

Witness short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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1
2 gence man in the Navy in Hawaii?

3 General Short: He had very close liaison with the
4 man who had charge of the subversive action measures al-
5 together. They had offices side by side in town; they
6 had a teletype that connected the FBI and ONI and G-2,
7 so they could talk back and forth.

8 Senator Lucas: Do I understand you to say to the
9 committee, General, that all of the information that you
10 received as to the situation existing between Japan and
11 this country in the months preceding the attack came from
12 Washington, D. C.?

13 General Short: Or some from the Navy Department. None
14 on our own. I will amend that slightly. Our contact officer
15 made it a habit to meet the boats from the Orient so he
16 could get in touch with the people who had been living out
17 in China or Japan who were coming through, and pick up
18 anything he could.

19 Of course the value of that information varied with
20 the individual he talked to. We were never sure how valu-
21 able it was, but we carried it on all the time, getting
22 what we could out of these passengers going through.

23 Senator Lucas: Do I understand your only means of
24 obtaining intelligence information was through the Army and
25 Navy Intelligence Department here in Washington D.C.?

Witness short

questions by: Senator Lucas

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1
2 General Short: No, we got some from the Navy in
3 Hawaii.

4 Senator Lucas: In Hawaii?

5 General Short: Yes, sir.

6 Senator Lucas: I was going to ask you where Admiral
7 Bloch figured in in that picture, as far as obtaining any
8 intelligence was concerned?

9 General Short: Admiral Bloch had a service, a radio
10 intercept service on the location of ships, Japanese ships,
11 and his office kept track of them pretty thoroughly, and
12 on a good many occasions I have seen the map showing the
13 various locations of the Japanese ships as they thought
14 they had been.

15 I also talked with both Admiral Bloch and Admiral
16 Kimmel as to where the Japanese Fleet was.

17 Senator Lucas: There was an interchange then of
18 information with respect to the communications that were
19 received?

20 General Short: Yes, sir. I think it was more directly
21 with me than it was with G-2. My liaison with Admiral
22 Kimmel and Admiral Bloch was a little closer than his
23 liaison with the man who handled that type of information.

24 Senator Lucas: One of the reasons that I have asked
25 these questions is because of what I find in Exhibit 33.

Witness short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 In Exhibit 33, on November 26, 1941, I note a
3 memorandum for the Chief of Staff: Subject: Japanese
4 Naval Task Force.

5 "The following information was received from the
6 Commandant 14th Naval District through the Office of
7 Naval Intelligence at 12:45 a. m. this date."

8 In that memorandum they set forth at some length
9 where they believe the Japanese fleet might be on that
10 particular day. I was just wondering whether you had ever
11 seen that memorandum before it left Hawaii for the Naval
12 Intelligence Department here.

13 General Short: I did not see the memorandum as such.
14 I might have had the information from conversations with
15 Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel, or I might have seen the
16 same thing on the map in Admiral Bloch's headquarters.

17 Senator Lucas: The only reason that I mention that
18 is to me it is apparent that Admiral Bloch, or someone
19 out at Hawaii had a considerable amount of information
20 that they had obtained, and thought it valuable enough
21 to send to Washington in order that they might have the
22 advantage of making any evaluation of it that they saw
23 fit.

24 General Short: Yes, sir, they had a regular intercept
25 service. As I understand the thing, Washington took their

1 witness short

questions by: Senator Lucas

h5 2 estimates and the estimates of the intercept station at
3 Manila. If there was no difference in the information,
4 or if there was no difference of opinion, they accepted
5 it, and if there was a difference of opinion they gave
6 more credence to Manila, because it was closed and they
7 thought it would be more accurate.

8 Senator Lucas: Now in that memorandum to the Chief
9 of Staff, which came from the Naval Intelligence of the
10 14th Naval District, you conclude by saying:

11 "The evaluation put upon the above information by the
12 Commandant 14th Naval District is that a strong force
13 may be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia, while
14 component parts thereof may be expected to operate from
15 Palao and the Marshall Islands."

16 Is not that a strong indication that those in Hawaii
17 at the time believed that Japan was going to move towards
18 the Marshall Islands?

19 General Short: That would indicate that they thought
20 some ships were going towards the Marshall Islands. Of
21 course Palao is well down towards the Philippines.

22 Senator Lucas: Yes, I know.

23 General Short : The Marshalls would have been of
24 decided interest. I don't remember having that piece
25 of information, and I believe I have seen since in docu-

Witness short

questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 ments here that Manila disagreed, and within 12 hours
3 they knew from the War Department that Manila had disagreed
4 from that finding, and that may be one reason I never did
5 know about it.

6 Senator Lucas: That may be true. I am not certain
7 about whether Manila disagreed with this finding. I am
8 only pointing out the Marshall Islands, because under the
9 Orange war plans, that was where the American Fleet was
10 going to strike also.

11 General Short: That was of very great interest.

12 Senator Lucas: So if the Commandant of the 14th
13 Naval District, on November 26, 1941, had any information
14 that he believed that the Japanese Fleet, or a part of it
15 might go into the Marshall Islands, you were getting pretty
16 close to where America expected to start her offensive in
17 the event of a declaration of war?

18 General Short: That is correct. It would have been
19 of interest to me, and, as I say, it is possible I did
20 not get it because of the disagreement between the two
21 stations.

22 Senator Lucas: I do not think that Admiral Kimmel
23 was interrogated upon that message. I overlooked it. It
24 seems to me it would be rather important as showing definite
25 information on the 26th of November as to what Admiral Bloch

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1 Witness short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 West Coast.

3 The message that was sent by General Marshall to
4 you and the message that was sent by General Marshall
5 to General DeWitt on the West Coast are almost identical
6 are they not?

7 General Short: That is correct.

Larry fls.

8 Senator Lucas: I have been puzzled at your reply
9 when I compare it with the reply of General DeWitt, and
10 here is what he says:

11 "REPORT FOLLOWING MEASURES TAKEN AS PER YOUR RADIO
12 NOVEMBER 27: YOUR RADIO PARAPHRASED TO COMMANDING
13 GENERALS ADC SECOND AIR FORCE, FOURTH AIR FORCE, NINTH
14 CAD, PACIFIC COASTAL FRONTIER SECTORS, NINTH CORPS AREA,
15 AND COMMANDANTS ELEVENTH, TWELFTH AND FIFTEENTH NAVAL
16 DISTRICTS. ALL HARBOR ENTRANCE CONTROL POSTS CONTINUOUSLY
17 MANNED. ONE GUN BATTERY EACH HARBOR DEFENSE CONTINUOUSLY
18 ALERTED. PROTECTION AGAINST SABOTAGE AND OTHER SUBVERSIVE
19 ACTIVITIES INTENSIFIED. SIXTH INFANTRY BATTALIONS AND
20 NECESSARY MOTOR TRANSPORTATION ALERTED SO AS TO BE INSTANTLY
21 AVAILABLE TO CG NTA TO CARRY OUT HIS MISSIONS UNDER RAINBOW
22 FIVE. CONSTANT CONTACT BEING MAINTAINED WITH CORPS AREA
23 AND NAVAL DISTRICT COMMANDERS AND FULL COOPERATION ASSURED.
24 PCF, SECTOR AND SUB SECTOR PLANS RAINBOW FIVE PRACTICALLY
25 COMPLETED AND NECESSARY RECONNAISSANCE BEING MADE TO CARRY

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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OUT DEFENSE OF CRITICAL AREAS. TWO RIFLE COMPANIES FURNISH-
ING CG SF P OF E FOR GUARD DUTY AND ONE COMPANY FURNISHED
TO CG NCA FOR INTERNMENT ALIENS AT ANGEL ISLAND PAREN IN
CONNECTION THIS REPORT SEE MY RADIO TO CG GHQ NOVEMBER 25
WHICH RECOMMENDED THAT WPL FIVE TWO BE EXTENDED TO INCLUDE
PACIFIC COAST AND JAPANESE VESSELS AND WHICH OUTLINED STEPS
TAKE BY ME IN PREPARATION THEREFORE. AS AIR FORCES AS
WELL AS OTHER ARMY FORCES WILL BE INVOLVED IN THE EXECUTION
OF WPL FIVE TWO OR THE PREPARATORY STAGE OF RAINBOW FIVE
IT IS STRONGLY URGED THAT I BE AUTHORIZED TO DIRECT OPERA-
TION OF AIR FORCES IN DEFENSE OF THE PCF OR THAT INSTRUCTIONS
BE ISSUED SPECIFYING AIR ACTION AND THAT I BE FURNISHED
COPY OF SUCH DIRECTIVE. SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR THIS
COMMAND NOW READY TO CARRY OUT TASKS ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW
FIVE SO FAR AS THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN EXCEPT FOR WOEFUL
SHORTAGE OF AMMUNITION AND PURSUIT AND BOMBARDMENT PLANES
WHICH SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE WITHOUT DELAY."

I presume that there are reasons for the difference
in the answers that were made by yourself and the one who
was in command of the West Coast.

Can you tell me why General DeWitt would take the
position that he did in replying to the same kind of a
message?

