

B. Background

Following the resignation in October 1948 of Prime Minister Hitoshi Ashida together with his coalition Cabinet of Democrats, Social Democrats and Peoples' Cooperative and the formation of a new government by Shigeru Yoshida, leader of the Democratic Liberal Party, which for eighteen months had been in the opposition, a general election to select a new House of Representatives became inevitable. The Democratic Liberals did not command a majority in the House of Representatives. A coalition with other conservative groups, even if it had been feasible, would have produced a precarious majority at best, but it did not prove possible in the existing circumstances. The House of Representatives was sharply divided between the government bloc and the opposition parties and both camps proved rigidly uncooperative and intransigent. Further, the revelations of bribery and official corruption which had come to light during the fall of 1948 had implicated not only prominent members of the coalition cabinet but a number of Diet members as well. The public was disillusioned and confused. The problems facing the Japanese government, including measures necessary to carry out Occupation objectives and to promote rehabilitation, required a government which enjoyed the confidence of the public. The need for a new House of Representatives was indisputable.

Prime Minister Yoshida's intention to dissolve the existing House of Representatives was made known soon after his assumption of the Premiership; but the action was delayed pending enactment by the Diet of the bill revising the National Public Service Law in which General Headquarters, SCAP had an avowed interest. This bill was passed on November 30. The Government's budget plan which was related to the public service salary question, remained as unfinished business when the third (special) Diet session closed on November 30 but was presented again as a supplementary budget to the fourth (regular) Diet session which began on December 1, 1948. On December 4, 1948 Prime Minister Yoshida in his administrative policy address to the House of Representatives in Plenary Session served notice on the opposition parties that the Government intended to dissolve the House of Representatives two weeks after the submission of the supplementary budget. He stressed that his Cabinet was a "minority government" and that the dissolution of the current Diet would hasten the establishment of a democratic political system in Japan and emphasized the necessity of stabilizing the political situation of post-war Japan through the speedy institution of a two party political system.

On December 7, 1948 a conference of representatives of the opposition parties agreed upon a request which was submitted to the Government by Gizo Tomabechi, acting president of the Democratic Party, proposing (1) in the interest of a fair election that the Government avoid holding the general election during the year end and new year season; (2) the opposition parties favor dissolution of the House of Representatives; (3) a vote of non-confidence in the present Cabinet be introduced; (4) the policy agreement previously entered into by the Democratic, Social Democratic and Peoples' Cooperative parties was not binding on the minor parties.

On December 21, 1948 the Diet passed the Government's new wage bill for Government employees, clearing the way for approval of the supplementary budget. On December 22 the supplementary budget bill was passed. On December 23 the House of Representatives by a vote of 227 to 130 passed the opposition motion of non-confidence in the Yoshida Cabinet. On the same day the Imperial Rescript counter-signed by the Prime Minister was received by Speaker Komakichi Matsuoka and the House was dissolved. The Rescript stated that the House was being dissolved in accordance with the provisions of Articles 69 and 7 of the Constitution of Japan. This was the first time the House of Representatives had been dissolved under the new Constitution and the first time Article 69 thereof had been invoked.

On the following day, the Cabinet met to discuss post-dissolution issues. In a press conference following the meeting, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida declared that his Government would seek the confidence of the people in order to put its policies into practice. "Our Cabinet has sustained considerable wounds during the past Diet session," Yoshida declared, "but such wounds are only slight and we hope to become healthier and stronger hereafter." The Prime Minister characterized as deplorable the events which took place in the Third and Fourth Diet sessions and said he hoped in the next general election that the people would select a new Diet of which they could really be proud. He further stated that he hoped to realize a two-party political system in Japan, and that he would strive to bring all conservative elements within a single powerful party.

On December 27, 1948 the Imperial Edict setting the date of the general election was published in the Official Gazette. The Edict stated as follows:

"I hereby proclaim that general election of members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the 23rd day of January 1949, in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 and Article 54 of the Constitution of Japan, as well as Article 18 of the Law for the Election of Members of the House of Representatives."

C. Occupation Interest In The Election

1. Statement of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

The interest of the Allied Powers in the impending election was expressed by General MacArthur in the following paragraph from his New Year's Message to the Japanese people on January 1, 1949:

"The general election just ahead will test your wisdom in the selection of a leadership to whom you will in this crucial period entrust the sovereign power. The times require a great dignity and capacity for wise statesmanship and such should be the measure of your choice -- men capable of elevating your national legislative forum to the standard set by the finest of your traditions. Thereafter the issue will rest squarely upon the type of leadership they bring to the country and the resolute will by which each among your citizenry acquits his individual responsibility in the great task of ensuring that Japan may live."

2. Surveillance by the Occupation Authorities

The election surveillance procedure employed in the general elections of 1946 and 1947 having proved highly satisfactory was adopted again in the 1949 election. This consisted of general observation and surveillance of the pre-election campaign, the administration of the election procedures, the voting, and the ballot counting, performed by Military Government Teams and tactical units of the Occupation forces to insure that the election laws were fairly and honestly administered and that the election was conducted without official or other interference from any source.

Command instructions charging the Commanding General, Eighth Army with responsibility for the surveillance of the election were dispatched on December 24, 1948. These instructions were accompanied by two handbooks which included annotated text of all laws and ordinances pertinent to the election.

Continuous contact was maintained between the Government Section of General Headquarters, SCAP and the Military Government Section, Headquarters, Eighth Army. Until the termination of the election the Government Section remained the

the principal point of contact with the Japanese National Election Management Commission. As in previous elections under the Occupation the Military Government Teams were authorized to report directly to General Headquarters, SCAP any matters which in their judgment required expeditious action such as a serious infringement of the election laws, or criticism of activities on the part of Occupation personnel in connection with the campaign or the election.

The Military Government Teams began actual surveillance of the election at the time of the announcement on December 27, 1948. Several days thereafter a surveillance team from other units of the Occupation forces was assigned and began operation in each of the 117 electoral districts of Japan. Just prior to election day the program was augmented by many additional teams so that on election day and until the counting of the ballots there were 1168 surveillance teams actually in the field, of which 139 came from Eighth Army units, 686 from I Corps units, 304 from IX Corps units, 3 from the U. S. Navy, 7 from the U. S. Marine Corps, and 29 from EOCF. A surveillance team consisted of an officer or a non-commissioned officer of the first three grades, an interpreter and a driver, and was equipped with a motor vehicle.

Surveillance teams were physically present in the electoral districts throughout the entire campaign and were in constant contact with the various local election administration committees, with candidates, political party leaders, newspaper men, and personnel of the law enforcement agencies. They attended political meetings, observed campaign procedures and interviewed members of the general public. If violations of the law were reported to have occurred, reports were immediately sent to Headquarters, Eighth Army, where the Military Government Section indicated the action to be followed. No major violations were found and no criticism of the activities of Occupation personnel were received.

On the voting and counting days the surveillance teams visited over 90% of all the polling stations and counting places throughout Japan at least once on each day, subsequently making reports to the Military Government Teams based on their observations.

D. Administration Of The Election

1. Legislation

The general election of 1949 was held under the law for the election of the members of the House of Representatives, the same law which had governed the election of April 1947 with certain changes which had been made by the Japanese Diet early in 1948. These amendments were aimed at equalizing the competitive campaign opportunities of all candidates by placing certain limitations on electoral publicity, speech making and other campaigning by candidates, parties and supporters, and providing more stringent penalties for election law violations, including bribery, forgery, intimidation, violence, abduction or official neglect of duty or abuse of power.

The Law Concerning the Regulation of Political Contributions and Expenditures, enacted by the Diet on 30 June 1948, increased the penalties for violations of the provisions of the Law for the Election of Members of the House of Representatives approximately threefold, and in some cases more. For example, violations calling for fines of ¥1,000 were increased to as high as ¥25,000; ¥20,000 fines were increased to ¥35,000; ¥30,000 increased to ¥75,000; etc.

The Law Concerning the Regulation of Political Contributions and Expenditures,--also popularly called the "Corrupt Practices Law,"--was enacted with the aim of insuring fair and impartial elections, both national and local.

This law, as its title indicates, requires all political parties, political organizations, and candidates to report contributions and expenditures, requires that certain appropriate records and vouchers pertaining to contributions and expenditures be maintained within the political parties and organizations. It prohibits certain types of contributions.

