures of the government, and those who are in control of the government.

Question. You think that politics are mixed up with military movements?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think there are outside considerations which qualify the efficiency and energy which we have a right to expect from officers in command. That is my opinion now, and it has been for some time.

Question. You have been under General Meade all the time he has been in command. Do you know of any aggressive movement he has led against the enemy at any time?

Answer. An independent movement?

Question. Yes, sir; where he has planned an expedition against the enemy and undertaken to carry it out.

Answer. No, sir; I do not. The only time I have ever known General Meade to be actively engaged was at Fredericksburg.

Question. That was when General Burnside was in command. I mean since General Meade has been in command of the army of the Potomac.

Answer. No, sir; I do not, unless you consider the cutting the enemy's line of march at Gettysburg was an aggressive movement.

Question. If I have understood it, the battle of Gettysburg was not a pre-meditated movement of General Meade; but it was brought on by the fact that some of our corps were attacked there, and it was not until quite late in the fight that it was really determined to fight a decisive battle there.

Answer. No, sir; I do not think that can be given as a direct answer to your inquiry. That battle grew out of the necessity of the hour. The army of the Potomac was moving to stop the march of the rebels. Our advance struck them there, and the position being a good one our forces were brought up and we accepted battle there.

Question. I want to ask you whether the rank and file of this army are not more than ordinarily intelligent for private soldiers? I mean in their ability to comprehend and understand things that are going on.

Answer. Before answering that question directly, I will say that I have been 22 years in the army; I graduated in 1841. I was in what was known as Twigg's division in the war with Mexico, on General Scott's line, and before we left Puebla to go into the valley of Mexico there was a great deal of pride and emulation between that division and another regular division commanded by General Worth, as to which should become the most efficient, and I refer to the condition of things at Puebla as showing perhaps the highest degree of efficiency in any large division that we have had since I have been in the service.

And when I come to compare the personnel of this army, or that portion of it with which I am familiar, the degree of efficiency which it is capable of rapidly attaining, with anything I have before seen, I may say that I do not think the old army can compare with this one. As I have said to several old officers whom I have met here, there is a degree of military efficiency and discipline in the

division of the 6th corps which I have commanded, there is a skill and ability to perform evolutions as a division, which has been rapidly acquired, that I have never seen equalled at all in the best showing I have ever seen in the old army. The character and intelligence of the men is markedly superior; they are men of far more intelligence, and more readily acquire efficiency in military matters.

Question. Do not this intelligent rank and file of the army of the Potomac appreciate somewhat the want of resolution in their officers in leading them to attack? In other words, do not they appreciate the advantages of a position such as you had on the left of the enemy at Mine run, and are they not disappointed when they find themselves called upon suddenly to retreat from such a position?

Answer. I think they do appreciate them most unquestionably, and I think the effect of those retrograde or abortive movements must be marked. And except for the high character of the rank and file as men of intelligence and ability to understand, I cannot account for the good morals of our army as it stands at this day, in the face of the failures and disappointments and mortifications with which they have met.

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*Testimony of Major General George G. Meade.*

WASHINGTON, *March 5, 1863.*

Major General GEORGE G. MEADE sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and position in the service?

Answer. I am a major general of volunteers, commanding the army of the Potomac.

Question. When were you invested with the command of that army?

Answer. I think it was the 28th of June, 1863.

Question. Where was the army at that time?

Answer. It was lying around and near Frederick, Maryland.

Question. You superseded General Hooker?

Answer. I relieved General Hooker.

Question. Will you give a statement, in your own way, of the battle of Gettysburg, and the disposition of your troops there?

Answer. When I assumed the command of the army of the Potomac, on the morning of the 28th of June, it was mostly around Frederick, Maryland; some portions of it, I think, were at that time at Middletown; one or two corps were the other side of a range of mountains between Frederick and Middletown. I had no information concerning the enemy beyond the fact that a large force under General Lee, estimated at about 110,000 men, had passed through Hagerstown, and had marched up the Cumberland valley; and through information derived from the public journals I had reason to believe that one corps of the rebel army, under General Ewell, was occupying York and Carlisle, and threatening the Susquehanna at Harrisburg and Columbia.

My predecessor, General Hooker, left the camp in a very few hours after I relieved him. I received from him no intimation of any plan, or any views that he may have had up to that moment. And I am not aware that he had any, but was waiting for the exigencies of the occasion to govern him, just as I had to be subsequently.

Under this existing state of affairs I determined, and so notified the general-in-chief, that I should move my army as promptly as possible on the main line from Frederick to Harrisburg, extending my wings on both sides of that line

as far as I could consistently with the safety and the rapid concentration of that army, and should continue that movement until I either encountered the enemy, or had reason to believe that the enemy was about to advance upon me; my object being at all hazards to compel him to loose his hold on the Susquehanna and meet me in battle at some point. It was my firm determination, never for an instant deviated from, to give battle wherever and as soon as I could possibly find the enemy, modified, of course, by such general considerations as govern every general officer—that when I came into his immediate neighborhood some manœuvres might be made by me with a view to secure advantages on my side in that battle, and not allow them to be secured by him.

On the morning of the 29th of June the army was put in motion. On the night of the 30th, after the army had made two days' marches, I had become satisfied, from information which I had received from different sources, that the enemy was apprised of my movement; that he had relinquished his hold on the Susquehanna; that he was concentrating his forces, and that I might expect to come in contact with him in a very short time; when and where, I could not at that moment tell. Under those circumstances I instructed my engineers, with such information as we had in our possession, from maps and from such knowledge of the country as we could obtain from individuals, to look about and select some general ground, having a general reference to the existing position of the army, by which, in case the enemy should advance on me across the South mountain, I might be able, by rapid movement of concentration, to occupy this position and be prepared to give him battle upon my own terms. With this view the general line of Pipe-clay creek, I think, was selected; and a preliminary order, notifying the corps commanders that such line might possibly be adopted, and directing them, in the event of my finding it in my power to take such a position, how they might move their corps and what their positions should be along this line. This order was issued, I think, on the night of the 30th of June, possibly on the morning of the 1st of July, certainly before any positive information had reached me that the enemy had crossed the mountain and were in conflict with any portion of my force.

On the 1st of July, my headquarters being at Taneytown, and having directed the advance of two corps the previous day to Gettysburg, with the intention of occupying that place, about 1 or 2 o'clock in the day, I should think, I received information that the advance of my army, under Major General Reynolds, of the 1st corps, on their reaching Gettysburg, had encountered the enemy in force, and that the 1st and 11th corps were at that time engaged in a contest with such portions of the enemy as were there. The moment I received this information I directed Major General Hancock, who was with me at the time, to proceed without delay to the scene of the contest; and, having in view this preliminary order which I had issued to him, as well as to other corps commanders, I directed him to make an examination of the ground in the neighborhood of Gettysburg and to report to me, without loss of time, the facilities and advantages or disadvantages of that ground for receiving battle. I furthermore instructed him that in case, upon his arrival at Gettysburg—a place which I had never seen in my life, and had no more knowledge of than you have now—he should find the position unsuitable and the advantages on the side of the enemy, he should examine the ground critically as he went out there and report to me the nearest position in the immediate neighborhood of Gettysburg where a concentration of the army would be more advantageous than at Gettysburg.

Early in the evening of July 1, I should suppose about 6 or 7 o'clock, I received a report from General Hancock, I think in person, giving me such an account of a position in the neighborhood of Gettysburg, which could be occupied by my army, as caused me at once to determine to fight a battle at that point; having reason to believe, from the account given to me of the operations of



July 1, that the enemy were concentrating there. Therefore, without any reference to but entirely ignoring the preliminary order, which was a mere contingent one, and intended only to be executed under certain circumstances which had not occurred, and therefore the order fell to the ground—the army was ordered immediately to concentrate, and that night did concentrate, on the field of Gettysburg, where the battle was eventually fought out.

I dwell particularly upon the point of this order, in consequence of its having been reported on the floor of the Senate that an order to retreat had been given by me. No order to retreat was at any time given by me. But, as I have already stated, a preliminary order, a copy of which is herewith furnished, [see copy appended to this deposition,] was issued by me before I was aware that the enemy had crossed the mountain, and that there was any collision between the two forces. That preliminary order was intended as an order of manœuvre, based upon contingencies which did not occur, and therefore the order was not executed. Such an order was given, as I have already acknowledged.

On the next day, July 2, the army was got into position at Gettysburg. Early in the morning it had been my intention, as soon as the 6th corps arrived on the ground—it having a distance, of nearly thirty-two miles to march—and a preliminary order had been issued, to make a vigorous attack from our extreme right upon the enemy's left, the command of which was to be given to Major General Slocum, who commanded the 12th corps on the right. The attacking column was to be composed of the 12th, 5th, and 6th corps. Major General Slocum, however, reported that the character of the ground in front was unfavorable to making an attack; and the 6th corps, having so long a distance to march, and leaving at nine o'clock at night, did not reach the scene until about two o'clock in the afternoon. Under these circumstances I abandoned my intention to make an attack from my right, and, as soon as the 6th corps arrived, I directed the 5th corps, then in reserve on the right, to move over and be in reserve on the left. About three or half past three o'clock in the afternoon—it having been reported to me about two o'clock that the 6th corps had arrived—I proceeded from my headquarters, which were about the centre of the line, and in rear of the cemetery, to the extreme left, in order to see as to the posting of the 5th corps, and also to inspect the position of the 3d corps, about which I was in doubt.

I had sent instructions in the morning to General Sickles, commanding the 3d corps, directing him to form his corps in line of battle on the left of the 2d corps, commanded by General Hancock, and I had indicated to him in general terms, that his right was to rest upon General Hancock's left; and his left was to extend to the Round Top mountain, plainly visible, if it was practicable to occupy it. During the morning I sent a staff officer to inquire of General Sickles whether he was in position. The reply was returned to me that General Sickles said there was no position there. I then sent back to him my general instructions which had been previously given. A short time afterwards General Sickles came to my headquarters, and I told him what my general views were, and intimated that he was to occupy the position that I understood General Hancock had put General Geary in the night previous. General Sickles replied that General Geary had no position, as far as he could understand. He then said to me that there was in the neighborhood of where his corps was some very good ground for artillery, and that he should like to have some staff officer of mine go out there and see as to the posting of artillery. He also asked me whether he was not authorized to post his corps in such manner as, in his judgment, he should deem the most suitable. I answered General Sickles, "Certainly, within the limits of the general instructions I have given to you; any ground within those limits you choose to occupy I leave to you." And I directed Brigadier General Hunt, my chief of artillery, to accompany General

Sickles and examine and inspect such positions as General Sickles thought good for artillery, and to give General Sickles the benefit of his judgment.

In consequence of these several messages to General Sickles, and this conversation with him, as soon as I heard that the 6th corps had arrived, and that the 5th corps was moving over to the left, I went out to the left for the purpose of inspecting General Sickles's position, and to see about the posting of the 5th corps. When I arrived upon the ground, which I did a few minutes before 4 o'clock in the afternoon, I found that General Sickles had taken up a position very much in advance of what it had been my intention that he should take; that he had thrown forward his right flank, instead of connecting with the left of General Hancock, something like a half or three-quarters of a mile in front of General Hancock, thus leaving a large gap between his right and General Hancock's left, and that his left, instead of being near the Round Top mountain, was in advance of the Round Top, and that his line, instead of being a prolongation of General Hancock's line, as I expected it would be, made an angle of about 45 degrees with General Hancock's line. As soon as I got upon the ground I sent for General Sickles and asked him to indicate to me his general position. When he had done so I told him it was not the position I had expected him to take; that he had advanced his line beyond the support of my army, and that I was very fearful he would be attacked and would lose the artillery, which he had put so far in front, before I could support it, or that if I undertook to support it I would have to abandon all the rest of the line which I had adopted—that is, that I would have to fight the battle out there where he was. General Sickles expressed regret that he should have occupied a position which did not meet with my approval, and he very promptly said that he would withdraw his forces to the line which I had intended him to take. You could see the ridge by turning around which I had indicated to him. You could see the ridge, by turning around, which I had intended him to take. But I told him I was fearful that the enemy would not permit him to withdraw, and that there was no time for any further change or movement. And before I had finished that remark, or that sentence, the enemy's batteries opened upon him and the action commenced.

Question. Before General Sickles had time to retire his corps?

Answer. Yes, sir; while I was speaking to him. And the subsequent events of that battle fully confirmed my judgment upon this occasion. The enemy threw immense masses upon General Sickles's corps, which, advanced and isolated in this way, it was not in my power to support promptly. At the same time that they threw these immense masses against General Sickles a heavy column was thrown upon the Round Top mountain, which was the key-point of my whole position. If they had succeeded in occupying that, it would have prevented me from holding any of the ground which I subsequently held to the last. Immediately upon the batteries opening I sent several staff officers to hurry up the column under Major General Sykes, of the 5th corps, then on its way, and which I had expected would have reached there by that time. This column advanced, reached the ground in a short time, and, fortunately, General Sykes was enabled, by throwing a strong force upon Round Top mountain, where a most desperate and bloody struggle ensued, to drive the enemy from it and secure our foothold upon that important position. In the mean time reinforcements were rapidly thrown from all parts of the line, so that by the time that General Sickles's corps, notwithstanding their gallantry and their stubborn resistance, was shattered and broken and driven into our lines, a reformation and a new line were made by the supports, and the enemy were repulsed and driven back to their former position.

I also make these remarks *in extenso* in consequence of my position and views in reference to the position occupied by General Sickles not being fully comprehended by the public, and not being expatiated on in my report. It is not my intention in these remarks to cast any censure upon General Sickles. I am of

the opinion that General Sickles did what he thought was for the best; but I differed with him in judgment. And I maintain that subsequent events proved that my judgment was correct, and his judgment was wrong.

This terminated the contest of the second day. The enemy was repulsed, and the line which I had intended originally General Sickles should form on was finally occupied by our troops and held to the last of the battle.

During these operations upon the left flank, a division and two brigades of the 12th corps, which held the right flank, were ordered over for the purpose of re-enforcing the left. Only one brigade, however, arrived in time to take any part in the action; the enemy having been repulsed before the rest of the force came up. The absence of this large proportion of the 12th corps caused my extreme right flank to be held by one single brigade of the 12th corps, commanded by General Greene. The enemy perceiving this, made a vigorous attack upon General Greene, but were held at bay by him for some time, until he was re-enforced by portions of the 1st and 11th corps, which were adjacent to him, when he succeeded in repulsing them.

During the night that portion of the 12th corps which had been sent over to the left was returned to its former position. On returning, however, they found that the enemy had advanced and were occupying a portion of the line of breastworks which the 12th corps had constructed before they left. The next morning at early daylight, the enemy having been re-enforced during the night, a spirited contest commenced, and was continued until 10 or 11 o'clock in the morning, in which nearly the whole of the 12th corps were engaged. It resulted in their finally driving the enemy from the position he had occupied and securing the line of the right flank as it was designed it should be.

About one o'clock in the day, as near as I can remember, the enemy opened upon our lines, with, I should judge, about 125 guns, a severe cannonade which they kept up between one and two hours, and which was directed at my left and left centre; principally at my left centre. The object of this was to demoralize my command by the severe fire, the enemy hoping that they would be enabled to drive us back from our lines, and to injure my artillery; and then intending, as they subsequently did, to make a grand assault, which should secure them the victory. This assault was made about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and was directed principally against that portion of the line commanded by Major General Hancock, on the left centre. After I became fully satisfied of the object of the enemy's fire, I directed my artillery to cease firing in order to save their ammunition, and also with the view of making the enemy believe that they had silenced our guns, and thus bring on their assault the sooner. It resulted as I desired. As soon as we ceased our firing the enemy ceased firing, and shortly afterwards they made their assault. This assault, which was made in three lines of battle, which were apparently over a mile and a half in extent in front, was entirely and successfully repulsed, although the enemy bravely and gallantly advanced until they came within the guns of our line of battle; one of their generals, General Armistead, being wounded and captured inside of my batteries. This assault was repulsed, and the enemy retired about five o'clock.

As soon as the assault was repulsed, I went immediately to the extreme left of my line, with the determination of advancing the left and making an assault upon the enemy's lines. So soon as I arrived at the left I gave the necessary orders for the pickets and skirmishers in front to be thrown forward to feel the enemy, and for all preparations to be made for the assault. The great length of the line, and the time required to carry these orders out to the front, and the movement subsequently made, before the report given to me of the condition of the forces in the front and left, caused it to be so late in the evening as to induce me to abandon the assault which I had contemplated.

The next day, which was the 4th of July, it was reported to me from the

extreme right that the enemy had disappeared from our front, but that he still maintained his appearance on the left and the left centre. I immediately directed General Slocum, in command of the right, to advance his corps and his skirmishers, and ascertain the position of the enemy. I likewise directed General Howard, in the centre, to push into Gettysburg, to see whether the enemy still occupied that town. I found, from the reports of those officers, that the enemy had retired from the circular position which they had occupied around us, and had assumed a position about parallel to my left and left centre. It rained very violently during portions of this day, so violently as to interrupt any very active operations if I had designed making them.

During the night of the 4th, the enemy, as I ascertained on the 5th, retired through the Cashtown and Fairfield passes. So soon as I was positively satisfied, from the reports of my officers, that the enemy had actually retired, I directed General Sedgwick, in command of the 6th corps, which corps had been comparatively unengaged during the battle, and was in full force and strength, to advance on the Fairfield road and pursue the enemy vigorously. At the same time I despatched a cavalry force to follow the retreating column on the Cashtown road, believing that the enemy was retiring into the Cumberland valley, and not satisfied what his further movements would be, not being satisfied that he was in full retreat for the Potomac, and not aware of what injury I had done him in the battle of Gettysburg, although satisfied that I had punished him very severely.

From information which I had previously received of the character of the passes at Fairfield and Cashtown, having been informed that they had been fortified by the enemy, and that a small force could hold a large body in check for a considerable time, I made up my mind that a more rapid movement of my army could be made by the flank through the Boonsboro' Pass, than to attempt to follow the enemy on the road which he himself had taken. I therefore directed that orders should be prepared, but not issued, for the movement of the various corps by way of Middletown and South mountain towards Hagerstown. This was, I think, the 6th of July. The 5th of July, I think, was occupied, after the retreat of the enemy, in burying our dead and attending to the wounded, of which we had a large number.

During this day, the 6th, I received reports from General Sedgwick that he was following the enemy's rear guard as rapidly as he could, but that he had reason to believe, from reports of prisoners, or from other information (which I do not recollect) that the main body of the enemy was around and in the vicinity of Fairfield Pass, and that it was not impossible that another engagement might be had with the enemy in those mountains. Under those circumstances, as a matter of security, and also willing to meet such a movement on the part of the enemy, I directed that two corps, I think the 3d and 5th—I am not positive about that—should be immediately moved in the direction of General Sedgwick, so as to be near him to assist him if he were attacked, or to re-enforce him if he himself required re-enforcement. When I had given this order I found that the other order, for the movement of the whole army, had been issued by my chief of staff, General Butterfield, without my authority. I so informed General Butterfield; and at the same time sent officers and arrested the progress of the 3d and 1st corps, which had not moved very far, and detained them to sustain General Sedgwick in case it was necessary. The other corps moved on.

During that day, towards evening or at night, I received a report from General Sedgwick that he had pushed the enemy's rear guard as far as Fairfield Pass; that the Fairfield Pass was a very strong position; that a very small force could hold him in check for a considerable time, though he could finally take it; and that, in his judgment, it would involve delay and waste of time to endeavor to push the enemy any further on that road. Upon receiving this

information I directed the whole army to move down towards Middletown; and directed General Sedgwick to move from Fairfield pass in the direction of Emmettsburg, leaving a force of cavalry and infantry to harass the rear of the enemy.

I have been thus particular in speaking of these movements because a report has also reached me that I lost a day by having stopped these two corps to sustain and re-enforce General Sedgwick, in case he should require it.

After reaching Middletown, it having been reported to me by my corps commanders that there were many necessary articles of clothing and other supplies that the army were very much in want of, and having myself, as I rode along, seen I may say hundreds of men walking over these broken turnpikes bare-footed on these long marches, I deemed it my duty to remain at Middletown one day in order to obtain the necessary supplies, and put my army in condition, and give them some rest. I may say that it was not until the end of that day that the whole army had come up, for, in consequence of the heavy rains which, as I have already stated, visited us on the 4th of July, the roads over which we had moved, notwithstanding they were the best roads in Pennsylvania, had been so cut up by the passage of my trains and artillery, that a considerable portion of the trains were in the rear, and the army did not get up and in hand until the close of the day which I remained for the purpose of obtaining supplies. As soon as the army was in condition we moved from Middletown through the South mountain.

I ought to have stated before, that in advancing from Frederick, upon assuming command of the army, I had directed a portion of the garrison at Harper's Ferry, under General French—which was placed under my command by the general-in-chief—7,000 of that garrison, to move up from Harper's Ferry to Frederick, to hold Frederick and the line of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, not knowing but that my communication would be dependent upon that road. The balance of that garrison, consisting of 4,000 men, I at first ordered to remain and hold Maryland heights. I did this, not because I considered the occupation of Harper's Ferry an important matter so far as the crossing of the Potomac river was concerned, for I did not, any more than any other place where the river could be crossed. But I did consider it important to hold that point as a *debouche* into the Cumberland valley, so that, if upon my return I should have found the enemy occupying the other passes, so long as I held Harper's Ferry I could always enter. Having been informed, however, that the supplies at Harper's Ferry were limited, and that in consequence of the railroad and the canal being right alongside the river and exposed to fire from the other side, the enemy with a small force could cut off communication with Harper's Ferry and prevent them from being supplied, and not knowing how long a time the campaign I was entering on might last, I yielded to the suggestions made to me to evacuate Harper's Ferry entirely; and late on the night of the 28th of June I ordered the 4,000 men previously ordered to remain there to garrison the place, to collect all the canal-boats that they could, load them with the public property at Harper's Ferry, so that nothing should be destroyed, and proceed with them down to Washington, where, in case of any disaster to me, they could act as part of the defence of Washington; or in the event of my being successful, they could be returned to my army. Those orders I believe were executed; General French occupied Frederick and threw a force into South Mountain pass.

As soon as it became evident that the enemy were retiring, information was sent to General French, and he was directed to immediately seize and hold South Mountain pass, and also reoccupy Harper's Ferry, bringing up the force from Washington for that purpose. All of which orders were not only executed, but General French, in advance of any instructions to that effect, had sent a cavalry force in his command across the mountain during the battle, which had penetrated as far as Williamsport, where they partially destroyed or rendered

ineffective a pontoon bridge of the enemy, capturing the greater portion of the small guard left there to defend it.

Having crossed the South mountain, I moved my army forward, by way of Boonsboro', until about the 12th of July I got into position in front of the enemy, whom I found on a line extending from Hagerstown towards a place called Downiesville, I think. So soon as my troops were in line, or as soon as my army was in hand and ready for offensive operations, although I had had no opportunity of examining critically and closely the enemy's position, still knowing the importance of not permitting the enemy to recross the river without a further action, it was my desire to attack him in that position. Having, however, been in command of the army not more than twelve or fourteen days, and in view of the important and tremendous issues involved in the result, knowing that if I were defeated the whole question would be reversed, the road to Washington and to the north open, and all the fruits of my victory at Gettysburg dissipated, I did not feel that I would be right in assuming the responsibility of blindly attacking the enemy without any knowledge of his position. I therefore called a council of my corps commanders, who were the officers to execute this duty, if it was determined upon, and laid before them the precise condition of affairs.

Question. Will you, as you pass along, give us the names of those corps commanders in that council?

Answer. The 1st corps was represented by General Wadsworth; General Newton, who commanded the corps, being sick at the time. The 2d corps was commanded, I think, by General William Hays; the 3d by General French; the 5th by General Sykes; the 6th by General Sedgwick; the 11th by General Howard, and the 12th by General Slocum.

I represented to those generals, so far as I knew it, the situation of affairs. I told them that I had reason to believe, from all I could ascertain, that General Lee's position was a very strong one, and that he was prepared to give battle and defend it if attacked; that it was not in my power, from a want of knowledge of the ground, and from not having had time to make reconnoissances, to indicate any precise mode of attack or any precise point of attack; that, nevertheless, I was in favor of moving forward and attacking the enemy and taking the consequences; but that I left it to their judgment, and would not do it unless it met with their approval. The opinion of that council was very largely opposed to any attack without further examination. I cannot state positively what each individual vote was without referring to my papers. But I am now under the impression that there were but two officers decidedly in favor of attacking; I think that General Wadsworth and General Howard were the only two in favor of attacking, while all the rest were opposed to it.

In view of this opinion of my subordinate officers I yielded, or abstained from ordering an assault, but gave the necessary directions for such an examination of the enemy's position as would enable us to form some judgment as to where he might be attacked with some degree and probability of success.

The 13th of July, which was the day spent in this examination, was very rainy and misty, and not much information was obtained; nevertheless, on the night of the 13th I directed that the next morning at daylight the whole army should move forward with a view to attacking the enemy. This order was duly executed, but during the night of the 13th the enemy had retired across the river.

It is proper I should say that an examination of the enemy's lines, and of the defences which he had made—of which I now have a map from an accurate survey, which can be laid before your committee—brings me clearly to the opinion that an attack, under the circumstances in which I had proposed to make it, would have resulted disastrously to our arms.

Question. Will you give us the reasons for that opinion?

Answer. It is founded upon the strength of their position. I will say that if I had attacked the enemy in the position which he then occupied—he having the advantage of position and being on the defensive, his artillery in position and his infantry behind parapets and rifle-pits—the very same reasons and causes which produced my success at Gettysburg would have operated in his favor there, and be likely to produce success on his part.

Question. Have you any reason to suppose that after that terrible artillery fire at Gettysburg his ammunition was nearly exhausted?

Answer. No, sir; from all the information I could obtain—which I acknowledge, however, was quite scanty—I had reason to believe that ammunition trains had been brought from Winchester and crossed on the ferry at Williamsport for the supply of General Lee's army; and from the character of the battle at Gettysburg, which consisted in a series of offensive operations on his part, mostly subjected to artillery fire, I had no reason to believe that the expenditure of ammunition by him had been such as to reduce him to a low point.

Question. You are now speaking of small-arm ammunition.

Answer. Yes, sir; and all the information which I obtained led to the belief that his army had been supplied with ammunition from Winchester, for I had positive information that ammunition trains had been ferried across at Williamsport; and my opinion is now that General Lee evacuated that position, not from any want of ammunition, or the fear that he would be dislodged from it by any active operations on my part, but that he was fearful that a force would be sent by Harper's Ferry to cut off his communications, which I had intended to do, having brought up a bridge from Washington and sent the cavalry down there, and that he could not have maintained that position probably a day if his communications had been cut. That was what caused him to retire.

Question. Did you discover, after the battle of Gettysburg, any symptoms of demoralization in Lee's army, such as excessive straggling, or anything of the kind?

Answer. No, sir; I saw nothing of that kind. I have no doubt his army was somewhat demoralized, for every army is, in some measure, demoralized after a defeat. But I doubt whether it was any more demoralized than we were when we fell back to Washington in 1862, after the second battle of Groveton, under General Pope. Then in forty-eight hours afterwards, when we got over on this side and got into the presence of the enemy, our morale was just as good as ever it was. I do not think that a great many stragglers or deserters from General Lee's army were picked up.

Question. I will ask you, in this connexion, about the comparative strength of the two armies at the battle of Gettysburg. What was your opinion about that?

Answer. My opinion about that was that General Lee was, as far as I could tell, about 10,000 or 15,000 my superior.

Question. What was your strength upon that battle-field?

Answer. Including all arms of the service, my strength was a little under 100,000 men—about 95,000. I think General Lee had about 90,000 infantry, from 4,000 to 5,000 artillery, and about 10,000 cavalry.

Question. There were other troops of ours at that time under General Schenck?

Answer. Yes, sir; and I had command of everybody. I had command of General Schenck, of General Couch, and of general everybody else.

Question. You did not bring General Schenck's forces into the field?

Answer. I never had any return from him; I did not know what force he had.

Question. What was the strength of the force about Washington?

Answer. I do not know what the strength about Washington was; but I understood that Washington was quite stripped.

Question. Did not General Heintzelman have a corps here?

Answer. I do not know. The very next day after I took command of the army I had no telegraphic communication with General Halleck. I think the returns showed me, when I took command of the army, amounted to about 105,000 men; included in those were the 11,000 of General French, which I did not bring up, which would reduce it down to about 94,000. Of that 94,000 I was compelled to leave a certain portion in the rear to guard my baggage trains.

Question. You say that the enemy had 125 pieces of artillery that he brought to bear upon you on the third day of the fight?

Answer. That is my estimate; their own estimate is 115 pieces.

Question. Was not that a heavier artillery fire on both sides than was ever before in a battle?

Answer. I must have had on the field at Gettysburg but little short of 300 guns; and I think the report of my chief of artillery was that there were not more than two batteries that were not in service during that battle.

Question. Was not that a greater proportion of artillery than is generally used in battles?

Answer. I think it was. I know I had then, and have now, more artillery with me than is usual. The artillery I have now is the artillery which General McClellan had when he had an army of 150,000, and he got a little more artillery even than was necessary for that army, because it was thought at that time that artillery would be the turning-point; and I have kept all the artillery while my infantry has been reduced. I think I had some 325 or 330 guns last summer; but I had some heavy siege guns which I had sent to the rear. I think there were about twenty-five guns with my trains at Westminster. I only had field-guns on the field.

In reference to the re-enforcements, I desire to say that after moving from Gettysburg, the forces under General French, which I had left at Frederick, amounting to about 8,000 men, were added to my army. That was the only addition to my army until I had arrived in the presence of General Lee's army. Subsequent to my crossing the mountains, but before the day that I advanced to attack the enemy at Williamsport, I received notice of troops arriving both at Frederick and at Harper's Ferry. But in connexion with that notice came information that those troops were mostly nine-months men from North Carolina and the Peninsula, who had but one or two days longer to serve, and who were from that fact in a very unsuitable moral condition to bring to the front; and so little reliance did I place upon them that I brought none of them any further to the front than Frederick, South mountain, and Harper's Ferry, to cover my communications in case anything happened to me.

And about the 12th of July, I should think, in connexion with a brigade of infantry, and some cavalry which I had left to follow the retreat of the enemy through Fairfield pass, and who joined me about that time, I also received under General William F. Smith a portion of General Couch's command, charged with the defences of the Susquehanna, and which General Couch had sent forward after the enemy evacuated Carlisle. General Smith arrived at Boonsboro' with a force of from 4,000 to 5,000 men; but he reported to me that those men were entirely new and totally undisciplined, and when I offered to attach him as a division to one of my corps, and put him in the front, he advised so strongly against it that I left him in the rear at Boonsboro'. The foregoing are all the re-enforcements which I can now remember of receiving, unless there may have been one or two regiments under General Gordon, which were old and efficient regiments, and which arrived about the 12th or 13th of July. So that I may say, notwithstanding I am aware that every exertion was made to send forward to me all the available troops that could be obtained from everywhere, that really and practically, with the exception of General French's command which was attached to the army when I took command of it, I was in front of the enemy at Williamsport with very much the same army that I moved from Gettysburg.



Question. The enemy recrossed the river at Williamsport ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Go on with your narrative, if you please.

Answer. When the enemy had recrossed the Potomac, the question came up as to how the further pursuit was to be continued. I was informed that it was the experience of Major General McClellan the year before, when placed in similar circumstances, and when the question was fully and thoroughly discussed, that it was impracticable to pursue the enemy in the valley of Virginia because of the difficulty of supplying an army in that valley with a single-track railroad in very bad order from Harper's Ferry to Winchester. I therefore determined to adopt the same plan of movement as that adopted the year previous, which was to move upon the enemy's flank through Loudon valley. I accordingly put the army in motion for Berlin, in Maryland, where bridges were thrown across the Potomac, and the army was moved as rapidly as possible, until it occupied a position the general line of which was the turnpike from Leesburg to Winchester.

Whilst in this position I could not ascertain from scouts, or from any other means of obtaining information which I possessed, that the army under General Lee, which was known to be in the valley and extending from Winchester to Martinsburg, had made any movement. Unwilling to move beyond this line, which would have enabled him to pass in my rear and come down that pike from Winchester to Leesburg, and thus have left the road open to Washington, I halted for a day, throwing forward my cavalry to occupy the lower passes of Manassas gap, and to ascertain, if I possibly could, what the movements, if any, were to be of General Lee. During this day we were informed from our signals on Ashby's gap and on Snicker's gap, which we held, of the movement of General Lee's army up the valley in further retreat from Winchester. I immediately put my army in motion, and directed five corps in the direction of Manassas gap, putting the 3d corps in advance, with instructions that they should move to Manassas gap that night, and the next morning at daylight advance through the gap and push on to Front Royal. The 3d corps reached Manassas gap some time during the night, and the movement was made the next day. Soon after passing a point previously occupied by our cavalry, the enemy was encountered in some force. Some skirmishing ensued, but they were gradually pushed through the gap, until a little before sundown, when we arrived within sight of Front Royal—and out of the gap, into a sufficiently open country to deploy the 3d corps, or any additional force—the enemy were found in line of battle with a number of pieces of artillery in position. Every disposition was made for a battle the next day, which I believed or hoped would take place, supposing that I had interrupted the retreat of General Lee, and that he would be compelled to defend that position in order to secure his trains.

During the night, however, the enemy retired. It was subsequently ascertained that he had been moving with great rapidity over several roads further to the west than the road to Front Royal, one of which passed through Strasburg, and that he had conducted his retreat with so much rapidity that the force we had encountered at Front Royal the day previously was his rear guard. Having failed in this attempt to cut off his retreat, I then retired through Manassas gap and proceeded to the Rappahannock, General Lee, in the mean time, retiring to Culpeper and taking up a position between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan. Upon my arrival at the Rappahannock, which was towards the close of July, I communicated my views to the government, in which I expressed the opinion that the further pursuit of General Lee should be continued at that time, inasmuch as I believed that our relative forces were more favorable to us than they would be at any subsequent time if we gave him time to recuperate. It was thought proper, however, by the general-in-chief to direct me to take up a threatening attitude upon the Rappahannock, but not to advance.

Question. About what time was that?

Answer. About the 1st of August. I did as directed; took up a position upon the Rappahannock, and immediately threw out my cavalry and had a fight at Brandy Station. That was the first fight at Brandy Station that General Buford was in. This position was maintained until about the middle of August, I think, when my force was diminished, first by the detachment of a division sent to South Carolina, and subsequently by a considerable body of troops which were sent to New York for the purpose of enforcing the draft. Some time after this, about the middle of September, I received information which induced me to believe, or which satisfied me, that Longstreet's corps, or a portion of it, from General Lee's army, had been detached to the southwest. Immediately upon receiving this information, and without waiting for instructions, I sent my cavalry across the Rappahannock, drove the enemy across the Rapidan, and subsequently followed with my whole army, occupying Culpeper and the position between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan. I found the enemy, although diminished by the departure of Longstreet's corps, still in a very strong position on the Rapidan—strong by nature, and which he had made still stronger by his works—so much so that I considered it impossible to attack him successfully in his front, and that any further operations would have to be made upon the one or other of his flanks.

I was entirely ignorant of the country, and could get no information except by actually sending my cavalry over it. Some time was necessarily consumed in making reconnoissances and obtaining information of the country.

In the mean time, just as I had made up my mind upon a plan of operations, I received an intimation from the department, or from the general-in-chief, that it was absolutely essential that my army should be still further weakened by the loss of two corps for the operations in Tennessee. Those corps were detached, and that suspended any operations of importance on my part until the return of the troops which had been sent to New York. Those troops were returned to me between the first and middle of October, but very much reduced; I think not more than two-thirds of those which I had sent away. In the mean time, however, I had received some accessions to my army from the draft. But of the conscripts who came in, considerable numbers deserted soon after arriving. The most of them were raw and unreliable, and could not be considered by me as being practically of much value until they had been some time in the army.

About the time when my troops finally returned from New York, which was somewhere about the middle of October, and when I had again determined upon a forward movement against the enemy, General Lee advanced against me. The first intimation which I had of this manœuvre was a report from my pickets from all parts of my line that the enemy were withdrawing from the Rapidan, and the general impression and belief was that he was withdrawing from the line of the Rapidan. I myself was not satisfied of that; nevertheless dispositions of the army were made to test the question whether he was withdrawing from the Rapidan, or whether it was a manœuvre for some other purpose.

At the same time that it was observed that his force upon the Rapidan had been very much diminished, there was an apparent movement of cavalry and some infantry on our right flank, which was believed to be a mere demonstration to throw me off the track, while he withdrew his army. I therefore made dispositions for the cavalry to cross the Rapidan upon my left, and for two corps of infantry to ford the Rapidan. The day these dispositions were made, I became satisfied that the enemy were moving on my right flank, with the determination of getting in my rear and cutting off my communications. If I had believed that the enemy would have attacked me at Culpeper Court House, around which and towards the Rapidan my army was posted, I never should have moved from there. My desire was to give battle to General Lee; but his

movement by the way of Sperryville and Woodville, so far to my right, satisfied me that he was not going to attack me, and that he was moving off to seize the Rappahannock, or some point on the railroad in my rear, cut off my communications, and compel me to move out and attack him to my disadvantage.

With this view I directed a retrograde movement of the army to the line of the Rappahannock, which was accomplished. I cannot recollect the exact date—I think about the 10th or 11th of October. The army reached the Rappahannock, and in the afternoon I had prepared the necessary instructions and orders to move the army that night, or the next morning, and occupy the line of Warrenton and Warrenton Junction, which I hoped to reach in advance of the enemy, and there give him battle.

Before those orders were issued, however, the rearguard of my army returned under the command of Major General Pleasonton commanding the cavalry, and General Sykes commanding the infantry. From the representations of those officers as to the manner in which they had been followed in their retreat, and from the appearances which they had seen on the field, it was their conviction that the enemy had moved into Culpeper, and had really occupied it, and were in my rear. Under this belief, and being anxious to give him battle, it not being my desire at all to avoid a battle, except to avoid it upon his terms, instead of ordering the movement to Warrenton and Warrenton Junction, which I had previously designed, I directed the movement of three corps early the next morning, amounting to about 30,000 men, with which I marched back again in the direction of Culpeper, with the expectation that if General Lee was there we would have a fight.

It was not till late in that day, and after those troops had all marched over and got into position, that I received information from General Gregg, who was in command of the cavalry on my right flank, that he had been driven across what is called the Hazel river by a large force of the enemy; that he had, subsequently, been driven at Sulphur Springs by cavalry, artillery, and infantry, or that, in other words, the whole rebel army was still continuing their movement on my flank in the direction of Warrenton. This information came late in the night of the day in which I had moved 30,000 men in the direction of Culpeper. By this movement I had lost a day, and, in consequence of this information, it was necessary for me to make another retrograde movement, in order to assume the position which it was my desire to do, and which I was determined, if possible, to do, so as to place myself between the enemy and Washington, with my back towards Washington and my front towards the enemy. I therefore moved back as far as Auburn, and Greenwich, and Cattle's Station. Those were the three points occupied by my army along the line of the railroad.

During that night I mainly endeavored, by means of my cavalry, to get some information as to the exact position and movements of the enemy. From all that I could ascertain, I had reason to believe that the enemy was continuing his movement along what is called the Warrenton pike, and that his object was to cross Bull Run and get possession of the heights of Centreville, if possible, thus interposing himself between me and Washington, and preventing me from opening my communications without first attacking him in that strong position. It subsequently turned out that in this I was mistaken, and that, notwithstanding my losing a day, I had moved with more celerity than the enemy, and was a little in his advance. If I had known this at the time I would have given the enemy battle the next day in the position that I had occupied at Auburn and Greenwich. But under the conviction that he was moving on, and had moved on, I that night gave orders for a further retrograde movement, until I occupied the line of Centreville and Bull Run. In performing this movement the next day, I ascertained, when too late to take advantage of it, that the enemy had not moved on the pike, but that he had moved across with the ex-

pectation of falling upon my flank and rear, and that his advance, under General Heth, had encountered my rearguard, which was the 2d corps, under the command of General Warren, and had been very severely handled by General Warren, who captured five guns and numerous prisoners, and repulsed all their attacks, and succeeded during the night in withdrawing his corps and taking his position upon the line of Bull Run.

After occupying this line, and ascertaining that the enemy did not continue his pursuit, as I presumed he would do, I determined immediately to return and attack him. But, unfortunately, there came up a very heavy rain, which raised Bull Run so as to render it unfordable; and not anticipating that I should have any occasion to use pontoon bridges at all, my whole pontoon train had been sent some eight or ten miles to the rear with my trains from the Rappahannock, and it was necessary, therefore, either that I should wait for the falling of Bull Run or send back for my bridges, which latter measure I adopted. But by the time the pontoon train had arrived the stream had subsided, and the army was then put in motion and advanced again.

During this time, however, which was some two or three days, the enemy had been occupied in destroying the railroad between Broad run and the Rappahannock, a distance of some twenty-five or twenty-six miles. So soon as they found they could not get a battle upon their own terms, and that I had got into such a position that if they attacked me they would probably be defeated, they abandoned all idea of active operations, destroyed the railroad, and retired. I continued the advance until I got to Warrenton, which I reached some time about the latter part of October. The enemy retired, however, across the Rappahannock. I was detained at Warrenton some eight or ten days until the railroad between Broad run and Warrenton Junction could be repaired, which portion of the road was necessary in order to enable me to receive my supplies; as soon as that road was repaired I immediately moved again. The enemy was then in position along the Rappahannock, at Rappahannock Station and Kelly's ford. I advanced upon both of those places, succeeded in surprising the enemy, forcing a passage, compelling him to retreat rapidly and hurriedly to the Rapidan. The army was then moved across the Rappahannock and placed in position between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, somewhere near its former position, but not quite so far to the front as before, because I had not my communications open. Here a further delay was rendered necessary until the railroad could be completed from Warrenton Junction and the Rappahannock, and my communications opened.

I should have stated that before I left my position at Warrenton and Warrenton Junction, and before I crossed the Rappahannock, it was my desire to move from that position rapidly and seize the heights of Fredericksburg, changing my base and line of communication from the Orange and Alexandria railroad to the Aquia Creek railroad. I believed, from the position of General Lee's army, and from the fact that he would presume that it would take me a long time to repair the railroad, and from information that I got that he was going into winter quarters, that any movement I might make with rapidity would be a surprise to him, and I was satisfied that I could occupy the heights of Fredericksburg before he could get down there. If he followed me down there to give me battle, that would be just what I wanted; if he did not, then I could take up my position there, open my communications, and then advance upon him or threaten Richmond. But upon proposing this plan to the general-in-chief, it was not approved.

Question. What was his objection to it?

Answer. The only objection he made was that he did not approve of any change of base; that any tactical movement I chose to make I was at liberty to make; that if I chose to make any movement against Lee I was at liberty to do so; but that he did not approve or recommend any change of base.

Question. When you retired on that retreat to Centreville, it was not with any view to avoid a battle?

Answer. Not at all. Why should I avoid a battle, when it was my business to fight? This matter must be settled by fighting.

Question. Your constant object was to bring on a battle on advantageous terms?

Answer. My object was to manœuvre so as to bring my army into such a position that, when giving battle to the enemy, I would have a reasonable probability of success; and in the event of a disaster, I would have a line of retreat or line of communication open.

Question. In all this manœuvring between here and the Rappahannock there has always been a most sedulous caution on our part to keep between Washington and the enemy. Suppose the enemy should be rash enough to come in in front of you and between you and Washington; then his communications would be cut off, would they not?

Answer. Certainly. That is what I was trying to accomplish at Williamsport, but he fell back too soon for me; he got back to the river and got into the position I wanted to go into myself.

Question. Did your army destroy any portion of the road when you retired?

Answer. When I moved back from the Rappahannock I destroyed the bridge across the Rappahannock.

Question. What was the object of that?

Answer. To prevent the enemy from using the bridge. If I had not done that, when he came to any part of the road he could run his cars from Culpeper right down there. I did not destroy, as I might have done, the bridge that was near Culpeper.

Question. In the retiring of your army, did we lose much military stores?

Answer. None at all that I am aware of, except a small quantity of ammunition that was destroyed by the stupidity of an ordnance clerk, he being under the impression that the army had all gone beyond him, though they were in fact all around him at that time. That ammunition was destroyed at Bealton Station by a subordinate agent of the ordnance department without authority.

Question. What was the strength of your army about this time, according to your recollection of it?

Answer. As near as I can judge my army contained of efficient men, equipped and armed, such as I could bring into battle, between 60,000 and 70,000 men.

Question. What was the strength of the enemy according to the best estimate you could make?

Answer. I think he had about 60,000 men; I thought I was probably from 8,000 to 10,000 his superior.

Question. Please go on with your narrative.

Answer. As soon as the railroad to the Rappahannock was completed, and the railroad bridge across that stream completed, and the necessary arrangements made for a depot at Brandy Station, so that the army could be properly supplied, I made a further movement to endeavor to engage General Lee in battle, or at least compel him to retire from the line of the Rapidan. This movement was made upon General Lee's right flank. I had ascertained that whilst he held the line of the Rapidan, from about Morton's ford to Liberty Mills, which is about west from Orange Court House, he had abandoned the guarding of the lower fords of the river, but depended for the defence of his right flank upon a line of intrenchments which he had constructed perpendicularly to the river at Morton's ford, and extending down to a place called Bartlett's Mills, on Mine run, which is a small tributary of the Rapidan. I could not hear of any intrenchments or preparations beyond Bartlett's Mill's; nor could I hear that he had made any intrenchments on the plank road and Old Town pike-road, two of the main communications between Federicksburg and Orange Court

House, or that he had made any arrangements for receiving an attack. I had satisfactory information that the line from Bartlett's Mills around to Rapidan station was occupied and defended by General Ewell's corps, and that the other corps of General Lee's army, commanded by General Hill, was extended from somewhere about Rapidan Station away down somewhere towards Charlottesville. With this knowledge, it was my expectation and design, by moving rapidly across the river at the lower fords where I knew there would be no opposition, and by marching forward and seizing the plank and turnpike roads, and advancing on them towards Orange Court House, to encounter first a concentration of Ewell's corps. And I hoped, by having my army, as it would be, concentrated in this movement, to throw such forces upon Ewell's corps as either to destroy him, or to so cripple him before General Hill could arrive, that I should then be able to turn upon Hill, and in this way I should have an opportunity of meeting General Lee's army in detail, and secure an effective lodgment at Orange Court House and Gordonsville.

The army was directed to move about the 24th of November, I think. A storm occurred, however, which created a delay of two days, and the army moved on the 26th of November. Various circumstances occurred to cause delay which I had not expected—some arising from obstacles that I could not overcome or anticipate; others from the failure or neglect of subordinate officers to do what I had a right to expect they would have done. The first of these obstacles was the failure of the 3d corps, commanded by Major General French, to arrive at the Rapidan river within three hours of the time that the other corps arrived, having no longer distance to march than they had. This caused a delay in the movement of the whole army for three hours, because I would not allow the other corps to cross until he was ready to cross, not knowing what I should encounter on the other side.

Question. What excuse did General French give for his slowness of movement?

Answer. The excuse was the fault of the commander of one of his divisions. Another obstacle was the fact that the river Rapidan proved to be a little broader than the engineers had estimated it, so that every one of the four bridges, which I had directed to be thrown across, was one boat too short, and trestle work and temporary means had to be provided to increase their length, which caused some delay. Another reason was the very precipitous character of the banks of the Rapidan at all the fords, which occasioned a delay in the passage of artillery and trains.

In consequence of these obstacles and these difficulties, the army, instead of forming a concentration on the 26th of November, as I expected, at Robertson's tavern, on the pike, and at some church—I forget the name—on the plank road, had actually only crossed the Rapidan. The next day the movements of the 3d corps were again much slower than I had expected, or than I now believe were necessary. And instead of that corps effecting a junction at Robertson's tavern, they remained halted at a point three or four miles distant from that tavern, where they were attacked in the afternoon by the enemy and held in check until late in the evening.

In the mean time the second column, under the command of Major General Warren, consisting of only one corps which had reached Robertson's tavern, was not allowed by me to advance and attack the enemy until communication was opened with the right column, which consisted of two of my largest corps and constituted nearly one-half of my army. And it was not until late at night that this communication was opened, and that I was enabled to make any movement in advance of Robertson's tavern. The consequence was, that the next morning, when we did advance, there was no enemy in our front. They had withdrawn to the position of Mine run; that is to say, a prolongation of the

line which I knew previously existed, but which I supposed terminated at Bartlett's Mills, on Mine run.

Upon following the enemy to this position I found it to be an exceedingly strong one, both by nature and by the artificial means which, in a short time—they had had not more than 24 hours—they had made, and which rendered the position an almost impregnable one. The army was immediately, and as rapidly as possible, put in position in front of the enemy's position at Mine run, and reconnoissances were made with the view of ascertaining a point of attack. In order to secure an efficient and active reconnoissance, orders were given to every corps commander to prepare himself to attack the enemy in his immediate front, and to examine critically and to ascertain as early as he possibly could where would be the best place to attack the enemy.

At the same time that these reconnoissances were made I sent a force, consisting of the 2d corps, under command of Major General Warren—increased by a division of the 6th corps, so that he had a force of 15,000 or 16,000 men—with directions to move upon the enemy's right flank and endeavor to find out how far his line extended, and if possible, to outflank him and to turn him.

About 5 or 6 o'clock in the afternoon of the 30th of November, I think, General Sedgwick, on my extreme right, reported to me, through General Wright, that there was a point of the enemy's left which he thought weak and assailable; that the enemy evidently had not expected an attack there, and had not prepared it with the same degree of care that they had prepared other portions of their lines.

About this time Major Ludlow, one of my aides-de-camp, and whom I had sent with General Warren, returned from his column and reported to me that General Warren had taken a position on the plank road extending from what was called Catharpin road, by which we had outflanked the enemy's line of works; that he had distinctly seen them prolonging their line of battle to meet his movement; that General Warren was on high ground which commanded the enemy's line, and that everything was most favorable for an attack from his position. This was about 6 o'clock in the afternoon, about sunset. I had also received a report through my engineers that in front of the 3d corps, commanded by General French, they thought was an opportunity more practicable for making an attack than upon other portions of the line, although they considered it pretty desperate there.

I therefore determined that the next morning at daylight I would assault the enemy at three points—on the extreme right, where General Sedgwick had found a weak point; on the extreme left, where I had understood there would be no difficulty in General Warren's attacking; and in the centre, in front of General French. Before these orders were issued, however, General Warren himself came to my headquarters about 8 or 9 o'clock at night. He confirmed all that Major Ludlow had said to me, and was even stronger and more emphatic in the opinion which he gave of the facility of making an attack upon the enemy's right; and indeed so confident was he that he expressed the opinion that the enemy would not be found there the next morning; that they would be compelled to fall back.

Under these circumstances, having great confidence in General Warren's judgment, and inasmuch as General French had given his opinion against attacking in his own front, I changed my plans so far as to take two of General French's divisions, amounting to over 10,000 men, and send them over to General Warren, thus making his force some 25,000 or 26,000 men, and abandoned my centre attack. I then issued the orders that the next morning at the designated time the assault should be made on the extreme right by General Sedgwick, and on the extreme left by General Warren, and that when those assaults were reported successful, which I had reason to believe they certainly would be, then the force which I retained in the centre to hold the

centre should be advanced, and so have the whole army in the battle. Everything was arranged for this purpose.

The next morning, however, at the time designated for the assault, which was after our batteries had been opened for some time, and just before General Sedgwick was to make his assault, which was directed to be made about one hour after General Warren's attack, as General Warren's was to be the main attack, hoping that the enemy would throw re-enforcements over there and weaken the left. About the time for General Sedgwick to make his assault an aide-de-camp arrived from General Warren, handing me a despatch, the substance of which was that by daylight, and upon a closer inspection of the enemy's works, he found they had been largely re-enforced during the night, had constructed works which did not exist the day before, and that so strong was their position, and, in his judgment, so precarious were the chances of success in an attack, that he had assumed the responsibility, inasmuch as the attack had been based upon his judgment, of suspending the attack until further orders should be received from me, it being his clear judgment that morning that there was no chance of success in attacking there.

In this embarrassing position in which I found myself, having put nearly the half of my army over on my left, under the command of General Warren, where I thought that success was absolutely certain, and it being impossible to withdraw them back in time into a position where they could sustain General Sedgwick, it was out of the question to allow General Sedgwick to make his isolated attack, because, even if he should succeed, it was necessary, after we had broken through the enemy's lines, to fight a battle with them; for the taking the line was only getting on the ground to fight, and I had no means of re-enforcing or supporting him, for the half of my army was tied up on my left flank under General Warren; I therefore, just in time, directed General Sedgwick to suspend his attack.

In the mean time I mounted my horse and rode over to General Warren's position, to see if possible, by discussion with him, and by examination, it would not be possible some time during the day to make an attack, so that an attack should still be made. I rode over to General Warren, and found that his opinion was firm and conclusive against an attack there. In the mean time I received word from General Sedgwick that, although he had taken every precaution to conceal his movements, the opening of his batteries had given the enemy information that they might be attacked there, and they had gone to work to make the position in front of him as strong as any other part of their line; so that every hour it became more questionable about making an attack there.

Finding this to be the case, there remained but one alternative, and that was, to make a further effort to move to the enemy's flank and get further around towards Orange Court House, and to get in some position where he would not be able to intrench himself before I could attack him. Had it been any other season of the year than the early part of December, I should undoubtedly have made that movement. But at that period of the year, in which bad weather was to be expected at any moment, I did not deem it advisable to do so. Indeed, it was extraordinary that we had such good weather as we had in our movements. In taking up the position I then occupied I had not been obliged to bring my heavy trains across the river, but had left them on the other side guarded by a portion of my cavalry. But if I made this further movement it would be absolutely necessary to bring my trains over to bring my supplies to me, because I could not get supplies for my army otherwise.

When this period arrived it was the 3d of December; I had consumed about one-half of the supplies I had brought with me; I had abandoned my communications entirely. And in view of the season of the year, the impossibility of moving from that place if there came on even a couple of hours of rain; having failed in my first plan, which was to attack the enemy before they could concentrate; and then having failed in my plan to attack them after they had con-



centrated in the manner in which I have related, I concluded that under the circumstances it was impossible for me to do anything more; I therefore withdrew my army and returned to my former position.

There was a third course which I might have pursued; which was, in spite of all obstacles, all opinions and all judgments, to make an assault in the enemy's direct front, and in the face of all their obstacles there. But I was so clearly satisfied, from my own personal observation of such portions of their line as I was able to visit, that such an assault would be hopeless, that I never had any hesitation whatever about the course I should pursue in the matter.

Question. Did the enemy come out of their works when you retired?

Answer. No, sir; I do not think they followed us, except with some of their cavalry; they were acting entirely on the defensive. We withdrew during the night; and I think by six or seven o'clock the next morning—an hour or so after daylight—we were all across the river, and the bridges were up. Having no trains on that side, we could make a very rapid movement.

Question. Is there anything further that you desire to say?

Answer. I would probably have a great deal to say if I knew what other people have said.

Question. I have briefly called your attention to the points upon which I have heard criticisms. Are you heartily sustained by your corps commanders under all circumstances, so far as you believe?

Answer. I believe I have been; I have no complaint to make of want of assistance from all my corps commanders, except what is stated in my evidence in reference to Mine run.

The witness then said:

The following is the rough draught of the original preliminary order before the battle of Gettysburg. The whole jist of the thing is contained in the first part of it.

[General MEADE subsequently appeared before the committee and withdrew this rough draught of the preliminary order, and substituted in place of it a series of orders, &c., which will be found at the close of his testimony.]

MARCH 11, 1864.

Major General GEORGE G. MEADE appeared before the committee, and said:

I desire to substitute, in lieu of the rough draught of the preliminary order which I left here when I gave my testimony, a series of orders and circulars issued by me on the 30th of June and the 1st day of July, a careful perusal of which, I am sure, will satisfy every member of this committee that there was no intention on my part to withdraw my army from the position at Gettysburg the very moment that I ascertained that the enemy were there in force, that the ground was favorable for a battle, and that I could fight one there. I will not read all of these orders—only enough to substantiate the point I have here made.

The papers herewith submitted, marked A, B, and C, are the orders issued on the 30th of June, together with the information from General Buford, in command of the cavalry. The information from General Buford, C, was not received, however, until pretty late on the morning of the 1st of July. Letter D contains the orders for the movement of troops on July 1, under which two corps were moved up to Gettysburg. Letter E is the circular, of which I left a rough draught when here before, issued to corps commanders on the morning of July 1, before the information from General Buford had been received, and before I had any positive information that the enemy were moving on the Cashtown road. To show that this circular did not contemplate, under all circumstances or emergencies, a withdrawal or retreat of the army, I would call the attention of the committee to the paper marked F, which are the in

structions issued to the commanding officer of the 1st corps, Major General Reynolds, who was ordered up to Gettysburg. Those instructions were sent to him about the time that the circular marked E was sent to him. The paper marked F I will now read.—(See appendix to this deposition.)

I desire to say, in connexion with this despatch, that at the time I wrote it I simply knew of the concentration of the enemy, without having any accurate knowledge of the point at which he would strike; and it would be evident to any one perusing it, it having been sent simultaneously with the circular, that I was calling upon my corps commanders to give me information which would justify me in fighting at Emmettsburg, Gettysburg, or any other point where the enemy might suitably be met.

The next despatch I propose to read was a despatch to the commanding officer of the 6th corps, who was to my right and rear, at Manchester. Between the despatch marked F, just read, and the one I now propose to read, marked G, I had received a despatch from General Buford which indicated a strong concentration of the enemy at Gettysburg. Hence this order to the commander of the 6th corps, the most remote from me, to move up to Gettysburg, should such be decided upon as the most commanding position to be adopted. [The paper marked G was then read.] This despatch was to notify General Sedgwick that there was every probability that a battle might be fought at Gettysburg, and that he should hold his corps in readiness to move up there; and that it was also within contingencies that General Reynolds might find himself in the presence of a superior force, and might be compelled to fall back, in which case it would be essential that the line should be concentrated on his rear, and in that event the circular order should be enforced.

About 1 o'clock on the 1st of July I received the sad intelligence of the fall of General Reynolds and the actual engagement of my troops at Gettysburg. Previous to receiving this intelligence I had had a long conversation with Major General Hancock, and explained to him fully my views as to my determination to fight in front if practicable; if not, then to the rear, or to the right or the left, as circumstances might require. Without any further reflection than the fact that General Reynolds was the officer upon whom I had relied under my instructions, and anxious to have some one in front who understood and could carry out my views, I directed General Hancock to proceed to Gettysburg and take command of the troops there, and particularly to advise me of the condition of affairs there, and the practicability of fighting a battle there. The paper marked H contains my instructions to General Hancock. [The paper was then read.] General Hancock immediately proceeded upon this duty. But from information received from the field, from officers returning, I became satisfied that the enemy were in such force there that it was evident that General Lee was about to concentrate his army there. I therefore did not wait for the report from General Hancock, as I can prove from staff officers who took my orders, but immediately commenced to move my troops to the front, being determined to fight a battle there. I will, however, read General Hancock's first report, marked K, and dated 5.25, from Gettysburg, and received by me, I should suppose, about 7 o'clock. [The paper was then read.] As I have already stated, before this despatch was received I ordered up the troops immediately in my neighborhood, the 12th and 5th corps, to the scene of action. Afterwards I sent written instructions to both the 6th and 5th corps to move up. The instructions to the 6th corps, marked M, I will read. [The paper was then read.]

I trust that a careful perusal of these orders, with the explanations I have made here as to the time at which they were written or received, will satisfy the committee that my only doubt about fighting at Gettysburg was caused by, first, the unknown position of the enemy; and secondly, the character of the ground. That the moment those points were made clear to my mind, there was

no hesitation on my part to order my troops up there and fight the battle out at that place.

I will call the attention of the committee to another despatch received by me from General Buford, marked I, and dated 20 minutes past 3 o'clock, and which must have been received by me after General Hancock had gone to the front. I read it to show that my sending General Hancock there was in a measure justified by the opinion of that distinguished officer, General Buford, now deceased. (Paper marked I was then read.)

That is all I have to say about the report which has been prevalent in the public press, that the battle at Gettysburg was never intended by me to have been fought there, and that if my plans had been carried out as I intended them to be carried out the battle would not have been fought out there. In connexion with these papers I have appended a map, which will show the position of the army and the line proposed to be taken, and its reference to these different points.

There are two other points upon which I would like to speak.

The chairman. Certainly; I desire you to state whatever you may think necessary or proper—anything you may desire to state.

Answer. I have understood that an idea has prevailed that I intended an order should be issued on the morning of the 2d of July requiring the withdrawal of the army or the retreat of the army from Gettysburg, which order was not issued, owing simply to the attack of the enemy having prevented it.

In reply to that, I have only to say that I have no recollection of ever having directed such an order to be issued, or ever having contemplated the issuing of such an order; and that it does seem to me that to any intelligent mind who is made acquainted with the great exertions I made to mass my army at Gettysburg on the night of July the 1st, it must appear entirely incomprehensible that I should order it to retreat; after collecting all my army there, before the enemy had done anything to require me to make a movement of any kind.

On the morning of the 2d of July I directed an order to be issued to Major General Slocum, commanding the 12th corps, and at that time commanding the 5th corps also, to examine the ground in front of his position, and to hold himself in readiness to make an assault upon the enemy's line so soon as the 6th corps, then on their way, should arrive on the ground. Whether that order was issued verbally or in writing I cannot say; I think it must have been a verbal order, because I cannot find any record whatever of it on my books. However, at that time a great many orders and directions were written on little slips of paper, and no copies kept of them. Before the 6th corps arrived, which was late in the afternoon, it having to march thirty-two miles in a night and day, Major General Slocum reported to me that the character of the ground in his front was not favorable to an assault, and the idea of an assault from the right was abandoned by me.

So soon as the 5th corps arrived, the 5th corps was ordered over to the left, as stated in my previous testimony; and I went to the left with the view of ascertaining as far as I could the position of my own troops and the troops of the enemy, and with the intention of ordering an attack from there, if the enemy did not themselves attack. The enemy, however, attacked and were repulsed.

I beg leave to say, in connexion with this subject of attacking or receiving an attack, that I do not hesitate to say that it was my policy and intention to act upon the defensive, and receive the attack of the enemy, if practicable, knowing that the enemy would be compelled either to attack me or to retire from his position; that it was not within his power to wait any length of time in my front and manœuvre, and that the chances of victory on my side were greater if I acted on the defensive than they would be if I assumed the offensive.

Having thus denied any recollection of having issued, or directed to be issued, any order on the morning of the 2d of July for the retreat of my army be-

fore any attack from the enemy, I now desire to refer to a consultation of my corps commanders held on that evening, which, it has occurred to me, may possibly be the groundwork for this report that I had directed an order to retreat.

On the evening of the 2d of July, after the battle of that day had ceased, and darkness had set in, being aware of the very heavy losses of the 1st and 11th corps on the 1st of July, and knowing how severely the 3d corps, the 5th corps, and other portions of the army had suffered in the battle of the 2d of July—in fact, as subsequently ascertained, out of the 24,000 men killed, wounded, and missing, which was the amount of my losses and casualties at Gettysburg, over 20,000 of them had been put *hors du combat* before the night of the 2d of July; and taking into consideration the number of stragglers, and weakening of my army from the two days' battle, my ignorance of the condition of the corps, and the moral condition of the troops, caused me to send for my corps commanders to obtain from them the exact condition of affairs in their separate commands, and to consult and advise with them as to what, if anything, should be done on the morrow. The strong attack of the enemy that day upon my left flank, and their persistent efforts to obtain possession of what is called Round Top mountain, induced the supposition that possibly, on the next day, a very persistent attack might be made, or that a movement, upon their part, to my left and rear might be made to occupy the lines of communication I then held with the Taneytown road and the Baltimore pike.

The questions discussed by this council were, first, whether it was necessary for us to assume any different position from what we then held; and secondly, whether, if we continued to maintain the position we then held, our operations the next day should be offensive or defensive. The opinion of the council was unanimous, which agreed fully with my own views, that we should maintain our lines as they were then held, and that we should wait the movements of the enemy and see whether he made any further attack before we assumed the offensive. I felt satisfied that the enemy would attack again, as subsequently proved to be the case, for he made a vigorous assault upon my right flank, which lasted from daylight in the morning until 10 o'clock. He then made one of his heaviest assaults upon my left and left centre, which lasted from one o'clock until six in the evening.

I have been specific in giving the details of this council, because it has occurred to me as possible that some erroneous report of what took place there may have given rise to the idea that I desired to withdraw my army and retreat, and that I called my corps commanders together to know if they were in favor of retreating.

I should like to have the committee, and I trust they will do so, call upon all the principal officers I had upon that field—the corps commanders and division commanders; that their attention should be called to all the points to which I have alluded here; and that they should be specifically questioned as to their recollection and views upon those points.

Question. The council to which you have referred is one held on the evening of the 2d of July?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. I believe one of the witnesses we have examined states that a council was held on the night of the 3d of July also. Was there such a council held?

Answer. I do not remember any council held on the night of the 3d of July. I had one on the night of the 4th of July, as to a plan of action in reference to pursuing the enemy. I do not remember any council on the 3d of July; if there was one, it was a council with my corps commanders, and they are all as well able to state what transpired there as myself; but I do not remember calling any council at that time. It is possible there was a consultation. I never called

those meetings councils ; they were consultations, and they were probably more numerous and more constant in my case, from the fact that I had just assumed command of the army, and felt that it was due to myself to have the opinions of high officers before I took action on matters which involved such momentous issues.

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A.

[Circular.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*June 30, 1863.*

The commanding general requests that, previous to the engagement soon expected with the enemy, corps and all other commanding officers will address their troops, explaining to them briefly the immense issues involved in the struggle. The enemy are on our soil ; the whole country now looks anxiously to this army to deliver it from the presence of the foe ; our failure to do so will leave us no such welcome as the swelling of millions of hearts with pride and joy at our success would give to every soldier of this army. Homes, firesides, and domestic altars are involved. The army has fought well heretofore ; it is believed that it will fight more desperately and bravely than ever if it is addressed in fitting terms. Corps and other commanders are authorized to order the instant death of any soldier who fails in his duty this hour.

By command of Major General Meade :

S. WILLIAMS,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 9, 1864.*

Official copy :

CHAS. E. PEASE, *A. A. G.*

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B.

[Circular.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*June 30, 1863.*

The commanding general has received information that the enemy are advancing, probably in strong force, on Gettysburg. It is the intention to hold this army pretty nearly in the position it now occupies until the plans of the enemy shall have been more fully developed.

Three corps, 1st, 3d, and 11th, are under the command of Major General Reynolds, in the vicinity of Emmettsburg, the 3d corps being ordered up to that point. The 12th corps is at Littlestown. General Gregg's division of cavalry is believed to be now engaged with the cavalry of the enemy near Hanover Junction.

Corps commanders will hold their commands in readiness at a moment's notice, and upon receiving orders to march against the enemy, their trains (ammunition wagons excepted) must be parked in the rear of the place of concentration.

Ammunition wagons and ambulances will alone be permitted to accompany the troops. The men must be provided with three days' rations in haversacks, and with sixty rounds of ammunition in the boxes and upon the person.

Corps commanders will avail themselves of all the time at their disposal to familiarize themselves with the roads communicating with the different corps.  
By command of Major General Meade.

S. WILLIAMS,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 9, 1864.*

Official copy :

CHAS. E. PEASE, *A. A. G.*

C.

GETTYSBURG, *June 30, 1863—10.30 p. m.*

The reserve brigade, under General Merritt, is at Mechanicstown, with my trains. General Pleasanton wrote he would inform me when he relieved it. To-day I received instructions saying it would picket towards Hagerstown and south.

I am satisfied that A. P. Hill's corps is massed just back of Cashtown, about nine miles from this place. Ponder's division of this (Hill's) corps came up to-day, of which I advised you, saying "the enemy in my front was increased." The enemy's pickets (infantry and artillery) are within four miles of this place, at the Cashtown road. My parties have returned that went north, northwest and northeast, after crossing the road from Cashtown to Oxford in several places. They heard nothing of any force having passed over it lately. The road, however, is terribly infested with prowling cavalry parties. Near Heidlersburg, to-day, one of my parties captured a courier of Lee's; nothing was found on him. He says Ewell's corps is crossing the mountains from Carlisle, Roach's division being at Petersburg in advance. Longstreet, from all I can learn, is still behind Hill.

I have many rumors and reports of the enemy advancing upon me from towards York. I have to pay attention to some of them, which causes me to overwork my horses and men. I can get no forage or rations—am out of both. The people give and sell the men something to eat, but I can't stand that way of subsisting. It causes dreadful straggling. Should I have to fall back, advise me by what route.

Respectfully,

BUFORD.

Major General REYNOLDS.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 9, 1864.*

Official copy :

CHAS. E. PEASE, *A. A. G.*

D.

[Orders.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*June 30, 1863.*

Headquarters at Taneytown.  
Third corps to Emmettsburg.  
Second corps to Taneytown.  
Fifth corps to Hanover.  
First corps to Gettysburg.

Eleventh corps to Gettysburg, (or supporting distance.)

Sixth corps to Manchester.

Twelfth corps to Two Taverns.

Cavalry to front, and flank well out in all directions, giving timely notice of operations and movements of the enemy.

All empty wagons, surplus baggage, useless animals, and implements of every sort to Union bridge, three miles from Middleburg; a proper officer from each corps with them. Supplies will be brought up there as soon as practicable. The general relies upon every commander to put his column in the lightest possible order.

The telegraph corps to work east from Hanover, repairing the line, and all commanders to work repairing the line in their vicinity between Gettysburg and Hanover.

Staff officers report daily from each corps, and with orderlies to leave for orders. Prompt information to be sent into headquarters at all times. All ready to move to the attack at any moment.

The commanding general desires you to be informed that from present information Longstreet and Hill are at Chambersburg, partly towards Gettysburg; Ewell at Carlisle and York. Movements indicate a disposition to advance from Chambersburg to Gettysburg.

General Couch telegraphs, 29th, his opinion that enemy's operations on Susquehanna are more to prevent co-operation with this army than offensive. The general believes he has relieved Harrisburg and Philadelphia, and now desires to look to his own army, and assume position for offensive or defensive, as occasions require, and give rest to the troops.

It is not his desire to wear the troops out by excessive fatigue and marches, and thus unfit them for the work they will be called upon to perform.

Vigilance, energy, and prompt response to the orders from headquarters are necessary, and personal attention must be given to reduction of impediments. The orders and movements from these headquarters must be carefully and confidentially preserved, that they do not fall into the enemy's hands.

By command of Major General Meade.

S. WILLIAMS,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 9, 1864.*

Official copy :

CHAS. E. PEASE, A. A. G.

E.

[Circular.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Taneytown, July 1, 1863.*

From information received the commanding general is satisfied that the object of the movement of the army in this direction has been accomplished, viz: the relief of Harrisburg and the prevention of the enemy's intended invasion of Philadelphia beyond the Susquehanna.

It is no longer his intention to assume the offensive until the enemy's movements or position should render such an operation certain of success. If the enemy assume the offensive and attack, it is his intention, after holding them in check sufficiently long to withdraw the trains and other impediments, to withdraw the army from its present position, and form line of battle with the left resting in the neighborhood of Middleburg, and the right at Manchester, the general direction being that of Pipe creek.

For this purpose General Reynolds, in command of the left, will withdraw the force at present at Gettysburg, two corps by the road to Taneytown and Westminster, and, after crossing Pipe creek, deploy towards Middleburg. The corps at Emmetsburg will be withdrawn, by way of Mechanicsville, to Middleburg, or, if a more direct route can be found, leaving Taneytown to their left, to withdraw direct to Middleburg.

General Slocum will assume command of the two corps at Hanover and Two Taverns and withdraw them *via* Union Mills, deploying one to the right and one to the left after crossing Pipe creek, connecting on the left with General Reynolds, and communicating his right to General Sedgwick at Manchester, who will connect with him and form the right.

The time for falling back can only be developed by circumstances. Whenever such circumstances arise as would seem to indicate the necessity for falling back and assuming this general line indicated, notice of such movement will at once be communicated to these headquarters and to all adjoining corps commanders.

The 2d corps, now at Taneytown, will be held in reserve, in the vicinity of Uniontown and Frizelburg, to be thrown to the point of strongest attack, should the enemy make it. In the event of these movements being necessary, the trains and impedimenta will all be sent to the rear of Westminster.

Corps commanders, with their officers commanding artillery, and the divisions, should make themselves thoroughly familiar with the country indicated, all the roads and positions, so that no possible confusion can ensue, and that the movement, if made, be done with good order, precision, and care, without loss, or any detriment to the morale of the troops.

The commanders of corps are requested to communicate at once the nature of their present position, and their ability to hold them in case of any sudden attack at any point by the enemy.

This order is communicated that a general plan, perfectly understood by all, may be had for receiving attack if made in strong force upon any portion of our present position. Developments may cause the commanding general to assume the offensive from his present positions.

The artillery reserve will, in the event of the general movement indicated, move to the rear of Frizelburg, and be placed in position, or sent to corps, as circumstances may require, under the general supervision of the chief of artillery.

The chief quartermaster will, in case of the general movement indicated, give directions for the orderly and proper position of the trains in rear of Westminster. All the trains will keep well to the right of the road in moving, and in case of any accident, requiring a halt, the team must be hauled out of the line, and not delay the movements.

The trains ordered to Union Bridge, in these events will be sent to Westminster. General headquarters will be, in case of this movement, at Frizelburg.

General Slocum as near Union Mills as the line will render best for him.

General Reynolds at or near the road from Taneytown to Frizelburg.

The chief of artillery will examine the line and select positions for artillery. The cavalry will be held on the right and left flanks after the movement is completed; previous to its completion, he will, as now directed, cover the front and exterior lines well out.

The commands must be prepared for a movement, and, in the event of the enemy attacking us on the ground indicated herein, to follow up any repulse.

The chief signal officer will examine the line thoroughly and at once. Upon the commencement of this movement, extend telegraphic communications from each of the following points to general headquarters, near Frizelburg, viz: Manchester, Union Mills, Middleburg, and the Taneytown road.



All true Union people should be advised to harass and annoy the enemy in every way ; to send in information, and taught how to do it—giving regiments by number of colors, number of guns, generals' names, &c. ; all their supplies brought to us will be paid for, and not fall into the enemy's hands.

Roads and ways to move to the right and left of general line should be studied, and thoroughly understood. All movements of troops should be concealed, and our dispositions kept from the enemy. Their knowledge of these dispositions would be fatal to our success, and the greatest care must be taken to prevent such an occurrence.

By command of Major General Meade.

S. WILLIAMS,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 9, 1864.*

Official copy :

CHAS. E. PEASE, A. A. G.

F.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 1, 1863.*

COMMANDING OFFICER, *1st Corps :*

The telegraphic intelligence received from General Couch, with the various movements reported from Buford, seem to indicate the concentration of the enemy either at Chambersburg, or at a point situated somewhere on a line drawn between Chambersburg and York, through Heidlersburg, and to the north of Gettysburg.

The commanding general cannot decide whether it is his best policy to move to attack, until he learns something more definite of the point at which the enemy is concentrating. This he hopes to do during the day. Meanwhile he would like to have your views upon the subject, at least so far as concerns your position.

If the enemy is concentrated to the right of Gettysburg, that point would not, at first glance, seem to be a proper strategic point of concentration for this army. If the enemy is concentrating in front of Gettysburg, or to the left of it, the general is not sufficiently well informed of the nature of the country to judge of its character either for an offensive or defensive position. The number of the enemy are estimated at about 92,000 infantry, with 270 pieces of artillery, and his cavalry from six to eight thousand. Our numbers ought to equal it, and with the arrival of General French's command, which should get up to-morrow, exceed it, if not too much weakened by straggling and fatigue.

The general having just assumed command in obedience to orders, with the position of affairs leaving no time to learn the condition of the army as to morale and proportionate strength compared with its last return, would gladly receive from you any suggestions as to the points laid down in this note. He feels that you know more of the condition of the troops in your vicinity and the country than he does.

General Humphreys, who is at Emmettsburg with the 3d corps, the general considers an excellent adviser as to the nature of the country for defensive or offensive operations. If near enough to call him to consultation with you, please do so, without interference with the responsibilities that devolve upon you both. You have all the information which the general has received, and the general would like to have your views.

The movement of your corps to Gettysburg was ordered before the positive knowledge of the enemy's withdrawal from Harrisburg and concentration was received.

S. WILLIAMS,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 9, 1864.*

Official copy :

CHAS. E. PEASE, A. A. G.

G.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 1, 1863.*

COMMANDING OFFICER, *6th Corps :*

I am directed by the commanding general to state that it would appear from reports just received that the enemy is moving in heavy force on Gettysburg, (Ewell from Heidlersburg, and Hill from Cashtown Pass,) and it is not improbable he will reach that place before the command under Major General Reynolds, (the 1st and 11th corps,) now on the way, can arrive there. Should such be the case, and General Reynolds finds himself in the presence of a superior force, he is instructed to hold the enemy in check, and fall slowly back. If he is able to do this, the line indicated in the circular of to-day will be occupied to-night. Should circumstances render it necessary for the commanding general to fight the enemy to-day, the troops are posted as follows for the support of Reynolds's command, viz: On his right at "Two Taverns," the 12th corps; at Hanover, the 5th corps; the 2d corps is on the road between Taneytown and Gettysburg; the 3d corps is at Emmettsburg.

This information is conveyed to you that you may have your corps in readiness to move in such direction as may be required at a moment's notice.

S. WILLIAMS,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 9, 1864.*

Official copy :

CHAS. E. PEASE, A. A. G.

H.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*July 1, 1863—1.10 p. m.*

COMMANDING OFFICER, *2d Corps :*

The major general commanding has just been informed that General Reynolds has been killed, or badly wounded. He directs that you turn over the command of your corps to General Gibbon; that you proceed to the front, and by virtue of this order, in case of the truth of General Reynolds's death, you assume command of the corps there assembled, viz: the 11th, 1st, and 3d, at Emmettsburg. If you think the ground and position there a (better) suitable one to fight a battle under existing circumstances, you will so advise the general, and he will order all the troops up. You know the general's views, and General Warren, who is fully aware of them, has gone out to see General Reynolds.

LATER—1.15 p. m.

Reynolds has possession of Gettysburg, and the enemy are reported as falling back from the front of Gettysburg. Hold your column ready to move.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 9, 1864.*

Official copy :

CHAS. E. PEASE, *A. A. G.*

## I.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION,  
*July 1, 1863—20 minutes past 3.*

GENERAL PLEASANTON: I am satisfied that Longstreet and Hill have made a junction. A tremendous battle has been raging since 9½ a. m., with varying success. At the present moment the battle is raging on the road to Cashtown, and in short cannon range of this town; the enemy's line is a semicircle on the height from north to west. General Reynolds was killed early this morning. In my opinion there seems to be no directing person.

JOHN BUFORD,  
*Brigadier General of Volunteers.*

We need help now.

BUFORD.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March, 1864.*

Official copy :

CHAS. E. PEASE, *A. A. G.*

## K.

52.5.

GENERAL: When I arrived here an hour since, I found that our troops had given up the front of Gettysburg and the town. We have now taken up a position in the cemetery, and cannot well be taken; it is a position, however, easily turned. Slocum is now coming on the ground, and is taking position on the right, which will protect the right. But we have as yet no troops on the left, the third corps not having yet reported, but I suppose that it is marching up. If so, his flank march will in a degree protect our left flank. In the mean time Gibbon had better march on so as to take position on our right or left to our rear, as may be necessary, in some commanding position. General G. will see this despatch. The battle is quiet now. I think we will be all right until night. I have sent all the trains back. When night comes it can be told better what had best be done. I think we can retire; if not we can fight here, as the ground appears not unfavorable with good troops. I will communicate in a few moments with General Slocum, and transfer the command to him.

Howard says that Doubleday's command gave way.

Your obedient servant,

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK,  
*Major General Commanding Corps.*

General Warren is here.

General BUTTERFIELD, *Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 9, 1864.*

Official copy :

CHAS. E. PEASE, *A. A. G.*

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L.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*July 1, 1863—7 p. m.*

COMMANDING OFFICER, *5th Corps :*

The major general commanding directs that you move up to Gettysburg at once upon receipt of this order, if not already ordered to do so by General Slocum. The present prospect is that our general engagement must be there. Communicate with General Slocum, under whose directions you are placed by the orders of this morning. The general had supposed that General Slocum would have ordered you up.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 9, 1864.*

Official copy :

CHARLES E. PEASE, *A. A. G.*

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M.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Taneytown, July 1, 1863—7½ p. m.*

COMMANDING OFFICER, *6th Corps :*

The major general commanding directs me to say that a general battle seems to be impending to-morrow at Gettysburg. That it is of the utmost importance that your command should be up. He directs that you stop all trains, or turn them out of the road that impede your progress. Your march will have to be a forced one to reach the scene of action, where we shall probably be largely outnumbered without your presence. If any shorter road presents itself without difficulty in getting up, you will use your discretion in taking it, and report the facts to these headquarters.

General Sykes has been ordered up from Hanover to Gettysburg, and General Slocum from Littletown, and General Hancock's corps from here. The whole army is there, (Gettysburg,) or under way for that point. The general desires you to report here in person without delay the moment you receive this. He is waiting to see you here before going to the front. The trains will all go to Westminster and Union Bridge, as ordered.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *March 9, 1864.*

Official copy :

CHAS. E. PEASE, *A. A. G.*

*Testimony of Major General Alfred Pleasonton.*WASHINGTON, *March 7, 1864.*

Major General ALFRED PLEASONTON sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

(See testimony "Army of the Potomac—General Hooker.")

Question. General Meade assumed command of the army of the Potomac upon General Hooker being relieved ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Go on with your narrative from that point.

Answer. When General Meade assumed the command, he adopted the decision of General Hooker to place General Stahl's division of cavalry in the cavalry corps under my command, and I assigned General Kilpatrick to the command of it; and I also recommended Captains Farnsworth and Custer as brigadier generals and they were appointed, and that division fought Stuart's cavalry and defeated it on the 1st day of July, two days after, at Hanover Junction, Pennsylvania. I may say here that I had studied that whole country the year before very carefully indeed, all its roads and topographical features, and was probably about as well posted in regard to it as any officer in the army. And in the distribution of the cavalry force I sent the strongest division on the left flank of our army, that is, nearest the enemy, to cover and occupy Gettysburg till our army could move in that direction. That division was General Buford's division. It moved on the 29th of June from near Middleburg, and arrived in front of Gettysburg that evening or early the next morning. The 1st division was on the left; Kilpatrick's took the front, and Gregg's division took the right. When Stuart made his raid between our army and Washington, General Meade was very anxious for me to send some cavalry after him. But I have always opposed movements of that sort, because it is very difficult, if not almost impossible, for one mounted command to catch another with a day's or even a half a day's start. And I urged that if Stuart encumbered himself with plunder, we would head him off as he proceeded up into Pennsylvania, and he would become a much easier victim than he would of prepared to fight without plunder. My views were confirmed by the result of Kilpatrick's fight with Stuart at Hanover, for Stuart's cavalry gave us very little annoyance after that event. I then turned my attention to the infantry and securing the flanks of the army. I was satisfied from my general knowledge of the country—and so mentioned to General Meade several times—that there was but one position in which for us to have a fight, and that was at Gettysburg; and I had given orders to General Buford to hold that point to the last extremity until we could get there. The enemy attacked General Buford at Gettysburg on the 1st of July; and the first mistake they committed was in permitting him to keep them in check until the 1st and 11th corps, under General Reynolds, came up and held that position. On the 2d of July, Buford's division, having been so severely handled the day before, was sent by me back to Westminster, our depot, to protect it, and also to recruit. General Gregg's division was placed on our right to prevent the enemy from turning our flank; Merritt's brigade of the 1st division being at Emmettsburg, and Farnsworth's brigade of Kilpatrick's division having been sent to the left. On the 3d of July Merritt's brigade was ordered up from Emmettsburg to take the enemy in rear at Gettysburg, and join with Farnsworth's brigade in preventing the enemy turning our flank on the left. Both of those divisions had very heavy fighting, and I have always been of the opinion that the demonstration of cavalry on our left materially checked the attack of the enemy on the 3d of July; for General Hood, the rebel general, was attempting to

turn our flank when he met these two brigades of cavalry, and the officers reported to me that at least two divisions of the rebel infantry and a number of batteries were held back, expecting an attack from us on that flank. The rebel army was finally repulsed on the 3d of July. Immediately after that repulse, I rode out with General Meade on the field, and up to the top of the mountain, and I urged him to order a general advance of his whole army in pursuit of the enemy, for I was satisfied that the rebel army was not only demoralized, but that they must be nearly, if not quite, out of ammunition; and that our army, being in fine spirits with this last repulse, could have easily defeated and routed the enemy. But General Meade ordered me to send my cavalry to the rear of the rebels, to find out whether they were really falling back. This took some time. The cavalry rode all night. The first officer who reported was General Gregg. He reported, 22 miles on the Chambersburg road by the next morning at 8 o'clock, that the road was strewn with wounded and stragglers, ambulances and caissons, and that there was great demoralization and confusion.

By Mr. Chandler :

Question. Was this reported to General Meade ?

Answer. It was reported to General Meade immediately. And, in fact, General Gregg had captured a large number of prisoners; I cannot mention the number now, but it showed that the rebel army had suffered terribly. He captured their wounded, left in the hospitals, and other prisoners, showing that they were greatly demoralized.

By the chairman :

Question. Were many stragglers found ?

Answer. Yes, sir, a great many. Kilpatrick's command was ordered to the left to get in rear of them and destroy their trains as they were passing over the mountains, while Buford was ordered by the way of Frederick city to go to Williamsport and destroy what trains he could there. Both of these commands travelled day and night and succeeded in inflicting a great deal of damage upon the enemy.

Question. You advised an immediate advance of the whole army ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What reasons did General Meade give against ordering it ?

Answer. General Meade said he was not sure they might not make another attack on him. And to satisfy himself, he wanted to know first that they were in retreat; and for that reason I was to send the cavalry out to ascertain.

Question. You ascertained that they were in retreat ?

Answer. Yes, sir; the other commands, besides General Gregg's, found out that the whole rebel army was retreating to Williamsport or Falling Waters, and they inflicted upon the enemy a great deal of damage in proportion to their power.

Question. With what expedition did our army advance after you had ascertained the enemy were retreating ?

Answer. We were one or two days at Gettysburg after we received the information from General Gregg that the enemy were in retreat. The bulk of the army marched by the way of Frederick city to Middleburg, to a position on the Antietam river, the right resting about Hagerstown.

By Mr. Chandler :

Question. Were you in that council of war that was held in relation to attacking the enemy at Williamsport ?

Answer. Yes, sir, I was in the council.

By the chairman:

Question. I want to know of you, as a military man of a great deal of experience, what your opinion was that our army ought to have done under the circumstances?

Answer. It was my opinion that our army should have attacked the rebel army then at Falling Waters. Every position that our army occupied on the Antietam had been won by the cavalry. It satisfied me that the enemy were not very strong. On the day of the council, the brigade that was in front of General Slocum's command, under Colonel Henry, of the Pennsylvania cavalry, near St. James's college, or St. James's church, I think they call it, drove in the enemy, and reported to me that he could have carried that position, but that General Slocum had ordered him to halt for fear of bringing on a general engagement. The enemy afterwards brought a strong force there to hold that point. A second reason for this opinion for attacking the enemy was, that I was satisfied their army was short of ammunition; that they had not a sufficient supply to last for more than a three or four hours' fight; while our army was well supplied. The third reason was that they had a river at their back, which was swimming, and also one on their flank; and from the disappointment of their hopes in the battle of Gettysburg, and the discomfords that they had met with during the march to Falling Waters, and the buoyant feeling in our army, I believed that we should have captured—if not captured, at least dispersed—three-fourths of that army, at least taken all their artillery, and the sequel, proving that the enemy were also of that opinion, was the fact that they themselves moved off.

Question. What reasons were given by those who voted for not attacking the enemy? What was their idea about it?

Answer. There were various reasons given. The council was late at night. It was wet weather, and it struck me, when the question was asked of them, that most of the party did not attach that importance to the matter that I did. I knew several of those generals, who, from all I had seen of them in action, would much sooner fight a battle than run after the enemy. That was what we all wanted, to fight. There was one general, General French, I think, who remarked, after General Meade declared that he would not order an attack against the vote of the council, "Why, it does not make any difference what our opinions are; if you give the order to attack, we will fight just as well under it as if our opinions were not against it." I mention that to show that the generals did not attach that importance to the matter that I did.

Question. Then you followed the enemy along until you finally reached Culpeper?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Will you go on and state what happened there, with such facts as in your opinion are matters of interest, especially your retreat from Culpeper?

Answer. After we arrived on the Rappahannock I sent a command of cavalry under General Buford to see if the enemy still occupied Culpeper. He advanced to within a few miles of Culpeper, when the enemy brought out a heavy force of infantry and drove him back. We, however, still held the south side of the Rappahannock, the cavalry picketing there principally. After having been down there some time, and finding from the reports that came in that the enemy were not nearer than the Rapidan in any strong force, I moved with the whole cavalry force from Catlett's Station and Rixeyville through Culpeper to the Rapidan, driving out all their cavalry and capturing three guns. The enemy were taken completely by surprise. I remained there three days before the army came up on the Rapidan, before my cavalry were relieved. The army then occupied a position around Culpeper, picketing the Rapidan. The cavalry were then thrown to the right, to the left, and to the rear. On the right Kil-

patrick's division was stationed out as far as James City. We remained at Culpeper some time, and there were several advances and reconnoissances made to the right and to the left, but no formidable movement. The day before the army fell back from Culpeper I was ordered to send Buford's division of cavalry across the Rapidan at Germania ford. It was to move up in rear of the enemy and cause them to uncover Morton's ford. The first corps was to cross at Morton's ford and operate in conjunction with Buford's cavalry, whilst Sedgwick's corps, the 6th corps, on the right, was to attack the position of the enemy on our right. That evening it was telegraphed from the signal stations on the mountains near there that the enemy were moving in force on Madison Court House. General Meade became very much excited and determined to fall back with the army.

Question. What was our force at that time ?

Answer. We had five corps—probably 60,000 fighting men of infantry—that is my impression.

Question. You had more than that number of all arms ?

Answer. Yes, sir; we must have had nearly 80,000 fighting men in all. General Meade, as well as General Humphreys, mentioned to me that General Lee had been re-enforced, and had a force of 80,000 men. I urged that we should advance and attack the enemy at Madison Court House; or, if they moved further than that, then let them move as far as Sperryville, and then cut them off in their rear, which I thought could be done with three corps. I stated then that I never was satisfied that General Lee had received any re-enforcements, and that I believed we were stronger than he was. Besides, my troops, which had been sent across the river under the impression that we were going to make a forward movement, would be liable to be cut off if we fell back. General Meade, however, decided to fall back.

When General Buford came to Morton's ford and Raccoon ford—he crossed at both places—he found that the infantry which had been ordered to co-operate with him had gone. He was attacked by a heavy force of the enemy's cavalry and infantry, which he had to fight. I was ordered to cover the retreat with Gregg's and Kilpatrick's divisions. I sent Gregg in the rear, by way of Rixeyville, and remained myself with Kilpatrick's division at Culpeper until near two o'clock in the day, in order to give Buford time to get out of the way, and so that I could assist him if he wanted it. The enemy pressed me very heavily with cavalry and infantry in falling back from Culpeper to Brandy Station, and threw a large force of cavalry in between Buford and myself. At one time we had cavalry all around us. But we marched through them and formed at Brandy Station, where we had a very severe fight. General French, with the 3d corps, was marching to our left, and very kindly sent over and told me he was there and offered me assistance. But it was not necessary, as we did everything that was required of us.

My orders were to fall back with the cavalry behind the Rappahannock. But on reaching General Meade's headquarters, and telling him of this fight, of which he said he had heard nothing, had not heard the cannon, he directed me to leave the cavalry on the other side, and hold a position there, and see whether the enemy came in that direction in force. I told him that both divisions of my men had had very heavy fighting, and if the enemy did come in force, our men could make very little resistance. I said that, in order to determine the fact whether the enemy were coming up in our rear, it would be better to send a couple of corps back to Brandy Station the next day, in order to determine the movements of the enemy. He adopted that suggestion, and Buford's division of cavalry went back with two corps, and we remained a day there. Buford went back as far as Culpeper, but found no enemy. It appears that they had been making a rapid movement to our right. They attacked General Gregg that day with twenty-four pieces of artillery and a very heavy force of infantry,



showing clearly that they were moving on our right. General Gregg suffered considerable loss from that attack.

When General Meade heard of that he ordered the army to fall back; and we fell back to a position near Catlett's Station, and from there we fell back to Centreville.

When we had crossed the river I urged an attack, taking up a position at Warrenton. I was always under the impression that we could thrash Lee's army in any position along there. We were in splendid condition; in as good a condition as an army ever was. And the manner in which the enemy acted convinced me that there was either great timidity on their part, or that they had very small numbers; one of the two. I considered that General Lee, if he had had 80,000 men, would have walked right up to us. But I saw nothing, from the time we started until we got to Centreville, to make me believe the enemy had a force to beat us at all.

Question. What do you suppose Lee's force was then?

Answer. My calculation has been this: I considered that they lost out of their army at Gettysburg 45,000 to 50,000 in killed, wounded, deserters, and all that. And Longstreet had gone off at that time. I did not believe that they had more than from 45,000 to 50,000 men. I considered that was making a large allowance for their army.

Question. Did you tear up any of the railroad, or destroy any bridges, as you retreated at that time?

Answer. Our engineers did blow up the Rappahannock bridge; that is the only bridge that was destroyed by us that I know of.

Question. If you had been seeking a fight with the enemy, was there any difficulty in finding a place where you could force them to fight you on reasonably advantageous terms?

Answer. I considered that Lee's movement in going to Madison Court House and attempting to turn us by Sperryville was the most dangerous movement he could have been guilty of for himself. We could certainly have cut him off from the south, and his only recourse then would have been to go up in the valley or get between us and Washington.

Question. If the idea was always to retreat before the army of the enemy, why did you follow him so far out into this country? Why not have taken up your position in the defences of Washington, if you were not going to fight the enemy when you came up to him?

Answer. That is not a question for me to answer. I can only give you the impressions that occurred to me at the time. It was my impression, and it has been and still is, that we could have afforded to risk a battle, for we had all the advantages on our side that we could reasonably expect to have in war. Of course you may sometimes have all the advantages, and they may all set against you. But our force was all in hand; it was in good condition, and we had a good country to operate in; and we knew it thoroughly, for I believe we know their country there as well as they do themselves. As an evidence of that I will state the remarkable fact that, from the time we left Falmouth through the whole of the Gettysburg campaign until the time we got back to the Rappahannock, there was not a single order of mine that miscarried or was misexecuted, as many times as my staff officers had to go through the enemy's lines. None of my commands ever missed a road, or failed to get into their places at the proper time. And this service was performed night and day; showing that we know that country as well as they do.

Question. You lost the whole of the fall season by reason of that retreat?

Answer. Yes, sir; because we had to wait until the railroad was rebuilt before we could move out again.

Question. You advanced again after that retreat when the enemy retired?

Answer. Yes, sir; we advanced to Warrenton, and from there we went on again to Culpeper.

Question. And finally to Mine run?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. You were out there?

Answer. Yes, sir; I was with General Meade when we crossed the Rappahannock the second time.

Question. What was the object of that last advance, when you went to Mine run; do you know?

Answer. Before I come to that, I was going to speak of another occasion when I thought we lost another opportunity.

Question. State that, if you please. Go on with your narrative, in your own way.

Answer. It is in reference to the crossing of the Rappahannock the second time. General Meade was desirous of moving down to Fredericksburg, and telegraphed to the government to that effect. But they said that, as we had been to the expense of building up that railroad, we ought to protect it; and that they wished him to advance on that line and attack the enemy. In the discussion of plans, I recommended that two corps be crossed at Rappahannock Station and three corps at Kelly's ford, for Kelly's ford always turned the position at Rappahannock Station. It was said that we could cross there, and the moment the three corps crossed there they were only eleven miles from Germania ford, whereas the road running from Rappahannock Station to Culpeper is fifteen or more miles. I urged that these three corps marching across from Kelly's ford to Germania would, on coming up, get in rear of the rebel army on the other side of the Rapidan before the enemy could get there, and that the two corps that crossed at Rappahannock Station should move up and support the three corps at Germania. That plan was attempted up to the crossing, and it was very successful. General Sedgwick took the works of the enemy there, but General Meade would not order the three corps to go from Kelly's ford to Germania. I think he there made a mistake, for the movements of the enemy showed that they all went to the right pretty much through Culpeper, and that the three corps that crossed at Kelly's ford could have gone on and crossed at Germania and got into the rear of the enemy. The enemy were very much discouraged at being driven away from the Rappahannock, after they had commenced to build their winter quarters. That was another occasion where, I think, we might have gained a great deal by making an attempt to cross the Rapidan. We certainly could have crossed at Germania, for they had no force there that could have opposed the crossing of the three corps.

We then moved up and occupied Culpeper again. General Meade determined to make an attempt to flank the enemy by way of Mine run. He found out the point where the works of the enemy terminated, and then went up the stream. I knew nothing of what General Meade intended to do until the order was published relative to the movement, in which he directed me where to put the cavalry. General Gregg's division was thrown on the outside flank on the plank road to cover and protect it. They first crossed the river, and then protected the flank of the two corps on that side. The first division covered all our trains at Richardsville, while General Kilpatrick's division covered the fords and held them.

During the operations General Custer, who was in command of this division, crossed and went inside the enemy's works, and went four miles in the direction of Orange Court House, and had our troops then acted promptly I think we could then have succeeded in routing the enemy from their lines. After our army had got into position, and general orders came to attack from our left, which were declined by the general in command there, I recommended to General Meade that if he could not find one officer to do it to take another; that I thought

it necessary for the honor of the country and of the army that we should not back out without a fight. But he said it was too late; that the enemy were too strongly fortified, and he did not intend to attack them, and he came back with our army.

Question. Since the battle of Gettysburg the army has done little else but retreat?

Answer. No, sir; it has not fought as an army since then.

Question. I want to know of you whether the commanding general retains the confidence of his officers and men after all these retreats?

Answer. Well, sir, as far as my own corps is concerned, I do not think General Meade has their confidence. There has been a great deal of dissatisfaction for some time past among the cavalry in consequence of the manner in which they have been used. I have mentioned that to General Meade more than once. They find that they are throwing a great deal of hard work away to no purpose; that they have lost a great many men, and yet no beneficial results are obtained.

Question. As a military man, do you think it possible for us ever to conquer the rebellion by defensive operations alone?

Answer. No, sir; it must be done by offensive operations.

Question. What effect is produced upon the men by this constant shrinking from an engagement with the enemy, when we have reason to suppose that our force is equal to or superior to theirs?

Answer. It discourages them very much. I think our army was very much discouraged in coming away from Mine run without a fight. At least that is my impression. I may be mistaken. I am only giving you my impression about it.

Question. In your judgment, is there cordial co-operation of these commanders of army corps in these enterprises? Do the leading generals co-operate and act with one mind to effect the general result? It is a pretty searching question, I know, but we want to get inside of these matters if we can.

Answer. As a general answer, I do not know, but I should say that they did; that when anything is ordered to be done the thing is done. That is my general impression.

Question. But if the hearts of the leaders of the army are not in the enterprise it is very easy for them not to act with that spirit by which success is generally achieved, and yet not lay themselves directly open to censure?

Answer. I do not know any profession in which the character of the leaders tells more upon those under them than the military profession. I have been a long time a soldier, and I do not know any people who have to be more of actors than military men who understand their profession. I know that the men do look to their officers, their leaders. I have frequently seen men, when under great excitement and trepidation, calmed down by a quiet, jocular, or encouraging remark from their commander, turning the whole tenor of their minds, so that the thing they looked upon before as dangerous they would go right into without hesitation. I have seen men when they have been hesitating or excited, and some gallant, dashing man would come up, and you would see the men brighten up at once. You could see an immediate change to a different state of feeling. In fact, I do not know any profession in which the character of one man stamps itself more indelibly upon masses of men than in the military profession.

Question. And the spirit of the commanding general usually diffuses itself through the whole army?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. You have said that in your corps you think that, after all these occurrences, General Meade does not retain the entire confidence of the officers and men?

Answer. That is my impression.

Question. I do not know that I have any further questions to ask you. If there is anything further which you wish to say you will please go on and say it.

Answer. I do not now think of anything. I may not have made my statements here as connectedly as I might have done if I had thought the matter over; but I have given you just as the matters impressed me at the time.

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*Testimony of Major General David B. Birney.*

WASHINGTON, March 7, 1864.

Major General DAVID B. BIRNEY sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

See testimony "Army of the Potomac—General Hooker."

Question. How many days before the battle of Gettysburg did General Meade assume command of the army of the Potomac?

Answer. He took command at Frederick city, Maryland, on the 28th of June, 1863, and on the 1st of July the fight at Gettysburg was commenced by General Reynolds.

Question. Was it not most extraordinary to change commanders where two great armies were approaching each other so near a battle?

Answer. I think it was very extraordinary.

Question. Will you give us your observations in regard to that battle, how it came on, how it was fought, &c., so far as you may think it material?

Answer. I reached Emmettsburg, with my division of the 3d corps, on the 30th of June. I had been relieved at Frederick city of the command of the corps by General Sickles, who had returned to the army and assumed command of the corps, and I resumed the command of my division. As I said, I reached Emmettsburg on the 30th of June. On the 1st of July I was ordered beyond Emmettsburg to take position and cover the road that came from a gap in the mountains. About 2 o'clock in the afternoon a staff officer from General Sickles rode up to me with an order to proceed immediately to Gettysburg and report to General Howard, who had succeeded to the command there when General Reynolds was killed; to move with all despatch with my division. It was about ten miles from Emmettsburg to Gettysburg. We reached there about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, and formed upon the left of the 1st corps, on Cemetery ridge, as it is called there. We bivouacked in that position for the night. Upon the 2d of July I was ordered to relieve Geary's division of the 12th corps, that during the night had bivouacked on my left. I took position with my left at and on Round Top about 9 o'clock in the morning, and threw out skirmishers along the Emmettsburg road to cover the left. About 11 o'clock, the firing with my skirmishers being very sharp, and seeming to increase, I asked permission of Major General Sickles to send a regiment and a battalion of sharpshooters to make a reconnoissance and see what the enemy were doing. I received from General Sickles permission to do so. The reconnoissance showed that the enemy were moving in three columns, under cover of the woods, to our left. I reported this immediately to General Sickles, and he ordered me at once to prepare to meet the attack. About half past two o'clock in the afternoon the columns of the enemy could be plainly seen from the left of my position, and at three o'clock I ordered Clark's rifled battery to open upon them, as they were within fair range. At that time General Meade rode down to the line, accompanied by General Sickles, and asked what the firing was for. General Sickles and myself explained to him the position and movements of the enemy; that they were moving in order to turn out left, and we had opened upon them.

At that time General Sickles told me that General Sykes would, at my request, send me a division to support me upon my left; and that I could also call upon General Hancock, of the 2d corps, for another division upon my right, if it was necessary; that they had been ordered by General Meade to support us with those two divisions. I sent a staff officer to General Sykes asking him to send up at once the division that had been ordered from his corps to support me; that an attack by the enemy was imminent, and that I thought it would be made at once. The staff officer saw him, and he returned for answer that he would come up in time; that his men were making coffee and were tired, but that he would be up in time. He came up with one of his divisions in about an hour from that time, and formed upon my left upon Round Top, and placed Barnes's division massed behind my centre. I held with my division from Round Top to the Emmetsburg road.

I present here a map of the battle-field of Gettysburg, which gives, with accuracy, the position of the 3d corps during the battle on Thursday. I wish it received as a part of my testimony, to explain it.

The attack was commenced by the enemy about half past 3 o'clock, their force being formed in three lines. It was resisted by us, but my line was so long and thin that I was forced to send to General Sickles, asking for more support, as I had no troops in reserve. My line was almost a single one, and as the enemy, in the fight, attacked any particular point, I had to take regiments from other points to meet their attack. General Sickles sent me a brigade from the 2d corps, with one of his staff officers, which was placed by me in position in the centre of the line held by me.

About 5½ o'clock p. m. I received word from one of his staff that General Sickles had been wounded, and that he would like to see me. I rode to him and saw him, and at his request took command of the corps. The fight with our corps lasted until about 7 o'clock, we receiving support from brigades of the 2d corps and from brigades of the 5th corps. At about 7 o'clock I withdrew my corps from the front line, and massed it some half a mile to the rear of the line which I had held during the day. After this the enemy made no attack during the night. On the 3d of July we supported the 1st and 2d corps, but were not seriously engaged, and met with very small loss.

Question. Was there any council of war held the night after General Sickles was wounded? If so, state what you know about it.

Answer. There was a council of the corps commanders held at General Meade's headquarters that night, of which I was one present. It was there determined to remain and fight the next day; to make no attack the next day, but to receive one should the enemy make it.

General Meade said that his orders were to cover Baltimore and Washington, and he seemed indisposed to hazard a battle except on the most favorable terms. On Saturday night there was another council held, as to whether we should remain there or retire. The enemy had manifested no disposition to attack, but had drawn back his left flank, maintaining his position in front of our left.

Question. That was after the enemy had been finally repulsed on the third day of the fight?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What could have been the object of that council at that time?

Answer. It was suggested that the enemy were making a flank movement, and would probably try to interpose between us and Washington. At this council, on Saturday night, it was decided to remain twenty-four hours longer in our position, and that General Sedgwick, who had come up with fresh troops, whose troops had not been in the fight, should be sent with his corps to find out as to the enemy's right, and as to their position upon our extreme left, to see whether they were still in position there. I was also ordered to send out a reconnoissance at daylight to ascertain the position of the enemy. I did so

early Sunday morning, and reported that the enemy were in full retreat. I also sent back for permission to open upon the enemy with my rifled batteries as they were crossing a point very near me, upon the turnpike going towards Hagerstown, and the staff officer brought me permission to do so. I had commenced the movement to attack, when another staff officer arrived from General Meade with a written order from him to make no attack, which was done. My skirmishers advanced and took possession of their hospitals, with a large number of their wounded. I had sent some twenty orderlies with a staff officer, who led the reconnoissance, and I reported these facts constantly to General Meade; but this peremptory order from him not to open fire at all prevented any pursuit of the enemy.

Question. This was after the final repulse of the enemy?

Answer. Yes, sir. The council was held on Saturday night, and this was on Sunday morning.

Question. I would like to know who could have been of the opinion that a beaten and repulsed army could have endangered Washington by any movement they could have made?

Answer. There were several, I think, voted on Saturday night for retiring to another position.

Question. Who were they?

Answer. I forget now exactly who they were. It was a matter of some doubt in the council on Saturday night whether we should remain or retire; but it was finally decided to remain there twenty-four hours longer before we made any retrograde movement. It was decided not to make an aggressive movement, but simply to wait developments.

Question. Do you remember how the vote stood in that council?

Answer. My impression is that it was three to five.

Question. Do you remember the names of those who voted to retire?

Answer. I cannot give the exact vote. I know that in both councils General Howard, General Sedgwick, General Pleasanton and myself were for fighting. The first council was also divided.

Question. On Thursday night?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Whether you should retire?

Answer. Yes, sir, I think so. I know that several of the corps commanders objected to the position; said that our left was weak.

Question. Do you recollect how General Meade stood on that question?

Answer. General Meade stated that his orders were positively to cover Washington and Baltimore, and that he did not wish to hazard a battle without he was certain of victory; that was his statement to the council. He said that he intended to be guided by the opinions of his corps commanders.

Question. The council might have understood him to be rather of the opinion that it was safest to retire, might they not?

Answer. I could only state my own impression. I have given his language as I remember it.

Question. What was the condition of our army after the fight was over?

Answer. I have never seen the army so confident of success, in most admirable spirits, and so anxious for a fight.

Question. Were they not less jaded and fatigued by the battle than were the enemy?

Answer. Much less; the enemy had made longer marches and had attacked, and we had received it and repulsed them. Our men were somewhat jaded from their long march from Falmouth; but the army was never in a better condition physically than it was then, and very buoyant over their success.

Question. Suppose that the first council, where you think they divided

equally, had determined to retire, and you had done so, what, in your judgment as a military man, would have been the effect ?

Answer. It would have been very demoralizing to the army. They had marched with great spirit and animation to meet the enemy; and to have retreated at that time, while the enemy were in our own loyal State of Pennsylvania, in my opinion, would have been almost fatal to the command, if not to the country.

Question. How long did you remain at Gettysburg, after the enemy were finally repulsed, before you commenced the pursuit in force ?

Answer. The enemy retreated Saturday night. We remained there Saturday, Sunday, and Monday, and on Tuesday I moved with the corps towards Middleburg. At Middleburg, General French, with General Milroy's troops from Harper's Ferry, 10,000 men, was assigned to the corps, which had suffered heavily in the battle. He ranked me, and consequently assumed command of the corps on the 9th day of July, and I resumed command of my division.

Question. Do you know why those 10,000 troops were not brought up earlier, so as to have participated in the battle ?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Do you know why the troops at Baltimore, under General Schenck, were not brought into that battle ?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Those troops joined the army after the battle was over ?

Answer. Yes, sir; and there were a large number of militia from New York, and other troops that were in Frederick, which would have swollen the army; and I have understood that troops from General Foster's command, in North Carolina, were sent up.

Question. What number of troops do you understand came from there ?

Answer. I understood that the accession of good troops to the army amounted to 20,000 or 25,000 men.

Question. I cannot forbear asking this question: Do you know any reason why those troops from all these different points could not have been brought up to participate in the battle from its commencement, as well as they could have been brought up after its close ?

Answer. I do not know any reason.

Question. Was it not a great military blunder not to have concentrated them there ?

Answer. I think so.

Question. The enemy retreated, and you finally followed them ?

Answer. Yes, sir. At Middleburg General French, with those 10,000 troops from Harper's Ferry, joined the army, and took command of the 3d corps. I left the army and did not rejoin it again until it reached Warrenton, when I resumed command of my division.

Question. Nevertheless, you understand the condition of affairs when the enemy reached Williamsport and Falling Waters ?

Answer. From hearsay; yes, sir.

Question. Although you were superseded by General French, and did not participate in the movements of the army until they reached Warrenton, I will ask you, as a military man, what would probably have been the effect of a vigorous assault upon the enemy at Williamsport before they recrossed the river ?

Answer. The utter defeat of the rebel army, I think.

Question. What re-enforcements had our army received between the time of the final battle at Gettysburg and the recrossing of the Potomac by the enemy ?

Answer. I can only give an estimate, for I have no official knowledge. I should judge that of good troops there was an addition of 25,000 men, and I understood that of the militia in Pennsylvania there were 30,000 more.

Question. Would not those militia have been very useful against a retreating army ?

Answer. Very useful. I have found that new regiments, when they are inspired by a confidence of success, will fight nearly as well as old troops, especially if they are sustained by old troops. I have had regiments the first time they have been under fire fight as gallantly and handsomely as my old regiments, and they perhaps stood greater loss, because they were not used to retreating.

Question. Is it not your experience that the great difference between old well disciplined troops and raw troops is, that you can manœuvre the old troops better, especially in retreating, though the raw troops may fight right ahead about as well as the old ones?

Answer. The new troops are better, perhaps, to attack; but they will not do as well in retreating as the army of the Potomac, because they do not understand it so well; they are more easily demoralized.

Question. Do you know of any military reason that should have justified a general in permitting that army of the enemy to recross the Potomac at that time without a general assault on them?

Answer. I know of none.

Question. You were relieved by General French from the command of the 3d corps?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. When did you again rejoin the army?

Answer. I rejoined it at Warrenton, on the 26th of July; the army was then lying at Warrenton.

Question. Begin there, and proceed in your own way with an account of the operations of the army from that time onward.

Answer. My command was near Sulphur Springs, covering Fox's ford and the ford at Sulphur Springs, and occupying some four miles on the river. We remained in camp without any movement until September; I think towards the middle of September. We then crossed the Rappahannock to a position within three miles of Culpeper, on the Sperryville turnpike, and remained there until October 10, when a movement of the enemy to our right flank led to our retreat and falling back across the Rappahannock. My division brought up the rear and left, and we crossed the Rappahannock expecting to occupy our old position at Sulphur Springs, and the next morning after the retreat from Culpeper I resumed my march to Sulphur Springs. I was met, however, by an aid to General French, with orders to mass my troops at Freeman's ford, and not take my old position at Sulphur Springs.

About two o'clock in the afternoon of that day, an order emanating from the headquarters of the army reached me, stating that the whole army would be prepared to advance; that it would recross the Rappahannock. I held my division in readiness until night. I was then upon the right of our army, and little before dark the cavalry under General Gregg, who was stationed at the fords formerly held by me, reported that the enemy was there. That was beyond the line assigned to me, and I sent a staff officer on a gallop to headquarters of the corps reporting facts and asking instructions. I received orders to be on the alert and ready to receive an attack, and hold my command in readiness to move. I remained there all night; the enemy crossed within two miles and a half of my command, and I did not interrupt them at all. The next morning I received an order to fall back with the rest of the corps, which we did, and upon the extreme left of the retreating army marched to Greenwich and then bivouacked.

My division had a little fight at Auburn before we reached Greenwich. Two brigades of cavalry under Stuart attacked the head of my column. The fight lasted about thirty minutes, and resulted in a retreat of the enemy, leaving their dead and wounded. I lost about fifty in killed and wounded from my leading brigade. Stuart was cut off by this repulse at Auburn, and bivouacked that night to our right, within our army.



During the night, at Greenwich, I received an order to move promptly at daylight and forward to Centreville.

We massed at Bristow Station for an hour and marched on to Centreville, and found the army partly in position there. There seemed to be great fear that the enemy would attack us en route. His advance guard during this day's march was in sight of, and occasionally skirmishing with, our rear guard. The next morning I was ordered to the extreme left of the army to cover and hold Fairfax Station against an expected attack of the enemy from the left. I remained there some four days, during which the enemy had retired from our front, destroying the railroad from Manassas to the Rappahannock. I received an order to advance with the corps, and we advanced up the railroad and found it all destroyed. The enemy had taken up the rails and ties, made piles of the ties, and burned the rails upon them, so that they were utterly destroyed, and had blown up all culverts and bridges.

We advanced to Bristow Station. The next morning I received an order to move towards the right, towards Haymarket; that the enemy were there in force, and that there would probably be a battle. We moved in that direction, and got nearly there, when I received a written order to move to Greenwich; we moved to Greenwich, and from there we moved to a position on the Orange and Alexandria railroad beyond Catlett's Station.

We remained there three or four days in constant alarm that the enemy were coming upon us, but they did not come. During this time the enemy had a small force north of the Rappahannock, as I understood, taking up the rails and ties on the railroad and removing them across the Rappahannock.

After a while we found out that the enemy had retired, and we moved up to the heights at Licking creek, and encamped there. After remaining there a week or so, I received an intimation on the 7th of November that the army was to advance again, and attack the enemy and drive them from their position.

Question. What do you understand was the strength of our army when it made this retreat back to Centreville?

Answer. My idea was, that we had in the army, of all arms, about 90,000 men for duty.

Question. What did you understand was the strength of the enemy at that time?

Answer. We supposed that the enemy, after Longstreet's corps had gone away, had about 50,000 effective troops, exclusive of cavalry.

Question. What military reason can you now give for the retreat of our army under those circumstances?

Answer. I know of none.

Question. Was not our army in good condition?

Answer. Never better; they had fully rested since the operations in July.

Question. Were they well clothed, well fed, and well equipped?

Answer. No army in the world better.

Question. And yet you retreated before an army that was known to be inferior to your own. Could you have found no strong position where you could have fought them before you got back to Centreville?

Answer. I think we could have found positions that would have been equally advantageous.

Question. If you had been really in earnest about a fight, would there have been any difficulty in bringing one on?

Answer. I think there would have been no difficulty.

Question. Did we not by that retreat, and the destruction of our lines of communication, lose the entire fall season for campaigning?

Answer. The season that we could have relied on was lost, and the confidence of the men was a great deal weakened.

Question. You say there was another advance?

Answer. Yes, sir; on the 7th of November General French sent me a copy of orders from headquarters of the army of the Potomac; that the army would move; that it had been divided into two columns, the left column consisting of the 1st, 2d, and 3d corps, under the command of General French; and I was directed to take command of the 3d corps. The orders were to proceed by the way of Kelly's ford to Brandy Station, and that the 6th corps would cross at Rappahannock Station. I took command of the 3d corps, started at daylight, marched to the ford and massed my troops, concealing them perfectly, and occupied the hills on the left with my artillery. Without waiting for the pontoons, I crossed my own division by wading, captured some 500 prisoners at the ford, and prevented the enemy from re-enforcing their troops in the rifle-pits at the ford, by means of the guns which I had planted upon the hills which commanded the crossing.

I crossed with one division upon the other side about 2 o'clock, and laid the pontoons and crossed my other two divisions on them. By the time I got across it became dusk.

I found the enemy in strong force. Under orders from Major General French, I formed my columns ready to attack at daylight in order to carry the enemy's position.

I got my columns all ready, and at 3 o'clock ordered my pickets to advance quietly, and from thence I discovered that the enemy were moving. I also learned from contrabands that came in that the enemy were moving, going up by way of Culpeper to cross the river at Morton's and Raccoon fords.

I sent a staff officer across the river to General French, who commanded the left wing, to tell him of these facts, and that at daylight I would advance and follow the enemy. The night was very dark, and in my opinion it would have been imprudent, if not impossible, to follow the enemy before daylight.

At daylight I advanced, but before I reached the railroad I received orders from General Meade not to advance beyond it. I sent back word that the rear guard of the enemy were there, and that if I had a brigade of cavalry I could capture it and their battery, and asked permission to follow. I did not receive this permission, but halted at the railroad, about two miles from Brandy Station, until three o'clock in the afternoon. By that time General Sedgwick had crossed with the 6th corps. This movement of mine, in crossing the river, had flanked the enemy, and enabled General Sedgwick to cross without opposition, after capturing the fortification that was on the north side of the river.

The 6th corps joined mine in the afternoon, and then I received orders to advance to Brandy Station. We advanced to Brandy Station, and, although the enemy were in full sight, we halted and remained there. The enemy that night moved into Culpeper with their trains, and I am of opinion that if I had been permitted to advance, as my troops were in fine condition and eager to do so, we could have struck the enemy a very severe blow. Their army was scattered along in winter quarters, and I do not think that they had over 30,000 troops massed, and all the information I have obtained since confirms me in this belief.

The information we got from prisoners, contrabands, and other sources, showed that the rebel army was scattered for forty miles, and that our advance was a complete surprise.

We remained there in camp until the 26th of November. We were then ordered to prepare to cross the Rapidan, and we moved on the 26th of November. My division was placed in the rear of the corps. The 3d corps was to cross at Jacob's ford, with orders to move to Robertson's tavern, connecting there with the 2d corps, General Warren. Jacob's ford, the place selected for crossing the river by the 3d corps, was impracticable on the opposite bank for artillery or wagons, or even empty ambulances. In fact it was almost impossible for a horseman to go up on the opposite side of the river without dismounting. The 3d

corps, on reaching the river, had to send all the artillery and ambulances to the Germania ford. The place seems to have been selected with total ignorance of the ground on the opposite bank of the river.

We fortunately met with no opposition, and climbed up the heights, having sent all the wheeled conveyances to the lower ford.

We marched in the morning, my division being still in the rear of the corps. About 9 o'clock the head of the column reached Raceoon ford road, and found some of the cavalry of the enemy.

We remained there halted upon the road until three o'clock in the afternoon, at which time I received an order from General French to bring up my command in order to support the other two divisions of his corps. General French gave me orders to form a second line of battle with my division, stating that he was swinging the corps around so that his left would connect with the 2d corps, near Robertson's tavern. I formed in rear of the 3d division, which was very hotly engaged. That third division was composed of the troops which had come from Harper's Ferry. They soon exhausted their ammunition, and I had to bring my division in the front of the line. The attack was a very sharp one with musketry, and it lasted some three hours. The enemy were driven back, leaving their wounded on the field as they retired. I sent word back to General French that the enemy had retired, and received orders to throw out pickets and bivouack then for the night, which we did.

Before morning I found there was no enemy in front; that they had gone, leaving all their wounded and dead on the field. The 3d corps moved at daylight on Saturday, by the right road, in order to join the army at Robertson's tavern. This road had been missed the preceding day by the leading division. We buried our dead, carried off the field all our wounded, capturing a large number of small-arms. The loss in my division there was about 350. The three divisions of the corps lost, I think, 700.

We marched to Robertson's tavern on Saturday morning, and there I was ordered to take up a position, crossing Muddy branch, to the left of the 1st corps, which I did. It seems that a council of war was held there, at which I was not present, and General Warren had suggested that he could turn the right flank of the enemy by a movement towards Fredericksburg. Two divisions from our corps were taken for that purpose, and ordered to report to General Warren. I think Warren's plan failed, because it was attended with too much reconnoitring, fire-building, and delay, all of which fully advertised the movement to the watchful enemy, and prevented a surprise. When Warren was ready to attack he found the enemy ready to receive him.

Saturday and Sunday were expended in front of the enemy, who were busy fortifying in these plains.

An order was issued from headquarters army of the Potomac, stating at 8 o'clock Monday morning the attack would begin on the whole line.

My division was the only one in the 3d corps left in the command, leaving General French without a command really, except that I was under his orders.

I made my dispositions for the attack, forming my lines, and throwing out skirmishers.

At 8 o'clock a. m., according to orders, the artillery on my line opened on the enemy, and I ordered my infantry to advance. We crossed the creek of Mine run, and took the first line of rifle-pits of the enemy. The enemy were in great commotion. I think that in extending their right they had weakened their centre.

At that time, to my astonishment, an aid rode up and ordered me, from General Meade, to cease the demonstration; that there was to be no attack; and I withdrew from the line of the enemy's works and resumed my position, the one I held that morning before I made the attack.

General Meade rode up, and I told him of the success we had met with. We asked for some heavy ordnance guns, 4½-inch guns, which were in the reserve artillery, which, in my opinion, would have commanded their works opposite to us. But this was declined, and an intimation was given, or I at least got the impression, that we would retire, because Warren had found the enemy's lines too strong in his front.

That night we retired and recrossed the river, getting across safely, and have remained there.

Question. Did General Meade expect to capture the enemy without a fight?

Answer. I do not know.

Question. What was the object of your advance? Do you know?

Answer. I had supposed that the object was to attack the enemy, weakened by Longstreet's absence, and destroy Lee's army. I do not know what the object was, since this was avoided.

Question. What was the object of the retreat? Do you know that?

Answer. No, sir; I do not know the object of either movement.

Question. You were not driven from your advanced position?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. You retreated from what seemed to be a successful movement?

Answer. The assault was confined to my own division, under misapprehension of orders.

Question. Suppose you had been permitted to go on there with your division advanced; would it not have been very damaging to the enemy if you had broken their line there?

Answer. It would have been impossible for my division to have advanced further without the co-operation of the whole line.

Question. Exactly; but would it not have been damaging to them, had the other divisions come up?

Answer. I have always been confident that the enemy's position there was vulnerable, and could have been taken, though not without loss of life. I cannot see why, if we wished to engage the enemy, and the ground there was too strong, the enemy could not have been flanked and obliged to fight on ground that was more favorable to us. Their fortifications were not formidable, but their position was a good one.

Question. Do you know the nature of their position opposite our right, where the 6th corps was placed, and whether it was not assailable there, so far as you would judge from what you heard from officers who examined the position?

Answer. I think their position could have been turned there; I do not know what the reports of the officers were. That was very near the place we fought on Friday. I believe that a vigorous real attack on Friday morning under the orders from General Meade would have been fatal to the enemy. General Meade expected that this would have been done.

Question. What has been the effect upon the spirits and morale of the army, of their constant retreats and shrinking from the enemy?

Answer. I think these constant retreats have injured its morale very much; but I think the army now is in very good condition.

Question. Do the officers and men of the army, so far as you know, retain confidence in their commander after all these retreats?

Answer. There is no enthusiasm for him. I think he is rather liked by them; but, so far as I know, they have very little confidence in him as a military leader, or as a decided, resolute general.

Question. Why do they not retain their confidence in his ability and resolution?

Answer. The general opinion is that he lacks decision of character, and will not take responsibility at the proper time; and responsibility naturally devolves upon him as the commanding general.

Question. You have been a long time in the army. I want to know if there is anything like politics operating among the corps commanders in that army; and do they, under all circumstances, support each other with that enthusiasm that is necessary to the unity and efficiency of the army?

Answer. I do not know that there is anything like politics. There are several who are very strong admirers of General McClellan, and who feel that he is the only general that should command that army; but I think they support each other, in obedience to orders. I have never known an instance when they have not carried out the orders which they have received.

Question. Do they carry them out always with that alacrity which is necessary to success? There is a great difference whether you do a thing so as merely to escape censure, or whether you do it with zeal.

Answer. That is rather a hard question for me to answer.

Question. Well, I will waive that question. You spoke of their being admirers of General McClellan in the army. Are they not generally in opposition to that part of the army that do not so particularly believe in General McClellan? Is there not, to some extent, an antagonism between these admirers of General McClellan and the other portion of the army?

Answer. I think that was somewhat more the case before General McClellan's letter about the election of Judge Woodward, of Pennsylvania, than it has been since. I have heard very little said about him, since he has become an acknowledged politician, in the army. But my own position has always been so well known that I would be likely to hear very little of these matters. There was quite an excitement at the time of the McClellan testimonial—quite a feeling throughout the army.

Question. Have the rank and file now that enthusiasm for General McClellan that they are said sometimes to have, so that they will not fight under any other leader?

Answer. I do not think there is anything of that, except in those corps where the commanders are the strong personal friends of General McClellan, and make that a point. I know that in my corps there was not a single subscriber to that testimonial. I was approached by a general to know why I had prohibited it within my division, and refused to allow a staff officer to act upon it at that time. I answered that I had not prohibited it, but there was no one in the 3d corps that I knew of who would subscribe. If there was, they were at perfect liberty to do so. But there was no feeling that way in the corps at all; therefore I think the rank and file reflect, to a certain extent, the opinion and belief of their leader. I think that if the commander of an army is active and enthusiastic, the men would reflect the same feelings. I think the army is now in a good condition, and will obey any one willingly and promptly, although it is, to a certain extent, disheartened.

Question. And if the army was not composed of the best material in the world it would not be worth anything to-day?

Answer. No, sir; I think there has been enough to dispirit it. Its history, since the battle of Gettysburg, has been a succession of useless advances and rapid retreats. The summer and fall were wasted, and our army has, in every instance, after seeking it, avoided a general engagement. In my opinion, the rebel army could have been defeated at Williamsport; badly worsted on their retreat at Manassas gap; badly defeated October 11, 1863, in its attempt to turn our right flank, and during our rapid retreat to Centreville. I also believe that after crossing Kelly's ford, November 9, 1863, a rapid movement by way of Stevensburg would have cut off a considerable portion of their army, and that on Friday, November 27, 1863, a vigorous, determined attack by the 3d and 6th corps, supported by the 2d corps, on the enemy would have resulted in a victory, and in preventing the enemy from occupying their subsequent po-

sition at Mine run. All these opportunities being lost, or not taken advantage of, has dispirited the army, with good cause.

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*Testimony of Major General G. K. Warren.*

WASHINGTON, *March 9, 1864.*

Major General G. K. WARREN sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

(See testimony "Army of the Potomac—General Hooker.")

Question. You were present at Gettysburg after General Meade assumed command of the army of the Potomac ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. In what capacity did you act there ?

Answer. I continued right along in the same capacity as under General Hooker, chief of engineers of the army of the Potomac. When General Meade assumed command, he changed hardly any of General Hooker's staff. He deliberated about it, I think ; but after a while continued them the same as before. He assumed command on Sunday morning, and the troops continued to move on just the same as if the command had not been changed.

Question. Will you go on and give us your views of that campaign ?

Answer. To go back a little ; when the army with General Hooker was at Fairfax, we had a great difficulty and uncertainty about where General Lee's army was. If we crossed the river too soon we might be thrown out of position ; if we stayed where we were too long we might be thrown too far behind. It was exceedingly difficult to get reliable information, even though the enemy was in our own country. Therefore General Hooker waited until he felt assured that the enemy were going into Maryland. Finding that General Lee had gone over there and was gathering forage and supplies, and preparing evidently to stay there, General Hooker determined to strike him wherever he could find him. And when General Meade took command he continued that same idea right along, moving forward as rapidly as possible, for the purpose of hitting Lee's army with something, no matter what it was, so as to bring him into line and bring on a battle. The army moved, as we generally move, in three columns. When we got into the neighborhood of Taneytown, we began to get pretty definite information of where Lee was ; but it was still quite uncertain whether the main strength of his army was off over on our right, towards York, or on our left, towards Chambersburg. We could not tell exactly where the mass of his army was, though his forces were lying off on both sides of us. If he could get off on our right, he could go down to Baltimore ; if to the left, he might escape us and go to Washington.

Our route of march took us into Carroll county, Maryland, and about that county we had very little information. It was the only county in all the operations of that campaign that we had no decent map of. The cavalry on our left, that portion under General Buford, was very far in advance of the rest of the army. Our left wing was commanded by General Reynolds ; the centre was more immediately under the command of General Meade ; while the right, off towards York, was, I think, more under the command of General Sedgwick. On the 1st of July we were near Taneytown.

In view of these contingencies we had prepared lines of battle in different positions. One probable line was the line of Manchester and Ridgeville ; the dividing ridge between the Monocacy and the waters running into the Chesapeake bay. Then we had another line under consideration on Big Pipe creek ;

and orders were issued for that as the probable line of battle; and all the officers I could get were sent out to reconnoitre that line.

On the morning of the 1st of July we got information from General Buford that the enemy were moving down upon him at Gettysburg from the direction of Fairfield. I do not know how orders were issued; but I know that about that time General Reynolds moved forward to the support of General Buford, passing through the town of Gettysburg, and engaged the enemy there. This news came in very early in the morning. General Meade ordered me to go to Gettysburg to obtain information about it and examine the ground. In consequence of mistaking my road I went to Emmetsburg, a little out of the way. Almost at the same time that I left news came down that General Reynolds had been killed. General Meade then sent up General Hancock, with discretionary orders, I think, either to hold that place, if he thought it a good one, or, if not, then to fall back to the line of Pipe creek, keeping General Meade informed. General Hancock got there a little before I did.

At that time General Reynolds's corps, the 1st corps, had fallen back pretty badly damaged; and what there was of the 11th corps, that had gone out to help him, was coming back in great confusion. General Howard was then on Cemetery ridge with one division. General Buford's cavalry was all in line of battle between our position there and the enemy. Our cavalry presented a very handsome front, and I think probably checked the advance of the enemy. General Hancock made a great deal of personal efforts to get our troops into position; and I think his personal appearance there did a great deal towards restoring order.

I went around over the ground with General Hancock, and we came to the conclusion that if that position could be held until night, it would be the best place for the army to fight on if the army was attacked. General Hancock himself reported that to General Meade, who ordered all the army up to that position. It was a very difficult movement to make, for the 6th corps had to march over 30 miles to reach that position. I went back and reported to General Meade about midnight, and found him just ready to start out. All his orders had been given, and all the troops were moving.

The next morning as the troops arrived they kept going to position. By General Meade's direction I reconnoitred our position on the right; the most of our troops were coming up on the right; and General Meade had it in contemplation to order an assault from our right if his troops could be got into that position and be prepared for it before anything else took place. From the reconnaissance that I made I advised General Meade not to attack in that direction, because of the character of the ground.

Soon afterwards I rode out with General Meade to examine the left of our line, where General Sickles was. His troops could hardly be said to be in position. There seemed to be some doubt about whether he should occupy a line in front, or the one on the ridge in the rear; and I am not sure but a report had come in from some of our officers that that position was not occupied. I know I had sent an officer there to ascertain and report. However, when we got on the ground the enemy were just about attacking, and General Sickles immediately began to arrange his troops on the advanced line. I suppose that was about the only thing that could be done at that time.

I then went, by General Meade's direction, to what is called Bald Top, and from that point I could see the enemy's lines of battle. I sent word to General Meade that we would at once have to occupy that place very strongly. He sent, as quickly as possible, a division of General Sykes's corps; but before they arrived the enemy's line of battle—I should think a mile and a half long—began to advance, and the battle became very heavy at once. The troops under General Sykes arrived barely in time to save Round Top mill, and they had a very desperate fight to hold it.

I felt very well satisfied that General Sickles could not hold his position against the force brought against him; that his troops could not stand, and I so reported to General Meade; and other reports, either a call for re-enforcements or something else, made me think it could not be done. A portion of the 2d corps went to help him, a division of General Slocum's corps, and, I believe, some of the 1st corps also, and all of the 6th that could come up were sent to fill up that line in rear of where General Sickles's corps was fighting. The enemy drove our lines back clear to the main ridge, and our troops then drove the enemy back; that ended the fighting for that day. The repulse was mainly by the 12th, 1st, and 2d corps. I do not know which troops had the most prominent part in it. I only know they were all there.

Whilst this attack was going on on our left, the enemy also attacked on our right, and got possession of a part of the line General Slocum had established there, so that when his troops returned he found the enemy there. The enemy also attacked the line of the 11th corps just at dark; but, on the whole, they gained no essential advantage.

The next morning we began a fight on our right, to drive the enemy out, which was accomplished by General Slocum about 10 o'clock, I should suppose, and about 1 o'clock the enemy opened a very heavy artillery fire about on our left centre. After that had continued for about an hour and a half they assaulted us with a pretty large force, though I think not so large as the force they used the day before. That assault was repulsed, and that ended essentially the battle of Gettysburg.

Question. That battle lasted for three days, I believe?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Were any councils of war held during that engagement?

Answer. There was not held what I should call a council of war. The officers met together, but merely for the purpose of explaining to each other how things stood.

Question. Were you present at those consultations?

Answer. I was part of the time. A great many of the officers slept in the same house. I knew what the opinion of all the officers was. I talked with nearly all of them, and everybody was for fighting it out; there was no necessity for any council. General Meade had so arranged his troops on our left during the third day that nearly one-half of the army was in reserve in that position. It was a good sheltered position, and a convenient one from which to re-enforce other parts of the line; and when the repulse of the enemy took place on that day, General Meade intended to move forward all the forces he could get in line and assault the enemy in turn. He ordered an advance of the 5th corps, but it was carried on so slowly that it did not amount to much, if anything.

Question. Who commanded that corps?

Answer. General Sykes. Instead of advancing the whole of the 5th corps, I believe only about one brigade was advanced.

Question. What was the condition of our army after the final repulse of the enemy; were our men much fatigued and discouraged, or were they in good spirits?

Answer. They were in splendid spirits; they were not fatigued then. Those three days had been days of rest for the most of them; but we had lost a great many of our most spirited officers. General Reynolds was dead, and General Hancock was wounded and carried to the rear.

Question. General Sickles was also wounded and carried off?

Answer. Yes, sir; and many officers of lower rank, but relatively of as much importance as they were, were killed or wounded. We were very much shattered in that respect; and there was a tone amongst most of the prominent



officers that we had quite saved the country for the time, and that we had done enough; that we might jeopard all that we had won by trying to do too much.

Question. Do you know of any council of war held after the final repulse of the enemy?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think there was a talk that night about what to do.

Question. What was the opinion and decision of that council?

Answer. I am not certain whether there was a council of war before the night of the 4th of July. It is my impression that there was no council until the night of the 4th. On the morning of the 4th General Meade ordered demonstrations in front of our line, but they were very feebly made; and when the officers met together that evening to report the state of things in their front, there was so little definitely known as to the position and designs of the enemy that after some consultation they determined, I believe, to try and find out something before they did move. I know that was the result. I made the offer that night that if they would give me command of a division by 8 o'clock the next morning, I would tell them whether the enemy was retreating or not. It was not even known whether the enemy was retreating or not. On the morning of the 5th I went out with the 6th corps. General Meade gave orders for a division of the 6th corps to go with me, and for the whole corps to follow if I wanted.

Question. Are you certain there was no council of war held on the evening of the second day of the battle?

Answer. I do not know that there was; not what I would call a council of war. I think it probable that General Meade asked the opinion of all his officers about what they thought of their position.

Question. But you do not remember anything like a definite council, and a vote in that council?

Answer. No, sir; but a part of that evening I was asleep, being very tired, as we all were, of course. We were all in the same house together.

Question. Go on with your narrative of the way you got down to Williamsport.

Answer. We were considerably delayed in starting; but we found out that the enemy had gone, and we followed them up with the 6th corps to Fairfield. General Meade, during the day, issued orders for the whole army to move towards Frederick. On the evening of the 4th of July there was a discussion of the question whether we should move right after the enemy through the mountains, or move towards Frederick; that question was not decided, for the reason that we did not know enough about the enemy; and to have gone off the battle-field before the enemy did would have been giving up the victory to them. And then, if the enemy had gone, it was a question which way to go after him. To go right after him was a good way in one respect; but then we had to get all our provisions from Frederick.

Question. You remained at Gettysburg two days after the battle was fought before you pursued much?

Answer. We commenced the pursuit with the 6th corps on the 5th of July, and on the 6th a large portion of the army moved towards Emmetsburg, and all that was left followed the next day. On July 7th the headquarters were at Frederick. On July 8th headquarters were at Middletown, and nearly all the army was concentrated in the neighborhood of that place and South mountain. On July 9th headquarters were at South Mountain House, and the advance of the army at Boonsboro' and Rohrersville. On July 10th the headquarters were moved to Antietam creek; the left of the line crossed the creek, and the right of the line moved up near Funkstown. On the 11th of July the engineers put a new bridge over the Antietam creek; the left of the line advanced to Fairplay and Jones's Crossroads, while the right remained nearly stationary. In my opinion we should have fought the enemy the next morning, July 12th.

Question. Was there a council of war held about that time?

Answer. I think there was.

Question. Of the corps commanders?

Answer. Yes, sir; almost every night they met. However, I think it probable that no council was held on the night of July 11th. The troops were not in position; we had got no very definite information of the enemy, and we had not heard of the columns on our right.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. What was the impression in our army as to the amount of ammunition that the enemy had after such a severe engagement as that at Gettysburg?

Answer. I do not think that they considered it exhausted. I did not hear any one say that the enemy did not have ammunition enough. We always had enough. I do not know how it is with them; but we always carry along enough to fight two or three battles. I do not know whether they do or not. But from the best calculations I think it was considered that the enemy had enough ammunition yet to fight a battle, though I think it is very probable that he was somewhat short of ammunition. It would take me a long time to state the reasons that governed them for not fighting on a morning like that.

Question. What troops had you in the way of re-enforcements that had not participated in the battle of Gettysburg? Had you any troops besides those that you had in the fight?

Answer. Yes, sir; we had probably had 5,000 or 6,000 under General French.

Question. And you also had some militia under General William F. Smith?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What number?

Answer. I do not know what number he reported. I know that we did not consider them fit to put in battle.

Question. Then there was no use in having militia. Are they not good against a retreating enemy?

Answer. I could use them; I should have done what I could with them. But I know the report of the officer in command of them was that you could not rely upon them much, unless you mixed them up with other troops.

Question. You do not know the number of such militia?

Answer. No, sir; I probably knew at the time, but I have forgotten.

Question. You say it would take a great while to give the reasons for and against fighting the enemy at the river the night of the 11th or the morning of the 12th of July?

Answer. Yes, sir; I should have fought on the morning of the 12th if I could have got my troops to fight.

Question. Was there any difficulty in that particular? You say the troops were in high spirits?

Answer. There was the same trouble that there had been before; worse than ever before. Having lost a great many of our good corps commanders, we could not get our troops well into line, for we could not get officers who understood that. The weather was also very stormy, and the roads were muddy. All of these things were great sources of trouble, so that none of them, I know, considered themselves ready to fight.

Question. You knew that the enemy also had lost as many good officers as we had?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Are they better disciplined, and can they handle their troops better than we can ours? Are they so superior to us that they can handle a defeated army better than we can handle a victorious army?

Answer. No, sir, I do not believe they can. The 12th of July was spent in trying to get the troops into position. General Meade then did have a council of war about what to do the next morning.

Question. Were you in that council?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was the conclusion of the council?

Answer. They were opposed to an attack.

Question. All of them?

Answer. The most of them. General Wadsworth was not, and I think General Howard was not. But General Howard's opinion did not carry much weight with the rest, because his troops did not behave well. The conduct of his troops at Gettysburg was not such as to restore them to the confidence of the army.

Question. Then the corps commanders were pretty generally of the opinion that they should not attack the enemy?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What reasons did they give for that? Were not our numbers equal to those of the enemy?

Answer. Yes, sir; I suppose they must have been. I do not know of any real reason they had for not attacking, except that they considered the enemy's positions and intrenchments were too strong to carry, and they quoted such instances as the first battle of Fredericksburg, and our own repulse of the rebel forces at Malvern Hills and Gettysburg. I do not think I ever saw the principal corps commanders so unanimous in favor of not fighting as on that occasion.

Question. If you were not strong enough to fight their whole force, why not have fought some of them before they all got across the river?

Answer. They all got over in the night. At daylight on the 13th of June General Meade was out along the line, and ordered an attack to be made the next morning at daybreak. But when the troops, on the morning of the 14th, moved forward, the enemy was gone. One reason that operated on the mind of General Meade was this for not ordering an attack sooner: that if the enemy fell back across the river he could follow them into their own country and give them battle under, probably, as favorable circumstances as were there presented to him; that is, he thought if he lost that opportunity he could have another one. But he determined, finally, against the opinions of the others, to fight a battle there.

