

OUR ALLY CHINA

美國衆議院共和黨議員 周以德

我們的盟邦——中國

(附英文原文)

(再版本)

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本社認爲外人對我國言論，無論是批評或讚揚，善意或惡意，都值得介紹於國人，以資借鏡。所以本館以前外論編譯社的工作，發行外論叢刊。目前既在要知道外國人的真態度，所以文字完全照譯，不加刪削，不改變語氣，并附原文，以供對照。

本篇係美國明尼梭達州共和黨衆議員祝特於一九四五年三月十五日在美國國會發表的演詞。祝氏曾僑居中國十年，回國六年當選議員後，在一九四四年秋天又來中國，從新考察一次。在美論國會中，熟悉中國情形的無過於他，外國人論列中國的文章，也以他這篇最爲澈底。雖然係在戰爭進行中發表的，其價值並不因戰爭結束而稍減，所以仍然譯出介紹，列入外論叢刊。


祝特於一九四五年十一月二十日又向國會促勸勿將中國遺棄，異日倘覓得原文，尙再譯介。

我們的盟邦中國

美國衆議院共和黨議員

祝 特

(一九四五年三月十五日在議會演詞)



(南)

我們因亞洲而牽入戰爭；萬一美國再牽入第二場戰爭的話，定必也是因亞洲而起。

現在美國所弄不明白的問題，沒有幾個及得上中國問題。當我在一九三八，一九三九，一九四〇幾年間，奔走國內各地，到處報告先幾年——包括在日軍佔領區內五個月——在中國所見所聞，想喚醒國人注意當時日本政策以及美國對策的危險時，多數人士要說：「哦，對日本人不必擔心，你是過份張惶了。說去說來，中國人是不經打的，日本人尙且打他不到，豈能奈何我們？」

及至有一天早上，日本竟使美國吃了一場一百六十八年獨立史上得未曾有的敗仗。於是我們愕然驚醒，說道：「怎麼，那夥日本人倒是利害。他們既能對付我們，中國何以竟能抵抗到四年半之久？中國人想必也是利害的。」我們對中國人的估價由是便高漲起來。

× × × ×

隨後蔣夫人光臨美國，抓住了美國人的想像力。曾經像她那樣抓得住的，外國人固然只有少數，亞

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洲人的確更沒有第二個。因之我們對中國人的估價便愈加扶搖直上，竟致漲得太高了。聽許多美國人——連帶時事評論家，專論著作家在內——講談議論，所有的中國人全都是捨身為國，憑着一片愛國心，為自由，為民族幸福而犧牲一切。我們會僑居過中國的固然憂慮，中國的領袖們尤其不安，因為彼此都知道這並不是中國的真情實況，任何國家也不會如此，更知道過份的理想化，免不了要降回到過份的失望。我們現時正在回降的當中。一年前找不出再好的字眼來褒頌中國盟友的，現在却又找不出再壞的字眼去貶責他們。現在聽他們談論起來，所有的中國人全都是懶惰的，行詐的，舞弊的，全都是阻難主義者，思想排外，黨同伐異，做事全無效率，刻刻在意的是保全自身地位更重於擊敗日本，打仗的事，希望我們全部替他們擔當，種種說法，不一而足。在這兩個極端當中，那一說對呢？諸位有曾向我問及的。我想到諸位如果要問我的意見，我須得把實際情況從新考察一下。我回國已有六年，我想看看中國現在的情況，爲了這個目的，我便在去年秋天前往中國一行。

我曾在中國從事醫務十年的工夫，一年在南京，五年在華南，四年在華北。我能用中國話和過去深知的許多中國人交談，共事的醫生，我們醫院訓練出來的護士，我們學校裏的校長教師學生，大學校長教務長，還有商人。直到最後的兩天纔和中國的高級官吏談話。我所接談的都是中國人民。我想根據這種觀察，來提供一些要點，如果我能夠的話。

諸位中有曾遊歷過遠東的，當記得瞥眼所見的種種。貧乏，擁擠，污穢，不潔，疾病，觸目皆是，所起的頭一個反感是：『怎麼，這些人的生活，幾乎像畜類一樣。他們的情況簡直是無可救藥。』這種反感正是諸位在普通情形下所起的，對不對？遭受了差不多八年的戰爭和侵略後，其壞豈不更甚嗎？

在往時，關於中國的報告，多數是來自前往中國做傳教士，做教授，經商，留學，或長時担任記者的美國人。他們去了不久，也看到有毛織品，七寶燒，和瓷器，看到中國人文藝的成就，成熟的智慧，根本的美德，以及友善的態度。他們想在中國過愉快的生活，於是他們便去尋求，終給他們尋到最好的。他們學到了中國人久已知道的，就是羸花中最可愛的蓮花，是從污泥中生長出來的。

但是現在有成千成萬在中國的美國人，是不注重中國的文化的。他們的去中國并不是因為他們想去，他們是被派去的，或由他們所任事的報館或由美國政府，他們往往只看見表面上的東西，幾乎全引不起好感，所以他們不歡喜。我看出我們在國外的子弟們對於任何國家都不歡喜，就祇歡喜一個，那就是美國。他們祇是想回轉來，他們寫信回國告訴家人當地是如何骯髒，如何兇殘，方法如何古板，態度如何苦悶等等，做父母的讀了信，就算懂得中國的一切了，因為他們的孩子在那裏，見到知道。

同樣，多數的記者——他們不願被派去幹那項差事，所以他們也不歡喜，很可以理解得到的。這些美國人判斷中國，多半會不以中國的看法，而是以西方的立場來判斷。他們以為情況的壞，是由於現在的政府無能所致。其實在戰前幾年間，在這個政府之下，情況並沒有變壞，而且還好了許多。

另一件事實為許多人所未充份理會的，就是當中國還在一個大革命過程中，便被違反了她的志願，逼入道場戰爭。革命本來差不多千篇一律，總是混亂而長時期的事。法國人費了八十年纔得完成他們的革命。美國革命後，連南北戰爭在內，一直過了九十年纔得有頭緒。諸位想必記得當美國成立共和年數已比中國成立的年數多的時候，國內在一八一二年戰爭後半期，情況之壞，政府的腐敗，與黨同伐異之盛，行政事務之糟，以及軍隊紀律聲名之狼藉，弄到紐英格蘭人民代表集會於康奈狄克州的哈特福，隆