The highlights of this law follow:

- (1) Prohibits purges from making contributions in any election.
- (2) Prohibits holders of government contracts, both national and prefectural, from making political contributions.
- (3) Prohibits candidates from making contributions within the area in which the candidate is running for office.
- (4) Prohibits persons from making or receiving election contributions anonymously, or under any name other than his full legal name, together with his legal address.
- (5) Prohibits foreign nationals or agencies from making election or campaign contributions.
- (6) Prohibits contributions through a third person.
- (7) Requires that political parties, political organizations, and individual candidates register the names and addresses of responsible officials with the National Election Management Commission or the Prefectural Electoral Administration Committee.
- (8) Requires that a candidate report in writing all contributions made by him for the period of one year preceding the date of announcement of the election for which he is a candidate.
- (9) Requires that political parties, political organizations, and individual candidates report to the National Election Management Commission or the Prefectural Electoral Administration Committee the names, addresses, dates of birth, and dates of appointment of responsible party officials, location of the political party or organization, within 7 days of its establishment.
- (10) Requires that political parties, political organizations, and individual candidates keep account books, records, and other documents pertaining to all contributions, to include the names, addresses, and occupations of all persons making the contributions. (For organizations making contributions, their names, address of main office, and name and address of representative).
- (11) Requires that political parties, political organizations, and individual candidates keep account books, records, and other documents indicating all payments made on behalf of the political party or association. Records must also indicate the name, address, and occupation of all persons to whom such payments have been made, together with the object, amount, and date of such payments.
- (12) Requires that any person other than the treasurer of a political party or organization who accepts contributions or makes payments for or on behalf of said party, shall report the details of such payments or contributions to the treasurer within 7 days, or immediately upon request of the treasurer.

- (13) Requires that vouchers for any payments exceeding ¥1,000 made by the political party, political organization, or other organization, be collected and maintained by the treasurer of the political party or organization.
- (14) Requires that the treasurer of a political party, or political organization submit a report to the National Election Management Commission prior to the tenth day following each April 30, August 31, and December 31, which must include the following items:
- a. All contributions and all other income received by a political party, or political organization, and all contributions and incomes received on their behalf.
 - b. Contributions received by a political party or political organization which exceed ¥1,000 (or aggregate amounts for identical contributions) must indicate name, address, and occupation of contributor, and amount and date of contribution.
 - c. Contributions received by other than a political party, political organization, or other organization which exceed ¥500 must indicate the name, address, and occupation of contributor, and amount and date of contribution.
 - d. All payments made by a political party, or political organization.
 - e. Payments made by a political party, or political organization which exceed ¥1,000 (¥500 for other than political parties) must indicate name, address, and occupation of the person to whom such payments were made and the object and date.

2. Supervision by the Electoral Authorities

Before the elections of April 1947, supervision over Japanese elections was exercised by local executives: governors, mayors, and headsmen. For the first time in the history of Japanese political affairs, the elections of April 1947 were supervised by special committees elected by local legislatures and responsible for all elections, national or local, which were held in their areas of responsibility.

On the basis of the experience thus derived, the functions of these committees were developed and strengthened by legislation. An election administration committee was set up in each local entity. These committees were responsible to the public at large and charged with supervision of all elections conducted in their area of jurisdiction. Each city, town, village, and Tokyo ward thus had a committee exercising on its own account immediate control over the election in its own locality, under the general supervision of prefectural committees. The prefectural committees had six members, including a chairman; others had four. The method of electing committees permits of bipartisan membership. A committee meeting was held at the request of any member. All complaints regarding the conduct of the election were normally made, in the first instance, to the committee.

SECRETARY OF THE HOUSE SEC. 5(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 775012

An innovation since the elections of April 1947 was the establishment in December of that year, of the National Election Management Commission, under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's Office. This Commission is composed of nine regular members and nine alternate members, nominated by the various parties. The Commission assumed certain of the functions pertaining to elections once performed by the former Home Ministry having to do with the coordination of the work of the various levels of local committees, statistics gathering and reporting, and so forth.

Under the law creating the National Election Management Commission, enacted December 9, 1947, the Commission is responsible for the administration of all popular elections. This includes elections for both national and local offices, as well as those held for ratification of amendments to the Constitution and, as in the present election, for the popular review of Supreme Court Judges. Among the specific duties of the Commission are the securing of necessary appropriations assisting in the procurement of necessary paper, and other preparations concerning the elections.

Although the National Election Management Commission is placed under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister, it operates as an autonomous body governed by the decisions of its members.

All political parties and political associations must register with the Commission and file with it financial statements or any other data required.

The Commission coordinated the work of all independent local committees. There was an election administration committee in each of the 46 prefectures, and 10,050 cities, towns, and villages each had an election administration committee under the direction of the prefectural committee. In addition, each of the six major cities (Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Kobe, Nagoya, Kyoto) had an election administration committee in each of their wards. Thus, Tokyo had 23 ward election administration committees. In short, in the recent election there were over 10,000 subsidiary election administration committees under the 46 prefectural election committees, whose work was supervised by the National Election Management Commission.

Before the end of December 1948, the National Election Management Commission had already completed all the necessary preparations to discharge its duties thoroughly, beginning with the acceptance of candidacy applications and ending with the opening of the polling stations on election day, so that an orderly election would result. The Commission set up 42,900 polling stations throughout the country to accommodate the 42,090,916 eligible voters. In the election of 1949, the Commission operated on a budget of ¥770,000,000.

3. Screening of Candidates

All candidates who had not previously received certificates of eligibility pursuant to screening under the provisions of SCAPIN 550 were screened by the Japanese Government before being admitted as candidates in the 1949 election. Of the 291 aspirants so examined only one, Tosoyo Oda, Tokyo independent, was barred under Category G of SCAPIN 550 because of his ultranationalistic writings. 19 candidates were former purgees who had been released from the disabilities of the Purge as the result of appeals, and of this number 8 were elected. Prominent among such successful candidates were Ken Inukai, Ryuta Komine, and Shigeru Hori; notable among such reinstated purgees who were defeated in the election were Matara Narahashi, and Tada Tanabe.

4. Regulation of Campaign

All candidates were required to file candidacy applications before January 13, 1949, the deadline date as provided by law.

As already noted, the Japanese election laws provided stringent regulation of the election campaign. The basic election law for members of the House of Representatives was amended by the "Law Concerning the Provisional Exceptions to the Election Campaign and Others" of 29 July 1948, and the "Cabinet Order Relating to the Enforcement of the Law Concerning Temporary Exceptions Relating to the Election Campaign, etc., No. 192" of 29 July 1948.

These revisions affecting the election campaign in 1949 in many respects differed from the regulations in force for the previous election. The highlights of these revisions were as follows:

a. Regulation of campaign speech-making:

Election campaign speeches were limited to the following:

- (1) Competitive speech meetings among candidates sponsored by the city, town, or village election administration committee. (Each candidate was permitted to participate in one such meeting in each city, town, or village, and a total of 30 in his election district).
- (2) Thirty individual speech meetings by each candidate at a public school or a hall provided by the city, town, or village election administration committee.
- (3) Street speech meetings: no limit in number, provided the candidate was present.
- (4) Radio broadcasts: 3 times.

b. Use of publicity literature was limited to the following:

- (1) Newspaper advertisement: 2 times.
- (2) Signboards, posters, stickers, and placards used at street speech meetings and candidate's campaign office and on motor vehicle.
- (3) One thousand free postcards and envelopes (with postage) supplied by the Government (the National Election Management Commission) to each candidate.

c. Other:

- (1) Preparations for holding competitive speech meetings and individual speech meetings, as well as the announcement of speech meetings, were required to be made by the city, town, or village election administration committee at the expense of the national treasury.
- (2) Fifteen free passes enabling the holder to ride in public or privately managed railways, streetcars, etc., were issued per candidate. (This expense to be borne by the national treasury).
- (3) Use of good offices to obtain gasoline and charcoal for motor vehicles to be used by candidates in the election campaign.

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- (4) Use of motor vehicles, loudspeakers, and boats was restricted to one each per candidate.
 - (5) The offering or receiving of food or drinks in connection with the campaign were absolutely prohibited.

5. Interpretation

On the whole the administration of the election procedures by the National Election Management Commission was praiseworthy. At one point during the campaign, however, there arose some apparent confusion on the manner of application of certain provisions of the election laws which, although intended to prevent unfair campaign practices, could, if literally and strictly construed, result in unduly confining the efforts of candidates and their supporters and in restricting the normal freedom of the Press, including its right to support or oppose particular parties or candidates. The question was actually raised as to whether, under the pertinent provisions of the existing legislation, the Japanese Press could legally support or oppose individual candidates or parties. Representatives of the National Election Management Commission and the Office of the Attorney General at first were inclined to construe such activities as violations of the Law Concerning the Temporary Exceptions to Election Campaigns promulgated on July 29, 1948. According to the Attorney General's initial interpretation, activities of candidates and parties could be fully reported in the Press but, if a newspaper should go beyond the point of merely reporting events and should urge support of or opposition to any candidate or party, it could be charged with violating the election laws.

Such a situation obviously required clarification and this was accomplished by means of a conference held in the office of the Government Section, General Headquarters, SCAP, on January 15, 1949, in which representatives of the Government Section and the Civil Information and Education Section, General Headquarters SCAP, met with representatives of the National Election Management Commission, the Attorney General's Office, and the National Rural Police Headquarters. At this conference Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, Chief of Government Section, stated in part as follows:

"I feel that the question immediately before you is a fundamental one. It is our purpose to give all assistance in resolving the question in the interest of the people of Japan.