Question. Then all but General Meade and one or two others did not intend to fight them at all if the enemy had a mind to take up their quarters there? What, in your opinion, as a military man, would have been the effect of a general assault upon the enemy's position there by the river?

Answer. I think we should have cut them all to pieces; that was my opinion.

Question. Will you go on and tell us about your following the enemy after they had crossed the river; and tell us more particularly about our army falling back from Culpeper to Centreville in October last?

Answer. Before the enemy recrossed the river General Meade had reason to expect that re-enforcements would reach him in time; none of the re-enforcements had then got to him; that was a strong point in his mind. General Meade has always been anxious to fight the enemy when he could. After the enemy had recrossed we moved at once down to Harper's Ferry, without any delay. That same morning I went down to Harper's Ferry and got a bridge across the Shenandoah. Our movements in getting the army over were conducted with the greatest rapidity. While we were doing that we refitted all the army. We got down to Union by the 20th of July. By that time General Lee had hardly left the Potomac, and from information that we got we were compelled to halt there another day. We got information, I think, that General Lee was returning, though it was not believed. We then moved on as rapidly as we could, and got into Manassas gap on the 23d of July. General Meade there intended to attack General Lee's army, the whole of it or any part of it, for he knew he had got there before Lee had. General French then had the advance, and our troops were first-rate in hand. But General French made a very feeble attack, with one brigade only, and wasted the whole day; and the enemy got off again that night.

Question. Why was not the assault made with more vigor ?

Answer. General French was in command at the place, but he did not make the assault with more than a brigade. I am sure General Meade was more disappointed in that result than in anything else that had happened. For when the enemy got away at Williamsport, General Meade fully calculated to attack him at Manassas gap, or some place similar to it.

Examination suspended until to-morrow.

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WASHINGTON, *March* 10, 1864.

Major General G. K. WARREN'S examination resumed.

By the chairman :

Question. Proceed with your narrative.

Answer. After the failure at Manassas gap, we were unable to accomplish much more then, and the army finally halted around Warrenton, and in that vicinity, and a delay occurred there for some time to rest the men and to refit. There was nothing particular to be gained by moving one day rather than another. And there were reasons, I do not know exactly what they were, why the army did not move then, for which I do not think General Meade was responsible. There were matters that concerned our delay there with which I am not fully acquainted, such as movements down at Chickamauga, &c., and we spent the time in refitting and recruiting.

Question. And you finally moved on to Culpeper ?

Answer. Yes, sir. I then changed my position, as I have already stated, on the 15th of August, from chief engineer of the army, and at Morrisville was placed in command of the 2d army corps. We remained perfectly quiet, or nearly so, until the rebels captured two steamers down at the mouth of the Rappahannock. On the 31st of August the cavalry went down there to destroy them, and I went down to support them, but nothing much happened.

On the 13th of September the cavalry and the 2d corps crossed the Rapidan, and advanced on to Culpeper, to see in what force the enemy was in position there ; we found nothing but cavalry there, and they were driven over the Rapidan. The whole army then came up and encamped around Culpeper. I think it was then General Meade's intention to advance shortly afterwards ; but the necessities out west compelled them to withdraw the 11th and 12th corps out there, and that stopped us for that time. The 2d corps had been stationed down at Miller's Station, nearest the enemy, until the 5th of October. On that day we were relieved by the 6th corps, and we marched back to Culpeper. That, I think, gave General Meade the idea that another corps was going away from our army, for his advance took place about the 10th of October. On the 8th of October I went to Baltimore. On the 9th I was telegraphed to come back at once, and got back on the 10th. The movement back to Centreville began on the 11th of October. I know but very little about this movement, further than I was commander of a corps, and had only to obey orders.

Question. And the whole army retreated before the enemy ?

Answer. Yes, sir. General Lee passed our right flank, and on Sunday we fell back across the Rappahannock. On Monday it was uncertain whether General Lee intended to do more ; and the 5th, 6th and 2d corps, and the cavalry, all went forward again towards Culpeper to reconnoitre. About dark, after we had got as far as Brandy Station, General Meade received word from General Gregg, on our right flank, towards what is called Warrenton Springs, that General Lee had passed on and was crossing the river there with infantry, artillery, and cavalry. General Meade then ordered us all back again, and the movement to the rear continued all the next day. We were moving along near the rail-

road, and General Lee's army was supposed to be moving on the pike through Warrenton. The general impression in the army was—and as far as we could get information—that General Lee was trying to get possession of Centreville.

On the morning of October 14, the 2d corps, with Gregg's cavalry, formed the rear guard of our army, mainly on the flank towards the enemy. At day-break that morning we encountered Ewell's corps, of General Lee's forces. We delayed them for several hours, and then resumed our march towards Bristow Station. When we got there we found that the head of General Ewell's rebel corps had already arrived at that point. We there had a fight with them, and drove them off. Then during the night we continued the movement, and crossed the Bull Run.

Question. What was the estimated strength of the two armies, and what necessity was there for a retreat, which enabled the enemy to tear up our communications?

Answer. I do not know what the estimated strength of the enemy was. The object of the retreat, as I understood it, was to enable us to meet him wherever he might go, and keep along with him. My general narrative has told how we conducted the march to the rear.

Question. You blew up some bridges?

Answer. Yes, sir; I believe the bridge at Rappahannock Station was blown up.

Question. What was that for?

Answer. That was to prevent the enemy from supplying himself with provisions.

Question. Was there any difficulty in bringing on a general engagement with General Lee, if General Meade had thought best to do it, anywhere along the line of this retreat?

Answer. I suppose there was not. But General Meade had good reason to think, I suppose, that as General Lee advanced he meant to fight him somewhere, and he was going to select his best position—that is, he had no idea that General Lee would go off without assaulting him. Therefore he was all the time trying to keep the advantage of position.

Question. Could he not have met him on equal terms on several fields that he might have selected?

Answer. Yes, sir; I now think he might, and I do not know but what I thought so at the time. I am, at any rate, very certain now that he could have done so. I think if we had concentrated at Bristow Station we would have had a general battle.

Question. Suppose that General Lee had turned your flank, and got between you and Washington, what would have been the result in your opinion? Was it not of as much advantage to you as to him to have him get into that position?

Answer. It is my opinion that it was. I think if we had stopped, he never would have dared to pass us.

Question. And if he had, and you had brought on a general engagement with him between you and Washington, and defeated him, it would have been a most disastrous defeat?

Answer. Yes, sir; a defeat would have been most disastrous to either of us under those circumstances.

Question. Of course it would. But if you were seeking a fight, would not that be as good a position as you could have?

Answer. I think so. Of course we must take the risk of a smash up of the army before we settle this matter.

Question. Do you think it was good generalship to have retreated before General Lee's army, and permitted him to destroy our communications, which really occupied the rest of the season to restore?

Answer. No, sir, I do not think it was. But I would say, in favor of General

Meade, that I think he was very much misinformed; his information was so incorrect that he did not know what was going on. His cavalry deceived him very much; and I think some of his other officers failed him in spirit. I think at Bristow, for instance, the orders were to concentrate that night at Centreville; but when I was engaged in battle, it seemed to me plain enough that General Sykes ought to have helped me without solicitation or orders.

Question. He had an army corps?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. How far was he from you when you were engaged?

Answer. When I began the fight the last of his corps was moving off. I do not suppose he got more than three or four miles away; and a part of his corps did come back just at dark.

Question. Why is it that there have been so many occasions that one corps has not assisted another when engaged in fighting against almost if not quite overwhelming forces of the enemy?

Answer. My opinion is that the corps have not been commanded by soldiers—that is, that the corps commanders have not been the men they ought to be.

Question. Now, I want you, as an officer of experience, and one who has acted with this army of the Potomac for a long time, to tell me if you believe this army, just as it is now organized, is as efficient as it ought to be?

Answer. No, sir; I think that for offensive warfare it could be made immeasurably superior to what it is by properly organizing it.

Question. What do you mean by properly organizing it? What would you do?

Answer. For instance, I would consolidate this army into three corps. Then I would get whoever should be the best man to command the army, and then I would allow him to have the choice of his own corps commanders. Then I would allow these corps commanders to choose their subordinate commanders.

Question. And then hold them all to a strict accountability for what they did?

Answer. Yes, sir; and let them understand that their position depended upon their doing well; not merely excusing themselves, but accomplishing something.

Question. Now, for offensive warfare in an enemy's country, have you full confidence in the activity and spirit of our commanders?

Answer. No, sir, I have not, and I have never had, and now less of any time. I have the very highest confidence in General Hancock, but he is not with the army now; we have been operating without him ever since the battle of Gettysburg. At Gettysburg we lost General Hancock by wounds, General Reynolds by death, and then, by the change of commanders, we lost General Meade as a corps commander.

Question. And General Sickles by wounds?

Answer. Yes, sir. These were considered as fighting men by the army. They were men who handled their corps well, and stood well with their commands. I do not think that General Sickles is as good a soldier as the others; but he did the best he could, and with the corps he had he managed very well. His corps was composed of a little different material from the others.

Question. You considered him a man of resolution and courage, and one that would bring his corps into a fight well?

Answer. Yes, sir, he did very well. I do not think that General Sickles would be a good man to fight an independent battle, which a corps commander would often have to do. I think if he had been educated a soldier he might have stood very high. But when you come down to all the details of a battle, General Sickles has not had the same experience which others have had. The knowledge of those details do not make a soldier, but he should be possessed of them as much as he is of his own language.

Question. Then, according to your views, there is eminent necessity for a reorganization of this army?

Answer. Yes, sir ; and I have maintained that on every ground since the battle of Gettysburg.

Question. Now, to resume : You ultimately repaired the roads the enemy had destroyed when you retreated to Centreville, and then advanced again to the Rapidan ?

Answer. Yes, sir. And we had a very pretty movement at the Rappahannock about which nothing has been said.

Question. Go on and give your views of that.

Answer. On the 7th of November the railroad had been repaired as far as Bealton, about six miles from the Rappahannock. The intervening space was all of the railroad that the enemy had destroyed near the Rappahannock. On the morning of the 7th the whole army moved towards the Rappahannock. General French had command of the left wing, and General Sedgwick had command of the right. The left wing was composed of the 3d, 2d, and 1st corps. The right wing was composed of the 6th and 5th corps. That afternoon General Birney's division of the 3d corps forced a passage across at Kelly's ford, and just at dark a portion of the 6th corps captured all the enemy there was on our side of the river at Rappahannock Station. But the whole of November 8 was almost wasted in useless and uncertain movements. I do not know who is to blame for that. But if we had advanced that day rapidly towards either Culpeper or through Stevensburg, towards the south of it, we should most certainly have cut Lee's army in two. But as it was, the advance did not take place until quite late in the day, and during that night the enemy again withdrew across the Rapidan.

Question. What is the reason you did not embrace this opportunity when it was apparent to you ?

Answer. I do not know what was the reason there. It lies between General Sedgwick, General French, and General Meade.

Question. I would inquire if this hesitation has not led to the loss of a great many opportunities for our army ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; and the advance was then stopped for the completion of the railroad, the six miles I have referred to. Our next advance was delayed a little by the weather, but it finally took place on the 26th of November. We then advanced again ; the left, composed of the 3d and 1st corps, advanced towards what is called Culpeper Mine ford. The 2d corps, followed by the reserve artillery, advanced to Germania ford ; and the 5th corps, followed by the 6th, went towards Jacob's ford. The army stretched over a distance of about eight miles. Jacob's ford was the right of our advance. Here, again, the right column under General French got very much behind time ; why it did so I do not know. I have heard that it is yet to be a matter of investigation. They certainly did get behind time, so that all the rest of the army had to wait for their movement. We crossed the Rapidan at all three places without any opposition, and advanced some miles out into the country. We might have been kept marching all night if the 5th and 6th corps had been across the river, but we had to wait for them. The plan was all marked out before we started. The left of the line, swinging around towards the right, struck the plank road and followed it towards Orange Court House. That column was composed of two corps, about 25,000 men. I had the centre of the line with about 10,000 men, and was followed by the reserve artillery. The right of the line consisted, I suppose, of 30,000 men. One corps from the right was to join me on the turnpike road when we got to Robertson's tavern. I advanced as rapidly as we could, and got to Robertson's tavern, and engaged the enemy and drove them away from it. But the right of the line lost the road, I suppose, for they did not join me at Robertson's tavern, and could not be heard of at all during the whole of the day, and that compelled the centre of the

line to halt and wait until we could hear of the right again. General Meade was near me at that time. That delay of that day really lost the whole movement, for the enemy discovered our object, and concentrated behind Mine run, right across our path, in an intrenched position. Towards the evening the position of the forces on our right was discovered, and a portion of them were ordered at once to join the centre, and at daylight we all moved forward again. We found no enemy until we got to Mine run, about two miles and a half further on from Robertson's tavern. I reconnoitred in front as closely as I could all along where I was, and found it very strong. The whole of the day was occupied in getting the other troops up in position. At a consultation which was had that evening among the corps commanders, it was the universal opinion, I think—it was my own—that it was impracticable to assault the enemy on that front. It was my view that we ought not to assault them at all there. But I offered, if they would detach me, to go and make a demonstration on the enemy's left, to see if I could find a weak point, or shake him in the position in which he was then posted; and to keep on to his left until I even struck the railroad at Frederickshall Station if necessary. When I set out the next morning for that purpose, I had to make a detour of about eight miles to the rear in order to get clear of the rest of our forces and arrive on the plank road. General Gregg's cavalry reported the enemy intrenched within a very short distance in front of me, so I prepared to attack that position and see what it was. Having made my preparations, I advanced about three miles and drove the enemy, but found no intrenchments until I drove him into his real lines on Mine run; at that time that part of the enemy's lines was weak. But my movement had been apparent to the enemy, for I had made all the fires I could, my object being to make a demonstration as of a heavy force. The enemy also saw other troops moving—that a large force was being concentrated there, and during the night the enemy concentrated a large force there also. At dark I went to General Meade and reported what I had seen and done. He informed me that the officers thought there was a favorable opportunity to make an attack from our right with a part of our force; that General French, in the centre, did not think he could attack on his front at all, and that his troops, therefore, were available to assist me. General Meade accordingly sent me two divisions from General French's corps. When I started in the morning, in the first part of my move, I had, besides my own corps, a division of the 6th corps. That gave me a force of about 26,000 men, including the two divisions from General French's corps. I had only three batteries of artillery; it was a place where I could not use it much, and I did not want it.

The officers on the right had thought it feasible to attack there, and their troops were already in position when I got to General Meade. It was appointed, if I could get my troops in position, that I should begin the attack the next morning at eight o'clock, and an hour afterwards the attack from our right was to follow. The right and left of our army, in this condition, would have been about four miles apart, with a very weak centre.

I wish to have it distinctly understood that it was no scheme of mine at all to attack this place. The night before, in the council, every one had said that if we were going to attack that position we ought to do it at once, and not wait for the enemy to make any further intrenchments. But twenty-four hours had been given the enemy to make additional intrenchments, and the attack was afterwards ordered without my knowing anything about it.

I spent the night in getting my troops in position, and at daylight I was ready to begin the battle. But, after a thorough examination of the enemy's position by daylight, I did not think it was prudent to risk a fight there. I sent an officer at once and so informed General Meade; and, as I was to begin the action, my stopping suspended the whole of it for a time. General Meade came over to see me, and after a full consultation with me he concluded that it was best not to make the attack there. In fact, he said that he thought it was



best for us that we had not attacked; that the enemy, he had no doubt, was fully prepared for us. So, beyond some cannonading and a little skirmishing, there was nothing at all done.

Question. Were you aware of the strong and advantageous position our forces held on the right at that time?

Answer. I was not familiar with any part of our right.

Question. It was on your recommendation that there should be no attack on our left that led to the giving up the attack?

Answer. Yes, sir; and for that I am responsible. It was my firm opinion that it ought not to be done.

Question. How had the enemy changed the condition of things from the time that you reported you could carry that position on their right? You reported at one time, when you first examined their position, that you thought you could carry it. Now, what change did the enemy make from that time until you went there with the order to attack, and how long a time had they in which to make the change?

Answer. They had the whole night of the 27th of October. They had a distance of not more than three miles to move their troops; and in one space, where there was not a gun before, we could then count seventeen guns, in a commanding position.

Question. Did you counsel a fight earlier than this? Was it your opinion that an attack should be made at once?

Answer. My opinion was that, if we fought them on Mine run at all, we should fight them at once. But my idea was that, as we had plenty of provisions, we should keep on until we had passed their left and their intrenchments there, and attack the enemy where he had not anything.

Question. To turn his works?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Who objected to your advice to turn their works and attack them in that way?

Answer. I do not know; I never had any consultation about that. I consider really that if we had fought at Mine run we had every chance of being tremendously repulsed, and it would have been just another such a battle as the first Fredericksburg, owing to delays. I am personally a great deal on trial about Mine run. But that the plan of that fight did not depend on anything that I said that night is apparent from the fact that the troops on the right were already in position for the attack before I got to General Meade. I put the best face that I could on it then. But when I saw the condition of affairs next morning, and the change that the enemy had made, I changed my opinion. And what can be done in a night is everything.

Question. Is it not your opinion that we have lost a great many opportunities by hesitating and waiting at the decisive points?

Answer. Yes, sir. I will enumerate the points where, during the last year, I think we have lost opportunities. I think we should have advanced on the evening of the 3d of July, after the enemy were repulsed at Gettysburg, with all the force we had on our left. I think we should have attacked the enemy at Williamsport on the morning of the 12th of July. I think we were as ready then as we ever were, and the enemy was not ready at all. Then we lost another opportunity at Manassas gap, on the 23d of July, while the enemy was retreating. Then, again, we lost another opportunity when the enemy attacked me on the 14th of October at Bristow. Perhaps not at that point exactly, but during that movement, we missed an opportunity that we should be very glad to have again. Then, again, we lost a good opportunity after we recrossed the Rappahannock on the 8th of November. And another opportunity was lost in not making the junction we should have had at Robertson's tavern on the 27th of November. Nearly all these delays and failures, I think, are due not so much to General Meade as to his plans and expectations not being carried out.

Question. And you think that, on the occasions you have enumerated, with promptness and energy of action, a serious injury might have been inflicted upon the enemy?

Answer. Yes, sir, almost amounting to his destruction.

Question. You have enumerated five or six of these opportunities lost. Is not that evidence of a defect either in the organization of the army, or in the character of its officers, or both?

Answer. Yes, sir. One great objection, one might say, is that we have too many corps; and as corps are independent bodies, to a great extent they require able and independent commanders; and of course it is more difficult to obtain five able and competent independent commanders than it is to obtain only three, and it is more difficult to manage five than three after you have got them. That is one trouble, that we have too many corps. And then, I think that our corps commanders have not all of them been equal to their positions; and I think there is enough in that to impair almost every plan and jeopard every chance, though I do not say it is owing altogether to that.

Question. And there seems to be a want of determination and resolution in our aggressive movements?

Answer. One defect in the corps commanders is that, I think, they do not go enough to the front to see for themselves; they rely too much upon the directions and information sent to them; they do not depend enough upon their own knowledge.

Question. Do they approach the enemy near enough to feel of him, and find out in that way?

Answer. I do not think they do. I think there is too much reporting "the enemy in force," or "the enemy in position," when there is nothing there. False reports have been the real cause of our failures.

Question. And this over-caution in approaching the enemy seems to be the reason that you do not know more of them?

Answer. Yes, sir; that is it.

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*Testimony of Major General Andrew A. Humphreys.*

WASHINGTON, March 21, 1864.

Major General ANDREW A. HUMPHREYS sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

[See testimony "Army of the Potomac—General Hooker."]

Question. When did General Meade succeed to the command of the army of the Potomac?

Answer. I received a note from General Meade on the 28th of June, asking me to come and see him, which I did. I learned from him that he had that day been put in command of the army. I remained at headquarters for some hours, and then rejoined my division as it marched through Frederick. It was on that occasion that General Meade invited me to become his chief of staff, which I desired not to do until after the coming battle, and circumstances admitted of my postponing a decision until then. On the 29th of June we reached Taneytown. About midday of the 30th, as my division was encamped near Taneytown, we had orders to march, our march being directed towards Emmetsburg. I was sent for at the same time to go to general headquarters. General Meade being very much engaged at the time, I was informed by General Butterfield, who was still acting as chief of staff, of the object of my being sent for. He informed me of the positions of the different portions of the army, and told me that General Meade wished me, when I reached Emmetsburg, to examine the ground in that vicinity and see whether it would do to fight a

battle there, in the event of its being desirable to do so ; and what ground we could occupy. I think that the orders for our march were given under some information that Lee was moving towards us with his army. I understood there had been no very definite information received concerning his movements recently. But my division only moved about half way to Emmettsburg, some four or five miles, when I was told that the information under which we had marched had turned out to be erroneous, and my division remained where it was for the night. On the first of July we marched to Emmettsburg, and I posted my division about a mile out of town, on the Waynesboro' pike. After conversing with General Sickles as to whether we should remain there or not, and finding that we should probably remain there some hours, I examined the ground very thoroughly in every direction. I was not satisfied with the ground at all ; it was broken, complicated ground ; the features of it were not of that bold, decided character that indicated any very good position in which to fight a battle ; and I was obliged to make my examination a very minute one. Upon returning to my division about four o'clock, I perceived that some of the troops had left the ground. In my absence orders had been sent to march up to Gettysburg at once. I immediately followed on as rapidly as I could, and when I got to the head of the column I found that orders had been received between three and four o'clock to march at once, leaving one brigade and one battery on the Waynesboro' road, to watch it. We were directed to move up with all possible expedition to Gettysburg, and informed that the enemy had made their appearance there in force ; that the 1st and 11th corps had been very hotly engaged, and that General Reynolds had been killed. Two brigades of the other division of the 3d corps were moving up the main road ; I was to follow a road about two miles to the west of that one. I learned that Lieutenant Colonel Hayden, assistant inspector general of the corps, was there with a gentleman from Gettysburg, who acted as a guide for the route that General Sickles wished me to take. I had a map of that country which I had purchased that morning that showed all the roads. My division did not reach the position which it occupied at Gettysburg until one o'clock in the morning. When about half way to Gettysburg, I received a note from General Sickles, which had been written to him by General Howard, telling him to look out for his left as he moved up (on the main road I suppose was meant) from Emmettsburg. I was to the left of this road, some two miles. Just after this I met a person who had conducted a portion of the first corps up in the morning, and he told me that there were none of our troops on the west side of the Emmettsburg road. Therefore when I came to where this road turned off to the right and united with the main road, I wished to move over to the right, but Colonel Hayden, who was there, insisted upon it that General Sickles had directed him to guide the division by the way of the Black Horse tavern, which was on the road from Fairfield to Gettysburg, the road by which some of the enemy came. I was convinced the enemy were on that part of the ground. Just previous to this conversation with Colonel Hayden, about dusk, a staff officer from General Sickles gave me directions from him to take position on the left of Gettysburg when I got up. I presumed the left, as we were then moving, was meant—that is, on the west side of the road. Therefore, upon Colonel Hayden's being so positive that General Sickles wished me to approach by the Black Horse tavern road, I moved over there. It occupied considerable time to move there, owing to the crossings of Marsh run. I took the precaution of directing my column to move quietly as it approached this road, and to close up, as I expected to fall in with the enemy. We found that the enemy were posted there in force. They were not aware of my presence, and I might have attacked them at daylight with the certainty of at least temporary success ; but I was three miles distant from the remainder of the army, and I believed such a course would have been inconsistent with the general plan of operations of the commanding general. As soon

as I found what was the exact condition of things, I retraced my steps and moved my command by the route I have already indicated, bivouacking near Gettysburg about 1 a. m. on the 2d of July. This delayed me several hours, and fatigued my men a great deal. I mention it to explain why it was that I was so late in getting upon the field. It was a moonlight night, but hazy. I had to move back some distance after I found the enemy there. However, the fighting was over that day before any of the corps got to Gettysburg.

Question. By the way, what is the reason that you generals never fight a battle by moonlight ?

Answer. It is very dangerous to attempt anything of that kind by night, for if your troops are broken and dispersed it is almost impossible to rally them, and you are very liable to fire into your own men. A night operation is a very difficult one, and very rarely succeeds. Where you undertake to surprise a small force of the enemy, it may succeed, but it is very difficult and dangerous to attempt any offensive movement of magnitude at night.

I ought to mention that when I informed General Sickles of the circuitous route by which I had come, he informed me that it was altogether a misapprehension upon the part of Colonel Hayden to guide the division by way of the Black Horse tavern. But it shows what can be done by accident. If any one had been directed to take a division to the rear of the enemy's army and get up as close as I did unperceived, it would have been thought exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to do it unnoticed.

Early in the morning of the 2d of July my division was massed on the left of the 2d corps, on ground which, in my official report, I have called the Round Top ridge. It is in reality a ridge of elevated ground which runs between Cemetery hill and Round Top hill, and therefore might, perhaps, be as well termed Cemetery ridge. About 12 o'clock, or a little after, by direction of General Sickles, my division was formed some 400 or 500 yards in front of the position in which it had remained during the night. The first brigade was in line of battle, forming the front of the line. The second brigade was formed in line of battalions in mass in rear of the first, and the third brigade was massed in column of regiments in rear of the centre. This brigade had come up in the morning at 9 o'clock, having been ordered up by General Meade, as understood from the brigade commander. My left touched the right of the first division, commanded by General Birney. My right was opposite to the left of the 2d corps, General Caldwell's division, and I suppose some 500 yards in front of it. Afterwards, by direction of General Sickles, who commanded the corps, my third brigade moved down beyond my left, in a wood in rear of the first division, I being directed to give support from that brigade to General Birney if he needed it. At the same time I was authorized to call on General Caldwell, who commanded a division of the 2d corps in rear of my right, for such support as I might want. We remained in that position for some time.

Question. Your position was in advance of the general line somewhat ?

Answer. Yes ; my division was.

Question. So as to expose its flanks ?

Answer. Not at that time. My orders first were to form with my right resting on the left of the 2d corps, and my left touching General Birney's right, and in line with him ; but I could not do both ; and when I learned from General Caldwell that he had no orders to move forward, I reported it to General Sickles, and was ordered to form as I did. It was at that time, I think, that I was authorized to call on General Caldwell for support. We were both of opinion that the distance I was then in front of him would make no very great difference. We were in a hollow, and this was simply a preliminary formation of the troops. I went to the front, as soon as we were formed, to examine the ground, and at once directed a regiment to occupy a little log-house on the Emmettsburg road,

and an orchard in front of and near the centre of my line. I also examined the enemy's position in front of me. They were in a wood something less than half a mile in front of us. I ought to have mentioned that during the morning, before 12 o'clock, by direction of the corps commander, I had sent out working parties and had all the fences taken down in my front, so that we could move readily in all directions. I did not see General Sickles in the morning, because I could not leave my division unless sent for. I therefore, at that time, had no knowledge of the general position of the other troops except what I could see on my right; the ground on my left was hidden by trees. I did not know how the ground was beyond where I could see the troops. I learned about mid-day, from an aide-de-camp of General Birney, Captain Briscoe, that there was an important position on our left, a high hill, which he thought we ought to occupy—an opinion in which I concurred from his description of it, and so told him. The ground where I formed was a hollow, from which the ground sloped up in my rear to the ridge which I have called Round Top ridge, and also up towards the Emmetsburg road in my front, which road ran along the crest of another ridge. As far as I could see, the ground fell off again towards the west just beyond the Emmetsburg road. Perhaps a little after 4 o'clock I received orders from General Sickles to move up near the Emmetsburg road, and at the same time I was authorized to call on General Hunt, the chief of artillery, if I wanted any more artillery than Lieutenant Seely's battery, which had been assigned to me that morning. I immediately moved my command forward, placing my first brigade close up to the Emmetsburg road, just under the crest, perhaps fifty feet or so in some places from the road. I put Lieutenant Seely with his battery on the right of the log-house I have referred to. I increased my front line by a regiment from my second brigade, which remained in rear of my first brigade; my third brigade, from that time forward, was, by direction of the corps commander, left to the control of General Birney. As we moved up the enemy opened with artillery upon our left, but it did not amount to much for some time, doing very little damage. I sent an aide-de-camp to General Sickles and asked whether I should attack the enemy, and received for answer No; to remain where I was. I had previously said to him that the enemy were in a pretty strong place in front, but, nevertheless, if he was to be attacked we were ready to go forward. The artillery fire went on increasing on my left, but on my front, or to my left front, it did not amount to a great deal. The enemy in my front made several demonstrations to attack, but they were nothing more than demonstrations.

When I found that my third brigade was to be used entirely for the support of General Birney, I think I sent to General Hancock, of the 2d corps, to inquire whether the division on his left, General Caldwell's, was ready to support me, and I am under the impression that I sent a request to him to throw forward some troops between my right and his left. The front line of my division was between a half and three-quarters of a mile in front of the main line, and in front of the troops from which I was to draw support, and there was this open space on my right. The orchards in my front and towards my right were very thick orchards, and a very heavy force of skirmishers could get pretty well into them without being seen by my command, and I felt a little uncomfortable about my right; probably it was in consequence of that message that General Hancock did send forward some artillery and a couple of regiments.

The fire of the artillery began to get pretty hot on my left. My own artillery had very little to do. I changed the position of Lieutenant Seely's battery from the right of the house a little further down to the left, so that he might fire better into a battery that had annoyed us a little; and I sent for another battery, (Turnbull's was sent me,) which I posted where Lieutenant Seely's had been. My left was near to General Graham's brigade of General Birney's division. I think it must have been as late as half past five before the musketry and artillery got to be serious. By that time it had reached to

something like the dimensions of a battle, and increased in hotness. During this time one of my regiments, Colonel Sewall's, of the third brigade, reported to me and relieved the skirmishers of Graham's brigade, of Birney's division, who were in his front, and extended partly over my front.

It was a little after 6 o'clock when I received an earnest message from General Sickles, through a staff officer, to send a regiment to support Graham's brigade, as they were very hard pressed; at the same time he left it to my own judgment whether I could send it. I surmised, from the way the enemy were attacking, that I should be attacked in a very short time. I told those officers, from General Sickles and General Graham, that I was disposed to give them every assistance I could, but I could very ill afford it then, for I knew I might be attacked at any moment. While these officers were there, Colonel Sewall sent in word to me that the enemy were evidently deploying from the wood and were going to advance upon me. So urgent was the appeal, however, that I sent one of my regiments to General Graham, and at the same time sent a staff officer back to the 2d corps to send me up a brigade.

The enemy began to advance on me, and my artillery opened upon them. The space to my left, between a battery under General Graham and Lieutenant Seely's battery, was such that I could not throw any troops up on the front line. I found it was necessary to get my artillery out of the way as quickly as possible, intending to advance my whole line and pour in a fire as the enemy advanced. Just at that time I received an order from General Birney informing me that General Sickles was wounded, and that he had succeeded to the command of the corps, and that his division was going to fall back and form a line extending towards my right from the Round Top ridge, in rear of and oblique to my present line, and that I must change front and form on that line. In complying with this order I had to change front to the rear, under a heavy fire of infantry and artillery, just as I wanted to throw forward somewhat my troops to the attack. While I was making the movement the troops on my left, that were to continue the line to the Round Top ridge, did not stop there, but passed to or beyond the Round Top ridge. I formed my line and extended it out to the left as far as possible to close up this aperture, and by that time was attacked on my flanks as well as on my front. I never have been under a hotter artillery and musketry fire combined. I may have been under a hotter musketry fire. For a moment I thought the day was lost. I did not order my troops to fall back rapidly, because, so far as I could see, the crest in my rear was vacant, and I knew that when troops got to moving back rapidly it was exceedingly difficult to stop them just where you wanted to stop them.

At that moment I received an order to fall back to the Round Top ridge, which I did, falling back slowly, suffering a very heavy loss. I did not fall back rapidly, because I disliked to fall back at double-quick before the enemy, and besides I did not suppose I could rally my troops, or that any troops could be rallied at the place where the line was to be formed, if the movement backward was made rapidly. I reached this ridge, leaving some three guns behind, the horses of which had been killed, and rallied my division, or the remnants of it, on the ridge. As the enemy came up they received the fire of the 2d corps on my right, and my troops joined in, and we drove those fellows back. My men brought back two, if not all three, of the guns we had left. I am under the impression we brought off all three of them ourselves, though I understand that the 2d corps claims that they brought off one of them. These men of mine did not wait for any orders, but went forward, and as there were so few of them I went with them to bring them back before they got too far from the main line. By that time it was dusk, and the fighting ceased for the day.

When I sent the regiment to General Graham, I immediately sent to General Hancock and asked him to send me as many troops as he could to support me,

and at the time I was changing front to the rear, two regiments of the 2d corps were brought out and posted very advantageously, and formed a protection to my flank. I lost about 2,000 men killed and wounded, out of something like 5,000 men. That is the part my division took in the battle of the 2d of July at Gettysburg.

Question. Did you consider your line of the 2d of July as really too far advanced from the main line?

Answer. Yes. I do not know what the enemy's plans would have been if we had occupied the main line and not the advanced line. I think, very probably, he would have done what he did the next day—that is, have attacked us on that Round Top ridge, advancing over somewhat the same ground from which I had fallen back; but it will be seen that we were driven from this advanced position which we took up, and were not driven the next day from Round Top ridge, although we had a reduced force then.

Question. Suppose you had taken your position at first in the position to which you finally retired; would it not have been better?

Answer. Undoubtedly, as the result showed.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Did not your advanced line, from a half to three-quarters of a mile, expose your division to the concentrated force of the enemy?

Answer. Undoubtedly; they waited until they broke the left before they attacked me. I saw all the troops on my left moving out of the way, and before I was heavily engaged I saw their artillery on the left approaching very much closer.

By the chairman:

Question. How did your troops behave?

Answer. I think they behaved very well. It is the most trying position in which troops can be placed. I wanted to move forward and attack, because there is always a great deal in the spirit of advancing, even though it be but a few paces. If I had not received the order to change my position to the rear, I should have attacked, and I do not think I should have suffered a great deal more than I did, and I should have punished the enemy very severely.

Question. Suppose you had advanced still further; would you not have been exposed to a still heavier fire?

Answer. I should have caught it very severely, but still I should have punished them more, and probably we should have been broken so much in a very short time that we would have been forced to move back very rapidly. The first corps was, I think, brought up in the mean time, and helped to fill the gap, but so far as I could see when we were falling back the gap was open, and I was afraid they would drive us through it.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Did not your advanced position also expose our army to the danger of being cut in two?

Answer. No, I do not think it did. In one sense it was not a gap, and they would not attempt to go through there except when they pressed forward on me. They would simply attempt to drive me back and try to break me to pieces.

Question. That is what I mean. If you had been broken in pieces, was not all this space you were to occupy an open space?

Answer. Yes, sir, that would have been vacant, but another corps was brought up and put in there. The 1st corps and portions of the 6th corps came up and occupied ground on the left, and the 5th corps, or part of it, was brought up and occupied the Round Top, and the ground on its right.

By the chairman :

Question. This was on the 2d of July?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And that finished that day's work?

Answer. Yes, sir; during that night I remained on the left of the position of the 2d corps. I received directions in the course of the evening to move to the rear and fill up my ammunition and get rations issued—some of my men had had no rations during the 2d, but that was their own fault. I requested to be permitted to remain until daylight, which was granted. At daylight I got up and began to move to the rear, when the enemy commenced shelling me very fiercely. I waited half an hour, perhaps an hour, to see what they were going to do, before I moved to the rear. I then moved there and got together my first brigade, which was with the first division, and got together as many of my men as I could, and put my division into some shape. By direction of General Birney I then moved up and formed my division in masses in rear of the right of the 5th corps and the portions of the 6th corps which were towards the left of the line. I remained there until about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, when I was ordered to move quickly up towards the right and form my division into columns of attack, and be prepared to advance upon the enemy. I did so at once, and remained massed in rear of some batteries which were near the ground I had first of all occupied on the night of the 1st July. I sustained a loss there from the artillery fire of some very valuable officers and somewhat less than a hundred men. We did not advance to attack, and the enemy did not renew their attack. Towards night I returned to my position further to the left, where I remained until we marched from Gettysburg.

Question. The battle of the 3d of July was the last of the fighting there?

Answer. Yes, it was the last battle there. I think I had between 2,500 and 3,000 men for duty on that day.

Question. What was your loss in that battle?

Answer. I lost, principally on the 2d of July, over 1,900 men in killed and wounded in my division of something less than 5,000 men for duty.

Question. Your division, then, lost as severely as any division in the army?

Answer. I think it did. It was a fine division; the men were good soldiers.

Question. What was the condition of our army after that battle was over?

Answer. I remained very close with my division. I can only say that the spirit of my men was just as fine after the battle as at any time. I know that on the afternoon of the 3d of July, when I moved up, the greatest difficulty I had was to keep my men (a part of them) from jumping over the little breast-work in front of the artillery, and advancing against the enemy without any orders. They were full of fight, and felt angry at the way they had been cut up the day before. So far as my division was concerned, they were in fine spirits after the battle; they were not in the least disheartened.

Question. What was the reason you did not pursue after the enemy retired? They retired on the night of the 3d of July, did they not?

Answer. I think not; but I cannot tell you about that. We, our army, suffered very severely there; we never suffered as much in killed and wounded in any battle or series of battles. We lost some 17,000 or 18,000 men in killed and wounded. I do not know why we did not advance and attack them; they had also been damaged very severely.

Question. They had had as hard a time of it as we had had?

Answer. It is estimated that they lost more than we did in killed and wounded.

Question. Was not the position of our army there rather a defensive than an offensive one?

Answer. Yes; the battle was a defensive battle, and to that I think is to be ascribed our success; we had the advantage in that.



Question. What I wanted to know was whether they, who took the offensive, would not be more fatigued by such a fight than we, who acted upon the defensive alone?

Answer. As to that, I do not think there would be much difference, as moving up to this position or that position would fatigue us also. The loss would make a difference, and I have understood that their loss was considerably greater than ours.

Question. Which army do you think had the greatest numbers?

Answer. I think, from all I could learn, that if there was any superiority in the number of infantry it was with the enemy. It was estimated that they were superior to us in numbers. The 6th corps did not get up until the evening of the 2d of July; they made a march of 32 miles to get up to where we were. But that corps was not materially engaged in that battle; I understand they lost only 100 or 200 men out of the whole of that corps; and I am under the impression that this corps numbered something like 15,000 men. The absence of that corps from any active participation in the battle would reduce the number of those actually engaged very materially.

Question. The 6th corps was pretty fresh at the close of the battle?

Answer. Well, sir, that march of 32 miles would use them up; would fatigue them a great deal more than fighting the battle. And we had had a pretty severe time marching before that. I was very much fatigued myself the night I got there at 1 o'clock, as I had been actively engaged all day, which was a sultry one, making examination of the ground about Emmettsburg.

Question. Do you recollect at what time our army did advance in pursuit of the enemy?

Answer. The corps I belonged to did not march from there until the 6th of July; but we did not follow in direct pursuit, as that would have taken us to mountain passes in possession of the enemy. The 6th corps was moved forward in direct pursuit as far as the mountains, I understand; on what day I do not know. I did not leave my division, as I might receive orders at any moment, and did not, therefore, learn what was going on outside of the corps. I did not go off the ground, not to my hospital even, which was a mile or two in the rear, though I sent my aides-de-camp down to see the wounded.

Question. General Sickles's corps was the first that was attacked on the 2d of July?

Answer. Yes, sir; they began the fight—that is, were the first engaged, though demonstrations of attack were made on other corps during the day, as I learn, but I do not know at all what the attacks at other places amounted to. A division commander rarely knows more than what transpires on his immediate ground.

Question. You were down at Williamsport, where the enemy recrossed?

Answer. Yes; I accepted the position of chief of staff on the night of the 8th of July, while my division was on the march from Gettysburg towards Middletown.

Question. Some military men have thought that we ought to have attacked the enemy before he crossed the river there?

Answer. O, yes, undoubtedly.

Question. What is your opinion as a military man?

Answer. It certainly was that we should have attacked them as soon as possible. The army reached the Antietam on the evening of the 10th of July. On the 11th the right of the army was thrown forward, and strong reconnoissances were pushed out to feel the enemy, and see what his position was; and the different corps were directed to take such ground as would put them in connexion with each other.

Question. The army received some re-enforcements after the battle of Gettys-

burg, and before the enemy recrossed at Williamsport, did it not—some from Harper's Ferry?

Answer. I think General French had some 6,000 or 7,000 men, which he had taken from the force which had been at Harper's Ferry; I think he was near Frederick at the time of the battle of Gettysburg.

Question. He joined our army before the enemy recrossed the Potomac?

Answer. Yes; I think he joined the army on the 8th, and his division was attached to the 3d corps and formed a portion of it. I do not think the army received any material increase after that. I forget whether it was on the 11th or 12th of July that General William F. Smith reported that he was within available distance with a division. The numbers of that division I do not recollect, but it was composed entirely of raw troops. So far as I heard it mentioned, it was said General Smith did not have much opinion of the effectiveness of the troops that he commanded.

Question. After so fierce an engagement as that at Gettysburg, with such a heavy artillery fire, did it ever occur to you that the enemy, being so far from the base of his operations, must have been pretty short of ammunition?

Answer. I think he ought not to have been; I think that a general who starts out on an operation like that which General Lee was engaged in should, above all things, see that he had ammunition enough for his purposes. He need not have troubled himself much about provisions, but I think he should be pretty careful about his ammunition train. The question of ammunition did not, at any time, enter very seriously into my mind. I recollect that it was said, when we were at Williamsport, that General Lee had an ammunition train advancing from Winchester. The expenditure of artillery ammunition by our army at Gettysburg was a little more than 100 rounds per gun. I do not think that we expended more than half our infantry ammunition, if that much. Lee's army did not probably expend more ammunition than we did. I have some indistinct recollection of its being reported that Lee had received some ammunition while at Williamsport, but I was very much occupied at that time, particularly on the 12th of July, when I received and sent off a very great number of despatches, which I wrote with my own hand.

Question. You were then acting as chief of staff?

Answer. I was chief of staff at that time; I began as such on the morning of the 9th of July.

Question. Were you consulted with as to whether an attack should be made there?

Answer. Yes, sir; in this way: On the morning of the 12th of July General Meade expressed to me his views, which were to move the army forward and feel the enemy, and to attack them at such points as he should find it best to attack. We knew something of the general character of their position, but it was a very general knowledge. General Meade asked my opinion. I replied that I coincided with him; that I was in favor of the operation he proposed, the advance of the army and a reconnoissance in force, as it is called, to be converted into an attack. We could not see the position of the enemy well; their skirmishers acted as a sort of curtain, to keep us from looking too closely at them. A circular note was therefore sent to corps commanders to meet at 8 o'clock in the evening at general headquarters; they were to be brought there for the purpose of receiving instructions, and to give all the information they had collected during the day concerning the position of the enemy, &c. They met, and were generally of the opinion that it was not proper to make the attack then.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. How many were there in the council?

Answer. I think there were seven corps commanders there. I do not include

the commander of the cavalry corps, though he was present during part of the time. I do not know that he took any part in the discussion, and I have never considered myself as forming a part of the council of war. I have been present at times, but I considered myself as being there rather for the purpose of giving any information that might be wanted. I do not think that the chief of staff forms part of the council properly, therefore I should take very little part in any discussion. In fact, it was hardly a discussion, but, as I understood, a presentation of such acknowledge as the corps commanders had of the enemy and the ground they occupied, and the expression of their opinion as to whether we ought or ought not to attack. I was in the tent part of the time, and part of it outside, the tent being small and crowded. I think there were two commanders, that is, General Howard and General Wadsworth, the latter temporarily commanding the 1st corps—General Newton being too unwell to be present—those two, I think, were the only corps commanders who advised an attack. I do not know that they advised it; they assented to advancing upon general principles, rather than upon special knowledge. General Warren, chief engineer, was present part of the time, and expressed himself in favor of General Meade's views. Finding this very positive opinion on the part of the corps commanders against attacking, General Meade deferred to them so far as to delay until he could examine our own ground and that of the enemy, so far as it was possible to do so. I rode with him the next morning, and we saw something of the general character of the ground, and some part of the ground in detail occupied by the enemy and by our troops, and upon returning, by direction of General Meade, I prepared instructions to the different corps commanders to move the next morning and make reconnoissances in force, supported by the whole army—a movement similar in most respects to the one which General Meade wanted to make that morning. They did advance on the morning of the 14th of July to make this reconnoissance in force, intending to feel the enemy and to attack him where he was weakest, if it promised to be successful. He had, however, retired in the night.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Did you counsel with General Meade that it was best to attack the enemy in that position ?

Answer. Yes, sir, in the manner in which the advance on the morning of the 14th was made.

Question. Did you ever obtain any subsequent knowledge or opinion which led you to suppose that it would not have been advisable to make that attack ?

Answer. Subsequent information showed that the enemy had a very strong position, and indicated that had we made an attack we should have suffered very severely. But it was proper that we should have made an attack at that time—that is, a reconnoissance in force, converting it into a battle upon circumstances warranting it.

Question. You still think that it would have been the better course to have made a reconnoissance in force ?

Answer. I still think it would have been better to have made the reconnoissance in force, and have made an attack if we had found some parts of the enemy's line were not as strong as others. We might, perhaps, have found towards the right that we could have attacked them. It was very strong ground, and if we had made an attack there is no doubt that we should have lost very severely. But I cannot pretend to say now whether, if I had seen all that ground, I should or should not have counselled an attack. It would have been right for us to have made that reconnoissance in force, and to have been guided afterwards by the developments made by that reconnoissance.

I think that the public, and probably a great many officers, confound attacking field-works or intrenchments, where there is a small body of men posted, with attacking a whole army that has thrown up intrenchments. Now that is

a different thing altogether. You may take field-works, in which there are small garrisons, by assault; but when you have to attack a whole army, well entrenched, you will suffer terribly in getting up to them.

Question. If we had made a reconnoissance in force, as was suggested, and had been repulsed, would any serious disaster have followed to us?

Answer. I think we could have maintained our position there. We might have been broken, but we had pretty good ground to which to have withdrawn and withstood a return attack on their part; and I do not think, if they had attacked us in turn, that we could not have driven them back.

Question. Suppose, on the other hand, we had broken their lines, what would have been the consequence to them?

Answer. They would have suffered very severely; I suppose they would have endeavored to retreat rapidly up the Potomac. An army of 60,000 or 80,000 men is not to be knocked in pieces by any such battle as we have fought as yet. It is a rare thing to read of an army being completely broken in pieces, so that it cannot be collected together again and take up a position so as to make it difficult to dislodge them from it, especially in the country where we were. It is a broken country, full of good positions, where a good stand may be made. I do not think it would have been utter ruin to that army if we had defeated it there, though we should have done them a great deal of injury—damaged them very badly, no doubt.

Question. They would have been in about as bad a position or condition as an army of that size well could be?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the chairman :

Question. While we could have made a reconnoissance in force, and felt them pretty smartly without any great hazard to ourselves, if we had been successful it would have been almost destruction to them. Was it not, then, unmilitary not to make the attempt?

Answer. We did make the attempt the morning of the 14th.

Question. But after the enemy had all gone.

Answer. The order was issued before they had gone; they moved away after the orders were issued. There were no indications of their moving until the morning of the 14th.

Question. You accompanied our army after the escape of Lee there?

Answer. I have been with the army ever since. When we found that the enemy had all got across, the question arose with General Meade whether we should pursue him by his flank or his rear. It was concluded that the flank pursuit was the most advisable, and we moved accordingly. It looked very much as if Lee intended to remain about Winchester and Martinsburg. Our flank movement down the outside of the Blue Ridge did not at first appear to start him; so General Meade ordered a strong force towards and to enter Manassas gap, followed by the rest of the army. Lee, as soon as he perceived the character of the movement, moved with the utmost precipitation out of that valley.

Question. And you followed on to Culpeper?

Answer. Yes; that is, we moved up to the vicinity of Warrenton and the Rappahannock, and Lee went to the Rapidan, his cavalry in front of Culpeper Court House. I was absent from the army a few days when our first movement across the Rappahannock was made.

Question. Were you with our army when it retreated before Lee from Culpeper to Manassas?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What have you to say about that retreat?

Answer. It was not a retreat. In the first place, when Lee made his move-

ment on our right, General Meade was contemplating at the same time moving down on his left. General Meade and myself had been on Pony mountain, looking at the general features of the country in that direction, and then, on Friday, the 9th October, I think, we went to Cedar mountain. We had noticed, from Pony mountain, a long line of smoke along the foot of the mountain range on the upper Rapidan. When we were on Cedar mountain, which was pretty close to Robertson river and the Rapidan, we noticed fires off on our right in the direction of Madison Court House, and the signal officers reported movements of the enemy's cavalry. Just as we were leaving that mountain, information began to come in of changes in the picket line of the enemy, which seemed to indicate a movement of some magnitude, and before we returned to headquarters we learned that there was a heavy force of cavalry and, I think, some infantry moving on our right. A few days before General Meade had thrown out a division of infantry, which seemed to threaten their left, and it appeared probable that this movement of the enemy was a counter movement to that. It was not until late in the afternoon of Saturday, the 10th, that the character of the movement of the enemy was developed, our signal officers being finally able to perceive large masses of infantry moving on our right to Madison Court House. The cavalry on that flank also reported at this time the presence of masses of infantry as well as cavalry. There was then no question as to what that movement meant; it was evident that their whole army was in motion for the purpose of turning our flank. Lee, by that time, had got so far on, in consequence of the difficulty we had had of ascertaining his movements, that we could not advance to strike him in the flank. Had we done so we should have come on his line in the rear of his army, and he would have been on the line of our communication.

Question. And you would also have been on his ?

Answer. We should have been in his rear; he would have been far ahead of us. If we had undertaken to move on him while he was moving forward in the direction of Warrenton and our lines of communication, we should have been far in his rear. What we had to do was to move at once to Warrenton, which we would probably reach before he could, and take position in that vicinity, when, if he did not advance on us, we could advance on him. That would cover our lines of communication, and enable us to come in contact with him quicker than in any other way, and with the advantage of selecting our position. Orders for that movement were prepared and issued to the different corps commanders, and the movement began immediately. General Meade left his headquarters near Culpeper about mid-day on Sunday, and followed up the movement. That evening the infantry extended along the Rappahannock from Freeman's ford down to Kelly's ford, a distance of nine miles.

General Pleasanton, who took command of the rear-guard formed of a portion of his cavalry, was very positive, when he came in that evening, that Lee's army had intended to go to Culpeper to fight, and was moving at that time on Culpeper Court House. One of the corps commanders who had moved on our left, I think it was the commander of the 5th corps, gave some information which seemed to give probability to that opinion. He said there were very large clouds of dust on their left, apparently indicating a movement in the direction of Culpeper Court House. On Sunday General Gregg, with his division of cavalry, was directed to move up the Rappahannock and occupy all the roads leading to Warrenton which Lee's army must take, so as to give early information of the approach of the enemy in that direction. In consequence of the statement of General Pleasanton, I sent, about sunset, a despatch to General Gregg, telling him of what great importance it was that the commanding general should have the very earliest information of the enemy, where he was, which way he was moving, and everything about him; that it was of the utmost importance to have that information at the earliest moment. That note

was delivered to General Gregg, the staff officer returning near daylight the next morning. General Gregg wrote to me, acknowledging the receipt of my despatch, saying, in substance, that he understood thoroughly what he was out there for, and the importance of sending in intelligence of the enemy. The movement towards Warrenton was suspended. Noon passed, and we had no information whatever from General Gregg—no communication from him. I began to think that we had been deceived by Lee, and that he had moved down to Culpeper, for we certainly ought to have heard something of him by that time from Gregg if he was moving towards Warrenton. It seemed, therefore, to be highly probable that he was moving towards Culpeper. General Meade was so far of that opinion that he ordered two corps to cross at Rappahannock Station and move back towards Culpeper as far as Brandy Station, and find out if the enemy was there; a third corps followed in support. The afternoon passed away, despatches being received from time to time that there was only some cavalry and a few infantry in the direction of Culpeper Court House. Apparently, Lee's army was not there. Sunset came, and it was reported that there was no great force of the enemy near Culpeper. Buford had gone nearly to the Court House, driving in the enemy's cavalry, which was supported by very little infantry, and found that Lee was not there. It was puzzling; nothing had been heard from Gregg, and the enemy were not at Culpeper. I thought it could hardly be possible that Lee had gone back again. It was about 10 o'clock at night, or between 9 and 10 o'clock—we were sitting around our camp-fires—when I received a despatch from General Gregg, dated from Fayetteville, between us and Warrenton, informing me that he had been attacked by an overpowering force of the enemy at 11 o'clock that morning, and that he had been driven with great loss across the Rappahannock; and that Lee's whole army was at that time, and had been for some hours before, pouring across the Rappahannock, and were a great deal nearer to Warrenton than we were. There must have been, according to General Gregg's account, 40 field guns at work some time between 11 o'clock and sunset of that day, not more than seven or eight miles off I think, and yet we did not hear any of them.

The position of our army was this: one corps was at Freeman's ford; two corps were at Brandy Station; another between Rappahannock Station and Brandy Station; and one corps at Kelly's ford, some five or six miles below Rappahannock Station; and Lee was pouring his whole army across the river, not more than four or five miles above Rappahannock Station. It was a disagreeable position to be caught in. If it had been daylight, Lee could have moved upon us with advantage. Orders were issued at once to the corps to move, and the whole army was set in motion. But we had to move further in towards our base, in order to get the army together, and recover our position on our lines of communication. On Tuesday night our advance corps was at Bristow Station, and the enemy were up with our other corps on the left flank. The question then was, where the army should take position the next day. If the character of the ground between the railroad and the pike running from Alexandria to Warrenton had been known to us, General Meade would probably have tried to concentrate there. But the ground was not known; nobody had been through there, attention having been directed to other points. And it was evident, from the position of the two armies, that before we could fight, holding our line of communication, as we ought to do, we should have to fall back at least as far as to the Bull Run battle-ground—a position which, I think, no one wished to occupy—or to Centreville, which was the point Lee was probably aiming at. He had the shorter line of the two to reach that point. Centreville was the first point where there was a certainty that the army could concentrate before Lee could. It was accordingly moved to that position. The army had been up all Saturday night; a large portion of it had a good rest on Sunday night; it had marched a good portion of the day of Monday; was up marching

Monday night; and had moved all day Tuesday in forced marches, and had started at a very early hour the next day; so that it was pretty well fagged out when it reached the vicinity of Centreville.

Question. Lee's army must also have been pretty well fagged?

Answer. Yes, I suppose it was. If his army had not been, he would have hit us before we got to Centreville. He was ahead of us at the beginning in both movements, and then we got ahead of him. I have endeavored to explain to you by these details why the army went to Centreville. Why Ewell did not strike our flank before he did, and in greater force, may be accounted for by what I heard, that he lost his way in that portion of the country I spoke of, between the railroad and the pike, which delayed him; because when he made his attack at Bristow upon our rear, the second corps, he ought to have been able to bring up the whole of his corps. He was handsomely beaten in that attack by General Warren.

Question. Suppose you had reversed positions with Lee, with your back towards Richmond and his towards Washington; could you not have fought a battle that way just as well as any other, and a battle which would have been very destructive to whichever army was beaten?

Answer. Yes, a battle might have been fought in that way which might have been very destructive to the beaten army. If I had any choice in the matter, however, I hardly think I should choose such a position as that. I would prefer not to fight with the enemy on my line of communication, particularly if his army was better acquainted with the country than mine; my troops knowing certain roads and no others. Suppose, in the present case, we had followed Lee towards Warrenton; he would have selected his ground and obliged us to attack him under disadvantages, or make a flank movement in his presence, always a dangerous movement. By moving as he did, General Meade sought to retain the power of choosing when to attack Lee, or to make Lee attack him. To have followed Lee to Warrenton would have transferred to him that power of choice. The movement to Centreville was simply a manœuvre, or two manœuvres, and was not made for the purpose of avoiding a battle. Afterwards, when we moved back, we attacked Lee in a very strong position on the Rappahannock; and it was the fact of our surprising him that prevented his fighting as he ought to have done. I do not think there has been anything more brilliant than our crossing the Rappahannock in the first part of November last. We surprised the enemy completely, and captured nearly 2,000 men who were intrenched there, and some artillery; and Lee could not get his army together quickly enough to fight us.

Question. In this operation, in October, the enemy tore up some of our communications?

Answer. Yes, he tore up the railroad from Bristow Station to the Rappahannock. When we reached Centreville, it was the intention to move against the enemy after giving the troops one day's rest, and attack him wherever he might be found; but a heavy storm of rain came on during the night, and our troops could not cross Bull Run. Our bridge trains had been sent off with our other trains.

Question. Was it not possible to have brought on a general engagement with Lee during that movement?

Answer. Yes, it was possible, by yielding certain advantages to the enemy which should not have been yielded. If General Meade had had that knowledge of the ground in the region I have before indicated, that would have enabled him to put the army in a good position and fought a battle; we should have fought there instead of moving towards Centreville, as we did. Our first movement was towards the vicinity of Warrenton, where we should have had the control of our line of communication, and where we were familiar with the general features of the country.

Question. When you invade an enemy's country you always have to encounter the difficulty of his being better acquainted with the ground than you are, do you not?

Answer. Yes, but I do not know that he was better acquainted with this interior part than we were.

Question. And when you do thus invade, does it not follow, as a general thing, that you should act on the offensive rather than the defensive?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And if we do not feel able to attack the enemy wherever we can catch him, unless the character of the ground is very disadvantageous, then we have no business to be off in his country?

Answer. The object of going there is to beat him, of course.

Question. Then should we not have brought on a battle there?

Answer. We tried to do that, but we were prevented, as I have stated, from getting to the position at Warrenton. Every general prefers to keep his line of communication open when he fights, so that, if any portion of his army is beaten and broken, he can move where he knows the country, and keep his communication with his base open. I would rather fight in that way than in any other. The line of communication may be and should be abandoned temporarily if necessary to gain an advantage that promises victory. But I cannot perceive that the present instance was one of those cases. The line of supply may be abandoned in offensive operations, and the supply trains relied upon for a limited period. It was with the expectation of fighting the enemy that the movements I have described were made. It was not with the intention of avoiding a battle, but simply to fight it as we chose to fight it, and not as the enemy chose. When we afterwards moved forward we attacked the enemy in a strong position. We did not hesitate to advance on the Rappahannock and attack him, strongly posted as he was there.

Question. You lost a great deal of very valuable time in October by that movement, did you not?

Answer. Yes, there is no doubt of that. I have given this explanation to show why it was that we moved to Centreville, and that it was not a retreat; and at the same time to show upon what little things apparently the movements of an army depend. Now, had General Gregg, who was sent out there, not for the purpose of fighting, but for the purpose of collecting information, and giving General Meade the first intelligence of any movements of the enemy—if General Gregg had sent in that information early on Monday, we would have fought the enemy the next day, for we were moving for the purpose of fighting. But he did not give us the information until Lee was between us and the ground we had selected to occupy. If we had undertaken to follow him we should have lost distance, and he would have taken up his position on strong ground and forced us to attack him, or to make a flank movement to compel him to attack us. In justice to General Gregg, I ought to state that General Pleasanton, commanding the cavalry corps, mentioned that he, Gregg, had sent messages to General Meade on Monday, but none reached him until the despatch I have mentioned was received.

Question. It is the enemy's policy, undoubtedly, to spin out and protract this war as much as possible, and your policy to finish it as quickly as you can?

Answer. Yes. Yet there is this to be said: the commander of that army can never forget that he is to protect Washington, as well as to carry on an offensive war. And the difference of numbers in our favor is not great enough to admit of our making such movements as will oblige the enemy to fight us with equal advantages of ground. For instance, suppose we had had force enough when we made that movement on Mine run to have left a heavy column near Culpeper, and had moved on his flank and brought his army away from the Rapidan. Then having this column in position, concealed, which might have



been done, we could have thrown it on those portions of the enemy's lines which were not occupied, and have moved it to attack his left flank, in connexion with an attack on his front. If we had had force enough for that, there would have been no question as to the result. But such movements as these, being double movements, require a very great force, a very large superiority of numbers, in order to be carried on successfully. That is the experience of military men.

*Testimony of Major General W. S. Hancock.*

WASHINGTON, *March 22, 1864.*

Major General W. S. HANCOCK sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

(See testimony—"Army of the Potomac—General Hooker.")

Question. Go on with your narrative of the operations of the army of the Potomac after General Meade took command of it.

Answer. I arrived in Frederick on the 28th of June. General Meade had probably been placed in command on the night of the 27th. On the 29th the whole army moved, making very long and rapid marches. I marched with my whole corps, (the 2d corps,) of which I then had the command, from 32 to 34 miles that day—from Frederick city to Uniontown, arriving there about 10 o'clock that night. It was very sultry weather, and my troops were much exhausted when I got there. I found that the rebel General Stuart, with his cavalry, was at Westminster, six miles ahead of me. I knew that General Gregg, of our cavalry, was to have been in Westminster that night; but I knew that he would not be there, because I had met him on the way, and the roads being narrow, the artillery of his column had been interfered with by our infantry. General Sedgwick had also been ordered to march to Westminster with his corps; but knowing the very long march I had made, and that General Sedgwick had the outside of me, I felt certain that he could not get there that night. We took up a line, as it were, along the general direction of the Baltimore turnpike. I was to have gone to Frizelburg, but General Meade authorized me to stop at Uniontown.

As soon as I found that Stuart, with his cavalry, was at Westminster, I sent a note to General Meade, giving him the information. General Meade sent for General Pleasonton, who denied that Stuart was there, saying that he had received information from his staff officers that General Gregg was there. The mistake arose in this way, I have no doubt: General Gregg had got to New Windsor, and the name of Windsor was confounded with that of Westminster. My report of the matter was not credited, and no effort was made to catch Stuart. If there had been, I have no doubt we should have inflicted serious damage upon him; indeed, I do not believe he could have gotten away. At all events, that rapid march of our whole army had one grand effect—it placed us so near Stuart that instead of marching up to Gettysburg, as he probably would otherwise have done, he was forced over towards the Susquehanna, which I have no doubt prevented him from joining Lee earlier in the action, which was an advantage to us. I remained at Uniontown during the next day, the 30th, because my troops were very much exhausted; but other movements were probably in operation.

On the morning of the 1st of July I received an order to march to Taneytown. I arrived there about 11 o'clock, and massed my troops. I then went to the headquarters of General Meade and reported to him. While I was there General Meade told me all his plans. He said he had made up his mind to fight a battle on what was known as Pipe creek; that he had not seen the ground

but judging from the map it presented more favorable features than any other position that he could see; that he had sent his engineers there to examine the position and note all its strong features, and that he was then preparing an order for that movement. Shortly after that conversation General Meade received a message from General Reynolds, who at Gettysburg was really a mask, in order to allow this movement (occupying the line of Pipe creek) to go on in his rear. But it turned out that the enemy started to march down the same road a little earlier than was anticipated. Therefore, when General Reynolds attempted to move up from a point between Emmetsburg and Gettysburg to Gettysburg, where he had been directed to move that morning, it became a race between him and the enemy which should first get to Gettysburg. But General Buford, by a persistent deployment of his cavalry, and continually attacking the enemy, held them in check until General Reynolds beat them to Gettysburg. General Reynolds at once advanced to the relief of Buford, and engaged the enemy, knowing that it was no time to inquire about future operations, and that the only thing was to attack the enemy and delay him until the commander of the army should come to some decision. Whether General Reynolds had received this order designating Pipe creek as the line of battle which General Meade told me was in preparation, I do not know. General Reynolds engaged the enemy, and the 11th corps, under General Howard, came to his assistance.

General Meade heard, about the time I have stated, that this affair was going on at Gettysburg. He felt that the matter was being precipitated very heavily upon him, and he felt the responsibility. Shortly afterwards he heard that General Reynolds was either killed or mortally wounded. I had returned at that time to my troops.

I soon received an order, dated 1.10 p. m., directing me to proceed to the front, and in the event of the death of General Reynolds, or his inability to command, to assume the command of all the troops there, consisting of the 1st, 3d, and 11th corps. (Order appended, marked A.) I started a little before half past 1, turning over the command of my corps to General Gibbon, under General Meade's directions. General Gibbon was not the next in rank in that corps, but he was the one General Meade directed should assume the command, as he considered him the most suitable person for it.

Several such instances occurred during that battle. General Meade, prior to the battle, showed me or told me of a letter he had received from the Secretary of War on this subject. The government recognizing the difficulty of the situation, believing that a battle was imminent, and might occur in one, two, or three days, and not knowing the views of General Meade in relation to his commanders, the Secretary of War wrote him a note, authorizing him to make any changes in his army that he pleased, and that he would be sustained by the President and himself. That did not make it legal, because it was contrary to law to place a junior officer over a senior. At the same time it was one of those emergencies in which General Meade was authorized, as before stated, to exercise that power. I was not the senior of either General Howard, of the 11th corps, or General Sickles, of the 3d corps. My commission bore date on the same day with theirs; by my prior commission they both ranked me. Of course it was not a very agreeable office for me to fill, to go and take command of my seniors. However, I did not feel much embarrassment about it, because I was an older soldier than either of them. But I knew that legally it was not proper, and that if they chose to resist it, it might become a very troublesome matter to me for the time being. Whether or not General Meade, when he gave me the order, knew about this relative rank, I do not know. I say this because I have since understood that he did not. When I spoke to him about it before departing, however, he remarked, in substance, that he was obliged to use such persons as he felt disposed to use; that in this case he sent me because he had explained his views to me, and had not explained them to the others; that I

knew his plans and ideas, and could better accord with him in my operations than anybody else. I went to Gettysburg, arriving on the ground not later than half past 3 o'clock. I found that, practically, the fight was then over. The rear of our column, with the enemy in pursuit, was then coming through the town of Gettysburg. General Howard was on Cemetery hill, and there had evidently been an attempt on his part to stop and form some of his troops there; what troops he had formed there I do not know. I understood afterwards, and accepted it as the fact, that he had formed one division there prior to this time. I told General Howard I had orders to take command in the front. I did not show him the orders, because he did not demand it. He acquiesced.

I exercised the command until evening, when General Slocum arrived, about 6 or 7 o'clock. His troops were in the neighborhood, for they apparently had been summoned up before I arrived, by General Howard possibly, as well as the 3d corps. When General Slocum arrived, he being my senior, and not included in this order to me, I turned the command over to him. In fact, I was instructed verbally by General Butterfield, chief of staff, before I left for the front, that I was to do so.

When I arrived and took the command I extended the lines. I sent General Wadsworth to the right to take possession of Culp's hill with his division. I directed General Geary, whose division belonged to the 12th corps, (its commander, General Slocum, not then having arrived,) to take possession of the high ground towards Round Top. I made such disposition as I thought wise and proper. The enemy evidently believing that we were re-enforced, or that our whole army was there, discontinued their great efforts, and the battle for that day was virtually over. There was firing of artillery and skirmishing all along the front, but that was the end of that day's battle. By verbal instructions, and in the order which I had received from General Meade, I was directed to report, after having arrived on the ground, whether it would be necessary or wise to continue to fight the battle at Gettysburg, or whether it was possible for the fight to be had on the ground General Meade had selected. About 4 o'clock p. m. I sent word by Major Mitchell, aide-de-camp, to General Meade, that I would hold the ground until dark, meaning to allow him time to decide the matter for himself. As soon as I had gotten matters arranged to my satisfaction, and saw that the troops were being formed again, and I felt secure, I wrote a note to General Meade, and informed him of my views of the ground at Gettysburg. I told him that the only disadvantage which I thought it had was that it could be readily turned by way of Emmettsburg, and that the roads were clear for any movement he might make. I had ordered all the trains back, as I came up, to clear the roads.

General Meade had directed my corps, the 2d corps, to march up towards Gettysburg, under the command of General Gibbon. When I found that the enemy had ceased their operations, I directed General Gibbon to halt his corps two or three miles behind Gettysburg, in order to protect our rear from any flank movement of the enemy. Then my operations in the front being closed, I turned the command over to General Slocum, and immediately started to report to General Meade in detail what I had done, in order to express my views clearly to him, and to see what he was disposed to do. I rode back and found General Meade about 9 o'clock. He told me he had received my messages and note, and had decided, upon the representations I had made, and the existence of known facts of the case, to fight at Gettysburg, and had ordered all the corps to the front. That was the end of operations for that day. The next morning, some time after daylight, I again reported to General Meade, at Gettysburg, and assumed the command of my own corps after it arrived. I was placed on the line connecting Cemetery hill with Little Round Top mountain, my line, however, not extending to Round Top, probably only about half way. General Sickles was directed to connect with my left and the Round Top mountain, thus

forming a continuous line from Cemetery hill (which was held by General Howard) to Round Top mountain.

Everything remained comparatively quiet during that morning, except that the enemy attacked General Slocum; but that was on the other part of the line, the extreme right, directly behind the position I have just referred to. There was fighting going on there all the morning with portions of Ewell's corps, but we did not know at that time whether that was going to be the main attack or not. In fact, when I arrived on the ground in the morning, General Meade thought there would be a formidable attack by the enemy on the right of our line, and when my corps arrived on the ground it was formed facing in that direction, but shortly afterwards was marched over to the position which we held during the subsequent battle.

Everything remained quiet, except artillery and engagements with pickets on our front, until about 4 o'clock that afternoon, when General Sickles moved out to the front. I happened to be present with my corps at the time. I knew that the fight was expected to commence, but the object of General Sickles moving to the front I could not conceive. I recollect looking on and admiring the spectacle, but I did not know the object of it. I soon saw, however, that it was going to involve a fight in front of our line, because the enemy were only a certain distance from us and parallel to us, and I thought it would be disadvantageous to us.

Very shortly the fight commenced with General Sickles's corps, and in the course of the afternoon involved everybody along the line. One of my divisions, General Caldwell's, was sent over to the left of General Sickles; but it was sent to report to General Sykes, and it was posted, I believe, by one of his staff officers. I imagine that the reason it was ordered to report to General Sykes was, that after General Sickles advanced General Sykes was ordered to hold Round Top, and probably his own troops had not gotten up, although he was there in person, and I judge it was intended that that division of mine should hold the position until General Sykes's command should arrive. In fact, I was told at the time that the division would be returned to me as soon as General Sykes's troops had arrived; but it became involved in the fight, and fought there all the afternoon. The enemy succeeded late in the afternoon in turning the left of the 3d corps by passing between it and Round Top mountain, and, making the attack upon the flank of the 3d corps, forced it back. General Gibbon, of my command, had sent out two regiments and a battery to connect the right of General Sickles with our line. There was a little brick house in front of our line which seemed to be a good point to rest the right upon, and, in order to strengthen General Sickles, he sent out these regiments and a battery. The remaining troops of my corps remained as they were, except as I have stated. As the 3d corps formed part of the original line of battle, and this division of mine (Caldwell's) which I had sent to the assistance of that corps also formed a part of that line, it followed, of course, that the moment those commands were forced back there was a vacancy in the original line of battle from Round Top up to the point where the right of this first division had rested. The 3d corps and Caldwell's division of the 2d corps did not return to the original line that day, but were forced behind that line. The enemy breaking through at different places, it required us to patch up that line all the latter part of the afternoon and evening. Detachments of the 12th corps came over from the right, and also greater detachments of the 1st corps came up. The enemy made an attack along the whole front there, and on the 2d corps. But although the enemy had actually gotten in our line at more than one place, yet when night came we had managed to repulse them, and had driven them back, so that we held exactly the position we had started out with, which was the direct line from Cemetery hill to Round Top. But we did not hold any of the advanced ground which was attempted to be taken.

Things then remained in that condition. After we had successfully disposed of that force of the enemy, I heard a heavy firing on the front of General Howard and General Slocum. As it appeared to be coming nearer, I directed General Gibbon, then commanding the 2d corps, to send a brigade and two regiments, under Colonel Carroll, to that point, and they very materially assisted to repulse the enemy, who had made a very vigorous attack upon General Howard.

There was a council held that evening at General Meade's headquarters. All the corps commanders were sent for. I was present. Some of this fighting was going on at twilight, and after we had assembled in council. The 12th corps, on their return from the left centre, or the portion of it which had been sent over there, found that the enemy had taken a part of their intrenchments, and they went to work to drive them out. They did not succeed that night, but they did early the next morning. I should have stated that after General Meade received notice that General Sickles was wounded so as to be unable to continue in command, he sent word to me to go and take command of the 3d corps. I then turned the command of the 2d corps over to General Gibbon. When I went out to the front I took with me a brigade of my own corps, which I had been directed a few minutes before to send to General Birney, who was then in command of General Sickles's corps. I got down on the original line of battle, from which General Sickles had marched out just in time to be enabled to stop the enemy there. There we met the enemy, for that was the first point which they attempted to break through. I soon found that the 3d corps was all gone as a force for that occasion. I met General Birney, and he so informed me, when I told him I had been sent to take command. A small part of General Humphrey's division stopped on the line. I then exercised a general command on the left centre, in virtue of rank and verbal orders I had received from General Meade, and used the troops sent to me and with me to drive the enemy back. General Birney went to collect his division. I never really exercised any command over any part of the 3d corps in action, save the fragments of General Humphrey's command, (many 3d corps men, individuals, stopped on our line when directed to halt there,) because the command was in the condition represented. They were scattered, and could not be collected then. That was the end of it as a corps for that day. That night this council was held. After each corps commander had reported the actual condition of things along his front, the question was submitted to the council. General Meade being present, and General Butterfield questioning the members whether we should remain there or the army fall back to a better position—I understood with a view of protecting our supplies—one corps commander, I think it was General Newton, said he did not think the position of Gettysburg a very good one. General Gibbon, who was the junior officer, I believe, and voted first, said that he had not seen the entire ground, but he had great confidence in General Newton's military eye for these matters, and he voted in accordance with that view of the case, except that he objected to anything that looked like a retreat. I understood afterwards that General Newton really had the same view, and did not propose to make a retreat. But all the other commanders, I understood, said they wished to fight the battle there, and General Meade announced that to be the decision. The council then adjourned, and that was the last operation of the second day of the fight.

On the third day, in the morning, the enemy and General Slocum were a good deal engaged. About 1 or 2 o'clock in the afternoon the enemy commenced a terrific cannonade, from probably 120 pieces of artillery, on the front of the line connecting Cemetery hill with Round Top, the left centre, commanded by me. That line consisted of the 1st, 2d, and 3d corps, of which I had the general command. I commanded that whole front. General Gibbon commanded the 2d corps in my absence, General Newton the 1st corps, and General Birney

the 3d. That cannonade continued for probably an hour and a half. The enemy then made an assault at the end of that time; it was a very formidable assault, and made, I should judge, with about 18,000 infantry. When the columns of the enemy appeared it looked as if they were going to attack the centre of our line, but after marching straight out a little distance they seemed to incline a little to their left, as if their object was to march through my command and seize Cemetery hill, which I have no doubt was their intention. They attacked with wonderful spirit; nothing could have been more spirited. The shock of the assault fell upon the 2d and 3d divisions of the 2d corps, and those were the troops, assisted by a small brigade of Vermont troops, together with the artillery of our line, which fired from Round Top to Cemetery hill at the enemy all the way as they advanced whenever they had the opportunity. Those were the troops that really met the assault. No doubt there were other troops that fired a little, but those were the troops that really withstood the shock of the assault and repulsed it. The attack of the enemy was met by about six small brigades of our troops, and was finally repulsed after a terrific contest at very close quarters, in which our troops took about thirty or forty colors and some 4,000 or 5,000 prisoners, with great loss to the enemy in killed and wounded. The repulse was a most signal one, and that decided the battle, and was practically the end of the fight. I was wounded at the close of the assault, and that ended my operations with the army for that campaign. I did not follow it in its future movements.

Question. And that also ended the fighting at Gettysburg?

Answer. That practically ended the fighting of the battle of Gettysburg. There was no serious fighting there after that, save on the left, in an advance by a small command of the Pennsylvania reserves, made very soon afterwards, and based upon our success. I may say one thing here: I think it was probably an unfortunate thing that I was wounded at the time I was, and equally unfortunate that General Gibbon was also wounded, because the absence of a prominent commander, who knew the circumstances thoroughly, at such a moment as that, was a great disadvantage. I think that our lines should have advanced immediately, and I believe we should have won a great victory. I was very confident that the advance would be made. General Meade told me before the fight that if the enemy attacked me he intended to put the 5th and 6th corps on the enemy's flank; I therefore, when I was wounded, and lying down in my ambulance and about leaving the field, dictated a note to General Meade, and told him if he would put in the 5th and 6th corps I believed he would win a great victory. I asked him afterwards, when I returned to the army, what he had done in the premises. He said he had ordered the movement, but the troops were slow in collecting, and moved so slowly that nothing was done before night, except that some of the Pennsylvania reserves went out and met Hood's division, it was understood, of the enemy, and actually overthrew it, assisted, no doubt, in some measure, by their knowledge of their failure in the assault. There were only two divisions of the enemy on our extreme left, opposite Round Top, and there was a gap in their line of one mile that their assault had left, and I believe if our whole line had advanced with spirit, it is not unlikely that we would have taken all their artillery at that point. I think that was a fault; that we should have pushed the enemy there, for we do not often catch them in that position; and the rule is, and it is natural, that when you repulse or defeat an enemy you should pursue him; and I believe it is a rare thing that one party beats another and does not pursue him, and I think that on that occasion it only required an order and prompt execution.

When this assault first commenced I was on the extreme left of our line. As soon as I saw the skirmishers coming over the hill I knew the assault was coming, and I followed it up to see where it was going to strike, and as I passed General Caldwell, who commanded the left division of the 2d corps, I told

him this: "If the enemy's attack strikes further to your right I want you to attack on their flank; why I say so is this—you will find the 5th and 6th corps on your left, and they will help you." He did not attack on their flank; why, I do not know. Perhaps it would not have been wise for him to do so, because the 5th and 6th corps did not make the movement.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. Do I understand you to say that there was a gap of a mile in the enemy's line?

Answer. There must have been practically a gap to that extent, because it took a mile of troops in position to have made that attack in column as it was made.

By the chairman:

Question. Was all of their artillery thus left without infantry support?

Answer. This shattered mass of the enemy's forces rushed to the rear over the ground on which their artillery was posted and through it, and I judged there was nothing of any importance left with their batteries, but the artillery-men, as I understood the only two divisions the enemy had on their extreme right were Hood's and McLaws's, and they were evidently in a pretty shattered condition, because they had been heavily engaged the day before. I judge of their condition from the fact that this small command of the Pennsylvania reserves overthrew Hood's division by their advance. General Meade gave the order for the 5th and 6th corps to advance, but he said the troops were so slow in moving that they allowed the remaining hours of daylight to pass by before much was accomplished. I think we would have won a greater victory had the advance been promptly made and with spirit; and I have stated the reasons why it ought to have been done, for the intention was announced even beforehand that the 5th and 6th corps were to make a movement.

Question. We seem always to have failed to follow up a victory?

Answer. And we shall never reap the just fruits of a victory until we do follow it up promptly.

Question. I have observed that neither the enemy nor ourselves, when we come in collision with our great armies, seem to gain a decisive victory.

Answer. That is generally so, and one reason for that is this—unless the very moment is seized it passes away, because the troops on both sides have become so inured to war, that if you give them time to collect again they are ready for another fight. They know the advantage of collecting together as soon as possible, and if you allow them time to do it you lose all the benefits of your victory, or at least of that condition of things which immediately follows a victory. The men will fight again—not with the same spirit, perhaps, but still they will fight, as I have seen on many occasions.

Question. After the furious cannonade in that battle, and the expenditure of so much ammunition, what was the opinion of our officers as to the enemy having a supply of ammunition left?

Answer. I do not know, because, after the cannonade, I was intensely occupied and interested until the close of the fight; after I was shot, I had only time to dictate that note, to which I have already referred, to General Meade, when I was taken from the field.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. What would then have been your opinion?

Answer. If the matter had presented itself to my mind at all, I should have considered that the enemy must at least have exhausted their ammunition upon the field, because their artillery fire was most terrific, and they must have exhausted an immense deal of ammunition. It was the most terrific cannonade I ever witnessed, and the most prolonged.

By the chairman :

Question. Which side had the most artillery on the field at that time?

Answer. The enemy had the most in operation at the time ; we used as little as possible, for the reason that we were separated from our supplies by a distance of twenty-five miles ; we had brought up but a limited quantity of ammunition ; we were short of ammunition, and were continually husbanding it, and, frequently, during that cannonade, orders were sent to expend as little ammunition as possible, or it would be exhausted. On the night of the 2d of July, when we went to fill up our boxes for the next day's fight, we were not able to refill them completely, even from the artillery reserve.

Question. And if we were short of ammunition the enemy must have been still more so ?

Answer. I have no doubt the enemy regarded the success of their assault as certain, so much so that they were willing to expend all their ammunition. They did not suppose that any troops could live under that cannonade, but they met troops that had been so accustomed to artillery fire that it did not have the effect on them that they expected. It was a most terrific and appalling cannonade—one possibly hardly even paralleled.

Question. Was there ever, in any battle of which you have read, more artillery brought into action than in that battle ?

Answer. I doubt whether there has ever been more concentrated upon an equal space, and opening at one time. I think there has been more artillery engaged in many battles, but do not believe there has been more upon both sides concentrated on an equal space.

Question. You did not follow the army from there ?

Answer. No, sir ; I left the field the moment the fight was over ?

Question. When did you join the army again ?

Answer. I did not join it again until some time in December, when active operations had ceased. I was then ordered by the Secretary of War into the States from whence the regiments of my corps came, to fill them up by recruitment, and I am now on my return to the army.

Question. You were not with the army when it retired from Culpepper to Centreville ?

Answer. No, sir ; I have not been with it during any of its movements since the battle of Gettysburg.

Question. You have been with the army of the Potomac during all its important operations, and have been in a great many battles. What do you say of the spirit of our troops and that of the enemy ?

Answer. I think the spirit of our troops is always good—as good as that of the enemy ; but as a general thing I think the attacks of the enemy are made with more vivacity than our attacks are made. I think our men have fought better in defensive positions than the enemy have. I think the enemy, from peculiarity of characteristic and climate, and possibly other reasons, attack with more vivacity, but I do not think they continue the fight with the same energy as our troops do when serious resistance is made.

By Mr. Chandler :

Question. But with equal numbers you would not hesitate to attack the enemy anywhere under equal circumstances ?

Answer. No, sir, I would not. In fact there is no finer army, if as fine, in existence in the world than the army of the Potomac. The troops will do anything if they are only ordered. If they have not made this or that attack, it is because their commanders did not order them to make it.

By the chairman :

Question. And if they do not attack with as much vivacity as the enemy,



may that not be owing to the fact that this army has not been accustomed to take the offensive ?

Answer. It may be so ; they have not been in the habit of it. That has not been our system of fighting ; our practice has habitually been to seek a defensive position and receive an attack.

Question. Does it not require more coolness to receive an attack than to make one ?

Answer. I think, with equal education, it does. I think it is more difficult to stand and receive an attack—see it coming on before you are called upon to take part in it—than in any other operation of war.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Why has it been generally true that this army has waited to be attacked, instead of itself taking the offensive ?

Answer. I think it has depended entirely upon the temperament or policy of the commander ; I can see no other reason for it, because our troops are always anxious to attack. I have always had troops that were eager to attack, and I judge it has been owing to the policy or temperament of the commander that that has not been our system.

By the chairman :

Question. Is not this overcaution derived from the fact that all the fights of the army of the Potomac have been rather in defence of our capital ?

Answer. I have no doubt that has had its effect. I think the very fact that we have been defending something has placed us to a certain extent in the position to lead us all to feel that we are fighting a defensive fight ; without being able to point to any distinctive fact that seems to prove it, other than that the capital is under our protection.

Question. Suppose that our fortifications about this capital were manned and supported, say, by 30,000 troops, would not that baffle an army of the enemy until our army could come up and engage the enemy ?

Answer. They ought to do so. But I have been stationed in Alexandria at times when the enemy were approaching the capital, and I have always thought that unless we had a very large force of infantry there, under judicious commanders, who knew these fortifications well, the enemy had it in his power to penetrate between our forts with great impunity, particularly at night. We have always allowed free ingress and egress of people ; there has been no time apparently when peace ceased and war commenced. While the enemy are approaching the gates of the capital, the country seems to be open. There is no consolidation of troops, and no system, and I have not much confidence in that kind of defences.

Question. That is a defect in the organization of the forces ?

Answer. I think so. I think, with the disciplined army the enemy have in front of us, it would take a very large army in those works to defend them, because the works occupy a great deal of ground ; and you must have a large body of troops at each of the different prominent points—the great centres.

Question. I did not mean to indicate that our troops should make a permanent defence here ; but would not they detain the enemy until our army should come up ?

Answer. There is no doubt that they ought to do so ; that the fortifications have not performed their functions unless they can do so.

Question. That, I suppose, was the object of the fortifications ?

Answer. No doubt ; and it ought to be known what command of infantry, in conjunction with these forts, could defend them.

Question. Do you know the number of troops in and about Washington at the time of the battle of Antietam ?

Answer. I have no doubt that there were quite a number here, because I know some divisions of the army of the Potomac that were not in the battle of Antietam; and some of these I understood were in Washington.

Question. In your opinion as a military man, I will ask whether or not our army should have attacked the enemy before he recrossed the Potomac at Williamsport?

Answer. I was not there, but my impression is that I should have voted for an attack. My military opinion may not be good for much, because I have not seen the ground, but my impression is that the enemy should have been attacked there.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. During the battle of Gettysburg did you know anything about an order of General Meade's to retire from that position?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Would you have known of such an order if it had been published?

Answer. I suppose so; the movement could not have been made without my knowledge.

A.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

July 1, 1863—1.10 p. m.

*Commanding Officer 2d Corps:*

The major general commanding has just been informed that General Reynolds has been killed or badly wounded. He directs that you turn over the command of your corps to General Gibbon; that you proceed to the front, and by virtue of this order, in case of the truth of General Reynolds's death, you assume command of the corps there assembled, viz: the 11th, 1st, and 3d, at Emmettsburg. If you think the ground and position there a better one to fight a battle under existing circumstances, you will so advise the general, and he will order all the troops up; you know the general's views, and General Warren, who is fully aware of them, has gone out to see General Reynolds.

LATER—1.15 p. m.

Reynolds has possession of Gettysburg, and the enemy are reported as falling back from the front of Gettysburg. Hold your column ready to move.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. BUTTERFIELD,  
*Major General and Chief of Staff.*

JANUARY 13, 1864.

Official copy:

S. WILLIAMS, A. A. G.

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*Testimony of Brigadier General James S. Wadsworth.*

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1864.

General JAMES S. WADSWORTH sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

[See the testimony—"Army of the Potomac—General Hooker."]

Question. You were at the battle of Gettysburg?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was your position there?

Answer. I commanded the 1st division in the 1st corps during that battle. This was the first division that engaged the enemy on the morning of the 1st of

July. I commanded the division during the engagement, and until the army crossed the Potomac.

Question. How many men did you lose from your division?

Answer. A little more than half of them.

Question. Will you give us a brief but clear account of the first day's fight?

Answer. I do not know under what orders General Reynolds moved that day. He was, generally, very particular in communicating his orders to his division commanders, but on that occasion he communicated none, if he had any. He rode up to my headquarters, on the morning of the 1st of July, and asked what orders I had received from General Doubleday, who then commanded the corps, General Reynolds being then in command of two corps, the 1st and 11th. I told him that I was waiting for the other divisions to pass, as I was ordered to move in rear of the other two divisions. He said that that was a mistake, and that I should move on directly. This was about four miles from Gettysburg.

I moved on the road with him until we got within a mile of Gettysburg, when we heard the report of guns. General Reynolds then received a report from General Buford that the infantry of the enemy were advancing in some force and driving his cavalry back. It was a matter of momentary consultation between General Reynolds and myself whether we would go into the town or take a position in front of the town. He decided that if we went into the town the enemy would shell it and destroy it, and that we had better take a position in front of the town. We moved across the fields to the Seminary ridge, about half a mile west of Gettysburg. Before we had time to form our line we were engaged with the enemy. The only battery in my division was placed in position by the side of the road leading to Cashtown. At that time only one brigade was up.

General Reynolds told me to take three regiments to support the battery on the right, and he would go to the left and place the balance of the division there. I went on the right of the battery with three regiments, and he went on the left, but was almost immediately killed. I, however, did not hear for some time that he was killed. I contended with the enemy for two hours alone. General Doubleday came up in person in about half an hour, and the other divisions of the 1st corps in about two hours. The 11th corps came up about the same time and took position on our right, on the north of Gettysburg. I was driven back with my three regiments on the right. We retired in order, keeping up the contest, and the left of my division swung around and captured about 800 of the enemy, including Brigadier General Archer.

I then formed my division on the same ridge, a little in front of Seminary ridge, under orders from General Doubleday, and held that position until four o'clock in the afternoon. And so far as anything in front of us was concerned I could have continued to hold it. We had a very good position for the artillery, and had some six or eight Napoleon 12-pounders throwing grape and canister, and the enemy could not have driven us from that position. But the 11th corps having broken on the right, and the other portions of the 1st corps on our left having been driven back, the enemy got on to our flanks and nearly surrounded us.

General Howard had ridden over to see me about 2 o'clock, and told me to hold the position as long as I could, and then to retire. This was the only order I received after General Reynolds's death, except one before referred to from General Doubleday. When we found that we were very nearly surrounded, and my division was reduced to a very small force, I retired to Cemetery hill. This was 4 o'clock p. m. Very few of my division were taken prisoners, but a great many prisoners were taken on the right from the 11th corps, and from one division of the 1st corps that went into position on the right. The next morning I had but 1,600 men answer to their names, out of about 4,000 men that went into the action.

We think that we punished the enemy so severely in that contest, and that they lost so heavily, that they were in no condition to continue the attack after we had retired to Cemetery hill from Seminary ridge. The reports which we have from the enemy, especially from some English officers who were among them, were that they suffered very much in the first day's fight, and were not disposed to continue the contest until they had completed the concentration of their army. We who were engaged in that day's fight claim the credit of having held the enemy in check until General Meade concentrated his forces at Gettysburg.

I was on the evening of the first day assigned, with my division, to a position on the mountain ridge on the right of Gettysburg. The enemy attacked us there the next morning, by which time, however, we had got up a pretty good line of breastworks. They continued the attack until about 9 o'clock at night, driving a portion of the 12th corps, which was on our right, out of their rifle-pits; but we recovered them the next morning. I sent two regiments, the 14th Brooklyn and ———, to assist in this work.

On the morning of the third day of the fight the enemy renewed the attack on the right, taking advantage of a valley which broke the mountain at the point where my division joined to the 12th corps. It was a very furious assault, but it was repelled by the 12th corps, and my division of the 1st corps. The balance of the 1st corps was over on the left, separated from us. My division did not lose much on the second and third days of the fight, as they were protected by breastworks.

Question. What portion of our army was engaged on the field of battle at Gettysburg?

Answer. Every man in the army was available. The whole army was concentrated on about three miles square; the reserve was within thirty minutes' march of any part of the line. The position was such that the enemy could not attack on our right and left simultaneously; and that left our right at liberty to re-enforce the left, if necessary, or *vice versa*.

Question. You say all our men were available for that battle?

Answer. Yes, sir; our left rested on Round Top mountain, which protected us perfectly from being outflanked in that direction. Our right rested upon a ridge of mountains running easterly, which protected us on the right, except in a valley in which the enemy did attack us. But the distance from this point to the left of the line was estimated at several miles, the enemy having to make a large detour round Gettysburg, that place being commanded by our guns on Cemetery hill, so that they could not attack at that point and on the left at the same time, without dividing their army. So far as I know, this is the only battle the army of the Potomac has ever fought in which our whole army was available, or in which even much more than one-third of it was engaged at one time.

On the morning of the third day Ewell's corps attacked us on the right, and made repeated and furious assaults to break the line in the valley which I have mentioned, and across which our line was formed. Having failed in that, his troops, except a few skirmishers, were moved around Gettysburg, a march of six or seven miles, to our left, and precipitated in the attack on our left, which was very fierce, particularly the artillery fire. I do not think the army at any moment was in jeopardy from this attack, as the whole army could have been concentrated to meet it in twenty or thirty minutes.

Question. What was the condition of our army after the battle was over on the third day—I mean in morale and spirits?

Answer. The slaughter had been terrible; but the spirit of the troops was unimpaired, and, in my opinion, our troops were in good condition to have taken the offensive, and they would have taken it with alacrity.

Question. Do you know why they did not then take the offensive?

Answer. I do not; they were not ordered to take it. I think that General Meade did not, perhaps, appreciate fully the completeness of his victory. The terrible slaughter of our men produced, of course, a great impression upon the officers of our army. General Meade's headquarters were almost in the line of battle, and were surrounded by great havoc. A large number of horses were killed in the yard of the little house which he occupied.

Question. Do you suppose the slaughter on our side was greater than it was on the side of the enemy?

Answer. I think not; I think the slaughter was greater on the side of the enemy than on our side on every day of the battle. I am sure it was on the first day; I know we almost annihilated one or two brigades that came against us on the first day. They came up within canister range of our guns, and our men claim to have utterly annihilated them.

Question. You then followed the enemy down to Williamsport?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was the condition of things down there?

Answer. General Meade, on the 12th of July, formed a line on the southwest side of the Antietam creek, which was then swollen by heavy rains, and a very formidable stream to cross except at the bridges. The moment the line was formed we commenced a line of breastworks, which by dark was nearly completed, and was quite formidable. About dark the corps commanders were summoned to meet at General Meade's headquarters, five or six miles in the rear. General Newton being ill at that time, I was in command of the corps temporarily, and I attended the council. We assembled about 8 or 9 o'clock in the evening. General Meade stated briefly the condition of our forces, giving his estimate of our army, and the best information he had as to the numbers of the enemy; stating, as I think, that he believed we were superior to them in numbers, and he asked the corps commanders, commencing with the ranking officer, General Sedgwick, what they thought of the expediency of attacking the enemy the next morning. General Sedgwick, General Slocum, General Sykes, General French, and General Hays, who was temporarily commanding the 2d corps, pronounced decidedly against the attack. General Howard, General Pleasonton, and myself, advised an attack. General Meade stated that he favored an attack; that he came there to fight the enemy, and did not see any good reason why he should not fight them. But he said he could not take the responsibility of bringing on a general engagement against the advice of his commanders.

It will be observed that four of the officers who opposed the attack were the ranking officers of the army, next to General Meade, and held, in every respect, the highest positions in the army. The reasons for and against an attack were not discussed for some time, and I believe not until I asked that those generals who opposed the attack should state their reasons for it. General Sedgwick did not give at any length his reasons against an attack, but stated generally that General Meade had won a great victory, and he thought he ought not to jeopard all he had gained by another battle at that time. General Sykes and General French gave as a reason for not making an attack, as nearly as I can remember, that there was nothing between the enemy and Washington except our army, and that if it was overwhelmed, Washington and Baltimore would be open to the enemy.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Was not that true?

Answer. There was no force of any moment but that army, not enough to have resisted General Lee. General Warren, the engineer officer of General Meade's staff, made a strong and able argument in favor of an attack; and General Pleasonton likewise urged an attack. General Howard, who had voted for

an attack, did not enter much into the discussion. I did not myself, except to meet the objection that there was nothing between the enemy and Washington but our army, which I did by urging that our line of breastworks, the Antietam creek, and South mountain gave us defensive lines, where we certainly could hold the enemy if repulsed in our assault; and that we had every reason to believe that the enemy were demoralized by their retreat, and were short of ammunition. Some of the officers—I do not recollect whom—took the ground that the enemy would attack us if we did not attack them. I said that I did not believe that the enemy had ever come there to fight a battle; that so good an officer as General Lee never would take a position with his back on the river to fight a battle.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your opinion now, as a military man, with all the light upon the subject you have since obtained, as to the result had you attacked the enemy then?

Answer. I believe there is very little difference of opinion in the army now as to the expediency of making an attack then. Most of the officers I have met think it should have been made. We know now that the enemy then was very short of ammunition; that he had already got a great deal of his material across the river; that he was prepared to cross and commenced to cross at two o'clock in the afternoon of the very day we should have attacked him.

Question. And a vigorous attack on our side, with our army in good spirits, as you say they were, must have been destructive to Lee's army under the circumstances?

Answer. I believe almost everybody in the army admits that now. I have not talked with many officers upon the subject, but I do not think there is much difference of opinion in the army about it.

Question. Did you follow the army on to Culpeper?

Answer. No, sir; I left the army of the Potomac about that time.

Question. Did you participate in any of the councils held on the second or third day of the fight at Gettysburg?

Answer. No, sir; this was the only time I was at headquarters during the whole affair. I know nothing of any other council.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Who selected the position occupied by our army at Gettysburg; and was that selection a matter of accident or design?

Answer. I cannot answer that question. I think the necessity of the case forced us to fight near that point.

Question. What reason had you for supposing the army of the enemy to be short of ammunition at Williamsport?

Answer. The very profuse use they had made of ammunition at Gettysburg, and the difficulty of transporting it to where they were. I have never seen ammunition thrown away as they threw it away at Gettysburg. I thought, from their using it so profusely there, that they had staked everything upon that battle. The whole army of the enemy was so handled as to show that they staked everything on that struggle. Their assaults were very furious, and even reckless.

By Mr. Chandler :

Question. They expected to destroy us, or to be destroyed themselves?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And if they failed they expected nothing but annihilation?

Answer. Yes, sir. Colonel Morrow, of the 24th Michigan volunteers, who was taken prisoner there, heard a conversation between General Ewell and one of

his subordinate officers, in which the subordinate officer reported to him that they had failed and could not force the line on our right. General Ewell replied, with an oath, that he knew it could be done, and that it should be done, and that the assault should be renewed; and the fact is that they did assault our line there three times on the evening of the second day, and made three or four assaults on the morning of the third day. They were repulsed with terrible slaughter; the ground was covered with their dead.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. How long was it after the final repulse of the enemy on our left before you became satisfied that the enemy would not renew the attack, and were retreating, or meditating a retreat?

Answer. I was satisfied of it when they did not renew the attack on the morning of July 4. Had they intended to renew the attack, they would certainly have done it by daylight that morning. They were short of provisions, had no chance of getting up re-enforcements, and had nothing to gain by delay, and we had everything.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. It has been said that General Meade never intended to fight that battle at Gettysburg, but had ordered a retreat to Pipe creek?

Answer. I know nothing about that.

Question. Did you ever see anything that indicated any but an advance movement from the time the battle began?

Answer. No, sir. General Meade or his chief of staff could tell you all about it; I know nothing about it.

Question. Would not your position in the army have given you such information?

Answer. From my position in the army I would not have heard of any movement until its execution commenced.

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*Testimony of Major General Daniel Butterfield.*

WASHINGTON, *March 25, 1864.*

Major General DANIEL BUTTERFIELD sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

[See testimony "Army of the Potomac—General Hooker."]

Question. What was your rank and position in the army of the Potomac at the time General Meade took command of it?

Answer. I was major general of volunteers and chief of staff of that army.

Question. Give us a narrative, in your own way, of what occurred in the army of the Potomac after General Meade assumed the command. If any questions occur to me I will put them as you go along.

Answer. On the 27th of June General Hooker telegraphed a request to the War Department to be relieved from the command of the army of the Potomac. On the morning of the 28th, about four o'clock, a staff officer, Colonel Hardee, arrived from the War Department with orders relieving General Hooker from the command of the army, and assigning General Meade to the command in his place.

Question. Why did General Hooker ask to be relieved from the command of that army at that time?

Answer. General Hooker had had in mind, as part of his operations, to use the garrison at Harper's Ferry, which consisted of 10 000 or 11,000 men, under

General French. On the morning of the 27th of June he left me at Poolesville, with instructions to take the portion of the army near there to Frederick. He asked me if I knew of any reason why the garrison at Harper's Ferry should be retained there. I said that I did not, in view of the then condition of General Lee's army. He said: "I wish you would telegraph to General Halleck, in my name, asking him if there is any reason why that garrison should remain at Harper's Ferry, and I will go personally to Harper's Ferry and look over the place; and when you telegraph ask that a duplicate of the answer be sent to Harper's Ferry and to Frederick. I will go to Harper's Ferry, and take General Warren (of the engineers) with me, and look over the ground and see if I can find any reason why that garrison should be kept there, and I will be at Frederick to-night."

General Hooker's intention had been to take that garrison with General Slocum's corps, near Knoxville, the two making about 25,000 men, throw them rapidly in rear of General Lee's army, cut his communications, destroy the bridges and capture his trains, and then reunite with the main army for the battle. He had assembled three corps at Middletown, under Reynolds, with a view to this movement, so that if the enemy turned back to attack this force in their rear, the corps at Middletown holding the mountain passes could fall on their flank. General Lee's report, since made, shows his anxiety as to his communications and his rear, and what effect that would have had. General Halleck telegraphed back that the post of Harper's Ferry was a very important one, and that the garrison should not be taken away, or something to that effect; I cannot give the exact language of the despatches. General Hooker then telegraphed, asking to be relieved from the command of the army.

That evening General Hooker came down to Frederick and informed me that he had asked to be relieved from the command of the army. I was surprised, and asked him why he had done so. He replied that he had too much respect for the position to remain in command of the army when he was not allowed to command it; that he would rather go into the ranks as a soldier than to stand there and be thwarted at such a time, when it was necessary for every man to be used for the safety of the country and the destruction of Lee's army; that they would appoint a successor to him who would be allowed everything, while he would trust to history for a right judgment in regard to his motives. Many other remarks were made by him that I do not at present recall. The next morning he was relieved.

General Meade came up very early in the morning to headquarters. It had been General Hooker's intention that the army should move on the 29th of June, the following day; allowing the 28th, Sunday, for the army to rest at Frederick. I went into General Hooker's tent and asked him if I should prepare orders for the movement the next day. The general told me that I had a new commander; that General Meade was in command of the army, and I had better apply to him.

I saw General Meade shortly afterwards; he came to me and asked me what I desired to do. I replied that if I had been put in command of that army at half past four in the morning, without any previous advice of it, there was no major general who should tell me what he wished to do—that they should do as I wanted them to do; that I had nothing to say; that I would serve him in any capacity and in any way, most cheerfully, and to the best of my ability; that I recognized without question his right to select his chief of staff, and that if he did not desire me to act in that capacity, I should not have the slightest feeling about it, for I had been in the field constantly since the breaking out of the war, and would not object to a rest. He said I would relieve him from embarrassment if I would express my preference. I told him that if he placed it on that ground, I would say most decidedly that my preference had never been for that position; that I preferred to command troops; that I had accepted



that position, as I had done everything else, because I was ordered to do so. It was thought then that I could render valuable assistance. He said he was very much obliged to me for my course; that it certainly was very patriotic and very kind; he would take the matter into consideration, and let me know during the day what he intended to do with me.

Towards afternoon General Meade came to me and said, "General Butterfield, I have made up my mind that I cannot get along without you; I desire you to remain as my chief of staff." I said I would serve him to the best of my ability; and if I did not act according to his ideas, it was only necessary for him to suggest what he wished. I then said, "General, since you have selected me for this position, it is necessary this army should be moved to-morrow." He desired to know the reasons why. I explained to him that one corps of General Lee's army (Ewell's) was in the vicinity of York and Carlisle, and the others had passed through Hagerstown; that if it was General Lee's intention to cross the Susquehanna and move towards Harrisburg and Philadelphia, we must prevent it and try to catch him while crossing.

Question. Were you in possession of General Hooker's plan of operations?

Answer. That will appear when I state all this conversation. I said that if it was General Lee's intention to go around our right into Baltimore, we had to prevent that; that we must not let him get too far away from us; that we had to move up and cover the approaches around the mountains—there was a pass near Emmetsburg and Gettysburg—and prevent him getting on in that direction. General Meade said he had not had time to give the subject as much reflection as he ought to give it, having been so pressed with the duties incident upon taking command. I asked him if he had a full and free conversation and understanding with General Hooker in regard to his plans and purposes. He said yes, but it was very early in the morning, and he had been taken so completely by surprise in being placed in command of the army that he did not know that he could recall it all, though he had a general idea of General Hooker's views and plans. I asked General Meade if he desired me, as his representative, to have an official conversation with General Hooker concerning his plans and purposes, and he replied that he desired I should do so. I then went to General Hooker's tent and said to him, "General, General Meade has selected me as his chief of staff, and I have come officially from him to have an official conversation with you in regard to your plans and purposes. I do not consider it necessary, in order to enlighten me any further in regard to what you intended to do; but it is better that it be in that shape, in order that there may be no misunderstanding about it." General Hooker then went over his plans and purposes with me, as he had done before; repeated his intentions, and I returned and repeated the substance of the conversation to General Meade.

Question. Can you tell us what those intentions and purposes were?

Answer. I can hardly do so understandingly without a map. General Hooker's plans were, of course, interfered with by the, to him, unexpected refusal of the troops within the line of his operations. After repeating the conversation General Meade said that was what General Hooker had told him, and directed that the movement should be made as proposed—that is, to move the army, in three columns, up towards Gettysburg, and the line of the Northern Central railroad, across from Gettysburg. The only change made in General Hooker's plan was the leaning a little to the right, so as to use the Northern Central road as a line of supply in case of necessity, possibly separating the army a very little more, which was in accordance with the opinions and views of General Hooker, and the orders were issued accordingly.

Shortly after the order had been prepared, and General Meade had looked it over and assented to it, a telegram came from the Secretary of War announcing that there was a force of the enemy at Winchester, north of the Potomac. General Meade said he could not move the army as proposed, for here was a despatch from the Secretary of War that there was a force of the enemy at

Winchester. I stated that, in my opinion, there was no force of the enemy at Winchester; that our information was very accurate, very correct in regard to Lee's army, and that it was that it had all crossed over the Potomac; that if there was any force of the enemy there, it was probably only a regiment or two, or at most a small brigade, to keep Lee's line of communication with the river open, and to guard his trains and despatches. General Meade said he could not disregard a despatch from the Secretary of War, who was the highest official authority, and that he did not think he was justified in moving the army as had been proposed, after having received this notice from the Secretary of War of a force of the enemy at Winchester. I told him I thought he ought to telegraph to the Secretary of War that if this force was there it might stop his contemplated movement. After some discussion, General Meade decided that the movement should go on.

I then asked him if he intended to use the garrison at Harper's Ferry. He said, no; that it had been refused to General Hooker, and it would create a great disturbance if he should take it. I told him that the question was not one of any disturbance; that it was a question of what had best be done; that our information showed us that Lee had 91,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry, and 275 pieces of artillery. Lee's army, as it passed through, had been counted by several citizens of Hagerstown from the commencement to the end; they had counted it at different points, comparing notes every night; our own spies and scouts had brought us information; and coming from several sources, the information was reliable. I said to General Meade that, with the marches we were making, when we came to fight the battle, which we should certainly within a week, we might fall short that number of infantry, while we would have a superiority of artillery; that the garrison at Harper's Ferry would be of no possible use there while Lee's army was in or beyond Hagerstown; that if we failed, that garrison would have to leave Harper's Ferry; and if we took it away and succeeded, it could be replaced; that his orders and authority from General Halleck and the Secretary of War gave him the command of all the troops in the vicinity, and of General Couch's command; and in case of his failure, he would be responsible for not using them; while in case of his success, no one would ever question his use of them. I said that if we went on, the present line of supply—the railroad from Baltimore to Frederick—would have to be guarded; and if we did not bring those troops from Harper's Ferry up to Frederick to do that duty, we would have to detach forces from our own army for that purpose; and I considered it altogether advisable to use this garrison. After General Meade had reflected upon the subject for some time, he directed an order to be issued, directing General French to move up with that garrison to Frederick, which was done.

The army made the march decided upon on the 29th of June, and on the 30th it continued its march. I happen to have a copy of the orders of march which were issued on the 30th of June. They are as follows:

*“Order of march for July 1.*

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“June 30, 1863.

“Orders.

“Headquarters at Taneytown.

“3d corps to Emmettsburg.

“2d corps to Taneytown.

“5th corps to Hanover.

“12th corps to Two Taverns.

“1st corps to Gettysburg.

“11th corps to Gettysburg, (in supporting distance.)

"6th corps to Manchester.

"Cavalry to the front and flanks, well out in all directions, giving timely notice of positions and movements of the enemy.

"All empty wagons, surplus baggage, useless animals, and impediments of every sort, to Union Bridge, three miles from Middleburg—a proper officer from each corps with them. Supplies will be brought up there as soon as practicable."

We came across a railroad there which nobody seemed to know was in existence. It was not indicated upon any of the railroad maps. Although I supposed I knew every railroad in the country, I found a railroad there of the existence of which nothing was known to us before, and it was determined to make use of it at once.

"The general relies upon every commander to put his column in the lightest possible order. The telegraph corps to work east from Hanover, repairing the line, and all commanders to work repairing the line in their vicinity between Gettysburg and Hanover."

The army was then moving up in fan-shape, and would cover the line of railroad from Gettysburg over to the railroad to Baltimore, and cover the line of retreat if it was found that General Lee was moving from the Susquehanna.

"Staff officers to report daily from each corps, and with orderlies to leave for orders; prompt information to be sent in to headquarters at all times; all ready to move to the attack at any moment.

"The commanding general desires you to be informed that, from present information, Longstreet and Hill are at Chambersburg, partly towards Gettysburg; Ewell at Carlisle and York; movements indicate a disposition to advance from Chambersburg to Gettysburg. General Couch telegraphs, 29th, his opinion that the enemy's operations on the Susquehanna are more to prevent co-operation with this army than offensive. The general believes he has relieved Harrisburg and Philadelphia, and now desires to look to his own army and assume position for offensive or defensive as occasion requires, or rest to the troops. It is not his desire to wear his troops out by excessive fatigue and marches, and thus unfit them for the work they will be called upon to perform. Vigilance, energy, and prompt response to the orders from headquarters are necessary, and the personal attention of corps commanders must be given to reduction of impediments. The orders and movements from these headquarters must be carefully and confidentially preserved, that they do not fall into the enemy's hands.

"By command of Major General Meade."

I may say that this is a copy which I always required the Adjutant General to furnish me, that I might have one with me. And it was one of the few documents I did not send back to the army, it being unnecessary to do so, as the original was there. The following is an addendum to the foregoing order:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"June 30, 1863.

"The movements indicated in the enclosed orders are to be made as early to-morrow as their receipt and the condition of the troops will permit. The trains sent off must be subordinate to these movements. Maps, whenever possible, must be obtained from citizens.

"By command of Major General Meade."

The army moved under these orders. The headquarters of the army were moved to Taneytown. At Taneytown, I think, on the morning of the 30th of June, General Meade came to me with an order which he proposed to issue. That order, as issued, I have a copy of; it is as follows:

(See papers accompanying testimony of General Meade, the one commencing with this paragraph :)

“From information received, the commanding general is satisfied that the object of the movement of the army in this direction has been accomplished, viz : the relief of Harrisburg, and the prevention of the enemy’s intended invasion of Philadelphia, &c., beyond the Susquehanna.”

The order, as General Meade brought it to me, was in his own handwriting, and somewhat different from the one issued, of which this is a copy. Some additions were made to the order by me, with his approval, in regard to the details. I think General Williams may have the original, as prepared by General Meade, with the additions which I made with his consent. If he has, the committee can obtain it from him if they desire it.

When General Meade presented this order to me, I stated to him that I thought the effect of an order to fall back would be very bad upon the morals of the army, and that it ought to be avoided if possible. General Meade seemed to think that we were going ahead without any well-understood plan, and that by reason of that we might be liable to disaster. I spoke to General Hancock, who was at headquarters at the time, with regard to the order ; I also spoke to General Ingalls, and, I think, to some others. I stated to them that I thought an order indicating a practical falling back would have a bad effect upon the morals of the army, and that it ought to be avoided if possible. And I requested of them that, if those were also their views, they would express them to General Meade should he have any conversation with them in regard to the order—that which I have read in the corrected order as issued. I am not sure whether the original of the order directed the falling back immediately or not. That is why I speak of it. This is the order that was sent out.

During the day intelligence was brought in that General Reynolds had got in collision with the enemy at Gettysburg. Shortly after news of the death of General Reynolds came in. I stated to General Meade that, in the event of the death of General Reynolds, I thought it his duty to go upon the field in person, or to send me as his representative. There would be inevitably confusion on the field if the chief commander was killed, and that it was necessary to decide at once whether he would fight the battle there at Gettysburg, or, in case of that being considered an unfavorable position, to manœuvre for position elsewhere ; that the question must be decided then whether we should fight at Gettysburg or elsewhere. General Meade replied that he could not go himself ; that the enemy was, as stated in this last order, at Emmettsburg, Two Taverns, Taneytown, &c., and that he could not spare me. I replied that if he thought he could not go himself or send his chief of staff, he ought to send some one on the field fully possessed of his views and intentions to represent him, and decide whether to fight there or to fall back, and where the army should be concentrated for battle. He asked who there was to send. I replied, if I was in command of the army, and felt that I could not go myself or send my chief of staff, I should intrust that duty to General Hancock, whom I considered entirely competent, and in whose ability I had great confidence. He was close at hand, too, for the duty. General Meade then requested me to get my horse and go to General Hancock, and to write an order for the purpose. General Hancock was then at Taneytown, a short ride from headquarters. Before I could get my horse General Meade rode off to General Hancock’s headquarters. I prepared the order, of which the following is a copy :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ July 1—1.10 p. m., 1863.

“COMMANDING OFFICER, *2d Corps* :

“The major general commanding has just been informed that General Reynolds has been killed or badly wounded. He directs that you turn over the command

of your corps to General Gibbon; that you proceed to the front, and by virtue of this order, in case of the truth of General Reynolds's death, you assume command of the corps there assembled, viz: the 11th, 1st, and 3d, at Emmettsburg. If you consider the ground and position there a better one to fight a battle, under existing circumstances, you will so advise the general, and he will order all the troops up. You know the general's views; and General Warren, who is fully aware of them, has gone out to see General Reynolds.

“LATER—1.15 p. m.

“Reynolds has possession of Gettysburg, and the enemy are reported as falling back from the front of Gettysburg. Hold your column ready to move.”

I followed General Meade to General Hancock's headquarters. General Meade had some conversation with General Hancock, explaining his views, which I did not hear. He read the order I had prepared and gave it to General Hancock, who jumped into an ambulance, in order that he might have an opportunity to consult his maps, leaving directions for General Gibbon to assume command of his corps and move it up on the road at once, and started for Gettysburg. Meanwhile, during the time of General Hancock's absence, and before his return, orders had been issued to other corps to move towards Gettysburg. General Hancock came back in the evening and made his report to General Meade.

Before General Hancock left for Gettysburg I stated to him my views of the matter. I told him that I hoped, as he was vested with this authority, he would not, if circumstances were such that it could be avoided, have the army fall back; that I thought the effect upon the morale of the army would be bad. General Hancock said that he would not fall back if there was any other way of doing anything, or something to that effect. I ought to say here that in all the conversations I report, I do not express the precise language, but my recollection of the substance of the conversations.

In the evening General Hancock came back and made his report to General Meade, who determined to go on the field of Gettysburg. He went up that night, leaving me at Taneytown, with instructions to remain there until I could get a reply from General Sedgwick, whose corps had been ordered up from Manchester. We had sent two or three staff officers and two or three orderlies, but we had got no reply from General Sedgwick. General Meade himself had waited for some time for the purpose of having an interview with General Sedgwick, and himself giving him his views. In order that I might correctly and without any mistake convey General Meade's views to General Sedgwick, I took a memorandum, the original of which I have with me. I was to state as follows to General Sedgwick:

“General Meade presumes that the condition of General Sedgwick's troops, upon their arrival at Taneytown, will be such that he can hardly get on the field at Gettysburg before the matter is pretty well settled. General Meade proposes making a vigorous attack upon the enemy to-morrow. He thinks that General Sedgwick, after resting at Taneytown, better move forward as far as possible and take up a position in line of battle at some strong point, so that in the event of General Meade's being compelled to withdraw, General Sedgwick can cover his withdrawal, and if General Meade is successful General Sedgwick can push forward and aid him. The inhabitants represent that there is a very strong position on this side of Willalloway creek, a high commanding ground. The engineer battalion here is placed under General Sedgwick's orders, who can use them to prepare any works that may be necessary.”

My instructions were to remain at Taneytown and communicate the views and wishes of General Meade to General Sedgwick in person. I got no word from General Sedgwick, though I waited all night. I sent out several times,

but hearing nothing from him, at daylight in the morning I concluded that, under the circumstances, it was my duty to go on to the field and disregard the order requiring me to remain, as it was possible that General Sedgwick might have gone by some other route. I did so. On my arrival at headquarters General Meade informed me that he had received word during the night from General Sedgwick that he was on his way up by another route, instead of through Taneytown—a little shorter route; that he would be up during the day, and that everything was up but the 6th corps, and that he was glad I had arrived.

General Meade then directed me to prepare an order to withdraw the army from that position. I stated to him that it would be necessary that I should know the exact position of the troops.

Question. What day of the fight was this?

Answer. This was on the morning of the 2d of July, before the battle of that day had commenced. I stated to General Meade that I could not prepare that order properly without first going over the field and ascertaining the position of each division and corps of the army with relation to the roads. General Meade replied that he could not wait for that—that he could show me where the troops were. He then took a pencil and a piece of paper and made a rough sketch showing the position of the different corps. I stated to him that the order was one requiring a great deal of care in its preparation; that it involved something more than logistics, as we were in the presence of the enemy, and that while preparing it I must not be interrupted by anybody coming to me with despatches or orders. He said, "Very well, you shall not be interrupted." I told him I thought I could not prepare the order without a more accurate sketch, and I would have to send out to the corps commanders to give me a report of the position of their troops in regard to the various roads; that in the mean while I could be studying the maps. He said, "Very well, do so." I then went up stairs, and, after carefully studying the maps, I prepared the order for the withdrawal of the army from the field of Gettysburg. After finishing it, I presented it to General Meade, and it met his approval. I then stated to him that it would be a great deal better, if that order was to be executed, as it might involve grave consequences if not properly executed, to submit it for careful examination to such general officers as were then present, with a view of giving them an opportunity of finding any fault with it then, so that no misunderstanding should arise from the manner in which it was worded or expressed. He said there was no objection to having that done. I called General Gibbon, who was present, and, I think, General Williams and General Ingalls, and stated to them that I had been directed to prepare this order, and that I would be very much obliged to any of them if they would look it over and point out any faults in it then, rather than after it was put into execution; that I desired it scrutinized carefully with a view of discovering anything in it which might be misunderstood. Some of these officers—I do not now remember which; I am very sure General Gibbon was one—I think General Hancock was there, but whether he read it over or not I am not sure—some of the officers read it over and said that they thought it was correctly prepared.

The corps commanders were then sent for by General Meade to report to headquarters. The order which I had prepared was given to General Williams, and was copied by the clerks, or was in process of being copied by them. As General Sickles rode up to headquarters, in pursuance of the request of General Meade, the battle broke out in front of General Sickles's corps, and there was no council held. General Sickles returned immediately, and every corps commander there rode immediately to his command. Without my memorandum I cannot fix the hour of this occurrence, but it was during the 2d day of July.

General Sickles's corps was very severely attacked. General Hancock went to his relief with two brigades; other re-enforcements were sent from the left. General Sickles was wounded and taken from the field, and the enemy were finally repulsed.

After night-fall, General Meade summoned a council of the corps commanders.

Question. Did this collision of General Sickles's corps with the enemy prevent the order being executed which you had prepared?

Answer. It is impossible for me to state that, because General Meade had not communicated to me his intention to execute that order regardless of the opinions of the corps commanders, or whether he intended to have the order submitted to them. He merely directed me to prepare such an order, which I did. It is for him to say whether he intended to execute it or not. He may have desired it prepared for an emergency, without any view of executing it then, or he may have had it prepared with a full view of its execution.

Question. The collision of Sickles's troops with the enemy broke up the council?

Answer. It prevented any consultation of the corps commanders at that time. That evening, after the enemy were repulsed, a council of corps commanders was held. I kept minutes of that council, which I sent to General Williams, who informs me that they have been lost. The general question put to the corps commanders present at that council was, whether our army should remain on that field and continue the battle, or whether we should change to some other position. A vote of the corps commanders was taken in regard to that, and a majority were in favor of remaining on the field and fighting it out. General Slocum gave the first opinion; his answer was, "Stay and fight it out." I will not be positive as to what corps commanders differed with him; but the majority were for remaining on the line which the army then held, and fighting it out.

Question. Can you give the opinion of each corps commander? Because, perhaps, in justice to them, that ought to be known.

Answer. My impression is, that those generals can tell how they voted. I am clear in my memory that General Slocum voted to stay and fight it out, and that General Sykes so voted; that General Newton entered into a long discussion to show that that position was a disadvantageous one; that he was not prepared to vote to leave it, but he wanted the council to understand that he had objections to it. General Birney, I think, voted to stay and fight it out, as did General Hancock also. I do not remember what General Sedgwick's vote was, nor do I remember how General Howard voted; I think he had a great deal to say upon the subject. The reason I do not remember the votes exactly is, because I intrusted the matter to the memorandum which I sent General Williams. After the council had finished, General Meade arose from the table, and remarked that, in his opinion, Gettysburg was no place to fight a battle; but it was settled to remain there, and the council dispersed.

On the next day, the 3d of July, matters were very quiet along the lines until about noon, when the enemy opened a terrific artillery fire on our left front and centre.

Question. About what number of guns had they in operation in your judgment?

Answer. I should judge from 125 to 150. It was a very terrific cannonade, but our troops behaved with the greatest composure. During this artillery fire, and before the enemy made their assault with infantry, I was wounded and sent over to General Meade's headquarters, on the Westminster turnpike. While I was lying on a bed there, word was brought to me by some person that General Hancock was severely wounded and desired to see me. I made an effort to get out; was lifted on my horse, and rode as far as General Slocum's position, when I found I was unable to go any further, and dismounted there and

laid down for a time. Appearances on the field indicated to me that we were successful. I sent for General Slocum and asked him his opinion in regard to it, and he agreed with me. I then said to General Slocum that there was a great chance for him; that his command, though it had had hard fighting, had been well protected and had not met with heavy loss; that I hoped if there was any intention to pursue, he would not be one to say that he could not pursue, but that he would have his command ready to move out and tear the enemy in pieces; that he would get up ammunition and rations, and if there was any intention to pursue, that he would not hesitate to offer to go out, for he would thus have a great opportunity to make a reputation and a name, and to do a very brilliant thing. General Slocum assented to what I said, and said that within half an hour he would be ready to pursue. After resting for some time, I was again lifted on my horse, and rode over on the field. The enemy had retired and withdrawn, and there was very little firing going on. It was some time before I found General Meade. When I did see him he seemed to think that General Lee had only withdrawn into the mountains with the view of inducing him to follow and to attack him in a stronger position. He did not seem much inclined to make a vigorous pursuit. No council was held on the night of the 3d of July.

On the night of the 4th of July a council was called. I have with me the minutes of that council as I kept them at the time.

On the morning of the 4th of July a very heavy rain came up. We were almost drowned out at headquarters, down in the woods, and had to leave there and go into the house where General Neal had his headquarters. Heavy details were made to go out and collect our dead and bury them; and I believe a portion of the troops were ordered out to make a pursuit, but, as I was wounded, I did not make out any of these orders. I cannot speak positively as to what orders were then issued, but the records of headquarters will show.

I have here the minutes I kept of the council of the 4th of July. That council was held at the headquarters of General Neal. He gave up his headquarters to General Meade. The council was opened by General Meade explaining his instructions and asking the corps commanders for their advice as to what course he should pursue.

Question. Can you state what General Meade said his instructions were?

Answer. I think he said his instructions were to cover Washington and Baltimore. He said he had no knowledge of General Foster's movements. There was a rumor that General Foster was coming up from Washington with re-enforcements. General Meade said he desired the earnest assistance and advice of every corps commander. The corps commanders commenced giving their opinions, beginning with General Slocum, and followed by General Sedgwick and General Howard. Their advice, according to my memorandum here, was as follows:

General Slocum would move on an interior line as far as Emmetsburg, and then, if the enemy had not gone from Gettysburg, hold on there, and push out a force at once with a view of preventing the enemy from crossing the Potomac.

General Sedgwick would wait at Gettysburg until certain that the enemy were moving away.

General Howard would like to remain at Gettysburg and ascertain what the enemy were doing, but thought it would do no harm to send a corps to Emmetsburg.

General Meade then determined to change the manner of procedure in the council, and the following questions were written by his instructions. A portion of these questions are in his handwriting, and a portion in mine.

The first question was, "Shall this army remain here?" That is, at Gettysburg.

Second. "If we remain here, shall we assume the offensive?"



Third. "Do you deem it expedient to move towards Williamsport, through Emmettsburg?"

Fourth. "Shall we pursue the enemy if he is retreating on his direct line of retreat?"

To the first question General Newton answered No; to the second question, No; and to the third question, Yes.

General Slocum answered to the first question, No; the second question was involved in that answer; to the third question, Yes; to the fourth question, To pursue on the direct line of retreat, with cavalry moving with the infantry, to cut him off.

General Sedgwick, to the first question, answered, Would remain here (at Gettysburg) until positive information concerning their movement; to the second question, No; to the third question, Yes; to the fourth question, Only cavalry.

General Howard, to the first question, did not exactly say yes, and did not exactly say no, but would commence a movement to-morrow; to the second question, No; to the third question, Yes; to the fourth question, By a show of force.

General Sykes, to the first question, as to remaining at Gettysburg, answered, Until we know where the enemy is gone; to the second question, No; to the third question he made no answer, his answer to the first question involving that; to the fourth question he answered, He would pursue with cavalry only.

General Birney, to the first question, answered, Yes, until we see; to the second question, No; to the fourth question, He thinks not.

General Pleasanton, to the first question, answered, No; to the second question, No; to the third question, Move by that route; to the fourth question, Would pursue with infantry and cavalry.

General Hays answered to the first question, Yes, until we find out where the enemy are, and what they are doing; to the second question, No; to the third question, Yes, if we move; to the fourth question, No, only with cavalry.

General Warren, as to the first question, whether we should remain there, answered, Yes, until we see what they are doing; to the second question, about assuming the offensive, Not if the enemy remains.

Those are the questions to the corps commanders, and their answers. The summary which I made for General Meade in the council of the answers to the first question, whether we should remain at Gettysburg, was—

Those in favor: Birney, Sedgwick, Sykes, Hays, and Warren.

Opposed: Newton, Pleasanton, and Slocum.

Doubtful: Howard.

By this memorandum I see that the corps commanders reported about 55,000 infantry on the field. That was not from actual returns, but that was their estimate. I have noted here what each one reported on the 4th of July, and also what was the force we had on the 11th of June.

Question. Was there any discrepancy between their estimates and the real facts about our force?

Answer. Yes, sir; that is always the case after a battle. A great many commanders come in and say that half their force is gone; the colonel reports that half his regiment is gone; that is reported to the brigade commander, who reports that half the brigade is gone, and so on.

Question. How many troops had we, in fact, there at that time?

Answer. I have never seen the actual returns, because I left that army soon after that.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. How many did the corps commanders estimate at that time?

Answer. The estimate then made was as follows: 1st corps, 5,000; 2d corps,

5,000; 3d corps, 5,676; 5th corps, 10,000; 6th corps, 12,500; 11th corps, 5,500; 12th corps, 7,838; making altogether 51,514 infantry. This was merely their judgment; it was not given as the exact numbers.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. How many had they when the battle began?

Answer. I can state what they had on the 10th of June. The 1st corps had 11,350; 2d corps, 11,361; 3d corps, 11,898; 5th corps, 10,136; 6th corps, 15,408; 11th corps, 10,177; 12th corps, 7,925; making in all 78,245.

By the chairman:

Question. What do you understand were our losses at Gettysburg?

Answer. I left the army of the Potomac soon after that, and have never been back since, and have never seen the returns of our losses. I believe General Meade gives them in his official report. I have never seen a copy of that but once, and then only for a moment, and have forgotten what is stated there to have been our losses.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Had there been any considerable change in the army between the 10th of June and the time the battle of Gettysburg was fought?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What change?

Answer. A portion of the Pennsylvania reserves, some 4,000 or 5,000, had been added to the 5th corps; General Stannard's Vermont brigade had been added to the 1st corps, but were to go out of service very shortly; General Lockwood, with the Maryland brigade, of about 2,500 men, had joined the 12th corps. I have a memorandum among my papers at Lookout valley which will show all the additions made to the army of the Potomac. I do not remember the exact figures now. I was suffering so much from my wound during the occurrences of the 4th and 5th of July that I was unfitted for much duty; still I was anxious to work all I could, but I finally had to succumb; and, by the advice of the medical director of the army, I left on the 6th of July and went home. I had prepared an order for the movement of the army through Frederick and Middletown, to intercept General Lee. It was not executed, at least until after I left. What occurred after the 6th of July, when I left, I have no knowledge of, except from hearsay.

By the chairman:

Question. You say that at the time the enemy made their last assault at Gettysburg, they opened upon our lines with from 125 to 150 pieces of artillery?

Answer. I will explain. On the afternoon of the 3d of July they made their last assault. In making that assault they had placed in position about 125 pieces of artillery, with which they opened upon that portion of our line held principally by General Hancock's 2d corps, and to his right and left. They kept up their artillery fire I should think for an hour or more, and while their artillery fire was going on they were forming their infantry columns for the assault. When they ceased their artillery fire they made their assault with their infantry. But during that artillery fire I was wounded and left the field.

Question. What was the condition of the enemy's artillery after their infantry attack had been repulsed? Where was it, and why could we not have taken it?

Answer. The range of artillery is much greater than that of small-arms; their artillery was further from our lines than their infantry. I have no doubt that if a prompt pursuit had been made by us after they were repulsed, all that artillery, or the most of it, would have fallen into our hands.

Question. Where was General Sedgwick, with his corps, when that attack had been repulsed?

Answer. He had been in reserve principally on the left of the centre. What his position then was I do not know, as, while I was lying down at General Neal's, after being hit, his position might have been changed.

Question. Suppose he had made a vigorous advance at the time the enemy were repulsed; what would have become of the enemy's artillery?

Answer. A better opinion than mine would come from those who were there at the exact time. I think we should have captured a large number of guns.

Question. Did you ever state, in Baltimore, say about the 7th of July, that General Lee would escape across the Potomac?

Answer. I did say so.

Question. What reasons had you for expressing that opinion?

Answer. That was in a private conversation with General Schenck. General Schenck came to me at the Eutaw House, in Baltimore, to see if he could do anything for me, and assist me in getting through. He asked me whether Lee's army would be destroyed: I said, no. He asked me why I thought so. I told him that I had not seen that inclination to pursue that would have pleased me; that Lee was an able engineer, and would get away, if he was not followed up right sharply. General Schenck asked me how Lee would get across the Potomac. I told him that Lee would find a way to get across the Potomac by making bridges; and I did not think he would be hurt before getting across; that that was my judgment from the complexion of affairs at headquarters before I left. That is my recollection of the conversation.

Question. Have you had any correspondence with General Meade since the battle of Gettysburg, which would be proper to be laid before the committee? If so, I would like to have it; if it is not, I will not ask for it.

Answer. I have had some correspondence with him. Shortly after the battle of Gettysburg General Meade sent me, unsolicited, the following letter:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 14, 1863.

"DEAR GENERAL: I owe you an apology for not having sooner written to you; but I need hardly make it to you, who know so well how difficult it is for me to find time to write.

"After you left, in view of the suffering you seemed to experience from your wound, and the probability of the length of time you might be kept from the army, together with my knowledge of the fact that the position you occupied was not altogether one of choice, I deemed it proper to appoint a successor, which I did by having General Humphreys made a major general.

"I hasten to explain to you the reasons for my so doing, and at the same time to express my grateful sense of the value of the services you rendered me during the time intervening between my assuming command and your being wounded. I shall never cease to remember and to bear testimony to the efficient assistance you so heartily rendered me, and without which I hardly know how I should have gotten through with the new and arduous duties imposed on me.

"Trusting, my dear general, you will understand the necessity which compelled me to appoint a successor, and that you will believe my assurance that it did not arise from any want of confidence in you, and hoping you may soon be restored to perfect health,

"I remain most sincerely and truly yours,

"GEO. G. MEADE,  
"Major General."

I replied to that letter, but I have not a copy of my reply. There were several letters of a friendly character passed between us.

I had no more correspondence with General Meade until the publication of General Halleck's report, in which there appeared this paragraph :

"Our force at Harper's Ferry at this time was supposed to be about 11,000. It was incorrectly represented to General Meade to be destitute of provisions, and that he must immediately supply it or order the abandonment of the place. Accordingly, a few hours after he assumed the command, he assented to an order drawn up by an officer of General Hooker's staff, directing General French to send 7,000 men of the garrison to Frederick, and with the remainder—estimated at 4,000—to remove and escort the public property to Washington. This order, based on erroneous representations, was not known in Washington till too late to be countermanded. It, however, was not entirely executed when General Meade very judiciously directed the re-occupation of that important point."

As soon as I saw that report I considered that the paragraph I have read unjustly reflected upon me. I addressed this letter to General Meade:

"JANUARY 23, 1864.

"*Major General Meade:*

"GENERAL: I find the following most extraordinary statement in the annual report of the general-in-chief:

[Extract from report.]

"Although it does not mention me by name, it will be considered by the public that I was the officer alluded to, as I was, before your assuming command, serving as chief of staff to the army under General Hooker, and am now temporarily serving in that capacity with him, although at the time alluded to I was no more an officer of General Hooker's staff than was Generals Williams, Hunt, Ingalls, or any of the officers serving on the general staff of that army.

"Under the presumption that he may allude to me, it is proper, before taking the steps I propose to in the matter, that I should ascertain whether the entirely erroneous statement made by the general-in-chief in the premises is based upon anything he may have received from you officially or otherwise.

"You will certainly well remember that the garrison had an abundance of supplies, and it was so stated to me by you. You will also remember that no order was drawn up until after we had conversed upon the subject, and you had directed the order to be drawn; also, that the grounds upon which I advised it were, generally, first, that Lee's army, to our then certain knowledge, numbered 91,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry, and about 275 pieces of artillery; that without this garrison, and taking into consideration our rapid marches, we should be likely to fall short of that number of infantry; that your having an order which gave you control of that garrison would make you responsible in the event of failure for not making use of them; that in such an event they would in all probability be required to leave that post; that in the event of success they could be returned at once.

"You will also doubtless remember that the bringing on of the general battle at Gettysburg sooner than you expected by Reynolds's collision with Hill and the events that followed prevented French reaching us in time, and it being determined that he could not reach us, orders were given him for his movements, contingent upon our success or failure, as the battle would be decided before he could reach us. The telegraphic and other correspondence will show this.

"I recall these facts to your recollection, knowing the duties suddenly imposed upon you at the time may have caused you, while giving attention to other and more pressing duties, to fail to fix decidedly in your mind these points. I shall be glad to know, if such is the case, that some other person than myself is alluded to.

In conclusion, I would repeat the purpose of this communication, and respectfully and earnestly request a reply at your earliest convenience, as to whether the statement given above of the general-in-chief is based upon anything he may have received from you officially or otherwise."

This letter General Meade replied to as follows :

" PHILADELPHIA, *February 4, 1864.*

GENERAL: I am in receipt of your letter of the 23d ultimo. I have never seen any official communication to the general-in-chief upon the subject of the withdrawal of the troops from Harper's Ferry, except such as were made at that time.

Some time after the battle of Gettysburg, the first time I saw the general-in-chief, I did in private conversation say to him 'that my own judgment was in favor of leaving the garrison at Harper's Ferry intact, although I agreed with General Hooker that it was of no importance as a crossing-place of the Potomac river, but I did think it of importance to hold it as a debouche into the Cumberland valley; that after much discussion I yielded to your arguments, and I directed 4,000 men to be left to garrison Maryland heights, and the balance, 7,000, to be brought to Frederick to guard the Baltimore and Ohio railroad; that late on the night of the 28th, understanding from you that the supply and subsistence stores with the garrison was limited, and that owing to the difficulty of protecting the canal and railroad the communications with the place would be precarious, I ordered the abandonment of the place, and directed the 7,000 men to escort the public property to Washington.'

This communication was private, and was made in explanation of my course, with no expectation that it would be officially used by the general-in-chief. You will see from it that I did not repudiate the responsibility of the act, and that I did state that it was based on arguments used by you and information derived from you. \*

I shall greatly regret if my recollection of the facts differ from yours; but it is proper I should state that my recollection is clear and distinct as given above.

" Respectfully yours,

" GEORGE G. MEADE,

" *Major General.*"

Major General D. BUTTERFIELD,

" U. S. Vols., Headquarters 11th and 12th Corps, Lookout Valley, Tennessee."

I have answered this letter, but have not a copy of my answer with me. I will append the copy to my testimony when I come to examine it.

Question. What number of troops had General Meade after the close of the battle of Gettysburg with which he might have pursued the enemy?

Answer. According to the statements of the corps commanders on the 4th of July, which I have already given, he had 51,514 men; that was their actual strength, according to the best of their judgment.

Question. But, in fact, they must have had much more than that, when you consider the real amount of our loss at Gettysburg and the re-enforcements that have been received after the 10th of June. That is, was not their estimate manifestly an under estimate?

Answer. I think it was rather under than over.

Question. What was the condition of our troops after that battle, and what was their ability to pursue?

Answer. They were in splendid spirits, very exultant, and I think would have undergone any privations with a view to pursuit.

Question. How was it with the 6th corps under General Sedgwick? Had they been engaged in the battle enough to have become much fatigued?

Answer. They had not been so much engaged as some of the other corps.  
Question. In your judgment, as a military man, what should have been after the final repulse of the enemy?

Answer. They should have been pursued immediately.

Question. How did you consider their ammunition to have been after terrific cannonade? Considering that they were so far from their base operations, could they have had much ammunition on hand, or did you, a military man, suppose that their artillery ammunition was nearly exhausted?

Answer. My opinion was that their supply of ammunition must have been very limited. We had no knowledge at that time that General French broken their bridges and stopped their communications. But it was generally estimated that their supply of ammunition was short.

Question. It has occurred to me a great many times to ask why it was, when Lee had crossed over into Maryland, and it was known there would be a general engagement, the troops from Baltimore, Washington, Suffolk—all our disposable forces—were not brought into action. Was that ever a subject of deliberation?

Answer. Some time in May, I think on the 28th of May, General Hool telegraphed to Washington that General Lee was about to renew his campaign of the year previous. That was before Lee had commenced his movement all, and General Hooker asked permission, in the event of Lee's moving, to execute certain movements. I will refer to that more in detail in another part of my testimony. And at that time General Hooker telegraphed to Washington, requesting that all the troops in the departments of Washington, Baltimore, Fortress Monroe, Western Virginia, all the troops that could possibly operate upon General Lee's army, should be placed under one commander, in order to secure unity and concert of action; and that his motives might not be misunderstood and unappreciated, General Hooker expressly requested that some general other than himself should be that commander.

Question. Was there any more difficulty for General Foster to bring his troops up before the battle than after?

Answer. It only took a certain length of time for him to bring them up, depending upon when he should get the order. I presume he could just as well have brought them up a week sooner if he had been ordered to do so.

Question. Do you know why it was that General Halleck refused to General Hooker the garrison at Harper's Ferry, and immediately afterwards allowed General Meade to take it?

Answer. It is true General Halleck refused the troops at Harper's Ferry to General Hooker; but his order to General Meade I do not think expressly contemplated that General Meade would use them. It merely gave him confidence over them. The letter which General Meade had when he assumed command will show that. I must say, however, that General Hooker was always under the impression that General Halleck did not support him cordially.

Question. What is your opinion about that?

Answer. As General Halleck, as chief of staff of the armies, is my superior I prefer not to express an opinion upon that subject.

Question. Can you tell why the enemy were not followed up more promptly after the battle of Gettysburg?

Answer. General Meade was under the impression that General Lee had been drawn past into the mountain passes and taken a strong position there, where it would be unwise to attack him. The telegraphic correspondence and reports from headquarters at that time with Washington and General Couch will probably express the views entertained.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Was not that the fact, that those mountain passes were very strong positions?

Answer. Mountain passes are generally strong positions.

Question. Was it not the fact that those positions were very strong?

Answer. I did not go through them; they were reported as strong positions.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Have you the order for the retreat of the army from Gettysburg which you prepared under the direction of General Meade on the morning of the 2d of July?

Answer. I have not. It was given to General Williams to be copied by his clerks, but was never issued.

Question. Did you, when you were preparing that order, understand that it was to be issued immediately, or that it was to be issued only in certain contingencies?

Answer. I understood, when I prepared the order, that it was General Meade's intention to consult with his corps commanders, and that it was a matter of precaution to have the order in readiness in case it should be decided upon to retreat. That is my recollection of it. General Williams can produce that order, and the wording of it will tell a great deal in regard to that.

Question. Did you understand the circular of the 1st of July was intended by General Meade as an order to retreat to the point indicated, or was it dependent upon contingencies?

Answer. I would suggest that that question can be more properly answered by General Meade.

Question. If it was his original intention to move the army back to that position, do you know what he supposed the enemy would do?

Answer. The natural inference is that he supposed the enemy would attack him there.

Question. Was the battle-ground of Gettysburg selected by design and intent, or was its selection merely the result of accident?

Answer. My testimony shows that I was at Taneytown when the collision occurred between General Reynolds and the enemy before Gettysburg. General Hancock was sent up there when General Reynolds fell, and, as I understood it, General Hancock selected the ground where the battle was fought. It rests between General Hancock and General Howard as to who selected the lines on which the battle was fought. My impression is that it was done by General Hancock and approved by General Meade when he went on the ground.

Question. How soon was it understood by the officers of our army, after the last assault of the enemy, that they did not intend to renew the attack?

