

was that it did not fix fair strengths for the Powers concerned. And there are the following facts tending to support the soundness of that opinion. On November 17, 1921, at a meeting between the Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt (Assistant Secretary of Navy) and Vice-Admiral Kanji Kato, Japan's Chief Technical Expert, Roosevelt said, "In determining the relative strengths set forth in the American proposal, the question of national defense needs was not taken into consideration as the basis of calculation". Then, at a meeting of the representatives of U.S.A., Great Britain and Japan held two days later, Navy Minister Tomosaburo Kato said, "The 70% thesis is one which Japan has insisted upon for years. I have expounded it before the Diet; and it is, moreover, the desire of the Japanese people as a whole". To which Mr. Hughes replied, "There is no prospect of reaching any agreement unless existing strengths are taken as the basis of discussion". And Lord Balfour added, "If we listen to the experts, the tendency will be toward an increase of strengths, so their opinions should be excluded. And if we were to determine naval strengths upon the basis of national defense needs, the conclusion will probably be reached that Britain must have ten times the strength of Japan". And there was strong protest against the Hughes proposal from the French delegate on the strength allotted by it to his country fell far short of her defensive needs.

What Japan could not understand at that time from the experts'

viewpoint was why there should be parity in naval strength as between U.S.A. and Great Britain, since there was considerable difference between their existing strengths and tremendous difference in the degree of their naval needs. Actually, when the draft treaty was under discussion in the Privy Council preparatory to its ratification, a member posed the following question to Navy Minister Tomosaburo Kato, "America, having such a strong war potentiation, is in a position to increase her naval strength whenever necessity should arise, and hence has no need of being equipped with a strong navy in time of peace. On the contrary, a country so poor in resources and industrially backward like Japan, unless prepared from peacetime, would have no means of coping with a situation calling for a strong navy. When fixing peacetime armaments, such as by a disarmament treaty, therefore, would it not be fair to reverse the ratio as between America and Japan so as to permit Japan to have the stronger peacetime force?"

Moreover, the delegates from the Foreign Office submitted their opinion that the Treaty would not be appropriate as it stood, since, in the ultimate, it was nothing more than the maintenance of the status quo. (Annex document No. 1).

As stated above, there were points in the Washington Treaty which Japan found hard to comprehend, others with which she was not satisfied. It was acceded to, nevertheless, because it was considered desirable from a broad view of the situation to conclude

the treaty and to bring about better relations with the United States. And in order to faithfully implement the treaty, minute care was taken to speedily enact the necessary laws. Shortly ~~after the~~ conclusion of the treaty, however, such measures as America's exclusion act against Japanese immigrants and Britain's creation of a strong naval base at Singapore served to irritate and discourage the Japanese people. The Japanese Government which had all along stressed the need of world harmony was thus placed in a painful predicament; and I recall the difficulties the authorities had at the time to explain the situation suitably to the people.

Moreover, the view was advanced at the Washington Conference that while the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been concluded with a view to preventing aggression by Germany and Russia, danger of such aggression was no longer existent; and that since the existence of the Alliance would serve rather to create misunderstanding, it would be better to abolish it. (Annex Document No.2) ~~So it was done at the time of the conclusion of the 4-Power~~ Pact. But it was with reluctance that the Japanese Government agreed to that abolition, which left with the Japanese people a feeling of isolation.

III. Limitation on auxiliary vessels did not materialize at the Washington Conference because of objection, principally by France, to the tonnages allocated. In 1927 the American Government sent invitations to the Signatories to the Washington Naval

Armaments Limitation Treaty for a 5-Power Conference to be convened in Geneva. Great Britain and Japan accepted. But France expressed unwillingness to participate on the ground that since the proposal set forth in the invitation disregarded the principles advocated by the French delegate at Geneva and approved by the Commission of Experts, viz. (1) impossibility of tackling limitation of naval armaments without taking into consideration methods for the solution of the question of limitation of land and air armaments and (2) impossibility of achieving limitation of naval armaments otherwise than by the method of allocating to the various Powers global tonnages which each Power would be left free to assign to the various categories in accordance with its own needs, adoption of the above proposal would be inconsistent with the attitude hitherto maintained by France. Refusing even to send an official observer, France sent only an "informer". Italy, too, refused to participate, but sent an informal observer.

This Conference met in the buildings of the League of Nations in Geneva from 20 June, 1927 to 4 August. And the proposals of the various Powers may be summarized as follows:

(a) American proposal.

Maximum tonnages to be fixed in respect of each category of auxiliary vessels; and the allocation to the various Powers to be in accordance with the capital-ship ratio of the Washington Treaty.

In cruisers: for U.S.A. and Great Britain, from 250,000 to 300,000 tons; for Japan, from 150,000 to 18,000 tons.

In destroyers: for U.S.A. and Great Britain, from 200,000 to 250,000 tons; for Japan, from 120,000 to 150,000 tons.

In submarines: for U.S.A. and Great Britain, from 60,000 and 90,000 tons; for Japan, from 33,000 to 50,000 tons.

(b) British proposal.

From the standpoint of curtailing national expenditures, to reduce the displacement and armaments of capital-ships and aircraft carriers, to extend the age of capital-ships and to slow down new construction for replacement purpose.

In the case of auxiliary vessels, the 5:5:3 ratio fixed for capital-ships to be applied to cruisers of 10,000 ton displacement and carrying 8-inch guns.

Future cruisers to be limited to maximum displacement of 7,500 tons and maximum gun calibre of 6 inches.

The number of vessels in each category to be allowed the various Powers to be determined by the needs arising from their respective national conditions.

(c) Japanese proposal.

No nation may, in the future, adopt any program of new construction nor acquire anew any naval vessels for the purpose of augmenting its naval strength.

The naval strength to be allotted to each Power shall

be agreed upon separately for surface craft and submarines on the basis of the tonnage of completed ships actually possessed by each Power and the designed tonnage of ships now in course of construction by that Power, and by taking into consideration the designed ~~tonnage of ships~~ not yet laid down but which are embodied in authorized building programs and the tonnage of ships which will pass the replacement age during the execution of such programs.

Of these three, the Japanese proposal was patterned after the Hughes proposal submitted to the Washington Conference.

While discussions were carried out on all these proposals, Britain, at the 3rd meeting of the Commission of Experts, indicated as the figures dictated by her defensive needs: 15 cruisers of 10,000 tons or carrying 8-inch guns, 55 small craft or 6-inch gun cruisers and 5 mine-layers and aircraft carriers, thus making a total of 75; it being further explained that Britain attached importance to the number of ships, and that if the ships could be reduced in size, it would be possible for her to reduce the total tonnage. In reply the American representative pointed out that since the British demand amounted to 600,000 tons or twice that indicated in the American proposal, it was not in fact a reduction in armament, - and was it not true that Britain had agreed to 450,000 tons in auxiliary surface craft at the Washington Conference? The Conference was thus confronted with two opposing principles, - the principle of large number of small ships advocated

by Britain and that of small number of large ships advocated by America. With regard to the characteristics of 8-inch gun ~~cruisers~~, Britain contended that "since 8-inch guns were offensive arms, an agreement which did not limit such arms would be without meaning". This was opposed by America on the ground that "if 8-inch gun vessels are not allowed other than 10,000 ton cruisers, it would be a serious question for America". (At the 6th conversations of delegates).

By way of showing that the British demand was not unreasonable, Mr. Bridgeman, the Chief British Delegate, at the 3rd Open Plenary Session held on 4 August, 1927, quoted a speech made on 4 January, 1926 by Chairman French of the House Naval Committee to the following effect: "If Britain's sea communications are cut, her people will begin to feel difficulties within a few weeks. But America may be cut off from the rest of the world for a few weeks or even years without her people feeling any difficulties or being deprived of any essential commodities".

With such a gap appearing between the American and British contentions, the debates became very heated, and there appeared little hope of finding any points of conciliation.

Japan was therefore placed in a position of having to accept the role of mediator. At the 2nd Plenary Session held on 14 July, Mr. Gibson, the American delegate, said in the course of his address: "We are in such close agreement with the Japanese delegation with respect to total tonnage limitation and types of the

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cruiser class that we could easily find a basis of agreement with them. If some basis can be found which is mutually acceptable to the British and Japanese delegations, I feel sure that it will be possible for the American delegation to make the agreement complete". Negotiations were therefore commenced between the British and Japanese delegates, and a draft agreement was formulated. But the American delegation, strongly demanding freedom to mount 8-inch guns, refused to approve the draft.

As a last effort to achieve agreement, the Japanese delegation then submitted a compromise plan to the effect that "Great Britain and Japan, aside from proceeding with the present programs, agree not to build any new auxiliary surface craft until 1931; and the United States undertakes not to increase their auxiliary surface craft strength above that of Great Britain". But the American delegation rejected it on the ground that they could not proceed with the discussions on the basis of such a plan. Hope of achieving agreement was therefore lost.

The Conference was thus brought to a close upon completion of the 3rd Plenary Session on 4 August. At this last meeting the various delegates voiced their respective attitudes, and finished up by issuing a joint declaration, - appearances being preserved by announcing that the Geneva 3-Power Naval Disarmament Conference was adjourning since die. (Annex Document No.3)

IV. The London Naval Conference commenced on 11 February, 1930 upon the invitation of the British Government. This Conference had

as its principal object limitation on auxiliary vessels which had ended in failure at the Geneva Conference of 1927, France and Italy also participated, but because of their failure to come to agreement with the other participants on the tonnages to be allowed them, the provisions of the 1930 London Naval Treaty relating to the strength to be allowed in auxiliary craft which resulted from this Conference did not become binding upon them.

Japan's demand at this Conference with reference to naval strength was, for the possession of such strength as would enable her to defend her autonomy and independence and to protect the sea lanes essential to her national existence. The concrete proposal submitted was as follows:

(a) During the life of the Washington Arms Limitation Treaty, the existing strength as of the end of 1931 to be taken as the standard for auxiliary vessels, with total tonnage of 70% of the American tonnage.

(b) Japan is willing to cooperate with the other Powers and to reduce the above tonnage provided the essential purpose of armament is not thereby contravened and the required ratio is not lost; but submarines shall be considered separately.

(c) Heavy cruisers with 8-inch guns, - 70% of American strength.

Submarines - existing strength as of the end of 1931
(78,497 tons).

In order to allow for the demands (a) and (b), some sacrifice in light cruisers and destroyers may be unavoidable.

The above proposal was consonant with the ideas of security of national defense, reduction of the people's burden and promotion of friendly relations with other Powers, which were the basic concepts of the Japanese Government relative to armaments. And in the instructions given to the Japanese delegates, attention was called to the fact that the actual strength of armaments did not depend solely on regular weapons, but that such potential forces as raw materials, mercantile fleets and industrial power constituted important factors; and that since Japan was weak in such potential forces as compared with the other Powers, special attention should be given to that fact when making an agreement on naval arms limitation.

The demands of the other Powers relative to their respective armaments might be summarised as follows:

(a) U.S.A.
Parity with Britain, and a certain number of 8-inch gun vessels.

(b) Great Britain.
A specified number of auxiliary vessels.

(c) France.

Fix a maximum level applicable to all the navies of the world; then permit each Power autonomously to determine, below

that level, the amount which it considers necessary.

(d) Italy.

Willing to carry out any reduction so long as she does not lose parity with the strongest European naval Powers.

Thus it was impossible to reach agreement on the figures to be allotted to France and Italy; but U.S.A., Great Britain and Japan were able to come to agreement. Prior thereto, however, the Japanese delegate wired home for the Government's permission to accept as the agreement a provisional draft agreement which had resulted from conversations between Mr. Reed, the American delegate, and Mr. Matsudaira.

According to this provisional draft agreement Japan would have obtained approximately 70% globally vis-a-vis America, the figures to be allotted to Japan were 108,400 tons less in heavy cruisers (ca. 10%) and 25,142 tons less in submarines than those demanded by the Japanese delegates in pursuance of the instructions received from the Government, To be sure there was an increase of 41,452 tons in light cruisers and destroyers, but those were categories for which Japan had no great desire. In the categories to which we attached the greatest importance, viz heavy cruisers and submarines, we felt a considerable shortage.

America's allotment, on the contrary, showed an increase of 50,000 tons in heavy cruisers, thus entitling America to undertake

new construction. Japan would then not only have to sit by and watch America increase her strength in heavy cruisers, but since she could not undertake any new construction in heavy cruisers and submarines for a considerable period, difficulty would have been felt in maintaining ship-building technique.

