

96. (If witness denies conference or states he does not recall, refresh his recollection.)
97. Did not WIEHL stress in that conference the fact that Germany was entitled to a preferential treatment not only politically but also economically and morally because of her aid given to Japan, such as, recall of military advisors, stopping of war material deliveries, and losses resulting therefrom, and did you not show full understanding and declare that you had always urged preferential treatment and that the Japanese Army was in favor of it?
98. Did you not also inform WIEHL that you had sent an energetic wire report to Tokyo on 9 December to the effect that the preferential treatment should be granted in writing?
99. Did you not further inform WIEHL that you had sent letters to the same effect to leading personalities of the Japanese Army through a Japanese General who recently visited Berlin?
- (These last questions are based on IPS Dec. 4041, Item 15.)
100. While a representative of the Japanese Government in Germany, is it not true that you were chief of all Japanese diplomatic representatives and intelligence services in Europe?

**IV**

1. Upon the conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact did you resign as Ambassador without consulting the Japanese Army with regard thereto?
2. In your affidavit you characterize the conclusion of this Pact as an act of extreme bad faith on the part of Germany. Did you later change your views on that subject?
3. Did you not state in your interrogation that one of your reasons for resigning as Ambassador was that you mistrusted the German leaders? Is that correct?
4. Did you later change your views in that regard?
5. Did you consider that the conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact created an extremely critical situation between the two governments?
6. What did you do about it, if anything?
7. I hand you Prosecution Document No. 3268, which is the January, 1940, issue of the magazine "Bungei Shunju", and I ask you if at page 64 you find printed therein an article entitled "The Idea of German Diplomacy," written by you?
8. I offer for identification only Prosecution Document No. 3268, and I desire to tender in evidence Prosecution Document No. 3268-A, an excerpt therefrom consisting of the article mentioned.

(If necessary to state grounds for introduction of document, state as follows:

This document contradicts the witness' statement with regard to his alleged mistrust of German leaders, the statement in his affidavit that he considered the Non-Aggression Pact an act of extreme bad faith on the part of Germany, the witness' statement with regard to his acts in this critical period, and in particular the statement on page 26, and many other places, in the affidavit of his purpose in desiring an alliance between Japan and Germany.)

9. I will read Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_\_.
10. In January 1940, the month after your return from a five and a half year sojourn in the land of Hitler and the Nazi Party, you knew of the founding of the Gestapo under Goering and the putting of all trade unions under party SA and SS leaders in 1933, did you not?
11. You knew that Hitler's Mein Kampf, teaching the right of pure Germans to dominate all races and that force is necessary to solve international problems, had been used in the schools and colleges throughout Germany and distributed to all government officials, did you not?
12. You witnessed in June, 1934, the murder without warning of those who opposed the Hitlerian doctrines in what was notoriously known as the "blood bath", did you not?
13. And incidentally, this "blood bath" had its counterpart in Japan in the various assassinations between 1931 and 1936 of those who opposed the policy of the Japanese Army. Is that not true?

14. You also witnessed the establishment of the notorious concentration camps in Germany and you were familiar with the reign of terror that followed. Is that not true?
15. With all this knowledge and more on your part you prepared this article relating to the so-called Hitler diplomacy of Honor, Equality and Freedom for the purpose of aligning more closely the Japanese government and people with Hitlerite Germany. Is that not true?

16. In this public statement, you asserted in effect that Germany established a strong Army in order that Hitler's three principles of diplomacy, Honor, Equality and Freedom, would have the support of real power, and by it Germany had often achieved bloodless victories. By bloodless victories, were you referring to such events as the Nazi Putsch in Vienna in July 1934 when Dolfuss was assassinated; the occupation of the Rhineland in March 1936 in violation of the Treaty of Versailles; the Austrian Anschluss in March 1938 when Von Schuschnigg was forced to resign upon threat of German invasion; the incorporation of Austria into the Reich in March 1938; and the occupation of the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia in October 1938?

17. You then pictured Germany as a nation always prepared for war and determined to resort to arms at any moment in order to carry out her own positive policies. Had not the same thing been true in Japan since the Manchurian Incident?

18. When you added, "There is nothing more necessary at present than such close connection of diplomacy and military force", were you not advocating a military partnership between Japan and Germany in order that both nations may better carry out their own positive policies.
19. When you stated, page 26 of your affidavit, that your constant idea was that a military alliance between Japan and Germany was meant to be used as a means in diplomatic negotiations, did you not actually mean, in keeping with the sense of this article, that you would not hesitate to hold a loaded pistol to the head of your neighbor determined to pull the trigger if he refused to obey your directions.
20. By your statement in this article that "Our government, at this juncture, must establish national policies and to exert itself to carry them out", it was intended as a criticism and an attack on those in the government who were opposed to the Tri-Partite military alliance, is that not true?
21. This statement was also intended to gain the support of Japanese public opinion for the diplomacy and military force doctrines enunciated in this article and which could only be acquired by the adoption of a national policy geared to the so-called Hitler diplomacy of Honor, Equality and Freedom, is that not so?
22. This public demand made by you that the Japanese government establish national policies at this juncture finally reached fruition in the replacement of the YONAI Cabinet

by the Second KONOYE Cabinet in June 1940, and the conclusion by it of the Tri-Partite Pact on September 27, 1940, is that not true?

23. After your return to Japan from Germany, did you have conversations with Ambassador SHIRATORI in which you discussed various aspects of the Tripartite Alliance, and, if so, when did these conversations take place?

(Based on page 114 of the interrogation.)

24. Did STAHRER, Special Envoy of HIRBERTROP, confer with you in Japan during the summer of 1940, and, if so, in what month did he first talk with you?

25. At this conference did you advise STAHRER to consult Foreign Minister MATSUOKA regarding negotiations for a Tripartite Pact?

(Based on page 110 of the interrogation.)

26. After the negotiations had been opened were you a guest of STAHRER at the German Embassy, at which time STAHRER discussed with you certain phases of the negotiations and you suggested that he state his views clearly to MATSUOKA?

27. Were MATSUOKA or either of the Diplomatic Councillors of the Foreign Office, SHIRATORI and SAITO, present at this conference at the German Embassy?

28. Was not the signing of the Tripartite Pact and the formation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association jointly celebrated by Japanese and Germans throughout Japan on Sunday morning, 13 October 1940?

by the Second KONOYE Cabinet in June 1940, and the conclusion by it of the Tri-Partite Pact on Sept. 27, 1940, is that not true?

23. Were you in favor of this partnership between Japan, Germany and Italy known as the Tri-Partite Pact?
24. Were there substantial elements in Japan which did not approve of this pact?
25. What means were used by the leaders in the Japanese government to silence this opposition?
26. Was not an Imperial Edict secured which had the effect of compelling the Japanese nation to follow the provisions of the Tripartite Alliance?  
(Question based on page 263 of the interrogation.)
27. Did you advise that the Emperor be used in this manner?
28. Exhibit 562, page 6429 of the Transcript, is a telegram from Ambassador OTT, of 31 January 1941, in which it is stated: "Unity of government and nation behind the Tripartite Pact has been unmistakably proved in the Diet negotiations." What, if anything, did you do to secure the unity of the government and nation behind the Tripartite Pact?
29. I hand you Prosecution Document No. 2377, which is a copy of the November, 1940, issue of the magazine "Dai-Asia Shugi," and I will ask you if you find on page \_\_\_\_\_ of this issue that there is printed an article entitled "Tripartite Alliance and the United States," written by you?

30. Will you examine the inside of the back cover sheet of this magazine and state whether or not it appears that the magazine is published by the Greater Asia Association?
31. Will you examine it further and advise me whether or not I am correct in stating that the following accused were officials of this Association: MATSUI, Iwane, Chief of the Association; HIROTA, Koki, SHIRATORI, Toshio, and MATSUOKA, Yosuke, Councillors of the Association, and SUZUKI, Teiichi, a Director of the Association?
32. I offer for identification only Prosecution Document No. 2377, and I tender in evidence Prosecution Document No. 2377-A, an excerpt therefrom, consisting of the article written by you.
33. I will now read a part of Exhibit \_\_\_\_\_.
34. Having used your influence at a critical period in Japanese-German relations by publication of your article in the January, 1940, issue of "Bungei Shunju", the great weight of your influence was again used in another critical period in your effort by this article to unify both the government and the nation behind the Tripartite Pact. Is that not true?
35. In this article you state: "The fact that this recent alliance was concluded with the grand object of establishing a New Order in the world constitutes the great feature of the treaty." What provision of the treaty provides for this great feature?



36. (If adequate answer is not given). In the preamble to the Pact the statement is made that the three governments "have made it our fundamental principle to establish a new order for co-prosperity of its own race, in Great Asia and Europe, and to maintain the same; and have reached the decision to cooperate and co-assist each other in carrying out this basic fundamental in each respective field \*\*\*, " and in Article III it is provided that "Japan, Germany and Italy shall agree to cooperate with one another in carrying out the aforementioned policy; \*\*\*." Do these provisions constitute the great feature of the treaty to which you refer?
37. Will you tell the Tribunal what HITLER and MUSSOLINI did to carry out the fundamental principle contained in these provisions of the Pact?
38. (If answer non-committal.) In the first place, did not HITLER and MUSSOLINI continue to wage the war of aggression in Europe which they were engaged in at the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact?
39. HITLER's General Order No. 24, Exhibit 573, page 6470, provided "The aim of the cooperation based on the Three-Power Pact must be to bring Japan, as soon as possible, to active operations in the Far East." Did you not state in your interrogation that by the issuance of this order HITLER may have intended to invoke the statement in the preamble about the building of a New Order in East Asia? (Based on page 260 of the interrogation.)
40. Is it not a fact that you showed to HITLER a military map of Singapore containing the location of field fortifications and gun emplacements and discussed with him the difficulties of an attack upon Singapore? (Based on page 165 of the interrogation.)

*at close Friday*

41. In your interrogation did you not justify this act on your part by stating that it was in accord with the agreement at the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact? By that did you not mean the same provisions which I quoted to you a few minutes ago?
42. Were not the conferences in Berlin between ~~HITLER~~, RIBBENTROP and MATSUOKA conducted in the spirit and under the provisions of this part of the treaty?
43. What did you or Japan do to carry out the fundamental principle contained in these provisions of the Pact?
44. (If non-committal answer made.) Did not Japan continue the war with China which had been in progress many years prior to the conclusion of the Pact?
45. Did not Japan continue its efforts to establish the New Order in East Asia under these provisions of the Pact by the military occupation of Indo-China where naval and air bases were secured for use by Japan?
46. Did not you in your article published in the November, 1940, issue of "Dai-Asia Shugi" inform the Japanese nation that it was necessary that they cooperate in the establishment of the so-called New Orders of Germany and Italy, and was this not based on these provisions of the Pact?
47. In other words, General OSHIMA, the later provision of the Pact, Article III, regarding military aid in the event of attack by a power not presently engaged in war in Europe or Asia was in fact designed as a cloak to conceal and a shield to protect the participating powers in the course of conduct in which they were then engaged. Is that not true?

or PM,

Why not  
suspect

48. On the last page of your article, published in Nov. 1940, you state "By the Tripartite alliance our country has made a start towards a new diplomacy." By this, did you mean that the close connection of diplomacy and military force which you stated in your article of January 1940 was of the utmost necessity finally had been accomplished?
49. After your return to Japan from Germany, did you have conversations with Ambassador SHIRATORI in which you discussed various aspects of the Tripartite Alliance, and, if so, when did these conversations take place?  
(Based on page 114 of the interrogation.)
50. Did STAHER, Special Envoy of RIBBENTROP, confer with you in Japan during the summer of 1940, and, if so, in what month did he first talk with you?
51. At this conference did you advise STAHER to consult Foreign Minister MATSUOKA regarding negotiations for a Tripartite Pact?  
(Based on page 110 of the interrogation.)
52. After the negotiations had been opened, were you a guest of STAHER at the German Embassy, at which time STAHER asked your advice regarding the negotiations?  
(Based on page 111 of the interrogation.)
53. Were MATSUOKA or either of the Diplomatic Councillors of the Foreign Office, SHIRATORI and SAITO, present at this conference at the German Embassy?

V

1. Exhibit 559, page 6,417 of the Transcript, is a memorandum between Japan, Germany and Italy, bearing date 20 December 1940, the exact date of your reappointment as Ambassador to Germany, providing for the establishment of a general commission, a military commission, and an economic commission under Article 4 of the Tripartite Pact. The General Commission in Berlin was composed of the German Foreign Minister and the Japanese and Italian Ambassadors. Will you state, as a member of that Commission, what your duties were?
2. Was your Commission also charged with the responsibility of determining in the event of war whether a party to the Pact had been attacked within the meaning of Article 3, i.e., whether the contracting party was the aggressor or not? (Page 115 of the interrogation.)
3. Was this General Commission of which you were a member ever called into session to determine who was the aggressor between a party to the Pact and a third power?
4. Did you receive a joint order from the War Minister, Navy Minister and Foreign Minister at the time of the establishment of the Commission under the Tripartite Pact which changed the existing rule relating to the duties of an Ambassador by providing that in the case of the Ambassador to Germany permission was given to discuss matters of a military nature with German officials if the Japanese Military and Naval Attaches and members of the Military Commission accompanied the Ambassador to such conferences? (Page 262 of the interrogation.)
5. It is a fact, is it not, that you frequently discussed military matters with HITLER, RIBBENTROP and other high-ranking German officials without having present at the conferences any of the officials required to be there under the joint order to which we referred?

The last  
p. 42

He says  
no in his  
affidavit

6. Is it not true that on 2 January, 1942, you informed RIBBENTROP that you had received from your government instructions which permitted you to concentrate in your hands all questions in regard to the general line of cooperation in a common war, and that only questions of details in the military and economic fields would be dealt with by the military and economic member of the special commission under the Tripartite Pact?
7. And did not RIBBENTROP welcome the concentration of authority in your hands because it switched the center of gravity of the Tripartite Commissions to Berlin?  
(Questions 6 and 7 are based on IPS Doc. 4075, Item 9)
8. Is it not true that at a conference with HITLER on 3 January 1942 HITLER stated to you that he would discuss military affairs only with you personally, and did he not at that conference outline to you many secret matters relating to the operations of Rommel in Africa and the operations against Russia on the Eastern front?
9. And did you not tell HITLER at this conference that you were empowered by your government to discuss the prosecution of the war with the German Foreign Minister?
10. Did you not further state to HITLER that while individual questions might be discussed between the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy, it was of prime importance that the principal policy be laid down exclusively by you and the Foreign Minister, and is this not what was actually done?
11. Is it not also true that you stated to HITLER that this same method should be applied to economic and political questions?  
(Questions 6 thru 9 based on IPS Dec. 4096.)

2 questions

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**VI**

1. Did not Japan and Germany, prior to Pearl Harbor, exchange raw materials for use in the wars then being waged by both Japan and Germany?
2. Did not Japan and Germany prior to Pearl Harbor exchange military information and technical knowledge?
3. You state on page 4 of your affidavit that you approved the exchange of culture between Japan and Germany. Did this exchange of culture include scientific knowledge and inventions useful in the waging of war?
4. Is it not true that many German agents migrated to Japan between 1938 and 1942 in the guise of businessmen, technicians, advisors, teachers and tourists for the purpose of instructing the Japanese in the Nazi way, economically, politically, and militarily, and did you not encourage these migrations?
5. Did Joseph A. MEISSINGER, Colonel in the Gestapo Branch of the German police, come to Japan for work here?
6. Was Von DURKHEIM sent to Japan during this period for the purpose of strengthening the so-called cultural cooperation between the two countries?
7. Was HELFRICH, President of the Hamburg American Shipping Lines, sent to Japan in 1940 for the purpose of obtaining close cooperation with Japanese economic circles?
8. Was Rheinhardt SCHULTZE, a leader in the Hitler Youth Movement, sent to Japan for organization work here?

9. Were not many officers in the Japanese Army and Navy sent to Germany for study and were not many of them students at the University of Munich?
10. Was Karl HAUSHOFER known as the leading authority in Germany on Japan, and were his works read and studied by Japanese students in Germany and in Japan?  
*is it not true that HAUSHOFER's theory of geopolitics constituted the basis of Nazi philosophy of geographic expansion?*
11. Is it not true that HAUSHOFER's theory of geopolitics constituted the basis of Nazi philosophy of geographic expansion?
12. Did he not teach the doctrine that small nations had no right to exist and the existence of small states was a sign of degeneration?
13. Did he not teach the doctrine that consolidation of power in Central Europe should be in one great nation?
14. Did he not teach the doctrine that the political power of Germany should follow German culture wherever found?
15. Was not HAUSHOFER the originator of the Nazi doctrine known as Deutschum im Ausland, Germanity Abroad, and was not the Nazi annexation and subjugation plan based on his teachings?
16. When the Nazi Party came into power was not HAUSHOFER made President of the Deutsche Akademie, which was nothing more than a special research bureau for the advancement of Nazi principles?
17. In this school was there not mobilized an activist group of scientists and scholars who disseminated propaganda to other countries?

18. Was not HAUSHOFER also a member of the academy for German law, "Akademie für Deutsches Recht," which elaborated the specific laws for the control of occupied areas? *Suggested*

19. Did HAUSHOFER, while Military Attache to Japan and while engaged in the teaching of geopolitics in Germany, become acquainted with many Japanese of rank and position?

20. On page 12 of your affidavit you state that in the winter of 1936 a Japanese Home Office official came to Germany to study measures for controlling Communism. Who was that individual, and did he meet HAUSHOFER or attend his lectures?

21. Do you know whether any of the following-named persons who were members of the Japanese Institute for Research into Total War studied in Germany and were acquainted with HAUSHOFER:

KANIKAWA, Hikomatsu

OSAKA, Junji

FUJIMURA, Ryosuke

ENDO, Kiichi

OKAMOTO, Kiyofuku

22. Was not the Institute for Research for Total War, and its parent organization which was a bureau of resources research the counterpart in Japan of the HAUSHOFER school in Germany?

23. I believe that you were acquainted with HAUSHOFER as early as 1922 and that you entertained him socially on every occasion that you went to Munich. Is that not true?

24. Did you ever visit the home of HAUSHOFER at Kolberstrasse, Munich?



25. Did not HAUSHOFER on many occasions confer with Japanese nationals at the Foreign Ministry in Berlin?

26. Is it not true that HAUSHOFER wrote a book entitled "Japan Builds Her Empire," and dedicated it in the following language: "The General Baron Takeo Kikuchi, Ryosuke Kamimura, Baron Hiroshi Oshima, the most loyal among my Japanese friends."?

