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**PART I**

**TITLE** : 2.26 Incident  
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**SUBJECT** : The nature of the thought and the origin of the actions of SHIKI Takato.

**Prisoner:** 1st Lt. SHIKI Takato

(T.N. - The gist of SHIKI's answer at the army Court Martial in Tokyo on 7 December 1936 is as follows:)

1. 1st Lt. SHIKI thought that Japan would face a catastrophe, if left to the present trend of political and economic tendencies.
2. His belief in taking direct violent action to attain his aims changed gradually as the years passed, but the general trend of his thought never changed. If inevitable, he thought, he must take violent action.
3. He thought Japan to be quite rotten, due to the maladministration of the "Privileged Government" built on the so-called privileged class of GENRO (TN Elder Statesmen), ZAIBATSU (TN Financial Cliques), and JUSHIN (TN Ex-Premiers). Therefore, he thought that these men and their class must be struck down as soon as possible.
4. The origin and the true cause of Japan's rottenness came, according to him, from only one fundamental cause; i.e., the lack of the true consciousness of KOKUFUAI (TN National Polity) among the general public.
5. Since the time when he was a student in the Military

Academy, he had unflinchingly thought that there was dire necessity for some sort of drastic reformation to remedy the situation.

6. To the question of whether he thought that direct action was quite necessary, or whether he thought some other method could achieve his end, he answered that, though he didn't think that direct action was always necessary, when an "inevitable circumstance" occurred, he would resort to violent direct action.

7. When he was asked what kind of things he thought were "inevitable", he declared that any action resulting in the destruction of the KOKUTAI (TN National Polity) must be taken as an "inevitable circumstance" to justify direct action. From his remarks during the trial, not once did he seem to have become conscious of the existence of other peaceful, democratic methods to achieve his end. He only knew of the mission of the sabre; this trend of prejudice can be observed in the minds of all of his colleagues and friends.

8. His ultimate ideal regarding his action was eventually to establish in Japan a government under a quasi-divine Emperor--a "so-called Emperor system benevolent to the mass of the people". This ideal, one can easily observe, is rather semi-religious, and fully devoid of the treatment of state politics in the light of modern science.

9. To summarize, he was a plain and simple fanatic brought up under the biased influences and prejudiced teachings of the Japanese military education and its ultra-nationalistic principles.

10. In order to carry out the SHOWA Renovation SHIKI advocated a purge of the army. The purge, he stressed, did not mean the wholesale overthrow of the high staff officers of the army, but the target of his attack was the "staff fascists" in Tokyo who ran counter to the KOKUTAI (TN National Polity) or, in the light of his interpretation, the pure Emperor system.

**SUBJECT:** The violent opinions of 1st Lt. SHIKI about the trial of Lt. Col. AIZAWA.

The gist of SHIKI's answer at the Army Court Martial on 7 December 1936 in Tokyo is as follows:

1. On February 1936, just before the 2.26 Incident, SHIKI heard, through a publication which came from Tokyo, a rumor to the effect that Lt. Col. AIZAWA's trial was being complicated owing to the alleged oppression of the military leaders conspiring with the clique of JUSHIN (TN Ex-Premiers). Angered furiously by this information, he declared that he came to feel as though he wanted "to stand up unsheathing his sword" in order to bring about the SHOWA Renovation by our (young officer's) hand.

2. He advocated the opening of the trial to the public. The reason was, he thought, to upset the secret interests of the military leaders and JUSHIN (TN Ex-Premiers), who composed the so-called privileged class. It was against them, that AIZAWA had fought, and it was against them also, that SHIKI was fighting indirectly.

3. Therefore, SHIKI was one of the strong sympathizers of

Lt. Col. AIZAWA.

SUBJECT: NAKASHIMA and SHIKI

The gist of SHIKI's answer at the Army Court Martial in Tokyo on 7 December 1936 is as follows:

1. SHIKI, when asked by Maj. Gen. HIRANO for spiritual and mental support for the SHOWA Renovation, introduced to him NAKASHIMA Susumu and OKASHIMA Ryohei just after the outbreak on the morning of the Incident, February 26.
2. According to SHIKI's testimony, NAKASHIMA Susumu and OKASHIMA Ryohei were regarded in KUMAMOTO as the right-wing violence gang.
3. NAKASHIMA and OKASHIMA were intimate friends; both lived in KUMAMOTO City, KUMAMOTO Prefecture, and NAKASHIMA was leading OKASHIMA.
4. NAKASHIMA established in his home a private school by the name of SHONAN JUKU (TN Bright Camphor School), but had practically no pupils; OKASHIMA was the only follower.
5. SHIKI sometimes gave some monetary aid (tens or two hundreds) to NAKASHIMA in the testimony of SHIKI.
6. Both NAKASHIMA and OKASHIMA, though they were not in military service, were firmly connected with military men and militaristic ideas. They respected Gen. MAZAKI Jinsaburo, then Inspector General of Military Education, and believed and strongly advocated the ideal of the SHOWA Renovation.
7. When the 2.26 Incident occurred, both were at KUMAMOTO

having no direct connection with men who had risen in Tokyo. But, by the instruction of SHIKI, OKASHIMA went to KAGOSHIMA for correspondence purposes.

8. The facts between Maj. Gen. HIRANO and some right-wing gang virtually proves that HIRANO is an outstanding member of SHIKI's group.

**SUBJECT: Maj. Gen. HIRANO's opinions and action regarding the trial of Lt. Col. AIZAWA**

**Prisoner: 1st Lt. SHIKI Takato**

(Page 52-60) The gist of SHIKI's answer at the Army Court Martial in Tokyo on 7 December 1936 is as follows:

1. Maj. Gen. HIRANO declared to SHIKI that the outcome of the AIZAWA Trial would decide the turning point of the success or failure of the SHOWA Renovation movement.

2. He said that he would like to have men who would strive for the SHOWA Renovation with convictions of righteousness, and asked SHIKI for mental and material support.

**SUBJECT: Maj. Gen. HIRANO's connections with Lt. Gen. YANAGAWA**

**Prisoner: 1st Lt. SHIKI Takato**

1. Maj. Gen. HIRANO regretted the removal of Lt. Gen. YANAGAWA to Formosa as the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Taiwan Force, because YANAGAWA was the outstanding member of the group.

2. In February of 1936, HIRANO sent a letter to SAITO Makoto, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. HIRANO made known the contents of the letter to SHIKI on February 27, and SHIKI published it at once and distributed it among the officers of his regiment (Kumamoto). Of this action, SHIKI declared that the aim of the publishing and distribution was to let other officers know the impending necessity of carrying out the SHOWA Renovation, and the necessity of ousting the GENRO (TN Elder Statesmen), ZAIBATSU (TN Financial Cliques), and JUSHIN (TN Ex-Premiers), who all had close relationship with the Court.

**SUBJECT:** Gen. MAZAKI's connection with SHIKI about the time when the former's resignation as Inspector General of Military Education was pending.

1. SHIKI, on NAKASHIMA Susumu's advice, sent a letter to Gen. MAZAKI, wishing him to stand firmly in his convictions on the then heated problem of the "TENNO KIKAN SETSU" (TN Emperor Organ Theory advocated by Prof. MINOBE of the Tokyo Imperial University viewing the Emperor system as an organ of the state).

(Page 63) 2. To this letter MAZAKI answered by a letter to SHIKI, adding a Japanese poem regarding his inner feelings on his resignation from the post of Inspector General of Military Education.

**PART II**

**SUBJECT:** SAKURAKAI (TN Cherry Blossom Society), October Incident, 12.20 Incident, and the 5.15 Incident.

Prisoner: Capt. SUGANAMI Saburo

(Page 112) On 8 December 1936, SUGANAMI Saburo answered as follows at the Army Court Martial in Tokyo:

"During March 1931, six months before the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, I heard in Tokyo a rumor of the Manch Incident which schemed to achieve a coup d'etat. In August of that year, I was in the 3rd Infantry Regiment, Tokyo. At that time, in the army headquarters in Tokyo there was a society, the name of which was the SAKURAKAI (The Cherry Blossom Society), and which was then vehemently advocating its principle of renovating the nation.

I thought that the society was established in the intentions of the upper class of army officers to foster an internal atmosphere for the solution of heated problems in Manchuria and Mongolia. One day I attended a meeting of the SAKURAKAI (The Cherry Blossom Society) and heard the address of Maj. NAKA. On that occasion, Col. HASHIMOTO Kingoro, then a Lt. Col. and Chief of the Russian Section of the Army General Staff, addressed the party, speaking as if he were a hero like Kemal ATATURK, the heroic president of the Turkish Republic. I felt somewhat very strange and queer.

In September of that year the Manchurian Incident occurred. At that time a part of the young officers since the 41st Class, who had been in Tokyo (Those officers who graduated in the 41st Class of the Army Officers' School) were invited by the staff officers to attend



the meetings of the SAKURAKAI (TN Cherry Blossom Society) for then  
it was aiming to tide over the then internally critical situation of the  
nation, upholding the three chiefs (TN War Minister, Chief of General  
Staff, and Inspector General of Military Education). Therefore, we,  
the young officers, participated in the meeting.

The place of meeting of the SAKURAKAI (TN Cherry Blossom Society)  
moved gradually to that of some eating-houses, and it was said that the  
expenditures were coming from the "KIMITSU-HI" (TN Secret Fund) of the  
army. (Page 114) Especially, Lt. Gen. CHO Isamu, then a Major, who was  
said to have come to Tokyo from Manchuria, was said to have mastered hundreds  
of RONIN (TN Leaderless warriors of the Shogunate; now, slang for free,  
right-wing members and gangs). Sometimes he bragged that he would some-  
day assault the Chief of the Metropolitan Police, and he seemed like  
a DOKATA (TN low-class construction worker; slang for a worthless person).

As I was secretly investigating what sort of things they were  
plotting, and observing them with cautious eyes, I came to detect that  
they were plotting a secret scheme, nearly another continued version of  
the March Incident--a coup d'etat plot. (Page 115) Then I was determined  
that, should they rise up, I must imprison them in the barracks detention  
room, using the forces of the 1st and 3rd Infantry Regiments. I informed  
the young officers of the 1st and the 3rd Infantry Regiments of my in-  
tention and conferred with them. The result was that they assented to

move under my leadership against the plot.

"However, this plot of Colonel HASHIMOTO and Lt. Col. CHO was disclosed to the authorities on October 16, and the chief plotters were arrested and put into the barracks detention room. This was the October Incident. Afterwards, the "staff clique" (chief plotters of the October Incident) schemed to rise once again, fixing the date of the uprising for 20 December 1936, and Capt. OHARA Shigetaka called on me and asked for my co-operation. However, I opposed this dishonest plot. Though I was blamed by KURIHARA Yasuhide, a patriotic young officer, as the fascist mania was very prevalent in those days, I advocated correcting the supreme command system from the higher officers down to the lower officers, and to forge ahead in the purge of the army. I also wished that those radical young officers would reconsider and reflect. At last the plot of the staff clique failed owing to the fact that the young officers did not participate."

"During 1932, the Shanghai Incident occurred, and I was sent to Shanghai. There, I felt great sorrow, as Major FUJII Hitachi died in action." (TN FUJII was a spiritual leader of the young naval officers' group which flocked together for national reformation.)

"In April 1932, I returned to Tokyo after finishing my duties in Shanghai, and I knew that some army cadets, united closely with some naval young officers, were growing very radical regarding the problems of the critical internal situation and of the London Naval Disarmament Conference. As a suspected case of cholera appeared from my section I

was detained in the barracks, so that I had no opportunity <sup>to</sup> see such cadets. It was on 14 May 1932 that I was granted permission to go out. May 15 was on a Sunday, and in the morning Captain ASAYAMA Kojiro called on me and said, 'As I advised IKEMATSU Takeshi, an army cadet, to call on you, I ask you to instruct him at that time'.

That afternoon IKEMATSU and SAKAMOTO, both cadets, called on me. I advised them not to rouse themselves to action, and asked their reconsideration; I imagined that I succeeded in changing their minds. Before that day, I had been resting assured that Lt. KOGA Kiyoshi would not rouse himself to action because I had asked Lt. MURAYAMA Tadayuki to take steps to hold back KOGA.

Subsequently, I went to the residence of Maj. Gen. YAMASHITA Tomoyuki (then a Colonel and head of the Military Affairs Section of the War Department) with my father and elder brother. There I was telephoned by KURIHARA Yasuhide. I left YAMASHITA's residence alone and hurried to the house of NISHIDA Chikara in a taxi. During the drive the taxi driver informed me of the hot news of the 5.15 uprising. Just when I reached NISHIDA's residence I saw him being conveyed to the JUNTENDO Hospital on an ambulance but, although he was in such a condition, he was in high spirits. At NISHIDA's residence, I met Capts. OKURA Eieichi, SASAKI Jiro, and ASAYAMA Kojiro. There we all agreed to make our opinions known to the War Minister as the army leaders might feel anxious, since the naval cadets had risen up.

In the War Minister's residence we met some of the army's higher leaders, as the War Minister was then absent. We said that the young officers of the army would not arouse themselves, and I also endeavored to keep the young army officers in check.

After the TOHOKU Division went out to Manchuria, I observed that the homes of the dispatched soldiers were in a miserable state due to the current depression in the farming districts. In July 1932, after consulting ANDO Teruzo and KURIHARA Yashuhide, I initiated a humane movement to raise a relief fund for the distressed homes of the soldiers, and I distributed a pamphlet I had written to all the Japanese army officers. We hoped to utilize this humane action as the means to make the ZAIBATSU (Financial Cliques) reconsider, and also to furnish a motive for their surrender of economic power, and for the execution of the SHOWA Renovation.

However, due to abuses and deprecations by the staff cliques, Maj. Gen. YAMAOKA, the head of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Dept., declared that my action was not good and ordered me to cease my action at once; eventually <sup>I was</sup> put in barracks prisons, after being sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor.

On the next day, 9 December 1936, at the Army Court Martial in Tokyo, when asked the meaning of the reformatory purge of the army,

Later, I received information from Capt. OKUMA Eiichi about this incident. According to it, the fact was that the plot was utterly

SUGANAMI answered, "I thought that the ringleaders of the March Incident and the October Incident such as Gen. UGAKI Issei, Gen. MINAMI Jiro, Lt. Gen. KOISO Kuniaki, Lt. Gen. TAKEKAWA Yoshitsuga, Col. HASHIMOTO Kingoro, Lt. Col. TANAKA Ryukishi, and Lt. Col. CHO Issam, must be relieved from their posts."

SUBJECT: The November 1934 Incident, which was a forerunner of the 2.26 Incident.

Prisoner: Capt. SUGANUMA Saburo

(Page 296-297)

On 12 December 1936, SUGANUMA answered as follows at the Army Court Martial in Tokyo:

Q. How are the prisoner's relations with Gen. MAZAKI?

A. I do not know about Gen. MAZAKI.

Q. How does the prisoner think about the November Incident?

A. In September of 1934, when I was in Manchuria, I received news through my information net of the November Incident, which was then said

to have been the conspiracy plot of MURANAKA Koji and ISOBE Asaichi.

According to this information there were in Manchuria some people concerned with the incident. Thus, I perceived intuitively that this Incident might be a fabricated one. When I asked in the headquarters

of the KWANTUNG Army, they showed me a report from the Military Police

Headquarters in Tokyo. It suggested that this Incident was not a fact.

Later, I received precise information from Capt. OKURA Eiichi about

this incident. According to it, the fact was that the plot was utterly

a fabrication by a part of the staff clique of Tokyo, aiming to oppress our young officer members.

I felt that my first expectations were right. I felt a deep sympathy towards Mr. MURANAKA and Mr. ISOBE, who were both placed in custody, and later suspended from office. I took measures with my comrades to aid the families of these two men. Later, MURANAKA and ISOBE sent me a paper which declared that the prosecution was utterly fabricated.

Important Facts in the Evidence and Testimony  
Found in the Trial of 1st Lt. SHIKI Takata

(TN The prisoner SHIKI Takata was not an important man among the prisoners. When the 2.26 Incident occurred, he was in KUMAMOTO, KYUSHU. Until the day of the outbreak he virtually knew nothing of the scheme. About noon on Feb. 26, he was informed of the outbreak of the incident by a reporter's telephone message. He wished to go to Tokyo, but failed. He wished to aid the rioters in Tokyo, but his efforts were almost negligible. Later, he was arrested.

The facts found in his trial are only his intimate connection with Maj. Gen. HIRANO and MAZAKI Jinsaburo, then Inspector General of Military Education; also, his right-wing activities in KUMAMOTO, KYUSHU.)