The expert opinion of Japan's Navy Department on this draft agreement was that unless modified it would render Japan's national defense insecure. And when the Government's instructions, based on this expert opinion, reached London, the Japanese delegate proposed the following amendments add conditions to the American and British delegates. U.S.A. not to complete construction of more than 30,000 tons in heavy cruisers by the end of 1936; Japan to be allowed to complete construction of 12,000 tons in submarines by the end of 1936, so as to permit maintenance of ship-building technique; to have the treaty expire at the end of 1936, thus giving it short life; Japan not to be restricted as to her attitude at future conferences. Upon compromise being reached on the above points, the provisional draft agreement was accepted by Japan.

It was some time before the Japanese Government sent out the instructions asked for. That the grave importance of the matter involved was partly responsible for this delay goes without saying. But another reason was the inadequate contact between the delegation and the Government, - a defect which kept the Government from being adequately informed as to the progress of the Conference. Actually, when the delegation wired home for new instructions, the

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Government did not even have material upon which to base its judgment. So the Government had to order such material to be sent in a hurry before it could even formulate the instructions asked for. That situation can be understood from the telegram sent by the Vice Minister of Navy to Vice-Admiral Sakonji, the Chief Technical Expert of the delegation, on 27 March, 1930 (Annex Document No. 4).

It was the opinion of the naval authorities responsible for operations that with the naval strengths allotted under the agreement it would be difficult to assure the safety of national defense under the policy of national defense hitherto followed. It was therefore decided to have the authorities concerned with naval administration and those responsible for operations jointly work out measures to cope with the situation. The force of existing ships was to be improved and maintained by suitable steps for strengthening organs for the sound organization, study and research of air arms, improvement of defensive installations, construction of special surface craft, maintenance of ship construction technique and building capacity and prevention of unemployment. These facts can be understood by reading the statement made by the Navy Vice-Minister at the Cabinet Meeting at which the draft of the instructions was considered (Annex Document No. 5).

Thus it was that the instructions were sent out after it was ascertained that the naval authorities responsible for operations

had no objections. But the refusal of the Powers concerned to allow Japan's minimum defense requirement of 70% vis-a-vis U.S.A. which had been her contention ever since the Washington Conference, and which had been recognized in part by Great Britain at certain times, made Japan feel that she was being harshly treated, especially as it was clear as a matter of common sense that her demand could not possibly endanger America's security, involving as it did an increase of one A-class cruiser, more or less in case America was to have 18 and Japan 10 in that class. This was considered particularly regrettable because of the feeling that a little more magnanimity on the part of the other Powers would have had the effect of pacifying public opinion in Japan, of promoting between international relations and of furthering the work of arms reduction in general.

In connection with the conclusion of the 1930 London Treaty, there supreme command, which greatly aroused public opinion in the country. This resulted from the machinations of narrow-minded constitutional scholars and of elements who had grievances against the Government to the Diet. For so far as the conclusion of the London Treaty was concerned, the Cabinet and the Navy Department were at that time in complete accord; and there was no objection raised by the Chief of the Naval General Staff, who is supreme in command of naval operations.

In addition to the matters set forth above, it was decided in connection with the London treaty that U.S.A., Great Britain and Japan should postpone replacement construction of capital-ships until 1936; to this Japan had no objection.

With regard to the auxiliary craft tonnages for France and Italy as already stated, no decision was made. But the so-called compromise plan of 1927 pertaining to a formula for arms limitation submitted by the French delegate drew the attention of the Powers concerned (Annex Document No. 6). This plan called for the setting of a common limit of naval strength which no Power might exceed, but within which limit each Power might build according to its own needs. As is clear from the explanation offered by the American delegate, Mr. Hugh Gibson, at the 3rd Plenary Session of the Conference on 30 January, 1930 (Annex Document No. 7), this compromise plan known as the Paul-Boncour proposal had been considered since 1927 by the League of Nation's Preparatory Commission on Disarmament; and as a result of Anglo-French conversations held during 1928 agreement was reached on a plan which divided warships into four categories for the purposes of limitation, setting a maximum tonnage for auxiliary vessels common to all the Powers, within which maximum limit each Power was to indicate at the final Conference the tonnage which it considered necessary.

At the 1930 London Conference the American delegates agreed to accept this French compromise plan as the basis of discussions; and actually the transfer formula which constituted a part of that compromise plan was incorporated into Arts. 17 and 18 of the London treaty.

V. The General Disarmament Conference convened in Geneva in February 1932, although it produced no concrete results, suggested many things to the Japanese Government. Among the more important points suggested were the following:

(a) Nations having weak armed forces feel menaced by, and are suspicious of, the armed forces of strong Powers far more than the latter imagine.

(b) National security is a condition precedent to disarmament.

(c) Certain weapons constitute a menace not only to national defense but to the civilian population in general.

(d) In order to satisfy all of the above points, thus making it possible for all nations to carry out arms reduction without apprehension, it is of course essential to perfect a security organization; but it is first of all necessary for the more heavily armed Powers to make sacrifices by taking the initiative in arms reduction and thus showing an example to the rest of the world.

The material from which Japan received the suggestions above-

mentioned were numerous and varied; but the principal ones were the following:

(a) The contentions of Turkey, Haiti and Finland relative to arms parity, the demands of the majority of Powers for abolition of warships exceeding 10,000 tons.

(b) Resolution pertaining to the basis of disarmament adopted on 19 April, 1932 (Conf. D.C.G. 24-Annex Document No. 8).

(c) Resolution adopted on 22 April, 1932 relative to the principle of qualitative disarmament (Conf. DoC.G. 26 - Annex Document No. 9).

(d) Resolution adopted on 22 April, 1932 relative to the application of the principle of qualitative disarmament (Conf. D.C.G. 28(2) - Annex Document No. 10)

Under these resolutions, it was recognized by many Powers that the aircraft carrier was the most offensive in character, most effective for the destruction of a nation's defense and most menacing to civilian population in general; and that capital-ships exceeding a certain displacement and mounting guns exceeding a certain calibre likewise had those characteristics (Report to the General Commission presented by Naval Commission, Conf. D. 121, May 28th, 1932).

In view of the above circumstances, the Japanese Government submitted to the Conference a proposal (Conf. D. 150 - Annex Document No. 12), for which the French compromise plan submitted to

the 1930 London Conference and the part of the British proposal to the General Disarmament Conference which was concerned with air arms (Conf. D. 157 - Annex Document No. 11) were used as reference. The Japanese proposal was in substance as follows:

The agreement to be divided into general agreement and special agreement. Under the general agreement, there shall be qualitative limitation on naval vessels in general and quantitative limitation on the capital-ships, aircraft carriers and A-class cruisers of the five leading naval Powers, with the object of greatly reducing the offensive character of those ships; and in addition, a common upper limit shall be fixed for the B-class cruisers, destroyers and submarines of those five Powers, and under the special agreement, there shall be quantitative limitation principally on B-class cruisers, destroyers and submarines among nations which have the closest relations, due regard being had for the geographical position and special conditions of the nations concerned.

It was Japan's firm belief that only under such a plan would it be possible to conclude an agreement on disarmament which could satisfy all the nations of the world. In the main this plan was almost identical with the plan upon which Great Britain and France were able to compromise in 1928; and the plan of division into general agreement and special agreement merely followed the precedent set by the 1930 London conference in dividing the dis

discussions into the Ocean group and the European group.

At the 1935 London Naval Conference (1st meeting of the principal delegates held on 16 December, 1935) Admiral NAGANO said with reference to the forementioned British plan, "The state of my mind in making the Japanese proposal is very similar to that of the British delegate at the Geneva Conference who, at the meeting of the Bureau in November 1932, made a proposal for the reduction of air forces." (Annex Document No. 13 (1) and 13 (2)).

VI. Overtures for preliminary negotiations by way of preparation for the naval disarmament conference scheduled for 1935 were received from Sir John Simon, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs on 17 May, 1934. The Japanese Government accepted forthwith and designated Mr. Matsudaira, Ambassador to Great Britain, as delegate. Negotiations were started by the representatives of U.S.A., Great Britain and Japan on 18 June; but as the talks, instead of being confined to the question of procedure for the conference to be held the following year, began to get involved deeply in the substance of naval limitation, they were discontinued for a time on 12 July, with the understanding that they should be reopened on 23 October. On 7 September the Japanese Government designated Rear-Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (promoted to Vice-Admiral while in London) as an additional delegate to the Preliminary Negotiations. He left Tokyo via U.S.A. on 20 September and arrived in London

early in October.

On that occasion I accompanied Rear-Admiral Yamamoto as a member of Committee of Experts. On 3 October the American Government announced the designation of Mr. Norman Davis and Admiral William Standley as its delegates to the Preliminary Negotiations.

Upon the appointment of Rear-Admiral Yamamoto as delegate, instructions bearing on the substance of the disarmament question were issued (Annex Document No. 14) to him and Mr. Matsudaira as an addition to the instructions which had already been sent to the latter.

Prior to his departure from Tokyo, Rear-Admiral Yamamoto received explanations as to the purport of the instructions from the authorities concerned; and he himself asked questions on points in doubt. As a result the following points were generally clarified:

(a) That security of national defense, alleviation of the people's burden and promotion of peace and friendly relations between nations were not mutually inconsistent, and hence that their realization were to be desired; and that from the standpoint of promoting peace and friendly relations between nations it was necessary to carry on the negotiations in as genial a manner as possible.

(b) While the principle that "the possession of armaments to an extent necessary for safety of national defense is a right

to which all nations are equally entitled" is a self-evident truth. It was especially mentioned in the instructions because it had its basis in Art. 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which constituted the very foundation of arms limitation, and also in view of the resolution adopted by the General Disarmament Conference relative to the basis of disarmament and the numerous demands for equality of rights in arms made at the said Conference.

(c) The principle of non-aggression and non-menace had already been advanced by the Japanese Government at the 1930 London Naval Conference; but it was specially set forth in the instructions in view of the fact that the principle of qualitative limitation had been adopted by the Geneva General Disarmament Conference and that so many Powers had demanded abolition of offensive arms at that Conference.

(d) The formula for setting a common upper limit for the armaments of all Powers was identical in purport with the so-called compromise plan proposed by France at the 1930 London Naval Conference, and was moreover suggested by that part of the British draft treaty submitted to the Geneva General Disarmament Conference which pertained to the air force. It was extremely comprehensive in application and was calculated to give feeling of security to all nations. This formula, moreover, was an extension in scope of the one which Japan had already submitted to the Geneva General Disarmament Conference.

(e) This formula was to be applied first to the more heavily armed Powers, so as to set an example to the other Powers and thus to make it possible for them to carry out disarmament without apprehension.

(f) While the abolition of aircraft carriers and capital-ships would entail proportionate sacrifices on the part of the large naval Powers possessing these categories of ships, such as U.S.A., Great Britain and Japan, that was inevitable as sacrifice for the cause of world peace.

(g) Japan having opposed the abolition of capital-ships at the Geneva General disarmament Conference, it might be considered ~~unwise~~ ~~to~~ ~~advocate~~ ~~such~~ ~~abolition~~ ~~now~~. But it should be advocated if circumstances of the Conference permit.

(h) Depending on the figure at which the upper limit is fixed, it is possible that it may take a considerable period of years for Japan's naval force to reach that limit; but the possibility of that limit being set at such a level that it will be quickly reached by the Japanese Navy is not anticipated.

If pronounced offensive character can be removed from the naval armaments of the various Powers, need of apprehension over relative strengths will be reduced.

(i) While Japan's stand for leveling off of naval armaments might be misconstrued and criticized as being actuated by the intention to take a free hand in China by shutting off interference

by other Powers, such criticism could only come from wholly groundless suspicion. As an actual question, if Japan were to behave wilfully in China with its complexity of strong foreign interests, there is bound to be interference by U.S.A., Great Britain and many other Powers. In such case Japan, even if she had a naval force with which she could resist the naval force of either U.S.A. or Great Britain, obviously would not be strong enough to resist the combined strength of all of those Powers. That fact becomes all the more evident when one takes into consideration the superior mercantile fleets (which will become a strong potential fighting strength when capital-ships and aircraft carriers are abolished or reduced) and other potential war-strength of those Powers.