General Short : I can only make a guess at it. My

Witness short

Questions by: senator Lucas

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guess would be that he did not have a standing operating procedure, and therefore it was necessary for him to go more into detail.

Our standing operating procedure showed that we had two battalions with full motor transportation ready to go any place on the islands.

We didn't mention that because that was part of the standing operating procedure. The reconnaissance apparently had no agreement with the Navy so he had to show the reconnaissance. The air force that he speaks about wanting placed under his command, I think was part of GHQ Air Force that operated directly under Washington, and he was asking to have it put under him for operation.

That is largely an estimate, but I think it is probably a fair one.

Senator Lucas: His danger was not as much as yours, was it, General?

General Short: Well, he had the much longer front, and he had some very vital installations, like all of the factories at Los Angeles, and so it was difficult to say, because he had less, far less personnel to defend with than we had. Our area was a concentrated area where we could take up our positions in a relatively short time. His were hundreds of miles long, and he had a very limited force.

follows
Hook
AL-1

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 Senator Lucas: Well, the thing that struck me as being
3 rather strange was to find a reply of this kind to the same
4 kind of a message and the reply of yours from Hawaii which
5 always seemed to me to be the most dangerous spot perhaps of
6 our outlying possessions or our coastal positions.

7 General Short: I believe it would indicate that our
8 preparation for occupying our positions and everything of
9 that kind were much more complete.

10 Senator Lucas: It may be, but he went on an all-out
11 alert; DeWitt went on the all-out alert?

12 General Short: No, I don't think so. He alerted certain
13 infantry battalions. We had certain infantry battalions
14 alerted. If you notice, on his seacoast guns, he alerted,
15 I believe, one gun at the entrance of each harbor.

16 Senator Lucas: (Reading)

17 "ALL HARBOR ENTRANCE CONTROL POSTS CONTINUOUSLY MANNED.
18 ONE GUN BATTERY EACH HARBOR DEFENSE CONTINUOUSLY ALERTED."

19 General Short: He only had one battery alerted. Around
20 San Francisco he probably had at least 12 and at Puget Sound
21 he had a very considerable number. So you can see his was
22 a partial alert. It was not a complete alert at all.

23 Senator Lucas: Let me ask you about the civilian popula-
24 tion in Hawaii. You alerted for sabotage. You were not there
25 in 1940 when they had the previous alert?

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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3 General Short: No, sir.

4 Senator Lucas: Well, did you learn about any uprisings
5 or any undue sabotage being committed at that time by the
6 people of Hawaii was the result of that alert?

7 General Short: No; you wouldn't get sabotage as a result
8 of an alert. You might get it because you didn't go into
9 an alert.

10 Senator Lucas: He went on an all-out alert in 1940?

11 General Short: That is right, on a direct order from
12 the War Department.

13 Senator Lucas: I know.

14 General Short: Then he cut it back on July 16.

15 Senator Lucas: What I am trying to find out is whether
16 as a result of the alert the population of Hawaii was in
17 any way disturbed.

18 General Short: If you will read the letters between
19 General Marshall and General Herron there is one letter in
20 there where General Herron says that a lot of people were
21 considerably disturbed for the first few days and he says
22 that even some of the younger officers sent their families
23 to the hills.

24 Senator Lucas: Well, the War Department in Washington
25 and you fellows out in Hawaii were both wrong on that, too,
weren't you, on the question of sabotage?

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 General Short: It is very difficult to say. We can't
3 tell what would have happened if we hadn't held a tight rein
4 over them. I think the feeling was, with everybody who had
5 made a careful study, that if there had ever been any real
6 success to the Japanese plans, that most anything might have
7 happened.

8 Senator Lucas: What do you call a success if December 7,
9 1941 wasn't a pretty fair test of success?

10 General Short: A landing on the Island of Oahu. They
11 immediately would have had perhaps an army of thousands, a
12 fifth column of thousands, ready to support them.

13 Senator Lucas: Were you alerted against sabotage because
14 you feared a landing of the Japanese?

15 General Short: No, sir. We were alerted because we
16 felt they might try to destroy all the vital installations;
17 and, as a matter of fact, without an alert against sabotage,
18 the way the gasoline and oil was placed along the waterfront
19 in Honolulu a very small group of men could have destroyed
20 the City of Honolulu; and the same thing with 4 million gallons
21 of oil in Pearl Harbor. They could have done much more damage
22 than was done because they could have destroyed all the oil.
23 They could have destroyed the repair facilities. And probably
24 the fire would have destroyed a good many of the ships in
25 the harbor.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 Senator Lucas: I don't doubt but that is true, General
3 Short, that you had every reason to take every precaution
4 possible against sabotage, but I come back to my original
5 question, whether or not anybody from Japan really used the
6 sabotage methods on December 7 or immediately thereafter
7 insofar as you know?

8 General Short: Whether they used it?

9 Senator Lucas: Whether they did carry out these acts
10 of sabotage that you people in Hawaii and the people in Wash-
11 ington were constantly afraid of.

12 General Short: There was none, but whether there would
13 have been if we had been lax I don't think anybody will ever
14 know.

15 Senator Lucas: Perhaps not. That is one of those things
16 that will go unsolved.

17 General Short: Yes, sir.

(3) 18 Senator Lucas: I think it is in the record, but do
19 you recall how many planes you lost that morning in the air
20 raid that were on Hickam Field?

21 General Short: I think I have it here.

22 Senator Lucas: It may not be material but I am leading
23 up to another question.

24 General Short: It is in that Exhibit No. 7 of the Roberts
25 Commission. I don't know whether I am going to find it right

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 here or not. I have the statement of planes here as of
3 December 7 and then as of December 20th. I don't have the
4 statement right here on that.

5 Senator Lucas: You don't recall how many planes you
6 lost at that particular time?

7 General Short: No, sir, I do not. This shows the
8 different types. Some of them may have been repaired, don't
9 you see, between December 7 and December 20 and be back in use.

10 Senator Lucas: You may have received some more by that
11 time.

12 General Short: Beg pardon?

13 Senator Lucas: You may have received some more from the
14 mainland.

15 General Short: We received 29 more B-17's and that
16 was all.

17 Senator Lucas: How many planes got in the air before the
18 last attack was completed?

19 General Short: I think there were a total of 14.

20 Senator Lucas: Did they shoot down any Jap planes?

21 General Short: They shot down 10 enemy planes.

22 Senator Lucas: They shot down 10 enemy planes.

23 General Short: Yes, sir.

24 Senator Lucas: So it is a pretty safe assumption that
25 if the planes had been warmed up and ready to go that, consider-

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1
2 ing what you did with the 14 planes, that the damage would
3 have been minimized considerably?

4 General Short: No question about that. I think our
5 pilots showed that they were superior to the Japanese pilots
6 in individual combat that day.

7 Senator Lucas: Do you recall seeing that two-man submarine?

8 General Short: Yes, sir.

9 Senator Lucas: Do you remember seeing the prisoner that
10 they took?

11 General Short: I did not. I recall the incident but I
12 didn't actually see him.

13 Senator Lucas: Do you recall now, from the conversations
14 that you had with anyone there, as to just how far out that
15 two-man submarine was before it started operating at sea?

16 General Short: Well, I can give you a rather interesting
17 report of just what happened at the time of the capture. It
18 was off a reef opposite Bellows Field and the Commanding
19 Officer or G-2 of Bellows Field phoned me that it was there
20 and that the Navy were getting ready to bomb it. I said if
21 they wanted to destroy it, I didn't think it ought to be
22 destroyed, but if the Navy wanted to destroy it we could bring
23 up a piece of field artillery and do it very quickly, because
24 it was on the reef. But before that message, apparently,
25 could get to the Navy, they dropped a bomb, which fortunately

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 missed it and picked it up and set it on the inside of the
3 reef, and we sent a man out to put a rope around the conning-
4 tower and towed it in. Some fellow from Texas, probably,
5 lassoed it.

6 Senator Lucas: Was there ever any conclusive evidence
7 as to how and where that submarine took to sea, how far out
8 it was and what brought it there?

9 General Short: I would hesitate to say. I am afraid my
10 information would not be exact.

11 Senator Lucas: Well, was it possible that a surface
12 ship, a warship of some kind, belonging to the enemy, could
13 have come within 200 miles and dropped it off, or do you think
14 it came in by submarine?

15 General Short: I think the feeling was at the time that
16 there was a mother ship that had brought them at least a
17 considerable part of the way. I don't believe they were
18 capable of going more than 150 to 200 miles under their own
19 power.

20 Senator Lucas: Now, what kind of a ship -- that was the
21 point I was making -- what kind of a ship did you people con-
22 clude brought this midget submarine to 150 miles of the
23 Hawaiian Islands?

24 General Short: Well, I am really a little uncertain on
25 that. I think the Navy would be a much better source.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1
2 Senator Lucas: Could a Jap submarine carry one of these
3 small two-man submarines?

4 General Short: I think the largest type probably could
5 but again I am not sure.

6 Senator Lucas: There is more than a possibility that
7 some large surface Japanese ship sailed within 150 or 200
8 miles of the Hawaiian Coast that morning and dropped that sub-
9 marine off?

10 General Short: I believe the feeling was that they must
11 have been in the vicinity of Hawaiian waters, maybe for
12 several days, and had not been picked up.

