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Vol. 37

5

Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

January 16, 1946

Washington, D. C.

Pages: 6814 to 7067

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PEARL HARBOR REPORT

VOL. 37

(5th COPY)

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16
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21
22
23
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C O N T E N T S

<u>TESTIMONY OF:</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
KIMMEL, Rear Admiral Husband E. (Resumed)	6826

E X H I B I T S

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
113	6822
114	6822
115	6823
116	6824
117	6824
118	6825
119	6825
120	6825
121	6829
122	7001
123	7001

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Wednesday, January 16, 1946

Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
Ferguson and Brewster.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel;
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel, and John E.
Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

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The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in order.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman --

The Vice Chairman: The Chairman is detained a few moments and we will go ahead.

Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, in relation to the letter written by Mr. Justice Roberts read yesterday, I would like to call attention for the record to the minutes of the meeting of the Roberts Committee on January 21, 1942. It is just one page and if I might put it into the record I would like to do so.

"January 21, 1942.

"The Commission reconvened at 9:30 o'clock a.m. at room 2905 Navy Building, Washington, D. C.

"All of the members of the Commission were present, and the Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Clerk to the Commission were in attendance.

"The Commission went into an Executive Session which continued until 1:10 o'clock p.m., when the Commission took a recess until 2:45 p.m.

"At that time the Commission reconvened and resumed the Executive Session until 6:30 o'clock p.m., when there was an adjournment until Thursday, January 22, 1942, at 9:30 o'clock p.m.

1
2 "At 3:00 o'clock p.m. the Secretary of the Navy, having
3 been" --

4 This is the part I had in mind calling to the attention
5 of the committee and for the record:

6 "At 3:00 o'clock p.m. the Secretary of the Navy, having
7 been shown certain proposed findings of fact, stated that he
8 suggested no changes for safeguarding the national interest,
9 in any of the statements, except one in Finding No. 20. This
10 was then differently phrased.

11 "At 4:30 o'clock p.m. Brigadier General Gerow, desig-
12 nated by the Chief of Staff, after examining the same findings
13 for the same purpose, stated to the Recorder that he found
14 no changes to suggest, and the Recorder so informed the
15 Commission.

16 Signed Owen J. Roberts, Chairman.

17 Signed Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder.

18 Signed Albert J. Schneider, Clerk."

19 Now, if we examine the Roberts Report, that was printed
20 as Document No. 159 of the 77th Congress, Second Session, I
21 find only 19 paragraphs. The 19th finding is on page 16 and
22 carries over on page 17. There is no number 20 Finding.
23 Whereas in the minutes of the Commission it says "except one
24 in Finding No. 20. This was then differently phrased."

25 I think we should have that as part of the record, indi-

1
2 cating that the Finding No. 20 does now not appear in the
3 record, as indicated by Document No. 159 of the 77th Congress,
4 Second Session.

5 The Vice Chairman: Is that all, Senator?

6 Senator Ferguson: Yes, that is all. It is to clear
7 up that matter of yesterday.

8 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, might I, in that con-
9 nection, ask whether it is contemplated that that will be
10 taken up further with Justice Roberts to find out what the
11 report was on that?

12 Mr. Richardson: There was a suggestion yesterday, Mr.
13 Chairman, that it was possible that the reading of the
14 Roberts letter might dispense with the necessity of calling
15 Justice Roberts as a witness.

16 My attention was called later to the idea that he might
17 still be asked to appear as a witness. I would like to
18 inquire now whether any member of the committee would like
19 to have me arrange to have Mr. Justice Roberts present himself
20 for examination in connection with the point brought up by
21 Senator Ferguson, or any other point in connection with the
22 Report in which the committee is interested.

23 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I would like to have
24 Justice Roberts called as a witness, particularly with regard
25 to the minutes that I read this morning indicating that there

1
2 were 20 Findings and there are only 19 appearing in the
3 official document. Also if he had a conversation, which is
4 indicated in the letter, for several hours with the President
5 on this particular case and on his findings, and so forth,
6 we may obtain information there that would help to explain
7 some of the things now before the committee.

8 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman --

9 The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson has submitted his
10 request. Are there any other requests?

11 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I would like to say on the
12 record that I cannot see why we should call Justice Roberts,
13 a former Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
14 when we are not calling any members of the Army Board, we
15 are not calling any members of the Navy Board.

16 Of course, it may be that the gentleman wants to talk
17 to him because he talked to President Roosevelt.

18 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman --

19 The Vice Chairman: Senator Lucas.

20 Senator Lucas: May I ask Senator Ferguson this question.
21 I haven't examined the report to which the Senator refers.
22 Do I understand that each one of those paragraphs presents
23 a separate finding within itself?

24 Senator Ferguson: That is true. They relate to each
25 other but they are the findings.

1
2 Senator Lucas: I was wondering whether the report
3 might not include the entire findings even though there are
4 only 19 paragraphs in it.

5 Senator Ferguson: But I can't tell that from the Report
6 itself and from the minutes. That is the reason I think it
7 is material that we find out. Particularly is this true
8 because we haven't been able up to now to locate the original
9 of a report from a Commission named by the President.

10 Senator Lucas: The only point I was attempting to make
11 was whether or not the Report itself sets out definitely one
12 finding after another.

13 Senator Ferguson: That is right.

14 Senator Lucas: There are a number of findings in there?

15 Senator Ferguson: That is right.

16 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman --

17 The Vice Chairman: Senator Brewster.

18 Senator Brewster: I think that it is altogether desirable
19 that Justice Roberts should appear as I think there is some-
20 thing that would be not clear to any further student of this
21 situation in the letter of Justice Roberts that we had read
22 yesterday. He said:

23 "I replied that the Commission had submitted the fact
24 findings (but not the report) to the Secretaries of War and
25 Navy and had been advised by each of them that there could

1
2 be no objection to the publication of the facts as the
3 Commission had stated them in its report."

4 I assume the Justice there referred to the final draft
5 after the changes which had been made, but that was, of course,
6 the object of the Committee in its original inquiry, as to
7 whether there were changes made subsequent to the first de-
8 terminations of the Commission, and I am sure Justice Roberts
9 would be helpful in clarifying that situation.

10 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, so that the record will be
11 complete, I would like to say that in the testimony of the
12 Roberts Commission itself there was a statement made that
13 all of the testimony would be submitted to both the Secretary
14 of War and the Secretary of Navy in order to have them pass
15 on it, to see whether or not there was anything there that
16 would affect national security, that would affect national
17 interest, or would affect national defense, and as to whether
18 or not that in being made public would affect them.

19 Senator Brewster: I think that was proper. The clear
20 implication of the Roberts letter is that no changes were
21 made as a result of that inquiry and it would appear from
22 the record Senator Ferguson has read clearly there were
23 certain changes which may well have been in the public inter-
24 est at that time but might affect the record as far as
25 subsequent developments were concerned.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.
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follows

1 The Vice Chairman: Is there objection to the request
2 that former Associate Justice Roberts of the Supreme Court be
3 requested to appear as a witness in this hearing?

4 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I have no objection but I
5 prophecy now that he won't add anything to this Pearl Harbor
6 inquiry outside of taking a little more time.

7 The Vice Chairman: Is there objection?

8 (No response.)

9 The Vice Chairman: The chair hears none and the counsel
10 will please arrange for the appearance of Justice Roberts.

11 Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, if I may I should like to
12 offer at this time a number of exhibits for the record that
13 came to my attention in connection with an examination of the
14 record and of Admiral Kimmel's statement in his prior testi-
15 mony. I do not regard them as particularly important and they
16 are not new but in order that the historical documents in the
17 case may be complete and since some questions may be asked
18 concerning some of these exhibits, I have had copies prepared
19 and laid before the members of the committee and I should like
20 permission now to have the various documents marked as exhibits
21 and offered in evidence at this time.

22 The Vice Chairman: You will please proceed and call the
23 attention of the committee to the documents and give the num-
24 ber of the exhibit. They will be admitted as exhibits for
25 the record.

1 Mr. Masten: As the next exhibit, which I believe is 113,
2 we would like to offer the document entitled, "Pacific Fleet
3 Employment Schedules, Fall and Winter 1941." This includes
4 a letter dated August 13, 1941 signed by Admiral Kimmel, the
5 employment schedules for Task Forces 1, 2 and 3.

6 In addition, we are having duplicated the employment
7 schedule for Task Force 9, which will be offered as soon as
8 it has been duplicated.

9 The Vice Chairman: This will be received as exhibit 113.

10 (The document above referred to
11 was marked Exhibit No. 113.)

12 Mr. Masten: As exhibit 114 we would like to offer a
13 photostatic copy of WPAC-46, which is Admiral Kimmel's imple-
14 mentation of Rainbow 5.

15 The Vice Chairman: Is that before members of the com-
16 mittee?

17 Mr. Masten: We did not have the complete ten copies for
18 each member of the committee but we have distributed as many
19 as we had and we will obtain the other copies, but did not get
20 them this morning.

21 The Vice Chairman: That will be accepted as exhibit 114.

22 (The document above referred to
23 was marked Exhibit No. 114.)

24 Mr. Masten: As exhibit 115 we would like to offer a col-
25 lection of three documents. The first is entitled, "Communi-

1 cation Intelligence Summaries Concerning Location of Japanese
2 Fleet Units 1 November 1941 to 6 December 1941."

3 The Vice Chairman: That is 115?

4 Mr. Masten: 115, yes. The second part of exhibit 115 is
5 entitled, "Intelligence Reports by Pacific Fleet Intelligence
6 Officer 27 October 1941 to 2 December 1941."

7 The third part of exhibit 115 is entitled, "Pacific Fleet
8 Intelligence Memorandum of 1 December 1941 - Location of
9 Japanese Fleet Units."

10 We would like to offer all of those as exhibit 115.

11 The Vice Chairman: They will be so received.

12 (The documents above referred to
13 were marked Exhibit No. 115.)

14 Mr. Masten: As exhibit 116 we would like to offer a
15 compilation of all of the correspondence which we have found
16 dealing with the subject of anti-torpedo nets. Certain of
17 this correspondence has already been offered as part of the
18 record included in the present exhibit, but this brings to-
19 gether in one compilation all of the correspondence in that
20 connection. We offer that as exhibit 116.

21 The Vice Chairman: Let us see a little more clearly just
22 what that is. Hold up the document.

23 Mr. Masten: This is a compilation of letters the first
24 of which is dated February 11, 1941 from the Chief of Naval
25 Operations to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.

1 The Vice Chairman: That is 116?

2 Mr. Masten: 116.

3 The Vice Chairman: It will be received.

4 (The document above referred to
5 was marked Exhibit No. 116.)

6 Mr. Masten: As exhibit 117 we would like to offer a col-
7 lection of correspondence, the first of which is a letter dated
8 16 January 1941, from the Commander Patrol Wing 2 to the Chief
9 of Naval Operations. This correspondence is offered to com-
10 plete the record on the subject of air defense of the Hawaiian
11 Islands. There are a number of other documents in this con-
12 nection that are already in exhibits but they do not include
13 the correspondence which we now offer as exhibit 117.

14 The Vice Chairman: It will be received as exhibit 117.

15 (The document above referred to
16 was marked Exhibit No. 117.)

17 Mr. Masten: As exhibit 118 we would like to offer the
18 daily memoranda dated 30 November 1941 and December 5, 1941
19 prepared by Admiral Kimmel and entitled, "Steps to be taken in
20 Case of American-Japanese War within the Next Twenty-Four
21 Hours."

22 It is our understanding that no memoranda were prepared
23 on the days of December 1, 2, 3 and 4, that these two are the
24 only ones that exist. We offer them as exhibit 118.

25 The Vice Chairman: It will be received as exhibit 118.

(The document above referred to
was marked Exhibit No. 118.)

Mr. Masten: As exhibit 119 we offer the document entitled, "Radio Log of Bishop's Point Radio Station 7 December 1941." This includes communications between the Destroyer Ward and the radio station in connection with the dropping of depth charges on the submarine on the morning of 7 December.