重的投票要自行脫離。他們對於這個共和國的努力奮鬥，以求國內統一安定，認為是毫無希望。他們的問題與中國的比較起來，簡直是小巫之見大巫。

在內部的困難之外，中國還不斷的受着外來的干涉。革命開始纔不過四年，日本便以二十一條件相要脅，想使她變成附庸。又越四年，四個白種人坐在凡爾賽取了她的聖地山東省，想拿來酬贈日本，日本於一九二七〔民十六〕年又進犯山東，一九三一〔民二十〕年奪去滿洲，并在往後六年間侵佔了其他三處中國領土之後，便於一九三七〔民二六〕年發動大規模的戰爭。此外還有其他幾個國家也在擾亂中國的事，想阻止她臻於統一強盛。中國人不能完成他們的革命，而建立起一個統一民主而有效力的現代政府，是理所當然的了。

x x x x

在完成革命，建立新政府，將人民組織團結起來，困難重重，無可避免，而在這些困難之上，還加添了第三個因素。中國在患着很利害的邱吉爾所謂的「失敗病」。

緊接着珍珠港事件後，邱吉爾羅斯福作了一個基本的決定，在太平洋取守勢，以解決歐洲的德義兩國。主要的戰略是集中力量先擊敗希特勒。因此我們的接濟百分之九十八以上是運往歐洲，運往東亞的不足百分之二，其中又祇有百分之十歸於中國。直到數月前，我們終於開始認定中國軍隊有充份的重要，而盡全力加以援助，然而他們仍祇得到我們對各盟國接濟總額分之一中的分之二。

我們與歐洲盟國所作決議，曾在歐洲收到極優良的效果。但是這個決議在亞洲却不免產生了惡果。倘若我們對歐洲的良果居其功，那末對亞洲的惡果便難逃其一部份責任。

中國在戰爭初起的幾個月內，便失去主要的幾條鐵路。又失了對揚子江流域的控制，揚子江在中國
的運輸上，比美國的密西士比河尤其重要。這些事使中國無力迅速調遣軍隊，無力自糧食富足的區域運
糧到奇缺的地方。

諸位閱報會見有中國兵士掠奪平民和農民奮起反抗軍隊的事，說不定會想，「這是怎樣的一種軍
隊，竟向他們自己的人民奪取糧食，這是怎樣的一種盟軍，竟不給養自己的部隊。」但是兵士有時候不
得不就地取糧，否則便要餓死。我要提醒諸位，在我們的革命時期，也會有過同樣的情事。華盛頓的部
下有時不得不取糧於當地，因此爲一輩殖民地居民所深恨，且會遭到他們的抵抗。

所謂失敗病是些什麼症候？第一是體力的惡化。我去秋看到許多中國人，特別是兵士的形狀，使我
爲之吃驚。往時我會見過逃荒的難民，以爲對於缺乏營養總算是看慣的了，但是這種形狀更是不堪。中
國兵士必須有六個月時間得吃清淡的好飯，纔能望他們有精神氣力去開始反攻。

我們美國人，如果相信所讀到的廣告，每天必須吞一兩片丸劑維他命，纔能克服我們說是下半年要
有的小小疲勞，何況在經常的飲食中多數已是有了充份的維他命。然而中國人是已經多年多年不够維他
命了，他們比平常越加心緒不寧，易受刺激。他們疲瘡無力。他們是貧血的，他們長滿了寄生蟲，他們
患齊了瘧疾痢和肺病。他們須有適當的飲食和醫療。

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其次是經濟的惡化。中國維持經濟平衡，一直維持到一九四二年被完全封鎖之時，而其被封鎖，過
失並不在她的身上。英美掌握了制海權，竟不能使中國的海道敞開，英國又不能守牢緬甸，以致中國完
全被隔絕。封鎖對於中國的影響，與美國州與州間戰爭時代南方所受到的相同，南方還沒有工業化，和

中國的沒有工業化一樣，南方須向外仰給軍需裝備機械武器，也恰與中國類似，南方須出售棉花及其他產物換取外匯以維持幣制安定，也正和中國并無二致。到封鎖關斷了貿易，南方便不得不求助於印刷機，結果遂致通貨膨脹。使南方力量減弱終至失敗的，就是因受封鎖造成經濟崩潰和缺乏接濟，實甚於其他任何一個因素。

其次是道德的惡化。貪贓舞弊，黑市漁利，這些事情任何國家在戰時都有發生，尤以敗戰為甚。但關於中國的舞弊，有些話是要說明的。第一，其弊雖壞，從處境而言，並沒有我預料的壞。其次，中國本來就有「揩油」的風氣，這在我們認為便是舞弊，而在他們却並不以為然。中國人替你經手一項交易，要取一成的回佣。倘若他拿到兩成，他便算是不誠實；若不拿一成，他並不算誠實，而是齷齪。中國人說不誠實是要使人留下不好的印象纔算數。所以從中國人觀點來看，並不是舞弊，因為人人都知道有這一回事。這是向來就有的「老例」，人所皆知的。

中國人到美國來和我們做生意，應該依照我們的辦法，我們若在他們國內和他們做生意，也得依照他們的辦法，這是說，如果我們要想把事做好的話。

又其次是政治的惡化。任何國家台下的總是想上台，到台上的差不多別無作為，只有敗績時，台下免不了要益加反對。中國令人詫異的事，不在於以前曾有，而且現在還有人反對蔣介石。所成爲異跡的，却是經過了七年間差不多無止境的屢敗之後，他還是得到中國民衆絕大多數的信任，用拳賽話作比方，他還是在圈子裏——有點搖幌，但並沒有跌到繩上立不起來——而且還在我們隊裏使着勁。我們應該感謝上帝使他還能牽制着大部份日本對付我們的實力，而不叫苦連天的訴說，身受禍患，不得從事

若干內政改革，無論這些改革是急需和重要到怎麼樣。我們的比例意識何在？

英國是國會之母，在民主國家中資格最老，在動亂時期中，尙且不敢冒險舉行國會改選垂十年之久。可是中國在生死存亡的殘酷戰爭中，中國自有歷史四千餘年來又從未有過選舉，況加國土一半淪陷在敵人手裏，國民百分之八十不識字，而蔣介石因爲不辦選舉，竟被人罵得不亦樂乎，簡直是滑天下之大基礎已經奠定了的民主國家，在戰時，甚至在打勝仗的時候，全都限制人民的自由；竟要蔣介石正稽。在國內戰事失利的當口開放自由，這簡直是十足不通的胡話。