VII

1. In your news article of January 1940, Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_\_, you referred to the possibility that the Soviet Union desired to reach a rapprochement with Japan in the Far East after the conclusion of the German-Russian non-aggression pact. Do I correctly understand from this that in January 1940, you favored a rapprochement between Japan and U.S.S.R.?
  2. Shortly after your return to Germany on your second mission as Ambassador did you learn of the probability of an attack by Germany on Russia?
  3. Did you not have a conference with HITLER in February or March, 1941, in which HITLER advised you that Germany would probably attack Russia? berlin
  4. As a matter of fact, did you not in March 1941 tell YOKOI, your Naval Attache, of a conference you had with HITLER in which he told you that Germany probably would attack Russia? 11
- 4A and 4B - See Page 40.
5. Aside from any direct statement to you by German officials on this matter, did you not have reason to believe from the concentration of large bodies of troops on the Russian border and the extensive military preparations then being made, that Germany would probably attack Russia?
  6. (If denied) Did you not state to Mr. Hyde in your interrogation on 25 February 1946 as follows:  
"A. .... Sometime in April 1941, it came to the notice of practically everybody in Germany that German troops were being moved in great numbers to the Eastern front. This fact was quite obvious and without having to receive news of it from any special sources one could see with one's own eyes that something was going on. There was much talk floating around Germany at the time and a good many rumors arose. The other day I went ahead of my

6 - continued:

story and answered your question regarding my talk with MATSUOKA on the train when he was leaving Berlin. This talk was the result of my observations of these troop movements, and my statement to him regarding the necessity of going slowly on this proposed non-aggression pact with Russia was based on my idea that German-Soviet relations were coming to a turning point. Of course, by this I do not mean that I felt that war was imminent, but both MATSUOKA and I felt that perhaps after Germany had cleared up matters on the Western front it was her intention to turn her thoughts to the East. I had no opposition in mind so far as the actual non-aggression pact was concerned, but I felt that no large concessions should be made in order to simply bind the pact as quickly as possible. It was my feeling that before any such concessions were made Japan should closely scrutinize the changing trend of events in so far as German Soviet relations were concerned." (P. 183)

*Could this be a question?*

7. Did you not consider at that time that while Germany had seemed to desire Japanese-Russian friendly relations conditions were changing in regard to German-Russian relations, and so it would be best to think things over carefully before making a non-aggression pact with Russia?

(Page 151-2 of the interrogation)

8. (If denied) Did you or did you not make this statement to Mr. Hyde in your interrogation of 20 February 1946?

about  
"A. Although I wish to go back and explain more fully these matters which have a direct bearing upon what I said to MATSUOKA in the train, in substance it was that while Germany had seemed to desire Japanese-Russian friendly relations, conditions at the time were changing in regard to German-Russian relations and so it would be best to think things over carefully before making a non-aggression pact with Russia if it entailed the granting of heavy concessions."

(Page 151-2 of the interrogation)

9. Having that opinion, did you not discourage MATSUOKA at the time - you accompanied him on the train to the German border from entering into a non-aggression pact with Russia?
10. Did MATSUOKA communicate with you from Moscow advising that the pact could be put through without excessive concessions?
- 4A. Did you not have a conference with WEISACKER May 17, 1941, with regard to MATSUOKA's statement/Ott to the effect that Japan would attack the U.S.S.R. in case of a Russo-German war, at which time WEISACKER asked you whether or not Foreign Minister MATSUOKA understood the true state of affairs between Germany and Russia when he returned from his stay in Germany?
- 4B. Did you not reply at that time that since the Foreign Minister had many interviews with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP during his stay in Germany you had no doubt that MATSUOKA was aware of the real relationship between Germany and Soviet Russia and in fact you notified MATSUOKA of this conversation on May 20, 1941, is that not true?  
(Exhibit 1075, pp. 9927-8.)

VIII

1. After MATSUOKA's return to Japan in April 1941, were you aware that talks were conducted between Japan and the United States? 7 1
2. Did you discourage MATSUOKA from conferring with the United States?
3. Did you learn that MATSUOKA proposed to make a visit to the United States? 7 2  
Crosby
4. Did you take it upon yourself to express disapproval of that contemplated action?
5. Did you not also oppose the diplomatic policy of MATSUOKA in entering into an agreement with the United States? 2
6. Did you use the opinions of the General Staffs of Germany and Italy in attempting to influence MATSUOKA to abandon his policy with regard to the United States?
7. Did you criticize MATSUOKA for asserting that it was not necessary for you to report to him the opinions of the staffs of Germany and Italy?
8. Did you not remind MATSUOKA that on his recent visit to Germany he had said as his personal opinion that Japan was going to attack Singapore?
9. Did you not inform MATSUOKA that in your opinion Japan would lose the chance to establish her right for leadership in East Asia if Japan concluded the anticipated agreement with the United States? + 3
10. Did you not submit to MATSUOKA two plans admittedly prepared by you to take care of the German viewpoint, one of which contemplated the refusal of the American proposal, and the other of which would have bound the United States to abandon "convoy" patrol lines? + 4

11. Did you not remind MATSUOKA that when he came to Germany all the people in Germany welcomed him and delighted in the strengthening of the Axis, but that since the Japanese-United States' negotiations came directly after this occasion, the feeling that Germany had been betrayed was very strong?
12. Did you not also remind MATSUOKA that the European war was developing favorably for Germany and Italy and in a few months very important developments were expected? *note that* 5 *London*
13. Did you not also urge upon MATSUOKA that if at that time Japan should lose the confidence and trust of Germany and Italy, who would become the leaders in Europe, it would be very unfavorable for Japan? *T*
14. Did you not inform MATSUOKA that his policy was a two-faced diplomacy which would lead Japan to an absolute international isolation during the critical period which may arise after the war?
15. Did you not also explain to MATSUOKA your apprehension that should Japan lose this opportunity to expand southward and the possibility of attacking Singapore, she would invite the contempt of not only America and England but also Germany and Italy? *6*
16. Did you not charge that if MATSUOKA persisted in his policy it would mean that Japan had abandoned her great mission to establish a new order in the Great East Asia? *7*
17. Did you not call upon MATSUOKA to establish the idea of the Tripartite Pact by upholding the principle that Japan is to facilitate the battle of Germany and Italy against Britain? *8*
18. With regard to these matters I have asked you about did you not state to MATSUOKA "I beg you to take these circumstances under consideration"?

(Exhibit 1075, pp. 9918-9932.)

*tel Norway*

19. Did you take it upon yourself to express to MATSUOKA your disapproval of his contemplated visit to the United States in April or May 1941?
20. I hand you Prosecution Document 1383, telegram No. 480, purporting to be a telegram of May 4, 1941, from you to the Foreign Minister, marked "Secret." Will you please examine it and state whether or not it was sent by you or under your direction? (If identified, offer in evidence and read.)
21. Who was your Military Attache in May 1941?
22. Did you discuss with him your objection to MATSUOKA's proposed visit to the United States?
23. Did your Military Attache, with your approval or acquiescence convey your views to his superior in Tokyo?
24. Did you convey any information to your Military Attache such as would lead him to the conclusion that there was a possibility of your resignation as an ambassador?
25. I hand you IPS Document 1383-B(9) and I ask you if it is the original telegram of May 5, 1941, from your Military Attache to the Assistant Chief, Tokyo? (Offer in evidence and read.)
26. Does the telegram bear the official seal of the Foreign Office and is it initialed in ink by Vice Minister OHASHI?
27. I hand you new Prosecution Document 1383, telegram No. 373, and I ask you whether you can identify it as a telegram from Foreign Minister MATSUOKA to you? (Offer in evidence and read.)
28. Subsequent to May, did you further advise MATSUOKA to break off negotiations with Washington?
29. Did you not, on or about July 12, 1941, state to WEISacker that you had recently advised MATSUOKA again simply to break off negotiations with Washington?  
(IPS Dec. 4025, Item 11)

30. Did not the Japanese-American negotiations fail at this time?



IX

- 41571
1. Did you discuss plans with RIBBENTROP on 23 February 1941 for close cooperation in all spheres of activity in carrying on the war?  
Ex 571
  2. And were not plans discussed, particularly with regard to news services and newspapers?  
Ex 571
  3. And was it not suggested by RIBBENTROP that the cooperation should be in the same manner as was already being done in Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria?
  4. And did you not state that you intended to create a plan for more intensive Japanese propaganda?
  5. And to that end was not a newspaper division set up within the Italian Embassy and Minister SAKUMA brought over from Japan to have charge of it?  
(Pages 252-3 of interrogation.)
  6. Toward the last of March, 1941, did you discuss a general plan of extension in Japan of the propaganda idea with Ambassador OTT who had been called back to Germany for the MATSUOKA conferences?  
(The above questions based on Exhibit 571, EP \_\_\_\_\_)
  7. In your discussions with OTT did you not approve the plan drafted by the Propaganda Section of the German Foreign Ministry which provided in part for the building of a demonstration hall in Tokyo?
  8. Was not the purpose of intensification of propaganda to improve the minds of the Japanese people for cooperation between Japan and Germany?

9. Did you have a detailed conversation with RIBBENTROP shortly prior to 4 January 1942 regarding the question of cooperation between the Axis Powers and Japan in the field of propaganda directed especially toward India and the Arabian countries? (IPS Dec. 4075, Item 4.)
10. Incidentally, did you have more conferences than that of 23 February 1941 with RIBBENTROP prior to 27 February 1941?
11. (If he says there were no other conferences) I hand you Prosecution Dec. 1593 and ask you if it is a telegram which you sent on 27 February 1941 to MATSUOKA? (Offer and read in evidence.)
12. Was not a joint military commission set up in December 1941 to decide matters of tactics and operations?
13. Were not Admirals NOMURA and YOKI and Lt. General BANZAI, Japanese members of this Commission, and Field Marshal KEITEL and Admiral DORNITZ German representatives on this Commission?
14. Then there was the military agreement between Japan, Germany and Italy of 18 January 1942, dividing the world into zones for military and naval operations, was there not?
15. Is it not true that a common code was arranged for the use of the Japanese and German navies?
16. In a conference between you and HITLER on 3 January 1942, were you informed of the German invention of a highly armor-piercing hollow grenade, and was it not offered by HITLER to Japan for use by Japan?

17. Did HITLER stress the importance of the exchange of military discoveries between Japan and Germany?
18. Did you not enthusiastically agree with this and did you not state that the Japanese Army was skilled in landing operations, having carried them out for fifty years, and offer to place at the disposal of the German Army Japanese officers who were experts on landing operations?
19. Did you not express the opinion that the Japanese Army would seek to occupy Burma and you considered it important in this connection that Germany and Japan make a joint declaration against India?
20. And did you not say that once English bases in India were eliminated Japan could easily send convoys to the Persian Gulf?
21. Did not HITLER emphasize that Japan should secure the southwest Asia region to prevent England from using Australia and New Zealand as centers from which to fight Japan?
22. Did you not agree with this opinion of HITLER's?
23. And did you not add that Japan must also secure the north region and would occupy bases in the Aleutians in the spring?
24. And did you not at the conclusion of the conference express the hope that Germany and Japan would enter into close cooperation after the war?
25. In this conference did HITLER not state that this was probably the first time in history that two so powerful military powers that were situated far apart from each other should be engaged in battle jointly?

26. And in this connection did he not state that this situation created the possibility through exact timing of operations of producing a smoke screen over military activity which must have a considerable reaction on the enemy as the latter would be forced as a result to keep shifting his main effort and in this way to scatter his forces hopelessly?
27. Did HITLER not also state that Germany and Japan should devise common plans for 1942-1943?  
(Questions 16 through 27, inclusive, based on IPS Dec. 4096.)
28. Did you not tell RIEBENTROP on 6 March 1943, that in the near future Japanese officers, clothed as couriers and Embassy secretaries, would come to Berlin from Tokyo to deliver particulars concerning the military situation and Japanese forces and plans?  
(Exhibit 812-A, Transcript page 8014, part not read in evidence.)
29. (If statement denied, confront witness with unread portion as follows:)  
"At the end of March or early April of this year, a few officers, cloaked as couriers and Embassy Secretaries, will come here from Tokyo in order to deliver particulars concerning the situation and Japan's military forces and plans. He will be able to draw a better picture /of matters/ there when these have arrived. The ambassador emphasized again that Japan was unwilling to take up a defensive attitude."
30. Did these officers come to Berlin?
31. Were these plans and particulars delivered to the German Government?  
(Exhibit 812-A, page 3, portion not read.)

32. In your conference with HITLER on 3 January 1942, did he discuss with you the naval war situation in the Atlantic and did he not state that the most important task was to get the submarine war going at full blast?
33. Did he not mention that merchant vessels were being sunk by Germany without warning in order that as many as possible of the crew should perish?
34. And did he not express the idea that this course would cause America to have difficulty in recruiting crews because of the time required to train seafaring personnel?
35. And did not Hitler say that he had ordered his submarines to surface after torpedoing and shoot up the life boats?
36. Did you not concur in these statements of Hitler and did you not say that the Japanese were forced to follow these methods?
37. Did you not have a conference with RIBBENTROP on 9 July 1942, at which he urged Japan to send more submarines as well as cruisers and other large units to the Indian Ocean to intercept supplies for the British in Egypt?
38. Did you not state that the English and American reinforcements to Egypt were being impeded by the activity of Japanese submarines?
39. Did you not agree to report RIBBENTROP's suggestions to Tokyo to take measures in the immediate future which would affect enemy transportation to Egypt?
40. Did you recommend acceptance of these suggestions?
- (Questions 37 thru 40 based on IPS Dec. 525.)

41. Were you informed that prior to February 26, 1943, Admiral NOMURA stated to German officials that the Japanese Navy was planning to use submarines against merchant shipping and that he had asked you and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP to request that two German submarines be put at Japan's disposal?

42. Were you also informed that HITLER favored the idea of releasing one submarine, but that he would not decide the matter until he was asked directly?

(Questions based on FUHRER CONFERENCES 1943, page 14, SubSection 4.)

✓ 43. At a conference with RIBBENTROP on 6 March 1943, did you not state that the Japanese Government intended to increase the submarine shipping attacks and would immediately set about making the necessary preparations?

✓ 44. And did you not mention the fact that Japanese submarines were at that time not suited for shipping attacks and that the Navy had to revamp its construction program?

✓ 45. And did you not state that the Japanese Navy would be grateful if it could obtain two submarines as models from the German Navy?

✓ 46. And did you not tell him that you had discussed the new submarine construction program with Admirals NOMURA and YOKOI?

✓ 47. And did you not tell him that Admiral NOMURA had been ordered back to Japan and suggest that it was important that he, NOMURA, discuss all the details with Admiral DOENITZ before his departure?

48. And did not the Foreign Minister agree with you and state that he would speak to Admiral DOENITZ?

✓ 49. Later, on the same day, 6 March 1943, did not RIBBENTROP again summon you to a conference and explain to you that the German Government after consultation with the Navy was prepared to place one or two U-boats at the disposal of the Japanese Navy?

50. And did he not state at that time that the German Government offered these submarines on condition that the Japanese Navy tackle immediately submarine construction on a large scale and carry mass production into effect?

51. And did you not state that the Japanese Government was prepared to do this?

✓ 52. And did you not express the gratitude of the Japanese Navy and state that you would now direct Admiral NOMURA to discuss the details of this matter with the German Navy?

(Questions 43 thru 52 based on IPS Dec. 2312, portions of which were introduced as Exhibit 812-A, Record page 8014, but the paragraphs on which the above questions were based were omitted from the translation of this document.)

✓ 53. At a conference between you, RIBBENTROP and Admiral NOMURA at Fusel on 18 April 1943, did not Admiral NOMURA inform RIBBENTROP that a plan was completed in October of 1942 to undertake a large naval operation in the Indian Ocean but that this plan had been frustrated by the American attack off the Solomon Islands?

54. Did not RIBBENTROP explain to Admiral NOMURA the views of the Fuehrer concerning tonnage warfare?

55. And did he not mention the discussions which had taken place between you and RIBBENTROP concerning the necessity of Japan conducting tonnage warfare?

is referring on page 34, 35 of the transcript  
you said that certain activities were going on in the Navy

56. And did not NOMURA reply that this change of policy was exactly  
what was needed by the Japanese Navy?

57. And did not Admiral NOMURA state that plans and preparations for  
construction of new models had already been made and that the new  
U-boats were expected to be ready for use by the end of the year?

(Questions 53 thru 57 based on IPS Doc. 520, introduced as  
Exhibit 839, Record page 8174, for identification only. Material  
involved here was not introduced as an excerpt.)

58. Among other things, did you not present a plan providing for a German  
credit to Japan of 2 billion yen and a provision of 20 million  
yen in order to enable Japan to obtain machinery, equipment, and  
factory equipment?

59. Did you advise Ambassador in 1936 conference that German investment  
could be entered in the exploitation of the South Seas?

(Questions 58 to 59, inclusive, are based on IPS Document 400, Item B.)

60. In presenting this plan of credit did you not say that it was  
initiated and without authority of your government?

61. Did not the matter on 20 January 1936 require your authority  
to initiate this plan?

62. Did not Ambassador, head of your Economic Division, inform WASH on  
24 January 1936 that you had presented a draft of the economic treaty  
of assistance without the approval of your government because you  
believed that it would satisfy the credit agreement if the  
assent of the Japanese Government would have to be obtained first  
(IPS Document 400, Item B, 2, and B.)

63. At a conference on 25 June 1937, did you not differentiate between  
economic cooperation between the European-African sphere under the  
leadership of Germany and Italy on the one side and the East Asia  
sphere under the leadership of Japan on the other side?



58. In testifying on cross examination, page 34,147 of the transcript, you stated that economic matters were entirely in the hands of economic experts and on the following page you testified that you had almost no knowledge of economics at all. As a matter of fact, General OSHIMA, were you not very active in the field of economic cooperation in the pursuit of the war?
59. At the conference of 2 January 1942 with Ribbentrop, did you not present a memorandum suggesting certain concrete negotiations regarding mutual use of German and Japanese economic power?
60. Among other things, did you not present a plan providing for a German credit to Japan of 1 billion Yen and a provisional credit of 50 million Yen in order to enable Japan to obtain machines, armaments, and factory equipment?
61. Did you advise Ribbentrop in this conference that German interests would be considered in the exploitation of the South Seas?

(Questions 58 to 61, inclusive, are based on IPS Document 4075, Item 9.)