The Vice Chairman: It will be received as exhibit 119.

(The document above referred to
was marked Exhibit No. 119.)

Mr. Masten: As the last exhibit this morning, which will be No. 120, we offer two reports, the first of which is a memorandum for Admiral Kimmel signed by Admiral Bellinger and dated December 19, 1941 and the second of which is a memorandum dated 2 January 1942, also signed by Admiral Bellinger, to which is attached a report of the Army-Navy Board dated 31 October 1941, referred to in the memorandum of 1 January.

The Vice Chairman: It will be received as exhibit 120.

(The document above referred to
was marked Exhibit No. 120.)

The Vice Chairman: Does that complete the exhibits?

Mr. Masten: That completes all of those that are ready this morning. There will be a few others.

The Vice Chairman: Permit the chair to inquire as to this document that appears to be before all members.

1 Mr. Masten: That is the Pacific War Plan 46 which was
2 offered as exhibit 114.

3 The Vice Chairman: That is what you referred to as the
4 photostat?

5 Mr. Masten: That is right. That is all we have this
6 morning.

7 The Vice Chairman: Does counsel have anything further at
8 this time before the examination of the witness begins?

9 Mr. Richardson: No, Mr. Chairman.

10 The Vice Chairman: Admiral Kimmel, do you have anything
11 further you desire to present to the committee before the ex-
12 amination of counsel begins?

13 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir, I have nothing further.

14 The Vice Chairman: Counsel will proceed with the exam-
15 ination of the witness.

16 TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL

17 (resumed)

18 - - -

19 Mr. Richardson: Admiral Kimmel, you have spent forty
20 years in the Navy, according to your testimony yesterday?

21 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

22 Mr. Richardson: How much time and what have been your
23 assignments in the Pacific area during those forty years, gen-
24 erally?

25 Admiral Kimmel: I will have to think a minute. I was in

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1
2 the Pacific area first in 1908 on a cruise around the world, when
3 we went around South America up the West Coast to Hawaii,
4 Australia, Manila, Japan, China and the rest of the way around
5 the world.

6 In 1913 I was in the Pacific. I served on the staff of
7 Admiral Thomas B. Howard and later Cameron Winslow, who were
8 successively Commanders-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. I was
9 a fleet gunnery officer at that time.

10 In 1923 to 1925 I was in the Asiatic Fleet.

11 In 1921 I was in the Pacific Fleet. Oh, I suppose all the
12 time I was in command of a battleship or command of a squadron
13 of destroyers I was in the Pacific except for brief visits to
14 the Atlantic. As a matter of fact, the last duty I did in the
15 Atlantic was about 1911, except for a period during the first
16 war, first World War, when I was with Admiral Rodman in the
17 American detachment of battleships with the British Fleet.

18 Mr. Richardson: When did you join the Pacific Fleet prior
19 to your appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet?

20 Admiral Kimmel: I joined the Pacific Fleet in the summer
21 of 1938. I took command of the Seventh Heavy Cruiser Divi-
22 sion with the San Francisco as flagship. I cruised in the
23 Pacific and when we came to the Atlantic for the war game I
24 made a trip around South America with three cruisers on a good-
25 will tour and I visited all the principal ports of South

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 America. After that I shifted my flag to the Honolulu, which
3 was the flagship of the cruisers for the battle force, that
4 is, the light cruisers, and from that time until I became
5 Commander-in-Chief, - this was in 1939, - I was in command of
6 the cruisers of the battle force and I cruised with the Fleet.
7 When the Fleet went to Hawaii in 1940 I went out there with
8 the Fleet and except for about two weeks when I came back to
9 the coast I stayed out there until I was relieved as Commander-
10 in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

11 Mr. Richardson: And your specific command at the time
12 you were promoted was what?

13 Admiral Kimmel: My specific command at the time I was
14 promoted was three divisions of light cruisers. They in-
15 cluded two divisions of the Boise class, which were probably
16 some of the most effective units we had in the Fleet. I
17 trained them and I think contributed somewhat to their effi-
18 ciency.

19 Mr. Richardson: When did you retire from the Navy, Ad-
20 miral?

21 Admiral Kimmel: I retired from the Navy on the 1st of
22 March 1942.

23 Mr. Richardson: Will you relate the circumstances lead-
24 ing up to and in connection with your retirement?

25 Admiral Kimmel: I have some documents here which I have

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 prepared on that subject, which gives a factual account. I
3 will review it briefly rather than read it. If I make any
4 mistakes you can readily correct it from this record.

5 Mr. Richardson: I think, Mr. Chairman, that it might be
6 well, in view of the nature of the testimony, if this com-
7 pilation might be offered as an exhibit since copies are now
8 being distributed to members of the committee. I have not
9 seen this compilation myself up to now.

10 The Vice Chairman: What is the number of the exhibit?

11 Mr. Richardson: 121.

12 The Vice Chairman: It will be received as exhibit 121.

13 (The document above referred to
14 was marked Exhibit No. 121.)

15 The Vice Chairman: You may proceed, Admiral.

16 Admiral Kimmel: After I was relieved I was ordered back
17 to the West Coast.

18 Mr. Richardson: And when were you relieved?

19 Admiral Kimmel: I was relieved on the 17th day of De-
20 cember 1941. I stayed in Hawaii for several weeks and after
21 I had completed my testimony before the Roberts Commission I
22 was ordered to the West Coast and I went to San Francisco.

23 I waited in San Francisco for whatever disposition they
24 wished to make. The Roberts Commission report was published
25 and about two or three days, - a few days after the Roberts

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Commission report was published Admiral Greenslade, Rear Ad-
3 miral Greenslade then, Commandant of the Thirteenth Naval
4 District, got in touch with me, told me he had an official
5 communication from the Navy Department for me. He informed
6 me that Admiral Randall Jacobs, Chief of the Bureau of Navi-
7 gation, had telephoned him an official message to be delivered
8 to me that the Acting Secretary of the Navy had informed him
9 that General Short had submitted a request for retirement.
10 That was the message.

11 Up to that time I had not considered submitting any re-
12 quest for retirement, it never entered my head. I thought the
13 matter over and decided if that was the way the Navy Depart-
14 ment wanted to arrange this affair that I would not stand in
15 their way. I wrote a request for retirement and I submitted it.

16 A few days later Admiral Greenslade told me that he had a
17 telephone message from Admiral Stark in which Stark assured him
18 that this information which had been supplied to me was not
19 intended to influence me in submitting a request for retire-
20 ment, that I was free to do as I thought best. Of course I
21 was free to do as I thought best.

22 In reply to that I submitted a letter to the Navy Depart-
23 ment under date of January 28, 1942 in which I stated:

24 "Reference (A) was submitted after I had been of-
25 ficially informed by the Navy Department that General Short

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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had requested retirement.

"I was officially informed today by the Navy Department that my notification of General Short's request was not intended to influence my decision to submit a similar request.

"I desire my request for retirement to stand, subject only to determination by the Department as to what course of action will best serve the interests of the country and the good of the service."

That went along. I had various communications from Admiral Stark in the meanwhile which are included here. Then the storm of criticism arose because I was running out on them and on February 22nd I wrote this letter to Admiral Stark.

W. G. MOTEHIBAW JUAN S ORAW

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fls 10185

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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"Dear Betty:

"I started writing this letter a few minutes after Pye gave me your letter of 21 February. I thank you for the letter and for the information contained therein. I also thank you for your other letters which I have not answered.

"I understand from your letter that I will not be re-tired for the present, that I will be in a leave status until some further action is taken.

"I submitted my request for retirement because I was notified that Short had done so and took that notification as a suggestion for me to do likewise. I submitted this request solely to permit the department to take whatever action they deemed best for the interests of the country. I did not submit it in order to escape censure or punishment.

"When I was notified that the notification in regard to Short was not meant to put pressure on me, I submitted my second letter on the subject.

"When the fact that Short and I had submitted requests for retirement was published to the country, I was astounded that the department would put Short and me in such light before the public.

"On February 19, I received notification by the

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Secretary that I would be placed on the Retired list on
3 March 1, 1942. Paragraph 2 of this letter states, 'This
4 approval of your request for retirement is without condona-
5 tion of any offense or prejudice to future disciplinary
6 action.'

7 "I do not understand this paragraph unless it is to
8 be published to the country as a promise that I will be
9 disciplined at some future time.

10 "I stand ready at any time to accept the consequences
11 of my acts. I do not wish to embarrass the government in
12 the conduct of the war. I do feel, however, that my
13 crucifixion before the public has about reached the limit.
14 I am in daily receipt of letters from irresponsible people
15 over the country taking me to task and even threatening
16 to kill me. I am not particularly concerned except as it
17 shows the effect on the public of articles published about
18 me.

19 "I feel that the publication of paragraph two of the
20 Secretary's letter of February 16 will further inflame the
21 public and do me a great injustice.

22 "I have kept my mouth shut and propose to continue to
23 do so as long as it is humanly possible.

24 "I regret the losses at Pearl Harbor just as keenly,
25 or perhaps more keenly than any other American citizen.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 I wish that I had been smarter than I was and able to fore-
3 see what happened on December 7. I devoted all my energies
4 to the job and made the dispositions which appeared to me
5 to be called for. I cannot now reproach myself for any
6 lack of effort.

7 "I will not comment on the Report of the Commission,
8 but you probably know what I think of it. I will say in
9 passing that I was not made an interested party or a defen-
10 dant.

11 "All this I have been willing to accept for the good of
12 the country out of my loyalty to the Nation, and to await
13 the judgment of history when all the factors can be published.

14 "But I do think that in all justice the department
15 should do nothing further to inflame the public against me.
16 I am entitled to some consideration even though you may
17 consider I erred grievously.

18 "You must appreciate that the beating I have taken
19 leaves very little that can be added to my burden.

20 "I appreciate your efforts on my behalf and will always
21 value your friendship, which is a precious thing to me.

22 "My kindest regards always.

23 /s/ H. E. Kimmel.

24 "To: Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations.

25 "(Written in San Francisco, California.)"

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 That letter went forward on the 22nd of February.

3 Admiral Stark apparently did not even know that the
4 papers retiring me had left the Navy Department. In any
5 event, I was retired and the Secretary promised the public
6 to give me a general court martial.

7 I subsequently learned from Admiral Jacobs that the
8 Acting Secretary of the Navy who had directed him to inform
9 me of General Short's retirement was Mr. Knox.

10 In my request for retirement, the original request,
11 I stated that I stood ready to perform any duty that the
12 Navy Department would assign to me. In order to keep the
13 record straight on 21 April, 1942, I submitted an official
14 letter to the Bureau of Navigation in which I stated, "Sup-
15 plementing the statement in my request for retirement dated
16 26 January, 1942, I wish to again state that I stand ready
17 to perform any duty to which the Navy Department may assign
18 me."

19 Mr. Richardson: You received no assignment?

20 Admiral Kimmel: I received no assignment.

21 Mr. Richardson: When Admiral Stark testified,
22 Admiral Kimmel, he stated that there never at any time was
23 anything between you and him except the closest personal
24 friendship. Do you agree with that statement?

25 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I agree in that statement. I

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 had known Admiral Stark since Naval Academy days. I had
3 served with him on several occasions; I had the highest
4 regard for him; I trusted him, and I felt he was one of
5 my best friends. I had that feeling, but I cannot forget
6 the fact that -- well, events that have occurred since then.

7 Mr. Richardson: Would you say that your relations
8 during your term of duty at Hawaii were friendly and co-
9 operative with the various naval officers connected with
10 Admiral Stark in the Office of Naval Operations?

11 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, oh, yes.

12 Mr. Richardson: You are not conscious at this time
13 that that office, or anyone in it, had any personal dislike
14 or hostility to you?