最後還有士氣的惡化，也是一種失敗病。祇要你有着希望，并能看到前途的轉變，你還能無限期的支持下去；但若對一部份同盟者的最後目的失了信念，便會失去自身的勇氣。這正是中國人心裏所感覺的，因之士氣也受了影響。在蔣介石領導之下，他們會盡了他們最大的能力，守住對日防線，俾我們在歐洲得以集中力量先擊潰希特勒。他們會依照我們所定的戰略，忠實履行他們所分担的任務。他們反抗暴力最早，而把他們放在最後，他們雖然並不歡喜這個戰略，還是接受下來，毫無怨懟之詞。但是現在起了一種繼長增高的憂慮，便是無論他們怎樣努力，犧牲多大，恐怕得不到一個機會變成真正自由獨立的強盛國家。他們不知道講和時是否會被出賣。

敗於敵人手固然是糟糕；受盟邦言詞攻擊壓迫，其糟尤甚。這種言詞的攻擊和壓迫雖然是小事，但却有驅中國抗戰趨於崩潰的威脅。

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一年多以來，美國嘗有一個步調相同的宣傳運動，攻擊中國的中央政府和蔣委員長。來源共有三個

• 一是歐洲的一部份帝國主義者。他們知道，人民繼續相信亞洲人天生不能以民主資格自爲其政，是亞洲整個殖民制度所建立的基礎。倘若中國站得住腳跟，憑自己的力量漸求進步，這種謬論便不攻自破，帝國的基礎便要開始崩潰。

邱吉爾從魁北克「會議」回到英國，第一次出席國會演說，其中有一句說：「中國得了美國逾格的援助後，猶迭遭敗績，殊令人失望而憤慨。」

英國在比利時和法國作戰并不怎樣佳妙。我們有向她跳過腳嗎？沒有。她在希臘，克利底，托布魯克，緬甸曾有過「令人失望而憤慨」的敗績，我們有沒有花費時間去加以指責？沒有——我們還加一倍的努力去扶持她。她曾得過認真逾格的援助——重達幾千百萬噸，價值幾百萬萬美元的供應品。中國會得過些什麼？

中國人對於援助的鮮少，從沒有公開發過怨言，在邱吉爾演說第二天，由一位發言人召集新聞記者，也還是不發怨尤之詞，而祇把紀錄解說明白。他說出中國究竟得過美國多少援助。其數量祇够一師美國兵在前線維持一星期之用！

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攻擊中國政府和蔣系私人的第二個宣傳來源，是中國共產黨，以及美國的共產份子。關於這一點，我要特別小心，不可使人誤解，因爲有許多美國人以爲一提到共產黨這個名詞，便自然而然是指俄國。我到中國去想調查的各種事情中，一樁便是克萊姆林「蘇聯政府」對中國共產黨究竟有無支援，若有的話，究竟支援到什麼程度。蘇聯自一九三七年「民廿六」與蔣介石締結軍事協定後，其對中國的舉措是

正確而守範圍的，我找不到也聽不到任何證據，足以證明蘇聯在過去七年間，對中國共產黨政府曾在物質上或指導上有過支持或接濟。

所以我並不指責蘇俄，而是指責中國的共產黨，和美國的共產黨及其同道。他們是以從事他們所信為有利於俄國未來政策和權益的工作為主體。我愈漸相信中國共產黨人是先想到共產黨，其次纔想到中國，正和美國的共產黨人先想到共產黨，其次纔想到美國一樣。以中國共產黨人而論，我是不得已而推翻我前幾年的論調。我以前有一個時期，也認為他們是農村改革家，純是專為爭取中國自由和民主的愛國者。現在却深信中國的共產黨人根本是効忠於俄國，不管俄國是不是要他們這樣做；他們的目的是要俄國像在歐洲一樣，在亞洲得佔最大的勢力，如此做法，我以為終非俄國之福，亦非亞洲或吾人之福，因為這是需要龐大的軍備，和經常在危疑震撼之中，我希望在戰後的世界中，是大可不必的。

對於一個有種種理由相信其心外向的離叛政府，焉能够要中國政府去給與軍火呢？世界上斷沒有一個政府能望其肯這樣做。非至中國共產黨人肯放棄其自有的軍隊，絕不能正式加以承認。而放棄自有軍隊一事，是他們向不願意，而且我以為將來也不會願意的。

自一九二七【民十六】年起，共產黨在中國便想以流血革命爭取勝利。一九三〇【民十九】年五月至十二月八個月間，我適在中國南方共產黨控制的區域內。我親眼看見他們排除異己，拂其意者，輒遭殘殺。然而他們用那種方法是收不到信徒的，因為中國人根本是一個愛和平，守秩序的民族。到中國共產黨人力盡技窮之後，他們又改變了另一種方法，他們向世界大肆宣傳，希望世人相信他們是被踐踏的愛國志士，為求解脫蔣介石的暴政和壓迫，以爭取自由，建立民主——與美國先代在一七七六年時一

樣。以自由民主統一等名詞爲標榜，又把凡與他們立異的人都指爲法西斯或獨裁者，他們居然愚弄了幾百千萬的美國人，使他們上了歷史上胸無城府的人所未會上的大當。我在中國對於這個題目比對別的題目花了更多的時間去研究，並且和他們的蘇維埃政府，即所謂邊區政府的主席林祖涵氏討論了一個早上，我可以老實告訴諸位，他們的宣傳乃是一個大騙局。他們也和希特勒一樣，知道對於一個要求，如果提出的次數多了，自然會有許多人相信是真的。

× × × × ×

共產黨頭一件事便說蔣介石及其政府不肯與他們聯合起來，共同對日本作戰。中國統一不是爲美國所關懷的嗎？因此我們豈不是應該堅持要蔣介石和中國政府與共產黨合作嗎？

但是却沒有人堅持要共產黨與政府合作，豈非怪事？

他們的論據有少數美國人信以爲真，便很幼稚的假定共產黨是一個政治黨派，是一個少數黨或反對黨，而在戰時，我們又是需要各黨合作，甚至需要組織聯合政府。因此我們便問：蔣介石爲什麼不肯引用共產黨人，如羅斯福招致少數共和黨人加入內閣之例。但是其間大有差別。我們共和黨人並不因我們對某幾項新政策不滿，便自行私養軍隊，武力割據國內大幅的區域。然而共產黨人確擁着私有的軍隊，並且另行設立了一個政府。他們不僅僅是一個政黨。他們簡直是武裝叛變。

