

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 29

PLACE: Meiji Bldg..

DATE: 15 Oct. 1945

TIME: 1000

DIVISION OF ORIGIN: Office of Chairman

SUBJECT: Organization, Responsibilities, and pertinent
Information regarding the Seibi Kyoku (Military
Preparations and Equipment Bureau).

Personnel Interrogated and background of each:

Lt. Gen. YOSHIZUMI, Chief, Seibi Kyoku, War Ministry.
Colonel SATO, Chief, Seibi Kyoku, War Ministry.

Where interviewed: Meiji Building, Tokyo.

Interrogator: Mr. Paul H. Nitze

Interpreter: Lt.(jg) K. Lansner

Others Present: Mr. R. Ruggles, Military Supplies Division.
2d Lt. P. Farley, Capt. Equipt. & Constr.

Summary: The Seibi Kyoku, Military Preparations and
Equipment Bureau, up until March 1945, and thereafter
the Gummu Kyoku, the Central Bureau of the War Min-
istry into which the Seibi Kyoku was merged, was
responsible for the reconciliation of army require-
ments with potential supply, the planning for the
mobilization of the necessary raw materials, fuel,
transport, productive plant equipment, and industrial
administration necessary to fulfill these plans, and
for the liaison between the War Ministry and the
Munitions Bureau, integrating the army's require-
ments into the overall economic programming for
Japan as a whole.

Information and data required by the Survey on
these subjects should be obtainable from the records
of the Gummu Kyoku.

INTERROGATION

General YOSHIZUMI was Chief of the Seibi Kyoku from April 1942 to March 1945. In April 1945, the Seibi Kyoku was consolidated into the Gummu Kyoku, the Central Bureau of the War Ministry, and General Yoshizumi became Chief of the Gummu Kyoku.

The Seibi Kyoku was, prior to April 1945, divided into three departments, or Ka's. The Seibi Ka, or general department, was, in turn, divided into four sections, or Han's. The first section was responsible for industrial mobilization, i.e., the programming of raw material supply to the various plants producing for the army. The second section was responsible for industrial administration, i.e., the supervision of such plants. The third section was responsible for finance, and the fourth section was responsible for the manpower requirements of such plants. The second department was responsible for transportation, both ship and rail, and communications. The third department was responsible for the general administration of the army's liquid fuel supply. These latter two departments were not divided into Ka's.

After April 1945, the Gummu Kyoku was divided into three departments. The Gungi Ka, or Military Department, which was responsible for army organization and overall army finance. The second department, the Gummu Ka was responsible for handling the overall political and central administrative problems of the War Ministry. The responsibilities of the Transportation Department in the old Seibi Kyoku were transferred to the Gummu Ka. The third department of the Gummu Kyoku, which was called the Seibi Ka, took over all the remaining former responsibilities of the Seibi Kyoku.

General Yoshizumi stated that the Seibi Kyoku was the agency of the War Ministry which worked with the Munitions Ministry in drawing up plans for the allocation of transportation, the production and allocation of raw materials and the allocation of manpower. He stated that army requirements were prepared by the General Staff, based on the requirements certified to by the field armies. These requirements were then sent to the Gungi Ka of the War Ministry. The requirements thus certified were invariably in excess of the amounts which the War Ministry considered could be actually made available, taking into consideration the availability of raw materials. Meetings would be held with the appropriate army supply boards, i.e., the clothing board, the foodstuffs board, the ordnance board, air headquarters, the sanitation board, etc. and a plan would be drawn up which was then submitted to the War Minister for his approval. Approved plans were then presented to the Munitions Ministry for incorporation into the overall mobilization plans drawn up by the Munitions Ministry, along with similar plans covering many and civilian requirements.

Each army in the field attempted to satisfy its requirements locally to the maximum extent possible. The plans approved by the War Minister, therefore, covered army requirements in Japan proper, and the supply to armies in the field of their deficiencies not procurable locally.

The Army in Manchuria was completely self-sufficient, except as to airplanes and certain minor supplies. Large stocks had been built up in Manchuria against the possibility of a war with Russia. A considerable portion of the troops sent to the South Pacific were sent from Manchuria and took their own equipment with them. Manchuria was, therefore, not a drain on Japanese production during the war, but rather eased their problems elsewhere. Most of the stocks of equipment built up in Manchuria had originally been supplied from

Japan. The army controlled arsenals, powder plants, repair depots, and certain synthetic fuel plants in Manchuria. However, 80% of the plants in Manchuria were civilian plants, coming under the control of the Munitions Ministry.

The armies in Central China exchanged rice, wood oil, and certain other commodities for steel, coal, and other supplies from Manchuria. Communications of the army in South China with Central and North China were bad, and most of its supplies had to be obtained from Japan proper. The supply requirements of the army units in the South Pacific were handled by the Rear Communication Department under General Headquarters.

General Yoshizumi stated that the Seibi Kyoku was faced with serious problems during the entire period that he was its chief. He said that deficiencies in transportation had made the mobilization of the required raw materials impossible and that, therefore, the Seibi Kyoku was never able to meet its plans. Production gradually declined and with the impact of bombing, decreased precipitously. Requirements became larger and larger, while shipping, coal and steel became tighter and tighter. They were faced with an insoluble problem. When the demand for small arms became very critical, they cut down tank and heavy ordnance production to help the production of small arms. Then they were in a box as to tanks and heavy ordnance. There was no way of meeting the problem and all military supplies were short of requirements.