"There is involved a question concerning freedom of the Press, freedom of the individual, and respect for the agencies of the Japanese Government. It is not our purpose to inject ourselves into the operational procedures of agencies of the Japanese Government, but rather to join with you in asserting our desire that no principles of the Constitution be violated by any improper interpretation of existing laws.

"Fundamental to that Constitution is the provision that freedom of expression is guaranteed and that the Government of Japan shall be responsive to the free will of the Japanese people. We do intend to join with you in insuring that these fundamentals of the Constitution are not violated by law or by an interpretation of the law. Had we felt that the Constitution was violated by any changes in the Election Law under consideration by the Diet, we would have been forced to intervene and to hold up those proposed changes. It is fundamental to the responsibility of this Headquarters to insure that basic freedoms and rights guaranteed by the Constitution are preserved inviolate to the people so long as we are here. We did not intervene in that legislative process because we assumed that the legislation would be broadly construed in the light of the paramountcy of the public interest. For

there can be no free and enlightened expression of the people's will unless the people can be fully informed concerning facts about which they are called to register their will.

"Since I have been in Japan I have observed a tendency on the part of judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative bodies to place a too literal interpretation on laws and administrative regulations, and I have on numerous occasions urged that official thinking and official interpretations be broadened so as to encompass the public interest. Because, after all, the public interest should be master of all official thinking and official action.

"Now that is precisely the issue presently involved: a narrow, literal, arbitrary interpretation of the body of law which governs the elections or a broad, statesmanlike interpretation which serves the public interest. My advice to you and to every section of the government here represented, in the interest of insuring free election and an untrammelled expression of public will, is that you construe all laws which you are called on to administer in the light of constitutional mandates.

"And in so doing, whenever there is doubt in your minds concerning the proper interpretation of laws or regulations you can make no mistake if you resolve that doubt in the interest of free expression. This is a fundamental requirement of all law in Japan. You must understand that it is not necessary that the provisions of the Constitution be repeated in every Act of the Diet. Those provisions are superimposed over all laws enacted in Japan. You can never fail in meeting your trust and responsibilities if you read into every law every provision of the Constitution. Apply every law and administer every law as if every provision of the Constitution were written therein. That, of course, gentlemen, is your safest course since your first loyalty and devotion is to the Constitution.

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"I believe that those provisions of the election law which interfere with or may be interpreted to restrict the freedom of the individual, whether they be applied to members of the electorate, political parties, candidates, or the press, should be interpreted in such fashion as to insure preservation of individual liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. I recognize that there are some seeming conflicts between the laws and the Constitution. I want to see a broad, statesmanlike interpretation of those provisions, with unflinching devotion to the precepts of the Constitution. This is a challenge to your wisdom, the breadth of your minds and your devotion to the public interest."

At the conclusion of the conference, Shunkichi Unno, head of the National Election Management Commission, on behalf of the Japanese officials present, expressed appreciation and agreement, but in view of certain difficult questions which might arise, indicated that General Headquarters' advice and guidance might occasionally be requested. It was agreed that the National Election Management Commission and other agencies of the Japanese Government would make every effort to resolve future questions and doubts in the light of General Whitney's statement, and that any residual questions would be referred to General Headquarters for assistance in developing guiding principles.

On January 18, after obtaining Cabinet approval, the National Election Management Commission issued the following statement:

"Needless to say, it is the true function of the press to report to the public all news freely and impartially. The Constitution guarantees the press freedom to express opinion. This

also in the spirit of the Press Code. It is therefore desired that the press at the time of an election especially demonstrates its true function and speedily and actively supply the voting public fair and just opinions on political parties and candidates. We believe that in the administration of election laws these principles should naturally be fully respected.

"The foregoing imposes on the press the obligation to perform its functions as a responsible media of public information, at all times giving paramount importance to the promotion of the interests of the people."

Following this release, the National Election Management Commission, the Attorney General's Office, the National Rural Police Headquarters, and other agencies of the Japanese Government instructed all prefectural and local subsidiaries to give full consideration to the Bill of Rights contained in the Constitution in administering the election laws.

E. Campaign Publicity and Press Coverage

1. Election Publicity

Candidates and political parties were extensively publicized during the campaign period - by newspapers, the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan, the National Election Management Commission and its branches throughout Japan, by the League of Political Education and other organizations and agencies. The intensive campaign efforts of individual candidates and parties served also to inform the electorate concerning election issues and party programs.

The Press devoted extensive space to the campaign throughout the election period. In general newspapers gave full coverage without giving support to individual candidates or parties, preferring instead to urge that support be accorded parties and individuals of conviction and integrity. The Press also advocated that electors inform themselves concerning campaign issues and that voters exercise their franchise on election day. Even those newspapers which did support or oppose individual candidates gave extensive publicity to major parties and candidates. Many newspapers expressed severe criticism of the laws under which the election was being conducted, holding that some provisions were excessively restrictive, tending thereby to reduce interest in the campaign and to give unfair advantage to incumbent or well-known candidates over "new faces". This criticism served to publicize the elections and undoubtedly cause many voters further to examine the records of candidates and parties.

All candidates were given opportunity to address their constituencies by means of radio. The Broadcasting Corporation of Japan also devoted extensive time to the transmission of specific information concerning individual candidates and major election issues. In addition, short biographical sketches of each candidate were broadcast ten times during the campaign. Emphasis was also given to the importance of enlightened participation in the elections.

The National Election Management Commission did an extremely effective job (1) in instructing all election officials and candidates concerning requirements of the election laws; (2) in informing the electorate concerning candidates and election procedures; and (3) in stimulating widespread participation in the election.

The Commission issued a series of informational publications which were distributed to all persons with any responsibility for the administration or enforcement of election laws. At the start of the campaign period prefectural

election administration officials conferred with Commission heads in Tokyo. Subsequently, daily information bulletins were dispatched to all local units by means of direct police telephone or radio.

Each candidate was furnished a handbook explaining the laws under which the elections were being conducted.

The Commission published 900,000 posters emphasizing the importance of the election and the review of Supreme Court justices. Local prefectural offices issued hundreds of thousands of leaflets similarly stressing the importance of the election. The single most important piece of election literature published by the Commission was issued in 53 editions, one for each election district, and was distributed to each of the 17,000,000 voting families in Japan. This bulletin contained biographical information concerning candidates in each district. Voting families also received full information relative to review of Supreme Court justices.

The Commission also utilized street panels, radio interviews, sound trucks and loud speaker announcements at all railway stations in an effort to encourage widespread participation in the elections.

Notable assistance in publicizing the election was given by the League for Political Education for Democracy, an independent non-partisan agency of the Diet, which distributed hundreds of thousands of posters, hand-bills and pamphlets designed to stimulate widespread interest and participation in the election. The League also made extensive use of the radio, motion pictures, kamishibai and all other information media in an effort to get out the vote on election day.

2. Press Coverage and Editorial Opinion

During the five weeks preceding the election, political discussion dominated the Press and the progress of the campaign was reported in great detail. Most papers made some predictions by parties in several series; some published party platforms for the convenience of their readers. Yomiuri and Jiji Shimpō, for instance, carried articles by ex-Communists in opposition to the Communist Party.

While most newspapers refrained from supporting outright individual parties or candidates, an undercurrent of sympathy in favor of the Democratic Liberal Party could be seen in the attitude of major metropolitan papers. As the election drew closer, the entire press, in efforts to stimulate public interest, urged the people to vote, and sought to rouse popular political consciousness with pertinent slogans and well-pointed editorials to vote intelligently. Political commentators almost unanimously expressed serious concern over the possibility of wide abstention from voting. Two reasons accentuated this concern: the fact that the cold weather might keep the public away from the polls on election day, and an appearance of general indifference and apathy which characterized the pre-election scene.

A Mainichi editorial, at the outset of the campaign, after expressing relief that the Diet had been finally dissolved and excoriating the Opposition bloc for delaying the inevitable break-up, urged the voters to scrutinize the candidates and the parties closely so that the most competent Diet possible would be returned. Careful study of both candidates and party platforms was also advocated by Nihon Keizai. The voters must remember, Asahi wrote, that representatives must be chosen competent enough to put the nation back on its feet.

A segment of the Press regarded the Social Democratic Party as the "black sheep" of the Opposition camp for its political fickleness. Yomiuri expressed the opinion that minor parties impeded parliamentary politics and advised the voters to cast their ballots for the major parties only, thus eliminating the "useless" small groups. Sekai Keizai, confirming this opinion, maintained that

unless minor parties whose existence could be justified bonded together, the threat of communism would develop into a real menace in Japan. Dai Ichi warned all parties not to make rash campaign promises which could never be harmonized with SCAP's 9-point economic stabilization program.

Emergence of a healthy two-party system of politics, shorn of all antagonism between "reactionary conservatives" and "class-conscious workers" was desired by Nihon Keizai's editorial on December 25, which especially advocated a genuine improvement in "old-fashioned conservatism". At the same time, Tokyo Shimbun, voicing disgust at the partisan bickering preceding the Diet's dissolution, called for an ideal election free from bribery characteristics of previous voting.