(Page 347) Gist of Parts I, II, and III

(TN The following is the gist of Part I, Part II, and Part III

in the prosecution made by SUGANO Yasuyuki, the army prosecutor, against Capt. SUGANAMI Saburo and 1st Lt. SHIKI Takato in the case of the criminals of the 2.26 Incident of rebellion.

#### Introduction

This case is a movement of the outer circles in the rebellion case which occurred on 26 Feb. 1936, concerning the factions of MURANAKA Koji.

When the rebellion occurred, young officers and civil "right-wing" thinkers who were in close connections with the rebels, executed effective measures suitable to their respective residences, so as to maintain and enlarge the rebellion in Tokyo. Such cases appeared not only in Japan Proper but also in HOKKAIDO, KOREA, and in more remote regions like Manchuria, thereby bringing the situation at one time to the brink of nation-wide rebellion.

Fortunately, however, the rebellion in Tokyo ended in four days, and the judicial punishments against the rebels <sup>were held</sup> on 5 July 1936 at the Army Court Martial here and the execution thereafter. Now the problem depends solely on the outcome of this case, which is the second version of the rebellion.

#### Facts

Both prisoners, from years preceding, were feeling deeply the necessity of national reformation, and were actively working for the realization of the so-called SHOWA Renovation by co-operating with

MURANAKA Koji, ISOBE Assichi, ANDO Teruzo, KODA Kiyosada, and other members of the same circle in the civil and military world.

On 26 Feb. 1936, ANDO Teruzo and MURANAKA Koji assaulted, killed, or injured the JUSHIN (TH Ex-Premiers) and some high officers of the government, and occupied the important parts of the Capital by resorting to the use of armed forces. They forcibly demanded the upper men of the army to realize at once the reformation--thus a rebellion was realized.

The first prisoner, SUGANAMI Saburo, hearing this news, did the following things to benefit the rebels:

1. SUGANAMI obstructed the activities of gendarmes who acted secretly to investigate the actions of SUGANAMI.

2. SUGANAMI made a speech to the soldiers of his company, applauding the rebels, saying that their motive came from a pure heart of love for the nation, and also saying that their motive had the same sincerity shown by Lt. Col. AIZAWA. He went on, saying, "Soldiers, if there was error in my order, kill me; but those who think that there was no error in my saying, come with me. I will always stand at your head."

3. At 9:30 a.m., 29 Feb. 1936, SUGANAMI was called on by OKASHIMA Ryohai, a student in the SHONAN Private School in KUMAMOTO, for a secret communication with the members of the same circle of KUMAMOTO. At that time SUGANAMI encouraged OKASHIMA and gave him ¥45 for travel expenses.



The facts stated above damaged the military interests of the empire.

The second prisoner, Lt. SHIKI Takato committed the following acts to benefit the rebels:

1. At noon of Feb. 26, 1936, he stressed to a few officers belonging to his regiment the necessity of averting mutual fighting within the army, and also the necessity of forging ahead for the reformation movement.

(TN 2-9 are nearly the same offenses, namely, of propoganda and communications at his residence and at his regiment.)

The performance aforementioned damaged the military interests of the empire.

Verification of the Crime (TN this part was omitted as this was a long legal argument.)

Prosecutor's Legal Conclusion

I think that the performance aforesaid in using diverse devices to benefit the rebels is the crime, each of which devices is applicable to the latter part of Article 29 and Article 30 of the Army Criminal Law which stipulates that one who damages the military interests of the empire by resorting to methods other than specified in Article 27 and Article 28 is culpable. (TN this legal discussion is omitted.)

Subject person: Capt. SUGANAME Saburo

PART IV

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At the sixth trial of Capt. SUGANAMI Saburo, held on 13 December 1936, at the Army Court Martial in Tokyo, the prosecutor, SUGANO Yasuyuki, made the prosecution against Capt. SUGANAMI Saburo. Among the long prosecution documents the gist of the part "Curriculum Vitae of his (TN SUGANAMI) thought and action" is as follows:

(TN SUGANAMI Saburo was an outstanding personality mentioned by MURANAKA Koji as a spiritual leader of the SHOWA Renovation coupled with NISHIDA Chikara. SUGANAMI was indeed a peculiar spiritual leader of the 2.26 Incident. Therefore, we must know him fully, if we want to know the intellectual background of the 2.26 Incident. Following is the gist of the antecedents of his thought and actions, as explained in the prosecution.)

1. During his course in the Military Preparatory School, he read a book which discussed the "Five Big Factions of the Army", and since that time he planned to correct the wrongs of the army.
2. After he became an officer in the KAGOSHIMA Regiment, he stressed, at every opportunity, the necessity of carrying out the second version of the Meiji Reformation to his superior officers.
3. For his rule, he adopted an attitude of worship of the Emperor.
4. Since 1930, he became acquainted with Lt. Comm. FUJII

Hitoshi and Capt. OKISHI Yoriyoshi, and also with civilians who were intending to carry out the reformation.

5. In February 1931, he uncovered beforehand the plot of the March Incident, and questioned Gen. ARAKI Sadao about the measures he would take when the conspiracy should be put into action.

6. In February 1931, he changed his post to the 3rd Infantry Regiment. In October of that year he experienced the October Incident and thought it had originated, as had the March Incident, in the vicious desire of the leaders of the army for political powers. Therefore, consulting with OKISHI Yoriyoshi and SUEMATSU Taihei, he hoped to realize at once the SHOWA Renovation by taking the initiative against the staff clique and leading the young officers under his command. However, the October Incident was disclosed to the authorities before its outbreak and so it was not realized. Later, as Gen. ARAKI was installed to the post of War Minister, he backed him up and frequently stated to him his intention of joining the SHOWA Renovation.

7. On 15 May 1932, the 5.15 Incident occurred. Although the prisoner did not have any direct relation with the incident, the influences of his thoughts, given to army cadets who had participated in the incident, were very great.

8. After the TOHOKU Division went out to Manchuria, he distributed a pamphlet advocating a relief movement for the homes of soldiers

who came from poor farming areas in TOHOKU, and was consequently punished.

9. In August 1932, his post was changed to Manchuria. However, due to his one year's intellectual activities in Tokyo until that time of transfer, he was adequately praised as a leader of young officers.

10. After he went to Manchuria, he established contact by letters and manuscripts with NISHIDA Chikara and MURANAKA Koji. Furthermore, MURANAKA Koji, SHIBUZAWA Zensuke, and ISOBE Aseichi one by one came to Manchuria and consulted with the prisoner about the SHOWA Renovation activities.

11. SUGANAMI organized in Manchuria the MANCHU SEINEN DOSHIKAI (The Manchurian Youth Comrades Society) and, enlisting the workers of the South Manchuria Railway Company and others, did his utmost to recruit members for the renovation movement. He also received money and donations from October 1934 as follows: ¥14500 from OSAWA Hayabusa, ¥2000 from TSUJI Masao, ¥500 from IFUJI Seisoo, and ¥2200 from the fund of the MANCHU SEINEN DOSHIKAI (The Manchurian Youth Comrades Society). Apart from the above, ¥3300 was received from OSAWA Hayabusa for gratitude and travel expenditures. The total received was ¥22500. He distributed the money in as follows: ¥2500 to MURANAKA Koji; ¥1000 each to NISHIDA Chikara, SHIBUKAWA Zensuke, and OKISHI Yoriyoshi; and ¥500 to HAKAMURA Yoshiaki. Each was given for expenses in connection with the renovation movement.

12. In August, 1935, he returned to Japan Proper by change of post. On his way to his new post, he came to Tokyo (without permission and by this act he was placed under arrest and confined for three months) and consulted with MURANAKA Koji. In those days, he was deeply moved by the AIZAWA Incident; he dispatched a telegram of encouragement to Lt. Col. MITSUI, and also sent another telegram, which requested the opening to the public of the AIZAWA trial, to Col. KOFUJI, the chief judge of the AIZAWA trial.

Regarding the national reformation, he came to embrace a conviction, since the October Incident, that, if inevitable circumstances occurred, he was justified in resorting to unlawful measures.

The prosecutor summarized as follows: "The prisoner, SUGANAMI Saburo, must be thought of as a leader of the reformation movement of young officers. The development of his clear and deep renovation principles, the power of his splendid writing--all these factors--charmed these young officers and he became an idol to them. However, he was unfortunate. Though he lived one day in a nook in a northern region, and another day in an obscure corner in southern SATSUMA, his vast spiritual influence was exerted on the members of the same circle in Tokyo. Therefore, I recognize that his thought constituted one of the intellectual motives of the present incident.

**SUBJECT: SUGANAMI's views on the March and October Incidents, and the factions of the army.**

Prisoner: Capt. SUGANAMI Saburo

(Page 267-)

On 11 December 1936, Capt. SUGANAMI was questioned at the Military Court Martial in Tokyo as follows:

Q. What is the meaning of your so-called "staff fascists"?

A. It is wrong to think that the target of our attack was the staff of the army headquarters. In fact our target of attack was the fascists among the staff of the army headquarters.

Q. How did the prisoner come to know of the scheme of the October Incident, and what were its scope and contents?

A. Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO Kingoro said, at a dinner party held at NAKANO (TN in Tokyo), some words about KYOHEI (TN raising an army).

Hearing this, I earnestly made a secret investigation, and at last it was disclosed that: 1. The method was to use force. 2. The targets of attack were Baron SHIDEHARA Kijuro, the Foreign Minister; Marquis MAKINO Nobuaki (or Shinken), the Lord Privy Seal; IKKI Kitakuro, the Imperial Household Minister; other KANSHIN (TN False-hearted retainers surrounding the Emperor); and some high officers of the government. 3. Lt. Col. CHO Isamu held full responsibility in disposing of the Prime Minister. 4. The date of action was October 25.

5. After the outbreak, they would take measures for the publication of an Imperial Rescript. 6. Even the draft of the Imperial Rescript was already completed.
- Q. Did the prisoner agree to the plot?
- A. No, I didn't agree to the plot from the beginning. The reason I participated in that meeting was solely to reconnoiter their movements. However, I thought at first to stop that plot by leading them properly, but, concluding that such a step was impossible, I was determined to put them into a barracks detention room.
- Q. If so, for what reasons did the prisoner participate in the party of KEPPAN (TN Pledge of secret membership by means of a blood seal)?
- (Page 270) Isn't it true that an unresolved person could not occupy such a seat?
- A. They feared that, should they omit me, my comrades, the young officers, might be demoralized. Their action was not systematic and, drinking sake', they boasted and bragged before the maid servants. They acted so crudely that it was no trouble for me to find opportunities.
- Q. Were those men, OKISHI Yoriyoshi, MURANAKA Koji, OKURA Eiichi, wishing to participate in the October Incident?
- A. OKISHI was in the TOHOKU District and, when we met in August 1931, he asked me to advise him. I think he had no intention of participating in the Incident, like MURANAKA and OKURA, who seemed to be blindly

A. That means to make them obey the right commands. Therefore, I do not supporting it.

Q. The prisoner said he had a plan to put them into a barracks detention room. What plan was it then?

A. I thought they would arise by using force on the festival of the Yasakuni Shrine. Therefore, I planned to go directly to the General Staff office. Then, having under my leadership, the forces of the 1st and 3rd Infantry Regiments, to arrest them, place them into the barracks detention room, and, thereafter, to await the order of the Emperor. Accordingly, I consulted with ANDO Teruzo and KODA Kiyosada, young officers of the 1st and 3rd Infantry Regiments, and obtained their consent. These actions on our part were, of course, so-called extra-legal actions, and, therefore, it was necessary that we awaited the Imperial order.

Q. In the actual plan of the prisoner, there was an item in the outline of the actions to be taken for the October Incident. This item was, viz. to consult with the KENKIBUTAI (TH the rebelling troops) of the Imperial Guards, etc., and to try to convert them into a righteous and loyal force for the Emperor. What do you mean by this? Is it possible that a "rebellious corps" could become a righteous and loyal force for the Emperor?

...-23-... belonging to the CHOKKI class from entering the Military College. Due to this fact, there are some in higher ranks now, who could not enter the Military College because they were from the CHOKKI class. I think that measures like this continued



- A. That means to make them obey the right commands. Therefore, I do not know whether it is possible to change them into a righteous and loyal force for the Emperor.
- Q. Is such an action called an "extra-legal advance"?
- A. Yes, someone named it so.
- Q. You said that after reading the book "Five Big Factions of the Army", you thought that there were factions or cliques in the army. What did you think, then, of the factions?
- A. Japan was united by the MEIJI Reformation. However, since the main forces which accomplished the MEIJI Reformation were the two feudal clans of the "SATSUMA" and the "CHOSHU", there were fostered within the forces, the feudal influences of the SATSUMA clan and the CHOSHU clan. Thus, there has developed the SATSUMA clan in the navy, and the CHOSHU clan in the army. Due to this fact, gradually the evil influences aggravated themselves, and in the army there appeared a tendency to try to upset the CHOSHU clan. The organization established for this purpose was the ISSSEKI-KAI (THE EVENING SOCIETY). The leader of this movement was the late Lt. Gen. NAGATA Tetsuzen. Taking the position as an instructing officer in the Military College, through which any officer should be able to distinguish himself, he obstinately took measures to oppose and prevent those youths belonging to the CHOSHU clan from entering the Military College. Due to this fact, there are some in higher ranks now, who could not enter the Military College because they were from the CHOSHU clan. I think that measures like this sometimes

contain self-interest and, therefore, it naturally fostered antagonism between opposing clans.

Q. Did the prisoner think that there were such factions as the TOSEI-HA (TN Control Faction), and the KODO-HA (TN Imperial Way Faction)?

A. I can't say whether there were really factions, but I acknowledge the fact that there were such ideas.

Q. Did the prisoner recognize them as factions?

A. Judging from what appeared in journalism, I think there are the SEIGUN-HA (TN Pure Army Faction), the KODO-HA (TN Imperial Way Faction), and the TOSEI-HA (TN Control Faction). Those connected with the March Incident, and the October Incident were of the SEIGUN-HA (TN Pure Army Faction); those connected with the coup d'etat plotted by a part of the staffs in the autumn of 1933 were the TOSEI-HA (TN Control Faction); Generals ARAKI, MAZAKI, etc., were called the KODO-HA (TN Imperial Way Faction). I recognize the existence of these factions, and also recognize the antagonism and competition among them.

Q. In what ways do such antagonism and competition appear?

A. I think it appears in the change of personnel. I thought so, for instance, when I saw changes in the personnel who were said to be having connection with such factions in the magazine "ISHIN" (TN Political Reform).

Q. Were there some instances when the young officers, including the

prisoner were treated from the angle of such factions?

A. Yes, in the unthinking oppression of young officers who were my comrades.

Q. What were the connections between the prisoner and NISHIDA Chikara at the time of the October Incident?

A. As NISHIDA Chikara was investigating the theoretical part, I once asked Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO Kingoro to request of NISHIDA his precise opinion regarding NIHON KAIZO HOAN TAIKO (TN KITA Ikki's book, Outline of Japan Reform Bill, which was the main intellectual background for the SHOWA Renovation movement). I alluded then not only to NISHIDA but to other civilians working for the national reformation movement, like GONDO Seikyo and others. However, it seemed that HASHIMOTO conceived of me as a man belonging to the faction of KITA Ikki and NISHIDA Chikara.

Q. Is it not NISHIDA Chikara who disclosed the October Incident?

A. It was true that such propaganda was circulating; I don't know as to its veracity. I have never consulted with NISHIDA Chikara regarding the October Incident.

Q. What does the prisoner think about such an extra-legal action?

A. I think that I said something about it at the preliminary examination. I think that, when such anti-KOKUTAI (TN contrary to the national polity) actions as the March Incident or the October Incident occur, it is good that we resort to action to suppress them.

PART I

Academy, he had satisfactorily thought that there was also necessity for  
TITLE : 2.26 Incident  
VOLUME REFERENCE : No. 19 out of 32 volumes  
OUR REFERENCE : No. 14  
SUBJECT : The nature of the thought and the origin of the actions of SHIKI Takato.