13 By the way, I have the report here, Senator, of the planes
14 damaged.

15 Senator Lucas: Please read that.

16 General Short: I will take up first what we had.

17 We had at the beginning of the attack: Planes in com-
18 mission, 80. That is pursuit planes. Pursuit planes out of
19 commission, 69. A total of 149. Of those 80 were damaged.

20 We had reconnaissance planes: In commission, 6. Out
21 of commission, 7. Out of those 13, 6 were damaged. We had
22 bombers: In commission, 39. That included the old B-18's.
23 Bombers out of commission, 33. And 34 of those bombers were
24 damaged.

25 Now, a considerable number of those planes we were able

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 General Short: I don't know what the technical term in
3 the Navy would include. In the Army any defense in the world
4 we would take up would include reconnaissance.

5 Senator Lucas: I want to call your attention to the report
6 of the Army Board that made an investigation into this Pearl
7 Harbor affair. I direct your attention to the last page.

8 The Board says:

9 "Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Lieutenant
10 General Walter C. Short, failed in his duties in the following
11 particulars:

12 "(a) To place his command in a state of readiness for war
13 in the face of a war warning by adopting an alert
14 against sabotage only."

15 You have gone into that thoroughly and have made your
16 explanation.

17 General Short: I have.

18 Senator Lucas: I presume you did the same thing before
19 the Army Board?

20 General Short: Yes, sir.

21 Senator Lucas: Notwithstanding its finding?

22 General Short: Yes, sir.

23 Senator Lucas: And I presume your evidence before the
24 Army Board was practically what is before this committee?

25 General Short: That is correct. I know some things

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1 now, like magic, which I had never heard of at the time I
2 was before the Army Board.
3

4 Senator Lucas: They further state:

5 "The information which he had was incomplete and confusing
6 but it was sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between
7 our Government and the Japanese Empire and that hostilities
8 might be momentarily expected."

9 Do you agree with that?

10 General Short: Yes, sir, but that wouldn't necessarily
11 mean an attack. I doubt very much if that Board knew of the
12 conclusions of General Grunnert and General Betts, which agreed
13 100 percent with mine, and why they made them. They made
14 them because they didn't have access to magic.

15 Senator Lucas: Assuming, General Short, that you had
16 never received any message from the War Department, either on
17 November 27 from Marshall or on the 28th from Miles, or on
18 the 29th from Arnold --

19 General Short: Or had any previous information?

20 Senator Lucas: No. From the 27th on you only received
21 three messages?

22 General Short: Yes, sir.

23 Senator Lucas: But you saw some of the Navy messages?

24 General Short: Yes, sir.

25 Senator Lucas: Would your position have been any different

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 on December 7 than it was previous to the message on November
3 27?

4 General Short: I think the three messages that followed
5 up the 27th all pointing directly to sabotage did a great deal
6 to confirm me in my opinion that I had done what the War De-
7 partment wanted.

8 Senator Lucas: I can well appreciate that.

9 General Short: I could have gone into any other alert in
10 a few minutes if I had anything to indicate but what I got
11 from the War Department pointed, all of it, 100 percent, very
12 definitely to sabotage.

13 Senator Lucas: That is, the second and third messages
14 pointed definitely to sabotage.

15 General Short: Second and third and fourth.

16 Senator Lucas: Which tended to confirm your message to
17 General Marshall?

18 General Short: That is correct.

19 Senator Lucas: That is the way you took it?

20 General Short: Yes, sir.

21 Senator Lucas: The question I am asking you is this:
22 Assuming you received no messages at all from the War Department
23 your position on December 7, 1941 would have been no different
24 than if there was an attack on November 24th?

25 General Short: I would not have had the message of the
27th?

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: That is right.

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General Short: I hadn't been told to report any measures taken?

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Senator Lucas: That is right.

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General Short: I would have been in the same position I was on November 24th.

(5)

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Senator Lucas: In other words, these messages didn't enlighten you whatsoever as far as going on an all-out alert or going on the second alert which was near an all-out alert?

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General Short: There was absolutely no additional enemy information. And there was one thing that cut down the probability. If you remember in the Navy message of the 24th they said, "including action towards the Philippines and Guam". In the message of the 27th they told me to be prepared for sabotage at Guam.

17

18

In other words, it looked like they had eliminated even Guam, which was right alongside Japan, from possible attack.

19

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Senator Lucas: Yes, but the message of the 27th to you didn't have anything to do with sabotage.

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General Short: No. That was the Naval message.

24

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Senator Lucas: That is true, but you relied primarily upon General Marshall's message, more than any Navy message?

General Short: So far as information pointing to an attack I had to rely on the Navy messages because at no time

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 after July 8 did I ever have an Army message that indicated
3 any probable line of action by the Japanese.

4 Senator Lucas: You did rely upon both messages, of
5 course?

6 General Short: Yes, sir.

7 Senator Lucas: But I recall in this testimony that you
8 stated that the message of November 24, I think it was, that
9 was sent to the Navy, which was the war warning message of
10 the 27th --

11 General Short: The 27th was the war warning.

12 Senator Lucas: In previous testimony you were not sure
13 whether or not you ever saw that war warning message.

14 General Short: I think I said that I knew the substance
15 of it. I was under the impression that Admiral Kimmel had
16 just read it out loud at a conference. But in reading over
17 the testimony, Captain Layton says that he personally brought
18 it to me, and I have no doubt he did, and that he discussed
19 it with me. I was perfectly aware of the contents. But I
20 couldn't find in my headquarters, when I assembled the material
21 for the Roberts Commission, I couldn't find the message of
22 either the 24th or the Naval message of the 27th, and so I
23 was doubtful whether I had been advised orally or whether I
24 had received copies.

25 Senator Lucas: Do you believe that in the future, should

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1 something of this kind occur, that someone in Hawaii should
2 assume all responsibility for the proper interpretation and
3 analyzation of such a message as was sent by Admiral Stark
4 to Admiral Kimmel?
5

6 General Short: I would say, in view of all of the dis-
7 cussion and publicity with reference to Pearl Harbor, that
8 anybody in command would take no chances whatever. To illustrate
9 what I mean, in March of 1942 I visited a good-sized post in
10 the interior of the country and I found around the parade
11 ground anti-aircraft guns manned 24 hours of the day, when
12 the possibility of an attack at that particular place was
13 practically nil. But the Commanding Officer was taking no
14 chances.

15 I believe that would be the condition that you will have
16 for some years.

17 Senator Lucas: You realize that Americans forget pretty
18 fast?

19 General Short: Well, in a generation they might forget
20 some. I don't believe they would forget much faster. The
21 ones in the Army wouldn't forget.

22 Now, along that same line, this was hardly over until the
23 War Department had called on the Command and General Staff
24 School at Fort Leavenworth to prepare changes in their Manual
25 to provide for just that kind of a thing, and I would like to

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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read what they inserted. This was inserted as an entirely new paragraph. It was not in the old Manual. This is Field Manual 100-15, Field Regulations, Larger Units, June 29, 1942, paragraph 23:

"In times of strained relations the War Department must exhaust every possible source of information to keep its Commanders of field forces advised -- "

Not only keep itself but:

" -- keep the Commanders advised of air, military and naval dispositions and movements of potential enemies and of the trend of diplomatic relations. Commanders of the field forces must keep themselves informed of the possibility of a surprise attack being made both from without and within previous to a declaration of war. During this period Commanders must dispose of their forces so that a sudden attack will be defeated."

Hook follows

2 D NOTDINHAW -JUNE 6 GRAY

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 In other words, the War Department took very decisive
3 action and prescribed very definitely for themselves
4 that they would keep the commanders completely informed
5 of the information and of the relations.

6 Senator Lucas: Of course, that comes about through
7 the Pearl Harbor disaster.

8 General Short: It comes about definitely through the
9 Pearl Harbor disaster.

10 Senator Lucas: What I am talking about is: Assuming
11 that in 50 years a similar situation occurs, where there
12 is no unity of command, it is still under a joint control
13 system. You told the committee this morning that whether
14 or not they had that complete unity of thought and action
15 that was so necessary for the protection of the Fleet and
16 Islands, that personalities were involved. That is, two
17 men might get along all right, and two men who followed
18 might not get along all right.

19 If you had one man in command, where you could place
20 all of the responsibility over the Hawaiian Islands and
21 the Fleet, would that eliminate what I am talking about
22 here, eliminate the possibility of any confusion or con-
23 flicting interests in the future which might be responsible
24 for a similar disaster?

25 General Short: I believe it would be decidedly helpful.

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1 Witness short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

h2

2 When you put it at 50 years, it is hard to say whether
3 everybody would forget.

4 Senator Lucas: Suit your own time on that. Most
5 of us won't be around.

6 The Chairman: You don't mean that, Senator.

7 Senator Lucas: Yes, I do.

8 (Laughter)

9 Senator Lucas: One further question. There can't be
10 any question but what under the evidence submitted before
11 this committee they were as much confused in Washington
12 in the Intelligence Branch of the service as they were
13 in Hawaii with respect to what was going on between the
14 two departments.