Jiji Shimpō also decried the tactics of the Opposition bloc for staving off dissolution of the Diet and thus setting a bad precedent in Diet-Cabinet relations. The editorial cautioned the people not only to vote wisely but to study the records of the Supreme Court judges in order to evaluate their qualifications properly and to dismiss those believed to be incompetent.

The Communist Party organ Akahata on December 27 plugged for a joint Communist-Social Democratic election offensive as the forerunner of "a gigantic struggle for the expansion, strengthening, and bolshevization of the Communist Party." Akahata's editorial on the following day contained an "order" to Communists to fight "resolutely and dauntlessly" for their party, unifying the masses and attacking the "corrupt parties."

3. Prime Minister's Statement on the Election

On the eve of election day, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida urged all voters throughout the nation to vote with a clear understanding and with freedom of judgment. The Prime Minister's statement made on the afternoon of January 22, declared:

"Following the passage of the non-confidence resolution, the Government dissolved the Diet, in conformity with the customary practice under a constitutional form of government, to test the confidence of the people in the Government. Realizing fully the significance of the present election, the people should clarify their political faith with a clear understanding of the future of the political situation and with complete freedom of judgment.

"Needless to say, in view of the importance of the franchise, no one should abstain from voting. Abstention not only means abandonment of an important right and duty, but it will also have a far-reaching effect upon the outcome of the election. It is, therefore, strongly urged that you fulfill your sovereign duties by casting your vote. It is further urged that you do your share in cleaning up political circles by categorically rejecting the buying of votes and other corrupt practices which are bound to cast dark shadows on government.

"The Constitution of Japan is the Constitution of the people. Therefore, only the people should shape the destiny of tomorrow's government by deciding on today's government. I, therefore, earnestly hope that the people, realizing fully this important duty, will conduct a free, fair, and just election, so that a completely stabilized political situation may be created through a House of Representatives which fully reflects the sovereign will of the people and which has their confidence. I firmly believe that by so doing the people will rebuild Japan by accomplishing the nine-point economic stabilization program and thereby justify world confidence in us."

4. Political Platforms

The tendency toward vague generalizations and sweeping promises which has characterized post-war political party platforms, though still in evidence, was somewhat modified. The Democratic Liberals, in a bid to bring all conservative elements under their banner, advocated a responsible single-party government, independent within the scope permitted by the Allied Powers, relaxation of economic controls and a stiffer policy toward labor. The democrats, less definite, were for an early peace conference, economic recovery, balanced state finances and government economy. The Social Democrats also were for an early peace treaty and "racial independence", socialization of basic industries, pro-labor measures and pro-farmer measures. The Communists were for "rigid observance of the Potsdam Declaration and realization of complete national independence", for "democracy" and against fascism, against the enormous budget inviting to the danger of war", and "state management and people's control" of banking and industry, for shorter hours and higher wages to labor, and for better prices to farmers for their crops, but lower prices to consumers. They opposed the introduction of foreign capital and "hunger exports at the sacrifice of independence."

COMPARATIVE PLATFORMS OF POLITICAL

JAPANESE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF JANUARY 1949

	DEMOCRATIC LIBERAL	DEMOCRATIC	SOCIALIST	COMMUNIST	PEOPLES COOPERATIVE
Fundamental Policy	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Advocacy of liberalism in its true sense; 2. Establishment of a democratic government and of definite rules concerning change of government; 3. Abolition of coalition cabinets, and the establishment of a responsible single-party cabinet; 4. Promotion of independent government within the scope permitted by the Allied Powers 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Readjustment of the national structure and enforcement of official discipline; 2. Acceleration of holding of the peace conference; 3. Concrete application of the 9-point economic principles and realization of economic recovery; 4. Enforcement of administrative readjustments and rationalization to effect high administrative efficiency 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Thorough infusion and application of democracy and adoption of socialism; 2. The abolition of conservative reactionary governments; 3. Establishment of a single-party Socialist cabinet to succeed the current administration; 4. Early realization of a peace treaty and racial independence 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rigid observance of the Potsdam Declaration and realization of complete national independence; 2. Safeguard of democracy and elimination of fascism; 3. Opposition to the enormous budget inviting the danger of war; 4. State management and peoples' control of financial institutions and key industries 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reconstruction of national economy through cooperatives; 2. Purification of political, business and official circles and establishment of an honest government; 3. Preferential encouragement to cultural policies and thorough propagation and realization of democratic government 4. Early realization of the peace conference and participation in UN
Economic Policy	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Broad abolition of economic controls within the extent permitted by the 9-point economic principles; 2. Establishment of the principle of free economy to enable Japanese industries to compete with international level production costs; 3. Readjustment and rationalization of enterprises according to the 3-point economic principles; 4. No new-yen measures in anticipation of the early establishment of a single foreign exchange rate 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Maintenance of sound, balanced State finances and the adoption of financial policies with emphasis on industrial recovery; 2. Seek importation of foreign capital and promotion of export trade; 3. Establishment of strong public confidence in national currency and abstaining from currency revision attempts; 4. Fixation of a single exchange rate without enforcing currency devaluation 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Practice of democratic State control and socialization of basic industries; 2. Establishment of a democratic committee vested with legal authority to draft economic planning; 3. Revision or abolition of present price-fixing policy which ensures unfair profits to monopolistic capital and adjustment of prices in conformity with international commodity price levels; 4. Concrete readjustment of presently inflated currency 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Replacement of bureaucratic control with the control by the people; 2. Lowering of prices of the products of monopolistic capital, and the guarantee of prices of farm and marine products covering production costs; 3. Opposition to imports and hunger exports at the sacrifice of independence; 4. Opposition to the introduction of foreign capital menacing the peace and independence of the nation 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sever vicious circle of rising prices and wages; 2. Prohibition of unrestricted loan extensions by financial institutions, especially the RFB; 3. Rational readjustment of both central and local taxation systems; 4. Rationalization of tax on earned income to realize fair taxation and create elasticity of the source of revenue
Labor Policy	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Encouragement of democratic unions and the elimination of destructive, extreme-leftist unions; 2. Revision of labor laws where necessary, and a 30 percent cut in government employees coming under the General Accounts budget; 3. Readjustment and reconstruction of enterprises on a sound basis, and the adoption of the system of higher wages for higher work efficiency; 4. Establishment of a system of arbitration for labor disputes affecting public utilities and basic industries 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. For simplification, greater efficiency and economy in administration effect a 20 percent reduction in the budget-authorized government employees; 2. Expansion of the unemployment insurance program and establishment of a composite social security system; 3. Establishment of a wage structure based on proficiency; 4. Expansion of dispute conciliation and arbitration organs. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Opposition to business readjustments which protect only the interests of capital and also to administrative adjustments which intend to reduce the national budget; 2. Establishment of a rational, sliding-scale wage system to meet rising commodity prices; 3. Revision of NPSL and elevation of the wage standard; 4. Acquisition of political freedom for state and public employees and school teachers 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Payment of wages sufficient to enable a decent livelihood, and the practice of the 8-hour work day; 2. Opposition to the dismissal of workers through administrative and enterprise readjustments; 3. Opposition to anti-labor revisions of the NPSL and other labor regulations; 4. Full freedom of expression, assembly, association and the right to strike 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Democratization of the union movement and elimination of the fraction activity of extreme leftists; 2. Realization of labor-capital cooperation through participation of labor in management; 3. Adoption of proficiency bonuses to supplement standard wages; 4. Full distribution of daily necessities to workers and securing of real wage through stabilization of commodity prices
Agricultural Policy	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Replace class struggle with class cooperation and effect village peace; 2. Practice of intensive agriculture based on the principle of proper crops most suited to the particular land; 3. Increase of land productivity through greater land improvement and employment of draft animals; 4. Modification of the present government crop delivery system, and adoption of measures to permit free sale of produce upon completion of assigned quota 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Maintain balance between the prices of farm products and those of other commodities; 2. Simplification and unification of production and distribution of fertilizer; 3. Thorough enforcement of the 2nd Farm Land Reform program; 4. Exchange and redivision of farm land and rationalization of farm operations 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Thorough enforcement of a third farmland reform program; 2. Enforcement of river and land improvement at government expense and practice of state control of fertilizer and farm implements industries; 3. Establishment of an agricultural finance program; 4. Establishment of a fair price for rice and revision of the official prices of farm products to conform with the rise in the general price level 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Opposition to unilateral and arbitrary government-set quotas for crop deliveries, and the completion of crop delivery at cost-covering prices; 2. Prohibition of one-sided dissolution of tenancy agreements by landowners, and the practice of control of farm land by farmers; 3. Immediate emancipation of all tenant farms, fields and forests; 4. Opposition to destructive heavy taxation upon agriculture 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Thorough enforcement of the 2nd Farmland Reform Program and creation of model farms; 2. Enactment of laws for the establishment of land improvement associations and industries in farming villages; 3. Elevation of farmland productivity at State expense and the establishment of an emergency plan for reforestation; 4. Establishment of an agricultural rehabilitation bank and expansion of the agricultural cooperative program to check agricultural depressions
Cultural Policy	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Elimination of narrow-minded nationalism and the establishment of a democratic concept making the Emperor and the people one; 2. Promotion of a true cultural life; 3. Amplification of national education, and the abolition of academic cliques; 4. Encouragement of healthy recreation 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Cultivation of the spirit of independence; 2. Cultural promotion in backwoods areas and purification of popular arts; 3. Internationalization of Japanese culture and beautification of national domain; 4. Encouragement of athletic games and elevation of the cultural level of the working people 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Grant budget priorities to educational and cultural appropriations and guarantee minimum appropriations; 2. Open universities to the public and expand the program of scholarships and assistance to deserving students; 3. Supervision over the education committee; 4. Popularization of the UNESCO movement 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Freedom of students' political activities; 2. Opposition to sheer imitation of foreign culture; 3. Guarantee of the livelihood of orphans and widows; 4. Elimination of decadent culture 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Establishment of a peaceful nation and promotion of world friendship; 2. Establishment of a school finance program; 3. Thorough enforcement of the new 6-3 compulsory education system; 4. Improve school teachers' salaries and send them to foreign countries for further study