Answer. Owing to my being wounded and unfit for constant duty, I cannot answer that question properly.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. At the time of the issuing of the circular of the 1st of July was there at headquarters any well-defined opinion, or satisfactory information, as to the intention and purposes of the enemy?

Answer. Some thought that Lee intended to move up into Pennsylvania, crossing the Susquehanna; others thought he intended to move around our right towards Baltimore. On the morning of the 30th General Meade asked General Couch if he could keep Lee from crossing the river.

Question. In that uncertainty, was not that circular a prudent one, as indicating a place for the concentration of our forces?

Answer. I would rather you would not ask me that question.

TUESDAY, *March 29*, 1864.

Major General DANIEL BUTTERFIELD recalled and examined.

By Mr. Loan :

Question. The chairman of the committee, who is now absent, has handed me some questions which he desires me to ask you. [See testimony—"Army of the Potomac—General Hooker."] What were the tendencies of General Hooker's remarks to yourself and other officers of the staff of the army of the Potomac at the time General Hooker was relieved from the command, as to their course towards his successor ?

Answer. Most of the officers called upon General Hooker in a body to pay their respects to him before his departure. The general made a few remarks to them, stating that it was all for the best that General Meade had the command of the army; that he thought his own influence was impaired; that General Meade was a brave and gallant man, who would undoubtedly lead them to success; and he hoped that all who regarded him, or his wishes, or his feelings, would devote every energy and ability to the support of General Meade, or words to that effect. I do not undertake to repeat the exact language he used.

Question. That was the tendency of the language he used ?

Answer. Yes.

Question. From what you know, do you think General Meade was honestly and cordially supported at Gettysburg by the entire army ?

Answer. In my experience with that army I have never seen an officer supported more cordially and earnestly by everybody in it, from highest to lowest, than General Meade was there.

Question. Were there any flags of truce after the battle of Gettysburg ?

Answer. Yes; on the morning of the 4th of July, a little after daybreak, or very early in the morning, a letter was sent in to General Meade from General Lee, under flag of truce, containing a proposal, for the convenience of both armies, to exchange the prisoners that each army held. General Meade asked me what I thought of it. I told him that I thought it was a device of the enemy to gain time. General Meade did not seem to so regard it at first; but, after a little reflection, he declined the proposition, and an answer was returned to that effect. That is the only flag of truce that I know of.

Question. Were there any other communications from rebel officers than by flag of truce after the battle? If so, what were they ?

Answer. There were a great many rumors of communications. I know nothing positively about any, except one from a rebel general who had lived in Baltimore—General Trimble, I think—who sent a note to General Meade, saying that he was wounded and had been left on the field without care or accommodation, and asking, as a favor from an old acquaintance, that General Meade would send an ambulance and bring him in and have him cared for, and General Meade ordered it to be done. Before the battle was over (on the night of the 2d) it was reported that General Barksdale was on the field wounded, and desired to be brought in; but he died before we reached him. I sent for him, but he was dead when found. General Armistead was also wounded, but that was within our lines. No communication from him came in from the outside. There were several reports brought in of rebel officers of various ranks who had been left wounded in barns and buildings, and wanting assistance. But the only formal communication was this one received from General Trimble, which I have stated.

Question. What was the general character of the report received from the front after the battle of Gettysburg ?

Answer. Everybody that came in reported that all the barns and houses were full of the enemy's wounded, most of them without anything to eat, and all of



them acknowledged that they had been very badly whipped; that the enemy's wounded were suffering very much, and that medical supplies and stores should be sent out to them at once; that every barn and house, so far as anybody had gone, were filled with the enemy's wounded, who had been left behind and abandoned.

Question. Was there any attempt made to secure the co-operation and aid of General Couch's troops with the army at Gettysburg?

Answer. Despatches were sent to General Couch, informing him of the relative positions of both armies, and asking his co-operation and assistance. General Couch was under General Meade's orders. The exact nature of those despatches I do not remember, whether they were in the character of peremptory orders, or whether they were of the nature of information merely to General Couch of our position, leaving it to him whether to come down or not. My impression is, that they partook of the latter character, or both. General Couch was under General Meade's command, and he had authority to order him down; but I do not think he did so peremptorily. General Smith's command, which was a portion of General Couch's, first opened communication with us on the afternoon on the 4th of July; a staff officer from General Smith arriving to announce that his column was near.

Question. Any orders or information sent to General Couch were sent by direction of General Meade?

Answer. Yes, certainly. No orders or instructions were made out or sent to any command except by his order.

Question. When you were before the committee last Friday you stated, in reply to a question, that at the time the order was issued to form our army in line on Pipe creek, it was thought by some that Lee intended to cross the Susquehanna and move up into Pennsylvania; by others that he intended to move around over night towards Baltimore. And then, when asked whether, in that uncertainty, that circular of the 1st of July was not a prudent one, as deciding upon a place for the concentration of our forces, you declined to answer. Will you answer that question now, and what were your reasons for declining to answer it then?

Answer. My reasons for declining to answer the question then was, that I did not like to pass unfavorable criticisms upon a superior officer, as the answer to that question would have been. But I will answer the question now, for fear my refusal may be misunderstood or misrepresented.

I do not think that circular was a judicious one. I do not think the position designated in that circular was a good one. And I think if we had gone back there it would have resulted in the destruction of our army; and the movement would not have prevented either of the movements that Lee was supposed or expected to make. It was the business of our army then to find Lee and fight him.

Question. You think the movement down to Pipe creek would have been injudicious?

Answer. Extremely so; and I so expressed myself at the time to officers of the staff.

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*Testimony of Major General George G. Meade.*

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1864.

Major General GEORGE G. MEADE appeared before the committee and said:

I desire to add a little to my testimony, with the permission of the committee.

The chairman: Certainly, you are at liberty to make such additional statements as you please.

The witness : I wanted to say a few words to the committee, in extension of the remarks which I made the last time I was here, in reference to a charge which I expected then would be made against me, and which I understand has since been made against me, to the effect that I intended that an order should be issued, on the morning of July 2, withdrawing the army from the position it then occupied at Gettysburg and retreating, before the enemy had done anything to require me to withdraw.

It is proper that I should say that the fact of such a charge having been made here, or such a report given here, has reached me through outside sources, but in such a way that I can hardly disbelieve that such a statement has been made ; and that it was made by an officer who occupied a very high and confidential position on my staff—the chief of staff, Major General Butterfield. Now, indulging in the utmost charity towards General Butterfield, and believing that he is sincere in what he says, I want to explain how it is possible that such an extraordinary idea could have got into his head.

I utterly deny, under the full solemnity and sanctity of my oath, and in the firm conviction that the day will come when the secrets of all men shall be made known—I utterly deny ever having intended or thought, for one instant, to withdraw that army, unless the military contingencies which the future should develop during the course of the day might render it a matter of necessity that the army should be withdrawn. I base this denial not only upon my own assertion and my own veracity, but I shall also show to the committee, from documentary evidence, the despatches and orders issued by me at different periods during that day, that if I did intend any such operation, I was at the same time doing things totally inconsistent with any such intention.

I shall also ask the committee to call before them certain other officers of my staff, whose positions were as near and confidential to me as that of General Butterfield, who, if I had had any such intention, or had given any such orders as he said I gave, would have been parties to it, would have known it, and have made arrangements in consequence thereof; all of whom, I am perfectly confident, will say they never heard of any such thing. I refer to General Hunt, chief of artillery, and who had artillery, occupying a space of from four to five miles, drawn out on the road, and who, if I had intended to have withdrawn that army, should have been told to get his trains out of the way the very first thing, because the troops could not move until the artillery moved. I would also ask you to call upon General Ingalls, my chief quartermaster, who had charge of the trains; also General Warren, my chief engineer, who will tell you that he was with me the whole of that day, in constant intercourse and communication with me; and that instead of intending to withdraw my army, I was talking about other matters. All these officers will corroborate what I say, that I never mentioned any such purpose to any of them.

General Butterfield remained at Taneytown on the night of the 1st of July, and did not join me on the field until about 9 or 10 o'clock in the morning of the 2d, I having arrived there at 1 o'clock. Soon after he arrived I did direct him to familiarize himself with the topography of the ground, and I directed him to send out staff officers to learn all the roads. As I have already mentioned in my previous testimony here, I had never before been at Gettysburg, and did not know how many roads ran from our position, or what directions they ran. My orders to General Butterfield were similar to this :

“General Butterfield, neither I nor any man can tell what the results of this day's operations may be. It is our duty to be prepared for every contingency, and I wish you to send out staff officers to learn all the roads that lead from this place, ascertain the positions of the corps—where their trains are; prepare to familiarize yourself with these details, so that in the event of any contingency, you can, without any order, be ready to meet it.”

It was in anticipation of possible contingencies, and not at all that I had made up my mind to do anything of that kind.

I would furthermore call the attention of the committee to the absurdity of such an idea. If I had directed the order to be issued, why was it not issued? With General Butterfield's capacity it would not have taken him more than ten or fifteen minutes to prepare such an order. We were furnished with what you call manifold letter-writers, so that after the frame work of an order is prepared, ten or a dozen copies may be made at once. Why was the order not issued, or if issued, why was it not executed? There was no obstacle to my withdrawing that army, if I had desired; the enemy presented none. There was not a moment from the time the first gun was fired at Gettysburg until we knew the enemy had retired that I could not have withdrawn my army. Therefore, if I had entertained such an idea, it seems to me extraordinary that I did not execute it.

I will now read the documentary evidence that I propose to lay before this committee. The first is a despatch to Major General Slocum, commanding the 12th corps, as follows :

"JULY 2, 1863—9.30 a. m.

"GENERAL: The commanding general desires that you will at once examine the ground in your front, and give him your opinion as to the practicability of attacking the enemy in that quarter.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"S. WILLIAMS,

"Assistant Adjutant General.

"Major General H. W. SLOCUM, *Commanding.*"

Then there is a despatch at 10 a. m., addressed to General Slocum, written by General Butterfield himself, directing him to make an attack :

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC,

"July 2, 1863, (supposed about 10 a. m.)

"Major General SLOCUM:

"The commanding general desires you to make your arrangements for an attack from your front on the enemy, to be made by the 12th corps, supported by the 5th.

"He wishes this a strong and decisive attack, which he will order so soon as he gets definite information of the approach of the 6th corps, which will also be directed to co-operate in this attack; for this purpose he has sent an officer to ascertain the whereabouts of General Sedgwick, and report.

"I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,

"Major General and Chief of Staff."

At 10 o'clock I was ordering General Slocum to make the attack; at the same time I sent General Warren, my chief engineer, to consult with General Slocum as to the advisability of making the attack. General Warren went, and then returned and reported to me. I also received the following note from General Slocum :

"HEADQUARTERS, July 2, 1863—10.30 a. m.

"Major General MEADE,

"*Commanding Army of Potomac.*

"GENERAL: Your note of 9.30 a. m. is received. I have already made a better examination of the position in my front than I was able to do, now that

we have taken up a new line. If it is true that the enemy are massing troops on our right, I do not think we could detach enough troops for an attack to insure success. I do not think the ground in my front, held by the enemy, possesses any peculiar advantages for him.

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“H. W. SLOCUM,  
*Major General, Commanding.*”

General Warren, furthermore, reported to me that he did not think an attack advisable from our right flank; I therefore abandoned that attack, and waited for the 6th corps to arrive, intending to move the 5th corps over to the left, as I did, and then, if the enemy did not attack me, to make an attack myself from the left.

I find on the records of the Adjutant General's office of the army of the Potomac a document, supposed to have been issued at 10 o'clock a. m. of the 2d of July, which is in confirmation of what I consider my orders to General Butterfield. It is as follows :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC,  
“*July 2, (supposed about 10 a. m.,) 1863.*

“The staff officers on duty at headquarters will inform themselves of the positions of the various corps—their artillery, infantry, and trains—sketch them with a view to roads, and report them immediately, as follows :

“3d corps, Colonel Schriver.

“2d corps, Lieutenant Colonel Davis.

“1st corps, Lieutenant Perkins.

“12th corps, Lieutenant Oliver.

“5th corps, Captain Cadwalader.

“It is desired to know the roads on or near which the troops are, and where their trains lie, in view of movements in any direction, and to be familiar with the headquarters of the commanders.

“By order of General Meade.

“S. WILLIAMS,  
“*Assistant Adjutant General.*”

That was the sum and substance of the instructions I gave to General Butterfield, to familiarize himself with the position, and be ready, in case I should desire to retreat or do anything else, to issue the necessary orders.

In further confirmation of that, I find among my papers my despatch to General Halleck, informing him of what had transpired up to the hour at which it was written, and what I proposed to do during the rest of the day, if in my power to do so. The despatch to General Slocum to make the attack was at 10 a. m. This despatch to General Halleck was at 3 p. m., and is as follows :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC,  
“*July 2, (3 p. m., near Gettysburg,) 1863.*

“Major General HALLECK, *Washington :*

“I have concentrated my army at this place to-day. The 6th corps is just coming in very much worn out, having been marching since 9 p. m. last night. The army is fatigued.

“I have to-day, up to this hour, awaited the attack of the enemy, I having a strong position for defence. I am not determined as yet in attacking him till his position is more developed. He has been moving on both my flanks apparently, but it is difficult to tell exactly his movements. I have delayed attacking to allow the 6th corps and parts of other corps to reach this place, and to

rest the men. Expecting a battle, I ordered all my trains to the rear. If not attacked, and I can get any positive information of the position of the enemy which will justify me in so doing, I shall attack. If I find it hazardous to do so, or am satisfied the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear, and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back to my supplies at Westminster. I will endeavor to advise you as often as possible.

“In the engagement yesterday the enemy concentrated more rapidly than we could, and towards evening, owing to the superiority of numbers, compelled the 11th and 1st corps to fall back from the town to the heights on this side, on which I am now posted.

“I feel fully the responsibility resting on me, and will endeavor to act with caution.

“GEORGE G. MEADE,  
“*Major General.*”

The committee will perceive that I tell General Halleck that I was waiting the arrival of the 6th corps before I should commence any active operations myself; that I had been expecting an attack up to that moment; that, after the 6th corps arrived, if the enemy did not attack me I should attack him if I thought it advisable to do so.

There is no doubt, as I mentioned here before, and as I have no hesitation to say again now, whatever influence it may have upon my reputation as a general, that it was my desire at Gettysburg to receive the attack of the enemy, and fight a defensive rather than an offensive battle, for the reason that I was satisfied my chances of success were greater in a defensive battle than an offensive one, and I knew the momentous consequences dependent upon the result of that.

That General Butterfield may have misapprehended what I said to him; that he may himself have deemed a retreat necessary, and thought we would be compelled to retreat in the course of the day, and in the excess of zeal and desire to do more than he was called upon to do, may have drawn up an order of that kind, I do not deny; but I say he never showed me any such order, and it had not my sanction or authority.

I have only further to say that I have brought with me a map of the field of Gettysburg. I consider the map accurate. It contains on it, in blue lines, the position which General Sickles thought proper to take, and, in red lines, the position I designed him to occupy.

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*Testimony of General John Gibbon.*

WASHINGTON, *April 1, 1864.*

Brigadier General JOHN GIBBON sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?

Answer. I am a captain in the 4th regular artillery and a brigadier general of volunteers, commanding a division in the 2d corps of the army of the Potomac.

Question. We are inquiring now more particularly about the battle of Gettysburg. You were in that battle ?

Answer. Yes, sir, I commanded a division there.

Question. Will you state to us in your own way such facts and circumstances connected with that battle as you may deem material or interesting ?

Answer. I can only tell my own part of it; I do not know much about any of the rest. I was put in command of the 2d corps on the afternoon of the 1st of July, at Taneytown, General Hancock having been ordered to the front, at Gettysburg, when news arrived of General Reynolds having been killed or very seriously wounded. I was ordered to march to Gettysburg, and began the march; but about sundown I received orders from General Hancock to put the corps in position on the Taneytown road, about three miles from Gettysburg. That night, about 12 o'clock, General Meade passed my headquarters on his way to Gettysburg, and shortly afterwards I received orders to push the corps forward to Gettysburg. I got in motion shortly after daylight, and got upon the field early that morning. The corps—General Hancock resuming command of it—was put in position on the ridge to the left of Cemetery hill. During the most of that forenoon I understood that the troops were coming into position, taking their places in the line. There was not much fighting going on until General Sickles's movement took place, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon. I understood his position to be on the left of our line, extending our line along the ridge in the direction of Round Top hill, quite a prominent hill on our left flank.

About 4 o'clock in the afternoon I was standing on the hill within the limits of my division, and noticed troops moving out to our left and front. It turned out to be the 3d corps, under General Sickles; they were taking up their position obliquely to our line and to the front, somewhere along the Emmetsburg road, which ran just to the front of the right of my division, and obliquely to the line. I was standing there with General Hancock, and noticed the position of Sickles's line. There was quite a thick wood away off to the left of Sickles's line, and I asked General Hancock if he supposed there was anything in those woods; and very shortly afterwards the enemy brought out his guns and commenced firing, and there was more or less fighting whilst General Sickles's corps was being put in position. They then commenced their attack on Sickles's left. After fighting for some time the corps was evidently giving away; had to change its position. I had several messages from General Humphreys, I think, asking me to send troops out to their assistance. General Hancock was there, and I consulted with him, and, by his direction, sent two regiments, I think. I also sent two regiments to connect Sickles's right with our line, and prevent the enemy from coming in and cutting him off entirely from our line. Those regiments became very heavily engaged, when the troops began to fall back, and lost both of their commanding officers.

Soon afterwards I saw the enemy's lines advancing after our troops directly in my front. I went up to the batteries which were on the most prominent part of the line and directed them to fire solid shot over the heads of our own men at the advancing enemy. I was afraid to fire shell for fear they might explode too soon and injure our own men. The smoke soon became so thick on this hill that nothing could be seen at all, and I had to discontinue the firing. I understood that our men came back in a great deal of confusion, but I could see very little myself on account of the smoke being so thick.

I was riding down to the left of my line, where General Meade sent for me. He was coming up with a portion of the 12th corps. Those men went in and the enemy was beaten back. I think, however, that the enemy were forced back from our line before any re-enforcements came up. I understood they ran over several batteries that were in position on the outside of our line; but the guns were immediately recovered when our troops advanced. That was about all the fighting that took place on the 2d of July that I know anything about.

After we had repulsed one attack there was heavy firing over on the right of Cemetery hill. I received a message from General Howard, commanding the 11th corps, asking for re-enforcements. Just about the same time General Hancock became alarmed at the continued firing, and desired me to send a brigade,

designating Colonel Carroll's, and afterwards three other regiments from my division, to the assistance of our right centre. Colonel Carroll moved off promptly, and, as reported to me, arrived on the right of Cemetery hill to find the enemy actually in our batteries and fighting with the cannoniers for their possession. He gallantly moved forward with his command, drove the enemy back, retook the position, and held it till the next day.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. When you say that the enemy were forced back from our line before the re-enforcements came up, which line do you mean—the advanced line taken by General Sickles, or the line subsequently taken ?

Answer. I mean the line upon which the battle of Gettysburg was fought ; the line which we subsequently took, extending along the ridge from Cemetery hill to Round Top.

Question. Do you know why General Sickles took the advanced line which he did ?

Answer. I do not ; I have no knowledge of his reasons for taking that line.

Question. Was it or not, in your opinion, a judicious position in which to place his men ?

Answer. I should think it was not.

Question. Will you state the disadvantages of that advanced line ?

Answer. In the first place we had our line established, and General Sickles was in a position where he would very naturally have support on both flanks. To put himself out in that position he would isolate his corps from the rest of the army, and necessarily weaken the position, without having the same support to his wings which he would have had if he had remained in the continuous line. Then, again, I think the position he put his corps in, as it turned out, invited an attack upon his left flank, and such an attack is almost always disastrous, particularly to volunteer troops who are not thoroughly disciplined. You will see necessarily how his troops had to change their position when the attack was made on them from the direction of the Emmettsburg road. Those troops had to change their position, and in doing so were fired upon by the enemy.

By the chairman :

Question. What do you know about any councils of war being held on the 2d of July ?

Answer. There was a council of war held on the night of the 2d of July.

Question. Were you there ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; although properly I ought not to have been there. I had commanded the corps on the afternoon of the 1st of July, in the absence of General Hancock. When I came up to Gettysburg with the corps General Hancock, of course, resumed the command of it. During the retreat of Sickles's corps, General Hancock turned the command of the corps over to me, as he had done the day before, in order, as he informed me, to take command of the 3d corps after General Sickles was wounded. At night, after the fighting was over, the staff officer, in summoning corps commanders to the council, summoned me, and I went there. General Hancock also went there, so that the 2d corps really had two representatives there. I spoke to General Meade about it after the council was over. I was present at the council in that way. During a portion of the sitting of the council there was fighting off to the right of our line somewhere ; I did not know exactly where. As the corps commanders came in, the result of the day's fighting was ascertained, each one reporting what had taken place near his position. The subject was very thoroughly discussed. We were sitting in a room not half as large as this one, very close together, of course, and we were all discussing the result of the day's fighting. During the conversation General Newton made some objec-

tions to the position we occupied. He is an officer of engineers, and I supposed had examined the whole position; while I knew nothing at all about it, except my own part of the field. The matter was discussed in regard to the military position. After we had been sitting there for several hours, there were a number of points written out by direction of General Meade, upon which the council was to decide. Among the rest was the question—

Should the army remain upon its present ground, or should it retire and take up some other position?

Being the youngest member of the council, I had the first vote on it, and I therefore had probably more full discussion with General Newton in regard to his objections to the position. Finally, when the question was put, my vote was that we should rectify the position as far as possible, but not to leave it so far that anybody could construe it into a retreat from our position. General Newton, I think, voted substantially the same as myself, because I recollect there was a little sparring between us as to whether he was agreeing with me or I with him. Every other member of the council, according to my recollection, voted simply to stay there and fight. I recollect very distinctly General Meade's announcement, when the vote was taken: "That, then, is the decision." There was great good feeling among all present as far I could understand, and we were all unanimous upon the subject.

There is a matter connected with a report in regard to the retreat of the army from Gettysburg, which I think it proper to mention in my testimony. It is this: some time during the day of the 2d of July, but before this fight with General Sickles's corps had taken place, I was at General Meade's headquarters, as I frequently was during the day; I consequently knew a great deal of the dispositions made, and orders given, for the troops to come up. I had been urged frequently in the morning of that day, by General Meade, to hurry up to the field, and I heard of the other corps that were coming up; I therefore had but one idea in regard to General Meade's intention, which was to concentrate the whole army there for the purpose of fighting a battle; when, therefore, on coming out of the little room in which he had his office, I met General Butterfield, his chief of staff, and he asked me to read over with him, and compare with a map he had there, a draught of an order which he had, and I asked him what it was, and he told me that it was an order for the army to retreat, I was struck with a great deal of astonishment, and I recollect very well my exclamation, "Great God! General Meade does not intend to leave this position?" General Butterfield did not say that General Meade did intend to leave; he merely said something to the effect that it was necessary to be prepared, in case it should be necessary to leave, or some remark of that kind. He then showed me the order, and either he read it over and I pointed out the places on the map, or I read it over and he pointed out the places to which each corps was to go. When he got through, I remarked that it was all correctly drawn up.

Until very recently I supposed that the order which General Butterfield showed me was an order in regard to the army falling back to a position which I heard General Meade had selected on Pipe Clay creek. But I am satisfied now that order must have been some different order from the one I had been thinking it was. Being firmly convinced, as I was at the time, that General Meade had no idea of falling back from the position there, it struck me as very remarkable that his chief of staff should be making out an order to retreat; and I still think so.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Do you know what was the opinion of General Meade, at the time the council was held on the night of the 2d of July, in regard to remaining on the ground where you were?



Answer. I can only judge of that from his manner after the decision of the council was made, because I do not recollect that General Meade said much upon the subject during the council. He appeared to me to be waiting to listen to the reports and opinions of his corps commanders. I do not recollect having heard him express a decided opinion one way or the other. I certainly did not hear him express any preference for retreating.

Question. At the time of your interview with General Butterfield, do you remember whether or not that you understood that the order which had been prepared for the army to retreat was one that was to be executed?

Answer. No, sir. I understood from him that it was merely preparatory, in case we might be called upon to retreat.

By the chairman :

Question. Will you go on with your narrative?

Answer. On the morning of the 3d of July skirmishing commenced pretty early, but I do not recollect any serious fighting—there was none on our part of the line—until about 1 o'clock, when the enemy opened their artillery fire upon us. I do not believe there was ever a hotter fire of artillery in the world; it was the most terrific scene I ever witnessed. That fire continued about an hour and a half.

Question. Which side had the most guns in position there?

Answer. I am not able to answer that question. I know they had a great many more than I wanted to see there. But we kept up a pretty heavy pummelling all the time, too. I suppose that fire must have continued an hour and a half or two hours, when the enemy's lines of infantry appeared coming out of the woods in our front, line after line, a heavy line of skirmishers, then a line of infantry, then another line behind that, and, I believe, a third behind that; and, from my position near the left centre of my division, as far as I could see, these lines were coming up against us in most beautiful style.

Question. How many men do you judge there were in that assault?

Answer. I had no time to calculate. I had no idea how many there were; the lines to our right and their left extended as far as I could see. Over to our left they did not extend so far. And their line was broken in one part as they came upon my division. I rode to the left of my division, and was trying to get some regiments to wheel outside of the little breastworks they had thrown up, and attack this assaulting line in flank. And I am satisfied that if I had been able to get these men to do what I wanted, we would have captured a great many more than we did.

Question. What was the difficulty?

Answer. It was the want of proper discipline. Men get very much excited in battle; they are all yelling, hallooing, shooting, and, unless they are very well drilled and disciplined, they do not wait for the orders of their colonels.

Question. In the heat of battle can a commanding officer have much control over his men?

Answer. Not after the men become thoroughly engaged. But if men are well disciplined and accustomed to listen implicitly to the voice of their officers they can have an immense influence over them, if they (the officers) stand by them and direct them. I was wounded about the time, I suppose, the enemy's second line got into our batteries, probably a little before that. As described to me afterwards, the result, I think, will carry out my idea in regard to it; because the enemy broke through, forced back my weakest brigade, under General Webb, got into our batteries, and the men were so close that the officers on each side were using their pistols on each other, and the men frequently clubbed their muskets, and the clothes of the men on both sides were burned by the powder of the exploding cartridges. An officer of my staff, Lieutenant Haskell, had been sent by me, just previously to the attack, to General Meade, with a mes-

sage that the enemy were coming. He got back on top of the hill hunting for me, and was there when this brigade was forced back; and, without waiting orders from me, he rode off to the left and ordered all the troops of the division there to the right. As they came up helter-skelter, everybody for himself, with their officers among them, they commenced firing upon these rebels as they were coming into our batteries, and took them in flank, and the rebels laid down their arms by hundreds. And if I had got these regiments in a little sooner they would have taken the rebels in flank before they got into the batteries.

Question. At what time of the day were you wounded?

Answer. I must have been wounded somewhere about 3 o'clock.

Question. Where was the 6th corps during this assault?

Answer. I cannot tell; it was on our left and rear somewhere, but I do not know its position.

Question. After the enemy had been repulsed that day, was there any council of war held that you know of?

Answer. Not that I know about; I was in the hospital.

Question. You did not accompany the army as it followed the enemy to Williamsport?

Answer. No, sir; I have not been with the army since.

Question. Do you desire to place on record any other observations in regard to that battle?

Answer. I do not know that I have, particularly. I think it was one of the hardest fought battles of this war, and one of the best fought.

Question. You have studied the history of battles a great deal. Now, in the battles of Napoleon had they at any time half as many artillery engaged as there were at Gettysburg?

Answer. I am not sufficiently conversant with military history to tell you that. I think it very doubtful whether more guns were ever used in any one battle before. I do not believe Napoleon ever had a worse artillery fire.

Question. Which army had the most men in that battle, as near as you can ascertain?

Answer. I do not know. I have had no opportunity of judging. I could not tell you what our own force was. I should imagine we had about the same force as they had; however, that is a mere rough guess.

Question. Are our troops as well disciplined as those of the enemy, as a general thing?

Answer. I do not think they are.

Question. What reason do you give for that?

Answer. I think they are fully aware of the fact that they cannot get along unless they do have strict discipline, and I am sorry to say that we seem to have a notion that we can. There are some volunteer regiments that are as well disciplined as any men I ever want to see. I had several such regiments in that battle. A great deal of it depends upon the kind of officers they have. I think we ought to have some kind of rule for promoting officers for efficiency and gallantry in the field.

Question. Have they any articles of war, or rules of proceeding that will enable them to discipline their men better than ours?

Answer. I do not know that they have. But I believe that all their forces are under the control of the central government. I do not know how that is, but that is my idea. I think the central government makes all the appointments, but I will not be certain of that. But I am satisfied of one thing: that men in their service get their promotion from military recommendations. In our service, the governor of each State has the appointment of officers from his State, though he appoints none higher than colonels; and very frequently they will insist upon appointing men who are not competent in a military point of view. The general government, however, has the power of dismissing officers;

that will enable us to get rid of the worst officers in time, but we have no system which will enable us to get the good officers in position, and sometimes the bad ones are put back upon us.

Question. The rebels, of course, must have selected many of their officers from civil life, as we have done?

Answer. Yes, sir. Do not misunderstand me. I do not want men of military education, but I want men who have shown themselves in the field to be competent. There are two kinds of military ability—one theoretical, and the other practical. We have plenty of volunteer officers who have shown themselves to be really competent soldiers, but they do not get promotion. There was one young man on my staff, who has been in every battle with me, and who did more than any other one man to repulse that last assault at Gettysburg, and he did the part of a general there, yet he has been only a first lieutenant until within a few weeks. I have now succeeded in getting the governor of Wisconsin to appoint him to a colonelcy, and I have no doubt he will, before long, come before you of the Senate for a star. He is an excellent soldier, and has distinguished himself in every battle; and I have also got the general government to recognize his services, and he is appointed a major in the Adjutant General's department.

Question. Does not that arise from the necessity of having rules by which it is rendered very difficult to supersede an officer? If a vacancy happens anywhere in the regular army, the next in rank moves up, so that it is very difficult, is it not, to break through these rules, and reward merit?

Answer. We have broken through that rule during this war. Suppose we had promoted in the regular army altogether according to the rule of seniority; you would not have had one officer who has distinguished himself in this war, unless you had promoted all the older officers and then retired them.

This is the rule which I say will give us a good army, the best in the world: We have the best material upon the face of God's earth of which to make an army; I am convinced of that. In the first place, let us commence with the regiment. After a regiment goes into service, if the colonel is not fit for his place, put him out, either by a court-martial, which is slow, or by a board, which a great many people say is unjust; and then put a competent man in command of the regiment; and then never make a promotion to a captaincy or field officer in that regiment unless upon the recommendation of that colonel. And as long as that colonel tells you that this or that captain of his regiment is a competent military man, never make a promotion in his company except in accordance with his indorsement. If the colonel tells you that the captain is not a competent man, and insists upon having somebody that he knows to be competent promoted, take the colonel's word and promote accordingly.

Question. Your colonel may have his favorites, and dispense his recommendations accordingly?

Answer. That is true. But how are you going to avoid these partialities? Who is going to decide upon them? Suppose the colonel is an indifferent military man—is not fit for his place; he will have his prejudices as much as anybody else. The only question is, whether the competent military man will not be the surest source from which to make those appointments, who will make them with an eye solely to the good of the service, and will be a more competent man to judge than a man who is not declared by military authority to be the right man for the position. In both cases you will probably have partiality; but in the one case you have partiality governed by military principles; in the other you have partiality governed by politics, relations, anything else, you do not know what.

Question. Suppose this very excellent, competent young staff officer of yours had been placed in command of a regiment at once; would not the morale of

that regiment have been destroyed or seriously impaired by placing the junior officer over the others, notwithstanding his great merits ?

Answer. He has gone out to Wisconsin, and in a few weeks his regiment has been raised for him.

Question. That is all very true ; he has raised a new regiment. But suppose you had placed him over all the officers in an old regiment ?

Answer. I can only answer that in this way : I will instance two Wisconsin regiments. I commenced with what is known as "the iron brigade," and those two regiments were in it. One of the regiments was commanded by a graduate of the Military Academy, who, however, was not in the service when the war commenced. The other was commanded by a man who had no military education whatever, but who was naturally a disciplinarian and a soldier. Those two regiments, the 2d and 6th Wisconsin, were, and are yet, what is left of them, two of the finest regiments that ever fought on any field. The principle in those regiments was to promote only competent men ; and I attribute their discipline and the reputation which they have gained to that fact alone. I believe there was some objection to it at first ; but the governor of Wisconsin finally almost always promoted those who were recommended by the colonels.

I tried once to get this very same young staff officer of mine, Lieutenant Haskell, before I knew so much about him as I know now, made a lieutenant colonel ; but the pressure was too strongly in favor of the major of the regiment, who was a very good soldier too, and whom I have also recommended for promotion.

Now, in other States they do not pay that regard to these recommendations which I think they ought to do. I think, also, these recommendations should always go up through the regular military channel. For instance, if a colonel, no matter from what State he comes, recommends such a captain for promotion to the position of major, I think that recommendation should receive the indorsement of the brigade commander, and then go up for the indorsement of the division commander. I do not know that it should go further than that, for those officers are the ones who have the best opportunity to observe the ability and conduct of the one recommended.

Now, to show you how the other rule works, I will give an instance that occurred in this very division of mine at the battle of Fredericksburg last May. When we went down at one o'clock at night, to take possession of Fredericksburg, the colonel in command of one of my brigades was found by me to be so intoxicated that he was utterly unfit for command, and I had to relieve him from his command and give it to some one else. I preferred charges against him, and a court of volunteer officers was ordered. He was tried and dismissed the service for drunkenness when going into action. The lieutenant colonel, who commanded the regiment at Gettysburg, had not been mustered in as colonel when he was killed at the head of his regiment. Now, the government here, for some reason or other, rescinded the order dismissing this colonel from the service, and he has been reinstated, by the governor of New York, as the colonel of that regiment. They hold in New York that the rescinding of the order of dismissal was a kind of recommendation to the governor of New York to reappoint him. I told the adjutant general of the State of New York that the rescinding of the order dismissing that colonel from the service did not make him either a sober man or a competent officer, and that if the State of New York had had troops in the field she need blame nobody for it but herself, for we were inclined to do everything we could to improve them, for it was a matter of life and death with us to have good soldiers under us. I speak for myself : we will not recommend any other than competent men for promotion. I do not think you can leave the matter to better judges than military men, though we may make mistakes sometimes in the matter.

By Mr. Julian :

Question. Can you not illustrate your idea by the case of an Indiana brigadier general now absent on sick leave?

Answer. Yes, sir, very well. I had in my brigade—"the iron brigade"—three Wisconsin regiments and one Indiana regiment. The colonel of the Indiana regiment I soon found was a marked contrast to at least two of the other colonels. I found him always opposing every plan of mine to render that brigade more efficient. He had not the first principle of a soldier in him; he was altogether disqualified for his position. I asked that he should be brought before a board of examination, but it was never done. In the first place he was very much opposed to my coming into the brigade. Like a great many other volunteers he had prejudices against regular officers, which only needed contact with them to remove. He made complaints to the War Department against me for my military administration of the brigade. After the first fight we got into, which was on the 28th of August, 1862, in General Pope's campaign, when I lost 600 men in about an hour and twenty minutes, this man seemed to have changed in his sentiments towards me, and I always supposed he was a great friend of mine. We went up into Maryland and fought the battle of South mountain. My brigade was charged with the duty of going up into a gorge along the turnpike and carrying that position. This colonel had command of his regiment along the left of the turnpike; opposite to him was another regiment, and behind him were the other two regiments of the brigade. The enemy were posted behind a stone-wall and a great deal protected there. While this man was marching up with his regiment I sent him word to throw out two companies on his left into a little skirt of woods, to keep along through the woods to see that there was nothing there to fire on his flank. Instead of doing that, he changed front forward on his left company and faced the woods, thus exposing his flank to the fire of a rebel battery. Now, my main object was to push forward rapidly and get engaged before the darkness came on, but this delayed us. And this very Lieutenant Haskell, of whom I have spoken, had to go down there and give him commands to put his regiment back into its old position, and then I had to send orders to Colonel Fairchild to push the other regiment into action. This Indiana regiment had the finest material in it in the whole brigade, and yet it was the worst regiment I had.

At the battle of Antietam my brigade led off in the attack on the right, and lost very heavily. The colonel of this Indiana regiment was not in that battle at all; he came here to Washington on sick leave. When he came back to the army he had a brigadier general's strap on.

Question. How did he get it?

Answer. Through the recommendation of General Hooker; which was obtained because the pressure from very high authority was so strong that General Hooker could not refuse. I protested against his appointment, and wrote a letter to the Adjutant General of the army, telling him the man was totally disqualified for any such position.

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*Testimony of General Henry J. Hunt.*

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1864.

Brigadier General HENRY J. HUNT sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch :

[See testimony—"Army of the Potomac—General Hooker."]

Question. When were you restored to the full command of the artillery?

Answer. General Meade took command on the 28th of June, I think, and moved the next morning. I had no opportunity then of saying anything what-

ever to him about my position. I proceeded to do everything I could, as I always had done, to forward whatever was necessary to be done. At Taneytown I received orders from General Meade with regard to selecting positions for the artillery at Pipe creek and examining the country there, and I accompanied him to Gettysburg, which place we reached about one o'clock at night. As soon as the position was explained to General Meade by some officers there, he directed me to immediately select the positions for the artillery, which I proceeded to do, so far as the darkness would permit. I could see our own ground, but not that of the enemy. General Meade accompanied me. About dawn of day General Slocum reported to General Meade that there was a gap in his lines, which should be filled by a division which was not there, and that he apprehended an immediate attack. I was lying down near the root of a tree there. General Meade immediately asked for me; and when I reported to him he gave me directions to take immediate measures for stopping that gap, and if an attack was made to repulse it. I looked upon that as no opportunity to come to an explanation with him; but I regarded it, and his previous order to look to the positions of the batteries, as, in fact, recognizing the position I had held both under General McClellan and General Burnside. At all events, I proceeded at once to act upon that assumption; ordered artillery from wherever I could find it, where I thought it could be spared, without any regard to the commands of others, except to inform them that it was necessary; took possession of all the ground that covered the position, put the batteries on it, and covered that gap until the troops took their position there, when I distributed the artillery back to its former positions.

At the request of General Meade I sent for the artillery reserves, which had been kept behind us, and from that time I exercised all the duties of commander of the artillery, as recognized in modern armies, in the same way as at Antietam, where General McClellan told me on the field that he held me responsible for everything in connexion with the artillery, and that I might make every use of his name if I came across anybody that ranked me; that is, I took full control of the artillery where, by the regulations and necessities of the service, it was not under the exclusive command of others.

It was in discharge of my duties as commander of the artillery of the army that I went to every point of attack, where it was frequently necessary to use the artillery of adjoining corps, together with portions of the reserve artillery brought up for the purpose, and which, of course, no one corps commander could take charge of. I gave all the orders I found necessary under these circumstances at all the points of attack.

The day after we recrossed the Potomac General Meade called me, and stated that there was some mismanagement in the marching of the heavy ammunition trains of the reserve artillery and the general park. I explained to him that they had crossed a long pontoon bridge, where the wagons could not keep close together, but were compelled to have a certain distance between them; that after crossing they were compelled to move rapidly, in order to catch up with those in front, or leave wide openings, and of course some confusion had occurred in regard to regularity of march; that it could not be wondered at that the lines should be cut by infantry troops crossing the adjoining bridge. I asked the general why he spoke to me about it, and said that under existing orders—those of General Hooker—I had no authority to interfere; that the orders given to the artillery reserve were not given through me; that I had not had an opportunity to bring the subject to his attention, as he was engaged in matters of more importance; that I had been able to get things along as they were without any particular authority, but now I wished him to define my duties.

A few weeks afterwards, when we had got into camp, the subject was taken up. The command of all the artillery not attached to troops was given to me; and all the management and responsibility, as to movements, equipments, &c., of

the troops of the artillery that were attached to other troops, were also put under my direction. In fact, it amounted to giving me the command of the whole of the artillery, as in other armies. One by one, since that time, as occasion has arisen, when it has been necessary to decide, I believe all, or nearly all, the powers of a corps commander have been conferred upon me under special orders, so that now I occupy a position very much like that of the commander of the cavalry, and it is, to all intents and purposes, the same that was given me at first.

Question. Will you give to us a concise description of the battle of Gettysburg?

Answer. The first day of the fight, July 1, I was not on the ground; I was at headquarters. I accompanied General Meade to Gettysburg. On my arrival there I examined the ground and posted the batteries, or approved of the positions where the batteries had been placed, and placed such additional batteries as were required the next morning.

As my attention was drawn more particularly to my own arm of the service, I can give a description of the battle only in general terms. On the morning of the 2d of July I examined all the positions along the whole line. I think the 3d corps was just coming up to its ground on our extreme left; next to them was the 2d corps; then the 11th, and I think the 1st corps, on Cemetery ridge; then on their right was the 12th corps. I do not remember distinctly the relative positions of the 1st and 11th corps. In fact, I was so busy with the artillery that I did not fix in my mind the relative positions of the infantry corps.

On the morning of the 2d the reserve artillery, with its heavy trains of ammunition, which had been left behind some three or four miles, was brought forward by direction of General Meade, and parked about the centre of the field, between the Baltimore pike and the Taneytown road, near which I think the 5th corps was in support of the 12th and 11th corps, the 6th corps not having yet arrived.

About 11 o'clock, I had just come into headquarters from an inspection of the ground, when General Meade sent for me and told me that General Sickles, who was there at the time, wished me to examine his line, or the line that he wanted to occupy; and General Meade wished me to go with General Sickles and examine the line. I think he added that General Sickles had no good position for his artillery. At that time I did not know anything of the intentions of General Meade—whether it was to occupy a line with a view to attack, or a defensive line, or a defensive and offensive line. As we left the room I asked General Sickles what his idea was. He said he wished to throw forward his line from the position in which it was then placed, and where it was covered in its front by woods and rocks, with a view to cover the Emmettsburg road. Whether I asked him the question if that was his view or not, or whether he stated it, I do not remember; I may have asked him that. The orders were to bring up the ammunition of the corps and the reserve; and I had learned that General Sickles had left his ammunition behind on that road, and I thought, among other things, he was naturally anxious to control that road until it should get in.

I examined the position with him and told him that the right of his proposed line was out where it would not be connected with the 2d corps; that it would have to be connected, perhaps, by throwing out the left wing of the 2d corps, and that that could not well be done unless a wood in our front, in which I saw no enemy, was under our control, so that the enemy could not take possession of it. We met a couple of countrymen just then, who told us that the wood in front of us was a narrow strip with open ground beyond it, and I was told that we had some cavalry in the open ground. General Sickles said he would send in a couple of companies of Berdan's sharpshooters to examine the wood and see whether the enemy was there.

About this time a very heavy cannonade was opened at the cemetery, which continued, and made me anxious about that point, for I was even worse off in regard to field officers at Gettysburg than I was at Chancellorsville, and that made it necessary to go myself to every point of attack and look after it. I told General Sickles that I would follow the line from the position he mentioned down to the Round Top on our left, and report its condition to General Meade. He asked me, as far as I remember, something about whether it would be proper to move forward his line, and I said, "No; that he should wait orders from General Meade;" for, as far as I was concerned, I had no authority in the matter.

I moved down that road; it was a very good line to occupy, provided it was necessary to watch our left flank and prevent a movement by the enemy, or from which to make an offensive demonstration; but one which exposed both its own flank and the flank of the 2d corps, which would have to move forward to join it, to a cross-fire, if the enemy should take position in the strip of woods of which I have spoken.

I returned to headquarters, on my way to Cemetery ridge, and went in and made a report, very briefly, to General Meade. I stated to him that I had examined the line; that, so far as it was a line for troops to occupy, taken by itself, it was a very good line; but before putting any troops on it, or occupying it, I would advise him to examine it for himself; that I would not give any advice in the matter. I did this because I did not know General Meade's intentions, and I supposed he would soon be out there and examine it for himself if he thought it necessary. I went up to the Cemetery hill, on which an attack was being made, at that time principally by artillery, and some troops thrown out as sharpshooters. Some demonstrations were made by moving down by our right. I remained there until I saw the attack would not be a very serious one, and, feeling anxious about the position of General Sickles, I returned directly towards the position he wanted his right to occupy. On approaching it, Captain Randolph, who commanded the artillery of the 3d corps, came riding towards me, stating that he was glad I had come; that he was ordered to post a couple of batteries in a peach orchard there, and wished me to select the position. I asked if General Sickles had ordered it, and he said yes. The skirmishers were already engaged. I dismounted and went in with him, bringing us under a warm musketry fire. I told him if the batteries were to be placed there, the place he had selected was as good a position as he could find; pointed out another position for another battery, and sent immediately to the artillery reserve for some rifled batteries, as I saw the enemy's artillery moving in heavy force around our left, and beyond the reach of our smooth-bores. As soon as I had given these instructions I started back immediately to find General Sickles. On approaching him I saw he was in conversation with General Meade. I supposed, of course, that General Meade had come out there, and had approved of his occupying that line. I therefore returned to Captain Randolph and assisted him in putting his batteries in position, when we were opened upon by a very heavy artillery fire, at close range, from this strip of wood in front of General Sickles's new line. Having given instructions to one of the field officers of the reserve artillery whom I found on the ground for the posting of the batteries that I had sent for to the reserve, I proceeded at once to the extreme left of the line, where I knew there was a battery to be placed in a position very difficult of access, but which, if once attained, would give a very effecti upon the batteries of the enemy that were then playing upon our right. I went into position. On reaching the position I found that three of the batteries of Smith's battery—4th New York—had been got up quite a precipice, and were in the desired position. I had a fire opened immediately, which very much interfered with the enemy's batteries, and relieved our right a great deal from their fire. At the same time some of the enemy's batteries that I had seen passing round to our left had got into position, and opened, partly on Sickles's right, partly on



Smith's battery, which he answered with effect. I then left him to proceed along the line of Sickles's front, looking to the positions of the batteries, giving such directions as I found necessary, and sending for such additional batteries as I wanted. I continued there until nearly sunset. I found that the time had passed very rapidly, and that I had been absent from General Meade a long time, and fearing that he might want me, I returned to headquarters. Soon after I arrived there, all at headquarters got up suddenly and left—the bulk of them going down the Tenallytown road, under the lead of General Butterfield. I remained, with two of my staff officers and an aid of General Meade, with him, and accompanied the re-enforcements which were then going up to the position originally occupied by Sickles's corp, and from which the enemy were driven back.

In the mean time an attack had taken place on the 12th corps, on our right. But by the time we had got through with the battle of the 3d corps, it had got so dark that I saw there would be no further use for the artillery over there; and being pretty well worn out, I did not go over to that affair, but proceeded to the park of the artillery reserve, to supervise the reorganization of the batteries and the necessary repairs.

The next morning an attack by our own troops took place where the 12th corps was, and I went over and took charge of the artillery there. I then went to the position of the 11th corps on Cemetery ridge, where another cannonade had commenced between the enemy's batteries and our own.

I moved from there along the ridge to Round Top, as I saw the enemy were placing batteries in position in the woods opposite our line—whether with a view to opening upon us preparatory to an attack, or fearing an attack from us, I could not judge. I gave orders to the artillery along the line what should be done. I had just reached the extreme left battery on the hill of Round Top, when the bombardment of the enemy commenced, I think about 1 o'clock. The enemy opened upon us with some 115 or 120 guns, to which we could bring but about 70 to reply effectively. This bombardment continued for an hour and a half, I should judge. It was very destructive to our material, but was replied to very effectively by our artillery, until I ordered them, commencing at the cemetery, to slacken their fire and cease it, in order to see what the enemy were going to do, and also to be sure that we retained a sufficient supply of ammunition to meet, what I then expected, an attack. At the same time batteries were ordered up to replace those guns which had been damaged, or which had expended too much ammunition.

By the time these batteries had reached the ground, I saw directly in front of the 2d corps the enemy forming their column of attack, or rather their lines of attack. It turned out to be Pickett's division of the rebel army. They advanced directly towards the 2d corps, and our artillery in reach was turned upon them very effectively. But they continued to advance very handsomely, and made a direct attack upon our position. As soon as their troops had got so nearly joined to ours that it was unsafe any longer to fire canister upon them, I found that our men were giving way. As the supports had not come up, I left the batteries and went up to assist in keeping the men up. My horse was soon killed, which brought me down; and before I could get remounted and back there again the struggle was over, and we captured all of the enemy who did not run away or were not killed.

As soon as that attack was over, and the enemy saw that their men had given up, they opened their batteries at once, and upon their own men and ours at the same time, and after that cannonade they formed another column of attack, which advanced, but more upon our left, opposite the 3d corps. That attack was more easily disposed of than the other, as the enemy, I suppose, were somewhat disheartened by the repulse of their first attack. We were enabled to bring our guns all to bear upon them, so that they did not get within a hun-

dred yards of our line, but went back under cover of a little stream which was covered by a growth of small bushes. I can only say that my knowledge of the battle of Gettysburg is very much circumscribed, as I was kept busily occupied by my own special duties.

Question. Had you any knowledge of any order being prepared during the battle of Gettysburg for the withdrawal of the army from the position it then occupied?

Answer. No, sir. I know of no such order, and no such intention. I presume if any such intention had been entertained I should have known of it as soon as anybody, as the first thing to have been done was to get rid of the large reserve artillery and ammunition train under my charge, and which had been brought up on the morning of the 2d of July, under, or by the direction of, General Meade.

Question. You say you had no knowledge or intimation of any such thing during the battle?

Answer. None at all. The only time I ever had a thought such an idea might be entertained was on the night of the 2d of July. On that night I was down at the artillery reserve, refitting and reorganizing the batteries that had been cut up that day. I received a message from General Meade's headquarters—I do not now recollect whether it was from General Meade himself or from General Butterfield—stating that both General Tyler, who commanded the reserve artillery, and myself, were wanted at headquarters. I told General Tyler that it was impossible for me to go up just then, but that if the question came up about falling back, to cast my vote against it. He remained for some time, and I went up with him, perhaps a half an hour afterwards. On arriving at headquarters, I understood that the question had been spoken of as to what they should do, and there was no person at all in favor of leaving the ground we had then; that was just as the consultation closed.

Just about daylight on the 2d of July General Meade ordered the reserve artillery brought up. I sent my aid for it, and it came up about 8 o'clock in the morning, I think; so that at that time there could have been no question of leaving.

Question. The meeting of our troops with those of the enemy at Gettysburg was not premeditated, was it? It was an accidental conflict between the two armies as they were moving, was it not?

Answer. As I have always looked upon it, the army was moving up there to see as to the position of the enemy. From the orders that were issued at Taneytown it was evident that the enemy had seen the necessity of concentrating; and it was certain that if he concentrated he would have to attack us, and arrangements were made looking to the collecting of our troops behind Pipe creek. I cannot say, however, that the battle of Gettysburg was accidental. It necessarily followed from the concentration of the enemy there, unless General Reynolds had seen fit to fall back.

Question. Do you mean that the battle at Gettysburg followed necessarily from the concentration there of the troops of the enemy, or the concentration of our troops there?

Answer. The enemy would necessarily have to concentrate when he found us in his neighborhood. And so soon as our movements up there had shown him that we were getting together he did commence concentrating his troops at Gettysburg, and of course he would attack any portion of our troops he might find there. It is a natural place, I should think, for an attack of that kind to be made, so many roads meeting there. If he wanted to concentrate, it would be the most natural place for him to do so.

Question. Why did General Meade select Pipe Clay creek as the point at which he proposed to concentrate?

Answer. He had several corps of his troops out in a fan shape looking for the enemy and feeling for him. He supposed, of course, they would concentrate as soon as possible and attack him. He had to select some position at which to concentrate his own troops, and I suppose he selected that from the appearance of the map as a good line, and also from what he considered the absolute necessity of the enemy's attacking him; for it could hardly be supposed that, having gone up into Pennsylvania, they would fall back without attacking us. I know of no particular reasons for selecting that line, except that, from the appearance of the map, it appeared to be an eligible place, and it was considerably nearer than Gettysburg to Manchester, the place where we had our supplies; and it was a question, too, of battle-fields. General Meade had not had time to examine the ground at different points. As soon as General Hancock came down and reported the nature of the ground at Gettysburg, General Meade immediately gave the order to concentrate there.

Question. What do you say of the position which we held at Gettysburg? Was it a very advantageous one for us?

Answer. I think it was a very advantageous position. If the enemy attempted to turn us, of course, being upon the outer circle, he would have to scatter his forces a great deal. At the time he attacked General Sickles it appeared to me, from what I saw of his movements, in the hurried examination I made, that he was making a movement in that direction, that is, towards turning our extreme left. The position was a very strong one; that is, the ground was very favorable for the use of our arms, of the infantry in particular. There was a ridge extending from the cemetery for a half or three-quarters of a mile, which was open in front, and over which the enemy could not advance without exposing themselves to the sweep of our artillery before they came within musketry range; beyond that it was wooded and rocky, and favorable for our infantry, although unfavorable for our artillery. The result was that they were enabled to concentrate more guns upon us in the heavy cannonade of July 3 than we could bring to reply to them.

Question. Was the advanced line selected by General Sickles, on the Emmettsburg road, under all the circumstances, a judicious selection; and did advantage or disadvantage result to us from the adoption of that line by him?

Answer. That would depend upon circumstances. If the battle was to have been a purely defensive one, based upon the almost certainty that the enemy must attack us, I suppose our policy would have been to have taken up a strictly defensive line. In that case the line should have extended, as it was ordered, from Cemetery ridge direct to Round Top, along the crest. If there was fear of our left being turned, our line might have been thrown forward to prevent the attempt, but that should have been done by placing it in *echelon* instead of changing the direction of the line by throwing forward the right flank, as was done of Sickles's corps. I suppose the occupation of that advanced position compelled the enemy to attack us there, even if they had started to turn our left flank. I do not know enough about the numbers of the troops we had there on our left at the time to judge what would have been the result of the enemy turning our position, because I was so taken up with my own duties that it was impossible for me to learn all those particulars. I know it led to a very severe and a very bloody battle. And it gave great advantages to the enemy on General Sickles's right flank, for they occupied the wood in front, which I said to him must be in our possession, or at least not occupied by the enemy.

On the whole, I cannot say whether it would have been better or not for him to have remained behind. Excepting on that right flank, it was probably as well to fight there as anywhere else. It would have been well, however, if the general commanding had known of it sooner, so as to dispose of troops behind; yet I was informed that they came up in very good time. The only disposable

supports at that time, as I understood, was the 5th corps, which was left in support of the 12th corps on the Baltimore pike, and which was only to leave there when the 6th corps showed itself on that road. I have understood, but I do not know it of my own knowledge, that the 6th corps came up in very good time, or at least in sufficient time to enable General Sykes to move his corps over to the left early. My attention was taken up so entirely with the artillery that I did not take time to find out the position and strength of the infantry troops.

Question. Immediately after the final repulse of the enemy, on the 3d of July, were we not in a condition to have attacked the enemy, and why was not that done?

Answer. I think we might have attacked the enemy there if the troops in hand had been formed so that they could push forward at once. But our troops were very roughly handled where they were attacked. I thought that the troops that were on the right of the point of attack, near the 2d corps, and which moved out beyond their lines, and continued to move down the front of our line after the first assault was repulsed, might have joined in an attack upon the right of the enemy, of course taking the chances of his position.

On the evening of the 2d of July, when the re-enforcements came up, just at dusk, I thought it would be well to move forward. But on the evening of the 3d I did not feel so positive about it by any means, because I did not see a disposable force sufficiently large, immediately on the ground, to attack the enemy in position in those woods, where I knew, from my experience of that day, that they had more than one hundred guns in position, a much larger force of artillery than we could bring to bear against them. And they had been planted behind that wood long enough to have made such defences as were found so effective where the 12th corps was. It was one of those cases where it was a question of risk and opportunity, and the general commanding must decide for himself whether he will run the risk or not.

Question. At what hour on the 3d were the enemy finally repulsed?

Answer. What I looked upon as the final repulse—for his attacks afterwards did not amount to much—was about 4 o'clock. I suppose after that they formed quite a heavy column of attack, which moved over and came within about two hundred yards of us. But the first troops, which came out on the right of the 2d corps, had moved down towards their lines, and when the enemy saw them they turned and ran back in confusion to their lines.

Question. Were you present at any council of war at Gettysburg after the final repulse of the enemy?

Answer. I was not present at any council at that time. I had no field officers, and had so much duty to attend to that I was scarcely ever at headquarters at the time those things occurred.

Question. What is your opinion as to an immediate attack upon the enemy, or a pursuit if the enemy was retreating?

Answer. My idea was that our cavalry should have been so used as to have made that movement of his getting off almost impossible, although I perhaps do not know enough of the country to decide who is to blame for that not having been done. On the 4th it stormed terribly, so that afternoon it would have been almost impossible to move. We might have organized an attack on the morning of the 4th if the general had seen reason to do so; and, of course, had we seen the enemy move we should have followed up at once. The moment there was good reason to believe the enemy were withdrawing we should have followed at once without losing any time.

By the chairman:

Question. Do you know whether the enemy used oxen to get their artillery on or off the field?

Answer. Not that I know of. I never heard of it. I heard a great deal about the enemy being out of ammunition, but I do not believe that.

Question. What supports had their artillery after the repulse of their final charge?

Answer. I do not know; they had the cover of a wood. I do not know what they had behind there. From the maps, and their works, and what I afterwards saw on the ground, I learned that they had rifle-pits, and troops in them. Their artillery was very much cut up by our fire; their losses, both in material and horses, were as great as ours. I saw graves, showing that our fire had passed over the artillery and struck infantry supports. I found evidences of great losses on their part; but what troops they had behind there I do not know.

Question. Was the 6th corps in the fight of the last day?

Answer. I do not think the 6th corps was engaged heavily; I do not know very much about that corps. It came up and was in reserve. I know its artillery was not much engaged, if at all.

Question. Where was that corps stationed at the time of that final repulse?

Answer. On our left, as I heard. When I reached the extreme left, just before the cannonade commenced, I heard that General Sedgwick was near there, and I meant to see him. I was prevented by the opening of the enemy's fire, and the fact, until now, had escaped my memory.

Question. Those troops were fresh; had not been much engaged?

Answer. They were fresh so far as fighting, but not so far as marching was concerned, for they had done very hard marching.

Question. Suppose an immediate and vigorous attack had been made after that repulse, what is your opinion as to their getting off their immense line of artillery there?

Answer. If the attack had been successful, we should most likely have captured all of it. I do not know what would have been the result of the attack; but our troops were very good.

Question. Were the troops in good spirits?

Answer. Our troops were in very good spirits.

Question. In your judgment, as a military man, what would have been the effect of a sudden advance along our line after their repulse and retreat? What would have become of their artillery?

Answer. If we had been successful, we probably would have got all their artillery, and I would have liked to see the attack made. It is very difficult to give a decided opinion upon these matters. If I had been asked, I should have advised an attack as soon as troops to make it could have been collected, though I did not know all the conditions of our army. We must risk to win.

Question. You had got over the heavy fighting, and then was the time to reap the harvest?

Answer. Yes, sir, if circumstances would permit.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Were you consulted in relation to attacking the enemy while he was at Williamsport?

Answer. I was not.

Question. In your opinion, should or not an attack have been made upon the enemy at Williamsport?

Answer. I did not have an opportunity to examine the ground there, as I was kept at the headquarters of the army. From what I could hear at the time, I was in favor of moving up to our right and attacking the enemy. I was told afterwards that the position the enemy occupied was a very strong one from the character of the ground. It was described to me as rolling ground, with ridges presented towards us, each of which could have been made a line

of defence by the enemy; but from all I could learn, we could have got rid of that difficulty by moving up to our right, and moving down upon the enemy from that direction.

Question. Knowing as you did that the enemy had been repulsed, and were falling back with the intent to recross the Potomac river, which at that time was in a swollen condition, in your judgment should not such steps have been taken as would have enabled you to attack that army, either before it made the crossing, or while it was in the act of crossing?

Answer. I thought then, and I have seen no reason since to change my opinion, that a comparatively small force, which might have consisted mostly of cavalry, with some infantry, could, if thrown across the river, whether from that army, or pushed up from Frederick or from Washington, have prevented their crossing, and have shut them up on the north side of the river, where they would have been compelled to stand an attack from us—in which case we could have taken our time about it, and we had a large force of artillery—or, from all I heard of the character of the roads behind them, they would have been compelled to abandon the most of their material, in order to escape up the river, by the Hancock road, and cross above. I was then under the impression that we should have made an attack.

Question. If we had attacked them at that point, and our attack had been successful, it would have resulted in the destruction of that army, would it not?

Answer. Yes, sir; or rather in the loss of much material and many men. The destruction of an army is no easy matter.

Question. And could we not have made an attack in such manner as to have withdrawn, in the event we had found ourselves unable to cope with the enemy without any serious disaster to us?

Answer. I do not see why we could not have organized an attack, nor can I see why such an attack could not have been made consistently with proper precautions against a disaster in case of an adverse result. I will add that these opinions are based on the facts of the case as then presented to my mind. As I have already stated, I was not called into council, and I may not have been in possession of all the facts bearing on the subject and necessary to the forming of a sound judgment.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. What opportunities did you have for knowing what orders General Meade issued from day to day, during the continuance of the battle of Gettysburg?

Answer. I received from day to day the circulars and orders that were issued regarding the movements of troops involving those of the artillery; and I had the same opportunities that others on his staff had. My headquarters are with the general, and though I have not been so much with him as others have been, still he could hardly have given any orders affecting extensively the movements of the army without my knowing them.

Question. I am speaking now particularly of the battle of Gettysburg; were you the chief of artillery there?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Were you on General Meade's staff as chief of artillery?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. At what time were you assigned to duty as chief of artillery on General Meade's staff?

Answer. On assuming command he found me chief of artillery of the army. I continued chief of artillery of the army; no order was necessary to confirm it, and none was issued.

Question. At what time were you appointed chief of artillery on the staff of General Hooker?

Answer. He found me chief of artillery upon his assuming the command. As such, I do not form part of the personal staff of the commander, but of the general staff of the army.

Question. At what time did General Hooker appoint you as chief of artillery on his staff?

Answer. I will not say now that he appointed me at all; he found me there, and I continued so.

Question. I understood you to say that you were upon his staff as chief of artillery?

Answer. Yes, sir; that is, I have been chief of artillery of the army of the Potomac from September 5, 1862, to this time.

Question. At what time did he issue an order assigning you to that duty?

Answer. I cannot remember positively that I was ever announced in orders; I would continue on duty as chief of artillery until relieved.

Question. Did General Meade, on assuming command, assign to duty the staff officers of General Hooker, in the positions they occupied on General Hooker's staff at the time General Meade took the command?

Answer. I have seen no orders from General Meade about the staff. He brought his personal staff with him. He recognized or continued the chiefs of "the staff" of artillery and of engineers as they stood when he took the command. At least he did not relieve me from my duties.

Question. Not having been assigned to any duty upon his staff, what particular facilities or opportunities did you have for knowing what orders he issued during the three days' battle at Gettysburg?

Answer. As chief of artillery of the army of the Potomac I was furnished with all the orders that it was necessary I should know for the movements of the artillery, the positions they occupied, with the positions and movements of the troops, so that I should know where they were. I suppose I had the same facilities that any other person at headquarters had.

Question. Did you have any other facilities that you can name?

Answer. I was furnished with copies of all the orders that were issued.

Question. How do you know you received all the orders?

Answer. I mean circular orders. I simply assume that I received all the orders, because I received copies of all the orders that I saw or heard of. I know of no general movements that took place of which I did not receive notice.

Question. Had you any means of knowing what private orders General Meade issued to corps commanders?

Answer. No, sir; I know nothing about his private orders. When his special orders affect me I am furnished with them.

Question. Had you any means of knowing any orders or intentions of General Meade, excepting such as were promulgated to officers occupying your grade?

Answer. No, sir, except so far as my *position*, which is independent of grade, gives them to me, and what I can infer from the circumstances of the case. My position, in this respect, would put me on a footing with a corps commander, or the chief of engineers; and in other armies the officer occupying it would have the rank due to the position. The question is not one that can be determined by the grade of the officer. I do not think that any order involving the movements of troops could have been given without my knowing it, for the simple reason that the first thing to be provided for in falling back was the movements of heavy trains of ammunition and the reserve artillery under my charge, and which would be the first thing to see to. There were some very heavy guns left behind at Westminster. All wagons and supply trains of every kind, including large portions of the medical wagons, were left behind, so that there should be as little to cumber the roads as possible. But it was necessary to bring up the artillery, and with that very large trains of ammunition,

My facilities for knowing of any orders relating to the general movements of troops not only were as good, but I suppose better than those of most others in one respect, because the movements of these trains were involved in any such orders. I had all the facilities that anybody about headquarters had.

Question. The same as the adjutant general?

Answer. No, sir; not perhaps the same as those who *write* the orders; I refer to others than those who write the orders; an order might be lost on its way to me.

Question. Was it usual at that time, when special orders were sent to individual officers, to send copies to others whether they related to their action or not?

Answer. No, sir; only those that related to their action.

Question. Then your means of knowledge related only to such general orders as were issued to officers of your grade, and such special orders as related particularly to your arm of the service?

Answer. That is all; I mean to include officers of my position as well as grade.

Question. Do I understand you rightly, that you were not present at the council of war held on the night of the 2d of July?

Answer. I was not present at the time, though I was sent for.

Question. Nor were you present at the next council?

Answer. I was present at no council held there.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Will you give us an account of the important movements and operations of the army subsequent to the escape of Lee across the Potomac at Williamsport?

Answer. We moved down very much the same route as we had done the year before, taking possession of the different gaps. A portion of our force passed through Mahassas gap, and had an action near Front Royal, but found that the most of the enemy had passed on and gone down in advance of us to Warrenton, near which place we encamped until somewhere about the beginning of September, I think, when we moved across the Rappahannock and took possession of Culpeper and beyond, nearly, if not quite, to the Rapidan. Some time early in October, about the 8th or 10th, the enemy crossed the Rappahannock, turning our right, making for Warrenton, and we fell back across the Rappahannock. The next day Buford's cavalry, supported by Sedgwick's infantry, recrossed the Rappahannock and drove the enemy back, what was there, not a very large force. We then continued our movement to Centreville, the 2d corps having quite an action at Bristow Station. The enemy declined to attack, and, withdrawing, we followed them and resumed our old positions on the north of the Rappahannock. Afterwards, in the beginning of November, we again crossed the Rappahannock at Rappahannock Station and Kelly's ford, and resumed very nearly the positions there we had occupied before. In the latter part of November the army crossed the Rapidan at Germania ford, Jacobs's ford, and Ely's ford, and moved through the Wilderness, up to what is called Mine run. General French, on the right, was attacked on his march, and prevented from effecting a junction with Warren's corps, which was in the centre, and so postponed the attack upon the enemy for nearly, if not quite, all the time in which an attack was practicable.

A day or two was spent after Sedgwick's corps and French's corps came up in examining the ground and the position of the troops. The enemy made his lines so strong that it became very imprudent, in the judgment of some of those who examined them closely, to attack. However, an attack was resolved on, and on the morning of the day on which it was to have been made, an order was given to attack at 8 o'clock, the signal of which was to be a cannonade from



our right, which I was directed to open, with a view to clear Sedgwick's point of attack from the enemy. The cannonade commenced, and was proceeding very satisfactorily, when I received orders to cease firing. I proceeded then to headquarters, and asked the meaning of it. I was told by General Meade, or by General Humphreys, that the attack had been suspended on account of reports from our extreme left, under General Warren.

We remained in that position that day, and on the night of the next day we withdrew to our old positions on the north of the Rapidan.

Question. Do you know how the force of the enemy compared with ours from the time we crossed the Rappahannock down to the present time?

Answer. I do not. I have always understood that we were superior in numbers; that is, I have heard them estimated from 40,000 to 60,000, sometimes 70,000.

Question. Their forces during that time?

Answer. Yes, sir, I have heard this since Longstreet's command left.

Question. Do you know how their force compared with ours at the time they advanced, and we fell back to Centreville?

Answer. I do not know. I have never got any information that I could consider very reliable; but I was under the impression that we outnumbered them.

Question. Was there not during the movement back to Centreville any opportunity for us to have taken the aggressive, and made an attack upon the enemy, with a reasonable prospect of success?

Answer. I think we might have taken the initiative, and moved over across his line of movement towards Warrenton, so far as I could see.

Question. Do you know whether that was ever contemplated by the general commanding?

Answer. I do not think he ever contemplated it; I do not know whether he considered it or not. There might have been other things to have caused him to decide otherwise. Two or three different courses, I think, might have been followed; we might have made a stand at any position. The object of the enemy, probably, was to turn us and get possession of Centreville, and compel us to attack him in a very advantageous position to himself. If that was the case, and the general commanding felt that he could not be certain of the success of other movements, it would be better policy for him to fall back to Centreville, and take possession of it himself. In fine, any one of half a dozen things might have been done, and the commanding general, I suppose, chose the one which, in his judgment, was, under the circumstances, the best.

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*Testimony of Major General John Sedgwick.*

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1864.

Major General JOHN SEDGWICK sworn and examined.

[See testimony—"Army of the Potomac—General Hooker."]

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Were you connected with the army of the Potomac at the time General Meade assumed the command?

Answer. I was.

Question. Will you give us an account of the operations of the army from that time forward until General Lee recrossed the Potomac?

Answer. I do not know that I can give a detailed account of it, except so far as my own corps was concerned. Frequently the corps were separated for long distances, and I did not know the positions of the other corps.

Question. Give us an account of that which came under your own observation.

Answer. On the night of the 1st of July my corps was at Manchester, about thirty miles from the field of Gettysburg. About 7 o'clock that night I received orders from General Meade to march for Taneytown, which at that time was his headquarters. After proceeding about seven or eight miles, I received another order to make a forward march to Gettysburg, and I immediately commenced the movement. I arrived at Gettysburg about 2 o'clock on the afternoon of the 2d of July, having marched thirty-five miles from 7 o'clock the evening previous. I received on the way frequent messages from General Meade to push forward my corps as rapidly as possible, as a battle was imminent, and it was important I should be there. I received no less than three messages by his aids, urging me on. I arrived on the field, as I have said, about 2 o'clock.

I immediately reported to General Meade's headquarters, but found that he had gone out to the position of the 3d corps, and I waited until his return, a few minutes, to see him; for I knew nothing about the dispositions of the troops at that time. General Meade said that he had been out to the front; that General Sickles had not taken the position he had directed, but had moved out from a quarter to three-quarters of a mile in advance. I asked General Meade why he had not ordered him back. He replied that it was then too late; that the enemy had opened the battle.

I received my orders from him, and returned to my corps to carry them into execution. The orders were to take a position near the left of the line, between the 5th and 3d corps. But General Sickles, in the mean time, had been forced back, leaving an opening that was filled up by, I think, a portion of the 5th corps. A portion of my corps went in and occupied the position the 5th corps had left. We arrived there just in time to throw two brigades into line of battle and assist in checking and repulsing the enemy.

My corps did not take any important part in the battle of Gettysburg. It was frequently sent to different parts of the field to re-enforce and support other troops that were more vigorously engaged.

On the morning of the 5th, as soon as it was ascertained that the enemy were retreating, I was ordered with my corps in pursuit, and pursued them as far as Fairfield, perhaps eight miles, when I was recalled, and joined the rest of the army in its movement.

Question. Were you present at any councils of war at Gettysburg?

Answer. Yes, sir; at two.

Question. Please state at what councils you were present, and what was done in those councils.

Answer. I think the first council was on the 2d of July, at night. The question submitted, I believe, was, whether we should attack the enemy, or wait in position and receive an attack. The decision was pretty much unanimous that we should receive the attack.

Question. Were you present at any other council there?

Answer. I think there was one on the evening of the 4th of July, in which the question was whether we should pursue the enemy directly, or move in a parallel line and endeavor to cut him off, or attack him. I believe the council were unanimous to move on a parallel line.

Question. When the enemy had been finally repulsed, on the 3d of July, why was he not immediately pursued and attacked by our army?

Answer. He held a very strong position. I presume he was with equal force to our own. I do not think it would have been expedient to have attacked him. I think that was pretty much the opinion of most of the general officers present there.

Question. Can you tell how many men we had who could have participated in an attack at that time?

Answer. I think our army numbered 55,000 infantry, and perhaps 12,000 or 15,000 cavalry and artillery; that included our whole force. Of course, they were, most of them, available.

Question. Do you think the enemy had that number of effective men after that final repulse?

Answer. I believe they had; and that was the general opinion.

Question. Have you any knowledge of the preparation of any order for the withdrawal of the army at any time during the battle of Gettysburg, or the retreat of the army from the position it then held?

Answer. I never heard of any such order until within the last four weeks; and when I first heard it I denied most positively that any such order could have been given. I was the second in command there, and reported to General Meade at a critical time; and if he contemplated so important a move, he would have informed me. Besides, his urging my corps forward shows that he intended to fight the battle there. General Meade undoubtedly was apprehensive that the enemy might turn his flank; and in that event he would have had to take up a new position; but I do not think he ever contemplated any retreat.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Had it been the intention of the commanding general to retreat the army, was not the order to you to come up in direct conflict with any such intended movement?

Answer. It certainly was. In the course of the night of the 1st and the morning of the 2d of July I received no less than three verbal messages from him to hurry up with all possible despatch.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. Where was your corps stationed during the battle of the third day, relative to the point of attack, for instance?

Answer. I had two brigades stationed between two divisions of the 5th corps, on the left of the point of attack as we faced the enemy. I had three brigades on the left of the Round Top, beyond the divisions of the 5th corps of which I have spoken. My other brigades were detached to different parts of the field in support of troops actively engaged.

Question. You had five brigades of yours convenient to the point of attack?

Answer. Yes, sir, in close vicinity.

Question. The 5th corps was there?

Answer. The 5th corps occupied the Round Top, and to the right.

Question. What troops occupied the valley to the right of Round Top, where the enemy made their assault?

Answer. A portion of the 5th corps, two brigades of my corps, the 3d and 2d corps, commanded by Gen. Hancock.

Question. The enemy made their assault there about 2 or 3 o'clock on the evening of the 3d, and that assault was repulsed?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. In what condition did that repulse leave the artillery of the enemy at that time?

Answer. I have no means of knowing; I was not on that part of the field.

Question. You do not know the condition it was left in?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Did you receive any orders that evening to pursue the enemy after they were repulsed?

Answer. I did not receive any.

Question. Do you know whether General Sykes received any such orders?

Answer. My impression is that General Sykes was ordered to send out a strong reconnoitring party to ascertain if the enemy were retreating, or if he could force them to retreat.

Question. Was that order obeyed ?

Answer. It was. I was present with General Sykes when he gave the order, and was present when the troops returned. They met the enemy in considerable force, which checked them, and the force then returned.

Question. At what time in the evening did that force return ?

Answer. I cannot state with any certainty.

Question. Do you know at what point they met the enemy in force to check them ?

Answer. It was directly in front of the position which General Sykes occupied on the right of Round Top.

Question. After the assault had been repulsed, do you know any reason why General Sykes's corps could not have continued to drive the retreating enemy ?

Answer. I do. It is not likely that the whole of their forces were engaged in that assault, and that the troops General Sykes's forces met were no part of the assailing party, and were in such position as to check his troops.

Question. If I remember rightly, you said you were present when General Sykes gave the order to a part of his command to advance ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. At what time was that ?

Answer. I think it was soon after the attack, but I cannot remember the hour ; it might have been 4 o'clock—perhaps a little later.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Did those troops return before dark ?

Answer. I think they returned about dark. They had a very sharp skirmish ; I was in a position where I could see it.

Question. Will you state why the enemy was not attacked at Williamsport by our army ?

Answer. They occupied a very strong position there. I think they were at that time quite as strong as we were, for we had received no re-enforcements. In the council held there I voted against any attack, and my subsequent information confirmed me in the opinion that I was right in so voting : that the enemy occupied too strong a position for General Meade to attack.

Question. What subsequent information did you get ?

Answer. In passing over the ground they had occupied and seeing their works.

Question. You knew at that time that it was the intention of General Lee to cross his army over the Potomac, if possible ?

Answer. I presumed he had retreated to that point for that purpose.

Question. Did not the fact that he was intending to cross that river afford you a very favorable opportunity to attack him while he was in the act of crossing, and why was it that he was permitted to escape without being attacked ?

Answer. He occupied a very strong position in front of Williamsport, and he withdrew in the night. It certainly would have been very advantageous to have attacked him while he was withdrawing, but not while he was in position there. I believe if we had attacked him we would have received a severe repulse.

Question. Was it impossible to ascertain when he commenced the movement of his army across the Potomac ?

Answer. I do not know that it was impossible, but I think it was impracticable.

Question. Why so ?

Answer. We could not force his lines to ascertain what was behind him. I think we had information afterwards that he was two or three days in crossing over his sick and wounded, and bringing over supplies both of ammunition and rations.

Question. Bringing supplies over to the Maryland side ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; I think our information was that he at least received supplies of ammunition from the other side.

Question. Was it before or after it was possible for us to have made the attack that he received those supplies ?

Answer. During the time he was occupying that position. All the time he was lying there I think he was transporting his sick, and probably his baggage, to the Virginia side ; and the small number of boats he had to take them over brought back ammunition and probably other supplies.

Question. Could not an attack have been made upon him sufficient to ascertain his strength without endangering our forces ?

Answer. I scarcely know how to answer that question.

Question. I will say—without seriously endangering our forces ?

Answer. It is very difficult to withdraw troops after they have once become seriously engaged, without having them severely handled. I recollect the vote of the different officers composing the council of war regarding the attack.

Question. What was that vote ?

Answer. General Wadsworth represented General Newton, who was commanding the 1st corps. General Wadsworth voted for an attack ; General Howard also voted for an attack. Those were the only two corps commanders who did vote for it. The others all strongly opposed it. I think General Pleasonton, in command of the cavalry corps, voted for it ; and I believe General Meade expressed himself in favor of an attack, but of course he did not vote. He acquiesced in the decision of the council. Whether General Meade expressed himself so at the council or not I am not positive, but I am sure he did in conversation with me.

Question. What prevented our placing troops on the south side of the Potomac sufficient in number to so far impede the crossing of the enemy as to enable the main body of our army to attack him while making the crossing ?

Answer. I do not think that we had the troops ; but I think that as soon as possible bridges were laid at Harper's Ferry, and General Meade ordered all the cavalry, or at least such portion of it as he could spare, to cross over, and probably if he had other troops they would have been ordered over.

By Mr. Odell :

Question. In this council of war at Williamsport, where the question was discussed of attacking the enemy there, did or not this consideration enter into your deliberations—the exposed condition of Baltimore and the capital, should you attack and be repulsed ?

Answer. It did in mine, and I presume it did with the others.

Question. If you had been repulsed and defeated, was there any force between you and the capital that would have resisted the progress of the enemy ?

Answer. I know of none.

Question. Had you any evidence, at any time during or after the battle of Gettysburg, that the enemy were destitute of ammunition ?

Answer. No, sir ; I do not know of any. I did understand at Williamsport, while lying there, that the batteaux that crossed over their sick and wounded returned with ammunition ; I understood that from citizens of Williamsport, who resided there ; I heard it myself at the time.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Will you give us a concise account of the operations of the army subsequent to the crossing of Lee's army over the Potomac ? I do not desire a detailed statement of everything, but a concise account of such movements and operations as you deem of importance.

Answer. I have not thought of that matter much of late, and I have none of my papers with me.

MR. GOOCH.—You can then prepare such a statement and append it to your testimony, when the manuscript of what you have already given shall be submitted to you for revision.

Subsequently the witness furnished the committee the following :

Answer. After crossing the Potomac the army moved in the valley east of the Blue Ridge to the Rappahannock. In September, crossed the Rappahannock and moved to the Rapidan. About October 10 the enemy crossed the Rapidan on the right and moved to gain our rear. The army fell back and recrossed the Rappahannock. The movement of the enemy continuing, the army retired and took position on the heights of Centreville to receive attack. No attack was made. The army again advanced on the 19th of October and reoccupied the line of the Rappahannock. On the 7th of November the passage of the Rappahannock was forced at two points, and the enemy retired behind the Rapidan. On the 26th of November the army crossed the Rapidan at Germania and Jacobs's fords in two columns. The enemy was encountered by the advance of the right column at Locust Grove; a partial engagement ensued. The enemy abandoned the field during the night. The next day the army was concentrated and moved forward, and found the enemy occupying a strong position on Mine run. Early the following morning General Warren moved with a portion of the army to gain the enemy's right, and during the ensuing night I was ordered with the 5th and 6th corps to move to the right for the purpose of turning and attacking the enemy's left. It was ascertained that the position in front of General Warren was too strong to be attacked with reasonable hope of success. The condition of the weather and our supplies rendered further delay exceedingly hazardous, and the army recrossed the Rapidan, and resumed its former position between the two rivers. On the 6th of February, 1864, in obedience to orders from Washington, another crossing of the Rapidan was made for the purpose of creating a diversion in favor of a movement to be made by General Butler on Richmond. A portion of one corps was thrown across, forcing the passage with a loss of about 250 men, and held the opposite bank until the time fixed for the termination of General Butler's movement. The troops then returned to their former camps, where they have since remained.

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*Testimony of Brigadier General Seth Williams.*

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1864.

Brigadier General SETH WILLIAMS sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your present rank and position in the army ?

Answer. I am a lieutenant colonel in the adjutant general's department of the regular army, a brigadier general in the volunteer service, and at present on duty as assistant adjutant general of the army of the Potomac.

Question. How long have you been connected with the army of the Potomac ?

Answer. Since its organization.

Question. You are now on the staff of General Meade ?

Answer. Yes, sir. During the time General Burnside was in command I was inspector general of the adjutant general's department.

Question. We have been inquiring into the administration of that army from the time General Meade took command until the present time, and we desire your account of what took place under your observation. In the first place, I will ask what do you know in regard to the plan of the battle of Gettysburg ?

Answer. I think when General Meade took command of the army his first idea was to move in the direction of the Susquehanna, supposing that he would there find the army of General Lee. But subsequent information induced him to move towards Gettysburg, and he put the army in motion in that direction.

Question. There has been a great deal said as to what General Meade's intentions and purposes were, and what dispositions of troops he intended to make, and whether he intended to fight the battle where it was fought or somewhere else. I do not know whether it is very material, but such questions have been made. What do you know in regard to those points?

Answer. I think that as soon as General Meade heard that the enemy was moving in the direction of Gettysburg, and as soon as he learned the general result of the engagement on the 1st of July in front of Gettysburg, and the character of the ground at Gettysburg, he made up his mind to fight the battle at that place, and he concentrated the army there with all possible rapidity. I think his orders were all in accordance with that idea.

Question. Have you now, with you, any of the orders that were issued on that battle-field?

Answer. No, sir; I did not bring them. I did not know that the committee desired to have them.

Question. We told General Meade that we desired you to bring with you all the papers relating to that battle. How happened it that the battle took place where it did?

Answer. I do not think that either General Lee or General Meade had at first any idea as to where the battle would be fought. I think General Meade was desirous to bring on the battle at the earliest possible moment, and with as much advantage to himself, of course, as might be attainable. He learned that the position at Gettysburg was a good position for a battle, and he assembled his troops and put them in position there, designing to fight the battle out at that place.

Question. Do you not consider that the ground on which that battle was fought was well chosen?

Answer. Remarkably well chosen.

Question. What do you know about the disposition of General Sickles's corps there?

Answer. Of my personal knowledge I know nothing. I only know what I heard at the time and what I have heard since, that General Sickles did not assume the exact position which General Meade designed he should take up, but extended his left considerably in advance of the ground it was intended he should occupy. I was not on that part of the field, and do not personally know anything about the disposition made of the third corps.

Question. You were with General Meade during the battle?

Answer. I was with him at the field headquarters, but did not always accompany him to the front, and was generally left at headquarters to prepare and send out orders and instructions, as well as to receive and dispose of communications addressed to me by the different commanders. On the third day I was with General Meade on the field a considerable portion of the time.

Question. Is there anything pertaining to that battle in any part of the field that you would be likely to know that he did not see or know?

Answer. I think not. I was not over the field except when with him; my duties required me to be at the field headquarters for the most part.

Question. Were you there when the final charge was made by the enemy on the third day?

Answer. I was at the field headquarters a part of the time, and a part of the time with General Meade as he rode along the line.

Question. Do you know anything about an order on the 2d of July to withdraw the army?

Answer. The orders for the movements of the army, under the present arrangement, are generally prepared by the chief of staff, and the manuscripts of the orders are turned over to me to have copies prepared for those to whom they are to be distributed, and I am held responsible that the orders are correctly

copied, and that they are delivered to the persons for whom they are intended. In regard to the order of the 2d of July, to the best of my recollection and belief, the chief of staff either handed to me or to my clerk an order looking to a contingency which possibly might happen of the army being compelled to assume a new position. To the best of my belief such an order was prepared, and I presume it may have been signed by me, and possibly the copies may have been prepared for the corps and other commanders. Orders of such a character are usually made out in manifold in order to save time. The particular order in question, however, was never distributed; no vestige of it is to be found among any of the records of my office, and it must have been destroyed within a day or two after it was prepared. I have no reason to suppose, other than the fact that the order was given to me or my clerk by the chief of staff, that General Meade had any knowledge of it. It was not for me to look beyond the orders of the chief of staff. Whether or not a copy of that order was given to Major General Butterfield, who was then acting as chief of staff, I am unable to say, and I cannot certainly state whether the rough draught was ever handed back to him. I only know that there is nothing in relation to that order to be found among the records in my charge. The order was never recorded, or issued in any sense. I do not now remember the exact tenor of the order, but to the best of my belief it was an order which, if carried out, would have involved a retrograde movement of the army.

Question. What was the condition of our troops after the battle ended on the third day there?

Answer. So far as I could see, the troops were in an efficient condition, although our losses had been very heavy.

Question. I mean in what spirits were our troops?

Answer. The troops were in fine spirits as far as I had an opportunity of observing.

Question. At what time on the third day did it become known that the enemy were retreating?

Answer. I do not think it was exactly known at all during that day that the enemy was actually on the retreat. The enemy had fallen back to the woods from which he emerged when he made the attack. I do not think it was until the next morning and along in the forenoon that we were certain he had abandoned his position.

Question. What is your opinion as a military man? Ought our army to have advanced or not as soon as it was ascertained the enemy were retreating?

Answer. I think that as soon as we found out certainly what direction the enemy had taken, orders to march were given for the purpose of coming up with him again by the way of the South Mountain passes.

Question. After the army had reached Williamsport, what was the reason that a general attack was not ordered before the enemy recrossed the Potomac?

Answer. I was not present at any of the consultations that General Meade had with his chief of staff or with his corps commanders, and I am unable to say what influenced his action on that occasion.

Question. You have been a long time in the service. As a military man, what is your opinion as to whether the enemy should have been attacked before they recrossed the river?

Answer. Inasmuch as I did not see the ground at the time, I do not think my opinion would be entitled to the same weight as the opinion of those who did see it. From what I have heard I think the enemy had a very strong position indeed, and that it is doubtful whether we could possibly have carried it. I was not at the extreme front, but I have always understood that the position held by the enemy was naturally a very strong one, and that an attack upon it, when fortified, would be by no means certain of success.



Question. Have you the custody of the despatches and orders written and issued during that period?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Where are they now?

Answer. The most of the papers are in an office we have in this city.

Question. Would they throw any light upon any of these subjects?

Answer. I think General Meade has already handed to the committee the most of the papers they would desire to have. He certainly has had me make copies of the most essential papers.

Question. If you think of anything else in regard to that battle and campaign which will throw any light upon the subject, will you please state it?

Answer. I have not much personal knowledge respecting the plan of the campaign and its principal operations, except what I have derived from the orders and instructions issued as they have passed through my hands. I think General Meade's intention, after assuming command of the army, was to fight a battle as soon as possible, and he moved the army with great rapidity, and, as I supposed, with that object in view. His design was to bring on a battle, but at the same time to gain for himself, of course, what advantage he could in the way of position, presuming the enemy to be equal or a little superior to himself in effective force.

Question. The understanding was that the troops of the enemy were equal in numbers to ours?

Answer. Yes, sir, I think so. I think it was supposed that, numerically, he was a little stronger than we were.

Question. What was the reason that before that battle our army was not strengthened by the troops around Washington, Baltimore, &c?

Answer. I am unable to say; I have no idea as to the reasons that controlled the authorities in the matter.

Question. Do you know whether that subject was ever mooted among the officers?

Answer. I think the impression was that it was one of those occasions when all troops that could possibly be spared from other points should be sent to the army. When the army crossed the Potomac there was some little anxiety as to where the battle would be fought and how re-enforcements could be forwarded. I think General Meade himself expected to fight the battle somewhere on the Susquehanna or in that direction.

Question. You continued with our army after the enemy recrossed the Potomac until our army went to Culpeper?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And were with our army when it retreated from Culpeper back to Centreville?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was the cause of that retreat as you understood it?

Answer. General Meade received information that led him to suppose that the enemy was moving to turn his position at Culpeper, and he fell back in order to place himself between the confederate army and Washington; and it was his design, on finding himself in that position, to then fight the enemy wherever he could do so to advantage.

Question. Have you any knowledge of the strength of Lee's army at that time?

Answer. I have not. I have been under the impression that the fighting portion of his army was nearly equal to that of our own army.

Question. Do you know what the strength of our army was at that time?

Answer. I do not remember what it was at that particular time. The strength of the army varies from month to month.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Did you have any conference whatever with General Meade, at any time during the operations at Gettysburg, in relation to an order for a withdrawal of the army from that place ?

Answer. No, sir, none at all. I have very good reason to suppose that General Meade knew nothing of the existence of such an order.

Question. Why did you suppose that ?

Answer. I think all his actions that day lead irresistibly to the conclusion that he intended to fight at Gettysburg, because the 6th corps, some distance in the rear, was hurried up, orders were repeatedly sent to the commander of the corps to move up as rapidly as possible, and all of General Meade's arrangements looked to fighting the battle in the position in which it was finally fought.

Question. When you received the order and had the copies prepared, were you instructed at that time not to issue them ; or what would have been the regular course ?

Answer. To the best of my belief the chief of staff handed me or my clerk the manuscript of the order, with the understanding that no copies were to be sent out until I received further instructions from him, and I infer this from the fact that no copies of the order were sent out. The order was prepared a short time before the engagement on that day commenced. I only know such an order was in fact never issued.

By Mr. Odell :

Question. If General Meade had intended to have retired his army, would you have known it ?

Answer. I must have known it, because I should have seen the preparations going on around me—should have seen the ammunition and other trains sent to the rear ; and I should doubtless have had something to do with, or some knowledge of, the instructions issued for such a movement.

Question. Would he have ordered his troops to come forward ?

Answer. I should suppose not, because he would have been blocking up the road. I have no idea that he could for a moment have entertained the idea of withdrawing, except as a last extremity. I think if he gave any orders it was that the country might be explored for the purpose of ascertaining in what direction the army should fall back in case we were compelled to do so. All that I saw led me to believe that General Meade fully intended to fight the battle at Gettysburg.

Question. Was it not the part of a prudent commander to ascertain the avenues of retreat in case of disaster ?

Answer. In my opinion it would have been his duty as a skilful commander to prepare to meet every contingency that might happen, and to gain all the information with respect to the country that he might be able to obtain, so that in the event of the occurrence of the alternative of a disaster the army might move in the direction determined upon without any confusion. I have no reason to suppose that General Meade expected a reverse.

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*Testimony of Brigadier General S. W. Crawford.*

APRIL 27, 1864.

Brigadier General S. W. CRAWFORD sworn and examined.

By Mr. Loan :

Question. General, will you state what your present employment is ; if you are in the army ; what your rank is, and what command you are connected with ?

Answer. I am a brigadier general of volunteers, in command of the third division, 5th army corps. I have been in command of that division since last April.

Question. Go on, now, in a narrative form, and state what you know of the battle of Gettysburg; how you got to the field, and what occurred there.

Answer. I was ordered to join the army of the Potomac from the defences of Washington, and I carried along two brigades of the division, the first and third; the second, though placed under my orders, was detailed at the solicitation of the authorities in Alexandria, General Slough refusing to allow the colonel commanding that brigade to obey the orders I had sent him to join me on the Leesburg turnpike. I marched forward and crossed the Potomac at Edwards's ferry the following day. I received, in crossing the Potomac, orders to report to the 5th corps, General Meade commanding. I joined the army of the Potomac on June 28, 1863, at Frederick, Maryland, when General Meade had assumed command of the whole army. We lay for two days at Frederick, and the whole army was placed in motion. I was in the rear division of the corps, and on the evening of the 1st of July I marched through Hanover and along the road through McSherrystown, marching until between two and three o'clock in the morning, and bivouacked at a town called Brushtown; and before dawn on Thursday, the 2d of July, a staff officer of General Sykes, then commanding the corps, rode to my headquarters and directed me to march my men, without giving them any coffee, at once to the field. I placed the column in motion and arrived before noon in the rear of the other divisions of the corps. They were on a spot called Wolf's hill, near Rock creek, and to the left of the Baltimore and Gettysburg turnpike, in rear of the order of battle, behind the first and second divisions of the 5th corps. I there rested my men. About twelve o'clock I received an order from General Sykes, stating that I was to go to the field with my division at three o'clock, and that a staff officer would come to indicate to me the road to the field of battle—that part of it to which he wished me to go with my division. My division was to follow the second division of regulars. At three o'clock, no staff officer having reported to me, I placed the column in motion; went to the left around Wolf's hill, and struck a road running along the woods. The regular division were marching on my left, but were suddenly halted and marched to the right. As this did not lead towards the field of battle, in my judgment, I did not follow, expecting the officer to arrive who would show me the proper place to go. At this moment an officer arrived, very much excited; pointed over in the direction of some hills, which were directly in my front, and said that the enemy were attacking those hills; that it was most important to hold them, and that the troops there were in need of assistance. I asked him who he was. He said he was Captain Moore, of General Meade's staff. I said to him, "Very well, that is sufficient authority for me. If you give me General Meade's order I will go at once, if you will show me the direction. I am expecting an officer from General Sykes's staff, who commands the corps, to show me the way he wishes the division to go; but if you give me General Meade's order I will go at once." He said, "I cannot give you General Meade's order." I said, "There are some general officers to my right. General Slocum is there, commanding the 12th corps. Bring me his order, and I will go."

He galloped down the road, and in a few minutes returned with the order from General Slocum. I moved the column rapidly with him, and arrived in a few moments on the field. I crossed the Taneytown road, on a cross-road running from it to the Emmettsburg road, and to the right of Little Round Top. I rode at once and reported to General Sykes. He said to me he was gratified to see I was so promptly upon the field, and that the other division had just come up. He directed me to mass my command in a field of scrub oak, to the right, and hold them in readiness for any movement. Before I could complete the movement I received an order from him to move to the left, across this

cross-road that runs from Emmetsburg to the Taneytown road, and there to support our men, in case they were compelled to fall back. I crossed the road and formed my division on the slope of Little Round Top, to the right of the summit. The movement was scarcely completed before I received another order from General Sykes, directing me to send a brigade to my left and rear, to the support of a brigade of Barnes's division, which had demanded re-enforcements. I detached the 3d brigade, under Colonel J. W. Fisher, consisting of five regiments, and gave him the order to go at once to report to the officer commanding that brigade. At this moment the firing was exceedingly heavy in our front; some of my men had fallen. I heard the cheers of the enemy, and looking in front, across a low ground, I saw our men retreating in confusion; fugitives were flying across in every direction; some of them rushed through my lines. I then ordered one of the regiments that belonged to Fisher's brigade, which had not yet marched to the left, to remain with McCandless, of the 1st brigade. The plain in front was covered with the flying men. The regular division had marched out past my left flank. A wheat field lay between two masses of woods directly in my front. A stone wall skirted these roads from right to left. The enemy in masses were coming across this wheat field, having driven everything before them. Their line of skirmishers had crossed the stone wall, and their column was coming across the low ground towards the hills upon which we stood. I ordered an immediate charge upon the enemy by the whole division. The division moved forward at once; two volleys were fired, when the whole command started at a double quick. We met the enemy on the low ground, drove them back to the stone wall, for the possession of which there was a short struggle, and at which two regiments, which had been massed on the flanks of the line, were deployed, drove the enemy through the woods and over the wheat field, over to the ridge beyond. The line was there permanently established. I sent back to General Sykes and begged him to send me supports; that I had advanced far ahead of our line and driven the enemy back, and that I needed support. He said he had none to send. I returned myself at a later period, and again asked him for supports. He said he would wait until morning, and if he then saw fit he would send them. At this moment I met an aid from Colonel Rice, who succeeded to the command of Vincent's brigade, and to whom the regiments of Fisher's brigade had been sent. He said he came from Colonel Rice to say that a hill in his front was yet unoccupied by our troops, and he wanted to occupy it. I asked him who Colonel Rice was. He replied that he was with those troops on that hill, pointing to Little Round Top hill. I told him I was going there. On my way I met an aid of Colonel Fisher, who stated that the hill was occupied by the enemy, not in great force, and representing the necessity of taking it. I rode at once to the summit of Little Round Top, where I met Colonel Fisher, and asked him in regard to this. He informed me that the enemy was at the hill in advance, which is the main top; that he could hear him moving about up there, and that he would like permission to move up his regiments there and take it. It was of vital importance to take this hill. I directed Colonel Fisher to take two of his regiments and deploy a line of skirmishers, and move up and occupy the hill. He replied that Colonel Rice desired to co-operate with him in the movement. I told him I had no objection, but to move up the hill at once, before it got any darker. I then rode back to my command.

Question. Where did you remain on Thursday night?

Answer. I was in advance of Little Round Top with the command that had carried the wheat field.

Question. Did Colonel Fisher take the main Round Top that night?

Answer. Fisher remained there that night.

Question. Your command lay on the ridge where they crossed the wheat field?

Answer. They lay in advance of the stone wall. I had driven the enemy back, and the left of our line was secure.

Colonel Fisher reported to me that he deployed the 20th Maine in his front as skirmishers, and moved up with the 5th and 12th regiments to occupy the Round Top. I found them on its summit in the morning.

Question. If I understand you rightly, your men were in advance at the stone wall, and Fisher occupied the Round Top?

Answer. Yes, sir. That was the relative position of the forces that night.

The command held its position all night. Bartlett's division of the 6th corps were, early on Friday morning, moved up in support of my advanced line. No attempt was made by the enemy on the extreme left during Friday. The prisoners taken belonged to Anderson's and McLaws's divisions of Longstreet's corps. On the afternoon of Friday General Meade came to the Little Round Top. He was accompanied by several general officers. He asked what command it was that was occupying the line of the stone wall. He was answered that it was my division. He directed General Sykes to order me to advance and clear the woods in my front; that if I found too strong a force I was not to engage them. I directed the command at once to advance. It consisted of McCandless's brigade, and one regiment of Fisher's brigade—the 11th of Fisher's brigade. Hardly had the men unmasked from the hill, before a battery of the enemy, stationed on a ridge beyond the wheat field, opened with grape and canister. I directed Colonel McCandless to deploy a strong body of skirmishers towards the battery, and discover whether there was any strong infantry support; if not, to advance with his command and take the battery. As soon as the skirmishers opened fire on the cannoneers, the battery limbered up and fled. I then formed a line and directed it to cross the wheat field and clear the woods. In doing this they came upon a brigade of Hood's division under General Anderson or General Bonham, composed of Georgia troops; they attacked them, capturing over 260 prisoners, the battle flag of the 15th Georgia, retaking nearly all the ground that had been lost, and over 7,000 stand of arms, besides one 12-pound Napoleon gun and three caissons, and all the wounded, which had lain entirely uncared for. We permanently held that line. Hood's division was driven entirely off for a mile distance.

Question. What time during the day was this on Friday?

Answer. Towards evening.

Question. Will you state about the time that General Meade directed you to make this charge?

Answer. It was about half past four or five o'clock.

Question. You had remained, then, from the night before, up until about five o'clock, holding that position, without any orders to change?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. State what was your relative position to that of General Hancock, of the 2d corps, on Friday.

Answer. General Hancock was on my right; how far I do not know.

Question. Who was on your immediate right, between you and Hancock?

Answer. The 6th corps, I think. There were so many that came and changed again that I cannot say positively.

Question. During Friday while you were lying at the stone wall, can you tell who it was that was on your immediate right in the direction of our line of battle?

Answer. I think I was next to Hancock's corps, though I believe I saw Newton there, and I think a fragment of the 1st corps was there.

Question. Where was Sedgwick's corps?

Answer. In my rear, in the rear of the Round Tops, in rear of the line of battle entirely.

Question. Did you see that charge made upon the 2d corps?

Answer. I witnessed it. It was made upon Hancock's corps.

Question. State if, while in your position, you were in advance of the line of battle, relatively, to Hancock's position?

Answer. I was in advance of Hancock's position. I was on the right flank of the charging line of Pickett when making the charge upon Hancock's corps; but I was some distance from it, so as to leave a space of considerable extent between us. The enemy left a gap between Hood's division and a division on his left.

Question. What time was it that Hancock repulsed that charge on Friday?

Answer. That was about noon, or a little after it. There had been a terrible bombardment all day, and the enemy moved immediately after it.

Question. After that repulse what prevented the 5th and 6th corps following up the enemy?

Answer. the repulse at night?

Question. After that on Friday. After the repulse of the charge on Hancock's command, I understand they were repulsed?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Now, if I understand, Sedgwick was in your rear. What was to prevent the unemployed men of the 5th and 6th corps being thrown right on the retreating enemy?

Answer. Nothing at all, that I know of.

Question. What was the condition of their artillery at the time of their repulse? If I understand it, they had massed their artillery there, and had opened a very heavy bombardment on our lines, and after firing for an hour or so they organized this assaulting column and made this charge. In what condition did it leave their artillery as regards supports, and what prevented its capture?

Answer. I do not know.

Question. Can you tell whether there were supports for that artillery?

Answer. I cannot. They opened 140 or 150 pieces, I think. It was as heavy a bombardment as I ever saw except that at Fort Sumter.

Question. You know of nothing to prevent the unemployed portion of the 5th and 6th corps from pursuing the broken columns of Pickett's division?

Answer. There was nothing, to my knowledge, to prevent it.

Question. What further occurred?

Answer. I remained on the field all that night, holding this advanced line. The enemy made no further demonstrations. The next morning their picket line was there quite close to us. On the morning of Saturday a reconnoissance was ordered, which consisted of the regular division and some supports. They advanced a short distance beyond my line, developed the enemy's line of battle, and returned.

Question. Where was that line of battle found on Saturday morning?

Answer. I cannot say. I did not go with them, but Colonel Day, who made the reconnoissance, told me that the enemy were there.

Question. Did you ascertain why they were not attacked the next morning?

Answer. No, sir, I did not.

Question. What time did Lee's retreat commence?

Answer. On the morning of Sunday I was ordered to advance my picket line, and to find the position of the enemy. The picket lines on my right and left were also ordered to advance. I crossed the ground in front of the Round Tops and advanced beyond my position on the ground that we had held, and across the fields towards the ridge where the enemy had intrenched himself on Friday night. My men there took some prisoners, one or two, who had been left behind in the enemy's retreat. At two o'clock on Sunday morning they left that part of the line, according to the statement of the prisoners.

At what time was pursuit made by your command?

Answer. Immediately after the reports were received that no enemy could be

found, Sedgwick's corps was thrown at once to the front, and marched to the Emmettsburg road.

Question. What time was that?

Answer. I advanced the picket line at half past 8 o'clock, in connexion with the line on my right and left. I advanced to the enemy's position and found that he had retreated.

Question. At what hour was it that you arrived at the enemy's position, and found he had retreated?

Answer. About 9 o'clock I arrived at the enemy's intrenchments and found that he had entirely gone. I sent back word immediately, and reported it to General Sykes.

Question. About what hour in the day was it that Sedgwick's command moved in pursuit?

Answer. About 11 o'clock.

Question. Do you know anything about the pursuit?

Answer. I do not; I heard his guns soon after, and I reported to General Sykes. When I made the report to General Sykes that I had taken Round Top on Thursday evening, he did not understand where the locality was, and its position was subsequently explained to him by one of my staff officers by means of a diagram. The whole army then moved in pursuit of the enemy. We met the enemy in the neighborhood of Williamsport. The enemy immediately in my front had intrenched themselves strongly. The 5th corps were moved to the left, which brought us down to near the Hagerstown pike, and that force moved to the left, which brought us down in front of St. Mary's college. We were ordered to remain in line of battle and hold ourselves in readiness at any moment to move. The pickets were quite close, and the enemy distinctly visible.

Question. You say you found the enemy strongly intrenched at Williamsport?

Answer. Yes, sir, and he appeared to be so at every part of his lines, and could be very easily seen, at any place, digging.

In the night of July 13 I received an order from Major General Sykes, enclosing to me an order of General Meade, requiring a reconnoissance in force to be made of four divisions of the army. My division was selected from my corps. I was ordered to advance at 7 o'clock the following morning to drive in the enemy's pickets, to drive in the supports, and develop their line of battle. If strongly posted, or in great force, I was to await support before attacking. I moved precisely at the hour indicated. The division of the 6th corps, under Brigadier General Wright, was on my right. The division of the 2d corps was on my left, under Brigadier General Caldwell; and a division of the 12th corps, under Brigadier General Williams, was on its left. We advanced and found the enemy had retreated. I advanced towards his fortifications, which were very strong. The whole position had been selected with great care. I found some negroes, who told me that the enemy had retreated at 7 o'clock the night before. I reported at once to General Sykes that the enemy had retreated. I advanced my division over the Williamsport and Boonsborough road, when I received a message from the cavalry in my front, that a large body of infantry had not yet crossed the river. I pushed on my whole division at once, came up with Buford's cavalry, and in conference with that general found that the enemy had entirely crossed, and had taken up the bridge. The cavalry fight had taken place during my march. Finding that he was not in need of support, and the enemy had retreated, I returned.

Question. What prevented taking him as he was crossing the river?

Answer. Night, and the uncertainty as to when the movement was made.

Question. Which battle of Fredericksburg were you at?

Answer. I was wounded at Antietam. I was not at Chancellorsville. I have not been at any defeats of the army.

*Testimony of Brigadier General M. R. Patrick.*WASHINGTON, *February 1, 1865.*

Brigadier General M. R. PATRICK sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. I am a brigadier general. Since about the 1st of November, 1862, I have been Provost Marshal General of the army of the Potomac; and since the armies have come together here I have been Provost Marshal General of the armies operating against Richmond, including the armies of the Potomac and the James, and the army of Sheridan partially.

Question. Were you with the army of the Potomac at the time it advanced, under General Meade, to Mine run, something over a year ago?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. To what do you attribute the failure of that expedition?

Answer. Two or three causes. As I understood at the time, the order was given for the 3d corps to move at a certain hour, at daylight, I believe; but I will not undertake to specify the hour exactly. It was delayed a long time. At the time when I supposed the division of the 3d corps, commanded by General Prince, should have been at Jacobs's ford, I passed it some miles from there. As I understood, it subsequently lost its way—did not take the right road. When I reached Germania, where I overtook General Meade, I found that the movement there was delayed because the movement above was not perfect; that seemed to be the first cause. After the 3d corps crossed the river, they again lost their way. One of my guides, who subsequently died of wounds received in the Dahlgren expedition, told me that when he went to General French he was far off the road, and it took him a long time to get back again. These delays of the 3d corps, it was believed at the time, were mainly the causes of the failure.

Question. Who commanded that corps at that time?

Answer. General French.

Question. You say the reason of the delay was losing their way?

Answer. General Prince lost his way. My guide informed me of the road on which General French was after having crossed the ford. It made a delay in getting into position the next morning, and caused our movements to be known to the enemy and provided for.

The most that I know beyond that is what General Meade himself told me in the confidence of a classmate. After our return he came to my tent very much depressed, and said that he was conscious that his head was off. He stayed with me for some time, and gave me more particulars than I had known before. But that was hearsay; I did not see it.

Question. To what did General Meade attribute the failure?

Answer. To start with, he attributed it to the failure of the 3d corps to take their proper position at the proper time, thus delaying the whole movement until the rebels were prepared to meet us. Then subsequently, after we were in position, towards the last of the movement, General Warren was deceived as to the position and strength of the enemy. Without having examined sufficiently, General Warren expressed his belief that he could carry the enemy's left, which led General Meade to give him some 25,000 troops—the exact number I do not remember—for that purpose, stripping the others, with orders to attack at a certain hour. A general attack all along the line was ordered at that hour, but General Warren, at the last moment, decided that the position was too strong; that he had been mistaken, and that, as the assault had been ordered on his representation, he would assume the responsibility of declining to make it, and



he notified General Meade that such was the case, and therefore the assault was not made.

We all felt, after this failure of General Warren—or rather not the failure, but his non-movement—that it was unwise to push further. The enemy had made themselves so strong, and we had got so far behind, that we could not do it without very great loss, and the roads had assumed such a character that we could not do it.

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## APPENDIX.

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GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 194. }

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Adjutant General's Office, Washington, June 27, 1863.*

By direction of the President, Major General Joseph Hooker is relieved from command of the army of the Potomac, and Major General George G. Meade is appointed to the command of that army and the troops temporarily assigned to duty with it.

By order of the Secretary of War :

E. D. TOWNSEND,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Official :

E. D. TOWNSEND,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

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GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 66. }

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*June 28, 1863.*

By direction of the President of the United States I hereby assume command of the army of the Potomac. As a soldier, in obeying this order—an order totally unexpected and unsolicited—I have no promises or pledges to make. The country looks to this army to relieve it from the devastation and disgrace of a hostile invasion. Whatever fatigues and sacrifices we may be called upon to undergo, let us have in view constantly the magnitude of the interests involved, and let each man determine to do his duty, leaving to an all-controlling Providence the decision of the contest. It is with just diffidence that I relieve in the command of this army an eminent and accomplished soldier, whose name must ever appear conspicuous in the history of its achievements, but I rely upon the hearty support of my companions in arms to assist me in the discharge of the duties of the important trust which has been confided to me.

GEORGE G. MEADE,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Official :

S. F. BARSTOW, *A. A. G.*

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[Telegram.—Received 10 a. m.]

FREDERICK, MD., *June 28, 1863.*

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

The order placing me in command of this army is received. As a soldier I obey it, and to the utmost of my ability will execute it. Totally unexpected as it has been, and in ignorance of the exact condition of the troops and position of the enemy, I can only now say that it appears to me I must move toward the Susquehanna, keeping Washington and Baltimore well covered, and if the enemy is checked in his attempt to cross the Susque-

hanna, or if he turns towards Baltimore, to give him battle. I would say that I trust that every available man that can be spared will be sent to me, as, from all accounts, the enemy is in strong force.

So soon as I can post myself up I will communicate more in detail.

GEORGE G. MEADE,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

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[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, June 28, 1863.*

Major General G. G. MEADE, *Army of the Potomac :*

I fully curcur in your general views as to the movements of your army. All available assistance will be given you. General Schenck's troops outside of the line of defences will move as you may direct. General Couch is also directed to co-operate with you, and to move his forces as you may order. It is most probable that Lee will concentrate his forces this side of the Susquehanna.

In regard to supplies of horses, &c., I send herewith a copy of a telegram to General Schenck on the 25th.

J. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 1 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

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[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., June 28, 1863.*

Major General Couch, *Harrisburg :*

You will co operate as far as possible with General G. G. Meade, who now commands the army of the Potomac, and who is authorized to assume the general command of all troops within the sphere of his operations. This authority embraces your command. Any information of enemy's movements in your vicinity will be immediately telegraphed to General Meade.

J. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

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[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., June 28, 1863.*

Major General MEADE, *Frederick :*

A brigade of Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry has crossed the Potomac near Seneca creek, and is making for the railroad to cut off your supplies. There is another brigade of rebel cavalry south of the Potomac which may follow. We have no cavalry here to operate against them. General Hooker carried away all of General Heintzelman's cavalry.

J. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 2 30 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 2 p. m., in cipher.]

FREDERICK, June 28, 1863.

Major General HALLECK :

Despatch received in relation to crossing of enemy's cavalry at Seneca creek. Have ordered two brigades and batteries to proceed at once in search and pursuit.

G. G. MEADE.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, April 8, 1865.

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., June 28, 1863.

Major General MEADE, *Frederick* :

It is reported here that the supplies at Edwards's ferry, and returning by the canal, are left unprotected. If so, Lee's cavalry will probably destroy them. It is reported that Lowell's battalion of cavalry, left at Poolesville, was sent to Sandy Hook, contrary to my orders. If so, there is not a cavalry picket on the line of the Potomac below Edwards's ferry, and we have none here to send out.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 2 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 11, 1865.

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major*, A. A. G.

[Telegram.—Received 2.20 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Frederick*, June 28, 1863—1 p. m.

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

Am I permitted, under existing circumstances, to withdraw a portion of the garrison at Harper's Ferry, providing I leave sufficient force to hold Maryland heights against a coup-de-main?

Reliable intelligence leads to the belief that Stuart has crossed at Williamsport, and is moving towards Hagerstown, in rear of Lee's army, and all accounts agree in giving Lee so large a force that I cannot believe he has left any considerable body on the south side of the Potomac. Please give me your views fully.

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, April 8, 1865.

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

[Telegram.—Received 2.50 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Frederick*, June 28, 1863—2 p. m.

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

To organize with efficiency the cavalry force now with this army I require three brigadier generals. General Pleasonton nominates Captain Farnsworth, 8th New York cavalry; Captain George A. Custar, 5th New York cavalry; Captain Wesley Merritt, 2d cavalry. Can these officers be appointed?

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, April 8, 1865.

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., June 28, 1863.*Major General MEADE, *Frederick* :

It is just reported that your train of one hundred and fifty wagons has been captured by Fitzhugh Lee near Rockville. Unless cavalry are sent to guard your communications with Washington they will be cut off. It is reported here that there is still a considerable rebel force south of the Potomac.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 3 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., June 28, 1863.*Major General MEADE, *Frederick* :

The garrison at Harper's ferry is under your orders. You can diminish or increase it as you think the circumstances justify.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 3.30 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Received 4 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Frederick, Md., June 28, 1863.*Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

I would recommend that General Schenck increase the force at Ellicott's Mills, with orders to hold that bridge, and also the Relay Junction, at all hazards. The 6th New York State militia were ordered to be returned to General Schenck from Monocacy bridge; also a section of artillery there. They should have started to-day.

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General*.

Official :

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 8, 1865.*D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received 4.55 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*June 28, 1863—3 p. m.*

Major General HALLECK :

Your despatch concerning capture of one hundred and fifty wagons received. Two brigades of cavalry, with artillery, had already been sent in pursuit of Lee. Colonel Lowell has been directed to return to Poolesville. Do you consider the information at all to be depended upon concerning a force of the enemy south of the Potomac? All our information here tends to show that Lee's entire army passed through Hagerstown, the rear passing yesterday morning.

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General*.

Official copy :

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 9, 1865.*D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received 6.05 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 28, 1863.

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

The following statement has been furnished me. It is confirmed by information gathered from various other sources regarded as reliable. I propose to move this army to-morrow in the direction of York :

"Thomas McCamron, blacksmith, a good man, from Hagerstown, left there on horse-back at 11 a. m. to-day. Rebel cavalry came first, a week ago last Monday, General Jenkins having 1,200 mounted infantry, said to be picked men from Jackson's men, and three or four hundred cavalry of his own. The cavalry went back and forth out of Pennsylvania, driving horses and cattle. The first infantry came yesterday a week ago—General Ewell's men; he came personally last Saturday, and was at the Catholic church, Sunday, with General Rhodes and two other generals. On Monday he left in the direction of Greencastle, in the afternoon, Rhodes having left the same morning. Rebel troops have passed every day, more or less, since, some days only three or four regiments or a brigade, and some days (yesterday, for instance) all of Longstreet's command passed through, except two brigades. Saw Longstreet yesterday; he and Lee had their headquarters at Mr. Grover's, just beyond town limits, towards Greencastle, last night, and left there this a. m. at 8 o'clock. Think A. P. Hill went through last Tuesday. Heard from James D. Roman, prominent lawyer and leading confederate sympathizer, who was talking in the clerk's office last night; said that their officers reported their whole army 100,000 strong, now in Maryland or Pennsylvania, except the cavalry. Mr. Logan, register of wills, and Mr. Preston, very fine men, in Hagerstown, have taken pains to count the rebels, and could not make them over 80,000. They counted the artillery; made it 275 guns. Some of the regiments have only 175 men; two that I saw, 150 men. Largest regiment that I saw was a Maryland regiment, and that was about 700; don't think their regiments would range 400. Great amount of transportation; great many wagons captured at Winchester; horses in good condition. Ewell rides in a wagon. Two thousand comprise the mounted infantry and cavalry. Saw Wilcox's brigade wagons yesterday or day before. Saw Kershaw's wagons in town yesterday. Kershaw's brigade is in McLaw's division, Longstreet's corps. Know Hood and Armstead; have passed through Hood's division and Armstead's brigade. Pickett's division is in Longstreet's corps. The Union men in Hagerstown would count them and meet at night. Officers and men in good condition; say they are going to Philadelphia. Lots of confederate money; carry it in flour barrels, and give \$5 for cleaning a horse, \$5 for two shoes on a horse, rather than fifty cents United States money."

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding*.

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., June 28, 1863.Major General MEADE, *Frederick*:

I doubt if there is any large force south of the Potomac; probably a few thousand cavalry—enough to render it necessary to have a strong rear-guard to protect the trains and picket the river.

Lowell's cavalry was ordered on the latter duty, but removed, (contrary to my positive order,) which exposed your trains. We have no cavalry here except what we have picked up from Pleasonton's command.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 7.20 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 11, 1865.

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington City, D. C., June 28, 1863.

Major General MEADE, *Commanding Army of the Potomac, Frederick*:

I have just seen (at the telegraph office) your despatch to General Halleck respecting the appointment of brigadier generals. The officers you name shall be appointed brigadiers to-morrow morning, and you can assign them commands at once on that assurance. The letters of appointment will be forwarded to your care.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War*.

Sent 8 p. m.

[Telegram.—Received 9.40 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 23, 1863.*

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

General Steinwehr, from the Mountain House, South mountain, reports that his scouts inform him that 5,000 of Stuart's cavalry passed through Williamsport yesterday afternoon. General Sedgwick, on the march up from Poolesville, reports that 3,000 of the enemy's cavalry, with some artillery, are in his rear. This is communicated to you for your information. My impression is that Stuart has divided his forces, with a view of harassing our right and left flanks.

GEORGE G. MEADE.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 9, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 10.20 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Frederick, Md., June 28—9 p. m.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

Your despatch received. Colonel Lowell, as soon as your wishes were known, was ordered and will be left, and I shall intrust to him, through you, the guarding of the river.

There seems to be no doubt that three thousand of the enemy's cavalry have been on our right, between us and Washington, to-day. My intention is now to move to-morrow on three lines to Emmettsburg and Westminster, having the army on the road from Emmettsburg through Westminster, or as near there as we can reach. This movement is based upon what information we have here of the enemy's movements.

The army to-night is as follows: 1st, 2d, 11th, and 12th corps, with artillery reserve, within a few miles of Frederick; the 3d corps towards New Market, and expecting to reach there to-night.

I have not decided yet as to the Harper's Ferry garrison.

I should like to have your views as to the movement proposed.

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 9, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Frederick, June 20, 1863—9 a. m.*

Major General HALLECK :

GENERAL: Upon assuming command of the army, and after carefully considering the position of affairs and the movements of the enemy, I have concluded as follows :

To move to-day on towards Westminster and Emmettsburg; and the army is now in motion for that line, placing two corps (1st and 11th) at Emmettsburg; two corps (3d and 12th) at Taneytown; (1) 2d corps at Frizelburg; (1) 5th corps at Union; 6th corps at New Windsor—my cavalry guarding my flanks and rear. If Lee is moving for Baltimore, I expect to get between his main army and that place. If he is crossing the Susquehanna, I shall rely upon General Couch, with his force, holding him until I can fall upon his rear and give him battle, which I shall endeavor to do. I have ordered the abandonment of Harper's Ferry—a detachment of not more than 3,000 to proceed with the property by canal to Washington, and strengthen your force there against any cavalry raid. The remainder to move up and join me.

The line to Frederick from Baltimore by rail will necessarily be abandoned while I move forward.

I shall incline to the right towards the Baltimore and Harrisburg road, to cover that and draw supplies from there, if circumstances permit it, my main objective point being, of course, Lee's army, which, I am satisfied, has all passed on through Hagerstown towards Chambersburg. My endeavor will be, in my movements, to hold my force well together, with the hope of falling upon some portion of Lee's army in detail.

The cavalry force between me and Washington (as soon as I can learn sufficiently of their movement to pursue and fight them without wasting the necessary force by useless movements) will be engaged by my cavalry. Stuart's cavalry, from my best information, have divided into two columns—one on my right, between me and Baltimore, and one on my left, through Hagerstown, to join their army. My main point being to find and fight the enemy, I shall have to submit to the cavalry raids around me in some measure.

The section of artillery and small force of cavalry sent from here to Baltimore have been ordered to fall back from Poplar Springs and join General Pleasonton's force on my right, their route having been intercepted by the enemy's cavalry.

I have hastily made up this despatch to give you the information. Telegraph communication having been cut off, I have no opportunity to receive a reply to mine asking your advice as to these movements, and upon my best judgment proceed to execute them.

I can, at present, give no orders as to General Schenck's department in Baltimore, or the Potomac, in my rear; neither can I, in the absence of telegraphic communication, and on account of the great distance of General Couch, exercise any influence, by advice or otherwise, concerning the co-operation of that force. These circumstances are beyond my control.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding.*

I send this by courier, with the hope and expectation that it will reach you safely.

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 6, 1865.*

Official :

RICHARD D. CUTTS *Colonel and A. D. C.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., June 29, 1863.*

Major General MEADE, *Frederick :*

Since my last telegram I have heard from Lowell's cavalry at Rockville. The rebel cavalry which destroyed the train left Brookville early this morning, apparently for the direction of Ellicott's Mills. They have with them the captured mules and part of the wagons. Your cavalry may be able to cut them off. Fry's cavalry will be added to Lowell's, but they are too weak to do much.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 11 a. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., June 29, 1863.*

Major General MEADE, *Frederick :*

I have delayed answering your telegram of nine p. m., received after midnight, in hopes of ascertaining something more of rebel forces on the Potomac. But there is nothing further that is reliable. The cavalry force in our front is said by some to be two and by others three brigades, with seven pieces of artillery.

So far as I can judge, without a better knowledge of enemy's positions, your proposed movements seem good.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 10.35 a. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., June 30, 1863.*

GENERAL: Your plan of operations is approved. I have just received your second despatch by the hands of an orderly. I write no fuller for obvious reasons.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Major General MEADE, *Commanding Army of the Potomac.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 5, 1865.*

Official copy:

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

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[Telegram.]

SANDY HOOK, *June 30, 1863.*

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

I could not telegraph yesterday. The immense amount of stores here cannot be removed under at least ten days. I shall be obliged to have General Elliott's brigade, thirty-three hundred men, with artillery and engineer company. I commenced this morning to destroy ammunition; some of the heavy guns will have to be left. I am in readiness to move with the remainder of my force, but will await your instructions. I cannot communicate with headquarters army of the Potomac.

WM. H. FRENCH, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 9, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

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[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., June 30, 1863.*

Major General COUCH, *Harrisburg:*

Every possible effort should be made to hold the enemy in check on the Susquehanna till General Meade can give him battle. I have no direct communication with General Meade, but he wishes you to be in readiness to act in concert with him. You will probably be able to learn his movements from the country people. He will be close on the enemy's right and rear.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 12.15 p.m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

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[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., June 30, 1863.*

Major General MEADE, *Army of the Potomac:*

If you abandon Harper's Ferry, ordnance stores must not be destroyed. Such destruction can be justified only by absolute necessity.

Forces have been sent up the canal to ascertain its condition. It is reported that all your stores and pontoons on the canal have been destroyed, and the canal much injured.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 1.30 p.m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*



[Telegram.]

SANDY HOOK, June 30, 1863—3.30 p. m.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

I have no orders, except from General Butterfield, which urge the movement of these troops within a few days as a necessity for the army of the Potomac.

The removal of this property must be covered by a large force, as the road is perfectly commanded. As for defending the property, all that is required is an order not to abandon, or something definite from some source. My instinct has placed me on the road for the army, with 5,000 untried men. I leave over 3,000 men, who came from Winchester, ready to take the rear at the first alarm. If I am to be held responsible for the evacuation of Maryland heights, it should be given me reasonably. I cannot communicate with headquarters army of the Potomac.

W. H. FRENCH, *Major General*.HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 9, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.—Received 4.06 July 1.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 30—4.30 p. m.

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

Headquarters Taneytown. Two (2) corps between Emmettsburg and Gettysburg, one at Littlestown, one at Manchester, one at Union Mills, one between here and Emmettsburg, one at Frizelburg. Pennsylvania reserves cannot keep up; still in rear. General Lockwood, with the troops from Schenck, still behind. These troops cannot keep up with the marches made by the army.

Our reports seem to place Ewell in the vicinity of York and Harrisburg. The cavalry that crossed the Seneca ford have passed up through Westminster and Hanover, some six to eight thousand strong. The people are all so frightened that accurate information is not to be obtained.

I shall push on to-morrow in the direction of Hanover Junction and Hanover, when I hope by the second of July to open communication with Baltimore, by telegraph and rail, to renew supplies. I fear I shall break down the troops by pushing on much faster, and may have to rest a day. My movement, of course, will be governed much by what I learn of the enemy. The information seems to place Longstreet at Chambersburg, and A. P. Hill moving between Chambersburg and York. Our cavalry drove a regiment out of Gettysburg this a. m. Our cavalry engaged with Stuart at Hanover this a. m.; result not yet known.

G. G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding*.HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 9, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

HARRISBURG, PA, June 30, 1863.

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

As telegraphed previously, part of the rebel force, if not all, have fallen back towards Chambersburg, passing Shippensburg last night in great haste. I expect every moment to hear that my cavalry, under General Smith, has re-occupied Carlisle.

My latest information is that Early, with his 8,000 men, went towards Gettysburg or Hanover, saying they expected to fight a great battle there. At Carlisle they said they were not going to be outflanked by Hooker.

D. N. COUCH, *Major General*.HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., April 9, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington City, June 30, 1863—11.30 p. m.*

Major General MEADE :

The following despatch has just been received, which, although you may be informed on the subject, I have ordered to be sent to you by express. It is proper you should know that General French this morning evacuated Maryland heights, blowing up his magazine, spiking the large cannon, and destroying surplus stores. A telegram from him received this evening indicates that he is still at Sandy Hook, waiting orders, and doubtful what he should do with his force. Please instruct him what you wish him to do.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

Sent 11.50 p. m.

Send Haupt's despatch of June 30.

[Telegram.]

HARRISBURG, PA., *June 30, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

Lee is falling back suddenly from the vicinity of Harrisburg and concentrating all his forces. York has been evacuated. Carlisle is being evacuated. The concentration seems to be at or near Chambersburg; the object, apparently, a sudden movement against Meade, of which he should be advised by courier immediately. A courier might reach Frederick by way of Western Maryland railroad to Westminster. This information comes from T. A. Scott, and I think it reliable.

H. HAUPT, *Brigadier General.*

Copies sent to Generals Meade and Schenck.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 9, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

HARRISBURG, *July 1, 1863—12.45 a. m.*

Major General HALLECK :

Information just received, 12.45 a. m., leads to the belief that the concentration of the forces of the enemy will be at Gettysburg rather than at Chambersburg. The movement on their part is very rapid and hurried. They returned from Carlisle in direction of Gettysburg, by way of the Petersburg pike. Firing about Petersburg and Dillstown this p. m., continued some hours. Meade should by all means be informed and prepared for a sudden attack from Lee's whole army.

H. HAUPT, *Brigadier General.*

Sent to General Meade by courier from Frederick at 2 p. m.; copy to General Schenck.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 9, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 1, 1863.*

Major General MEADE, *Army of the Potomac:*

The movements of the enemy yesterday indicate his intention to either turn your left or to cover himself by the South mountain and occupy Cumberland valley. Do not let him draw you too far to the east.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 10.45 a. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, MD, July 1, 1863—1 30 p. m.

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

I think there is no rebel force whatever between General Meade and myself. I sent up General Kane last evening to Westminster with an escort, and two couriers in the night with despatches.

Lee, I think, is either massing his troops or making a general retreat towards Cumberland valley. Most likely the former. They are so near that I shall not be surprised if a battle comes on to-day. I will look to the Baltimore and Ohio railroad to Frederick.

R. C. SCHENCK, *Major General*.HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 9, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received 3.40.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 1, 1863—7 a. m.*Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

Despatches of 12.30 p. m. received. French was ordered to send three thousand of his force to Washington, with all his property, then to move up and join me with the balance.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 4 p. m., July 1, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

*Nine miles east of Middleburg, July 1, 1863—7 a. m.*Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

Despatch of General Couch and General Haupt received. My positions to-day are : One corps at Emmettsburg, two at Gettysburg, one at Taneytown, one at "Two Taverns," one at Manchester, one at Hanover. These movements were ordered yesterday, before receipt of advices of Lee's movements. Our cavalry, under Kilpatrick, had a handsome fight yesterday at Hanover. He reports the capture of one battle-flag, a lieutenant colonel, one captain, forty-five privates, with fifteen or twenty of the enemy killed.

The point of Lee's concentration, and the nature of the country when ascertained, will determine whether I attack him or not. Shall advise you further to-day, when satisfied that the enemy have fully withdrawn from the Susquehanna. If General Couch has any reliable force, I shall call upon him to move it to aid me.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding.*HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *Washington, April 9, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 4.30 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 1, 1863—12 m.*Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

Despatch sent last night giving my position at Emmettsburg, Gettysburg, and Hanover. Ewell is marching at Heidelberg ; A. P. Hill is massed behind the mountains at Cash-town ; Longstreet somewhere between Chambersburg and the mountains. The news from my advance has answered its purpose. I shall not advance any, but prepare to receive an attack in case Lee makes one. A battle-field is being selected to the rear, on which the army can be rapidly concentrated, on Pipe creek, between Middleburg and Manchester, covering my depot at Westminster. If I am not attacked, and can secure reliable intelli-

gence, have reason to believe I can attack with reasonable degree of success, I will do so; but at present, having relieved the pressure on the Susquehanna, I am looking to the protection of Washington and fighting my army to the best advantage.

1 p. m.—The enemy are advancing in force on Gettysburg, and I expect the battle will begin to-day.

GEO. G. MEADE.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 9, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 1, 1863.*

Major General MEADE, *Army of the Potomac:*

Yours of 12 m. received. Your tactical arrangements for battle seem good, so far as I can judge from my knowledge of the character of the country. But in a strategic view are you not too far east, and may not Lee attempt to turn your left and cut you off from Frederick? Please give your full attention to this suggestion.

Lowell's cavalry was sent this morning to escort the stores from Harper's Ferry. This will relieve General French to obey your orders. The destruction of unguarded property on the canal along the Potomac has been terrible.

Will not Frederick become a better base of supplies than Westminster? In anticipation of this I have directed General Schenck to guard that road as well as he can.

I have asked General Couch to co-operate with you as far as possible; but I fear very little reliance can be placed on his troops in an emergency.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 12.15 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Received 5 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 1, 1863.*

General COUCH, *Harrisburg:*

The enemy are advancing on Gettysburg—Hill from Cashtown, Ewell from Heidelberg. Can you throw a force in Ewell's rear, to threaten him, and at the same time keep your line of retreat open? If you can, do so.

MEADE.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., July 1, 1863.*

General COUCH, *Harrisburg:*

There seems to be a strong probability of a battle not far from Emmetsburg. It is hoped that you will assist General Meade by operating on the enemy's left flank or left rear, towards Gettysburg.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 9.15 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA, July 1, 1863.

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

Despatch received. I have sent out a force in direction of Carlisle. It has been attacked by a body of cavalry, at least, and just now things do not look well.

D. N. COUCH, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, April 9, 1865.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 1, 1863.

Major General MEADE, *Army of the Potomac*:

Arrangements have been made to run an express train to Westminster every three hours. Copies of all despatches will also be sent to Frederick, and by messenger to you from that point.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 10 p. m.

[Telegram.—Received 10.20 p. m., 1st.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
via Frederick, July 1, 1863—6 p. m.

General HALLECK:

The 1st and 11th corps have been engaged all day in front of Gettysburg. The 12th, 3d, and 5th have been moving up, and all, I hope, by this time, on the field. This leaves only the 6th, which will move up to-night. General Reynolds was killed this morning, early in the action. I immediately sent up General Hancock to assume command. A. P. Hill and Ewell are certainly concentrating. Longstreet's whereabouts I do not know. If he is not up to-morrow, I hope, with the force I have concentrated, to defeat Hill and Ewell; at any rate, I see no other course than to hazard a general battle. Circumstances during the night may alter this decision, of which I will try to advise you.

I have telegraphed Couch that if he can threaten Ewell's rear from Harrisburg, without endangering himself, to do so.

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, April 9, 1865.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 11 a. m., 2d.]

BALTIMORE, July 2, 1863.

Major T. T. ECKERT:

The following despatch found on the body of a soldier killed June 30, 4½ miles from Glen Rock:

[In cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 29, 1863.

Major General HALLECK:

Upon assuming command of the army, and after carefully considering the position of affairs and the movements of the enemy, I have concluded as follows: To move to-day towards Westminster and Emmettsburg—and the army is now in motion for that line—placing two corps, 1st and 11th, at Emmettsburg; two corps, 3d and 12th, at Taneytown; one corps, 2d, at Frizelburg; one corps, 5th, at Union; 6th corps at New Windsor; my cavalry guarding my flanks and rear. If Lee is moving for Baltimore, I expect to get between his main army and that place. If he is crossing the Susquehanna, I shall rely upon General Couch, with his force, holding him until I can fall upon his rear and give him battle, which I shall endeavor to do.

I have ordered the abandonment of Harper's Ferry. A detachment of not more than 3,000 to proceed with the property, by canal, to Washington, and strengthen your forces there against any cavalry raid; the remainder to move up and join me. The line from Frederick to Baltimore by rail will necessarily be abandoned. While I move forward I shall incline to the right towards the Baltimore and Harrisburg road, to cover that and draw supplies from there, if circumstances permit it; my main objective point being, of course, Lee's army, which, I am satisfied, has all passed on through Hagerstown towards Chambersburg. My endeavor will be in my movements to hold my force well together, with the hope of falling upon some portion of Lee's army in detail.

The cavalry force between me and Washington, as soon as I can learn sufficiently of their movement to pursue and fight without wasting the necessary force for useless movements, will be engaged by my cavalry. Stuart's cavalry, from my best information, have divided into two columns—one on my right, between me and Baltimore; one on my left, through Hagerstown, to join their army. My main point being to find and fight the enemy, I shall have to submit to the cavalry raids around me in some measure.

The sections of artillery and small force of cavalry sent from here to Baltimore have been ordered to fall back from Poplar Springs and join General Pleasanton's force, on my right, their route having been intercepted by the enemy's cavalry.

I have hastily made up this despatch to give you the information. Telegraphic communication having been cut off, I have no opportunity to receive a reply to mine asking your advice as to these movements, and upon my best judgment I proceed to execute them. I can at present give no orders as to General Schenck's department in Baltimore, or the Potomac in my rear; neither can I, in the absence of telegraphic communication and on account of the great distance of Couch, exercise any influence, by advice or otherwise, concerning the co-operation of that force. These circumstances are beyond my control. I send by this courier with the hope and expectation that it will reach you safely. Headquarters to-night are at Middleburg, three miles from Uniontown and thirteen from Westminster. There is rail communication from Baltimore to Westminster.

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *April 10, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.—Received 10.20 a. m., 3d.]

HEADQUARTERS NEAR GETTYSBURG, *July 2, 1863—3 p. m.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

I have concentrated my army at this place to-day. The 6th corps is just coming in, very much worn out, having been marching since 9 p. m. last night.

The army is fatigued. I have to-day, up to this hour, awaited the attack of the enemy, I having a strong position for defensive. I am not determined as yet on attacking him till his position is more developed. He has been moving on both my flanks apparently, but it is difficult to tell exactly his movements. I have delayed attacking to allow the 6th corps and parts of other corps to reach this place and rest the men. Expecting a battle, I ordered all my trains to the rear. If not attacked, and I can get any positive information of the position of the enemy which will justify me in so doing, I shall attack. If I find it hazardous to do so, or am satisfied the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back to my supplies at Westminster. I will endeavor to advise you as often as possible. In the engagement yesterday the enemy concentrated more rapidly than we could, and towards evening, owing to the superiority of numbers, compelled the 11th and 1st corps to fall back from the town to the heights this side, on which I am now posted. I feel fully the responsibility resting on me, but will endeavor to act with caution.

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 10, 1865,*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received 1.30 p. m., 2d, in cipher.]

BALTIMORE, MD., *July 2, 1863.*

Following was found on the body of a Union soldier, killed June 30, 1863, 4½ miles from Glen Rock:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Taneytown, Md., June 30, 1863—11 a. m.*

Major General COUCH, *Harrisburg, Penn.:*

I am in position between Emmettsburg and Westminster, advancing upon the enemy

The enemy hold (A. P. Hill) Cashtown pass, between Gettysburg and Chambersburg. Their cavalry, three to five brigades, are on my right, between me and the Northern Central.

My force is tolerably well concentrated, moving with all the speed that the roads and physique of the men will bear. I am without definite and positive information as to the whereabouts of Longstreet and Ewell. The latter I presume to be in front of you. The army is in good spirits, and we shall push to your relief, or the engagement of the enemy, as circumstances and the information we receive during the day, and on the marches, may indicate as most prudent and most likely to lead to ultimate success. I am anxious to hear from you and get information of the dispositions of the enemy and his movements, as far as you know them. If you are in telegraphic communication, or otherwise, with Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington, I should like supplies and shoes to be accumulated, to be thrown to me on the line of the Northern Central, or the Susquehanna, as circumstances may require, or my movements may make most advisable.

Please communicate my despatch to the general-in-chief. My communications with him are interrupted by the cavalry of the enemy on my right. Can you keep the enemy from crossing the river?

I am, very respectfully,

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 10, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

-----  
[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, *July 2, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief :*

I have positive intelligence of one brigade (and two are reported) of rebel cavalry crossing at Williamsport to-day, and taking the direct road to Greencastle and Chambersburg. They were from 11 a. m. to 4 p. m. crossing. My informant saw what he understood to be a brigade of about twenty-five hundred, with five pieces of artillery. They told him the commander was General Jones.

R. C. SCHENCK, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 10, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

-----  
[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 3, 1863.*

Major General D. N. COUCH, *Harrisburg :*

As Lee is concentrating his forces near Gettysburg against Meade, all your available forces should be thrown forward to the assistance of our main army. Probably this assistance can be best rendered by moving rapidly on Lee's left flank, compelling him to make detachments.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 1 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

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[Telegram.—Received 5.10 p. m., 3d.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 3, 1863—8 a. m.*

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief :*

The action commenced again at early daylight upon various parts of the line. The enemy thus far have made no impression upon my position. All accounts agree in placing the whole army here. Prisoners report Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's forces much injured yesterday, and many general officers killed. General Barksdale's (Mississippi) dead body is within our lines. We have sent off thus far 1,600 prisoners and a small number

yet to be started. I have given certain instructions to General French which he will telegraph you. The despatches from you yesterday, owing to disappearance of telegraph operator, Caldwell, are here in cipher, unintelligible.

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

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[Telegram.—Received 5.15 p. m., 3d.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 2, 1863—11 p. m.*

General HALLECK :

The enemy attacked me about 4 p. m. this day, and, after one of the severest contests of the war, was repulsed at all points. We have suffered considerably in killed and wounded ; among the former are Brigadier General Paul Zook ; and among the wounded, Generals Sickles, Barlow, Graham, and Warren, slightly. We have taken a large number of prisoners. I shall remain in my present position to-morrow, but am not prepared to say, until better advised of the condition of the army, whether my operations will be of an offensive or defensive character.

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

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[Received 5.35 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 3, 1863—8.30 a. m.*

General COUCH, *Harrisburg :*

I presume you are advised of condition of affairs here by copies of my despatches to general-in-chief. The result of my operations may be the withdrawal of the rebel army. The sound of my guns for these three days, it is taken for granted, is all the additional notice you need to come on. Should the enemy withdraw, by prompt co-operation we might destroy him. Should he overpower me, your return and defence of Harrisburg and the Susquehanna is not at all endangered.

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General*.

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[Telegram.—Received 5.35 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 3, 1863.*

General COUCH, *Harrisburg :*

Telegraph despatches reach me through Baltimore and Frederick. My cavalry have been at Berlin. The country between this and you is probably clear of all but stragglers, your easy prey. Your officers could communicate with me now *via* Hanover and Taneytown.

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

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[Telegram.—Received 6.45 p. m.]

FREDERICK, *July 3, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK :

I submit a télégram just received from headquarters army of the Potomac.

W. H. FRENCH, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 8, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*



[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Near Gettysburg, July 3, 1863—7 a. m.*

General FRENCH:

General Meade desires me to say that the enemy attacked us vigorously yesterday and was repulsed on all sides. The conflict is apparently renewed to-day, and we have retained our position. Should the result of to-day's operations cause the enemy to fall back towards the Potomac, which you would probably learn by scouts and information from Hagerstown, &c., before you would be advised from here, he desires you will reoccupy Harper's Ferry and annoy and harass him in his retreat. It may be possible for you now to annoy and cut his communication with any cavalry or light-marching infantry you have; of this you can judge. If the result of to-day's operations should be our discomfiture and withdrawal, you are to look to Washington and throw your force there for its protection. You will be prepared for either of these contingencies should they arise. Communicate a copy of these instructions to the general-in-chief for his information. Acknowledge.

