

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

USS SANTEE (CVE29)

Action Report - OKINAWA - Part (V) - Special Comments and Information -  
Section (B) - Combat Information Center.

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Recommendations: (Cont'd)

C.I.C. Volume control would improve the ARC-1 sets. The necessity of frequent repairs and adjustments impaired the use of RCK receivers.

Consideration should be given to establishing a satisfactory visual fighter director station with a gyro repeater and proper visibility.

As usual, on too many occasions LCAP were required to identify friendly planes not showing IFF.

Attention is directed to the problem of enemy planes showing "friendly lights" to different radars in same task group.

On one occasion, all reporting ships called an indication friendly which was visually identified by the ST. LOUIS as a VAL and splashed by gun fire. The VAL came in at high altitude and probably produced a friendly indication for the reason that a PBM was approaching at the time from the same direction at very low altitude.

On another occasion, our radar reported "bogey" bearing 035-45 miles on crossing course. Reports from other ships agreed on range, bearing and course, but there followed a divergence of opinion concerning lights. CAP was vectored out and splashed one DINAH.

It is suggested that: (1) Extreme care in determining absence of "friendlies" on screen at same range and different bearing or altitude from bogey; (2) A suspicious approach to all "weak lights"; (3) The intelligent evaluation of reported code with course and speed; and (4) An up-to-date status board of planes in, or expected in the vicinity will materially aid in guarding against any surprise visits.

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Section (C) - Communications

Communications, as they effected the SANTEE and Air Group TWENTY-FOUR functioned smoothly. Lack of confusion, in our opinion was due to the following efforts:

Constant material checks and overhauls to prevent breakdowns.

Prompt dissemination of information.

Realizing that the operation would not be a short one it was determined at the outset that material improvements and alterations, both large and small could not wait for "availability". Therefore, the following were accomplished while the ship was underway and without interruption to air operations:

Removed low frequency direction finder to provide more space on bridge, as well as clearing the space occupied by the receiver in the base of the island thereby enlarging the crash shelter for plane handlers stationed forward on the flight deck.

Added extension on TBS antenna to provide better coverage and longer range.

Installed ZBX to provide shipborne monitor for YE.

Installed a fifth operation position in Radio ONE.

Constructed portable emergency VHF set using ARC-1. This equipment can be set up and operated by one man in any location, merely by connecting any 24 volt source of supply.

The well prepared communications plan and the use of more circuits were important aides in successfully conducting operations. Two examples of effectiveness of additional circuits are:

ARC-1 speeded up aircraft communications.

TBS secondary cleared operational traffic quickly and reliably, leaving TBS primary free for tactical use.

C.I.C. fighter direction communications, ship to ship and ship to aircraft, via VHF, over the long operational period were very good and considerably improved over Philippine engagement. Increased efficiency is

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attributed to:

Voice circuits available for use under the carefully planned division of traffic schedule.

Strict circuit discipline by FFOO.

Minimum mechanical and electrical failures (due to better equipment and the frequent checks by maintenance crew in their effort to avert failures);

VHF circuits made available by use of: four (4) TDQ-RCK, two (2) ARC-1 and one (1) NAN set, provided sufficient flexibility to permit compliance with VHF demands with minimum delay.

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Section (D) - Navigation

A summation of the activity of the Navigation Department throughout this operation can be made as follows: It has been routine daily work in navigation which provided continuously and as accurately as possible the determination of the position of the ship in the open sea and pilot waters. And in addition, this department has maintained a progressive system of training for personnel attached.

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Section (E) - Engineering

During current operations the activities of the department became a daily routine, modified to meet the requirements of periodical fueling of escort ships, re-arming and refueling ship.

An emergency generator watch has been kept, maintaining a minimum of one emergency generator on the line 24 hours a day to meet the changes in electrical load.

Air operations accounted for flank speed for considerable periods during this operation, which was exceedingly hard to meet at times due to the load on the boilers. This was especially critical while steam was on deck and H.P. air was maintained.