PARTIES

LABOR - FARMER	SOCIAL REFORM
1. Formation of a wide democratic peoples' front and establishment of a revolutionary democratic government through peaceful means;	1. Execution of anti-capitalism, anti-fascism and anti-communism;
2. State ownership and control of key financial and industrial organs;	2. Enforcement of official discipline and readjustment of governmental organs in local provinces;
3. Early realization of the peace treaty and autonomous reconstruction of the nation;	3. Sound development of agricultural cooperative unions;
4. Elimination of militarism and fascism and safeguarding of international peace	4. Realization of honest political parties and enforcement of the 9-point economic principles

1. Establishment of a rehabilitation program of self-help recovery and not entire dependence upon foreign aid;	1. Curtailment of unproductive expenditures and greater emphasis on productive expenditures;
2. When possible, effect balance of national economy with limited foreign aid;	2. Reconstruction and stabilization of independent economy;
3. Promotion of socialistic policies with which to socialize industries and finance;	3. Creation of a currency stabilization fund and establishment of long term credit;
4. Abolition of official controls over goods in abundant production, abolition of the Transactions Tax and creation of a tax on bank checks	4. Creation of a democratic control committee to supervise financial organs

1. Opposition to pro-capital rationalization and readjustment of enterprises;	1. Establishment of a minimum wage standard;
2. Creation of a minimum wage standard and opposition to anti-labor revisions of the labor laws;	2. Adoption of a quarter-annual sliding wage scale;
3. Practice of the 8-hour working day and the protection of laborers;	3. Absorption of employment into export industries;
4. Technical training for youths at government expense, and the establishment of facilities for the protection of women workers	4. Establishment of a social insurance program and an unemployment relief program

1. Greater democratization of crop delivery system to give producers more voice in this matter, and full distribution of producers goods to farmers and fishermen;	1. A national re-study of the rice price;
2. Elimination of the influence of old time landowners and rationalization of land distribution;	2. Establishment of a producer-operated system of crop delivery;
3. Increase of loans to farmers and abolition of undue taxation upon farmers and fishermen;	3. Expansion of the program of distribution of agricultural implements in proportion to crop delivered;
4. Reorganization along democratic lines and enlargement of agricultural cooperative unions	4. Expand agricultural public works projects program

1. Equalization of opportunity for education and education entirely at government expense;	1. Thorough enforcement of the new 6-3 school system at government expense;
2. Emancipation of women through abolition of the feudalistic family system, and more scientific daily life;	2. Increase and expansion of educational facilities;
3. Creation of progressive culture;	3. Participation in international peace-promotion organization;
4. Promotion of cooperation with democratic elements in foreign countries	4. Full enforcement of democratic education program for women

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F. Election Statistics

1. Summary of Results

a. Population. According to the ration census announced on August 1, 1948, the population of Japan was as follows:

Male	39,365,452
Female	<u>40,851,444</u>
Total	80,216,896

b. Voting Age. The voting age figures (20 years and over) were given as follows:

Male	21,046,824
Female	<u>22,941,823</u>
Total	43,988,647

c. Registered Voters. According to figures of the National Election Management Commission, the registered voters in Japan on January 23, 1949 totalled 42,090,916, divided as follows:

Male	20,054,142
Female	<u>22,036,774</u>
Total	42,090,916

d. Number of Candidates. The number of candidates registered by the various political parties, according to the National Election Management Commission, follows:

Democratic Liberal Party	416
Democratic Party	212
Social Democratic Party	186
People's Cooperative Party	63
Social Renovation Party	30
New Liberal Party	12
Japan Farmer's Party	16
Farmer-Labor Party	45
Communist Party	115
Independent	211
Minor Parties	58
Total	<u>1,364</u>

e. Total Votes Cast. At the close of the polls at 1800 hours on January 23, 1949, a total of 31,168,625 votes had been cast in the general election for members of the House of Representatives. This represented a turn-out of 74.1 percent of the total of 42,090,916 registered voters.

The highest voting participation by prefecture was 89.9 percent in Shimane Prefecture; the lowest voting participation by prefecture occurred in Tokyo with 61.6 percent.

The highest voting participation of townships was 99.8 percent in Kuranimura in Shizuoka Prefecture. In the 1947 election, the highest voting participation of townships was 93.8 percent in Iwatsunachi in Aichi Prefecture.

f. Comparative Percentages of Participation and Abstention.

	<u>Participation</u>		
	<u>1946</u>	<u>1947</u>	<u>1949</u>
Male	78.6	74.9	80.7
Female	<u>67.0</u>	<u>61.6</u>	<u>68.0</u>
Total	72.1	67.9	74.1

	<u>Abstention</u>		
	<u>1946</u>	<u>1947</u>	<u>1949</u>
Male	21.4	25.1	19.3
Female	<u>33.0</u>	<u>38.4</u>	<u>32.0</u>
Total	27.9	32.1	25.9

g. Parties in the Diet. Tabulated according to political parties, final election results were as follows:

<u>Party</u>	<u>Vote</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>	<u>Number Elected</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
Democratic Liberal	13,381,610	43.8	264	56.7
Democratic	4,835,504	15.8	68	14.6
Social Democratic	4,129,724	13.5	49	10.5
Communist	2,984,583	9.6	35	7.5
People's Cooperatives	1,042,123	3.4	14	3.0
Labor-Farmer	606,744	2.0	7	1.5
Social Renovation	387,214	1.3	5	1.1
New Liberal	187,208	0.6	2	0.4
Japan Farmer	232,833	0.8	1	0.2
Minor Parties	795,308	2.6	9	1.9
Independents	2,007,328	6.6	12	2.6
Totals	30,590,179*	100.0	466	100.0
	.578,446**	1.9		
	<u>31,168,625</u>			

*Valid Votes

** Invalid Votes

h. Composition of the New House of Representatives.

(1) New Faces in the Diet. One hundred and ninety-two of the members of the House of Representatives are "new faces," elected for the first time; 243 were reelected, and 31 were members of former Diets. Following is tabulation by party:

<u>Party</u>	<u>New</u>	<u>Re-elected</u>	<u>Former</u>	<u>Total</u>
Democratic Liberal	121	125	18	264
Democratic	23	39	6	68
Social Democratic	6	40	3	49
Communist	28	4	3	35
People's Cooperatives	0	14	0	14
Labor-Farmer	0	7	0	7
Social Renovation	1	4	0	5
New Liberal	0	2	0	2
Minor Parties	2	7	1	10
Independents	11	1	0	12
Totals	192	243	31	466

(2) Women. A total of 44 women candidates ran for seats in the House of Representatives; of these 12 women were successful. (Fifteen women were elected in 1947).

(a) Women Candidates according to political parties:

Democratic Liberals	5
Democrats	8
Social Democrats	9
Communists	3
People's Cooperatives	1
Social Renovation	1
New Liberal	0
Japan-Farmer	0
Labor-Farmer	1
Independents	14
Minor Parties	2
Total	44

(b) Women elected according to parties:

Democratic Liberals	2
Social Democrats	5
Communists	3
Social Renovation	1
Labor-Farmer	1
Total	12

(3) Distribution of House of Representatives according to Occupation:

Government officials	16
Educators	16
Religious	5
Commerce	14
Industry & Mining	19
Agriculture & Forestry	50
Fisheries	11
Attorneys & Public Accountants	51
Physicians	5
Writers	29
Company Employees	152
Journalists	5
Miscellaneous	49
Without known occupation	44
Total	466

(4) Distribution of members of the House of Representatives according to age.

<u>Age Group</u>	<u>Number</u>
25 - 29	1
30 - 39	59
40 - 49	177
50 - 59	160
60 - 69	59
70 -	10
Total	466

i. Eminent Political Personalities Who Failed in the 1949 Election.