(j) Since the abolition of the Washington Treaty is a measure unavoidable for formulating an agreement on disarmament based on a new formula, the reason why such abolition is unavoidable should be made known to the Powers concerned as soon as possible. In so doing, care shall be taken not to irritate public opinion, and to adopt a method that will not create any obstacles to the formulation of a new disarmament agreement.

It was early in October that Rear-Admiral Yamamoto, the additional delegate, reached London. Prior thereto, upon receipt of the British Government's proposal for the Preliminary Negotiations on 17 May, Japan completed the various steps necessary and on 30 May informed Britain of its acceptance of the proposal and of the nomination of Ambassador Matsudaira as its delegate. Talks

with the British were commenced on 18 June, and with the Americans on 19 June. Meanwhile Mr. Norman Davis had been named America's delegate and departed for London on 9 June. Consequently the statement that "while Great Britain and U.S.A. commenced their talks around June or July, the Japanese delegate did not reach London till October" is at great variance with the facts.

The British Government was moving very cautiously at the time because were it to negotiate with only one of the Powers concerned, it might very easily create the biased impression (as so often happens at international conferences) that a combination was being formed to bring pressure to bear on the other Powers. Actually that attitude of caution was carried to the extent of scheduling the first Anglo-American meeting for the morning of 18 June and the first Anglo-Japanese meeting for the afternoon of the same day. During this stage of the negotiations, the following important meetings were held:

- June 18 - 1st Anglo-American talks in the morning; Premier
McDonald and Matsudaira talks in the afternoon.
- " 19 - Davis-Matsudaira meeting.
- " 20 - 2nd Anglo-American meeting.
- " 21 - Anglo-American meeting of experts.
- " 23 - 2nd Japanese-American meeting.
- July 9 - 3rd Japanese-American meeting.
- " 12 - Craigie-Matsudaira talks.

~~During the above period, the Japanese Government placed the Naval~~
Attache in London in charge of technical matters, and in addition
Captain Iwashita was named member of the staff of experts.

No particular difficulties arose during these negotiations as regards the Powers that should participate in the conference procer, the venue and date of opening nor the scope of the discussions. On questions of substance, however, considerable differences of opinion developed. There was a report of rumors to the effect that the 2nd Anglo-American talks of 20 June, followed by the meeting of experts of those two Powers on the following day, had brought to light the existence of such a wide gap between the views of the two Powers that the conversations had virtually reached a deadlock. And in connection with that situation, the London HERALD on 22 June, reported the following as Britain's proposal:

~~(1)~~ Britain to commence construction of a new capital-ship fleet simultaneously with the expiration of the London Treaty.

(2) Britain to build 30 new cruisers, and to demand a total strength of 70 cruisers.

(3) Britain to build many new destroyers.

(4) Britain to build a new aircraft carrier.

At the Craigie-Matsudaira conversations on 28 June, the former explained that 70 cruisers had always been Britain's minimum demand. And there was a report received from Washington to the effect that when Ambassador Saito called on Secretary of State Hull on 25 June, the latter complained that he found it difficult to understand

Britain's claim for 70 cruisers and of their use of newspapers to publicize that claim. And at the Davis-Matsudaira meeting on 9 July, the former expressed desire to go home for a while and to return later because the negotiations were making no progress owing to the difficulty of reconciling Britain's principle of large number of small ships with the American principle of small number of large ships.

France accepted the invitation to the Preliminary Negotiations on 15 June, and Italy on 21 June. Anglo-French talks took place from 9 to 11 July. But prior thereto, at Geneva on 5 June, Captain Deleuze, French Naval Representative to the League of Nations, had body, that the only interest France had was in Germany and Italy. And there was a report also of a meeting between Ambassador Sato and M. Massigli in Paris at which the latter said that while France would take part in the Preliminary Negotiations, it was difficult for her to participate in a conference of only the five Powers, since a conference in which all the naval Powers were not represented would be without meaning. Still later, at a meeting with Mr. Matsudaira on 22 October, the French Ambassador stated that the French Government attached greater importance to the question of armaments in general than to the naval question.

On 29 June the Japanese Government wired instructions to Mr. Matsudaira to the effect that there would be no objection to his discussing questions of substance also; but as a matter of fact, not much progress was made in that direction.

Japan was thus aware that tremendous difficulties lay in the path of the Preliminary Negotiations. It was for that reason that the phrase "in view of the extreme complexities likely to develop in the coming Preliminary Negotiations" was used in the second instructions given to its delegates, by the Japanese Government, by way of calling their attention to the difficulties anticipated.

Agreement was reached between U.S.A., Great Britain and Japan to suspend the Preliminary Negotiations for a time in July; and announcements of identical substance were made public simultaneously in the capitols of the three countries.

VII. The Preliminary Negotiations were re-opened on 23 October, and discussions principally on questions of substance were carried on by the delegates of U.S.A., Great Britain and Japan.

Although considerable differences of opinion developed between the three Powers in the course of the Preliminary Negotiations, most cordial atmosphere prevailed throughout all the discussions. It was some months after the conference that Vice-Admiral Yamamoto received a letter from Admiral Standley saying that he might be coming to the Olympic Games in Tokyo as a member of the American committee, and that he was looking forward to the pleasure of meeting him again. And when Sir Robert Craigie arrived in Japan as new British Ambassador, he called on Vice-Admiral Yamamoto, then Navy Vice-Minister, even before completing his official call to the Foreign Office, and this friendly relationship was steady.

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maintained thereafter. There were times when Vice-Admiral Yamamoto was criticized by some circles in Japan as being of the pro-Anglo-American school.

A. The second phase of the Anglo-Japanese negotiations was opened informally before Rear-Admiral Yamamoto and the American delegates reached London. It started on 8 October when the Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, summoned Mr. Matsudaira and engaged in conversations, in which the latter offered an explanation of the general outline of Japan's contentions. The official negotiations, however, did not begin until 23 October, after the arrival of the American delegates in London.

Pertaining to the disarmament formula proposed by Japan.

At the first Anglo-Japanese meeting of 23 October, i.e. the first following resumption of the negotiations delegates Matsudaira and Yamamoto explained Japan's fundamental demand on the basis of their instructions. At subsequent meetings, the following exchanges of opinion took place relative thereto:

(a) Britain's questions and opinions.

(1) The various Powers differ in vulnerability according as their national conditions differ. And since their naval needs will in turn differ, will it not be illogical to set a common upper limit?

(2) Under the Japanese proposal a country with high

vulnerability like Britain and another with low vulnerability will be limited to the same level in naval strength; in such case can the insecurity of a country with high vulnerability be removed?

(3) Naval strength is relative as well as absolute. If a common upper limit be fixed, there will be flexibility in the case of a nation whose need is below that limit; but a nation whose need may exceed that limit will nonetheless be subject to that restriction.

(4) Who is to determine the figures to be allotted to a Power which does not need to build to the maximum limit?

(5) Britain can readily understand the question of national prestige.

(6) Upon what basis are weapons to be differentiated as to their offensive or defensive character?

Abolition of aircraft carriers will be difficult because of their need in case of air attacks from land in the Mediterranean and North Seas; capital-ships are necessary for the defense of the homeland; on the question of A-class cruisers, there is little difference from the Japanese view; submarines can be made defensive by greatly reducing their size.

(b) Japan's replies and opinions.

(1) Since security of a nation's defense is affected also by such factors as natural resources, industrial power, etc., it is hardly proper to determine the quantity of arms solely on the basis of vulnerability. Since it is Japan's policy to deprive

armaments as a whole of their offensive character by abolishing or reducing the more offensive weapons, the vulnerability of the various Powers should be extinguished or greatly reduced as a matter of course. What Japan has in mind is to take the minimum strength of countries with high vulnerability as the maximum limit, and to have countries with low vulnerability stay below that limit. Although there is no treaty outside of the five great naval Powers, there has never been an instance of any single Power through building an excessively large navy, having given rise to naval competition.

(2) While some difference in conditions between Great Britain and Japan is to be recognized, is it not true that there is parity between Britain and U.S.A. notwithstanding great discrepancy in vulnerability? There does not appear to be any difference between U.S.A. and Japan as considered from the standpoint of Britain's relations with them.

As between U.S.A. and Japan, Japan's defense is far more vulnerable; hence Japan could not possibly constitute a menace to U.S.A. even if the two were to have the same naval ratio.

(3) If, by radically limiting offensive weapons, the offensive character of naval armaments is reduced to an extreme degree, there will then be less need of attaching importance to the relative character of naval armaments; and the establishment of a common upper limit should give no cause for uneasiness.

(4) The strength to be possessed by Powers which do

not build up the maximum limit shall be determined by each of them on the basis of their respective minimum requirements.

(5) While Japan wishes to feel secure, it does attach importance to the question of her people's prestige; hence she desires to consider all issues free from the hypothesis of the Washington Treaty ratio.

(6) Believing aircraft carriers, capital-ships and A-class cruisers to be offensive in that order, and B-class cruisers, destroyers and submarines to be defensive, Japan advocates the abolition or radical reduction of the former group; and if retained they should be limited by category; and the latter group, i.e. B class cruisers and lesser types, should be limited globally; and the common upper limit should be fixed for their aggregate.

Japan desires abolition of aircraft carriers. Abolition of capital-ships may not be possible at once, since they are not confined to the five leading naval Powers; but they should be reduced as much as possible; and the same as regards A-class cruisers.

(It was the belief of the Japanese delegation that the idea of dividing weapons into offensive and defensive categories had been generally recognized, because at the 1927 3-Power Naval Conference the British delegation had strongly advocated the abolition of 8-inch gun cruisers as offensive weapons, as well as contending on numerous occasions that while large submarines were

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I M T F E

United State of America et al

- VS -

ARAKI, Sadao et al

SWORN DEPOSITIO

Deponent : ENOMOTO, Shigeji

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

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offensive weapons, small submarines were defensive weapons).

(Pertaining to quantity of arms).

Japan's contention was predicated upon the removal of offensive character from the naval armaments of the various Powers and was aimed principally to free the lesser naval Powers from any feeling of insecurity. The figures demanded for herself was therefore very low, - being far lower than those demanded by Britain, which tended to be higher than those allowed under existing treaties. Britain's demand gave the impression, moreover, that it was strongly tinged with the idea of an absolutely required quantity in armaments.

At the meeting with Admiral Chatfield on 28 December, 1934, Admiral Yamamoto indicated a plan which entailed a striking reduction for Japan, proportionately with U.S.A. and Great Britain, A-class cruisers and above, but no reduction, either for U.S.A. or Great Britain, in B-class cruisers and lesser categories. The plan called for the following:

Aircraft carriers - to be abolished if possible; but if retention be insisted on, 3 to be allowed.

Capital-ships - 6 or 8, if abolition impossible.

A-class cruisers - 8, but even greater reduction desired.

B-class cruisers and lesser types - 350,000 tons.

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B-class cruisers and lesser types - 350,000 tons.

At the Chatfield-Yamamoto meeting of 13 December, the former brought a table which contained the following figures:

Capital-ships (25,000 or 30,000 tons) - 15

Aircraft carriers - 5

A-class cruisers - 15

B-class cruisers - 234,800 tons.

N.B. - In addition to the above, the table called for 150,000 tons of destroyers, 50,000 tons of submarines, 50 over-age cruisers and a few over-age destroyers.

Annex Document No.14-2

In the memorandum pertaining to Britain's minimum defensive requirements sent by the British Government to the Japanese delegation on 16 January, 1935, the following figures were indicated:

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| | |
|---------------------------------|------|
| Capital-ships (25,000 tons) | - 15 |
| Aircraft carriers (22,000 tons) | - 5 |
| A-class cruisers | - 15 |
| | - 50 |

Under-age 6-inch gun cruisers to be built at the rate of 3 per year until a total of 70 shall have been reached; the total of under-age A-class and B-class cruisers at the end of 1942 to be 47; deficiency to be made up by retention of over-age ships.

Destroyer.

In the even of submarine tonnages of the other Powers being increased above the present figures, it will be necessary to retain additional over-age destroyers.

Submarines.

If abolition impossible, to be limited below existing figures.