The boilers have had 2800 hours steaming since last being cleaned on fire and watersides. The continuous forced operation of the boilers prevails at high speeds with high fuel oil pressure which, at times, is greater than that allowed. A condition of excessive pitting exists in the tubes of these boilers. A request for the renewal of all tubes was submitted during last overhaul, but the renewal of only the tubes below the superheater bank was accomplished. Several boiler tube failures have occurred above the superheater bank.

The extent to which most of machinery in the department must be operated continuously while cruising, precluding underway repairs, is a feature of this class of ship. Under such extended operations, a long list of ship's force repair work, which was formerly done when the plant could be periodically secured, has accumulated.

Since the renewal of the starboard tail shaft and propeller on 1 March, a very noisy condition has existed in the starboard stern sleeve indicating misalignment, loose wood, or improper clearances.

The total time not underway for the 85 days covered by this report was 55.6 hours.

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Section (F) - Supply

Commissary:

It is believed that the most important single activity of the Supply Department during an operation is the efficient performance of the commissary function. With this in mind, preparations for battle feeding were made on 27 March and 28 March prior to entry in the combat zone.

Special menus for feeding the entire crew at battle stations were prepared, with consideration being given to ease in preparation and serving, and to the ship's regulations specifying alternate cold and hot meals. These menus are detailed below. Sufficient ham and beef for two cold meals were prepared and stored in the cold storage boxes, and provisions for two (2) hot meals were broken out and stored in the forward mess hall. Extra stocks of bread and cookies were prepared and maintained as a reserve for emergency use.

To provide for possible inaccessability of the storerooms, a ten (10) day supply of flour, salt and sugar, and a supply of canned fruits for baking was maintained in the bake ship issue room. In addition, a seven (7) day supply of canned provisions was stored forward in the cigar mess storeroom (Main deck, starboard side, frame 80-81) for emergency use only. These provisions were selected with the possibility in mind of eating them cold if heating facilities were not available.

For serving at battle stations, a three (3) day supply of paper plates, cups and spoons were stored in the bake shop issue room. Sufficient hot food carriers were broken out and maintained in the scullery.

At no time during the operation was it necessary to feed the entire crew on battle stations. However, from 1 April to 20 April the ship was in Condition ONE EASY, during which period over 300 men, or approximately 35% of the crew were fed on battle station. The remainder of the crew were served in the forward messing compartment.

The regular menu was served, with only slight variations to accommodate the differences in serving. After the first week, a method was devised of serving ice cream in paper cups in such a way as to insure its receipt by all personnel. Coffee or fruit juice was served at battle stations in mid-morning and with cookies in mid-afternoon. In addition, coffee was served just prior to sunset on several chilly evenings. Hot broth or soup can also be served in this manner between meals.

Paper mess gear was used for serving on battle stations during the first part of the operation but was discontinued when the extended length of the operations became apparent. Hot drink cups continued to be

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Commissary: (Cont'd)

used, however, for lack of a practical substitute. It was found that the regular compartmented trays with metal teaspoons were much more satisfactory and could be successfully used without loss by means of a simple check-out and check-in system. A list of the guns and the number of each crew was maintained and used for the purpose of preparing and segregating the food for each station so that it could be issued with a minimum of delay.

Provisions:

The following summary indicates the refrigerated provisions status during the period covered by this report:

	<u>Frozen</u>	<u>Chilled</u>	<u>Total Refrigerated</u>
On hand 25 March	24,430 lbs	57,693 lbs	82,123 lbs
Received	43,042 lbs	43,543 lbs	86,585 lbs
Total Available	67,472 lbs	101,236 lbs	168,708 lbs
On hand 17 June	13,594 lbs	5,190 lbs	18,784 lbs
Consumption 25 March to 17 June--89,000 rations	53,878 lbs	96,046 lbs	149,924 lbs
Consumption per ration	.60 lbs	1.08 lbs	1.68 lbs
Ration Allowance per Com- ServPac Disp. 222253, April 1945.	.81 lbs	1.17 lbs	1.98 lbs

Consumption of refrigerated provisions fell below the allowance established by ComServPac due to inability to obtain satisfactory replenishment during this period.