I am, very respectfully,

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 8, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 8.30 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 3, 1863.*Major General COUCH, *Harrisburg:*

I have received General Meade's telegram to you of 8.30 a. m. His call for assistance should not pass unheard.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 8.31 a. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, *Maryland, July 3, 1863.*Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

I have reliable information that the rebels have a pontoon bridge across the Potomac at Falling Waters, which is two or three miles below Williamsport. The bridge is protected by artillery on the Virginia side.

ROBERT C. SCHENCK.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 8, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 11 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 3, 1863—12.30 p. m.*

Major General HALLECK:

At the present moment all is quiet. Considerable firing, both infantry and artillery, has taken place in various parts of our line; but no development of the enemy's intention. My cavalry has been pushing the enemy on both my flanks and keeping me advised of any effort to outflank me. We have taken several hundred prisoners since morning.

GEORGE G. MEADE.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 8, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 6.10 a. m., 4th.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 3, 1863—8.35 p. m.*

Major General HALLECK :

The enemy opened at 1 p. m. from about one hundred and fifty guns concentrated upon my left centre, continuing without intermission for about three hours, at the expiration of which time he assaulted my left centre twice, being upon both occasions handsomely repulsed with severe loss to him, leaving in our hands nearly three thousand prisoners; among the prisoners Brigadier General Armistead and many colonels and officers of lesser rank. The enemy left many dead upon the field and a large number of wounded in our hands. The loss upon our side has been considerable. Major General Hancock and Brigadier General Gibbon were wounded. After the repelling of the assault, indications leading to the belief that the enemy might be withdrawing, an armed reconnoissance was pushed forward from the left and the enemy found to be in force. At the present hour all is quiet; my cavalry have been engaged all day on both flanks of the enemy, harassing and vigorously attacking him with great success, notwithstanding they encountered superior numbers, both cavalry and infantry. The army is in fine spirits.

GEORGE G. MEADE.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 9, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received 8.40 a. m., July 4.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 3, 1863—9.57 p. m.*Major General D. N. COUCH, *Harrisburg; Penn.* :

You will be apprised of my operations through my despatch to the general-in-chief. I do not think Lee will attack me again; but am as yet uncertain whether he will assume an offensive attitude and await an attack from me, or whether he will withdraw down the Cumberland valley, holding strongly the mountain passes, which I understand he has fortified. Should the former be the case, I will apprise you of the fact as soon as I am certain of it, and I then desire you either to form a junction with me, or, if in your judgment the same can be done without jeopardizing the safety of your command, attack him. Should I be satisfied that he is retreating, I shall then move down on this side of the mountain, and wish you to pursue him as rapidly as possible down the valley.

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Telegram.—Received 9 a. m., 4.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 3, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK :

I would respectfully request that Colonel Strong Vincent, 33d Pennsylvania regiment, be made a brigadier general of volunteers for gallant conduct on the field yesterday. He is mortally wounded, and it would gratify his friends as well as myself. It was my intention to have recommended him with others should he live. Among the general officers wounded to-day I omitted to mention in previous despatch Major General Butterfield and Major General Doubleday, not seriously.

GEORGE G. MEADE.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 9, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received 10.05 a. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,

*Washington, D. C., July 4, 1863.*Major General MEADE, *Headquarters :*

According to your request, Colonel Vincent has been appointed brigadier general for gallant service on the field. This department will rejoice to manifest honor and gratitude to you and your gallant comrades in arms.

EDWIN M. STANTON,

*Secretary of War.*

Sent 10.20 a. m.

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 68. }

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
Near Gettysburg, July 4, 1863.

The commanding general, in behalf of the country, thanks the army of the Potomac for the glorious result of the recent operations.

Our enemy, superior in numbers and flushed with the pride of a successful invasion, attempted to overcome or destroy this army. Utterly baffled and defeated, he has now withdrawn from the contest.

The privations and fatigues the army has endured, and the heroic courage and gallantry it has displayed, will be matters of history to be ever remembered. Our task is not yet accomplished, and the commanding general looks to the army for greater efforts to drive from our soil every vestige of the presence of the invader.

It is right and proper that we should, on suitable occasions, return our grateful thanks to the Almighty Disposer of events, that in the goodness of his providence he has thought fit to give victory to the cause of the just.

By command of Major General Meade:

S. WILLIAMS, A. A. G.

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[Received 3.50 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
July 4, 1863—Noon.

Major General HALLECK:

The position of affairs is not materially changed since my last despatch, 7 a. m. The enemy apparently has thrown back his left, and placed guns and troops in position in rear of Gettysburg, which we now hold. The enemy has abandoned a large number of his killed and wounded on the field. I shall require some time to get up supplies, ammunition, &c., rest the army, worn out by long marches and three days' hard fighting. I shall possibly be able to give you a return of our captures and losses before night, and return of the enemy's killed and wounded in our hands.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 9, 1865.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

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[Telegram.]

HANOVER, July 4, 1863—4 p. m.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

I have just returned from Littlestown; bridge repaired; trains with wounded following. Saw Captain Fry, of General Sickles's staff. Have arranged to bring General Sickles by special train to Washington. General Meade's headquarters said to be nine miles from Littlestown, on Taneytown road. I am now starting towards Gettysburg to repair road and telegraph. Captain Fry reports that Pleasonton sent a note to General Sickles last evening, saying that he had routed and driven the enemy; reported that Longstreet and Hill both wounded and prisoners; that 3,000 prisoners passed through Littlestown this morning; that we are in possession of Gettysburg, and that Lee is retreating by Chambersburg road. I give these reports as I get them from Captain Fry. They may not be correct. No firing heard to-day. Telegraph from General Meade just received by courier says enemy retreated from Gettysburg at 3 a. m. He will follow when rations are received for men and horses.

H. HAUPT, *Brigadier General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 9, 1865.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

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[Telegram.]

HANOVER JUNCTION, July 4, 1863.

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

All the supplies offered for transportation of Westminster branch have been sent forward, and sidings at Relay are clear. Our arrangements work well. Transportation of the wounded

should be sent *via* Westminster to fill return cars; I have so requested. Our men rebuilt entirely the bridge at this junction (three spans of about forty feet) this morning. They expect to reach York to-morrow night. The reconstruction of the N. C. entire at this time may not be an imperative military necessity, but as my corps would not be otherwise employed, it is best to do it. I will endeavor to secure for you, when I reach Hanover, more rapid communication by telegraph with Gettysburg.

A. HAUPT.

Official copy:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 9, 1865.*

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

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[Telegram.—Received 7.20 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC,  
*July 4, 1863—7 a. m.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

This morning the enemy has withdrawn his pickets from the positions of yesterday. My own pickets are moving out to ascertain the nature and extent of the enemy's movement. My information is not sufficient to decide its character yet, whether a retreat or manœuvre for other purpose.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*

Official copy:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 9, 1865.*

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

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[Telegram.]

Major General HALLECK:

FREDERICK, *July 4, 1863—8 p. m.*

An expedition sent out by me last night has just returned, having entirely destroyed the pontoon bridge over the Potomac at Williamsport, capturing the guard, a lieutenant, and thirteen (13) men.

W. H. FRENCH, *Major General.*

Official copy:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 9, 1865.*

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

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[Received 10.40 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC, *July 4, 1863—8.30 a. m.*

Major General COUCH, *Harrisburg, Pa.:*

I send herewith the duplicate of despatch sent last evening:

“The enemy has withdrawn from his positions occupied for attack. I am not yet sufficiently informed of the nature of his movements. He was repulsed yesterday in his attack upon me. You will therefore be governed by the instructions heretofore sent you; until I get further information I cannot decide as to the character of the movements or the enemy's intentions.”

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding.*

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[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., July 5, 1863.*

Major General W. H. FRENCH, *Frederick, Md.:*

The forces here from Harper's Ferry, with two batteries of artillery, and some troops from Baltimore, can be sent to you at Frederick, should General Meade desire that disposition of

them. Should he deem it preferable, they can be sent back by Poolesville to Point of Rocks. Please communicate immediately with General Meade, and get his instructions. I have had no communication from him since yesterday morning.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 10.30 a. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS, BALTIMORE, *July 5, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

To get my troops to Frederick quick and fresh to-morrow, I will send them by railroad ; will send you report when I have started them. I think I can send over three thousand pretty good men.

R. C. SCHENCK, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 9, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 5, 1863.*

Major General MEADE, *Army of Potomac* :

You will assume the general command of such of General Couch's forces as are operating in the field, and direct their movements as you may deem best. It seems to me that they should connect with your right flank.

I think that the troops sent here from Harper's Ferry, and a part of the forces now in Baltimore, could join General French, and be available for your operations. Four small regiments from North Carolina have reached Baltimore. I am waiting an answer from my despatch sent through General French this morning, in regard to re-enforcing him as above indicated. So long as your movements cover Baltimore and Washington from Lee's main army, they are in no danger from any force the enemy may detach for a raid.

We have heard nothing from you since yesterday morning, and are anxious to learn more of the results of your brilliant fighting.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

HARRISBURG, *July 5, 1863—3 p. m.*

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

Ruffenspagers is in Franklin township, one and a half mile west of Arendtsville, on the road to Cashtown and Chambersburg. A cavalry force went from Loudon this morning toward Williamsport. Colonel Price, 12th Pennsylvania cavalry, commanding forces in the mountains west of Chambersburg. I hope to have my advance near Cashtown and Arendtsville.

D. N. COUCH.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 9, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

FREDERICK, MD., *July 5, 1863—3 p. m.*

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

Your despatch of this date is just received. Meade's instructions to me require the force sent back from Harper's Ferry. No time is to be lost. Buford is passing through to-day. I have destroyed the bridge at Williamsport, and am fortifying the South Mountain passes.

Lee, it is reported, has massed at Chambersburg, and will rest his right on the river at Williamsport. Should he find his passage there impracticable, as the river is rising, he will endeavor to seize the passes. I have one good brigade holding them. I also hold the Monocacy bridge, and have only a few unreliable infantry in reserve. Should you send me re-enforcements, they should come direct by railroad. The cavalry is broken down. I have issued a proclamation for horses, and will remount as fast as they are brought in. It was reported to me that artillery was being placed on the heights at Shepherdstown ford, and a bridge in readiness to swing across. Buford will visit that place to-night.

To reoccupy Maryland heights will require time, and probably the holding for a while the opposite side of the river. The enemy can get nothing by having them, and a small force without a depot would be a *cul de sac*.

FRENCH.

I have just received the following despatch from headquarters army of the Potomac, dated July 4, 10.30 a. m.:

“Major General FRENCH:

“More recent developments may indicate that the enemy may have retired to take a new position and await an attack from us. The general commanding countermands his despatch requiring you to reoccupy Maryland heights and seize the South Mountain passes, resuming the instructions of July 3, making your movements contingent upon those of the enemy.”

“D. BUTTERFIELD, *Chief of Staff*.”

Received 2 p. m.—Latest despatch, July 5—7 a. m.:

“General FRENCH:

“The enemy appear to be in full retreat, and you can act upon the contingencies provided in previous despatches.

“D. BUTTERFIELD.”

I will therefore require the re-enforcements.

W. H. FRENCH, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 9, 1865*.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 4.15 p. m., 5th.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 4, 1863—10 p. m.*

Major General HALLECK:

No change of affairs since despatch of 12, noon. I make a reconnoissance to-morrow, to ascertain what is the intention of the enemy. My cavalry are now moving towards the South Mountain pass, and should the enemy retreat, I shall pursue him on his flank. A proposition, made by General Lee under flag of truce, to exchange prisoners, was declined by me.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 9, 1865*.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 5—6 p. m.*

Copy for information of General Halleck.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 4, 1863*.

Major General FRENCH, *Frederick*:

The major general commanding directs that you proceed immediately and seize and hold the South mountain with such force as in your judgment is proper and sufficient to prevent the enemy seizing it to cover his retreat. With the balance of your force reoccupy Maryland heights, and operate upon the contingency expressed yesterday in regard to the retreat of the enemy. Buford will probably pass through South mountain to-morrow p. m. from this side.

D. BUTTERFIELD, *Major General and Chief of Staff*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 9, 1865*.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 5, 1863.*Major General SCHENCK, *Baltimore* :

You will immediately send to Frederick, to report to Major General French, all troops in Baltimore not already necessary to man the fortifications.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 7.29 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 5, 1863.*Major General FRENCH, *Frederick* :

Re-enforcements from Baltimore and Washington re ordered to report to you. Send your orders to Monocacy Junction whether they are to go to Frederick and towards Harper's Ferry.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 7.31 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Received 8.30 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 5, 1863—8 p. m.*

Major General FRENCH :

A column of enemy's cavalry, probably covering flank on far South Mountain pass, passed through Emmettsburg about daylight this morning, bound, as they say, for Frederick. Notify Buford, and be prepared.

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Telegram.—Received 8.40 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 5, 1863—8.30 a. m.*

Major General HALLECK :

The enemy retired, under cover of the night and heavy rain, in the direction of Fairfield and Cashtown. All my available cavalry are in pursuit on the enemy's left and rear. My movement will be made at once on his flank, *via* Middletown and South Mountain pass. I cannot give you the details of our captures in prisoners, colors, and arms. Upwards of twenty battle flags will be turned in from one corps. I cannot delay to pick up the *debris* of the battle-field, and request that all these arrangements may be made by the departments. My wounded, with those of the enemy in our hands, will be left at Gettysburg. After burying our own dead, I am compelled to employ citizens to bury the enemy's. My headquarters will be to-night at Creagerstown. Communication received from General Smith, in command of three thousand men, on the march from Carlisle towards Cashtown.

Field return last evening gives me about fifty-five thousand effective men in the ranks, exclusive of cavalry, baggage guards, ambulance attendants, &c. Every available re-enforcement is required, and should be sent to Frederick without delay.

GEO. G. MEADE.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 9, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 9.30 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 5, 1863.*

General KELLY :

Send forward your forces in hand, and order the others to follow as rapidly as possible.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 9.40 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 9.30 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 5, 1863.*

Major General MEADE, *Army of the Potomac*:

Your movements are perfectly satisfactory. Your call for re-enforcements to Frederick has been anticipated. Call to you all of Couch's force.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 10 p. m.

Official:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

D. C. WAGER *Major, A. A. G.*

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[Telegram.—Received 9.50 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 5, 1863.*

Major General SCHENCK, *Baltimore*:

Send everything forward to Frederick, except the usual garrison of Baltimore. The enemy is in retreat. Baltimore is in no possible danger. Give General Meade all the aid in your power.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 10 p. m.

Official:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

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[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 5, 1863.*

Major General HEINTZELMAN, *Commanding Washington*:

All cavalry detachments from the army of the Potomac should be sent immediately to Frederick, by Rockville:

The movement of troops ordered this afternoon should be pushed forward as rapidly as possible.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Official:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

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[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 5, 1863.*

General KELLY:

Do everything in your power to capture or destroy Lee's trains, which will endeavor to cross at Williamsport or Falling Waters. His army is in full retreat.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 10 p. m.

Official:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

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[Received 11 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 5, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

Among the several officers killed is General Farnsworth, of our cavalry, not before mentioned. Rebel General Kemper killed, Pender and Johnson wounded.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding*



[Received 11.10 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 5, 1863.*

Major General FRENCH, *Frederick, Md.:*

Your despatches received. Major General Halleck has been requested to throw the forces spoken of to Harper's Ferry by rail at once. Lose no time in occupying the passes—in-trench, and hold them. General headquarters will be at Frederick to-morrow p. m. The canal and rail can supply troops at Harper's Ferry.

DAN'L BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

[Telegram.—Received 11.30 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 5—6 p. m.*

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

I send copies of all my despatches since yesterday a. m. My army is all in motion. I shall be at Frederick to-morrow night.

I desire the forces mentioned in your despatch to Major General French to be thrown to Harper's Ferry by rail as soon as possible. I shall so instruct Major General French. It is of importance to get possession of South Mountain passes and Maryland heights.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *April 9, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received 12 midnight, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*July 5, 1863—6 p. m.*

Copy for information of General Halleck:

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 4, 1863.*

“General FRENCH, *Frederick:*

“The major general commanding directs that you proceed immediately and seize and hold the South Mountain passes with such force as in your judgment is proper and sufficient to prevent the enemy's seizing them to cover his retreat. With the balance of your force re-occupy Maryland heights, and operate upon the contingency expressed yesterday in regard to the retreat of the enemy. Buford will probably pass through South mountain to-morrow p. m., from this side.

“DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,  
“*Major General, Chief of Staff.*”

[Telegram.]

FREDERICK, MD., *July 6, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK:

The river is high and cannot be forded at Shepardstown or Williamsport. The enemy is sending his wounded across in flats.

W. H. FRENCH, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 9, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, *July 6, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

There are now in the field with General Meade all the available troops remaining of my corps; under General French, ten thousand, (10,000,) besides three thousand and nine hundred (3,900) sent to him to-day; under General Briggs, fifteen hundred (1,500) or more

with General Lockwood, and near three thousand (3,000) of Milroy's men now up at Bloody run, making an aggregate of over eighteen thousand (18,000) in my own department. I propose, with your permission, to leave here to proceed to-day to Frederick, or wherever the troops may be, to assume the command of them under General Meade. It appears to me my right, and I trust you will approve my doing so.

R. C. SCHENCK, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 9, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

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[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, *July 6, 1863—9 a. m.*

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

Nearly everything I have available here is now started, leaving nothing but limited garrisons and guards in the three old forts. I shall have ordered to General French's command in a few hours an aggregate of three thousand nine hundred men. I send the eightieth, forty-fifth, and fifty-first Massachusetts infantry, the ninth and tenth Maryland infantry, second Long Island infantry, seventh New York militia, first Connecticut cavalry, battery C, first Pennsylvania artillery, twelve rifled guns. I have substituted some New York militia for the seventh New York in Fort Federal Hill. The ninth and tenth Maryland are new and incomplete six-months regiments. May I suggest, if it has not already been ordered, that Brigadier General Kelly might advance with good effect from New Creek and on the railroad.

R. C. SCHENCK, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

---

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., July 6, 1863.*

Major General SCHENCK, *Baltimore:*

It is deemed proper that your headquarters should remain for the present in Baltimore. All troops in the field are under General Meade's orders, and will be assigned and moved as he may direct.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 11.30 a. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

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[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, *July 6, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

I have already reported to you this morning the troops I send from here. Everything mentioned in my despatch has gone forward except the Eastern Shore Maryland volunteers, about five hundred strong, which I am getting in from along the Northern Central railroad, and the Connecticut cavalry, the detachment of which I am getting in, and which will number about one hundred. I expect to start the Eastern Shore regiment at one p. m. The fragments of eighty-seventh Pennsylvania, fifty-three in number, I will send at the same time. They are instructed now to move directly on the cars to Harper's Ferry, unless otherwise ordered by Major General French.

ROBT. C. SCHENCK, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 6, 1863.*

Major General MEADE and Major General FRENCH:

It is just reported here that the bridge at Harper's Ferry was left intact when General French's command abandoned that place. If so, it gives Lee a good crossing, unless it be occupied by us in strong force. No time should be lost in throwing troops into Maryland heights.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 12.30 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major and A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 12.55 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 6, 1863.*Major General COUCH, *Harrisburg:*

Major General Meade has authority to command and direct the movements of all troops of your department. His orders will be obeyed.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 12.5 p. m.

Copy sent to Major General Meade.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major and A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

HARRISBURG, *July 6, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK:

Your despatch received. General Meade's wishes, recommendations, and instructions have been carried out so far as practicable. I have directed that a copy of cipher despatches to him be sent to you for your information.

As I prominently mentioned that officer for his present position, it may be inferred that I would show no lukewarmness in carrying out his orders.

D. N. COUCH, *Major General.*

Official copy:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1865.*D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received 2 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *via Hanover, July 6, 1863.*General COUCH, *Harrisburg:*

I cannot get very reliable intelligence of the enemy's movements. My belief is they are in retreat to the Potomac. A captured despatch to a rebel cavalry officer, dated July 5, says Longstreet is moving through Tock mountain, and orders him to picket roads to Emmettsburg, and to report to Longstreet at Tock mountain, and Ewell at Fairfield. Sedgwick, with his corps, is pushing them at Fairfield; other corps are in support. I have delayed my flank movement until I am positively satisfied they are retreating to the Potomac. I hope to-day *some time* to determine this.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

FREDERICK, MD., July 6, 1863.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

I had the bridge named in your despatch of this date thoroughly destroyed yesterday. As soon as I can re-enforce the important passes I will reoccupy the heights—probably to-night. There is no force there.

W. H. FRENCH, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 10, 1865.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

[Telegram, in cipher]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., July 6, 1863.Major General MEADE and Major General FRENCH, *Frederick*:

Fifteen hundred cavalry left here this forenoon on Rockville and Frederick turnpike. They are detachments from the army of the Potomac, remounted. You can send ordersthen on the road to move as you deem best.

Elliott's command, with two new batteries, left by railroad this morning.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 8 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 11, 1866.

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major*, A. A. G.

[Telegram.—Received 9.20 p. m., 6th.]

GETTYSBURG, July 6, 1863—2 p. m.

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

Yesterday I sent General Sedgwick with the 6th corps in pursuit of the enemy towards Fairfield and a brigade of cavalry towards Cashtown. General Sedgwick's report indicating a large force of the enemy in the mountains, I deemed it prudent to suspend the movement to Middletown until I could be certain the enemy were evacuating Cumberland valley.

I find great difficulty in getting reliable information, but, from all I can learn, the enemy is retreating, very much crippled and hampered with his trains. General Sedgwick reports that the gap at Fairfield was very formidable, and would enable a small force to hold my column in check for a long time. I have accordingly resumed the movement to Middletown, and I expect by to-morrow night to assemble the army in that vicinity. Supplies will be then provided, and as soon as possible I will cross South mountain and proceed in search of the enemy. Your despatch requiring me to assume the general command of the forces in the field under General Couch has been received. I have nothing of the position or strength of his command, except the advance under General Smith, which I ordered here, and which I desire should furnish a necessary force to guard this place while the enemy is in the vicinity.

A brigade of infantry and one of cavalry, with two batteries, will be left to watch the enemy at Fairfield, and to follow them whenever they evacuate the gap. I shall send general instructions to General Couch to move down the Cumberland valley as far as the enemy evacuate it, and keep up communication with me; but from all the information I can obtain I do not rely on any active co-operation in battle with this force. If I can get the army of the Potomac in hand in the valley, and the enemy have not crossed the river, I shall give him battle, trusting, should misfortune overtake me, that sufficient number of my force, in connexion with what you have in Washington, would reach that place so as to render it secure.

General Trimble, of the confederate army, was found to-day wounded just outside of Gettysburg. General Kempse was found mortally wounded in the road to Fairfield, and a large number of wounded, estimated at several thousand. Generals Heth, Wade Hampton, Jenkins, and Pinder, are reported wounded. The losses of the enemy were no doubt very great, and he must be proportionately crippled. My headquarters will be here to-night, and to-morrow I expect to be at Frederick.

My cavalry have been attacking the enemy on both flanks, inflicting as much injury as possible.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 10, 1865

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

[Received 10 p. m., June 6.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Gettysburg, July 6, 1863—6 p. m.*Major General COUCH, *Harrisburg* :

The general-in-chief has directed me to assume the general command of all the troops you have in the field. This, in view of my ignorance of the number, organization, and position of your troops, is a very difficult matter. Lee, from all I can learn, is withdrawing towards Hagerstown and Williamsport. I propose to move *via* Middletown and South mountain, and if the condition of the roads and the implements in his way should delay him I may have an opportunity of attacking him. In this you can co-operate either by directly re-enforcing me by moving down the valley, establishing communication with my army, or your movement may be confined, as I previously desired it to be, to a simple demonstration on these points. I do not wish to hamper you with instructions, but leave to your knowledge of your troops and of the necessity the defence of the Susquehanna. I think I have inflicted such injury on Lee that he will hardly contemplate another demonstration against Harrisburg; still, if I have to meet with disaster, such a contingency should be held in view. I would like your opinion, with the remark that all the assistance I can get will be not only needed, but most gratefully received. General Smith being very near me, I have ordered him to this place, where a force should be left to cover our withdrawal and protect the hospitals and public property. If you can spare Smith I should like to have him so soon as the movements of the enemy indicate a force to be no longer necessary at this point. My headquarters to-night will be here; to-morrow night at Frederick. The army is in motion now.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Telegram.—Received 1.30 a. m., 7th.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 6, 1863—8 p. m.*

General H. W. HALLECK :

I shall be very glad to have the four regiments from No. 9, now at Baltimore, which you propose to add to General French's command. They should be put in marching order with shelter tents.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

FREDERICK, *July 7, 1863—12 m.*

Major General HALLECK :

Troops sent here for immediate service should have, at least, their haversacks and cart-ridge-boxes filled, which was not the case with those from Baltimore; hence a delay.

WM. H. FRENCH, *Major General.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

HARRISBURG, *July 7, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK :

It is reported to me positively that the enemy intend occupying Maryland heights until they recross the river. Please send copy to General Meade.

D. N. COUCH, *Major General.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 7, 1863.*

Major General MEADE and Major General FRENCH, *Frederick :*

What force has been sent to Maryland heights, and how many have reached there? It seems to me at the present to be a most important point, and should be held with force sufficient to prevent its occupation by the enemy. Should his crossing above be impossible, he will probably attempt to take and hold that position till he can make the passage.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 12 m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 7, 1863.*

Major General MEADE, *Army of the Potomac :*

I have received from the President the following note, which I respectfully communicate.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

“WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington, July 7, 1863.*

“Major General HALLECK:

“We have certain information that Vicksburg surrendered to General Grant on the 4th of July. Now, if General Meade can complete his work so gloriously prosecuted thus far by the literal or substantial destruction of Lee's army, the rebellion will be over.

“Yours truly,

“A. LINCOLN.”

Sent 1.35 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Received 1.15 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington, D. C., July 7, 1863.*

Major General MEADE, *Commanding Army of the Potomac :*

The enemy surrendered Vicksburg to General Grant on the 4th of July.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 2.40 p. m.

[Telegram.—Received 2.55 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 7, 1863.*

Major General G. G. MEADE, *Army of the Potomac :*

It gives me great pleasure to inform you that you have been appointed a brigadier general<sup>1</sup> in the regular army, to rank from July third, the date of your brilliant victory at Gettysburg.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 3.10 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 4.30 p. m., 7th.]

FREDERICK, *July 7, 1863—4 p. m.*

Major General HALLECK :

An officer of the cavalry from the front reports the enemy's army occupying Hagerstown and Williamsport, and guarding their artillery and train, which they cannot cross. So soon as my command is supplied and their trains up I shall move.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*

Official :

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1865.*

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 4.45 p. m.]

FREDERICK, MD., *July 7, 1863—3.10 p. m.*

General HALLECK :

General Buford reports that he attacked Williamsport yesterday, but found it guarded by a large force of infantry and artillery. Heavy forces were coming into Williamsport all night. French having destroyed their bridges, the river being unfordable, they are crossing in country flatboats—a slow operation. My army will be assembling to-morrow at Middletown; I will immediately move on Williamsport. Should the enemy succeed in crossing the river before I can reach him, I should like to have your views of subsequent operations—whether to follow up the army in the valley or cross below or near Washington.

GEO. G. MEADE *Major General.*

Official copy :

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1865.*

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 5 p. m.]

FREDERICK, MD., *July 7, 1863—4 p. m.*

Major General HALLECK :

I have received your despatch announcing my appointment as a brigadier general in the regular army. Please convey to the President my grateful thanks for this honor, and receive for yourself my thanks for the kind manner you have conveyed its notification.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*

Official copy :

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1865.*

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 5.25 p. m.]

FREDERICK, *July 7, 1863—4 p. m.*

General HALLECK :

Maryland heights are at present occupied by Kenley's brigade, 1,700 men. Three thousand additional men and two batteries of artillery left here this morning for that place. No indication of the enemy this side of Williamsport and Hagerstown. The bridge at Harper's Ferry was rendered impassable at both sides by General French.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*

Official copy :

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1865.*

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received 5.45 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Frederick, Md., July 7, 1863—4.40 p. m.*

Major General COUCH, *Harrisburg, Pa.:*

An order was sent this morning to General Smith to continue the pursuit of the enemy to the best advantage, and not to go to Gettysburg. The Potomac river is bank full at Williamsport, and there is no bridge. General Buford attempted to take Williamsport yesterday; the enemy's infantry compelled him to retire. There are a good many wagons at Williamsport. Troops and wagons are being ferried over very slowly in two flat-boats. The main army of the enemy has not crossed, and must fight us before he can.

By order of the general commanding:

G. K. WARREN, *Chief of Staff.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., July 7, 1863.*

Major General MEADE, *Frederick:*

You have given the enemy a stunning blow at Gettysburg. Follow it up and give him another before he can cross the Potomac. When he crosses, circumstances will determine whether it will be best to pursue him by the Shenandoah valley or this side of the Blue Ridge. There is strong evidence that he is short of artillery ammunition, and, if vigorously pressed, he must suffer.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 8.30 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., July 7, 1863.*

Major General MEADE, *Frederick:*

I have seen your despatch to General Couch of 4.40 p. m. You are perfectly right. Push forward and fight Lee before he can cross the Potomac.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 9 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 9 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 8, 1863—8 a. m.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

I desire to have the commission of major general conferred on Brigadier General A. A. Humphreys, that he may act as my chief of staff. Can this be done?

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Telegram.—Received 10.45 a. m.]

FREDERICK, MD., *July 8, 1863.*

GENERAL HALLECK: I have ordered General Naglee, with the eight (8) regiments of his command, to Harper's Ferry, to re-enforce General Kenly, and to assume command. This will make a force of between six and seven thousand men. He is directed to hold his com-



mand in readiness to move forward to my support, if required. I have also sent a bridge train there with an engineer party, the bridge to be thrown over only when any command, cavalry or others, should arrive there to cross. I leave the seventh (7th) New York regiment and a battery of six pieces to defend their depot against any raids.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., July 8, 1863.*

Major General COUCH, *Chambersburg :*

Your views in regard to repair of railroad are approved.

I think all the available forces in your department should be thrown forward to assist General Meade. They can be of no use at present elsewhere.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 11 a. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., July 8, 1863.*

Major General SCHENCK, *Baltimore :*

Send to General Meade the two New York regiments *en route*, and everything else you can spare.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 11 a. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 8, 1863.*

Major General MEADE, *Frederick :*

There is reliable information that the enemy is crossing at Williamsport; the opportunity to attack his divided forces should not be lost. The President is urgent and anxious that your army should move against him, by forced marches.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 12.30 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 8, 1863.*

Major General MEADE, *Army of the Potomac :*

Brigadier General Humphreys has been made major general, as you requested.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 2.20 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 2.55 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 8, 1863—2 p. m.*

Major General HALLECK:

General Couch from scouts learns that the train at Williamsport is crossing very slowly. So long as the river is unfordable the enemy cannot cross. My cavalry reports that they had a fight at Funkstown, through which they drove the enemy to Hagerstown, when a large infantry force was seen. From all I can gather, the enemy extend from Hagerstown to Williamsport, covering the march of their train.

Their cavalry and infantry pickets are advanced to the Hagerstown and Sharpsburg pike, on general line of the Antietam. We hold Boonsboro', and our pickets, four miles in front towards Hagerstown, are in contact with the enemy's pickets. My army is assembling slowly; the rains of yesterday and last night have made all roads but pikes almost impassable; artillery and wagons are stalled. It will take time to collect them together. A large portion of the men are barefooted; shoes will arrive at Frederick to-day, and will be issued as soon as possible. The spirit of the army is high; the men are ready and willing to make every exertion to push forward; the very first moment I can get the different commands, the artillery and cavalry, properly supplied and in hand, I will move forward. Be assured I most earnestly desire to try the fortunes of war with the enemy on this side of the river, hoping through Providence and the bravery of my men to settle the question; but I should do wrong not to frankly tell you of the difficulties encountered.

I expect to find the enemy in a strong position, well covered with artillery, and I do not desire to imitate his example at Gettysburg, and assault a position where the chances were so greatly against success; I wish, in advance, to moderate the expectations of those who, in ignorance of the difficulties to be encountered, may expect too much. All that I can do under the circumstances I pledge this army to do.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER. *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 3.20 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 8, 1863—3 p. m.*

Major General HALLECK:

My information as to the crossing of the enemy does not agree with that just received in your despatch. His whole force is in position between Funkstown and Williamsport. I have just received information that he has driven my cavalry force in front of Boonsboro'. My army is and has been making forced marches short of rations and barefoot; one corps marched yesterday and last night over thirty miles. I take occasion to repeat that I will use my utmost effort to push forward this army.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 8, 1863.*

Major General MEADE, *Army of the Potomac:*

Do not understand me as expressing any dissatisfaction. On the contrary, your army has done most nobly. I only wish to give you opinions formed from information received here. It is telegraphed from near Harper's Ferry that the enemy have been crossing for the last two days. It is also reported that they have a bridge across. If Lee's army is so divided by the river, the importance of attacking the part on this side is incalculable. Such an opportunity may never occur again. If, on the contrary, he has massed his whole force on the Antietam, time must be taken also to concentrate your forces. Your opportunities for information are better than mine.

General Kelly was ordered some days ago to concentrate at Hancock and attack the enemy's right. General Brooks is also moving from Pittsburg to re-enforce Kelly. All troops arriving from New York and Fort Monroe are sent directly to Harper's Ferry, unless you order differently. You will have forces sufficient to render your victory certain. My only fear now is that the enemy may escape by crossing the river.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 4.40 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SUSQUEHANNA,  
*Harrisburg, July 8, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK, *Commander-in-Chief U. S. A.:*

SIR: I intend going to Chambersburg in the morning, leaving my office here for the present. Troops are thrown into the Valley as fast as the railroad can do it, which, at present, is not more than 3,000 for 24 hours. About (10) ten regiments have been equipped in two days.

I shall use my judgment in the manner of effecting a junction with Meade, having in view the peculiar kind of force under my command, endeavoring to keep the advantage of the mountains in my favor, trusting that I can be of some use to him in his great efforts. Fear is expressed that the New York troops will not march over the line. A great many of them march as though they would halt if danger threatens in front. I hope for the best.

D. N. COUCH, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 9.41 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 9, 1863.*

Major General MEADE, *Army of the Potomac:*

If no arrangement was made between you and General Lee for the exchange and parole of prisoners of war by designating places of delivery, as provided in seventh article of cartel, no parole given by the troops of either army is valid. Please answer if any such agreement was made.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 11.20 a. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Received 11.40 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 9, 1863—11.30 a. m.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

In answer to your despatch of 9.40, I have to state that General Lee made a proposition to me for an exchange of prisoners on the field of Gettysburg, which I declined accepting.

[GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Received 12.10 p. m., July 9.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Middletown, July 9, 1863—11 a. m.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

The army is moving in three columns, the right column having in it three corps. The line occupied to-day with the advance will be on the other side of the mountains, from Boonsboro' to Rohrsersville. Two corps will march without their artillery, the animals being

completely exhausted—many falling on the road. The enemy's infantry were driven back yesterday evening from Boonsboro'—or, rather, they retired, on being pressed—towards Hagerstown. I am still under the impression that Lee's whole army is between Hagerstown and Williamsport, with an advance at Middleburg, on the road to Greencastle, observing Couch. The state of the river and the difficulty of crossing has rendered it imperative on him to have his army, artillery, and trains ready to receive my attack. I propose to move on a line from Boonsboro' towards the centre of the line from Hagerstown to Williamsport, my flank looking to the river, and my right towards the mountains, keeping the road to Frederick in my rear and centre. I shall try to keep as concentrated as the roads by which I can move will admit, so that, should the enemy attack, I can move to meet; and if he assumes the defensive, I can deploy as I think proper. I transmit a copy of despatch sent to General Smith, at Waynesboro'; one of like tenor was sent to General Couch. The operations of both these officers should be made to conform to mine. They can readily ascertain my progress from scouts and by the movements of the enemy; and if the forces under them are of any practical value, they could join my right flank and assist in the attack. My cavalry will be pushed to-day all to the front, on the right and left, and I hope will collect information. It is with the greatest difficulty that I can obtain any reliable information of the enemy. I send a despatch received this morning from General Neil, in command of a brigade of infantry and cavalry, who followed the retreat of the enemy through Fairfield, and effected a junction with General Smith at Waynesboro'. A copy of my despatch to General Smith is also sent you. When I speak of two corps having to leave their batteries behind them, I should have stated that they remained at Frederick to get new horses and shoe the others, and that they will rejoin their corps this p. m. The object of the remark was to show the delay. I think the decisive battle of the war will be fought in a few days. In view of its momentous consequences, I desire to adopt such measures as in my judgment will tend to insure success, even though these may be deemed tardy.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding.*

11.30 A. M.

A deserter has just been brought within our lines, who reports the enemy's army all between Hagerstown and Williamsport; that they have brought up a bridge from Winchester, which is now thrown across at Williamsport; that they are using this bridge not to cross their forces, but to bring over supplies; that the men are in fair spirits, and the talk among them is, they must try it again. This deserter says he belongs to the artillery of Stuart's command. I send the information for what it is worth.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding.*

General COUCH, *Harrisburg:*

The enclosed copy of instructions to General Smith is sent for your information and guidance. More definite directions will be sent as soon as it is possible to give them.

A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

JULY 9—9 a. m.

General W. F. SMITH:

The army will occupy the line from Boonsboro' to Rohrsersville to-day. The army, both men and horses, is very much exhausted, and cannot advance as rapidly as desired. Although the information respecting the position of the enemy is not very definite, yet he is believed not to have crossed any large part of it over the Potomac, but to be concentrating it between Hagerstown and Williamsport. Under these circumstances definite instructions cannot be sent to you. You will look to the security of your command. Join this army when you can do so with security, unless the operations of General Couch require you to unite with him. Definite instructions will be sent you as soon as practicable. Although highly desirable that General Neil should rejoin his corps, yet he must be governed by your instructions.

S. WILLIAMS, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS LIGHT DIVISION, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 9, 1836.

General S. WILLIAMS:

SIR: Baldy Smith is here with his command. Colonel Gregg, with brigade of cavalry, who leaves for Boonsboro' to-night, will send this. A scout brings information that Lee has one corps intrenched on the Williamsport pike from Hagerstown, another on the Boonsboro' pike, and Early is said to be up towards Middleburg, (*quien sabe*) between Greencastle and Hagerstown. The news of the capture of Vicksburg is confirmed. Have sent a cavalry

reconnaissance towards Hagerstown this morning. It has not returned. Since writing the above have felt the enemy's pickets with a regiment of cavalry at a bridge four or five miles from Hagerstown. They are very stubborn. We drove them away, but they returned as we retired. General Smith is in with his mixed command; am delighted to have the benefit of his counsel and advice. We are all right, but watch Early's division on my right towards Middleburg.

THOMAS H. NELLE, *Brigadier General, Commanding.*

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[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 9, 1863.*

Major General G. G. MEADE, *Army of the Potomac:*

The evidence that Lee's army will fight north of the Potomac seems reliable. In that case you will want all your forces in hand. Kelley is collecting at Hancock. I have directed him to push forward, so as to take part in the coming battle. Brooks's militia refuse to cross the Pennsylvania lines. Everything I can get here will be pushed on to Harper's Ferry, from which place you can call them in to your left.

Don't be influenced by any despatch from here against your own judgment. Regard them as suggestions only. Our information here is not always correct.

Take any horses or supplies you can find in the country. They can be settled for afterwards.

Would it not be well to fortify the Hagerstown gap through the South mountain as a point of support?

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 3 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

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[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 9, 1863.*

Brigadier General KELLEY, *Hancock, Va.:*

If Lee gives battle don't be absent, but come in and help General Meade gain a victory. A battle is not far off.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 3.20 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

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[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 9, 1863.*

Major General SCHENCK, *Baltimore:*

Can't you squeeze out some more troops to send to Harper's Ferry? Try it. Baltimore and the railroads are perfectly safe. Every available man should be sent to assist General Meade. There are more troops to arrive at Baltimore, which can be used there should it be necessary. In the mean time everything possible must be sent to the front. There is another big battle pending.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 4 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, <sup>8</sup>Washington, D. C., July 9, 1863.

Major General MEADE, *Army of the Potomac* :

Two full regiments and two complete batteries are ordered to leave here to-night. Three brigades are on their way, and may be expected to-morrow or the day after. They will be sent to Harper's Ferry unless you wish otherwise.

I shall do everything in my power to re-enforce you. I fully appreciate the importance of the coming battle.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 4.20 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 11, 1865.

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 7.10 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 9, 1863—5 p. m.

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

I transmit herewith a copy of instructions this moment sent to General Naglee at Harper's Ferry.

Very respectfully, &c.,

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General Commanding*.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 9—5.20 p. m.

“Brigadier General NAGLEE, *Commanding at Harper's Ferry* :

“Organize the re-enforcements in brigades as fast as they arrive, and send them to join the left of the army through Rohrersville, seeing that they have haversacks and three days' rations. First secure a garrison of three or four thousand men to garrison Maryland heights against a *coup de main*.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS, *Major General, Chief of Staff*.”

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 11, 1865.

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *Assistant Adjutant General*.

[Telegram.]

BALTIMORE, July 9, 1863.

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

The 17th New York, two hundred and ninety-nine (299,) and the 18th, one hundred and sixty strong, have just arrived. They are perfectly raw, and not filled out. I will supply them ammunition, rations, &c., and get them off by daylight to Frederick or Harper's Ferry. After General Naglee reported here, we overhauled the 43d Massachusetts infantry, and the result was that I got off yesterday two hundred of the men, with their officers, to go to General French, and sent three hundred of them to Boston.

ROBERT C. SCHENCK, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 11, 1865.

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 9.45 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
July 18, 1863—9 a. m.

Major General HALLECK :

Means of transportation and supplies required by the re-enforcements of this army being at Frederick, it would facilitate their junction with the army if the reinforcements were sent to Frederick instead of Harper's Ferry.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 11, 1865.

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 10, 1863.*

Major General MEADE, *Army of the Potomac:*

You can stop at Frederick the re-enforcements ordered to Harper's Ferry. Those ordered hereafter will be directed to Frederick, as you request. I fear the three additional brigades may not reach here before to-morrow night.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 11 a. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 11, 1865.

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 2.55 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Near Mountain House, July 10, 1863.*

General HALLECK :

In consequence of the very efficient service and the material aid rendered to me by the cavalry during my recent operations, I would esteem it a personal favor if the President would assign Major General Pleasanton to the command of the cavalry corps, the position I found him in when I assumed command.

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 10, 1865.

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.—Received 3.10 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
July 10, 1863—1 p. m.

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

The information received to-day indicates that the enemy occupy positions extending from the Potomac, near Falling Waters, through Downsville to Funkstown, and to the northeast of Hagerstown, Ewell's corps being to the northeast of Hagerstown, Longstreet at Funkstown, and A. P. Hill on their right. These positions they are said to be intrenching. I am advancing on a line perpendicular to the line from Hagerstown to Williamsport, and the army will this evening occupy a position extending from the Boonsboro' and Hagerstown road at a point one mile beyond Beaver creek to Bakersville, near the Potomac. Our cavalry advanced this morning, drove in the enemy's cavalry on

the Boonsboro' pike to within a mile of Funkstown, when the enemy displayed a large force, and opened a fire from heavy guns, (20-pounders.) I shall advance cautiously on the same line to-morrow until I can develop more fully the enemy's force and position, upon which my future operations will depend. General Smith is still at Waynesboro'. A despatch was received from him at that place this morning. Instructions similar to those of yesterday were sent to him.

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

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[Received 3.10 p. m.]

WASHINGTON, *D. C., July 10, 1863.*

Major General MEADE, *Army of the Potomac:*

Major General SCHENCK, *Baltimore, Md.:*

Brigadier General L. THOMAS, *Harrisburg, Pa.:*

It has been understood and agreed between Colonel Ludlow and Mr. Ould, agents for exchange of prisoners, that paroles not given as prescribed in section seven of the cartel, after May 22, are to be considered as null and void, and that the officers and men of the respective parties paroled not in accordance with that section of the cartel will be returned to duty without exchange. They will be so returned to duty.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 5.05 p. m.

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[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington D. C., July 10, 1863.*

Major General MEADE, *Army of Potomac:*

I think it will be best for you to postpone a general battle till you can concentrate all your forces, and get up your reserves and re-enforcements. I will push on the troops as fast as they arrive. It would be well to have staff officers at the Monocacy to direct the troops arriving where to go, and to see that they are properly fitted out. They should join you by forced marches. Beware of partial combats. Bring up and hurl upon the enemy all your forces, good and bad.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 9 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Near Mountain House, July 10, 1863.*

General SMITH, and General NEIL, *at Waynesboro:*

There is an abundance of rations at Gettysburg. You have wagons. If more are needed make requisitions on Captain Rankin, at Gettysburg, or impress them from the country people. While in your present position you must supply yourself from Gettysburg. No further instructions can be sent to you than to occupy the enemy to the best advantage in your front, and be prepared to join us or General Couch, as the movements of the enemy will permit or may require. We are advancing to-day. Our left to-night will be at Bakersville, and our right on the Boonsboro' and Hagerstown road between Antietam and Beaver creek.

By command of Major General Meade.

S. WILLIAMS, *A. A. G.*



[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., July 11, 1863.*Major General MEADE, *Army of the Potomac*:

Your telegram in relation to General Pleasonton has been shown to the Secretary of War. There is no intention to supersede him in command of the cavalry. General Stone-  
man remains here. There is, however, an objection to any formal order at present.

The three brigades are arriving. Assign them and their officers as you may deem best, without regard to present or former organizations.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 12 m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 5.30 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Antietam Creek, July 11, 1863—4 p. m.*Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Commander-in-Chief*:

The line of this army was advanced cautiously this morning in the direction stated in yesterday's despatch, and at this time its right rests on the road from Smoketown to Funkstown, about two miles from the latter—the line crossing the Antietam, passing through Jones's crossroads, the left being near Wash run. Strong reconnoissances of infantry are being pushed out towards Funkstown, on the left bank of the Antietam, towards the same point on the right bank, and on the road from Sharpsburg to Funkstown; at the same time cavalry force is pushing out on the left on the Boonsboro' and Williamsport road, and on the right towards Hagerstown from Chewsville and Leitersburg. The cavalry on the Chewsville road advanced without opposition to within a short distance (about a mile and a half) of Hagerstown. The cavalry force in the direction of Leitersburg and that advancing towards Williamsport have not yet been heard from. Everything indicates that the enemy is massing between Hagerstown and Williamsport, and from various sources it is stated that they are intrenching.

From the representations of General Spinola, that the nine-months men of his command could not be relied upon, as their time had nearly expired, and my own experience of troops under such circumstances, I have directed the regiments of his brigade to be posted in the rear. Troops of this character can be of little service unless they are pledged to serve beyond their terms of enlistment, and the supplies they consume and the space they occupy on the lines of communication can be illy spared; besides, their presence may have an injurious effect upon other troops. I do not, therefore, desire to be re-enforced by such troops, unless they have pledged themselves to remain beyond their terms of service, and until I can dispense with their services.

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding*.HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1865.*

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 11, 1863.*Major General MEADE, *Army of the Potomac*:

The nine-months men told me that they were willing to serve through this crisis under any one but General Spinola, but would not serve under him, as they regarded him as worthless. You are authorized to relieve him and send him away.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 9 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

CHAMBERSBURG, *July 12, 1863—12.30 p. m.*General WARREN, *Headquarters Army of the Potomac* :

It is reported that the rebels crossed a good many horses yesterday at Williamsport, swimming the river, and that fourteen flats were nearly completed yesterday. I can't find out that any large force of the enemy are at Fairview.

My second division will move down so soon as my provisions are up.

D. N. COUCH, *Major General.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

[Received 2.40 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 12, 1863.*Major General COUCH, *Harrisburg* :

My troops occupied Hagerstown this morning, the enemy retiring towards Williamsport before them. The enemy are intrenched on a line one mile and a half from Hagerstown, in the direction of dam number four on the river. The road is open to you to Hagerstown.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General Commanding.*

[Telegram, in cipher.—Received 8 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 12, 1863—4.30 p. m.*Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

Upon advancing my right flank across the Antietam this morning the enemy abandoned Funkstown and Hagerstown, and my line now extends from the latter place to Fairplay. The advance of the cavalry on the right showed the enemy to be strongly posted on the Hagerstown and Williamsport road, about a mile and a half from Hagerstown. On the left the cavalry advance showed them to be in position back of St. James College and at Downsville. Their position runs along the high ground from Downsville to near Hagerstown. This position they are prospecting. Batteries are established on it. It is my intention to attack them to-morrow unless something intervenes to prevent it, for the reason that delay will strengthen the enemy and will not increase my force.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General Commanding.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

[Telegram.—Received 6.40 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 13, 1863—5 p. m.*Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

In my despatch of yesterday I stated that it was my intention to attack the enemy to-day unless something intervened to prevent it. Upon calling my corps commanders together and submitting the question to them, five out of six were unqualifiedly opposed to it under these circumstances, in view of the momentous consequences attendant upon a failure to succeed. I did not feel myself authorized to attack until after I had made more careful examination of the enemy's position, strength, and defensive works. These examinations are now being made.

So far as completed they show the enemy to be strongly prospected on a ridge running from the rear of Hagerstown, past Downsville, to the Potomac. I shall continue these

reconnoissances with the expectation of finding some weak point, upon which, if I succeed, I shall hazard an attack. General Smith, with the advanced division of General Couch's forces, has arrived here to-day; but from the organization and condition of these troops and the short time they have to serve, I cannot place much reliance upon them.

Difficulties arising with the troops sent me, whose terms of service are about expiring, respecting the dates at which they expire, I beg to be informed by the department upon that head respecting each such regiment sent me.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 13, 1863.*

Brigadier General B. F. KELLEY, *Fairview :*

Move up upon the enemy's flank and rear, and attack and harass him wherever you can. If you can reach his crossing annoy him as much as possible.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 9 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 13, 1863.*

Major General COUCH, *Chambersburg :*

You telegraph to General Meade that you cannot move for want of transportation. Take it wherever you can find it; and if you cannot find any, go without it, and live on the country. Don't stop at trifles at this crisis, but prove yourself equal to the emergency.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 9 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 13, 1863.*

Major General G. G. MEADE, *Army of the Potomac :*

Yours of 5 p. m. is received. You are strong enough to attack and defeat the enemy before he can effect a crossing. Act upon your own judgment. Make your generals execute your orders. Call no council of war. It is proverbial that councils of war never fight. Re-enforcements are pushed on as rapidly as possible. Don't let the enemy escape.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 9.20 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 12.10 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

July 14, 1863—11 a. m.

General HALLECK :

On advancing my army this morning, with a view of ascertaining the exact position of the enemy, and attacking him if the result of the examination should justify me, I found on reaching his lines that they were evacuated. I immediately put my army in pursuit; the cavalry in advance at this period. My forces occupy Williamsport, but I have not yet heard from the advance on Falling Waters, where it is reported he crossed his infantry on a bridge. Your instructions, as to further movements in case the enemy is entirely across the river, are desired.

G. G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 10, 1865.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.]

CHAMBERSBURG, July 14, 1863.—9.30 a. m.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

General Meade has declined to take the responsibility of ordering my forces to join him. Smith's division is with him. Dana's division, twelve thousand strong, will probably be at Greencastle to-night. I have notified General Meade that it will be at his disposal.

D. N. COUCH, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 10, 1865.

Official copy:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, D. C., July 14, 1863.

Major General MEADE, *Army of the Potomac:*

The enemy should be pursued and cut up wherever he may have gone. This pursuit may or may not be upon the rear or flank, as circumstances may require. The inner flank towards Washington presents the greatest advantages. Supply yourself in the country as far as possible. I cannot advise details, as I do not know where Lee's army is, nor where are your pontoon bridges.

I need hardly say to you that the escape of Lee's army, without another battle, has created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the President, and it will require an active and energetic pursuit on your part to remove the impression that it has not been sufficiently active heretofore.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Sent 1 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, April 11, 1865.

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, D. C., July 14, 1863.

Major General MEADE, *Army of the Potomac:*

Should you cross at Berlin or below Harper's Ferry, your supplies for the time can be sent by Baltimore and Ohio railroad. General Meigs will therefore recall General Haupt

and railroad brigade to repair the Manassas road, so that supplies can meet you by Thoroughfare Gap or Warrenton, should you require them there.

Telegraph condition of things.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., July 14, 1863.*

Brigadier General KELLY, *Fairview, Md. :*

General Meade telegraphs that enemy's main army has crossed at Falling Waters. If so, you should also cross to act on his flank. If any forces are still on north side, try and cut them up.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 2.40 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.—Received 3.10 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*July 14, 1863—2.30 p. m.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief :*

the President (conveyed in your despatch of 1 p. m. this day) is, in my judgment, so undeserved that I feel compelled most respectfully to ask to be immediately relieved from the

Having performed my duty conscientiously and to the best of my ability, the censure of command of this army.

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 3.15 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 14, 1863—3 p. m.*

General HALLECK :

My cavalry now occupy Falling Waters, having overtaken and captured a brigade of infantry, fifteen hundred (1,500) strong, two (2) guns, two caissons, two battle-flags, and a large number of small-arms. The enemy are all across the Potomac.

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.—Received 4 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 14—3.30 p. m.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief :*

The difficulty of supplying the army in the Valley of the Shenandoah, owing to the destruction of the railroad, has decided me to move by Berlin.

I shall pursue and harass the retreat of the enemy with my cavalry.

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1863.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

## ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

[Telegram.]

WILLIAMSPORT, MARYLAND, *via* CHERRY RUN,  
July 14, 1863—3.30 p. m.

Major General HALLECK :

Just arrived. Find that the enemy crossed the river during the night and early this morning. River now rising rapidly.

B. F. KELLY, *Brigadier General*.HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Telegram, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, D. C., July 14, 1863.*Major General MEADE, *Army of the Potomac* :

My telegram stating the disappointment of the President at the escape of Lee's army was not intended as a censure, but as a stimulus to an active pursuit. It is not deemed a sufficient cause for your application to be relieved.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 4.30 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 11, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *Major, A. A. G.*

[Telegram.—Received 9.40 p. m., in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
July 14, 1863—8.30 p. m.Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief* :

My cavalry have captured five hundred prisoners, in addition to those previously reported. General Pettigrew, of the confederate army, was killed this morning in the attack on the enemy's rear guard. His body is in our hands. A division of my cavalry crossed the river at Harper's Ferry to-day, who will pursue and harass the retreat of the enemy, and give me information of his movements. General Kelly, with an infantry force, and Averell's cavalry, have reached Williamsport. Am I authorized to detain him here to watch the Potomac, while I move to Berlin?

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding*.HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *April 10, 1865.*

Official copy :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received 8.20 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington, D. C., July 15, 1863.*Major General MEADE, *Commanding Army of the Potomac* :

Official information is received that Port Hudson unconditionally surrendered to General Banks on the 8th instant, thus opening the Mississippi river.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

Sent 8.30 p. m.

*Testimony of Major General Godfrey Weitzel.*WASHINGTON, *May 18, 1865.*

Major General GODFREY WEITZEL recalled and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. We desire to examine you in relation to the call of the rebel legislature of Virginia to assemble in Richmond, purporting to have been authorized or sanctioned by you. Will you state how that call came to be issued, and all about it ?

Answer. I received an order from President Lincoln to permit the call to be made. Of course, I never would have thought of doing any such thing myself. The original order is in the hands of Major General Ord, but I have his certified copy. When General Ord assumed command at Richmond, the original order was still in force, and I left it with him. The night before I left Richmond I received a telegram from Mr. Lincoln to annul or rescind that call; that telegram I turned over to General Ord for his execution, as I was to leave the next morning with my command.

Question. Have you a certified copy of the original order with you now ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Please furnish it to the committee.

Answer. The witness handed the committee a paper, which read as follows :

## "HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

*"City Point, April 6, 1865.*

"It has been intimated to me that the gentlemen who have acted as the legislature of Virginia, in support of the rebellion, may now desire to assemble at Richmond, and take measures to withdraw the Virginia troops and other support from resistance to the general government. If they attempt it, give them permission and protection, until, if at all, they attempt some action hostile to the United States, in which case you will notify them, give them reasonable time to leave, and at the end of which time arrest any who remain. Allow Judge Campbell to see this, but do not make it public.

"Yours, &c.,

"A. LINCOLN.

"Major General WEITZEL,  
"Richmond, Virginia."

"I certify that the above is a true copy of the original in my possession.

"E. O. C. ORD,

"Major General Volunteers."

Question. You say this is a true copy of the original order from Mr. Lincoln ?

Answer. Yes, sir. The original was handed to me by Senator Wilkinson, and it is now in possession of General Ord, to whom I gave it, because the call was in the papers when he assumed command there, and I thought he ought to have it.

Question. What was your position and command at the time you received that order ?

Answer. I was in the city of Richmond, and was commanding officer of all the United States forces in Richmond.

Question. Did you conceive any idea of doing such a thing as that until you received this order from the President ?

Answer. Not the most remote.

Question. Was it in accordance with your own private judgment of what ought to have been done?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Did you have any conversation with the President previous to the time he issued this order?

Answer. I had conversations with him, but not upon this subject, except that he said to me, "General, probably I may send you a letter to-morrow morning from City Point, which will guide you," or some remark like that.

Question. At what time did you receive this order?

Answer. Senator Wilkinson handed it to me on the morning after it was written.

Question. And in accordance with this direction you issued the call for the rebel legislature to assemble?

Answer. I did not issue the call. I met a committee of those people, and told them they might put a call in the papers, and I would approve it.

Question. What was done under the call before it was rescinded by order of the President?

Answer. Nothing had been done under it, except sending out passes to nearly all the men mentioned in the call.

Question. Where was the President when he issued the order to rescind the call?

Answer. He was in Washington city. The order to rescind was issued on the night of the 12th of April.

Question. Had any members of the rebel legislature assembled in Richmond prior to the call being rescinded?

Answer. Not that I know of.

Question. Have you a copy of the order rescinding this call?

Answer. I have not; General Ord has it.

Question. Was there anything more in it than simply a direction to annul or rescind the call?

Answer. I do not remember the language, except that it said that the necessity for that call had then passed.

Question. Is there anything further you wish to state in reference to this matter, by way of explanation or otherwise?

Answer. No, sir, except that I simply obeyed the order as one from my superior officer. I had my own views about the matter; but there was the order, and I obeyed it.

Question. I have seen in the papers a statement to the effect that you removed a colored guard from about Mrs. Lee's house or premises, at her request, and put white troops in their place. How was that?

Answer. That statement is untrue; there is not the least foundation for it.

Question. It has also been stated that the city was guarded to some extent by colored troops at first, and that they were removed in consequence of the objection of the people there.

Answer. That is untrue also. The provost guard was a brigade of General Deven's division. The way that brigade happened to come in was this: when I had got about a quarter of a mile within the city limits, I found that a perfect mob had taken possession of the city, and were robbing and plundering, blacks and whites. The city was on fire in three or four places, the powder magazines were blowing up, and shells were exploding every minute; it was a perfect pandemonium. I saw the necessity at once of getting some troops in to preserve order, and I sent one of my aides-de-camp back with orders to get the first brigade he could find, and bring it in to act as provost guard. I did not designate any particular brigade, and he brought in this one of General Deven's division.

Then, in accordance with instructions, I directed all the rest of my troops to march around the outskirts of the city and take possession of the inner lines of



redoubts just outside of the city. The only body of troops, which marched through the city, which had not received this order, were the 5th Massachusetts colored cavalry and the 20th New York cavalry.

There was another statement in the papers which I should like to set right. Question. You can state anything you desire.

Answer. There was a statement that I had marched my white troops through Richmond and had not marched my colored troops through there. That statement probably arose from the fact that the white division of the 24th corps was reviewed by me on the Saturday after I got into Richmond. I had intended to review both divisions together. But General Devens, who is an old brigadier general, came to me and said that he did not like to have the two divisions reviewed together; that General Coxe was a younger brigadier general than he was, though acting under his (General Coxe's) appointment as brevet major general, and that neither would like to be placed on the left of the other. I said, "Very well, I can get rid of that difficulty by reviewing you on different days; I will review you on Saturday, and Coxe on Monday." On Monday it became necessary, from the reports I had received, to send out reconnoitring parties. And as nearly all of those parties had to go out on roads which were held by colored troops, I used them for that purpose.

It would have been unjust to have reviewed them on Tuesday, just after they had made a march of twenty-five or thirty miles, and I put it off till Wednesday. I said to the people there, "You have tried to get up colored troops and failed; I will show you a review of colored troops." But on Wednesday it rained, and on Thursday General Ord came there, and I was ordered to take all my colored troops out of Richmond. But I marched them right through the heart of Richmond and down to Petersburg, and right through Petersburg, and one of my colored regiments, at the request of a rebel officer, sang the John Brown song as they marched along. I have frequently detailed colored guards for women and children, and have never heard any complaint or any feeling expressed on the subject.

Question. And they have never been changed for white troops at the instance of the people there?

Answer. Never anything of the kind; I should not command the corps, if I could be guilty of doing that.

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*Testimony of Major General George G. Meade.*

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1865.

Major General GEORGE G. MEADE recalled and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. You have been in the army almost since the war commenced, and have had as intimate connexion with and knowledge of the army of the Potomac as any general I know. For that reason I desire to place on our record your answer to the following inquiry: In what manner has Mr. Stanton, the Secretary of War, performed his duties in regard to the supply of the army and the support of the military operations under your charge?

Answer. So far as my knowledge extends and I have had any relations with the War Department, I can say most cheerfully that everything I have required, or that I thought ought to be done, has been promptly attended to by Mr. Stanton, as the head of the War Department.

Question. What do you say of the talent and ability with which Mr. Stanton has conducted his department?

Answer. I consider that the department has been conducted with very great ability. There may have been some matters in which I may have differed with Mr. Stanton, and might have criticised his operations.

Question. I speak of the general management of the department.

Answer. As to the general management of the War Department, I consider it has been conducted with great ability.

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*Testimony of Lieutenant General U. S. Grant.*

WASHINGTON, *May 18, 1865.*

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT recalled and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. You have been lieutenant general commanding the whole army for a year past and more?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. I wish to place upon our record your answer to the following question: In what manner has Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War, performed his duties in the supply of the armies and the support of the military operations under your charge?

Answer. Admirably, I think. There has been no complaint in that respect—that is, no general complaint. So far as he is concerned I do not think there has been any ground of complaint in that respect.

Question. Has there ever been any misunderstanding with regard to the conduct of the war, in any particular, between you and the Secretary of War since you have been in command?

Answer. Never any expressed to me. I never had any reason to suppose that any fault was found with anything I had done. So far as the Secretary of War and myself are concerned, he has never interfered with my duties, never thrown any obstacles in the way of any supplies I have called for. He has never dictated a course of campaign to me, and never inquired what I was going to do. He has always seemed satisfied with what I did, and has heartily cooperated with me.

# BATTLE OF PETERSBURG.

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

December 15, 1864.

On motion by Mr. ANTHONY,

*Resolved*, That the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War be directed to inquire into and report the facts concerning the attack on Petersburg, on the 30th day of July, 1864.

Attest :

J. W. FORNEY, *Secretary*.

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Mr. WADE submitted the following  
REPORT.

*The Committee on the Conduct of the War, in pursuance of the foregoing resolution, submit the following report, with accompanying testimony:*

In the attack upon the enemy's lines before Petersburg, the 16th, 17th, and 18th of June, 1864, the ninth corps gained an advanced position beyond a deep cut in the railroad, within about one hundred and twenty-five yards of the enemy's lines. Just in rear of that advanced position was a deep hollow, where work could be carried on entirely out of sight of the enemy.

Within a few days after that position had been gained, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pleasants, 48th Pennsylvania volunteers, made the suggestion to General Potter, commanding the division, that a mine could be run under one of the enemy's batteries, by means of which it could be blown up, and an opening made in the enemy's lines. The suggestion having been submitted to General Burnside, it was approved by him, and work was commenced upon the mine on the 25th of June.

It will be seen from the testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Pleasants that he labored under disadvantages in the successful accomplishment of this important work, which would have deterred a man of less energy and determination. It was not merely the evident lack of faith in the success of the enterprise shown by all the officers of high rank but his division and corps commanders, but that lack of faith was accompanied by an entire failure to furnish the assistance and implements necessary to the success of the undertaking within a reasonable time. And your committee take pleasure in commending the zeal, energy, and persistence displayed on that occasion by Lieutenant Colonel Pleasants and the men of the 48th Pennsylvania regiment, under his command. And the failure of the attack, resulting from causes with which Colonel Pleasants could have no connexion, should not be allowed to detract from the meed of praise due to that officer.

The testimony of Colonel Pleasants, on that point, is as follows :

“ Question. Can you fix the time when you mentioned the matter to General Burnside, when you commenced the work, &c. ?

“ Answer. The work was commenced at 12 o'clock, noon, on the 25th of June, 1864. I saw General Burnside the night previous, and commenced the mine right off—the next day.

“ Question. Did you have any communication with any other commanders on the subject ?

“ Answer. No, sir.

“ Question. About how many men did you employ in the work ?

“ Answer. My regiment was only about four hundred strong. At first I employed but a few men at a time, but the number was increased as the work progressed, until at last I had to use the whole regiment, non-commissioned officers and all. The great difficulty I had was to dispose of the material got out of the mine. I found it impossible to get any assistance from anybody; I had to do all the work myself. I had to remove all the earth in old cracker boxes. I got pieces of hickory and nailed on the boxes in which we received our crackers, and then iron-cladded them with hoops of iron taken from old beef and pork barrels.

“ Question. Why were you not able to get better instruments with which to construct so important a work ?

“ Answer. I do not know. Whenever I made application I could not get anything, although General Burnside was very favorable to it. The most important thing was to ascertain how far I had to mine, because if I fell short of or went beyond the proper place the explosion would have no practical effect. Therefore, I wanted an accurate instrument with which to make the necessary triangulations. I had to make them on the furthest front line, where the enemy's sharpshooters could reach me. I could not get the instrument I wanted, although there was one at army headquarters; and General Burnside had to send to Washington and get an old-fashioned theodolite, which was given to me.

“ Question. Do you know any reason why you could not have had the better instrument which was at army headquarters ?

“ Answer. I do not. I know this: that General Burnside told me that General Meade and Major Duane, chief engineer of the army of the Potomac, said the thing could not be done; that it was all clap-trap and nonsense; that such a length of mine had never been excavated in military operations, and could not be; that I should either get the men smothered for want of air or crushed by the falling of the earth, or the enemy would find it out, and it would amount to nothing. I could get no boards and lumber supplied to me for my operations. I had to get a pass, and send two companies of my own regiment with wagons outside of our lines to rebel saw-mills and get lumber in that way, after having previously got what lumber I could by tearing down an old bridge. I had no mining picks furnished me, but had to take common picks and have them straightened for my mining picks.

“ Question. Was General Burnside the only officer who seemed to favor the mine ?

“ Answer. The only officer of high rank, so far as I learned. General Burnside, the corps commander, and General Potter, the division commander, seemed to be the only high officers who believed in it.

“ Question. How long from the time you commenced the mine did it take you to finish it ?

“ Answer. I finished the whole thing, lateral galleries and all, ready to put the powder in, on the 23d of July.

“ Question. How long would it have taken you had you been supplied with the proper tools and instruments ?

“Answer. I could have done it in one-third or one-fourth of the time. The greatest cause of the delay was taking the material out.

“Question. How far did you have to carry it?

“Answer. The whole length of the mine, and to where it could be deposited, and every night I had to get the pioneers of my regiment to cut bushes and cover it up where it had been deposited; otherwise the enemy could have climbed up the trees in their lines and seen the pile of newly excavated earth.

“Question. What was the length of the mine?

“Answer. The main gallery was  $510\frac{8}{10}$  feet in length; the left lateral gallery was 37 feet in length, and the right lateral gallery was 38 feet. The magazines were to be placed in the lateral galleries.

“Question. What were the dimensions of the galleries?

“Answer. They varied at different places; I suppose the average was  $4\frac{1}{2}$  by  $4\frac{1}{2}$  feet.”

On the 26th of July, at the request of General Meade, the following plan of attack was submitted to him by General Burnside :

“HEADQUARTERS 9TH ARMY CORPS,

“July 26, 1864.

“I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your notes this morning by Captains Jay and Bache; also of a telegram from the commanding general, relating to the same subject.

“It is altogether probable that the enemy are cognizant of the fact that we are mining, because it is mentioned in their papers, and they have been heard to work on what are supposed to be the shafts in close proximity to our galleries. But the rain of night before last has no doubt much retarded their work; we have heard no sounds of work in them, either yesterday or to-day; and nothing is heard by us in the mine but the ordinary sounds of work on the surface above. This morning we had some apprehension that the left lateral gallery was in danger of caving in from the weight of the batteries above it, and the shock of their firing. But all possible precautions have been taken to strengthen it, and we hope to preserve it intact.

“The placing of the charges in the mine will not involve the necessity of making a noise. It is therefore probable that we will escape discovery if the mine is to be used within two or three days. It is nevertheless highly important, in my opinion, that the mine should be exploded at the earliest possible moment consistent with the general interests of the campaign. I state to you the facts as nearly as I can, and, in the absence of any knowledge as to the meditated movements of the army, I must leave you to judge the proper time to make use of the mine. But it may not be improper for me to say that the advantages reaped from the work would be but small if it were exploded without any co-operative movement.

“My plan would be to explode the mine just before daylight in the morning, or at about five o'clock in the afternoon. Mass the two brigades of the colored division in rear of my first line, in columns of division—“double columns closed in mass,” the head of each brigade resting on the front line; and as soon as the explosion has taken place, move them forward with instructions for the division to take half distance, as soon as the leading regiments of the two brigades pass through the gap in the enemy's line, the leading regiment of the right brigade to come into line perpendicular to the enemy's line by the right companies ‘on the right into line wheel,’ the left companies ‘on the right into line,’ and proceed at once down the line of the enemy's works as rapidly as possible; and the leading regiment of the left brigade to execute the reverse movement to the left, running up the enemy's line. The remainder of the columns to move directly towards the crest in front as rapidly as possible, diverging in such a

way as to enable them to deploy into column of regiments, the right column making as nearly as possible for Cemetery hill. These columns to be followed by the other divisions of the corps, as soon as they can be thrown in.

"This would involve the necessity of relieving these divisions by other troops before the movement, and of holding columns of other troops in readiness to take our place on the crest, in case we gain it, and sweep down it. It would, in my opinion, be advisable, if we succeed in gaining the crest, to throw the colored division right into the town. There is a necessity for the co-operation, at least in the way of artillery, of the troops on our right and left. Of the extent of this you will necessarily be the judge. I think our chances of success in a plan of this kind are more than even.

"The main gallery of the mine is 522 feet in length; the side galleries about forty feet each. My suggestion is, that eight magazines be placed in the lateral galleries, two at each end, say a few feet apart, in branches at right angles to the side gallery, and two more in each of the side galleries, similarly placed by pairs, situated equidistant from each other and the end of the galleries; tamp, beginning at the termination of the main gallery, say one hundred feet, leaving all the air space in the side galleries. Run out some five or six fuzes and two wires, to render the ignition of the charges certain. I propose to put in each of the eight magazines from twelve to fourteen hundred pounds of powder; the magazines to be connected by a trough of powder instead of a fuze.

"I beg to enclose a copy of a statement from General Potter on the subject :

"I would suggest that the powder train be parked in a woods near our ammunition train, about a mile in rear of this place. Lieutenant Colonel Pierce, chief quartermaster, will furnish Captain Strang with a guide to the place. I beg also to request that General Benham be instructed to send us, at once, eight thousand sand-bags, to be used for tamping and other purposes.

"A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General.*

"Major General HUMPHREYS,

"*Chief of Staff.*"

General Burnside testifies that, under his orders, the division of colored troops, under General Ferrero, had been drilling for some weeks with the view of making the attack in the manner set forth in the plan submitted to General Meade. His reasons for selecting that division for the advance, and which were stated to General Meade in an interview with him on the 28th of July, were, that, in his opinion, they were in a better condition to make a charge than either of the white divisions. The colored troops had not been in any very active service, had not been exposed much, were not broken down by hard work, and had, besides, been drilled for some weeks with special reference to this charge. The white divisions, on the contrary, had performed very arduous duties since the commencement of the campaign, and since they had occupied the position before Petersburg had been in such close proximity to the enemy, that no man could raise his head above the parapets without danger of being fired at. They had been in the habit, during the whole of that time, of approaching the main line by covered ways, and of using every possible means of covering themselves from the fire of the enemy. In the opinion of General Burnside, in which he was sustained by the opinion of his inspector general, the white divisions were not then in a condition to make a vigorous charge.

General Meade objected to the colored troops being placed in the advance. His testimony upon that subject is as follows :

“Prior to issuing the orders for the assault, General Burnside told me it was his intention to place his colored division in the advance of the assaulting column. I objected to his doing so, on the ground, not that I had any reason to believe that the colored troops would not do their duty as well as the white troops, but that, as they were a new division and had never been under fire, had never been tried, and as this was an operation which I knew beforehand was one requiring the very best troops, I thought it impolitic to trust it to a division of whose reliability we had no evidence. Therefore I thought that he ought to take one of his white divisions that he knew from long service could be relied upon. General Burnside objected. I told him, then, that in view of his wishes upon the subject I would report the matter to the lieutenant general, state to him my reasons, and those of General Burnside, and let him decide. If he should decide that General Burnside’s arguments were sound and mine were wrong, then I would yield. The matter was referred to General Grant, and he confirmed my view that it would be impolitic in a critical operation of that kind to take troops that were untried and place them in the advance, and it was upon that ground that General Burnside’s opinion was overruled.”

General Grant’s testimony upon this point is as follows :

“General Burnside wanted to put his colored division in front, and I believe if he had done so it would have been a success. Still I agreed with General Meade in his objection to that plan. General Meade said that if we put the colored troops in front, (we had only that one division,) and it should prove a failure, it would then be said, and very properly, that we were shoving those people ahead to get killed because we did not care anything about them. But that could not be said if we put white troops in front. That is the only point he (General Meade) changed after he had given his orders to General Burnside.”

Instructions were accordingly given to General Burnside to select one of his divisions of white troops to lead the assault ; and the order of assault was also changed in respect to the sweeping down the enemy’s lines to the right and left of the crater by the leading regiments of the assaulting column. General Burnside testifies that he received the instructions to select a division of white troops to lead the assault, in the afternoon of the day preceding the morning for the assault. As there were reasons for assigning each one of the three white divisions to that duty, he determined to decide the question by lot, which was done. General Ledlie drew the lot to lead the advance, with his division.

The mine was charged, and preparations made to spring it on the morning of the 30th of July.

The following orders were issued by General Meade :

#### ORDERS.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“July 29, 1864.

“The following instructions are issued for the guidance of all concerned :

“1. As soon as it is dark, Major General Burnside, commanding 9th corps, will withdraw his two brigades under General White, occupying the intrenchments between the Plank and Norfolk roads, and bring them to his front. Care will be taken not to interfere with the troops of the 18th corps moving into their position in rear of the 9th corps. General Burnside will form his troops for assaulting the enemy’s works at daylight on the 30th, prepare his parapets and abatis for the passage of the columns, and have the pioneers equipped for work

in opening passages for artillery, destroying enemy's abatis, and the intrenching tools distributed for effecting lodgement, &c., &c.

"2. Major General Warren, commanding 5th corps, will reduce the number of his troops holding the intrenchments of his front to the minimum, and concentrate all his available force on his right and hold them prepared to support the assault of Major General Burnside. The preparations in respect to pioneers, intrenching tools, &c., &c., enjoined upon the 9th corps, will also be made by the 5th corps.

"3. As soon as it is dark, Major General Ord, commanding 18th corps, will relieve his troops in the trenches by General Mott's division of the 2d corps, and form his corps in rear of the 9th corps, and be prepared to support the assault of Major General Burnside.

"4. Every preparation will be made for moving forward the field artillery of each corps.

"5. At dark, Major General Hancock, commanding 2d corps, will move from Deep Bottom to the rear of the intrenchments now held by the 18th corps, resume the command of Mott's division, and be prepared at daylight to follow up the assaulting and supporting columns, or for such other operations as may be found necessary.

"6. Major General Sheridan, commanding cavalry corps, will proceed at dark from the vicinity of Deep Bottom to Lee's mill, and at daylight will move with his whole corps, including Wilson's division, against the enemy's troops defending Petersburg on their right by the roads leading to that town from the southward and westward.

"7. Major Duane, acting chief engineer, will have the pontoon trains parked at convenient points in the rear, prepared to move. He will see that supplies of sand-bags, gabions, fascines, &c., &c., are in depot near the lines, ready for use.

"He will detail engineer officers for each corps.

"8. At half past three (3½) in the morning of the 30th Major General Burnside will spring his mine, and his assaulting columns will immediately move rapidly upon the breach, seize the crest in the rear and effect a lodgement there. He will be followed by Major General Ord, who will support him on the right, directing his movement to the crest indicated, and by Major General Warren, who will support him on the left.

"Upon the explosion of the mine the artillery of all kinds in battery will open upon those points of the enemy's works whose fire covers the ground over which our columns must move, care being taken to avoid impeding the progress of our troops. Special instructions respecting the direction of fire will be issued through the chief of artillery.

"9. Corps commanders will report to the commanding general when their preparations are complete, and will advise him of every step in the progress of the operation and of everything important that occurs.

"10. Promptitude, rapidity of execution, and cordial co-operation are essential to success, and the commanding general is confident that this indication of his expectations will insure the hearty efforts of the commanders and troops.

"11. Headquarters during the operations will be at the headquarters of the 9th corps.

"By command of Major General Meade.

"S. WILLIAMS, *Ass't Adj't General.*

General Grant had shortly previous executed a movement on the north side of the James river, and to some extent turned the enemy's attention in that direction.

On the morning of the 30th of July the match was applied to the mine at the time designated, but it failed to explode in consequence



of the defective fuze employed. The fuze supplied had been in pieces, requiring that it should be spliced. It ceased to burn at one of the points of junction. The additional precaution had been taken to lay the fuze in a train of powder, but the powder had become damp from being so long laid, some thirty or more hours, and that also failed to ignite. After waiting some time Lieutenant Jacob Douty, first lieutenant company K, and Sergeant Henry Rees, now second lieutenant company F, 48th Pennsylvania regiment, volunteered and went in the mine, ascertained the cause of the failure to explode, and relighted the fuze. The mine exploded at 4.42 a. m.

None of the witnesses seemed to be of the opinion that the delay in the explosion of the mine had any effect upon the result of the operation. The enemy, so far as could be ascertained, did not discover any of the preparations made for a movement. No opinion was expressed as to the effect upon our troops by their being obliged to wait an hour under arms before they had an opportunity to move forward.

In the course of from five to ten minutes after the explosion of the mine the division of General Ledlie charged from our lines and entered the enemy's line at the breach made by the explosion. The explosion had made a crater from 150 to 200 feet in length, about 60 feet in width, and from 25 to 30 feet in depth, presenting a serious obstacle to the passage of troops. The organization of the division was broken, and the troops crowded into the crater and sought shelter there and for a short distance in the adjoining lines of the enemy.

The first division met with but little resistance from the enemy before they reached the mine. Soon, however, fire was opened upon them from a battery of the enemy upon the right, and one upon the left, and, before long, from a battery in their front upon Cemetery hill.

Another division was thrown in with about the same result as with the first, the troops immediately seeking shelter in the crater of the mine and the lines of the enemy adjacent thereto. The third division was thrown in with a similar result. From 150 to 200 yards of the enemy's lines on either side of the crater were occupied by our troops in that manner. By that time the enemy had recovered from the confusion into which it had been thrown by the explosion of the mine, and a heavy fire of artillery and musketry was opened upon our troops from the right, left, and front.

Several efforts were made to reorganize our troops and charge the crest of Cemetery hill, but none of them were successful.

The fourth (colored) division was also ordered to advance, and did so under a heavy fire. They succeeded in passing the white troops, already in, but in a disorganized condition. They reformed to some extent and attempted to charge the hill in front, but without success, and broke in disorder to the rear. This was about 8.45 a. m., about four hours after the explosion of the mine.

At 9.45 a. m. General Burnside received a peremptory order from General Meade to withdraw his troops. General Burnside testifies that, "Upon the reception of the order to withdraw our troops from

the enemy's lines, I went to General Meade's headquarters and requested that that order might be rescinded, stating that I did not think we had fought long enough on that day, and that I thought we could succeed in carrying the crest if we persevered in the attack. He said that the order to withdraw was final, and that he had ordered all offensive operations on the right and left to cease."

General Meade testifies, "He (General Burnside) was directed about ten or eleven o'clock to withdraw. The first order sent to him was a distinct order to withdraw. General Burnside came to the position where I was with General Grant, at the headquarters on the field, and stated that, in his judgment, it would be injudicious to withdraw at that moment—that it would cause great sacrifice of life. I immediately authorized him, in writing, to exercise his judgment in the withdrawal—to remain there as long as he deemed it necessary for the secure withdrawal of his command—stating that he could remain there, if he chose, until night."

The troops were withdrawn between one and two o'clock in considerable confusion, caused by an assault of the enemy, and returned to the lines they had occupied in the morning.

The details of the charge and of the several movements of the different bodies of troops are given in the testimony. The loss sustained by our troops was between four and five thousand in killed, wounded, and missing. No troops took part in the assault except those of the 9th corps and a brigade of the 18th corps. The only part taken in the operation by the 2d corps, on the right, and the 5th corps, on the left, was to employ their artillery, which had the effect of silencing the most of the enemy's batteries, but not all.

Your committee cannot, from all the testimony, avoid the conclusion that the first and great cause of disaster was the change made on the afternoon preceding the attack, in the arrangement of General Burnside to place the division of colored troops in the advance. The reasons assigned by General Burnside for not taking one of his divisions of white troops for that purpose are fully justified by the result of the attack. Their previous arduous labors, and peculiar position, exposed continually to the enemy's fire, had, as it were, trained them in the habit of seeking shelter; and, true to that training, they sought shelter the first opportunity that presented itself after leaving our lines. And it is but reasonable to suppose that the immediate commander of a corps is better acquainted with the condition and efficiency of particular divisions of his corps than a general further removed from them.

The conduct of the colored troops, when they were put into action, would seem to fully justify the confidence that General Burnside reposed in them. And General Grant himself, in his testimony, expresses his belief that if they had been placed in the advance, as General Burnside desired, the assault would have been successful, although at the time the colored troops were ordered in the white troops already in were in confusion and had failed in the assault upon the crest beyond the crater, and the fire of the enemy had become exceedingly destructive. The colored troops advanced in good order,

passed through the enemy's lines and beyond our disorganized troops there, and, stopping but a short time to reform, made the charge as directed. But the fire of the enemy was too strong, and some other of our troops hurrying back through their lines, they were thrown into confusion and forced to retire.

The same reasons which, in the opinion of your committee, can be urged in favor of the selection for the advance which General Burnside made in his first plan, viz., his opportunity, from more intimate connexion with the troops of his corps, judging correctly which division was best fitted for that purpose, can also be urged against the mode of selection resorted to by him when compelled by the order of his commanding general to select another division to lead the assault. It may have been that, from the same causes, each of the three divisions of white troops had become, from the training of the previous forty days, unfitted for that duty. But the practice of leaving the selection of troops for an important undertaking to be determined by chance is one that does not commend itself to the judgment of your committee. It, however, is but just to General Burnside that the reasons which led him to resort to that mode of selection should be stated. His testimony is as follows:

“These three commanders (Generals Potter, Wilcox, and Ledlie) of the white divisions were then informed of the change in the plan, and also that one of their divisions must lead the assault. Considerable conversation occurred as to the condition of the different divisions. I said to them, ‘There is a reason why either General Wilcox’s or General Potter’s division should lead the assault, and that is, that they are nearer to the point of assault, and it would require less time to get them into position for the work. But there is also a reason why General Ledlie’s division should lead, which is, that his men have not been in such close proximity to the enemy as those of the other two divisions, and in fact have not had to do quite as hard work for the last thirty or forty days.’ Each of the division commanders, as well as every officer in the command, who had given his attention to the subject in the least degree, was fully aware of the condition of the white troops, as I had previously stated it to General Meade, and was firmly impressed with the conviction that the colored troops were in much better condition to lead the attack, and of the wisdom of using the white troops as supports. There was no time to be lost, however, as the hour for springing the mine had been fixed for half past three o’clock the next morning, and it was now after noon. I finally decided that I would allow the leading division to be designated by lot, which was done. General Ledlie drew the lot to lead the advance, and the necessary orders were given for the movement of his division to the point from which the attack was to be made.”

The order of attack as proposed by General Burnside was also changed by direction of General Meade, with the approval of General Grant. Instead of moving down to the right and left of the crater of the mine for the purpose of driving the enemy from their lines in those directions, and thus removing to that extent the danger of flank attacks by the enemy upon our advancing columns, General Meade directed that the troops should push at once for the crest of Cemetery hill. General Burnside also contemplated co-operative movements by troops on the right and left of his corps. Orders were given to General Warren to make a movement from his position if he deemed

it advisable, but he reported that the enemy were in too strong force, and no movement was made. On the right, occupied by a portion of General Hancock's force, the same condition of things existed, and also a smaller force of our troops than were on the left. The enemy not being driven from their lines on either side of the mine, except for a short distance in consequence of the explosion of the mine, and the efforts of our troops to obtain shelter from the fire of the enemy, they organized attacking columns which finally succeeded in driving our forces from the position they had gained.

It will be seen from the testimony that when the order to withdraw was given by General Meade, against the representations made by General Burnside, orders were also given by General Meade for offensive operations to cease on the right and left of General Burnside's position, and General Ord's troops were at the same time withdrawn from the position where they had been placed in support of the 9th corps. The enemy were thus left entirely free to make such dispositions as they chose against the force of General Burnside within their lines. General Burnside's testimony upon this point is as follows :

"Upon the reception of the order to withdraw our troops from the enemy's lines, I went to General Meade's headquarters and requested that the order might be rescinded, stating that I did not think we had fought long enough, and that I thought we could succeed in carrying the crest if we persevered in the attack, and the other troops were put in. He said that the order to withdraw was final, and that he had ordered all offensive operations on the right and left to cease. This order, I consider, materially affected the result of our withdrawal, inasmuch as the enemy's forces upon our right and left were entirely unoccupied, and thereby had an opportunity of concentrating upon us during the withdrawal. It could hardly have been expected that the withdrawal could have been made without disaster after all offensive operations had ceased on the right and left, and the supporting force withdrawn from the rear. My only hope was that the force in the crater would be able to hold the position until a covered way could be dug from our advanced line out to the crater, a distance of a little over a hundred yards. This covered way had been commenced both in the crater and on our advanced line, and I instructed General Ferrero to push it forward as rapidly as possible, with such of his troops as had been driven back and collected in the advanced line. The communication between the advanced line and the crater was almost entirely cut off; and although the distance was so short, only about a hundred yards, it was next to an impossibility for messengers to reach the crater, much less to send in ammunition and water. The men had become very much exhausted with the heat and labors of the day.

"After I was informed by General Meade that the order was final to withdraw, and that there was no object in holding the crater by connecting its flanks with our old advanced lines, as I had suggested, I telegraphed to General White, my chief of staff, whom I had left at my field headquarters, that the orders to withdraw were peremptory; and I at once sent for the division commanders in order to consult as to the most favorable method and time for withdrawal. In the mean time my despatch to General White had been sent to the division commanders, and by them sent in to the crater for report from the brigade commanders. Previous to and during this time the enemy made several assaults upon our position, which were repulsed. Soon after this a heavy attack was made upon the left of our forces, driving us back, and causing a hasty evacuation of the crater by all who could get back to the main line."

It will also be seen from the testimony that General Meade claims that his orders in relation to levelling the parapets and removing the abatis of our line, so as to afford a sufficient *debouche* for our assaulting forces, were not carried out so fully as they should have been. General Burnside claims that those orders were carried out as fully as he could do so, without affording the enemy an opportunity to discover, prematurely, the movement in which he was engaged. As it appears, beyond all question, that more troops passed from our lines into those of the enemy than, under the circumstances, could be profitably managed or employed there, your committee do not regard that matter as having any important bearing upon the subject of their inquiry.

Your committee would also call attention to the fact that General Grant attributes the disastrous result of that assault, to a greater or less extent, to the troops being sent in unaccompanied by any of the division commanders. How far the division commanders would have been able, by their presence, to overcome the confusion and disorganization into which the troops were thrown, from the causes heretofore referred to, your committee are unable to say. None of the witnesses examined previous to General Grant made any reference to that fact. It was first brought to the notice of the committee near the close of their investigation, when they were unable to direct their attention to that particular point. They refer to it here, however, as the opinion of the highest officer in our service, and also because they deem everything relating to this most disastrous affair worthy of consideration.

Your committee desire to say that, in the statement of facts and conclusions which they present in their report, they wish to be distinctly understood as in no degree censuring the conduct of the troops engaged in this assault. While they confidently believe that the selection of the division of colored troops by General Burnside to lead the assault was, under the circumstances, the best that could have been made, they do not intend thereby to have it inferred that the white troops of the 9th corps are behind any troops in the service in those qualities which have placed our volunteer troops before the world as equal, if not superior, to any known to modern warfare. The services performed by the 9th corps on many a well-fought battle-field, not only in this campaign but in others, have been such as to prove that they are second to none in the service. Your committee believe that any other troops exposed to the same influences, under the same circumstances, and for the same length of time, would have been similarly affected. No one, upon a careful consideration of all the circumstances, can be surprised that those influences should have produced the effects they did upon them.

In conclusion they, your committee, must say that, in their opinion, the cause of the disastrous result of the assault of the 30th of July last is mainly attributable to the fact that the plans and suggestions of the general who had devoted his attention for so long a time to the subject, who had carried out to a successful completion the project of mining the enemy's works, and who had carefully selected and

drilled his troops for the purpose of securing whatever advantages might be attainable from the explosion of the mine, should have been so entirely disregarded by a general who had evinced no faith in the successful prosecution of that work, had aided it by no countenance or open approval, and had assumed the entire direction and control only when it was completed, and the time had come for reaping any advantages that might be derived from it.

Respectfully submitted :

B. F. WADE, *Chairman.*

# TESTIMONY.

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WASHINGTON, *December 17, 1864.*

Major General A. E. BURNSIDE sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army at the present time?

Answer. I am a major general of volunteers. At present I am waiting orders.

Question. Were you in the army of the Potomac on 30th of July, 1864, at the time a mine was sprung before Petersburg?

Answer. Yes, sir; I was in command of the 9th army corps, which made the assault on that occasion.

Question. Will you please give us, in your own way, a statement of such facts in connexion with that attack as you may consider important?

Answer. In the attack upon the enemy's lines, on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of June, the 9th corps gained an advanced position beyond a deep cut in the railroad, which was but a little more than a hundred yards from the enemy's lines. Just in rear of this advanced position was a deep hollow where work could be carried on, entirely out of the sight of the enemy. On the 26th of June I received a letter from General Potter, stating that he was of the opinion that a mine could be run from this hollow to a point under a battery of the enemy immediately opposite our position. I understood from him that the suggestion was first made by some of the non-commissioned officers and privates of the 48th Pennsylvania regiment, which was composed almost entirely of miners from Schuylkill county, Pennsylvania. It was then communicated by the commanding officer of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Pleasants, to General Potter.

I wrote to General Potter, requesting him to come to my headquarters with Colonel Pleasants, or to reduce his plan to writing. That evening he and Colonel Pleasants came to my headquarters, and the matter was fully talked over. I authorized them to commence the work, and stated that I would report what had passed between us to the commanding general of the army of the Potomac, and would inform them of the result; that no harm could occur from beginning the work, as it could be suspended if it should not be approved. I did communicate the substance of this conversation to the commanding general of the army of the Potomac, and received from him his assent, rather than his approval of the work. Other conversations were had, from time to time, with General Meade on the subject.

On the 3d day of July General Meade sent me a letter requesting an opinion as to the probability of success of an attack upon the enemy from our front. That letter, and the correspondence resulting from it, are as follows :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“12 m., July 3, 1864.

“The lieutenant general commanding has inquired of me whether an assault on the enemy's works is practicable and feasible at any part of the line held by this army. In order to enable me to reply to this inquiry, I desire, at your earliest convenience, your views as to the practicability of an assault at any point in your front, to be made by the 2d and 6th corps in conjunction with yours.

“Respectfully,

“GEO. G. MEADE,  
“Major General.

“Major General BURNSIDE.”

"HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS,  
"July 3, 1864.

"I have delayed answering your despatch until I could get the opinion of my division commanders, and have another reconnoissance of the lines made by one of my staff. If my opinion is required as to whether now is the best time to make an assault, it being understood that if not made the siege is to continue, I should unhesitatingly say, wait until the mine is finished.

"If the question is between making the assault now and a change of plan looking to operations in other quarters, I should unhesitatingly say, assault now. If the assault be delayed until the completion of the mine, I think we should have a more than even chance of success. If the assault be made now, I think we have a fair chance of success, provided my corps can make the attack, and it is left to me to say when and how the other two corps shall come in to my support.

"I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
"A. E. BURNSIDE,  
"Major General, Commanding 9th Corps.

"Major General MEADE,  
"Commanding Army of the Potomac."

It would seem that the language I employed in my letter was unfortunate, for it was entirely misunderstood, as will appear from the reply of General Meade, of the same date as follows :

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 3, 1864.

"GENERAL: Your note by Major Lydig has been received. As you are of the opinion there is a reasonable degree of probability of success from an assault on your front, I shall so report to the lieutenant general commanding, and await his instructions.

"The recent operations in your front, as you are aware, though sanctioned by me, did not originate in any orders from these headquarters. Should it, however, be determined to employ the army under my command in offensive operations on your front, I shall exercise the prerogative of my position to control and direct the same, receiving gladly at all times suggestions as you may think proper to make. I consider these remarks necessary in consequence of certain conditions which you have thought proper to attach to your opinion, acceding to which in advance would not, in my judgment, be consistent with my position as commanding general of this army. I have accordingly directed Major Duane, chief engineer, and Brigadier General Hunt, chief of artillery, to make an examination of your lines, and to confer with you as to the operations to be carried on, the running of the mine now in progress, and the posting of artillery. It is advisable as many guns as possible, bearing on the point to be assaulted, should be placed in position.

"I agree with you in opinion that the assault should be deferred till the mine is completed, provided that can be done within a reasonably short period—say a week. Roads should be opened to the rear to facilitate the movements of the other corps sent to take part in the action, and all the preliminary arrangements possible should be made. Upon the reports of my engineer and artillery officers the necessary orders will be given.

"Respectfully, yours,

"GEO. G. MEADE,  
"Major General, Commanding.

"Major General BURNSIDE,  
"Commanding 9th Corps."

The next day I replied as follows :

"HEADQUARTERS 9TH ARMY CORPS, July 4, 1864.

"GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of last evening, and am very sorry that I should have been so unfortunate in expressing myself in my letter. It was written in haste, just after receiving the necessary data upon which to strengthen an opinion already pretty well formed. I assure you, in all candor, that I never dreamed of implying any lack of confidence in your ability to do all that is necessary in any grand movement which may be undertaken by your army. Were you to personally direct an attack from my front I would feel the utmost confidence; and were I called upon to support an attack from the front of the 2d or 6th corps, directed by yourself, or by either of the commanders of those corps, I would do it with confidence and cheerfulness.

"It is hardly necessary for me to say that I have had the utmost faith in your ability to handle troops ever since my acquaintance with you in the army of the Potomac, and certainly accord to you a much higher position in the art of war than I possess; and I at the same time entertain the greatest respect for the skill of the two gentlemen commanding the 2d and 6th corps; so that my duty to my country, to you, and to myself, forbids that I should for a moment assume to embarrass you, or them, by an assumption of position or authority.



I simply desired to ask the privilege of calling upon them for support at such times, and at such points, as I thought advisable. I would gladly accord to either of them the same support, and would be glad to have either of them lead the attack; but it would have been obviously improper for me to have suggested that any other corps than my own should make the attack in my front. What I asked, in reference to calling upon the other corps for support, is only what I have been called upon to do, and have cheerfully done myself, in regard to other corps commanders.

"If a copy of my letter has been forwarded to the general-in-chief, which I take for granted has been done, that he may possess my full opinion, it may make the same impression upon him as upon yourself, and I beg that you will correct it; in fact, I beg that such impression may be, as far as possible, removed wherever it has made a lodgement. My desire is to support you, and in doing that I am serving the country.

"With ordinary good fortune we can pretty safely promise to finish the mine in a week; I hope in less time.

"I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"A. E. BURNSIDE,

*Major General, Commanding 9th Army Corps.*

"Major General MEADE,

*Commanding Army of the Potomac."*

To which General Meade replied as follows :

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 4, 1864.

"GENERAL: Your letter of this date is received. I am glad to find that there was no intention on your part to ask for any more authority and command than you have a perfect right to expect under existing circumstances. I did not infer from your letter that you had any want of confidence in me. I rather thought you were anticipating interference from others, and thought it best to reply as I did.

"Your letter has not been shown to any one, nor forwarded to the general-in-chief, and my answer has only been seen by the confidential clerk who copied it. I am very grateful to you for your good opinion, as expressed, and shall earnestly try to merit its continuance. In the trying position I am placed in, hardly to be appreciated by any one not in my place, it is my great desire to be on terms of harmony and good feeling with all, superiors and subordinates; and I try to adjust the little jars that will always exist in large bodies to the satisfaction of each one. I have no doubt, by frankness and full explanations, such as have now taken place between us, all misapprehensions will be removed. You may rest assured, all the respect due to your rank and position will be paid you while under my command.

"Truly yours,

"GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General.*"

This correspondence is presented for the purpose of showing the views of General Meade in reference to putting into action the support on the flanks and in the rear, and also to show that I had no authority whatever to order in any of the supports.

Nothing of importance occurred in reference to the contemplated attack for several days after this correspondence took place. I had frequent conversations with General Meade in reference to the condition of the command, its position on the line, &c.

The 4th division of the 9th corps, under command of General Ferrero, composed entirely of colored troops, had been detached, at the beginning of the campaign, from my immediate command, and had received orders directly from General Grant's and General Meade's headquarters, up to the crossing of the James river.

During the month of July it was at intervals under my command, and I had made up my mind, in case an assault was to be made by the 9th corps, to put this division in the advance. I had so informed General Ferrero, and, at my suggestion, he submitted to me an opinion as to the formation which would be the most effective in passing over the ground in our front; which formation, after some consideration, I approved, and directed him to drill his troops with a view of making the attack in that way.

This first conversation must have been some three weeks before the attack was made, on the 30th of July.

The work on the mine was prosecuted with as much rapidity as possible, but it took a longer time to complete it than was at first supposed. Many ob-

stacles were encountered, all of which, however, were finally overcome. There was, besides these natural obstacles, a considerable degree of personal discouragement during the prosecution of the work. Prominent officers expressed their fears that a mine of that length could not be successfully run, and particularly by the plan which Colonel Pleasants had adopted, that of simply relying upon the tenacity of the earth to keep the gallery intact, instead of putting up continuous supports along its whole length. His plan, however, succeeded, and the mine was finished not far from the 20th of July. I have not the means in my possession at this time of determining the exact date of its completion.

When completed, the fact was reported to General Meade, after which considerable discussion took place in reference to the charge, that was necessary to explode the mine. In my opinion it should have been a charge of 12,000 pounds of powder, and I so expressed myself. It was finally decided that the charge should be 8,000 pounds. I do not mention this as anything material, but it happens to be a fact.

The enemy's works were blown up with the 8,000 pounds, but the declivity of the crater would not have been so great had it been done with 12,000.

On the 26th of July, I think, General Meade called upon me, through his chief of staff, for a detailed statement of my plan of attack from my front. I sent him the following communication :

“HEADQUARTERS 9TH ARMY CORPS, *July 26, 1864.*

“I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your notes of this morning by Captains Jay and Bache; also a telegram from the commanding general, relating to the same subject.

“It is altogether probable that the enemy are cognizant of the fact that we are mining, because it is mentioned in their papers, and they have been heard at work on what are supposed to be shafts in close proximity to our galleries.

“But the rain of night before last has no doubt much retarded their work. We have heard no sound of workmen in them either yesterday or to-day, and nothing is heard by us in the mine but the ordinary sounds of work on the surface above. This morning we had some apprehension that the left lateral gallery was in danger of caving in from the weight of the batteries above it, and the shock of their firing. But all possible precautions have been taken to strengthen it, and we hope to preserve it intact.


“The placing of the charges in the mine will not involve the necessity of making a noise. It is therefore probable that we will escape discovery if the mine is to be used within two or three days. It is nevertheless highly important, in my opinion, that the mine should be exploded at the earliest possible moment consistent with the general interests of the campaign. I state to you the facts as nearly as I can, and, in the absence of any knowledge as to the meditated movements of the army, I must leave you to judge of the proper time to make use of the mine. But it may not be improper for me to say that the advantages reaped from the work would be but small if it were exploded without any co-operative movement.

“My plan would be to explode the mine just before daylight in the morning, or at about five o'clock in the afternoon; mass the two brigades of the colored division in rear of my first line in columns of division ‘double columns closed in mass,’ ‘the head of each brigade resting on the front line,’ and, as soon as the explosion has taken place, move them forward with instructions for the division to take half distance, and as soon as the leading regiments of the two brigades pass through the gap in the enemy's line, the leading regiment of the right brigade to come into line perpendicular to the enemy's line by the ‘right companies on the right into line, wheel,’ the ‘left companies on the right into line,’ and proceed at once down the line of the enemy's works as rapidly as possible; and the leading regiment of the left brigade to execute the reverse movement to the left, moving up the enemy's line. The remainder of the columns to move directly towards the crest in front as rapidly as possible, diverging in such a way as to enable them to deploy into columns of regiment, the right column making as nearly as possible for Cemetery hill. These columns to be followed by the other divisions of the other corps as soon as they can be thrown in.

“This would involve the necessity of relieving these divisions by other troops before the movement, and of holding columns of other troops in readiness to take our place on the crest in case we gain it, and sweep down it. It would, in my opinion, be advisable, if we succeed in gaining the crest, to throw the colored division right into the town. There is a necessity for the co-operation, at least in the way of artillery, by the troops on our right and left. Of the extent of this you will necessarily be the judge. I think our chances of success in a plan of this kind are more than even.

“The main gallery of the mine is 522 feet in length; the side galleries about forty feet each. My suggestion is that eight magazines be placed in the lateral galleries, two at each end, say

a few feet apart in branches at right angles to the side gallery, and two more in each of the side galleries, similarly placed by pairs situated equidistant from each other and the end of the galleries, thus :



tamp, beginning at the termination of the main gallery, say one hundred feet, leaving all the air space in the side galleries. Run out some five or six fuzes and two wires, to render the ignition of the charge certain.

"I propose to put in each of the eight magazines from 1,200 to 1,400 pounds of powder the magazines to be connected by a trough of powder, instead of a fuze.

"I beg to enclose a copy of a statement from General Potter on the subject.

"I would suggest that the powder train be parked in a woods near our ammunition train, about a mile in rear of this place. Lieutenant Colonel Pierce, chief quartermaster, will furnish Captain Strang with a guide to the place. I beg also to request that General Benham be instructed to send us at once eight thousand sand-bags, to be used for tamping and other purposes.

"A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General.*

"Major General HUMPHREYS, *Chief of Staff.*"

On Thursday, the 28th, when I called upon General Meade, at his headquarters, he informed me that that portion of my plan which contemplated putting the colored troops in the advance did not meet with his approval; and also, that he did not approve of the formation proposed, because he was satisfied that we would not be able, in the face of the enemy, to make the movements which I contemplated, to the right and left; and that he was of the opinion that the troops should move directly to the crest without attempting these side movements.

A long conversation ensued, in which I pointed out to General Meade the condition of the three white divisions, and urged upon him the importance, in my opinion, of placing the colored division in the advance, because I thought it would make a better charge at that time than either of the white divisions. I reminded him of the fact that the three white divisions had for forty days been in the trenches in the immediate presence of the enemy, and at no point of the line could a man raise his head above the parapet without being fired at by the enemy. That they had been in the habit, during the whole of that time, of approaching the main line by covered ways, and using every possible means of protecting themselves from the fire of the enemy. That their losses had been continuous during that time, amounting to from thirty to sixty men daily. That the men had had no opportunity of cooking upon the main line—everything

having been cooked in the rear, and carried up to them. That they had had very few, if any, opportunities of washing; and that, in my opinion, they were not in condition to make a vigorous charge. I also stated that I was fortified in this opinion, which had been formed from personal observation, by the report of my inspector general, who had taken occasion to look at the troops with a view to making up his mind as to their effectiveness for a work of that kind.

General Meade still insisted that the black troops should not lead; that he could not trust them, because they were untried, and probably gave other reasons which do not occur to me at this moment. But he said that, inasmuch as I was so urgent in the matter, he would refer it to General Grant, whom he expected to visit that afternoon, and his decision of course would be final. I said to him that I would cheerfully abide by any decision that either one of them would make, but I must still urge upon him that I thought it of the utmost importance that the colored troops should lead.

General Meade did go to see General Grant that day, and I think returned the same afternoon, but I did not hear from him. During the next forenoon, Friday, General Wilcox and General Potter, commanding two of my white divisions, came to my headquarters to talk over the attack, which it was understood would be made the next morning. I told them I had been very much exercised the day before lest that portion of my plan which contemplated putting the colored division in advance should be changed by General Meade, but that I was pretty well satisfied he had given it up, because I had heard nothing further from him about it.

While in the midst of this conversation, or very soon after, General Meade came to my headquarters, and there told me that General Grant agreed with him as to the disposition of the troops, and that I would not be allowed to put the colored division in the advance. I asked him if that decision could not be reconsidered; he replied, "No, general, the order is final; you must detail one of your white divisions to take the advance." I said, "Very well, general, I will carry out this plan to the best of my ability."

I at once sent for my other division commander, General Ledlie. These three commanders of the white divisions were then informed of the changes in the plan, and also that one of their divisions must lead the assault. Considerable conversation occurred as to the condition of the different divisions; I said to them, "There is a reason why either General Wilcox's or General Potter's division should lead the assault, and that is, that they are nearer to the point of assault, and it would require less time to get them into position for the work. But there is also a reason why General Ledlie's division should lead, which is, that his men have not been in such close proximity to the enemy as those of the other two divisions, and in fact have not had to do quite as hard work for the last thirty or forty days." Each of the division commanders, as well as every officer in the command, who had given his attention to the subject in the least degree, was fully aware of the condition of the white troops, as I had previously stated it to General Meade, and were firmly impressed with the conviction that the colored troops were in much better condition to lead the attack, and of the wisdom of using the white troops as supports. There was no time to be lost, however, as the hour for springing the mine had been fixed for half past three o'clock the next morning, and it was now afternoon. I finally decided that I would allow the leading division to be designated by lot, which was done; General Ledlie drew the lot to lead the advance, and the necessary orders were given for the movement of his division to the point from which the attack was to be made.

General Ferrero, who commanded the colored division, had, with his officers, already examined the ground upon which he was to form, and had made a reconnaissance of the ground over which he was to pass at the time he expected to lead the attack. I sent General Ledlie with his brigade officers to make similar reconnaissances, which they did. At about four o'clock in the afternoon they

reported to me that the examination had been made, and they only waited for darkness, and troops to relieve them, in order to get the division in position for the attack.

General Meade issued his battle order, a copy of which I have not with me, but which can no doubt be obtained very easily by the committee, either from the headquarters of the army of the Potomac or from the Adjutant General's office.

General Ord was to send troops to relieve my troops from their position on the line, in order that we might make the concentration for the assault. Much delay occurred that night in making these changes, in consequence of the difficulty of moving large bodies of troops at night, and from the fact that the officers of General Ord's command were not acquainted with the positions of our different divisions, although they had by personal reconnoissances informed themselves as well as possible, with the short notice they had.

The mine was charged as was designated by the plan, except in amount of powder. The fuze material was not furnished in sufficient quantity to run three or four separate fuzes, as was contemplated by the plan. In fact, we had but material enough to run one line of fuze, and that material came to us in small pieces of from ten to fifteen feet in length, and had to be spliced before it was laid.

The troops were in position in time for the assault. I issued orders to govern the different division commanders in the attack, and also sent them copies of the battle order of General Meade. One of the directions in the order of General Meade was "to level the breastworks and to remove the abatis before the explosion, so the troops could pass quickly to the front." This part of the order was necessarily inoperative, because of lack of time and the close proximity to the enemy, the latter of which rendered it impossible to remove the abatis from the front of our line without attracting, not only a heavy fire of the enemy, but also his attention to that point, and letting him know exactly what we were doing. But as far as was possible that portion of the order was carried out. It was afterwards found that the abatis which had to be removed when our troops did advance did not delay them more than five minutes.

General Meade made his headquarters for the day at my permanent headquarters, and I moved mine to what is called the "fourteen-gun battery," now known as Fort Morton, on the crest, just in rear of our main line some forty or fifty yards. A telegraph was run to my new headquarters from my old headquarters, where General Meade was stationed.

Directions were given to fire the mine at the time designated by General Meade. There was considerable delay in the explosion, which caused great uneasiness to all of us. General Meade sent several despatches to me during this delay to know the cause of it. I could give him no information on the subject, was quite as anxious about the delay as he was, and sent staff officers to ascertain the cause of it. I am of the opinion that to some of the messages which General Meade sent me during that time no answers were returned, because no satisfactory answers could be given.

It will be readily understood that the cause of the delay was not easy to be ascertained, because the fuze had been lighted, and a man going into the gallery to ascertain whether or not it was still burning would, in case of explosion, necessarily lose his life.

However, a commissioned and a non-commissioned officer of the 48th Pennsylvania regiment volunteered to go into the gallery. They ascertained that the fuze had died out about a hundred feet from the mouth of the main gallery. This was a thing that would not have occurred had we had material enough to have laid four or five fuzes; and I do not think it would have occurred had the fuze been continuous, or in but two or three pieces, instead of being, as it was, in so many pieces. It died out at one of the points of contact, where two of the

pieces had been spliced together, either by the failure to put in powder, or by the powder becoming damp, or for some other reason which I do not myself know.

The fuze was relighted by those men, and Colonel Pleasants, who was in charge of the mine, informed me that the explosion would take place in eleven minutes from the time the information was given to Major Van Buren, my aide-de-camp. I immediately directed the major to give the information to General Meade's aid, Captain Jay, but I suppose before it reached him (General Meade) the mine exploded.

The leading division moved forward, passed over our own lines, and passed into the crater which was made by the explosion of the mine.

I will here submit a copy of the report which I made to General Meade of the operations of the 30th of July, as it will probably give a more accurate statement of what occurred on that day than I can now give from memory. The report is as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS,  
"Before Petersburg, Va., August 13, 1864.

"GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this corps in the engagement of July 30th last.

"It will be necessary to advert to the preliminary operation of running a mine under the enemy's works. This project was proposed by Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pleasants, of the 48th Pennsylvania volunteers, to General Potter, who submitted the proposal to me soon after our sitting down before that place. It met my hearty consent and support. It was commenced June 25th, (twenty-fifth,) prosecuted with great zeal through a difficult soil, sometimes of the nature of quicksand, at others a heavy marl, and with no tools but the ordinary intrenching spade and pick. The main gallery was finished July 17th, 522 feet in length. It was then found that the enemy were at work in immediate proximity, and its further prosecution was conducted with great caution. Lateral galleries 37-38 feet in length, running under and nearly parallel to the enemy's works, were completed July 23d, and the mine was ready for the charge. This, by order from the general commanding, was put in on the 27th. It consisted of about 8,000 pounds of powder. Great praise is due to Colonel Pleasants and the officers and men of his regiment for the patient labor cheerfully bestowed on a work which deserved and met complete success.

"On the 26th of July, at the request of the commanding general, I submitted a plan of assault, which contemplated the placing of the colored division of this corps in the advance, that division not being wearied by long and arduous duties in the trenches, as were the other divisions. A certain formation of troops was also suggested. This plan was not adopted as to these two points, and the troops were put in in accordance with the orders of the commanding general.

"I received orders from the general commanding to spring the mine at 3.30 a. m. The troops were in position at that hour, massed behind the portion of our line nearest the point to be reached. The fuze, however, failed to ignite at a point where it had been spliced, and delay occurred. It was reignited, and the mine sprung at 4.45 a. m. Immediately the leading brigade of the first division, (the 2d,) under Colonel Marshall, started for the charge. There was a delay of perhaps five minutes in removing the abatis. Clearing that, the brigade advanced rapidly to the fort that had been mined, now a crater of large proportions, and an obstacle of great formidableness. Mounting a crest of at least 12 feet above the level of the ground, our men found before them a huge aperture of 150 feet in length by 60 in width, and 25 to 30 in depth, the sides of loose pulverized sand piled up precipitately, from which projected huge blocks of clay. To cross such an obstacle and preserve regimental organization was a sheer impossibility. The lines of the enemy on either side were not single, but involuted and complex, filled with pits, traverses, and bomb-proofs, forming a labyrinth as difficult of passage as the crater itself.

"After the training of the previous six weeks, it is not to be wondered at that the men should have sought shelter in these defences. Their regimental organizations were broken, and the officers undertook to reform before advancing. One regiment, the 2d Pennsylvania heavy artillery, advanced some 100 yards beyond the crater, but, not supported, fell back.

"It is reported that the enemy on my left opposite the 5th corps, on the explosion of the mine, left their lines and ran to the rear. But few shots were fired from that direction on the head of my column.

"An infantry fire was opened at once from the enemy's line up to within two hundred feet of the crater; and as soon as the guns could be brought to bear, artillery was opened upon our columns from across the ravine on our immediate right, and from several works at a distance in front of the extreme right of the old line of the 9th corps

"The 1st brigade of the 1st division immediately followed the 2d. The two filled the crater

seized part of the line of pits to the right, and began to cover themselves from the fire of the enemy's artillery, now opening from the crest in their immediate front.

"Before all of the regiments of the last brigade of the 1st division had left our line, at about 5 a. m., the 2d division commenced its advance on the right, the 2d brigade, General Griffin, leading. The distance to be traversed to reach the line of rebel works was 130 yards. The head of the column was somewhat deflected by the enemy's fire, and borne to the left, so that it struck the line near the crater, and the men of the two divisions became, in some degree, intermingled.

"Several attempts were made to advance, which resulted only in the gain of a little ground to the right. General Wilcox had, meanwhile, thrown in part of a brigade to the left of the crater, the remainder halting till the 1st division should advance. Part of the 2d brigade, Colonel Bliss, (2d division,) was also thrown forward into the enemy's line. The other regiments were held until the line should be partially cleared.

"At about 6.30 a. m. orders were again sent to the division commander not to halt at the works, but to advance at once to the crest, without waiting for mutual support.

"General Potter's division (the 2d) was at that time forming for an attack on the right, but under these orders its direction was changed to the front. Its formation in front of the lines was exceedingly difficult, owing to the heavy fire from the crest and from the troops the enemy had now brought up and placed behind the covered way in the ravine. The division charged, and almost reached the summit of the hill, but, unsupported, it fell back, taking shelter behind another covered way on the right.

"Meanwhile the few regiments of that division that had not previously left our lines advanced, seizing for a considerable distance the enemy's lines on the right.

"General Wilcox, on the left, found an advance impossible; his men dug from the mine two guns and held the left flank.

"Peremptory orders from the commanding general directed me to throw in all my troops and direct them against the crest. Under these orders I directed the 4th (colored) division to advance, which division I had hitherto held back, under the belief that those new troops could not be used to advantage in the crowded condition of the portion of the enemy's line held by us.

"The column was thrown forward and advanced gallantly over the slope of the crater, though by this time the ground was swept by a steady fire of artillery and infantry. A part of the column was deflected to the right and charged and captured a portion of the enemy's line with a stand of colors and some prisoners. The division, disorganized by passing the pit, crowded with men of the other divisions, then reformed as well as was possible beyond the crater, and attempted to take the hill; were met at the outset by a counter charge of the enemy, broke in disorder to the rear, passed through the crater and lines on the right, throwing into confusion and drawing off with them many of the white troops, and ran to our own lines. The enemy regained a portion of his line on the right. This was about 8.45 a. m.

"But not all of the colored troops retired; some held the pits behind which they had advanced, severely checking the enemy till they were nearly all killed.

"I believe that no raw troops could have been expected to have behaved better. Before reaching the point from which they had formed to charge, they had been shattered by the enemy's fire, broken by the exceedingly difficult passage of the enemy's lines, and disheartened by the inability of the other divisions to advance.

"At the time of the assault of the 4th division, General Wilcox threw out his 2d brigade, Colonel Humphreys's, and took an additional portion of the line on the left.

"Soon after the repulse, an assault from the front was made on the crater; it was gallantly repulsed with great loss to the enemy, none of them advancing to our lines except those who surrendered themselves.

"At this time the enemy had planted artillery at several points on the hill, and had gained the range of the crater and lines with great accuracy, his mortar firing being especially destructive.

"At 9.15 a. m. I received with regret a peremptory order from the general commanding to withdraw my troops from the enemy's line. The order was sent into the crater at 12.20 p. m. with instructions to brigade commanders on the spot to consult and determine the hour and manner of retiring. I directed General Ferrero to immediately commence a covered way to the crater, to meet one already begun from there.

"The men in the crater and lines adjoining had become exhausted with the severity of the day's work. They had made several and repulsed three distinct assaults, and had fought hand to hand with the enemy for the possession of his pits. They were suffering severely under a hot sun from want of water.

"Finding that their position was not to be held, the general determined, in order to save further loss of life, upon an evacuation of the lines. A message to that effect, requesting a heavy fire of infantry and artillery to right and left should be opened from the old lines, to distract the attention of the enemy, was on its way to me when another assault of the enemy was made. Seeing its preparation, and knowing their men to be discouraged by the proposed relinquishment of all the advantages gained at such cost, and disheartened that they were to expect no further support, Generals Hartgraft and Griffin directed their troops to with-

draw. It is feared the order was not clearly understood in the crater, as most of the troops, and all of the wounded then lying there in great numbers, were captured.

"During the engagement the batteries of the corps did efficient service, especially in keeping down the fire of the rebel fort on the left and in annoyance of the enemy's guns on the right. Twenty-three commanders of regiments were lost on that day, four killed, fifteen wounded, and four missing; two commanders of brigades—General W. F. Bartlett and Colonel E. G. Marshall—were taken prisoners.

"In a report so hurriedly made up, it will be impossible for me to mention the many acts of heroism which characterized the action; and I will only say that my entire command, officers and men, did all that gallant men could do under the circumstances.

"To my staff—Brigadier General Julius White, chief of staff; Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Richmond, assistant adjutant general; Lieutenant Colonel C. G. Loring, jr., assistant inspector general; Surgeon John E. McDonald, medical director; Surgeon James Harris, medical inspector; Major Edward M. Neill, assistant adjutant general; Major Philip M. Lydig, assistant adjutant general; Major J. L. Van Buren, aide-de-camp; Major William Cutting, aide-de-camp; Captain W. H. Harris, U. S. A., chief of ordnance; Captain H. A. Rathbone, commissary of musters; Captain Duncan A. Pell, aide-de-camp; Captain J. C. Paine, signal officer; Lieutenant D. S. Remington, acting assistant quartermaster—I must express my thanks for their activity and gallantry during the action.

"Colonel Loring, Major Cutting, and Major Van Buren were detailed to accompany divisions, and discharged their duties in the most faithful and gallant manner.

"I must again express my thanks to Colonel Pleasants and the men of his regiment for their skilful and meritorious services.

"I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
"A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General, Commanding.*

"Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,  
"Ass't Adj't General Army of the Potomac."

Question. How long after the explosion of the mine before your troops advanced to the first assault?

Answer. There was probably a delay of five minutes in removing the abatis, but no other delay occurred. They commenced the movement forward to the assault at once.

Question. Could you tell whether, on the explosion of the mine, the enemy abandoned any of their intrenchments to the rear of it?

Answer. There was no formidable line in rear of that one held by them at that time.

Question. What was the first effect of the explosion on the enemy, as far as you could see?

Answer. As was stated in my report, it was understood that a considerable portion, if not all of the enemy in their line in front of the fifth corps, abandoned their line temporarily.

Question. Did you deem it very essential that the troops who were to lead the advance should be trained for it somewhat before the springing of the mine?

Answer. Yes, sir; I deemed that essential. It is always better that officers commanding troops should know the work they have to do; and if the men can be drilled with a view to a specific work, they can always do that work better. I felt at the time that my reasons for putting in the colored troops first were good, and I have had no cause to change that opinion. Although it is necessarily a matter of opinion, and no one can ever tell what the result would have been had my plan been strictly adhered to, still I am clearly of the opinion that the colored troops would have made a better charge on that day than almost any other division of the army, in consequence of the peculiar circumstances by which the army had been surrounded. They had been fighting and marching up to the time that they crossed the James river, and my corps particularly had been constantly under fire after crossing the James, for forty days, so that a man could not raise his head above the breastworks without being shot at.

Question. And they were compelled to lie very much quiescent during that time?

Answer. Yes, sir; they had very little exercise, and that little in this constant state of suspense caused by the continuous musketry and artillery fire of the enemy.



Question. From your experience with colored troops, how would you say they compared in reliability as soldiers with the white troops, provided they have had the same training?

Answer. So far as I am myself concerned, I have the greatest faith in colored soldiers. I do not say they are fully equal to our white soldiers, because they have not the same intelligence; but they are quite as easily disciplined, and, as far as my experience goes, they stand fire quite as well as any troops we have had. And, with the exception of the intelligence which prevails to a considerable extent among our white soldiers, and which makes each man a pretty good judge of what he ought to do in a fight, I think the colored soldiers are as good soldiers as we have.

Question. To what do you attribute the failure of the 30th of July? The enterprise did fail, and I suppose you have some idea why it failed.

Answer. Well, sir, it is my opinion that the change that was made the day before the battle in the troops which were to lead the advance, and the directions which were given modifying the mode of putting the troops in, had a very serious effect upon the result. But I am not prepared to say that it would not have been a success even with those changes, had our troops on the right and left of the point assaulted attacked the enemy, and taken advantage of the weak condition of their lines. This is simply an opinion, given without reference to the action of the generals who commanded those troops, because I know nothing of their orders; and my opinion may be entirely erroneous.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. Was your assault sustained by the second corps on your right, or the fifth corps on your left?

Answer. No, sir, not to my knowledge. I do not think they attempted an attack. The 18th corps, under General Ord, had relieved my troops on that line, and a portion of that corps was held in reserve to assist us, and a brigade, or possibly a division, did make an attempt to charge the enemy's works.

By the chairman:

Question. In your judgment, was the failure of the fuze to ignite the mine on the first attempt attended with any disastrous effects?

Answer. I think not. I do not think the delay in the explosion of the mine resulted in giving the enemy any information of our movements. Therefore I do not think it resulted in any harm.

Question. Who is responsible for the deficiency in the supply of fuzes necessary to explode the mine?

Answer. I was directed to make my requisitions for fuze and powder upon the chief of artillery. I did so at the proper time. A despatch from one of his assistants came to me inquiring how much I desired, and I informed him of the distinct number of feet. I think, at any rate, I stated to him in substance that I wanted enough to run three or four fuzes in to the charge.

Question. Of course you were compelled to make use of such as he sent you?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. And the quantity supplied was sufficient for only one fuze?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the chairman:

Question. Did you have any interviews with General Meade during the battle or afterwards on that day? If so, what took place during those interviews?

Answer. I had but one personal interview with General Meade that day, and that was after the battle. Upon the reception of the order to withdraw our troops from the enemy's lines, I went to General Meade's headquarters and re-

quested that the order might be rescinded, stating that I did not think we had fought long enough, and that I thought we could succeed in carrying the crest if we persevered in the attack, and the other troops were put in. He said that the order to withdraw was final, and that he had ordered all offensive operations on the right and left to cease. This order, I consider, materially affected the result of our withdrawal, inasmuch as the enemy's forces upon our right and left were entirely unoccupied, and thereby had an opportunity of concentrating upon us during the withdrawal. It could hardly have been expected that the withdrawal could have been made without disaster, after all offensive operations had ceased on the right and left, and the supporting force withdrawn from the rear. My only hope was that the force in the crater would be able to hold the position until a covered way could be dug from our advanced line out to the crater, a distance of a little over a hundred yards. This covered way had been commenced both in the crater and on our advanced lines, and I instructed General Ferrero to push it forward as rapidly as possible, with such of his troops as had been driven back and collected in the advanced line. The communication between the advanced line and the crater was almost entirely cut off; and although the distance was so short—only about one hundred yards—it was next to an impossibility for messengers to reach the crater, much less to send in ammunition and water. The men had become very much exhausted with the heat and labors of the day.

After I was informed by General Meade that the order was final to withdraw, and that there was no object in holding the crater by connecting its flanks with our old advanced line, as I had suggested, I telegraphed to General White, my chief of staff, whom I had left at my field headquarters, that the orders to withdraw were peremptory, and I at once sent for the division commanders, in order to consult as to the most favorable method and time for withdrawal. In the mean time my despatch to General White had been sent to the division commanders, and by them sent into the crater for report from the brigade commanders. Previous to and during this time the enemy made several assaults upon our position, which were repulsed. Soon after this a heavy attack was made upon the left of our forces, driving us back, and causing a hasty evacuation of the crater by all who could get back to the main lines.

In the evening of that day General Meade sent me a message stating that he had understood that our troops had been driven from the crater, and he desired to know if such was the fact. I very improperly threw the message one side, and said to my staff officer, who was with me, that I would not answer such a message; that if General Meade felt disposed to cease offensive operations on the right and left, and leave us to get out of the crater as best we could, and had taken so little interest in the matter as not to know late in the evening that we had been driven from the crater before two o'clock, I certainly would not give him the information, and that I believed he knew all about it. He sent me, I think, two more messages during the evening, which I treated in the same way.

I refer to this as a piece of insubordination on my part for which no excuse can be offered; but it had no effect upon the result, as it occurred after the fight.

An unfortunate correspondence took place between General Meade and myself during the day, which reads as follows:

“General MEADE:

“JULY 30.

“I am doing all in my power to push the troops forward, and, if possible, we will carry the crest. It is hard work, but we hope to accomplish it. I am fully alive to the importance of it.

“A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General.*”

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“7.30 a. m., 1864.

“Major General BURNSIDE :

“What do you mean by hard work to take the crest? I understand not a man has advanced beyond the enemy’s line which you occupied immediately after exploding the mine.

“Do you mean to say your officers and men will not obey your orders to advance? If not, what is the obstacle? I wish to know the truth, and desire an immediate answer.

“GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*”

“HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS,  
“Battery Morton, July 30, 1864.

“General MEADE :

“Your despatch, by Captain Jay, received. The main body of General Potter’s division is beyond the crater. I do not mean to say that my officers and men will not obey my orders to advance. I mean to say that it is very hard work to advance to the crest.

“I have never, in any report, said anything different from what I conceived to be the truth. Were it not insubordinate, I would say that the latter remark of your note was unofficerlike and ungentlemanly.

“Respectfully, yours,

“A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General.*”

I refer to this correspondence because it has been made the subject of charges against me upon which I was not tried. I felt, at the time I wrote the offensive despatch, that General Meade intended to imply that I had not made truthful reports, but I am now satisfied that he did not so intend.

General Meade ordered a court to investigate the operations of the 30th. This court was composed of General Hancock, who commanded the troops on my right, General Ayres, who commanded a division of troops on my left, (which division was selected for the purpose of making an attack from our left, but did not attack,) and General Miles, who commanded a brigade in General Hancock’s corps, which was on my right. The judge advocate of the court was the inspector general at General Meade’s headquarters.

I at once telegraphed to Mr. Stanton as follows :

“HEADQUARTERS 9TH ARMY CORPS, August 6, 1864.

“To the Secretary of War of the United States, Washington :

“While I have the greatest respect for the officers composing the court ordered by Special Order W. D. No. 258 to examine into the affair of the 30th instant, I beg to submit that it should be composed of officers who do not belong to this army.

“While I am most willing, and feel it to be my due to have the fullest investigation, I should not, under the circumstances, demand one, nor seek to press the matter to an issue in any degree adverse to the general commanding the army of the Potomac. I am ready to await the verdict of time. But if an investigation is to be had, I feel that I have a right to ask that it be made by officers not in this army, and not selected by General Meade. All of the officers constituting the court held command in the supporting columns which were not brought into action on that day. The judge advocate is a member of General Meade’s staff.

“General Meade has also preferred charges against me, upon which I desire to be tried.

“As the court convenes on Monday, the 8th instant, I respectfully request an answer may be returned as soon as possible.

“A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General.*”

To this telegram I received the following reply :

“UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH.

“[By telegraph from Washington, dated August 8, 1864—11 a. m.]

“Major General BURNSIDE :

“Your telegram of the sixth (6th) has been laid before the President, who directs me to say, that, while he would like to conform to your wishes, the detail for the court of inquiry having already been ordered, he does not see that any evil can result to you. The action of the board of inquiry will be merely to collect facts for his information. No charges or even imputations have reached him or the department in respect to you. It is not known here, except by your telegram, that General Meade has made against you any charges. He directs me further to assure you that you may feel entire confidence in his fairness and justice.

“EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*”

I stated in my evidence a few moments ago that General Meade ordered the court, which is the fact. It assembled under his order, and decided that such a court could not proceed without the authority of the President of the United States. The matter was then referred to Washington, and the existence of the court was legalized by the President. This court assembled and took its evidence, which I understand is now in the hands of the President.

There is also a point which will come up in this investigation, I suppose, inasmuch as it came up in the investigation before this military board; that is, as to the information which was furnished by me to General Meade during the action. I have simply to say, that I reported to him all important movements, and that I did not feel at any time that any information was withheld from him which was necessary to the making up of a correct opinion as to the state of affairs in my front. I will leave with the committee a copy of all messages received from General Meade by me during the action, and of all messages sent by me to General Meade, and by some of General Meade's officers, who were with me at intervals during the day, and who reported to General Meade the progress of affairs, which I considered the same as if reported myself.

Question. What reason did General Meade give for not having the attack made on the right and left, as you had suggested?

Answer. He never gave me any reasons. We never conversed upon the subject.

Question. An attack by the corps on your right and left was contemplated in the plan that you first submitted to him?

Answer. Yes, sir; and in the despatches, just referred to, will be found one from me to General Meade, requesting that General Warren's corps should be put in. I first sent him a despatch, taking as much responsibility as I thought I could, in view of his letter of the 3d of July, stating that if Warren's men could be concentrated, and I could designate the time when they could go in, I would let him know, making it a half request. Afterwards, becoming anxious, I sent him a despatch embracing these words: "Now is the time for Warren to go in." Notwithstanding the fact of his letter of the 3d of July, I thought I would take the responsibility of sending this despatch to him, and I did so.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. As I understand it, the enemy's lines were very much weakened on their right and left at the time of the explosion of the mine?

Answer. Yes, sir. As I was informed by my signal officer, they took troops from in front of General Warren's corps, formed them in columns, and marched them around and assaulted our men who were trying to take the crest; but he did not report having seen any troops taken from their left opposite General Hancock's corps.

By the chairman:

Question. In your opinion were there any other of our troops engaged that day excepting those who were trying to advance through the crater?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Did not that fact enable the enemy to concentrate a greater force upon those who were advancing than they could have done had they been vigorously attacked at other points of their lines?

Answer. There is scarcely a doubt of it.

Question. Do you know any reason why those other troops along our lines were not ordered to engage the enemy at the time you were endeavoring to penetrate beyond the crater?

Answer. No, sir; I do not know of any reason, and I do not know of any orders issued on that day, except those concerning my own command.

The following are the despatches from General Meade :

“No. 1.]

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,  
“*Headquarters Army of the Potomac, July 30, 1864—3.20 a. m.*”

“Major General BURNSIDE: As it is still so dark, the commanding general says you can postpone firing the mine if you think it proper.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“*Major General, Chief of Staff.*”

This despatch was answered either by a written or verbal message from me, stating that the mine would be exploded at the hour designated—3.30 a. m.

“No. 2.]

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,  
“*Headquarters Ninth Army Corps, July 30, 1864—4.30 a. m.*”

“Major General BURNSIDE. Is there any difficulty in exploding the mine? It is three-fourths of an hour later than that fixed upon for exploding.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“*Major General and Chief of Staff.*”

It is possible I did not answer this despatch, as I was at the time anxiously endeavoring to ascertain the cause of the delay in the explosion.

“No. 3.]

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,  
“*Headquarters Ninth Army Corps, July 30, 1864—4.30 a. m.*”

“Major General BURNSIDE: If the mine cannot be exploded something else must be done, and at once. The commanding general is awaiting to hear from you before determining.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“*Major General and Chief of Staff.*”

The cause of the delay had not been ascertained when I received this despatch :

“No. 4.]

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,  
“*Headquarters Ninth Army Corps, July 30, 1864—4.35 a. m.*”

“General BURNSIDE: The commanding general directs, if your mine has failed, that you make an assault at once, opening your batteries.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“*Major General and Chief of Staff.*”

Just as I received this despatch Major Van Buren reported the cause of the delay, and I directed him to inform General Meade's aid (who was waiting) of the cause. Very soon after the mine exploded.

“No. 5.]

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,  
“*Headquarters Army of the Potomac, July 30, 1864—5.40 a. m.*”

“General BURNSIDE: The general commanding learns that your troops are halting at the works where the mine exploded, and he directs that all your troops be pushed forward to the crest at once. Call on General Ord to move forward his troops at once.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“*Major General and Chief of Staff.*”

This was simply an order, and required no answer.

“No. 6.]

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,  
“*Headquarters Army of the Potomac, July 30, 1864—5.40 a. m.*”

“General BURNSIDE: What news from your assaulting column? Please report frequently.

“GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*”

To this despatch I replied as follows :

“HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS,  
“*Battery Morton, July 30, 1864.*”

“General MEADE: We have the enemy's first line and occupy the breach. I shall endeavor to push forward to the crest as rapidly as possible.

“A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General.*”

“P. S.—There is a large fire in Petersburg.

“W. W. SANDERS, *Captain Sixth Infantry.*”

“UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,  
“Headquarters Army Potomac, 6 a. m., July 30, 1864.

“Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps* :

“The commanding general wishes to know what is going on on your left, and whether it would be an advantage for Warren’s supporting force to go in at once.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“Major General and Chief of Staff.”

This was answered as follows :

“6.20 a. m.

“General MEADE :

“If General Warren’s supporting force can be concentrated just now, ready to go in at the proper time, it would be well. I will designate to you when it ought to move; there is scarcely room for it now on our immediate front.

“A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General*.”

“UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,  
“Headquarters Army Potomac, July 30, 1864—5.30 a. m.

“Major General BURNSIDE :

“Warren’s force has been concentrated, and ready to move since 3.30 a. m. My object in inquiring was to ascertain if you could judge of the practicability of advancing without waiting for your column. What is the delay in your column moving? Every minute is most precious, as the enemy are undoubtedly concentrating to meet you on the crest; and if you give them time enough, you cannot expect to succeed. There will be no object to be gained in occupying the enemy’s line; it cannot be held under their artillery fire, without much labor in turning it. The great point is to secure the crest at once and at all hazards.

“GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General*.”

I replied to this as follows :

“JULY 30, 1864.

“General MEADE :

“I am doing all in my power to push the troops forward, and, if possible, we will carry the crest. It is hard work, but we hope to accomplish it. I am fully alive to the importance of it.

“A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General*.”

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC, 7.30 a. m., July 30, 1864.

“Major General BURNSIDE :

“What do you mean by hard work to take the crest? I understand not a man has advanced beyond the enemy’s line which you occupied immediately after exploding the mine. Do you mean to say your officers and men will not obey your orders to advance? If not, what is the obstacle? I wish to know the truth, and desire an immediate answer.

“GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General*.”

“HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS,  
“Battery Morton, July 30, 1864.

“General MEADE :

“Your despatch per Captain Jay received. The main body of General Potter’s division is beyond the crater. I do not mean to say that my officers and men will not obey my orders to advance. I mean to say that it is very hard to advance to the crest.

“I have never in any report said anything different from what I conceived to be the truth. Were it not insubordinate, I should say that the latter remark of your note was unofficerlike and ungentlemanly.

“Respectfully yours,

“A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General*.”

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC, 7.30 a. m., 1864.

“Major General BURNSIDE :

“GENERAL: Will you do me the favor to send me a copy of my note to you per Captain Jay. I did not keep any copy, intending it to be confidential. Your reply requires I should have a copy.

“Respectfully yours,

“GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General*.”

This was answered by sending either a copy or the original note by the aid who brought the above despatch.

“UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,  
“Headquarters Army Potomac, 8 a. m., July 30, 1864.

“General BURNSIDE:

“Since writing by Captain Jay, Captain Sanders has come in, and reported condition of affairs. He says Griffin has advanced and was checked. This modifies my despatch. Still I would like to know the exact morale of your corps. Ord reports that he cannot move until you get out of the way. Can't you let him pass out on your right, and let him try what he can do?

“GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*”

“U. S. MILITARY TELEGRAPH, BEFORE PETERSBURG,  
“Covered Way, Fourteen-Gun Battery, July 30, 1864.

“General MEADE:

“Many of the ninth and eighteenth corps are retiring before the enemy. I think now is the time to put in the 5th corps promptly.

“A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General.*”

“UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,  
“Headquarters Army Potomac, 9.30 a. m., July 30, 1864.

“Major General BURNSIDE:

“The major general commanding has heard that the result of your attack has been a repulse, and directs that if in your judgment nothing further can be effected, that you withdraw to your own line, taking precaution to get your men back safely. General Ord will do the same.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“Major General and Chief of Staff.”

“UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,  
“Headquarters Army Potomac, July 30, 1864.

“General BURNSIDE:

“The major general commanding directs that you withdraw to your own intrenchments.  
“A. A. HUMPHREYS, *Major General.*”

After the receipt of these despatches I went to General Meade's headquarters, as I before stated, to request that the orders might be rescinded.

“UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,  
“Headquarters Army Potomac, July 30, 1864.

“General BURNSIDE and General ORD:

“You can exercise your own discretion in withdrawing your troops now, or at a later period—say to-night. It is not intended to hold the enemy's line which you now occupy any longer than is required to withdraw safely your men.

“GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General.*”

The despatch, I think, passed me while I was on the way to General Meade's headquarters.

Besides the despatches from me, the following were sent from my headquarters by an aide of General Meade, who was with me during the day:

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“5.50 a. m., July 30, 1864.

“General MEADE:

“The eighteenth corps have just been ordered to push forward to the crest. The loss does not appear to be heavy; some prisoners coming in.

“W. W. SANDERS, *Captain 6th Infantry.*”

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“6.10 a. m., July 30, 1864.

“Major General MEADE, *Commanding*:

“General Burnside says he has given orders to all his division commanders to put everything in at once.

“W. W. SANDERS, *Captain 6th Infantry.*”

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“8.45 a. m., July 30, 1864.

“General MEADE:

“One gun has just been taken out of the mine, and is now being put in position. Have not heard anything from the attack made from the left of the mine. One set of colors just sent in, captured by the negroes.

“W. W. SANDERS, *Captain 6th Infantry.*”

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“9 a. m., July 30, 1864.

“General MEADE :

“The attack made on the right of mine has been repulsed. A great many men are coming to the rear.

“W. W. SANDERS, *Captain 6th Infantry.*”

In addition to these, General Meade received a despatch from Lieutenant Colonel Loring, my inspector general, which was intended for me, and was forwarded to me by him, (General Meade,) which assured me that he had the information contained in the despatch.

*Testimony of Major General George G. Meade.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Before Petersburg, Va., December 20, 1864.*

Major General GEORGE G. MEADE sworn and examined.

By Mr. Chandler :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?

Answer. I am a major general of the United States army, commanding the army of the Potomac.

Question. Will you state to the committee, in your own way, whatever you may deem important in relation to the battle before Petersburg, of July 30, 1864 ?

Answer. Immediately after that action took place, I felt that it was due to the public, to the army, and to myself, that the matter should be thoroughly investigated. I therefore applied to the President of the United States, the only power having authority to order such an investigation, to order a court of inquiry, which he immediately did. The court was composed of four of the most distinguished officers of this army. Major General Hancock was the president of it, and Brigadier General Ayres, Brigadier General Miles, and some other officer, whose name I do not now recollect, were the other members of it.

That court was in session in this army within a few days after the battle. I appeared before it and submitted a full and complete statement and explanation of all the facts connected with the matter, and directed their attention to the proper persons to be called before them. They had before them all the officers who were then upon the ground, and thoroughly investigated the whole subject. Their proceedings were transmitted to the War Department, where, so far as my knowledge extends, they have been from that time to this. Of the result of those proceedings, the opinion of the court, or anything that occurred before them, excepting my own testimony, I am perfectly ignorant.

I would suggest to the committee that they call upon the War Department for a copy of those proceedings, as they will find there all the information which can possibly be obtained. And if, after an examination of those proceedings—which might be made a part of the testimony before you—any further information should be desired, it could easily be obtained by calling upon such officers as the committee might deem it advisable to examine.

At present the only documents I have with me are my official report, which I made to Lieutenant General Grant immediately after the affair, and some papers referred to in that report. Those, with the permission of the committee, I will now read and make part of my testimony. They give a general history of the transaction, but do not enter into details so much as I could do if I had all my despatches and official papers here.