62. In presenting this plan of credit did you not act purely on your own initiative and without authority of your government?
63. Did not OTT and WOHLTAT on 23 January 1942 question your authority to initiate this plan?
64. Did not MATSUSHIMA, head of your Economic Division, inform WIEHL on 24 January 1942 that you had presented a draft of the economic treaty of assistance without the approval of your government because you believed that it would unduly delay the credit agreement if the consent of the Japanese Government would have to be obtained first?  
(IPS Document 4045, Items 2, 3, and 5.)
65. At a conference on 23 March 1942, did you and Ribbentrop discuss future economic cooperation between the European-Africa sphere under the leadership of Germany and Italy on the one side and the East Asia sphere under the leadership of Japan on the other side?

66. Did you not contemplate in the course of this discussion a great economic agreement between the three powers aimed at establishing provinces for Japan, Germany, and Italy and the exclusion of the United States as much as possible?  
(IPS Document 1230 - part material here is not in evidence. Complete translation will be found in folder from which Exhibit 807 was introduced.)
67. At a conference between you and Ribbentrop on 9 May 1942 was the position taken by Ribbentrop that the Tripartite Pact was the starting point for all political and economic discussions and plans for international relations even after the period of the war?
68. Did you not enthusiastically concur in this statement?
69. Did you not envisage the waging of war with the United States in the field of economy by Japanese, German and Italian boycott thereby enforced after the shooting war had ended?
70. Did you discuss the facilitation of the economic cooperation between the two great economic areas defined in the Tripartite Pact by the establishment of a strict central of economy?
71. What decision was reached as to the method of controlling the economy of the independent states?
72. Did you not plan that the Axis powers should exert influence on the independent states in such a way as to compel regulation of their economy?
73. Did you not agree that insofar as the United States and Central and South American countries were concerned a binding arrangement should be made that after the war the resumption and continuation of economic relations should only take place after mutual agreement between Japan, Germany, and Italy.

*Concur*  
*Concur*

74. Did not you and Ribbentrop agree to examine into these matters more painstakingly and write up the further shaping of the present treaty proposals in detail so that another conversation could be held in a few days?  
(Question 67 to 74, inclusive, are based on IPS Document 1373.)
75. Did not Ribbentrop at this conference suggest that wherever economic independent forces within the two major economic spheres are still existent, such as big firms like the Mitsui, and are adverse or rebellious against the contemplated regulations, it would be necessary to take measures to eliminate such problems?
76. Did you agree to these suggestions?  
(Have Steiner check IPS Document 1373 for matters relating to questions 75 and 76.)
77. I hand you Exhibit 50 in the Japanese text, which is an announcement by the board of information of the agreement between Japan and Germany concerning economic cooperation. (It was not read in evidence.) Will you glance at this announcement and tell me whether you signed the agreement referred to therein in behalf of Japan and the date you signed it?
78. Was there a secret protocol attached to this agreement which was not made public?
79. Did this secret agreement contain clauses relating to the following matters which I have questioned you about?
- 1) The 1 billion Yen credit which you suggested as early as January 2, 1942?
  - 2) Resumption of economic relations with certain other countries only after mutual consultation?
  - 3) Influencing of the economy in the remaining independent states in their respective economic spheres?
  - 4) Consultation before making agreements with independent states regarding economic matters?

80. I hand you IPS Document \_\_\_\_\_ and ask you if it is the secret protocol to the treaty regarding economic cooperation between Germany and Japan (if identified offer in evidence and read portions).

1. Near the top of page 36 of your affidavit, you state that Germany first officially requested Japanese participation in the war against Russia in the summer of 1943. Was it not in the summer of 1942?
2. (If Witness denies) I will read you from your interrogation by Mr. Hyde on 5 March 1946 as follows: "In the summer of 1942 Germany officially requested Japan to enter into the Soviet war". Does this not refresh your memory as to the correct time of the making of the official request?
3. Were you not in fact in favor of a Japanese attack on Russia prior to the summer of 1942?
4. Prior to the making of the official request did you have numerous conferences with various German officials regarding the progress of the war against Russia?
5. On or shortly prior to 17 November 1941, did you have a conference with Erdmandorf relating to the war against Russia?
6. Let me refresh your recollection. Do you not recall and is it not a fact that on this occasion you told Erdmandorf that you had no information whatever concerning the intention and the deliberations of the Japanese government, but according to your own personal opinion that in view of the time of year Japanese military operations against the Soviet Union could take place only on a limited scale? (Exhibit 655 - part referred not read in evidence. Check to see if admitted in evidence.)
7. In a conference with Ribbentrop on 23 March 1942, did not Ribbentrop mention to you that an advance of Japanese armies against Vladivostok in the direction of the Bikal Sea area would be advisable if Japan felt that she was strong enough?

8. Did you not fully agree with Ribbentrop's suggestion and state that although you had received no official communique of the Japanese intentions you favored an advance against Vladivostok within East Siberia within the year as you were of the opinion that a more opportune time would never arrive again?  
(Last questions based on IPS Document 1230 which is not in evidence.)
9. In a conference with WEIZSACKER on 21 April 1942, did you not state that as a matter of course it seemed to you that Japan should attack the Russians in East Asia?
10. In this conference, did you not assure Weissacker that you were working hard to put an end to the wholly unnatural situation in which Japan was still living in peace and close neighborliness with the Russian enemy so furiously engaged by Germany?  
(The last two questions based on IPS Document 4033, Item 15.)
11. Was not the final request for Japanese entry into the Russo-German war made in a conference between you and Ribbentrop on 9 July 1942?
12. Upon receiving this official request, did you not state that you were well pleased with developments in Russia and North Africa and that you, yourself, were convinced of the imperative-ness of a Japanese attack on Russia?
13. Did you not indicate to Ribbentrop that you were very enthusiastic over the idea and that you would immediately report the request to Tokyo?  
(11 to 13, inclusive, are based on IPS Document 525.)

14. Did you not continue to express your personal approval of a Japanese attack upon Russia and did you not continue to present your personal views to Tokyo in favor of such an attack?
15. On 30 July 1942, did you convey to RIBBENTROP the Japanese reply to the official request for participation in the Russo-German war?
16. Was the reply favorable or unfavorable?
17. On this occasion did you advise RIBBENTROP that you had cabled Tokyo details of your last talk with RIBBENTROP and had also added your own point of view, namely, that an early intervention against Russia and intensive action to paralyze English shipping in the Indian Ocean was proper?
18. Did you not on this occasion state to RIBBENTROP that you personally share Germany's understanding that today an uniquely favorable opportunity presented itself to Japan to deal a blow to the Russians, and moreover the Japanese Army had always advocated the opinion that such action against Russia was necessary?
19. Did you not also advise RIBBENTROP that undoubtedly there were various opinions in Japan on this matter and that you did not consider the answer was final?
20. Did you not further state that you had proposed again and again to utilize the opportune moment and that this would be borne in mind in Japan?
21. Did you not also state that in spite of the large operations in the South you favored conducting a thrust against Russia too?

22. Did you not close your remarks at this conference with the assurance that in your opinion the advance to the North was Japan's fateful question which you had always reiterated to your government?
23. At a conference with RIBBENTROP on 6 March 1943, did you not advise RIBBENTROP that although you did not know the intentions of the military leaders in your Fatherland, nevertheless you knew that for a long time Japan had the intention of turning against Russia?  
(If denied, refer to Exhibit 813-A, page 8,018 of the Transcript.)
24. At a conference between you and RIBBENTROP at Fusel on 18 April 1943 did you not state that you knew the Japanese Embassy in Sophia had reported to Tokyo rumors about a separate peace between Germany and Russia, in consequence of which you had arranged for all such telegrams from Sophia to be given to you and that you had taken measures against its repetition?  
(This is part of the document of which Exhibit 839 is an excerpt.)
25. Did you receive in September, 1944, an instruction from your government suggesting conclusion of a separate peace between Germany and Russia?
26. In your conversation with RIBBENTROP regarding this matter did you not state that Japan would fight on Germany's side till the final victory?  
(Based on IPS Document 1230, telegram of 7 Sept. 1944.)

*Should we not have  
mentioned from [unclear] 3  
[unclear] - my memo 26 Nov 47  
7.3*



**XI**

1. Did you approve of and favor Japanese exploitation of French Indo-China in September, 1941?
2. Did you approve of and favor Japanese establishment of naval and air bases in South French Indo-China during September, 1941?
3. Did you consider the action of Japan in French Indo-China in September, 1941, as a step in the establishment of the New Order in East Asia in accordance with the spirit of the Tripartite Pact?
4. I hand you Prosecution Document 3270, which is a bound volume of the daily issues of TOKYO NICHU NICHU newspaper, and I ask you to look at the issue of the 27th day of September, 1941. Will you please state whether or not there appears in that issue a news article datelined Berlin, September <sup>25</sup>~~22~~, 1941, quoting a speech made by you in commemorating the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact?
5. Did you make the speech attributed to you in that news article from Berlin?
6. (If identified) I offer in evidence for identification only IPS Doc. No. 3270, and I tender in evidence Prosecution Doc. 3270 - A, an excerpt therefrom, consisting of the speech referred to. (Read the speech.)
7. Who was instrumental in having the Anti-Comintern Pact prolonged by the agreement which was concluded on the 25 day of November, 1941?

8. Did you have a conference with GAUS on or shortly before 11 October 1941, with regard to the prolongation of the Anti-Comintern Pact in which you advised him that you had wired to Tokyo repeatedly in this matter?
9. Did not you and GAUS discuss the advisability of playing up the prolongation in a great manner?
10. Did you sign the prolongation agreement in behalf of Japan?
11. Was a ceremonial meeting held in commemoration of its signing?
12. Did you speak on that occasion?
13. Did any other Japanese speak?
14. Did you speak in the German language?
15. I hand you IPS Document 4017, entitled "Japanese Speaks German," and I ask you if this is the speech you made on that occasion? (If identified offer in evidence and read.)
16. Were you not of the opinion that the Japanese Government, in establishing the so-called New Order in East Asia under the Tripartite Pact planned to use armed force for its accomplishment?
17. Did you have a conference with ERDMANSDORFF on or shortly prior to 18 October 1941 in which you stated that in your opinion the Japanese Government in concluding the Tripartite Pact must have been certain that the Great East Asiatic Area could be achieved only by an advance with the sword to the South?

18. Did you not further state in this conference that action had been prepared and the question was only when it should be released?
  
19. Did you not further state that the attack may possibly be simultaneous with German operations against Great Britain?
  
20. Did you not also state that it would be advantageous to establish a land connection between Germany and Japan by a Japanese advance into East Siberia and that you had proposed this repeatedly to your government?

(IPS Doc. 4066, Item 13.)

XI (Revised)

1. General OSHIMA, when I was questioning you yesterday regarding <sup>about</sup> your opposition to MATSUOKA's policies regarding the United States, I failed to ask you a question I intended to ask you. Did you not, on or about July 12, 1941, state to WEISACKER that you had recently advised MATSUOKA again simply to break off negotiations with Washington? (IPS Doc. 4025, Item 11.)
2. I will return now to matters involving Indo-China. I was asking you questions yesterday about the request from Tokyo for German pressure to be brought on Vichy France in order to enforce certain demands against French Indo-China. I desire now to go back and ask you whether or not you received a wire from MATSUOKA on 17 February 1941 requesting that you take appropriate measures to bring German pressure to bear upon France to accept Japanese mediation plans in the Indo China-Thailand dispute?
3. I hand you Prosecution Doc. 1157-A and ask you if this is the telegram to which I referred, and whether or not it was received in the Japanese Embassy in Berlin? (If identified offer in evidence and read - If not identified, cross-examine on it.)
4. Did you approve of and favor Japanese establishment of naval and air bases in South French Indo-China during September, 1941?
5. Did you not as early as 12 July 1941 advise WEISACKER that the occupation of certain positions in South Indo-China as a base for aircraft and warships was an urgent Japanese need?  
(Based on French Doc. #477.)
6. Did you not know in September, 1941, of the penetration of Japanese troops into French Indo-China and did you not approve that action?

7. I hand you Prosecution Doc. 3270, which is a bound volume of the daily issues of TOKYO NICHU NICHU newspaper, and I ask you to look at the issue of the 27th day of September, 1941. Will you please state whether or not there appears in that issue a news article datelined Berlin, September 25, 1941, quoting a speech which you made in commemorating the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact? (If identified, offer paper in evidence for identification and offer excerpt in evidence.)
8. Were you not of the opinion that the Japanese Government, in establishing the so-called New Order in East Asia under the Tripartite Pact planned to use armed force for its accomplishment?
9. Did you have a conference with ERDMANSDORFF on or shortly prior to 18 October 1941 in which you stated that in your opinion the Japanese Government in concluding the Tripartite Pact must have been certain that the Great East Asiatic Area could be achieved only by an advance with the sword to the South?
10. Did you not further state in this conference that action had been prepared and the question was only when it should be released?
11. Did you not further state that the attack may possibly be simultaneous with German operations against Great Britain?
12. Did you not also state that it would be advantageous to establish a land connection between Germany and Japan by a Japanese advance into East Siberia and that you had proposed this repeatedly to your government?

(IPS Doc. 4066, Item 13.)

13. Did you not state to ERDMANSDORFF on or shortly prior to 17 November 1941, your personal view that an advance by Japan toward the South was unavoidable, especially because of the pressing need for petroleum?
14. And by advance did you not explain that you meant the seizure of the Island of Borneo above all was necessary?
15. Did not you and ERDMANSDORFF examine a map and determine that Borneo was only 1000 kilometers distant from the part of Indo-China occupied by Japanese troops?
16. Did you not also discuss the nature of the fortifications at Singapore in connection with which you expressed the opinion that an attack on Singapore would be most effective?
17. Did you not further state that in your opinion a Japanese advance against Singapore is to be considered in conjunction with a German advance in the Middle East?
18. Did you not also inform ERDMANSDORFF that the three Japanese infantry divisions on the Island at Hainan, you assumed, were being trained for landing operations and combat in tropical regions?  
(Questions 13-18, inclusive, are based on part of Exh. 655 not read in evidence - Doc. 11-A(6).)
19. I offer in evidence Prosecution Doc. No. \_\_\_\_\_ consisting of pertinent excerpts put to the witness during cross-examination. I do not intend to read them. The document will be processed and circulated as soon as the work can be completed.

20. Who was instrumental in having the Anti-Comintern Pact prolonged by the agreement which was concluded on the 25th day of November, 1941? (7)

21. Did you have a conference with GAUS on or shortly before 11 October 1941 with regard to the prolongation of the Anti-Comintern Pact in which you advised him that you had wired to Tokyo repeatedly about this matter?

22. Did not you and GAUS discuss the advisability of playing up the prolongation in a great manner?

23. Did you sign the prolongation agreement in behalf of Japan?

24. Was a ceremonial meeting held in commemoration of its signing?

25. Did you speak on that occasion?

26. Did any other Japanese speak?

27. Did you speak in the German language?

28. I hand you IPS Document 4017, entitled "Japanese Speaks German," and I ask you if this is the speech you made on that occasion?  
(If identified offer in evidence and read.)

DEFENSE DOCUMENT 2854

The Tribunal, upon objection by the Prosecution has heretofore rejected excerpts from Ribbentrop's testimony at Nuremberg, Record 24,587 to 24,600.

*However* In view of the fact that the first four sentences of the last paragraph of this document were admitted as Exhibit 2692-A, Record 23,557, the Prosecution having made no objection thereto, we do not object to the excerpt now tendered except as to that part which is repetitive of Exhibit 2692-A.



RE: Def. Doc. 2854--Excerpt from Ribbentrop's Testimony at Neurenburg.

The first four sentences of the last paragraph of this document have heretofore been admitted in evidence (Ex. 2692-A, R. 23,557, 19 June 1947, No objection was made by the Prosecution).

An excerpt from Ribbentrop's testimony at Neurenburg was subsequently offered (R. 24,587). After elaborate argument this document was rejected in toto (R. 24,600).

*An excerpt from Neurenburg of Dr. Schmidt  
was admitted over objection - Ex 2703*

*R. 24,747 - 24749*


MEMORANDUM

23 October 1947

FOR: Mr. D. N. Sutton  
FROM: Mr. Floyd W. Cunningham  
SUBJECT: OSHIMA, Hiroshi, Summary of Evidence and SAIONJI Memoirs.

Herewith are original and one copy each of summaries of Defense Evidence applicable to OSHIMA, introduced from 4 August through 21 October 1947, and entries from the SAIONJI-HARADA Memoirs.

A copy of each was delivered to Mr. F. S. Tavener, Jr. October 22, 1947.

  
Floyd W. Cunningham  
Room 379

21 October 1947

Resume by Floyd W. Cunningham

SUMMARY OF DEFENSE EVIDENCESince August 4, 1947Record Page

30,487-507

Exhibit 3316 - January 1939. ITAGAKI, Seishiro, testified on cross-examination that a proposal was presented by von Ribbentrop. He dodged the question as to whether or not this was drawn up by OSHIMA and Ribbentrop, and stated that the proposal did not say that it was not a military alliance.

30,489

He stated that the official instructions sent to the Ambassador when the Japanese proposal was forwarded to Germany was that, although the USSR was to be the object of the proposed pact, the pact may also be applied to other third powers depending upon circumstances or situations.

30,490

He said, "The question as to the application of the use of force against third powers other than the Soviet Union, of course, depended on the circumstances or situation, and it may never be applied at all and, of course, there would be various degrees of application of that -- such measures depending on circumstances. And such matters were decided upon by the Five Ministers' Conference, were incorporated in what may be called the basic Japanese draft, and this was forwarded by the Foreign Minister to the Ambassador, together with instructions." ITAGAKI said that according to what he heard from the Foreign Minister (ARITA) the Ambassadors in the field -- whether it was both of them or only one of them, he thought it was one of them -- communicated his opinions to the central Government before passing the draft on to Germany, that there seemed to be some doubts on certain points and for this reason "We had to hold another conference."

30,499

As to the Government's statement concerning the pact, it was conveyed to the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo, rather than to the Japanese Ambassadors in Berlin and Rome, ITAGAKI said that various discussions were held among them (Government officials) and "although this direct means of presenting the message or note was taken, this course was not taken for the purpose of ignoring our two Ambassadors, but rather to support them. He heard this at the Five Ministers' Conference."

28,491-4

Exhibit 3169 - May or June 1939 (R. 28,491). Witness ARITA, Hachiro, was cross-examined by Prosecution as to the debates at the Five Ministers' Conference as to whether the proposed alliance with Germany and Italy should commit Japan to military action to support Germany and Italy against countries with whom they might be at war, other than Russia. He made no definite reply.

OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

Record Page

28,491-4  
(Continued)

He admitted he knew the late Baron HARADA well and had on many occasions given information to HARADA which he might use on reporting on diplomatic and political developments to SAIONJI.