Memorandums were issued on 8 and 15 April to all messes, indicating in detail the status on those dates of the fresh meats on hand. An additional memorandum was issued on 27 April citing various food conservation measures and the allowances established by ComServPac.

The stock of dry provisions in general remained satisfactory, although non-availability of certain items made these critical and necessitated rationing. These items were coffee, catsup, powdered sugar, cinnamon, canned bacon, spaghetti, canned vegetables, and canned fruits.

Replenishment of Supplies at Kerama Retto:

The following summary indicates the extent to which supplies were available and obtained at Kerama. The figures in series opposite each item and under each data represent, in order, quantities requested, available and received.

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Replenishment of Supplies at Kerama Retto: (Cont'd)

<u>ITEM</u>	13 Apr.:	26 Apr.:	6 May :	15 May :	
Refrigerated Prov.-Units	0-0-0	:10-3 $\frac{1}{2}$ -3 $\frac{1}{2}$ :	10-0-0	:10-0-0	
Dry Provisions-Tons	0-0-0	:70-51-51:	25-0-0	:37-30-15	
GSK-No. of Items	0-0-0	: 0- 0- 0:	0-0-0	:325-161-21	
G&SS, Ship's Stores-Tons	0-0-0	: 0- 0- 0:	15-0-0	: 15-Yes-0	
		27 May	4 June		
Refrigerated Prov.-Tons	50- 0- 0		50-22*-22*		
Dry Provisions-Tons	35-34-34		15-15 -15		
GSK-No. of Items	229-52-52		225-30 -30		
G&SS, Ship's Stores-Tons	15- 0- 0		15- 4 - 4		

\* Misc. items from AD20.

Aviation supplies were obtained as requested in inverse ratio to the length of time that the aviation supply ship remained unrelieved by the aviation supply barge that was originally due the first of May. Some critical shortages started to develop as of the latter part of the period covered by this report, such as spark plugs, catapult cable, ordnance spares and radio crystals.

Due to inability to obtain sufficient symbol 1120 aviation lube oil from oilers, it was necessary to request bulk delivery at Kerama on 15 May, at which time 4100 gallons were received.

The main reasons for the small quantities of supplies actually received at Kerama are believed to be as follows:

Supply ships too few and far between--only a portion of the total requirements in this area were sent out and at infrequent intervals. On this basis, it was purely a matter of good fortune to find supplies available on the date scheduled for rearming.

Lack of advance scheduling by ComSerRon 10 Supply Representative--On 15 May, the issue ships were not notified of our requirements until after we had arrived at Kerama, although advance notice had been given by dispatch and by requisitions left on 6 May with the ComServRon 10 Supply Representative on the MT. MCKINLEY. As a result, the SANTEE was not scheduled for issue until afternoon by both supply ships. A further complicating factor was receipt of



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Replenishment of Supplies at Kerama Retto:(Cont'd)

notice of impending heavy air attacks, which necessitated sending both issue ships a dispatch to load only critical items and return the working parties immediately. Because of this constant threat in such an anchorage, it is essential that early loading be made available so that every moment is used to full advantage.

Lack of boats--Only a limited issue schedule was possible with the number of LCM's and other craft made available to the supply ships. On the morning of the 15th, all the boats assigned to the MATAR were being used to load the NEW YORK alone.

Replenishment of Supplies from Oilers:

On 8 May and 17 May, the Supply Department served as coordinator of all material requirements from refueling oilers. In addition to the fuel and lubricants normally obtained, it was possible to secure other critical items, such as CO2, 4" fueling hose, a steel sounding tape, and over two (2) tons of fresh and dry provisions.