15 Do you agree that if you had one man in Washington
16 responsible solely for all of the information, the evalua-
17 tion of all of the intelligence, both from the Army and
18 Navy, that that would be conducive to better administra-
19 tion, and possibly reduce the danger throughout?

20 General Short: I think it would tend to. At the
21 same time, one department would have to analyze critically
22 which I don't believe was done.

23 Senator Lucas: At any rate if you had one man, you
24 wouldn't have a general like General Miles coming before
25 the committee and when you ask him about the important

1 Witness short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

h3

2 message that was sent from Tokyo to Honolulu carving
3 the Island into five districts, you wouldn't have him
4 saying that that was a Navy responsibility, and not
5 his, to properly interpret that?

6 General Short: He would know definitely it was his
7 responsibility.

8 Senator Lucas: That is where I think we are going
9 to have to lodge some of these things, definite responsi-
10 bility in someone so there can't be any buck-passing
11 when a serious thing happens.

12 General Short: I agree fully that you should have
13 a much more competent Intelligence service that is combined.
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Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: Now this report further says, reading again from the Army Board Report:

"This required that he guard against surprise to the extent possible and make ready his command so that it might be employed to the maximum and in time against the worst form of attack that the enemy might launch."

I take it you do not agree with that, and you have covered that in your testimony.

General Short: I do not agree.

Senator Lucas: Further:

"(b) To reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the Admiral commanding the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the Fourteenth Naval District for implementing the joint Army and Navy plans and agreements then in existence which provided for joint action by the two services. One of the methods by which they might have become operative was through the joint agreement of the responsible commanders."

You could not agree with that in view of the position that you took with respect to the interpretation of these messages?

General Short: I believe that the War Department fully expected to declare when the situation had arrived to put the war plans into effect and that they would have expected us to get their permission before we thought of doing it.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 Senator Lucas: They further state:

3 "(c) To inform himself of the effectiveness of the
4 long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy."

5 As I understand you took that for granted, that they were
6 doing the job?

7 General Short: I knew that Admiral Kimmel was doing a
8 great deal. I didn't know the exact details. But I con-
9 sidered that he was more capable of fitting the ships,
10 surface ships and the submarines and the planes, into a
11 complete picture than I was.

12 Senator Lucas: Under a unity of command no Board could
13 have made that charge?

14 General Short: That is correct.

15 Senator Lucas: Do you know why the air drills were
16 stopped on November 12, 1941?

17 General Short: I am of the opinion that they probably
18 were not all stopped. The ones that had to do with the B-17's
19 I think were stopped because we needed all the time we had
20 for training the crews.

21 Senator Lucas: What was the nature of one of those
22 air drills, what did you do?

23 General Short: They were of various natures. We would
24 have a report, or the Navy would make an estimate, that
25 possibly some Japanese ships were in a certain direction.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1
2 A squadron or group would be given the mission of going
3 out and finding this carrier. If they were successful
4 then a bombing squadron would be sent out to bomb them.

5 Then you might, by the next phase, assume that the
6 carrier got in without being picked up and the fighter planes
7 were coming in. You would get that information just in time
8 possibly to send up your own pursuit planes to try to inter-
9 cept the enemy bombers and fighters before they reached the
10 islands.

11 They varied.

12 Senator Lucas: That was an actual drill?

13 General Short: Oh, yes. We had one a week on the
14 average from about March on and I think probably about one
15 a month where the B-17's were excluded because we didn't
16 think we could spare the time.

17 Senator Lucas: Why did you have those drills?

18 General Short: To try to get the Army-Navy Air Corps
19 so they could work together.

20 Senator Lucas: Did you have any potential enemy in mind?

21 General Short: We always, any time we maneuvered in
22 Hawaii, the potential enemy was Japan. There wasn't any
23 doubt in our minds about that. We didn't mention it but
24 we thought -- we thought of it as Orange -- but it was Japan.

25 Senator Lucas: That was the real reason for the air

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 drills, was it not?

3 General Short: That is correct.

4 Senator Lucas: There was no point in having any air
5 drills over the islands unless it was for the defense of
6 those islands and the defense of the Fleet in case of an
7 attack by the common enemy?

8 General Short: Yes, sir. Those air drills were held,
9 as I recall, from sometime in February up to November 12.
10 I think it was probably about the first of March before we
11 really got them under way.

12 Senator Lucas: And all of a sudden they ceased.

13 General Short: I don't know definitely but I am inclined
14 to think that they had one on the 29th of November that did
15 not include the B-17's.

16 Senator Lucas: Well, it is difficult for me to under-
17 stand why you had all of these air drills all summer long
18 and yet when the tension became more strained and everybody
19 in Hawaii knew, as well as here, that the conditions with
20 Japan were deteriorating day by day, all of a sudden you
21 quit the air drills and went to sabotage.

22 General Short: I can tell you why no air drill was
23 scheduled for the morning of the 7th. They had a good many
24 of these exercises on Sunday morning when the carriers would
25 come in and the planes would be sent ashore on Ford Island.

(8)

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Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1
2 They would come in Saturday afternoon and then there would
3 be an air drill scheduled for Sunday morning in which the
4 Navy fighter planes would participate. On this particular
5 Sunday morning the carriers were all out at sea. One was
6 returning from Wake. One was going to Midway. One was on
7 the West Coast being overhauled. So there were no Naval
8 planes to participate. That I know was one reason why
9 nothing was scheduled that Sunday morning.

10 Senator Lucas: General Short, where were you on the
11 morning of December 7 when the attack came?

12 General Short: I was in my quarters.

13 Senator Lucas: How far were your quarters from the
14 quarters of Admiral Kimmel?

15 General Short: I would say probably about a mile and
16 a half, maybe just a little more than that.

17 Senator Lucas: And you immediately, of course, took
18 command and gave the orders to your men on the island there
19 as soon as the first flight of planes came through?

20 General Short: The Chief of Staff came into my
21 quarters somewhere around 8:03 and I gave him directions
22 to immediately put No. 3 Alert into effect. I went over
23 to my headquarters. He was there by the time I got there
24 and probably about 8:12, and he said that by 8:10 he had
25 them all alerted. I remained there just long enough to

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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make sure my G-3 section had reached the field command posts.
 I left Colonel Phillips in charge of the regular headquarters
 that had communication with Washington, and I went to the
 field command post where I could be in touch with all of
 them.

Shefner
 follows
 3:15

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

2 Senator Lucas: Admiral Kimmel told the committee that
3 he was not only alerted to sabotage but a good many other
4 things, as I recall, but was not clear whether he knew that
5 you were alerted to sabotage only.

6 General Short: I believe that we have some of his tes-
7 timony before this Board that states that he did know.

8 Senator Lucas: That he did know that you were alerted
9 to sabotage?

10 Mr. Kaufman: He testified both ways.

11 General Short: On page 6985 of the transcript:

12 "I conferred with General Short on November 28 about
13 the messages each of us had received on the 27th. We
14 discussed these dispatches in all aspects. We con-
15 sidered, as we did frequently before and did later, the
16 probabilities and possibilities of an air attack on
17 Pearl Harbor. In this connection there was discussion of
18 the effect of the suggestion from Washington that fifty
19 Army pursuit planes be sent by aircraft carriers to Wake
20 and Midway. I understood the Army was on an alert and
21 that the alert was against sabotage among other things,
22 although I do not now recall General Short specifically
23 mentioning the details of his alert."

24 Senator Lucas: Did you talk to Admiral Kimmel on December
25 the 6th in the afternoon or the evening?

Witness Short

Questions by Sen. Lucas

1 General Short: I did not.

2 Senator Lucas: You did not expect on December the 6th any
3 surprise attack on the following day?

4 General Short: No, sir, I did not.

5 Senator Lucas: Was there anybody in Hawaii that you knew
6 that expected a surprise attack?

7 General Short: If they did they never told me before or
8 after. Ordinarily afterwards there is someone who does ex-
9 pect it.

10 Senator Lucas: Well, everybody in Washington and every-
11 body in Hawaii sent messages from February on up to almost
12 the day of the attack about the possibility of a surprise at-
13 tack. They had air drills for it, they had the Martin-
14 Bellinger report that detailed exactly how this thing might
15 happen, which it did, and everybody was surprised when the
16 attack came.

17 General Short: Yes, sir. I think you must differentiate
18 between possibilities and probability.

19 Senator Lucas: I presume that is correct.

20 General Short: We had probabilities pointing to attacks
21 at other places and nothing probable pointing to an attack on
22 Hawaii.

23 Senator Lucas: Well, the truth of the matter is that
24 everyone thought that this war was going to start over around
25

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 the Malayan States, down the China Sea, and everybody just
3 went to sleep on watching Hawaii.

4 General Short: I think the universal opinion was that
5 that is where the war was going to start.

6
7 Senator Lucas: You stated in your statement before the
8 committee that you alerted your command and your troops took
9 the battle positions against what you thought was the possibil-

10 General Short: Yes, sir.

11 Senator Lucas: Was that a serious possibility?

12 General Short: Here was the way I felt about it: I
13 felt that if that many carriers could elude the Navy and get
14 in there as a complete surprise that there was an outside pos-
15 sibility that there would be a landing force attack here and
16 that I would take no chances.