When asked if it were not true that HIRANUMA, ITAGAKI, and OSHIMA were in favor of giving such military support under the alliance proposed, and that it was opposed by YONAI and himself, the witness stated that it was a fact that he and YONAI were opposed.

28,496-7

He further said he did not know if a draft plan read to him concerning giving political and economic support, and military aid if possible, was sent to Germany in that form, but that it was a matter of course that a compromise plan somewhat to that effect was communicated to "the representation in the field".

28,956-9

ARITA further stated that at the time of the YONAI Cabinet formation, it was understood that it was completely opposed to the Tripartite Pact. Reports had been made to the cabinet of the situation in Europe, but there was no discussion of it. The Ambassador to Berlin when the YONAI Cabinet came into power, he thought, was OSHIMA. This was an important post. The witness retracted his statement that it was OSHIMA when the YONAI Cabinet party came in.

At the time of the HIRANUMA Cabinet, talks regarding the Tripartite Pact were dropped because of the German-Russian non-aggression pact. He thought OSHIMA returned again to Germany after the second KONOYE Cabinet was formed. OSHIMA returned to Japan once, and he thought he returned to Germany at that time. He could not recall who was Minister to Berlin when he became Foreign Minister of the YONAI Cabinet.

28,956-9

He did not know OSHIMA well, but knew KURUSU very well. He did not know what OSHIMA's views toward the Pact were at the outset of the YONAI Cabinet, but did know his views at the time of the previous HIRANUMA Cabinet. The witness thought OSHIMA believed a German-Japanese rapprochement was favorable to Japan. In the witness' recollection, OSHIMA became the Ambassador to Germany midway in the first KONOYE Cabinet and returned to Japan during the ABE Cabinet, which succeeded the HIRANUMA Cabinet.

28,965

He stated he did not know whether RIBBENTROP had stated to special Ambassador SATO that he had long favored cooperation between Germany and Japan, and that the work of he and OSHIMA had borne fruit for both parties.

OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

Record Page

28,992-3

Mr. Cunningham, counsel for OSHIMA, called the Court's attention to Exhibit 121 to show that OSHIMA resigned his post and went into retirement (?) in December 1939, at the time when the ABE Cabinet had succeeded the YONAI Cabinet.

30,336-7

Exhibit 3316, 1939. ITAGAKI, Seishiro, testifying on his own behalf, on direct examination by counsel for OSHIMA, said that with regard to negotiations for the Tripartite Alliance, he never sent a message to OSHIMA in Berlin, nor had he ever sent a telegram to OSHIMA asking him to refrain from taking any action or working on ARITA.

30,517

Exhibit 3316 - 25 August 1939. ITAGAKI, Seishiro, testified on cross-examination that at the Five Ministers' Conference on 25 August 1939, he did not remember whether the question of recalling Ambassadors OSHIMA and SHIRATORI was brought up.

33,904

Exhibit 3340 - July 1940. KIDO, Koichi, testified on direct examination that when MATSUOKA assumed the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, he immediately carried out a big shake-up of diplomatic representatives abroad on the ground that the current difficult situation could not be pulled through by the old court diplomacy. That he conducted personnel affairs in a unique fashion by jettisoning leading career diplomats. Among other ambassadors chosen by him was OSHIMA, Ambassador to Germany. That as a result of MATSUOKA's shake-up the pro-British and pro-American colorings of Japan's diplomatic front began to fade rapidly.

30,926

KIDO said that Prosecution Exhibit 1084, his diary of June 6, 1941, merely showed that he read Ambassador OSHIMA's telegram re the outbreak of war between Germany and the USSR and also MATSUOKA's estimate that this was not so eminent.

31,207

With regard to the alleged conspiracy charged against him in the indictment, KIDO testified that he met OSHIMA and five other defendants for the first time in Sugamo Prison.

27,037-8

Exhibit 3027 - October 1940 to December 1942. Defense witness TANAKA, Shinichi, testified on direct examination by Mr. Shimanouchi, counsel for OSHIMA that while he was Chief of the Operational Planning Division of the General Staff Headquarters, the General Staff, from October 1940 to December 1942, never conveyed its operational plans to OSHIMA, and the witness himself did not personally convey that information individually. These plans were revealed, even in the General Staff, only to those especially connected with them.

OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

Record Page

28,019-22

Exhibit 3146 - 1941. Witness OTT stated that he was the German Ambassador at some of the times when OSHIMA was Ambassador in Germany.

The affiant stated that he made the survey on the possibilities of Japanese attack on Singapore in early 1941, through his own initiative and not in response to any instructions. OSHIMA had no part in the discussions. In all discussions leading up to the Tripartite Pact, no word was said concerning offensive action by the parties. The main purpose was to prevent U. S. entry into the war. OSHIMA took no part in these discussions. The transfer of two submarines was a Navy transaction. The affiant never heard that either Ambassador took part in it. The transfer was of no practical value and actual delivery took place after his tour of duty. At no time during his duty in Japan as attache or ambassador was there any real cooperation between the fighting forces of the two countries.

He was with MATSUOKA on his European tour in 1941. The feeling was cool between MATSUOKA and OSHIMA and no conferences were attended together, except preliminary introductory meetings. After that, OSHIMA attended only informal occasions.

Since the affiant was the ranking German official in Japan at the time of Pearl Harbor, any advance news of the event would have been brought to his attention. It was a complete surprise to him and his staff, and he was officially informed hours after its occurrence. The Germans were never advised of Japanese military or naval plans until after the event. It was the German foreign policy to help settle the conflict between Chiang Kai-shek and Tokyo. Success seemed close at times and the affiant spent considerable time to bring peace to the Far East, but his efforts failed. Germany cherished friendly relations with China and valued her commercial possibilities, but she was never favored over other nations in her commercial dealings with Japan except during the war.

25,726-7

Exhibit No. 2877 - June 1941. Excerpt from KONOYE Memoirs stated that while the complicated negotiations were being conducted a question of special significance was being deliberated upon by the cabinet, namely, whether to continue negotiations indefinitely, or break them off abruptly. And more important still, they were considering whether war with the United States would follow from the breaking off of negotiations.

These negotiations were being participated in by only the highest leaders of the Government, Army, Navy and the Supreme Command. It was progressing to the absolute exclusion

OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

Record Page

25,726-7  
(Continued)

of lesser officials. With the exception of MATSUOKA, all hoped for success of the negotiations and they were conducting it in absolute secrecy to avoid opposition.

News began to leak out however, mostly as a result of MATSUOKA's secret reports to German and Italian Ambassadors. As they began to perceive the general outline of the negotiations, the lesser officials began to disapprove. The Army in particular stiffened its opposition. At this moment the German-Soviet war broke out. While the leaders were able to set aside insistent demands for an immediate war with the Soviet, they had to decide upon the armed occupation of FIC as a consolation prize.

26,677-83

Exhibit 3006 - October 1939 to September 1941. Witness KONDO, Nobutake, testified on direct examination by OSHIMA's counsel that when he was Vice-Chief of Naval Staff, OSHIMA never contacted the navy directly, and the Navy Staff never informed OSHIMA of operational plans. The witness stated that the Japanese Navy had no preparations to move to the south of East Asia, especially Hong Kong, around December, 1939, as shown in Exhibit No. 509. The Japanese Navy had no concrete plans for military advance in September, 1939, and he had never heard or seen that OSHIMA had submitted this proposal to the Navy. Between February and April, 1941, studies with regard to war against England were being made, but there were no concrete plans for preparations for occupying Hong Kong. There were no concrete plans with regard to occupation of the Philippines.

He stated that he was familiar with the statement contained in exhibit No. 576 by Ott that in March, 1941, an inquiry was made of the witness, and it was learned that strong preparations were under way for an attack on Singapore, and they would probably be completed by the end of May. The witness stated he never received any formal consultation. The end of February or the first of March he attended a luncheon given by Admiral Wenneker, and Ott was present. Conversation took place with respect to Singapore, and the witness was asked as to the possibility of an attack on Singapore. The witness replied that if it were an order from Imperial General Headquarters, the Navy, so far as it was concerned, could do it.

In the course of the conversation, the witness stated that an attack on Singapore would be an operation against Britain, and in light of the existing situation, this would also mean operation against the U.S. Japan must devote her full powers to the settlement of the China Incident, and for that reason trouble with any third power must be avoided, and this required the most serious consideration.

OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

Record Page

26,677-83  
(Continued)

In February or March, 1941, the Japanese Navy had no concrete preparations for an attack on Singapore. After October, 1941, the witness was Commander-in-Chief of the Second Fleet, which was undergoing fleet training under the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet. This fleet participated in the Malay, Philippine, and NEI operations. With respect to forming plans for operations in Malay, Philippines, NEI, Singapore and Hong Kong, there were no suggestions from Germany or OSHIMA.

26,118-21

Exhibit - May-November 1941. Defense witness YAMAMOTO, Kumaichi, testified previously (R. 25,908) that in 1940 he was Director of the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs of the Foreign Ministry, and in October 1941 was appointed concurrently Director of the Bureau of American Affairs. (Note: MATSUOKA was Foreign Minister from July 1940 to July 16, 1941.)

On Direct examination by Mr. Shianouchi, Counsel for OSHIMA, YAMAMOTO testified that the Foreign Office did not convey to OSHIMA the decisions of the Imperial Conferences and liaison conferences. A very simple notification was given to him with regard to the fact that the United States negotiations were under way by MATSUOKA in May 1941. When asked whether other notifications were made, he recalled that instructions were sent the end of November with respect to the question of no separate peace. He could recall no other notification to OSHIMA in regard to the United States negotiations.

When asked whether OSHIMA's opinions were taken up in the liaison conferences, the witness stated that reports from the field on the military situation were brought up but other than that OSHIMA did not come up for discussion. OSHIMA's opinion was not brought up for discussion in any form. He recalled that no notice had been sent to OSHIMA on the decision to open war prior to the actual opening of hostilities in the Pacific. At the liaison conference both the Army and Navy agreed with TOGO that there could not be much help or assistance expected from Germany. Instructions were sent to OSHIMA regarding the conclusion of a no separate peace agreement with Germany just before the outbreak of the Pacific war. The proposed agreement for a no separate peace had no connection with Japan's determination for war.

26,586-9

January 18, 1942. On cross-examination by the Prosecution NOMURA said that he did not definitely recall when the negotiations for the military agreement of January 18, 1942, began, but it was a day or two after he received his report on the battles of December 8 that negotiations were begun, on receiving a telegram. Before this there were no telegrams in



OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

Record Page

26,586-9  
(Continued)

connection with this matter. There were no preliminary talks. The telegrams were addressed to the witness and Lt.-Gen. BANZAI, the military attache, from the Navy Minister, War Minister, and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staff. The instruction was signed jointly by the four heads.

Other than the fact that OSHIMA made contact for opening negotiations, he did nothing, since they were to be conducted by the witness and BANZAI with the German Military and Naval authorities, as per instructions. It was true that OSHIMA kept the Navy and Military informed on matters relating to them, and that he saw copies of the telegrams relating to such messages when they were sent.

26,586-9

He had never seen any telegram from OSHIMA in which he threatened to resign in the event his views on the proposed military pact in 1939 were not carried out. There were no occasions when OSHIMA communicated directly with the Army or Navy Chiefs of Staff.

26,571

Exhibit 3000 - January 19, 1942. Defense witness NOMURA, Naokuni, a former member of the Military Committee of the Mixed Technical Commission set up under the Tripartite Pact, testified that in January 1942 the Military Agreement was concluded by Germany, Italy and Japan. Since this was purely a military accord the Ambassador took no part. According to its provisions, Japan was to destroy the enemy in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean east of Longitude 70 degrees east, and Germany and Italy were to destroy the enemy in the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Indian Ocean west of Longitude 70 degrees east.

26,573-6

That while he did not know what the German Navy expected of Japan in connection with Hitler's offer to OSHIMA of a gift of two German submarines to Japan, from what had been explained to him, it originated entirely in Hitler's mind and was utterly unconditional. No request was made for more intensive submarine warfare on the part of Japan. According to OSHIMA, Hitler stated that German submarines had been improved in maneuverability and underwater capacity. Hoping that Japan would be benefited in submarine construction, he wanted to donate two of the new German submarines to Japan. These words were carried in OSHIMA's telegram at that time and the message from Tokyo in reply stated that Japan would accept with gratitude this offer. In the telegram the witness received from Tokyo in those days in connection with bringing these submarines to Japan, no allusion was made to encouraging the submarine warfare; the naval authorities in Tokyo simply instructed him that the primary object of bringing the German submarines to Japan was the contributory effect

OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

Record Page

26,573-6  
(Continued)

that they would have on Japanese submarine-building technique and three German submarine technicians should be brought with them. So far as the Japanese Navy and the witness were concerned it was understood that the offer was made solely along the lines of Hitler's words and no intensified submarine warfare was an entailed condition in the offer.

One of the two submarines was lost enroute and only one of the submarines reaches its destination. However such a difficult problem as the improvement of submarine construction technique could not be solved in a short time. On the other hand, an opinion became prevalent that this type of submarine with its inferior underwater speed would not meet Japanese purposes and an entirely new idea was needed of submarine construction. There was therefore no practical benefit to Japanese submarine operations.

As to the policy of annihilating the crew members of enemy vessels sunk by submarines, nothing was suggested by the Germans. He had never heard of such a suggestion from OSHIMA or anyone else. At the London Disarmament Conference the witness personally participated in the discussion of the problem of treatment of crew members when their ships were sunk by submarines. If he had heard talk of this kind he would have remembered it. No telegram was dispatched by him to Tokyo on this subject.

26,577-82

On direct examination by counsel for OSHIMA, NOMURA further testified that the negotiations for the donation of the submarines to Japan from Germany, took place between OSHIMA and Ribbentrop about the 1st of March, 1943. OSHIMA called on Hitler and during that conversation Hitler made the statement quoted in the witness' affidavit. This meeting took place around the 26th, 27th, or 28th of February, 1943.

He heard from OSHIMA of this talk and the Ambassador telegraphed to Tokyo and requested that the matter be notified to the Minister of the Navy. About four or five days after, around the 5th or 6th of March, the witness received a telegram from the Navy Minister which stated that the Navy would accept Hitler's offer with gratitude and requested that OSHIMA be asked to thank Hitler. The telegram included instructions to the witness to discuss with the German Naval authorities regarding the navigation of the submarines. Hitler was then not in Berlin and so OSHIMA called on Ribbentrop and asked him to convey the thanks.

The question arose between Ribbentrop and OSHIMA for the first time on this occasion. He had heard of the contents of the negotiations between Ribbentrop and OSHIMA. There was no such talk as that about annihilating the crews of sunken merchantmen. He had never heard while in Germany that the German Navy had machinegunned the survivors of sunken enemy merchant vessels.

OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

Record Page

26,577-82  
(Continued)

The witness was connected with the navigation of the two German submarines to Japan and returned on one of them. They had sunk Enemy merchantmen during the cruise. The submarine was under the command of German officers and was operated by German officers and crew. In addition to the witness Commander SUGITA of the Naval Medical Corps was along. Nothing was done to the survivors of the enemy merchantmen.

He had never heard from February through May of 1941 that OSHIMA had discussed with German authorities the problem of attacking Singapore or Hong Kong. He had never heard that OSHIMA had conversations on this subject with the Navy Minister in Tokyo and he had never heard whether OSHIMA made such recommendations to the Tokyo Foreign Office of Naval Ministry.

OSHIMA addressed his telegram for the Foreign Minister and when anything in the telegram involved questions of a military nature at the end he would request that the matter be communicated to the Navy Ministry or to the High Command. OSHIMA always showed the witness any telegrams he sent which had included military subjects. He had no recollection of seeing any telegram in which OSHIMA discussed attacks on Singapore or Hong Kong. The Naval Attache's office in Berlin had never received a copy of such a telegram.

There were occasions when the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin communicated direct with the Naval Ministry in Tokyo.

26,599

November 1942. He said further that on his departure he expressed to Ribbentrop thanks for the offer of the two submarines. As he recalled, OSHIMA was not present then.

On redirect by OSHIMA's counsel, when asked why he had asked OSHIMA to contact the military authorities when he and BANZAI had received instructions from the army and navy, the witness stated that inasmuch as he and BANZAI got direct instructions from Tokyo, they thought of opening negotiations with the German military authorities in accordance with instructions. However, the Germans desired and it was their custom, for all matters relative to diplomacy to be conducted through the Ambassador and the Foreign Ministry. Upon receipt of their instructions, they reported to OSHIMA and asked him to see the Foreign Ministry to make arrangements so they could begin the negotiations. They thought that that was the proper respect to pay to a foreign country to which they were assigned.

26,603

Again on redirect, he stated that OSHIMA had never directly telegraphed any messages to the War or Navy Ministers. If he had said "Yes" to the question put to him by Mr. SHIMANOUCHI, that was a misapprehension. He believed then that the question was, "Did he, the witness, communicate directly with the Navy Minister?"

22 October 1947  
Resume by Floyd W. Cunningham

OSHIMA, Hiroshi

EXCERPTS from SAIONJI-HARADA Memoirs

DATE

12 Jan. 1936:

ARITA visited HARADA on this date and told him that he had received a long letter from SHIRATORI in Sweden urging that the time was ripe to open hostilities against Russia, and that in his opinion Germany and Poland would join Japan at this time.

Ambassador ARITA said, "SHIRATORI had much to say on the situation in Poland, as well as in Germany; he said, 'I found myself in Germany and Poland to see Brigadier General OSHIMA and Brigadier General YAMAWAKI. My private aim was to observe the general nature of European policies. The opinion of these two military attaches was 'the hostility toward Russia does not necessarily mean that Germany and Poland will fight side by side against Russia. Furthermore, when nations, such as Germany and Poland, are geographically related to Russia probably they are not too anxious to fight against her. For these reasons, we can not see any point in Japan, a nation far from Russia geographically, being so excited about this.'" (Part X, Vol. I, Chap. 193, p. 1400-1.)

30 July 1936:

HARADA met Bureau Chief TOGO at the Foreign Ministry. TOGO said, "the army is saying: shake Russia by revealing to her that Japan has a secret pact with a certain country." HARADA says this is because of the increased threat of Russian military preparations; actually, OSHIMA, Military Attache to the Embassy (Berlin), has been carrying on unofficial negotiations for an entente at Berlin. This was gradually revealed from Germany, and when MUSHAKOJI returned to his post after a leave of absence, this story gradually took concrete form. (Part XI, Vol. I, Chap. 211, p. 1554.)