Storerooms:

Two storekeepers were available at all times during Condition ONE EASY to issue necessary materials from the general and aviation storerooms. Not only were all of the ship's requirements filled from stock, but it was possible to transfer critical material to other ships, indicating commendable foresight and initiative on the part of the storekeepers concerned. C&SS issue room was opened on 13 April while in port rearming and then regularly after after 21 April. All excess paints, oil and dunnage were disposed of at Leyte.

Ship's Service Activities:

The ship's store was opened on 9 April and 13 April during condition ONE EASY and men permitted to leave battle stations in relays during the day to replenish their supplies. After the first week under Condition ONE EASY, one man was secured for a day to make ice cream for issue to the messes, and this procedure was adopted twice a week thereafter. This supplied the general mess with ice cream twice a week and the other messes four times a week. The laundry operated continuously during the whole period, but the barber shop, cobbler and tailor were closed. After 20 April, all activities operated on a normal schedule. Both the laundry and soda fountain were hampered by defective machinery which gave continual trouble.

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Menus for Battle Feeding Under Condition ONE:

BREAKFAST

1st Day

Fresh Fruit  
Soft Boiled Eggs  
Corned Beef Hash  
Bread and Coffee

2nd Consecutive Day

Fresh Fruit  
Baked Beans & Catsup  
Hot Corn Bread  
Bread and Coffee

MEALS OTHER THAN BREAKFAST

1st Day

Ham Sandwiches  
Cheese Sandwiches  
Potato Salad  
Chocolate Cake  
Fruit Juice

2nd Day

Beef and Vegetable Stew  
Fried Potatoes  
Cole Slaw  
Cookies and Canned Fruit  
Bread and Cocoa

3rd Day

Roast Beef Sandwiches  
Chopped Ham Sandwiches  
Chicken Salad  
Vanilla Cake  
Tomato Juice

4th Day

Chile ConCarne  
Steamed Rice  
Vegetables Salad  
Cookies and Canned Fruit  
Bread and Tea

Personnel:

During the entire period of Condition ONE EASY, nine (9) steward's mates were at their battle stations continually, leaving ten (10) men to run the wardroom and pantry and clean officer's staterooms. All storekeepers and strikers remained at their assigned battle stations, either as members of gun crews, or as telephone talkers.

Recommendations:

Regular menu can and should be followed during Condition ONE EASY.

During an extended period of battle station feeding, the use of paper mess gear is not only unsatisfactory, but impractical due to limitations of stowage space. Regular metal mess gear - trays and teaspoons - may be used satisfactorily, but it is believed that a plastic pie plate,

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Recommendations: (Cont'd)

with or without compartments, would be the best solution. There is also a definite need for a drinking utensil to be retained by each man. Possible alternatives would be a plastic telescoping cup and case, or the infantry cup and canteen combination.

Replenishment of Ammunition and Supplies at Kerama Retto:

When time is an essential factor, advance planning and scheduling is vital to utilize efficiently all of the time that the ship is at anchor. Ammunition and supply ships should have permanent working parties assigned, to have boats loaded and ready when the ship anchors, thus avoiding the time delay involved in the ship sending large working parties to do this job. Furthermore sending large working parties from the ship, particularly from the Gunnery Department, when the ship is under constant danger from air attacks reduces it's ability to defend itself and to get underway rapidly, with consequent increased chance of incurring damage. To facilitate advance planning and scheduling, the carrier should:

Ascertain from preceding carriers or other sources the current availability and sources of supplies. Send a radio dispatch, or a mailgram via the preceding carrier, specifying total requirements and requesting early scheduling. This will be addressed to the individual supply ships if known; if not to ComServRon 10 Representative.

Submit detailed requisitions in advance, to extent possible, either on previous trip or preceding carrier.

ComServRon 10 Supply Representative should:

Advise issue ships sufficiently in advance so that the carrier and its escorts may be scheduled for early morning issue.

Send a visual to the carrier while it is entering the anchorage, advising replenishment arrangements in general.