Prisoner: 1st Lt. SHIKI Takato

(T.N. - The gist of SHIKI's answer at the army Court Martial in Tokyo on 7 December 1936 is as follows:)

1. 1st Lt. SHIKI thought that Japan would face a catastrophe, if left to the present trend of political and economic tendencies.
2. His belief in taking direct violent action to attain his aims changed gradually as the years passed, but the general trend of his thought never changed. If inevitable, he thought, he must take violent action.
3. He thought Japan to be quite rotten, due to the maladministration of the "Privileged Government" built on the so-called privileged class of GENRO (TN Elder Statesmen), ZAIBATSU (TN Financial Cliques), and JUSHIN (TN Ex-Premiers). Therefore, he thought that these men and their class must be struck down as soon as possible.
4. The origin and the true cause of Japan's rottenness came, according to him, from only one fundamental cause; i.e., the lack of the true consciousness of KOKUTAI (TN National Polity) among the general public.
5. Since the time when he was a student in the Military

Academy, he had unflinchingly thought that there was dire necessity for some sort of drastic reformation to remedy the situation.

6. To the question of whether he thought that direct action was quite necessary, or whether he thought some other method could achieve his end, he answered that, though he didn't think that direct action was always necessary, when an "inevitable circumstance" occurred, he would resort to violent direct action.

7. When he was asked what kind of things he thought were "inevitable", he declared that any action resulting in the destruction of the KOKUTAI (The National Polity) must be taken as an "inevitable circumstance" to justify direct action. From his remarks during the trial, not once did he seem to have become conscious of the existence of other peaceful, democratic methods to achieve his end. He only knew of the mission of the sabre; this trend of prejudice can be observed in the minds of all of his colleagues and friends.

8. His ultimate ideal regarding his action was eventually to establish in Japan a government under a quasi-divine Emperor--a "so-called Emperor system benevolent to the mass of the people". This ideal, one can easily observe, is rather semi-religious, and fully devoid of the treatment of state politics in the light of modern science.

9. To summarize, he was a plain and simple fanatic brought up under the biased influences and prejudiced teachings of the Japanese military education and its ultra-nationalistic principles.

10. In order to carry out the SHOWA Renovation SHIKI advocated a purge of the army. The purge, he stressed, did not mean the wholesale overthrow of the high staff officers of the army, but the target of his attack was the "staff fascists" in Tokyo who ran counter to the KOKUTAI (TN National Polity) or, in the light of his interpretation, the pure Emperor system.

SUBJECT: The violent opinions of 1st Lt. SHIKI about the trial of Lt. Col. AIZAWA.

The gist of SHIKI's answer at the Army Court Martial on 7 December 1936 in Tokyo is as follows:

1. On February 1936, just before the 2.26 Incident, SHIKI heard, through a publication which came from Tokyo, a rumor to the effect that Lt. Col. AIZAWA's trial was being complicated owing to the alleged oppression of the military leaders conspiring with the clique of JUSHIN (TN Ex-Premiers). Angered furiously by this information, he declared that he came to feel as though he wanted "to stand up unsheathing his sword" in order to bring about the SHOWA Renovation by our (young officer's) hand.

2. He advocated the opening of the trial to the public. The reason was, he thought, to upset the secret interests of the military leaders and JUSHIN (TN Ex-Premiers), who composed the so-called privileged class. It was against them, that AIZAWA had fought, and it was against them also, that SHIKI was fighting indirectly.

3. Therefore, SHIKI was one of the strong sympathizers of

Lt. Col. AIZAWA.

**SUBJECT: NAKASHIMA and SHIKI**

The gist of SHIKI's answer at the Army Court Martial in Tokyo on 7 December 1936 is as follows:

1. SHIKI, when asked by Maj. Gen. HIRANO for spiritual and mental support for the SHOWA Renovation, introduced to him NAKASHIMA Susumu and OKASHIMA Ryohei just after the outbreak on the morning of the Incident, February 26.
2. According to SHIKI's testimony, NAKASHIMA Susumu and OKASHIMA Ryohei were regarded in KUMAMOTO as the right-wing violence gang.
3. NAKASHIMA and OKASHIMA were intimate friends; both lived in KUMAMOTO City, KUMAMOTO Prefecture, and NAKASHIMA was leading OKASHIMA.
4. NAKASHIMA established in his home a private school by the name of SHONAN JUKU (TN Bright Camphor School), but had practically no pupils; OKASHIMA was the only follower.
5. SHIKI sometimes gave some monetary aid (tens or two hundreds) to NAKASHIMA in the testimony of SHIKI.
6. Both NAKASHIMA and OKASHIMA, though they were not in military service, were firmly connected with military men and militaristic ideas. They respected Gen. MAZAKI Jinsaburo, then Inspector General of Military Education, and believed and strongly advocated the ideal of the SHOWA Renovation.
7. When the 2.26 Incident occurred, both were at KUMAMOTO

having no direct connection with men who had risen in Tokyo. But, by the instruction of SHIKI, OKASHIMA went to KAGOSHIMA for correspondence purposes.

8. The facts between Maj. Gen. HIRANO and some right-wing gang virtually proves that HIRANO is an outstanding member of SHIKI's group.

**SUBJECT: Maj. Gen. HIRANO's opinions and action regarding the trial of Lt. Col. AIZAWA**

**Prisoner: 1st Lt. SHIKI Takato**

(Page 52-60) The gist of SHIKI's answer at the Army Court Martial in Tokyo on 7 December 1936 is as follows:

1. Maj. Gen. HIRANO declared to SHIKI that the outcome of the AIZAWA Trial would decide the turning point of the success or failure of the SHOWA Renovation movement.

2. He said that he would like to have men who would strive for the SHOWA Renovation with convictions of righteousness, and asked SHIKI for mental and material support.

**SUBJECT: Maj. Gen. HIRANO's connections with Lt. Gen. YANAGAWA**

**Prisoner: 1st Lt. SHIKI Takato**

1. Maj. Gen. HIRANO regretted the removal of Lt. Gen. YANAGAWA to Formosa as the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Taiwan Force, because YANAGAWA was the outstanding member of the group.



2. In February of 1936, HIRANO sent a letter to SAITO Makoto, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. HIRANO made known the contents of the letter to SHIKI on February 27, and SHIKI published it at once and distributed it among the officers of his regiment (Kumamoto). Of this action, SHIKI declared that the aim of the publishing and distribution was to let other officers know the impending necessity of carrying out the SHOWA Renovation, and the necessity of ousting the GENRO (TN Elder Statesmen), ZAIBATSU (TN Financial Cliques), and JUSHIN (TN Ex-Premiers), who all had close relationship with the Court.

SUBJECT: Gen. MAZAKI's connection with SHIKI about the time when the former's resignation as Inspector General of Military Education was pending.

1. SHIKI, on NAKASHIMA Susumu's advice, sent a letter to Gen. MAZAKI, wishing him to stand firmly in his convictions on the then heated problem of the "TENNO KIKAN SETSU" (TN Emperor Organ Theory advocated by Prof. MINOBE of the Tokyo Imperial University viewing the Emperor system as an organ of the state).

(Page 63) 2. To this letter MAZAKI answered by a letter to SHIKI, adding a Japanese poem regarding his inner feelings on his resignation from the post of Inspector General of Military Education.

## PART II

SUBJECT: SAKURAKAI (TN Cherry Blossom Society), October Incident, 12.20 Incident, and the 5.15 Incident.

Prisoner: Capt. SUGANAMI Saburo

(Page 112) On 8 December 1936, SUGANAMI Saburo answered as follows at the Army Court Martial in Tokyo:

"During March 1931, six months before the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, I heard in Tokyo a rumor of the Manch Incident which schemed to achieve a coup d'etat. In August of that year, I was in the 3rd Infantry Regiment, Tokyo. At that time, in the army headquarters in Tokyo there was a society, the name of which was the SAKURAKAI (The Cherry Blossom Society), and which was then vehemently advocating its principle of renovating the nation.

I thought that the society was established in the intentions of the upper class of army officers to foster an internal atmosphere for the solution of heated problems in Manchuria and Mongolia. One day I attended a meeting of the SAKURAKAI (The Cherry Blossom Society) and heard the address of Maj. NAKA. On that occasion, Col. HASHIMOTO Kingoro, then a Lt. Col. and Chief of the Russian Section of the Army General Staff, addressed the party, speaking as if he were a hero like Kemal ATATURK, the heroic president of the Turkish Republic. I felt somewhat very strange and queer.

In September of that year the Manchurian Incident occurred. At that time a part of the young officers since the 41st Class, who had been in Tokyo (Those officers who graduated in the 41st Class of the Army Officers' School) were invited by the staff officers to attend

the meetings of the SAKURAKAI (TN Cherry Blossom Society) for then it was aiming to tide over the then internally critical situation of the nation, upholding the three chiefs (TN War Minister, Chief of General Staff, and Inspector General of Military Education). Therefore, we, the young officers, participated in the meeting.

The place of meeting of the SAKURAKAI (TN Cherry Blossom Society) moved gradually to that of some eating-houses, and it was said that the expenditures were coming from the "KIMITSU-HI" (TN Secret Fund) of the army. (Page 114) Especially, Lt. Gen. CHO Issamu, then a Major, who was said to have come to Tokyo from Manchuria, was said to have mustered hundreds of RONIN (TN Leaderless warriors of the Shogunate; now, slang for free, right-wing members and gangs). Sometimes he bragged that he would someday assault the Chief of the Metropolitan Police, and he seemed like a DOKATA (TN low-class construction worker; slang for a worthless person).

As I was secretly investigating what sort of things they were plotting, and observing them with cautious eyes, I came to detect that they were plotting a secret scheme, nearly another continued version of the March Incident--a coup d'etat plot. (Page 115) Then I was determined that, should they rise up, I must imprison them in the barracks detention room, using the forces of the 1st and 3rd Infantry Regiments. I informed the young officers of the 1st and the 3rd Infantry Regiments of my intention and conferred with them. The result was that they assented to

move under my leadership against the plot.

"However, this plot of Colonel HASHIMOTO and Lt. Col. CHO was disclosed to the authorities on October 16, and the chief plotters were arrested and put into the barracks detention room. This was the October Incident. Afterwards, the "staff clique" (chief plotters of the October Incident) schemed to rise once again, fixing the date of the uprising for 20 December 1936, and Capt. OHARA Shigetaka called on me and asked for my co-operation. However, I opposed this dishonest plot. Though I was blamed by KURIHARA Yasuhide, a patriotic young officer, as the fascist mania was very prevalent in those days, I advocated correcting the supreme command system from the higher officers down to the lower officers, and to forge ahead in the purge of the army. I also wished that those radical young officers would reconsider and reflect. At last the plot of the staff clique failed owing to the fact that the young officers did not participate."

"During 1932, the Shanghai Incident occurred, and I was sent to Shanghai. There, I felt great sorrow, as Major FUJII Hitashi died in action." (TN FUJII was a spiritual leader of the young naval officers' group which flocked together for national reformation.)

"In April 1932, I returned to Tokyo after finishing my duties in Shanghai, and I knew that some army cadets, united closely with some naval young officers, were growing very radical regarding the problems of the critical internal situation and of the London Naval Disarmament Conference. As a suspected case of cholera appeared from my section I

was detained in the barracks, so that I had no opportunity <sup>to</sup> see such cadets. It was on 14 May 1932 that I was granted permission to go out. May 15 was on a Sunday, and in the morning Captain ASAYAMA Kojiro called on me and said, 'As I advised IKEMATSU Takeshi, an army cadet, to call on you, I ask you to instruct him at that time'.

That afternoon IKEMATSU and SAKAMOTO, both cadets, called on me. I advised them not to rouse themselves to action, and asked their reconsideration; I imagined that I succeeded in changing their minds. Before that day, I had been resting assured that Lt. KOGA Kiyoshi would not rouse himself to action because I had asked Lt. MURAYAMA Tadayuki to take steps to hold back KOGA.

Subsequently, I went to the residence of Maj. Gen. YAMASHITA Tomoyuki (then a Colonel and head of the Military Affairs Section of the War Department) with my father and elder brother. There I was telephoned by KURIHARA Yasuhide. I left YAMASHITA's residence alone and hurried to the house of NISHIDA Chikara in a taxi. During the drive the taxi driver informed me of the hot news of the 5.15 uprising. Just when I reached NISHIDA's residence I saw him being conveyed to the JUNTENDO Hospital on an Ambulance but, although he was in such a condition, he was in high spirits. At NISHIDA's residence, I met Capts. OKURA Eiichi, SASAKI Jiro, and ASAYAMA Kojiro. There we all agreed to make our opinions known to the War Minister as the army leaders might feel anxious, since the naval cadets had risen up.

In the War Minister's residence we met some of the army's higher leaders, as the War Minister was then absent. We said that the young officers of the army would not arouse themselves, and I also endeavored to keep the young army officers in check.

After the TOHOKU Division went out to Manchuria, I observed that the homes of the dispatched soldiers were in a miserable state due to the current depression in the farming districts. In July 1932, after consulting ANDO Teruzo and KURIHARA Yashuhide, I initiated a humane movement to raise a relief fund for the distressed homes of the soldiers, and I distributed a pamphlet I had written to all the Japanese army officers. We hoped to utilize this humane action as the means to make the ZAIBATSU (Financial Cliques) reconsider, and also to furnish a motive for their surrender of economic power, and for the execution of the SHOWA Renovation.

However, due to abuses and deprecations by the staff cliques, Maj. Gen. YAMAOKA, the head of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Dept., declared that my action was not good and ordered me to cease my action at once; eventually <sup>I was</sup> put in barracks prisons, after being sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor.

On the next day, 9 December 1936, at the Army Court Martial in Tokyo, when asked the meaning of the reformatory purge of the army,

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SUGANAMI answered, "I thought that the ringleaders of the March Incident and the October Incident such as Gen. UDAKI Issai, Gen. MINAMI Jiro, Lt. Gen. KOISO Kuniaki, Lt. Gen. TAKEKAWA Yoshitsuga, Col. HASHIMOTO Kingoro, Lt. Col. TANAKA Ryukishi, and Lt. Col. CHO Isamu, must be relieved from their posts."

**SUBJECT:** The November 1934 Incident, which was a forerunner of the 2.26 Incident.

Prisoner: Capt. SUGANAMI Saburo

(Page 296-297)

On 12 December 1936, SUGANAMI answered as follows at the Army Court Martial in Tokyo:

- Q. How are the prisoner's relations with Gen. MAZAKI?
- A. I do not know about Gen. MAZAKI.
- Q. How does the prisoner think about the November Incident?
- A. In September of 1934, when I was in Manchuria, I received news through my information net of the November Incident, which was then said to have been the conspiracy plot of MURANAKA Koji and ISOBE Asaichi. According to this information there were in Manchuria some people concerned with the incident. Thus, I perceived intuitively that this Incident might be a fabricated one. When I asked in the headquarters of the KWANTUNG Army, they showed me a report from the Military Police Headquarters in Tokyo. It suggested that this incident was not a fact. Later, I received precise information from Capt. OKURA Eichi about this incident. According to it, the fact was that the plot was utterly

a fabrication by a part of the staff clique of Tokyo, aiming to oppress our young officer members.

I felt that my first expectations were right. I felt a deep sympathy towards Mr. MURANAKA and Mr. ISOBE, who were both placed in custody, and later suspended from office. I took measures with my comrades to aid the families of these two men. Later, MURANAKA and ISOBE sent me a paper which declared that the prosecution was utterly fabricated."

**Important Facts in the Evidence and Testimony  
Found in the Trial of 1st Lt. SHIKI Takata**

(TN) The prisoner SHIKI Takata was not an important man among the prisoners. When the 2.26 Incident occurred, he was in KUMAMOTO, KYUSHU. Until the day of the outbreak he virtually knew nothing of the scheme. About noon on Feb. 26, he was informed of the outbreak of the incident by a reporter's telephone message. He wished to go to Tokyo, but failed. He wished to aid the rioters in Tokyo, but his efforts were almost negligible. Later, he was arrested.

The facts found in his trial are only his intimate connection with Maj. Gen. HIRANO and MAZAKI Jinsaburo, then Inspector General of Military Education; also, his right-wing activities in KUMAMOTO, KYUSHU.)

**PART III**

(Page 347) Gist of Parts I, II, and III

(TN) The following is the gist of Part I, Part II, and Part III



in the prosecution made by SUGANO Yasuyuki, the army prosecutor, against Capt. SUGANAMI Saburo and 1st Lt. SHIKI Takato in the case of the criminals of the 2.26 Incident of rebellion.

Introduction

This case is a movement of the outer circles in the rebellion case which occurred on 26 Feb. 1936, concerning the factions of MURANAKA Koji.

When the rebellion occurred, young officers and civil "right-wing" thinkers who were in close connections with the rebels, executed effective measures suitable to their respective residences, so as to maintain and enlarge the rebellion in Tokyo. Such cases appeared not only in Japan Proper but also in HOKKAIDO, KOREA, and in more remote regions like Manchuria, thereby bringing the situation at one time to the brink of nation-wide rebellion.