17 Senator Lucas: Then if there was that possibility I would
18 like to ask you this hypothetical question:

19 Assuming that the Fleet had been withdrawn to the Western
20 Coast and conditions at Pearl Harbor were the same other than
21 that, do you believe that it would have been possible under
22 those conditions or probable that the Japs could have made
23 a landing with the striking air forces that they had and
24 brought the planes down as they did?

25 General Short: It would have been thoroughly possible.

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1 If they had sent as large a force as they sent against the
2 Philippines they could have made the landing. I doubt very
3 much if they could have made the landing with a hundred
4 thousand but I believe they sent 224,000 against the Philip-
5 pines and a force of that size, willing to take its losses,
6 could undoubtedly have made the landing.
7

8 Senator Lucas: And that would have been a possibility --

9 General Short: That would have been a possibility.

10 Senator Lucas: (Continuing) -- if the Fleet had not been
11 in Pearl Harbor?

12 General Short: I would have been much more worried if
13 there had been no fleet in Hawaiian waters; I don't mean in
14 Pearl Harbor but in the waters of Hawaii.

15 Senator Lucas: In the Hawaiian waters.

16 General Short: I wish to make the distinction.

17 Senator Lucas: Yes, in the Hawaiian waters. If that
18 should have happened, that possibility should have happened, -
19 and it was a possibility, - and the Japs had taken the Island
20 of Oahu, it would have taken us a long time to have thrown
21 them out of there, wouldn't it?

22 General Short: It would have been very serious.

23 Senator Lucas: Very costly.

24 General Short: Yes, sir.

25 Senator Lucas: Referring again to the question of

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 Admiral Kimmel's statement on sabotage I call your attention
3 to page 6989 of the present transcript where this question
4 was asked by Mr. Richardson, counsel for the committee:

5 "Mr. Richardson: Did you know, Admiral, what Gen-
6 eral Short's first alert was?

7 "Admiral Kimmel: You mean No. 1 alert, as you call
8 it?

9 "Mr. Richardson: That is it.

10 "Admiral Kimmel: I did not know he had but one kind
11 of an alert.

12 "Mr. Richardson: What kind of alert did you think
13 he had?

14 "Admiral Kimmel: I thought he had an alert where he
15 put his people on the alert.

16 "Mr. Richardson: Did you know at the time you talked
17 with General Short that his No. alert was simply against
18 sabotage?

19 "Admiral Kimmel: I did not know he had a No. 1
20 alert. I think I have found out since, however, that this
21 No. 1, 2 and 3 alert business was put into effect on the
22 5th of November of 1941. Prior to that they had an alert
23 and a non-alert status."

24 So that seems to place his testimony just a little dif-
25 ferent.

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 General Short: That is a little contradiction from the
3 other.

4 Senator Lucas: Yes.

5 General Short: I would like to say, however, that we had
6 furnished Admiral Bloch's headquarters with ten copies of our
7 alert system, so someone in the staff should have known ex-
8 actly what the different alerts meant.

9 Senator Lucas: I want to ask one final question, Gen-
10 eral Short. Notwithstanding this far reaching sea disaster
11 and the damage that was done to the property on the island
12 and the loss of life is it your contention now that with all
13 the information available at that time you did all that any
14 prudent commander would do to prevent or minimize such a
15 surprise attack?

16 General Short: I believe I did all that a prudent com-
17 mander could be expected to do, yes, sir.

18 Senator Lucas: Do you believe under all the circumstances
19 you exercised that high degree of care and caution that was
20 automatically imposed upon you when you took over the command
21 of that base?

22 General Short: I believe the people in the, -- all the
23 people in the Army there and the civilians know that I worked
24 very seriously and very conscientiously constantly from the
25 time I got there until the date of the attack to improve

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 conditions to get ready for an attack.

3 Senator Lucas: And you feel that you exercised that super-
4 ior judgment necessary for one of your rank and position when
5 you knew that war was on its way?

6 General Short: I believe I did.

7 Senator Lucas: That is all, Mr. Chairman.

8 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that I
9 shall be here when my turn comes and I only have one question.
10 I do not want it answered now.

11 I will put the question in connection with this material
12 which the counsel has now given me and which he has gone over
13 with General Short. I can re-offer it again as an exhibit,
14 although I won't press the offer at this time, but before
15 General Short concludes his testimony I should like to have
16 him make whatever comment he may think is warranted on certain
17 of the items in here which indicate certain conflicts in his
18 prior testimony and I will only read one sentence from the
19 exhibit here that bears on it. It is not of a critical char-
20 acter.

21 The Chairman: Not of what?

22 Senator Brewster: This is not of a critical character but
23 other portions of the exhibit are. (Reading)

24 "General Short's non-feasance or omission were based
25 on an estimate of a situation which although proved faulty

Witness Short

1
2 by subsequent events was, insofar as I am able to ascertain
3 from the report of the Roberts Commission, made or con-
4 curred in by all of those officers in Hawaii best quali-
5 fied to form an exact military opinion. That estimate
6 was that an attack by air was in the highest degree im-
7 probable."

8 Now, whether you want to accept it now or whether
9 you want other members of the committee to look it over before
10 it is offered is immaterial to me.

11 The Chairman: The chair has stated that other members
12 would like to see them and look them over before it is made
13 an exhibit and I see no delay in that procedure that would be
14 disadvantageous.

15 Senator Brewster: That is quite all right.

16 The Chairman: And inasmuch as it is obvious that the
17 committee will not conclude with General Short's testimony
18 today that might go over until tomorrow.

19 Senator Brewster: I think he should certainly have a
20 full opportunity to prepare any statement he desires on it
21 and that is why I think it ought to be gone over.

22 The Chairman: Well, the General is familiar with this,
23 with the interrogatory of the Senator from Maine.

24 General Short: I am not familiar with the particular
25 things he is bringing up there.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 The Chairman: Would you like to have an opportunity to
3 familiarize yourself with it before you answer it?

4 Senator Brewster: Well, I am not asking for it now.

5 The Chairman: Well, even the suggestion.

6 General Short: I think it would be an advantage.

7 The Chairman: Yes, all right. Well, we will determine
8 that later. Congressman Murphy.

9 Mr. Murphy: General Short, you were an infantry officer
10 for some years, were you not?

11 General Short: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Murphy: Did you ever have any training or work with
13 the air force at all prior to going to Pearl Harbor?

14 General Short: Yes. In maneuvers we had air corps units
15 attached.

16 Mr. Murphy: Outside of maneuvers you never did deal di-
17 rectly with the air as such, did you?

18 General Short: In the Command Staff School and in the
19 Army War College we had a great deal of instruction.

20 Mr. Murphy: How many years before Pearl Harbor were you
21 at the Staff School and had any instruction about the air?

22 General Short: I graduated from the Army War College
23 in 1925.

24 Mr. Murphy: Had you been there between 1925 and 1941?

25 General Short: No, sir.

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 Mr. Murphy: Admiral Kimmel was a ship man primarily,
3 wasn't he?

4 General Short: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Murphy: He had not had anything to do particularly
6 with the air either then, so far as you know?

7 General Short: I do not know, sir.

8 Mr. Murphy: Now, both Admiral Kimmel and yourself, as
9 I recollect it, say that you were largely influenced by the
10 newspaper at Honolulu as to your estimate of the situation
11 subsequent to November the 27th. Is that right in your case?

12 General Short: No, sir. I would say the only thing I
13 remember getting from the newspaper that had a direct bear-
14 ing on this message was the fact that the negotiations in
15 Washington with the Japanese had been resumed. That is the
16 only thing --

17 Mr. Murphy: Now, I would like to direct your attention
18 to the headlines of the papers in Manila. I am now reading--

19 The Chairman: In Manila?

20 Mr. Murphy: In Honolulu. I beg your pardon.

21 I am now reading from page 11 of the United States News
22 which contains the Army Pearl Harbor Board report. The news-
23 paper headlines in question, referring to the Honolulu Adver-
24 tiser and the Honolulu Star Bulletin, - the newspaper head-
25 lines in question read as follows:

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 "U.S. Waits Japan Reply." That was the Honolulu Star-
3 Bulletin of November 29th.

4 "Japanese May Strike Over Weekend; Kurusu Bluntly
5 Warned Nation Ready for Battle." That was the Honolulu
6 Advertiser of November 30th, although it is recorded here
7 as the 20th, which is a typographical error because the
8 piece is already in the record. That is in the Honolulu
9 Advertiser.

10 "Hull, Kurusu in Critical Meeting Today." That is
11 the 1st of December in the Honolulu Advertiser.

12 "U.S. Army Alerted in Manila, Singapore Mobilizing
13 as War Tension Grows; Japanese Envoys Resume Talks Amid
14 Tension; War Fears Grow in Philippines." That was the 1st
15 of December in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.

16 "Japan Called Still Hopeful of Making Peace With
17 U.S."; "Japan Gives Two Weeks More to Negotiations."
18 That was December 2nd in the Honolulu Advertiser.

19 "Huge Pincher Attack on U.S. By Japan, France
20 Predicted." That was the 3rd of December in the Honolulu
21 Advertiser.

22 "Japan Spurns U.S. Program." That was on the 4th
23 of December in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.