## "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"August 16, 1864.

"I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the operations on the 30th ultimo, when an unsuccessful assault was made on the enemy's works in front of Petersburg. Soon after occupying our present lines, Major General Burnside, commanding 9th corps, at the suggestion of Lieutenant Colonel Pleasants, 48th Pennsylvania volunteers, commenced the running of a gallery from his line to a battery occupied by the enemy, with a view of placing a mine under this battery. When my attention was called to this work, I sanctioned its prosecution, though at the time, from the reports of the engineers and my own examination, I was satisfied the location of the mine was such that its explosion would not be likely to be followed by any important result, as the battery to be destroyed was in a re-entering part of the enemy's line, exposed to an enfilading fire, and reverse fire from points both on the right and left. The mine being completed, and the movement of the 2d corps to the north side of the James having drawn off the greater portion of the confederate army, the lieutenant general commanding directed the explosion of the mine, and the assaulting the enemy's works. For this purpose the 18th corps was placed under my command, in addition to the army of the Potomac. On the 29th ultimo, a general order of battle was issued, a copy of which is herewith annexed, (marked A,) which will serve to show the plan of the proposed attack. On the 30th, owing to a defect in the fuze, the explosion of the mine was delayed from 3.30 to 4.45 a. m., an unfortunate delay, because it was designed to assault the crest of the ridge occupied by the enemy just before daylight, when the movement would in a measure be obscured. As soon as the mine was sprung, the 1st division 9th corps, Brigadier General Ledlie commanding, moved forward and occupied the crater without opposition. No advance, however, was made from the crater to the ridge, some 400 yards beyond; Brigadier General Ledlie giving as a reason for not pushing forward, that the enemy could occupy the crater in his rear, he seeming to forget that the rest of his corps and all of the 18th corps were waiting to occupy the crater and follow him. Brigadier Generals Potter and Wilcox, commanding 2d and 3d divisions, 9th corps, advanced simultaneously with Ledlie, and endeavored to occupy parts of the enemy's line on Ledlie's right and left, so as to cover those flanks, respectively, but on reaching the enemy's line Ledlie's men were found occupying the vacated parts, both to the right and left of the crater, in consequence of which the men of the several divisions got mixed up, and a scene of disorder and confusion commenced, which seems to have continued to the end of the operations. In the mean time the enemy, rallying from the confusion incident to the explosion, began forming his infantry in a ravine to the right, and planting his artillery both on the right and left of the crater. Seeing this, Potter was enabled to get his men out of the crater and enemy's line, and had formed them for an attack on the right, when he received an order to attack the crest of the ridge. Notwithstanding he had to change front in the presence of the enemy, he succeeded not only in doing so, but, as he reports, advancing to within a few yards of the crest, which he would have taken if he had been supported. This was after 7 a. m., more than two hours after Ledlie had occupied the crater, and yet he had made no advance. He, however, states that he was forming to advance when the 4th division, (colored troops,) General Ferrero commanding, came rushing into the crater, and threw his men into confusion. The 4th division passed beyond the crater, and made an assault, when they encountered a heavy fire of artillery and infantry, which threw them into inextricable confusion, and they retired in disorder through the troops in the crater, and back into our lines. In the mean time, in ignorance of what was occurring, I sent orders to Major General Ord, commanding 18th corps, who was expected to follow the 9th, to advance at once on the right of the 9th, and independently of the latter. To this General Ord replied, the only debouches were choked up with the 9th corps, which had not all advanced at this time. He, however, pushed on a brigade of Turner's division over the 9th corps parapets, and directed it to charge the enemy's line on the right, where it was still occupied. While it was about executing this order, the disorganized 4th division (colored) of the 9th corps came rushing back and carrying everything with them, including Turner's brigade. By this time—between 8 and 9 a. m.—the enemy, seeing the hesitation and confusion on our part, having planted batteries on both flanks in ravines where our artillery could not reach them, opened a heavy fire, not only on the ground in front of the crater, but between it and our lines, their mortars at the same time throwing shells into the dense mass of our men in the crater and adjacent works. In addition to this artillery fire, the enemy massed his infantry and assaulted the position. Although the assault was repulsed and some heroic fighting was done, particularly on the part of Potter's division and some regiments of the 18th corps, yet the exhaustion incident to the crowding of the men and the intense heat of the weather, added to the destructive artillery fire of the enemy, produced its effect, and report was brought to me that our men were retiring into our old lines. Being satisfied the moment for success had passed, and that any further attempt would only result in useless sacrifice of life, with the concurrence of the lieutenant general commanding, who was present, I directed the suspension of further offensive movements, and the withdrawal of the troops in the crater when it could be done with security, retaining the position till night if necessary. It appears that when this order reached the crater, 12.30, the

greater portion of those that had been in were out; the balance remained for an hour and a half repulsing an attack of the enemy, but, on the enemy threatening a second attack, retreating in disorder, losing many prisoners. This terminated this most unfortunate and not very creditable operation. I forbear to comment in the manner I might otherwise deem myself justified in doing, because the whole subject, at my request, has been submitted for investigation by the President of the United States to a court of inquiry, with directions to report upon whom, if any one, censure is to be laid. I transmit herewith the reports of corps, division, and brigade commanders, giving the details of the operations of each corps. There are two remarks in the report of Major General Burnside which justice to myself requires I should notice. General Burnside has thought proper to state: "A plan of attack was submitted, involving the putting the colored division in advance, and a certain formation of troops, and that the plan was disapproved in these two particulars." This statement is not accurate. The proposition to place the colored division at the head of the assaulting column was disapproved, but no control was exercised over General Burnside in the tactical formation of his column. This will be seen by reference to the correspondence that passed upon the subject, marked B and C. Again, Major General Burnside says: "Peremptory orders from the commanding general directed me to throw in all my troops and direct them against the crest. Under these orders, I directed the 4th division, colored, to advance, which division I had hitherto held back, under the belief that these new troops could not be used to advantage in the crowded condition of the portion of the enemy's line held by us." I presume Major General Burnside here refers to the despatch addressed to him as follows. (See despatch of July 30, 6 a. m.)

"It was not intended by that order, nor was any such construction justified by its terms, to push forward the colored division into the overcrowded crater, there to add to the disorganization and confusion already existing, and of the existence of which I was utterly ignorant, but of which it is to be presumed, from the extract from his report, General Burnside was aware. The order required that the men in the crater should be pushed forward at all hazards to the crest beyond, and when they moved the colored division advanced after them. It will be seen to be the concurrent testimony of all parties that the failure of success was in a great measure due to the injudicious advance of the colored division into the overcrowded crater and adjacent parts of the enemy's line, and to the confusion produced by their retiring a disordered and disorganized mass, after attempting an assault. From the reports transmitted, I cannot perceive that the colored troops are open to any more censure for their conduct than the other troops engaged. I enclose herewith a list of casualties, amounting in all in the army of the Potomac and 18th corps to 4,400 killed, wounded, and missing; 246 prisoners, two (2) colors and two (2) guns were captured, but the latter were abandoned on retiring from the crater.

"In closing this report, I cannot forbear from expressing the poignant regret I experienced at the failure of an operation promising such brilliant results had it been successful. Had the mine been sprung at 3.30 a. m., and the crest promptly seized, as it is believed it could have been done in thirty minutes after the explosion, such a force could have been poured into the crest as to have rendered its repossession by the enemy impossible, and thus have rendered untenable all his lines around Petersburg. But the operation was essentially a *coup-de-main*, depending for success upon the utmost promptitude of movement, and the taking advantage of the shock produced on the enemy by the explosion of the mine. The causes of the failure justice to all parties requires I should leave to the court of inquiry to ascertain.

"Very respectfully, &c.,

"GEO. G. MEADE,  
Major General, Commanding."

"Lieut. Col. T. S. BOWERS, *Assist. Adjt. General*.

"Official:

"S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General*."

A.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 29, 1864.

"ORDERS.

"The following instructions are issued for the guidance of all concerned:

"1. As soon as it is dark, Major General Burnside, commanding ninth corps, will withdraw his two brigades under General White, occupying the intrenchments between the plank and Norfolk roads, and bring them to his front. Care will be taken not to interfere with the troops of the eighteenth corps, moving into their position in rear of the ninth corps. General Burnside will form his troops for assaulting the enemy's works at daylight of the 30th, prepare his parapets and abatis for the passage of the columns, and have the pioneers equipped for work in opening passages for artillery, destroying enemy's abatis, and the intrenching tools distributed for effecting lodgement, &c.

"2. Major General Warren, commanding fifth corps, will reduce the number of his troops holding the intrenchments of his front to the minimum, and concentrate all his available force on his right, and hold them prepared to support the assault of Major General Burnside. The preparations in respect to pioneers, intrenching tools, &c., enjoined upon the ninth corps will also be made by the fifth corps.

"3. As soon as it is dark, Major General Ord, commanding eighteenth corps, will relieve his troops in the trenches by General Mott's division of the second corps, and form his corps in rear of the ninth corps, and be prepared to support the assault of Major General Burnside.

"4. Every preparation will be made for moving forward the field artillery of each corps.

"5. At dark Major General Hancock, commanding second corps, will move from Deep Bottom to the rear of the intrenchments now held by the eighteenth corps, resume the command of Mott's division, and be prepared at daylight to follow up the assaulting and supporting columns, or for such other operations as may be found necessary.

"6. Major General Sheridan, commanding cavalry corps, will proceed at dark from the vicinity of Deep Bottom to Lee's mill, and at daylight will move with his whole corps, including Wilson's division, against the enemy's troops defending Petersburg on the right, by the roads leading to that town from the southward and westward.

"Major Duane, acting chief engineer, will have the pontoon train parked at convenient points in the rear, prepared to move. He will see that supplies of sand-bags, gabions, fascines, &c., are in depot near the lines, ready for use. He will detail engineer officers for each corps.

"8. At half past three in the morning of the 30th, Major General Burnside will spring his mine, and his assaulting columns will immediately move rapidly upon the breach, seize the crest in the rear, and effect a lodgment there. He will be followed by Major General Ord, who will support him on the right, directing his movement to the crest indicated, and by Major General Warren, who will support him on the left.

"Upon the explosion of the mine the artillery of all kinds in battery will open upon those points of the enemy's works whose fire covers the ground over which our columns must move, care being taken to avoid impeding the progress of our troops. Special instructions respecting the direction of fire will be issued through the chief of artillery.

"9. Corps commanders will report to the commanding general when their preparations are complete, and will advise him of every step in the progress of the operation, and of everything important that occurs.

"10. Promptitude, rapidity of execution, and cordial co-operation are essential to success, and the commanding general is confident that this indication of his expectations will insure the hearty efforts of the commanders and troops.

"11. Headquarters during the operation will be at the headquarters of the ninth corps.

"By command of Major General Meade.

"S. WILLIAMS,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

"Official:

"S. WILLIAMS, A. A. G."

## B.

"HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS, July 26, 1864.

"GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your notes of this morning by Captains Jay and Bache, also of a telegram from the commanding general relating to the same subject. It is altogether probable that the enemy are cognizant of the fact that we are mining, because it has been mentioned in their newspapers, and they have been heard to work on what are supposed to be shafts in close proximity to our galleries. But the rain of night before last no doubt filled their shafts and much retarded their work. We have heard no sounds of work in them either yesterday or to-day, and nothing is heard by us in the mine but the usual sounds of work on the surface above.

"This morning we had some apprehensions that the left lateral gallery was in danger of caving in from the weight of the batteries above it and the shock of their firing. But all possible precautions have been taken to strengthen it, and we hope to preserve it intact.

"The placing of the charges in the mine will not involve the necessity of making a noise. It is therefore probable that we will escape discovery if the mine is to be used within two or three days. It is nevertheless highly important, in my opinion, that the mine should be exploded at the earliest possible moment consistent with the general interests of the campaign. I state to you the facts as nearly as I can, and, in the absence of any knowledge as to the meditated movements of the army, I must leave you to judge the proper time to make use of the mine. But it may not be improper for me to say, that the advantages reaped from the work would be but small if it were exploded without any co-operative movement. My plan would be to explode the mine just before daylight in the morning, or about 5 o'clock in the

afternoon, mass the two brigades of the colored division in rear of my first line, in column of divisions, 'double columns closed in mass'—the head of each brigade resting on the front line, and as soon as the explosion has taken place move them forward with instructions for the divisions to take half distance; and as soon as the leading regiments of the two brigades pass through the gap in the enemy's line, the leading regiments of the right brigade to come into line perpendicular to the enemy's line by the right companies 'on the right into line, wheel,' the left companies 'on the right into line,' and proceed at once down the line of the enemy's works as rapidly as possible; the leading regiments of the left brigade to execute the reverse movement to the left, moving up the enemy's line. The remainders of the two columns to move directly towards the crest in front as rapidly as possible, diverging in such a way as to enable them to deploy into columns of regiments, the right column making as nearly as may be for Cemetery hill. These columns to be followed by the other divisions of this corps as soon as they can be thrown in. This would involve the necessity of relieving these divisions by other troops before the movement, and of holding columns of other troops in readiness to take our place on the crest, in case we gain it, and sweep down it.

"It would be advisable, in my opinion, if we succeed in gaining the crest, to throw the colored division right into the town. There is a necessity for the co-operation, at least in the way of artillery, of the troops on my right and left; of the extent of this you will necessarily be the judge. I think our chances of success in a plan of this kind are more than even.

"The main gallery of the mine is five hundred and twenty-two (522) feet in length, the side galleries about forty (40) feet each. My suggestion is that eight magazines be placed in the lateral galleries—two at each end, say a few feet apart, in branches at right angles to the side galleries, and two more in each of the side galleries, similarly placed, situated by pairs equidistant from each other and the ends of the galleries, thus:

[See diagram, page 17.]

Tamping beginning at the termination of the main gallery, for, say, one hundred feet, leaving all the air space in the side galleries. Run out some five or six fuzes and two wires, to render the ignition of the charge certain.

"I propose to put in each of the eight magazines from twelve to fourteen hundred pounds of powder, the magazines to be connected by a trough of powder instead of a fuze.

"I beg to enclose a copy of a statement from General Potter on the subject. I would suggest that the powder train be parked in a wood near our ammunition train, about a mile in rear of this place; Lieutenant Colonel Pierce, chief quartermaster, will furnish Captain Strang with a guide to the place.

"I beg also to request that General Benham be instructed to send us at once eight thousand (8,000) sand-bags, to be used for tamping and other purposes.

"I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"A. E. BURNSIDE,

"Major General, Commanding.

"Major General HUMPHREYS, *Chief of Staff.*

"Official:

"CHARLES E. PEASE,

"Assistant Adjutant General."

C.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"July 29, 1864—10.15 a. m.

"COMMANDING OFFICER 9th Corps:

"I am instructed to say that the major general commanding submitted to the lieutenant general commanding the armies your proposition to form the leading columns of assault of the black troops, and that he, as well as the major general commanding, does not approve the proposition, but directs that those columns be formed of the white troops.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,

"Major General and Chief of Staff.

"Official copy:

"S. WILLIAMS, A. A. G."

## "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"July 30, 1864—6 a. m.

"Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps.*

"Prisoners taken say there is no line in their rear, and that their men were falling back when ours advanced; that none of the troops have returned from the James. Our chance is now; push your men forward at all hazards, white and black, and don't lose time in making formations, but rush for the crest.

"G. G. MEADE,

"Major General, *Commanding.*

"Official copy:

"S. WILLIAMS, A. A. G."

This report, which I made to Lieutenant General Grant immediately after the affair occurred, was accompanied by the official reports of the subordinate commanders. I subsequently appeared before the court of inquiry and made a very long and detailed statement, accompanied by all my despatches, illustrating all the events of the day, which it is not now in my power to make to this committee from want of material and the absence of those papers. I propose, therefore, with the sanction of the committee, to content myself with the submitting of those papers, provided that, if the suggestion I have made, that the committee call for the proceedings of this court of inquiry, is not acceded to, I shall then be permitted, upon some further occasion, when I can get my papers, to again appear before the committee and make such statement as I may desire to make.

Question. Can you state what was the cause of the delay in the explosion of the mine?

Answer. Yes, sir; that was caused by a defect in the fuze. That was an accident for which nobody was responsible. That was corrected by the gallantry of some soldiers, whose names I do not now remember, who went into the mine, found that the fuze had ceased to burn, and relighted it.

Question. Was there any delay in making the assault after the mine was exploded?

Answer. Yes, sir; not so much delay in making the assault as delay in taking advantage of the occupation of the crater of the mine within the enemy's line. There was some delay in making the charge. Arrangements which should have been made preparatory to that charge were not made so far as I can ascertain. There was not a sufficient *deboche* from our line of works. There was a high parapet in front of our lines, an abatis and other obstacles to keep the enemy from us. Those obstacles should have been removed to enable our troops to move out promptly. There was but a small opening made, by which the 9th corps, 15,000 men, moved out by the flank; whereas there should have been an opening sufficiently large to have allowed the whole corps to move out and to have gone to the crest in not more than thirty minutes.

I will furnish the committee with a map which will show exactly the relative position of the mine with the enemy's lines and to our own, and which will show the position which it was desirous to take after the explosion of the mine. The explosion of the mine was simply a preliminary operation for the purpose of making an opening in the enemy's line through which we might pour our troops and get in rear and occupy a hill behind their line which commanded all their works. But, after getting into the crater of the mine, the troops never advanced beyond. No effort was made to gain possession of the hill beyond until the enemy had collected such a force that our troops were repulsed.

Question. Could this abatis have been cleared away prior to the springing of the mine?

Answer. Certainly; and it ought to have been done, and it was ordered to be done during the night previous. oe

Question. Can you state about how much delay there was, after the springing of the mine, before the charge was made?

Answer. The charge never was properly made. I think that in the course of twenty or twenty-five minutes the troops advanced and occupied the crater of the mine. But the charge was to have been made from the mine. There was no firing upon our troops until they got to the mine—nothing but marching ahead for the first half hour. During that time anybody could walk across and get to the mine. The charge was to have been made from the mine to the hill beyond. That charge never was made. But the troops kept crowding into this crater, which was a large hole some 150 feet in length by 50 feet in width and 25 feet in depth. The troops just crowded into that hole and the adjacent parts of the enemy's lines which had been abandoned for about a hundred yards on each side of the crater. That was immediately filled up by our troops. There they remained, and the more men there were there the worse it was. Their commanders could not keep order among them. The difficulty was to get the men out of this crater and to the hill beyond.

I probably ought to add that the condition of the army, from the long campaign in which it had been engaged, the number of battles it had fought, and the frequent attempts it had made to take the enemy's works, which had resulted unsuccessfully, the heat of midsummer—from all these causes the condition of the army was in some measure unfavorable for all operations of this kind. The men did not fight at that time with the vim with which they fought when we first crossed the Rapidan.

I am probably as ignorant as the committee in regard to many of these details. I did not hear the testimony before the court of inquiry; I was not present when it was taken. But undoubtedly the solution of all these questions will be found in their proceedings. If I had them before me I could better answer your questions. I never could ascertain, and I do not know, why that charge was not made from the crater of the mine upon the crest of the hill beyond at the time when it might have been made.

I do not know who to censure, whether General Burnside or the soldiers of that command. I involved myself in a difficulty with General Burnside by surmising, during the course of the operations, that it was owing to some indisposition on the part of the men; that the men would not go forward; that their officers could not get them forward; and, in my anxiety to know the correct state of the case, in order that I might base my orders upon it—because I had made up my mind that if any such obstacle existed the men should be withdrawn and not uselessly slaughtered—I addressed a despatch between eight and nine o'clock in the morning to General Burnside, in reply to one which he had sent to me, in which he stated to me that he was trying to take the crest, but it was very hard. I asked what was the difficulty, and said that his men, so far as I could ascertain from such information as I could gather, had not advanced beyond the crater, and had made no attempt to take the crest; therefore I could not understand what the difficulty was. Then I asked him, "Is it that you cannot get your orders obeyed, and that your men will not advance? I want to know the truth."

I did not mean to impugn General Burnside's veracity, or to suppose for an instant that he would tell me what was not true. All I meant to say was, "If you know this, you are naturally reluctant to acknowledge it; and in order to give you an opportunity to do so, I will make my request as urgent and emphatic as possible." General Burnside considered it a personal reflection upon himself and his veracity, and became very indignant. But it was not that. I wanted to know the exact state of the case. I had received a despatch which was intended for General Burnside, about six o'clock in the morning, or a little after six. The mine had been sprung at 4.45. The despatch was brought to me by an orderly. I was then at General Burnside's former headquarters, where I had established my headquarters during the day. The despatch was written by Colonel Long, of General Burnside's staff, and was

dated from the crater. It stated, "Ledlie's division has occupied the crater without opposition. But his men are crowding down in it, and he cannot get them forward." That was the first cause of difficulty in getting the men to go forward. I sent the despatch to General Burnside, informing him that I had read it, and asked him to use every measure to push the men forward. For if we did not immediately take advantage of the opening for us made by the explosion of the mine, the time would soon go by in which we could do so. I made no further allusion to that.

When it came to eight and nine o'clock, and no advance was made, and I got this despatch from General Burnside, that it was very hard to get the men forward, I asked him, "What is the difficulty? Is it that your men will not go forward?" I drew the attention of the court of inquiry particularly to that, and requested that they would investigate and ascertain whether there was any difficulty on the part of the men, because the thing has occurred before, and it may occur again, that men will not do what they are wanted to do; and if that is the case, no officer should be held responsible.

Question. Were the supporting corps, on the right and left, engaged at the time of the attack?

Answer. No, sir; they could not be engaged, because they could not get out of our lines. The theory of the attack was this: The explosion of the mine would make an opening in the enemy's lines. General Burnside's corps, of 15,000 men, was to immediately take advantage of that and rush through and get on the crest beyond. The moment that was done, they were to be followed by General Ord and his corps, and then by about 10,000 men of General Warren's corps, which was massed and held in readiness immediately on General Burnside's left; and then eventually to be followed by General Hancock's forces. I prepared a force of from 40,000 to 50,000 men, to take advantage of our success gained by General Burnside's corps. Their movements were essentially dependent upon General Burnside: if he failed, all the rest were to be kept quiet; when he did not get through, but was withdrawn, all the rest of the command was not called into action.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. If I understand your statement correctly, the theory of the operation was that after breaking their line by the explosion of the mine, General Burnside was to advance and seize the crest of the hill beyond. Then he was to be followed by General Ord and the 19th corps, and you had troops massed and all ready to support them if necessary?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. From where did the assault upon the troops in the crater come?

Answer. It came from the enemy.

Question. From what direction—from the right or left of the crater?

Answer. It came principally from the right of the crater—from a ravine to the right of the crater. There the enemy brought guns from all points, and threw their shells into the crater.

Question. It was expected, I suppose, that the shock of the explosion would distract the attention of the enemy. Was there any arrangement made to attack the enemy in front of the corps to the right and left of the position of General Burnside, so as to keep them engaged, and prevent their attacking General Burnside?

Answer. General Hancock was ordered, and so was General Warren, to hold themselves in readiness, and if there was the slightest disposition shown by the enemy to weaken their lines, to assault the enemy. They sent me reports that the enemy's lines in their front were strongly held, and that they could do nothing; that the enemy had sent away none of their troops in their front, and it was impossible to do anything there. All that matter is in my testimony for

the court of inquiry. After reading that testimony before that court, which I hope you will do, if any question then arises I will very readily answer it. My despatches are away from here now.

Question. I understand that the plan was for General Burnside to throw in his troops as soon as the mine was sprung, and to occupy the crest of the hill beyond?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What co-operating assistance did you direct to be given to General Burnside in that matter?

Answer. General Ord was directed to immediately follow General Burnside; to report to him, and to hold his command in readiness, which he did. General Warren was directed to mass all his available reserve, so as to prevent the enemy from making an attack, and to co-operate with General Burnside as soon as his (Burnside's) movements would justify his doing so. General Hancock was directed to hold his command in readiness, to watch the enemy's movements and keep them engaged in his front, and if he saw any abandonment of their lines, any opportunity to co-operate with General Burnside, to move forward and assault the enemy. Those orders were all given the morning of the attack.

Question. Did the enemy in front of Generals Hancock and Warren evacuate any portion of their lines?

Answer. They held them so firmly that both of those officers reported to me on the field that it would be useless to make any assault upon them.

Question. Do you know whether any portion of the enemy opposed to Generals Hancock and Warren were directed against the forces of General Burnside in the crater?

Answer. I do not; my impression is, that the troops who operated against General Burnside's forces came from the enemy's extreme right, and did not embrace any that had been immediately in presence of our forces.

Question. Will you, as briefly as you can conveniently do so, tell us why it was that white troops, instead of colored troops, were placed in the advance to carry that work, as I understand the case?

Answer. Prior to issuing the orders for the assault General Burnside told me it was his intention to place his colored division in the advance of the assaulting column. I objected to his doing so on the ground, not that I had any reason to believe that the colored troops would not do their duty as well as the white troops, but that, as they were a new division, and had never been under fire—had never been tried—and as this was an operation which I knew beforehand was one requiring the very best troops, I thought it impolitic to trust it to a division of whose reliability we had no evidence; therefore, I thought he ought to take one of his white divisions that he knew, from long experience, could be relied upon. General Burnside objected. I told him, then, that in view of his wishes upon the subject, I would report the matter to the lieutenant general; state to him my reasons, and those of General Burnside's, and let him decide. If he should decide that General Burnside's arguments were sound, and mine were wrong, then I would yield. The matter was referred to General Grant, and he confirmed my view that it would be impolitic, in a critical operation of that kind, to take troops that were untried and place them in the advance, and it was upon that ground that General Burnside's opinion was overruled.

Question. What was the condition of General Burnside's white troops? Had they been exposed to any fatiguing duty for any great length of time previous to that assault?

Answer. They had been engaged in holding this line ever since we had arrived before Petersburg—just such duty as they are now performing, for that corps has got back into its old line.

Question. Was that duty calculated to exhaust the men and render them less efficient than under other circumstances?



Answer. I cannot say that I thought it was ; as I have already told you, the general services performed by the army I thought had undoubtedly affected its morale. The whole army was not in the condition it was when it crossed the Rapidan. I do not think there was anything in the special services of the 9th corps to render that corps less efficient.

Question. Was there anything calculated to exhaust the white troops more than the colored troops ?

Answer. I think not.

Question. The white troops were up to the same standard with the colored troops ?

Answer. The colored troops had not been in the front. Up to that time they had not been engaged at all. The white troops had been engaged ever since they had crossed the Rapidan.

Question. Had the colored troops been drilled with especial view to making that charge ?

Answer. I believe they had. By referring to my orders, a copy of which I have submitted to the committee, with my report, I think it will be apparent that so far as events could be anticipated in the movements of such large bodies of men, for there were nearly 50,000 men prepared to move, every contingency that could be thought of was had in view.

Question. Were the enemy in the habit of firing day and night upon our lines wherever any of our men showed themselves ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Would it have been possible, without great loss of life, to have removed the abatis in front of the 9th corps ?

Answer. Yes, sir, it could have been done at night, without great loss of life—at least, that is my impression. But whatever might have been the loss of life, it was absolutely necessary for our further operations. I am of the opinion that it would not have been accompanied by any great loss of life.

By Mr. Chandler :

Question. Would it not have called the attention of the enemy to the proposed movement ?

Answer. If they had seen it, it would undoubtedly have drawn their attention to it. However, it was one of the risks which we had to run.

Question. Can you give the distance our assaulting column had to move to reach the crater of the mine ?

Answer. As near as we could tell, it was about one hundred yards ; that was the estimated distance ; I should say the distance between the two lines was about a hundred yards.

By Mr. Loan :

Question. You think there was a failure to prepare the necessary *debouchement* for our troops ?

Answer. I think that was one of the difficulties, that sufficient arrangements had not been made in advance.

Question. Can you tell what time elapsed between the springing the mine and the occupation of the crater by our troops ?

Answer. I do not think it was more than ten or fifteen minutes before the head of the column got in. But at nine o'clock in the day the whole of General Burnside's troops had not got out ; I do not think he ever got all his men out of our lines.

Question. Was there an attack upon the right when the order was given to attack and seize the crest of the hill directly ?

Answer. So far as I understand the circumstances, they were as follows : When I found that there was delay in the movement of this column up to the

crest, I sent a despatch to General Burnside, urging him to push forward all his troops, without distinction of color, and to gain the crest as soon as possible; that despatch he sent to General Potter, directing him to immediately advance to the crest. He sent him a peremptory order, which order General Potter received about the time he was becoming engaged with the enemy, who were threatening him from the right. The order being peremptory, without reference to the condition of affairs, which General Burnside did not know, and which I did not know. General Potter being a good soldier, began his movement toward the crest, and was met by another force of the enemy, and compelled to fall back; that is the way I understand it. But in regard to that you can obtain the testimony of General Potter and others, who may give a different view of the matter.

Question. You have stated that you consulted the lieutenant general in regard to placing the colored troops in advance; was any further plan of General Burnside in regard to that assault submitted to General Grant at the same time?

Answer. I think he was informed of everything that General Burnside had informed me of.

Question. As I understand the matter, General Burnside had submitted to you in a communication a plan of attack for your consideration?

Answer. Yes, sir, and which I never disapproved of. The only question of difference was in regard to the troops to be employed. I never objected to his plan of handling his troops; I only objected to the colored troops being placed in the advance. General Burnside seemed afterwards to be under the impression that I objected to all his plan;

Question. Was there anything in that plan which referred to the commanders of the corps on the right and left of General Burnside—any suggestions in regard to them?

Answer. No, sir, I do not think there was in that plan of his; but previous to that there had been a question between General Burnside and myself in reference to the corps commanders on his right and left, which I will explain to you, because I suppose that is what you refer to, and I want to make my way smooth as well as your own.

Question. I may be mistaken, but I asked the question so that if I am not mistaken you can explain it. If I understand the matter rightly, General Burnside suggested to you a plan of operations. The question I wanted to get at was whether that whole plan had been submitted to Lieutenant General Grant, and whether it met his approval, and your approval—whether it was adopted or not.

Answer. So far as my recollection serves me, I think there was no general plan, involving the movements of the whole army, submitted to me by General Burnside. There was a plan involving the movements of his own corps, which he submitted to me; but that referred simply to the movements of his advance division. The only objection I intended to make to that plan was to the use of the colored troops in the advance. As to his tactical formation, and what he was to do with his troops, I made no objection. Therefore I think it extremely probable that I did not submit to General Grant anything but the question in regard to the colored troops.

Question. I understand you to say that the delay in the explosion of the mine arose from the failure of the fuze to burn?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. How many lines of fuze were used to explode that mine?

Answer. I am under the impression that there were three lines of fuze; at least I think General Burnside so reported. Whether the fact was that there were three fuzes or not, I never inquired.

Question. There must have been a failure to burn of all three, if three were ignited. I want to ascertain whether there were three fuzes or not.

Answer. That is more than I can tell ; I can only tell that the fuze failed to burn.

Question. If there was but one line of fuze, I wanted to learn whether ordinary prudence was exercised in a case of that importance. If there were three lines of fuze, there can be no question about the prudence exercised.

Answer. That would bring up a question which I never asked, whether there were three fuzes, and if so, whether they were all fired. I recollect very well that General Burnside said there were three fuzes ; and my recollection is that when the delay was explained, General Burnside said the fault had been found in a fuze about fifty feet from the mouth of the gallery, and that the fuze had been reignited and had then gone off. But why it was that he did not ignite one of the other fuzes I do not know.

Question. Would not ordinary prudence in an affair of that magnitude have required the three fuzes to have been ignited, so as to have secured three chances for the explosion of the mine, instead of one ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Were any orders sent to General Burnside to retreat, or to withdraw his troops from the crater ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; he was directed about ten or eleven o'clock to withdraw. The first order sent to him was a distinct order to withdraw. General Burnside came to the position where I was with General Grant, at the headquarters on the field, and stated that in his judgment it would be injudicious to withdraw at that moment—that it would cause great sacrifice of life. I immediately authorized him, in writing, to exercise his judgment in the withdrawal—to remain there as long as he deemed it necessary for the secure withdrawal of his command—stating that he could remain there, if he chose, until night.

Question. As I understand you, General Potter, who was moving to the right to attack, upon the reception of his orders changed his movement towards the crest of the hill, where he was met by the enemy and repulsed ?

Answer. Yes, sir, so I understand.

Question. Were there any other troops of the 9th corps, or any troops of any corps that got beyond the crater during the engagement ?

Answer. I think the colored troops got beyond the crater ; were forming beyond the crater when they received the artillery fire which caused them to break and go to the rear.

Question. About what hour in the morning was that ?

Answer. I cannot exactly say, but I should think it was about 8 o'clock ; perhaps between 8 and 9 o'clock.

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“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *January 16, 1865.*

“SIR: I herewith transmit by the hands of my aid, Major Bache, additional testimony, which I desire placed on record in relation to the affair of July 30, 1864. It includes the statement made by me to the court of inquiry, and is forwarded in accordance with the privilege accorded me by the committee authorizing me to add anything I chose to my deposition of the 20th ultimo.

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“GEORGE G. MEADE,  
“Major General United States Army.

“Hon. B. F. WADE,

“Chairman Com. on Conduct of War, Washington, D. C.”

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*Major General Meade's testimony before Court of Inquiry.*

Major General Meade, United States volunteers, being duly sworn, says :

I propose in the statement that I shall make to the court—I presume the court want me to make a statement of facts in connexion with this case—to

give a slight preliminary history of certain events and operations which culminated in the assault on July 30, and which, in my judgment, are necessary to show to this court that I had a full appreciation of the difficulties that were to be encountered, and that I had endeavored, so far as my capacity and judgment would enable me, not only to anticipate, but to take measures to overcome those difficulties.

The mine constructed in front of General Burnside was commenced by that officer soon after the occupation of our present lines, upon the intercession of Lieutenant Colonel Pleasants, I think, of a Pennsylvania regiment, without any reference to, or any sanction obtained from, the general headquarters of the army of the Potomac. When the subject was brought to my knowledge I authorized the continuance of the operations, sanctioned them, and trusted that the work would at some time result in forming an important part in our operations. But from the first I never considered that the location of General Burnside's mine was a proper one, because, from what I could ascertain, the position of the enemy's works and lines erected at that time, the position against which he operated, was not a suitable one in which to assault the enemy's lines, as it was commanded on both flanks, and taken in reverse by their position on the Jerusalem plank road, and their works opposite the Hare House.

I will now read to the court the despatches which passed between Lieutenant General Grant, commanding the armies of the United States, and myself, which will bear in themselves a sort of history of the preliminary operations, a correspondence which resulted, as I said before, in the final arrangements for the assault on July 30th.

On the 24th of July I received a letter from the lieutenant general commanding, which I will now read. I had been previously informed by the lieutenant general commanding that he desired some operations to take place offensive against the enemy, and he had instructed the engineer officer at his headquarters, the engineer officer at General Butler's headquarters, and the engineer officer at the headquarters army of Potomac, to make an examination of the enemy's position, and give an opinion as to the probable result of an attack. Their opinion is contained in the following letter:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
"City Point, Virginia, July 24, 1864.

"Maj. Gen. GEORGE G. MEADE, *Commanding Army of the Potomac* :

"The engineer officers who made a survey of the front from Bermuda Hundred report against the probability of success from an attack there; the chances they think will be better on Burnside's front. If this is attempted, it will be necessary to concentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemy's line we expect to penetrate. All officers should be fully impressed of the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond the enemy's present line, if they should succeed in penetrating it, and of getting back to their present line promptly if they should not succeed in breaking through.

"To the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery possible should be brought, to play upon the enemy in front during the assault. Thin lines would be sufficient for the support of the artillery, and all the reserves could be brought on the flank of their commands nearest to the point of assault, ready to follow in if successful. The field artillery and infantry, held in the lines during the first assault, should be in readiness to move at a moment's notice, either to their front or to follow the main assault, as they should receive orders. One thing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders; if they see the enemy giving way in their front, or moving from it to re-enforce a heavily assaulted position of their line, they should take advantage of such knowledge, and act promptly without waiting for orders from their army commander.

"General Ord can co-operate with his corps in this movement, and about five thousand troops from Bermuda Hundred can be sent to re-enforce you, or can be used to threaten an assault between the Appomattox and James river, as may be deemed best.

"This should be done by Tuesday morning, if done at all. If not attempted we will then start at the date indicated to destroy the railroad as far as Hicksford, at least, and to Weldon if possible.

"Please give me your views on this matter, and I will order at once. In this I have said nothing of the part to be taken by the cavalry, in case the enemy's lines are assaulted. The

best disposition to be made of them probably would be to place them on the extreme left, with instructions to skirmish with the enemy, and drive him back, if possible, following up any success gained in that way according to the judgment of the commander, or orders he may receive.

"Whether we send an expedition on the railroad, or assault at Petersburg, Burnside's mine will be blown up.

"As it is impossible to hide preparations from our own officers and men, and consequently from the enemy, it will be well to have it understood as far as possible that just the reverse of what we intend is in contemplation.

"I am, general, very respectfully, &c.,

"U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

"Official copy:

"S. F. BARSTOW, A. A. G."

I desire to call the particular attention of the court to that communication, because it contains the views of the lieutenant general commanding with reference to the assault which should be made on Petersburg, and I wish them to compare this communication with the orders and arrangements that I gave and made, so that they may see that to the best of my ability I ordered everything which he indicated to be done.

At the time that this communication was made to me, however, I was under the impression that the obstacles to be overcome were more formidable than the subsequent operations made me to believe, and also that subsequent to that time there had been no movement of the army to produce that great weakening of the enemy's front which afterwards occurred. Therefore my reply was to the effect that I was opposed to our making the assault.

The following is my reply, sent on the 24th:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 24, 1864.

"GENERAL: I have received your letter per Lieutenant Colonel Comstock. In reply thereto I have to state that yesterday I made in person a close and careful reconnoissance of the enemy's position in my front. Although I could not detect any positive indication of a second line, yet, from certain appearances at various points, I became satisfied that a second line does exist on the crest of the ridge, just in rear of the position of Burnside's mine. I have no doubt of the successful explosion of the mine, and of our ability to crown the crater, effect a lodgement, and compel the evacuation of the enemy's present occupied line, but from their redoubt on the Jerusalem plank road, and from their position in front of the Hare House, their artillery fire would render our lodgement untenable, and compel our advance or withdrawal.

"The advance, of course, should be made, but its success would depend on the question whether the enemy have a line on the crest of the ridge. If they have, with the artillery fire they can bring to bear on the approaches to this second hill, I do not deem it practicable to carry the line by assault, and from my examination, together with the evident necessity of their having such a line, I am forced to believe we shall find one there.

"I cannot, therefore, advise the attempt being made, but should it be deemed expedient to take the risks, and there is certainly room for doubt, I would like a little more time than is given in your note in order to place in position the maximum amount of artillery to bear upon the lines not assaulted. In reference to the assaulting force, it will be composed of the 9th and 2d corps.

"The 5th corps will have to remain in their present position, and be prepared to meet any attempt of the enemy to turn our left flank, which is not altogether unlikely, particularly if we should fail in our assault, and be compelled to withdraw.

"I am fully impressed with the importance of taking some immediate action, and am satisfied that, excepting regular approaches, the springing of Burnside's mine and subsequent assault is the most practicable, and I am not prepared to say the attempt would be *hopeless*. I am, however, of the opinion, so far as I can judge, that the chances of its success are not such as to make it expedient to attempt it.

"Very respectfully, yours,

"GEORGE G. MEADE,  
"Major General, Commanding.

"Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT.

"Official:

"S. F. BARSTOW, A. A. G."

"P. S.—I enclose you a report of Major Duane, which confirms my views; if Wright is soon to return, and we can extend our lines to the Weldon railroad, we could then advance against the salient on the Jerusalem plank road, and make an attempt to carry them at the same time we assaulted in Burnside's front.

"This was my view some time ago, and we have been preparing the necessary siege works for this purpose. Under your instructions, however, none of the heavy guns and material have been brought to the front, and it would take, perhaps, two days to get them up.

"GEORGE G. MEADE.

"Official copy:

"S. F. BARSTOW, A. A. G."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"Office of Chief Engineer, July 24, 1864.

"Major General MEADE, *Commanding Army of the Potomac*:

"In reply to your communication of this date, I have the honor to state that the line of the enemy's works in front of General Burnside is not situated on the crest of the ridge separating us from Petersburg. That the enemy have undoubtedly occupied this ridge as a second line.

"Should General Burnside succeed in exploding his mine, he would probably be able to take the enemy's first line, which is about one hundred yards in advance of his approach. Beyond this I do not think he could advance until the works in front of the 5th corps are carried, as the 9th corps column would be taken in flank by a heavy artillery fire from works in front of the centre of the 5th corps, and in front by fire from the works on the crest near the Cemetery hill. I do not believe that the works in front of the 5th corps can be carried until our lines can be extended so as to envelope the enemy's line.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"J. C. DUANE,

"Major Engineers, *United States Army*.

"Official copy:

"S. F. BARSTOW, A. A. G."

In reply to that I received a communication or report from General Grant, the result of which was a suspension of the proposed attack:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
"City Point, July 24, 1864.

"GENERAL: Your note, brought by Colonel Comstock, is received. It will be necessary to act without expecting Wright. He is now in Washington; but it is not fully assured yet that Early has left the valley, and if Wright was to start back no doubt the Maryland raid would be repeated. I am not willing to attempt a movement so hazardous as the one against entrenched lines, against the judgment of yourself and your engineer officers, and arrived at after a more careful survey of the grounds than I have given it. I will let you know, however, in the morning what determination I come to.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General*.

"Major General MEADE,  
*Commanding Army of the Potomac*.

"Official copy:

"S. F. BARSTOW,  
"Assistant Adjutant General."

Next day I made a closer examination; and in the mean time a signal station was erected in a pine tree in front of General Burnside, which gave us a more complete view than we had previously had of the enemy's line. My observations modified my views, because I could not detect a second line, although I detected isolated batteries on the crest. I therefore wrote the following communication to General Grant, dated 12 m., July 26:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 26, 1864—12 m.

"Lieutenant General GRANT:

"More critical examinations from a new signal station would lead to the conclusion that the enemy have detached works on the ridge in front of Burnside, but they have no connected line. This fact increases the chances of a successful assault, taken in connexion with the fact that General Burnside does not now think the enemy have discovered his mine; on the contrary, believes they are laying the platform for a battery right over it.

"I have suspended the orders to load and discharge it to-morrow, as it may yet be useful in connexion with further operations.

"I am afraid the appearance of McLaws's division, together with Willcox's, previously reported, will prevent any chance of a surprise on the part of our people to-morrow. Yesterday's Richmond Examiner also says your strategic movements are known, and preparations made to meet them, referring, I presume, to Foster's operations.

"There was considerable shelling by the enemy yesterday afternoon all along our lines, brought on, I think, by Burnside discovering a camp he had not before seen and ordering it shelled. No serious casualties were produced on our side, but the 5th corps working parties were very much annoyed and interrupted. With this exception, all was quiet.

"GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*

"Official copy:

"S. F. BARSTOW, *A. A. G.*"

To which I received the following reply:

"UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,  
"By telegraph from City Point, 3 p. m., dated July 26, 1864.

"Major General MEADE:

"The information you have just sent, and all information received on the subject, indicates a probability that the enemy are looking for a formidable attack either from General Burnside or north of the James river, and that they will detach from Petersburg heavily to prevent its success. This will make your remaining two corps, with the 18th, relatively stronger against the enemy at Petersburg than we have been since the first day. It will be well, therefore, to prepare for an assault in General Burnside's front, only to be made if further development justifies it. If made it would be necessary to abandon most of the front now held by the 5th corps.

"U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

"Official copy:

"S. F. BARSTOW, *A. A. G.*"

There you perceive that the lieutenant general commanding ordered that whilst the 2d corps was across the James river I should immediately make an assault with the 9th and 5th, abandoning the line of the 5th corps. In answer to that I wrote him the following despatch:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"5.30 p. m., July 26, 1864.

"Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT:

"Telegram 3 p. m. received. The only preparation that can be made is the loading of Burnside's mine. I cannot advise an assault with the 2d corps absent, for some force must be left to hold our lines and protect our batteries.

"The withdrawal of the 5th corps would prevent any attempt on our part to silence the fire of the enemy's guns in front of the 5th corps, and unless these guns are silenced no advance can be made across the open ground in front of the 9th corps.

"It is not the numbers of the enemy which oppose our taking Petersburg; it is their artillery and their works, which can be held by reduced numbers against direct assault.

"I have just sent you a despatch indicating an attack on my left flank by the enemy. This is my weak point, and a formidable attack turning my flank would require all my force to meet successfully.

"GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*

"Official:

"S. F. BARSTOW, *A. A. G.*"

That produced a suspension of the order to attack until the return of General Hancock. The next despatch I received from General Grant was as follows:

"UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,  
"BY TELEGRAPH FROM CITY POINT,  
"12.20 p. m., dated July 28, 1864.

"Major General MEADE:

"Your despatch of 12 m. received. Unless something turns up north of the James between this and night that I do not expect, you may withdraw Hancock, to be followed by Sheridan, and make arrangements for assault as soon as it can be made. We can determine by the movements of the enemy before the time comes whether it will be advisable to go on with the assault. I will put in the 18th corps, or not, as you deem best.

"U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*"

"Official:

"S. F. BARSTOW, *A. A. G.*"

Which I answered at 1 p. m., July 28, as follows:

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC, 1 p. m., July 28, 1864.

“Lieutenant General GRANT:

“Your despatch of 12.20 received. On reflection, I think daylight of the 30th is the earliest time it would be advisable to make the assault. Besides the time required to get up heavy guns and mortars, we require the night to make certain preliminary arrangements, such as massing troops, removing abatis from the debouche of the assaulting column, &c. I shall make the assault with the 9th corps, supported by the 2d. The reserves of the 18th should be held in readiness to take part, and if developments justify it, all of Ord’s and Warren’s commands can be put in.

“GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General*.

“Official:

“S. F. BARSTOW, *A. A. G.*”

I will here observe that Lieutenant General Grant, in consequence of the service which the 2d corps had performed across the river, desired, and gave me directions verbally to that effect, to use the 18th corps in the assault, and to let the 2d corps take the place of the 18th in the line.

The next despatch I received was the following, dated City Point, July 29:

“HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
“*City Point, Va., July 29, 1864.*

“GENERAL: I have directed General Butler to order General Ord to report to you for the attack on Petersburg. The details for the assault I leave to you to make out.

“I directed General Sheridan, whilst we were at Deep Bottom last evening, to move his command immediately to the left of Warren from Deep Bottom. It will be well to direct the cavalry to endeavor to get round the enemy’s right flank; whilst they will not probably succeed in turning the enemy, they will detain a large force to prevent it. I will go out this evening to see you; will be at your headquarters about 4 p. m.

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General*.

“Official:

“S. F. BARSTOW, *A. A. G.*”

“Major General GEO. G. MEADE,  
“*Commanding Army of the Potomac.*

“P. S.—If you want to be at any place on the line at the hour indicated, inform me by telegraph, and I will meet you wherever you may be.

“U. S. G.”

General Grant came to my headquarters at 4 p. m., July 29, and at that time I showed him the order for the assault next day, which I had just then prepared, and which order met with his perfect approbation; he read the order and expressed his satisfaction with it. No other despatches passed between the lieutenant general and myself.

Next morning, between half past three and four o’clock—before four o’clock, he arrived on the ground, at General Burnside’s headquarters, and all further communications between us were verbal, until August 1, at 11.40 a. m., when I received the following despatch:

[“Cipher, received 11.40 a. m.]

*By telegraph from City Point, 9.30 a. m., dated August 1, 1864.*

“Major General MEADE:

“Have you any estimate of our losses in the miserable failure of Saturday? I think there will have to be an investigation of the matter. So fair an opportunity will probably never occur again for carrying fortifications; preparations were good, orders ample, and everything, so far as I could see subsequent to the explosion of the mine, shows that almost without loss the crest beyond the mine could have been carried; this would have given us Petersburg with all its artillery, and a large part of the garrison beyond doubt. An intercepted despatch states that the enemy recaptured their line with General Bartlett and staff, seventy-five commissioned officers, and nine hundred rank and file, and recaptured five hundred of their men.

“U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General*.

“Official:

“S. F. BARSTOW, *A. A. G.*”



We had given our respective views concerning the assault, and particularly impressed my views with reference to the difficulty to be overcome. When it was ascertained that the movement of the 2d corps had drawn over to the north bank of the James five of the eight divisions composing General Lee's army, together with the information I had obtained that the enemy had no second line upon the ridge, but only one or two isolated batteries, I came to the conclusion that the explosion of the mine, and the subsequent assault on the crest I had every reason to believe would be successful, and would be followed by results which would have consisted in the capture of the whole of the enemy's artillery, and a greater part of his infantry.

The plan sketched out by Lieutenant General Grant in his despatch to me, which I endeavored to carry out, and for the execution of which I gave the necessary orders, was, that the mine should be exploded as early as possible in the morning, before daylight; that in the mean time the 9th corps should be massed and formed in assaulting columns; that every preparation should be made by removing the abatis so that the troops could debouche, and particularly the assaulting columns; that as soon as the mine was exploded, the assaulting columns should push forward; that a sufficient proportion should be left to guard the flanks of the main column, because they had to look for an attack on the flanks; that the main body should hold the lines during the attempt to gain the crest of the hill, and if it was successful then I intended to throw up the whole of the 18th corps, to be followed up by the 2d corps, and if necessary by the 5th corps, also. I do not suppose it is necessary to read the order. I will read it, however.

#### “ORDERS.

#### “HEADQUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC, July 29, 1864.

“The following instructions are issued for the guidance of all concerned:

“1. As soon as it is dark, Major General Burnside, commanding 9th corps, will withdraw his two brigades under General White, occupying the intrenchments between the Plank and Norfolk roads, and bring them to his front. Care will be taken not to interfere with the troops of the 18th corps moving into their position in rear of the 9th corps. General Burnside will form his troops for assaulting the enemy's works at daylight of the 30th, prepare his parapets and abatis for the passage of the columns, and have the pioneers equipped for work in opening passages for artillery, destroying enemy's abatis, &c., and the intrenching tools distributed for effecting lodgements, &c.

“2. Major General Warren, commanding 5th corps, will reduce the number of his troops holding the intrenchments of his front to the minimum, and concentrate all his available forces on his right, and hold them prepared to support the assault of Major General Burnside. The preparations in respect to pioneers, intrenching tools, &c., enjoined upon the 9th corps, will also be made by the 5th corps.

“3. As soon as it is dark Major General Ord, commanding 18th corps, will relieve his troops in the trenches by General Mott's division of the 2d corps, and form his corps in rear of the 9th corps, and be prepared to support the assault of Major General Burnside.

“4. Every preparation will be made for moving forward the field artillery of each corps.

“5. At dark Major General Hancock, commanding 2d corps, will move from Deep Bottom, to the rear of the intrenchments now held by the 18th corps, resume the command of Mott's division, and be prepared at daylight to follow up the assaulting and supporting columns, or for such other operations as may be found necessary.

“6. Major General Sheridan, commanding cavalry corps, will proceed at dark from the vicinity of Deep Bottom, to Lee's Mill, and at daylight will move with his whole corps, including Wilson's division, against the enemy's troops defending Petersburg on their right by the roads leading to that town from the southward and westward.

“7. Major Duane, acting chief engineer, will have the pontoon trains parked at convenient points in the rear, prepared to move. He will see that supplies of sand-bags, gabions, fascines, &c., are in depot near the lines, ready for use.

“He will detail engineer officers for each corps.

“8. At half past three in the morning of the 30th, Major General Burnside will spring his mine, and his assaulting columns will immediately move rapidly upon the breach, seize the crest in the rear, and effect a lodgement there. He will be followed by Major General Ord, who will support him on the right, directing his movement to the crest indicated, and by Major General Warren, who will support him on the left.

“Upon the explosion of the mine, the artillery of all kinds in battery will open upon those

points of the enemy's works whose fire covers the ground over which our columns must move, care being taken to avoid impeding the progress of our troops.

"Special instructions respecting the direction of fire will be issued through the chief of artillery.

"9. Corps commanders will report to the commanding general when their preparations are complete, and will advise him of every step in the progress of the operations, and of everything of importance that occurs.

"10. Promptitude, rapidity of execution, and cordial co-operation are essential to success, and the commanding general is confident that this indication of his expectations will insure the hearty efforts of the commanders and troops.

"11. Headquarters during the operations will be at the headquarters of the 9th corps.

"By command of Major General Meade.

"S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

"Official :

"S. F. BARSTOW, *A. A. G.*"

Having read to the court the correspondence which passed between the lieutenant general and myself preliminary to the operations, and having read the order for the operations, I now propose to read and accompany with some explanatory remarks the despatches and correspondence which passed between myself and Major General Burnside, who had the immediate active operations to perform; afterwards between myself and Major General Ord, between myself and Major General Warren, and between myself and Major General Hancock. These despatches, when compared with each other, and in connexion with the remarks which I shall make, will show the facts so far as they came to my knowledge; and I wish the court to bear in mind, and I desire to call their attention particularly to the paucity of information which was furnished me by Major General Burnside of the operations which were made, and to the difficulty that a major general commanding an army like the one I am commanding labors under to give direct orders in the ignorance of matters transpiring in the front at the immediate scene of operations.

Before the operations were concluded upon I called upon Major General Burnside to furnish me in writing what he proposed to do in case his mine was exploded. In response to which I received the following report :

"HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS, *July 26, 1864.*

"GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your notes of this morning by Captains Jay and Bache; also a telegram from the commanding general relating to the same subject.

"It is altogether probable that the enemy are cognizant of the fact that we are mining, because it has been mentioned in their newspapers, and they have been heard to work in what are supposed to be shafts in close proximity to our galleries; but the rain of night before last no doubt filled their shafts and much retarded their work. We have heard no sounds of work in them either yesterday or to-day, and nothing is heard by us in the mine but the usual sounds of work on the surface above. This morning we had some apprehensions that the left lateral gallery was in danger of caving in from the weight of the batteries above it and the shock of their firing; but all possible precautions have been taken to strengthen it and we hope to preserve it intact. The placing of the charges in the mine will not involve the necessity of making a noise. It is therefore probable that we will escape discovery, if the mine is to be used within two or three days. It is nevertheless highly important, in my opinion; that the mine should be exploded at the earliest possible moment consistent with the general interests of the campaign. I state to you the facts as nearly as I can; and, in the absence of any knowledge as to the meditated movement of the army, I must leave you to judge the proper time to make use of the mine; but it may not be improper for me to say, that the advantages to be reaped from the work would be but small if it were exploded without any co-operative movements.

"My plan would be to explode the mine just before daylight in the morning, or about five o'clock in the afternoon; mass the two brigades of the colored division in rear of my line in column of divisions—double column closed in mass; the head of each brigade resting on the front line, and as soon as the explosion has taken place move them forward, with instructions for the divisions to take half-distance; and as soon as the leading regiments of the two brigades pass through the gap in the enemy's line, the leading regiment of the right brigade to come into line perpendicular to the enemy's line by the right companies on the right into line, 'wheel the left companies on the left into line,' and proceed at once down the line of the enemy's work as rapidly as possible; the leading regiment of the left brigade to execute the re-

verse movement to the left, moving up the enemy's line; the remainder of the two columns to move directly towards the crest in front as rapidly as possible, diverging in such a way as to enable them to deploy into columns of regiments, the right column making as nearly as may be for Cemetery hill; these columns to be followed by the other divisions of this corps as soon as they can be thrown in; this would involve the necessity of relieving these divisions by other troops before the movement, and of holding columns of other troops in readiness to take our place on the crest, in case we gain it and sweep down it. It would be advisable, in my opinion, if we succeed in gaining the crest, to throw the colored division right into the town. There is a necessity for the co-operation, at least in the way of artillery, of the troops on my right and left; of the extent of this you will necessarily be the judge. I think our chances of success in a plan of this kind are more than even. The main gallery of the mine is five hundred and twenty-two (522) feet in length; the side galleries about forty feet each. My suggestion is, that eight magazines be placed in the lateral galleries—two at each end, say a few feet apart, in branches at right angles to the side galleries; and two more in each of the side galleries, similarly placed, situated by pairs, equidistant from each other and the end of the galleries, thus:

[See diagram, page 17.]

"Tamping beginning at the termination of the main gallery for, say, one hundred feet, leaving all the air space in the side galleries. Run out some five or six fuzes and two wires, to render the ignition of the charge certain. I propose to put in each of the eight magazines from twelve to fourteen hundred pounds of powder, the magazines to be connected by a trough of powder instead of a fuze.

"I beg to enclose a copy of a statement from General Potter on the subject. I would suggest that the powder train be parked in a wood near our ammunition train, about a mile in rear of this place. Lieutenant Colonel Pierce, chief quartermaster, will furnish Captain Strand with a guide to the place.

"I beg also to request that General Benham be instructed to send us, at once, eight thousand (8,000) sand-bags, to be used for tamping and other purposes.

"I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General, Commanding.*

"Major General HUMPHREYS, *Chief of Staff.*"

"Official:

"S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*"

The request made in that letter by Major General Burnside was complied with—that is to say, sand-bags were furnished him; but the amount of powder asked for, which was twelve thousand pounds, was reduced to eight thousand pounds, upon the belief on my part, and on my engineers, that eight thousand pounds would be sufficient for the purpose.

Another matter in that despatch to which my attention was directed, and which was finally the subject of an order on my part, is the suggestion of Major General Burnside to place the colored troops at the head of the assaulting column. That I disapproved, and I informed him of my disapproval, which was based upon the ground, not that I had any reason to doubt, or any desire to doubt, the good qualities of the colored troops, but that I desired to impress upon Major General Burnside, which I did do in conversations, of which I have plenty of witnesses to evidence, and in every way I could, that the operation was to be a coup-de-main; that his assaulting column was to be as a forlorn hope, such as are put into breaches, and that he should assault with his best troops; not that I had any intention to insinuate that the colored troops were inferior to his best troops, but that I understood that they had never been under fire, nor that they should not be taken for such a critical operation as this, but that he should take such troops as from previous service could be depended upon as being perfectly reliable. Finding General Burnside very much disappointed—for he had made known to General Ferrero and his troops that they were to lead in the assault—and fearing that the effect might be injurious, and in order to show him that I was not governed by any motive other than such as I ought to be governed by, I told him I would submit the matter, with his reasons and my objections, to the lieutenant general commanding the armies, and I would abide by the decision of the lieutenant general as to whether it was expedient and right for the colored troops to lead the assault. Upon re-

ferring the question to the lieutenant general commanding, he fully concurred in my views, and I accordingly addressed to Major General Burnside, or had addressed to him, the following communication :

“ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ 10½ a. m., July 29, 1864.

“ Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps* :

“ I am instructed to say that the major general commanding submitted to the lieutenant general commanding the armies your proposition to form the leading columns of assault of the black troops, and that he, as well as the major general commanding, does not approve the proposition, but directs that these columns be formed of the white troops.

“ A. A. HUMPHREYS, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*”

“ Official :

“ S. F. BARSTOW, *A. A. G.*”

The next despatches to Major General Burnside were addressed by me at 9.45 p. m., July 29, the evening before the action. I had received a despatch from General Ord, stating that it would take him till very late to relieve the troops in the trenches.

The following is my despatch to General Burnside :

“ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ July 29—9½ p. m., 1864.

“ Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps* :

“ A despatch from General Ord refers to the late hour at which his troops will relieve yours in the trenches. The commanding general has informed General Ord that it is not necessary for you to wait for your troops to be relieved in the trenches by General Ord before forming them for the assault. They should be formed for the assault at the hour you deem best, without any reference to General Ord's troops, who will enter the vacated trenches as soon as they can.

“ A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“ *Major General and Chief of Staff.*”

“ Official :

S. F. BARSTOW, *A. A. G.*”

My idea was that General Burnside should form his columns of assault, make all his preparations, take all his men out of the trenches, and move forward ; and that then General Ord should occupy his trenches in case he should not find it necessary to return. No further despatches passed between General Burnside and myself. I think it proper to state, however, that on the day previous to the assault I was at General Burnside's headquarters, and had the good fortune to meet his three division commanders, and some conversation passed between us, and I would like the court to inquire into what transpired on that occasion, because I would like to impress upon the court, as I did impress upon General Burnside and his officers, that this operation which we had to perform was one purely of time ; that if immediate advantage was not taken of the explosion of the mine, and the consequent confusion of the enemy, and the crest immediately gained, it would be impossible to remain there, for that as soon as the enemy should recover from their confusion, they would bring their troops and batteries to bear upon us and we would be driven out. That there were two things to be done, namely, that we should go up promptly and take the crest ; for, in my judgment, the mere occupation of the crater and the holding on to that was of no possible use to us, because the enemy's line was not such a line as would be of advantage for us to hold, except to go from it to the crest ; and that the troops were to be withdrawn when the assault proved unsuccessful.

I saw Potter, Ledlie, and Wilcox, and I referred in the presence of those gentlemen to the tactical manœuvres to be made between that crater and the crest—that the only thing to be done was to rush for the crest and take it immediately after the explosion had taken place ; and that they might rest

assured that any attempt to take time to form their troops would result in a repulse.

These were all the despatches that transpired between General Burnside and myself before the day of the assault.

On the morning of the 30th, about a quarter past three o'clock, when I was about preparing to go forward to General Burnside's headquarters, I found that it was very dark, and suggestions being made by some of my officers that it was too dark to operate successfully, and that a postponement of the explosion of the mine might be advantageous, I accordingly addressed a despatch to General Burnside to the following effect :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ July 30, 1864—3.20 a. m.

“Major General BURNSIDE:

“As it is still so dark, the commanding general says you can postpone firing the mine if you think proper.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“Major General and Chief of Staff.

“Official:

“S. F. BARSTOW, A. A. G.”

To that I received the following reply from General Burnside :

“BY TELEGRAPH FROM NINTH ARMY CORPS,  
“ Dated July 30, 1864—3.20 a. m.

“Major General HUMPHREYS:

“The mine will be fired at the time designated. My headquarters will be at the 14 gun battery.

“A. E. BURNSIDE, Major General.

“Official:

“S. F. BARSTOW, A. A. G.”

I then went over to General Burnside's headquarters, he, during these operations, being further to the front. The hour had arrived. I stood waiting. I heard no report from General Burnside and no explosion of the mine. In the mean time Lieutenant General Grant arrived. Finding that there was no explosion, I sent two staff officers, first Captain Jay, and then ———, I do not recollect the name of the other; but I sent two staff officers to General Burnside to ascertain what the difficulty was, if there was any difficulty; why his mine did not explode, if he knew; to which I received no answer. At 4.10 the following depatch was sent to him :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ July 30, 1864—4.15 a. m.

“Major General BURNSIDE:

“Is there any difficulty in exploding the mine? It is now three-quarters of an hour later than the time fixed upon for exploding it.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“Major General and Chief of Staff.

“Official:

“S. F. BARSTOW, A. A. G.”

And to this I got no answer.

At 4.20 another despatch was sent to him, as follows :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 1864.

“OPERATOR at General Burnside's field headquarters:

“Is General Burnside at his headquarters? The commanding general is anxious to learn what is the cause of delay.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“Major General and Chief of Staff.

“Official:

“S. F. BARSTOW, A. A. G.”

I should have stated before this, that, in order to secure the speedy transmission of intelligence, I took the precaution to have a telegraph run from my headquarters, in General Burnside's camp, to where General Burnside had established his headquarters for the day, in the 14-gun battery.

The following is the next despatch I sent to General Burnside :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“July 30, 1864—4.35 a. m.

“Major General BURNSIDE :

“If the mine cannot be exploded, something else must be done, and at once. The commanding general is awaiting to hear from you before determining.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,

“Major General and Chief of Staff.

“Official :

“S. F. BARSTOW, A. A. G.”

To this I received no reply. Finding that no replies were received, and the lieutenant general commanding desiring that an immediate assault should be made without reference to the mine, at 4.35 the following despatch was sent to General Burnside :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“July 30, 1864—4.35 a. m.

“Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps* :

“The commanding general directs, that if your mine has failed, that you make an assault at once, opening your batteries.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,

“Major General and Chief of Staff.

“Official :

“S. F. BARSTOW, A. A. G.”

The same orders you will find were sent to General Warren, to General Mott, and to General Hunt to open the artillery. About this time, however, about 4.40, the mine was exploded. In the mean time Captain Jay returned and informed me that the fuze had failed ; that a defect was found, and the fuze had been overhauled about fifty feet or twenty-five feet, I forget the distance, from the entrance ; that the defect had been ascertained and remedied, and that finally the mine had been exploded. So far as my recollection goes the mine was exploded about 4.40 or 4.45. At 5.45 a. m., one hour after the explosion of the mine, the following despatch was sent to General Burnside :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“July 30, 1864—5.40 a. m.

“Major General BURNSIDE :

“What news from your assaulting column? Please report frequently.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General*.

“Official :

“S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adj. General*.”

The following despatch was received from him, apparently in answer to mine, although, through a difference in time, it is dated before it :

“BY TELEGRAPH FROM BATTERY MORTON,

“5.40 a. m., dated July 30, 1864.

“General MEADE :

“We have the enemy's first line and occupy the breach. I shall endeavor to push forward to the crest as rapidly as possible.

“A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General*.

“P. S.—There is a large fire in Petersburg.

“W. W. SANDERS, *Captain and A. D. C.*

“Official :

“S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adj. General*.”

About this time, 5.45 or 5.50, (I see by reference to the despatch that it is 5.45,) an orderly came up to me and delivered me a despatch, which, upon opening, I found to be a despatch from Colonel Loring, inspector general of the 9th corps, written at the crater, and addressed to General Burnside, which despatch the orderly, not knowing where to find General Burnside, had brought to his old headquarters, where it found me. That despatch, so far as I recollect the purport of it, was to the effect that General Ledlie's troops occupied the crater, but, in his (Colonel Loring's) opinion, he feared the men could not be induced to advance beyond. That despatch was telegraphed to General Burnside, and sent to him by an officer, so that I have no copy of it. That was the substance of it, however. It was shown to General Grant and General Humphreys, both of whom can give their recollection of it in confirmation of mine. It is an important matter to be taken into consideration here that as early as 5.45 a. m. a despatch was placed in my hands stating that General Ledlie's troops could not be induced to advance.

In addition to that the following despatch was sent to him :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“July 30, 1864—5.40 a. m.

“Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps* :

“The commanding general learns that your troops are halting at the works where the mine exploded. He directs that all your troops be pushed forward to the crest at once. Call on General Ord to move forward his troops at once.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS, *Major Gen. and Chief of Staff*.

“Official :

“S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adj. General*.”

Fearing there might be some difficulty on the part of General Burnside's troops, I thought it possible that by another corps going in on his right encouragement might be given to his men, and a prompt assault might be made.

The next despatch I received was from an aide-de-camp, whom I had sent to General Burnside's headquarters to advise me of what was going on. It is dated 5.50, and is from Captain Sanders :

“BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS, 14-GUN BATTERY,

“July 30, 1864—5.50 a. m.

“Major General MEADE :

“The 18th corps has just been ordered to push forward to the crest. The loss does not appear to be heavy. Prisoners coming in.

“W. W. SANDERS, *Captain and C. M.*

“Official :

“S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adj. General*.”

The next despatch that I will read is one addressed to General Burnside, at 6 a. m. :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“July 30, 1864—6 a. m.

“Major General BURNSIDE :

“Prisoners taken say there is no line in their rear, and that their men were falling back when ours advanced ; that none of their troops have returned from the James. Our chance is now. Push your men forward at all hazards—white and black—and don't lose time in making formations, but rush for the crest.

“GEO. G. MEADE, *Major Gen., Commanding*.

“Official :

“S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adj. General*.”

Despatches were at this time also sent to Generals Ord and Warren. You can keep these dates in your mind.

The next despatch was received from Captain Sanders, at 6.10 a. m., as follows :

"BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 14-GUN BATTERY,  
July 30, 1864—6.10 a. m.

"General MEADE:

"General Burnside says that he has given orders to all his division commanders to push everything in at once.

"W. W. SANDERS, *Captain and C. M.*

"Official:

"S. F. BARSTOW,  
"Assistant Adjutant General."

The following despatches are next in order:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 30—6.05 a. m., 1864.

"Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps*:

"The commanding general wishes to know what is going on on your left, and whether it would be an advantage for Warren's supporting force to go in at once.

A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
"Major General and Chief of Staff.

"Official:

"S. F. BARSTOW,  
"Assistant Adjutant General."

"[Telegraph from headquarters 9th corps.]

"Dated July 30—6.20 a. m., 1864.

"Major General MEADE:

"If General Warren's supporting force can be concentrated just now, ready to go in at the proper time, it would be well. I will designate to you when it ought to move. There is scarcely room for it now in our immediate front.

"A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General.*

"Official:

"S. F. BARSTOW,  
"Assistant Adjutant General."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC,  
"July 30—6.50 a. m., 1864.

"Major General BURNSIDE:

"Warren's force has been concentrated and ready to move since 3.30 a. m. My object in inquiring was to ascertain if you could judge of the practicability of his advancing without waiting for your column. What is the delay in your column moving? Every minute is most precious, as the enemy undoubtedly are concentrating to meet you on the crest, and, if you give them time enough, you cannot expect to succeed. There is no object to be gained in occupying the enemy's line. It cannot be held under their artillery fire without much labor in turning it. The great point is to secure the crest at once and at all hazards.

"GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*

"Official:

"S. F. BARSTOW,  
"Assistant Adjutant General."

At seven a. m. Lieutenant General Grant put into my hand a despatch from Colonel Comstock, an officer whom he had sent to see the progress of operations:

"[By telegraph from 5th army corps.]

"JULY 30—7 a. m., 1864.

"Lieutenant General GRANT:

"Several regiments of Burnside's men are lying in front of the crater, apparently, of the mine. In their rear is to be seen a line of battle of a brigade or more, under cover, and I think between the enemy's line and ours. The volley firing half ( $\frac{1}{2}$ ) hour ago was from the enemy's works in Warren's front.

"C. B. COMSTOCK, *Lieut. Colonel.*

"Official:

"S. F. BARSTOW,  
Assistant Adjutant General."

I read all these despatches over, that you may see how I was situated on the occasion, and what I knew of what was going on.



At 7.20—twenty minutes afterwards—I got the following despatch from General Burnside:

“ [Telegraph from headquarters 9th corps.]

“ Received about 7.20 a. m., July 30, 1864.

“ General MEADE :

“ I am doing all in my power to push the troops forward, and, if possible, we will carry the crest. It is hard work, but we hope to accomplish it. I am fully alive to the importance of it.

“ A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General.*

“ Official :

“ S. F. BARSTOW,  
“ *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

Upon the receipt of this despatch from General Burnside, informing me that it was hard work to take the crest, at the same time he not having reported to me that anybody had attempted to take it, or that any part of his force had made any effort to take it; with the despatches from my officers, the despatch from Colonel Loring, and the despatch from Colonel Comstock, to the effect that the troops were lying there, I came to the conclusion that possibly there might be some difficulty in getting the men to move forward, either from the enemy's fire, or some imaginary obstacle the troops had to encounter; that, as it was now 7 o'clock, and that the place had been occupied at 5.30, I began to suppose that there was some reason for the delay which had not been officially reported. I considered it natural that General Burnside would be indisposed to make it known, so long as he had hopes of overcoming the difficulty. To me, in my position as major general commanding the army, it was a matter of the utmost importance, because it was my intention during the assault, and before it, that if we could not carry the crest promptly by a coup-de-main, to withdraw the troops as quickly and safely as possible. Impressed with this view, and in order to get at the exact condition of affairs, and to justify General Burnside, if there was any reason of that kind, I addressed him the following despatch :

“ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ 7.30 a. m., July 30, 1864.

“ Major General BURNSIDE :

“ What do you mean by hard work to take the crest? I understand not a man has advanced beyond the enemy's line which you occupied immediately after exploding the mine. Do you mean to say your officers and men will not obey your orders to advance; if not, what is the obstacle? I wish to know the truth, and desire an immediate answer.

“ GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*

“ Official :

“ S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

It is proper to say, that immediately after sending that despatch, and before receiving General Burnside's answer, I received a report verbally from Captain Sanders that an attempt had been made to make an attack on the right, I think by General Griffin, and that he had been repulsed. I immediately sent another despatch to General Burnside at 8 a. m., as follows :

“ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ July 30—8 a. m., 1864.

“ To Major General BURNSIDE :

“ Since writing by Captain Jay, Captain Sanders has come in and reported condition of affairs. He says Griffin has advanced and been checked; this modifies my despatch. Still I should like to know the exact morale of your corps. Ord reports he cannot move till you get out of the way. Can't you let him pass out on your right, and let him try what he can do?

“ GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*

“ Official :

“ S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

To the first of these two despatches, subsequent to sending the second, I received this reply :

"HEADQUARTERS 9TH CORPS, BATTERY MORTON,  
"About 7.35 a. m., July 30, 1864.

"General MEADE:

"Your despatch by Captain Jay received. The main body of General Potter's division is beyond the crater. I do not mean to say that my officers and men will not obey my orders to advance; I mean to say that it is very hard to advance to the crest.

"I have never in any report said anything different from what I conceived to be the truth; were it not insubordinate, I would say that the latter remark of your note was un-officerlike and ungentlemanly.

"Respectfully, yours,

"A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General.*

"Official:

"S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*"

The next despatch that I received was one from Colonel Comstock, about the same time, 8 a. m.:

"[By telegraph from 5th army corps.]

"8 a. m., July 30, 1864.

"To Lieutenant General GRANT:

"About a brigade more of our men has moved up to the crater, and then filed off to the right along the enemy's line; they are still moving to the right.

"C. B. COMSTOCK,

"*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

"Official:

"S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*"

The next despatch I received was one dated 8.45 a. m., from Captain Sanders

"[By telegraph from headquarters 9th army corps.]

"8.45 a. m., July 30, 1864.

"To General MEADE:

"One gun has just been taken out of the mine, and is now being put in position. Have not heard anything from the attack made from the left of mine. One (1) set of colors just sent in, captured by the negroes.

"W. W. SANDERS, *Captain and Aide-de-Camp.*

"Official:

"S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*"

At 9 a. m. I received the following despatch from General Burnside:

"[By telegraph from headquarters 9th army corps.]

"9 a. m., July 30, 1864.

"General MEADE:

"Many of the ninth (9th) and eighteenth (18th) corps are retiring before the enemy. I think now is the time to put in the fifth (5th) corps promptly.

"A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General.*

"Official:

"S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*"

That was the first information I had received that there was any collision with the enemy, or that there was any enemy present. At 9.30 a. m. the following despatch was sent to General Burnside:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"July 30, 1864—9.30 a. m.

"Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps:*

"The major general commanding has heard that the result of your attack has been a repulse, and directs that if, in your judgment, nothing further can be effected, that you withdraw to your own line, taking every precaution to get the men back safely.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,

"*Major General and Chief of Staff.*

"General Ord will do the same.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,

"*Major General and Chief of Staff.*

"Official:

"S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*"

Then I received the following despatch from Captain Sanders :

“ [By telegraph from headquarters 9th army corps.]

“ 9 a. m. July 30, 1864.

‘ To Major General MEADE :

“ The attack made on right of mine has been repulsed. A great many men are coming to the rear.

“ W. W. SANDERS, *Captain and C. M.*

“ Official :

“ S. F. BARSTOW,  
“ *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

The next despatch was this, from Colonel Comstock :

“ [By telegraph.]

“ HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMY CORPS,

“ July 30, 1864—9.35 a. m.

“ To Lieutenant General GRANT :

“ I cannot see that we have advanced beyond the enemy’s line in the vicinity of the mine. From here, it looks as if the enemy were holding a line between that point and the crest.

“ C. B. COMSTOCK,

“ *Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

“ Official :

“ S. F. BARSTOW,  
“ *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

The next despatch to General Burnside, at 9.45, was the peremptory order to withdraw :

“ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“ July 30, 9½ a. m., 1864.

“ To Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps* :

“ The major general commanding directs that you withdraw to your own intrenchments.

“ A. A. HUMPHREYS,

“ *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

“ Official :

“ S. F. BARSTOW,  
“ *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

Receiving information from some person—I don’t know who it was—that there was some difficulty about withdrawing at that time, that the safety of the column might be jeopardized by undertaking to withdraw it, the following despatch was sent to General Burnside, and also to General Ord, who had troops there at that time. None of my despatches to General Ord have been presented yet, because it would have confused matters. I will read them hereafter :

“ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“ July 30, 10 a. m., 1864.

“ Major Generals BURNSIDE and ORD :

“ You can exercise your discretion in withdrawing your troops now or at a later period ; say to-night. It is not intended to hold the enemy’s line which you now occupy any longer than is required to withdraw safely your men.

“ GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*

“ Official :

“ S. F. BARSTOW,  
“ *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

About that time, both Major General Burnside and Major General Ord came to the headquarters where General Grant and myself were temporarily located. General Burnside seemed to be very much displeased at the order of withdrawal, and expressed the opinion that if allowed to remain there, by nightfall he could carry that crest. As, however, he did not give any reason to show how he could take it, and as he had been from half past five in the morning till nearly ten, and not only had not taken it, but had his men driven out of the works he had been occupying, and as Major General Ord, whose troops were also there, upon being asked if the crest could be carried, answered very positively that it

was entirely out of the question, it was determined by the lieutenant general commanding and myself, or rather I referred the matter to him, to know if he desired the orders changed—it was determined that no further attempt should be made to take the crest, but that the men should be withdrawn whenever that could be done with security.

There is now a very important point to which I will call the attention of the court, and which I want investigated very thoroughly, and that is the withdrawal from the crater.

At the time the order was given to withdraw the troops, the report of Major General Ord was, that the crater of the mine was so overcrowded with men that it would be nothing but murder to send any more men forward there. I do not recollect as to whether the report of Major General Burnside was so definite, but I believe the report of Colonel Loring was that there was at least one division of the troops in there. The impression left upon my mind was, that at that time there were as many men in the crater as would enable them to defend themselves if attacked, and in case no defence was necessary there was no occasion on my part to order troops to be sent there. I presumed that Major General Ord and Major General Burnside, having charge of that operation, would see that the men would be properly withdrawn.

This conclusion having been arrived at by the lieutenant general and myself, and it not appearing necessary that we should remain any longer at Major General Burnside's headquarters, the lieutenant general commanding withdrew to City Point, and I withdrew to my former headquarters, where I was in telegraphic communication with Major General Burnside, and where, under the common correspondence between a general officer commanding the army and his subordinates, not to say under a peculiar exigency, I expected to be informed of anything that should occur. I remained in total ignorance of any further transactions until about six or seven o'clock in the evening. About that hour a report, or a rumor, reached me that there were a number of our wounded men lying between the crater and our line, and I think an appeal was made to me by General Ord if something could not be done to remove these men. I was not aware that there was any difficulty in the way of removing them, and wondered why they had not been removed, presuming that our men were in the crater; and as no report had been made to me that they had been withdrawn, I directed a despatch to be sent to Major General Burnside, calling upon him for information. That despatch read as follows :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ July 30, 1864—7.40 p. m.

“Major GENERAL BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps* :

“The major general commanding desires to know whether you still hold the crater; and if so, whether you will be able to withdraw your troops from it safely to-night; and also to bring off the wounded. The commanding general wishes to know how many wounded are probably lying there. It will be recollected that on a former occasion General Beauregard declined to enter into any arrangement for the succor of the wounded and the burial of the dead lying under both fires; hence the necessity of immediate and active efforts for their removal in the present case.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“Major General and Chief of Staff.

“Official:

“S. F. BARSTOW,  
“Assistant Adjutant General.”

You will remember that I left General Burnside's headquarters about 10 o'clock, with the understanding that the troops were to be withdrawn when they could be withdrawn with security.

The following despatches were subsequently read by the witness :

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 30, 1864—10.35 p. m.

"Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps* :

"The major general commanding desires to know whether you have any wounded left on the field; and directs me to say that he is awaiting your reply to the despatch of 7.40 p. m.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
"Major General and Chief of Staff.

"Official :

"S. F. BARSTOW,  
"Assistant Adjutant General."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 31, 1864—8.40 a. m.

"To Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps* :

"The major general commanding directs me to call your attention to the fact that you have made no report to him upon the condition of affairs in your front since he left your headquarters yesterday, and that you have made no reply to the two special communications upon the subject sent you last night at 7.40 p. m., and at 10.40 p. m.

"I am also directed to inquire into the cause of these omissions.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
"Major General and Chief of Staff.

"Official :

"S. F. BARSTOW,  
"Assistant Adjutant General."

"BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 9TH CORPS,  
"July 31, 1864—9 a. m.

"Major General HUMPHREYS :

"Your despatch was received just as I was making out a report of our casualties. I have used every means to get something like accurate reports, but it has been difficult.

"The rumors are very numerous and exaggerated. I will send report by messenger. The order to retreat caused great confusion, and we have lost largely in prisoners.

"General Ord's men on our lines were not relieved.

"A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General*.

"Official :

"S. F. BARSTOW,  
"Assistant Adjutant General."

"BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 9TH CORPS,  
"July 31, 1864—6.40 p. m.

"Major General HUMPHREYS :

"The loss in this corps in the engagement of yesterday amounts to about 4,500; the great proportion of which was made after the brigade commanders in the crater were made aware of the order to withdraw.

"A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General*.

"Official :

"S. F. BARSTOW,  
"Assistant Adjutant General."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 31, 1864—7.20 p. m.

"Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps* :

"Your despatch relative to the loss in your corps yesterday is received.

"The commanding general requests that you explain the meaning of the latter part of your despatch, and again reminds you that he has received no report whatever from you of what occurred after 11 a. m. yesterday.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
"Major General and Chief of Staff.

"Official :

"S. F. BARSTOW,  
"Assistant Adjutant General."

"BY TELEGRAPH FROM 9TH CORPS,  
"July 31, 1864—9.10 p. m.

"Major General HUMPHREYS, *Chief of Staff* :

"Your despatch of 7.20 p. m. received. Just before the order for withdrawal was sent in o the brigade commanders in the crater, the enemy made an attack upon our forces there and were repulsed with very severe loss to the assaulting column. The order for withdrawal,

leaving the time and manner of the execution thereof to the brigade commanders on the spot, was sent in, and while they were making arrangements to carry out the order the enemy advanced another column of attack. The officers, knowing they were not to be supported by other troops, and that a withdrawal was determined, ordered the men to retire at once to our old line. It was in this withdrawal, and consequent upon it, that our chief loss was made. In view of the want of confidence in their situation, and the certainty of no support, consequent upon the receipt of such an order, of which moral effect the general commanding cannot be ignorant, I am at a loss to know why the latter part of my despatch requires explanation.

“A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General.*”

“Official:

“S. F. BARSTOW,  
“*Assistant Adjutant General.*”

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“*July 31, 1864—9½ p. m.*”

“Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps:*

“Your despatch explanatory of that in relation to the loss in your corps yesterday is received.

“The major general commanding directs me to say that the order for withdrawal did not authorize or justify its being done in the manner in which, judging from your brief report, it appears to have been executed, and that the matter shall be investigated by a court.

“The major general commanding notices that the time and manner of withdrawal was left to the brigade commanders on the spot. He desires to know why there was not a division commander present where several brigades were engaged, and by whom the withdrawal could have been conducted.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“*Major General and Chief of Staff.*”

“Official:

“S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

So far as any information from General Burnside is concerned, I had to go to bed that night without knowing whether his troops were in the crater, or whether they were not. During the night despatches were received, referring to the relief of General Ord's troops next morning, July 31, at 8.40 and 9 a. m. The despatches 18½ and 18¾ were sent and received by General Humphreys. No despatch was received from General Burnside with reference to the withdrawal of these troops till 6.40 p. m., July 31, (marked 18¾) to which was sent the one marked 19, at 9.10 p. m., July 31. The despatch was received from General Burnside, marked 19½, and the reply, marked 20, was sent. Now, I beg leave to call the attention of the court to the fact that this despatch is dated 9.10 p. m., July 31, and although it does not give an official statement of the time of the withdrawal of the troops, I know, but only from other information, that the withdrawal was at about 2 p. m., July 30. And as I consider that my conduct is here the subject of investigation as much as that of any other officer or man engaged in this enterprise, I wish to repudiate, distinctly, any responsibility resting upon me for the manner of the withdrawal, beyond the orders I gave to the effect that the troops were to be withdrawn when they could be withdrawn with security; and if they had been able to repulse an attack of the enemy, it seems to me rather extraordinary that when another attack was threatened after the success, that they should be withdrawn simply because they were threatened with another attack. But that is the point to which I wish to call the attention of the court, and which I wish to have thoroughly investigated.

I believe these constitute the sum and substance of all the orders that passed between myself and Major General Burnside. But I respectfully submit to this court that so far as it was in my power as the commanding general of this army to give orders, I anticipated the difficulties that occurred, and endeavored to avoid them as much as I could do so, and that I cannot be held responsible for the failure which afterwards resulted.

Having finished my correspondence with and orders to General Burnside, I now propose to read the correspondence with and orders to General Ord, who

was the officer commanding the force next to be employed after those of General Burnside, and whose movements it is important to know.

Major General Ord was directed to relieve his corps by General Mott's division of the 2d corps on the evening of the 29th. He was then to move and mass his troops in rear of the 9th corps, and it was intended that he should support the 9th corps whenever the 9th corps had effected a lodgement on the crest; that he was promptly to move up to them and support them on the crest. I had several interviews with General Ord on the 28th and 29th. I went with him and showed him the position; showed him exactly the ground; gave him all the information I had, and also caused him to send staff officers to select positions for the troops, so that when it became dark they might know the roads. On the morning of July 30, when it became evident to my mind that General Burnside's troops were not going to advance further than the crater, and when I had reason to suppose it was owing to some difficulty on the part of the troops themselves, and so far as any official report came to me, rather than obstacles presented by the enemy, I sent a despatch to General Ord changing his previous orders and directing him, instead of supporting General Burnside, to make an assault independent of General Burnside. That despatch and subsequent despatches are as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 29, 9 $\frac{3}{4}$  p. m., 1864.

"Major General ORD, *Commanding 18th Corps* :

"Your despatch of 9.25 p. m. is received. The commanding general does not consider it necessary for General Burnside to wait for your troops to relieve his in the trenches. General Burnside can form his troops for the assault without reference to yours, and your troops can file into the trenches at any time after they are vacated. General Burnside is telegraphed to that effect.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
"Major General, *Chief of Staff*."

"Official copy :

"S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General*."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 30, 4.50 a. m., 1864.

"Major General ORD, *Commanding 18th Corps* :

"General Burnside is ordered, if his mine has failed, to open all his batteries and assault at once. You will consider the orders the same as if the mine had exploded and the assault made in consequence.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
"Major General, *Chief of Staff*."

("Just before this was finished the mine exploded and the batteries opened. It was not sent.—A. A. H.)

"Official copy :

"S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General*."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 30, 6 a. m., 1864.

"Major General ORD, *Commanding 18th Corps* :

"The major general commanding directs that you at once move forward your corps rapidly to the crest of the hill, independently of General Burnside's troops, and make a lodgement there, reporting the result as soon as attained.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
"Major General, *Chief of Staff*."

"Official copy :

"S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General*."

"[By telegraph from headquarters 9th army corps.]

JULY 30, 8 a. m., 1864.

'To General MEADE :

"General Turner in my front reports that the only place I can get out of the line is opposite the crater. It is already full of men who cannot develop. I shall put in my column as soon as I can. It is impossible, by reason of the topography, to charge in the manner you

indicate. I must go in by head of column and develop to the right. This is reply to orders from General Meade to push for crest of hill regardless of General Burnside's troops. General Ames makes similar reports.

"E. O. C. ORD, *Major General.*

"Official copy:

"S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 30, 9 $\frac{1}{2}$  a. m., 1864.

"Major General ORD, *Commanding 18th Corps:*

"The major general commanding directs that you withdraw your corps to the rear of the 9th corps, in some secure place.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
"Major General, *Chief of Staff.*

"Official copy:

"S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 30, 10 a. m., 1864.

"Major Generals BURNSIDE and ORD:

"You can exercise your discretion in withdrawing your troops now or at a later period, say to-night.

"It is not intended to hold the enemy's line which you now occupy any longer than is required to withdraw safely your men.

"GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General.*

"Official copy:

"S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*"

There were some other despatches to General Ord of a similar character, (but I do not see them here,) to endeavor to get him forward, independent of the 9th corps, to make an isolated attack, an attack of his own, independent of the 9th corps. Owing to the obstacles presented—the fact that there was no proper *debouche* for our troops to that portion of the enemy's line, and the fact that the crater was overcrowded with men—General Ord, considering those obstacles insurmountable, confined his operations to sending forward, I think, only one brigade. But General Ord and his division commanders have made reports, which will be placed before you. I forgot to bring them with me to-day.

At about 9.45 a. m. the same orders were sent to General Ord as to General Burnside, with reference to the withdrawal of the troops. That finishes all that passed between General Ord and myself.

The other supporting column was under Major General Warren on the left.

In the original order General Warren was directed to mass his available troops on the right of the line, and to make all his preparations to support General Burnside in the assault wherever he should be ordered.

At 4.40 a. m. the following despatch was sent to him:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 30, 4.40 a. m., 1864.

"Major General WARREN, *Commanding 5th Corps:*

"General Burnside is directed, if his mine has failed, to open all his batteries and assault. Upon hearing his batteries open you will open all in your front.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
"Major General and *Chief of Staff.*

"Official:

"S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

At 5.50, one hour afterwards, and immediately after my receiving the information that General Burnside's corps occupied the crater, the following despatch was sent to him:



“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“July 30, 5.50 a. m., 1864.

Major General WARREN, *Commanding 5th Corps* :

“General Burnside is occupying the crater with some of his troops. He reports that no enemy is seen in their line. How is it in your front? Are the enemy in force there or weak?

“If there is apparently an opportunity to carry their works, take advantage of it and push forward your troops.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“Major General and Chief of Staff.

“Official :

“S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

I wish to call the attention of the court to the fact that as early as 5.50 I authorized General Warren, if he saw any opportunity of doing anything with his corps, not only in support of General Burnside, but as an independent operation of his own, that he should take advantage of it and push forward his troops. His reply, dated 6 a. m., is as follows :

“[By telegraph from 5th army corps.]

“JULY 30, 6 a. m., 1864.

“To Major General HUMPHREYS :

“Your despatch just received. It is difficult to say how strong the enemy may be in my front. He has batteries along the whole of it. I will watch for the first opportunity. I can see the whole line where I am. The enemy has been running from his first line in front of General Burnside's right for some minutes, but there seems to be a very heavy line of troops just behind it in high breastwork. There is a battery in front of General Burnside's left which fires towards the river, the same as it did on the 18th of June, and which our artillery fire has but very little effect on.

“G. K. WARREN, *Major General.*

“Official copy :

“S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

At 6.15 a. m. another despatch was received from him, as follows :

“[By telegraph from headquarters 5th army corps.]

“JULY 30, 6.15 a. m., 1864.

“To Major General HUMPHREYS :

“I have just received a report from my line on the centre and left. The enemy opened with musketry when our firing commenced, but our own fire kept it down, and also that of all their artillery except in the second line on the main ridge, from which they fire a little. Major Fitzhugh, of the artillery, is badly wounded by a musket ball in the thigh. None of the enemy have left my front, that we can see.

“G. K. WARREN, *Major General.*

“Official copy :

“S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

Then at 6.20 another despatch, No. 29, came from General Warren, in which he states that what we thought was a heavy line of the enemy behind the line occupied by Burnside's troops, as the sunlight comes out and the smoke clears away, proves to be our own troops in the enemy's position.

“[By telegraph from 5th army corps.]

“JULY 30, 6.20 a. m., 1864.

“To Major General HUMPHREYS :

“What we thought was the heavy line of the enemy behind the line occupied by General Burnside, proves, as the sunlight comes out and the smoke clears away, to be our own troops in the enemy's position.

“G. K. WARREN, *Major General.*

“Official copy :

“S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

You will perceive that at 5.40 I authorized General Warren and directed him to make an attack without waiting for the support of General Burnside—that is, if circumstances would justify his making an attack; and that his replies here indicate that no such attack was practicable. Coming to that conclusion, and

receiving information from the signal officers that the enemy had left their extreme right, which I presumed they would do, to mass on the centre to receive our attack, the following despatch was sent to General Warren at half past six o'clock :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 6.30 a. m., 1864.

“Major General WARREN, *Commanding 5th Corps* :

“The signal officer reports that none of the enemy's troops are visible in their works near the lead works. The commanding general wishes, if it is practicable, that you make an attack in that direction. Prisoners say there are but three divisions in the works, and but one line of intrenchments, thinly filled with their troops.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS, *Major General and Chief of Staff.*”

“A despatch just going to Wilson to make a lodgement on the Weldon railroad and move up along it to the enemy's right flank.

“Official copy :

“S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

“HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS, July 30, 6.40 a. m., 1864.

“General HUMPHREYS :

“I have all my troops on my right except General Crawford. I have sent him your despatch, with directions to do whatever he can on the left with Baxter's brigade and half of Ledlie's.

“Do you mean for me to move Ayres in that direction? The enemy have a 30-pounder battery on the main ridge in my front, behind their first line. We cannot make out what his second line is.

“Respectfully,

“G. K. WARREN, *Major General.*”

“Official copy :

“S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 7 a. m., 1864.

“Major General WARREN, *Commanding 5th Corps* :

“What about attacking the enemy's right flank near the lead works with that part of your force nearest to it?

“A. A. HUMPHREYS, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*”

“Official :

“S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

The next despatch in order is the following, dated 7.30 a. m., to General Warren :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 7½ a. m., 1864.

“Major General WARREN, *Commanding 5th Corps* :

“Your despatch respecting attacking the enemy's extreme right received. The general commanding will await General Crawford's reconnoissance before determining whether you should send Ayres also in that direction.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*”

“Official :

“S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

General Ayres still remained on the right, and the orders still existed to do anything with him that could be done to advantage. At 7.50 a. m. we have the next despatch from General Warren :

“HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS, July 30—7.50 a. m.

“Major General HUMPHREYS :

“I have just returned from the scene of General Burnside's operations. In my opinion, the battery of one or two guns to the left of General Burnside should be taken before attempting to seize the crest. It seems to me it can be done, as we shall take the infantry fire quite obliquely. This done, the advance upon the main hill will not be difficult. I think it would pay you to go to General Burnside's position. You can see in a moment, and it is as easy to communicate with me as by telegraph.

“It will be some time before we can hear from Crawford.

“Respectfully,

“G. K. WARREN, *Major General.*”

“Official copy :

“S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

Nothing further was received while we awaited developments from General Crawford until 8 a. m., when the following despatch was received from General Warren :

“ BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMY CORPS,  
“ July 30, 1864—8 a. m.

“ Major General HUMPHREYS :

“ I sent your despatch to General Crawford with directions to do what he could. He says the lead works are over a mile from the angle of my picket line. I do not think an attack upon the enemy's works at or near that point at all practicable. With the force I can spare, I can make a demonstration if it is desired ; the cavalry are moving and I will have my left uncovered. He sent word he will await further orders. He is so far off that I do not think it well to wait for anything more he can do, and I renew my suggestion that you take a look at things from General Burnside's headquarters and direct me either to go in with Burnside or go around to my left with Ayres's division and I do the other thing.

“ G. K. WARREN, *Major General.*

“ Official copy :

“ S. F. BARSTOW,  
“ *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

Notwithstanding that it was considered that General Warren's original order authorized him to take the batteries if it could be done, inasmuch as he was directed to move and attack with General Crawford, and as it was suggested that General Ayres might be required, it was thought proper to send him the following order at 8 $\frac{3}{4}$  a. m. :

“ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ July 30, 1864—8 $\frac{3}{4}$  a. m.

“ Major General WARREN, *Commanding 5th Corps :*

“ Your despatch is received. The major general commanding directs that you go in with Burnside, taking the two-gun battery. The movement on the left need not be carried further than reconnoissance to see in what force the enemy is holding his right. The cavalry are ordered to move up on your left and to keep up connexion.

“ A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“ *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

“ Official copy :

“ S. F. BARSTOW,  
“ *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

At 9.15 a. m. the following despatch was received from General Warren :

“ BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMY CORPS,  
“ July 30, 1864—9.15 a. m.

“ Major General HUMPHREYS :

“ Just before receiving your despatch to assault the battery on the left of the crater occupied by General Burnside, the enemy drove his troops out of the place and I think now hold it. I can find no one who knows for certainty or seems willing to admit, but I think I saw a rebel battle-flag in it just now and shots coming from it this way. I am therefore, if this is true, no more able to take the battery now than I was this time yesterday. All our advantages are lost. I await further instructions, and am trying to get at the condition of affairs for certainty.

“ G. K. WARREN, *Major General.*

“ Official copy :

“ S. F. BARSTOW,  
“ *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

At this time the conclusion had been arrived at by the lieutenant general commanding and myself that the affair was over, and that nothing more could be done; and soon afterwards, orders similar to those which were sent to others were sent to General Warren, that he should not make any attempt to take the two-gun battery. The following despatches were sent to General Warren :

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 30, 1864—9.25 a. m.

"Major General WARREN :

"The attack ordered on the two-gun battery is suspended.

"GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*

"Official copy :

"S. F. BARSTOW,

"*Assistant Adjutant General.*"

"BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 5TH CORPS,

"July 30, 1864—9.45 a. m.

"Major General HUMPHREYS, *Chief of Staff :*

"GENERAL: I find that the flag I saw was the enemy's, and that they have reoccupied all the line we drove them from, except a little around the crater which a small force of ours still hold.

"Respectfully,

"G. K. WARREN, *Major General.*

"Official copy :

"S. F. BARSTOW,

"*Assistant Adjutant General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"July 30, 1864—9.45 a. m.

"General WARREN, at 9th Corps Headquarters :

"A despatch has been sent to your headquarters, rescinding order to attack; all offensive operations are suspended. You can resume your original position with your command.

"GEORGE G. MEADE.

"Official :

"S. F. BARSTOW,

"*Assistant Adjutant General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"July 30, 1864—5 p. m.

"Major Generals WARREN and BURNSIDE :

"Signal officers report the enemy returning rapidly from the north side of the James. Every preparation should be made to strengthen the line of works where any obstacles have to-day been removed. The lines should be held strongly with infantry and artillery, posted wherever practicable—available reserves held in hand ready for movement in case it becomes necessary. I anticipate offensive movements on the part of the enemy, and expect it will be by a movable column, turning our left and threatening our rear.

"GEORGE G. MEADE,

"*Major General, Commanding.*

"Major General Hancock will, to-night, resume his former position and General Ord his also.

"Official copy :

"S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General.*"

These are all the orders and communications that passed between General Warren and myself. He was authorized to attack, if he could see a good chance to attack; when he reported no chance to attack, and was asked what force he had available, he reported that he had no force available except he moved Ayres; he was directed not to move Ayres until information was received from Crawford; only, if he could attack the two-gun battery in his front, he was ordered to attack it, and then the operations were subsequently suspended.

Now I have read you the communications that passed between myself and General Grant, myself and General Burnside, myself and General Ord, and myself and General Warren. It now remains for me to read the communications that passed between myself and General Hancock, and myself and General Mott.

The first was a communication sent 4.40 a. m. to General Mott.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“July 30, 1864—4.40 a. m.

“Brigadier General MOTT, *Commanding Division in intrenchments of 18th Corps, Old Headquarters of 18th Corps* :

“General Burnside is ordered, if his mine has failed, to open all the batteries on his front and assault at once.

“Upon hearing his batteries open, have all the batteries of the 18th corps opened.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS, *Major General, Chief of Staff*.

“Official :

“S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General*.”

At 4.50 a. m. the following despatch was sent to the telegraph operator at the headquarters of the 18th corps :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30—4.50 a. m.

“OPERATOR at Headquarters 18th Corps :

“Send the following message by orderly to General Hancock :

“Major General HANCOCK, *Commanding 2d Corps* :

“The commanding general wishes you to be about the headquarters of the 18th corps, so that he can communicate with you at any time.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS, *Major General, Chief of Staff*.

“Official :

“S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General*.”

The following despatch dated July 30, 6 a. m., was sent to General Hancock, after the mine was occupied :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“July 30, 1864—6 a. m.

“Major General HANCOCK, *Commanding 2d Corps* :

“The major general commanding directs me to say that General Burnside reports the enemy's line in his front abandoned, and the prisoners taken say that there is no second line. The commanding general may call on you to move forward at any moment, and wishes you to have your troops well up to the front prepared to move. Do the enemy's lines in front of Mott's division appear to be thinly occupied, and is there any chance to push forward there ?

“A. A. HUMPHREYS, *Major General, Chief of Staff*.

“Official :

“S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General*.”

The following despatches were sent and received :

“BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 2D ARMY CORPS,

“July 30, 1864—6 a. m.

“Major General HUMPHREYS :

“It is not possible to say about the line in front of General Mott, as both keep down firing whenever a head is shown. General Ord left word for me by General Mott that there was no place to assault here, as the line was not only protected by abatis, but by wire. This was the decision of himself and his division commanders, and he requested General Mott so to inform me. I know nothing more about it. I will be prepared for your orders.

“W. S. HANCOCK.

“Official copy :

“S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General*.”

“BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 2D CORPS,

“July 30, 1864—6.20 a. m.

“Major General HUMPHREYS, *Chief of Staff* :

“I have sent out to have General Mott's line examined as far as practicable, to see how strong the enemy appear to hold their line in General Mott's front.

“W. S. HANCOCK.

“Official copy :

“S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General*.”

“BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 2D CORPS,

“July 30, 1864—6.30 a. m.

“Major General HUMPHREYS :

“I have directed General Mott to advance a skirmish line to see whether the enemy hold a strong line in his front.

“W. S. HANCOCK, *Major General*.

“Official copy :

“S. F. BARSTOW, *Assistant Adjutant General*.”

"BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 2D CORPS,  
" July 30, 1864—6.50 a. m.

"General GEO. G. MEADE:

"The brigade next to General Burnside's attempted an advance of a skirmish line just now and lost the officer in command of the line and several men in getting over the parapet. The enemy's mortars are at work, but they cannot fire much artillery other than this. The other brigades have not yet been heard from. Your despatch is just received. I will continue to watch the enemy in my front.

"W. S. HANCOCK, *Major General.*

"Official copy:

"S. F. BARSTOW, *Asst. Adj't General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
" July 30, 1864—7 a. m.

"Major General HANCOCK:

"The report from prisoners would indicate weakness in the enemy's line—that a considerable portion has been vacated.

"If Burnside and Ord gain the crest, the enemy cannot hold in your front, for they will be open to attack from front and rear. It was to take advantage of this contingency that I wanted you to have your troops in hand.

"The orders to Mott are all right. If the enemy are in force and prepared, you will have to await developments; but if you have reason to believe their condition is such that an effort to dislodge them would be successful, I would like to have it made. Burnside now occupies their line, but has not pushed up to the crest, though he reports he is about doing so.  
"GEO. G. MEADE.

"Official:

"S. F. BARSTOW, *Asst. Adj't General.*"

"BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 2D CORPS,  
" July 30, 1864—7 a. m.

"General HUMPHREYS, *Chief of Staff*:

"Report from 2d brigade, General Mott's division, shows that the enemy are there in some strength, having two batteries which they fire seldom, owing to the close proximity of our riflemen. The commanding officer of the brigade says he can see every man who leaves his front to their right, and none have left since daylight. He is using mortars effectively. I will report any change of troops.

"W. S. HANCOCK, *Major General.*

"Official copy:

"S. F. BARSTOW, *Asst. Adj't General.*"

"BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 2D ARMY CORPS,  
" July 30, 1864—9 a. m.

"Major General HUMPHREYS:

"General Mott's remaining brigade deceived the enemy in their front by putting their hats on rammers above the parapet, which elicited quite a spirited volley.

"W. S. HANCOCK, *Major General.*

"Official copy:

"S. F. BARSTOW, *Asst. Adj't General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
" July 30, 1864—9.25 a. m.

"Major General HANCOCK:

"Offensive operations have been suspended. You will for the present hold in force the lines held by the 18th corps. Make your dispositions accordingly.

"GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding.*

"Official:

"S. F. BARSTOW, *Asst. Adj't General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
" July 29, 1864—10 a. m.

"Brigadier General WILSON, *Com'dg 3d Division Cavalry*:

"The major general commanding directs that you concentrate your division on the left, somewhere near the plank road, and hold its available force ready for prompt movement.

"The guard left with trains should be merely sufficient to protect them against any small irregular parties of the enemy. The dismounted enemy should form this guard. Please report your location as soon as established.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
"Major General and Chief of Staff.

"P. S.—The patrols and pickets on the north side of the Blackwater should be reduced to the minimum consistent with watching the main avenues of approach.

"Official copy :

"S. F. BARSTOW, *Asst. Adj't General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"July 29, 1864—2½ p. m.

"Brigadier General WILSON,

"*Com'dg Cavalry Division, Jordan's Point :*

"The commanding general considers that not more than one regiment should remain north of the Blackwater, and that he be so posted as to be brought in rapidly to-morrow morning.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,

"*Major General and Chief of Staff.*

"Official copy :

"S. F. BARSTOW, *Asst. Adj't General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"July 29, 1864—3¼ p. m.

"Brigadier General WILSON, *Commanding 3d Division Cavalry Corps :*

"GENERAL: Major General Sheridan is ordered to move at dark to Lee's mill, and at daylight against the enemy's troops defending Petersburg on their right, by the roads leading to that town from the southward and westward.

"Your division will accompany him, and the commanding general directs that you be prepared to call in your patrols and pickets early to-morrow morning and move with the cavalry corps. You will send a staff officer to meet General Sheridan and receive his instructions.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,

"*Major General and Chief of Staff.*

"Official copy :

"S. F. BARSTOW,

"*Assistant Adjutant General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"July 29, 1864—10 p. m.

"Major General SHERIDAN :

"The commanding general directs that you keep up connexion with our left, in the operations of to-morrow.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,

"*Major General and Chief of Staff.*

"Official copy :

"S. F. BARSTOW,

"*Assistant Adjutant General.*"

These include the despatches sent to the cavalry. I would explain that the separate orders to General Wilson were issued because General Sheridan was across the James river, at Deep Bottom, with two divisions, and I had to issue separate orders to General Wilson, so that he might be ready for the movement next day.

Here are some despatches which are of no particular consequence, but I will introduce them here. They are despatches from the signal officers, indicating the movements of the enemy :

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"July 29, 1864—3 p. m.

"Brigadier General WHITE,

"*Commanding (temporary) Division, 9th Corps :*

"The major general commanding directs that, as soon as it is dark, you withdraw your command from the intrenchments you are now holding, and move to the position of the 9th corps, and report to your corps commander. You will call in your pickets upon moving.

"You will at once report to Major General Burnside, and receive his instructions as to the route you will take.

"Very respectfully, &c.,

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,

"*Major General and Chief of Staff.*

"Official :

"S. F. BARSTOW,

"*Assistant Adjutant General.*"

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“July 30, 1864—4.45 a. m.

“Colonel WAINWRIGHT, *Chief of Artillery, 5th Corps* :

“General Burnside is directed, if his mine has failed, to open all his batteries on his front and assault at once. Upon hearing his batteries open, those of the 5th corps will open also.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“Major General and Chief of Staff.

“Official :

“S. F. BARSTOW,  
“Assistant Adjutant General.”

“PLANK ROAD SIGNAL STATION,  
“July 30, 1864—5 a. m.

“Major B. F. FISHER :

“There are no tents or the sign of any force on the right of the enemy’s line near lead works.

“The two batteries directly in front of station, which opened heavily this morning, have ceased firing.

“A large building is burning in the city.

“I have seen no movement of the enemy’s troops.

“J. B. DUFF,  
“Lieutenant, Signal Officer.

“Official :

“S. F. BARSTOW,  
“Assistant Adjutant General.”

“[By telegraph from Plank Road Signal Station.]

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“July 30, 1864—6.20 a. m.

“Major FISHER :

“The enemy’s infantry has been passing to our right for twenty minutes; first noticed them at a point due west of the station marching in rear of their line; they came out in plain view at a point northwest from station. The column was at least a strong brigade; all the camps, one-quarter mile of lead works, have been broken up; the largest visible from station has just been broken up and the troops moved to our right.

“J. B. DUFF, *Signal Officer.*

“Official :

“S. F. BARSTOW,  
“Assistant Adjutant General.”

[“By telegraph from 5th corps.]

“JULY 30, 1864.

“Major FISHER :

“The enemy are wholly concealed along the line in view of this station. Not one has been seen; only three guns, and those in redoubts, at Gregor House. Reply to us.

“Copy sent to General Warren.

“S. LYON, *Lieutenant.*

“Official :

“S. F. BARSTOW,  
“Assistant Adjutant General.”

It was on these reports of the signal officers that General Warren’s orders were predicated.

The following is the report of the chief of engineers :

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“Office of Engineers, August 5, 1864.

“SIR: In compliance with directions received from you to-day, I have the honor to make the following report of the duty performed by the engineer officers during the assault of July 30.

“In compliance with directions from the chief of staff, I detailed an officer of engineers for duty with each corps that was ordered to take part in the attack on the 30th of July.

“Major Michler, who was charged with selecting the position of the column on the right, after having reconnoitred the position, reported to General Ord, and was informed that his subordinate generals had already examined the position, were thoroughly acquainted with the ground, and required no further assistance. They had already determined to take the same position indicated by Major Michler. Two engineer officers belonging to the 18th corps accompanied the movement.



"Lieutenant Benyaurd, engineer, who has been on duty on the 9th corps front, reported to General Burnside, and remained with him during the whole affair.

"After having consulted with the commanding general of the 5th corps as to the direction his column would take, I proceeded to the batteries in front of that corps and assisted Colonel Abbott in directing their fire so as to silence that of the enemy against the assaulting column. I then repaired to the right of his line. By this time, however, the attack had been abandoned and my services were no longer required.

"Very respectfully,

"J. C. DUANE, *Major Engineers.*

"Brigadier General S. WILLIAMS,  
"Assistant Adjutant General Army of the Potomac.

"Official:

"S. F. BARSTOW, *A. A. G.*"

I believe I have now read every despatch that I have received, and the court are fully aware of all the information that I received on the ground.

I would state that in the general orders issued on the night previous to the assault the cavalry was ordered to make this attack on the left. Two divisions of the cavalry corps were over at Deep Bottom. They could not cross the river until after the second corps had crossed, so that it was late in the day before they came up. Indeed, the head of the column did not appear before the offensive operations were suspended. As General Wilson had been ordered to be in readiness, however, and in view of the unavoidable delay of Sheridan, orders were sent to General Wilson not to wait for General Sheridan, but to push on himself to the Weldon railroad and make an assault upon the enemy. No report was received from General Sheridan. General Sheridan was sick. General Gregg reported in the evening that he had advanced his cavalry, and that they had found the enemy in force at Ream's station, at Gurley's house, and at various other points along the railroad. There was no attack made by the cavalry except at Lee's mills, where General Gregg, encountering cavalry, drove them away to water his horses.

When it was known that our offensive operations were suspended, orders were sent to the cavalry that they should push on as far as possible and find out the enemy's position; but the original orders about going into town were modified, inasmuch as the operations in our immediate front were suspended.

I desire to say to the court that it has not been my disposition or intention to throw censure upon anybody for the unfortunate failure; that, indeed, I have not been furnished with the necessary information to enable me to do so. I have not yet received Major General Burnside's, or his subordinate commanders', official reports. I have very little knowledge of what actually transpired except from the despatches you have heard read here. I have been groping in the dark since the commencement of the attack. I did not wish to take any unpleasant measures, but I thought it my duty to suggest to the President of the United States that this matter should be investigated, and that the censure should be made to rest upon those who are entitled to it. What I have done has been to show that I tried to do all I could to insure success.

#### FOURTH DAY.

#### COURT ROOM, HEADQUARTERS 2D CORPS,

*August 10, 1864.*

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Hancock, Brigadier Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge advocate.

There were also present Generals Ferrero, Potter, and Wilcox, of the 9th corps, General Mott, of the 2d, and General Carr, of the 18th.

The proceedings of the third day were read and approved.

Testimony of General Meade continued.

Questions by General Burnside :

Question. Where were your headquarters during the action of the 30th ?

Answer. From four o'clock until about eleven—I am not exactly confident as to the time of leaving it—my headquarters, as announced in the order of battle on the day previous, were established at the headquarters of the 9th corps. At eleven o'clock, or about that time, as near as I can remember, I removed to the headquarters of the army of the Potomac, which are situated about three-quarters of a mile to the eastward of the headquarters of the 9th corps, and are in telegraphic communication with the same headquarters where I remained during the rest of the day.

Question. How far was that from the scene of action ?

Answer. If by the scene of action is meant the crater of the mine and that portion of the enemy's line in front of it, so far as I have knowledge of the ground, derived from maps, I should suppose that the headquarters of the 9th corps were possibly a mile to the eastward of the crater, and my headquarters are three-quarters of a mile, as I stated, beyond that, still further to the east.

Question. Could anything of the action be seen from there ?

Answer. Nothing could be seen from any of the points that I occupied.

Question. Did you go further to the front during the action ? If so, where ?

Answer. I did not leave the headquarters of the 9th corps during the active operations.

Question. Did you not know that there were several positions on our line where you could see the action for yourself, and yet be in as proper a place for you as in General Burnside's permanent camp, and also have full personal communications with Generals Burnside and Ord, and be much nearer to General Warren, and likewise have telegraphic communication with the rest of the army ?

Answer. I undoubtedly was aware that there were points of the line where I could see more of the action than I could see at the position I occupied, but I was not aware that there was any point where I could see anything particularly or on which I could base my orders. I adopted the position I did in consequence of its being a central one and in telegraphic communication with all parts of the line where officers were stationed with whom it was necessary to communicate ; and having a large staff, and many communications to receive, and many persons to communicate with, and being there in telegraphic communication, I considered it more proper to remain where I announced to the army my headquarters would be, and where all information could be sent to me, than to make any change of position as intimated in the question. Besides which, I desire to say to this court that it has been a matter of policy with me to place myself in such position that my communications made, and the replies made thereto, should be made in such way as a record could be kept of them, and not be confined to verbal communications, which are often subject to misapprehension and to misconception. There undoubtedly was telegraphic communication from General Burnside's headquarters in the field—the fourteen-gun battery, as it was called—with the other headquarters in the army.

Question. Did you not have an aide-de camp with General Burnside during most of the action ?

Answer. During a portion of the time I did have Captain Sanders, aide-de-camp, at the headquarters of General Burnside. I sent him there in consequence of not receiving any communication from General Burnside, in the hope that he would be enabled to send me some information.

Question. Was not Captain Sanders sent there before the mine exploded ?

Answer. No, sir ; he was sent there some considerable time after the mine exploded ; that is, upon the duty that I now refer to. I have previously stated to the court that before the mine exploded I sent two officers to endeavor to ex-

plain the delay. One was Captain Jay, and one might have been Captain Sanders; but they returned before the explosion of the mine. After the explosion of the mine I sent Captain Sanders on the duty that I now refer to, which was to remain at General Burnside's headquarters and communicate to me anything which he could ascertain. I think it further proper to add to this answer to this question that, finding I did not get the information which I desired to have, or which I thought I could have, and fearing that my having sent an aide-de-camp—the object being to facilitate the transmission of information—might be used to deter responsible officers from communicating information to the commanding general, I withdrew Captain Sanders, before the action closed, by an order.

Question. For what purpose was he sent? Was it not to report to you the state and progress of affairs, and did he not so report?

Answer. I have already answered the first part of that question. As to his reports, all the despatches from him are on file in my evidence before the court. As to whether he reported all he should have reported, and all the information to be obtained, I presume the court will ascertain from him and from other evidence.

Question. Was there any information not furnished you by General Burnside, or through other sources, which, if received, would have influenced your conduct of the action? If so, what?

Answer. I have already informed the court that all the information I received has been placed before them in the shape of official documents. It is impossible for me to say what my action would have been if I had received any other information. I acted upon the information I received.

Question. What time did Captain Sanders leave General Burnside to return to you?

Answer. I should say it was about half past eight; between that and nine, as near as I can recollect. I have a copy of the order to him, which I can furnish if desired.

Question. You state that General Burnside's despatch of 9 a. m. was the first information you had received that any collision had taken place, or that there was any enemy in our front; had you not, before the receipt of this despatch, written to General Burnside in reference to General Griffin's attack and repulse; also, received a despatch from Captain Sanders speaking of captured colors; also, seen and examined rebel prisoners taken that morning?

Answer. In reply to that question, I would say that I am willing to assume that there is an apparent discrepancy in my testimony, which I am very glad to have an opportunity of explaining. I should suppose that any one cognizant of the circumstances that took place on that day, even of the most general nature, would know that I never meant to say that I did not know that there was no enemy anywhere. I was fully aware that when the crater was occupied a number of prisoners were taken. I was also aware that the enemy occupied their lines both on the right and on the left of the position occupied by General Burnside; and I did know that Captain Sanders had made a report of captured colors, and that an attack had been made in front of Griffin; but my whole attention was absorbed in the endeavor to have a charge made to the crest, and my thoughts were all upon that; and when I said this was the first intimation I had of there being any enemy in the front, I meant any enemy so situated as to prevent a direct assault upon the crest. Besides which, I must throw myself upon the consideration of the court, and say that the vast number of despatches, the frequency with which they were sent and received, was such that my memory may not serve me well, and the incidents may be, in a measure, not related in the exact order in which they occurred. I wish to call the attention of the court to a very important fact for the benefit of General Burnside, if it results to his benefit as well as to mine, and that is the difficulty of having the time of these despatches uniform. A despatch is sent to me marked with the time of

the officer who sends it, but the time by his watch may be ten or fifteen minutes different from mine. But I do honestly and conscientiously say that that was the first positive information, when I received that despatch that the men of the 9th and 18th corps were returning, that I had that there was any such force or disposition of the enemy as to render it questionable that that assault could be made.

General Burnside here remarked, "I want the record in such a shape as to enable the casual reader and the revising officer to see that there was, before that time, an effort on my part, or on the part of some person near me, to give information, and not an effort to cast any imputation on General Meade, and I do not desire to invalidate his testimony, but simply to elaborate. I am confident that there is no disposition on the part of General Meade to make erroneous statements."

Question. Have you a note written me by you about two weeks before the assault as to the practicability of an assault in my front, my answer thereto, your second letter, and my reply, and will you be kind enough to furnish copies?

Answer. I presume that those documents, like all other official documents, are on file. I will have a search made for them, and as soon as they are discovered will very cheerfully furnish General Burnside or the court a copy of them.

[General Burnside explained that one of them was a semi-official letter, and General Meade, being reminded of the purport of it, answered that he did not think he had it.]

By the court :

Question. What knowledge had you of the movements of the different divisions of the enemy on July 30?

Answer. I had very positive information from deserters, not only those who came within my own lines here, but those who came into the lines of General Butler, and those who came into the lines of General Hancock, that there were but three divisions of the enemy in our front, consisting of Mahone's division of Hill's corps; and Johnson's and Hoke's divisions of Longstreet's corps; and that the other divisions of Lee's army were on the north side of the James river, confronting General Hancock and Sheridan, on the 29th. I also received the same information from prisoners taken that morning. During the operations I received information from the signal officers on the plank road that the enemy were moving troops from their right to their centre, which I anticipated, and upon receiving that information the orders were sent to General Warren to endeavor to turn the enemy's right by pushing forward General Crawford, and to General Wilson to push on without delay, without waiting for the arrival of General Sheridan, coming from Deep Bottom.

Question. Did the order to suspend operations (given about 9 a. m. July 30) originate with Lieutenant General Grant?

Answer. No, sir; the order, I think, originated with myself. Some time before the order was given, I informed Lieutenant General Grant that, as far as I could see, there was no prospect of our succeeding in the manner in which we had expected to do; that the time had passed for the coup-de-main to succeed; and I suggested to him that we should immediately withdraw the troops, to which he acceded. About that time a despatch was received from the signal officer of the 5th corps, stating that the colored troops had captured a brigade of the enemy, with four of their colors, to which, however, I did not attach much importance, not knowing how a signal officer could see an operation of that kind when it did not come to me from the officer in charge of the operations. We nevertheless suspended this order and held it in abeyance until the arrival of the despatch of General Burnside, informing me that some of the men of the 18th and 9th corps were retiring, and I think also that the Lieutenant General himself rode down to our trenches and made some personal examination, and had seen General Ord, and had some conversation with him. Upon his return, from

what he had learned from General Ord, and subsequently an officer coming in and saying that the colored troops, instead of capturing a brigade and four colors, had themselves retired in great confusion, which information, I think, was given me by Major Fisher, the chief signal officer, I again referred the subject to the lieutenant general, and again gave him my opinion that, as it was then about 9.25, it was unnecessary to make any other efforts, and an unnecessary sacrifice of life; my idea being that they could be withdrawn without any difficulty then, as we should have difficulty later in the day in withdrawing them. To this he assented, and the order was given to withdraw them. Afterwards, when the information was received from General Burnside of the difficulty of retiring, then the order was modified.

Question. Were any instructions given for destroying the bridges in Petersburg in case the crest was gained?

Answer. There were not, for two reasons: and first, if we had succeeded, as I hoped we would, in overcoming the enemy, we should have driven them across the Appomattox, and should have wanted those bridges to follow them, but the contingency of their destroying those bridges was held in view, and it was to meet that contingency that the chief engineer was ordered to have a pontoon train brought up so that we could throw our own bridges. My expectation was, that if we had succeeded in the coup-de-main, these three divisions of the enemy would have gone out of our way, and we should be enabled to cross not only the Appomattox, but also Swift run, and open communication with General Butler at Bermuda Hundred before General Lee could send any re-enforcements from the five divisions that he was known to have north of the James river.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ July 26, 12 m., 1864.

“Major General BURNSIDE:

I wish you would submit in writing your project for the explosion of your mine, with the amount of powder required, that the preliminary question may be definitely settled. You had better also look for some secure place in the woods, where the powder required can be brought in wagons, and kept under guard; thus saving the time it will take to unload it from the vessels and haul it to your camp. Whenever you report as above, and designate a point, I will order the powder brought up.

“GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General.*

“Official:

“S. F. BARSTOW,  
“ *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.,  
“ July 26, 1864.

“Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps:*

“GENERAL: The major general commanding directs me to inquire whether anything has transpired connected with your mine that leads you to believe it is in danger from countermining. If it is your conviction that it is so endangered, then the commanding general authorizes you to make every preparation for springing it; but directs that you do not explode it earlier than to-morrow afternoon, Wednesday, the 27th, say at four o'clock, if not otherwise ordered. The commanding general further directs me to say that the charge of the mine should be determined by the usual rules governing such subjects. It is not intended by the commanding general to follow the explosion of the mine by an assault or other operations. If, therefore, the mine can be preserved for use at some early future day, when circumstances will admit of its being used in connexion with other operations, the commanding general desires that you take no steps for exploding it as herein prescribed.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“ *Major General and Chief of Staff.*

“Official:

“S. F. BARSTOW,  
“ *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

The foregoing is substantially the statement which I made to the court of inquiry.

It alludes to all the points which required any explanation on my part, so far as my own conduct was concerned.

There is one point, however, which I deem it proper to elaborate before this committee, because I have reason to believe it will be set forth prominently in the testimony of others, and that is the position I occupied on the field. The selection of this position was made the day previous, and was due to the fact that from it there were lines of telegraph running to the Avery and Jordan houses, which I presumed would be in the vicinity of the headquarters of the 5th and 2d corps, and instructions were given to run a line to the 14-gun battery, where General Burnside had informed me he should establish his headquarters. The object of its selection was to secure a central position, where I could be in prompt communication with the several corps commanders. During the operations I remained there, because, having announced it as the headquarters in the field, I feared if I left it some important communication might be sent, and time lost in hunting me up to deliver it. It was for this reason, stated at the time to the lieutenant general commanding, that when he went to the front I did not accompany him. It was for this reason, also, that when Major General Warren proposed I should go over to his position, I did not accede to his request, for it seemed to me then, as it does now, that any information General Warren had in any manner acquired could be transmitted to me by telegraph as well as if I went there to see for myself, and the objection to going was the danger that during my absence others might have information equally as important, which would not, owing to my absence, be promptly transmitted. I now refer to not going to General Warren's headquarters, because I am satisfied from the testimony of others that nothing was to be seen from there; and General Warren had himself transmitted me erroneous intelligence, which he subsequently corrected. Nor would going down to the front line of our works have produced any change, because the lieutenant general on returning from them acknowledged to me that nothing could be seen, and he left there under the impression that all was going on well, when he met Major General Ord, who reported to him our people were being driven back.

Furthermore, I have the testimony of Major General Ord and others; that owing to the smoke from the artillery, and a mist which prevailed part of the time, there was really nothing to be seen or known, unless you went to the crater itself.

Now, I am willing to admit that had I gone to the crater I should perhaps have known earlier the true condition of affairs and had I foreseen what subsequently occurred, I should undoubtedly have gone, but it would not have been because it was my place, but it would have been because I felt myself called upon to assume the duties of the corps, division, and perhaps brigade commanders. My failure to do so, in ignorance of any necessity for so doing, I respectfully submit should not be deemed a cause for censure. And it may be well for the committee to inquire who did go to the crater and give their personal superintendence to the movement of the troops, and if it is found that any corps or division commanders whose immediate commands were there did not go, and did not deem themselves called upon to go, I trust I shall have the benefit of the superior knowledge they were presumed to possess, being not only nearer to the scene of action, but having communication with the troops there.

The points, therefore, which I desire to call the attention of the committee to are:

1st. The position I selected was a proper one, had my orders been carried out to promptly transmit to me everything that occurred.

2d. That the testimony of others proves that it was a proper position, because those in other parts of the field, whose duty it was to transmit information to me, did not do so, and the inference therefore is that they could not, or did not, see or hear anything that would have influenced my action.

3d. I have the testimony of the lieutenant general commanding, and Major General Ord, Brigadier General Hunter, Major Duane, and others who were at

various points in the front, that nothing positive could be seen or known of the actual state of affairs.

4th. I maintain it would have been wrong in me to have left my post without the strongest reason for so doing, and in confirmation of this I refer the committee to the fact on record, that between 5 and 10 o'clock I received and transmitted over one hundred despatches and orders, averaging one every three minutes, and that had I been absent it would have been impossible to have given the orders I did. If the committee will study what I did do on that day, they will see the impossibility of my having attended to all these points, and be at the same time riding round to see if my subordinates were doing their duty.

I feel satisfied that, on a deliberate review of what did occur, the committee will agree with me, that though possibly it might have been of advantage for me to have gone to the immediate front, it could only have been so in consequence of the failure of others to do what they should have done, and that under the circumstances, and with the knowledge I had, my course was the proper one.

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*Testimony of Brevet Major General O. B. Wilcox.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
Before Petersburg, Va., December 20, 1864.

Brevet Major General O. B. WILCOX sworn and examined.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. I am a brevet major general of volunteers. At the time of the operations you are investigating I commanded the third division; and I now command the first division of the 9th corps.

Question. Will you state such facts as you may deem important, in relation to the operations of July 30, 1864?

Answer. The attack of the 30th of July was intended and expected to be a surprise. It was thought that the mine could be exploded before or at daylight; that it could be exploded at any minute desired. It was ordered to be exploded at half past three, and every preparation was made for a speedy assault. The mine failed to explode at the time fixed, in consequence of a defect in the fuze. It did not explode until a quarter to five o'clock, or some time after daybreak. This probably gave the enemy some warning of a movement, because they must have noticed an unusual number of troops massed in rear of the works near the mine, so that, in point of time, it was not wholly a surprise. The explosion was expected to throw up masses of earth and stones at such a distance that our own troops were a little apprehensive of the effects of the explosion. The mine was less than 140 yards from our works, behind which the assaulting column was massed. In consequence of the explosion, there was a little hesitation on the part of the leading troops—those of General Ledlie's division. But in a few minutes those troops went forward and filled the gap caused by the explosion of the mine. There was a mistake on the part of one of the brigades of the first division, in going into the mine instead of striking the works to the right of the mine. Thus, at the beginning of the movement, the whole of the first division found themselves in the very narrow gap, which was very much deepened by the explosion, so that it was some twenty-five feet in depth. In the mean time the enemy had begun to recover from their surprise, and a fire was brought to bear from nearly every direction upon the troops at the crater, so that it was very difficult to form the troops outside of the crater. I think the first mistake made was in not moving the troops to the right and left of the crater, instead of through the crater; whose mistake that was I do not know. The intention was that the first division should move first, and pass over the works and proceed to Cemetery hill; the next division, mine, was to cross the works as soon as the

first division should leave them, and then move up to the left of Cemetery hill, so as to protect the left flank of the first division; and the next division, following mine, was to move in the same way to the right of Cemetery hill, so as to protect the right flank of the first division. The ninth corps being out of the way, it was intended that two other corps should pass through and be ready to follow up the result; but in consequence of this narrow gap being filled up with troops, all huddled together in the crater itself, and unable to move under the concentrated fire of the enemy, no other troops could be got in. When I came down to support the first division, I found that division, and three regiments of my division, together with the regiments of the second division which had gone in on my right, so completely filling up the crater that no more troops could be got in there. I therefore ordered an attack, with the rest of my division, on the works of the enemy, to the left of the crater. This attack was made, and was successful, and the works to the left of the crater, for some 150 yards of the intrenchments, were held for some time by my troops. I do not think that the tactical arrangements for the troops for that movement were such as I would have ordered. But it is always easier to judge of those things afterwards than before. I think that, in the first place, there should have been a storming party of picked troops, every man of whom should have known his business, and should have known that he was to go through the works of the enemy, and gain the top of Cemetery hill, without regard to rank or formation; and those should have been followed by troops in order, and ready to fight a battle. I think that the next division should have moved down the enemy's line to the left, and captured their men and guns, and the next division should have moved down on the other flank, inside the enemy's intrenchments. This, I think, would have opened the way for the whole army; but the order was for everything to move right on towards Cemetery hill, and the passage-way was so narrow that it proved to be impossible to do so.

By Mr. Julian :

Question. Whose order was that?

Answer. The general order of General Meade was that Cemetery hill should be crowned. The particulars of that order came from General Burnside; that is, the movements of the divisions. At the same time, I think that other points of attack should have been selected, and other demonstrations or series of attacks made.

By Mr. Loan :

Question. Will you name those other points?

Answer. Along the line to the right and left of the crater, in front of the 5th and 18th corps.

Question. Where was the 18th corps?

Answer. The line of the 18th corps was to the right of the 9th, and the troops, except a portion for the trenches, came up and formed to the right and rear of the 9th.

Question. Where was General Hancock's corps?

Answer. His corps was in rear of the centre, in reserve. The 18th corps was on our right, and the 5th corps on our left, in reserve, such of it as was brought out of the trenches, and the 2d corps, Hancock's, was in reserve, in rear of all. I would say here that operations by mining at a particular point have very seldom yielded any general results, so far as the history of war teaches.

Question. What we desire to learn is, if there were any errors committed, and if so, to ascertain those errors, and the cause of the failure.

Answer. Certainly.



By Mr. Chandler:

Question. Do you know what General Burnside's original plan of assault was?

Answer. Yes, sir; General Burnside originally intended to make his colored division the storming party. The colored troops were the freshest troops in the corps, the other troops having been under fire in the trenches some fifty days. The colored troops had been drilled with a view to this movement on Cemetery hill, and it was intended that they should lead the advance, and crown Cemetery hill. That movement was countermanded by higher authority.

Question. Do you know whether it was contemplated in the original plan of General Burnside that there should be a movement to the right and left of the assaulting column?

Answer. To a considerable extent it was.

Question. And the troops were drilled with a view to that movement?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Can you state at what time you received your orders as to the part you were to take in the assault of the 30th?

Answer. About dusk of the afternoon before.

Question. Up to that time your part had not been assigned to you?

Answer. Not fully; I would say that the general plan of the movement was known to me about noon of the 29th.

Question. And the change in the troops to lead the assault?

Answer. That was known by me about noon of the day before, (29th.) My orders I received about dusk.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. How long was it after our troops first entered the crater before the enemy opened fire upon them from the right and left?

Answer. I do not think it was over ten minutes; it may have been fifteen minutes from the time we struck the crater.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. How long was it, after the explosion of the mine, before the commencement of the assault?

Answer. I should judge that the troops commenced to move to the assault about five minutes after the explosion. The troops were sheltering themselves from the effects of the explosion, they were so close to the mine, so that it took five minutes, perhaps ten minutes, to form them in order to move forward. It was about fifteen minutes before the troops got to the crater after the explosion, and they had to pass over about 140 yards besides what they were staggered back by the explosion.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. Do you know from what points the troops of the enemy were drawn that opened this fire upon our troops on the right and left of the crater?

Answer. The first fire was opened from troops in the enemy's trenches, on the right and left. The fire which we next encountered was from the enemy's field artillery, which took position in the rear of the crater, and which fired into and over the crater, and even over our own works. The third movement of the enemy was made, as I supposed by re-enforcements which the enemy brought up. But in the mean time, as I judged, the enemy drew troops from their intrenchments in front of the 5th corps, and moved them around and attacked our troops in the crater.

Question. Do you know any reason why the 5th corps could not have attacked the enemy's troops in front of them, and held them in check during this assault by the 9th corps?

Answer. I thought the 5th corps was to make such an attack. But when I found there was no room for my division to go in where the other troops had gone, I supposed that an attack was to be made on the right and left.

Question. Do you know any reason why it was not done?

Answer. I do not, other than the ordinary obstacles of the intrenchments. I know of no reason why the order was not given. My opinion is that the attack should have been made.

Question. Now, the same question in regard to the enemy's troops on the right?

Answer. A vigorous attack should have been made on both sides.

Question. Do you know of any reason why an attack was not made?

Answer. The troops of the 18th corps were massed on the right, and their lines were thinned out; but still, I think there should have been a vigorous attack made on the right of the crater.

Question. Were there troops there that could have held the enemy's troops on the right?

Answer. I think there were, viz: 18th corps men.

Question. Do you know of any reason why that should not have been done?

Answer. I know of no reason why the attack should not have been made. The success of the thing would depend entirely upon other matters.

Question. I understand you to say that there was a mistake in the movements of one of the brigades of the 1st division in entering the crater, instead of passing over the works to the right?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know how that mistake occurred, and who was responsible for it?

Answer. I cannot state from personal knowledge, only from information derived from General Ledlie.

Question. About what hour of the day were our troops withdrawn?

Answer. It was between one and two o'clock.

Question. Did your command ever get beyond the crater?

Answer. My command got outside of the crater to the left, but not towards Cemetery hill, because they would have had to pass to the front of the first division to do that.

Question. Your orders were to pass through and take a position to the left upon Cemetery hill, so as to protect the left flank of the first division?

Answer. Yes, sir; subsequently, when it was found that the first division had not been able to move forward, my orders—the general order to all the 9th corps division commanders—were to press forward. But, in consequence of the way being blocked up by the advance, it was impossible to get the troops through, and that order was not carried out.

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*Testimony of Major General G. K. Warren.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
Before Petersburg, Va., December 20, 1864.

Major General G. K. WARREN sworn and examined.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. Major general of volunteers, commanding the fifth army corps.

Question. Please state concisely whatever you may deem important in regard

to the springing of the mine and the assault upon the enemy's lines on the 30th of July last.

Answer. On that particular occasion I had very little to do. A mine was begun in front of General Burnside's lines, and when completed arrangements were made to explode it, and follow up the explosion with an assault. My duty was to support General Burnside's assault with two of my divisions, and hold the line that I occupied with my other division.

After the mine was sprung, and General Burnside's troops gained possession of the crater and the enemy's lines contiguous, they were nearly expelled from it by the enemy, without my troops being called into support, and the attack was abandoned.

I do not consider that I was in position to say, authoritatively, what was the exact fault, or who was to blame; whether the fault was in the conception of the plan or in its execution.

Question. Your command was on the left of the 9th army corps?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. In front of the enemy's works?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Had you any orders to attack the enemy on your front at the time General Burnside made his assault?

Answer. No, sir, no more than that the batteries in my front and what infantry was there should keep down the fire of the enemy in my front, which was effectually done. The enemy did not use his guns in our front to any extent.

Question. Did the enemy in your front join in the attack upon the troops of the 9th corps while in the crater?

Answer. I think not; I think they took no part in that attack.

Question. Have you any knowledge of what troops of the enemy on the left of the ninth corps were used to oppose our troops in the crater?

Answer. I have no knowledge; but I have understood that they came from west of the lead works to the left of my corps. It was a part of the general order that our cavalry should go around and attack the enemy in that position, but they did not get there.

Question. That is a matter of which you had no especial charge?

Answer. No, sir. My place in the programme was rather insignificant, so far as any knowledge of the affair was concerned.

Question. How were you to support the assault of General Burnside?

Answer. To follow his column.

Question. Was any place assigned to you particularly?

Answer. I was to have followed on as soon as I could. My troops were closed up on General Burnside's left, and as soon as his troops had got out of the way I was to follow on. The kind of support I should have rendered would have depended upon circumstances, and what General Burnside called upon me to do; for his being in command at the time, and directing the attack, we were to receive instructions from him as to where he wanted support, and how and when.

Question. Did you receive any instructions to obey General Burnside's orders as to the time when you were to assist him, and how?

Answer. I did not get any instructions to obey his orders specially; I would have done that by virtue of his rank on the ground, without any special instructions.

Question. I understand your statement to be that no part of the troops of the enemy in your immediate front were used in assaulting our troops in the crater, but that you held them in that part of their lines.

Answer. I think none were.

Question. Had you means of ascertaining certainly in regard to that matter?

Answer. As much as anybody in our army had, unless the enemy could have moved right from under my eyes without my seeing them. We did not any of us know how much covered way they had. But I am quite well satisfied that they did not take part in the attack.

Question. Do you know how long it was after our troops entered the crater before the enemy opened fire on them from the left, or opposite your front? I understand that from the time of the explosion of the mine everything was quiet for a time, and that our troops crossed over from our lines to the crater without any guns being fired upon them at all, and that the troops of the enemy did not rally immediately after our troops entered the crater.

Answer. Judging from what I saw, I think the enemy opened fire on the left of General Burnside's line immediately after the troops started. I think that one or two guns there were fired upon the crater, and I do not know but they opened fire from the right; I do not know about that.

Question. Was there any fire opened from Cemetery hill?

Answer. There was a thirty-pounder battery there, or one or two 4½-inch guns upon the ridge, that fired all around; they kept firing almost all day—at least I judge so from the shot lying around afterwards. It had not much influence on the affair, however.

Question. Was there any attack upon our troops from the left that amounted to anything, that you knew of?

Answer. No, sir; none at all from the left.

Question. Do you know where the enemy's troops came from that attacked our troops in the crater?

Answer. I should think they came nearly in a direct line from this church, [indicating on the map,] obliquely from General Burnside's right.

Question. At what time did you receive your orders to co-operate in this assault?

Answer. In the afternoon of the preceding day.

Question. Were there any reasons why you should not have attacked the enemy directly in your front? I have heard it suggested that the enemy might have been attacked on the right and left of General Burnside's column.

Answer. It was not a part of the programme.

Question. What I mean is, do you know any reason why it should not have been a part of the programme?

Answer. I should say myself that I had no better chance to attack there after the mine was sprung than I had the day before. I might just as well have attacked at any other time, and a great deal better a month before, because the enemy had not then so many abatis, or batteries, &c. I fought a battle there on the 18th of July with all my corps, and with as much vigor as I could, when the enemy had had but one day's preparation, and did not succeed. Then they had had forty-two days' preparation. There was no more reason why I should have attacked the lines on my front on that day than on any day of the preceding forty-two. I had, with more men, failed in my attack before.

Question. And that was a reason why you should not have attacked on the 30th?

Answer. Yes, sir; if I had been asked beforehand I should have said that I would not advise it. But if I had been ordered to do it I should have done it. We have had to do a great deal of attacking in this campaign which did not seem exactly right to those in front; but it had a bearing upon other parts of the field which we could not understand. One of the most difficult things in a campaign is to subordinate your own particular ideas to the general plan. We have learned that now.

Question. You know of no other reason than what you have assigned?

Answer. No, sir; no other.

Question. What did your corps do on that day?

Answer. I do not know that I could say we did anything more than I have already stated, except to retire to the camp.

By Mr. Chandler :

Question. Will you state what, in your opinion, should have been the manner in which that assault should have been made ?

Answer. In my opinion there should have been two independent columns, perhaps as large as a division each, to have rushed in immediately after the explosion of the mine, and have swept down the enemy's lines right and left, clearing away all their artillery and infantry by attacking in the flank and rear. This would then have allowed the main column to follow on to the main crest rapidly and without molestation. I believe that insufficient preparation was made in not making wider covered ways, and in not more thoroughly levelling our own parapets and removing our own abatis. The consequence was, that the troops seemed to move very slowly, and went forward very stragglingly, like a skirmish line. Those that reached the crater apparently huddled into it, and made no attempt, that I know of, to take the enemy's lines to the right and left. The object of mining the enemy's lines at any one point was evidently to give the opportunity to take the rest of the enemy's lines in flank and reverse, and then the troops in front of those lines could move forward. Unless this part was properly carried out at the breach, all the rest of the forces would necessarily have to remain quiescent.

Question. If that had been done, what do you think would have been the result of the attack ?

Answer. I think we would undoubtedly have gained the whole of the enemy's outer lines, and probably Petersburg.

By Mr. Loan :

Question. Could they have taken the line of Cemetery hill ?

Answer. The main column should not have been bothered with the flank movement, but should have gone right on for the hill as soon as the road was clear; and it would not have been molested if the other had opened out for it. A similar programme to that was sketched in the order issued by General Hunt to the artillery, though I believe it was not in the general instructions. It was, probably, such an obvious matter that it was not thought worth while to specify it.

Question. In regard to the levelling of the parapets [and removing the abatis, preparatory to the assault, could that have been done with ordinary prudence, or would it have cost an unusual loss of life ?