這裏有一張四分之三篇幅的廣告，這是共產黨去年冬天在全國各報上所刊登的，諸位見了，或許記得起布勞德「美國共產黨領袖」所說的話：『美國堅持要重慶政府恢復國內秩序，所有中國軍隊不在形式上，而是真正統一起來時，不但已經成熟，而且是已經太熟了。』

「統一」這一個名詞的意思是——不是二；是一個政府，不是兩個政府；是一個軍隊，不是兩個軍隊。蔣介石從最初起，以及在以往七年間曾說過，在上個月又從新提出，倘若他們肯變成一個政黨，這就是說，肯放棄他們另外的軍隊和另外的政府，他當立即歡迎他們加入組織聯合政府。我們如果堅持要蔣介石使中國分裂，把軍需品去接濟一個武裝叛變，就無異是要他做賣國的漢奸。除非共產黨先放棄他們另外的政府和軍隊，蔣介石當然是不肯這樣做的。沒有這樣的法律，也沒有這樣的邏輯，能要一個合法政府的元首去承認本國境內的一個完全獨立主權的，援助更不用說了。

共產黨是在拿方士所煉的金磚來騙我們，想使我們相信他們必須維持他們的軍隊，否則便要消滅。他們維持着他們另外的軍隊，是想以統一為藉口，在蔣介石把美國接濟的軍火分給他們之後，用來搶奪政權。

共產黨對外國人所說的另一個辯爭理由，是說中國對日本的抗戰，大部份是由他們擔任，所以美國應該支持他們，像支持「羅馬尼亞的」蒂多而不支持米海羅維區一樣，因為對德打仗，據說是以蒂多之力為多。米海羅維區是與德國勾結的，所以我們不該支持他。然而無人能說蔣介石與日本提攜。照事實而論，我們倒是與日本提攜——歷時凡四年半之久；並且若不是日本太蠢，來向美國進攻，我恐怕直到現在或許與日本還在提攜着。在四巨頭中，蔣介石是四巨頭中惟一未與日本提攜的政治領袖，關於這一點他的紀錄是始終保持着清白的。

關於對日本作戰的事實如何？共產黨曾與日本軍有過幾百次小接觸，尤其在日軍派隊出去奪搶或毀滅農作物的時候。但是自一九三七年九月以來，沒有一個中立觀察者曾見到共產黨與日本軍有過一次可

以够得上稱爲大戰的戰役，反之，他們却親眼目睹蔣介石的軍隊與日本軍有過十多次劇烈的大戰，單是去年便有好幾次。

日本軍沒有認真用勁去摧毀自命爲真正抗日份子的共產黨，但是日本軍却向蔣介石的根據地及其所部被人指爲不與日軍打仗的軍隊，一再大舉進攻，豈非怪事？

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對日作戰係由共產黨担任大部份這個爭辯，由觀察日軍的行爲，可立即決定答案。我試舉出具體的事實。一九三八「民二七」年二月十七日日軍佔領山西省汾州，其時我正在該地美國醫院服務。往後兩星期內，日軍便向西推進七十五哩，到達黃河岸邊。黃河是與共產黨控制的陝西省分界，距離共產黨的都城延安不到一百哩，但是日軍就在那裏停止前進，亘七年之久，從未大舉去進攻延安。我希望有人能解釋其理由。倘若共產黨對於日軍真是一種威脅的話，日軍肯讓茅草在足下生長「臥榻之側，容他人酣睡」嗎？我們去年在華南建築成空軍根據地，能對日軍有威脅，日軍便花絕大的代價，長驅直下一千多哩，去佔領那些根據地。日軍很够機敏，看出從正面攻擊中國既是非常困難，削弱中國的最好方法，便無過於讓共產黨繼續和中國政府搗亂，使之不能統一，使之失去人心，而從內部自行分裂。凡是有理性的人，總不會在上面結論外另有別的結論。日軍對付中國的，也就是對付美國的真正「祕密」武器，便是得到有些美國人加以有力援助的中國共產黨。援助他們的美國人用意是真誠的，但照我的判斷，可惜是誤聽人言。

我所要問的是，這輩美國人替共產黨宣傳，他們以爲究竟受害的是些什麼人？可以拿穩的說，美國

本身受害最大，意思就是，累及對日作戰的每一個美國兵士的生命。

我不樂意再舉出反對中國政府宣傳的第三個來源。有大部宣傳是經美國陸軍部和國務院批准或授意的。所以發生這種景象，有好幾個原因。從最初時候起，對於作戰的最好方法，蔣介石與美國領袖主張就根本不同。蔣介石主張我們不能從空中或海上擊敗日本，必須從亞洲大陸上纔能將其打敗。

戰爭一開始，蔣介石便說，須經歷三個階段：第一是戰略的退却階段，以空間換取時間，第二是膠着階段，中國在這個階段中差不多已有三年之久；第三是反攻階段，將日軍逐出中國境內。他不到準備完成，他是不會，也不肯開始第三個階段的。

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所有這這種種複雜的因素，導成了中國與三派人的一個大鬥爭，雖然現在已沒去年秋天那樣的劇烈——我料想我們可以摸得一點邊際。頭一派是對於白種人完全失望的中國人。這一派人有些參加了日人手下的傀儡政府。他們認為他們並不是漢奸。他們認為他們是愛國的硬漢，蔣介石是受人迷誤的蠢子，會去相信西方人士。

還有第二派，是在中國共產黨領導下的。他們的辯爭論據是這樣：『爲什麼不和俄國建立貿易與市場，而去與英美建立？倘若與俄國合作，我們中國可於地球上最廣大的土地，最繁衆的人口，在中亞細亞造成一個世界最大的工業集團。』這也是一個頗爲有力的論據，對不對？這於美國有利嗎？然而有些誠實的，可惜是錯誤的美國人，還要極力支援中國共產黨的綱領。

再有第三派，就是蔣介石和大部份受過西方教育的英美留學生領導下的中央政府。其中有些秉政過

久，成了反動份子，甚至腐化份子，是毫無疑問的，但在大體上他們對於在英美所學得的思想 and 理想，却都一向忠守，并想竭盡所能，在鉅大的困難中，把中國造成亞洲的一個姊妹共和國家。

我們要怎樣去幫助？第一，我們對於中國的事情，或是莫須有的，或其過不在他們的，或是任何國家在受過同等災禍後所必有的，務須取消這種不負責任，不合份量的批評。我們應該停止強迫中國人做我們認為最上策的事。他們是以有理性著稱的民族，但他們是不能用威嚇或要挾強迫得了的。