Sadayoshi Hitotsumatsu	Democrat	(Former Welfare Minister)
Tetsu Katayama	Social Democrat	(Former Prime Minister)
Kanju Kato	Social Democrat	(Former Labor Minister)
Shizue Kato	Social Democrat	(Noted Feminist Leader)
Tetsuo Kudo	Democratic Liberal	(Former State Minister)
Kazuo Nagae	Social Democrat	(Former Agriculture and Forestry Minister)
Wataru Narahashi	Democrat	(Former Chief Cabinet Secretary)
Suehiro Nishio	Social Democrat	(Former State Minister)
Kazuo Nomizo	Social Democrat	(Former Agriculture and Forestry Minister)
Giichi Takeda	Democrat	(Former Welfare Minister)
Eiji Tomiyoshi	Democrat	(Former Communications Minister)
Haruye Yamashita	Democrat	(Involved in "Izumiyama Incident")

j. Runners-Up (According to Parties).

<u>Party</u>	<u>Number</u>
Democratic Liberals	28
Democrats	26
Social Democrats	32
Communists	10
Farmer-Labor	2
People's Cooperatives	2
Japan Farmer	2
New Liberals	3
Independents	8
Minor Parties	4
Total	117 (Election Districts)

2. Comparative Statistics

COMPARISON OF ELECTIONS FOR HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN JAPAN - APRIL 1946; APRIL 1947; JANUARY 1949

1949

1947

1. TYPE OF VOTING - Single Ballot System.
2. SIZE OF ELECTION DISTRICTS - Medium
3. NUMBER OF ELECTION DISTRICTS - Total of 117 in Japan.
4. REGISTERED VOTERS - MALE - 20,054,142
FEMALE - 22,036,774
TOTAL - 42,090,916
5. TOTAL NUMBER OF VOTES CAST -
MALE - 16,192,775
FEMALE - 14,975,850
TOTAL - 31,168,625
6. AVERAGE ABSTENTION RATE -
MALE - 19.3
FEMALE - 32.0
TOTAL - 25.9

1. TYPE OF VOTING - Single Ballot System.
2. SIZE OF ELECTION DISTRICTS - MEDIUM
3. NUMBER OF ELECTION DISTRICTS - Total of 117 in Japan.
4. REGISTERED VOTERS - MALE - 19,569,839
FEMALE - 21,326,483
TOTAL - 40,896,322
5. TOTAL NUMBER OF VOTES CAST -
MALE - 14,658,264
FEMALE - 13,139,620
TOTAL - 27,797,884
6. AVERAGE ABSTENTION RATE -
MALE - 25.1
FEMALE - 38.4
TOTAL - 32.1

7. TOTAL NUMBER OF ABSTAINERS - 10,922,291
8. TOTAL NUMBER OF INVALID VOTES CAST - 578,446
9. TOTAL NUMBER OF CANDIDATES -

PARTY	NUMBER	ELECTED
DEMOCRATIC LIBERAL	416	264
DEMOCRAT	212	68
SOCIAL DEMOCRAT	186	49
PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE	63	14
COMMUNIST	115	35
SOCIAL RENOVATION	30	5
NEW LIBERAL	12	2
JAPAN FARMER	16	1
FARMER - LABOR	45	7
MINOR PARTIES	58	9
INDEPENDENTS	211	12
TOTAL	1,364	466

7. TOTAL NUMBER OF ABSTAINERS - 13,098,438
8. TOTAL NUMBER OF INVALID VOTES CAST - 435,273
9. TOTAL NUMBER OF CANDIDATES -

PARTY	NUMBER	ELECTED
LIBERAL	326	131
DEMOCRAT	350	121
SOCIAL DEMOCRAT	289	143
PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE	108	29
COMMUNIST	120	4
MINOR PARTIES	155	25
INDEPENDENTS	242	13
TOTAL	1,590	466

10. TOTAL NUMBER OF CANDIDATES - FEMALE

PARTY	NUMBER	ELECTED
DEMOCRATIC LIBERAL	5	2
DEMOCRAT	8	0
SOCIAL DEMOCRAT	9	5
PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE	1	0
COMMUNIST	3	3
SOCIAL RENOVATION	1	1
NEW LIBERAL	0	0
JAPAN FARMER	0	0
FARMER - LABOR	1	1
MINOR PARTIES	2	0
INDEPENDENTS	14	0
TOTAL	44	12

10. TOTAL NUMBER OF CANDIDATES - FEMALE

PARTY	NUMBER	ELECTED
LIBERAL	9	3
DEMOCRAT	22	3
SOCIAL DEMOCRAT	15	9
PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE	4	0
COMMUNIST	8	0
MINOR PARTIES	4	0
INDEPENDENTS	22	0
TOTAL	84	15

11. COMPOSITION OF DIET AS RESULT OF JANUARY 1949 ELECTION

PARTY	ELECTED FOR FIRST TIME	PREVIOUS DIET	FORMER DIETS
DEMOCRATIC LIBERAL	121	125	18
DEMOCRAT	23	39	6
SOCIAL DEMOCRAT	6	40	3
PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE	0	14	0
COMMUNIST	28	4	3
SOCIAL RENOVATION	1	4	0
NEW LIBERAL	0	2	0
JAPAN FARMER	0	1	0
FARMER LABOR	0	7	0
MINOR PARTIES	2	6	1
INDEPENDENTS	11	1	0
TOTAL	192	243	31

11. COMPOSITION OF DIET AS RESULT OF APRIL 1947 ELECTION

PARTY	ELECTED FOR FIRST TIME	PREVIOUS DIET	FORMER DIETS
LIBERAL	56	69	1
DEMOCRAT	64	66	3
SOCIAL DEMOCRAT	73	70	3
PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE	7	24	0
COMMUNIST	2	2	0
MINOR PARTIES	14	3	0
INDEPENDENTS	6	6	0
TOTAL	222	237	7

* Of the 16 original Japan Farmer Party candidates, only one ran on the Japan Farmer Party ticket. All others ran as minor party candidates (New Japan Farmers' Party which was formed by 15 candidates).

12. VOTES AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VALID VOTE RECEIVED BY PARTIES -

PARTY	VOTES REC'D	PERCENT
DEMOCRATIC LIBERAL	13,381,610	43.8
DEMOCRAT	4,835,504	15.8
SOCIAL DEMOCRAT	4,129,724	13.5
PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE	1,042,123	3.4
COMMUNIST	2,984,583	9.6
LABOR FARMER	606,744	2.0
SOCIAL RENOVATION	387,214	1.3
NEW LIBERAL	187,208	.6
JAPAN FARMER	232,833	.8
MINOR PARTIES	795,308	2.6
INDEPENDENTS	2,007,328	6.6
TOTAL	30,590,179*	100.0

12. VOTES AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VALID VOTE RECEIVED BY PARTIES -

PARTY	VOTES REC'D	PERCENT
LIBERAL	7,295,242	26.7
DEMOCRAT	6,857,480	25.1
SOCIAL DEMOCRAT	7,168,888	26.2
PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE	1,862,753	6.8
COMMUNIST	1,002,883	3.7
MINOR PARTIES	1,561,070	5.7
INDEPENDENTS	1,614,295	5.8
TOTAL	27,362,611*	100.0

*This figure does not include 435,273 invalid votes.

*This figure does not include 578,446 invalid votes.

1947; JANUARY 1949

1946

1. TYPE OF VOTING - Restricted Plural Voting System
(two to three votes permitted
each elector)

2. SIZE OF ELECTION DISTRICTS - Large

3. NUMBER OF ELECTION DISTRICTS - Total 53 in Japan.

4. REGISTERED VOTERS - MALE - 16,278,926
FEMALE - 20,557,564
TOTAL - 36,836,490

5. TOTAL NUMBER OF VOTES CAST -

MALE - 12,778,242
FEMALE - 13,780,369
TOTAL - 26,558,611

6. AVERAGE ABSTENTION RATE -

MALE - 21.4
FEMALE - 33.0
TOTAL - 27.9

7. TOTAL NUMBER OF ABSTAINERS - 10,277,879

8. TOTAL NUMBER OF INVALID VOTES CAST - 460,000

9. TOTAL NUMBER OF CANDIDATES -

PARTY	NUMBER	ELECTED
LIBERAL	485	140
PROGRESSIVE	376	94
SOCIAL DEMOCRAT	331	92
COOPERATIVE DEMOCRAT	92	14
COMMUNIST	143	5
MINOR PARTIES	570	38
INDEPENDENTS	773	81
TOTAL	2,770	464
		(vacant) 2
		466

10. TOTAL NUMBER OF CANDIDATES - FEMALE Elected

PARTY	FEMALE	Elected
LIBERAL	5	5
PROGRESSIVE	7	6
SOCIAL DEMOCRAT	9	8
COOPERATIVE DEMOCRAT	2	0
COMMUNIST	5	1
MINOR PARTIES	20	9
INDEPENDENTS	23	10
TOTAL	71	39

11. COMPOSITION OF DIET AS RESULT OF APRIL 1946 ELECTION

PARTY	ELECTED FOR FIRST TIME	PREVIOUS DIET	FORMER DIETS
LIBERAL	102	14	23
PROGRESSIVE	70	13	10
SOCIAL DEMOCRAT	70	7	15
COOPERATIVE DEMOCRAT	13	0	1
COMMUNIST	5	0	0
MINOR PARTIES	37	0	1
INDEPENDENTS	78	4	1
TOTAL	375	38	51

12. VOTES AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VALID VOTE RECEIVED BY PARTIES -

PARTY	VOTES REC'D	PERCENT
LIBERAL	13,505,746	24.4
PROGRESSIVE	10,350,530	18.7
SOCIAL DEMOCRAT	9,858,408	17.8
COOPERATIVE DEMOCRAT	1,799,764	3.2
COMMUNIST	2,135,757	3.8
MINOR PARTIES	6,473,272	11.7
INDEPENDENTS	11,325,402	20.4
TOTAL	55,448,879*	100.0

*Plural vote figures above indicate actual votes received - not "voters".