Answer. It should have been done at any hazard. If that could not be done the whole thing would be a failure.

Question. Did not the success of a movement of this kind depend upon its being a surprise, and the celerity with which the necessary operations were carried out ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. The lines of the two armies being so near each other, as they were, would not any attempt to remove the abatis and lower the parapets to any considerable extent have attracted the attention of the enemy, and put him on his guard ?

Answer. The whole thing, except making the covered ways, could have been done in half an hour, and that time would not have benefited the enemy much. In fact, the more men he had got into the mine, the more would have been blown up.

Question. What delay actually occurred after the explosion of the mine in the movement of the assaulting column, in consequence of the insufficient preparations ?

Answer. What I meant was that the whole thing seemed to move slowly, and the men to straggle along up.

Question. Did you understand the delay to be occasioned by the failure to remove the abatis and to lower the parapets?

Answer. That was a part of it. I also said that the covered ways should have been very much wider; that was a very important part of it; that was inside of our own lines. The rear of General Burnside's troops had not got done moving to the front, when the head of the column was repulsed. There was no lack of troops, for there was no space for them to go up. If I had been there myself, I should have charged the enemy's lines right down to the right and left at once. If I could not have carried the two batteries each side of me I should not have tried to do anything else.

Question. Yet you would have felt yourself under obligations to have obeyed any special orders to you in regard to your action there?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Even if they had been at variance with your opinion as to what was judicious to have been done?

Answer. Yes, sir; but if I had been charged with conducting the assault, and those things I complain of had existed, I should consider myself personally blamable for it.

Question. If you had received positive orders to the contrary?

Answer. No, sir; but if I had been charged with assaulting that point, and I had not cleared away those obstacles, I should have considered myself at fault.

Question. Was there any failure in the movement on that account?

Answer. Yes, sir; enough, in my opinion, to have marred any plan.

Question. How long was it from the time of the explosion of the mine until the head of General Burnside's column was in the crater?

Answer. That I do not know. I have heard it variously estimated from a few minutes to an hour. It was in the gray of the morning, and in the smoke, and I saw nothing of it myself.

Question. What is your opinion based upon, when you say the troops were delayed?

Answer. As soon as I could see, I saw them going up in a straggling manner, and the rear of the column was not out of the trenches until the time I have mentioned. To express to you how it was, the bringing back of the wounded through the covered ways almost stopped the column going to the front.

Question. That was inside of our lines?

Answer. Yes, sir; they should not have been allowed to bring any wounded men into our lines at that time. Check the advancing column under the fire of the enemy, and in my opinion it is nearly whipped then.

Question. It is liable to be repulsed?

Answer. Yes, sir.

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*Testimony of Brevet Major General Robert B. Potter.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Before Petersburg, Va., December 20, 1864.*

Brevet Major General ROBERT B. POTTER sworn and examined.

By Mr. Chandler :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. I am a brigadier general and a brevet major general of volunteers, commanding the 2d division of the 9th army corps.

Question. Will you state to the committee, as concisely as possible, what you know in relation to the springing of the mine and assault upon the enemy's works on the 30th of July last?

Answer. About the 24th of June, I should think, the idea of mining under the enemy's works in my immediate front was suggested to me; in fact, I had thought of it before, and several others had thought of the same thing. Lieutenant Colonel Pleasants, commanding the 48th Pennsylvania volunteers, came to my quarters and suggested to me that he was familiar with mining, and that many of the men in his regiment were miners, and that they thought they could undermine one of the enemy's works in my immediate front. After some conversation with him, I wrote a communication to General Burnside, who was then my corps commander, suggesting this plan of mining the enemy's works, giving some of the details. The general subsequently sent for me to come to his headquarters and bring Colonel Pleasants with me, which I did, and we had an interview with him. Subsequently he notified us that he had submitted the plan to the general commanding the army of the Potomac, who had approved of the same, and that we were authorized to undertake the work. We then went to work and pushed the mine along as well as we could until, about the 17th of July, we were near the completion of the mine. We were then under the enemy's works, and were directed to hold up. We did nothing for several days, except to secure the work we had already performed. Afterwards we were ordered to go on and finish the work and put in the charge, which was completed about the 26th or 27th of July. On the 29th of July General Burnside sent me an order to report at his headquarters. Arriving there I found General Wilcox, who then commanded the 3d division of the 9th corps. We had some conversation about the explosion of the mine and the proposed attack; then General Ledlie, who commanded the 1st division, was sent for. The general plan of the attack, as proposed by General Burnside, was explained to us. While this interview was going on, General Meade, accompanied by General Ord and some staff officers, arrived there and had some conversation of a general nature. General Meade stated, to some extent, his ideas as to what ought to be done. They left, I think, to look at the position. It was understood that General Ord's troops were to come up to support the attack and to relieve a portion of our corps. Shortly afterwards, General Meade returned. At that time General Burnside, I presume, had made all the suggestions he wished in regard to the attack, and the only question was as to what troops should lead the attack. General Burnside suggested that, as we were all in the same position, the fairest way to decide the matter was by lot, which was accordingly done. By that decision General Ledlie was to lead the advance with his division, General Wilcox was to follow with his division, and I was to follow with my division after General Wilcox. The colored division of General Ferrero, who was not present at the time—General White was then temporarily in command of the division—was to come in last. The theory of the attack was, that after the explosion of the mine the leading division should advance immediately through the breach made in the enemy's works and attempt to seize the crest of the hill beyond, known as Cemetery hill; General Wilcox was then to follow through the breach and deploy on the left of the leading division and attempt to seize the line of the plank road; my division was to pass to the right of General Ledlie's division and form, so as to protect his right flank, on the line of a ravine which ran to the right, and which it was supposed it would be difficult to cross; then the division of General Ferrero, which was composed exclusively of colored troops, was to advance in case we secured a lodgement there, pass over the line of General Ledlie's division, and make an immediate assault on the town of Petersburg.

Some time in the course of the evening of the 29th of July, I think about nine o'clock, we received General Meade's written order, and an order from

General Burnside in conformity thereto. The general detail of those orders was in conformity with the plan that had been suggested.

During the afternoon previous I had sent for my brigade commanders and explained the plan of attack to them, and directed them where to mass their troops, so that they should be prepared. One of my brigades, which held the trenches immediately in front of the mine, and extending around to the Norfolk railroad, was to have been relieved by a division of General Ord's command, commanded by General Carr. Owing to the darkness of the night, or to some other cause, only two regiments of this division of General Carr had arrived by 12 o'clock at night. General Carr himself then came to my headquarters and told me that his division had got astray. I told him that as soon as it came up he should relieve me. He relieved a small portion of my line to the right. About two o'clock in the morning, finding that my division had not been relieved, I wrote to General Burnside, and suggested to him that, as my troops had not been relieved, it would, perhaps, not be safe to take all the troops out of the trenches; that I would relieve a portion of the brigade in the trenches, clear the trenches immediately in front of the mined work, leaving a strong picket line there, and mass that portion of the brigade relieved with the rest of the division.

About three o'clock in the morning, just as I was getting on my horse, General Carr came to me and said that he had found the rest of his troops, and that they would be up in half an hour. I told him I thought it would be too late then to change the programme. The time fixed for the explosion of the mine was, I think, half past three o'clock. I had my troops massed—those that were out of the trenches—on the right-hand side of the covered way that led from the rear of the line down to my line immediately in front of the mine.

The troops of General Wilcox were massed immediately on my left. General Ferrero's troops, I believe, were to General Wilcox's left and rear. General Ord's troops were massed mostly in a woods, some 500 or 600 yards in rear of where I had my troops massed. I had one regiment, which had been engaged in making the mine, which I had received orders not to put in the attack unless it was absolutely necessary. That regiment was in the rear, and I was using them as a provost guard. I had a small regiment as an engineer regiment, provided with levelling tools, &c.

The mine failed to explode at the time fixed. I waited for some time, and finally sent to inquire what was the matter. In the mean time I received a report from the officer in charge of the mine, Colonel Pleasants, that the fuze had gone out, and that an officer and a sergeant had volunteered to go in and light it again. At this time it had become daylight, but the enemy showed no indications of having discovered the dispositions we had made for the attack. I immediately reported the facts to my superior. I think it was about a quarter before five o'clock that the explosion took place. It was then broad daylight. Immediately all our batteries opened.

Finding that my column did not advance, as I had ordered, I sent to find out what was the difficulty. Before I got a report, however, Colonel Pleasants came back and told me that the first division had advanced across to the enemy's works, and had got into the crater of the mine and halted there, checking all the rest of the column. This report I sent to General Burnside. At the same time I sent an order to the commanding officer of my first brigade—the leading brigade—General Griffin, to advance to the right of the mine, if possible, and make an attack there on his own account; that it was important to press forward as quickly as possible before the enemy recovered.

About midnight of the night before, I had, on my own responsibility, given an order to General Griffin to deploy a line of skirmishers, who were to advance to the right of where we were expected to make an attack, and, if they found the enemy were stunned by the explosion, not to wait for the advance of the other troops, but he was to push ahead immediately with his brigade, and make



a lodgement to the right. I impressed upon him the importance of time, for the success of this movement depended mainly upon its being a surprise.

In consequence of that order, as soon as General Griffin found that the division of General Ledlie was in the mine, he advanced his skirmishers, and followed with his brigade. The smoke which arose from the explosion, and the immense cloud of dust which hung over the place, made it almost impossible to see anything, and to some extent some of the leading regiments of his troops and those of General Ledlie's division got mixed up.

The confusion was increased to some extent by the colonel of one of the leading regiments being killed immediately after they struck the crater of the mine, or the lines of the enemy's works.

Colonel White, who led the advance, and who was taken prisoner on that occasion, advanced promptly through the line of the enemy's works, and turned to the right as he was ordered. Meeting with some opposition, and finding that the division of General Ledlie was not advancing, he halted, and sent back for orders. I was still urging General Griffin to press forward as rapidly as possible.

As soon, I suppose, as my report could have reached General Burnside that the troops of General Ledlie had halted at the crater, he sent me a verbal order by an aide-de-camp to the effect that I was to advance, instead of going where I had intended, and attempt to carry the hill in front of the mine. This order I immediately communicated to my subordinate commanders, and gave such orders as were necessary to alter the disposition of the troops, and endeavored to push my column forward. But the difficulty which I had apprehended immediately occurred, viz: that as soon as we advanced into the opening in the enemy's lines we found it filled with men. The troops were thrown into confusion, and it was impossible to do anything with them.

By this time, which was probably a half or three-quarters of an hour after the explosion of the mine, the enemy had recovered from the apparent panic into which they had been thrown, and had opened their batteries and concentrated their fire upon this point. There was a very severe fire. The worst fire I saw came from the right. There was a battery there behind some timber which it was very difficult for our batteries to reach. I ordered my own batteries to turn their whole attention to that one, but it apparently produced no effect at all.

The affair went on in this way for some time. We were endeavoring to press ahead. I got three or four of my regiments across and beyond this line of the enemy's works, and was getting them into pretty good shape. I was convinced that something must be done to create a diversion and distract the enemy's attention from this point. I accordingly gave orders to Colonel Bliss, who commanded my second brigade, to send two of his regiments to support General Griffin, and to take the remainder of his brigade and make an attack on the right. Subsequently it was arranged that the two regiments going to the support of General Griffin should pass into the crater, turn to the right, and sweep down the right of the enemy's works. This order was carried out. Colonel Bliss was partially successful, and we got possession of the line of the enemy's works to the right of the crater for the space of 200 or 300 yards, and one of my regiments got up within twenty or thirty yards of this battery which I was anxious to silence.

At this time I wrote a despatch to General Burnside, in which I stated that it was my opinion from what I had seen, and from the reports which I had received from my subordinate officers, that too many men were being forced in at this one point; that the troops there being in confusion, it was absolutely necessary that an attack should be made from some other point of the line, in order to divert the enemy's attention, and give us time to straighten out our line a little. To that despatch I never received any answer.

I kept receiving these orders to push our men forward as fast as I could.

That in substance was about all the orders I received that day, up to the time of the withdrawal.

Some little time after this I received a copy of an order, which seemed to be a general order to division commanders, to the effect that we should attack at once with all our force, or press ahead with all our force at once, or something of that kind. I was at that time doing all I could to press my division forward, and consequently gave very little attention to this order, as I felt satisfied I was already doing my own duty in regard to it. It did not occur to me to reflect what effect that order would have upon the other divisions; but soon after this, as I was going back to report to General Burnside, I heard cheering, and turned around and saw the division of colored troops coming up to make an attack. They were advancing some distance to my left, moving obliquely to the right, and running parallel to the enemy's lines, who were firing on them. They then attempted to advance forward through the crater of the mine, and then to the right, where most of my men were; some of those troops halted when they found the other troops lying down; some of them advanced up to the ground where my men were, and formed in among them.

This added somewhat to the confusion. The colored troops made a very spirited attack, and behaved remarkably well while coming up. But the place they came into was a place where we could hardly hope for any success, because the troops were so much broken up. They got up, gained some little ground, and then some time elapsed in trying to straighten out the men who had got confused.

I went on immediately to try and find General Burnside, and ask him not to send any more men there. When I did find him General Ord was at the same place. Just as I commenced to speak to him some confusion arose, and I immediately turned back and found that this division of colored troops had given way and was coming back. I went then to look after my own division. No effort that I am aware of was made after that for the renewal of the attack at that point, more than the general order to press our troops forward.

I was in conversation with General Burnside, to whom I had again returned, for I wanted to withdraw one of my brigades, the one under Colonel Bliss, and make an attack still further to the right. I thought that by attacking on the other side of the ravine, I could burst through the line and get in rear of the battery which was annoying me, and relieve my troops in that way. General Burnside told me that he had received an order to prepare for the withdrawal of his troops, and that I should not take any steps until he had seen General Meade.

We did nothing more then except to hold our position until I received an order from General Burnside to report at his headquarters. General Ord's command was withdrawing at this time. I went there and had some conversation with him as to our position, &c., as to the practical difficulties in withdrawing our troops, and also the advantage of holding the position we had already gained.

We were then ordered to make arrangements for withdrawing our troops. Before I got back to my division—in fact, I think before I left General Burnside's headquarters—the enemy made an attack on us and forced our troops out of the position we had gained, and we then resumed our old position.

Question. Do you know the cause of the delay in the explosion of the mine?

Answer. Yes, sir; the fuzes went out where they were spliced.

Question. Do you know the cause of that?

Answer. I do not; I think there were three of the Gomez fuze; I subsequently inquired, but could not find out definitely what was the difficulty. The fuze, where it went out, did not seem to be wet, or anything like that, but had probably absorbed some of the dampness of the air. The charging of the mine, &c., was not strictly in accordance with the rules of engineering. The

charge was larger than that laid down in the books, and the arrangement, in some respects, was different. My recollection is, that from where the charge was tamped there was about forty feet length of fuze. The mine was about one hundred and thirty yards long. Of course it required some time before a man would make up his mind that the explosion would fail, and before he would go in the mine to examine, and it took some little time to readjust it.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. You say you think there were three fuzes; have you any personal knowledge of the number of fuzes?

Answer. No, sir, I have not.

Question. At the commencement of your testimony you say it was determined by lot which division of General Burnside's corps should lead the advance; do you know any reason why the colored division should not have led that advance?

Answer. General Burnside was very anxious to have the colored division lead the advance on that occasion. We had been discussing this thing a long time. The reason why that division was not allowed to lead the advance was this: The morning that General Meade came with General Ord to General Burnside's headquarters we were discussing the plan of this attack under the theory that the colored division was going to take the lead. General Meade said, "I saw General Grant, and he agrees with me that it will not do to put the colored division in the lead." The reason why they were not put in was because General Meade would not permit it.

Question. Were those colored troops defective in any respect?

Answer. Not at all, that I know of, except that they had never been tried in action.

Question. Do you know whether they had been drilled with a view to making this assault?

Answer. Yes, sir, I had seen them drilling, and had discussed the matter with General Ferrero, and had seen the plan for the assault.

Question. I will ask you, as a military man, whether those colored troops were competent to make that assault at that time?

Answer. In my opinion they were the most fit troops in the corps, at that time, to make that assault.

Question. What kind of service had the white troops been rendering? Was it, or not, of an exhaustive nature, tending to reduce the morale and spirit of the troops in reference to making an assault at that time?

Answer. The white troops of the corps had been in the trenches from the 19th of June under the immediate fire of the enemy, which at that time was very severe. Our losses were very considerable indeed. The weather was very hot, and the labor of building works, &c., was very exhaustive. In fact, the troops were in very bad condition physically. The losses on the line around Petersburg at that time, from the heavy fire of the enemy, were principally confined, I think, to the ninth and eighteenth corps. Before taking up this position they had been very heavily engaged on the 17th and 18th of June, and had lost very heavily.

Question. What was the spirit of the troops, owing to this exhaustive labor—higher or lower than was usual with that command?

Answer. I think it was lower than usual with them.

Question. What had the colored troops been doing?

Answer. They had been in the rear. I do not think they had been doing anything in particular. They had principally been drilling with a view to making this assault. They slashed considerable timber and built some works on the left.

Question. Was their morale high or low, comparatively speaking?

Answer. As far as I could judge it was very good.

Question. What troops of the enemy were they who fired upon our troops as they entered the crater? And how long was it from the time our troops entered the crater of the mine until the enemy opened fire upon them?

Answer. The musketry fire opened immediately; the enemy's artillery did not reply for some time; I think it was fifteen or twenty minutes before I noticed any artillery firing.

Question. What troops of the enemy opened fire?

Answer. The troops occupying that line of works.

Question. Do you know of any reason why our troops upon the right of General Burnside's line did not attack the troops of the enemy opposite to them?

Answer. I do not know any reason, except from hearsay.

Question. Do you know of any military reason why they should not have been ordered to do so?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Was there any military obstruction or obstacle that would have rendered it injudicious to have given such an order?

Answer. Not that I could see. The enemy's works were very strong; I cannot say anything more than that.

Question. That you may understand the object I have in view in making these inquiries, I will say that I understand the lines of the two armies, where the mine was, were opposed to each other and about a hundred yards apart, and it was the business of those confronting each other to hold their respective lines?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Now at the time that General Burnside made his assault, was it judicious for the commands on his right and left to have attacked the enemy's troops in their immediate front, and to have kept them engaged so as to prevent their firing upon General Burnside's advancing column?

Answer. In my opinion it was.

Question. Do you know of any military reason why such orders might not have been judiciously given?

Answer. I think it probable that our line to the right was rather weakly held.

Question. Who was in command on the right?

Answer. I think that General Mott's division of General Hancock's corps occupied the line to our right. The troops of General Ord which had been holding the line to our right had been massed to support this attack, and the position they had held had been taken by this division of General Mott, which I think had been drawn from the north side of the James for the purpose of relieving General Ord's troops. The explosion of the mine and the assault following it had been preceded by a diversion by General Hancock upon the north side of the James. General Hancock himself that day was on that part of our line, to the right.

Question. Were the troops under his command brought into action that day in any way?

Answer. Not that I am aware of.

Question. At what time did you receive orders to withdraw your command from that assault?

Answer. I think it must have been about mid-day.

Question. Do you, as a military man, think that any advantage could have been gained by continuing the contest longer on that day?

Answer. Not at that point.

Question. Would a longer continuance of the contest, with the troops capable of fighting, have been of any benefit in relieving those in the crater of the mine from the confusion into which they had been thrown?

Answer. A demonstration on our right and left I think would have relieved us.

Question. Was it possible to have made that demonstration with any troops that were available at that time?

Answer. I think so.

*Testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Loring.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Before Petersburg, Va., December 20, 1864.*

Lieutenant Colonel CHARLES G. LORING sworn and examined.

By Mr. Chandler :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?

Answer. Lieutenant colonel and assistant inspector general of the 9th army corps.

Question. Did you hold that position on the 30th of July last ?

Answer. I did.

Question. Will you state concisely the facts within your knowledge in relation to the assault made by the 9th corps on that day ?

Answer. I had made, with Colonel Van Buren, the position of the enemy a subject of special study; and therefore, on that occasion, I volunteered to go in with the first division that was to go in. The plan of the attack was changed from that first decided upon by General Burnside. His plan had been to have the colored division, under General Ferrero, lead the assault, and to have the attack made with a certain formation of the troops engaged. Both of those points were countermanded on the day previous to the actual assault. The reason for selecting the colored troops to lead in the assault, I suppose, was in some slight measure due to an opinion I had expressed, as follows: Some time previous to the intended assault I officially informed General Burnside that, in my opinion, the white troops of his corps were not in a fit condition to make the assault; that many of them had been for six weeks in close proximity to the enemy's lines, within one hundred and thirty yards; that all of them had been very near the enemy's fire; and that when troops are exposed, as they were, day and night for six weeks to an incessant fire, it is impossible that they should have the same spirit as fresh troops. In addition to that, before sitting down before the enemy's lines, they had been very much worn by the long and arduous campaign, in which, as I considered, the 9th corps had performed more arduous services than the other corps. But even if they had been fresh when they had arrived before Petersburg, the experience of those six weeks—during which they had been under fire day and night without cessation, so that it was impossible to get to the rear even to attend to the calls of nature without being exposed to being killed on the spot; during which period their losses had averaged over thirty (30) per day, amounting in the whole to one man in eight—was enough at least to weaken the zeal of the men. For this reason, principally, General Burnside selected to lead the assault the colored division, which up to that time had never been under any serious fire. Parts of it had been engaged in one or two little skirmishes, but the division had never been under any serious fire. That division was, therefore, selected upon the principle that fresh troops are much better to make an assault than old but worn-out troops. This plan was changed at noon of the day previous to the assault, and the first division of white troops, under General Ledlie, was selected to lead the attack the next morning.

At about half past two o'clock of the morning of the 30th I went with General Ledlie down to the front line, and we took our position very near the line, close in rear of it, with his division, waiting for the mine to explode. There was a delay of perhaps three-quarters of an hour in the explosion of the mine. But I do not think the enemy discovered at all that we had made any unusual preparations. As soon as the explosion took place the division started to go in. But it was not with the formation that General Burnside had desired, nor with exactly the same object. General Burnside's plan had been

to throw in a column, the two leading regiments of which were to wheel, the one to the right and the other to the left, and sweep down the enemy's lines on either side, while the main body were to press on to the top of the hill beyond the crater of the mine. This formation, as I understand, was altered by orders from headquarters. The first brigade that went in started from our lines in three lines, with instructions to the brigade commander, as also to the commander of the second brigade, to push on at once for the top of Cemetery hill. I crossed over myself while the brigade which started second (being the first brigade) was passing out of our lines, and went into the crater of the mine, where I found the brigade that first started (being the second brigade) crowded together. The crater presented an obstacle of fearful magnitude. I suppose it was a hole of about 200 feet in length, by perhaps 50 or 60 feet in width, and nearly 30 feet in depth. The sides of it were composed of jagged masses of clay projecting from loose sand. The upper surface had been of sand, with a lower stratum of clay. It was an obstacle which it was perfectly impossible for any military organization to pass over intact, even if not exposed to fire. The whole brigade was broken up in confusion, and had utterly lost its organization. The officers were endeavoring to reform their men, but it was an exceedingly difficult operation. I remained there for about ten minutes. By that time the rest of the division had come up, and the whole of the first division was in the crater or lines immediately adjoining. It was all in the same confused condition. I went back to report to General Ledlie the condition his division was in, and to see if he could not rectify it. I then went up and told General Burnside of the state of affairs. From that time forward my position was mostly near General Ledlie in our old front line. As to what occurred with General Potter's division I cannot say, as that was some distance from where we were placed. Nor did I have any particular connexion with any other transactions until the ordering in of the colored division, which I think took place about half past seven o'clock. I cannot be precise as to the time, for I have not my notes with me. The troops in the crater of the mine had remained in confusion. They had spread themselves for a short distance both on the right and left of the crater, though it was exceedingly difficult for them to do so. The lines of the enemy were found to be of the most intricate nature. There was one uniform front line; then in the rear there were various lines, traverses between them, and bomb-proofs. It was more like a honey-comb than anything that can be seen on our lines; so that it was exceedingly difficult for troops to spread themselves either way, either to the right or to the left. It had to be done, not by any movement of a mass of troops, but by hand-to-hand fighting. All that I know of what took place beyond those lines I know from hearsay only, as the lines were so high as to cut off the view. I know from reports brought to me by others that our troops made several attempts to get up the hill, but I did not see that myself.

Nothing especial occurred, so far as I saw, until about half past seven o'clock, when the colored division was ordered in. At that time I was standing in our front line. General Ferrero, who commanded the colored division, was standing near me when the order was brought to him, by one of General Burnside's staff, to lead his division also into the crater, and to push for the top of the hill. The order struck me as being so unfortunate that I took the liberty to countermand it on the spot. General Ferrero hesitated, as he said here was a positive order from General Burnside. I told him that I was the senior staff-officer present, and that, in General Burnside's name, I would countermand the order until I could go up and inform General Burnside of the state of affairs.

I went up and represented to General Burnside that this colored division could not be expected to pass the lines of the old troops; that it was impossible to expect green troops to succeed where old troops had failed before them; and furthermore that, instead of accomplishing any good result, they would only throw into confusion the white troops that were already in that line and holding

it. General Burnside did not reply to me, as he usually does to his staff officers, by stating his reasons for disagreeing with them, but simply repeated his previous order.

That evening, after the affair was all over, General Burnside showed me a written order from General Meade, directing him to throw in all his troops and push for the top of Cemetery hill; and he added that under those instructions he felt that he could not have done otherwise than he did.

The colored division went in very gallantly indeed. The fire of the enemy, at that time, was exceedingly heavy, especially from some batteries in a ravine on the right, and also from some batteries on our left. There was consequently a cross-fire directed upon the ground over which the colored division had to pass. Besides that, they were exposed to a cross-fire of infantry.

They went in very gallantly. I think it was about half an hour after that that they came running back in confusion. I understood that not only were they driven back in confusion, but it entailed also a heavy loss upon the white troops then in the enemy's line of works, and who came out with the colored troops.

I remained at the front until towards noon, when General Burnside ordered all his division commanders to report at his headquarters, he having received a peremptory order to cease aggressive operations and withdraw his troops. He directed me to carry the order down to the front line, and to send it in to the troops that were in the crater. I think the officer who carried the order to the brigade commanders of General Potter's division was the only officer who succeeded in getting in. The order was sent in, and indorsements were put upon it by the various brigade commanders then in the crater. One only advised waiting until night; the others advised immediate evacuation when they found that it was intended by the general commanding that the line should be evacuated, and not permanently held.

After General Burnside had received the order that offensive movements should cease, and while his men were yet struggling in the crater, the troops of General Ord, stationed in rear of the mine as a support to the 9th corps, were the greater part withdrawn, and in such way as to disclose the movement to the enemy.

Soon after this order came in the enemy prepared another charge, and the brigade commanders decided to evacuate at once, which was done, leaving, I believe, many in the crater, who were taken prisoners.

By Mr. Loan :

Question. What troops went into the crater of the mine besides those of General Ledlie's division?

Answer. General Ledlie's division was to go in first; the whole of that division went into the crater, or lines immediately adjoining. General Potter's division was to go in next, but to go in on the right of the other. I did not see them, and I do not know how many of them went into the crater. I simply saw the head of the column going in. I understood that they all went into the enemy's lines, but I cannot say positively about that. General Wilcox's division also went in, at the same place where General Ledlie's division went in. I think four of his regiments—I am not sure of the number—failed to get in. In starting from our line, they bore off too much to the left and came back to our own line, and did not go in. I think that, with that exception, the whole of General Wilcox's division went into the enemy's lines. The regiments of his division went in at different times, not as a division, but disjointedly. And at half past seven, about two hours and a half after the mine exploded, the whole of the colored division went in at the same point.

Question. How many of those troops gained the high ground beyond the crater, within the enemy's lines—the ground outside of the crater?

Answer. I cannot say how many. They made a great many attempts to charge up the hill, but how far they reached I cannot say, because I was not with them. I was not in the crater at the time they made any of their charges; only those on the spot could answer that question.

Question. Are you able to state how many of our troops were in the crater at the time the order to retreat was given?

Answer. I am not.

Question. Can you tell what the men were doing in the crater from the time General Ledlie's division entered it until the order to withdraw was given?

Answer. They immediately prepared the ground in front to protect themselves, and those who had arms and ammunition prepared to defend themselves.

Question. That would only be one line at the lips of the crater?

Answer. Yes, sir; and they also held a long stretch of the enemy's lines, to the right and left of the crater.

Question. What troops?

Answer. General Potter's troops held the line on the right, and General Wilcox's troops that on the left.

Question. Were those lines held by troops that had originally gone into the crater of the mine?

Answer. No, sir; almost all of the first division were collected together in the crater; some few of them were on the right; the most of General Potter's command were on the right; almost all of General Wilcox's command were on the left; some few of them were also in the crater. Two guns of the enemy were dug out of the ruins and turned against the enemy. At one time we held at least 400 or 500 yards of the enemy's lines, the crater in about the centre.

Question. Do you know where the troops of the enemy opposed to our troops in the crater were brought from?

Answer. When the column first went into the crater there was very little opposition. But the enemy's infantry remained within their lines within 200 feet of the crater; I myself saw them within 200 feet of the crater. They remained there when we went in, until gradually driven out, man by man, and our line spread in that way. After we had been there some time the enemy brought some troops to the top of the hill. There were two slight earthworks there in which they had mounted field-pieces, which fired shrapnell and canister all the morning. They came to the top of the hill, and then down a covered way which was on the right, which covered way they used as a breastwork. It connected with their lines, and from that they fired the whole time.

Question. Was there any eminence which commanded the crater, or were our men in the crater protected?

Answer. The men in the crater could be protected from direct fire by standing down in the bottom of it, but those standing on the top of the crater were exposed to a steady fire of canister from the hill beyond, which was decidedly higher than the crater, and the enemy brought their mortars to bear upon the crater, so as to drop their shells right over it.

Question. If I understood you rightly, you stated that on the day before the assault the plan of attack, as well as the tactical arrangement of the troops, were changed?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. By what kind of an order, verbal or written; and by whom was the order given?

Answer. So far as I know it was only a verbal order. General Meade came to General Burnside's headquarters at about noon of the day previous to the assault, and there gave the order.

Question. Did you hear General Meade give the order?

Answer. I was not present.



Question. Then all you know about it is from information derived from others ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By Mr. Chandler :

Question. Do you know the cause of the delay in the explosion of the mine ?

Answer. While we were waiting there I wrote to Colonel Pleasants, asking the cause of the delay. He replied to me that the fuze had gone out at a place where it had been spliced together ; that he had sent some one in to rectify it—to rejoin it and relight it—and that it would go off at a certain time which he named, which time it did go off.

Question. Were there one or more fuzes ?

Answer. I think there were two laid, but I am not certain.

Question. You have no personal knowledge of that ?

Answer. No, sir. I wish to say a word in relation to the enemy's artillery fire. I understand an officer of high authority has said that the enemy's artillery fire was silenced during the latter part of that affair. I can only say that it is the opinion of one who could not have been in the front line that day. I was myself in our front line, except for the short time that I was in the crater, and the short time when I went to report to General Burnside on two or three occasions ; with those exceptions, I was in the front line the whole of that morning, and I know that the enemy kept up a very steady and heavy fire of artillery from both the left and right, raking the whole of the ground from our line to the crater of the mine ; and further, that from the hill in front of the crater they kept up a steady stream of shrapnell and canister, whenever any demonstration was made by our troops. I can testify to this very positively, as I was present on the spot.

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*Testimony of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel J. L. Van Buren.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Before Petersburg, Va., December 20, 1864.*

Brevet Lieutenant Colonel J. L. VAN BUREN sworn and examined.

By Mr. Chandler :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?

Answer. I am a major and additional aide-de-camp, and brevet lieutenant colonel.

Question. What was your position on the 30th of July last ?

Answer. Major, and aide-de-camp on the staff of Major General Burnside, then commanding the 9th corps.

Question. Will you state, as concisely as possible, what you know in regard to the action of that day ?

Answer. On the night before the assault I was detailed by General Burnside to be with General Potter, who commanded the second division of the 9th corps. There was a staff officer detailed to each division. I reported to General Potter about half past two o'clock on Saturday morning, the day of the assault, and went with him to the front line where the reserves were massed. On the way there we met an officer from Colonel Pleasants, who reported that the mine had been fired and would explode at 3.41 a. m. After waiting a certain time and hearing no explosion, General Potter sent down to inquire about it, and I went over and reported to General Burnside that General Potter had sent down. I then returned to General Potter. An officer from Colonel Pleasants reported that the fuze had gone out, but he had had it relighted, and the mine would explode in a certain number of minutes. I went back to General Burnside and reported

this to him, and to Captain Jay, of General Meade's staff, who had been sent by General Meade to ascertain the cause of the delay in the explosion; and while I was there, at 4.42 a. m., the mine exploded. I then returned to General Potter, and remained with him I should suppose for one hour, reporting to General Burnside by letter any information that came to me in regard to General Potter's troops. General Potter's division was the second in the order of attack in the assault that followed the explosion. About seven o'clock I told General Potter I thought I would go down myself and see what I could ascertain, and I went down to our front line. While I was there Captain Harris, of our staff, came and asked for General Ledlie, who commanded the division that led the assault; I told him I was just going over to the crater, and would take over any orders to him. Captain Harris had orders from General Burnside that General Ledlie must push forward his division at once. I went over to the crater, but did not find General Ledlie there; I saw his two brigade commanders, General Bartlett and Colonel Marshall, and communicated the orders to them; soon afterwards a staff officer came in from General Ledlie with the same orders. After some little delay Colonel Marshall said to me that he did not think he could advance from where he was; that the enemy were on his flank. I told him I would go down with him and look at his line. As you go out of the crater of the mine you come into a labyrinth of bomb-proofs and magazines with passages between. The enemy's rear line was about twenty-five yards in rear of their front line, and between them were these bomb-proofs, making a very bad place for troops to pass over. In that way for about three hundred yards our first division was crowded in some confusion; beyond this came the high rear line, and on the other side of that was the enemy's covered way, and in that the most of General Potter's division. I went down the line to the right, about three hundred yards, to where the line crooked, and just the other side of the line were the enemy, and quite sharp firing was going on. Colonel Marshall told me that he did not see how he could charge with those men on his flank; I told him that the orders were imperative, and the charge on the crest must be made. We formed a line of his brigade on the right, and General Bartlett's brigade on the left, so far as we could on the bad ground, and charged, but, meeting a very heavy fire, the line broke and fell back. I then assisted Colonel Marshall in reforming his men. While we were reforming Colonel Marshall's brigade along the enemy's line the head of the colored division came over the crest of the crater right down this line and knocked all to pieces the formation we had secured. Colonel Bates, in command of one of the colored regiments, was at the head of this colored column. Colonel Bates apparently did not know where he was going to strike for. I pointed out a white house on Cemetery hill as the objective point. It seemed to me that by detaching a force, and charging down the line at the same time that we charged in front, we should probably capture the enemy's men on the right who were annoying us. I started back towards the crater; when I got very near there I saw the movement of this colored column, jumping out from the enemy's line towards our line in the rear and striking off towards the right. They carried about two hundred yards of the enemy's lines, capturing a color and quite a number of prisoners. I went with them as far as they went, and then came back to the crater to see the officers there. Just as I got to the crater the second brigade of the colored division came across, going right through the crater and somewhat to the right, and right over the tops of the bomb-proofs and over the men of the first division. They came on in good style, under a sharp fire, but were much broken and disordered by the unfavorable ground and the crowded condition of the pits. All this time the fire of the enemy was very heavy. There were two guns in what was known as the fort on the left of the New Market road, and two guns just across a ravine to the right. They were throw-

ing canister and shrapnell in there in a very lively way. There was some mortar firing also.

I then saw Colonel Sigfried, who commanded the right brigade of the colored division, and Colonel Thomas, who commanded the left brigade. General Ferrero was not there. I gave them their instructions for the final charge of the whole division. I instructed Colonel Thomas to form his brigade as far to the front as he possibly could; Colonel Sigfried to form on his right, and then to charge directly for Cemetery hill. I instructed Colonel Marshall and General Bartlett to form their brigades, as much as the nature of the ground would permit, in the rear of the colored division and support the charge.

I suppose this must have been about a quarter to nine o'clock. Having made these arrangements I started back to report to General Burnside. But the difficulties in the way of getting back were so great, the firing being very heavy, and the covered way being crowded with the troops of the eighteenth corps, that it took me a very long time to get up. Before I got up there the colored division had made their charge and been repulsed.

Then occurred the trouble that had been anticipated. When they fell back into the enemy's lines, which were already crowded with the troops of the white divisions, and with their own stragglers, their formation was utterly broken up. They lost coherence, and a great part of the colored division came surging back in confusion.

I saw General Burnside and reported to him all that I had done. In the course of twenty minutes after that came an order from General Meade for the withdrawal of the troops, which finished operations for the day.

We stayed around there long enough to attend to anything that had to be done, and then we went back.

Question. What was the cause of the delay in the explosion of the mine?

Answer. A failure to burn at a place where the fuze was spliced. The fuze came out, and of course it had to be spliced, and at one of the places of junction it had failed to burn.

Question. In how many pieces did you receive the fuze?

Answer. I knew at the time, but I would not pretend to state now.

Question. Do you know whether there was more than one fuze laid to fire the charge in the mine?

Answer. The fuze was laid in a trough of powder; if the one did not go off the other would. I would not be certain about the number of fuzes.

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*Testimony of Major General H. J. Hunt.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
Before Petersburg, Va., December 20, 1864.

Major General H. J. HUNT sworn and examined.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. What is your position and rank in the army?

Answer. I am a major general, commanding the artillery of the army of the Potomac.

Question. Will you state what information you have in regard to the attack on the 30th of July last on the enemy's lines before Petersburg?

Answer. About the 3d of July I was ordered, in conjunction with Major Duane, of the engineers, to make an examination of the lines of the enemy facing east in front of Petersburg, and to ascertain whether an assault was practicable, especially in front of Generals Burnside and Warren. I made the examination with Major Duane, and reported, I think on the 6th of July, that

an open assault would be very dangerous, and that it would be better to have our approaches partake rather of the nature of regular approaches. This was ordered to be executed, and proper measures were taken by Major Duane and myself to carry them on so far as the means would permit. There were not sufficient troops to extend our left sufficiently to embrace the angle of the enemy's works, where their lines turn and run towards the west. The work was consequently slow. About the 28th of July, after the principal batteries had been erected, orders were issued for an attack on the position of the enemy in front of General Burnside's line, as a mine which he had constructed, and which it was meant to work into the operation, had been completed. It was necessary, in order that the assault should be successful at the point indicated, that the angle of the enemy's lines, of which I have spoken, should be in our possession, or that such preparation should be made as should suppress his fire at that point, his principal batteries being those, and from that position the whole ground in front of our line could be swept. From the want of troops to envelope that position it was impracticable to carry forward approaches against that angle so as to get it in our possession. I therefore limited myself to bringing such a weight of artillery to bear upon it as would keep down its fire and also to keep down the fire along the whole of the enemy's lines, upon which was placed the battery which had been undermined. The plan of General Burnside, who was to make the assault, as given to me by him, was to send forward a heavy column of troops so arranged that as soon as the explosion should take place, or the mine was sprung, they would pass over the mine and form to the right and left perpendicularly, and sweep down the enemy's lines. The troops with which he intended to assault Petersburg were to advance immediately after the others, assault the battery behind the mine on the crest held by the enemy, and pass on from there into Petersburg. My preparations were all made on the 28th of July, and examined and verified on the 29th. On the morning of the 30th the mine was sprung a little over an hour after the time appointed. The artillery opened as directed, and succeeded remarkably in keeping down the enemy's fire, as he was evidently surprised. There was one battery upon the crest behind the mine, which opened at intervals, but which was always silenced after firing not more than two or three rounds. The battery next to the one undermined, on the left, as we looked at it, was silenced, with the exception of one or two guns in a hollow, near the left flank of the battery next the mine. From this gun, or perhaps two guns, a fire was kept up at intervals on the position of the crater of the mine. That battery was one, as I understood it, that was to have been in our possession within ten or fifteen minutes after the explosion of the mine; that is, as soon as troops could pass from the crater and sweep to the left and get possession of it. The position of the guns which, if any, would have commanded that hollow, was immediately behind the mine, and between that position and the enemy's battery there was a fringe of woods which was to have been cut away by General Burnside's troops, but which had not been cut away down to the 29th, when I sent down to see if all the preparations had been made. General Burnside declined cutting away that wood, as so doing would alarm the enemy. I could not see very clearly what took place about the mine, as I had to look after my own guns, which covered a very large extent of ground. But after some delay, an hour and a half I suppose, I saw portions of the troops that had formed close to the enemy's lines. I did not see them advance beyond the enemy's line. About 8 or half past 8 o'clock, or rather in the course of the morning, for I will not be positive about the time, an order was given for the troops to charge.

Question. You spoke about a delay in the explosion of the mine. Do you know the cause of that delay?

Answer. I understood at the time that it was owing to the fuze which led to the mine having become broken.

Question. Do you know whether there was one or more fuzes laid to the charge in the mine ?

Answer. I do not know how many fuzes were placed in it. I furnished safety fuzes enough to make three or four lines. But I understood that it was determined, instead of using this safety fuze, to use a wooden pipe filled with powder. But I cannot speak positively as to that.

Question. Do you know the condition of the fuze that was furnished ; was it in good condition, and in a few or many pieces ?

Answer. I do not know in what pieces it was furnished. I know there were some hundred yards of it. I did not see it myself ; I ordered it from City Point to General Burnside, and that order was handed over to the ordnance officer. It was sent by the ordnance officer at City Point to the ordnance officer of General Burnside's corps, Captain Harris, I believe.

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*Testimony of Brevet Colonel James C. Duane.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Before Petersburg, Va., December 20, 1864.*

Brevet Colonel JAMES C. DUANE sworn and examined.

By Mr. Chandler :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?

Answer. I am a major of engineers, and brevet colonel, and acting chief engineer of the army of the Potomac.

Question. Will you state what you know about the attack upon the enemy's lines before Petersburg, on the 30th of July last ?

Answer. Orders were given to concentrate all our fire in order to silence the enemy's fire while General Burnside's operations were going on after the explosion of the mine. The position I had at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 30th was on General Warren's line ; I was assisting General Abbott in directing his fire. The 18th corps was massed in rear and a little to the right of the 9th corps. A portion of the 5th corps was massed along the line of the Norfolk railroad, in the cut, ready to support the attack of the 9th corps. As soon as the explosion took place all the guns on the line of the 5th corps opened fire and completely silenced the enemy's fire. I remained on the line of the 5th corps until nearly 8 o'clock, during which time we kept up a constant fire. I then proceeded to General Warren's headquarters. When I arrived there I found that the troops that had proceeded to the crater of the mine were falling back. With regard to the operations of the 9th corps I had very little to do. General Burnside took on himself the entire charge of the engineering operations there.

By Mr. Loan :

Question. What, in your opinion, was the cause of the failure of the attack ?

Answer. I think the difficulty was that proper measures had not been taken to clear away the obstructions both in front of our own line and the enemy's line ; and also in making the attack by the flank instead of in columns.

Question. What number of columns do you think the assaulting force should have been composed of ?

Answer. I think they should have gone up in three columns.

Question. In what relation to each other do you think those columns should have been ?

Answer. The leading or centre column should have gone to the crater of the mine and removed the obstructions, so as to have allowed a column on the right and one on the left to have followed immediately after.

Question. At what distance from each other?

Answer. The distance at that point could not have been greater probably than 150 yards on each side.

Question. Of what strength should those columns have been?

Answer. Each a division of a corps. I had supposed that the arrangement was that the whole of the 9th corps should have gone in, and the portion of the 5th corps that was massed for its support, and the whole of the 18th corps, to have gone in immediately after.

Question. Was there any other cause, in your judgment, that contributed to the disaster of that day?

Answer. I cannot state about that. I was not at the point where the mine was exploded. All I know about that is from hearsay.

Question. Did you receive any instructions to make an examination with General Hunt, chief of artillery, as to the front of the rebel line in regard to the placing of the artillery prior to the attack?

Answer. We had a general order to take charge of that line.

Question. At what time was that order given?

Answer. I forget the date; but it must have been some two or three weeks previously.

Question. Did you make an examination with a view to the springing of this mine and making this assault?

Answer. Towards the latter part of the time such examination was made. The first order in the beginning of July was to make an examination in reference to a general attack.

Question. Was there any special order given to you and General Hunt to examine the rebel line in front of the 5th corps, with a view of silencing the rebel batteries, while the assault was being made by the 9th corps?

Answer. Yes, sir; there was.

Question. Who issued that order, and at what time was it issued?

Answer. I think it was given to me verbally. I am not certain whether it was by General Meade himself or by his chief of staff.

Question. It was issued by General Meade's authority?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. About how long previous to the time when the assault was made?

Answer. I should think it was about ten days; I am not certain about the time. We had ample time, however, to establish our batteries and put in position all the guns that could be placed in that line.

Question. And if I understand you rightly, the batteries on the rebel right, in front of General Warren's corps, were effectually silenced at the time of the attack?

Answer. Yes, sir; I was enabled, in about half an hour, to stand on top of the parapet. The enemy's batteries were effectually silenced.

Question. What position did the enemy's batteries occupy that were firing upon our troops in the crater of the mine?

Answer. There were two guns which took a position in a ravine—two field-pieces which were run down there, and which commenced firing about an hour after we had taken possession of the crater; at least that was the first I saw of their firing; they may have fired previously to that time.

Question. Those were the only two guns upon our left which fired upon our troops in the crater?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What other guns of the enemy were there that fired upon our troops in the crater?

Answer. There were some guns over on the right, but I could not see what they were from my position.

*Testimony of Major General E. O. C. Ord.*

CITY POINT, Va., December 20, 1864.

Major General E. O. C. ORD sworn and examined.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. Major general, now in command of the 24th army corps.

Question. What was your command on the 30th of July last?

Answer. I was then in command of the 18th army corps, and of a part of the 10th army corps.

Question. Will you state such facts as may have come to your knowledge, and which you may deem important, in relation to the attack by the 9th corps on the enemy's lines before Petersburg, on the 30th of July last?

Answer. I will read the report which I made of that affair, and then I will answer such additional questions as you may think proper to ask.

## "HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH ARMY CORPS,

"Near Petersburg, August 3, 1864.

"GENERAL: In obedience to orders from General Meade (to whom I was ordered to report) the 1st and 3d divisions of the 18th corps were, on the night of the 29th of July, placed in the trenches of General Burnside's front, relieving portions of his command as trench guards, that the 9th corps might prepare to assault the enemy's line next a. m. The 2d division 10th corps, Brigadier General Turner commanding, and the 2d division 18th corps, Brigadier General Ames commanding, were placed in rear of General Burnside's corps as reserve supports, and in positions selected by him. Their orders were to await orders, to be sent as soon as the result of the assault next morning by the 9th corps could decide where supports might be needed.

"About 5 o'clock a. m., 30th of July, the mine in front of the 9th corps sprung, and I took my position near General Burnside awaiting the result of his assault, and with an understanding that as soon as his corps could get out, General Turner was to follow his (Burnside's) rear division and support it on the right, beyond our lines. About 6 o'clock General Burnside told me it was time for General Turner to move, and I directed General Turner accordingly; but the general got ahead of Potter's division, 9th corps, and was obliged to wait until it had passed. To understand the manner of the movement, I quote General Burnside's order, dated July 29, for the assault, which says:

"1. 'The mine will be exploded to-morrow morning at half past three. \* \* \*

"2. 'General Ledlie will immediately, upon the explosion of the mine, move his troops forward. \* \* \*

"3. 'General Wilcox will move his division forward after General Ledlie has passed through the first line of the enemy's works, bearing off to the east. \* \* \*

"4. 'General Potter will move his division forward to the right of General Ledlie's as soon as it is apparent that he will not interfere with the movement of General Wilcox's division, and will, as near as possible, protect the right flank of General Ledlie's from any attack in that quarter, and establish a line on the crest of a hill which seems to run from the Cemetery hill, nearly at right angles to the enemy's main line, directly in our front. \* \* \*

"5. 'General Ferrero will move his division immediately after General Wilcox until he reaches our present advance line, where he will remain until the ground in his front is entirely cleared by the other three divisions, when he will move forward over the same ground that General Ledlie moved over, will pass through our lines, and, if possible, move down and occupy the village to our right.'

"Thus it will be seen that all three of his rear divisions had to follow each the action of those in its front; and I learned afterwards that the passage out and to our front line of breastworks was by a long trench or covered way and through a breach in our works. Hence the movements were slow, and there was delay especially after the enemy had massed his men, and our wounded coming from the front began to choke this covered way. About half past six a. m., having sent General Turner, commanding my advance division, an order to move forward on the crest of hill to right of Potter, (see the above order directing General Potter to establish a line on the crest of the hill,) near or on the Jerusalem plank road, in reply to this General Turner reported that General Burnside's troops filled the trenches in his front, occupying the crater and blocking up the way. About this time, or shortly after, I received an order directly from General Meade's headquarters, as follows:

"You will at once move forward your corps rapidly to the crest of the hill, independently of General Burnside's troops, and make a lodgement there, reporting the result as soon as obtained.'

"This order I sent at once to Generals Turner and Ames. The latter was with his division

closing up on Turner, and keeping his men massed for a movement in any direction. General Turner replied:

“The only place I can get out of the lines is opposite the crater. It is already full of men who cannot develop. I shall put in my column as soon as I can. It is impossible, by reason of the topography, to charge in the manner you indicate. I must go in by head of column and develop to the right.”

“From General Ames I received the following:

“I find that the covered way is the only way of getting to the front. General Turner occupies the road, and it is impossible for me to move until he gets out of my way.”

“Now I had not seen the ground, and supposed, all this time, that there were several places of exit, and the ground tolerably free from obstructions.

“I sent Generals Turner's and Ames's replies to General Meade, and went myself to the front, where I found our men were debouching *into* the crater, and in a short space of the enemy's trench on each side of it. I met General Turner just from the crater, (only 75 yards off,) and saw Burnside's white and black men needlessly filing into the crater, and into this short line of the enemy's works, under a destructive cross-fire. The enemy, just then, had brought up an additional six-gun battery, and was sweeping the 75 yards of bare up hill, where the 9th corps debouched, with a cross-fire of canister, grape, and musketry. I also saw that the crater and trench adjacent were in a sort of a re-entrant angle of the enemy's work, and that the men who had crowded in them were useless, and, in a measure, helpless. The crater was a *big hole*, some twenty feet deep, and was shortly afterwards rendered almost inaccessible by the cross-fire, and the trenches near it were crowded with men who were indisposed or unable to go forward; and I saw that the black troops were charging out *by the flank*, increasing this mass of men huddled under the enemy's fire. I directed General Turner not to put his men in the crater or the trench already filled with men, but to make a charge to the right where the enemy were massing. This he did, and I gave him all the aid in my power; the men climbing up and over our parapet, and dashing towards the enemy's trench in good style. (See Turner's report.) On my return to headquarters of General Burnside, I overtook General Grant, and he directed me to say to General Burnside that ‘no more men should be sent into the crater or trenches of the enemy already filled, but he (General Burnside) should send forward intrenching tools, and hold all his men had gained.’ I did so, and again ordered General Turner to push his whole division out, and to the right. Immediately thereafter—about 8 o'clock—I received from General Turner the following despatch:

“Colonel Bell's brigade, in attempting to gain ground to the right on the enemy's line, was severely met by the enemy's fire, when a regiment of colored troops stampeded and broke through the brigade, carrying it all with them into our line.”

“This I communicated to General Meade, and repeated my orders to Turner to get his other brigade out to attack, but shortly afterwards (before my last order could be communicated) I received orders from General Meade to draw my men all inside our trenches to the rear, and afterwards an order was received to turn with my corps\* to my own front.

“I may mention here, that when General Burnside had received the information that his men had occupied the crater, and a part of his command was in front of the crater—not advancing—I wrote the following despatch before I had any order from General Meade:

“HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH ARMY CORPS, 6½ o'clock, 30th.

“GENERAL MEADE: Turner, in my front, reports that Burnside's troops fill our trenches in his front, occupying the crater, the enemy still holding their trenches to the right and left of the crater. Shall I order the divisions (two) of the 18th corps to try and charge the enemy's trenches over the heads of the men? Rifle firing has almost ceased in our front, and both parties covering.

“E. O. C. ORD, *Major General of Volunteers.*”

“The despatch I submitted to General Burnside, and he requested me to wait a few moments and he would have the way cleared. It was shortly after this I received the first order from General Meade to advance independently of General Burnside's troops. After receiving the order from General Meade to draw off my men and go back to my own front, I found that if I drew out the 1st and 3d divisions, 18th corps, which had been placed by General Burnside in his trenches, the trenches would be left too weak, and hence I directed General Carr, commanding these divisions, to remain where he was until night, when General Burnside promised to relieve him. The next day I asked General Burnside for the two (2) divisions left in his trenches, and finding that he could not send them all to me without inconvenience, I telegraphed General Meade that I could get along with the part which had been returned. The whole reported that night or the next morning.

“Enclosed you will find reports of division commanders and reports of casualties.

“I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

“E. O. C. ORD,

*Major General of Volunteers, Commanding.*

“Major General A. A. HUMPHREYS,

*Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac.*”

\* Should be *command*.



Question. To what do you attribute the failure of that enterprise?

Answer. In the first place, the crater of the mine was in a very bad place for a storming party to go in. It was swept by a flanking fire of the enemy; it was up hill; and, as it appeared to me, it was not covered by any of our batteries. The ground to the left and front of the mine was marshy, and covered by bushes and trees. No preparations had been made for our troops to pass out to our right or left. They could only get out by a single long trench or covered way; so that in the slow process of getting 10,000 or 12,000 men up through this narrow space and out through a single opening the enemy had an opportunity to make preparations to meet them. All this produced delay.

There should have been several openings made, and the troops should have attacked the enemy at several points at once. The mine was to have been sprung at half past three o'clock in the morning. But the last division of General Burnside's troops did not get out until nearly eight o'clock; some of the men were not out then. On account of the slow exit of these men, the enemy had an opportunity of pounding them as they came out in small force, by concentrating their fire upon them. That was one cause of failure. Another was that when the men did get out, from what I learn they were not sufficiently disciplined as soldiers to obey orders and advance as directed. The troops that first went out, as I was told, were dismounted cavalry—a very bad specimen of troops.

Question. If I understand you, this crater being too narrow a space through which to push an army successfully for a surprise, there should have been simultaneous attacks made at other points along the line?

Answer. You do not get precisely my idea. The men had to go through a long narrow trench, about one-third of a mile in length, before they got into our extreme outwork, and then they went into this crater, and were piled into that hole, where they were perfectly useless. They were of about as much use there as so many men at the bottom of a well. Afterwards they filed into the trenches on either side of the crater for a small space, and covered themselves there as well as they could. If there had been several places of exit instead of but one, we could have tried the enemy elsewhere, and some of our parties might have been successful if others had been headed off.

Question. Of course this delay did not come under your observation, and the cause of it is not known to you?

Answer. When they had decided to follow in the order of General Burnside's march, one after the other through this one trench, and through one opening, that produced a delay which should have been anticipated. Better provision should have been made for the attack.

By Mr. Loan :

Question. What parts of the enemy's lines were open to attack with any chance of success?

Answer. I think it probable success might have been attained on the left and right of the crater, at the distance of half a mile, if our parapets had been opened during the night, and parties of men held there in readiness had dashed out upon the nearest works of the enemy, immediately after the explosion; for we learned afterwards that upon the explosion the enemy abandoned several of their batteries nearest our works, thinking they were also mined.

Question. What forces of ours were opposite those points where you think attacks might have been successfully made?

Answer. I had all of my available troops directly in rear of General Burnside's command, and reported to him and obeyed his directions by General Meade's orders. General Warren, I think, remained with his command on the left of General Burnside. There were no troops prepared on the right strong enough to make an attack. General Mott, who took my place there, had, I

think, only one division, though quite a large one, to occupy the place of a much larger force while it was relieved for the attack. And it would not have been advisable to have had his troops attack.

Question. We then had no men on the right who could have made an attack there?

Answer. The answer I gave in regard to what might have been done referred to arrangements to have been made a day or so previous, by which troops could have been massed opposite the different places of exit, and then have gone out as soon as required. But the troops were massed all in this one place, along this covered way, a portion of them in front of this work, and the balance in rear by divisions, so that they were all in a column.

Question. That relates to the 9th corps, and to your corps in their rear?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. But your remark would not apply to General Warren's command?

Answer. I should not suppose it would apply to his command, if arrangements had been made beforehand.

Question. What I mean is the situation of General Warren's command as it was on the morning of the 30th of July. Were his troops in a situation where they could have attacked the enemy on our left?

Answer. I really do not know, because I am not aware how his troops were located. If they could have attacked by prearrangement, I think they were in a situation to have attacked.

Question. It would have been necessary to have arranged the troops, to have attacked on the right and left, in assaulting columns at half a mile distance from the crater, in connexion with the main assault through the crater?

Answer. Yes, sir; that suggested itself in answer to your question. We can never tell before an event takes place what might succeed half so well as we can afterwards, and a criticism that is advanced after the occurrence should, of course, be received with all this allowance.

Question. The cause of the failure was chiefly owing to the want of a proper outlet or *debourcement* for the troops?

Answer. Not entirely.

Question. No, not entirely, but chiefly?

Answer. My answer was intended to cover more than the fact of the *debourcement* not being a proper one. The massing the troops and sending them out by such a long, narrow covered way is what I particularly referred to, and which caused them to be very slow in their movements.

Question. Who decided upon the locality of your troops when they were ordered to be massed in the rear of General Burnside's corps?

Answer. I do not know positively, but my impression is that, the mine being General Burnside's idea, and he having been at work at it for some time, he made nearly all the arrangements for the explosion and the attack.

Question. Did he give directions for the location of your troops?

Answer. Yes, sir; he located them himself.

Question. Were they massed by his directions?

Answer. By his selection; for I sent my officers to report to him, and to get their situations from him.

Question. How long was it after the explosion of the mine before the head of General Ledlie's column entered the crater?

Answer. That I do not know; because I was not then near enough to the mine to see that; I was back with General Burnside.

Question. Have you any knowledge what troops of the enemy those were that opened this cross-fire upon our advancing columns? What I want to get at is, whether they were those troops that occupied the intrenchments, or whether they were drawn from some other parts of the enemy's line.

Answer. I cannot speak positively; but my impression is that they came in

from other points. They almost always keep troops in reserve along their lines, so that when an attack is made, they can dash at once towards the threatened point.

Question. What was the effect of the explosion upon the enemy's troops in the trenches?

Answer. I think, from what I learned afterwards, that those batteries nearest the mine were partially abandoned, but that the trenches, under which it was not expected a mine could be easily built, were not abandoned except in the immediate vicinity of the crater.

Question. Do you know whether the troops in the enemy's trenches opened fire immediately upon our advancing column, or was there some delay?

Answer. I learned from others that there was some little delay; I do not know positively.

Question. Can you state whether our troops were enabled to pass across the space between our line and the crater before they were met by any fire from the enemy?

Answer. That I can only state from what others told me; I did not go to the front until I found that my divisions were impeded, and that difficulties were encountered in carrying out my orders.

Question. Were they impeded by the fire from the enemy's batteries on the right, or on the left, that were sweeping across the space between our lines and the crater?

Answer. The enemy's battery that I spoke of in my report took a position on the right of the crater as we faced the enemy's lines; there were other batteries a little more removed playing on the left also. The most destructive fire, however, was musketry and grape.

Question. From what locality?

Answer. From the right and left and front, apparently; but more particularly from the right.

Question. How was the enemy's infantry protected?

Answer. The nature of the ground to the right as we went out was such that our intrenchments fell off down into a swamp or bottom. There were bushes and tall trees in front of us, and we could not see anything in that direction thirty or forty yards off, and the enemy could form there, entirely screened, and in such position as to be in flank and in a measure in rear of those going from our works to the crater.

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*Testimony of Brevet Major General Edward Ferrero.*

CITY POINT, VA., December 20, 1864.

Brevet Major General EDWARD FERRERO sworn and examined.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. What was your rank and position in the army on the 30th of July last?

Answer. I was then a brigadier general, commanding a division.

Question. What is your present rank?

Answer. Brevet major general.

Question. In what corps was your command last July?

Answer. It was the fourth division of the 9th army corps, and was composed of colored troops.

Question. We have been instructed to inquire into the operations of the 30th of July last, the springing of the mine, the attack by the 9th corps, &c. Will

you state, in the first place, what you know in relation to the charging of the mine that was exploded on that day?

Answer. I know nothing about that; I had no connexion whatever with it.

Question. Had you, previously to the 30th of July, drilled your division with a view to making an assault after the springing of the mine?

Answer. I had, for over three weeks.

Question. What was the condition of your troops at that time, as to their spirit and morale?

Answer. They were in fine condition—better than any other troops in the army for that purpose. We were expecting to make this assault, and had drilled for weeks, and were in good trim for it.

Question. Had you made any examination of the ground and other preliminary arrangements with a view to the assault?

Answer. Before the commencement of the mine I had had a conversation with General Burnside, as it was intended I should make the assault, and submitted to him a plan, which is already in the report. I had surveyed the ground, made an examination, and given my plan of attack, which had been approved by General Burnside, and it was submitted to General Meade.

Question. Will you give the outlines of that plan—how the advance was to be made, and in what form?

Answer. The mine was under a considerable fort upon the right. There was a small fort a short distance, probably six hundred yards, to the left, with three or four guns. My idea was to make an assault at the moment of the explosion of the mine between those two points. I wanted to advance one brigade, which was to be the leading brigade, then divide it in two parts, one portion to go to the right and sweep the enemy's lines in that direction, and the other portion to go down the left and sweep the lines in that direction. The other two brigades of the division were to march forward in column, and carry the crest of Cemetery hill.

Question. Your object was to cross the enemy's works between the two forts?

Answer. Yes, sir, and not go over the point where the explosion was to take place, because the mass of earth that would be thrown up there would impede any troops. The object was to gain every moment at the explosion of the mine. My idea was to clear the enemy's line of works, and thus prevent a fire in our rear, as well as in our front.

Question. At what time was it decided not to use your division for that purpose?

Answer. The night before the assault I received the first intimation that they were not to be so used.

Question. What troops were used for that purpose?

Answer. The first division of the 9th army corps, under General Ledlie, was assigned the lead of the assault.

Question. What was the condition of those troops at that time? Had they been engaged in any exhaustive labors?

Answer. They were not the troops to put in at that time, from the very fact that they had been constantly under fire for a long period—so much so that it had become a second nature with them to dodge a bullet; from having been in such close contact with the enemy they had acquired that habit.

Question. Do you know anything about the arrangement for the *debouchment* of that command?

Answer. Every arrangement was made that it was possible to make under the circumstances, as it was necessary that we should do everything without giving information to the enemy. Nothing more could have been done without exposing our plans.

Question. Then one of the main elements of success in this enterprise consisted in the surprise of the thing?

Answer. Undoubtedly.

Question. Was it desirable in that connexion that our troops should move very rapidly after the explosion?

Answer. That was certainly very necessary.

Question. To what extent were the abatis removed, and the parapets levelled, in front of our own works, in order to enable the troops to *debouch* rapidly?

Answer. That point was probably the nearest point to the enemy upon our whole line, and it was utterly impossible to do anything more than was done. There was enough done to enable the troops to get over with all the necessary rapidity required at that moment.

Question. Did the troops move rapidly forward after the mine was sprung?

Answer. I was where I could witness the column movement. By my time they moved from five and a half to six minutes after the explosion. They could not move sooner on account of the concussion of the explosion, which would naturally prevent their going forward for a few moments.

Question. Have you any knowledge as to the effect produced by the explosion upon the enemy's troops in the vicinity of the mine?

Answer. I can state nothing further than that they seemed to be perfectly paralyzed for quite a long space of time.

Question. Was there any firing upon the part of the enemy upon our troops as they crossed over the space between our outer works and their lines?

Answer. The firing was very light on the first column that went up.

Question. Can you assign any reason for the confusion that ensued after the assault had been begun, and our troops had entered the crater?

Answer. Yes, sir. In the first place, the nature of the ground was such as to cause confusion among men who had been accustomed to seek shelter under fire for five or six weeks. The crater was a hole some twenty-five or thirty feet deep and fifty or sixty feet broad. When the men got into that hole they became confused, and it was utterly impossible to get them out. That was one of those things which will happen with the best of troops.

Question. Was there any remedy for that misfortune, when the troops refused to come out?

Answer. I am hardly at liberty to say. I was not in command of the army.

Question. What do you think could have been done?

Answer. We all differ in opinion.

Question. That is true; but we ask your opinion, as a military man.

Answer. I think myself that if the assault had been made a little to the left it would have been better. There would not have been so much impediment.

Question. I refer to the time when General Ledlie's division had been thrown into this inextricable confusion, in the bottom of this hole, and the men refused to come out from the shelter afforded them there; was there, after that occurrence, any chance to remedy the condition of affairs by any other movements which could have been made?

Answer. I cannot answer that question, because, not being in command of the army, I was not aware of the condition of the enemy, the number of troops on either side, their position, &c., all of which things it is supposed the general commanding is informed of.

Question. I had supposed you might have seen what force the enemy afterwards developed, and what his means of defence were.

Answer. I have since heard what his force was.

Question. You do not know what he actually did on the ground?

Answer. Yes, sir; I was there and saw it.

Question. Could we have used our forces at other points with any probability of gaining a success?

Answer. I think an attack made upon some other portions of the enemy's lines would probably have been successful.

Question. Upon what portions?

Answer. There were no other portions available except in front of the 5th corps.

Question. Have you any means of knowing from what points the enemy drew the troops that he concentrated upon our forces in the crater of the mine?

Answer. Nothing more than from the reports of the signal officers, who saw them moving their troops in the vicinity of the town after the assault was made, and from the heavy fire we sustained there.

Question. There is no doubt about there being a heavy concentration of troops there. What I want to ascertain is from what localities those troops of the enemy were drawn.

Answer. It is reported that they were drawn from in front of the 5th corps.

Question. If they were drawn from in front of the 5th corps, they must have weakened their lines there?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And you think it probable that a vigorous attack there might have been successful?

Answer. Yes, sir, it might.

Question. It would have had the effect of relieving the troops in the crater from the severe cross-fire?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Was it possible for General Ord to have made any judicious movement upon the right, if he had been so ordered, so as to have compelled the attention of the enemy to the right of the crater?

Answer. I do not think the nature of the ground would have admitted anything of the kind. I had surveyed the whole of that ground with a view to this assault, and I knew all about it.

Question. Will you state, as a military man, whether you think the dangers of the disaster were enhanced by the narrowness or insufficiency of the *debouchement* prepared for the troops of the 9th corps?

Answer. I do not think so. I think the great impediment was in front.

Question. The going into that hole, and being subjected to that cross-fire?

Answer. Yes, sir; the troops moved very handsomely up to that position.

Question. After the third division of the 9th corps had gone in, your division was then ordered to advance?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was the condition of the white troops at the crater and beyond, at the time you were ordered to make your advance?

Answer. They were without any organization; just one mass of human beings seeking shelter in the bomb-proofs of the enemy.

Question. About what number of men composed the three divisions that preceded yours?

Answer. I could not tell you at this time. I could give the strength of my own division.

Question. At what time in the day did you receive orders to advance?

Answer. About an hour and a half after the explosion of the mine.

Question. What was the strength of your division?

Answer. I had four thousand three hundred men for duty.

Question. Please narrate what occurred after your division began to move.

Answer. I received an order to advance my troops and pass the white troops which had halted, and move on and carry the crest of the hill at all hazards. I had but a few paces to move to our outer breastworks. Previous to that I had sent a staff officer to ascertain the condition of affairs at the front. From his report I did not think it advisable to move my division in, as there were three divisions of white troops already huddled together there. I reported to Colonel Loring, of General Burnside's staff, who requested me to halt until he could report to

General Burnside. I refused to do so, when he gave me an order in General Burnside's name to halt, and I did so. He then went off to report to General Burnside, and came back and reported that the order was peremptory for me to carry my division through at all hazards. I then started with my division; they went in magnificently under a most galling fire; they passed beyond the white troops, captured the only prisoners captured that day, some two hundred and fifty to three hundred, together with a rebel stand of colors, and recaptured a stand of our colors belonging to a regiment of white troops of the 9th army corps. They were a little broken by going through the mass of white troops there, and the colonel in command of the first brigade of the division proceeded to reform for the assault. There was a dismounted cavalry regiment, I think of the second division of the 9th corps, a little off to one side. As my troops started, the color guard of that regiment came back on the double-quick, broke through the ranks of my leading brigade, which of course caused my negroes to break. My troops came back in very bad order. Finding no shelter there, as the white troops had all the shelter, they came back to our main line, inside of which they were reformed, and there they remained the balance of the day. As my troops went in so gallantly under a most galling fire, I maintain that, had they led the assault when there was comparatively no fire, nothing could have stopped them until they got into Petersburg.

Question. Where were the batteries located which you found to be most effective against your troops?

Answer. There was a battery off to the right of the crater, beyond a ravine, which enfiladed the line; then there was a battery on the left which also enfiladed the line.

Question. What was the strength of the battery to the left?

Answer. Two pieces of field artillery.

Question. Did it move into position after the mine was sprung?

Answer. No, sir; the men abandoned it at the time of the springing of the mine, and then came back.

Question. Was that battery in front of General Warren's command?

Answer. No, sir; it was on what was still the old front of the 9th corps.

Question. Were those the only batteries that were effective?

Answer. Those two were the only batteries that enfiladed the line; we had a fire directly in front, and from a battery a little to the left of the centre.

Question. Were those field guns in front brought into position after the springing of the mine?

Answer. I think they were permanent batteries.

Question. What was the reason for changing the plan of allowing your division to lead the assault, as had been first contemplated?

Answer. I do not know the reason; I only know that General Meade opposed it, and that General Grant approved his decision.

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*Testimony of Lieutenant General U. S. Grant.*

CITY POINT, VA., December 20, 1864.

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT sworn and examined.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. Will you give the committee such information as you may deem important in regard to the action before Petersburg, on the 30th of July last?

Answer. As you are aware, I made a feint on the north side of the James river, which I intended to convert into an attack if everything should prove

favorable. By that movement the attention of the enemy was called to that side of the river, causing them to concentrate there. They were so well fortified there that an advance on that side could not be made without great sacrifice of life.

General Burnside had, prior to this, made a mine in front of the 9th corps, which I would not allow to be exploded until such time as it could be used advantageously. Finding that the principal part of the enemy's forces had been drawn to the north side of the James, I telegraphed to General Meade that then was the time to charge the mine and explode it, and directed him to make preparations to assault. My despatch gave no details at all how this was to be done. I left that to him, knowing him, as I did, to be fully capable of determining when and what ought to be done.

He prepared an order for assault, which was submitted to and approved by me. I think now it was all that we could have done; I think he could not have done better.

I was over on the north side of the river when these arrangements were made. I came back to the south side of the river before the explosion took place, and remained with General Meade until probably a half or three-quarters of an hour after the springing of the mine. I then rode down to the front; that is, I rode down as far as I could on horseback, and then went through to the front on foot. I there found that we had lost the opportunity which had been given us.

I am satisfied that if the troops had been properly commanded, and been led in accordance with General Meade's order, we would have captured Petersburg with all the artillery and a good portion of its support, without the loss of 500 men. There was a full half hour, I think, when there was no fire against our men, and they could have marched past the enemy's intrenchments just as they could in the open country.

But that opportunity was lost in consequence of the division commanders not going with their men, but allowing them to go into the enemy's intrenchments and spread themselves there, without going on further, thus giving the enemy time to collect and organize against them. I think I can say nothing more on that point.

I blame myself a little for one thing. General Meade, as I stated, on my telegraphic despatch from the north side of the James river, made his orders most perfectly. I do not think that now, knowing all the facts, I could improve upon his order.

But I was informed of this fact: that General Burnside, who was fully alive to the importance of this thing, trusted to the pulling of straws which division should lead. It happened to fall on what I thought was the worst commander in his corps. I knew that fact before the mine was exploded, but did nothing in regard to it. That is the only thing I blame myself for. I knew the man was the one that I considered the poorest division commander that General Burnside had—I mean General Ledlie.

By Mr. Loan :

Question. There has been a great deal of controversy in regard to the sufficiency of the *debouchment* prepared by General Burnside for the egress of his troops after the explosion of the mine?

Answer. That I could not swear to exactly. I went beyond his *debouchment*, but did not think to note it. But I am satisfied that he did not make the *debouchment* that he was ordered to make. I know that as well as I know anything that I cannot exactly swear to. I went beyond it myself, and on my return to the rear ordered the troops back.

Question. I suppose the success of this enterprise was dependent in a great measure upon the surprise of the enemy, caused by the explosion of the mine, and



prompt movements afterwards to avail yourself of the distraction occasioned by it?

Answer. It all depended upon that.

Question. Was there not some danger of apprising the enemy of the contemplated movement by undertaking to level the parapets and remove the abatis and other obstructions in front of our line?

Answer. Not at all. That could be done entirely under cover of the night. After dark we could take down any of our parapets and remove our abatis without their noticing it.

Question. So far as you are advised in the matter, was not a part of the disaster owing to the slow movement of our troops in passing over the ground?

Answer. I think if I had been a corps commander, and had had that in charge, I would have been down there, and would have seen that it was done right; or, if I had been the commander of the division that had to take the lead, I think I would have gone in with my division. We have a great many officers here who would have done the same thing.

Question. Did the slowness of the movement tend to promote the disaster?

Answer. I do not think that that alone had any effect at all.

Question. What, then, do you think was the cause of the disaster?

Answer. I think the cause of the disaster was simply the leaving the passage of orders from one to another down to an inefficient man. I blame his seniors also for not seeing that he did his duty, all the way up to myself.

Question. You think that the opportunity for success passed by owing to the confusion of the troops in consequence of the inefficiency of that division commander?

Answer. Yes, sir. As I understand it, the troops marched right into the breach caused by the explosion without there being a single division commander there. They had no person to direct them to go further, although the division commanders were directed in the most positive terms to march to what is called Cemetery hill, which would have given us everything.

Question. Speaking of those orders, was it judicious to direct the main advancing column to proceed directly to Cemetery hill without any regard to the enemy on their right and left?

Answer. Cemetery hill commanded the rear of their intrenched line; it commanded everything.

Question. The troops had to pass over considerable ground to reach Cemetery hill?

Answer. Only 300 or 400 yards.

Question. Then to accomplish that object, you do not think it would have been necessary to have taken possession of the enemy's batteries and intrenchments on the right and left of the crater of the mine?

Answer. Not at all. If they had marched through to the crest of that ridge they would then have taken everything in rear. I do not think there would have been any opposition at all to our troops had that been done. I think we would have cut off entirely those of the enemy to our right, while those on the left would have tried to make their escape across the Appomattox.

Question. There has been something said in regard to the changing of General Burnside's plan of putting his division of colored troops in the advance.

Answer. General Burnside wanted to put his colored division in front, and I believe if he had done so it would have been a success. Still I agreed with General Meade in his objection to that plan. General Meade said that if we put the colored troops in front (we had only that one division) and it should prove a failure, it would then be said, and very properly, that we were shoving those people ahead to get killed because we did not care anything about them. But that could not be said if we put white troops in front. That is the only point he changed, to my knowledge, after he had given his orders to General Burnside. It was then that General Burnside left his three division commanders

to toss coppers or draw straws which should and which should not go in front.

By Mr. Julian :

Question. That change was made the evening before the assault, was it not?

Answer. I cannot say whether it was the evening before the explosion or twenty-four hours earlier.

Question. Was General Burnside's plan submitted to you for consideration?

Answer. He had no plan; he had merely to execute an order.

Question. He desired to use his colored troops for the advance?

Answer. Yes, sir; and that part was changed, I thought then very properly, and I think so yet; for we had but one division of colored troops in the whole army about Petersburg at that time, and I do not think it would have been proper to put them in front, for nothing but success would have justified it.

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*Testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pleasants.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., January 13, 1865.

Lieutenant Colonel HENRY PLEASANTS sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. Were you in the army of the Potomac at the time the mine was sprung before Petersburg, on the 30th of July last; if so, in what capacity?

Answer. I was there at that time. I was then lieutenant colonel of the 48th Pennsylvania volunteers, and commanding the regiment at the time the explosion took place.

Question. What connexion did you have with the construction of the mine?

Answer. I proposed it and executed the work. I had the whole charge of everything connected with its construction.

Question. Will you state who originated the mine, and what was done in regard to it?

Answer. I was then commanding the first brigade of the second division of the 9th corps. That corps was then under the command of Major General Burnside. While commanding the brigade I frequently had occasion to go to the front line. I noticed a little cup of a ravine near to the enemy's works. I having been a mining and civil engineer many years before the war, it occurred to me that a mine could be excavated there. I examined the ground, and after I had satisfied myself that it could be done, I spoke to the officer next in rank above me, Brigadier General Potter, commanding the division, and explained to him what I proposed to do and how I proposed to do it, and what would be the effect of an explosion of that kind upon the enemy. He received the idea favorably, and wrote a note to General Burnside in relation to it. General Burnside sent for me, and I explained to him carefully the mode of ventilating the mine and everything about it. He seemed very much pleased with the proposition, and told me to go right on with the work.

Question. Can you fix the time when you mentioned the matter to General Burnside, when you commenced the work, &c.?

Answer. The work was commenced at 12 o'clock noon on the 25th of June, 1864. I saw General Burnside the night previous, and commenced the mine right off the next day.

Question. Did you have any communication with any other commanders on the subject?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. About how many men did you employ in the work?

Answer. My regiment was only about four hundred strong. At first I employed but a few men at a time, but the number was increased as the work pro-

gressed, until at last I had to use the whole regiment, non-commissioned officers and all. The great difficulty I had was to dispose of the material got out of the mine. I found it impossible to get any assistance from anybody; I had to do all the work myself. I had to remove all the earth in old cracker boxes. I got pieces of hickory and nailed on the boxes in which we received our crackers, and then iron-clad them with hoops of iron taken from old pork and beef barrels.

Question. Why were you not able to get better instruments with which to construct so important a work?

Answer. I do not know. Whenever I made application I could not get anything, although General Burnside was very favorable to it. The most important thing was to ascertain how far I had to mine, because if I fell short of or went beyond the proper place the explosion would have no practical effect; therefore I wanted an accurate instrument with which to make the necessary triangulations. I had to make them on the furthest front line, where the enemy's sharpshooters could reach me. I could not get the instrument I wanted, although there was one at army headquarters, and General Burnside had to send to Washington and get an old-fashioned theodolite, which was given to me.

Question. Do you know any reason why you could not have had the better instrument which was at army headquarters?

Answer. I do not. I know this: that General Burnside told me that General Meade and Major Duane, chief engineer of the army of the Potomac, said the thing could not be done; that it was all clap-trap and nonsense; that such a length of mine had never been excavated in military operations, and could not be; that I would either get the men smothered for want of air, or crushed by the falling of the earth; or the enemy would find it out, and it would amount to nothing. I could get no boards and lumber supplied to me for my operations. I had to get a pass and send two companies of my own regiment with wagons outside of our lines to rebel saw-mills and get lumber in that way, after having previously got what lumber I could by tearing down an old bridge. I had no mining picks furnished me, but had to take common army picks and have them straightened for my mining picks.

Question. Was General Burnside the only officer who seemed to favor the mine?

Answer. The only officer of high rank, so far as I learned. General Burnside, the corps commander, and General Potter, the division commander, seemed to be the only high officers who believed in it.

Question. How long from the time that you commenced the mine did it take you to finish it?

Answer. I finished the whole thing, lateral galleries and all, ready to put the powder in, on the 23d of July.

Question. How long would it have taken you had you been supplied with the proper tools and instruments?

Answer. I could have done it in one-third or one-fourth of the time. The greatest cause of the delay was taking the material out.

Question. How far did you have to carry it?

Answer. The whole length of the mine, and to where it could be deposited. And every night I had to get the pioneers of my regiment to cut bushes and cover it up where it had been deposited, otherwise the enemy could have climbed up the trees in their lines and seen the pile of newly excavated earth.

Question. What was the length of the mine?

Answer. The main gallery was  $510\frac{8}{10}$  feet in length; the left lateral gallery was 37 feet in length, and the right lateral gallery was 38 feet. The magazines were to be placed in the lateral galleries.

Question. What were the dimensions of the galleries?

Answer. They varied at different places. I suppose the average was  $4\frac{1}{2}$  by  $4\frac{1}{2}$  feet.

Question. Did the enemy discover that you were mining there ?

Answer. Deserters came into our lines from the enemy, who stated that they had found out where the mine was, and were trying to countermine. They said that some deserters from the 5th corps in our army had told them about it. General Burnside ordered me to stop all work on a certain day on that account, and to listen for one day; but not hearing anything of the enemy's working, we resumed our work. I did not hear them working until I got right under the fort. They did a great deal of hammering. While I was propping up the mine that we had dug, I made no noise. I had the timber all framed and notched outside of the mine, and it was put together by hand, without any blows.

Question. Was the mine placed directly under the fortification, or close by it ?

Answer. It was exactly under it, except that the right lateral gallery made a little circular direction on account of avoiding a shaft which we supposed the enemy were making near by. It did not move out of line much, so that when the explosion took place it would tear up all around there, any how.

Question. What amount of powder was used ?

Answer. I called for twelve thousand pounds; they gave me eight thousand.

Question. What means did you take to consume the powder, so that it would have the proper effect ?

Answer. I had bags of sand interspersed with logs. There was no tamping between the magazines; it was left all open there, so that there might be oxygen enough for the combustion of the powder. Outside of the lateral galleries, in the main gallery, it was tamped.

Question. What means did you use to insure the explosion of the powder ?

Answer. I used three lines of fuze, called the blasting fuze. I asked for fuze, and they sent me this common blasting fuze. There were troughs running from one magazine to the other, half filled with powder; and then from where the two lateral galleries joined there were two troughs with fuzes in them. The troughs were half filled with fine powder; then from a certain distance out there was nothing but three fuzes, without any powder. The fuze I received was cut in short pieces; some of them are only ten feet long.

Question. Why was that ?

Answer. I do not know.

Question. Was not that an objection to it ?

Answer. A great objection.

Question. Was there any danger that it would not communicate at those parts where it was joined ?

Answer. It did not, and had to be relighted.

Question. Who had the courage to go down into the mine and relight it ?

Answer. I had a lieutenant and a sergeant with me in the mine when I lighted it the first time.

Question. How far in did it go out ?

Answer. I had a fuze about ninety feet long, and it burned about forty feet—the whole three fuzes.

Question. How long did you wait to find out whether it would explode ?

Answer. I waited from quarter after three, the time it was first lighted, until quarter after four, when it was relighted, and exploded at sixteen minutes to five.

Question. Have you been accustomed to use these fuzes in your engineering work ?

Answer. Not a great deal; I had seen it done; my province was to do the instrumental work and surveying.

Question. Is there generally much uncertainty about the ignition of powder by means of these fuzes?

Answer. No, sir, unless they are spliced, and then they are very uncertain.

Question. Could you not procure fuzes that were not spliced?

Answer. It was too late after the fuzes came. The mine was prepared and ready for the powder to be put in on the 23d of July, and the enemy was trying to find me out all this time; but I could not get powder to put in, or permission to put it in, until the 28th or 29th.

Question. What reason was given you for that?

Answer. No reason at all; they were not ready, that was all. General Burnside told me he had not permission yet to explode it. I was afraid the enemy would find me out that week.

Question. After you had commenced that mine, and before its completion, could you not have obtained fuzes of the proper quality from coal mines and other places?

Answer. These fuzes were sufficiently good if they had not been cut up.

Question. Was there any difficulty in obtaining fuze that was not spliced?

Answer. When it came it was too late. Besides, as it turned out, it was better that it went out then than if it had gone off at half past three.

Question. I am endeavoring to ascertain whether there was any carelessness in regard to this fuze; to ascertain what reason military men could give for spending so much time on a mine, and then not having their powder and fuze of the proper quality ready when the mine was ready. Whose fault was that?

Answer. I presume this fuze, like the powder, was stored at Fortress Monroe. They sent just whatever they had. It hardly ever happens that they require fuze for that distance.

Question. Then ought they not to have taken special pains to have obtained it, for they knew how long the mine was to be?

Answer. Well, it was not done.

Question. They could have brought other powder from Fortress Monroe in less than twenty-four hours?

Answer. Yes, sir, in a day at least. I do not know why they did as they did.

Question. You state that you prepared three fuzes and laid them?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Why was that?

Answer. I wanted to make a certain thing of it; but all three of the lines were spliced, and all three went out. The whole of the tamping, putting in the powder and everything, was completed at 6 p. m. on the 28th of July, and remained there until it was exploded on the morning of the 30th of July; and the powder remaining there a day and a half in the mine of course became damp.

Question. Did it not require some nerve to go in there and relight those fuzes?

Answer. At first it did; but afterwards we felt certain that the reason the mine did not explode was that the fuzes had gone out.

Question. Who went in to relight them?

Answer. Lieutenant Jacob Douty, 1st Lieutenant company K, 48th Pennsylvania volunteers, (he has since been mustered out,) and Sergeant Henry Rees, now 2d lieutenant company F, 48th Pennsylvania volunteers.

Question. They volunteered to go in?

Answer. Yes, sir; but I would not let them go in at first, until I felt convinced of the cause of the failure to explode.

Question. Had you been furnished with all the facilities in the power of those in charge there to have completed and exploded the mine, how long would it have taken you from the commencement until the mine was completed?

Answer. I think about twelve days.

Question. Were you present when the mine was exploded?

Answer. Yes, sir; my regiment having been engaged in constructing the mine, was not in the battle, but I volunteered on General Potter's staff, and was through the engagement, and was there at the time of the explosion.

Question. What effect did the explosion seem to have on the enemy?

Answer. It completely paralyzed them.

Question. What did the enemy do?

Answer. Those that were not killed ran away.

Question. What effect did it have on the next tier of fortifications of the enemy?

Answer. There was no other tier—nothing beyond that. There was a partially completed little earthwork beyond, but nothing in it.

Question. What, in your judgment, was the cause of the failure of that enterprise?

Answer. I have thought of that a great deal. There were several causes for the failure. The first one, and immediate one, was the failure of the first division of the 9th corps to go beyond the enemy's works. The whole of them, or a great portion of them, went up very promptly and occupied the enemy's works. There was nothing to resist them; but they remained there and did not go beyond; and when the other divisions came up, having orders to go through the same gap, the second division to form on the right of the first, and the third division to form on the left of the first, and to go on to Cemetery hill—when the other divisions came into the crater and that portion of the enemy's works which the first division occupied, they got all mixed up; they were all in a medley. That was the immediate reason of the failure.

Question. Suppose they had gone promptly through and taken possession of the heights in force, what then would have been the effect?

Answer. The enemy must have evacuated their line, or else we would have cut their army in two. I stated in my report that there was no cannon shot fired, as I thought, for an hour—I think it was two hours, but I will say one—from the left, and from the right but very few scattered shots, and no infantry firing from the front for half an hour; from the left for twenty minutes, and a few far to the right.

Question. You have stated the immediate reason of the failure: what was the more remote reason?

Answer. Another reason was, that the troops were not massed sufficiently near to our breastworks. It was feared that the explosion would throw up a great deal of debris and boards and everything of that kind into the air, and injure our men when they come down; and although I urged it upon General Burnside to mass them nearer the breastworks, still he would not agree to it for fear the men would be injured. The consequence was, that when the second brigade of the second division of the ninth corps came up in the morning, they came up by the flank, just straggling along, and not together, as they would have done if they had been right close up to the line.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. Did you testify as a witness before the court of inquiry which was ordered to investigate this matter by the commander of the army of the Potomac?

Answer. No, sir; I was on leave of absence then, and was not called.

Question. Will you state the circumstances under which that leave of absence was obtained.

Answer. I made application for leave of absence to attend to private business, and it was granted me by General Meade.

Question. Had it in any way for its object to avoid your testimony being given there?

Answer. Well, I did not want to go before the board; I thought no good

would come of it; it would only make me enemies, and I thought it better, as long as I remained in the army, that I should not go before the board. Therefore I made application for leave of absence.

Question. Who granted that leave of absence?

Answer. General Meade was the only person who had authority to grant it.

Question. Have you any reason to believe that General Burnside was aware of your disinclination to testify as a witness before that board?

Answer. General Burnside was not there.

Question. I should have said General Meade; had he any reason to know it?

Answer. I do not know.

Question. Why was it you did not wish to testify? Did you or not deem your knowledge of the facts material to the investigation of that affair?

Answer. No, sir, I did not. My only reason was, that I thought perhaps my testimony might be injurious to some of the general officers; and as the failure was a fact, and it could not be remedied, no good would come of it if I did testify, and it might have been the means of losing me some friends and making me some enemies. That was the reason I did not wish to testify. I have a copy of my report here, to which I have referred while giving my testimony, for the purpose of being correct in reference to dates, &c.

Question. Will you furnish the committee with a copy of that report?

Answer. I will, sir.

The following is a copy of the report referred to:

HEADQUARTERS 48TH PENN'A VETERAN VOLUNTEERS,  
*Near Petersburg, Va., August, 1864.*

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report, relating to the mine I excavated in front of the second division of the 9th corps.

It was commenced at 12 o'clock m., the 25th of June, 1864, without tools, lumber, or any of the materials requisite for such work. The mining picks were made out of those used by our pioneers; plank I obtained, at first, by tearing down a rebel bridge, and afterwards by sending to a saw-mill, five or six miles distant. The material excavated was carried out in hand-barrows made out of cracker boxes. The work progressed rapidly till the 2d of July, when it reached an extremely wet ground; the timbers gave way and the gallery nearly closed, the roof and floor of the mine nearly meeting. Retimbered it and started again. From this point had to excavate a stratum of marl, whose consistency was like putty, and which caused our progress to be necessarily slow. To avoid this, I started an inclined plane, and in about one hundred feet rose thirteen and a half feet perpendicularly.

On the 17th of July the main gallery was completed, being five hundred and ten and  $\frac{8}{10}$  feet in length. The enemy having obtained some knowledge of the mine, and having commenced searching for it, I was ordered to stop mining, which was, however, resumed on the 18th of July by starting the left lateral gallery. At 6 p. m., July 18, commenced the right lateral gallery; but as the enemy could be heard very plainly working in the fort over us, I caused this gallery to be excavated a little beyond and in rear of their work, and gave to it a curved line of direction. The left gallery, being thirty-seven feet long, was stopped at midnight on Friday, July 22; the right gallery, being thirty-eight feet long, was stopped at 6 p. m., July 23. The mine could have been charged and exploded at this time. I employed the men, from that time, in draining, timbering, and placing in position eight magazines, four in each lateral gallery. Having received the order to charge the mine on the 27th of July, I commenced putting in the powder at 4 p. m., and finished at 10 p. m. The tamping was begun at 10 p. m., July 27, and completed at 6 p. m., July 28. Thirty-four feet of main gallery was tamped, and ten feet of the entrance of each of the side galleries; but the space between the magazines was left untamped.

I received orders from corps headquarters, on the 29th of July, to fire the mine at half past three a. m., July 30. I lighted the fuze at 3.15 a. m., and having waited till 4.15 a. m., an officer and sergeant of my regiment volunteered to go in and examine into the cause of the delay, and found that the fire had stopped where the fuzes were spliced. They relighted it, and at sixteen minutes of five the powder exploded.

The charge consisted of three hundred and twenty kegs of powder, each containing about twenty-five pounds. It was placed in eight magazines, connected with each other by troughs half filled with powder. These troughs from the lateral galleries met at the inner end of the main one, and from this point I had three lines of fuzes for a distance of ninety-eight feet. Not having fuzes as long as required, two pieces had to be spliced together to make the required length of each of the lines.

The mine was ventilated at first by having the fresh air go in along the main gallery as far as it was excavated, and to return charged with the gases generated by the breathing and exhalation of the workmen, by the burning of the candles, and by those liberated from the ground, along and in a square tube made of boards, and whose area was sixty inches. This tube led to a perpendicular shaft twenty-two feet high, out of which this vitiated air escaped. At the bottom of this shaft was placed a grating, in which a large fire was kept burning continually, which, by heating the air, rarefied it, and increased its current. Afterwards I caused the fresh air to be let in the above-mentioned wooden tube to the end of the work, and the vitiated air to return by the gallery and out of the shaft, placing a partition with a door in the main gallery a little out of the shaft, to prevent its exit by the entrance of the mine. The latter plan was more advantageous, because the gases had to travel a less distance in the mine than before.

As the excavation in the mine progressed, the number of men required to carry out the material increased, until at last it took nearly every enlisted man in my regiment, which consisted of nearly four hundred effective men. The whole amount of material excavated was 18,000 cubic feet.

The great difficulty to surmount was to ascertain the exact distance from the entrance of the mine to the enemy's works, and the course of these works. This was accomplished by making five separate triangulations, which differed but slightly in their result. These triangulations were made in our most advanced line, and within 133 yards of the enemy's line of sharpshooters.

The size of the crater formed by the explosion was at least two hundred feet long, fifty feet wide, and twenty-five feet deep.

I stood on top of our breastworks and witnessed the effect of the explosion on the enemy. It so completely paralyzed them that the breach was practically four or five hundred yards in breadth. The rebels in the forts, both on the right and left of the explosion, left their works, and for over an hour not a shot was fired by their artillery. There was no fire from infantry from the front for at least half an hour; none from the left for twenty minutes, and but few shots from the right. The accompanying drawings which I have made, and forward with this report, will explain whatever else has been omitted here.

I have the honor to be, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
 HENRY PLEASANTS,  
*Lieutenant Colonel.*

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*Testimony of Brigadier General John W. Turner.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., *January 17, 1865.*

Brigadier General JOHN W. TURNER sworn and examined.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. I am a brigadier general of volunteers, and upon the staff of Major General Butler.

Question. What was your position on the 30th of July last?

Answer. I was in command of the second division of the 10th army corps. My division was detached from the 10th army corps and attached to the command of General Ord, commanding the 18th corps.

Question. What part did you take in the assault made upon the lines before Petersburg on the 30th of July last?

Answer. On the 29th of July I was ordered to hold myself, with my division, in readiness to participate in the assault that was to be made the next morning in General Burnside's front, with additional instructions from General Ord to report to General Burnside on the afternoon of the 29th for detailed instructions as to the position my division should occupy during the night, and the part I would have to take in the next day's work. I did so, and my instructions from General Burnside were that my division would follow immediately after the 9th corps. It was designed that the 9th corps should assault the enemy's line on the springing of the mine, and immediately push for Cemetery hill. My division would follow close after, move off to the right, and cover the movement of the 9th corps on Cemetery hill on its right flank. General Burnside further



told me that, in case they did not succeed in gaining Cemetery hill, they would undoubtedly hold possession of the enemy's lines, which they would take in the vicinity of the mine, and then I probably would not be brought into the engagement at all.

I went over the ground carefully with a staff officer of General Burnside's staff, visited the gallery leading to the mine and the route over which I was to take my division, especially through the woods, arriving at the point where I was directed to mass my division. I returned to General Burnside and asked him if there were any other troops to pass over that road during the night. Knowing the confusion that was likely to occur in the movement of troops during the night, particularly a dark night, I wanted no mistake to be made, and that I should be in my position at the time the attack was to be made, which was at half past three o'clock, the hour at which the mine was to have been sprung.

Just after nightfall I withdrew my troops from the trenches they were occupying and moved them to a point just in rear of where I was to mass them, where the road led into the woods. I there halted and waited for General Ledlie's division to pass, which was the division that General Burnside informed me would pass over that road, and the only division that was to pass. I was told to wait for it, and that after it had passed there would be nothing in my way to prevent my taking up my position. I arrived at the point where this road led into the woods about twelve o'clock at night, there halted my division and remained waiting for General Ledlie. To make sure, I had despatched a staff officer to General Ledlie's headquarters to ascertain when his division moved, as it was quite dark and it was very difficult to distinguish troops in the night time, more particularly to what division they belonged. I remained there until about half past two o'clock, when General Ledlie's division commenced passing. I remarked that it was pretty late for that division to pass to get into its position to move out at the time designated (at half past three) to make the assault, knowing the difficulties of the road. It passed me, and I immediately moved my division to the point designated, which was at the commencement of the covered way which led to our immediate front, through which all the troops were obliged to pass. It was a narrow covered way. I reported to General Ord about daylight that my troops were in position. He ordered me to wait for further orders.

Some time after five o'clock, between five and half past five, the mine was exploded. I immediately moved my division down this covered way towards the front, the leading regiments of it. Feeling an anxiety to get my men as far forward in support of the assault as possible, I moved them down a hundred yards and there halted. I then mounted a small mound of earth to observe the fighting that was going on. I remained there, I should judge, about half an hour. I then went myself to the front in order to gather all the information I could, so that I might be well informed when I got my orders. I returned, and I should judge it was half past six when I got my first orders to move to the front. My orders from General Ord were, "Follow Potter's division and move out to the right." The last of the troops of Potter's division had just then passed me. I was obliged to take my division down this covered way, where I could have only a two-file front, and in some places only a single file, and followed close on to the rear of General Potter's column. When the head of my column reached the point at which our assaulting column had passed through our lines, it was, as near as I recollect, about 7 o'clock.

I jumped upon a parapet to observe what was going on. Immediately in front of me lay the crater, about seventy-five yards distant. The men were in it and around it in great confusion; they were lying down, seeking shelter from the fire of the enemy, which at that time had become exceedingly warm. The enemy had succeeded in getting a cross-fire of artillery and musketry over

the ground lying between our line and the crater. My idea was that the 9th corps would penetrate the enemy's line and double them up to the right and to the left, and then I was to pass out and cover the right flank of the assaulting column; but the enemy still held possession of their lines up to within one hundred yards of the crater when I arrived, which surprised me. It left me no alternative of going out anywhere but directly opposite the crater, where the 9th corps went out. I could see no movement taking place beyond the crater towards Cemetery hill. The troops lay very thick in and around the crater, evidently more than could find cover from the enemy's fire. At that moment I received an order from General Ord again to move out rapidly to the right and cover General Potter on his right flank. It was evident to my mind that General Ord did not understand the topography of the country and the condition of affairs as they were at that moment. It was impossible to move out to the right. The idea was that we would dispossess the enemy of their lines, roll them up to the right, and allow me to go out to the right over any portion of our lines for four hundred yards. That state of affairs did not exist. To have gone out to the right I should have had to mount the parapet exposed to the enemy's fire directly opposite to me, (and they had their lines well manned at that time,) push through our own abatis, cross the morass through the enemy's abatis, and mount his line, which was a line that had been deemed impregnable for two months previous, and the only manner of getting at them was by breaking them, as was done by the crater, and then doubling them up. But the enemy held possession of their line, and to go out right in front of the crater was piling men on top of men already in and around there. I sent back word to General Ord that it was impossible to go out in the manner he had indicated. To make sure, I gave orders to my leading brigade (which was arriving very slowly in consequence of passing through this long, narrow covered way) to mass as it arrived, while I went over and examined the ground in and around the crater. I passed over there, and was confirmed in the judgment which I had held previously from mounting the parapet. The crater was full of men; they were lying all around, and every point that would give cover to a man was occupied. There was no movement towards Cemetery hill; the troops were all in confusion and lying down. I asked one or two officers there if an attempt had been made to move on Cemetery hill. They said the attempt had been made, but it had failed. I then said, "You ought to intrench your position here, and you have too many troops here already to intrench. There are so many troops here that they are in each other's way; they are only exposed to this terrific fire of the enemy," which was then growing warmer and warmer, and was a very severe fire. While I was talking to an officer—we had sought shelter in the crater—the head of the colored division appeared at the crest of the crater, and the division commenced piling over into the crater and passing across it on the other side as well as they could. I exclaimed, "What are these men sent in here for? it is only adding confusion to the confusion which already exists." The men literally came falling right over into this crater on their hands and knees; they were so thick in there that a man could not walk. Seeing that I was going to be covered up there, and be entirely useless, I thought I would go out. As I had no control over these troops, and supposing there were officers in command, I said, "If you can get these troops beyond this line so that I can get out, I will move my division right out and cover your right flank;" and I went back for the purpose of doing so. I met General Ord on our line at the head of my division. I said, "General, unless a movement is made out of the crater towards Cemetery hill, it is murder to send more men in there. That colored division should never have been sent in there; but there is a furor there, and perhaps they may move off sufficiently for me to pass my division out." "Well," said he, "do so if they move." A very few moments after I thought they had started to make a rush towards Cemetery hill, and I

immediately ordered my leading brigade, which was massed by regiments, to charge to the right of the crater. The colored division by that time had nearly, if not quite, all got into the crater; had passed to the right of it perhaps fifty yards, and were all lying down, principally this side of the enemy's line and in it, and were trying to cover themselves the best way they could. My leading brigade charged over our line up to the enemy's works, and took possession of about one hundred yards of it; but there were no movements of the troops in and around the crater to advance on Cemetery hill. At the time my leading brigade charged I directed the head of my second brigade to move out through a break in our works where a creek passed through it, so as to join hands on the right of the first brigade and charge the enemy's lines beyond. They succeeded in getting only about half way between our lines and the lines of the enemy, when they were stopped by the enemy's fire. The first brigade, as I said, succeeded in reaching the enemy's works, and took possession of about one hundred yards of it, when they laid down. I immediately sent word to my first brigade commander, who was within hailing distance—within sight, probably seventy-five yards off—to take his leading regiment and charge by the right flank, so as to sweep down the enemy's lines, while I brought up the second brigade. I was in hopes to take possession of a still greater length of the enemy's line. I returned to the brigade commander of my third brigade, and ordered him to mass his troops behind our lines, and hold them in readiness for any exigency. I had but just given him his instructions when my first brigade charged by the right flank, in obedience to my orders. I immediately passed over the line to the second brigade to give the command "Forward!" I had got, probably, half way between our line and the enemy's lines—which were perhaps only a hundred yards apart at that point, and it was a very broken country, thick underbrush and morass—when, looking to the left, I saw the troops in vast numbers come rushing back, and immediately my whole first brigade came back, and then my second brigade on my right, and everything was swept back in and around the crater, and probably all but about one-third of the original number stampeded back right into our lines. After some exertion I rallied my men of the first and second brigades after they got into our lines, while my third brigade held the line. After rallying them I placed them in position in the line, and remained there until probably the middle of the afternoon, when I received orders to retire. I would state, further, that the peculiar topography of the ground had a great influence in determining the result. It was impossible to assault in mass; columns had to come up only two file front.

Question. Why was there any necessity for your coming up that covered way within our line, after the 9th corps had charged?

Answer. The fire of the enemy had not been reduced, and it swept all the ground from the position where our division was massed up to the front of our line.

Question. What was the distance?

Answer. I suppose that distance was four hundred yards. When I was down there the day before I did not intend to pass through that covered way, knowing the great delay it would cause in trying to get troops through there. My idea was, and it was the idea conveyed at General Burnside's headquarters, that the 9th corps breaking the enemy's line would double it up to the right, and then I expected to move my division right over hill and vale—it was very rough. But by the time I got orders to move my division, the enemy's fire covered the ground.

Question. And you were compelled to use the covered way because of the enemy's fire?

Answer. Yes, sir; it was so heavy that the troops could not come up otherwise without great loss.

Question. You spoke about your first brigade passing to the enemy's line; did they pass through the crater?

Answer. No, sir; to the right of the crater.

Question. Did they pass through the enemy's line, and charge his parapet?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. While you were in the crater, or at any other time, did you see any of the division commanders of the 9th corps in the crater, or immediately with their troops?

Answer. I did not. I did not know General Potter, but I recognized no division commander of the 9th corps there. When I was in the crater I tried to find a division commander, for I had supposed I would find one in there, and I wanted to impress upon him my idea of the necessity of moving forward, because then was the time to determine what to do. It was one of two things; if we failed to move towards Cemetery hill, there was but one other thing to do, to intrench ourselves in the position we had gained, and we should have turned our attention to it. There was already twice the number of troops in and around the crater necessary to intrench themselves. They were in each other's way; and it was necessary also to open a communication between the crater and our own line. I went over there to see the ground, and to see a general officer and converse with him on that point, as I had no command or control over any of the 9th corps.

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## APPENDIX.

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WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington City, February 8, 1865.*

SIR: In compliance with your request I transmit herewith a copy of the testimony before the court of inquiry of which Major General W. S. Hancock was president, in relation to the explosion of a mine and attack upon the enemy's lines before Petersburg, Virginia, on the 30th July, 1864.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

Hon. B. F. WADE,

*U. S. Senate, Chairman Committee on Conduct of War.*

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RECORD OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY INSTITUTED BY SPECIAL ORDER No.  
258, 1864, W. D.

NOTE.—The erasures and interlineations in this record were almost unavoidable under the circumstances, but they were not regarded sufficiently objectionable to warrant the delay which would have attended the preparation of a fairer copy. The corrections were all made with the knowledge of the court.

EDWARD SCHRIVER,  
*Inspector General, Judge Advocate.*

*Record of the proceedings of court of inquiry instituted by virtue of the following orders :*

SPECIAL ORDERS, } WAR DEPARTMENT,  
 No. 258. } *Adj't General's Office, Washington, D. C., Aug. 3, 1864.*

[Extract—Paragraph 43.]

By direction of the President a court of inquiry will convene in front of Petersburg at 10 o'clock a. m. on the 5th instant, or as soon thereafter as practicable, to examine into and report upon the facts and circumstances attending the unsuccessful assault on the enemy's position on the 30th of July, 1864.

The court will report their opinion whether any officer or officers are answerable for the want of success of said assault; and if so, the name or names of such officer or officers.

*Detail for the court.*

Major General W. S. Hancock, Brigadier General R. B. Ayres, Brigadier General N. A. Miles; and Colonel E. Schriver, inspector general, judge advocate, United States volunteers.

By order of the Secretary of War :

E. D. TOWNSEND,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

FIRST DAY.

COURT ROOM, HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS,  
*August 6, 1864.*

The court met pursuant to the foregoing orders.

Present: Major General Hancock, Brigadier Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge advocate.

The order instituting the court was read, and the court and the judge advocate were sworn according to law.

The judge advocate then presented and read the orders issued from the headquarters of the army of the Potomac on the 29th of July, 1864, containing the "instructions for the guidance of all concerned" in the operations against the enemy's position before Petersburg, on the 30th of July, as follows :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*July 29, 1864.*

*Orders.*—The following instructions are issued for the guidance of all concerned :

1. As soon as it is dark Major General Burnside, commanding 9th corps, will withdraw his two brigades under General White, occupying the intrenchments between the plank and Norfolk roads, and bring them to his front. Care will be taken not to interfere with the troops of the 18th corps moving into their position in rear of the 9th corps.

General Burnside will form his troops for assaulting the enemy's works at daylight of the 30th, prepare his parapets and abatis for the passage of the columns, and have the pioneers equipped for work in opening passages for artillery, destroying enemy's abatis, &c., and the intrenching tools distributed for effecting lodgement, &c.

2. Major General Warren, commanding 5th corps, will reduce the number of his troops holding the intrenchments of his front to the minimum, and concentrate all his available force on his right, and hold them prepared to support the assault of Major General Burnside. The preparations in respect to pioneers, intrenching tools, &c., enjoined upon the 9th corps, will also be made by the 5th corps.

3. As soon as it is dark, Major General Ord, commanding 18th corps, will relieve his troops in the trenches by General Mott's division of the 2d corps, and form his corps in rear of the 9th corps, and be prepared to support the assault of Major General Burnside.

4. Every preparation will be made for moving forward the field artillery of each corps.

5. At dark, Major General Hancock, commanding 2d corps, will move from Deep Bottom to the rear of the intrenchments now held by the 18th corps, resume the command of Mott's division, and be prepared at daylight to follow up the assaulting and supporting column, or for such other operations as may be found necessary.

6. Major General Sheridan, commanding cavalry corps, will proceed at dark from the vicinity of Deep Bottom to Lee's mill, and at daylight will move with his whole corps, including Wilson's division, against the enemy's troops defending Petersburg on their right, by the roads leading from the southward and westward.

7. Major Duane, acting chief engineer, will have the pontoon trains parked at convenient points in the rear prepared to move. He will see that supplies of sand-bags, gabions, fascines, &c., are in depot near the lines ready for use. He will detail engineer officers for each corps.

8. At half past three in the morning of the 30th Major General Burnside will spring his mine, and his assaulting columns will immediately move rapidly upon the breach, seize the crest in the rear, and effect a lodgement there. He will be followed by Major General Ord, who will support him on the right, directing his movement to the crest indicated, and by Major General Warren, who will support him on the left. Upon the explosion of the mine the artillery of all kinds in battery will open upon those points of the enemy's works whose fire covers the ground over which our columns must move, care being taken to avoid impeding the progress of our troops. Special instructions respecting the direction of fire will be issued through the chief of artillery.

9. Corps commanders will report to the commanding general when their preparations are complete, and will advise him of every step in the progress of the operation, and of every thing important that occurs.

10. Promptitude, rapidity of execution, and cordial co-operation are essential to success, and the commanding general is confident that this indication of his expectations will insure the hearty efforts of the commanders and troops.

11. Headquarters during the operation will be at the headquarters of the 9th corps.

By command of Major General Meade:

S. WILLIAMS,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Whereupon the court directed the judge advocate to notify all the officers named therein of the institution and design of the court, so as to enable them to be present during its sessions, which was done by addressing the following circular to each:

COURT ROOM, HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS,  
*August 6, 1864.*

SIR: The court of inquiry instituted by the War Department, Special Orders No. 258, of August 3, 1864, for the investigation of the facts and circumstances which attended the unsuccessful assault on the enemy's lines before Petersburg on the 30th ultimo, will meet here on the 8th instant, and the days following, at ten o'clock a. m., and I am directed to acquaint you thereof, so that you may be present at the court's session, should you desire to do so. Please acknowledge the receipt of this communication to me at the headquarters of the army of the Potomac.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

EDWARD SCHRIVER,  
*Inspector General, Judge Advocate.*

Addressed to Major Generals Meade, Burnside, Warren, Sheridan, and Ord, and Brigadier Generals White, Hunt, and Mott, and Major Duane.

The court then adjourned, to meet at ten o'clock a. m. on the 8th instant.

SECOND DAY.

COURT ROOM, HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS,  
*10 o'clock a. m., August 8.*

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Hancock, Brigadier Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge advocate.

The proceedings of the first day were read and approved.

The judge advocate stated that he had engaged Mr. Finley Anderson, a phonographer, to record the proceedings, so long as he should do so to the court's satisfaction, and Mr. Anderson was sworn according to law.

It is here recorded, also, that all officers of rank who it is supposed participated in the affair of the 30th ultimo have been informed that they could be present at the court's sessions, and make any statements they may regard important to themselves, should they see fit.

Major General G. G. Meade, United States volunteers, being duly sworn, says :

I propose in the statement that I shall make to the court—I presume the court want me to make a statement of facts in connexion with this case—to give a slight preliminary history of certain events and operations which culminated in the assault on July 30, and which, in my judgment, are necessary to show to this court that I had a full appreciation of the difficulties that were to be encountered, and that I had endeavored, so far as my capacity and judgment would enable me, not only to anticipate, but to take measures to overcome those difficulties.

The mine constructed in front of General Burnside was commenced by that officer soon after the occupation of our present lines, upon the intercession of Lieutenant Colonel Pleasants, I think, of a Pennsylvania regiment, without any reference to, or any sanction obtained from, the general headquarters of the army of the Potomac. When the subject was brought to my knowledge I authorized the continuance of the operations, sanctioned them, and trusted that the work would at some time result in forming an important part in our operations. But from the first I never considered that the location of General Burnside's mine was a proper one, because, from what I could ascertain, the position of the enemy's works and lines erected at that time, the position against which he operated, was not a suitable one in which to assault the enemy's lines, as it was commanded on both flanks, and taken in reverse by their position on the Jerusalem plank road, and their works opposite the Hare House.

I will now read to the court the despatches which passed between Lieutenant General Grant, commanding the armies of the United States, and myself, which will bear in themselves a sort of history of the preliminary operations, a correspondence which resulted, as I said before, in the final arrangements for the assault on July 30.

On the 24th of July I received a letter from the lieutenant general commanding, which I will now read. I had been previously informed by the lieutenant general commanding that he desired some operations to take place offensive against the enemy, and he had instructed the engineer officer at his headquarters, the engineer officer at General Butler's headquarters, and the engineer officer at the headquarters of the army of the Potomac, to make an examination of the enemy's position, and give an opinion as to the probable result of an attack. Their opinion is contained in the following letter.—(See document marked A, appendix.)

I desire to call the particular attention of the court to that communication, because it contains the views of the lieutenant general commanding with reference to the assault which should be made on Petersburg, and I wish them to compare this communication with the orders and arrangements that I gave and made, so that they may see that to the best of my ability I ordered everything which he indicated to be done.

At the time that this communication was made to me, however, I was under the impression that the obstacles to be overcome were more formidable than the subsequent operations made me to believe, and also that subsequent to that time there had been no movement of the army to produce that great weakening of the enemy's front which afterwards occurred. Therefore my reply was to the effect that I was opposed to our making the assault.

The following is my reply, sent on the 24th.—(See document B and B 2.)

In reply to that I received a communication or report from General Grant, the result of which was a suspension of the proposed attack.—(Document C.)

Next day I made a closer examination; and in the mean time a signal station was erected in a pine tree in front of General Burnside, which gave us a more complete view than we had previously had of the enemy's line. My observations modified my views, because I could not detect a second line, although I

detected isolated batteries on the crest. I therefore wrote the following communication to General Grant, dated 12 m., July 26.—(Document D.)

To which I received the following reply.—(Document E.)

There you perceive that the lieutenant general commanding ordered that whilst the 2d corps was across the James river I should immediately make an assault with the 9th and 5th, abandoning the line of the 5th corps. In answer to that I wrote him the following despatch.—(Document F.)

That produced a suspension of the order to attack until the return of General Hancock. The next despatch I received from General Grant was the following.—(Document G.)

Which I answered at 1 p. m., July 28, as follows.—(Document H.)

I will here observe that Lieutenant General Grant, in consequence of the services which the 2d corps had performed across the river, desired, and gave me directions verbally to that effect, to use the 18th corps in the assault, and to let the 2d corps take the place of the 18th in the line.

The next despatch I received was the following, dated City Point, July 29.—(Document I.)

General Grant had come to my headquarters at 4 p. m., and at that time I showed him the order for the assault next day, which had just then been prepared, and which order met with his perfect approbation; he read the order and expressed his satisfaction with it. No other despatches passed between the lieutenant general and myself.

Next morning, between half past three and four o'clock—before four o'clock, he arrived on the ground, at General Burnside's headquarters, and all further communications between us were verbal, until August 1, at 11.40 a. m., when I received the following despatch.—(Document J.)

We had given our respective views concerning the assault, and I particularly impressed my views with reference to the difficulties to be overcome. When it was ascertained that the movement of the 2d corps had drawn over to the north bank of the James five of the eight divisions composing General Lee's army, together with the information I had obtained that the enemy had no second line upon the ridge, but only one or two isolated batteries, I came to the conclusion that the explosion of the mine, and the subsequent assault on the crest, I had every reason to believe would be successful, and would be followed by results which would have consisted in the capture of the whole of the enemy's artillery, and a greater part of his infantry.

The plan sketched out by Lieutenant General Grant in his despatch to me, which I endeavored to carry out, and for the execution of which I gave the necessary orders, was, that the mine should be exploded as early as possible in the morning, before daylight; that in the mean time the 9th corps should be massed and formed in assaulting columns; that every preparation should be made by removing the abatis so that the troops could debouch, and particularly the assaulting columns; that as soon as the mine was exploded, the assaulting columns should push forward; that a sufficient proportion should be left to guard the flanks of the main column, because they had to look for an attack on the flanks; that the main body should hold the lines during the attempt to gain the crest of the hill, and if it was successful then I intended to throw up the whole of the 18th corps, to be followed by the 2d corps, and if necessary by the 5th corps, also. I do not suppose it is necessary to read the order. I will read it, however.—(Document K.)

Having read to the court the correspondence which passed between the lieutenant general and myself preliminary to the operations, and having read the order for the operations, I now propose to read and to accompany with some explanatory remarks the despatches and correspondence which passed between myself and Major General Burnside, who had the immediate active operations to perform; afterwards between myself and Major General Ord, between myself



and Major General Warren, and between myself and Major General Hancock. These despatches, when compared with each other, and in connexion with the remarks which I shall make, will show the facts so far as they came to my knowledge; and I wish the court to bear in mind, and I desire to call their attention particularly to the paucity of information which was furnished me by Major General Burnside of the operations which were made, and to the difficulty that a major general commanding an army like the one I am commanding labors under to give direct orders in the ignorance of matters transpiring in the front at the immediate scene of operations.

Before those operations were concluded upon I called on Major General Burnside to furnish me in writing what he proposed to do in case his mine was exploded. In response to which I received the following report.—(Document L.)

The request made in that communication by Major General Burnside was complied with—that is to say, sand-bags were furnished him; but the amount of powder asked for, which was twelve thousand pounds, was reduced to eight thousand, upon the belief on my part, and on that of my engineers, that eight thousand pounds would be sufficient for the purpose.

Another matter in that despatch to which my attention was directed, and which was finally the subject of an order on my part, is the suggestion of Major General Burnside to place the colored troops at the head of the assaulting column. That I disapproved, and I informed him of my disapproval, which was based upon the ground, not that I had any reason to doubt, or any desire to doubt, the good qualities of the colored troops, but that I desired to impress upon Major General Burnside, which I did do in conversations, of which I have plenty of witnesses to evidence, and in every way I could, that this operation was to be a *coup-de-main*; that his assaulting column was to be as a forlorn hope, such as are put into breaches, and that he should assault with his best troops; not that I had any intention to insinuate that the colored troops were inferior to his best troops, but that I understood that they had never been under fire, nor that they should not be taken for such a critical operation as this, but that he should take such troops as from previous service could be depended upon as being perfectly reliable. Finding General Burnside very much disappointed—for he had made known to General Ferrero and his troops that they were to lead in the assault—and fearing that the effect might be injurious, and in order to show him that I was not governed by any motive other than such as I ought to be governed by, I told him I would submit the matter, with his reasons and my objections, to the lieutenant general commanding the armies, and I would abide by the decision of the lieutenant general as to whether it was expedient and right for the colored troops to lead the assault. Upon referring the question to the lieutenant general commanding, he fully concurred in my views, and I accordingly addressed to Major General Burnside, or had addressed to him, the following communication.—(Document M.)

[The following despatches read near the end of the testimony are here inserted, as directed, in their proper places.]—(Documents M 1, and M 2.)

The next despatch to Major General Burnside was addressed by me at 9.45 p. m., July 29, the evening before the action. I had received a despatch from General Ord, stating that it would take him till very late to relieve the troops in the trenches.

The following is my despatch to General Burnside.—(Document N.)

My idea was that General Burnside should form his columns of assault, make all his preparations, take all his men out of the trenches, and move forward; and that then General Ord should occupy his trenches in case he should find it necessary to return. No further despatches passed between General Burnside and myself. I think it proper to state, however, that on the day previous to the assault I was at General Burnside's headquarters, and had the good fortune

to meet his three division commanders, and some conversation passed between us, and I would like the court to inquire into what transpired on that occasion, because I would like to impress upon the court, as I did impress upon General Burnside and his officers, that this operation which we had to perform was one purely of time; that if immediate advantage was not taken of the explosion of the mine, and the consequent confusion of the enemy, and the crest immediately gained, it would be impossible to remain there, for that as soon as the enemy should recover from their confusion, they would bring their troops and batteries to bear upon us and we would be driven out. That there were two things to be done, namely, that we should go up promptly and take the crest; for, in my judgment, the mere occupation of the crater and the holding on to that was of no possible use to us, because the enemy's line was not such a line as would be of advantage to us to hold, except to go from it to the crest; and that the troops were to be withdrawn when the assault proved unsuccessful.

General HANCOCK, *president*. Do you not mean that you met four division commanders, instead of three, as you said, at the headquarters of General Burnside?

General MEADE. No; I mean three. I saw Potter, Ledlie, and Wilcox, and I mentioned in the presence of those gentlemen the tactical manœuvres to be made between that crater and the crest—that the only thing to be done was to rush for the crest and take it immediately after the explosion had taken place; and that they might rest assured that any attempt to take time to form their troops would result in a repulse.

Those were all the despatches that transpired between General Burnside and myself before the day of the assault.

On the morning of the 30th, about a quarter past three o'clock, when I was about preparing to go forward to General Burnside's headquarters, I found that it was very dark, and suggestions being made by some of my officers that it was too dark to operate successfully, and that a postponement of the explosion of the mine might be advantageous, I accordingly addressed a despatch to General Burnside to the following effect.—(Document O.)

To that I received the following reply from General Burnside.—(Document P.)

I then went over to General Burnside's headquarters, he, during these operations, being further to the front. The hour had arrived. I stood waiting. I heard no report from General Burnside and no explosion of the mine. In the mean time Lieutenant General Grant arrived. Finding that there was no explosion, I sent two staff officers, first Captain Jay, and then ———, I do not recollect the name of the other; but I sent two staff officers to ascertain from General Burnside what the difficulty was, if there was any difficulty; why his mine did not explode, if he knew; to which I received no answer. At 4.10 the following despatch was sent to him.—(Document Q.)

And to this I got no answer.

At 4.20 another despatch was sent to him, as follows.—(Document R.)

I should have stated before this, that, in order to secure the speedy transmission of intelligence, I took the precaution to have a telegraph run from my headquarters, in General Burnside's camp, to where General Burnside had established his headquarters for the day, in the 14-gun battery.

The following is the next despatch I sent to General Burnside.—(Document S.)

To this I received no reply. Finding that no replies were received, and the lieutenant general commanding desiring that an immediate assault should be made without reference to the mine, at 4.35 the following despatch was sent to General Burnside.—(Document T.)

The same orders, you will find, were sent to General Warren, to General Mott, and to General Hunt to open the artillery. About this time, however, about 4.40, the mine was exploded. In the mean time Captain Jay returned and informed me that the fuze had failed; that a defect was found, and the fuze had been overhauled about fifty feet or twenty-five feet, I forget the distance, from the entrance; that the defect had been ascertained and had been remedied, and that finally the mine had been exploded. So far as my recollection goes, the mine was exploded about 4.40 or 4.45. At 5.45 a. m., one hour after the explosion of the mine, the following despatch was sent to General Burnside.—(Document U.)

The following despatch was received from him, apparently as an answer to mine, although through a difference in time, it is dated before it.—(Document V.)

About this time, 5.45 or 5.50, (I see by reference to the despatch that it is 5.45,) an orderly came up to me and delivered me a despatch, which, upon opening, I found to be a despatch from Colonel Loring, inspector general of the 9th corps, written at the crater, and addressed to General Burnside, which despatch the orderly, not knowing where to find General Burnside, had brought to his old headquarters, where it found me. That despatch, so far as I recollect the purport of it, was to the effect that General Ledlie's troops occupied the crater, but, in his (Colonel Loring's) opinion, he feared the men could not be induced to advance beyond. That despatch was telegraphed to General Burnside, and sent to him by an officer, so that I have no copy of it. That was the substance of it, however. It was shown to General Grant and General Humphreys, both of whom can give their recollection of it in confirmation of mine. It is an important matter to be taken into consideration here, that as early as 5.45 a. m. a despatch was placed in my hands stating that General Ledlie's troops could not be induced to advance.

In addition to that, the following despatch was sent to him.—(Document W.)

Fearing that there might be some difficulty on the part of General Burnside's troops, I thought it possible that by another corps going in on his right encouragement might be given to his men, and a prompt assault might be made.

The next despatch I received was from an aide-de-camp, whom I had sent to General Burnside's headquarters to advise me of what was going on. It is dated 5.50, and is from Captain Sanders.—(Document X.)

The next despatch that I will read is one addressed to General Burnside, at 6 a. m.—(Document Y.)

Despatches were at this time also sent to Generals Ord and Warren. You can keep these dates in your mind.

The next despatch was received from Captain Sanders, at 6.10 a. m., as follows.—(Document Z.)

The following despatches are next in order.—(Documents 1, 2, and 3.)

At 7 a. m. Lieutenant General Grant put into my hand a despatch from Colonel Comstock, an officer whom he had sent to see the progress of operations.—(Document 4.)

I read all these despatches over, that you may see how I was situated on the occasion, and what I knew of what was going on.

. At 7.20—twenty minutes afterwards—I got the following despatch from General Burnside.—(Document 5.)

Upon the receipt of this despatch from General Burnside, informing me that it was hard work to take the crest, at the same time he not having reported to me that anybody had attempted to take it, or that any part of his force had made any effort to take it; with the despatches from my officers, the despatch from Colonel Loring, and the despatch from Colonel Comstock, to the effect that the troops were lying there, I came to the conclusion that possibly there might be some difficulty in getting the men to move forward, either from the

enemy's fire, or some imaginary obstacle the troops had to encounter; that, as it was now 7 o'clock, and that the place had been occupied at 5.30, I began to suppose that there was some reason for the delay which had not been officially reported. I considered it natural that General Burnside would be indisposed to make it known, so long as he had hopes of overcoming the difficulty. To me, in my position as major general commanding the army, it was a matter of the utmost importance, because it was my intention during the assault, and before it, that if we could not carry the crest promptly by a coup-de-main, to withdraw the troops as quickly and safely as possible. Impressed with this view, and in order to get at the exact condition of affairs, and to justify General Burnside, if there was any reason of that kind, I addressed him the following despatch.—(Document 6.)

It is proper to say, that immediately after sending that despatch, and before receiving General Burnside's answer, I received a report verbally from Captain Sanders that an attempt had been made to make an attack on the right, I think by General Griffin, and that he had been repulsed. I immediately sent another despatch to General Burnside at 8 a. m., as follows.—(Document 7.)

To the first of these two despatches, subsequent to sending the second, I received this reply.—(Document 8.)

The next despatch that I received was one from Colonel Comstock, about the same time, 8 a. m.—(Document 9.)

The next despatch I received was one dated 8.45 a. m., from Captain Sanders.—(Document 10.)

At 9 a. m. I received the following despatch from General Burnside.—(Document 11.)

That was the first information I had received that there was any collision with the enemy, or that there was any enemy present. At 9.30 a. m. the following despatch was sent to General Burnside.—(Document 12.)

Then I received the following despatch from Captain Sanders.—(Document 13.)

The next despatch was this, from Colonel Comstock.—(Document 14.)

The next despatch to General Burnside, at 9.45, was the peremptory order to withdraw.—(Document 15.)

Receiving information from some person—I don't know who it was—that there was some difficulty about withdrawing at that time, that the safety of the column might be jeopardized by undertaking to withdraw it, the following despatch was sent to General Burnside, and also to General Ord, who had troops there at that time. None of my despatches to General Ord have been presented yet, because it would have confused matters. I will read them hereafter.—(Document 16.)

About that time, both Major General Burnside and Major General Ord came to the headquarters where General Grant and myself were temporarily located. General Burnside seemed to be very much displeased at the order of withdrawal, and expressed the opinion that if allowed to remain there, by nightfall he could carry that crest. As, however, he did not give any reason to show how he could take it, and as he had been from half past five in the morning till nearly ten, and not only had not taken it, but had his men driven out of the works he had been occupying, and as Major General Ord, whose troops were also there, upon being asked if the crest could be carried, answered very positively that it was entirely out of the question, it was determined by the lieutenant general commanding and myself—or rather I referred the matter to him, to know if he desired the orders changed—it was determined that no further attempt should be made to take the crest, but that the men should be withdrawn whenever that could be done with security.

There is now a very important point to which I will call the attention of the

court, and which I want investigated very thoroughly, and that is the withdrawal from the crater.

At the time the order was given to withdraw the troops, the report of Major General Ord was, that the crater of the mine was so overcrowded with men that it would be nothing but murder to send any more men forward there. I do not recollect as to whether the report of Major General Burnside was so definite, but I believe the report of Colonel Loring was that there was at least one division of the troops in there. The impression left upon my mind was, that at that time there were as many men in the crater as would enable them to defend themselves if attacked, and in case no defence was necessary there was no occasion on my part to order troops to be sent there. I presumed that Major General Ord and Major General Burnside, having charge of that operation, would see that the men would be properly withdrawn.

This conclusion having been arrived at by the lieutenant general and myself, and it not appearing necessary that we should remain any longer at Major General Burnside's headquarters, the lieutenant general commanding withdrew to City Point, and I withdrew to my former headquarters, where I was in telegraphic communication with Major General Burnside, and where, under the common correspondence between a general officer commanding the army and his subordinates, not to say under a peculiar exigency, I expected to be informed of anything that should occur. I remained in total ignorance of any further transactions until about six or seven o'clock in the evening. About that hour a report, or a rumor, reached me that there were a number of our wounded men lying between the crater and our line, and I think an appeal was made to me by General Ord if something could not be done to remove those men. I was not aware that there was any difficulty in the way of removing them, and wondered why they had not been removed, presuming that our men were in the crater; and as no report had been made to me that they had been withdrawn, I directed a despatch to be sent to Major General Burnside, calling upon him for information. That despatch read as follows.—(Document 17.)

You will remember that I left General Burnside's headquarters about 10 o'clock, with the understanding that the troops were to be withdrawn when they could be withdrawn with security.

[The following despatches were subsequently read by the witness:—(Documents 18, 18 $\frac{1}{4}$ , 18 $\frac{1}{2}$ , 18 $\frac{3}{4}$ , 19, 19 $\frac{1}{4}$ , 20.)

So far as any information from General Burnside is concerned, I had to go to bed that night without knowing whether his troops were in the crater, or whether they were not. During the night despatches were received, referring to the relief of General Ord's troops next morning, July 31, at 8.40 and 9 a. m. The despatches 18 $\frac{1}{4}$  and 18 $\frac{1}{2}$  were sent and received by General Humphreys. No despatch was received from General Burnside with reference to the withdrawal of these troops till 6.40 p. m., July 31, (marked 18 $\frac{3}{4}$ ), to which was sent the one marked 19, at 9.10 p. m., July 31. The despatch was received from General Burnside, marked 19 $\frac{1}{4}$ , and the reply, marked 20, was sent. Now, I beg leave to call the attention of the court to the fact that this despatch is dated 9.10 p. m., July 31, and although it does not give an official statement of the time of the withdrawal of the troops, I know, but only from other information, that the withdrawal was at about 2 p. m., July 30. And as I consider that my conduct is here the subject of investigation as much as that of any other officer or man engaged in this enterprise, I wish to repudiate, distinctly, any responsibility resting upon me for the manner of the withdrawal, beyond the orders I gave to the effect that the troops were to be withdrawn when they could be withdrawn with security; and if they had been able to repulse an attack of the enemy, it seems to me rather extraordinary, when another attack was threatened after the success, that they should be withdrawn simply

because they were threatened with another attack. But that is the point to which I wish to call the attention of the court, and which I wish to have thoroughly investigated.

I believe those constitute the sum and substance of all the orders that passed between myself and Major General Burnside. But I respectfully submit to this court that so far as it was in my power, as the commanding general of this army, to give orders, I anticipated the difficulties that occurred, and endeavored to avoid them as much as I could do so, and that I cannot be held responsible for the failure which afterwards resulted.

Having finished my correspondence with and orders to General Burnside, I now propose to read the correspondence with and orders to General Ord, who was the officer commanding the force next to be employed after those of General Burnside, and whose movements it is important to know.

Major General Ord was directed to relieve his corps by General Mott's division of the 2d corps on the evening of the 29th. He was then to move and mass his troops in rear of the 9th corps, and it was intended that he should support the 9th corps whenever the 9th corps had effected a lodgement on the crest; that he was promptly to move up to them and support them on the crest. I had several interviews with General Ord on the 28th and 29th. I went with him and showed him the position; showed him exactly the ground; gave him all the information I had, and also caused him to send staff officers to select positions for the troops, so that when it became dark they might know the roads. On the morning of July 30, when it became evident to my mind that General Burnside's troops were not going to advance further than the crater, and when I had reason to suppose it was owing to some difficulty on the part of the troops themselves, and so far as any official report came to me, rather than obstacles presented by the enemy, I sent a despatch to General Ord changing his previous orders and directing him, instead of supporting General Burnside, to make an assault independent of General Burnside. That despatch and subsequent despatches are as follows.—(Documents 21, 22, 23, 23½, 23½, 24.)

There were some other despatches to General Ord of a similar character, (but I do not see them here,) to endeavor to get him forward, independent of the 9th corps, to make an isolated attack, an attack of his own, independent of the 9th corps. Owing to the obstacles presented—the fact that there was no proper *debouche* for our troops to that portion of the enemy's line, and the fact that the crater was overcrowded with men—General Ord, considering those obstacles insurmountable, confined his operations to sending forward, I think, only one brigade. But General Ord and his division commanders have made reports, which will be placed before you. I forgot to bring them with me to-day.

At about 9.45 a. m. the same orders were sent to General Ord as to General Burnside, with reference to the withdrawal of the troops. That finishes all that passed between General Ord and myself.

The other supporting column was under Major General Warren, on the left.

In the original order General Warren was directed to mass his available troops on the right of the line, and to make all his preparations to support General Burnside in the assault wherever he should be ordered.

At 4.40 a. m. the following despatch was sent to him.—(Document 25.)

At 5.50, one hour afterwards, and immediately after my receiving the information that General Burnside's corps occupied the crater, the following despatch was sent to him.—(Document 26.)

I wish to call the attention of the court to the fact that as early as 5.50 I authorized General Warren, if he saw any opportunity of doing anything with his corps, not only in support of General Burnside, but as an independent operation of his own, that he should take advantage of it and push forward his troops. His reply, dated 6 a. m., is as follows.—(Document 27.)

At 6.15 a. m. another despatch was received from him, as follows.—(Document 28.)

Then at 6.20 another despatch, No. 29, came from General Warren, in which he states that what we thought was a heavy line of the enemy behind the line occupied by Burnside's troops, as the sunlight comes out and the smoke clears away, proves to be our own troops in the enemy's position.

You will perceive that at 5.40 I authorized General Warren and directed him to make an attack without waiting for the support of General Burnside—that is, if circumstances would justify his making an attack; and that his replies here indicate that no such attack was practicable. Coming to that conclusion, and receiving information from the signal officers that the enemy had left their extreme right, which I presumed they would do, to mass on the centre to receive our attack, the following despatch was sent to General Warren at half past six o'clock.—(Document 30.)

General BURNSIDE asked for the reading of the despatch to General Wilson, commanding a cavalry division.

General MEADE replied that he did not have the despatch with him now, but would procure it for him. The order to General Wilson was written, he said, about the same time as the above despatch to General Warren—about half past six a. m.

General BURNSIDE wished to be informed whether or not the order to General Wilson was rescinded.

General MEADE replied that the order to the cavalry was rescinded when the infantry was ordered to withdraw.

General MEADE then resumed the reading of despatches, presenting Documents 31 and 32.

General BURNSIDE. I would like to know what that despatch to the cavalry was, and exactly what time it was rescinded.

General HANCOCK. If you will recollect the matter, we will have it called for subsequently.

General MEADE. Just make a memorandum of it, and I will have it sent. Indeed, I am not positive, but I think my despatches to General Sheridan, of the cavalry, are here. If they are, they will be read.

The next despatch in order is the following, dated 7.30 a. m., to General Warren.—(Document 33.)

General Ayres still remained on the right, and the orders still existed to do anything with him that could be done to advantage. At 7.50 a. m. we have the next despatch from General Warren.—(Document 34.)

Nothing further was received while we awaited developments from General Crawford until 8 a. m., when the following despatch was received from General Warren.—(Document 35.)

Notwithstanding that it was considered that General Warren's original order authorized him to take the batteries if it could be done, inasmuch as he was directed to move and attack with General Crawford, and as it was suggested that General Ayres might be required, it was thought proper to send him the following order at 8 $\frac{1}{2}$  a. m.—(Document 36.)

At 9.15 a. m. the following despatch was received from General Warren.—(Document 37.)

At this time the conclusion had been arrived at by the lieutenant general commanding and myself that the affair was over, and that nothing more could be done; and soon afterwards, orders similar to those which were sent to others were sent to General Warren, that he should not make any attempt to take the two-gun battery. The following despatches were sent to General Warren.—(Documents 38, 38 $\frac{1}{2}$ , 39, and 40.)

These are all the orders and communications that passed between General

Warren and myself. He was authorized to attack, if he could see a good chance to attack. When he reported no chance to attack, and was asked what force he had available, he reported that he had no force available except he moved Ayres. He was directed not to move Ayres until information was received from Crawford; only, if he could attack the two-gun battery in his front, he was ordered to attack it, and then the operations were subsequently suspended.

Now I have read you the communications that passed between myself and General Grant, myself and General Burnside, myself and General Ord, and myself and General Warren. It now remains for me to read the communications that passed between myself and General Hancock, and myself and General Mott.

The first was a communication sent 4.40 a. m. to General Mott.—(Document 41.)

At 4.50 a. m. the following despatch was sent to the telegraph operator at the headquarters of the 18th corps.—(Document 42.)

The following despatch, dated July 30, 6 a. m., was sent to General Hancock, after the mine was occupied.—(Document 43.)

The following despatches were sent and received.—(Documents 44, 45, 45½, 45¾, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, and 52.)

These include the despatches sent to the cavalry. I would explain that the separate orders to General Wilson were issued because General Sheridan, commanding the cavalry corps, was across the James river, at Deep Bottom, with two divisions, and I had to issue separate orders to General Wilson, so that he might be ready for the movement next day.

Here are some despatches which are of no particular consequence, but I will leave them here. They are despatches from the signal officers, indicating the movements of the enemy :

General BURNSIDE. I would suggest that all the despatches should be left.

General HANCOCK. General Meade is now giving his direct testimony, and only such despatches are numbered as he wishes to incorporate. The others will be left here and can be called for at any time.

General MEADE. Well, I will read these despatches, and you can number them and put them down.—(Documents 54, 55, 56, 57, and 58.)

It was on those reports of the signal officers that General Warren's orders were predicated.

The following is the report of the chief of engineers.—(Document 59.)

I believe I have now read every despatch that I have received, and the court are fully aware of all the information that I received on the ground.

General BURNSIDE said that before the court adjourned he would like to ask what latitude was allowed in the investigation.

General HANCOCK explained that the court had gone back to the orders from General Meade, the orders from General Grant, and to the first inception of the mine.

General MEADE. I would state that in the general orders issued on the night previous to the assault the cavalry was ordered to make this attack on the left. Two divisions of the cavalry corps were over at Deep Bottom. They could not cross the river until after the second corps had crossed, so that it was late in the day before they came up. Indeed, the head of the column did not appear before the offensive operations were suspended. As General Wilson had been ordered to be in readiness, however, and in view of the unavoidable delay of Sheridan, orders were sent to General Wilson not to wait for General Sheridan, but to push on himself to the Weldon railroad and make an assault upon the enemy. No report was received from General Sheridan. General Sheridan was sick. General Gregg reported in the evening that he had advanced his cavalry, and that they had found the enemy in force at Ream's Station, at Gurley's house, and at various other points along the railroad. There was no attack made by the



cavalry except at Lee's mills, where General Gregg, encountering cavalry, drove them away to water his horses.

When it was known that our offensive operations were suspended, orders were sent to the cavalry that they should push on as far as possible and find out the enemy's position; but the original orders about going into town were modified, inasmuch as the operations in our immediate front were suspended.

I desire to say to the court that it has not been my disposition or intention to throw censure upon anybody for the unfortunate failure; that, indeed, I have not been furnished with the necessary information to enable me to do so. I have not yet received Major General Burnside's, or his subordinate commanders', official reports. I have very little knowledge of what actually transpired except from the despatches you have heard read here. I have been groping in the dark since the commencement of the attack. I did not wish to take any unpleasant measures, but I thought it my duty to suggest to the President of the United States that this matter should be investigated, and that the censure should be made to rest upon those who are entitled to it. What I have done has been to show that I tried to do all I could to insure success.

During the day General Burnside and some of his staff, Generals Potter and Ferrero of the 9th corps, were present.

The court adjourned, to meet at 10 o'clock a. m. on the 9th.

### THIRD DAY.

#### COURT ROOM, HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, *August 9, 1864.*

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Hancock, Brigadier Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge advocate.

The reading of the record of the second day was proceeded with until suspended at page 30, document 25, by General Burnside's verbal application to have all the documents bearing date after 2 o'clock p. m. on the 30th July, and all evidence relating to events subsequent to that time, removed from the record, the reasons for which, by direction of the court, were reduced to writing, and presented as follows:

#### HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS, *August 9, 1864.*

GENTLEMEN: I beg to submit to the court that all testimony, whether by despatches or otherwise, relating to occurrences subsequent to 2 p. m. on 30th July last, at which time our troops had withdrawn from the enemy's line, and the assault was over, should be erased from the record, and no such evidence admitted in future.

The terms of the order appointing the court distinctly limit the action of the court to reporting the "facts and circumstances attending the unsuccessful assault on the enemy's position on the 30th July, 1864," and "their opinion whether any officer or officers are answerable for the want of success of said assault," and whatever events happened subsequent to the withdrawal have no relation to the success or want of success of the assault, and are not within the purview of the court.

Moreover, certain of these subsequent occurrences have been made the subject of charge against me by the major general commanding the army, and on which charges I am to be tried by another court. They, therefore, should not be investigated by this court.

I am, gentlemen, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General.*

COURT OF INQUIRY,  
Maj. Gen. HANCOCK, *President.*

The following paper was then submitted by Major General Meade:

"I respectfully submit to the court that the objection raised by Major General Burnside is not tenable. As I have before said, I consider my conduct the subject of the court's investigation. To show that I was not, and could not be, held responsible for the manner of the withdrawal, and the circumstances attending it, it is necessary for me to show that I was

not furnished with any information; and furthermore, I claim the right to show in evidence that no effort on my part was omitted to obtain the necessary information.