The so-called minimim requirements indicated above by Great Britain was virtually the same as the one she submitted at the 1927 Geneva Naval Conference, to the 3rd meeting of the Committee of Experts held on 23 June, as her defensive requirement, and which was soundly criticized by the American delegates as being twice that indicated in the American proposal. And in cruisers, it called for 70, or an increase of 20 over the existing strength. In capital ships and aircraft carriers there was no reduction. And in the tot

of all the categories demanded, there was, if anything, an increase over the figures provided under the Washington and London Treaties.

The basis of the British demand, in effect, was an effort to recognize an absolute quantity in naval armaments, and hence could not be consonant with the idea of disarmament generally held by the other Powers. That fact was made clear by the American delegation at the 1927 3-Power Geneva Naval Conference (Annex Document No. 15). And since that American criticism was generally recognized as being well-founded, Japan was truly perplexed by this British demand.

B. Second phase of the Japanese-American negotiations commenced on 24 October.

(Pertaining to the disarmament formula proposed by Japan).

The first meeting with the American delegation took place on 24 October, i.e. one day after the first Anglo-Japanese meeting. Delegates Matsudaira and Yamamoto explained Japan's basic principle, the same as they had done to the British delegation. Among the opinions that were exchanged on that subject at that meeting and those following which differed somewhat from the opinions that were expressed in the meetings with the British were the following:

(a) America's questions and opinions.

(1) What is meant by right of equality?

(2) Looking at submarines from the standpoint of

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destruction of commerce, can they be considered a defensive weapon?

(3) Why do the relative strengths determined in 1922 constitute a threat to Japan?

(4) Is Japan's proposal of a common upper limit intended to recognize the same strengths for France and Italy also?

(5) What are the details of qualitative limitation?

(6) Increase of naval strength does not increase a nation's prestige. Relative to the China question, it will be by cooperating with U.S.A. and Britain that Japan can increase her prestige.

(7) Equality of naval strength does not necessarily give equality of security.

(b) Japan's replies and opinions.

(1) The demand for equality means that the Powers will enter into agreement on a basis of equality, and not that they will actually build up to the maximum limit; it is rather the intention that the Powers shall build up their navies in accordance with the respective national strength. Discriminating ratios are bad from the standpoint of national prestige.

(2) Criticism of the submarine solely on the ground of its being destructive to commerce is not warranted, for the

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same can be said of other categories of ships. The London Treaty, moreover, contains provisions rigidly restricting the use of submarines.

(3) Japan had thought that the 1922 Washington Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments gave her tactical equality in her own neighboring waters. But the subsequent increase in the mobility of warships has reduced distances on oceans, with resulting advantage to the attacker.

(4) If France and Italy demand equal rights under the formula of the common upper limit, there is no reason for refusing them; but the relations between the two could be settled by an agreement between themselves.

(5) The question of qualitative limitation is inseparable from Japan's fundamental policy. The basis of that policy is to make wars impossible. If the fundamental policy cannot be determined, there would be no sense in discussing details.

(6) While we feel the same as regards cooperation of the three Powers on the China question, it is essential that that cooperation be on the basis of equality of position.

It cannot be said that the idea of ration might not have undersirable emotional effect upon Japanese-American relations.

(7) While the argument has been advanced that equality of naval strength does not give equality of security, it can at least be said that the existing treaties have not taken the

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question of security very deeply into consideration. If America's 5 does not constitute a threat to Japan's 3, there is no reason for saying that Japan's 5 will constitute a threat to America's 5.

With regard to shipbuilding, whatever might be said of Britain, at least America enjoys a big advantage in natural resources and building capacity.

(Pertaining to quantity of arms).

The American delegation stated that it was their intention to carry out a 20% reduction within the scope of the Washington and London Treaties, but indicated no concrete plan as to how it should be done.

At the meeting between Admiral Standley and Vice-Admiral Yamamoto on 14 December, the former produced with reference to the British building program an American building program which contained the following figures:

Capital-ships:

| | | |
|------------------------------|-------------|---------|
| Prior to 1937 - | 0) | |
| 1937, 1938 & 1939 - annually | 1) | total 5 |
| 1940 - | 0) | |
| 1941, 1942 - | annually 1) | |

Aircraft carriers:

Prior to 1937 - 1 being built

| | | |
|---|-----|----------|
| 1937 and after - | 0) | total |
| A-class cruisers: | | |
| Prior to 1937 - | 18) | total 18 |
| 1937 and after - | 0) | |
| B-class cruisers: | | |
| Prior to 1937 - (OMAHA class for replace- ment) - | 2) | total 10 |
| 1937 and after - | 8) | |
| Destroyers: | | |
| Flotilla leaders, 4 annually |) | total 28 |
| Destroyers - 12 annually |) | total 84 |
| Submarines: | | |
| 6 annually |) | total 42 |

C. Anglo-American talks took place on 13 and 14 October. On the 15th Mr. Craigie summoned Embassy Councillor Kato and told him of the following matters concerning the Anglo-American talks:

(1) Britain stood for large numbers of small ships, U.S.A. for large ships and large guns. In case the British demand in small ships is recognized, America demanded that compensation be made by allowing large numbers in other categories also.

(2) If the differences between Britain and Japan can be ironed out, the views of U.S.A. and Britain can probably

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be brought together.

(3) Great Britain contended that qualitative limitation was important for preventing competitive building.

There was, moreover, no report of any marked progress in the negotiations with France and Italy.

D. Although the American delegation stated time and again that they had a plan for 20% reduction in the tonnages of the various Powers on the basis of the existing treaty rations, no concrete plan was ever presented. In the connection, Admiral Standley told Vice-Admiral Yamamoto (on 3 December) that the United States could not consent to an increase in any category, not even to increase in Britain's destroyers. From which fact it would appear that this American plan which envisaged an uniform 20% reduction in each category. But such a method would not only increase the difficulties of the weaker naval Powers from the standpoint of relative strength, but in practice would entail far greater sacrifices by such Powers as Britain and Japan which already possessed full treaty strength than by speel out which was considerably below her treaty strength in all but capital-ships. No fair results could be expected from such a plan. A proposal of similar purport was made by the American delegate, Mr. Gibson, at the 5th Planary Session of the General Disarmament Conference on 9 February, 1932; and on that occasion

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Captain Deleuze, the French Expert, told Captain Koh, the Japanese Expert, that France could not possibly accept such a proposal (25 February, 1932).

At the Anglo-Japanese Meeting on 7 November, the British delegate produced a tentative plan. Under this plan "All the Powers are to declare their naval strengths voluntarily and unilaterally, and when all these declarations were collected, a table would be made of the naval strength of the principal Powers. This table would give some idea of the substance of the quantities which the Powers concerned desired to possess; and through discussion of that substance, effort would be made to maintain the proportion of naval strengths for a few years to come".

To that British plan, the Japanese delegation posed the following questions: "After the declarations of strengths have been made, are the final figures to be determined through consultation of the various Powers?" and "Is the intention to determine future strengths on the basis of existing rations?" The British delegation replied, in effect, that consultation would be necessary; that while there would be equality as to prestige, they would not recognize equality of strength; and that when it is desired to change a program, further consultations would be held.

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The purport of this plan for declaring building programs was to maintain the relative strengths fixed by existing treaties. Achievement of a thorough going disarmament was no part of its aim. It therefore appeared to the Japanese delegation as a temporizing scheme which could not possibly be reconciled with Japan's fundamental proposal. Believing however, that the demands of the various Powers could not be harmonized by sticking to its own plan alone, the Japanese delegation studied the above plan with the British and, at the Anglo-Japanese meeting on 27 November, proposed an amendment to the following effect: "Under the British plan, the various Powers can change their building programs whenever necessity arises. But such a scheme is likely rather to lead to a race in naval construction. A common upper limit should therefore be set to the British plan, so that this limit will be reached gradually, and not at once". Then on 30 November Vice-Admiral Yamamoto engaged in free talking with Admiral Chatfield; and on 10 December the Japanese delegation made a report to the Government on the negotiations on the British plan and at the same time asked for its views thereon. The Japanese delegation, moreover, made preparations for subsequent negotiations by drawing up the following tentative plan for inserting the common upper limit formula into the British plan in the event of that plan being adopted as a basis of

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discussion:

First plan:

(1) Common upper limit for the various categories to be:
capital ships - 300,000 tons;
A-class cruisers - 100,000 tons; B-class cruisers and lesser
types - 400,000 tons.

(2) Yardstick: capital-ships - 3 ; A-class cruisers - 2;
B-class cruisers and lesser types - 1.

(3) Adjusted tonnages resulting from multiplying the
figures of (1) by the yardstick:

Capital-ships - 900,000 tons.

A-class cruisers - 200,000 tons.

B-class cruisers and lesser types
- 400,000 tons.

Total - 1,500,000 tons.

(4) No Power to be allowed arms exceeding an actual strength corresponding to 1,200,000 tons of the above adjusted tonnage.

Second plan:

(1) Common upper limit for the various categories to be:
capital-ships - 300,000 tons; A-class cruisers - 100,000 tons;
aircraft carriers - 60,000 tons; B-class cruisers and lesser categories - 400,000 tons.

(2) Yardstick:

Capital-ships - 3; aircraft carriers - 5;
A-class cruisers - 2; B-class cruisers and lesser types - 1.

(3) Adjusted tonnages resulting from multiplying the figures of (1) by the yardstick:

Capital-ships - 900,000 tons.

Aircraft Carriers - 300,000 tons.

A-class cruisers - 200,000 tons.

B-class cruisers and lesser types - 400,000 tons

Total - 1,800,000 tons.

(4) No Power to be allowed arms exceeding an actual strength corresponding to 1,500,000 of the above adjusted tonnages.

The above two tentative plans were based on the Paul Boncour plan already mentioned and the London Treaty, and had incorporated in them some of the desires of both Great Britain and U.S.A. As the tonnage allowances were low, it was anticipated in view of the conditions obtaining at the time that ready acceptance by Great Britain and U.S.A. might be difficult. But the Japanese delegation was of the belief that continuing negotiations with the other two Powers on the basis of their plan, a point of understanding might be reached.

But the American delegation brought forward no definite proposal other than their plan for 20% reduction. And as they expressed a desire to return to America before Christmas

(originally wanted to leave London on 17 December, later changed to 20th), there was no opportunity for adequate discussion; and much to the regret of the Japanese delegation, no chance for formal presentation of its tentative plans presented itself.

E. The Preliminary Negotiations went into recess on 19 December. The Japanese delegation, wishing to see it re-opened not later than the following March, voiced the desire that the recess should be for a specified period. To which the British Foreign Minister replied that there would be no objection to that if the Americans were willing (at the Anglo-Japanese meeting on 18 December). If the negotiations could be resumed as the Japanese delegation desired, it was intended that Vice-Admiral Yamamoto and most of the members of the delegation who had been despatched from Tokyo should remain in London.

The American delegation however not only did not wish to commit themselves on the date, but expressed the view that no useful purpose could be served by re-opening the conversations without a definite basis. And the British, fearing that further insistence on that point might mean final adjournment than and there, expressed reluctance to press the matter on the American. The Japanese delegate therefore approached the Americans directly (on 19 December), but without

success. It thus became impossible to come to any definite agreement ~~on the date of resumption of the negotiations;~~ so it was merely agreed that an opportune time for resumption should be found at as early a date as possible.

Although it became impossible thereafter to negotiate with the British and Americans officially, the Japanese delegation believing that it would be to the mutual advantage of the Powers concerned to have the way smoothed for the negotiations when it should be resumed and to find out how the besetting difficulties might be solved, continued conversations with the British even after the official recess (28 and 29 December, and 18 January). On 28 December, at a meeting attended by Admiral Chatfield and Mr. Craigie, Vice-Admiral Yamamoto was asked whether he, upon return to Japan, would be able to obtain his Government's approval to taking the building program formula as the basis of discussion. His reply was that he did not think ~~that was impossible~~ if the question of the common upper limit could be solved, and that in any case he would cooperate by doing his utmost to dissolve the difficulties in the way.

Upon return to Japan, Vice-Admiral Yamamoto submitted a report to the effect that while he regretted the inability of the Powers concerned to reach understanding, he did believe that

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the negotiations had enabled them to know each other's demands;
but that even greater effort would be needed in the future in
other to prevail upon the British and U.S.A. to recognize Japan's
demands (Annex, Document No. 15)

VIII. Regarding abolition of the Washington Treaty.

Since Japan's demand at the Preliminary Negotiations was based on the principle of equal footing for all the Powers concerned, which differed fundamentally from the system of discriminatory strengths provided for by the Washington Treaty, Japan had reached the conclusion that the amendment of the kind she considered necessary could not be effected under the relevant provision of the Washington Treaty (Art. 21), and that in order to secure a treaty founded on a new basis the only sure way was to abrogate that Treaty in pursuance of Art. 23 para. 1 and to ask for another conference to be convened within one year in accordance with the second paragraph of the said Article. And it was so indicated in the instructions.