15 Admiral Kimmel: I had not that idea at any time.

16 Mr. Richardson: And is that also true with respect
17 to the Secretary of the Navy?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Yes. I felt the Secretary of the
19 Navy was a very loyal friend of mine, Mr. Knox. I had known
20 the Secretary only slightly. I met him when he came to
21 Hawaii in September, I think it was, of 1940. He was
22 sent by Admiral Richardson -- I will put it this way:
23 Admiral Richardson arranged for a schedule for him to visit
24 various types of ships with various Flag Officers, and
25 Secretary Knox spent about three days with me in my Flag

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Ship while we were at sea, and that was when I came to
3 know him, and about the only time I knew him.

4 Mr. Richardson: You know of no reason, Admiral, why
5 there should have been the slightest difficulty in a com-
6 plete liaison between the Office of Naval Operations, the
7 Secretary of the Navy in Washington, and your command in
8 Hawaii?

9 Admiral Kimmel: I had not any question in my mind.
10 None.

11 Mr. Richardson: Now, Admiral, it would be fair to say,
12 would it not, that your experience in the Pacific had given
13 you a very intensified superior knowledge of Naval condi-
14 tions in the Pacific area?

15 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I had served there a good while.

16 Mr. Richardson: Subject to your ability to understand
17 those conditions, you have had plenty of opportunity to
18 find out what that work was?

19 Admiral Kimmel: I had plenty of opportunity, yes, sir.

20 Mr. Richardson: And those contacts of yours in the
21 Pacific gave you an extensive and detailed contact with
22 Japan, and its representatives?

23 Admiral Kimmel: No, I did not have detailed contact
24 with the representatives of Japan. I had some contacts
25 with them. I had never lived in Japan. I visite d in Japan

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h7 2 on occasions, two or three times, but I had no opportunity
3 to obtain any profound knowledge of the Japanese people
4 by contacts with them.

5 The knowledge I had came principally from reading,
6 and I did that extensively.

7 Mr. Richardson: The only important power in the Pacific
8 of direct interest to the United States was Japan, was it
9 not?

10 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes.

11 Mr. Richardson: And in all of your war plans from
12 the time you first went to the Pacific and up to the 7th
13 of December, Orange in those plans meant Japan?

14 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

15 Mr. Richardson: And all of those plans were directed
16 at the exigency of possible war with Japan?

17 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

18 Mr. Richardson: And in connection with those plans
19 there was constantly in the minds of you and the other
20 officers in charge of our Navy in the Pacific what would
21 be done or could be done, and how it should be done in the
22 event hostilities with Japan should ever eventuate?

23 Admiral Kimmel: I will put it this way:

24 The only war plan that was called for in the Pacific,
25 and the only one of which I had any knowledge, was the

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Orange war plan, and all of our thoughts, so far as the
3 Pacific war was concerned, were directed against Japan,
4 yes, sir.

5 Mr. Richardson: And it had come to be a fixed feeling
6 among the Naval officers familiar with Pacific missions
7 that sooner or later it was extremely likely there would
8 be a war with Japan?

9 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I think that is a fair statement
10 that a good body of opinion in the Navy felt that a war
11 with Japan was coming sooner or later. There was, however,
12 a considerable number of officers in the Navy who felt
13 that Japan and the United States would have no real reason
14 to fight, and principally because if Japan did ever start
15 anything, they would be wiped off the map.

16 Mr. Richardson: As a matter of fact, Admiral, there
17 was quite a divergence of opinion in the Navy as to how
18 long it would take to accomplish that result, was there
19 not.

20 Admiral Kimmel: Yes. In a body of that kind there
21 is always a considerable number of different opinions,
22 but in my thoughts about Japan, and my studies at the
23 War College, and other places, everything I knew and read
24 about, confirmed what President Theodore Roosevelt is
25 purported to have said back in about 1905 or 1906, and

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 that was that forces necessary to lick Japan in the
3 Pacific would take a fleet equal to the then British
4 Fleet, plus an army equal to the then German Army, and
5 that anybody who embarked on a Pacific war with any other
6 idea was in for a great awakening.

7 Mr. Richardson: In 1941, all of this situation with
8 respect to the probability of war with Japan immensely
9 increased, did it not?

10 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Richardson: And may it be fairly said that it
12 was the opinion of the high naval command in the Pacific
13 that the peaceful situation between Japan and the United
14 States was constantly deteriorating day by day?

15 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, that is right.

16 Mr. Richardson: And that it seemed quite probable,
17 from a military standpoint, that war would result?

18 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

WARD & BUNT WASHINGTON D. C.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: Now in 1941 there was a shooting war in the Atlantic?

Admiral Kimmel: Beginning in the summer, yes.

Mr. Richardson: That was known to the High Command in the Pacific?

Admiral Kimmel: That is true.

Mr. Richardson: That was the subject of certain conversations and correspondence between you and the Office of Naval Operations?

Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

Mr. Richardson: You understood that it was the settled military policy that the war in the Atlantic was to have precedence over the situation in the Pacific?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, that is one way of putting it.

Mr. Richardson: And there was during 1941 a transfer to operations in the Atlantic, and operations relating to the Atlantic, of the overwhelming majority of all of our munitions of war and ships and other equipment in aid of the Atlantic situation?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, and that was something I tried to put a few brakes on, and I felt that a strong Pacific Fleet was a real deterrent to Japan and, as I think you will find in my correspondence -- this is no afterthought -- I stated then that a weaker one might be an invitation.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Mr. Richardson: Well, at its top strength the Pacific
3 Fleet during 1940 and 1941 was never strong enough to meet
4 in battle the main Japanese Fleet, was it, on equal terms?

5 Admiral Kimmel: If you could have gotten the two Fleets
6 out and lined them up and eliminated all questions of logistics
7 and just gotten them into battle with the Fleet prior to the
8 time they made the transfer to the Atlantic -- well, it would
9 have been a nice mix-up, and it would not have been all one-
10 sided by any means.

11 But when you speak of a Fleet in the Pacific sufficient
12 to defeat Japan, we are speaking of something entirely differ-
13 ent from what you have spoken of. We are speaking of a
14 Fleet which can go to Japanese waters and force them out
15 and defeat them in their own home waters, and none of our
16 plans ever stopped short of that, and we never at any time
17 until this war started had the Navy to implement that plan.

18 Mr. Richardson: And until we had this policy of ours
19 in the Atlantic you never contemplated that the war against
20 Japan in the Pacific would be given secondary consideration?

21 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir.

22 Mr. Richardson: By the Government?

23 Admiral Kimmel: No. We were forced into that.

24 Mr. Richardson: Now early in 1941 this Fleet in the
25 Pacific was materially weakened by the withdrawal of a

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 battleship and several cruisers, several destroyers, and
2 other naval vessels?

3 Admiral Kimmel: Well, not the withdrawal of "a" battle-
4 ship, but it was a withdrawal of a division of three battleships
5 which, incidentally, were probably the strongest ships we
6 had in the Fleet.

7 Mr. Richardson: They were removed from the Pacific area
8 to the Atlantic area?

9 Admiral Kimmel: They were removed, three battleships,
10 one carrier, eighteen destroyers and four of the most modern
11 and most effective light cruisers.

12 Mr. Richardson: Who recommended that withdrawal?

13 Admiral Kimmel: I do not know. I did not.

14 Mr. Richardson: Was there any discussion that you knew
15 of pro and con on whether that withdrawal should be made at
16 the time it was made?

17 Admiral Kimmel: Not with me. I think you will recall
18 I had a letter setting forth this plan in which Admiral Stark
19 says, "I am telling you, not arguing with you".

20 Mr. Richardson: Now following that, Admiral, there was
21 another proposed attempt to further weaken the Pacific Fleet
22 by an additional assignment of additional fighting ships to
23 the Atlantic area, was there not?

24 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.
25

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Mr. Richardson: Just what part did you play in connection
3 with that event?

4 Admiral Kimmel: I was in the Navy Department, having
5 come here for an official conference, in June of 1941, and
6 Mr. Knox, I think, came back from a Cabinet meeting and
7 stated that they had decided to transfer another division of
8 battleships, another carrier, four cruisers and a number of
9 destroyers to the Atlantic from the Pacific. I heard that
10 and I was very much concerned.

11 Mr. Richardson: Why?

12 Admiral Kimmel: Because I felt that we should make every
13 effort to keep Japan out of the war. I felt that the way
14 to keep Japan out of the war was to have a Fleet out there
15 which would deter them from doing anything. I felt in case
16 we did get into a war with Japan and if we had been further
17 reduced by another increment equal to the first, leaving
18 us one-half as strong as we had been in 1940, that we would
19 be in a bad way.

20 Subsequently, when I had an interview with Mr. Roosevelt,
21 I told him just that. As I recall his conversation, he said,
22 "Well, they told me from the Navy Department that that would
23 be all right." "Well," I said, "whoever told you was crazy.
24 It just is ridiculous," and eventually that transfer was not
25 made.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: As an experienced Naval Officer, Admiral, what is and what was during 1941 the importance of the Pacific Fleet in the Pacific to the United States?

Admiral Kimmel: Well, the importance of the Pacific Fleet was to keep Japan out of the war, and failing that, to be in a position to stop their advance.

Mr. Richardson: Was there any other defense of importance in the entire Pacific Ocean to our western coast than this Pacific Fleet?

Admiral Kimmel: May I have that question again?

Mr. Richardson: Will you read it, please?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Admiral Kimmel: Well, there were many important elements out there: The bases on the Pacific Coast, the productive capacity of the Pacific Coast, the bases at Hawaii. The Fleet was a very important part, and perhaps the most important part, of the defense of the Coast at that time.

Mr. Richardson: It was the only major naval power we had in the Pacific?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes. It was all the naval power we had in the Pacific except the detachment in the Asiatic known as the Asiatic Fleet.

Mr. Richardson: And how extensive a detachment was that?

Admiral Kimmel: Well, they had a squadron of destroyers,

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 a number of submarines, about two light cruisers, and we had --
3 the Navy Department had, I mean, deliberately kept that Fleet
4 down there for two reasons. One was that unless they could
5 put a sufficient fleet in the Asiatic to meet the Japanese
6 Fleet it was not good policy to sacrifice ships out there,
7 and the other was we had no means of maintaining a fleet in
8 the Asiatic.

9 In the weeks immediately preceding the outbreak of war
10 we transferred most of our submarines from the Pacific to
11 the Asiatic.

12 Mr. Richardson: What was the base of the Asiatic Fleet?

13 Admiral Kimmel: What was the basis of it?

14 Mr. Richardson: The base. What was its base?

15 Admiral Kimmel: Manila, I should say. They had other
16 bases out there, but Manila was the principal one.

17 Mr. Richardson: With the exception of the Manila base
18 the only major base we had in the Pacific was at Pearl Harbor,
19 was it not, away from the mainland?

20 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I would say Pearl Harbor was the
21 only base we had in the Pacific. Manila was by no means a
22 major base at that time. All it afforded was ample anchorage
23 space.

24 Mr. Richardson: The main base was Pearl Harbor?

25 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: And had been such for years, had it not?

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Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

3

Mr. Richardson: Pearl Harbor is located on the Island

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of Oahu?

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

6

Mr. Richardson: And the Island of Oahu is a small island?

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

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Mr. Richardson: And the base is very largely surrounded

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by mountains?

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

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Mr. Richardson: The base itself is a shallow harbor, is

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it not?

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, it is.

14

Mr. Richardson: Difficult of entrance?

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Admiral Kimmel: Well, it is not a difficult navigational

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problem, but there is only one entrance.

17

Mr. Richardson: That is narrow, long and somewhat winding?

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Admiral Kimmel: Well, it is fairly straight.

19

Mr. Richardson: There is no place in the base where

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major ships can be hidden or camouflaged?

21

Admiral Kimmel: No.

22

Mr. Richardson: And the base is of such a nature and

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location that anyone with a pair of spy glasses who wants to

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climb any one of 100 mountains can see the entire base and

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1
2 everything in it?

3 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

4 Mr. Richardson: And there is no possible way of avoiding
5 it except by keeping human beings away from the mountains
6 with spy glasses?