第二，我們對於壞的，有時的確很壞的事情，務須作有建設性的正當合理批評。關於這一層我要向「駐華大使」赫爾利及「羅斯福總統代表」納爾遜致敬。他們一着手便有了一個極好的開端，因為他們抱批評的態度，而同時又具同情心，建設性。他們入題的方式不是，「喂中國，你成了我們的問題，我們對你要怎樣辦？」而是，「中國啊，你有些問題，我們要怎樣纔能幫助你解決這些問題？我們要怎樣纔能彼此都得到最大的幫助？」這其間相差有天淵之別。

第三，我們對中國務須趕快多給些物質的援助，多給些供應。我知道這似乎不可能。然而要中國支持到七年之久是不可能的，她竟能支持過去。要英國支持過一九四〇年夏秋兩季是不可能的，她居然支持過去。要俄國堅守莫斯科，列甯格勒，和斯達林格勒也是不可能的，她也終於守得住。現在也要輪到我們來施展點奇跡了。

第四，我們對中國務須多給些政治上的援助，多給些精神上的援助。倘若我們使他們明白這場戰爭也是為爭他們的自由，他們是能够，並且願意繼續英勇的作戰，而且效力日有增進的。這樣可以省却許多師美國兵，可以少費幾十萬萬金錢。

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OUR ALLY CHINA

Walter H. Judd

Representative of Minnesota (Republican) to the Congress.

We got into this war through Asia; and if America gets into another war, almost certainly it will also be through Asia.

[But] there are few subjects about which American thinking is more confused today than it is about China. During 1938, 1939, and 1940, when I was going up & down the country reporting what I had seen in China in the preceding years, including a period of five months under the Japanese Army, and trying to awaken my fellow citizens to the dangers of Japan's and our own policies at that time, most people were inclined to say "Oh, don't worry about the Japanese. You are unduly alarmed. After all, the Japanese can't even lick the Chinese, and of course the Chinese can't fight, so what could the Japanese do to us?"

Then one morning Japan gave us the worst defeat in our whole 168 years of independent history. We woke up with a start and said: "Why, those Japanese are good. And if they can do that to us, how in the world have the Chinese been able to hold out against them for four and a half years? The Chinese must be good, too." Our estimate of the Chinese began to soar.

Idealization, Disillusion. Then Madam Chiang came to this country and she captured American imagination as few foreigners ever had, and certainly as no Asiatic ever had. Our estimate of the Chinese soared still higher—too high. To hear many American talk, including commentators and columnists, practically every Chinese was selfless in his devotion to his country, patriotically sacrificing everything for freedom and his nation's welfare, and so forth. We who had lived there were concerned, and Chinese leaders were even more disturbed, because we and they knew that it was not a true picture of the situation in China or in any country, and that such over-idealization would inevitably lead to a swing-back into over-disillusionment. We are in the midst of that swing-back now. Those who a year ago could hardly find words good enough with

which to describe our Chinese allies now can hardly find words bad enough. To hear them talk now, all Chinese are lazy, are crooks, and grafters, are obstructionists, anti-foreign, hopelessly inefficient, split up into political factions interested more in preserving themselves than in defeating Japan, expecting us to do all fighting, and so forth. Between those two extremes, where is the truth? Some of you have asked me that question. I thought if you were going to ask my views, I ought to have a fresh look at the situation. I had been home for six years and I wanted to get the feel of things as they are in China to-day. So I went out to China last fall for that purpose.

I had worked there ten years as a medical missionary, one year in Nanking, five years in south China, and four years in north China. I was able to talk in their own language with many Chinese whom I had known well in the past, doctors with whom I had worked, nurses we had trained in our hospitals, principals and teachers and students from our schools, presidents and deans of universities, businessmen. I did not talk to high Chinese Government officials until the last two days. I talked with Chinese people. It is on the basis of such observations that I want to present some of the highlights, if I can.

Desperate Conditions. Some of you have traveled in the Orient and you remember your first glimpse of it. The poverty, the overcrowding, the dirt, the squalor, the disease were all right out there in full view; and your first reaction was: "Why, these people are living almost like animals. Their condition is hopeless." It was just about all you could take under ordinary circumstances, wasn't it? How much worse after almost eight years of war and invasion?

In former years most reports on China came from Americans who went out as missionaries, or as teachers, or as businessmen, or as long-term reporters or students. They soon observed also the tapestries and cloisonnés and porcelains, the literary achievements, the mature wisdom, the basic goodness and friendliness of the people. They wanted to live their lives happily there, so they looked for and found the best. They learned what the Chinese have long known, that the loveliest flower of all, the lotus, frequently grows in the most uninviting surroundings.

But thousands of Americans are there today who are not interested in China's culture. They did not go because they

wanted to go. They went because they were sent, by their newspaper or by Uncle Sam. They frequently see only the external things, almost all unprepossessing, and they do not like it. I find our boys abroad do not like any country except one, and that is the United States of America. They want only to get back to it. They write home to their families about the filth and the cruelties and the antiquated methods and what seem to be lackadaisical attitudes and all the rest. The fathers and mothers read it, and then they know all about China because their boy, John, well, he is there and he saw and he knows.

Likewise most reporters—they do not want to be sent to that assignment and they do not like it. Understandably, these Americans tend to judge China, not in terms of China's own past but in terms of the West. They assume the bad conditions are the result of the present Government's failures, when in reality conditions became not worse, but very much better under that Government in the years prior to the war.

The second fact which many fail to appreciate fully is that China was still in the midst of a great revolution when she was plunged into this war against her wishes. Revolutions are almost always disorderly and long-drawn-out affairs. It took the French 80 years to get through their revolution. It took us 90 years, including a great Civil War, before we got straightened out after our revolution. You will remember that when our Republic was older than China's is, conditions in this country in the latter part of the War of 1812 were so bad, the corruption and factionalism were so rampant in the Government, inefficiencies in the Army were so notorious, and the administration of affairs was so bad that representatives of the people of New England met in Hartford, Conn. and solemnly voted to secede. They were giving up as hopeless the attempt to get internal unity and stability in this struggling Republic. Their problem was child's play compared to China's.

In addition to her internal difficulties, she was undergoing constant interference from without. It was only four years after the revolution began in 1911 that Japan tried to force on China the 21 demands which would have made China a vassal state. Four years later a group of four white men sitting at Versailles took Shantung, the sacred province of China, and tried to award it to Japan. Japan invaded that province again in 1927, took Manchuria in 1931, and bit off three other pieces of Chinese territory in the next six years before starting full-

scale war in 1937. In addition, several other nations were meddling in China's affairs, trying to prevent her achieving real unity and strength. Naturally the Chinese were not able to get their revolution completed and a modern, efficient, unified, and democratic government set up.