21 Dec. 1937:

HARADA talked to Foreign Minister HIROTA, who told him that General Staff Headquarters wanted to stop the war as soon as possible. He wanted Germany as mediator to ascertain the decision of China. This plan was presented to the Cabinet but they thought that if it was not accepted it would be embarrassing to the Japanese Government.

OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

D A T E

21 Dec. 1937:  
(continued)

On that day HARADA met KIDO, who told him "the whole matter has been disorderly and I said plenty at the Cabinet meeting. I wonder if General Staff Headquarters hasn't committed various stipulations concretely through the German Military Attache in Tokyo." (Part XV, Chap. 259, p. 1891.)

18 April 1938:

A civil engineer of the Home Ministry named KURASHIGE, on the non-official staff of General Staff Headquarters of the Army, told HARADA that the Navy says, "at present the Army General Staff is maneuvering to install Major General OSHIMA, the present Military Attache at the Berlin Embassy, as the Ambassador and attempting to oust Ambassador TOGO." HARADA says that General Ott, the Military Attache at the German Embassy in Tokyo, has been promoted to Ambassador, so the Army desires the same to be done in Berlin. (Part XV, Chap. 269, p. 2084.)

27 June 1938:

HARADA had a conference with Premier KONOYE at his official residence. The Premier commented that ITAGAKI "is rather easily excited." KONOYE was concerned over the problem of the Japan-German economic treaty, saying that it was one that concerned the Ambassador, Major General OSHIMA, who was participating in it of course.

When Vice Admiral GODO went to Berlin as a national representative, Ambassador TOGO took over the problem himself in the midst of negotiations, since it was a part of the foreign policy. This became a source of complaint to the Army and Vice Admiral GODO. Lately they have begun to say "please change TOGO". General Staff Headquarters secretly want to make OSHIMA the Ambassador. KONOYE continued, "As I told you before, OTT, the German Military Attache residing in Tokyo, was promoted to Ambassador to Japan. The Army wants to do the same and make Major General OSHIMA an Ambassador." (Part XV, Chap. 279, 2154.)

6 Aug. 1938:

HARADA had a discussion with SATO concerning the possibility of helping UGAKI (Foreign Minister) and possibly helping him to avoid blunders. SATO said, "I am visiting Foreign Minister UGAKI at his private residence tomorrow morning, the 6th. I won't say anything about other matters. However, I do intend to say 'it is absolutely out of the question to appoint Lt. General OSHIMA as Ambassador to Germany.'" (Part XV, Chap. 285, p. 2205.)

7 Aug. 1938:

SATO reported his first visit to UGAKI to the effect that he had told UGAKI that it was absolutely out of the question to appoint Lt. General OSHIMA as Ambassador. That

OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

D A T E

7 Aug. 1938:  
(Continued)

from the viewpoint of the foreign nations they looked upon UGAKI as an Army General functioning as Foreign Minister, and that he had many generals and admirals in his Cabinet, saying "if you appoint an active service officer as Ambassador to Germany, they will conclude that Japan's foreign policy is being molded by the militarists. This is, of course, true, but, if you do such a thing, the foreign nations, who are already on their guard, will begin increasing their watchfulness. Ambassador OTT is a Major General of the German Army and has become the German Ambassador to Japan. However, this was possible because he was a Nazi. It is a fact that he was an Army officer but for a Lt. General of the Japanese Army to become an Ambassador is a matter of an entirely different nature." UGAKI replied, "I have to consider harmony with the Navy and I won't do such a thing." (Part XV, Chap. 285, p. 2213.)

29 Aug. 1938:

HARADA discussed the Japan-German military pact with Foreign Minister UGAKI at KONOYE's request. UGAKI told him "this is a problem which had been discussed previously between OSHIMA and RIBBENTROP. Germany made a plan and sent it to us. Generally speaking, it called for immediate participation in war and there was no limitation as to the scope or to the opposing nations. In general, Japan was to participate immediately, in case Germany finally went to war with a third nation. The scope was extremely wide, and its force was quite strong. Therefore, we stated as our first condition 'Immediate participation is distressing. We would like to decide after a conference.' The second condition was 'the opponent must be a communistic nation, and the sphere must be limited to Europe and the Far East. Naturally, places like the United States must be omitted, in order not to hurt the feelings of England and the United States we want to lessen incitements as much as possible.'" (Part XVI, Chap. 289, p. 2236.)

7 Sept. 1938:

KONOYE said to HARADA "Foreign Minister UGAKI interferes in personal affairs. It was my intention to send SAITO to London, but he expressed a desire to remain in Japan so I acceded to his wishes and sent SHIGEMITSU to London. TOGO was sent to Russia and Major General OSHIMA was placed on a reserve list and appointed the Ambassador to Germany. SHIRATORI will be sent to Italy. HOTTA will be relieved and will be sent to the United States and SAITO will return. SAWADA (the younger brother) will be appointed the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs." (Part XVI, Chap. 290, p. 2240.)

11 Nov. 1938:

When ARITA became Foreign Minister he had a conference at his home in Mejiro with HARADA, in which he said:

"A troublesome matter at this time is that a military alliance among Japan, Germany and Italy was drawn up by OSHIMA and RIBBENTROP during UGAKI's tenure as Foreign Minister.

OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

D A T E

11 Nov. 1938: That was just before the time of the Czechoslovakian problem. (Continued) At first, this alliance dealt solely with Russia, but according to present reports, it seems to have been extended against England and France as well. When War Minister ITAGAKI explained the situation to Foreign Minister UGAKI, he (UGAKI) did not approve of it there on the spot. ITAGAKI asked UGAKI: 'Do you agree with the substance of the matter?' ITAGAKI wired this information to OSHIMA immediately and OSHIMA has notified RIBBENTROP. This matter is very important and I'm very perplexed. Fortunately, MUSSOLINI said: 'It will be complicated if this problem is settled before March.' Thus, this problem is temporarily shelved at the request from Italy. However, at the Five Ministers' Conference, they definitely decided that the Anti-Comintern Pact is against Communism, namely, against Soviet Russia. Nevertheless, it is surprising that a problem like this was discussed between the Foreign Minister and the War Minister. In fact, this is a very perplexing problem." (Part XVII, Chap. 302, p. 2339.)

21 Dec. 1938: As the result of the telephone conversation I had with KONOYE (21st), we promised to have supper at the Kuwana at around 6:00 p.m. I went there at a little after six and when I met KONOYE, it seemed that KONOYE felt that the plot would be a success. He said: "The opinions of the higher and lower echelons of the Army, Navy and the lower officials of the Foreign Ministry differ completely. The suspicious thing is that the lower echelons of the Army and the Navy are taking it as though the same joint military action is to be taken against England and France as with the Soviet regarding the decision of the Three Ministers' Conference. Since they have been in contact with Ambassador OSHIMA in Germany, OSHIMA relayed this to RIBBENTROP. The officials of the Foreign Ministry are saying that it is not military but simply economic aid, and that it does not concern any joint military action at all. This is where the officials of the Foreign Ministry and the Army and Navy differ. Haven't you heard from Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO what their real intentions are?" I said: "I haven't heard anything as yet." In my conversation with KIDO yesterday, he said that the higher and lower officials of the Army and Navy were alienated but I cannot believe that. Then I told KONOYE: "I will ask YAMAMOTO." (Part XVII, Chap. 308, p. 2395.)

7 Feb. 1939: Just after February 2 the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal told HARADA that the Deputy Chief of Army General Staff (NAKAJIMA, Tetsuzo) came to him and said, "I told Ambassador OSHIMA that the supreme authority of diplomacy is vested in the Emperor. I also cautioned him that it was not desirable to forget one's position and do as Germany says by agreeing with her. Japan has/deciding authority. The Army has no the

OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

D A T E

7 Feb. 1939:  
(Continued)

intention of infringing upon the diplomatic prerogative of the Emperor. Also, the Army does not pay any attention to the rightists because they are absurd. The civil police and KEMPEI have been instructed to take action without hesitation." HARADA says that the reason behind this was that the General Staff Headquarters and the Army were discouraging Premier KONOYE when he expressed his desire for resignation.

The Deputy Chief of the General Staff had a conference with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. The Lord Keeper said, "The Army is absurd! Also, the action taken by OSHIMA is beyond reason. It can be said that he ignored the Emperor's diplomacy prerogative. In the central circles, the Colonels and Lt. Colonels make their decisions and force them on the Ministers and the Chief of the General Staff Headquarters. Furthermore, they even force them on the Emperor! What kind of attitude is this? It is an insincere action and lacking in loyalty. How about thinking more carefully?" According to HARADA he said it in such a blunt manner that the Deputy Chief of the General Staff came to apologize and said, "OSHIMA has no such ideas. I have spoken to him before."  
(Part XVIII, Chap. 313, p. 2338-9)

6 Feb. 1939:

HARADA had a long conversation with the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and Foreign Minister ARITA at the Tokyo Club. The Foreign Minister said that it was necessary "in order to bring the United States and England to the Japanese side they must show speedily that Japan would not banish other nations from China, nor close the 'open door'. The most important matter then was domestic administrations, not diplomacy. He said that they must imitate forcefulness in order to lead the others as a group. He continued 'the other day he said to an Army group "the Foreign Minister does not know anything about the telegram between OSHIMA and the General Staff Headquarters which concerns the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern program. No matter how much and how many years the Army has studied diplomacy, what right do they have to act without the consent of the Foreign Minister?" He asked further reconsideration and the Army said that they were sorry. At any rate, such a situation is distressing but a little more patience is necessary."

At 3 p. m. HARADA met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and told him that former Foreign Minister UGAKI has the greatest responsibility for the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern program. At the same time the appointment of military attache OSHIMA as Ambassador was a complete failure. Foreign Minister ARITA was also saying similar things.



OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

D A T E

6 Feb. 1939:  
(Continued) Quoting HARADA "in times like these the Army is simple minded: Therefore, Germany looks promising. They act as if they want to say that Germany is the only reliable nation. The Foreign Minister (ARITA) was very cautious about problems concerning Germany regardless of their importance because of the above fact.

"Germany tries to take the upper hand in everything and unless we are very cautious, she will try to take advantage of us. ARITA was continually saying this and it was also said that this had been told to the Army. This issue was brought up by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. He was worried over the fact that Ambassador OSHIMA is being used by Ribbentrop as if he were a messenger." (Part XVIII, Chap. 314, pp. 2443-5.)

7 Mar. 1939: HARADA had dinner with Commercial Attache SUDO at the Tokyo Club and listened to his observation of his stay in Berlin and the situation between the Army and German authorities. This was a gathering of members of the KOSEIKAI, of which ten were invited, together with SAKAI and OKABE of the KENYUKAI, and HOSOKAWA of the KAYOKAI.

SUDO spoke of OSHIMA, the Ambassador to Germany, whose actions are hard to distinguish between being German or Japanese. Citing examples, he also spoke of the Embassy employees whose minds became spellbound when they went to Germany, and did everything as Germany proposed.

9 Mar. 1939: On this day HARADA had a conversation with Captain TAKAGI on a morning train ride to Tokyo. He reported to Prime Minister HIRANUMA that Captain TAKAGI advised that if a conference should be held in connection with the reply to be made to Ambassadors OSHIMA and SHIRATORI, it would be best to have all agencies come to a preliminary understanding of matters through negotiation. This was because it would be very inconvenient should the Navy and the Foreign Ministries get together and oppose the Army after the conference was convened. The Prime Minister replied, "Just the same, it is my intention not to take up this matter during the present session of the Diet, but settle after the session is adjourned."

After lunch, HARADA met the Foreign Minister (ARITA), who told him that there was no problem as far as the different agencies coming to an understanding were concerned; that the matter had been reported to the Emperor who had stated that it was in inevitable consequence of circumstances and had sanctioned it; that no matter what the Ambassadors to Rome and Berlin might say the Japanese Government could not cancel its decision; that all "we" have to do is to change the Ambassadors if they are going to rush to conclusions and say that the decisions of the Japanese Government will not do.

OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

D A T E

9 Mar. 1939:  
(Continued)

He further said, "As for the transfer of Ambassadors, I would like to carry it out after the close of the present session of the Diet. In all cases, we wired back instructions to both (Ambassadors) to do as recommended by the Japanese Government. In all likelihood, the Premier is of the same opinion." (Part XIX, Chap. 317, pp. 2467-9.)

23 Mar. 1939:  
(?)

The Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau inquired of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal if it would be possible to conclude something in the line of a Tripartite Military Pact without causing a change in the cabinet. As the attitude of the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau (Machijiri) was very impertinent, it seems that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal quite severely reprovved him in regard to the Army's modus operandi, as well as the attitude of the two Ambassadors. (Part XIX, Chap. 318, pp. 2470-1.)

16 Mar. 1939:

HARADA had dinner with Foreign Minister ARITA and MATSUDAIRA, Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, at the KUWANA, and discussed the decision of the Five Ministers' Conference in connection with the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact, as well as Germany's high-handed attitude. ARITA appeared perturbed and said, "In short, the fact that our military personnel has been saying to the German Government that Japan can not stand alone has caused much damage. This is why Germany always comes out in a high-handed manner and our army personnel swallows the whole matter without any reasoning. As I said before, it is very distressing to have people such as Ambassador OSHIMA send wires which make it difficult to comprehend whether he is a Japanese Ambassador or a German one." (Part XIX, Chap. 318, p. 2475.)

19 Mar. 1939:

Foreign Minister ARITA and his wife called on HARADA after a visit to TAKAGI. ARITA said, "Aside from me, the four other Ministers are saying, 'Do not change the basic contents (proposed Tripartite Pact) but somehow modify the request of OSHIMA and SHIRATORI.' But, if this be done, the basic principle will become altered. Therefore, I asked SAWADA his opinions on the matter and he said, 'The fundamental ideas of the four ministers are wrong. Therefore, it is difficult to make them understand.' If I, Foreign Minister, have a long talk with the Premier, I am sure he will understand. Therefore, when I return, I shall make it a point to see him." (Part XIX, Chap. 318, p. 2476.)

1 April 1939:

Foreign Minister ARITA told HARADA that when a few days previous the Premier (HIRANUMA) gave a report of the Five Ministers' Conferences to the throne, there was granted an interview, the Emperor asked two questions, "Just what is to be done in the event that Ambassadors SHIRATORI and OSHIMA do not conform to the directives of our Government concerning the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact?" And "will there be any more changes in the alliance?" The Premier

OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

D A T E

- 1 April 1939: (Continued) replied, (1) "If the Ambassadors fail to carry out the directives of the Government, they will either be recalled or other appropriate measures taken;" (2) "Intention that details of pact will be determined with the idea that effective military support can be rendered." (Part XIX, Chap. 320, p. 2486.)
- 7 April 1939: The Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal (MATSUDAIRA) gave the following story to HARADA of the situation abroad concerning the directives issued for the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact; with the final directives in their hands, Ambassadors OSHIMA and SHIRATORI met with the Italian representative at Rome and explained them. Ciano said that it was impossible, that such a weak attitude was disturbing and asked, "Is Japan going to participate in the war?" SHIRATORI replied that Japan would. Ciano then said, "That settles the basic problem. However, we have never contended that Japan dispatch troops to Europe, but if that is the determination, that is fine. A generalized explanation should be made to the other nations. It would be very troublesome to have Japan make a special explanation. Other than to say that Germany and Italy are advocates of the defensive principle, no other explanations will be made. There need not be any worry because a generalized explanation will be given."
- Ribbentrop met the Ambassadors and the same things were said to him. Ribbentrop said, "Is Japan to participate in the war?" OSHIMA replied, "Japan will probably participate." Ribbentrop explained to Hitler and the plan was acceptable to him. Ciano was called by telephone and he accepted. (Part XIX, Chap. 320, pp. 2488-9.)
- (NOTE: However, HARADA goes on to say on page 2490 that "When it was said that Japan would participate, they did not mean that Japan's proposals would be altered. It is the opinion of the Embassy circle, that it is favorable to agree, according to the situation.")
- 11 April 1939: Some time prior to this date, HARADA met Vice Navy Minister YAMAMOTO (under Minister YONAI) who told him that the Navy Minister had been opposed to a military alliance in connection with strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact, and had said, "Since Ambassadors SHIRATORI and OSHIMA are that way, the Government must issue directives with the main points clearly emphasized." (Part XIX, Chap. 320, p. 2493.)
- 18 April 1939: On the 10th (?), the Foreign Minister (ARITA) was received in audience after the Five Ministers' Conference where the Emperor asked him about the progress of the meeting.

OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

D A T E

18 April 1939: Prior to this the Emperor knew of the opposition to the Governmental directive by SHIRATORI and OSHIMA. Consequently, the Emperor thought that it was highly unforgivable for OSHIMA and SHIRATORI to overstep the limits of their authority and say that Japan would participate in war (with Germany and Italy).

On the same day, the Emperor told War Minister ITAGAKI "In the first place, it is an infringement upon the supreme authority of the Emperor for the two Ambassadors to express intentions of participating in war, a matter beyond them to discuss. Under such circumstances, I do not think it very favorable for you to take the attitude of supporting them. This also applies to your covering up for them at the cabinet conferences."

On the 13th, ARITA told HARADA "On the afternoon of the 8th, I went to the palace and was granted an audience with the Emperor. I reported on the decision of the Five Ministers' Conference. I also reported 'Ambassadors SHIRATORI and OSHIMA have stated that Japan will participate (in war) in the event that England and France fought with Germany and Italy. They have clarified the position of the Empire by the expression of their own personal opinions without regard to the intentions of the Government. Their statements should be rescinded as actions overstepping their limits (as Ambassadors). However, because of the fear that this would cause blemishes on their honor and lead to other complications, "participate" should be interpreted in a broader sense and taken to mean effective and appropriate actions further than military support. By such a means, I believe that it would be wiser not to persecute the Ambassadors overstepping their limits.' The Emperor answered, 'The action of the Ambassadors ignored the supreme authority of the Emperor.'" (Part XIX, Chap. 321, pp. 2494-6.)

22 April 1939:

KIDO (Home Minister) told Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal "We intend to continue without changing present terms. We intend to make contact with Hitler through Ambassador OSHIMA and not to have the Premier do it directly. If this method does not work, the cabinet will resign." (Part XIX, Chap. 322, p. 2504.)

23 April 1939:

On this date, a Five Ministers' Conference was held but the business at hand could not be finished so it was continued on the 24th. When HARADA called on KIDO on the morning of the 24th, he seemed to have changed his attitude and said, "There is no alternative but to recall the Ambassadors (OSHIMA and SHIRATORI). If this influences peace and order within the nation, I will do something about it and I can suppress the rightists myself."

OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

D A T E

23 April 1939:

On the 25th, after the Five Ministers' Conference, ARITA told HARADA, "A request has come from the Ambassadors OSHIMA and SHIRATORI for their recall." Therefore a discussion was held to decide on this matter. It was decided that notification be made directly to Hitler and Mussolini through the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo instead of using the Japanese Ambassadors situated in Berlin and Rome.

HARADA was told by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal that Premier HIRANUMA had made a general political report and that he withdrew without touching on the problem of this treaty. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal asked the Premier when he came for an audience whether he would present a report to the throne before arriving at a final decision on this matter (treaty) and the Premier had replied that he would. Although the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal had not actually ascertained the differences in opinion between the Emperor and the Premier, it was certain that the Ambassadors had not been recalled although it was the Premier's intention to do so. Also that the Premier would oppose the opinion of the Emperor very slightly. (Part XIX, Chap. 323, pp. 2506, 2509.)

6 May 1939:

ARITA told HARADA that as soon as he handed the Premier's message to the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo, he received an official wire from Consular USAMI in Berlin to the effect that USAMI was requested by Gauss, the Deputy Vice Minister of the German Foreign Office, to meet him. He said, "Do you suppose Japan will agree on this draft? This has not been shown to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop yet so I do not know what he will say but I am showing this to you unofficially as of my plan." The draft appeared to be written in a very indirect fashion and was a draft written with the emphasis on the German demands which was refused by Japan. "I (ARITA) have investigated the origin of this draft and it seems that it was submitted to the German Foreign Office through the Attache by the Japanese Army. This is outrageous and I won't be responsible if this sort of conspiracy goes on."

After this without any relation to the Premier's message there was a wire from Ambassador OSHIMA which mentioned that Foreign Minister Ribbentrop called up Ambassador OSHIMA in Berlin from Munich on the way to meet Ciano at Como and questioned OSHIMA "when a contracting nation goes to war against another, and even if there is no military aid from Japan would it be permissible to recognize Japan as being in a state of war?" OSHIMA had replied in the affirmative.

ARITA said "It is indeed inexcusable for those abroad to promise such a thing as 'participation in war' and to reply in such a manner independently. A Five Minister's

OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

D A T E

6 May 1939:  
(Continued)

Conference is scheduled for tomorrow but this matter will cause considerable difficulty for Premier HIRANUMA desires to support rather than remain neutral. There is no doubt that such matters have already been transmitted abroad by the Army and if such is to be the case, I can not assume the responsibility of foreign policy."

On the 7th HARADA visited the Foreign Minister at his urgent request and asked him the results of the Five Ministers' Conference. It seemed that the Premier supported the opinion of the War Minister which is the answer of OSHIMA to Ribbentrop in the event of war between contracting nations and other nations. Japan would be considered to have entered a state of war although there may not be any military support. The Premier expressed approval. (Part XIX, Chap. 324, pp. 2515-16.)

10 May 1939:

After the Five Ministers' Conference on the 10th, HARADA met Foreign Minister ARITA who said, "The Premier considered that a reply to his message (concerning the treaty) was unnecessary because the matter had already been solved when Ambassador OSHIMA had replied 'Yes'. When Foreign Minister Ribbentrop had asked him whether it was all right to consider Japan a participant (in the event of war), in other words it was agreeable for Japan to be considered as likely to participate in the event of war between England-France and Germany-Italy.

The Navy Minister emphatically explained that if Japan enters the war the Supreme Command (Staff) of the Navy can not be held responsible for the seizure of her ships on the high seas. The Premier seemed to be very much surprised to hear of this and said 'if the high command of the Army sanctions participation and the Navy does not, that is if the high commands of the Army and Navy will not agree, we can never progress. If the opinions of the high command do not agree then I must reconsider the matter with further study.'" (Part XIX, Chap. 325, p. 2523.)

17 May 1939:

On the 17th the War and Navy Ministers met and agreed on two points with reference to the treaty. One was to delete that portion of the Gauss draft which read "The three participant nations will not hinder any state of war which may arise." The other point was a weakening of the announcement to say that this treaty was only applicable to the Comintern. The Foreign Minister said that the deleting of the phrase "The three participant nations will not hinder any state of war which may arise" was not sufficient; that together with this deletion, the statement of Ambassador OSHIMA to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop that Japan enter into a state of war must be annulled or its effectiveness will suffer. The Navy and War Ministers agreed upon this on the 19th.

OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

D A T E

20 May 1939:

A Five Ministers' Conference was held on the 20th. Concerning the opinion of the Foreign Minister to annul the affirmative statement of OSHIMA to Ribbentrop the Premier (HIRANUMA) hemmed and hawed and did not appear to be in favor of annulling it. Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and Foreign Minister ARITA reported to HARADA that the Premier was very vague in his attitude "because it seemed the Premier agreed with the Army to have the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact go as far as to mean actual participation in war."

At the Five Ministers' Conference the Premier was asked to rescind the answer of Ambassador OSHIMA, but he only said that was sufficient. Finally the agreement stopped at the deletion of paragraph 3 of the secret protocol, i.e., the participant nations, etc. and the revision of the announcement to be made to the world. The great factor behind the evil which was left lies in the fact that the annulment of the reply of Ambassador OSHIMA to Ribbentrop, a matter which was pushed by Foreign Minister ARITA had not been carried out.

25 May 1939:

On the morning of the 25rd, HARADA called up Vice Minister YAMAMOTO to ask of the situation. He said that both Ambassadors SHIRATORI and OSHIMA refused saying they would not consider that draft. ARITA told HARADA over the phone that the Army's contention that words were missing from the treaty draft meant a clear-cut expression of participation in war and he could not agree with them; that he had sent the Vice Minister to the Premier to ask his opinion but he (premier) says that it should be done the way the Army wants. "It appears as if he wishes to have it read 'participation in war!'" (Part XIX, Chap. 326, pp. 2533-36.)

8 June 1939:

The Vice Minister of Navy told HARADA on the morning of the 8th: "Besides the telegram which was sent by the Foreign Minister to Ambassador OSHIMA on June 5, the matter which was determined at the Five Ministers' Conference on June 6 related to the attitude our country should take in case the United States took part in a war on the side of England and France. In case of 'b' and 'c' of the numeral 2 of the telegram plan: 'Should the United States enter the war before the Soviet Union is involved, and should Japan, from general circumstances, constitute a silent threat towards checking their participation in the war, and should this be advantageous to the third party, she may not express any intention, nor send any armed forces. However, even in this instance, she will, of course, confer with Germany and Italy. The conference was adjourned after this memorandum was drawn up.'" (Part XX, Chap. 329, p. 2548.)

At pages  
2553-2555:

Several days ago, KONOYE said: "I have been gathering the telegrams of the War and Foreign Ministries and looking at them. I think that War Ministry telegram, No. 235, dated

OSHIMA, Hiroshi, continued:

D A T E

8 June 1939: August 29, 1938; that is, from the Vice-Ministers of War and Navy to OSHIMA and KOJIMA, the military attaches, and the telegram from the Vice-Minister of War on the same day to OSHIMA explaining War Ministry telegram No. 235; were very much the source of the error. Won't you get these telegrams for me?"

Therefore, I asked Captain TAGAKI of the Navy and collected the telegrams at once and looked at them. At that time, Captain TAKAGI wrote:

I have enclosed the matter which we discussed confidentially the day before yesterday, so please consider it.

The contents of this telegram indicate the mistaken interpretation of the Navy Ministry of what was decided at the Five Ministers' Conference and also changes in the assertions of the Army. Since the Navy Ministry does not wish to show this to outsiders, please take this into consideration and return it after you are through. The following telegram is War Ministry telegram No. 235:

1. Both the Army and Navy are in agreement with the purport of the treaty plan which was brought by Major Gen. KASAHARA. The opinion to adopt this concurred upon the following conditions:
  - a. Add the following essentials as the preamble. (Plan for preamble omitted).
  - b. Change 'Diplomatically' of Article 2 to 'economic'.
  - c. Change the end of Article 3 from: 'there is an obligation to perform' to 'will enter into a conference immediately.'
  - d. The phrases, 'menace and attack' of Articles 2 and 3 will be designated as: 'unless provoked'.
  - e. It is our opinion that we would like to prescribe clearly and in detail, the methods of execution and limit of the sphere of the conditions of military aid to be given in accordance with the secret treaty to be attached to the main treaty.
2. Since we desire to conclude this treaty as promptly as possible, we wish Germany would take steps to submit this plan formally soon.



OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

D A T E

8 June 1939: Explanations concerning War Ministry Telegram No. 236:  
(Continued)

1. 'The Preamble Draft' is that this treaty is an extension of the existing Anti-Comintern Pact, and is a plan which makes clear the intent that the Soviet Union is the chief target. Care was taken so as not to give the impression from the wording that England and the United States are the greatest enemies.
2. The Text Plan, Obligation of Military Aid in Article 3, is not instantaneous or unconditional. In order to nullify the danger of becoming involved in a purely European problem against our will, a conference before we enter with military aid is the principle.
3. In order to allow the purport of this treaty to take on a defensive character, 'menace and attack' will be limited to 'provocation.'
4. Furthermore, the text of the plan is at present under zealous consideration."

16 June 1939:       Around the 16th, a reply that Germany would not accept the term proposed by the Japanese Government came from Ambassadors OSHIMA and SHIRATORI. Since they advised that the 2nd Gauss proposal be used, General Staff Headquarters is trying to push this through. However, the Minister of Foreign Affairs said: "Although it appears the same on the surface, I oppose proposals that have such differences." On the other hand, it seems that the Minister of Foreign Affairs wishes to begin negotiations in Tokyo about the Tientsin Incident. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in speaking of General UGAKI (Foreign Minister) said: "Although he (UGAKI) was constantly speaking of the sweeping change in foreign policy he sent Lt. General OSHIMA as Ambassador to Germany which contradicts this. It seems that he (UGAKI) was helpless in regards to the unification of the Army." (Part XX, Chap. 330, p. 2559.)

3 Aug. 1939:       On the 3rd, HARADA had dinner with Captain TAKAGI of the Navy. Among other things, TAKAGI said "When Captain ENDO, Naval Attache, Berlin, explained the position of the Japanese Navy in regards to the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact to the Chief Secretary in the German Navy Ministry, he (Chief Secretary) expressed his intentions of agreeing. In other words, if war should break out between Germany-Italy and England-France, it would be fine if Japan maintains a friendly neutrality. After some time had elapsed, ENDO told this to OSHIMA. OSHIMA became very angered and through Stahmer, Second Secretary to Ribbentrop, he (OSHIMA) said to Ribbentrop, "Does the Foreign Minister know?" Upon

OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

D A T E

- 3 Aug. 1939:  
(Continued) the return of Admiral Foerster to Germany from Japan, he told ENDO that he felt that the explanation of the Japanese Navy was just and righteous and he would like to explain this to OSHIMA immediately and said that he would try his utmost to have the Ambassador from Japan voice sympathy with the conditions of the Navy. (Part XX, Chap. 336, p. 2599.)
- 10 Aug. 1939: At pages 2605-6: On the 10th, HARADA met the Foreign Minister who said: "Considering the present condition of the Army, it is futile to follow the first section so I think it better to quit. However, since it is necessary to leave some reserve in the Cabinet and to have changes, with the expectancy that the worst will come in regard to taking steps even if it is futile, we purposely did not determine the method and put it off. If you are to follow the first section in what manner will you give out the instructions? If you are to do this, the army's so-called first section is no good; and there is no alternative but to have both plenipotentiaries forward the final written instructions to the respective governments. Since this differs from the intentions of the Army, OSHIMA probably will not forward it."
- Foreign Minister ARITA concluded: "although the Premier says that he would follow the pre-arranged plan in regard to the three steps of the Army, and stopping of the documenting of the agreement on the first step, he rejects it. In regard to the omitting of the matters of reservation in the second step and the approval of negotiations of OSHIMA in the third step, the Premier rejects only the first step and he doesn't say much about the second and third ones. Therefore, there is some doubt left."
- 11 Aug. 1939: At page 2607: Prince SAIONJI told HARADA on the 11th: "If it is possible to recall the two Ambassadors overseas, that is the principal problem. If (it) is depressing because most of the officials overseas are influenced by the militarists and by Germany. We must do something about this."
- Instead of considering the use of documents, however, I (Prince) think it is more important to change the personnel. I wonder if it would be difficult.
- 23 Aug. 1939: On the question of the Military Alliance effecting the change in the Cabinet, according to Prince CHICHIBU's opinion he desired that the responsibility of Cabinet resignation be diverted from the Army. In a conference with KIDO he inquired "How about changing our Ambassadors stationed in Germany and Italy? What if the Premier himself should go and visit Hitler and Mussolini in Germany and Italy?" Whereupon KIDO said: "It would be injurious to the national dignity to have the Premier go. The effects would be bad." They were saying that at the same time it was not possible to change the Ambassadors at so late a time and although it wasn't impossible for the

OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

D A T E

- 23 Aug. 1939: Premier to go, his visit itself would be a problem. (Part XX, (Continued) Chap. 337, p. 2615.)
- 10 Sept. 1939: SAIONJI told HARADA that in Berlin "Ambassador OSHIMA is being greatly encouraged by Ribbentrop to have Japan conclude a non-aggression pact with Russia. OSHIMA has agreed unconditionally and considers it a great success. His attitude is disloyal to his own emperor." (Part XXI, Chap. 340, p. 2644.)
- 27 Sept. 1939: SAIONJI told HARADA "We must recall Ambassador OSHIMA from Berlin as soon as possible because alarming reports are becoming numerous. Is it not distressing to have complications so repeatedly? It seems that the Ambassadors and the Ministers are taking the advice of the military attaches abroad, rather than obeying the directives of the Foreign Office. This, too, is a distressing situation!" (Part XXI, Chap. 341, p. 2653.)
- 2 Oct. 1939: SAIONJI told HARADA "When I see recent newspapers, news from England and Germany are included. It seems that there are numerous news items in the Japanese newspapers which favor Germany generally, and that is not satisfactory. I am firmly convinced that England will not lose this war in the end. Again, the unlawful acts of Germany violate historical conventions. Since the telegrams of Ambassador OSHIMA, who is residing in Germany, seemed to bear nothing but the German version, wouldn't it become troublesome unless we recall him as soon as possible?" (Part XXI, Chap. 342, pp. 2662-3.)
- 12 Dec. 1939: YANAGIDA, former manager of the London branch of the bank, called on HARADA upon his return to Japan. He said, "I have also visited Germany and Italy. What surprised me most when I visited Germany was the complete inefficiency of Ambassador OSHIMA. He has, under him, counsellors and other officials who are close friends of my University days, but they have neither ability nor vigor. We can not do anything about the Ambassador, and besides, they (diplomats) are always being victimized by the Army personnel." (Part XXI, Chap. 348, p. 2707.)
- 12 Dec. 1939: HARADA met Foreign Vice-Minister TANI. He discussed a telegram from Roosevelt to the Foreign Minister about NOMURA and the Navy -- and the favorable turn of diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan. TANI said, "Also, it is said that on the 21st, upon his return to Japan, Ambassador OSHIMA is to deliver a speech in the Imperial presence. However, immediately after his speech, they will request his resignation and have him resign his post. Also, the younger members of the SHIRATORI faction who call themselves the reform faction, will be sent outside of Tokyo. By the end of the year, the majority of them will be ordered out of Tokyo for duty elsewhere. As long as I have been appointed Foreign Vice-Minister, I intend to carry out matters the way I think is right. Therefore, don't be too concerned about me." (Part XXI, Chap. 348, p. 2712.)

OSHIMA, Hiroshi - continued:

D A T E

19 Jan. 1940:

On the 19th (during the short YONAI Cabinet) HARADA says that on the return home from Tokyo he listened to this and that. There was much criticism of the fact that FUJIWARA became the Minister of Commerce and Industry. The Army hates IKEDA. While Ambassador OSHIMA was in Germany Goering said to him: "Japan becomes pro-British because she respects the financial capitalists. Germany finally eliminated a pro-British like Schacht and Japan is hopeless unless she respects industrial capitalists instead of financial capitalists."

This was related to the Army High Command upon his (OSHIMA) return. Therefore the Army utilizes this material for attacking IKEDA and YUKI and hoped to put in industrial capitalists. At the same time it is a fact that GO was always jealous of IKEDA's great power and it is rather peculiar that he had a certain amount of personal grudge against IKEDA. Coincidentally, a person who did not know the relations between GO and IKEDA considered them the same and attacked GO's opinions. This turned out just the way GO wanted accidentally and he (HARADA) regretted this fact. (Part XXII, Chap. 351, pp. 2742-43.)

5 Feb. 1940:

On the afternoon of the 5th, HARADA met KONOYE and they discussed the Japanese diplomatic situation in Europe. KONOYE said: "Foreign Minister MATSUOKA told me that HORIKIRI, Zembe would be sent to Italy so I asked him the reason for this. MATSUOKA replied that someone must be sent from the political parties. Lt. General OSHIMA is slated for Germany, but he is considering this matter at the present." (Part XXIV, Chap. 375, (A), p. 2931.)

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C O P Y Page 1

Berlin, 22 August 1929

c. o. (?) Vol. VIII. 1377

Diplograma

TOKYO

No. 260

Telegram in Cipher  
(Secret)

Urgent!

Following are the notes of the State Secretary for your information and guidance /sprachregelung/.

"After the Reich Foreign Minister had briefly informed the Japanese Ambassador by telephone late yesterday evening from BERGHOF of the new turn of events between Berlin and Moscow, I received the Japanese Ambassador in audience at midnight for about an hour.

I then explained to him the natural developments which led to the present conclusion of a non-aggression pact. Next came OSHIMA with his own troubles and finally we determined the arguments by which he might convince his government of the necessity and, indeed, the advantages of the present step.

His objections were:

1. Relieved of her burden in Europe, Russia would strengthen her East Asia front and revive the Chinese war anew.
2. Lawyers in Tokyo would dispute the compatibility of our present step with certain earlier German-Japanese agreements.

He further added that there was no point in wanting to disturb the existing facts. But he foresaw the violent effects in Japan and might be able to mitigate them by his telegraphic report this very night.

My argument was to the following effect:

1. We were doing nothing to cast doubt on our friendly relations with Japan. On the contrary, we would maintain them and we treasure most sincerely the personalities who had fought and would fight for them firmly as OSHIMA had.

2. The present step was not surprising, insofar as the Reich Foreign Minister had months ago indicated to the Ambassador that a normalization of German-Russian relations was worth obtaining.

3. Such a settlement would enable us to maintain an equilibrium in Japanese-Russian relations and to assure it for a long time. It was of course certain that Japan was not for the present seeking a Japanese-Russian conflict. But I also received from the Russian note the impression that there, too, a Moscow-Tokyo agreement would be welcome.