With regard to the method of abrogation, it was stated in the instructions that it should be done so as to cause as little commotion as possible, and that the utmost care should be paid to preclude any adverse effect upon subsequent negotiations. If possible, the steps for abrogation should be taken jointly by the Powers concerned, to be followed by a concerted effort by them all to consummate a new agreement.

Acting in accordance with the purport of those instructions, the Japanese delegate to the Preliminary Negotiations, on 24 October, explained to the American delegation the reasons for the necessity of Japan abrogating the Washington Treaty; and

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similarly to the British representatives on 26 October. At the Japanese-American talks on the 27th, desire was expressed that the abrogation should be effected jointly; and on the 31st it was explained to the American delegation that Japan desired, by abrogating the Washington Treaty, to conclude a better agreement on an even better basis. But the American delegation did not favor abrogation of that Treaty; and the British did not concur with the idea of joint notice of abrogation. Then at the Anglo-Japanese meeting on 6 December, British expressed the desire that the notice of brogation should not be given too soon, by saying that since there would be no difference in the effect of the notification if given within the year, it should be delayed as much as possible, so as to make it easier for them to detain the American delegation and to convince them that the Japanese are sincerely desirous of discovering some method of solution.

Earlier, on 22 November, Mr. Matsudaira informed the French Ambassador in London of Japan's intention regarding abrogation of the Washington Treaty, but without getting any clear-cut answer.

Thus it was Japan delayed the notice of abrogation as long as possible, and caused Ambassador Saito to notify Secretary of State Hull on 29 December. Consequently it should be clear that Japan did not give notice of abrogation after waiting to

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see the result of the Preliminary Negotiations; it came after the recess merely because Japan acted in accordance with the desires of the Powers concerned.

That the Washington Treaty was a measure relating to disarmament which was taken with unprecedented resolution and which contributed greatly toward world peace, was fully realized by the Japanese Government. But it is a fact that not all of the Powers concerned were altogether satisfied with its substance. France, for instance, strongly objected to the application of the capital-sheep ratio to auxiliary vessels, with the result that an agreement on the tonnages to be allowed in auxiliary vessels failed to materialize. And, in the conferences of 1927 and 1930 also, France refused to participate or to concur on the limitation on tonnages. Then with reference to her attitude toward the 1930 London Conference, France on 20 December, 1929 issued a memorandum which contained the following passage:

"The question of methods is no less important. In accordance with the example set by the Washington Conference, the Government of the United States and the British Government would appear to have contemplated the adoption of a method of assessing naval armaments dealing merely with armaments of the five numerically most powerful navies and based on mathematical ratios.

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The experience, however, of the naval conference in Rome tends to remind us that the principles of the Washington Treaty met with a setback when the League attempted, in 1924, to extend them to every navy; and it has frequently been demonstrated in Geneva that mere ratios do not permit of a rational application, appropriate for every State, of the principles laid down in Article 8 of the Covenant, which provides for a general reduction of armaments to a minimum compatible with the security of each State and with the international obligations imposed upon it according to its geographical position and its particular conditions."

Similar complaints were heard also from other Powers. It was therefore Japan's firm belief that in order to consummate a treaty that would satisfy all the Powers concerned it was absolutely essential to adopt a method of limitation different from that employed in the Washington and London Treaties. And, as already stated, Japan was not satisfied with the substance of the armaments allotted under the Washington Treaty even at the time of its conclusion. To retain that Treaty without modifications even after its expiration in 1936, in disregard of the various developments in technique and weapons and changes in nature

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conditions and international relations, it appeared to Japan, would be to deprive the Treaty's substance of the attributes of fairness and justice, and hence improper.

The London Treaty was to expire automatically at the end of 1936. But the Washington Treaty contained a provision (Art. 23 para. 1) for the extension of its period of validity, as well as provisions envisaging its amendment (Arts. 21 and 22). Japan therefore made a study to ascertain whether it might not be possible to so amend it as to render it compatible with new conditions and satisfactory to the non-Signatory Powers as well. The outcome of that study was that such a fundamental amendment was impossible under the relevant provisions of the Washington Treaty, and that the surest way to conclude an agreement founded on a new basis was to convene a conference to be attended by all the Signatories of the Washington Treaty in pursuance of Art. 23 para. 2 of the said Treaty within one year after the notification of abrogation had become valid. The report on the study made on this matter is set forth in Annex Document No. 17.

Japan thus abrogated the Washington Treaty for no other purpose than to open the way for the conclusion of new treaty that would be consonant with new developments and conditions and satisfactory to the various Powers, and to

made it certain that a conference for drawing up such a new treaty would be called. And the reason the abrogation was effected before the end of 1934 was to make the conference which would have to be called in consequence of that abrogation coincide in time with the 1935 Conference envisaged by Art. 23 para. 2 of the London Naval Treaty. The notification was given after the adjournment of the Preliminary Negotiations, not from any desire to see first how those negotiations were turning out, but because delay was desired by the British and American delegations.

Abrogation of the Washington Treaty was of course a serious matter. But considering that the British had expressed dissatisfaction at the Washington Conference; that the French, too, were not satisfied; and that Britain's Foreign Minister Simon had stated at the Geneva General Disarmament Conference on 8 February, 1932 that: "Apart from this, it is well known that certain of the Naval Powers have already given serious consideration to the question of reduction of naval armaments and have achieved positive and valuable results in the shape of the Washington and London Naval Treaties. It is the opinion of His Majesty's Government that these treaties represent a substantial contribution to the cause which we all have at heart and our view is that they should be retained intact until they

expire in December 1936", the Japanese Government did not feel that there would anything unreasonable about giving notice of abrogation by the end of 1934 or that it would greatly excite the Powers concerned. Desire for steps to abrogate the treaty jointly with the other co-Signatories was mentioned in the instructions to the Delegation because of the feeling that it would be unfortunate if the abrogation by Japan alone were to unduly excite public opinion in the countries concerned and give rise to misunderstanding.

IX. The 1935 London Conference was opened on 9 December. This Conference, as was set forth in Mr. Craigie's letter of 24 October relative to the invitation summoning the Disarmament Conference, was opened under the auspices of the British Government in accordance with the express provisions of Art. 23 of the Washington and corresponding Article of the London Treaty, for the purpose of concluding a treaty to take the place of the two expiring at the end of 1936 and thereby to form as comprehensive an agreement as possible relating to naval arms limitation.

A. The Japanese Government being thus definitely informed that the discussions of the coming conference were to cover the whole field of naval limitation, accepted the invitation of the British Government and despatched

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initiative in working for promotion of peace.

(b) The attitude of the Japanese Government toward the question of naval limitation is to have thorough-going arms limitation carried out in accordance with the aims above mentioned.

(c) Although the proposal for declaration of building programs submitted by Great Britain at the Preliminary Negotiations was intended for a short period, in substance it will have the effect of retaining discriminatory ratios so long as a common upper limit on tonnages to be allowed is not set. Since it will thus not be productive of the effects of disarmament, the Japanese Government is not able to accept it.

(d) Qualitative limitation unaccompanied by quantitative limitative limitation will not only fail to produce the real effect of disarmament, but will result in the continuance of the existing relative strengths. The Japanese Government is therefore unable to support such a method.

In the light of the attitudes and contentions of the various Powers at the Preliminary Negotiations, special attention of the Japanese delegates to the 1935 London Naval Conference was called to the following points:

(a) Although the British concept of an absolutely

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as delegates Admiral Nagano and Ambassador Matsuzo Nagai. The Japanese Navy also considered the idea of sending Vice-Admiral Yamamoto who had headed the Japanese delegation to the Preliminary Negotiations. But considering that the other Powers would be represented by high-ranking officers, Admiral Nagano was named delegate as a matter of courtesy to the other delegates, and also because he was well-qualified by reason of his experiences as a delegate to the 1932 Geneva General Disarmament conference. Ambassador Nagai had been one of Japan's delegates to the 1930 London Naval Conference.

The Japanese Government accepted the invitation of the British Government on 29 October. But prior thereto, on 18 October, informed the British Government of its desires (already made clear at the Preliminary Negotiations) regarding the 1935 Naval Limitation Conference and clarified its attitude toward the question of disarmament, to the following effect:

(a) The way to maintain and promote world peace is for all nations to give due consideration to each other's existence and necessary requirements, as well as to carry out a thorough disarmament which will bring about among the Powers a state of non-aggression and non-menace. To that end it is essential that the strong Powers take the

necessary strength in armaments was in some respects inconsistent with the achievement of arms limitation, it was necessary, in order to make consummation of an agreement on disarmament certain, to give the utmost consideration to Britain's demand in view of her special national circumstances.

(b) Although Japan's proposal was to fix a maximum limit for the naval armaments of the stronger naval Powers, as a practical question there would be no objection to doing that in such a way that it would take a considerable period for Japan's navy to reach that limit.

(c) Since the problems of the European Powers were extremely complicated, Japan should not become too deeply involved in them.

(d) Consummation of a disarmament agreement being most desirable as a measure for allaying the state of uneasiness then existing throughout the world, efforts to that end should be made to the very last.

(e) Since the lightening of the people's burden was an urgent need for Japan, the agreement to be made should be of such nature as will meet that need without fail.

By way of reference material, a study made with reference to expenditures for armaments was also handed to the delegation (Annex Document No. 18).

The Conference was opened on 9 December, and was attended by the representatives of France and Italy, in addition to the American, British and Japanese delegates. But this time, unlike in the case of the Preliminary Negotiations, formal meetings were the general rule; and as these meetings were attended by large numbers, opportunities for frank talks were few. As a result, explanations offered by the Japanese delegation might not have been adequate at times; but it is a fact that every effort was directed toward achieving an agreement.

The other Powers concerned, however, were mainly concerned with maintenance of the status quo, and showed little interest in carrying out a thorough-going arms limitation. They confined their efforts for the most part to criticisms of the Japanese proposal, and no new ideas to meet new conditions were brought forward with reference to quantitative limitation. The attendant circumstances were somewhat as follows:

At the informal Anglo-Japanese meeting of 7 December, 1935, Mr. Craigie said, "According to my experience in disarmament talks, there is no end of argument when the question of vulnerability is touched upon. That is the reason the British delegation does not hold much hope for the success of quantitative limitation in the present Conference"

At the first informal Japanese-American talks of 17 December, Admiral Standley said, "American probably will not be able to carry out a 20% reduction in cruisers at once, in view of the British attitude. In cruisers, however, America, having about 50 over-age units, is ready to reduce immediately". Then he asked, "Not only does Britain not desire arms reduction, but in cruisers she even suggests a desire to increase. In such case do you propose to keep up with the British?"

At this same meeting Mr. Davis said, "With British showing the attitude of not desiring to effect reduction, it cannot be said that the British attitude will not affect America, since there is a possibility of America being drawn into the European situation. In that respect we differ from you. Japanese-American parity is by no means a question confined solely to our two countries. America desires Japan's friendship. Japan and America are good customers to each other, and I firmly believe that no other two countries are in as good a position to understand each other. There is nothing that America wants to take away from Japan. But in view of the Italo-Ethiopian controversy and the situation in China, and with everybody in a state of uneasiness because of inability to foretell what will come next, this is not an opportune time for

concluding a basic agreement. We therefore desire to have status quo maintained until mutual suspicion shall have been dissolved".

At the first meeting of the 1st Committee held on 10 December, Vice-Admiral Robert, the French delegate, said that he felt on the basis of his past experience that quantitative limitation would be difficult. And at the informal Franco-Japanese talks on 7 December, Vice-Admiral Durant-Viel said: "France does not like the question of quantity; rather it hopes for an agreement on qualitative limitation alone. France has hitherto never obtained satisfaction on the question of quantity; and in the present Conference it will probably be difficult to solve the quantitative question even as between France and Italy alone. It will therefore be better to have no limitation as to quantity. While Britain seems desirous of proceeding under a long-period, e.g. 8 years, building limitation plan, such a plan in fact differs little from a treaty based on the principle of ratios and hence cannot be approved. What France desires is to preclude the possibility of surprise by requiring notification of short-period, e.g. 1 year, building programs, and at the same time to effect an agreement on qualitative limitation".