Diseases of Defeat. Superimposed on the inevitable difficulties involved in carrying through a revolution, getting a new type of government established and the people organized and unified, is a third factor. China is suffering acutely from what Mr. Churchill has well called "the diseases of defeat."

Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt made the basic decision, right after Pearl Harbor, to hold defensively in the Pacific while disposing of Germany and Italy in Europe. The fundamental strategy was to concentrate on beating Hitler first. So we poured over 98% of our supplies into Europe, and sent less than 2% to east Asia and than 10% of that went to the Chinese. Up until a few months ago when we finally began to consider the Chinese armies of sufficient importance to make an all-out effort to get more assistance to them, they had had only two-tenths of 1% of all the supplies that we sent abroad to our allies.

We and our Western allies made a decision which gave brilliant results in Europe. But that decision inevitably led to almost disastrous results in Asia. If we take the credit for good results in Europe, there is no way we can escape some of the responsibility for the bad results in Asia.

China lost her major railroads in the first few months of the war. She lost control of the Yangtze River Valley, which is far more important to her transportation than the whole Mississippi River Valley is to us. These things made it impossible to shift troops rapidly or to get food from the areas of plenty to those of acute deficiency.

You have read of Chinese soldiers foraging on the common people, and of Chinese peasants rising up against their own armies. You probably thought, "What kind of troops are these that take food from their own citizens? What kind of allies are these that will not support their own armies?" But the soldiers simply have to live off the land at times, or starve. And I would remind you that the same thing happened in our Revolution. George Washington's men had to live off the land at times and they were royally hated and resisted by some of the Colonists because of that fact.

What are the diseases of defeat? First, there is physical deterioration. I was shocked last fall by the appearance of many Chinese, particularly among the soldiers. I had seen famine refugees in times past, and thought I was used to malnutrition, but this was even worse. The Chinese soldiers will have to have just plain good food for at least six months before anyone can possibly expect them to have the strength and vigor and stamina to start a counteroffensive.

We Americans, if we believe all the advertisements we read, have to take a vitamin pill or two every day to get through that little letdown we are said to have in the middle of the afternoon, and most of us are pretty well supplied with vitamins in our regular diet. But the Chinese haven't had enough vitamins for years and years, and they are more jittery and irritable and restless than ordinarily, and they are tired. They are anemic, they are full of parasites and malaria and tuberculosis and dysentery. They have got to have adequate food and medical care.

Economic Deterioration. Then there is economic deterioration. China was able to keep her economy in surprisingly good balance until a complete blockade was slapped upon her in 1942, and that was not her fault. We and the British controlled the seas, but we could not keep the sea lanes open to China and the British could not hold Burma and so China was completely cut off. The blockade had the same effect on her as it had on our South in the War between the States. The South was not industrialized, as China is not industrialized. The South had to get supplies and equipment and machinery and munitions from abroad, just as China did. The South had to sell its cotton and other products abroad in order to get foreign exchange to keep its currency stable, just as China did. When the blockade shut off trade the South had to resort to the printing press and inflation resulted. It was this economic breakdown and lack of supplies as a result of the blockade which led to the weakening and defeat of the South more than any other single factor.

Then there is moral deterioration—graft, corruption, profiteering, black market. These things develop in any country in war, and especially in defeat. But there are several things to say about the graft in China. First, while it is bad, it is not nearly as bad as I expected to find, considering the circumstances. Second there has always been in China the "squeeze" system, which we consider graft, but they do not. Any Chinese

who handles a transaction for you takes 10%. If he takes 20%, he is dishonest; but, if he does not take 10%, he is not considered honest, he is just dumb. The Chinese say that dishonesty consists in leaving somebody with the wrong impression. So it is not graft from the Chinese point of view, because everybody knows perfectly well it is being done. It is "old custom," has always been done, and everybody understands it.

When Chinese come to this country and do business with us, they have to do it on our terms. And, when we do business with them in their country, we have got to do it on their terms, that is, if we want to get much accomplished.

Political Deterioration. Then there is political deterioration. In any country the "outs" want to get in, and, when the "ins" have almost nothing but defeats to show, the outs inevitably increase their opposition. The surprising thing is not that there has been and is opposition in China to Chiang Kai-shek. The miracle is that after seven years of almost unending defeats he still has the confidence of an overwhelming majority of the Chinese people, that he is still in the ring—a little wobbly, to be sure, but not on the ropes—and that he is still slugging away on our side. We ought to be thanking God that he is still able to divert much of Japan's strength from ourselves, instead of complaining too bitterly because he has not been able in the midst of all his disasters to carry out a lot of internal reform, desirable and important as they are. Where is our sense of proportion?

England, the mother of parliaments and the oldest democracy, has not dared risk an election for ten years in a time of trouble. Yet you have heard Chiang Kai-shek cursed up & down because he has not held an election in the midst of a cruel war for sheer survival and in a country which has never before held an election in its 4,000 years of history, and half of which is occupied by an enemy and 80% of whose people cannot read & write. It is ridiculous.

The established democracies all restrict their people's freedoms in war, even in victory; but Chiang is supposed to extend freedoms in his country even in the midst of defeat. It is an absurd counsel of perfection.

Then there is deterioration of morale, one more of the diseases of defeat. You can hold on indefinitely as long as you have hope, or can see a turn in the road ahead; but if you begin to lose faith in the ultimate objectives of some of

your allies, then something goes out of you. That is what is happening in China's heart and therefore to morale. Under Chiang's leadership they have done their best to hold the line against Japan so that we in the West could concentrate on beating Hitler first. They have tried to do their part loyally according to the strategy which we determined. They did not wholly like that strategy because it put them last, though they had been fighting tyranny first, but they accepted it without complaining. But now there is a mounting fear that, no matter how great their efforts and their sacrifices, they are not going to be given a chance to become really strong, free and independent in their own right. They wonder whether they may not be sold down the river in the peacemaking.

Defeats from one's enemy are bad enough; verbal attacks and pressures from one's allies are even worse. They are the straw which has threatened to break the back of China's resistance.