3. Election Law Violations

A total of 1,895 cases of violation of election laws occurred in the election of 1949. This figure compares favorably with the figures reported for the previous two elections: 2,632 in 1946, and 2,997 in 1947 (five separate elections, national and local). In this connection, it is significant to point out that charges advanced by the Press, the candidates, the parties, and the general public concerning improper voting were insignificant; and no charges were made from any source concerning improper counting of votes.

According to figures submitted by the National Election Management Commission on January 27, the violations included the following:

	<u>Number of Violations</u>	<u>Cases Prosecuted</u>
Bribing	228	1
Campaigning before announcing candidacy	100	7
House to house canvassing	414	1
Obstruction of election	87	
Violations concerning voting	4	
Disturbing election - carrying weapons	35	
Violation of prohibition to make use of school children	9	
Speech making and speech meeting violations	113	
Violations concerning restrictions on distribution of pamphlets, posters, and pictures	719	
Unlawful contributions and expenditures	19	
Violation of Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 (January 4, 1947: political activities by purgees)	11	
Others	156	
Total	<u>1,895</u>	

A breakdown of violations according to political parties and individuals involved is as follows:

<u>Party</u>	<u>Individuals Violating the Law</u>
Democratic Liberals	915
Democrats	398
Social Democrats	260
People's Cooperatives	73
Communists	311
Independents	203
Minor Parties	129
Others	334
Total	<u>2,623</u>

A total of 354 cases of violations were reported for Tokyo, as follows:

<u>Violation</u>	<u>Number Of Cases</u>
Bribing	111
Campaigning before announcing candidacy	10
House to house canvassing	155
Obstruction of election	27
Violation of restrictions on distribution of pamphlets, posters, and pictures	35
Speech making and speech meeting violations	6
Violation of Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 (political activities by purgees)	1
Others	9
Total	354

Distributed according to political parties and individuals involved:

<u>Party</u>	<u>Individuals Violating the Laws</u>
Democratic Liberals	273
Democrats	123
Social Democrats	39
People's Cooperatives	20
Communists	31
Independents	55
Minor Parties	1
Others	23
Total	569

PART II

REFERENDUM ON THE JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT

A. Introductory Statement

The new Constitution of Japan was promulgated on November 3, 1946 and became effective six months later on May 3, 1947. The general election of members of the House of Representatives held on January 23, 1949, although the third such election since the beginning of the Occupation, was the first to be held under the new Constitution. It was also the first such election to be held following the appointment on August 4, 1947 of the judges of the Supreme Court under the new Constitution. Consequently, under Article 79 of the Constitution the people were given their first opportunity to review the appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court.

The pertinent provisions of Article 79 read as follows:

"The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Judge and such number of judges as may be determined by law; all such judges excepting the Chief Judge shall be appointed by the Cabinet.

"The appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court shall be reviewed by the people at the first general election of members of the House of Representatives following their appointment, and shall be reviewed again at the first general election of members of the House of Representatives after a lapse of ten (10) years, and in the same manner thereafter.

"In cases mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, when the majority of the voters favor the dismissal of a judge, he shall be dismissed.

"Matters pertaining to review shall be prescribed by law."

B. Legal Provisions

The manner in which the review of the appointment of Supreme Court judges is to be conducted is specified in the Law of the People's Examination of Supreme Court Judges, enacted by the Japanese National Diet on November 20, 1947.

Prior to the referendum, the law requires issuance and posting of an Official Examination Bulletin containing the name, date of birth, and personal history of the judge to be voted upon, the main cases in which he has participated and his expressed opinions in such cases. This information is designed to afford the voters an opportunity to evaluate the quality of each judge and to decide whether to vote for or against retention in office. If the majority of the voters indicate a desire to dismiss a judge from office he will be removed and cannot be again appointed to the Supreme Court until five years thereafter. On the other hand, a majority vote for retention will confirm an appointment.

While the Law places no restriction on a judge prohibiting him to campaign for himself or on behalf of his colleagues and to exercise his right to vote, he may not engage in certain other specified activities. Article 52 of the

Court Organization Law (Law No. 59 of 1947) specifies that judges, while in office, shall not do any of the following acts:

"(1) To become members of the Diet or of assemblies of local public entities actively in political movements;

"(2) To hold another salaried position without obtaining the permission of the Supreme Court.

"(3) To carry on any commercial business or a business which aims at pecuniary gain."

The Law of the People's Examination of the Supreme Court Judges, in Articles 44-49, provides stringent penalties for all possible violations of the law. These offenses include direct evasions or inducing others to evade the provisions of the law, illicit canvassing, bribery, intimidation, abduction, neglect of duty or abuse of authority by officials, publication of false matters, and the like. Penalties are provided for such offenses, ranging from two to four years' imprisonment and fines of ¥10,000 - ¥30,000.

C. Referendum Procedure

In the process of discussing the form of ballot to be used in the referendum, the Judicial Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives realized that because of the large number of judges to be voted upon at one time (the number may be as high as fifteen; in the 1949 referendum the number of judges reviewed was fourteen, because there was one vacancy on the Court), a requirement that each ballot have correctly written thereon the name of each judge in the voter's own handwriting would place an undue burden on the voter and probably result in an excessive number of invalid votes. Accordingly, after considering several proposals, the Committee decided to adopt a simple form of printed ballot which would have a number of divided columns, one for each judge subject to review.

On this ballot the names of the judges were printed in the lower parts of the columns, and the voter was required simply to mark an "X" in the column over the name of any judge whose dismissal he considered desirable, and leave blank the column over the names of those judges he wished to remain on the bench.

This form of voting, entirely new to the voters of Japan, places upon their shoulders the responsibility for determining the quality of the men who administer the third branch of government.

BALLOT FOR REVIEW
OF
SUPREME COURT JUDGES

COLUMNS FOR MARKING															
	(Sawada)	(Fujita)	(Shima)	(Mano)	(Kawamura)	(Mibuchi)	(Inoue)	(Hasegawa)	(Kuriyama)	(Tsukazaki)	(Iwamatsu)	(Saito)	(Otani)	(Shimoyama)	X 書く欄
	澤田竹治郎	藤田八郎	島野保毅	真野毅	河村又介	三淵忠彦	井上登	長谷川太郎	栗山茂	塚崎直義	岩松三郎	齋藤悠輔	小谷勝重	霜山精一	裁判官の名

* 注意

一、やめさせた方がよいと思う裁判官については、その名の上の欄にXを書くこと。
 二、やめさせなくてよいと思う裁判官については、何も書かないこと。

***TRANSLATION:**

Place an "X" mark above the name of the Judges who you think should be relieved; leave blank if you do not desire him to be relieved.

Writing in Romaji has been inserted for the purposes of this report.

D. Results of the Referendum on the Judges of the Supreme Court

Contrary to fears expressed in some quarters before the election that many voters, ignorant of the identities and records of the judges of the Supreme Court, would fail to participate in the referendum and thus allow a minority unduly to sway the result, the number of ballots cast in the referendum totalled 31,052,733, or only 115,892 less than the total cast for members of the House of Representatives.

The result of the referendum, summarized below, was overwhelmingly in favor of retaining all the judges.

Total Number of Votes Cast for Individual Judges

<u>Name of Judge</u>	<u>Votes for Retention</u>	<u>Votes for Dismissal</u>
1. Seiichi Shimoyama	28,678,639	1,444,983
2. Katsushige Otani	28,762,482	1,367,242
3. Yusuke Saito	28,762,969	1,356,242
4. Saburo Iwamatsu	28,802,512	1,327,465
5. Naoyoshi Tsukasaki	28,807,528	1,318,425
6. Shigeru Kuriyama	28,789,911	1,339,515
7. Taichiro Hasegawa	28,798,217	1,330,531
8. Noboru Inoue	28,832,369	1,295,515
9. Tadahiko Mibuchi (President)	28,462,160	1,665,270
10. Matasuke Kawamura	28,889,782	1,238,262
11. Tsuyoshi Mano	28,884,052	1,243,661
12. Tamotsu Saima	28,861,062	1,258,852
13. Hachiro Fujita	28,909,018	1,215,965
14. Takejiro Sawada	28,917,190	1,211,957
Total Votes	403,155,891	18,613,885

(95.5% for retention) (4.4% for dismissal)

Total number of invalid ballots - 859,291, (or 2.8%).