"Independent of this personal consideration, and my rights as one whose conduct is under examination, I beg leave also to submit that the receiving of these official despatches in this case cannot, in any way, affect the case of General Burnside when on trial on the charges referred to by him. Those charges are disobedience of orders, and have no reference to his management of affairs on the 30th; because, even should it be proved to the satisfaction of the court (and I shall be glad to hear that it is) that General Burnside is in no way responsible for the lamentable failure on the 30th, it does not alter the facts of the case whether he obeyed or disobeyed my orders on that or any other occasion.

"This is a foreign matter, stands on its own merits, and has no connexion with the proceeding of this court, beyond the fact that these documents will be produced in both cases.

"Again, I respectfully submit, General Burnside's objections should have been made earlier in the proceedings, because among the charges preferred against him is one based on the very disrespectful despatch sent by him to me at light, a. m., July 30, and this despatch should be thrown out on the same ground, which would at once prevent me from stating my case in the manner in which I claim I have the right to.

"I beg leave to call the attention of the court to the hour of 2 o'clock being specified in General Burnside's objections, and ask the court to note that there is no evidence before them when the assault, if any, was made, or what occurred at 2 o'clock.

"I take it this court must modify the rules which would govern courts of inquiry when the conduct of only one individual is called in question. This court has to pass judgment on the conduct of numerous officers, and the relative rights of each should be considered.

"As I understand it, no one in particular is arraigned here, and, therefore, what occurs here can only be repeated elsewhere to the detriment of any of the parties concerned, and must be repeated.

"These are official documents, part of the archives of the army of the Potomac, and their production in my vindication will give no weight to their production against General Burnside, should he be tried on the charge of disobedience of orders. For these reasons I must respectfully insist on the court's receiving them."

General Burnside then submitted the following :

"In reply to General Meade's argument, I beg to say that there is no evidence on the record, and none furnished by the documents in question, that General Meade did in any way, by aide-de-camp or otherwise, use means to obtain any information in reference to the withdrawal, or anything that occurred after he left my headquarters, about 11 o'clock, until after 6 o'clock in the evening, instead of, as he states, no effort being omitted on his part to obtain the necessary information. Nor was such effort made, to my knowledge. General Meade himself states, in his argument, that the charges have no reference to the management of affairs on the 30th; and as these charges contain in full the documents to which I object, they therefore should be excluded here.

"A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General.*"

The court was cleared. The court was opened, and the following decision of the court announced :

The proper time for objection to the reception of evidence is when it is offered and before accepted. Due notice was given to all persons who were supposed to be interested in the investigation (of which General Burnside was one) to be present if they so willed. The court, however, decides that the evidence, documentary and verbal, in question has a bearing on the conduct of individuals other than General Burnside. The court is ordered to examine into the "facts and circumstances attending the unsuccessful assault on the enemy's position on the 30th of July," and the authorities permit a court of inquiry to enter into such incidental examination of particular points as may become necessary to a full understanding of the matter at issue.

The court, therefore, considers it a duty to examine into all the circumstances of the assault, the subsequent withdrawal of the troops, and everything connected therewith.

The judge advocate continued the reading of the record of the second day, and, on completion, it was approved, several corrections having been made by the witness, whose meaning had not been fully understood.

The examination of Major General Meade was then resumed.

Question by judge advocate. When did Mott's division leave Deep Bottom, and arrive at the 18th corps to relieve it?

Answer. Orders were given in person to Major General Hancock about 5 or 6 o'clock on the evening of the 28th, requiring him to withdraw Mott's division, then in his line of battle, in the presence of the enemy, after dark, and send it to report to General Ord, commanding the 18th corps. Orders were subsequently given to General Ord, when the division came up, about daylight on the 29th, to mass it in the woods near the railroad, out of sight of the enemy, and at dark on the evening of the 29th to put it in his trenches to relieve his corps.

Adjourned till 10 o'clock a. m. on the 10th.

#### FOURTH DAY.

#### COURT ROOM, HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS,

*August 10, 1864.*

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Hancock, Brigadier Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge advocate.

There were also present Generals Ferrero, Potter, and Wilcox, of the 9th corps, General Mott, of the 2d, and General Carr, of the 18th.

The proceedings of the third day were read and approved.

Testimony of General Meade continued.

Questions by General Burnside:

Question. Where were your headquarters during the action of the 30th?

Answer. From four o'clock until about eleven—I am not exactly confident as to the time of leaving it—my headquarters, as announced in the order of battle on the day previous, were established at the headquarters of the 9th corps. At eleven o'clock, or about that time, as near as I can remember, I removed to the headquarters of the army of the Potomac, which are situated about three-quarters of a mile to the eastward of the headquarters of the 9th corps, and are in telegraphic communication with the same headquarters where I remained during the rest of the day.

Question. How far was that from the scene of action?

Answer. If by the scene of action is meant the crater of the mine and that portion of the enemy's line in front of it, so far as I have knowledge of the ground, derived from maps, I should suppose that the headquarters of the 9th corps were possibly a mile to the eastward of the crater, and my headquarters are three-quarters of a mile, as I stated, beyond that, still further to the east.

Question. Could anything of the action be seen from there?

Answer. Nothing could be seen from any of the points that I occupied.

Question. Did you go further to the front during the action? If so, where?

Answer. I did not leave the headquarters of the 9th corps during the active operations.

Question. Did you not know that there were several positions on our line where you could see the action for yourself, and yet be in as proper a place for you as in General Burnside's permanent camp, and also have full personal communications with Generals Burnside and Ord, and be much nearer to General Warren, and likewise have telegraphic communication with the rest of the army?

Answer. I undoubtedly was aware that there were points of the line where I could see more of the action than I could see at the position I occupied, but I

was not aware that there was any point where I could see anything particularly, or on which I could base any orders. I adopted the position I did in consequence of its being a central one and in telegraphic communication with all parts of the line where officers were stationed with whom it was necessary to communicate; and having a large staff, and many communications to receive, and many persons to communicate with, and being there in telegraphic communication, I considered it more proper to remain where I announced to the army my headquarters would be, and where all information could be sent to me, than to make any change of position as intimated in the question. Besides which, I desire to say to this court that it has been a matter of policy with me to place myself in such position that my communications made, and the replies made thereto, should be made in such way as a record could be kept of them, and not be confined to verbal communications, which are often subject to misapprehension and to misconstruction. There undoubtedly was telegraphic communication from General Burnside's headquarters in the field—the fourteen-gun battery, as it was called—with the other headquarters in the army.

Question. Did you not have an aide-de camp with General Burnside during most of the action?

Answer. During a portion of the time I did have Captain Sanders, aide-de-camp, at the headquarters of General Burnside. I sent him there in consequence of not receiving any communication from General Burnside, in the hope that he would be enabled to send me some information.

Question. Was not Captain Sanders sent there before the mine exploded?

Answer. No, sir; he was sent there some considerable time after the mine exploded; that is, upon the duty that I now refer to. I have previously stated to the court that before the mine exploded I sent two officers to endeavor to explain the delay. One was Captain Jay, and one might have been Captain Sanders; but they returned before the explosion of the mine. After the explosion of the mine I sent Captain Sanders on the duty that I now refer to, which was to remain at General Burnside's headquarters and communicate to me anything which he could ascertain. I think it further proper to add to this answer to this question that, finding I did not get the information which I desired to have, or which I thought I could have, and fearing that my having sent an aide-de-camp—the object being to facilitate the transmission of information—might be used to deter responsible officers from communicating information to the commanding general, I withdrew Captain Sanders, before the action closed, by an order.

Question. For what purpose was he sent? Was it not to report to you the state and progress of affairs, and did he not so report?

Answer. I have already answered the first part of that question. As to his reports, all the despatches from him are on file in my evidence before the court. As to whether he reported all he should have reported, and all the information to be obtained, I presume the court will ascertain from him and from other evidence.

Question. Was there any information not furnished you by General Burnside, or through other sources, which, if received, would have influenced your conduct of the action? If so, what?

Answer. I have already informed the court that all the information I received has been placed before them in the shape of official documents. It is impossible for me to say what my action would have been if I had received any other information. I acted upon the information I received.

Question. What time did Captain Sanders leave General Burnside to return to you?

Answer. I should say it was about half past eight; between that and nine, as near as I can recollect. I have a copy of the order to him, which I can furnish if desired.

Question. You state that General Burnside's despatch of 9 a. m. was the first information you had received that any collision had taken place, or that there was any enemy in our front; had you not, before the receipt of this despatch, written to General Burnside in reference to General Griffin's attack and repulse; also, received a despatch from Captain Sanders speaking of captured colors; also, seen and examined rebel prisoners taken that morning?

Answer. In reply to that question, I would say that I am willing to assume that there is an apparent discrepancy in my testimony, which I am very glad to have an opportunity of explaining. I should suppose that any one cognizant of the circumstances that took place on that day, even of the most general nature, would know that I never meant to say that I did not know that there was no enemy anywhere. I was fully aware that when the crater was occupied a number of prisoners were taken. I was also aware that the enemy occupied their lines both on the right and on the left of the position occupied by General Burnside; and I did know that Captain Sanders had made a report of captured colors, and that an attack had been made in front of Griffin; but my whole attention was absorbed in the endeavor to have a charge made to the crest, and my thoughts were all upon that; and when I said this was the first intimation I had of there being any enemy in the front, I meant any enemy so situated as to prevent a direct assault upon the crest. Besides which, I must throw myself upon the consideration of the court, and say that the vast number of despatches, the frequency with which they were sent and received, was such that my memory may not serve me well, and the incidents may be, in a measure, not related in the exact order in which they occurred. I wish to call the attention of the court to a very important fact for the benefit of General Burnside, if it results to his benefit as well as to mine, and that is the difficulty of having the time of these despatches uniform. A despatch is sent to me marked with the time of the officer who sends it, but the time by his watch may be ten or fifteen minutes different from mine. But I do honestly and conscientiously say that that was the first positive information, when I received that despatch that the men of the 9th and 18th corps were returning, that I had that there was any such force or disposition of the enemy as to render it questionable that that assault could be made.

General Burnside here remarked, "I want the record in such a shape as to enable the casual reader and the revising officer to see that there was, before that time, an effort on my part, or on the part of some person near me, to give information, and not an effort to cast any imputation on General Meade, and I do not desire to invalidate his testimony, but simply to elaborate. I am confident that there is no disposition on the part of General Meade to make erroneous statements."

Question. Have you a note written me by you about two weeks before the assault as to the practicability of an assault in my front, my answer thereto, your second letter, and my reply, and will you be kind enough to furnish copies?

Answer. I presume that those documents, like all other official documents, are on file. I will have a search made for them, and as soon as they are discovered will very cheerfully furnish General Burnside or the court a copy of them.

[General Burnside explained that one of them was a semi-official letter, and General Meade being reminded of the purport of it, answered that he did not think he had it.]

By the court:

Question. What knowledge had you of the movements of the different divisions of the enemy on July 30?

Answer. I had very positive information from deserters, not only those who came within my own lines here, but those who came into the lines of General

Butler, and those who came into the lines of General Hancock, that there were but three divisions of the enemy in our front, consisting of Mahone's division of Hill's corps, and Johnson's and Hoke's divisions of Longstreet's corps; and that the other divisions of Lee's army were on the north side of the James river, confronting General Hancock and Sheridan, on the 29th. I also received the same information from prisoners taken that morning. During the operations I received information from the signal officer on the plank road that the enemy were moving troops from their right to their centre, which I anticipated, and upon receiving that information the orders were sent to General Warren to endeavor to turn the enemy's right by pushing forward General Crawford, and to General Wilson to push on without delay, without waiting for the arrival of General Sheridan, coming from Deep Bottom.

Question. Did the order to suspend operations (given about 9 a. m. July 30) originate with Lieutenant General Grant?

Answer. No, sir; the order, I think, originated with myself. Some time before the order was given, I informed Lieutenant General Grant that, as far as I could see, there was no prospect of our succeeding in the manner in which we had expected to do; that the time had passed for the coup-de-main to succeed; and I suggested to him that we should immediately withdraw the troops, to which he acceded. About that time a despatch was received from the signal officer of the 5th corps, stating that the colored troops had captured a brigade of the enemy, with four of their colors, to which, however, I did not attach much importance, not knowing how a signal officer could see an operation of that kind when it did not come to me from the officer in charge of the operations. We nevertheless suspended this order and held it in abeyance until the arrival of the despatch of General Burnside, informing me that some of the men of the 18th and 9th corps were retiring, and I think also that the Lieutenant General himself rode down to our trenches and made some personal examination, and had seen General Ord, and had some conversation with him. Upon his return, from what he had heard from General Ord, and subsequently an officer coming in and saying that the colored troops, instead of capturing a brigade and four colors, had themselves retired in great confusion, which information, I think, was given me by Major Fisher, the chief signal officer, I again referred the subject to the lieutenant general, and again gave him my opinion that, as it was then about 9.25, it was unnecessary to make any other efforts, and an unnecessary sacrifice of life; my idea being that they could be withdrawn without any difficulty then, or we should have difficulty later in the day in withdrawing them. To this he assented, and the order was given to withdraw them. Afterwards, when the information was received from General Burnside of the difficulty of retiring, then the order was modified.

Question. Were any instructions given for destroying the bridges in Petersburg in case the crest was gained?

Answer. There were not, for two reasons: and first, if we had succeeded, as I hoped we would, in overcoming the enemy, we should have driven them across the Appomattox, and should have wanted those bridges to follow them, but the contingency of their destroying those bridges was held in view, and it was to meet that contingency that the chief engineer was ordered to have a pontoon train brought up so that we could throw our own bridges. My expectation was, that if we had succeeded in the coup-de-main, these three divisions of the enemy would have gone out of our way, and we should be enabled to cross not only the Appomattox, but also Swift run, and open up communication with General Butler at Bermuda Hundred before General Lee could send any re-enforcements from the five divisions that he was known to have north of the James river.

Major General A. E. BURNSIDE, United States volunteers, duly sworn, says:

Soon after this army arrived before Petersburg I received a note from General Potter, stating that if it was desirable, the fort in front of his position could, in his opinion, be mined; and that he would, at my request, make a statement of the matter, or would come to my headquarters with Colonel Pleasants, of the 48th Pennsylvania, and lay the matter before me verbally.

I sent him word that I would be glad to take the matter into consideration; and accordingly he and Colonel Pleasants came to my headquarters, and laid before me a plan for running a mine to that position. In the course of the conversation Colonel Pleasants remarked to me that this thing had first been suggested by the men of his regiment, who, I think, were stationed in the advance line, and pretty much all of whom were miners, from Schuylkill county, Pennsylvania. The matter was fully discussed, and I authorized General Potter to commence the work—making the remark, if I remember right, that it could certainly do no harm to commence it, and it was probably better that the men should be occupied in that way, and I would lay the matter before General Meade at my earliest opportunity. We parted with that understanding, and the work was commenced.

Probably at the first interview that I had with General Meade I mentioned the matter to him. He said to me that he had no instructions in reference to siege operations in his front; that that was a matter for the lieutenant general to decide upon; that he could not authorize any work of that kind, but he would acquiesce in it—and I am inclined to think that I have upon record a letter to the same effect from General Meade. This work was started and progressed with the full knowledge of General Meade; in fact, I was in almost daily communication with him, and much conversation was had upon that subject.

When the gallery was first started there were many discouragements, in the way of prophecies as to its failure, which had to be overcome, and a great many suggestions as to the mode by which the work should proceed. I, however, left the matter entirely in the hands of General Potter, Colonel Pleasants and his regiment, feeling satisfied that these miners had experience in matters of that kind which would enable them to accomplish this work.

When it began to be demonstrated that we would probably reach a point under the enemy's fort, conversations were had with reference to the feasibility of an assault after the explosion had taken place. Feeling that the old troops of the 9th corps had experienced very hard service during the campaign, and had been in so many engagements that they were very much wearied, and their ranks thinned, I made up my mind, if I was called on to make an assault with the 9th corps, to place the fourth division, under General Ferrero, in the advance, inasmuch as that division had not suffered so severely—in fact, had not been in any general engagement during the campaign, but had frequently been very honorably engaged on the outposts of the army. General Ferrero himself, and all his officers, expressed to me their utmost confidence in his troops, and especially his confidence in their ability to make a charge, or, in other words, a dash. I accordingly instructed him to drill his troops with a view to leading the advance, in case the 9th corps was called upon to make the attack.

Soon after this, General Meade called upon me for a statement as to the practicability of making an assault in my front, which call seemed to have been general, or, rather, seemed to have been made upon all the generals commanding corps then on the advance line. I answered him, giving to him, as I conceived to be, under the circumstances, a proper opinion, stating that I thought the chances were fair that a successful assault could be made from my front, if it could be supported in a specific way, and I could have the discretion of determining when the supporting columns should be put in. General Meade answered me to the effect that he commanded this army, and that he could not

give to any one the authority to determine as to the time that his troops should be put in action; that he would be glad to receive from me at all times such suggestions as I might make, but that he himself would take the responsibility of re-enforcing any force that he should see fit to order in action, or words to that effect. I at once wrote him a letter, stating that I had no disposition whatever to claim the right to put other troops than my own in action; that I had simply made this suggestion because I had given troops to other corps commanders to support their columns, which they themselves had used during the campaign, without any interference on my part, and I simply meant to ask what I had granted to others. That while I was certainly not anxious to put my own troops in action, the troops of any other corps could be called upon to make the assault; that I was fully willing to accord to General Meade more military skill than I possessed, and more ability to put troops in action, but that my troops had been given to corps commanders, both on my right and on my left, and placed in action by them; and, as I before said, I simply desired to have accorded to me what I had accorded to them.

It was decided, I believe, at that time, that no assault should be made; but I, notwithstanding, sent for General Ferrero, and directed him to go down to our advance line and select positions for concentrating his division, to look at the positions on the line over which he had to pass, and to reconnoitre the ground over which his division would have to pass in an assault upon Cemetery hill. I also directed him to send his brigade commanders down for the same purpose, and indicated to him exactly the position which I wanted him to take and the parts of the line over which I desired him to pass. I requested that he would present to me a plan for the manœuvring of his troops in case an assault of that kind were ordered.

In accordance with that General Ferrero presented me a plan, which is in substance laid down in my plan of attack and contained in the proceedings already before you.—(See document L.) I approved of this plan, especially that part of it which contemplated the movement of troops to the right and left of the breach which we might make in the line, in order to allow the other column to proceed to the front without any molestation from any of the enemy that might be left in the rifle-pits on the right and left of the breach. This must have been fifteen or twenty days, if not more, before the assault was made. I was afterwards informed by General Ferrero that his troops had been drilled for a movement of that kind, and was informed by a large number of his officers that it was their understanding that they were to make an attack with them; that, if I mistake not, they had passed over lines on intrenchments, performing the movement with a view to familiarizing their men with the movement, and they each and all expressed to me the greatest possible confidence in their ability to accomplish the work, which I considered a very material element in making the movement.

Nothing of importance occurred for a few days before the mine was sprung, except ordinary conversations with reference to the charge which was to be placed in the mine.

I, myself, from a long experience in experiments with gunpowder—having been a manufacturer of arms several years before the war commenced, and in constant practice with fire-arms—had a particular view with reference to the mode in which the mine should be charged, and the amount of charge to be placed in it. It was not in accordance with the methods laid down in scientific works upon the subject of military mining, but entirely in accordance with all experience in mining and blasting by civil engineers, within the last two or three years, since the method of heavy tamping had been abandoned. It is not worth while for me to enter here into an explanation of my theory, because I can present the report of the officer who built the mine, and that will explain the matter fully. It is sufficient to say that the mine was charged partially



upon my theory and partially upon the theory of the old established plan of military mining. In the theory which I decided to be adopted large charges could be used without detriment, in my opinion, to persons in the immediate proximity of the mine; but persons who were not of my opinion felt that the effect of this mine at great distances, with the charge which I proposed to place in it, would be very great; and it became, from some cause or other, known to my troops, both officers and men, that a difference of opinion of that kind had arisen, and to such an extent that I have had general officers come to me and ask me if I did not think the charge I was putting in the mine was too large. I did not think the charge so large that there was danger of injuring our own men. This feeling among the men had a certain effect which I will leave for the court to decide, and, if they request it, I will send them the names of witnesses who have mentioned to me that impression on the subject long before the mine exploded, so that there can be no mistake as to the impression that prevailed at the time. I, myself, was satisfied, without knowing definitely, that the charge which I desired to place in the mine could be placed there with safety. I witnessed this anxiety among the troops with a good deal of concern. But that it did not prevail in the division which it was supposed would make the assault—it not being then upon our lines—was a source of gratification to me. This court will see, by looking at the documents which General Meade has presented, that I was directed to keep the amount of powder placed in the chambers within the limits of rules prescribed by military works upon that subject. I, however, in several verbal communications with General Meade, insisted upon the other method; and it was finally decided that we should place in the mine eight thousand pounds of powder instead of twelve thousand pounds. The ground that I took was this: that the depth of the mine, or rather the bottom of the chambers, was fixed; the greater the explosion the greater the crater-radius, and less inclination would be given the sides of the crater, and the greater breach on the right and left of the charges would be made, thereby giving a greater space for the troops to pass over and a less inclination for them to pass up and down in the line. It was, however, determined that eight thousand pounds of powder should be put in instead of twelve, and the mine was accordingly exploded with that charge. The decision in reference to the charge to be placed in the mine was given in ample time to let me make arrangements for that amount of powder.

The general facts and movements connected with this army, for the first three or four days previous to the fight, are so well known to the court that I will not delay them by any statement as to my correspondence and personal intercourse, or anything of that nature, up to Thursday before the fight.

On that day (Thursday, two days before the fight) I went to General Meade's headquarters. He spoke to me in this way:

"I have received information that it is impossible for General Hancock to advance beyond his present position; he has succeeded in inflicting upon the enemy a severe punishment, and captured some four pieces of cannon, but is not able to advance beyond that point," (or, at any rate, it was decided that he should not advance beyond that point.) "A large force of the enemy from this position has been attracted to that side of the river by this movement of General Hancock, and General Grant desires that an attack should be made here." (I think he made that last remark, but I will not be positive; he either said that General Grant desired, or he, himself, desired that an attack should be made.) He asked how long it would take to charge the mine. There was some correspondence before and after that time—I do not know if it is in your proceedings or not—in reference to the time necessary to charge the mine. I think it very likely that General Meade has placed all the documents before you. Previous to this he had written to me to present my *project* for this movement, which is now before you. During this conversation, on Thursday, he said to

me: "I cannot approve of your placing the negro troops in the advance, as proposed in your project." I asked him why. He said: "Because I do not think they should be called upon to do as important a work as that which you propose to do, certainly not called upon to lead," or words to that effect. I, in a considerable conversation, urged upon General Meade the necessity for placing General Ferrero's division in the advance. I stated to him that the three white divisions had been on the advance line, and under fire from the moment of the establishment of the line, on the 18th or 19th of June, until that time; that they were very much wearied, had contracted a habit of covering themselves by every method within their reach, and that I was satisfied they were not in a condition to make anything like as much of a dash upon the enemy's line as General Ferrero's division, which had not been under any considerable fire from the time of its arrival at this place to that moment. I told him I considered my troops to be as good as they ever were, with the exception of this weariness and the habit—which had almost become a second nature—of protecting themselves from the fire of the enemy. In fact, upon this subject I was very, very urgent.

I will here present to the court some of the reasons for forming this opinion, which reasons were presented to General Meade. Take an intermediate date, say the 20th of July, and there were, for duty, nine thousand and twenty-three (9,023) muskets in the three old divisions of the ninth corps, which occupied the line. From the 20th of June, which was after the fight at this place, to the day before the fight on the 30th day of July, these divisions lost as follows:

Killed, 12 officers, 231 men; wounded, 44 officers, 851 men; missing, 12 men, making a total of 1,150 men; which is over twelve (12) per cent. of the command, without a single assault on the part of the enemy, or of our own troops. These casualties were caused from picket firing and shell firing, and extended pretty evenly over the whole line. I think that the whole of General Wilcox's division was on the line for thirty days, or more, without relief. General Potter's and General Ledlie's divisions had some small reliefs, enabling those gentlemen to draw some of their men off at intervals, for two or three days at a time, at certain intervals during this period.

A considerable portion of our line was so situated as to render it impossible to keep pickets to the front of them. It was, in fact, situated very much as a portion of the line occupied by the second corps, at Coal Harbor. As I stated before, I stated these facts to General Meade, except that I will not say that I gave him these exact figures; but the full substance of what I have stated here was given to him, together with the statement of the loss of officers and men, and the way in which the losses occurred. And, in fact, statements were made regularly to General Meade, so that these facts were in his possession, but were not made with the same particularity to him as I have made them here.

The ninth corps also lost in the fight of the 17th and 18th of June 2,903 men, and in the action of the 30th of July 3,828.

The following are the figures, more in detail:

June 17 and 18—killed, 29 officers, 348 men; wounded, 106 officers, 1,851 men; missing, 15 officers, 554 men. Total, 2,903.

July 30—killed, 52 officers, 376 men; wounded, 105 officers, 1,556 men; missing, 87 officers, 1,652 men. Total, 3,828.

General Meade said to me that he was going to see General Grant, and would submit the question to him as to whether the colored troops would be allowed to take the advance or not. This, as I said, was on Thursday—I think in the forenoon. He said to me that he would start at one o'clock, and would return that evening.

I parted with him, and on the next morning, not having heard anything from General Meade, and knowing, from information that I had received, that he had returned from City Point during the evening, I imagined that no further action

was to be taken in the matter, and that I was to be allowed to place the fourth division in the advance.

On Friday forenoon General Wilcox and General Potter, two of my division commanders, came to my headquarters, and we talked over the matter of the fight which was to take place on Saturday morning. I said to one or both of them to this effect: that I had been very much worried and troubled the day before lest General Meade would overrule that part of my plan which contemplated the putting in of the colored troops; but that I hoped nothing further would be heard from it, because General Meade had gone to City Point the day before, and the matter was to be referred to General Grant; and that inasmuch as I had not heard from General Meade, I took it for granted that he had decided to allow the thing to remain as it was. This I must necessarily give in substance, because my conversations with my division commanders are not guarded. They can be called upon themselves to state what they know about the matter.

Soon after that, say eleven o'clock, Generals Meade and Ord came to my headquarters. I am under the impression that I broached the subject myself as to the colored division taking the advance, but whether I did or not, he informed me that General Grant coincided with him in opinion, and it was decided that I could not put that division in advance. I felt, and I suppose I expressed, and showed, very great disappointment at this announcement; and finally, in the conversation which occurred, and to which there are two witnesses here present, I asked General Meade if that decision could not be changed. He said: "No, general, it cannot; it is final, and you must put in your white troops." No doubt in the conversation I gave some of the reasons for not wishing to put the white troops in that I had given at his headquarters, but of that I am not certain.

This was the day before the fight. I said to General Meade that that would necessarily change my plan. Now, this conversation either occurred at that time, or it occurred at a later hour in the day, say one or two o'clock, when General Meade returned to my headquarters; because he went off with General Ord for an hour or two, say, and returned to my headquarters. It is not impossible that this conversation occurred in the afternoon, instead of in the forenoon of the 29th.

After some conversation with Generals Wilcox and Potter as to which troops should take the advance, one of them remarked to me that I had better send for General Ledlie, and we would talk the matter over as to which one of the divisions should take the advance. I sent for General Ledlie, and after some discussion of the matter, I decided that, taking everything into consideration, it should be but fair that these gentlemen should cast lots for the advance. General Wilcox was probably better situated as to position for the advance, as his troops then were, than either of the other divisions—certainly than General Ledlie; but his troops, as I stated before, had been constantly on the line, with the exception of an intermission of a day or two, which rendered it, if anything, desirable that General Ledlie's troops should lead instead of his. General Potter's troops had been, next to General Wilcox's, more constantly on the line, and I think he was, next to him, better situated for the advance; but, as I have indicated by previous remarks, General Ledlie's division was less fatigued, and in my opinion it was more just to call upon them to make the charge, and they had fought as gallantly as troops could fight on the 17th, and I therefore did not hesitate to call upon them in consequence of any lack of faith in their courage.

So I said, "It will be fair to cast lots," and so they did cast lots, and General Ledlie drew the advance. He at once left my headquarters in a very cheerful mood to make his arrangements for the advance, as no time could be

lost in making the necessary arrangements, as it was then certainly three o'clock in the afternoon, and the assault was to be made next morning.

I directed him to take his brigade commanders and go to the front with Colonel Loring, my inspector general, who was entirely conversant with the ground, and I indicated to Colonel Loring about the position I desired General Ledlie to take, and I also stated verbally to General Wilcox and General Potter about the positions I desired them to take with their division; and the ground being familiar to all of us, enabled us to talk very understandingly and easily upon the subject. General Potter expressed some doubt as to finding room enough on the right of the covered way to place his troops, of which I was in doubt myself, the general instructions being for General Potter to mass all his troops, if possible, on the right of his covered way, General Wilcox to occupy his covered way and such portions of the railroad cut as was necessary, and room to be found between the two for General Ledlie, who had the assaulting column. At all events, there was, as far as I know, a distinct understanding between myself and my division commanders as to the positions to be occupied by the troops. Not that they did finally occupy exactly the positions which I indicated to them, because some of them were immaterially modified by correspondence, I think, between Generals Wilcox, Potter, and myself. It is sufficient to say that General Ledlie's troops were massed in about the same position as I had desired to mass General Ferrero. The arrangement which General Meade objected to, of sending troops down to the right and left to clear the way, was dispensed with; it having been understood before that that was a part of the plan or of the arrangements, the plan was made to accord with General Meade's views; in other words, in consequence of his objection, I did not give any instructions for troops to pass down to the right and left, but to make at once for the crest.

The commanding general had been urgent in his views, that in order to carry the crest—that is, Cemetery hill—a dash must be made at it without reference to formation; that there would be no time for manœuvring; that if we attempted to handle the troops as proposed in my plan, he was satisfied it would be a failure. If I mistake not, the amount of these views was expressed before General Potter and General Wilcox. Generals Meade and Ord called at my headquarters and had a conversation there in reference to my plans. General Ord went with General Meade to our signal station, and General Ord took a look at the position of the enemy. After returning to my headquarters, General Ord said he would send staff officers to me to report, in order that they also might reconnoitre the ground and pick out positions for troops. Instead of staff officers coming, I think that in almost every instance the general officers of General Ord's corps came themselves. I gave them facilities for reconnoitring the position of the enemy, and also gave them instructions as to where these troops were to mass in rear of our lines. I received General Meade's order, which is on your record. I sent him a copy of my order, which I have not here at present, but which I will procure and present at the end of my evidence. There were some details into which I did not enter in this order, in consequence of the verbal understanding which existed between myself and my division commanders; that fact, I believe, being noted in the order.

During that night our troops were concentrated in accordance with those orders, ready for the attack; and General Ord's troops were also concentrated as nearly as possible in accordance with my understanding with his officers. During the night some changes were necessarily made in the positions of General Ord's troops—changes which are always consequent upon the movement of as large a body of men as a corps in the night; but every effort, in my opinion, was made by his officers, and also by my own, to carry out to the letter the instructions given by General Meade and by myself. Inasmuch as you will have an opportunity of examining both of these orders at your leisure, it will not be necessary for me to enter into the details as to the movements that were directed.

The action was to commence with the explosion of the mine, which was ordered to take place at half past three o'clock. It may not be amiss to state here that the mine had been ready charged since the 23d. General Potter was ordered to see that Colonel Pleasants exploded the mine at the time indicated by General Meade.

My order for the movement of the 30th stated that I would make my headquarters at the fourteen-gun battery, which is not far from the centre of the line occupied by the 9th corps. Just before leaving my permanent headquarters, say at two o'clock in the morning, there came from General Meade a despatch stating that if I desired to delay the time for the explosion of the mine in consequence of the darkness, I could do so. I telegraphed him back that the mine would be exploded at the hour designated. I went to the place designated as my headquarters at the proper time, and, like every one else, awaited with great anxiety the explosion of the mine. I need not say to this court that my anxiety on the occasion was extreme, particularly as I did not know the reason of the delay. I waited for several minutes, and thinking that there was some miscalculation as to the time it would take the fuze to burn up to the charge, I sent an aide-de-camp to find out what was the reason of the delay. Soon after that I sent a second aide-de-camp. Soon after that time Major Van Buren arrived at my headquarters and told me the cause of the delay. In the mean time Captain Sanders, I think, or some other one of General Meade's staff, came to my headquarters to know the reason. I said to him that I had sent to ascertain the reason; that I could not tell him then. Another despatch, either written or verbal, came to know the reason, and I sent word again that I did not know the reason, but as soon as I could ascertain it I would give the general the reason. I then got another despatch from General Meade, that if the mine had failed I must make a charge independent of the explosion of the mine. Having almost made up my own mind that the mine had failed, or that something had occurred which we could not discover during that morning, and feeling the absolute necessity, as General Meade expressed in his despatch, of doing something very quickly, I was on the eve of sending an order for the command to be ready to move forward, as directed by General Meade; but I said again, "I will delay, to ascertain what is the reason of the non-explosion of the mine."

I had nothing that I could report up to the time that Major Van Buren came to my headquarters. I gave to those aids freely the statement that I did not know the reason of the non-explosion of the mine, but that as soon as I learnt it I would inform the commanding general. As I before stated, Major Van Buren came to my headquarters and told me that the fuze had gone out, and that a gallant soldier named Sergeant Reese, of the 48th Pennsylvania, had volunteered to go into the gallery to ascertain whether the fuze was really burning still and burning slowly, or whether it had failed. He discovered that it had failed, and refired it; and Major Van Buren further said that General Potter had told him that the mine was to explode at a certain minute. This was, I think, within eleven minutes of the time of the explosion. I am not sure that I did not receive a similar message from an aide-de-camp to General Potter. I think I did.

Within one minute of the time designated by Major Van Buren—and it was a fact which was cognizant to every one—I was not with the advance column of troops that was to make the charge. I understand that there was considerable anxiety among the men, after and before the explosion, as to the effect it might have upon them, and I have been informed by Colonel Loring, my inspector general, (who may be called before this court,) who was with the column, that it took probably five minutes to get the men in perfect condition to dash forward. After their ranks were re-established, they went forward, as far as I could see or know, or hear, in the most gallant possible style, until they arrived within

the crater. Here, owing to the inequalities of the ground, and possibly other reasons, which will be matters of investigation in this court, there was a pause, the men to a considerable extent disorganized, and it was so reported to me. I will state here, though, that I have not been able to make up my mind that any set of troops of this army, or any other army, that had gone through the labor that these troops had gone through for the last thirty days, could be made to do better than they did upon that occasion.

I saw with me there, at my headquarters, Captain Sanders. I think I remarked to him that I was glad he was to be with me on that day, as he had been with me during the fight on the 18th, and had been the means of communication between General Meade and myself; and I was very much pleased that he was present with me on that morning, and I think I so expressed myself. At all events, my impression was—he did not tell me so—that he was to remain with me during the morning. The despatches I received from General Meade, which I hope the court will examine carefully, bore the marks of very great anxiety—such as I was at the time feeling—to learn the information which I was about the same time endeavoring to learn, and at the same time unable to give him; and I so stated to his aides-de-camp. I, of course, was glad that no movement was made by me (as General Meade must be) in accordance with the order to attack in case the mine had failed.

From that time until the time that the troops were withdrawn I endeavored to give at all important points—I do not mean in minutiae—to General Meade by telegraph, and to Captain Sanders by word, all the information of which I was possessed. I, of course, was in a position in which I could examine the movements of the troops. For half an hour at a time I would be away from my headquarters. I went with General Warren once down the covered way to the front. The covered way was full of troops, and there was no way of going on horseback or of carrying any number of staff officers; and from the positions we were to reconnoitre, it would not have been advisable to carry any number of officers to that point. The despatches that I sent to General Meade are, I think, on record; and I think, if carefully examined without reference to the numerous despatches I received from him, it will be ascertained that at every important epoch correct and definite information was sent to him, either by Captain Sanders or myself, up to the receipt of a despatch which was misunderstood by me, and which appears upon your record, and bears the positive certainty of insubordination, for which I must be responsible and must necessarily suffer. I will state the circumstances under which the despatch was given me. It was handed to me by Captain Jay, who came up to me and said, "General Meade desires me to say that this is for you personally," or words to that effect, no doubt meaning that it was for my personal attention. I misunderstood the tenor of it, no doubt; read it and put in my answer, which is also on record before you.

The orders that I gave from time to time to my division commanders were principally verbal orders given through my aides-de-camp. I had with each division a responsible aide-de-camp, who was in constant communication with me, and, if I mistake not, I did not receive from Generals Ferrero or Ledlie a single written despatch, and but one or two each from Generals Potter and Wilcox; but at the same time, I received verbally frequent information of all that was going on in order to enable me to direct the movements of my troops.

After giving orders for all the white troops to be shoved in, and sending additional orders forward, which were also reiterated by division commanders, for the troops to advance and move upon the crest in accordance with the understanding and plan of the night before, which were plain and distinct, I received from General Meade an order to put in my whole force and move for the crest at once. I had not done this because I was satisfied that there was very great

difficulty attending the formation of the troops in the crater, in consequence of the great number there.

I have since learned that considerable progress had been made in the formation at that time; indeed, the troops were progressing to the right and left, and, to my knowledge, had driven the enemy; General Potter to the right, and General Wilcox to the left.

A despatch, which was intended for me, from Colonel Loring, went to my old headquarters, and was read by General Meade. I was cognizant of that fact, and I knew that General Meade was aware of the circumstances which surrounded the troops at that place, because General Meade sent an orderly with a message stating that he had read the despatch himself. It was therefore not necessary for me to re-communicate the information I had received from Colonel Loring. After my three divisions had been put into the position they occupied in the works, I hesitated to put in this colored division.

I remember having told General Meade that in case the colored division should falter in the advance, I did not think it would affect our old white divisions—certainly as to holding their position; that if the white divisions were to falter in the advance, it would be impossible to get the black division to pass them. I am not sure but I told him this the very day before the battle, in my tent. I received from General Meade an order to put in my whole force, which I did. I sent an order to General Ferrero to go to the top of the crest with his division. One of my aids was there at the time, Colonel Loring, and took the responsibility of saying that that should be stopped, because he was satisfied that I had not received his despatch. He came to me, and I said my orders were peremptory to put in my whole command, and he himself told General Ferrero to put in his division at once, and go to the top of the crest if possible. The colored division was put in, and, from what I can learn, no officers or men behaved with greater gallantry than they did. After passing the white troops and attempting something like a formation they were driven back by the enemy, and driven through the white troops, the white troops, or the principal portion of them, still maintaining their position, fighting as gallantly as three divisions ever fought.

I witnessed this repulse myself, and at the same time saw that the enemy had been repulsed by our own white troops, the black troops coming to the rear to a very considerable extent.

There is one point to which I wish to call the attention of the court. I sent to General Meade a despatch at 6.20, stating that if General Warren's reserve force could be concentrated at that time, I thought it would be well, or something to that effect, and I would designate to him when that force should be put in. To that despatch you have the answer.

Not far from that time General Warren came himself to my headquarters, if not exactly at that time. I then said to him, "General, let us look at this position," having in view answering the question which General Meade desired me to answer. General Warren and I went down to the front, leaving my headquarters, and going down a covered way until we got to a position on the left-hand side of General Potter's covered way beyond. We got on a mound of earth, and reconnoitred the enemy's position until we were satisfied. I said to General Warren, "I think your plan would be to strike across by the fort which enfiladed our line," or something to that effect. At any rate, whatever opinion I expressed to General Warren, it is sufficient to say that he told me that he should go back and explain to General Meade the circumstances, and, if possible, to get him to come to the front and look for himself. That, of course, satisfied me with reference to that point of General Meade's inquiry.

Although this narrative is very disconnected, I believe I have stated in it all the material points.

I do not know of a single order of mine that was not carried out by my di

vision commanders. I do not know of any lack of energy on their part in carrying out my views, and the views of the commanding general, except, possibly, in the case of General Ledlie, who was quite sick on that day, and who, I thought afterwards, ought to have gone to the crater the moment his men were in. But I understood that he was very sick, and could hardly have walked that far under the oppressive heat. He was within one hundred and twenty (120) yards of his brigades, I should say.

Between half past nine and ten o'clock I received two despatches from General Meade with reference to withdrawal. They are marked numbers 12 and 15 in the record before you. I was very much concerned in reference to the matter, because, although we had met with some reverses, I could not help feeling myself that we could hold the position which we occupied, if we could not gain more ground. In fact I was under the impression at the time that we were gaining ground in the direction of the enemy's rifle-pits to the right and left, and I felt that if troops were put in on our left flank, that then we would have been enabled to establish ourselves on the enemy's line, which, of course, would have made our position secure. However, that is simply a matter of opinion, upon which the commanding general had to decide. I also felt that if we could gain no more ground, we could run out lines at an angle to the crater, and establish a salient upon the enemy's lines, which would be of material advantage to us in future operations, particularly in making him vacate that part of the line which is now opposite my front, and in fact, as I had not given up all hopes of carrying the crest even, if a positive and decided effort were made by all the troops. But feeling disinclined to withdraw the troops, I got on my horse and rode over to General Meade's headquarters, which were at my permanent headquarters. He and General Grant were there together. General Ord and I entered the tent, and General Meade questioned General Ord as to the practicability of the troops being withdrawn. I made the remark that none of General Ord's troops were in the enemy's line, and he would have no trouble in withdrawing; that none but the troops of the ninth corps were in the line, and I thought that my opinion on that subject would probably be a proper one to be received, and I stated that I did not think that we had fought long enough that day; that I felt that the crest could still be carried if a decided effort were made to carry it. To that I received the reply that the order was final, or something to that effect.

General Meade, in his evidence, states that I gave no reasons why I thought the crest could be carried; and it will not be amiss for me to say that no reasons were asked, and that he simply stated that the order was final. I was then satisfied that the best time to withdraw those troops would be after nightfall; that it would be best to retain possession of the place till after nightfall. I thought, from reports which I had received from my aides-de-camp and division commanders, that we could then withdraw the troops. I had myself witnessed a very handsome repulse of the enemy by our troops just before leaving to go to General Meade's headquarters.

[At this point the court took a recess. After recess, General Burnside resumed his testimony, saying:]

I will supply one or two omissions in this disjointed narrative now. Some time before I received the order from General Meade to put in my whole force, I received a verbal message from General Wilcox, by one of his aids, Captain Brackett, that it was useless to send more troops up that line at that point; that all the troops were there that could be handled or could be used, or words to that effect; and that an immediate attack should be made, both upon our right and left. That is as far as I can remember of the message. I am under the impression I immediately transmitted this message to General Meade, either by a staff officer of my own, or by one of his. I also said that, in several conversations with General Meade, I stated to him that I was satisfied that the



explosion of the mine in our front, and the advance of our troops, would enable a strong skirmish line to carry everything on the left. I am of the impression that I expressed that opinion to General Meade the day before the fight, in the presence of General Potter and General Wilcox. I know that I expressed it to him a half dozen times. After it had been decided by General Meade, finally, that the troops were to be withdrawn, I was necessarily very much exercised as to the best method of withdrawal. I had directed General White, who was acting on that day as chief of staff, to remain on the line until he heard from me, and that I would send him the result of my interview with General Meade. I wish to read here the despatch I sent him, and the accompanying note written by General White :

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,  
Headquarters Ninth Army Corps, July 30, 1864.

I have no discretion in the matter. The order is peremptory to withdraw. It may be best to intrench where we are for the present ; but we must withdraw as soon as practicable and prudent.

A. E. BURNSIDE,  
*Major General.*

Brigadier General WHITE,  
*Chief of Staff.*

Division commanders will instruct in accordance with the within despatch ; the officers on the line to consult and determine the time of evacuation.

By order of Major General Burnside :

J. WHITE,  
*Brigadier General and Chief of Staff.*

Official :

EDWARD M. NIEL,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

I sent for my division commanders after sending that despatch. Feeling confident, from the reports I had received, that our people would be able to hold the position which they then occupied, until night certainly, and feeling that, if they were not, one time for evacuation was about as good as another, I thought it best to have perfect understanding as to the method of withdrawal. They came to my headquarters, and it was decided that we should dig a trench or trenches from our main line to the crater, and thereby enable them to withdraw without serious loss. It will be remembered that this distance is but a little over one hundred yards, and taking into consideration the radius of the crater, it is probably less than that distance. General Wilcox had already given instructions, as he informed me, and as I know, to dig a trench connecting our advance line with the crater, and I am not sure that the other division commanders had not commenced like operations. I remember the fact being stated, at the conversation at my headquarters, that the work was going on ; and that was decided upon as the best method of withdrawal. The despatch which I sent to General White, and which I have just handed to the court, was received by him in time to be read by two of the division commanders before they left the front for my headquarters, and was forwarded by them to the general officers in the crater.

One of those general officers was taken prisoner, and the other two are available as witnesses before this court. Their names are Generals Hartrauft and Griffin. As to the effect of this despatch, I will leave it for the persons present to give evidence of, particularly as an important despatch from myself to General Meade, here, contains my opinion of it.

Adjourned till August 11.

## FIFTH DAY.

COURT ROOM, HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS,  
*August 11, 1864.*

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Hancock, Brigadier Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge advocate.

The proceedings of the 4th day were read (General Burnside's testimony first) and approved, after various corrections by General Burnside.

Generals Ferrero, Wilcox, and Potter were present also.

General Burnside's testimony continued:

In concluding my testimony, I simply desire to call the attention of the court to the fact that important evidence before them would indicate that I had not given proper information of what was going on in my front during the action on the 30th, and to say to them that, up to the time the mine was exploded, there was nothing possible for me to report, because I could not answer questions which General Meade propounded to me by one or two different despatches, except by saying that I did not know the reason for the delay, and as soon as I learnt it I would inform him of it, which I think I did by verbal communications, either by Captain Sanders or Captain Jay. As soon as I ascertained the cause of the delay, I requested Major Van Buren, who informed me of it, to state to Captain Jay, fully, the causes, and he will be able to state to you whether he did so or not.

The explosion of the mine, as I before said, was a fact evident to every one along the line, and each and every command there had its orders to do a certain work, which were so explicit as to enable them to move at once to that work: first, orders to corps commanders under General Meade; next, orders from corps commanders to their division commanders, and so on.

I reported to General Meade by despatch when we made a breach in the enemy's works, as will be seen by your record. I also reported to him soon after, in answer to probably frequent anxious despatches, that we were endeavoring to advance—that it was hard work, but that we hoped to succeed; which was the full extent of the knowledge then in my possession, and all that I could learn from personal observation of the contest in the neighborhood of the breach. Soon after he received the report of my inspector general, stating the condition of the troops in the crater, and in the rifle-pits to the right and left of it. This report was intended for me, but was opened by General Meade and sent to me by him. The obligation resting upon me to send him a copy was therefore removed, inasmuch as I knew that he had already seen its contents, from his own statement. I reported to him a short time after that, or just before, that I thought it was the proper time to concentrate General Warren's troops, and that I would indicate to him the time when I thought they ought to go in, for there was hardly room at that time for them to go in on our front. I received an answer from him stating the object of his despatch, and that he desired to know if it was practicable for General Warren's force to be put in upon our left. At about that time, certainly before I could determine the fact, I came into contact with General Warren personally at my headquarters, and he and I made the personal reconnaissance that has been before alluded to. I parted with General Warren with the distinct understanding that he was to report to General Meade the condition of affairs in his front, and, as I before said, with the statement that he would endeavor to get General Meade to come to the front himself, which I considered to be sufficient answer to General Meade's despatch, particularly as General Warren went directly from me to the telegraph office. It is possible that in this I made a mistake.

At another juncture I reported to him that I thought that was the time for General Warren to be put in promptly. Soon after that time, and before it would have been possible for me to have sent any other intelligent report, I received orders to withdraw the troops to our own intrenchments.

During the engagement General Meade also received from Captain Sanders, his aide-de-camp, who was at my headquarters, certainly three written despatches and one verbal despatch, which he acknowledges, independent of the verbal despatch which I speak of giving to him before the explosion of the mine. I desire to say that Captain Sanders was near me constantly; knows that I never failed to give an aide-de-camp, situated as he is, every possible information; heard all my conversations with my aides-de-camp, and I think had free access to every despatch and report that reached me from the front or from my division commanders. I learned personally, in presence of General Humphreys's chief of staff of the army of the Potomac, that that was the understanding of Captain Sanders.

There were some papers which I desired to have removed from the record of this court in consequence of certain conditions which surrounded them, and which this court has made a very proper decision upon; but as they form a portion of the record, it becomes necessary for me also to state some of the circumstances which surround one of these papers, which was a despatch sent by me to General Meade containing an objectionable remark, which will be recognized on the record by all the members of the court. In conversation with two mutual friends of General Meade and myself, I became satisfied that I had misunderstood the note which he had sent me from the front on that morning. I obtained permission to go to City Point to see General Grant, and I stated to him the circumstances of the case, among other things upon which we conversed. I left him with the understanding that I should return and withdraw the letter which I had written to General Meade. General Wilson, of the cavalry, was present at this interview. I returned to my headquarters and found upon my table charges preferred against me, and a request that I should be relieved from command in this army, against neither of which have I any complaint to make, but simply make this explanation to remove any responsibility from the shoulders of General Meade which might possibly attach to the letter which he wrote to me, and which I imagined at the time indicated a belief on his part that I was not disposed to tell him the truth on the day of the action.

When I went to my headquarters at my permanent camp, and learned from General Meade himself that the order to withdraw was final, I at the same time learned that offensive operations had ceased on both the flanks of the line which we had occupied, and to which we were ordered to withdraw.

I have stated to the court, as well as I knew how, the means taken by me to effect that withdrawal securely, with one exception, I think, which is, that I started General Ferrero off at once with definite instructions to put all the force that he could get to work to dig a trench or trenches from our old line to the crater, in order that our men might come out, and that he started off on the moment. What followed that will no doubt be inquired into by the court.

Soon after I learned that offensive operations were to cease on our flanks, it became evident that all the operations of this corps were to be independent. General Meade left my headquarters, making no request of me for information. I received no despatch from him until the evening of the day after which the troops were driven out of the crater, and to a certain extent were re-established in our own lines. The negligence on my part to report after that time I will not attempt to justify myself for, by any reasons, before this court, inasmuch as it will probably become the subject of charges pertaining to things that took place long after the troops had come inside of our own lines.

I should not dwell so fully upon my rule of conduct in matters of this kind, but for the fact that matters of a like nature have been elaborated upon in

evidence which now lies before this court. I can readily conceive General Meade's anxiety, which would induce him to write frequent despatches; but in my rule of conduct with my officers I have rather cultivated the idea that frequent despatches, unless they are well authenticated, are not desirable—particularly despatches with reference to the condition of the troops and calls for re-enforcements.

I endeavored during my movements on that day to obey every order that was given to me. I put every single man of the 9th corps in action. I was not called upon to fight a field fight. There was no opportunity to manœuvre troops. There was no discretion about looking out for flanks beyond that which fell upon commanders managing their troops in action; there was simply an obligation on my part to rush these troops through the crater and gain the top of the crest, without reference to formation; and I put three divisions on as promptly as I knew how. And when I received the order to put my whole force in, I threw the fourth division in, with the most positive and distinct orders to my division commanders, given in the evidence before this court. I had no possible chance to push batteries forward to protect the flanks, or of moving troops forward to protect them; I simply had to gain the crest. I obeyed every order to the best of my ability, and did everything that I could do to place my troops in that position.

I have not elaborated as much as to the features of the ground in my front at the mine as I might have done, and I will not delay the court with it now. I will endeavor to make that as distinct as possible in my official report, which will probably be prepared by to-morrow morning, and will probably be laid before this court, together with the reports of the division and brigade commanders of my command.

I desire now to insert certain papers here, which relate to the evidence that I have given before you. The battle-order of General Meade is already before you. The document I now hand you is the circular containing the battle-order to my corps—(Document 60.) I sent a copy of this to General Ord, General Warren, and to the headquarters of the army, and I should have sent a copy to General Hancock had he been here at that time.

I present now the order for the siege, dated July 9, directing operations on this line, and desire to state, as the reason for presenting it, that the works on my front had been conducted with the understanding that there would be an attempt made to capture the position of the enemy by military operations, conducted under the chief engineer of this army and the chief of artillery, together with the corps commanders.—(Document 61.)

I now desire to present a copy of a correspondence between General Meade and myself early in July. The first is an answer of mine to a circular sent to corps commanders with a view to ascertaining what were the chances of the success of an assault in their fronts, and is as follows.—(Document 62.)

I beg to say here that this is specifically an answer in reference to an assault in my front, which was the only opinion I was required to give. The second document is General Meade's answer to my letter, and is as follows.—(Document 63.)

My reason for stating that my answer to General Meade was semi-official, and that the whole correspondence was of that nature, was the fact that it is marked at the top "confidential." The despatches sent by General Meade to me were marked likewise, but in this copy that is omitted. The envelopes, at least, were marked "confidential."—(Document 64.)

Questions by the judge advocate :

Question. Were you in a position to see all the operations of the assault before Petersburg, or how much of them ?

Answer. I was in a position, at different times, to see every particle of the

assault before Petersburg—at one time in one position, at another in another. Not that I desire to convey the impression that I was all the time looking to the front; but that, at proper intervals of time, I could see all that was desirable to see.

Question. What was the distance from the fourteen-gun battery to the crater?

Answer. I should say six hundred or six hundred and fifty yards. I wish to state that, whilst at my headquarters, in order to get a look at what was going on on certain portions of the front, we placed ourselves upon the magazine of the fort, or upon the high ground just in rear of the fort, or upon the high ground just to the right or left of the fort. I was, however, frequently to a considerable extent in advance of the fort, as was the case when General Warren and myself made our reconnoissance; and I also visited a commanding position on the opposite side of General Potter's covered way during the engagement, from which other parts of the line could be seen. The fort I refer to is the fourteen-gun battery, which is established immediately in rear of the old brick wall and chimneys, and is essentially on our main line, say fifty yards to the rear. The advance line is about one hundred and fifteen yards from the crater; the main line is about four hundred yards from that, and then the battery is a short distance, say fifty yards, in rear of the main line. But the position from which most of the movements could be seen was in advance of the main line, between the two lines.

Question. What preparations were made for the passage of the attacking columns from the breastworks, as directed by General Meade's order?

Answer. All the preparations were directed to be made that were possible, such as removing *abatis*, and so forth, as directed by General Meade's order; but it was not expected by any one that any considerable success could attend any work of that kind without serious loss to the command, and discovery on the part of the enemy. The *abatis* in front, which was the only serious obstruction, was very much cut up by the enemy's fire, and did not present as serious an obstacle to the movement of troops as it would be supposed by a person hearing that the *abatis* still remained in front of the line. I have never ascertained from any one that the troops were at all obstructed in passing over, and I am therefore free to say I made no special inquiry upon that subject. If I remember right, it is the first time it has occurred to me since the reading of General Meade's order; but I do remember that not much was expected to be done, in view of our close proximity to the enemy. This refers to the front, over which the troops had to pass. I will state definitely that there was no expectation on my part that that portion of the order could be carried out without discovery, and without very great harm to the troops that would have to prepare this work, and in my order I placed no clause of that nature; but it was distinctly understood that the troops were to be provided with pioneer tools and other means of clearing away such obstructions as might be in the way—understood between myself and the division commanders.

Question. Did you intend that the obstructions should not be removed until the pioneers advanced with the columns, or did you intend that they were to be removed by the division commanders the night before, and what division commanders were charged with the execution of that order?

Answer. I did not intend any of my division commanders to do any work in the way of removing obstructions on that night, because I did not expect that they could do it; and, besides, I was ordered to be relieved on the line by General Ord's troops, and to concentrate my troops for the assault. But I will state again that there was an understanding between the division commanders and myself that anything that could be done in that direction would be done. I did not expect them to do anything; there was no order to that effect from me, unless it was contained in my verbal orders to the division commanders. My remarks now apply to work on the advance line, where I did not suppose

any work could be done without discovery by the enemy, in consequence of its close proximity to the enemy's line to the front of the main line. There were covered ways cut both to General Wilcox's and to General Potter's front.

Question. What time elapsed from the springing of the mine to the forward movement of the assaulting columns, and how long was it before the crater was reached by the storming party?

Answer. At the risk of involving the same difference in time as in similar matters, I will state that it was about five minutes until the advance column moved forward, and say ten minutes before the leading column reached the crater. This delay occurred in consequence of the hesitation which has been already alluded to in my evidence, but not personally known to me, and it is not impossible that I may be mistaken as to the time. There was only one column started to move to the crater, because the divisions were ordered to go in succession, the first division, General Ledlie commanding, leading, in consequence of the probability that a breach would not be made sufficiently broad in the enemy's line to admit more than one column, my intention up to the day of the attack being to make the assault by my plan, which you have before you.

Question. To what did you attribute the halting of the troops in the crater instead of proceeding to the crest immediately as by the order?

Answer. To the breaking up of the column in consequence of the inequality of the ground, and to the continual habit of the men for the last thirty or forty days of protecting themselves by almost every obstruction they came in contact with.

Question. In what order and tactical formation were your divisions ordered to go in?

Answer. I ordered the division commanders to use their discretion in carrying their divisions in, giving them my general views on the subject, my general directions being to carry them in if possible in column by regiments; but the regiments being so unequal—some being not more than one hundred strong, and some six or seven hundred—it was thought best for them to go in in such formation as to be able to deploy rapidly in two lines as soon as they gained the crest, General Ledlie taking the centre, General Potter taking the line perpendicular to the main line of works, and General Wilcox the line parallel to the Jerusalem plank road.

Question. Were these movements of the divisions successive or simultaneous?

Answer. They were successive.

Question. What was the interval between them?

Answer. General Ledlie was to move first; General Wilcox was to follow General Ledlie as soon as possible after General Ledlie had cleared the breach; then General Potter was to follow General Wilcox. As soon as I ascertained that General Ledlie had made a halt, I sent orders at once to General Wilcox and to General Potter to proceed, without reference to General Ledlie, in the order in which they had been directed to move. I ordered them to go in at once without reference to going through the breach, and proceed at once, as before directed, without reference to General Ledlie, thinking that if they could find room to get through to the right and left, and could move forward, it would enable General Ledlie also to move forward with his troops. And, finally, General Ferrero was moved, upon the last order from General Meade to put in my whole force. I think that the troops were moved forward as rapidly as they could be moved forward under the circumstances, and I know that they did not pass by the flanks of General Ledlie to go to the crest; but it was in consequence of obstacles produced by the firing of the enemy and the rough ground in the crater of the enemy's works. But they did go to the right and left, driving away a considerable portion of the enemy from those lines, and made several distinct attempts to charge to the front. My own opinion is, that the principal obstacle was the presence of the enemy to our right and left,

which enabled them, the moment our troops attempted to advance to the top of the crest, to give them a fire in the rear.

Question. For what distance on each side of the crater were the enemy's works abandoned immediately after the explosion of the mine?

Answer. I should say one hundred and fifty yards, or more, on each side.

Question. To your own personal knowledge did any of your troops get beyond the crater, and how far towards the crest?

Answer. As far as I could see, there were lines formed beyond the crater, and attempts made to charge, but the lines were repulsed; but to say how far, I would not be willing to express an opinion.

Question. Can you tell how far it was from the crater to the crest?

Answer. From the crater to the crest, I should say was five hundred yards.

Question. How long did your troops remain in the crater before the order was given to retire?

Answer. The order was given to retire, I think, about half past nine. When the order was given to retire, I went to General Meade's headquarters, consulted with him, ascertained that it was final, and decided that our best method of retiring was to hold the crater until dark, and then retire by trenches.

(The question was repeated, and the witness requested to give a more specific answer.)

Question. How long did your troops remain in the crater before the order was given to retire?

Answer. They remained there until about two o'clock. I think the order reached them about 11.40. They remained there about four hours before the order was given to me to retire.

Question. Did Generals Wilcox's and Potter's divisions attack the crest, or did they proceed perpendicularly along the enemy's intrenchments to the right and to the left?

Answer. The principal part of their movements was in that direction, with all possible directions to move to the front as fast as possible.

Question. Had you authority to put in the supports, (of other corps,) or had any one else who was present and could see what was going on?

Answer. Although I can designate no order upon which I had a right to put in supports, yet I am satisfied that any support which I called upon General Ord for would have been given me; and it is almost impossible that there was such an order. At all events, he expressed every willingness to give me all the support possible, no matter what the movements of his troops were, and consulted freely with me, and asked me at what points I thought he ought to put his corps in. I told him I thought it could move off to our right, and make a very considerable diversion in our favor, or something to that effect, and he told me that he had issued an order to that effect. He spoke of the ground being broken in that direction, and wanted to know if I thought he could go over my line of works. I told him I thought he could; that it is the same ground that Generals Wilcox and Potter fought over on the 18th, and that a portion of his column could move forward in that direction, the balance moving down the covered way.

Question. Were you the senior officer present, and did you regard yourself responsible for putting in at the proper time the troops designated as supports in orders?

Answer. I was the senior officer present in front of my own corps; but I never dreamed of having any authority whatever to order in the troops of any other corps. I might have had authority to call upon other troops, but I had no authority to order any in that I know of.

Question. You don't consider yourself responsible for anything further than your own corps?

Answer. No, sir, except as to making such suggestions as I thought were

proper. I did not think that I had any general command that day. In fact, I had no authority to order in any other troops than my own corps, General Meade having specially reserved that right to himself in the correspondence before you.

The court then adjourned to meet at 10 o'clock a. m. on the 12th instant.

## SIXTH DAY.

## COURT ROOM, HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS,

*August 12, 1864.*

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Hancock, Brigadier Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge advocate.

The proceedings of the fifth day were read and approved.

The testimony of Major General Burnside was resumed.

Questions by the judge advocate:

Question. What brigade commanders were in and about the crater near the enemy's line?

Answer. All the brigade commanders of the corps, I think.

Question. What division commanders?

Answer. I do not know positively that any division commander was in the crater, unless possibly General Potter. Their headquarters were upon the advance line, something over one hundred yards from the crater.

Question. Please describe the covered ways through which the troops passed from the rear up to your line, how long they were, and their direction with reference to your line of works.

Answer. Both the covered ways were, in general direction, perpendicular to the advance line, particularly just before approaching it. There were advantages taken of the depression of the ground in rear that made certain portions of them at angles to the line—some obtuse and some acute. The covered ways were built so as to enable columns to move under comparatively good shelter entirely up to our advance line, or, in other words, to the low ground just in rear of our advance line, and were capable of allowing regiments to pass by twos if not by fours. The commencement of all the covered ways was in the depressed ground in rear of the main line, or, in other words, in rear of the fourteen-gun battery; and I should think that they would average, including the zigzag, a thousand yards.

Question. In what formation did the colored troops move to the assault?

Answer. The colored troops moved from their position in rear of our advance line by flank up to the position we had carried in the enemy's line, and from there endeavored to move in line to the front.

Question. Could General Ord's troops get into action at any other point than at the crater?

Answer. I received positive information from General Potter that his troops were not in the way, and that General Ord's could have moved to the right, and I distinctly understood from General Ord that he had given orders for his troops to move to the right of the ground that we occupied. As to how many obstacles they would have met in that movement I am not here prepared to say. I am satisfied of one thing, that General Ord gave the necessary orders for an advance in that direction. As to the efforts that were made, I am not personally cognizant. General Potter, who held the right of our line, is a more intelligent witness upon that point than I am.

Question. Did any officer report to you that his troops could not be got forward?



Answer. No, sir. I received a report from Colonel Loring, which General Meade opened, stating to me that there was great difficulty in getting the troops to move from that crater, or something to that effect. That paper is lost, as far as I can find. I have ordered it to be looked for. But Colonel Loring was not a commander of troops; he was an aide-de-camp of mine. But no commander of troops reported to me that his troops could not be brought forward.

Question. Please state what were the obstacles, *abatis* or other obstacles, in front of the enemy's line in the neighborhood of the crater. Were they a serious opposition to the passage of troops?

Answer. On the right and left of the crater, beyond the parts that had been effected by the explosion, there were both *abatis* and *chevaux-de-frise*, principally the latter, constructed by placing rails in the parapet, sharpening the points, and, I suppose, tying them back, or putting in sticks, to hold them in their positions; but of that I cannot say, because I was not close enough to determine that fact. Considerable *abatis* was in one portion of the line, lying upon these rails, which the enemy had not been able to place in consequence of the constant fire from our troops in the front line. I do not think the obstacle was remarkably formidable, but it was a sufficient obstacle to stop the progress of troops. There would have been a necessity for their removal by pioneers before troops could have passed over.

Question. How much of the enemy's breastworks were blown up by the springing of the mine? How much of the *abatis* destroyed?

Answer. The report of Colonel Pleasants will be before you, and he will give you that exactly. I should place it at from one hundred and forty-five to one hundred and fifty feet—say one hundred and fifty feet. There was not as much of their line disturbed as I expected. I supposed that for a considerable distance on the right and left of the line the earth would have been so much disturbed as to cause *chevaux-de-frise* to fall from the parapet.

Question. Was the ground around the crater commanded by the ground held by the enemy?

Answer. Yes, sir, to a very great extent.

Question. What was your opinion at the time of the force of the enemy resisting your advance on the 30th of July?

Answer. From data received by me, and especially from a despatch received very soon before the order to withdraw came, I judged there was about a division and a half, certainly not to exceed two divisions. This force consisted of troops that were in the line when the mine was exploded, and troops that were moved from the enemy's right. No troops were reported to me as having moved from the enemy's left. There was a signal station in front of my line from which, I think, any important movement of troops from the enemy's left could have been discovered. They certainly could not have approached our line from the enemy's left without being observed. I received a despatch from my signal officer, Captain Paine, stating that the enemy's right was very much weakened. This was not communicated to me direct, inasmuch as I had left my headquarters to visit General Potter's, and it did not reach me in time to communicate the substance of it to General Meade before the orders to withdraw came.

Question. What was the nature of the enemy's fire concentrated on the crater, immediately after the explosion of the mine—how much artillery fire? Please explain that, if you know.

Answer. The artillery fire was very light indeed, and had the advance troops been in condition to assault, and made the kind of an assault that they could have made, or that they had made in the beginning of the campaign, there is no doubt in my mind but they could have gained the crest. For a long time, comparatively speaking, the fire, both of musketry and artillery, was very light. What I mean by a long time is fifteen minutes, say.

Question. Why did not your troops remain, as you wished, to hold the crater, and for what purpose did you propose to hold it?

Answer. I received a positive order to withdraw to our intrenchments. I left my chief of staff with a view to getting that order rescinded. Finding that it was final, I telegraphed to him to that effect, and he communicated to the general officers in the crater that the order was final. In fact, he sent a copy of my telegram to them. My reason for desiring to hold the crater was, that if we could have connected it with diagonal lines reaching from a point, say one hundred and fifty yards to the right, to General Potter's extreme left, and another line extending to it from our old line one hundred and fifty yards from General Wilcox's extreme right, we would have a salient which would have been quite as easy to hold, if not more easy, than the one we now hold, and would have given us, I think, command of a considerable portion of the enemy's line both on our right and left, forcing him, I think, even if we had made no further attempt to carry the crest, to move his whole line back to that position.

Question. You have said somewhere in the testimony that 3,828 was the 9th corps's loss. At what phase of the action did the loss chiefly occur?

Answer. I have already given a detailed account of the killed, wounded, and prisoners. A large proportion of the prisoners were lost after the order to withdraw had been received, and I think a considerable portion of the killed and wounded. I will not venture to say now that so great a proportion occurred after that time as was indicated in the despatch sent by me to General Meade, and which is now before the court; but that was not far wrong, in my opinion.

Question. Why were the men withdrawn at the time they were?

Answer. The despatch stating that there was a final order to withdraw had reached the crater, and it was known to both officers and men that such a despatch was in existence. At the last assault of the enemy, General Hartrauft gave the order to his command to withdraw, and sent word down the line that he had given this order; and such portion of the command as could get out of the crater and the enemy's lines returned to our own lines. General Hartrauft was not, in fact, authorized to make such a movement; but I have not the slightest doubt in my own mind but he thought he was carrying out the spirit of the order. It was one of those misunderstandings which are so likely to happen at so critical a time. He had before reported that they would be able to hold their position, which report was made previous to any knowledge on his part of the fact that we were ordered peremptorily to withdraw.

Question. Did any troops, to your knowledge, misbehave, fail to go forward when ordered, or disobey orders in any way or at any time during the action? If so, name them.

Answer. A considerable portion of the troops failed to go forward after repeated orders from their officers and extreme efforts to cause them to advance; but I do not believe that, under the circumstance, any of the troops can be counted guilty of misbehavior. It is a fact that the black troops broke and ran to the rear in considerable of a panic, which indicates misbehavior; but they went in late, found in the enemy's works quite a mass of our own troops unable to advance, and during their formation, and, in fact, during their advance between the two lines, they were subjected to probably the hottest fire that any troops had been subjected to during the day; and I do not know that it is reasonable to suppose that after the loss of so great a portion of their officers they could have been expected to maintain their position. They certainly moved forward as gallantly under the first fire, and until their ranks were broken, as any troops I ever saw in action.

Question. Who conducted the retirement of the troops from the crater?

Answer. That question is entirely answered by the answer to the question previously put, but I will reiterate it. General Hartrauft, unexpectedly to me and to the division commanders, made a move with his brigade in consequence

of the receipt of the despatch to which I have referred, and the word was passed along the line to retire, upon which all the troops came back to our lines that could get back.

Question. Where were the division commanders while the troops were in the crater?

Answer. The division commanders were at their headquarters on our old advance line, say one hundred and fifteen yards from the crater, moving at intervals from one point to another at that line, until it was decided that the order to withdraw was final, when I sent for the division commanders to come to my headquarters to arrange for the withdrawal; soon after which I sent General Ferrero to make arrangements for digging trenches. In fact, preparations had already been made for that purpose before the division commanders came to my headquarters. Before this work could be done the troops were driven from the crater in the manner in which I have designated.

By the court:

Question. How did all your troops cross from the advance line of works to the assault—by the flank or in line?

Answer. Generals Ledlie and Wilcox crossed in line; Generals Potter and Ferrero by flank.

Question. Could the troops of the different divisions have been formed, the night previous to the assault, in lines parallel to the advance line, and near it?

Answer. They were formed in that position as nearly as possible, all of the advanced division being formed exactly in that way.

Question. Was the mine placed under charge of the engineer department of the army of the Potomac?

Answer. No, sir, it was not. In fact, two of the young engineers who reported for duty at my headquarters stated expressly that they were instructed that they had nothing to do with the mine.

Question. Were there working parties detailed to follow the assaulting troops, carrying tools, gabions, and so forth, to crown the crest when gained?

Answer. Yes, sir. There was an engineer regiment detailed to follow each division of white troops, with all the necessary tools; and all necessary preparations were made for pioneers in the division of colored troops. There were no instructions to carry gabions, but all these engineer regiments were fully equipped with necessary tools for intrenching, if we had been successful in crowning the crest.

Question. Why did not the division commanders go to the front, particularly when the troops ceased to advance?

Answer. I do not know.

Question. Was General Hartrauft in command in the crater?

Answer. He was not in command in the crater.

Question. Had you been permitted to put your corps into action according to your own views—that is, the colored division in advance—do you think the result would have been different?

Answer. For reasons already given, and given before the fight, and from observations on that day, I am forced to believe that the fourth division (the colored division) would have made a more impetuous and successful assault than the leading division.

The receipt of orders requiring the presence elsewhere of two members of the court caused its adjournment until it should be reconvened by the President, or some other proper authority.

## SEVENTH DAY.

## HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS,

*Jones House, August 29, 1864.*

The court met, pursuant to the orders from the President, at ten o'clock a. m. Present: Major General Hancock, Brigadier Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge advocate.

The proceedings of the sixth day were read and approved.

The judge advocate submitted a letter which he received from Major General Burnside, respecting his testimony, as follows:

“COLEMAN’S EUTAW HOUSE,

“Baltimore, August 15, 1864.

“COLONEL: You will remember that, in answering the last question put to me as to the reason none of my division commanders went into the crater, I made some explanation after saying ‘I don’t know;’ but it was finally decided to let the answer be, ‘I don’t know.’

“Lest it may be understood to be a censure upon those officers, I beg to add to the answer the following: I think General Potter was in the crater, and I am satisfied that the others felt that they were in the best position to command, except General Ledlie, who, I understood, was sick. The court can determine.

“Please lay this before the court, and believe me yours, very truly,

“A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General.*

“These officers, with the exception of General Ledlie, have served with me long and gallantly, and I do not desire to do aught to injure their well-earned reputation.

“COLONEL SCHRIVER,

“*Inspector General, Army of the Potomac, Judge Advocate, &c.*”

*Record of the court of inquiry instituted by Special Order No. 258, 1864,  
War Department.*

	Page.
Testimony of Major I. C. Duane, United States Engineers.....	123
“ Brigadier General R. B. Ayres, United States Volunteers .....	133
“ Major General G. K. Warren, United States Volunteers .....	137
“ Lieutenant General U. S. Grant, United States Army .....	148
“ Lieutenant Colonel C. B. Comstock, Aide-de-Camp .....	150
“ Major General E. O. C. Ord, United States Volunteers .....	153
“ Brigadier General R. B. Potter, United States Volunteers .....	167
“ Brigadier General E. Ferrero, United States Volunteers .....	179
“ Brigadier General O. B. Wilcox, United States Volunteers .....	185
“ Major General A. A. Humphreys, United States Volunteers .....	188
“ Brigadier General H. I. Hunt, United States Volunteers .....	191
“ Lieutenant W. H. Beuyaurd, United States Engineers .....	194

Major I. C. DUANE, engineer corps, sworn, says to questions by the judge advocate:

Question. Were you present at the assault of the 30th of July, and in what capacity did you serve?

Answer. It was on the 5th corps front, assisting in directing the artillery fire.

Question. Can you produce maps showing the lines then occupied by the armies?

Answer. Yes, sir. I here produce two maps, showing the general positions of the armies, and the position of the 9th corps in detail. These maps are marked Nos. 65 and 66, appendix.

Question. What, in your opinion, were some of the causes of failure on that occasion?

Answer. One cause was, that the troops, instead of moving up by division front, (column of division,) moved up by the flank. Another was, that they stopped in the crater, instead of pushing immediately forward. The points between which they could have taken on the ridge are the points on the map be-

tween Clark's house and Cemetery hill. Those being taken Petersburg, was in our possession. I have no doubt the enemy had guns in that position, but I do not know that he had any works; if there were any works there, they were screened by the trees. No guns were opened immediately after the assault. The distance from the crater to the crest is about five hundred yards.

Question. Could the troops have gone forward by division front?

Answer. I think they could if proper working parties had been sent to remove the abatis.

Question. Were there any working parties with them?

Answer. I do not know. I was directed not to interfere with General Burnside in his operations. I had no control over the operations in that part of the line.

Question. Were there engineer officers to lead or direct the assaulting columns?

Answer. Lieutenant Beuyaurd, of the engineers, was on duty on that front, and was available in case the general commanding that corps wished to make use of an engineer. Captain Farquhar was also on duty with the 18th corps, and was present, but not under my orders.

Question. What arrangements were made for facilitating the debouch of the troops from our lines and passage over the enemy's parapets?

Answer. I do not know.

Question. Were the obstructions at the enemy's line formidable? Of what did they consist?

Answer. They consisted of a strong rifle-pit, with a good abatis in front. Such obstructions are formidable, in case there are troops behind the parapets to defend them. In this instance there did not appear to be sufficient force behind the parapet to prevent these works being carried.

Question. How was our artillery fire as to effectiveness on that occasion?

Answer. It completely silenced the batteries of the enemy that were in position, and had been in position previous to this day, on the 5th corps front. I had nothing to do with the right, which was on the 18th corps line.

Question. In your opinion, was the point of attack a judicious one?

Answer. I did not consider it so, although there was a chance of success. The point of attack was on a re-entrant on the line, which exposed an attacking column to a fire on both flanks and front.

Question. Did you at any time make that known to the authorities?

Answer. I did, two or three days previous to the attack.

Question. In written or verbal communications?

Answer. I had frequently made it known verbally; two days previous to the attack, in writing, to the general commanding the army of the Potomac.

Question. Can you produce that report?

Answer. I can; and I will hand it to the judge advocate. (It is marked 67.)

Question. What is your opinion of the mine as a means of assault?

Answer. It is a very unusual way of attacking field fortifications. I do not think that there was any reasonable chance of success by such an attack.

Question. Had the engineer department anything to do with it?

Answer. It had not.

Question. Please to state what advantage would have resulted from holding the crater simply?

Answer. No advantage.

By the court:

Question. Did you see this explosion and assault?

Answer. I saw the explosion. I did not see the assault distinctly; I was too far to the left.

Question. You could not see how far to the right or left the enemy's parapet was abandoned from any fire that came from it?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. What artillery of the enemy did you see open and play upon that assaulting column within the first fifteen minutes after the explosion?

Answer. I did not see any. They opened on our batteries, but I did not see them open on the column. I did not see them open on the column, and do not think they did. They opened with 30-pounders on us.

Question. Although you did not think the mine, as a means of assault, promised much success, do you believe, from the circumstances that transpired, it would have been a success had the troops gone to the top of the crest?

Answer. I believe it would.

Question. Do you believe that there was any difficulty in the way of the troops going to the crest during the first fifteen minutes?

Answer. I do not think there was the slightest difficulty.

Question. Do you think that, immediately after the explosion, had there been proper working parties at work, the parapet of the enemy could have been cleared of sufficient of the obstructions and abatis within the first fifteen minutes to have allowed a brigade front to have passed over?

Answer. Yes; I think there could.

Question. There was no other difficulty in crawling over the parapet except the fire?

Answer. No, sir; and the abatis was a loose abatis of limbs pitched over the parapet. In some places it was a rail abatis—rails inclined forward.

Question. What should the storming party have done when they reached the crest, had they reached it? what should have been their first operation—to have proceeded to Petersburg or intrenched themselves?

Answer. I think they should have intrenched on the crest. I do not think they could have stayed in Petersburg, as it was commanded.

Question. Had you ever been called upon for any gabions or any materials for making a parapet upon the enemy's intrenchments?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Were any gabions prepared in this army except by the engineer department for those works?

Answer. None.

Question. Nor any other material of that kind—facines, and so forth—to assist in making a parapet?

Answer. No.

Brigadier General R. B. AYRES, United States volunteers, sworn by the judge advocate:

Question. General, were you present at the assault on the 30th of July, and had you facilities for seeing the progress of affairs on that day?

Answer. My division was a part of the command of the 5th corps, massed upon the right of the 5th corps, and upon the left of the 9th, in the railroad cut, for purposes indicated in the order of assault. I was directed by General Warren to make my headquarters with his at the five-gun battery, in the corner of the woods in front of the Avery house. I was in that position when the mine was sprung and the assaulting columns went forward. The general directions of those columns as they marched forward were visible from this position. As the troops filed out we could see them distinctly. After quite a large force filed out there, they seemed to have formed a line of battle at one time along, in, or near the enemy's rifle-pits, adjacent to the mine. A body of troops also filed behind that line to the left, as we looked at them, apparently to march around

the line and advance to the crest, which was the object to be gained—Cemetery hill. After a time I saw those troops go back again towards the right, coming in still behind that line of battle standing. Directly after this I was requested by General Warren to ride to the 15-gun battery, to see what chance offered me to put my division in on the left of the troops still standing, as I described. I went there, made an examination, turned to General Warren and stated to him that as the troops were massed in our old line in rear of the mine in great crowds it would be very difficult to march my division through there unless they made a way for me; but if a way was made I could march my division by the flank, face it to the left, sweep down to the left, carry a certain battery there was firing across, and clean out the rifle-pits they occupied. General Warren rode with me a second time there, immediately after this. First, my division was ordered to be closed up as soon as possible, to be in readiness; then we rode together to the 15-gun battery. As we crossed the field between this 5-gun battery and the 15 gun battery I saw the negro troops coming back to the rear like a sand-slide. By the time we got to the corner of the 15-gun battery numbers of them were sweeping through that—sweeping around from different quarters; some one side and some another, some into the covered ways and some into the field between. A close observation assured me that that line of battle which I first described was replaced by the enemy in the rifle-pits on the right of the mine. I saw their battle-flags, and their bullets fell around us. Some one then proposed that General Warren should immediately put in the 5th corps at that moment. General Warren and myself concluded that the time was passed; they had lost what they had, excepting those men who were left in the crater. And immediately after that we rode to our position at the 5-gun battery, and I received notice that the movement was suspended, and a few moments after orders to send my division to its camp.

Question. Please to relate some of the chief causes of failure on that occasion.

Answer. Firstly, those troops that went to make their attack seemed to be going out simply by the right flank from two covered ways; therefore, the heads of regiments arrived at the crater in that condition, when there should have been a line of battle arriving there. These men rushed into the crater, and a considerable amount of time was lost in endeavoring to get troops in some formation to advance properly in line of battle. Arrangements should have been made, that when that mine was sprung the troops which were to make the assault to carry the crest, which looked down upon the city, should advance in line of battle, so that they would have been in hand and subject to the command of their officers. That, in my judgment, was the principal cause of the failure. The commencement of the assault, in my judgment, was the cause of its entire failure. If those dispositions had been made, and those troops had advanced in line of battle instead of in columns of regiments, I believe they would have taken that crest. There was a great deal of work which should have been done along our old line nearest to the crater and to the south of the line of the gallery, so that troops could have really marched forward at least in two regiments abreast. That being done, and those troops advanced as I described, I believe they would have taken that crest readily, and I believe that then, if the supports had been thrown in promptly, that crest would have been held and success would have crowned the operation. After it was clear that the thing had failed I think that prompt orders should have been given to withdraw, in one rapid movement, all the troops left in the crater, to bring them out in one body rapidly back to their lines.

Major General G. K. WARREN, United States volunteers, being duly sworn, says :

By the judge advocate :

Question. General, were you present at the assault on the 30th July, the day the mine was sprung, near this place ; and if so, in what capacity ?

Answer. I was there in command of the 5th corps.

Question. Will you please to state what, in your opinion, were some of the chief causes of that failure ?

Answer. To mention them all at once, I never saw sufficient good reasons why it should succeed. I never had confidence in its success. The position was taken in reverse by batteries, and we must, as a matter of course, have expected a heavy fire of artillery when we gained the crest, though we did not get near enough to develop what that would be. I never should have planned it, I think.

Question. As it was planned, had you an opportunity of seeing whether the plan was carried out in the best manner—the plan having been adopted ?

Answer. I can mention some faults. There was a great defect, I think, in the preparation for the movement of the assaulting column. I judge so from the way the column moved, as I did not visit the exact point. And second, I think the first force, instead of moving straight on the hill, should have cleared the intrenchments right and left of the crater, so as not to have exposed the advancing column to a flank fire. I tried to make a similar assault there on the 18th of June, and that very same battery that operated on the left flank of Burnside's force that day was in operation on the previous occasion, and stopped all my efforts.

Question. Could you mention that battery particularly by showing it on the map, or designating it in some way ?

Answer. It is the first battery on the south side of the mine.

Question. Was our artillery fire effective on that occasion ?

Answer. As much so as it could be. I heard Colonel Abbot complain that a group of trees in front of one of his large batteries was left standing, and it was his desire to have it cleared away.

Question. Did he say whose business it was to clear it away ? Did he find fault with any one ? In whose front was it ?

Answer. In General Burnside's front. I remember he said General Burnside had told him that he was afraid clearing it away might disclose his intention ; but I do not think that he said whose fault it was that it was not done, or whether it was a fault, except in interfering with his battery.

By the court :

Question. Aside from any general principle with reference to the matter upon which you predicated the chances of success, do you think that after the mine exploded there really was a chance of success ?

Answer. There are so many ifs in it. If we could have carried that first line of rifle-pits, and then maintained ourselves after we got to the crest, we would have had success ; but I do not believe any troops will stand on an open plain with artillery, covered by redoubts, playing upon them ; and I think that is what the enemy had then, or ought to have had, if they did not. If they have been there all this time without that preparation ; they are much more unprepared than I think they are.

Question. Did they open much artillery fire for the first fifteen minutes or half hour after the explosion ?

Answer. I should say not a great deal, not where I was ; only a very little. There was no particular danger in my vicinity for a group of horsemen standing right out in plain sight, as we did all the time. Their batteries were mainly



placed for enfilading any line attacking, and probably reserved their fire until that line approached.

Question. Aside from that operation of the 9th corps, if the 5th corps, supported by another, could have been thrown round on the enemy's right, occupying those two railroads and turning his right, what was the chance of success in that direction?

Answer. It would be impossible for me to say. I do not know what the nature of their defences was in that direction. I believe, from what I have heard, that the very brigade which repulsed General Burnside was located there in the morning, and my corps at that time had no force in reserve, except General Ayres's division and a brigade of General Crawford's and a brigade of General Cutler's.

Question. Was there any force of the enemy there strong enough to resist the number of troops we had disposable, had they been put in properly after the first assault had failed?

Answer. I can answer that question and cover a little more. When we attacked, in the first operation on Petersburg, we had more force than on this occasion, and the enemy had about the same, I think; and I don't believe that the blowing up of the mine made up for the difference in the increased strength of the earthworks, as they were on the 18th of June and the 30th of July; and if the operation of the 18th of June decided anything, I think it decided that the operation of the 30th of July would have met with the same result.

Question. Did you feel the want of any person on the field who could see for himself and give commands on the spot? Had that any effect upon the result? Or do you think that any person ought to have been present who should have had command of the storming party and all the troops ready to take part in the operation?

Answer. I think some one should have been present to have directed my command as well as General Burnside's and General Ord's—some one person; but whether that would have affected the result or not I am not prepared to say.

Question. Did you experience any uncertainties and doubts for the want of such a person's presence there?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Were there moments when such a person's presence was necessary in order to decide at once what should be done?

Answer. I think it was necessary that some one should have been there. If you have my official report it will show you that I was in doubt whether to move to the left or move to the right to help General Burnside, and that I had to await the transmission of despatches and corresponding answers—my report shows how much; but I do not know that that would have affected the main result at all. My report is a complete answer to your question. Sometimes, in these badly planned or badly inaugurated assaults, the longer and better they are pressed the worse we are off—great losses being sustained after the time and chance of success are gone.

The court adjourned, to meet at 10 o'clock a. m. on 30th August.

#### EIGHTH DAY.

#### HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS,

*Jones House, August 30, 1864.*

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Hancock, Brigadier Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge advocate.

The proceedings of the seventh day were read and approved.

By General Meade :

Question. What did you mean by saying "some one should have been present to have directed my command, together with the commands of Generals Ord and Burnside?" Were you not aware that the commanding general of the army of the Potomac was in the field, and in telegraphic communication with yourself and the other officers alluded to?

Answer. I saw from my position, which was, I suppose, about four hundred yards from General Burnside's, as well as could be seen in the morning in the smoke, that the assault was not going on very rapidly, and that no effort had been made to do what I thought was the first essential—to take that battery on the left of the mine. I then went to General Burnside's, which was as close to the scene of operations as a man could be and see well. There I found Generals Burnside and Ord engaged in conversation. I suggested to General Burnside that that battery should be taken at once; he asked me to go down the line and take a look at it from another point, and I did so. Upon returning, I saw I was confirmed in my first opinion, and he asked me if my troops could not take it. At that time all the approaches leading down to where the mine was were filled with his troops, still slowly moving down, and there was no chance for me to get at the battery, except to go over an open field. I, however, determined to put in General Ayres's division at once, and try to take it, and went back for that purpose, when I got a despatch from General Meade, the exact language of which I do not remember, to the effect that I would await information from some operations which had been directed or that were then going on on the left; and then it was that I wrote one of the despatches in which I said that I thought some one should be there to direct whether I should attempt to take that battery or go with my division round to the left, as General Crawford reported that he was unable to do anything, with what force he had there, on the plank road. I will qualify what I said about the loss of time. I lost considerable time talking to General Burnside; I lost some time in going to see the battery with him; I lost some time in writing despatches and awaiting answers; and, in an operation of that kind, every moment was of vital importance, for before I got the order to go in and take the battery, the enemy had driven nearly all of General Burnside's line out of the intrenchments he had taken.

If General Burnside had given me any orders, as I was there for the purpose of supporting him, I would have obeyed them; but he seemed to act as if what we did was to be done after consultation, and, therefore, I thought that some one should have been right there to have directed at once, without a moment's loss of time, what should be done and what should not.

Those despatches show the extent of the loss of time. But, as I said in my testimony yesterday, I do not know that it affected the result at all. But, in reply to the direct question, if I thought there should have been some one there to give promptly positive orders what to do, I gave my first answer.

Question. How much time was occupied in these consultations, reconnoissances, and other matters referred to by you? and would not the commanding general, had he been at the point referred to by you, have been compelled to consume the same time?

Answer. I do not remember how much time was lost, and cannot tell exactly, unless I can have my official report, or a copy of it, or some records of that kind to refer to. But it was a point of observation at which I should have consulted with nobody.

Everything was plainly to be seen.

Different persons might look at it differently, but it was a position where any one man could see the whole. In my opinion, the most important time was lost before I went to that point.

Question. Why did you consume the time which you acknowledge to have

been lost, and why did you not at once telegraph the commanding general about what you saw and what you thought could or should be done?

Answer. The time that I speak of was consumed by General Burnside. In my instructions I was directed to support him; and I informed him where my headquarters were, as stated, not far from him. I waited there for his directions. I thought that my being with him, under orders to support him, the time lost was lost by him and not by me. I did keep the commanding general as promptly informed of everything as I possibly could. Even if I had chosen to have acted independently, according to my own discretion, subject to the approval of the commanding general, all the approaches to the point were occupied by General Burnside's troops. I could not have moved mine without getting them mixed up with his.

By the court:

Question. Did you not mean, in your previous answers, that it was your belief that if the commanding general had been on that field there would have been a pressure brought to bear to push those troops of the 9th corps that occupied those trenches forward faster than they went?

Answer. I think that the controlling power should have been there, and nowhere else, so that there should have been no reference to anywhere else.

Question. When you replied to the last question put to you yesterday, did you consider that the commander of the army of the Potomac should have been present in person, or that some one should have been invested with the command of all the troops engaged in the assault as supports, reserves, &c., if said command was not there?

Answer. I meant that some one person, having general command, should have been there to have seen and directed all at once.

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT, United States army, being sworn and examined by the judge advocate, says:

Question. Will you please to state what, in your judgment, caused the failure of the attack on the enemy's lines on the 30th of July?

Answer. It seemed to me that it was perfectly practicable for the men, if they had been properly led, to have gone straight through the breach which was caused by the explosion of the mine, and to have gone to the top of Cemetery hill. It looked to me, from what I could see and hear, that it was perfectly practicable to take the men through; but whether it was because the men themselves would not go, or whether it was because they were not led, I was not far enough to the front to be qualified to say.

Question. What orders which you issued were not executed, if any?

Answer. I could send you copies of all the despatches that I wrote. The orders for the assault were issued by General Meade, in obedience to general instructions from me. I saw the detailed order of General Meade before the mine was exploded, and I thought that the execution of that order was practicable. That order, I presume, you have before you. My order was to General Meade, and then General Meade made his order from what I directed him to do, and sent me a copy of it; and I thought it was all that could be required. I recollect that, failing on the north bank of the river to surprise the enemy, as we expected or hoped to do, but instead of that drew a large part of his force to the north side, I telegraphed to General Meade that we would now take advantage of the absence of that force of the enemy to explode the mine and make an assault on Petersburg.

By the court:

Question. From your information, how many of the enemy were in Petersburg at the time of this assault?

Answer. My information was, that three divisions were left in Petersburg, with one brigade absent from those divisions—Johnson's. From the best evidence, none of the enemy's troops crossed the James river until 2 o'clock of the 30th of July, on their way back. Then they had fully sixteen miles to travel to get back, with, however, the advantage of a railroad near them to carry many of the men. The distance I guess at, when I say sixteen miles.

Lieutenant Colonel C. B. COMSTOCK, aide-de-camp, being duly sworn and examined by the judge advocate, says:

Question. Were you at or near the scene of the assault on the 30th of July; by whose orders, and in what capacity?

Answer. I was at General Burnside's headquarters, as aide-de-camp to Lieutenant General Grant, and afterward at General Warren's headquarters by General Grant's orders.

Question. Did you see General Burnside in person; and had you conversation with him?

Answer. I had some conversation with him.

Question. Relate the conversation in brief.

Answer. I went from General Burnside's headquarters, to the position he had in the front, to ascertain how things stood; I suppose the time was about an hour after the explosion of the mine. He told me that his troops were forming then for an assault to carry the crest of the hill. That was the only important point in the conversation.

Question. Did he give you any information to communicate to General Grant?

Answer. I do not recollect that he did.

Question. Had you an opportunity of forming an opinion as to the cause or causes of the failure on that day?

Answer. I had not, from anything that I saw myself.

By the court:

Question. Were you so situated that you could see this assault?

Answer. I could not until I went to General Warren's headquarters, which was about 7 o'clock. I could not see the details.

Question. Had you made such an examination prior to the assault that would enable you to give a professional opinion as to the chances of success in attempting to take Cemetery hill by assault, considering the explosion of the mine as the basis of the assault?

Answer. I had.

Question. I wish you would state to the court what the chances of success were, using this mine as a means of inaugurating the assault.

Answer. I thought it entirely impracticable when the mine was made, if the enemy's line should be held in full force. This opinion was formed a week or ten days prior to the assault. Afterwards, with the knowledge I had of the movement of the enemy's troops from the south to the north side of the river, I thought an assault was entirely practicable.

Question. What do you suppose would have been the best plan for the assaulting troops to have followed after having reached Cemetery hill—made a lodgement on and fortified that place, or proceeded immediately into the town of Petersburg?

Answer. I suppose the first step should have been to have made a lodgement on Cemetery hill, and then to have pushed up troops to hold it at all hazards. The disposition of the troops would depend upon the nature of the ground.

Question. From your knowledge of the nature of the intrenchments, our own and the enemy's, do you think that immediately after the explosion of the mine, if proper working parties had been arranged, there would have been any diffi-

culty in removing sufficient obstructions to have enabled our troops to have moved against those intrenchments in line of battle?

Answer. I do not think there would have been any difficulty.

Major General E. O. C. ORD, United States volunteers, being duly sworn and examined by the judge advocate, says:

Question. Please state what was your command at the assault on the 30th of July.

Answer. My command was composed of two divisions to aid in the assault, one of which belonged to the 10th corps, and was under General Turner, and the other to the 18th corps, under General Ames. The divisions numbered, General Ames's about 3,500 and General Turner's 4,000 available muskets, or probably a little less.

Question. What were your troops ordered to do?

Answer. My troops were ordered to a position in the rear of General Burnside's corps, with a view to supporting it. The positions were selected by General Burnside.

Question. Did your troops experience any interference from the 9th corps moving into position on that occasion?

Answer. After General Burnside's troops had made the assault and pushed forward, probably about an hour or a little more after the explosion of the mine, he said to me, "Now you can move your troops forward." I sent orders immediately to the leading division to move forward rapidly, according to the programme, following the division that was in front of it, which was the rear division of General Burnside's corps. In the course of twenty minutes after the order was sent out by a staff officer, General Turner reported to me that he found the way blocked, that the approach to the place of debouch was occupied by the divisions in front, and that he had found himself in front of General Potter's troops.

This was the report made by him. General Potter's troops, according to the programme, were to precede his.

Question. Were any arrangements made for the passage of troops through the abatis, and over the parapets, to go to the front on that day?

Answer. When I went to the front I found the troops debouching by a single opening. The parapet had been thrown down, and the abatis had been removed, and the troops were moved out by that opening.

Question. Please state the dimensions of that opening; would it admit of the passage of troops in column, or line, or how?

Answer. I cannot give the exact dimensions, because my attention was occupied principally in watching what was going on in front of this place; but my impression is that the opening was large enough for a column of a company front to go out over pretty rough ground. I do not know whether there was more than one opening; I only saw that one.

Question. That was the one your troops passed through?

Answer. No, my troops did not all pass through that way; I directed a portion of my troops to go over the parapet.

Question. Did you direct them to go over the parapet because, in your judgment, the opening was inadequate?

Answer. I gave those directions because the ground in front of this place of exit was occupied by other troops, and there was no room after they got out for them to be of service without moving for a considerable distance by the flank, to the right and left.

Question. How were the troops that debouched to the assault formed to advance?

Answer. When I went to the front, I saw white troops moving out by the

flank into the crater and the trenches near ; I say by the flank, but I will explain that they passed along by twos and threes, and sometimes fours, along this space, which was pretty well swept by the fire of the enemy—the space between our trenches and the crater formed by the explosion of the mine. These white troops were followed afterwards by some colored troops, who also moved out, as it were, by flank, though the appearance of moving by flank may have been caused by the columns being somewhat disordered and hesitating in the move, so that a few moving forward first, and others following them, would diminish the width of a column, and give the troops the appearance of moving by flank.

Question. In your opinion, was this movement by flank judicious, or was it unavoidable?

Answer. I would not suppose it was a judicious move, under the circumstances, if it could have been avoided ; I rather think, if intended to be a movement with a front of one or more companies, then the kind of formation I saw was caused by the hesitation of the troops in the rear, and the natural disposition of those men who are more or less timid in following those in front to string themselves out in almost single file.

Question. What, in your opinion, were some of the causes of failure on that occasion ?

Answer. I think the first cause was that the troops were not well disciplined ; they probably had not had time to become soldiers. The next cause may have been that they passed out of the trenches by one place of exit, and through the covered way to a considerable extent, which necessarily impeded the progress of troops going out, especially as troops began coming in by the same covered way.

Question. Were the obstacles met by our troops, in your opinion, formidable ?

Answer. I did not go to the front until difficulties were reported in the way of carrying out the order received from General Meade, to move my division out to the right, independent of the troops in my front, and endeavor to reach the crest of the hill ; it was reported by the division commanders that the nature of the ground was such that they could not get out that way. I went down to inspect the ground myself, and I derived the impression that there were difficulties in the way of getting out from the position occupied by my men at that time, except in one place. They were in the long covered way—the way leading to the angle from which the troops debouched ; the ground was swampy, covered with more or less undergrowth and trees, and appeared to run obliquely in front of the enemy's trenches. If the troops should get into that swamp and undergrowth it would have been difficult to have kept them in order, and the enemy would have had them at a greater disadvantage, raking them if they occupied the trenches. The covered way was a pretty deep one, and I supposed from the fact of its being there, leading to the place of exit, it was swept by a very heavy fire from the enemy's batteries. It was reported that the stream running through the marsh was bridged in one place by a narrow bridge where we crossed it, and that it was a difficult place for troops to pass over ; when I got there I saw that it was very muddy, that delays would be occasioned, and that it was a difficult place to attempt to take the enemy's intrenchments, and we would have got on the ground just under the enemy's works, and probably been exposed to a very severe fire.

Question. Did any troops, to your knowledge, misbehave or disobey orders ?

Answer. None that I know of, except after, when an assault was made by some colored troops, followed by a brigade of the 10th corps, which assault was made about 8 o'clock, while I was in the front line of our trenches and within less than one hundred yards of the crater, and what I would call the movement of assault ; the men were repulsed by a very heavy concentrated fire which

enveloped that point of exit—the enemy having massed forces on the right and front, and some fire coming from the left.

Question. In your opinion, had the first troops that went forward not hesitated nor halted in the crater, could they not have got to the desirable point—that is, Cemetery hill?

Answer. I know nothing about their halting, or the facilities that they had for getting forward, except through what I heard from others, I not having been present at that time.

Question. How was our artillery firing, as far as you observed—effective or otherwise?

Answer. The artillery fired very rapidly and for a long time; and, judging from the reports in the enemy's newspapers which I have seen since, we must have done considerable damage by our artillery upon their columns moving across to the place of attack.

Question. Were the obstructions north and south of the crater removed sufficiently to admit the passage of troops in line of battle—say brigade front?

Answer. I did not see that any obstructions made by the enemy's trenches had been removed when I was there, except what had been removed by the explosion of the mine at the crater. Their ditch still remained, and I counted the regimental flags of our troops in my front occupying the trench. I do not know whether there was a strong abatis before the attack, so that I refer only to the ditch and the parapet.

By the court :

Question. Do you think the assault would have been successful there, had the best dispositions been made that you are conversant with?

Answer. From what I learned afterwards of the behavior of the troops after the explosion, when the enemy was most alarmed, I think that the assault, if it had been made with no more vigor, would have failed, no matter what the disposition. If the troops had behaved properly elsewhere, I think the probability of success would have been increased by having more openings, a simultaneous assault, and increased material; but if the troops would have behaved as improperly as they are reported to have done in front, not going forward when ordered, I think the assault would have failed, no matter what the disposition.

Question. In your opinion, was there any necessity for an officer of rank being present who should have had a more general command than the commander of the troops making the assault and the commanders of the supports and reserves? should there have been an officer present to have combined the whole command nearer than the commander of the army, who was only in telegraphic communication with the different commanders of troops on the field? should there have been one single person there invested with authority to direct the whole operation? and would the result have been different if such had been the case?

Answer. The only commands referred to as present there—the assembling corps and the reserves—were under General Burnside and myself; and upon reporting to General Burnside, I accompanied him to the trenches, and told him I would obey any instructions he gave me; so that the whole of the operations were under his orders, until the orders came from higher authority to make the change referred to, and to discontinue the assault. General Burnside being the senior officer, I considered that he had a right to give me orders. He directed me to place my troops in the rear until after his troops should have made the assault, and until he learned when they would be necessary, and where, which I did. General Burnside was to give me word when to move my troops, and where to move them. I told him I considered myself bound to obey any instructions that he might give me, and that any instructions that he would give would be obeyed with alacrity; so that, so far as concerns the movements directed by him, I do not think the presence of any other officer in those two corps would have made any change in moving forward.

Question. Could your troops, when they were called into action, have advanced to the front over the enemy's parapet, and have gotten through in line of battle in any front greater than that of two regiments, at the time you were sent in, on each side of the crater?

Answer. I think it probable that my troops might have gotten in on the left of the crater at that time, if they had advanced through the opening by fronts of regiments, or even companies, gotten into the enemy's trenches; but my answer must be understood to convey only a knowledge of what I saw. I do not know what force the enemy had on the left. I only know that the resistance on the right was very great, and they appeared to have a severe fire upon the troops on the right of where we advanced to the crater. My troops were directed to support General Burnside on the right.

Question. Were you present when the mine exploded? Do you consider that the troops might have advanced to the top of Cemetery hill on that ridge, had they been properly led forward, or the troops behaved properly?

Answer. I do not consider I was present when the mine exploded.

By General Meade :

Question. Where was your general position on the field during the operation of the morning?

Answer. When the mine exploded, and probably for an hour and a half or two hours afterwards, I was with General Burnside in the trenches in rear of one of the batteries about one-third or a half mile from the point of assault; after that for half an hour I was up to the front as far as I could get without going into the crater, or outside our line of intrenchments as far as the head of my advanced division was. I then returned, and General Burnside and myself occupied the same place in the rear of this battery for probably an hour, except that I rode to the rear where General Meade was, and passed around a little, trying to rally some troops who were going from the front. This took me till between 9 and 10 o'clock, when General Burnside and myself both rode to the rear to learn something about an order that was issued in regard to our future movements.

Question. Could anything be seen from this point with sufficient distinctness to have enabled the commanding general to give orders other than he did from the point occupied?

Answer. Immediately after the explosion, the fire from both our batteries and the enemy's came very heavily, and the cloud of smoke prevented us from seeing anything that was going on there. We were ignorant of the condition of things except from the information staff officers brought us, or from the nature of the firing we heard, up to the time that I informed myself by going to the front.

Question. Did you hear any staff officer report to General Burnside that the troops could not be got to advance from the crater? If so, how many officers so reported, and do you know their names?

Answer. The first two or three reports that were brought to General Burnside were brought by officers whose names I do not know, and not until some considerable time had expired after the explosion; and although I did not hear the reports distinctly enough to repeat them, they were not satisfactory, and indicated that the troops could not be moved readily forward.

Question. Did you not report to the commanding general that the troops were overcrowded in the crater, and the enemy's works adjacent, and that in your judgment there was no probability of the crest of Cemetery hill being carried—this somewhere between 9 and 10 a. m., at the headquarters of the commanding general in the field?

Answer. I did. I would say, in addition to my answer, that General Burnside and myself were present at the time, and the question was, whether we



could carry it at that time; and my answer intended to convey whether *we*—General Burnside and myself, with our forces—could have done so, had they let us; and after the troops were disorganized and driven back, those who made the attack later and those who made the attack earlier were packed in the trenches adjacent; that, under the circumstances, we could not carry it with all our troops at that point of attack.

Question. Did General Burnside, about 10 a. m., when at his commanding general's headquarters on the field, say that he could maintain his lodgement in the crater, and that he could take Cemetery hill before night, if so permitted?

Answer. General Burnside disagreed with me, when I said I did not think we could take it. I supposed he meant that he could take it with the force he had, consisting of his own corps and my reserves, though he said something about it was time then for the 5th corps to move up. The remark was made by General Burnside, with a view to persisting in the attack which he commenced, and it had been my opinion, ever since I was near enough to see what was going on in the crater, that the sooner we withdrew our troops, when we got into such a bad position, the better, and any persistence in the attack at that point I looked upon as very improper.

Question. Was it not understood at this time that offensive operations should cease, but that the crater should be held till the troops could be securely withdrawn, and that this would probably be till night?

Answer. I think such was General Burnside's understanding, and I know he received such orders. My troops were all inside the intrenchments, except those who had run into the enemy's trenches to avoid the tremendous fire which they met when they went out.

By General Warren:

Question. Do you remember seeing General Warren at the battery at General Burnside's station?

Answer. I do.

Question. Was not the whole field at that time sufficiently clear from smoke to be visible, and had been so for some time previously at that point?

Answer. I do not know whether it was after my return from the vicinity of the crater or before that I saw General Warren. My impression is that each time I looked from the parapet before I left the trenches—which was two or three times that I rose to look to the front—the smoke obscured the view, so that I, at least, could form no definite idea of what was going on at the front. After the firing from the batteries on our side had ceased, which was probably an hour from the time of the assault, the atmosphere was clearer; but even then I could make out really little of what was going on in front, from the distance, the peculiar position of the point of attack, and from the fact, too, that I do not see very well, because I am near-sighted.

Brigadier General R. B. POTTER, United States volunteers, being sworn and examined by the judge advocate:

Question. Were you in a position to see the operations of the assault before Petersburg on the 30th of July, and in what capacity?

Answer. I was commanding the 2d division 9th army corps.

Question. Do you regard it as a failure or otherwise?

Answer. I regard it as a failure.

Question. To what cause or causes do you attribute this?

Answer. Firstly, to the failure of the troops who had the advance on that day to carry out the orders to advance through the enemy's line and seize the hill. Secondly, that when it was evident that this part of the plan had failed no attempt was made at a diversion, at any other part of the line, to en-

able the troops, which were thrown into confusion at this point, to be re-formed. I would further state that I do not think the preliminary arrangements were very perfect.

Question. What preparations were made, or what orders were given for the same, to pass troops through the abatis and over the parapet in front of the 9th corps? Did you receive any orders yourself?

Answer. I received no orders whatever in relation to that matter, except what are contained in the general order from the headquarters of the army of the Potomac. I was furnished a copy of that order, but no other order.

Question. But what preparations were made, or what orders were given for the same, to pass troops through the abatis and over the parapet in front of the 9th corps?

Answer. The general order of General Burnside—I suppose it might be called the order of attack—was the only order given in writing. Verbal instructions were given to have the pioneers of the different regiments, and a sort of pioneer regiment that we call the engineer regiment, in each division, prepared with their tools, &c., to prepare the breastworks for the passage of field batteries, in case we were successful in moving forward. My regiment was immediately in the neighborhood of the breastwork, ready to carry out these instructions, and my pioneers were also prepared. I had orders not to disturb anything immediately in the vicinity of the mine, so as not to attract the attention of the enemy to that point. I was told to withdraw everything from that part of the line for a space of two or three hundred yards, except a thin line of skirmishers, and not to attract the enemy's attention there, if I could help it.

Question. How were the 9th corps troops formed for the assault—your own division for instance?

Answer. My own division was to have been formed left in front, to move forward by the flank, so that when my troops had passed the line of the enemy's intrenchments, by fronting their front would be to the right, my division being intended to cover the right of the advance. One brigade of my division was massed between the railroad and the advance line of works on the right-hand side of my covered way, and south of the mine. I had orders not to allow any troops on the left of the covered way. The other brigade was partially in the trenches, and about to be relieved by some of the troops of the 18th corps. Two or three regiments, which I was ordered not to put in the assault, were not in the trenches.

Question. What time elapsed from the springing of the mine till the forward movement of the assaulting columns?

Answer. I do not know, sir; I did not see the movement of the first division. The first of my regiments commenced to move, I should think, about eight or ten minutes after the mine exploded. My division was to move third in order, but I took the liberty of altering the programme a little. After I received the order of Major General Burnside—I received the order about nine o'clock at night—after thinking the matter over, it occurred to me that it would be a very long time before my division would have an opportunity to get forward, as the divisions of Generals Ledlie and Wilcox were to precede me. I therefore commanded General Griffin, who had the lead in my division, to deploy a line of skirmishers to the right of this crater, and in case the assault seemed to be successful and General Ledlie moved forward, he should advance his skirmishers to the right, and if he did not find so much serious opposition as to detain him there, he should push his troops forward to the right and move forward nearly parallel with General Ledlie. I gave him these orders about twelve o'clock at night, and I do not think that I communicated to General Burnside that I had made this change. Therefore my troops commenced moving as soon as General Griffin found that General Ledlie's column had started.

This leading division commenced moving and passed into the right of the crater and turned down to the right.

Question. Did the troops halt in the crater?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Why?

Answer. No reason at all that I know of.

Question. What was the nature of the obstructions in the enemy's line, formidable or otherwise?

Answer. To the right of the crater there was an ordinary line of rifle-pits, with a sort of *chevaux-de-frise* in front of it, made by pointed stakes being driven into the ground. Immediately in rear of this, and to the right of it, there were two covered ways. One seemed to be a covered way, and one, perhaps, a place dug to carry something out of the fort. There were transverse lines of rifle-pits, and some coverings thrown up by the men to protect themselves—one running in these angles between the advance line and this covered way, which runs off towards Petersburg, and another running on the bank of the ravine which runs up through the enemy's line to the right of the mine, about the line I was ordered to take.

Question. What was the degree of artillery firing on that point—the point of assault?

Answer. Immediately after the assault, very light; afterwards the fire was very severe indeed—as severe as I ever saw.

Question. What time elapsed, as near as you can tell, from the time of the assault till the time this severe fire commenced?

Answer. I should think fully half an hour.

Question. Was the ground around the crater commanded by the ground held by the enemy?

Answer. Yes, sir; that is, immediately in rear of the enemy's line which we had pierced the ground commanded it, and the ground to the right on the other side of the ravine commanded it. In speaking of the right, I mean our right. The ground to the left I did not notice so well, because I had no business there.

Question. For what distance on each side of the crater were the enemy's works abandoned after the explosion of the mine?

Answer. To the right of the crater the front line was abandoned for a space of two hundred and fifty or three hundred yards I should think; that is, the enemy's troops rushed out of this line back to these covered ways, and so forth. From the hasty glance I gave to the left, there did not seem to be anybody within three hundred yards. Perhaps it would be better to say that the line was only partially abandoned; they did not all go—some went and some did not.

Question. Could the troops have proceeded to the crest immediately after reaching the crater?

Answer. I do not know any reasons why they could not.

Question. Did any troops that you know of advance from the crater to the crest?

Answer. Some of my troops advanced from the right of the crater towards the crest; I suppose they went upwards of two hundred yards, and they were driven back.

Question. Why, do you suppose, were they driven back?

Answer. At that time they were driven back by the fire. They were too weak to advance further.

Question. By the fire of artillery or of infantry?

Answer. Both.

Question. At what hour was that?

Answer. That must have been about half or three-quarters of an hour after the mine exploded.

Question. Do you think that if your men had been adequately supported,

they could have gone forward to the crest notwithstanding the obstacles that presented themselves, firing, and so forth, at that hour?

Answer. I think that if I had had my whole division together at that time, if the ground had been such that I could have had my whole division together and made that charge, I could have gone to the crest.

Question. When these troops fell back where did they go?

Answer. They fell back partially into this covered way leading from the fort to the right, and a few were driven into the crater of the mine.

Question. How long was it after they got in before they were ordered to retire; how long were you in that place, or wherever they were?

Answer. Until the general order came to withdraw the troops.

Question. How long would you estimate that time to be?

Answer. It must have been five or six hours. It seems to me we did not get that order till about 11 o'clock. General Burnside sent for me, I should think, about 10 o'clock in the morning, and stated that he had received an order to withdraw, and asked me if I thought we could hold the position. I told him I thought we could hold the position, but unless something was going to be done there was no use in it. He said it was an important point, or something of that sort, and I asked him if I would make arrangements to withdraw, and he told me no; that he was going to see General Meade, and that I should wait until he should have consulted with him. Half or three-quarters of an hour afterwards I received a copy of a telegram to General White, who was acting as his chief of staff, with an indorsement on the back of the despatch to the effect that it should be submitted to the officers in the crater, or something to that effect, for their opinion as to how they should withdraw. Subsequently I started to go into the crater to consult with them, and I received an order from an aide-de-camp of General Burnside to report in person at his headquarters.

Question. Was the time a fit one to withdraw, in your opinion?

Answer. The troops were not withdrawn at all. They were driven out by the enemy.

Question. When did the chief loss of men occur?

Answer. The chief loss in my division occurred between half past six and ten o'clock in the morning. The heaviest loss was at the time that some of the troops of the 4th division (the colored division) met with a check and were repulsed.

Question. Was it in the act of retiring from the crater?

Answer. More than half the prisoners I lost were lost in the crater. I should explain that I had very few men in the crater; that seeing how it was overcrowded, and that one or two regiments that attempted to pass through were lost among the other troops, I endeavored to get my troops out of there; but when some of the other troops gave way, and the operation of General Ferrero's troops was unsuccessful and they gave way, I had some stragglers forced into the crater. I suppose I had not more than two hundred men in there. My troops were holding the line to the right of that mostly.

Question. By whom was this removal of the troops conducted?

Answer. It was not conducted at all, sir. The circumstances were these: After we had received this order General Burnside directed me to report at his headquarters. I went to his headquarters, met there the other division commanders, and we consulted upon the best plan which should be adopted to withdraw the troops. I had previously sent out orders to connect my right with the crater by an intrenchment, if possible. While we were returning from this consultation an assault was made upon the crater, and the enemy recovered possession of it. Then all the troops were forced back to our line except two regiments that I had sent beyond the ravine to silence a battery, and these I withdrew about four o'clock in the afternoon.

Question. Do you know whether any troops misbehaved or disobeyed orders in any way, or at any time, during the action?

Answer. I do not know that I can answer that exactly. I know by the reports of my staff officers, and so forth. But I saw troops lying there when they had been ordered to go forward. Immediately after the mine exploded, probably within ten minutes, Colonel Pleasants, who had charge of the explosion, and whose regiment, having built the mine, being relieved from duty on that day, except as a sort of provost guard with orders from the 9th army corps, had volunteered as an aid on my staff, and as soon as the mine was exploded he rushed forward into the crater, and the troops were moving up; and he reported to me that the troops could not be made to move forward; that was, the troops of the 1st division. He showed me his hand, which was blistered in driving them up. It was Marshall's brigade of Ledlie's division.

By the court:

Question. What tools were the engineer regiments supplied with?

Answer. Axes, spades, and picks. The engineer regiment, I think, was supplied particularly with axes to cut down the abatis.

Question. Did they move forward?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did they destroy the abatis?

Answer. The *chevaux-de-frise* on the enemy's lines for two or three hundred yards was broken down.

Question. Was there any difficulty in passing a brigade or regimental front over our intrenchments and on either side of that crater to the front?

Answer. It might have been done on the left, but not on the right.

Question. What was the difficulty on the right?

Answer. The difficulty on the right was that where you would have to form your troops you would have to pass through a wooded ravine and swamp. A heavy regiment which charged through in regimental front, I think, got very badly broken up. They would have succeeded better further to the right.

Question. Where did you stay during the attack?

Answer. Most of the time I stayed on the hill on this side of the railroad—a point where you can see the ground.

Question. Did all of your troops go into action?

Answer. My troops all went into action except my engineer regiment, which had just moved up to the front.

Question. Did they all get as far as the crater?

Answer. All except one regiment got beyond the crater.

Question. Did you ever go to the crater?

Answer. I never went to the crater myself. I was within about eighty yards of it—just off to the right of it.

Question. At the time your skirmish line was ordered up the hill did any individual members of your division get to the top of the crest?

Answer. I do not think there did. It was reported to me that some did; but having investigated it since, I am satisfied that they did not.

The court adjourned, to meet at ten o'clock on the 31st of August.

#### NINTH DAY.

#### HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS,

August 31, 1864.

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Hancock, Brigadier Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge advocate.

The proceedings of the eighth day were read and approved.

Brigadier General EDWARD FERRERO, United States volunteers, being duly sworn, to questions by judge advocate says :

Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command ?

Answer. I was ; commanding the 4th division of the 9th army corps, (colored troops.)

Question. What was their formation for the attack ?

Answer. There was no formation, further than moving down in rear of the third division, as directed in the orders, by the flank in the covered way.

Question. Was this the most judicious ?

Answer. It was the only formation that could be adopted under the circumstances.

Question. Please to state the circumstances.

Answer. There being no position to mass the troops.

Question. Why was there no position ?

Answer. On account of there being three other divisions in advance of mine, which would occupy all the available ground where my troops could have been formed.

Question. What orders had you to prepare the parapet for the debouch of troops ?

Answer. I had no orders whatever.

Question. State some of the causes of the failure, if you regard it so.

Answer. I do regard it as a failure.

Question. State some of the causes, briefly.

Answer. The failure of the 1st division to go forward immediately after the explosion.

Question. Do you attribute their halting and not going forward to misbehavior on their part ?

Answer. Not being present there, that I could not say. In my opinion, there is no reason that I know of why they should not have gone forward.

Question. State the reasons why you arrived at that conclusion.

Answer. I would state that there could have been no obstructions whatever at that time, from the fact that the crater was crowded with troops, in and about it, when my division went through and passed over the obstacles, not only the obstacles occasioned by the explosion, but also the mass of troops in the crater. They went through and passed beyond those troops at a time when there was heavy firing ; whereas those troops that had gone forward on the lead could have gone forward with a very slight loss, in my opinion. I would state that, in my opinion, the order of battle for the movements of troops on that day was extremely faulty. If I understand it right, the object to be attained was to gain the crest on Cemetery hill ; and to take advantage of the momentary paralyzation of the troops in and about the crater, caused by the explosion of the mine, it was necessary that the troops that made the assault should move with the utmost rapidity to gain that crest. I contend that the point of the assault was not properly selected to carry out that object ; that the obstructions which the explosion of the mine would naturally create would disorganize the troops and prevent them moving forward with the rapidity that was desired. Furthermore, I would state that the manner in which the troops went in would not lead them to attain the object that was desired. The two divisions that followed the leading division were to have protected the flanks of the same. Now, how could they protect the flank when the leading division, the head of that column, would hardly have reached the crest before the 2d division would have reached the crater, subjecting the 1st division to flank fires, and to be taken in reverse ? And even had the 3d division, which had the second position in column, have gotten through, it would have taken a long time before the 2d division, which

was the third in column, could have reached its proper point to protect the right flank of the 1st division. I mean to convey the idea, that either other movements should have been made on the flank of the leading division, or that division should have been deployed to the right and left, engaging the enemy on the flank, so as to give the assaulting column an opportunity to advance rapidly to the crest of the hill.

By the court :

Question. How long was it after the explosion of the mine before the assaulting column moved forward ?

Answer. I was not with the leading division ; therefore I cannot give you the exact time, but it was very shortly after.

By the judge advocate :

Question. State to the court how the 4th division, (colored troops,) your own command, conducted themselves on the occasion.

Answer. I would state that the troops went in in the most gallant manner ; that they went in without hesitation, moved right straight forward, passed through the crater that was filled with troops, and all but one regiment of my division passed beyond the crater ; the leading brigade engaged the enemy at a short distance in rear of the crater, where they captured some two hundred odd prisoners and a stand of colors, and recaptured a stand of colors belonging to a white regiment of our corps. Here, after they had taken those prisoners, the troops became somewhat disorganized, and it was some little time before they could get them organized again to make a second attempt to charge the crest of the hill. About half an hour after that they made the attempt and were repulsed by a very severe and galling fire, and, I must say, they retreated in great disorder and confusion back to our first line of troops, where they were rallied, and there they remained during the rest of the day and behaved very well. I would add that my troops are raw new troops, and never had been drilled two weeks from the day they entered the service till that day.

Question. If your division had been the leading one in the assault, would they have succeeded in taking Cemetery hill ?

Answer. I have not the slightest doubt, from the manner in which they went in under very heavy fire, that had they gone in in the first instance when the fire was comparatively light, they would have carried the crest of Cemetery hill beyond a doubt.

By the court :

Question. Did you go forward with your division ?

Answer. I went to our first line of works, and there remained to see my command go through. I would state, that I deemed it more necessary that I should see that they all went in than that I should go in myself, as there was no hesitation in their going forward whatever. I was at no time at a further distance than eighty or ninety yards from my division.

Question. Where were you after they had all passed the crater, and were, as you say, at one time half an hour in reorganizing ?

Answer. I was immediately in front of the crater on our front line of works. I would also state that one regiment was checked between the crater and our front line, unable to get through ; and I was at that time making every effort to get that regiment through, with the intention of passing through myself as soon as they got past, but it was impossible for me to do so from the crowded state of the troops that were there.

Question. Were the obstructions in front of the first line of works of a character to admit the passage of a horseman or a piece of artillery, after the whole corps had passed ?

Answer. They would not admit of the passage of either, because the parapet of the rifle-pit had never been dug away. I was compelled to remove *abatis* on our own front, under fire, to get my command through by the flank.

Brigadier General O. B. WILCOX, United States volunteers, being duly sworn, says to questions by judge advocate:

Question. Were you in a position to see the operation of the assault before Petersburg on the 30th of July, and in what capacity?

Answer. I commanded the 3d division of the 9th army corps. At the time of the explosion of the mine I was at Romer's battery, just in rear of my second brigade, and in good position to observe the assault.

Question. Do you regard the attack as a failure?

Answer. I do.

Question. State some of the causes of it.

Answer. The first and most obvious cause was the failure of the 1st division to go forward when there was no firing, for the fire of the enemy was suspended for fifteen to twenty minutes. In the next place, I think that the troops that went in support of the leading division should have gone in almost simultaneously with it, and should have gone to the right and left, avoiding the crater, but going near it, and then bearing down the enemy's works to the right and left, so as to have prevented the enemy bringing flank and reverse fires to bear on the advancing columns. The order of attack stated that my division should wait until the 1st division had cleared the enemy's works. For that reason, of course, the three divisions could not have gone in simultaneously. It was the published order that prevented it in part. The attention of the enemy was not attracted to any other point than the crater. I consider that the third reason. Almost as soon as the enemy's first astonishment was over they concentrated an almost circular fire around the crater. Their field batteries came out in position on different points on the Jerusalem plank road and on Cemetery hill. They kept up a flank and reverse fire; and a battery in the grove of trees on our right was so situated, the line of the rebel works taking a direction a little re-entering, that almost as soon as they opened fire at all, they began to fire nearly in rear of the crater. I would say, that at the meeting in General Burnside's tent, when Generals Ord and Meade were present, I supposed it was intended that the two divisions following the leading division should move to the right and left, and that the duty of the 9th corps was to clear the ground to enable the 18th corps to move forward. If that plan had been carried out, I think it would have been successful; but I do not think that the temporary occupation of Cemetery hill by a small force would have insured the success of that attack. I think that ultimately they would have been driven out, unless we had a large force, two corps at least, to fight a battle at those works. Now, to go back to the interview which General Burnside had with his division commanders, where General Meade was present, it was a well-understood thing there that this was intended to be a surprise, and it was thought by all the generals, including General Meade himself, that, unless it should be a complete surprise, it would be a failure; and the written order which was published to the commanders did not fully, in fact did not substantially, give the order of attack as it was understood at this interview. I mean General Burnside's order of attack. At the time the matter was talked over I certainly understood that I was to move down and clear the enemy's works on the left, and then move up towards the Jerusalem plank road. The order stated that I would bear to the left and take a position on the Jerusalem plank road.

Question. What preparations were made, and what orders were given, to pass troops over the parapet and through the enemy's works?

Answer. None but the written orders before the court. The *abatis*, what was left of it when my division passed over, was no obstacle whatever.



Major General A. A. HUMPHREYS, United States volunteers, chief of staff, being duly sworn, says to questions by the judge advocate:

Question. Were you with General Meade during the assault on the 30th of July?

Answer. I was.

Question. What was the substance or language of a despatch which he received from Lieutenant Colonel Loring, assistant inspector general of the 9th corps, but addressed to General Burnside, about 5.45 a. m. of that day?

Answer. The substance of the despatch was, that some of the troops there, I think Ledlie's division, were in the crater, and would not go forward, and asking that some other division or some other troops should be sent to go forward to the crest. The main point with me, however, was, that his troops were in the crater, and were not going forward as they ought to have done.

Question. Relate what passed at the interviews between General Burnside and Generals Grant and Meade after the former had been directed to withdraw the troops from the crater, and prior to the withdrawal of the troops.

Answer. I recollect the directions to General Burnside, which were, that if he could not withdraw his troops with security during the day they should be withdrawn at night; that the best time for the withdrawal of the troops he himself should be the judge of. My impression is that General Burnside did not wish to withdraw them. He certainly so expressed himself to me after General Meade left, for I did not leave the headquarters of General Burnside the same time as General Meade, but remained there a short time. I do not know whether he so expressed himself to General Meade and General Grant or not. I thought I understood the conditions that existed there, and there was no question in my mind as to the necessity of withdrawing them.

Question. Did you understand it to be his wish to maintain his position in the crater?

Answer. I did not pay much attention to what he said to General Meade and General Grant, but he so expressed himself to me afterwards; but inasmuch as he stated no facts which put a different aspect on the condition of things, I did not consider that he gave very good reasons for his wish. He certainly differed from General Ord.

Question. Did you hear General Ord give any opinion as to the probable success of carrying the crest if persisted in for a certain time; and if so, what was it?

Answer. I heard him then or before express the opinion that the time was past. He was averse to it. I did not pay so much attention to what was said at that time, for the reason that the facts were well known, and the conclusions come to in regard to them.

Question. Were you at the fourteen-gun battery, near which General Burnside had his temporary headquarters, on that day?

Answer. Yes, I rode out there; I think it was between 10 and 11 o'clock when I rode out there. I had been there before, and am somewhat familiar with the ground.

Question. Could anything be seen from there with sufficient distinctness to have enabled the commanding general to give orders other than he did, from the point occupied by him?

Answer. I think not. I do not think it made any difference whether he was there, or whether he was at the point he occupied. In the gratification of a personal wish to see simply, he might have seen something more, but it would not have made any difference in the conclusions arrived at; he would have understood matters as thoroughly where he was as if he had seen them.

Question. Ought the assault on that day to have been successful?

Answer. I think so; I was confident that it would have been successful.

Brigadier General H. I. HUNT, United States volunteers, chief of artillery, army of the Potomac, being duly sworn, says, in answer to questions by judge advocate :

Question. Please to state in what capacity you were serving during the assault on the enemy's lines on the 30th July, and days preceding it.

Answer. I am chief of artillery of the army of the Potomac, and had charge of the siege operations on this side of the Appomattox.

Question. Relate briefly what arrangements were made for opposing the enemy's artillery fire on that occasion, and if they were successfully carried out.

Answer. Batteries that had been constructed several weeks preceding the assault had armaments placed in them, from the plank road to the Hare house; there were eighteen siege guns in the line, eighteen large mortars, and twenty-eight cohorts along in the lines in front, and some eighty field-pieces. The object was to silence the fire of the enemy's batteries in the redoubt which formed their salient on the plank road, and especially all of their guns which bore upon the ground in front of the mine. The fire was opened immediately upon the explosion of the mine, and was very successful in keeping down the enemy's fire.

Question. Was the enemy's artillery fire formidable, and particularly directed to the point of our assault, after the explosion of the mine?

Answer. The fire did not become very formidable; it was almost entirely silenced soon after it opened, with the exception of one gun in a battery next to the mine, and a battery on the crest beyond the mine, and a few guns that were used by the enemy on our right of the mine, towards the railroad. The gun that was in the work next the mine was so placed that it was protected from all direct fire, and a sufficient number of mortars could not be brought to bear upon it to stop it. No large mortars had been placed to control that battery, as, according to the plan of assault, that work might reasonably be supposed to fall into our hands within ten or fifteen minutes after the explosion; all the guns in that battery were silenced, however, excepting that one. The battery on the crest of the hill directly in front of the mine was almost shut up after firing two or three rounds, as we had some heavy guns bearing on it, and a number of field guns. I was not where I could see the fire from our right of the mine. I had Colonel Monroe in charge there, and he reported that the fire was pretty well kept down. On the left they occasionally fired a shot.

Question. Under the circumstances, then, ought not the assault have succeeded?

Answer. I think so; that is, so far as it depended upon us. I do not know what the enemy had behind the crest; the object was to take the crest.

Question. Have you formed any opinion as to the causes of the failure of the assault on that occasion?

Answer. I do not know what other causes might have existed, but I attributed the failure to the want of promptitude in pushing forward assaulting columns immediately on the explosion of the mine. I believed, from the first, that if that were not done promptly the attack would probably fail.

Question. Was the enemy's fire directed upon the point of attack very formidable at any time, so as to prevent reasonably resolute troops from pushing onward?

Answer. I think not; certainly not within the period within which their advance should have taken place.

Lieutenant W. H. BEUYAURD, United States engineers, being duly sworn, says to questions by judge advocate :

Question. Were you present at the assault on the rebel lines on the 30th July, and in what capacity ?

Answer. I was with General Burnside on that morning. I was sent by Major Duane to report to him for duty as an engineer.

Question. Were you in a situation then to see the progress of events on that day ?

Answer. Not all the time ; a portion of the time I was with General Burnside at his headquarters, and then, afterwards, I was at different points along the front. I was not in such a position that I could see everything that was going on.

Question. Were there working parties for the assaulting columns, and engineer officers to lead them ?

Answer. Not that I know of.

Question. No arrangements had been made with you by General Burnside for anything of that sort ?

Answer. No, sir ; not previous to the assault.

Question. Do you know if any arrangements were made for the debouch of our troops from our lines, and their passage over the enemy's ?

Answer. No, sir ; General Burnside did not give me any instructions in regard to taking away the abatis or the rifle-pit on the front line.

Question. Were the obstructions on the enemy's line formidable, and of what did they consist ?

Answer. They had a pretty strong abatis in front of their rifle-pits.

Question. Could they have been removed by working parties that usually accompany assaulting columns ?

Answer. I did not go near enough to the crater along that line to judge of that, although it appeared to be merely the usual abatis placed in front of works, and placed in the usual position.

Question. Did you see the explosion of the mine ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Was its effect to clear for any distance, and if so how much, the enemy's parapets ?

Answer. Only a portion of the parapet was blown down ; a portion of it remained standing. I suppose the crater that was formed might have been forty or fifty yards long, and perhaps twenty wide.

Question. Was the breach sufficient and practicable for the passage of troops in line ?

Answer. I did not go in to look at the crater, and consequently I could not say whether they could go in without further work being done or not. I could not tell how deep it was.

Question. As an engineer would you criticise that point of attack ?

Answer. I had been there working on that front before, and I had frequently expressed the opinion that the enemy could bring a flank fire all along there. That is, their line formed a kind of re-entering there.

Question. Did you ever chance to hear why that point was selected, or do you know ?

Answer. I did hear that that mine was made because that hollow in front was a good position to run a mine from.

Question. State briefly some of the causes, in your opinion, of the failure of the assault.

Answer. I think one cause was the way in which the troops were taken in by the flank, passed down these covered ways, one on the right and the other on the left, on which General Ferrero's troops went down. I understand that only

a portion of our parapet was taken away, and the troops had to go through by the flank instead of advancing in line. The portion of the ground south of the covered way was the way along which the troops could have advanced in line, the railroad cut being only six feet high in one place. The troops could easily have advanced through that. The troops were not in their proper positions at the time of the assault; that is, a portion of the troops were away back beyond the edge of those woods, when they should have been in the hollow.

By the court :

Question. Had you been placed in charge of a proper working party, suitably equipped, could you not, immediately after the explosion of the mine, have levelled the enemy's parapets, so as to have allowed troops in line of battle to have passed through ?

Answer. I think I could. When the enemy afterwards had a flank fire between the enemy's line and ours, I offered to General Burnside to run a covered way from our line to the enemy's line on the right and left of the crater. (Lines marked on map 66 *a* and *a'*.)

By the judge advocate :

Question. Would any advantage have ensued from simply holding the crater, without advancing further ?

Answer. No, sir; I do not think so.

By the court :

Question. Were there any preparations made in the way of collecting gabions, and so forth, so that, if the troops had been successful, we could have crowned the crest ?

Answer. No, sir, not that I know of.

Question. Were tools collected or used, picks, shovels, axes, &c. ?

Answer. I did not see any.

The court adjourned, to meet at ten o'clock on the 1st of September.

*Record of the court of inquiry instituted by Special Orders No. 258, 1864, War Department.*

	Page.
Testimony of Brigadier General O. B. Wilcox, (recalled,) U. S. Vols.....	199
“ Brigadier General S. G. Griffin, U. S. Vols.....	200
“ Brigadier General J. F. Hartrauft, U. S. Vols.....	205
“ Surgeon O. P. Chubb, 20th Michigan Vols.....	210
“ Colonel H. G. Thomas, U. S. Colored Troops.....	216
“ Colonel C. S. Russell, 28th U. S. Colored Troops.....	223
“ Brigadier General A. Ames, U. S. Vols.....	227
“ Colonel H. L. Abbott, 1st Connecticut Artillery.....	234
“ Brigadier General G. Mott, U. S. Vols.....	237
“ Major J. C. Duane, (recalled,) U. S. Engineers.....	240
“ Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Barnes, 29th Massachusetts Vols.....	241
“ Lieutenant Colonel G. B. Robinson, 3d Maryland Battery.....	245
“ Major G. M. Randall, 14th New York Heavy Artillery.....	248
“ Lieutenant Colonel J. A. Monroe, 1st Rhode Island Artillery.....	251
“ Captain T. Gregg, 45th Pennsylvania Vols.....	253
“ Surgeon H. S. Smith, 27th Michigan Vols.....	256
“ Brigadier General J. C. Carr, U. S. Vols.....	260
“ Captain F. N. Farquhar, U. S. Engineers.....	265
“ Lieutenant A. A. Shedd, 43d U. S. Colored Troops.....	274
“ Captain E. T. Raymond, 36th Massachusetts Vols.....	275

## TENTH DAY.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS,  
*September 1, 1864.*

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Hancock, Brigadier Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge advocate.

The proceedings of the ninth day were read and approved.

General Wilcox recalled.

By the judge advocate:

Question. In your testimony yesterday you stated that, at the time of the explosion of the mine, you were at Romer's battery. Where were you the rest of the time?

Answer. Immediately after the explosion I started for the head of my column, which was on the left, and in the rear of the first division. I arrived at the front line of works nearest the crater before the whole of the first division had crossed. The head of my column had already commenced moving for the crater, and was then occupying the left portion of the enemy's works.

By the court:

Question. You stated that General Burnside's order directed that your division should bear to the left, and take up a position on the Jerusalem plank road. What was the cause of the failure to execute this manœuvre?

Answer. The first division was to move on Cemetery hill. I would state that Cemetery hill bore rather to the right of my front, so that it was necessary that Cemetery hill should be occupied before any ground beyond it could be occupied. In pursuance of my original expectation, I had given orders that the leading regiment should turn down to the left in the line of works, and the 27th Michigan started down that line. As soon as General Burnside perceived that the first division was not moving forward, he sent me orders to move forward my division direct upon Cemetery hill. My idea was to carry out the spirit of what was understood the day before, and my plan was to throw the whole division on the left into line, so that the right would rest on the Jerusalem plank road; and that would have completely protected the flank of the first division. This movement was begun, but the commanding officer of the 27th Michigan was shot, and the way the first division moved forward by division created more or less confusion; and by the time I received the order to advance on Cemetery hill, or before that in fact, the enemy had concentrated such a fire that we could not advance any further.

Brigadier General S. G. GRIFFIN, United States volunteers, being duly sworn, says to questions by judge advocate:

Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command?

Answer. I was at the assault; my command was the second brigade, second division, (General Potter's,) 9th army corps.

Question. Did you regard that assault as a failure?

Answer. Yes, sir, I think I should, because we did not hold the ground.

Question. State some of the causes that you attribute this to.

Answer. In the first place, I should say that the troops in the front did not advance exactly as they should nor as far as they should. Probably the best ground was not selected. Then the cause of our not holding the ground was the piling in of so many troops in certain parts of the ground, where there was no room for them, and a panic having seized those troops, caused the disaster.

The enemy concentrated all their fire upon that point as soon as we attacked, which was another great reason, no doubt. We received their fire at that point from all directions, and very soon after we first arrived there it was a very sharp fire.

Question. Why were all the troops directed to that point?

Answer. I do not know.

Question. Do you think that arrangement was faulty?

Answer. The execution of the plan seemed to be faulty.

Question. Were any arrangements made for passing the troops through the abatis of our line, and over the parapet in front of the enemy's?

Answer. For my part, in my brigade I had a pioneer corps and skirmishers to clear the way for them.

Question. Did your command go beyond the crater?

Answer. It did.

Question. About how far?

Answer. I should judge two hundred yards. It might be more, or it might be less. It could not have been much less, however; that is, as near as I can judge.

Question. Why did you retire?

Answer. My troops were driven back from that point. They afterwards retired from the crater under orders. They were driven back from the advanced position at the time the panic seized the negroes, which more or less affected all our troops, and the negroes rushing through them as they did, carried them back. The rebels made a very desperate attack at the same time.

Question. If the enemy's parapets had been levelled on each side of the crater, or made practicable for the passage of troops, what would have been the probable result?

Answer. I am not sure that I can tell what the result would have been. Probably the troops might have advanced more readily and with more force, but it was not a thing easy to do.

Question. Do you know anything that prevented the troops, having attained the crater, from going forward immediately to the crest of Cemetery hill?

Answer. Nothing more than the sharp fire from the enemy.

Question. What kind of fire?

Answer. All kinds. I would state here that there is another reason why my troops could not go forward. The ground where they were was broken up with covered ways and numerous rifle-pits of the rebels. We had just driven the rebels out, and my troops occupied their places; therefore, in that position, disconnected as many of them were, it was difficult and almost impossible to form them to make a direct charge; but if a column had moved further to the left, I did not see any reason why they should not have gone in.

Question. Suppose you had had working parties to level the works, those working parties being supplied with fascines and other necessary preparations to render a passage practicable, could you not have gone forward then?

Answer. I do not think there was time for that work. It would have taken hours. I think the time to go forward was at the first, because, very soon after we went there, the enemy concentrated their troops and poured into us at that point a terrible fire from every quarter.

Question. The great mistake, then, was the halting of the troops in the crater?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Whose troops were they?

Answer. General Ledlie's division.

Question. Could the troops have gone over the enemy's parapets on the left of the crater in line of battle immediately after the explosion of the mine?

Answer. I think they could, but I could not say positively, because my attention was directed more particularly to the right of the crater.

Question. Could they have done it on the right?

Answer. No, sir, on account of those numerous cross-lines and pits and covered ways, which were full of the enemy's troops even after we arrived there; and others kept pouring in in addition to those that were already there.

Question. When the troops retired from the crater, was it compulsory from the enemy's operations, or by orders from your commander?

Answer. Partly both. We retired because we had orders. At the same time a column of troops came up to attack the crater, and we retired instead of stopping to fight. This force of the enemy came out of a ravine, and we did not see them till they appeared on the rising ground immediately in front of us.

Question. Where was your position during the contest?

Answer. I went up with my brigade, and while we were there I was most of the time in the crater, or near it, with my troops all the time.

Question. What was the force that came out to attack you—the force that was exposed in the open?

Answer. Five or six hundred men were all that we could see. I did not see either the right or left of the line. I saw the centre of the line as it appeared to me. It was a good line of battle. Probably, if we had not been under orders to evacuate, we should have fought them and tried to hold our position; but, according to the orders, we withdrew.

Brigadier General J. F. HARTRAUFT, United States volunteers, being duly sworn, says to questions by judge advocate:

Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command?

Answer. I was there; my command was the first brigade of the third division (General Wilcox's) of the 9th corps.

Question. Did you regard the attack as a failure?

Answer. I did.

Question. What, in your opinion, were some of the causes of that failure?

Answer. The massing of the troops in the crater, where they could not be used with any effect. I think that the troops, instead of being sent to the crater, should have been sent to the right and left, so as to have moved in line of battle, when they could have advanced in some kind of shape; but after they came into the crater, in the confusion they were in, other troops being brought up only increased the confusion, and by that time the enfilading fire of the enemy's artillery and infantry had become very annoying, which also made it very difficult to rally and form the troops.

Question. Do you know any reasons why the troops did not go to the right and left of the crater? Were there any physical obstacles to prevent them?