Imperialist Propaganda. For over a year there has been in this country a concerted propaganda campaign against the Central Government of China and the Generalissimo. There are three main sources. One is some of the imperialists of Europe. They know the foundation stone of the whole colonial system in Asia is people's continuing to believe that all Orientals are congenitally incapable of governing themselves as democracies. If China gets on her feet and moves along progressively under her own power, that fallacy is automatically exploded and the foundation of the empires begins to collapse.

When Mr. Churchill got back from Quebec, he said in his first speech in Parliament that "after all the lavish aid which America has given to China, these defeats in China are most disappointing and vexatious."

England did not do so well in Belgium and France. Did we jump on her? No. She had some rather "disappointing and vexatious" defeats in Greece and Crete and Tobruk and in Burma. Did we spend our time pointing them out? No—we redoubled our efforts to help hold her up. And she had had really lavish aid—millions of tons and billions of dollars worth of supplies. How much had China had?

The Chinese had never complained publicly about the smallness of the assistance they had received but after that statement by Mr. Churchill, a Chinese official spokesman in Chung-

king called in the newspaper reporters the next day, not to complain even then, but merely to set the record straight. He told them just how much aid the Chinese had received from America. It was the amount required to keep one American division in the field for one week.

Communist Propaganda. The second source of the propaganda against the Government of China and against the Chiangs personally is the Communist group in China, and the Communists in America. I want to be careful not to be misunderstood at this point because, to many Americans, the word "Communist" automatically means Russia. One of the things I wanted to find out in China was how much, if any, is the Kremlin behind the Communists in China. Russia's official conduct with regard to the Chinese Communists since they made a pact with Chiang in September 1937 has been perfectly correct and circumspect. There was no evidence that I could find or hear about that Moscow has been backing or supplying, either with materials or with guidance, the Communist government in China during the last seven years.

So I am not making charges against the Russians. But I am charging that the Communists in China and the Communists and fellow travelers in this country are working primarily in terms of what they believe will best serve Russia's future policies and interests. I am increasingly convinced the Chinese Communists are first Communist and second Chinese, just as we know American Communists are first Communists and second Americans. In the case of the Chinese Communists this is a reluctant reversal of the opinion I held some years ago. I, too, was taken in for a time by the talk of their being just agrarian reformers, just Chinese patriots struggling only for the freedom of China and for democracy. I am convinced now the primary allegiance of the Chinese Communists is to Russia, whether Russia wants it that way or not, and their purpose is to make Russia overwhelmingly the strongest power in Asia as well as in Europe, which I think would be as bad in the long run for Russia as it would for Asia and for ourselves, requiring enormous armaments and constant tensions and suspicions which I hope profoundly will not have to be in the postwar world.

How can the Chinese Government be asked to furnish arms to a rebel government whose primary allegiance it has every reason to believe is to a foreign power? No government in the

world could be rightly expected to do that. The Communists cannot be given full recognition in China until they are willing to give up their separate army. That they have never been, and, I think, never will be, willing to do.

Beginning in 1927, the Communists tried to win in China by bloody revolution. For eight months, May to December in 1930, I was in an area under their control down in south China. I saw firsthand their utterly ruthless purges and slaughterings of anyone who crossed their will. But they could not win converts by that method because the Chinese are basically too peace-loving and orderly a people. When the Communists in China had reached the end of their rope they shifted to another method. They adopted a great propaganda program to sell to the world the belief that they are merely downtrodden patriots, seeking to escape the tyranny and oppressions of Chiang Kai-shek in order to get freedom and establish democracy—just like our forefathers were in 1776. By talking about freedom and democracy and unity and so forth, and by calling all who disagree with them fascists and dictators, they have succeeded in selling to millions of Americans one of the greatest hoaxes any unsuspecting people ever bought in all history. I spent more time and effort in China on this than on any other subject, including a morning discussing it with Mr. Lin Tsu-han, the chairman of their soviet government, the so-called border region government, and I can assure you that their propaganda is a gigantic fraud. They know, like Hitler, that if a big claim is made often enough, a lot of people will come to believe it is the truth.

Disloyal Opposition. The Communists have said, first of all, that Chiang Kai-shek and his Government will not unite with them in the fight against Japan. Now is it not to our country's interest to have China united? Therefore, must we not insist that Chiang Kai-shek and the established Government of China cooperate with the Communists?

But is it not strange that no one ever insists that the Communists cooperate with the Government?

Their argument is given credence by some Americans on the naive assumption that the Communists are just a political faction, a minority or an opposition and in war we need cooperation, even a coalition, of all parties. We ask: why will not Chiang take in the Communists as Roosevelt takes a few Republicans into his Cabinet? But there is a very considerable

difference. We Republicans do not maintain a private army exercising arbitrary armed control over whole sections of the country because we do not like some New Deal policies. But the Communists do have a private army and a separate government. They are not just a political party. They are an armed rebellion.

Perhaps you recall seeing this three-quarter-page advertisement by the Communists last summer in papers all over the country, in which Earl Browder says: "The time is more than ripe for the United States to insist that the Chungking Government shall put its house in order with a real, not a formal, unification of all Chinese fighting forces."

The word "unity" means one, not two; one government, not two; and one army, not two. Chiang has said from the beginning and during all these seven years, and reiterated the offer last month, that he will accept them in a coalition government immediately if they will become just a political party—that is, will give up their separate army and their separate government. For us to insist that Chiang Kai-shek reconcile himself to a splitting of his own country and send military supplies to an armed rebellion is to ask him to be a traitor. Of course, he has not been willing to do it, and will not, unless the Communists will, first of all, give up their separate government and army. There is no law or logic whereby the head of a legitimate government can be asked to recognize, let alone assist, a wholly independent sovereignty within his own country.

The Communists are selling us a gold brick when they try to make us think that they must maintain their army or be destroyed. They maintain their separate army because they want to seize power after Chiang has armed them with American supplies under the pretext of unity.

The other main Communist argument for foreign consumption is that they are doing the bulk of the fighting against Japan and therefore we should support them, just as we supported Tito rather than Mihailovich, because Tito was allegedly doing most of the fighting against Germany. Mihailovich was said to be a collaborationist, and therefore we should not support him. But no one can accuse Chiang of being a collaborationist. As a matter of painful fact, we were the collaborationists with Japan—for four and a half years; and I fear might still be today if Japan had not been so stupid as to attack

us. Chiang is the one political leader among the Big Four who has not been a collaborationist, whose record is completely clear on that point.