7 Admiral Kimmel: That is right. I might add, with cameras
8 also.

9 Mr. Richardson: How close is it possible for the casual
10 observed to get to the Pearl Harbor base?

11 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, it is my recollection maybe 100
12 yards, 200 yards, something of that kind.

13 Mr. Richardson: Now our two main military establishments
14 in Hawaii are Hickam Field and Shafter, are they not?

15 Admiral Kimmel: Hickam Field and what other?

16 Mr. Richardson: Shafter. Isn't it Shafter where the
17 General of the Army has his headquarters?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Shafter?

19 Mr. Richardson: Yes.

20 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

21 Mr. Richardson: They are the two military establishments
22 on Oahu, are they not?

23 Admiral Kimmel: Well, the Schofield Barracks.

24 Mr. Richardson: Schofield, I mean, not Shafter.

25 Admiral Kimmel: Shafter is another. Then they have a

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1
2 number of small forts scattered around.

3 Mr. Richardson: What are two or three of the largest?

4 Admiral Kimmel: Schofield Barracks is the largest.
5 Shafter is the next. I suggest you get the details from
6 General Short. I may be a little mixed up in names.

7 Mr. Richardson: Well, in location, Admiral, they are
8 all fairly close to Pearl Harbor, are they not?

9 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I do not remember the exact
10 dimensions of Oahu, but I think it is something like 40 by
11 25 miles, something like that. Isn't that about right?

12 Mr. Richardson: Well, they are close enough, are they
13 not, Admiral, so that it is perfectly practicable for one
14 air attack to attack all of those establishments at Pearl
15 Harbor on the same operation?

16 Admiral Kimmel: Provided you have enough planes, yes.

17 Mr. Richardson: Admiral, if we are to have any defense
18 in the Pacific worthy of the name the thing of the most
19 supreme importance in the Pacific is the Pacific Fleet, is
20 it not?

21 Admiral Kimmel: Do you mean now?

22 Mr. Richardson: At any time in the last half-dozen years.

23 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes.

24 Mr. Richardson: And in order to have a Pacific Fleet
25 functioning there must be a base for that fleet?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, but the experiences of this war
3 have pretty well demonstrated that the Fleet can take its
4 own base with them, and that is something that our Navy had
5 been working on for many years, and I think it is in pretty
6 good shape at the present time.

7 Mr. Richardson: But that was not the situation in the
8 summer of 1941?

9 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

10 Mr. Richardson: And with conditions as they were in
11 the summer of 1941 would you not agree with me that the
12 protection of the Pacific Fleet was of the highest importance
13 to the interest of the United States?

14 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes.

15 Mr. Richardson: Now what is the significance, Admiral, --

16 Admiral Kimmel: I just want to interject one little
17 thought. You cannot spend all your time protecting yourself.
18 If you do you do not get anywhere.

19 Mr. Richardson: I was just going to come to that.
20 What is the significance of a base for a fleet such as you
21 had in Hawaii in 1941?

22 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I cannot give any better definition
23 than I have already given. It is in the statement taken from
24 the joint action of the Army and Navy in a plan known long
25 before it was enunciated, and the basic point of that is that

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 a permanent naval base must have within itself the means for
3 its own defense and for the defense of all the naval units
4 which are based thereon, and that the Fleet must have no
5 anxiety as to the security of its base. That was laid down
6 many, many years before Pearl Harbor.

7 Mr. Richardson: Now it is essential, is it not, Admiral,
8 in the operation of such a Fleet as you had there in the
9 summer of 1941, that that Fleet make use of the Pearl Harbor
10 base at regular intervals?

11 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Richardson: Why?

13 Admiral Kimmel: There was no alternative.

14 Mr. Richardson: What use would the Fleet be absolutely
15 required to make of the base?

16 Admiral Kimmel: In the first place, the thing that
17 tied the Fleet to the base more than any other one factor was
18 the question of fuel. We had the fuel at Pearl Harbor.
19 During the time I was there, as I stated in this statement,
20 I tried to operate more ships at sea and found I could not
21 do it because I was depleting the fuel supply at a time when
22 it was imperative that we bring this fuel supply up. Every
23 move I made I had to get back to that base to get some fuel.

24 The facilities for fueling in Pearl Harbor were such
25 that you could not fuel more than about one-eighth of the

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Fleet in any twelve-hour period. And the tankers we had
3 were entirely inadequate to support that whole Fleet at sea
4 for indefinite periods.

5 I had gone to great lengths in order to get the tankers
6 equipped for fueling ships at sea, and we were running our
7 tankers betwixt the mainland and Hawaii and having them
8 away long enough to have these exercises at sea in fueling
9 and to keep up the fuel supply there. It was a nice balance
10 that we had to maintain.

11 The policy that I did follow out there, - and it was
12 forced on me more than anything else, - and when the time
13 came we did have the place full of fuel, and I have been
14 informed that, I think in the first six months after the
15 war started, they used up more than half of that stored fuel
16 before they could get their supply coming out to keep it
17 replenished and to keep the Fleet replenished.

18 Mr. Richardson: Now, Admiral, the fuel supply in Pearl
19 Harbor is kept in a lot of metal tanks?

20 Admiral Kimmel: Was kept in metal tanks.

21 Mr. Richardson: On the edge of the base?

22 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

23 Mr. Richardson: Perfectly visible?

24 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

25 Mr. Richardson: Perfectly subject to air attack?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

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Mr. Richardson: But fortunately not touched by the attack of December 7?

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

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Mr. Richardson: If that supply of fuel in the Pearl Harbor base had been destroyed by that attack, could you have continued to maintain your Fleet at the Pearl Harbor base in the future?

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Admiral Kimmel: With the facilities I had at that time?

11

Mr. Richardson: Yes.

12

Admiral Kimmel: No.

13

Mr. Richardson: What would you have had to have done?

14

15

Admiral Kimmel: I would have had to withdraw to the Coast where I could get fuel.

16

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Mr. Richardson: You were familiar, were you not, Admiral, with the dispute between Washington and Admiral Richardson with respect to where the Fleet should be stationed?

18

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Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

20

21

Mr. Richardson: In that controversy did the question of the safety of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor ever become the subject of discussion?

22

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Admiral Kimmel: I never took part in any of those discussions. I think you better get that answer from Admiral Richardson. However, I think from all my knowledge of it that

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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his prime idea was to put the Fleet in a place where it could train more expeditiously and get ready for war more expeditiously. All of this that you speak of was well-known to Admiral Richardson, the Navy Department, and everybody concerned.

Mr. Richardson: Well, on the question of fuel alone, there always hung over the safety of the Pearl Harbor base the protection of that fuel supply?

Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

Mr. Richardson: Now from the very start of your connection with the Pacific Fleet as its Commander in Chief, you knew, did you not, Admiral, what that base in Hawaii and what your Fleet should have in connection with the base by way of equipment in order to properly defend the base and defend the Fleet?

Admiral Kimmel: I think if you will read my letters written during that period you can arrive at that conclusion.

Mr. Richardson: And it is a fact, is it not, Admiral, that constantly from the time you took charge of that Fleet you bombarded Washington for more planes, more anti-aircraft guns, more ammunition and more men?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: Did you think that those additional items were necessary in order to properly protect the Fleet and defend the base?

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WARR & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Admiral Kimmel: I adopted the scheme of providing as
3 far as I could for all eventualities. I wanted Hawaii to be
4 secure not only for the protection of the Fleet while it
5 was in there, but for the protection of the base, for the
6 facilities, the fuel supply at all times, and I wanted the
7 Fleet free to move and accomplish something.

8 Mr. Richardson: What would you have had to have had
9 that you did not have to accomplish those results? Let me
10 put it affirmatively.

11 You needed more patrol planes, did you not?

12 Admiral Kimmel: It was a combination --

13 Mr. Richardson: I am not saying, Admiral, what you
14 had or the devices that you used to make what you had go
15 as far as possible, I am simply stating now, as a naval
16 expert, when you took charge of the Pacific Fleet what did
17 you need to be sent to you as Commander in Chief of the
18 Fleet in order to protect the Fleet and protect the base?

19 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I should say the protection of
20 the base was an Army responsibility.

21 Mr. Richardson: I understand that.

22 Admiral Kimmel: It was not what I needed. I did not
23 command the Army in Hawaii, I had no command over them what-
24 soever. It was what the Army needed for the defense of Hawaii.

25 Mr. Richardson: In order to make my question clear, I

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1
2 am entirely familiar, Admiral, with your suggestion that it
3 is a military axiom that the Fleet is not supposed to protect
4 its own base.

5 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

6 Mr. Richardson: That is the duty of the Army. But
7 there never was a time at Hawaii, was there, Admiral, when
8 the protection of the base was not part of the duty of the
9 Fleet, under your cooperative arrangement that you made with
10 the Army in Hawaii?

11 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, if you are talking about what steps
12 I took after I came there in command, we had a condition to
13 face and not any theory.

14 Mr. Richardson: What was the condition?

15 Admiral Kimmel: The condition was that the Army had
16 a handful of planes, the Army was short of a great many things.
17 Subsequent to the effort that we made in the early days of
18 my command out there they got a few planes. They got some
19 fighters, they got some B-17 bombers. At one time the Army
20 was built up to 27 B-17's -- I think that figure is correct --
21 and we had promises of more. Then the War Department ordered
22 the bombers transferred to the Philippines and all of those
23 B-17's disappeared to the westward, along with some others,
24 except 12, and in the process of outfitting them at Hickam
25 Field they stripped 6 of those 12 planes to such an extent

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 that they were not in commission.

3 That was the way we found ourselves on December 7th.

(9)
4 Now the Army had allocated -- and I speak from memory --
5 about 180 B-17's. The Navy had allocated 160 patrol planes
6 to Oahu, and with that 160 patrol planes plus the 180 bombers --
7 and we had hopes always, you see -- this condition would have
8 been quite different.

9 The allocations were alright, but what we had was all
10 wrong.

11 Mr. Richardson: In order to properly defend the base
12 and the Fleet in connection with the base it was necessary,
13 was it not, to have Navy patrol planes to carry on that type
14 of reconnaissance which would disclose an approaching enemy
15 force in the ocean?

16 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir. And furthermore, to have
17 available a striking force of bombers and torpedoes, and
18 what not, who would go out and destroy the approaching force.
19 It does not profit you much to discover the enemy if you
20 cannot hit him with anything.

21 Mr. Richardson: And you had neither the planes with
22 which to discover nor the planes with which to hit him after
23 you discovered him?

24 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

25 Mr. Richardson: And you so advised Washington?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

3 Mr. Richardson: Now the fact is, Admiral, is it not,
4 that as a matter of naval policy you were directed to carry
5 on and maintain a defensive position in the Pacific?

6 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

7 Mr. Richardson: And the only departure that was contem-
8 plated in WPL-46 was a raiding move towards the Mandated
9 Islands?

10 Admiral Kimmel: The most important part of any defensive
11 attitude is the offensive action you take to carry it out.
12 We speak of defensive in the sense of strategic defensive,
13 not a tactical defensive.

14 Mr. Richardson: Well, with the size of Fleet that you
15 had in Hawaii during the summer of 1941 you were not in a
16 position to inaugurate a grand offensive?

17 Admiral Kimmel: No, no.

18 Mr. Richardson: Against the Japanese Fleet?

19 Admiral Kimmel: A main offensive involved going into
20 the Japanese waters. What we had there would permit us to
21 make raids on the Marshalls. This was a Navy Department
22 plan and I was carrying out the plan. We hoped to divert
23 the strength of the Japanese away from the Malay Barrier,
24 to ease the pressure on the British and Dutch, and to do
25 as much damage as we could to the enemy.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

Incidentally, we had Wake Island and we planned, in the days before Pearl Harbor, that we could use Wake Island as more or less of a bait to catch detachments of the Japanese Fleet down there.

(10) Mr. Richardson: Now, Admiral, if you had any naval disaster in the Hawaiian area, was there any place you could look for immediate aid?