Fortunately, however, the rebellion in Tokyo ended in four days, and the judicial punishments against the rebels <sup>were held</sup> on 5 July 1936 at the Army Court Martial here and the execution thereafter. Now the problem depends solely on the outcome of this case, which is the second version of the rebellion.

Facts

Both prisoners, from years preceding, were feeling deeply the necessity of national reformation, and were actively working for the realization of the so-called SHOWA Renovation by co-operating with

MURANAKA Koji, ISOBE Asaichi, ANDO Teruzo, KODA Kiyosada, and other members of the same circle in the civil and military world.

On 26 Feb. 1936, ANDO Teruzo and MURANAKA Koji assaulted, killed, or injured the JUSHIN (TN Ex-Premiers) and some high officers of the government, and occupied the important parts of the Capital by resorting to the use of armed forces. They forcibly demanded the upper men of the army to realize at once the reformation--thus a rebellion was realized.

The first prisoner, SUGANAMI Saburo, hearing this news, did the following things to benefit the rebels:

1. SUGANAMI obstructed the activities of gendarmes who acted secretly to investigate the actions of SUGANAMI.

2. SUGANAMI made a speech to the soldiers of his company, applauding the rebels, saying that their motive came from a pure heart of love for the nation, and also saying that their motive had the same sincerity shown by Lt. Col. AIZAWA. He went on, saying, "Soldiers, if there was error in my order, kill me; but those who think that there was no error in my saying, come with me. I will always stand at your head."

3. At 9:30 a.m., 29 Feb. 1936, SUGANAMI was called on by OKASHIMA Ryohai, a student in the SHONAN Private School in KUMAMOTO, for a secret communication with the members of the same circle of KUMAMOTO. At that time SUGANAMI encouraged OKASHIMA and gave him ¥45 for travel expenses.

The facts stated above damaged the military interests of the empire.

The second prisoner, Lt. SHIKI Takato committed the following acts to benefit the rebels:

1. At noon of Feb. 26, 1936, he stressed to a few officers belonging to his regiment the necessity of averting mutual fighting within the army, and also the necessity of forging ahead for the reformation movement.

(TN 2-9 are nearly the same offenses, namely, of propoganda and communications at his residence and at his regiment.)

The performance aforementioned damaged the military interests of the empire.

Verification of the Crime (TN this part was omitted as this was a long legal argument.)

#### Prosecutor's Legal Conclusion

I think that the performance aforesaid in using diverse devices to benefit the rebels is the crime, each of which devices is applicable to the latter part of Article 29 and Article 30 of the Army Criminal Law which stipulates that one who damages the military interests of the empire by resorting to methods other than specified in Article 27 and Article 28 is culpable. (TN this legal discussion is omitted.)

PART IV

Subject person: Capt. SUGANAMI Saburo

(Page 454)

At the sixth trial of Capt. SUGANAMI Saburo, held on 13 December 1936, at the Army Court Martial in Tokyo, the prosecutor, SUGANO Yasuyuki, made the prosecution against Capt. SUGANAMI Saburo. Among the long prosecution documents the gist of the part "Curriculum Vitae of his (TN SUGANAMI) thought and action" is as follows:

(TN SUGANAMI Saburo was an outstanding personality mentioned by MURAHAKA Koji as a spiritual leader of the SHOWA Renovation coupled with NISHIDA Chikara. SUGANAMI was indeed a peculiar spiritual leader of the 2.26 Incident. Therefore, we must know him fully, if we want to know the intellectual background of the 2.26 Incident. Following is the gist of the antecedents of his thought and actions, as explained in the prosecution.)

1. During his course in the Military Preparatory School, he read a book which discussed the "Five Big Factions of the Army", and since that time he planned to correct the wrongs of the army.

2. After he became an officer in the KAGOSHIMA Regiment, he stressed, at every opportunity, the necessity of carrying out the second version of the Meiji Reformation to his superior officers.

3. For his rule, he adopted an attitude of worship of the Emperor.

4. Since 1930, he became acquainted with Lt. Comm. FUJII

Hitoshi and Capt. OKISHI Yoriyoshi, and also with civilians who were intending to carry out the reformation.

5. In February 1931, he uncovered beforehand the plot of the March Incident, and questioned Gen. ARAKI Sadao about the measures he would take when the conspiracy should be put into action.

6. In February 1931, he changed his post to the 3rd Infantry Regiment. In October of that year he experienced the October Incident and thought it had originated, as had the March Incident, in the vicious desire of the leaders of the army for political powers. Therefore, consulting with OKISHI Yoriyoshi and SUEMATSU Taihei, he hoped to realize at once the SHOWA Renovation by taking the initiative against the staff clique and leading the young officers under his command. However, the October Incident was disclosed to the authorities before its outbreak and so it was not realized. Later, as Gen. ARAKI was installed to the post of War Minister, he backed him up and frequently stated to him his intention of joining the SHOWA Renovation.

7. On 15 May 1932, the 5.15 Incident occurred. Although the prisoner did not have any direct relation with the incident, the influences of his thoughts, given to army cadets who had participated in the incident, were very great.

8. After the TOHOKU Division went out to Manchuria, he distributed a pamphlet advocating a relief movement for the homes of soldiers

who came from poor farming areas in TOHOKU, and was consequently punished.

9. In August 1932, his post was changed to Manchuria. However, due to his one year's intellectual activities in Tokyo until that time of transfer, he was adequately praised as a leader of young officers.

10. After he went to Manchuria, he established contact by letters and manuscripts with NISHIDA Chikara and MURANAKA Koji. Furthermore, MURANAKA Koji, SHIBUZAWA Zensuke, and ISOBE Asaichi one by one came to Manchuria and consulted with the prisoner about the SHOWA Renovation activities.

11. SUGANAMI organized in Manchuria the MANCHU SEINEN DOSHIKAI (The Manchurian Youth Comrades Society) and, enlisting the workers of the South Manchuria Railway Company and others, did his utmost to recruit members for the renovation movement. He also received money and donations from October 1934 as follows: ¥14500 from OSAWA Hayabusa, ¥2000 from TSUJI Masao, ¥500 from IFUJI Sotae, and ¥2200 from the fund of the MANCHU SEINEN DOSHIKAI (The Manchurian Youth Comrades Society). Apart from the above, ¥3900 was received from OSAWA Hayabusa for gratitude and travel expenditures. The total received was ¥22500. He distributed the money as follows: ¥2500 to MURANAKA Koji; ¥1000 each to NISHIDA Chikara, SHIBUKAWA Zensuke, and OKISHI Yoriyoshi; and ¥500 to NAKAMURA Yoshiaki. Each was given for expenses in connection with the renovation movement.

12. In August, 1935, he returned to Japan Proper by change of post. On his way to his new post, he came to Tokyo (without permission and by this act he was placed under arrest and confined for three months) and consulted with MURANAKA Koji. In those days, he was deeply moved by the AIZAWA Incident; he dispatched a telegram of encouragement to Lt. Col. MITSUI, and also sent another telegram, which requested the opening to the public of the AIZAWA trial, to Col. KOFUJI, the chief judge of the AIZAWA trial.

Regarding the national reformation, he came to embrace a conviction, since the October Incident, that, if inevitable circumstances occurred, he was justified in resorting to unlawful measures.

The prosecutor summarized as follows: "The prisoner, SUGANAMI Saburo, must be thought of as a leader of the reformation movement of young officers. The development of his clear and deep renovation principles, the power of his splendid writing--all these factors--charmed these young officers and he became an idol to them. However, he was unfortunate. Though he lived one day in a nook in a northern region, and another day in an obscure corner in southern SATSUMA, his vast spiritual influence was exerted on the members of the same circle in Tokyo. Therefore, I recognize that his thought constituted one of the intellectual motives of the present incident.

**SUBJECT: SUGANAMI's views on the March and October Incidents, and the factions of the army.**

**Prisoner: Capt. SUGANAMI Saburo**

**(Page 267-)**

On 11 December 1936, Capt. SUGANAMI was questioned at the Military

**Court Martial in Tokyo as follows:**

**Q. What is the meaning of your so-called "staff fascists"?**

**A. It is wrong to think that the target of our attack was the staff of the army headquarters. In fact our target of attack was the fascists among the staff of the army headquarters.**

**Q. How did the prisoner come to know of the scheme of the October Incident, and what were its scope and contents?**

**A. Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO Kingoro said, at a dinner party held at NAKANO (TN in Tokyo), some words about KYOHEI (TN raising an army).**

Hearing this, I earnestly made a secret investigation, and at last it was disclosed that: 1. The method was to use force. 2. The targets of attack were Baron SHIDEHARA Kijuro, the Foreign Minister; Marquis MAKINO Nobuaki (or Shinken), the Lord Privy Seal; IKKI Kitokuro, the Imperial Household Minister; other KANSHIN (TN False-hearted retainers surrounding the Emperor); and some high officers of the government. 3. Lt. Col. CHO Issamu held full responsibility in disposing of the Prime Minister. 4. The date of action was October 25.



5. After the outbreak, they would take measures for the publication of an Imperial Rescript. 6. Even the draft of the Imperial Rescript was already completed.

Q. Did the prisoner agree to the plot?

A. No, I didn't agree to the plot from the beginning. The reason I participated in that meeting was solely to reconnoiter their movements. However, I thought at first to stop that plot by leading them properly, but, concluding that such a step was impossible, I was determined to put them into a barracks detention room.

Q. If so, for what reasons did the prisoner participate in the party of KEPPAN (TN Pledge of secret membership by means of a blood seal)?

(Page 270) Isn't it true that an unresolved person could not occupy such a seat?

A. They feared that, should they omit me, my comrades, the young officers, might be demoralized. Their action was not systematic and, drinking sake, they boasted and bragged before the maid servants. They acted so crudely that it was no trouble for me to find opportunities.

Q. Were these men, OKISHI Yoriyoshi, MURANAKA Koji, OKURA Eichi, wishing to participate in the October Incident?

A. OKISHI was in the TOHOKU District and, when we met in August 1931, he asked me to advise him. I think he had no intention of participating in the Incident, like MURANAKA and OKURA, who seemed to be blindly

1. That meant to make them obey the right commands. Therefore, I do not supporting it.

Q. The prisoner said he had a plan to put them into a barracks detention room. What plan was it then?

A. I thought they would arise by using force on the festival of the Yasukuni Shrine. Therefore, I planned to go directly to the General Staff office. Then, having under my leadership, the forces of the 1st and 3rd Infantry Regiments, to arrest them, place them into the barracks detention room, and, thereafter, to await the order of the Emperor. Accordingly, I consulted with ANDO Taruzo and KODA Kiyosada, young officers of the 1st and 3rd Infantry Regiments, and obtained their consent. These actions on our part were, of course, so-called extra-legal actions, and, therefore, it was necessary that we awaited the Imperial order.

Q. In the actual plan of the prisoner, there was an item in the outline of the actions to be taken for the October Incident. This item was, viz. to consult with the KKKIBUTAI (TH the rebelling troops) of the Imperial Guards, etc., and to try to convert them into a righteous and loyal force for the Emperor. What do you mean by this? Is it possible that a "rebelling corps" could become a righteous and loyal force for the Emperor?

to appear and prevent them from -23- belonging to the KKKIBUTAI from entering the Military College. In this case, there are some in higher ranks who, they could not enter the Military College because they were from the KKKIBUTAI plan. I think that measures like this were

- A. That means to make them obey the right commands. Therefore, I do not know whether it is possible to change them into a righteous and loyal force for the Emperor.
- Q. Is such an action called an "extra-legal advance"?
- A. Yes, someone named it so.
- Q. You said that after reading the book "Five Big Factions of the Army", you thought that there were factions or cliques in the army. What did you think, then, of the factions?
- A. Japan was united by the MEIJI Reformation. However, since the main forces which accomplished the MEIJI Reformation were the two feudal clans of the "SATSUMA" and the "CHOSHU", there were fostered within the forces, the feudal influences of the SATSUMA clan and the CHOSHU clan. Thus, there has developed the SATSUMA clan in the navy, and the CHOSHU clan in the army. Due to this fact, gradually the evil influences aggravated themselves, and in the army there appeared a tendency to try to upset the CHOSHU clan. The organization established for this purpose was the ISSEKI-KAI (TN an evening society). The leader of this movement was the late Lt. Gen. NAGATA Tetsuzan. Taking the position as an instructing officer in the Military College, through which any officer should be able to distinguish himself, he obstinately took measures to oppose and prevent those youths belonging to the CHOSHU clan from entering the Military College. Due to this fact, there are some in higher ranks now, who could not enter the Military College because they were from the CHOSHU clan. I think that measures like this sometimes

contain self-interest and, therefore, it naturally fostered antagonism between opposing clans.

Q. Did the prisoner think that there were such factions as the TOSEI-HA (TN Control Faction), and the KODO-HA (TN Imperial Way Faction)?

A. I can't say whether there were really factions, but I acknowledge the fact that there were such ideas.

Q. Did the prisoner recognize them as factions?

A. Judging from what appeared in journalism, I think there are the SEIGUN-HA (TN Pure Army Faction), the KODO-HA (TN Imperial Way Faction), and the TOSEI-HA (TN Control Faction). Those connected with the March Incident, and the October Incident were of the SEIGUN-HA (TN Pure Army Faction); those connected with the coup d'etat plotted by a part of the staffs in the autumn of 1933 were the TOSEI-HA (TN Control Faction); Generals ARAKI, MAZAKI, etc., were called the KODO-HA (TN Imperial Way Faction). I recognize the existence of these factions, and also recognize the antagonism and competition among them.

Q. In what ways do such antagonism and competition appear?

A. I think it appears in the change of personnel. I thought so, for instance, when I saw changes in the personnel who were said to be having connection with such factions in the magazine "ISHIN" (TN Political Reform).

Q. Were there some instances when the young officers, including the

prisoner were treated from the angle of such factions?

A. Yes, in the unthinking oppression of young officers who were my comrades.

Q. What were the connections between the prisoner and NISHIDA Chikara at the time of the October Incident?

A. As NISHIDA Chikara was investigating the theoretical part, I once asked Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO Kingoro to request of NISHIDA his precise opinion regarding NIHON KAIZO HOAN TAIKO (TN KITA Ikki's book, Outline of Japan Reform Bill, which was the main intellectual background for the SHOWA Renovation movement). I alluded then not only to NISHIDA but to other civilians working for the national reformation movement, like GONDO Seikyo and others. However, it seemed that HASHIMOTO conceived of me as a man belonging to the faction of KITA Ikki and NISHIDA Chikara.

Q. Is it not NISHIDA Chikara who disclosed the October Incident?

A. It was true that such propaganda was circulating; I don't know as to its veracity. I have never consulted with NISHIDA Chikara regarding the October Incident.

Q. What does the prisoner think about such an extra-legal action?

A. I think that I said something about it at the preliminary examination. I think that, when such anti-KOKUTAI (TN contrary to the national polity) actions as the March Incident or the October Incident occur, it is good that we resort to action to suppress them.

Time for truth.

**The 2.26 Incident**

**Volume 7 of 29 Vols. of The Action Group**

**Our Reference #3**

**Judgment Rolls**

**Tokyo (Military) Court Martial**

**TESTIMONY OF**

**SHIBUKAWA, Zensuke, Age 32 years**

P 50 A

Q. When did you meet your group prior to the Incident and what did you discuss?

A. I don't recall the exact date. Probably it was in the evening when I saw Lt. Col. AIZAWA's 6th trial, that I related that trial to 20 or 30 members of the group gathered at the Restaurant "ryudo" in front of the 3rd Infantry Regiment, Amaba.

P 249 B

Q. What did you do on the 27th?

A. -- Later, as I had been asked by Capt. MATSUDAIRA on the previous night to call at "Kodo Iahin Ren-me" (T.N. a name of a private school ultra-nationalistic, meaning Association of Emperor's Rule Restoration), I went there after supper. When I asked them to give me a prospectus of the uprising, they answered that they did not yet finish printing. But a pupil there gave me 200 or 300 copies of them.

P 241 A

In the protocol of preliminary examination it says that primarily we attempted to change the political system of our country. But we have never planned such a thing. We merely wanted to assist the Emperor's management of the restoration.

Secondly, though it states that we roused an army privately and were going to oppose the national law and at the same time throw the capitol in confusion etc., those were not our aims; and that we tried to organize a new government for ourselves, which was not true.