In the course of the Conference there were proposals

from the British, French and Italian delegations, but they were concerned principally with notification of building programs; and the advance notifications advocated were for extremely short periods and did not involve any scrapping. It was the opinion of the Japanese delegation that such proposals could not possibly attain the object of arms reduction.

The American delegation proposed a proportionate reduction of 20% from the treaty figures, failing which there should be 15%, 10% or even 5% cuts from the existing tonnages. And at the Japanese-American meeting of 17 December, as already stated, Admiral Standley stated that in view of the British attitude America could not put a 20% reduction into immediate execution. And with reference to capital-ships, he said, "America will have seven over-age capital-ships in 1937. The first three of these she proposed to replace with the 35,000 ton type, and after having tested their efficiency, to study the possibility of reducing the size of that category". The Japanese delegation was therefore lead to believe that perhaps the American delegation did not have any concrete plan in the strict sense of the term.

C. The Conference was thus a great disappointment to the Japanese delegation. For they had looked forward to

it with keen anticipation in the firm belief that the Japanese proposal was calculated to bring about an ideal state of affairs wherein the various Powers could develop their respective destinies with complete ease of mind, and that it was the best plan conceivable at the time for lightening the people's tax burdens by forestalling the huge expenditures involved in the large-scale building of big ships which were bound to come under the old treaties. And as that proposal had already been explained to the American and British representatives at the Preliminary Negotiations, it was felt that it would make a notable contribution to the work of disarmament if only all the Powers concerned, and especially U.S.A. and Great Britain, would study and consider it fairly and without bias.

It was the belief of the Japanese Delegation that while world insecurity might be traced to numerous causes, the principal cause was the tact of a few Powers with strong offensive armaments causing the lesser armed Powers to feel insecure. The removal of such a situation was felt to be a matter of urgent necessity. Nor did they think that their proposal was necessarily an idealistic one, nor one that would be difficult to put into practice, - the more so as other plans similar to it in formula had already been put forward by other Powers at earlier

conferences, as already stated, and a part of it had actually been incorporated into an agreement. And in the way of plans for sweeping disarmament, there was the so-called "Hoover Plan" calling for a one-third or one-fourth reduction in naval armaments which was submitted by the American delegation to the 1932 Geneva General Disarmament Conference in June 1932. And in November of the same year, a proposal for an even more sweeping reduction in air armaments was submitted by Sir John Simon of the British delegation. All of the above plans had been taken into consideration, more or less as a pattern, in formulating the Japanese proposal. And since the Japanese delegation were prepared, moreover, to delay enforcement for a considerable period in the event immediate enforcement should be found difficult, they did not feel that they were trying to force the impossible or anything radically unreasonable upon the other Powers.

Such was the general situation in the Conference. And although the Japanese delegates, believing that the other delegates could be convinced of their good faith and of the real significance of their proposal if they but tried hard enough, left nothing undone to explain the merits of the proposal. The results, however, were disappointing.

The general purport of the Japanese proposal was that

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the principal naval Powers (U.S.A., Great Britain and Japan) should make sacrifices by way of showing an example to the rest of the world. Consequently, when at the informal Anglo-Japanese talks held on 7 December Admiral Chatfield asked whether the common upper limit was to be set for all Powers, Admiral Nagano replied that it was meant for U.S.A., Great Britain and Japan. Admiral Chatfield then asked whether, in that case, it was intended to have only those three Powers discuss the proposal in this conference.

And Admiral Nagano's reply was that while Japan had no objection to participation by France and Italy also, what she wanted was the setting of a common upper limit for U.S.A., Great Britain and Japan.

At the 2nd meeting of the First Committee held on 11 December Admiral Nagano said, "We should therefore have no objection to the fixing of any suitable figure for the European navies within the common limit through consultation among the Powers concerned. Nor should we have any objection to the United States becoming a party to such conversations of the European Powers. Should there take place, however, in these conversations discussion of any important matter having a direct bearing upon our country's interests we desire to reserve the right to speak on such occasion". Then, at the 3rd meeting of the First Committee held the

following day, Vice-Admiral Robert (France said, "The basic issue apart, we cannot agree to the procedure proposed. It seems to be the intention of the Japanese proposal to obtain agreement first between U.S.A., Great Britain and Japan. But France is opposed to such a procedure which does not take into consideration the position of France with its grave responsibilities". He was followed by the Italian delegate who said, "The explanation that the common upper limit should apply only to U.S.A., Great Britain and Japan amounts to a new proposal entirely different from that explained at the first meeting. Italy is opposed to the procedure of concluding an agreement of the three Powers. The purpose of this Conference should be to discover a basis applicable not only to the five Powers, but to all naval Powers".

The above observations of the various delegates on the Japanese proposal had the effect of bringing out some extreme arguments. For instance, at the 4th meeting of the First Committee held on 13 December Viscount Morsell (Britain) said that if the application of the common upper limit was to be extended from the three Powers to the five Powers, might it not mean that it will in turn be extended to every country with a navy, then eventually even to the Dominions. And at the 10th meeting of the First Committee

held on 15 January, 1930, the Irish delegate stated that in the event of adoption of the Japanese plan Ireland would demand the same rights as other Powers, and that Ireland could not take any part in an agreement which did not treat her on the same basis with the other Powers.

Such arguments were perhaps without parallel in a disarmament conference which should above all have been realistic and practical, and greatly perplexed the Japanese delegation. Particularly was it astounded by the question whether the British Dominions, if they wished, might also be treated as units, each entitled to a common upper limit of its own. Ever since the Washington Conference it had been taken for granted by Japan that for the purposes of an agreement on disarmament the Dominions were included within the British Empire; and as a matter of fact the invitation to the London Naval Conference issued under date of 7 October, 1929 contained the statement that the idea of equality of strength is conceived by the British to include the naval strength of the whole of the British Empire. Since Japan had thus looked upon the fact of the British Empire being treated as a single unit as a self-evident truth, the Japanese delegation found difficulty in understanding the real meaning of the above questions.

E. The following are the questions and observations

made by the various delegates on the Japanese proposal, and the answers of the Japanese delegation thereto, which were not exact duplications of those made at the Preliminary Negotiations:

(a) Questions and opinions of the various delegations:

(1) The Washington Treaty gave equality of defense to the Powers concerned. Establishment of the common upper limit, and the consequent equalizing of armed strength, would upset equality of security.

(2) To set the common upper limit at a point lower than Japan's present strength would be an absolute impossibility. But if the limit be made high, the various Powers would build up to that limit and thus give rise to an arms expansion.

(3) If the common upper limit is applied only to the three Powers, the ratio principle would still be left in the relations with the other Powers. Moreover, it would be impossible to conclude a long-period agreement between the three Powers, as was done at the time of the conclusion of the London Treaty.

(4) In the case of a country like Great Britain which is a Pacific Power as well as an European Power, the impossibility of scattering its forces will make it necessary for it to possess two parity-strengths.

(5) Does not the extension of the common upper limit from three Powers to five Powers involve the possibility of further extension to every country with a navy, or even to the Dominions?

(b) Replies and opinions of the Japanese delegation:

(1) Since the direct and greatest cause of differences in what the British refer to as vulnerability lies in unreasonable differences in naval strengths, the first step toward the removal of those differences should be the establishment of a common upper limit.

The Washington Treaty merely used the figures obtained by a certain special method of computation on the basis of existing strength, which was a casual fact. It was concluded under the abnormal conditions prevailing immediately after the first World War, and the likelihood of having to amend it later was anticipated. By no means did it accord equality of security to the Powers concerned.

(2) By setting a common upper limit, and at the same time radically reducing or totally abolishing offensive weapons so as to render armaments substantially non-aggressive and non-menacing, no Power will menace another even if it builds within the common upper limit the arms necessary for its defense; nor will the various Powers feel mutually menaced even if the common upper limit is further lowered. Nor can there be any apprehension of arms expansion.

(3) Recognizing that an agreement among the three Powers whose positions from the standpoint of sea defense were similar was the first essential step toward disarmament, Japan merely wished to first determine a criterion applicable to those three. But if that method is not acceptable there would be no objection to having the five Powers join the discussion from the beginning, nor to have discussions first by the European Powers, to be followed later by discussions by U.S.A., Great Britain and Japan.

(4) Because of the high mobility of naval vessels, it is no difficult matter for a country to concentrate its warships at a single point whenever necessary. So if a country were to possess two forces on the ground of its having responsibilities in far scattered areas, its armaments are bound to become a menace to others. Depending upon the point of view, such a demand might even be construed as a demand for the right to possess armaments on a two-Power or even greater standard. Such a demand is untenable from the standpoint of any agreement on disarmament.

(5) The idea of treating the British Dominions as independent units probably was never anticipated by this Conference.

F. In addition to the Japanese proposal, the following proposals were submitted to this Conference:

(a) British proposal pertaining to unilateral declaration of new construction.

Under this plan each Power was to voluntarily declare by categories the figures of strength in naval armaments needed for its national defense, which figures it would undertake not to exceed either by new construction or new acquisition for a certain period.

(b) British proposal pertaining to prior notification and exchange of information.

Under this plan each of the signatory Powers was to give notification relative to construction of all ships exceeding 100 tons (102 metric tons) displacement, as follows: - within the first month of each fiscal year, the list of all ships for which the construction order should be issued within that year, their types and the maximum calibre of their guns; and within the first six months of each fiscal year, the names and essential specifications of all ships to be laid down during that year.

(c) Italian proposal relating to voluntary quantitative limitation on naval armaments.

Under this plan, each signatory Power, after having recognized the right of all the co-signatories to build, under conditions of absolute autonomy, the naval armaments dictated by their respective defensive needs, would each year notify all

the co-signatories the total tonnage and number of ships which it proposed to lay down or acquire during that year, broken down into the categories provided for in the existing treaties, with an undertaking not to exceed the figures so notified.

(d) French proposal relating to unilateral and voluntary declaration on shipbuilding.

Under this proposal all Powers capable of doing so were to declare, at a time of their own choice, the total tonnage of new construction in each category which would not be exceeded during a certain period; and each Power, irrespective of whether or not it makes the above declaration, was to incur the duty of announcing each year the list and principal specifications of all ships to be laid down during that fiscal year.

The attitude taken by the Japanese delegate toward the above proposals was as follows (statement by Admiral Nagano at the 9th meeting of the First Committee on 8 January, 1936):

The Japanese delegation attaches the greatest importance to the question of quantitative limitation and believes that the creation of a state of non-aggression and non-menace through quantitative limitation is a condition prerequisite to an agreement on disarmament. Being therefore opposed to proceeding to a discussion of other problems before a decision has been reached on the question of quantitative limitation, the Japanese delegat

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refrains from making any statement now on the exchange of information but reserves all observations thereon for another occasion. But as regards the parts of the French and Italian plans which are based on the idea of quantitative limitation, that is to say, the parts which are concerned with a declaration of building programs, observations thereon will be offered in due course.

The fact of the French plan having been prepared with care can be readily recognized. But it does not appear to be the most suitable method for readjusting the existing relations between navies; nor has sufficient consideration been given therein to the need for securing real reductions in armaments; and it is not likely to prove an effective check on naval competition. With such defects, the application of the French plan cannot bring about an agreement on quantitative limitation that will be really effective. The French plan, moreover, appears to be aimed at limiting the quantity of naval construction of the various Powers, and has not given sufficient consideration to the basic principle of equal security for all Powers.

The Italian plan, too, has been prepared with great care. With the purport of Article I recognizing clearly the sovereign right of each Power in matters pertaining to its naval armament

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in particular, the Japanese delegation associates itself wholeheartedly. But the plan cannot be accepted, for much the same reasons as those stated in connection with the French Plan.

With reference to the 2nd British plan (substituted for the 1st British plan), Admiral Nagano stated at the 9th meeting of the Committee on 8 January that he would reserve his observations thereon till a later time because it was concerned merely with exchange of information. But with reference to the 1st British plan dealing with declaration of building programs, observations were made at the 7th meeting of the Committee on 20 December, to the following effect;

(1) Although the Japanese delegation is wholly in accord with the principle set forth in the British plan that "naval strength should be based on the minimum limits required for national security of the respective Powers"; but in actual practice there is no other course but to go back to the principle of equality of armaments.