Admiral Kimmel: Well, we could look for immediate aid by planes from the Coast, that they would send out.

Incidentally, I have been informed, although not in detail, that in the days immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor a great many planes of good type did appear there.

Mr. Richardson: Then the only relief they could give to you would come from the mainland?

Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes.

Mr. Richardson: And from the mainland bases?

Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

Mr. Richardson: So that, as a matter of fact, Admiral, it can be fairly stated, can it not, that your main defense for yourself in the Pacific lay in your own hands and that of the Army at Hawaii?

Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes; we were out there.

Mr. Richardson: Now you not only found when you went there, Admiral, a shortage of planes which could make

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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reconnaissance and planes which could attack upon a reconnaissance, but you also found the base deficient in anti-aircraft defenses, did you not?

Admiral Kimmel: And in fighter planes.

Mr. Richardson: Leaving the fighter planes, there was also a shortage of anti-aircraft guns, was there not?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

Mr. Richardson: And part of your requests to Washington asked for an assignment of more of those guns?

Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

Larry follows

WARD
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WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Mr. Richardson: Were they an essential part of the
3 defense of the base?

4 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I think so.

5 Mr. Richardson: Those guns would be ordinarily under
6 the control of the Army, would they not?

7 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, but we wanted additional anti-
8 aircraft guns for our outlying island bases. We requested
9 that on many occasions.

10 Incidentally, on the 29th of November of 1941, I
11 received a dispatch from the Navy Department in which the
12 -- well, here is the dispatch:

13 "Arrangements described in your 280627 appear to be
14 best that can be done under the circumstances, but suggest
15 advisability of transferring very many of 221."

16 That is a marine fighting squadron.

17 "- - - from San Diego to Hawaii via Saratoga. War
18 Department will instruct Commanding General, Hawaiian De-
19 partment to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army
20 pursuit planes and Army troops in support of marines. War
21 Department will endeavor to expedite plans for increase of
22 AA defenses, but it is doubtful if much improvement is
23 possible soon.

24 "Marine Corps will shortly receive 16 37-millimeter
25 AA guns and receive ammunition in February. You desire these

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kimmel

questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 guns for Midway and Wake. Request airmail report on
3 present defenses of all outlying bases and these increases
4 planned in immediate future."

5 When I got that dispatch, I sent another dispatch --
6 I don't see it here -- to the Navy Department in which I
7 urged that inasmuch as they were going to supply us with
8 16 37-mm AA guns for the marines in December, that they give
9 us at least 3,000 rounds of ammunition to teach the people
10 at least how to use them when they got the ammunition in
11 February.

12 Mr. Richardson: Now, was this condition that I have
13 been talking about with respect to the need of planes and
14 anti-aircraft guns and the other equipment which you felt
15 was essential to the protection of the base -- the Fleet's
16 interest in the base -- ever furnished you in sufficient
17 quantities to meet the need?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Not completely, no. And when you
19 say furnished me, you mean furnished the Army in Hawaii?

20 Mr. Richardson: Yes. Admiral, I plead guilty to the
21 fact of not being able all the while to separate in my
22 mind the Army and the Navy in Hawaii, but that is due to
23 the fact, and I am going to ask you whether you didn't
24 enter into a cooperative defense arrangement in late 1941
25 in which you were both for one and one for both?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Admiral Kimmel: I entered into that early in February
3 of 1941. I issued a letter which is entitled 2 CL-41. The
4 date of the first letter was early in February, and about
5 two or three weeks later we replied to that. I wanted to
6 get something out right away and that is the reason we
7 hurried with the first one.

8 Two or three weeks later we revised it, and issued
9 another one in the latter part of February and by that
10 time we felt that we had covered the point with the equipment
11 and the forces we had in pretty good shape.

12 That letter stood until the 14th of October of 1941,
13 when we issued another letter.

14 Incidentally, I might tell you a little bit about my
15 activities in regard to getting an agreement betwixt the
16 air forces out there. Immediately I got this responsibility,
17 or knew I was going to have it, I started to work on the
18 Army and when General Short arrived, I went out to call
19 on General Short before he had taken over his command. I
20 went out in civilian clothes. I realized the importance
21 of cooperation betwixt the services.

22 I found General Short a very likable gentleman, and
23 subsequently a very able Army officer. I broached the
24 subject of some kind of an agreement whereby the efforts
25 of the Army air and the Navy air could be coordinated on

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h4

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2 the Island of Oahu and in the Hawaiian area.

3 I found General Short very much of the same mind, and
4 we set in motion the studies which eventually resulted in
5 the agreement to use what we had jointly.

6 That agreement was sent on to Washington. Eventually,
7 we got out the estimate of the situation, which Admiral
8 Bellinger and General Martin had a great deal to do with
9 drawing up, and the coordination betwixt the two services
10 was of a higher degree there than any other area that I
11 had ever known prior to that time.

12 I issued an order that every Navy squadron of planes
13 on wheels was to land on each of the Army fields, and to
14 be serviced there and to get ammunition and bombs so they
15 would know how to do it, and General Short did the same
16 thing for the Army.

17 Now, those were the steps that we took in trying
18 to utilize to the best advantage the facilities and the
19 forces that we had.

20 Mr. Richardson: Those steps were made necessary,
21 Admiral, by your shortage in equipment?

22 Admiral Kimmel: No, in any event it would have been
23 very desirable, especially as regard air. I am talking
24 now of the air of the Army and the air of the Navy, which
25 was temporarily based on shore at any one time.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Mr. Richardson: Then, as a matter of fact, Admiral,
3 for the Navy you did assume a protection to the base which,
4 under better conditions you wouldn't have had to assume?

5 Admiral Kimmel: I tried to insure that we would have
6 all of our forces actively take part in the defense of the
7 Islands.

8 Mr. Richardson: You had become quite familiar with
9 Hawaii?

10 Admiral Kimmel: I don't know what you mean.

11 Mr. Richardson: You knew that 40 percent of the people
12 in Hawaii were of Japanese ancestry?

13 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, I knew that.

14 Mr. Richardson: You knew that there was in Hawaii
15 a very numerous and highly developed Japanese espionage
16 system?

17 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I had an idea that that might
18 be so.

19 Mr. Richardson: The conditions were ideal for
20 the building of such a system, were they not?

21 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct, and in the summer
22 of 1941 there was numerous consular agents there. The
23 Commandant of the District, who handled all of those
24 matters for the Fleet and for the Navy --

25 Mr. Richardson: That was Admiral Bloch?

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h6

2 Admiral Kimmel: Admiral Bloch. Recommended they
3 put them all in the jug. That is in effect what he
4 recommended. The Army thought that wasn't a good idea,
5 and they recommended against it.

6 This bounced back and forward and I believe that --
7 I have since found out, or since then informed that the
8 Secretary of War was the man who finally decided that no
9 action should be taken against these people. What his
10 reasons were, I don't know.

11 Mr. Richardson: And in dealing with such a group,
12 did you find any difficulties in your way by reason of
13 the law in connection with wire tapping, or the tapping
14 of cables and other means by which messages could be trans-
15 mitted from Hawaii to Tokyo?

16 Admiral Kimmel: I think I did find some difficulties
17 yes. I, of course, took an interest in all of these matters.
18 I was more concerned with the information they obtained
19 than the means they took to obtain it. And, as I have
20 said, that phase of the Pacific Fleet's operations, whatever
21 responsibility the Navy had in Hawaii, was directly under
22 Admiral Bloch.

23 I have every reason to believe that Admiral Bloch did
24 everything within his power.

25 Mr. Richardson: Well, with that large group of Japanese

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 agents free in Hawaii, you knew, did you not, Admiral,
3 that they knew everything with respect to the disposition
4 of the base, its defense and the movement of ships in and
5 out of the base, that you knew?

6 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I wouldn't go so far as that.
7 I would say that they could know the movements of the
8 ships in and out of the base, but I hoped then that we
9 were able to keep a good many things from them. When all
10 of the disclosures were made about what they knew at Pearl
11 Harbor, I found we hadn't been quite so successful as
12 we thought we had been.

13 Mr. Richardson: There was no reason, was there, why
14 an intelligent group of spies, such as these, couldn't
15 keep an active watch on what was happening on every air-
16 field in Oahu?

17 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I imagine they did pretty
18 well, because they could go up in the hills and look down,

19 Mr. Richardson: And if the planes on the various
20 air fields were bunched together, it would be very easy
21 for them to find it out?

22 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I don't know about that.

23 Mr. Richardson: All they would have to do is use
24 their eyes, wouldn't that be so?

25 Admiral Kimmel: I should say so.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h8

2 Mr. Richardson: You had always discovered in your
3 talks and conferences concerning the Japanese that they
4 were an ardent, competent, intelligent people in connec-
5 tion with such a subject as espionage?

6 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes.

7 Mr. Richardson: And they were not afraid?

8 Admiral Kimmel: They were most industrious.

9 Mr. Richardson: They never were afraid?

10 Admiral Kimmel: They were industrious. I don't go
11 with all the rest of that.

12 Mr. Richardson: They never were afraid of hard work?

13 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir.

14 Mr. Richardson: Well, then, would you be surprised
15 now to find that the Japanese spies were unable to find
16 out the number of available planes that the Army and the
17 Navy had in Hawaii during 1941?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, I think they knew that; they
19 must have known it.

20 Mr. Richardson: You knew, of course, that whatever
21 they knew, they were free to send to Tokyo?

22 Admiral Kimmel: Well, they were much freer than I
23 knew they were.

24 Mr. Richardson: Every method of transmission between
25 Hawaii and Tokyo was open to them, was it not?

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir; but you must remember
3 that I had something else to do besides running around
4 finding out what the Japanese knew. I had competent
5 officers there to do everything within their power. I
6 believe they did do everything within their power.

7 Mr. Richardson: I understand that. When I say "you"
8 Admiral, it is a rather editorial "you."

9 Admiral Kimmel: All right, sir.

10 Mr. Richardson: I mean that you knew, as the Commanding
11 Officer, the extent and possibility of Japanese espionage
12 in Hawaii?

13 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

14 Mr. Richardson: And it was your duty as a Commanding
15 Officer, to fear the worst with respect to the amount of
16 things they could find out?

17 Admiral Kimmel: We feared the worst, alright. We
18 feared it all the time.

19 In connection with this, you mentioned something
20 about the bunching of planes. This is something about
21 which my part has never been presented to anybody so far
22 as I know.

23 I ran across this letter, which I knew I had issued
24 on September 23, 1941, and this is a letter which deals
25 with the security of aircraft in the Hawaiian area from

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h10

2 air attack at fields or stations. I don't know whether
3 it is necessary to read the whole letter, but in it I
4 direct the Commandant of the District to take steps to
5 insure at all times the maximum dispersion of aircraft
6 at the various fields, and naval stations there.

7 Mr. Richardson: Why?

8 Admiral Kimmel: Because it was the sensible thing
9 to do.

10 Mr. Richardson: I ask again why was it sensible?
11 What were you trying to effectuate by objecting to the
12 bunching of planes on airfields?

13 Admiral Kimmel: I was reading at all times, the
14 results of the war in Europe. We were trying to put into
15 effect in Hawaii every single thing that would help us
16 in the defense of Hawaii in the event of an air attack
17 or in the event of any other kind of an attack.

18 I tried to overlook nothing, and this was just one
19 of the steps.

20 Now, this was a thing that could be done and should
21 be done and I presumed was done to the limit of the facili-
22 ties that we had there at that time.

23 Mr. Richardson: Well, if the planes were all bunched
24 up close, wing tip to wing tip, it would take a consider-
25 able amount of time to get them in a position where they

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 could take off and go into the air?

3 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, no, I don't think it would take
4 much more time. They could be bunched wing tip to wing tip
5 and you could run one out at a time and get them out quick-
6 ly.