P 25 A

260 B

Explanation of the restoration movement.

Restoration movement means nothing in particular. It is merely to improve all that we hear and see. There always has been a

fight for truth.

Presently the Emperor's will, which are intercepted, does not reach the people. Nor does public opinion reach the Emperor. It is our present aim of the restoration movement to reform these evil practices. It has been since the London Treaty was concluded (T.N. 1930) that I have exerted myself socially for this movement. In summer, 1929, we organized a society called "Gakusei Kokoku Ren-meii" (T.N. a name given to a private school, meaning the student's association for the prosperity of the country) and started movement to realize our three great principles of the Treaty of London and later to make an objection on the ratification of the same Treaty. In fall, 1930, I called on Mr. MITSUKAWA, Kametaro at "a private school for the prosperity of Asia" (Koa Gakufuku) and stayed there for a year and a half. Afterwards I entered "Keiten Juku" (T.N. a private school for ultra-nationalistic movement, meaning to open the road to present an address to the Throne) kept by the graduates of Colonial University (T.N. Takushoku Daigaku), YOSHIMOTO Toshikuma, KAWAHATA, Hagi (or Ushiyoshi) and others. This school is a student's dormitory for training mentally, a fresh man to practice moral obligation of patriotism. I stayed there for about a year, but the institution was moved to the present mental training school called Chokushin Dojo (T.N. meaning to train our minds towards righteousness) at Koishikawa.

P 261 A - 262 B

The same school was later kept by SAIGO Takahide, OMORI Issai and I. In the same year, I had a little connection with the "Kawagoe Teishin Tai" (Kawagoe Volunteer's group Incident).

Only connection I had with the above Incident was that I was present at the discussions and meetings. These meetings were held at "Kaniyo Sonjuku" (T.N. meaning a private village school of the age of Gods) and at a tea-room at Sakumashi, Otsuka. And as those who were present at these meetings were involved in the above Incident, I was restricted under suspicion for 50 days.

Owing to the Kawagoe Incident and others, "Keiten Juku" was under surveillance by the authorities, so we gave it up and started the present mental training school "Chokushin Dojo", the keepers being OMORI, SAIGO and I, and this time, students were not limited only to those of Colonial University.

Since fall in the same year, they published "Kakushin" (Reform) and I assisted in its publication. Concerning the incident of an assault on the Aoyama Takagicho post-office, I was examined since the beginning October and at the beginning of the following month I was detained for violating regulations of fire-arms and ammunition and allowed bail at the end of July, 1935.

P 260 B - In the same year I was busily engaged in clarification of the Imperial polity. As for AIZAWA's Incident, I have done my best to reveal the truth to the world.

P 262 B - 263 A  
Q. Have you never carried on an enlightening movement of restoration among the farmers of North-eastern and North-western districts?

A. I have never done it directly.

Q. What have you done indirectly?

A. In the provinces, some of my congenial "spirits" worked intently so I can say I have participated in it indirectly.

P 263 B - 265 A  
Relationship with NISHIDA Chikara:  
While I was in the Military Academy, there was a magazine called "Japan" in the assembly-room of the school. It was the days of weak-kneed foreign policy of Japan and the military man was unpopular among the civilians. NISHIDA was an editor of this magazine. In those days I read Mr. KITA's "A plan on reformation of Japan" published by NISHIDA. That is how I became acquainted with him.

Q. Do you agree to "A general plan on reformation of Japan"?

A. It may be necessary for me to explain the minute points, but I thought it excellent opinion and I still agree with him in the general principles.

Q. What do you think of stopping the constitution, bringing a state of siege, and carrying on cout d'etat?

A. I cannot say either to agree or not to agree. It is a matter of methodology.

P 265 B  
Q. Give me the main accounts which you and NISHIDA worked together to accelerate the movement of restoration.

A. We have never worked together for any purpose, but merely to have an occasional conversation. I have never received particular instruction from him, nor have we published pamphlets.

Q. What was his opinion about the movement of restoration when you had a talk with him?

A. We did not have any consistent talk about it. I called on him to hear him talk on the present situation.



P 270 B - P 271 A

- Q. Did you think that "Genro" (T.N. the elder statesman) and "Jushin" (T.N. the chief vassals) must be killed for the sake of the restoration movement?
- A. It depends on the circumstances. I think that if they will not reflect upon their conducts, it will be necessary to kill them.

P 275 B - 276 A

Connections with YAMAGUCHI Ichitaro:

After the 5.15 Incident, the officers who took part in it were placed under the care of each commander. So YAMAGUCHI and I went to the residence of the Commander of the 1st Division to state that it was unnecessary to do so.

The same captain planned "A ten years' program for establishing the Manchurian industry" with the students of Waseda University. I assisted him. I think he is still now an adviser of "Dai Ajia Nippon Seinen Ren-meï" (T.N. the Great Asiatic association of the Japanese young men)

P 278 B

- Q. Why didn't they kill the leaders of Zaibatsu (financial clique) and the political parties?
- A. I do not know. As for the political parties, they are out of the question. Whenever they want to crush the Zaibatsu, it is easy for them to do so with the power of the government. Therefore, I think it is unnecessary to crush them first.

P 288 B

- Q. Have you ever had any communications with your congenial "spirits" at Aomori (T.N. place-name) through SATO Shozo?
- A. Yes, I have. He is connected with "Tohmon Kai" (T.N. East Gate Society). It has been organized from those days when the Triple Intervention was carried out. MURAJIRO, son of the then president of the society, Ito Shigeru, and I are friends and therefore I have been an associate member of it. That is how I come to know SATO Shozo.

He came to me in the morning of the 27th Feb. I asked him to go to Hiroaki and Aomori and to tell our "congenial spirits" the truth about this Incident.

P 292 A - P 304 B

The Private Papers of Shibukawa Zensuke  
Reasons for Participating in the Incident, and afterthought and prayer. (T.N. Herein revealed the true character of the Japanese ultra-nationalistic idea since the Feudal Days.)

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2. The National Polity of The Empire and assistance of Restoration.
3. The Trend of the International affairs and our Mission and the urgent duty at present.
4. National Affairs.
5. The Situation preceding the Incident.
6. The meaning of the Incident.
7. Conclusion.  
Afterthought and Prayer.

P 53 A  
Q How did you meet your group prior to the incident and what did you discuss?  
A I don't recall the exact date. Probably it was in the spring when I met the Gen. Alliance Club which, I recall that trial to 20 or 30 members of the group gathered at the "Restaurant" in front of the 3rd Infantry Regiment, Austin.

P 219 B  
Q What did you do on the night?  
A -- Later, as I had been asked by Gen. Alliance on the previous night to visit the "Hotel Jordan" which is one of a private school ultra-nationalistic, meaning association of Emperor's Holy Declaration. I went there after supper. When I asked them to give me a prospectus of the article, they answered that they did not yet finish printing. But a night later gave me 200 or 300 copies of them.

P 111 A  
In the protocol of preliminary examination it says that primarily we attempted to change the political system of our country. But we have never planned such a thing. It merely stated in social the Emperor's encouragement of the restoration.  
Secondly, though it states that we found an easy privately and were going to oppose the national law and at the same time attract the capital to ourselves etc., these were not our aims, and that we tried to organize a new government for ourselves, which was not true.

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The restoration of the monarchy is dependent. The restoration movement means nothing in particular. It is merely to improve all that we hear and see. There always has been a

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Afterthought and Prayer.

I investigated the conditions of the Japanese people at the time of the incident. I found that the Japanese people were suffering from various social disturbances which included the extreme poverty and degradation in Japan. I felt that we must correct these retrogressive conditions in such fields as politics, economics, education, and in the administration of justice. The occurrence of violations of the human rights, the work of the Japanese people, the Manchurian Incident, etc., tells us that the Japanese aimed only at their selfish interest and had no consideration for the national welfare. The so-called JEMIN (The Promises) political parties, the aristocratic and special privileged classes were united to abuse their privileges and violated justice as well as morality. Their degeneracy had reached its height, and we concluded that the only way to correct these injustices and lawlessness...

1. "Why did you plan to kill the following officers?"
  1. General HAYASHI, General HAYASHI, Colonel ISHIZUKA Hajime, Lt. Col. WANO Akira, Colonel HIRATA Hiroshi, and Major KATSUMI Goro
2. "I think Gen HAYASHI is responsible for the violation of the supreme command in connection with the replacement of TOSHIMITSU OKADA of MILITARY EDUCATION."
3. "Gen HIRATA was a supporter of the 'Separate Army Theory.'"
4. "As to Col. ISHIZUKA, I wonder why he should be killed as he dedicated himself to assist in the MANCHU Insurrection."
5. "Lt. Col. WANO, Col. HIRATA, and Major KATSUMI must have been connected with the October Incident."

Vol Ref. #8 of 29 Volumes.  
(our ref. #4)

From transcript of testimony of SAKAI Naoshi in the 2.26 Insurrection  
Incident

Testimony taken at Tokyo (Military) Court Martial held at its Headquarters  
on the 2nd of March 1936.

1st Lt., 3rd Inf. Regt.

p. 5-6 The motives and circumstances leading into the 2.26 Incident.

"As an instructor engaged in the training of young soldiers, I investigated the social conditions of the Japanese families and saw the exhausted conditions were beyond our perspective, and felt the necessity for the fundamental reconstruction of Japan. On the other hand, daily newspapers were crowded with such articles as corruption, bribery, and major criminal cases, left wing movements, and other social disturbances which indicated the extreme putrefaction and degeneration in Japan. I felt that we must correct these putrefactions in such fields as politics, economics, education, and in the administration of justice. The evidences of violations of the Supreme Command, the weak-kneed diplomacy before the Manchurian Incident, etc., tells us that the politicians aimed only at their selfish interest and had no consideration for the national welfare. So-called JUSHIN (Ex-Premiers) political parties, ZAIATSUS and special privileged classes were united to abuse their privileges, and violated justice as well as morality. Their degeneration had reached its limits, and we concluded that the army must correct these injustices and immoralities."

p. 15-16 Q. "Why did you plan to kill the following officers?"

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2. "Gen WATANABE was a supporter of the "Emperor Organ Theory."
3. "As to Col ISHIWARA, I wonder why he should be killed as he dedicated himself to assist in the SHOWA Insurrection."
4. "Lt. Col. MUTO, Col. NEMOTO, and Major KATKURA must have been connected with the October Incident."

Observing Lt. Col. Akira's total, I have always thought that it was not the opportune moment for pure agitation but for immediate revolution. In this case we must especially assert that we had definitely rejected the cooperation of Inspector-General SHIMAZU, but unfortunately he rejected it, and therefore we were forced to assassinate him.



P. 20 "The main characters with whom I consulted on the movement of the SHOWA RESTORATION were Maj Gen YAMASHITA Tomoyuki and Maj Gen SAITO Ryu."

P. 16-16B "Those persons authorized to enter the official residence of the War Minister until 7AM, on the 26th Feb were: Maj Gen YAMASHITA, Lt Gen KOSO, Maj Gen SAITO Takahashi, Lt Gen KASHII, Maj. Gen YANO, Lt Gen HASHIMOTO, Lt Gen HORI, Col KOFUJI, and Capt YAMAGUCHI."

"Those persons authorized to enter official residence of the War Minister after 7 AM on the 26th Feb were: Gen HONJO Shigeru, Gen ARAKI Sadao, Gen MAZAKI Jinsaburo, Lt Gen IMAI Kiyoshi, Maj Gen KUHATA Binshiro, Maj Gen OKAMURA Naiji, Col MURAKAMI Keisaku, Col NISHIMURA Takuma, Col SUZUKI Teiji, and Lt. Col. MITSUI Sakichi."

P. 21 "Civilians who had close connections with the SHOWA Insurrection were: Messrs. NISHIDA Chikara, MURANAKA Koji, and ISOBE Asaichi."

Testimony of 2nd Lt. TAKAHASHI Taro taken at Tokyo Court Martial on 3 Mar 1936 - Age 24 years.

P. 73-B The causes and motives for the prevailing thoughts.

"I had actually witnessed the social conditions in the social, political, and financial organizations, and especially upon observing the indignations against these injustices and hearing of such heretical doctrines and mistaken theories as the "Emperor Organ Theory" indulged in by these arrogant JUSHINS (TH Ex-Premier) I was determined to cooperate in the accomplishment of this SHOWA Insurrection."

P. 74-B "I did not think our actions had any adverse influences such as essence and dignity upon the Imperial Army. I wondered why our actions was not accepted in the mind of the Emperor."

P. 75 "I believe that if our actual spirit would prevail throughout Japan, it would bring about very favorable results."

"As for influences in world affairs, The Imperial Army did not wish to be treated with contempt by foreign countries, and moreover, foreigners can never fully comprehend the true spirit of our Army."

Testimony of 2nd Lt. YASUDA Yu, Artillery, taken at Tokyo (Military) Court Martial on 1 Mar 1936.

P. 92 "Observing Lt. Col. AIZAWA's trial, I have always thought that it was not the opportune moment for mass agitation but for immediate revolution. In this case we must especially assert that we had definitely requested the cooperation of Inspector-General WATANABE, but unfortunately he rejected it, and therefore we were forced to assassinate him."

p. 100-108 Explains the reason for his participation. Infantry. Age 23 years.

p. 102-104 "I had witnessed many social injustices and immoralities from my childhood and felt indignant about them. I hoped to become a lawyer and intended to remedy these injustices, but I realized later that my hope would never be realized as law is often influenced by financial interests. Finally I decided that a soldier is the most just person in Japan, and so I volunteered. But unfortunately my expectations were betrayed by: a. those who graduated from the military cadet school were so poor that they sometimes stole others' property, b. some students often frequented cafes, or house of prostitution wearing 'sack coats.' Encountering many instances of injustice, I felt the necessity for the reorganization of the country, with the violation of the Supreme Command being the most regrettable problem. As to economical conditions, it is evident that in Japan there is a close relationship between the Emperor and the people. However there are extreme differences between the agricultural people and the upper classes in urban communities.

p. 472

"Since the Manchurian Incident, the military has endeavored to coerce the political party, but it has become the 'hot-bed' of the political party since the profits of the munitions industry were kept by the political party. For example, in the production of aircraft, they bought the patents from foreign countries. NAKAJIMA, KAWASAKI, MITSUBISHI, etc., are selling these patents at high prices to the military authorities. These companies had become the 'hot-bed' of the political parties."

Testimony of 2nd Lt. TOKINA Minoru, Infantry, taken at Tokyo (Military) Court Martial on 1 March 1936. Age 23 years.

p. 302

p. 148-149

"We intended to eliminate the JUSHINS (IN Ex-Premiers) as they were hindering the Imperial Rule, and thereby restore the real order of Japan. Then, by our actions, hoped that the Emperor would be able to accomplish the SHOWA Revolution."

p. 151

"I felt regrettable for the ambiguous attitude of the government and considered the so-called JUSHIN "blec" as its fundamental cause.

Testimony of 2nd Lt. KIYOHARA Yasuhei, Infantry, taken at Tokyo (Military) Court Martial on 2 March 1936 - Age 23 years.

p. 174

"The main purposes of this incident were to restore the financial power of the Emperor, to secure the rights of Supreme Command, and to exterminate the 'Emperor Organ Theory.'"

"Captains ANDO and NONAKA, 1st Lt. SAKAI and others induced me to participate in this incident."

Testimony of 2nd Lt. SUZUKI Kinjiro, Infantry. Age 23 years.

p.182-194 Covers in detail his thoughts as to influences on the essence and dignity of the army.

Testimony of 1st Lt. SAKAI Naoshi, Infantry. Age 27 years.

p.226-228 Explains the reason for his participating in the incident, i.e., the distressing social and economic conditions, etc., the JUSHINS (TH Ex-Premier) utilizing the Royal prerogative for their private benefits, etc. Detailed explanations given from pages 230 to 246 in his own writing on ideologies, social, economic, educational, and religious circles.

p. 271

"The SHOWA Restoration was not to make fundamental revisions of the national and social organizations as did the MEIJI Restoration, but to re-establish the idea of political unity between the Emperor and his people, and to do this, the villainous retainers must be exterminated and filial and loyal people appointed in their place in important political positions. Because heretofore, the Imperial dignity has been infringed upon by discreditable retainers, the common people could not have a share in the boundless kindness and dignity of the Emperor."