Arrange for the individual supply ships to send visuals to the carrier while it is entering anchorage, specifying time scheduled for issue, size of working party required, boat arrangements, etc. This could be included in the visual mentioned above.

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Replenishment of Ammunition and Supplies at Kerama Retto: (Cont'd)

In problems of actual delivery to the ship it was found that craft larger than LCT's could not lay alongside the ship and discharge ammunition efficiently and that LCM's were the best for this purpose. However, where large amounts of general supplies were needed, LCT's proved the most practical.

Ship's Store:

In future operations of a similiar nature, it is recommended that the ship's store be opened one day each week and that ice cream be made twice a week for serving in the messes.

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Section (G) - C & R

The SANTEE received oil, gasoline and supplies from oilers 7 times, taking a total of 56,505 barrels of fuel oil. 27 destroyers were fueled, usually two simultaneously, receiving a total of 26,129 barrels. In most cases, a transfer of supplies, equipment or personnel was accomplished at the time of fueling. In addition to the above, a total of 87 ships came alongside for transfer of mail or personnel.

Refueling without the use of a tow line was satisfactory and timesaving and maintained the ships at all times in a condition for speedy breakaway.

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ACTION REPORT - OKINAWA

PART VI - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

SECTION (A) - MEDICAL REPORT

During the entire operation the general health of the ship's officers, enlisted men, and pilots was considered good. Hygienic and sanitary conditions were reasonably satisfactory under prevailing combat conditions.

Motion pictures in Elementary First Aid were shown to the entire crew. Lectures in Elementary First Aid were also given in conjunction with the above, including instruction in transportation of wounded personnel by organized stretcher bearers.

The following listed personnel received injuries, suffered death, or have been listed as "Missing" or "Missing in Action" during the Okinawa Invasion, dating from 27 March 1945:

30 March 1945 - Ensign Harry Louis HOTCHKIN, A1, USNR, File No. 368463, VF-24 pilot, at 1817, zone minus nine time, while in the process of making a carrier landing, crashed into the sea and was drowned. Body was not recovered.

Diagnosis: DROWNING #2521, KL - "I", SL - "R".

1 April 1945 - At 0908, zone minus nine time, a fighter plane, upon returning to the ship, crashed into the island structure and plunged into the sea, resulting in the following death and injuries:

Lieutenant (jg) Grant Leland KELLEY, A1, USNR, File No. 283071, VF-24, pilot of plane, did not escape from cockpit.

Diagnosis: DROWNING #2521, KL - "I", SL - "R".

RICCIO, William Victor, SC3c, V-6, USNR, Service No. 821 27 45, suffered the following injuries: Rupture, traumatic, bladder and pelvic components. Fracture, simple, pubic, bilateral with displacement of fragments. Fracture, right ischium. Prognosis considered serious. Transferred to the U.S.S GOSPER as a patient on 13 April 1945 for hospitalization at a Naval Hospital Facility.

LOOMIS, Ernest Luther, ACMM(AA)(T), USN, Service No. 371 96 16, received contusions, both legs. Treated and returned to duty.

SOLIDAY, John Harry, CPhoM(AA)(T), USN, Service No. 256 36 81, received contusions and abrasions, left leg. Treated and returned to duty.

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Section (A) - Medical Report.

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1 April 1945 - Continued.

TAGLIERI, Edward James, AMM2c, V-6, USNR, Service No. 725 27 45, received Wound, lacerated, right hand. Treated and returned to duty.

BURNELL, Roy John, S2c, V-6, USNR, Service No. 628 10 63, received Contusions, right arm and elbow. X-ray revealed absence of bone pathology. Admitted to sick list for observation.

WHITING, Jess Gerald, AMM1c, V-6, USNR, Service No. 610 41 68, leaped from flight deck into the sea in order to avoid being struck by plane. He was rescued by the U.S.S. DREXLER (DD471). WHITING received injuries as follows: Contusion, right thigh. Sprain, left ankle. Elastic bandage applied to sprained ankle, preceded by procaine injection into area and heat to the contusion. Recovery uneventful following period of light duty.