7 Mr. Richardson: What did you think, was the primary
8 danger by way of attack to the Pearl Harbor base?

9 Admiral Kimmel: Well, the Pearl Harbor base, the
10 principal danger from attack to the Pearl Harbor base was
11 from the air, of course.

12 Mr. Richardson: You pointed that out, did you not,
13 over again in your correspondence with the Chief of Naval
14 Operations?

15 Admiral Kimmel: Yes; but there is another form of
16 attack in the Hawaiian area, and that was a submarine
17 attack on the base as divorced from the whole area. The
18 primary form of attack was probably by air, if any attack
19 came.

20 Mr. Richardson: I think, Mr. Chairman, in view of
21 the Admiral's suggestion as to this letter, since we have
22 been furnished with copies, it might be well to have it
23 made an exhibit, and circulated with the committee.

24 The Vice Chairman: Why not just read it into the
25 record?

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Mr. Murphy: It would be better to spread it in the
3 record so it will be tied up with the testimony at this
4 point.

5 Mr. Richardson: I have no objection.

6 The Vice Chairman: Proceed to read it, Admiral.

7 Admiral Kimmel: (Reading):

8 "UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

9 U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

10 "CinCPAC File No.

11 A16-3/AD/(95)

"Pearl Harbor, T. H.

12 Serial 01504

September 23, 1941.

13 "CONFIDENTIAL

14 From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

15 To: Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

16 Subject: Security of Aircraft, Hawaiian Area, from
17 Air Attacks at Fields or Stations.

18 "1. The Commander-in-Chief desires that provision
19 be made for maximum security of Fleet aircraft in the
20 Hawaiian area from air attack while on the ground or
21 water.

22 "2. As amply demonstrated by current war experience,
23 both dispersal and protection where dispersed are funda-
24 mental requirements. Movement of aircraft units to various
25 available fields or locations and individual dispersal
at these locations are primarily operational responsi-

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 bilities. Provisions for this individual dispersal and
3 for passive protection, however, are under the cognizance
4 of the District.

5 "3. Because of the large size of patrol planes and
6 the need for solid surfaces for these planes when on shore,
7 less can be done for their individual dispersal and protec-
8 tion than for landplanes. It must be handled primarily
9 by maximum intervals between planes on parking platforms
10 and maximum provision of well separated moorings of all
11 patrol plane operating points.

12 "4. Much can and must be done, however, for indivi-
13 dual landplane dispersal and protection. Ideally, there
14 should be separate 'stalls' at each landplane field or
15 runway where, during emergency conditions, all planes that
16 may need to operate from a given field can be placed while
17 on the ground. It should be possible to taxi planes readily
18 to and from these points without undue delay in operating
19 speed. These points should, further, be arranged in other
20 than straight lines so as not to provide consecutive targets
21 for attacking planes. Revetments for averting and localizing
22 damage should be provided around each stall.

23 "5. For both patrol planes (when on shore) and land-
24 planes, suitable concealment camouflage should be developed
25 and provided. The net type is suggested.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 "6. The Commander-in-Chief understands that action
3 along the above lines is already being taken by the Army
4 in this area. He also understands that studies are in
5 progress for dispersal construction at Ewa Field." --
6 That is a marine field. -- "He considers that dispersal
7 construction should be undertaken at all fields under
8 naval control in the Hawaiian Area and on the outlying
9 islands. These on the Island of Oahu are of primary import-
10 ance and should have first priority. It is recognized
11 that what can be accomplished on Ford Island will, because
12 of space restrictions, be far from ideal, but the best
13 possible solution should be sought.

14 "7. Because of the close relationship of dispersal
15 construction requirements with active operations, it is
16 important that all phases of dispersal be simultaneously
17 considered and coordinated. Accordingly, Commander Aircraft
18 Battle Force and Commander Patrol Wing Two are directed to
19 consult with the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District as
20 to plans and requirements. The objective is the earliest
21 possible provision of both the necessary construction and
22 suitable operating doctrine.

H. E. Kimmel

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson
Senator Lucas

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Compatwing TWO."

Senator Lucas: May I inquire, Mr. Counsel, what is the date of that?

Admiral Kimmel: I beg your pardon?

Senator Lucas: What is the date of that again, Admiral?

Admiral Kimmel: 23 September, 1941.

And I might add that the Navy at Kaneohe Bay had dispersed their patrol planes to the maximum extent possible. Over there they had anchored out quite a number of patrol planes. They had done the same thing at other Naval fields out there.

On the day of the attack every single one of the patrol planes that was anchored out was destroyed because they were sunk at the moorings, and the ones that were more or less bunched on the ramps, most of them were saved because they could get to them and put out the fires.

Mr. Richardson: Admiral, the United States lost about 3,000 men in that attack, did they not?

Admiral Kimmel: Something on that order.

Mr. Richardson: Can you tell me where the great bulk of losses came? Was it on board ship, or was it in connec-

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 with trying to get the planes off?

3 Admiral Kimmel: I think the major part of the losses
4 were on shipboard. That is something you can verify very
5 readily.

6 Mr. Richardson: Now, throughout 1941 and up to the
7 early fall, pretty near every communication you had with
8 the Chief of Naval Operations referred to the possibility
9 of air attack?

10 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

11 No, that isn't right. It didn't refer to the possi-
12 bility of air attack. Nearly every communication I had
13 from the Navy Department did not refer to the possibility
14 of air attack. It referred in greater or less degree to
15 the supply of material which we thought we needed out there.

16 Mr. Richardson: Well, in every one of your letters
17 where the subject of an attack on Hawaii was discussed,
18 the possibility of an air attack was presented by you as
19 one of the hazards of the base?

20 Admiral Kimmel: There was always that possibility.
21 I wanted that base to be secure over an indefinite period
22 and to meet any eventuality that war might bring forward.

23 I wanted it to be able to defend itself even though
24 the Pacific Fleet were wiped out.

25 Mr. Richardson: And so far as ships in Pearl Harbor

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 were concerned, the danger that they would suffer from
3 a submarine attack would be less than they might suffer
4 from an air attack?

5 Admiral Kimmel: We thought that the danger from sub-
6 marine attack in Pearl Harbor was nil -- nothing.

7 Mr. Richardson: That is right.

8 Admiral Kimmel: We had at the entrance of the Harbor
9 an anti-torpedo net. We didn't have an anti-submarine net.
10 We knew of no submarines which could enter the harbor
11 entirely submerged and this two-man submarine that did
12 enter the harbor submerged was an entirely new type and
13 something of which we had no knowledge.

14 Incidentally, I think the two-man submarine never paid
15 for itself. The only one that ever got in to that harbor
16 they sank very promptly, and its two torpedoes were dis-
17 charged harmlessly.

18 Mr. Richardson: Then your discussion of a submarine
19 attack had reference to damages to the Fleet in the open
20 sea?

21 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, in the operating areas around --
22 in the sea around Pearl Harbor.

23 Mr. Richardson: With reference to the hazard to the
24 base that lay in a possible air attack?

25 Admiral Kimmel: Yes. That appeared to be the only means

Witness Kimmel

questions by; Mr. Richardson

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2 that they could take to get in to do any damage to the
3 Fleet at that time.

4 Mr. Richardson: Now, with respect to an air attack,
5 you had to have a suitable fleet of reconnaissance planes
6 that could carry on a distant reconnaissance in an attempt
7 to locate an attacking enemy force before their planes
8 could leave their carriers for attack?

9 Admiral Kimmel: And to have a striking force to go
10 out and sink the carriers.

11 Mr. Richardson: The second thing that you had to have,
12 passing from the question of patrol planes for distant
13 reconnaissance, was a suitable fleet of fighters that
14 could do some fighting after you found the enemy?

15 Admiral Kimmel: No, the fighters, the pursuit planes,
16 which we call them in the Navy, fighters are defensive.
17 They are to knock down the planes after the attack is
18 launched. And the only real defense against an airplane
19 attack from carriers, is to discover the carriers and to
20 sink the carriers before they can launch the planes. And
21 those are bombing planes, long range bombing planes.

22 Mr. Richardson: And it is a fact, is it not, Admiral,
23 that once the planes leave a carrier in quantity for an
24 attack it is a very difficult matter to prevent some of
25 those planes from reaching their objective?

Witness Kimmel

questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

Mr. Richardson: And however good your defense may have been against the attack on December 7, you, as a Naval man, would be surprised if some of the attacking planes had not come through and reached their targets?

Admiral Kimmel: Those were the lessons that we had learned from the war in Europe at that time. We had learned those lessons from our own maneuvers.

We had staged many attacks on Pearl Harbor ourselves as a matter of training, and those same principles and facts have been demonstrated many, many times during the four years that have elapsed since that time.

Mr. Richardson: Now, in addition to the subject of planes, patrol and fighters, it was essential to a proper defense of an attack on the base that you have, that there be available a proper number of anti-aircraft guns?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, as an immediate defense.

Mr. Richardson: Did you have such in Hawaii at that time?

Admiral Kimmel: We didn't have such on our ships. The anti-aircraft batteries of all our ships, and particularly the battleships, were woefully inadequate. It was something that a great many of us had known for many years, and that somehow or other we hadn't been able to remedy.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 And the thing we were particularly deficient in was the
3 short range anti-aircraft guns. That deficiency we were
4 in the process of remedying at the time the attack came
5 on Pearl Harbor.

6 Today battleships, I don't know the number, but they
7 have hundreds of anti-aircraft guns. On the battleships
8 that we had out there we had 12 or 15, maybe 20 altogether
9 of all types. Fifty calibres. And no real short-range
10 anti-aircraft guns.

11 I mean, so few as to be almost negligible.

12 Mr. Richardson: The land-based anti-aircraft guns
13 were under the control of the Army?

14 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

15 Mr. Richardson: Did you ever make an inspection of
16 the anti-aircraft batteries of the Army?

17 Admiral Kimmel: No.

18 Mr. Richardson: Do you know how many they had?

19 Admiral Kimmel: In general, it has been reported to
20 me.

21 Mr. Richardson: Had you made the subject of their guns
22 or their number a matter for definite examination by members
23 of your staff?

24 Admiral Kimmel: No. The number of anti-aircraft guns
25 had been reported. I don't know what you mean by definite

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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examination by members of my staff.

You mean to go out and look at them?

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Mr. Richardson: That is what I meant.

3 Admiral Kimmel: So far as I know, no.

4 Now, this question of numbers of guns was treated in
5 correspondence and you will recall that that subject was taken
6 up by Admiral Bloch and in December of 1940 he prepared a let-
7 ter. Richardson had had a conference with the commanding
8 General, General Herron, out there and this letter was pre-
9 pared by Bloch and forwarded by Richardson and apparently
10 that started the correspondence betwixt the Secretary of
11 War and Secretary of the Navy and when I saw that correspond-
12 ence I had high hopes that we were going to get what every-
13 body seemed to admit was required in Hawaii.

14 Mr. Richardson: But you knew you had not gotten them?

15 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I knew we had not gotten them and
16 in the quantities -- they got some but they had not gotten
17 them in the quantities that they thought were necessary.

18 Mr. Richardson: Did you have any knowledge, or did you
19 direct any member of your staff to get specific knowledge as
20 to the status of readiness of the Army's anti-aircraft bat-
21 teries immediately prior to the attack on December 7th?

22 Admiral Kimmel: That was a matter which was covered in
23 my Fleet Security Order and all of that work was delegated
24 to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, who was the
25 Naval Base defense officer, he was also the commander of the

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, and as I indicated yesterday, with
3 General Short was charged with the defense of the Hawaiian
4 Coastal Frontier by the Navy Department and as a naval base
5 defense officer to coordinate whatever fleet effort could be
6 available with that of the Army, and I read from specification
7 "G" of 2 CL-41, dated October the 14th, 1941:

8 "(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is
9 the Naval Base Defense Officer. As such he shall:

10 "(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory con-
11 trol over the defense against air attack.

12 "(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-
13 aircraft guns emplaced.

14 "(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-
15 based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing
16 TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the
17 Army and Navy.