Testimony of 2nd Lt. MORIYA Kiyonari, Infantry, taken at Tokyo (Military) Court Martial on 18 March 1936 - Age 37 years.

p. 301

Extracts: "I do not know the details but at the time, the leaders of the Rebellion Corps namely MURANAKA Keji, ISOBE Asaichi, Captains AMDO and NONAKA, and others were reportedly in consultation with the War Minister and Military Councillors."

p. 302

"I have not heard anything concerning the assassination of Inspector-General WATANABE before its actual execution."

p. 304

"Q. You told me 'I had heard from Lt. SAKAI that at the present time the regiments in TOKYO would cooperate with our plan.' Did you also hear the names of the leaders and the reason for the assassination?"

"A. I had heard of the plans, but have forgotten all the names of the leaders excepting Captain AMDO, Captain NONAKA and Lt. KURIHARA. I had heard that SAITO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Premier OKADA, former Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and MAKINO were to be assassinated."

P. 313 Extracts of plans for this incident.

"I do not know the exact details, but judging from the plan to assassinate the Keeper of the Privy Seal SAITO, this incident must have been planned chiefly by Captains ANDO and NONAKA, Lt. KURIHARA, MURANAKA, ISOBE, and others. The plan was to mobilize the 1st and 3rd Infantry Regiments, with the young officers (those mentioned before) to take lead of the corps. With the assassination of such arrogant JUSHINS, as Keeper of the Privy Seal SAITO, Inspector General WATANABE, MAKINO, SHINKEN, Premier OKADA, Finance Minister TAKAHASHI, and Grand Chamberlain SUZUKI, the plan was to place the capitol city into chaos, and then to occupy the official residence of the War Minister, the Military Staff Headquarters, and the Metropolitan Police Board."

P. 319 "I have had no relationship with NISHIDA Chikara and KITA Kazuteru."

Testimony of 2nd Lt. TAKAHASHI Taro taken at Tokyo (Military) Court  
Martial on 15 March 1936 - Age 23 years.

P. 359 Extracts as follows:

"At that time Lt. SAKAI was in the official residence of the War Minister, and he often came to our company and reported circumstances in the official residence of the War Minister to be as follows: 'The War Minister as well as the Military Councillors, have not yet made up their mind to support the revolution. However since the Military Councillors had visited the palace and discussed this matter, I believe our aims will soon be realized.'"

P. 365 Extracts: "Captain MINAKA acting as representative of our army met with military Councillors, Generals MASAKI, ABE, and NISHI, and requested General MASAKI to settle the present situation. General MASAKI replied, 'I have complete understanding of your ideals and I will try to do my best.'"

P. 378 B "Our second object was to attract the Emperor's attention to the fact so that he in turn will request the aid of the army to issue an Imperial Rescript of the Showa Restoration."

P. 379 "Q. Are there any persons who should be executed for their treasonous acts?"  
"A. Prince SAIONJI, and the Chief of the Privy Seal ICHIKI Kitokuro should be duly assassinated."

P. 381 "I was not personally familiar with NISHIDA Chikara nor KITA Kazuteru."  
"I have read the work of KITA 'The General Plan to Reconstruct Japan' during my days at the Military Academy, but I could not agree with his views."

P. 382 Goes on in detail of his reasons for his participation in this rebellion.

Testimony of 2nd Lt. YASUDA Yutaka taken at Tokyo (Military) Court  
Martial on 20 March 1936 - Age 25 years.

P. 436 Extracts of YASUDA's memorandum reads as follows:

"The reasons for the decision to eliminate the six following persons are:

- a. MAKINO - He was the ringleader who violated the Supreme Command at the time of the London Treaty. He was also an Elder Statesman who had always hindered the trends toward the revolution and used the Imperial Prerogative for the protection of the specially privileged classes. The above mentioned fact can be evidenced by their secret activities at the time of each cabinet organization. For example by substituting his own opinions for the statements of other Elder Statesmen in inducing the Emperor to change his mind.
- b. SUZUKI - He knows of the evidences in the violation of the London treaties and was the leader of the JUSHIN (TM Ex-Premiers) blocs. He also violated orders in the palace and oppressed the army. It is evident that he has violated the Supreme Command in July in cooperation with SAITO, Keeper of the Privy Seal.
- c. SAITO - He was the most important person among the JUSHINS, and was also the ringleader of the violation of the Supreme Command.
- d. OKADA - He is the head of a weak cabinet. I believe we can further promote the cause for the Restoration by overthrowing him.
- e. TAKAHASHI - We respect his ability, but he is merely a representative for the ZAIBATSU's.
- f. WATANABE - He is a believer of the 'Emperor Organ Theory.'

P. 508 Testimony of TOKIWA Minoru, 16 Mar 1936.

"I distributed the pamphlets 'The Main Object' and 'The True Character of the JUSHINS' to my company since I was told to by Captain AMDO."

1.521-569 Testimony of KIYOHARA Yasuhei, 18 Mar 1936.

"In my opinion, the backers for the Showa Restoration were Generals ARAKI and MASAKI, Lt. Gen. YANAGAWA, and Major General SAITO Kyu."

at the time of the 5.15 Incident already permitted them to hold political parties in check.

I suppose that the reason for the Navy wanting to speed up the action was due to pressure subjected since the 5.15 Incident (Blood Brotherhood) Incident which happened before the 5.15 Incident.

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(our ref. #6).

FROM TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY OF SASAKI Jiro

IN THE 2.26 INSURRECTION INCIDENT

P 74-75

Q - It is said that ISOBE put up at your house on his way home from MANCHURIA last July. Why did he visit MANCHURIA?

A - ISOBE stated that he shadowed War Minister HAYASHI and Chief of Bureau NAGATA who visited MANCHURIA since it was likely that they might maneuver together with Gen MINAMI.

P 183

Testimony of NAGAO, Masao, 2nd Lt.

Q - Have you learned anything concerning the movements of the officers here when War Minister HAYASHI visited RANAN in June of last year?

A - 2nd Lt. YAMAMOTO merely told me that there existed an inside state of affairs between Gen MINAMI and War Minister HAYASHI during the latter's stay in MANCHURIA. ISOBE stated that both Lt Gen KOISO and Lt Gen TATEKAWA must be rid of as they are leaders of the SAKURA KAI (Cherry Blossom Society).

Testimony of OKURA, Riehi

P 333A

Impressions on the "Reorganization of Japan" written by MIYA Riehi. I read the book in 1932, and if I remember correctly, it was written in 1918. I read extracts of the prevailing movements, mainly in the Tokyo district since the 5.15 Incident with aims of national reorganization and clarification of the national policy.

The Army was so prudent that they controlled military cadets suspected to be in cooperation with the Navy. For this reason, Army had an opinion that immediate direct action would not favor them, as the circumstances at the time of the 5.15 Incident already permitted them to hold political parties in check.

I suppose that the reason for the Navy wanting to speed up the action was due to pressure subjected since the KETSU MEI DAN (Blood Brotherhood) Incident which happened before the 5.15 Incident.

Testimony of SASAKI, Jiro. 3rd Trial

P 395

The present ZAIBATSU are blinded by the desire for gains and have committed many dishonest acts in complicity with politicians.

P 396

I am afraid that the necessity for our southern penetration in China is going to be advocated openly with the recent deadlock of activities in North China. It is natural that ZAIBATSU are covetous for additional investments in the South because investments there would bring profits in a shorter time than in MANCHURIA and North China. The Navy will also be pleased with the southern penetration.

P 396 B

If this project is carried out for the benefit of the selfish interests of the ZAIBATSUS, our national policies in the Continent (China) may possibly be blocked by them. Furthermore, we must be prepared for the conflict in the south with Great Britain.

Testimony of ASAYAMA Kokiyo

P 465 A

Impressions on the "Reorganization of Japan" written by KITA Ikki. I read the book in 1932, and if I remember correctly, it was written in 1919 or 1920. Therefore, I admire the author's foresight in considering the problem of the so-called reform of Japan over the last ten years.

P 466

He stated that private properties are to be limited and the exempted portions be contributed to the nation for which service the government would grant special rights or appreciation. I thought it a good idea and hope the above properties will be contributed voluntarily. I sympathize with his opinions that major and other important enterprises should be nationalized.

P 466 B

Japan would govern the world in accordance with "The Doctrine of HAKKO ICHIU" and the movement of national reorganization would be helped by ex-soldiers.

P 472 A

I learned the views concerning the "Emperor Organ Theory" held by the late believer Inspector General of Military Education WATANABE through pamphlets and also in an address delivered by WATANABE to the chiefs of remaining troops in NAGOYA to the effect that this theory was frequently discussed, and that it came into question during Marshal YAMAGATA's days. He further expressed that the word "head" in the phrase of "have us for the head, etc." in the Imperial Rescript is an organ of the human body.

Testimony of YAMAMOTO Shinichi

P 827 A

At the meeting, ISOBE enumerated the names of both the reliable staff and the oppositionists within the army authorities. The names of the former staff have escaped my memory except for that of Generals MASAKI, ARAKI, MINAMI. In the oppositionists there were NAGATA Tetsuzan, HASHIMOTO Toranojo, HASHIMOTO Kongoro, Maj KATAKURA, and MURAKAMI Keisaku. The others have slipped my mind.

Testimony of MURANAKA Koji

P 651-667

The witness stated that the movements of national reorganization since the 5.15 Incident were as follows:

Since I joined the movement in October 1931, the officers had split into two groups; one comprising OKURA Hichi, ASAYAMA Kojiro, and KURIHARA Yasuhide, of which I took part, and the other led by HASHIMOTO Kingoro. Our party was not concerned with the KETSUMEI DAN (Blood Brotherhood) Incident, and we refused to accept the proposal of some navy officers to cooperate in their uprising. Since then we were favored by Minister ARAKI and his successor, Minister HAYASHI, who had sympathized with us only at the beginning. Maj Gen NAGATA insisted on lawful reorganization of the nation



but this opinion was changed to that of maintaining the status quo. We were dismissed from our posts with the November Incident. The movements for the clarification of the national policy previously set forth began to be suppressed by Maj General NAGATA and civilians, Home Minister GOTO and KARAWAWA Toshiki. Their attitude angered us. Being provoked by the problem of the transfer of Inspector-General MASAKI, namely the infringement of the Supreme Command, we were somewhat satisfied with the occurrence of the AIZAWA Incident, and its public trial made it clear that the Supreme Command had been infringed. Then we made our minds to solve these domestic troubles before the First Division (Dai-ichi Shidan) was detached to Manchuria so that we would be able to face foreign enemies free from all anxiety. War Minister HAYASHI was spoken well of by SAITO Makoto discharging General MASAKI. Maj General NAGATA took part in promoting MASAKI's discharge by expressing his views to the JUSHINS (Ex-Premiers) through the "ASAMESHI KAI" (Breakfast Club) and the MINSSEI party.

Testimony of NAGAO Masao, 2nd Lt.

P 625-632

In the deposition, the witness stated that he received a manifesto with vehement language from TOKYO in February, but could not estimate the happening of the event. Stated he was interested in the study of social circumstances, particularly the reason for the upper class for their tendencies to evade military services.

P 649

I had known that the movement for the Showa Restoration had started since the 5.15 Incident, and joined it in March 1934. Those days were the period of enlightenment and the unification of ideas. During 1934 and 1935, many problems such as the November Incident, Emperor Organ Theory, the transfer of Inspector-General of Education MASAKI, Inspector-General WATANABE's speech agreeing with the "Emperor Organ Theory," and the AIZAWA Incident. Although these stimulated the young officers, they, however, did not plan to act, but attempted merely for stronger unification.

The MINSSEI party had been going to become influential, and there was no hope for the change of the military staffs. Inspector-General

Testimony of ANDO Teruzo

P 670-675

Summarized as follows:

From the November Incident until the 5.15 Incident, we had believed that War Minister ARAKI would cooperate with us in the innovation of Japan. Since about 1932, the field officers grade became interested in this movement, and manifestos hoping for the unity of the whole army were delivered at the end of 1933. During March, April and May of 1934, we had frequent class alumni meetings to discuss current problems and opinions. However, in May of the same year, we were prohibited to hold such meetings. Pamphlets had been widely distributed since then among army personnel and accordingly, army officials began to study these, expecting the participation in the movement of the entire army. As we had become more active in the enlightening of this problem, we were finally checked by the War Ministry. The oppression of the War Ministry authorities became so intense that even private opinions were strictly scrutinized. In short, the military authorities seemed to be trying to subjugate the young officers and at the same time General MASAKI being suspected of having connection with these officers, was transferred from his position of Inspector-General of Military Education to another. The reason for AIZAWA's uprisal was because the army had been manipulated by the JUSHINS (TN - Ex-Premiers) and the ZAIBATSUS. The term of office during War Minister KAWASHIMA was rather peaceful. Suddenly after the 1st Division had been sent to MANCHURIA we commenced the planning of uprising to occur approximately two weeks before its actual undertaking.

Testimony of ISOBE Asaichi

P 703 A

Reason for sudden planning of uprising in February 1936.

Situation had become unfavorable and the question of encroachment upon the Supreme Power was dropped at AIZAWA's Public Trial. The SEIYU KAI that had been against the Emperor Organ Theory lost an election to the MINSEI TO whose representatives in the Diet were going to become influential, and there was no hope for the change of the military staffs. Inspector-General

of Military Education MASAKI and Chief of Army Affairs Bureau IMAI refused our advice to resign from their posts. Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal MAKINO retired but the more disagreeable SAITO succeeded him. Being unsatisfied with the situation which was steadily becoming worse, we set about to plan our committment.

P 704 A

Relationship between the AIZAWA Incident and reason for uprisal.

The necessity of the national renovation is based upon the grounds that we must not let them abuse the supreme power and maintain their influence. The SAGOYA Tomikichi Incident at the time of the London Treaty, the K TSUMEI DAN (Blood Brotherhood) Incident, and the 5.15 Incident arose with the object of chastising those who had been encroaching on the supreme power. In spite of these three chastisements, the supreme power was once again encroached upon in July of 1935. Then we intended to bring upon the uprisal, regardless of the procedure of the AIZAWA case. Furthermore, SAITO Makoto, who was concerned with the encroachment of the supreme power at the time of the London Treaty, and was now the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and IKKI Yuasa were occupying other important posts. Therefore under such circumstances, the AIZAWA Incident could not take a favorable trend. The national renovation movements among our friends are grounded in the book, "The Theory of National Reorganization," written by KITA, whose central idea is to keep the Imperial System, adding that Japan must control the whole world.

P 705 A

#### Testimony of SHIMURA Rikujo

P 712

Circumstances of the Showa Renovation Movement since 5.15 Incident.

I joined the movement in August 1934 while attending the CHIBA Infantry School, influenced greatly by Captain SUMATSU. I made a study chiefly on the problem of national policy and discussed it with my many friends. We underwent an examination, on suspicion of participating in the incident caused by MURANAKA, ISOBE

and others in November 1934, but it ended without reaching any conclusions. MURANAKA and ISOBE were discharged from military services. Therefore, the young officers criticized the authorities on Captain TSUJI's unfair discretion. When the young officers heard of the occurrence of the False Accusation Incident and the AIZAWA Incident, they were vexed.

Testimony of ASAYAMA Kojiro

P 741

Summary of conversation with ISOBE during his stop-over at RANAN (KORRA) in June or July of 1935.

He explained to me about the November Incident that "When the military cadets called at MURANAKA's house, a cadet, SATO, suggested their intentions of committing a direct action as a substitute for us if we would give up our uprising. He then told the cadets differently to satisfy them."

(On page 725 NISHIDA relates on the above problem that in order to control SATO and other cadets, MURANAKA disclosed their false plan to them).

This deliberate false information spread to the authorities and MURANAKA and ISOBE were arrested about the 20th of November. As I took it for SATO's doings, I brought an action against Captain TSUJI for his false accusation but no progress on it was ever made.

Testimony of Captains OKURA Eiichi,  
SASAKI Jiro and ASAYAMA Kojiro

P 804 A Summarized reasons for uprisal.

The defendants have been concerned on the future of Japan after observing that the governing class, namely the JUSHINS (TN: Ex-Premiers), bureaucrats, ZAIBATSUs, and political cliques have been thinking little in terms of national defense, and drawing the state into corruption. Feeling keenly the necessity of national renovation, to correct the existing evils, they had come to believe that it was a soldier's duty to see the return of the true character of the national policy. After discussion with MURANAKA, KOTA, ANDO, ISOBE, and KURIMARA, it was decided to overthrow the above-mentioned classes by mass force. Since about

STATEMENT OF WITNESS

January 1932, they had been keeping in touch with MURANAKA and others, and gradually joined in the plot. In order to hasten the realization of the Showa Restoration by making speeches at the court, propagating that the late NAGATA Tetsuzan had had influence on the Japanese Army, they dispatched a wire advising the then War Minister, Commander of 1st Division Chief Judge SATO to have the AIZAWA Trial opened to the public.