24 "Pacific Zero Hour Near; Japan Answers U.S. Today."
25 That is the 4th of December 1941 in the Honolulu Advertiser.

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 "Singapore on War Footing"; "New Peace Effort Urged in
3 Tokyo"; "Civilians Urged to Leave Manila." That is the 6th
4 of December in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.

5 "America Expected to Reject Japan's Reply on Indo-
6 China"; "Japanese Navy Moving South"; "Detailed Plans Com-
7 pleted for M-Day Setup." That is the 6th of December 1941
8 in the Honolulu Advertiser.

9 "F. D. R. Will Send Message to Emperor on War Crisis."
10 That is the 7th of December 1941 in the Honolulu Advertiser.

11 Do you think there is anything in those headlines that
12 would justify you in feeling that there was a lessening of
13 the tension that existed?

14 General Short: Only one thing, the fact that the nego-
15 tiations were expected to continue for two weeks.

16 Mr. Murphy: In other words, with about fourteen you
17 eliminate thirteen and you stand on that one that says they
18 might go two weeks?

19 General Short: But practically all of them pointed
20 towards the South Pacific. In addition --

21 Mr. Murphy: Let us stick to the papers, General. Out
22 of the fourteen the only one that impressed you was the one
23 that they might go on for two weeks?

24 General Short: No.

25 Mr. Murphy: Notwithstanding the fact that the subsequent

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 one says that the zero hour may be on the 4th, or the Pacific
3 zero hour is near, is that right?

4 General Short: I was willing to accept the information
5 in the message of the 27th that hostilities might break out.

6 Mr. Murphy: Well, I understand you. You said that
7 the November 27th message made you feel that war was immin-
8 ent.

9 General Short: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Murphy: Do you think then that Admiral Kimmel or
11 yourself would be justified, in view of these headlines in
12 December, that the newspaper headlines would make you feel
13 there was a lessening in the tense situation that existed
14 on the 27th of November?

15 General Short: The only thing there would be the state-
16 ment of December 1st on account of the fact that the message
17 had said there was a bare possibility that the Japanese gov-
18 ernment would come back and would resume operations and it
19 shows that they had resumed operations and then the message
20 indicating that the negotiations would probably continue
21 for two weeks might well have led us to believe that there
22 was less likelihood of hostilities until the expiration of
23 the two weeks.

24 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, that was the only paper that
25 influenced you, was it, that one about the two weeks?

Witness Short.

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 General Short: That one and the one about the progress
3 of the negotiations.

4 Mr. Murphy: And the others you dismissed?

5 General Short: No. I thought the others were in line
6 with what --

7 Mr. Murphy: With the 27th message?

8 General Short: With the information we had been given
9 and also the direction of the attack was in line with the
10 information we had been given.

11 Mr. Murphy: General, you felt and spontaneously Admiral
12 Kimmel felt that there was going to be an attack on the Phil-
13ippines. You both agreed on that, didn't you?

14 General Short: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Murphy: Why, if there were going to be an attack on
16 a United States possession and at the Philippines, wouldn't
17 you feel that there was grave danger of some kind of an at-
18 tack on Hawaii?

19 General Short: Frankly, I felt that there would certainly
20 be internal disorders but that in all probability if the
21 Japanese were going to make a real out and out attack on the
22 Philippines, on the Philippine Islands, that they would employ
23 practically all of their equipment and available means for
24 that purpose to make it as strong as possible.

25 Mr. Murphy: Now, the thing that puzzles the writers and

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 a lot of people in the country is if they were going to go
3 all out on the Philippines why wouldn't any military man ex-
4 pect that there was danger of an attack from the Fleet then
5 on their flank and why wouldn't they seek to eliminate that
6 possibility?

7 General Short: To make that attack they took six out
8 of the eight airplane carriers they had. In other words,
9 they took three-fourths of their air power that might have
10 been used to support the Philippine attack and sent it to
11 Hawaii. It weakened their attack in the Philippines very
12 much and ordinarily when any country is making a very serious
13 effort like that they try not to divide their forces.

14 Mr. Murphy: Couldn't an attack on the Philippines, Gen-
15 eral, be made and wasn't it made by land-based bombers?

16 General Short: They could by a certain amount.

17 Mr. Murphy: Well, didn't they attack it? Isn't that
18 what they used?

19 General Short: They did.

20 Mr. Murphy: And didn't you know that, that they could?

21 General Short: Yes, but also we knew that the addition
22 of the carrier planes would make that attack much heavier and
23 much more serious.

24 Mr. Murphy: Well, they did a pretty thorough job with
25 land-based planes, didn't they?

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 General Short: They did, yes, but we have used both all
3 through the war whenever we have had a serious attack.

4 Mr. Murphy: Now I would like to review with you, General,
5 if you will, exhibit 53.

6 General Short: 53?

7 Mr. Murphy: I think it is important that somewhere in
8 the record there should be a resume of the correspondence be-
9 tween you and General Marshall. And before I go into that,
10 General, on May the 1st, 1941 you had an all-out alert in
11 Honolulu, did you not, where you had fortifications being
12 built, you had everything out you could have in the way of
13 equipment, didn't you, for the whole day?

14 General Short: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Murphy: Did you have some plans for a maneuver on
16 the 10th of December?

17 General Short: No, sir, we had no definite plans for a
18 maneuver.

19 Mr. Murphy: Had you discussed it?

20 General Short: We were counting on having a maneuver.
21 There were two things that we were waiting for for a complete
22 maneuver. We were building an underground interceptor command
23 post and we were completing our own field command post. We
24 were waiting until they were completed and got into communi-
25 cation so that our next maneuver would be controlled by the

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 communications which we expected to have already to follow.

3 Mr. Murphy: I will take that up with you later. Let me
4 go to Marshall's correspondence with you. I refer first to
5 the letter of February the 7th, 1941. At that time General
6 Marshall gave you his impression and appraisal of Admiral
7 Kimmel; that he was brusque and unflippant in his approach
8 to problems and that he appeared rather rough in his methods
9 of doing business and that he felt that he was entirely re-
10 sponsive to plain speaking on the part of the other fellow
11 if there is frankness and logic in the presentation.

12 You remember that?

13 General Short: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Murphy: And then you answered him, did you not, by
15 saying that you had told Kimmel and Bloch that there would be
16 no hair-splitting between you, on February 19th?

17 General Short: That is correct.

18 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, to come back to the letter of
19 February 7th, General Marshall told you that Hawaii was on
20 a far better basis than any other command in the Army, did he
21 not?

22 General Short: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Murphy: He told you at that time that at Cavite and
24 Corregidor they had only two anti-aircraft guns?

25 General Short: Yes, sir.

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: He also told you, and I think this is significant:

"Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentrations at Hawaii."

That was your mission there, wasn't it?

General Short: Yes, sir.

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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1
2 Mr. Murphy: Then he also told you about the Army
3 and Navy feuds "which still persist in confusing issues
4 of national defense," and "we must be completely imper-
5 sonal in these matters"?

6 General Short: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, in your letter of the 19th
8 of February, you told him that you were taking up the
9 question of dispersion of pursuit aviation upon the
10 Island of Oahu in order that you might be able to meet
11 an attack from any direction, did you not?

12 General Short: That is correct.

13 Mr. Murphy: Then on page 7 of your letter, you make
14 reference, General, to a letter on maximum readiness of
15 aircraft in the Hawaiian area. Do you have a copy of
16 that letter? I am speaking now of page 7 of the Exhibit,
17 General.

18 General Short: What paragraph is that?

19 Mr. Murphy: The third paragraph from the bottom of
20 the page, "Letter HHD to Major Echelon Commanders, 17
21 February 1941, subject: Maximum Readiness of Aircraft
22 in Hawaiian Area."

23 I would like to see a copy of that letter, if I may.

24 General Short: I have not a copy here. I will ask
25 Colonel Duncombe if he can obtain a copy.

Witness short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h2

1
2 Mr. Murphy: Will you make a notation of that, counsel,
3 please? That is the third last paragraph on page 7.

4 On page 8 you spoke to General Marshall about the
5 necessity of bomb-proofing the vital installations, did
6 you not?

7 General Short: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Murphy: On March 5, 1941, General Marshall wrote
9 you a letter in which he said:

10 "I would appreciate your early review of the situation
11 in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from
12 air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system
13 of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter
14 of first priority."

15 Do you recall that?

16 General Short: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Murphy: On March 6, 1941, you wrote General Marshall:

18 "One of the first projects which I investigated in
19 this Department was the aircraft warning service which I
20 believe is vital to the defense of these islands."

21 Then again you said:

22 "With the present international situation, it seems
23 to me that if this equipment is to be used at all, the
24 need for it is now here."

25 That was back in March, was it not?

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h3

1
2 General Short: Yes, sir.

3 Mr. Murphy: Then you also stated in the next para-
4 graph that the equipment would arrive in June and the
5 stations would be operating shortly thereafter, did you
6 not?

7 General Short: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Murphy: You assured General Marshall that the
9 personnel would be trained and the stations in operation
10 within 30 days after the receipt of the equipment men-
11 tioned in your letter?