(2) Although the British plan is said not to be based on the ratio system, it is very similar to it. And since nothing is made clear regarding the scrapping of ships, it will be difficult to effect any modification of the relations now existing between the various navies, and hence will result in the maintenance of the present relations in general.

(3) The British plan has given no consideration to the carrying out of positive reduction. The aim of disarmament cannot be attained even if qualitative limitation should be carried out.

(4) The British plan may even lead to an increase in armaments if a Power submits a plan of excessive size.

(5) It has been explained that the Japanese thesis regarding security of national defense has been incorporated into the British plan. But such does not appear to be the case since what Japan is demanding is that differences between armaments be substantially removed.

In addition to the various proposals abovementioned, there was the American plan suggesting ⁻⁻ though not strongly insisting upon a 20% reduction. To this plan the Japanese delegate made the observation that while a proportionate reduction of 20% on the existing strength of the various Powers might be effective as a measure of disarmament, it could not be productive of fair results (informal Japanese-American meeting of 7 December and 9th meeting of the First Committee of 8 January).

Suffice it to say that while all the nations but Japan were not strongly determined to carry out disarmament at the time, ^{Japan} in striking contrast was bent on a thorough-going disarmament. This difference in attitude, as judged from all that transpired in the Conference, arose from the fact that Japan took the view that

since the principal cause of world insecurity was the wide differences between the armaments of the various Powers, the best approach to the problem was to tackle it boldly by removing those differences; while both U.S.A. and Great Britain took the view that since any great modifications in armaments at a time when there was insecurity in the world would only serve to aggravate insecurity, status quo should be maintained. And as for France, it appeared to the Japanese delegation that she was concerned both with Germany's re-armament and the question of relative strength with Italy, and hence was not desirous of touching the question of quantitative limitation.

G. In the following paragraphs is given an account of the various efforts made by the Japanese delegation during the Conference to obtain the understanding and collaboration of the other delegations on the Japanese proposal.

Beginning with the informal Anglo-Japanese meeting of 7 December, 1935, the Japanese delegation continued negotiations, both formal and informal, with the representatives of other Powers until 16 December; and thereafter also efforts were made to explain the purport and application of the Japanese proposal whenever opportunity presented itself. And with regard to Britain's vulnerability, which appeared to be a big obstacle to agreement, the Japanese delegation were prepared to give it the utmost consideration short of altering its own basic policy

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on disarmament; and to that end, when Admiral Chatfield stated at the 2nd informal Anglo-Japanese meeting of 13 December, 1935, that Britain's vulnerability being high, she required an absolute minimum in certain specified categories as well as relative strengths in other categories; so Britain's position would be rendered extremely difficult under the common upper limit. He then asked whether Admiral Nagano would recognize Britain's special minimum requirement, or would he oppose it. To which Admiral Nagano replied that since he knew, as a matter of common sense, that Britain's vulnerability was high, he recognized the need of making big adjustment for Britain; but the degree of adjustment must be studied. He further explained that since Japan well understood Britain's position, there would not be actual parity even under the common upper limit. And to Mr. Craigie's question as to whether Admiral Nagano realized that, depending upon how the common upper limit is fixed, certain countries might require armaments in excess of that limit, the latter replied that while it would be alright to take Britain's strength as the common upper limit, it was mutually desirable to avoid exciting the peoples of the various countries; consequently it was necessary to refrain from inserting in the treaty any provision that would amount to a waiver by the various Powers of their right to possess arms necessary for their respective national defenses.

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And at the 3rd informal Anglo-Japanese meeting, Admiral Nagano said that although the establishment of a common upper limit would give every Power the right to build up to that limit, the Japanese delegation, being deeply sympathetic regarding Britain's position, was willing to have Britain exceed that limit; but great care should be taken in working that out, so as not to excite the emotions of the peoples concerned.

The observation was made that this attitude on Japan's part was inconsistent with the purport of the Japanese proposal to establish a common upper limit, and that it might end up in the ratio system. But it was only because of its earnest desire to achieve agreement that the Japanese delegation took such an attitude. And by the method of adjustment referred to above, the Japanese delegation had in mind the idea of facilitating the possession by Britain of the large number of ships she desired by employing the method of transfer which was incorporated in the tentative plan prepared by Admiral Yamamoto at the Preliminary Negotiations, as well as the idea of allowing Britain to retain over-age vessels whose efficiency as combat units was considered inadequate (The question of retention of over-age vessels was recognized also in the Anglo-Japanese compromise plan at the 1927 3-Power Conference, and was also suggested by the British at the Preliminary Negotiations).

The above circumstances can be readily understood from the

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speech made by Admiral Nagano at the 10th meeting of the First Committee on 15 January, 1936. At any rate, it was the view of the Japanese delegation that however its attitude might appear as to form, there was no substantial inconsistency with Japan's basic thesis.

With regard to France and Italy, there being some delicate questions involved in the relations between those two countries, the Japanese delegation felt it best from the standpoint of achieving general agreement not to get too deeply involved in that matter but to leave it to be considered in friendly discussions by the European Powers. So the Japanese plan had been so drafted as to have as little repercussion as possible upon French-Italian relations; but as the Conference progressed it became impossible to follow the procedure originally anticipated, and the discussions became complicated.

H. The situation was further complicated by the fact all the Powers, with the exception of U.S.A., were not desirous of effecting arms reduction and placed emphasis on qualitative limitation rather than on quantitative limitation. And the only other question they seemed to be interested in discussing was that of exchange of information. And since the Japanese delegation was firmly of the belief that without quantitative limitation it would be impossible to achieve real disarmament, to protect the sense of security of the various Powers or to secure economy on naval expenditures, it requested, at the 9th

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meeting of the First Committee on 8 January, 1936, that the agenda thereafter should be so arranged to obtain decision first on quantitative limitation, to be followed by discussion of the questions of quantitative limitation and exchange of information.

On the following day, i.e. 9 January, an informal Anglo-Japanese meeting was held at the Foreign Office at 4 p.m. upon the suggestion of the British delegation. At this meeting Viscount Monsell said, "We have now the Japanese plan, the British plan and the French plan before the Committee. If we return to the discussion of these three plans, the time will come when it will be necessary to make decisions on them. Does the Japanese delegation desire that?" To which Admiral Nagano replied, "If it is clear that no other plans are to be submitted anew, please do so whenever it is convenient for you". Viscount Monsell then said, "there is no other plan; and since the Japanese plan was submitted first it will be necessary to take a decision on that first. But in the event the Japanese plan is rejected, will the Japanese delegation be able to remain in the Conference still? And should you withdraw from the Conference and the four Powers decide to continue the discussions in order to consider such questions as qualitative limitation and exchange of information, will Japan be able to leave an observer?"

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Such a situation had never been anticipated by the Japanese delegation. And it certainly had no desire to withdraw from the Conference, especially as it knew how the relations between U.S.A. and Great Britain had deteriorated after the 1927 3-Power Conference. Admiral Nagano therefore replied that "the matter was beyond the scope of his instructions". Immediately thereafter the Japanese delegation reported the situation in the Conference to the Government and asked for urgent instructions as to the attitude to be taken thereafter (Annex Document No. 19). The Government's instructions (Annex Document No. 20) were received on 12 January.

The purport of the new instructions was briefly as follows. -- You shall further explain at the Committee meetings and other gatherings the thesis which Japan has always maintained regarding the firm establishment of the principle of non-aggression and non-menace and a sweeping reduction in armaments to be achieved through the setting of a common upper limit, which is the fundamental policy of the Japanese Government, and reductions, both quantitative and qualitative, in offensive armaments. Nothing shall be left undone to show that what the Japanese Government earnestly desires is the conclusion of a fair and reasonable disarmament treaty and that it entertains a sincere concern for the work of disarmament. And if even the Japan's thesis does not receive the final approval of the other Powers, withdrawal from the Conference may be unavoidable. But

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even in such an eventuality, in order to avoid unfavorable effects upon international relations, effort should be made to save the situation by having the five Powers agree to matters on which they can come to agreement, then to have the Powers concerned make a joint declaration not to engage in an armament race before bringing the Conference to a close; all other questions to be turned over to a new Conference to be held thereafter by the four Powers. There will be no objection to having an observer present at the four-Power Conference.

On the following day, i.e. 13 January, therefore, the Japanese delegates had a meeting with the British delegation and voiced their desire to offer further detailed explanations on the Japanese plan at the next meeting of the First Committee with the object of obtaining the understanding of the various Powers, and to take steps to obtain agreement first on the question of restrictions on the use of submarines and other questions upon which there was prospect of agreement among the five Powers. But the suggestion to have the questions upon which there was prospect of agreement by the five Powers was rejected by the British. The next question taken up was that of the measures to be taken in the event of the Japanese plan not being approved by the other Powers. The Japanese delegates expressed the desire that in such an eventuality a vote

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should not be taken on the Japanese plan; and since it was obvious that agreement by the five Powers on the question of quantitative limitation would be difficult, it was desirable from the standpoint of preserving the tranquility of international relations to end this Conference at this point by going through the form of an indefinite postponement, after the pattern of the 1927 Geneva 3-Power Naval Conference. But as this, too, was rejected by the British, the Japanese delegation was forced to go to the next meeting of the First Committee without being able to do anything more.

On 15 January, at the 10th meeting of the First Committee, Admiral Nagano offered detailed explanations on the Japanese plan and answered points on which the other Powers had doubts, and asked that they consider the Japanese plan (Annex Document No. 21). But the answer of the American delegate to that was that under the Japanese proposal the Powers now having strong navies would have to reduce while those with weak navies would be allowed to build up; that Japan recognized differences in vulnerability, responsibility and need, and hence proposed to make adjustments to meet those differences but that that was a continuation of the ratio system; that equality of security and equality of armament were incompatible and contradictory; and that it was impossible to draw any distinction between offensive and defensive weapons. The French delegate expressed

the view that while he supported the principle of each Power determining of its own sovereignty the forces necessary for its defense as laid down in the Japanese proposal, since the conditions of security are not the same for all the Powers their armaments should also differ one from another. The British delegate expressed complete agreement with the first part of Japan's fundamental thesis: that "to possess the measure of armaments necessary for national security is a right to which all nations are equally entitled", but opposed the Japanese plan on such points as the necessity for equality of fleets in the area of contact and the fact of the primary cause of differences in vulnerability being inequality of armaments. On the latter point he did not believe that differences in vulnerability could be adjusted by the indefinite procedure suggested by the Japanese delegation. He was opposed, moreover, to applying the common upper limit to the five Powers, as well as to lowering that limit. The Italian delegate expressed himself as being in complete accord with the principle of the Japanese proposal, but was not prepared to re-examine the naval problem on the basis of any classification or hierarchy of naval Powers; and while the Japanese delegate has proposed to make adjustments on the basis of the common upper limit, there is apprehension that such a procedure would take us right back to the ratio system.

Thus the various delegates make observations on the Japanese proposal from their respective points of view, expressing concurrence on some points, opposition to others.

Finally, the Chairman spoke as follows, "The discussion of the Japanese proposal has now proceeded as far as it usefully can. All the delegations have considered it carefully, both inside and outside the Conference; but I have to note that it has received no support. Furthermore, this Japanese proposal deals in the main only with quantitative limitation, and quantitative limitation itself is only a limited part of the many problems before this Conference. I therefore think the best plan will be to adjourn the meeting and to proceed at the next meeting with the other important work before the Committee, beginning with the French, Italian and United Kingdom proposals for the advance notification of building programs".

Such opposition to its proposal was difficult for the Japanese delegation to understand because the points concerning vulnerability on which apprehension was felt by the American and British delegations would have been cleared away had they but made a careful study of the purport of the Japanese proposal and the explanations offered by the Japanese delegates; and the point on which the French delegation felt apprehension was based on the French plan known as the Paul Boncour plan.

As regards the question raised by the American and Italian

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delegates as to whether the Japanese proposal would not mean a return to the ratio system, it was felt by the Japanese delegation that if a minute study had been made of the method of adjustment which it had in mind it would have been readily discovered that it was nothing more than the method which had been frequently used in disarmament conferences for disposing of difficult questions.