Testimony of IKEDA Masuji

P 809-810

Q - What did ISOBE have to say to you when he came to RANAN (KOREA) in June 1935?

A - I was told to have about 20 persons in event of emergencies, with Generals ARAKI, MASAKI, HAYASHI, Colonels NEMOTO and BANNAI at the head.

OK.

FEBRUARY 26 INCIDENT  
LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

Translator:  
NISHIYAMA, Natsuo

Tokyo Court Martial  
No. 22 out of 32 Volumes.

*Our #8*  
SUBJECT PERSONNEL

Captain OKURA, Eiiji

Page 157 B)

Q.: I hear that you have harbored the vice-leader of the Blood Brotherhood Corps, Eiji FURUUCHI, for some time in your house. Why have you harbored him?

A.: FURUUCHI visited my house at the beginning of 1931 for the first time. Since then I became closely acquainted with him. In February 1932 since he visited my house and requested me to give him shelter for some time, I had lodged him. Though I knew that he was a member of the Blood Brotherhood Corps, I did not know the conspiracy of it. Therefore, I did not know that he was sought by the police as an accused member of the Blood Brotherhood Corps.

Page 159 -

Q.: Have you ever visited KITA, Terujiro and NISHIDA, Chikara?

A.: Yes, I have visited them several times. Once I asked KITA concerning his reasons for limiting private property to one million yen in his work, "The General Plan for the Reorganization of Japan". In response to this question, he answered, "There is no reason for it; I only felt the necessity of it".

Page 162 B -

Q.: What are your opinions about the 5.15 Incident?

A.: At that time, since I had the feeling that the navy officers would take direct action, I visited Sub-Lieutenant KOGA to oppose this. However, military cadets finally took the leadership into their own hands and rebelled in direct action. I did not know anything about this incident. The reason for the young officers of the Army resisting the action of Sub-Lieutenant NAKAMURA was because General ARAKI was the War

Minister. Because of this fact we considered that even if we backed the Minister, we could not break the deadlock of the present situation without direct action.

Q.: Did you think that present social conditions required the SHONA Revolution? (Page 215 B)

A.: Certainly, present social conditions of our country have the evil influences of European and American civilization. Political and economic organizations were also affected by them and they were not suited for our national structure. On the other hand, [chief vassals], [plutoerata], and political parties stood between the Emperor and people and disrupted the administration. To break this evil condition, I thought that we must diffuse the spirit of Imperialism throughout Japan.

ZAI BATSUS

Just Hints

Page 219 -

Q.: Although a gloomy atmosphere prevailed over society at that time, you thought there were no reasons to break this atmosphere by direct action?

A.: Certainly! In regard to the outbreak of this 2.26 Incident, the SEIYU Party met the general election shouting for the clarification of our national structure, which was in direct opposition to the views of the MINSEI Party, consequently, the former was defeated by the latter who had a more democratic idea.

As the military authorities have been eagerly supporting the clarification of our national structure from the beginning, there arose a gloomy atmosphere in political circles. Observing this circumstance, I thought that our comrades in Tokyo would rise to direct action.

Page 222 -

Q.: Do you believe that there was a violation of the Supreme Command in connection with the change of the Inspector Generalship?

A.: Yes. According to military regulations, the personnel affairs of high officials should be decided upon after the consultation of the Three Chiefs. [The war Minister, the Inspector General, and the Chief of the Military Staff]. Nevertheless, the war Minister had decided to make the change by himself without consulting the other two chiefs.

(Page 222 B).

Q.: From whom did you hear this?

A.: I heard it from MURAHARA, Soji. (Page 227)

Q.: Have you made any secret oppositions against the problem that "the Emperor was merely a figure head, a theory" which was supported by Inspector General WATANABE

A.: I have not made any oppositions against it. But, as I had secured many documents in connection with the theory, I thought that if it were a true fact, I could not permit matters to rest. I presented the documents to the staff of the Toyama Military School and insisted on its investigation. However, they would not readily accept its investigation. Therefore, I made a memorandum asserting that "if the contents of the documents were true, I must request Inspector General WATANABE to resign his post; and if it were otherwise, we must disclose it to the whole army," and presented it to the head of the school requesting its delivery to the Inspector General. But unfortunately it was not accepted. (Page 295).

Q.: Have you ever read "The General Plan to Reorganize Japan"?

A.: When I heard the lecture of OKAWA, SHOMET in my days at the Military Academy, the book was recommended by my friend. (Page 296).

Q.: How did you feel after you read the book?

A.: My criticisms against this book is divided into two aspects:

- 1. From the viewpoint of Time Period.
- 2. From the viewpoint of our national structure.

Q.: Since I had not read it with appreciation, I should like to explain that which remains in my memory. If I remember correctly it was published in 1919, at that time the wave of weak diplomacy and the worship of the Almighty Money had been surging all over Japan.

Even officers of the General Staff disliked to wear their uniforms on their way to the office and changed from sack coats after they reached their posts. I acknowledged the author's superiority because he had published such a book on militarism at that period and especially for his declaration that "peace without war is not the way to Heaven", and his insistence that history indicates the rise

Q.: I did not like them, as they were in favor of the League Treaty.



and decline of the race and nation". Thus he urged the futility of hoping for peace without war. I think his opinion is excellent on this point. It is also excellent in that he thought so much of soldiers on the reserve list. (Page 299).

Q.: What are the names of the books which have become the basis of your thoughts concerning the national structure?

A.: Mainly, "The Ancient Chronicle". (Page 299 B).

Q.: What do you think of the present systems of politics, economy, diplomacy, education?

A.: I do not think that the systems or the organizations are wrong. Our main problem is our leaders. The reason for our existing systems not functioning properly is due to its improper leadership. (Extract from Page 301 B).

It is very wrong for Premier HIROTA to boast that "as far as I can in the past, there never will be war".

**2.26 INCIDENT** Translator: NISHIYAMA, Natsumi

**Legal Proceedings**

**Tokyo Court Martial**

Our Ref. No. 8. No. 22 out of 32 Volumes

Subject Person: OKURA Kiji

Page 304:

Q.: What do you think of the existence of Jushin (T.N. Ex-Premier), political Cliques, and Zaibatsu (T.N. Financial Cliques).

A.: I think that the mere existence of such groups in itself justifies their existence, therefore I believe they are useful for the country. However, I think that if they grow presumptuous, they are of no use to our country.

Q.: Assuming that the Jushins (T.N. Ex-Premiers) had not been assassinated in the 2.26 Incident, would you have permitted their survival?

A.: I did not like them, as they were in favor of the London Treaty.

Q.: For example, what attitude can you take against the declaration of Prime HIROTO that as far as he remained in post, there will never be war?

A.: I would not think it right to kill him just because he had made such a statement. If I had committed a slight mistake and was killed for that reason I would think it very regrettable. (Extract from Page 306) -- Summary.

Since such an emergency as the Manchurian Incident has arisen, the present number of Divisions is not sufficient for armaments.

It would be a mistake to appoint General Ugaki to the Premier's post, because he had decreased the number of divisions and would therefore create bad influences on the thoughts of the people. (Extract from Page 316) -- Summary.

Since the Manchurian Incident there arose two factions in the Army. One group is represented by General TANAKA, Giichi and UGAKI, Kazunari, who were in conspiracy with political parties. The other, is represented by General MUTO and Lt. General MURAKA who has had no connection with political parties.

After the Manchurian Incident General ARAKI was appointed as War Minister and was later succeeded by General HAYASHI. However, I did not know the relationship which existed between them. I only felt that political parties have made it a political issue in connection with the change of Inspector General MAZAKI. At that time, I thought that General HAYASHI was just a good-for-nothing person. (Page 324 B).

Q.: Have you any proof that Inspector General WATANABE is a supporter of the theory that ~~the Emperor is a figure-head~~ *Organ Theory?*

A.: I have heard that he has made a statement concerning that theory at the Army Club of the Third Division. (Page 361).

Q.: You have expressly "sworn allegiance to the Emperor with Arms". Does it reflect the attitude of the insurgent troops?

A.: At the time of the Meiji Restoration, the attitude of the Choshu Clan was "to swear allegiance to the Emperor with Arms". At HAMAGURI Gate, I quoted passages from it. These words do not always indicate the attitude of the Insurgent Troops, but in my opinion, it indicated the attitude of the Army. Concerning the Incident, the Army swears allegiance to the Emperor and will be armed against democratic ideals.

FEBRUARY 26 INCIDENT  
LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

Translator:  
NISHIYAMA, Ratsuo

Tokyo Court Martial  
No. 22 out of 32 volumes  
Car No. 8

SUBJECT PERSONNEL

Captain ASAYAMA, Kojiro

(Pages 412 to 416 -- Summary)

Defendant.

[10,000 yrs]

when I was appointed officer for the first time, I was engrossed in the technical training of soldiers. In the 6th Year of SHOWA (1931), viewing the situation in Manchuria, I thought that Japan must by all means go to war. Since then I had begun to think in earnest of the importance of the Army. As you <sup>know</sup> every Japanese national would cry "BANZAI" [long live] for His Majesty, the Emperor, at the moment they die on the battle field, and would not consider private affairs when they were in such an excited condition. But once they were awakened from their excited condition, they would be sure to think of their family. In the first world war Germany fought desperately to the end, but was defeated. I believe the reason for her defeat was defeat in thought. Although she was stable in her mind. I do not think even the Japanese can be at ease about it. After freeing soldiers from family cares, we must pound the idea of national construction into their mind. Why did China insult Japan? It must have been caused by the mischief - making by Britain and America after the London Treaty. The London Treaty was concluded with the intention of Britain and America to suppress the Japanese Navy. Seeing that, China thought that if Britain and America interfered with Japan, Japan would withdraw soon.

On the other hand, within the country, political parties and Zaibatsu (financial cliques) we have indulged in pursuing self-interest and national thought is growing so bad that the round-up of Communists has taken place incessantly. The farm-villages in the north-eastern District have fallen into distress.

Observing the above mentioned circumstances, I wondered why three million ex-soldiers would not arise in action for this national

emergency because there are so many ex-soldiers who had been educated by myself. When I blamed them in connection with the charge of buying notes, they did not take heed, saying that "the present social circumstances are not what you think they are", and were aware that the majority of opponents were persons who had to support the military. As the result of this, I made up my mind to create loyal and brave soldiers, however, miserable the social circumstances, or our national conditions may be. (Page 418).

Q.: Were you affected by the book "General Plan to Reorganize Japan".  
A.: No, I was not.

Q.: Do you agree with the opinion for the reorganization of the political and economical system which was written in this book?

A.: In my opinion the private ownership should be interpreted in a sense of public ownership. (Page 419).

In the situation in Manchuria, I thought that Japan was by all means to win. Since then I had begun to think in earnest of the importance of the army. As you all know Japanese national would not fight for the empire, the Emperor, at the moment they die on the battle field, and would not consider private affairs which they were in such an excited condition. But now they were concerned with their excited condition, they would be sure to think of their family. In the first world war Germany fought desperately to the end, but was defeated. I believe the reason for her defeat was defeat in thought. Although she was stable in her mind. I do not think even the Japanese can be allured about it. After fighting soldiers from family comes, we must regard the idea of national consecration into their mind. The 5th China Incident Japan it may have been caused by the mischief - making by Britain and America after the London Treaty. The London Treaty was concluded with the intention of Britain and America to suppress the Japanese ship. Looking back, China thought that if Britain and America interfered with Japan, Japan would withdraw soon.

In the other hand, within the country, political parties and laborers (in Manchuria) were indulged in pursuing selfish interests and national thought is scarce so that the possibility of a committee has taken place immediately. The Manchurians in the north-eastern district have fallen into distress.

Considering the above mentioned circumstances, I realized my duty which was to create loyal and brave soldiers in order to save the nation.

FEBRUARY 26 INCIDENT  
LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

Translator:  
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FROM TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY  
OF CHEKANA NISHIDA, IN THE 2.26 INSURRECTION INCIDENT  
(Volume #24 of 32 Volumes. Our Reference, #10)

Testimony was taken at Tokyo (Military) Court Martial held at it's Headquarters, on the 16th of March 1936.

- P 16 I did not know the extent of the plans or the names of army officers who participated in the insurrection. However the purpose of the uprising was to remove from the group of JUSHING /THE Ex-Premiers/people such as Prince Kinmochi SAIONJI, Count Nobuaki MAKINO, Admiral Makoto SAITO, Prime Minister Admiral OKADA, Grand Chamberlain Admiral Kantaro SUZUKI, and Finance Minister Korekiyo TAKAHASHI. It also appears to me that Baron Kitokuro ICHI, President of the Privy Council, and Seihin IKEDA were placed on the secondary list of purposes. The War Minister was to be requested to take measures against General Hamamori USAKI and General Jiro HIRAHARA. The plan also called for the punishment of Lt Gen KOISO and Lt Gen TATEKAWA who were connected with the March Incident.
- P 17 It further called for a demand for drastic measures to be taken against KATAMURA and TSUJI who were connected with the November Incident and also against those who were connected with the "OMOTO KYO" /THE-OMOTO Sect is a religious sect/
- P 18 The funds for the uprising that Lt Koji MURANAKA accumulated amounted to 1500 yen received from Mr. KAMEKAWA at the latter's home and 500 yen from a daughter of Mr TSUJI from Manchuria, who called on MURANAKA at my house.
- P 50-B I had heard of the December Incident from KAMEKAWA and YAMAUCHI. This story was told by KAMEKAWA. KAMEKAWA conceived the plan and KURIHARA agreed to this.
- P 51-B I do not remember hearing KAMEKAWA recommending KURIHARA to the post of Cabinet Minister, but have heard distinctly his recommendation of KURIHARA to the position of Chief Secretary of the Cabinet.
- P 52-B I did ask KAMEKAWA to convey to General HAYASHI the relief of MURANAKA and ISOBE. I did not make any statement that the rumor of organizing the MASAKI Cabinet came from Viscount OGASAWARA's group. I merely stated that from my point of view, they could agree to the MASAKI Cabinet if they were asked about it, since they were so favorable to him. In regards assault upon Count SAIONJI, I did state that he must agree to it if he thought of the young men's mental attitude if KAMEKAWA made strong opposition to it.

- FORMER MEMBERS OF THE  
JAPANESE ARMY, IN THE U.S.A. INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
- P 389 KAMEKAWA admired Fusanosuke KUHARA, one of the celebrated men, and insisted that we must recommend him as a candidate for a ministry in the next new cabinet. However, I scoffed at his idea and told him that I did not care for KUHARA.
- P 389 B The situation was such that the young officers were insisting on direct action to clear the court of corrupt elements and it's present condition made us unable to suppress them. Therefore, I had a talk with KAMEKAWA about the situation on or about Feb 20. I stated that we should assist these young officers from the outer circles to realize their ideals. We must take efforts to organize the new cabinet as quickly as possible in order to control the situation. I also discussed with KAMEKAWA that General YANAGAWA, Governor-General of TAIWAN (TA Formosa) is a suitable man for the head of the new cabinet, but that at present, his post is far too distant from the mainland and therefore cannot be reached for the new post of prime minister in time to meet the emergency. Therefore we should ask General MASAKI instead of General YANAGAWA to be in control after the uprising of the young officers.
- P 406 Details of the interview with KAMEKAWA, 27th February. Early morning of the 27th February, I phoned KAMEKAWA as I wanted to know of ~~situation~~ about his visit with General MASAKI on the previous date /TH Feb. 26th, the circumstances about UZAWA who had returned from OKITSU (TH-where Prince SAIGONJI was living); UZAWA is familiarly acquainted with the Prince and also to let him know about the information I had received since the previous day. I wished to discuss these things with him and to plan future events. However since phone connections were bad, I asked him to my house. In the course of conversation KAMEKAWA stated Gen MASAKI was very much confused.
- P 407 UZAWA called on Prince SAIGONJI and related the entire situation but said that SAIGONJI did not express his opinions. I also met Colonel HASHIMOTO, Colonel ISHIHARA, and Lt Col MITSUI at the Imperial Hotel and discussed the succeeding cabinet with them. Col ISHIHARA stressed that Prince HIROASHI-KUNI be the head of the incoming cabinet and organize a "KOZOKU" /TH Imperial Family/Cabinet. Col HASHIMOTO stressed that Lt Gen TATEKAWA be the head of the new cabinet, while Lt Col MITSUI stressed that we place Fusanosuke KUHARA into a powerful post at the present.
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Capt SUGANAMI, Saburo

~~1st Lt YAMAMOTO, Steve~~

**2.26 Incident** in Tokyo, trusting to justice. To achieve unity with  
**Judicial Record** ad. you must have a loyal mind and behave yourselves  
 fully, and then you must dedicate yourselves to accomplish anything.  
**Tokyo Military Court Marshal** orders with this spirit. If you consider  
 the commander's orders to be wrong, you may kill me. If you consider  
**No. 17 of 32 Volumes** follow me. Your commander will always lead you.