What are the facts on this matter of fighting the Japanese? There have been hundreds of skirmishes between the Communists and the Japanese, especially when the latter sent out expeditions to seize or destroy the crops. But no neutral observer has seen anything that could be called a battle between the Communists and the Japanese since September 1937. On the other hand, they have witnessed a dozen terrific battles between Chiang's troops and the Japanese, several in the last year.

The Japanese have made no serious effort to destroy the bases of the Communists who are alleged to be the real anti-Japanese elements, but the Japanese have launched repeated campaigns to destroy Chiang Kai-shek's bases and his armies, which are said not to be fighting the Japanese. Is that not odd?

Japan's Secret Weapon. The definite answer to this argument that the Communists are doing most of the fighting can readily be determined from observing the behavior of the Japanese. Let me make it concrete. I was working in our hospital in Fenchow, Shansi Province, when the Japanese finally captured the city on February 17, 1938. In the next two weeks they pushed on west 75 miles to the Yellow River, which separates us from the Communist province of Shensi. There the Japanese have been within 100 miles of the Communist capital, Yen-an, for just over seven years, and have not made a single major effort to get that Communist capital. I wish somebody would explain that. Have the Japanese ever allowed grass to grow under their feet when there was a real threat to them? When we got air bases in south China last summer that threatened the Japanese, they drove down a thousand miles at terrific cost and captured those bases. No reasonable person can come to any other conclusion than that the Japanese have been shrewd enough to see that since it had proved most difficult to knock the Chinese out by direct assault, then the best way to weaken China is to allow the Communists to continue their work of disrupting and disunifying and discrediting the Government of China, breaking it down from within. The real "secret weapon" of the Japanese against China, and therefore against us, has been the Communists of China, ably as-

assisted by some of our own people, sincere, but in my judgment grievously misguided.

What I want to ask is, whom do such Americans think they are hurting by their propaganda for the Communists? Surely our own country most of all. That means it involves the life of every American boy fighting against Japan.

I dislike even more to mention the third main source of the propaganda against the Government of China. A lot of it is approved, even inspired, by persons in our own War and State Departments. There are several reasons for this sorry spectacle. There has been a fundamental difference of opinion from the beginning between Chiang Kai-shek and some of our leaders as to the best way to fight the war. Chiang Kai-shek maintained we could not beat the Japanese from the air or from the sea; they must be beaten on the mainland of Asia.

Chiang said when the war began that there would be three stages: first, the stage of strategic retreat, trading space for time; second, the stage of stalemate in which China has been for almost three years; and third, the stage of counteroffensive to drive the Japanese out of China. He will not start the third until he is ready, any more than we would.

Three-Group Struggle. All these complicated factors have led to a great struggle in China between three main groups, although not as acute now perhaps as it was last fall—I think we may be around the corner. First is a group of Chinese who are completely disillusioned regarding the white man. Some of them are in the Japanese puppet governments. They do not consider themselves traitors. They consider themselves the hardheaded patriots and Chiang a misguided fool for trusting the West.

There is a second group, led by the Chinese Communists. Their argument goes like this: "Why not build up trade and markets for Russia, rather than for America and England? In cooperation with Russia, we Chinese can build in Central Asia the greatest industrial bloc in the world, in the midst of the greatest land and population bloc on the earth." That, too, is a rather potent argument, is it not? Would it be in America's interest? And yet some sincere but mistaken Americans vigorously support the Chinese Communist program.

And then there is the third group, the Central Government of China led by Chiang Kai-shek and men who are mostly

Western-trained students, from America and England. There are unquestionably some who have been in power too long, are reactionary, even corrupt. But on the whole they have been loyal to the ideas and ideals they learned here and have tried their best under enormous difficulties to make China a sister republic in Asia.

What can we do to help? First, we have got to cut out this irresponsible, unbalanced criticism of the Chinese for things that do not exist or are not their fault or would be present in any country after comparable disasters. We have got to stop trying to force the Chinese to do what we think is best. They are an eminently reasonable people, but they cannot be browbeaten or coerced.

Second, we have got to make constructive the criticisms that are justified, of things that are bad, sometimes very bad indeed. I want to pay tribute to General [Patrick] Hurley* and Donald Nelson† in this respect. They got off to a wonderful start because they have been sympathetic and constructive as well as critical. Their approach was not, "Now, China, you are our problem. What shall we do with you?" But rather, "China, you have some problems. How can we help you with the problems? How can we help each other most?" There is a world of difference.

Third, we have got to get more material assistance, more supplies to China, quickly. I know it seems impossible. It was impossible for China to hold out seven years, but she has. It was impossible for the British to hold out in the summer and fall of 1940, but they did. It was impossible for the Russians to hold at Leningrad and Moscow and Stalingrad, but they did. Now, we have got to perform a miracle, too.

Fourth, we have got to get more political assistance to the Chinese, more spiritual assistance. They can and will fight on valiantly and with increasing effectiveness if we will make it clear to them that this is a war for their freedom, too.* That will save a good many American divisions and billions of dollars.

* U.S. Ambassador at Chungking.

† Also visited China as President Roosevelt's personal representative in 1944, helped to establish the Chinese War Production Board.

OUR ALLY CHINA By *Walter H. Judd*

First Edition, December, 1945. CNC \$ 800.00 *Abroad US 30 cts*

This article is a speech made on March 15, 1945 in the U.S. House of Representatives by Walter H. Judd, Republican Representative from Minnesota, who has lived in China more than ten years—long enough to understand the Chinese frame of mind—and came to China last fall “to have a fresh look of the situation.” The author is “of all Americans occupying elective office, the man who know most about the Far East” and his is “the most comprehensive speech yet made on the subject”, according to the Editor of time from which this piece is reproduced. Although it was made in the war the significance of Representative Judd’s brilliant views on China has not, in view of the fact that postwar relations between China and the U.S.A. are going to be as close as, if not more than, those existed during the time of war, lost in the slightest.

We have pleasure to present it is this booklet together with the Chinese translation done by us to our foreign friends who have not read it previously as well as to the Chinese public.

As recent as November 20, 1945, he again urged Congress not to “throw away our hard bought victory by abandoning China.” On this occasion he asserted that Generalissimo Chiang Kc -shek could have had peace on repeated occasions if he had been willing to desert his allies and demanded “Are we now to try to get peace by deserting him when the war is not over and cannot be until almost 2,000,000 Japanese soldiers in China are disarmed and back in their country?”

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我 們 的 盟 邦 中 國
OUR ALLY CHINA

A Speech Made in the U. S. Congress

By
Representative *Walter H. Judd*



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