4. Since the acceptance of the Anti-Comintern Pact (mentioned by OSHIMA), the hostile front had shifted from both Germany and Japan. It was clear as daylight that for Japan, England had become Enemy No. 1, just as Germany too was much less importuned by Russian policy than by British. The agreement now sought with Moscow therefore served our mutual interests.

5. It would not be disputed that we had sought with unending patience to deepen German-Japanese relations. We waited half a year for the Japanese response. Thus, the Japanese government delayed, and credit was due to OSHIMA for being constantly aware of this and for having urged haste.

6. Our economic and also certain political conversations with Moscow indeed lasted some time. But discussion on the non-aggression pact was of the most recent date. Only in the last two or three days had a possibility of this kind arisen. Polish arrogance might now force war upon us this very week. Time being so short, we were absolutely compelled to take action.

At the end the Ambassador assured me of his unchanged intention to continue working for German-Japanese friendship."

End of the State Secretary's notes.

WOERMANN.

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. CUMMING  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. GARDE  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Doc 4033-E

イロキ

第八卷

一三二

一九三九年八月二十二日

東京

外交関係電報

第二六〇号

暗号電報(秘)

要旨

下記、海參崴、通、國務卿、電言すべし

日、海參崴、通、外務大臣、山、駐、日本大使、電話す

簡、直、和、林、心、ス、ア、同、勢、動、向、就、通、告、す

後、余、深夜、本、大使、訪問、受、約、一、時、向、互、り、合、談、す

余、先、ツ、現在、不、可、侵、條、約、締、結、す、と、互、に、互、に、自、然、的

経、途、を、依、り、説、明、す、新、々、と、大、局、を、考、念、し、探、ら、す、互、に、互、に

時、局、現、在、情、況、が、不、可、避、く、モ、ア、リ、向、り、也、有、利、と、モ、ア、リ

と、モ、ア、リ、本、國、政、府、の、納、得、を、得、る、に、ヤ、リ、論、據、を、我、々、

確、立、す、と、モ、ア、リ、後、に、要、論、を、次、に、如、く、モ、ア、リ、す

の、歐、洲、に、於、て、は、日、露、戦、争、が、露、兵、の、露、兵、の、東、進、に、於、て、は、戦、線

を、強、化、し、且、中、國、に、於、て、は、戦、争、を、再、開、す、る、可、き、と、モ、ア、リ、

向、東、京、の、法、律、專、門、家、達、に、我、々、現、在、の、情、況、を、指、置、き、固、く、従、来、

日、俄、兩、國、間、の、協、定、を、或、ル、モ、ト、し、調、和、ト、し、其、を、就、て、要、論

を、陳、述、す、と、モ、ア、リ、思、ふ

後、の、更、に、是、を、面、面、に、對、し、覆、へ、り、ウ、と、モ、ア、リ、且、其、意、義、を、附、言、

す、と、モ、ア、リ、後、に、日、本、に、於、て、は、日、露、戦、争、を、再、開、す、る、可、き、と、モ、ア、リ、

今、電、報、電、報、を、其、レ、ヲ、社、説、に、出、す、可、き、と、モ、ア、リ、

ト、言、ふ、と、モ、ア、リ、

No. 1



余の議論は、次の如くである。

(1) 我々の何等我國に日本との交関係は暗黙に  
投ずるに非らず、寧ろ我々の維持  
を期すに非らず、且、大島、加、其の断乎とレテ戦  
夕人物又ハコシカラ戦フ人物ヲ誠意ヲ以テ擁護スル  
モノナラズ

(2) 既に数箇月亦ニ獨逸外務大臣ハ入使ニ對シテ獨  
露關係ノ正常化ヲ將ニ努力ニ價ヒスルモノトシテ就  
テ說明済ミ、此以上此友ノ措置ニ當リニ六當ニナ  
ト思フ

(3) 斯ナル協定ハ日露兩國關係ニ於ケル靜穩状態  
ノ維持ヲ可能ナラシム且、ソレヲ長期ニ亘リ保證スルモノ  
ト思フ日本ハ是當リ日露紛争ヲホメテイナイコト  
ハ勿論確カナル、然レモ余ハ露西三側カラノ覺書ニ  
依リテ露國ニ於テモ又モスニ東京同ノ協定ヲ歡迎  
スルコトヲウツトイフ印、象ヲ受ケテイルナラズ

(4) 防共協定ノ受諾以來、大島ニ依リテ、(一)日獨  
兩國ニ對スル敵對戰線ハ其相貌ヲ一ニ交シテ、日本  
ニトシテ英國ハ亦一敵トナシ、(二)ハ明ニテアル、同様ニ  
獨逸モ又英國ノ政策ニヨリテ受ケル負担ヨリハ露國  
ノ政策ニヨリ重ムル負担ノテ、選ヲ輕クテト思フ、故ニ  
現在努力シテイルモノコウト、打結ハ我々相互ノ利益  
ニ資スルモノナラズ

(5) 我々が日獨關係ノ緊密化ヲ無限ノ忍耐ヲ以テ求メ  
テ来タコトハ否定スベカラサル所ナラズ、我々の過去半

武蔵、亦日本側ノ反響ヲ待望シテ未ダ斯クテ  
日本政府ハ邊廷ヲ重ネテ居リ大島ハ常ニ之レヲ感  
知シテ其ヲ促進スルニ於テ將ニ貢獻スル  
所カアツタリテアル

14) 我々、モスコウトノ經濟上及ヒ或ル政治上ノ問題ニ  
関スル商議ハ既ニ長期ニ亘リ繼續サレテ未ダ併シ  
不可侵蝕的ニ関スル論議ハ極ク最近ノ事デアアル斯  
カニ可能性カ現ハレテ未ダモツイ此、ニ三日ノアデアアル  
今ヤ我々ニ對スルポーランドノ驕慢ナ態度ハ今週  
中ニモ同戰ヲ余議ナキニ至ラシムルヤウナ形勢アル  
斯カニ緊迫シテ情勢下ナリ我々ハ行動ニ出デルコトヲ余  
議ナクサレシ。至ワタリデアアル

國務卿、實書

終リ

ラオエールマーン

WDERMANN

Affidavit

供述書

私ハブルジョア主義者ナシ

ハ正規宣誓ノ上左記ノ通り證言致シマス

一私ハ獨逸問題ニ関スル合衆國政治顧問部付合衆國國務省隨員デアリ又右ノ資格ニテ(合衆國)對獨軍政部代表デアリマス又前記ノ私ノ資格ニ對シテ收メテ獨逸外務省ノ編綴及ビ文書類原本ヲ獨逸國ベルリン(ベルリン)ニ於テ所持シ保管シ又管理シテアリマス

二前記ノ外務省ノ編綴及ビ文書類原本ハ聯合國派遣軍最高指揮官指揮下ニアル軍隊ノ接收入手セルモノデアリ且、押收接收ノ際先ワ前記ノ軍隊ガ獨逸國ニ於テ先ヅ軍文書本部ニ集收シテ聯合國軍正規兵等者ガ前記ノ中央文書本部即チベルリンニ於テ文書本部ニ移管シタモノデアリマス

三私ハ一九四五年八月十五日以前記ノ獨逸ノベルリンノ文書本部勤務ヲ命ゼラレシ前記ノ獨逸外務省ノ編綴及ビ文書類原本ハ私ガ(ベルリン)ニ於テ所持管理ニ移サレテモ、其ノ後右書類ハ引續キ私ノ管理下ニテリ私ノ所持シ保管スル所トナワリマス

Doc. No. 4034 - E

Page 1

TELEGRAM (Secret Coding Process) to TOKYO, 26 August 1939  
0510 o'clock

Arrived 26 August 1939 - 1510 o'clock  
No. 364 of 26 August

For High Command -- Attache Group, Berlin

The Japanese Army, whose leader is exerting himself again most strongly, especially most recently, for a military alliance, is hard hit by the surprising Russia Pact, but is trying nevertheless to work against the internal crisis of confidence which is being strongly utilized propagandistically from the English side. Striving for change of cabinet in the direction of new possibility of a tie with Germany for which purpose concrete German proposals are awaited if the occasion arises. First of all, some sort of an early declaration of sympathy for the Japanese Army from the German armed forces would be of particular significance for the strength of this pro-German Army policy. Desires also confidential promise that the exchange of military information up to now will not be used to the disadvantage of the Japanese. The morale of young officers is being broken down with this suspicion.

/Signed/ MATSKY

OTT

Done in 8 copies,  
of these the following were delivered:

1. Pol. Ig. with 3 copies
2. Reich's Foreign Minister
3. State Secretary

This is No. 3.

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. CUMMING  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. GARDE  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

國際檢察部

文書第四〇三四一E号

電報 (秘 暗号)

東京 一九三九年八月廿六日五時十分

一九三九年八月廿六日十五時十分着

第三六四号 八月廿六日附

伯林 最高司令部

幕僚 岡宛

日本陸軍ノ指導者ハ殊ニ最近再々軍事同盟ノ為  
 極力推進シテイルノデアルガ 突然ノ露西亞條約ニ依  
 テ日本陸軍ハ深刻ナ打撃ヲ受ケタノデアル。然ラシ  
 ソレモ拘ハラズ英國側テ盛ニ宣傳工作ニ利用シテ  
 イル内部信賴ノ危機ニ對処セント努力シテイル。独逸  
 ハ新タテ接近ノ可能性トイフ意味テ内閣ノ更迭ヲ策  
 シテイルガ其ノ為独逸側ノ具體的提案ガ期行サレキ  
 誤テアル。第一ニ此陸軍ノ新独逸政策強化ノ為日本  
 陸軍ニ對スル独逸軍側ノ何等カノ早急ナ同情表明  
 ガ特ニ有意義ナミト考ヘラレルノデアル。尚又從来ノ軍事  
 上ノ情報交換ハ日本側ニトリ不利ナ方嚮ニ利用サレルコトノ  
 ナイトイフ確タル保障ヲ要求シテイルノデアル。

此点ノ疑惑々々青年將校層ノ士氣ハ阻害サレテイル。

(署名) マツキ / MATSKY

オット / OTT

201

202

Doc. 4034-E

八通作表

其、中左ノ通り發送済

一、外ニ復奉參通ヲ添へPOL. I Gへ、

二、独逸外務大臣へ

三、國務卿へ、

此分ハ第三通ナリ。

一三六〇七六

Affidavit

供述書

私ハ、<sup>ベルリン</sup>ベルリンニ於テ、<sup>ロシヤ</sup>ロシヤノハ正規宣誓ノ上左記ノ通り證言致シマス

一、私ハ獨逸問題ニ関スル合衆國政治顧問部付 合衆國國務省 隨員デアリ 又右ノ資格ニテ(合衆國)對獨軍政部ノ代表デアリマス 又前記ノ私ノ資格ニ對シテ收セル獨逸外務省ノ編綴及ビ文書類原本ヲ獨逸國<sup>BERLIN</sup>ベルリン<sup>BERLIN</sup>ニ於テ所持シ保管シ又管理シテオリマス

二、前記ノ外務省ノ編綴及ビ文書類原本ハ聯合國派遣軍最高指揮官ノ指揮ニ下ニアル軍隊ノ接收入手セルモノデアリ且ソノ押收接收ノ際先ツ前記ノ軍隊ガ獨逸國<sup>MUNICH</sup>ミュンヘン<sup>MUNICH</sup>ノ軍文書本部ニ集收シ次ニテ聯合國軍正規兵事者ガ前記ノ中央文書本部即チ<sup>BERLIN</sup>ベルリン<sup>BERLIN</sup>ニ於テ文書本部ニ接管シタモノデアリマス

三、私ハ一九四五年八月十五日以前記ノ獨逸<sup>MUNICH</sup>ミュンヘン<sup>MUNICH</sup>ノ文書本部勤務ニ命ゼラレ前記ノ獨逸外務省ノ編綴及ビ文書類原本ハ私ガ<sup>MUNICH</sup>ミュンヘン<sup>MUNICH</sup>ニ在勤中初メテ私ノ所持管理ニ移サレタモノデアリ其ノ後右書類ハ引續キ私ノ管理ニ下ニテ私ノ所持シ保管スル所トナツテリマス

No. 1



8/12

*17 Oct - 1 copy given to Mr. Zimmerman*

OSHIMA, Hiroshi

EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE DEFENSE

Record Page  
and/or  
Witness

24,737

1) Exhibit No. 2762. Affidavit of VON RIBBENTROP stated that he first met OSHIMA in the summer of 1935 when he was Military Attache in Berlin. They had several subsequent meetings. After the China Incident broke out in 1937, RIBBENTROP talked to OSHIMA about making peace with China. OSHIMA did not contribute to the German-Italian military alliance in 1939. In 1941, he asked OSHIMA that Japan go to war with Britain but not to include the United States. This, however, was merely a discussion and no plans were made. After the Russian war broke out RIBBENTROP tried to get Japan against Russia but RIBBENTROP had the impression that Japan did everything possible to avoid conflict with Russia. The attack on Pearl Harbor came as a surprise to OSHIMA. OSHIMA did not handle the matter of the transfer of the two submarines from Germany to Japan in 1943. No agreement was ever suggested between OSHIMA and RIBBENTROP for dividing war spoils.

24,397  
STAHRER

2) The witness testified that he acted as liaison man between OSHIMA and RIBBENTROP both socially and officially, although he rarely attended major conferences between them. He did see OSHIMA from time to time and explain the ideas and wishes of RIBBENTROP, while OSHIMA would give him his comments on cables and instructions from Japan, which information he would convey to RIBBENTROP. He sometimes accompanied OSHIMA when he traveled in Germany and would keep social contacts with him and the members of his Embassy in Berlin. The witness was not present at major conferences between RIBBENTROP and OSHIMA except on one or two occasions on general matters.

24,412  
STAHRER

3) The witness stated that during all conversations and negotiations with OSHIMA, the latter took no positive personal stand on any controversial issue, but reserved judgment until he had submitted the matter to his government, unless he had prior instructions. In their discussions personal opinions would have no bearing, for in diplomacy it is the government and not the individual. Rarely did the German Government learn anything new from OSHIMA. They almost always knew Japan's reactions on matters before OSHIMA himself passed on such matters.

Record Page  
and/or  
Witness

- 22,518 4) Exhibit No. 2617. 24 March 1937: Conversation between Foreign Minister SATO and VON DIRKSEN after SATO's speech before the Diet. GOERING had lodged a protest with OSHIMA against the attitude of Japanese press, which gave the impression that SATO regarded the German-Japanese Anti Comintern Pact as an unavoidable evil. VON DIRKSEN told him that such attitude could give rise in Europe to the opinion that Japan was going to denounce the Pact.
- 24,468  
STAHRMER 5) The witness testified that in 1938 and 1939 the negotiations on the Tripartite Pact were conducted between RIBBENTROP and OSHIMA. At that time OSHIMA was still Military Attache and TOGO was Ambassador. So far as he knew, TOGO had nothing to do with these negotiations, and while he did not remember the date, the negotiations began in the summer of 1938. TOGO was transferred to Moscow in October 1938. The witness never talked to TOGO personally about this subject, but so far as his information went TOGO had nothing to do with the negotiations from the beginning until his transfer.
- 24,290 6) Exhibit No. 2735A. 1938: KONOYE's memoirs concerning the Tripartite alliance stated that the idea of a military alliance between Japan, Germany, and Italy was proposed by Germany in the summer of 1938. This proposal was conveyed by OSHIMA, then Military Attache in Berlin, and was submitted for consideration to the Japanese cabinet of which KONOYE was the head. It was a plan to convert the Anti Comintern Pact into a military alliance with Russia as the principal target. The matter was handed to the HIRANUMA Cabinet in January 1939.
- 24,552  
STAHRMER 7) The witness stated on re-direct examination that RIBBENTROP asked him to take up the matter of a closer understanding between Germany and Japan with OSHIMA, to determine what the Japanese army was thinking concerning Tripartite negotiations.
- 24,543  
STAHRMER 8) 6 March 1939: When the witness was asked how he could explain the statement in his affidavit that OSHIMA took no personal stand on any controversial issues, when the CIANO diary (Pros. Exhibit No. 501, Rec. 6096) showed that OSHIMA acted with SHIRATORI to bring about the fall of the Cabinet by resignation unless Japan agreed to a military treaty without reservations, he stated that OSHIMA told him nothing about these ideas and he did not see SHIRATORI at the time. Witness was always impressed that OSHIMA was very cautious and always based his talks on telegrams from home. On several occasions when the witness asked OSHIMA's personal opinion or his government's views, he stated that he did not know and must ascertain. He could not explain the difference between the diary and his statement. He only knew what and how he talked with OSHIMA. He had read some parts of the CIANO Diary but not all.

Record Page  
and/or  
Witness

24,399  
STAHRER

9) 20 April 1939: The witness testified that while negotiations were deadlocked, Germany's political situation grew more tense. RIBBENTROP, on the occasion of OSHIMA's and SHIRATORI's presence at HITLER's birthday party on this date, told them quite frankly that he was not optimistic concerning the conclusion of the treaty. Since Germany wished under all circumstances to be most friendly with Japan, he felt obliged to inform them confidentially that under prevailing conditions Germany might feel forced to approach the Soviet to conclude a non-aggression pact. He assured them that nothing yet had been done.

To find a way out of the deadlock, in May and June 1939, some Japanese Embassy officials had several conversations with GAUSS, legal expert of the German Foreign Office, but without success. The negotiations were completely broken off when the pact between Germany and Russia was concluded on August 23, 1939. The negotiations resulting in the Russo-German Pact were kept secret from the Japanese. When the matter was agreed on the witness was ordered by RIBBENTROP to tell OSHIMA. OSHIMA's attitude was perfectly gentlemanly, but he could not conceal his extreme disappointment and stated so.

24,544  
STAHRER

10) 26 April 1939: When the witness was asked to explain the inconsistency between his statement and the telegram from RIBBENTROP on this date, which showed that OSHIMA and SHIRATORI had refused to present the instructions received from Japan on the Tripartite Pact and declared that they would resign, the witness stated that he could not explain the difference, but could only repeat that OSHIMA did not tell him these things. He had heard later that OSHIMA had difficulties with his government. Witness was not present when he had such conversations with RIBBENTROP. He was not asked about it and was not shown the telegram.

24,546  
STAHRER

11) 28 May 1939: The witness stated he could not explain the inconsistency between his statement and RIBBENTROP's telegram to OTT in which he said that OSHIMA and SHIRATORI had said that the Japanese modified proposal was impossible. Asked how he explained the inconsistency between this statement and Exhibit No. 2230 (Rec. 15,990), a confidential conversation between OSHIMA and RIBBENTROP in which OSHIMA stated that he officially refused to pass to Germany ARITA's instructions that Japan wished to reserve entrance into a state of war in the European conflict, he stated he did not know the document and did not know the fact.