2 April 1945 - At 1337, zone minus nine time, machine guns of a parked fighter plane were accidentally fired. Bullets struck a gas line, starting a fire in the immediate vicinity on the flight deck and catwalk, resulting in the following casualties:

LAMBERT, Richard Edwin, Slc, V-6, USNR, Service No. 955 93 45, suffered Burn, third degree, entire body surface, #2508, KL - "L". LAMBERT expired at 1645, zone minus nine time, and was buried at sea 1813, zone minus nine time, this date.

BAILEY, Eugene Ira, S2c, V-6, USNR, Service No. 701 83 54, leaped into the sea from catwalk to escape fire. He was observed floating face-down by men of this vessel and men on the U.S.S. METCALF (DD595). A search was instituted by the destroyer, but he was not recovered. BAILEY is listed as "Missing."

GRESENS, Alfred Gerhardt, QM2c, V-6, USNR, Service No. 305 60 71, leaped into the sea to escape fire and was rescued by the U.S.S. METCALF (DD595). Returned to this vessel on 3 April 1945. GRESENS suffered Burn, second degree, both legs to mid-thigh, face, neck and hands. Treated with burn ointment, compression bandages, and given necessary plasma. Prognosis considered good. Transferred to U.S.S. GOSPER on 13 April 1945 for hospitalization at a Naval Hospital Facility.

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Section (A) - Medical Report.

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2 April 1945 - Continued.

Lieutenant (jg) Glen William FREEMAN, Al, USNR, File No. 299072, VF-24, received multiple small lacerations over right eye and abrasions and contusions, both knees, when airplane he was pilot of crashed into barrier upon landing on flight deck at 1315, zone minus nine time, this date. All injuries were minor and did not incapacitate the officer. Was not rendered unconscious.

10 April 1945 - Lieutenant Commander Rexford John OSTROM, USN, File No. 82602, pilot and commander of Fighter Group TWENTY-FOUR, was declared "Missing in Action," when his plane was hit by enemy AA during a TCAP operational flight. Plane burst into flames and crashed into the sea. Pilot succeeded in removing himself from cockpit, but as related by eyewitnesses, parachute failed to open, and he was seen to plunge into the sea at approximately 1628, zone minus nine time.

12 April 1945 - CHRISTENSEN, Gwynn Merril, ARM3c(CA), V-6, USNR, Service No. 306 44 85, VT-24, received a war wound; Abrasion, mid-nasal area, and medial aspect of right orbit, in action against an organized enemy while on an authorized mission in TBM plane. Treatment consisted of sulfanilamide granules to abrasion, .5 cc tetanus toxoid administered. Permitted to return to duty.

23 April 1945 - While on an authorized bombing mission, the following named officer and aircrewmen were listed as "Missing in Action," when their TBM plane was shot down over target by enemy AA fire at approximately 0900, zone minus nine time:

Ensign Joseph Francis FLORENCE, Al, USNR, File No. 382837, pilot, VT-24.

BOLEY, Charles Edward, ARM3c(CA), V-6, USNR, Service No. 755 85 93, VT-24.

MURPHY, Richard Joseph, AMM3c(CA), USN, Service No. 258 60 91, VT-24.

24 April 1945 - MURPHY, Robert Danna Michael, AMM2c(CA), V-6, USNR, Service No. 846 94 18, VT-24, received a war wound-- Wound, lacerated, lips, when he was hit by enemy flak while on an authorized mission in a TBM plane. Treatment consisted of Tr. Merthiolate, one suture, dry dressing. Permitted to return to duty.



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Action Report - OKINAWA - Part (VI) - Personnel Performance and Casualties -  
Section (A) - Medical Report.