LIST OF SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL CANDIDATES FOR HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION 23 JANUARY 1949

(Final Candidate Report, National Election Management Commission, 25 January 1949)

NOTE: FIGURES IN PARENTHESIS INDICATE ELECTED CANDIDATES.

PREFECTURE	DISTRICT	SEATS TO BE FILLED	DEMOCRATIC LIBERAL	DEMOCRAT	SOCIAL DEMOCRAT	PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE	COMMUNIST	SOCIAL RE-NOVATION	JAPAN FARMER	FARMER LABOR	NEW LIBERAL	MINOR PARTIES	INDEPENDENT	TOTAL
AICHI	I	5	4 (2)	1 (1)	3 (1)	1	1 (1)	1	1	1	1	0	5	20
	II	4	2 (2)	3 (2)	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	10
	III	3	1 (1)	1 (1)	1	1 (1)	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	6
	IV	4	3 (2)	2 (1)	2	1	1	0	1 (1)	0	0	0	1	11
	V	3	3 (3)	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	6
AKITA	I	4	3 (2)	3 (2)	2	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	12
	II	4	3 (3)	2 (1)	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	8
AOMORI	I	4	2 (2)	2 (2)	2	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	10
	II	3	3 (1)	2 (1)	1	1 (1)	1	1	0	0	1	0	2	12
CHIBA	I	4	5 (4)	3	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	11
	II	4	4 (3)	2 (1)	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	10
	III	5	6 (4)	5 (1)	1	2	1	1	0	1	0	0	2	19
EHI	I	3	5 (3)	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	10
	II	3	2 (2)	2 (1)	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	10
	III	3	5 (3)	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
FUKUI	I	4	3 (2)	4 (2)	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	1	14
FUKUOKA	I	5	2 (2)	3 (1)	2 (1)	0	1	1	0	0	0	1 (1)	5	15
	II	5	2 (2)	2	3 (2)	0	1 (1)	0	0	1	0	2	1	12
	III	5	5 (2)	2 (1)	2	1	1	0	0	2	0	2 (1)	1 (1)	16
	IV	6	3 (3)	2	1	0	1	2 (1)	0	0	0	1	2	12
FUKUSHIMA	I	4	4 (3)	2	2 (1)	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	2	13
	II	5	7 (4)	2	1 (1)	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	4	16
	III	3	3 (2)	0	1 (1)	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	7
GIFFU	I	5	5 (4)	2 (1)	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	1	2	14
	II	4	3 (3)	1	1 (1)	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	10
GUMMA	I	3	3 (1)	2	1 (1)	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	2 (1)	10
	II	3	4 (1)	2 (2)	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	11
	III	4	5 (2)	2 (1)	1 (1)	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	3	13
HIROSHIMA	I	3	1 (1)	1	1 (1)	1 (1)	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	6
	II	4	4 (3)	1	1 (1)	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	9
	III	5	5 (3)	2	3 (1)	1 (1)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	12
HOKKAIDO	I	5	3 (3)	2 (1)	3	0	1	0	0	1	0	4 (1)	1	15
	II	4	4 (2)	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	3 (2)	2	13
	III	3	3 (3)	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	8
	IV	5	4 (1)	2	3	0	1 (1)	0	0	2 (1)	0	2 (2)	2	16
	V	5	3 (2)	2 (1)	4	0	1	0	0	0	0	2 (2)	1	13
HYOGO	I	3	1 (1)	1	1 (1)	1	1 (1)	0	0	0	0	4	3	12
	II	5	3 (3)	2	3 (1)	1	1 (1)	0	0	1	0	0	0	11
	III	3	3 (3)	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
	IV	4	3 (1)	3 (2)	1	1 (1)	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	12
	V	3	2 (2)	2 (1)	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	6
IBARAKI	I	4	5 (3)	1	1	0	1	0	0	1 (1)	0	0	2	11
	II	3	3 (2)	1	1	0	1	0	0	1 (1)	0	0	2	9
	III	5	4 (2)	2 (2)	2	1	1 (1)	0	0	0	0	0	1	11
ISHIKAWA	I	3	3 (1)	2	1 (1)	0	1 (1)	0	0	0	0	0	1	8
	II	3	2 (2)	2 (1)	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	7
IWATE	I	4	3 (3)	1	2 (1)	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	10
	II	4	4 (3)	1 (1)	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	5	14
KAGAWA	I	3	3 (1)	1 (1)	2 (1)	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	8
	II	3	3	2 (2)	1 (1)	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	10
KAGOSHIMA	I	4	6 (3)	3 (1)	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	12
	II	3	4 (3)	3	2	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	15
	III	3	5 (3)	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	8
KANAGAWA	I	4	3 (1)	2	2 (2)	0	1 (1)	0	0	1	0	2	3	14
	II	4	3 (1)	1 (1)	2 (1)	1	1 (1)	1	0	0	0	2	3	14
	III	5	4 (3)	1	2	1	1 (1)	1	0	1	0	0	2 (1)	13
KOCHI	I	5	2 (2)	2 (2)	1	0	1	1 (1)	1	1	0	1	3	13
KUMAMOTO	I	5	3 (1)	3 (2)	2 (1)	0	1	1	0	0	1 (1)	0	4	15
	II	5	4 (3)	4 (2)	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	13
KYOTO	I	5	3 (1)	3 (2)	4 (1)	0	1 (1)	0	0	0	1	0	4	16
	II	5	4 (2)	4 (1)	1	0	1 (1)	1 (1)	1	1	0	1	2	16
MIE	I	5	3 (2)	3 (1)	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	2 (2)	12
	II	4	4 (2)	2	1 (1)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1 (1)	9
MIYAGI	I	5	4 (3)	2 (1)	3 (1)	1	1	0	1	0	0	2	3	17
	II	4	3 (3)	2 (1)	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	11
MIYAZAKI	I	3	4 (3)	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	12
	II	3	3 (2)	1 (1)	1	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	11
NAGANO	I	3	3 (2)	1 (1)	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	10
	II	3	2 (1)	2 (1)	1	2 (1)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
	III	4	3 (2)	1	1	1 (1)	1 (1)	0	0	1	0	0	0	8
	IV	3	3 (3)	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
NAGASAKI	I	5	6 (5)	2	2	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	2	17
	II	4	5 (2)	2 (1)	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3 (1)	13
NARA	I	5	5 (2)	5 (1)	2	0	1 (1)	0	0	0	0	0	9 (1)	22
NIIGATA	I	3	3 (2)	1	1	0	1 (1)	0	0	1	0	0	1	8
	II	4	1 (1)	2 (1)	1 (1)	0	1	0	0	1 (1)	0	0	1	7
	III	5	5 (3)	2	2 (1)	0	1	1 (1)	0	0	0	0	1	12
	IV	3	2 (2)	1	1 (1)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	6
OITA	I	4	2 (2)	2 (1)	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	3 (1)	11
	II	3	3 (3)	3	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	11
OKAYAMA	I	5	3 (2)	2 (1)	1	1	1 (1)	0	0	1 (1)	1	0	3	13
	II	5	3 (3)	1 (1)	1	1	1	0	1	1 (1)	0	0	3	12
OSAKA	I	4	5 (2)	2	1 (1)	0	1 (1)	1	0	1	0	0	3	14
	II	4	6 (2)	2	1 (1)	1	1 (1)	0	0	0	0	0	6	17
	III	4	4 (2)	1	2 (1)	0	1 (1)	0	0	1	0	1	3	13
	IV	4	3 (2)	1	2 (1)	0	1 (1)	1	0	0	1	0	1	10
	V	3	5 (2)	1	1 (1)	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	12
SAGA	I	5	6 (3)	3 (2)	2	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	16
SAITAMA	I	4	4 (2)	1	3 (1)	1	1 (1)	0	0	0	0	0	2	12
	II	3	4 (3)	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
	III	3	3 (1)	2	2	1	1 (1)	0	0	0	0	0	1 (1)	10
	IV	3	3 (3)	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	8
SHIGA	I	5	4 (2)	2	3 (1)	1 (1)	1 (1)	0	0	1	0	0	2	14
SHIMANE	I	5	2 (1)	2 (2)	3 (1)	1	1 (1)	0	0	0	0	0	1	10
SHIZUOKA	I	5	6 (3)	1	2	1	1 (1)	0	0	0	0	0	2 (1)	13
	II	5	4 (3)	1 (1)	2 (1)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	10
	III	4	4 (3)	1	2	2 (1)	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	12
TOCHIGI	I	5	5 (2)	2 (1)	2 (1)	1 (1)	1	1	0	0	0	2	2	16
	II	5	6 (5)	2	2	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	14