Our Reference No. 13 on the present political, economical, and educa-  
**Preliminary Examination** tionally from the standpoint of principles of  
**Subject Person** the Emperor and people.

(Page 1-34)

Capt. SUGANAMI, Saburo**Remarks (Summary)**

The defendant had been sympathizing with the information that an  
 insurgent army under the command of ex-Capt. HONAKA and others had arisen  
 in Tokyo to annihilate the JUSHIN (THE Ex-Premiers) and SAIBATSU (THE finan-  
 cial cliques). After the outbreak of the Incident, he felt discontent  
 against the trial which had been conducted by the Kagoshima Military Po-  
 lice Detachment and frequently requested the Detachment to abolish it.  
 Accidentally, when the night exercise of his company took place, he es-  
 pecially concentrated his troops during the street-fighting exercises  
 near the Kagoshima Prefectural Office and the Military Police Corps.

At about 8:30 P.M., he visited the Military Police Corps and re-  
 quested the Commander of the Corps, Capt HAYASHI, to absolutely abolish  
 the trial. After the night exercises were over, he addressed his soldiers  
 thus:

"The rising in arms at this time is aimed at the annihilation of the  
 JUSHINS (THE Ex-Premiers) who have been violating our national structure  
 and disturbing the prosperity of the nation, and also aimed at the occupa-  
 tion of the main sectors of the city.

"These men participated in the uprising with a grave concern in their  
 hearts for their country and did it with the confidence of loyalty to their  
 Emperor. I believe that their action closely corresponds to the loyalty  
 which was shown by Lt Col AIZAWA.

"Nevertheless, among the people, there are those who do not under-  
 stand the true spirit and speak anti-militaristic words and make mis-  
 chiefs to alienate the people from the Army. You should never be misguid-  
 ed by those public rumors.

"In conclusion, I stress the loyalty which was shown by our comrades

Capt SUGANAMI, Saburo

who have risen in Tokyo, trusting to justice. To achieve unity with the Emperor's mind, you must have a loyal mind and behave yourselves justly, and then you must dedicate yourselves to accomplish anything. Your commander will give you orders with this spirit. If you consider the commander's orders to be wrong, you may kill me. If you consider it correct, you must follow me. Your commander will always lead you."

P 292 His observation on the present political, economical, and educational situation, especially from the standpoint of principle of unity between the Emperor and people.

When we observe in detail the principle of unity between the Emperor and people, it must be the unity of the church and the state, that is "theocracy". Nevertheless, the present situation is not suited to this principle in many respects. For instance, when the "Emperor Organ Theory" was discussed in the Diet, War Minister General HAYASHI could not give an immediate answer for this grave problem. Premier OKADA answered for the first time, "I have no objections against that theory." The following instance he stated, "It is wrong," until at last he was discovered as having an inconvincing reply and was required to issue his statement again by the military authority. For a responsible state minister who assists the Imperial polity of theocracy, I felt his ideals to be wrong. Again I wondered why War Minister HAYASHI did not give immediate answer to the "Emperor Organ Theory" in the traditional spirit of the Imperial Army. Observing these circumstances, I could not help but feel that they were far from the national spirit throughout the army as well as outside the army. Capts NONAKA, KODA, ANDO, KONO; Lts KURIHARA, SAKANOTO, NIFU, TSUSHIMA, and ANDO were the only persons I knew who were related to the 2.26 Incident. The extent of my relationship with Maj Gen HIRANO was slight.

Testimony of HIRANO, Sukakuro, Maj Gen.

Age 53 years.

HOYO Fortress Commander.

- P 339 Q. Have you ever met Lt Col IKARI?  
A. Yes, I have met him at my official residence. At that time we had talked about the clarification of the national structure. I do not know his present whereabouts.
- Q. Lt Col IKARI sent a telegram to Inspector General WATANABE to resign his post. Have you any connection with it?  
A. I have had no connection with it, but I talked with him about WATANABE's address in NAGOYA which has been widely reported.
- P 343 Q. For what reasons did you write letters to Capt SUGANAMI?  
A. Simply because we have the same loyal spirit towards the Emperor.

Capt SUGANAMI, Saburo

Although we have written several letters to Capt SUGANAMI, I have not received a single reply.

- Q. Have you sent telegrams to General MASAKI?
- A. Yes, once. The contents read; "If I can sacrifice my life to prevent the troops from incurring the name of a 'rebel' I wish to dedicate myself to it."

P 346 "The meaning of SHOWA Revolution must mean that it must be brought about by the Emperor and not by us."

P 347-B I know Lt Col MITSUI very well.

P 401 Data for Observing Captain SUGANAMI.

1. Remarks (Summary). Presented by Col HAGATA, Masaku, Commander of 3rd Inf. Reg't.

Capt SUGANAMI was indignant about the present putrefactions and degeneration of our social conditions, and felt that the remedy and reformation for these circumstances should not be neglected even for a moment. The main power for the guidance of reformation depended chiefly on military power, especially in young officers who must be the leaders for this movement and take the initiative to accomplish the Showa Restoration. Since then, Capt SUGANAMI conducted himself under that belief, and step by step, his opinions expanded among young officers. Observing the result, his confidence had become more and more stable.

The axis of this Captain's ideas is very pure and does not contain a bit of impure desires for publicity or distinction.

2. His Recent actions.

#### 5.15 Incident.

On that day, he heard of the outbreak of the Incident by telephone at 8:00 p.m. and since he anticipated the enforcement of martial law, he suddenly put on his uniform and rushed to his regiment. I suggested that instead of leaving his Regiment, he should wait for orders.

Nevertheless, considering the fact that his comrade, NISHIDA Chikara, was bedridden because of a heavy wound, he left his Regiment without permission and visited NISHIDA at the hospital. By mere coincidence, 4 or 5 comrade officers were also there, and therefore, he joined them to visit the War Minister at his official residence. However, as the War Minister was absent, they met Vice War Minister MAZAKI and expressed their opinions with Major General HAGATA, Col YAMASHITA, Major General KOHATA as follows:

Capt SUGANAMI, Saburo

Capt SUGANAMI, Saburo

a. The officers who had participated in this Incident had not done it by instigation, but by their own opinions.

b. They had no relationship with others in the execution of this Incident. Therefore, they did not violate the command of the Army.

That night, they were admonished by the Division Commander for one hour.

A testimony by Capt SUGANAMI of his activities in Manchukuo.

Page

492 to (Summary)

494B

In the beginning, after the Manchurian Incident, such associations as the DAI-YU-HO KAI and the Young Men's Association were organized in Manchuria. However, I observed that these organizations had apparently reached their limits, and I guessed the reason for this was that they had no guiding principles. Owing to my experiences, I reached the conclusion that there must necessarily be an influential Japanese idealistic group to lead a nation of 30,000,000 Manchurians. I guess Col ISHIWARA was of the same opinion.

However, as the "KYOMA-KAI" (YM: Society of Cooperation (Y)) at that time had no substantial value to accomplish this duty, I was convinced that we must organize a new thought association and administrate Manchuria as well as Mongolia in cooperation with the army and the nation. In 1933 we commenced to organize a thought group which would absolutely support the military authority under its steady leading spirit, and thus resulted in the establishment of the "Manchurian Young Comrades Association". The first activities of this organization was at the time of the reorganization of the South Manchurian Railway Co., Ltd. There arose an extreme anti-militaristic movement within the South Manchurian Railway against its reorganization. At the time, as I was serving in the "Hsing-king Safety Precaution Detachment," I expressed my opinion to Col SAKANOTO, a superior staff officer of the Kwantung Military Police, that "as I have the confidence to oppress the anti-militaristic movements in the S.M. Ry. from its interior, I request you to send me to Dairen to meet the staff officers of S.M. Ry. there." The Col agreed. However he said "I can't send you by order, you may go in the capacity of a civilian." Thus I proceeded to Dairen. Since then, by incessant mobilization of the Manchurian Young Comrades Association, we disturbed the core of the anti-militaristic movement in the S.M. Ry. and turned the Young Men's Association of the S.M. Ry. (Organized by the intellectual members of the company) to support the military.

Summarized procedures concerning the reorganization movement for the country.

P 519- From 1925 to 1931, I had been trying to explain my thoughts and opinions  
525 to our comrades whenever I was able to find the opportunity, and at



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the same time endeavoring to secure followers. However my transfer to the 3rd Infantry Regiment took place immediately after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident and at that time the military was also vigorously propagandizing the Manchurian problem and were giving sound arguments to the people on this problem. Correspondingly, our young officers had been planning to accomplish the national revolution based on international relationship. Therefore I began to have connections with field officers of the General Staff and ultimately became related with the October Incident. Prior to this incident, I had consulted Lt Commander FUJII and sounded out the SAKURA KAI (TK - Cherry Blossom Society) which was organized mainly by the staffs of the military authority. Thus it resulted in my learning of the plot of the so-called October Incident. When I had sounded out the contents of the SAKURA KAI, their plan was to excite the coup d'etat and afterwards request the Emperor to grant an Imperial Rescript, thus accomplishing the Showa Revolution. Moreover the plan of the Imperial Rescript was already prepared.

Soon Gen ARAKI was appointed War Minister, and to accomplish the Showa Revolution by supporting him, we had been expressing our opinions to him. Within a short time, the 5.15 Incident occurred, but I had no relations with it. Then in July of that year, I began to establish the movement to relieve the farmers in the North-Eastern district and distributed pamphlets to all the officers throughout Japan. The aim was to relieve the poor families of soldiers, who were born and bred in farm villages of the North-Eastern District, and thus free them from family cares, thereby making them truly strong soldiers. Contrary to my expectations, I was punished by the military authorities and transferred to Manchuria.

In November of 1934, our comrades MURAHARA, ISONE, and others were imprisoned in connection with the crime of rebelling and plotting and after the circumstances were disclosed, I felt the need of enforcing pure military discipline. At the same time, as the incident of Lt Col AIZAWA had broken out, I was determined to proceed with the national revolution by enforcing pure military discipline through the trial of Lt Col AIZAWA.

P 535-  
536 On February 29th, when the Imperial order was given to take repressive measures against the insurgent troops, I read the newspaper extras reporting that neither troops had not yet fought each other. At noon when the staff officers had gathered for a meeting I expressed my opinion that the Imperial Army should never fight their friends and, on the other hand, to request Prince HIGASHIKUNI to settle the situation.

P 549 By enforcement of pure military discipline as the Restoration, it

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means the dismissal of the leaders who were connected with the March and the October Incidents, from their posts, namely, Gen UGAKI, Lt Gen KOISO, Lt Gen TATEGAWA, Col HASHIMOTO, Lt Col TANAKA, and others. Simultaneously, it means the control of thought based on the principle of the constitution.

P 550 Q. "Can you accomplish the national reorganization in the manner indicated by the book, "The General Plan for the Reorganization of Japan," written by KITA Ikki, by enforcing pure military discipline?"

A. "To realize the restoration by the enforcement of pure military discipline is equal to the embodiment of the guiding principles of national structure. By the accomplishment of the former, there will naturally arise the policy which will embody the guiding principles of the national structure."

The War Minister should carry on this policy to the cabinet meeting and if it is not adopted, he can repeatedly demand Cabinet sessions. In my opinion, since the book "The General Plan for the Reorganization of Japan" excluding minor details, embodies the principles of our national structure, we can accomplish the national reorganization similar to it.

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(Extracts)

At the time, I had heard of the November Incident from ISOBE. From a new source of intelligence, it was reported that there existed a confederacy between the controlling members of the army and officials and they were reported to be holding "ASAMESHI KAI" (Breakfast meetings). Lt Gen NAGATA (TN: head of the Bureau of Military Affairs) is reported to have close relationship with IZAWA Takio and KARASAWA (TN Director of Police Bureau). There especially existed a secret understanding between NAGATA and KARASAWA and they had oppressed the revolutionary movements of young military officers as well as the Right Wing Party in Manchuria. Considering these circumstances, particular caution is necessary since the visit to Manchuria by War Minister HAYASHI and Lt Gen NAGATA is most likely aimed at the oppression of the revolutionary movements of young officers in Manchuria.

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Q. "Did the plot actually exist at that time?" (TN Sept 1933).

A. "It is evident that there existed a plot of coup d'etat among the staff officers in Tokyo. I asked OGISHI for the actual facts of this coup d'etat plot when I was going to Tokyo last year and he explained it as follows: 'Actually the plot existed but it was checked by Col SUZUKI Sotsudo who was the Chief of the Operation Department in the Military Staff Office at that time.' As I was still in doubt about it, he showed his cipher code book

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to me and pointed out that my name "SUGANAMI" was prescribed in the name of "SUMIRE" (TW a violet) and required particular caution. I did not realize the existence of the plot until I heard these facts."

Q. "Have you ever been called by Prince CHICHIBU when you were in MANCHURIA."

A. "In May or June of 1934, when Prince CHICHIBU, as the representative of His Majesty, the Emperor, called on the Emperor of Manchuria, the weather was bad on the day of his departure from Hsingking, so that he altered his schedule for that day, and ordered the staff of the Kwantung Army to invite me to his presence. Since I was presented this golden opportunity, I intended to report my impressions of Manchuria and wrote in haste an essay, "The Fundamental Observation of Manchuria." When I presented the essay to Prince CHICHIBU at this occasion, he asked me many questions. After an hour, I withdrew from his presence."

(TW: In this volume, there is an essay covering the plans for the national mobilization to accomplish the Showa Revolution. The following is its essential outline.)

(P 771 to 782) Summary. The General Gist of the Plan for the National Mobilization to Accomplish the Showa Revolution. (1932) by The Showa Restoration Acceleration Alliance.

Note: This plan was the motto of the Imperialistic clique in the army and was used as the fundamental plan of the 2.26 Incident. This essay was secured by a certain ex-Ambassador. (TW. The name of the author is not given.)

#### Introduction:

In the present world, all of mankind has been falling into the bottom of distress. The mission of alleviating this distress into a glorious future for mankind should be carried on Japan's shoulders. However, whether Japan has the ability to accomplish this mission or not, the answer is quite evident -- no, she can not, because she is concerned with internal as well as external anxiety. Therefore to clarify and exploit her own model administration, Japan must take the initiative to execute a complete national revolution under this guiding principle, and she must declare and expand it to the world. Namely, in the future, Japan must revolutionize the whole organization of the capitalistic, communistic, and dictatorial nations which are either going to extremes or being misguided, and thereby set free subjugated mankind who had hitherto been bound by an oppressive chain, and assist in their gaining independence.

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CHAPTER I. General Rules.

Overthrow the movements toward dictatorship of the Asiatic Fascists and Communists, and convert them to support the Imperial Administration; and thus accomplish the revolution of Japan.

CHAPTER II. The Object of the Revolution.

To accomplish the complete reconstruction of the policies for economics, society, thoughts, education, diplomacy, politics, national defense, etc., based on the principles of National Structure.

CHAPTER III. Preparatory Operation.

1. Call public opinion to national defense or national mobilization through the problems of Manchuria, Mongolia, and in armament.

a. Administrate Manchuria and Mongolia in cooperation with military authorities and civilians.

b. Concentrate everything in the Emperor.

c. Concentrate everything in National Mobilization.

2. Expand the military occupation areas in Manchuria and Mongolia and renovate the management of these areas.

a. Dispose of the excess population in Japan and Korea by placing the mass emigration of farmers, workers, and merchants under government control.

b. Obtain the raw materials for the National Mobilization.

3. Place the Army and the Navy into the proper attitude in preparation for the enforcement of martial law.

CHAPTER IV. The Beginning of the Revolution.

1. Take the opportunity to kill the individuals whose existence is not justified.

2. The issuance of an Imperial Command.

CHAPTER V. The Early Stages of the Revolution.

1. Annihilate all political parties by the issuance of the Imperial Command.

2. Annihilate all the organs of public opinion by the issuance of the Imperial Command.

- (1) The Foreign Ministry
- (2) The Finance Ministry
- (3) The Overseas Ministry