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- 25 April 1945 - Lieutenant (jg) Glen William FREEMAN, Al, USNR, File No. 299072, VF-24, listed as "Missing in Action" when fighter plane he was pilot of failed to recover from dive. He was seen to plunge into the sea at approximately 0830, zone minus nine time.
- 26 April 1945 - MILLICK, Marshall Wagner, GM3c, USN, Service No. 244 15 38, received surface abrasion of lower right abdominal region. Wound was caused by a flying splinter from a .30 caliber machine gun bullet when gun was accidentally fired in Ship's Armory. Treatment: 5cc tetanus toxoid administered and patient permitted to return to duty.
- 4 May 1945 - Lieutenant Commander Frank Gilleas JONES, USN, File No. 81512, the Air Officer of this vessel, fell in forward elevator pit during darken ship and sustained the following injuries: Fracture, simple, comminuted, right mid-metacarpal; multiple contusions and abrasions, right shoulder, anterior and posterior chest, hip, right calf and ankle. X-ray revealed the fracture of the right middle metacarpal. Treatment: Bed rest, heat lamp to back, plaster cast applied to right hand, sedative at bedtime. On 10 May 1945, permitted to return to duty status under treatment.
- 15 May 1945 - Ensign John Elvin COXE, Jr., Al, USNR, File No. 395284, VT-24, who during routine examination upon reporting aboard as a TBM pilot, revealed signs of chronic Nephritis. Ensign COXE was transferred to the U. S. S. NATRONA (APA 214) for observation.
- 24 May 1945 - Lieutenant (jg) Irving (n) MAYER, Al, USNR, File No. 306437, VF-24 pilot, developed sudden signs and symptoms of right spontaneous Pneumothorax, corroborated by X-ray. Lt.(jg) MAYER was transferred on 27 May 1945 to U.S.S. GOSPER (APA 170) for treatment and disposition.
- 29 May 1945 - Lieutenant John Frank GRAY, Al, USNR, File No. 124138, VF-24 pilot, was pilot of F6F plane on a regularly scheduled and authorized attack on Ishigaki Airstrip, Ishigaki Jima (Lat. 24° - 20½' N., Long. 124° - 11½' E.). At 0130 Zebra time, the plane failed to pull out of a dive, crashed and exploded upon striking the ground, after being hit by enemy antiaircraft fire. Lieutenant GRAY is listed as "Missing in Action."

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Action Report - OKINAWA - Part (VI) - Personnel Performance and Casualties -  
Section (A) - Medical Report.

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11 June 1945 - WELLS, Daniel Webster, Slc, V-6, USNR, Service No. 880 04 47, was in the process of defusing a bomb beneath wing of an F6F plane. Plane was suddenly put in motion by plane pushers, causing wheel to travel over left foot and edge of left calf, resulting in the following injuries: Abrasion of both knees; abrasion of both anterior tibial regions; multiple abrasions ecchymosis, and swelling of left foot; fracture of left navicular bone (tarsal bone); fracture of 2nd, 3rd, and 4th metatarsals, proximal 1/3 with dislocation of respective toes. Treatment: Reduction of fractures and dislocations. Dressing applied to abrasions. Tetanus toxoid .5cc administered. Passive immobilization until edema and ecchymosis of left foot subsides, following which a plaster cast will be applied.

SMITH, Eddie (n), StMlc, V-6, USNR, Service No. 831 57 35, was transferred by aircraft on 12 April 1945 to Yonton Airfield, Okinawa Island, for further transfer to a Naval Hospital Facility. Diagnosis: CALCULUS, Kidney, with aneuria, #749.

The following is a resume of other diseases admitted to sick list during period covered by this report:

<u>DIAGNOSIS</u>	<u>NO. CASES</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>
THROMBOSIS, #239	1	Duty
COLITIS, Acute, #315	1	Duty
CONSTIPATION, #316	1	Duty
DUODENITIS, #321	1	Duty
GASTRO-ENTERITIS, #387	6	Duty
CALCULUS, URETHRAL, #749	1	Duty
CATARRHAL FEVER, Acute, #801	13	Duty
PNEUMONIA BRONCHO, #811	1	Duty
TONSILLITIS, Acute, #818	2	Duty
PHARYNGITIS, Acute, #822	3	Duty
SYPHILIS, Early, #1221	1	Duty
CELLULITIS, #1305	6	Duty
FURUNCLE, #1312	3	Duty
LYMPHANGITIS, #1405	1	Duty
PSYCHONEUROSIS, HYSTERIA, #1542	3	Duty
BURSITIS, TRAUMATIC, #1604	1	Duty
MYOSITIS, Acute, #1631	1	Duty
NEURITIS, Sciatic, #1742	1	Duty
URTICARIA, allergic, #1967	1	Duty
PNEUMONIA, LOBAR, with plural effusion #812	1	Remaining on Sick List

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

USS SANTEE (CVE29)

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<u>DIAGNOSIS</u>	<u>NO. CASES</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>
ABSCESS, left index finger, #1300	1	Remaining on Sick List
PLEURISY, FIBRINOUS, with effusion #1813	1	Remaining on Sick List

Recommendations:

It is suggested that Squadron Flight Surgeons detailed for duty aboard a CVE with the Air Group be screened to determine the extent of surgical knowledge and instructed as to their expected duties aboard, in view of the limited medical officer complement. This will modify frequent misunderstandings that may arise.

A junior medical officer should be assigned to all CVE's when assigned to duty in immediate combat areas. This will be preferable to the assignment of a warrant pharmacist.

It is considered impossible for the entire complement aboard a ship to nurse complete confidence in one medical officer, which of course creates dissatisfaction in some instances and eventually leads to psychological instability.

It is not considered wise nor safe for a single medical officer to perform emergency major operative procedures when the occasion arises.

During a prolonged strenuous operation, it is necessary for the squadron flight surgeon to devote his entire day at flight quarters; so that his time to expedite squadron personnel responsibilities is limited.

The hospital corps complement is considered satisfactory.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

USS SANTEE (CVE29)

Action Report - OKINAWA - Part (VI) - Personnel Performance and Casualties.  
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Section (B) - General Personnel Performance

The performance of all personnel was of high standard throughout the participation of this ship in the operation. The extended nature of the operation lends increased significance to this fact. During the entire period there was no single day during which the personnel had an opportunity to relax from operating conditions. While at Kerama Retto, working parties were loading supplies and ammunition. During refueling operations, local flights and gunnery exercises were carried out. During periods of poor weather, the crew was engaged in preparations for flights in the event of improvement in conditions.

Recommendations:

When similar operations of long duration are contemplated, definite plans for the ship to be secured from flight operations for a period of at least 24 hours at specified intervals would materially increase the efficiency of the crew and particularly the air department.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U. S. S. SANTEE (CVE-29)

ACTION REPORT - OKINAWA

PART VII - BATTLE DAMAGE

N O N E

U. S. S. SANTEE (CVE-29)

ACTION REPORT - OKINAWA

PART VIII - IMPORTANT RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is strongly recommended that in future operations against enemy airfields and installations that a long-delay fuse be used. It is considered impractical to attempt to render airstrips non-operational by the use of bombs armed with .01 or .025 second delay fuses. This point has been emphasized by the fact that runways bombed in the late afternoon, using .01 and .025 second fuse, were evaluated as operational by the first strike pilots the next morning. There were numerous instances where the enemy repaired damage to their airfields during the night and also during periods of adverse flying conditions due to weather.)

2. It is recommended that a Carrier Division Air Group Commander be designated to coordinate the air activities of and insure that all Air Groups within the division receive the same information and same instructions concerning methods to be used in accomplishing the missions assigned. The Division Air Group Commander should be assigned in time to indoctrinate all Air Groups thoroughly prior to the time they are embarked aboard their assigned carriers and should remain at sea as long as the Air Groups in order to insure that information disseminated and methods used remain standard. Indoctrination of new air groups and replacement pilots in the proper method of conducting successful strikes against enemy targets which are well defended by anti-aircraft should be one of the main duties of the recommended Carrier Division Air Group Commander.

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