18 "(d) Coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the
19 base defense by:

20 "(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl
21 Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S.
22 Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

23 "(2) Holding necessary drills.

24 "(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal,
25 all clear signal.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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"(4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

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"(5) Arranging communication plan.

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"(6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed."

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Admiral Bloch, I might say, was the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet just prior to Admiral Richardson. Admiral Richardson relieved him as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet. I relieved Richardson, as you recall.

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Admiral Bloch was an accomplished officer, an officer in whom I had the highest confidence and still have and I had turned over this matter to him, not to a member of my immediate staff, and he did, I believe, a great many things. You will get him here, you will have him testify.

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Mr. Richardson: Well, did you understand, Admiral, that it was Bloch's duty under your direction to see to it that the Army anti-aircraft batteries were in a state of readiness to defend that base?

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Admiral Kimmel: Well, insofar as the Navy had any responsibility for it, yes, but now I think maybe it would be well for me to go into that a little bit in regard to General Short's alert.

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In the late afternoon of November 27, 1941, Captain Earle, Admiral Bloch's Chief of Staff, brought to me a copy

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 of the message which General Marshall had sent to General
3 Short. General Short had sent a copy to the Naval Base De-
4 fense Officer, Admiral Bloch. I read General Marshall's mes-
5 sage. I noted the language that Short's measures were not to
6 alarm the civilian population or disclose intent. I also noted
7 the order directing General Short to report the measures taken
8 by him to General Marshall. The officer who brought me the
9 message informed me, "The Army has gone on an alert." The
10 next morning my Chief of Staff confirmed this report with
11 information about Army troop movements.

12 I conferred with General Short on November 28 about the
13 messages each of us had received on the 27th. We discussed
14 these dispatches in all aspects. We considered, as we did
15 frequently before and did later, the probabilities and pos-
16 sibilities of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. In this connec-
17 tion there was discussion of the effect of the suggestion from
18 Washington that fifty Army pursuit planes be sent by aircraft
19 carriers to Wake and Midway. I understood the Army was on an
20 alert and that the alert was against sabotage among other
21 things, although I do not now recall General Short specific-
22 ally mentioning the details of his alert.

23 During 1941 I went to sea with the Fleet on maneuvers
24 whenever that was possible. I also expected that if war came
25 and the Fleet left Pearl Harbor on an operation, I would be

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 far from Pearl Harbor. Consequently, I knew there was need
3 to have a Naval officer permanently based in Pearl Harbor to
4 coordinate the use of the Naval units which might be in Pearl
5 Harbor at that time in the Base Defense. If you refer to my
6 Fleet Security Order, 2CL-41, Exhibit 44, Item 12, you will
7 find the following provisions:

8 "(G) (6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District
9 is the Naval Base Defense Officer. As such he shall:

10 "(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory con-
11 trol over the defense against air attack.

12 "(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-
13 aircraft guns emplaced.

14 "(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-
15 based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing
16 TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the
17 Army and Navy.

18 "(d) Coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the
19 base defense by:

20 "(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl
21 Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S.
22 Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

23 "(2) Holding necessary drills.

24 "(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal,
25 all clear signal.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 "(4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of
3 the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

4 "(5) Arranging communication plan.

5 "(6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm
6 signal prescribed."

7 Admiral Bloch, the Commandant of the Fourteenth
8 Naval District was the Naval Base Defense Officer. He was
9 invariably in attendance at my conferences with General Short.
10 He has testified at some length before the Naval Court as to
11 his activities prior to the attack in carrying out the duties
12 assigned to him under the provisions of my orders which I have
13 just read. He will be a witness here. I do not wish to an-
14 ticipate his testimony. However, I will give you certain
15 high-lights of his activities, as testified to before the
16 Naval Court of Inquiry, because I was generally familiar with
17 them prior to the attack.

18 In February 1941 he had urged upon General Short the ne-
19 cessity of emplacing his mobile anti-aircraft guns in the
20 field. He personally examined the plans for location of all
21 Army anti-aircraft weapons that were to be emplaced. His sub-
22 ordinates were in constant touch with Army representatives.

23 In October or November 1941 General Short had explained
24 to him the difficulties General Short had emplacing certain
25 of the Army's mobile anti-aircraft guns. Sites were not on

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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government land. Fire control communications were out in weather and subject to deterioration. It was difficult for personnel comprising the gun crews to be quartered and subsisted.

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To help obviate this last problem for the Army, the Navy was actually making arrangements on December 7 to mess and quarter Army gun crews on Navy reservations.

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I considered I had done everything I could prior to the attack to strengthen the Army anti-aircraft defense of Pearl Harbor. As late as December 2, in an official letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, I pointed out that "The Army is not only lacking anti-aircraft guns for outlying bases, but has a serious shortage on Oahu." I had appointed a responsible Naval officer to exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack and to arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced. From everything I knew, he had been active and diligent in following the matter up. Of course, the Army had its difficulties, some of which I have mentioned. Neither I nor Admiral Bloch could solve them. Moreover, if I had constantly intruded into the day-to-day coordination of Admiral Bloch and General Short on this matter I might very well have undone all my Security Order, 2 CL-41, was designed to accomplish - the working out of a permanent Army-Navy local defense coordin-

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 ation which would have to continue in my absence and that of
3 the Fleet.

4 I knew that General Short had been ordered to report the
5 measures he took in response to his message of November 27
6 from General Marshall. This meant the joint participation of
7 General Marshall and General Short in the character of the
8 alert assumed in Hawaii. I thought that General Marshall and
9 General Short knew better than I what specific Army measures
10 should be adopted to perform adequately the Army mission of
11 defending the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor and at the same time
12 of complying with the restrictions involved of not alarming
13 the civilian population nor disclosing intent.

14 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, could I inquire from what the
15 witness is reading? Is it from a previous record or what?

16 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Murphy has inquired, Admiral,
17 as to what it is you have been reading from?

18 Admiral Kimmel: A memorandum which I prepared.

19 Mr. Murphy: Your own memorandum?

20 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

21 Mr. Murphy: All right.

22 Mr. Richardson: Did you know, Admiral, what General
23 Short's first alert was?

24 Admiral Kimmel: You mean No. 1 alert, as you call it?

25 Mr. Richardson: That is it.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Admiral Kimmel: I did not know he had but one kind of an
3 alert.

4 Mr. Richardson: What kind of alert did you think he had?

5 Admiral Kimmel: I thought he had an alert where he put
6 his people on the alert.

7 Mr. Richardson: Did you know at the time you talked with
8 General Short that his No. 1 alert was simply against sabotage?

9 Admiral Kimmel: I did not know he had a No. 1 alert. I
10 think I have found out since, however, that this No. 1, 2
11 and 3 alert business was put into effect on the 5th of Novem-
12 ber of 1941. Prior to that they had an alert and a non-alert
13 status.

14 Mr. Richardson: Did you know from any conversation you
15 had with General Short or any reported to you by your staff
16 that Short had responded to the dispatch from Marshall with a
17 notice on his part to Marshall that he had put in this first
18 alert against sabotage?

19 Admiral Kimmel: I never saw Short's reply and was never
20 informed of it.

21 Mr. Richardson: You never knew anything about it?

22 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

23 Mr. Richardson: In your opinion, under the circumstances
24 that there faced you would an alert against sabotage have
25 been in accordance with what you were contemplating under
the order that you have just referred to concerning a defense

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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of Pearl Harbor?

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Admiral Kimmel: I had taken the steps to put the ships of the Fleet on an alert some time before, - I mean to put them in shape where they could go on an alert very quickly a long time before. I had provided, - I mean I had made sure that the ammunition for the guns was available, that the crews were on board and that a certain proportion of them would be manning the guns. At sea we had full security measures in effect and in port we had the security measures in effect which we felt that the situation demanded at the time and there was very little more that we could have done in port than what we did.

Mr. Richardson: Well, now, did you contemplate, Admiral, in connection with your assignment of duties to Admiral Bloch, that he should inform himself of the question of the readiness of the anti-aircraft batteries of the Army?

Admiral Kimmel: That was the Army's responsibility and there were two separate commands in Hawaii. There was the Army command and there was the Navy command and when the Army said they were on an alert I thought they knew their business and I had every reason to think so because General Short is a very capable officer.

Mr. Richardson: Well, if it should be found to be the fact that only one battery of anti-aircraft guns were in readi-

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 ness, that none of the othe guns had ammunition, some not
3 nearer than 75 yards and some not nearer than 500 yards from
4 the gun placements, would, in your opinion, that have been a
5 form of alert against an attack on the base that you thought
6 the Army had in effect at the time of your discussion with
7 General Short or at the time of any directions you may have
8 given to Admiral Bloch?

9 Admiral Kimmel: My best answer to that is to call your
10 attention to the steps that I took.

11 Mr. Richardson: Now, Admiral, one more subject I want
12 to bring up at this point.

13 In addition to the question of the use of planes to de-
14 fend against an air attack and in addition to the use of anti-
15 aircraft guns to defend against an air attack there is one more
16 method, is there not, by which you can help and get ready to
17 defend yourself and that is radar?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

19 Mr. Richardson: Now, as I understood your statement, you
20 suggested that there had been supplied at long last to the
21 Fleet vvarious radar equipment?

22 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

23 Mr. Richardson: And that in connection with the use of
24 that equipment and as an aid to the Army you took with you a
25 number of men designated by the Army on your ships in order to

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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familiarize them with radar?

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Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

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Mr. Richardson: And it is a fact, is it not, that there was to be supplied to the Army in Hawaii a number of so-called mobile radar sets and a number of radar sets that were to have fixed land locations?

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Admiral Kimmel: I think that is true.

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Mr. Richardson: And you knew prior to December 7th by a report from General Short or under his authority that the mobile radar sets were operating and were in shape to operate?

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Admiral Kimmel: I will put it this way: I could not concern myself with whether the Army had mobile radar sets or fixed radar sets. I knew they had radar which could give a coverage, I had been so informed by General Short, and whether they were mobile or fixed I do not recall whether I knew that or not. I knew something of the plans but just which ones they had in operation, my knowledge of that prior to the attack, which ones they had in operation, was sketchy. I knew they had sets in operation, that they could give us coverage and I was so informed.

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Mr. Richardson: Now, Admiral, there was no way within the instrument itself at that time by which you could tell through radar whether approaching planes were enemy planes or friendly planes?

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Admiral Kimmel: That is right, and that was something
3 that we had urgently requested because we realized from the
4 time that radar first came out there that that was going to be
5 one of the great difficulties.

6 Mr. Richardson: And in order to make a practical use --

7 Admiral Kimmel: Such a device was in existence, you know.

8 Mr. Richardson: But you did not have it?

9 Admiral Kimmel: We did not have it.

10 Mr. Richardson: So the only way you could allow for that
11 would be to try and orient planes that would be discovered on
12 radar with your own information as to where your own planes
13 might be?

14 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

15 Mr. Richardson: So that if a radar set operating on
16 Hawaii should find on the chart approaching planes, the only
17 way of telling whether those planes were friendly planes or
18 enemy planes would be to have available the information where
19 the friendly planes that you knew of were?

20 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

21 Mr. Richardson: Well, now, in order to do that you would
22 have to have, would you not, established what is known as an
23 information center and that to that information center would
24 come the reports from the various radar sections of what they
25 discovered and then there would be at the radar center appro-

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 priately assigned men who from their knowledge of where our
3 paines were could make a deduction as to whether the p lanes
4 shown were or were not friendly planes?

5 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, they had to have that knowledge and
6 the only way they would get that knowledge and keep up to date
7 was to be in communication with the operating agencies. All
8 they had to do was to get in communication and even then it would
9 be a very difficult thing to do.

10 Mr. Richardson: Yes, I presume so, because you never
11 could be exactly sure where your own planes were?

12 Admiral Kimmel: No, you could never be exactly sure where
13 your own planes were and with some of the -- well, I will say
14 half trained pilots we had out there at that time, they were
15 fine boys and no fault of theirs, but they did not always go
16 and do exactly what they were told to do.