12 General Short: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Murphy: Now, on March 13, 1941, General Marshall
14 wrote to you and said:

15 "The progress that you are making in reaching close
16 coordination with local naval authorities, and so insuring
17 a maximum degree of readiness in your Department, is most
18 gratifying."

19 On March 15, 1941, you received a letter from General
20 Bryden, in the absence of General Marshall, saying:

21 "The War Department appreciates fully the necessity
22 for the early establishment of the aircraft warning service
23 station in the Hawaiian Department."

24 Then, the third paragraph:

25 "I have given these matters my personal attention."

Witness short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h4

1
2 The last paragraph:

3 "We are as anxious as you to work out a solution
4 for these problems with the least practicable delay, and
5 I know that I can count upon you for fullest cooperation."

6 General Short: May I interrupt you a moment?

7 Mr. Murphy: All right, General.

8 General Short: That particular thing he is discussing
9 is the question of getting the permission of the Park
10 Service.

11 Mr. Murphy: That is right.

12 General Short: That request was started in June, 1940.

13 Mr. Murphy: That is right.

14 General Short: And we did not get the authority
15 until April, 1941.

16 Mr. Murphy: That is right. You had great difficulty
17 in getting permission to have the fixed stations operate.
18 The fixed stations were not operating and therefore they
19 could not help you on December 7th?

20 General Short: That is correct.

21 Mr. Murphy: Just put that one on one side, and let
22 us go to the next one.

23 Now, on March 15, 1941, you stated to General Marshall:

24 "On all fields the planes have been kept lined up on
25 the field where they would suffer terrific loss."

Witness short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h5

1
2 So apparently you meant to change that situation,
3 did you not?

4 General Short: In case of an air attack, yes, sir.

5 Mr. Murphy: But you did not, did you?

6 General Short: We were not alerted against air
7 attack. We were alerted against sabotage.

8 Mr. Murphy: I see.

9 Now, then, on page 16, you said:

10 "In general, we have no serious shortage in three-inch
11 anti-aircraft artillery, only 16 guns being required to
12 complete our complement," did you not?

13 General Short: That is correct.

14 Mr. Murphy: Then in the paragraph on the bottom of
15 the page:

16 "After the installation of our new detectors, we
17 shall have some warning from the different islands and
18 almost continuous service in the most dangerous direction
19 for approximately 75 miles."

20 What was the most dangerous direction you were speaking
21 of there? It was from the north, wasn't it?

22 General Short: The north is what we ordinarily figured,
23 although the Navy felt that there was quite a possibility
24 of an attack coming in from the southwest, on account of the
25 Mandated Islands.

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h6

1
2 Mr. Murphy: As a matter of fact, an expert on
3 Hawaii, and Admiral Kimmel on several occasions, and some
4 other witnesses in these records, have said the most
5 dangerous area was from the north. Are you familiar with
6 that?

7 General Short: I am familiar with that particular
8 thing. Also the Navy thought there was considerable
9 danger from the southwest.

10 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, throughout the testimony,
11 for hundreds and hundreds of pages, the north was pointed
12 to as the most dangerous place. Then, at a subsequent
13 hearing, after the Roberts Board had completed, there was
14 a statement that the most dangerous place was from the
15 north, and in this hearing there is a reference by Admiral
16 Richardson to what he thought. The fact is you thought
17 the north was the most dangerous section, did you not?

18 General Short: Not necessarily directly north, but
19 northwest to north. That was the most probable.

20 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, you said there, "The
21 pursuit aviation, however, will have to be prepared to
22 take the air in the minimum amount of time." That is what
23 you told General Marshall, is it not?

24 General Short: That would be true no matter what
25 direction they came from.

Witness short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h7

1
2 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, that is what you told
3 General Marshall, that pursuit aviation would have to be
4 prepared to take the air in the minimum amount of time?

5 General Short: That is correct.

6 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, on the last page, page 17 of
7 that letter, the letter of March 15, you told General
8 Marshall:

9 "I feel that the question of anti-aircraft defense
10 against air attack is the most serious problem that we
11 have to face," did you not?

12 General Short: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Murphy: Now, on March 28, 1941, General Marshall
14 wrote you, and at that time he said in the second to the
15 last paragraph, he said:

16 "I am hopeful of arranging for the early augmentation
17 of your anti-aircraft garrison so as to provide full
18 strength unit for the armament available within your de-
19 partment."

20 Then, again, in the last paragraph:

21 "I approved your proposal to send General Martin
22 and General Gardner, or their executives, to the West Coast
23 defense exercise."

24 That was an air exercise, wasn't it?

25 General Short: Yes, sir.

Witness short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h8

1
2 Mr. Murphy: On April 14, 1941, you wrote General
3 Marshall, and in the second to the last paragraph on page
4 19, you said:

5 "Knowing that you are very much interested in the
6 progress that we are making in cooperating with the Navy,
7 I am enclosing the following agreement made with them:"

8 And one of them was the joint coastal frontier de-
9 fense plan.

10 Then in paragraph 3, on page 20, or the one numbered
11 3, you state:

12 "putting into effect for the Army the provisions of
13 the Joint Agreement."

14 The next paragraph:

15 "I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch
16 very cooperative, and we all feel steps have been taken
17 which make it possible for the Army and the Navy Air Forces
18 to act together and with the unity of command as the situa-
19 tion requires.

20 "We still have some detail work to do with reference
21 to coordinating the Air Force and the anti-aircraft de-
22 fense. I hope we shall arrive at something on that in the
23 near future. The more I go into the details, the more I
24 am becoming convinced that it will be necessary for us
25 to set up an air defense command."

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h9

2 Then, in the last paragraph, you told General
3 Marshall:

4 "The Navy has felt very much encouraged by the in-
5 crease in our air and anti-aircraft defense."

6 Now, I go over to the letter of May 5, that General
7 Marshall wrote to you:

8 "Thank you for your letter of the 14th enclosing the
9 joint plans and the estimate concerning possible air action.
10 It is evident that you have been on the job, and I know
11 that the Navy is delighted to have such generous coopera-
12 tion."

13 And in the last paragraph -- and this is significant --

14 "It is most gratifying to hear you say that everything
15 is going along extremely well, and do not hesitate to write
16 at any time."

17 Do you remember that?

18 General Short: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Murphy: Now, on May 29, 1941, you wrote General
20 Marshall, and you were describing the recent maneuvers. In
21 Paragraph 2, you said this:

22 "The maneuver was divided into three phases. The first
23 phase consisted of the air action and the actual issue
24 of one day's fire and of engineer supplies for field
25 fortifications and of engineer tools. During the air

Witness short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h10

1
2 phase, our bombers acted under Navy Command in coopera-
3 tion with the Naval Patrol Squadrons and actually located
4 and bombed airplane carriers 250 miles out at sea. The
5 movement of the carrier was entirely free so that the Navy
6 Patrol planes had the mission of locating the ship and
7 notifying our bombers and they then made the attack. Pur-
8 suit attacked enemy bombers represented by naval planes
9 and our own bombers, when they came in to attack ground
10 defenses.

11 "Upon receipt of the warning for this phase our
12 bombers were sent to fields on outlying islands and pursuit
13 planes were dispersed. The Navy cooperated very fully
14 during this phase, and I believe we learned more about
15 the coordination of Army Air Force, Navy Air Force, and
16 anti-aircraft, than we had during any previous exercise.

17 "Ammunition and engineer supplies had never been
18 actually issued before, and we got complete data in regard
19 to the time and the transportation required to complete the
20 issue."

21 If you had done just that after the war warning, it
22 would have been a different result, would it not?

23 General Short: Not just that alone, no.

24 Mr. Murphy: If you had done just what you did on
25 May 29, issued live ammunition and had your planes ready,

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

hll

2 and have your pursuits ready?

3 General Short: We had live ammunition at all anti-
4 aircraft batteries but four, or immediately accessible
5 to them.

6 Mr. Murphy: You said you had that ready, and you
7 also said you could go into alert 2 from alert 1 in seven
8 minutes, but the fact is, it took five to six hours for
9 them to get to their guns, didn't it?

10 General Short: No, it did not. It took time to
11 move the guns and troops to prescribed positions. There
12 were some batteries that had to move probably 20 miles.

13 Mr. Murphy: You mean to go from Alert 1 to Alert 2
14 you would make a phone call and say, "Go to Alert 2"
15 is that it?

16 General Short: They were prepared for that anyway.

17 Mr. Murphy: You would just give the order, but it
18 might take six hours to get to where you could shoot?

19 General Short: For a few of the batteries that is
20 true.

21 Mr. Murphy: It took a few batteries sometime to get
22 into their positions?

23 General Short: They had to move their troops.

24 Mr. Murphy: You mean your ammunition was at the crater?

25 General Short: The ammunition was at the crater for

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

hl2

2 four batteries.

3 Mr. Murphy: In the 64th Coast Artillery, Anti-air-
4 craft B, C, D, and F, just those four batteries?

5 General Short: Those four batteries. The others
6 were placed close to the prescribed positions, within,
7 I think 20 to 75 yards.

8 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, when you had this maneuver
9 on May 29, and when you had the alert on May 1st for 12
10 days -- or would that be the same one, General?