24,494  
STAHRER

12) 23 August 1939: The witness stated that he was assigned the task of notifying OSHIMA that Germany had signed a pact with USSR, on this date he believed. He did not know that OSHIMA

Record Page  
and/or  
Witness

24,494  
(Cont.)

had been summoned to Berghof (a house near Bertchesgaden, where HITLER lived) on 21 August. He did not know that on the night of 22 August there was a discussion in which WEIZSAECKER explained the reasons for the Pact and OSHIMA his objections, at the end of which OSHIMA assured WEIZSAECKER of his unchanged intention to keep on working for friendship notwithstanding the pact. He did not hear of the matter. He could not remember if there was any other instance shortly after the Pact in which OSHIMA assured that he would work for improving German-Japanese relations. The witness was then in Salzburg.

24,503  
STAHMER

13) 28 August 1939: Witness stated that it is possible that on or prior to this date OSHIMA spoke to him about Premier ABE, and stated that he and ABE had served on the general staff and that ABE had been an attache in Berlin. However, he could not remember because of the time lapse. It is possible that OSHIMA advised that ABE would be more favorable than HIRANUMA, but he could not remember. He could not recall having a conversation with OSHIMA about the new Cabinet.

He could not remember that OSHIMA had told him the press was returning to reason, and not to take the press articles too seriously. He did not remember that OSHIMA told him that he was working with all his power to maintain and improve Japanese-German relations. He had a feeling that OSHIMA was still a friend of Germany. The only thing he remembered was the farewell given by RIBBENTROP where there were short, formal speeches exchanged.

He identified his signature on Exhibit No. 2476, a note from him to WEIZSAECKER on the above date, which stated that OSHIMA had told him about the new Prime Minister. He had stated that ABE was 64 years old, with an excellent military career, and had served with OSHIMA on the general staff. He had belonged for a long period as a captain to a German military regiment in Thorn, and was acting as military attache in Berlin. ABE was a personal friend of OSHIMA, who considered him more favorable as Premier than HIRANUMA. OSHIMA would get information about the other members of the Cabinet named up to now and will inform him. He further felt that the Japanese press was gradually returning to reason, and asked that they not take the articles too seriously and that he was working with all his powers on maintaining and improving German-Japanese relations.

24,508  
STAHMER

14) September 1939: Witness did not remember any conference in this month between RIBBENTROP and OSHIMA at which RIBBENTROP stated that close cooperation between the Axis was not dead, and OSHIMA agreed with him. However, he remembers that RIBBENTROP told him at that time the cooperation between Japan, Germany, and Italy must go on and be strengthened. He admitted it is possible he was told that OSHIMA agreed but he could not recall.

Record Page  
and/or  
Witness

24,508  
(Cont.)

When asked whether RIBBENTROP considered it of great importance for his policy that OSHIMA remain as Ambassador and whether OSHIMA enjoyed the complete confidence of Hitler and the German Army, he stated that he had always been under the impression that RIBBENTROP like OSHIMA and had heard that HITLER did also. He did not know of OSHIMA's position with the German Army, but believed he was on good terms with them. He said he remembered that once RIBBENTROP had told him that it was very bad and that he was very sorry that OSHIMA had to leave. He did not remember that RIBBENTROP had stated that it was of great importance for the policy he had in mind that OSHIMA remain as Ambassador. He had the impression that OSHIMA and SHIRATORI were always working to keep up and improve Japanese-German relations, but he did not have the idea they were going to work for an alliance.

When asked to describe the character of his employment, he stated he received an order from RIBBENTROP, for instance, to become liaison man with OSHIMA and then had to fill out his work.

24,547  
STAHMER

15) 18 September 1939: When asked how he could explain the inconsistency of his affidavit with Prosecution Exhibit No. 506 (Rec. 6124), a memoranda of WEIZSAECKER, on above date, showing that OSHIMA disobeyed his government's instructions by postponing delivery of Japan's protest until 18 September, the witness stated he did not know that fact.

24,479  
STAHMER

16) February 1940: Witness stated that during this month he made his first short stay in Japan when he was on a Red Cross tour. At that time he sent Exhibit No. 511 (Rec. 6140), in which he stated he found OSHIMA, SHIRATORI, ISHII, and others in the same friendly attitude.

24,519  
STAHMER

17) 23 February 1940: With respect to Exhibit 511, the witness stated that he regarded the conversation with OSHIMA, SHIRATORI, and others as a general one, and of course these men were always regarded as Pro German. What he called a political conversation was one about a serious political problem, or plans. The report he made in the telegram was a combination of everything he heard from the Japanese he knew, the German Ambassador, and German journalists. RIBBENTROP's policy of an alliance with Japan was of vital concern to Germany at the time. They then saw only a small possibility, but the idea was most important. OSHIMA and SHIRATORI had exactly the same idea as the German side had, that an alliance would be very favorable. When asked whether he discussed political matters with other persons, he said once on the first meeting when TERAUCHI was present and other people, OSHIMA and SHIRATORI took part in the conversation. When asked whether TERAUCHI was sent to Germany by the Japanese Army, he said he knew he was sent to Italy as a sort of a commission and later came to Germany.

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24,519  
(Cont.)

When asked whether his political purpose in coming to Japan included interviews with OSHIMA and SHIRATORI, he stated that he wanted to see them because he knew them in Berlin, but he was very careful about a political interview, for two reasons. First, the situation between the countries at that time was not good, and there was no possibility of making progress. Second, he did not want to trouble the Ambassador's job.

24,446  
STAHRMER

18) 27 September 1940: The witness stated that at the time of the signing of the Tripartite Pact there was no action or situation contemplated for concluding the military agreement and providing for operational coordination. At no time during the conversations did OSHIMA commit himself as favorable to the commencement or participation in any war by Japan. There was no collaboration between Germany and Japan so far as the witness knew that wasn't provided for by a treaty and which did not go through established channels. OSHIMA's dealings with the witness and RIBBENTROP did not differ at all from dealings with other Ambassadors with whom he worked. As far as he knew, OSHIMA never interested himself in matters outside diplomatic tasks contrary to the best interests of either Germany or Japan. The witness had never heard OSHIMA express greater friendship toward any particular one of the foreign ministers. Having been absent so long from Japan he probably did not even know them personally.

24,406  
STAHRMER

19) 27 September 1940: The witness testified that at the time of the signing of the Tripartite Pact, OSHIMA had no official position and no concern with the negotiations so far as he knew. During the witness' stay in Japan he called on OSHIMA as an old friend and met him socially. However, he neither revealed the negotiations to OSHIMA nor asked his advice.

24,439

20) September 1940: The witness denied that OSHIMA and SHIRATORI were sent to Rome to induce MUSSOLINI to join the Tripartite Pact.

24,406  
STAHRMER

21) February 1941: The witness testified that when OSHIMA returned to Berlin as Ambassador in February 1941, the witness was again liaison man between him and RIBBENTROP. As previously, the witness seldom attended conversations between them. The conversations with OSHIMA never committed Japan to attack Singapore or the Soviet. He could not recall that RIBBENTROP had ever told him that OSHIMA had done so. While the witness was always friendly with OSHIMA, the latter never told him any military plans or revealed any secrets. The witness himself had nothing to do with military matters and neither did RIBBENTROP officially. OSHIMA was in Germany many years, spoke German well, and was well liked there.

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Witness

24,409  
STAHRER

22) March 1941: The witness stated that prior to MATSUOKA's arrival in Germany he heard nothing from OSHIMA about the items to be taken up by MATSUOKA nor of his wishes or ideas that he wanted to convey to RIBBENTROP. During MATSUOKA's stay, the witness met OSHIMA only at various luncheons. He did not believe OSHIMA had much influence on MATSUOKA and he felt that their personal relations were not close. MATSUOKA told him nothing about OSHIMA.

24,444  
STAHRER

23) March 1941: The witness testified that upon MATSUOKA's arrival in Germany he did not advise the witness of the principal question he desired to discuss with RIBBENTROP. He only heard shortly after he left Berlin that MATSUOKA wanted to make a non-aggression pact with the Soviet. He did not know whether OSHIMA knew beforehand the object of MATSUOKA because OSHIMA did not tell him.

24,582  
NAGAI

24) Exhibit No. 2747 (Record P. 24,578). March 1941: The witness testified that so far as he could remember OSHIMA attended only the first courtesy call on HITLER and RIBBENTROP when MATSUOKA arrived in Germany. Whether he knew beforehand or afterwards of MATSUOKA's conversation at conferences he did not attend the witness did not know. The relations between MATSUOKA and OSHIMA in Berlin were rather cold. The witness had several conversations with OSHIMA in Berlin, and heard only information on Germany and the European war. OSHIMA never expressed opinions with respect to political and military measures to be taken by Japan in connection therewith. (Prosecution did not cross examine but referred to Exhibit No. 569, Rec. p. 6453.)

24,303  
USHIRA

25) The witness testified that MATSUOKA negotiated in Moscow and contrary to German expectations concluded a neutrality pact. According to OSHIMA's report HITLER was astonished and RIBBENTROP unpleasantly surprised. RIBBENTROP told OSHIMA that he found it difficult to understand MATSUOKA's real intention in concluding such a treaty with the very country with whom Germany would fight in the near future as he had told MATSUOKA.

There was a great discrepancy between the understanding of RIBBENTROP and MATSUOKA on this subject. Regardless of whether it was due to mutual misunderstanding or to willful distortion on either side, the German-Soviet relations had increasingly become so bad that after April all of OSHIMA's reports hinted on the imminence of war between the two. Japan could no longer placidly watch the development of the situation.

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- 24,586 26) Exhibit No. 2748. 23 April 1941: A telegraph from RINTELER to STAHRER stating that OSHIMA would be requested to inform MATSUOKA that the matter of RIBBENTROP promising to place the excerpt of conversation between himself and HITLER at MATSUOKA's disposal was a misunderstanding; that SCHMIDT took note only of catch words for the purpose of translation. OTT would also be informed telegraphically.
- 24,548  
STAHRER 27) 28 June 1941: On cross examination the witness stated he did not know the Exhibit No. 587, the telegram from RIBBENTROP to OTT on this date in which RIBBENTROP stated he had an agreement with OSHIMA that the latter would influence Japan towards supplying military action against Russia.
- 23,558 28) Exhibit No. 2693. July 1941: OSHIMA stated in interrogation that he knew nothing about the KWANTUNG Army after the German attack on Russia being in a state of military preparedness for a move against Russia. On the contrary, he felt Germany was always dissatisfied of Japan's making no move against the Soviet. On several occasions they received protests referring to the fact that Japan did not effectively prevent shipment between United States of munitions to Vladivostok.
- About the middle of 1941 RIBBENTROP unofficially told OSHIMA of desire of the German Army that Japan join in the war against Soviet. This was reported to the Foreign Minister TOYODA but no reply was received. On several occasions OSHIMA was asked by RIBBENTROP whether Japan would join the war. OSHIMA did not fail to report this to his government.
- 24,732 29) Exhibit No. 2761A. 1 October 1941: Excerpt from the hearings before the joint committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack contained in intercepted Japanese message on this date disclosed that OSHIMA had had several visits with RIBBENTROP who stated that he knew that although reports of Japanese-American negotiations were withheld from OTT, the United States was in secret communications with England on them. Dissatisfaction with Japanese attitude was general in Germany. OSHIMA asked that it be conveyed to the army and navy that feeling in Germany of leadership and people is growing worse.
- 24,681 30) Exhibit 805. 6 December 1941: A telegram from the foreign office in Tokyo to the Japanese office in Berlin which stated that they were to explain at length that so far as American materials being shipped to the Soviet to any point within the scope of Japan's intelligence, they are not of high quality or large quantity. In case Japan starts war with the United States



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they would capture all United States' ships destined for Russia. He was also to try to come to an understanding on this line. If RIBBENTROP should insist on a guarantee, since there would be no other recourse he was to state whether as a matter of principle Japan would prevent war materials from being shipped by the United States to Russia via Japanese waters. He was to try to get a proviso that so long as strategic reason continued to make it necessary to keep Russia from fighting Japan, they could not carry it out thoroughly.

In case Germany refuses to agree with one and two and makes her approval conditional upon Japanese participation in the war and concluding a treaty against a separate peace, Japan has no way but to postpone a conclusion of such treaty.

24,485  
STAHMER

31) Exhibit No. 2745. September 1944: The witness identified this exhibit as a document he brought with him to Japan to the conference in the middle of September. He delivered his official communication to SHIGEMITSU but also gave him the written paper as an aid memoir to prevent misunderstanding. The document stated that OSHIMA informed HITLER about the Japanese Government's suggestion for a separate peace between Germany and the Soviet. HITLER explained the German point of view that they had no indications that the Soviet was ready for an understanding with Germany. They believed that STALIN would try to come to an understanding with Germany only when convinced that he can not continue the war successfully or that his forces are insufficient to defeat Germany. If this should happen, a new political situation would be created. The German Government fully appreciates Japan's suggestion. Because of this Germany requested the Japanese Government to refrain from any steps with the Soviet.

To OSHIMA's question whether the German war aims against Russia had changed HITLER replied that STALIN did not ask for peace negotiations when the German troops were on the Don River and the same holds good for Germany under the present circumstances.

Compiled by the Russian Division

OSHIMA, Hiroshi

SYNOPSIS

of the documents presented to the Court containing direct reference to the actions of the accused connecting him with the facts mentioned during prosecution's phase " Japanese Aggression Against the USSR."

DOCUMENTS

REFERENCE TO THE FOLLOWING FACTS:

1. Minutes of interrogation of Oshima dated April 22, 1946 in which he admitted that when the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded " Russia was meant in the first place." ( Prosecution's doc. No. 4121, Exhibit No.776-A )

2. Minutes of interrogations of Oshima dated February 4, 1946 and March 5, 1946 in which he admitted that following the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact Germany and Japan agreed to furnish each other with intelligence about the Russian armed forces . In this regard and for carrying anti-Soviet propoganda was decided to intensify the use of White Russians. ( Prosecution's Doc. Doc.N.N. 2157-B,2156, Exhibit N.N.487,488 )

3. Himmler's memorandum of the conversation with Oshima on January 31,1939 in which is stated that Oshima together with German counter-espionage " was undertaking long-range work of disintegration in Russia, emanating from the Caucasus and the Ukraine" and took measures to foster terrorist activity in

14. The conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was a military political alliance of aggressors directed against the democratic states and against the USSR in particular. The results of its enforcement as regards the USSR prior to the conclusion of the Tripartite pact. ( 1936-1940 )

14. the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was a military political alliance of aggressors directed against the democratic states and against the USSR in particular. The results of its enforcement as regards the USSR prior to the conclusion of the Tripartite pact. ( 1936-1940 )

8. Subversive activities of the Japanese military against the USSR and the employment of white Russian emigrants for this purpose the violation of the Peking convention of 1925. ( 1928-1945 )

14. The conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was a military political alliance of aggressors directed against the democratic states and against the USSR in particular. The results of its enforcement as regards the USSR prior to the conclusion of the Tripartite pact. ( 1936-1940 )

the USSR.  
( Prosecution's Doc. No.533, Exhibit No.489 )

8. Subversive activities of the Japanese military against the USSR and the employment, of white-Russian emigrants for this purpose.

The violation of the Peking convention of 1925.

15. The conclusion of the Tri-partite Pact finally shaping the conspiracy of aggressors against the democratic states and the USSR in particular.

4. Minutes of interrogation of Oshima dated April 22, 1946 in which he admitted the active part he played in concluding the Tri-partite Pact which was directed against the USSR. ( Prosecution's Doc. No.4121, Exhibit No. 776-A)

5. Memorandum of the Conference between Ribbentrop and Oshima on June 24, 1942 in the course of which Oshima agreed with Ribbentrop that " It was the strength of the Tripartite powers that they had proceeded on the offensive from the outset, never waging a defensive war ... " ( Prosecution's doc. No.1372-A) Exhibit No.778-A ).

15. The conclusion of the Tri-partite Pact finally shaping the conspiracy of aggressors against the democratic states and the USSR in particular.

6. Record of the Conversation between Ribbentrop and Matsuoka on March 27, 1941 during which Ribbentrop stated that Ambassador Oshima knew how the Non-aggression Pact with Russia was concluded and that the signing of the Pact was dictated by the considerations of the moment and that Germany had at that time the desire to conclude a pact with Japan. ( Prosecution's Doc. No. 4005-B, Exhibit No. 783)

15. The conclusion of the Tri-partite Pact finally shaping the conspiracy of aggressors against the democratic states and the USSR in particular.

7. Extract from the record of the Conference of Ribbentrop with Oshima in Fuschl on February 23, 1941 during which Ribbentrop gave to understand that Germany was preparing for a war against the USSR and expected " a gigantic German victory " and the end of the Soviet regime, and expressed his desire that Japan should enter into the war as soon as possible to secure her position in the Far East.

Oshima agreed with this entirely and said that he would do everything to carry through this policy. ( Prosecution's Doc. No. 531, Exhibit No. 632 ).

8. Telegram of Oshima from Berlin to Tokyo dated May 20, 1941 in which he reported that "... the German Government attached great importance to Foreign Minister Matsuoka's statement to Ott to the effect that Japan would attack the USSR in case of a Russo-German war " and that he (Oshima) had no doubt that Matsuoka was aware " of the real relationship between Germany and Soviet Russia." ( Prosecution's Doc. No. 1383-18, Exhibit No.1075 ).

9. Minutes of interrogation of Oshima dated April 22, 1946 in which Oshima admitted that at the end of July or at the beginning of August 1941 he on his own initiative received information from Ribbentrop and Keitel about the slowing up of the advance of the German Army against the USSR.

( Prosecution's Doc. No.4121, Exhibit No. 776 )

16. The knowledge of the Japanese Government as represented by Matsuoka, the Foreign Minister, and Oshima, the Ambassador in Berlin, of the preparation of Germany for an attack on the USSR and taking this circumstance into consideration by the Japanese while concluding the neutrality Pact with the USSR as well as a promise to participate in the war on Germany's side.

16. The knowledge of the Japanese Government as represented by Matsuoka, the Foreign Minister, and Oshima, the Ambassador in Berlin, of the preparation of Germany for an attack on the USSR and taking this circumstance into consideration by the Japanese while concluding the neutrality Pact with the USSR as well as a promise to participate in the war on Germany's side.

17a. The preparation of an attack on the USSR and waiting meanwhile for a convenient time for it. ( 1941 - 1944 )