The point raised by the American delegate regarding the difficulty of drawing a distinction between offensive and defensive weapons was also difficult for the Japanese delegation to comprehend, because at the 1927 3-Power Naval Conference the British delegate frequently declared 8-inch gun vessels to be offensive weapons; and at the 1932 General Disarmament Conference a concrete study was made of naval armaments that were offensive and those that were not, and many views were expressed declaring certain of them to be offensive.

Having come to this pass, however, the Japanese delegation felt that they had done everything that should have been done, and that there was nothing more that they could do. And as they were firmly of the opinion that an arms limitation agreement without quantitative limitation would not only fail to attain the aims of arms limitation, but would lead to an unfair result they felt that they could make no further contribution to the Conference even if they remained in it. Hence there remained no alternative but to withdraw from the Conference. On the

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evening of 15 January, therefore, notice was given to the Chairman of the First Committee to the effect that the Japanese delegation considered that no useful purpose would be served by its continuing to participate in the discussions of the Conference; and on the 20th the Conference was notified that while the Japanese delegation could not continue to participate in the discussions of the Conference, an observer would be left (Annex Document No. 22).

The Japanese delegation had attended the Conference with high hope of consummating a fair and just agreement on disarmament, and had even completed study of plans for a further extension of the agreement (Annex Document No. 23). But as so many features of the Conference turned out to be contrary to Japan's expectations, there was finally no choice but to withdraw. In his report the Japanese delegate expressed deep regret over the withdrawal from the Conference (Annex Document No. 24).

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*Do not separate
) complete copy*

On this 30th day of July, 1947
At Tokyo.

DEPONENT: ENOMOTO, Shigeji (seal)

I, ENOMOTO, Shigeji hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness (signed) OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

ENOMOTO, Shigeji (seal)

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14 November 1921

No. 1. Conference committee.

Chief, League of Nations Section

For Limitation of Armaments.

To Secretary-General (of Japanese Delegation).

Subject: Observations On The U.S. Secretary of State's
Proposal of November 12.

According to the statement made by the Secretary of State, the U.S. Government intends to submit another formal proposal on the limitation of naval strength. An accurate discussion on the U.S. Proposal may therefore not be possible until after the above proposal has been made. But since the general effect of the U.S. proposal can be perceived from the Secretary of State's statement, we submit the following observations.

First: Proposal to reconsider the matter of replenishment ten years later.

The Secretary of State's proposal seeks to bind the respective signatory powers permanently in naval strength for the U.S. British Empire and Japan.

However, such factors as fast changing international relations, differences between nations as regards ups and downs in their national destiny, the progress of science

leading to a boundless development of armaments, etc., render it difficult to recognize as reasonable the Secretary of State's proposal of fixing permanently the ratio of naval strength among the U.S., Great Britain and Japan at 5:5:3 and to indicate the standard of naval strength by tonnage.

Therefore, while we should willingly accept the Secretary of State's proposal, it should be in order for us to propose that ten years later, should a necessity arise to make alterations due to changes in circumstances, another conference should be held in Washington for free exchanges of opinion with a view to establishing a reasonable and practical agreement.

Moreover, the following matters are worth being considered as reference in respect of this question.

1. The Secretary of State's proposal seeks to establish the principle of maintaining status quo on armaments.

However, such severe opposition was voiced by the U.S. and other powers against the so-called "status-quo" principle in connection with Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant that the fate of the said article was, in effect, virtually the same as though it had been rescinded.

2. The fact that the United States, whose armaments did not even become an issue when the question of arms limitation was discussed at the first Hague Peace Conference held some twenty years ago, is today sponsoring a disarmament conference is one instance showing how greatly the international situation

may change.

3. Being confident that Japan is destined to develop greatly in the future, we do not consider it advisable to adhere to an agreement which would permanently restrain us on the problem of armament on which the basis of national strength should be sound. Furthermore, for us to openly agree to maintain the ratio of 5 to 3 against the U.S. and Britain would be a grave problem affecting Japan's prestige. We deem it necessary therefore to take every precaution so that the agreement may not become absolute and immutable.

Second. Proposal to have the agreement on armament limitation take the form of a treaty.

The execution of armament limitation, unlike in the case of its expansion, does not require the approval of the Diet under the municipal law of any country. It is not impossible to carry it out by the sole authority of the Government. Consequently it is not necessarily impossible to adopt the form of an exchange of diplomatic notes or of an agreement which does not require ratification, rather than the form of a formal treaty.

It must be pointed out, however, that the Japanese Government gladly accepted the invitation to the Conference and are now considering the proposal made by the Secretary of State with good will because first, arms limitation is the demand of world opinion and second, we were moved by the sincerity of the

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American Government in taking the initiative to carry out arms limitation. It, therefore, becomes important, before Japan's attitude on this question is determined, to know whether or not the public opinion in America will support the Secretary of State's proposal. From which it follows that Japan should insist upon the arms limitation being effected in the form of a treaty, and hence requiring ratification by the U.S. Senate. If, instead, it is effected merely as an agreement between governments, it cannot be guaranteed that arguments regarding its invalidity will not arise in consequence of change of governments, as was the case some time ago in the case of the Ishii-Lansing Agreement. It must be said that Japan cannot possibly rely upon the choice of so indefinite a method for determining a question having such an important bearing on the nation's independence and destiny as that of national defense.

Remarks;

Although there have been numerous instances in the Past when treaties having important bearing upon the question of national defense, such as alliances, were concluded without the approval by the Diet, the principal reason for following such procedure was the necessity of maintaining secrecy. However, things differ today and questions on national defense should be discussed and determined in the light of public

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opinion. Whereupon we consider it unnecessary to adhere to such precedents.

Third. Proposal to designate a definite date for the enforcement of arms limitation agreement.

The Secretary of State proposed that the U.S. possess 18 capital ships, the British Empire 22 and Japan 10 capital ships "within three months after the making of the agreement", but what is meant by "the making of the agreement" is not clear.

1. In case the form of an agreement which does not require ratification is adopted, the time indicated would be when the respective delegates sign the agreement at Washington. The reason why such a form of agreement should be opposed has already been set forth above. Therefore this interpretation should not be adopted.

2. In case it takes the form of a treaty, it should mean, as a matter of pure logic, the time when all the signatory powers have completed ratification, that is when the ratification by the last nation has been finished. In this case, should the respective powers wait for the other nation to ratify it, it must be borne in mind that the time of conclusion of the treaty would only be gratuitously prolonged. Again, should the ratification by any single power be unduly delayed owing to debating in Diet etc., the other two powers would be forced to stand in an unstable position.

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As a measure of expediency, therefore, the proposal may be made that it would be most practical to have the three months period begin to run from the time when the delegates of the U.S., Britain and Japan sign the treaty at Washington. It is conceivable that, in view of the American desire to carry out limitation of armaments at an early date, that such a proposal may be made.

In such a case we would propose that a signatory power which fails to ratify within three months after the signing should be deemed to have refused ratification (that the agreement will not be formed if even one nation rejects ratification goes without saying); and also, in view of the special circumstances of our country, to change the period from three months to five months.

In brief, this problem is the first important question which will be encountered in connection with the execution of the limitation agreement.

We consider it necessary to suggest determining this point clearly beforehand.

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Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in Japanese, consisting of 8 pages and entitled "Observations on the U.S. Secretary of State's Proposal of Nov. 12" is an excerpt from the documents which is still in my custody at present by the order of my chief at the Washington Conference in 1921.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30th day of July, 1947.

/s/ ENOMOTO, Juji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on the same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

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Mr. Balfour's address bearing on
abolition of Anglo-Japanese Alliance made
at the 4th Plenary Session of Washington
Disarmament Conference, December 10, 1921.
- Official Conference Report (Government
Printing Office, Washington), pp. 170
and 172.

Mr. Balfour (speaking in English): Mr. Chairman and Gentle-
men of the Conference:

You have heard an exposition by Senator Lodge of the Contents
of this Treaty, admirable in its clarity, perfect in its literary
form, and you have just heard the way in which this Treaty strikes
a great Frenchman in its world relations; you have heard his
views, in an eloquent speech by one of the greatest masters of
eloquence now living. (Applause.)

So far as I am concerned, I would most gladly leave the matter
in their hands, for I have nothing to add to what they have said
upon the general aspects of the Treaty. If I rise to occupy your
attention for one or two moments it is not to deal with the Treaty
in its entirety, but merely to say something about one clause in
that Treaty in which only my friends from Japan and the British
Empire Delegation can regard themselves as immediately interested.

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although I think it touches, in truth and in reality, the interests of the whole world.

You will have noticed that Article IV provides that when this Treaty receives its ratification at the hands of the Signatory Powers, at that moment the Treaty between Japan and Great Britain comes to an end. Now, I am perfectly well aware that the Treaty between Great Britain and Japan has been the cause of much sear-chings of heart, of some suspicions, of a good deal of animadver-sion in important sections of opinion in the United States, and I think that from the historical point of view that attitude may at first cause surprise, for certainly nothing was further from the thoughts of the original framers of the Treaty between Japan and Great Britain than that it could touch in the remotest way, either for good or for evil, the interests of the United States. The United States seemed as remote from any subject touched in the original agreement, as Chile or Peru.

Now what has caused the change in what I think was the original view taken in the United States by all sections of opinion? To what is it that the change of opinion is due? I think it is due to the fact that a state of international tension did arise in the Pacific area-and I hope I may incidentally say that it is now forever set at rest (applause)-but at all events it did arise in the area of the Pacific Ocean, and critics in the United States began to say to themselves, "Why is there this Treaty between Japan and

Great Britain? What further interest does it serve?" They called to mind the fact that it originally came into being on account of the aggressive attitude taken in Far Eastern affairs by Russia and Germany, and they asked themselves, "Is there any further danger from Russia? Is there any further peril to be feared from Germany?" And when they answered that question, as of course they were obliged to answer it, in the negative; when they perceived that the practical objects for which the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was brought into being no longer existed, that history had wiped them out, they said to themselves, "Why, then, is this Treaty continued? May it not in certain conceivable eventualities prove hampering and injurious in case strained relations should become yet more strained?"

I understand that point of view; but there is another point of view which I want you to understand, and with which even those who disagree with it will sympathize. There is no audience that I would rather appeal to than an American audience on the point I am just going to mention. This Treaty, remember, was not a Treaty that had to be renewed; it was a Treaty that ran until it was formally denounced by one of the two parties to it. It is true that the objects for which the Treaty had been created no longer required international attention. But, after all, that Treaty (or its predecessors) had been in existence within a few days of twenty years. It had served a great purpose in two great wars. It had stood the strain of common sacrifices, common

anxieties, common efforts, common triumphs.

When two nations have been united in that fiery ordeal, they can not at the end of it take off their hats one to the other and politely part as two strangers part who travel together for a few hours in a railway train. Something more, something closer, unites them than the mere words of the Treaty; and, as it were, gratuitously and without a cause to tear up the written contract, although it serves no longer any valid or effective purpose, may lead to misunderstandings in one nation just as much as the maintenance of that Treaty has led to misunderstandings in another. Great Britain therefore found herself between the possibilities of two misunderstandings; a misunderstanding if she retained the Treaty, a misunderstanding if she denounced the Treaty; and we have long come to the conclusion that the only possible way out of this impasse, the only possible way of removing those suspicions and difficulties which are some of the greatest obstacles to that condition of serene peace which is the only tolerable condition, after all, for civilized people was that we should annul, merge, destroy, as it were, this ancient and outworn and unnecessary agreement and replace it by something new, something effective, which should embrace all the Powers concerned in the vast area of the Pacific.

(Applause.)

The Joint Resolution and
Mr. Gibson's address made at the
3rd Plenary Session of the Three
Power Naval Conference at Geneva,
August 4th, 1927

- Official Conference Report,
PP. 42 - 46

The Hon. Hugh Gibson: As I indicated in my opening remarks, the Conference has just reached a point where we have been reluctantly forced to admit that we cannot continue our work with any hope of a successful conclusion. Since the proposals which have been laid before us by Mr. Bridgeman represent a final decision of the British Empire delegation. I have already informed Mr. Bridgeman that we shall be forced frankly to admit that our efforts at present to find a basis for negotiation acceptable to all three Powers have not been successful.

I should like to take this occasion for stating somewhat fully the American views on the subject, not by way of argument with my colleagues but because the solution of this problem can be found only if all conflicting views are clearly stated and left for mature consideration.

First of all let us consider why we came here. The President of the United States, on February 10th, extended to the Powers