11 General Short: The same one, yes.

12 Mr. Murphy: At that time, did the public get hysteri-
13 cal?

14 General Short: I do not think you understood that
15 ammunition business. What we were attempting there, was
16 to find out, from a logistics point of view, how long
17 it would take to move a day's fire. That ammunition
18 was not issued out to the men. That ammunition was trans-
19 ported from the various places of storage to the troops.

20 The boxes were not opened. It was a question of
21 transportation, as to how long it would take to load up
22 the ammunition and to deliver it to the organizatbn con-
23 cerned. It was a logistics problem entirely, and it had
24 never been tried out before in Hawaii.

25 Mr. Murphy: The fact is that on May 1st, you say now

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

hl3

1
2 that you did not take the ammunition out and did not use
3 live ammunition?

4 General Short: We did not use any of it.

5 Mr. Murphy: Did not fire any shots at all?

6 General Short: No, we fired none. It was a logistics
7 proposition.

8 Mr. Murphy: Now, you also say that the ammunition
9 up in the crater only affected four anti-aircraft batter-
10 ies. Is that correct?

11 General Short: That is correct. Now, do not misunder-
12 stand me. There were lots of other ammunition in the
13 crater. We had ammunition immediately accessible to the
14 gun positions of all but those four batteries. There were
15 many days of fire in the crater.

16 Mr. Murphy: Did not you issue one full day's supply
17 of ammunition to each gun in the maneuvers in May?

18 General Short: We delivered it to the batteries, yes,
19 sir.

20 Mr. Murphy: You had it right there ready for use?

21 General Short: It was not ready for use. It was a
22 purely transportation proposition.

23 Mr. Murphy: It was in the boxes and the boxes were
24 not opened?

25 General Short: It was testing the time that it took

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

hl4

1
2 to draw the ammunition at the storage, and to move it
3 to the battery.

4 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, you said in the last
5 paragraph of that letter, on page 36:

6 "Some time later we expected to have a maneuver
7 without any warning whatever to the troops. But will wait
8 until after the organization of our air defense command."

9 General Short: That is correct.

10 Mr. Murphy: Is that the one you were still waiting
11 for in December?

12 General Short: That is the one we were waiting for.

13 Mr. Murphy: On October 10, you said to Senator Lucas
14 you had no word from Washington about the air subsequent
15 to July, as I understood you, and here is a letter from
16 General Marshall to you, dated October 10, which said:

17 "The mimeographed standard operating procedure for
18 the Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, has just come to
19 my attention, and I am particularly concerned with missions
20 assigned to air units."

21 Then again, in the second paragraph:

22 "This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are
23 placing on air strength in Hawaii."

24 General Short: That has no relation whatever to
25 a probable attack.

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Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h15

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2 Mr. Murphy: Well, that was a discussion between
3 you and General Marshall as to how much the air forces
4 should be trained for using guns and the like; and in
5 your letter you told him, did you not, that you had a
6 surplus of some 3,000 men?

7 General Short: Right at that time.

8 Mr. Murphy: That you had around 7,000-some-odd-hundred
9 men, and if you used around 3,000 of them, that would take
10 care of all of your needs for the airplanes, and you had
11 3,000 left over, and you wanted some to take care of them-
12 selves in the event there was an invasion; is that right?

13 General Short: That is correct, at that particular
14 day.

15 Mr. Murphy: But you were still talking about air,
16 and the importance of air?

17 General Short: Yes, but nobody was pointing to the
18 probability of an air attack today, or tomorrow, next
19 week or next month.

20 Mr. Murphy: I expect you had those airplanes there
21 to stop an air attack, did you not?

22 General Short: Yes.

23 Mr. Murphy: You had your air fields, your anti-aircraft
24 guns, your pursuit planes, and the only reason for them
25 being there was to stop an air attack, was it not?

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

hl6

1
2 General Short: Yes, but that did not mean at all
3 that an air attack was going to take place in the immediate
4 future.

5 Mr. Murphy: You were told that war was imminent?

6 General Short: Yes.

7 Mr. Murphy: You thought they should tell you where
8 the stroke would come?

9 General Short: If they had the information, I thought
10 so, and I still think so today, and I think they had it.

11 Mr. Murphy: Then, on October 14, you wrote to General
12 Marshall:

13 "I have your letter of October 10 with reference to
14 the use of men of the air force on other than strictly air
15 duties. At the time our tentative standing operating
16 procedure was put out the Air Corps had 7,229 men. Full
17 combat details and all overhead required only 3,885 men
18 for the planes and organizations actually on hand. This
19 left a surplus of 3,344 men with no assigned duties during
20 maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the assignment was
21 to give these men something to do during the maneuvers.
22 Another reason was the belief that any serious threat of
23 an enemy ground attack of Oahu could come only after
24 destruction of our Air Forces."

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Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 So that there would not be any need of an all-out
3 alert particularly unless the Air Force was destroyed?

4 General Short: That was my estimate of the situation.

5 Mr. Murphy: You say then near the end of the second
6 to the last paragraph:

7 "As regards their use as military police that was not
8 correct. The plan was to use them for guarding certain
9 essential utilities, which did not require team training.
10 However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has
11 just passed the Home Guard Bill, which will go into effect
12 very soon. They will be able to take over guarding of
13 all essential utilities, highway bridges, railroad bridges,
14 etc."

15 So that on October 14, at any rate, you were discussing
16 the air forces as such with General Marshall?

17 General Short: We were always discussing air forces.

18 Mr. Murphy: Now, General, I would like to ask you this:
19 In the alert you put out what did you do about your fire
20 control stations? Did you alert them?

21 General Short: The fire control for the coast artillery?

22 Mr. Murphy: All of your fire control stations under
23 the command of the Army.

24 General Short: We did not do anything about the fire
25 control stations because we were not on that kind of an alert.

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 Mr. Murphy: Right. The fact is that a great amount
3 of the damage was done to the hangars. I see here a picture
4 of the hangar burning. What hangar would that be, General,
5 do you remember?

6 General Short: I rather suspect it may have been the
7 Hawaiian Air Depot. I am not sure.

8 Mr. Murphy: I show you another picture of what appears
9 to be another hangar, or it may be the same one. Will you
10 examine this, if you please?

11 General Short: I would not know which particular hangar
12 it was, because they all look alike.

13 Mr. Murphy: Will you pass these two to him, please?

14 (The photographs were handed to General Short.)

15 General Short: I would not be able to say what parti-
16 cular hangars those were.

17 Mr. Murphy: The fact is that a great deal of damage
18 occurred from fire there that day, did it not?

19 General Short: Yes.

20 Mr. Murphy: If you had your fire control stations
21 alerted would that have cut down the damage?

22 General Short: When you are talking about fire control
23 I assume you mean those stations for controlling the fire
24 of the harbor defense guns. We had a fire department on every
25 post.

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 Mr. Murphy: I misunderstood you. I do not know
3 anything about those things. I see Admiral Richardson
4 laughing back there. However, I am only a layman and you
5 are an expert.

6 What special provisions did you take to stop fire after
7 November 27?

8 General Short: We always had provisions to stop fires.

9 Mr. Murphy: What special provisions after November 27?

10 General Short: Our fire department was always fully
11 alerted. We did not take any special provisions.

12 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, you say that the Navy had re-
13 connaissance, General, and therefore the Navy had reconnaissance
14 because of an expected air attack. Why did you have your
15 pursuit planes on 4 hours' notice?

16 General Short: I did not say that the Navy had re-
17 connaissance because of an expected air attack, because I
18 do not think they did expect an air attack. They had re-
19 connaissance to make sure that there were no Japanese vessels
20 in the coastal zone.

21 Mr. Murphy: Is that the understanding you gave to the
22 Roberts Board that I read yesterday, that the reconnaissance
23 that was had was the kind of reconnaissance that was expected
24 in the joint air mission? Is that what you referred to,
25 the responsibility of reconnaissance in the event of an air

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 attack?

3 General Short: That does not pertain only to air
4 attack. That responsibility would be for any kind of re-
5 connaissance.

6 Mr. Murphy: You have said, General, you expected the
7 Navy was carrying out their full duty in having reconaissance
8 and the Navy expected you to be doing your full duty on radar.
9 Now if the Navy was having reconaissance why did you have
10 your pursuit planes on 4 hours notice?

11 General Short: You are making statements that I have
12 not made. I said I expected them to do their full duty
13 as far as they were able to do it with the equipment they
14 had.

15 Mr. Murphy: I understood you to say, sir, you expected
16 the Navy to do complete reconaissance.

17 General Short: I did not say that.

18 Mr. Murphy: Let me find your answer and let me give
19 your exact words in the statement you gave before the Army
20 Pearl Harbor Board.

21 General Short: Will you please quote the page?

22 Mr. Murphy: I will, General. I have it here.

23 The Chairman: I might say we have reached the hour
24 of 4:00 o'clock.

25 Mr. Murphy: All right.

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Witness Short

The Chairman: Do you want to recess now or go into this?

Mr. Murphy: No, I will go into it in the morning.

The Chairman: The Committee will recess until 10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:00 o'clock p.m., the committee recessed until 10:00 o'clock a.m. of the following day, Friday, January 25, 1946.)

- - -

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.