Answer. No, I think troops could have been sent there. The second brigade of my division was sent to the left of the crater. They took a portion of the pits. If a vigorous attack had been made on the right and left of the crater, I think the enemy's pits could have been taken without any difficulty, and the line occupied.

Question. What was the formation of your command in moving forward?

Answer. I formed my command, which was immediately in rear of the first division, (which was the assaulting division,) in one or two regiments front. I put two small regiments together; and my instructions were, after I passed through the crater with my advance, to form to the left of the first division, protecting its left flank while they were advancing, and form my line as the regiments would come up, so as to form a line of battle on the left of the first division.

Question. If the troops that first went into the crater had not delayed there, could they not, considering the consternation that the explosion of the mine made in the enemy's camp, have got forward to the crest of Cemetery hill?

Answer. I think they could have moved up to that crest immediately, if they had made no halt at all, under the consternation of the enemy. I think they would have had to re-enforce them speedily in order to hold that hill.

Question. The re-enforcements were there, were they not?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And there was nothing to prevent that result?

Answer. I have thought, sometimes, that it would have been difficult to have sent troops through the crater in sufficient force to sustain the first division in advance on that hill; that the troops would have had, after all, to have been sent to the right and left of the crater, because very soon after I was in the crater myself the enemy were seen on the hill about the position we were to take, and was moving troops to the right. A dozen rebels were seen in the corn-field. My brigade moved right on after the first division, and after my fourth regiment had gone forward I went forward myself to the crater. The fifth regiment was then ordered forward, and was going up.

Question. Did you remain till the troops retired?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did they retire in confusion?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Driven out?

Answer. They were driven out at the same time that I had passed the word to retire. It was a simultaneous thing. When they saw the assaulting column within probably one hundred feet of the works, I passed the word as well as it could be passed, for everybody to retire, and I left myself at that time. General Griffin and myself were together at that time. The order to retire we had indorsed to the effect that we thought we could not withdraw the troops that were there on account of the enfilading fire over the ground between our rifle-pits and the crater without losing a great portion of them, that ground being enfiladed with artillery and infantry fire. They had at that time brought their infantry down along their pits on both sides of the crater, so that their sharpshooters had good range, and were in good position. Accordingly we requested that our lines should open with artillery and infantry, bearing on the right and left of the crater, under which fire we would be able to withdraw a greater portion of the troops, and, in fact, every one that could get away. While we were waiting for the approval of that indorsement, and the opening of the fire, this assaulting column of the enemy came up, and we concluded—General Griffin and myself—that there was no use in holding it any longer, and so we retired.

By the court:

Question. What was the fault owing to—owing to the orders that were given, or to the execution of those orders? Was it that the plan was bad, or that the troops or their commanders behaved badly?

Answer. Not being familiar with all the orders and arrangements, I could not say. So far as my own command was concerned, we did all that we could do.

Question. Could you have been ordered to have done it in a better way?

Answer. I think if they had gone forward in line of battle it would have been successful. I consulted with General Bartlett and General Griffin and Colonel Humphreys, and we were all of the opinion that no more troops should be sent to the crater. After that the colored division passed right through the crater while we were in it.

Question. How did those colored troops behave?

Answer. They passed to the front just as well as any troops; but they were certainly not in very good condition to resist an attack, because in passing through the crater they got confused; their regimental and company organization was completely gone.



Question. What general officers were in or about the crater on the enemy's line during all this time?

Answer. General Griffin, General Bartlett and myself, of the 9th corps, and the general commanding the division of the 10th corps that was there, (General Turner.) I did not see any others, although there might have been others there.

Surgeon O. P. CHUBB, 20th Michigan volunteers, 9th corps, being duly sworn, says to questions by judge advocate:

Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July?

Answer. I was.

Question. State what you did there.

Answer. I accompanied the 2d brigade, of the 3d division of the 9th corps, across the ravine, and up to within about ten rods of our breastworks, at the point where the troops passed through immediately after the explosion of the mine. I took position in a bomb-proof, which had been used as some regimental headquarters, and remained there for the purpose of dressing wounded. This bomb-proof is located at a point about ten rods in rear of our line. Shortly after I took up that position, Generals Ledlie, of the 1st division, and Ferrero, of the 4th, came up to the front of the bomb-proof, and shortly afterward came in and took seats. This was in the morning, about half an hour after the explosion of the mine. That was some time before the colored troops came up. The 3d division (General Wilcox's) was then lying in a little dip of the ground—lying flat upon the ground to avoid shelling at that point, and General Ledlie's troops, of the 1st division, had crossed over our breastworks and gone over to the fort immediately after the explosion. I saw them go up. I was where I could see the explosion and the movement of the troops as they passed over the space between our works and the fort. Our division and our brigade of that division remained in that position for some time. General Ledlie came there and sat down in front of the place where I was; remained there some little time, and afterwards went inside and sat down—I could not tell how long, but not a great length of time after, because General Ferrero came in. His troops were then lying in the covered way and on the flat. They had not yet come up to go into action. While things were in that position, our 3d division made a move, charged over the works, some of them went to the fort, and some, I believe, came back. Then General Ferrero had brought his division up to that point, and seemed to be waiting for some orders or movement. General Ledlie received orders in my hearing to move his troops forward from where they were then lying. The order came something like this, as near as I can recollect: "The general wishes you to move your troops forward to the crest of the hill, and hold it." To the best of my recollection, that was the meaning of the order at least, and, I think, very near the words. I do not know whom the order came from. It was brought by an officer, and I supposed that "the general" meant General Burnside. General Ledlie despatched an aid or some other officer to order that done. Then, shortly afterwards, came an order to General Ferrero to move his division through, and charge down to the city. He replied that he would do so "as soon as those troops were out of the way." He did not designate what troops, so that I understood "those troops" meant the troops that were already there. But this order came two or three times, and the last time it came the order was peremptory "to move his troops forward at once." His answer to the order always was, that he would do so as soon as "those troops" were out of the way; and whenever General Ferrero made that answer, General Ledlie sent an aid to order the troops out of the way, and see that it was done, so that it became my impression that it was his troops that were in the way. These two general officers were in the bomb-proof with me. General Ledlie's troops were in the crater, and General Ferrero's

were in the rear. After General Ferrero received this last peremptory order he went out; General Ledlie went out with him, and the colored troops commenced moving past the door of the bomb-proof—as it was in the track that troops took—and moved up; and I stepped out, and saw them go over our works just in front of where General Ledlie's division passed over. Then they passed out of sight of where I was standing; but in a very short time I heard they were coming back; and sure enough, they poured down all along in that vicinity, with a good many white troops mixed with them. About that time General Ferrero returned. I am not positive whether General Ledlie returned or not; and in answer to somebody who asked him how the battle was going, General Ferrero said we had lost everything, or something to that effect; that we were repulsed. He said it was nonsense to send a single body of troops, colored or white, forward at one single place, in front of lines held by us, to throw them in the face of a re-enforced enemy, or an enemy who had opportunities to bring other forces to bear. General Ferrero said he thought his division was needlessly slaughtered.

By the court:

Question. Did you see General Ledlie when his division advanced?

Answer. No, sir, I did not. Our division was lying in the covered way at the point in our first line of works about opposite the fourteen-gun battery, as it is called, and I had passed up the line of the hill to the crest, where I looked over the breastwork and saw those troops move forward, but I could not see everything distinctly, because there was considerable distance across the ravine or hollow to his division.

Question. Was there any conversation between those generals and yourself, while they were in the bomb-proof, bearing on this subject?

Answer. I asked General Ledlie, soon after he came in, if his division had been properly supported. The reason of my asking it was that I thought I heard some remark of his that led me to think it had not been, and, besides, I myself was entirely in the dark in regard to the delay; and so I asked him if his division had been properly supported as it was intended, and he said it had.

Question. Did you hear him give any reason for the division halting?

Answer. No, sir. From the efforts he made to have them ordered forward somewhere, I judged that it was contrary to his expectation that they did halt. He frequently sent up aids to have them moved forward somewhere, and from the order that came to him I supposed it was to the crest of the hill. The aid who brought the order said: "The general wishes you to move forward to the crest of the hill."

Question. Do you know any reason why he was not with his troops himself?

Answer. No, sir. But during almost the last moments of his stay there he sent an aid to ascertain how things were going on, and remarked that he could not go himself, as he had been hurt in the side by a spent ball. I cannot state positively when this occurred; it seemed to be after I first saw him; but I recollect his having mentioned that fact quite late in the forenoon, nearly noon, for the first time. I have a strong impression that he came back there after General Ferrero's troops moved forward, but I could not say so positively.

Colonel H. G. THOMAS, 19th United States colored troops, being duly sworn, says to questions by judge advocate:

Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command?

Answer. I was at the assault on the 30th of July, and commanded the second brigade, fourth division, 9th corps, (colored troops.)

Question. What was the formation of your troops in going to the assault?

Answer. The formation was by file left in front, which brought us faced by the rear rank when we made the charge.

Question. The head of your troops struck the enemy's line where?

Answer. I forced my brigade around the right of the crater, contrary to orders, because the crater was so full that no man could get through; that is, I left two staff officers to force them through. I went straight to the front and filed to the right, and went into these rifle-pits in the enemy's line as far as the head of the first brigade of our division, which I was ordered to support.

Question. Did you get beyond the line of the crater with your troops?

Answer. I did, sir.

Question. How far?

Answer. I should say about between three and four hundred yards to the right of the crater, and in front of it. I was ordered to support the first brigade when it made its charge.

Question. Did you get beyond the enemy's line?

Answer. I did, sir; I led a charge which was not successful. The moment I reached the head of the first brigade I started out the 31st colored regiment, which was in front, but it lost its three ranking officers in getting in position, and did not go out well.

Question. What, in your opinion, were some of the causes of the failure of the general assault on that day?

Answer. So far as I can judge from my own stand-point, my utter inability to make a decent charge with my own brigade was the fact that the pits, into which we were sent, were entirely occupied by dead and dying rebel troops, and our own from the first division of our corps, General Ledlie's. There was no room for us to move up. We were delayed, I should think, an hour and a half, in the covered way through which we moved, from the fact, so far as I can learn, that the first division did not make the charge. We were to occupy the pits after they made the charge.

Question. Do you know why the first division did not go forward?

Answer. I do not, sir.

Question. Did you see any of the appliances for overcoming obstacles that usually accompany troops—working parties with tools?

Answer. I saw no such preparations to remove obstacles in the enemy's line. I had no such assistance.

Question. Do you think the mode of marching up your command was a judicious one—the form, I mean?

Answer. No, sir; it was injudicious, for two reasons: First, we moved up by the flank; that I consider injudicious. And, secondly, we were ordered up left in front, which made us face by the rank rear, which was not a satisfactory way of manœuvring.

Question. Was it a verbal or a written order; and by whom was it issued?

Answer. It was a verbal order, issued by General Ferrero about eleven o'clock on the night before. The order to me that night was to go up by division, follow the first brigade, and to move left in front. But early in the morning I learned from a staff officer, whom I sent out to tell me when the first brigade moved, that it was filing along the covered way. My instructions were to follow the first brigade. I was detained at least an hour and a half in the covered way by the troops in front, and by the order of the assistant inspector general of the corps. He finding the pits into which we were to go full of troops, suspended the other order until he could see General Burnside.

Question. How did your particular command retire from the front?

Answer. In confusion.

Question. Driven?

Answer. Driven back by a charge of the enemy.

Question. And not by any orders?

Answer. No, sir; they received no orders. They were ordered to stop by myself and all my staff, who were in the pits. When I got into this position on the right of the crater, the fire was very severe; there was also a very severe enfilading fire from the right. I attempted one charge, without success, the moment I reached there. I could not get more than fifty men out. I sent word to General Burnside by Major Van Buren, of his staff—as he was the only staff officer I saw in the pits except my own—that unless a movement was made to the right, to stop the enfilading fire, not a man could live to reach the crest; but that I should try another charge in ten minutes, and hoped I would be supported. In about eight minutes I received a written order from General Ferrero in pretty near these words: “Colonels Seigfried and Thomas, commanding first and second brigades: If you have not already done so, you will immediately proceed to take the crest in your front.” It was signed in the ordinary official manner: “By order of General Ferrero: George A. Hicks, captain and assistant adjutant general.” I cannot produce that order because I destroyed it when I was captured in Petersburg. Colonel Seigfried had, I think, already received it, as he was in the crater. I sent word to Colonel Seigfried’s brigade on my right, where I supposed the colonel to be, that I was about to charge; that we should go over with a yell, and that I hoped to be supported. I went over with two regiments and part of a third, but I was driven back. The moment they came back the white troops in the pits all left, and they after them. I was not supported at all in my charge.

Question. Where was the division commander all this time?

Answer. I do not know. When I went up with my brigade he was in a bomb-proof on the left, with the commanding officer of the first division. Generals Wilcox, Ledlie, and Ferrero were in the bomb-proof on the left.

Question. Was the bomb-proof a good place to see what was going on?

Answer. No, sir; there were places near there where something could be seen, but the earth about the crater prevented almost anything being seen immediately to the left of it. The dirt was thrown up very high. There were, I think, however, places near there where a view could be got.

Question. From what you know of affairs that day, is it your opinion that the assault ought to have been successful if the troops engaged in it had performed their duty?

Answer. Going up so late as I did, I am not a good judge, but I think from what I could see at the late hour at which I got in, that if the division that went in first had gone ahead, there is no question of our taking the crest on that ridge, Cemetery hill, hardly with the loss of a man. We waited in the covered way over an hour, with almost no musketry on our right. We were detained; there we could not get up.

By the court:

Question. Did you ever go over that ground afterwards?

Answer. I did, sir.

Question. Under what circumstances?

Answer. I went over it two days afterwards, the 1st of August, when the flag of truce was out.

Question. Did you see anything in the nature of the enemy’s defences that would change the opinion you formed on the day of the assault?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Did you see any obstacles in the nature of the ground?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Did you have an opportunity of seeing what the enemy had on the top of Cemetery hill?

Answer. No, sir; I did not have an opportunity of seeing just what they might have had there.

Question. Did you see any works there?

Answer. No, sir; I do not think there were any.

Question. How did the colored troops behave?

Answer. They went up as well as I ever saw troops go up—well closed, perfectly enthusiastic. They came back very badly. They came back on a run, every man for himself. It is but justice to the line officers to say, that more than two-thirds of them were shot; and to the colored troops, that the white troops were running back just ahead of them.

Colonel CHARLES S. RUSSELL, 28th United States colored troops, being duly sworn, says to questions by the judge advocate:

Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And what was your command?

Answer. I was a lieutenant colonel, commanding six companies of the 28th United States colored troops, Thomas's brigade, of Ferrero's division.

Question. Did your command participate in the assault?

Answer. Yes, sir. We left the covered way to make the assault before eight o'clock, and ten minutes after eight part of my regiment with two others went over the outside of the enemy's line into what seemed to be a covered way beyond, to go to Cemetery hill. Mine was to have been third in order, but it became second.

Question. How far in advance did you get toward Cemetery hill?

Answer. Not exceeding fifty yards. We were driven back.

Question. By what?

Answer. I should judge by about from two to four hundred men, infantry, which rose up from a little ravine and charged us. Being all mixed up and in confusion, and new troops, we had to come back.

Question. Do you think you could have maintained yourself in that position if you had been supported by troops that were known to have been in the crater at that time?

Answer. No, sir; I do not think we could, considering our condition. There were no two companies together; the officers were shot down, and the troops were very much dispirited. They were all in there just as thick as they could possibly stick. The orders were to advance and take the crest of that hill at once, and I went right over with all the men I could gather, supposing that all the rest would follow. Not more than 150 or 200 men out of the three regiments went outside.

Question. Did your troops sustain a good deal of loss in that affair?

Answer. Yes, sir; I lost nearly half, and seven officers out of eleven.

By the court:

Question. Do you think that if you had advanced on the right or left of the crater, where the ground was more practicable, you would have done better?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think that if we had gone up there an hour before we could have carried the crest, for there was but little musketry fire at that time.

Question. Where were you during that interval?

Answer. In the covered way, in rear of a battery of 4½-inch guns.

Question. Was the division commander around there?

Answer. The division commander was at the head of the division. I saw him when we went into the crater. I passed him and spoke to him. He was then on the left of the first line of rifle-pits built by our people. I mean the most advanced line of rifle-pits.

Question. What did Colonel Siegfried's brigade do.

Answer. That brigade, instead of going into the crater, as near as I can tell, seemed to file to the right; at least that was my impression.

Question. Did they go over the enemy's breastworks?

Answer. I do not know, sir. My impression is that they did not.

Question. I mean the breastworks of which the crater was a continuation.

Answer. No, sir; I do not think they did.

By the judge advocate:

Question. Did you form any opinion as to the cause of that failure?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was it?

Answer. Delay. It was Lieutenant General Grant who moved us up, about 5 o'clock, for we had not started from our bivouac in those woods at 5 o'clock. General Grant rode up and asked what brigade that was, and what it was doing there. That was some time after the explosion of the mine and the cannonading had commenced. General Grant told us to move on. The order was not given to me directly; it was given to Colonel Thomas. Then we moved into the covered way and remained there till 8 o'clock.

The court adjourned to meet at 11 o'clock on the 2d September.

#### ELEVENTH DAY.

SEPTEMBER 2, 1864.

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Hancock, Brigadiers General Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge advocate.

The proceedings of the 10th day were read and approved.

Brigadier General A. AMES, United States volunteers, being sworn, says in answer to questions by judge advocate:

Question. Were you present at the assault on the 30th day of July, and what was your command?

Answer. Yes, sir; I was present where I could see the last part of it. I had a division of the 18th army corps.

Question. Did your troops experience any interference from the 9th corps in moving into position in rear on that occasion?

Answer. Not directly. My division was a support. I understood from the commanding officer of the corps that my troops were held in reserve for any emergency that might arise, or a battle that might be fought after we had taken possession of the heights, and at no time were my troops further advanced than the woods in rear of our own works. At one time I was ordered to take my division in to support General Turner's. The idea was that he was to advance, and I was to carry my division in on his right, being careful not to get in advance of him, so as to have his left flank interfered with. Upon receiving the order I understood that I was expected to move to the front through the covered way, but I found that there was still a brigade of General Turner's division in reserve, and as I passed through the covered way I saw that it was blocked up by one of General Turner's brigades. As it was intended that I should go to the front with my troops, I first went to see what kind of ground I was to pass over, and found that the covered way was blocked up by troops, as well as in some places by wounded coming to the rear, and in others by men carrying ammunition to the front. When I got to our most advanced position beyond the creek or bottom, I found that General Turner had a brigade massed there, and that there were evidently more troops in front than could be well handled. I had a conversation with General Turner, and the state of

affairs was such that we thought it desirable that General Ord, from whom we received our orders, should know that it was impossible for us to move to the front at once, going down through the covered way, as he intended that we should. I immediately wrote a note to General Ord, requesting him to come down to the front and see the state of affairs for himself, otherwise his orders would probably not be obeyed. I went to the rear and found him, and came down to the front with him; and he then decided that our troops, at least that my division, should not move forward.

Question. Were the arrangements that were made for the passage of troops through the abatis near the parapet to go to the front adequate?

Answer. I think not. I did not examine it in particular, but I was down there when part of General Turner's command went to the front, and having nothing else to do, I drove some of his men over the parapet, and I found that they experienced great difficulty in getting through the abatis. The place that I refer to was at our right of the mine.

Question. State some of the causes for the failure of the assault on that occasion, in your opinion.

Answer. I then formed the opinion, and I have not seen any cause to change it, that at the time I was there a clear head, where it could see what was going on, and see the difficulties at the front, might have corrected a great many of the faults that then existed. I think the trouble was, no one person at the front was responsible, in consequence of which there was no unity of action. It took a long time for commanders in the front to communicate with those in the vicinity of the 14-gun battery in the rear, on the top of the high hill. My idea is that everybody appeared to be acting for himself, with no particular determination to go any further than he was compelled to. So far as I could see, when I arrived there, that appeared to be the state of the case.

Question. Will you, as far as your observation goes, remark upon the formation of the troops as they went forward, and also as to their preparation with all things needful for passing over the enemy's line of works and establishing themselves on the further side?

Answer. I remained in the rear with my troops until I was ordered to advance, and at this time part of the 10th corps had already advanced to our most advanced work, and the rest, as I stated, were in the covered way; and I did not see any of the 9th corps—the white troops of it—make any movements whatever. They had all moved forward and occupied the crater before I had gone to the front, so that I am ignorant of their formation. I know that the colored troops went down the covered way before the division of the 10th corps. It was my opinion, the case being as it was, that the division of the 10th corps should not have passed down the covered way; that they might have passed down the hill to the bottom, then passed over our works, and then up over the open ground towards the enemy's. I think all the troops should have gone that way. The massing of our troops at our most extreme advanced position, and then, crowded as they were, forming them for an advance, created more or less confusion. It would be likely to do so among the best of troops, and certainly it did in the 9th corps. I was going to remark that it was my opinion that, instead of waiting to have moved down the covered way, it would have been proper for me to have avoided the covered way and moved over the open ground. There was very little fire upon that ground, and the enemy could have probably brought but little there at best; and I think the division could have been moved down the hill and up over the open ground without serious loss—no more than might be expected; and then the troops would have been already in position to have acted with some considerable vigor, and with a reasonable hope of adequate results.

Question. Do you know of, or did you see, anything like fascines, gabions, or

such things as are generally used, and considered necessary, indeed, for an affair of that kind, on the ground?

Answer. No, sir. When I saw the difficulty in passing our troops from our most advanced work to the crater, and saw that there was a little depression where the ground rose on each side of it—not much, to be sure, but almost enough to cover the troops—I recommended to my superiors, General Ord, and also his staff, that men with shovels should go out and throw up—certainly on the left of the crater, on a little rising ground—a rifle-pit or breastwork to cover our men, so that they could pass from our line of works to the crater without danger; but I learned that there were no tools there for any such work; but it was concluded that these tools should be obtained, and afterwards Captain Farquhar, of the engineers, told me that he had sent for the tools, and that they would go to work and make this covered way. But before anything could be accomplished, the troops were running back.

Question. Do you think the plan for the assault was one that, with ordinary diligence and skill, ought to have been successful?

Answer. I don't see how ordinary troops, with good commanders, and one head to direct, could have possibly failed under the circumstances. It was necessary that some one person should be present to direct the various movements and make them one operation. If there had been, perhaps the result would have been different.

Question. Do you think it would have been any benefit to our arms to have held the crater simply?

Answer. That, I think, would depend upon our ultimate object. I think it would have been no use to have held the crater if we had remained inactive, or on the defensive, as we have done since. If it was our intention to work up to the crest by mining, it would have been so many hundred yards to our advantage.

Question. Would it not have been difficult to hold the place in consequence of the fire that could have been brought to bear upon it? Is not that the re-entrant point in the line?

Answer. Yes, sir. The enemy's fire, at least as I saw it, was at least a semicircle. That is, a continuation of the line of fire from one side in the direction of the crater would strike the enemy's works on the other, making the line of fire a semicircle.

Question. You regard the order to withdraw the troops at the time it was given a judicious one, do you?

Answer. I think so, under the circumstances. I understood that the troops in the crater did not move forward; and that being the case, the sooner they went back the better.

Colonel H. L. ABBOT, 1st Connecticut artillery, being duly sworn, says to questions by judge advocate:

Question. Did you participate in the assault on the 30th July, and what was your command, and what were your particular duties at that time?

Answer. I did participate in the assault. I was in command of all the heavy guns and mortars, S1 in all. I remained most of the time on the left, in charge of the mortar batteries especially. We expected fire from the enemy's salient, and I had sixteen mortars to keep it down, and I remained chiefly there and by Van Ried's battery.

Question. Do you regard the artillery fire on that occasion as very effective; and was it what it ought to have been, and what it was meant to be?

Answer. I do, sir. I think it accomplished all we hoped to do.

Question. Were there at any point obstacles to the fire of the artillery which ought to have been removed?

Answer. Yes, sir; in front of what we call the 14-gun battery.



Question. Please to state what they were.

Answer. This battery is nearly in front of the mine, and some trees were growing a little to its left, which masked the fire of the guns upon the next rebel battery to our left of the mine. These trees it was our wish to have removed. They had not been when the battery was first established, because we did not wish to show the enemy what we were doing. As soon as the six 4½-inch guns were in position, I was anxious to have them cleared away.

Question. What measures did you take to effect that?

Answer. I had, on several occasions, conversation with General Burnside on the subject, in which I referred to the necessity of their being cleared away before we could use the battery to advantage. On the night of the 27th, working parties were ordered by him to cut the trees, but they were driven off after accomplishing very little. On the night of the 28th I represented the matter to General Hunt, chief of artillery, at the headquarters of the army of the Potomac. I went with him to the telegraph office, when he telegraphed General Burnside, I should think about seven o'clock in the evening, urging him to have the trees removed. One of my captains, Captain Pratt, who commanded the battery, was so desirous of having his field of fire clear, that he took some of his own company and cut partially that night, no working parties coming. On the night of the 29th, the matter was again raised—by whom I do not know—but General Burnside declined to have any trees cut on that night, lest it might give the rebels an idea of the attack. But a party was formed which did begin to cut as soon as the mine exploded. It partially but not entirely cleared away the trees, and the guns were enabled to do some service, but they could not see one flanking gun which did us a good deal of harm. I could not see myself, from where I was, exactly what that gun was doing. I received orders from General Hunt—I should think about half past seven o'clock, but I cannot be sure as to the exact time—to try to turn some of my mortars upon it, as it was making trouble. I did so, and made some good shots in that direction, but I do not think the fire of the gun was stopped. The battery was too far off. The trees that were removed were removed partly by my men and partly by the negroes.

Question. Were you in a situation to tell the court whether the artillery fire of the enemy was at all effective, and how soon after the explosion of the mine?

Answer. It would be very difficult to state positively on account of the smoke and the noise of our own guns. I do not think that they fired any guns for nearly an hour. I could not detect any, although I was watching carefully at Van Reid's battery, so as to make any alteration in our fire that might be necessary. I am sure they did not fire from the place we expected it most, in front of the 5th corps. I do not think they fired during the day from here to do any damage. They fired a few shots, however. They fired from a 30-pounder at our battery, which, of course, did not amount to anything. This gun was on the plank road. Over on the right I could not form any exact idea of what they were doing, but I could see that there was certainly no heavy firing. There were only a few straggling shots in that direction. Where we most feared the fire, we did not get any at all. The firing that they did, according to the reports I have received, was from a light battery on the crest, and it was once moved from its position by our mortar batteries on our right, near the left of the 18th corps. We expected fire from the two flanks, and we had a heavy fire of mortars to stop both fires.

Brigadier General B. MORR, United States volunteers, being duly sworn, says, to questions by judge advocate:

Question. Will you state to the court what time and under what circumstances you relieved the 18th corps, previous to the assault on Petersburg?

Answer. I left across the James river on the night of the 28th July. I crossed the river at 9 o'clock, and one of General Ord's aids met me and put me in position before daylight next morning. As soon as it was dark, on the night of the 29th, I relieved the 18th corps and one division of the 10th, in the intrenchments, and completed the operation about eleven o'clock.

Question. What did General Ord say to you as to the practicability of making an assault in your front in connexion with the operation of the mine?

Answer. He wished me to say to General Hancock, and he said that he had also telegraphed to General Meade, that it was not practicable to make an assault there on account of a good abatis being in front of the enemy's work, and on account of their being well wired, so that it was impossible for the men to get through.

Question. During the assault of General Burnside through the crater and subsequent to that time, did you make any examination to see whether the enemy had left your front or not?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was the result?

Answer. I sent a staff officer to each brigade commander to instruct them to make a demonstration to see if the enemy had left. General De Trobriand, commanding the 1st brigade, attempted to advance his pickets which he had out. In doing so he had one officer and fifteen men killed. Colonel Madill, commanding the 2d brigade, said he had a position from which he could see if any one left his front, and not a man left since daylight. Colonel McAlister commanding the 3d brigade, made a demonstration by sounding the bugle for a charge, and snapped some caps, and he immediately received a volley from the enemy's works. He had no pickets out in the daytime.

Question. What time was this?

Answer. I think it was about 7 o'clock, about the time I got a despatch, when General Burnside reported that the enemy had left his front.

The court then adjourned, to meet at 10 o'clock on the 3d of September.

#### TWELFTH DAY.

SEPTEMBER 3, 1864.

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Hancock, Brigadier Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge advocate.

After taking testimony of all the witnesses present on this day, the proceedings of the eleventh day were read and approved.

Major DUANE recalled.

Question. Were there pontoon trains, sand-bags, &c., in readiness at convenient points near the place of assault on the 30th of July, as ordered by Major General Meade?

Answer. There were.

Question. Were engineer officers detailed for each corps?

Answer. There were.

Question. You stated in your former testimony that you were near the 5th corps at the time of the assault. Were there arrangements made for passing the field artillery through the works in front of that corps?

Answer. I think not. I did not understand that it was part of the plan that the troops of the 5th corps should advance through that part of their front. They were to have advanced on the 9th corps front. I understood it was intended that they should pass through the enemy's lines opposite the left of the 9th corps. I had no conversation with General Meade on that subject. I merely inferred it from what I had heard.

Question. Were the pioneers equipped for destroying the enemy's abatis, and

were intrenching tools in readiness for use when required for the 5th corps in their progress against the rebel line ?

Answer. I do not know. The pioneers were not under my orders.

Question. Why did not the engineer department take charge of the engineering operations and be responsible for their execution ?

Answer. General Burnside took charge of the operations, and I was directed by General Meade not to interfere with them. I had once or twice attempted to send officers to direct the operations, and General Burnside would not allow them to do so.

Lieutenant Colonel JOSEPH H. BARNES, 29th Massachusetts volunteers being duly sworn, says to questions by judge advocate :

Question. Were you in the crater at the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command ?

Answer. No, sir ; I was not in the crater.

Question. Were you near it ?

Answer. I was near it on the outside.

Question. In what formation did your command go forward ?

Answer. It will be necessary to state that I did not go forward with my command proper. On the night previous I was in command of the division picket, and on the picket being relieved, in accordance with orders I had received, I followed my command, but did not reach my command proper until after they had moved forward to the assault. I went forward to the crater at the head of the troops of the fourth division, (colored troops.)

Question. What was the condition of things in or about the crater when you arrived there ?

Answer. When I arrived at the crater the negro troops were pouring through the opening down into the crater. I hesitated about going in there with them, there was so much confusion at the bottom of the crater, and I remained outside with a captain, who had been brigade officer of the day, who was with me. We remained outside the crater until all the negro troops had passed in ; then, my orders being to join my command, and seeing a color in the earthworks about one hundred yards to the right of the crater, I moved to the right, supposing it might be my color, keeping all the time about one hundred yards from the ditch. Arriving at that point I found it was not my regimental color ; but meeting the commanding officer of the 13th Indiana regiment of the 10th corps, I stopped to converse with him. There were in front of me at this time, lying outside the earthworks, negro troops in two lines—that is to say, four deep. They were lying on their faces in line of battle immediately on the outside of the ditch. Directly in front of them was another line of negro troops in the ditch, mingled with the white troops of the first division. I did not go into the crater, because I was desirous, if possible, of learning where my regiment was before getting in. In justice to myself I might say, that it was a much more exposed position outside the ditch than it was inside ; but, as I said before, I desired to find my regiment first ; but being unable to do so, I had determined to go in and look for it in the ditch. Just as I was about to step forward about half a dozen officers of the negro troops rose up and attempted to get their commands out of the work—for the purpose of advancing, I should judge, although I knew nothing of what the movements were to be, and therefore only judged so from their actions. About 200 men, white and black, rose right in my front, their officers attempting, as I understood, to advance them, but they immediately fell back ; and thereupon the two lines of negro troops that had been lying in front of me near the ditch rose to their feet and went back to the rear, marching over the 13th Indiana regiment, which remained in its position. This was about one hundred yards on the right of the crater.

Question. The white troops in the crater belonged to what division?

Answer. They belonged to the first division, (General Ledlie's.)

Question. State to the court, if you know, or give your opinion as to why they hesitated or stopped in the crater and did not go forward.

Answer. Of my own knowledge I do not know.

Question. Did any of the troops of the first division get beyond the crater towards the enemy?

Answer. I do not know.

Question. In your opinion, how did this hesitation or rest in the crater affect the result of the action?

Answer. In my opinion, it affected it in this manner: The hesitation and the length of time consumed in reorganizing or rearranging the men for moving forward enabled the enemy immediately in front to be prepared, not only for our advance, which they were, but to advance against us, which they did.

Question. Do you know whether the division and brigade commanders were present when the troops halted in the crater?

Answer. No, sir; I do not know of my own knowledge.

By the court:

Question. How many troops were there in those two lines which lay just along the enemy's rifle-pit?

Answer. The number from the crater to a short distance to my right was, I should judge, six or seven hundred, possibly more. I could not say how many more there might be, because of the nature of the ground, there being a descent in the ground, beyond which I could not see.

Question. Did they at any time charge up the slope towards Cemetery hill?

Answer. They did not to my knowledge.

Question. When they rose up and went to the rear, in what order did they go?

Answer. In disorder.

Question. Were those troops again brought forward that day?

Answer. Not to my knowledge; some of them were rallied in rear of the next line in the rear.

Lieutenant Colonel GILBERT P. ROBERTSON, third Maryland, battalion, being duly sworn, says to questions by judge advocate:

Question. Were you in the crater at the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command on that occasion?

Answer. I was in the crater at the assault, and I formed part of the third line making the assault; the brigade was in three lines; I belonged to the second brigade of the first division.

Question. In what formation did your command go forward?

Answer. In column of battalions.

Question. Did any of your troops get beyond the crater?

Answer. Yes, sir; some of them did. My brigade went to the right of the crater to the breastwork in front of the battery, which was in accordance with the orders from Colonel Marshall the night before.

Question. Did the mass of the troops of the first division halt in the crater and about it, or did they go forward towards the crest?

Answer. I did not see any of them go forward towards the crest. A majority of them went through the crater perpendicular to our front. I kept to the right.

Question. You know the fact that those troops halted there?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know why they halted?

Answer. I could not positively say why, without it was in consequence of the ground being so small and so many of them getting together in the crater. There was great confusion in the crater.

Question. Was not there plenty of ground in front; why did they not go?

Answer. Yes, sir. I cannot answer what transpired on the left. I went to the right and kept up a fire, and advanced as far as I could, until I got to an angle in the works, which was held by the rebels. I used the Spencer rifle upon them. The battalion numbered only fifty-six men.

Question. Was there confusion at that point of attack, or were the troops in any order?

Answer. I could not see any order at all. There was nothing but confusion in the crater. What was in the covered way beyond the crater towards Petersburg I could not say.

Question. Did you have an opportunity of observing whether efforts were made by division and brigade officers to relieve the troops from this disorder?

Answer. Yes, sir; every effort that could be made was made by Colonel Marshall and myself, for he had given orders that I should be obeyed, as I was next in command. I saw no division commander in the crater at the time.

Question. What was the cause of this confusion that you say existed in the crater?

Answer. I cannot assign any reason for the confusion if it was not, as I said, the ground being so much torn up and the place being so small. And when they got in there the fire was pretty strong.

Question. What was the nature of the enemy's fire at that time, heavy or otherwise?

Answer. When we got there the fire was not so strong as it was half an hour afterwards.

Question. What kind of fire was it, artillery or musketry?

Answer. Both. I would call it a moderate fire. I do not think the heavy fire commenced until after 8 o'clock. I think we had fire there from their mortar batteries.

Major GEORGE M. RANDALL, 14th New York heavy artillery, being duly sworn, says to questions by judge advocate:

Question. Were you in or about the crater on the 30th July, and what was your command?

Answer. I was in the crater, and was acting aid to General Ledlie.

Question. In what formation did your division go forward?

Answer. It went forward, as I should judge, by the flank. They did not go forward in solid column, as we expected they would do.

Question. Do you know any reason why they did not?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Were you near the head of the column? Or were you among the first that got into the crater?

Answer. I was about the second line. I was ordered by General Ledlie to go forward with the advancing column.

Question. Had you an opportunity of observing why the troops halted in the crater?

Answer. Yes, sir. I saw the 14th New York and 2d Pennsylvania heavy artillery pass through the crater and occupy traverses in rear of the fort, and there they remained.

Question. Were efforts made to urge them forward, according to the plan?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And at a time, too, when they were not in disorder?

Answer. They were very much in disorder when they arrived at the crater. That was just the difficulty. If the regiments had been in their proper places when they arrived at the crater we would have taken the crest of the hill. But they were scattered, and it was impossible to get any of the regiments to-

gether. Colonel Robinson and myself attempted to get them forward, but could not do so.

Question. While this was going on, was there a fire of any account from the enemy?

Answer. No, sir; there was not much when we first advanced in there.

Question. Please to state, in your opinion, what it arose from.

Answer. I cannot tell exactly. I suppose it was because, when the mine exploded, they were so much excited; for when the mine exploded, they hardly knew what they were doing. It appeared to be the opinion of all who were there that immediately after the explosion one good regiment in solid column could have gone forward without any difficulty. But we were in there only a short time when the enemy opened on our right and left.

Question. Was the division commander present during this confusion?

Answer. Not in the crater.

Question. Is it your opinion that this hesitation affected the result of the action?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know whether there were any pioneers with tools or engineer troops with fascines or gabions ready to come forward to crown the crest in the event of your getting up on Cemetery hill?

Answer. I think I saw the 25th Massachusetts, first division, with shovels and spades; I cannot positively say, but I think I saw them there somewhere.

By the court:

Question. To all appearances were the rebels awake and vigilant before and up to the time of the springing of the mine, or were they apparently asleep and unprepared?

Answer. They appeared to be awake. When I was on the first line, the line that General Wilcox's division occupied, shots were continually fired by the enemy from the fort before the mine exploded. They came from the right or left; at least from the immediate vicinity of the fort.

Question. Are you certain they came from the enemy?

Answer. Yes, sir, I am positive of it.

Question. Where was the division commander during the assault?

Answer. He was in rear of the first line, the line occupied by General Wilcox's troops. I carried orders to him, and found him always in rear of the first line, sitting down behind the parapet.

Question. Do you know any reason why General Ledlie was not with his division in front?

Answer. No, sir.

Colonel J. A. MONROE, 1st Rhode Island artillery, being duly sworn, says to questions by judge advocate:

Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th July, and in what capacity did you serve?

Answer. I was there as chief of artillery of the 9th army corps.

Question. What preparations were made, such as making openings for passing field artillery through our line of works, when it should become necessary in the front?

Answer. No such preparations were made to my knowledge.

Question. What preparations were made for unmasking our artillery, such as cutting down the trees and obstructions that were in front?

Answer. No preparations had been made immediately before the explosion. Some had been made weeks before. The trees in front of what is known as the "heavy work" were left standing until the morning of the 30th, directly after the explosion of the mine, when a few of the trees were cut down.

Question. Do you understand that some of the batteries were masked by those trees?

Answer. They were not exactly masked, but the trees obstructed the fire of the batteries.

Question. Were you aware that the 5th corps' artillery was to find its way to the front through openings that were to be made in the 9th corps's front?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. What have you to say about the fire of the enemy's artillery, as to its commencement and its formidableness on that day?

Answer. It was not severe at all at first. Half or three-quarters of an hour after—it might have possibly been an hour—they had a battery firing which enfiladed our line on the right. That fire came apparently from one or two guns on Cemetery hill.

By the court :

Question. What troops occupied that line?

Answer. I think it was the first division of the 9th corps, which had endeavored to move up towards the crest of Cemetery hill by the way of the Chimneys, where there is another battery. The fire of the enemy's battery on Cemetery hill was not formidable, because the heavy battery of ours kept it almost completely silenced.

Question. Had those trees been removed, could our batteries have played on the enemy's guns on our right of the crater, which were firing across the plain, over which our troops were to charge?

Answer. Yes, sir. They could also have fired upon a battery in the edge of the woods, almost in front of the crater, that was enfilading our line.

Question. What is the reason the trees were not cut down?

Answer. I called General Burnside's attention to it three weeks before. I went to the general the night before the explosion of the mine, and tried to get a large party to cut those trees down, and he said no trees should be cut down until the mine should have exploded. I asked him for a detail, and he gave me eighty men, which were to be set at work immediately after the explosion of the mine. I put them to work, two men to a large tree and one man to a small one and they commenced cutting, but only a few trees were cut down, the party was so small.

Captain THEODORE GREGG, 45th Pennsylvania volunteers, (9th corps,) being duly sworn, says to questions by judge advocate :

Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th July, and what was your command?

Answer. I was at the assault on the 30th July; my command was the 45th Pennsylvania veteran volunteers, first brigade, second division, 9th army corps.

Question. State briefly what you observed about the operations on that day.

Answer. My regiment was in the intrenchments opposite the rebel fort that was blown up. About half past three o'clock, on the morning of the assault, I received orders from Captain Raymond, aid to Colonel Bliss, commanding the brigade, to leave part of the regiment, deployed as skirmishers, and go back with the remainder to the edge of the woodlands and form on the right of the 4th Rhode Island, and remain there until further orders. When the explosion took place I was ordered by Captain Peckham, who was also an aid to Colonel Bliss, to follow the 4th Rhode Island. We marched by the flank, left in front, through the covered way. On arriving at our front line of the works opposite the crater the order was given to double-quick across the open plain. On arriving in front of the rebel works we found several regiments lying down on the ground, and a great many men killed and wounded. I then received orders to charge across the crater. I gave the command "Face by the right flank," in order to

march in line of battle, and on arriving at the edge of the crater I faced again by the left flank, and marched in single file around and in rear of the crater. The crater was filled with the troops of the first and second divisions of the 9th army corps. General Bartlett, commanding the first brigade, first division, General Griffin, commanding the second brigade, second division, and General Hartrauft, were in the crater. They appeared to be endeavoring to rally the troops for the purpose of charging forward to some buildings, about four hundred yards in the rear of the crater, towards Petersburg, and, I believe, on Cemetery hill. I was ordered by General Bartlett to charge across the plain and secure those buildings, so that we could use them to operate as sharpshooters against the enemy's artillery. At the same time Captain Peckham ordered me to form in line of battle and then charge down in the rear of the enemy's line of rifle-pits on the right—that is, to face by the rear rank and charge the enemy in the rifle-pits on the right. As soon as they should see the colors of the 45th, other regiments of the first brigade, of the second division, were to charge forward. As soon as I had the regiment formed in line I received an order from General Griffin and other officers to charge to the left of the crater, in order to create a diversion in favor of other regiments of the second brigade. The crater was filled with troops.

Question. What troops were they?

Answer. I knew them to be troops of the first and second divisions by seeing General S. G. Griffin and other officers, as well as men whom I had known before. They were very much mixed up, and could not be got forward by their officers. Some officers attempted to rally them and some did not.

Question. Was there any firing at this time?

Answer. There was. The enemy's fire could not reach the men in the crater, but there was heavy firing at this time in front of the crater from field-pieces about those buildings. The enemy also had an enfilading fire of artillery from the fort situated on our left, and from another battery on our left, and at a deep cut in the railroad. I received so many orders from so many different commanders at that time that I did not know which to obey.

Question. Where was your division commander?

Answer. I do not know where he was. I did not see the division commander there at any time during the action. I understood that he was on the ground. He might have been there, and, in the confusion, I not have seen him. Neither did I see our brigade commander. General Potter was our division commander and Colonel Bliss our brigade commander.

Surgeon H. E. SMITH, 27th Michigan volunteers, (9th corps,) being duly sworn, says to questions by judge advocate:

Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th July, and in what capacity?

Answer. I was in charge of the surgeons on the field of the third division, to see that the wounded were attended to and taken to the rear.

Question. Had you an opportunity, on that occasion, of observing any of the military movements?

Answer. Nothing more than seeing our troops advance over our breastworks. I was there when the colored troops were ordered to advance, and heard General Burnside's aid give repeated orders to General Ferrero to take his troops up and charge towards Petersburg. I think he gave the order three times. The third order General Burnside sent to General Ferrero was an imperative order to advance. To the previous orders General Ferrero would make the answer, that the other troops were in his way, and he could not possibly advance while they were there, and if they would be taken out of the way he would go ahead.

Question. General Ferrero was present?



Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Any other generals?

Answer. General Ledlie was present. Those were the only generals I saw.

Question. Did General Ledlie make any reply, that you heard, when this order was given to General Ferrero?

Answer. I did not hear him make any reply or any statement on the subject of that order from General Burnside.

Question. What troops did you understand General Ferrero to allude to as being in the way?

Answer. I did not understand. I supposed they were those troops that had made the charge. The general was in front of a bomb-proof which had been used as a regimental headquarters, and was situated about 10 or 12 rods, as near as I could judge, in rear of the work. This bomb-proof was fronting to the rear.

Question. Did General Ferrero leave that place and accompany his troops to the front when they left?

Answer. He did. General Ledlie, I think, left the bomb-proof for a very short time. That was about the time of the stampede of the darkeys. Then, I think, both General Ledlie and General Ferrero returned about that time. I am not positive, however, for I was busy seeing that the wounded were being attended to. General Ledlie asked me for stimulants, and said he had the malaria, and was struck with a spent ball. He inquired for General Bartlett, as he wanted to turn the command over to him and go to the rear. It was one of General Bartlett's aids, I believe, who replied that he was in the crater.

Question. You say that during the stampede Generals Ferrero and Ledlie returned to the bomb-proof. How long did they remain there?

Answer. General Ferrero remained a very short time. He was exhausted. I think he came in for the purpose of getting some stimulant, too, and, I think, he went out immediately after I gave him the stimulants. General Ledlie remained some time longer, probably half an hour, I should judge.

Question. You mention stimulants. What were they, hartshorn, materia medica, or what?

Answer. It was rum, I think. I had rum and whiskey there, and I think I gave them rum.

Question. How often did you administer stimulants to those two officers during that day?

Answer. I think that once was the only time. I was not in the bomb-proof all the while that they were there. It was perfectly safe in there, but it might not have been outside. I had to go out to look after the wounded.

Question. Were there any brigade or regimental commanders in the bomb-proof, any commanding officers besides those whom you have named?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Name them.

Answer. There was a colonel commanding a brigade of colored troops, Colonel Siegfried, I believe. He came there after the stampede quieted down a little, after the troops stopped going to the rear. Also Lieutenant Colonel Cutchin, of the 20th Michigan. He came in from the crater, about the middle of the day, to see General Wilcox, to learn if anything could be done to relieve the troops in the crater, as they were suffering very much for water, and also from the artillery fire of the enemy.

Question. What was the reply?

Answer. General Wilcox was not there, sir.

Question. How long did the colonel stay there?

Answer. Half an hour, at least. He was very much exhausted in running over. He said he had come through a very heavy fire, and it was almost certain death to come from the crater to that place.

Brigadier General J. C. CARR, United States volunteers, being duly sworn, says to questions by judge advocate :

Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command?

Answer. Yes, sir, I was at the assault. My command was the first division of the 18th army corps and a portion of a colored division of the one known as Hinek's division of colored troops. I had one brigade of that division.

Question. Had you opportunities of observing the progress of events on that day; were you in a situation to see things?

Answer. Nothing but my own command. I took position in the trenches with my command. I relieved the troops of General Burnside's command, the 9th army corps, on the evening before, with the exception that I had one brigade, which I did not put in the front line. I kept that in reserve to fill the vacancy left in our line at the point where the assaulting column was to debouche from our intrenchments.

Question. Could you see the formation of the assaulting column?

Answer. Yes, sir; I saw it before it made the assault.

Question. What was the formation?

Answer. I should judge it was in column of battalions.

Question. Was that the first division?

Answer. I think it was, sir. It was very dark, not yet daylight in the morning. I left General Burnside's headquarters at twenty minutes after three o'clock, and as I passed going down I could see the column on my left in column of battalions, I should judge. The position I had did not afford me a good opportunity for observing anything but my own immediate command, as I was in the trenches during the engagement, and remained there until 12 o'clock that day.

At about half past 8 o'clock General Turner, of the 10th corps, was ordered to form his division in rear of the intrenchments, and in doing so he found that it would crowd too much on the troops in his front, and that there was no room to get his division in there. He immediately sent for General Ord to come down—I think it was General Ames who called upon General Ord to come down—and see the position of the troops for himself, and he went down to see the position of the troops in the trenches. As General Turner was forming his command, an attempt was made by the troops on my right to charge the rifle-pits. I saw a vacancy, a gap that I thought about four regiments would fill, and assist that line of battle that was going over our breastworks to take those rifle-pits. I immediately took command of part of Turner's division, and ordered them over the line to join the line of troops then advancing, and told them to charge the rifle-pits in their front, which they did. That was about two hundred yards on the right of the crater. After putting those troops in, I stepped back from the intrenchments some ten or fifteen yards towards the covered way, and I had scarcely got back to the lower end of the covered way when the stampede began, and I suppose two thousand troops came back, and I was lifted from my feet by the rushing mass, and carried along with it ten or fifteen yards in the covered way. What staff I had with me assisted me in stopping the crowd in the covered way, and in putting some of them in position in the second line: some were in the first line. I left General Potter in the covered way.

Question. Was there any good reason that you know of for this retirement of the troops?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Did you notice any arrangements that were made for the passage of troops over the parapet and through the abatis of our lines?

Answer. No, sir. There was no abatis in the front where I was, at least I did not notice any abatis. There was abatis to the right of it.

Question. If you had moved your troops to the front how would you have

got through our lines? what mode would you have taken to get them through? what formation would you have adopted?

Answer. I should have formed a column of divisions.

Question. Were there intervals made in our line for the passage of such a column?

Answer. I could not say, sir; all I know is what was in my immediate front. I saw that there were no obstructions to prevent troops passing over our intrenchments to the enemy's works. The rifle-pit I speak of was an advanced work of the enemy where they had a thin line of skirmishers; the main line was behind it.

Question. Did the enemy fire from the main line upon your party that took the pits?

Answer. Yes, sir; briskly with musketry. I do not know the exact hour, but I think that it was about half past 8 a. m.

Question. How did those troops of the 10th corps that you took forward pass over the parapet of our line?

Answer. They went over by a flank movement.

Question. How long did those troops of the 10th corps hold the pits that they took?

Answer. Just as long as I was walking about thirty paces. I had just got into the mouth of the covered way when they came back. I saw officers waving their swords on the pits, but they did not stay a great while.

The court then adjourned, to meet at ten o'clock on the 5th of September.

#### THIRTEENTH DAY.

#### HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS,

*Jones's House, September 5, 1864.*

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Hancock, president; Brigadier Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge advocate.

Captain F. U. FARQUHAR, United States engineers, being duly sworn, says to questions by judge advocate:

Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and in what capacity?

Answer. I was present, and was chief engineer on the staff of General Ord commanding the 18th corps.

Question. Were you in a situation to observe the operations on that day?

Answer. I was a portion of the time, after the smoke cleared away.

Question. Did you witness the explosion of the mine?

Answer. Yes, sir; I saw the explosion of the mine.

Question. Relate what you saw done unusual on such occasions—occasions of assault; state some of the omissions, if any, and the principal causes which conduced to the failure of the assault.

Answer. At or near fifteen minutes before 5 a. m. the explosion of the mine took place. Immediately on the explosion the artillery opened, and, I should judge, three or five minutes afterwards we heard the cheer of the assaulting party. Nothing could be seen from the time of the opening of the artillery for twenty-five minutes or half an hour, when the smoke commenced to clear away. At the time of the explosion of the mine the general officers in command were in the covered way, in rear of the 14-gun battery, near what are known as "Thomas's Chimneys," I believe. Between half and three-quarters of an hour after the explosion Lieutenant Colonel Loring, of General Burnside's staff, came from the front, and reported that the troops that were in the crater were lying there, and could not be pushed forward or gotten out of it. It was fully three quarters of an hour after the explosion of the mine before the enemy opened any

artillery, and then not at all severe. At the time of the explosion, Turner's division of the 10th corps, which was under General Ord's command, was lying at or near the mouth of, or entrance to, the covered way on the right of the 14 gun battery. Ames's division of the 18th corps was in rear of that strip of woods which is in rear of the 14-gun battery. Both the covered ways on the right and left of this 14-gun battery were filled with troops of the 9th corps—the negro division being in the left covered way. There seemed to be an unaccountable delay in the advance of the supports to the first assaulting column. I cannot tell the exact time. I did not see the second one go up, but I heard the cheer some time after—how long I cannot recollect. Somewhere between half past six and seven o'clock I went to the front line, to which the assaulting columns had started. The ground immediately in front of our salient from which our forces started was favorable for charging over, as the troops were partially protected pretty near all the way up from the left flanking fire by a very small ridge; the men could have passed over easily, and there were very few dead or wounded lying on that space between our line and the crater. The men seemed to be lying in the crater, and on our side of the crater, but no movements seemed to be taking place. I saw General Turner at that time going to the crater. There seemed to be a lack of enthusiasm or spirit in both officers and men. The negro division filed over our parapet and went into the crater by the flank, exposing their whole line as they passed over from our line to the enemy's to the fire from both sides of the crater. At between nine and ten o'clock the cross-fire of the enemy in front of the salient had become so severe that hardly a man could pass from our salient to the crater without being hit. At this front line that I went to there seemed to be no person of any authority to meet any emergency that might arise, and in that, in my opinion, lies one of the chief causes of the disaster. The chief causes of failure are, in the first place, that the mine was in the wrong place, because it was in a re-entrant; and in the second, that there was no officer present to make any new dispositions or movements to meet any emergency that might arise. It seemed to me, so far as I could see, that the troops were not ready to move. They were in the covered ways, and so situated that you could not follow the assaulting columns up with the necessary supports. As it was, the assaulting column, if it had gone forward, would be a mile ahead before the supports could get up. I was present when General Turner sent back a note to General Ord, saying that he could not get his troops forward on account of General Burnside's troops being in the way. General Ord then sat down and wrote a letter to General Meade—I believe it was General Meade—telling him that he would advance Turner's division as soon as General Burnside's troops were out of the way. He showed it to General Burnside, who asked him not to send it, for he would have his troops out of the way immediately; but whether he ever sent it or not, I do not know. General Ord then went to the front himself at the time that General Turner said he could not get his troops forward, and found the same state of things existing—that the covered way was filled up with General Burnside's troops going to the front, and that the wounded were being brought to the rear in the same covered way that the troops going forward to fight were going forward in. There was no reason why the troops should move through the covered way at all. From the position of the assaulting columns and the troops fighting, the enemy could not notice troops passing down the slope of the hill without going through the covered way. The colored troops seemed to be well led, and followed their officers with as much enthusiasm as any other troops that day. They seemed to go about two hundred or two hundred and fifty yards to the right of the crater, going towards the enemy's intrenchments. Then there came a halt, and by that time General Turner had got one of his brigades to the front, and he ordered an assault with his brigade. Instead of passing along the edge of the crater as the other troops had done, which gave them a temptation to lie down, he charged to the right of

the crater. It was just then that the negroes came back, and his men were carried back with them. I went to the front immediately after this affair, when I saw General Turner, and he seemed to be very much distressed about it.

Question. State if there were any means taken for crowning the crest if gained—working parties with fascines, gabions, intrenching tools, &c.

Answer. I can speak only with reference to myself. I had my sappers and miners equipped with tools, ready to move with the 18th corps when it should move.

Question. With the ordinary performance of their duties by officers and men, on such occasions, ought not the assault to have been successful?

Answer. It was successful, for the line was carried. It only wanted some person present to tell them what to do afterwards. I think that, had there been any person of authority at the place, even at our own front line, at the salient, to have given directions at the proper time, we had ninety-nine chances in a hundred of being successful in the object expected to be gained. From my own experience I know that it would take you at least three minutes to get to the front through the covered way, because it was so crowded, and three minutes to get back again to where the general was, and then count your time for observation besides; and at that time, when the opposing forces were so close to each other, ten minutes would make a great deal of difference. I think that, with the exception of a lack of enthusiasm, the troops behaved as well as ever troops behaved. What they wanted was handling. Just in front of the crater, in rear of the enemy's line, there was a sort of a redoubt or earthwork upon the hill, from which not a shot was fired. There was not a soul between the crater and that position, and I believe that position was the objective point of the assault. And I think, had the troops been pushed forward properly, the columns following as one column should have followed another, there would have been no difficulty in the place being carried.

Question. Then there were no physical obstacles in the way of our success?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Is it your opinion that, if we had not had the mine, we would have been more successful?

Answer. No, sir. The mine of itself was a success. The consternation of the enemy in consequence of the explosion of the mine more than compensated for the flanking fire which they opened upon us. But it was three-quarters of an hour before they opened fire.

Question. Were adequate preparations made for the passage of our troops over our parapets and through the abatis?

Answer. There seemed to be room enough at our salient to pass over certainly in regimental front.

Question. Could artillery have passed through?

Answer. No, sir. I saw no place where artillery could have passed through at any point within two hundred or two hundred and fifty feet of the salient. I do not know how practicable it was further to the right or left. Leading up from the hollow to the front, the covered ways were very narrow, not at all adequate to the necessities of the occasion for conveying troops to the front. And there was room enough in that hollow to have massed all the troops under cover of the darkness. Had that been done, as it was not light when the mine should have exploded, they would all have been in the enemy's lines before they could have been much hurt.

Question. Who gave you orders for preparing the fascines, gabions, and intrenching tools, and working parties, in the 18th corps?

Answer. I got them from General O. d. All I had were shovels, spades, picks, and sand-bags.

Question. Did you see General Burnside on that occasion?

Answer. Yes, sir; I saw him quite frequently.

Question. Any of his division and brigade commanders?

Answer. I only noticed one division commander.

Question. Name him.

Answer. General Potter. If the others were there I did not happen to see them.

There being no more witnesses in attendance the court adjourned, to meet at 10 o'clock on 6th September.

#### FOURTEENTH DAY.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS,  
*Jones's House, September 6, 1864.*

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Hancock, president; Brigadier Generals Ayres and Miles; and Colonel Schriver, judge advocate.

The proceedings of the 12th and 13th days were read and approved.

There being no more witnesses\* present, the court was cleared.

The record of evidence was referred to, and discussions took place; after which the court adjourned, to meet at 10 o'clock a. m. on the 7th September.

#### FIFTEENTH DAY.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS,  
*September 7, 1864.*

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Hancock, president; Brigadier Generals Ayres and Miles; and Colonel Schriver, judge advocate.

Discussion was resumed; and the court then adjourned till 10 o'clock on the 8th September.

#### SIXTEENTH DAY.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS,  
*September 8, 1864.*

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Hancock, president; Brigadier Generals Ayres and Miles; and Colonel Schriver, judge advocate.

Lieutenant A. A. SHEDD, 43d United States colored troops, being duly sworn, says, to judge advocate's

Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th July, and in what capacity?

Answer. As aide-de-camp to Colonel Siegfried, commanding 1st brigade, 4th division, 9th corps.

Question. Were you in the crater at any time?

Answer. I was.

Question. Were any of your troops there?

Answer. They were; they went in under Colonel Siegfried; they were not all in.

Question. If they halted there, why did they so?

Answer. There were so many troops in before they came; that is one reason.

Question. What efforts were made to push them forward beyond the crater?

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\* The following named officers, on account of sickness or absence, did not appear as witnesses before the court: Brigadier Generals Ledlie, Turner, and Burnham; Colonel Siegfried; and Lieutenant Colonels Loring and Pleasants.

Answer. The colonel (Bates) of the 30th regiment colored troops led his through; that is the only one I saw go through the crater.

Question. Was Colonel Siegfried present with his troops in the front all the time?

Answer. He was; he came out when the troops did, about 10 to 11 o'clock.

Captain E. T. RAYMOND, 36th Massachusetts volunteers, duly sworn, says, to judge advocate's

Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th July, and in what capacity?

Answer. I was, as brigade inspector, 1st brigade, 2d division, 9th corps.

Question. What was your general position on the field on that occasion?

Answer. In the crater a portion of the time; part near the right of our brigade, in our works.

Question. Under whose immediate orders were you serving?

Answer. Colonel Z. R. Bliss, 7th Rhode Island volunteers, commanding the brigade.

Question. Was he with his troops all the time?

Answer. He was. At 7 o'clock we moved down the covered way, from in rear of our batteries, in front of our reserve camp. Three regiments went into the crater; the remainder of the brigade stopped in the works. About 8 o'clock I was sent into the crater by Colonel Bliss, to ascertain why the three regiments in front did not charge—he remaining in the works, with four regiments of the brigade. I went, and found the three regiments were formed in the covered way beyond the crater, towards Cemetery hill.

Question. Where did the covered way strike the enemy's pits to the left of the crater?

Answer. Facing their front, it led a little to our right of the crater, tending off a little to the right of Cemetery hill.

Question. What efforts were made to bring up the regiments which were left in the works by their commanders?

Answer. The three regiments which went forward were first to charge before the rear regiments were to move forward.

Question. With what part of the brigade was Colonel Bliss?

Answer. With the portion that was left behind. He remained with the last regiment, and did not go forward at all to my knowledge.

The court, after discussion with closed doors, adjourned, to meet at 10 o'clock on the 9th September.

#### SEVENTEENTH DAY.

#### HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS,

*September 9, 1864.*

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Hancock, president; Brigadier Generals Ayres and Miles; and Colonel Schriver, judge advocate.

The proceedings of the 14th, 15th, and 16th days were read and approved.

The court, with closed doors, then resumed the discussion of the testimony; and decided on the following finding and opinion:

#### FINDING.

After mature deliberation on the testimony adduced, the court find the following facts and circumstances attending the unsuccessful assault on the 30th July.

The *mine*, quite an important feature in the attack, was commenced by Major General Burnside soon after the occupation of his present lines, without any direc-

tions obtained from the headquarters of the army of the Potomac. Although its location—and in this the engineers of the army concur—was not considered by Major General Meade a proper one, it being commanded from both flanks and reverse, the continuance of the work was sanctioned.

It was not the intention of the lieutenant general commanding, or of the major general commanding the army of the Potomac, it is believed, to use the mine in the operations against Petersburg, until it became known that the enemy had withdrawn a large part of his forces to the north side of the James river, when it was thought advantage might be taken of it in an assault. All the Union troops sent north of the James had been recalled in time to participate in the assault, so that the whole of the forces operating in front of Petersburg were disposable.

The mine was ordered to be exploded at 3.30 a. m., but, owing to a defective fuze, it did not take place till 4.45.

The detailed order or plan of operations issued by Major General Meade is in accordance with General Grant's instructions, and was seen and approved by the latter previous to its publication. It is marked K in the appendix.

It is the concurrent testimony that, had the order been carried out, success would have attended the attack. Also, it is in evidence that General Meade met General Burnside and three of his division commanders the day before the assault, and impressed upon them that the operation was one of *time*; that unless prompt advantage were taken of the explosion of the mine to gain the crest, it would be impossible to get it, or the troops to remain outside of their lines.

That order directed that General Burnside should "form his troops (the 9th corps) for assaulting," and that General Ord, commanding the 18th corps, and General Warren, commanding the 5th corps, should support the assault on the right and left respectively.

Major General Burnside's order (No. 60, appendix) directed Brigadier General Ledlie's division, immediately on the explosion of the mine, to be moved forward and crown the crest known as Cemetery hill. Brigadier General Wilcox was to move his division forward as soon as possible after General Ledlie's, bearing off to the left, and Brigadier General Potter was to follow and go to the right. Brigadier General Ferrero was to move his (colored) division next, and pass over the same ground that General Ledlie's did.

Five minutes after the explosion of the mine General Ledlie's division went forward, and it was followed by those of Generals Wilcox and Potter, though it is in evidence that the latter did not move in the prescribed order, and that they were not formed in a manner to do the duty assigned them.

General Ledlie's division, instead of complying with the order, halted in the crater made by the explosion of the mine, and remained there about an hour, when Major General Meade received the first intimation of the fact through a despatch from Lieutenant Colonel Loring, assistant inspector general of the 9th corps, intended for General Burnside, in which he expressed the fear that the men could not be induced to advance.

This crater was on the enemy's line of works, and was fifty to sixty yards long, twenty yards wide, and twenty to twenty-five feet deep. It was about five hundred yards from the Cemetery crest.

General Burnside was then (5.40 a. m.) ordered to push forward to the crest all his own troops, and to call on General Ord to move forward his troops at once. It is in evidence, that when the order was communicated to General Ferrero, commanding the colored division, he said he could not put in his troops until the troops already in front should be moved out of the way. They did go forward, however, after some delay, but only to be driven back, and in their flight to rush impetuously against other troops, destroying their formation, and producing disorder.

At 6.10 a. m., inquiry being made of General Burnside if it would be an ad-



vantage for Warren's supporting force to go in at once on the left, the answer was, "There is scarcely room for it in our immediate front." The importance of the utmost promptness, and the securing of the crest at once, at all hazards, were urged upon him at 6.50 a. m.

At 7.20 a. m. General Burnside reported to General Meade that he was doing all in his power to push forward the troops, and if possible carry the crest, and also that the main body of General Potter's division was beyond the crater. It does not appear in evidence, however, that they ever got any considerable distance, not exceeding two hundred yards, beyond the crater towards the crest, whence they were driven back immediately. This was also the fate of the few colored troops who got over the enemy's line for a moment.

At 9 o'clock a. m. General Burnside reported many of the 9th and 18th corps were retiring before the enemy, and then was the time to put in the 5th corps. It having just been reported, however, by two staff officers (not General Burnside's) that the attack on the right of the mine had been repulsed, and that none of the Union troops were beyond the line of the crater, the commanding general thought differently; and the lieutenant general concurring, General Burnside was directed at 9.50 a. m. to withdraw to his own intrenchments immediately or at a later period, but not to hold the enemy's line any longer than was required to withdraw safely his men. This order brought General Burnside to General Meade's headquarters, where he remonstrated against it, saying by nightfall he could carry the crest. No other officer who was present, and who has testified before the court, concurred in this opinion. The troops in the crater were then ordered to retire; but before it could be effected they were driven out with great loss, at two o'clock p. m. These troops, however, were making preparations to retire, and but for that would probably not have been driven out at that time.

The 5th corps did not participate at all in the assault, and General Ord's command only partially, because the condition of affairs at no time admitted of their co-operation, as was contemplated by the plan of assault.

The causes of failure are—

1. The injudicious formation of the troops in going forward, the movement being mainly by flank instead of extended front. General Meade's order indicated that columns of assault should be employed to take Cemetery hill, and that proper passages should be prepared for those columns. It is the opinion of the court that there were no proper columns of assault. The troops should have been formed in the open ground in front of the point of attack, parallel to the line of the enemy's works. The evidence shows that one or more columns might have passed over at and to the left of the crater, without any previous preparation of the ground.

2. The halting of the troops in the crater instead of going forward to the crest, when there was no fire of any consequence from the enemy.

3. No proper employment of engineer officers and working parties, and of materials and tools for their use, in the 9th corps.

4. That some parts of the assaulting columns were not properly led.

5. The want of a competent command head at the scene of the assault, to direct affairs as occurrences should demand.

Had not failure ensued from the above causes, and the crest been gained, the success might have been jeopardized by the failure to have prepared in season proper and adequate debouches through the 9th corps lines for troops, and especially for field artillery, as ordered by Major General Meade.

The reasons why the attack ought to have been successful are:

1. The evident surprise of the enemy at the time of the explosion of the mine, and for some time after.

2. The comparatively small force in the enemy's works.
3. The ineffective fire of the enemy's artillery and musketry, there being scarcely any for about thirty minutes after the explosion, and our artillery being just the reverse as to time and power.
4. The fact that some of our troops were able to get two hundred yards beyond the crater towards the crest, but could not remain there or proceed further for want of supports or because they were not properly formed or led.

#### OPINION.

The court having given a brief narrative of the assault, and "the facts and circumstances attending it," it remains to report that the following named officers engaged therein appear, from the evidence, to be "answerable for the want of success" which should have resulted:

I. Major General *A. E. Burnside*, United States volunteers, he having failed to obey the orders of the commanding general—

1. In not giving such formation to his assaulting column as to insure a reasonable prospect of success.
2. In not preparing his parapets and abatis for the passage of the columns of assault.
3. In not employing engineer officers who reported to him to lead the assaulting columns with working parties, and not causing to be provided proper materials necessary for crowning the crest when the assaulting columns should arrive there:

4. In neglecting to execute Major General Meade's orders respecting the prompt advance of General Ledlie's troops from the crater to the crest; or, in default of accomplishing that, not causing those troops to fall back and give place to other troops more willing and equal to the task, instead of delaying until the opportunity passed away, thus affording time for the enemy to recover from his surprise, concentrate his fire, and bring his troops to operate against the Union troops assembled uselessly in the crater.

Notwithstanding the failure to comply with orders, and to apply proper military principles, ascribed to General Burnside, the court is satisfied he believed that the measures taken by him would insure success.

II. Brigadier General *J. H. Ledlie*, United States volunteers, he having failed to push forward his division promptly according to orders, and thereby blocking up the avenue which was designed for the passage of troops ordered to follow and support his in the assault. It is in evidence that no commander reported to General Burnside that his troops could not be got forward, which the court regard as a neglect of duty on the part of General Ledlie, inasmuch as a timely report of the misbehavior might have enabled General Burnside, commanding the assault, to have made other arrangements for prosecuting it before it became too late. Instead of being with his division during this difficulty in the crater, and by his personal efforts endeavoring to lead his troops forward, he was most of the time in a bomb-proof, ten rods in rear of the main line of the 9th corps works, where it was impossible for him to see anything of the movements of troops that were going on.

III. Brigadier General *Edward Ferrero*, United States volunteers—

1. For not having all his troops found ready for the attack at the prescribed time.
2. Not going forward with them to the attack.
3. Being in a bomb-proof habitually, where he could not see the operation of his troops, showing by his own order issued, while there, that he did not know the position of two brigades of his division, or whether they had taken Cemetery hill or not.

IV. Colonel *Z. R. Bliss*, 7th Rhode Island volunteers, commanding 1st brigade, 2d division, 9th corps—

In this: that he remained behind with the only regiment of his brigade which did not go forward according to the orders, and occupied a position where he could not properly command a brigade which formed a portion of an assaulting column, and where he could not see what was going on.

V. Brigadier General *O. B. Wilcox*, United States volunteers.

The court are not satisfied that General Wilcox's division made efforts commensurate with the occasion to carry out General Burnside's order to advance to Cemetery hill, and they think that more energy might have been exercised by Brigadier General Wilcox to cause his troops to go forward to that point.

Without intending to convey the impression that there was any disinclination on the part of the commanders of the supports to heartily co-operate in the attack on the 30th day of July, the court express their opinion that explicit orders should have been given assigning one officer to the command of all the troops intended to engage in the assault when the commanding general was not present in person to witness the operations.

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK, *Major General U. S. Vols.,*  
*President of Court.*

EDWARD SCHRIVER, *Inspector General U. S. A.,*  
*Judge Advocate.*

The court then adjourned *sine die*.

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK, *Major General U. S. Vols.,*  
*President of Court.*

EDWARD SCHRIVER, *Inspector General U. S. A.,*  
*Judge Advocate.*

## APPENDIX TO THE RECORD OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY.

### APPENDIX A.

*Despatches from Major General Meade to Lieutenant General Grant, July 24, 26, and 28, 1864, and from General Grant to General Meade, July 24, 26, 28, 29, and August 1, 1864.*

#### A.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
“*City Point, Virginia, July 24, 1864.*

“GENERAL: The engineer officers who made a survey of the front from Bermuda Hundred report against the probability of success from an attack there; the chances they think will be better on Burnside's front. If this is attempted, it will be necessary to concentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemy's line we expect to penetrate. All officers should be fully impressed of the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond the enemy's present line, if they should succeed in penetrating it, and of getting back to their present line promptly if they should not succeed in breaking through.

“To the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery possible should be brought, to play upon the enemy in front during the assault. Thin lines would be sufficient for the support of the artillery, and all the reserves could be brought on the flank of their commands nearest to the point of assault, ready to follow in if successful. The field artillery and infantry, held in the lines during the first assault, should be in readiness to move at a moment's notice, either to their front or to follow the main assault, as they should receive orders. One thing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders; if they see the enemy giving way in their front, or moving from it to re-enforce a heavily assaulted position of their line, they should take advantage of such knowledge, and act promptly without waiting for orders from their army commander.

“General Ord can co-operate with his corps in this movement, and about five thousand troops from Bermuda Hundred can be sent to re-enforce you, or can be used to threaten an assault between the Appomattox and James rivers, as may be deemed best.

"This should be done by Tuesday morning, if done at all. If not attempted, we will then start at the date indicated to destroy the railroad as far as Hicksford, at least, and to Weldon if possible.

"Please give me your views on this matter, and I will order at once. In this I have said nothing of the part to be taken by the cavalry, in case the enemy's lines are assaulted. The best disposition to be made of them probably would be to place them on the extreme left, with instructions to skirmish with the enemy, and drive him back, if possible, following up any success gained in that way according to the judgment of the commander, or orders he may receive.

"Whether we send an expedition on the railroad, or assault at Petersburg, Burnside's mine will be blown up.

"As it is impossible to hide preparations from our own officers and men, and consequently from the enemy, it will be well to have it understood as far as possible that just the reverse of what we intend is in contemplation.

"I am, general, very respectfully, &c.,

"U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

"Maj. Gen. GEORGE G. MEADE, *Commanding Army of the Potomac.*

"Official copy :

"S. WILLIAMS, A. A. G."

B.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 24, 1864.

"GENERAL: I have received your letter per Lieutenant Colonel Comstock. In reply thereto I have to state that yesterday I made in person a close and careful reconnoissance of the enemy's position in my front. Although I could not detect any positive indication of a second line, yet, from certain appearances at various points, I became satisfied that a second line does exist on the crest of the ridge, just in rear of the position of Burnside's mine. I have no doubt of the successful explosion of the mine, and of our ability to crown the crater, effect a lodgement, and compel the evacuation of the enemy's present occupied line, but from their redoubt on the Jerusalem plank road, and from their position in front of the Hare House, their artillery fire would render our lodgement untenable, and compel our advance or withdrawal.

"The advance, of course, should be made, but its success would depend on the question whether the enemy have a line on the crest of the ridge. If they have, with the artillery fire they can bring to bear on the approaches to this second hill, I do not deem it practicable to carry the line by assault, and from my examination, together with the evident necessity of their having such a line, I am forced to believe we shall find one there.

"I cannot, therefore, advise the attempt being made, but should it be deemed expedient to take the risks, and there is certainly room for doubt, I would like a little more time than is given in your note in order to place in position the maximum amount of artillery to bear upon the line, not assaulted. In reference to the assaulting force, it will be composed of the 9th and 2d corps.

"The 5th corps will have to remain in their present position, and be prepared to meet any attempt of the enemy to turn our left flank, which is not altogether unlikely, particularly if we should fail in our assault, and be compelled to withdraw.

"I am fully impressed with the importance of taking some immediate action, and am satisfied that, excepting regular approaches, the springing of Burnside's mine and subsequent assault is the most practicable, and I am not prepared to say the attempt would be *hopeless*. I am, however, of the opinion, so far as I can judge, that the chances of its success are not such as to make it expedient to attempt it.

"Very respectfully, yours,

"GEORGE G. MEADE,  
"Major General, *Commanding.*

"Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT.

"P. S.—I enclose you a report of Major Duane, which confirms my views; if Wright is soon to return, and we can extend our lines to the Weldon railroad, we could then advance against the salient on the Jerusalem plank road, and make an attempt to carry them at the same time we assaulted in Burnside's front.

"This was my idea some time ago, and we have been preparing the necessary siege works for this purpose. Under your instructions, however, none of the heavy guns and material have been brought to the front, and it would take, perhaps, two days to get them up.

"GEORGE G. MEADE.

"Official copy :

"S. WILLIAMS, A. A. G."

## B 2.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Office of Chief Engineer, July 24, 1864.*

"GENERAL: In reply to your communication of this date, I have the honor to state that the line of the enemy's works in front of General Burnside is not situated on the crest of the ridge separating us from Petersburg; that the enemy have undoubtedly occupied this ridge as a second line.

"Should General Burnside succeed in exploding his mine, he would probably be able to take the enemy's first line, which is about one hundred yards in advance of his approach. Beyond this I do not think he could advance until the works in front of the 5th corps are carried, as the 9th corps column would be taken in flank by a heavy artillery fire from works in front of the centre of the 5th corps, and in front by fire from the works on the crest near the Cemetery hill. I do not believe that the works in front of the 5th corps can be carried until our lines can be extended to the left so as to envelop the enemy's line.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"J. C. DUANE,

"Major Engineers, United States Army.

"Major General MEADE, *Commanding Army of the Potomac.*

"Official copy:

"S. WILLIAMS, A. A. G."

## C.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*City Point, July 24, 1864.*

"GENERAL: Your note, brought by Colonel Comstock, is received. It will be necessary to act without expecting Wright. He is now in Washington; but it is not fully assured yet that Early has left the valley, and if Wright was to start back no doubt the Maryland raid would be repeated. I am not willing to attempt a movement so hazardous as the one against intrenched lines, against the judgment of yourself and your engineer officers, and arrived at after a more careful survey of the grounds than I have given it. I will let you know, however, in the morning what determination I come to.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

"Major General MEADE,

"*Commanding Army of the Potomac.*

"Official copy:

"S. WILLIAMS,

"*Assistant Adjutant General.*"

## D.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*July 26, 1864—12 m.*

"Lieutenant General GRANT:

"More critical examinations from a new signal station would lead to the conclusion that the enemy have detached works on the ridge in front of Buinside, but they have no connected line. This fact increases the chances of a successful assault, taken in connexion with the fact that General Burnside does not now think the enemy have discovered his mine; on the contrary, believes they are laying the platform for a battery right over it.

"I have suspended the orders to load and discharge it to-morrow, as it may yet be useful in connexion with further operations.

"I am afraid the appearance of McLaws's division, together with Wilcox's, previously reported, will prevent any chance of a surprise on the part of our people to-morrow. Yesterday's Richmond Examiner also says your strategic movements are known, and preparations made to meet them, referring, I presume, to Foster's operations.

"There was considerable shelling by the enemy yesterday afternoon all along our lines, brought on, I think, by Burnside discovering a camp he had not before seen and ordering it shelled. No serious casualties were produced on our side, but the 5th corps working parties were very much annoyed and interrupted. With this exception, all was quiet.

"GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*

"Official copy:

"S. WILLIAMS, A. A. G."

E.

[Cipher.]

"UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,

"By telegraph from City Point, 3 p. m., dated July 26, 1864.

"Major General MEADE:

"The information you have just sent, and all information received on the subject, indicates a probability that the enemy are looking for a formidable attack either from General Burnside or north of the James river, and that they will detach from Petersburg heavily to prevent its success. This will make your remaining two corps, with the 18th, relatively stronger against the enemy at Petersburg than we have been since the first day. It will be well, therefore, to prepare for an assault in General Burnside's front, only to be made if further development justifies it. If made, it would be necessary to abandon most of the front now held by the 5th corps.

"U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General*.

"Official copy:

"S. WILLIAMS, *A. A. G.*"

F.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"5.30 p. m., July 26, 1864.

"Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT:

"Telegram 3 p. m. received. The only preparation that can be made is the loading of Burnside's mine. I cannot advise an assault with the 2d corps absent, for some force must be left to hold our lines and protect our batteries.

"The withdrawal of the 5th corps would prevent any attempt on our part to silence the fire of the enemy's guns in front of the 5th corps, and unless these guns are silenced no advance can be made across the open ground in front of the 9th corps.

"It is not the numbers of the enemy which oppose our taking Petersburg; it is their artillery and their works, which can be held by reduced numbers against direct assault.

"I have just sent you a despatch indicating an attack on my left flank by the enemy. This is my weak point, and a formidable attack turning my flank would require all my force to meet successfully.

"GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General*.

"Official:

"S. WILLIAMS, *A. A. G.*"

G.

"UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,

"By Telegraph from City Point, 12.20 p. m., dated July 28, 1864.

"Major General MEADE:

"Your despatch of 12 m. received. Unless something turns up north of the James between this and night that I do not expect, you may withdraw Hancock, to be followed by Sheridan, and make arrangements for assault as soon as it can be made. We can determine by the movements of the enemy before the time comes whether it will be advisable to go on with the assault. I will put in the 18th corps, or not, as you deem best.

"U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General*."

"Official:

"S. WILLIAMS, *A. A. G.*"

H.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC, 1 p. m., July 28, 1864.

"Lieutenant General GRANT:

"Your despatch of 12.20 received. On reflection, I think daylight of the 30th is the earliest time it would be advisable to make the assault. Besides the time required to get up heavy guns and mortars, we require the night to make certain preliminary arrangements, such as massing troops, removing abatis from the debouch of the assaulting column, &c. I shall make the assault with the 9th corps, supported by the 2d. The reserves of the 18th should be held in readiness to take part, and, if developments justify it, all of Ord's and Warren's commands can be put in.

"GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General*.

"Official:

"S. WILLIAMS, *A. A. G.*"

## I.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
"City Point, Va., July 29, 1864.

"GENERAL: I have directed General Butler to order General Ord to report to you for the attack on Petersburg. The details for the assault I leave to you to make out.

"I directed General Sheridan, whilst we were at Deep Bottom last evening, to move his command immediately to the left of Warren from Deep Bottom. It will be well to direct the cavalry to endeavor to get round the enemy's right flank; whilst they will not probably succeed in turning the enemy, they will detain a large force to prevent it. I will go out this evening to see you; will be at your headquarters about 4 p. m.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General*.

"Major General GEO. G. MEADE,

"*Commanding Army of the Potomac*.

"P. S.—If you want to be at any place on the line at the hour indicated, inform me by telegraph, and I will meet you wherever you may be.

"U. S. G.

"Official:

"S. WILLIAMS, *A. A. G.*"

## J.

[Cipher—received 11.40 a. m.]

*By telegraph from City Point, 9.30 a. m., dated August 1, 1864.*

"Major General MEADE:

"Have you any estimate of our losses in the miserable failure of Saturday? I think there will have to be an investigation of the matter. So far an opportunity will probably never occur again for carrying fortifications; preparations were good, orders ample, and everything, so far as I could see subsequent to the explosion of the mine, shows that almost without loss the crest beyond the mine could have been carried; this would have given us Petersburg with all its artillery, and a large part of the garrison beyond doubt. An intercepted despatch states that the enemy recaptured their line with General Bartlett and staff, seventy-five commissioned officers, and nine hundred rank and file, and recaptured five hundred of their men.

"U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General*.

"Official:

"S. WILLIAMS, *A. A. G.*"

## APPENDIX B.

*Order of the Major General commanding, for the movement against the enemy's position, July 30, 1864.*

## K.

"ORDERS.]

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC, July 29, 1864.

"The following instructions are issued for the guidance of all concerned:

"1. As soon as it is dark, Major General Burnside, commanding 9th corps, will withdraw his two brigades under General White, occupying the intrenchments between the Plank and Norfolk roads, and bring them to his front. Care will be taken not to interfere with the troops of the 18th corps moving into their position in rear of the 9th corps. General Burnside will form his troops for assaulting the enemy's works at daylight of the 30th, prepare his parapets and abatis for the passage of the columns, and have the pioneers equipped for work in opening passages for artillery, destroying enemy's abatis, &c., and the intrenching tools distributed for effecting lodgements, &c.

"2. Major General Warren, commanding 5th corps, will reduce the number of his troops holding the intrenchments of his front to the minimum, and concentrate all his available forces on his right, and hold them prepared to support the assault of Major General Burnside.

The preparations in respect to pioneers, intrenching tools, &c., enjoined upon the 9th corps, will also be made by the 5th corps.

"3. As soon as it is dark, Major General Ord, commanding 18th corps, will relieve his troops in the trenches by General Mott's division of the 2d corps, and form his corps in rear of the 9th corps, and be prepared to support the assault of Major General Burnside.

"4. Every preparation will be made for moving forward the field artillery of each corps.

"5. At dark, Major General Hancock, commanding 2d corps, will move from Deep Bottom, to the rear of the intrenchments now held by the 18th corps, resume the command of Mott's division, and be prepared at daylight to follow up the assaulting and supporting columns, or for such other operations as may be found necessary.

"6. Major General Sheridan, commanding cavalry corps, will proceed at dark from the vicinity of Deep Bottom to Lee's Mill, and at daylight will move with his whole corps, including Wilson's division, against the enemy's troops defending Petersburg on their right by the roads leading to that town from the southward and westward.

"7. Major Duane, acting chief engineer, will have the pontoon trains parked at convenient points in the rear, prepared to move. He will see that supplies of sand-bags, gabions, fascines, &c., are in depot near the lines, ready for use.

"He will detail engineer officers for each corps.

"8. At half past three in the morning of the 30th Major General Burnside will spring his mine, and his assaulting columns will immediately move rapidly upon the breach, seize the crest in the rear, and effect a lodgement there. He will be followed by Major General Ord, who will support him on the right, directing his movement to the crest indicated, and by Major General Warren, who will support him on the left.

"Upon the explosion of the mine, the artillery of all kinds in battery will open upon those points of the enemy's works whose fire covers the ground over which our columns must move, care being taken to avoid impeding the progress of our troops.

"Special instructions respecting the direction of fire will be issued through the chief of artillery.

"9. Corps commanders will report to the commanding general when their preparations are complete, and will advise him of every step in the progress of the operations, and of everything of importance that occurs.

"10. Promptitude, rapidity of execution, and cordial co-operation are essential to success, and the commanding general is confident that this indication of his expectations will insure the hearty efforts of the commanders and troops.

"11. Headquarters during the operations will be at the headquarters of the 9th corps.

"By command of Major General Meade.

"S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General*.

"Official :

"S. WILLIAMS, A. A. G."

#### APPENDIX C.

*Despatches from Major General Meade to Major General Burnside, commanding 9th army corps, and from Major General Burnside to Major General Meade, July 26, 29, 30, and 31, 1864; also despatches from General Meade to Captain Sanders, A. D. C., and from Captain Sanders to General Meade, July 30, 1864; also despatches from Lieutenant Colonel Comstock, A. D. C., to Lieutenant General Grant, July 30, 1864.*

#### L.

"HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS, July 26, 1864.

"GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your notes of this morning by Captains Jay and Bache; also a telegram from the commanding general relating to the same subject.

"It is altogether probable that the enemy are cognizant of the fact that we are mining, because it has been mentioned in their newspapers, and they have been heard to work in what are supposed to be shafts in close proximity to our galleries; but the rain of night before last no doubt filled their shafts and much retarded their work. We have heard no sounds of work in them either yesterday or to-day, and nothing is heard by us in the mine but the usual sounds of work on the surface above. This morning we had some apprehensions that the left lateral gallery was in danger of caving in from the weight of the batteries above it and the shock of their firing; but all possible precautions have been taken to strengthen it, and we hope to preserve it intact. The placing of the charges in the mine will not involve the necessity of making a noise. It is therefore probable that we will escape discovery, if the



mine is to be used within two or three days. It is nevertheless highly important, in my opinion, that the mine should be exploded at the earliest possible moment consistent with the general interests of the campaign. I state to you the facts as nearly as I can; and, in the absence of any knowledge as to the meditated movement of the army, I must leave you to judge the proper time to make use of the mine; but it may not be improper for me to say, that the advantages to be reaped from the work would be but small if it were exploded without any co-operative movements.

"My plan would be to explode the mine just before daylight in the morning, or about five o'clock in the afternoon; mass the two brigades of the colored division in rear of my line in column of divisions—double column closed in mass; the head of each brigade resting on the front line, and as soon as the explosion has taken place move them forward, with instructions for the divisions to take half-distance; and as soon as the leading regiments of the two brigades pass through the gap in the enemy's line, the leading regiment of the right brigade to come into line perpendicular to the enemy's line by the right companies on the right into line wheel, the left companies on the left into line, and proceed at once down the line of the enemy's work as rapidly as possible; the leading regiment of the left brigade to execute the reverse movement to the left, moving up the enemy's line; the remainder of the two columns to move directly towards the crest in front as rapidly as possible, diverging in such a way as to enable them to deploy into columns of regiments, the right column making as nearly as may be for Cemetery hill; these columns to be followed by the other divisions of this corps as soon as they can be thrown in; this would involve the necessity of relieving these divisions by other troops before the movement, and of holding columns of other troops in readiness to take our place on the crest, in case we gain it and sweep down it. It would be advisable, in my opinion, if we succeed in gaining the crest, to throw the colored division right into the town. There is a necessity for the co-operation, at least in the way of artillery, of the troops on my right and left; of the extent of this you will necessarily be the judge. I think our chances of success in a plan of this kind are more than even. The main gallery of the mine is five hundred and twenty-two (522) feet in length; the side galleries about forty feet each. My suggestion is, that eight magazines be placed in the lateral galleries—two at each end, say a few feet apart, in branches at right angles to the side galleries; and two more in each of the side galleries, similarly placed, situated by pairs, equidistant from each other and the end of the galleries, thus:

[See diagram, page 17.]

"Tamping beginning at the termination of the main gallery for, say, one hundred feet, leaving all the air space in the side galleries. Run out some five or six fuzes and two wires, to render the ignition of the charge certain. I propose to put in each of the eight magazines from twelve to fourteen hundred pounds of powder, the magazines to be connected by a trough of powder instead of a fuze.

"I beg to enclose a copy of a statement from General Potter on the subject. I would suggest that the powder train be parked in a wood near our ammunition train, about a mile in rear of this place. Lieutenant Colonel Pierce, chief quartermaster, will furnish Captain Strang with a guide to the place.

"I beg also to request that General Benham be instructed to send us, at once, eight thousand (8,000) sand-bags, to be used for tamping and other purposes.

"I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General, Commanding.*

"Major General HUMPHREYS, *Chief of Staff.*

"Official:

"S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*"

#### M.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"10 $\frac{1}{2}$  a. m., July 29, 1864.

"Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps:*

"I am instructed to say that the major general commanding submitted to the lieutenant general commanding the armies your proposition to form the leading columns of assault of the black troops, and that he, as well as the major general commanding, does not approve the proposition, but directs that these columns be formed of the white troops.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

"Official:

"S. WILLIAMS, *A. A. G.*"

## M 1.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ July 26, 12 m., 1864.

“Major General BURNSIDE :

“I wish you would submit in writing your project for the explosion of your mine, with the amount of powder required, that the preliminary question may be definitely settled. You had better also look for some secure place in the woods, where the powder required can be brought in wagons, and kept under guard; thus saving the time it will take to unload it from the vessels and haul it to your camp. Whenever you report as above, and designate a point, I will order the powder brought up.

“GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General.*

“Official :

“S. WILLIAMS,  
“ *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

## M 2.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ July 26, 1864

“Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps :*

“GENERAL: The major general commanding directs me to inquire whether anything has transpired connected with your mine that leads you to believe it is in danger from countermining. If it is your conviction that it is so endangered, then the commanding general authorizes you to make every preparation for springing it; but directs that you do not explode it earlier than to-morrow afternoon, Wednesday, the 27th, say at four o'clock, if not otherwise ordered. The commanding general further directs me to say that the charge of the mine should be determined by the usual rules governing such subjects. It is not intended by the commanding general to follow the explosion of the mine by an assault or other operations. If, therefore, the mine can be preserved for use at some early future day, when circumstances will admit of its being used in connexion with other operations, the commanding general desires that you take no steps for exploding it as herein prescribed.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“ *Major General and Chief of Staff.*

“Official :

“S. WILLIAMS,  
“ *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

## N.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ July 29—9½ p. m., 1864.

“Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps :*

“A despatch from General Ord refers to the late hour at which his troops will relieve yours in the trenches. The commanding general has informed General Ord that it is not necessary for you to wait for your troops to be relieved in the trenches by General Ord before forming them for the assault. They should be formed for the assault at the hour you deem best, without any reference to General Ord's troops, who will enter the vacated trenches as soon as they can.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“ *Major General and Chief of Staff.*

“Official :

“S. WILLIAMS, *A. A. G.*”

## O.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ July 30, 1864—3.20 a. m.

“Major General BURNSIDE :

“As it is still so dark, the commanding general says you can postpone firing the mine if you think proper.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“ *Major General and Chief of Staff.*

“Official :

“S. WILLIAMS, *A. A. G.*”

## P.

“BY TELEGRAPH FROM NINTH ARMY CORPS,  
“Dated July 30, 1864—3.20 a. m.

“Major General HUMPHREYS:

“The mine will be fired at the time designated. My headquarters will be at the 14-gun battery.

“A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General*.

“Official:

“S. WILLIAMS, *A. A. G.*”

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## Q.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“July 30, 1864—4.15 a. m.

“Major General BURNSIDE:

“Is there any difficulty in exploding the mine? It is now three-quarters of an hour later than the time fixed upon for exploding it.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“*Major General and Chief of Staff*.

“Official:

“S. WILLIAMS, *A. A. G.*”

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## R.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *July 30, 1864.*

“OPERATOR at General Burnside's field headquarters:

“Is General Burnside at his headquarters? The commanding general is anxious to learn what is the cause of delay.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“*Major General and Chief of Staff*.

“Official:

“S. WILLIAMS, *A. A. G.*”

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## S.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“July 30, 1864—4.29 a. m.

“Major General BURNSIDE:

“If the mine cannot be exploded, something else must be done, and at once. The commanding general is awaiting to hear from you before determining.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“*Major General and Chief of Staff*.

“Official:

“S. WILLIAMS, *A. A. G.*”

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## T.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“July 30, 1864—4.35 a. m.

“Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps*:

“The commanding general directs that, if your mine has failed, you make an assault at once, opening your batteries.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“*Major General and Chief of Staff*.

“Official:

“S. WILLIAMS, *A. A. G.*”

## U.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 30, 1864—5.40 a. m.

"Major General BURNSIDE:

"What news from your assaulting column? Please report frequently.

"GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General*.

"Official:

"S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adj. General*."

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## V.

"BY TELEGRAPH FROM BATTERY MORTON,  
"5.40 a. m., dated July 30, 1864.

"General MEADE:

"We have the enemy's first line and occupy the breach. I shall endeavor to push forward to the crest as rapidly as possible.

"A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General*.

"P. S.—There is a large fire in Petersburg.

"W. W. SANDERS, *Captain and A. D. C.*

"Official:

"S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adj. General*."

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## W.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 30, 1864—5.40 a. m.

"Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps* :

"The commanding general learns that your troops are halting at the works where the mine exploded. He directs that all your troops be pushed forward to the crest at once. Call on General Ord to move forward his troops at once.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS, *Major Gen. and Chief of Staff*.

"Official:

"S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adj. General*."

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## X.

"BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS, 14-GUN BATTERY,  
"July 30, 1864—5.50 a. m.

"Major General MEADE:

"The 18th corps has just been ordered to push forward to the crest. The loss does not appear to be heavy. Prisoners coming in.

"W. W. SANDERS, *Captain and C. M.*

"Official:

"S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adj. General*."

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## Y.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 30, 1864—6 a. m.

"Major General BURNSIDE:

"Prisoners taken say there is no line in their rear, and that their men were falling back when ours advanced; that none of their troops have returned from the James. Our chance is now. Push your men forward at all hazards—white and black—and don't lose time in making formations, but rush for the crest.

"GEO. G. MEADE, *Major Gen., Commanding*.

"Official:

"S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adj. General*."

Z.

“BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 14-GUN BATTERY,  
“July 30, 1864—6.10 a. m.

“General MEADE:

“General Burnside says that he has given orders to all his division commanders to push everything in at once.

“W. W. SANDERS, *Captain and C. M.*

“Official:

“S. WILLIAMS,  
“Assistant Adjutant General.”

No. 1.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“July 30—6.05 a. m., 1864.

“Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps*:

“The commanding general wishes to know what is going on on your left, and whether it would be an advantage for Warren’s supporting force to go in at once.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“Major General and Chief of Staff.

“Official:

“S. WILLIAMS,  
“Assistant Adjutant General.”

No. 2.

“[Telegraph from headquarters 9th corps.]  
“Dated July 30—6.20 a. m., 1864.

“Major General MEADE:

“If General Warren’s supporting force can be concentrated just now, ready to go in at the proper time, it would be well. I will designate to you when it ought to move. There is scarcely room for it now in our immediate front.

“A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General.*

“Official:

“S. WILLIAMS,  
“Assistant Adjutant General.”

No. 3.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC,  
“July 30—6.50 a. m., 1864.

“Major General BURNSIDE:

“Warren’s force has been concentrated and ready to move since 3.30 a. m. My object in inquiring was to ascertain if you could judge of the practicability of his advancing without waiting for your column. What is the delay in your column moving? Every minute is most precious, as the enemy undoubtedly are concentrating to meet you on the crest, and, if you give them time enough, you cannot expect to succeed. There is no object to be gained in occupying the enemy’s line. It cannot be held under their artillery fire without much labor in turning it. The great point is to secure the crest at once and at all hazards.

“GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*

“Official:

“S. WILLIAMS,  
“Assistant Adjutant General.”

No. 4.

“[By telegraph from 5th army corps.]  
“JULY 30—7 a. m., 1864.

“Lieutenant General GRANT:

“Several regiments of Burnside’s men are lying in front of the crater, apparently, of the mine. In their rear is to be seen a line of battle of a brigade or more, under cover, and I think between the enemy’s line and ours. The volley firing half ( $\frac{1}{2}$ ) hour ago was from the enemy’s works in Warren’s front.

“C. B. COMSTOCK, *Lieut. Colonel.*

“Official:

“S. WILLIAMS,  
“Assistant Adjutant General.”

No. 5.

" [Telegraph from headquarters 9th corps.]

" Received about 7.20 a. m., July 30, 1864.

" General MEADE :

" I am doing all in my power to push the troops forward, and, if possible, we will carry the crest. It is hard work, but we hope to accomplish it. I am fully alive to the importance of it.

" A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General.*

" Official :

" S. WILLIAMS,  
" *Assistant Adjutant General.*"

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No. 6.

" HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
" 7.30 a. m., July 30, 1864.

" Major General BURNSIDE :

" What do you mean by hard work to take the crest? I understand not a man has advanced beyond the enemy's line which you occupied immediately after exploding the mine. Do you mean to say your officers and men will not obey your orders to advance; if not, what is the obstacle? I wish to know the truth, and desire an immediate answer.

" GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*

" Official :

" S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*"

No. 7.

" HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
" July 30—8 a. m., 1864.

" To Major General BURNSIDE :

" Since writing by Captain Jay, Captain Sanders has come in and reported condition of affairs. He says Griffin has advanced and been checked; this modifies my despatch. Still I should like to know the exact morale of your corps. Ord reports he cannot move till you get out of the way. Can't you let him pass out on your right, and let him try what he can do?

" GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General.*

" Official :

" S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*"

No. 8.

" HEADQUARTERS 9TH CORPS, BATTERY MORTON,  
" About 7.35 a. m., July 30, 1864.

" General MEADE :

" Your despatch by Captain Jay received. The main body of General Potter's division is beyond the crater. I do not mean to say that my officers and men will not obey my orders to advance; I mean to say that it is very hard to advance to the crest.

" I have never in any report said anything different from what I conceived to be the truth; were it not insubordinate, I would say that the latter remark of your note was un-officerlike and ungentlemanly.

" Respectfully, yours,

" A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General.*

" Official :

" S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*"

## No. 9.

“ [By telegraph from 5th army corps.]

“ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ 8 a. m., July 30, 1864.

“ To Lieutenant General GRANT :

“ About a brigade more of our men has moved up to the crater, and then filed off to the right along the enemy's line ; they are still moving to the right.

“ C. B. COMSTOCK,

“ Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

“ Official :

“ S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant General.”

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## No. 10.

“ [By telegraph from headquarters 9th army corps.]

“ 8.45 a. m., July 30, 1864.

“ To General MEADE :

“ One gun has just been taken out of the mine, and is now being put in position. Have not heard anything from the attack made from the left of mine. One (1) set of colors just sent in, captured by the negroes.

“ W. W. SANDERS, Captain and C. M.

“ Official :

“ S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant General.”

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## No. 11.

“ [By telegraph from headquarters 9th army corps.]

“ 9 a. m., July 30, 1864.

“ General MEADE :

“ Many of the ninth (9th) and eighteenth (18th) corps are retiring before the enemy. I think now is the time to put in the fifth (5th) corps promptly.

“ A. E. BURNSIDE, Major General.

“ Official :

“ S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant General.”

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## No. 12.

“ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“ July 30, 1864—9.30 a. m.

“ Major General BURNSIDE, Commanding 9th Corps :

“ The major general commanding has heard that the result of your attack has been a repulse, and directs that if, in your judgment, nothing further can be effected, that you withdraw to your own line, taking every precaution to get the men back safely.

“ A. A. HUMPHREYS,

“ Major General and Chief of Staff.

“ General Ord will do the same.

“ A. A. HUMPHREYS,

“ Major General and Chief of Staff.

“ Official :

“ S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant General.”

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## No. 13.

“ [By telegraph from headquarters 9th army corps.]

“ 9 a. m., July 30, 1864.

“ To Major General MEADE :

“ The attack made on right of the mine has been repulsed. A great many men are coming to the rear.

“ W. W. SANDERS, Captain and C. M.

“ Official :

“ S. WILLIAMS,

“ Assistant Adjutant General.”

No. 14.

“ [By telegraph.]

“ HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMY CORPS,  
 “ July 30, 1864—9.35 a. m.

“ To Lieutenant General GRANT :

“ I cannot see that we have advanced beyond the enemy's line in the vicinity of the mine. From here, it looks as if the enemy were holding a line between that point and the crest.

“ C. B. COMSTOCK,  
 “ Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

“ Official :

“ S. WILLIAMS,  
 “ Assistant Adjutant General.”

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No. 15.

“ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
 “ July 30, 9½ a. m., 1864.

“ To Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps* :

“ The major general commanding directs that you withdraw to your own intrenchments.

“ A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
 “ Major General, Chief of Staff.

“ Official :

“ S. WILLIAMS,  
 “ Assistant Adjutant General.”

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No. 16.

“ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
 “ July 30, 10 a. m., 1864.

“ Major Generals BURNSIDE and ORD :

“ You can exercise your discretion in withdrawing your troops now or at a later period ; say to-night. It is not intended to hold the enemy's line which you now occupy any longer than is required to withdraw safely your men.

“ GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General*.

“ Official :

“ S. WILLIAMS,  
 “ Assistant Adjutant General.”

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No. 17.

“ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
 “ July 30, 1864—7.40 p. m.

“ Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps* :

“ The major general commanding desires to know whether you still hold the crater ; and if so, whether you will be able to withdraw your troops from it safely to-night, and also to bring off the wounded. The commanding general wishes to know how many wounded are probably lying there. It will be recollected that on a former occasion General Beauregard declined to enter into any arrangement for the succor of the wounded and the burial of the dead lying under both fires ; hence the necessity of immediate and active efforts for their removal in the present case.

“ A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
 “ Major General and Chief of Staff.

“ Official :

“ S. WILLIAMS,  
 “ Assistant Adjutant General.”



No. 18.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"July 30, 1864—10.35 p. m.

"Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps* :

"The major general commanding desires to know whether you have any wounded left on the field; and directs me to say that he is awaiting your reply to the despatch of 7.40 p. m.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,

"Major General and Chief of Staff.

"Official :

"S. WILLIAMS,

"Assistant Adjutant General."

No. 18½.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"July 31, 1864—8.40 a. m.

"To Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps* :

"The major general commanding directs me to call your attention to the fact that you have made no report to him upon the condition of affairs in your front since he left your headquarters yesterday, and that you have made no reply to the two special communications upon the subject sent you last night at 7.40 p. m., and at 10.40 p. m.

"I am also directed to inquire as to the cause of these omissions.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,

"Major General and Chief of Staff.

"Official :

"S. WILLIAMS,

"Assistant Adjutant General."

No. 18¾.

"BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 9TH CORPS,

"July 31, 1864—9 a. m.

"Major General HUMPHREYS :

"Your despatch was received just as I was making out a report of our casualties. I have used every means to get something like accurate reports, but it has been difficult.

"The rumors are very numerous and exaggerated. I will send report by messenger. The order to retreat caused great confusion, and we have lost largely in prisoners.

"General Ord's men on our lines were not relieved.

"A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General*.

"Official :

"S. WILLIAMS,

"Assistant Adjutant General."

No. 18¾.

"BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 9TH CORPS,

"July 31, 1864—6.40 p. m.

"Major General HUMPHREYS :

"The loss in this corps in the engagement of yesterday amounts to about 4,500; the great proportion of which was made after the brigade commanders in the crater were made aware of the order to withdraw.

"A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General*.

"Official :

"S. WILLIAMS,

"Assistant Adjutant General."

No. 19.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ July 31, 1864—7.20 p. m.

“Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps* :

“Your despatch relative to the loss in your corps yesterday is received.

“The commanding general requests that you will explain the meaning of the latter part of your despatch, and again reminds you that he has received no report whatever from you of what occurred after 11 a. m. yesterday.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“ *Major General and Chief of Staff.*

“Official :

“S WILLIAMS,  
“ *Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 19½.

“BY TELEGRAPH FROM 9TH CORPS,  
“ July 31, 1864—9.10 p. m.

“Major General HUMPHREYS, *Chief of Staff* :

“Your despatch of 7.20 p. m. received. Just before the order for withdrawal was sent in to the brigade commanders in the crater, the enemy made an attack upon our forces there and were repulsed with very severe loss to the assaulting column. The order for withdrawal, leaving the time and manner of the execution thereof to the brigade commanders on the spot, was then sent in, and while they were making arrangements to carry out the order the enemy advanced another column of attack. The officers, knowing they were not to be supported by other troops, and that a withdrawal was determined, ordered the men to retire at once to our old line. It was in this withdrawal, and consequent upon it, that our chief loss was made. In view of the want of confidence in their situation, and the certainty of no support, consequent upon the receipt of such an order, of which moral effects the general commanding cannot be ignorant, I am at a loss to know why the latter part of my despatch requires explanation.

“A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major General.*

“Official :

“S. WILLIAMS,  
“ *Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 20.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ July 31, 1864—9½ p. m.

“Major General BURNSIDE, *Commanding 9th Corps* :

“Your despatch explanatory of that in relation to the loss in your corps yesterday is received.

“The major general commanding directs me to say that the order for withdrawal did not authorize or justify its being done in the manner in which, judging from your brief report, it appears to have been executed, and that the matter shall be inquired into by a court.

“The major general commanding notices that the time and manner of withdrawal was left to the brigade commanders on the spot. He desires to know why there was not a division commander present where several brigades were engaged, and by whom the withdrawal could have been conducted.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“ *Major General and Chief of Staff.*

“Official :

“S. WILLIAMS,  
“ *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

## APPENDIX D.

*Despatches from Major General Meade to Major General Ord, commanding 18th army corps, and from Major General Ord to Major General Meade, July 29 and 30, 1864.*

No. 21.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“July 29, 9½ p. m., 1864.

“Major General ORD, *Commanding 18th Corps* :

“Your despatch of 9.25 p. m. is received. The commanding general does not consider it necessary for General Burnside to wait for your troops to relieve his in the trenches. General Burnside can form his troops for the assault without reference to yours, and your troops can file into the trenches at any time after they are vacated. General Burnside is telegraphed to that effect.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“Major General, Chief of Staff.

“Official copy :

“S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

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No. 22.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“July 30, 4.50 a. m., 1864.

“Major General ORD, *Commanding 18th Corps* :

“General Burnside is ordered, if his mine has failed, to open all his batteries and assault at once. You will consider the orders the same as if the mine had exploded and the assault made in consequence.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“Major General, Chief of Staff.

“(Just before this was finished the mine exploded and the batteries opened. It was not sent.—A. A. H.)

“Official copy :

“S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

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No. 23.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“July 30, 6 a. m., 1864.

“Major General ORD, *Commanding 18th Corps* :

“The major general commanding directs that you at once move forward your corps rapidly to the crest of the hill, independently of General Burnside’s troops, and make a lodgement there, reporting the result as soon as attained.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
“Major General, Chief of Staff.

“Official copy :

“S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

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No. 23½.

“[By telegraph from headquarters 9th army corps.]

“JULY 30, 8 a. m., 1864.

“To General MEADE :

“General Turner in my front reports that the only place I can get out of the line is opposite the crater. It is already full of men who cannot develop. I shall put in my column as soon as I can. It is impossible, by reason of the topography, to charge in the manner you indicate. I must go in by head of column and develop to the right. This is reply to orders from General Meade to push for crest of hill regardless of General Burnside’s troops. General Ames makes similar reports.

“E. O. C. ORD, *Major General.*

“Official copy :

“S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

No. 23 $\frac{1}{2}$ .

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
" July 30, 9 $\frac{1}{2}$  a. m., 1864.

"Major General ORD, *Commanding 18th Corps* :

"The major general commanding directs that you withdraw your corps to the rear of the 9th corps, in some secure place.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
" *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

"Official copy :

"S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

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No. 24.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
" July 30, 10 a. m., 1864.

"Major Generals BURNSIDE and ORD :

"You can exercise your discretion in withdrawing your troops now or at a later period, say to-night.

"It is not intended to hold the enemy's line which you now occupy any longer than is required to withdraw safely your men.

"GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major General.*

"Official copy :

"S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*"

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#### APPENDIX E.

*Despatches from Major General Meade to Major General Warren, commanding 5th army corps, and from Major General Warren to Major General Meade, July 30, 1864.*

No. 25.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
" July 30, 4.40 a. m., 1864.

"Major General WARREN, *Commanding 5th Corps* :

"General Burnside is directed, if his mine has failed, to open all his batteries and assault. Upon hearing his batteries open you will open all in your front.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
" *Major General and Chief of Staff.*

"Official :

"S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

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No. 26.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
" July 30, 5.50 a. m., 1864.

"Major General WARREN, *Commanding 5th Corps* :

"General Burnside is occupying the crater with some of his troops. He reports that no enemy is seen in their line. How is it in your front? Are the enemy in force there or weak?

"If there is apparently an opportunity to carry their works, take advantage of it and push forward your troops.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
" *Major General and Chief of Staff.*

"Official :

"S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*"

No. 27.

"[By telegraph from 5th army corps.]

"JULY 30, 6 a. m., 1864.

"To Major General HUMPHREYS:

"Your despatch just received. It is difficult to say how strong the enemy may be in my front. He has batteries along the whole of it. I will watch for the first opportunity. I can see the whole line well where I am. The enemy has been running from his first line in front of General Burnside's right for some minutes, but there seems to be a very heavy line of troops just behind it in high breastwork. There is a battery in front of General Burnside's left which fires towards the river, the same as it did on the 18th of June, and which our artillery fire has but very little effect on.

"G. K. WARREN, *Major General*.

"Official copy:

"S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General*."

No. 28.

"[By telegraph from headquarters 5th army corps.]

"JULY 30, 6.15 a. m., 1864.

"To Major General HUMPHREYS:

"I have just received a report from my line on the centre and left. The enemy opened with musketry when our firing commenced, but our own fire kept it down, and also that of all their artillery except in the second line on the main ridge, from which they fire a little. Major Fitzhugh, of the artillery, is badly wounded by a musket ball in the thigh. None of the enemy have left my front, that we can see.

"G. K. WARREN, *Major General*.

"Official copy:

"S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General*."

No. 29.

"[By telegraph from 5th army corps.]

"JULY 30, 6.20 a. m., 1864.

"To Major General HUMPHREYS:

"What we thought was the heavy line of the enemy behind the line occupied by General Burnside's troops proves, as the sunlight comes out and the smoke clears away, to be our own troops in the enemy's position.

"G. K. WARREN, *Major General*.

"Official copy:

"S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General*."

No. 30.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 6.30 a. m., 1864.

"Major General WARREN, *Commanding 5th Corps*:

"The signal officer reports that none of the enemy's troops are visible in their works near the lead works. The commanding general wishes, if it is practicable, that you make an attack in that direction. Prisoners say there are but three divisions in the works, and but one line of intrenchments, thinly filled with their troops.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS, *Major General and Chief of Staff*."

"A despatch just going to Wilson to make a lodgement on the Weldon railroad and move up along it to the enemy's right flank.

"Official copy:

"S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General*."

## No. 31.

“HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS, July 30, 6.40 a. m., 1864.

“General HUMPHREYS:

“I have all my troops on my right except General Crawford's. I have sent him your despatch, with directions to do whatever he can on the left with Baxter's brigade and half of Ledlie's.

“Do you mean for me to move Ayres in that direction? The enemy have a 30-pounder battery on the main ridge in my front, behind their first line. We cannot make out what his second line is.

“Respectfully,

“G. K. WARREN, *Major General.*

“Official copy:

“S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

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## No. 32.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 7 a. m., 1864.

“Major General WARREN, *Commanding 5th Corps:*

“What about attacking the enemy's right flank near the lead works with that part of your force nearest to it?

“A. A. HUMPHREYS, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*”

“Official:

“S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

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## No. 33.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 7½ a. m., 1864.

“Major General WARREN, *Commanding 5th Corps:*

“Your despatch respecting attacking the enemy's extreme right received. The general commanding will await General Crawford's reconnoissance before determining whether you should send Ayres also in that direction.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

“Official:

“S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

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## No. 34.

“HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS, July 30—7.50 a. m.

“Major General HUMPHREYS:

“I have just returned from the scene of General Burnside's operations. In my opinion, the battery of one or two guns to the left of General Burnside should be taken before attempting to seize the crest. It seems to me it can be done, as we shall take the infantry fire quite obliquely. This done, the advance upon the main hill will not be difficult. I think it would pay you to go to General Burnside's position. You can see in a moment, and it is as easy to communicate with me as by telegraph.

“It will be some time before we can hear from Crawford.

“Respectfully,

“G. K. WARREN, *Major General.*

“Official copy:

“S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

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## No. 35.

“BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMY CORPS,

“July 30, 1864—8 a. m.

“Major General HUMPHREYS:

“I sent your despatch to General Crawford with directions to do what he could. He says the lead works are over a mile from the angle of my picket line. I do not think an attack upon the enemy's works at or near that point at all practicable. With the force I can spare, I can make a demonstration if it is desired; the cavalry are moving and I will have my left uncovered. He sent word he will await further orders. He is so far off that I do not think

it well to wait for anything more he can do, and I renew my suggestion that you take a look at things from General Burnside's headquarters and direct me either to go in with Burnside or go around to my left with Ayres's division and I do the other thing.

"G. K. WARREN, *Major General*.

"Official copy:

"S. WILLIAMS,  
"Assistant Adjutant General."

No. 36.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 30, 1864—8 $\frac{3}{4}$  a. m.

"Major General WARREN, *Commanding 5th Corps* :

"Your despatch is received. The major general commanding directs that you go in with Burnside, taking the two-gun battery. The movement on the left need not be carried further than reconnoissance to see in what force the enemy is holding his right. The cavalry are ordered to move up on your left and to keep up connexion.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
"Major General, *Chief of Staff*.

"Official copy:

"S. WILLIAMS  
"Assistant Adjutant General."

No. 37.

"BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMY CORPS,  
"July 30, 1864—9.15 a. m.

"Major General HUMPHREYS:

"Just before receiving your despatch to assault the battery on the left of the crater occupied by General Burnside, the enemy drove his troops out of the place and I think now hold it. I can find no one who knows for certainty or seems willing to admit, but I think I saw a rebel battle-flag in it just now and shots coming from it this way. I am therefore, if this is true, no more able to take the battery now than I was this time yesterday. All our advantages are lost. I await further instructions, and am trying to get at the condition of affairs for certainty.

"G. K. WARREN, *Major General*.

"Official copy:

"S. WILLIAMS,  
"Assistant Adjutant General."

No. 38.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 30, 1864—9.25 a. m.

"Major General WARREN:

"The attack ordered on the two-gun battery is suspended.

"GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General*.

"Official copy:

"S. WILLIAMS,  
"Assistant Adjutant General."

No. 38 $\frac{1}{2}$ .

"BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 5TH CORPS,  
"July 30, 1864—9.45 a. m.

"Major General HUMPHREYS, *Chief of Staff* :

"GENERAL: I find that the flag I saw was the enemy's, and that they have reoccupied all the line we drove them from, except a little around the crater which a small force of ours still hold.

"Respectfully,

"G. K. WARREN, *Major General*.

"Official copy:

"S. WILLIAMS,  
"Assistant Adjutant General."

No. 39.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“July 30, 1864—9.45 a. m.

“General WARREN, at 9th Corps Headquarters :

“A despatch has been sent to your headquarters, rescinding order to attack; all offensive operations are suspended. You can resume your original position with your command.

“GEORGE G. MEADE.

“Official :

“S. WILLIAMS,  
“Assistant Adjutant General.”

No. 40.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“July 30, 1864—5 p. m.

“Major Generals WARREN and BURNSIDE :

“Signal officers report the enemy returning rapidly from the north side of the James. Every preparation should be made to strengthen the line of works where any obstacles have to-day been removed. The lines should be held strongly with infantry and artillery, posted wherever practicable—available reserves held in hand ready for movement in case it becomes necessary. I anticipate offensive movements on the part of the enemy, and expect it will be by a movable column, turning our left and threatening our rear.

“GEORGE G. MEADE,  
“Major General, Commanding.

“Major General Hancock will, to-night, resume his former position, and General Ord his also.

“Official copy :

“S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant General.”

## APPENDIX F.

*Despatches from Major General Meade to Brigadier General Mott, commanding division, 2d army corps, and to Major General Hancock, commanding 2d army corps; also despatches from Major General Hancock to Major General Meade, July 30, 1864.*

No. 41.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“July 30, 1864—4.40 a. m.

“Brigadier General MOTT, Commanding Division in intrenchments of 18th Corps, Old Headquarters of 18th Corps :

“General Burnside is ordered, if his mine has failed, to open all the batteries on his front and assault at once.

“Upon hearing his batteries open, have all the batteries of the 18th corps opened.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS, Major General, Chief of Staff.

“Official :

“S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant General.”

No. 42.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 30, 1864—4.50 a. m.

“OPERATOR at Headquarters 18th Corps :

“Send the following message by orderly to General Hancock :

“Major General HANCOCK, Commanding 2d Corps :

“The commanding general wishes you to be about the headquarters of the 18th corps, so that he can communicate with you at any time.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS, Major General, Chief of Staff.

“Official :

“S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant General.”



No. 43.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

" July 30, 1864—6 a. m.

"Major General HANCOCK, *Commanding 2d Corps* :

"The major general commanding directs me to say that General Burnside reports the enemy's line in his front abandoned, and the prisoners taken say that there is no second line. The commanding general may call on you to move forward at any moment, and wishes you to have your troops well up to the front prepared to move. Do the enemy's lines in front of Mott's division appear to be thinly occupied, and is there any chance to push forward there?"

"A. A. HUMPHREYS, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

"Official copy :

"S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*"

No. 44.

"BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 2D ARMY CORPS,

" July 30, 1864—6 a. m.

"Major General HUMPHREYS :

"It is not possible to say about the line in front of General Mott, as both parties keep down, firing whenever a head is shown. General Ord left word for me by General Mott that there was no place to assault here, as the line was not only protected by abatis, but by wire. This was the decision of himself and his division commanders, and he requested General Mott so to inform me. I know nothing more about it. I will be prepared for your orders."

"W. S. HANCOCK, *M. G.*

"Official copy :

"S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*"

No. 45.

"BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 2D CORPS,

" July 30, 1864—6.20 a. m.

"Major General HUMPHREYS, *Chief of Staff* :

"I have sent out to have General Mott's line examined as far as practicable, to see how strong the enemy appear to hold their line in General Mott's front."

"W. S. HANCOCK, *M. G.*

"Official copy :

"S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*"

No. 45½.

"BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 2D CORPS,

" July 30, 1864—6.30 a. m.

"Major General HUMPHREYS :

"I have directed General Mott to advance a skirmish line to see whether the enemy hold a strong line in his front."

"W. S. HANCOCK, *Major General.*

"Official copy :

"S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*"

No. 45¾.

"BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 2D CORPS,

" July 30, 1864—6.50 a. m.

"General GEO. G. MEADE :

"The brigade next to General Burnside's attempted an advance of a skirmish line just now and lost the officer in command of the line and several men in getting over the parapet. The enemy's mortars are at work, but they cannot fire much artillery other than this. The other brigades have not yet been heard from. Your despatch is just received. I will continue to watch the enemy in my front."

"W. S. HANCOCK, *Major General.*

"Official copy :

"S. WILLIAMS, *Asst. Adj't General.*"

No. 46.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ July 30, 1864—7 a. m.

Major General HANCOCK :

The report from prisoners would indicate weakness in the enemy's line, and that a considerable portion has been vacated.

“If Burnside and Ord gain the crest, the enemy cannot hold in your front, for they will be open to attack from front and rear. It was to take advantage of this contingency that I wanted you to have your troops in hand.

“The orders to Mott are all right. If the enemy are in force and prepared, you will have await developments; but if you have reason to believe their condition is such that an effort to dislodge them would be successful, I would like to have it made. Burnside now occupies their line, but has not pushed up to the crest, though he reports he is about doing so.

“GEO. G. MEADE.

Official :

“S. WILLIAMS, *Asst. Adj't General.*”

No. 47.

“BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 2D CORPS,  
“ July 30, 1864—7 a. m.

“General HUMPHREYS, *Chief of Staff* :

“Report from 2d brigade of General Mott's division shows that the enemy are there in some strength, having two batteries which they fire seldom, owing to the close proximity of our riflemen. The commanding officer of the brigade says he can see every man who leaves his front to their right, and none have left since daylight. He is using mortars effectively. I will report any change of troops.

“W. S. HANCOCK, *Major General.*

“Official copy :

“S. WILLIAMS, *Asst. Adj't General.*”

No. 48.

“BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS 2D ARMY CORPS,  
“ July 30, 1864—9 a. m.

“Major General HUMPHREYS :

“General Mott's remaining brigade deceived the enemy in their front by putting their hats on rammers above the parapet, which elicited quite a spirited volley.

“W. S. HANCOCK, *Major General.*

“Official copy :

“S. WILLIAMS, *Asst. Adj't General.*”

No. 49.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ July 30, 1864—9.25 a. m.

“Major General HANCOCK :

“Offensive operations have been suspended. You will for the present hold in force the lines held by the 18th corps. Make your dispositions accordingly.

“GEO. G. MEADE, *Major General, Commanding.*

“Official :

“S. WILLIAMS, *Asst. Adj't General.*”

## APPENDIX G.

*Miscellaneous papers.*

Despatches from Major General Humphreys to Major General Sheridan and Brigadier General Wilson, July 29, 1864.

Despatches from Major General Humphreys, chief of staff, to Brigadier General White, temporarily commanding 4th division 9th corps, July 29, 1864.

Despatches from Major General Humphreys, chief of staff, to Colonel Wainwright, chief of artillery, 5th corps, July 30, 1864.

Despatches from signal officers, July 30, 1864.

Report of Major Duane, acting chief engineer of operations, July 30, 1864.

No. 50.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“July 29, 1864—10 p. m.

“Major General SHERIDAN, *Commanding Cavalry Corps* :

“The commanding general directs that you keep up connexion with our left, in the operations of to-morrow.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,

“*Major General and Chief of Staff.*”

“Official copy :

“S. WILLIAMS,

“*Assistant Adjutant General.*”

No. 51.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“July 29, 1864—10 a. m.

“Brigadier General WILSON, *Com'dg 3d Division Cavalry* :

“The major general commanding directs that you concentrate your division on the left, somewhere near the plank road, and hold its available force ready for prompt movement.

“The guard left with trains should be merely sufficient to protect them against any small irregular parties of the enemy. The dismounted enemy should form this guard. Please report your location as soon as established.

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,

“*Major General and Chief of Staff.*”

“P. S.—The patrols and pickets on the north side of the Blackwater should be reduced to the minimum consistent with watching the main avenues of approach.

“Official copy :

“S. WILLIAMS, *Asst. Adj't General.*”

No. 52.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“July 29, 1864—2½ p. m.

“Brigadier General WILSON,

“*Com'dg Cavalry Division, Jordan's Point* :

“The commanding general considers that not more than one regiment should remain north of the Blackwater, and that be so posted as to be brought in rapidly to-morrow morning.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,

“*Major General and Chief of Staff.*”

“Official copy :

“S. WILLIAMS, *Asst. Adj't General.*”

No. 53.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“July 29, 1864—3¼ p. m.

“Brigadier General WILSON, *Commanding 3d Division Cavalry Corps* :

“GENERAL: Major General Sheridan is ordered to move at dark to Lee's mill, and at daylight against the enemy's troops defending Petersburg on their right, by the roads leading to that town from the southward and westward.

“Your division will accompany him, and the commanding general directs that you be prepared to call in your patrols and pickets early to-morrow morning and move with the cavalry corps. You will send a staff officer to meet General Sheridan and receive his instructions.

“A. A. HUMPHREYS,

“*Major General and Chief of Staff.*”

“Official copy :

“S. WILLIAMS,

“*Assistant Adjutant General.*”

No. 54.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 29, 1864—3 p. m.

"Brigadier General WHITE,

"*Commanding (temporary) Division, 9th Corps :*

"The major general commanding directs that, as soon as it is dark, you withdraw your command from the intrenchments you are now holding, and move to the position of the 9th corps, and report to your corps commander. You will call in your pickets upon moving.

"You will at once report to Major General Burnside, and receive his instructions as to the route you will take.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"Official:

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
"Major General and Chief of Staff.

"S. WILLIAMS,  
"Assistant Adjutant General."

No. 55.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 30, 1864—4.34 a. m.

"Colonel WAINWRIGHT, *Chief of Artillery, 5th Corps :*

"General Burnside is directed, if his mine has failed, to open all the batteries on his front and assault at once. Upon hearing his batteries open, those of the 5th corps will open also.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,  
"Major General and Chief of Staff.

"Official:

"S. WILLIAMS,  
"Assistant Adjutant General."

No. 56.

"PLANK ROAD SIGNAL STATION,  
"July 30, 1864—5 a. m.

"Major B. F. FISHER:

"There are no tents or the sign of any force on the right of the enemy's line near lead works.

"The two batteries directly in front of station, which opened heavily this morning, have ceased firing.

"A large building is burning in the city.

"I have seen no movement of the enemy's troops.

"Official:

"J. B. DUFF,  
"Lieutenant, Signal Officer.

"S. WILLIAMS,  
"Assistant Adjutant General."

No. 57.

"[By telegraph from Plank Road Signal Station.]

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
"July 30, 1864—6.20 a. m.

"Major FISHER:

"The enemy's infantry has been passing to our right for twenty minutes; first noticed them at a point due west of the station marching in rear of their line; they came out in plain view at a point northwest from station. The column was at least a strong brigade; all the camps, one-quarter mile of lead works, have been broken up; the largest visible from station has just been broken up and the troops moved to our right.

"J. B. DUFF, *Signal Officer.*

"Official:

"S. WILLIAMS,  
"Assistant Adjutant General."

No. 58.

“[By telegraph from 5th corps.]

“JULY 30, 1864.

“Major FISHER:

“The enemy are wholly concealed along the line in view of this station. Not one has been seen; only three guns, and those in redoubts, at Gregor House. Reply to us.

“Copy sent to General Warren.

“S. LYON, *Lieutenant*.

“Official:

“S. WILLIAMS,  
“*Assistant Adjutant General.*”

No. 59.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“*Office of Chief Engineer, August 5, 1864.*

“SIR: In compliance with directions received from you to-day, I have the honor to make the following report of the duty performed by the engineer officers during the assault of July 30.

“In compliance with directions from the chief of staff, I detailed an officer of engineers for duty with each corps that was ordered to take part in the attack on the 30th of July.

“Major Michler, who was charged with selecting the position of the column on the right, after having reconnoitred the position, reported to General Ord, and was informed that his subordinate generals had already examined the position, were thoroughly acquainted with the ground, and required no further assistance. They had already determined to take the same position indicated by Major Michler. Two engineer officers belonging to the 18th corps accompanied the movement.

“Lieutenant Benyaurd, engineer, who has been on duty on the 9th corps front, reported to General Burnside, and remained with him during the whole affair.

“After having consulted with the commanding general of the 5th corps as to the direction his column would take, I proceeded to the batteries in front of that corps and assisted Colonel Abbott in directing their fire so as to silence that of the enemy against the assaulting column. I then repaired to the right of his line. By this time, however, the attack had been abandoned and my services were no longer required.

“Very respectfully,

“J. C. DUANE, *Major Engineers*.

“Official:

“S. WILLIAMS, *A. A. G.*”

No. 60.

CIRCULAR.]

HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS,  
*July 29, 1864.*

I. The mine will be exploded to-morrow morning at half past three by Colonel Pleasants. General Potter will issue the necessary orders to the colonel for the explosion.

II. General Ledlie will, immediately upon the explosion of the mine, move his division forward as directed by verbal orders this day, and if possible crown the crest at the point known as Cemetery hill, occupying, if possible, the cemetery.

III. General Wilcox will move his division forward as soon as possible after General Ledlie has passed through the first line of the enemy's works, bearing off to the left so as to effectually protect the left flank of General Ledlie's column, and make a lodgement, if possible, on the Jerusalem plank road, to the left of General Ledlie's division.

IV. General Potter will move his division forward to the right of General Ledlie's division as soon as it is apparent that he will not interfere with the movements of General Wilcox's division, and will, as near as possible, protect the right flank of General Ledlie from any attack on that quarter, and establish a line on the crest of a ravine which seems to run from the Cemetery hill nearly at right angles to the enemy's main line, directly in our front.

V. General Ferrero will move his division immediately after General Wilcox's until he reaches our present advance line, where he will remain until the ground in his front is entirely cleared by the other three divisions, when he will move forward over the same ground

that General Ledlie moved over, will pass through our line, and, if possible, move down and occupy the village to the right.

VI. The formations and movements of all these divisions, together with their places of rendezvous, will be as near as possible in accordance with the understanding during the personal interviews with the division commanders.

The headquarters of the corps during the movement will be at the fourteen-gun battery, in rear of the Taylor house. If further instructions are desired by the division commanders, they will please ask for them at once.

By order of Major General Burnside.

W. H. HARRIS, *Captain Ordnance, U. S. A.*

Official:

J. L. VAN BUREN, *Major and A. D. C.*

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No. 61.

ORDERS.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
July 9, 1864.

1. The operations of this army against the entrenched position of the enemy defending Petersburg will be by regular approaches on the front opposed to General Burnside's and General Warren's corps.

2. The siege works will be constructed under the direction of the acting chief engineer of the army, Major J. C. Duane, corps of engineers, upon plans prepared by him and approved by the commanding general. Those plans that relate to the employment of the artillery will be prepared jointly by the acting chief engineer and the chief of artillery of the army, Brigadier General H. J. Hunt, United States volunteers. Duplicates of the plan of siege will be furnished the commanders of the 9th and 5th corps.

3. The engineer officers and troops of the army will receive their orders from the chief engineer, who will regulate the hours at which they will go on duty.

4. The siege artillery will be served under the direction of the chief of artillery of the army, who will prescribe the hours at which artillery officers and troops go on duty.

5. A general of the trenches will be detailed, daily for each of the two fronts designated where the siege operations are carried on by the commanders of the 9th and 5th corps respectively.

Guards of the trenches will in like manner be detailed daily from those corps. The strength of the guard will be determined by the commander of the corps furnishing it.

The general of the trenches is responsible for the security of the siege operations and the police and discipline of the trenches, and will dispose the guard so as to protect the working parties and repel sorties. For armed purposes, as well as for police and discipline, he commands all in the trenches.

He will report for instructions at the headquarters of his corps on the day previous to going on duty, and will confer with the officers of engineers and artillery in charge of the trenches and batteries, and visit the localities of the siege works, so as to make himself familiar with the ground, and determine upon the best disposition of the guard.

He will go on duty at 8 a. m., and, upon being relieved, will turn over to his successor all orders and instructions and information that he is possessed of pertaining to the duties specified.

The commander of the guard of the trenches will report to him for instructions at 8 a. m. The guard of the trenches will go on duty at dark. Previous to the commencement of his tour of service, the commander will report for instructions to the general of the trenches.

The commander of the guard will report hourly to the general of the trenches what is transpiring in front, and immediately everything of importance.

The general of the trenches will make similar reports to the corps commander, who will transmit anything important to the commander of the army.

Upon being relieved, the general of the trenches will make a written report to his corps commander of the operations carried on during his tour, which will be forwarded to the commanding general of the army.

6. For the work of the trenches, details from the two corps named will be made upon the requisitions of the chiefs of engineers and artillery. These requisitions will specify the character and locality of the work to be performed.

An officer of high rank will be detailed daily to take charge of the working parties of each corps. He will be responsible for the faithful and energetic performance of duty by the working parties, and will see that they conform to the directions of the engineer and artillery officers in charge of the works.

In the event of an attack, he will command the working parties under the orders of the general of the trenches, and as soon after the commencement of his tour of duty as practicable he will report to that officer the manner in which the working parties are distributed.

He will report for instructions at the headquarters of his corps on the day before he goes on duty, and will confer with the engineer and artillery officers in charge of the trenches, and receive information from them as to the manner of performing the work, and visit the localities before dark, so as to make himself familiar with the same. He will go on duty at 8 a. m.

Upon being relieved, he will turn over to his successor all orders, instructions, and information pertaining to the duty that he may be possessed of.

Working parties will go on duty just before daylight. They will be equipped for action.

Upon being relieved, he will make a written report to his corps commander of the work executed by the working parties under his charge, which will be forwarded to the major general commanding the army.

7. Materials for the siege will be prepared by working parties detailed from the corps not in the trenches, upon requisitions of the acting chief engineer and chief of artillery.

8. The corps will relieve each other in the duties of the trenches should it be found necessary.

9. The acting chief engineer and chief of artillery will report every twelve hours to the commanding general the progress made in the operations.

The morning report will include a statement of the work proposed to be executed in the next twenty-four (24) hours following the tour of working duty then going on. These reports will be accompanied by drawings exhibiting the same.

Duplicates of these reports will be furnished to the commanders of the corps on whose front the operations are conducted.

By command of Major General Meade:

S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

Official:

EDWARD M. NEILL, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

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No. 62.

“HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS,  
“ July 3, 1864.

“I have delayed answering your despatch until I could get the opinion of my division commanders, and have another reconnoissance of the lines made by one of my staff. If my opinion is required as to whether now is the best time to make an assault, it being understood that if not made the siege is to continue, I should unhesitatingly say, wait until the mine is finished.

“If the question is between making the assault now and a change of plan looking to operations in other quarters, I should unhesitatingly say, assault now. If the assault be delayed until the completion of the mine, I think we should have a more than even chance of success. If the assault be made now, I think we have a fair chance of success, provided my corps can make the attack, and it is left to me to say when and how the other two corps shall come in to my support.

“I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
“A. E. BURNSIDE,

“Major General, Commanding 9th Army Corps.

“Major General MEADE,

“Commanding Army of the Potomac.

“Official:

“S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*”

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No. 63.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
“ July 3, 1864.

“GENERAL: Your note by Major Leydig has been received. As you are of the opinion there is a reasonable degree of probability of success from an assault on your front, I shall so report to the lieutenant general commanding, and await his instructions.

“The recent operations in your front, as you are aware, though sanctioned by me, did not originate in any orders from these headquarters. Should it, however, be determined to employ the army under my command in offensive operations on your front, I shall exercise the prerogative of my position to control and direct the same, receiving gladly at all times

such suggestions as you may think proper to make. I consider these remarks necessary in consequence of certain conditions which you have thought proper to attach to your opinion, acceding to which in advance would not, in my judgment, be consistent with my position as commanding general of this army. I have accordingly directed Major Duane, chief engineer, and Brigadier General Hunt, chief of artillery, to make an examination of your lines and to confer with you as to the operations to be carried on, the running of the mine now in progress, and the posting of artillery. It is desirable as many guns as possible bearing on the point to be assaulted should be placed in position.

I agree with you in opinion that the assault should be deferred till the mine is completed, provided that can be done in a reasonably short period—say a week. Roads should be opened to the rear to facilitate the movements of the other corps sent to take part in the action, and all the preliminary arrangements possible should be made. Upon the reports of my engineer and artillery officers the necessary orders will be given.

Respectfully, yours,

GEO. G. MEADE,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General BURNSIDE,  
*Commanding 9th Army Corps.*

Official:

S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 64.

[Confidential.]

HEADQUARTERS 9TH ARMY CORPS, *July 4, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of last evening, and am very sorry that I should have been so unfortunate in expressing myself in my letter. It was written in haste, just after receiving the necessary data upon which to strengthen an opinion already pretty well formed. I assure you, in all candor, that I never dreamed of implying any lack of confidence in your ability to do all that is necessary in any grand movement which may be undertaken by your army. Were you to personally direct an attack from my front I would feel the utmost confidence: and were I called upon to support an attack from the front of the 2d or 6th corps, directed by yourself, or by either of the commanders of those corps, I would do it with confidence and cheerfulness.

It is hardly necessary for me to say that I have had the utmost faith in your ability to handle troops ever since my acquaintance with you in the army of the Potomac, and certainly accord to you a much higher position in the art of war than I possess; and I at the same time entertain the greatest respect for the skill of the two gentlemen commanding the 2d and 6th army corps; so that my duty to the country, to you, and to myself, forbids that I should for a moment assume to embarrass you, or them, by an assumption of position or authority. I simply desired to ask the privilege of calling upon them for support at such times, and at such points, as I thought advisable. I would gladly accord to either of them the same support, and would be glad to have either of them lead the attack; but it would have been obviously improper for me to have suggested that any other corps than my own should make the attack in my front. What I asked, in reference to calling upon the other corps for support, is only what I have been called upon to do, and have cheerfully done myself, in regard to other corps commanders.

If a copy of my letter has been forwarded to the general-in-chief, which I take for granted has been done, that he may possess my full opinion, it may make the same impression upon him as upon yourself, and I beg that you will correct it; in fact, I beg that such impression may be, as far as possible, removed wherever it has made a lodgement. My desire is to support you, and in doing that I am serving the country.

With ordinary good fortune we can pretty safely promise to finish the mine in a week; I hope in less time.

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
A. E. BURNSIDE,

*Major General, Commanding 9th Army Corps.*

Major General MEADE,  
*Commanding Army of the Potomac.*

Official copy:

S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant General.*



HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*July 24, 1864.*

MAJOR: Please give me, with as little delay as practicable, your views on the expediency of an assault on the enemy's works after a successful springing of General Burnside's mine, and particularly your views as to the subsequent operations after carrying the enemy's first line, and following up a lodgement on the crater of the mine.

Respectfully yours,

GEORGE G. MEADE,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major J. C. DUANE,  
*Acting Chief Engineer, Army of Potomac.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Office of Chief Engineer, July 24, 1864.*

GENERAL: In reply to your communication of this date, I have the honor to state that the line of the enemy's works in front of General Burnside is not situated on the crest of the ridge separating us from Petersburg—that the enemy have undoubtedly occupied this ridge as a second line. Should General Burnside succeed in exploding his mine, he would probably be able to take the enemy's first line, which is about one hundred yards in advance of his approach. Beyond this I do not think he could advance until the works in front of the 5th corps are carried, as the 9th corps columns would be taken in flank by a *heavy artillery fire* from works in front of the centre of the 5th corps, and in front by fire from the works on the crest near the Cemetery hill.

I do not believe that the works in front of the 5th corps can be carried until our lines can be extended to the left so as to envelop the enemy's line.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. C. DUANE, *Major of Engineers.*

Major General MEADE,  
*Commanding Army of Potomac.*



## ERRATUM.

Report, "Army of the Potomac—General Hooker," page L, line 8 from top, "Independent" should read "Alliance."

## INDEX OF VOL. I.

	Page.
General Report.....	iii
Journal.....	vii
<b>ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.—GENERAL HOOKER.</b>	
Report.....	xlii
Testimony of Birney, Major General David B.....	33
Butterfield, Major General Daniel.....	73
Devens, Brigadier General Charles.....	178
Doubleday, Major General Abner.....	15
Gibbon, Brigadier General John.....	86
Hancock, Major General W. S.....	65
Hooker, Major General Joseph.....	111
Howe, Brigadier General A. P.....	18
Humphreys, Major General A. A.....	61
Hunt, Brigadier General Henry J.....	89
Johns, Colonel Thomas D.....	38
Papers from War Department.....	183
Pleasonton, Major General Alfred.....	26
Sedgwick, Major General John.....	95
Sickles, Major General Daniel E.....	3
Wadsworth, Brigadier General James S.....	71
Warren, Major General G. K.....	43
<b>ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.—GENERAL MEADE.</b>	
Report.....	lv
Testimony of Birney, Major General David B.....	366
Butterfield, Major General Daniel.....	417
Crawford, Brigadier General S. W.....	468
Doubleday, Major General Abner.....	305
Gibbon, General John.....	439
Grant, Lieutenant General U. S.....	524
Hancock, Major General W. S.....	403
Howe, General A. P.....	312
Humphreys, Major General Andrew A.....	388
Hunt, General Henry J.....	447
Meade, Major General George G.....	329, 425, 523
Patrick, Brigadier General M. R.....	474
Pleasonton, Major General Alfred.....	359
Sedgwick, Major General John.....	459
Sickles, Major General Daniel E.....	295
Wadsworth, Brigadier General James S.....	412
Warren, Major General G. K.....	376
Williams, Brigadier General Seth.....	464
Weitzel, Major General Godfrey.....	521
Appendix.....	475

## BATTLE OF PETERSBURG.

	Page.
Report.....	i
Testimony of Burnside, Major General A. E.....	13
Duane, Brevet Colonel James C.....	99
Ferrero, Brevet Major General Edward.....	105
Grant, Lieutenant General U. S.....	109
Hunt, Major General H. J.....	97
Loring, Lieutenant Colonel Charles G.....	91
Meade, Major General George G.....	30
Ord, Major General E. O. C.....	101
Potter, Brevet Major General Robert B.....	84
Pleasants, Lieutenant Colonel Henry.....	112
Turner, Brigadier General J. W.....	118
Van Buren, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel J. L.....	95
Warren, Major General G. K.....	80
Wilcox, Brevet Major General O. B.....	77
Appendix.....	122