17 Mr. Richardson: Well, now, if on the morning of December
18 7th a radar station had located an approaching group of planes,
19 the next step would have been to have communicated that in-
20 formation instantly to an information center?

21 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

22 Mr. Richardson: And then at the information center there
23 should be representatives familiar with the supposed where-
24 abouts of any friendly planes, either Navy or Army?

25 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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18 7th a radar station had located an approaching group of planes,
19 the next step would have been to have communicated that in-
20 formation instantly to an information center?

21 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

22 Mr. Richardson: And then at the information center there
23 should be representatives familiar with the supposed where-
24 abouts of any friendly planes, either Navy or Army?

25 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Mr. Richardson: So that would require at the informa-
3 tion center Army representatives to do that job and Navy
4 representatives to do that job?

5 Admiral Kimmel: Not necessarily.

6 Mr. Richardson: Why not?

7 Admiral Kimmel: A Navy man has no God-given faculty for
8 telling where Navy planes are. He has to work with the naval
9 operators to get it. An Army man properly trained could do it
10 just about as well as a Navy man. Any individual put in there
11 and trained and told where to get his information could have
12 done it.

13 Mr. Richardson: Then it would be the duty of the rep-
14 resentative, let us say, of the Navy at the information center
15 to communicate where he had been educated to communicate to
16 find out whether there were Navy planes in the sector from which
17 these approaching planes had been seen?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I never operated an information
19 center, I have never had anything to do with an information
20 center such as this. That was purely and entirely an Army
21 function. I presumed that the steps necessary to make the
22 information center or the radar information, you might say,
23 effective had been taken. I did not go to the information cent-
24 er.

25 Now, one other thing: There would be in a case like Hawaii

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 not one Navy representative as you call him, one man to look
3 out for Navy affairs, but one man perhaps to look out for the
4 patrol planes, another man to look out for the planes at
5 Wheeler Field, another to look out for the battleship planes,
6 to look out for what not. Now, how many men would be required
7 is a question of experience and whether that man who sits
8 there and is responsible for a segment or detachment of planes
9 is an Army man or a Navy man is immaterial so long as he gets
10 the information and knows where to get it.

11 Now, suppose -- I will anticipate a question a little
12 bit. I had a letter from General Short. He asked me on 5
13 August 1941 in a letter to detail an officer from my head-
14 quarters to serve as liaison officer betwixt my headquarters
15 and his.

16 Senator Lucas: Is that an exhibit, Mr. Counsel?

17 Admiral Kimmel: Sir?

18 Senator Lucas: Is that in an exhibit?

19 Admiral Kimmel: I think not. I have it here, you can
20 have it. It has been passed to the committee, I am informed.

21 Senator Lucas: Thank you.

22 Admiral Kimmel: On August 16th I replied to that letter
23 and assigned my Fleet Communications Officer, Commander Maurice
24 L. E. Curts, to act as a liaison officer.

25 Now, Commander Curts was to assist him. My understanding

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 and my intention at the time was that Commander Curtis was to
3 assist him in any way he could in technical matters. I never
4 had any request from General Short at any time to detail any
5 watch standards in the communications center, the information
6 center, and I would not have expected him to request me as
7 Commander-in-Chief to detail these officers. I would not have
8 expected him to ask Admiral Bloch to detail the officers and
9 I think you will get from Admiral Bloch whatever steps that
10 were taken there.

11 Now, I did detail an additional officer to General Short
12 at the request of the Army, I think it was General Short's
13 request, a Lieutenant Taylor. Lieutenant Taylor had been in
14 Britain and he had some knowledge of the operational difficul-
15 ties of an information center and I turned Lieutenant Taylor
16 over to the Army completely for the time being, to give them
17 whatever assistance he could in advising them as to the oper-
18 ation of an information center.

19 Now, you must realize that we had had many drills in
20 Hawaii, during which time this information center, to the best
21 of my knowledge and belief, was operating and in shape. The
22 Commandant of the District reported to me that successful
23 drills were conducted. He had the men who conducted drills
24 insofar as the Navy was concerned. I never inspected the
25 information center and I never went into the organization of

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 the information center and I was under the conviction, you
3 might say, from the conversations that I had had with General
4 Short and also with General Davidson, who was in command of
5 the Fighter Group and the information center, General Davidson
6 had told me of some of the results that they had obtained and
7 they appeared to be quite satisfactory to me.

8 The Vice Chairman: Does that complete your answer, Ad-
9 miral?

10 Admiral Kimmel: That is all I want to say.

11 The Vice Chairman: It is now 12:30. The committee will
12 recess until 2 o'clock.

13 (Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock P.M., a recess was
14 taken until 2:00 o'clock P.M. of the same day.)
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AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 p.m.

The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything further before resuming the examination?

Mr. Richardson: Yes, Mr. Chairman. There are two more compilations of the records which have been referred to by Admiral Kimmel which we would like to offer in evidence at this time as exhibits.

Mr. Masten: The first is a compilation of letters, of eight letters, the first of which is dated August 16, 1941, on the top of the compilation, all having to do with aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department. We believe these should be offered as Exhibit 122.

The Vice Chairman: Just a moment.

Mr. Masten: They were distributed to the committee near the close of the morning hearing.

The Vice Chairman: Give us the date and description again, please.

Mr. Masten: The top letter is one dated August 16, 1941 from Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, regarding aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department.

The Vice Chairman: That is Exhibit what?

Mr. Masten: 122.

WARD & PAUL - WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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J. C. MONTGOMERY, JR., WASHINGTON, D. C.

The Vice Chairman: It will be received as Exhibit 122.

(The documents referred to were marked as Exhibit No. 122.)

Mr. Masten: The second is a group of communications, copies of which were distributed to the committee a few minutes ago, having to do with the question of the construction of a combined operating center in Hawaii. The top communication is a message from OPNAV to Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, dated October 15, 1941.

We offer those as Exhibit 123.

The Vice Chairman: It will be received as Exhibit 123.

(The documents referred to were marked as Exhibit No. 123.)

Mr. Masten: That is all we have, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman: Does counsel have anything further at this point before resuming the examination?

Mr. Richardson: No, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman: Admiral Kimmel, do you have anything at this point before the examination is resumed?

Admiral Kimmel: No, sir, I don't.

The Vice Chairman: Counsel will proceed.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL

(Resumed)

Mr. Richardson: Admiral, are we to understand from your

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 testimony that there was an Information Center in operation
3 in connection with the Army radar?

4 Admiral Kimmel: You would understand from my testimony
5 that the radar had been operated; that orders had been given
6 to planes in drills. I did not know the condition of the
7 operating center, Information Center, and I did not inquire
8 as to the specific condition in which it was at that time.

9 Mr. Richardson: Do I understand that it is your re-
10 collection that you assigned anyone from the Navy to function
11 at that Information Center?

12 Admiral Kimmel: I was never requested to detail anybody
13 to function at that Information Center. I considered it an
14 Army responsibility. I stood ready to help them in any way
15 I could. I did help them. The organization and the whole
16 Information Center was purely an Army function.

17 Mr. Richardson: I want to call your attention to your
18 testimony before the Roberts Commission to see whether it,
19 in your opinion, is a fair statement of what it had reference
20 to. I read from page 663 of the record. This is your language:

21 "My recollection is, and I give you this for what it
22 is worth -- I have not talked to anybody about this since the
23 action -- but my impression was that they had, I think, three
24 permanent stations, and I think some seven or eight portable
25 stations around the Island, and their big ones were the ones,

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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according to which I thought that we could have some dependence on.

"The Chairman: Well, while I think your information is incorrect as to that, the fact is that in the week of December 7 and the days prior to that, and on the morning of December 7, you were quite confident that you would get a definite warning of distant planes; is that right?

"Admiral Kimmel: I thought we would get some warning of distant planes.

"General McNarney: And as a responsible officer you did not assure yourself of that fact?

"Admiral Kimmel: No, except indirectly, but when we had two separate commanders and when you have a responsible officer in charge of the Army and responsible Commanders in the Navy, it does not sit very well to be constantly checking up on them.

"General McNarney: Let us examine into that. Under the situation you had the system of mutual cooperation?

"Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

"General McNarney: And in the method of mutual cooperation, it is necessary for one Commander to know what the other Commander is doing or what his plans are?

"Admiral Kimmel: No."

That fairly represents what you desire to express with

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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reference to your attitude toward this Radar Information Center?

Admiral Kimmel: The "no" business at the end there?

Mr. Richardson: That is right.

Admiral Kimmel: Let me see that.

Mr. Murphy: What is that, 667?

Mr. Richardson: 663.

Admiral Kimmel: You will have to turn over -- in the first place, I put in a correction, I find here now, on page 631-A, wherein the answer to the last question was changed from "no" to "yes". As a matter of fact, I have no recollection of every having said "no", but I corrected it.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Kimmel

questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Then on page 672 of the record --

3 Mr. Richardson: What page is that?

4 Admiral Kimmel: 672 (reading):

5 "After the conclusion of the session on Saturday,
6 I thought that a portion of my testimony was not clear
7 and also that there might be some misapprehension as to
8 my underlying attitude. I think I stated in the discus-
9 sion which took place at the last session that I was con-
10 vinced that there were at least three fixed stations, and
11 by that I meant three stations with communications to the
12 central plotting room, and to the central place by wire,
13 and reasonably secure, and I thought there were more.

14 "I find that there were six, and I underestimated.

15 "Now, I have been informed that each one of these radar
16 stations that was manned was the search type and that they
17 are -- what do you call them, two seventy, wasn't it? Leave
18 that out."

19 I don't know what that means now, that last thing.

20 Mr. Richardson: Is that all you want to read?

21 Admiral Kimmel: That is all I see right here now. I
22 think that is all for the present.

23 Mr. Richardson: Well, now, Admiral, in order to sort
24 of crystallize this, I want to go over those operations
25 which, in your opinion were essential to the defense of

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Hawaii, so that none may be omitted, and the first I desire to suggest would be the availability of a suitable number of patrol planes for distant reconnaissance.

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Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

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Mr. Richardson: Second, there should be enough of those patrol planes to conduct a proper patrol over a 360 degree protected area around Oahu?

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Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

Mr. Richardson: There should be available the best radar facilities available?

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Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

Mr. Richardson: Land defenses of all character should be mobilized in radio?

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

Mr. Richardson: The Fleet should be alerted?

Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

Mr. Richardson: Now, it is true, is it not, Admiral, that the extent --

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Admiral Kimmel: Just one moment. You left out, I think, an essential point of this defense of Oahu, and that is the presence of sufficient long-range bombers to destroy the enemy carriers after they are discovered.

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Mr. Richardson: Correct. I accept your suggestion. I missed it in my notes.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Now, Admiral, the extent and detail to which these operations are to be carried is dependent upon judgment as to the extremeness of the danger?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Mr. Richardson: You thought on December 7th that the
3 danger of air attack on Hawaii was very slight?

4 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

5 Mr. Richardson: In fact, Admiral, the danger was ex-
6 ceedingly great as the event proved to be?

7 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I think that is fair.

8 Mr. Richardson: Then the disaster at Hawaii was the
9 result of an error of judgment?

10 Admiral Kimmel: Well, not entirely. It was not entire-
11 ly the result of an error of judgment. If we had had avail-
12 able in Oahu at this time all of the facilities which you have
13 outlined and we had been able to take the precautions which
14 you have outlined, that would have been one thing.

15 We had to make a choice. We felt that we had to make a
16 choice. We had to provide for what we knew was coming in
17 all probability against what we conceived at that time to be
18 a very small chance of an attack on Oahu.

19 Now, you can never be absolutely secure, there is no
20 such thing as absolute security and with a fleet that is par-
21 ticularly true and this estimate that we made, - that I made,-
22 was made after mature consideration of balancing probabili-
23 ties and when you balance probabilities you must take into
24 account the means which you have to meet these various possi-
25 bilities.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.